U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

30–664 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

S. HRG. 114–789 

A REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2017 

STATE AND USAID BUDGET REQUEST 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE DEPARTMENT 

AND USAID MANAGEMENT, 

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, AND 

BILATERAL INTERNATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 1, 2016 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

http://www.govinfo.gov 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

TODD WOMACK, Staff Director

JESSICA LEWIS, Democratic Staff Director

JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk

(II)

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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Perdue, Hon. David, U.S. Senator from Georgia ................................................... 1 

Kaine, Hon. Tim, U.S. Senator from Virginia ....................................................... 2 

Pitkin, Douglas A., Director, Office of U.S. Budget and Planning, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC .......................................................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Douglas Pitkin by 

Senator David Perdue .................................................................................. 38 

Sastry, Hari, Director, Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Hari Sastry by 

Senator David Perdue .................................................................................. 61 

Napoli, Roman, Acting Director, Office of Budget and Resource Management, 

U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC ........................ 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Roman Napoli by 

Senator David Perdue .................................................................................. 80 

(III)

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

(1) 

A REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2017 

STATE AND USAID BUDGET REQUEST 

TUESDAY, MARCH 1, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE DEPARTMENT AND USAID 

MANAGEMENT, INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, AND

BILATERAL INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in Room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. David Perdue, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Perdue [presiding], Isakson, Kaine, and Markey. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID PERDUE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Senator PERDUE. Good afternoon. The committee will now come 

to order. This hearing of the Subcommittee of State Department 

and USAID Management, International Operations, and Bilateral 

International Development—only in Washington can you have a 

title that long—is entitled ‘‘A Review of the Fiscal Year 2017 State 

Department and USAID Budget Request.’’ 

I would like to begin by welcoming our witnesses, Mr. Pitkin, Mr. 

Sastry, and Mr. Napoli. Thank you, guys, for being here. We appreciate it. I talked to your leadership at the State Department yesterday. I am anxious to get a lot of your testimony on the record before—I think Deputy Secretary Higginbotham is to be before the 

full committee next week, so we will try not to be redundant. We 

have looked at some of the questions. The ranking member and I 

have looked at these to make sure that we are—we will try not to 

do that for the sake of your time and hers as well. 

We are here to discuss the international affairs budget—State 

Department, that is—request for Fiscal Year 2017, which includes 

our State Department, USAID, and other funding for diplomatic 

engagement and foreign assistance. Today is intended to be a deep 

dive into the budget request for those who have come up with the 

budget at State and USAID. 

I personally serve on both the Foreign Relations Committee and 

the Budget Committee, which I believe gives me a unique understanding—as does the ranking member, Senator Kaine. I believe 

that gives us a unique understanding of how our global security 

crisis and the fiscal crisis are actually intertwined. Given our current fiscal situation, every dollar we spend on State and USAID, 

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2 

if you look at it that way, is basically borrowed, which makes it 

even more important that we understand the request. 

With that said, the United States is and should continue to be 

the most philanthropic Nation in the history of the world. We have 

no shortage of problems in the world that require American leadership. As this Administration plans to draw down American forces 

in Afghanistan, as we continue to have lower troop levels in Iraq, 

the cost of the State Department maintaining a presence in these 

difficult, high-threat environments increase. 

Today I would like to cover a number of issues, including longterm budget trends, the issue of OCO funding, the State Department and USAID’s plans to combat the Zika virus, how monitoring 

and evaluation results are integrated into budget decisions, and 

how this budget would address the growing migration crisis in Europe, to name just a few. Also, as follow-up questions on how some 

of the USAID money has been used in the past in places like Haiti, 

for example. We certainly have a lot of ground to cover. 

So with that let me turn it to our ranking member, Senator Tim 

Kaine. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TIM KAINE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the witnesses. We are looking forward to this hearing today. As Chairman 

Perdue mentioned, I also serve with him on the Budget Committee, 

and I am on the Armed Services Committee as well. And I feel like 

a lot of this hearing is really about, you know, an important part 

of American power, very connected to our military mission, but on 

the diplomacy side. And I will make the point, and this is not to 

chide anybody within the State Department, but as you guys often 

are professional men and women in advocating for your budget, the 

DOD is often even better at advocating for your budget. 

General Mattis testified at a SASC hearing in 2013, ‘‘If you do 

not fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.’’ That is a direct quote. Secretary Gates is known for saying the same thing. And one of the things that has interested me 

as an Armed Services Committee member is hearing how strongly 

they support a full budget for the State Department. Secretary 

Kerry reminded us last week during the full committee hearing 

that this total budget is less than one percent of the Federal budget, and it is a statement of our priorities and the degree to which— 

with which we prioritize diplomacy abroad. 

I am a big believer in this budget. You have got organizations 

like U.S. Global Leadership Coalition that make the case for the 

importance of it because we do so much good in this—in this area, 

but we have so many concerns as well. So we are going to be 

digging a lot into it. The chair mentioned Zika, for example. We 

want to understand the President’s proposal to spend money to battle Zika, but we also want to understand how the State Department is prioritizing keeping our own personnel safe, which is I 

know got to be something that is of significant concern to all of you. 

We have got military conflicts around the world that we know 

will not end without some political resolution—Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan, Syria. State and USAID play an important role as those 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

3 

conflicts are hopefully moving toward an end, but then even after. 

We have—we are entering a new chapter in the relationship with 

Colombia after three Presidents, three Administrations have been 

consistent in Plan Colombia. We are moving to Pas Colombia and 

trying to play an important role in that—in that strong ally’s continuing progress, which is good for the people of Colombia, but also 

good for the people of the region and of the world. 

And I also have a particular interest, having followed the Plan 

Colombia to Pas Colombia. Particularly interested in how the State 

Department would intend to use the $750 million appropriation 

that we just put into the budget for the Central America prosperity 

process, and the President has an additional billion-dollar request 

this year, so kind of how you intend to use those funds. What 

would be the metrics under which we would analyze whether we 

were being successful, we would have reason to believe because of 

Plan Colombia’s success that we could be successful. We will only 

be successful if we spend the dollars the right way. 

So there are many, many issues in this budget, State and 

USAID, and we will dig into them with other colleagues who are 

here, both now and when we have our full committee meeting next 

week. But we appreciate your service and look forward to your testimony. 

And thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you. And now, we will hear from our 

witnesses. I will introduce individually prior to your testimony. 

First we have Mr. Douglas Pitkin, the director of the Bureau of 

Budget and Planning of the State Department. Mr. Pitkin is responsible for developing the diplomatic engagement budget, overseeing strategic planning and performance management of those 

resources as well as control of all departmental resources. He has 

served in this position since June 2015. 

Prior to coming to the Office of Budget and Planning, Mr. Pitkin 

served in the Iraq Transition Assistance Office in Baghdad and in 

the Office of Management and Budget. 

Mr. Pitkin, thank you for your service. We are anxious to hear 

your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS A. PITKIN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF 

U.S. BUDGET AND PLANNING, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. PITKIN. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 

Ranking Member Kaine, and distinguished members of the subcommittee for inviting my colleagues and me to discuss the Fiscal 

Year 2017 Department of State and USAID budget request. At a 

time when the demand for U.S. leadership and engagement has 

never been greater, this budget provides America’s diplomats and 

development professionals with the tools they need to advance our 

national security interests and build a safe and prosperous world. 

The total request for the Department of State and USAID for Fiscal Year 2017 is $50.1 billion, of which $35.2 billion is in our 

base enduring budget, and $14.9 billion is requested in overseas 

contingency operations. This combined funding, as you said, still 

constitutes just one percent of total Federal spending. 

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As the director of the State Department’s Bureau of Budget and 

Planning, I will focus on our diplomatic engagement request, which 

comprises our people, our diplomatic and embassy security programs, public diplomacy initiatives, our treaty-based commitments 

to the United Nations and other international organizations, and 

our global management platform. 

This portion of the budget in terms of appropriations totals over $16.1 billion, which for Fiscal Year 2017 constitutes a $560 million 

increase over the 2016 omnibus level. This portion of the budget 

constitutes 32 percent of the total State/USAID request with the 

foreign assistance and USAID budget making up the remaining 68 

percent. We are submitting the details of our overall budget request and many of the numbers as part of the USAID/State fact 

sheet for the record, but I will highlight a few of the specifics that 

drive the majority of our request. 

A large portion of our request is for our operating platform of security programs and diplomatic facility construction for which we 

are requesting a total of $6.1 billion. $3.7 billion of that supports 

our Diplomatic Security Bureau operations and other worldwide security protection programs, which actively secure our personnel, 

our facilities, and our information. 

$2.4 billion of that request is for our diplomatic facility construction and maintenance, which provides the Department’s share of 

the Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program, which builds safe, secure, and functional diplomatic facilities overseas. Both components 

of that security request sustain our Department’s commitment to 

implementing the Benghazi Accountability Review Board Recommendation of several years ago. As these programs do help us 

manage risk and mitigate overseas threats, they are major recipients of OCO funding, both in this budget and in the last—over the 

last few years. 

As you know, the 2015 bipartisan budget agreement yielded a 

significant increase for OCO resources for the Department and 

USAID for Fiscal Year 2016 and 2017. Since 2012, OCO has been 

instrumental to achieving many of our national security objectives, 

especially on the diplomatic engagement side for managing the 

transitions to a largely civilian presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

which previously had been funded by periodic and sometimes unpredictable supplementals. 

For Iraq, the diplomatic engagement request includes $1.3 billion 

for our embassy and consulate operations as well as diplomatic security funding for guard facilities in Embassy Baghdad, increased 

contract costs and security equipment. In collaboration with the 

Department of Defense, the U.S. embassy in Iraq continues to support the diplomatic engagement critical to strengthening the Iraqi 

government and supporting Operation Inherent Resolve’s counterISIL’s efforts. 

In Afghanistan, our mission focuses on our engagement and outreach and part of the military transition, and our total request for 

Afghanistan is $1.2 billion, which also includes significant increases for the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. We are also 

leveraging OCO to expand the Global Engagement Center, which 

is a high priority for the Department and another example of our 

close collaboration with the Department of Defense. The Global EnFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

5 

gagement Center will continue countering violent extremist messaging and communications by empowering our partners’ efforts to 

undermine disinformation espoused by extremists and terrorist 

groups, including ISIL and al Qaeda. 

The Department has brought in a senior counterterrorism leader, 

Michael Lumpkin, over from DOD to synchronize efforts across the 

national security spectrum and with our international partners in 

both the governmental and non-governmental community. To sustain these efforts over the long term, the 2017 President’s budget 

once again proposes to end sequestration for Function 150 and 

other discretionary spending for Fiscal Year 2018. We anticipate 

that the future of OCO will play heavily into that for Fiscal Year 

2018 as well. 

Other priorities in our budget continue to strengthen United States’ relations with the international community. We have $1.2 

billion for our public diplomacy and global engagement goals, to expand our outreach and engagement programs. We also have requested funding to support our contributions to international organizations, $1.4 billion for the U.N. and other international bodies, 

$2.4 billion for U.N. peacekeeping to address conflict-related crises. 

In addition to our appropriated funding, we do retain significant 

fee revenues for our consular and border security programs. That 

portion of our budget provides services to Americans who travel as 

well as foreign visitors. These programs facilitate legitimate travel 

which is vital to our economy, while denying entry to individuals 

who threaten our Nation’s people. 

Last summer, the QDDR office came out with the Department’s 

second Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. While 

not specifically a budget document, the QDDR does guide our management efforts, and our request does include funds, particularly 

for our Bureau of Human Resources, to increase our workforce diversity with almost a two-thirds increase over prior funding for 

outreach to new Foreign Service leaders. 

This is just a brief summary of our request. I want to assure you 

that we are committed to being good stewards of taxpayer dollars. 

With continued congressional support, I am sure we can have a 

positive impact in promoting our foreign policy priorities at home 

and abroad. And I look forward to answering your questions. 

[Mr. Pitkin’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS PITKIN

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kaine, and distinguished members 

of the subcommittee for inviting me to discuss the FY 2017 State Department Diplomatic Engagement budget request. At a time when the demand for U.S. leadership 

and engagement has never been greater, the FY 2017 request provides America’s 

diplomats and development professionals with the tools they need to advance the 

Nation’s interests and build a safer and more prosperous world. As a component of 

the National Security budget, we take our national security role seriously. The FY 

2017 budget request for the State Department and USAID together is $50.1 billion, 

$35.2 billion of which is Enduring, and $14.9 billion of which is Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. This funding constitutes just one percent of total 

federal spending 

As the Director of the State Department Bureau for Budget and Planning, I am 

here today to discuss our request for our people; diplomatic and embassy security 

programs; public diplomacy efforts; treaty based contributions to United Nations 

peacekeeping efforts and international organizations, and our global management 

platform, otherwise known as the Diplomatic Engagement portion of the DepartFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

6 

ment’s budget. The Diplomatic Engagement budget is about 32 percent of the total 

State/USAID request, with foreign assistance rounding out the remaining 68 percent. The FY 2017 request for this portion of the budget totals $16.1 billion, an increase of $560 million over the FY 2016 level. 

We are submitting the Department of State and USAID Fiscal Year 2017 Fact 

Sheet for the record, so many of the specific numbers related to our request are included in the attached document, and I will speak to a few major priorities here. 

A large portion of the Department’s operating platform consists of security programs 

and overseas facilities, for which we are requesting $6.1 billion. This includes $3.7 

billion for Diplomatic Security (DS) operations and other Worldwide Security Protection programs. The request for diplomatic facility construction and maintenance sustains the Department’s commitment to implementing the security recommendations 

of the Benghazi Accountability Review Board. This also includes Department’s share 

of the Capital Security Cost Sharing Program, which constructs secure, safe, and 

functional diplomatic facilities, as well as ongoing lease, repair and maintenance for 

our overseas real property assets. 

The 2015 Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) provided a significant OCO increase for 

the Department for FY 2016 and FY 2017 relative to FY 2015. We have been able 

to achieve many of our national security objectives using OCO. OCO has been instrumental for the transitions to largely civilian presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The Diplomatic Engagement request includes $1.26billion for Iraq, which includes 

embassy and consulate operations, as well as Diplomatic Security funding for Embassy Baghdad’s guard camp, contract costs and equipment. In collaboration with 

DOD, the U.S. Embassy in Iraq continues to support diplomatic engagement critical 

to Operation Inherent Resolve. 

In Afghanistan, our mission continues to focus on engagement and public outreach as the military transitions. The total request for Afghanistan is $1.2 billion, 

which includes an increase for Diplomatic Security aviation, contracts & equipment 

and to complete security upgrades to our facilities in Kabul. 

The request includes $21.5 million for the Global Engagement Center (GEC), 

which is a high priority for the Department and another example of our strong collaboration with DOD. The Center will continue countering violent extremist communication by more effectively synchronizing messaging to foreign audiences through 

empowering governmental and nongovernmental partners in their efforts to undermine disinformation espoused by extremist and terrorist groups, including ISIL and 

al-Qaeda. We brought Michael Lumpkin over from DOD to fully synchronize all of 

our efforts across the national security spectrum and with our international partners. 

To sustain these efforts over the long term, the FY 2017 President’s Budget once 

again proposes to end sequestration for function 150 and other discretionary spending in FY 2018. 

Other priorities in our budget serve to strengthen U.S. relations with the international community. Our request includes $1.2 billion to support our global engagement goals by building up our public diplomacy and exchange programs. The request also includes funding to meet our commitments for international organizations 

and peacekeeping, including $1.4 billion for our annual assessments for the U.N. 

and other bodies and $2.4 billion to address conflict-related crisis through our assessed share of United Nations peacekeeping operations. 

In addition to our request for direct appropriations, this budget expands consular 

services to Americans, while providing immigrant and non-immigrant visa services 

to prospective foreign visitors. The Department’s proposed Consular and Border Security Programs account will enable transparency in our efforts to provide protection 

to U.S. citizens overseas and contributes to national security and economic growth. 

It is a core element of national security to assist and facilitate the entry of legitimate travelers and promote tourism while denying entry to individuals who threaten the safety and security of our nation and its people. 

While not a specific budget tool, we use the QDDR to guide a modern State Department and USAID and empower our professionals to get the job done. This includes targeted efforts to increase the diversity of our workforce by expanding recruitment and fellowship opportunities for America’s future foreign policy experts; 

this is a two thirds increase over existing funding resources. 

This is just a brief summary of our overall request. I want to assure you that we 

are committed to being good stewards of taxpayer dollars. With continued Congressional support, we can have a positive impact in promoting our foreign policy priorities at home and abroad. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you, Mr. Pitkin. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

7 

We now turn to Mr. Hari Sastry, the director of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources. Mr. Sastry is a career member of the Senior 

Executive Service, and in his current role manages the Department 

of State and USAID foreign assistance budget. He has previously 

served in the Department of Commerce as well as the White House 

Office of Management and Budget. 

Mr. Sastry. 

STATEMENT OF HARI SASTRY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF U.S. 

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE RESOURCES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. SASTRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kaine, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting us to speak with you today about the Fiscal Year State Department and USAID foreign assistance budget request. 

As Secretary Kerry noted and as you noted in a recent hearing 

before the committee, while the foreign affairs request makes up 

just one percent of the total Federal budget, it may very well impact much of history that will be written about this era. I am here 

to discuss our Fiscal Year 2017 foreign assistance priorities, outyear challenges, and long-term spending trends, our efforts to enhance foreign assistance management, and aid transparency and 

interagency coordination. 

The Fiscal Year 2017 State Department and USAID request of $50.1 billion includes $34 billion for foreign assistance programs 

and activities. The budget request directly supports our national 

security strategy and our foreign policy priorities. Our foreign assistance continues to provide strong, sustainable leadership in the 

face of unprecedented challenges. 

The Secretary spoke to the committee at length about the Department’s Fiscal Year 2017 request and our priorities, and I am 

not going to go through all of them today. Some of the critical priorities that he highlighted include our efforts to counter violence 

extremism, Daesh, and Russian aggression, to support climate 

change, democracy in governance, and global health programs, and 

to address other critical regional challenges and opportunities. We 

have provided a fact sheet summarizing the main points of our request for the record. 

A core component of the Fiscal Year 2017 foreign assistance request includes $9.6 billion in overseas contingency operations funding, a level which is aligned with the cap set in the 2015 bipartisan 

Budget Act and equal to the amount provided to us by Congress 

in Fiscal Year 2016. The OCO request will enable us to prevent, 

address, and help countries to recover from human-caused crises 

and natural disasters. 

While the bipartisan Budget Act effectively increased the amount 

of OCO appropriated for foreign assistance by 59 percent above the 

Fiscal Year 2015 level, our Fiscal Year 2016 base appropriation 

was reduced by eight percent below the Fiscal Year 2015 level. The 

future of base versus OCO is not clearly defined, and as we look 

toward planning our 2018 budget, we look forward to working with 

you to effectively tackle this issue. 

In addition to the OCO base issue, the broader out-year challenge for foreign assistance is that we recognize that the various 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

8 

crises around the world are producing more refugees and more disasters, and we are asked to take the lead in responding to more 

global health pandemics. We are constantly asked to address new 

challenges that land on the front pages of the Washington Post 

today while simultaneously providing continued support to countries that focus on longer term needs as we aim to ensure those 

countries do not end up on the front page tomorrow. 

The demands on our limited foreign assistance resources show no 

signs of abating, so we ask ourselves how do we do more with less. 

First, we look to strengthening our internal systems and processes. 

Informed data driven decisions drive our strategy to address these 

increasing global challenges, and are a critical component of the 

Department’s commitment to achieving the most effective U.S. foreign policy outcomes and greater accountability. 

Last year, the Department updated and expanded its evaluation 

policy. We have also expanded the quantity and quality of data 

available on foreignassistance.gov, a web site we manage on behalf 

of the U.S. government, to publish the aid data of the 22 agencies 

that implement foreign assistance activities for the American public. These critical monitoring evaluation and transparency efforts 

make us a government better able to serve the American people 

and more effective in our use of U.S. dollars abroad. 

Second, we look at how we can best leverage these resources. We 

are able to tackle many global issues through close coordination 

with our Agency partners. We work directly with the Departments 

of Defense, Treasury, Agriculture, Homeland Security, the Centers 

for Disease Control, and many others to address these complex 

challenges. We are doing everything we can to ensure U.S. taxpayer dollars are used as efficiently and effectively as possible 

within the top line provided by Congress. 

Today’s global challenges make clear that what may appear to be 

a distant concern has the power to impact Americans right here on 

our home soil. Our leadership role in addressing these issues is important now more than ever. It is essential to promoting our goals 

and objectives abroad, stimulating the economy, and creating jobs, 

and protecting the American people and our values here at home. 

To adapt to this ever-evolving global landscape, foreign assistance must be, as the President said in his recent State of the 

Union address, a part of our national security, not something separate, not charity. Foreign assistance is and must be seen as a powerful tool that enables our Nation to continue to lead the world in 

effective solutions to global challenges. 

Thank you for your continued support, and I look forward to answering any questions you might have. 

[Mr. Sastry’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HARI SASTRY

Chairman Perdue, Ranking Member Kaine, and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, good afternoon. Thank you for inviting me to speak with you today 

about the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 State Department and United States Agency for 

International Development (USAID) foreign assistance budget request. 

As Secretary Kerry noted in his recent hearing before the committee, while the 

foreign affairs request makes up just one percent of the total federal budget, it may 

very well impact much of the history that will be written about this era. I am here 

today to discuss our FY 2017 foreign assistance priorities, out-year challenges and 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

9 

long-term spending trends, our efforts to enhance foreign assistance management 

and aid transparency, and interagency coordination. The FY 2017 State Department and USAID Request of $50.1 billion includes $34.0 billion for foreign assistance programs and activities. The budget request directly supports our national security strategy and foreign policy priorities. Our foreign assistance continues to provide strong and sustainable leadership in the face 

of unprecedented challenges. 

Secretary Kerry spoke to the committee at length about the Department’s FY 

2017 request and our priorities. I am not going to go through them all again today— 

instead, we have provided a Fact Sheet summarizing the main points of our request 

for the record. He spoke of our efforts to counter violent extremism, to counter 

Daesh and Russian aggression; to support climate change, democracy and governance, and global health programs; and to address other critical regional challenges 

and opportunities, such as the conflict in Syria, the migrant crisis in Central America, a potential peace plan in Colombia, our continued efforts to advance our rebalance in the Asia-Pacific region, and of course the many programs we have in Africa. 

I look forward to answering any questions you have on these topics. 

The Department and USAID undertake a rigorous strategic planning and budget 

formulation process prior to sending up our budget requests each February. During 

the FY 2017 formulation process, we had the benefit of rolling in our 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). The QDDR outlines four of our 

major priorities—countering violent extremism, open democratic societies, inclusive 

economic growth, and climate change. A core component of the FY 2017 foreign assistance request includes $9.6 billion 

in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, a level which is aligned with 

the caps set in the 2015 Bipartisan Budget Act and equal to the amount provided 

to us by Congress in FY 2016. The OCO request will enable us to prevent, address, 

and help countries to recover from human-caused crises and natural disasters. 

While the Bipartisan Budget Act effectively increased the amount of OCO appropriated for foreign assistance by 59 percent above the FY 2015 level, our FY 2016 

base appropriations were reduced by 8 percent below FY 2015. The future of base 

versus OCO funding is not clearly defined, and as we look toward planning the FY 

2018 budget, we look forward to working with you to effectively tackle this issue. 

There are, of course, many foreign assistance funding trends that we used to help 

guide us in our budget formulation process. Since 2001, foreign assistance funding 

has nearly tripled, correlating to the increase of complex global challenges. Over the 

past several years, foreign assistance funding has remained relatively stable, ranging between $32 billion and $35 billion, including all sources of funding (base, OCO 

and supplemental). This is obviously not an insignificant amount of money. When 

we talk about out-year trends though, we recognize that we are increasingly asked 

to provide assistance in insecure areas—including in Afghanistan, Central African 

Republic, and Iraq. The various crises around the world are producing more refugees, and more disasters, and we are asked to take the lead in responding to more 

global health pandemics. We are constantly asked to address new challenges that 

land on the front page of the Washington Post today, while simultaneously providing continued support to countries with programs that focus on longer-term 

needs, as we aim to ensure those countries do not end up on the front page tomorrow. We must be able to address immediate challenges without losing sight of the 

vital, ongoing support for core development and democracy programs—the foundation of Department of State and USAID efforts worldwide. The demands on our limited foreign assistance resources show no signs of abating. 

So we ask ourselves: how do we do more with less? First, we look to strengthening 

our internal systems and processes. Informed, data-driven decisions drive our strategy to address these increasing global challenges, and are a critical component of 

the Department’s commitment to achieving the most effective U.S. foreign policy 

outcomes and greater accountability. Last year, the Department updated and expanded its evaluation policy, requiring each bureau to conduct evaluations every 

year and for foreign assistance programs, publicly post evaluations within 90 days 

of completion. We have also expanded the quantity and quality of data available on 

ForeignAssistance.gov, a website we manage on behalf of the U.S. government, to 

publish the aid data of the 22 agencies that implement foreign assistance activities 

for the American public. These critical monitoring, evaluation, and transparency efforts make us a government better able to serve the American people, and more effective in our use of U.S. dollars abroad. 

Second, we look at how we can best leverage the resources. We are able to tackle 

many global issues through close coordination with our agency partners. We work 

directly with the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Agriculture, Homeland Security, the Centers for Disease Control, and many others to address complex chalFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

10 

lenges. Over the past few years we have worked hand-in-hand with our U.S. government partners on many issues, whether countering Daesh, addressing the underlying factors of migration in Central America, or combatting global health crises 

such as Zika and Ebola. We also leverage our resources by teaming up with the private sector and other bilateral and multilateral partners, which I know Roman will 

address shortly in more detail. The bottom line is this: we are doing everything we 

can to ensure U.S. taxpayer dollars are used as efficiently and effectively as possible 

within the topline we are provided by Congress. 

In closing, I would like to reiterate something you have all already heard from 

Secretary Kerry and many others from the Department and USAID: this request 

makes up just one percent of the total federal budget. Just one percent: that is the 

levy of our leadership role in global affairs, and it provides a tremendous return on 

investment. This return on investment is palpable. The advancements the Department and USAID have been able to achieve would not have been possible without 

the support of the American people, so I thank you for your continued support. 

Today’s global challenges make clear that what may appear to be a distant concern has the power to impact Americans right here on our home soil. Our leadership 

role in addressing these issues is important now more than ever—it is essential to 

promoting our goals and objectives abroad, to stimulating the economy and creating 

jobs, and protecting the American people and our values here at home. To adapt 

to this ever-evolving global landscape, foreign assistance must be, as the President 

said in his recent State of the Union address, ‘‘a part of our national security, not 

something separate, not charity.’’ Foreign assistance is and must be seen as a powerful tool that enables our nation to continue to lead the world in effective solutions 

to global challenges. 

Thank you for your continued support. I look forward to answering any questions 

you might have. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you. 

Finally, we will hear from Mr. Roman Napoli, the acting director 

of the Office of Budget and Resource Management at USAID. In 

this role, he provides advice to Agency leadership on a range of 

budget issues, including performance, management, budget planning, and financial management. 

He has previously served as the head of the Budget Formulation 

and Execution for USAID’s program budget, as well as the head of 

the Strategic Planning and Resources for the Middle East Partnership Initiative. 

Mr. Napoli. 

STATEMENT OF ROMAN NAPOLI, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE 

OF BUDGET AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, U.S. AGENCY 

FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. NAPOLI. Thank you, Chairman Perdue, Ranking Member 

Kaine, and members of the subcommittee. I am very pleased to join 

you to discuss the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Fiscal Year 2017 budget request. 

Our request totals $22.7 billion and reflects the critical role that 

development plays in advancing U.S. interests and values abroad. 

As the lead on development in the U.S. government, USAID is now 

better positioned and more capable of making a sizable impact 

around the world, leading not just with our dollars, but with leadership that the international community and the American people 

expect. 

We do this in four ways. First, this request helps USAID foster 

and sustain development progress all over the world. USAID will 

institutionalize proven investments by fostering inclusive economic 

growth and strengthening democratic governance through tested 

and proven interventions. This work is lifting millions out of exFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

11 

treme poverty, and helping countries become open, peaceful, and 

flourishing partners for the United States. 

The request will enable USAID to double down on efforts that 

are delivering results, and continue to build the conditions that 

make progress possible. With this budget, we will continue to save 

lives and improve health worldwide by contributing to global efforts 

to end preventable child and maternal death, creating an AIDS-free 

generation, and protecting communities from infectious diseases. 

PEPFAR is well on track to reach bold HIV and AIDS prevention 

and treatment targets, and we see the same opportunity with malaria. Ninety percent of all malaria deaths occur in Sub-Saharan 

Africa, most of which are among children under five. But we have 

already seen significant declines in child mortality due to our work 

with reductions up to 55 percent. This budget includes a total increase of $200 million to expand and broaden our malaria work. 

Second, the request enables USAID to prevent, mitigate, and respond to manmade and natural humanitarian crises that are occurring at unprecedented scale and frequency. USAID’s response to 

crises around the globe is intricately linked to our development 

mission. This request will enable USAID to provide lifesaving responses to areas with the most vulnerable populations. We will provide emergency food supplies, address the underlying causes of food 

security, and assist victims of conflict and natural disaster. 

Third, this budget supports our critical work to confront threats 

to national security and global stability. USAID is providing critical 

support to Central America where we are building on our current 

investments by providing expertise to host governments as they 

make necessary reforms, scaling up proven community-based interventions, and training youth for a 21st century workforce, while 

helping businesses have the financial and market access to invest 

and generate jobs. 

Finally, this budget will position USAID to continue to lead and 

meet the needs of a changing world by investing in approaches that 

work. We will emphasize knowledge and evidence-based learning, 

and we will support the men and women of USAID as they proudly 

serve the American people in increasingly challenging environments. 

With this request we will enhance science, evaluation, and learning with $196 million in funding for the Global Development Lab 

and the Policy, Planning, and Learning Bureau. Investments in the 

Lab will enable USAID to develop and scale breakthrough solutions, leverage more out of our funding, and improve the sustainability of our development investments by attracting private sector 

resources. The request also includes necessary support for USAID’s 

staff capacity with a requested $1.7 billion across USAID administrative expense accounts to sustain ongoing operations and build on 

the institutional reforms we have undertaken with USAID Forward. 

While there is tremendous ambition in this request, we acknowledge that the expectations for USAID are as diverse and as multifaceted as the problems we address. While these issues are complex, USAID is evolving and fundamentally changing the way we 

do business, integrating innovation into all our work, leveraging 

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our resources for greater impact, and focusing like never before on 

measuring and delivering results. 

We envision a world where the most vulnerable are emerging 

from extreme poverty and contributing to stable democratic societies, building a safer world that promotes the dignity and freedom 

of people everywhere, and advances our security and prosperity. 

And with that, we look forward to your questions. 

[Mr. Napoli’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROMAN NAPOLI

Thank you, Chairman Perdue, Ranking Member Kaine, and members of the subcommittee. I am very pleased to join you to discuss President Obama’s Fiscal Year 

2017 budget request for the United States Agency for International Development 

(USAID). 

As the committee is well aware, the world around us is increasingly complex, 

challenging and dangerous. It is also ripe with opportunities for development 

progress. Thanks to bipartisan support from Congress, including members of this 

committee, and consistent with the 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 

Review (QDDR) and the Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development, 

USAID is now better positioned and more capable of fulfilling our mandate of 

partnering to end extreme poverty and promote resilient, democratic societies while 

advancing our nation’s security and prosperity. 

As a core pillar of American leadership and power, global development works together with defense and diplomacy to advance our interests and values abroad, and 

to protect the American people at home. With less than one percent of the federal 

budget, USAID supports critical development activities and the courageous development professionals who carry them out in challenging, often dangerous, conditions 

every day. 

In total, the President’s funding request for accounts from which USAID admin- isters assistance is $22.7 billion. $11.0 billion of this total is in core USAID-managed accounts: 1) Development Assistance; 2) Global Health Programs-USAID; 3) 

International Disaster Assistance; 4) Food for Peace Title II; 5) Transition Initiatives; 6) Complex Crises Fund and 7) USAID Administrative Expense accounts. 

The President’s budget request reinforces and expands U.S. global development 

leadership in several distinct, but interrelated ways. First, the budget request will 

help USAID foster and sustain development progress all over the world. Second, the 

request enables USAID to prevent, mitigate and respond to the man-made and natural humanitarian crises that are occurring at unprecedented scale and frequency. 

Third, the request supports our critical work to confront threats to national security 

and global stability, from countering Russian aggression to strengthening reforms 

in Afghanistan and addressing the underlying conditions driving migration from 

Central America. And, finally, this request represents an investment in the development professionals, technical expertise, institutional infrastructure, and monitoring 

and evaluation needed to position USAID to continue to lead as the world’s premiere 

global development agency, making us more transparent, accountable and agile. 

Foster and sustain development progress 

All over the world, USAID advances broad-scale human progress by fostering sustained and inclusive economic growth and strengthening democratic governance. 

This work is lifting millions out of extreme poverty and helping countries become 

open, peaceful and flourishing partners for the United States, and its success burnishes the image of our country globally. 

The President’s budget request will enable USAID to expand successful programs 

and continue to build the conditions that make progress possible. 

With this budget request, we will continue to save lives and improve health worldwide. The request includes $8.6 billion for life-saving global health programs—including $2.9 billion requested for USAID specifically—which will contribute to global 

efforts to support three critical goals: 1) ending preventable child and maternal 

deaths; 2) creating an AIDS-free generation; and 3) protecting communities from infectious diseases. 

USAID child survival and maternal health programs have already helped save the 

lives of 2.4 million children and almost 200,000 mothers, and forged partnerships 

with the twenty-four priority countries for Ending Preventable Child and Maternal 

Deaths. This budget includes robust support for these efforts, including $275 million 

for Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, which is a $40 million increase over the FY 2016 enFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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acted level, as part of the four-year, $1 billion pledge announced last year to immunize 300 million additional children and save at least five million lives by 2020. 

Additionally, PEPFAR is well on track to reach the bold HIV prevention and 

treatment targets set by President Obama last September. As the President stated 

in this year’s State of the Union Address, additional opportunities exist with malaria. Ninety percent of all malaria deaths occur in sub-Saharan Africa, most of 

which are among children under five. In 17 of the 19 President’s Malaria Initiative 

(PMI) countries, significant declines in mortality rates among children under five 

have been observed—ranging from 18 percent (in both Liberia and Nigeria) to 55 

percent (in Zambia). The budget includes a total increase of $200 million (30 percent) for PMI above the FY 2016 enacted level, of which $71 million is requested 

as additional resources and $129 million is requested to be made available from remaining Ebola emergency funds. 

This budget request also continues our important work to foster sustainable development that reflects the realities of a changing climate. By furthering our work 

overseas to promote low-emissions development, we’re helping our partner nations 

to lighten their carbon footprint, adapt to climate-driven risks, and promote public 

health. It also means doing the footwork to make sure that all USAID partnerships 

recognize the challenges posed by climate change. Ensuring that our investments 

account for the risks posed by climate change is not only good policy, its prudent 

policy as well. Failing to account for growing storm surges, or shifting precipitation 

patterns, can mean that years of work on an USAID project can be wiped away in 

a matter of hours. 

