Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

CBP’s Efficacy of Controls Over 
 

Drug Seizures 
 

OIG-11-57 March 2011 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

MAR 17 2011

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report addresses the efficacy of Customs and Border Protection’s controls for 

receipting and recording, transporting, storing, and disposing of drug seizures. It is based 

on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct 

observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our 

office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We 

trust this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We 

express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Anne L. Richards 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits 
Executive Summary .............................................................................................................1 
 

Background..........................................................................................................................2
 


Results of Audit ...................................................................................................................3 
 

Noncompliance With Policies and Procedures ........................................................3 
 

Actions Taken by CBP ............................................................................................9 
 

Conclusion .........................................................................................................................10
 


Recommendations..............................................................................................................10
 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ......................................................................11 
 

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.......................................................13
 


Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report .......................................14
 


Appendix C: CBP Drug Seizures ..............................................................................16
 


Appendix D: Major Contributors to this Report........................................................17
 


Appendix E: Report Distribution ..............................................................................18
 


Abbreviations 

CBP U.S. Customs and Bor der Protection 
 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 
 

FY fiscal year 
 

FPFD Fines, Penalties & Forfeiture Division 
 

GAO Government Accountability Office 
 

GPO Government Pri nting Office 
 

SEACATS Seized Asset and Case Tracking System 
 

SPS Seized Property Specialist 
 

Table of Contents/Abbreviations
 

OIG
 


Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection is responsible for securing the 

homeland by preventing the illegal entry of people and goods. In 

1990, U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (formerly U.S. 

Customs Service) Seized Property Program was designated as 

“high risk” by the Government Accountability Office, but was 

removed from this designation in 2003 as a r esult of substantially 

improved management and accountability of seized property, 

including drugs. Since 2003, the Government A ccountability 

Office has not audited the internal controls f or the seizure process. 

We conducted this audit to determine the efficacy of U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection’s controls for receipting and recording, 

transporting, storing, and disposing of seized drugs. 

Although U.S. Customs and Border Protectio n has policies and 

procedures in place, field personnel did not always receipt and 

record, transport, store, or dispose of seized drugs according to 

established policies and procedures, and in some cases, 

circumvented established guidance by using inv alid waivers. We 

attributed these conditions to insufficient oversight, 

communication, and staffing throughout key stages of the seizure 

process. With the continuous influx of illegal drugs into the 

United States and a significant increase in drug seizures over the 

past 4 years, it is imperative that U.S. Custom s and Border 

Protection comply with its established guida nce to ensure that 

seized drugs are protected from loss, theft, or abuse, and to 

maintain evidentiary value in the event of l egal proceedings. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection has initiate d corrective 

actions to address some of the identified deficiencies. Based on 

the results of our audit, we are making four recommendations 

intended to increase the effectiveness of U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection’s controls over seized drugs. 

CBP’s Efficacy of Controls Over Drug Seizures 


Page 1 

 

Background
 


In 1990, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) designated 

the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (formerly the U.S. 

Customs Service) Seized Property Program as “high risk” 

following a review that revealed serious weaknesses in key internal 

controls and systems. These weaknesses affected the Customs 

Service’s ability to control, manage, and rep ort the results of its 

seizure efforts, including accountability and stewardship over 

seized property, which includes seized drugs. In 2003, GAO 

removed the high-risk designation because U. S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) had substantially improved management 

and accountability for seized property, inclu ding seized drugs. 

Since 2003, GAO has not tested the implementa tion of internal 

controls for the drug seizure process. 

In 2007, the Departmentof Homeland Security (DHS) published 

the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, which 

focused primarily on what the U.S. governmen t could do to 

prevent the illegal trafficking of drugs across the border with 

Mexico. Since then, CBP, in support of this strat egy, has increased 

its investment in seizing personnel and technolog y in order to stop 

the flow of illegal drugs. 

