IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ATRON CASTLEBERRY :

1011 Debusk Street :

Jacksonville, TX 75766 : No. 4:15-CV-00153

:

 and :

:

JOHN BROWN :

158 County Road 2432 :

Alto, TX 75925 :

:

Plaintiffs, : (Judge Brann)

:

v. :

:

STI GROUP :

204 Wilson Industrial Drive :

Towanda, PA 18848 :

:

and :

:

CHESAPEAKE ENERGY :

CORPORATION :

1 Fox Chase Drive :

Towanda, PA 18848 :

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

June 22, 2016 

I. BACKGROUND

This matter involves two Plaintiffs who have previously been directed by

this Court to file a second amended complaint to remedy the deficiencies in their

Case 4:15-cv-00153-MWB Document 39 Filed 06/22/16 Page 1 of 20
first amended complaint. Plaintiffs have added some relatively insignificant details

to the factual averments they allege, but not sufficient substantive facts to support

their claims. Accordingly, I will dismiss the action in its entirety pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 15 for the reasons set forth below. 

On January 22, 2015, Plaintiffs, Atron Castleberry and John Brown1

,

brought a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Defendants STI Group

and Chesapeake Energy Corporation2

. Castleberry and Brown brought claims of

Harassment (Count I), Discrimination (Count II), and Retaliation (Count III)

against Defendants.

Castleberry and Brown filed an amended complaint on June 1, 2015, and

both Defendants filed motions to dismiss the first amended complaint. On

November 4, 2015, I granted the motions with leave for Plaintiffs to amend the

complaint.3

 Plaintiffs then filed a second amended complaint, with the same three

causes of action against Defendants. On December 2, 2015, Defendants filed the

instant motions to dismiss the amended complaint.4

 The motions have been fully

1

Hereinafter “Castleberry” and “Brown” 

2

Hereinafter “STI” and “Chesapeake” 

3

ECF No. 29. 

4

ECF Nos. 32 and 33. 

2

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briefed5

 and are now ripe for disposition. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Motion to Dismiss Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may file a

motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."

Such a motion "tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading" and "streamlines litigation

by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding."6

 "Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes

a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law."7

 This is true

of any claim, "without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory

or on a close but ultimately unavailing one."8

Beginning in 2007, the Supreme Court of the United States initiated what

some scholars have termed the Roberts Court's "civil procedure revival" by

significantly tightening the standard that district courts must apply to 12(b)(6)

5

Defendant STI should be aware that there are typos throughout its brief in support of its

motion, ECF No. 34. Each citation is in duplicate with some version of “{TA /s}” before the

duplicate citation. I politely point this out to Defendant, as the typos were distracting, and while

the undersigned can look past this, other courts may not. 

6

In re Hydrogen Peroxide Litigation, 552 F.3d 305, 316 n.15 (3d Cir. 2008) (Scirica,

C.J.) (quoting Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001)

(Easterbrook, J.)). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1989).

7

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326 (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69, 73 (1984)).

8

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

3

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motions.9

 In two landmark decisions, Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly and

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Roberts Court "changed . . . the pleading landscape" by

"signal[ing] to lower-court judges that the stricter approach some had been taking

was appropriate under the Federal Rules."10 More specifically, the Court in these

two decisions "retired" the lenient "no-set-of-facts test" set forth in Conley v.

Gibson and replaced it with a more exacting "plausibility" standard.11

Accordingly, after Twombly and Iqbal, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.'"12 "A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."13 "Although the

plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a

pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

9

Howard M. Wasserman, THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIVAL, 31

Rev. Litig. 313 (2012).

10550 U.S. 544 (2007); 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), Wasserman, supra at 319-20.

11Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 670 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)) ("[a]cknowledging

that Twombly retired the Conley no-set-of-facts test").

12Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

13Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

4

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unlawfully."14 Moreover, "[a]sking for plausible grounds . . . calls for enough facts

to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of

[wrongdoing]."15

The plausibility determination is "a context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."16 No

matter the context, however, "[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely

consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility

and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'"17

When disposing of a motion to dismiss, a court must "accept as true all

factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences from the facts alleged

in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff]."18 However, "the tenet that a court

must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable

to legal conclusions."19 "After Iqbal, it is clear that conclusory or 'bare-bones'

14Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., No. 14-3792, 2016 WL 106159, at *3 (3d Cir. Jan. 11,

2016) (Jordan, J.) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

15Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

16Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

17Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotations

omitted)).

18Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008) (Nygaard, J.).

19Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations omitted).

5

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allegations will no longer survive a motion to dismiss."20 "Threadbare recitals of

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice."21 

As a matter of procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit has instructed that:

Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court

reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps. First, it

must tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a

claim. Second, it should identify allegations that, because they are no

more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.

Finally, [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly

give rise to an entitlement to relief.22

With the standard of review in mind, I turn to the factual allegations of

Plaintiffs. 

B. Facts Alleged in the Second Amended Complaint

The procedural dictate when faced with a motion to dismiss is that the court

is to accept the facts alleged as true. "Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance ...

dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations."23 

20Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (Nygaard, J.).

21Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

22Connelly, 2016 WL 106159, at *4 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

23Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).

6

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However, courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation."24 That said, the following are the facts alleged in the second

amended complaint.25 

Castleberry and Brown are both African-American males hired by STI in

March 2010.26 STI is a subcontractor/placement staffing agency for Chesapeake. 

Plaintiffs were assigned to work27 for a crew in Towanda, Pennsylvania under

Defendant STI’s superintendent Glenn Wyatt.28 Plaintiffs reported to

Superintendent Wyatt and to Jim Bender,29 STI’s project manager.30 Plaintiffs’

24Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986).

25Because the matter is proceeding on a second amended complaint, ECF No. 31, I will

footnote the factual averments that are new/different from those in the now dismissed amended

complaint. Minor changes, such as adding the words “while working at the Towanda,

Pennsylvania,” location, in paragraph 19, will not be noted. Only material, substantive changes

are noted. 

26In my November 4, 2015 Memorandum Opinion, I held that the matter can proceed on

the joint employer doctrine. 

27 Plaintiffs do not explain the nature of the work they were hired to do. Fom what I can

glean from the briefs, Plaintiffs believe that they were hired to work on pipelines; in what

fashion, however, the papers do not make clear.

28Hereinafter “Superintendent Wyatt.” Plaintiffs did not state Superintendent Wyatt’s

race. 

29Hereinafter “Project Manager Bender.” Plaintiffs did not state Project Manager

Bender’s race. 

30This is a new factual averment. 

7

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work was also overseen by Chesapeake’s Head of Safety, Tammy Bennett.31

Plaintiffs aver that Head of Safety Bennett had authority to fire Plaintiffs, or

influence the decision to fire Plaintiffs.32 Head of Safety Bennett’s supervisor was

Chesapeake’s Director of Safety, Shad MacNaughton.33

At the time that the Plaintiffs were hired, there was only one other AfricanAmerican employee at the Towanda location.34 Shortly thereafter, this other

African-American employee was “fired,” leaving Plaintiffs as the sole AfricanAmerican employees at the work site in Towanda.35

Plaintiffs aver the following facts36 as evidence of harassment and

discrimination: 

¶ 31. [E]ach morning the laborers would have to sign-in.37

31Hereinafter “Head of Safety Bennett.” Plaintiffs did not state Head of Safety Bennett’s

race. 

32This is a new factual averment. 

33Hereinafter “Director of Safety MacNaughton.” Plaintiffs did not state Director of

Safety MacNaughton’s race. 

34This is a new factual averment. 

35This is a new factual averment. 

36Pursuant to the Third Circuit’s directive, I have “identif[ied] allegations that, because

they are no more than[legal] conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and have

not refer to them as ‘facts.’ See Connelly, 2016 WL 106159, at *4. 

