UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EZZIE CHARLES JOHNSON : 

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-1920

Petitioner : 

 (JUDGE MANNION)

v. : 

 

MELINDA ADAMS, : 

 

 Respondent : 

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court is pro se Petitioner Ezzie Charles Johnson’s 

(“Johnson” or “Petitioner”) instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. §2254, seeking relief from the Judgment of Sentence entered 

on January 5, 2021, in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal 

Division at CP-14-CR-0001386-2019, following conviction of two counts of 

possession with intent to deliver, under 35 Pa. Stat. §780-113(a)(30). (Doc. 

1). Johnson seeks relief upon a single ground, that the police allegedly 

violated his Fourth Amendment right when the police executed a warrantless 

search of the residence he occupied under police-contrived exigent 

circumstances. 

For the reasons set forth below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus, 

which is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

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1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, April 24, 1994 (“AEDPA”), will be 

denied. 

I. State Court Factual and Procedural Background

The relevant facts set forth below are extracted from the Superior Court 

of Pennsylvania’s November 15, 2021, decision considering the Petitioner’s 

singular issue on appeal of whether the trial court erred in denying 

Petitioner’s Motion to Suppress based upon the warrantless entry and 

search of the residence absent exigent circumstances (Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, No. 110 MDA 2021 (Pa. Super. 2021)):

Detective Donald Paul (“Detective Paul”) is employed by 

the State College Police Department Criminal Investigations 

Division, Drug Enforcement Section. On October 2, 2019, 

Detective Paul was conducting surveillance of [Petitioner’s] 

residence located at 215 E. Logan Street, along with Detective 

Chris Federinko (“Detective Federinko”), Trooper Ryan Maggs 

(“Trooper Maggs”), and Trooper Trevor Danko (“Trooper 

Danko”).

The Commonwealth alleges knowledge of [Petitioner’s] 

address was acquired following a hearing wherein the Honorable 

Katherine V. Oliver issued a bench warrant for one of 

[Petitioner’s] alleged co-conspirators, Dana Walk (“Walk”), said 

warrant listing 215 E. Logan St. Bellefonte, PA as Walk’s 

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residence. Walk’s warrant was issued due to alleged probation 

violations, including the use of controlled substances.

“Based on previous surveillance and tips from a known 

informant,” the above law enforcement personnel began 

surveillance of [Petitioner’s] residence at approximately 10:30 

a.m. for drug-related activity. The previous surveillance revealed 

[Petitioner] delivering controlled substances from the local 

Ramada Inn in August of 2019.

Walk [also] lived at the residence on Logan Street in 

Bellefonte with her then boyfriend, Jeff Spicer (“Spicer”). 

Detective Paul saw Walk and another individual, Ricky Vannoy 

(“Vannoy”), enter the residence at approximately 12:11 p.m. 

While conducting surveillance, multiple individuals were seen 

coming and going from the residence and speaking with 

[Petitioner] on the porch, their behavior noted as being consistent 

with drug dealing activity.

One such individual was later identified as Kylie Smith 

(“Smith”), whom Detective Paul decided to follow until she parked 

in order to make contact with her. When Detective Paul 

approached Smith, she was getting out of her vehicle while 

speaking on her cell phone. Detective Paul identified himself 

[specifically stating he was from Drug Enforcement] and asked if 

he could speak with Smith, to which she agreed and hung up her 

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phone.1 Smith later confirmed she was speaking with Spicer on 

her cell phone when she was approached by Detective Paul.

During their conversation, Smith admitted to purchasing 

methamphetamine from individuals within the residence on 

Logan Street. Smith told Detective Paul that Spicer was currently 

traveling out of state. Spicer sent a text message to Smith during 

her interaction with Detective Paul which read, “You good hun?”

Smith later allowed Detective Paul and the other officers [to] take 

photographs of her text messages with Spicer involving her

purchase of methamphetamine within the residence. Detective 

Paul asked for permission to search the vehicle and Smith 

consented. During his search, Detective Paul discovered a small 

plastic bag of crystal meth in Smith's wallet and alerted the other 

officers.