Our work is also ensuring food security and progress toward ending hunger, with 

$978 million requested for USAID for the Feed the Future (FtF) initiative. Feed the 

Future is a whole-of-U.S. government initiative that focuses on increasing food security and economic growth—with an emphasis on empowering women—by promoting 

growth in the agriculture sector and reducing hunger, poverty and malnutrition. 

The request will also help vulnerable populations become more resilient to shocks 

that can limit access to food. 

FtF is working. FtF has helped reduce stunting by 14.4 percent in areas of Bangladesh from 2011–2014; by 21 percent in areas of Cambodia from 2010–2014; by 

25 percent in areas of Kenya from 2008–2014; and by 33 percent in Ghana from 

2008–2014. In Honduras, average incomes of FtF beneficiaries increased 55 percent 

between 2012 and 2014, helping nearly 36,450 beneficiaries rise out of extreme poverty and reducing one of the underlying factors of outbound migration. United 

States support for FtF has helped leverage an additional $18.5 billion in support 

from G-8 members and other donors. We are pleased that Members of this committee, including Senator Isakson, are sponsoring legislation to institutionalize this 

innovative, effective approach to reducing hunger, childhood malnutrition, and poverty. 

Through Power Africa, a whole-of-government initiative, the U.S. is increasing access to reliable, cleaner power to drive economic growth across the continent. Power 

Africa’s recently released Roadmap outlines a concrete plan to achieve the ambitious 

goal of adding 30,000 megawatts (MW) of electricity generation and 60 million connections by 2030, thereby doubling access to electricity across the continent. Power 

Africa has already helped transactions expected to generate 4,300 MWs reach financial close. The FY 2017 USAID request for $291.3 million for Power Africa is part 

of President Obama’s $300 million annual commitment. Power Africa will continue 

to build on our ongoing work to strengthen the investment climate across sub-Saharan Africa and to increase the capacity of African governments and utilities to develop and manage their domestic energy sectors, and in doing so, help to catalyze 

private sector investment to sustain Africa’s impressive economic growth rates 

where political will exists. Due to U.S. leadership to garner support for Power Africa 

goals, we now have over 120 private and public sector partners that have committed 

over $43 billion to date. 

The budget request also includes $75 million for Trade Investment Capacity 

Building, which will align, focus and expand current U.S. Government bilateral and 

regional trade programs in sub-Saharan Africa. An additional $10 million is requested for the Young African Leaders Initiative to support young African leaders 

returning to Africa following their fellowship training and professional development 

activities in the United States. 

The budget requests $2.3 billion to strengthen democracy and governance around 

the world. This support is essential at a time when we’re seeing troubling trends 

like democratic backsliding and closing space for civil society, independent voices 

and aid workers alike. Particular focus regions include Africa, Asia, Eurasia, and 

Central America. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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This assistance will help USAID support and strengthen inclusive and accountable democracies to advance freedom, dignity and development. And, these advances 

will help ensure sustainable, transparent, and effective development investments in 

areas such as health, agriculture and power. Vibrant democracies foster stable societies, advancing the U.S. interest in a peaceful and democratic world. 

This budget request also continues support for the rebalance in the Asia-Pacific 

region, with a particular emphasis on development objectives. The $694.4 million requested will strengthen democratic governance and processes, foster engagement 

with civil society, and promote rule of law and respect for human rights in this region. Other activities will support economic growth by improving the conditions for 

competition in the private sector; improve health through an emphasis on preventing and containing pandemic threats; and enhance critical trade efforts through 

increased investment, economic inclusion and innovation, including activities related 

to the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement. 

Prevent, mitigate and respond to global and humanitarian crises 

USAID’s response to crises around the globe is intrinsically linked to our development mission. This request will help the United States maintain the agility and 

flexibility that is so desperately needed in preventing, mitigating, and responding 

to global and humanitarian crises. 

All over the world, countries are dealing with crises that are more complex and 

lasting longer than ever before. And, as we have seen with Ebola, and now the Zika 

outbreak, new urgent challenges can emerge at any time. This budget enables 

USAID to assist the people facing these challenges while helping countries prepare 

for and withstand future disasters. 

On Zika, last week the President asked Congress for approximately $1.9 billion 

in FY 2016 emergency supplemental funding to enhance our ongoing efforts to prepare for and respond to the Zika virus. The supplemental request includes $335 million for USAID, which will be used to help affected countries through health programming, public education, and efforts to control mosquitoes and combat transmission of the virus. We will also work with our partners at the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention (CDC) and National Institutes of Health (NIH) to accelerate 

vaccine research and diagnostic development. 

We are also showing humanitarian leadership in response to the crisis in Syria. 

The United States is the single largest donor of humanitarian aid to the Syrian people, having contributed more than $5.1 billion since the crisis began. USAID is providing emergency assistance to 5 million Syrians every month, including 4 million 

people inside Syria and Syrian refugees in neighboring countries. 

Although the United States leads the world in international disaster assistance, 

responding to crises after the fact is not enough, and taxes U.S. resources. USAID 

also works to build the capacity of countries to withstand future crises and meet 

humanitarian needs on their own through enhanced service delivery, public administration, and governance. 

This budget will enable USAID to provide life-saving responses to areas with the 

most vulnerable populations, with $3.3 billion in USAID-managed humanitarian assistance to provide emergency food supplies and address the underlying causes of 

food insecurity, and to assist internally displaced persons and the victims of conflict 

and natural disasters. 

An additional $107.6 million is requested to prevent conflict and stabilize emerging democratic processes in critical transition environments, and for quick response 

to urgent, unanticipated civilian contingencies. 

Through the Global Climate Change Initiative, USAID will invest $352.2 million 

to work with countries that are particularly well-suited to transition to climate-resilient, low-emission economic growth, including the development and implementation 

of 25 countries’ low-emissions development strategies. 

In 2015, partner countries achieved 30 major milestones as a result of U.S. assistance, each reflecting measurable improvement in national frameworks for low emission development. Climate adaptation programs—for which the United States 

broadly pledged to double grant-based public financing by 2020—help countries become more resilient and contribute to stability and economic growth. Through these 

types of initiatives, we also help build our partner countries’ resilience to recurrent 

crises related to climate change. 

Confront threats to national security and global stability 

Complementary to the development and humanitarian missions, USAID plays a 

key role in addressing threats to our nation’s security. 

In regions of strategic national security importance, USAID works side-by-side 

with our counterparts in the U.S. Military and Department of State to confront 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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emerging threats and other global security challenges. On the ground in strategic 

countries, here in Washington, and in key commands, USAID leaders engage sideby-side with our colleagues in the military to ensure the proper balance between 

military and civilian efforts. 

Our efforts to achieve development progress in countries facing conflict and crisis 

helps enhance global stability and fosters good will toward the United States. 

One example of our close, collaborative work with the Department of Defense and 

other U.S. Government Agencies is the Sahel Development Initiative. The initiative 

addresses new challenges presented by extremists and was developed as part of a 

joint interagency planning effort. USAID’s unique expertise in addressing governance challenges, corruption, and impediments to economic growth are being leveraged to limit the space for extremists whose use of violence impede and set back 

development gains. 

In Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia, as part of the broader effort to counter Rus- sian aggression, we are requesting $698.1 million through the Economic Support 

Fund (ESF) and Global Health Programs (GHP) accounts to strengthen market 

economies and trade opportunities; bolster independent media and democratic institutions; empower anti-corruption efforts; increase energy independence in Eastern 

Europe and Central Asia, and sustain enduring commitments including in core development sectors such as health. These efforts, complemented by robust funding requested by the State Department under the security and law enforcement accounts, 

will help Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and their neighbors stand strong against debilitating Russian pressure. 

We are requesting $77.6 million to seize emerging opportunities to promote lasting stability, peace and democracy through Transition Initiatives in countries 

plagued by conflict and crisis. The budget will provide flexible funding to catalyze 

positive change in countries all over the world, from Nigeria to Syria to Colombia. 

Finally, closer to home, the request will continue to address the underlying conditions driving migration from Central America, with $470.3 million to improve prosperity, governance, and economic growth, and regional economic integration. This 

bilateral and regional assistance for Central America is part of the Administration’s 

$1 billion whole-of-government request for appropriations and financing assistance 

to support the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. Building upon 

prior appropriations, funding will provide expertise to host governments as they 

make necessary reforms, scale up proven community-based interventions, and train 

youth for a 21st century workforce while helping businesses gain the financial and 

market access to invest and generate economic growth and jobs. 

Position USAID as a leader in development 

USAID is modernizing development and driving smart policy approaches by promoting new partnerships; science, technology and innovation; evidence-based decision making and host country ownership with a relentless focus on measuring and 

delivering results. As a global leader in development, USAID is mobilizing the rest 

of the world around shared challenges, and leveraging investments through partnerships with other donors, country governments, the private sector and local organizations. USAID’s successes are U.S. successes, and show the world the United States’ 

continuing commitment to a more peaceful, prosperous future. 

USAID leverages other resources to use development assistance more efficiently. 

Since FY 2010, the global average of Mission funds programmed through local systems increased from 9.6 percent to 16.9 percent in FY 2014. In addition to the billions of dollars we are leveraging on specific efforts to galvanize the world on energy, food security, global health and humanitarian emergencies, we work to leverage the private sector across all of our work. USAID has also shifted towards a 

broader range of private sector engagement approaches including large multi-stakeholder alliances such as Power Africa and the New Alliance for Food Security and 

Nutrition, for which USAID serves as a catalyst and convener for private sector investment. 

This budget request will position USAID to continue to lead and meet the needs 

of a changing world by investing in approaches that work, emphasizing knowledge 

and evidence-based learning, supporting the men and women of USAID as they 

bravely serve the American people in increasingly challenging environments, and 

strengthening USAID as an institution. 

The President’s budget will enhance science, technology, innovation, evaluation 

and learning, and partnerships with $195.5 million in funding for the Global Development Lab and the Policy, Planning, and Learning (PPL) Bureau. Funding for PPL 

will enhance USAID’s evaluation programs and policy development. Lab resources 

will also enable USAID to source, develop, and scale breakthrough solutions; accelerate the transformation of the U.S. development enterprise by leveraging addiFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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tional outside funding; and improve the sustainability of development interventions 

by attracting private-sector, market-driven resources. 

The request continues the required investment in USAID by seeking $1.7 billion 

across multiple USAID Administrative Expense accounts to sustain ongoing operations and build on recent reforms, including through continued improvements in 

procurement, local-capacity building, innovation, and accountability. 

This budget also reflects the most recent QDDR through this sustained investment in our workforce and building USAID as a dynamic organization. The budget 

also directly responds to the QDDR’s strategic priorities, including preventing and 

combating violent extremism; promoting open and democratic societies through democracy, rights and governance programming; advancing economic growth through 

initiatives like Power Africa, Feed the Future, and others; and mitigating and 

adapting to climate change. 

Conclusion 

USAID is fundamentally changing the way we do business: integrating innovation 

into all of our work; leveraging our resources for greater impact through partnership; and focusing like never before on measuring and delivering results. We envision a world where the most vulnerable are emerging from extreme poverty and contributing to stable, democratic societies. Building a better, safer world promotes the 

dignity and freedom of people everywhere and advances our security and prosperity. 

Senator PERDUE. Well, thank you all. I look forward to your answers here. And, again, let me just for the record remind us all 

that we will have Deputy Secretary Higginbotham here next week 

to answer questions about the budget as well and other issues. So 

today we are going to—I am going to dial into some of these detailed questions that we hopefully will not get into next week. 

I want to put this in perspective, if I could. First of all, in the 

spirit of really nonpartisanship, which is what I think Senator 

Kaine and I on this subcommittee and then Senator Corker and 

Cardin have done in the full committee, is that this is one of those 

committees that really does have a record of bipartisanship, and 

really nonpartisanship. We look at State Department that way. 

Senator Kaine’s comments are exactly correct. You know, as we 

pull out of these areas, we know the pressure is increasing on 

State. And honestly, I want to give some perspective to this with 

that comment in mind, and that is that, you know, if you look at 

since 2009, the costs in the State Department have been fairly flat. 

As a matter of fact, this is a budget request that actually is lower 

than last year’s budget request, and I do not want to gloss over 

that. As a business guy, I appreciate that. 

So having said that, I want to talk to you a little bit about some 

history just so we have perspective when we talk about this particular budget. If we go back a few years—let us go back and look 

at it two different ways—the State Department was spending on 

average somewhere between $25 and $30 billion a year for quite 

a long period of time. Now, as a percentage of GDP, it actually— 

since 2009 it has actually declined from about .4 percent of GDP 

to about .3 percent of GDP. So let us put that in perspective. And 

I think you are to be congratulated on that from that perspective. 

I kind of look at it the other way in looking at hard dollars, 

though, and say, okay, here is the mission. I know it is changing 

this dynamic, and here is how we spend money against that. So the 

percentage of GDP is one benchmark that I think we use. It is not 

the end-all. 

Having said that, can you help me with the perspective of what 

we are doing in and say—I know we had the surge in Iraq and so 

forth. Mr. Pitkin, can you address that to start with, and anybody 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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else that has a comment on that I appreciate it. But can you speak 

to sort of what we have seen, and is this a new norm, or is there 

some anticipation that somehow the world is going to get safer and 

we can go back to where it was maybe in 2001 or 2000 to 2008, 

for example. 

The question is, with all the dynamic threats around the world 

and the pressures—I am not trying to lead you into an answer, but 

I really am trying to figure out what that $20 billion is going for 

in this new world. 

Mr. PITKIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, I certainly hope, of course, that the world does get safer and that our 

budget can help move us in that direction. But certainly as part of 

the Department’s management team, I frequently hear the reports 

from our Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, Greg Starr, 

who is very candid about the threats that we face overseas, and 

their evolving nature, that they are unpredictable, and that they 

can emerge even in countries like France, as we saw earlier or last 

year that are unexpected. And so, we have to be able to be mindful 

of those threats, not just in what we currently call the frontline 

states or the high-threat posts, but other posts where our adversaries have the capacity to strike unexpectedly. 

So, but going back to the original question, I have been with the 

Bureau of Budget and Planning since 2007, and certainly the main 

driver that I have seen for our operating costs has been our presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. And as you noted, I actually came 

from the Iraq office, have been working in the Embassy Baghdad 

primarily actually on the foreign assistance side. 

And one of the challenges that certainly the Department faced 

was as the military was drawing down, there was a transition plan 

of which the Department of State has or was and has taken over 

the lion’s share of responsibility for the operating platform from 

DOD, and that comes with a cost. It comes with a cost for operating in an environment where we cannot rely on the local economy. We have to bring in employees from outside. We have very 

unique and challenging security conditions. 

And so, since that time and particularly since the creation of 

OCO, we have made significant investments, both one-time investments in facilities and recurring investments in people and programs to help protect our staff and our other interagency partners 

in Embassy Baghdad. 

The same trend we are seeing in Embassy Afghanistan. Now, in 

Afghanistan we have drawn down more. Now we just are focused 

on Embassy Kabul, but we are seeing the threat evolve, as the 

DOD forces and international partners draw down, more of that security platform falls upon the Department of State. 

And we take—we try to be appropriate and take appropriate 

measures. I think last year in the Fiscal Year 2016 omnibus and 

2016 budget, we tried to contain some of those costs. But now for 

2017, just the way that the contract cycles move, we are seeing increasing costs that we are trying to address in this budget request. 

Senator PERDUE. Is it safe to say that during—I hate to look at 

it this simplistically. I know it is not. But if you look at the war 

period, say between 2002 and 2009, while we have fighting forces 

in a country, the need for State expense is not as great as it is as 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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we see after the departure of those defense forces. Is that—is that 

a correct, simplistic way to look at, because I am looking at is that 

part of the run-up in that $30 billion? 

It is a 76 percent increase. It is not on this watch, I understand 

that. But I am trying to look historically to say is this a new norm, 

or do we have potential to eventually bring that back down? 

Mr. PITKIN. I certainly hope we can bring it down over time, but 

that would definitely depend on security conditions on the ground. 

And we did make decisions several years ago under previous leadership to try to constrain some of our Iraq presence to just the two 

consulates and Embassy Baghdad, one partly for security reasons 

because the more sites, the more acreage we had to protect, the 

more movements we had, the more we exposed our people to risk. 

It also did have expensive costs, but primarily security, and getting 

the job done, and achieving our mission, and working with the 

Iraqi government was the key priority. 

It has declined somewhat, but actually we are getting a lot of 

support, and from DOD previously. DOD helped provide our security. It was not free, but as DOD has drawn down, that entire cost 

falls upon the Department of State. So I would say it is, one, a fairly stable presence, but as DOD withdraws its forces, we have to 

pick up the slack to help protect the personnel who remain. 

Senator PERDUE. My time is going to run out. But, Mr. Napoli, 

I would like to address the follow-up. You mentioned in your testimony that one of the issues is trying to make sure that the money 

that is invested has a good result. And so, I would like to talk 

about Haiti for a minute. 

I was elected in November of 2014, and between then and the 

time I was sworn in as a private citizen, I went on a mission trip 

to Haiti to try to rebuild some housing and an orphanage for 275 

kids down there. And it really touched us that in five years after 

the earthquake, not a lot had changed frankly. I understand that 

the Navy was down there early, USAID was there early, and we 

did a lot of good. However, I was really troubled by the state of the 

situation, particularly, if I am correct, that we have spent some $4 

billion in Haiti. 

And I have a particular question, you know, as to the effectiveness of money spent there. We know that historically Haiti has always been the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. We 

know there were allegations of corruption there for decades. None 

of this is new. But in February and March of 2015, USAID itself 

suspended two contractors that had been working a flagship $30 

million housing project—I think it was called Caracol-EKAM, if I 

am correct—due to faulty home construction, poor drainage, the list 

goes on. 

There was also a question about where it was put. There was a 

lot of housing that was built in and around Port-au-Prince that was 

not where the people were living. They were in other areas where 

they could clear ground, and so I am not sure how effective that 

was. 

Can you speak to the follow-up that USAID has in a country like 

Haiti to be sure that the money goes to the people that it needs 

to help, that we are not just using U.S. resources, that we are 

using local resources when we can, and that the results are, after 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

19 

a five-year period of time effectively what we wanted out of a $4 

billion investment. 

Mr. NAPOLI. Senator, thank you for that and thank you for sharing your personal experience. As you know, Haiti is one of the poorest countries in our hemisphere, and so it has a particular amount 

of attention, especially after the earthquake there. 

I think when we talk about Haiti and how we follow up and how 

we make good, there are a number of things that we think about. 

But really it is our work in the political space, righting the governance of the country, helping them to govern themselves, put things 

in place that are going to lead that government down a road to full 

rehabilitation. 

But for USAID’s investments there are a couple of things that I 

think we really want to talk about, bringing in capital and other 

things through our Development Credit Authority where we have 

the Haitian diaspora, and Haitian business leaders coming, finding 

ways to work with USAID, and leveraging that money in the country. That is the kinds of thing that I think really helps, one, lower 

the U.S. government’s risk, but also allow us to do things that are 

sustainable and locally owned. 

So I think there are a lot of challenges in Haiti, and that is 

something we can talk more about following the hearing. But my 

perspective is we have done a lot. We have gotten 98-plus percent 

people out of temporary housing. There has been a lot of progress, 

but there are going to continue to be a lot of things we need to do 

in Haiti going forward, and this budget does include a healthy request for continuing some of that work. 

Senator PERDUE. I am out of time. I will come back to one followup question on that in a minute. But for the sake of time, we will 

go to the ranking member. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate the 

testimony, and I will probably have multiple chunks of questions, 

too. But, Mr. Pitkin, I am going to start with you, just sort of a 

budget philosophy question because you have been doing this at 

State since, did you say 2006? 

Mr. PITKIN. 2007. 

Senator KAINE. 2007. 

Mr. PITKIN. 2007, yes. 

Senator KAINE. And then you were at OMB prior. 

Mr. PITKIN. That is correct. 

Senator KAINE. We have now done two two-year budgets in a 

row. It was not easy getting there. We got to the first one after a 

shutdown. We got to the second one in a middle of a speaker retiring, so I am not sure we can always count on something like that. 

But I really like two-year budgets. I am a former governor. We always did two-year budgets. Senator Isakson has had a two-year 

budget bill for years. I am a co-sponsor of it. 

We have kind of gotten into this bit where we do a two-year 

budget deal and single-year appropriations. But once we do the 

first appropriations bill, it gives people at least kind of a range of 

reason if they know the top line for year two sort of what to expect. 

I really feel like the economy outside, but also our inside operation, 

does a lot better the more certainty we can provide it. And congresFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

20 

sional activity around the budget has been a big uncertainty generator rather than a certainty generator. 

We are having a little bit of a debate potentially right now in the 

Budget Committee, and a number of us are on that committee, 

about whether we stick with the two-year budget deal and then 

just work on appropriations this year in response to the President’s 

submitted budget, or whether we actually go back in and alter year 

two of the two-year budget deal that we struck in October. 

Do you agree with me that certainty is generally a good thing 

and that, you know, the two-year budget concept, if we can normalize it and try to honor it going forward would provide some benefit in terms of the fiscal planning for an agency like State? 

Mr. PITKIN. Thank you, Senator. Well, it is difficult for me to 

speak to the broader budget process because certainly there are a 

number of equities. And as evidenced in the Fiscal Year 2017 request, even our request for State had to take into consideration the 

range of challenges the Administration tried to cope with on both 

the discretionary and mandatory side of the budget. So I recognize 

that even in negotiating a single-year budget within a two-year 

budget deal, there are going to be different puts and takes in order 

to achieve the right balance for the American people that is fiscally 

responsible. 

But in terms of planning, yes, to a certain degree working within 

a planning ceiling helps us set expectations. It helps us try to know 

what the external stakeholders would consider fiscally responsible. 

That is why the request that sent forward stuck to the OCO ceiling 

that was negotiated last fall, even as we made different tradeoffs 

within the OCO level. And in part of the ESCM 4 request is some 

programs that we tried to shift into the base to get it out of OCO 

because we thought it was more of a base program to make room 

for other OCO-related priorities, such as the security efforts I referenced earlier. 

So a certain degree of certainty or planning agreement helps us, 

but we recognize it is part of a broader political dynamic, and that 

we have to be able to explain the tradeoffs of what happens if we 

have to work with less resources or address new challenges. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you for that. Now, a question about OCO 

for all of you, again kind of a broader question. You know, there 

is a legitimate use of an OCO account because there are true contingencies. There is also a degree to which OCO can be used just 

to kind of skate around budget caps. 

I think what we have done in the two two-year deals that we 

have done, the Murray-Ryan deal in December 2013 and the deal 

we got in October of 2015, is basically not only have we done twoyear budgets, but we have decided we will treat the budget caps 

as a discipline, but not a straitjacket, as a starting point and a default, but not just an ironclad and impermeable straitjacket. And 

so, we have adjusted off the budget caps in both the first two-year 

deal and the second one. 

Share a little bit about from each of your perspective as we are 

thinking about our budget and appropriations work, the way we 

ought to look at OCO. Obviously it is more predictable if it is in 

the base. You know, what is a base expenditure? What is an OCO 

expenditure? I mean, you kind of hinted at it, the idea is do we 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

21 

think it is going to be regular and continuing versus truly episodic. 

But if of your agencies would offer us advice as we are grappling 

with this OCO question, that could be helpful. 

Mr. SASTRY. Thank you, Mr. Senator. I think what the chairman 

said earlier when he asked the question is it too simplistic, I think 

that is a part of the answer really. As we look into the out-years 

and as DOD, for example, clears space in certain areas, it is State 

Department and certainly on the assistance side that we are—that 

we are going in, and we often have programs that are going to last 

longer than a short-term surge. Building governance takes time. 

So the budget deal certainly provided welcome relief from sequestration. It provided some planning certainty. Both of those things 

were very good. But our reliance on OCO increased, and as the Secretary said last week, that is something we need to tackle going 

forward. 

And so, what we did really was we shifted a lot of programs that 

we had traditionally funded through the base appropriation that do 

have a little bit of a longer term look to them, and we funded them 

through OCO because that is the tool that we had. 

So going forward, we certainly have this challenge of how do we 

respond in many more parts of the world than we were responding 

to in 2004, 2005, or 2006, and how do we maintain that because 

we do not see the pressures on the assistance side abating much 

at all in the short term. 

Of course we hope that will come down in the long term, but in 

the near future we just—we do not see that. And the real drivers 

have been, you know, the conflicts have driven humanitarian costs 

up, et cetera. 

Senator KAINE. Mr. Napoli. 

Mr. NAPOLI. I will not add too much more to what was said, but 

I think from our perspective at USAID, one of the things we look 

at is—over 90 percent of our international disaster assistance account is now in OCO. And while we can see a way in which that 

makes—that framing works in the short term, in the long term we 

know very well that part of what we do in the International Disaster Assistance account is also make investments in disaster readiness, working to make communities more resilient to future external shocks. 

So there is a little bit of conflict there that I think over the 

longer term will have to be resolved. 

Senator KAINE. I do not want OCO to end up being like the 

Willie Sutton line, ‘‘Why do you rob banks? That is where the 

money is.’’ We are not going to vary the budget caps, but if we 

could just put it in the OCO account, then everybody will be going 

there. So some rational understanding of what is an OCO expenditure and what is a base budget expenditure is something that 

members of this committee and the Budget Committee, too, are 

going to grapple with. 

I am going to save my questions about individual items for our 

next round for Senator Isakson’s sake. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you. Senator Isakson? 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Senator Perdue. Let me ask—Mr. 

Pitkin, help me here. Your first page of your printed testimony, you 

said the President’s budget is $50.1 billion, $35.2 of which is endurFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

22 

ing. I think that is the wording. Then, Mr. Sastry, your first line 

says the he Fiscal Year 2017 budget is $50.1 billion, which is the 

same number. Then it says $34 billion of which is foreign assistance. Is ‘‘foreign assistance’’ and ‘‘enduring’’ the same thing? 

Mr. SASTRY. No, Mr. Senator. On each—of the $50.1 billion, $34 

billion is foreign assistance. That is split between our base piece 

and our OCO piece. So our base piece is approximately $25 billion, 

and our OCO piece is about $9 billion. 

Senator ISAKSON. So $25 billion is foreign assistance? 

Mr. SASTRY. $34 billion is the total. 

Senator ISAKSON. Out of two separate accounts? 

Mr. SASTRY. Correct. 

Senator ISAKSON. How much of that goes to Israel? 

Mr. SASTRY. $3.1 billion. 

Senator ISAKSON. Okay. So about 10 percent of all foreign assistance goes to Israel. 

Mr. SASTRY. Correct. 

Senator ISAKSON. The point I want to make on that is I have 

been caught, as has every senator, with people who think, well, if 

you just repeal for the foreign assistance budget, you can balance 

the budget, and you never have any problems as a country, and our 

debt goes away. It is probably the best buy we have got in the entire budget for peace and security. And I think ‘‘enduring’’ is an intriguing and accurate word, but I think to know that 10 percent 

foreign assistance goes to Israel. 

And I always ask the question of my constituents who complain 

about foreign assistance, how much do you think it would cost us 

to build and maintain a military base in the Middle East? It would 

be a heck of a lot more than $3 billion a year, so it is a great return 

on the dollar. Tremendous return on the dollar. ‘‘Roman Napoli,’’ 

by the way, is a great name. You ought to have been at the Oscars 

the other night. [Laughter.] 

Senator ISAKSON. You would have won one. I thought I saw 

Roman Patoli there, but I guess I did not. Anyway, never mind. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator ISAKSON. In your testimony, you said the accounts—you 

said the President’s funding request for accounts from which 

USAID administers assistance is $22.7 billion. Is that out of the 

$50.1 billion total, or is that another pot? 

Mr. NAPOLI. No, sir, that is inclusive of the number, and it is inclusive of the $30 billion number that Mr. Sastry used. 

Senator ISAKSON. So foreign assistance, USAID, et cetera, et 

cetera, et cetera, all comes under the umbrella of $50.1 billion. 

Mr. NAPOLI. Yes, sir. 

Senator ISAKSON. Just out of different component accounts. Is 

that right? 

Mr. NAPOLI. Yes, sir, that is right. 

Senator ISAKSON. What about embassy security and embassy improvements around the world? Is that in this $50.1 billion as well? 

Mr. PITKIN. Yes, senator, it is, $6.1 billion in total. 

Senator ISAKSON. Is there any new embassy or replacement embassy we are building in this budget? 

Mr. PITKIN. Yes, we have funding in our Capital Security Cost 

Sharing Program to build four new embassy facilities, and we can 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

23 

get the details. But I believe they are in Guatemala City, Kenya, 

and two others, and I can get back to you on those, but, yes. We 

have four new embassies in this budget. 

[See Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Deputy 

Director Douglas Pitkin by Senator David Perdue, Questions 8 and 

9.] 

Senator ISAKSON. Given what happened in Benghazi and the 

tragedy, which all of us felt for Ambassador Stevens and the others 

who lost their lives, have we done a thorough job of reviewing 

country by country, embassy by embassy, our security and our contingency? 

Mr. PITKIN. Yes. Certainly, Senator, after Benghazi and the 

Benghazi Accountability Review Board, the Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security, as well as the Undersecretary for Management, the Deputy Secretary of State, led a very detailed review of our embassy 

security posture, particularly in several dozen of the facilities that 

were deemed the highest risk. And DS has a number of ways of 

measuring risk. It is more of an art than a science. But they looked 

at a number of factors, and they designated several dozen of our 

overseas posts as high-risk, high threat posts. 

And first off, they did create a special directorate within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security called the High Threat Directorate 

which focuses on these highest-risk posts. It created new programs. 

They hired new people. They put in place new controls to ensure 

that those posts were prioritized for resources and received extra 

attention in terms of having the right security capacity on the 

ground. 

We reprogrammed at that time about a billion dollars of savings 

that we had gleaned from Iraq and reprogrammed that to both facilities and personnel to basically bolster our security posture at 

those and other posts. And then we have sustained those investments as part of our ongoing budget request. 

And we are still in the process of standing up some increased 

marine security guard presences at, I believe, 34 total posts. In 

many cases we still have to work with the local governments, and 

get permissions, and find the right housing, but we have that funding both in our—part of our base budget to sustain those efforts. 

And I believe we have implemented all but I think—fully implemented all but two of the Benghazi ARB recommendations, and the 

last two, I believe, are really because of policy, local host-nation 

issues, and not because of funding. 

Senator ISAKSON. Once you get outside the high premium appointments like ambassador to France, and Australia, and a few 

places like that, the rank and file diplomat is on the front line of 

the United States of America, are in embassies around the world 

that people have never heard of. And they risk their lives to do so, 

or they put their life certainly at risk. 

And I think it is very important that we make sure they know 

that we care about their security, that we are planning every day 

to see to it every person deployed overseas on behalf of the United 

States of America is as secure as they possibly can be and we can 

make them. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

24 

I am a big believer in soft power. It works best when your heavy 

power is already working and enhanced. But soft power only works 

if you have the type of volunteers and the type of people willing 

to commit their life to represent the United States of America. So 

I—there is no dollar we should spare whatsoever in securing the 

security of our embassies around the world and the people we recruit for them, and I just wanted to put that in the record because 

I think it is critical for what you do. 

Mr. PITKIN. Thank you, Senator. 

And just to complete the thought on the four facilities that we 

are requesting in 2017: Guatemala City; New Delhi, India; Kampala, Uganda; and Nairobi, Kenya. And we also have other programs that provide compound security upgrades and other safety 

upgrades to facilities that are not in the near-term schedule for a 

new compound. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, I have been to two of the four, and they 

are good choices. 

Mr. PITKIN. Thank you, sir. 

Senator ISAKSON. One last thing, I guess, while I have got 50 seconds. On Zika, do you all have any input on addressing Zika? 

Mr. PITKIN. Yes, we did have input on the request for Zika, although most of that funding was on the foreign assistance and AID 

side. 

Senator ISAKSON. And I think the budget was completed before 

Zika became an issue, was it not? 

Mr. NAPOLI. I think CDC and others have been tracking Zika for 

some time. The disease is much older, although it had not become 

as acute as it is now. But we have been trying to work as fast as 

possible to get where we have gotten. 

Senator ISAKSON. One last thing, Mr. Chairman. Let me put a 

bug in your ear about Zika. In Kansas, in Georgia, in California, 

and in New York—I think those are the right four States—private 

hospitals and facilities entered the Ebola battle and caused us to 

be able to cure some people with Ebola and quarantine them with 

Ebola, and they spent a lot of their money. 

And I think the reimbursement still has not come in some of 

those cases from Ebola, and there are a lot of people talking about 

funding Zika out of the leftover money from Ebola. We have got to 

make sure that it is left over after we have paid every obligation 

we have to those hospitals that volunteered their time and their 

services in the Ebola outbreak. 

Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you. 

Let us move over to Europe for a minute. I had a chance a couple 

of weeks ago to go to Serbia and actually met the president of Macedonia and a few other leaders over there of other countries, talking about the refugee pipeline from Greece all the way up into Austria, Germany, Norway, and Sweden. 

And talked to several families who had been on the road for 35 

days. I have to report they seemed to be well fed, clean. They were 

being taken care of. Nobody was on the road walking. These people 

were on the train and bus. 

But there is an ongoing tragedy over there that is not complete 

at all. I mean, this thing is really in its early stages, in my humble 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

25 

estimate. But I think one of the questions, June 2015, the U.N. 

High Commissioner for Refugees reported that worldwide nearly 60 

million people have been displaced. You know, 11 million in Syria 

alone is one estimate I have seen. 

Despite these highs, the total U.S. humanitarian assistance re- quest of $6.2 billion, I think that is 20 percent less than 2016. And 

further, the amount in the Migration and Refugee Assistance Account in this year’s request decreased by about $250 million, $260 

million. 

What accounts for those decreases in the time when you hear 

and see this growing demand for assistance with migrants and refugees? Mr. Sastry? 

Mr. SASTRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

So, first, you are right. The situation around the world, especially 

with Syria, is something that has certainly seized everyone’s attention, and there is quite a few requirements being driven from— 

from that crisis. 

Our 2016 appropriation gave us $7.6 billion in humanitarian assistance. We thank Congress for the support. It was a nearly 25 

percent increase from what we had in 2015. 

So when we were building the 2017 budget, what we really did 

was look at what our needs were across 2 years, across 2016 and 

2017, and to see what we could—what was the right amount that 

would be able to meet the needs while also making sure we balance 

some of our development funding at the same time because we 

want to ensure that we are preventing crises in other places of the 

world as well. 

So if you look at it across 2 years, it is nearly $14 billion in hu- manitarian over 2 years. So that is $7 billion a year. That is still 

a very strong footprint for humanitarian assistance. 

