IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 

JANE DOE, a minor, by her mother : Civ. No. 3:23-CV-1118 

and natural guardian, Jennifer Nied, : 

and JENNIFER NIED, individually, : 

 : 

 Plaintiffs, : 

 : 

v. : (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom) 

 : 

RIVERSIDE SCHOOL DISTRICT, : 

d/b/a Riverside Junior/Senior : 

High School, et al., : 

 : 

Defendants. : 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

I. Introduction 

This case comes before us for consideration of a motion to dismiss 

the plaintiffs’ amended complaint filed by several defendants—Riverside 

School District (the “District”), Robert Presley, Christopher Lazor, and 

Paul Brennan. (Doc. 48). Jennifer Nied filed this action on behalf of 

herself and her daughter Jane Doe, a minor student in the Riverside 

School District. (Doc. 1). The complaint alleged that Jane Doe was 

sexually assaulted off school grounds by another student, A.P., who 

attended the same school, and that following that student’s adjudication 

of delinquency, the school failed to expel him or otherwise keep him away 

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from Jane Doe. (See generally Doc. 1). This, in turn, allegedly led to Jane 

Doe’s abuser harassing her during school hours and at school functions. 

(Id.). 

The original complaint asserted a host of claims against the School 

District and the School Board, as well as Paul Brennan, the 

Superintendent, and Robert Presley and Christopher Lazor, both of 

whom served as the principal of the school at some time during the 

alleged events. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, which 

we granted in part. (Docs. 36, 37). Specifically, we concluded that the 

plaintiffs’ complaint adequately pleaded a claim for discrimination

against the District under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 

(“Title IX”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, et seq., but that the remaining claims 

failed as pleaded. (Id.). We further dismissed the claims against the 

School Board. (Id.). We permitted the plaintiffs leave to amend their 

complaint against the School District and the individual District 

defendants. (Id.).

The plaintiffs have now filed their amended complaint, which is 

currently the operative pleading. (Doc. 45). The amended complaint 

asserts a Title IX discrimination claim, as well as claims brought 

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pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the plaintiffs’ 

Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id.). Specifically, the plaintiffs allege 

that the individual defendants, as well as the District, were deliberately 

indifferent to the harassment perpetrated against Jane Doe by A.P. They 

assert that this conduct violated the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and Due 

Process rights. The District defendants have moved to dismiss the 

amended complaint, arguing that the amended complaint suffers from 

the same flaws as the original complaint, and thus, fails to state a claim 

against them.1 (Doc. 48). 

The motion is fully briefed and ripe for resolution. (Docs. 49, 57, 58). 

After consideration, the defendants’ motion will be granted in part and 

denied in part as set forth below.

II. Background 

 

The factual background of this Memorandum Opinion is taken from 

the well-pleaded facts alleged in the plaintiffs’ amended complaint (Doc. 

45), which we must accept as true for purposes of the instant motion to 

dismiss. The minor plaintiff, Jane Doe, was enrolled as a student in the 

1 Bryan and Nicole Pica, the remaining defendants, also filed a motion to 

dismiss the negligence claim brought against them, which we denied on 

December 4, 2024. (Docs. 62, 63).

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Riverside School District (“the District”) at Riverside Junior/Senior High 

School, located in Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 45 ¶ 26). 

Jane Doe was a student with a disability and had a 504 Service 

Agreement with the District that outlined the accommodations she 

required. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28). 

In January and February of 2021, Jane Doe was sexually assaulted 

by A.P., a minor who was also enrolled at Riverside Junior/Senior High 

School. (Doc. 45 ¶¶ 34-35). The assaults occurred outside of the school 

setting. (Id.). Following the assaults, the Luzerne County District 

Attorney’s Office filed a Petition Alleging Delinquency, claiming that A.P. 

raped and/or sexually assaulted Jane Doe. (Id. ¶ 36). After a hearing, the 

Court adjudicated A.P. delinquent of Felony 2 Sexual Assault pursuant 

to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3124.1. (Id. ¶ 37). 

The amended complaint alleges that following this adjudication, 

A.P. was permitted to continue to attend the same school as Jane Doe. 

