IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 

CHRISTOPHER F. MBEWE, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

THERESA A. DELBALSO, et al., 

 Defendants. 

 No. 4:24-CV-01508 

 (Chief Judge Brann) 

 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

JANUARY 8, 2025 

 Plaintiff Christopher F. Mbewe filed the instant pro se Section 19831

 action, 

alleging constitutional violations by prison officials at the State Correctional 

Institution, Mahanoy (SCI Mahanoy), in Frackville, Pennsylvania. The Court will 

dismiss Mbewe’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and will grant 

him limited leave to amend. 

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 

Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,” pro se

prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or employees.2

 One 

basis for dismissal at the screening stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim 

1

 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional 

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves 

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ. 

v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002). 

2

 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

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upon which relief may be granted[.]”3 This language closely tracks Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to 

screening a pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as 

they utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).4

 

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire 

“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to 

offer evidence to support the claims.”5

 The court must accept as true the factual 

allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff.6

 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of 

the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint, 

matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to 

a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these 

documents.7

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a 

three-step inquiry.8

 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the] 

3

 Id. § 1915A(b)(1). 

4

 See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O’Brien 

v. U.S. Fed. Gov’t, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (nonprecedential); 

cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). 

5

 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 

1996). 

6

 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). 

7

 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. 

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). 

8 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted). 

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plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”9 Second, the court should distinguish wellpleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal 

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be 

disregarded.10 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations 

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”11 

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”12

 Because Mbewe proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed 

and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”13 This is particularly true 

when the pro se litigant, like Mbewe, is incarcerated.14

II. DISCUSSION 

 The gravamen of Mbewe’s complaint concerns the handling of his legal mail 

by SCI Mahanoy officials. Mbewe alleges that, in May 2019, legal mail was sent 

to him by Attorney Nilam Sanghvi, who worked for the Pennsylvania Innocence 

Project at Temple University.15 Mbewe contends that “the SCI Mahanoy mailroom 

9

 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)). 

10 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). 

11 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). 

12 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. 

13 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted). 

14 Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). 

15 Doc. 1 ¶ 15; Doc. 1-1. 

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or property room received the legal mail on May 22, 2019,” but rejected it without 

providing notice to him.16 Mbewe further asserts that the legal mail was not 

returned to Attorney Sanghvi but was instead sent to “Camp-Hill” by “prison 

staff.”17 He maintains that he did not learn about this rejection until September 9, 

2022, when he requested a copy of his legal mail log from SCI Mahanoy 

officials.18

 Mbewe alleges that the rejection of the May 22, 2019 incoming mail from 

Attorney Singhvi without notice “and a reasonable opportunity to protest” the 

rejection violated his First Amendment free speech rights, First and Fourteenth 

Amendment right of access to the courts, and Fourteenth Amendment procedural 

due process rights.19 He names six defendants: Superintendent Theresa A. 

Delbalso, Captain M. Dunkle, Lieutenant K. Wall, and Corrections Officers A. 

Crawford, A. Chapman, and M.J. Wall,20 and seeks “compensatory and punitive 

damages.”21 

On review of Mbewe’s complaint, he fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted. The Court will address Mbewe’s pleading deficiencies in turn. 

16 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 15, 16. 

17 Id. ¶ 15. Mbewe may be referring to the State Correctional Institution located in Camp Hill, 

Pennsylvania. See https://www.pa.gov/agencies/cor/state-prisons/sci-camp-hill.html (last 

visited Jan. 3, 2025). 

18 Id. ¶ 16; Doc. 1-3. 

19 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 23-25. 

20 Id. ¶¶ 2-5. 

21 Id. ¶ 30. 

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A. Personal Involvement 

 It is well established that, in Section 1983 actions, liability cannot be 

“predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”22 Rather, a Section 

1983 plaintiff must aver facts that demonstrate “the defendants’ personal 

involvement in the alleged misconduct.”23 Personal involvement can include direct 

wrongful conduct by a defendant, but it can also be demonstrated through 

allegations of “personal direction” or of “actual knowledge and acquiescence”; 

however, such averments must be made with particularity.24 Furthermore, it is 

equally settled that involvement in the post-incident grievance process alone does 

not give rise to Section 1983 liability.25

Mbewe’s first pleading deficiency is his failure to allege personal 

involvement by any Defendant. Although Mbewe names six SCI Mahanoy 

officials in the defendant-identification section of his complaint, he does not 

include any specific allegations of wrongdoing that would establish personal 

involvement by these Defendants in the purported constitutional violations. In 

22 Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (affirming same principle in Bivens context). 