1 This factual point was contested by the Petitioner who alleged that 

Smith “parked her car, got out began to walk towards an apartment building 

while she was speaking to someone on her cellphone. She was in the 

process of ending the call, when she noticed Det. Don Paul trying to get her 

attention. She was caught off guard but aggreed [sic] to speak to the 

detective. At the police station, Kylie Smith supplied a written statement and 

also testified at the [Petitioner’s] suppression hearing that ... ‘She had hung 

up her phone before Don Paul introduce himself as a cop...’ Then when 

questioned on the stand if she believed that the person she was speaking to 

heard the police introduce himself she stated no.” (Doc. 7, p. 2). This Court 

will accredit the factual determination made by the trial court, which weighed 

all the evidence and testimony provided at the suppression hearing on 

January 16, 2020. (See generally, Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. CP-14-

CR-1396-2019, Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, Penn. Criminal 

Action Opinion and Order (June 2, 2020)). 

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Detective Paul provided testimony indicating concern 

regarding the remaining occupants of the residence becoming 

aware of the police officer presence and the [potential for] 

destruction of evidence. Based on his concern, Detective Paul 

directed the other officers to secure the residence while he made 

the application for a search warrant.

Corporal McGuire and Trooper Danko approached the 

residence in full uniform and saw an individual standing in the 

doorway. Trooper Danko testified to stating, “Hey, I need to talk 

to you,” as he approached the front door of the residence. At that 

time, the individual, who was confirmed via radio to be 

[Petitioner], attempted to run back inside the residence and close 

the doors on the officers. The officers and [Petitioner] struggled 

at the door until Trooper Maggs assisted the officers in pushing 

it open.

After pushing the door back open, the officers could visibly 

see drugs under the couch and on the coffee table in the living 

room. A protective sweep was conducted. Trooper Maggs 

testified to clearing the residence and detaining the individuals 

inside. Detective Paul testified the entry into the home was in 

order to secure the residence and prevent the destruction of 

evidence. Detective Paul obtained a warrant to search the 

residence following the protective sweep.

The Affidavit of Probable Cause for the search warrant 

stated, “Based upon your affiant’s experience, training and all of 

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the circumstances of this case, it is believed that probable cause 

exists to search the residence based upon the following ... (4) 

additional drugs were observed in plain view on the coffee table 

in the residence.” Methamphetamine, heroin, fentanyl, marijuana 

and pills were found within the residence. Smith provided 

conflicting statements as to who handed her the 

methamphetamine.

Id. at *1-2 (quoting the Suppression Court Opinion, see infra n. 1) 

(except for this Court changing the term “Appellant” for “Petitioner,” all other 

modifications were made by the Superior Court). As a result of the police 

investigation and search of the residence, Petitioner was arrested and 

charged with 15 crimes. On December 16, 2019, Petitioner filed a motion to 

suppress, challenging the warrantless entry into the residence. The court 

held a hearing on January 16, 2020, and on June 2, 2020, it issued an 

opinion and order denying the motion, finding that exigent circumstances 

existed making the warrantless entry into the residence reasonable. 

Following an October 1, 2020 bench trial, the court having reviewed, among 

other things, the suppression hearing transcript, the drug identification 

report, Smith’s written statement and photographs taken at the residence 

showing the heroin and methamphetamine on the coffee table inside the 

residence, convicted Petitioner of two counts of possession with intent to 

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deliver.

2 On January 5, 2021, the court sentenced Petitioner to an aggregate 

7 to 14 years of incarceration. 

Petitioner then filed a notice of appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior 

Court on January 19, 2021, raising a singular issue on appeal, whether the 

trial court erred in denying Petitioner’s Motion to Suppress based upon the 

warrantless entry and search of the residence absent exigent circumstances. 

The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction by opinion 

and order dated November 15, 2021, finding that exigent circumstances 

existed justifying the warrantless entry and that the police did not create the 

exigencies in question. Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. 110 MDA 2021 at 

*10-15 (Pa. Super. 2021).

Petitioner then filed for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court on December 13, 2021, which was denied on June 24, 2022. 

(See Doc. 16-1, Appx. J and K). Petitioner has exhausted all state remedies 

for the sole claim presented and now comes before this Court. 

2 Counts 1-4 and 7-15 were dismissed by Commonwealth’s decision 

to discontinue the prosecution of such counts. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 

No. 110 MDA 2021 at *3 (Pa. Super. 2021).

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II. Legal Standard

A habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 is the proper 

mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the “fact or duration” of his 

confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973). 28 U.S.C. 

§2254, provides, in pertinent part:

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a 

district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment 

of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States.

...

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall 

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on 

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of 

the claim— 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. §2254. Section 2254 sets limits on the power of a federal 

court to grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state 

prisoner. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011); Glenn v. Wynder, 

743 F.3d 402, 406 (3d Cir. 2014). A federal court may consider a habeas 

petition filed by a state prisoner only “on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 

U.S.C. §2254(a). This limitation places a high threshold on the courts. 

