1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : Crim. No. 4:16-CR-0006-1

:

v. : (Judge Brann)

:

RAHEEM JAMAR RULEY, :

:

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

April 15, 2016

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 14, 2016, Defendant Raheem Ruley (hereinafter “Mr. Ruley”) 

and Co-Defendant Antoine Paris Davis (hereinafter “Mr. Davis”) were charged 

with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and 100 grams or more of heroin, in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and with one count of possession with intent to distribute 100 

grams or more of heroin and cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846(a)(1). Mr. 

Ruley was also charged with three counts of distribution of cocaine.

On March 1, 2016, Mr. Ruley, through his counsel, filed a motion to sever 

and a motion to suppress evidence discovered after the execution of a search 

warrant obtained on June 15, 2015. In accordance with the following analysis, Mr. 

Ruley’s motions are both denied. 

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II. BACKGROUND

On three separate occasions between June 3 and June 16, 2015, 

Pennsylvania State Police troopers conducted controlled purchases of cocaine from 

Mr. Ruley. On June 3, 2015, undercover trooper Ryan Kelly (hereinafter “Trooper 

Kelly”) received information from a confidential informant that the informant 

could buy two “8-balls” or eighth-ounce quantities of cocaine for $400 from a 

suspect known as “Ant.” The informant provided text messages to and from Ant 

regarding the cocaine purchase and sent a text to Ant’s phone requesting an 8-ball.

Mr. Ruley answered, directing the informant to meet him at Weis Market at the 

intersection of River Avenue and Washington Boulevard in Williamsport, 

Pennsylvania. Mr. Ruley then directed the informant to meet him near the Pizza 

Hut on 3rd Street in Williamsport instead. Trooper Kelly and the informant 

proceeded to the Pizza Hut where Mr. Ruley entered the back seat of the vehicle 

and exchanged $400 of prerecorded funds for the cocaine. Approximately five 

minutes later, surveillance officers observed Mr. Ruley seated on the steps of 321 

Tinsman Avenue, Williamsport, Pennsylvania. 

Similarly on June 10, 2015, Trooper Kelly contacted the cell phone used by 

Mr. Ruley and arranged another controlled drug buy. Trooper Kelly picked up Mr. 

Ruley near Tinsman and Homewood Avenues in Williamsport and was then 

directed to drive to another location where Mr. Ruley again received $400 in 

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exchange for a bag of cocaine. Prior to the transaction, surveillance officers 

observed Mr. Ruley descend the porch steps of 321 Tinsman Avenue and walking 

in the direction of the meeting location. Immediately following the transaction, Mr. 

Ruley was seen re-entering 321 Tinsman Avenue.

Two days later, on June 12, 2015, Mr. Ruley texted Trooper Kelly to arrange 

a sale of an ounce of cocaine for $1,200. After the exchange took place, Trooper 

Kelly prepared an anticipatory search warrant for 321 Tinsman Avenue. The 

search warrant was contingent on Mr. Ruley exiting 321 Tinsman Avenue 

immediately prior to the controlled drug sale and delivering cocaine to Trooper 

Kelly. The magistrate judge issued the search warrant on June 15, 2015.

On June 16, 2015, Mr. Ruley and Trooper Kelly arranged a sale and agreed 

for Trooper Kelly to pick up Mr. Ruley on Homewood Avenue. Immediately prior 

to the sale, surveillance officers observed Mr. Ruley exit the front door of 321 

Tinsman Avenue and walk in the direction of the meeting location. He was picked 

up by Trooper Kelly and exchanged seven 8-balls of cocaine for $900. As Mr. 

Ruley exited the vehicle, Trooper Kelly gave a pre-arranged signal to the other 

officers to arrest Mr. Ruley. As they approached, however, Mr. Ruley began 

running and led investigators on a foot chase until he was arrested in the parking 

lot of TJ Maxx Plaza on 3rd Street in Williamsport. Mr. Ruley’s jacket, hat, and 

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currency were recovered along the path of Mr. Ruley’s flight. Mr. Ruley’s cell 

phone was not recovered. 

After Mr. Ruley was arrested, investigators executed the anticipatory search 

warrant at 321 Tinsman Avenue. The search of the residence yielded two safes

containing evidence of drug trafficking. One safe contained four ounces of heroin, 

sixteen bags of cocaine, bags containing approximately eleven grams of cocaine 

powder, packing materials, and a digital scale. The second contained $1,000 in 

currency, including the prerecorded funds used by Trooper Kelly to purchase 

cocaine from Mr. Ruley on June 10, 2015, six caliber rounds, and a small bag of 

cocaine. 

