U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

28–947 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

S. HRG. 115–278 

OPEN HEARING ON WORLDWIDE THREATS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2018 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman 

MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

ANGUS KING, Maine 

JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia 

KAMALA HARRIS, California 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio 

CHRIS JOYNER, Staff Director 

MICHAEL CASEY, Minority Staff Director 

KELSEY STROUD BAILEY, Chief Clerk 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

(III) 

CONTENTS 

FEBRUARY 13, 2018 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina ................ 1 

Mark R. Warner, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Virginia ......................... 3 

WITNESS 

Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence; Accompanied by: Michael 

Pompeo, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Admiral Michael Rogers, Director of the National Security Agency; Lieutenant General Robert 

Ashley, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Chris Wray, Director 

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Robert Cardillo, Director of 

the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency ..................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 

Responses of Daniel R. Coats to Questions for the Record .................................. 78 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

(1) 

OPEN HEARING ON WORLDWIDE THREATS 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2018 

U.S. SENATE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Present: Burr (presiding), Warner, Risch, Rubio, Collins, Blunt, 

Lankford, Cotton, Cornyn, Feinstein, Wyden, Heinrich, King, 

Manchin, Harris, and Reed. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA 

Chairman BURR. I’d like to call this hearing on worldwide 

threats to order, and I’d like to welcome our distinguished witnesses today: 

Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats; 

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Mike Pompeo; 

Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency General Robert Ashley; 

Director of the Federal Bureau of Investment Chris Wray; 

Director of the National Security Agency, Admiral Mike Rogers; 

And Director of the Geospatial Intelligence Agency Robert 

Cardillo. 

We’ve got a long day in front of us and I thank all of you for 

being here. I know how forward you look to this one occasion on 

an annual basis. Since 1995, this Committee has met in open 

forum to discuss the security threats facing the United States of 

America. This has never been, nor will it ever be, a comfortable 

conversation to have. 

The threats this country face are complex, evolving, and without 

easy answers. They exist in multiple domains. They’re asymmetrical and they’re conventional. They can be launched from across 

the ocean or be planned in the heart of our homeland. Nonetheless, 

this conversation serves a vital purpose and it’s essential that it 

takes place in the public square, with as much detail and candor 

as is possible. 

In my view, that is the true value and public service of this hearing. It provides the American people with insight that they just 

don’t normally get. Those insights are about the spectrum of 

threats we’re up against as a Nation. But, importantly, those insights are also about the work that the intelligence community 

does to push back on those threats. This is work that is both timeLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

2 

and labor-intensive. It can be frustrating, heartbreaking, and dangerous. It’s often thankless, but because of the tireless dedication 

and patriotism of men and women who make up our intelligence 

community, it gets done on behalf of the American people every 

single day. 

To this point, I encourage all the witnesses this morning to not 

only address the threats to our Nation, but to talk about what their 

organizations are doing to help secure this country and, to the degree they can in an unclassified setting. 

Director Coats, your testimony for the record ties together the expertise, capabilities, and wisdom of the entire intelligence community. I encourage everyone to familiarize themselves with its contents. It’s lengthy and it’s detailed, and it’s a testament to the 

broad range of talents our IC brings to the table. It’s also a compelling reminder of why this country invests so substantially in its intelligence apparatus. 

Director Pompeo, when we held this hearing last year I invited 

you to share your assessments of things on the Korean Peninsula. 

I’m going to ask you again for your insights on the state of North 

Korea’s nuclear and missile program and, importantly, what’s 

going on politically with North Korea’s leadership. Perhaps you can 

help us differentiate between a genuine effort to reconcile with 

South Korea and an opportunistic attempt to drive a wedge between Washington and Seoul. 

General Ashley, the work just never seems to end for our Defense Department. I would value your latest assessment of the battlefield situations in Syria and Afghanistan. Last week we had U.S. 

advisors and Kurdish allies come under fire in eastern Syria. This 

prompted a retaliatory strike that killed dozens of pro-regime 

forces. 

In Afghanistan, a string of terrorist attacks in Kabul left 150 

dead last month, suggesting to me that, after 16 years of war, the 

insurgency is nowhere near folding and the government remains 

hard-pressed to provide the security needed for its own people. I’d 

particularly value your unvarnished appraisal of where progress is 

being made in Afghanistan and where it’s not. 

Admiral Rogers, cyber is clearly the most challenging threat vector this country faces. It’s also one of the most concerning, given 

how many aspects of our daily lives in the United States can be 

disrupted by a well-planned, well-executed cyber-attack. I’d appreciate your assessment of how well we’re doing when it comes to 

protecting the Nation’s most critical computer networks. From the 

systems that guide our military to the networks that ensure the 

Nation’s energy supply, they are all essential to the functionality 

of a modern America, and I fear that they’re increasingly vulnerable to state and non-state actors. 

Director Wray, I’m keenly interested in hearing your assessment 

of the threat posed by the spread of foreign technology in the 

United States. This Committee has worked diligently to sound the 

alarm bells when it comes to the counterintelligence and information security risks that come prepackaged with the goods and services of certain overseas vendors. 

The focus of my concern today is China, and specifically Chinese 

telecom, like Huawei and ZTE, that are widely understood to have 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

3 

extraordinary ties to the Chinese government. I hope you’ll share 

your thoughts on this, and I also ask you to provide your insights 

into how foreign commercial investments and acquisitions are jeopardizing the Nation’s most sensitive technologies. 

Lastly, I’d like to spend a moment on the counterintelligence 

threat to our national academic, research, and laboratory construct. 

What’s the scale of the problem and what’s the FBI doing to fight 

it? 

Finally, Director Cardillo, we’ve come to associate NGA with the 

modernization of the intelligence community. The adversaries of 

this country are investing in innovating faster and with fewer constraints than we have. The threats we face are multidimensional, 

decentralized, and global. NGA has played an essential role in 

pushing the envelope with new ways of tackling problems, like having more data than you can feasibly analyze. 

As the IC edges closer to automation, machine learning, and 

eventually artificial intelligence, the computer learning and computer vision work at NGA will be a bridge to help us get there. I 

look forward to your thoughts on what’s next at NGA and how the 

intelligence community as a whole can make better use of innovation and technology to advance intelligence disciplines that have 

not changed much in the past 60 years. Our adversaries aren’t 

going to wait for us to catch up. 

I’ll close there because we have a lot to get to, but I want to 

thank you and, more importantly, I want to thank those who are 

not here with you, those who carry out the lion’s share of the work 

on behalf of the American people, the intelligence community. The 

folks you represent are important to this Committee. We can’t do 

our oversight without the work they perform. 

Before turning to the distinguished Vice Chairman, I’d like to 

highlight for my colleagues: We will reconvene at 2:30 this afternoon in a closed session to hear from the same witnesses in a classified setting. I would ask Members to please reserve anything that 

remotely gets into a classified question for the afternoon session. 

With that, Vice Chairman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me 

also welcome all of you here and echo the Chairman’s comments. 

Thank you all for your service and we hope you will convey back 

to all the brave men and women who work for you, that this Committee will always have your back. 

I think this open hearing comes at an extraordinarily important 

time. Our Nation’s intelligence agencies stand at the forefront of 

our defense against continuing threats from terrorist groups, extremist ideology, rogue regimes, nuclear proliferation, and regional 

instability. 

We all know—and we discussed this at length—in recent years 

we’ve also seen the rise of nations who view themselves at least as 

competitors, if not as adversaries, of the United States. They’ve 

begun to use, utilize, new asymmetric weapons to undercut our 

democratic institutions, to steal our most sensitive intellectual 

property. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

4 

Let me start with Russia. Obviously, certain questions remain 

with respect to the true extent of the Russian interference in the 

2016 elections, and we’ll continue to work through them in a bipartisan way on this Committee. However, I think you’ll find a broad 

bipartisan consensus on this Committee on a number of critical 

issues: 

First, that Russia engaged in a coordinated attack to undermine 

our democracy; 

Second, that effort included targeting of State and local elections, 

electoral activities, in 21 states; 

And third, the Russian effort, in a new area, utilized our social 

media platforms to push and spread misinformation at an unprecedented scale. 

Now, we’ve had more than a year to get our act together and address the threat posed by Russia and implement a strategy to deter 

further attacks. But I believe, unfortunately, we still don’t have a 

comprehensive plan. 

Two weeks ago, Director Pompeo publicly stated that he had 

every expectation that Russia will try to influence our upcoming 

elections. Secretary of State Tillerson just last week said that we’re 

already seeing Russian efforts to meddle in the 2018 elections. But 

I believe, in many ways, we’re no better prepared than we were in 

2016. Make no mistake, this threat did not begin in 2016, and it 

certainly didn’t end with the election. What we are seeing is a continuous assault by Russia to target and undermine our democratic 

institutions, and they’re going to keep coming at us. 

Despite all this, the President, inconveniently, continues to deny 

the threat posed by Russia. He didn’t increase sanctions on Russia 

when he had a chance to do so. He hasn’t even tweeted a single 

concern. 

This threat I believe demands a whole-of-government response, 

and that response needs to start with leadership at the top. 

At the same time, other threats to our institutions come from 

right here at home. There have been some, aided and abetted by 

Russian internet bots and trolls, who’ve attacked the basic integrity of the FBI and the Justice Department. This is a dangerous 

trend. This campaign of innuendo and misinformation should 

alarm all of us, regardless of our partisan affiliation. 

In addition to this ongoing threat from Russia, I’m concerned 

that China has developed an all-of-society, not just all-of-government, but all-of-society, approach to gain access to our sensitive 

technologies and intellectual property. I’m paying a great deal of 

attention to the rise of China’s tech sector. In particular, I’m worried about the close relationship between the Chinese government 

and Chinese technology firms, particularly in the area of commercialization of our surveillance technology and efforts to shape telecommunication equipment markets. 

I want to ensure that the IC is tracking the direction that China’s tech giants are heading, and especially the extent to which 

they are beholden to the Chinese government. In recent years 

we’ve seen major technology firms whose rise is attributed in part 

to their illicit access to U.S. technology and IP. These companies 

now represent some of the leading market players globally. Most 

Americans have not heard of all of these companies, but as they 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

5 

enter Western economic markets we want to ensure that they play 

by the rules. We need to make sure that this is not a new way for 

China to gain access to sensitive technology. 

There are a number of other concerns I hope to raise both in the 

hearing this morning and in the closed hearing this afternoon. Let 

me just briefly mention two. First, how is the IC poised to track 

foreign influence that relies on social media and misinformation? 

Just last week, the Chairman and I had a good management with 

our UK parliamentary colleagues investigating this issue. Russian 

trolls and bots continue to push divisive content both in the United 

States and against all our allies in Europe, not only the UK, but, 

as we talked before, France, Germany, Netherlands. We also heard 

recent indications of Russian activities in Mexico. The IC needs to 

stay on top of this issue and I am worried that we don’t have a 

clear line of assignment. 

Let me also raise another issue. I believe we need to do more to 

reform the broken security clearance system, which GAO recently 

placed on its list of high-risk government programs in need of reform. We’ve seen close to 700,000 folks now waiting in line, folks 

that need to serve our country, whether in government or in the 

private sector, who have been just waiting way too long to get their 

security clearances. It’s obviously hampering your recruitment and 

retention, and it’s costing us millions of dollars in inefficiency. 

Again, thank you to all of you for your service. Please convey our 

best wishes to the men and women who work with you, and I look 

forward to our hearing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Vice Chairman. 

I’m going to recognize Director Coats and he is the only one who 

will give official testimony. All members of the panel are open for 

questions. I will recognize our Members by order of seniority for up 

to five minutes. 

With that, Director Coats, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL R. COATS, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 

INTELLIGENCE; ACCOMPANIED BY: MICHAEL POMPEO, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; ADMIRAL MICHAEL ROGERS, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT ASHLEY, DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; CHRIS 

WRAY, DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; AND ROBERT CARDILLO, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

Director COATS. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I want to start by 

apologizing for my raspy voice. I’ve been fighting through some of 

the crud that’s going around, that several of us have endured. I 

may have to clear my throat a few times, which I apologize for. 

But it strikes me, listening to your opening remarks and the Vice 

Chairman’s opening remarks that we have continued to have a 

very interactive presence with this Committee. The issues that you 

and the Vice Chairman have raised and that others will raise are 

issues that we talk about continuously with you, and we want to 

continue to work with you carefully by both sides of the aisle here, 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

6 

as we go forward looking at what the intelligence community can 

provide for this Committee and the issues that we find in common. 

Vice Chairman Warner, Members of the Committee: We thank 

you for the opportunity to be with you here today. There have been 

some changes on the panel since we were here last year. This will 

be Admiral Rogers’ last visit before this Committee on the threat 

assessment issue. He deeply regrets not having to come before you 

in the future years, as he’s enjoyed this process so very much. 

Chairman BURR. We’re considering an emeritus status so that he 

can be annually invited back. 

[Laughter.] 

Director COATS. We have two new members, Director Wray and 

General Ashley, who have been looking forward to this day, I’m 

sure, with great anticipation. 

I say all that because what you are looking at here is a team, 

a team that works together in terms of how we provide the American people, Congress, and policymakers with the intelligence that 

they need. So it’s an honor for us to be here, and I think this team 

reflects the hard work of the intelligence community in their testimonies and their answers to questions today. 

Before I begin the sobering portion of my remarks, let me take 

a moment to acknowledge a positive development for the intelligence community and express our thanks to Members of this 

Committee for their support in the renewing of the authorities in 

the recent 702 authorization. This is, as we have told you, our most 

important legislative issue because it is our most important collection issue against foreign terrorists and threats to America, and we 

appreciate the work that the Committee has done and others have 

done, and particularly this team has done, in reaching that goal. 

As you will hear during these remarks, we face a complex, volatile, and challenging threat environment. The risk of inter-state 

conflict is higher than at any time since the end of the Cold War, 

all the more alarming because of the growing development and use 

of weapons of mass destruction by state and non-state actors. 

Our adversaries as well as other malign actors are using cyber 

and other instruments of power to shape societies and markets, 

international rules and institutions, and international hot spots to 

their advantage. We have entered a period that can best be described as a race for technological superiority against our adversaries, who seek to sow division in the United States and weaken 

U.S. leadership, and non-state actors, including terrorists and 

criminal groups, are exploiting weak state capacity in Africa, the 

Middle East, Asia, and Latin America, causing instability and violence both within states and among states. 

In the interest of saving time for your questions, I will not cover 

every topic in my opening remarks. I think that will be a relief to 

the Committee. We are submitting a written statement, however, 

for the record with additional details. 

Let me turn to global threats, and I’d like to start with the cyber 

threat, which is one of my greatest concerns and top priorities. 

Frankly, the United States is under attack, under attack by entities that are using cyber to penetrate virtually every major action 

that takes place in the United States. From U.S. businesses to the 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

7 

Federal Government to State and local governments, the United 

States is threatened by cyber-attacks every day. 

While Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea pose the greatest 

cyber threats, other nation-states, terrorist organizations, 

transnational criminal organizations, and ever more technically capable groups and individuals use cyber operations to achieve strategic and malign objectives. Some of these actors, including Russia, 

are likely to pursue even more aggressive cyber-attacks with the 

intent of degrading our democratic values and weakening our alliances. Persistent and disruptive cyber operations will continue 

against the United States and our European allies, using elections 

as opportunities to undermine democracy, sow discord, and undermine our values. 

Chinese cyber espionage and cyber-attack capabilities will continue to support China’s national security and economic priorities. 

Iran will try to penetrate U.S. and allied networks for espionage 

and lay the groundwork for future cyber-attacks. And North Korea 

will continue to use cyber operations to raise funds, launch attacks, 

and gather intelligence against the United States. Terrorists will 

use the internet to raise funds and promote their malign messages. 

Criminals will exploit cyber tools to finance their operations. 

My next topic for you is weapons of mass destruction, WMD. 

Overall, state efforts to modernize, develop, or acquire WMD, their 

delivery systems, or the underlying technologies constitute a major 

threat to the United States and to our allies. North Korea will be 

the most volatile and confrontational WMD threat in the coming 

year. In addition to its ballistic missile tests and growing number 

of nuclear warheads for these missiles, North Korea will continue 

its longstanding chemical and biological warfare programs. 

Russia will remain the most capable WMD power and is expanding its nuclear weapon capabilities. China will continue to expand 

its weapons of mass destruction options and diversify its nuclear 

arsenal. Iran’s implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 

Action, the JCPoA, has extended the time it would take to develop 

a nuclear weapon from several months to about a year, provided 

Iran continues to adhere to the deal’s major provisions. 

Pakistan is developing new types of nuclear weapons, including 

short-range tactical weapons. And state and non-state actors, including the Syrian regime and ISIS, the remnants of ISIS in Syria, 

continue to possess and, in some cases, have used chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq, and we continue to be concerned about some 

of these actors’ pursuit of biological weapons. 

Turning now to terrorism, the terrorism threat is pronounced 

and spans the sectarian spectrum from ISIS and Al-Qaeda to Lebanese Hezbollah and other affiliated terrorist organizations, as well 

as the state-sponsored activities of Iran. U.S.-based home-grown 

violent extremists, including inspired and self-radicalized individuals, represent the primary and most different to detect Sunni terrorism threat in the United States. 

ISIS’ claim to having a functioning caliphate that governs populations is all but thwarted. However, ISIS remains a threat and 

will likely focus on regrouping in request and Syria, particularly in 

ungoverned portions of those countries, enhancing its global presence, championing its cause, planning international attacks, and 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

8 

encouraging members and sympathizers to attack their home countries. 

Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda almost certainly will remain a major actor 

in global terrorism as it continues to prioritize a long-term approach and the organization remains intent on attacking the 

United States and U.S. interests abroad. 

Now, moving on, as if we don’t have enough threats here on 

Earth, we need to look to the heavens: threats in space. The global 

expansion of the space industry will extend space-enabled capabilities and situational awareness to nation-state and commercial 

space actors in the coming years. Russia and China will continue 

to expand to space-based reconnaissance, communications, and 

navigation systems in terms of numbers of satellites, breadth of capability, and applications for use. Both Russian and Chinese 

counter-space weapon will mature over the next few years, as each 

country pursues anti-satellite weapons as a means to reduce U.S. 

and allied military effectiveness and perceptions of U.S. military 

advantage in space. 

The final functional topic is transnational organized crime, which 

poses a growing threat to U.S. and allied interests. These criminal 

groups will supply the dominant share of illicit drugs, fueling 

record mortality rates among our population. They will continue to 

traffic in human life. They will deplete national resources and siphon money from governments and the global economy. 

I’d like to briefly go around the world on regional topics, starting 

with East Asia. You know, if you went out and hired a private 

plane and launched from Los Angeles and went around the world 

and stopped at every hot spot in this world, you would make multiple dozens of stops. That’s the kind of threat that we face. 

But let me start with East Asia. North Korea continues to pose 

an ever more increasing threat to the United States and its interests. Pyongyang has repeatedly stated that it does not intend to negotiate its nuclear weapons and missiles away, because the regime 

views nuclear weapons as critical to its security. Kim also probably 

sees nuclear ICBMs as leverage to achieve his long-term strategic 

ambition to end Seoul’s alliance with Washington and to eventually 

dominate the peninsula. 

In the wake of its ICBM tests last year, we expect to see North 

Korea press ahead with additional missile tests this year, and its 

foreign minister has threatened an atmospheric nuclear test over 

the Pacific. Pyongyang is committed to fielding a long-range nuclear-armored missile capable of posing a direct threat to the 

United States, and modest improvements in North Korea’s conventional capabilities will continue to pose an ever greater threat to 

South Korea, Japan, and U.S. targets in those countries. 

China will increasingly seek to expand its regional influence and 

shape even this and outcomes globally. It will take a firm stance 

on its claims to the East China Sea and South China Sea, its relations with Taiwan and its regional economic engagement. China 

also intends to use its ‘‘One Belt, One Road’’ initiative to increase 

its reach to geostrategic locations across Eurasia, Africa, and the 

Pacific. 

From East Asia we head to South Asia. In Afghanistan, Kabul 

continues to bear the brunt of the Taliban-led insurgency, as demLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

9 

onstrated by recent attacks in the city. Afghan National Security 

Forces face unsteady performance, but, with coalition support, 

probably will maintain control of most major population centers. 

Complicating the Afghanistan situation, however, is our assessment that Pakistan-based militant groups continue to take advantage of their safe havens to conduct attacks in India and Afghanistan, including U.S. interests therein. 

Pakistani military leaders continue to walk a delicate line. Ongoing Pakistani military operations against the Taliban and associated groups probably reflect the desire to appear more proactive 

and responsive to our requests for more actions against these 

groups. However, the actions taken thus far do not reflect a significant escalation of the pressure against these groups and are unlikely to have a lasting effect. 

In the last month, the Administration has designed—excuse 

me—designated eight militants affiliated with the Taliban, 

Haqqani Network, and other Pakistani militant groups, and we assess that Pakistan will maintain ties to these militants while restricting counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States. 

Next is Russia, where President Putin will continue to rely on assertive foreign policies to shape outcomes beyond Russia’s borders. 

Putin will resort to more authoritarian tactics to maintain control 

amid challenges to his rule. 

With respect to Russia influence efforts, let me be clear: The 

Russians utilize this tool because it’s relatively cheap, it’s low-risk, 

it offers what they perceive as plausible deniability, and it’s proven 

to be effective at sowing division. We expect Russia to continue 

using propaganda, social media, false flag personas, sympathetic 

spokesmen, and other means to influence, to try to build on its 

wide range of operations and exacerbate social and political fissures in the United States. There should be no doubt that Russia 

perceives its past efforts have been successful and views the 2018 

U.S. midterm elections as a potential target for Russian influence 

operations. 

From Russia I’ll turn to the Middle East and North Africa. This 

region will be characterized by political turmoil, economic fragility, 

and civil and proxy wars in the coming year. Iran will remain the 

most prominent state sponsor of terrorism and adversary in the 

Middle East, especially in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Iran will seek 

to expand its regional influence and will exploit the fight against 

ISIS to solidify partnerships and translate battlefield gains into political, security, and economic agreements. 

We also assess that Iran will continue to develop military capabilities that threaten U.S. forces and U.S. allies in the region. For 

example, Iran has the largest ballistic missile force in the Middle 

East. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps navy and its unsafe 

and unprofessional interactions pose a risk to U.S. naval and allied 

naval operations in the Persian Gulf. And Lebanese Hezbollah, 

with the support of Iran, has deployed thousands of fighters to 

Syria and provides direction to other militant and terrorist groups, 

all fomenting regional instability. Iran’s provocative and assertive 

behavior, as we saw most recently this past weekend in northern 

Israel, increases the potential for escalation. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

10 

Turkey will seek to thwart Kurdish ambitions in the Middle East 

and the ongoing Turkish incursion into northern Syria is complicating ongoing counter-ISIS activities in the region and increases 

the risk to U.S. forces located in the area. 