23 Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374 (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). 

24 Id. (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). 

25 See id. at 374 (affirming dismissal of claims against prison officials for lack of personal 

involvement when officials’ “only involvement” was “their review and denial of [plaintiff]’s 

grievance”); Lewis v. Wetzel, 153 F. Supp. 3d 678, 696-97 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (collecting cases); 

Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (nonprecedential); Alexander v. 

Gennarini, 144 F. App’x 924, 925 (3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential) (explaining that prisoner’s 

claims against certain defendants were “properly dismissed” because the allegations against 

them “merely assert their involvement in the post-incident grievance process”). 

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other words, Mbewe never pleads what each Defendant did or did not do to violate 

the constitution. Mbewe, however, must specify each Defendant’s personal 

involvement in the alleged constitutional misconduct to state a Section 1983 claim. 

Accordingly, the Court must dismiss the Section 1983 claims against all 

Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for lack of personal involvement. 

B. First Amendment Free Speech – Legal Mail Interference 

Mbewe first asserts that the rejection of his legal mail from Attorney Singhvi 

without notice on a single occasion violated his First Amendment free speech 

rights. The Court need not spend substantial time on this claim. It is well settled 

that a single instance of interference with legal or personal mail generally does not 

rise to the level of actionable First Amendment censorship.26 Accordingly, 

Mbewe’s First Amendment free speech claim concerning the rejection of one legal 

letter must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted. 

 

26 See Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2006) (requiring a pattern and practice of 

opening legal mail outside of prisoners’ presence); Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1452 (3d 

Cir. 1995) (“We decline to hold that a single instance of damaged mail rises to the level of 

constitutionally impermissible censorship.”), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 

518 U.S. 343 (1996); Iwanicki v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 582 F. App’x 75, 79 (3d Cir. 2014) 

(nonprecedential) (citing Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003)); Fortune v. 

Hamberger, 379 F. App’x 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2010) (nonprecedential) (noting that district court 

“correctly determined that a single instance of interference with an inmate’s mail is not 

sufficient to constitute a First Amendment violation” (citing Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1452)). 

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C. First and Fourteenth Amendment Access to Courts 

Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution, “prisoners retain a right of access to the courts.”27 Inmates, however, 

may only proceed on access-to-courts claims in two situations: “challenges (direct 

or collateral) to their sentences and conditions of confinement.”28 To adequately 

plead an access-to-courts claim that is backward-looking in nature,29 the prisoner 

must allege “(1) that they suffered an ‘actual injury’—that they lost a chance to 

pursue a ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim; and (2) that they have no 

other ‘remedy that may be awarded as recompense’ for the lost claim other than in 

the present denial of access suit.”30 The underlying claim must be described well 

enough to demonstrate that it is “more than hope,” and the complaint must set out 

the “lost remedy.”31

Mbewe’s access-to-courts claim fails for at least two reasons. First, Mbewe 

has not plausibly alleged an access-to-courts claim. He appears to assert that, 

because the May 22, 2019 legal mail from Attorney Singhvi was rejected without 

notice, he lost the opportunity to fully litigate a state post-conviction case that was 

27 Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 

(1996)). 

28 Id. (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354-55). 

29 There is also a category of access-to-courts claims that is forward-looking, in which plaintiffs 

allege that “systematic official action frustrates a plaintiff or plaintiff class in preparing and 

filing suits at the present time.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413 (2002). 

30 Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205 (quoting Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415). 

31 See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416-17. 

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pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County.32 Yet Mbewe never 

plausibly explains what was contained in the May 22, 2019 legal mailing nor how 

its rejection detrimentally affected his state post-conviction proceedings. In fact, 

Mbewe’s then-pending post-conviction petition—his fourth such petition—

asserted that a particular provision of Pennsylvania’s Crimes Code should be held 

unconstitutional for vagueness.33 Mbewe has simply failed to plausibly allege facts 

that would show that the rejection of Attorney Singhvi’s mailing caused an “actual 

injury,” i.e., a lost opportunity to pursue an underlying nonfrivolous postconviction claim. 

The second, more fundamental problem with this claim is that it has already 

been litigated and rejected in a prior civil rights lawsuit in this Court: Mbewe v. 