And the other priority we had going forward, and the Secretary 

mentioned this at the conference in London a couple weeks ago, is 

as the U.S. continues to be the number-one donor for humanitarian 

assistance, the other issue that we need to tackle is bringing other 

donors to the table. 

So I think it was a combination of making sure that we have a 

strong humanitarian funding level over the 2-year period, but also 

making sure that we are engaging other countries to come to the 

table. 

Senator PERDUE. I noticed Senator Markey has arrived. But before I move to him, there is a follow-up question. 

Mr. SASTRY. Sure. 

Senator PERDUE. Is State Department having any conversations 

specifically with any of the Arab countries that are not now participating in this humanitarian aid? 

Mr. SASTRY. So I will take that question back. There have been 

discussions, but I do not have the details and will get back to you. 

Senator PERDUE. Well, I am happy to table that until next week. 

Would you let Under Secretary Higginbottom see if she wants to 

respond for the record? 

Mr. SASTRY. Sure. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you. 

Senator Markey, if you are ready, I will yield to you if you are 

ready? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

26 

Thank you. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having this very, very important hearing. 

I would like to go to Ethiopia, if I could, talk about El Nino, talk 

about this historic impact it is having in Ethiopia. The impact it 

is having that could lead to malnutrition for millions of kids in 

Ethiopia, and what we are doing or what can we do to help. 

This is clearly an exacerbated form of the climate change impacts 

that we are seeing, and that part of the world is particularly vulnerable. So could you talk a little bit about that? 

Mr. SASTRY. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Senator. 

And I actually was recently in Ethiopia a few months ago and 

was able to see some of the preparations as they were bracing for 

El Nino. 

Our total request in this budget is $513 million for Ethiopia, and 

that includes a lot of our work in the resilience of communities that 

are susceptible to the shocks that you see when there is a drought 

in the drylands. 

That also includes a lot of our work with them on governance, 

on health, and on some of the healthcare—some of the health infrastructure that we help them with. 

Senator MARKEY. So how are you coordinating, you know, Feed 

the Future in your work on this issue? Can you talk about that? 

Mr. NAPOLI. We are right now actively looking at what kind of 

posture we need to have on the response side, and so we have put 

additional food resources and food aid into Ethiopia since this crisis 

has become more acute. I want to make sure that we say that first. 

Concurrent to that, though, we see the ability for agriculture to 

make a difference. In a country like Ethiopia, it is a lot about land 

management, water management, teaching people how to use crops 

that are drought resistant and really helping them. And I think 

that we see a lot of that. 

You know, Ethiopia is one of the countries that was part of the 

African Food Alliance, and so those are the kinds of things where 

they have a direction they want to go. We want to help them get 

there. But right now, we are really focused on the acute needs that 

are so evident. 

Senator MARKEY. Okay. So how is AID incorporating climate 

change into the developmental risk assessment, which you are 

making as you look at the different regions of the world? 

Mr. NAPOLI. So I think there is a policy issue at play, and then 

there is a pragmatic issue. So there is an executive order that the 

President signed, which requires USAID and other Federal agencies to include climate considerations in all of their programming. 

USAID has taken that to heart, and so all of our strategies and all 

of our work and all of our projects now include a climate component, ensuring that we take those things into consideration so that 

we do not build schools in potential flood zones, so that we consider 

the availability of water on our agricultural projects. 

And I think that is step one in that space. 

Senator MARKEY. Okay. So why is that important in terms of 

using U.S. tax dollars wisely, that we have thought through the climate change impacts on these different regions? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

27 

Mr. NAPOLI. There is a project that I was recently briefed on 

what USAID is doing with NASA, where we are using satellite 

data to help watershed managers in Pakistan. And the idea is that 

when we have data about how much water should be flowing, when 

it should be flowing, looking at that data over the course of a year, 

multiple years, it helps us to understand how much can be diverted 

for agriculture. How much needs to remain to keep the aquaculture? Those are the kinds of questions we can begin to answer 

because we have done the right work, and we have the right technology to do it. 

Senator MARKEY. Yes, the problems in Sub-Saharan Africa were 

actually the first problems, first areas kind of identified as the 

problem area for climate change. This goes back to 1976, when it 

was actually on the first day I came to Congress, the story on the 

front page of the Washington Star, which was the other paper in 

town at the time, was on climate change and its impacts on SubSaharan Africa. 

The article talked about how it was going to intensify regional 

conflicts as they fought over limited resources, that the impacts on 

water, et cetera, would lead to gangs fighting over what was left 

over. And so all of that has now been borne out. 

And I would just like, if I could, then to move over to Power Africa for a second because two out of three people in Sub-Saharan Africa still do not have electricity, and you are making a request here 

for additional money for Power Africa. Can you talk a little bit 

about that and what progress we have made and what you hope 

to do perhaps over the next 5 years? 

Mr. NAPOLI. This request includes $291 million for Power Africa, 

and I think the ambitious goals that we have set around electrifying Africa reinforces the message that we think these are valuable things. 

We have made a tremendous amount of progress. We have already got 4,300 megawatts that have been brought to bear. That 

is very good for a project that is in its first few years. But what 

is most important to a lot of us at AID is the fact that we have 

brought $43 billion of private and public sector investment into the 

space. 

So in an area where USAID is contributing a small amount of 

funding, all that funding is being matched, doubled, tripled, and 

quadrupled with private sector funding that is really something 

that we think is very valuable for an effort that is so broad and 

such a big policy statement. 

Senator MARKEY. Yes. I went with the President to Africa last 

July, and in Ethiopia, we had a signing of an agreement. And so 

can you talk a little bit about the geothermal potential in Ethiopia 

and these other surrounding countries and what we are doing in 

order to telescope the timeframe it will take to extract those energy 

resources for the people of those countries? 

Mr. NAPOLI. Well, I want to thank you, and thank you for taking 

the time to make the visit. As a budget person, I think you have 

tapped my knowledge of geothermal energy. I am sorry. [Laughter.] 

Mr. NAPOLI. But I will bring that question back, and we would 

love to make sure we talk more about it with you and your team. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

28 

Senator MARKEY. By the way, I will say that the utility executives and regulators in those countries reminded me a lot of the 

same executives in America in terms of their ‘‘Do we really have 

to do this? Do we really have to move to geothermal? Do we really 

have to move to solar? Yes, it is sunny every day here. You know, 

maybe we could do that.’’ 

They had to show up at the ribbon cutting. They had to smile. 

But you could see they were doing it through gritted teeth. 

It is a challenge, but it is a good thing USAID is there. It is a 

good thing these other agencies are there because they have the 

credibility to help them to kind of almost double their electricity 

generation in just 2 or 3 years for the entire country, you know? 

It is just amazing, and it is working. And we thank you for your 

great work. 

Senator PERDUE. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And just going to hop through some issues now. I am real interested in this planned Central America investment. We would have 

reason that if we did it right to be hopeful because the Colombian 

example of failed narco-state to really progressing economy and democracy and security assistant around the world. I was with Colombian forces in the Sinai as part of the multinational force of observers, watching them do that. I mean, it has been a remarkable 

transition. 

So that should give us some hope that if we make the investments right in Central America, we could see a similar path if we 

are consistent with it. I hope we might have a hearing about this 

in the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee to kind of get into the 

programmatic side. But the key is how do you spend the money? 

Do you spend it right? So we just did $750 million in the appropriations bill, and this request is for $1 billion. I think $360 million of it is on the USAID 

side, and the remainder is through the State budget. 

But could you just talk a little bit about how you see us starting 

down this path? If we help those economies be stronger, we can 

slow the unaccompanied minors. If we help those economies be 

stronger, they can become, you know, valuable security partners. 

Talk a little bit about there is a lot of ways you can spend that 

money—infrastructure, education, economic development, security. 

How do you approach a task like that in terms of how the money 

should be spent? 

Mr. SASTRY. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Senator. 

And I will answer a little bit, and I will turn it over to Mr. 

Napoli, who can certainly speak on some of the AID equities. 

As you said, our request in the 2017 budget is $1 billion, of 

which $750 million is here in the State and AID budget. The other 

$250 million is with OPIC and DoD, et cetera. 

Senator KAINE. I see. Okay. 

Mr. SASTRY. The Central American strategy has three pillars, 

and the administration has set forth a path: one pillar being governance, one being prosperity, and one being security. On the security side, for example, there is a little over $300 million, largely 

working with the communities to increase rule of law, working 

with training of police, et cetera. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

29 

On the development side, we have obviously the three countries 

that we are targeting is El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. 

And each of those have a slightly different bent to how we are tackling the problems, depending on the issues with that country. 

Mr. NAPOLI. So I think from USAID’s perspective, we always 

think about what is the cause? Why are we here? What is the 

issue? And we assess that, and we begin to look at those underlying factors. 

For Honduras, clearly, it is economic opportunity. And in El Salvador and Guatemala, clearly, violence is also one of the drivers of 

migration. In Honduras we have really made significant investments in agriculture, and we have increased farmers’ incomes for 

the areas we have worked by 55 percent. So giving people an incentive to stay, generating those jobs and creating those opportunities. 

And in El Salvador something that is really interesting is when we 

get into some of these communities where violence is the most 

acute, USAID’s programming has a very strong effect, and it has— 

it is mutually reinforcing with what the central governments are 

trying to do. 

So in the 70-plus communities where we were promoting nonviolent programming, we actually saw 60-plus percent reductions 

in homicide. So we think that there are tremendous investments 

that we can make and that there is actually numbers to back up 

those investments. 

Senator KAINE. Talk about governance. That is the third pillar. 

We talked about security. We talked about prosperity. 

Mr. SASTRY. Sure. 

Senator KAINE. And then governance was the third pillar. 

Mr. SASTRY. Right. So in governance, I think one of the areas of 

focus is really the anti-corruption in a couple of the countries and 

how are we tackling—how are we helping those countries tackle 

the issue? So I know there have been, and as you said, if you have 

a WHA hearing, they can certainly get into the details of how they 

are exactly doing this. But we have nearly, I believe, a third of 

that—of our request is for that pillar. 

Senator KAINE. Jumping over to Russia, so $1 billion in the re- quest for the Americas, the northern triangle. There is a $4.3 billion request for countering Russian aggression, and I am assuming 

that is across, you know, the broad area of Europe, Eastern Europe. But talk a little bit about, again, programmatically on that, 

what are the pillars of that investment? That is a sizable investment. What are the pillars? What are the metrics that we would 

use? 

Mr. SASTRY. Sure. 

Senator KAINE. I guess we cannot affect, you know, the inside 

Russia dynamic, but we can affect the degree to which surrounding, neighboring countries are more resilient to that aggression. 

Mr. SASTRY. Sure. So our countering Russian aggression total is $951 million. 

Senator KAINE. Okay. 

Mr. SASTRY. The higher number you may be referencing includes 

the DoD European Reassurance Initiative potentially. But the 

State/AID portion is $951 million. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

30 

Senator KAINE. Okay. 

Mr. SASTRY. The big difference I think you will see from previous 

years and what we hope is we will see an improvement in the 

macro economic conditions in Ukraine is we do not have a loan 

guaranty in this request. We have done two. We are in the process 

of completing the third, and we are hoping that we will see a little 

bit of progress. 

But you know, we are working in the countering Russian space 

not just in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, but also in the Balkans, 

also in Central Asia, kind of that whole region. And our focus in 

that area runs the gamut. 

A lot having to do with training police and working with law enforcement, rule of law. There is also a lot of governance, especially 

energy security area, within Ukraine. It is a rather comprehensive 

approach in the area, but it is not just that. As you said, not just 

that focus on Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, but the broader EUR 

area. 

Senator KAINE. Let me ask about this, and I am surprised I have 

not asked this question before. I have been going to so many 

Armed Services hearings the last few years, where we have been 

talking about the pivot or the rebalance to Asia, as if it is purely 

a DoD pivot. 

Within State and USAID, have you guys made a similar kind of 

deflection in the direction to, you know, play a larger role in that 

theater? 

Mr. SASTRY. Yes, and thank you for the question. So our total in Fiscal Year 2017 is $824 million, which is almost 

a $100 million increase from the previous year. That sustains a 

strong maritime security presence, which is something that 2 or 3 

years ago was at a much lower level than what you are seeing now. 

And it responds to some of the events in that region. 

We also have funding to take advantage of some political transitions. For example, in Burma, there is some additional funding 

going in there, as well as a strong funding level by almost $300 

million in the health area. 

Mr. PITKIN. I would just like to add to that briefly. 

Senator KAINE. Please. 

Mr. PITKIN. I think it is important to note that part of the platform supporting all those programs is the funding for our regional 

bureaus. Particularly first for the EUR bureau, as well as the EAP 

bureau, we do have some very targeted increases for increased public diplomacy programming in Russia’s neighbors, about $1.5 million. 

Also targeted funding for the EAP regional bureau for about $1 

million, as well as some of the new embassies are opening up. So 

while the increase is not dramatic, one of the things we are trying 

to do in this budget is sustain and restore some of the funding that 

we, frankly, had to sort of trim or constrain over the last 2 years 

for the platform for the regional bureaus that are funded under the 

diplomatic State Department budget as well. 

Senator KAINE. Two areas where I think I have seen reductions 

in funding in this budget request that kind of surprised me, although maybe I am not reading the line items right. Under the 

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funding, we 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

31 

have traditionally had funding for Palestinian Authority security 

sector to work on security cooperation with Israel. 

And that has strong benefit for Israel. Israel has been supportive 

of it. If I read it right, the INCLE funding for the security initiative 

has been about $70 million a year, but the Fiscal Year 2017 request cut it in half to $35 million. Am I reading that right? And 

if that is the case, why? 

Mr. SASTRY. Yes. You are reading that correctly. That is not a 

cut to our activities in the program. It is the natural progression 

of that program. It was very resource intensive. There was a lot of 

training, a lot of infrastructure, and now we are ramping that 

down to the size that it should be. 

This is not a cut to the current level of effort. 

Senator KAINE. You are saying some of the spending in early 

years might have been one time, such as equipment that you do 

not have to buy again. 

Mr. SASTRY. Correct. And the intensive training early on for 

some of these policias. 

Senator KAINE. Right. You do not have to repeat the training 

again. I see. 

Mr. SASTRY. Yes. 

Senator KAINE. Okay. And then there is a second one—and this, 

Mr. Napoli, is probably for you—on humanitarian assistance. The 

omnibus we did included a significant increase for humanitarian 

assistance. But it looks like the Fiscal Year 2017 budget request 

proposes about a 20 percent cut in that program. 

And I wondered, again, do I read that right, and if that is so, 

why is that the case? 

Mr. NAPOLI. When we look at the International Disaster Assistance Account, which is our primary humanitarian account, we take 

a 2-year view. We look at the generous amount of funding that the 

Congress appropriated in Fiscal Year 2016, and we compare that 

and looked across FY 2016 and FY 2017. So FY 2017 was clearly 

impacted by the Fiscal Year 2016 levels. 

For USAID, what is important is we are going to continue to 

make commitments in places that we have significant humanitarian needs in, and we think we can do that in this budget. We 

will be responsive in Yemen. We will be responsive in Syria. 

So that does not propose any change in our posture. It is just 

really looking at the fiscal years, looking at the generous allocation 

that Congress provided and how we would balance that over 2 

years. 

Senator KAINE. Last question. Mr. Chair, I wanted to just ask— 

and this may be less budgetary than programmatic. And maybe I 

could direct it to Heather Higginbottom if it is less pure budget. 

But that is Zika and our personnel. 

So you have put out travel advisories about a whole series, probably 15, Latin American and Caribbean countries where you have, 

you know, warned Americans, especially if they might be vulnerable because they are pregnant or they could, you know, be in the 

kind of pregnancy window. You have warned people not to travel. 

What are we doing with our embassy personnel or USAID personnel, Federal employees generally. They could with the DEA; 

they could be with any agency serving in these countries. What are 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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we doing to try to make sure that we are protecting them as best 

we can? 

Mr. PITKIN. Our medical office, part of the Department of State, 

has issued guidance, a number of guidance circulars, for both Department of State and other agency personnel working in those embassies. And it contains a number of sort of the same type of guidance that we provide to American travelers, American visitors, and 

one of the things we are doing is essentially increasing the time in 

which people, particularly women who are pregnant, with their 

families can medevac, which is our term of art for when we basically have someone come home for an overseas post, particularly an 

overseas post with perhaps not the level of healthcare that you 

would get in the States. 

So we are increasing that now, letting people come home basically 6 months earlier than they normally would. Normally, I think 

the time to come home for is in the last few weeks of pregnancy, 

and now we are essentially saying that a pregnant woman or employee or family member can come home about 6 months sooner. 

And so part of our request in the supplemental is the increased 

costs that will accrue not just the Department of State, but also 

some of our interagency partners for that increased cost for coming 

back to the States sooner. 

Senator KAINE. Great. Thank you very much. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you, guys. I just have a few closing questions, and we will try to get you out of here momentarily. Thank 

you for your forbearance. 

The U.N. estimates there are about 13.5 million people in Syria 

who need help, and I know we are not the only ones providing that 

help. But how much aid are we providing to Syria? 

How do we get it through the restriction that Bashar al-Assad 

has in place through—how do we get it through our networks of 

volunteers? How do we defend against fraud? How are we assured 

that what we are giving is actually getting to the people that we 

are trying to help? 

Mr. NAPOLI. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. So our assistance total that we are requesting for Syria is $239 

million, and that does not include the humanitarian assistance that 

we will end up giving once we determine it. 

Senator PERDUE. Can I put that in perspective? What is the portion we give to Jordan right now? 

Mr. NAPOLI. One billion dollars. 

Senator PERDUE. Okay. And is all that $1 billion for Jordan refugees. 

Mr. NAPOLI. No, not necessarily. No, not necessarily. 

Senator PERDUE. Okay. 

Mr. NAPOLI. Actually, that $1 billion does not include any humanitarian funding. 

Senator PERDUE. I did not think so. Okay. So the $239 million 

is against zero for somebody like Jordan, for example, on the refugee issue? 

Mr. SASTRY. Right. So the $239 million in Syria is not related to 

the humanitarian. In addition to the $239 million, we do give 

money to Syria on humanitarian, but that traditionally we determine in the year of execution. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

33 

Senator PERDUE. Who are the recipients of the $239 million? I 

am sorry. 

Mr. SASTRY. The $239 million is largely given to support the 

armed opposition with nonlethal support. 

Senator PERDUE. Okay. 

Mr. SASTRY. So this is equipment, supplies, food, et cetera. 

Senator PERDUE. Is that part of the OCO? 

Mr. SASTRY. It is part of OCO. That is correct. 

Senator PERDUE. So in terms of humanitarian aid, we are not 

providing any aid into Syria directly today? 

Mr. SASTRY. We are. So we are projecting that we will have to spend about $1.7 billion in Syria in humanitarian aid, but that is 

an estimate for 2017, depending on the situation, there obviously 

could be a lot that changes between now and then. In addition to that $1.7 billion, we are spending $239 million in 

the country to aid the armed opposition with nonlethal equipment 

and supplies. 

Senator PERDUE. I understand that, but I am really trying to get 

at are we trying to get money through that very confused battle 

space to these 13.5 million that we are trying to help? And to put 

that in perspective, does that come out of the bilateral aid bucket 

in terms of the budget? 

Mr. SASTRY. No. 

Senator PERDUE. Where does that $1.7 billion come from? 

Mr. SASTRY. It comes from the two main humanitarian accounts, 

which is the Migration and Refugee Assistance and the International Disaster Assistance. 

Senator PERDUE. Okay. What I am trying to determine is, of the $1.7 billion, how big is that relative to the $22.5 billion for bilateral 

aid or the multilateral assistance, which is only $2.6 billion. I’m 

trying to put the $1.7 billion in perspective. We heard $3 billion for 

Israel earlier. 

Mr. SASTRY. Right. So I think the $3 billion for Israel obviously 

does not include any humanitarian aid. 

Senator PERDUE. Right. 

Mr. SASTRY. If you want to compare—— 

Senator PERDUE. One way to look at it is that it is part of the $34 billion foreign assistance? 

Mr. SASTRY. Yes. Yes. Yes. 

Senator PERDUE. Okay. All right. That is all I need. 

Mr. SASTRY. Yes. 

Senator PERDUE. All right. But what are we putting in place to 

make sure that money gets through to the people that really need 

it? 

Mr. SASTRY. I do not know if you want to take that? 

Mr. NAPOLI. I would be happy to say a few words about that. 

Thank you, Senator, for asking. Making sure that people get the 

aid that we are trying to provide is critical to how we think about 

this, that they are the beneficiaries. The end game is to provide 

that assistance to them. So we are doing a number of different 

things, and I know it sounds kind of bureaucratic, but it is really 

overlaying a couple of different approaches. It is making sure that, 

before assistance leaves Turkey or before it leaves Jordan we have 

inspected, that we have made sure the food is what it says it is. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

34 

We have third-party monitors that are actually in country that are 

using technology, cell phones, photographs, other kinds of things to 

make sure did the truck arrive? Did people receive the assistance? 

Senator PERDUE. But in country, is it volunteers that are delivering that assistance? 

Mr. NAPOLI. We have a number of organizations that we work 

with that, yes, they are. 

Senator PERDUE. And so what I am trying to get at is what type 

of oversight structure do we have with them to assure that this is 

not being absconded to, you know, government forces or whatever 

that we would not want this aid getting to? 

Mr. SASTRY. So I think that is something we can certainly bring 

back and talk to you about. 

Senator PERDUE. Would you? 

Mr. SASTRY. Yes. 

Senator PERDUE. Okay. Just a little more specificity. 

Mr. SASTRY. Yes. 

Senator PERDUE. Talk to me just a little bit about the administrative overhead. One of the things, being involved in various philanthropies during my career, you always look at the overhead, 

right, and how much money is really being spent. If I look at this 

right, of the $34 billion in foreign assistance, the USAID administration costs are $1.7 billion, round numbers. 

Is that the only overhead that we have in the State Department, 

besides the State operations-related agencies group there? That 

was some $17 billion. But I am just looking at foreign assistance. 

Is that the administrative overhead for foreign assistance, the $1.7 

billion? 

Mr. SASTRY. So our foreign assistance is both State and USAID, 

have both State and USAID components. So when we talk about 

our people and platforms that are required, that is the overhead 

that you talk about, we talk about both on the diplomatic engagement side, that Mr. Pitkin talked about, and the USAID administrative overhead that you just mentioned. 

So it is a combination of the two that is required for us to deliver 

our assistance. 

Senator PERDUE. Okay. And then talk to me about, last question 

I have is, embassy security. One of the responsibilities of this job 

is traveling out to meet our men and women in uniform and then 

people on State assignments and so forth, and it really is a great 

pleasure to meet these people dedicated their lives to serving our 

country and making lives better for people around the world. 

And their security is paramount, as Senator Isakson said, Senator Kaine has said. My question is I know that we have got new 

embassies around. I was in the Singapore embassy. I know we got 

a new one in London coming up. There is one under construction 

in Islamabad, for example. 

Can you talk through the expense of these after the Benghazi 

Review Board? And what are we looking at? Are these billion-dollar, you know, embassies, as we go forward? And I also saw some 

numbers. I am not prepared today to get into it, but we saw some 

overrun numbers that were fairly shocking on a few of these. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

35 

So can you talk, maybe Mr. Pitkin, if you are the one to address 

that, and we can bring this up next week as well, but I thought 

we could get into that today a little bit, if you do not mind? 

Mr. PITKIN. Absolutely, Senator. Well, again, it is a twofold issue. 

One is that, to a certain extent, costs are increasing. The Capital 

Security Cost Sharing Program was initially authorized I believe 

about 10 years ago at about $1.4 billion and certainly something 

that we have seen was that the average cost, just based on the cost 

of construction, the dollar going up and down overseas, inflation, 

and particularly in developing economies, costs go up faster than 

here in the States, that it basically was costing more to deliver the 

same essentially embassy platform. 

Senator PERDUE. Could you provide for us a record, just some of 

the recent construction projects, what their forecast costs were and 

then what the ending costs might have actually been? We do not 

have to do it today, but I think for the record, that would be instructive. 

Mr. PITKIN. Right. We can absolutely do that. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you. 

Mr. PITKIN. So in addition to the costs going up, we also have 

to make sure that they are the safest and secure facilities as possible. And so many cases, we are putting in the latest technology, 

the latest high-volume air conditioning and air flow to provide 

chemical/biological warfare protection agents. So we are basically 

having to make sure that these facilities can face and protect 

against a range of threats, whether it is forced entry, ballistic 

threats, other types of kinetic threats. 

And as we have seen, we cannot just assume that those threats 

are only limited to the what we would call the high-threat posts or 

posts like Iraq and Afghanistan. Now certainly embassies and facilities there need extra protection, perhaps overhead cover. If you 

have been to some of those posts, you have seen the extra steps 

that we have to take there. 

Senator PERDUE. The buffer zones are much larger. 

Mr. PITKIN. The buffer zones, yes. 

Senator PERDUE. At the London office, that was the reason that 

was given as to why that had to be relocated. 

Mr. PITKIN. Right. The setbacks. And some of those requirements 

were emphasized in the Benghazi ARB report, and so many times 

that constrains the number of places that we can find to negotiate 

with the local government to put those facilities in place. 

So it is something we track. OBO, the Office of Overseas Building Operations bureau does its best to maintain within certainly 

the budget amount for these various embassies. We occasionally do 

have to come before the committees and make sure that we realign 

some money if we have an overrun. But usually those are offset by 

savings that have been identified in other embassies. 

So you are right. Overruns sometimes do occur, but we have 

managed to keep the overall program within the topline level set 

by Congress. 

I actually do want to correct something I said earlier. We actually do have three outstanding ARB recommendations that we are 

following up on. Two are on the public record, and one can be dealt 

with in a separate session. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

36 

Senator PERDUE. How much prior year embassy construction 

budget is still unallocated? 

Mr. PITKIN. All of their funds have been allocated. They do have a significant unobligated balance, I believe over $4 billion. It is 

part of what we do report to the Congress. But that is because 

these projects can take up to 5 years or longer to complete. 

Senator PERDUE. So they are already committed. They just have 

not been spent? 

Mr. PITKIN. Right. The projects have been committed, and we essentially have the money there so as the construction proceeds, we 

fit it out, the money has been allocated and is available. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Mr. Pitkin, on the ARB, the unaddressed three, 

I think I will ask the classified question as a question for the 

record that can obviously be submitted back classified. But what 

are the two that are unaddressed? And I think you indicated that 

they were maybe policy, not funding. But if there are policies that 

we ought to help with, you know, I would not want to leave this 

opportunity without it. 

Mr. PITKIN. One was Number 7, which dealt with collocation, 

which is a theme of actually some of the previous embassy security 

acts, which was to emphasize the need to collocate, to the greatest 

extent practicable and possible, all chief of mission or U.S. personnel on these secure facilities. 

And in many cases, either because of the number and the size 

of the U.S. Government presence, that is not always feasible, and 

there are various type of waivers or arrangements that DS and the 

Department has to reach with other agencies on collocation. 

And so that is an area where we are still working through exactly how the process of collocation works. 

Senator KAINE. And so I am sure there is a lot of collocation and 

as you are building new facilities, you do it whenever you can. But 

that is just going to take some time to get that done? 

Mr. PITKIN. Yes, Senator. That does drive some of the cost. In 

many cases, we are replacing distributed multiple buildings, multiple locations, some leased, some owned, and trying to bring it 

onto one centralized compound with a setback and all the security 

enhancements. 

The other is camera upgrades. One of the recommendations, 

Number 20, I believe, was on installing the latest generation of 

cameras to provide 24–7 coverage. In many cases, we are still, in 

some cases, still working through some issues of visas and getting 

access to the specific sites. 

And that is really an issue of dealing with the host government 

of getting the technical experts there onsite to do the installation, 

and these, of course, have to be cleared American contractors. And 

so there are some facilities where we are still working through the 

issues with the local government. 

Senator KAINE. So that is not something where, you know, we 

need to provide policy alteration in order to enable it, but this is 

just a matter of something that is going to take a while to get fully 

implemented? 

Mr. PITKIN. Yes, sir. That is right. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

37 

Senator KAINE. And I will ask the classified question for the 

record. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

[The question referred to and the Department of State’s response 

follow:] 

Question. During his testimony, Douglas Pitkin stated that three recommendations from the Accountability Review Board report have not yet been implemented— 

recommendations Number 7 and Number 20, regarding the collocation—to the extent possible—of overseas government facilities and upgrading security cameras, respectively. However, he was unable to discuss the third recommendation at the 

hearing because it is classified. Please provide a classified response to detail this 

outstanding recommendation and explain in detail why it has not yet been implemented. 

Answer. Due to the classification of this subject matter, the Department is submitting a response to the committee under separate cover. 

Senator PERDUE. I do have one last question. Going back to 

Haiti, I did not get to follow up on that. 

The GAO issued a report in 2015 on part of what we spent, about 

$1.7 billion, and it came with two observations, that they found a 

lack of planning for sustainability of non-infrastructure projects, 

non-infrastructure. And then also a lack of USAID-wide guidance 

on how missions should plan for the sustainability for their infrastructure projects. 

So two observations. My question is, is what has USAID done to 

follow up on that report and use Haiti as a learning experience for 

future investments like that? 

Mr. NAPOLI. I am not as familiar with the exact way that we responded to the GAO. We can bring that back to you, but thank you 

for asking. 

[See Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Roman 

Napoli by Senator David Perdue, Question 2.] 

Senator PERDUE. No, that is fine. 

Mr. NAPOLI. I think in terms of lessons learned, there are two 

things that really stand out to me. There were a number of investments. The port is one of the issues. I mean, we were really trying 

to support economic recovery in Haiti after the earthquake, and 

you know, we had an option of building a new port in the northern 

part of the country or refurbishing the existing port. 

And we were able to use cost-benefit analysis, use market research, use a number of tools at our disposal, and we were able to 

pick an option that actually was more cost effective. So before the 

first taxpayer dollar went into that project, we knew we had kind 

of made the best choice with the information we had. 

Something else that I would allude to is our ability to bring in 

the diaspora, and how valuable they can be. The Haitian community is so strong and had such a strong response to the events. And 

that is something we really want to keep building on, and that is 

something we have learned. 

When we had the earthquake in Nepal and other places, we continue to learn. It is a lesson that is refreshed to us all the time, 

where we remember and those communities bond together in a 

time and a place around a certain kind of crisis. And we can work 

with them to leverage a lot of that and really do something very 

special in the aftermath. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

38 

Senator PERDUE. Well, thank you all. We obviously want to be 

good stewards of taxpayer money, and that is why we had this 

hearing. I appreciate your preparation and your testimony today. 

But I also want to talk to you and thank you for your career of 

service. I mean, we can never do this enough. The most humbling 

thing I have had is to meet men and women in uniform. Senator 

Kaine has a son that is in Africa now, I believe? 

Senator KAINE. Back home now. 

Senator PERDUE. Back home now, but has been serving over 

there. And then you see people in the State Department that every 

2 years, they are moving their family and so forth, putting themselves in harm’s way. And I just want this for the record to go back 

that this is a nonpartisan observation, but how much we appreciate 

that. 

We are trying to make sure they are safe. We are trying to make 

sure this is a career they can continue to build, and they are going 

to continue to get support from the United States Senate. 

So thank you guys for being here. We really appreciate your testimony. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:59 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

Additional Material Submitted for the Record 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED

TO DOUGLAS PITKIN BY SENATOR DAVID PERDUE

Questions 1 and 2. Based on our discussion, I would like to ask a few more questions on recent broader trends in the State Department’s budget. Looking at your 

overall budget request for the International Affairs budget for FY 17, it represents 

a 25 percent increase since FY 2008 in constant dollars. 

What accounts for this increase in the budget since FY 2008? What accounts 

caused this increase? What were your biggest driver of increased spending? 

Overall, this budget request appears to have some shifting priorities since FY 16. 

While the overall request has gone down by about one percent, the request for diplomatic engagement has gone up 4 percent. However, the overall the overall foreign 

assistance request has decreased by 3 percent. 

Is that the right direction we should be going in? How do you account for spending more here in Washington, D.C. and less on foreign assistance? 

Answer. Increases in spending by the Department of State and USAID since 2008 

are primarily due to a greater investments in humanitarian aid and the rising costs 

of maintaining the safety of our employees stationed overseas. 

The Department and USAID have expanded foreign assistance programs in recent 

years to address increasing global challenges, including addressing conflict and insecurity in Syria, Iraq, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and elsewhere. As part of this effort, humanitarian assistance 

needs have greatly increased, and we have responded robustly. In recent years, we 

have also expanded resources to address global health needs, the underlying causes 

of the migration crisis in Central America and to invest in Asia, as part of the administration’s Asia Rebalance effort. 

The increase in the Diplomatic Engagement portion of the Department of State 

budget from FY 2008 to the FY 2017 request is largely attributable to an increase 

in funding for security projects over this timeframe. Authority for non-security 

spending has remained essentially flat, while security related spending has more 

than doubled. 

There are three major factors which have contributed to the increase in security 

related authority: 

• The Department of State’s priority on maintaining a presence in conflict areas 

has required funding to protect our persons and assets in those areas. The DeFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

39 

partment sees great value in having Americans observing at the ground level 

in conflict areas worldwide. This is true of our missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and Pakistan. It is also true of missions that the United States maintained in 

conflict areas such as Libya and Yemen. America needs a diplomatic presence 

in conflict areas to counter terrorism, sectarian violence, and the spread of conflicts beyond borders. 

• The military draw-down in Iraq and Afghanistan has required that security of 

American persons and assets be provided by State resources. As the military 

presence has been reduced in these two vital missions, the Department of State 

has taken on the role of maintaining a secure environment from which United 

States government personnel can operate. The security situation in these two 

countries is not only very different now than it was in 2008, but the number 

of military personnel is far smaller than in 2008. 

• Internal reorganizations have moved security related spending to a handful of 

accounts, increasing these security accounts and reducing the administrative accounts from which the funds were moved. In FY 2008 much of the funding for 

Diplomatic Security was in the Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) ongoing operations account. Over time this funding has been moved to the Worldwide Security Protection (WSP) account. Similarly, security related funds in the 

Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) account have moved 

into the Worldwide Security Upgrades (WSU) account. 

The table below groups Diplomatic Engagement budget authority into four categories: 

FOUR CATEGORIES OF DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT BUDGET AUTHORITY 

D&CP Ongoing Operations The non-security portions of the D&CP (19-0113) account 

Other Diplomatic Engagement All other non-fee, non-security appropriated accounts except International Organizations (IO) 

Security Programs WSP, WSU, Protection of Foreign Missions and Officials 

International Organizations Contributions to International Organizations (CIO), Contributions to International 

Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) 

COMPARISON OF APPROPRIATED BUDGET AUTHORITY FOR DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT 

FY 2008 Actual Versus FY 2017 Request (Non-Adjusted Dollars in Millions) 

FY 2008 

Actual 

FY 2017 

Request 

percent 

Change 

(NonAdjusted) 

percent 

Change 

(Constant 

Dollars)1

Diplomatic and Consular Programs ...................................... 5,639 4,957 –12 –21

Other Non-Security Diplomatic Engagement ......................... 1,439 1,852 29 16 

Security Related Programs .................................................... 1,949 5,332 174 146 

Worldwide Security Protection ........................................... 1,179 3,715 215 183 

Worldwide Security Upgrades ............................................ 747 1,587 112 91 

Protection of Foreign Missions and Officials .................... 23 30 30 17 

International Organizations .................................................... 3,473 3,932 13 2 

Contributions to International Organizations .................... 1,409 1,387 –2 –12

Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities .... 2,064 2,545 23 11 

Total Administration of Foreign Affairs ........................ 12,500 16,073 29 15 

1 Dollars adjusted using CPI-U BLS full year average for CY 2008 and OMB President’s Budget FY 2017 Assumptions for 

FY 2017. 