Typically, habeas relief will only be granted to state prisoners in those 

instances where the conduct of state proceedings resulted in “a fundamental 

defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice [or] an 

omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” Reed 

v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 348 (1994) (citations omitted).

As mentioned in the introduction, Petitioner’s case is governed by the 

AEDPA and “because the purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal 

habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state 

criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction,” Greene v. 

Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted), 

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“[t]his is a difficult to meet and highly deferential standard ... which demands 

that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen, 563 U.S. 

at 181 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, the burden is on 

Petitioner to prove entitlement to the writ. Id.

III. Discussion

Petitioner claims that the police violated his rights under the Fourth 

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution to be 

free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amnd. IV 

and XIV; Pa. Const. Art. I. §8. In particular, Petitioner claims that the trial 

court’s, as well as the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s, findings of exigent 

circumstances was “contrary to, or involving an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” (Doc. 20, pp. 7-8). The Court disagrees. 

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be 

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 

searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. As that 

text makes clear, “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 

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‘reasonableness.’” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). “That 

standard ‘generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant’ before a law 

enforcement officer can enter a home without permission.” Lange v. 

California, 594 U.S. 295, 301 (2021) (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 

373, 382 (2014)). “But not always: The ‘warrant requirement is subject to 

certain exceptions.’” Id. (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S., at 403).

One important exception is for exigent circumstances. It applies when 

“the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so 

compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable.” Kentucky 

v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The 

exception enables law enforcement officers to handle ‘emergenc[ies]’—

situations presenting a ‘compelling need for official action and no time to 

secure a warrant.’ Lange, 594 U.S. at 301 (quoting Riley, 573 U.S., at 402). 

Over the years, the Supreme Court has identified several such exigencies. 

An officer, for example, may “enter a home without a warrant to render 

emergency assistance to an injured occupant[,] to protect an occupant from 

imminent injury,” or to ensure his own safety. Brigham City, 547 U.S., at 403. 

So too, the police may make a warrantless entry to “prevent the imminent 

destruction of evidence” or to “prevent a suspect’s escape.” Brigham City, 

547 U.S., at 403; Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) (internal 

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quotation marks omitted). “In those circumstances, the delay required to 

obtain a warrant would bring about ‘some real immediate and serious 

consequences’—and so the absence of a warrant is excused.” Lange, 594 

U.S. at 302 (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 751 (1984)).

The Supreme court has determined that cases applying the exigentcircumstances exception must do so on a “case-by-case basis.” Lange, 594 

U.S. at 302 (citing Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016)). The 

exception “requires a court to examine whether an emergency justified a 

warrantless search in each particular case.” Id. (citing Riley, 573 U.S. at 402). 

“Or put more curtly, the exception is ‘case-specific.’ Id. “That approach 

reflects the nature of emergencies. Whether a ‘now or never situation’

actually exists—whether an officer has ‘no time to secure a warrant’—

depends upon facts on the ground.” Id. The court must review the totality of 

circumstances confronting the officer as he decides to make a warrantless 

entry. Id.

Here, Petitioner does not challenge the exception found to the 

warrantless search as a matter of law but as a matter of fact. Petitioner 

argues that the trial court’s determination of exigent circumstances was 

unreasonable because there was contradictory testimony offered by 

Detective Paul and Smith at the suppression hearing making it “unclear when 

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[Smith] hung up her phone”—whether it was before or after Detective Paul 

identified himself. (Doc. 20, p. 11). If it was unclear, he argues, then the 

exigent circumstances found of curtailing the imminent destruction of 

evidence and protecting the officers’ safety was based on mere speculation; 

insufficient to justify a warrantless search. (Id., pp. 11-12). Beyond that, 

Petitioner argues that even if the exigent circumstances were reasonably 

found, such circumstances were nevertheless contrived by the Detective 

when he chose to forego applying for a search warrant and asked the other 

officers to secure the residence, effectively creating the exigent 

circumstances he needed to make his warrantless search. (Id.). The Court 

will address each of these arguments in turn. 

a. The Trial Court’s Factual Determination 

Under the AEDPA, federal courts reviewing a state prisoner’s 

application for a writ of habeas corpus may not grant relief “with respect to 

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” 

unless the claim (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) “resulted in a 

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

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light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 

§2254(d). Petitioner’s first argument pertains to the second exception. 

