1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : Crim. No. 4:16-CR-0006-2

:

v. : (Judge Brann)

:

ANTOINE PARIS DAVIS, :

:

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

July 6, 2016

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 14, 2016, Defendant Antoine Paris Davis (hereinafter “Mr. 

Davis”) and Co-Defendant Raheem Ruley (hereinafter “Mr. Ruley”)1 were charged 

with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and 100 grams or more of heroin, in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and with one count of possession with intent to distribute 100 

grams or more of heroin and cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846(a)(1).2 Mr. 

Ruley was also charged with three counts of distribution of cocaine.

3

On March 1, 2016, Mr. Ruley, through his counsel, filed a motion to sever

4

and a motion to suppress

5

evidence discovered after the execution of a search 

warrant obtained on June 15, 2015. Mr. Ruley’s motions were both denied by this 

 

1 All references to ECF documents refer to Docket Number 4:16-cr-00006.

2 ECF No. 1.

3

Id.

4 ECF No. 40.

5 ECF No. 38.

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Court on April 15, 2016.

6 Mr. Davis has since filed a motion to sever7

and a 

motion to suppress.8In accordance with the following analysis, Mr. Davis’ motions 

are both denied.

II. BACKGROUND

On three separate occasions between June 3 and June 16, 2015, 

Pennsylvania State Police troopers conducted controlled purchases of cocaine from 

Mr. Ruley. These controlled drug purchases were coordinated by an undercover 

trooper after receiving information from a confidential informant that the 

substances could be purchased from a suspect known as “Ant.” Prior to the third 

controlled purchase, the undercover trooper obtained a search warrant from a state 

magisterial district judge for 321 Tinsman Avenue, Williamsport, Pennsylvania, 

the home which Mr. Ruley was seen exiting prior to the controlled drug purchases. 

The search warrant was contingent on Mr. Ruley exiting 321 Tinsman Avenue 

immediately prior to the third controlled drug sale and delivering cocaine to an

undercover trooper. The third controlled drug purchase occurred as planned and 

Mr. Ruley was duly arrested.

After the arrest, investigators executed the anticipatory search warrant at 321 

Tinsman Avenue. The search of the residence yielded two safes containing 

evidence of drug trafficking. One safe contained four ounces of heroin, sixteen 

 

6 ECF No. 57.

7 ECF No. 60.

8 ECF No. 64.

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bags of cocaine, bags containing approximately eleven grams of cocaine powder, 

packing materials, and a digital scale. The second safe, found in Mr. Davis’ room,

contained $1,000 in currency, including the prerecorded funds used by the 

undercover trooper to purchase cocaine from Mr. Ruley on June 10, 2015, six 

caliber rounds, and a small bag of cocaine. 

In a kitchen drawer, investigators recovered Mr. Ruley’s wallet, which 

contained his Pennsylvania identification card and $380 in cash. Also in the 

drawer, investigators recovered plastic bags containing crack cocaine and vials of 

marijuana. In a bedroom, investigators found identification connecting Mr. Davis 

to the 321 Tinsman Avenue residence and various Lycoming County court 

documents bearing Mr. Davis’ name. The owner of the property also reported that 

Mr. Davis resided at the residence and paid the rent. A key to the residence was 

found on Mr. Davis’ person at the time of the search. Witnesses reported that Mr. 

Ruley occupied one of the bedrooms in the residence. In that bedroom, 

investigators found two digital scales, 9mm and .38 rounds, and records in the 

name of a person identified by the property owner as a former occupant in the 

home.

Mr. Davis’ cell phone was also recovered during the search. Mr. Davis’ 

phone uncovered calls and texts with the cell phone that the confidential informant 

and undercover trooper called to set up the controlled drug purchases which

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resulted in Mr. Ruley’s arrest. Text message conversations between Mr. Davis and 

Mr. Ruley and other individuals included discussion of heroin transactions and 

other drug distribution activities. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Suppress

In denying Mr. Ruley’s motion to suppress,9this Court held that the 

anticipatory search warrant issued for the search of 321 Tinsman Avenue was 

valid.10 Mr. Davis, in his motion to suppress, argues that, while the search warrant 

was validly issued, it was not validly executed. Specifically, Mr. Davis argues that 

upon entering the residence, law enforcement was informed that the home 

contained multiple dwelling units. At that point, law enforcement could no longer 

rely on the warrant to justify a search of the entire residence. Mr. Davis seeks to 

have the items recovered in his room, identified as room #5, suppressed because 

law enforcement lacked probable cause to search it.

