49046 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 181 / Thursday, September 18, 1997 / Notices

Average Burden Per Response: 15

minutes.

Estimated Average Burden: 12,500

hours.

Written comments and

recommendations regarding the

information collection(s) should be sent

within 60 days from the date of this

publication, directly to the SSA Reports

Clearance Officer at the following

address: Social Security Administration,

DCFAM, Attn: Nicholas E. Tagliareni,

6401 Security Blvd., 1–A–21 Operations

Bldg., Baltimore, MD 21235.

In addition to your comments on the

accuracy of the agency’s burden

estimate, we are soliciting comments on

the need for the information; its

practical utility; ways to enhance its

quality, utility and clarity; and on ways

to minimize burden on respondents,

including the use of automated

collection techniques or other forms of

information technology.

II. The information collection(s) listed

below have been submitted to OMB:

Waiver of Benefit Payment—0960–0533

Form SSA–149 is required to

document the fact that benefits due are

not being paid, because the beneficiary,

(for personal reasons) has requested

nonreceipt. Personal reasons can range

from religious, patriotic, or political

beliefs to situations where continued

receipt of payment causes some adverse

effect. The respondents are beneficiaries

who wish to waive entitlement to

benefit payments.

Number of Respondents: 100.

Frequency of Response: 1.

Average Burden Per Response: 2

minutes.

Estimated Annual Burden: 3 hours.

Written comments and

recommendations regarding the

information collection(s) should be

directed within 30 days to the OMB

Desk Officer and SSA Reports Clearance

Officer at the following addresses:

(OMB)

Office of Management and Budget,

OIRA, Attn: Laura Oliven, New

Executive Office Building, Room

10230, 725 17th St., NW.,

Washington, D.C. 20503

(SSA)

Social Security Administration,

DCFAM, Attn: Nicholas E. Tagliareni,

1–A–21 Operations Bldg., 6401

Security Blvd., Baltimore, MD 21235

To receive a copy of any of the forms

or clearance packages, call the SSA

Reports Clearance Officer on (410) 965–

4125 or write to him at the address

listed above.

Date: September 11, 1997.

Nicholas E. Tagliareni,

Reports Clearance Officer, Social Security

Administration.

[FR Doc. 97–24775 Filed 9–17–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4190–29–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

Notice of Safety Advisory

AGENCY: Federal Railroad

Administration (FRA), Department of

Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.

SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety

Advisory 97–2 addressing safety

practices to reduce the risk of casualties

from runaway locomotives, cars, and

trains caused by a failure to properly

secure unattended rolling equipment

left on sidings or other tracks.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Dennis Yachechak, Operating Practices

Specialist, Office of Safety Assurance

and Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh

Street, S.W., RRS–11, Mail Stop 25,

Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone

202–632–3370), or Nancy L. Goldman,

Trial Attorney, FRA, Office of Chief

Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,

RCC–12, Mail Stop 10, Washington, D.C.

20590 (telephone 202–632–3167).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A fatal

head-on collision between a Union

Pacific Railroad Company (UP) freight

train and an unattended, runaway UP

locomotive consist near Fort Worth,

Texas, on August 20, 1997, has caused

FRA to focus on the effectiveness of

certain railroad procedures for

protection of people and property from

hazards caused by failure to properly

secure locomotives, cars, and other

rolling equipment left unattended on

sidings or other tracks.

FRA and the National Transportation

Safety Board (NTSB) are investigating

the accident. In addition, FRA

inspection teams are on UP’s property to

conduct safety assurance reviews on all

aspects of the issue. The facts and

findings developed in the investigations

will be published when the individual

investigations are complete.

In the meantime, FRA’s preliminary

findings indicate that the UP crew

applied the hand brake on the lead

locomotive of the locomotive consist

and then applied the independent air

brake. The crew then released the

independent brake to verify that the

hand brake would hold, which it

appeared to do. The crew then reapplied

the independent brake. Three of the four

locomotives in the locomotive consist

were already shut down. The remaining

locomotive was then shut down and the

crew left the locomotive consist

unattended. Sometime later, however, it

is believed that the air brakes eventually

leaked off and that the single hand brake

did not, by itself, sufficiently secure the

locomotive consist, enabling it to roll

out of the siding eastward and onto the

main track where it collided head-on

with a UP freight train.