Question 3. The growing dependence on OCO to fund America’s development and 

diplomacy programs means that a broad range of programs and accounts that are 

designed to meet long-term commitments, and historically were funded in the base 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

40 

budget, now receive a significant share of their funding through a temporary funding mechanism. Given the strain on discretionary resources, this flexibility is important in the short-term but has led to a significant shift in funding from base to OCO 

for certain programs. For example, nearly 100 percent of U.S. assistance to Jordan 

is funded through the OCO account in this year’s budget request. In another example, the line item for ‘‘Contributions for International Peacekeeping’’ went from 

being fully base-budget funded in FY 2015 to now 66 percent of the amount has 

been shifted to OCO in FY 2017. 

• Could you expand on the administration’s thinking behind these major shifts 

in funding for long-term programs specifically? 

Answer. The Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) portion of the FY 2017 Re- quest for the Department of State and USAID is $14.9 billion, consistent with the 

Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015. The Department is also concerned about the shift 

in balance between base and OCO funding, particularly the substantial increase in 

OCO funds as compared to base. The Department looks forward to working with 

Congress to restoring enduring funding levels as we move toward the FY 2018 budget. The President’s Budget actually anticipates this by planning for the restoration 

of $8.7 billion to the International Affairs base budget in FY 2018. 

Question 4. The world is facing unprecedented humanitarian crises—conflict and 

disaster have displaced millions of people. In June 2015, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that worldwide, nearly 60 million persons 

were forcibly displaced—the highest number on record. Despite these record highs, 

the total U.S. humanitarian assistance request is $6.156 billion—that’s 20 percent 

less than FY 2016. Further, the amount in the Migration and Refugee Assistance 

account in this year’s request decreased by $267 million. 

• What accounts for this significant decrease? Particularly when the causes of 

this mass migration have yet to be solved? 

Answer. Humanitarian assistance remains a top priority for the administration. 

The United States continues to be the largest bilateral contributor of humanitarian 

assistance funding. The FY 2017 Request includes $6.2 billion in humanitarian assistance, which is over $500 million above the FY 2016 Request of $5.7 billion. 

In concert with the significant resources provided by Congress in FY 2016, the 

funding included in the FY 2017 Request will help to meet humanitarian assistance 

needs globally over the next two years. 

Question 5. State Department officials have also suggested that the proposed 

funding reduction assumes an increased share of the humanitarian assistance burden will be taken on by other donors. 

• Is responding to humanitarian needs brought on by political crisis, such as in 

Syria and Iraq, different from those brought on by a natural disaster, such as 

the earthquake in Nepal or typhoon in Micronesia? 

• Does the cause of the suffering come into play when the United States 

prioritizes recipients of humanitarian assistance? 

• How do you respond to critics who argue that humanitarian assistance may actually prolong political crisis? 

Answer. While there are some similarities in the response to natural disasters 

and complex emergencies—including addressing immediate humanitarian needs 

such as access to temporary shelter, food, clean water and sanitation—there are important differences in response. In a nation that generously welcomed international 

assistance to respond to a natural disaster, such as the Government of Nepal after 

the 2015 earthquake, the politics of humanitarian aid are starkly different from a 

case like Syria, where the government is a party to ongoing conflict that is displacing large numbers of people and is the primary cause of growing humanitarian 

needs. 

Despite differences in response, the United States prioritizes humanitarian assistance based on need, whether that need arises from a man-made or natural disaster. 

While natural disasters often lead to quick responses, complex disasters caused by 

conflict may continue for years. Long-term, unceasing violence or oppression may 

mean that uprooted people aren’t able to go home. For example, some 45 percent 

of refugees today have been displaced for five years or more. A child born in a refugee camp at the start of a crisis will often spend his or her entire childhood away 

from home. 

In addition to the United States, other traditional humanitarian donors include 

Western European governments, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and, more 

recently, the Republic of Korea. At critical junctures in the past few years, the Saudi 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates also have given hundreds of millions 

of dollars to help cope with the emergencies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. We are 

working to expand cooperation with India in this area and to encourage China to 

become more engaged on humanitarian issues. 

Our efforts to increase engagement on humanitarian issues include diplomacy in 

addition to assistance programs. The United States is a leader in diplomatic efforts 

to resolve the conflicts at the root of humanitarian suffering, and we pursue political 

solutions both bilaterally and multilaterally. Humanitarian assistance does not prolong conflict, although it can sometimes distract leaders from focusing on political 

engagement. 

Humanitarian programs save lives, reduce suffering, and work towards durable 

solutions for those displaced by conflict and natural disaster. U.S. humanitarian assistance strives to advance America’s humanitarian values, maximizing diplomatic 

and programmatic efforts to provide effective protection and assistance worldwide. 

The FY 2017 humanitarian assistance budget request seeks to balance rising humanitarian requirements and a difficult budget reality in order to meet basic needs 

and sustain ongoing programs. 

Question 6. How does the current allocation of foreign assistance, both regionally 

and by sector, reflect larger U.S. foreign policy priorities? 

• How could aid, as a tool for foreign policy, be allocated to more effectively address strategic priorities? 

• How will you manage foreign assistance programs differently, if at all, in the 

absence of congressional directives? 

Answer. The President’s FY 2017 Request for the Department of State and 

USAID includes $34.0 billion for foreign assistance programs. This request supports 

key national security, foreign policy, and development mission objectives. Regionally, the request includes $4.0 billion to counter Da’esh, respond to the crisis in 

Syria, and support humanitarian needs in the region. It requests $750.6 million to 

bolster the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America and $873 million to 

support economic development and security efforts as part of the Asia Rebalance effort. It also requests $7.1 billion to support our goals in Africa, including advancing 

democracy, health, education, economic growth and security throughout the region. 

As part of these regional efforts, the Department of State and USAID are also requesting funds to support important investments in critical sectors across the globe. 

The request includes $2.7 billion for Democracy, Human Rights and Governance 

programming, one of the core strategic goals of this administration. It also includes 

$983.9 million to support the Global Climate Change Initiative and $561.8 million 

for basic education. These are just examples of the important cross-cutting programs 

requested as part of the FY 2017 Request. All of these investments, plus many others, are critical to ensuring the success of our broader foreign policy and development goals. 

The Department of State and USAID always work to ensure the funds are allocated to address strategic priorities. The development of the President’s annual 

budget request for the Department of State and USAID begins at embassies and 

USAID missions around the world. These requests are based on country-specific priorities and strategies and are organized by mission objectives when they are submitted to the Department of State and USAID in Washington, DC. Department and 

USAID leadership then review the submissions from the embassies and missions 

overseas, and make tough decisions to ensure the request supports the most critical 

regional and global strategic priorities. In coordination with the Office of Management and Budget this results in a final budget request that advances the U.S. government’s most important foreign policy, national security, and development objectives. The President’s request reflects these priorities when it is submitted to Congress each year. 

Once an appropriation bill is passed, the allocation of funds must abide by funding directives included in the bill as well as the Statement of Managers, as required. 

Within these guidelines, the Department and USAID work to ensure the best allocation of resources in support of strategic foreign policy priorities. 

The Department of State and USAID have many shared priorities with Congress. 

While many congressional funding directives support these shared goals, including 

advancing democracy or education across the globe, we must be able to respond to 

changing circumstances and adapt as needed. Often times the world looks different 

from the time we submit our request until the time we receive our final appropriation. We need to remain nimble. 

In the absence of congressional directives, we would allocate funding according to 

the President’s request, which sustains projects, programs, and activities supported 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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by Congress, taking into account changing circumstances, prior year funding availability, and any new needs that have emerged since the request was submitted. This 

would reduce our dependence on transfer authorities, which, while incredibly valuable, can be time consuming to execute and thus hinder our ability to move funds 

and respond quickly. 

Question 7. As we touched on during the subcommittee hearing, I am very interested in the Embassy, Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) account 

trends, and I appreciate your offer to relay more information on this topic. Currently, how much prior-year Embassy Construction money is still unobligated? Why 

has that money not been spent yet? Why is the State Department requesting a 6 

percent increase in Embassy Construction funds, when you still have significant 

carry-over from prior years? 

Answer. Due to the multi-year nature of the Department of State’s overseas construction projects, the Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) 

account is a no-year appropriation that is available until expended. The Department, with congressional encouragement, budgets the full cost of each project up 

front, but those funds are obligated over several years through the life of the project. 

Typically, 60-70 percent of the budget is obligated in the first year with the award 

of the construction contract. The remaining 30-40 percent is obligated in subsequent 

years for ongoing project costs such as the Department’s on site project supervision 

and construction security, telephone systems and furniture, and construction contingency. 

There is currently $8.6 billion unobligated in the ESCM account, of which $8.0 

billion, or 93 percent, is associated with over 80 major construction and renovation 

projects that are in various stages of design or construction. Nearly $3 billion of this 

is for projects under design for which construction contracts are planned for award 

by the end of 2016. 

All of the unobligated funding is associated with ongoing projects and will be obligated as those projects are completed. Therefore, it is not available for new projects 

to offset the amounts requested in the FY 2017 budget. In the event that projects 

have remaining balances upon completion, the Department will apply those funds 

to future projects via the congressional reprogramming process. 

The six percent increase requested in FY 2017 is associated with an increase in 

Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding to support the final components of 

transition in Kabul. The FY 2017 ESCM request for Kabul is $282 million, which 

is an increase of $158 million over the FY 2016 appropriation. Excluding the increase for Kabul, the remainder of the ESCM request is actually a $23 million decrease from the FY 2016 level. 

Questions 8 and 9. How often are contractors’ bids less than what you budgeted 

for the project? Please provide specific historical examples, if applicable. 

• I understand the FY 2017 budget request includes plans for four new embassy 

construction projects. Please supply any information you have on these new 

projects, including location, projected timeline, projected cost, and justification 

for each project. 

Answer. The FY 2017 request includes funding for the construction of several 

major projects that are currently under design. They include new embassy compounds in Guatemala City; new annexes and security upgrades in Kampala, 

Nairobi, and New Delhi; a Marine security guard residence and official parking 

structure in Paris; and the major rehabilitation of embassy facilities in Athens and 

Moscow. The request also includes construction funding for security and renovation 

projects in Kabul. These are the only construction projects for which funding is requested in FY 2017. 

In addition to the projects included in the FY 2017 request, the Department has 

75 ongoing major projects that were funded in prior years. All of these projects are 

at locations that are among the Department’s most vulnerable, with facilities that 

do not conform to security standards and do not meet co-location and operational 

requirements. The construction of new facilities is the only feasible option to provide 

a consolidated, secure, safe, and functional embassy or consulate. The complete list 

of projects in design or under construction, as of March 2016, is detailed below. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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ONGOING EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS 

Post Type of Project 

Total 

Budget 

(1,000’s) 

Planned 

Completion 

Date 

Amman ...................................... NOX and chancery rehab ...................................................... 224,600 Oct-18 

Ankara ....................................... NEC ....................................................................................... 528,100 Sep-19 

Ashgabat ................................... NEC ....................................................................................... 271,670 Jul-18 

Asuncion .................................... NEC ....................................................................................... 234,682 Aug-20 

Athens ....................................... Compound rehab ................................................................... 317,000 Feb-21 

Beijing ....................................... Annex ..................................................................................... 135,100 Mar-16 

Beirut ........................................ NEC ....................................................................................... 1,167,100 2022 

Belmopan .................................. MSGR ..................................................................................... 21,700 Apr-17 

Belo Horizonte ........................... COB ....................................................................................... 42,292 Oct-17 

Berlin ......................................... Annex rehab .......................................................................... 91,300 May-18 

Bishkek ...................................... Annex ..................................................................................... 170,800 Oct-16 

Brasilia ...................................... Housing rehab ....................................................................... 2,300 Jan-17 

Brazzaville ................................. Warehouse/shops .................................................................. 21,900 Feb-17 

Brussels .................................... NATO HQ fitout ...................................................................... 132,508 Sep-16 

Colombo .................................... NEC ....................................................................................... 342,100 Jan-20 

Dhahran .................................... NCC ....................................................................................... 339,300 Sep-19 

Dhaka ........................................ Housing redevelopment ......................................................... 9,460 Jul-17 

Dushanbe .................................. Warehouse ............................................................................. 21,500 May-17 

Erbil ........................................... NCC ....................................................................................... 655,871 TBD 

Georgetown ................................ Chancery/Warehouse rehab ................................................... 50,800 Oct-16 

Guatemala City ......................... NEC ....................................................................................... 499,500 Aug-21 

Guayaquil .................................. MSGR ..................................................................................... 30,600 May-17 

Harare ....................................... NEC ....................................................................................... 293,485 Jun-18 

Hong Kong ................................. Housing rehab ....................................................................... 32,000 TBD 

Hyderabad ................................. NCC ....................................................................................... 364,896 Nov-20 

Islamabad ................................. NEC ....................................................................................... 1,088,840 Mar-18 

Jakarta ...................................... NEC ....................................................................................... 497,800 Jun-18 

Jeddah ....................................... NCC ....................................................................................... 287,600 Sep-16 

Kabul ......................................... Annex/Housing ....................................................................... 967,900 Nov-17 

Kampala .................................... Annex ..................................................................................... 488,700 Oct-21 

Karachi ...................................... Housing ................................................................................. 67,100 May-17 

London ....................................... New Embassy ........................................................................ 1,030,000 Dec-16 

Manila ....................................... Chancery rehab ..................................................................... 173,366 Apr-20 

Maputo ...................................... NEC ....................................................................................... 284,117 TBD 

Matamoros ................................ NCC ....................................................................................... 192,500 May-19 

Mbabane ................................... NEC ....................................................................................... 141,000 Apr-16 

Mexico City ................................ NEC ....................................................................................... 943,065 Oct-21 

Montevideo ................................ Chancery renovation ............................................................. 112,800 Mar-20 

Montreal .................................... COB ....................................................................................... 44,343 Oct-16 

Moscow ...................................... Annex ..................................................................................... 280,700 Aug-17 

Moscow ...................................... Compound rehab ................................................................... 231,676 Oct-21 

Moscow ...................................... Housing rehab ....................................................................... 4,800 Sep-16 

Moscow ...................................... Compound housing rehab ..................................................... 76,255 Oct-21 

Nairobi ....................................... Annex (Phase I) ..................................................................... 130,823 Nov-19 

N’Djamena ................................. NEC ....................................................................................... 230,032 Oct-16 

New Delhi .................................. NEC ....................................................................................... 841,000 2024 

Niamey ...................................... NEC ....................................................................................... 287,811 Apr-20 

Nouakchott ................................ NEC ....................................................................................... 213,892 Oct-16 

Nuevo Laredo ............................ NCC ....................................................................................... 156,000 Sep-17 

Oslo ........................................... NEC ....................................................................................... 243,500 May-16 

Paramaribo ................................ NEC ....................................................................................... 165,900 Aug-16 

Paris .......................................... MSGQ/parking garage ........................................................... 59,042 Oct-19 

Port au Prince ........................... Housing/support facilities ..................................................... 123,631 Apr-16 

Port Moresby ............................. NEC ....................................................................................... 212,300 TBD 

Porto Allegre .............................. COB ....................................................................................... 59,245 Sep-16 

Pristina ...................................... NEC ....................................................................................... 261,500 Oct-17 

Rangoon .................................... American Center rehab ......................................................... 26,277 Mar-17 

Recife ........................................ Consulate Office Building ..................................................... 52,513 Nov-18 

Reyjavik ..................................... NAB fitout ............................................................................. 62,404 Jul-18 

Sanaa ........................................ Annex/housing ....................................................................... 278,000 TBD 

Sanaa ........................................ DTFS ...................................................................................... 86,900 TBD 

Sarajevo .................................... Warehouse/shops .................................................................. 12,100 Aug-16 

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ONGOING EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS—Continued 

Post Type of Project 

Total 

Budget 

(1,000’s) 

Planned 

Completion 

Date 

Shanghai ................................... Consular expansion ............................................................... 19,500 Dec-17 

Shenyang ................................... COB ....................................................................................... 17,421 Jan-18 

Taipei ........................................ NOB ....................................................................................... 236,468 Dec-16 

Tel Aviv ..................................... Chancery rehab ..................................................................... 55,100 Aug-18 

The Hague ................................. NEC ....................................................................................... 220,000 Jun-17 

Tijuana ...................................... MSGR ..................................................................................... 19,000 Sep-17 

Tokyo ......................................... CMR rehab ............................................................................ 7,500 Feb-17 

Tokyo ......................................... Housing rehab ....................................................................... 3,000 TBD 

Vienna ....................................... OSCE lease fitout .................................................................. 39,570 Mar-16 

Vilnius ....................................... Phase II ................................................................................. 42,200 Jul-16 

Wellington ................................. Chancery rehab ..................................................................... 65,750 Feb-17 

Wellington ................................. CMR rehab ............................................................................ 4,500 Dec-17 

Wuhan ....................................... COB ....................................................................................... 26,636 Nov-17 

It is not uncommon for contractors’ bids to be less than the government estimate 

from which the project budget was based. Such ‘‘savings’’ on an individual project 

would not be enough to add a new project that was not in the annual spend plan, 

but an accumulation of several of those lower-than-expected bids, combined with 

savings from completed projects (final cost of a project was below the budget), may 

allow the Department to advance a project that was planned for a later year. Any 

such realignment of savings from one project to another requires Congressional notification. 

Questions 10 and 11. Additionally, how many ongoing embassy construction 

projects are included in this year’s request? Please specifically outline each continuing construction project, along with the projected timeline, cost, and justification 

for construction or upgrades. 

• How often are you able to add a construction project that was not in your annual spending plan? 

Answer. The FY 2017 request includes funding for the construction of several 

major projects that are currently under design. They include new embassy compounds in Guatemala City; new annexes and security upgrades in Kampala, 

Nairobi, and New Delhi; a Marine security guard residence and official parking 

structure in Paris; and the major rehabilitation of embassy facilities in Athens and 

Moscow. The request also includes construction funding for security and renovation 

projects in Kabul. These are the only construction projects for which funding is requested in FY 2017. 

In addition to the projects included in the FY 2017 request, the Department has 

75 ongoing major projects that were funded in prior years. All of these projects are 

at locations that are among the Department’s most vulnerable, with facilities that 

do not conform to security standards and do not meet co-location and operational 

requirements. The construction of new facilities is the only feasible option to provide 

a consolidated, secure, safe, and functional embassy or consulate. The complete list 

of projects in design or under construction, as of March 2016 is detailed in table 

above (Answer to Questions 8 and 9). 

It is not uncommon for contractors’ bids to be less than the government estimate 

from which the project budget was based. Such ‘‘savings’’ on an individual project 

would not be enough to add a new project that was not in the annual spend plan, 

but an accumulation of several of those lower-than-expected bids, combined with 

savings from completed projects (final cost of a project was below the budget), may 

allow the Department to advance a project that was planned for a later year. Any 

such realignment of savings from one project to another requires Congressional notification. 

Question 12. Within the Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance 

(ESCM) request is more than $1 billion to provide for the Department of State’s 

share of the Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS) program, which is an interagency 

shared funding mechanism designed to ensure that each U.S. government agency 

represented abroad is paying its fair share of construction costs for new and more 

secure facilities. 

• Are all agencies fulfilling their commitments under this program? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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• Please provide details and discuss any obstacles that may exist to meeting the 

full $2.2 billion CSCS level called for by the post-Benghazi Accountability Review Board. Has a failure of others to pay for this expense led to an increased 

cost to State for maintenance? 

Answer. While the vast majority of agencies are fulfilling their commitments 

under the Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS)/Maintenance Cost Sharing (MCS) 

programs, a few agencies are not. 

Some agencies choose to fund improvements to their spaces in overseas facilities 

to meet their own unique requirements outside the CSCS/MCS program. As spelled 

out in the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations’ (OBO) annual program guidance, these are treated as agency-specific projects, and do not qualify as credits to 

MCS. Yet one agency unilaterally claimed $68 million of unauthorized ‘‘maintenance 

credits’’ against its FY 2014 and FY 2015 CSCS/MCS bills for work they performed 

in their spaces in a number of Department of State facilities. 

In addition to the unauthorized maintenance credits, the same agency’s FY 2015 congressional budget request under-funded its FY 2015 contribution by $62 million, 

and subsequent Congressional action reduced their FY 2015 funding by an additional $25 million. This resulted in a combined FY 2015 deficit of $87 million. Their 

FY 2016 appropriation reduced the request by $50 million. As a result, that agency 

will have underfunded the program by $205 million over FY 2014–2016. A second agency had its appropriations for CSCS/MCS reduced by $7.5 million in both FY 2015 and FY 2016, for a total of $15 million over the two-year period. The FY 2014 shortfall did result in the Department of State paying $38 million 

more than its fair share of the costs for the MCS program. In FY 2015, the shortfall 

resulted in the deferral of a critical rehabilitation project in Manila, Philippines. 

The Department believes that the cost sharing program is effective as currently 

structured, as long as agencies pay their fair share as required by legislation. Since 

its inception in FY 2005, the program has allowed the Department to fund more 

projects and relocate many more people to safe, secure, and functional facilities than 

would have been otherwise possible; to date more than 35,000 people have been 

moved. In addition to delivering a robust funding source for embassy construction 

and maintenance, the cost sharing mechanism provides an incentive for agencies to 

rightsize their overseas presence. 

Fully achieving the goals of the program is impeded by the failure of some agencies to pay their fair share—due either to internal decisions by the agency to pay 

less than the amount due, or to Congress failing to appropriate the amount requested by the agency to pay their bill. Congress has provided a remedy for such 

actions in Section 7004(a) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2016 (Div. K, P.L. 114-113), which states that: 

. . . a project to construct a diplomatic facility of the United States may not 

include office space or other accommodations for an employee of a Federal 

agency or department if the Secretary of State determines that such department or agency has not provided to the Department of State the full 

amount of funding required . . .

To date, the Department of State has not taken such action, as we have been 

working with the tenants to resolve their delinquent balances. However, the Department is strongly considering invoking Section 7004(a) this fiscal year should tenant 

agencies fail to provide their full share of the program. 

Question 13. The Diplomatic & Consular Programs budget request for FY 2017 

represents a 6 percent increase from last year. This includes pay for local, non-U.S. 

staff at diplomatic posts. 

• Could you explain why the Department set a policy to pay local staff at posts 

at the 60th percentile or more of their local labor markets? 

• What is the justification for the 60th percentile tie?Why wouldn’t pay be based 

on the recruiting and retention needs of each post? 

Answer. The Department of State endeavors to compete with other progressive 

local, multi-national and international employers in each of the labor markets where 

we employ local staff in support of our Missions. 

After the three-year wage freeze, the Department developed a policy and strategy 

to adjust the compensation of local staff in their respective local labor markets. In 

an effort to recalibrate the market position of our employees in their local labor 

market, the Department began moving employees from the 50th percentile of their 

local labor market (an average position in the market) to the 60th percentile of their 

local labor market when setting salary rates. As we continue to calibrate labor market positions and consistent with the policy, the Department developed criteria to 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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determine how competitive a Mission needs to be in the local labor market based 

on a set of factors applied globally. These factors are: A) attrition, B) recruitment, 

C) economic and political uncertainty, D) unemployment, and E) unique labor market conditions. A review of these factors at each Mission is used to determine if 

placement should be at the 60th percentile or higher in order to recruit and retain 

the caliber of local staff needed to ensure our Missions advance priority policy and 

programmatic objectives. 

Pay is based on the recruiting and retention needs of each post. Each post calculates salary levels based on the local labor market. This ensures that salary 

amounts are individualized to each post’s recruiting and retention needs. While the 

percentile level may be globalized, as needed, the actual dollar amounts differ. 

Question 14. In order to support implementation of its new Cuba policy, $3.8 million is requested within the Diplomatic and Consular Programs account for infrastructure improvements to the U.S. embassy in Havana (converted from an interests 

section last year), and additional funds are requested for additional staffing at the 

embassy. 

• Could you describe what impact, if any, that the conversion of the Interests Section to an Embassy has had on our bilateral relationship? 

• What further steps, if any, are contemplated in the context of this budget in 

support of the new administration’s Cuba policy? 

Answer. U.S. Embassy officials are able to travel more freely in Cuba since the 

re-establishment of diplomatic relations. For the first time in decades, some embassy staff can travel throughout the island without providing advance notification 

to Cuban government officials. Free travel allows us to broaden our contacts with 

average Cubans and promote more diverse people-to-people engagement. 

U.S. officials at the U.S. Embassy in Havana are also able to more effectively engage with a broad range of Cuban government counterparts since the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. As a result, U.S. and Cuban officials, including U.S. 

Embassy officials, were able to negotiate an arrangement to restore scheduled air 

service between the United States and Cuba, sign a joint statement on environmental protection cooperation, and agree on a pilot program for the direct transportation of mail between the United States and Cuba. These instruments, as well as 

others we are negotiating related to counternarcotics cooperation, law enforcement 

cooperation, and oil spill prevention and response, put in place the mechanisms for 

bilateral cooperation on these issues going forward. 

Additionally, re-establishing diplomatic relations has facilitated bilateral dialogues with Cuban government officials regarding important areas in which we had 

previously limited engagement, such as U.S. claims against the Cuban government. 

The FY 2017 budget request for Diplomatic and Consular Programs would allow 

U.S. Embassy Havana to increase staff and improve the embassy’s unsafe and aging 

facilities. At present, our diplomats work in poor and deteriorating conditions. The 

budget request would support basic repairs. The U.S. Embassy requires additional 

U.S. personnel to support an already overburdened platform. Since August 2015, the 

embassy has supported a range of high-level visitors, including a visit by the President and four Cabinet-level officials, four separate Cabinet-level visits, and visits by 

more than 50 members of Congress. This high-level focus will not subside any time 

soon. 

A mixture of reporting and support positons are required to deepen U.S. understanding of Cuba’s political, social, and economic environment; oversee maintenance 

upgrades; conduct human rights monitoring and advocacy; and deepen law enforcement cooperation on issues such as fugitives and counternarcotics. Adding these positions is vital to protecting U.S. national security and advancing U.S. national interests, especially our economic and commercial interests. 

Question 15. The State Department, as requested, has been provided by the Congress with a substantial influx of additional resources since FY 2013 to address 

global diplomatic security needs. 

• How are these resources contributing to the security of our diplomats abroad? 

• To what extent are the requests for higher levels of spending likely to persist 

into future years? 

• How are you balancing funding for and attention to securing high threat posts 

against the possibility that less threatened posts will be targeted--bearing in 

mind that Kenya and Tanzania were not considered high threat when they were 

bombed in 1998? 

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Answer. Diplomatic Security programs protect thousands of Chief of Mission 

(COM) personnel, and the facilities and data systems on which these personnel rely, 

at 275 overseas posts and 125 domestic offices. The Department’s budget request 

reflects the administration’s commitment to: 

• Prepare U.S. government personnel posted overseas under COM authority for 

assignments to critical and high threat posts; 

• Manage a full spectrum of counterterrorism, criminal, and special investigations 

to include violations of laws regarding U.S. passports and visas, defensive counterintelligence programs, and interagency liaison functions. Investigations include analysis involving terrorist threats, incidents, and hostile activities directed against U.S. government personnel, facilities, and interests around the 

world; 

• Provide robust and nimble information security protection that keeps pace with 

changing technology; 

• Leverage the latest physical and technical countermeasures for use worldwide; 

and 

• Conduct initial and periodic vetting of all employees and contractors in positions that require security clearances, access to sensitive intelligence, or public 

trust certifications. 

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security conducts regular, integrated budget and performance reviews over the course of the fiscal year. These reviews inform resource 

requirements, and provide for the informed and accountable development of future 

budgets. Resources are finite. Therefore, the Department carefully manages its resources to ensure that emergent priorities are addressed as quickly as possible in 

order to keep our people safe at all of our posts worldwide. We apply the lessons 

learned from previous attacks to all of our facilities. 

Although the unique conditions at each post dictate a specific approach to providing security for facilities and personnel, such as a post-specific travel policy, 

there are a number of programmatic commonalities that apply worldwide, regardless of threat levels and local security environments, including: 

• The need for construction of hardened, secure facilities with setback where older 

facilities fall short; 

• The use of appropriate technical and physical security technologies and countermeasures; 

• The development and maintenance of a well-trained, well-equipped and flexible 

cadre of security professionals across a variety of disciplines; 

• Training to deal with enhanced-risk environments: the Foreign Affairs Counter 

Threat (FACT) course will be required for all Chief of Mission employees serving overseas by January 1, 2019; 

• The deployment of a wide range of technical security equipment needed to protect our facilities and people; 

• Close cooperation with interagency partners and host country security agencies 

to detect, deter and disrupt threats directed against U.S. interests abroad; and 

• Soft target funding for physical and technical security improvements at international schools. 

While risk can never be completely eliminated from our diplomatic duties, we 

work to constantly mitigate it, regardless of the threat level. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security is also fortunate to retain no-year availability authority on Worldwide Security Protection funding. Continuation of this authority provides the Department essential flexibility to sustain complex, global security programs, and to 

adjust mitigation responses as security threats evolve, not only at high threat posts, 

but at all diplomatic locations. 

Additionally, the Department prioritizes the construction of safe and secure embassy and consulate facilities to replace those that are most vulnerable. Under the 

direction of the Bureau of Overseas Building Operations, 129 projects have been 

completed since the 1999 enactment of the Secure Embassy Construction and 

Counterterrorism Act—moving more than 35,000 people into safer and more secure 

facilities. Funding in FY 2013–2015 has allowed us to move forward with the following projects: 

• FY 2013—New Embassy Compounds (NEC) in N’Djamena, Chad; Nouakchott, 

Muaritania; Paramaribo, Suriname; and The Hague, Netherlands; as well a new 

office annex in Amman, Jordan and new housing in Karachi, Pakistan; and 

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• FY 2014—NECs in Ankara, Turkey; Ashgabat, Turkmenistan; Harare, 

Zimbabwe; Maputo, Mozambique; and Pristina, Kosovo; as well as New Consulate Compounds (NCC) in Erbil, Iraq and Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. In addition, 

Marine Security Guard Residences were funded in Belmopan, Belize; 

Guayaquil, Ecuador; and Tijuana, Mexico. 

Question 16. The State Department requested more funds than were actually 

needed for Ebola response in FY 2015, and my understanding is that some of those 

funds are still floating around the State Department. Budget documents suggest 

that the proposed boost in malaria program funding would come in part from unobligated emergency funds to counter Ebola, if authorized by Congress. 

• Could you discuss the $1.3 billion in unobligated Ebola funds? 

• Why are these funds no longer needed to address Ebola? 

Answer. The Department of State and USAID were appropriated $2.5 billion in Ebola emergency funds. As of January 1, $1.2 billion in foreign assistance funding 

and $34.3 million in diplomatic engagement funding has been obligated for the 

State-USAID Ebola emergency response and recovery efforts. $2.1 million in diplomatic engagement and nearly $1.3 billion in foreign assistance Ebola funding is unobligated. The bulk of this unobligated funding is, however, planned for critical ongoing Ebola response and recovery efforts in West Africa, including ensuring our 

ability to rapidly and effectively respond to new Ebola cases as well as addressing 

the needs of the survivor population, and activities to support the Global Health Security Agenda over the next five years. 

While the height of the Ebola epidemic is over, a majority of the unobligated 

Ebola funds are, in fact, still needed to sustain our ability to support Ebola recovery 

efforts and maintain our readiness to respond to flare-ups as they occur. While we 

do plan to maintain some resources to ensure we can meet ongoing Ebola needs, 

we anticipate some availability with remaining Ebola funds to address other critical 

health threats. 

Malaria remains a major cause of morbidity and mortality in sub-Saharan Africa, 

with a number of high burden countries in West and Central Africa. Malaria globally infects over 200 million people and kills over 400,000 people annually. As such, 

the FY 2017 Budget proposes to allocate approximately $129 million from remaining 

USAID Ebola funds to fight malaria. The administration believes that this is an appropriate use of remaining Ebola emergency funds because malaria is a dangerous 

infectious disease that continues to kill many, particularly children under the age 

of five, including in the Ebola-affected countries of West Africa. 

Question 17. Do you anticipate that the outbreak of the Zika virus in Latin America, which came to international attention after this budget request was formulated, 

will impact plans for global health assistance allocations in FY 2017? 

Answer. At this time, there are no changes to the FY 2017 Global Health request. 

The response to Zika requires immediate action. The FY 2016 emergency supplemental appropriations request would be our primary response to Zika. We are also 

exploring additional authorities to use available funds, including remaining funds 

in the Ebola supplemental appropriations. 

We should not divert funding from other important Global Health challenges for 

Zika. This would undermine our ability to achieve important global goals—such as 

ending child and maternal deaths and protecting communities from infectious diseases, including completing the response to Ebola, building global health security 

capacity, and addressing tuberculosis. These issues currently claim millions of lives 

each year—and most of these deaths are preventable, and doing so has been a priority of the U.S. government for many years. The experience over the last several 

years with outbreaks of Ebola, SARS, MERS-CoV, avian influenza and Zika has underscored the point that infectious disease outbreaks will happen and they can have 

devastating impacts locally and globally if they are not prevented and mitigated. 

Ensuring effective prevention, detection and response of such outbreaks is at the 

heart of global health security. If Zika continues to spread around the world, and 

response needs exceed the emergency funding capacity we have requested, we will 

have to explore and review the options available to address the changing epidemic. 

Question 18. If unobligated funds are not necessary for Ebola programs, why did 

the Department choose not to apply them to addressing the Zika virus instead of 

seeking an emergency supplemental? Since the State Department has so much 

transfer authority, coupled with the unobligated funds, is a Zika supplemental really necessary? 

Answer. While we anticipate some availability with remaining Ebola funds to address other critical health threats, a majority of the funds are still needed to sustain 

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our ability to support Ebola recovery efforts and maintain our readiness to respond 

to flare-ups as they occur. The FY 2016 Zika supplemental request of $376 million 

reflects our best estimate, given current information, of potential Department of 

State and USAID needs for the Zika response at this time; however, there remains 

significant uncertainty around the scope of the Zika challenges we will face. As 

such, the President’s FY 2017 Budget and the FY 2016 Zika supplemental request 

authority to use unobligated Ebola funds for other infectious diseases, such as Zika, 

in addition to Ebola. This authority would allow us to consider the use of Ebola 

funds to address Zika and other future infectious disease outbreaks, if needed, beyond the currently identified needs. We should not short-change our ability to address either of these important health challenges. 