Syria will face unrest and fighting through 2018, even as Damascus recaptures urban areas and violence decreases in some areas. 

Iraq is likely to face a lengthy period of political turmoil and conflict. The social and political challenges that gave rise to ISIS remain and Iran has exploited those challenges to deepen its influence in Iraq’s military and security elements, diplomatic and political arms. 

The war in Yemen between the Iranian-backed Houthis and the 

Saudi-led coalition is likely to continue and will worsen the already 

tragic humanitarian crisis for 70 percent of the population of about 

20 million people in need of assistance. The situation in Yemen is 

emblematic of a far larger problem: The number of people displaced 

by conflict around the world is the highest that it’s been since the 

end of World War II. 

Turning to Europe, where I want to draw your attention to two 

significant developments that are likely to continue to impact European politics and foreign policy in the coming year, let me state 

first: The continent’s center of gravity appears to be shifting to 

France, where President Macron has taken a more assertive role 

in addressing European global challenges. The results of the recent 

German election I think enforce that assessment. 

Second, recent efforts by some governments in Central and Eastern Europe to undermine judicial independence and parliamentary 

oversight and increase government control over public media are 

weakening the rule of law. These steps could presage further democratic decline and offer opportunity for Chinese and Russian influence. 

There are many more topics I could discuss. I haven’t even gotten to the Western Hemisphere or Africa. But I would like to close 

with a discussion of one additional threat, this one internal and 

somewhat personal. I am concerned that our increasing fractious 

political process, particularly with respect to Federal spending, is 

threatening our ability to properly defend our Nation, both in the 

short term and especially in the long term. The failure to address 

our long-term fiscal situation has increased the national debt to 

over $20 trillion and growing. This situation is unsustainable, as 

I think we all know, and represents a dire threat to our economic 

and national security. 

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen first 

identified the national debt as the greatest threat to our national 

security. Since then he has been joined by numerous respected national security leaders of both parties, including former Secretaries 

of State Madeleine Albright and Henry Kissinger, as well as former 

Defense Secretaries Bob Gates and Leon Panetta; and our current 

Defense Secretary Jim Mattis agrees with this assessment. 

Many of you know I have spent a lot of time in my last term in 

the Senate working on this issue and, unfortunately, the problem 

continues to grow. So I would urge all of us to recognize the need 

to address this challenge and to take action as soon as possible, beLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

11 

fore a fiscal crisis occurs that truly undermines our ability to ensure our national security. 

With that, I and the rest of the panel are happy to take your 

questions. We appreciate the opportunity to be with you today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Director Coats follows:] 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

12 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 1 here 28947.001
13 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 2 here 28947.002

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD 

WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT 

of the 

US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 

February 13. 2018 

INTRODUCTION 

Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner, Members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to 

offer the United States Intelligence Community's 2018 assessment of threats to US national security. 

My statement reflects the collective insights of the Intelligence Community's extraordinary women 

and men, whom I am privileged and honored to lead. We in the Intelligence Community are 

committed every day to providing the nuanced, independent, and unvarnished intelligence that 

policymakers, warfighters, and domestic law enforcement personnel need to protect American lives 

and America's interests anywhere in the world. 

The order of the topics presented in this statement does not necessarily indicate the relative 

importance or magnitude of the threat in the view of the Intelligence Community. 

Information available as of8 February 2018 was used in the preparation of this assessment. 

2 
14 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 3 here 28947.003

CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 2 

CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................ 3 

FOREWORD .......................................................................................................................... 4 

GLOBAL THREATS ............................................................................................................... S 

CYBER THREATS .................................................................................................................. S 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND PROLIFERATION ......................................... 7 

TERRORISM .......................................................................................................................... 9 

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND FOREIGN DENIAL AND DECEPTION ...................... 11 

EMERGING AND DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY .............................................................. 12 

TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITIONS AND STRATEGIC ECONOMIC COMPETITION ......... 12 

SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE .......................................................................................... 13 

TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME ......................................................................... 13 

ECONOMICS AND ENERGY .............................................................................................. 15 

HUMAN SECURITY ............................................................................................................ 16 

REGIONAL THREATS ......................................................................................................... IS 

EAST ASIA ........................................................................................................................... 18 

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA .............................................................................. 19 

SOUTH ASIA ........................................................................................................................ 22 

RUSSIA AND EURASIA ...................................................................................................... 23 

EUROPE ............................................................................................................................... 25 

AFRICA ................................................................................................................................ 26 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE ........................................................................................... 27 

3 
15 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 4 here 28947.004

FOREWORD 

Competition among countries will increase in the coming year as major powers and regional aggressors 

exploit complex global trends while adjusting to new priorities in US foreign policy. The risk of interstate 

conflict, including among great powers, is higher than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The most 

immediate threats of regional interstate conflict in the next year come from North Korea and from SaudiIranian use of proxies in their rivalry. At the same time, the threat of state and nonstate use of weapons of 

mass destrnction will coatinue to grow. 

• Adversaries and malign actors will use all instruments of national power-including information 

and cyber means-to shape societies and markets, international rules and institutions, and 

international hot spots to their advantage. 

• China and Russia will seek spheres of influence and to check US appeal and influence in their 

regions. Meanwhile, US allies' and partners' uncertainty about the willingness and capability of 

the United States to maintain its international commitments may drive them to consider 

reorienting their policies, particularly regarding trade, away from Washington. 

• Forces for geopolitical order and stability will continue to fray, as will the rules-based 

international order. New alignments and informal networks--outside traditional power blocs 

and national governments-will increasingly strain international cooperation. 

Tens ion within many countries will rise, and the threat from Sunni violent extremist groups will evolve as 

they recoup after battlefield losses in the Middle East. 

Slow economic growth and technology-induced disruptions in job markets are fueling populism 

within advanced industrial countries and the very nationalism that contributes to tension among 

countries. 

• Developing countries in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa face economic challenges, and 

many states struggle with reforms to tamp down corruption. Terrorists and criminal groups will 

continue to exploit weak state capacity in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. 

• Challenges from urbanization and migration will persist, while the effects of air pollution, 

inadequate water, and climate change on human health and livelihood will become more 

noticeable. Domestic policy responses to such issues will become more difficult-especially for 

democracies-as publics become less trusting of authoritative information sources. 

4 
16 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 5 here 28947.005

GlOBAl THREATS 

CYBER THREATS 

The potential for surprise in the cyber realm will increase in the next year and beyond as billions more 

digital devices are connected--with relatively little built-in security-and both nation states and malign 

actors become more emboldened and better equipped in the use of increasingly widespread cyber toolkits. 

The risk is growing that some adversaries will conduct cyber attacks-such as data deletion or 

localized and temporary disruptions of critical infrastructure-against the United States in a crisis 

short of war. 

In 2016 and 2017, state-sponsored cyber attacks against Ukraine and Saudi Arabia targeted 

multiple sectors across critical infrastructure, government, and commercial networks. 

Ransomware and malware attacks have spread globally, disrupting global shipping and 

production lines of US companies. The availability of criminal and commercial malware is 

creating opportunities for new actors to launch cyber operations. 

• We assess that concerns about US retaliation and still developing adversary capabilities will 

mitigate the probability of attacks aimed at causing major disruptions of US critical 

infrastructure, but we remain concerned by the increasingly damaging effects of cyber operations 

and the apparent acceptance by adversaries of collateral damage. 

Adversaries and Malign Actors Poised for Aggression 

Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea will pose the greatest 

cyber threats to the United States during the next year. 

These states are using cyber operations as a low-cost tool 

of statecraft, and we assess that they will work to use -,,,,.., --------------

cyber operations to achieve strategic objectives unless 

they face clear repercussions for their cyber operations. 

Nonstate actors will continue to use cyber operations for 10 

financial crime and to enable propaganda and 

messaging. 

The use of cyber attacks as a foreign policy tool 

outside of military conflict has been mostly limited 

to sporadic lower-level attacks. Russia, Iran, and HI 

North Korea, however, are testing more aggressive 

cyber attacks that pose growing threats to the United 

States and US partners. P 2007 08 09 10 II 12 I3 14 IS 16 17 

5 
17 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 6 here 28947.006

Russia. We expect that Russia will conduct bolder and more disruptive cyber operations during the next 

year, most likely using new capabilities against Ukraine. The Russian Government is likely to build on 

the wide range of operations it is already conducting, including disruption of Ukrainian energydistribution networks, hack-and-leak influence operations, distributed denial-of-service attacks, and 

false flag operations. In the next year, Russian intelligence and security services will continue to probe 

US and allied critical infrastructures, as well as target the United States, NATO, and allies for insights 

into US policy. 

China. China will continue to use cyber espionage and bolster cyber attack capabilities to support national 

security priorities. The IC and private-sector security experts continue to identifY ongoing cyber 

activity from China, although at volumes significantly lower than before the bilateral US-China 

cyber commitments of September 2015. Most detected Chinese cyber operations against US private 

industry are focused on cleared defense contractors or IT and communications firms whose products 

and services support government and private sector networks worldwide. China since 2015 has been 

advancing its cyber attack capabilities by integrating its military cyber attack and espionage 

resources in the Strategic Support Force, which it established in 2015. 

Iran. We assess that Iran will continue working to penetrate US and Allied networks for espionage and to 

position itself for potential future cyber attacks, although its intelligence services primarily focus on Middle 

Eastern adversaries--especially Saudi Arabia and Israel. Tehran probably views cyberattacks as a 

versatile tool to respond to perceived provocations, despite Iran's recent restraint from conducting 

cyber attacks on the United States or Western allies. Iran's cyber attacks against Saudi Arabia in late 

2016 and early 2017 involved data deletion on dozens of networks across government and the 

private sector. 

North Korea. We expect the heavily sanctioned North Korea to use cyber operations to raise funds and to 

gather intelligence or launch attacks on South Korea and the United States. Pyongyang probably has a 

number of techniques and tools it can use to achieve a range of offensive effects with little or no 

warning, including distributed denial of service attacks, data deletion, and deployment of 

ransom ware. 

• North Korean actors developed and launched the WannaCry ransomware in May 2017, judging 

from technical links to previously identified North Korean cyber tools, tradecraft, and 

operational infrastructure. We also assess that these actors conducted the cyber theft of$81 

million from the Bank of Bangladesh in 2016. 

Terrorists and Criminals. Terrorist groups will continue to use the Internet to organize, recruit, spread 

propaganda, raise funds, collect intelligence, inspire action by followers, and coordinate operations. Given 

their current capabilities, cyber operations by terrorist groups mostly likely would result in personally 

identifiable information (PII) disclosures, website defacements, and denial-of-service attacks against 

poorly protected networks. Transnational criminals will continue to conduct for-profit cyberenabled crimes, such as theft and extortion against US networks. We expect the line between 

criminal and nation-state activity to become increasingly blurred as states view cyber criminal tools 

as a relatively inexpensive and deniable means to enable their operations. 

6 
18 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 7 here 28947.007

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND PROLIFERATION 

State tdforts to modernize, develop, or acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, 

or their underlying technologies constitute a major threat to the security of the United States, its deployed 

troops, and its allies. Both state and nonstate actors have already demonstrated the use of chemical 

weapons in Iraq and Syria. Biological and chemical materials and technologies-almost always 

dual-use-move easily in the globalized economy, as do personnel with the scientific expertise to 

design and use them for legitimate and illegitimate purposes. Information about the latest 

discoveries in the life sciences also diffuses rapidly around the globe, widening the accessibility of 

knowledge and tools for beneficial purposes and for potentially nefarious applications. 

Russia 

Russia has developed a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) that the United States has declared 

is in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Despite Russia's ongoing 

development of other Treaty-compliant missiles with intermediate ranges, Moscow probably 

believes that the new GLCM provides sufficient military advantages to make it worth risking the 

political repercussions of violating the INF Treaty. In 2013, a senior Russian administration official 

stated publicly that the world had changed since the INF Treaty was signed in 1987. Other Russian 

officials have made statements complaining that the Treaty prohibits Russia, but not some of its 

neighbors, from developing and possessing ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 

5,500 kilometers. 

China 

The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) continues to modernize its nuclear missile force by 

adding more survivable road-mobile systems and enhancing its silo-based systems. This new 

generation of missiles is intended to ensure the viability of China's strategic deterrent by providing a 

second-strike capability. China also has tested a hypersonic glide vehicle. In addition, the PLA 

Navy continues to develop the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and might produce 

additional JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. The JIN-class submarinesarmed with JL-2 SLBMs-give the PLA Navy its first long-range, sea-based nuclear capability. The 

Chinese have also publicized their intent to form a triad by developing a nuclear-capable nextgeneration bomber. 

Iran and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 

Tehran's public statements suggest that it wants to preserve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 

because it views the JCPOA as a means to remove sanctions while preserving some nuclear 

capabilities. Iran recognizes that the US Administration has concerns about the deal but expects the 

other participants-China, the EU, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom-to honor 

their commitments. Iran's implementation of the JCPOA has extended the amount of time Iran 

would need to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about one 

year, provided Iran continues to adhere to the deal's major provisions. The JCPOA has also 

enhanced the transparency oflran's nuclear activities, mainly by fostering improved access to 

Iranian nuclear facilities for the IAEA and its investigative authorities under the Additional Protocol 

to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. 

7 
19 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 8 here 28947.008

Iran's ballistic missile programs give it the potential to hold targets at risk across the region, and 

Tehran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Tehran's desire to 

deter the United States might drive it to field an ICBM. Progress on Iran's space program, such as 

the launch of the Simorgh SLV in July 2017, could shorten a pathway to an ICBM because space 

launch vehicles use similar technologies. 

North Korea 

North Korea will be among the most volatile and confrontational WMD threats to the United States over 

the next year. North Korea's history of exporting ballistic missile technology to several countries, 

including Iran and Syria, and its assistance during Syria's construction of a nuclear reactordestroyed in 2007-illustrate its willingness to proliferate dangerous technologies. 

In 2017 North Korea, for the second straight year, conducted a large number ofballistic missile tests, 

including its first ICBM tests. Pyongyang is committed to developing a long-range, nuclear-armed 

missile that is capable of posing a direct threat to the United States. It also conducted its sixth and 

highest yield nuclear test to date. 

We assess that North Korea has a longstanding BW capability and biotechnology infrastructure that 

could support a BW program. We also assess that North Korea has a CW program and probably 

could employ these agents by modifying conventional munitions or with unconventional, targeted 

methods. 

Pakistan 

Pakistan continues to produce nuclear weapons and develop new types of nuclear weapons, 

including short-range tactical weapons, sea-based cruise missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, and 

longer-range ballistic missiles. These new types of nuclear weapons will introduce new risks for 

escalation dynamics and security in the region. 

Syria 

We assess that the Syrian regime used the nerve agent sarin in an attack against the opposition in 

Khan Shaykhun on 4 April2017, in what is probably the largest chemical weapons attack since 

August 2013. We continue to assess that Syria has not declared all the elements of its chemical 

weapons program to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and that it has the capability to 

conduct further attacks. Despite the creation of a specialized team and years of work by the 

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to address gaps and inconsistencies 

in Syria's declaration, numerous issues remain unresolved. The OPCW-UN Joint Investigative 

Mechanism (JIM) has attributed the 4 April2017 sarin attack and three chlorine attacks in 2014 and 

2015 to the Syrian regime. Even after the attack on Khan Shaykhun, we have continued to observe 

allegations that the regime has used chemicals against the opposition. 

ISIS 

We assess that ISIS is also using chemicals as a means of warfare. The OPCW-UN JIM concluded 

that ISIS used sulfur mustard in two attacks in 2015 and 2016, and we assess that it has used 

chemical weapons in numerous other attacks in Iraq and Syria. 

8 
20 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 9 here 28947.009

TERRORISM 

Sunni violent extremists-most notably ISIS and al-Qa 'ida-pose continuing terrorist threats to US 

interests and partners worldwide, while US-based homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) will remain 

the most prevalent Sunni violent extremist threat in the United States. Iran and its strategic partner 

Lebanese Hizballah also pose a persistent threat to the United States and its partners worldwide. 

Sunni Violent Extremism 

Sunni violent extremists are still intent on attacking the US homeland and US interests overseas, bnt their 

attacks will be most frequent in or near conflict zones or against enemies that are more easily accessible. 

• Sunni violent extremist groups are geographically diverse; they are likely to exploit conflict 

zones in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, where they can co-mingle terrorism and insurgency. 

• ISIS and al-Qa'ida and their respective networks will be persistent threats, as will groups not 

subordinate to them, such as the Haqqani Taliban Network. 

Sunnl Vioienl E:dremisls' Primary Operating Areas as of 2017 

Primary 

Operating 

Areas 

ISIS 

Over the next year, we expect that ISIS is likely to Joens on regrouping in Iraq and Syria, enhancing its 

global presence, championing its canse, planning international attacks, and encouraging its members and 

sympathizers to attack in their home countries. ISIS's claim of having a functioning caliphate that 

governs populations is all but thwarted. 

ISIS core has started-and probably will maintain-a robust insurgency in Iraq and Syria as part 

of a long-terrn strategy to ultimately enable the reemergence of its so-called caliphate. This 

activity will challenge local CT efforts against the group and threaten US interests in the region. 

9 
21 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 10 here 28947.010

ISIS almost certainly will continue to give priority to transnational terrorist attacks. Its 

leadership probably assesses that, ifiSIS-linked attacks continue to dominate public discourse, 

the group's narrative will be buoyed, it will be difficult for the counter-ISIS coalition to portray 

the group as defeated, and the coalition's will to fight will ultimately weaken. 

• Outside Iraq and Syria, ISIS's goal of fostering interconnectivity and resiliency among its global 

branches and networks probably will result in local and, in some cases, regional attack plans. 

AI·Qa'lda 

AI·Qa'ida alnwst certainly will remain a major actor in global terrorism becaase of the combined staying 

power of its five affiliates. The primary threat to US and Western interests from a/-Qa'ida's gwbal 

network through 2018 will be in or near affiliates' operating areas. Not all qffiliates will have the intent 

and capability to pursue or inspire attacks in the US hamewnd or elsewhere in the West. 

• Al-Qa'ida's affiliates probably will continue to dedicate most of their resources to local activity, 

including participating in ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, as well 

as attacking regional actors and populations in other parts of Afiica, Asia, and the Middle East. 

• Al-Qa'ida leaders and affiliate media plarforrns almost certainly will call for followers to carry 

out attacks in the West, but their appeals probably will not create a spike in inspired attacks. 

The group's messaging since at least 2010 has produced few such attacks. 

Homegrown Violent Extremists 

Homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) will renwin the most prevalent and difficult-to-detect Sunni terrorist 

threat at home, despite a drop in the number of attacks in 2017. HVE attacks are likely to continue to 

occur with little or no warning because the perpetrators often strike soft targets and use simple tactics 

that do not require advanced skills or outside training. 

• HVEs almost certainly will continue to be inspired by a variety of sources, including terrorist 

propaganda as well as in response to perceived grievances related to US Government actions. 

Iran and Lebanese Hizballah 

Iran remains the most prominent state sponsor of terrorism, providing financial aid, advanced 

weapons and tactics, and direction to militant and terrorist groups across the Middle East and 

cultivating a network of operatives across the globe as a contingency to enable potential terrorist 

attacks. 

Lebanese Hizballah has demonstrated its intent to foment regional instability by deploying 

thousands of fighters to Syria and by providing weapons, tactics, and direction to militant and 

terrorist groups. Hizballah probably also emphasizes its capability to attack US, Israeli, and Saudi 

Arabian interests. 

10 
22 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 11 here 28947.011

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND FOREIGN DENIAl AND DECEPTION 

The United States will face a complex global foreign intelligence threat environment in 2018. We assess 

that the leading state intelligence threats to US interests will continue ta be Russia and China, based on 

their services' capabilities, intent, and broad operational scope. Other states in the Near East, South 

Asia, East Asia, and Latin America will pose local and regional intelligence threats to US interests. 

For example, Iranian and Cuban intelligence and security services continue to view the United 

States as a primary threat. 

Penetrating the US national decisionmaking apparatus and the Intelligence Community will remain 

primary objectives for numerous foreign intelligence entities. Additionally, the targeting of national 

security information and proprietary information from US companies and research institutions 

involved with defense, energy, finance, dual-use technology, and other areas will remain a persistent 

threat to US interests. 

Nonstate entities, including international terrorists and transnational organized crime groups, are 

likely to continue to employ and improve their intelligence capabilities, including human, technical, 

and cyber means. As with state intelligence services, these nonstate entities recruit sources and 

perform physical and technical surveillance to facilitate their illicit activities and to avoid detection 

and capture. 

Trnsted insiders who disclose sensitive or classified US Government information without 

authorization will remain a significant threat in 2018 and beyond. The sophistication and 

availability of information technology that increases the scope and impact of unauthorized 

disclosures exacerbate this threat. 

Russia and Influence Campaigns 

Influence operations, especially through cyber means, will remain a significant threat to US iaterests as 

they are low-cost, relatiPe/y low-risk, and deniable ways to retaliate against adversaries, to shape foreign 

perceptions, and to influence populations. Russia probably will be the most capable and aggressive 

source of this threat in 2018, although many countries and some nonstate actors are exploring ways 

to use influence operations, both domestically and abroad. 

We assess that the Russian intelligence services will continue their 4Jorts to disseminate false information 

Pia Russian state-controlled media and coPCTt online personas about US actiPities to encourage anti-US 

politicalPiews. Moscow seeks to create wedges that reduce trust and confidence in democratic 

processes, degrade democratization efforts, weaken US partnerships with European allies, 

undermine Western sanctions, encourage anti-US political views, and counter efforts to bring 

Ukraine and other former Soviet states into European institutions. 

• Foreign elections are critical inflection points that offer opportunities for Russia to advance its 

interests both overtly and covertly. The 2018 US mid-term elections are a potential target for 

Russian influence operations. 

• At a minimum, we expect Russia to continue using propaganda, social media, false-flag 

personas, sympathetic spokespeople, and other means of influence to try to exacerbate social and 

political fissures in the United States. 

11 
23 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 12 here 28947.012

EMERGING AND DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 

New technologies and novel applications of existing technologies have the potential to disrupt labor markets 

and alter health, energy, and transportation systems. We assess that technology developments-in the 

biotechnology and communications sectors, for example--are likely to outpace regulation, which 

could create international norms that are contrary to US interests and increase the likelihood of 

technology surprise. Emerging technology and new applications of existing technology will also 

allow our adversaries to more readily develop weapon systems that can strike farther, fuster, and 

harder and challenge the United States in all warfare domains, including space. 

• The widespread proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI)-the field of computer science 

encompassing systems that seek to imitate aspects of human cognition by learning and making 

decisions based on accumulated knowledge-is likely to prompt new national security concerns; 

existing machine learning technology, for example, could enable high degrees of automation in 

labor-intensive activities such as satellite imagery analysis and cyber defense. Increasingly 

capable AI tools, which are often enabled by large amounts of data, are also likely to present 

socioeconomic challenges, including impacts on employment and privacy. 