Securement Procedures

The Federal power brake regulations

at 49 CFR 232.13(f) require that, ‘‘The

automatic air brake must not be

depended upon to hold a locomotive,

cars or train, when standing on a grade,

whether locomotive is attached or

detached from cars or train. When

required, a sufficient number of hand

brakes must be applied to hold train,

before air brakes are released. When

ready to start, hand brakes must not be

released until it is known that the air

brake system is properly charged.’’

Based upon FRA’s review of the Fort

Worth incident, and its awareness of

other incidents involving improper

securement of rolling equipment, it

appears evident that further guidance

regarding securement procedures may

be of assistance to our nation’s railroads.

This advisory may be especially

beneficial to those railroads that may

not be aware of current practices in the

industry regarding securement of rolling

equipment. Accordingly, FRA believes

that the following recommended

procedures for the proper securement of

unattended rolling equipment can be

taken to reduce the likelihood of future

accidents, which each railroad can then

adapt to meet its own individual

circumstances.

Recommended Action

FRA believes that the likelihood of

further accidents, such as the one that

occurred on the UP on August 20, 1997,

would be greatly reduced by the

inclusion of certain additional measures

into railroads’ procedures for

securement of unattended locomotives,

cars, and trains left on sidings or other

tracks. Therefore, FRA recommends that

each railroad adopt and implement its

own procedures incorporating the

following actions, or equally effective

measures, with respect to a locomotive,

car, or train that is left unattended:

1. Consistent with the railroad’s rules

and procedures, place each locomotive,

car, or train on a track that is protected

by a permanent derail or apply a

portable derail, if available.

2. On cars: (a) Apply the appropriate

number of handbrakes; to assist
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 181 / Thursday, September 18, 1997 / Notices 49047

crewmembers in this regard, railroads

should develop and implement a

process or procedure, such as a matrix,

that would provide specific guidance in

determining the appropriate number of

hand brakes to apply, considering grade,

tonnage, and other local conditions

prevalent at the time of securement, for

example, high winds or extreme cold;

(b) where appropriate, remove slack

from the train, or as commonly referred

to in the industry, ‘‘bunch the slack’;

and (c) detach any locomotives from the

cars to allow an emergency brake

application.

3. On locomotives, fully apply all

hand brakes on all unattended

locomotives in the consist. If the grade

exceeds one percent, or whenever it is

otherwise required by railroad rules, in

addition, chock or chain the front and

back of at least one pair of wheels in the

locomotive consist. Railroads should

develop and implement procedures that

would then verify that the hand brakes

will hold the locomotive consist.

Further, railroad instructions should

address: (a) The throttle position; (b)

status of the reverse lever; (c) position

of the generator field switch; (d) status

of the independent brakes; (e) position

of the isolation switch; and (f) position

of the automatic brake valve. The above

procedures should also take into

account winter weather conditions as

they relate to throttle position and

reverser handle.

FRA may modify Safety Advisory 97–

2, issue additional safety advisories, or

take other appropriate necessary action

to ensure the highest level of safety on

the Nation’s railroads.

Issued in Washington, DC on September

15, 1997

Edward R. English,

Director, Office of Safety Assurance and

Compliance.

[FR Doc. 97–24962 Filed 9–17–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

Notice of Safety Advisory

AGENCY: Federal Railroad

Administration (FRA), Department of

Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.

SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety

Advisory 97–3 addressing safety

practices to reduce the risk of accidents

arising from the authorization of train

movements past stop indications of

absolute signals.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Dennis Yachechak, Operating Practices

Specialist, Office of Safety Assurance

and Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh

Street, SW., RRS–11, Mail Stop 25,

Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202–

632–3370), or Nancy L. Goldman, Trial

Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA,

400 Seventh Street, SW., RCC–12, Mail

Stop 10, Washington, DC 20590

(telephone 202–632–3167).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A fatal

head-on collision between a Union

Pacific Railroad Company (UP) freight

train and an unattended, runaway UP

locomotive consist near Fort Worth,

Texas, on August 20, 1997, has caused

FRA to focus on railroad operating rules

and procedures pertaining to protection

against conflicting train movements

when train dispatchers and control

operators authorize movements past a

stop indication of an absolute signal.

FRA and the National Transportation

Safety Board (NTSB) are investigating

the accident. FRA has also initiated an

in-depth and comprehensive analysis of

train dispatcher procedures employed

by UP. FRA inspection teams are on

UP’s property to conduct safety

assurance reviews on all aspects of the

issue. The facts and findings developed

in the investigations will be published

when the individual investigations are

complete.

The collision occurred in single track,

centralized traffic control (CTC)

territory. Preliminary FRA findings

indicate that an unoccupied UP

locomotive consist unintentionally

rolled out of a controlled siding

eastward onto a main track. A UP

dispatcher noticed on his computer

screen that the siding switch was out of

correspondence, and that the main track

segment beyond the switch was

occupied. At least three times, the

dispatcher radioed the runaway light

locomotive consist, in an attempt to

contact a crewmember. Not getting a

response, the dispatcher then contacted

a signal maintainer. Meanwhile, a UP

control operator at Fort Worth,

authorized a westbound freight train to

pass a stop indication of an absolute

signal at the west end of Centennial

Yard in Fort Worth, and proceed onto

the main track at restricted speed.

Subsequently, the runaway light

locomotive consist struck the

westbound freight train at a speed of

approximately 60 miles per hour. The

UP engineer and engineer pilot were

killed, and the UP conductor was

seriously injured.

Operating Practices

FRA rules require each railroad to

periodically instruct its employees on

the meaning and application of the

railroad’s operating rules (49 CFR

217.11), and also require each railroad

to periodically conduct operational tests

and inspections to determine the extent

of compliance with its code of operating

rules, timetables, and timetable special

instructions (49 CFR 217.9).

UP train dispatcher rule 20.6 pertains

to movements in adjoining territories

and requires that, ‘‘Train dispatchers

must not issue track warrants, track

bulletins, or instructions or take any

action that may affect safe train

operation on another train dispatcher’s

territory unless the dispatchers reach an

understanding.’’ Rule 9.12.1 of the

General Code of Operating Rules

pertains to CTC Territory and requires

that, ‘‘At a signal displaying a Stop

indication, if no conflicting movement

is evident, the train will be governed as

follows: Before authorizing the train to

proceed, the control operator must

know that the route is properly lined

and no conflicting movement is

occupying or authorized to enter the

track between that signal and the next

absolute signal governing movement or

the end of CTC where applicable.’’

Initial findings of the FRA

investigation of the collision indicate, in

part, that the train dispatcher and

control operator did not communicate

with each other as to the cause of the

stop indication on the absolute signal at

the west end of Centennial Yard. It

appears that the train dispatcher did not

contact the control operator of the

adjoining territory and inform him of

the track occupancy. Likewise, it

appears that the control operator did not

verify the cause of the stop indication

by determining whether a conflicting

movement was occupying the track

segment between that signal and the

next absolute signal governing

movement, before authorizing the

westbound train to pass the stop

indication.

Recommended Action

FRA believes that the likelihood of

further accidents, such as the one that

occurred on the UP on August 20, 1997,

would be greatly reduced by the

inclusion of certain additional measures

into the railroads’ operating procedures.

Therefore, FRA recommends that:

1. As soon as possible, but preferably

within seven calendar days of the date

of publication of this Safety Advisory in

the Federal Register, each railroad

should:

(a) Ensure that a railroad operating

supervisor personally contacts each

train dispatcher and control operator

responsible for controlling train