Responsibilities for seizing drugs are shared by three separate CBP 

law enforcement arms: the Office of Field Operations, the Office 

of Border Patrol, and the Office of Air and Marine. The Office of 

Field Operations functions at the official ports of entry into the 

United States, the Office of Border Patrol operates between ports 

of entry, and the Office of Air and Marine supports the drug 

seizure process with its air and maritime assets. 

CBP personnel work at 327 ports of entry, 20 Border Patrol sectors 

(with 139 Border Patrol stations and 32 checkp oints), 46 air units, 

and 67 marine units. In fiscal year (FY) 2010, C BP made more 

than 66,000 drug seizures, approximately 50% m ore than in FY 

2007 (see table 1). CBP is not able to estimate the cost of its drug 

seizure efforts. CBP concurred with all four of the 

recommendations in the report and has already begun to formulate 

plans and initiate actions to address the recommendations. 

CBP’s Efficacy of Controls Over Drug Seizures 
 

Page 2
 

Table 1. Total Drug Seizures, FY 2007–FY 2010 

CBP Law 

Enforcement 

2007 

CBP Seizures 

2010 

Field Operations 

Arms 

34,097 38,918 

2008 

48,681 

2009 

46,808 

Border Patrol 9,907 10,329 16,407 19,012 

Air and Marine 211 172 233 561 

Totals 44,215 94 ,419 65,321 66,381 

Source: CBP. 

CBP person r nel are equire d to follow the policies and procedures 

in the Seized Asset Management and Enforcement Procedures 

Handbook1

 when processing drug seizures. This handbook 

contains preventive, detective, and corrective controls to assist 

personnel in their responsibility of maintaining the integrity of 

drug seizures and ensuring that drugs are safe ly kept from the 

public and maintained as evidence. In extenuating circumstances, 

CBP headquarters may grant field locations waive rs that allow 

them to temporarily bypass these policies and procedures. 

Results of Audit 

CBP’s controls for receipting and recording, transporting, storing, and disposing 

of seized drugs were not always effective. CBP field personnel did not always 

receipt and record, transport, store, or dispose of seized drug s according to the 

policies and procedures in its Seized Asset Management and Enforcement 

Procedures Handbook. In some cases, field personnel circum vented established 

guidance by using invalid waivers. CBP field personnel did not always comply 

with policies and procedures because of insufficient oversight, communication, 

and staffing throughout key stages of the seizure process. With a significant 

increase in drug seizures over the past 4 years, it is imperative th at CBP comply 

with its established guidance to ensure that seized drugs are protected from loss, 

theft, or abuse, and to maintain evidentiary v alue in the event of legal proceedings. 

Noncompliance With Policies and Procedures 

We reviewed 637 case files from 14 CBP locations b etween FYs 2007 and 

20092 to determine compliance with policies and procedures during key 

stages of the seizure process (receipt and recording, transport, storage, and 

disposal). CBP creates a case file for every drug seizure incident. The 

1

 CBP is currently revising the Seized Asset Management and Enforcement Procedures Handbook to 
 

reassess the efficacy of current seized property policies and procedures. 


2

 See appendix C for locations and number of case files reviewed. 
 

CBP’s Efficacy of Controls Over Drug Seizures 

Page 3 
case file includes the chain of custody 6051S form, the electronic Seized 

Asset and Case Tracking System (SEACATS) record, the evidence 

destruction form, and any other legal documentation that is required for 

processing the drug evidence. Fifty-seven percent of the 637 case files 

contained at least one indication of noncompliance wit h a policy or 

procedure. Indications included inadequate receip ting and recording, 

improper transporting, incorrect storage, and imprope r disposal of seized 

drugs; and instances of using invalid waivers to circumvent CBP controls. 

Receipting and Recording of Seized Drugs 

A key control in receipting and record ing of seized drugs is accurate 

documentation of seizure inform ation. According to CBP policy, 

field personnel must record information such as th e date, custodians, 

weight, and quantity of drugs on the chain of cu stody 6051S form 

and the evidence destruction form. Field personnel are then to 

transfer the information from the 6051S form to SEACATS within 

24 hours from time of seizure, and a supervisor must ensure that the 

information on the 6051S form matches the SEA CATS information. 