Delbalso, No. 4:21-cv-00654 (M.D. Pa.). In that case, Mbewe alleged that SCI 

Mahanoy officials’ interference with his legal mail caused him to lose the 

opportunity to file a post-conviction petition based on newly-discovered evidence 

of innocence from eyewitness Rasheeda Johnson.34 This Court ultimately 

dismissed that claim with prejudice, finding that Mbewe had failed to plausibly 

32 See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 10-14, 24, 26-29; see also Commonwealth v. Mbewe, No. 470 WDA 2020, 2021 

WL 2905824, at *1 & n.1 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 8, 2021) (nonprecedential). 

33 See Mbewe, 470 WDA 2020, 2021 WL 2905824, at *1-2. 

34 See Mbewe v. Delbalso, No. 4:21-cv-00654, Doc. 86 at 7-11 (M.D. Pa. May 17, 2023), aff’d, 

No. 23-2054 (3d Cir. Feb. 9, 2024) (per curiam). 

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plead a viable access-to-courts claim.35 The United States Court of Appeals for the 

Third Circuit affirmed that final judgment.36 

Mbewe appears to attempt to reassert this same access-to-courts claim in the 

instant case, arguing that the rejection of his legal mail without notice prevented 

him from raising a newly-discovered-evidence claim involving new information 

from eyewitness Rasheeda Johnson.37 But Mbewe does not get two bites at the 

apple; this access-to-courts allegation is barred by claim preclusion. 

Claim preclusion requires “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit 

involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on 

the same cause of action.”38 These elements are satisfied here. Mbewe’s prior 

access-to-courts claim was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim, 

which constitutes a final judgment on the merits.39 His earlier lawsuit also targeted 

the same SCI Mahanoy officials.40 And his present access-to-courts claim is based 

35 See id., Doc. 86 at 7-11, 15; see also id., Doc. 96 at 5, (denying motion for reconsideration). 

36 See id., Doc. 100. 

37 See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 26-29. 

38 Beasley v. Howard, 14 F.4th 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). 

39 See Fairbank’s Cap. Corp. v. Milligan, 234 F. App’x 21, 23 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that 

“dismissal ‘with prejudice’ is treated as an adjudication of the merits and thus has preclusive 

effect” (citing Gambocz v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837, 840 (3d Cir. 1972))). 

40 See Mbewe, No. 4:21-cv-00654, Doc. 62 ¶¶ 2-5 (naming as defendants Delbalso, Dunkle, K. 

Wall, Crawford, and Chapman). Although Mbewe’s earlier lawsuit did not include defendant 

Corrections Officer M. J. Wall, that discrepancy is immaterial. Any identical claim that was 

previously adjudicated on the merits and which is later reasserted against a closely related new 

defendant (here, M. J. Wall) is barred by nonmutual claim preclusion and application of 

Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950). See Gambocz, 468 F.2d at 840-42 

(concluding that second lawsuit asserting identical cause of action but adding several new but 

closely related defendants was barred by res judicata and Bruszewski doctrine); Bruszewski, 

181 F.2d at 422; see also 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.

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on the same, previously adjudicated cause of action. Mbewe’s duplicative accessto-courts claim is thus precluded by res judicata, and its dismissal is therefore 

appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) as frivolous and malicious41 in addition 

to failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

D. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim 

Mbewe’s final claim is that the rejection of his incoming legal mail without 

notice violated his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights. This 

claim has potential merit. As the Third Circuit explained in Vogt v. Wetzel,

42 when 

prison officials censor or withhold delivery of incoming mail, they must provide 

“minimal procedural safeguards” which include “notice and a reasonable chance to 

challenge the original official’s decision[.]”43

The problem with Mbewe’s procedural due process claim, however, is that 

he does not allege who is responsible for the mail censorship at issue. His 

complaint is silent as to who actually rejected the May 19, 2022 letter without 

COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4464.1, at 702 (3d ed. 2017) (concluding that 

one “cogent argument in favor of nonmutual claim preclusion is that the party to be precluded 

should have joined his new adversary in the original litigation”). 

41 See Washington v. Gilmore, 825 F. App’x 58, 60 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential) (citing 

Higgins v. Carpenter, 258 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Cato v. United States, 

70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995); Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 994-95 (5th Cir. 

1993)); McWilliams v. Colorado, 121 F.3d 573, 574 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Repetitious litigation 

of virtually identical causes of action may be dismissed under § 1915 as frivolous or 

malicious.” (quotation marks and alterations omitted)). 