The government, conversely, argues that the valid search warrant authorized 

law enforcement to search the entire premises. It further opposes Mr. Davis’ 

categorization of 321 Tinsman Avenue as a “multi-dwelling residence” and instead 

contends that this residence was a traditional single-family house.

 

9 ECF No. 38.

10 ECF No. 56.

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Both parties cite to Maryland v. Garrison11 and U.S. v. Ritter12 in support of 

their arguments. In Garrison, law enforcement secured a valid warrant to search a 

third floor apartment.13 The officers discovered that the third floor was in fact 

divided into two separate apartments after they found contraband in the 

neighboring apartment.14 The United States Supreme Court held that “if the 

officers had known, or even if they should have known, that there were two 

separate dwelling units . . . , they would have been obligated to exclude 

respondent's apartment from the scope of the requested warrant.”

15 The Court 

concluded that the search was nonetheless valid because the officers' failure to 

realize the overbreadth of the warrant was objectively understandable and 

reasonable under the circumstances.16

In Ritter, law enforcement executed a warrant to search a single-family 

house that was later determined to have been divided into multiple dwellings.17

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded the case to the 

District Court for further fact-finding to determine what evidence was discovered 

 

11 480 U.S. 79 (1987).

12 416 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2005).

13 Garrison, 480 U.S. at 81.

14 Id.

15 Id. at 85.

16 Id. at 88.

17 Ritter, 416 F.3d at 259.

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before and what evidence was discovered after the officers realized that the house 

had multiple dwelling units.18

These cases, while instructive, however, are not directly applicable to the 

matter at hand. The valid search warrant granted law enforcement the authority to 

search the property at 321 Tinsman Avenue, which was assumed to be a 

traditional, single-family home. Upon entering the residence, law enforcement 

were informed that Mr. Davis and his girlfriend, Angelie Lopez, shared the master 

bedroom and that Mr. Ruley and Hakeem Price, another adult present during the 

search, each had a room in the home. Nothing in the record indicates that these 

rooms were separate dwellings. In fact, it seems that Mr. Davis, the lessee of the 

entire premises, allowed Mr. Ruley, Mr. Price, and Ms. Lopez to reside there. 

While Mr. Davis may have had roommates, this fact does not convert the singlefamily home into an apartment house or multi-unit dwelling.19 Thus, law 

enforcement’s execution of the search warrant was lawful.

B. Motion to Sever

In his motion to sever, Mr. Davis contends that Mr. Ruley, his co-defendant, 

has agreed to testify on his behalf but only if separate trials are ordered, as Mr. 

Ruley does not wish to take the stand in his own trial. The Government opposes 

the request, arguing that there is no reason to believe that Mr. Ruley will actually 

 

18 Id. at 267.

19 See Durham v. McElynn, 254 Fed. Appx. 892, 896 (3d Cir. 2007).

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testify at trial and that, even if he did, his testimony would not be in any way 

exculpatory and would be easily impeached.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 provides that two or more defendants 

may be charged under one indictment “if they are alleged to have participated in 

the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, 

constituting an offense or offenses.”

20 Joint trials are generally favored in that they 

“conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, 

and avoid delays in bringing those accused of crime to trial.”21 A transactional 

nexus must exist, however, before joinder of defendants in a multiple-defendant 

trial is proper.22

Typically, defendants jointly indicted should be tried together to conserve 

judicial resources, especially where the same evidence would be presented at both 

trials.23 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14, however, provides that a court may 

order separate trials when a proper joinder “appears to prejudice a defendant . . .”24

In determining prejudice, “[t]he proper question on appeal is whether the jury 

could have been reasonably expected to compartmentalize the allegedly prejudicial 

evidence in light of the quantity and limited admissibility of the 

 

20 Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b).

21 U.S. v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 82 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)).

22 Jimenez, 513 F.3d at 82-83 (citing United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 287 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2003)).

23 U.S. v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 568 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing U.S. v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 306 (3d Cir.1989), cert. 

denied, 494 U.S. 1089 (1990); United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963, 984 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 

1110 (1986)).

24 Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a).

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evidence.”25 “Neither a disparity in evidence, nor introducing evidence more 

damaging to one defendant than others entitles seemingly less culpable defendants 

to severance.”