In a kitchen drawer, investigators recovered Mr. Ruley’s wallet, which 

contained his Pennsylvania identification card and $380 in cash. Also in the 

drawer, investigators recovered plastic bags containing crack cocaine and vials of 

marijuana. In a bedroom, investigators found identification connecting Codefendant Antoine Davis to the 321 Tinsman Avenue residence and Lycoming 

County court documents bearing Mr. Davis’ name. The owner of the property also 

reported that Mr. Davis resided at the residence and paid the rent. A key to the 

residence was found on Mr. Davis’ person at the time of the search. Witnesses 

reported that Mr. Ruley occupied one of the bedrooms in the residence. In that

bedroom, investigators found two digital scales, 9mm and .38 rounds, and records 

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in the name of a person identified by the property owner as a former occupant in 

the home.

Investigators also recovered several cell phones at the residence. One of the 

cell phones contained a number for “Scrizz,” which matched the number used by 

Trooper Kelly to arrange the three controlled drug purchases. Multiple text 

message exchanges with the number contacted by Trooper Kelly during the same 

time period as the controlled drug purchases were also discovered on the cell 

phone. The cell phone also contained text messages concerning drug trafficking 

activities with other individuals. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Sever

In his motion to sever, Mr. Ruley argues that the continued joinder of his 

case with the case of Co-Defendant Antoine Paris Davis is prejudicial to him. He 

contends that no true nexus exists between him and the 321 Tinsman Avenue 

residence because none of the evidence, other than the wallet recovered in the 

kitchen drawer, links him to 321 Tinsman Avenue. The government opposes the 

motion and argues that Mr. Ruley and Mr. Davis are indeed properly joined under 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 8. It further contends that Mr. Ruley will suffer no prejudice 

because a joint trial will not impair his right to confront and cross-examine 

witnesses.

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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 provides that two or more defendants 

may be charged under one indictment “if they are alleged to have participated in 

the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions,

constituting an offense or offenses.”

1

Joint trials are generally favored in that they 

“conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, 

and avoid delays in bringing those accused of crime to trial.”2 A transactional 

nexus must exist, however, before joinder of defendants in a multiple-defendant 

trial is proper.3 Whether defendants are properly joined under Rule 8 depends on 

“the indictment, not upon the proof that was subsequently produced at trial.”4

In the matter at hand, the indictment contains five counts: Count I: 

conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, 

Counts II through IV: distribution of a controlled substance, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and Count V: possession with intent to distribute, in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).5 Mr. Ruley is charged in all five counts. Mr. Davis is 

charged in Count I and Count V. The superseding indictment charged both 

Defendants with a unitary, integrated conspiracy to distribute cocaine and heroin. 

Specifically, it alleges that the Defendants, together, used 321 Tinsman Avenue to 

 

1

Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b).

2 U.S. v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 82 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)).

3

Jimenez, 513 F.3d at 82-83 (citing United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 287 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2003)).

4

Jimenez, 513 F.3d at 82.

5 ECF No. 1.

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accomplish the objects of the conspiracy through a common manner and means. 

Accordingly, the Defendants’ cases are properly joined under Rule 8.

Typically, defendants jointly indicted should be tried together to conserve 

judicial resources, especially where the same evidence would be presented at both 

trials.6 Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, provides that

a court may order separate trials when a proper joinder “appears to prejudice a 

defendant . . .”7In determining prejudice, “[t]he proper question on appeal is 

whether the jury could have been reasonably expected to compartmentalize the 

allegedly prejudicial evidence in light of the quantity and limited admissibility of 

the evidence.”8“Neither a disparity in evidence, nor introducing evidence more 

damaging to one defendant than others entitles seemingly less culpable defendants 

to severance.”

9

Whether to sever is a determination within the sound discretion of the trial 

judge.10 In making the determination, the trial judge must consider what trial 

developments are foreseeable at the time the motion to sever is made.11 Even if a 

judge is found to have abused his or her discretion in denying a motion to sever, a 

 

6 U.S. v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 568 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing U.S. v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 306 (3d Cir.1989), cert. 

denied, 494 U.S. 1089 (1990); United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963, 984 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 

1110 (1986)).

7

Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a).

8 Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 568 (quoting U.S. v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963, 984 (3d Cir. 1985))

9 Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 568 (citing United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 427 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 

1017 (1988)).

10 U.S. v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 400 (3d Cir. 1981)

11 See Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 568.

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conviction will not be overturned unless the appellant meets the “heavy burden” of 

demonstrating “clear and substantial prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair 

trial.”12

Mr. Ruley alleges that his Sixth Amendment right to confront and crossexamine witnesses will be violated if statements of Mr. Davis, who is a codefendant and may choose not to testify, are used in trial against Mr. Ruley. He 

also argues that he should be entitled to severance because the evidence against 

him is de minimis when compared to the evidence against Mr. Davis, risking 

prejudice to Mr. Ruley. 