42 8 F.4th 182 (3d Cir. 2021). 

43 Id. at 186 (citing, inter alia, Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 417-19 (1976), overruled on 

other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989)). 

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notice and could possibly be held liable under Section 1983 for the purported 

Fourteenth Amendment violation.44 Leave to amend will be granted to permit 

Mbewe an opportunity to name or otherwise identify an appropriate Section 1983 

defendant. 

E. Damages 

Mbewe seeks compensatory and punitive damages as relief. Neither are 

available under the facts alleged in the complaint. 

Compensatory damages may be awarded in a Section 1983 action “to 

compensate for actual injury suffered as a result of the violation of a constitutional 

right.”45 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA),46 however, 

compensatory damages are not available to prisoners for mental or emotional 

injuries alone. Rather, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), a prisoner cannot recover 

compensatory damages under Section 1983 for “mental or emotional injury” 

without first establishing “a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of 

a sexual act[.]”47 Mbewe does not identify a compensable injury to person or 

property. Moreover, he has not (and likely cannot) allege that he suffered a 

physical injury from the rejection of his legal mail on a single occasion. Thus, 

44 It is possible that this is because Mbewe does not know what mailroom employee or other SCI 

Mahanoy official rejected the mail from Attorney Singhvi. 

45 Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2000). 

46 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et seq. 47 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 533 (3d Cir. 2003). 

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under the plain language of the PLRA, Mbewe is unable to recover compensatory 

damages for the Section 1983 claims as they appear in his complaint.48

Although Mbewe cannot pursue compensatory damages, he could 

theoretically still seek punitive damages for his constitutional claims.49 To 

constitute a basis for the imposition of punitive damages, a defendant’s unlawful 

conduct must rise to the level of “callous” or “malicious” action or exhibit “evil 

motive or intent,” or it must “involve[] reckless or callous indifference to the 

federally protected rights of others.”50 

Mbewe’s allegations do not come close to providing a basis for the 

imposition of punitive damages. He avers that his privileged mail was rejected for 

failing to comply with then-existing DOC policy, and that rejection without notice 

was part of that then-existing policy.51 Rejecting incoming mail pursuant to an 

established policy does not implicate malicious conduct or evil motive, nor does it 

imply reckless or callous indifference to prisoners’ federal rights. 

F. Leave to Amend 

 Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless 

48 See Allah, 226 F.3d at 250-51. 

49 See Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 533. 

50 See Springer v. Henry, 435 F.3d 268, 281 (3d Cir. 2006); Allah, 226 F.3d at 251 (citing 

Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1497 (3d Cir. 1996)). 

51 See Doc. 1 ¶ 22. 

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amendment would be inequitable or futile.”52 Mbewe will be granted limited leave 

to amend in the event that he can plead facts that would plausibly state a 

Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim. 

Mbewe’s First Amendment free speech claim will be dismissed with 

prejudice, as granting leave to amend would be futile. It is well settled that 

interference with a single incoming letter—legal or personal—does not implicate a 

free speech violation. Mbewe’s access-to-courts claim will also be dismissed with 

prejudice. That claim is insufficiently pled, frivolous and malicious because it is 

duplicative of a prior lawsuit, and barred by claim preclusion. 

If Mbewe chooses to file an amended complaint in conformity with this 

Memorandum, it should be a stand-alone document, complete in itself and without 

reference to any previous pleadings. The amended complaint should set forth his 

Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim in short, concise, and plain 

statements, and in sequentially numbered paragraphs. Mbewe must leave one-inch 

margins on all four sides of his pleading.53 He must also name proper defendants 

and specify the offending actions or omissions by a particular defendant. This step 

is particularly critical for Mbewe, as his initial complaint is devoid of allegations 

that demonstrate Defendants’ personal involvement in the purportedly 

unconstitutional conduct. Mbewe must sign the amended complaint and indicate 

52 Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114. 

53 See LOCAL RULE OF COURT 5.1 

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the nature of the relief sought, keeping in mind this Court’s above discussion 

regarding the availability of compensatory and punitive damages. 

If Mbewe does not timely file an amended complaint, dismissal of his 

Section 1983 claims without prejudice will automatically convert to dismissal with 

prejudice and the Court will close this case. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss Mbewe’s complaint pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Mbewe may file an amended complaint in accordance 

with this Memorandum. An appropriate Order follows. 

 

BY THE COURT: 

s/ Matthew W. Brann 

 Matthew W. Brann 

 Chief United States District Judge 

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