This policy ensures the integrity of the drug seizur e and makes it 

more difficult for fraudulent changes or human error to go 

unnoticed. Further, other federal agencie s, including the 

Department of Justice’s U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, use these CBP 

drug seizure forms and reports in prosecuting suspected cri minals. 

CBP did not conduct proper oversight of these control measures to 

ensure that personnel were following polices and procedures. For 

example, during a tour of CBP’s operations in a n international 

mailing facility, we observed a large numbe r of backlogged khat3 

seizures located in an unsecured4 location, with only partially 

completed 6051S forms. The CBP official who escorted us 

estimated that 400 backlogged khat seizures w ere awaiting 

processing. We also observed port personnel r ecording khat 

seizures using input dates rather than actual seizure dates. Port 

personnel told us that khat seizures can go unprocessed for up to 

10 days. Not entering actual information about a seizure can make 

drug seizure cases more vulnerable to lega l challenges. Khat is 

classified as “high-risk, illegal” in the United Sta tes, and according 

to a CBP official, can be used as a tool to obtain a search warrant 

of suspected drug dealers. However, CBP personnel at this 

location did not treat it as high risk and did not make its processing 

a priority. Figure 1 shows unproce ssed khat observed during a tour 

3 Catha edulis, commonly known as khat, is a flowering shrub native to East Africa and the Arabian 
 

Peninsula that is used as a recreational drug. 


4

 A location not meeting temporary or permanent physical security vault requirements. 
 

CBP’s Efficacy of Controls Over Drug Seizures 

Page 4 
of CBP’s operations in an international mailing facility. Figure 2 

is an example of an incomplete 6051S form. 

Figure 1. Unprocessed khat with partially completed 6051S forms 

Source: DHS OIG. 

Figure 2 . Partially completed 6051S form 

Source: DHS OIG. 

At another location, we identified instances where port personnel 

used a rubber signature stamp in lieu of origi nal signatures when 

completing the 6051S form. According to a CBP headquarters 

memorandum, all letters, forms, and documents signed by the 

Fines, Penalties & Forfeiture office must bear an original 

signature. No signature stamps are to be used on these official 

documents. If an unauthorized user misappropriated a signature 

stamp, it could jeopardize the integrity of the seizure case and 

potential prosecutions. Additionally, an official from the Federal 

CBP’s Efficacy of Controls Over Drug Seizures 

Page 5 
Bureau of Investigation said that any inconsistencies in the 

receipting and recording of seized drugs can create chain of 

custody issues, which defendants can use in an attempt to have the 

evidence omitted. 

Transporting Seized Drugs 

CBP did not ensure that personnel transported seized drugs to 

permanent storag e or other federal agencies within required 

timeframes. According to CBP’s policies and procedures, 

personnel must transfer seized drugs from te mporary storage to 

permanent storage (where drugs are storeduntil destruction) or 

other federal agencies within 3 calendar days from the time of 

seizure. Permanent storage facilities must meet strict physical 

security requirements to ensure that seized d rugs are safely and 

securely stored. Temporary storage facilities are only supposed to 

act as interim storage for seized drugs and therefore do not meet 

the rigorous requirements to safeguard the seize d drugs. At one 

location, we saw that CBP personnel were not transferring drugs 

out of temporary storage for an additional wee k beyond the 

required timeframes. The untimely transfer of d rugs increases the 

risk of loss and may compromise the chain of cu stody or the 

evidentiary value. 

Storing Seized Drugs 

CBP did not ensure that personnel stored seized drugs according to 

policies and procedures. CBP personnel did not consistently 

document drug seizure shelf weights prior tostorage. According to 

CBP policies and procedures, upon storage, all drugs must be 

assigned a shelf weight, which must be docume nted on the 6051S 

form and in SEACATS. The shelf weights on the 6051S form 

must be verified and updated during inventories and at the time of 

destruction, as well as match the SEACATS r ecord at all times. 