• New biotechnologies are leading to improvements in agriculture, health care, and 

manufacturing. However, some applications ofbiotechnologies may lead to unintentional 

negative health effects, biological accidents, or deliberate misuse. 

• The global shift to advanced information and communications technologies (ICT) will 

increasingly test US competitiveness because aspiring suppliers around the world will play a 

larger role in developing new technologies and products. These technologies include nextgeneration, or SG, wireless technology; the internet of things; new financial technologies; and 

enabling AI and big data for predictive analysis. Differences in regulatory and policy approaches 

to ICT-related issues could impede growth and innovation globally and for US companies. 

• Advanced materials could disrupt the economies of some commodities-dependent exporting 

countries while providing a competitive edge to developed and developing countries that create 

the capacity to produce and use the new materials. New materials, such as nanomaterials, are 

often developed faster than their health and environmental effects can be assessed. Advances in 

manufacturing, particularly the development of 3D printing, almost certainly will become even 

more accessible to a variety of state and nonstate actors and be used in ways contrary to our 

interests. 

TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITIONS AND STRATEGIC ECONOMIC COMPETITION 

Persistent trade imbalances, trnde bafflers, and a Jack of market-friendly policies in some countries 

probably will continue to challenge US economic security. Some countries almost certainly will continue to 

acquire US intellectual property and propriety information illicitly to advance their own economic and 

national security objectives. 

China, for example, has acquired proprietary technology and early-stage ideas through cyberenabled means. At the same time, some actors use largely legitimate, legal transfers and 

12 
24 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 13 here 28947.013

relationships to gain access to research fields, experts, and key enabling industrial processes that 

could, over time, erode America's long-term competitive advantages. 

SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE 

Continued global space industry expansion will further extend space-enabled capabilities and space 

situational awareness to nation-state, nonstate, and commercial space actors in the coming years, 

enabled by the increased availability of technology, private-sector investment, and growing 

international partnerships for shared production and operation. All actors will increasingly have 

access to space-derived information services, such as imagery, weather, communications, and 

positioning, navigation, and timing for intelligence, military, scientific, or business purposes. 

Foreign countries-particularly China and Russia-will continue to expand their space-based 

reconnaissance, communications, and navigation systems in terms of the numbers of satellites, the 

breadth of their capability, and the applications for use. 

Both Russia and China continue to pursue antisatellite (ASAT) weapons as a means to reduce US 

and allied military effectiveness. Russia and China aim to have nondestructive and destructive 

counterspace weapons available for use during a potential future conflict. We assess that, if a future 

conflict were to occur involving Russia or China, either country would justifY attacks against US and 

allied satellites as necessary to offSet any perceived US military advantage derived from military, 

civil, or commercial space systems. Military reforms in both countries in the past few years indicate 

an increased focus on establishing operational forces designed to integrate attacks against space 

systems and services with military operations in other domains. 

Russian and Chinese destructive ASAT weapons probably will reach initial operational capability in 

the next few years. China's PLA has formed military units and begun initial operational training 

with counterspace capabilities that it has been developing, such as ground-launched ASAT missiles. 

Russia probably has a similar class of system in development. Both countries are also advancing 

directed-energy weapons technologies for the purpose of fielding ASAT weapons that could blind or 

damage sensitive space-based optical sensors, such as those used for remote sensing or missile 

defense. 

Of particular concern, Russia and China continue to launch "experimental" satellites that conduct 

sophisticated on-orbit activities, at least some of which are intended to advance counterspace 

capabilities. Some technologies with peaceful applications-such as satellite inspection, refueling, 

and repair--can also be used against adversary spacecraft. 

Russia and China continue to publicly and diplomatically promote international agreements on the 

nonweaponization of space and "no first placement" of weapons in space. However, many classes 

of weapons would not be addressed by such proposals, allowing them to continue their pursuit of 

space warfare capabilities while publicly maintaining that space must be a peaceful domain. 

TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 

Transnational organized criminal groups and networks will pose serious and growing threats to the security 

and health of US citizens, as well as to global human rights, ecological integrity, government revenues, and 

4forts to deal with adversaries and terrorists. In the most severe cases abroad, criminal enterprises will 

13 
25 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 14 here 28947.014

contribute to increased social violence, erode governments' autlwrities, undermine the integrity of 

international financial systems, and lwrm critical infrastructure. 

Drug Trafficking 

Transnational organized criminal groups supply the 

dominant share of illicit drugs consumed in the United 

States, fueling high mortality rates among US citizens. 

Causes of US Premature Deaths, 1999-2016 

• Americans in 2016 died in record numbers from 

drug overdoses, 21 percent more than in 2015. Drug 

Poisoning 

• Worldwide production of cocaine, heroin, and 

methamphetamine is at record levels. US 

mortality from potent synthetic opioids doubled in 

2016, and synthetic opioids have become a key 

cause of US drug deaths. 

• Mexican criminal groups will continue to supply 

much of the heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, 

and marijuana that cross the US-Mexico border, 

Homicide 

while China-based suppliers ship fentanyls and O 

fentanyl precursors to Mexico-, Canada-, and USbased distributors or sell directly to consumers via 

the Internet. 

Broader Threats From Transnational Crime 

2000 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 

Transnational organized criminal groups, in addition to engaging in violence, will continue to traffic in 

human beings, deplete natural resources, and siphon money from governments and the global economy. 

Human trafficking will continue in virtually every country. International organizations estimate 

that about 25 million people are victims. 

The FBI assesses that US losses from cybercrime in 2016 exceeded $1.3 billion, and some 

industry experts predict such losses could cost the global economy $6 trillion by 2021. 

• Criminal wildlife poaching, illegal fishing, illicit mining, and drug-crop production will continue 

to threaten economies, biodiversity, food supply security, and human health. For example, 

academic studies show that illicit mining alone adds some 650 to I ,000 tons of toxic mercury to 

the ecosystem each year. 

Transnational organized criminal groups probably will generate more revenue from illicit 

activity in the coming year, which the UN last estimated at $1.6-$2.2 ttillion for 2014. 

14 
26 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 15 here 28947.015

ECONOMICS AND ENERGY 

Globalgrowthin2018-projectedbytheiMFto Worldwide Economic Growth, 2015·18 

India 

China 

rise to 3. 9 percent-is likely to become more broadly 

based, but growth remains weak in many countries, 

and inflation is below target in most advanced 

economies. The relatively favorable outlook for 

real economic growth suggests little near-term 

risk of unfavorable deficit-debt dynamics among 

the advanced economies. Supportive fmancial 

conditions and improving business sentiment 

will help to drive economic activity in advanced 

countries. China's growth may decelerate as the 

property sector cools and if Beijing accelerates 

economic reforms. India's economy is expected 

to rebound after headwinds from taxation 

changes and demonetization, and the continuing 

Emerging 

economies 

~ Global 

GDP 

Advanced 

economies 

upswing in emerging and developing economies 

could be tempered by capital outflows from a 

stronger dollar and monetary policy 

normalization in the United States and Europe. 

Oil-exporting countries continue to suffer from the 

2015 16 17 18' 

late-2014 oil price drop, and their economic woes are likely to continue, with broader negative implications. 

Subdued economic growth, combined with sharp increases in North American oil and gas 

production, probably will continue putting downward pressure on global energy prices, harming oilexporting economies. The US Energy Information Administration forecasts that 2018 West Texas 

Intermediate and Brent prices will average $58 and $62 per barrel, respectively, far below the average 

annual prices of$98 and $109 in 2013. 

• Low oil prices and production declines-along with poor economic policies-have pushed 

Venezuela and the state-owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, to miss debt payments, 

putting them in selective default. 

Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf oil exporters have experienced sharp increases in budget 

deficits, forcing governments to issue debt and enact politically unpopular fiscal reforms, such as 

cuts to subsidies, social programs, and government jobs. 

In Africa, declining oil revenue, mismanagement, and inadequate policy responses to oil price 

shocks have contributed to Angolan and Nigerian fiScal problems, currency strains, and 

deteriorating foreign exchange reserves. 

OPEC member countries and select non-OPEC producers, including Russia, in early 2017 

committed to cut oil production in order to lift prices, with compliance likely to be offi;et 

somewhat as Libya or Nigeria-both are exempt from the deal-are able to resume production. 

15 
27 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 16 here 28947.016

HUMAN SECURITY 

Governance shortfalls, violent conflict, environmental stresses, and increased potential for a global health 

crisis will create significant risks to human security, including high levels of human displacement and 

migration flows. 

Governance and Political Turbulence 

Domestic and foreign chollenges to democracy and institutional capacity will test governance quality 

globally in 2018, especially as competitors manipulate social media to shape opinion. Freedom 

House reported the 11th consecutive year of decline in "global freedom" in 2017, and nearly onequarter of the countries registering declines were in Europe. 

• While the number of democracies has remained steady for the past decade, some scholars 

suggest the quality of democracy has declined. 

• We note that more governments are using propaganda and misinformation in social media to 

influence foreign and domestic audiences. 

• The number and sophistication of government efforts to shape domestic views of politics have 

increased dramatically in the past 10 years. In 2016, Freedom House identified 30 countries, 

including the Philippines, Turkey, and Venezuela, whose governments used social media to 

spread government views, to drive agendas, and to counter criticism of the government online. 

Poor governance, weak national political institutions, economic inequality, and the rise of violent nonstate 

actors all undermine states' abilities to project authority and elevate the risk of violent--even regimethreatening--instability and mass atrocities. 

Environment and Climate Change 

The impacts of the long-term trends toward a warming climate, more air pollution, biodiversity loss, and 

water scarcity are likely to fuel economic and social discontent-and possibly upheaval-through 2018. 

The past 115 years have been the warmest period in the history of modern civilization, and the 

past few years have been the warmest years on record. Extreme weather events in a warmer 

world have the potential for greater impacts and can compound with other drivers to raise the 

risk of humanitarian disasters, conflict, water and food shortages, population migration, labor 

shortfalls, price shocks, and power outages. Research has not identified indicators of tipping 

points in climate-linked earth systems, suggesting a possibility of abrupt climate change. 

Worsening air pollution from forest burning, agricultural waste incineration, urbanization, and 

rapid industrialization-with increasing public awareness-might drive protests against 

authorities, such as those recently in China, India, and Iran. 

• Accelerating biodiversity and species loss-driven by pollution, warming, unsustainable fishing, 

and acidifying oceans-will jeopardize vital ecosystems that support critical human systems. 

Recent estimates suggest that the current extinction rate is 100 to 1 ,000 times the natural 

extinction rate. 

16 
28 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 17 here 28947.017

• Water scarcity, compounded by gaps in cooperative management agreements for nearly half of 

the world's international river basins, and new unilateral dam development are likely to heighten 

tension between countries. 

Human Displacement 

Global displacement almost certainly will remain near record highs during the next year, raising the risk of 

disease outbreaks, recruitment by armed groups, political upheaval, and reduced economic productivity. 

Conflicts will keep many of the world's refugees and internally displaced persons from returning 

home. 

Health 

The increase in frequency and diversity of reported disease outbreaks-such as dengue and Zika-probably 

will continue through 2018, including the potential for a severe global health emergency that could lead to 

major economic aud societal disruptions, strain governmental aud international resources, and increase 

calls on the United States for support. A novel strain of a virulent microbe that is easily transmissible 

between humans continues to be a major threat, with pathagens such as H5Nl and H7N9 itifluenza and 

Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus having pandemic potential if they were to acquire efficient 

human-to-human transmissibility. 

• The frequency and diversity of disease outbreaks have increased at a steady rate since 1980, 

probably fueled by population growth, travel and trade patterns, and rapid urbanization. 

Ongoing global epidemics ofHIV I AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis continue to kill millions of 

people annually. 

• Increasing antimicrobial resistance, the ability of pathogens-including viruses, fungi, and 

bacteria-to resist drug treatment, is likely to outpace the development of new antimicrobial 

drugs, leading to infections that are no longer treatable. 

• The areas affected by vector-borne diseases, including dengue, are likely to expand, especially as 

changes in climatological patterns increase the reach of the mosquito. 

• The World Bank has estimated that a severe global influenza pandemic could cost the equivalent 

of 4.8 percent of global GDP-more than $3 trillion-and cause more than 100 million deaths. 

17 
29 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 18 here 28947.018

REGIONAL THREATS 

EAST ASIA 

China 

China will continue to pursue an active foreign policy-especiaOy in the Asia Pacific region-highlighted 

by a firm stance on its sovereignty claims in the East China Sea (ECS) and South China Sea (SCS), its 

relations with Taiwan, and its pursuit of economic engagement across the region. Regional tension will 

persist due to North Korea's nuclear and missile programs and simmering tension over territorial 

and maritime disputes in the ECS and SCS. China will also pursue efforts aimed at fulfilling its 

ambitious Belt and Road Initiative to expand China's economic reach and political influence across 

Eurasia, Africa, and the Pacific through infrastructure projects. 

North Korea 

North Korea's weapons of mass destruction program, public threats, defiance of the international 

community, confrontational military posturing, cyber activities, and potential for internal instability 

pose a complex and increasing threat to US national security and interests. 

In the wake of accelerated missile testing since 2016, North Korea is likely to press ahead with more tests in 

2018, and its Foreign Minister said that Kim may be considering conducting an atmospherti: nuclear test 

over the Pacific Ocean. Pyongyang's commitment to possessing nuclear weapons and fielding capable 

long-range missiles, all while repeatedly stating that nuclear weapons are the basis for its survival, 

suggests that the regime does not intend to negotiate them away. 

Ongoing, modest improvements to North Korea's conventional capabilities continue to pose a 

serious and growing threat to South Korea and Japan. Despite the North Korean military's many 

internal challenges and shortcomings, Kim Jong Un continues to expand the regime's conventional 

strike options with more realistic training, artillery upgrades, and close-range ballistic missiles that 

improve North Korea's ability to strike regional US and allied targets with little warning. 

Southeast Asia 

Democracy and human rights in many Southeast Asian countries will remain fragile in 2018 as autocratic 

tendencies deepen in some regimes and rampant corruption and cronyism undermine democratic values. 

Countries in the region will struggle to preserve foreign policy autonomy in the face of Chinese 

economic and diplomatic coercion. 

• Cambodian leader Hun Sen will repress democratic institutions and civil society, manipulate 

government and judicial institutions, and use patronage and political violence to guarantee his 

rule beyond the 2018 national election. Having alienated Western partners, Hun Sen will rely 

on Beijing's political and financial support, drawing Cambodia closer to China as a result. 

The crisis resulting from the exodus of more than 600,000 Rohingyas from Burma to Bangladesh 

will threaten Burma's fledgling democracy, increase the risk of violent extremism, and provide 

openings for Beijing to expand its influence. 

18 
30 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 19 here 28947.019

• In the Philippines, President Duterte will continue to wage his signature campaign against drugs, 

corruption, and crime. Duterte has suggested he could suspend the Constitution, declare a 

"revolutionary government," and impose nationwide martial law. His declaration of martial 

law in Mindanao, responding to the ISIS-inspired siege ofMarawi City, has been extended 

through the end of2018. 

• Thailand's leaders have pledged to hold elections in late 2018, but the new Constitution will 

institutionalize the military's influence. 

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 

Iran 

Iran will seek to expand its influence in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, where it sees corif/icts generally trending 

in Tehran'sfavor, and it will exploit the fight against ISIS to solidify partuerships and translate its 

battlefield gains into political, security, and economic agreements. 

• Iran's support for the Popular Mobilization Committee (FMC) and Shia militants remains the 

primary threat to US personnel in Iraq. We assess that this threat will increase as the threat from 

ISIS recedes, especially given calls from some Iranian-backed groups for the United States to 

withdraw and growing tension between Iran and the United States. 

• In Syria, Iran is working to consolidate its influence while trying to prevent US forces from 

gaining a foothold. Iranian-backed forces are seizing routes and border crossings to secure the 

Iraq-Syria border and deploying proregirne elements and Iraqi allies to the area. Iran's 

retaliatory missile strikes on ISIS targets in Syria following ISIS attacks in Tehran in June were 

probably intended in part to send a message to the United States and its allies about Iran's 

improving military capabilities. Iran is pursuing permanent military bases in Syria and probably 

wants to maintain a network of Shia foreign fighters in Syria to counter future threats to Iran. 

Iran also seeks economic deals with Damascus, including deals on telecommunications, mining, 

and electric power repairs. 

In Yemen, Iran's support to the Huthis further escalates the conflict and poses a serious threat to 

US partners and interests in the region. Iran continues to provide support that enables Huthi 

attacks against shipping near the Bab al Mandeb Strait and land-based targets deep inside Saudi 

Arabia and the UAE, such as the 4 November and 19 December ballistic missile attacks on 

Riyadh and an attempted 3 December cruise missile attack on an unfinished nuclear reacror in 

Abu Dhabi. 

Iran will develop military capabilities that threaten US forces and US allies in the region, and its unsafe 

and unprofessional interactions will pose a risk to US Navy operations in the Persian Gulf. 

Iran continues to develop and improve a range of new military capabilities to target US and allied 

military assets in the region, including armed UAVs, ballistic missiles, advanced naval mines, 

unmanned explosive boats, submarines and advanced torpedoes, and antishipand land-attack cruise 

missiles. Iran has the largest ballistic missile force in the Middle East and can strike targets up to 

2,000 kilometers from Iran's borders. Russia's delivery of the SA-20c SAM system in 2016 has 

provided Iran with its most advanced long-range air defense system. 

19 
31 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 20 here 28947.020

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy forces operating aggressively in the Persian 

Gulf and Strait ofHormuz pose a risk to the US Navy. Most IRGC interactions with US ships 

are professional, but as of mid-October, the Navy had recorded 14 instances of what it describes 

as "unsafe and/ or unprofessional" interactions with Iranian forces during 2017, the most recent 

interaction occurring last August, when an unarmed Iranian drone flew close to the aircraft 

carrier USS Nimitz as fighter jets landed at night. The Navy recorded 36 such incidents in 2016 

and 22 in 2015. Most involved the IRGC Navy. We assess that these interactions, although less 

frequent, will continue and that they are probably intended to project an image of strength and, 

possibly, to gauge US responses. 

Iranian centrist and hardline politicians increasingly will clash as they attempt to implement competing 

visions for Iran's future. This contest will be a key driver in determining whether Iran changes its 

behavior in ways favorable to US interests. 

• Centrists led by President Hasan Ruhani will continue to advocate greater social progress, 

privatization, and more global integration, while hardliners will view this agenda as a threat to 

their political and economic interests and to Iran's revolutionary and Islamic character. 

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's views are closer to those of the hardliners, but he has supported 

some ofRuhani's efforts to engage Western countries and to promote economic growth. The 

Iranian economy's prospects-still driven heavily by petroleum revenue-will depend on 

reforms to attract investment, strengthen privatization, and grow nonoil industries, which 

Ruhani will continue pursuing, much to the dismay of hardliners. National protests over 

economic grievances in Iran earlier this year have drawn more attention to the need for major 

reforms, but Ruhani and his critics are likely to use the protests to advance their political 

agendas. 

• Khamenei has experienced health problems in the past few years, and, in an effort to preserve his 

legacy, he probably opposes moving Iran toward greater political and economic openness. As 

their relationship has deteriorated since the presidential election last June, Ruhani has tried to 

mend relations with Khamenei as well as his allies, but, in doing so, he risks failing to make 

progress on reforms in the near-term. 

Syria 

The conflict has decisively shifted in the Syrian regime's favor, enabling Russia and Iran to further 

entrench themselves inside the country. Syria is likely to experience episodic conflict through 20181 even as 

Damascus recaptures most of the urban terrain and the overall/eve/ of violence decreases. 

• The Syrian opposition's seven-year insurgency is probably no longer capable of overthrowing President 

Bashor al-A.sad or overcoming a growing military disadvantage. Rebels probably retain the 

resources to sustain the conflict for at least the next year. 

• ISIS is likely on a downward trajectory in Syria; yet, despite territorial losses, it probably 

possesses sufficient resources, and a clandestine network in Syria, to sustain insurgency 

operations through 2018. 

20 
32 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 21 here 28947.021

• Moscow probably cannot force President Asad to agree to a political settlement that he believes 

significantly weakens him, unless Moscow is willing to remove Asad by force. While Asad may 

engage in peace talks, he is unlikely to negotiate himself from power or offer meaningful 

concessions to the opposition. 

Russia and Iran are planning for a long-term presence, securing military basing rights and 

contracts for reconstruction and oil and gas exploitation. Iran is also seeking to establish a land 

corridor from Iran through Syria to Lebanon. The Kurdish People's Protection Unit-the 

Syrian militia of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)-probably will seek some form of 

autonomy but will face resistance from Russia, Iran, and Turkey. 

As of October 2017, there were more than 5 million Syrian refugees in neighboring countries, 

and an estimated 6.3 million internally displaced. Reconstruction could cost at least $100 billion 

and take at least 10 years to complete. Asad's battered economy will likely continue to require 

significant subsidies from Iran and Russia to meet basic expenses. 

Iraq 

Iraq is likely to face a lengthy period of political turmoil and conflict as it struggles to rebuild, reconstitute 

the Iraqi state, maintain pressure on ISIS, and rein in the Iranian-backed Shia militias that pose an 

enduring threat to US personnel. 

The Iraqi Government, which has accrued $120 billion in debt, requires substantial external 

assistance to cover hundreds of millions of dollars in humanitarian-aid shortfalls and a World 

Bank estimated $88.2 billion to restore heavily damaged infrastructure, industry, and service 

sectors in areas retaken from ISIS. 

• Prime Minister Haydar al-Abadi's forceful reassertion of Baghdad's authority after the Kurdistan 

Regional Government's (KRG) independence referendum in September illustrates the divisions 

among Iraqi leaders over the future of the state. The move to curb Kurdish autonomy was 

popular among many Arab Shia and Sunnis and may prompt Iraqi leaders to be 

uncompromising in political reconciliation discussions in order to consolidate votes in the runup to elections planned for next spring. 

• ISIS will remain a terrorist and insurgent threat, and the group will seek to exploit Sunni 

discontent to conduct attacks and try to regain Iraqi territory. Baghdad will struggle to reorient 

the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) from conventional warfare to counterinsurgency and 

counterterrorism against ISIS while consolidating state control of territory and integrating the 

Iranian-backed and Shia-dominated Popular Mobilization Committee (PM C). 

• There is an increasing risk that some Shia militants will seek to attack US targets in Iraq because 

they believe that the US security presence is no longer needed, want to reassert Iraqi sovereignty, 

and support Iran's goal of reducing US influence in Iraq. 

Baghdad will have to contend with longstanding and war-hardened ethnosectarian divisions 

between Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds that were kept in check by the threat from ISIS. Despite ISIS's 

loss of territory, the social and political challenges that gave rise to the group remain and threaten 

the cohesion of the Iraqi state. 