The test for §2254(d)(2)’s “unreasonable determination of facts” clause 

is whether the petitioner has demonstrated by “clear and convincing 

evidence,” §2254(e)(1), that the state court’s determination of the facts was 

unreasonable in light of the record. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338–

339 (2006) (“State-court factual findings, moreover, are presumed correct; 

the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by ‘clear and 

convincing evidence.’”) (quoting § 2254(e)(1)) (citing Miller–El v. Dretke, 545 

U.S. 231, 240, (2005)). Importantly, the evidence against which a federal 

court measures the reasonableness of the state court’s factual findings is the 

record evidence at the time of the state court’s adjudication. Cullen, 563 U.S 

at 185.

Finally, Section 2254(e) provides that “[i]n a proceeding instituted by 

an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to 

the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue shall be 

presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the 

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. 

§2254(e)(1).

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Applying the above legal principles and having reviewed the trial 

records, this Court finds that the trial court’s factual determination of sufficient 

exigent circumstances was reasonable, and Petitioner has failed to meet his 

burden to rebut the presumption afforded to the trial court’s determination. 

An exigency arose the moment Detective Paul introduced himself to Smith 

as part of Drug Enforcement while she was still on the phone with Spicer, 

the owner of the residence. After Smith hung up the phone, a real possibility 

existed that Spicer would become suspicious and alert the occupants of his

residence that the police were on their tail. Such a possibility was made even 

more probable when Smith received a text from Spicer asking if she was 

“good.” With no response from Smith, Spicer would likely grow more 

suspicious and inform his co-conspirators that their activity had been 

discovered by the police who were on their way, creating a potential for his 

co-conspirators to either flee or destroy evidence. Under those reasonable 

beliefs, Detective Paul asked the other members of his team to secure the 

residence while he applied for a warrant. Commonwealth v. Ariondo, 397 Pa. 

Super. 364, 580 A.2d 341, 346 (Pa. Super. 1990) (“Normally, a reasonable 

belief by police that evidence is likely to be destroyed will give rise to exigent 

circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless entry into a private 

residence.”) (citing United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1973)).

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Then, Corporal McGuire and Trooper Danko approached the residence in 

full uniform and saw Petitioner standing in the doorway. Danko approached 

the front door and upon stating, “Hey, I need to talk to you,” Petitioner 

attempted to run back inside the residence and close the doors on the 

officers. Under those circumstances, the officers reasonably believed that 

Petitioner would have sought to flee or destroy evidence. See id. The officers 

and Petitioner struggled at the door until Trooper Maggs assisted the officers 

in pushing it open and making an entry.

All of the above events were testified to by multiple members of law 

enforcement and Ms. Smith at the Suppression Hearing, which the trial court 

relied upon when deciding on the facts. Granted, Ms. Smith’s and Detective 

Paul’s testimonies did not perfectly align. However, it is the province of the 

trial court, as factfinder, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight to be accorded the evidence produced at the suppression hearing 

and trial. The factfinder is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence 

when making its final determination. “28 U.S.C. §2254(d) gives federal 

habeas courts no license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose 

demeanor has been observed by the state trial court, but not by them.” 

Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983). Indeed, “the assessment 

of the credibility of witnesses is generally beyond the scope of review.” 

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Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 330 (1995). The proper question is not whether 

the witnesses were credible, but “whether there is sufficient evidence which, 

if credited, could support the conviction.” Id. This Court finds that there is. 

Moreover, the determination of a factual issue is presumed to be correct, 28 

U.S.C. §2254(e)(1), and Petitioner has failed to present any clear and 

convincing evidence to overturn that presumption. Accordingly, Defendant’s 

first argument that his claim resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts is without merit. 

b. Validity of the Exigent Circumstances 

Petitioner’s second argument is that his claim resulted in a decision 

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States because his case is “the mirror image of a few cases in which relief 

was granted and illegal[ly] obtained evidence was suppressed” where the 

exigent circumstances were contrived by the police. (Doc. 7, p. 3). As 

explained above, federal courts reviewing a state prisoner’s application for a 

writ of habeas corpus may not grant relief “with respect to any claim that was 

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the claim 

“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

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application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States”. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).

Under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1), a decision is “contrary to” federal law if 

“the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in 

[Supreme Court] cases” or “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are 

materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). The test for §2254(d)(1)’s 

“unreasonable application of” clause is as follows: “[a]n ‘unreasonable 

application’ occurs when a state court ‘identifies the correct governing legal 

principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that 

principle to the facts’ of petitioner’s case.” Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 

380 (2005) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 519, 520 (2003)). 