Mr. Ruley’s arguments lack merit. First, in Richardson v. Marsh, the United 

States Supreme Court held that a defendant’s rights under the confrontation clause 

are not violated when a co-defendant’s out-of-court statements are admitted under 

a jury instruction not to use the statements in any way against the defendant and 

the statements are redacted to eliminate the defendant’s connection to the case.

13

Mr. Ruley argues that Mr. Davis’ statements cannot be adequately redacted but 

fails to explain which statements he refers to or why they could not be adequately 

redacted. 

Similarly, Mr. Ruley’s argument that the evidence against him is de minimis

when compared with the evidence against Mr. Davis is also unconvincing. The 

 

12 Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 568.

13 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987).

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amount of evidence against Mr. Ruley himself is significant. Mr. Ruley was seen 

exiting 321 Tinsman Avenue on several occasions immediately prior to and 

following the controlled drug purchases. Mr. Ruley’s wallet containing his 

Pennsylvania identification card was found in the residence. Prerecorded funds 

from a controlled drug sale between Trooper Kelly and Mr. Ruley were found in 

the residence. Witnesses reported that Mr. Ruley had a room at the residence. 

Additionally, the text messages exist between the cell phone found in the 

residence and “Scrizz,” whose telephone number matched the number Trooper 

Kelly used to arrange controlled drug purchases with Mr. Ruley. Moreover, there

exists abundant witness testimony Trooper Kelly and other witnesses who will 

likely testify for the prosecution at trial, all of whom are subject to crossexamination by Mr. Ruley. The evidence against Mr. Ruley is not de minimis. 

The evidence links Mr. Ruley to 321 Tinsman Avenue and also seems to be 

interconnected and applicable to both Defendants. Accordingly, the Defendants 

must be tried together. 

B. Motion to Suppress

In his motion to suppress, Mr. Ruley challenges the legality of the 

anticipatory search warrant issued by the magistrate judge to search 321 Tinsman 

Avenue on the premise that the government lacked probably cause to search the 

home. Mr. Ruley further requests a Franks hearing and challenges the truthfulness 

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of the information in the affidavit of probable cause on which the search warrant 

relied.14

In reviewing a magistrate judge’s issuance of a warrant, a court’s only duty 

is to ensure that the magistrate judge had a “substantial basis” to determine that 

probable cause existed.15 A magistrate judge’s “determination of probable cause 

should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.”16

To determine probable cause to issue a search warrant, a magistrate judge 

must determine whether, “given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit 

before him . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime 

will be found in a particular place.”17 In cases of conditioned anticipatory search 

warrants, like the one in the case at hand, two prerequisites must be met for a 

finding of probable cause: 1) there must be probable cause to believe that the 

triggering condition will occur, and 2) if the triggering condition occurs, “there is a 

fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 

 

14 While the issue was not raised by either party, there remains a question of whether Mr. Ruley even has standing to 

challenge the search warrant. The United States Supreme Court has held that an individual “who is aggrieved by an 

illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person’s 

premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 

134 (1978). Mr. Ruley maintains that he has no connection with 321 Tinsman Avenue (other than the recovery of 

the wallet and prerecorded funds from the previous drug transaction at the residence). Mr. Davis was on the lease 

and was described by the landlord as the lessee. The government states that witnesses during the search reported that 

one of the rooms of the residence belonged to Mr. Ruley. Mr. Ruley, however, does not admit nor deny this 

information. As the motion to suppress is nevertheless denied, this Court will assume that Mr. Ruley has standing to 

challenge the legality of the search warrant for the purposes of this Memorandum. 

15 See Jones v. U.S., 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960).

16 Spinelli v. U.S., 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969).

17 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).

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place.”

18 “The supporting affidavit must provide the magistrate with sufficient 

information to evaluate both aspects of the probable-cause determination.”

19

The affidavit of probable cause provided the following information, in 

relevant part, to the magistrate judge: on June 3, 2015, police observed a male 

identified as “Ant” conduct a drug sale and immediately thereafter walk onto the 

porch of 321 Tinsman Avenue; on June 10, 2015, police observed the individual 

known as “Ant” exit 321 Tinsman Avenue, immediately thereafter conduct a drug 

sale, and then subsequently return to 321 Tinsman Avenue. The warrant was thus

conditioned on the same individual, known at the time as “Ant” and later identified 

as Mr. Ruley, “exiting the residence at 321 Tinsman Avenue and then delivering a 

quantity of cocaine to [Trooper Kelly].”20

The affidavit provided sufficient information for the magistrate judge to 

conclude that “Ant” would exit the residence, as he had on previous occasions 

prior to and following controlled drug buys. The affidavit also provided sufficient 

information for the magistrate to conclude that there was a fair probability that 

drugs would be found at 321 Tinsman Avenue. 