21 
33 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 22 here 28947.022

Yemen 

The war in Yemen is likely to continue for the foreseeable future because the Iranian-backed Huthis 

and the Saudi-led coalition remain far apart on terms for ending the conflict. The death of furmer 

Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Salih is only likely to further complicate the conflict as the Huthis 

and others scramble to win over those who previously backed Salih. We assess that the Huthis will 

continue to pursue their goals militarily and that, as a result, US allies and interests on the Arabian 

Peninsula will remain at risk of Huthi missile attacks until the conflict is resolved. 

Continued fighting almost certainly will worsen the vast humanitarian crisis, which has left more 

than 70 percent of the population-{)r about 20 million people-in need of assistance and 

aggravated a cholera outbreak that has reached nearly 1 million confirmed cases. Relief 

operations are hindered by security and bureaucratic constraints established by both the HuthiSalih alliance and the Saudi-led coalition and by international funding shortages. 

SOUTH ASIA 

Afghanistan 

The overall situation in Ajghanistan probably will deteriorate 

modestly this year in the face of persistent political instobility, 

sustoined attacks by the Taliban-led insurgency, unsteady 

Ajghan National Security Forces (ANSF) performance, and 

chronic financial sharifolls. The National Unity Government 

probably will struggle to hold long-delayed parliamentary 

elections, currently scheduled for July 2018, and to prepare 

for a presidential election in 2019. The ANSF probably will 

maintain control of most major population centers with 

coalition force support, but the intensity and geographic 

scope ofTaliban activities will put those centers under 

continued strain. Afghanistan's economic growth will 

stagnate at around 2.5 percent per year, and Kabul will 

remain reliant on international donors for the great majority 

of its funding well beyond 2018. 

Pakistan 

Pakistan will continue to threaten US interests by deploying new 

nuclear weapons capabilities, maintaining its ties to militants, 

restricting counterterrorism cooperation, and drawing closer to 

South Asian Threats 

US Security Interests ln 

R Deteriorating Political/Security Situation 

18 Militant Svpport 

India-Pakistan Tensions 

~ lndlo-Chino Tenslons 

- Rohlngya Refugee Crisis 

Chino. Militant groups supported by Islamabad will continue to take advantage of their safe haven 

in Pakistan to plan and conduct attacks in India and Afghanistan, including against US interests. 

Pakistan's perception of its eroding position relative to India, reinforced by endemic economic 

weakness and domestic security issues, almost certainly will exacerbate long-held fears of isolation 

and drive Islamabad's pursuit of actions that run counter to US goals for the region. 

22 
34 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 23 here 28947.023

India-Pakistan Tension 

Relations between India and Pakistan are likely to remain tense, with continued violence on the Line of 

Control and the risk of escalation if there is another high-profile terrorist attack in India or an uptick in 

violence on the Line of Control. 

India-China Tension 

We expect relations between India and China to remain tense and possibly to deteriorate forther, despite 

the negotiated settlement to their three-month border standoff in August, elevating the risk of unintentional 

escalation. 

Bangladesh-Burma Rohingya Crisis 

The turmoil resulting from more than 600,000 Rohingyas fleeing from Burma to Bangladesh increases 

regional tension and may expand opportonities for terrorist recruitment in South and Southeast Asia. 

Further operations by Burmese security forces against Rohingya insurgents or sustained violence by 

ethnic Rakhine militias probably would make it difficult to repatriate Burmese from Bangladesh. 

RUSSIA AND EURASIA 

Russia 

In his probable next term in office, President Vladimir 

Putin will rely on assertive and opportunistic .foreign in Russia's N<l•ia'hborl><""d 

policies to shape outcomes beyond Russia's borders. He 

will also resort to more authoritarian tactics to maintain 

control amid challenges to his rule. 

Moscow will seek cooperation with the United States 

in areas that advance its interests. Simultaneously, 

Moscow will employ a variety of aggressive tactics to 

bolster its standing as a great power, secure a "sphere 

of influence" in the post-Soviet space, weaken the 

United States, and undermine Euro-Atlantic unity. 

The highly personalized nature of the Russian 

political system will enable Putin to act decisively to 

defend Russian interests or to pursue opportunities 

he views as enhancing Russian prestige and power 

abroad. 

Russia will compete with the United States most 

aggressively in Europe and Eurasia, while applying 

less intense pressure in "outer areas" and cultivating 

partnerships with US rivals and adversaries-as well 

as with traditional US partners-to constrain US 

power and accelerate a shift toward a "multipolar" 

world. Moscow will use a range of relatively lowFree trade ogreemenf 

with EU only 

No offHiotion 

RUSSIA 

GEORGIA~ 

~, 

AZERBAIJA~ 

TURKMENISTAN UZBEKISTAN 

cost tools to advance its foreign policy objectives, including influence campaigns, economic 

coercion, cyber operations, multilateral forums, and measured military force. Russia's slow 

23 
35 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 24 here 28947.024

economic growth is unlikely to constrain Russian foreign policy or by itself trigger concessions from 

Moscow in Ukraine, Syria, or elsewhere in the next year. 

President Putin is likely to increase his use of repression and intimidation to contend with domestic 

discontent over corruption, poor social services, and a sluggish economy with structural deficiencies. 

He will continue to manipulate the media, distribute perks to maintain elite support, and elevate 

younger officials to convey an image of renewal. He is also likely to expand the government's legal 

basis for repression and to enhance his capacity to intimidate and monitor political threats, perhaps 

using the threat of "extremism" or the 2018 World Cup to justifY his actions. 

In 2018, Russia will continue to modernize, develop, and field a wide range of advanced nuclear, 

conventional, and asymmetric capabilities to balance its perception of a strategic military inferiority 

vis-a-vis the United States. 

Ukraine 

Ukraine remains at risk of domestic turmoi~ which Russia could exploit to undermine Kyiv's pro-West 

orientation. These factors will threaten Ukraine's nascent economic recovery and potentially lead to 

changes in its foreign policy that further inflame tension between Russia and the West. 

Popular frustrations with the pace of reforms, depressed standards of living, perceptions of 

worsening corruption, and political polarization ahead of scheduled presidential and legislative 

elections in 2019 could prompt early elections. 

• Opposition leaders will seek to capitalize on popular discontent to weaken President Petro 

Poroshenko and the ruling coalition ahead of elections in 2019. 

The conflict in eastern Ukraine is likely to remain stalemated and marked by fluctuating levels of violence. 

A major offinsive by either side is unlikely in 2018, although each side's calculus could change if it sees the 

other as seriously challenging the status quo. Russia will continue its military, political, and economic 

destabilization campaign against Ukraine to stymie and, where possible, reverse Kyiv's efforts to 

integrate with the EU and strengthen ties to NATO. Kyiv will strongly resist concessions to 

Moscow but almost certainly will not regain control of Russian-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine 

in 2018. Russia will modulate levels of violence to pressure Kyiv and shape negotiations in 

Moscow's favor. 

• Russia will work to erode Western unity on sanctions and support for Kyiv, but the Kremlin is 

coping with sanctions at existing levels. 

Belarus, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Moldova 

The Kremlin will seek to maintain and, where possible, expand its influence throughout the former Soviet 

countries that it asserts are in its self-described sphere of influence. 

Russia views Belarus as a critical buffer between itself and NATO and will seek to spoil any 

potential warming between Minsk and the West. Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenko will 

continue close security cooperation with Moscow but will continue to aim for normalized relations 

with the West as a check on Russia's influence. 

24 
36 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 25 here 28947.025

Russia's continued occupation of20 percent of Georgia's territory and efforts to undermine its 

Western integration will remain the primary sources ofThilisi's insecurity. The ruling Georgian 

Dream party is likely to seek to stymie the opposition and reduce institutional constraints on its 

power. 

Tension over the disputed region ofNagorno-Karabakh could devolve into a large-scale military 

conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which could draw in Russia to support its regional ally. 

Both sides' reluctance to compromise, mounting domestic pressures, Azerbaijan's steady military 

modernization, and Armenia's acquisition of new Russian equipment sustain the risk oflarge-scale 

hostilities in 2018. 

Russia will pressure Central Asia's leaders to reduce engagement with Washington and support 

Russian-led economic and security initiatives, while concerns about ISIS in Afghanistan will push 

Moscow to strengthen its security posture in the region. Poor governance and weak economies raise 

the risk of radicalization-especially among the many Central Asians who travel to Russia or other 

countries for work-presenting a threat to Central Asia, Russia, and Western societies. China will 

probably continue to expand outreach to Central Asia-while deferring to Russia on security and 

political matters-because of concern that regional instability could undermine China's economic 

interests and create a permissive environment for extremists, which, in Beijing's view, could enable 

Uighur militant attacks in China. 

Moldova's ostensibly pro-European ruling coalition-unless it is defeated in elections planned for 

November-probably will seek to curb Russian influence and maintain a veneer of European reform 

while avoiding changes that would damage the coalition's grip on power. The current Moldovan 

Government probably will move forward on implementing Moldova's EU Association Agreement 

against the will of openly pro-Russian and Russian-backed President Igor Dodon. Settlement talks 

over the breakaway region ofTransnistria will continue, but progress likely will be limited to small 

issues. 

EUROPE 

The European Union and European national governments will struggle to develop common approaches to 

counter a variety of security challenges, including instability on their periphery, i"egular migration to their 

region, heightened terrorist threats, and Russian influence campaigns, undercutting Western cohesion. 

These concerns are spurring many countries to increase defense spending and enhance 

capabilities. 

European governments will need to strengthen their counterterrorism regimes to deal with a 

diverse threat, including ISIS aspirants and returning foreign fighters. 

Turkey's counterterrorism cooperation with the United States against ISIS is likely to continue, but 

thwarting Kurdish regional ambitions will be a foreign policy priority. President Recep Tayyip 

Erdogan is likely to employ polarizing rhetoric, straining bilateral relations and cooperation on 

shared regional goals. 

25 
37 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 26 here 28947.026

AFRICA 

Nigeria--the continent's largest economy--will face a security threat from Boko Haram and ISIS West 

Africa (ISIS-WA) while battling internal challenges from crimina~ militant, and secessionist groups. 

ISIS-W A and Boko Haram are regional menaces, conducting cross-border attacks in Nigeria, 

Cameroon, Chad, and Niger and posing a threat to Western interests. Meanwhile, militant and 

secessionist groups in in the southern and central areas of Nigeria are capitalizing on longstanding 

social and economic grievances as the country nears the 2019 presidential election. 

Politically fragile governments in Africa's Sahel region will remain vulnerable to terror attacks in 2018, 

despite tifforts to coordinate their counterterror operations. ISIS and al-Qa'ida-allied groups, along with 

other violent extremists, will attempt to target Western and local government interests in the region, 

and a stalled peace process is likely to undercut the presidential election in Mali. 

The Ethiopian and Kenyan Governments are likely to face opposition from publics agitating for redress of 

political grievances. Somalia's recently elected government probably will struggle to project its authority 

and implement security reforms amid the drawdown of African Union forces in 2018, while al-Shabaabthe most potent terrorist threat to US interests in East Africa-probably will increase attacks. 

Clashes between the South Sudanese Government and armed opposition groups will continue, raising the 

risk of additional mass atrocities as both sides use ethnic militias and hate speech and the government 

continues its crackdown on ethnic minorities. The South Sudanese are the world's fastest growing 

refugee population, and the significant humanitarian challenges stemming from the conflict, 

including severe food insecurity, will strain the resources of neighboring countries hosting refugees. 

Sndan is likely to continue some aspects of its constructive engagement with the United States following the 

suspension of sanctions because it has given priority to shedding its international pariah status and reviving 

its economy. Khartoum probably will acquiesce to some US requests, such as increasing 

counterterrorism cooperation and improving humanitarian access, but will be reluctant to take any 

steps that it perceives jeopardize its national security interests. 

Political unrest and security threats across the region are likely to intensifY as the Presidents of Burundi 

and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR C) face public and armed opposition to their rule and the 

Central African Republic (CAR) struggles to cope with a nationwide surge in conflict. Over-stretched UN 

missions in CAR and DRC are unlikely to stem the rising challenges from their concurrent 

humanitarian and security crises. 

26 
38 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 27 here 28947.027

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

A key feature of the 2018 political environment in Latin America almost certainly will be popular 

frustration with low economic growth, corruption scandals, and the specter of endemic criminal activity in 

some countries. Larger and increasingly sophisticated middle classes-with greater access to social 

media-are demanding more accountability from their governments. Presidential elections, 

including those in Mexico and Colombia, will occur at a time when support for political parties and 

governing institutions is at record lows and could bolster the appeal of outsider candidates. 

Mexico 

Mexicans are focused on presidential and legislative elections scheduled for July 2018, in which 

corruption, high violence, and a tepid economy will be key issues. The Mexican Government has 

made slow progress implementing rule-of-law reforms and will continue to rely on the military to 

lead counternarcotics efforts. Mexico's $1.1 trillion economy benefits from strong economic 

fundamentals, but uncertainty over trade relationships and higher-than-expected inflation could 

further slow economic growth. President Enrique Pena Nieto is focusing on domestic priorities, 

including recovery from the September 2017 earthquakes and managing impacts from potential US 

policy shifts ahead of the elections. In recent years, Mexican US-bound migration has been net 

negative but might increase if economic opportunity at home declined. 

Central America 

Insecurity and lack of economic opportunities likely will remain the principal drivers of irregular 

migration from the Northern Triangle countries ofEl Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. 

Homicide rates in these countries remain high, and gang-related violence is still prompting Central 

Americans to flee. 

Venezuela 

Economic woes and international diplomatic pressure probably will put political pressure on the 

Venezuelan Government in 2018. Living standards have declined and shortages ofbasic goods are 

driving the increase in Venezuelans seeking asylum in the United States and the region. Venezuela's 

negotiations with creditors probably will lead to messy legal battles. Venezuela almost certainly will 

seek to minimize further disruptions to oil production and exports to maintain its critical oil export 

earnings. Oil prices have increased slightly this year, but crude oil production continues to decline. 

Colombia 

President Juan Manuel Santos will seek to cement implementation of the Revolutionary Artned 

Forces of Colombia (F ARC) peace accord, as campaigning intensifies for the May 2018 presidential 

election. The FARC's new political-party status and the uncertainty around the transitional justice 

reforms will be a factor in the political environment ahead of elections. Substantial budget 

constraints will slow major programs or policy changes. The influx ofF ARC dissidents, drug 

traffickers, and other illegal actors into remote areas will challenge security forces during the next 12 

months. Cocaine production in Colombia is at an all-time high, and crop substitution and 

eradication programs are facing stiff local resistance. 

27 
39 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 28 here 28947.028

Cuba 

Havana will seek to manage President Raul Castro's planned retirement in April2018. Castro's 

successor will inherit a stagnant economy and a stalled economic reform process. 

Haiti 

As President Jovenel Moise begins his second year in office, he will confront competing interests 

within his government, a vocal opposition, and a fragile economy. Crime and protest activity will 

test the Haitian National Police following the departure of the UN Stabilization Mission in October 

2017 and the transition to a police-only UN mission. 

28 
40 

Chairman BURR. Dan, thank you very much for that very thorough overview of the world and what’s at play. 

I’ll recognize Members based upon seniority for up to five minutes. The Chair recognizes himself. 

Admiral Rogers, according to the statement for the record the intelligence community assesses that most detected Chinese cyber operations against the United States’ private industry are focused on 

cleared defense contractors or IT and communications firms whose 

products and services support government and private sector networks nationwide. Rate the intelligence community’s performance 

when it comes to notifying cleared defense contractors and other 

sensitive private sector actors about malicious cyber activities on 

their networks. 

Admiral ROGERS. First, in all honesty, you’re asking me to rate 

a function for which I don’t have responsibility or day-to-day execution. So I’ll give an opinion, but it’s not informed by day-to-day experience per se. This is an issue both at NSA and at Cyber Command, although I try to work very aggressively because, as you 

have outlined, it’s a tremendous concern for us in the Department. 

Clearly, I think we are not where we need to be. The challenge 

I think is we’ve got multiple areas of knowledge and insight across 

the Federal Government, within the private sector, and how do we 

bring this together in an integrated team, with some real-time flow 

back and forth? That is not where we are today, but that’s where 

we’ve got to get to. 

Chairman BURR. In your estimation, are we doing enough to 

warn the private sector of the threat that’s out there? 

Admiral ROGERS. I think we are informing them as we become 

aware of it. But one of my concerns is we’re only going to see one 

slice of this picture. I’m also interested in it from the private sector’s perspective. Tell us what you are seeing. If we can bring these 

two together, we’ll have such a broader perspective and much more 

in-depth knowledge of what’s happening. I think that’s part of this. 

It’s not just, hey, one side needs to do a better job. I’m not trying 

to say it’s two-sided, but I think it’s our ability to bring this together as a team. 

Chairman BURR. Given that you’ve seen the difficulty especially 

this Committee and the intelligence community has had communicating with the tech companies about a way forward that is in 

commonality, are you concerned at how this is going to become an 

increasingly challenging landscape for both Congress and for the 

intelligence community working as we see new tech firms emerge 

every day? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, I am, because, quite frankly, I wonder, 

how bad does it have to get before we realize we have to do some 

things fundamentally differently? I would argue if you look at the 

Internet of Things, you look at the security levels within those components, folks, this is going to orders of magnitude. If we think the 

problem is a challenge now, if we just wait it’s going to get much, 

much worse, exponentially, from a security perspective. 

Chairman BURR. Director Pompeo, the IC assesses that North 

Korea is likely to press ahead with more tests in 2018, missile 

tests, noting that North Korea’s foreign minister indicated an atmospheric nuclear test over the Pacific may be under consideration 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

41 

by Pyongyang. What’s the IC assess the regional reaction to this 

kind of test would be? 

Director POMPEO. Senator, thanks for the question. If I may just 

take one minute to say, I’ve been doing this for a year now and I 

want to express my appreciation to this Committee for helping the 

CIA do the things it needs to do, providing us the resources and 

the authorities we need. We have put a lot of effort against this 

very problem. You have been incredibly supportive of that. So my 

team thanks you for that. 

We think a test like that would certainly further unite the region. Having said that, our sense is that we have built a global coalition pushing back against Kim Jong Un and his terror regime. 

With respect to what each particular country might do, I’d prefer 

to keep that conversation to closed session this afternoon. 

Chairman BURR. Great. 

What’s the IC’s assessment of North Korea’s willingness to employ its expansive conventional military capabilities? 

Director POMPEO. Senator, one of the things that Director Coats 

referred to in his opening remarks is that Kim Jong Un remains 

not only intent on staying in power, the thing all dictators prefer 

to do, die in their sleep fully at the peak of their power; but he has 

this mission that is a longstanding North Korean idea of reunification. Their capacity to use a nuclear umbrella combined with their 

conventional forces to exert coercive behavior, certainly inside their 

country, certainly against South Korea, but more broadly, is something that our analysts are continuing to look at. 

We can see as they ratchet up their nuclear capability, making 

a response more different, their capacity to do harm in the region 

as a result of their incredible conventional capabilities alone increases. 

Chairman BURR. Probably for General Ashley and Admiral Rogers: According to the statement for the record, the widespread proliferation of artificial intelligence is likely to prompt new national 

security concerns. How is the IC accounting for the possibility of 

these new national security concerns? Are we seeing indications 

now that our adversaries are working to harness emerging technologies, like artificial intelligence, and is the IC looking to maximize the potential of emerging technologies in our own processes 

and analysis of data and intelligence? 

General ASHLEY. Sir, if I could take a first shot at that one. You 

look at DIA—and thanks for all the support the Committee provides to the Defense Intelligence Agency. If you look at our coordination, if you look at foreign militaries and the operational environment, this is central to looking at doctrine and what they’re developing. When you think about artificial intelligence, our near-peer 

competitors are pursuing this. It’s a lot of commercial technology 

that’s available. But when you look at the volume, big data and 

what’s available, the ability to digest and pull all that information 

in, artificial intelligence is going to be integral to that. 

An example of one of the projects we’re working on—and this is 

at the open source level—Project Maven. You look at full motion 

video, for example, or social media. In full motion video, you’re 

never going to be able to have the work force that’s going to be able 

to go through all of the material, whether it’s video, whether it’s 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

42 

what Admiral Rogers works in the way of signals intelligence, or 

what’s available in social media. So artificial intelligence, machine 

learning, which is really kind of where we are right now. It’s more 

machine learning than it is artificial intelligence. We’re seeing all 

of our near-peer competitors invest in these kinds of technologies 

because it’s going to get them to decision cycles faster, allow them 

to digest information in greater volumes, and have a better situational understanding of what’s happening in the battle space, and 

in some cases just what’s happening in the strategic environment. 

Admiral ROGERS. Sir, I would agree with General Ashley. I 

would also highlight, every organization on this table is faced with 

the challenge of victims of our own success in some ways. The ability to access data at increased levels brings its own set of challenges. So we are collectively all attempting to deal with this. 

When I look at potential adversaries, I see them going through 

the same set of challenges. I would argue when I look at the PRC 

in particular, there clearly is a national strategy designed to harness the power of artificial intelligence to generate strategic outcomes, along the lines that General Ashley highlighted, to generate 

positive outcomes. 

You look at their research, you look at how it is affecting the 

amount of data they are going after. I can remember five, ten years 

ago looking at some data concentrations and thinking to myself: 

This is so large and has such a disparate amount of information 

in it, boy, it would be really different for an opponent potentially 

to generate insight and knowledge from it. I don’t have those kinds 

of conversation any more. 

With the power of machine learning, artificial intelligence, and 

big data analytics, data concentrations now increasingly are targets 

of attraction to a whole host of actors. We have watched the PRC 

and others engage in activities designed to access these massive 

data concentrations. 

General ASHLEY. If I could follow up on that also, because this 

is one of those areas that’s debatable in the commercial industry, 

so you see a lot of investment, academia and others, that are pursuing this. So there’s a key piece of this I think is worth addressing 

as well, which is how do you operationalize it? If I could just use 

a World War II example, the fact that there were planes, radios, 

and tanks was not unique to the Germans in World War II. What 

they did is they came up with an operational concept that allowed 

them to leverage that. 

Peter Singer, if anyone’s ever read ‘‘Wired for War’’ or ‘‘Ghost 

Fleet,’’ is a futurist. We sat on a panel with him a couple years ago, 

and it was interesting when I asked him: As you look at the things 

that are emerging from the technology and things that are coming 

out, what do you see in the way of breakthroughs to give somebody 

a really marked advantage? Peter’s comment wasn’t that I see 

something that gives someone such a marked advantage. It’s who’s 

able to harness it, who’s able to operationalize it and put it to effect. So that’s really a key difference, because a lot of that technology is going to be available globally. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you. 

Director COATS. If I could just ask your permission here, Robert 

Cardillo’s agency NGA has probably taken some very significant 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

43 

lead on this, given the enormous volume of collection that they take 

and the inability to process that through the use of humans. I’ve 

asked Robert to be prepared to answer that question for you because I think they’re taking some leading efforts that might be 

helpful. 

