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67–053PDF 2011

PRESERVING PROGRESS: TRANSITIONING

AUTHORITY AND IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGIC

FRAMEWORK IN IRAQ, PART 2

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 23, 2011

Serial No. 112–49

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security 

Studies, Council on Foreign Relations ............................................................... 5

Mr. Michael Eisenstadt, Director, Military & Security Studies Program, The 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy ........................................................ 13

Mr. Richard Fontaine, Senior Fellow, Center for New American Security ........ 19

Ms. Marisa Cochrane Sullivan, Deputy Director, Institute for the Study of 

War ........................................................................................................................ 25

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Max Boot: Prepared statement ........................................................................ 8

Mr. Michael Eisenstadt: Prepared statement ....................................................... 15

Mr. Richard Fontaine: Prepared statement .......................................................... 21

Ms. Marisa Cochrane Sullivan: Prepared statement ............................................ 27

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 44

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 45

The Honorable Steve Chabot, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Ohio, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia: 

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 46

(1)

PRESERVING PROGRESS: TRANSITIONING AUTHORITY AND IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK IN IRAQ, PART 2

THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

AND SOUTH ASIA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. CHABOT. The meeting will come to order. Good afternoon. I 

want to welcome all of my colleagues. And we will have more coming in as we just had a series of votes on the floor. The hearing, 

this, of course, is the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South 

Asia of the Foreign Affairs Committee. 

We are now approximately 5 months away from the December 

31st, 2011 deadline, when, according to the current Status of 

Forces Agreement with the Government of Iraq, all U.S. armed 

forces must leave Iraq. 

Starting on January 1st, 2012, the State Department will take 

the lead implementing all U.S. policy in Iraq. Earlier this month, 

administration witnesses from the Department of State, Department of Defense, and USAID testified before this subcommittee 

about the current plan to transition from a Defense lead to a State 

lead. Regrettably, their testimony stoked, rather than allayed, my 

fears. 

I recently travelled to Iraq, where I was able to see just how critical the work of our military continues to be. In conjunction with 

their Iraqi partners on the ground, their hard work has helped to 

set Iraq on the course to becoming a stable, secure, and democratic 

country that respects human rights. That certainly is the goal. But 

even as we celebrate these hard-won gains, we must remember 

that we are not there yet. 

Iraq’s recent progress is regrettably as precarious as it is positive. We cannot look at where we are today and forget where we 

were just a few years ago. 

And although the administration’s transition plan may be wellintentioned, I am concerned that it is neither well-timed nor wellreasoned. Our brave men and women in uniform have fought tirelessly for nearly a decade to get us to where we are today. ThouVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:02 Aug 18, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\062311\67053 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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sands of American lives have been lost. Billions of dollars have 

been spent. 

The worst possible outcome would be to withdraw our forces before Iraq is ready to stand on its own. Yet, the plans that the administration has offered to date fall short of what Iraq requires to 

consolidate these gains. 

To quote then-Senator Hillary Clinton, it would require a willful 

suspension of disbelief to believe that Iraq will be where it needs 

to be for us to withdraw by December 31st, at least in my opinion. 

It also requires a willful suspension of disbelief to believe that 

the State Department alone, without the help of U.S. military 

forces on the ground, has the capability to satisfactorily execute 

this mission. 

Numerous challenges lay before us in Iraq. Although the Iraqi 

security forces have progressed by leaps and bounds over the past 

several years, it is an undeniable fact that our military forces continue to play a vital role on the ground. The Iraqis, despite this 

progress, lack certain core capabilities, like the ability to secure 

their own airspace. 

Our continued presence functions as the ultimate guarantor of 

their security and enables the Iraqi security forces to continue to 

develop. 

Not only do our forces secure Iraq from outside threats, but they 

also alleviate Arab-Kurdish tensions in Iraq’s north. Our presence 

effectively allows Iraq’s nascent democratic institutions to continue 

to develop, even as the political system, as I am sure the testimony 

here will address, continues to experience what we all hope are 

merely growing pains. 

And although the U.S. has commitments elsewhere in the world, 

we must remain dedicated to achieving success in Iraq. There can 

be no question that it is in both the U.S. and Iraq’s national interest to see a stable and democratic Iraq emerge that is capable of 

defending itself. 

Such an outcome would offer a model to the Arab world at this 

time of transition. It would stand as definitive evidence that the 

rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are innate 

human rights and do not stop at the water’s edge. This is our strategic objective, and we should do everything in our power to ensure 

it happens, including, if need be, by considering an extension of our 

military presence on the ground. 

A greater number of Iraqi political and military figures have recently come out in support of extending the deadline to withdraw, 

but, as could be expected, no one wants to foot the bill. 

Iraqi domestic politics make it very difficult to outright ask the 

U.S. to remain in Iraq. And, as a result, Iraq’s leadership is pointing fingers and passing bucks. Yet, despite this difficult situation, 

the only clear message from the administration is that we are 

happy to stay, but the Iraqis must openly ask. 

I hope our witnesses today will speak to what we could be doing, 

which we are not, to help encourage the Iraqis to request a continued U.S. military presence. The situation requires responsible leadership, both in the U.S. and Iraq, leadership that can make the 

right decision even if it is unpopular. Again, it would be a failure 

3

of colossal proportions to seize defeat from the jaws of victory. And, 

yet, that is precisely what I fear may come to pass. 

And at this time, I would like to recognize the gentleman from 

New York, the ranking member of the committee, Mr. Ackerman, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the chairman very much. 

As I tried to suggest at our previous hearing on this subject and 

before that at a hearing convened in the full committee in the previous Congress, the Obama administration’s plans and goals for an 

enduring American commitment and partnership with Iraq are 

likely unsustainable. 

Following the death of Osama bin Laden, something worth recalling with satisfaction, many Americans and, thus, naturally 

many of their elected representatives feel that the time has come 

to wrap up an era of war. The nation’s economy is struggling. The 

government’s finances are strained. And, most critically, the public 

no longer feels the urgency of war. 

While still content to stand in line for security at airports and 

get scanned and sniffed and have our luggage, et cetera, rifled 

through on occasion, the understanding needed to sustain the deployment of our troops and the massive expenditures of war is slipping away. 

Even in Iraq, which, quite frankly, never had a thing to do with 

the fight against al-Qaeda, where our combat troops have departed 

and our remaining troops will come home by the end of this year, 

the momentum for our engagement is slacking. 

Iraq in the minds of our constituents and, thus, in the minds of 

many Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle is no longer 

our problem. The Obama administration, however, doesn’t seem to 

have gotten the memo and is preparing for a very considerable 

post-conflict engagement, requiring massive resources for U.S. diplomats and other officials aiding Iraq in its struggle to put itself 

together. 

Unprecedented security responsibilities are going to be passed on 

to the U.S. mission in Iraq as well as massive and ambitious efforts 

to assist Iraq with its political, military, civil society, and governmental and economic development. 

