I N T H E U NI T E D S T A T E S DI S T RI C T C O U R T 

F O R T H E MI D D L E DI S T RI C T O F P E N N S Y L V A NI A 

G R E G O R Y O. F A N N, J R., 

Plai ntiff, 

 v. 

B O B B Y-J O S A L A M O N, et al., 

Defe n da nts. 

 N o. 4: 2 3- C V- 0 1 7 8 7 

( C hief J u d ge Bra n n) 

M E M O R A N D U M O PI NI O N 

A N U A R Y 2 0 2 5 

Plai ntiff Gre g or y O. Fa n n, Jr., is c urre ntl y i ncarcerate d at t he State 

C orrecti o nal I nstit uti o n ( S CI) Pi ne Gr o ve, l o cate d i n I n dia na, Pe n ns yl va nia. He 

file d t he i nsta nt pr o se Secti o n 1 9 8 3 acti o n i n late 2 0 2 3, clai mi n g c o nstit uti o nal 

vi olati o ns b y m ostl y hi g h-le vel pris o n offi cials at t he Pe n ns yl va nia De part me nt of 

C orrecti o ns ( D O C). Prese ntl y pe n di n g is Defe n da nts’ m oti o n t o dis miss Fa n n’s 

a me n de d c o m plai nt p urs ua nt t o Fe deral R ule of Ci vil Pr oce d ure 1 2( b)( 6). T he 

C o urt will gra nt i n part a n d de n y i n part Defe n da nts’ m oti o n. 

I. B A C K G R O U N D

Fa n n’s la ws uit c o ncer ns e ve nts t hat alle ge dl y occ urre d i n 2 0 2 2 at S CI

R oc k vie w a n d S CI Fa yette. Acc or di n g t o Fa n n, o n A pril 2 5, 2 0 2 2, w hile he was 

 4 2 U. S. C. § 1 9 8 3. Secti o n 1 9 8 3 creates a pri vate ca use of acti o n t o re dress c o nstit uti o nal 

wr o n gs c o m mitte d b y state official s. T he stat ute is n ot a s o urce of s u bsta nti ve ri g hts; it ser ves 

as a mec ha nis m f or vi n dicati n g ri g hts ot her wise pr otecte d b y fe deral la w. See G o nz a g a U niv. 

v. D oe, 5 3 6 U. S. 2 7 3, 2 8 4- 8 5 ( 2 0 0 2).

Case 4:23-cv-01787-MWB-MP Document 34 Filed 01/03/25 Page 1 of 18
2 

incarcerated at SCI Rockview, inmates on “A-block” participated in a protest, 

causing the facility to go on lockdown.2

 Fann recalls that he was housed on “Dblock” at that time and eventually figured out that the facility had been locked 

down when he noticed the lack of inmate movement.3

 

The following day, DOC officials from “Central Office” came to D-block 

and interviewed some of the inmates.4

 Fann was interviewed by a female official 

from SCI Coal Township, and he informed her about a previous grievance 

(#972434) he had filed at SCI Rockview in March 2022 regarding hazardous 

conditions on the block and various staff misconduct.5

 

The next day, April 27, Fann was escorted to the “Education building” for 

another interview.6

 He was questioned by a “Mr. Almo” about the inmate protest 

as well as the conditions at SCI Rockview.7

 Fann responded that he knew very 

little about the protest, only that some of the inmates were upset because prison 

officials were considering taking away “Night time blockout,” (i.e., evening outof-cell time).8

 Fann also voiced his complaints about the conditions at SCI 

Rockview, including serious misconduct by several corrections officers.9

 Fann 

2

 Doc. 26 ¶ 13. 

3

 Id.

4

 Id. ¶ 14. 

5

 Id. ¶¶ 10, 14; Doc. 26-1 at 1. 

6

 Doc. 26 ¶ 15. 

7

 Id. ¶ 16. 

8

 Id. 

9

 Id. ¶¶ 16, 17. 