Director CARDILLO. I think it’s important to note at the front 

what hasn’t changed. Quite frankly, the mission, the responsibility, 

this whole table has is to provide you with decision advantage. 

What’s changed is the world around us and now within us. So what 

we used to hold exclusively because we had capabilities that others 

didn’t, is now more shared. So as Admiral Rogers has said, this is 

something that we all lock arms on, because it isn’t the access that 

is exclusive anymore; it’s the use. It’s the concept of operations, as 

General Ashley said. 

I have the same concerns you do about getting the cooperation 

we need from these companies. I’m rather optimistic about it because I think at the end of the day we can advance the American 

economy, we can advance American entrepreneurship, and we can 

advance our understanding of the world in a way that gets back 

to that first step, which is decision advantage. 

Chairman BURR. Rest assured, the processing of data will come 

up in our closed session with you. I’ve got you targeted. 

Vice Chair. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think I take with some note the fact that the ODNI Director 

started his discussion with cyber. I think it’s very telling in terms 

of how we view worldwide threats. 

Let me get one question out on the record. We all know it’s been 

over a year since the Russian intervention in our 2016 elections. 

We’ve also seen Russia intervene in a number of other Western democracies. I’d like each of you to briefly reconfirm to the American 

public that our intelligence community understands this threat. 

Last year those of you who were on the panel each expressed 

confidence in the January 2017 IC assessment that Russia interfered in the 2016 elections. I’d like each of you today to, one, reaffirm that; and also, with a simple yes or no, do you agree with Director Pompeo that we haven’t seen a significant decrease in the 

Russian activity and we have every expectation—and, Director 

Coats, you’ve already alluded to this—that they’ll try to continue 

to intervene in our elections in 2018 and 2020. We’ll start with you, 

Director Cardillo. A simple yes or no will do. 

Director CARDILLO. No change in my view of the 2017 assessment. I support that. And I agree with Director Pompeo’s assessment about the likelihood of the 2018 occurrence as well. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Admiral. 

Admiral ROGERS. I participated in that 2017 work. I stood by it 

then and I stand by it now, and I agree with Director Pompeo: This 

is not going to change or stop. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. General Ashley. 

General ASHLEY. Yes, it is not going to change, nor is it going 

to stop. 

Director COATS. Throughout the entire community, we have not 

seen any evidence of any significant change from last year. 

Director POMPEO. I agree with Director Pompeo. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

44 

[Laughter.] 

Vice Chairman WARNER. You’ve been waiting for that answer. 

Director POMPEO. I have. I’ve had that one in the pocket for a 

while, yes, sir. 

Director WRAY. As do I. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. One area that I think we were all a little all caught off guard on, and to a degree understandably, was 

how the Russians use social media. I realize this is a new area for 

all of us and there are legitimate issues around American civil 

rights that have to be balanced. But the fact is I think we have to 

have an organized plan going forward. 

This question will be directed at DNI Coats and Director Wray, 

but if others want to weigh in. Because of the notion that these 

companies, while maybe located here, operate in cyber space and 

when we’ve got somebody masquerading as Mike Pompeo but is actually Boris Badenov in St. Petersburg, it doesn’t fit neatly into a 

particular flow chart. 

Director Coats and Director Wray, who is in charge of addressing 

the threat posed by foreign nationals or foreign nations in terms 

of their use and misuse of social media? 

Director COATS. There’s no single agency, quote, ‘‘in charge.’’ 

There are several agencies throughout the Federal Government 

that have equities in this, and we are working together to try to 

integrate that process. It clearly is something that needs to be addressed and addressed as quickly as possible. 

You and I have had a number of discussions about that. So we 

are keen on moving forward in terms of not only identification, but 

relative response and things that we can do to prevent this from 

happening. We are gaining more, I think, support from the private 

sector, who are beginning to recognize ever more the issues that 

are faced with the material that comes through their processes. We 

cannot as a government direct them what to do, but we certainly 

are spending every effort we can to work with them to provide 

some answers to this question. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Great. 

Director WRAY. I would agree with Director Coats. I think it’s a 

team effort, and one of the things that’s really jumped out at me 

since being back in government is how much more of a team the 

intelligence community is than the last time I was in this space. 

I have one of Mike’s people who sits right in my inner team, and 

vice versa, and we’re dealing with each other every day. So it’s 

teamwork within the intelligence community and then partnership 

with the private sector, which is I think the other big change I’ve 

noticed. There’s a lot more forward-leaning engagement with the 

private sector in terms of trying to share information and raise 

awareness on their end, because at the end of the day we can’t 

fully police social media, so we have to work with them so that 

they can police themselves a little bit better as well. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Well, let me say I think the companies 

themselves are slow to recognize this threat. I think they’ve still 

got more work to do. But the fact that we don’t have clarity in 

terms of who’s in charge means I believe we don’t have a full plan. 

Let me just get one last question in quickly on the rise—and the 

Chairman has alluded to this as well—the rise of Chinese tech 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

45 

companies. I know Senator Cornyn and Senator Feinstein have got 

legislation on CFIUS. But my fear is that some of these Chinese 

tech companies may not even have to acquire an American company before they become pervasive in our market. 

Again, I’ll start with Director Coats and Director Wray: How do 

we make sure that we send a signal to the private sector before 

some of these companies in effect totally invade our market, particularly because so many of them are tied back to the Chinese government? 

Director COATS. Well, I think it’s not only sending a signal and 

working together, sharing information with the private sector and 

the public sector. It also I think involves almost a whole of government issue, in particular legislative, with the legislation that is 

being looked at in terms of the CFIUS process. I think we need to 

go beyond what the current process is in terms of evaluating. We 

as a community will coordinate our intelligence to provide policymakers and those that are making these decisions with the best intelligence we can relative to what the situation is. 

So we view this as a top priority, and it’s ongoing because, as I 

mentioned in my earlier remarks here, the Chinese are pervasive 

on this and we’ve seen it happen throughout both the public and 

the private sector. 

Director WRAY. We’ve tried very hard to be more out and about 

in the private sector in terms of providing what are almost like defensive briefings, so that some of the U.S. telecommunications companies, among other technology industry members, kind of can recognize the threats that are coming their way. I think I’ve been 

pretty gratified by the response that we’ve gotten by most companies once we’re able to try to educate them. 

I think one of the bigger challenges we face is that, because 

America is the land of innovation, there’s a lot of very exciting stuff 

that’s happening in terms of smaller startup companies. A lot of 

them are a lot less sophisticated about some of this stuff, and trying to make sure we’re touching those and educating them as well 

is a continuing challenge. The reality is that the Chinese have 

turned more and more to creative avenues, using nontraditional 

collectors, which I think we in the intelligence community recognize, but I think the private sector is not used to spotting. So a lot 

of it is trying to educate them about what to be on the lookout for 

and to have it be more of a dialogue. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you very much. 

First of all, I want to associate myself with the remarks of the 

Vice Chairman when he said that this Committee will always have 

your backs. For those of you who’ve been associated with this Committee—Dan, since you used to sit here; and Director Pompeo, you 

ran the same operation across the way; Mr. Cardillo, Mr. Rogers— 

you guys seem like part of the committee, we see you so much up 

there. You know that’s the case, and we sincerely appreciate that. 

Every one of us here knows what a tough job each of your agencies has. Speaking for myself and I suspect for most, if not all, of 

the committee, we have absolute 100 percent confidence in your 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

46 

ability to, in a very neutral, dispassionate fashion, deliver to us the 

facts that we need in order to make the policy decisions. 

One of the things that does rear its ugly head occasionally and 

causes issues and that winds up in the media a lot more than it 

should is when your jobs intersect with domestic political affairs. 

Mr. Wray, probably you will wind up with this more than anybody 

else. It gets messy. It gets difficult. I think we’ve all got to recommit ourselves to what we’re actually doing here to reach the right 

facts. 

I would respectfully disagree with my good friend from Virginia 

that we are no better prepared to handle the Russians’ onslaught 

in 2018 than we were in 2016. When this happened in 2016, those 

of us on this Committee, those of you at the panel, and most of you, 

most everyone who works in the IC, were not surprised to find out 

that the Russians were attempting to meddle in our affairs. 

I think probably one of the best hearings we’ve had this year was 

the open hearing we had on how they use social media. We saw 

how disjointed it was, how ineffective it was, how cheap it was for 

them to do that. But I think after that, with all due respect to my 

friend from Virginia, I think the American people are ready for 

this. I think that now they’re going to look askance a lot more at 

the information that is attempted to be passed out through social 

media. 

The American people are smart people. They realize that there’s 

people attempting to manipulate them, both domestic and foreign. 

I agree with everybody on the panel that this is going to go on. 

This is the way the Russians have done business. This is no surprise to us. We saw it even more so than we got it in France and 

Germany in the past year. 

So I think the American people are much more prepared than 

they were before. 

Dan, thank you for that analysis of Syria. I doubt it made it any 

clearer for me or for the American people. It’s a Rubik’s Cube that 

is very difficult and, after this weekend, I think it got even more 

complicated. I think that we’re going to have to keep an eye on 

that. 

I agree with you, cyber is certainly something that’s right at the 

top. The financial condition of this country is of critical importance 

to us. 

I want to close and I want to ask a specific question to four of 

you regarding Korea. I think that’s the most existential threat that 

we face. I think it’s something that’s at our doorstep. A year ago 

when we talked about this, it was then. This is now. The movement of North Korea has not slowed down. In fact, if anything I 

think all of us would agree that it’s probably picked up. And it’s 

at our doorstep. 

This is going to have to be dealt with in the very, very near future. We’ve talked about trying to engage in conversations and 

what conditions would be, etcetera. I think we’re still in the process 

of refining that. But that’s moving. 

We’ve all watched over the last week the smile campaign that 

North Korea has inflicted on the South Korean people. The South 

Korean people seem to be charmed by it to some degree. Some of 

them seem to be captivated by it. From my point of view, I think 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

47 

it’s nothing more than a stall by the North Koreans to further develop what they’re trying to do; and I suspect in my judgment I 

think we need to be very, very cautious of this. 

Director Coats, Pompeo, Rogers, and Ashley, I’d like to hear your 

view of this supposed turn in the last couple of weeks by the North 

Koreans? 

Director COATS. Well, this is an existential threat, potentially to 

the United States, but also to North Korea. Kim Jung Un views 

any kind of kinetic attack or effort to force him to give up his nuclear weapons as an existential threat to his nation and to his leadership in particular. 

As you know, it’s a very hard collection nation, given their secrecy and so forth. But we do know that it’s a one-man decision. 

We have processes in place here in the United States to have multiple engagements with various agencies in terms of our policymaking and relative to the decision that ultimately the President 

makes. That does not appear to be the case in North Korea. 

The provocative nature and the instability that Kim has demonstrated potentially is a significant threat to the United States. I 

agree with you that the decision time is becoming ever closer in 

terms of how we respond to this. Our goal is a peaceful settlement. 

We are using maximum pressure on North Korea in various ways, 

which can be described by my colleagues here, most of that in 

closed session. But we have to face the fact that this is a potentially existential problem for the United States. 

Senator RISCH. Wise words. 

Director Pompeo. 

Director POMPEO. The last part of your question, about this past 

now almost week at the Olympics: We should all, the American 

people should all remember that Kim Jung Un is the head of the 

propaganda and agitation department. There is no indication 

there’s any strategic change in the outlook for Kim Jung Un and 

his desire to retain his nuclear capacity to threaten the United 

States of America. No change there. 

Senator RISCH. Admiral Rogers. 

Admiral ROGERS. I would just say if KJU thinks he can split the 

relationship between ourselves and the South Koreans he is sadly 

mistaken. 

Senator RISCH. And finally, Lieutenant General Ashley. 

General ASHLEY. No change to his strategic calculus. As a matter 

of fact, under the KJU regime you’ve seen a much more deliberate 

effort in terms of readiness, very different from his father. So 

you’ve got a million man army, 70 percent of it is south of 

Pyongyang, and they train in a very deliberate fashion. The strategic calculus has not changed and we should not be misled by the 

events that are taking place around the Olympics. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you so much. 

My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thanks very much. 

I want to associate myself with some of the comments of Senator 

Risch. We just had a secure briefing last week and I think it was 

difficult and harsh. I harken back to the words of the Secretary of 

State on the three nos: one, that we do not seek regime change; 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

48 

two, we do not—we are not seeking the accelerated reunion of the 

peninsula; and finally, that we will not bring U.S. forces north of 

the Demilitarized Zone if the Korean Peninsula is reunified. 

Let me ask you, Mr. Pompeo, because you just spoke with some 

certainty: Does Kim Jung Un really understand and believe that 

our goals are not regime change or regime collapse? 

Director POMPEO. Senator Feinstein, I can’t give you any certainty about what Kim Jung Un actually subjectively believes. A 

very difficult intelligence problem anywhere in the world, most especially difficult there. I have expressed this before: We do remain 

concerned, our analysts remain concerned, that Kim Jung Un is 

not hearing the full story. That is, that those around him aren’t 

providing nuance, aren’t suggesting to him the tenuous nature of 

his position both internationally and domestically, the breach with 

China, and the deep connections between the United States and 

the Republic of Korea. 

We are not at all certain that the leaders around him are sharing 

that information in a way that is accurate, complete, and full. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. In a recent Washington Post op-ed, Victor 

Cha, who was recently under consideration to be United States 

Ambassador to South Korea, warned of the dangers of a preventive 

United States military strike against North Korea. He cautioned 

that such a strike would not halt North Korea’s nuclear weapons 

program and could spark an uncontrolled conflict in the region that 

could kill hundreds of thousands of Americans. 

He is not the only one. A number of experts on the area have 

said that. He argued to continue to press for multilateral sanctions 

at the UN, to provide Japan and South Korea advanced weapons 

training and intel, and some other things. 

Has the intelligence community assessed how the North Korean 

regime would react to a preventive United States attack? 

Director POMPEO. We have. I would prefer to share that with you 

in closed session this afternoon. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Would you do that this afternoon? 

Director POMPEO. Yes, absolutely, Senator, yes. We have written 

about various forms of actions. We analyze the certainty and uncertainty we have around that analysis, as well as what we think happens in the event that the United States decides not to do that and 

continues to allow Kim Jung Un to develop his nuclear weapons arsenal. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Have you explored what it would take to 

bring them to the table? 

Director POMPEO. We have. I prefer to share that with you in 

closed session, yes, ma’am. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Would you bring that to our attention this 

afternoon as well? 

Director POMPEO. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

49 

Thank you all for being here. I also echo the same words everyone else has shared with you about the esteem we have for all of 

our agencies and the important work they do. 

I—and I think this has already been touched upon. I do believe 

that Russia, Vladimir Putin in particular, efforts around the world 

are very important. But the biggest issue of our time in my view, 

and I think in the view of most of the Members of this Committee 

and I would venture to guess most of the members of this panel, 

is China and the risks they pose. 

I’m not sure, in the 240-some odd year history of this Nation, we 

have ever faced a competitor and potential adversary of this scale, 

scope, and capacity. It is my personal view, and it’s shared by 

many people, that they are carrying out a well-orchestrated, wellexecuted, very patient, long-term strategy to replace the United 

States as the most powerful and influential nation on Earth. 

You see that reflected in this repeated use of this term ‘‘community of common destiny,’’ which basically means a retreat from 

Western values of democracy and freedom and openness towards 

some other model that benefits them. Their pursuit of this appears 

to be every element of their national power—military, commercial, 

trade, economic, information, and media. 

The tools they use are everything from hacking into companies 

and critical infrastructure and defense contractors, everybody you 

can imagine, to using our immigration system against us, to even 

our universities. 

That’s where I wanted to begin. This week I—well, let me just 

ask this, and I’d start this with Director Coats: Is it your view that 

the United States today as a government is prepared for the scale, 

scope, and magnitude of the challenge presented by this plan that 

China’s carrying out? 

Director COATS. We have full awareness of what the Chinese are, 

attempting to have full awareness of what the Chinese are attempting to do on a global basis. There’s no question that what you 

have just articulated is what’s happening with China. They’re 

doing it in a very smart way. They’re doing it in a very effective 

way. They are looking beyond their own region. I think they have— 

it’s clear that they have a long-term strategic objective to become 

a world power and they are executing throughout the whole of government ways in which they can accomplish that. 

We have intensive studies going on throughout the intelligence 

community relative to A to Z on what China is doing. General 

Mattis has asked us for that. Others have asked us to provide that. 

Senator Warner called me last week. We had a discussion on that. 

I assured him that we are pulling all of our elements of intelligence-gathering together to provide a very, very deep dive into 

what China is doing now and what their plans are for the future 

and how it would impact on the United States. 

Senator RUBIO. Just to highlight the different ways and 

untraditional ways in which they’re pursuing this plan, Director 

Wray, let me ask you, what in your view could you say in this setting is the counterintelligence risk posed to U.S. national security 

from Chinese students, particularly those in advanced programs in 

the sciences and mathematics? 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

50 

Director WRAY. I think in this setting I would just say that the 

use of nontraditional collectors, especially in the academic setting, 

whether it’s professors, scientists, students, we see in almost every 

field office that the FBI has around the country. It’s not just in 

major cities. It’s in small ones as well. It’s across basically every 

discipline. 

I think the level of naivete on the part of the academic sector 

about this creates its own issues. They’re exploiting the very open 

research and development environment that we have, which we all 

revere, but they’re taking advantage of it. 

So one of the things we’re trying to do is view the China threat 

as not just a whole of government threat, but a whole of society 

threat on their end. I think it’s going to take a whole of society response by us. So it’s not just the intelligence community, but it’s 

raising awareness within our academic sector, within our private 

sector, as part of the defense. 

Senator RUBIO. In that vein, last week I wrote a letter to five 

higher education institutions in Florida about the Confucius Institutes, which are funded by Chinese government dollars, at U.S. 

schools. It is my view that they’re complicit in these efforts to covertly influence public opinion and to teach half-truths designed to 

present Chinese history, government, or official policy in the most 

favorable light. 

Do you share concerns about Confucius Institutes as a tool of 

that whole of society effort and as a way to exploit the sort of naive 

view among some in the academic circles about what the purpose 

of these institutes could be? 

Director WRAY. We do share concerns about the Confucius Institutes. We’ve been watching that development for a while. It’s just 

one of many tools that they take advantage of. We have seen some 

decrease recently in their own enthusiasm and commitment to that 

particular program, but it is something that we are watching warily and in certain instances have developed appropriate investigative steps. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Vice Chairman Warner highlighted in his opening statement the 

importance of an effective security clearance process. So I’ve got a 

question for you, Director Wray. Was the FBI aware of allegations 

related to Rob Porter and domestic abuse? And if so, was the White 

House informed this could affect his security clearance? When were 

they informed? And, who at the White House was informed? 

Director WRAY. Well, Senator, there’s a limit to what I can say 

about the content of any particular background investigation, for a 

variety of reasons that I’m sure you can appreciate. I would say 

that the background investigation process involves a fairly elaborate set of standards, guidelines, protocols, agreements, etcetera, 

that have been in place for 20-plus years, and I’m quite confident 

that in this particular instance the FBI followed the established 

protocols. 

Senator WYDEN. So was the White House informed that this 

could affect his security clearance? That’s a yes or no. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

51 

Director WRAY. I can’t get into the content of what was briefed 

to the—— 

Senator WYDEN. What were they informed? 

Director WRAY. What I can tell you is that the FBI submitted a 

partial report on the investigation in question in March and then 

a completed background investigation in late July; that soon thereafter we received request for follow-up inquiry; and we did the follow-up and provided that information in November; and that we 

administratively closed the file in January; and then earlier this 

month we received some additional information and we passed that 

on as well. 

Senator WYDEN. Okay. Let me turn now to the two recent arbitrary and inconsistent decisions that affect the politicizing of the 

classification system. The first was the public release of the Nunes 

memo. The second involved the report that the Congress required 

on Russian oligarchs, their relationship with President Putin, and 

indications of corruption. In that case the Secretary of the Treasury 

released nothing other than a list of rich Russians taken from public sources. 

My question—and any of you can respond—Did any of you take 

a position on either of these two arbitrary classification decisions, 

and did any of you have any communications with the White House 

about either of those classification matters? 

Director COATS. I’ll start, and the answer is no. 

General ASHLEY. No. 

Admiral ROGERS. I raised concerns on this issue with the DNI. 

Director CARDILLO. No. 

Director POMPEO. The CIA was not asked to review the classification of the document. 

Director WRAY. Not on the second, the oligarch Treasury document. We did have interaction about the memo from Chairman 

Nunes. 

Senator WYDEN. Is there anything you can say that protects 

sources and methods in an open session with respect to that matter? 

Director WRAY. Well, I would just say, as we said publicly, that 

we had grave concerns about that memo’s release. 

Senator WYDEN. Okay. 

On encryption: Director Wray, as you know—this isn’t a surprise 

because I indicated I would ask you about this—you have essentially indicated that companies should be making their products 

with back doors in order to allow you to do your job. And we all 

want you to protect Americans. At the same time, sometimes 

there’s these policies that make us less safe and give up our liberties. That’s what I think we get with what you are advocating, 

which is weak encryption. 

Now, this is a pretty technical area, as you and I have talked 

about, and there’s a field known as cryptography. I don’t pretend 

to be an expert on it. But I think there is a clear consensus among 

experts in the field against your position to weaken strong 

encryption. So I have asked you for a list of the experts that you 

have consulted. I haven’t been able to get it. Can you give me a 

date this afternoon when you will give me—this morning—a sense 

of when we will be told who these people are and who is advising 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

52 

you to pursue this route? Because I don’t know of anybody respected in the field who is advising that it is a good idea to adopt 

your position to weaken strong encryption. So can I get that list? 

Director WRAY. I would be happy to talk more about this topic 

this afternoon. My position is not that we should weaken 

encryption. My position is that we should be working together, government and the private sector, to try to find a solution that balances both concerns. 

Senator WYDEN. I’m on the program for working together. I just 

think we need to be driven by objective facts, and the position you 

all are taking is out of sync with what all the experts in the field 

are saying. I would just like to know who you are consulting with, 

and we’ll talk some more about it this afternoon. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Pompeo, last week the New York Times published a report that alleged that U.S. intelligence officials had paid $100,000 

to a Russian source for phony secrets, including potentially compromising information about the President and information on certain 

tools allegedly stolen from the NSA. 

First, is it accurate that the CIA has categorically denied the assertions in this story? And second, if so, what would be the motivations of a Russian who peddled this story to the New York Times 

and other Western media outlets? Is this part of the Russian campaign to undermine faith in Western democracies? 

Director POMPEO. Senator Collins, first let me say thanks for the 

question. Reporting on this matter has been atrocious. It’s been ridiculous, totally inaccurate. In our view, the suggestion the CIA 

was swindled is false. The people who were swindled were James 

Risen and Matt Rosenberg, the authors of those two pieces. Indeed, 

it’s our view that the same two people who were proffering phony 

information to the United States Government proffered that same 

phony information to these two reporters. 