The administration’s goal is to avoid repeating the mistakes we 

as a nation made, first in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal, and then following the defeat of the Taliban. An abandoned 

Iraq could very easily become a source of considerable regional danger and instability as well as a target for even greater Iranian efforts at regional subversion and hegemonism. 

On the other hand, an Iraq that successfully struggles to its feet, 

that develops a government capable of protecting Iraq’s sovereignty, and that provides its citizens with the services that they 

require could be a powerful source of stability in the Persian Gulf 

and a check on Iranian ambitions. 

I have said before, and I think it is worth repeating because the 

Obama administration, like its predecessors, doesn’t seem to understand or believe that when it comes to this kind of major international commitment of resources and responsibility, nothing explains itself and nothing sells itself. 

4

The basic policy of continuing engagement and support for Iraq 

is a good one. There is more than sufficient reason for us to remain 

actively and extensively engaged in helping Iraq. 

The effort to sell it in Congress, which has to provide the money, 

and the American public, which has to agree that the expenditure 

is justified and worth enduring, can’t even be described as a failure. To argue the sales job is a failure would be to imply that some 

effort has actually been made to sell it, which just isn’t true. 

To state the blisteringly obvious, a multi-year, multibillion-dollar 

political-military commitment to a foreign nation simply cannot be 

put on autopilot in a time of economic difficulty and fiscal austerity. It won’t work, and it shouldn’t be attempted. 

As bad as failure to support Iraq’s development over the next few 

years would be, a sudden collapse of that effort because of a collapse of political support here in Washington would be infinitely 

worse, calling into question America’s reliability as a political and 

security partner around the world. What nation would put its trust 

in an ally whose promises of a long-term enduring relationship collapse in a matter of months? 

It gives me no pleasure to say that the Obama administration 

truly is tempting fate with its current approach to Iraq, not because the policy they are pursuing is strategically unwise or beyond 

our ability to accomplish but, rather, because they have utterly ignored their responsibility to develop a sufficient base of political 

support to sustain it. 

A diplomatic surge is necessary in Iraq, but a political surge is 

even more necessary in Washington. Times have changed, and politics have changed. And the membership of Congress has changed. 

The only thing that hasn’t changed is the administration’s belief 

that they can get whatever resources they need for Iraq without a 

sustained and aggressive outreach to Members of Congress to explain what they are doing and to persuade them of the importance 

of our efforts. 

As President Nixon’s chief economist, Herb Stein, used to say, 

anything that can’t go on forever won’t. I fear the Obama administration is about to learn that lesson the hard way. 

I want to commend the chairman for holding this hearing as well 

as its predecessor. And I look forward to hearing from our distinguished expert witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

And we appreciate our very distinguished panel here this afternoon, the other members. Did you want to make a statement? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Just what——

Mr. CHABOT. Go ahead. Go ahead. 

Mr. HIGGINS. No. Let’s get to the testimony. Then I can. Thank 

you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. We will get to it in the questions, then. As 

I indicated, we have a very distinguished panel. I would like to do 

the introductions at this time. 

First we have Max Boot. He is the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior 

Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations as well as contributing editor to the Weekly Standard, a great 

publication in my opinion, and the Los Angeles Times. He also 

serves as an adviser to U.S. commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan 

5

and was a senior foreign policy adviser to Senator John McCain’s 

Presidential campaign. 

Before joining the Council in 2002, Mr. Boot was the op. ed. editor of the Wall Street Journal. He has an M.A. in history from Yale 

University and a B.A. in history from the University of California 

at Berkeley. We welcome you this afternoon. 

Then we next have Michael Eisenstadt, who is a senior fellow 

and director of the Washington Institute’s Military and Security 

Studies Program. Mr. Eisenstadt earned an M.A. in Arab studies 

from Georgetown University. 

Prior to joining the Institute in 1989, Mr. Eisenstadt worked as 

a military analyst. He also served for 26 years as an officer in the 

United States Army Reserve. And, on behalf of the subcommittee, 

I would like to say thank you for your service to the country, Mr. 

Eisenstadt. 

Next we have Richard Fontaine, who is a senior fellow at the 

Center for a New American Security. He previously served as foreign policy adviser also to Senator John McCain. He has also 

worked at the State Department, the National Security Council, 

and on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and 

Senate Armed Services Committee. 

Mr. Fontaine has an M.A. in international affairs from the Johns 

Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a B.A. in 

international relations from Tulane University. We welcome you 

here this afternoon. 

And, finally, we have Marisa—is it Cochrane?—okay, Sullivan, 

who is a deputy director of the Institute for the Study of War and 

supervises the Iraqi and Afghanistan projects as well as conducts 

research on Iraqi political dynamics, Shia militia groups, and the 

security environment in central and southern Iraq. 

Ms. Cochrane Sullivan previously served as the command historian for the Multinational Force Iraq and has appeared as a commentator on Iraq-related issues for the Voice of America, Los Angeles Times, Fox News, and other media outlets. She holds a B.A. in 

international studies from Boston College. And we welcome you 

here as well. 

As far as the rules of the committee, you will all receive 5 minutes. And there is a lighting system. The yellow light will indicate 

you have 1 minute to wrap up. If the red light comes on, we would 

appreciate it if you would complete your testimony at that time. 

And we also limit ourselves to the 5 minutes to ask questions. 

So, Mr. Boot, you are first. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MAX BOOT, JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK SENIOR FELLOW FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, COUNCIL 

ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. BOOT. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling 

this hearing to call attention to it. I think all of us probably agree 

it is one of the most important, yet least recognized, foreign policy 

issues that we confront in the next 6 months while Libya, Afghanistan, and many other conflicts get headlines for understandable 

reasons. 

I think you are quite right to point out the central importance 

of Iraq and the need to have a good outcome to that conflict, which 

6

has already cost so many American lives, which has cost also so 

much American treasure. None of that we want to see go to waste. 

I think the way we prevent that from going to waste is exactly 

along the lines of what you suggested as we need to have continued 

engagement in Iraq. And I don’t think it can be exclusively diplomatic engagement because the situation there is still too fragile. I 

mean, if you look at other post-conflict situations, such as Bosnia 

or Kosovo, if you go back further to Germany, Japan, Italy, and 

many others, the key to long-term stability has been long-term security provided by an American troop presence or by some other 

international peacekeeping presence. 

Iraq has come a long way since the terrible days of 2006–2007, 

when balance was tearing the country apart. But those tensions 

have not fully healed. The suspicions still run high. 

I was struck by the fact that when I was last in Iraq in March, 

I arrived in the middle of yet another crisis between the Iraqi security forces and the Kurdish pesh merga. Of course, this is nothing 

unexpected because pretty much every single time I have traveled 

to Iraq—and I have traveled there once or twice a year since 

2003—pretty much every single time I arrive, the pesh merga and 

the Iraqi security forces seem to be on the verge of shooting it out 

with one another. 