Additionally, CBP did not always ensure that afull-time Seized 

Property Specialist (SPS) was assigned and responsible for 

managing and safeguarding drug seizures in permanent vaults. 

CBP headquarters requires permanent vaults to have at least one 

full-time SPS to oversee the vaults and ultimate ly be accountable 

for drugs stored in the vaults. We identifie d three instances in 

which drugs were stored for more than 3 calendar days in vaults 

that were not managed and overseen by a full-time SPS. Instead, 

the vaults were managed by rotating Seizing Officers, whose 

primary duties were not vault management. Although CBP 

CBP’s Efficacy of Controls Over Drug Seizures 

Page 6 
headquarters officials communicated their objections, they did not 

formally require ports to end this practice. 

At one location, we identified defective tamperproof bags. Field 

personnel throughout the United States use this type of bag to store 

seized drugs. Properly sealed evidence bags ensure that drug 

seizures are not tampered with and that the integrity of the 

evidence is maintained. The bags we examined had defective glue 

strip seals that had dried and cracked and were t herefore 

inadequate for the storage of seized drugs . See figures 3 and 4 for 

images of the defective tamperproof bags. 

Figure 3. Evidence bag with broken glue lines 

Source: DHS OIG.
 


Figure 4. Partially open evidence bag 
 

Source: DHS OIG. 

CBP’s Efficacy of Controls Over Drug Seizures 

Page 7 
Field personnel said that they often need to rebag, reweigh, and 

update the 6051S form and the SEACATS record because of the 

defective bags. 

Disposing of Seized Drugs 

CBP did not ensure that personnel accurately completed 

destruction form s and destroyed drugs within required timeframes. 

According to CBP policy, Paralegal Specialists are required to 

issue destruction forms after 60 calenda r days of the seizure for all 

bulk drugs above a certain weight threshold. Additionally, 

according to CBP’s policy, seized drugs must be destroyed within 

30 days after a destruction order is issued. CBP did not meet the 

required timeframes owing to multiple vacant S PS and Paralegal 

Specialist positions. According to CBP officials, the scarcity of 

personnel hinders their ability to manage drug seizures properly 

and timely. According to a CBP official, to m anage case files 

properly and timely, Paralegal Specialists sho uld manage not more 

than 250 cases at a time. At one location where destruction 

timeframes were not being met, Paralegal Specialists were 

managing an average of 385 case files each at an y given time. The 

substantial caseload at this location made it difficult to ensure that 

all drug seizure cases complied with required ti meframes. 

28 CFR § 50.21(c) (Controlled Substance Destruction Procedures) 

requires entities “to prevent the warehousing of large quantities of 

seized contraband drugs which are unnecessary for due process in 

criminal cases. Such stockpiling of contraband drugs presents 

inordinate security and storage problems whi ch create additional 

economic burdens on limited law enforcement resources of the 

United States.” 

Invalid Waivers 

CBP field personnel were using invalid waiver s to circumvent 

polices and procedures. In extenuating circum stances, such as 

during a natural disaster or a shortage of staff needed to handle a 

location’s increased drug seizures, CBP headquarters can grant 

waivers that allow field personnel to temporaril y bypass policies 

and procedures. Waivers are supposed to be granted on a case-bycase basis and must be (1) signed by authoriz ed headquarters 

officials and (2) defined and used during specified time periods. 

We found three instances in which ports were operating under 

invalid waivers unbeknownst to headquarters officials. At one 

CBP’s Efficacy of Controls Over Drug Seizures 

Page 8 
location, backlogged khat seizures had reached a critical level and 

personnel requested permission from CBP headquarters to 

circumvent policies and procedures to expedite the destruction of 

the khat backlog. SPSs were allowed to pick up drugs at the mail 

facility for immediate transport to the destructio n site, and 

personnel were allowed to bypass require ments for drugs to be 

verified against shelf weights prior to destructio n. According to 

field personnel, no waiver was officially documented and signed 

by an authorized headquarters official; instead, verbal approval 

was granted in February 2009 to address the b acklogged khat. 