(Doc. 45 ¶ 40-41). The plaintiffs assert that A.P. continued to harass Jane 

Doe during school hours and on school grounds. (Id. ¶ 47). For example, 

the amended complaint asserts that in January of 2022, A.P. attended 

the semi-formal dance, during which he sat at a table next to Jane Doe 

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and her friends and allegedly harassed and tormented her all night, 

claiming she “made the whole thing up.” (Id. ¶¶ 55, 57). Additionally, the 

amended complaint alleges that while passing Jane Doe in the hallway, 

A.P. mockingly shouted at her. (Id. ¶ 60). Jennifer Nied brought these 

issues to the District and requested a meeting with the principals and 

guidance counselor. (Id. ¶ 61). The meeting occurred on February 23, 

2022. (Id. ¶ 62). During the meeting, Nied was told that nothing could 

be done and that if Jane Doe was having issues, she could move to a 

different school district. (Id.). 

The plaintiffs allege that school continued to be a threatening and 

hostile environment for Jane Doe due to the District’s failure to protect 

her from A.P. (Doc. 45 ¶¶ 53-54). The plaintiffs assert that the individual 

defendants, and specifically Superintendent Brennan, were made aware 

of these instances of harassment and torment because Jennifer Nied 

corresponded with him directly. (Id. ¶ 40). The amended complaint 

further asserts that Jennifer Nied specifically informed Defendants 

Lazor and Presley of several incidents, including Jane Doe being 

ridiculed in front of her class by a teacher alleged to be a friend of the 

Pica defendants, as well as threats made to Jane Doe’s friends regarding 

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removal from the football team after they spoke up on her behalf. (Id. ¶¶ 

43-44). 

The plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on July 5, 2023. (Doc. 1). 

After the defendants’ filed a motion to dismiss, which we granted in part 

and denied in part, the plaintiffs then filed the amended complaint. (Doc. 

45). As to the District defendants, the plaintiffs assert a Title IX 

discrimination claim, as well as Equal Protection and Due Process claims 

under § 1983. (Id.). The defendants have now moved to dismiss the 

amended complaint. (Doc 48). 

This motion is fully briefed and ripe for resolution. (Docs. 49, 57, 

58). After consideration, the motion will be granted as to the Due Process 

claim and denied in all other respects.

III. Discussion 

 

A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review 

The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the complaint 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 

12(b)(6) permits the court to dismiss a complaint if the complaint fails to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

Under federal pleading standards, a complaint must set forth a “short 

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and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under 

this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the 

complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 

them after construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 

1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal 

conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 

Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice”). 

As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a twopart analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim 

should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the 

complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any 

legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then 

determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are 

sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for 

relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more 

than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint 

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has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 

515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, 

“[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer 

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint 

has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” 

determination will be “a context-specific task that requires 

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense.” Id.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). 

Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on 

the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public 

record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court 

can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant 

attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are 

based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. 

White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if 

the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically 

attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the 

court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v. 

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). 

However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when 

deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.

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B. The Motion will be Granted in Part and Denied in Part. 

 

As we have noted, the defendants have moved to dismiss all the 

claims against them, arguing that the plaintiffs have failed to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted. As we will discuss below, we find 

that the plaintiffs have adequately pleaded a discrimination claim under 

Title IX. Additionally, we conclude that the plaintiffs have adequately 

stated an Equal Protection claim against the defendants, both against 

the individual defendants and the District under Monell. However, 

because the plaintiffs have failed to address the defendants’ arguments 

regarding the Due Process claim, this claim will be dismissed. 

1. Title IX 

 

The plaintiffs assert a claim against the District under Title IX, 

alleging that the District discriminated against Jane Doe. The amended 

complaint alleges that Jane Doe was subjected to a hostile educational 

environment when the District was aware of and permitted sexual 

harassment against her by her abuser, A.P. The defendants challenged 

this claim in their initial motion to dismiss, and we found that the 

complaint adequately stated a claim for discrimination under Title IX. 

(Doc. 36 at 11-15). After a review of the amended complaint, we conclude 

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that the allegations are sufficient to state a Title IX discrimination claim 

against the District. 