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3 

told Almo that certain officers on D-block “like to have sex in the hub on the unit, 

in the bathroom, or in the counselor’s office” while working, and he reported other 

sexually inappropriate or physically abusive behavior by multiple D-block 

officers.10

The following day—April 28—Fann was transferred to SCI Fayette.11 He 

was placed in the RHU at SCI Fayette, apparently in administrative custody.12 On 

May 5, 2022, Fann received a misconduct (D539215) for “threatening an employee 

or their family with bodily harm” and “engaging or encouraging unauthorized 

group activity.”13 The misconduct was issued on May 4, 2022, by defendant 

Captain D.R. Davis and stated that Fann had been identified by the DOC’s Bureau 

of Investigations and Intelligence (BII) as being involved in a plot to take SCI 

Rockview officials hostage during “an unauthorized inmate protest on April 25, 

2022.”14 

Fann denied the charges asserted in the misconduct, pointing out that he had 

alibis for his whereabouts on April 25 (the day of the protest), and that he was 

housed on D-block, not A-block—where the protest occurred.15 On May 10, Fann 

attended a hearing with a Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO), where he asserted 

10 Id. ¶¶ 17-19. 

11 Id. ¶ 20. 

12 Id. ¶¶ 20-21. 

13 Id. ¶ 21; Doc. 26-1 at 5. 

14 Doc. 26 ¶ 21; Doc. 26-1 at 5. 

15 See Doc. 26 ¶ 22; Doc. 26-1 at 6. 

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his innocence in the protest and hostage plot and alleged that the misconduct had 

been fabricated by Davis as retaliation for speaking out about the conditions and 

staff misconduct at SCI Rockview.16 It appears that the May 10 hearing was 

continued “to obtain additional information.”17 

On May 18, 2022, the DHO resumed the hearing and determined that Fann 

had committed both charged offenses.18 The DHO relied primarily on a May 13 

in-camera interview with defendant BII Major Torres as to the reliability of a 

“Confidential Human Source” (CHS) and the content of that source’s report.19 

According to Torres, the informant had identified Fann as one of the inmates 

involved with planning the protest and hostage incident and was “going to be 

involved in taking hostages and protesting on D Block had the incident [gone] 

according to plan.”20 Fann was sentenced to an aggregate punishment of 120 days’ 

disciplinary custody.21

In his initial complaint, Fann provided more information regarding the 

recommendation—allegedly made by SCI Rockview officials—to be placed in the 

“Security Threat Group Management Unit” (STGMU) at SCI Fayette.22 In the 

original complaint and attached documents, Fann alleged that SCI Rockview 

16 Doc. 26 ¶ 22. 

17 Doc. 26-1 at 6. 

18 Id. at 7-8. 

19 See id. at 6, 7. 

20 See id. at 6. 

21 Id. at 7; Doc. 26 ¶ 24. 

22 See Doc. 21 at 5. 

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5 

officials had recommended that he be placed in the STGMU as retaliation for his 

written and oral complaints about SCI Rockview.23 The documents he attached to 

his complaint indicated that STGMU placement was officially “approved” on July 

27, 2022.24 Fann mentions his STGMU recommendation and placement in his 

amended complaint,25 but fails to include most of the explicit allegations or 

documents provided as part of his original complaint. 

In that initial complaint, Fann sued six defendants: SCI Rockview 

Superintendent Bobby-Jo Salamon, Former DOC Secretary Gregory Little, Captain 

D.R. Davis, BII Major Torres, DOC Secretary Laurel Harry, and BII Director 

James Barnacle. Fann asserted the following Section 1983 claims: (1) an alleged 

Eighth Amendment violation regarding his conditions of confinement at SCI 

Fayette; (2) an alleged Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation 

regarding the misconduct process; (3) a Fourteenth Amendment claim of 

deprivation of property without due process; and (4) a First Amendment retaliation 

claim regarding his transfer, the misconduct, and his STGMU designation.26

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).27 The Court granted that motion. Specifically, the Court 

23 Id.

24 See Doc. 1-1 at 33-34. 

25 See Doc. 26 ¶¶ 4, 24, 30, 32, 46, 52. 

26 See Doc. 1 at pp. 20, 22-46. 

27 Doc. 16. 

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dismissed all claims against four of the six Defendants (Salamon, Little, Harry, and 

Barnacle) for lack of personal involvement in the alleged constitutional 

misconduct.28 The Court then examined the sufficiency of each of Fann’s Section 

1983 claims. 