Mr. Ruley argues that there is no nexus between him, the contraband, and 

the place to be searched. He states that there was no connection between the 

cocaine transferred to Trooper Kelly and the cocaine and other drugs found during 

 

18 U.S. v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 96-97 (2006) (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238).

19 Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 97.

20 ECF No. 39-5.

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the search of 321 Tinsman Avenue. He further contends that the affidavit 

overstated Mr. Ruley’s connection to the residence because the individual seen 

entering and exiting the residence, described as 5 feet 10 inches and 150-165 

pounds, does not match the description of Mr. Ruley.21 These arguments, however, 

are better suited for trial. The affidavit was prepared by Trooper Kelly, the same 

individual who had, on three separate occasions, purchased cocaine from Mr. 

Ruley. At the time the affidavit was written, Mr. Ruley was identified by the alias 

“Ant.” The affidavit provided sufficient probable cause to establish that drugs 

would be found at 321 Tinsman Avenue immediately after Mr. Ruley, who had 

sold drugs to Trooper Kelly on these three separate occasions, exited the residence 

to sell drugs. 

Lastly, Mr. Ruley requests a Franks hearing, pursuant to Franks v. 

Delaware,

22 because he challenges the truthfulness of the affidavit of probable 

cause relied on by the magistrate judge in signing the search warrant. Specifically, 

he argues that Trooper Kelly’s statement in the affidavit of probable cause that 

Trooper William Holmes observed “Ant” re-entering 321 Tinsman Avenue after 

the controlled drug sale on June 10, 2015 was not supported by Trooper Holmes’ 

report.

 

21 Mr. Ruley also argues that the triggering condition was not met because the warrant was conditioned on “Ant” 

leaving 321 Tinsman Avenue, completing the controlled buy, and returning to 321 Tinsman Avenue. The affidavit, 

however, clearly states that the warrant was conditioned on the individual leaving Tinsman Avenue and delivering a 

quantity of cocaine to Trooper Kelly. See ECF No. 39-5 at 2.

22 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978).

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In Franks v. Delaware, the United States Supreme Court held that 

where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a 

false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless 

disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant 

affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the

finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a 

hearing be held at the defendant's request.23

At a Franks hearing, a defendant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

(1) that there was a false statement or omission in the affidavit and that it was 

made knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, and (2) 

that the false statement or omission was material to the probable cause 

determination.24

The affidavit of probable cause does state, as Mr. Ruley contends, that “Ant” 

was observed “re-entering 321 Tinsman Avenue by Tpr. William HOLMES” at 

1239 hours on June 10, 2015.25 The government, however, argues that the 

statement was merely an inadvertent error concerning which troopers observed 

“Ant” returning to the residence after the controlled drug sale. The government 

further submits the reports of Troopers Wool and Eisenhower, both of which state 

that the officers observed “Ant” return to the residence after the drug sale.

This Court is persuaded that Trooper Kelly’s statement that Trooper Holmes 

observed the suspect return to the residence was an inadvertent misstatement and 

 

23 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978).

24 U.S. v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 2006).

25 ECF No. 39-5.

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not a false statement made knowingly and deliberately or with a reckless disregard 

for the truth. All three troopers’ reports state the following information on which 

Trooper Kelly relied in composing the affidavit of probable cause: 1) Trooper 

Holmes observed “the target” leave 321 Tinsman Avenue but was unable to 

capture a digital image due to traffic; 2) Trooper Eisenhower observed a “B/Nmale subject” exit the residence at 1208 wearing a gray vest over a black shirt and 

grey shorts; 3) Trooper Wool observed a black male exit the residence at 1219 

hours; and 4) Troopers Eisenhower and Wool both observed the same individual 

they saw exit the residence re-enter the residence at 1239 hours. Three officers saw 

Mr. Ruley exit the residence sometime between 12:09 and 12:19 p.m. and two 

officers observed Mr. Ruley re-enter the residence at 12:39 p.m.

Read in their totality, the reports suggest that Trooper Kelly simply wrote 

the wrong trooper’s name as the trooper who observed Mr. Ruley return to the 

home. 

IV. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing reasoning, Mr. Ruley’s motion to sever and 

motion to suppress are both denied.

BY THE COURT: 

s/ Matthew W. Brann 

Matthew W. Brann

United States District Judge 

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