Title IX prohibits entities receiving federal financial assistance 

from discriminating against, excluding, or denying benefits of an 

educational program or activity to individuals on the basis of sex. 20 

U.S.C. § 1681(a). Under Title IX, the School District may be liable for 

student-on-student sexual harassment if the District (1) had “substantial 

control over both the harasser and the context in which the harassment 

occurred”; (2) “had ‘actual knowledge’ of the harassment”; (3) “was 

‘deliberately indifferent’ to the harassment”; and (4) the harassment was 

so severe or pervasive that it effectively deprived the victim of access to 

educational benefits and opportunities provided by the school. Lockhart 

v. Willingboro High School, 170 F. Supp. 3d 722, 736 (D.N.J. 2015) 

(quoting Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Education, 526 U.S. 629, 645, 650 

(1999)). 

At the outset, it is undisputed that the District receives federal 

funds as required under § 1681. Further, the plaintiffs have pleaded that 

Jane Doe was subjected to sexual harassment. See Goodwin v. Pennridge 

Sch. Dist., 389 F. Supp. 3d 304, 314 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (citing C.S. v. 

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Southern Columbia Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 2371413, at *9 (M.D. Pa. May 

21, 2013)) (“When a sexual assault triggers a course of harassment, the 

total course of events can be considered sexual harassment.”). 

Accordingly, we conclude that the amended complaint sufficiently alleges

that Jane Doe was subjected to sexual harassment. 

We further conclude that the amended complaint adequately pleads 

that the District had knowledge of the harassment, had control over the 

harasser and the context in which the harassment occurred, and was 

deliberately indifferent to the harassment. Here, the plaintiffs allege that 

the District was informed by Jennifer Nied, as well as by A.P.’s juvenile 

probation officer, that A.P. was adjudicated delinquent of sexually 

assaulting Jane Doe. It is further alleged that A.P. harassed Jane Doe 

during school hours and at a school dance, and that Jennifer Nied 

informed the District of this harassment during a meeting with the 

principals and guidance counselor. The amended complaint asserts that 

even after the District was informed of the harassment, the District did 

nothing to prevent A.P. from further harassing Jane Doe; in fact, it is 

alleged that Jane Doe and A.P. were placed in the same lunch period, 

that Jane Doe was placed in a class taught by a friend of the Pica 

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defendants who ridiculed her in front of her peers, that A.P.’s picture was 

placed on a banner on her route to school, and that her friends were 

threatened with removal from the football team after they spoke up on 

her behalf.

The District argues that the plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient 

facts to establish that Jane Doe was deprived of educational benefits and 

opportunities. However, as we concluded with respect to the original 

complaint, in our view, the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts to 

satisfy this element. Like the original complaint, the amended complaint 

asserts that, in addition to the physical and emotional harm Jane Doe 

suffered, she also suffered a decline in her grades and an increase in 

absences from school due to A.P.’s continued harassment and the 

District’s failure to stop it. She further alleges that the District denied 

her request to transfer out of a class taught by a teacher who was hostile 

toward her. While a decline in grades, by itself, is not sufficient to prove 

a denial of educational opportunities, Davis, 526 U.S. at 652, in our view, 

the allegations taken together are sufficient at this stage to show that 

Jane Doe was denied educational benefits or opportunities. Accordingly, 

we find that the allegations in the amended complaint are sufficient to 

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state a claim for Title IX discrimination against the District, and this 

claim will proceed forward. 

2. Section 1983 Claims 

The plaintiffs also assert several claims against the District and the 

individual defendants pursuant to § 1983, alleging violations of their 

Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs assert an 

Equal Protection Claim, as well as a Monell claim against the District, 

and a Due Process claim. We will discuss each of these claims in turn.

a. Equal Protection 

The plaintiffs contend that the defendants’ failure to respond to the 

ongoing harassment and torment of Jane Doe amounted to deliberate 

indifference and intentional discrimination in violation of the Equal 

Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs assert 

this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States or other person within the 

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 

or other proper proceeding for redress.

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See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, “Section 1983 imposes civil liability 

upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives 

another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States.” See Shuman v. Penn Manor 

School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Section 

1983 “does not create any new substantive rights but instead provides a 

remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.” 

See id. (citation omitted).

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state may “deny to 

any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.” U.S. 

Const. amend. XIV § 1. A plaintiff alleging an Equal Protection claim 

based on student-on-student harassment “must allege that she ‘was 

subjected to the discriminatory peer harassment.’” Zavada v. East 

Stroudsburg Univ., 2024 WL 4311492, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2024) 

(quoting Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 702 (4th Cir. 