37This is a new factual averment. 

8

Case 4:15-cv-00153-MWB Document 39 Filed 06/22/16 Page 8 of 20
¶ 32. On multiple occasions, someone had written “don’t be black on

the right of way” on the sign in sheet.38 

¶ 34. Plaintiffs’ supervisors would have been aware of the

discriminatory comments on the sign-in sheets since they

retained these documents.39 

¶ 35. By way of further example, despite coming to the Towanda

location with substantial experience working on pipelines,

Superintendent Wyatt and Project Manager Bender would

refuse to permit Plaintiffs, the only African Americans at the

Towanda location, to work directly on the pipeline, but would

only permit Plaintiffs to clean around the pipeline.40

¶ 37. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiffs worked on a worksite of

Defendant Chesapeake that was adjacent to property owned by

Head of Safety Bennett. 

¶ 38. During said time, Defendant Chesapeake was running a

pipeline through Head of Safety Bennett’s property. 

38This is a new factual averment. 

39This is a new factual averment. 

40This is a new factual averment. 

9

Case 4:15-cv-00153-MWB Document 39 Filed 06/22/16 Page 9 of 20
¶ 39. On or about November 30, 2012, as part of Plaintiffs’ and their

co-workers’ employment duties, Plaintiffs and their co-workers

were required to remove a fence on Head of Safety Bennett’s

property, in order to allow Defendant Chesapeake to run the

pipeline. 

¶ 40. As Plaintiffs and their co-workers were in the process of

removing the fence, Head of Safety Bennett approached them

and stated that they “nigger-rigged” the fence. 

¶ 41. Head of Safety Bennett then asked Plaintiff Castleberry whether

he was offended by her use of the racial slur. 

¶ 42. Plaintiff Castleberry responded that he was offended by Head

of Safety Bennet’s use of the racial slur. 

¶ 43. Head of Safety Bennett then told Plaintiff Castleberry that he

should learn how to “take a joke.” 

¶ 44. Demonstrating Head of Safety Bennett’s ability to fire

Plaintiffs, she also stated that if the cows got out due to the

fence, they would all be fired.41

Plaintiffs aver the following facts as evidence of retaliation: 

41This is a new factual averment. 

10

Case 4:15-cv-00153-MWB Document 39 Filed 06/22/16 Page 10 of 20
 ¶ 47. Plaintiff Castleberry called and reported Head of Safety

Bennet’s highly offensive use of the word ‘nigger’ to

Superintendent Wyatt. 

¶ 48. Plaintiff Brown also called and reported Head of Safety

Bennett’s highly offensive use of the word ‘nigger’ to

Superintendent Wyatt and Project Manager Bender. 

¶ 54. Within approximately two (2) weeks thereafter, Defendants

fired Plaintiffs. 

¶ 57. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs were rehired by Defendant STI and

Defendant Chesapeake; this was done by Project Manager

Bender and Superintendent Wyatt, as they recognized that

Plaintiffs should not have been fired in the first place. 

¶ 62. On January 25, 2013, Plaintiffs were again fired by Defendants,

stating “lack of work” as the reason behind the firing. 

I will discuss each count against Defendants in turn, bearing these factual

allegations in mind. 

C. Discussion 

1. Count I: Harassment in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981

In my November 4, 2015 Memorandum Opinion dismissing the first

11

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amended complaint with leave to amend, I explained my reasoning as to Count I as

follows. 

To establish a plausible claim for race-based harassment under Section

1981, Plaintiffs must allege facts that (1) they suffered intentional

discrimination because of race; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and

regular; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiffs; (4)

the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the

same race in that position; and (5) respondeat superior liability existed.

