J. A14006/14 

 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : 

: 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

v. : 

: 

JOHN JAMISON, : No. 1403 MDA 2013 

: 

 Appellant : 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, May 15, 2013, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of York County 

Criminal Division at No. CP-67-SA-0000441-2011 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OLSON AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 06, 2014 

 John Jamison appeals from the judgment of sentence of May 15, 2013, 

following his conviction of two summary counts of failure to comply with the 

requirements of a police officer, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6311, and operating a motor 

vehicle that does not comply with Pennsylvania Department of 

Transportation (“PennDOT”) regulations, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4107(b)(2). We 

affirm. 

 On July 9, 2011, Officer Jacob Clevenger was on routine patrol when 

he observed appellant’s vehicle with dark sun screening on the vehicle 

windows. (Notes of testimony, 2/1/12 at 6.) Officer Clevenger effectuated 

a traffic stop and measured the light transmittance in the glass using a 

self-calibrating light meter. (Id. at 7.) According to Officer Clevenger, 

appellant’s windows had a light meter reading of only 13%, and the legal 
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minimum as defined by PennDOT regulations is 70%. (Id.) 

Officer Clevenger advised appellant that he was in violation of 67 Pa.Code 

§ 175.67(d)(4), and issued a “5-day card,” directing him to remove all tint 

from the windows within five days. (Id. at 6, 9-10.) Officer Clevenger did 

not receive the card back within five days, and after being informed that 

appellant did not intend to remove the tint, he issued a citation for a 

Section 6311 violation, failure to respond regarding the compliance card, as 

well as the citation for violating Section 4107(b)(2), failure to comply with 

PennDOT regulations. (Id. at 6-9.) 

 A magisterial district judge convicted appellant of the two 

above-mentioned summary offenses, and following a trial de novo, the 

convictions were affirmed. The trial court disagreed with appellant’s 

argument that the charges must be dismissed because he should have been 

cited under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1), which specifically governs window 

tinting, rather than under the “catch-all” provision of 75 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 4107(b)(2). On May 15, 2013, the trial court found appellant guilty of 

both charges and imposed an aggregate fine of $525. On July 15, 2013, 

appellant was granted permission to file a nunc pro tunc appeal, and notice 

of appeal was filed on August 1, 2013. On August 9, 2013, appellant was 

ordered to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal within 

21 days pursuant to Pa.R.A.P., Rule 1925(b), 42 Pa.C.S.A.; appellant filed 
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his statement on September 5, 2013.1

 On October 23, 2013, the trial court 

filed an opinion, relying on the transcript and its prior order of May 15, 

2013. 

Appellant has raised the following issue for this court’s review: 

I. Whether the explicit language of 75 Pa.C.S. 

§ 4524(e), which regulates sun screening on 

car windows, should supercede [sic] the 

equipment regulations that regulate the same 

topic as incorporated into the Vehicle Code via 

the catch-all provision at 75 Pa.C.S. 

§ 4107(b)(2)? 

Appellant’s brief at 4 (capitalization omitted).

 Because appellant’s issue presents a pure question of law, our 

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. 

Commonwealth v. Raban, 85 A.3d 467, 468 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). 

Section 4524 of the Vehicle Code, “Windshield obstructions and 

wipers,” provides, in relevant part: 

(e) Sun screening and other materials 

prohibited.-- 

(1) No person shall drive any motor 

vehicle with any sun screening 

device or other material which 

does not permit a person to see or 

view the inside of the vehicle 

through the windshield, side wing 

or side window of the vehicle. 

 

1 While it appears that appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was untimely 

filed, because the trial court accepted the late statement and addressed 

appellant’s substantive issues, we will not find waiver. Commonwealth v. 

Rodriguez, 81 A.3d 103, 105 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 91 

A.3d 1238 (Pa. 2014). 
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75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1). At trial, appellant presented testimony that a 

person would be able to see the inside of his vehicle through the tinted 

windows. However, appellant was not charged with violating 

Section 4524(e)(1), he was charged with violating Section 4107(b)(2), which 

provides: 

(b) Other violations.--It is unlawful for any 

person to do any of the following: 

(2) Operate, or cause or permit 

another person to operate, on any 

highway in this Commonwealth any 

vehicle or combination which is not 

equipped as required under this 

part or under department 

regulations or when the driver is in 

violation of department regulations 

or the vehicle or combination is 

otherwise in an unsafe condition or 

in violation of department 

regulations. 

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4107(b)(2). Appellant’s citation for violating 

Section 4107(b)(2) was based on his violation of the PennDOT regulation at 

67 Pa.Code § 175.67(d)(4), concerning sun screening material: 

§ 175.67. Glazing. 

(d) Obstructions. A vehicle specified under this 

subchapter shall have glazing free from 

obstructions as described in § 175.80 (relating 

to inspection procedure). 

(4) A sun screening device or other 

material which does not permit a 

person to see or view the inside of 

the vehicle is prohibited . . . . See 
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Table X for specific requirements 

for vehicles subject to this 

subchapter. Passenger car 

requirements relating to the rear 

window are delineated by vehicle 

model year in Table X. 

67 Pa.Code § 175.67(d)(4). Table X sets forth specific light transmittance 

requirements for different passenger cars. It is undisputed that the 

PennDOT regulations for appellant’s particular vehicle require 70% light 

transmittance.2

 Appellant argues that the statutory provision at Section 4524(e) of the 

Vehicle Code supersedes the PennDOT regulation found at 67 Pa.Code 

§ 175.67(d)(4); and therefore, both citations should have been dismissed. 

