IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHAWN CHRISTIAN MURRAY, :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : CIVIL NO. 4:CV-14-531

:

SECRETARY JOHN WETZEL, : (Judge Brann)

:

Respondent :

MEMORANDUM

January 23, 2015

Background

Shawn Christian Murray filed this pro se habeas corpus petition pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 while previously confined at the State Correctional Institution

Camp Hill, Pennsylvania.1

 Upon consideration of Petitioner’s motion to amend,

Superintendent John Thomas of SCI-Chester has been deemed the sole

Respondent in this matter.2

 Service of the Petition was previously ordered.

Petitioner states that he was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI)

1 Murray recently notified the Court that he has been released from

confinement and is residing in Fayatteville, Pennsylvania. See Doc. 25.

2

 Prior to service of the Petition, Murray was transferred to the State

Correctional Institution, Chester, Pennsylvania (SCI-Chester).

1

Case 4:14-cv-00531-MWB-JVW Document 30 Filed 01/23/15 Page 1 of 8
in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Pennsylvania on July 15, 2013

(No. 2116 of 2012). Murray notes that his conviction was the result of a trial

conducted in absentia. On August 22, 2013, he was sentenced to a three (3) to six

(6) month term of confinement as a result of that conviction. Petitioner states that

service of his sentence was to commence September 30, 2013 and conclude March

30, 2014.

Murray also indicates that his probation (which was imposed for an earlier

terroristic threats conviction, No. 1694 of 2009) was revoked on December 18,

2013 and he was sentenced to serve a nine to sixty month term of confinement

which was to commence December 31, 2013 and conclude June 7, 2018 with

sentence credit being awarded for the period of March 27, 2012 to March 21,

2013.3

 See Doc. 1, p. 2.

Petitioner claims entitlement to federal habeas corpus relief on the grounds

that he was denied due process because his trial on the DUI charge and related

sentencing were held in absentia and without the benefit of counsel. See id. at p.

9. Murray raises additional and at times repetitive arguments challenging the

legality of his DUI conviction and sentence including the following claims: the

trial court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction; violation of the

3

 Murray indicates that his 2012 DUI conviction caused the revocation of his

probation.

2

Case 4:14-cv-00531-MWB-JVW Document 30 Filed 01/23/15 Page 2 of 8
prohibition against double jeopardy; trial court bias; improper denial of his request

for a change of venue; denial of his right to a mandatory arraignment; ineffective

assistance of counsel; unlawful arrest; imposition of a sentence without a drug and

alcohol assessment; and denial of counsel at his preliminary hearing, arraignment,

and pre-trial stages.

Respondent has filed a motion seeking dismissal of the petition on the

grounds that Murray failed to exhaust his available state court remedies. See

Doc. 13. The opposed motion is now ripe for consideration.

Discussion

Respondent maintains that Murray did not properly exhaust his available

state court remedies. See Doc. 14, p. 1 . Specifically, Respondent argues that the

claims before this Court were raised by Petitioner in a January 15, 2014 petition

pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) which “is still

pending at the state level.”4

 Id. at p. 2. Petitioner asserts that his PCRA action is

now subject to dismissal on the basis of mootness and therefore he did everything

possible to comply with the exhaustion of state remedies requirement. See Doc.

4 See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9541 et seq. The PCRA “permits motions for

post-conviction collateral relief for allegations of error, including ineffective

assistance of counsel, unlawfully induced guilty pleas, improper obstruction of rights

to appeal by Commonwealth officials, and violation of constitutional provisions." 

Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d 246, 251 (3d Cir. 1991).

3

Case 4:14-cv-00531-MWB-JVW Document 30 Filed 01/23/15 Page 3 of 8
15, p. 4.

Title 28 United States Code Section 2254(b)(1) provides that an application

for a writ of habeas corpus filed on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court cannot be granted unless the applicant has exhausted the

remedies available in the courts of the State; or there is an absence of available

state corrective process; or there are existing circumstances which render the state

process ineffective.5

 The exhaustion requirement is not a mere formality. It

serves the interests of comity between the federal and state systems, by allowing

the state an initial opportunity to determine and correct any violations of a

prisoner’s federal rights. Crews v. Horn, 360 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2004). 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated that

“[U]nder 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c), such a petitioner ‘shall not be deemed to have

exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State ... if he has the right

under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question

presented.” Wenger v. Frank, 266 F.3d 218, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2001). 

“A state prisoner is generally barred from obtaining federal habeas relief

unless the prisoner has properly presented his or her claims through one ‘complete

5 However, a Section 2254 petition may be denied on the merits

notwithstanding the failure of a petitioner to exhaust available state court remedies. 