Ocasio v. Lehigh Valley Family Health Ctr., 92 F. App'x 876, 879 (3d

Cir. 2004) (citing Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074,

1081 (3d Cir. 1996)). (fn While Aman concerns a Title VII hostile work

environment claim, the Third Circuit has held that modifications in the

Civil Rights Act of 1991 embodied Congress’ intent that Section 1981

permits hostile work environment claims. Manatt v. Bank of Am., N.A.,

339 F.3d 792, 797(3d Cir. 2003). 

*****

Accepting as true all of the allegations contained within Plaintiffs’

Amended Complaint, the Court nonetheless finds that Castleberry and

Brown have failed to plead facts making plausible their claim of

harassment under Section 1981. In reaching this conclusion, the Court

notes the United States Supreme Court’s holdings in both Farragher v.

City of Boston and Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden. In Farragher, the

Supreme Court reiterated that whether an environment is sufficiently

hostile or abusive is determined by “ ‘looking at all the circumstances,’

including the ‘frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;

whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive

utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's

work performance.’ ” Farragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,

787-88 (U.S. 1998) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23

(U.S. 1993) (fn In a footnote to the Farragher opinion, the Court

recognized that Courts of Appeals have “in sexual harassment cases . .

. drawn on standards developed in cases involving racial harassment.”

The Court accepted this practice between sex and race-based claims,

12

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finding that “there is good sense in seeking generally to harmonize the

standards of what amounts to actionable harassment.” Farragher, 524

U.S. at 787 fn. 1. Similarly, in Clark County, the Supreme Court,

following Farragher, found that a single isolated incident of sexually

suggestive comment cannot be considered ‘ “extremely serious,” as our

cases require. Clark County Sch. Dist v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271

(U.S. 2001).

Based on these decisions, the Court finds that, even when viewed in the

light most favorable to Plantiffs, the factual averments within Plaintiffs’

Amended Complaint do not give rise to a plausible claim of harassment

under Section 1981. While the word “nigger” (fn In their brief opposing

Chesapeake Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs continually cite

Williams v. Mercy Health Sys., 866 F.Supp.2d 490 (E.D.Pa. 2012). This

opinion, however, concerns repeated use of the epithet “nigger” and not

a single use as alleged in the instant case.) is unquestionably an

unacceptable and hateful epithet, Castleberry and Brown allege a single

utterance by a Chesapeake Defendant employee. Given the holdings of

the Supreme Court, this single use of a racial epithet cannot by itself give

rise to a plausible harassment claim under Section 1981. Furthermore,

even consideration of Plaintiffs’ two additional allegations concerning

the sign-in sheet and Towanda job assignments fails to make plausible

an inference of “pervasive and regular” harassment required to be

actionable. Therefore, because a failure to plead pervasive and regular

discriminatory conduct is itself dispositive, the Court will not reach

whether Plaintiffs plead the existence of respondeat superior, and will

instead dismiss Plaintiffs’ Section 1981 harassment claim.42

In my November 4, 2015 Order I also explained that the harassment claim

under § 1981 would be dismissed because it did not aver sufficient facts to support

a claim, specifically as to the second element – that the discrimination was

42ECF No. 29 at 10-13. 

13

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pervasive and regular. In response, Plaintiffs added in the second amended

complaint the allegation that “don’t be black on the right of way” had been written

on the sign in sheet. However, this allegation had been asserted by Plaintiffs in

their briefs opposing the prior motion to dismiss, and I had addressed it in my prior

memorandum opinion. Accordingly, although Plaintiffs attempted to amend the

complaint by adding allegations, I had previously stated that the factual averments

regarding the sign in sheet were insufficient. 

Plaintiffs proffer three cases that they believe are analogous to the case at

bar. They believe that the “holding” of these three cases is that one or two uses of

the word “nigger” are sufficiently pervasive and regular. I respectfully disagree. 