The Central Intelligence Agency did not provide any resources, 

no money, to these two individuals who proffered U.S. Government 

information directly or indirectly at any time. And the information 

that we were working to try and retrieve was information that we 

believed might well have been stolen from the U.S. Government. It 

was unrelated to this idea of kompromat that appears in each of 

those two articles. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Director Wray, the President has repeatedly raised concerns 

about current and former FBI leaders and has alleged corruption 

and political bias in the performance of the FBI’s law enforcement 

and national security missions. I want to give you the opportunity 

today to respond to those criticisms. What is your reaction? 

Director WRAY. Well, Senator, I would say that my experience, 

now six months in with the FBI, has validated all my prior experiences with the FBI, which is that it is the finest group of professionals and public servants I could hope to work for. Every day, 

many, many, many times a day, I’m confronted with unbelievable 

examples of integrity, professionalism and grit. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

53 

There are 37,000 people in the FBI, who do unbelievable things 

all around the world. Although you would never know it from 

watching the news, we actually have more than two investigations. 

And most of them do a lot to keep Americans safe. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. That’s one of the reasons I wanted 

to give you an opportunity to respond. 

Director Coats, we’ve had a lot of discussion this morning about 

Russian attempts, which are ongoing, to influence elections in 

Western democracies, to undermine NATO, and to try to destroy 

institutions in our country and elsewhere. This is an election year 

in our country and it’s, frankly, frustrating to me that we haven’t 

passed legislation to help states strengthen their security of their 

voting systems. 

Putting that issue aside, there is also going to be an election this 

year in Latvia, one of our NATO allies. What is your assessment 

of whether or not the Russians are actively engaged in trying to influence that election, and how concerned is the intelligence community that they might be successful in producing a government that 

is very sympathetic to Russia’s foreign policy objectives? 

Director COATS. Not only are we concerned, the 29 nations of 

NATO are concerned. I returned not that long ago from a meeting 

in Brussels with the intelligence arm of NATO, all 29 nations. The 

topic was addressed primarily on Russian meddling in elections 

and trying to undermine democratic values. At the end of that, the 

new director of that organization asked for a show of hands or any 

verbal response from any representatives of the 29 nations if they 

thought that Russia had not interfered with their processes, and 

particularly their elections, or had the potential to do so. Not one 

person raised their hand. 

He said: So do I understand that we are unanimous in assessing 

what the Russians are trying to do to undermine our elections, to 

undermine our coordination with the United States and relationships with each other, to undermine the very basic principles of 

sharing with other European countries, everything that is accomplished through NATO? Do I understand that no one has an objection to—you all see this for what it is? 

Dead silence. He said: I take silence to be consent. So I think 

that says that this is pervasive, that the Russians have a strategy 

that goes well beyond what’s happening here in the United States, 

even though—while they have historically tried to do these kinds 

of things, clearly in 2016 they upped their game. The took advantage, sophisticated advantage of social media. They’re doing that 

not only in the United States, they’re doing that throughout Europe and perhaps elsewhere. 

So I think that sends a very strong signal that any elections that 

are coming up need to be—we need to assume that there might be 

interference with that, particularly from the Russians and maybe 

from some other malign actors, and steps need to be taken to work 

with State and local officials, because many of these elections in 

the off year will be State and local—governorships, even members 

of certain houses of representation within the states themselves. 

So it clearly is an issue that is whole of government and whole 

of—I would say this: The more—and we also agreed with this at 

Brussels and I tried to make that point while I was there. The 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

54 

more transparency we can provide to the American people, to people of nations that see this threat coming, the better off we will be. 

Obviously, we have to take other measures. But we need to inform the American public that this is real, that it’s going to be happening, and the resilience needed for us to stand up and say we’re 

not going to allow some Russian to tell us how to vote, how we 

ought to run our country. I think there needs to be a national cry 

for that. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Very valuable. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Heinrich. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Chairman. 

Director Wray, the FBI has been accused of political bias recently 

against the President, by the President himself. In fact, he said the 

FBI’s reputation is, quote, ‘‘in tatters.’’ Do you think the FBI’s reputation is in any way in tatters, and are you confident in the independence of your agents? 

Director WRAY. Senator, there’s no shortage of opinions about our 

agency, just like every other agency up here and just like the Congress. I can only speak from my experience. 

Senator HEINRICH. I think you’re doing better than the Congress. 

Director WRAY. And my experience has been that every office I 

go to, every division I go to, has patriots, people who could do anything else with their careers, but have chosen to work for the FBI 

because they believe in serving others. The feedback I get from our 

State and local law enforcement partners, from our foreign partners, from the folks we work with in the private sector and the 

community, office after office after office, has been very, very gratifying and reassuring to me. 

I’m a big believer in the idea that the FBI speaks through its 

work, through its cases, through the victims it protects. I encourage our folks not to get too hung up on what I consider to be the 

noise on TV and in social media. 

Senator HEINRICH. So you haven’t seen any evidence of some sort 

of inherent political bias in the agency? 

Director WRAY. No. 

Senator HEINRICH. How do statements like that impact the morale of rank and file agents, or are they able to shake that off? 

Director WRAY. Well, we have 37,000 people. They’re all individuals. They all think in their own way. But I guess I would say that 

our people are very mission-focused. They’re accustomed to the fact 

that we do some of the hardest things there are to do for a living. 

And I like to think that our folks are pretty sturdy. 

I think of a woman I met just the other day, an agent in the 

Miami office, who had a bad accident, 12 stitches in her face, and 

the next day, boom, right back at work. I think about the folks in 

the San Juan office that I visited recently. You want to talk about 

people going through a real storm. They do it, and they’re out in 

the community. I can tell you, the community values what they do 

on the island. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you. 

An op-ed by a number of former intelligence analysts called the 

Nunes memo and its release, quote, ‘‘one of the worst cases of 

politicization of intelligence in modern American history,’’ end 

quote. You said you had concerns about that memo. I know you 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

55 

can’t get into the gritty details of that, but can you say in your 

view whether or not one of those concerns is that it may have selectively cherry-picked information without presenting the entire fact 

pattern that led up to that FISA warrant application? 

Director WRAY. Well, Senator, I would just repeat what we said 

at the time, which is that we had then and continue to have now 

grave concerns about the accuracy of the memorandum because of 

omissions. We provided thousands of documents that were very 

sensitive and lots and lots of briefings, and it’s very hard for anybody to distill all that down to three and a half pages. 

Senator HEINRICH. Director Pompeo, have you seen Russian activity in the lead-up to the 2018 election cycle? 

[Pause.] 

Director POMPEO. Yes. I paused only I’m trying to make sure I 

stay on the unclassified side. Yes, we have seen Russian activity 

and intentions to have an impact on the next election cycle here. 

Senator HEINRICH. Director Coats. 

Director COATS. Yes, we have. 

Senator HEINRICH. Anyone else? Admiral Rogers. 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, and I think this would be a good topic to 

get into greater detail this afternoon. 

Senator HEINRICH. This afternoon, right. 

According to news reports, there are dozens of White House staff 

with only interim security clearances still, to include Jared 

Kushner, until last week to include White House Staff Secretary 

Rob Porter, what I would assume would have regularly reviewed 

classified documents as part of his job. 

Director Coats, if someone is flagged by the FBI with areas of 

concern in their background investigations into White House staff 

with interim clearances, should those staff continue to have access 

to classified materials? 

Director COATS. Let me first just speak in general relative to 

temporary classifications. Clearly, with a new administration in 

particular, we’re trying to fill a lot of new slots. And the classification process and security clearance process, as has been mentioned—— 

Senator HEINRICH. I’m only speaking with regard to folks who 

may have had issues raised, as opposed to just being in the matter 

of course of going through the long process. 

Director COATS. Well, I’m not in a position—and we can talk 

about this in the classified session. But I’m not in a position to discuss what individual situations are for specified individuals. I 

might just say that I think sometimes it is necessary to have some 

type of preliminary clearance in order to fill a slot. But I have publicly stated if that is the case the access has to be limited in terms 

of the kind of information they can be in a position to receive or 

not receive. 

So I think that’s something that we have to do as a part of our 

security clearance review. The process is broken. It needs to be reformed. As Senator Warner has previously said, it’s not evolution; 

it’s revolution. We have 700,000 backups. So we have situations 

where we need people in places, but they don’t yet have that. 

Your specific question I think I’d like to take up in the classified 

session. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

56 

Senator HEINRICH. Chairman, I’m over my time. 

Thank you, Director Coats. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Blunt. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Coats, Director Pompeo, Admiral Rogers, I think you all 

talked about evidence that the Russians would intend to do things 

to be active in our elections. There really seems to me two divisions 

of that activity. One is information that’s put on the record, misleading, false, trying to develop that level. The other, even more 

sinister, might be the level of dealing with the election system 

itself, the voting day system, the registration system. Of those two, 

clearly the voting day system, the one we need to have the most 

concerns about that critical infrastructure. 

This Committee has been working toward both of those goals, of 

trying to shore up critical infrastructure on Election Day as well 

as alert people to and decide what might be done about misinformation on the other side of the ledger. 

Voting begins in March. That’s next month. If we’re going to 

have any impact on securing that voting system itself, it would 

seem to me that we need to be acting quickly. I think a great part 

of the strength of the system is the diversity of the system, different not only from State to State, but from election jurisdictions 

within those states. That’s a strength, not a weakness, in my view. 

But what are some of the things we can do to be more helpful 

to local election officials in encouraging them to share information 

when they think their systems are being attacked, getting more information to them than we have. There was a lot of criticism in the 

last cycle that we knew that some election systems were being attacked and didn’t tell them they were being attacked. 

So the three of you in any order. Let’s just do the order that I 

started with: Director Coats, Director Pompeo, and Admiral Rogers. 

Any thoughts you have on what we can do to protect the critical 

infrastructure of the election system and how quickly we need to 

act if we intend to do that this year? 

Director COATS. Well, the intelligence community, all elements of 

it are aware, and we want to provide, collect and provide, as much 

information as we can, so that we can give those warnings and 

alerts, so that we can share information back and forth with local 

and State on election processes. 

With the Federal Government, the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, obviously are more involved, given these are domestic issues. But we do look to every piece of intelligence we can 

gather, so that we can provide these warnings. It is an effort that 

I think the government needs to put together at the State and local 

level and work with those individuals who are engaged in the election process. 

In terms of the security of their machines, cyber plays a major 

role here. So I think it is clearly an area where the Federal Government, foreign collection on potential threats of interference, 

warnings, and then processes in terms of how to put in place security and secure that to ensure the American people that their vote 

is sanctioned and well and not manipulated in any way whatsoever. 

Senator BLUNT. Director Pompeo. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

57 

Director POMPEO. Senator Blunt, when I answered Senator 

Heinrich’s question earlier I was referring to the former, the first 

part of your question, not truly to the latter. The things we’ve seen 

Russia doing to date are mostly focused on information types of 

warfare, the things that Senator Warner was speaking on most directly earlier. 

With respect to the CIA’s role—and I think Admiral Rogers will 

say his, too—we have two missions. One is to identify, identify the 

source of this information, make those here domestically aware of 

it so that they can do the things they need to do, whether that’s 

FBI or DHS, so that they have that information. We are working 

diligently along many threat vectors to do that. 

Then the second thing—and we can talk more about this this 

afternoon—is we do have some capabilities offensively to raise the 

cost for those who would dare challenge the United States’ elections. 

Senator BLUNT. After Admiral Rogers, Director Wray, I may 

want to come to you and see on that same, sharing information, 

any impediments to sharing that information with local officials or 

any reason we wouldn’t want to do that. 

Admiral Rogers. 

Admiral ROGERS. Sir, the only other thing I would add—and this 

is also shaped by my experience at Cyber Command, where I defend networks—is one of the things that we generally find in that 

role, many network and system operators do not truly understand 

their own structures and systems. So one of the things that I think 

is part of this is how do we help those local, federal, State entities 

truly understand their network structure and what its potential 

vulnerabilities, and to harness this information that the intelligence structure and other elements are providing them. It’s not 

necessarily an intel function, but I think it’s part of how we work 

our way through this process. 

Senator BLUNT. Director Wray. 

Director WRAY. Senator, I think that’s just one of the areas 

that—there’s been a lot of discussion about whether we’re doing 

better and this is one of the areas I think we are doing better. We 

together, at the FBI, together with DHS, recently, for example, 

scheduled meetings with various election, State election officials. 

Normally the barrier there would be classification concerns, whether somebody had clearances. We were able to put together briefings, appropriately tailored and with nondisclosure agreements, 

with those officials. So there are ways, if people are a little bit creative and forward-leaning, to educate the State election officials, 

which is of course where elections are run in this country. 

Senator BLUNT. Well, hopefully we’ll be creative and forwardleaning and we’ll want to keep track of what we’re doing there. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator King. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The first statement I want to make is more in sorrow than in 

anger. I’ll get to the anger part in a minute. The sorrow part is 

that, Director Coats, in response to a question from Senator Collins, you gave an eloquent factual statement of the activities of the 

Russians and the fact that they’re continuing around the world and 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

58 

that they’re a continuing threat to this country. All of you have 

agreed to that. 

If only the President would say that. I understand the President’s sensitivity about whether his campaign was in connection 

with the Russians. That’s a separate question. But there is no 

question—we’ve got before us the entire intelligence community— 

that the Russians interfered in the election in 2016, they’re continuing to do it, and they’re a real imminent threat to our elections 

in a matter of eight or nine months. 

My problem is I talk to people in Maine who say: The whole 

thing is a witch hunt and it’s a hoax because the President told me. 

I just wish you all could persuade the President as a matter of national security to separate these two issues. The collusion issue is 

over here, unresolved; we’ll get to the bottom of that. But there’s 

no doubt, as you all have testified today. We cannot confront this 

threat, which is a serious one, with a whole of government response when the leader of the government continues to deny that 

it exists. 

Now let me get to the anger part. The anger part involves cyberattacks. You have all testified that we’re subject to repeated cyberattacks. Cyber-attacks are occurring right now in our infrastructure all over this country. I am sick and tired of going to these 

hearings, which I’ve been going to for five years, where everybody 

talks about cyber-attacks, and our country still does not have a policy or a doctrine or a strategy for dealing with them. 

This is not a criticism of the current Administration. I’m an 

equal opportunity critic here. The prior Administration didn’t do it 

either. 

Admiral Rogers, until we have some deterrent capacity we are 

going to continue to be attacked. Isn’t that true? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. We have to change this current dynamic, because we’re on the wrong end of the cost equation. 

Senator KING. And we are trying to fight a global battle with our 

hands tied behind our back. 

Director Coats, you have a stunning statement in your report: 

‘‘They will work to use cyber operations to achieve strategic objectives, unless they face clear repercussions for their cyber operations.’’ Right now there are none. Is that not the case? There are 

no repercussions. We have no—we have no doctrine of deterrence. 

How are we ever going to get them to stop doing this if all we do 

is patch our software and try to defend ourselves? 

Director COATS. Those are very relevant questions and I think 

everyone, not only at this table but in every agency of government, 

understands the threat that we have here and the impact already 

being made through these cyber threats. Our role as the intelligence community is to provide all the information we possibly can 

as to what is happening, so our policymakers can take that, including the Congress, and shape policy as to how we are going to respond to this and deal with this in a whole of government way. 

Senator KING. It just never seems to happen. Director Pompeo, 

you understand this issue, do you not? We are not going to be able 

to defend ourselves from cyber-attacks by simply being defensive. 

We have to have a doctrine of deterrence. If they strike us in cyber, 

they are going to be struck back in some way. It may not be cyber. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

59 

Director POMPEO. I would agree with you. I would also argue 

that—and while I can’t say much in this setting, I would argue 

that your statement that we have done nothing does not reflect the 

responses that, frankly, some of us at this table have engaged in 

and the United States Government has engaged in, both before and 

after this—excuse me—both during and before this Administration. 

Senator KING. But deterrence doesn’t work unless the other side 

knows it. The doomsday machine in Dr. Strangelove didn’t work 

because the Russians hadn’t told us about it. 

Director POMPEO. It’s true that it’s important that the adversary 

know it. It is not a requirement that the whole world know it. 

Senator KING. And the adversary does know it in your view? 

Director POMPEO. I’d prefer to save that for another forum. 

Senator KING. Well, I believe that this country needs a clear doctrine: What is a cyber-attack, what is an act of war, what will be 

the response, what will be the consequences? Right now I haven’t 

seen it. 

Director POMPEO. Senator, I agree with you, we collectively. It is 

a complicated problem, given the nature of—— 

Senator KING. I include us, by the way. 

Director POMPEO. Yes, I would too. I sat as a member of the 

House of Representatives for six years. I take responsibility for not 

having been part of solving that, too. 

There is a lot of work here to do. We do need a U.S. Government 

strategy and clear authorities to go achieve that strategy. 

Senator KING. I appreciate it. I just don’t want to go home to 

Maine when there’s a serious cyber-attack and say: Well, we never 

really got to it; we knew it was a problem, but we had four different committees of jurisdiction and we just couldn’t work it out. 

Director POMPEO. Yes, sir. 

Senator KING. That’s not going to fly. 

Director POMPEO. Yes, sir. 

Senator KING. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. 

Director COATS. Senator, I might just add that we don’t want to 

learn this lesson the hard way. 9/11 took place because we were not 

coordinating our efforts. We are now coordinating our efforts, but 

we didn’t have the right defenses in place because the right information was not there. Our job is to get that right information to 

the policymakers and get on with it, because it’s just common 

sense. If someone is attacking you and there’s no retribution or response, it’s just going to incentivize more contacts. Right now there 

are a lot of blank checks. There’s a lot of things that we need to 

do. 

Senator KING. Director Coats, thank you. I appreciate that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Lankford. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you. 

Director Coats, you and I talked last year about this same issue 

that Senator King was just bringing up as well about cyber doctrine and a point person, on who that would be, and a defined person that would give options to the President and the Congress to 

say, if a response is needed and is warranted, this is the person, 

this is the entity, that would make those recommendations and 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

60 

allow the President to be able to make the decisions on what the 

proper response is. 

Has that been completed? Is there a point person to be able to 

give recommendations on an appropriate response to a cyber-attack 

to the President? 

Director COATS. That has not yet been completed. Of course, your 

understanding of the standup of Cyber Command and the new director that will be replacing Admiral Rogers—the decision relative 

to whether there would be a separation between the functions that 

are currently now NSA and Cyber has yet to be made. General 

Mattis is contemplating what the next best step is. They’ve involved the intelligence community in terms of making decisions on 

that role. But we at this particular point cannot point to one sort 

of cyber czar, but various agencies throughout the Federal Government are taking this very, very seriously and there are individuals 

that continue to meet on a regular basis. 

The ODNI has something called CTIIC and that is a coordination 

effort for all the cyber that comes in, so that we don’t stovepipe like 

what we did before 9/11. So things are under way. But in terms 

of putting a finalized, this is how we’re going to do it, together, it’s 

still in process. 

Director POMPEO. Senator Lankford, with respect to responses to 

that, these are Title 10 DOD activities unless they are granted to 

some other authority, a Title 50 authority. So there is a person responsible. Secretary Mattis has that responsibility to advise the 

President on the appropriateness of responses in all theaters of 

conflict with our adversaries. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you. 

I want to bring up the issue of the rising threat of what’s happening just south of our border in Mexico. In Mexico the homicide 

rate went up 27 percent last year. We had 64,000 Americans that 

died from overdose of drugs. The preponderance of those came 

through or from Mexico. We have a very rapidly rising threat, it 

appears to me. 

What I’d be interested in from you all is, on a national security 

level and what you’re seeing, what are we facing? What’s changing 

right now in Mexico versus ten years ago in Mexico in our relationship and the threats that are coming from there? 

Director COATS. I would defer to Director Wray relative to what 

his agency is doing. Clearly, we have a continuing problem and the 

Mexican government has a continuing problem relative to the 

gangs and the organizations. There have been some high-profile arrests lately. We’ve taken down some labs. Mexico is cooperating, 

but they themselves will admit that it’s almost overwhelming— 

their army’s been participating—it’s almost overwhelming for them 

to control the situation south of the border. We have our own 

issues then on border protection and as well as consumption here 

in the United States. 

Senator LANKFORD. Director Wray. 

Director WRAY. In many ways what we’re seeing is just more of 

the same. But one of the things that’s changed, because I think 

that was at the heart of your question, I think we’re seeing—one 

of the things we’re watching in particular is more black market 

fentanyl being shipped to transnational criminal organizations in 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

61 

Mexico, and then their taking advantage of the pricing advantages, 

and that’s being then delivered in large quantities to our streets. 

Certainly the Mexico relationship is from a law enforcement perspective and from a domestic security perspective one of our most 

important. I think the FBI LEGAT office in Mexico is our largest 

in the world. I’m pretty sure about that, or pretty close to it if not. 

That’s a reflection of how much activity there is. 

Senator LANKFORD. Let me ask you a specific Oklahoma question. It’s also a national question. There was an individual named 

Alfallaj that was picked up in Weatherford, Oklahoma, just a couple of weeks ago by the FBI. His fingerprints were identified from 

a terror training camp in Afghanistan. He’d been in the country for 

multiple years. 

What I’m trying to be able to determine is the coordination of information, the local law enforcement and from data that’s gathered 

from some of the work that’s happening overseas in Afghanistan 

and such. How are those two being married together that we can 

identify individuals that are a threat to our Nation based on their 

participation in a terror training camp overseas, now coming to the 

American shores? 

Director WRAY. Well, certainly we’ve become better at looking at 

biometric information from overseas and marrying it up with potential threat subjects here in the U.S. as well as in some of our 

allies. The individual in question, of course, turned out to have his 

fingerprints on information from the Al-Farooq Camp. It’s just a reminder to us that an awful lot of people went through those camps. 

And while the civilized world, the intelligence community, law enforcement, military, our allies around the world, made a major dent 

on those people, we’re kidding ourselves if we think that an awful 

lot of them aren’t still out there, and it’s just a reminder that we 

need to stay on the balls of our feet. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you. 

General ASHLEY. Senator Lankford, if I could. One additional 

point. You asked what has changed in Mexico. What has also transpired over the last couple years is you had five principal cartels. 

We alluded to a number of captures that have taken place, over 

100. Those five cartels have kind of devolved into 20, and part of 

that outgrowth, you see an increase in the level of violence. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank all of you. First let me just tell you, on behalf of the people of West Virginia, I want to thank you for the job you do in 

keeping us safe, the professionalism. And we have all the utmost 

confidence in what you’re doing and hope to be able to support even 

further. But thank you. The people really do appreciate it and we 

appreciate the service you’re giving. 