26

Whether to sever is a determination within the sound discretion of the trial 

judge.27 In making the determination, the trial judge must consider what trial 

developments are foreseeable at the time the motion to sever is made.28 Even if a 

judge is found to have abused his discretion in denying a motion to sever, a 

conviction will not be overturned unless the appellant meets the “heavy burden” of 

demonstrating “clear and substantial prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair 

trial.”29

Mr. Ruley has filed what has been described as an affidavit of truth 

indicating the following:

I Raheem Jarmar Ruley states that there was never any agreement 

between Antoine Paris Davis and I to distribute drugs to anyone. 

Antoine Paris Davis was not involved in any way, shape or form with 

drug activity nor did he have knowledge it. Antoine Paris Davis also 

did not receive any U.S. currency from me as a result of drug activity 

which involved Pennsylvania State Trooper Ryan S. Kelly on June 10, 

2015, as I put all of the U.S. currency that I received in my wallet. I 

will testify on behalf of Antoine Paris Davis in a severed trial. 

However, I will not testify in a joint trial.30

 

25 Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 568 (quoting U.S. v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963, 984 (3d Cir. 1985))

26 Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 568 (citing United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 427 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 484 

U.S. 1017 (1988)).

27 U.S. v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 400 (3d Cir. 1981)

28 See Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 568.

29 Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 568.

30 ECF No. 60-1.

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The Government also asserts that Mr. Ruley has expressed a desire to plead guilty 

to the conspiracy count of the indictment, with the following qualification: he will 

plead guilty to conspiring “with others,” but not with Mr. Davis.31 

In determining whether to “grant a severance on the ground that a joint trial 

would deprive the movant of the ability to call a codefendant as a defense 

witness,”32 a court must consider the following factors:

(1) the likelihood of co-defendant's testifying; (2) the degree to which 

such testimony would be exculpatory; (3) the degree to which the 

testifying co-defendants could be impeached; (4) judicial economy.33

First, a defendant seeking a severance on the basis that a co-defendant will 

testify on his behalf must show a likelihood that the co-defendant will actually 

testify.34 Courts have consistently held that “[b]are assertions that co-defendants 

will testify are insufficient” to warrant separate trials.35 The movant, however, need 

not show that the co-defendant is “certain” to testify but must show that he is 

“likely” to testify.36

 

31 ECF No. 66 at 15.

32 U.S. v. Kozell, 468 F. Supp. 746, 748 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (citing U.S. v. Boscia, 573 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 1978)).

33 Boscia, 573 F.2d at 832.

34 Id.

35 Id. See also Kozell, 468 F. Supp. at 748 (co-defendant’s counsel indication, in unsworn testimony, that if codefendant’s trial was held before defendant’s trial and if co-defendant was convicted, he “would probably be willing 

to testify on behalf of” defendant was insufficient to show that he was “likely” to testify); U.S. v. Schuler, 1997 WL 

83744 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 1997)(movant arguing that co-defendant could be “compelled to testify” and indicating his

intention to call co-defendant as a witness in the hope that he would furnish exculpatory testimony was insufficient 

to meet the first Boscia factor. Defendant’s motion was based on the following statement made by co-defendant 

after their arrest: “Man, what are you doing here? You ain’t a part of this ... stay strong ... I’ll even testify to that 

you didn’t have nothing to do with this.”).

36 Kozell, 468 F. Supp. at 748 (citing U.S. v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1965)).

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As stated above, Mr. Davis has provided an affidavit by Mr. Ruley 

indicating that he would testify on his behalf if severance were granted. The 

Government argues that, even if Mr. Ruley decides to plead guilty, he would still 

retain a privilege against self-incrimination throughout the presentence, sentencing, 

and appeals phases of his case and he would, therefore, be unlikely to actually 

testify on Mr. Davis’ behalf. The Government further cites Kozell for the 

contention that the first Boscia factor is not met when the co-defendant places 

condition on his willingness to testify.37

I believe that Mr. Davis has made a sufficient showing that Mr. Ruley would 

be likely to testify on his behalf if severance were granted. Mr. Davis has 

submitted a notarized affidavit38 by Mr. Ruley indicating that he would testify on 

Mr. Davis’ behalf if severance were granted.39 Through this affidavit, Mr. Ruley 

already incriminates himself, a fact that weighs against the Government’s 

argument that he is unlikely to testify because he retains his right to silence in the 

other phases of his case. Mr. Ruley has further expressed an interest in pleading 

guilty. His only condition is that he agrees that he conspired with “others” instead 