First, in Williams v. Mercy Health Sys.,

43 Plaintiff Williams was an AfricanAmerican nurse working for Caucasian supervisors. In addition to the

circumstantial evidence of discrimination, such as giving a preferable work

schedule to Caucasian nurses, Plaintiff Williams’ supervisors called her a “coon”

on one occasion and a “nigger” on at least three occasions.44 

Second, in Rogers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co.,

45 Plaintiff Rogers’

43866 F. Supp 2d 490 (E.D. Pa. March 20, 2012). 

44Id. at 494. 

45 12 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1993). 

14

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supervisor directed the word “nigger” twice to Plaintiff Rogers and at least ten

times in front of Plaintiff Rogers’ colleagues. Additionally, Plaintiff Rogers’

supervisor said to him, “You black guys are two fucking dumb to be insurance

agents” and that “You must think you’re back in Arkansas chasing jackrabbits.”46

In addition to these epithets, Plaintiff Rogers’ supervisor’s supervisor advised that

they would not hire any more black insurance agents.47 

In the final case Plaintiffs cite to support their contentions, Griffin v.

Harrisburg Prop. Services,48 Plaintiff Griffin’s supervisor, a Caucasian man said to

Plaintiff Griffin, "You know why there are black people, because God left them in

the oven too long."49 The supervisor also said to Plaintiff Griffin, "The reason why

we have AIDS is because black men have sex with monkeys."50 The supervisor

next texted Plaintiff Griffin "Black babies were given wings by God. P.S. God

does this mean I'm an angel. God laughed and said no nigga is means you are a

bat."51 

46Id. at 671.

47Id. 

482009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109097 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (Rambo, J.) 

49Id. at *2-3. 

50Id. at *3.

51Id.

15

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All of the aforementioned cases evince a regular and pervasive harrassing

environment. As I delineated in my November 4, 2015 Memorandum Opinion,

given the guidance from the Supreme Court, the single use of a racial epithet

cannot by itself give rise to a plausible harassment claim under Section 1981. Such

a claim cannot be premised on the fact that some unknown person wrote on the

sign in sheet, “don’t be black on the right of way.” This notation may or may not

be a racially discriminatory statement. Even taking this notation in combination

with Head of Safety Bennett’s poor choice of words in describing her fence as

“nigger-rigged,” a pervasive and regularly racially harassing environment is not

created. As Plaintiffs has added nothing new to their second amended complaint,

and the cases they cite do not present the holdings Plaintiffs suggest they do, this

claim is again dismissed. 

2. Count II: Discrimination in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981

In my November 4, 2015 Memorandum Opinion dismissing the first

amended complaint with leave to amend, I explained my reasoning regarding

Count II as follows. 

To establish a plausible claim for race-based discrimination under

Section 1981, Plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts that (1) their status

as a racial minority; (2) the intent of defendant to discriminate on the

basis of race; and (3) discrimination concerning one or more of the

activities enumerated in § 1981. Estate of Oliva ex rel. McHugh v. New

Jersey, 604 F.3d 788, 797 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pryor v. Nat’l

16

Case 4:15-cv-00153-MWB Document 39 Filed 06/22/16 Page 16 of 20
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 569 (3d Cir. 2002)).

In its Motion to Dismiss, Chesapeake Defendant argues that Castleberry

and Brown fail to allege facts supporting their allegation that race

influenced the decision to twice terminate them. Plaintiffs counter that

the facts alleged within their Amended Complaint make plausible the

Section 1981 discrimination claim. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the

following facts support the inference that termination by Chesapeake

Defendant was racially motivated: (1) Plaintiffs were told by

representatives of STI Group that they should leave and file a lawsuit

and that their complaints went “all the way to the top at Chesapeake; (2)

Plaintiffs were assigned to work away from the Towanda location; and

(3) no African Americans remained at the Towanda location after they

were reassigned.

Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court

finds that these allegations fail to state a plausible Section 1981

discrimination claim. First, the allegations concerning Plaintiffs’ reassignment from the Towanda location and the absence thereafter of any

African Americans at the site fail to support a logical inference that

discrimination played a role in Chesapeake’s decisions to terminate

Plaintiffs. The Court specifically notes that, absent additional factual

allegations, there may be perfectly neutral, nondiscriminatory reasons for

Plaintiffs’ job assignment. Second, Plaintiffs appear to intimate that they

were discharged because of their multiple complaints concerning Head

of Safety Bennett’s comments. These allegations, however, sound of

possible retaliatory conduct and not a race-based discrimination claim.

Plaintiffs also cite STI Group Defendant Doyle Arrant’s comments prior

to Plaintiff’s ultimate termination as support for their discrimination

claim. This allegation similarly speaks to possible retaliatory conduct

and not a discrimination claim.

Although termination would unquestionably be an adverse employment

action, Plaintiffs have failed to allege a factual basis from which

discriminatory animus can be inferred. Therefore, because of Plaintiffs’

17

Case 4:15-cv-00153-MWB Document 39 Filed 06/22/16 Page 17 of 20
scant factual averments, the Court will dismiss this claim.52

Plaintiffs have averred nothing new in their second amended complaint to

support this particular claim, and their arguments in their briefs are the same

arguments the undersigned previously rejected. Plaintiffs have failed to allege an

intent to discriminate sufficient to survive the pending Rule 12(b)(6) motions.

3. Count III: Retaliation in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981

In my November 4, 2015 Memorandum Opinion dismissing the first

amended complaint with leave to amend, I explained my reasoning as to the final

count as follows. 

To establish a plausible claim for retaliation, Castleberry and Brown

must allege sufficient facts that (1) they engaged in a protected activity;

(2) their employer took an adverse employment action against them; and

(3) there was a causal connection between their participation in the

protected activity and the adverse employment action. Estate of Oliva,

604 F.3d at 798 (citing Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331,

340–41 (3d Cir. 2006)). Chesapeake Defendant argues that Castleberry

and Brown’s Section 1981 retaliation claim should dismissed because (1)

Plantiffs did not have a reasonable belief that one comment by a

non-co-worker was unlawful, and (2) there was no causal connection

between Plaintiffs’ complaint and their discharge.

Viewing the allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ complaint in the light

most favorable to them, the Court finds that Plaintiffs did not have a

reasonable belief that one comment would be unlawful. The Court makes

this finding based upon the highly analogous Supreme Court case of

52ECF No. 29 at 13-15. 

18

Case 4:15-cv-00153-MWB Document 39 Filed 06/22/16 Page 18 of 20
Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden. In Clark County, the United States

Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation

claim by finding that “[n]o reasonable person could have believed that

the single incident recounted above violated Title VII's

standard.” Clark County, 532 U.S. at 271. Like plaintiff in Clark County,

the instant Plaintiffs complained to management about a single, isolated

incident that they believed to be discriminatory and thereafter based a

retaliation claim on their subsequent discharge. (fn While Plaintiffs

allege additional isolated incidents of “discrimination” in their Amended

Complaint, the Court notes that the factual averments of said Amended

Complaint do not indicate that Plaintiffs included these incidents in their

complaint to management. These additional incidents, therefore, do not

give weight toward the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ belief in unlawful

discrimination. Based on this factually analogous Supreme Court

holding, the Court finds that Plaintiffs, in reporting these comments to

Superintendent Wyatt, Project Manager Bender, and STI Defendant

Project Manager Hunter Pennick, did not have a reasonable belief that

one isolated incident would be unlawful. Plaintiffs’ Section 1981

retaliation claim will, therefore, be dismissed.53

Plaintiffs have again failed to allege anything new in their second amended

complaint to survive the renewed motions to dismiss; the second amended

complaint makes the same factual assertions that I previously found to be

insufficient. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Defendants Motions to Dismiss are

granted. An appropriate Order follows. 

53ECF No. 29 at 15-16. 

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BY THE COURT

s/ Matthew W. Brann 

Matthew W. Brann

United States District Judge 

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