And what prevents that from happening is the fact that U.S. 

forces are sitting in the middle and the fact that U.S. officers are 

trusted interlocutors for both sides, and they can bring the two 

sides, who would not otherwise speak to one another, they can 

bring them together in a room and get them to hash out their differences before an actual shooing would erupt. 

And, of course, there are many other tensions that lie not so far 

beneath the surface of Iraqi politics; whereas, we see terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda in Iraq as well as by Shiite groups and other 

Sunni groups as well continue to occur, continue to cost Iraqi lives. 

It is a very stable, very fragile situation. And I am very concerned about what would happen if U.S. troops were to pull out entirely at the end of the year. I think that would be a catastrophe 

for Iraq. And it would be a catastrophe for American foreign policy. 

It would make it impossible to achieve our goals in Iraq, which 

are to have a country that is a moderate ally in the Middle East 

and exemplar of democratic values and a bulwark of stabilization 

and moderation. 

All of that is enabled by an American troop presence going forward, I believe. It doesn’t have to be a huge troop presence. I would 

be comfortable with something on the order of 20,000 troops. I 

think the administration is probably looking at somewhere around 

the order of 10,000. Even that is far, far better than zero. 

The time is running out, as you know. By mid September, U.S. 

troops are going to be on a fast track out of Iraq. And to bring 

them back after that will be costly financially. It will be costly in 

terms of deployment schedules. And it will also be very difficult to 

do politically. 

Now, the problem is as we know, the last time we negotiated a 

Status of Forces Agreement with Iraq, which was in 2008, it took 

more than 1 year. Right now we have less than half a year before 

7

the lights go out and considerably less than that before the troops 

start pulling out en masse. 

Now, I think you are quite right to note that there has been 

some progress, that Prime Minister Maliki I think has indicated 

that he would be interested in having American troops there. And 

I think the Obama administration has finally made a decision that 

it is in our interest to have American troops there as well. They 

are tardy in this regard, and I wish they had been lobbying and 

pushing on that issue 1 year ago but better late than never. 

The question is whether we can get a deal done in time. And, as 

we have seen in Iraq time and time again, since 2003, nothing ever 

comes together when you want it to. It always goes into the 11th 

hour and sometimes frequently beyond. 

I think Mr. Ackerman raises a very good point as well when he 

talks about the lack of political groundwork which has been laid in 

this country, to say nothing of the political groundwork in Iraq and, 

really, either country by the two governments to sustain political 

support for a continuing American presence. This is really an issue 

I think. 

Although the decisions our President Obama has made have 

been fairly responsible, he has really been AWOL in terms of advocating for those decisions and advocating for a greater American 

presence in Iraq. 

And, you know, I think there is still support on the Hill, and I 

think there is still support in the country for a larger presence. 

However, a lot more needs to be done to explain why it is necessary, why it is in our interest. And Prime Minister Maliki has 

a huge selling job, obvious, an even bigger selling job in Iraq to 

bring the other political factions on board so they don’t spend their 

time simply embarrassing him but act in the greater Iraqi good, 

which requires, I believe, a longer-term American troop presence. 

I think we can get it done, but time is running out. And I am 

very concerned about the consequences of failure. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Boot follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Complete? Okay. Thank you very much. We appreciate your testimony. 

Mr. Eisenstadt, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL EISENSTADT, DIRECTOR, MILITARY & SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON 

INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Ackerman, 

and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here 

to testify about Iraq. And on behalf of all those who care about Iraq 

and its future, thank you for keeping Iraq in the public eye. 

Ongoing violence in Iraq, albeit at much lower levels than in the 

past, underscore the fact that the United States still faces major 

challenges to realizing its long-term policy objectives there. 

These events underscore that security is still job number one for 

the United States and the Government of Iraq. In this vein, the ongoing activities of Iranian supported special groups, groups such as 

JRTN and al-Qaeda, show that there is still too much to be done 

here. 

The intensified activities of Iranian supported special groups, 

which have ramped-up attacks on U.S. personnel in recent months, 

are a special source of concern. While it may be unrealistic to expect Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to speak out openly against 

these Shiite special groups since some of these groups have ties to 

some of his coalition partners, it is essential that his actions demonstrate that the Government of Iraq is a full partner in efforts to 

target these groups. Maliki’s willingness to do so will be a litmus 

test of the kind of relationship the U.S. can have with an Iraq 

under his leadership. 

The U.S. role will face a range of additional challenges in the 

coming years: First, countering Iranian influence. Iran’s attempts 

to wield its influence in Iraq have thus far yielded only mixed results, and the impending U.S. military drawdown or withdrawal 

from Iraq will present new opportunities for Iran to enhance its influence. 

It remains to be seen whether Iranian influence will continue to 

be self-limiting or whether this emerging reality will create new opportunities for Teheran to transform Iraq into a weak client state 

via a gradual process of Lebanonization. 

Thus, while assessments of Iran as the big winner in Iraq are 

premature, they may yet prove prescient if the United States does 

not work energetically to counter Iranian influence there in the 

years to come. 

U.S. interests in Iraq can be advanced only if the United States 

continues to engage Iraq on a wide variety of fronts, diplomatic, 

economic, informational, and military, and to counter Iran’s wholeof-government approach to Iraq with a whole-of-government approach of its own. And I have some ideas in the paper I have submitted on what the U.S. should be doing there. 

Secondly, a business surge for Iraq. The strategic framework 

agreement commits the United States and Iraq to a broad-based relationship. One of the most important elements of this relationship 

is trade and investment, which can provide Iraq’s citizens with a 

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lish a relationship of economic dependency that will enhance its leverage over Baghdad. Here U.S. actions lag behind words. 

At present, there are only two Commerce Department officials in 

Embassy Baghdad to facilitate business in Iraq. This needs to 

change. Moreover, the U.S. Government should provide tax incentives for companies investing directly in Iraq and do a better job 

of informing businesses of the range of insurance products available to help diffuse the risk of doing business there. 

Third, preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping. The U.S. military 

continues to play a critical role in managing tensions between the 

Federal Government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government, centering on the City of Kirkuk, and the so-called disputed internal boundaries areas. 

Should the Government of Iraq ask the U.S. to maintain a military presence in Iraq beyond the end of this year, keeping these 

troops in place would not be a high price to pay for keeping the 

peace in Iraq. Now, we know we are talking, really, about 1,500 

people in all engaged in these activities. 

Fourth, upgrading ties with the Kurdistan Regional Government. 

The U.S. has an enduring interest in the continued stability of the 

KRG. Recognizing its importance for the stability of Iraq, Washington should take a few modest steps to upgrade ties and intensify 

direct contacts with the KRG and its security forces. 

Furthermore, it should encourage U.S. businesses to use the 

KRG as a base of operations for activities in north central Federal 

Iraq and press the KRG to embrace political reforms that will ensure continued stability in the north. In doing so, the U.S. will 

need to be careful to strike a balance between supporting the KRG, 

on one hand, without feeding unrealistic aspirations Kurdish aspirations, for independence. 

