IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL EVAN KEELING : Civil No. 4:09-CV-0147

:

 Plaintiff, :

:

v. : (Chief Judge Kane)

:

PETE DAMITER, et al., : (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

:

 Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. Statement of Facts and of the Case.

This is a civil rights action brought by Michael Keeling, a state inmate, who is

proceeding pro se. In his complaint, Keeling has named ten prison officials as

Defendants, alleging that these staff violated his constitutional rights in the course of

two separate acts of retaliation at two different institutions. (Doc. 33.) In addition,

Keeling also complains about a series of prison housing decisions, decisions which

he alleges were made in retaliation against him for prior litigation which he pursued

against the Department of Corrections. 

This matter now comes before the Court on a motion to compel (Doc. 87) filed

by Keeling, which requests records relating to the disposition of every inmate

grievance filed by prisonersin the state prison systemfrom2005 through 2010. While

the basis for this request is not entirely clear, it seems that Keeling is attempting to

Case 4:09-cv-00147-YK Document 109 Filed 07/14/10 Page 1 of 8
secure this wholesale discovery in order to bolster some sort of claim regarding

alleged biases within the grievance system in the Department of Corrections. This

motion has been fully briefed by the parties, (Docs. 90 and 100) and is now ripe for

resolution.

For the reasons set forth below, the motion to compel will be denied.

II. Discussion

Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines both the scope

and limitations governing the use of discovery in a federal civil action:

(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope

of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any

nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense –

including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and

location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and

location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good

cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the

subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be

admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead

to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the

limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)( C ).

In addition as the Supreme Court has observed:

Rule 26 vests the trial judge with broad discretion to tailor discovery

narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery. On its own motion,

the trial court “may alter the limits in [the Federal Rules] on the number

of depositions and interrogatories and may also limit the length of

depositions under Rule 30 and the number of requests under Rule 36.

The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods otherwise

2

Case 4:09-cv-00147-YK Document 109 Filed 07/14/10 Page 2 of 8
permitted under these rules ... shall be limited by the court if it

determines that ... (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery

outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case,

the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the

issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed

discovery in resolving the issues.” Rule 26(b)(2).

Additionally, upon motion the court may limit the time, place, and

manner of discovery, or even bar discovery altogether on certain

subjects, as required “to protect a party or person from annoyance,

embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Rule 26(c).

And the court may also set the timing and sequence of discovery. Rule

26(d).

Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598-599 (1998).

Thus, Keeling’s motion, and the Defendants’ response in opposition to this

motion, call upon the Court to exercise its authority under the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure to regulate discovery in this case. Issues relating to the scope of discovery

permitted under the Rules rest in the sound discretion of the Court, Wisniewski v.

Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987), and a court’s decisions

regarding the conduct of discovery will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse

of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983).

In this case, we find that Keeling’s request for disclosure of statistical data on

all inmate grievances throughout the state correctional system for a five year period

is not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and would impose

3

Case 4:09-cv-00147-YK Document 109 Filed 07/14/10 Page 3 of 8
an undue burden on state correctional officials. Therefore, the motion to compel

(Doc. 87) will be denied. 

At the outset, with respect to this motion, we find that this statistical

information is not relevant to the issues raised by Keeling in his lawsuit. The merits

of this lawsuit will rise or fall on the conduct of correctional staff with respect to

Keeling. Nothing in accumulated statistics concerning the disposition of wholly

unrelated grievances ofthousands of other inmates will animate orinform the parties’

understanding of the merits of Keeling’s specific complaints. Therefore, this

statistical information is not relevant to this lawsuit.

Further, we note that thisstatistical information would not, in our view, provide

any grounds for further, independent claims against the Defendants since inmates do

not have a constitutional right to a prison grievance system. See Jones, 433 U.S. at

137-138; Speight v. Sims, No. 08-2038, 283 Fed. Appx. 880, 2008 WL 2600723 at

*1 (3d. Cir. June 30, 2008) (citing Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir.

2001) (“[T]he existence of a prison grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on

a prisoner.”). Consequently, dissatisfaction with response to an inmate’s grievances

does not support a constitutional claim. See also Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 Fed.

Appx. 924 (3d Cir. 2005) (involvement in post-incident grievance process not a basis

for § 1983 liability); Pryor-El v. Kelly, 892 F. Supp. 261, 275 (D. D.C. 1995)

4

Case 4:09-cv-00147-YK Document 109 Filed 07/14/10 Page 4 of 8
(because prison grievance procedure does not confer any substantive constitutional

rights upon prison inmates, the prison officials’ failure to comply with grievance

procedure is not actionable). In sum, since “mere concurrence in a prison

administrative appeal process does not implicate a constitutional concern,” Cole v.

Sobina, No. 04-99J, 2007 WL 4460617, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2007), statistics

regarding how thousands of completely unrelated inmate grievances were resolved

by officials at other prisons throughout the Commonwealth would add nothing to the

constitutional claims advanced by Keeling in this case.