We should not divert funding from other important challenges, particularly Global 

Health, for Zika. This would undermine our ability to achieve important global 

goals—such as ending child and maternal deaths and protecting communities from 

infectious diseases, including completing the response to Ebola, building global 

health security capacity, and addressing tuberculosis. These issues currently claim 

millions of lives each year—and most of these deaths are preventable, and doing so 

has been a priority of the U.S. government for many years. The experience over the 

last several years with outbreaks of Ebola, SARS, MERS-CoV, avian influenza and 

Zika has underscored the point that infectious disease outbreaks will happen and 

they can have devastating impacts locally and globally if they are not prevented and 

mitigated. Ensuring effective prevention, detection and response of such outbreaks 

is at the heart of global health security. If Zika continues to spread around the 

world, and response needs exceed the emergency funding capacity we have requested, we will have to explore and review the options available to address the 

changing epidemic. 

Question 19. Given the challenges the Ebola outbreak presented, how do you know 

that you’ve requested the right amount for the Zika virus response? Isn’t this the 

type of contingency that State should normally be able to handle in your regular 

and OCO budgets? 

Answer. The Zika supplemental request reflects our best estimate given current 

information of potential needs to address Zika at this time, primarily in the Global 

Health Programs account. However, we continue to face significant uncertainty 

around the scope of the Zika challenges we will face. 

As such, the President’s Budget and the Zika supplemental request expanded authority to use unplanned Ebola funds for ‘‘other infectious diseases’’ so we can consider the appropriateness of using Ebola contingency funds for Zika if needed beyond the needs identified. 

Similarly, Section 7058(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and 

Related Appropriations Act, 2015 (Div.J, P.L.113–235) potentially gives us another 

route to respond if Zika needs outpace what we have requested in the supplemental. 

But while we appreciate the flexible authority Congress provided to meet urgent 

health crises, we cannot keep diverting funds from other important health and development priorities to respond to outbreaks. We need to balance taking limited 

funds appropriated for other purposes with the needs of the current crisis. 

Question 20. The FY 2017 budget repeats the administration’s FY 2016 request 

for deep budgetary cuts to a number of State Department-funded institutions. In 

your budget request, ‘‘related programs’’ decreases 35 percent from last year. This 

includes the Asia Foundation and the National Endowment for Democracy. According to the State Budget Justification, ‘‘the mission entrusted to NED by Congress 

more than 30 years ago remains as urgent and as important as it has ever been.’’ 

If the NED’s mission is as urgent and as important as it has ever been, please provide the department’s rationale for requesting significantly lower funding for these 

organizations, as has been done in prior years. 

• Is this a signal that these organizations are less important or impactful than 

they historically have been? 

Answer. The Department of State recognizes the importance of both the National 

Endowment of Democracy (NED) and the Asia Foundation. However, given the Bipartisan Budget Agreement constraints on the enduring ‘‘base’’ funding for the Department of State and other agencies, the FY 2017 request required difficult tradeoffs among competing priorities, such as the normalization of Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

Pakistan ongoing operations into the base budget, and has necessitated constraints 

to other program and management priorities. The annual Department of State 

budget is spread across missions and programs worldwide, requiring trade-offs during the budgeting process. As a result, the FY 2017 request for both accounts was 

straight-lined from the President’s FY 2016 request. While lower than FY 2016, the 

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requested funding would be sufficient to maintain each organization’s principal mission. Further both organizations have been successful in securing additional program funds income from other Federal and non-Federal sources. In FY 2015, the 

Asia Foundation secured $68.7 million in other funding, and NED secured $1.8 million. 

Question 21. In the fiscal year 2014 omnibus appropriations bill, Congress told the 

administration that no less than $2.85 billion dollars should be spent on democracy 

programs, yet when the actual totals came in, only $1.9 billion had been spent. 

• Can you please explain why democracy programs were underfunded by nearly 

one billion dollars in FY 14? 

Answer. The U.S. government believes that Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) programs are essential to achieving and sustaining global development goals, as well as U.S. foreign policy objectives. 

As part of the annual budget process, and pursuant to Section 653a of the Foreign 

Assistance Act of 1961, USAID and the Department of State must provide a report 

to the Committees on Appropriations that details what our planning levels will be 

for all sectors and countries. Once there is agreement, the administration seeks to 

meet the Congressionally directed requirements, while supporting administration 

and Congressional priorities. In the end, in FY 2014, it was not possible to meet 

all Congressional directives and still fulfill these shared priorities. 

There are several reasons why we did not meet the suggested level for DRG in 

FY 2014. First, the amount of funding in a number of Congressionally directed sectors in the enacted bill were higher than requested, as such, tradeoffs were required 

to balance Congressional and administration priorities. Second, emerging opportunities or closing spaces required us to revise our planning and move some programming outside of where it was initially allocated or requested. Finally, there were account level reductions from the President’s budget request and the FY 2013 enacted 

levels in FY 2014 that made it difficult to meet all of the shared priorities. 

The FY 2017 request for DRG programs for USAID is $2.3 billion, and we will 

continue to work towards meeting our highest priority goals in this sector, even 

when we face constraints. 

Question 22. Because democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) funding 

was so hard hit in FY 2014 and again in FY 15, Congress for the first time included 

a hard protection for DRG funding in the FY 2016 omnibus, stating that the administration ‘‘shall’’ spend no less than $2.308 billion on democracy programs. This was 

to prevent, for example, funds being diverted to clean water or climate programs 

that also happen to build good governance. 

• How will the administration ensure that during the remainder of FY 2016 the 

full amount of this funding truly goes to DRG programs and is not used for 

other programs that have merely a secondary democracy or governance benefit? 

Answer. USAID appreciates Congress’s support of Democracy, Human Rights and 

Governance (DRG) programs, which are an essential aspect of U.S. foreign policy 

and sustainable, global development. 

The $2.3 billion earmark in FY 2016 will be allocated to core democracy, human 

rights and governance programs. In addition, USAID and the Department of State 

will continue to measure and invest in the integration of DRG principles and practices into programming outside of the DRG sector. This responds to USAID’s commitment to improve development outcomes through the integration of DRG principles in the 2015 Cross-Sectoral DRG Integration Action Plan and is responsive to 

the 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), which contends 

that ‘‘accountable, democratic governance is the surest way to expand social and economic opportunities’’ and ‘‘societies that allow citizens a say and a stake in their 

success are more stable, prosperous, and secure.’’ 

For example, an agriculture project that uses a community-based development approach to engage historically marginalized groups in the design and implementation 

of community development plansintegratesDRGprinciples, but would not fall within 

theDRG earmark set by the FY 2016 Appropriations bill. 

Question 23. In Africa, for example, DRG funding has decreased by almost 50 percent since FY 12, and between FY 12-FY 15, five countries (South Sudan, Liberia, 

DRC, Zimbabwe, and Kenya) received more than 60 percent of the DRG funding for 

the entire region.During this same time frame, in Latin America and the Caribbean, 

four countries (Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, and Haiti) received 58 percent of the region’s total DRG funding. In South and Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan receive 98 percent of this funding. 

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• In the FY 2017 budget request, which countries receive democracy, human 

rights, and governance funding and which do not? 

• Why were the countries that are not receiving DRG funding under this budget 

excluded? 

Answer. The 81 countries that would receive Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) funding in the FY 2017 request, in addition to central and regional 

allocations, are noted in the summary tables of the of the Congressional Budget Justification. Several factors are used to determine the countries that will receive DRG 

funding: 

• We consider the need for DRG assistance in a country based on the specific 

country context. 

• We assess whether DRG programs are likely to be effective, including the willingness of the host government to permit such programs to operate. 

• We factor in U.S. government foreign policy and development priorities, and 

prioritize countries based on the availability of assistance resources after taking 

into account legislative directives. In some cases, regional DRG funding is considered to be a more effective approach than bilateral funding. 

• In most cases, countries where we do not request DRG funding are places where 

the need for DRG assistance is lower than elsewhere, where it may be more difficult to conduct programs; or where the likelihood of having an impact is very 

low. 

Question 24. How is the FY 2017 budget request reflective of the 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review’s (QDDR) conclusions? 

• The QDDR is mentioned only in passing in the budget summary. How is the 

budget investing in improving the Department’s use of data and diagnostics, a 

key theme of the QDDR? 

Answer. The FY 2017 budget request supports new initiatives in the 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review’s (QDDR) Implementation Plan with 

$6.4 million focused on the administration’s diversity priority, cost saving opportunities pertaining to securing clearances for eligible family members as they move from 

post to post, our focus on countering violent extremism and data analytics and strategic planning efforts. Not all of the QDDR conclusions require additional FY 2017 

resources to implement; rather, the Department is realigning resources to address 

these 2015 QDDR recommendations, specifically $4.7 million in FY 2016 resources 

are focused on QDDR initiatives. 

• The over $12 million requested in the FY 2017 budget invests in strengthening 

the Department’s use of data analytics. This funding supports: 1) the Global Engagement Center’s efforts to counter extremist groups’ messaging; 2) the Department’s focus on rightsizing overseas staffing; 3) ensuring data is accurate 

and up-to-date, particularly in Post Personnel, eCountry Clearance (eCC), Active Directory, and the Real Property applications; 4) analyzing public diplomacy data to advance our U.S. foreign policy priorities and American interests, 

and; 5) streamlining the budget and planning processes at the Department. 

Question 25. The QDDR called for a broad discussion on physical risk with Congress and the American people, as well as adapting to a culture that supports programmatic risk to encourage innovation. Where do you believe we stand today in 

the discussion on these two sets of issues? 

Answer. Secretary Kerry has raised the issue of the risks and dangers inherent 

in conducting diplomacy in many parts of the world today. The Secretary has highlighted this issue in remarks to public audiences—including his October 2015 speech 

at Indiana University—and in conversations with Congress. In line with the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) recommendation, we are currently planning to intensify our engagement with Congress, the private sector, 

NGOs partners and others about the realities of our work and the way we manage 

risk. 

In March of last year, the Department published a formal Risk Management Policy that emphasized that advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives involves diverse 

types of risk and requires employees to engage in risk management for the decisions 

and activities within the scope of their duties. A central goal of the new risk management policy is to guide employees as they identify, manage, and mitigate risks 

in developing policy and implementing programs. Since the guidance was published 

the Department has worked to institutionalize the new policy, and implement a 

standard approach for managing and mitigating risk across our work. 

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Question 26. In the 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review 

(QDDR), the State Department pledged to enhance the use of data and diagnostics 

in decision-making. Can you tell us where these efforts stand, and what is included 

in the FY 2017 budget request to improve data collection and analysis? 

Answer. The Department remains committed to enhancing its data and its data 

analytics capacity. We recognize the importance that data and its analysis should 

play in policy and decision-making as well as in operations, planning, monitoring, 

and evaluation. The Department has recently chartered a small group of qualified 

data science officers and researchers, led by a senior Foreign Service Officer (FSO) 

who has been assigned as the Director of Data Analytics. This group aims to serve 

as a hub for data analytics by creating a community of practice dashboard that connects analytical offices. It is also performing limited data analytics functions for the 

Department and supporting other bureaus and offices that do not have analytical 

capability. Furthermore, per the 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), the Department continues to expand on the foundation of its Enterprise Data Quality Initiative and build a common data platform for Department use. On a broader scale, over $12 million was requested in the FY 2017 budget to further build the Department’s broader data analytics capacity. This funding would 

support: 

• The Global Engagement Center’s efforts to counter extremist groups’ messaging; 

• The Department’s focus on rightsizing overseas staffing; 

• Ensuring data is accurate and up-to-date, particularly in Post Personnel, 

eCountry Clearance (eCC), Active Directory, and the Real Property applications; 

• Analyzing public diplomacy data to advance our U.S. foreign policy priorities 

and American interests; and 

• Streamlining the budget and planning processes at the Department. 

Question 27. Evaluation of progress and effectiveness should be driving the budget 

conversations in every federal agency. 

• Can you provide any examples of how evidence and evaluation were used to 

drive changes in programs, and ultimately, budget decisions? 

Answer. In implementing the Department of State’s evaluation policy, bureaus 

have launched a number of types of evaluations including program evaluations, 

process evaluations and organizational assessments. As seen in the examples below, 

these assessments and research have helped refine strategies and increase efficiencies. 

The Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) conducted an evaluation 

of its American Centers that has provided senior staff with quantitative and qualitative information they can use to consider programmatic choices. A number of the 

evaluation recommendations—or key considerations—touch on the issue of strategy 

and focus. This material has supported or informed the IIP’s current approach of 

focusing the majority of American Spaces funding on a smaller number of strategically important centers. 

The Bureau of African Affairs conducted an organizational assessment this past 

year examining how the bureau was organized, how workload compared to that of 

peer-bureaus, and how staff skillsets fulfilled requirements for their position. Findings indicated that the operational tempo of the bureau had increased relative to 

its staffing structure, and led to a reorganization of bureau structure and plans to 

augment certain skillsets in existing staff so that the bureau could fulfill mission 

requirements. 

The Bureau of Budget and Planning conducted an evaluation of its foreign currency exchange management in the past year. Benchmarking current processes 

helped identify options to better integrate post-level exchange rate adjustments into 

budgeting, accounting, and reporting process. These recommendations provide guidance for designing a new foreign currency management system. 

The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in the Office of the 

Global AIDS Coordinator is an example of using multiple evaluations to shift the 

way a large program operates. As stated in the PEPFAR Blueprint for Creating an 

AIDS-free Generation, we must go where the virus is and put our resources where 

we can achieve the greatest impact. PEPFAR used data from evaluations to strategically target populations at greatest risk in geographic areas with the highest HIVburden. Expanding site-level data collection and analyses across the entire PEPFAR 

initiative permitted improved geographic mapping of the HIV epidemic and supported decision-making to strengthen programmatic impact and efficiency. 

A mid-term evaluation of a program by the Office of Global Women’s Issues to 

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prove maternal and child health found the implementer needed more empowered 

local staff, more local collaboration, and better ties to the Ministries of Health and 

Education in country. Lower literacy rates than the implementer had previously 

dealt with required a different design and approach to dissemination. Recommendations were used to correct the project course by providing solutions to meet the goal 

of a replicable, locally owned program. In addition, plans were made to use data 

from the mid-term evaluation to perform an end-of-project impact evaluation. 

In USAID’s Mozambique mission, findings from an impact evaluation showed that 

pairing reading instruction interventions with school management support improved 

reading outcomes more than reading instruction alone. This shaped the implementation model and led to the government requesting that the activity be scaled up from 

120 schools to 1,060 new schools, while expanding from grades two and three into 

grade one. The evaluation findings are also guiding the design of an early grade 

reading activity and recommendations on galvanizing community participation have 

been incorporated into the design of a new Mission-wide civil society advocacy activity. Other donors and the Ministry of Education have used the findings and recommendations to launch new early grade reading programs, community mobilization efforts, and applied research studies. 

In another example, USAID refocused health programming in the Latin America 

and Caribbean Region following baseline assessments and resulting criteria development. As part of strategic efforts to focus and concentrate on ending preventable 

child and maternal deaths, USAID reallocated resources from lower need, middle income countries to higher need, low income countries. Between FY 2008 and FY 

2015, USAID graduated or phased out health programs in Honduras and El Salvador among other Latin American countries, following a family planning baseline 

assessment and established graduation criteria. 

Question 28. U.S. development assistance should foster long-term self-sufficiency 

and ultimately support partner countries transition from foreign aid. The FY 2016 

Omnibus Appropriations bill included an important provision requiring all future 

country development strategies to include a plan for transitioning over time away 

from foreign assistance. 

• How are you approaching these transition plans? 

• Have you considered developing clear, measurable, and realistic benchmarks for 

country transition, such as benchmarks for social and economic progress across 

social groups, public sector capacity, or the enabling environment for civil society and the private sector? 

Answer. Transition planning is already being incorporated into USAID’s Country 

Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCS). Decisions about the necessary scope of 

transition planning for a particular mission are made during the early stages of 

strategy development, including the type of transition a mission is planning and 

over what timeframe. For example, transition could include phasing out of a particular sector, planning to transition assistance from programmatic to advisory, or 

phasing out of a country entirely. Development strategies, including any transition 

planning, are cornerstones of our whole-of-government Integrated Country Strategies (ICS) and we will be requiring all of our missions to consider foreign assistance 

transition planning more broadly in ICS development going forward. 

As part of its efforts to transition away from historic levels of assistance, USAID 

recently has reduced its full mission presence to either a non-presence status or a 

smaller office in the following countries: Mongolia, Namibia, Benin, Albania, and 

Macedonia. 

Setting end goals for foreign assistance and benchmarks towards achievement of 

those goals is integral to our approach to transition planning for development. These 

goals and benchmarks will be dependent on particular country contexts, rather than 

set at a corporate level. Given the variety of contexts in which we work, and the 

range of U.S. government interests in those countries, our approach is to develop 

broad guidelines while preserving adaptability so that it may be responsive to local 

and U.S. government realities. 

Question 29. Some U.S. policymakers, including some members of Congress, have 

disagreed with the U.S. peacekeeping assessment level set by the U.N. General Assembly. Since FY 1992, with few exceptions, Congress has enacted a cap on U.S. 

payments to U.N. peacekeeping at levels below the established U.N. assessment. 

Your budget request this year is based on the U.N. peacekeeping assessment for the 

U.S. of 28.56 percent, rather than the amount recognized by U.S. law, which is 

27.14 percent. 

• What is the administration’s position on this issue? 

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• How has the cap impacted recent budget requests and appropriations? 

• More broadly, what impact, if any, has this issue had on U.N. peacekeeping operations? 

Answer. The United States’ role as a global leader demands that we continue to 

pay our U.N. peacekeeping assessments in full, at the rate assessed, so U.N. peacekeeping missions have appropriate resources available to carry out their life-saving 

mandates. While Congress passed legislation in 1994 (P.L. 103–236) capping our use 

of appropriated funds for peacekeeping assessments at a rate of 25 percent, Congress also raised the cap for calendar years (CY) 2001 through 2012 to authorize 

the use of appropriated funds to pay U.S. assessed peacekeeping expenses in full. 

The current U.S. peacekeeping assessment rate for CY2016 is 28.57 percent. However, the Department only has the authority for FY 2016 to make payments from 

appropriated funds at the CY 2012 assessed rate of 27.14 percent. Because of the 

administration’s commitment to paying U.S. treaty obligations in full and on-time, 

the President’s request is based on the current U.N. peacekeeping assessment rate, 

and accordingly requests raising the statutory cap so that the United States can pay 

our assessments in full. 

If the funds are appropriated without an associated cap lift, the United Nations 

may apply U.N. peacekeeping credits to pay the difference to the extent such credits 

are available. If there are not adequate credits to address the difference, the cap 

will cause the United States to accrue new arrears. The reliance on credits is not 

a sustainable practice as there may not be sufficient peacekeeping credits to address 

future shortfalls caused by the statutory cap. 

The gap between the actual U.S. assessment rate and the amount of the U.S. payment will deprive the United Nations of the full amount of funding that the General 

Assembly appropriated for peacekeeping missions. Reductions in U.S. payments can 

strain important U.N. peacekeeping operations or cause delays in reimbursements 

to troop contributing countries that can affect future troop rotations. Timely and full 

U.S. payment has helped to solidify the U.N.’s ability to attract and retain peacekeeping forces, strengthened U.S. leverage with troop contributing countries, and allowed us to more effectively shape and reform peacekeeping operations to deliver 

maximum impact. For example, in September 2015, President Obama convened the 

Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping, which resulted in new and significant pledges of 

troops, police, and enabling capabilities to U.N. peacekeeping from over 50 countries 

and regional organizations. Paying late and accruing arrears undermines U.S. credibility and influence at the U.N., particularly on matters dealing with budget, finance, and management reform. In the past, this has affected world opinion regarding U.S. commitment to multilateral engagement and respect for the role of multilateral organizations, and has diminished U.S. influence even with our closest allies. 

Question 30. Roughly 10 percent, or $310 million, of State’s Development Assistance program budget is going to support the Global Climate Change initiative 

(GCCI). With all of the development challenges in the world today, do you think it 

is appropriate to be spending 10 percent of the overall on climate change? 

Answer. Climate change represents a substantial threat to U.S. national security 

interests and development objectives. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 

completed by the Department of Defense states that: 

Climate change poses another significant challenge for the United States 

and the world at large. As greenhouse gas emissions increase, sea levels are 

rising, average global temperatures are increasing, and severe weather patterns are accelerating. These changes, coupled with other global dynamics, 

including growing, urbanizing, more affluent populations, and substantial 

economic growth in India, China, Brazil, and other nations, will devastate 

homes, land, and infrastructure. Climate change may exacerbate water 

scarcity and lead to sharp increases in food costs. The pressures caused by 

climate change will influence resource competition while placing additional 

burdens on economies, societies, and governance institutions around the 

world. These effects are threat multipliers that will aggravate stressors 

abroad such as poverty, environmental degradation, political instability, 

and social tensions—conditions that can enable terrorist activity and other 

forms of violence. 

In late 2015, CIA Director John Brennan said the following while addressing the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Global Security Forum: 

Mankind’s relationship with the natural world is aggravating these problems and is a potential source of crisis itself. Last year was the warmest 

on record, and this year is on track to be even warmer. Extreme weather, 

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along with public policies affecting food and water supplies, can worsen or 

create humanitarian crises. Of the most immediate concern, sharply reduced crop yields in multiple places simultaneously could trigger a shock 

in food prices with devastating effect, especially in already-fragile regions 

such as Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. Compromised access to 

food and water greatly increases the prospect for famine and deadly 

epidemics. 

U.S. leadership is essential to addressing these broad and wide-reaching challenges. The Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI) is the principal U.S. tool for 

providing technical assistance to developing countries confronting those challenges, 

and it serves a compelling U.S. national security interest. GCCI programs not only 

benefit our efforts to protect our climate system, they promote our broader development objectives. Virtually all GCCI programs have important benefits for food security, health, sustainability, economic development, poverty reduction, and regional 

stability, all of which benefit the U.S. and global economy. 

Question 31. Do you intend to come to Congress for a specific authorization of the 

Green Climate Fund? Do you believe it is appropriate for Congress to have oversight 

over U.S. participation in the Green Climate Fund? 

Answer. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) has been established as a multilateral 

trust fund—much like other multilateral funds, such as the Climate Investment 

Funds—and has approved its first round of projects. The Department issued a grant 

to support the GCF from resources provided in the Department of State, Foreign 

Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2016 (Div. K, P.L. 114–113) 

(SFOAA). Specifically, in the SFOAA, Congress provided $4.3 billion in funding for 

the Economic Support Fund (ESF), an account that is used to fund environmental 

programs and many other foreign assistance programs. The ESF account is a primary account through which the administration requested funding to support the 

Green Climate Fund (GCF) in the President’s FY 2016 budget request. While over 

one-half of the account is earmarked for specific programs or activities, the remainder is available for other programs to carry out the ESF authority in the Foreign 

Assistance Act. The administration is using a portion of those unallocated funds for 

the GCF under the ESF authority and section 7060(c) of the SFOAA. While the 

SFOAA did not earmark funds specifically for the GCF, it also did not contain any 

restrictions on the use of FY 2016 funds for the GCF. Provision of ESF for environmental programs, including through grants to multilateral trust funds, is consistent 

with long standing practice. 

This administration takes its GCF oversight role seriously and we are working 

hard to ensure that GCF funding is used responsibly through our role on the GCF 

Board and our participation on two committees which oversee matters pertaining 

to oversight, the Ethics and Audit Committee and the Accreditation Committee. To 

that end, the GCF requires fiduciary standards and social and environmental safeguards that are among the strongest of all multilateral funds today. The Fund will 

have independent evaluation and integrity units, and Board proceedings and documents are among the most transparent of any multilateral mechanism. 

Question 32. I understand that USAID is often tasked with on-the-ground implementation of certain State Department plans and initiatives, and in order for 

USAID to carry out these implementation efforts, State grants USAID a portion of 

its programmatic funding. However, these specific proportions transferred from 

State to USAID are not reflected in State’s Congressional Budget Justification. As 

a matter of fact, in preparing for this hearing, I had to rely on ‘‘guess-timates’’ from 

the Congressional Research Service on how much funding State transfers to USAID 

for different line items in the budget. 

• In the interest of broader monitoring and evaluation, as well as public transparency, why are these funds not clearly delineated in either State or USAID’s 

budget? 

• Would it be feasible for State and USAID to begin disclosing these amounts? 

Answer. The joint Department of State and USAID budget includes the resources 

needed by both agencies to advance national security priorities related to diplomacy 

and development. The Department and USAID work closely both in developing 

budget requests, and in implementing programs in the year of appropriation. Decisions about implementing mechanisms and implementing partners are made in the 

year of appropriation, based on assessed needs on the ground, evolving circumstances (which USAID and the Department monitor), priorities, implementation 

capacity, and available implementation mechanisms. There are times in the field 

where Department of State often relies on USAID to program and assist in planning 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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the programming of resources, so the distinction of ownership over funding can play 

a relatively small role in how projects are designed and implemented. 

While there can be differences from year to year, historically USAID generally administers all of the Development Assistance, Global Health Programs-USAID, Food 

for Peace Title II, International Disaster Assistance, and Transition Initiatives accounts. In most years, USAID has fully administered funding in the Complex Crisis 

fund account as well. In addition, USAID fully implements the USAID Administrative Expense accounts: USAID Capital Investment Fund, USAID Development Credit Authority Admin Expenses, USAID Inspector General Operating Expenses, and 

USAID Operating Expenses accounts. USAID has historically administered 93 percent of the Economic Support Fund, 70 percent of Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, 

Central America, and 60 percent of the Global Health Program-State accounts. 

Question 33. As this administration contemplates the way forward in Afghanistan, 

I hope that we have learned the lessons of Iraq, and don’t find ourselves with another power vacuum. The intelligence community testified earlier this month that, 

quote, ‘‘Afghanistan is at serious risk of a political breakdown in 2016.’’ 

• To what extent does the aid request (of $1.25 billion) for FY 2017 seek to prevent or mitigate the effects of such a potential breakdown? 

• What criteria will the administration use to determine whether the Afghan government is meeting the conditions to receive the total amount of the aid? 

Answer. The FY 2017 foreign assistance request and already-appropriated resources at work in Afghanistan are essential to the success of our strategy to help 

Afghanistan build sustainable stability. At a strategic level, the Government of Afghanistan works closely with and greatly values the engagement and financial support provided by the international community. During the protracted election process in 2014, the United States, in coordination with our international partners, emphasized to Afghan leaders that continued financial and political support depended 

on a peaceful, constitutional handover of power from President Karzai to his democratically elected successor. Shortly after the formation of the Government, President Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah, presented their ‘‘Realizing SelfReliance’’ strategy paper to international donors at a major conference on Afghanistan in London. 

As part of our policy to support Afghan reform and greater self-sufficiency, the 

Department of State and USAID employ incentive programs linked to Afghan government actions in a wide array of policy areas. These incentive programs include 

conditions that the Afghan government must meet to receive additional on-budget 

assistance. President Ghani and CEO Abdullah encouraged the development of 

these programs, which include the U.S.-Afghan New Development Partnership 

(NDP), the counternarcotics-related Good Performers Initiative, and multilateral 

mechanisms like the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund’s (ARTF) Incentive 

Program, as a means of demonstrating accountability for the performance of the Afghan government. 

In 2017, we expect to continue the innovative NDP that was initiated during the 

visit of President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah in 2015. The NDP reserves 

a portion of our appropriate assistance funds for Afghanistan, and links the provision of those funds to the Afghan Government’s achievement of specific, pre-determined reforms and development results. The NDP conditions the provision of U.S. 

assistance on Afghan government progress in addressing corruption, improving the 

government’s fiscal sustainability and management, reducing poverty, and empowering women. Incentive funds are released only after the government has demonstrated that they have met pre-determined benchmarks established at the outset 

of the partnership. 

Each incentive program is continuously monitored and reviewed at least annually 

to determine if the program is having the intended reform results. For instance, 

under the terms of the NDP, U.S. and Afghan officials consult at least once a year 

to review progress on the current set of targets and to determine if changes need 

to be made to future targets. The NDP target results are focused on countering corruption, improving fiscal sustainability, reducing poverty, and empowering women. 

In 2015, the Afghan government achieved 90 percent of its annual reform targets 

and qualified for $180 million out of the $200 million available in on-budget assistance. The ARTF incentive program, which is partially funded by the United States, 

works similarly to the NDP and links the disbursement of on-budget assistance to 

Afghan government performance on revenue targets, and the implementation of policy reforms related to governance, civil service reform, public financial management, 

investment climate, and trade facilitation. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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To further sustainability and reinforce the reforms required, our assistance programs focus on improving the functioning and effectiveness of the Afghan government. For example, we are implementing programs focused on improving the Afghan government’s delivery of education and health services, which has an immediate impact on all Afghans and impacts local perceptions of the credibility of the 

government. We are working in a similar fashion to improve the functioning of the 

Afghan justice and correctional systems. 

Our assistance helps build a constituency for a stable government by providing 

Afghans with improvements and services that meet the needs of citizens and de-legitimize extremism. For example: 

• According to The Asia Foundation, in 2015, two-thirds of Afghans were satisfied 

with the quality of education their children received. 

• On average, nearly one million people per month are treated at USAID-supported facilities; of these, 76 percent are women and children younger than five. 

USAID has and will continue to support the Ministry of Public Health in their 

efforts to provide access to basic health care across Afghanistan. Women and 

children have particularly benefitted from USAID’s decade long commitment to 

Afghanistan’s health sector. Since 2002, USAID has trained more than 12,000 

community health workers and over 2,500 midwives - half of the entire population of midwives in the country. Furthermore, the Government of Afghanistan—in conjunction with the Department of State—reaches approximately 

28,000 patients per year in more than 100 drug treatment centers. 

• In 2015, women held 28 percent of seats in Parliament and four cabinet positions, and 165 judicial positions. 

• In 2015, after years of targeted assistance from USAID, the Afghan government 

successfully acceded to the World Trade Organization, and the Parliament is on 

track to ratify the accession agreement. 

• USAID recently completed the last segment of paved highway in eastern Afghanistan from Gardez to Khost. This road will link to the Pakistan border and 

open a strategic trade route. 

Question 34. With the U.S. presence in Afghanistan diminishing, how is the use 

of U.S. economic assistance monitored? 

• What programs have been most successful in promoting governance reform and 

economic growth? 

• How flexible are U.S. programs to augment those that are working and phasing 

out those that are not? 

Answer. U.S. agencies recognize the importance of program monitoring in Afghanistan to ensure the appropriate and effective use of our assistance funding. Due to 

the especially difficult operating environment in Afghanistan, the Department of 

State, USAID, and others have developed an innovative, multi-tiered monitoring approach for civilian assistance programs that allows for real-time assessment of how 

programs are functioning and whether they are achieving their intended results. 

This monitoring program draws on information from multiple sources, using independent monitors and various communications technologies to query recipients, local 

governments, and civil society on program performance. This monitoring information allows the United States to expand programs that are working well and to terminate programs that are not achieving results. When appropriate, we have 

changed course to refocus resources on more productive programs that have a greater demonstrated impact on Afghanistan’s development. 

Both the Department of State and USAID are contracting with independent, experienced organizations to verify program performance in areas of Afghanistan that 

are not regularly accessible to U.S. oversight officials. The organizations that monitor and verify the implementation of our programs employ mostly Afghan staff to 

operate in areas less accessible to foreigners. 

• USAID has a Monitoring Support Program in place to monitor project activities, 

and has also developed technical monitoring contracts to help oversee programs 

that require specialized expertise, such as construction. The Department of 

State is implementing a Flexible Implementation and Monitoring Team contract 

that will provide monitoring services in locations around Afghanistan. In a 

number of cases, smaller implementing partners have bought into monitoring 

contracts administered by larger agencies to augment available oversight tools. 

Below are a few examples of progress in Afghanistan attributable to U.S. assistance. We continue to review and analyze our current and past programs to assess 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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impact and sustainability to help ensure we are supporting the most successful programs in promoting governance reform and economic growth: 

• After years of targeted assistance from USAID, the Afghan government successfully acceded to the World Trade Organization in December 2015, and the Afghan Parliament is on track to ratify the accession agreement by summer 2016. 

WTO membership will anchor Afghanistan in a rules-based trading system, and 

foster regional trade. 

• The U.S.—Afghan New Development Partnership has focused Afghan government attention on tackling corruption, improving fiscal sustainability, reducing 

poverty, and empowering Afghan women. In the first year of the partnership, 

the Afghan government met 90 percent of its targets and qualified for $180 million of the $200 million available for disbursement. Moreover, the achievements 

under the program directly contributed to a 20 percent increase in government 

revenues, re-establishment of the Afghan relationship with the International 

Monetary Fund, anti-corruption measures in customs collection, and the establishment of a new procurement review commission. 

• The average number of years that Afghan children attend school has risen from 

2.5 years to 9.3 years since 2000, and 67 percent of Afghans are satisfied with 

the education that their children receive. In 2002, roughly 900,000 boys and 

zero girls were enrolled in school; by 2014, nearly eight million children attended school, with girls comprising one-third of the student population. 

• With help from USAID and other donors, the government provides basic health 

services to 2.3 million Afghan citizens a month. Since 2002, infant mortality has 

decreased 53 percent; child mortality rate has decreased 62 percent; and maternal mortality has decreased 77 percent. Furthermore, the Government of Afghanistan—in conjunction with the Department of State—reaches approximately 28,000 patients per year in more than 100 drug treatment centers. 

• Women hold 27 percent of seats in Parliament, three cabinet positions, and 165 

judicial positions. 

• We have also helped the Afghan government and private sector spur a communications revolution with nearly 90 percent of Afghan households owning a cell 

phone, and fostered the birth of a vibrant, free media. 

• The Department of State helped the government establish the Counter Narcotics Justice Center (CNJC), which tries all high-level and government official 

narcotics cases. With support from specialized enforcement units mentored by 

the Drug Enforcement Administration, and operations and maintenance support 

from the Department of State and the Government of Britain, the Afghan government has arrested and the CNJC has successfully prosecuted a U.S- designated drug king pin and provincial officials implicated in the drug trade. 

The United States has established an innovative, multi-tiered monitoring approach for assistance programs in Afghanistan that draws on information from multiple sources (including implementing partners, the Government of Afghanistan, 

other international donors, Afghan civil society, and third-party monitors) and allows us to assess in real-time how our programs are functioning and whether they 

are achieving intended results. This monitoring information allows the United 

States to adjust programs when they are not achieving results. When necessary, we 

have changed course to refocus our resources on more productive programs or to 

have greater impact on Afghanistan’s development. As we fine tune our development activities, we also recognize that progress on many issues takes long-term, 

sustained work, and we employ multi-year, national-scale projects to maximize impact. 

The review and monitoring of individual programs feeds into a broader, bi-annual 

portfolio review that helps assess whether our developmental priorities support our 

broader objectives and are able to be implemented given budgetary and other operational and strategic constraints. 