 

37 Kozell, 466 F. Supp. at 748.

38 The Government argues that suspicious circumstances mark Mr. Ruley’s affidavit because it does not contain the 

customary attestation that the affidavit was subscribed to and sworn before the notary and because Mr. Ruley’s 

signature is not immediately evident on the document, although his initials are. Mr. Davis, however, through his 

counsel, provides the contact information for Sara Schraeder, the Notary Public assigned to the Columbia County 

Prison who attested to Mr. Ruley’s affidavit, and indicates that the attestation also occurred in the presence of 

Correctional Officer Brad Hipps. Consequently, this Court is satisfied that the affidavit is authentic. 

39 See U.S. Ditizio, 530 F. Supp. 175, 177 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (“Obviously, had [defendant] submitted an affidavit by his 

co-defendant indicating that [co-defendant] intended to waive his privilege against self-incrimination, appear as a 

witness on [defendant’s] behalf, and repeat at a second trial the substance of the exculpatory statement he made to 

Government agents, the first Boscia consideration would be satisfied.”)

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of with Mr. Davis specifically. No evidence is presented to this Court that Mr. 

Ruley is conditioning his guilty plea on the severance of these cases. Therefore, the

only condition Mr. Ruley has set forth is in regard to his own guilty plea, not his 

willingness to testify on Mr. Davis’ behalf. Furthermore, Mr. Davis need not show 

that Mr. Ruley is certain to testify on his behalf and must only show that he is 

likely to testify on his behalf. Accordingly, Mr. Davis has met the first prong of the 

Boscia factors.

That said, Mr. Davis has failed to meet Boscia’s three remaining prongs.

Significant evidence was found in Mr. Davis’ room during the search of 321 

Tinsman Avenue, including a safe containing cocaine and approximately $1,000 in 

currency. The parties dispute whether this safe contained the prerecorded money 

used by the undercover trooper to purchase two bags of cocaine from Mr. Ruley on 

June 10, 2015 or whether the prerecorded money was found in Mr. Ruley’s wallet. 

Exhibit 1 of Mr. Davis’ brief in support of his motion to sever (a police report 

prepared by Trooper John Whipple) indicates, however, that the prerecorded 

money was seized from a safe in the master bedroom, room #5, identified as Mr.

Davis’ bedroom. At trial, officers would likely provide further testimony 

supporting this allegation. Accordingly, Mr. Ruley’s testimony that the 

prerecorded money was in his wallet would be wholly contradicted. 

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In addition to the currency and cocaine found in Mr. Davis’ room, his cell 

phone uncovered calls and texts to the phone number used by the confidential 

informant and the undercover trooper in arranging the controlled drug transactions. 

Text messages on the phone include discussions of heroin and other drug 

transactions between Mr. Davis and other individuals, including Mr. Ruley. Due to 

the abundance of evidence in support of Mr. Davis’ involvement in the charged 

offenses, the degree to which Mr. Ruley’s testimony would be exculpatory is 

extremely low.

Additionally, there is a significant likelihood that Mr. Ruley would be 

impeached if he were to testify at Mr. Davis’ trial. Mr. Ruley and Mr. Davis have 

been cellmates throughout the pendency of this trial. The Government maintains 

that Mr. Davis is older than Mr. Ruley and has a criminal history which 

significantly increases his sentencing exposure to a mandatory minimum prison 

term of ten years and maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Mr. Ruley, on the 

other hand, has no prior convictions. Accordingly, a jury would have reason to 

infer that Mr. Ruley would be testifying falsely to accept full responsibility on 

behalf of Mr. Davis so as to allow him to avoid a potentially harsh penalty.

Lastly, concerns of judicial economy weigh against granting a severance. 

The evidence against both defendants is interrelated and substantial. If Mr. Ruley 

elects against pleading guilty and continues to trial, a severance would require this 

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Court to expend time and resources presiding over two trials with similar issues, 

evidence, and witnesses. If Mr. Ruley decides to plead guilty, he may very well 

decide to testify on behalf of Mr. Davis, rendering this issue moot. Regardless, the 

risk of prejudice to Mr. Davis is low compared to the high cost of granting the 

motion to sever.

IV. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing reasoning, Mr. Davis’ motion to sever and 

motion to suppress are both denied.

BY THE COURT: 

s/ Matthew W. Brann 

Matthew W. Brann

United States District Judge 

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