BLD-158 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 21-1211

___________ DENNIS CAMPBELL; MINDY JAYE ZIED-CAMPBELL, Appellants

v. POSTMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

___________________ _________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern Distri ct of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:88-cv-04820) District Judge: Honorable Jan E. DuBois

___________________ _________________ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursua nt to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 April 22, 2021 Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ, and PORTER, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: April 29, 2021)

_________ OPINION *

_________ PER CURIAM Dennis John Campbell and Mindy Jaye Zi ed-Campbell, husband and wife, appeal from a series of post-judgment orders entered by the United St ates District Court for the

* This disposition is not an op inion of the full Court and pu rsuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2 Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Because th e appeal presents no s ubstantial question, we will summarily affirm. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. In 1988, the Campbells filed a complain t against the Postmaster General of the United States. The Postmaster General file d a motion for summary judgment, which the District Court granted in March 1989. Afte r decades of inaction, the Campbells filed a series of motions seeking post- judgment relief. The District Court denied those motion. In addition, by order entered April 3, 2015, the District Court en joined the Campbells from further filings without first obtaining leave of court, notin g that they “have demonstrated a continuous pattern of groundless and vexatious litigation.” 1 (ECF 23.) Following entry of that order, the Campbells filed numerous motions for leave to file additional post-judgment motions. The Distri ct Court denied those motions “as totally without merit,” rejected the Campbells’ reque sts for reconsideration of those denials, refused to act on emails sent by Mindy Zied-C ampbell, denied the Campbells’ motions to consolidate the case with other District Court actions, and ordered that “all future letters or motions from ... plaintiffs ... seeking relief previously addressed and denied ... will not be docketed and will be returned ....” (ECF 40, 46, 50, 51, 55, 59, and 64.) The Campbells filed a notice of appeal (ECF 61) , which they later amended (ECF 66). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1292(a)(1). 2 Our review of the District Court’s orders is for abuse of discretion. See Max’s Seafood Café v.

1 The Campbells’ appeal of that order was dismi ssed for failure to timely prosecute. C.A. No. 15-2668 (order ente red Jan. 30, 2020).

2 We lack jurisdiction over any orders ente red before December 4, 2020, because the3 Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (post-judgment motions for reconsideration); In re Packer Ave. Assocs., 884 F.2d 745, 746-47 (3d Cir. 1989) (filing injunctions); Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. v. Gateway Fu nding Diversified Mort g. Servs., L.P., 785 F.3d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 2015) (motions to c onsolidate). We may summarily affirm a District Court’s decision “on any basis suppor ted by the record” if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. L. A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. We discern no abuse of discretion in the Di strict Court’s denial of the Campbells’ motions for leave to file post-judgment mo tions. Setting aside th e question whether the April 2015 filing injunction required leave to file to those motions, it is clear that postjudgment relief was not warranted. The Camp bells’ motions, filed over 30 years after entry of the order granting the Postmaster General’s motion for summary judgment and over five years after the April 2015 filing in junction, did not comply with the limitations periods of Federal Rules of Civil Procedur e 59(e) and 60(b)(1)-(3 ), and was unreasonably belated for purposes of Rules 60(b)(5)-(6). 3 Furthermore, the District Court properl y denied the Campbells’ requests for reconsideration of the denial of the motions for post-judgment relief. See United States

notice of appeal was untimely as to any of t hose orders. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). 3 Although the time limits of Rule 60(c)(1) do not necessarily appl y to motions under Rule 60(b)(4), see United States v. One To shiba Color TV, 213 F. 3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), the Campbells did not assert that the District Court’s orders were “void.” See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espi nosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270 (2010) (stating that the “list of []infirmities” that render a judgm ent void “is exceedingly short; otherwise, Rule 60(b)(4)'s exception to finality would swallow the rule”).4 v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 28 8 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining th at a Rule 60(b) motion “may not be used as a substitute for an appeal , and ... legal error, without more does not warrant relief under that provision”). We also conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to act on em ails sent by Mindy Zied-Campbell because those emails did not request any relief. In addition, the Distri ct Court properly denied the Campbells’ motions to consolidate the case with other actions that they had filed in the Eastern and Middle Districts of Pennsylvania. There was no basis to consolidate because the cases either involved different defendants, had resulted in final judgments, or shared no common questions of law or fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). Finally, we conclude that the filing in junction issued on December 23, 2020, complied with the applicable requirements. Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d Cir. 1993) (providing that when imposing a filing injunction: (1) the order should be entered only in exigent circum stances, such as wh en a litigant continuously abuses the judicial process by filing meritle ss and repetitive actions; (2) the District Court must give notice to the litigant to show cause why the pr oposed injunction should not issue; and (3) the scope of the injunctive order must be narrowly tailored to fit the particular circumstances of the case). Fi rst, exigent circumstances ex isted here, as the Campbells had continued to file duplicativ e and meritless motions in an action that had been closed for decades. Second, the April 2015 filing injunction put the Cam pbells on notice that their groundless and vexatious litigation would no t be tolerated. Third, the December 23, 2020 injunction was narrowly tailored, applyi ng to only “future letters or motions ... seeking relief previously addressed and deni ed ....” Cf. Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 9015 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 1990) (approving of a pre-filing injunction that contains a statement that, in seeking leave of court, a litiga nt must certify, inter alia, that the claims she wishes to present are new claims never befo re raised and disposed of on the merits by any federal court). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that this appeal does not present a substantial question. Accordin gly, we will summarily affirm. 4

4 The Campbells’ motion for appointm ent of counsel is denied.