And then, fifth and finally, national reconciliation. Iraq will have 

a better chance of avoiding another civil war if it goes through a 

formal national reconciliation process. For now, hopes have been 

pinned on reconciliation through politics, in which a broad-based 

governing coalition would give elements from every community a 

stake in the political order. Instead, Iraqi politics since the 2010 

elections have exacerbated sectarian grievances, while recent 

heavy-handed Government of Iraq actions against peaceful 

protestors inspired by the Arab Spring have reopened old wounds. 

Washington should, therefore, press the Government of Iraq to 

permit peaceful protests and to investigate and, if necessary punish 

alleged human rights violations by its security forces. And it should 

indicate to the Government of Iraq that the quality of the U.S.-Iraq 

relationship will be influenced by the Government of Iraq’s adherence to international human rights standards. 

Meanwhile, the U.S. Embassy should work with the Government 

of Iraq, international and Iraqi nongovernmental organizations, 

and the United Nations to draw up a blueprint for a national reconciliation process that incorporates lessons from elsewhere but 

that also reflects Iraqi cultural values, preferences, and political realities. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Eisenstadt follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Fontaine, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. RICHARD FONTAINE, SENIOR FELLOW, 

CENTER FOR NEW AMERICAN SECURITY 

Mr. FONTAINE. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ackerman, and 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the privilege of testifying today. It is an honor to be here. 

Though America’s mission today in Iraq garners little attention 

from a public understandably preoccupied by the domestic economy, wars in Afghanistan and Libya, and other matters, 2011, nevertheless, remains a pivotal year in Iraq. This year’s planned transition, combined with the ongoing flux in Iraqi domestic politics, 

will play a key role in shaping events in Iraq and in the region for 

years to come. 

And, as our attention shifts, as we are spending a minute just 

to remember what our interests are in the successful outcome of 

the operations we have conducted in Iraq, Iraq remains a major 

player in the Middle East, and it will serve as a force for regional 

stability or instability in the future. 

Since the Gulf War some 20 years ago, Iraq has at various points 

served as a locus of regional competition, an arena for Iranian influence, a home for al-Qaeda, and the venue for an emerging democracy. 

After all of this turmoil, Iraq now has the potential to anchor 

stability in a region of critical importance to the United States. But 

the converse is also the case. An Iraq that returns to chaos and upheaval would quickly revert to a sanctuary for al-Qaeda in Iraq and 

see the reemergence of sectarian militias, invite further Iranian 

meddling, impose tremendous human costs on the Iraqi people, disrupt key oil supplies, and strengthen the hand of those who argue 

that only strongmen, and not democratic governance, can hold together fractious Arab states. 

As December 31st looms, we can best secure our interests by retaining a modest American military presence in Iraq. Currently the 

Iraqi Air Force can’t patrol the country’s air space, and the 

Navy cannot defend its waters, including its oil platforms. 

The U.S. military assists Iraq security forces with intelligence, 

training, logistics, and maintenance, all of which are critical to the 

ability to counter internal threats, such as al-Qaeda and Shia militia groups, both of which remain active. 

Critically, American Kurdish and Arab troops work together at 

checkpoints along the disputed border areas of Iraq’s northern 

provinces. In the past, the presence of U.S. troops has been vital 

to preventing eruptions of hostilities between Arab and Kurdish security forces. 

The United States should continue to unambiguously signal to 

the Iraqi leadership its willingness to secure a follow-on agreement 

that would permit American troops to remain in Iraq after 2011. 

But it must also be willing to accept that an Iraqi response, should 

it come, will generate lengthy and messy negotiations. Indeed, it is 

conceivable to me that an Iraqi request for a continued American 

presence could even come after December 31st. American officials 

20

will need to exhibit significant patience and creativity through this 

process. 

If it is impossible to secure a follow-on agreement, the State Department will embark on a difficult, ambitious mission, truly unprecedented in its history and will manage thousands of contractors to take on jobs formerly performed by the military. This, to say 

the least, will also demand even more patience and creativity. 

In either event, the State Department will have a key diplomatic 

role to play. The existential threat to the Iraqi state today stems 

not from insurgence but from the country’s political decisions. 

America’s diplomats must maximize their leverage within democratic constraints to urge Iraqi politicians to make decisions with 

the interests of the country in mind, rather than faction or personality. 

There is also, I believe, a role for America’s political leadership 

as well. Iraq has become the forgotten war. And with this has come 

the impression among many that the fight is over. But, as we are 

discussing here today, in fact, the mission continues. And it is incumbent on the President and other national leaders to articulate 

for Congress and for the American people the stakes in Iraq, our 

strategic interests there, and why securing those interests is worth 

the additional cost in blood and treasure after all these many 

years. 

The road in Iraq has been long and extraordinarily costly. Just 

3 years ago, the debate about the war was about how to mitigate 

the worst consequences of possible defeat. With the dramatic 

changes since then, however, we can legitimately discuss the extraordinary opportunity to see a stable, secure, prosperous, and imperfectly democratic Iraq emerge in the Middle East. Now is not 

the time for America’s commitment to that outcome to waver. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fontaine follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Cochrane Sullivan, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MS. MARISA COCHRANE SULLIVAN, DEPUTY 

DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR 

Ms. COCHRANE SULLIVAN. Thank you, Chairman Chabot, Representative Ackerman, and distinguished committee members, 

thank you for holding this hearing and inviting me before you 

today to testify. 

Today I would like to highlight some remaining challenges discussed in greater detail in my prepared statement and why these 

issues are more important to our engagement in Iraq and work to 

extend the presence of U.S. forces beyond 2011. But before I do so, 

I think it is useful to say why Iraq matters to the United States. 

The United States has important and enduring national security 

interests in Iraq. As my colleagues have mentioned, Iraq is a pivotal state at the crossroads of the Middle East. And for the first 

time in decades, it can play a stabilizing, not destabilizing, role in 

an increasingly turbulent region. 

Iraq has vast oil and natural gas reserves, which if properly 

stewarded over the next decade could make Iraq the economic powerhouse of the Middle East and greatly increase the world’s energy 

supply. 

Iraq’s military has built close ties with the U.S. military. And its 

counterterrorism forces are some of the best in the region. This 

makes Iraq an important ally in the fight against terrorist groups. 

A strong U.S. partnership with Iraq is an important counterweight to growing Iranian regional ambitions. There is no doubt 

that Iran will seek to fill the political, economic, and security vacuum left in Iraq should the United States completely withdraw its 

forces. 

And, lastly, within the context of the Arab Spring, Iraq is an important test of President Obama’s stated commitment to supporting 

democratic transitions in the Middle East. President Obama laid 

out his objectives shortly after taking office. He called for the 

United States to work to promote an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, 

and self-reliant with a government that is just, representative, and 

accountable, and that provides neither support nor safe haven to 

terrorists. We have made substantial progress toward achieving 

these objectives. But our work is not yet done in Iraq. 