The following are examples of when USAID/Afghanistan identified problems in 

implementation through monitoring and evaluation processes, and changed its programmatic approaches: 

• Democracy and Governance in Afghanistan: Computer-based video calls (e.g., 

Skype) are one of the tools USAID uses to remotely monitor democracy and governance training activities in Afghanistan. In 2015, USAID monitored over 600 

events. Thanks to this process, USAID has been able to observe events even 

when not physically present and take quick action to resolve any identified 

problems. For example, during one municipal budget training activity, it was 

observed that no females were involved in the training program. USAID disFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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cussed their observation with the implementing partner, which led the implementer to increase its efforts to include females in training activities. 

• Infrastructure in Afghanistan: USAID committed to building a critical, 101-kilometer road from Gardez to Khost in Western Afghanistan to enable the transport of goods between Afghanistan and Pakistan. USAID originally contracted 

with an international construction company on the project; however, after monitoring efforts revealed the contractor was struggling to build community support 

for the project, which was causing delays, USAID turned the project implementation over to a local firm. As a result, the project proceeded much faster and 

was recently completed. 

• Education in Afghanistan: In August 2013, USAID/Afghanistan signed an implementation letter with the Ministry of Education to fund a community-based 

education program. The budget for the program was $56 million over five years; 

this funding was intended to be direct government-to-government assistance, 

provided to the ministry based on achievement of key milestones. However, as 

the Ministry of Education did not meet key targets in the beginning of implementation, USAID/Afghanistan did not disburse these funds through the direct 

government-to-government mechanism. Instead, USAID worked with UNICEF 

to implement the program. UNICEF has since partnered with the Ministry of 

Education, as well as provincial and district education offices, to improve community-based education in Afghanistan. 

Question 35. We are seeing some troubling developments in Ukraine. Earlier this 

month, Ukraine’s economic minister and his full team resigned citing ingrained corruption as their reason for stepping down. A major focus of our assistance to 

Ukraine has been centered around countering this rampant corruption. 

• Are we failing in Ukraine? Is Ukraine making sufficient efforts to fight corruption and enhance the rule of law? If so, how? 

Answer. The Ukrainian government is implementing an ambitious anti-corruption 

and rule of law reform agenda. Although Kyiv has made tremendous progress, much 

more must be done to root out corruption and advance democratic reforms. Our 

highest priorities for rule of law reforms are focused on improving the effectiveness 

of the operations of the new anti-corruption institutions; reform of the prosecutorial 

and judicial system; and police reform. 

Regarding the new anti-corruption institutions, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) has been established, along with a special anti-corruption prosecutor 

under the umbrella of the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO), and the two entities 

are working together to conduct investigations. 

In 2015, the Rada passed legislation to reform judicial self-governance, and to 

change the processes for appointments, discipline, qualifications, and training for judiciary members. Constitutional amendments required to bolster judicial independence are moving through the Rada now. 

The most visible and celebrated reform has been the establishment of the new 

openly recruited patrol police that replaced the notoriously corrupt traffic police. In 

2016, the new patrol police will be expanded to all oblast capitals. Our efforts to 

support Ukraine as it addresses anti-corruption focuses on greater government 

transparency that will be enhanced by new laws on e-procurement, public officials’ 

asset disclosures, and transparency on media companies’ ownership. 

These reforms will be critical to Ukraine’s future and have been valiantly fought 

for by ordinary Ukrainians. The United States will continue to work with the 

Ukrainian government, civil society, and media to encourage further reforms during 

this critical time in Ukraine’s history. 

Question 36. Ukraine is still facing constant Russian aggression—both militarily 

and via propaganda. Is U.S. aid helping Ukraine’s armed forces enhance its capabilities? Is non-lethal aid sufficient to help deter Russian aggression, or is some level 

of lethal aid needed? 

Answer. Through the $266 million in training and equipment the United States 

has committed since the start of the crisis, we are helping Ukraine’s forces enhance 

their capabilities to monitor and secure their borders, operate more safely and effectively, and defend Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Our security assistance has saved lives while helping to build Ukraine’s long-term defense capacity. 

We have delivered non-lethal defensive equipment, including counter-battery radars, secure communications equipment, Humvees and up-armored civilian SUVs, 

medical equipment, and many other related items to help Ukraine protect its forces 

while defending against Russian aggression. We have stood up a multinational joint 

commission to better understand Ukraine’s defense requirements and have sent adFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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visors to promote long-term defense reform. In November 2015, we completed a 

training program for Ukraine’s National Guard and are now training its conventional and Special Forces to increase their defense capabilities and institutional 

training capacity. 

We continue to work closely with Ukraine to identify requirements for security 

assistance. With your support, we intend to continue our efforts in FY 2016 to increase the defense capacity of Ukraine’s conventional and Special Operations forces, 

State Border Guard Service, and National Guard. 

We have not ruled out sending lethal weapons to Ukraine. The United States continues to believe that there is no military resolution to the crisis, but Ukraine has 

the right to defend itself. We remain committed to supporting full implementation 

of the Minsk agreements, and our diplomatic efforts focus on supporting discussions 

in the Normandy format and in the Trilateral Contact Group to expedite their full 

implementation. We have provided significant non-lethal security assistance to 

Ukraine to help address the crisis, but our current focus is on finding a diplomatic 

solution. 

Question 37. What is the U.S. doing to help Georgia to hold free and fair elections 

later this year? Are there concerns about Georgia’s democracy and adherence to the 

rule of law? 

Answer. In FY 2015, the U.S. government allocated more than $20 million to promote democracy in Georgia. Funded programs seek to advance democratic political 

processes, strengthen civic participation, bolster independent media, and support 

the rule of law. 

The October 2016 parliamentary elections will represent a key moment in the 

transformation and consolidation of Georgia’s democracy, which has made significant progress since independence. We are currently assessing the electoral environment to identify any unmet needs in advance of the elections. We will fund observation missions by international and local NGOs and plan to contribute observers to 

the OSCE observation mission. Electoral reform and safeguarding media freedom, 

civil society and political pluralism during the election season will be a key focus 

of the upcoming U.S.-Georgia Democracy Working Group. 

In FY 2015, the U.S. government allocated more than $20 million to promote democracy in Georgia. Funded programs seek to advance democratic political processes, strengthen civic participation, bolster independent media, and support the 

rule of law in an effort to reinforce government transparency, accountability, and 

responsiveness. 

Georgia has made significant progress since independence towards becoming a 

fully democratic state and is unique in the region in its commitment to democracy. 

Its 2012 and 2013 national elections resulted in the first constitutional change of 

power in a post-Soviet state, with the exception of the Baltics. The October 2016 

parliamentary elections will represent another key moment in the consolidation of 

Georgia’s democracy. It will be important for Georgia to maintain media freedom, 

promote political pluralism, and ensure independence of the judiciary as it moves 

toward these elections. 

Question 38. Could you describe the department’s public diplomacy strategies in 

countering Russian propaganda efforts in Europe? 

• How do you measure the success or failure of these strategies? 

• To what extent do the BBG’s broadcasting efforts contribute to their success? 

• Is the budget request adequate to ensure the strategy’s success? 

Answer. The Kremlin is rapidly disseminating disinformation, part of a concerted 

effort to undermine trust in Western institutions and erode freedom of the press. 

Research shows that despite Moscow’s efforts and resources devoted to this objective, they have limited effectiveness abroad: less than a third of Europeans polled 

outside of Russia are confident that Putin will do the right thing in world affairs 

or see Russia favorably. In these same European countries, views of the United 

States are much more positive; 69 percent viewed the U.S. favorably. 

Capitalizing on this public goodwill, the Department of State is leading a coordinated effort to support the free flow of information, expand independent media, root 

out corruption, and refute Russian government disinformation. Our efforts extend 

across a range of diplomatic tools as we proactively amplify key U.S. Government 

messages, correct disinformation, engage opinion leaders, encourage independent 

voices, and forge and maintain people-to-people ties. 

The Department employs a combination of short-term messaging strategies with 

medium- and long-term programs to boost resilience and build capacity to recognize 

and reject Russian government disinformation. The Department of State supports 

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our overseas posts in times of heightened Kremlin messaging. Armed with the facts, 

our missions abroad are able to adapt the content and materials we supply to their 

own audiences and rapidly amplify the truth. We have also increased our capacity 

to deliver our messages proactively in Russian by forming a cadre of Russian-speaking officers to engage with the media and introducing a Russian-language, policyoriented Twitter handle. We augment this messaging activity by providing foreign 

audiences with opportunities to engage directly with experts, opinion leaders, and 

third party groups. 

The Department of State is implementing programs that support independent 

media and investigative journalists in countries throughout the region, including 

Azerbaijan, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Ukraine, and the Baltics. We 

have developed exchanges to encourage independent media voices, including workshops on digital skills and investigative journalism, and support for a Digital Communicators Network of more than 1,000 members who bring accurate, objective information to regional audiences. 

At the same time, we are supporting efforts to engage ethnic Russian populations 

by expanding our English language training programs and professional exchanges. 

These cost-effective programs create lasting educational and professional linkages 

and increase English proficiency of students and educators, helping remove language as a barrier for thought leaders to understand U.S. policy and culture. 

U.S. public diplomacy also includes NATO and U.S. military outreach and media 

engagement. These high visibility engagements help dispel the Russian government’s anti-NATO messages and serve as opportunities to explain our security partnerships. Last year the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 

provided a new fund to support embassy public affairs teams in developing new, innovative public outreach projects pegged to U.S. military exercises in Europe. These 

interactions between people are the cornerstone of our strategy and absolutely essential in refuting disinformation. 

We continue to use our public diplomacy tools to deepen people-to-people ties in 

an admittedly challenging political environment. In the past year, the Department 

of State designed and implemented a range of programs in the region that build relationships based on common interests and perceptions. Based on participant feedback, we know these programs are having a positive net effect. In addition to anecdotal evidence, we also conduct evaluations of our programs to ensure impact. 

The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) receives steady input from the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, who serves on the 

BBG to ensure its strategic planning is aligned with broader U.S. foreign policy 

goals. The BBG is an active participant in an ongoing working group at State, 

through which it apprises the Department of its efforts and provides analysis of current media trends. In its own work, the BBG maintains a robust response to Russian disinformation through the combined work of Voice of America and Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty, which employ flexible, innovative, and cross-platform programming around the world to counter the Kremlin’s strident anti-American messaging with fact-based journalism. 

The bureaus undertaking this important work ensure that our limited resources 

are directed, in the most effective way, toward implementing priority programs focused on countering Russian government disinformation. 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED

TO HARI SASTRY BY SENATOR DAVID PERDUE

Questions 1–5. Based on our discussion, I would like to ask a few more questions 

on recent broader trends in the State Department’s budget. Looking at your overall 

budget request for the International Affairs budget for FY 2017, it represents a 25 

percent increase since FY 2008 in constant dollars. 

• What accounts for this increase in the budget since FY 2008? 

• What accounts caused this increase? 

• What were your biggest drivers of increased spending? 

Overall, this budget request appears to have some shifting priorities since FY 

2016. While the overall request has gone down by about 1 percent, the request for 

diplomatic engagement has gone up 4 percent. However, the overall foreign assistance request has decreased by 3 percent. 

• Is that the right direction we should be going in? 

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• How do you account for spending more here in Washington, D.C. and less on 

foreign assistance? 

Answer. Increases in spending by the Department of State and USAID since 2008 

are primarily due to a greater investments in humanitarian aid and the rising costs 

of maintaining the safety of our employees stationed overseas. 

The Department and USAID have expanded foreign assistance programs in recent 

years to address increasing global challenges, including addressing conflict and insecurity in Syria, Iraq, South Sudan, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and elsewhere. As part of this effort, humanitarian assistance 

needs have greatly increased, and we have responded robustly. In recent years, we 

have also expanded resources to address global health needs, the underlying causes 

of the migration crisis in Central America and to invest in Asia, as part of the administration’s Asia Rebalance effort. 

The increase in the Diplomatic Engagement portion of the Department of State 

budget from FY 2008 to the FY 2017 request is largely attributable to an increase 

in funding for security projects over this timeframe. Authority for non-security 

spending has remained essentially flat, while security related spending has more 

than doubled. 

There are three major factors that have contributed to the increase in security related authority: 

• The Department’s priority on maintaining a presence in conflict areas has required funding to protect our persons and assets in those areas. The Department sees great value in having Americans observing at the ground level in conflict areas worldwide. This is true of our missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

Pakistan. It is also true of missions that the United States maintained in conflict areas such as Libya and Yemen. America needs a diplomatic presence in 

conflict areas to counter terrorism, sectarian violence, and the spread of conflicts beyond borders. 

• The military draw-down in Iraq and Afghanistan has required that security of 

American persons and assets be provided by Department of State resources. As 

the military presence has been reduced in these two vital missions, the Department has taken on the role of maintaining a secure environment from which 

United States government personnel can operate. The security situation in 

these two countries is not only very different now than it was in 2008, but the 

number of military personnel is smaller than in 2008. 

• Internal reorganizations have moved security related spending to a handful of 

accounts, increasing these security accounts and reducing the administrative accounts from which the funds were moved. In FY 2008 much of the funding for 

Diplomatic Security was in the Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) ongoing operations account. Over time this funding has been moved to the Worldwide Security Protection (WSP) account. Similarly, security related funds in the 

Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) account have moved 

into the Worldwide Security Upgrades (WSU) account. 

The table below groups Diplomatic Engagement budget authority into four categories: 

FOUR CATEGORIES OF DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT BUDGET AUTHORITY 

D&CP Ongoing Operations The non-security portions of the D&CP (19-0113) account 

Other Diplomatic Engagement All other non-fee, non-security appropriated accounts except International Organizations (IO) 

Security Programs WSP, WSU, Protection of Foreign Missions and Officials 

International Organizations Contributions to International Organizations (CIO), Contributions to International 

Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) 

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COMPARISON OF APPROPRIATED BUDGET AUTHORITY FOR DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT 

FY 2008 Actual Versus FY 2017 Request (Non-Adjusted Dollars in Millions) 

FY 2008 

Actual 

FY 2017 

Request 

Percent 

Change 

(NonAdjusted) 

Percent 

Change 

(Constant 

Dollars)1

Diplomatic and Consular Programs ...................................... 5,639 4,957 –12 –21

Other Non-Security Diplomatic Engagement ......................... 1,439 1,852 29 16 

Security Related Programs .................................................... 1,949 5,332 174 146 

Worldwide Security Protection ........................................... 1,179 3,715 215 183 

Worldwide Security Upgrades ............................................ 747 1,587 112 91 

Protection of Foreign Missions and Officials .................... 23 30 30 17 

International Organizations .................................................... 3,473 3,932 13 2 

Contributions to International Organizations .................... 1,409 1,387 –2 –12

Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities .... 2,064 2,545 23 11 

Total Administration of Foreign Affairs ........................ 12,500 16,073 29 15 

1 Dollars adjusted using CPI-U BLS full year average for CY 2008 and OMB President’s Budget FY 2017 Assumptions for 

FY 2017. 

Questions 6, 7, and 8. Some U.S. policymakers, including some members of Congress, have disagreed with the U.S. peacekeeping assessment level set by the U.N. 

General Assembly. Since FY 1992, with few exceptions, Congress has enacted a cap 

on U.S. payments to U.N. peacekeeping at levels below the established U.N. assessment. Your budget request this year is based on the U.N. peacekeeping assessment 

for the U.S. of 28.56 percent, rather than the amount recognized by U.S. law, which 

is 27.14 percent. 

• What is the administration’s position on this issue? 

• How has the cap impacted recent budget requests and appropriations? 

• More broadly, what impact, if any, has this issue had on U.N. peacekeeping operations? 

Answer. The U.S. role as a global leader demands that we continue to pay our 

U.N. peacekeeping assessments in full, at the rate assessed, so U.N. peacekeeping 

missions have appropriate resources available to carry out their life-saving mandates. While Congress passed legislation in 1994 (P.L. 103-236) capping our use of 

appropriated funds for peacekeeping assessments at a rate of 25 percent, Congress 

also raised the cap for calendar years 2001 through 2012 to authorize the use of 

appropriated funds to pay U.S. assessed peacekeeping expenses in full.The current 

U.S. peacekeeping assessment rate for calendar year 2016 is 28.57 percent. However, the Department only has the authority for fiscal year 2016 to make payments 

from appropriated funds at the calendar year 2012 assessed rate of 27.14 percent. 

Because of the administration’s commitment to paying U.S. treaty obligations in full 

and on-time, the President’s request is based on the current U.N. peacekeeping assessment rate, and accordingly requests raising the statutory cap so that the United 

States can pay our assessments in full. 

If the funds are appropriated without an associated cap lift, the United Nations 

may apply U.N. peacekeeping credits to pay the difference, to the extent such credits are available. If there are not adequate credits to address the difference, the cap 

will cause the United States to accrue new arrears. The reliance on credits is not 

a sustainable practice as there may not be sufficient peacekeeping credits to address 

future shortfalls caused by the statutory cap. 

The gap between the actual U.S. assessment rate and the amount of the U.S. payment will deprive the United Nations of the full amount of funding that the General 

Assembly appropriated for peacekeeping missions. Reductions in U.S. payments can 

strain important U.N. peacekeeping operations or cause delays in reimbursements 

to troop contributing countries that can affect future troop rotations. Timely and full 

U.S. payment has helped to solidify the U.N.’s ability to attract and retain peacekeeping forces, strengthened U.S. leverage with troop contributing countries, and allowed us to more effectively shape and reform peacekeeping operations to deliver 

maximum impact. For example, in September 2015, President Obama convened the 

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Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping, which resulted in new and significant pledges of 

troops, police, and enabling capabilities to U.N. peacekeeping from over 50 countries 

and regional organizations. Paying late and accruing arrears undermines U.S. credibility and influence at the U.N., particularly on matters dealing with budget, finance, and management reform. In the past, this has affected world opinion regarding U.S. commitment to multilateral engagement and respect for the role of multilateral organizations, and has diminished our own U.S. influence even with our closest allies. 

Question 9. The world is facing unprecedented humanitarian crises where conflict 

and disaster have displaced millions of people. In June 2015, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that worldwide, nearly 60 million persons 

were forcibly displaced—the highest number on record. Despite these record highs, 

the total U.S. humanitarian assistance request is $6.156 billion—that’s 20 percent 

less than FY 2016. Further, the amount in the Migration and Refugee Assistance 

account in this year’s request decreased by $267 million. 

• What accounts for this significant decrease? Particularly when the causes of 

this mass migration have yet to be solved? 

Answer. The administration remains dedicated to providing strong support for humanitarian programs worldwide. The President’s FY 2017 request reflects the administration’s ongoing commitment to these programs. The FY 2017 request level 

includes $1.957 billion for the International Disaster Assistance Account, $1.35 billion for Food for Peace Title II, $2.799 billion for the Migration and Refugee Assistance Account, and $50 million for the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance 

Fund. The overall FY 2017 request for humanitarian assistance is $511 million 

higher than the FY 2016 request. In concert with FY 2016 resources, the request 

will enable the U.S. government to respond to the dire humanitarian situation resulting from the conflicts in Syria, South Sudan, Iraq, Ukraine, Yemen, as well as 

the humanitarian needs resulting from El Nin ̃ o. 

Thanks to generous support from Congress, the U.S. government is the largest 

humanitarian donor in the world, including to the crisis in Syria. We plan to continue our robust support in FY 2016 and FY 2017 while urging other donors, including the Gulf nations, to contribute to these ongoing emergencies. We will continue 

to ensure that we are using funds as efficiently as possible in order to meet current 

and unforeseen needs. 

Question 10. Is responding to humanitarian needs brought on by political crisis, 

such as in Syria and Iraq, different from those brought on by a natural disaster, 

such as the earthquake in Nepal or typhoon in Micronesia? 

Answer. In conflict-related humanitarian crises, parties to the conflict, which 

often include the government, may openly refuse access to humanitarian aid operations. By comparison, the most common barrier to access in natural disasters often 

involves bureaucratic bottlenecks. Governments closely coordinate relief activities 

with the international community in responding to natural disasters, while in conflict-related crises governments do not necessarily take the same approach. Conflictrelated crises may also result in protracted, long-term displacement, while displaced 

people in natural disasters tend to stay closer to home and have fewer barriers to 

return, necessitating different responses to these two types of crises. 

Question 11. Does the cause of the suffering come into play when the United 

States prioritizes recipients of humanitarian assistance? 

Answer. The United States prioritizes humanitarian assistance only on the basis 

of need, and does not consider the cause of suffering in determining assistance packages. 

Question 12. How do you respond to critics who argue that humanitarian assistance may actually prolong political crisis? 

Answer. The United States believes that provision of humanitarian assistance reduces the suffering caused by war. Humanitarian assistance is provided to non-combatants, is impartial and neutral, and provides no benefit to parties to a conflict. 

Question 13. How does the current allocation of foreign assistance, both regionally 

and by sector, reflect larger U.S. foreign policy priorities? 

Answer. The President’s FY 2017 Request for the Department and USAID includes $34.0 billion for foreign assistance programs. This request supports key national security, foreign policy, and development mission objectives. Regionally, the 

request includes $4 billion to counter Da’esh, respond to the crisis in Syria, and support humanitarian needs in the region. It requests $750.6 million to bolster the U.S. 

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Strategy for Engagement in Central America and $873.0 million to support economic development and security efforts as part of the Asia Rebalance effort. It also 

requests $7.1 billion to support our goals in Africa, including advancing democracy, 

health, education, economic growth and security throughout the region. 

As part of these regional efforts, the Department and USAID are also requesting 

funds to support important investments in critical sectors across the globe. The request includes $2.7 billion for democracy, human rights and governance programming, one of the core strategic goals of this administration. It also includes $983.9 

million to support the Global Climate Change Initiative and $561.8 million for basic 

education. These are just examples of the important cross-cutting programs requested as part of the FY 2017 request. All of these investments, plus many others, 

are critical to ensuring the success of our broader foreign policy and development 

goals. 

Question 14. How could aid, as a tool for foreign policy, be allocated to more effectively address strategic priorities? 

Answer. The Department of State and USAID always work to ensure the funds 

are allocated to address strategic priorities. The development of the President’s annual budget request for the Department of State and USAID begins at embassies 

and USAID missions around the world. These requests are based on country-specific 

priorities and strategies and are organized by mission objectives when they are submitted to the Department of State and USAID in Washington, DC. Department and 

USAID leadership then review the submissions from the embassies and missions 

overseas, and make tough decisions to ensure the request supports the most critical 

regional and global strategic priorities. In coordination with the Office of Management and Budget this results in a final budget request that advances the U.S. government’s most important foreign policy, national security, and development objectives. The President’s request reflects these priorities when it is submitted to Congress each year. 

Once an appropriation bill is passed, the allocation of funds must abide by funding directives included in the bill as well as the Statement of Managers, as required. 

Within these guidelines, the Department and USAID work to ensure the best allocation of resources in support of strategic foreign policy priorities. 

Question 15. How will you manage foreign assistance programs differently, if at 

all, in the absence of congressional directives? 

Answer. The Department of State and USAID have many shared priorities with 

Congress. While many congressional funding directives support these shared goals, 

including advancing democracy or education across the globe, we must be able to 

respond to changing circumstances and adapt as needed. Often times the world 

looks different from the time we submit our request until the time we receive our 

final appropriation. We need to remain nimble. 

In the absence of congressional directives, we would allocate funding according to 

the President’s request, which sustains projects, programs, and activities supported 

by Congress, taking into account changing circumstances, prior year funding availability, and any new needs that have emerged since the request was submitted. This 

would reduce our dependence on transfer authorities, which, while incredibly valuable, can be time consuming to execute and thus hinder our ability to move funds 

and respond quickly. 

Question 16. The U.N. estimates that there are 13.5 million people in need of assistance inside Syria. Meanwhile, large parts of Syria are controlled by non-government forces, including ISIS, while other areas have controls put in place by the 

Assad government, limiting the delivery of humanitarian assistance. 

• Can you describe State’s strategies for delivering assistance to these areas? 

Answer. Since the cessation of hostilities in Syria came into effect on February 

27, humanitarian access has significantly improved for many of the hard-to-reach 

and besieged locations prioritized by the International Syria Support Group 

(ISSG).Interagency convoys have provided emergency relief assistance to over 

200,000 people in besieged and hard-to-reach areas throughout the country. A year 

earlier, the U.N. had not been able to provide aid to any people in besieged areas. 

Approximately 500 U.N. interagency trucks crossed into northern Syria via the 

Bab al Salaam and Bab al Hawa border crossings, providing emergency relief supplies to people in Afrin, Azaz, and Mar’a sub-districts in Aleppo, as well as Harim 

and Idlib sub-districts, Idlib Governorate. The Turkish Red Crescent, which facilitates non-governmental organization (NGO) utilization of the humanitarian lanes at 

the borders, also reported an uptick in NGO cross-border deliveries, noting that an 

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estimated 800 trucks passed through the Atmeh, Bab al Hawa, Bab al Salaam, 

Kobane, and Yamadiah border crossings in February. 

Question 17. Approximately, in what percentage of the country have State and 

USAID been able to operate? 

Answer. Non-humanitarian assistance provided through the Syria Transition Assistance Response Team (START) and the Southern Syria Assistance Platform 

(SSAP) reaches 10 of Syria’s 13 provinces, including: Aleppo, Idlib, Lattakia, Hama, 

and Homs in the north/west and Suwayda, Damascus, Qunaytrah, and Dar’a in the 

south. Non-humanitarian assistance has also been provided to al-Hasakeh province 

in east Syria. 

We cannot provide an exact percentage of Syria in which State and USAID can 

deliver assistance. However, we work closely with countries in the region, mainly 

Turkey and Jordan, the United Nations, and our NGOs partners to get assistance 

into Syria through all possible means. Approximately, half of the more than $5.1 

billion of humanitarian assistance that we have provided has gone to humanitarian 

needs inside Syria. 

Our International Organization and NGO partners hope that the cessation of hostilities in Syria will allow for more systematic access to the besieged areas and hardto-reach locations. As the cessation of hostilities holds we continue to work with the 

U.N. and members of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), particularly 

Russia, to expand access and assistance to more priority areas inside the country 

Question 18. What requirements or specific policies does State and USAID have 

in place to vet volunteers or networks that assist in the delivery of this humanitarian aid? 

Answer. The Department of State and USAID vet beneficiaries of Syria assistance 

as part of our strategy to mitigate the risk that U.S. government non-lethal assistance could benefit groups or individuals associated with terrorism. Further, the vetting process is intended to ensure that U.S. government assistance is not provided 

to individuals or entities that are human rights violators: 

• Vetting coordinators from each implementing office coordinate with the intelligence community to identify derogatory or potentially derogatory information. 

• In addition to vetting, we closely monitor and evaluate our assistance through 

a network of Syrian in-country monitors who interface directly with beneficiaries to ensure assistance is delivered, hand receipts, photographs, and 

tracking devices. 

Question 19. What types of monitoring activities do State and USAID implement 

to ensure accountability of assistance delivery? 

Answer. Department of State. There are unique challenges to working in Syria, 

given the ongoing conflict, range of actors on the ground including designated terrorist organizations and the lack of U.S. presence on the ground. However, we have 

a range of monitoring procedures in place to help mitigate the risk that assistance 

falls into the wrong hands and ensure that the assistance is used appropriately by 

recipients. These efforts include: 

• Meetings with the recipients of Department of State assistance in Turkey or 

Jordan to ensure they know the responsibilities of accepting U.S. assistance. 

• Having recipients sign a letter of assurance before receiving support that details 

the responsibilities of accepting U.S. assistance and declares that they will not 

use the assistance for any other than its intended purpose or divert equipment 

to DTOs. 

• Follow up meeting with beneficiaries to assess the usefulness of the assistance 

to further refine their needs assessments and target the appropriate assistance. 

• Survey reports from recipients via email/phone to report on the use of the assistance. 

• Syrian field monitors are contracted to observe and survey beneficiaries for the 

provision of heavy equipment. When security allows, photographs are taken of 

in kind assistance. When the security situation cannot allow monitors, phone 

calls are used to query the recipients on the current location and status of 

equipment. 

USAID. USAID works closely with partners to ensure that our assistance is 

reaching the intended beneficiaries. We exercise considerable oversight over our programs, and our partners have developed a variety of multi-layered monitoring and 

tracking mechanisms to make sure that our assistance gets to those it is intended 

to reach. 

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• Partners are required to provide prompt, regular updates on the progress of 

their activities and any security concerns. USAID staff closely and systematically track the reports, are in regular direct communication with partners, and 

immediately follow up on any reported issues. 

• USAID works closely with all its partners to collect performance and situational 

data to monitor activities and gather enough information from different sources 

to verify assistance is reaching targeted areas and beneficiaries, including 

through geo-tagged photos and videos of distributions, independent field monitors, and feedback hotlines for beneficiaries. Partners are required to provide 

regular program updates on the progress of their activities and any security 

concerns, and we require them to report any diversions, seizures, or losses immediately, without exception, for immediate follow-up and investigation. 

• The USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) in Jordan and Turkey 

meets regularly with partners to discuss programming, issues that impede humanitarian activities, and partners’ risk mitigation mechanisms. The DART 

also meets with the broader humanitarian community, and communicates directly and indirectly with Syrian organizations that provide added layers of 

ground-truth to partner reporting. The DART also attends cluster and donor coordination meetings, which provide an opportunity to triangulate information 

about partners’ performance. 

• In addition, USAID utilizes a third-party monitoring system to verify and provide independent confirmation of a number of USAID programs. By providing 

independent, field-based monitoring of activities and verification of outputs, as 

well as monthly progress reporting, third party mechanisms supply USAID with 

the level of assurance that comes from field visits that are the basis of USAID 

monitoring in more stable environments, but also contribute to program learning. 

• USAID staff in Washington also maintains regular contact with all humanitarian partners, including U.N. agencies, other international organizations, and 

NGOs, concerning their assistance activities in Syria. The U.S. government humanitarian response inside Syria is coordinated by the Middle East Crisis Response (MECHR) Management Team, which is inclusive of both USAID’s Office 

of Food for Peace and USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. 

USAID leadership also regularly engages with U.N. agency emergency directors 

and other senior U.N. staff in a variety of forums, including Emergency Directors Group meetings, Syria Top Donor Group meetings, and other events. 

• As part of its mandate, the OIG write a quarterly Operation Inherent Resolve 

(OIR) report detailing out events of the quarter. The investigators explore a variety of issues to help understand and review USAID/OFDA and USAID/FFP 

operating principles, methods for ensuring accountability of funding, and efficacy of programming. 

Question 20. What percentage of deliveries in Syria has been affected by fraud or 

diversion? How does the U.S. track this? 

Answer. Known losses comprise less than four percent of Department of State 

non-humanitarian assistance provided through the Syria Transition Assistance Response Team (START) and Southern Syria Assistance Platform (SSAP) platforms. 

To date, less than 0.05 percent of USAID program funds for the Syria humanitarian crisis response have been lost to fraud or diversion. 

Approximately .04 percent of total Office of Transition Initiatives funded non-humanitarian assistance is known to be lost or diverted. 

We take all battlefield losses of U.S.-provided equipment very seriously and have 

a range of risk mitigation steps in place to limit these losses. However, given that 

Syria is an active war zone, some losses are unavoidable. It is important that we 

maintain our commitment to supporting the moderate opposition in Syria as they 

seek to counter extremists and defend against the regime, with the goal of ultimately creating the conditions for a negotiated political solution. Losses accounting 

is a joint effort between START and SSAP, USAID and the Department of State, 

implementing partners, and grantees. As losses come to light, START and SSAP 

staff work closely with implementing partners and grantees to confirm all relevant 

details, which are then tracked in Washington. 

Question 21. ISIS’s branch in Libya is expanding its reach across a broadening 

area of Africa. They are taking advantage of the chaos and security vacuum in 

Libya to expand territory, and grow. CIA Director John Brennan told the Senate 

earlier this month that quote, ‘‘Libya has become a magnet for individuals not only 

inside Libya, but from the African continent as well as from outside,’’ in terms of 

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terrorist recruitment. This year’s budget request focuses most of its counter-ISIS 

measures at Iraq and Syria, as well as immediately neighboring countries like Jordan and Lebanon. While ISIS in Iraq and Syria is certainly the more immediate 

threat, we should work to prevent this emerging threat in Libya from getting out 

of hand. 

• Could you outline for me what State plans to do to counter this developing 

threat in Libya? 

Answer. The United States remains committed to supporting the Libyan people 

in their fight against Da’esh. We are actively supporting the U.N.-facilitated Libyan 

political process to finalize formation of the Government of National Accord, putting 

Libya on the path to regaining control of the country’s ungoverned space. We and 

our international partners will work together with the Government of National Accord to counter the growing threat from Da’esh-aligned groups and other violent extremists and rebuild a national security force to restore stability in Libya. To that 

end, we are committed to providing the Government of National Accord technical, 

economic, humanitarian, security, and counter-terrorism assistance, as requested. 

We are pursuing our counterterrorism and governance efforts so that they proceed 

in parallel and are mutually reinforcing. A unified, capable national government is 

our best hope for a sustainable effort to counter Da’esh and other extremists. 

At the same time, we will not ignore immediate threats from Da’esh or other extremists. As President Obama has made clear, we will not hesitate when it comes 

to defending U.S. national security interests and to taking direct action when necessary. Actions like the U.S. strike on a Da’esh facility in Sabratha, Libya, which 

we announced on February 19, are part of our comprehensive approach to degrading 

and ultimately destroying Da’esh. Last November, the United States conducted an 

airstrike against Abu Nabil, an Iraqi, who was at the time the leader of Da’esh in 

Libya. These actions show our commitment to dislodging Da’esh from Libya. 

Question 22. Do you anticipate that the outbreak of the Zika virus in Latin America, which came to international attention after this budget request was formulated, 

will impact plans for global health assistance allocations in FY 2017? 

Answer. At this time, there are no changes to the FY 2017 Global Health request. 

The response to Zika requires immediate action. The FY 2016 emergency supplemental appropriations request would be our primary response to Zika. We are also 

exploring additional authorities to use available funds, including remaining funds 

in the Ebola supplemental appropriations. 

We should not divert funding from other important Global Health challenges for 

Zika. This would undermine our ability to achieve important global goals, such as 

ending child and maternal deaths and protecting communities from infectious diseases, including completing the response to Ebola, building global health security 

capacity, and addressing tuberculosis. These issues currently claim millions of lives 

each year—and most of these deaths are preventable, and doing so has been a priority of the U.S. government for many years. The experience over the last several 

years with outbreaks of Ebola, SARS, MERS-CoV, avian influenza and Zika has underscored the point that infectious disease outbreaks will happen and they can have 

devastating impacts locally and globally if they are not prevented and mitigated. 

Ensuring effective prevention, detection and response of such outbreaks is at the 

heart of global health security. If Zika continues to spread around the world, and 

response needs exceed the emergency funding capacity we have requested, we will 

have to explore and review the options available to address the changing epidemic. 

Question 23. Budget documents suggest that the proposed boost in malaria program funding would come in part from unobligated emergency funds to counter 

Ebola, if authorized by Congress. Is that true? 