Here, Petitioner paradoxically provides this court with Pennsylvania 

state court precedents (Commonwealth v. Mason, 535 Pa. 560 (Pa. 1993), 

Commonwealth v. Melendez, 544 Pa. 323 (Pa. 1995), and Commonwealth 

v. Waddell, 61 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012)) and circuit court precedents 

(U.S. v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361 (3d Cir. 2006), U.S. v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662 

(11th Cir. 2000), and U.S. v. Ramirez, 676 F.3d 756 (8th Cir. 2012)) to argue 

that the decision in his matter resulted in “an unreasonable application of, 

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clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States”. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1); see Dennis v. Sec’y, Pennsylvania 

Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 280 (3d Cir. 2016) (“A state court decision is 

“contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court ... (2) ‘confronts 

a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the 

Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different’ from that 

reached by the Supreme Court.”) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405–06). In 

those cases, Petitioner argues, those courts were faced with a similar set of 

facts and decided against finding exigent circumstances because such 

circumstances were contrived by the police. Unfortunately for Mr. Johnson, 

those cases are inapplicable and factually distinguishable. 

Beginning with Coles, the Third Circuit held that exigent circumstances 

fail to meet Fourth Amendment standards if the government deliberately 

created the exigency. 437 F.3d at 366. However, the factual situation in 

Coles was unique and materially different from the case before this Court. In 

Coles, the government had a hotel room under covert surveillance because 

it believed the occupants were engaged in the illegal drug trade. Id. at 362–

64. Law enforcement surreptitiously entered the room, with help from a hotel 

employee, and observed suspected drugs and related paraphernalia. Id.

Such an entry was illegal, and the police exited the room waiting on the 

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occupants to return. Id. Thereafter, police observed two men entering the 

room, at least one of whom carried a backpack. Id. The officers then 

attempted to enter the room through subterfuge by claiming they were “room 

service” and then “maintenance to fix a reported leak.” Id. at 363. It was only 

after these failed attempts that the police identified themselves. Id. The Third 

Circuit found these facts disturbing stating that the record reveals “no 

urgency or need for the officers to take immediate action.” Id. at 371. The 

exigency “did not arise naturally or from reasonable police investigative 

tactics.” Id. Instead, law enforcement deliberately created the exigency by 

demanding entry. Id.

In the case before this Court, the facts show that the local law 

enforcement was dealing with a fluid situation quite differently than in Coles. 

The exigent circumstances here did not arise the moment Corporal McGuire 

and Trooper Danko approached the residence but earlier when Detective 

Paul identified himself while Smith was on the call with Spicer. The 

Detective’s ensuing suspicion that Spicer may communicate with the 

occupants of the Logan Street residence to alert them of the police’s 

investigation arose naturally and from reasonable police investigative 

tactics—unlike the developing circumstances in Coles. Afterwards, when 

asked to secure the residence, Corporal McGuire and Trooper Danko 

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approached the residence in full uniform at which point Petitioner attempted 

to flee into the residence to destroy evidence—which is at odds with Coles

whereby the defendant in that matter did not detect law enforcement 

surveillance until the police knocked on his door. Also, importantly, the facts 

in this matter clearly demonstrate that the local police were acting reasonably 

and observing proper investigative tactics leading up to their warrantless 

entry. Since law enforcement acted reasonably, this Court finds that they did 

not create the exigent circumstances and the exigencies of the situation 

warranted intrusion into the residence. See King, 563 U.S. at 463-64 (“Fourth 

Amendment requires only the steps preceding the seizure be lawful” and that 

courts must look to “objective factors, rather than subjective intent” to 

determine exigency.).

In Santa, the agents set up a sting operation whereby an informant was 

to purchase drugs from the Defendant. 236 F.3d at 669. After a sample was 

tested the Defendant offered to arrange an additional sale at his home. Id. 

Once the informant confirmed the presence of the drugs, the agents entered 

Defendant’s home without a warrant contending later that they had done so 

to “prevent the destruction of evidence and [a suspect’s] escape.” Id. The 

court held that exigent circumstances were not sufficient because the 

suspects had no knowledge that they were under police surveillance and 

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therefore no situation arose for a warrantless search. Id. Additionally, the 

court found it unlikely that danger of flight or destruction of drugs existed 

when the suspects had no reason to believe that they were under police 

surveillance. Id. “[The defendant’s] in home arrest may not be justified on the 

basis of exigent circumstances or created by the Government itself.” Id. at 

676. These facts are distinguishable from the case at hand where the police 

had a reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the East Logan Street 

residence would be alerted of the investigation from naturally arising 

circumstances that developed as the police were conducting their 

investigation. 

