# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed February 23, 2022

. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ No. 3D20

- 1830 Lower Tribunal No. 20

- 4425

________________



### Julian Iacono , Appellant,

vs. 

### Kingsley Arms Apartments, Inc., etc., Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami

- Dade County, Mark Blumstein , Judge. Goldberg & Rosen, P.A. , Judd G. Rosen and Mustafa H. Dandashly , for appellant. Cole Scott & Kissane, P.A. , and Lissette Gonzalez , for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and SCALES and GORDO , JJ. GORDO, J.2 Julian Iacono appeals the trial court’s final order granting a motion to dismiss in favor of Kingsley Arms Apartments. We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). Kingsley Arms Apartmen ts privately owns and operates a six

- floor apartment building located in Miami

- Dade County. A then s eventeen

- year - old Julian Iacono , an undiscovered trespasser, gained access to the rooftop of Kingsley and intentionally jumped from the rooftop to commit s uicide. Iacono survived his suicide attempt, but suffered serious injuries , including the amputation of his right leg. Iacono subsequently sued Kingsley for premises liability and negligence per se allegin g that Kingsley owed a duty to Iacono relying on a means restriction theory of suicide prevention because rooftops are where suicides take place . This theory posits that by eliminating or heavily restricting access to a particular method by which individuals attempt suicide, the overall rate of suicide attempts decreases proportional to the rate at which those specific means were used

. In his complaint, however, Iacono made clear that “[p] laintiff does not allege or otherwise contend that [d] efendant owed or breached a specific duty to [p] lai ntiff to prevent or guard against [p] laintiff’s specific attempt to commit suicide.” After a n extensive hearing, the trial court found that private building owners owe no duty to3 undiscovered trespassers attempting to commit suicide that would warrant lia bility . This appeal followed. Even if, as it must be assumed, the alleged facts are all true, we find it is apparent that no iteration of the facts would support a cause of action by Iacono against Kingsley for premises liability or negligence per se. S ee Kelley v. Beverly Hills Club Apartments , 68 So. 3d 954, 957 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (g enerally, “[t]here is no liability for the suicide of another [or for injuries sustained in a suicide attempt] in the absence of a specific duty of care.” (quoting Paddock v. Chacko , 522 So. 2d 410, 416 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988))) ; Garcia v. Lifemark Hosps. of Fla. , 754 So. 2d 48, 49 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) ( finding that a duty of care may exist “where a patient has surrendered himself to the custody, care and treatment of a psychiatric hospital and its staff” and the hospital has failed “to take protective measures to prevent the patient from injuring himself.” ); Paddock , 522 So. 2d at 416 ( “ [D] uty is based solely on the fact of the patient’s confinement in the hospital, and the hospital’s ability to supervise, monitor and restrain the patient.” ); Rafferman v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. , 659 So. 2d 1271, 1272

– 73 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) ( holding that a ship owner ha s no duty to protect a seaman from committing suicide unless there is evidence the seaman “had taken actions which indicate that [he] may do harm to others or to himself.” Absent such4 allegations a defendant can not be liable “even in t he extreme situation which occurs when a patient of a mental hospital

— who by definition is suffering from psychiatric difficulties of some kind

— has given no previous indication that his mental illness might lead to suicide.” ); Nicholson v. Stonybrook Apart ments, LLC, 154 So. 3d 490, 492 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) ( stating that in a premises liability case “the only duty a property owner owes to an undiscovered trespasser is to refrain from causing intentional harm, and the only duty it owes to a discovered or ‘kno wn’ trespasser is to refrain from gross negligence/intentional harm and to warn of known conditions that are not readily observable by others.” )

. Reviewing the facts as they appear in the complaint, then, no viable claim of premises liability or negligenc e per se were alleged and therefore, dismissal of the complaint with prejudice was warranted. See Alvarez v. E & A Produce Corp. , 708 So. 2d 997, 1000 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)

. Affirmed.