Director Coats, I think you and I both were in the Senate at the 

same time when Mike Mullen, then-Admiral Mullen, said that the 

greatest threat we face—I was on Armed Services; you were on Intelligence at that time. We were trying to find out what the greatest threat the United States faces. I was thinking of another country, whether it be Russia, China, or whatever. He didn’t hesitate 

when he said that the threat of our Nation, the greatest threat is 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

62 

the debt of our Nation. I think you just reiterated that in your 

opening remarks. 

Director, I was a little bit mystified by the report, the worldwide 

threat assessment. You didn’t mention the debt in here. It wasn’t 

in the report as a threat to the Nation, and I didn’t know if there 

was a thought process behind that, because you made a tremendous effort to put that in your opening statement. I appreciate that. 

But tell me what your thought process here was? 

Director COATS. Well, my thought process was that I’m getting 

a little bit out of my lane in terms of what I’m supposed to do, but 

I felt that—— 

Senator MANCHIN. I mean, you do think it’s a threat? It’s not in 

this assessment. 

Director COATS. It’s just something that Congress needs to deal 

with, and I didn’t want to come back and preach at you. 

Senator MANCHIN. I got you. 

Director COATS. But I thought at the very end—in fact, just yesterday—look, I think I have a responsibility to raise this issue because it does affect the military significantly, it affects the intelligence community, which is tied to the military in terms of intelligence. It’s going to have a serious effect on us if we can’t control 

it. 

Senator MANCHIN. Well, you’ve sat on both sides of the aisle. The 

only thing that seems to be bipartisan here today is spending 

money. Both sides seem to agree on spending more money, without 

any accountability. So I’m glad to hear your remarks on that. 

If I could, to all the witnesses: I share what Senator Lankford 

has said about concerns about what’s killing more Americans than 

any of the threats discussed that we have today. It’s with drugs. 

My State of West Virginia’s been hit harder than any State. I’ve 

got more deaths per capita than any State. It’s been ravaging as 

far as my communities, my homes, my schools, the families. It’s 

just unbelievable what we’re going through. 

I think in a nutshell what I would be asking—all of you are responsible to do everything you can to keep us safe and you’ve done 

a tremendous job as far as from the foreign attack and things of 

that sort. Director Wray, I appreciate what the FBI does and they 

have a strong presence in West Virginia and we’re very, very appreciative of that. What type of efforts from each one of your agencies have you spent as far as—Is drugs and fighting the drug infestation highest on your priority list, one of your greatest dangers, 

or is it just part of the overall scheme of things? 

Director COATS. Just speaking for the intelligence community, it 

is a high priority for us. We mentioned it in our threat assessment 

here. So we are the collectors of foreign sources, transnational organizations, etcetera, whether it’s coming from overseas, whether 

it’s coming from Afghanistan, whether it’s coming from Colombia, 

what it is, how it’s going. 

Then of course it is a whole of government, because once it penetrates the United States we then use our domestic agencies to address that. 

Senator MANCHIN. Director Wray, as far as the FBI, because 

you’re on the front line—you’re here on the homeland—what do you 

think? What can we do to help? 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

63 

Director WRAY. Well, I think on the good news side, in a country 

that’s often very divided this is one issue as far as I can tell where 

everybody agrees about what a major, major threat it is. It covers 

communities from North to South, from red to blue, from rich to 

poor, from urban to rural. I think that’s the good news. 

The bad news is that it’s grown to a point where there’s no one 

agency or one approach that’s going to solve the problem. So we’re 

doing our part. Some of the things that we’re able to do, we’re focusing particularly on gatekeepers, because a lot of this is coming 

through medical professionals and pharmacies. So we’re using intelligence-driven operations there, various initiatives. We have a 

prescription drug initiative that’s focused on that part of it. 

We’re partnering with our foreign counterparts. We’re working 

with DEA, State and local law enforcement, etcetera. We’re also 

trying to do things to raise awareness. We did a video with DEA 

called ‘‘Chasing the Dragon,’’ which has been shown in schools 

around the country. 

But this is a multi-disciplinary problem. 

Senator MANCHIN. My time is short. If I can just ask this question, maybe. Whoever wants to answer this one. Based on what we 

know and the way we distribute money for foreign aid to different 

countries, knowing that a lot of the countries we distribute to is basically allowing, permitting, this type of scourge coming to our 

country as far as in the form of drugs, have you all thought and 

considered and make recommendations that we hold them hostage, 

if you will, or liable, basically, to the money they’re receiving from 

the United States with the best of intentions? But that best of intentions is their fight against drugs coming to our country, when 

we know it’s coming, from whether it be a China, Afghanistan, or 

Iraq, wherever it may be coming from, Mexico and all the South 

American countries? 

We should hold that. I’ve never seen—we’re going to lose a whole 

generation in West Virginia. I have 10,000 jobs they can’t fill. The 

United States has 3 million jobs we can’t fill. And most of it is 

around drugs. 

So this is what we’re asking for. This has got to be all hands on 

deck. I don’t know if anybody wants to—do you have that as a high 

priority? Does anyone believe we should withhold foreign aid to 

countries that basically we know have illicit drugs coming to our 

country? 

Director POMPEO. Senator, I’ll answer this. I think the United 

States should use every tool, whether that’s foreign aid or other 

tools—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Money talks. 

Director POMPEO [continuing]. To get these—that’s exactly 

right—to get these nations that this is coming from to put it as a 

priority for their country. Some don’t have the capacity to fix it. 

That is, it’s a problem that’s bigger than their nation. But we ought 

to—we should be unafraid to use the leverage that comes with our 

generosity from the American taxpayer to ensure that these countries are doing everything they can to prevent drugs from coming 

from their country to ours. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

64 

Director COATS. As you do know, we do provide efforts within 

countries to help them eradicate. It hasn’t been totally successful, 

but that is one way in which we use some of that aid if it’s directly 

contributed to the eradication of drugs. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Cotton. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance, 

and thanks to all the men and women who you represent and for 

the work they do for our country. 

Mr. Wray, are you aware of a gentleman by the name of Oleg 

Deripaska? 

Director WRAY. I’ve heard the name. 

Senator COTTON. Is it fair to call him a Putin-linked Russian oligarch? 

Director WRAY. Well, I’ll leave that characterization to others, 

and certainly not in this setting. 

Senator COTTON. Chuck Grassley, the Chairman of the Judiciary 

Committee, last week sent a letter to a London-based lawyer who 

represents Mr. Deripaska and asked if Christopher Steele was employed, either directly or indirectly, by Oleg Deripaska at the time 

he was writing the so-called ‘‘Steele dossier.’’ Do you know if Christopher Steele worked for Oleg Deripaska? 

Director WRAY. That’s not something I can answer. 

Senator COTTON. Could we discuss it in the classified setting? 

Director WRAY. There might be more we could say there. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. And maybe we’ll hear back from 

the lawyer in London as well to give us a straight answer. 

Jim Comey testified before this Committee in an open setting 

last summer and he referred to the Steele dossier as ‘‘salacious and 

unverified.’’ Does that remain the FBI’s position? 

Director WRAY. I think maybe there’s more we can talk about 

this afternoon on that. 

Senator COTTON. Okay, thank you. 

I’d like to turn my attention to the threat posed by China and 

specifically Chinese telecom companies. Senator Rubio spoke earlier, and I agree with what he said, about the threat of a rising 

China, and also the threat of Confucius Centers. There’s also the 

threat the telecom companies, specifically Huawei and ZTE, but 

also Unicom and Telecom, pose to our country. That’s why I’ve introduced legislation with Senator Cornyn and Senator Rubio to say 

the U.S. Government can’t use Huawei or ZTE and that the U.S. 

Government can’t use companies that use them. I’m glad that some 

companies, like Verizon and AT&T, among others, have taken this 

threat seriously. 

Could you explain what the risk is that we face from ZTE and 

Huawei being used in the United States, especially here in this 

public setting, the risks that companies, State governments, local 

governments might face if they use Huawei or ZTE products and 

services? 

Director WRAY. I think probably the simplest way to put it in 

this setting would be that we’re deeply concerned about the risks 

of allowing any company or entity that is beholden to foreign governments that don’t share our values to gain positions of power inside our telecommunications networks that provides the capacity to 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

65 

exert pressure or control over our telecommunications infrastructure. It provides the capacity to maliciously modify or steal information, and it provides the capacity to conduct undetected espionage. 

So at a 100,000-foot level, at least in this setting, those are the 

kinds of things that worry us. I will say, like you, Senator, we’ve 

been gratified I think to date by the response of the large U.S. telecommunications providers trying to raise awareness on this issue. 

But I also recognize that the competitive pressures are building. So 

it’s something that I think we have to be very vigilant about and 

continue, as you are doing, to raise awareness about. 

Senator COTTON. Admiral Rogers, would you care to add anything about the threat posed by Huawei? 

Admiral ROGERS. I would agree with Director Wray’s characterization here. This is a challenge I think that’s only going to increase, not lessen, over time for us. 

Senator COTTON. So you would suggest to mayors, county judges, 

university presidents, and State legislatures, to look warily if 

Huawei or ZTE comes bearing gifts to them? 

Admiral ROGERS. I would say you need to look long and hard at 

companies like this. 

Senator COTTON. All the witnesses, I’d like to address this question to you. Will you please raise your hand if you would use products or services from Huawei or ZTE? 

[No response.] 

None of you would. You obviously lead intelligence services, so 

that’s something of a biased question. 

Raise your hand if you would recommend that private American 

citizens use Huawei or ZTE products or services? 

[No response.] 

None of you again are raising your hand. Thank you for that. 

Finally, I’d like to turn to a question, Director Pompeo, that’s 

been in the news in the last few hours. There are reports that over 

200 Russian mercenaries were killed in eastern Syria. Can you confirm or deny those reports? 

Director POMPEO. Senator Cotton, I’ll leave to the Department of 

Defense to talk about what transpired there. I can say this. From 

an intelligence perspective, we have seen in multiple instances foreign forces using mercenaries in battles that will begin to approach 

the United States. 

Senator COTTON. General Ashley, since you represent the Department of Defense, would you like to confirm or deny? 

General ASHLEY. If we could take that to a closed session, Senator, I think we can lay out a rather interesting fabric of what is 

Syria and what transpired over the last few days. 

Senator COTTON. We can address that in the afternoon. 

Director Pompeo, to come back, as a general matter can I ask, 

is massing and maneuvering forces against a location where U.S. 

personnel are present in Syria a good way to get yourself killed? 

Director POMPEO. I think I’ll defer that to the Department of Defense as well. 

Senator COTTON. General Ashley, would you like to answer that 

question? 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

66 

General ASHLEY. Sir, that does make you more susceptible. I 

would leave that also to the operational commander. But you are 

at greater risk when you start to mass in that situation. 

Senator COTTON. Not a good idea if you want to have a long and 

fruitful life. 

Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Harris. 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. 

I want to echo the comments of my colleagues in thanking the 

men and women who serve in your agencies. I am concerned that 

the political attacks against the men and women of your agencies 

may have had an effect on your ability to recruit, retain, and also 

the morale of your agencies. So I would like to emphasize the point 

that we all I think share in making, which is we thank the men 

and women of your agencies for their selfless work. They do it on 

behalf of the American people, without any expectation of award or 

reward, and we cannot thank them enough for keeping us safe. 

Director Wray, Chairman Nunes’s memo included sensitive FISA 

information regarding a person who worked on the President’s 

campaign. According to the White House statement, the President 

was the one who authorized the memo’s declassification. Do you believe there is an actual or at least the appearance of a conflict of 

interest when the President is put in charge of declassifying information that could complicate an ongoing investigation into his own 

campaign? 

Director WRAY. Well, Senator, we’ve been very clear what our 

view was about the disclosure and accuracy of the memo in question. But I do think it’s the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief 

under the rule that was invoked to object or not to the declassification. So I think that is the President’s responsibility. 

Senator HARRIS. Regardless of whether there is an appearance or 

actual conflict of interest? 

Director WRAY. Well, I leave it to others to characterize whether 

there’s an appearance or actual conflict of interest. But I think the 

President was fulfilling his responsibility in that situation. 

Senator HARRIS. If the President asked you tomorrow to hand 

over to him additional sensitive FBI information on the investigations into his campaign, would you give it to him? 

Director WRAY. I’m not going to discuss the investigation in question with the President, much less provide information from that 

investigation to him. 

Senator HARRIS. And if he wanted—if he received that information and wanted to declassify it, would he have the ability to do 

that, from your perspective? 

Director WRAY. Information from the—— 

Senator HARRIS. However he received it, perhaps from members 

of the United States Congress. 

Director WRAY. I think legally he would have that ability. 

Senator HARRIS. Do you believe the President should recuse himself from reviewing and declassifying sensitive FBI material related 

to this investigation? 

Director WRAY. I think recusal questions are something I would 

encourage the President to talk to the White House counsel about. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

67 

Senator HARRIS. Has the FBI done any kind of legal analysis on 

these questions? 

Director WRAY. Well, happily, I’m no longer in the business of 

doing legal analysis. I now get to be a client and blame lawyers for 

things, instead of being the lawyer who gets blamed. So we have 

not done a legal analysis. 

Senator HARRIS. Have you blamed any lawyers for their analysis 

of this issue? 

Director WRAY. What’s that? 

Senator HARRIS. Have you blamed any lawyers for their analysis 

of this issue? 

Director WRAY. I have not yet, no. 

Senator HARRIS. Okay. 

Is the FBI getting the cooperation it needs from social media 

companies to counter foreign adversaries’ influence on our elections? 

Director WRAY. I think the cooperation has been improving. I 

think we’re continuing to work with the social media companies to 

try to see how we can raise their awareness, so that they can share 

information with us and vice versa. So I think things are moving 

in the right direction, but I think there’s a lot of progress to be 

made. 

Senator HARRIS. What more do you need from social media companies to improve the partnership that you’d like to have with 

them to counter these attacks? 

Director WRAY. Well, I think we always like to have more information shared more quickly from their end. But I think from their 

perspective it’s a dialogue. They’re looking to get information from 

us about what it is we see, so that they can give responsive information. So I think we’re working through those issues. 

Senator HARRIS. Do you believe that the social media companies 

have enough employees that have the appropriate security clearance to make these partnerships real? 

Director WRAY. That’s not an issue I’ve evaluated, but I’m happy 

to take a look at it. 

Senator HARRIS. Please do, and follow up with the Committee. 

Director Coats, one of the things that makes guarding against 

foreign intelligence threats on social media so complex is that the 

threat originates overseas and so that would be within the jurisdiction of the CIA and the NSA, and then it comes to our shores and 

then it passes on to the FBI and also the social media companies 

themselves. 

I’m not aware of any written IC strategy on how we would confront the threat to social media. Does such a strategy exist in writing? 

Director COATS. I would have to get back with you on that. I’d 

be happy to look into it. From my perspective right now, a written 

strategy, specific strategy, is not in place, but I want to check on 

that. 

Senator HARRIS. Please do follow up. 

Also, last year Congress passed a bipartisan Russia sanctions 

bill. However, the Administration has not imposed those sanctions. 

From an intelligence perspective, what is your assessment of how 

Russia interprets the Administration’s inaction? 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

68 

Director COATS. I don’t have information relative to what the 

Russian thinking is in terms of that particular specific reaction. 

There are other sanctions, as you know, that are being imposed on 

Russian oligarchs and others through the United Nations and 

through other things that have been done in reference to the 

JCPoA. But specifically on your question, I don’t have an answer 

for that. 

Director POMPEO. Senator Harris. 

Senator HARRIS. Yes? 

Director POMPEO. May I comment? I think we ought to look at 

that in a broader context. That is, how the Russians view all of the 

actions of this Administration, not just a particular set of sanctions 

or the absence thereof. So as we’ve watched the Russians respond 

to this Administration’s decision to provide defensive weapons in 

Ukraine, to push back against Russian efforts in Syria, sanctions 

placed on Venezuela were directly in conflict with Russian interests, the list of places that the Russians are feeling the pain from 

this Administration’s actions are long. 

Senator HARRIS. But, Director Pompeo, I’m sure you would agree 

that in order to understand the full scope of effect it is also important that we analyze each discrete component, including what is 

the interpretation of this Administration’s failure to enact the sanctions as has been passed and directed by the United States Congress in a bipartisan manner. Have you done that assessment? 

Director POMPEO. Senator, in closed session I’ll tell you what we 

know and don’t know about that discrete issue. 

Senator HARRIS. Right. 

Director POMPEO. Yes, and I agree with you it is important to 

look at each one in its own place. But I think what we most often 

see in terms of Russian response, it’s to the cumulative activities 

in response to Russian activities. That is how the United States responds to those, in a cumulative way. 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. I look forward to our conversation. 

Thank you. 

Director POMPEO. Yes, ma’am. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. Director Coats, you alluded to the activities of 

transnational criminal organizations, and I’m thinking particularly 

as regards our neighbors down south of our border. Recently I 

heard somebody refer to the cartels, these transnational criminal 

organizations, as ‘‘commodity agnostic.’’ In other words, they’ll traffic in people, they’ll traffic in drugs and other contraband, all in 

pursuit of money. 

Director COATS. Whatever brings in the most dollars. 

Senator CORNYN. Senator Manchin I know and others have alluded to their concern about—and certainly we all share the concern about the deaths and overdoses caused by drugs in America, 

much of which comes across our southern borders through our 

ports of entry. This week we’re going to be considering border security measures as part of a larger package that the President has 

proposed while addressing the so-called ‘‘DACA recipients.’’ 

But, do you believe that modernizing our ports of entry and providing enhanced technology and other means to surveil, follow and 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

69 

identify illegal drugs coming across our ports of entry would be a 

good thing for us to do? 

Director COATS. I do. I do think that a layered approach is necessary to—it’s clear that just one specific defense put in place is not 

going to solve the problem. It needs to be a layered interest of not 

only physical facilities, but also Border Patrol, also how those who 

arrive and perhaps dissipate in waiting for their court appearance, 

tracking them—a whole range of things that I think are going to 

be needed to stop that flow from coming in. 

Senator CORNYN. I know it’s been alluded to, but just to emphasize my concern with the demand side. Maybe we’ve given up—I 

hope not—in addressing the demand side, which of course provides 

the money and the incentive for these cartels to operate, and it’s 

something I think deserves full attention and focus of the United 

States Government. I’ve heard General Kelly in his previous job at 

DHS talk about that, and I hope we will return to that focus as 

part of this layered approach, the demand side, because it’s something I think that is maybe the hardest thing to deal with, but perhaps might have the greatest impact. 

Director COATS. The supply depends on the demand and the demand drives the supply and provides the capital, with which to 

take extraordinary methods that bypass our defenses in order to 

get those drugs into the United States. 

On the demand side, this is a whole of the American people process. It’s PTA’s. We growing up got these videos of driving in driver’s training and the horrendous look at crashes and so forth and 

so on. We need to let every student know what the consequences 

of these drugs are to their lives and to their future. We need to get 

parents involved, parent-teacher associations involved, so whether 

they pick up their values from church or from the neighborhood or 

whatever. 

This is a national crisis and we all of us here represent or are 

from states which are staggering through the process here of 

watching young people and others die from drugs that are more potent than they’ve ever been. 

Senator CORNYN. Let me just lay down a couple of markers here 

in my comments, but then I want to end on CFIUS, the Committee 

on Foreign Investment in the United States. 

I will join Senator Rubio and Senator King, Senator Lankford, 

and others concerned about the failure of the U.S. Government 

again to have an all-of-government strategy to deal with the cyber 

threat. I have no doubt in my mind that we have superior capabilities, but they’re stovepiped. I don’t think we, the policymakers, are 

doing a good enough job, and I think it’s incumbent upon us to try 

to provide some policy guidance so that you and others in the intelligence community and the national security apparatus can address 

this threat in the way that it needs to be addressed. 

Our adversaries don’t suffer from a lack of an all-of-government 

policy. They are all over that. China, I agree with Senator Rubio 

about their strategy, and some of you have responded to that. 

But one of the strategies that China and other countries have 

adopted is to avoid some of the review measures in the Committee 

on Foreign Investment in the United States when it comes to direct 

investment, buying those dual-use technologies, startup companies 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

70 

and the like, and then using that to gain strategic advantage 

against the United States. 

I wonder if maybe, Director Wray, could you address that; and 

then anybody else in the time permitted, I’d be glad to hear what 

you have to say about that. 

Director WRAY. Senator, I think you’re exactly right that CFIUS 

reform is particularly relevant to the China threat, although not 

exclusively China threat. And there is a degree to which CFIUS as 

it currently stands is susceptible too much to the kind of ‘‘round 

pegs only go in round holes’’ kind of thing. It’s not hard to come 

up with other-shaped pegs to get around that process, the obvious 

example being joint ventures, but there are other ways as well. So 

that’s one of the significant problems. 

Another problem is the amount of time that’s built into the process to do a thorough review, which is too short. Another problem 

is the inability to share information, since other countries, our allies, are going through the same thing, to be able to share information, so when they go through their own versions of the CFIUS 

process they have the benefit of what was attempted in our country, and vice versa. 

I think in general we need to take a more strategic perspective 

on China’s efforts to use acquisitions and other types of business 

ventures, as opposed to just a tactical, looking only within the four 

corners of one particular transaction. 

General ASHLEY. If I could, the Director laid out really kind of 

the bigger issue at the strategic level and for us at DIA, we’re kind 

of taking on the tactical. So we’re the ones that are right about 

ready to penetrate the line. So if you look at supply chain risk 

management, we actually run the Threat Analysis Center that is 

hooked into CFIUS. So we bring the services together and look at 

supply chain risk management for CI issues associated with whomever may get a contract and ties back to China and other nations. 

But you allude to the fact that every case for CFIUS comes back 

and we take a look at it. We get about three days with it. We could 

use more time to make a more thorough scrub. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being 

late. We had a simultaneous hearing in the Armed Services Committee on SOCOM. 

All morning, gentlemen, we’ve heard the story of Russia influencing our campaigns and indeed in the current campaign for the 

midterms. So let me begin with Mr. Wray and say: Has the President directed you and your agency to take specific actions to confront and blunt Russian influence activities that are ongoing? 

Director WRAY. We’re taking a lot of specific efforts to blunt—— 

Senator REED. Directed by the President? 

Director WRAY. Not specifically directed by the President. 

Senator REED. Director Pompeo, have you received a specific 

presidential direction to take steps to disrupt these activities? 

Director POMPEO. I’m not sure how specific. The President’s 

made very clear we have an obligation from our perspective, from 

a foreign intelligence perspective, to do everything we can to make 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

71 

sure that there’s a deep and thorough understanding of every 

threat, including threats from Russia. 

Senator REED. But has he singled out the Russian threat, which 

appears to be critical to this election coming up? I know there are 

threats from many different vectors, but have you received a specific threat, i.e., it’s very important to him to get this done correctly? 

Director WRAY. Yes, I think the President’s been very clear that 

he has asked our agency to cooperate with each of the investigations that’s ongoing and do everything we can to ensure that we 

thoroughly understand this potential threat. 

Senator REED. Director Coats, have you received a specific directive to take specific steps to disrupt, understand first and then disrupt, Russian activities directed at our elections on 2018? 