In Santa, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that the government had as 

much as two days’ notice that a drug transaction would occur at Santa’s 

Miami apartment. Id. at 665. On the day of Santa’s arrest, agents were 

notified that the transaction would take place at the apartment of Santa and 

Ramirez. The C.I. accompanied them at 4:50 pm to their residence, while 

they awaited the supplier, Gallego, to arrive. At 6:50 pm Gallego arrived and 

made an exchange with Ramirez outside the unit. Ramirez returned to the 

apartment carrying a white plastic bag. Minutes later the C.I. emerged from 

the apartment and gave the concealed agents a prearranged signal that the 

heroin was in the apartment. Within 30 seconds of receiving the signal 

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agents moved in on the apartment. At no time did the agents seek to obtain 

a search warrant even with advance knowledge of the site where the 

exchange would occur. The Eleventh Circuit Court was unpersuaded by the 

government’s contention that a delay in the C.I.’s return to the apartment

would have caused Ramirez to grow suspicious as time went on. The court 

also noted that the entry occurred only seconds after the signal was given 

and there was no basis for predicting when Ramirez might have grown 

concerned. This is far from a mirror image of the matter at hand, where 

Detective Paul had a reasonable suspicion that the occupants of East Logan 

Street would have been alerted of the police investigation, sought a warrant, 

and asked members of his team to secure the residence until Petitioner 

elected to flee into his residence at the sight of the uniformed officers which 

necessitated a warrantless entry. 

In Ramirez, the Eighth Circuit reversed a district court’s finding that 

exigent circumstances justified officers’ warrantless entry into a hotel room. 

676 F.3d at 765. The officers in Ramirez, first attempted, without any 

evidence of exigency whatsoever, to enter the defendant’s room with a key 

card, and then forced entry when the defendant “attempt[ed] to shut the door” 

on their announcement they were police. Id. at 762. “[W]ithout more,” the 

Eighth Circuit concluded, merely shutting the door “[did] not bolster the claim 

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that it was reasonable to conclude that the destruction of evidence was 

imminent.” Id. But Ramirez is simply inapposite here. When Detective Paul 

identified himself to Smith while she was on a call with Spicer, he had 

reasonable cause to suspect that Spicer would alert his co-conspirators of 

the police’s investigation. Detective Paul asked the other members of his 

team to secure the residence and Petitioner responded to their arrival, not 

by declining to speak as in Ramirez, but by suddenly and forcefully 

attempting to flee into the residence and slam the door on the officers leading 

to a struggle at the door—thus creating a circumstance in which any 

reasonable, experienced officer would see an urgent need to take action. 

Even worse, Ramirez does not help Petitioner’s police-contrived exigent 

circumstances argument because the Eighth Circuit specifically refused to 

explore the question of police created exigencies. Id. at 765 (“Because we 

find no exigent circumstances here, we need not determine whether the 

officers in this case ‘created’ any exigency, which itself would have 

necessarily precluded the warrantless entry.”). 

In Mason, the case is factually inapposite. In that case, while waiting 

for a warrant, one of the police officers decided to enter the residence in 

question even though there was no indication that the residents were aware 

of the police’s presence. 535 Pa. at 563. This fact pattern is different than in 

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Petitioner’s case where the police reasonably believed that a co-conspirator 

(Spicer) may have become aware of the police’s closing investigation and 

warned his co-conspirators to quickly destroy evidence. Furthermore, unlike 

Trooper Danko who was dressed in full police uniform when he approached 

Petitioner, the police officer in Mason never identified himself as police but 

posed as a maintenance man to surreptitiously enter the residence and,

failing to do so, opted to use a battering ram to enter the apartment. Id. None 

of this occurred in Petitioner’s case. The Pennsylvania Supreme found it 

“beyond the bounds of constitutionally acceptable police conduct” to “batter[ 

] down doors without a warrant or exigent circumstances....” Id. at 571.