Fann’s Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim involved 

alleged conditions at SCI Fayette from April 28 to July 28, 2022, including lack of 

showers, denial of recreation, and denial of hygiene products.29 The Court 

assumed for the sake of argument that Fann had alleged a sufficiently serious 

deprivation, but dismissed the conditions-of-confinement claim because Fann had 

not plausibly alleged deliberate indifference to the purported conditions by any 

named Defendant.30

The Court next examined and dismissed Fann’s Fourteenth Amendment 

procedural due process claim.31 As the Court explained, Fann had alleged that he 

was sanctioned with 120 days’ disciplinary custody. Such a sanction, however, did 

not (and could not) implicate a protected liberty interest, and thus Fann’s 

procedural due process allegations failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted.32

28 See Doc. 21 at 8-9. 

29 Id. at 11. 

30 Id.

31 Id. at 12-13. 

32 Id.

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Fann’s Fourteenth Amendment claim alleging deprivation of property 

without due process likewise fell short. As the Court admonished, Fann had access 

to adequate state post-deprivation remedies, so he failed to state a plausible 

constitutional claim for deprivation of property.33 The deprivation-of-property and 

procedural due process claims were dismissed with prejudice, as granting leave to 

amend would be futile.34

Finally, the Court reviewed Fann’s First Amendment retaliation claims. 

Those claims were found to be deficient because Fann had not properly alleged 

causation—the third element of a prima facie retaliation case.35 In other words, 

Fann had failed to “allege who took most of the adverse actions or why those 

officials would retaliate against him for his protected conduct.”36

The Court granted leave to amend as to Fann’s conditions-of-confinement 

and retaliation claims.37 Fann was specifically admonished that he would not be 

permitted to reassert claims that had been dismissed with prejudice, and that he 

could not combine unrelated claims against different defendants in violation of 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2).38 

33 Id. at 13-14. 

34 Id. at 18-19. 

35 Id. at 14-17. 

36 Id. at 15. 

37 Id. at 18-20. 

38 Id. at 19. 

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Fann timely filed an amended complaint.39 He sues the same six 

Defendants,40 this time asserting the following claims: (1) Eighth Amendment 

conditions of confinement regarding his placement in “solitary confinement” at 

SCI Fayette41; (2) Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process regarding his 

disciplinary proceedings and STGMU placement42; and (3) First Amendment 

retaliation concerning his grievance and oral complaints about SCI Rockview 

conditions and staff misconduct.43 

Defendants once again move to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted.44 Their Rule 12(b)(6) motion is ripe for disposition. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6), courts should not inquire “whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but 

whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”45 The 

court must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all 

reasonable inferences from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.46 In 

addition to the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, the court may also 

39 Doc. 26. 

40 Id. ¶¶ 4-9. 

41 Id. ¶¶ 26-31. 

42 Id. ¶¶ 32-40. 

43 Id. ¶¶ 41-47. 

44 Doc. 27. 

45 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 

1996). 

46 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). 

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consider “exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as 

undisputedly authentic documents” attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss if 

the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these documents.47

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a 

three-step inquiry.48 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the] 

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”49 Second, the court should distinguish wellpleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal 

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be 

disregarded.50 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations 

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”51 

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”52

 Because Fann proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed 

and his amended complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less 

47 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. 

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). 

48 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted). 

49 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)). 

50 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). 

51 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). 

52 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. 

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stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”53 This is 

particularly true when the pro se litigant, like Fann, is incarcerated.54

III. DISCUSSION 

 Defendants contend that Fann’s amended complaint suffers from many of 

the same material pleading deficiencies as his original complaint. After careful 

consideration, the Court finds that only Fann’s retaliation claims may proceed. 

A. Personal Involvement 

 It is well established that, in Section 1983 actions, liability cannot be 

“predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”55 Rather, a Section 

1983 plaintiff must aver facts that demonstrate “the defendants’ personal 

involvement in the alleged misconduct.”56 Personal involvement can include direct 

wrongful conduct by a defendant, but it can also be demonstrated through 

allegations of “personal direction” or of “actual knowledge and acquiescence”; 

however, such averments must be made with particularity.57 Furthermore, it is 

equally settled that involvement in the post-incident grievance process alone does 

not give rise to Section 1983 liability.58 

53 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). 

54 Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). 

55 Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (affirming same principle in Bivens context). 

56 Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374 (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). 