On the political side, there are two key challenges that I see. 

First, Iraq’s Government is fragile, deeply divided, and characterized by mistrust. The concept of a national partnership government 

advocated by the Obama administration has proved flawed. Though 

the size of the government and many positions were created to satisfy Iraqi politicians, many of these positions are ill-defined. And 

some are extra-constitutional. 

The process of government formation focused more on dividing 

spoils, rather than on sharing power. It added more seats at the 

table without addressing the underlying disagreements between 

parties, making consensus even more difficult to achieve. 

Not surprisingly, Iraq’s Government has made little meaningful 

progress on security, economic, or political issues since its formation in December 2010. 

26

Second, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s centralization of power 

has prompted real concerns for Iraq’s democratic transition and 

rule of law. Prime Minister Maliki now has unprecedented control 

over Iraq’s security forces. 

Not only is he the commander in chief of the armed forces, but 

he has been serving as the acting Minister of Defense, acting Minister of Interior, and Minister of Intelligence for more than 6 

months. In recent months, there have been a growing number of 

cases where security forces controlled by the prime minister have 

been used to suppress dissent and target political opponents. 

There are also three key security challenges: Al-Qaeda in Iraq 

and other Sunni groups, though significantly degraded, are still 

able to conduct attacks and undermining the Iraqi Government. 

And Iranian backed Shia militia groups are growing increasingly 

active in central and southern Iraq. In recent months, they have 

stepped up their attacks against U.S. forces as well as Iraqi Government and security officials. 

Lastly, Iraqi’s security forces still lack capabilities required for 

Iraq’s external defense. But it is precisely because of these many 

challenges and the importance of Iraq that we must work to extend 

the U.S. troop presence and enhance our diplomatic engagement. 

Our experience in Iraq has shown that progress comes through 

increased engagement of which an enduring troop presence is a 

critical part. American forces are still an important check on political violence and terrorism. 

In addition to providing the necessary training, U.S. troops also 

bolster the professionalism of the Iraqi security forces, thereby 

safeguarding Iraq’s democratic process. An extension of a small 

number of U.S. forces can also help ensure that our diplomats can 

do their work without costing as much as a contracted security 

force. 

An extended military presence will require a new security agreement. And this will not be easy. It will entail extensive negotiations to build consensus for an agreement. 

U.S. officials have maintained that no negotiations can begin 

until Iraq formally asks for an extension. This posture inadvertently reduces the likelihood of an agreement because it will not 

prompt timely action by the Iraqis. The United States must fulfill 

its leadership responsibilities by guiding the discussion of the security agreement renegotiation. 

Progress is possible in Iraq. In 2006, most people thought Iraq 

was lost, but it was pulled back from the brink, thanks to the determined efforts of our military forces and the able work of our diplomats. Their efforts help stabilize Iraq and pave the way for successful elections in 2009 and 2010. It is, therefore, important to 

consolidate these gains that have come at such a cost. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Cochrane Sullivan follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. I want to thank all of the 

panel. We will now go into the questioning by the members up 

here, and we will each get 5 minutes as well. Mr. Fontaine, I will 

begin with you if I can. 

In your testimony, you stated that the planned State Department-led operation is ‘‘unprecedented in the history of the U.S. Department of State. And we should expect significant challenges as 

the Department implements this ambitious program.’’

My question would be, does the State Department have the requisite skill set to undertake a mission of this size and nature to ensure that the gains already made in Iraq are not lost? 

And, just to mention this, I have been to Iraq three times, most 

recently about 1 month ago. And, you know, we were told there 

were 47,000 I believe boots on the ground still then, I think under 

50,000 security civilian personnel. And by the end of the year, they 

are supposed to be down from a high of 170,000. We are now at 


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47,000 down to 157. And it was just pretty amazing. And I don’t 

think anybody expects that that is going to be it. Unless we reach 

some agreement, that is where we are supposed to be down to. 

So I would love to have your comments. 

Mr. FONTAINE. Well, first of all, there are things that the State 

Department and its contractors will not be able to do when the 

military is gone. So some of the checkpoints, for example, along the 

border between the Kurdish provinces and the Arab provinces, 

those have been manned by American security forces. It is inconceivable that either State Department or contractors are going to 

be there for that. So there is a sector of activity that just cannot 

be done if the military is not there. 

For the stuff where we would find work-arounds or put contractors on it, one of the key aspects of this is the State Department’s 

ability to manage those contractors. The Department of Defense 

has learned a lot since 2001 and 2003 in managing its contractors 

on the battlefield. And it still has some pretty significant problems 

of capacity. 

The State Department is in a much bigger hole that it is trying 

to dig out of. Contract management has never been in the core 

competency of the U.S. Department of State. The Commission on 

Wartime Contracting, SIGR and various other reports have documented some of the problems State Department is having in trying 

to ramp up so they can manage maybe 14,000 contractors once it 

gets into Iraq. And that is going to be a very, very difficult thing 

for them to do. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Boot, if I could go to you next? You stated in your testimony 

that you are ‘‘skeptical that any agreement can be reached by December 31st if the U.S. or Iraqi Governments insist on submitting 

it for ratification.’’ What alternatives are there? And what do you 

actually expect to happen here? 

Mr. BOOT. I don’t think there is any obligation for the Government of Iraq to submit an agreement for ratification to their own 

Parliament, that is something that Maliki may want to do to provide political topcoat for himself, but, you know, I mean, most of 

our status of force agreements around the world are not ratified by 

legislatures. 

Most of them are not even public. They are government-to-government deals, which is certainly within the realm of legal possibility here. The question is whether it is in the realm of political 

possibility. And I think we need to push for that if we are going 

to get a deal done. 

Another possibility would be to do some kind of interim deal, 

maybe for a year or 2, that would be basically a stop-gap measure 

so we wouldn’t have to pull every last trooper out on December 31 

and then take more time in order to negotiate a broader deal that 

might, in fact, be ratified by the Iraqi Parliament. 

But if we are going to expect the Iraqi Parliament to act by December 31, my prediction is we are going to be disappointed. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

I have only got 1 minute and 20 seconds here. Ms. Sullivan, I 

will go to you last here. And I will get back to you on the second 

34

round, which we will probably get a second round since we don’t 

have a huge number of members here this afternoon. 

In your testimony, you suggested that the United States needs 

to assume a more proactive and leading role to engage Iraq’s leaders and articulate the importance of an extended troop presence in 

Iraq. U.S. officials should adapt an integrated and bottom-up approach that builds confidence and consensus among Iraq’s various 

political blocks. 

What specifically should Congress and the administration be 

doing to achieve this end? 

Ms. COCHRANE SULLIVAN. There are a couple of things quickly. 

And then we are running out of time. While Maliki is important 

to the agreement, it is unlikely that he is going to act on his own 

given the political realities in Iraq. 