Officials estimated that CBP would operate un der the waiver for 1 

month and then resume adherence to policies and procedures once 

the backlog was eliminated. As a result of not having written 

approval, new employees who began to work at the location 

continued to bypass standard operating procedures from February 

2009 until March 2010, approximately 1 ye ar beyond the waiver’s 

intended timeframe. 

At another location, two invalid waivers were used to circumvent 

CBP policies and procedures. The first involved CBP personnel 

using an invalid waiver from 1995, which was issued prior to the 

creation of DHS. This waiver allowed the loca tion an additional 

30 days to issue a destruction order. CBP headquarters was not 

aware that the location was using this invalid w aiver. The same 

location was using another waiver that had exp ired at least 3 

months prior to our site visit, which allowed the SPS to transport 

drugs from temporary to permanent storage. To ensure separation 

of duties, CBP policy requires the CBP perso nnel transporting 

drugs and those accepting the drugs into storage to be different 

people. CBP headquarters was not aware that the waiver 

bypassing this control had expired. 

CBP does not have a system to track waivers gra nted by CBP 

headquarters to field locations. Without proper oversight, CBP 

cannot be certain that field personnel are using waivers as intended. 

Actions Taken by CBP 

CBP has taken action to address several of the deficiencies identified in 

this report. After CBP was informed of theimproper use of waivers, field 

and headquarters personnel took immediate action to resolve the issue. 

CBP agreed with our recommendation that a system to track waivers is 

needed and has begun to develop a waiver tracking tool. 

CBP’s Efficacy of Controls Over Drug Seizures 

Page 9 
Following our notification, CBP issued a memorandum to field offices 

prohibiting the use of rubber stamps in lieu of a signature. CBP reported 

that it received additional funding, which it will use to purchase two 

incinerators for two separate locations that seize a high volume of drugs. 

Officials said this should help CBP meet the required timeframe for 

destroying drugs. Additionally, CBP requested 50 new Paralegal 

Specialist positions and 31 new SPS positions in the President’s FY 2011 

budget request, and stated that it will be staffing the vacant SPS positions 

identified in this report and intends to conduct a staffing allocation 

assessment in FY 2011. Appropriate staffing will help CBP meet its 

timeframe requirements for destroying seized drugs. 

Upon being notified of the defective evidence bags, CBP headquarters 

officials responsible for field locations immediately issued a memo 

requesting a review of all drug evidence bags in the field. Eight locations 

reported more than 11,000 evidence bags that did not properly seal. CBP is 

working to address this issue. Additionally, CBP is updating the Seized 

Asset Management and Enforcement Procedures Handbook to ensure that 

all field personnel understand the requirements for processing drug seizures. 

Conclusion 

There has been a significant increase in drug seizures by CBP over the 

past 4 years. As DHS continues to implement the National Southwest 

Border Counternarcotics Strategy and initiatives, it is imperative that CBP 

comply with its established guidance and address areas of noncompliance 

to ensure that seized drugs are protected from loss, theft, or abuse and to 

maintain evidentiary value in the event of legal proceedings. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 

Recommendation #1: Strengthen communication and oversight 

to ensure that field personnel comply with established policies and 

procedures regarding receipting, recording, transporting, storing, 

and disposing of seized drugs. 

Recommendation #2: Conduct a staffing allocation assessment to 

staff key positions to ensure that staffing is properly aligned with 

seizure caseloads, and that all field locations are properly staffed 

with the appropriate SPS and legal case personnel to carry out their 

duties and responsibilities. 