57 Id. (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). 

58 See id. at 374 (affirming dismissal of claims against prison officials for lack of personal 

involvement when officials’ “only involvement” was “their review and denial of [plaintiff]’s 

grievance”); Lewis v. Wetzel, 153 F. Supp. 3d 678, 696-97 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (collecting cases); 

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Fann sues the same six Defendants, most of whom are high-level DOC 

officials. Once again, Fann’s amended complaint is essentially silent as to the 

alleged misconduct of defendants Harry and Barnacle. Although Fann asserts that 

these high-level officials are responsible for the “care, custody, and control” of all 

DOC inmates and staff,59 this is a quintessential respondeat superior allegation, 

which does not give rise to Section 1983 liability. There is no allegation in the 

amended complaint that Harry or Barnacle took unconstitutional action against 

Fann. Fann even concedes that Barnacle does not have “a direct connection to” his 

lawsuit.60 Accordingly, because Fann again does not allege how these Defendants 

were personally involved in the incidents underlying his lawsuit, they must be 

dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 

B. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement 

“[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons . . . 

which house persons convicted of serious crimes[] cannot be free of discomfort.”61 

Nevertheless, the state cannot subject an inmate to cruel and unusual punishment 

Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (nonprecedential); Alexander v. 

Gennarini, 144 F. App’x 924, 925 (3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential) (explaining that prisoner’s 

claims against certain defendants were “properly dismissed” because the allegations against 

them “merely assert their involvement in the post-incident grievance process”). 

59 See Doc. 26 ¶¶ 6, 9. 

60 Id. ¶ 54. 

61 Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2020) (second alteration in original) (quoting 

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)). 

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or “inhumane treatment,” such as deprivation of “identifiable human need[s]” like 

“food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety[.]”62 

To prevail on an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim, a 

prisoner-plaintiff must plausibly allege both objective and subjective elements.63 

Objectively, the inmate must demonstrate that “the prison official deprived the 

prisoner of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” often referred to as 

a “sufficiently serious” deprivation.64 “The benchmark for alleging such 

deprivation is not that the inmate was merely uncomfortable; he or she must show 

they [were] ‘incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious 

harm.’”65 

Subjectively, the prisoner must show that “the prison official acted with 

deliberate indifference” to the prisoner’s “health or safety.”66 Deliberate 

indifference means that the defendant “acted or failed to act despite having 

knowledge that her actions or inaction, as the case may be, would subject the 

inmate to a substantial risk of serious harm.”67 Deliberate indifference is a high 

bar and requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant “recklessly disregard[ed] a 

substantial risk of serious harm.”68

62 See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (citation omitted). 

63 See Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 226 (3d Cir. 2015) 

64 Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). 

65 Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th 167, 179 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). 

66 Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 226 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). 

67 Id. at 227 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). 

68 Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 227 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). 

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 Fann’s amended complaint changes tact from his original pleading. In his 

amended complaint, he alleges that he has unspecified “mental health conditions,” 

and that being kept in solitary confinement at SCI Fayette for a substantial period 

of time violated his Eighth Amendment rights.69 

 The problem with this new iteration of his conditions-of-confinement claim 

is that it cannot be asserted as part of the instant lawsuit. As the Court clearly 

explained in its prior opinion, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2) prohibits 

joinder of unrelated claims against different defendants.70 Fann has not plausibly 

alleged that any SCI Rockview or high-level DOC official kept him in solitary 

confinement at SCI Fayette for an extended period of time. Thus, he has failed to 

allege deliberate indifference to his health and safety by any named Defendant, and 

dismissal of his conditions-of-confinement is required. Such a claim, if Fann 

desires to purse it, must be brought against the appropriate decisionmakers at SCI 

Fayette in a separate lawsuit and filed in the appropriate court.71 

C. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process 

Fann’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim in his original 

complaint was dismissed with prejudice.72 Fann, moreover, was explicitly 

instructed that he was not permitted to reassert any claims in his amended 

69 Doc. 26 ¶¶ 26-31. 

70 See Doc. 21 at 19-20. 

71 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). 

72 See Doc. 21 at 12-13, 18-19. 

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complaint that had been dismissed with prejudice.73 Fann appears to have 

disregarded the Court’s direction, reasserting a similar procedural due process 

claim in his amended complaint.74 The Court will reiterate why Fann’s due 

process claim cannot survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny. 

To plausibly state a Section 1983 claim for infringement of procedural due 

process rights, “a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual 

interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of 

‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide 

‘due process of law.’”75 If a plaintiff cannot identify a protected interest that is “at 

stake,” the analysis is at an end.76

The gravamen of Fann’s procedural due process claim is that he was charged 

with an allegedly fabricated misconduct, convicted of the charged offenses without 

sufficient evidence, and given 120 days’ disciplinary custody as a punishment. 

Fann cannot state a procedural due process claim because he has not identified a 

protected liberty interest that is at stake. 

The Supreme Court of the United States has held that disciplinary 

segregation alone—under conditions that mirror those “imposed upon inmates in 

73 Id. at 19. 

74 See Doc. 26 ¶¶ 32-40. 

75 Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki, 

227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)). 