So it is very important for U.S. diplomats and U.S. officials to 

not just engage with him but engage with the other power brokers 

in Iraq so that they can also come to a consensus and that Maliki 

knows that he has broader backing for an agreement so that if he 

is going to take this political risk, he is doing it knowing he has 

got some backing. 

I think the other thing, too, is that the Iraqis need to understand, it needs to be communicated by the Obama administration 

and by Congress that the United States does care about Iraq, that 

Iraq matters and it matters at the highest levels, too. 

So thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you very much. My time has expired. 

The gentleman from New York, the ranking member, Mr. Ackerman, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. This panel has done a terrible thing keeping exactly within their time constraints, setting us an example. 

It seems to me that looking at this, it is like a bad movie about 

a terrible marriage in which, you know, she is throwing him out 

but needs him to stay and he’s insisting on leaving, ‘‘But please beg 

me to remain’’ kind of thing and then trying to figure out what to 

do. ‘‘I am going to keep this together for the sake of the kids,’’ who 

will grow up to be dysfunctional anyway. 

I have noticed sometimes when you drive along the highway or 

even pull into the airport there is a police car that you see up 

ahead on the side. And it is not until you are passing it you realize 

there is nobody in it, but everybody slows down. And it serves a 

great function. 

Is that what we are doing in Iraq, pulling out the troops but 

staying there? Do they need our sense of presence more than our 

presence? Mr. Eisenstadt? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Yes. If I could, you know, to answer that question, we have talked about—some numbers have been thrown out 

in terms of the number of troops that maybe would be desirable to 

be there. But except for the counterterrorism forces that we have 

there and the forces around Kirkuk and disputed internal boundaries areas, I think our presence is merely of symbolic importance. 

And I think the numbers are less important than the very fact 

that we are willing to have people on the ground there after the 

end of this year as a demonstration, a tangible demonstration, of 

35

our commitment to the stability of the Iraqi Government and the 

continuation of democratic governance there. 

So let me just say I think it is very important that we show our 

willingness to continue to stay, but I think senior officials, such as 

the Secretary of Defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, have already laid this marker down. 

And I would argue that, in the Middle Eastern market, just like 

in romance, it is best not to show too much interest, at least publicly and openly. When you go into a store in the market, if you 

show too much interest in the vendor’s wares, he knows he has you 

over a barrel. And he will get a favorable deal from his point of 

view. 

So I would argue that it is best not to on a public level show too 

much enthusiasm and also from the point of view of Iraqi politics. 

And making it easier for Maliki to make the sale, I would argue 

that it is best that we not show too much public interest and we 

work with our partners in Iraq, especially the members of the Iraqi 

Security Forces, to help them to make the arguments they need to 

make to their politicians for why the United States needs to stay 

beyond the end of the year and let them for the most part, for the 

most part, do the carrying of the water. 

Mr. BOOT. Could I just add one thing to what Michael just 

said,——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Sure. 

Mr. BOOT [continuing]. Which is that, I mean, I largely agree 

with him that it is primarily of symbolic importance that we 

stayed, but there are real issues of troop size and capability because Iraq is still a dangerous place. We were reminded of that recently when six American soldiers lost their lives at a base in 

Baghdad when they were shelled by the special groups. 

We know that the Iranians and their proxies are going to come 

after our forces. They want to create a Lebanon-like situation 

where they can create the perception that they had driven us out 

like the Israelis were driven out of Lebanon. They want to create 

American casualties and keep that in the headlines. 

And so we have to make sure that we don’t send such a small 

force that it is unable to defend itself. And that is one of my concerns about the State Department and their contractors. 

I don’t know if they are going to be able to defend themselves. 

I am concerned that they would have to hunker down in Baghdad 

and not be able to get out in the country, not be able to keep their 

presence. 

And so whatever force we send has to be large enough to be selfsustaining, including the security realm. And that is why I am saying maybe closer to 20,000, but 10,000 is fine. But just we have to 

be careful not to make it too small. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. There’s no way we can make an argument or 

anybody can really say that we are at war there? 

Mr. BOOT. I think it is primarily a peacekeeping role, but even 

peacekeepers have to be able to defend themselves against terrorist 

attacks. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. It seems to me some time ago Iraq was something that we conjured up and it morphed from something else baVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:02 Aug 18, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\062311\67053 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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sically to stand up to Iran. Is there a chance that they are going 

to continue doing that? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Well, the relationship with Iran is very complex. And I think it would be unhelpful at this point to try to push 

them to stand up to Iran. Right now, you know, they lack, I think, 

the confidence and the ability, both in terms of their military capabilities, in terms of the robustness of their economy to do so. 

I think, though, if you look at the polling data, by and large, 

there still is a very strong sense of Iraqi national identity and great 

distrust of Iran. I think that will come naturally on its own. There 

is no need for us to go in that direction. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. So we are leading, and we don’t like that they 

are flirting with someone else? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Well, they are going to flirt. The fact of the 

matter is Iran is their neighbor, and they are going to play footsie. 

And they are going to have a relationship. 

You know, the key political parties have longstanding ties. There 

are economic relations that are going to continue. And there is a 

religious influence. That is going to continue. But I think they 

would prefer to have the United States to ply off against Iran. And 

we should be ready to fill that role. 

If I could just add on the point that Max made, we are in agreement, I think. I said we need to have a very robust counterterrorism capability there to provide force protection to go after the 

bad guys, so no doubt about that. You need to have a very robust 

capability in that area. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Having just celebrated, my wife and I, our 38th anniversary yesterday, I want to thank the gentlemen for their advice on marriage 

and flirting and footsie and the rest here. I never thought we would 

get into that on Iraq, but we celebrated, by the way, 600 miles from 

each other because she is back in Cincinnati. I am in Washington. 

That being as it may, we will recognize the gentleman from New 

York, Mr. Higgins, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Continuing with this theme of flirtation, you know, I have been 

to the region several and I always walk away with a similar feeling. And that is that the Americans get played. 

There is a discussion that goes on when the Americans are in the 

room and a discussion that goes on when the Americans are out 

of the room. 

This constant flirtation with Iran is disturbing to me. And this 

whole 8 years in Iraq, it seems like the goalposts are always being 

moved. 

Remember when the surge was called for in November 2007, it 

was done for a specific purpose. And that was to try to tamp down 

violence with additional troops but also changing the way the 

troops were used, leaving them out of forward operating bases into 

the neighborhoods, trying to have respectful relations with the 

communities so as to make, really, the insurgency irrelevant. 

Militarily the surge worked. Violence was considerably tamped 

down. But the political settlement that was supposed to come with 

that, that breathing space, to allow the various factions, the Shia, 

37

the Kurds, and the Sunnis, to resolve their differences relative to 

the sharing of oil revenues, relative to political reconciliation, relative to disputed areas in the north, like the City of Kirkuk, that 

hasn’t occurred. 

And, you know, my sense is that we were supposed to have left 

Iraq this summer. And the Iraqis asked us to stay. And we are 

staying on until the end of the year at least. And my sense is that 

this is just a continuing drama that is played out with really no 

end. 