CBP’s Efficacy of Controls Over Drug Seizures 

Page 10 
Recommendation #3: Develop a plan to replace defective 

evidence bags in the field. This plan should include— 

�	 

�	 

�	 

Identifying ports with defective evidence bags, 

Securing a contractor that can provide nondefective 

evidence bags, and 

Replacing defective evidence bags as soon as possible. 

Recommendation #4: Implement a waiver tracking and 

management system. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

CBP concurred with all four of the recommendations in the report and has 

already begun to formulate plans and initiate actions to address the 

recommendations. 

Management Response to Recommendation #1: 

CBP concurred: CBP agreed with the need to strengthen communication 

and oversight to ensure that field personnel comply wit h established 

policies and procedures regarding receipting, recording, transporting, 

storing, and disposing of seized drugs. The Fines, Penalties and Forfeiture 

Division (FPFD) plans to augment its oversight progr am by conducting 

Fines, Penalties and Forfeiture office site short notic e surveys and by 

creating a specific oversight branch that will monitor personnel 

compliance with policies and procedures for process ing drug seizures. 

FPFD plans to have these changes implemented by June 30, 2011. 

OIG Analysis: Management’s response indicated ho w FPFD plans to 

address this recommendation; however, the other CB P offices and 

divisions, including Office of Border Patrol, re sponsible for receipting, 

recording, transporting, storing, and disposing of seized drugs have not 

indicated how they plan to address this recommendat ion. This 

recommendation is unresolved and will remain open until documentation 

is received from all CBP offices and divisions respon sible for handling 

drug seizures. The documentation they submit must indicate how they 

implemented the recommendation and how the implem entation will 

strengthen communication and oversi ght and ensure that personnel are 

complying with policies and procedures for processing d rugs seizures. 

Management Response to Recommendation #2: 

CBP concurred: CBP agreed with the need to conduct a staffing allocation 

assessment to staff key positions to ensure that staffing is properly aligned 

CBP’s Efficacy of Controls Over Drug Seizures 
 

Page 11
 
with seizure caseloads, and that all field locations are properly staffed with 

the appropriate SPS and legal case personnel to carry out their duties and 

responsibilities. On January 3, 2011, FPFD obtained a cost estimate for 

updating its Resource Optimization and Resource Allocation models. 

FPFD plans to implement this recommendation by March 1, 2011. 

OIG Analysis: Management’s response indicated how FPFD plans to 

address this recommendation; however, the other CBP offices and 

divisions (including Office of Border Patrol) responsible for receipting, 

recording, transporting, storing, and disposing of seized drugs have not 

indicated how they plan to address this recommendation. This 

recommendation is unresolved and will remain open until documentation 

is received indicating the staffing allocation assessment was conducted for 

all CBP offices and divisions responsible for handling drug seizures and 

those CBP offices and divisions have analyzed the results to determine 

whether their staffing is adequate based on seizure caseloads and position 

responsibilities. 

Management Response to Recommendation #3: 

CBP concurred: CBP agreed with the need to develop a plan to replace 

defective evidence bags in the field. CBP stated that the plan includes 

forwarding bags identified as defective to the Government Printing Office 

(GPO) for examination and GPO contacting the evidence bag vendor for 

necessary action, increasing the amount of adhesive used on each bag, 

including proper sealing instructions on every bag, distributing a training 

video to the appropriate personnel showing step-by-step instructions for 

properly sealing the bags, and developing a system of internal controls for 

monitoring the quality of evidence bags. CBP plans to implement this 

recommendation by June 1, 2011. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved but will remain open until 

documentation is received verifying that the recommendation was 

implemented and CBP has replaced all defective evidence bags in the field. 

Management Response to Recommendation #4: 

CBP concurred: FPFD agreed and has developed and implemented a 

waiver tracking and management system. It is looking at enhancing the 

Waiver Tracking System capabilities through SharePoint by June 1, 2011. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved but will remain open 

until documentation is received verifying that all CBP offices responsible 

for seizing and processing drug seizures are using the new waiver tracking 

and management system. 