Lastly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained at great length that the 

Mason ruling was based on its interpretation of Pennsylvania’s, not the 

federal’s, exclusionary rule. Id. at 569-571 (“The history of Article I, Section 

8, thus indicates that the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule in this 

Commonwealth is quite distinct from the purpose underlying the exclusionary 

rule under the 4th Amendment). The Mason court indicated that if they 

applied the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 4th Amendment as 

expressed in Leon v. United States, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) “to deter police 

misconduct,” the Mason court would have admitted the seized evidence. Id. 

(“If our sole purpose in applying Article I, Section 8 [of the Constitution of 

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Pennsylvania] to the facts of this case were to deter police misconduct, we 

would be constrained to rule in favor of the Commonwealth...”). 

In Melendez, the police stopped and searched Defendant Melendez, 

transported her back to her house and used her keys to gain entrance into 

her residence without a search warrant because she merely left a house that 

was under investigation for possible drug dealing activity. 544 Pa. at 326.

“Melendez was not engaged in any activity at the time she was stopped 

which would cause a person of reasonable suspicion that she was then 

engaged in criminal conduct,” yet the police stopped her and searched her 

residence without a warrant because, the police argued, delaying Melendez 

“to arrive at her destination at a particular time or within a particular period 

could well have set in motion, by pre-arrangement among the conspirators 

or by happenstance, circumstances which her co-defendant would have 

viewed as so untoward as to necessitate destruction or removal of 

contraband from the scene.” Id. at 328-330. These are not the exigent 

circumstances found in this matter. Rather, Detective Paul’s reasonable 

suspicion that the occupants of the East Logan Street residence may be 

alerted of the police’s investigation was not based on Smith’s delay in arriving 

to her destination but on the real possibility that Spicer may have overheard 

the Detective identify himself while Spicer was on the call with Smith. 

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Furthermore, Petitioner hurriedly began to escape into the residence to 

destroy evidence when he saw uniformed officers approach him. The facts 

of this case and the Melendez case do not “mirror” each other at all. 

Moreover, the Melendez court concluded “that the items seized and 

introduced into evidence must be suppressed under Art. I, Sec. 8 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution,” not the Fourth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution. Id. at 331; see also 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) (“contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States...”) (emphasis 

added). 

In Waddell, the Homestead Borough Police Department received a tip 

conveyed by a neighboring police department that large quantities of 

marijuana were being distributed from a house in the Borough. 61 A.3d at 

208. That tip was confirmed by another informant, and based upon 

information the informant disclosed, an arrest was made of individuals 

transporting 13 pounds of marijuana from the house. Id. Four officers then 

proceeded to the house to perform a “knock and talk.” Id. at 209. The officers 

detected the odor of marijuana in the vicinity of the house, which grew 

stronger as they approached. Id. The officers knocked three times at the door 

with no response, but they heard “slight movement” inside, which grew 

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louder after the third knock. Id. An officer posted at the rear of the residence 

then observed the defendant attempting to jump out of a rear window, 

radioing this information to the officers at the front of the house. Id. Upon 

learning of the attempted escape, the officers at the front of the house kicked 

the front door open and entered the house, discovering two firearms and ten 

pounds of marijuana in plain view in the residence. Id. at 209-10.

The Waddell court rejected the claim of exigent circumstances based 

upon a concern of potential destruction of evidence or a danger to the safety 

of the officers. While the court acknowledged that the officers had probable 

cause to conduct a search once they detected the smell of raw marijuana 

emanating from the house, the court distinguished the facts from other cases 

where the police were in hot pursuit of a felon who retreated into a residence, 

noting that the residents of the house appeared to be unaware of the police 

activity before they knocked on the door. Id. at 215; cf. Commonwealth v. 

Bostick, 958 A.2d 543, 557-58 (Pa. Super. 2008) (exigent circumstances 

found where individual opened front door that was targeted for drug 

operation, saw an arrest in progress, uttered an expletive, and retreated 

inside, tossing items in vestibule in an apparent effort to conceal evidence); 

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 785 A.2d 501, 506 (Pa. Super. 2001) (suspect 

fleeing police into residence and displaying handgun during his retreat 

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contributed to finding of exigent circumstances). In those cited to cases, 

which the Waddell court found the exigent circumstances necessitated a 

warrantless entry, “common to each of those cases was the fact that a 

suspect had spotted and immediately attempted to evade police by fleeing 

into a residence, creating an immediate risk that an attempt to destroy 

evidence was impending.” Id. at 214. This is exactly what occurred in this 

matter when Petitioner saw Corporal McGuire and Trooper Danko approach 

the residence in full uniform and attempted to run back inside the residence

to close the door on the officers and destroy evidence. See id. at 217 (“Also 

common to [cases where exigent circumstances necessitated a warrantless 

entry] were facts that the appellants in those cases had observed the 

presence of police and reacted by retreating into the residences that were 

ultimately searched.”). Thus, not only are the facts distinguishable in the 

Waddell case, but the Waddell holding also appears to undermine 

Petitioner’s argument.