Answer. Yes, the President’s budget for the Department of State and USAID in FY 2017 proposes to allocate approximately $129 million from unobligated Ebola 

funds as part of a $200 million increase for the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) 

to fight malaria. 

Malaria globally is a dangerous infectious disease that kills over 400,000 people 

annually, particularly children under five. Malaria remains a major cause of morbidity and mortality in sub-Saharan Africa, with a number of high burden countries 

in West and Central Africa. 

Question 24. Could you discuss the $1.3 billion in unobligated Ebola funds? What 

is the status of emergency Ebola funds? 

Answer. As of December 1, $1.2 billion in foreign assistance and $34.3 million in 

diplomatic engagement funding has been obligated for the Department of State ? 

USAID Ebola emergency response and recovery efforts. There is approximately $2.1 

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million unobligated diplomatic engagement Ebola funding and nearly $1.3 billion in 

unobligated foreign assistance. The bulk of this unobligated funding is, however, 

planned for critical ongoing Ebola response and recovery efforts in West Africa, including ensuring our ability to rapidly and effectively respond to new Ebola cases 

as well as addressing the needs of the survivor population, and activities to support 

the Global Health Security Agenda over the next five years. 

STATE AND USAID EBOLA EMERGENCY FUNDING—BY ACCOUNT 

As of January 1, 2016 

Total 

Appropriated Obligated Unobligated 

Foreign Assistance Funding 

IDA ......................................................................................................... 1,436,273,000 893,841,504 542,431,496 

GHP-USAID ............................................................................................ 312,000,000 164,024,524 147,975,476 

ESF ........................................................................................................ 711,725,000 128,687,073 583,037,927 

NADR ..................................................................................................... 5,300,000 5,300,000 0 

OE .......................................................................................................... 19,037,000 3,873,012 15,163,988 

OIG ........................................................................................................ 5,626,000 2,195,352 3,430,648 

Total .................................................................................................. 2,489,961,000 1,197,921,465 1,292,039,535 

Diplomatic Engagement Funding 

D&CP ..................................................................................................... 36,420,000 34,300,000 2,120,000 

Total .................................................................................................. 36,420,000 34,300,000 2,120,000 

Question 25. Why are these funds no longer needed to address Ebola? 

Answer. While the height of the Ebola epidemic is over, a majority of the unobligated Ebola funds are, in fact, still needed to sustain our ability to support Ebola 

recovery efforts and maintain our readiness to respond to flare-ups as they occur. 

While we do plan to maintain some resources to ensure we can meet ongoing Ebola 

needs, we anticipate some availability with remaining Ebola funds to address other 

critical health threats. 

Questions 26 and 27. If not necessary for Ebola programs, why did the Department choose not to apply them to addressing the Zika virus instead of seeking an 

emergency supplemental? 

• Since the State Department has so much transfer authority, coupled with the 

unobligated funds, is a Zika supplemental really necessary? 

Answer. While we anticipate some availability with remaining Ebola funds to address other critical health threats, a majority of the funds are still needed to sustain 

our ability to support Ebola recovery efforts and maintain our readiness to respond 

to flare-ups as they occur. The FY 2016 Zika supplemental request of $376 million 

reflects our best estimate, given current information, of potential State and USAID 

needs for the Zika response at this time; however, there remains significant uncertainty around the scope of the Zika challenges we will face. As such, the President’s 

FY 2017 Budget and the FY 2016 Zika supplemental request authority to use unobligated Ebola funds for other infectious diseases, such as Zika, in addition to Ebola. 

This authority would allow us to consider the use of Ebola funds to address Zika 

and other future infectious disease outbreaks, if needed, beyond the currently identified needs. We should not short-change our ability to address either of these important health challenges. 

We should not divert funding from other important challenges, particularly Global 

Health, for Zika. This would undermine our ability to achieve important global 

goals—such as ending child and maternal deaths and protecting communities from 

infectious diseases, including completing the response to Ebola, building global 

health security capacity, and addressing tuberculosis. These issues currently claim 

millions of lives each year—and most of these deaths are preventable, and doing so 

has been a priority of the U.S. government for many years. The experience over the 

last several years with outbreaks of Ebola, SARS, MERS-CoV, avian influenza and 

Zika has underscored the point that infectious disease outbreaks will happen and 

they can have devastating impacts locally and globally if they are not prevented and 

mitigated. Ensuring effective prevention, detection and response of such outbreaks 

is at the heart of global health security. If Zika continues to spread around the 

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world, and response needs exceed the emergency funding capacity we have requested, we will have to explore and review the options available to address the 

changing epidemic. 

Question 28. Given the challenges the Ebola outbreak presented, how do you know 

that you’ve requested the right amount for the Zika virus response? 

Answer. The recent increase in Zika virus cases around the world has had a significant impact on the medical evacuation operations of the Department of State. 

There have been a number of health concerns surrounding the impact of the Zika 

virus on those infected. However, a key concern has been the protection of the unborn child in our pregnant employees or family members. The Office of Medical 

Services has spent a considerable amount of time reviewing the latest published 

medical literature on the subject and information sent out from the applicable Federal and International organizations. As a result of our review and in keeping with 

our mission statement to safeguard and promote the health of our population, a decision was made to offer voluntary departure from posts under the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) level 2 travel advisory for Zika for women who 

are pregnant at any time during their pregnancy. 

The majority of additional funds requested are to support our medical evacuation 

program with a smaller amount needed to support additional full-time equivalent 

positions (FTEs) for our infectious diseases and epidemiology staff. The amount of 

additional funds requested was determined by using historical data on the number 

of obstetrical patients under the medical program for the past five years in the affected countries. A cost analysis was then undertaken to determine the projected 

amount of funds that would be required above and beyond normal operations to 

meet the medical evacuation needs of this population. We do not expect that all 

women who are authorized these funds will take advantage of the early medical 

evacuation option. 

However, we also expect that other countries in the near future will be added to 

those under this medical evacuation program. Therefore, we believe that the funds 

requested neither under or overestimate our additional funding needs. The nature 

of the Zika virus including its transmission, virulence and overall impact on an individual’s health is quite different than the Ebola virus. Although there are lessons 

learned from the Ebola response, the approach to Zika and its impact on our population is quite different making it difficult to draw parallel approaches. 

Question 29. The State Department requested more funds than were actually 

needed for Ebola response in FY 2015, and my understanding is that some of those 

funds are still floating around the State Department. 

• Isn’t this the type of contingency that State should normally be able to handle 

in your regular and OCO budgets? 

Answer. The Zika supplemental request reflects our best estimate given current 

information of potential needs to address Zika at this time, primarily in the Global 

Health Programs account. However, we continue to face significant uncertainty 

around the scope of the Zika challenges we will face. 

As such, the President’s Budget and the Zika supplemental request expanded authority to use unplanned Ebola funds for ‘‘other infectious diseases’’ so we can consider the appropriateness of using Ebola contingency funds for Zika if needed beyond the needs identified.Similarly, Section 7058(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Appropriations Act, 2015 (Div.J, P.L.113-235) potentially gives us another route to respond if Zika needs outpace what we have requested in the supplemental. But while we appreciate the flexible authority Congress provided to meet urgent health crises, we cannot keep diverting funds from 

other important health and development priorities to respond to outbreaks. We need 

to balance taking limited funds appropriated for other purposes with the needs of 

the current crisis. 

Question 30. In the fiscal year 2014 omnibus appropriations bill, Congress told the 

administration that no less than $2.85 billion dollars should be spent on democracy 

programs, yet when the actual totals came in, only $1.9 billion had been spent. 

• Can you please explain why democracy programs were underfunded by nearly 

one billion dollars in FY 2014? 

Answer. The U.S. government believes that Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) programs are essential to achieving and sustaining global development goals, as well as U.S. foreign policy objectives. 

As part of the annual budget process, and pursuant to Section 653a of the Foreign 

Assistance Act of 1961, USAID and the Department of State must provide a report 

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to the Committees on Appropriations that details what our planning levels will be 

for all sectors and countries. Once there is agreement, the administration seeks to 

meet the Congressional directed requirements, while supporting administration and 

Congressional priorities. In the end, in FY 2014, it was not possible to meet all Congressional directives and still fulfill these shared priorities. 

There are several reasons why we did not meet the suggested level for DRG in 

FY 2014. First, the amount of funding in a number of Congressional directed sectors 

in the enacted bill were higher than requested, as such, tradeoffs were required to 

balance Congressional and administration priorities. Second, emerging opportunities 

or closing spaces required us to revise our planning and move some programming 

outside of where it was initially allocated or requested. Finally, there were account 

level reductions from the President’s budget request and the FY 2013 enacted levels 

in FY 2014 that made it difficult to meet all of the shared priorities. The FY 2017 request for DRG programs for USAID is $2.3 billion, and we will 

continue to work towards meeting our highest priority goals in this sector, even 

when we face constraints. 

Question 31. Because democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) funding 

was so hard hit in FY 2014 and again in FY 2015, Congress for the first time included a hard protection for DRG funding in the FY 16 omnibus, stating that the 

administration ‘‘shall’’ spend no less than $2.308 billion on democracy programs. 

This was to prevent, for example, funds being diverted to clean water or climate programs that also happen to build good governance. 

• How will the administration ensure that during the remainder of FY 16 the full 

amount of this funding truly goes to DRG programs and is not used for other 

programs that have merely a secondary democracy or governance benefit? 

Answer. USAID appreciates Congress’s support of Democracy, Human Rights and 

Governance (DRG) programs, which are an essential aspect of U.S. foreign policy 

and sustainable, global development. The $2.3 billion earmark in FY 2016 will be allocated to core democracy, human 

rights and governance programs. In addition, USAID and the Department of State 

will continue to measure and invest in the integration of DRG principles and practices into programming outside of the DRG sector. This responds to USAID’s commitment to improve development outcomes through the integration of DRG principles in the 2015 Cross-Sectoral DRG Integration Action Plan and is responsive to 

the 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), which contends 

that ‘‘accountable, democratic governance is the surest way to expand social and economic opportunities’’ and ‘‘societies that allow citizens a say and a stake in their 

success are more stable, prosperous, and secure.’’ 

For example, an agriculture project that uses a community-based development approach to engage historically marginalized groups in the design and implementation 

of community development plansintegratesDRGprinciples, but would not fall within 

theDRG earmark set by the FY 2016 appropriations bill. 

Questions 32 and 33 . In Africa, for example, DRG funding has decreased by almost 50 percent since FY 2012, and between FY 2012-FY 2015, five countries (South 

Sudan, Liberia, DRC, Zimbabwe, and Kenya) received more than 60 percent of the 

DRG funding for the entire region.During this same time frame, in Latin America 

and the Caribbean, four countries (Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, and Haiti) received 58 

percent of the region’s total DRG funding. In South and Central Asia, Afghanistan 

and Pakistan receive 98 percent of this funding. 

• In the FY 2017 budget request, which countries receive democracy, human 

rights, and governance funding and which do not? 

• Why were the countries that are not receiving DRG funding under this budget 

excluded? 

Answer. The 81 countries that would receive Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) funding in the FY 2017 request, in addition to central and regional 

allocations, are noted in the summary tables of the of the Congressional Budget Justification. Several factors are used to determine the countries that will receive DRG 

funding: 

• We consider the need for DRG assistance in a country based on the specific 

country context. 

• We assess whether DRG programs are likely to be effective, including the willingness of the host government to permit such programs to operate. 

• We factor in U.S. government foreign policy and development priorities, and 

prioritize countries based on the availability of assistance resources after taking 

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into account legislative directives. In some cases, regional DRG funding is considered to be a more effective approach than bilateral funding. 

• In most cases, countries where we do not request DRG funding are places where 

the need for DRG assistance is lower than elsewhere, where it may be more difficult to conduct programs; or where the likelihood of having an impact is very 

low. 

Questions 34 and 35 . U.S. development assistance should foster long-term selfsufficiency andultimately support partner countries transition from foreign aid. The 

FY 16 Omnibus Appropriations bill included an important provision requiring all future country development strategies to include a plan for transitioning over time 

away from foreign assistance. 

• How is the State Department approaching these transition plans? 

• Have you considered developing clear, measurable, and realistic benchmarks for 

country transition, such as benchmarks for social and economic progress across 

social groups, public sector capacity, or the enabling environment for civil society and the private sector? 

Answer. Transition planning is being incorporated into USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCSs). During the first phase of CDCS development, 

decisions will be made regarding the necessary scope of transition planning for a 

particular mission, including the type of transition (e.g., phasing out of a particular 

sector, planning to transition assistance from programmatic to advisory, or phasing 

out of a country entirely) and over what time frame. 

Transition planning will be further developed and informed by analyses undertaken during subsequent phases of CDCS development. In the final phase of CDCS 

development, the Mission will complete a transition plan for inclusion in its CDCS 

submission. These decisions should be reflected in all CDCSs developed after January 1, 2016. 

Establishing goals for foreign assistance outcomes that would allow for USAID to 

transition its relationship with a country, and benchmarks towards achievement of 

those goals, is integral to USAID’s approach to transition planning. Given the variety of contexts in which USAID works, and the range of U.S. government interests 

in those countries, USAID’s approach is to develop broad guidelines for these benchmarks while preserving adaptability to local contexts so that our foreign assistance 

goals remain responsive to shifting realities. 

Benchmarks identified for transition may include indicators of democratic and socioeconomic progress as well as a consideration of levels of inequality and particular 

development needs or priorities (e.g., education, citizen security, etc.). Other benchmarks include major foreign policy and strategic considerations. Additionally, a Mission should identify resources and levels of capacity of local partners, host country 

government, the private sector and other donors to continue development progress 

once USAID transitions its role. 

One example of this approach has been USAID’s transition out of development assistance in Croatia. In March 2007, the Europe and Eurasia Bureau’s Monitoring 

Country Progress (MCP) team conducted a rigorous empirical analysis of Croatia’s 

progress in its transition to a market-oriented democracy, with a focus on the country’s prospects and timeline for transitioning from U.S. government assistance. The 

analysis centered on four MCP indices comparing economic reform, democratic reform, economic performance, and human capital trends in Croatia against those of 

several other key countries in the region whose degree of progress had earned them 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership and positive indication from Western Europe that European Union accession was likely. 

The MCP benchmarking exercise found that Croatia exceeded transition thresholds in most cases and particularly in terms of human capital, which takes into account per capita income, life expectancy, child mortality, secondary school enrollment, and public expenditures on education and health. Based on these findings, 

USAID determined that Croatia was soon likely to achieve a degree of progress 

upon which the path to political and economic reform had become irreversible. 

The decision to transition USAID/Croatia from a Mission to a non-presence country soon followed on June 30, 2008. First approved by the Department of State/ 

USAID Joint Policy Council in 2004, these MCP indices are still utilized and adapted to inform planning and strategic direction. 

Question 36. Roughly 10 percent, or $310 million, of State’s Development Assistance program budget is going to support the Global Climate Change initiative 

(GCCI). 

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• With all of the development challenges in the world today, do you think it is 

appropriate to be spending 10 percent of the overall on climate change? 

Answer. Climate change represents a substantial threat to U.S. national security 

interests and development objectives. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 

completed by the Department of Defense states that: 

Climate change poses another significant challenge for the United States 

and the world at large. As greenhouse gas emissions increase, sea levels are 

rising, average global temperatures are increasing, and severe weather patterns are accelerating. These changes, coupled with other global dynamics, 

including growing, urbanizing, more affluent populations, and substantial 

economic growth in India, China, Brazil, and other nations, will devastate 

homes, land, and infrastructure. Climate change may exacerbate water 

scarcity and lead to sharp increases in food costs. The pressures caused by 

climate change will influence resource competition while placing additional 

burdens on economies, societies, and governance institutions around the 

world. These effects are threat multipliers that will aggravate stressors 

abroad such as poverty, environmental degradation, political instability, 

and social tensions—conditions that can enable terrorist activity and other 

forms of violence. 

In late 2015, CIA Director John Brennan said the following while addressing the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Global Security Forum: 

Mankind’s relationship with the natural world is aggravating these problems and is a potential source of crisis itself. Last year was the warmest 

on record, and this year is on track to be even warmer. Extreme weather, 

along with public policies affecting food and water supplies, can worsen or 

create humanitarian crises. Of the most immediate concern, sharply reduced crop yields in multiple places simultaneously could trigger a shock 

in food prices with devastating effect, especially in already-fragile regions 

such as Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. Compromised access to 

food and water greatly increases the prospect for famine and deadly 

epidemics. 

U.S. leadership is essential to addressing these broad and wide-reaching challenges. The Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI) is the principal U.S. tool for 

providing technical assistance to developing countries confronting those challenges, 

and it serves a compelling U.S. national security interest. GCCI programs not only 

benefit our efforts to protect our climate system, they promote our broader development objectives. Virtually all GCCI programs have important benefits for food security, health, sustainability, economic development, poverty reduction, and regional 

stability, all of which benefit the U.S. and global economy. 

Questions 37 and 38 . Do you intend to come to Congress for a specific authorization of the Green Climate Fund? 

• Do you believe it is appropriate for Congress to have oversight over U.S. participation in the Green Climate Fund? 

Answer. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) has been established as a multilateral 

trust fund—much like other multilateral funds, such as the Climate Investment 

Funds—and has approved its first round of projects. As I stated during my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Department issued a 

grant to support the GCF from resources provided in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2016 (Div. K, P.L. 114- 

113) (SFOAA). Specifically, in the SFOAA, Congress provided $4.3 billion in funding 

for the Economic Support Fund (ESF), an account that is used to fund environmental programs and many other foreign assistance programs. The ESF account is 

a primary account through which the administration requested funding to support 

the Green Climate Fund (GCF) in the President’s FY 2016 budget request. 

While over one-half of the account is earmarked for specific programs or activities, 

the remainder is available for other programs to carry out the ESF authority in the 

Foreign Assistance Act. The administration is using a portion of those unallocated 

funds for the GCF under the ESF authority and section 7060(c) of the SFOAA. 

While the SFOAA did not earmark funds specifically for the GCF, it also did not 

contain any restrictions on the use of FY 2016 funds for the GCF. Provision of ESF 

for environmental programs, including through grants to multilateral trust funds, 

is consistent with long standing practice. 

This administration takes its GCF oversight role seriously and we are working 

hard to ensure that GCF funding is used responsibly through our role on the GCF 

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Board and our participation on two committees which oversee matters pertaining 

to oversight, the Ethics and Audit Committee and the Accreditation Committee. To 

that end, the GCF requires fiduciary standards and social and environmental safeguards that are among the strongest of all multilateral funds today. The Fund will 

have independent evaluation and integrity units, and Board proceedings and documents are among the most transparent of any multilateral mechanism.Questions for 

the Record Submitted toDirector Hari Sastry bySenator David Perdue (#39)Senate 

Committee on Foreign RelationsMarch 1, 2016 

Question 39. As this administration contemplates the way forward in Afghanistan, 

I hope that we have learned the lessons of Iraq, and don’t find ourselves with another power vacuum. The intelligence community testified earlier this month that, 

quote, ‘‘Afghanistan is at serious risk of a political breakdown in 2016.’’ 

• To what extent does the aid request (of $1.25 billion) for FY 2017 seek to prevent or mitigate the effects of such a potential breakdown? 

Answer. The FY 2017 foreign assistance request and already-appropriated resources at work in Afghanistan are essential to the success of our strategy to help 

Afghanistan build sustainable stability. A main focus of our assistance programs is 

to improve the functioning of the Afghan government. It is in our interests that the 

Afghan government be able to meet the needs of the people who elected it. Our programming enhances the effectiveness of Afghan governance in many ways. For example, we are implementing programs focused on improving the Afghan government’s delivery of education and health services, which has an immediate impact 

on all Afghans and impacts local perceptions of the credibility of the government. 

We are working in a similar fashion to improve the functioning of the Afghan justice 

and correctional systems. 

In 2017, we expect to continue the innovative New Development Partnership 

(NDP) that was initiated during the visit of President Ghani and Chief Executive 

Abdullah in 2015. The NDP will provide up to $800 million to the Afghan government through 2018 if it meets specific, pre-determined reforms and development results. The NDP conditions the provision of U.S. assistance on Afghan government 

progress in addressing corruption, improving the government’s fiscal sustainability 

and management, reducing poverty, and empowering women. Incentive funds are 

released only after the government has demonstrated that they have met pre-determined benchmarks established at the outset of the partnership. In 2015, the government achieved most of the NDP result targets agreed upon for the calendar year 

and qualified for $180 million of the $200 million that was available. 

Our assistance helps build a constituency for a stable government by providing 

Afghans with improvements and services that meet the needs of citizens and de-legitimize extremism. For example: 

• According to The Asia Foundation, in 2015, two-thirds of Afghans were satisfied 

with the quality of education their children received. 

• On average, nearly one million people per month are treated at USAID-supported facilities; of these, 76 percent are women and children younger than five. 

USAID has and will continue to support the Ministry of Public Health in their 

efforts to provide access to basic health care across Afghanistan. Women and 

children have particularly benefitted from USAID’s decade long commitment to 

Afghanistan’s health sector. Since 2002, USAID has trained more than 12,000 

community health workers and over 2,500 midwives - half of the entire population of midwives in the country. Furthermore, the Government of Afghanistan—in conjunction with the Department of State—reaches approximately 

28,000 patients per year in more than 100 drug treatment centers. 

• In 2015, women held 28 percent of seats in Parliament and four cabinet positions, and 165 judicial positions. 

• In 2015, after years of targeted assistance from USAID, the Afghan government 

successfully acceded to the World Trade Organization, and the Parliament is on 

track to ratify the accession agreement. 

• USAID recently completed the last segment of paved highway in eastern Afghanistan from Gardez to Khost. This road will link to the Pakistan border and 

open a strategic trade route. 

Question 40. What criteria will the administration use to determine whether the 

Afghan government is meeting the conditions to receive the total amount of the aid? 

Answer. As part of our policy to support Afghan reform and greater self-sufficiency, the Department of State and USAID employ incentive programs linked to 

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grams include conditions that the Afghan government must meet to receive additional on-budget assistance. President Ghani and CEO Abdullah encouraged the development of these programs, which include the U.S.—Afghan New Development 

Partnership (NDP), the counternarcotics-related Good Performers Initiative, and 

multilateral mechanisms like the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund’s (ARTF) 

Incentive Program, as a means of demonstrating accountability for the performance 

of the Afghan government. 

Each incentive program is continuously monitored and reviewed at least annually 

to determine if the program is having the intended reform results. For instance, 

under the terms of the NDP, U.S. and Afghan officials consult at least once a year 

to review progress on the current set of targets and to determine if changes need 

to be made to future targets. The NDP target results are focused on countering corruption, improving fiscal sustainability, reducing poverty, and empowering women. 

In 2015, the Afghan government achieved 90 percent of its annual reform targets 

and qualified for $180 million out of the $200 million available in on-budget assistance. The ARTF incentive program, which is partially funded by the United States, 

works similarly to the NDP and links the disbursement of on-budget assistance to 

Afghan government performance on revenue targets, and the implementation of policy reforms related to governance, civil service reform, public financial management, 

investment climate, and trade facilitation. 

Question 41. With the U.S. presence in Afghanistan diminishing, how is the use 

of USeconomic assistance monitored? 

Answer. U.S. agencies recognize the importance of program monitoring in Afghanistan to ensure the appropriate and effective use of our assistance funding. Due to 

the especially difficult operating environment in Afghanistan, the Department of 

State, USAID, and others have developed an innovative, multi-tiered monitoring approach for civilian assistance programs that allows for real-time assessment of how 

programs are functioning and whether they are achieving their intended results. 

This monitoring program draws on information from multiple sources, using independent monitors and various communications technologies to query recipients, local 

governments, and civil society on program performance. This monitoring information allows the United States to expand programs that are working well and to terminate programs that are not achieving results. When appropriate, we have 

changed course to refocus resources on more productive programs that have a greater demonstrated impact on Afghanistan’s development. 

Both the Department of State and USAID are contracting with independent, experienced organizations to verify program performance in areas of Afghanistan that 

are not regularly accessible to U.S. oversight officials. The organizations that monitor and verify the implementation of our programs employ mostly Afghan staff to 

operate in areas less accessible to foreigners. 

USAID has a Monitoring Support Program in place to monitor project activities, 

and has also developed technical monitoring contracts to help oversee programs that 

require specialized expertise, such as construction. The Department of State is implementing a Flexible Implementation and Monitoring Team contract that will provide monitoring services in locations around Afghanistan. In a number of cases, 

smaller implementing partners have bought into monitoring contracts administered 

by larger agencies to augment available oversight tools. 

Question 42. What programs have been most successful in promoting governance 

reform and economic growth? 

Answer. Below are a few examples of progress in Afghanistan attributable to U.S. 

assistance. We continue to review and analyze our current and past programs to assess impact and sustainability to help ensure we are supporting the most successful 

programs in promoting governance reform and economic growth: 

• After years of targeted assistance from USAID, the Afghan government successfully acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2015, and 

the Afghan Parliament is on track to ratify the accession agreement by summer 

2016. WTO membership will anchor Afghanistan in a rules-based trading system, and foster regional trade. 

• The U.S.—Afghan New Development Partnership has focused Afghan government attention on tackling corruption, improving fiscal sustainability, reducing 

poverty, and empowering Afghan women. In the first year of the partnership, 

the Afghan government met 90 percent of its targets and qualified for $180 million of the $200 million available for disbursement. Moreover, the achievements 

under the program directly contributed to a 20 percent increase in government 

revenues, re-establishment of the Afghan relationship with the International 

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Monetary Fund, anti-corruption measures in customs collection, and the establishment of a new procurement review commission. 

• The average number of years that Afghan children attend school has risen from 

2.5 years to 9.3 years since 2000, and 67 percent of Afghans are satisfied with 

the education that their children receive. In 2002, roughly 900,000 boys and 

zero girls were enrolled in school; by 2014, nearly eight million children attended school, with girls comprising one-third of the student population. 

• With help from USAID and other donors, the government provides basic health 

services to 2.3 million Afghan citizens a month. Since 2002, infant mortality has 

decreased 53 percent; child mortality rate has decreased 62 percent; and maternal mortality has decreased 77 percent. Furthermore, the Government of Afghanistan—in conjunction with the Department of State—reaches approximately 28,000 patients per year in more than 100 drug treatment centers. 

• In 2015, women held 28 percent of seats in Parliament, four cabinet positions, 

and 165 judicial positions. 

• We have also helped the Afghan government and private sector spur a communications revolution with nearly 90 percent of Afghan households owning a cell 

phone, and fostered the birth of a vibrant, free media. 

• The Department of State helped the government establish the Counter Narcotics Justice Center (CNJC), which tries all high-level and government official 

narcotics cases. With support from specialized enforcement units mentored by 

the Drug Enforcement Administration, and operations and maintenance support 

from the Department of State and the Government of Britain, the Afghan government has arrested and the CNJC has successfully prosecuted a U.S- designated drug king pin and provincial officials implicated in the drug trade. 

Question 43. How flexible are U.S. programs to augment those that are working 

and phasing out those that are not? 

Answer. The United States has established an innovative, multi-tiered monitoring 

approach for assistance programs in Afghanistan that draws on information from 

multiple sources (including implementing partners, the Government of Afghanistan, 

other international donors, Afghan civil society, and third-party monitors) and allows us to assess in real-time how our programs are functioning and whether they 

are achieving intended results. This monitoring information allows the United 

States to adjust programs when they are not achieving results. When necessary, we 

have changed course to refocus our resources on more productive programs or to 

have greater impact on Afghanistan’s development. As we fine tune our development activities, we also recognize that progress on many issues takes long-term, 

sustained work, and we employ multi-year, national-scale projects to maximize impact. 

The review and monitoring of individual programs feeds into a broader, bi-annual 

portfolio review that helps assess whether our developmental priorities support our 

broader objectives and are able to be implemented given budgetary and other operational and strategic constraints. 

The following are examples of when USAID/Afghanistan identified problems in 

implementation through monitoring and evaluation processes, and changed its programmatic approaches: 

• Democracy and Governance in Afghanistan: Computer-based video calls (e.g., 

Skype) are one of the tools USAID uses to remotely monitor democracy and governance training activities in Afghanistan. In 2015, USAID monitored over 600 

events. Thanks to this process, USAID has been able to observe events even 

when not physically present and take quick action to resolve any identified 

problems. For example, during one municipal budget training activity, it was 

observed that no females were involved in the training program. USAID discussed their observation with the implementing partner, which led the implementer to increase its efforts to include females in training activities. 

• Infrastructure in Afghanistan: USAID committed to building a critical, 101-kilometer road from Gardez to Khost in Western Afghanistan to enable the transport of goods between Afghanistan and Pakistan. USAID originally contracted 

with an international construction company on the project; however, after monitoring efforts revealed the contractor was struggling to build community support 

for the project, which was causing delays, USAID turned the project implementation over to a local firm. As a result, the project proceeded much faster and 

was recently completed. 

• Education in Afghanistan: In August 2013, USAID/Afghanistan signed an implementation letter with the Ministry of Education to fund a community-based 

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education program. The budget for the program was $56 million over five years; 

this funding was intended to be direct government-to-government assistance, 

provided to the ministry based on achievement of key milestones. However, as 

the Ministry of Education did not meet key targets in the beginning of implementation, USAID/Afghanistan did not disburse these funds through the direct 

government-to-government mechanism. Instead, USAID worked with UNICEF 

to implement the program. UNICEF has since partnered with the Ministry of 

Education, as well as provincial and district education offices, to improve community-based education in Afghanistan. 

Question 44. We are seeing some troubling developments in Ukraine. Earlier this 

month, Ukraine’s economic minister and his full team resigned citing ingrained corruption as their reason for stepping down. A major focus of our assistance has been 

centered around countering this rampart corruption. 

• Are we failing in Ukraine? 

Answer. With the help of U.S. and other international donor assistance, Ukraine 

continues to enact tough reforms, despite enormous challenges from continued Russian aggression in the east and occupation of Crimea, the difficulties of meeting the 

humanitarian needs of over one million internally displaced people, and the painful 

economic side effects of much-needed austerity measures. The U.S. government has provided approximately $760 million since the crisis began and $2 billion in loan guarantees. This includes a commitment of over $266 

million in security training and equipment to help Ukraine’s forces better monitor 

and secure their borders, operate more safely and effectively, and defend Ukraine’s 

sovereignty and territorial integrity. U.S. assistance also helped advanced key anticorruption reforms by supporting the establishment of the new anti-corruption institutions ensuring further reform of the Prosecutor General, and helping establish 

new patrol police in major cities throughout Ukraine, one of the most visible and 

publicly celebrated anti-corruption reforms so far. We will continue to dedicate 

funds to restructuring and professionalizing the entire police force, and to help ensure judicial and anti-corruption reforms continue. 

We also are working to help Ukraine confront Russian aggression as Russia arms, 

trains, finances, directs, and fights alongside separatists in eastern Ukraine and occupies Crimea. We have maintained unity with our European allies in imposing 

sanctions on Russia for its actions in Ukraine. 

These sanctions will remain until Russia fully implements the Minsk Agreements, 

restoring Ukrainian control over eastern Ukraine and its international borders. Crimea-related sanctions will remain in place until Russia ends its occupation of 

Ukraine’s peninsula.We will continue to push for progress in diplomatic engagement, pressing Russia at the highest levels to honor the commitments it made when 

it signed the Minsk Agreements. 

Question 45. Is Ukraine making sufficient efforts to fight corruption and enhance 

the rule of law? If so, how? 

Answer. The Ukrainian government is implementing an ambitious anti-corruption 

and rule of law reform agenda. Although Kyiv has made tremendous progress, much 

more must be done to root out corruption and advance democratic reforms. Our 

highest priorities for rule of law reforms are focused on improving the effectiveness 

of the operations of the new anti-corruption institutions; reform of the prosecutorial 

and judicial system; and police reform. 

Regarding the new anti-corruption institutions, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) has been established, along with a special anti-corruption prosecutor 

under the umbrella of the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO), and the two entities 

are working together to conduct investigations. 

In 2015, the Rada passed legislation to reform judicial self-governance, and to 

change the processes for appointments, discipline, qualifications, and training for judiciary members. Constitutional amendments required to bolster judicial independence are moving through the Rada now. 

The most visible and celebrated reform has been the establishment of the new 

openly recruited patrol police that replaced the notoriously corrupt traffic police. In 

2016, the new patrol police will be expanded to all oblast capitals. Our efforts to 

support Ukraine as it addresses anti-corruption focus on greater government transparency will be enhanced by new laws on e-procurement, public officials’ asset disclosures, and transparency on media companies’ ownership. 

These reforms will be critical to Ukraine’s future and have been valiantly fought 

for by ordinary Ukrainians. The United States will continue to work with the 

Ukrainian government, civil society, and media to encourage further reforms during 

this critical time in Ukraine’s history. 

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Question 46. Is U.S. aid helping Ukraine’s armed forces enhance its capabilities? 

Answer. Through the $266 million in training and equipment the United States 

has committed since the start of the crisis, we are helping Ukraine’s forces enhance 

their capabilities to monitor and secure their borders, operate more safely and effectively, and defend Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Our security assistance has saved lives while helping to build Ukraine’s long-term defense capacity. 

We have delivered non-lethal defensive equipment, including counter-battery radars, secure communications equipment, Humvees and up-armored civilian SUVs, 

medical equipment, and many other related items to help Ukraine protect its forces 

while defending against Russian aggression. We have stood up a multinational joint 

commission to better understand Ukraine’s defense requirements, which we have 

targeted for enhancement with subsequent security assistance, and have sent advisors to promote long-term defense reform. In November 2015, we completed a training program for Ukraine’s National Guard and are now training its conventional 

and Special Forces to increase their defense capabilities and institutional training 

capacity. 

We continue to work closely with Ukraine to identify requirements for security 

assistance. With your support, we intend to continue our efforts in FY 16 to increase 

the defense capacity of Ukraine’s conventional and Special Operations forces, State 

Border Guard Service, and National Guard. 

Question 47. Is non-lethal aid sufficient to help deter Russian aggression, or is 

some level of lethal aid needed? 

Answer. We have not ruled out sending lethal weapons to Ukraine. The United 

States continues to believe that there is no military resolution to the crisis, but 

Ukraine has the right to defend itself. We remain committed to supporting full implementation of the Minsk agreements, and our diplomatic efforts focus on supporting discussions in the Normandy format and in the Trilateral Contact Group to 

expedite their full implementation. We have provided significant non-lethal security 

assistance to Ukraine to help address the crisis, but our current focus is on finding 

a diplomatic solution. 

Question 48. What is the U.S. doing to help Georgia to hold free and fair elections 

later this year? 

Answer. In FY 2015, the U.S. government allocated more than $20 million to promote democracy in Georgia. Funded programs seek to advance democratic political 

processes, strengthen civic participation, bolster independent media, and support 

the rule of law. 