CBP’s Efficacy of Controls Over Drug Seizures
 

Page 12
 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

This report provides the results of our work to determine the 

efficacy of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s controls over 

seized drugs, including controls for receipting and recording, 

transporting, storing, and disposing of seized drugs. We reviewed 

637 case files from 14 CBP locations with the highest amount of 

drug seizures between FY 2007 and FY 2009. As part of our 

location selection, only drug seizures with drug weights considered 

beyond personal use, as codified by 19 CFR 17 1.51(b)(6) 

(Personal use quantities), were counted tow ard the total drug 

seizure population. CBP headquarters provided the total drug 

seizure numbers for FYs 2007–2009 and the number of defective 

evidence bags, neither of which were verified during this audit. 

We assessed compliance with CBP’s policies a nd procedures in the 

key stages of the seizure process: receipting and recording, 

transporting, storing, and disposing of drug seizu res. For each 

seizure stage, we tested key internal controls based on the Seized 

Asset Management and Enforcement Procedures Handbook. Site 

visits consisted of CBP personnel interviews an d direct 

observations of CBP handling of seized drugs throughout each of 

the key stages of the seizure process. 

We conducted our audit between December 2009 and August 2010 

under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as 

amended, and according to generally accept ed government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropria te evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based 

on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions. 

CBP’s Efficacy of Controls Over Drug Seizures 


Page 13 

e

,

..

·

MEMORANDUM FOR RICIIARD L. SKINNER

INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMEr-;T OF HOMELAND SECURITY

FROM: Assistant Commissionef '7 .t 7, /

to-... Office of Internal Affair , t D

SUBJl:CI U.S. Customs and Border Protection·s Response to the Office of Inspector

General·s Draft Report Entitled. ·'CRp·s Efficacy of Controls Over Drug

Seizures'·

Thunk you for providing us with a copy of your draft report entilled '·CBp·s Efficacy ofControls Over

Drug Seizures:' dated December 28, 2010. We appreciate the opportunity 10 review and respond to

Ihe report. The report identifies measures U.S. Customs and l30rder Protection (CBP) can take to

improve its process to safcguard seized drugs.

The report includes four recommendations. The recommendations and CIJI'·s actions to address the

recommendations are described below,

Recommendation 1#1: Strengthen communication and oversight to ensure that litld personnel

comply wilh estahlished policies and procedures regarding receipting. recording. transporting. slOring.

and disposing ofscized drugs.

CHI' Re~pome: CHI' C("lllCUrS with Ihe recommendation

For over (I year. the Fines, Penallies and Forfeiture Division·s (FPFD) goal has been to de,elop a more

robUSl o\crsight program thai \\ould enhance communication and focus on field compliance with

cstahlishcd policies and procedures. FI'FD has been in the process of fonnally proposing lhe creation

of a specific oversiglll branch for this purpose. In an effort to maintain oversight and communication

\\ ith the field the FPFD will continue: (I) conducting Fines, Penallles & Forfeiture (FP&F) officer

qU(lrterly conference calls to communicate policy and significant issues regarding the program to the

Held: (2) posling informational notices. policy and other program relevant material in SharePoint: (J)

(Isscssing FP&F ollices monthl)' by reviewing SEACATS case and property data; (4) conducting

un(lnnounccd pennanent lault reviews and oversight: and (5) expanding the oversight program by

conducting FP&F office site short notice surveys. Du~ Dale: June 30. 20 II

R~commcndation1#2: Conduct a staffi ng allocation asscssmcntto staff key positions to ensure that

stamng is properly aligned v.ith seizure caseloads. and thaI all field locations are proper!) staffed"" ilh

the appropriate 51'S and legal Case personnel to call) out their dUlies and responsihilities.

CHI' Rc.~ponsc: CBP concurs with the recommendation.