2018) (citation omitted)). Further, the plaintiff must show that school 

officials “responded to the discriminatory peer harassment with 

deliberate indifference, i.e. in a manner clearly unreasonable in light of 

the known circumstances.” Id. (quoting Feminist Majority Found., 911 

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F.3d at 702) (internal quotation marks omitted)). As one court in this 

district has noted, while “[t]he United States Supreme Court and the 

Third Circuit Court of Appeals . . . have not addressed whether the Equal 

Protection Clause protects students from a school’s deliberate 

indifference to student-on-student harassment[,]” there is “a robust 

consensus of persuasive authority” that such a right exists. L.S. v. 

Hanover Area Sch. Dist., 2024 WL 2393038, at *22 (M.D. Pa. May 23, 

2024) (Munley, J.) (collecting cases). 

Here, we conclude that the amended complaint sufficiently alleges 

that Jane Doe was subject to discriminatory peer harassment, and that 

the individual defendants knew of the harassment and responded in an 

unreasonable manner in violation of the Equal Protection clause. As we 

have discussed with respect to the Title IX claim, the alleged harassment 

of Jane Doe by A.P. arose out of a prior sexual assault. Such an allegation 

is sufficient to establish that Jane Doe was subjected to discriminatory 

peer harassment. See Goodwin, 389 F. Supp. 3d at 314 (citing C.S., 2013 

WL 2371413, at *9 (“When a sexual assault triggers a course of 

harassment, the total course of events can be considered sexual 

harassment.”)). 

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Additionally, the plaintiffs’ amended complaint sufficiently alleges 

that the individual defendants knew of the ongoing harassment and 

responded unreasonably considering the circumstances. Unlike the 

initial complaint, the amended complaint sets forth specific instances in 

which Jennifer Nied informed the individuals defendants of A.P.’s 

ongoing torment of Jane Doe. Specifically, the amended complaint alleges 

that Jennifer Nied informed Defendants Presley and Lazor that Jane Doe 

was ridiculed in front of her class by a teacher alleged to be a friend of 

the Pica defendants, as well as an instance in which threats were made 

to Jane Doe’s friends regarding removal from the football team after they 

spoke up on her behalf. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 43-44). The amended complaint also 

alleges that Jennifer Nied directly informed Superintendent Brennan of 

the ongoing harassment, as the “District’s Discrimination Policy requires 

the Superintendent to be informed of complaints of discrimination[.]” (Id.

¶ 40). The plaintiffs assert that rather than respond to and investigate 

these complaints of harassment, the defendants intentionally placed 

Jane Doe in a class taught by a friend of the Pica defendants, who was 

also a football coach and who allegedly ridiculed Jane Doe in front of her 

peers (id. ¶ 50); placed Jane Doe in the same lunch period as A.P. (id. ¶ 

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52); permitted A.P. to attend the semi-formal dance and sit at a table 

directly next to Jane Doe (id. ¶¶ 55-56); and placed a banner with A.P.’s 

photograph on Jane Doe’s route to school. (Id. ¶ 58). 

At the motion to dismiss stage, where we must accept these factual 

allegations as true, we conclude that the plaintiffs have sufficiently 

alleged that Jane Doe was subjected to discriminatory peer harassment, 

and that the individual defendants were deliberately indifferent to this

student-on-student harassment in violation of the Equal Protection 

clause. See e.g., Zavada, 2024 WL 4311492, at *10. Accordingly, the 

motion to dismiss this claim will be denied. 

b. Monell 

We further conclude that the plaintiffs have adequately pleaded a 

Monell claim against the District regarding the alleged Equal Protection 

violation. A municipal entity may be liable for a constitutional violation 

under § 1983 if the violation was a direct result of the entity's policy, 

custom, or practice. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 

436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978). However, an entity may not be held liable 

“solely because injuries were inflicted by its agents or employees.” 

Jiminez v. All American Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 

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2007). Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate a “direct causal link” 

between the alleged constitutional violation and the municipal policy or 

custom. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).

The Supreme Court has recognized four categories of municipal 

policies or customs—(1) formally approved rules, (2) unofficial 

widespread customs, (3) actions of municipal policymakers, and (4) 

deliberate indifference by a municipal entity. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; 

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986); Connick v. 