According to appellant, Section 4524(e) and the PennDOT regulation are in 

conflict, and statutes always supersede administrative regulations. See 

Commonwealth v. Kerstetter, 62 A.3d 1065, 1069 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2013), 

affirmed, 94 A.3d 991 (Pa. 2014) (“It is axiomatic that a statute is the law 

and trumps an administrative agency’s regulations.”), citing Joyce Outdoor 

Adver., LLC v. Dep’t of Transp., 49 A.3d 518, 524 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2012). 

However, “This Court has held an ‘administrative agency’s interpretation of 

its own regulations is controlling unless the interpretation is plainly 

 

2

 Appellant testified that his sun screening allows 20% light transmittance. 

(Notes of testimony, 2/1/12 at 16.) This would still be well below the 70% 

standard. 
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erroneous or inconsistent with the statute under which it is promulgated.’” 

Id., quoting Joyce Outdoor Adver., LLC, supra. 

 Section 4103(a) of the Vehicle Code grants PennDOT authority to 

promulgate vehicle equipment standards: “The department shall 

promulgate vehicle equipment standards for vehicles, equipment and 

devices required under this part. To the maximum extent possible, 

consistent with safety, the standards shall be expressed in terms of 

minimum acceptable performance levels, measured against objective testing 

parameters.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4103(a).

 We can discern no conflict between 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1) and 

67 Pa.Code § 175.67(d)(4); indeed, they are nearly identical. Both prohibit 

sun screening devices or other material which does not permit a person to 

see or view the inside of the vehicle. The cases relied upon by appellant, 

Kerstetter, supra, and Equitable Gas Co. v. Wade, 812 A.2d 715 

(Pa.Super. 2002), are readily distinguishable. 

 In Kerstetter, the Commonwealth Court found a clear conflict 

between the Public School Code and Department of Education regulations in 

their respective definitions of “compulsory school age.” The departmental 

regulations defined “compulsory school age,” as, inter alia, children 

enrolled in grades above kindergarten; while the Code’s compulsory school 

attendance provisions applied to any student enrolled in public school, 

regardless of whether they were enrolled in kindergarten. The appellant in 
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Kerstetter relied on the Department regulations, arguing that because her 

children were only enrolled in kindergarten, they were not subject to the 

compulsory school attendance law. The Commonwealth Court disagreed, 

finding that the Department’s regulations conflicted with the Code’s 

definition of “compulsory school age,” which took precedence over any 

inconsistent regulation. Kerstetter, 62 A.3d at 1070. 

 Similarly, in Wade, the gas company sought post-judgment interest of 

18% based on a lawful tariff it received from the Public Utility Commission 

(“PUC”), as well as a regulation governing late payments of utility bills set 

forth in the Pennsylvania Code. Both these provisions were in clear conflict 

with the statute governing post-judgment interest, which is set at the legal 

rate of 6% per year. Wade, 812 A.2d at 717, citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8101; 

41 P.S. § 202. The Wade court noted that both the regulation and the tariff

were issued by the PUC, not the Pennsylvania Legislature, and are not 

“statutes” under Pennsylvania law. Id. at 718. Therefore, they cannot 

supersede Section 8101 which sets forth the legal rate of post-judgment 

interest. Id.

 Both Wade and Kerstetter presented clear conflicts or inconsistencies 

between the relevant statutes and regulations. In the case sub judice, as 

stated above, there is no such conflict or inconsistency. Both the statute 

and the regulation prohibit driving with sun screening material which does 

not permit a person to see inside the vehicle. PennDOT then implemented 
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this requirement, pursuant to its legislative mandate, by establishing a 

minimum standard, i.e., 70% light transmittance. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e) is 

silent as to acceptable levels of light transmittance, so there is no 

inconsistency. Without the PennDOT standards for permissible light 

transmittance thresholds, police would have no objective testing parameters 

to determine whether a vehicle’s sun screening was in violation of the law.

Finally, appellant also cites this court’s decision in Commonwealth v. 

Brubaker, 5 A.3d 261 (Pa.Super. 2010), which is wholly inapposite. In 

Brubaker, the appellant was stopped and charged with violating

Section 4524(e)(1). Id. at 262. However, at trial, the investigating officer 

conceded that he could, in fact, see into the appellant’s vehicle even though 

there was sun screening material present on the subject windows. Id. at 

263-264. Therefore, the plain terms of Section 4524(e)(1) were not met. 

There was testimony at trial that the officer used a window tint meter to 

measure the percentage of light transmitted through the glass, and only 

36.3% of light was passing through the appellant’s front passenger side 

window, well below the 70% threshold. Id. at 264. However, appellant was 

not charged with violating Section 4107(b)(2), and Section 4524(e)(1) does 

not refer to the 70% light transmittance standard. The terms of 67 Pa.Code 

§ 175.67(d)(4) could not be utilized to sustain a conviction under 

Section 4524(e)(1). Id. This court found that given the officer’s testimony 
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that he could, in fact, see into the vehicle, the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain a conviction for violating Section 4524(e)(1). 

 Obviously, our holding in Brubaker does not inure to appellant’s 

benefit, where appellant was charged with violating Section 4107(b)(2), 

making it unlawful to operate a motor vehicle in violation of PennDOT 

regulations, which would include the 70% light transmittance standard 

referenced in 67 Pa.Code § 175.67(d)(4) and Table X. The defendant in 

Brubaker was charged under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1), which does not 

prohibit a person from driving a motor vehicle which possesses sun 

screening material that reduces transmittance of light to below any 

particular standard. As such, Brubaker is inapposite. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 10/6/2014