1300 ~nn5\'I'...nla A'"""ue NW

\\'ashmglon. DC 20129

u.s. Customs and

Border Protection

January 26. 2011

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

CBP’s Efficacy of Controls Over Drug Seizures 
 

Page 14
 

2

On January 3, 2011, FPFD obtained a cost estimate for updating the Re ource Optimization Model and

Resourc llocation Model for FP&F taff. FPFD will be looking for funding. Due Date: March I,

2011

Recommendation #3: Develop a plan to replace defective evidence bag in the field. This plan should

include:

- Identifying ports with defective evidence bags,

ecuring a contractor that can provide nondefective evidence bag. and

- Replacing defective evidence bags a oon a po sible.

CBP Re pon e: CBP concurs with the r commendation.

CBP will develop a plan to identify defective bags and remove them from inventory. Bags identified

as defective will be forwarded to the Government Printing Office (GPO) for examination. GPO will

contact the evidence bag vendor for nece sary action.

BP will increa e the amount of adhe ive used on each bag a well as including proper aling

in tructions on every bag: CBP will di tribute a training video to the appropriate personnel howing

tep-by- tep in tru tion for properly ealing the bags; and, cap will develop a sy tern of internal

control for monitoring the quality of evidence bags. This will include developing a proces for

random sampling a well as an analy i regarding helflife. Due Date: June J. 201 1

Recommendation #4: Implement a waiver tracking and management y t m.

CBP Response: BP concurs with the recommendation.

A Waiver Tracking y tern ha been d veloped and implemented by the FP D (for u e by Office of

Field Operation ). FPFD i looking at enhancing the Waiver Tracking ystem capabilities through

harePoint. Due Date: June 1. 2011

Technical comments to this report will be provided to the 010 electronically. With regard to the

classification of the draft report, cap has n t identified any information within this report that

warrants a "For Official U Only" clas ilication.

A always, CBP appreciate the opportunity to highlight our continuing effort to improve our

performance, and to provide additional information to the 010 regarding our future efforts that not

only address the OIG recommendation. but will also impro our overall operational effectiveness.

If you have any questi n regarding this re ponse, please contact me or have a member of your taff

contact Robin Whit , Deputy Director, Management In pection Divi ion. Audit Management and

Liai on, at (202) 344-1061.

CBP’s Efficacy of Controls Over Drug Seizures 
 

Page 15
 

Appendix C 

FY 2007–FY 2010 CBP Drug Seizures 

CBP SITE LOCATIONS 

NUMBER OF DRUG SEIZURES AND CASES FILES 

CBP Location 

Number of Drug 

Seizures 

FY 2007–FY 2009 

Cases Reviewed 

Location 1 27,287 175 

Location 2 4,136 30 

Location 3 4,028 30 

Location 4 3,684 48 

Location 5 3,672 30 

Location 6 3,410 30 

Location 7 2,064 48 

Location 8 1,870 49 

Location 9 1,870 30 

Location 10 1,775 30 

Location 11 1,742 30 

Location 12 1,616 47 

Location 13 1,534 30 

Location 14 1,382 30 

Total Seizures and Cases 60,070 637 

CBP’s Efficacy of Controls Over Drug Seizures 
 

Page 16
 

Appendix D 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Jewel Butl r, Director e 

Shelley Howes, Audit Manager 

Maryann Pereira, Audit Manager 

Matt Noll, Program Analyst 

Edward Jeye, Auditor 

Michael Brunelle, Pr ogram Analyst 

Thomas Bobrowski,Program Analyst 

Nachama R osen, Program Analyst 

Martha Barksdale, Auditor 

Danielle de Sanctis, Program Analyst 

Lovella Viray, Program Analyst 

David DeHaven, Independent Referencer 

CBP’s Efficacy of Controls Over Drug Seizures 


Page 17 

Appendix E 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretariat 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Customs and Border Protection 

Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations 

Chief, Office of Border Patrol 

Deputy Director, CBP Audit Management and Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

CBP’s Efficacy of Controls Over Drug Seizures 
 

Page 18
 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 254-4100, 

fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or noncriminal 

misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, 

Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 

245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.