Help me better understand this because I think, as previous 

speakers have referenced, the American people are tired of this. 

Members of Congress, both sides, are tired of this. And if there is 

not a commitment on the part of those who have to provide resources to this effort, this effort cannot be sustained. And my concern is that if we are here for another couple of years in Iraq, that 

it really won’t change much. 

Finally, let me just say this. I remember my first trip to Iraq was 

in the Summer of 2006. And there was an individual there by the 

name of Ahmad Chalabi. Chalabi was somewhat of a charismatic 

figure. He was educated in the United States, Ph.D. in mathematics, and just seemingly an anomaly that a lot of people put a 

lot of confidence in. 

Well, eventually Chalabi had alienated the American administration and the American military. And now Chalabi has reemerged 

in Iraqi politics as a pro-Iranian figure. And this is the situation 

that we are dealing with here. It doesn’t seem as though we are 

making the kind of political progress with all of those existential 

political issues that was identified as needing to be resolved in 

order to make forward progress. 

We did our part militarily. We provided that breathing space 

from which a political settlement could be achieved. The political 

settlement has not been achieved, and I don’t see promising signs 

that it is going to be achieved any time soon. 

So, with that, anybody can take it, but that is mien. 

Mr. FONTAINE. Maybe it is not the smart thing to do, but I will 

take a short. You are right, Congressman, that the search didn’t 

resolve all of the political problems that exist in Iraq, but it did enable a lot of political activity to take place that wasn’t taking place 

before and get Iraq politically to a different place than it was, a 

much better place. 

So, for example, in 2006 and 2007 and even in 2005, political discourse was essentially manifested through the barrel of a gun or 

an IED or a bomb. So the Sunnis weren’t participating in the political system. The Shia death squads were out there fighting. 

Now we are actually talking about the problems that are associated with a unity government under Prime Minister Maliki. The 

Sunnis there are disaffected groups, but the Sunnis have bought 

into the basic premise of the political system in Iraq. The same 

thing is true of the Shia. The same thing is true of the Kurds. 

That doesn’t mean we have a hydrocarbon law. That doesn’t 

mean that we have a solution or Kirkuk because they are going to 

be continuing and doing problems on the political side in Iraq. 

I do think that as those problems get smaller and smaller as the 

security forces in Iraq get better and better, the American commitVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:02 Aug 18, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\062311\67053 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ment necessary is getting smaller and smaller. So now we are talking about going maybe down to 10,000 troops, instead of even the 

47,000 we have there now. And I don’t think that those would necessarily need to be there very long term. Even in terms of cost, by 

2014, given increased oil revenues, Iraq should be able to pay for 

its military, which is the first time since 2003. 

So I do think that both on the cost side and the resource commitment side by the United States, you will see a downward trend, but 

it can’t be a cliff because if you hit the cliff and the resources the 

United States is providing go to zero, then those remaining political problems suddenly take on a much bigger character. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. We are going to 

go to a second round now. And I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. Mr. Eisenstadt, as I said, I will go to you next. 

In your testimony, you suggested a comprehensive national reconciliation process to stave off domestic tensions. Could you please 

kind of elaborate on this suggestion? And what issued would be encompassed in this? What can the U.S. do to facilitate this? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Yes. I mean, there are various models that have 

been practiced in various places around the world. And they often 

have common elements, such as truth commissions and partial justice for victims and symbolic punishment for perpetrators and the 

like. I don’t see that this is going to happen any time soon in Iraq. 

I just think it is very important. And I am not sure, actually, 

whether the U.S. Government should play a lead role in these efforts. 

I actually worked these issues when I worked in the Embassy 

with the U.S. forces headquarters last year in Iraq. And it may be 

that international and Iraqi NGOs played the lead on this until 

you have farsighted political leadership, such as an Iraqi Mandela, 

not to be glib. And really farsighted magnanimous leadership is 

really a sine qua non for all of these kinds of reconciliation processes. And, you know——

Mr. CHABOT. Can I stop you there for just a second? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Sure, sure. 

Mr. CHABOT. No. Go ahead. I will do it later. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. And I think, you know, again, it would be desirable to have people have done, kind of have a plan on hand so that 

if conditions permit 5, 10, 15, or 20 years down the road—and let’s 

keep in mind a lot of national reconciliation processes don’t occur 

right after a country’s civil war, though. It usually happens 5 or 

10 years down the road. We have a plan in hand. That is all. 

Mr. CHABOT. I wanted to let you finish your thought here, but 

you talked about a dynamic natural leadership figure, somebody 

like a Mandela or something. 

I remember—and this is getting a little off the topic here because 

we are on Iraq, but Afghanistan is clearly something that is important. And the President just made an important speech last night, 

some of which I agree with, other things I didn’t. 

I remember what some folks were saying about Karzai and Afghanistan. You know, he seemed to be—Max, I see you are nodding. So feel free to jump in here. But some people when they first 

look at him seem to think that perhaps he was that type of figure, 

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lieve had been murdered by the bad guys. And it is kind of an interesting history, but as it turns out, it hasn’t gone so well. So you 

can handle that or, Mr. Boot, if you would like to, I would be interested to hear what you might think about that. 

Mr. BOOT. Well, I mean, I share with Michael a desire to have 

an Iraqi Nelson Mandela or an Iraqi George Washington or Konrad 

Adenauer, you know, somebody wonderful. I think your comment 

is a reminder that we shouldn’t invest too much in the personal 

angle. I mean, I remember exactly what they are talking about. 

I remember, you know, sitting around in Baghdad around 2007. 

Everybody was sort of commiserating, saying, ‘‘Geez, if only we had 

a Hamid Karzai in Iraq. Everything would be so wonderful. Why 

are we dealing with a schmuck like Maliki?’’; you know. 

And now, of course, Maliki is starting to look pretty good by comparison with Karzai. And, in fact, the two countries in many ways 

have flipped positions where Afghanistan used to be the success 

story and Iraq was the basket case. Now it is a little bit more the 

other way around. 

I think there are several lessons we can draw from that. One is 

that neither failure nor success is perpetual. And something that 

looks pretty stable now can look not so hot 1 or 2 years down the 

line if we take our eyes off the ball but also that we shouldn’t invest too much in the personal angle. 

And we need to build stronger institutions. And I think one of 

the—it takes a while for that to emerge. And we shouldn’t expect 

that a wonderful person will suddenly take over Iraq and transform it overnight. We really need our stable institutions. 

One of the most stable and viable institutions there is the U.S. 

military. And I think it will be for a number of years to come. 

Mr. CHABOT. And I only have a short period of time. So let me 

ask the panel one other topic here relative to Iran. I mean, I think 

that is one of the things when people go back. We were in Saudi 

Arabia recently. And they are, of course, concerned that they are 

being kind of encircled by Iranian influence. 