76 See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005); Hill, 455 F.3d at 234-35. 

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administrative segregation and protective custody”—generally does not reflect an 

“atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 

incidents of prison life” such that it implicates a protected liberty interest under the 

Fourteenth Amendment.77 And the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 

Circuit has repeatedly held that disciplinary segregation for periods longer than 

that which Fann experienced does not rise to the level of an atypical and significant 

hardship.78 Therefore, because Fann has not identified a protected liberty interest 

that is at stake for his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, the 

analysis is at an end and this claim must again be dismissed.79

D. First Amendment Retaliation 

Although a prisoner’s constitutional rights are necessarily circumscribed, an 

inmate still retains First Amendment protections when they are “not inconsistent” 

with prisoner status or with the “legitimate penological objectives of the 

corrections system.”80 To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff 

77 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 486 (1995). 

78 See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002) (seven months); Torres v. Fauver, 

292 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2002) (135 days); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 705-07 (3d Cir. 

1997) (fifteen months); Dunbar v. Barone, 487 F. App’x 721, 725 (540 days). 

79 To the extent that Fann asserts in his amended complaint that his transfer to the STGMU 

violated his procedural due process rights, that claim fails for identical reasons. “[T]ransfer to 

the STGMU does not impose an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary 

incidents of prison life,” Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 522-23 (3d Cir. 2002), and thus 

“does not give rise to a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause,” Harris v. 

Ricci, 595 F. App’x 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2014) (nonprecedential). 

80 Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 

775, 781 (3d Cir. 2010)). 

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must plausibly plead that (1) “he was engaged in constitutionally protected 

conduct,” (2) he suffered an “adverse action” by prison officials sufficient to deter 

a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights, and 

(3) the plaintiff’s protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the 

prison officials’ decision to take the adverse action.81

The only cause of action in the amended complaint that survives Rule 

12(b)(6) scrutiny is Fann’s First Amendment retaliation claim. Fann plausibly 

alleges that, after he filed a grievance complaining about conditions at SCI 

Rockview (including staff misconduct) and spoke directly to DOC investigators 

about these same issues, he was transferred to a different prison, charged with a 

fabricated misconduct, and recommended for placement in the STGMU. 

Fann has clearly identified protected First Amendment conduct: filing a 

formal grievance and reporting staff misconduct to an investigator. He has also 

plausibly alleged adverse actions taken against him: transfer to a distant prison 

farther away from his family,82 a fabricated misconduct resulting in disciplinary 

custody, and—possibly—the STGMU recommendation. 

81 Id. (quoting Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001)); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 

523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333). 

82 The specific allegations regarding distance from his family were raised in the original 

complaint. See Doc. 1 at 22, 26. The Court will liberally construe Fann’s amended complaint 

as also asserting that his transfer to SCI Fayette took him farther away from his family. 

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In his amended complaint—as opposed to his original pleading—Fann 

plausibly alleges causation as to two Defendants. First, Fann asserts that 

Superintendent Salamon learned about Fann’s grievance and complaints to 

investigators and made the decision to transfer him to SCI Fayette and to 

recommend him for the STGMU.83 Fann also alleges that Captain Davis was a 

“co-worker and friend” of several of the D-block officials whom Fann reported for 

improper conduct, and therefore was motivated to issue Fann a fabricated 

misconduct.84 Accordingly, Fann’s First Amendment retaliation claims may 

proceed against defendants Salamon and Davis. His retaliation claims against all 

other Defendants will be dismissed for lack of causation. 

E. Leave to Amend 

 Generally, “in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints subject to 

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment 

would be inequitable or futile.”85 Further leave to amend will be denied because 

Fann has failed to cure numerous deficiencies with his pleadings even after 

“amendments previously allowed.”86 This case, therefore, will continue only as to 

Fann’s First Amendment retaliation claims against defendants Salamon and Davis. 

83 Doc. 26 ¶¶ 43, 46, 47, 52. 

84 Id. ¶¶ 44-45, 47. 

85 Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). 

86 See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver & 

Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (concluding that, where inmate plaintiff “has 

already had two chances to tell his story,” providing “further leave to amend would be futile”). 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant in part and deny in part 

Defendants’ motion (Doc. 27) to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). An appropriate Order follows. 

 

BY THE COURT: 

s/ Matthew W. Brann 

 Matthew W. Brann 

 Chief United States District Judge 

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