Director COATS. I would echo what Director Pompeo just said. We 

work together on this throughout. The agency has full understanding that we are to provide whatever intelligence is relevant 

and make sure that that is passed on to our policymakers, including the President. 

Senator REED. Passing on relevant intelligence is not actively 

disrupting the operations of an opponent. Do you agree? 

Director COATS. No. We pass it on and they make the decision 

as to how to implement it. 

Senator REED. As the Director of Intelligence, are you aware of 

or leading an inter-agency, an inter-governmental working group 

that is tasked with countering Russian activities? Not merely reporting on it, but tasked with countering those activities? Are you 

aware of any type of inter-agency group, any inter-governmental 

groups since State elections are critical or State elected officials are 

critical? 

Director COATS. Well, we essentially are relying on the investigations that are under way, both with this Committee and the HPSCI 

Committee, as well as the Special Counsel. 

Senator REED. So you’re not taking any specific steps, based on 

the intelligence, to disrupt Russian activities that are occurring at 

this moment? 

Director COATS. We take all kinds of steps to disrupt Russian activities in terms of what they’re trying to do. I think I’ll turn it over 

to Director Pompeo to—— 

Senator REED. Let me finish with the rest of the gentlemen. Are 

you finished, Mr. Coats, Director Coats? 

Director COATS. Yes. 

Senator REED. Thank you. Thank you. 

Director POMPEO. Senator Reed, we have a significant effort. I’m 

happy to talk to you about it in closed session. The CIA—and it is 

not just our effort. It is a certainly all-of-IC effort—there may be 

others participating as well—to do our best to push back against 

this threat. It’s not just the Russian threat. It’s the Iranians and 

Chinese. It’s a big, broad effort. 

Senator REED. I understand, Mr. Director, we have mutual 

threats, but one threat that has been central. And you’ve testified 

to this publicly. The last election there was Russian influence. This 

election, they seem to be more prepared. They’ve learned their lessons. The simple question I pose is: Has the President directed the 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

72 

intelligence community in a coordinated effort, not merely to report, but to actively stop this activity? The answer seems to be that 

I’m hearing is the reporting’s going on, as we’re reporting about 

every threat coming in to the United States. 

Let me get back quickly. Do any of the other panelists have anything to add on this point? 

Admiral ROGERS. For us, I can’t say that I’ve been explicitly directed to, quote, ‘‘blunt’’ or actively stop. On the other hand, it’s 

very clear, generate knowledge and insight, help us understand 

this so we can generate better policy. That clearly—that direction 

has been very explicit, in fairness. 

Senator REED. But I think again—you may agree or disagree— 

collecting intelligence, then acting on it in a coordinated fashion, 

are two different things. 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. I’d also argue, what’s our role as intelligence professionals in all of this? 

Senator REED. Let me just end. I’ve got very few moments remaining. We’ve talked a lot about China, CFIUS, and their involvement in trying to buy companies in the United States. What I 

think has to be pointed out, too, is they are undertaking significant 

national investment in artificial intelligence and quantum computing that is dwarfing anything that the Administration is proposing or suggesting. 

If artificial intelligence has even half of the benefits that its promoters claim, it is going to be extraordinarily disruptive. Quantum 

computing has the capacity to undercut cryptology as we know it, 

and the experts can correct me if I’m wrong. Some of the mechanisms that quantum computing can generate could, based on infinite measurements of gravity, detect devices underground and 

under the water, which for anybody who’s a submariner, you’ve got 

to be wondering. 

So where is our national Manhattan program for AI and quantum computing that will match the Chinese? Director Coats, you 

seem to be anxious to answer that. I’ll let you do that. 

Director COATS. I think there are some things that we’ll talk 

about in a classified setting here. We’re treading a very narrow line 

here relative to discussing this in an open meeting. 

Senator REED. I don’t want to tread that line, but we do have to 

recognize that, again, the Chinese activity to appropriate our intellectual property is obvious. They are generating their own intellectual property at a rate that could be disruptive and we are not 

matching them. Again, this Manhattan analogy might be a little bit 

out of date, but when we saw the potential effects of a scientific 

development back in the forties, we spared no expense so that we 

would get it first before our opponents. 

The Chinese seem to be making that type of commitment very 

publicly: hundreds of millions, billions of dollars. They’ve said publicly; they have a plan and they’re working the plan. 

Director COATS. And we provide that information to the extent 

that we can collect that information. But just like the Manhattan 

Project, we don’t openly share what steps that we’re taking to address it. 

Senator REED. I respect that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

73 

Thank you, sir. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator Reed, and I do hope you’ll 

come back to the closed session if you can this afternoon. I think 

that you’ll get some fidelity in that closed session. 

I want to turn to—we’re about to wrap up. Everybody can look 

up. There are no more questions, so you don’t have to lose eye contact with us hoping you’re not the guy that they’re going to ask to 

answer. 

[Laughter.] 

You can tell who the newbies are. They’ve stayed focused on the 

Members the entire time; and the ones that have been here before 

have been like this (indicating.). 

I want to turn to the Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We look forward to seeing you all this afternoon. Robert, we hope 

to get some overhead questions to you this afternoon. 

Echoing what we’ve all said, appreciate your service. But I think 

we’re hearing again a lot of commonality as we think about cyber, 

misinformation, and disinformation. It really is asymmetrical. 

One of the things that has struck me is that if you do a rough 

calculation and add up the costs to Russia in terms of their intervention in America, elections, the Dutch elections where they handcounted all the ballots, the French elections where Facebook acknowledged taking down 30,00 sites. You add that all together, it’s 

less than the cost of one new F–35 airplane. Pretty good bang for 

the buck. 

I remember a year or so ago at Langley looking at some of our 

fighter technology, stealth technology, and the colonel showing me 

around bemoaning the fact that the Chinese had gotten this again 

on the cheap by stealing a lot of the intellectual property that 

underlies that technology. 

Echoing what Senator Reed said—and again, I think this is 

where we all need to put our heads together—we just made a massive additional investment in DOD. We’re at roughly ten times the 

size on our spend versus our near-peer adversaries like China and 

Russia. I do feel, not from a criticism standpoint, but more from 

just where we ought to be thinking about going forward, that we 

may be buying the best twentieth century military that money can 

buy, when we see our near-peer adversaries making these massive 

investments in areas like AI, machine learning, quantum computing. I think we all need to think through this from a general 

strategic standpoint. 

I worry that we’ve got certain low-hanging fruit as we think 

about Chinese tech companies and how to get CFIUS right. One of 

the things some of us discussed with you in the past is, if you look 

simply at IoT-connected devices, we’re going to double the number 

from about 10 billion to 20 billion in the next three to five years. 

Yet we have no even de minimis security requirements for the Federal Government purchasing of IoT devices. 

I would—I know I’ve talked with General Ashley on this. I don’t 

believe there is, even across the IC and DOD, prerequisite that before we buy some of these connected refrigerators or sensors or 

common consumer goods, that there be that patchability or no embedded passcodes. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

74 

So I think again there’s a lot of work we can do, but we don’t 

have the luxury of short time. 

Senator Blunt raised some of the questions around election security. I know the Chairman’s going to make this comment in his 

closing remarks. I think this Committee has done some very good 

bipartisan work in a series of areas that arose out of the Russia 

investigation. It’s our hope that on election security we can come 

forward with a set of recommendations very quickly, because we 

have primaries coming up as early as March. My hope is that there 

will be able to be bipartisan legislation to try to start addressing 

this issue. 

So thank you, gentlemen. I look forward to our session this afternoon. With that, I’ll turn it over to the Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Vice Chairman. 

Admiral Rogers, I can’t remember whether it was you or somebody else at the table said when we had a closed session about investment: It’s not how much we spend; it’s how we deploy the capital that we’ve devoted to a particular thing. I think as a general 

statement we get much better at the way we deploy capital, and 

I think we deploy it with a measurement tool today on return 

that’s totally different than it was 10 and 20 and 30 years ago. I 

think that’s important. 

This Committee has a global mandate, a mandate that I think 

has been reflected, I think, in the statements and the questions of 

the Members of this Committee today. It’s my hope that the American people got a sense of the breadth of topics this Committee 

deals with on a daily basis, and so do you. 

What was unsaid today? What was unsaid is that the Special 

Counsel is not the only investigation that’s going on in Washington. 

The scope of the Special Counsel’s investigation was clearly stated 

by the DAG when he hired Bob Mueller. I think the media has 

spent some portion of every day trying to portray that the scope of 

that investigation has changed. 

The truth is I don’t know. I’m not sure that anybody in this room 

knows. But here’s what I do know: I know the Senate Intel investigation continues. We’re hopefully wrapping up some important 

areas that we have focused on. The Vice Chairman just alluded to 

the fact that it is our hope and our belief that before the primaries 

begin we intend to have an overview of our findings that will be 

public. We intend to have an open hearing on election security. And 

it’s the Committee’s intent to make recommendations that will enhance the likelihood that the security of our election process is in 

place. 

In addition to that, our review of the ICA, the Intel Community 

Assessment which was done in December of 2016, we have reviewed in great detail, and we hope to report on what we found, 

to support the findings where it’s appropriate, and to be critical if 

in fact we saw areas that we found came up short. We intend to 

make that public. To begin with, none of these would be without 

a declassification process, but we will have a public version that we 

air as quickly as we can. 

The third piece is the review of when we learned of Russia’s intrusions into our system, what we did or what we didn’t do, and 

again with the intent of sharing as much of that with the American 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

75 

public as we can find through open hearings and through an overview. 

Lastly, we will continue to work towards conclusions related to 

any cooperation or collusion by any individual, campaign, or company with efforts to influence the outcome of elections or to create 

societal chaos in the United States. 

I want to thank each of you at the table for an unprecedented 

access to intelligence products, legal documents, and other materials that were needed for us to do our job. 

We have a very talented group of individuals who have conducted this investigation. The remarks of every individual who has 

come in before us has commented on their professionalism and the 

fact that at the end of eight hours they couldn’t tell who was a 

Democrat and who was a Republican. So the effort to be bipartisan 

has not just been public; it is private as well, and permeates all 

the way down through our staff. 

They couldn’t do this in a timely fashion without the access that 

each of you have provided us and your agencies. Let me just reiterate again: We understand that this is an unprecedented access 

to this information. 

I promised you when we started a year ago that the sensitive nature of that material would in fact be protected. The Vice Chairman and I have done everything in our power to do that. We think 

we have maintained that promise. There have been times where information has found its way out, some of recent, where it didn’t 

come from us, but certainly have portrayed it did. And that’s okay, 

because you know and we know the security measures we’ve got in 

place to protect the sensitivity of that material. 

We have also protected the sensitivity of the individuals that 

have been interviewed, voluntarily. The individuals who have come 

in, what they’ve shared with us; to date we have not released any 

interview notes, because that’s not for public consumption. We ask 

people to come in and share with us things that help us understand what happened. It’s our responsibility to take that information and to put it into some form that furthers the American people’s understanding and assurance that we have thoroughly reviewed this. 

We will continue the promise that we made to each of you until 

the conclusion of this investigation and on. There are no expectations that everything you have shared with us is now a precedent 

that you have to continue. I hope it’s not. I have said publicly, and 

criticized for it, that our Committee was created to operate in secrecy, I believe that’s where we perform our best work, and we’re 

given the opportunity and the need for the American people to 

have a better understanding, that we should provide that for them 

in as controlled an atmosphere as we do. 

Today is an example of that, and we can now move from a public 

setting to a more private and closed setting to continue to get some 

clarity on some of the issues that our Members need. 

I want you to understand the take-away here. The take-away is 

this Committee has and will continue to focus on answering the 

question that was given to this Committee from an investigation 

standpoint: What Russia did to influence the 2016 elections? There 

are efforts to expand our efforts. They are not internal. We realize 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

76 

we have to answer for the American people: What did Russia do 

to mess with the 2016 elections? 

Like many of you, on some of the questions when we’ve asked 

that were specific about it in public and in private, we find it’s 

multi-jurisdictional. We’ve got to begin to sort that out for us, us 

the American people. 

So I thank you for your willingness to be here today. I thank you 

for the performance of your employees, who have worked tirelessly 

with very little thanks, and of late with a lot of criticism, to keep 

this country safe, and I might say to keep other countries safe, because we are very generous when we know that bad things are 

going to happen. 

The Committee is appreciative of the relationship that we have. 

We will continue to work to earn your trust, because that’s the only 

way we can perform the type of oversight that we believe the Committee is mandated to do. And for the cooperation that each one of 

you provides us, we’re grateful for that. 

With this, this hearing’s adjourned until a closed session at 2:30. 

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

(77) 

Supplemental Material 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

78 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 29 here 28947.029

UNCLASSIFIED RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD 

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

HEARING FEBRUARY 13, 2018 
79 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 30 here 28947.030

Hearing Date: 

Committee: 

February 13, 2018 

SSCI 

Member: Sen. Rubio 

Witnesses: Director Coats 

Info Current as of: April 2, 2018 

Question: The National Security Strategy of the United States emphasizes. "The United States 

also remains committed to supporting and advancing religious freedom." 

What kind of violations and threats to religious freedom do you assess are threats to our 

national security? Which countries are the greatest offenders? 

Answer: 

Most foreign government violations of religious freedom-from the persecution of small 

communities of Baha'is and Jehovah's Witnesses in many countries to North Korean 

prohibitions against all faiths---<:an be categorized as human rights concerns that might create 

conditions for future harm to U.S. national security interests. More direct threats to U.S. 

interests primarily arise when religious repression fuels either the growth of anti-Western violent 

extremism or instability in a country, such as majority-Buddhist Burma's crackdown on its 

population of2 million Muslim Rohingyas, which the United Nations and others have described 

as ethnic cleansing. Violations by governments against Muslims, for example, can bolster Islamunder-attack narratives that jihadist groups use to attract recruits and advance their agendas 

against the West and its partners. Government violations of religious freedom also can fuel 

societal intolerance against the targeted faiths, which in turn can lead to societal tensions, 

protests, political turmoil, or other forms of instability in a wide variety of places around the 

globe, including China and Western Europe. 

• Among the governments that violate religious freedoms-Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North 

Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan-are designated by 

the Department of State as Countries of Particular Concern (CPC) for engaging in or 

tolerating "systematic, ongoing, and egregious" violations. In 2017, the U.S. Commission on 

International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) recommended designating Russia and Syria as 

CPCs and placed Egypt, Indonesia, and Malaysia on the second-highest tier of concern. 

• Of the non-CPC countries, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, and Syria ranked highest on 

the Pew Research Center's most recent index of government violators compiled in December 

2015. Sunni terrorist groups are internationally notorious for being among the more 

egregious violators of religious freedom globally. 

2 
80 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 31 here 28947.031

Hearing Date: 

Committee: 

February 13, 2018 

SSCI 

Member: Sen. Rubio 

Witnesses: Director Coats 

Info Current as of: April 2, 2018 

Question: The National Security Strategy of the United States emphasizes, "The United States 

also remains committed to supporting and advancing religious freedom." 

What trends do you see regarding religious freedom violations, especially from 

governments justifying violations in the name of security or countering extremism? 

Answer: 

The depth and breadth of religious freedom violations around the world varies from country to 

country but is historically elevated, according to diplomatic, UN, and other open-source 

reporting. The level of violations in the early and mid-l990s that spurred passage of the 1998 

International Religious Freedom Act has since worsened, according to the USCIRF and other 

open-source reporting. Government restrictions on religious practice increased in all major 

regions of the world between 2007 and 2015, according to the Pew Research Center, while social 

hostilities and violations by nonstate actors also steadily increased in most regions. Department 

of State and USCIRF reporting highlights the growth in recent years of government violations of 

religious freedom tied to Jaws intended to counter terrorism or extremism. 

3 
81 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 32 here 28947.032

Hearing Date: 

Committee: 

Member: 

Witnesses: 

Info Current as of: 

February 13, 2018 

SSCI 

Sen. Wyden 

Director Coats 

Apri123, 2018 

Question: Recent news reports indicate that the same Russian hackers who infiltrated the 

Democratic National Committee in 2016 and the German Bundestag in 2014 repeatedly targeted 

senior US government officials, defense contractors, and scientists through their personal email 

accounts. (AP, '"Fancy Bear' hackers took aim at US defense contractors," February 7, 2018.) 

Do you believe there is a legitimate government interest in protecting the personal accounts 

and devices of government officials? 

Answer: 

The personal accounts and devices of government officials can contain information that is useful 

for our adversaries to target, either directly or indirectly, these officials and the organizations 

with which they are affiliated. 

4 
82 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 33 here 28947.033

Hearing Date: 

Committee: 

Member: 

Witnesses: 

Info Current as of: 

February 13, 2018 

SSCI 

Sen. Wyden 

Director Coats 

Apri123, 2018 

Question: Recent news reports indicate that the same Russian hackers who infiltrated the 

Democratic National Committee in 2016 and the German Bundestag in 2014 repeatedly targeted 

senior U.S. government officials, defense contractors, and scientists through their personal email 

accounts. (AP, "'Fancy Bear' hackers took aim at U.S. defense contractors," February 7, 2018.) 

What resources do you need in order to ensure that these personal accounts and devices 

are not a vulnerable target for foreign intelligence services? 

Answer: 

We have the resources we need to continue our respective education and awareness programs, 

which are the most important weapons in the cyber-battlefield when it comes to personal devices 

and accounts. We also need to continue to harden our government systems, both classified and 

unclassified, to prevent the potential compromise of a Government-issued personal device or 

account from becoming a major cyber-intrusion or cyber-success against our government 

networks or programs; I have made this a priority for the !C. If these programs require 

additional resources, I will inform this committee. 

5 
83 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 34 here 28947.034

Hearing Date: 

Committee: 

February 13, 2018 

SSCI 

Member: Sen. Cotton 

Witnesses: Director Coats 

Info Current as of: March 29, 2018 

Question: In 2017, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency referred to WikiLeaks as a 

"non-state hostile intelligence service" that often aids U.S. adversaries like Russia and China. At 

my request, Chairman Burr and Vice-Chairman Warner included language to that effect in the 

FYI7lntelligence Authorization Act. 

Do you agree with Director Pompeo and this Committee that WikiLeaks is a non-state 

hostile intelligence service that often aids U.S. adversaries like Russia? 

Answer: 

Yes, WikiLeaks should be viewed as a non-state hostile foreign intelligence entity whose 

actions, both individually and in collaboration with others, have caused harm to U.S. national 

security and interests. 

6 
84 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 35 here 28947.035

Hearing Date: 

Committee: 

February 13, 2018 

SSCI 

Member: Sen. Heinrich 

Witnesses: Director Coats 

Info Current as of: April 23, 2018 

Question: How long can personnel from the Executive Office of the President (EOP) bold 

an interim clearance before the clearance process is terminated and access suspended? 

Answer: 

Under Executive Order 12968 (EO 12968), where official functions must be performed prior to 

the completion of the investigation and adjudication process, temporary eligibility for access to 

classified information may be granted. EO 12968 imposes no time limit on temporary access. 

7 
85 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 36 here 28947.036

Hearing Date: February 13, 2018 

Committee: SSCI 

Member: Sen. Heinrich 

Witnesses: Director Coats 

Info Current as of: April 23, 2018 

Question: What accountability is there to the DNI, as the government's security executive 

agent, for the granting of interim security clearances generally, and the interim SCI 

clearances, specifically? 

Answer: 

While the DNI has policy and oversight responsibilities for Government personnel security 

programs and access to SCI, under authorities set forth in statute and Executive Order, 

Agency Heads are responsible for establishing and maintaining an effective program to 

ensure that temporary access to classified information by personnel is clearly consistent with 

the interest of national security. Agency Heads are responsible for following the DNI's 

policy guidance when granting such clearances. 

8 
86 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 37 here 28947.037

Hearing Date: 

Committee: 

February 13, 2018 

SSCI 

Member: Sen. Heinrich 

Witnesses: Director Coats 

Info Current as of: April 23, 2018 

Question: Has the DNI reviewed all the cases of interim access to SCI, both in the EOP 

and across the government? 

Answer: 

The DNI does not routinely review cases of interim access to SCI in the government. The 

DNI does not recommend temporary accesses be granted or denied in specific cases unless an 

Agency Head specifically requests guidance. 

9 
87 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 38 here 28947.038

Hearing Date: 

Committee: 

February 13, 2018 

SSCI 

Member: Sen. Heinrich 

Witnesses: Director Coats 

Info Current as of: April23, 2018 

Question: Are personnel with interim access to SCI under a Continuous Evaluation 

protocol, and if so, who manages that? 

Answer: 

Personnel with interim access may be under Continuous Evaluation. Identification of the 

population covered by Continuous Evaluation is the responsibility of the Agency Head. 

10 
88 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 39 here 28947.039

Hearing Date: 

Committee: 

February 13, 2018 

SSCI 

Member: Sen. Heinrich 

Witnesses: Director Coats 

Info Current as of: April 23, 2018 

Question: Are there executive branch and EOP personnel who have held interim access to 

SCI for longer than one year, and if so, how many such personnel and in what agencies do 

they work? 

Answer: 

In terms ofEOP interim SCI access, the best source of information would be EOP, and I 

would defer to them to address questions regarding EOP personnel with interim access to 

SCI. 

II 
89 

Æ 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 40 here 28947.040

Hearing Date: 

Committee: 

February 13, 2018 

SSCI 

Member: Sen. Harris 

Witnesses: Director Coats 

Info Current as of: Apri116, 2018 

Question: You have the authority to issue Intelligence Community Directives that establish 

policy across the IC. Your predecessor used that authority to establish specific duties to 

warn victims? 

Will you commit to using that same authority to establish a specific duty to warn states 

about election related cybersecurity threats? If not, why not? 

Answer: 

We appreciate the importance of this issue, and the IC remains committed to warning our 

intelligence consumers about the wide range of serious threats facing the United States that are 

prioritized and disseminated commensurate with oversight by select committees for 

intelligence. We do not intend to issue a policy specifically establishing a duty to warn states 

about election-related cybersecurity threats. The referenced policy, ICD 191, Duty to Warn, was 

issued in 2015 directing IC elements to warn U.S. and non-U.S. persons of impending threats of 

intentional killing, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping. The Duty to Warn Directive was 

established to account for intelligence that, when encountered, would be acted upon in a timesensitive manner directly by IC elements. We do have policies in place that were established to 

ensure the IC is providing intelligence information, at an appropriate clearance level, to support 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other Executive Branch agencies, as 

appropriate, in their ability to provide useful information to state, local, and tribal governments 

in a timely manner. The first of these policies, lCD 209, Tearline Production and 

Dissemination, was issued at the request of DHS to expand the utility of intelligence to a broad 

range of customers. The second Directive, ICD 208, Write for Maximum Utility, was issued to 

ensure intelligence products were written and disseminated in a manner that provides the greatest 

use for our customers. The IC will continue to support our customers by providing useful and 

timely intelligence information as appropriate. 

12