Iranian influence is growing in the region. And others had argued about Iraq being a buffer against Iran. Does anybody want to 

comment on just the concept that how the world has changed relative to Iran and what, if anything, at this point—you know, we 

are 10 years later now. What can be done in 10 seconds to make 

sure that Iran doesn’t continue to flex its muscles in that part of 

the world? 

Ms. COCHRANE SULLIVAN. Well, I think one of the biggest things 

is recognizing the role that Iraq plays in balancing Iranian influence and having a strong partnership between the United States 

and Iraq in doing so. 

I think that the Iranians would like to have an Iraq that is sympathetic to their interests. I think that Iraq could play an important role for the Iranians in helping to elude sanctions given the 

economic importance of Iraq. 

So I think that Iraq has to be viewed as a central component to 

any strategy in the region when you are looking at balancing 

against Iran. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you very much. My time has expired. 

40

The gentleman from New York is recognized, the ranking member. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much. Congratulations on your 

anniversary. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. My wife and I celebrated our 44th 3 weeks ago. 

And she reminded me the only reason we have lasted that long, despite the fact we have been married 44 years, we have only been 

together 6. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. CHABOT. Congratulations. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. Tough business. 

I was listening to the gentleman from New York’s very, as usual, 

astute comments and his recollection of Mr. Chalabi. And it just 

seems that I would remind us all that in the Middle East, more 

people seem to have risen from the dead than originally suspected. 

I want to go back to the relationship between Iran and Iraq. Instead of just acknowledging that there is a flirtatious relationship 

and looking at the reasons for why that is happening, it certainly 

is not in our interest, I think we would all agree, for that to develop in any meaningful way. 

What do we do from a strategy point of view to convince the 

Iraqis that that might be not in their best long-term interest, or 

should we just sit by and let that develop, which is not something 

that I believe? 

Mr. FONTAINE. Well, Congressman, I think one of the things that 

we can do as linked to what we have been talking about thus far, 

the continued American military presence. A number of I think the 

panelists have noted that Iraq doesn’t have the capacity right now 

to defend its borders without help from the U.S. military. 

Now, that is not—we don’t fear an Iranian invasion of Iraq, but 

to the extent to which Iran feels like it has a free hand in the border areas with Iraq, then that makes coercive diplomacy against 

Iraq that much more successful. It makes their ability to play 

interactive politics a little bit easier than it would be otherwise. 

So to show the Iraqis that they have alternatives to Iranian pressure, Iranian influence in their politics I think would be a good 

starting point and a good way for the United States to think about 

one aspect of its continued role there. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. If I could just add to that? My comment about 

the American business trade and investment in Iraq, in part, was 

directed toward strengthening the Iraqi economy so that there 

wasn’t this kind of uneven dependent relationship where the Iraqi 

economy is weak and vulnerable, in part, because of policies that 

the Iranian Government is pursuing in terms of dumping subsidized agricultural products and consumer goods and the like. 

Now, we have to realize and recognize there is always going to 

be trade between Iran and Iraq because of proximity, because of 

certain things that Iran produces meets the needs of Iraq’s consumer markets in a way that we can’t. But we need to build up 

to the degree that we can Iraq’s economy, particularly the oil and 

defense sector. Let me just also say—and that will enable them to 

have the strength in order to push back on Iran in the future. 

41

Another thing I think that is vitally important, in talks with people in Iraq in the past, when I asked them, ‘‘What is the most effective means of countering Iranian influence?’’ they say, ‘‘Information 

operations.’’

And so I would urge that the public diplomacy section of the Embassy in Baghdad be augmented by a military information support 

team. We have military information support teams in Embassies 

throughout the region and in other parts of the world. 

I don’t know what the plans are right now. I don’t believe there 

is one there yet. And I think it would be very desirable for the public diplomacy section to be augmented by military people who are 

specialized in information operations in order to shed light on how 

Iran operates in Iraq because, again, there is I think a real appetite for this among the Iraqi public. And I think that is a way of 

again kind of limiting Iranian influence by showing how they operate and with whom they operate. 

Mr. BOOT. Just add one very fast point. Also, I mean, one of the 

real capabilities that the U.S. military has there is intelligence 

gathering. So we can just figure out what the Iranians are actually 

up to. We have great situational awareness with 47,000 human 

sensors on the ground. And that’s one of the things I am really 

worried about is they are free to climb to zero. 

We are not even going to know what the Iranians are up to because it is going to be very hard for the State Department and the 

CIA and other civilian agencies to fill the gap and the intelligence 

gathering, which is a prerequisite for effective operations to 

counter the Iranian influence. 

Ms. COCHRANE SULLIVAN. I actually just want to follow up with 

two quick points on Max’s comment. The attacks against U.S. 

forces in our Embassies has been increasing in recent weeks. And 

they primarily have been by Iranian backed groups. 

Given the risk aversion of the diplomatic security corps, one that 

is heavily reliant on contractors, I am very concerned that if things 

start heating up a bit more and the Embassy or consulates are 

coming under attacks, that they are not going to be getting out 

when they need to get out most. And they are going to lost the visibility that they need to understand what is happening just beyond 

the gate. 

The other thing, finally, is just the United States is, arguably, 

one of the only or the only country in the region that actually 

wants Iraq to flourish, that wants Iraq to be strong. And I think 

that is a powerful argument, not just on what capabilities Iraq 

would be losing for the United States leaving but what capabilities 

it could gain. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

I’m sorry. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Marino, did 

you have any questions? No questions? Okay. Well, thank you for 

coming. 

The gentleman from New York is recognized if he would like to 

ask some more questions for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HIGGINS. On the issue of revenues, I think Ms. Sullivan indicated that the Iraqis are going to pay for a security component of 

this. I apologize, Mr. Fontaine. 

42

Mr. FONTAINE. The projections are that under the augmented oil 

production that is starting to take place now and that will continue 

through about 2014, then the projection I believe is that Iraq will 

able to control its armed forces by 2014. 

Now, that is separate from being able to control their air space, 

for example, because just the length of time it takes to train fighter 

pilots and so on is longer than that period of time. but in terms 

of actual financial resources, it should be 2014 is my understanding. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Any discussions about their participation in financing to continue the American military presence? 

Mr. FONTAINE. I have seen Americans say that. I have not seen 

any Iraqis say that other than to object strenuously to that idea. 

Mr. HIGGINS. I see. In terms of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki 

and his progress with the unity government, any substantial 

progress relative to the other issues that we have talked about, including sharing of oil revenues, for any of you? 

Ms. COCHRANE SULLIVAN. I haven’t seen much dialogue on that 

since the government is formed, although I know it is an issue that 

particularly the Kurds are going to want to see movement on. But 

I haven’t seen any. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. I have no more questions. I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. 

That concludes the questioning by the panel members up here 

this afternoon. We want to thank the witnesses for their testimony. 

It has been very helpful for the committee. We appreciate it very 

much. 

And, without objection, members will have 5 days to submit additional statements for the record. If there is no further business to 

come before the committee, we are adjourned. Thank you very 

much. 

[Whereupon, at 3:21 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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