All in all, Petitioner has cited to the above inapplicable decisions but 

has failed to acknowledge the direct applicability of the seminal Supreme 

Court decision in Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011) to his case. In King, 

the police had set up a controlled buy of crack cocaine outside an apartment 

complex. Id. at 455. An undercover officer watched the transaction occur and 

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then radioed uniformed officers to move in on the suspect. Id. at 456. The 

officers were unable to stop the suspect before he entered an apartment. Id. 

Police did not see which of two apartments in the vicinity the suspect entered 

but smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from one of the apartment 

doors (from the apartment the suspect did not enter). Id. One of the 

uniformed officers knocked loudly on the door and announced the presence 

of the police. Id. That officer maintained that he could hear the sound of 

things being moved inside and testified that he “believe[d] that drug-related 

evidence was about to be destroyed.” Id. Thereafter, the officers kicked down 

the door and were able to see marijuana and powder cocaine in plain view. 

Id. at 457. 

The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the police improperly created 

their own exigency in violation of the Fourth Amendment. King, 563 U.S. at 

457-458. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider 

whether the exigent circumstances rule applies “when police, by knocking on 

the door of a residence and announcing their presence, cause the occupants 

to attempt to destroy evidence.” Id. at 461-462. This question goes to the 

essence of Petitioner’s second argument, that Detective Paul created the 

exigency by identifying himself when he “approach[ed] [Smith] in the way he 

did, while she was clearly on her cellphone” and by the officers who identified 

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themselves when they approached Petitioner in full uniform, all of which led 

to Petitioner’s attempt to run back inside the residence and close the door 

on the police. (Doc. 20, pp. 12, 14). The Supreme Court was not persuaded 

by such an argument in King and deemed the “conten[tion] that law 

enforcement officers impermissibly create an exigency when they engage in 

conduct that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry is 

imminent and inevitable” as flawed. King, 563 U.S. at 468 (internal quotation 

marks removed).3 The King Court emphasized the “Fourth Amendment 

requires only the steps preceding the seizure be lawful” and that courts must 

look to “objective factors, rather than subjective intent” to determine 

exigency. Id. at 463–64. “When law enforcement officers who are not armed 

with a warrant knock on a door, they do no more than any private citizen do. 

3 Petitioner argues that King is inapposite because the facts are 

distinguishable from his case, namely that (1) the police in that matter had 

prior “knowledge from a C.I. that drugs were in the residence;” (2) the police 

were in pursuit of the defendant; and (3) the police in his matter were 

attempting to secure the residence and not conduct a “knock and talk” as in 

King. (Doc. 20, pp. 14-15). Petitioner is incorrect on all three points. First, the 

police in King did not have any prior knowledge regarding the residence of 

Hollis King because they were chasing after an unknown suspect who ran 

into a different apartment. Second, the police in King were not in pursuit of 

Hollis King but of an unknown suspect who, again, ran into a different 

apartment. Third, just as the officers in King who knocked on the apartment 

door to talk to the occupants, the police in this matter approached Petitioner 

in full uniform asking him “Hey, I need to talk to you.”

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And whether the person who knocks on the door and requests the 

opportunity to speak is a police officer or a private citizen, the occupant has 

no obligation to open the door or to speak.... Occupants who choose not to 

stand on their constitutional rights but instead elect to attempt to destroy 

evidence have only themselves to blame for the warrantless exigent 

circumstances that may ensue.” Id. at 469-479. 

Here, the exigencies that necessitated a warrantless entry began when 

Detective Paul had a reasonable suspicion that Spicer may alert his coconspirators of the police investigation and ended when Petitioner elected to 

flee into the residence for which the police reasonably believed was an 

attempt to destroy evidence. See Id. at 461 (“Destruction of evidence issues 

probably occur most frequently in drug cases because drugs may be easily 

destroyed by flushing them down a toilet or rinsing them down a drain.”). 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s second argument will be denied. 

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IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 (Doc. 1) will be DENIED. An appropriate 

order will issue. 

 s/ Malachy E. Mannion MALACHY E. MANNION

 United States District Judge

Dated: December 17, 2024 

22-1920-01 

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