4

Case 4:14-cv-00531-MWB-JVW Document 30 Filed 01/23/15 Page 4 of 8
round of the State’s established appellate review process.’” Woodford v. Ngo,

548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2386-87 (2006) (internal citations omitted);

O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999)(while exhaustion does not

require state prisoners to invoke extraordinary remedies, the state courts must be

afforded one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues via completion of

the State's established appellate review process). The United States Supreme

Court in O’Sullivan explained, that state prisoners must “file petitions for

discretionary review when that review is part of the ordinary appellate review

procedure in the State.” Id. at 847. The Supreme Court added that, in determining

whether a state prisoner has preserved an issue for presentation in a federal habeas

petition, it must be determined not only whether a prisoner has exhausted his state

remedies, but also whether he has properly exhausted those remedies, i.e., whether

he has fairly presented his claims to the state courts. See id. at 848.

Fair presentation requires that the “substantial equivalent” of both the legal

theory and the facts supporting the federal claim are submitted to the state courts,

and the same method of legal analysis applied in the federal courts must be

available to the state courts. Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, 959 F. 2d 1227,

1230 (3d Cir. 1992); Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997). 

Moreover, to satisfy exhaustion, the state court must be put on notice that a federal

5

Case 4:14-cv-00531-MWB-JVW Document 30 Filed 01/23/15 Page 5 of 8
claim is being asserted. Keller v. Larkins, 251 F.3d 408, 413 (3d Cir. 2001). The

exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the petitioner’s claims are presented through

a collateral proceeding, such as a petition under the PCRA, and it is not necessary

to present federal claims to state courts both on direct appeal and in a PCRA

proceeding. Evans, 959 F.2d at 1230.

In his Petitioner, Murray acknowledges that he did not seek relief via the

initiation of a direct appeal in Pennsylvania state court. See Doc. 1, p. 3. The

petitioner further admits that although he filed a PCRA action on January 13,

2014, that matter is still pending before the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin

County. See id. Thus, it is undisputed that Murray’s pending claims are

unexhausted.

Federal habeas corpus relief may not be granted on a petition containing

unexhausted claims. However, in both Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005) and

Crews v. Horn, 360 F. 3d 146 (3d Cir. 2004), a § 2254 petitioner filed a timely but

mixed (one containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims) federal habeas

corpus petition. Both Rhines and Crews addressed arguments that federal habeas

petitions should be held in abeyance while unexhausted claims were exhausted in

state court because those claims might be time barred upon returning to federal

court due to the time limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

6

Case 4:14-cv-00531-MWB-JVW Document 30 Filed 01/23/15 Page 6 of 8
The United States Supreme Court in Rhines, recognized that under such 

“limited circumstances” district courts have discretion to stay a mixed § 2254

federal habeas corpus petition so that the petitioner can pursue review of his

unexhausted claims in state court. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. The Third Circuit in

Crews similarly recognized that in order to avoid an unfair result, “when an

outright dismissal could jeopardize the timeliness of a collateral attack, a stay is

the only appropriate course of action.” Crews, 360 F.3d at p. 154 (internal

citations omitted).

Rhines and Crews both contemplate that the initial federal petition must be

timely filed. In the present case, there is no indication in the record that Murray’s

pending federal petition is untimely under the time frame established by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. As discussed above

Petitioner’s pending § 2254 action includes claims that he is also asserting via a

PCRA petition which is presently under consideration in Pennsylvania state court. 

Although Petitioner speculates that his PCRA action is now subject to dismissal as

moot, there is no indication that any state court has actually rendered such a

determination.

As in Crews, Murray should not face the prospect of forfeiting federal court

review of issues. Under these circumstances, Crews counsels in favor of a stay of

7

Case 4:14-cv-00531-MWB-JVW Document 30 Filed 01/23/15 Page 7 of 8
litigation in this case while Murray exhausts the state review process on his

pending federal claims. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust

state remedies will be granted in part and this matter will be stayed.6

 

Within thirty (30) days of the termination of Petitioner’s state court

proceedings regarding his pending federal claims, he will be required to file a

written status report with the Court detailing the conclusion of his state court

exhaustion efforts and including a copy of the relevant Superior and/or Supreme

Court’s dispositions if he wishes to proceed with this matter. An appropriate

Order will issue.

BY THE COURT:

 s/ Matthew W. Brann 

Matthew W. Brann

United States District Judge

6 Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are made when: (1) the state

corrective process is so deficient as to render any effort to obtain relief futile, 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b); (2) acts of state officials have, in effect, made state remedies

unavailable to the petitioner, Mayberry v. Petsock, 821 F.2d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1987);

or (3) "inordinate delay" in state proceedings has rendered state remedies ineffective. 

Story v. Kindt, 26 F.3d 402, 405 (3d Cir. 1994); Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819

F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1986).

Based upon the record to date in this matter, it has not been sufficiently shown

that Petitioner is presently entitled to be excused from the exhaustion requirement. 

However, in the event that Murray can satisfy one of the exceptions outlined above he

may seek the reopening of this matter.

8

Case 4:14-cv-00531-MWB-JVW Document 30 Filed 01/23/15 Page 8 of 8