In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-22-00086-CR

STEVEN BRANT HALEY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 102nd District Court

Red River County, Texas

Trial Court No. CR01895

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

On December 10, 2012, Steven Brant Haley was convicted of operating a motor vehicle 

while intoxicated, with two or more previous convictions relating to the operating of a motor 

vehicle while intoxicated, a third-degree felony.1 In accordance with a plea-bargain agreement, 

the trial court sentenced Haley to ten years’ imprisonment, suspended the sentence, placed him 

on community supervision for ten years, and assessed a fine of $1,000.00 and court costs of 

$1,008.00. After Haley violated the terms of his community supervision order several times by 

consuming alcohol, the trial court revoked Haley’s community supervision, sentenced him to ten 

years’ imprisonment, and assessed $75.00 in reimbursement fees.

Haley appeals his revocation.

Appointed counsel filed an Anders brief.2 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744

(1967); Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). In Anders, the United 

States Supreme Court recognized that counsel, though appointed to represent the appellant in an 

appeal from a criminal conviction, has no duty to pursue a frivolous matter on appeal. Anders, 

386 U.S. at 744. By letter, counsel informed Haley of his rights to review the record and file a 

pro se response. Counsel also mailed Haley copies of the clerk’s and reporter’s records, and this 

Court notified him that any pro se response was due on or before November 28, 2022. Also, by 

letter dated December 8, 2022, we notified Haley that the case would be submitted on briefs on 

December 29, 2022. Haley did not file a pro se response.

1See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.09(b)(2) (Supp.).

2Appointed counsel also filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. 
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After a thorough review of the record, counsel in this case concluded that there were no 

non-frivolous issues in Haley’s appeal. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders by 

presenting a professional evaluation of the record that demonstrates why there are no arguable 

grounds to be advanced. We conclude that counsel performed the duties required of appointed 

counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2014); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. 

proceeding).

We must, “after a full examination of all the proceedings, . . . decide whether the case is 

wholly frivolous.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83 (1988); 

accord Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 509–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). An appeal is “wholly 

frivolous” or “without merit” when it “lacks any basis in law or fact.” McCoy v. Court of 

Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1988). Based on our independent review of the 

entire record in this appeal, we conclude that no reversible error exists. In the Anders context, 

once we determine that the appeal does not contain reversible error, we must affirm the trial 

court’s judgment. “However, appellate courts are authorized to reform judgments and affirm as 

modified in Anders cases involving non-reversible error.” Mitchell v. State, 653 S.W.3d 295, 

297 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2022, no pet.) (comprehensively discussing appellate cases that 

have modified judgments in Anders cases). 

In this case, Haley was indicted for and convicted of operating a motor vehicle while 

intoxicated, with two or more previous convictions relating to the operating of a motor vehicle 

while intoxicated as set forth in Section 49.09(b)(2) of the Texas Penal Code. See TEX. PENAL 
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CODE ANN. § 49.09(b)(2). However, the trial court’s judgment of conviction that revoked 

Haley’s community supervision (Revocation Judgment), under “Statute for Offense,” recites,

“49.04 Penal Code.” For that reason, we will modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect the 

statute of offense as Section 49.09(b)(2) of the Texas Penal Code.

The trial court’s judgment of conviction that placed Haley on community supervision 

included a fine of $1,000.00 and court costs of $1,008.00. Under the trial court’s order imposing 

conditions of community supervision, Haley was ordered to pay the fine and court costs.

3

 The 

certified bill of costs included the itemized costs, fees, and fine accumulated during the entirety 

of the case and recited a “TOTAL COST OF CAUSE” of $2,833.00, a credit to Haley in the 

amount of $2,758.00, and an “Amount due from []Defendant” of $75.00. It appears that the 

$75.00 remaining after applying the credit to Haley is related to additional sheriff’s fees charged 

after Haley was placed on community supervision. This is because the bill of costs includes a 

charge for “SHERIFFS FEE CRIMINAL” in the amount of $195.00. Excluding any charges for 

the fine and attorney fees, the total court costs including $195.00 for the sheriff’s fee is $583.00. 

Haley paid all of the court costs ($508.00) ordered under the community supervision order. 

Subtracting $508.00 from $583.00 leaves $75.00. Also, the trial court’s Revocation Judgment, 

under “Reimbursement Fees,” recites $75.00.

Article 102.011 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant 

convicted of a felony must reimburse fees to a peace officer for certain services, including “$5

for commitment or release.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.011(a)(6) (Supp.). There is 

3The order itemized the $1,008.00 of courts costs assessed in its judgment as court costs of $508.00 and a courtappointed attorney fee of $500.00.
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support in the record that Haley was committed to jail three times and was released from jail two 

times after he was placed on community supervision. That would require Haley to pay $25.00 in 

reimbursement of peace officer fees. However, we find no support in the record of any other 

circumstance for which a peace officer’s fee is statutorily allowed. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 102.011 (Supp.). Consequently, we find that the record supports only $25.00 in peace 

officer’s fees after Haley was placed on community supervision. For that reason, we will modify 

the trial court’s Revocation Judgment by changing the amount under “Reimbursement Fees” to 

$25.00. We will also modify the certified bill of costs by changing the amount of “SHERIFFS 

FEE CRIMINAL” to $145.00, the amount of “TOTAL COST OF CAUSE” to $2,783.00, and the 

amount under “Amount due from []Defendant” to $25.00.

Further, we find that Haley’s counsel substantially complied with the requirements of 

Anders and Kelly. Therefore, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 

744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 318–20. 

Should appellant desire to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal 

Appeals, appellant must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file 

a pro se petition for discretionary review.4 Any petition for discretionary review (1) must be 

filed within thirty days from either the date of this opinion or the date on which the last timely 

motion for rehearing was overruled by this Court, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2, (2) must be filed 

with the clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.3, and (3) should 

4While an appellant has a right to file a petition for discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, 

review is not a matter of right. See TEX. R. APP. P. 66.2; TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5(b).
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comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, see TEX. 

R. APP. P. 68.4.

We modify the certified bill of costs by (1) changing the amount charged for “SHERIFFS 

FEE CRIMINAL” to $145.00, (2) changing the amount charged for “TOTAL COST OF 

CAUSE” to $2,783.00, and (3) changing the amount under “Amount due from []Defendant” to 

$25.00. We also modify the trial court’s judgment by changing the “Statute for Offense” to

Section 49.09(b)(2) of the Texas Penal Code and by changing the amount under “Reimbursement 

Fees” to $25.00. As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Charles van Cleef

Justice

Date Submitted: December 29, 2022

Date Decided: January 10, 2023

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