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011); Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 

318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003). A formally approved rule is one issued 

by a decisionmaker who has final authority to establish municipal policy. 

Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019). By 

contrast, an unofficial custom is a “persistent and widespread” practice 

that, though uncodified, is “so permanent and well settled as to constitute 

a custom or usage with the force of law.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (quoting 

Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1970)). Finally, a 

municipality is deliberately indifferent only if a “municipal actor 

disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Bd. of Cnty. 

Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997).

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Here, the plaintiffs have alleged that the District, specifically 

through its Title IX coordinator Superintendent Brennan, failed to 

implement adequate nondiscrimination policies and failed to adequately 

address the complaints of sexual harassment. The amended complaint 

asserts that Superintendent Brennan was made aware of the complaints 

of harassment directly by Jennifer Nied, and that he failed to investigate 

the complaints or take any action to quell the ongoing harassment. The 

plaintiffs allege that this failure by the District resulted in her injuries. 

In our view, the amended complaint sufficiently states a Monell claim 

against the District regarding its policies, or lack thereof, concerning 

discrimination and harassment. See e.g., S.M. v. Tamaqua Area Sch. 

Dist., 2023 WL 2332251, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2023) (finding that the 

complaint’s allegations concerning the school district’s failure to enforce 

its policies were sufficient to state a Monell claim). 

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the Monell claim against the 

District will be denied. 

c. Due Process 

The plaintiffs also appear to assert a Due Process claim against the 

defendants, alleging that the defendants denied Jane Doe her legitimate 

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entitlement to a public education as a property right under the 

Fourteenth Amendment by permitting the ongoing harassment by A.P. 

and creating a hostile educational environment. 

In the brief in support of their motion to dismiss, the defendants

characterize this claim as one alleging substantive Due Process and

contend that the plaintiffs have not adequately pleaded a substantive 

Due Process violation. (Doc. 49 at 18-21). For their part, the plaintiffs’ 

brief does not address any of the defendants’ arguments regarding the 

Due Process claim. (See Doc. 57). Thus, we conclude that the plaintiff’s 

failure to oppose the defendants’ arguments with respect to this claim 

constitutes an abandonment of this claim. See Levy-Tatum v. Navient 

Solutions, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 3d 701, 712 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (collecting cases)

(finding that the plaintiff “abandoned those claims upon which she failed 

to make an substantive arguments” in opposition to a motion to dismiss); 

see also Booker v. Central Loan Admin. & Reporting, 2024 WL 4826053, 

at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 19, 2024) (concluding that the plaintiff’s failure to 

address arguments in opposing a motion to dismiss constituted an 

abandonment of such claims). Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ Due Process 

claim will be dismissed.

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Finally, we note that the plaintiffs have requested leave to amend 

their complaint. Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits 

a party to amend a pleading once as a matter of course, if amended within 

a particular timeframe, and with either consent of the opposing party or 

leave of court in all other cases. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Leave to amend 

should be freely given “when justice so requires.” Id. However, the 

decision to grant a party’s request to amend a pleading lies within the 

discretion of the court. Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). 

A court may deny a party’s request to amend if amendment would result 

in undue delay, is motivated by bad faith, would prejudice the nonmoving 

party, or would be futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

Here, the plaintiffs have already amended their complaint once. 

Further, the plaintiffs had the opportunity to defend the merits of this 

Due Process claim and chose not to do so in their opposition to the instant 

motion. (See Doc. 57). Thus, in our view, permitting amendment would 

result in prejudice to the defendants, who have already expended time 

and resources arguing against the merits of this claim, both in the instant 

motion and in the previous motion to dismiss. See Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 

434 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[P]rejudice to the non-moving party is 

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the touchstone for the denial of an amendment.”) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ request for 

leave to amend will be denied. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 

48) will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: 

1. The motion will be GRANTED with respect to the plaintiffs’ 

Due Process claim; 

2. The motion will be DENIED with respect to the Title IX claim 

against the District, the Equal Protection claim against the 

individual defendants, and the Monell claim against the 

District; and

3. The plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend will be DENIED.

An appropriate order follows.

 s/ Daryl F. Bloom

Daryl F. Bloom

Chief United States Magistrate Judge 

Dated: December 23, 2024

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