Moreover, while thisinformation is not relevant, we anticipate that compliance

with this request would be burdensome. These burdens are a function of the fact that

federal law creates powerful incentives for inmates to thoroughly exhaust these

administrative remedies. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a) providesthat “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

under . . . [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any

jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.”

Section 1997e’s exhaustion requirement applies to a wide-range of inmate

complaints, including damages complaints like those made here grounded in alleged

violations of the Eighth Amendment. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218 (3d. Cir.

5

Case 4:09-cv-00147-YK Document 109 Filed 07/14/10 Page 5 of 8
2004); Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2000). While this exhaustion

requirement is not a jurisdictional bar to litigation, this requirement is strictly

enforced by the courts. This rigorous enforcement is mandated by a fundamental

recognition that § 1997e’s exhaustion requirement promotes important public

policies. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted:

Courts have recognized myriad policy considerations in favor of

exhaustion requirements. They include (1) avoiding premature

interruption of the administrative process and giving the agency a

chance to discover and correct its own errors; (2) conserving scarce

judicial resources, since the complaining party may be successful in

vindicating his rights in the administrative process and the courts may

never have to intervene; and (3) improving the efficacy of the

administrative process. Each of these policies, which Congress seems to

have had in mind in enacting the PLRA, is advanced by the across-theboard, mandatory exhaustion requirement in § 1997e(a). ... [A] a

comprehensive exhaustion requirement better serves the policy of

granting an agency the “opportunity to correct its own mistakes with

respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into federal

court.” Moreover, “even if the complaining prisoner seeks only money

damages, the prisoner may be successful in having the [prison] halt the

infringing practice” or fashion some other remedy, such as returning

personal property, reforming personal property policies, firing an

abusive prison guard, or creating a better screening process for hiring

such guards. And when a prisoner obtains some measure of affirmative

relief, he may elect not to pursue his claim for damages. In either case,

local actors are given the chance to address local problems, and at the

very least, the time frame for the prisoner's damages is frozen or the

isolated acts of abuse are prevented fromrecurring. An across-the-board

exhaustion requirement also promotesjudicial efficiency. . . . Moreover,

even if only a small percentage of cases settle, the federal courts are

saved the time normally spent hearing such actions and multiple appeals

6

Case 4:09-cv-00147-YK Document 109 Filed 07/14/10 Page 6 of 8
thereto. . . . In casesin which inmate-plaintiffs exhaust their remedies in

the administrative process and continue to pursue their claims in federal

court, there is still much to be gained. The administrative process can

serve to create a record for subsequent proceedings, it can be used to

help focus and clarify poorly pled or confusing claims, and it forces the

prison to justify or explain its internal procedures. All of these functions

help courts navigate the sea of prisoner litigation in a manner that

affords a fair hearing to all claims.

Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 75 -76 (3d Cir. 2000)(citations omitted)

Because of the important policies fostered by this exhaustion requirement, it

has been held that there is no futility exception to § 1997e’s exhaustion requirement.

Id. Instead, courts have typically required across-the-board administrative exhaustion

by inmate plaintiffs who seek to pursue claims in federal court. Moreover, courts have

also imposed a procedural default component on this exhaustion requirement, holding

that inmates must fully satisfy the administrative requirements of the inmate

grievance process before proceeding into federal court. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218

(3d Cir. 2004). Applying this procedural default standard to § 1997e’s exhaustion

requirement, courts have concluded that inmates who fail to fully complete the prison

grievance process are barred fromsubsequently litigating claims in federal court. See,

e.g., Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2000); Bolla v. Strickland, 304 F.

App’x. 22 (3d Cir. 2008); Jetter v. Beard, 183 F. App’x 178 (3d Cir. 2006).

Because the PLRA broadly mandates exhaustion of internal prison

7

Case 4:09-cv-00147-YK Document 109 Filed 07/14/10 Page 7 of 8
administrative grievance processes, the burdens of complying with wide-ranging

discoverydemandsfor statistical information on inmate grievance processing are now

substantial. Indeed in light of this strong statutory preference favoring inmate

submission of grievances to prison officials, it can be anticipated that many

complaints of questionable merit will have been tendered to corrections officials over

the years. This simple fact, which is a consequence of the law’s strong preference for

the presentation of inmate grievancesto prison officials, has a dualsignificance. This

fact both diminishes the probative value of statistics concerning the resolution of

these grievances, while heightening the burden of collecting this statistical data.

Given the significance of these discovery burdens, and the fact that the information

derived fromthis burdensome disclosure would not likely be relevant to the particular

issues raised in Keeling’s case, and would not be calculated to lead to the discovery

of relevant evidence, the proper exercise of our discretion here callsfor denial of this

motion.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s

motion to compel, (Doc. 87), is DENIED.

S/Martin C. Carlson 

United States Magistrate Judge

DATED: July 14, 2010

8

Case 4:09-cv-00147-YK Document 109 Filed 07/14/10 Page 8 of 8