The October 2016 parliamentary elections will represent a key moment in the 

transformation and consolidation of Georgia’s democracy, which has made significant progress since independence. We are currently assessing the electoral environment to identify any unmet needs in advance of the elections. We will fund observation missions by international and local NGOs and plan to contribute observers to 

the OSCE observation mission. Electoral reform and safeguarding media freedom, 

civil society and political pluralism during the election season will be a key focus 

of the upcoming U.S.-Georgia Democracy Working Group. 

Question 49. Are there concerns about Georgia’s democracy and adherence to the 

rule of law? 

Answer. In FY 2015, the U.S. government allocated more than $20 million to promote democracy in Georgia. Funded programs seek to advance democratic political 

processes, strengthen civic participation, bolster independent media, and support 

the rule of law in an effort to reinforce government transparency, accountability, 

and responsiveness. 

Georgia has made significant progress since independence towards becoming a 

fully democratic state and is unique in the region in its commitment to democracy. 

Its 2012 and 2013 national elections resulted in the first constitutional change of 

power in a post-Soviet state, with the exception of the Baltics. The October 2016 

parliamentary elections will represent another key moment in the consolidation of 

Georgia’s democracy. It will be important for Georgia to maintain media freedom, 

promote political pluralism, and ensure independence of the judiciary as it moves 

toward these elections. 

Questions 50 to 53. Public diplomacy (PD) spending, including exchange programs, 

would see a 5.4 percent boost under the FY 2017 request, to a total of $1.21 billion. 

Among the administration’s PD priorities is countering Russian propaganda in Europe. The FY 2017 request for the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), an independent Federal agency responsible for all U.S. non-military international media 

programs (including Voice of America and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting), is for 

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$0.78 billion, a 3.8 percent increase over FY 2016 estimates. To counter Russian 

pressure, the requested funding would allow BBG to significantly increase Russian 

television and digital content. 

• Could you describe the department’s public diplomacy strategies in countering 

Russian propaganda efforts in Europe? 

• How do you measure the success or failure of these strategies? 

• To what extent do the BBG’s broadcasting efforts contribute to their success? 

• Is the budget request adequate to ensure the strategy’s success? 

Answer. The Kremlin is rapidly disseminating disinformation, part of a concerted 

effort to undermine trust in Western institutions and erode freedom of the press. 

Research shows that despite Moscow’s efforts and resources devoted to this objective, they have limited effectiveness abroad ? less than a third of Europeans polled 

outside of Russia are confident that Putin will do the right thing in world affairs 

or see Russia favorably. In these same European countries, views of the United 

States are much more positive; 69 percent viewed the U.S. favorably. 

Capitalizing on this public goodwill, the Department of State is leading a coordinated effort to support the free flow of information, expand independent media, root 

out corruption, and refute Russian government disinformation. Our efforts extend 

across a range of diplomatic tools as we proactively amplify key U.S. government 

messages, correct disinformation, engage opinion leaders, encourage independent 

voices, and forge and maintain people-to-people ties. 

The Department of State employs a combination of short-term messaging strategies with medium- and long-term programs to boost resilience and build capacity to 

recognize and reject Russian government disinformation. The Department supports 

our overseas posts in times of heightened Kremlin messaging. Armed with the facts, 

our missions abroad are able to adapt the content and materials we supply to their 

own audiences and rapidly amplify the truth. We have also increased our capacity 

to deliver our messages proactively in Russian by forming a cadre of Russian-speaking officers to engage with the media and introducing a Russian-language, policyoriented Twitter handle. We augment this messaging activity by providing foreign 

audiences with opportunities to engage directly with experts, opinion leaders, and 

third party groups. 

The Department of State is implementing programs that support independent 

media and investigative journalists in countries throughout the region, including 

Azerbaijan, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Ukraine, and the Baltics. We 

have developed exchanges to encourage independent media voices, including workshops on digital skills and investigative journalism, and support for a Digital Communicators Network of more than 1,000 members who bring accurate, objective information to regional audiences. 

At the same time, we are supporting efforts to engage ethnic Russian populations 

by expanding our English language training programs and professional exchanges. 

These cost-effective programs create lasting educational and professional linkages 

and increase English proficiency of students and educators, helping remove language as a barrier for thought leaders to understand U.S. policy and culture. 

U.S. public diplomacy also includes NATO and U.S. military outreach and media 

engagement. These high visibility engagements help dispel the Russian government’s anti-NATO messages and serve as opportunities to explain our security partnerships. Last year the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 

provided a new fund to support embassy public affairs teams in developing new, innovative public outreach projects pegged to U.S. military exercises in Europe. These 

interactions between people are the cornerstone of our strategy and absolutely essential in refuting disinformation. 

We continue to use our public diplomacy tools to deepen people-to-people ties in 

an admittedly challenging political environment. In the past year, the Department 

of State designed and implemented a range of programs in the region that build relationships based on common interests and perceptions. Based on participant feedback, we know these programs are having a positive net effect. In addition to anecdotal evidence, we also conduct evaluations of our programs to ensure impact. 

The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) receives steady input from the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, who serves on the 

BBG to ensure its strategic planning is aligned with broader U.S. foreign policy 

goals. The BBG is an active participant in an ongoing working group at the Department of State, through which it apprises the Department of its efforts and provides 

analysis of current media trends. In its own work, the BBG maintains a robust response to Russian disinformation through the combined work of Voice of America 

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platform programming around the world to counter the Kremlin’s strident antiAmerican messaging with fact-based journalism. 

The bureaus undertaking this important work ensure that our limited resources 

are directed, in the most effective way, toward implementing priority programs focused on countering Russian government disinformation. 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO

ROMAN NAPOLI BY SENATOR DAVID PERDUE

Question 1. The world is facing unprecedented humanitarian crises where conflict 

and disaster have displaced millions of people. In June 2015, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that worldwide, nearly 60 million persons 

were forcibly displaced—the highest number on record. Despite these record highs, 

the total U.S. humanitarian assistance request is $6.156 billion—that’s 20 percent 

less than FY 2016. Further, the amount in the Migration and Refugee Assistance 

account in this year’s request decreased by $267 million. What accounts for this significant decrease? Particularly when the causes of this mass migration have yet to 

be solved? 

Answer. In concert with FY 2016 resources, the President’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 

request will enable USAID specifically and the administration broadly to respond 

to the dire humanitarian situation resulting from the conflicts in Syria, South 

Sudan, Iraq, Ukraine, Yemen, as well as the humanitarian needs resulting from El 

Nino. The request reflects the administration’s ongoing commitment to these programs. The FY 2017 request of $6.156 billion for humanitarian assistance includes 

$1.957 billion for the International Disaster Assistance Account, $1.35 billion for 

Food for Peace Title II, as well as $2.799 billion for the Migration and Refugee Assistance Account, and $50 million for the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund managed by the U.S. Department of State. The overall FY 2017 request 

for humanitarian assistance is $511 million higher than the FY 2016 request. 

Thanks to generous support from the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Government is the 

largest humanitarian donor in the world, including to the crisis in Syria. We plan 

to continue our robust support in FY 2016 and FY 2017, while urging other donors, 

including the Gulf nations, to contribute to these ongoing emergencies. We will continue to ensure that we are using funds as efficiently as possible in order to meet 

current and unforeseen needs worldwide. 

Question 2. In 2015, the GAO reported on $1.7 billion in USAID assistance to 

Haiti and found a lack of planning for the sustainability of non-infrastructure 

projects in Haiti and a lack of USAID-wide guidance on how missions should plan 

for the sustainability of their infrastructure projects. What has USAID done to address the recommendations of GAO’s report and to focus on improving the sustainability of its projects? Please be specific in describing the steps being taken. 

Answer. USAID has been working to address the recommendations set forth in 

the June 2015 GAO report (GAO-15-517). 

In its first recommendation, GAO instructed USAID/Haiti to perform sustainability analyses when designing non-infrastructure activities to ensure that the results to be achieved by a project will be sustainable after donor funding ends. These 

analyses include, for example, recurrent cost analysis, an identification of the source 

of future revenues, and an assessment of institutional capacity that should be put 

in place or developed through the project. 

Based on the GAO findings outlined in the draft report, USAID/Haiti began to incorporate sustainability analyses during the project design phase for education and 

health (nutrition) sector activities, and for a project to combat gender-based violence. USAID/Haiti also revised its Mission Order on Project Design to incorporate 

language requiring that sustainability analyses be conducted during the project design phase of the Program Cycle. This Mission Order reiterates Agency-wide guidance on sustainability analysis and is applicable to both infrastructure and non-infrastructure activities. Furthermore, USAID/Haiti made specific Agency tools available on the Mission’s internal website to assist with sustainability analyses, such 

as a checklist of sustainability considerations and a menu of illustrative questions, 

issues and examples to help design teams think through the sustainability objectives of projects. This revised Mission Order was issued on October 8, 2015 and remains in effect. 

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The second recommendation asked USAID to provide guidance for identifying capital assistance projects, including infrastructure activities, for which USAID Missions must certify sustainability, to ensure compliance with Section 611(e) of the 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended. The identification of infrastructure 

projects and follow-through on Section 611(e) requirements for capital investments 

are integral to USAID’s Program Cycle, particularly at the design stage. Operating 

units identify infrastructure activities and confirm Section 611(e) requirements are 

met through completion of mandatory activity checklists and other planning requirements including initial environmental examinations. 

Nevertheless, USAID recognizes that, especially where infrastructure is not the 

primary objective of an activity, identification and sustainability planning can fall 

short of reasonably expected planning levels. The recently completed USAID Construction Assessment (November 2014) broadly recommends developing further policies ′′around successfully designing, implementing, and administering construction 

activities′′ in order to more effectively and efficiently manage investments and risk 

around capital projects. To this end, the Agency is already taking action to address 

Section 611(e) compliance as follows: 

• Select operating units, including the USAID/Haiti Mission, have already developed Mission Orders (operating unit specific guidance) for construction activity 

management, including compliance with Section 611(e) requirements. 

• The Agency’s Global Acquisition and Assistance System (GLAAS) was modified 

to allow for a simple (check box) identification of infrastructure activities in 

each active award. This modification allows for a search of GLAAS data fields 

(location, budget, contract value, etc.) for all activities that include construction 

across the Agency’s portfolio. 

• A training program on Section 611(e) compliance and best practices was delivered at the Agency’s global infrastructure conference held in Washington, DC 

in December 2014. Attendees at the conference included Agency engineers and 

contracting officers. Training on the 611(e) process is a part of USAID’s fiveday Engineering and Construction Contracting Management course. In the past 

12 months, the Agency has trained over 100 USAID staff. 

• The Agency’s Acquisition and Assistance Planning system now includes a field 

to track construction activities in planned upcoming awards. This allows the 

Agency to generate reports that track construction activities by location, technical sector, award value, anticipated award date, etc. 

The third recommendation seeks to ensure that USAID management has access 

to all information necessary to certify a host government’s capability to maintain 

and operate a capital assistance project and provides guidance specifying the types 

of information that missions should include in 611(e) certifications. 

In USAID’s effort to revise ADS 200 (Programming Policy), new language has 

been drafted to make the identification and screening of risk mandatory at the planning stage of all construction activities. Risk screening protocols are being piloted 

across USAID operating units at present. Sustainability is considered a significant 

category of risk for USAID construction. Risk screening protocols emphasize rigorous compliance with policy requirements, like 611(e), in order to achieve appropriate levels of risk management and mitigation. Guidance is expected to be completed and linked to the Agency’s Automated Directive System in the next six to 

12 months. 

Question 3. In February and March of 2015, USAID suspended two of the contractors that had worked on its flagship $30-plus million Caracol-EKAM housing project 

in Haiti due to faulty home construction and poor drainage that resulted in flooding 

of the site. New contracts were required to assess and make repairs to the project. 

What is the current status of these repairs, including the total expected cost? What 

steps has USAID taken to ensure that similar issues will not occur with implementing partners in the future? 

Answer. USAID/Haiti was deeply concerned to discover deficiencies detected in 

the housing and related site works constructed at the Caracol-EKAM site. 

The Agency is working to remedy deficiencies at the Caracol-EKAM housing site— 

starting with the hiring of a U.S. construction firm to address the most urgent deficiencies. USAID has already reinforced the nine individual footings that support a 

water tower on site. Planned repairs include: site storm drainage improvements, 

sanitation system upgrades, water system upgrades, strengthening of roof fasteners, 

and structural upgrades of house walls. The current total estimated cost of repairs 

and needed improvements to the Caracol-EKAM site includes an estimated $4.5 million for the assessment, the design to address the deficiencies, and the construction 

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management to oversee the work; and an estimated $7.9 million for the actual repairs and improvements. 

USAID is committed to ensuring that American taxpayer dollars are used wisely, 

effectively, and for their intended purpose in every place we work, including Haiti. 

The two contractor companies that performed the deficient work are currently excluded from competing for most federal government construction contracts, thus protecting the USG and the U.S. taxpayer from future harm. The Agency can and does 

exclude vendors that do not perform, helping to ensure that the federal government 

does business only with responsible partners. In addition, in March and July 2015, 

USAID terminated for default two contracts that were held by the contractors who 

worked on housing construction at Caracol-EKAM. 

Finally, USAID’s Office of the Inspector General routinely audits Agency programs, which is a standard practice for USAID programs worldwide. These audits 

help ensure proper financial and management control and give us the opportunity 

to make adjustments as warranted. 

Question 4. The U.N. estimates that there are 13.5 million people in need of assistance inside Syria. Meanwhile, large parts of Syria are controlled by non-government forces, including ISIS, while other areas have controls put in place by the 

Assad government, limiting the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Can you describe State’s strategies for delivering assistance to these areas? Approximately, in 

what percentage of the country have State and USAID been able to operate? 

Answer. U.S. Government humanitarian assistance is provided based on need and 

the ability of our partners to access the populations in need of assistance. Over the 

past five years, the United States has contributed over $5 billion in humanitarian 

funds. We cannot provide a percentage of the country in which State and USAID 

have been able to operate in delivering humanitarian assistance, because it changes 

from week to week and month to month. However, our assistance reaches an estimated 5 million Syrians inside Syria and in neighboring countries every month, and 

U.S. Government-funded humanitarian assistance has reached all 14 governorates 

of Syria over the last four years. The greatest access challenges have been areas 

that are cut off by deliberate siege tactics—19 areas including the Damascus suburbs, Idlib, and Deir ez Zour—and areas controlled by ISIL in northern Syria, where 

it has become prohibitively difficult to deliver humanitarian assistance without interference. 

To reach as many people as possible, we are working through all channels, including across conflict lines and crossing borders. The besieged areas mentioned above 

have remained a leading concern for us, but recently, as part of the International 

Syria Support Group (ISSG) agreement, the United Nations has been able to deliver 

assistance to many of those areas. We continue to advocate that more needs to be 

done to ensure continuous access throughout the country. 

USAID exercises considerable oversight over our programs, and our partners have 

developed a variety of multi-layered monitoring and tracking mechanisms to make 

sure that assistance gets to those it is intended to reach. USAID works closely with 

all partners to collect performance and situational data to monitor activities and 

gather enough information from different sources to verify assistance is reaching 

targeted areas and beneficiaries. USAID staff closely and systematically track the 

reports, are in regular direct communication with partners, and immediately follow 

up on any reported issues. Partners are required to provide regular program updates on the progress of their activities and any security concerns, and we require 

them to report any diversions, seizures, or losses immediately, and halt activities 

as necessary, until the issue is resolved. Partners monitor programs through geotagged photos and videos of the distributions, multiple independent field monitors, 

and provide feedback hotlines for beneficiaries. 

Question 5. Due to restrictions in place in Syria, aid is often delivered using networks of volunteers. What requirements or specific policies does State and USAID 

have in place to vet volunteers or networks that assist in the delivery of this humanitarian aid? What types of monitoring activities do State and USAID implement 

to ensure accountability of assistance delivery? What percentage of deliveries in 

Syria has been affected by fraud or diversion? How does the U.S. track this? 

Answer. Diversion is never an acceptable cost of doing business. USAID takes the 

loss and diversion of assistance—no matter the modality—very seriously. USAID’s 

Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has reported that, of the approximately $1.1 

billion provided for the Syrian humanitarian response between FY 2015 and FY 

2016 to date, roughly one-tenth of one percent has been lost to diversion. 

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The operating environment in Syria and the extended response to this crisis have 

created complexities that we have never before seen. Thus, there is acknowledged 

risk, but also several learning opportunities that have already been realized and improvements institutionalized into processes to prevent future occurrences. 

USAID works closely with its partners to collect performance and situational data 

to monitor activities and gather information from different sources to verify that assistance is reaching targeted areas and beneficiaries. Agency staff closely and systematically tracks this information, and follows up promptly on any reported issues. 

Partners are required to provide regular program updates on the progress of their 

activities and any security concerns, and to report any diversions, seizures, or losses 

immediately. Additionally, the Agency uses a variety of approaches to verify that 

aid is reaching its intended beneficiaries, including geo-tagged photos and videos of 

distributions, multiple independent field monitors, and feedback hotlines for beneficiaries. 

The USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) in Jordan and Turkey 

meets regularly with partners to discuss programming, issues that impede humanitarian activities, and partners’ monitoring and risk mitigation mechanisms. The 

DART also meets with the broader humanitarian community and communicates directly and indirectly with Syrian organizations that provide added layers of ground 

truth to partner reporting. The DART attends cluster and donor coordination meetings, which provide additional opportunities to triangulate information about partners’ performance. 

In addition, USAID uses a third-party monitoring system to verify and provide 

independent confirmation of a number of USAID programs. Through independent, 

field-based monitoring of activities, verification of outputs and monthly progress reporting, the third party mechanisms supply USAID with an additional level of assurance—similar to the role field visits provide for USAID monitoring activities in 

more stable environments—while also contributing to program learning. 

The U.S. Government humanitarian response inside Syria is coordinated by the 

Middle East Crisis Response (MECHR) Management Team, which is inclusive of 

both USAID’s Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FFP) and USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA). USAID staff in Washington, D.C. also 

maintain regular contact with our humanitarian partners, including United Nations 

(U.N.) agencies, other international organizations, and NGOs, concerning their assistance activities in Syria. In addition, USAID leadership regularly engages with 

U.N. agency emergency directors and other senior U.N. staff in a variety of fora, 

including Emergency Directors Group meetings, Syria Top Donor Group meetings, 

and other events. 

As with diversion, USAID has a zero tolerance policy for fraud and abuse of 

American taxpayer resources and will take every measure at our disposal to recover 

misspent funds. USAID halted several humanitarian aid activities in Turkey based 

on information provided by an NGO implementer and USAID’s OIG. Given that 

these investigations are ongoing, we refer you to the OIG for any further information on their findings. 

Question 6. What is the total amount of the FY 2017 request designated for assistance in Syria? How does that compare with the current funding level? How much 

of this is USAID anticipating on using for humanitarian assistance? 

Answer. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2017, the President’s request includes $1.075 billion 

for USAID related assistance to Syria. The humanitarian assistance request includes $898 million in International Disaster Assistance (IDA)-Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for Syria—$69 million (8 percent) above the FY 

2016 request, and $32 million (5 percent) above the FY 2015 actual—in order to 

identify and respond to the most critical, life-saving humanitarian needs of displaced and conflict-affected families in Syria, prioritizing food assistance, basic 

health care, relief commodities, water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), and protection programming. These resources will also be used to provide emergency food assistance to Syrian refugees in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. 

The Economic Support Fund request is $175 million—$15 million (9 percent) 

above the FY 2016 request, and nearly $147 million (525 percent) above FY 2015 

actuals. Syria also received an additional $114 million to augment the FY 2015 ESF 

allocation. The FY 2017 ESF request is $33 million (23 percent) above the total ESF 

allocation in FY 2015. These programs support moderate opposition by providing 

them the resources to restore essential services; improve local governance capacity 

through the ability to manage and deliver these essential services; support civil society organizations; and create livelihoods and other economic opportunities. 

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Additionally, the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has provided $2.2 million 

of FY 2015 Transition Initiative (TI) funds, and plans for $2.2m of FY 2016 TI funds 

in Syria, subject to change based on the evolving needs on the ground and availability of funds. OTI has managed $35.2m in non-TI in FY 2015, and currently 

plans for $14m in non-TI in FY 2016. Through USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) Syria Regional Program, we support Syrians who are building 

inclusive, accountable, and responsive governance institutions that address community needs. 

Figures included in the request are estimated projections subject to change based 

on need. USAID humanitarian assistance, in particular, must retain flexibility in 

order to respond to humanitarian needs as they emerge, such as sudden mass displacement, infectious disease outbreaks, and potential deteriorations in food security. 

Question 7. Do you anticipate that the outbreak of the Zika virus in Latin America, which came to international attention after this budget request was formulated, 

will impact plans for global health assistance allocations in FY 2017? 

Answer. At this time, there are no changes to the FY 2017 Global Health request. 

The response to Zika requires immediate action. The FY 2016 emergency supplemental appropriations request would be our primary response to Zika. We are also 

exploring additional authorities to use available funds, including remaining funds 

in the Ebola supplemental appropriations. 

We should not divert funding from other important Global Health challenges for 

Zika. This would undermine our ability to achieve important global goals—such as 

ending child and maternal deaths and protecting communities from infectious diseases, including completing the response to Ebola, building global health security 

capacity, and addressing tuberculosis. These issues currently claim millions of lives 

each year—and most of these deaths are preventable, and doing so has been a priority of the U.S. Government for many years. The experience over the last several 

years with outbreaks of Ebola, SARS, MERS-CoV, avian influenza and Zika has underscored the point that infectious disease outbreaks will happen and they can have 

devastating impacts locally and globally if they are not prevented and mitigated. 

Ensuring effective prevention, detection and response of such outbreaks is at the 

heart of global health security. If Zika continues to spread around the world, and 

response needs exceed the emergency funding capacity we have requested, we will 

have to explore and review the options available to address the changing epidemic. 

Question 8. What is the United States doing to help developing countries take on 

more of a leadership role in serving their own citizens, to make sure that the countries we are trying to help have all the tools they need to manage their way to an 

AIDS-free generation? 

Answer. USAID, as part of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 

(PEPFAR), helps developing countries take on a leadership role in the HIV/AIDS 

response through developing capacity and ensuring sustainability, and advocating 

for domestic resource mobilization. USAID and PEPFAR measure progress toward 

sustainability in partnership with local stakeholders through the Sustainability 

Index and Dashboard (SID), which is required each year for bilateral programs 

starting in FY 2015. SID is made up of four domains: 1) Governance, Leadership, 

and Accountability; 2) National Health System and Service Delivery; 3) Strategic Investments, Efficiency, and Sustainable Financing; and 4) Strategic Information. 

Within each domain, there are indicators that are used to examine areas of strength 

and those in need of improvement. SID is completed through stakeholder meetings 

and consultations, which include civil society groups, a range of government ministries and officials, private sector representatives, multilateral partners and others, 

which ensures a wide range of country perspectives are reflected in the final SID 

findings. 

In combination with other data streams, SID sustainability data is used to target 

the U.S. Government HIV funding (and as relevant, other donor funding) in ways 

that both directly link to HIV outcomes and improve the health systems and capacity of local stakeholders for the long term. 

In a further effort to support developing country partner governments to take a 

leadership role in the HIV/AIDS response, USAID is leading efforts within PEPFAR 

around sustainable financing for HIV programs. In countries with growing economies, mobilizing domestic resources is critical to achieving a sustained response to 

the epidemic and promoting an AIDS-free generation. Under the Sustainable Financing Initiative, USAID aims to deliver an AIDS-free generation through shared 

financial responsibility with the partner country governments of Kenya, Tanzania, 

Uganda, Nigeria, Zambia, Vietnam, and Mozambique. 

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The portfolio of Sustainable Financing Initiative interventions to raise local resources include: 1) economic and macro-fiscal data analysis and advocacy—use of 

evidence and in-country finance, costing and economic analyses to increase and sustain political will by host governments to commit more resources to health and HIV; 

2) tax administration and policy reform/financial management —increasing tax revenues through improving the collection of existing taxes and/ or developing new 

taxes; public financial management and program-based budgeting; 3) efficiency—improving technical efficiency and resource allocation through optimizations in service 

delivery, supply chain systems, health insurance, and other management reforms to 

enable countries to avoid waste of essential resources and improve HIV and AIDS 

outcomes within the existing set of resources; and 4) private sector and innovative 

financing—increasing use of private health insurance and markets, innovative financing, and corporate social responsibility to facilitate greater private sector participation. 

Question 9. In the fiscal year 2014 omnibus appropriations bill, Congress told the 

administration that no less than $2.85 billion dollars should be spent on democracy 

programs, yet when the actual totals came in, only $1.9 billion had been spent. Can 

you please explain why democracy programs were underfunded by nearly one billion 

dollars in FY 2014? 

Answer. The U.S. government believes that democracy, human rights and governance (DRG) programs are essential to achieving and sustaining global development 

goals, as well as U.S. foreign policy objectives. 

As part of the annual budget process, and pursuant to Section 653a of the Foreign 

Assistance Act of 1961, USAID and the Department of State must provide a report 

to the Committees on Appropriations that details what our planning levels will be 

for all sectors and countries. Once there is agreement, the administration seeks to 

meet the Congressional directed requirements, while supporting administration and 

Congressional priorities. In the end, in FY 2014, it was not possible to meet all Congressional directives and still fulfill these shared priorities. 

There are several reasons why we did not meet the suggested level for DRG in 

FY 2014. First, the amount of funding in a number of Congressional directed sectors 

in the enacted bill were higher than requested, as such, tradeoffs were required to 

balance Congressional and administration priorities. Second, emerging opportunities 

or closing spaces required us to revise our planning and move some programming 

outside of where it was initially allocated or requested. Finally, there were account 

level reductions from the President’s budget request and the FY 2013 enacted levels 

in FY 2014 that made it difficult to meet all of the shared priorities. 

The FY 2017 request for DRG programs for USAID is $2.3 billion, and we will 

continue to work towards meeting our highest priority goals in this sector, even 

when we face constraints. 

Question 10. Because democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) funding 

was so hard hit in FY 2014 and again in FY 2015, Congress for the first time included a hard protection for DRG funding in the FY 2016 omnibus, stating that the 

administration ‘‘shall’’ spend no less than $2.308 billion on democracy programs. 

This was to prevent, for example, funds being diverted to clean water or climate programs that also happen to build good governance. How will the administration ensure that during the remainder of FY 2016 the full amount of this funding truly 

goes to DRG programs and is not used for other programs that have merely a secondary democracy or governance benefit? 

Answer. USAID appreciates Congress’s support of Democracy, Human Rights and 

Governance (DRG) programs, which are an essential aspect of U.S. foreign policy 

and sustainable, global development. 

The $2.3 billion earmark in FY 2016 will be allocated to core democracy, human 

rights and governance programs. In addition, USAID and State will continue to 

measure and invest in the integration of DRG principles and practices into programming outside of the DRG sector. This responds to USAID’s commitment to improve 

development outcomes through the integration of DRG principles in the 2015 CrossSectoral DRG Integration Action Plan and is responsive to the 2015 Quadrennial 

Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), which contends that ‘‘accountable, 

democratic governance is the surest way to expand social and economic opportunities’’ and ‘‘societies that allow citizens a say and a stake in their success are more 

stable, prosperous, and secure.’’ 

For example, an agriculture project that uses a community-based development approach to engage historically marginalized groups in the design and implementation 

of community development plans integrates DRG principles, but would not fall within the DRG earmark set by the FY 2016 appropriations bill. 

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Question 11. How are determinations being made regarding which countries receive DRG funding and which do not? In Africa, for example, DRG funding has decreased by almost 50 percent since FY 2012, and between FY 2012-FY15, five countries (South Sudan, Liberia, DRC, Zimbabwe, and Kenya) received more than 60 

percent of the DRG funding for the entire region. During this same time frame, in 

Latin America and the Caribbean, four countries (Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, and 

Haiti) received 58 percent of the region’s total DRG funding. In South and Central 

Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan receive 98 percent of this funding. In the FY 2017 

budget request, which countries receive democracy, human rights, and governance 

funding and which do not? Why were the countries that are not receiving DRG funding under this budget excluded? 

Answer. The 81 countries that would receive Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance funding in the FY 2017 request, in addition to central and regional allocations, are noted in the summary tables of the of the Congressional Budget Justification. 

Several factors are used to determine the countries that will receive Democracy, 

Rights, and Governing (DRG) funding: 

• We consider the need for DRG assistance in a country based on the specific 

country context. 

• We assess whether DRG programs are likely to be effective, including the willingness of the host government to permit such programs to operate. 

• We factor in U.S. Government foreign policy and development priorities, and 

prioritize countries based on the availability of assistance resources after taking 

into account legislative directives. 

• In some cases, regional DRG funding is considered to be a more effective approach than bilateral funding. 

• In most cases, countries where we do not request DRG funding are places where 

the need for DRG assistance is lower than elsewhere, where it may be more difficult to conduct programs; or where the likelihood of having an impact is very 

low. 

Question 12. What is USAID doing to help Georgia to hold free and fair elections 

later this year? Are there concerns about Georgia’s democracy and adherence to the 

rule of law? 

Answer. In FY 2015, the U.S. government allocated more than $20 million to promote democracy and rule of law in Georgia. This continues in FY 2016, where USG 

funded programs in Georgia will seek to advance democratic political processes, 

strengthen civic participation, bolster independent media, and support the rule of 

law in an effort to support government transparency, accountability, and responsiveness, and promote Georgia’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. 

The October 2016 parliamentary elections will represent another key moment in 

the transformation and consolidation of Georgia’s democracy. Georgia has made significant progress since independence towards becoming a fully democratic state and 

is unique in the region in its commitment to democracy. Its 2012 and 2013 national 

elections resulted in the first peaceful constitutional change of power in post-Soviet 

Georgia. It will be important for Georgia to maintain and strengthen media freedom, continue to promote political pluralism, and ensure independence of the judiciary as it moves toward parliamentary elections this fall. 

The U.S. government is currently assessing the electoral environment to identify 

any unmet needs in advance of this year’s elections. In addition, the U.S. government is funding observation missions by the International Republican Institute, the 

National Democratic Institute, and local NGOs, and plans to contribute observers 

to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe observation mission. 

Pursuing electoral reform and the importance of safeguarding media freedom, civil 

society and political pluralism during the election season will be a key focus of the 

U.S.-Georgia Democracy Working Group to be held in Tbilisi this summer. 

Question 13. U.S. development assistance should foster long-term self-sufficiency 

and ultimately support partner countries transition from foreign aid. The FY 2016 

Omnibus Appropriations bill included an important provision requiring all future 

country development strategies to include a plan for transitioning over time away 

from foreign assistance. How is the State Department approaching these transition 

plans? Have you considered developing clear, measurable, and realistic benchmarks 

for country transition, such as benchmarks for social and economic progress across 

social groups, public sector capacity, or the enabling environment for civil society 

and the private sector? 

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Transition planning is being incorporated into USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCSs). During the first phase of CDCS development, decisions will be made regarding the necessary scope of transition planning for a particular mission, including the type of transition (e.g., phasing out of a particular sector, planning to transition assistance from programmatic to advisory, or phasing out 

of a country entirely) and over what time frame. Transition planning will be further 

developed and informed by analyses undertaken during subsequent phases of CDCS 

development. In the final phase of CDCS development, the Mission will complete 

a transition plan for inclusion in its CDCS submission. These decisions should be 

reflected in all CDCSs developed after January 1, 2016. 

Establishing goals for foreign assistance outcomes that would allow for USAID to 

transition its relationship with a country, and benchmarks towards achievement of 

those goals, is integral to USAID’s approach to transition planning. Given the variety of contexts in which USAID works, and the range of U.S. government interests 

in those countries, USAID’s approach is to develop broad guidelines for these benchmarks while preserving adaptability to local contexts so that our foreign assistance 

goals remain responsive to shifting realities. Benchmarks identified for transition 

may include indicators of democratic and socioeconomic progress as well as a consideration of levels of inequality and particular development needs or priorities (e.g., 

education, citizen security, etc.). Other benchmarks include major foreign policy and 

strategic considerations. Additionally, a Mission should identify resources and levels 

of capacity of local partners, host country government, the private sector and other 

donors to continue development progress once USAID transitions its role. 

One example of this approach has been USAID’s transition out of development assistance in Croatia. In March 2007, the Europe and Eurasia Bureau’s Monitoring 

Country Progress (MCP) team conducted a rigorous empirical analysis of Croatia’s 

progress in its transition to a market-oriented democracy, with a focus on the country’s prospects and timeline for transitioning from U.S. government assistance. The 

analysis centered on four MCP indices comparing economic reform, democratic reform, economic performance, and human capital trends in Croatia against those of 

several other key countries in the region whose degree of progress had earned them 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership and positive indication from Western Europe that European Union accession was likely. The MCP benchmarking exercise found that Croatia exceeded transition thresholds in most cases and particularly in terms of human capital, which takes into account per capita income, life expectancy, child mortality, secondary school enrollment, and public expenditures on 

education and health. Based on these findings, USAID determined that Croatia was 

soon likely to achieve a degree of progress upon which the path to political and economic reform had become irreversible. The decision to transition USAID/Croatia 

from a Mission to a non-presence country soon followed on June 30, 2008. First approved by the State/USAID Joint Policy Council in 2004, these MCP indices are still 

utilized and adapted to inform planning and strategic direction. 

Question 14. I understand that USAID is often tasked with on-the-ground implementation of certain State Department plans and initiatives, and in order for 

USAID to carry out these implementation efforts, State grants USAID a portion of 

its programmatic funding. However, these specific proportions transferred from 

State to USAID are not reflected in State’s Congressional Budget Justification. As 

a matter of fact, in preparing for this hearing, I had to rely on ‘‘guess-timates’’ from 

the Congressional Research Service on how much funding State transfers to USAID 

for different line items in the budget. In the interest of broader monitoring and evaluation, as well as public transparency, why are these funds not clearly delineated 

in either State or USAID’s budget? Would it be feasible for State and USAID to 

begin disclosing these amounts? If no, why not? 

Answer. The joint Department of State (State) and USAID budget includes the 

resources needed by both agencies to advance national security priorities related to 

diplomacy and development. State and USAID work closely both in developing budget requests, and in implementing programs in the year of appropriation. Decisions 

about implementing mechanisms and implementing partners are made in the year 

of appropriation, based on assessed needs on the ground, evolving circumstances 

(which USAID and State monitor), priorities, implementation capacity, and available implementation mechanisms. There are times in the field where State Department often relies on USAID to program and assist in planning the programming of 

resources, so the distinction of ownership over funding can play a relatively small 

role in how projects are designed and implemented. 

While there can be differences from year to year, historically USAID generally administers all of the Development Assistance, Global Health Programs-USAID, Food 

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counts. In most years, USAID has fully administered funding in the Complex Crises 

fund account as well. In addition, USAID fully implements the USAID Administrative Expense accounts: USAID Capital Investment Fund, USAID Development Credit Authority Admin Expenses, USAID Inspector General Operating Expenses, and 

USAID Operating Expenses accounts. USAID has historically administered 93 percent of the Economic Support Fund, 70 percent of Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, 

Central America, and 60 percent of the Global Health Program-State accounts. 

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FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER