THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF ALUMINUM 

ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY 

AN INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 232 OF THE 

TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962, AS AMENDED 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

Office of Technology Evaluation
 

January 17, 2018 
     

   

   

   

   

     

   

   

     

     

   

   

         

         

   

               

             

           

                    

             

         

         

     

             

             

           

       

           

Table of Contents 

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................... 1
 

A. Overview...............................................................................................................................................1
 

B. Findings.................................................................................................................................................2
 

C. Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................5
 

II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................................................... 10
 

A. Section 232 Requirements.................................................................................................................. 10
 

B. Discussion ...........................................................................................................................................12
 

III. INVESTIGATION PROCESS....................................................................................................................... 18
 

A. Initiation of Investigation.................................................................................................................... 18
 

B. Public Comment..................................................................................................................................18
 

C. Public Hearing .....................................................................................................................................19
 

D. Interagency Consultation.................................................................................................................... 19
 

IV. PRODUCT SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION.............................................................................................. 20
 

V. BACKGROUND ON THE ALUMINUM INDUSTRY ...................................................................................... 21
 

VI. FINDINGS ...............................................................................................................................................23
 

A. Aluminum is Essential to U.S. National Security................................................................................. 23
 

1. Aluminum is Required for U.S. National Defense ........................................................................... 24
 

2. Aluminum is Required for U.S. Critical Infrastructure..................................................................... 36
 

B. Domestic Production of Aluminum is Essential to National Security ................................................ 39
 

C. Domestic Aluminum Production Capacity is declining ....................................................................... 40
 

1. Primary Aluminum Production Capacity......................................................................................... 40
 

2. Secondary Aluminum Production Capacity..................................................................................... 49
 

3. Canadian Primary Aluminum Capacity............................................................................................ 51
 

4. Downstream Aluminum Production ............................................................................................... 52
 

D. Domestic Production is Well Below Demand ..................................................................................... 59
 

E. U.S. Imports of Aluminum are Increasing ........................................................................................... 63
 

1. Overview of Aluminum Imports in Aggregate................................................................................. 63
 

2. Unwrought Aluminum Imports....................................................................................................... 70
 

3. Aluminum Bars, Rods and Profiles.................................................................................................. 71
 
           

     

         

         

         

           

                       

   

                 

       

     

4. Aluminum Plate, Sheet and Strip .................................................................................................... 72
 

5. Aluminum Foil .................................................................................................................................73
 

6. Aluminum Pipe and Tubes .............................................................................................................. 74
 

7. Aluminum Castings & Forgings ....................................................................................................... 75
 

F. United States Aluminum Exports......................................................................................................... 75
 

G. High Import to Export Ratio................................................................................................................ 84
 

H. Impact of Imports on the Welfare of the U.S. Aluminum Industry .................................................... 89
 

1. Declining Employment.................................................................................................................... 89
 

2. Poor Financial Status of the U.S. Aluminum Industry ..................................................................... 91
 

3.Research and Development (R&D) Expenditures ............................................................................ 95
 

4.Capital Expenditures ........................................................................................................................ 97
 

5. Aluminum Prices............................................................................................................................. 99
 

VII. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................................................104
 

VIII. RECOMMENDATION........................................................................................................................... 107
 

APPENDICES 

APPENDIX A: Public Comments 

APPENDIX B: Public Hearing Testimony 

APPENDIX C: Background on the Aluminum Industry 

APPENDIX D: Trade Actions Related to Aluminum 

APPENDIX E: Global Excess Aluminum Production 

Prepared by Bureau of Industry and Security
	

http://www.bis.doc.gov
	
 

 

 

                              

                   

        

  

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

A. Overview 

This report summarizes the findings of an investigation conducted by the 

U.S. Department of Commerce (the “Department”) pursuant to Section 232 of the 

Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended (19 U.S.C. §1862 (“Section 232”)), into 

the effect of imports of aluminum on the national security of the United States. 

In conducting this investigation, the Secretary of Commerce (the 

“Secretary”) noted the Department’s prior investigations under Section 232. This 

report incorporates the statutory analysis from the Department’s 2001 Report1

 with 

respect to applying the terms “national defense” and “national security” in a 

manner that is consistent with the statute and legislative intent.2 As in the 2001 

Report, the Secretary in this investigation determined that “national security” for 

purposes of Section 232 includes the “general security and welfare of certain 

industries, beyond those necessary to satisfy national defense requirements, which 

are critical to minimum operations of the economy and government.”3 

As required by statute, the Secretary considered all factors set forth in 

Section 232(d). In particular, the Secretary examined the effect of imports on 

national security requirements, including: domestic production needed for 

projected national defense requirements; the capacity of domestic industries to 

meet such requirements; existing and anticipated availabilities of the human 

resources, products, raw materials, and other supplies and services essential to the 

national defense; the requirements of growth of such industries and such supplies 

and services including the investment, exploration, and development necessary to 

assure such growth; and the importation of goods in terms of their quantities, 

availabilities, character, and use as those affect such industries; and the capacity of 

the United States to meet national security requirements. 

1	 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration; The Effect of Imports of Iron Ore and Semi‐

Finished Steel on the National Security; Oct. 2001 (“2001 Report”).

2	 Id. at 5.

3	 Id.

1
           

The Secretary also recognized the close relation of the economic welfare of 

the United States to its national security; the impact of foreign competition on the 

economic welfare of individual domestic industries; and any substantial 

unemployment, decrease in revenues of government, loss of skills, or any other 

serious effects resulting from the displacement of any domestic products by 

excessive imports, without excluding other factors, in determining whether a 

weakening of the U.S. economy by such imports threaten to impair national 

security. In particular, this report assesses whether aluminum is being imported “in 

such quantities” and “under such circumstances” as to “threaten to impair the 

national security.”4 

B. Findings 

In conducting the investigation, the Secretary found: 

(1) Aluminum is essential to U.S. national security. Aluminum is needed to 

satisfy requirements for: 

a.	 The U.S. Department of Defense (“DoD”) for maintaining effective 

military capabilities including armor plate for armored vehicles, aircraft 

structural parts and components, naval vessels, space and missile 

structural components, and propellants; and 

b.	 Critical Infrastructure Sectors that are central to the essential operations 

of the U.S. economy and government, including power transmissions, 

transportation systems, manufacturing industries, construction, and 

others. 

(2)The U.S. Government does not maintain any strategic stockpile of bauxite, 

alumina, aluminum ingots, billets or any semi-finished aluminum products 

such aluminum plate. 

(3)The present quantity of imports adversely impacts the economic welfare of 

the U.S. aluminum industry. 

a.	 Imports and global aluminum production overcapacity, caused in part 

by foreign government subsidies – particularly in China, have had a 

19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(3)(A).

2

4
 

substantial negative impact on the economic welfare and production 

capacity of the United States primary aluminum industry. The decline 

in U.S. production has occurred despite growing demand for 

aluminum both in the U.S. and abroad. 

b. In 2016, the United States imported five times as much primary 

aluminum on a tonnage basis as it produced; the import penetration 

level was about 90 percent, up from 66 percent in 2012. 

c.	 U.S. primary aluminum production in 2016 was about half of what it 

was in 2015, and output further declined in 2017. U.S. smelters are 

now producing at 43 percent of capacity and at annual rate of 785,000 

metric tons. As recently as 2013, U.S. production was approximately 

2 million metric tons per year. 

d. Since 2012, six smelters with a combined 3,500 workers have been 

permanently shut down, totaling 1.13 million metric tons in lost 

production capacity per year. 

e.	 The loss of jobs in the primary aluminum sector has been precipitous 

between 2013 and 2016, falling 58 percent from about 13,000 to 5,000 

employees. 

f.	 The U.S. currently has five smelters remaining, only two smelters that 

are operating at full capacity. Only one of these five smelters 

produces high-purity aluminum required for critical infrastructure and 

defense aerospace applications, including types of high performance 

armor plate and aircraft-grade aluminum products used in upgrading 

F-18, F-35, and C-17 aircraft. Should this one U.S. smelter close, the 

U.S. would be left without an adequate domestic supplier for key 

national security needs. The only other high-volume producers of 

high-purity aluminum are located in the UAE and China (internal use 

only). 

g. The impact so far has been greatest on the primary (unwrought) 

aluminum sector. Now, however, the downstream aluminum sector 

also is threatened by overcapacity and surging imports. 

3
h. Imports accounted for 64 percent of U.S. consumption of aluminum 

(primary and downstream mill products combined) in 2016. 

i.	 U.S. imports in the aluminum categories subject to this investigation 

totaled 5.9 million metric tons in 2016, up 34 percent from 4.4 million 

metric tons in 2013. In the first 10 months of 2017, aluminum 

imports rose 18 percent above 2016 levels on a tonnage basis. 

j.	 In the downstream aluminum sectors of bars, rods, plates, sheets, foil, 

wire, tubes and pipes, imports rose 33 percent from 1.2 million metric 

tons in 2013 to 1.6 million metric tons in 2016. 

k. Overall in 2016, for the aluminum product categories covered by this 

investigation, the United States ran a trade deficit of $7.2 billion. 

(4) Global excess aluminum capacity is a circumstance that contributes to the 

weakening of the U.S. aluminum industry and the U.S. economy. 

a.	 A major cause of the recent decline in the U.S. aluminum industry is 

the rapid increase in production in China. Chinese overproduction 

suppressed global aluminum prices and flooded into world markets. 

b. China’s aluminum production is largely unresponsive to market 

forces. China produced approximately one million metric tons of 

excess supply in 2016. This excess alone exceeds the total U.S. 2016 

production of primary aluminum of 840,000 metric tons. 

c.	 China’s industrial policies encourage development and domination of 

the entire aluminum production chain. These policies are further 

intended to stimulate the export of aluminum processed into sheets, 

plates, rods, bars, foils and other semi-manufactures and to target 

development of increasingly sophisticated and high-value product 

sectors such as automotive and aerospace. 

d. China imposes an excise tax that creates a disincentive for the export 

of primary aluminum ingots and billets. It provides tax rebates on 

exports of semi-finished or finished aluminum products. Thus, U.S. 

imports of aluminum from China are not in the form of unwrought 

4
		

aluminum, but primarily semi-finished downstream aluminum 

products. 

e.	 As imports make further inroads into the higher value-added, more 

sophisticated downstream sectors, U.S. downstream companies 

supporting the defense sector will be increasingly impacted. 

C. Conclusion 

Based on these findings, the Secretary of Commerce has concluded that the 

present quantities and circumstance of aluminum imports are “weakening our 

internal economy” and threaten to impair the national security as defined in 

Section 232. The Department of Defense and critical domestic industries depend 

on large quantities of aluminum. But recent import trends have left the U.S. almost 

totally reliant on foreign producers of primary aluminum. The U.S. is also at risk of 

becoming completely reliant on foreign producers of high-purity aluminum that is 

essential for key military and commercial systems. The domestic aluminum 

industry is at risk of becoming unable to satisfy existing national security needs or 

respond to a national security emergency that requires a large increase in domestic 

production. These risks and long-run industry trends “threaten to impair the 

national security” as defined by Section 232. 

The Secretary has determined that to remove the threat of impairment, it is 

necessary to reduce imports to a level that will provide the opportunity for U.S. 

primary aluminum producers to restart idled capacity. This will increase and 

stabilize U.S. production of aluminum at the minimal level needed to meet current 

and future national security needs. If no action is taken, the United States is in 

danger of losing the capability to smelt primary aluminum altogether. 

The imposition of a quota or tariff on downstream products also is necessary 

because global overcapacity, coupled with industrial policies that promote exports 

of downstream products, have had a negative impact on the U.S. primary 

aluminum industry through reduced demand for inputs from downstream 

companies, as well as directly on the downstream companies that face increased 

import penetration in many aluminum product sectors. 

5
                 

               

             

     

       

        

             

           

             

     

                 

   

         

                     

                 

     

   

   

               

           

                               

       

D. Recommendation 

Due to the threat, as defined in Section 232, to national security from the 

quantities and circumstances of aluminum imports, the Secretary recommends that 

the President take immediate action by adjusting the level of these imports. Under 

alternatives 1 and 2, the quotas or tariffs would be designed, even after any 

exemptions (if granted), to enable U.S. aluminum production to utilize an average 

of 80 percent of production capacity. The quotas and tariffs described below 

should be sufficient to enable U.S. aluminum producers to operate profitably under 

current market prices for aluminum and will allow them to reopen idled capacity 

(see Table 1). 

Table 1 ‐ Import Levels and U.S. Primary Aluminum Capacity Utilization Rates*

Primary Aluminum Market Snapshot (thousands of metric tons) 2013‐2016

Average

2017

Annualized

Total Demand for Primary Aluminum in U.S. (production+imports‐exports) 4,681 5,516

U.S. Annual Capacity 2,195 1,818

U.S. Annual Production (liquid) 1,518 785

Capacity Utilization Rate (percentage) 69% 39%

Imports and Exports (millions of metric tons)

Imports of Primary Aluminum to U.S. 3,536 5,046

Exports of Primary Aluminum from the U.S. 373 315

Percent Import Penetration 76% 91%

Production at Various Utilization Rates (thousands of metric tons)

Maximum Capacity 2,195 1,818

Production at 75% Capacity Utilization 1,646 1,364

Production at 80% Capacity Utilization 1,756 1,454

Production at 85% Capacity Utilization 1,866 1,545

Import Levels and Domestic Production Targets Based on 80% Capacity Utilization

Partial Equilibrium (No Projected Reduction in Exports and Demand)

Maximum Import Level (mmt) 4,377

Estimated Import Penetration 79%

Estimated Production (mmt) 1,454

Alternative 1: Quota Applied to 2017 Import Levels 86.7%

Alternative 1: Tariff Rate Applied to All Imports 7.7%

*Numbers may differ slightly due to rounding.

Source: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Annualized Data based on 2017 year‐to‐

date figures through October.

6
 

Two alternatives for achieving this object are described. In each 

alternative, quotas or tariffs would be imposed on imports of: 1) unwrought 

aluminum (Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) Code 7601); 2) aluminum castings 

and forgings (HTS Codes 7616.99.51.60 and 7616.99.51.70); 3) aluminum plate, 

sheet, strip, and foil (flat rolled products) (HTS Codes 7606 and 7607); 4) 

aluminum wire (HTS Code 7605); 5) aluminum bars, rods and profiles (HTS 

Code 7604); and 6) aluminum tubes and pipes (HTS Code 7608); and 7) 

aluminum tube and pipe fittings (HTS Code 7609) based on 2017 annualized 

imports in those categories. 

In either alternative, the Secretary recommends that the action taken to 

adjust the level of imports must be in effect for a duration sufficient to allow 

necessary time and assurances to stabilize the U.S. industry. It takes up to nine 

months to restart idled smelting capacity. Market certainty is needed to build cash 

flow to pay down debt and to raise capital for plant modernization to improve 

manufacturing efficiency. 

The Department of Commerce, in consultation with other appropriate 

departments and agencies, will monitor the status of the U.S. aluminum industry 

and the effectiveness of the remedies to determine if the remedies should be 

terminated, extended, or adjusted as needed. 

Alternative 1 – Global Quota or Tariff 

Global Quota 

A worldwide quota of 86.7 percent on imports described above would 

restrict aluminum imports sufficiently to allow U.S. primary aluminum producers 

to increase production by about 669,000 metric tons, bringing total production to 

about 1.45 million metric tons, or about 80 percent of U.S. primary aluminum 

production capacity. This quota would also be applied to the five other aluminum 

product categories listed above and would help ensure the viability of those U.S. 

producers to meet national security needs. 

7
 

 

Global Tariff 

A tariff rate of 7.7 percent on imports of unwrought aluminum and the other 

aluminum product categories listed above should have the same impact as the 86.7 

percent quota. This tariff rate would be in addition to any antidumping or 

countervailing duty collections applicable to any product. 

This tariff rate also will adequately adjust for the price distortions in 

downstream aluminum product sectors that are caused by global overcapacity and 

overproduction being exported in the form of downstream products. 

Alternative 2 –Tariffs on a Subset of Countries 

Tariffs on a Subset of Countries 

A tariff rate of 23.6 percent on imports of aluminum products from China, 

Hong Kong, Russia, Venezuela, and Vietnam should also restrict aluminum imports 

sufficiently to allow U.S. aluminum producers to utilize an average of 80 percent 

of capacity. These five countries are the source of substantial imports due to 

significant overcapacity, and/or are potential unreliable suppliers or likely sources 

of transshipped aluminum from China. 

As in Alternative 1 above, this tariff rate would be in addition to any 

antidumping or countervailing duty collections applicable to any product. (For 

targeted tariff, all other countries would be limited to 100 percent of their 2017 

import volumes.) 

Exemptions 

In selecting an alternative, the President could determine that specific 

countries should be exempted from the proposed quota (by granting those specific 

countries 100 percent of their prior imports in 2017 or exempting them entirely), 

based on an overriding economic or security interest of the United States, which 

could include their willingness to work with the United States to address global 

excess capacity and other challenges facing the U.S. aluminum industry. 

The Secretary recommends that any such determination should be made at 

the outset and a corresponding adjustment be made to the final quota or tariff 

imposed on the remaining countries. This would ensure that overall imports of 

8
aluminum to the United States remain at or below the level needed to enable the 

domestic aluminum industry to return to 2012 production and import penetration 

levels. 

Exclusions 

The Secretary recommends an appeal process by which affected U.S. parties 

could seek an exclusion from the tariff or quota imposed. The Secretary would 

grant exclusions based on a demonstrated: (1) lack of sufficient U.S. production 

capacity of comparable products; or (2) specific national security-based 

considerations. This appeal process would include a public comment period on 

each exclusion request, and in general, would be completed within 90 days of a 

completed application being filed with the Secretary. 

An exclusion may be granted for a period to be determined by the Secretary 

and may be terminated if the conditions that gave rise to the exclusion change. The 

U.S. Department of Commerce will lead the appeal process in coordination with 

the Department of Defense and other agencies as appropriate. Should exclusions 

be granted the Secretary would consider at the time whether the quota or tariff for 

the remaining products needs to be adjusted to ensure that U.S. aluminum 

production meets target levels. 

9
                                     

               

II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 

A. Section 232 Requirements 

Section 232 provides the Secretary with the authority to conduct 

investigations to determine the effect on the national security of the United States 

of imports of any article. It authorizes the Secretary to conduct an investigation if 

requested by the head of any department or agency, upon application of an 

interested party, or upon his own motion. See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1)(A). 

Section 232 directs the Secretary to submit to the President a report with 

recommendations for “action or inaction under this section” and requires the 

Secretary to advise the President if any article “is being imported into the United 

States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the 

national security.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(3)(A). 

Section 232(d) directs the Secretary and the President to, in light of the 

requirements of national security and without excluding other relevant factors, give 

consideration to the domestic production needed for projected national defense 

requirements and the capacity of the United States to meet national security 

requirements. See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d). 

Section 232(d) also directs the Secretary and the President to “recognize the 

close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our national security, and 

...take into consideration the impact of foreign competition on the economic 

welfare of individual domestic industries” by examining whether any substantial 

unemployment, decrease in revenues of government, loss of skills or investment, 

or other serious effects resulting from the displacement of any domestic products 

by excessive imports,5

 or other factors, result in a “weakening of our internal 

economy” that threaten to impair the national security. See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d). 

5 An investigation under Section 232 looks at excessive imports for their threat to the national security, rather than

looking at unfair trade practices as in an antidumping investigation.

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Once an investigation has been initiated, Section 232 mandates that the 

Secretary provide notice to the Secretary of Defense that such an investigation has 

been initiated. Section 232 also requires the Secretary to do the following: 

(1) “Consult with the Secretary of Defense regarding the methodological 

and policy questions raised in [the] investigation;” 

(2)	 “Seek information and advice from, and consult with, appropriate 

officers of the United States;” and 

(3)	 “If it is appropriate and after reasonable notice, hold public hearings 

or otherwise afford interested parties an opportunity to present 

information and advice relevant to such investigation.”6 See 19 

U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii). 

As detailed in Parts III and VI of this report, each of the legal requirements 

set forth above has been satisfied. 

In conducting the investigation, Section 232 permits the Secretary to request 

that the Secretary of Defense provide an assessment of the defense requirements of 

the article that is the subject of the investigation. See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(B). 

Upon completion of a Section 232 investigation, the Secretary is required to 

submit a report to the President no later than 270 days after the date on which the 

investigation was initiated. See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(3)(A). The required report 

must: 

(1)	 Set forth “the findings of such investigation with respect to the effect 

of the importation of such article in such quantities or under such 

circumstances upon the national security;” 

(2)	 Set forth, “based on such findings, the recommendations of the 

Secretary for action or inaction under this section;” and 

Department regulations (i) set forth additional authority and specific procedures for such input from interested

parties, see 15 C.F.R. §§ 705.7 and 705.8, and (ii) provide that the Secretary may vary or dispense with those

procedures “in emergency situations, or when in the judgment of the Department, national security interests

require it.” Id., § 705.9.

11

6
 

  

(3)	 “If the Secretary finds that such article is being imported into the 

United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to 

threaten to impair the national security . . . so advise the President.” 

See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(3)(A) 

All unclassified and non-proprietary portions of the report submitted by the 

Secretary to the President must be published. 

Within 90 days after receiving a report in which the Secretary finds that an 

article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such 

circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security, the President shall: 

(1)	 “Determine whether the President concurs with the finding of the 

Secretary”; and 

(2)	 “If the President concurs, determine the nature and duration of the 

action that, in the judgment of the President, must be taken to adjust 

the imports of the article and its derivatives so that such imports will 

not threaten to impair the national security.” See 19 U.S.C. § 

1862(c)(1)(A). 

B. Discussion 

While Section 232 does not contain a definition of “national security,” both 

Section 232, and its implementing regulations at 15 C.F.R. Part 705, contain 

non-exclusive lists of factors that Commerce must consider in evaluating the 

effect of imports on national security. 

Congress in Section 232 explicitly determined that “national security” 

includes, but is not limited to, “national defense” requirements. See 19 U.S.C. § 

1862(d). The Department in 2001 determined that “national defense” includes 

both defense of the United States directly and the “ability to project military 

capabilities globally.”7 

7 Id.

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The Department also concluded in 2001 that “in addition to the satisfaction 

of national defense requirements, the term “national security” can be interpreted 

more broadly to include the general security and welfare of certain industries, 

beyond those necessary to satisfy national defense requirements, which are critical 

to the minimum operations of the economy and government.” The Department 

called these “critical industries.”8 This report once again uses these reasonable 

interpretations of “national defense” and “national security.” However, this report 

uses the more recent 16 critical infrastructure sectors identified in Presidential 

Policy Directive 219

 instead of the 28 critical industry sectors used by the Bureau 

of Export Administration in the 2001 Report.10 

Section 232 directs the Secretary to determine whether imports of any article 

are being made “in such quantities” or “under such circumstances” that those 

imports “threaten to impair the national security.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(3)(A). 

The statutory construction makes clear that either the quantities or the 

circumstances, standing alone, may be sufficient to support an affirmative finding. 

They may also be considered together, particularly where the circumstances act to 

prolong or magnify the impact of the quantities being imported. 

The statute does not define a threshold for when “such quantities” of imports 

are sufficient to threaten to impair the national security, nor does it define the 

“circumstances” that might qualify. 

Likewise, the statute does not require a finding that the quantities or 

circumstances are impairing the national security. Instead, the threshold question 

under Section 232 is whether those quantities or circumstances “threaten to impair 

the national security.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(3)(A). This formulation leaves the 

matter to the Secretary’s discretion, and makes evident that Congress expected an 

affirmative finding under Section 232 would occur before there is actual 

impairment of the national security. 

8 Id.

9 Presidential Policy Directive 21; Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience; February 12, 2013 (“PPD‐21”).

10 See Op. Cit. at 16.

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Section 232(d) contains a considerable list of factors for the Secretary to 

consider in determining if imports “threaten to impair the national security”11 of the 

United States, and this list is mirrored in the implementing regulations. See 19 

U.S.C. § 1862(d) and 15 C.F.R. § 705.4. Congress was careful to note twice in 

Section 232(d) that the list they provided, while mandatory, is not exclusive.12 

Congress’ illustrative list is focused on the ability of the United States to maintain 

the domestic capacity to provide the articles in question as needed to maintain the 

national security of the United States.13 Congress broke the list of factors into two 

equal parts using two separate sentences. The first sentence focuses directly on 

“national defense” requirements, thus making clear that “national defense” is a 

subset of the broader term “national security.” The second sentence focuses on the 

broader economy, and expressly directs that the Secretary and the President “shall 

recognize the close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our national 

security.”14 See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d). 

Two of the factors listed in the second sentence of Section 232(d) are most 

relevant in this investigation. Both are directed at how “such quantities” of 

imports threaten to impair national security. See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(3)(A). In 

administering Section 232, the Secretary and the President are required to “take 

into consideration the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of 

11	 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(3)(A).

12	 See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) (“the Secretary and the President shall, in light of the requirements of national security

and without excluding other relevant factors...” and “serious effects resulting from the displacement of any

domestic products by excessive imports shall be considered, without excluding other factors...“).

13	 This reading is supported by Congressional findings in other statutes. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 271(a)(1)(“The

future well‐being of the United States economy depends on a strong manufacturing base...”) and 50 U.S.C. §

4502(a)(“Congress finds that – (1) the security of the United States is dependent on the ability of the domestic

industrial base to supply materials and services... (2)(C) to provide for the protection and restoration of

domestic critical infrastructure operations under emergency conditions... (3)... the national defense

preparedness effort of the United States government requires – (C) the development of domestic productive

capacity to meet – (ii) unique technological requirements... (7) much of the industrial capacity that is relied

upon by the United States Government for military production and other national defense purposes is deeply

and directly influenced by – (A) the overall competitiveness of the industrial economy of the United States; and

(B) the ability of industries in the United States, in general, to produce internationally competitive products and

operate profitably while maintaining adequate research and development to preserve competitiveness with

respect to military and civilian production; and (8) the inability of industries in the United States, especially

smaller subcontractors and suppliers, to provide vital parts and components and other materials would impair

the ability to sustain the Armed Forces of the United States in combat for longer than a short period.”).

14	 Accord 50 U.S.C. § 4502(a).

14
                                

                                   

                                 

                              

                           

individual domestic industries” and any “serious effects resulting from the 

displacement of any domestic products by excessive imports” in “determining 

whether such weakening of our internal economy may impair the national 

security.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d). 

Another factor, not on the list, that the Secretary found to be a relevant is the 

presence of massive foreign excess capacity for producing aluminum. This excess 

capacity results in aluminum imports occurring “under such circumstances” that 

that they threaten to impair the national security. See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(3)(A). 

The circumstance of excess global aluminum production capacity is a factor 

because, while U.S. production capacity has declined dramatically in recent years, 

other nations have increased their production capacity, with China alone able to 

produce as much as the rest of the world combined. This overhang of excess 

capacity means that U.S. aluminum producers, for the foreseeable future, will face 

increasing competition from imported aluminum, often subsidized by foreign 

national governments, as other countries export more downstream products to the 

United States to bolster their own economic objectives and offset loss of markets to 

Chinese aluminum exports. 

It is these three factors – displacement of domestic aluminum by excessive 

imports and the consequent adverse impact on the economic welfare of the 

domestic aluminum industry, along with global (primarily Chinese) excess capacity 

in aluminum– that the Secretary has concluded are “weakening...our internal 

economy” and therefore “threaten to impair” the national security as defined in 

Section 232.15 

The Secretary also considered whether or not the source of the imports 

affects the analysis under Section 232. The Department has previously determined 

“imports can threaten to impair U.S. national security if the United States is 

excessively dependent on imports from unreliable or unsafe sources, and thereby is 

15 The 2001 Report used the phrase “fundamentally threaten to impair” when discussing how imports may

threaten to impair national security. See 2001 Report at 7 and 37. Because the term “fundamentally” is not

included in the statutory text and could be perceived as establishing a higher threshold, the Secretary expressly

does not use the qualifier in this report. The statutory threshold in Section 232(b)(3)(A) is unambiguously

“threaten to impair” and the Secretary adopts that threshold without qualification. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(3)(A).

15
                                     

   

                                    

                               

                                

                             

                             

   

vulnerable to a supply disruption” for an input or article.16 Such an analysis is 

permissible under the statutory command to consider whether articles are “being 

imported into the United States... under such circumstances as to threaten to 

impair the national security.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(3)(A). Such an inquiry 

would be necessary and appropriate in “such circumstances” where the United 

States is dependent on imports to meet national security needs, for example when a 

mineral is not produced in the United States or domestic producers are unable to 

meet demand but imports from an unreliable source are preventing investment 

needed to increase domestic production. 

The source of imports could also be a “factor” the Secretary considers under 

the analysis required by Section 232(d). See 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d). That is up to the 

Secretary’s discretion. However, because Congress in Section 232 chose to 

explicitly direct the Secretary to consider whether the “impact of foreign 

competition” and “the displacement of any domestic products by excessive 

imports” are “weakening our internal economy” yet made no reference whatsoever 

to an assessment of the sources of imports, it is evident that Congress recognized 

that those adverse impacts might well be caused by imports from allies or other 

reliable sources.17 As a result, the fact that some or all of the imports causing the 

harm are from reliable sources does not compel a finding that those imports do not 

threaten to impair national security. 

The statute allows the Secretary to reasonably conclude that, in the absence 

of adequate domestic supply, imports from allies should not be relied upon in order 

to ensure domestic production facilities are sufficient to meet U.S. national security 

as defined in Section 232. Similarly, the statute also permits the Secretary to 

16	 2001 Report at 6. See also, 2001 Report at 7 (describing prior Department reports under Section 232 that

considered supply vulnerability.

17	 When Congress adopted the text of section 232(d) in 1962 the immediately preceding section was Section 231,

19 U.S.C. § 1861, which required the President, as soon as practicable, to suspend most‐favored‐nation tariff

treatment for imports from communist countries. Given the bipolar nature of the world at the time, the

absence of a distinction between communist and non‐communist countries in Section 232 suggests that

Congress expected Section 232 would be applied to imports from all countries—including allies and other

“reliable” sources.

16
consider the availability of reliable imports as a factor that supports a conclusion 

that imports are not threatening to impair U.S. national security. 

17
 

III. INVESTIGATION PROCESS 

A. Initiation of Investigation 

On April 26, 2017, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross initiated an 

investigation to determine the effect of imported aluminum on national security 

under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended (19 U.S.C. 

1862). 

Pursuant to Section 232, the Department notified the U.S. Department of 

Defense in an April 26, 2017 letter from Secretary Ross to Secretary James Mattis. 

On April 27, 2017, President Donald Trump signed a Presidential Memorandum 

directing Secretary Ross to proceed expeditiously in conducting his investigation 

and submit a report on his findings to the President. 

B. Public Comment 

On May 3, 2017, the Department invited interested parties to submit written 

comments, opinions, data, information, or advice relevant to the criteria listed in 

Section 705.4 of the National Security Industrial Base Regulations (15 C.F.R. § 

705.4) as they affect the requirements of national security, including the following: 

(a) Quantity of the articles subject to the investigation and other 

circumstances related to the importation of such articles; 

(b) Domestic production capacity needed for these articles to meet projected 

national defense requirements; 

(c) The capacity of domestic industries to meet projected national defense 

requirements; 

(d) Existing and anticipated availability of human resources, products, raw 

materials, production equipment, facilities, and other supplies and services 

essential to the national defense; 

(e) Growth requirements of domestic industries needed to meet national 

defense requirements and the supplies and services including the investment, 

exploration and development necessary to assure such growth; 

(f) The impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of any 

domestic industry essential to our national security; 

18
                                 

                            

                        

                           

(g) The displacement of any domestic products causing substantial 

unemployment, decrease in the revenues of government, loss of investment or 

specialized skills and productive capacity, or other serious effects; 

(h) Relevant factors that are causing or will cause a weakening of our 

national economy; and 

(i) Any other relevant factors. (See Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 88, 

Tuesday, May 9, 2017.) 

The public comment period ended on June 23, 2017. The Department received 91 

written submissions concerning this investigation. These public comments are set 

forth in Appendix A. 

C. Public Hearing 

The Department held a public hearing to elicit further information 

concerning this investigation in Washington, DC on June 22, 2017. The 

Department heard testimony from 32 witnesses at the hearing. A transcript of the 

testimonies given at the Public Hearing is included in Appendix B. 

D. Interagency Consultation 

Pursuant to the requirements of Section 232, Commerce Secretary Ross 

notified Defense Secretary Mattis of this investigation on April 26, 2017. In 

addition, Department of Commerce staff consulted with their counterparts in the 

Department of Defense regarding methodological and policy questions that arose 

during the investigation. 

The Department also consulted with other agencies of the U.S. Government 

with expertise and information regarding the aluminum industry, including the U.S. 

Geological Survey of the Department of the Interior and the U.S. International 

Trade Commission.18 

18 The U.S. International Trade Commission conducted an investigation at the request of the Committee on Ways

and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives entitled “Aluminum: Competitive Conditions Affecting the U.S.

Industry,” Publication Number 4703, Investigation Number 332‐557, June 2017. This report provided

information useful and pertinent to this Section 232 investigation and is cited henceforth as “USITC Report.”

19
         

   

   

         

   

                   

     

                     

       

         

         

         

                 

         

IV. PRODUCT SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION 

For this report, aluminum is defined at the Harmonized Tariff Schedule 

(HTS) 4-digit level. The HTS codes covered by this report are listed in Table 2. In 

addition, two HTS codes at the ten digit level are included, covering aluminum 

castings and forgings. 

Table 2 ‐ Harmonized Tariff Schedule For Aluminum Products

HTS Code Description

7601 Unwrought aluminum

7604 Aluminum bars, rods and profiles

7605 Aluminum wire

7606 Aluminum plates, sheets, and strip, of a thickness exceeding 0.2mm*

7607

Aluminum foil (whether or not printed, or backed with paper, paperboard, plastics or

similar backing materials) of a thickness (excluding any backing) not exceeding

0.2mm

7608 Aluminum tubes and pipes

7609 Aluminum tube and pipe fittings

7616.99.51.60 Other articles of aluminum: castings

7616.99.51.70 Other articles of aluminum: forgings

*Note: This category includes can sheet for aluminum can packaging.

Source: U.S. International Trade Commission

The scope of this investigation does not include bauxite or alumina, which 

are feedstocks for production of primary (unwrought) aluminum. Also excluded 

from analysis are aluminum waste and scrap (HTS 7602) and aluminum powders 

and flakes (HTS 7603) as these represent different industrial sectors. 

20
 

       

                 

V. BACKGROUND ON THE ALUMINUM INDUSTRY 

Aluminum is the most abundant naturally occurring metal in the earth’s 

crust, and it is an essential element of modern life. Virtually every person in the 

United States, and indeed most of the world, uses aluminum every single day. 

More aluminum is consumed today than at any point in the 125-year history of the 

metal’s commercial production. Lightweight, corrosion resistant, easily formed, 

highly conductive, highly reflective, durable and recyclable – aluminum is a highly 

useful material for manufacturers. It offers a wide range of options for product 

innovation and process improvements. Aluminum is critical to modern mobility, 

increasing sustainability, and the national economy. 

Aluminum is used in a wide variety of applications, and global demand for it 

is expected to grow at an annual rate of 3.8 percent.19 Transportation applications, 

including aircraft and automobiles, account for 40 percent of domestic 

consumption, followed by packaging with 20 percent, building construction with 

15 percent, electrical with eight percent, and machinery with seven percent.20 One 

of the factors driving increasing demand for aluminum is its ability to reduce 

weight, thereby improving energy efficiency. 

Aluminum originates from bauxite, an ore typically found in the topsoil of 

various tropical and subtropical regions; the United States is not a significant 

source of bauxite as it cannot be economically extracted here. Once mined, 

aluminum within the bauxite ore is chemically extracted in a refinery into alumina, 

an aluminum oxide compound. In a second step, the alumina is smelted to produce 

pure aluminum metal. 

The industry can be divided into three basic segments: upstream, 

downstream, and secondary. The upstream segment includes primary or 

“unwrought” aluminum production, in which aluminum is produced from raw 

materials. The products of the upstream industry segment are classified within 

HTS Code 7601. 

19 The Aluminum Association

20 U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Series, January 2017

21
                           

   

The majority of U.S. aluminum production today is based on recycled 

scrap, called secondary production, and is captured within HTS Code 7602. The 

United States is the world’s leading producer of secondary unwrought aluminum, 

due to its long established aluminum recycling industry. Secondary production 

increased from 22 percent of aluminum production in 1980, to 64 percent of 

domestic production in 2016.21 While aluminum produced through secondary 

production is an important feedstock for the U.S. aluminum industry, it is 

fundamentally a different industry sector and is not the focus of this report. 

The processing of aluminum into semi-finished aluminum goods such as 

rods, bars, sheets, plates, castings, forgings and extrusions is the downstream 

segment of the industry. These aluminum products can be manufactured using 

primary aluminum, secondary aluminum, or a combination depending on the 

unique requirements or specifications. Aluminum products manufactured by the 

downstream segment of the industry are included in HTS Codes 7604, 7605, 7606, 

7607, 7608, 7609, 7616.99.51.60 and 7616.99.51.70. 

(See Appendix C for a more detailed description of the aluminum industry) 

21 Aluminum: The Element of Sustainability; The Aluminum Association, September 2011 and USGS Mineral

Commodity Series.

22
 

VI. FINDINGS 

A. Aluminum is Essential to U.S. National Security 

Aluminum products are used widely across U.S. society in a range of 

consumer products, commercial applications, and industrial products. The supply 

of aluminum ingot, bar, rod, coils, sheet, cable and wire, and plate products is 

essential to the functioning of the U.S. economy, critical infrastructure, and the 

national defense. This lightweight, electrically conductive, corrosion resistant 

material has widespread uses in consumer goods, commercial products, and in 

many industrial applications. 

From food packaging to advanced military aircraft, aluminum is a vital 

material used in industry and in infrastructure critical to U.S. economic growth. 

These sectors consume large quantities aluminum for new construction, production 

of aircraft, automobiles, bridges, building materials, heating and cooling systems, 

housing, power transmission cable, trucks and trailers and other applications. 

A predictable supply of this versatile metal is required for the supply of 

many types of products and systems supporting U.S. government civilian and 

defense operations. For economic stability and to support national security 

requirements for U.S. critical infrastructure and the national defense, the United 

States needs domestic capability to produce both primary aluminum and semifinished aluminum products. 

Specifically, U.S. capability must be maintained for: 1) primary aluminum 

production, 2) processing of recycled aluminum into products, and 3) making bar 

and rod, plate and sheet, coils, extrusions, castings, forgings, pigments and 

powders, and other aluminum products. In 2016, imports of aluminum ingot and 

semi-finished aluminum products accounted for 64 percent of U.S. aluminum 

23
 

            

                                         

consumption.22 In 2016, the U.S. imported more than 90 percent of the primary 

aluminum it consumed.23

Total reliance on imports cannot provide an assured supply of aluminum to 

meet U.S. critical infrastructure and defense needs in a national emergency – as 

production facilities are vulnerable and supply lines are easily disrupted. A 

significant shortfall in the flow of imported aluminum to U.S. manufacturers could 

disrupt essential commercial production in the absence of a domestic supply base 

for aluminum. Moreover, the aluminum smelting and downstream aluminum 

products industry are critical to the minimum operations of the economy and 

government. 

Critical infrastructure sectors where there is significant dependence on 

aluminum content include: 

	 Defense Industrial Base: Design, production, delivery, and maintenance of 

military weapons systems, subsystems, and components or parts to meet 

U.S. military requirements 

 Energy: Electric power transmission and distribution (over 6,000 power 

plants) 

 Transportation: Aircraft, automobiles, railroad freight cars, boats, ships, 

trains, trucks, trailers, wheels 

	 Containers and Packaging: Cabinets, cans, foils, storage bins, storage tanks 

	 Construction: Bridges, structural supports, conduit, piping, siding, doors, 

windows, wiring 

	 Manufacturing: Machinery, stampings, castings, forgings, product 

components, consumer goods, heating and cooling devices, and utility 

lighting fixtures 

1.	 Aluminum is Required for U.S. National Defense 

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and its contractors use a small 

percentage of U.S. aluminum production. The DoD “Top Down” estimate of 

22 Based on Aluminum Association data.

23 Based on U.S. Geological Survey data for the U.S. production and on U.S. Census data for exports and imports.

24
25

average annual demand for aluminum during peacetime is , or 

percent of total U.S. demand.24 Despite the low percentage of 

aluminum consumed directly by the DoD, a healthy, vibrant commercial aluminum 

industry (both primary and downstream) is critical to U.S. national security. 

The following sections of the report describe the use of aluminum in U.S. 

military systems and in critical infrastructure. 

Use of Aluminum in U.S. Military Systems 

a. Ground Systems/Weapons 

In the area of ground weapons, cold-rolled thick aluminum plate is an 

integral part of the structure of armored vehicles such as tanks, personnel carriers, 

and amphibious vehicles. Such plate is classified within Harmonized Tariff 

Schedule (HTS) 7606. In these applications, aluminum provides outstanding 

ballistic protection and excellent corrosion resistance. Aluminum bar 

25
             

                     

and other extrusions (HTS 7604) are used in cage armor on a number of vehicles. 

Aluminum cage armor is approximately 50 percent lighter than steel cage armor. 

The use of aluminum also allows the design of low-weight, reliable, and 

cost-efficient components for light-armored civilian and tactical vehicles, as well 

as for heavy constructions like military bridges. Using aluminum plate in place of 

steel also improves the agility and transportability of defense and rescue vehicles 

and systems (by air transport, for example) into areas of conflict or disaster. 

Table 3 ‐ U.S. Defense Ground/Weapon Systems Using Aluminum

Systems Requiring Components Made of Plate, Sheet, Piping, Tubing, Castings and/or Forgings

Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) 

Ground Vehicle Trailers: Aircraft Loading System, 

105-mm Howitzer, Minuteman Missile 

Transporter, Nuclear Ordinance Trailer 

Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) 

Ground Vehicle Components: Cross Braces, 

Forged Front Hubs, Gasoline Tanks, Radiators, 

Transmission Support Brackets, Wheel Discs, 

Wheels 

Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) 

Bridges: Improved Float Bridge (Ribbon Bridge); 

Armored Vehicle Launch Bridge (AVLB); 

Aluminum Pneumatic Floating Bridge (M4T6) 

Bradley M-1 Tank* Javelin Anti-Tank Missile 

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Patriot Advanced Capability – 3 (PAC-3) 

Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF) M224 60 MM Mortar 

M109A7 Paladin Artillery Vehicle (M1009) Small Arms: Pistols, Rifles, Grenade Launchers 

*Out of production, but the manufacture of spare parts using aluminum may continue. 

Source: The Aluminum Association, U.S. Dept. of Defense, assorted industrial publications 

b. Aircraft 

Aluminum alloys are the predominant choice for the fuselage, wing, and 

supporting structures of many military aircraft. These types of products are 

classified within HTS 7606 (aluminum sheet) as well aluminum casting and 

forgings classified within HTS 7616.99.51. The use of aluminum has been key to 

the success of advanced aircraft over the decades, including planes such as the 

Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird, C-17 Globemaster, Boeing F-18 – and today, the F-35 

Joint Strike Fighter. 

26
 

                            

                            

                          

Because of aluminum’s light weight and excellent damage tolerance 

capability, it is used in a large number of aircraft applications: vertical stabilizers, 

horizontal stabilizers, plate for trailing edges, spars, ribs, fuselage frames, and air 

intake shells. A variety of aircraft-related systems, including bombs, decoy 

systems, and radar also require aluminum. The airframe of a military aircraft can 

be as much as 80 percent aluminum by weight. The military aircraft industry also 

demands high-strength aluminum products that can perform in harsh environments 

without cracking or outright failure. 

Aluminum products used in military aircraft are often highly engineered to 

meet specific performance attributes to facilitate machining complex aircraft parts. 

Structural components of U.S. military aircraft may be made of cast or fabricated 

wrought aluminum (forged, machined and assembled parts) as well as rolled sheet 

products. 

The supply of high-purity aluminum is critical to the production of highperformance aluminum alloys used in military aircraft and other applications. To 

meet aircraft component performance requirements, “Purity” and “High-purity” 

grades of aluminum must be used to enable the manufacture of aluminum materials 

with greater tensile strength, fracture toughness, improved high-temperature 

operating ability, and corrosion resistance.28 These advanced aluminum materials 

are used not only in aircraft, but in space, naval, and ground vehicles as well. 

While the industry classifies aluminum by purity, U.S. government trade and 

industry statistics (such as Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) and North American 

Industrial Classification (NAICS)) are not differentiated based on purity. 

Aircraft deployed by the DoD are expected to continue to use significant 

amounts of aluminum, even as composite materials replace parts traditionally made 

of aluminum or titanium. At least 36 types of U.S. military aircraft and related 

systems that require aluminum parts are in service today. These aircraft are 

purchased and used by the U.S. Government and foreign governments. In 

28 High‐Purity aluminum grades are: P0406,P0405, P0404, P0305, P0304, P0303, and P0202. Source: Arconic,

Century Aluminum, Harbor Aluminum, other industry sources. The average purity level of primary aluminum

produced is 99.9 percent, compared to standard‐purity aluminum which is approximately 99.7 percent.

27
addition, there are 19 other military aircraft systems for which spare aluminum 

parts continue to be required or may be required (See Table 4). 

28
             

                     

Table 4 ‐ Department of Defense Aircraft Systems Using Aluminum

Systems Requiring Components Made of Plate, Sheet, Piping, Tubing, Castings and/or Forgings

A-10/AO-10 Thunderbolt* Northrop F-5 Fighter* 

AE2100 – Engine* F-100*Super Sabre 

AH-1 Super Cobra Helicopter F-110* 

AH-64 Apache Helicopter F-117* 

ALE-50 Towed Decoy System Grumman F-14 Tomcat* 

Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) Boeing F-15 Eagle* 

APS-137 Radar General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon 

B-1 Bomber* Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet 

B-2 Bomber* Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor 

B-52 Bomber* F-24-Ultra Raptor 

C-5* F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 

C130J Super Hercules Cargo Plane Bell UH-1 Iroquois Helicopter* 

C-17 Globemaster Cargo Plane* Bell OH-58 Kiowa Helicopter 

C-27J Spartan Cargo Plane* Sikorsky UH-60 Blackhawk Helicopter 

Northrop Grumman E-2 Hawkeye* S-70 Black Hawk Helicopter 

E-2C Hawkeye* Sikorsky S-92 Helicopter 

E-2D Advanced Hawkeye Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallion 

Boeing E-3A Sentry (AWAC)* Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion Helicopter 

Boeing KC-46 Fueling Tanker Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight 

KC-135 Stratotanker* Boeing Vertol CH-47 Chinook 

KC-46A Pegasus Tanker V-22 

P-3 Orion* MK 84 Bomb 

P-8 Poseidon LM2500 Gas Turbine 

Boeing V-22 Osprey PW200 Helicopter Engine* 

Northrop Grumman EA-6B Prowler* F-135* Afterburner Turbofan Engine 

MQ-9 Reaper (Predator B) F-414 General Electric Engine 

Global Hawk ETF40 Gas Turbine 

EPF Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) 

T-38 Trainer Aircraft* APS-137 Radar 

T-45 Goshawk Trainer Aircraft* Multi-Spectral Targeting System (MTS) 

T-45 Goshawk trainers Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) 

TF-50*Trainer Aircraft Modernized Target Acquisition Designation 

Sight/Pilot Night Vision Sensor (M-TADS 

*Out of production, but the manufacture of spare parts using aluminum may continue. 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Defense, 

industry web sites. 

29
 

The U.S. manufacturers of products based on aluminum require 250,000 

metric tons of high-purity aluminum a year. Approximately 90 percent of this is 

for commercial aerospace and other applications. Ten percent is used to support 

the manufacture of defense-related products. The United States produced annually, 

until recently, 125,000 metric tons of high-purity aluminum (Grades P0404, P0303, 

P0202). The balance is imported, principally from the UAE, but also small 

quantities from Canada, New Zealand, and Russia. 

Century Aluminum operates the only high-volume, pure aluminum smelter 

in the United States. Its Hawesville, Kentucky facility has demonstrated capability 

to produce at least 100,000 metric tons of high-purity aluminum a year (it 

manufactured 60,000 metric tons high-purity aluminum in 2016). Arconic 

currently has an annual capability to produce approximately of 

high-purity aluminum using standard aluminum ingot in a fractionalization 

crystallization process. All of its production is for internal consumption for the 

manufacture of company products; it supplements its own production with 

imported high-purity aluminum (from the UAE). 

Aluminum from Century’s Hawesville smelter supplies the electrical 

conductor, remelt ingot, and high-purity ingot markets, as well as the defense and 

aerospace industries. A large portion of Hawesville’s specially configured facility 

provides the high-conductivity metal required by this facility’s largest customer, 

Southwire. This company is a major manufacturer of electrical wire (including 

power transmission conductor), cable, and other electrical products. 

30
 

 

The actions of Century’s customers are driven in part because of concerns 

about Century Aluminum’s future financial viability. Century has been closing 

smelting facilities in response to reduced orders for aluminum product from 

traditional customers – a situation attributed to foreign government intervention in 

the aluminum industry with massive subsidies. This has produced a global 

aluminum supply glut and a collapse of world aluminum prices. In turn, it has 

driven up U.S. imports of aluminum, which have drastically reduced company 

production and income. 

c. Space Applications 

There is a history of extensive use of aluminum in space applications, 

including launch vehicles, space capsules, satellites, and missiles. Aluminum has 

been a preferred material because of it is light weight, able to withstand stress, heat 

reflectance, and has other properties. 

For missile and space applications, aluminum has been the material used 

across a wide range of structures. Once again, its light weight and its ability to 

withstand the stresses that occur during launch and operation in space 

environments are why aluminum has been used on Apollo spacecraft, the Skylab, 

the space shuttles and the International Space Station, as well as in missiles. 

31
 

           

                     

 

Table 5 ‐ Space Launch Vehicles Using Aluminum

Systems Requiring Components Made of Plate, Sheet, Piping, Tubing, Castings and/or Forgings

System Components 

United Launch Alliance - Atlas V [Boeing, Aluminum Fuel Tanks Lockheed Martin] 

Second Stage –Propellant Tank Dome, Isogrid ring United Launch Alliance - Delta IV Heavy forgings, Tank skirts [Boeing, Lockheed Martin] Booster Tanks – Barrels, domes, skirts 

SpaceX - Falcon 9 

SpaceX - Dragon 

Capsule Pressure Vessel 

First Stage – Aluminum Lithium Tanks; Second 

Stage – Aluminum-Lithium Tube 

Orbital Sciences - Minotaur Interstage Structure 

Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Crew Capsule Structure 

Space Launch System - NASA Mars 

Mission 

Rocket Fuel Propellant Aluminum Powder 

Sources: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Orbital Sciences, SpaceX, https://biz360tours.com/ula-delta-iv-afspc-6 

Aluminum alloys consistently exceed other metals in such areas as 

mechanical stability, dampening, thermal management and reduced weight. 

Powdered aluminum is also used as the key ingredient in primary propellant for 

solid rocket booster motors for tactical missiles and space-launch platforms. The 

reason for this is because it has a high volumetric energy density and is difficult to 

ignite accidentally. 

d. Naval Applications 

Military marine designers and naval engineers recognize that aluminum’s 

low density, high strength, and corrosion resistance make it an advantageous 

material for some types of shipbuilding. Use of aluminum enhances ship speeds 

and enables operation in shallower water because of reduced draft. Increased fuel 

efficiency and higher cargo carrying capability also are enabled by vessel weight 

reductions achieved using aluminum. 

The greatest use of aluminum in the U.S. Navy is with four classes of ships: 

Expeditionary Fast Transport, Joint High Speed Vessel, Littoral Combat Ship – 

Monohull and the Littoral Combat Ship – Tirmarian. Smaller quantities of 

aluminum will be required for the construction of smaller craft – e.g., Dauntless 

Patrol Boats and the High Speed Maneuverable Surface Target (HSMST) boat. 

32
 

                                   

                               

             

The HSMSTs will be used to support weapon systems testing and evaluation, and 

fleet training exercises. 

Although the cost of aluminum material is higher than for steel, and more 

labor hours are required to build the structure for aluminum ships, for some types 

of vessels there is an overall cost savings due to the life-cycle benefits of 

aluminum’s significantly lower weight.30 The Navy’s future fleet program 

anticipates the use of aluminum in new vessel platforms that are under 

development. 

Table 6 ‐ Department of Defense Naval Systems Using Aluminum

Systems Requiring Components Made of Plate, Sheet, Piping, Tubing, Castings and/or Forgings

Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF) Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) – Monohull 

Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) – Trimarian 

Dauntless Patrol Boats High Speed Maneuverable Surface Target 

(HSMST) 

Ship-To-Shore Connector (SSC) Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) 

Tomahawk Missile Torpedoes (Mark 37,44,45,46,48) 

Sources: U.S. Department of Defense, assorted industrial sources. 

e. Future DoD Aluminum Requirements 

DoD projects that its requirements for defense products and systems using 

aluminum will grow in the years ahead. DoD estimates that annual consumption 

for just wrought aluminum plate used in nine defense systems will climb from

 in 2017 to more than tons in 2020. 

Much of this increase for wrought aluminum plate is attributed to orders for 

the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV), 

M109 Paladin Artillery Vehicle, and the Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), and 

the Littoral Combat Ship. Aluminum also is required for foreign military sales of 

Bradley Fighting Vehicles. These DoD aluminum projections do not include 

30 Lamb, Thomas, Nathaniel Beavers, Thomas Ingram and Anton Schmieman, “The Benefits and Costs Impact of

Aluminum Naval Ship Structure,” accessed through sname.org.

33
 

   

                                  

                                   

                                

                               

                               

                                 

                             

                     

aluminum consumed for the production of spare parts for more than 70 Army, Air 

Force, and Navy systems in use by DoD. 

In addition, ongoing research focused on improving sheet aluminum 

performance characteristics as well as casting and forging technology for aircraft 

and other defense application could result in greater use in DoD platforms. Indeed, 

R&D is expected to drive expanded use of the material – raising overall DoD 

tonnage requirements for production of defense systems. 

Yet the pace of expansion of aluminum use in defense and commercial 

markets may be slower than it might be were it not for the collapse of aluminum 

prices and loss of revenue at U.S. aluminum producers. At this time most 

aluminum companies cannot afford to fund research. The importance of research 

in this industry is clear, however. More than 90 percent of all alloys currently used 

in the aerospace industry were developed through Alcoa’s research.31

 Retention of domestic capacity to meet DoD production requirements for 

conventional aluminum plate, armor plate, and other aluminum production 

capacity is of concern to DoD. DoD does not keep any type of aluminum product, 

including armor plate, in the U.S. Government’s national stockpile.32 

With U.S. commercial applications accounting for 90 percent of high 

performance aluminum consumption, limited commercial stockpiles located in the 

United States are not likely to be sufficient to support DoD aluminum requirements 

in a time of a major war. The ability to ship aluminum products across the ocean 

could be severely restricted, if not impossible. 

31 Alcoa, http://www.alcoa.com/global/en/home.asp

32 In June 1966, the National Defense Stockpile contained 920,000 short tons of aluminum. Over time, the

Congress steadily reduced the stockpile's aluminum holding to zero. The purpose of the stockpile is to limit, if

not preclude dependence by the United States upon foreign sources in times of a national emergency. U.S.

Department of Defense requirements for aluminum in the stockpile have been reduced as a consequence of

demand/supply modelling by the Institute for Defense Analysis. The accuracy of the modelling can be affected

by assumptions on the duration and intensity of conflicts, capability to import materials in a time of war,

expansion and contraction of the supplier base, and other factors. Sources: Congressional Record; Managing

Materials for a Twenty‐First Century Military (2008), The National Academies Press.

34
 

 

                           

     

                                     

                   

As of June 2017, there were approximately 295,000 metric tons of primary 

and alloy aluminum held in U.S. warehouses operated by the London Metals 

Exchange (LME). Based on 2016 U.S. consumption of 5.1 million metric tons, the 

amount of aluminum held in LME warehouses in Baltimore, Detroit, and New 

Orleans represents three weeks of domestic industrial demand.33 

U.S. national security cannot be assured if the United States becomes 

entirely dependent on foreign suppliers for primary aluminum and high-purity 

aluminum. The U.S. in 2016 relied on imports for 89 percent of its primary 

aluminum requirements, up from 64 percent in 2012.35 Canada, which is highly 

integrated with the U.S. defense industrial base and considered a reliable supplier, 

is the leading source of imports. With Canadian smelters operating at near full 

capacity and with the vast majority of their production already going to customers 

in the United States, there is limited ability for Canada to replace other suppliers. 

In the future there is no assurance that some non-U.S. suppliers such as 

Russia (the largest supplier of primary aluminum to the U.S. after Canada) will 

provide all the necessary aluminum products on a timely basis and in the quantities 

requested, particularly in a time of war or national emergency. Shifts in the 

33 Sources: U.S. Department of Interior/USGS, U.S. Department of Commerce/BIS, and industry data sources.

34 Kaiser Aluminum.

35 Calculations were based on U.S. production of 840,000 metric tons, imports of 4.26 million metric tons, and U.S.

exports of 303,000 metric tons of primary aluminum (HTS 7601).

35
 

      

                     

policies of the governments of offshore aluminum suppliers, many of them stateowned, could leave the United States stranded. 

2. Aluminum is Required for U.S. Critical Infrastructure 

The Department of Homeland Security has designated 16 critical 

infrastructure sectors in the United States, which are considered so vital that their 

incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on defense capability, 

national economic security, national public health or safety.36 Virtually all of these 

sectors rely on aluminum products as a part of their principal missions. 

Specifically, these sectors include chemical production, commercial 

facilities, communications, critical manufacturing, dams, defense industrial base, 

emergency services, energy, food and agriculture, government facilities, 

transportation systems, and water management and waste water systems. No 

significant uses were identified for financial services and nuclear reactors and 

related waste management. Detailed information on the use and importance of 

aluminum in the various critical infrastructure sectors is described below. 

Use of Aluminum in Critical Infrastructure Sectors 

Of particular importance to U.S. critical infrastructure are core 

manufacturing activities such as primary metals manufacturing, including 

aluminum production and processing.37 The manufacture and supply of primary 

aluminum (HTS 7601), secondary production (HTS 7602), bars, rods, (HTS 7604) 

plate, and sheet material (HTS 7606) are key to the creation of aluminum-based 

products employed across the U.S. economy (see Table 7). 

Although aluminum use for electrical applications accounted for 

approximately seven percent of total U.S. aluminum consumption in 2016 (or 

about 836,000 metric tons),38 its importance to critical infrastructure cannot be 

overstated. Aluminum transmission cables (contained in HTS classification 7605) 

36 https://www.dhs.gov/critical‐infrastructure‐sectors

37 https://www.dhs.gov/critical‐manufacturing‐sector#

38 Aluminum Association, “Fast Facts at Glance – 2016,” December 2017

36
                       

power the nation, delivering electricity from power-generation facilities acrosslong-haul transmission grids for distribution at the regional, state, and local level. 

The health of the U.S. economy hinges on functioning power transmission 

systems and the timely supply of reliable, durable aluminum cable for use by 

electric utilities. Predictable supply is especially important for recovery from 

storms and other natural disasters. Commercial office buildings also use large 

amounts of aluminum cable; and it is widely used as the primary service feed to 

residential power meters and breaker boxes. 

The sector consuming the largest amount of aluminum is transportation. The 

manufacture of aircraft, automobiles, buses, freight and subway cars, boats and 

ships, tractor trailers, and related components accounted for about 35 percent 

(about 4.2 million metric tons) of U.S. aluminum consumption in 2016, according 

to the Aluminum Association. 

The ready availability of high quality aluminum bar, rod, coils, plate, sheet, 

and extrusions is critical to the ability of manufacturers to deliver product to their 

customers in a timely way and to respond to national emergencies. For this reason, 

Boeing purchases percent of the aluminum it uses for the manufacture of 

aircraft from suppliers in the United States.39 

The agriculture and food supply industries are another of the Department of 

Homeland Security’s (DHS) 16 critical infrastructure sectors. This industry relies 

heavily on the availability of aluminum packaging, including canning materials 

and foils (HTS 7607). Aluminum containers and packaging accounted for about 18 

percent of U.S. aluminum consumption in 2016 (about 2.2 million metric tons). 

Aluminum is also widely used in crop irrigation piping in fields. 

Building and construction, according to the Aluminum Association, was the 

third-largest major market for aluminum products in 2016, accounting for about 12 

percent of total U.S. consumption (about 1.5 million metric tons). Aluminum is 

used for structural supports; door, wall, and door framing; roofs and awnings; 

architectural trim; utility cabinets; air conditioning systems; drawbridges and 

39Source: Provided to the U.S. Department of Commerce/BIS by The Boeing Company.

37
               

     

 

portable emergency bridges; and many other applications. Many of these 

applications of aluminum are classified in HTS 7604 and HTS 7608. 

Table 7 ‐ DHS Critical Infrastructure Sectors – Use of Aluminum

Sectors Aluminum End Uses

1 Chemicals Product ingredients (small amounts) 

2 Commercial Facilities Structural Components, Architectural Trim, Doors, 

Window Frames, Aluminum Wiring 

3 Communications Antenna Towers, Antennas, Electronics Cabinets, 

Satellites, Circuit Boards, Connectors 

4 Critical Manufacturing 

Primary Aluminum Production, Semi-Finished: 

Extrusions, Bars, Rods, Coil, Plate, Sheet, Tube, 

Pipe Production 

5 Dams Aluminum Water Conduits, Drainage Systems 

6 Defense Industrial Base Aircraft, Ground Vehicles, Boats, Bridges, Ships, 

Missiles, Assorted Weapons Systems 

7 Emergency Services Portable Bridges, Fire Engines, Ambulances, 

Gurneys 

8 Energy Power Transmission, Commercial Wiring, Liquid 

Natural Gas Storage Tanks 

9 Financial Services ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐

10 Food and Agriculture Packaging, Irrigation, Green Houses, Storage 

Buildings 

11 Government Facilities Federal Research Laboratories, DoD Repair 

Depots, Y-12 

12 Health Care/Public Health Walkers, Wheel Chairs, Splints, Packaging 

13 Information Technology Electronic Cabinets, Capacitors, Heat Sinks 

14 Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste 

Sector High voltage Power Transmission Cable 

15 Transportation Systems 

Aircraft, Automobile, Buses, Engines, Freight Cars, 

Subway Cars, Tractor Trailers, Trucks, 

Transmission Housings, Truck Tankers, Boats, 

Ships 

16 Water and Waste 

Water Systems 

Temporary Piping, Cold Water Storage Tanks, 

Water Tankers 

Note: Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-21) on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, issued in 

February 2016, identified 16 industrial sectors. See: https://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructuresectors. 

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of Industry and Security, The Aluminum Association, 

Association of Water Technologies, North American Freight Car Assn., Applied Aerospace Structures 

Corp., Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates 

Excessive reliance on offshore producers as the primary suppliers of 

aluminum ingot, semi-finished, and finished products to sustain systems for critical 

infrastructure would pose risks. The ability of the United States to respond to 

38
national emergencies could be constrained by a lack of domestic production 

capability. Domestic inventories of aluminum products are often limited. 

Dependence on offshore manufacturers can hinder U.S. capabilities to respond to 

catastrophes and market surges. 

B. Domestic Production of Aluminum is Essential to National Security 

Continued access to U.S.-based aluminum production is important to critical 

infrastructure and to the nation’s overall defense objectives as well as economic 

security. All segments of the U.S. aluminum industry contribute, directly or 

indirectly, to the U.S. defense industrial base as aluminum is used in a variety of 

defense applications. High-strength aluminum alloys have become among the 

most commonly used materials to make military aircraft; and aluminum armor 

plate is used to protect against explosives and other threats. A number of U.S. 

Navy ships are now made with aluminum. 

The U.S. Department of Defense has a large and ongoing need for a range of 

aluminum products. These include: 

	 High-purity aluminum for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the F-18, and 

the C-17. 

	 High-purity aluminum for the armor plate in military vehicles, littoral 

combat vessels, and missiles. The percentage of aluminum content in 

armor plate in military platforms is increasing and may reach as much 

as 60 percent in the next generation military vehicles. 

	 The U.S. Coast Guard employs aluminum-intensive 47-foot firstresponse lifeboats. The craft are self-bailing, self-righting and have a 

long cruising radius for their size. 

Reliance on foreign suppliers for essential aluminum and aluminum products 

is contrary to U.S. national security. Moreover, overreliance on assumed future 

U.S. production capacity without adequate analysis given to the financial health 

and viability of the U.S. aluminum industrial base can lead to shortfalls in needed 

production, capabilities and related skilled work force when called upon. 

39
 

                 

To ensure U.S. national security response capability, the nation must have 

sufficient domestic aluminum production capacity to meet most commercial 

demand and to fulfill DoD contractor and critical infrastructure requirements. The 

economic stability of companies manufacturing aluminum in the United States is 

undermined by growing volumes of imported aluminum in key product sectors. 

Although the United States imports large quantities of aluminum products 

from foreign suppliers, historically U.S. aluminum manufacturers have been 

industry leaders. Innovation by U.S. aluminum producers has provided 

technological and cost advantages to many domestic industries that use aluminum, 

including the aerospace, automotive, and defense sectors. 

U.S. manufacturers have produced numerous high performance alloys to 

increase the strength, durability, performance of aluminum products. The widespread adoption of high-strength aluminum structural components and panels in 

automobiles, trucks, and aircraft are examples. 

To maintain the health of advanced aerospace and defense product lines, the 

domestic industry must have a strong aluminum manufacturing capability and 

commercial product portfolio (e.g., automotive, industrial, packaging). Without a 

robust level of commercial business, aluminum manufacturers cannot afford to 

conduct research and development, make capital investments, nor maintain their 

production infrastructure, including that needed for making products for critical 

infrastructure and national defense. 

C. Domestic Aluminum Production Capacity is Declining 

1. Primary Aluminum Production Capacity 

In 2016, global aluminum smelter capacity totaled 72.5 million metric tons, 

which was approximately two percent higher than the 2015 level.40 The top six 

aluminum-producing countries accounted for nearly 77 percent of the world’s total 

aluminum capacity, with China alone accounting for 55 percent of total global 

production capacity and 54 percent of global production. The United States’ 

40 U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summary, January 2017

40
 

                                    

                 

production capacity is ranked 6th in the world in 2016; in 2017 U.S. capacity has 

dwindled further. 

During World War II, aluminum was considered so important to U.S. 

national security that the U.S. government embarked on a program to expand U.S. 

production capacity, which in 1940 was limited to one producer (Alcoa). Through 

the government-owned Defense Plant Corporation, the U.S. expanded primary 

aluminum production capacity by building new smelters to meet military demands. 

The government-owned plants were ultimately sold to U.S. corporations Kaiser 

Aluminum and Reynolds Aluminum in 1950.41

During the Korean War, the U.S. government sought to further expand U.S. 

primary aluminum capacity to meet military needs. This time, incentives were 

used including accelerated amortization (reducing or eliminating corporate taxes) 

and purchase contracts (in which the government purchased all unsold aluminum). 

Further expansion in U.S. production capacity took place in the 1960’s, but during 

these years it was driven by increasing commercial demand. 

U.S. primary aluminum production and capacity was relatively stable at 

between 3.5 million and 4 million metric tons per year from 1970 to 2000. Since 

2000, there has been a steep decline in U.S. production. It corresponds with a 

large increase in U.S. imports of primary aluminum (see Figures 1 and 2 below). 

One of the main reasons for the decline in U.S. primary aluminum 

production capacity is that the United States is a relatively high cost producer. 

Because aluminum production is highly energy intensive, the world’s leading 

producers are generally the countries with the lowest energy costs (including 

Canada, Russia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain). The exception is 

China, where electricity costs are actually higher than those of the United States 

($614 per metric ton of aluminum produced in China versus $532 per metric ton in 

the United States); China’ overall production costs were equal to that of U.S. 

producers.42 

41 Routledge Revivals: The World Aluminum Industry in a Changing Energy Era, edited by Merton J. Peck, 2015.

42 CRU Group, included US ITC Report, p. 110.

41
       

     

0 

500 

1000 

1500 

2000 

2500 

3000 

3500 

4000 

4500 

5000 

197019721974197619781980198219841986198819901992199419961998200020022004200620082010201220142016

Thousand Metric Tons

Year

Figure 1 ‐ U.S. Primary Aluminum Production

1970‐2017

Source: U.S. Geological Survey

42
                 

                 

   

   

   

                   

Figure 2 - U.S. PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS OF
 

PRIMARY ALUMINUM (1996-2017)
 

Thousands of Metric Tons 

6000 

5000 

4000 

3000 

2000 

1000 

0 

U.S. 

Production 

U.S. Imports 

Source: U.S. Geological Survey; U.S. Census 

Table 8 ‐ Global Aluminum Smelter Capacity and Production – 2016

Country Production

Metric Tons (000)

Capacity

Metric Tons (000) Capacity Utilization Rate

China 31,000 40,100 77%

Russia 3,580 4,180 85%

India 2,750 3,850 71%

Canada 3,250 3,270 99%

UAE 2,400 2,400 100%

United States 840 1,740 48%

All Other 13,780 16,790 82%

Total 57,600 72,500 79% Average

Source: U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2017

43
 

             

   

  

   

   

   

                     

                               

                             

                               

Total U.S. primary aluminum production capacity and actual production for 

the most recent five-year period is shown in Table 9 below. The decline in U.S. 

production and capacity utilization has been particularly dramatic in just the past 

two years, during which aluminum prices were at near record lows. The erosion of 

primary aluminum production capacity in the United States due to falling 

aluminum prices and subsequent closure of smelters has been precipitous. 

In 1981, the U.S. produced 30 percent of the world’s primary aluminum and 

it remained the world’s largest producer until 2000, when there were 23 smelters in 

operation. In 2016, the U.S. accounted for just 1.5 percent of global production. 

In the same timeframe, production of primary aluminum in China grew from less 

than 15 percent of global production in 2000 to about 55 percent in 2016. 

Table 9 ‐ U.S. Primary Aluminum Production and Capacity

Year Production

Metric Tons (000)

Capacity

Metric Tons (000)

Capacity Utilization

Rate

2012 2,070 2,720 76%

2013 1,946 2,700 72%

2014 1,710 2,340 73%

2015 1,587 2,000 79%

2016 840 1,740 48%

2017

(based on Jan‐Nov) 785 1,818* 39%

Source: U.S. Geological Survey Mineral Commodity Series; Mineral Industry Surveys, Companies

*In July, 2017 Alcoa announced that it would partially reopen its Warrick smelter in 2018 with 269,000

metric ton capacity; it had previously announced that this smelter was to be permanently shut down.;

In December, 2017 the company announced permanent closure of its Rockdale, TX smelter (idled since 2008)

44
   

                 

       

Figure 3 – U.S. Primary Aluminum Production and Capacity

Source: U.S. Geological Survey

In 2017, there are only two aluminum (upstream) producers in the United 

States that operate smelters: Alcoa and Century Aluminum. A third company, 

Noranda, is in bankruptcy and its idled smelter was sold to ARG International AG 

of Switzerland. Table 10 below lists the status of aluminum smelting in the 

United States. At the beginning of 2016, three companies operated eight primary 

aluminum smelters in six U.S. states. In November, 2017, domestic smelters were 

operating at about 43 percent of capacity of about 1.8 million metric tons per 

year.

43 

43 https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/aluminum/mcs‐2017‐alumi.pdf; companies

45
           

     

         

       

         

                

       

       

             

      

         

        

                

           

       

           

     

     

      

                   

                               

                                           

     

               

                     

        

Table 10 ‐ Current U.S. Smelter Production Capacity

(As of November, 2017)

Company Location

Capacity

(Metric

Tons/Year)

Current

Operating

Level

(Metric

Tons/Year)

Idle

Aluminum

Smelter

Capacity

(Metric

Tons/Year)

Comments

Alcoa Ferndale, WA 279,000 230,000 49,000 Temporary shutdown of

79,000 tons in 3/2016

Alcoa Wenatchee,

WA 184,000 0 184,000 Temporary shutdown in2/2016

Alcoa Massena, NY

(West) 130,000 130,000 0 Operating at full capacity

Alcoa Evansville, IN

“Warrick” 269,000 0 269,000

Shut down in 03/16;

Expects to open 3 of 5 pot

lines in 2018

Century

Hawesville,

KY† 252,000 100,000 152,000 Pot line operations

curtailed to 100,000 tons

Century Sebree, KY 210,000 210,000 0 Operating at full capacity

Century Mt. Holly, SC 229,000 115,000 114,000 Temporary shutdown of

114,000 tons in 2/2015

Magnitude

7 Metals

(formerly

Noranda)

New Madrid,

MO 265,000 0 265,000

Temporary shutdown in

3/2016 ‐ bought by ARG

Int’l.* of Switzerland

Total 1,818,000 785,000 1,033,000

Average U.S. Smelter Facility Capacity Utilization in 2017 = 43.2%

Notes: Although Alcoa announced in 2016 that its Warrick smelting operations in Evansville, Indiana would be

permanently closed, in July 2017 it said that three of five pot lines would be restarted by the second quarter of 2018,

providing 275 jobs.

†This smelter is capable of producing high‐purity aluminum.

* ARG International of Switzerland renamed the New Madrid MO smelter Magnitude 7 Metals.

Source: U.S. Geological Survey; Aluminum Manufacturers

There are five smelters in the United States currently producing at some 

level, of which only two are operating at full production capacity. Three others are 

operating, but have reduced output levels below capacity by shutting down pot 

lines. During periods of weak demand or low aluminum prices, firms often shut 

down individual pot lines rather than run them at reduced capacity due to the 24/7 

nature of primary smelting operations. 

46
 

 

 

                          

Industry leader Alcoa has just one fully operational smelter in the U.S.: 

Massena West (NY), with 130,000-ton-per-year capacity. It was saved from 

closure by $73 million in aid from New York State.44 Alcoa’s Ferndale, 

Washington smelter was also set to be temporarily shut down, but in April 2016 the 

company reached an agreement with the Bonneville Power Administration that 

enabled it to continue operations at a reduced level until early 2018.45 

Although Alcoa announced in 2016 that its Warrick smelting operations in 

Evansville, Indiana would permanently close in July 2017 the company reversed 

that position announcing that three of five pot lines would be restarted by the 

second quarter of 2018, providing 275 jobs. Similarly, Century was close to idling 

one third of its Sebree, Kentucky smelter output in 2015, but made some 

organizational changes that enabled it to keep operating at full capacity.

46 

Two additional smelters are currently shut down, although no formal 

announcement of their permanent closure has been made: Alcoa’s Wenatchee, WA 

and Magnitude 7 Metals’ New Madrid, Missouri smelter (formerly Noranda). On 

October 28, 2016, ARG International AG of Switzerland completed the purchase of 

Noranda’s idle smelter and renamed it Magnitude 7 Metals; the new owner is 

attempting to negotiate a power contract that will enable it to restart operations.47 

Of the five smelters currently in operation at some level, only one is capable 

of producing high-purity aluminum needed for many advanced aerospace and 

defense applications: Century Aluminum’s Hawesville, KY plant. Century 

attributes its production decline to Chinese overproduction of high-purity 

aluminum and associated increases in Chinese exports of aluminum products. This 

smelter is a major source of high-purity aluminum to product fabricators, including 

Constellium, and Kaiser. These companies use high-purity materials to produce 

44 https://www.northcountrypublicradio.org/news/story/33518/20170306/massena‐hopeful‐as‐alcoa‐deadline‐

hits‐two‐year‐mark

45 http://www.bellinghamherald.com/news/local/article75151737.html

46 https://www.platts.com/latest‐news/metals/louisville‐kentucky/century‐aluminum‐shelves‐plans‐to‐shut‐one‐

third‐21631114

47 Testimony of Bob Prusak, CEO of Magnitude 7 Metals, June 22, 2017.

47
         

aluminum products for DoD, including types of high-performance armor plate and 

aircraft-grade aluminum products used in upgrading F-18, F-35, and C-17 aircraft. 

Aluminum Smelters Permanently Shut Down 

Since 2012, six aluminum smelters have been permanently shut down, 

totaling 1.13 million metric tons of annual production capacity,

48 and about 3,500 

jobs. Excluded from these statistics is Alcoa’s Evansville, IN plant (currently the 

largest U.S. smelter in existence), which was closed “permanently” in the first 

quarter of 201649, but which Alcoa later announced would be partially reopening in 

2018. 

In addition, the reopening of Noranda’s Missouri smelter (now Magnitude 7 

Metals) is in doubt. If these smelters were to make their closures permanent, total 

lost U.S. annual smelting capacity since 2012 could reach 1.5 million metric tons, 

and a loss of over 4,000 jobs. 

The closures of these facilities have had a significant impact on the local 

economies that relied on them for high quality jobs. Even temporary idling of 

plants threatens the U.S. industry as there are significant financial costs with reopening an aluminum plant. According to industry experts, it takes six to nine 

months to restart aluminum production at an idled smelter or pot line. The longer 

the facility is idled, the more difficult it is to bring back the highly skilled 

workforce needed to operate the facility, adding additional costs for worker 

training and production delays. 

48 U.S. Geological Survey, companies

49 http://www.businessinsider.com/r‐alcoa‐plans‐to‐close‐largest‐us‐aluminum‐smelter‐amid‐tumbling‐prices‐

2016‐1

48
                   

       

     

   

   

       

     

   

   

     

   

   

     

   

       

     

   

       

     

   

   

                           

                                    

                           

       

 

Table 11 – U.S. Aluminum Smelters Shut Down Permanently Since 2012

Company Location

Capacity

(Metric

Tons/Year)

Jobs

Lost Comments

Alcoa Alcoa, TN 215,000 450

Last produced 2009;

shutdown made

permanent 2012

Alcoa Massena, NY

(East) 125,000 500

Last production 2014;

shutdown permanent

2015

Alcoa Rockdale,TX 191,000 1,000

Last production 2008;

shutdown permanent

2017

Century Ravenswood,

WV 170,000 600

Last production 2009;

shutdown permanent

2014

Ormet Hannibal, OH 265,000 700

Last production 2012;

shutdown permanent

2014

Columbia

Falls/Glencore

Columbia

Falls, MT 168,000 200

Last production 2009;

shutdown permanent

2015

TOTAL 1,134,000 3,450

Note: Although Alcoa announced in 2016 that its 269,000 metric ton capacity Warrick smelting

operations in Evansville Indiana would be permanently closed, in July 2017 it said that three of five pot

lines would be restarted by the second quarter of 2018, providing 275 jobs.

Source: U.S. Geological Survey

2. Secondary Aluminum Production Capacity 

As has been noted, secondary aluminum production today accounts for a 

substantial portion of the total supply of aluminum in the United States. According 

to the Aluminum Association, about 75 percent of all the aluminum ever produced 

is still in use today. Table 12 below provides statistics on the recovery of 

aluminum from new and old scrap. In 2016, aluminum recovered from scrap was 

3.6 million metric tons, which was over four times primary aluminum production 

that year (841,000 metric tons). This figure represents secondary production by 

merchant producers; captive secondary production by downstream aluminum 

companies is not included. 

49
 

           

The USITC study also included an estimate for change in U.S. production 

and production capacity for secondary unwrought aluminum. The ITC found that 

U.S. secondary production capacity increased by 5.6 percent between 2011 and 

2015, while actual production increased by 13.4 percent during that timeframe. The 

USITC report estimates that merchant secondary aluminum producers operated at 

about 80 percent of capacity in 2015.50 

Despite its increasing usage, there is insufficient recycled aluminum 

available to meet growing demand for aluminum. Most of the major downstream 

aluminum manufacturers rely on a combination of secondary aluminum and 

primary aluminum in their manufacturing operations. The amount of primary 

versus recycled aluminum used varies on the specific product and its applications; 

manufacturers must control the properties of the alloy precisely to meet product 

specifications, which often requires using primary aluminum. 

Moreover, as aluminum is repeatedly recycled, impurities from paint, labels 

and other metals build up, affecting product composition and performance. A 

study by materials scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 51 found 

that as more and more aluminum scrap its recycled, there are likely to be more 

problems caused by impurities. 

Specialized applications such as airplane parts and electronics require the 

cleanest materials, for which recycled aluminum is not suitable. The MIT 

scientists note that there is a need for more research on ways to reduce 

accumulated contaminants, and that this is an area in which there has been 

underinvestment to date. As U.S. aluminum capacity shifts away from primary to 

secondary production, developing methodologies to increase the usability of everdecreasing quality scrap is of major importance. Since secondary scrap production 

in the United States is dominated by numerous smaller operations, their investment 

in R&D in this area is not likely to be sufficient. 

50 US ITC Report, p. 151.

51 http://news.mit.edu/2012/aluminum‐recycling‐study‐0306

50
 

 

                 

             

               

   

                       

                 

              

Table 12– U.S. Secondary Recovery of New

Aluminum and Old Aluminum Scrap

Metric Tons (000)

Year Scrap Recovery

2011 3,110

2012 3,380

2013 3,420

2014 3,570

2015 3,380

2016 3,610

Note: The data presented on secondary recovery of aluminum are different from

those reported by The Aluminum Association in its U.S. consumption information.

Source: U.S. Geological Survey: Mineral Industry Surveys

3. Canadian Primary Aluminum Capacity 

The U.S. and Canadian defense industrial bases are integrated. This 

cooperative relationship has existed since 1956 and is codified in a number of 

bilateral defense agreements. For example in 1987, DoD (all Services), the 

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 

and the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) joined together to form 

a North American Technology and Industrial Base Organization (NATIBO). 

NATIBO is chartered to promote a cost effective, healthy technology and industrial 

base that is responsive to the national and economic security needs of the United 

States and Canada. Current policy calls for a national defense force that derives its 

strength and technical superiority from a unified commercial- military industrial 

base. 

While small compared to China’s production, Canada is the third largest 

producer of primary aluminum in the world, with an estimated 3.15 million metric 

tons produced in 2016, up from 2.83 million metric tons in 2015.52 There are 10 

operational smelters in Canada owned by three companies: Alcoa, Rio Tinto 

Alcan, and Aluminerie Alouette. 

52 USGS and Aluminum Association of Canada, January, 2017

51
 

 

         

                       

In 2016, Canada exported about 2.3 million metric tons of primary 

aluminum to the United States – which represents over 70 percent of its total 

production. Canadian primary aluminum production is important to the U.S. 

aluminum industry. 

4. Downstream Aluminum Production 

There are over a thousand companies in the United States involved in the 

production of downstream aluminum products – such as bars, rods, sheet, plate, 

extrusions, tubes, pipes, forgings and castings. Many of these are small- and 

medium-sized businesses that serve specialized markets. The downstream industry 

is the largest segment of the overall aluminum industry in the United States, and is 

second in size only to that of China.53 

This industry segment is diverse – from production of large-volume 

commodity-grade articles such as can sheet for beverage cans, to high value added 

goods, including specialized products for the defense sector. Overall, downstream 

production is a capital-intensive process; some products require sophisticated 

manufacturing techniques. The U.S. industry is widely considered to be one of the 

world’s most technically advanced. 

Due to its size and diversity, there is little publicly available information on 

the production of the downstream aluminum industry as a whole. According to the 

American Foundry Association, there are 130 U.S. aluminum foundries in the 

defense casting supplier database maintained by the Defense Logistics Agency. 

These firms – many of which are small businesses – have been identified as 

qualified suppliers available to produce the over 10,000 distinct aluminum cast 

components procured by the military.

54 

53 USITC Report, page 142

54 Written submission of Doug Kurkul, CEO of the American Foundry Society

52
 

 

The U.S. International Trade Commission’s report contains data from market 

research firm CRU Group for U.S. production of certain downstream aluminum 

products –flat rolled, extrusions, and wire and cable. 

For flat-rolled aluminum, which includes HTS categories 7606 (plate, sheet 

and strip) and 7607 (foil), the U.S. is the world’s second largest producer, after 

China. These types of products are used extensively in automobile and aerospace 

applications. While U.S. production has been essentially flat between 2012 and 

2015, China’s production has grown from 6.64 million metric tons in 2011 to 9.2 

million metric tons in 2015 – a 38 percent increase in just four years. According to 

CRU, the U.S. flat-rolled aluminum sector is operating at about 70 percent of 

capacity throughout the period. 

Extruded aluminum products (including bars, rods and profiles in HTS 7604 

as well as pipes and tubes in HTS 7608) are used mainly in building and 

construction applications. The U.S. produced 1.9 million metric tons of aluminum 

extrusions in 2015, with the sector showing modest growth in production over the 

past four years. U.S. production, while second in the world, is small compared to 

China’s production, which topped 17 million metric tons in 2015. China’s 

production of extrusions accounted for nearly two thirds of global production, and 

has been increasing year over year (due to demand for China’s massive 

infrastructure development). 

U.S. production of aluminum wire and cable is small and declining (see 

Table 13), with just 129,000 metric tons produced in 2015 (ranking fifth in the 

world after China, India, Canada, and Russia). 

For comparison purposes, China produced nearly five million metric tons in 

2015 (60 percent of global production). Wire and cable is used in building and 

construction, and also in electricity transmission and distribution systems. 

53
                     

   

       

   

   

   

   

   

                     

                 

                   

Table 13 – U.S. Production of Wrought Aluminum Products

(000 Metric Tons)

Product HTS 2012 2013 2014 2015

Flat‐Rolled

HTS 7606,

7607

Production 4,088 4,070 4,130 4,180

Capacity 5,752 5,772 5,913 6,094

Capacity

Utilization 71% 71% 70% 69%

Extrusions

HTS 7604,

7608

Production 1,673 1,728 1,853 1,908

Wire and

Cable

HTS 7605

Production 168 177 134 129

Source: CRU Group, as cited in the USITC Report, pp. 75‐82

Figure 4 – U.S. Production of Downstream Aluminum Products

Source: CRU Group, as cited in the USITC Report, pp. 75‐82

Additional data on the U.S. downstream aluminum industry are available 

based on the U.S. International Trade Commission’s survey (which had a 64 

percent response rate). While the survey did not capture the entire U.S. industry, 

the agency estimated total U.S. production based on these responses. The Table 

below shows data on U.S. production, capacity, and capacity utilization for 

54
 

         

downstream aluminum products, based on the responses to the USITC industry 

survey. 

USITC’s survey results indicate that production rose 13 percent between 

2011 and 2015. The biggest sector of the downstream industry in the United States 

is flat rolled products (62 percent), followed by extrusion (32 percent). The 

USITC study also reported on capacity utilization rates for the companies 

responding to their survey: overall, the downstream industry was operating at 78 

percent of capacity. However, this figure varied significantly by product sector: 

99 percent for aluminum plate manufacturers (benefiting from strong demand from 

the auto sector); 62 percent for wire and cable; 72 percent for rod, bar and profile; 

and just 41 percent for tube and pipe producers.55 

55 USITC Report, p. 152

55
                 

             

             

   

   

   

   

   

  

   

   

   

  

   

   

   

   

  

  

   

  

                     

               

                     

Table 14 – U.S. Production, Capacity, and Capacity Utilization

– Wrought Aluminum Products

(000 Metric Tons)

Product HTS 2012 2013 2014 2015

Plate, Sheet, Strip and Foil (Flat Rolled Products)

HTS 7606,

7607

Production 4,470 4,266 4,361 4,393

Capacity 4,965 4,684 4,649 4,735

Capacity

Utilization 90.0% 91.1% 93.8% 92.8%*

Wire

HTS 7605

Production 454 451 422 445

Capacity 741 745 720 718

Capacity

Utilization 61.3% 60.5% 58.6% 62.1%

Bars, Rods, Profiles

HTS 7604

Production 1,597 1,682 1,764 1,835

Capacity 2,328 2,436 2,508 2,566

Capacity

Utilization 68.6% 69.1% 70.3% 71.5%

Tube and Pipe

HTS 7608

Production 325 356 402 434

Capacity 959 994 1,049 1,049

Capacity

Utilization 33.9% 35.8% 38.3% 41.4%

TOTAL

Production 6,603 6,754 6,948 7,107

Capacity 8,750 8,858 8,927 9,068

Capacity

Utilization 75.5% 76.3% 77.8% 78.4%

Source: USITC Survey, USITC Report – “Aluminum: Competitive Conditions Affecting U.S.

Industry, “ Appendix H, p. 518, July 2017.

*CRU Group reports 69 percent in 2015 for flat rolled aluminum producers

While USITC survey respondents reported very high levels of capacity 

utilization in the plate, sheet and strip sector, this capacity utilization rate was 

markedly higher than the comparable number reported by CRU Group – 69 percent 

in 2015 for flat rolled aluminum producers. 

CRU data, as reported in the USITC report, indicate that Chinese flat rolled 

products manufacturers are operating at only 62 percent of capacity. Although 

extruded products account for the highest percentage of Chinese wrought 

56
 

 

aluminum production, the largest amount of U.S. imports from China are in the 

flat-rolled product categories – plate, sheet and strip (HTS 7606) and foil (7607). 

It is likely that excess Chinese capacity and production in this segment, for which 

internal Chinese demand is insufficient, is being unloaded onto world markets, 

including the United States. 

Major U.S. Downstream Aluminum Companies 

The leading integrated aluminum production companies in the United States 

making downstream products include Constellium, Novelis, Aleris, Kaiser, 

Arconic, and Sapa. While commercial/industrial sectors account for most of their 

sales, these companies are also major suppliers of aluminum products for the 

defense industry. While the defense-related production of these companies makes 

up a small portion of their business, the same equipment is used to make military 

as well as commercial production. It is large-volume standard products that enable 

the companies to invest in fixed equipment and capacity that support the 

production of high-value added products, including defense. 

With U.S. headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, Novelis operates 24 facilities in 

10 countries; it is a subsidiary of Indian aluminum giant Hindalco. The company 

has 4,000 employees in the United States at seven production facilities and two 

research and development/engineering centers. Novelis is the world’s largest 

producer of flat-rolled aluminum products (e.g., plate and sheet) that are used to 

make beverage cans, building and structural products, and components for cars and 

trucks; it is also a leading recycler of beverage cans. Novelis states that unfairly 

priced imports originating from China and elsewhere are putting its U.S. operations 

at risk. The company was forced to shutter a facility in Kentucky and exit the 

aluminum converter foil business in 2008; in 2014, it reduced activities at its 

Indiana facility, exiting the household aluminum foil market due to unfairly priced 

imports from China. 

Kaiser Aluminum, based in California, was founded in 1946 and was once a 

fully integrated aluminum producer with U.S. smelting operations. Its original 

smelter was purchased from the United States Government, which built it to satisfy 

World War II production needs. Kaiser’s smelters were shut down in 2000, and the 

company underwent bankruptcy in 2002. Today, Kaiser operates 11 fabricating 

57
facilities in the United States with 2,700 employees and is a leading producer of 

aluminum products (sheet, plate, extrusions, rod, bar) for defense, aerospace, 

satellite, automotive and custom industrial applications. The company has invested 

$630 million since 2006 to increase capacity, lower costs and improve quality. 

Constellium, a Netherlands company with U.S. headquarters in Baltimore, 

Maryland is also a major manufacturer of downstream aluminum products, with 

12,000 employees worldwide. The company designs and manufactures aluminum 

products for the aerospace, automotive, packaging and defense markets. The 

United States market generates about 40 percent of the company’s $5 billion in 

revenue. Constellium invested $1.8 billion in its U.S. plants in the last five years, 

and opened a new R&D facility in Plymouth, Michigan. 

In Muscle Shoals, Alabama, Constellium produces cansheet for the 

packaging industry at its plant with 1,200 employees. Its Ravenswood, West 

Virginia facility, with 1,050 employees produces advanced alloyed plates for 

military aircraft, armored vehicles and U.S. Navy vessels. The company partners 

with the U.S. Army through the U.S. Army Tank Automotive Research 

Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC) in developing new aluminum 

solutions for combat vehicles of the future. Constellium states that it has been 

negatively affected by imports of low-price aluminum plate from China, which 

have displaced Constellium’s products in the market. 

Arconic, headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, was created in 2016 

when Alcoa split into two companies, manufactures high-value added downstream 

aluminum products. The company has 22,750 employees in 45 plants in the 

United States. While part of Alcoa, the company invested over $3.1 billion to 

modernize facilities since 2009. Arconic is a leading supplier of aluminum 

products to the DoD – including armor plate, aluminum bulkheads for aircraft, and 

marine applications. The company (again, as Alcoa), collaborated on R&D and 

manufacturing with the DoD to develop special alloys and manufacturing 

processes. Arconic’s Davenport, Iowa rolling mill produces high-purity aluminum 

products needed for such defense programs as the Joint Strike Fighter and Joint 

Light Tactical Vehicle using a process called fractional crystallization. 

58
Aleris, headquartered in Beachwood, Ohio, is a leading producer of rolled 

aluminum and extruded aluminum products for the aerospace, automotive, defense, 

construction and packaging markets. It is also a producer of secondary aluminum 

made from recycled scrap. The company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2009, 

emerging in 2010 as a privately held company. It has 12 production facilities (nine 

in the U.S.; two in Europe and one in China) and three “innovation centers” (two in 

Europe and one in Zhengjiang, China). The Chinese R&D center opened in 2014 

to support development of aircraft and commercial plate products for Aleris’s 

Chinese plant. Aleris recently completed an expansion of its rolling mill in 

Lewisport, Kentucky (capacity 220,000 metric tons per year) and began 

commercial production of body sheet for the automotive industry. Chinese 

aluminum extrusion company Zhongwang sought to purchase Aleris, but the 

transaction was withdrawn in November, 2017 due to concerns of the federal 

Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). 

Sapa Extrusions, a Norwegian company, is the world’s leading producer of 

aluminum extruded profiles and aluminum tubing. Its products are used in many 

industry sectors, including automotive, heating and ventilation, and building and 

construction. 

The company has 22,800 employees in 40 countries; in North America there 

are 6,500 employees in 23 facilities. It has four R&D Centers—three in Europe 

and one in Troy, MI. According to the company’s 2016 annual report, North 

American sales volume was 585,000 metric tons. 

D. Domestic Production is Well Below Demand 

In 2016, global primary aluminum consumption was 59.7 million metric 

tons, reflecting a 5.4 percent year-over-year increase. This was the seventh straight 

year of significant growth for aluminum consumption, and growth is forecast to 

continue at this rate. 

The world's top five leading consuming countries were responsible for more 

than 72 percent of total aluminum demand in 2016 (see Figure 5). According to 

CRU International, the leading aluminum consuming markets in 2016 were China, 

the United States, and Germany. 

59
       

           

               

       

         

       

    

 

 

 

    

    

 

 

                  

China

53%

United

States

9% Germany

4%

India

3%

Japan

3%

All Other

28%

Figure 5 ‐ Global Consumption of

Primary Aluminum

(2016 Total = 59.7 Million Metric Tons)

Source: CRU Group, as cited in the USITC Report

Table 15 ‐ Apparent North American Aluminum Consumption

– By Major Market

Thousands of Metric Tons

Major Market 2015 % of Total 2016 % of Total

Building & Construction 1,421 14 1,468 14

Transportation 4,185 40 4,227 40

Consumer Durables 742 7 795 8

Electrical 799 8 837 8

Machinery & Equipment 768 7 769 7

Containers & Packaging 2,135 21 2,160 20

Other 328 3 312 3

Domestic, total 10,378 100 10,583 100

Source: The Aluminum Association (Converted from Millions of Pounds)

60
                                 

                           

                                 

                   

      

             

Combined U.S. and Canadian shipments of all types of aluminum (primary, 

secondary, as well as downstream production of semi-manufactures) totaled 12.0 

million metric tons in 2016, according to the Aluminum Association.56 The 

transportation sector is the largest North American market for aluminum, 

accounting for 4.2 million metric tons or 35 percent of total consumption: this 

sector’s use of aluminum is expected to continue to grow as automakers strive to 

make lighter and more fuel-efficient vehicles. Another major factor in demand 

from the transportation sector is aircraft; the International Aluminum Institute 

estimates that that 80 percent of an aircraft’s weight is aluminum. 

U.S. consumption of primary aluminum has steadily increased rising by 46 

percent since 2000, according to the CRU International. In 2016, CRU estimates 

that the United States consumed nearly 5.4 million metric tons, or about nine 

percent of the world’s total consumption of 60 million metric tons of primary 

aluminum. While China is by far the leading consumer of primary aluminum, its 

consumption is well below its production level, whereas the United States 

production is substantially lower than consumption. 

The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) statistics show increases in U.S. 

apparent consumption57 of aluminum from 4.13 million metric tons in 2012 to 5.22 

million metric tons in 2015 (a 26 percent increase over the 4-year period).58 U.S. 

production in 2015 (primary and secondary) totaled just over three million metric 

tons; domestic production fell even further in 2016, while demand for aluminum 

continued to increase. 

Based on USGS production and U.S. Census statistics for U.S. exports and 

imports of primary aluminum, U.S. import dependence for primary aluminum was 

nearly 90 percent of apparent consumption in 2016, up from 64 percent in 2012. 

56 U.S. Government statistics are not available for U.S. production or consumption of aluminum other than for

primary aluminum; Aluminum Association figure is based on U.S. and Canadian Producer Shipments plus

imports and are included in the “Fact at a Glance‐2016,” December, 2017 (converted to metric tons from

pounds) and includes exports (except exports between the U.S. and Canada).

57 Defined as primary production + secondary production + net import reliance for crude aluminum and aluminum 

semi-manufactures (excluding imported scrap). 

58 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2017

61
                             

                                   

   

U.S. import reliance increased because domestic primary aluminum 

production decreased, so U.S. manufacturers by necessity filled their materials 

needs through imports. Since primary aluminum companies are globalized, some 

of the imported aluminum was from the foreign business units of U.S.-based 

companies. 

The Aluminum Association uses a different methodology to estimate U.S. 

consumption59 of aluminum (including unwrought and mill products). The 

Association’s data show that U.S. aluminum consumption was nearly 10 million 

metric tons in 2006, before declining during the years of economic crisis that 

followed and not yet fully recovering. There has been a dramatic increase in the 

share of U.S. consumption that is satisfied through imports in just the past two 

years, rising from a stable 51 percent from 2011- 2013 to over 64 percent for 2016. 

This is a direct result of the decline in U.S. primary aluminum production driven 

by falling prices and expanding non-U.S. production. This increase in imports has 

occurred in both primary aluminum and downstream products. 

59 U.S. apparent aluminum consumption = primary aluminum production + recovery of secondary aluminum +

imports of unwrought aluminum + imports of mill products – exports of unwrought aluminum – exports of mill

products.

62
                 

                     

                     

   

                         

                         

   

                     

                           

                           

                         

                         

                             

      

                                        

                          

Table 16 ‐ U.S. Aluminum Supply/Aluminum Consumption Balance

(Millions of Metric Tons)

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Primary 2.28 2.56 2.66 1.73 1.73 1.99 2.07 1.95 1.71 1.59 0.82

Additives 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02

Melt Loss ‐0.02  ‐0.03  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.02  ‐0.02  ‐0.02  ‐0.02  ‐0.02  ‐0.02  ‐0.01

Secondary Recovery 4.09 3.98 3.06 2.54 3.17 3.50 3.73 3.98 3.85 3.87 4.06

Imports (Mill

Products) 1.58 1.43 1.25 1.07 1.26 1.23 1.29 1.25 1.42 1.60 1.68

Imports (Ingot) 3.47 2.95 2.81 2.93 2.67 2.86 2.93 3.16 3.33 3.40 4.26

Change in Prod Inv. ‐0.01 0.00  ‐0.17  ‐0.28 0.08 0.02 0.09  ‐0.03 0.17 0.08 0.02

Total U.S. Supply* 11.46 10.94 9.98 8.56 8.77 9.57 9.95 10.40 10.16 10.39 10.82

Exports (Mill Products) 1.13 1.09 1.14 0.92 0.98 1.15 1.23 1.29 1.27 1.24 1.22

Exports (Ingot) 0.38 0.37 0.35 0.32 0.38 0.41 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.36 0.30

Total U.S.

Consumption 9.95 9.48 8.48 7.32 7.41 8.02 8.29 8.68 8.47 8.78 9.30

Imports as % of

Consumption 51% 46% 48% 55% 53% 51% 51% 51% 56% 57% 64%

Source: Aluminum Association

Note: Consumption figures cited in this table are slightly lower than those for Table 14, which reports for North America

– including Canada and the United States. Table 15 data reports U.S. production and consumption only.

E. U.S. Imports of Aluminum are Increasing 

1. Overview of Aluminum Imports in Aggregate 

Overall U.S. imports of the aluminum categories subject to this 

investigation combined (HTS #7601, 7604, 7605, 7606, 7607, 7608, 7609. 

7616.99.51.60 and 7616.99.51.70) were valued at $13.0 billion in 2016 -- a 15 

percent increase over 2013 import levels. For the first ten months of 2017, imports 

are up 30 percent on a value basis compared to the same period in 2016. These 

import figures are heavily influenced by changes in global aluminum prices. 

While imports on a value basis leveled off between 2014 and 2016, this is largely 

due to declining aluminum prices. 

63
 

Imports of aluminum on weight basis are a better indication of true trade 

flows, because they are unaffected by fluctuations in prices. By weight, U.S. 

imports in these aluminum categories were 5.9 million metric tons in 2016, up 34 

percent from 4.4 million metric tons in 2013. For the first 10 months of 2017, 

imports are running 18 percent above 2016 levels on a tonnage basis. There is no 

leveling off in the level of imports on a volume basis; rather, there has been a 

consistent increase year over year. 

Canada is the leading source of aluminum imports into the United States, 

accounting for about 43 percent of total imports by both value and weight in 2016. 

Imports from Canada have been at consistent level over the four-year period at 

about 2.6 million metric tons per year. 

In contrast, imports from the second leading source (by value), China, 

increased by 70 percent by value and 75 percent by weight between 2013 and 

2015. Imports from China by weight were 531,000 metric tons valued at $1.3 

billion in 2016, a slight decline from 2015 levels. However, imports from China in 

all aluminum categories are up by about 33 percent by value and 25 percent by 

weight for the first 10 months of 2017 compared with the same period last year. 

By product category, unwrought aluminum (primary) makes up by far the 

largest portion of imports – 63 percent of the total by value. The second largest 

category -- aluminum plates, sheets and strips -- accounts for an additional 19 

percent of imports. 

The following subsections present detailed information on U.S. imports of 

aluminum in specific product categories, as the source of the imports varies 

significantly. In general, the import data are provided in metric tons, which allows 

for a true picture of trends in import levels (versus import data by value, which 

fluctuate based on aluminum prices). 

64
  

  

  

   

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

   

             

                     

                 

       

          

Table 17 – U.S. Imports of Aluminum by Country and Value

(HTS 7601, 7604, 7605,7606, 7607, 7608, 7609; 7616.99.51.60 & 7616.99.51.70)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016 Jan‐

Oct

2017 Jan‐

Oct

% Change

YTD 2016 ‐

Country Thousands of Dollars (000) 2017

Canada 6,202,862 6,524,386 6,083,989 5,608,651 4,609,071 5,771,389 25.20%

Russia 525,499 796,395 716,134 1,349,508 1,116,152 1,301,650 16.60%

China 874,443 1,157,244 1,491,461 1,337,719 1,103,326 1,468,632 33.10%

United Arab

Emirates

581,412 620,781 661,933 1,029,269 804,818 1,176,366 46.20%

Bahrain 165,496 246,133 282,696 398,164 321,512 498,850 55.20%

Germany 466,761 378,888 397,349 345,715 295,852 232,961 ‐21.30%

Argentina 229,620 175,859 198,159 330,666 277,140 368,008 32.80%

Qatar 208,908 202,360 224,177 300,731 249,935 269,809 8.00%

France 85,536 160,366 168,485 192,993 164,489 165,625 0.70%

Mexico 186,479 228,357 219,742 189,505 157,617 200,427 27.20%

South Africa 221,733 235,281 178,286 186,206 155,008 322,552 108.10%

Austria 126,088 146,790 158,714 156,761 133,369 131,032 ‐1.80%

Japan 169,885 187,383 148,852 144,209 120,740 130,365 8.00%

Venezuela 102,845 219,705 126,485 116,038 81,800 159,401 94.90%

India 65,319 87,543 139,038 111,159 91,853 282,515 207.60%

All Other: 1,136,361 1,200,656 1,422,447 1,160,298 965,824 1,417,679 46.80%

Total 11,349,245 12,568,126 12,617,948 12,957,591 10,648,507 13,897,259 30.50%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

65
                                 

      

  

   

           

           

  

  

        

           

           

           

          

          

          

          

          

          

          

          

          

            

          

               

Table 18 ‐ U.S. Imports of Aluminum by Country and Weight

(HTS 7601, 7604, 7605,7606, 7607, 7608, 7609; 7616.99.51.60 & 7616.99.51.70)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016

Jan‐Oct

2017

Jan‐Oct

% Change

YTD 2016 ‐ 2017

Country Metric Tons

Canada 2,677,401 2,631,222 2,661,770 2,759,687 2,274,594 2,478,455 9.0% 

Russia 219,256 356,014 309,396 755,487 628,076 625,792 -0.4% 

United Arab

Emirates

250,852 260,934 292,785 555,857 435,170 569,405 30.8% 

China 304,069 410,043 534,940 530,580 438,446 547,127 24.8% 

Bahrain 63,522 96,579 114,654 190,042 153,705 213,614 39.0% 

Argentina 104,465 79,475 91,182 187,562 157,572 182,004 15.5% 

Qatar 94,985 91,731 86,325 115,705 96,155 103,711 7.9% 

Germany 96,378 77,074 92,064 85,774 74,418 48,805 -34.4% 

South Africa 71,814 83,748 57,037 73,195 60,749 141,600 133.1% 

Venezuela 49,999 109,568 67,443 69,526 50,509 82,078 62.5% 

India 20,769 31,830 60,041 53,986 45,115 132,014 192.6% 

Saudi Arabia 471 14,404 76,132 53,768 44,288 40,620 -8.3% 

Mexico 55,320 67,130 62,007 52,852 44,134 56,908 28.9% 

Brazil 50,549 37,203 18,748 48,998 35,653 33,010 -7.4% 

Indonesia 62,598 60,116 78,013 45,127 34,579 65,007 88.0% 

All Other 287,050 335,970 379,703 360,390 309,595 443,793 43.3%

Total 4,409,497 4,743,040 4,982,238 5,938,536 4,882,759 5,763,945 18.0%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

66
                   

                 

        

   

             

  

   

   

     

       

  

   

   

     

   

   

     

   

     

     

   

  

   

   

   

  

   

  

   

   

  

   

   

     

   

  

   

   

                

Table 19 – U.S. Imports of Aluminum by Product Category

(HTS 7601, 7604, 7605,7606, 7607, 7608, 7609; 7616.99.51.60 & 7616.99.51.70)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016

Jan‐Oct

2017

Jan‐Oct %

Change

YTD

2016 ‐

2017

Type of

Aluminum

Product By HTS

Code

Thousands of Dollars (000)

7601

ALUMINUM,

UNWROUGHT

6,903,314 7,656,615 7,331,489 7,909,651 6,435,919 8,678,149 34.80%

7606

ALUMINUM

PLATES, SHEETS

AND STRIP, OVER

0.2 MM (0.0079 IN.)

THICK

2,079,139 2,355,549 2,800,951 2,522,666 2,103,753 2,633,656 25.20%

7607

ALUMINUM FOIL

(WHETHER OR NOT

PRINTED OR

BACKED WITH

PAPER OR OTHER

BACKING

MATERIALS), NOT

OVER 0.2 MM

(0.0079 IN.) THICK

(EXCLUDING ANY

BACKING)

901,904 973,504 933,419 909,127 762,763 877,565 15.10%

7604

ALUMINUM BARS,

RODS AND

PROFILES

643,543 730,516 804,536 799,818 670,860 840,357 25.30%

7605

ALUMINUM WIRE

583,206 596,571 500,410 589,363 485,734 650,235 33.90%

7608

ALUMINUM TUBES

AND PIPES

141,497 151,411 156,545 145,324 121,978 136,488 11.90%

7609

ALUMINUM TUBE

OR PIPE FITTINGS

(INCLUDING

COUPLINGS,

ELBOWS, AND

SLEEVES)

96,643 103,961 90,598 81,641 67,500 80,808 19.70%

TOTAL 11,349,246 12,568,127 12,617,948 12,957,590 10,648,507 13,897,258 23.00%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

67
       

Figure 6 ‐ U.S. Aluminum Imports

Millions of Metric Tons

68
         

       

   

         

   

         

   

   

     

                 

                   

                 

Figure 7 ‐ U.S. Top 5 Aluminum Import Sources by HTS Code ‐ 2016

Import Sources For Specified HTS Codes

7601 (Unwrought Aluminum)

Canada

Russia

United Arab Emirates

Argentina

Qatar

7604 (Aluminum Bars, Rods, And Profiles)

Canada

Mexico

Vietnam

Indonesia

China

7605 (Aluminum Wire)

Canada

Bahrain

Argentina

Australia

Russia

7606 (Aluminum Plates, Sheets, And Strip*)

China

Canada

South Africa

Germany

Bahrain

7607 (Aluminum Foil**)

China

Germany

Canada

Russia

Armenia

7608 (Aluminum Tubes and Pipes)

Mexico

Canada

Japan

Indonesia

South Korea

7609 (Aluminum Tube and Pipe Fittings)

China

India

Mexico

Canada

South Korea

2,307

722

556

174

116

86

30

18

9

6

185

32

14

14

7

350

162

61

60

51

167

19

16

12

7

7

4

2

2

1

2

1

1

1

0

0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500

Thousands of Metric Tons

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through IHS Market Global Trade

Atlas. 1.10.2018. *Of a thickness exceeding 0.2mm. **Of A Thickness Not

Exceeding 0.2mm.

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2. Unwrought Aluminum Imports 

Of total U.S. aluminum imports, unwrought (primary) aluminum accounted 

for the bulk by weight (4.3 of 6.5 million metric tons), with a total value of $7.9 

billion. U.S. imports of unwrought aluminum have increased dramatically in 

recent years -- nearly 40 percent by weight since 2014. In 2016, of the total U.S. 

imports of 4.3 million metric tons, the majority was from Canada (54 percent), 

followed by Russia (16 percent), United Arab Emirates (13 percent), Argentina (4 

percent), Qatar (3 percent); the rest of the world accounted for 10 percent. While 

still not among the top sources, imports from Oman, South Africa and Venezuela 

have shown tremendous growth in the past year. 

Table 20 – U.S. Imports of Unwrought (Primary) Aluminum

(HTS 7601)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016 Jan‐

Oct

2017 Jan‐

Oct

% Change

YTD 2016 ‐

Country Metric Tons 2017

Canada 2,273,784 2,215,438 2,235,854 2,306,770 1,890,587 2,097,491 10.90%

Russia 189,599 325,420 279,980 721,614 599,295 581,465 ‐3.00%

United Arab

Emirates

250,432 260,921 292,764 555,824 435,164 567,504 30.40%

Argentina 97,495 72,189 85,944 173,714 145,992 171,162 17.20%

Qatar 94,985 91,731 86,325 115,705 96,155 103,708 7.90%

Bahrain 29,268 53,873 74,423 106,592 91,675 97,582 6.40%

Venezuela 49,997 108,302 66,937 66,895 48,458 78,204 61.40%

Saudi Arabia 469 14,403 76,130 53,082 44,288 30,246 ‐31.70%

Brazil 33,923 22,372 3,701 28,828 18,912 8,389 ‐55.60%

India 8 322 38,795 26,497 22,537 91,135 304.40%

South Korea 14,841 15,283 16,364 14,624 12,560 10,951 ‐12.80%

South Africa 12,434 26,282 9,873 12,006 8,972 99,181 1005.50%

Mexico 25,262 32,485 22,660 11,864 9,619 16,052 66.90%

France 4,259 8,607 10,874 9,994 8,308 7,944 ‐4.40%

Oman 0 35 0 9,154 9,154 13,564 48.20%

All Other 85,037 79,704 96,186 46,226 41,188 136,705 231.90%

TOTAL 3,161,793 3,327,367 3,396,772 4,259,587 3,482,864 4,111,283 18.04%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

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3. Aluminum Bars, Rods and Profiles 

For aluminum bars, rods and profiles (HTS 7604) the total value of U.S. 

imports (from all sources) in this category was $801 million in 2016, down slightly 

from $804 million in 2015. By weight, there was a slight increase in import levels 

in 2016 over 2015 levels (200,000 metric tons). Canada and Mexico are major 

players in this category. Imports from China fell off beginning in 2015 from 

earlier levels. Imports from Vietnam increased dramatically during the period, 

rising by over 800 percent between 2013 and 2016, with the trend continuing in 

2017. Some industry analysts have observed that a portion of the imports in this 

category from Vietnam are likely Chinese products that are being transshipped to 

avoid duties. 

Table 21 ‐ U.S. Imports of Aluminum Bars, Rods & Profiles

(HTS 7604)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016

Jan‐Oct

2017

Jan‐Oct

% Change

YTD 2016 ‐

Country Metric Tons 2017

Canada 78,733 84,031 91,062 85,820 72,619 76,400 5.20%

Mexico 19,377 24,234 26,603 29,992 25,173 27,765 10.30%

Vietnam 1,846 3,706 9,029 17,751 14,965 19,318 29.10%

Indonesia 2,441 6,833 8,872 8,852 7,057 9,309 31.90%

China 9,196 9,700 5,327 5,910 4,842 3,847 ‐20.50%

Colombia 2,438 2,564 4,107 5,806 4,895 6,404 30.80%

Malaysia 4,799 3,835 5,152 5,380 4,701 5,531 17.70%

Russia 5,445 6,628 6,076 4,715 3,906 5,823 49.10%

Germany 4,088 4,708 4,289 4,154 3,277 3,839 17.10%

Italy 3,307 4,422 4,168 4,093 3,342 5,163 54.50%

Dominican

Republic 2,624 3,021 4,325 3,923 3,371 2,433 ‐27.80%

India 1,770 2,902 2,408 2,559 2,175 2,880 32.40%

Israel 64 1,194 1,394 2,424 2,198 2,154 ‐2.00%

Slovenia 2,717 2,739 2,424 2,423 2,134 2,028 ‐5.00%

Belgium 1,685 1,960 2,281 2,319 1,933 1,808 ‐6.50%

All Other 11,890 11,634 13,571 16,694 13,688 22,248 62.50%

TOTAL 152,421 174,111 191,086 202,815 170,275 196,952 15.67%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

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4. Aluminum Plate, Sheet and Strip 

Aluminum plates, sheets and strip (HTS 7606) are the second largest 

category of imports (after unwrought aluminum) with a total value of $2.5 billion 

in 2016. On a weight basis, imports were essentially unchanged in 2016 compared 

to 2015 levels, but data for the first 10 months of 2017 show a nearly 20 percent 

increase over the same period in 2017. 

Over a third of total imports came from China, and imports from China are 

on the rise again (after tapering off in 2016). Canada, South Africa, Bahrain and 

Germany also supply significant amounts of plates, sheet and strip. Imports from 

Indonesia are on the rise in this category, double in 2017 over 2016 levels. 

Table 22‐ U.S. Imports of Aluminum Plate, Sheet & Strip

(HTS 7606)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016 Jan‐

Oct

2017 Jan‐

Oct

% Change

YTD 2016 ‐

Country Metric Tons 2017

China 173,449 264,943 369,291 349,628 289,567 381,705 31.80%

Canada 125,513 133,537 152,560 161,642 138,029 129,739 ‐6.00%

South

Africa

59,304 57,428 47,053 61,160 51,750 42,324 ‐18.20%

Germany 74,509 53,372 62,240 60,049 52,462 29,772 ‐43.20%

Bahrain 24,634 30,593 34,966 51,224 41,575 48,260 16.10%

Indonesia 59,409 51,719 66,842 33,614 25,051 53,535 113.70%

Austria 20,063 26,032 28,376 30,878 26,487 25,976 ‐1.90%

Japan 2,109 10,820 22,657 24,697 20,746 19,589 ‐5.60%

India 16,826 26,982 16,727 22,825 18,647 35,749 91.70%

Greece 18,426 18,089 21,631 19,938 16,023 16,181 1.00%

France 3,070 10,658 9,454 15,913 13,061 21,175 62.10%

Brazil 8,053 6,943 9,858 14,845 12,015 15,993 33.10%

South

Korea

998 22,165 18,973 10,744 9,972 8,785 ‐11.90%

Russia 8,670 8,785 10,190 10,218 8,480 9,059 6.80%

United

Kingdom

13,942 9,615 11,653 9,451 8,485 5,217 ‐38.50%

All Other 34,236 31,559 41,911 47,194 37,510 71,722 91.20%

TOTAL 643,210 763,239 924,381 924,020 769,860 914,781 18.82%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

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5. Aluminum Foil 

Aluminum foil imports are presented in the table below. The total value of 

imports in this category was $910 million in 2016, of which $475 million was from 

China. 

On a weight basis, China dominates, accounting for two thirds of the total 

imports to the United States in 2016. (Note: Aluminum foil imports from China 

are the subject of an ongoing antidumping/countervailing duty investigation). See 

Appendix D for more information on trade actions related to aluminum. 

Table 23 – U.S. Imports of Aluminum Foil

(HTS 7607)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016

Jan‐Oct

2017 Jan‐

Oct

% Change

YTD 2016

Country Metric Tons ‐ 2017

China 107,130 128,254 151,749 167,464 138,082 152,194 10.20%

Germany 15,380 16,734 17,520 18,705 16,351 12,428 ‐24.00%

Canada 13,547 13,802 13,521 15,638 13,068 12,635 ‐3.30%

Russia 126 2,072 7,718 11,803 10,220 13,468 31.80%

Armenia 27,162 26,077 13,787 7,258 6,809 11,647 71.10%

Brazil 8,386 7,778 5,015 5,112 4,513 8,616 90.90%

Austria 3,799 4,136 4,140 3,898 3,385 3,976 17.50%

Sweden 2,326 3,079 3,574 3,505 2,957 2,300 ‐22.20%

France 3,007 2,969 2,956 2,825 2,372 1,742 ‐26.50%

South Korea 1,827 1,258 2,279 2,619 2,231 4,039 81.00%

Japan 3,310 3,964 1,275 1,513 1,134 2,158 90.20%

Italy 1,502 1,611 1,425 1,330 1,093 1,007 ‐7.90%

Turkey 199 290 408 1,021 723 3,512 385.70%

Costa Rica 842 803 999 970 787 2,111 168.30%

Belgium 1,067 555 878 847 740 516 ‐30.20%

All Other 8,647 10,670 9,370 9,109 7,350 11,913 62.10%

TOTAL 198,257 224,052 236,615 253,617 211,815 244,263 15.32%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

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6. Aluminum Pipe and Tubes 

The table below presents data on imports of aluminum pipes and tubes (HTS 

7608) as well as pipe and tube fittings (HTS 7609). Unlike the other sectors, 

imports were down slightly in this category in 2016, but are growing in 2017 due 

to increases in imports from Mexico. Mexico is the largest supplier in the segment, 

followed by Canada, China, and Japan. 

Table 24– U.S. Imports of Aluminum Pipes and Tubes

(HTS 7608‐7609)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016

Jan‐Oct

2017

Jan‐Oct

% Change

YTD 2016 ‐

Country Metric Tons 2017

Mexico 7,710 7,418 9,247 7,963 6,639 10,222 54.00%

Canada 6,417 7,862 7,785 4,755 4,076 4,103 0.70%

China 3,289 3,817 2,907 2,618 2,147 2,865 33.50%

Japan 2,605 2,656 2,771 2,587 2,110 1,746 ‐17.20%

Indonesia 0 849 1,799 1,881 1,691 1,153 ‐31.80%

India 1,610 968 1,174 1,559 1,342 1,840 37.10%

South

Korea 964 1,007 1,035 1,490 1,314 989 ‐24.80%

Taiwan 1,457 1,510 1,341 1,282 1,074 1,144 6.50%

Germany 832 893 963 998 828 804 ‐2.90%

Israel 107 314 710 932 779 1,003 28.70%

Russia 798 559 455 535 486 400 ‐17.60%

Vietnam 360 411 651 388 266 811 205.60%

Switzerland 300 336 305 304 231 249 7.50%

France 220 203 210 299 250 184 ‐26.20%

Italy 103 149 143 162 135 197 45.70%

All Other 1,615 1,615 1,019 982 767 1,093 42.60%

TOTAL 28,386 30,567 32,515 28,737 24,134 28,804 19.35%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

74
 

               

       

   

      

                

                

            

                

                

                

                

            

            

            

                

            

            

  

            

                    

         

             

7. Aluminum Castings & Forgings 

Aluminum castings and forgings, the final category addressed in the report, 

also are an area where imports are on the rise (see Table below). Overall, imports 

are up 11 percent in 2017 (January-October) compared with 2016. China is the 

leading source of imports; while imports from China fell in 2016 from 2015 levels, 

they increased thus far in 2017. 

Table 25– U.S. Imports of Aluminum Castings and Forgings

(HTS 7616.99.50.60; 7616.99.50.70; 7616.99.51.60;7616.99.51.70)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016

Jan‐Oct

2017

Jan‐Oct

% Change

YTD 2016

Country Metric Tons ‐2017

China 7,901 9,493 13,146 11,284 9,209 10,068 9.30%

Mexico 3,629 3,548 3,757 2,759 2,369 2,543 7.40%

Taiwan 2,401 2,184 2,262 2,242 1,889 1,288 ‐31.80%

Canada 1,831 2,086 1,869 2,196 1,781 2,581 44.90%

India 1,105 1,790 1,370 1,479 1,294 1,469 13.50%

Czech Republic 65 69 259 902 825 1,213 47.10%

Japan 34 41 335 491 393 477 21.60%

France 292 285 456 449 365 845 131.50%

Italy 293 452 469 343 298 220 ‐26.20%

Greece 214 273 232 263 245 202 ‐17.40%

Thailand 362 433 194 254 186 260 39.60%

Poland 12 74 269 248 186 372 100.00%

United Kingdom 242 178 405 218 185 74 ‐60.20%

South Korea 137 109 121 216 177 41 ‐76.60%

Hong Kong 25 26 139 195 173 71 ‐59.10%

All Other 1,941 2,843 3,977 778 694 771 11.10%

TOTAL 20,484 23,884 29,261 24,318 20,270 22,497 10.99%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

F. United States Aluminum Exports 

In 2016, the United States exported a total of $ 6.4 billion in the aluminum 

product categories subject to this investigation (HTS 7601, 7604-7609, 

7616.99.51.60; 7616.99.51.70). The value of U.S. exports fell each year between 

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2013 and 2016. Exports for the first ten months of 2017 also show a slight decline 

from the same period in 2016. 

The largest category for U.S. exports is aluminum plates sheets and strip 

($3.4 billion), followed by aluminum bars, rods and profiles ($1.0 billion) and 

then unwrought, primary aluminum with $640 million. 

Table 26 – U.S. Domestic Exports of Aluminum by Product Category

(HTS 7601, 7604, 7605,7606, 7607, 7608, 7609; 7616.99.51.60 & 7616.99.51.70)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016

Jan‐Oct

2017

Jan‐Oct Change

YTD 2016

‐ 2017 Type of Aluminum

Product By HTS Code Thousands of Dollars (000)

7606

ALUMINUM PLATES,

SHEETS AND STRIP, OVER

0.2 MM (0.0079 IN.) THICK

3,823,936 3,763,076 3,654,514 3,440,770 2,912,946 2,867,475 ‐1.60%

7604

ALUMINUM BARS, RODS

AND PROFILES

877,081 855,962 864,016 1,048,692 927,545 691,283 ‐25.50%

7601

ALUMINUM,

UNWROUGHT

1,017,585 1,027,678 834,703 639,838 543,750 616,819 13.40%

7607

ALUMINUM FOIL

(WHETHER OR NOT

PRINTED OR BACKED WITH

PAPER OR OTHER BACKING

MATERIALS), NOT OVER

0.2 MM (0.0079 IN.) THICK

(EXCLUDING ANY

BACKING)

513,918 503,743 476,236 458,659 392,299 400,432 2.10%

7608

ALUMINUM TUBES AND

PIPES

256,168 285,241 268,566 259,486 221,808 249,122 12.30%

7609

ALUMINUM TUBE OR PIPE

FITTINGS (INCLUDING

COUPLINGS, ELBOWS, AND

SLEEVES)

137,945 161,845 162,389 148,146 122,827 130,193 6.00%

7605

ALUMINUM WIRE

158,700 168,242 153,868 125,886 107,228 103,287 ‐3.70%

7616.99.51.60,

7616.99.51.70 CASTINGS

AN FORGINGS

344,326 334,101 323,698 322,074 266,646 291,516 9.30%

TOTAL 7,129,659 7,099,888 6,737,990 6,443,551 5,495,049 5,350,127 ‐2.64%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

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By country, the vast majority of U.S. exports of aluminum products go to 

neighboring countries and NAFTA partners, Mexico and Canada. By value, these 

two countries accounted for nearly two thirds of U.S. exports. 

U.S. exports to Vietnam had a spike in 2016 that did not occur in any other 

year (including 2017); a closer look at these exports shows that they were primarily 

in HTS category 7604, and in particular, HTS 760421, which is “Aluminum Alloy 

Hollow Profiles.” The U.S. also saw a spike in imports from Vietnam in 2016. 

The composition of U.S. aluminum exports varies significantly by product 

category. For unwrought (primary) aluminum, exports to Mexico and Canada 

account for 92 percent of total U.S. exports by value and 95 percent by weight. 

Currently, Mexico does not have a primary aluminum smelter due to its inability to 

provide reliable, steady energy. 

Table 27 – U.S. Domestic Exports of Aluminum Products by Country

(HTS 7601, 7604, 7605,7606, 7607, 7608, 7609; 7616.99.51.60 & 7616.99.51.70)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016

Jan‐Oct

2017

Jan‐Oct

Change

YTD

2016‐

2017 Country Thousands of Dollars (000)

Mexico 2,466,070 2,616,709 2,540,224 2,262,702 1,910,290 2,077,114 8.70%

Canada 2,014,001 2,078,447 1,989,009 1,834,326 1,561,946 1,592,846 2.00%

Japan 230,043 233,545 248,810 291,370 246,276 130,808  ‐46.90%

China 328,672 306,023 288,155 276,576 230,832 175,285  ‐24.10%

South Korea 198,976 230,274 270,181 268,555 227,831 207,001  ‐9.10%

Vietnam 1,756 17,769 31,185 245,575 245,180 1,341  ‐99.50%

United

Kingdom

188,249 216,728 210,718 193,888 167,247 127,559  ‐23.70%

France 166,581 157,754 154,687 134,378 110,876 89,070  ‐19.70%

Germany 140,434 150,749 141,555 114,041 93,441 87,323  ‐6.50%

Guatemala 58,896 63,414 58,220 56,392 46,690 25,173  ‐46.10%

Brazil 114,821 92,715 60,598 52,613 46,182 37,844  ‐18.10%

Taiwan 77,091 50,928 54,310 51,983 43,381 45,181 4.10%

Turkey 42,556 29,330 39,549 40,761 35,631 31,397  ‐11.90%

Israel 54,180 47,801 40,688 40,219 34,895 35,424 1.50%

Singapore 45,086 49,900 44,926 38,011 30,872 28,579  ‐7.40%

All Other: 1,002,248 757,801 565,173 542,161 463,478 366,666  ‐20.90%

Total 7,129,659 7,099,887 6,737,989 6,443,550 5,495,049 5,058,610  ‐7.90%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

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Table 28– U.S. Exports of Unwrought Aluminum by Value

(HTS 7601)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016

Jan‐Oct

2017

Jan‐Oct

Change

YTD

Country Thousands of Dollars (000) 2016‐2017

Mexico 586,992 616,695 495,876 376,711 323,080 350,472 8.50%

Canada 296,882 315,948 249,336 188,746 159,265 185,749 16.60%

France 28,322 15,874 14,047 19,698 15,793 18,601 17.80%

Taiwan 12,819 11,694 12,474 7,816 6,082 9,352 53.80%

Argentina 8,439 5,121 2,748 6,379 6,339 6 ‐99.90%

Japan 6,855 7,397 7,433 6,116 5,418 6,190 14.20%

Germany 10,421 12,042 11,141 6,099 5,063 5,967 17.90%

The

Netherlands

1,050 609 3,712 3,754 3,633 381 ‐89.50%

South Korea 6,459 5,422 4,967 3,752 3,421 2,389 ‐30.20%

United

Kingdom

3,838 3,454 3,443 3,313 3,091 3,112 0.70%

China 20,777 5,121 2,482 2,221 1,798 2,877 60.00%

United Arab

Emirates

36 44 76 2,208 109 8,780 7926.30%

Costa Rica 2,475 631 728 1,914 1,853 163 ‐91.20%

Singapore 3,953 5,027 3,943 1,609 1,190 1,605 34.80%

Dominican

Republic

2,111 518 1,128 1,183 1,183 2,609 120.40%

All Other: 26,156 22,081 21,169 8,319 6,429 18,568 188.80%

Total 1,017,585 1,027,678 834,703 639,838 543,750 616,819 13.40%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

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Table 29 – U.S. Domestic Exports of Unwrought Aluminum by Weight

(HTS 7601)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016 Jan ‐

Oct

2017 Jan‐

Oct

% Change

YTD 2016 ‐

Country Metric Tons 2017

Mexico 248,514 251,702 220,829 185,266 158,856 158,510 ‐0.20%

Canada 121,130 125,426 109,316 94,004 79,347 84,423 6.40%

France 8,282 4,980 4,443 5,895 4,733 5,094 7.60%

Argentina 3,358 1,891 1,138 3,172 3,152 3 ‐99.90%

Taiwan 4,896 4,260 4,570 3,138 2,448 3,668 49.80%

Japan 1,517 1,932 1,855 1,706 1,397 1,783 27.60%

Germany 3,608 3,429 3,167 1,475 1,157 1,802 55.80%

The

Netherlands

352 64 1,296 1,449 1,435 60 ‐95.80%

United

Kingdom

1,058 890 734 886 840 602 ‐28.30%

Costa Rica 882 225 258 840 825 59 ‐92.90%

South Korea 2,520 4,141 5,073 728 638 611 ‐4.30%

China 7,470 929 532 590 424 602 42.00%

United Arab

Emirates

15 26 37 584 46 3,473 7436.20%

Dominican

Republic

817 84 373 554 554 1,240 123.60%

Australia 129 361 306 272 231 627 171.10%

ALL OTHER 11,911 9419 7979 1953 1583 6464 308.34%

TOTAL 416,458 409,762 361,906 302,517 257,668 269,012 4.40%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

The aluminum plate, sheet, and strip industry segment (HTS 7606) accounts 

for the biggest portion of U.S. exports of aluminum products subject to this 

investigation – nearly 900,000 tons valued at over $3.4 billion dollars in 2016. 

Once again, NAFTA partners Canada and Mexico account for the majority of 

exports. 

Exports in the first 10 months of 2017 are down slightly from 2016 levels, 

continuing a declining trend that occurred throughout the 2013-2017 period. 

Overall, since 2013, U.S. exports are down 10 percent by value and weight. 

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Table 30 ‐ U.S. Domestic Exports of Aluminum Plate, Sheet and Strip By Value

(HTS 7606)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016

Jan‐Oct

2017

Jan‐Oct

Change YTD

2016 ‐ 2017

Country Thousands of Dollars (000)

Canada 1,159,462 1,219,151 1,232,554 1,172,381 998,394 1,034,915 3.70%

Mexico 1,075,112 1,191,241 1,230,767 1,099,531 911,712 1,033,508 13.40%

South Korea 132,557 167,065 196,829 190,856 162,533 152,615 ‐6.10%

Japan 146,345 148,459 165,085 188,718 161,112 89,159 ‐44.70%

China 225,497 202,777 201,585 187,273 158,502 120,480 ‐24.00%

United Kingdom 55,513 74,417 76,706 63,860 56,602 42,168 ‐25.50%

Germany 83,118 80,940 82,282 59,813 49,668 61,757 24.30%

Guatemala 56,272 60,605 55,550 53,835 44,595 19,695 ‐55.80%

France 75,691 71,386 65,244 44,200 36,929 41,097 11.30%

Turkey 25,353 16,896 22,636 27,405 25,137 24,152 ‐3.90%

Brazil 69,056 47,690 28,962 25,887 23,901 19,561 ‐18.20%

Taiwan 42,579 21,598 18,590 25,754 21,680 24,853 14.60%

Thailand 7,486 9,126 24,080 25,158 21,643 19,036 ‐12.00%

Malaysia 19,228 17,841 17,311 23,193 19,024 25,815 35.70%

United Arab

Emirates

35,500 43,300 22,074 22,529 21,653 2,923 ‐86.50%

All Other: 615,166 390,585 214,259 230,377 199,862 155,740 ‐22.10%

Total 3,823,936 3,763,076 3,654,514 3,440,770 2,912,946 2,867,475 ‐1.60%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

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Table 31 – U.S. Domestic Exports of Aluminum Plate, Sheet and Strip

By Weight

(HTS 7606)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016

Jan‐Oct

2017

Jan‐Oct

Change YTD

2016 ‐ 2017

Country Metric Tons

Canada 338,547 345,144 371,547 379,670 326,391 299,878 ‐8.10%

Mexico 295,073 310,147 338,529 318,309 264,429 272,101 2.90%

China 31,080 34,611 33,166 31,179 26,225 20,216 ‐22.90%

South Korea 21,431 24,496 27,584 27,246 23,211 22,952 ‐1.10%

Japan 14,839 15,097 17,861 21,815 19,229 9,964 ‐48.20%

Guatemala 18,297 18,233 18,670 19,631 16,406 6,121 ‐62.70%

United Kingdom 7,415 10,460 10,955 8,239 7,158 5,886 ‐17.80%

Germany 10,657 10,670 10,157 7,558 6,288 11,020 75.30%

United Arab

Emirates

10,582 12,497 5,358 6,411 6,251 557 ‐91.10%

France 10,013 10,096 9,627 6,260 5,229 6,194 18.40%

Panama 4,111 4,296 5,061 6,128 4,917 1,675 ‐65.90%

Saudi Arabia 67,224 38,958 3,796 6,041 4,997 920 ‐81.60%

Thailand 1,144 1,242 4,656 4,932 4,251 3,575 ‐15.90%

Taiwan 4,907 3,528 3,174 3,905 3,322 3,603 8.50%

Brazil 13,640 8,955 4,439 3,895 3,579 2,533 ‐29.20%

All Other: 87,433 58,152 35,616 40,852 36,283 30,401 ‐16.20%

Total: 936,392 906,583 900,197 892,071 758,166 697,596 ‐7.99%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

A category of aluminum products that is a significant source of exports for 

the United States is bars, rods and profiles (HTS 7604) which are most commonly 

extrusions. Total U.S. exports in these aluminum products were just over one 

billion dollars in 2016. The export of 82,000 metric tons of these items valued at 

$233 million to Vietnam in 2016 appears to have been an anomaly. 

After increasing significantly in 2016 over 2015 levels, exports of these 

items were down by a quarter in value in the first ten months of 2017 compared to 

the same period in 2016; the decline in exports on a weight basis is even greater 

(42 percent), largely due to the return of exports to Vietnam to typical levels in 

2017. Canada and Mexico again account for the bulk of U.S. exports. 

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Table 32 ‐ U.S. Exports of Aluminum Bars, Rods & Profiles By Value

(HTS 7604)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016 Jan‐

Oct

2017 Jan‐

Oct

Change YTD

2016 ‐ 2017

Country Thousands of Dollars (000)

Mexico 344,761 323,471 349,301 345,849 299,349 288,552 ‐3.60%

Vietnam 635 635 21,690 233,561 233,494 213 ‐99.90%

Canada 237,966 240,556 228,005 195,781 165,399 183,004 10.60%

United Kingdom 51,666 54,652 46,575 50,349 43,412 38,634 ‐11.00%

Japan 50,603 41,476 37,466 45,316 38,083 19,235 ‐49.50%

South Korea 36,569 34,179 35,410 44,307 36,851 32,869 ‐10.80%

China 29,033 33,187 25,761 20,981 17,129 22,055 28.80%

France 18,482 20,028 20,002 20,548 17,263 20,038 16.10%

Israel 27,598 26,277 14,608 20,171 17,299 19,259 11.30%

Germany 10,437 15,852 16,711 13,083 10,938 5,063 ‐53.70%

Taiwan 5,080 4,360 7,266 5,822 4,741 5,637 18.90%

Brazil 3,992 3,832 3,271 3,945 3,366 2,337 ‐30.60%

Turkey 6,340 3,645 5,793 3,881 2,997 3,915 30.60%

Italy 4,085 4,656 3,422 3,716 3,095 5,147 66.30%

Singapore 3,621 3,928 3,724 3,264 2,766 4,058 46.70%

All Other: 46,214 45,228 45,013 38,118 31,361 41,264 31.60%

Total 877,081 855,962 864,016 1,048,692 927,545 691,283 ‐25.50%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

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Table 33 – U.S. Domestic Exports of Aluminum Bars, Rods and Profiles

By Weight

(HTS 7604)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016 Jan‐

Oct

2017 Jan‐

Oct

Change YTD

2016 ‐ 2017

Country Thousands of Dollars (000)

Mexico 70,194 92,274 95,979 89,245 78,209 63,306 ‐19.10%

Vietnam 119 137 10,689 82,133 82,123 29 ‐100.00%

Canada 49,690 49,265 46,744 41,215 35,068 37,032 5.60%

United Kingdom 5,492 5,581 4,735 5,100 4,269 4,994 17.00%

Israel 6,604 6,582 3,647 4,972 4,210 4,860 15.40%

South Korea 3,541 3,445 3,281 3,996 3,275 3,417 4.30%

Japan 3,862 3,432 2,722 3,400 2,849 1,424 ‐50.00%

France 3,587 3,180 3,178 3,153 2,625 2,592 ‐1.20%

China 3,330 4,113 3,355 2,427 1,921 2,853 48.50%

Taiwan 480 546 881 733 547 911 66.50%

Germany 880 1,056 1,038 656 560 396 ‐29.20%

Thailand 29 171 747 584 479 753 57.10%

Australia 343 380 434 468 401 359 ‐10.50%

Singapore 558 577 540 378 305 437 43.20%

Brazil 455 366 327 331 281 200 ‐29.00%

All other 7,614 7,396 5,300 3,863 3,154 3,761 19.30%

Total 156,777 178,499 183,597 242,655 220,276 127,323 ‐42.20%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

U.S. exports of aluminum castings and forgings, a relatively small category, 

were steady for the period 2013 to 2015, before rising in 2016 (see table below). 

Again, this increase in exports is attributed to an anomalous surge in exports to 

Vietnam. Data for the first ten months of 2017 show increased exports on a weight 

basis. 

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Table 34 ‐ U.S. Exports of Aluminum Castings and Forging by Weight

(HTS 7616.99.50.60; 7616.99.50.70; 7616.99.51.60; 7616.99.51.70)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016

Jan‐Oct

2017

Jan‐Oct

Change YTD

2016 ‐ 2017

Country Metric Tons

Mexico 2,294 2,141 2,479 3,386 2,674 6,469 141.90%

Canada 4,850 3,795 3,402 3,016 2,563 569 ‐77.80%

France 1,614 1,929 1,921 1,720 1,445 1,250 ‐13.50%

Japan 594 829 1,231 1,363 1,124 1,663 47.90%

China 1,656 1,551 1,217 1,254 998 3,389 239.70%

Italy 1,647 1,686 1,240 1,093 913 805 ‐11.80%

United Kingdom 770 787 899 1,083 881 1,066 21.00%

Germany 702 500 435 912 659 1,348 104.50%

Brazil 850 790 601 690 550 403 ‐26.80%

South Korea 922 959 646 578 456 682 49.50%

Turkey 271 191 272 274 192 189 ‐1.40%

Spain 351 276 269 253 222 142 ‐36.30%

Singapore 327 264 255 208 175 193 9.90%

Malaysia 472 605 430 170 150 131 ‐12.50%

Poland 218 203 191 151 138 112 ‐18.70%

All Other 2,738 2,207 1,652 1,381 1,164 1,799 ‐18.84%

Total 20,275 18,713 17,140 17,533 14,304 20,209 54.55%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

G. High Import to Export Ratio 

Overall, for the aluminum product categories subject to this investigation 

(HTS 7601, 7604-7609), 7616.99.51.60; 7616.99.51.70), the United States ran a 

trade deficit of $7.1 billion in 2016. These data suggest that the trade deficit in 

aluminum will be larger in 2017. 

The table below shows the U.S. trade balance by major trading partners. 

The U.S. runs substantial trade deficits in aluminum products with Canada, China, 

Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, and the deficit is growing. For the 

first 10 months of 2017, the total trade deficit is nearly double what it was for the 

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same period in 2016. The U.S. runs a large trade surplus with Mexico in aluminum 

products – about $2.1 billion in 2016, and a smaller trade surplus with the United 

Kingdom, Japan and South Korea.

Table 35 ‐ U.S. Trade Balance with Selected Countries

All Section 232 Aluminum Categories

(HTS 7616.99.50.60; 7616.99.50.70; 7616.99.51.60; 7616.99.51.70)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016

Jan‐Oct

2017

Jan‐Oct

Country Thousands of Dollars (000)

Mexico 2,371,834 2,455,539 2,387,534 2,173,122 1,826,582 1,942,402

Vietnam (10,732) (4,049) (9,316) 283,067 293,382 (70,256)

Hong Kong 1,313 4,924 (479) 3,678 4,968 (55,437)

South Korea 119,143 79,682 129,516 154,779 128,825 126,470

Japan 50,939 42,402 90,285 135,567 116,124 31,904

United Kingdom 104,149 148,915 141,343 130,094 114,321 101,988

Venezuela (91,415) (196,083) (113,191) (110,262) (77,358) (158,447)

Qatar (204,933) (199,549) (222,726) (299,067) (248,714) (268,725)

Argentina (210,147) (166,711) (191,493) (320,816) (268,540) (365,281)

Bahrain (163,748) (245,600) (282,206) (397,677) (321,112) (496,891)

United Arab Emirates (537,770) (569,045) (631,987) (996,698) (775,815) (1,156,558)

Russia (526,139) (796,127) (713,530) (1,346,567) (1,113,618) (1,298,504)

China (1,298,588) (1,480,191) (1,779,568) (1,641,203) (1,358,954) (1,757,882)

Canada (4,168,369) (4,394,953) (4,029,080) (3,802,964) (3,069,832) (4,189,266)

Overall Total (5,081,162) (6,233,445) (6,589,138) (7,177,672) (5,701,277) (9,268,602)

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

The U.S. runs a substantial trade deficit with China, totaling $1.6 billion in 

2016; the trade deficit with China in aluminum categories. Unlike the other 

countries with which the U.S. runs a trade deficit in aluminum (e.g., Canada, 

Russia, UAE, Bahrain), the imports from China are not in the form of primary 

aluminum but rather downstream products. 

Included in the table is the U.S. trade balance with Hong Kong and Vietnam; 

while not large in an absolute sense, the trade balance with these countries is 

volatile from year to year, reflective in unusual trade patterns that may indicate 

transshipments. 

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By industry sector, the U.S. trade balance varies: there is a trade surplus in a 

number of sectors such as hollow profiles and plate, sheet and strip. However, 

these surpluses are by far overshadowed by the categories in which the U.S. runs a 

trade deficit – primary aluminum and aluminum powders, foil, and wire. 

Table 36 ‐ U.S. Trade Balance by Aluminum Product Category

(HTS 7601; 7604‐‐7609)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016 YTD

Jan‐Oct

2017

Jan‐Oct

Type of Aluminum

Product By HTS Code Thousands of Dollars (000)

760110

ALUMINUM, NOT ALLOYED,

UNWROUGHT

(3,213,230) (3,160,851) (2,809,400) (3,871,305) (3,015,136) (4,649,776)

760120

ALUMINUM ALLOYS,

UNWROUGHT

(2,672,499) (3,468,086) (3,687,386) (3,398,508) (2,877,033) (3,411,554)

760410

ALUMINUM BARS, RODS AND

PROFILES, NOT ALLOYED

2,881 31,375 (11,267) (12,994) (10,464) (20,872)

760421

ALUMINUM ALLOY HOLLOW

PROFILES

(72,685) (136,690) (152,801) 45,720 78,021 (196,575)

760429

ALUMINUM ALLOY BARS, RODS

AND PROFILES, OTHER THAN

HOLLOW PROFILES

303,343 230,762 223,547 216,147 189,128 68,372

760511

ALUMINUM WIRE OF

NONALLOYED ALUMINUM, WITH A

MAXIMUM CROSS SECTIONAL

DIMENSION OF OVER 7 MM

(347,680) (333,949) (308,439) (418,253) (339,598) (504,712)

760519

ALUMINUM WIRE OF

NONALLOYED ALUMINUM, WITH A

MAXIMUM CROSS SECTIONAL

DIMENSION OF 7 MM OR LESS

17,266 10,905 2,872 (894) (483) (2,429)

760521

ALUMINUM ALLOY WIRE, WITH A

MAXIMUM CROSS SECTIONAL

DIMENSION OF OVER 7 MM

(109,490) (118,502) (60,143) (62,610) (54,856) (52,755)

760529

ALUMINUM ALLOY WIRE, WITH A

MAXIMUM CROSS SECTIONAL

DIMENSION OF 7 MM OR LESS

15,397 13,217 19,168 18,280 16,432 12,948

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Table 36 ‐ U.S. Trade Balance by Aluminum Product Category ‐ Continued

(HTS 7601; 7604‐‐7609)

760611

ALUMINUM NONALLOYED

RECTANGULAR (INCLUDING

SQUARE) PLATES, SHEETS AND

STRIP, OVER 0.2 MM THICK

(36,164) (32,713) (45,728) 43,341 32,500 39,153

760612

ALUMINUM ALLOY RECTANGULAR

(INCLUDING SQUARE) PLATES,

SHEETS AND STRIP, OVER 0.2 MM

THICK

1,694,642 1,369,395 847,662 851,659 754,432 163,165

760691

ALUMINUM NONALLOYED PLATES,

SHEETS OR STRIP, OVER 0.2 MM

THICK, NESOI (OTHER THAN

RECTANGULAR OR SQUARE

SHAPES)

18,787 45,760 24,525 33,686 26,153 40,176

760692

ALUMINUM ALLOY PLATES, SHEETS

OR STRIP, OVER 0.2 MM THICK,

NESOI (OTHER THAN

RECTANGULAR SQUARE SHAPES)

67,533 25,085 27,104 (10,582) (3,891) (8,675)

760711

ALUMINUM FOIL, NOT OVER 0.2

MM THICK, NOT BACKED, ROLLED

BUT NOT FURTHER WORKED

(205,299) (301,531) (325,798) (321,609) (265,163) (342,571)

760719

ALUMINUM FOIL, NOT OVER 0.2

MM THICK, NOT BACKED, NESOI

(122,812) (104,362) (33,748) (33,372) (25,138) (43,718)

760720

ALUMINUM FOIL, NOT OVER 0.2

MM THICK, BACKED

(59,875) (63,867) (97,638) (95,487) (80,163) (90,843)

760810

ALUMINUM TUBES AND PIPES,

NOT ALLOYED

37,855 37,627 38,987 35,451 30,480 47,665

760820

ALUMINUM ALLOY TUBES AND

PIPES

76,816 96,203 73,034 78,710 69,350 64,968

760900

ALUMINUM TUBE OR PIPE

FITTINGS (INCLUDING COUPLINGS,

ELBOWS, AND SLEEVES)

41,302 57,883 71,792 66,505 55,327 49,385

OVERALL TOTAL (4,563,912) (5,802,340) (6,203,656) (6,836,115) (5,420,104) (8,838,649)

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

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The U.S. trade deficit is particularly pronounced in the primary (unwrought) 

aluminum industry segment. The deficit for this category reached nearly $7 billion 

in 2016, and data for the initial six months indicate that it will be even greater in 

2017. 

The United States exported very little unwrought aluminum, but imported 

large amounts from Canada, Russia and other countries. On a weight basis, the 

U.S. deficit was nearly 4 million metric tons in 2016. 

Table 37 ‐ U.S. Trade Balance with Selected Countries

Unwrought Aluminum

(HTS 7601)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016 Jan‐

Jun

2017 Jan‐

Jun

Country Thousands of Dollars (000)

Mexico 756,707 791,828 741,779 653,537 337,023 368,797

Saudi Arabia (548) (36,695) (167,235) (98,931) (51,604) (27,031)

Venezuela (22,768) (118,071) (85,208) (103,022) (35,662) (90,060)

Bahrain (68,317) (125,142) (167,568) (195,003) (108,432) (116,343)

Argentina (195,002) (152,932) (184,196) (297,358) (128,448) (165,873)

Qatar (208,908) (202,328) (224,177) (300,643) (143,701) (159,024)

United Arab

Emirates

(579,762) (620,648) (661,738) (1,026,925) (519,748) (783,000)

Russia (424,889) (693,426) (643,647) (1,234,395) (632,628) (760,662)

Canada (4,151,656) (4,408,487) (4,360,271) (4,016,914) (1,931,387) (2,633,196)

OVERALL TRADE

BALANCE

(5,117,050) (5,876,301) (6,058,537) (6,982,268) (3,374,127) (4,809,136)

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

In the area of semi-finished aluminum products (including bars, rods, plates, 

sheet and strip), the United States ran a trade surplus in 2016 of $2.2 billion. 

However, there are certain countries with which the U.S. ran a trade deficit, 

including China, South Africa, Germany and Bahrain. 

The trade deficit with China in particular is substantial and growing in 2017 

over 2016 levels. Countries with which the United States ran a trade surplus in are 

NAFTA partners Mexico and Canada, as well as South Korea, Japan and the 

United Kingdom.

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Table 38‐ U.S. Trade Balance with Selected Countries Aluminum Semi‐

Manufactures including Bars, Rods, Plate, Sheet & Tubes

(HTS 7604, 7606, 7608, 7609)

Year >> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2016

Jan‐Jun

2017

Jan‐Jun

Country U.S. Trade Deficit ‐ Thousands of Dollars

China (243,021) (426,807) (677,567) (619,141) (300,537) (490,221)

South Africa (188,017) (177,448) (151,889) (160,615) (71,559) (74,333)

Germany (200,718) ($101,437) (150,262) (145,658) (83,399) (58,513)

Bahrain (73,247) (91,167) (101,627) (133,653) (70,843) (72,741)

Austria (83,404) (105,111) (127,130) (127,604) (65,330) (61,655)

Indonesia (153,022) (129,779) (177,619) (80,308) (30,402) (78,366)

Country U.S. Trade Surplus – Thousands of Dollars

Saudi Arabia 226,016 137,777 27,080 28,617 11,847 1,232

United Kingdom 39,260 58,818 62,923 50,344 28,176 20,768

Guatemala 56,712 61,629 56,382 54,149 25,616 11,639

Japan 108,006 85,411 57,297 80,283 38,800 6,402

South Korea 107,709 93,995 142,462 157,350 80,959 85,135

Canada 831,265 812,338 717,708 679,807 346,321 363,464

Vietnam (3,870) 8,222 6,229 1,182,487 230,308 (19,718)

Mexico 1,272,233 1,346,203 1,440,162 1,343,950 678,883 708,834

OVERALL TRADE

BALANCE

2,031,686 1,680,024 1,086,855 2,234,466 783,431 198,001

Source: Source: U.S. Census Bureau, accessed through USITC Dataweb

H. Impact of Imports on the Welfare of the U.S. Aluminum Industry 

1. Declining Employment 

The table below presents a snapshot of direct employment in the U.S. 

aluminum industry, by sector, based on data collected for the Aluminum 

Association. The loss of jobs in the primary aluminum sector has been precipitous 

between 2013 and 2016, falling 58 percent as several smelters were either 

permanently shut down or temporarily idled. 

Other (older) data from the association indicated that in 2010, employment 

in the Alumina Refining/Primary Aluminum sector totaled 21,600; employment in 

that sector declined by 75 percent in just six years. Employment in secondary 

production was 6,400 in 2010, so that segment of the industry has nearly doubled 

in employment by 2013, but has not increased substantially since then. 

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Employment in the other segments of industry has seen moderate growth 

over the past three years as demand for aluminum has grown, with aluminum 

foundries and manufacturers of semi-finished goods such as plates, sheets, and 

extrusions showing the strongest growth (and also accounting for the largest level 

of employment). Data from 2010 found that employment in “semi-fabrication” 

facilities was 101,000, and in Service Centers, 27,000. 

Table 39 – U.S. Aluminum Industry Direct Jobs by Sector

INDUSTRY SECTOR 2013 2016 % Change 2013‐

2016

Alumina Refining/Primary Aluminum 12,787 5,379 ‐58%

Secondary Production/Alloying 11,538 11,747 +2%

Sheet/Plate/Foil/Extrusion/Coatings 62,465 67,155 +8%

Foundries 36,484 41,552 +14%

Forgings 10,328 10,442 +1%

Metal Service Centers 23,142 24,633 +6%

TOTAL 156,744 160,888 +3%

Source: Aluminum Association

Information on employment in the domestic aluminum industry is also 

available from the Bureau of the Census’Annual Survey of Manufactures, which 

includes data on the Alumina and Aluminum Production and Processing industry 

(North American Industry Classification System (NAICS # 33131). The table 

below presents employment data from the Annual Survey of Manufactures for 

2013-2015, the latest year for which data are available. The employment data, too, 

show declining employment in the primary aluminum sector between 2013 and 

2015, but do not reflect the jobs lost in 2016 as additional smelters closed. These 

data also show relatively stable/slightly growing employment in other industry 

sectors. 

Modern aluminum production—particularly production of high-purity 

aluminum needed for critical infrastructure and military applications – is a 

complex and technical process. It requires a trained, skilled workforce that in 

some cases requires a decade or more of experience. As smelting facilities close, 

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the loss of this skill-base is eroding and the workforce will become increasingly 

difficult to bring back. 

While the primary aluminum industry sector has seen dramatic job losses in 

recent years, the downstream industry is likely to suffer as well in the future as 

foreign aluminum overcapacity drives into the domestic value-added industry 

sectors. This is already happening as evidenced by growing imports of aluminum 

semi-manufactured products. 

Table 40–Employment in Aluminum Industry, NAICS Based

NAICS # Sector Description 2013 2014 2015

33131 Alumina & Aluminum Production and

Processing (All Subsectors Combined) 56,381 54,953 56,381

331313 Alumina & Primary Aluminum Production 8,652 7,038 7,816

331314 Secondary Smelting & Alloying of Aluminum 5,672 5,560 6,174

331315 Aluminum Sheet, Plate & Foil Manufacturing 17,799 17,936 18,589

331318 Aluminum Rolling, Drawing & Extruding 24,258 24,419 24,900

NAICS = North American Industry Classification System, www.census.gov

Source: Bureau of the Census, Annual Survey of Manufactures

2. Poor Financial Status of the U.S. Aluminum Industry 

Upstream Industry Sector 

Low global aluminum prices and soaring imports due to overcapacity in the 

aluminum sector have damaged U.S. aluminum companies. See Appendix E for 

more information on global excess aluminum production. High costs for electricity 

are also a major factor affecting the U.S. aluminum industry, which is energyintensive. As a result of adverse market conditions, in 2017, there are only two 

major players in remaining the domestic primary aluminum industry: Alcoa and 

Century Aluminum. Three other companies have declared bankruptcy in recent 

years and no longer have any operating aluminum smelters in the United States. 

Noranda Aluminum (a Canadian company with U.S. smelting operations) 

filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in February 2016, citing high power prices and low 

prices for aluminum and the bauxite from its mine in Jamaica. Its New Madrid, 

Missouri smelter was shut down in March 2016. The facility was recently 

91
 

 

  

purchased by ARG International, a Swiss holding company, but its future as an 

aluminum smelter (now known as Magnitude 7 Metals) is uncertain.60 

Another former participant in the primary U.S. aluminum industry, Ormet, 

declared bankruptcy and sold its shuttered aluminum plant to a land developer in 

2014. Ormet cited lower aluminum prices, Chinese competition, and high energy 

costs as the reasons for its financial problems.61 One more casualty of poor market 

conditions was Columbia Falls Aluminum Company of Montana (owned by 

Glencore AG of Switzerland), which permanently closed and demolished its plant 

facilities in 2015; its smelter had been mothballed since 2009.62 

Financial performance of upstream aluminum companies was particularly 

poor between 2013 and 2016, when aluminum prices began to fall sharply. 

Chinese production of aluminum soared, and imports into the United States surged. 

The three publicly traded companies posted negative net incomes for much of 

those years. Alcoa and Noranda operated at a loss in three of the five years, 

including the two most recent years. Century Aluminum only had positive net 

income in one of the five years (2014). In 2016, the three remaining primary 

aluminum companies reported operating losses totaling $912 million. See the 

Table below. 

While the two smaller aluminum manufactures posted relatively stable 

sales/revenue during the period, the biggest player, Alcoa, saw sales drop 

drastically between 2014 and 2015. That trend continued in 2016. Over the past 

several years, Alcoa attempted to adjust to the market realities facing the aluminum 

sector by shutting down or selling high cost upstream assets and investing in assets 

that produce value added products. In 2015, Alcoa announced planned production 

curtailments of 503,000 metric tons of aluminum and 1.2 million metric tons of 

60 http://www.reuters.com/article/us‐bankruptcy‐noranda‐aluminum‐idUSKCN1212T7

61 http://www.peoplesworld.org/article/shutdown‐of‐ohio‐aluminum‐giant‐ormet‐appears‐final/

62 http://www.dailyinterlake.com/archive/article‐a06557e8‐c1bc‐11e4‐ab8c‐d7b2b1bc3deb.html

92
 

 

alumina to ensure continued competitiveness amid deteriorating market 

conditions.63 

As part of this strategy, in 2016, after 128 years of operating as a vertically 

integrated aluminum company, Alcoa split the company into two separate entities. 

Alcoa Corp. retained the upstream commodity assets including primary aluminum 

smelters, bauxite mines, alumina refineries, and power plants. Arconic, Inc. owns 

the downstream, value-added fabrication businesses, including rolling mills and 

associated secondary aluminum capacity, as well as specialty metal, aerospace and 

automobile product assets. 

Financial analysts are bullish on the restructured Alcoa, predicting its sales 

revenues to grow by 25 percent in 2017 and by single digits in 2018. This 

optimism is predicated on improving market conditions in alumina and aluminum 

sectors based on strong demand and higher aluminum metal prices. However, the 

majority of Alcoa’s production operations are no longer in the United States, and 

its financial success is based on its global operations in bauxite, alumina, 

aluminum smelting, and limited rolling and casting. 

The domestic upstream industry showed improved financial performance in 

the first quarter of 2017, largely due to improved market pricing of aluminum. 

Alcoa’s First Quarter 2017 results (its first full quarter since spinning off its 

downstream businesses) showed a positive Net Income of $225 million 

($1.21/share); Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization 

(EBITDA) was $533 million, up 59 percent due to higher alumina and aluminum 

pricing. The company expects its full year 2017 adjusted EBITDA of between 

$2.1 and $2.3 billion. 

Century Aluminum Company (CENX), too, reported improved First Quarter 

2017 results, although it still posted a net income loss. The company had an 

Adjusted EBITDA of $22 million 1Q17 vs. $12 in 4Q16. The company’s net loss 

in 1Q17 was $5 million, compared to $12 million loss in 4Q16. 

63 https://www.alcoa.com/global/en/who‐we‐are/history/default.asp

93
               

   

   

   

                   

       

As a whole, the three primary aluminum companies together had EBITDA 

of $2.273 billion in 2012, but this figure decreased to $1.114 billion for 2016, a 50 

percent decline. 

While the U.S. industry is seeing an uptick in demand and better pricing, it is 

not clear that this can be maintained given the rise of imported aluminum products, 

which are steadily eroding the customer base for domestic production. A sustained 

improvement in profitability over many quarters is needed for companies to 

stabilize and recover from financial losses suffered over the past 10 years. 

Table 41 – Aluminum Smelter Company Key Financial Statistics

Trading

Symbol Company 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Sales Revenue

AA ALCOA $26.68B $23.06B $23.88B $11.22B $9.33B

CENEX CENTURY $1.27B $1.45B $1.93B $1.95B $1.32B

NORNQ NORANDA $1.56B $1.39B $1.34B $1.36B $1.23B

NET INCOME

AA ALCOA $191M ($2.29)B $268M ($868)M ($400)M

CENX CENTURY ($36.61)M ($40.31)M $103.28M ($47.73)M ($252.42)M

NORNQ NORANDA $140.9M $49.5M ($47.6)M ($26.6)M ($259.6)M

EBITDA

AA ALCOA $2.00B $2.57B $3.53B $1.77B $1.10B

CENX CENTURY $53.99M $37.06M $214.92M $66.54M $29.8M

NORNQ NORANDA $219.6M $133.1M $83.2M $107.4M ($15.5)M

B = Billions of Dollars; M = Millions of Dollars

Source: Company Financial Statements

Financial Performance of Downstream Aluminum Companies 

The downstream sector as a whole experienced modest job growth across a 

range of industrial sectors between 2013 and 2016 based on increased demand for 

their products (such as the growing automotive sector). Downstream 

manufacturers of aluminum products have made investments in capital equipment 

to improve their manufacturing capabilities. According to the Aluminum 

Association, their member companies have invested $2.3 billion since 2013 in 

facilities to produce aluminum products – including aluminum sheet for 

automotive applications 

94
 

         

To date, the downstream sector has largely remained profitable by shifting 

production to markets not yet affected imports. Some formerly verticallyintegrated companies have shifted to production of higher value-added products 

(e.g., Arconic, Kaiser). Among the sectors hardest hit by soaring aluminum 

imports is the U.S. foil industry, which has all but disappeared. Alpha Aluminum 

closed its North Carolina foil facility in July, 2015 and Novelis idled its Terre 

Haute, IN foil plant in April, 2014. 

While the impact of imports on the downstream industry sector has so far 

been limited to certain product categories, the USITC noted that Chinese firms are 

striving to enter the more profitable automotive and aerospace markets.64 

3. Research and Development (R&D) Expenditures 

Research and development in the aluminum sector is important – it has made 

possible new applications for this material and has enabled more effective 

manufacturing processes. Because aluminum is lightweight, resistant to corrosion, 

high strength and recyclable, it is an essential material for modern economies. 

Exploiting the material’s properties required focused R&D. 

Some areas of research that are important include reducing the high energy 

usage in smelting (which accounts for an estimated 30 to 40 percent of the cost of 

production) and reducing the undesirable by-products of smelting, such as 

pollution. R&D is also important to meet regulatory requirements; and developing 

new markets, processes, and products for various market sectors, including 

automotive, aerospace, packaging, and construction. 

Arconic (formerly a part of Alcoa) is a leader in research and development in 

the aluminum industry. After establishing its first facility dedicated to improving 

production processes and finding new applications for aluminum in 1930, Alcoa 

established the Alcoa Technical Center outside of Pittsburgh in 1965 as a center for 

innovation. A success story of innovation, in 2005 Alcoa (now Arconic) signed a 

$1.1 billion, 10-year agreement with jet engine maker Pratt & Whitney to supply 

64 USITC Report, p. 148.

95
 

 

                         

  

                               

          

key engine parts. This supply pact included forging for the first-ever aluminum fan 

blades for jet engines. 

As recently as 2015, Alcoa undertook a $60 million expansion of its 

Technical Center to pursue the development of advanced 3D printing materials and 

manufacturing processes to meet increasing demand for complex, highperformance 3D-printed parts for aerospace, automotive, medical, building and 

construction and other high-growth markets. 

Of the three remaining companies with U.S. smelting operations in 2016, 

Alcoa is the only company to report spending on Research and Development over 

the past five years in its financial statements; Century Aluminum and Noranda 

reported zero spending on R&D since 2012. 

Despite its long history of innovation in the aluminum industry, poor market 

conditions and financial health have apparently significantly affected both Alcoa’s 

and Arconic’s research and development efforts. Alcoa’s R&D expenditures 

plunged from $95 million in 2014 to $33 million in 2016.65 In the first quarter of 

2017, Alcoa’s R&D spending was $7 million (an annualized $28 million), a 

reduction attributable to the creation of Arconic as a completely separate business, 

and declining aluminum earnings. 

Most of Alcoa’s R&D assets went to Arconic in the split. In 2016, Alcoa 

eliminated 90 positions at its technical center as part of an efficiency initiative; this 

followed a previous elimination of 50 workers in 2015. Alcoa is leasing a single 

R&D building at Arconic’s New Kensington, PA R&D campus (previously Alcoa’s 

R&D complex) for three years. Arconic reported R&D expenditures of $100 

million for 2015, $132 million for 2016, and the company projects spending of 

in 2017.66 

Limitations on the funding of research and development caused by sliding 

revenues could have serious implications for development of next-generation 

65 Alcoa Corp., 2016 10‐K Securities and Exchange Commission financial report, Statement of Consolidated

Operations.

66 Arconic R&D figures are extrapolated from Alcoa’s R&D program prior to Arconic’s formation. Anne McInerney,

Director of Federal Affairs, Arconic.

96
 

 

         

         

aluminum-based products, including those required for U.S. national security. U.S. 

defense programs continue to rely on strong, lightweight aluminum for use in 

engine parts and structural components for aircraft, military vehicles, equipment, 

armor and many other applications. Aluminum is a critical part of any armor 

solution because it has better blast absorption characteristics. More than 90 

percent of all alloys currently used in the aerospace industry were developed 

through Alcoa’s research. 

While downstream aluminum companies continue to conduct R&D in 

specific areas, the absence of fully integrated aluminum companies in the United 

States may be an inhibiting factor in development of next generation aluminum 

technologies. 

4. Capital Expenditures 

According to the Aluminum Association, since 2013 their member 

companies have invested $2.3 billion in facilities to produce downstream 

aluminum products. The USITC’s survey of downstream aluminum companies 

indicated that capital investment was on the increase, rising by 65 percent from 

2011 to 2015; much of this investment was by companies involved in the plate, 

sheet and strip industry segment.67

 In the secondary aluminum industry, the ITC’s survey found an average of 

$291 million per year of investments, with merchant producers accounting for 60 

percent of the investments. There was also a significant greenfield construction by 

a foreign firm (Shandong Nanshan Aluminum Co.), which built a captive 

secondary aluminum/extrusion mill in Lafayette, IN.68 Foreign investors that 

increased capacity through capital investment include Toyota Tsusho America, 

which purchased U.S.-based merchant producer Bermco in 2015. 

In the downstream wrought aluminum industry, the US ITC survey indicated 

that capital spending rose 65 percent between 2011 and 2015, to $995.3 million. 

67 USITC Report, p. 146‐147

68 USITC Report, p. 141‐142

97
 

               

   

       

       

           

             

               

               

               

             

               

 

         

Two thirds of this investment was by the flat rolled plate sector, which is due to the 

fact that the sector is experiencing demand growth and the high costs associated 

with rolling mill equipment compared to extrusion presses.69 

Information on capital expenditures by the U.S. aluminum industry is 

available through the Bureau of Census’ Annual Survey of Manufactures (NAICS 

#33131 – Alumina and Aluminum Production and Processing) and is presented in 

the Table below. 

Table 42 –Total Capital Expenditures by Aluminum Industry

(Millions of Dollars)

NAICS # Sector Description 2013 2014 2015

33131 Alumina& Aluminum Production and

Processing (All Subsectors) $1,145 $1,037 $1,285

331313 Alumina & Primary Aluminum

Production $164 $156 $166

331314 Secondary Smelting & Alloying of

Aluminum $110 $109 $139

331315 Aluminum Sheet, Plate & Foil

Manufacturing $615 $521 $789

331318 Aluminum Rolling, Drawing & Extruding $256 $251 $191

NAICS = North American Industry Classification System, www.census.gov

Source: Bureau of the Census, Annual Survey of Manufactures

These data include the total new and used capital expenditures reported by 

establishments in operation, including any known plants under construction, 

permanent additions, and major alterations to manufacturing and mining 

establishments, and new and used machinery and equipment. The table above 

shows that capital expenditures by the industry as a whole have been largely 

consistent over the three-year period. Capital investment by the primary and 

secondary aluminum smelting sectors account for a relatively small percentage of 

the total. The majority of capital expenditures are made by establishments in the 

downstream sector of the industry. As noted previously, 2015 is the most recent 

year for which this information is available; data for 2016 would likely show a 

decline in capital expenditures by the primary aluminum sector. 

69 USITC Report, p. 147

98
 

         

The USITC report on the Competitive Conditions Affecting the U.S. 

Aluminum Industry noted that several U.S. firms planned upgrades to smelting 

operations, but did not proceed due to financial considerations and market 

conditions. For example, in 2012 Alcoa announced plans to replace antiquated pot 

lines at its Massena East smelter, but cancelled the modernization plan in 2015-- 

and instead shut down the facility. Noranda also planned to upgrade its New 

Madrid, MO smelter, prior to the company declaring bankruptcy in 2016.70 

5. Aluminum Prices 

Aluminum is an exchange-traded commodity and global market prices for 

aluminum are determined on the basis of global supply and demand. The London 

Metal Exchange (LME) is the world’s largest exchange for base and other metals, 

including aluminum. In Asia, the Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE) is a major 

commodity exchange for unwrought aluminum contracts. Aluminum contracts for 

the United States and Europe are traded on the LME. Aluminum prices in China 

are set on the SHFE. The LME price of aluminum is used as the global reference 

point both in the metal industry and in the investment community. 

The price chart for aluminum on the LME illustrates the price weakness seen 

over recent years. The fundamental reason for the price drop is chronic 

oversupply, despite healthy growth in global demand for aluminum and stable costs 

of production. In fact, demand has increased by over nine times over the past 

decade and a half. 

The oversupply situation in the global market is primarily caused by 

developments in the Chinese aluminum industry. Chinese consumption rose from 

3.2 million metric tons in 2001 to 29.2 million metric tons in 2015. At the same 

time, production in the country increased by almost 14 times. 

In 2016 the world produced a total of 57.6 million tons of aluminum of 

which 31 million (54 percent) came from China. The result is that in 2015, there 

were huge stockpiles of aluminum in the world with nearly 3 million tons on the 

London Metal Exchange, the world's primary market for trading in nonferrous 

70 USITC Report, p. 137

99
 

metals. Since then, there has been a drawdown in global LME warehouse 

inventories to just over 2 million tons. 

The figures below show prices on the London Metals Exchange for 

aluminum. First, the recession of 2008 is readily evident in the figure. After 

bottoming out in 2008-2009, the price of aluminum recovered, only to fall 

dramatically between 2011 and 2016 in response to global oversupply. The price 

drop for aluminum was particularly dramatic in 2015. In November, 2014 the 

LME price for aluminum was as high as $2,100 per metric ton; one year later the 

price was less than $1,500 per metric ton. Aluminum prices on the LME fell 18.6 

percent in 2015 reaching a six-year low at $1,475 per ton, or an average of 75 cents 

per pound, and less than 73 cents per pound on average for 2016. 

The sharp drop in aluminum prices had a devastating effect on the U.S. 

industry—a number of U.S. smelters were forced to either temporarily or 

permanently halt operations during 2014-2016; two primary aluminum producers 

declared bankruptcy. 

100
                     

         

Figure 8. Price of Primary Aluminum on the London Metals Exchange

(Dollars per Metric Ton), 1998‐2016

101
 

                   

               

Figure 9 ‐ Price of Primary Aluminum on the London Metals Exchange

(Dollars per Metric Ton), January 2015‐November 27, 2017

In recent months, the LME price for aluminum has rebounded to more 

typical levels, and reached a five-year high in October, 2017 at nearly $2,200 per 

ton. Despite the improvement in the market, U.S. smelter operators have no 

confidence that prices will remain at or above current levels that are needed in 

order for them to operate profitably. 

Low aluminum prices, rising inventories and continued supply growth in 

China and other countries have caused many producers to close or curtail their U.S. 

smelting operations. While aluminum prices are beginning to rise from their 

historic low, it is not clear how readily the U.S. primary aluminum industry will 

rebound. Indeed, global aluminum production capacity continues to expand, which 

may mean that the increase in aluminum prices seen thus far in 2017 may not be 

sustained. While there has been a modest reduction in Chinese aluminum 

production in recent months, this trend, too, may be temporary. According to 

analysts at Bloomberg Intelligence, despite cuts to China’s aluminum capacity 

102
earlier in 2017, Chinese aluminum makers added 4 million metric tons net capacity 

in 2017 and may add an additional 3 million metric tons in 2018.71 

71 https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/aluminum‐landscape‐may‐get‐interesting‐winter‐passed/

103
VII. CONCLUSION 

Based on these findings, the Secretary of Commerce concludes that the 

present quantities and circumstance of aluminum imports (wrought and 

unwrought) are “weakening our internal economy” and threaten to impair the 

national security as defined in Section 232. The Secretary has determined that to 

remove the threat of impairment, it is necessary to reduce imports to a level that 

will provide the opportunity for U.S. primary aluminum producers to restart idled 

capacity. This will increase and stabilize U.S. production of aluminum at the 

minimal level needed to meet current and future national security needs. If no 

action is taken, the United States is in danger of losing the capability to smelt 

primary aluminum altogether. 

A quota or tariff on downstream products is also necessary because global 

overcapacity, coupled with industrial policies that promote exports of downstream 

products, have had a negative impact on the U.S. primary aluminum industry 

through reduced demand for inputs from downstream companies, as well as 

directly on the downstream companies which face increased import penetration in 

many aluminum product sectors. 

The continued rise in levels of imports of foreign aluminum threatens to 

impair the national security by placing the U.S. aluminum industry at substantial 

risk of losing the capacity to produce aluminum and aluminum products needed to 

support critical infrastructure and national defense. 

A major factor contributing to the decline in domestic aluminum production 

and loss of domestic production capacity has been excess production and capacity 

in China, which now accounts for over half of global aluminum production. This 

is despite the fact that China has no natural competitive advantage for aluminum 

production. Chinese excess production, unresponsive to market forces, flooded 

world markets and caused a steep decline in global aluminum prices between 2014 

and 2016. During this time of low prices, a number of U.S. aluminum smelters 

were forced to permanently shut down, while others were temporarily idled or 

curtailed their production. 

104
Although global aluminum prices have regained lost ground in recent 

months, the damage to U.S. aluminum production capability was significant and 

irreversible. U.S. ability to smelt primary aluminum, including high-purity 

aluminum needed for the most sophisticated commercial and defense applications, 

has been reduced to minimal levels. Imports of primary aluminum now account 

for nearly 90 percent of domestic consumption. Imports of downstream aluminum 

products are surging as well, up 30 percent in 2017 over 2016 levels. 

Since defense and critical infrastructure requirements alone are not sufficient 

to support a robust aluminum industry, U.S. primary and downstream aluminum 

producers must be financially viable and competitive in commercial markets to be 

able to produce the needed output. In fact, it is the ability to quickly shift 

production capacity used for commercial products to defense and critical 

infrastructure production that provides the United States a surge capability that is 

vital to national security, especially in an unexpected or extended conflict or 

national emergency. It is that capability that is now at serious risk. 

In addition, it is in the interest of U.S. national security and overall 

economic welfare that the United States retains an aluminum industry that is 

financially viable and able to invest in research and development of the latest 

technologies. This is especially important given the growing role that aluminum 

plays in both commercial and defense applications. 

The Secretary has determined that to remove the threat of impairment, it is 

necessary to reduce imports to a level that will provide the opportunity for U.S. 

primary aluminum producers to restart idled capacity. If no action is taken, the 

United States is in danger of losing the capability to smelt primary aluminum 

altogether. 

Moreover, the Secretary has concluded that action to adjust imports must 

apply to imported downstream (wrought) aluminum products as well as primary 

(unwrought) aluminum. The reason for this is threefold. First, the downstream 

industry has been also adversely affected by surging imports. Foreign industrial 

policies that promote exports of downstream products while discouraging exports 

of primary aluminum have resulted in increased import penetration in many 

aluminum product sectors. Second, reducing imports of downstream products and 

105
their replacement by domestic production will serve to increase domestic demand 

for primary aluminum. Lastly, import relief to downstream producers is necessary 

in order to compensate for the increase in primary aluminum prices that they will 

face. If the raw materials costs are increased for U.S. downstream producers, a 

tariff on imported downstream products is necessary so as not to adversely affect 

them vis a vis their foreign competitors. 

106
 

VIII. RECOMMENDATION 

Due to the threat, as defined in Section 232, to national security from 

aluminum imports, the Secretary recommends that the President take immediate 

action by adjusting the level of these imports. There are a few different means by 

which import restrictions could help address the threat to U.S. national security. 

Under alternatives 1 and 2, the quotas or tariffs would be designed, even after any 

exemptions (if granted), to enable U.S. aluminum producers to utilize an average 

of 80 percent of their production capacity. The quotas and tariffs described below 

should be sufficient to enable U.S. aluminum producers to operate profitably 

under current market prices for aluminum and will allow them to reopen idled 

capacity. 

Two alternatives for achieving this objective are described below. In each 

alternative, quotas or tariffs would be imposed on imports of: 1) unwrought 

aluminum (Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) Code 7601); 2) aluminum castings 

and forgings (HTS Codes 7616.99.51.60 and 7616.99.51.70); 3) aluminum plate, 

sheet, strip, and foil (flat rolled products) (HTS Codes 7606 and 7607); 4) 

aluminum wire (HTS Code 7605); 5) aluminum bars, rods and profiles (HTS Code 

7604); 6) aluminum tubes and pipes (HTS Code 7608); and 7) aluminum tube and 

pipe fittings (HTS Code 7609) based on 2017 annualized imports in those 

categories. 

In either alternative, the Secretary recommends that the action taken to 

adjust the level of imports must be in effect for a duration sufficient to allow 

sufficient time and assurances to stabilize the U.S. industry. It takes up to nine 

months to restart idled smelting capacity. Market certainty is needed to build case 

flow to pay down debt and to raise capital for plant modernization to improve 

manufacturing efficiency. 

The Department of Commerce, in consultation with other appropriate 

departments and agencies, will monitor the status of the U.S. aluminum industry 

and the effectiveness of the remedies to determine if the remedies should be 

terminated or extended. 

107
Alternative 1 – Worldwide Quota or Tariff 

Quota 

A worldwide quota of 86.7 percent on imports described above would 

restrict aluminum imports sufficiently to allow U.S. primary aluminum producers 

to increase production by about 669,000 metric tons, bringing total production to 

about 1.45 million metric tons, or about 80 percent of existing U.S. primary 

aluminum production capacity. This quota would also be applied to the five other 

aluminum product categories listed above and would help ensure the viability of 

those U.S. producers to meet national security needs. 

Tariff 

A tariff rate of 7.7 percent on imports of unwrought aluminum and the other 

aluminum product categories listed above should have the same impact as the 86.7 

percent quota. This tariff rate would be in addition to any antidumping or 

countervailing duty collections applicable to any product. 

This tariff rate also will adequately adjust for the price distortions in 

downstream aluminum product sectors that are caused by global overcapacity and 

overproduction being exported in the form of downstream products. 

Alternative 2 – Tariffs on a Subset of Countries 

Tariff 

A tariff rate of 23.6 percent on imports of aluminum products from China, 

Hong Kong, Russia, Venezuela, and Vietnam should also restrict aluminum imports 

sufficiently to allow U.S. aluminum producers to utilize an average of 80 percent 

of their capacity. These five countries are the source of substantial imports due to 

significant overcapacity and potential unreliable suppliers or likely sources of 

transshipped aluminum from China. 

108
As in Alternative 1 above, this tariff rate would be in addition to any 

antidumping or countervailing duty collections applicable to any product. For the 

targeted tariff, all other countries would be limited to 100 percent of their 2017 

import volumes. 

Exemptions 

In selecting an alternative, the President could determine that specific 

countries should be exempted from the proposed quota by granting those specific 

countries 100 percent of their prior imports in 2017 or exempting them entirely, 

based on an overriding economic or security interest of the United States, which 

could include their willingness to work with the United States to address global 

excess capacity and other challenges facing the U.S. aluminum industry. The 

Secretary recommends that any such determination should be made at the outset 

and a corresponding adjustment be made to the final quota or tariff imposed on the 

remaining countries. This would ensure that overall imports of aluminum to the 

United States remain at or below the level needed to enable the domestic aluminum 

industry to return to 2012 production and import penetration levels. 

Exclusions 

The Secretary recommends an appeal process by which affected U.S. parties 

could seek an exclusion from the tariff or quota imposed. The Secretary would 

grant exclusions based on a demonstrated: (1) lack of sufficient U.S. production 

capacity of comparable products; or (2) specific national security based 

considerations. This appeal process would include a public comment period on 

each exclusion request, and in general, would be completed within 90 days of a 

completed application being filed with the Secretary. 

An exclusion may be granted for a period to be determined by the Secretary 

and may be terminated if the conditions that gave rise to the exclusion change. The 

U.S. Department of Commerce will lead the appeal process in coordination with 

the Department of Defense and other agencies as appropriate. Should exclusions 

be granted the Secretary would consider at the time whether the quota or tariff for 

the remaining products needs to be adjusted to ensure that U.S. aluminum 

production meets targeted levels. 

109
  

THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF ALUMINUM ON THE 

NATIONAL SECURITY
 

AN INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 232 OF THE 

TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962, AS AMENDED 

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Public Comments 

APPENDIX B: Public Hearing Testimony 

APPENDIX C: Background on the Aluminum Industry 

APPENDIX D: Trade Actions Related to Aluminum 

APPENDIX E: Global Excess Aluminum Production 
Appendix A: Public Comments Page 1

On May 9, 2017, the Department of Commerce (“the Department”) published a 

Notice Request for Public Comments and Public Hearing on Section 232 National 

Security Investigation of Imports of Aluminum in the Federal Registrar. The 

public comment period ended on June 23, 2017. The Department received 91 

written public comment submissions. 

The public comment submissions were the following: 

1) AAEI
 

2) AAMetals
 

3) AAPC
 

4) AEC
 

5) Alliance for American Manufacturing
 

6) Almag Aluminum
 

7) Aluar
 

8) Aluminium Association of Canada
 

9) Aluminum Association
 

10) American Beverage Association
 

11) American Foundry Society
 

12) Antony Harris
 

13) Arconic
 

14) Association of Global Automakers
 

15) Ball Corporation
 

16) Beijing Antaike Information Co.
 

17) Bemis Corporation
 

18) BorgWarner
 

19) Brazeway
 

20) Brazilian Aluminum Association
 

21) C-KOE Metals
 

22) Can Manufacturer's Institute
 

23) Canadian Coalition of Aluminum Extruders
 

24) Century Aluminum
 

25) CNIA
 

26) Constellium
 

27) Crown Cork & Seal USA
 

28) Crown Extrusions Inc
 

29) Dana Inc
 

30) Economic Policy Institute
 
Appendix A: Public Comments Page 2

31) Elixir Extrusions LLC 

32) Emirates Global Aluminium 

33) EnergyGPS Consulting LLC 

34) European Aluminium 

35) EU 

36) Extrudax Aluminum 

37) Extrusions Inc 

38) Extrusions KC 

39) Flexible Packaging Association 

40) Forging Industry Association 

41) Gateway Extrusions Ltd 

42) George Washington University Law School 

43) Government of Canada 

44) Government of Mexico 

45) Government of Russia 

46) Grupo Vasconia 

47) Guardian Six 

48) ISRI 

49) JTEKT North America Corporation 

50) MAGNA 

51) Magnitude 7 Metals 

52) MEMA 

53) Members of Congress (Drew Ferguson and Others) 

54) Mexican Aluminum Institute (IMEDAL) 

55) MOFCOM China 

56) MSCI 

57) NADCA 

58) National Foreign Trade Council 

59) NERA Economic Consulting 

60) New Day Aluminum LLC 

61) Novelis 

62) Oil and Natural Gas Industry 

63) PCP Champion 

64) Peerless Products 

65) PMA and NTMA 

66) PMPA 

67) Printpack Inc 

68) ProAmpac 

69) Representative Bill Johnson 

70) Rio Tinto 
Appendix A: Public Comments Page 3

71) Rollprint Packaging Products 

72) Rusal 

73) Russia Ministry of Economic Development 

74) Senator Luther Strange 

75) Senator Shelley Moore 

76) Siberline Manufacturing Co., Inc 

77) Sierra Aluminum Company 

78) Starline Windows USA LLC 

79) Toro Aluminum USA Corp 

80) Trinidad Benham Corporation 

81) TST Inc – 1 

82) TST Inc – 2 

83) Turkey 

84) UAE MOFA 

85) United Steelworkers – 1 

86) United Steelworkers – 2 

87) US Magnesium 

88) US-UAE Business Council 

89) Vollrath Company 

90) Win Vent Windows 

91) ZF_Aluminum 

To view any of the public comments listed, please visit: 

https://www.bis.doc.gov/232aluminum 
Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 1 

Section 232 Investigation On The Effect Of 

Aluminum Imports on National Security 
Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 2 
Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 3 
Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 4 
 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 5 

U.S. Department of Commerce Section 232 Investigation 

on the Effect of Imports of Aluminum on U.S. National Security 

Testimony of the Ministry of Commerce 

of the People’s Republic of China 

June 22, 2017 

Good morning. My name is Li Xie, and I am with 

China’s Ministry of Commerce. As the only Chinese 

representative selected by the U.S. Department of Commerce to 

speak at this public hearing, on behalf of my Ministry and the 

Chinese industry, I wish to express the following views 

regarding the current Section 232 investigation against imported 

aluminum. 

First, U.S. national security requirements for aluminum are 

entirely supplied by U.S. domestic production, and therefore, 

imported aluminum plainly does not impair U.S. national 

security. The amount of aluminum required by national 

defense and homeland security is small, accounting for only 1.7 

percent of the U.S. total domestic consumption of aluminum and 

less than 4 percent of the U.S. total domestic supply of 

aluminum. 

1 
 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 6 

Second, the clear competitive and technological edge 

enjoyed by the U.S. aluminum industry ensures a continued and 

reliable supply of U.S. domestic aluminum for defense and 

national security. Over the past ten years, U.S. aluminum 

companies have acquired and control significant high quality 

bauxite stock in Australia, Brazil, and other countries and 

regions. For example, the bauxite reserved by Alcoa in these 

countries amounted to 230 million tons. In the meantime, U.S. 

companies have shifted electrolytic aluminum production to 

energy-rich countries and regions, such as Iceland and the 

Middle East. Furthermore, U.S. aluminum producers possess 

the most up-to-date technology and maintain a dominant 

position in the production of high-precision aluminum plate for 

the manufacturing of automobiles and aircraft. In addition, 

employment in the U.S. aluminum industry has been steadily 

rising, increasing by 3% since 2013. 

Third, international trade in aluminum products 

strengthens, rather than impairs, the U.S. economy. The 

United States imports primary aluminum materials such as 

bauxite, alumina, and primary aluminum, as well as common 

semi-finished aluminum products. At the same time, the 

2 
 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 7 

United States exports a significant amount of high-end 

aluminum products. In 2016 alone, the total value of U.S. 

exports of aluminum semi-finished products amounted to 6.8 

billion USD, accounting for a 1.4 billion USD trade surplus. It 

is clear that international trade in aluminum products does not 

have any impact on U.S. national security. Aluminum 

products from China imported into the United States are mostly 

general products with civilian applications, such as for building 

structures, packaging, electronic machinery shells or structural 

components, and commercial vehicles. None of these products 

are destined for the U.S. national defense and military sectors. 

Finally, we emphasize that the WTO legal framework 

governing international trade does not permit member countries 

to impose restrictive trade measures through the abusive 

invocation of a “national security” exception. Many countries 

and interested parties have already raised serious concerns about 

possible trade restrictions that may result from this 232 

investigation, and they have also expressed serious concern over 

the potential application of similar restrictive measures by other 

countries. 

3 
 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 8 

We believe that unilateral trade restrictions, having 

dubious legitimacy under the WTO, are not conducive to 

solving the global structural problems an industry faces, 

including global overcapacity. The underlying economic 

causes of such problems involve imbalances of supply and 

demand due to weaknesses in global economic growth and 

sluggish demand. The solutions to these challenges entail 

global joint efforts. For its part, the Government of China has 

proactively undertaken many measures to eliminate excess 

domestic aluminum production capacity and to encourage the 

broader application of aluminum products. We are here today 

to appeal to all countries to join hands in solving the global 

aluminum overcapacity problem through constructive 

engagement, not through unilateral trade barriers. 

In conclusion, we encourage the global aluminum industry 

to continue to address the industry’s challenges through 

dialogue and cooperation. We hope that the U.S. Department 

of Commerce will help encourage this approach by refraining 

from taking unilateral steps to impose restrictive measures on 

trade in imported aluminum products. 

Thank you for your attention. 

4 
 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 9 

Testimony of Talal M. Al Kaissi 

Embassy of the United Arab Emirates
 

before the 

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security 

Investigation of U.S. Imports of Aluminum 

Pursuant to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
 

June 22, 2017 Hearing
 

My name is Talal Al Kaissi, and I am appearing here today as part of the Trade & 

Commercial Office at the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates. I appreciate the opportunity to 

participate in this hearing, and will use the few minutes allotted to me today to emphasize several 

points developed more fully in our written submission. 

The fundamental point I wish to convey today is that the UAE’s exports of primary 

aluminum to the United States are one part of a robust, dynamic, and positive relationship 

between our two countries. UAE’s exports only primary aluminum which contributes 

significantly to the growing downstream United States aluminum sector.” From the UAE’s 

perspective, this trading relationship enhances U.S. economic and security interests. Please 

allow me to explain why. 

First, due to its fair trade policies, economic growth, and history of economic partnership 

with the United States, the UAE is the largest export market for U.S.-origin goods in the Middle 

East and North Africa. Over the past decade, U.S. exports to the UAE grew by 118 percent, with 

the United States enjoying a $19 billion trade surplus with the UAE in 2016. This bilateral trade 

surplus, which benefits many U.S. manufacturing industries, includes growing U.S. exports of 

aircraft, space systems and satellites, electrical machinery and electronics, vehicles, nuclear 

energy technology, and many other high-value manufactured items. According to UN Comtrade 

data, as detailed in our written submission, U.S. exports to the UAE are nine times higher, by 

1 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 10 

value, than UAE exports to the United States. Aluminum accounts for 27 percent of total UAE 

exports to the United States, but only three percent of the value of all U.S. exports to the UAE. 

Moreover, some of the high-value U.S. exports to the United States, such as GE-made power 

generation equipment, are purchased by our aluminum industry. 

The large U.S. trade surplus with the UAE also reflects the UAE’s purchases of U.S.-

made military hardware and technology. According to the Department’s International Trade 

Administration, the UAE “offer{s} vast potential for U.S. exporters.”1 The UAE accounted for 

6.4 percent of total U.S. defense exports in 2015, and has one of the largest projected growth 

rates for U.S. defense exports in the world.2 

Second, this robust bilateral trading relationship is accompanied by strong bilateral 

investment ties. In fact, over 1,500 U.S. firms have invested in the UAE, many of which employ 

the UAE as a hub for regional operations. Conversely, and according to data from SelectUSA, 

UAE investment in the US is around 30 Billion USD, and supports some of the most innovative 

U.S. manufacturing industries. To cite just one major example, the UAE is 100 percent invested 

in GlobalFoundries, a manufacturer of advanced semiconductors in New York State. 

Looking at the full picture of the economic ties between our two countries, the UAE has a 

trade relationship which supports jobs in every single U.S. state. Aluminum supplied by the 

UAE industry to U.S. value-added manufacturers around the country is part of this robust and 

mutually beneficial economic relationship. 

Third, the bilateral trade and investment ties I’ve just summarized are further bolstered by 

U.S.-UAE cooperation on a wide range of strategic and security initiatives. As characterized by 

1

 International Trade Administration, 2016 Defense Markets Report (June 2016), available at 

http://trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Defense_Top_Markets_Report.pdf, at 19. 

2 Id. at 9. 

2 
 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 11 

the U.S. Department of State, “{t}he United States and the UAE enjoy strong bilateral 

cooperation on a full range of issues including defense, non-proliferation, trade, law 

enforcement, energy policy, and cultural exchange,” while working together “to promote peace 

and security, support economic growth, and improve educational opportunities in the region and 

around the world.”3 In the security arena, the UAE is one of the United States’ critical partners 

in the region, providing essential support for U.S. troops, aircraft, and vessels operating in the 

Middle East. Indeed, Secretary of Defense Mattis was in the UAE just last month to finalize an 

updated Defense Cooperation Agreement. During the past 25 years, UAE and U.S. military 

forces have worked together on six military coalition actions, including the First Gulf War, 

Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya, and recent operations in Syria and Iraq.4

 U.S.-UAE strategic 

cooperation extends to many other areas, including counterterrorism and anti-money laundering 

enforcement and nuclear non-proliferation. 

This is the mutually beneficial context for UAE aluminum exports to the United States. 

Finally, I want to briefly mention the connection between this investigation and the rulesbased international trading system that the United States has long worked to promote, and which 

has helped so much to spur global economic growth. As the Department evaluates possible 

import-restrictive measures in this investigation, I would respectfully ask it to consider the 

compatibility of such measures with the World Trade Organization mutually agreed rules on 

when, how, and under what conditions WTO members may lawfully restrict trade. 

* * * * * 

3

 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations with United Arab Emirates (February 2, 2017), available at 

https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5444.htm. 

4

 Embassy of the United Arab Emirates, Share Commitment to Regional Security (Accessed June 3, 2017), 

available at http://www.uaeusaunited.com/story/omnibus-security/. 

3 
 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 12 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I hope my comments 

are useful as the Department formulates its findings and recommendations in this investigation. 

4 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 13 

Oral presentation by the Trade Mission of the Russian Federation in the USA 

on behalf of the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation 

at a public hearing on Section 232 National Security Investigation 

of imports of Aluminum
 

The Trade Representation of the Russian Federation in the USA on behalf of the Ministry 

of Economic Development of the Russian Federation expresses its gratitude to the US Department of 

Commerce for the opportunity to take part in these public hearings. We would like to present briefly 

our comments regarding Section 232 investigation initiated by the US Department of Commerce to 

determine the effects of aluminum imports on American national security. 

Based on the principle that there are “broad” and “narrow” interpretations of the notion 

“national security”1

 we are of the position that under either interpretation Russian imports do not and 

cannot threaten to impair US national security. 

According to the presidential Memorandum to the US Secretary of Commerce, the US 

domestic industry is suffering from the effects of global aluminum overcapacity and unfair trade 

practices2

. 

As for aluminum overcapacity, the long-term solution to excess capacity does not reside in 

raising trade barriers which will distort international trade flows and lead to structural imbalances in 

the US and global aluminum industry both from supply and demand-side perspectives. 

The Russian Federation supports the national Associations of aluminum producers of the 

United States, Canada, and European Union in urging the G20 leaders to provide a collective and 

prompt response by creating a Global Forum on aluminum excess capacity. 

In addition to this, we would like to note that Russian suppliers do not rely on unfair trade 

practices. They are reliable and competitive suppliers and operate fairly in the US and Global market 

in the market conditions. In 2002 Russia was recognized as a market economy country by the USA3 

and the EU4 and since 2012 Russia has been a WTO member. Importantly, Russian aluminum 

industry is completely privately owned. The Russian government has never granted specific export 

1 U.S. department of Commerce Bureau of Export Administration, 2001. The effects of imports of iron ore and semi-finished steel on the national 

security, page 5. 

2 Section 232 Investigation on the Effect of Imports of Aluminum on US National Security. Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of 

Commerce, Aluminum Imports and Threats to National Security. April 27,2017. 

3 http://www.trade.gov/media/PressReleases/may2002/russianMESsecretarialstatement_060602.html 

4 European Commission announces formal recognition of Russia as “Market Economy”, 29 May 2002. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-02-

775_en.htm 
 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 14 

subsidies or provided unfair financial contribution to Russian aluminum manufactures aiming at their 

market expansion. 

Aluminum is an exchange trade commodity and global market prices for aluminum are 

determined by the London Market Exchange on the basis of global supply and demand. 

We believe the Department of Commerce should substantially narrow the approach in this 

investigation and admit that the aluminum imports from Russia can not harm US national security. 

Imports from Russia were not the cause of smelters closures in the USA. The main reasons for such 

closures are high energy costs, high labor costs, the growth of secondary aluminum production5

 as 

well as low prices coupled with the availability of alternative locations where smelters were basically 

re-located by the US producers allowing downstream production to enjoy competitive supplies and to 

develop new capacities. Mostly due to this relocation there have been no anti-dumping or 

countervailing measures initiated by the US primary aluminum industry since 1981 and 1973. 

Moreover, the US downstream industry relies on the imports of primary aluminum to produce 

downstream products and it helps to develop high value added aluminum. 

So, any restrictive measures against foreign suppliers of aluminum from market economies can 

not be justified and would only harm the American aluminum industry and end-users since increase 

in aluminum prices due to imports restrictions would make downstream producers less competitive 

and decrease employment in these sectors. We would like to emphasize that without imports, there 

would be a massive shortage of aluminum raw materials required in the US market by all sectors of 

the aluminum industry. 

Importantly, it should be noted that the Russian aluminum imports are not supplied directly for 

any US military purposes. So, there is no any dependency of the American national security on the 

supplies of aluminum from Russia. 

We are convinced that Russian imports do not impair the capability of American industry 

to satisfy the defense needs of the country. The available data confirms that the national defense 

requirements for aluminum products are relatively low and can be fully satisfied by the US domestic 

industry. As reported by Bloomberg with reference to Harbor Aluminum Intelligence, US Department 

of Defense’ demand on aluminum can be satisfied by domestic production6

. 

5 http://www.aluminum.org/sites/default/files/FactSheet2015.pdf 

6 Bloomberg. “America Has a Secret Switch to Make Military Metal”. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-07/u-s-could-easilymeet-aluminum-defense-needs-researcher-says 
 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 15 

On the contrary, the availability of imported unwrought aluminum from Russia enables 

continuous further development of high value-added aluminum production in the US which drives 

American economic development and allows the aluminum industry to contribute about 1% of the US 

gross domestic product, according to the Aluminum Association data7

. 

For the reasons mentioned above, we believe that there is no need for the imposition of 

restraints on aluminum imports from Russia. Moreover, there is no threat or damage to the national 

security from Russian aluminum imports and any restrictions would cause injury to the wide range of 

US direct and indirect consumers, bringing significant adverse effect to the economic development. 

We believe the trade in aluminum products between US and Russia is mutually beneficial and should 

be supported and developed. 

Thank for your attention, 

7 http://www.aluminum.org/advocacy/jobs-economy 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 16 

Director Botwin and Members of the Panel, I thank you for inviting me to participate in this important 

hearing. As the Director General of European Aluminium, I speak today on behalf of the entire aluminium 

value chain in wider Europe from smelting to rolling and extrusion to recycling – these are more than 80 

members with about 600 plants in 30 countries. A considerable number of our members operate production 

facilities, in both Europe and the US. As history tells, aluminium is transatlantic from its origins when Paul 

Héroult, a French engineer, and Charles Hall, an American student, discovered the electrolytic production 

method. 

But today’s speech is about the future, not the past. European Aluminium shares the concerns of the US 

government regarding the significant Chinese aluminium overcapacity and its impact on the US and European 

industries, despite the healthy demand for aluminium worldwide. We, the European industry, believe that 

addressing the root causes of these problems requires continued joint efforts between the US, Europe and 

Canada. 

Within the framework of the current investigation, we urge the US Administration to take into account the 

following elements: 

1.		 European imports of aluminium pose no threat to US national security and should be excluded 

from any proposed action under the current Section 232 Investigation; 

2.		 the interconnected nature of the transatlantic aluminium industry (we are united in our day-today business); 

3.		 the common threat we face which requires a strong US – Europe coalition (in our struggles, too, 

we are united). 

1. First, imports of aluminium products from Europe, in view of both their quantity and characteristics, do 

not constitute a threat to the US National Security within the meaning of your statute: 

Although the percentage of US imports of aluminium has increased in past years, the percentage 

originating from Europe has remain stable over the past decade. Europe accounts for a relatively 

modest part of US imports and supplies specialty, high value added products to US consumers. The 

x
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 17 

vast majority of European imports have little to no link to US national security but are largely used in 

commercial applications. In other words, the US is not dependent on European imports for its 

national security requirements, including national defence. Moreover, Europe is one of the most 

stable and reliable suppliers of aluminium products to the US. 

Further, the European aluminium industry truly functions under market economy conditions and does not 

suffer from subsidization or excess capacity. Europe produces “fair” aluminium products and plays by the 

rules. Finally, Europe is a long-lasting military ally of the US and a fundamental player within NATO’s 

alliance. Under these circumstances, it’s clear that European imports do not threaten to impair the 

capability of US domestic industry to satisfy national security requirements. We call your government to 

refrain from targeting European imports with any potential measure associated with the Section 232 

investigation. 

2. Our second point is that the American and European aluminium industries are strongly interlinked. We 

are truly united in our day-to-day business. 

x	 Demand for aluminium products is global and supply is more and more structured globally, not regionally. 

Approximately 15 multinationals are members of both the European Aluminium and the American 

Aluminum Association and supply daily a vast majority of the entire aluminium value chain on both sides 

of the Atlantic. Together they own approximately 80 production and manufacturing facilities in Europe, 

and 75 in the US and employ a large number of American workers. These companies constitute a 

Transatlantic eco-system. Weakening the European side of their value chain will affect the US business. 

This would also impact innovation and research and development, which are essential for the 

development of advanced aluminium manufacturing and applications. 

x	 Intercompany shipments is a very common practice for these companies and measures would also not 

be in the interest of US consumers, who would see their choice of fairly priced products reduced and 

could suffer adverse consequences in terms of material yield, product quality, material availability and 

increased pricing. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

x

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 18 

3. Now, let’s talk about the nature of the major threat we are all facing: you will understand what I mean 

when I say that in our struggles, too, we are united. 

During my presentation in the United States Trade Commission, only nine months ago, on the true 

underlying problem of Chinese aluminium overcapacity, we testified, together with many of the parties 

in the room here today, about the importance of having a global solution to this unsustainable global 

risk. The ongoing cooperation at G7 and G20 level is indispensable to address the root causes of this 

structural threat. This requires continued joint efforts between the US, Europe and other like-minded 

governments. Moreover, we will continue to urge governments globally to address the effects of excess 

capacity on prices and quantities with traditional trade instruments, including through the WTO. We are 

concerned that restrictive actions based on the current 232 investigation on national security, will not 

provide lasting solutions that the markets need and may have unintended consequences that would lead 

to further market distortions. 

The conclusion is clear: continued joint efforts between the US and Europe are necessary to tackle the root 

causes of the global excess capacity and to secure balance in the US and European aluminium markets. We 

are concerned that measures, as the ones that seem to be under consideration under the current 232 

investigation on national security, will not provide the lasting solution needed by our markets and may 

have unintended negative consequences for integrated aluminium supply chains. In any event, European 

aluminium imports should not be the subject to proposed measures under the Section 232 investigation 

on national security, since they do not represent a threat to US national security. 

With that, European Aluminium remains open to continue to collaborate in this investigation for the interest 

of all our members with particular interest in those that add value to our economies and societies on both 

sides of the Atlantic. 
 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 19 

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT E. SCOTT

Hearing on Section 232 Investigation of Aluminum Imports
 

June 22, 2017
 

Good morning. My name is Robert E. Scott and I am a Senior Economist with 

the Economic Policy Institute. Thank you for holding this hearing. 

Imports threaten the entire domestic aluminum industry, which is today 

hanging on only by a thread. The threat is driven by the growth of excess capacity 

and overproduction in China. Chinese primary aluminum production capacity has 

increased nearly 1500 percent since 2000, and China is responsible for 82 percent 

of the total increase in global aluminum production capacity between 2000 and 

2017. This growth has been fueled by massive government subsidies and other 

market distorting practices. 

Chinese overcapacity has suppressed global aluminum prices, transmitting 

injury directly to domestic aluminum producers. Aluminum is a global commodity,

and prices are primarily driven by total global supply and demand, regardless of 

where the aluminum is produced, sold or stored, as reflected in the London Metal 

Exchange or LME price. The U.S. aluminum market effectively imports the adverse 

price and volume effects of China’s capacity and production via changes in LME 

prices. 

Collapsing prices have decimated U.S. primary aluminum production, 

capacity, and employment. The LME market price of aluminum fell 39% between 

DRAFT—NOT FOR QUOTATION 
 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 20 

2007 and 2016. In an industry with high fixed costs, most domestic producers have 

not survived this prolonged, steady price collapse Since 2010, 18 of 23 domestic 

smelters have shut down and roughly 14,000 good domestic production jobs have 

disappeared Last year, there were three U.S. alumina refineries supplying U.S. 

smelters; today, only one of these refineries is in operation. Despite a slight 

recovery in prices in early 2017, U.S. primary aluminum producers are barely 

surviving. 

The threat to U.S. national security posed by aluminum imports is significant.

The domestic industry is losing its ability to develop and supply products for both 

U.S. defense and critical infrastructure applications. Instead, the downstream U.S. 

producers are becoming increasingly dependent on unreliable sources of imports 

from the Middle East, Russia and elsewhere. If current trends persist, in time of war 

or other national emergency, the U.S. would find itself dependent on unstable 

import sources. 

For these reasons, it is critical that Section 232 relief is broad. Specifically, 

relief should be structured in a manner that allows as much primary aluminum 

production as possible to restart in order to maintain critical aluminum capabilities 

and prevent reliance on unstable supply. Moreover, relief must account for the fact 

that because so much U.S. production has been shut-down due to China’s market 

distorting practices, some imports are needed in the U.S. market. As such, as a 

contiguous source of stable supply, Canada should be excluded from relief while 

establishing broad, across the board restrictions on imports of both primary and 

downstream aluminum products.

2
 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 21 

According to market reports, the U.S. consumed approximately 5.3 million 

tons of primary aluminum in 2016. Nearly 80 percent of that consumption was 

serviced by imports, much of that from Canada, and less than a million tons were 

supplied by U.S. producers. Because aluminum is a global commodity, excluding 

Canada from relief would likely result in virtually all of Canada’s available capacity 

serving the U.S. market. Market analysts estimate that Canada possesses 

approximately 3.3 million tons of capacity. The remaining available U.S. capacity is 

approximately 1.8 million tons. Consequently, both Canadian and U.S. producers 

could service virtually the entire market. Therefore, if U.S. production is to restart, 

excluding any other import sources from the relief would undermine Section 232 

relief to the point where the U.S. industry would see virtually no benefits. 

Consequently, if the administration is contemplating a tariff rate quota, the quota 

portion on other imports sources should be extremely small and can be phased in 

over six to nine months as U.S. production restarts.

Moreover, relief must also be predicated, on adjusting for China’s attempt to 

capture control of the entire value chain. Chinese industrial policy promotes 

downstream production and exports through the use of massive production 

subsidies and an export tax on primary aluminum designed to channel cheap inputs 

into manufacturing of downstream aluminum products (e.g. sheet, plate, foil and 

extrusions). Chinese exports of downstream products have soared, taking market 

share away from processors elsewhere, and reducing demand for primary 

aluminum outside of China. For example, total imports of all aluminum products 

(HTS 76) from China reached $2.9 billion in 2016, 16.9 percent of total U.S. imports 

3
 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 22 

of aluminum products.1 China was the second largest source of aluminum imports 

in the U.S., behind only Canada. 

Thus, it is critical that Section 232 relief is broad, and also encompasses relief 

for downstream producers of aluminum products. Downstream producers also 

manufacture products for U.S. military and critical infrastructure applications.. In 

conclusion, for these reasons I recommend that the Commerce Department find that 

Aluminum imports are threatening to impair national security and critical national 

infrastructure, and recommend that the President authorize trade relief in the form 

of tariffs covering all aluminum products in HTSUS Chapter 76, excepting imports 

from Canada. 

1 Customs value data. Source: U.S. International Trade Commission, Trade DataWeb (data

downloaded June 12, 2017).

4
 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 23 

Section 232 National Security Investigation of Aluminum Imports 

Testimony of Mike Bless 

June 22, 2017 

Good morning. I am Michael Bless, President and Chief Executive Officer of 

Century Aluminum Company. On behalf of my 1,800 colleagues at Century, I 

would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

Century is the largest remaining producer of primary aluminum in operation 

in the United States. We have three smelters: two in Kentucky and one in South 

Carolina. While others may claim to speak for the aluminum industry, only Century 

can speak for a majority of the primary aluminum production in the United States. 

Our smelters produce high-purity and standard primary aluminum that are 

used in U.S. military and critical infrastructure applications. We are strongly 

committed to producing the highest quality aluminum products, and to producing 

them in the United States, for the United States. But our ability to continue doing so 

is at risk, along with what is left of the industry. 

This investigation comes at a vital time. The domestic industry is in danger 

of completely disappearing. In 2000, the United States was one of the largest 

producers of primary aluminum in the world. There were 23 smelters here. Today, 

there are only five – and of these, only two are running at capacity. In 2000, there 

were almost 16,000 U.S. jobs in primary aluminum. Today, it’s closer to 2,000. In 

just the last four years, employment has fallen nearly 60 percent. This statistic alone 

1
 
 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 24 

highlights precisely why it is a matter of national security to maintain what is left of 

this industry. 

There are two principal exchanges where primary aluminum is traded, the 

London Metal Exchange and the Shanghai Futures Exchange. These two exchanges 

are nearly perfect price discovery mechanisms and are extremely highly correlated. 

The LME maintains warehouses all over the world, including in China. As a result, 

the LME cash price reflects the total global supply and demand for primary 

aluminum, regardless of where it is produced, sold, or stored. 

The LME price has been depressed for some time. From 2011 to 2016, the 

LME price dropped by nearly 40 percent. As prices crashed, the U.S. industry saw 

several of its remaining smelters shuttered. Neither a decline in demand nor costs 

can explain the drop. In fact, over this time, demand has seen significant growth 

and energy costs in the United States have declined. This should have been a 

healthy period for America’s smelters. What, then, has caused the bottom to fall out 

of aluminum prices? The answer is simple: chronic, ever-expanding over 

production led by heavily-subsidized Chinese producers, but many others have also 

contributed. 

For decades, as part of its centralized economic planning, the Chinese 

government has sought to create and grow a domestic aluminum industry without 

regard to market conditions. The Chinese aren’t exploiting any natural advantage in 

2
 
 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 25 

aluminum production – they don’t have one. To the contrary, their smelters have 

among the highest costs in the world. They lose money. Yet, they continue to 

expand capacity and production, Chinese capacity increased by 1200 percent from 

2000 to 2015. During that same period, the United States has seen smelters close 

across the country: in West Virginia, North Carolina, Maryland, New York, Ohio, 

Tennessee, Texas, Montana, Oregon, and Washington. 

Market principles simply do not apply in China. Operating at a sustained loss 

is fatal to an American producer. But not for a Chinese producer. In fact, the one 

major Chinese company that has been highlighted as an example of good 

management and high profitability (Hongqiao) is now mired in allegations of 

fraudulent financial reporting and was recently bailed out by the Chinese 

Government when its debt was called. The Chinese government’s subsidies 

effectively push the adverse effects of their industry’s financial performance to the 

rest of the world. And so the industry in the United States is on life support. 

The Chinese system ensures that unfairly priced primary aluminum 

incentivize further downstream over production, which is then exported. It’s no 

surprise that the result is a flood of exports of semi-finished goods to the United 

States. Since 2000, Chinese exports of these products to the United States have 

increased by over 10,000 percent. As a result, the U.S. aluminum extrusion industry 

3
 
 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 26 

and the U.S. aluminum foil industry have both sought trade relief. We support them 

in their efforts. 

The surge in Chinese semi-finished exports further displaces additional U.S. 

primary aluminum production. Like these other parts of the U.S. aluminum value 

chain, the primary aluminum industry in the United States needs trade relief. Relief 

for the primary industry will no more impact the value chain than these other cases 

have. There is no need to pit one end of the value chain against the other. Broad 

comprehensive relief will benefit the entire value chain. 

The Chinese themselves recognize that their actions have adversely affected 

the global aluminum market at all ends of the value chain. They claim to be 

committed to fixing the problem, but there is a significant gap between what they 

say, and what they do. 

As the Chinese have collapsed the market, imports from the rest of the world 

have surged into the United States. Since 2012, imports from non-North American 

sources are up over 95 percent, while U.S. production is down over 60 percent. 

Because all aluminum is priced on a global exchange, these imports further transmit 

the Chinese price effects to the United States. U.S. producers cannot restart 

production with these large volumes of low priced aluminum imports from the rest 

of the world in the market. 

4
 
 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 27 

So much of our production has collapsed that we are on the verge of losing 

the ability to produce all aluminum, not just high-purity aluminum. And once an 

aluminum smelter shuts, it almost never reopens due to the high capital costs needed 

to restart. We will then be dependent on imports from unstable and even hostile 

sources. We need relief in order to ensure that the US industry is not lost forever, 

thereby threatening our national security. Before I discuss how, I need to dispel 

with a few myths about high-purity aluminum production in the United States. 

High-purity aluminum is used extensively in the defense industry, from 

building aircraft such as the F-18 and the F-35, to armored plate that protects our 

military vehicles and troops. High purity aluminum for these applications can only 

be produced in large commercial quantities at smelters like our Hawesville facility. 

Fractional crystallization or segmentation is a process by which high-purity 

aluminum is further refined into even higher-purity aluminum for use in different 

applications. This refining method cannot produce large commercial quantities of 

high-purity and currently only the Japanese and Chinese employ this method for 

producing high-purity. Consequently, this is in no way a viable substitute for the 

high-purity aluminum we produce at Hawesville. 

Recently, we have seen a significant surge in high-purity aluminum from 

Dubai. This metal has taken the entire market from us. Some of our customers even 

testified in other settings that they switched sources due to concerns over the US 

5
 
 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 28 

industry’s long-term viability. As a result, earlier this year we were forced to cease
 

all high-purity production. Because high-purity production is part art and part 

science, losing this volume jeopardizes our ability to properly train our workers to 

continue high-purity production. This production can be restarted, but only if the 

imports are “adjusted.” 

It is vital, however, that we maintain not just the capacity to produce highpurity aluminum in the United States, but primary aluminum as well. The 

Department of Homeland Security has included primary metals manufacturing in its 

critical infrastructure plan, and aluminum - from primary through downstream 

products – is included. Primary aluminum is a core input for such critical 

infrastructure as transportation, urban centers, energy transmission, and defense. 

Homeland Security, which has particular expertise in global supply chains, has 

expressly recognized that lengthy or distant supply chains are a source of risk 

because they are particularly vulnerable to disruption. 

Century recognizes that imports are a necessary part of the U.S. supply chain. 

It is not our position that the United States can, or should be, be totally selfsufficient when it comes to aluminum. However, the status quo is unsustainable. 

Canada, our NAFTA partner, is the largest exporter of primary aluminum to the 

United States. Over the last five years Canada’s exports to the United States have 

been fairly stable increasing slightly. By contrast, all other non-North American 

6
 
 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 29 

sources surged by over 95% in the last five years as U.S. production collapsed. As a 

contiguous, friendly neighbor, Canada is a safe and reliable source of supply. In 

Century’s view, Section 232 relief can be effective without applying it to Canada. 

However, Section 232 relief should be applied to the other sources of imports, 

which are supplied from long distances and are often not secure. Such a long, 

insecure supply chain is vulnerable to disruptions and presents a significant risk to 

U.S. national security. The goal is to bring idled capacity in the United States back 

online, with an economically viable future. Excluding countries other than Canada 

from the relief would make any relief ineffective. In fact, other countries such as 

the EU already apply tariffs against U.S. primary aluminum and downstream 

products. All we are asking for is similar relief. By “adjusting imports” through the 

232 investigation, the administration can preserve what is left of the U.S. industry, 

while addressing the root cause of the industry’s problems – China’s excess 

production and capacity -- through the WTO process. But, without real relief in this 

proceeding, the nation’s security, including its critical infrastructure, is at risk. 

Thank you very much for your time. 

7
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 30 

Testimony: Section 232 Investigation 

John Lapides, President,
 

United Aluminum Corporation,
 

100 United Drive, North Haven, CT 06473 

203Ͳ239Ͳ5881 

Mr. Secretary, members of the Commerce Department and other distinguished guests, 

Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony. 

Background: I am the President of a 4th generation familyͲowned rolling mill in North Haven, CT. I have 

worked at United Aluminum Corporation since my graduation from Stanford University Graduate School of 

Business in 1977. I have served as President for 27 years. 

United was founded by my great grandfather, Harris, in 1891 an immigrant from Russia. My grandfather, 

Louis, bought the first rolling mill in 1915. My father, Robert, returned to United after serving as the captain 

of two destroyers in WWII at the Pentagon during Korean Conflict and later became United’s second 

president upon the death of Harris in 1957. Originally named United Smelting and Aluminum Company, Inc., 

United began rolling aluminum over 100 years ago. The Company was a founding member of the Aluminum 

Association in 1933, along with Alcoa and Reynolds Aluminum. 

My points are brief: 

1.	 We are in favor of international trade. Canada, for example, produces ingot and the slabs used for 

hot rolling essential to US rolling mills and the downstream value chain, including United Aluminum. 

2.	 Chinese threat to U.S and Canadian Smelting: Chinese overcapacity caused low world prices 

threatening the viability of smelting in the U.S. and Canada. There is only one highͲpurity smelter 

left in the U.S., Hawesville, and that one is limping along already, a victim of low world prices caused 

by world overcapacity. 

3.	 Downstream impact significant: Chinese overcapacity is not just a smelter issue and has grown into a 

downstream issue that is affecting United Aluminum and other U.S. Rolling mills, downstream 

stamping, and other manufacturing. 

a.	 The increased use of aluminum in auto production has masked the adverse impact on the 

broader downstream endͲuse parts businesses. 

b.	 Serial dumpers can circumvent WTO rules by transͲshipping and manufacturing parts in other 

countries. 

c.	 The loss of manufacturing is detrimental to investment and job creation. 

d.	 The loss of knowͲhow, capability, and capacity will continue to harm readiness and national 

security. When we need it, will we be able to build it? 

e.	 China once needed overseas suppliers; this is less true every day as Chinese manufacturers 

improve their products, partly due to Chinese insistence on technology transfer for 

permission to access Chinese markets. 

4.	 Imbalanced Tariff Rates harm U.S. Producers: In addition to unfair competition, the imbalance of 

tariff rates between the U.S. and China and most other major trading countries allows open access 
 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 31 

to the U.S. and systematically disadvantages U.S. companies struggling to gain volume and the 

critical mass to remain in business. Example: sheet and coil: 

a.	 China: 10% tariff on imports. 17% VAT rebate on exports of semiͲfabricated aluminum. 

b.	 Europe: 7.5% tariff on imports, including freight cost. U.S.: 3% on duty on imports to the U.S. 

5.	 Other competitiveness issues: Tax rates, poor vocational skills, lower government sponsored pure 

research and development, internationally uncompetitive truck weights and insufficient rail 

capability, both freight and commuter rail, impede competitiveness and U.S. growth. 

6.	 U.S. Trade Actions to level the playing field: Trade actions undertaken by the US must discourage 

other countries, such as China, from distorting free trade regimes and worldͲwide economic 

balances, through improper subsidization of their own industries. 

7.	 Overall Social as well as Economic Impact of Unfair Trade: China and others have used stateͲ

sponsored support of manufacturing and unfair trading practices to export not only their products, 

but also unemployment, pollution and potential social unrest in the U.S. 

With the trade situation as it is, we can’t make America Great Again by being totally dependent on other 

countries. On behalf of American workers, thank you. 
 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 32 

Testimony of John Adams, Brigadier General, U.S. Army (Retired)

President, Guardian Six LLC
 

Hearing Regarding Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Aluminum

June 22, 2017
 

Good morning, Mr. Secretary and distinguished panelists. I am John Adams, President 

of Guardian Six LLC and a Retired Brigadier General of the U.S. Army. As I will discuss 

today, there is no doubt in my mind that aluminum imports are a threat to U.S. national 

security, and that broad and immediate Section 232 relief for the U.S. aluminum 

industry is necessary to address this threat. 

I am a proud Army veteran, with over 30 years of experience in the U.S. military. I 

served in Operation Desert Storm in Iraq and Operation Guardian Assistance in 

Rwanda, and spent nearly 18 years in different military posts in Europe, Asia, the 

Middle East, and Africa. On September 11, I was stationed at the Pentagon as Deputy 

Director for European Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, participating in 

immediate disaster recovery operations at ground zero and coordinating international 

support for the U.S. diplomatic and military response. My final post prior to retiring from 

the Army in 2007 was as Deputy U.S. Military Representative to the NATO Military 

Committee in Brussels. 

Given my extensive military background and political science and strategic studies 

education, in 2013, I authored a study on the military’s growing and dangerous reliance 

on foreign nations for the raw materials, parts, and finished products needed to defend 

the United States. Among the materials that I studied were alumina and bauxite, 

concluding that the United States’ growing reliance on imports of these and other 

materials places our U.S. national security at risk. This conclusion was true back in 

2013 when I authored the study and is especially so today, as the domestic aluminum 

industry’s financial and operational condition has only worsened due to imports. 

Aluminum is a raw material with critical U.S. national security applications. Primary 

aluminum and other aluminum products are used in a variety of military applications, 

including F-18 and F-35 fighter jets, Navy and Coast Guard vessels, and Army and 

Marine Corps tactical vehicles. Aluminum’s high strength-to-weight ratio, formability, 

rigidity, and ballistic protection are indispensable to our modern military arsenal. As an 

Army Aviator during the 1980s, I saw firsthand the importance of aluminum in providing 

the lightweight strength essential to my aircraft’s wings in high-stress flight maneuvers. 

Aluminum is also used in numerous critical infrastructure applications, which play a vital 

role in keeping our country safe and secure. Aluminum is a critical component used in 

bridges and highways, buildings, and other construction. Aluminum is also widely used 

in utility grids. In the event of war, natural disaster, or any other national emergency, 

damage to this and other critical infrastructure is likely, which would only increase U.S. 

demand for aluminum and reinforce the importance of ensuring adequate domestic 

supply. Therefore, as is it has done in prior Section 232 investigations, the Commerce 

Department should continue to broadly define national security to include critical 

infrastructure. 
 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 33 

Imports of aluminum increasingly place our national security at risk. Aluminum is a 

global commodity whose price reflects total global supply and demand. It is no secret 

that the Chinese government provides massive subsidies to its aluminum industry. 

These subsidies fuel aluminum production that far exceeds demand. The result of 

China’s growing aluminum overcapacity and production has been a complete collapse 

in global aluminum pricing. Because all aluminum is priced off of the global exchanges, 

U.S. imports of aluminum simply transfer the adverse price and volume effects of 

Chinese excess capacity and production to the U.S. market, which has sent U.S. prices 

tumbling. 

The collapse in U.S. pricing has resulted in dramatic declines in U.S. production, 

capacity, and revenue in recent years. For instance, the number of domestic smelters 

declined from 23 in 2010 to only 5 in 2016. Just last year, there were three U.S. alumina 

refineries supplying these U.S. smelters; today, only one of these smelters is in 

operation. In 2010, the U.S. industry had 3.3 million tons of capacity and produced 1.7 

million tons of primary aluminum; last year, the industry had 1.9 million tons of capacity 

and produced only 820 thousand tons. This year, these figures are expected to be even 

worse. Hundreds of highly skilled jobs have been lost in the process. Should we fail to 

successfully address our aluminum industry’s rapidly eroding market share, additional 

losses are certain. 

The current state of the domestic aluminum industry is simply unsustainable from a 

national security perspective. Our national security relies on the U.S. industry’s smelting 

capabilities. However, given the dramatic declines in U.S. primary aluminum capacity 

and production, the vast majority of primary aluminum is now produced overseas. This 

means that U.S. producers of finished products that are directly used in U.S. military 

and critical infrastructure increasingly rely on imports from Russia, the Middle East, and 

elsewhere for this critical aluminum input. These are potentially hostile sources of 

supply and, at best, unstable sources of supply. 

Qatar provides a good example of the dangers of relying on imports. Just two weeks 

ago, several of its Middle East neighbors severed diplomatic ties with Qatar, leaving the 

country without the logistical capability to ship its aluminum outside of the country and 

placing those relying on Qatar’s aluminum exports in a very vulnerable position. Put 

simply, having to rely on aluminum imports that travel over water during a conflict is a 

risk to our national security. 

Finally, we need to ensure that the U.S. industry remains healthy throughout the 

production chain by incentivizing production – from smelting to the finished and 

fabricated product – in the United States. In a time of war or other national emergency, 

the domestic industry must be self-sufficient from top to bottom, without dependence on 

unreliable foreign suppliers. It is also important to consider the industry’s ability to 

supply national security products in the context of the industry as a whole. If the 

commercial market is unprofitable, the defense production sector – and with it not only 

the smelters, but also the R&D -- cannot survive. Irreparable damage to our domestic 
 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 34 

aluminum industry increases our defense industrial base dependence on China and 

other potentially hostile governments. 

With this in mind, broad and immediate relief for the aluminum industry is imperative. 

This should include: 

- Safeguarding America’s economic and national security by recommending 

remedies that yield a meaningful opportunity for U.S. aluminum producers to 

recapture lost market share and rebuild broken supply chains. 

- Taking a broad view of the national security importance of aluminum, considering 

production for military weapons and equipment as well as homeland security and 

critical infrastructure. 

- Providing relief to the entire aluminum supply chain in the United States – from 

smelting to the production of finished aluminum products. 

- Establishing enforceable mechanisms for the elimination of global aluminum 

overcapacity. 

- Proactively applying our trade enforcement laws to provide relief from market 

distortions before plants are forced to close and capacity is irreparably lost. 

- Rigorously applying domestic sourcing policies in government procurement of 

aluminum. 

Mr. Secretary, I applaud the administration’s initiation of this Section 232 investigation. 

As I know you agree, we cannot allow our American aluminum capacity, R&D, and 

skilled workforce to disappear. We need concerted action to address the national 

security risks to our domestic aluminum manufacturing capacity before we lose it. 

Thank you, sir. 
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Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 42 

Testimony of
 

Robert Smith
 

President, USW Local 420-A
 

United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, 

Allied Industrial and Services Workers International Union (USW) 

Regarding the
 

Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Aluminum
 

June 22, 2017 

Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for allowing me to testify today. My name is Robert Smith, and I am 

the President of United Steelworkers, Local 420-A, based in Massena, New York. I 

have over a decade of experience in the aluminum industry and would like to share with 

you my concerns over the future of an industry that is critically important to the national 

security of the United States. In addition, I’d like to make you aware that the United 

Steelworkers International Union (USW) will be submitting a comprehensive statement 

in support of the investigation before the close of the comment period. 

This investigation comes at a critical time for the American aluminum industry. In 

addition to its use throughout the economy, domestic aluminum production is a critical 

component of our nation’s defense industrial base and vital to our critical infrastructure. 

The Department of Defense understands this, and classifies aluminum as a strategic 

material with uses ranging from structural airframe material to military and combat 

vehicles. For example, the Navy’s Independence-Class Littoral Combat Ship is built 

with an aluminum hull, while our troops traveling in light-tactical vehicles are being 

protected from improvised explosive devices by aluminum armor plating. Aluminum is 

similarly essential to the production of cutting edge fighter jets like the F-35 Joint Strike 

Fighter and the next generation of unmanned aerial vehicles. And aluminum is 
 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 43 

increasingly prevalent and crucial to the development and production of next-generation 

ammunition, projectiles, mines, torpedoes, and other ordnance systems. 

In addition to traditional defense and military applications, aluminum is 

increasingly being utilized throughout our nation’s critical infrastructure. Today, the U.S. 

electrical grid extensively employs lightweight aluminum wiring while aluminum 

capacitors are used in our personal electronics. When our personal devices seek 

connectivity through satellite networks, those aerospace systems often rely on 

aluminum for a range of functions. In fact, NASA’s Orion spacecraft, being built to 

transport humans deeper into space than ever before, is being built with an aluminum 

alloy. As we continue to explore the next generation of infrastructure development, 

aluminum is progressively strengthening its role as a critical resource. Whether it is the 

development of solar panels and energy storage, or as a lightweight, high-strength 

building material, aluminum will continue to serve a vital role in the rebuilding and 

maintaining of our nation’s infrastructure. 

With so many aspects of military production, maintenance, and forward-looking 

research and development having a heavy focus on continuing and increased use of 

aluminum, ensuring that the nation and military have a stable, reliable supply of this 

critical material is a national security imperative. Even more specifically, the military 

requires the highest-quality materials if they are to be integrated into our planes and 

ships, missiles and munitions and to support our critical infrastructure. 

Modern aluminum production, especially of military-grade high-purity aluminum, 

is a highly complex and highly technical process. Moreover, it cannot be done by just 

anyone. It requires a trained and skilled workforce, and the development of those skills 

takes years. One of the great advantages that America has – for now – is that the 

necessary skilled workforce already exists as long as the domestic industry still exists. 

As facilities close, however, our workforce skill-base is atrophying quickly. It is also 

important to note that bringing lost capacity back online is not something that can be 

done overnight. 

Right now, there is only a single domestic producer still operating that can 

produce aluminum at a purity level above 99.8%, and that represents a massive 

security risk and national vulnerability. If that producer is forced to shut down because 

of these predatory trade practices, it raises the very real and wholly unacceptable 

danger that the U.S. would be forced to rely on foreign sources in the event of an 

unforeseen future need such as a conflict or natural disaster. 

And this situation is becoming more of a potential reality with each passing day 

as the threats to the entire spectrum of aluminum production increase. Last year, 

American primary aluminum production dropped below 1 million tons for the first time 

since the 1950s, and so many domestic smelters have either closed or curbed 

production that only two smelters in the U.S. are considered fully operational. This is 

being driven by a glut of aluminum in the global market which is causing a drop in global 
 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 44 

aluminum prices and making it uneconomical for domestic producers to stay in 

business. 

This glut of global aluminum, which is causing American workers to lose their 

jobs and harming America’s national security, has a very discernible and sadly familiar 

cause: China. The Chinese government has been illegally subsidizing its aluminum 

industry for years, driving a massive expansion of its production and capacity far 

beyond what its internal demand can absorb. These state-subsidized Chinese 

producers are then dumping this excess production on the world market, driving 

American and other industries out of business and rapidly capturing market share. 

The proof is in the numbers. Between 2006 and 2015, Chinese primary 

aluminum production grew by over 225 percent, and by the end of 2015 it accounted for 

more than half of all aluminum production in the world. As this happened, it exported 

more and more of this illegally subsidized product into the U.S. market, which saw 

aluminum imports rise by 18% just last year while, as I mentioned earlier, U.S. 

production reached its lowest point in more than 60 years. 

This trend shows no sign of stopping, and the statements by the Chinese 

government that they will address this are sorely inadequate and cannot be believed 

any longer. The time is short for the American aluminum industry, and strong and swift 

governmental action is absolutely critical if this industry is to survive and continue to 

provide good jobs for American workers, the highest quality products to the American 

military, and the critical infrastructure needed to secure our national security. 

As the government approaches how they will deal with this issue, let me 

emphasize that the driving force behind our aluminum problems is Chinese 

overcapacity which has infected world markets. Unlike steel, where dumped and 

subsidized products have directly impacted our market, China’s policies and practices 

have suppressed world prices via the London Metal Exchange, where aluminum is 

priced. 

Right now, Canadian imports are the largest single source for consumption in our 

market. But, Canadian production is not fueled by illegal and predatory practices and 

the approach in this 232 Investigation must be to target the production of those 

countries which are engaging in unfair trade. As our International President Leo 

Gerard has said, Canada should be exempted from any relief measures that might be 

implemented as a result of the Administration’s actions. I and other workers in the 

aluminum sector here in the U.S. support that approach. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to share my views on this important topic. 

### 
 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 45 

TESTIMONY OF MARCO PALMIERI, NOVELIS CORPORATION 

U.S. Dept. of Commerce - Aluminum 232 Investigation Hearing 

June 22, 2017 

Good morning Secretary Ross. My name is Marco Palmieri, and I am the President of 

Novelis North America. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to speak on this important 

topic today. Novelis believes that the Department’s investigation is timely and vital to the future 

of the domestic aluminum industry. 

Novelis is the world’s largest producer of flat-rolled aluminum products used to make 

beverage cans, cars and trucks, and other diverse products. Novelis, a $10 billion company, 

operates 25 facilities in 11 countries and is the global leader in aluminum recycling. 

While we are a global company, we are deeply committed to our North American 

operations and have made significant investments in our U.S. facilities in recent years. Novelis 

employs around 4,000 people in the U.S. — with its corporate and regional headquarters and 

global research and technology center in Georgia, seven production sites in Georgia, Indiana, 

Kentucky, New York, Ohio and West Virginia, and a sales and engineering lab in Michigan. 

Today, I would like to highlight three main points for the panel. 

First, Novelis believes it is important for the Department to recognize that the aluminum 

industries of the United States and Canada are intertwined, with Canada playing a vital role in 

support of U.S. aluminum manufacturing efforts. 

U.S. smelting operations cannot meet the domestic demand for primary aluminum. At 

Novelis, we do source both primary and recycled metal from the U.S. But, because it is not 

possible for us to obtain all of the primary aluminum that we need through our U.S. purchases, 

we also rely on primary aluminum originating from Canada. 

1 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 46 

Additionally, our facility in Canada works in tandem with our U.S.-based facilities to 

manufacture products as part of a complex processing chain. For example, when making certain 

automotive products, aluminum may cross the border at least four times before it is fully finished 

and ready to ship to customers throughout the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. 

Therefore, to ensure the viability of the U.S. aluminum industry, the Department should 

exclude Canada from any remedy recommendation made in its final report. 

Second, Novelis believes in free and fair trade, but there must be a level playing field. 

Imports originating from countries like China – with excessive overcapacity driven by 

government subsidies – have significantly affected the aluminum industry, putting Novelis’ U.S. 

manufacturing facilities at risk. In fact, unfairly priced aluminum from China has already forced 

us to exit certain product lines. 

In 2008, we left the converter foil business – and shuttered a facility in Kentucky. Only a 

few years ago, we sold our household foil business. And, in April 2014, we were forced to idle 

some equipment and lay off workers at our facility in Indiana. 

To date, Novelis has maintained profitability by migrating its product portfolio to 

emphasize markets that have not yet been affected by imports from China. Those imports, 

however, have been entering new product market segments in the U.S. Novelis salespeople 

regularly report hearing about offers of imported products at extremely low prices. 

We also have reason to believe that Chinese producers will increase production of 

automotive aluminum capacity within the next few years. If this increased capacity of aluminum 

were permitted to be exported to the U.S. at subsidized and unfair prices, Novelis could be 

forced to slash production, lay off employees, and shutter entire facilities if those facilities are 

not able to deliver reasonable rates of return. 

2 
 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 47 

Third, the same equipment used to process and roll auto sheet can be used to make 

products for military applications, but those applications make up a small portion of the entire 

U.S. downstream aluminum market. Therefore, if trade measures under this investigation only 

were enacted to protect the aluminum used directly in defense-related products, such remedies 

would not secure the stability of the entire domestic aluminum industry, nor its associated 

hundreds of thousands of U.S. jobs. 

In conclusion, Novelis respectfully requests that the Department recognize that 1) 

Canada should be excluded from any remedy or recommendation made in the Department’s final 

report; 2) unfair prices and subsidized imports originating from outside North America are 

negatively affecting U.S. national security interests; and 3) relief is needed for the entire 

aluminum supply chain – including downstream rolled products – to ensure a healthy aluminum 

industry in the United States. Thank you. 

3 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 48 

Jean-Marc GERMAIN, Chief Executive Officer of Constellium 

Oral testimony - June 20, 2017 

Good morning. Thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today. I am Jean-Marc Germain, 

CEO of Constellium, based in Baltimore. 

Constellium is a downstream aluminum leader, listed on the NYSE. With 12,000 employees, we 

generate $5 billion in revenue, the U.S. representing around 40% of our business. We have a 

large industrial presence with plants in West Virginia, Alabama, Michigan, Kentucky and Georgia, 

and with a new R&D hub in Michigan. 

Our main clients include Boeing, Airbus, Lockheed Martin, SpaceX, AB InBev, Rexam/Ball, Ford, 

General Motors, BMW to name a few. 

In the defense market, we have been a key partner to the U.S. defense industry for decades, 

working with US defense companies such as Lockheed Martin. We also partner with the US Army 

to develop new aluminum solutions for armored vehicles. 

In our plant in Ravenswood, we are manufacturing advanced alloys for military aircraft and 

armored vehicles. We supply plates for military aircrafts and jet fighters, such as the Boeing C17 Globemaster, the F-16, or the new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 

We consider the US to be one of our key markets. This is why we have invested in the last five 

years over $1.8 billion in our U.S. plants, and in Ravenswood alone, $170 million. 

Our current positioning as a global leader is the direct result of this significant investment program. 

However, our business is threatened today by China’s long-term practice of market-distorting 

policies. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 49 

The risks that we are facing today are directly linked to the cost advantage the Chinese aluminum 

converters are benefiting from. 

In particular, non-reciprocity in the access to low cost raw material puts us at great disadvantage. 

Primary aluminum traded on the Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE) has regularly a price 

advantage over the price paid by U.S. players based on the London Metal Exchange – but nonChinese players cannot buy this raw material at the same price on the SHFE, as there is a 15% 

export duty on primary metal and on aluminum scrap. 

This cost advantage is even greater for the Chinese aluminum conversion industry, as Chinese 

rollers and extruders, in addition to benefiting from lower production costs and lower raw material 

costs, are also profiting from a 13% VAT rebate on their exports. 

Concretely, this means that for a product that would sell for $3,000, China would have a $500+ 

advantage thru tariff and duty structure, which represents more than half of our value add. 

China’s unfair pricing has already impacted our business, even though we believe the worse is 

still to come. Already, we have witnessed a significant increase of China’s U.S. imports of plates 

from 5kt in 2012 to almost 70kt in 2015 which represented more than 25% of the market, and 

more than our own plate shipments from Ravenswood. This resulted obviously in missed revenue 

for our U.S. business. 

This situation threatens our downstream business, which relies on both high value added products 

and larger volume standard products because of the fixed costs incurred by our facilities’ large 

installed capacity and equipment. 

As China’s interest and skills in aluminum value added products are rising, our industry is at even 

greater risk. In the coming years, China is expected to acquire the technical knowledge to produce 

also higher end products, and is already pushing into the global aerospace and automotive 

markets. 

Such a situation is obviously not sustainable in the long-term, and has a direct impact on our 

capacity to invest in our plant and in our assets. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 50 

While actions are needed to address the excess capacity and unfair pricing from China, I would 

like to express our strong support of fair, and rules-based trade of aluminum among the United 

States, Canada, and Europe. Our industry is interlinked via a global supply chain that is critical 

for the success of the aluminum business in the United States and relies on good and 

longstanding trading partners such as Canada and Europe. 

For these reasons, I respectfully request that the Commerce Department and the Administration 

formulate actions to address China’s unfair trading practices. Remedies should consider the 

whole value chain and should target all Chinese originated products - without exclusions. They 

should be tailored to address China’s trade-distorting subsidies, while protecting existing trading 

relationships between the U.S, Canada and Europe. 

Thank you again for your time and for giving Constellium this opportunity to testify on this critical 

issue for our industry. I would be happy to respond to your questions should you have any. 
 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 51 

Section 232 National Security Investigation of Aluminum Imports 

Testimony of Bob Prusak 

June 22, 2017 

Good morning. My name is Bob Prusak. I am the Chief Executive Officer of 

Magnitude 7 Metals. Magnitude 7 Metals recently purchased Noranda’s idled 

smelter located in New Madrid, Missouri. Thank you for this opportunity to testify 

today and explain why Section 232 relief is necessary for the domestic aluminum 

industry. My many years of experience in this industry make it abundantly clear to 

me that domestic primary aluminum production is in the midst of a crisis driven by 

Chinese overcapacity, declining global prices (for instance, the LME price has 

declined 39% between 2007 and 2016), and rising imports. Put simply, our industry 

is at a critical turning point and at risk of disappearing absent much needed relief. 

The number of domestic aluminum smelters in the United States has fallen 

from 23 in 2010 to 5 today, with only 2 two running at capacity. I would like to talk 

to you about two of these smelters today – Ormet and Noranda. I have a personal 

connection to both. 

I served on the board of Ormet Corporation, a domestic producer of primary 

aluminum, from 2007 to its closure in 2014. In early October 2013, Ormet 

announced it was curtailing the operations of its 272,000-ton smelter in Hannibal, 

Ohio, which is located along the West Virginia border south of Wheeling. Ormet 

started producing aluminum at its reduction plant in 1956. Like other U.S. smelters, 
 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 52 

in the years leading up to its closure, Ormet’s production suffered from falling 

aluminum prices and rising imports, largely driven by global and principally 

Chinese overcapacity. Ormet laid off roughly 1,000 workers in 2013 – most of them 

unionized steelworkers. With market conditions continuing to deteriorate, at the end 

of July 2014, Ormet could no longer withstand the onslaught and announced the 

permanent closure of its smelter, firing the last twenty workers and dashing any 

hope that its operations would be revived. 

Not only did Ormet’s closure deal a heavy blow to the workers and their 

families relying on the company for a decent wage, it also sent shock waves 

throughout the Ohio River communities. Ormet was effectively the sole employer 

in both Clarington and Hannibal, Ohio, and was the largest employer in New 

Martinsville, West Virginia. When Ormet closed, those towns were decimated. 

Unfortunately, this story has been repeated in communities throughout the 

United States. Just last October, my company purchased Noranda’s distressed 

smelting assets out of bankruptcy. As with Ormet, Noranda’s New Madrid smelter 

was forced to shut down after more than 50 years in operation. Also like Ormet, 

Noranda produced primary aluminum for semi-finished aluminum products used in 

both U.S. military and critical infrastructure applications that are vital to U.S. 

national security. 
 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 53 

Roughly 900 high paying, high skilled jobs were lost when Noranda closed, 

with many workers still out of work. When the smelter was operational, the 

company and its employees spread roughly $45 million dollars throughout Southeast 

Missouri. With this money gone, everyone – from local restaurants and business to 

the local school district – felt the pain. Madrid County, where the smelter is located, 

also took a big hit, losing millions of dollars of tax revenue annually. As a result, the 

local government was forced to delay projects, institute hiring freezes, slash 

infrastructure spending, and postpone wage increases. Community programs were 

negatively impacted, as well as the local police and ambulance services. Because 

the revenue from Noranda comprised nearly 17 percent of the entire budget for the 

New Madrid School District, a budget deficit resulted, leading to layoffs, staff 

reductions, and program cuts. In the span of only one year, the unemployment rate 

in New Madrid County increased by more than 3 percentage points. 

Ormet and Noranda are not alone. Again, they are only two among 23 

domestic smelters that have shuttered operations since 2010. While my company 

recently purchased Noranda’s smelting assets out of bankruptcy, the facility is not 

yet operational. We are currently negotiating a new power contract and hope to 

restart operations soon. However, without comprehensive Section 232 relief, our 

ability to fully restart operations is far from certain. Relief is nothing short of 

critical to get Noranda back up and running, and bring New Madrid back to life. 
Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 54 

This leads me to my final point. Section 232 relief must be broadly granted to 

the domestic aluminum industry and not riddled with exclusions that prevent the 

industry from getting back on its feet. Relief on high-purity alone is insufficient to 

bring aluminum production back to the United States. If we continue to allow 

imports to erode our market share of primary aluminum, we will lose the ability to 

produce all primary aluminum including high-purity aluminum. Our primary 

aluminum production must be viable to justify our high-purity production. The 

United States must maintain its domestic smelting capabilities because primary 

aluminum is used to produce a variety of semi-finished products for U.S. national 

security applications. Finally, I would stress that excluding any import sources 

other than Canada from Section 232 relief would undermine any relief granted to the 

point where the U.S. industry would see virtually no benefits. If the United States is 

going to maintain its ability to produce the aluminum that is vital to our national 

security, we cannot allow the relief to be undermined. 

Thank you for your time and consideration. 
Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 55 

Statement of 

Thomas Robb 

Chief Operating Officer, Noranda 

Chief Operating Officer, New Day Aluminum LLC
 

on 

United States Investigation Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 

To Determine the Effects on the National Security of Imports of Aluminum 

before the 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

Office of Technology Evaluation, Bureau of Industry and Security 

June 22, 2017 
Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 56 


 


 

Good morning Secretary Ross, Director Botwin, representatives of the Department and those 

conducting today’s hearing. 

My name is Thomas Robb, and as Chief Operating Officer of New Day Aluminum and its 

Noranda Bauxite and Noranda Alumina subsidiaries, I welcome this opportunity to offer my 

company’s unique perspective on the Commerce Department’s Section 232 investigation into 

imports of aluminum. Our perspective is unique because we operate, through Noranda Alumina, 

the only smelter grade alumina refinery remaining in operation in the United States. 

Alumina is the critical raw material in the production of aluminum. Tracing aluminum back to 

its source, the aluminum process begins with bauxite, which is refined to produce alumina, 

which is then converted to aluminum through an electrolytic process. It takes approximately two 

pounds of bauxite to produce one pound of alumina, and two pounds of alumina to produce one 

pound of aluminum. 

Our alumina refinery is located along the Mississippi River in Gramercy, Louisiana. It currently 

produces more than 1.1 million metric tons of alumina annually and employs 440 people. 

Through our Noranda Bauxite subsidiary, we also operate a bauxite mining operation in St. Ann, 

Jamaica. Our Jamaican facility currently supplies all of our Louisiana facility’s bauxite needs, 

and our Louisiana facility refines the bauxite ore to produce alumina. 

Noranda Alumina is the principal source of alumina supply to Century Aluminum, the largest 

remaining U.S.-based producer of primary aluminum, for two of its three operating smelters in 


Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 57 


 

the U.S. To our knowledge, Century is a significant U.S.-based producer of high purity 

aluminum, which is necessary for a number of national defense and military applications. We 

are proud of that partnership and its service to our nation. 

We respectfully recommend that any trade policies considered in this investigation should 

include protections to ensure the continuation of a U.S.-based supply of alumina. We further 

recommend that any review of the national security effects of imports of aluminum must also 

include a review of the U.S.’s supply of and access to bauxite ore, from which alumina itself is 

derived. As the Department may be aware, there are no longer any bauxite mining operations in 

the U.S. The closest sustainable, foreign source of bauxite is in Jamaica, where Noranda Bauxite 

is strategically positioned. The other three major mining facilities in Jamaica are wholly or 

majority owned by Chinese, Russian and Hong Kong interests, and none are permitted to export 

bauxite out of Jamaica. 

Rebuilding the U.S. stockpile of bauxite ore, which began in the 1930s and which was 

reinvigorated by President Reagan during his Administration, would be one way for the U.S. to 

alleviate the risks associated with sourcing this raw material exclusively from foreign countries 

and/or foreign interests. We therefore suggest that this Administration give strong consideration 

to creating a U.S. stockpile of as much as 10 million tons of bauxite, and we would be willing to 

work with the government on building up and managing that strategic reserve. 

As to the importation of aluminum itself, we understand the Department’s need to review a 

variety of trade policies related to this issue. However, and we share this with great deference, 


Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 58 


 

we believe trade policies that might significantly restrict or eliminate foreign imports of 

aluminum may have unintended but significant negative consequences. For example, in 2016, 

the U.S. produced approximately 60% less primary aluminum than it produced in 2012. Over 

the same period, U.S. demand for raw and semi-manufactured aluminum increased by more than 

40%. This tells us that the importation of primary aluminum is necessary and must continue, 

especially in the near term. 

I am a businessman and not an economist, but I believe that the current Chinese dominance in 

the production of both alumina (in its refineries) and aluminum (in its smelters) creates an ability 

for China to manipulate the aluminum value chain for its benefit. If such manipulation puts U.S. 

and other allied countries’ alumina and aluminum production facilities out of business, we and 

our allies will become dependent on foreign sources of these critical raw materials. We 

recognize that may be the worst of all possible scenarios, but merely suggest that all eventualities 

be considered in your investigation. 

In conclusion, we recommend that the Department consider creating a 10 million ton strategic 

reserve of bauxite in the U.S. We also recommend that the various unintended consequences of 

severe tariffs or trade regulations on foreign imports of aluminum, only one of which we 

postulated here, be examined in robust detail in considering whether and how such restrictions 

should be imposed. 

Thank you for the opportunity to offer our comments. I welcome any questions you may have. 


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 59 

Paul-Henri Chevalier 

President 

Jupiter Aluminum Corporation 

2800 S River Road 

Des Plaines, Illinois 60018 – USA 

Department of Commerce 

232 hearing – June 22nd, 2017 

Good morning Mr. Secretary and members of the panel! 

Thank you for the opportunity to share Jupiter Aluminum and its employees’ view here today. 

My name is Paul-Henri Chevalier. I am the President of Jupiter Aluminum Corporation, an 

American privately held aluminum producer based in Des Plaines Illinois. 

I am here because we need to preserve our industry and manufacturing jobs by establishing a 

level playing field with honest and fair competition so market-distorting behaviors cease. 

Jupiter Aluminum is turning 25 this year and since 1992 grew from a few tons to over 100,000 

tons shipped annually. We are about 400 people working in 3 plants, 2 in Indiana and 1 in West 

Virginia. 

24/7, we transform aluminum scrap sourced domestically into coils sold in the construction, 

automotive, distribution and government markets. Your car most probably has a license plate 

cast one day in our mill. Over 95% of our products are sold in the US and Canada. 

While relatively small compared to many other aluminum producers, Jupiter’s impact on the 

local and domestic economies is much larger than its own size when you factor in the various 

vendors and partners our operations require and there is no need to remind everyone that 

manufacturing and manufacturing-related jobs pay very well with excellent benefits. 

 Jupiter Aluminum – PH Chevalier testimony – DOC sec. 232 hearing - June 22nd, 2017 

Page 1 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 60 

Today, I will focus on 3 specific damaging consequences of the Chinese trade practices. 

1. The first damaging consequence is directly related to fair trade. 

The aluminum market started attracting the Chinese in 2003. The Aluminum Association 

organized a meeting with the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce in December 

2003 to raise the issue about the Chinese trade practices that allowed them to sell below market 

price. Not much resulted from that meeting. 

Since then, Chinese aluminum production soared from 11% of worldwide supply to 55% today. 

21 American smelters closed in the same period. China developed this extraordinary capacity 

during one of the world’s worse recessions. 

Jupiter Aluminum adapted to the new economic environment. Our patented high temperature 

oxy-fuel technology saves 70% of our natural gas consumption. That technology by the way 

also reduces CO2 emissions by 70%. However, innovation did not suffice; we also trimmed 

costs, investments and growth. 

Competition is good as it forces you to continuously improve. That however only works when 

standard economic rules apply to everyone. In China, financial viability does not seem as 

important as providing jobs and maintaining social stability. 

Once American Aluminum production is gone, nothing will block Chinese companies from 

moving downstream and directly sell finished goods our customers’ customers. 

China keeps increasing production today resulting in a dangerous over-supply. This battle 

between job creation in China and financial performance in the US is unfair. 

2. The second damaging consequence is related to our children’s future. 

That impact is global as it affects human health. EPA regulations are good for specific reasons. 

However, its standards only apply to American industries. 

The Aluminum Association has found that if Chinese aluminum producers energized from coalfired power plants constituted a country, that country would be the 16th largest emitter of 

greenhouse gases in the world. 

North-American production by comparison is cleaner because regulated. Replacing clean 

production by dirty one is unfair. 

 Jupiter Aluminum – PH Chevalier testimony – DOC sec. 232 hearing - June 22nd, 2017 

Page 2 
 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 61 

3. The third damaging consequence is on our country’s future. 

Jupiter mills are based in the heart of the steel industry. Over the last 30 years, the region has 

seen the steel mills bankrupting and downsizing. During that time, demand did not really 

disappear. Only production moved to China. The same is happening to aluminum. 

It has become increasingly difficult to attract the next generation in our industry as it has seen its 

parents lose their jobs and beyond their jobs their faith in their future. 

The questions are: 

- Can our country thrive without an industry? 

- Should our country become completely dependent on China for its manufactured goods? 

It is clear today that we must work with China on an agreed upon path forward. That said, that 

path forward has to be fair and honest without market-distorting behaviors. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and thanks to the members of the panel for this opportunity to 

address our industry’s concerns today. 

Paul-Henri Chevalier, 

President 

Jupiter Aluminum Corporation 

 Jupiter Aluminum – PH Chevalier testimony – DOC sec. 232 hearing - June 22nd, 2017 

Page 3 
Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 62 

Section 232 Oral Testimony of Henry Gordinier – June 22, 2017 

Secretary Ross, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to assist the Department in the 

Section 232 investigation on the impact of Aluminum imports to U.S. national security. 

My name is Henry Gordinier, and I am the Chief Executive Officer of Tri-Arrows Aluminum, 

Inc. Tri-Arrows is a downstream producer of rolled aluminum sheet serving the North American 

beverage container and automotive markets. It is our belief that a healthy North American 

aluminum industry is vital to national security. 

Our manufacturing operation is in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, where we employee over 

1,200 employees at the Logan Aluminum rolling mill, a production joint-venture with Novelis 

Corporation. 

The Commonwealth of Kentucky has more than 150 aluminum facilities – from mills to makers 

of end-user products – and the industry employs nearly 18,000 full-time workers. Aluminum 

accounts for $2 billion in the state’s gross domestic product. 

Since 2014, Tri-Arrows has invested approximately $425 million dollars in our manufacturing 

facility, creating 250 high skilled manufacturing jobs. These investments will increase our 

capacity by approximately 30%, and expand our manufacturing capabilities to serve a wider 

range of products in the North American market. 

Notably, these investments protect the capacity needed to serve our existing customer base, and 

support the developing automotive sheet market. 

At the outset, I would like to emphasize that Tri-Arrows supports fair and free competition, 

where this competition is based on (1) cost, (2) efficiency, and (3) productivity. 

Based on these measures, the Logan rolling mill is regarded as one of the most productive mills 

in the world, yielding a low-cost position in the market place. 

But we cannot compete with government subsidies. 

It is my understanding that direct intervention of capital, labor, land, raw materials, and basic 

inputs has led to massive overcapacity in Chinese aluminum assets, upstream and downstream, 

from primary production to fabricated products. With the Chinese overcapacity, we believe both 

our current business, as well as future investment and job expansion, are at risk. 
 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 63 

Today, imports are relatively small. However, they are growing at ~30% per year and we have 

seen forecasts which show China targeting over 75% of the West Coast Market. Recently, TriArrows has been displaced from West Coast plants in favor of Chinese metal. 

Metal costs for the Chinese manufacturers are not the same as in other market-based countries. 

Chinese metal is advantaged over domestic supply due to subsidized smelters, a unique metal 

index (SHFE) which typically trades at lower levels than the LME, and export policies and tariffs 

which favor the export of value added materials over primary aluminum. Due to these 

advantages, Chinese mills can offer fabricated product for import at extremely low prices – 

prices so aggressive that no Western mill would be able to generate a profit. 

I can present two recent examples that illustrate where subsidized Chinese imports are impacting 

the North American aluminum economy today. These examples show that the threat of harm is 

shifting from conceptual to transactional. 

1.	 First: In a recent multi-year North American contract discussion, Chinese price points 

were used to anchor the negotiation as a global reference point. Used in this manner, the 

impact of these imports is far greater than the actual volume shipped would indicate. 

2.	 Second: Semi-fabricated products (coil and rod) from China are being offered at prices 

below the exchange based price for metal in the U.S., with the intent for these products to 

be repurposed as raw material. This material is available in the market place today. If 

semi-fabricated product can be sold in North American below the base price for 

aluminum, it is not a leap to see where this level of “discount” might be applied to more 

highly engineered products. 

In conclusion, Tri-Arrows seeks a level playing field in which to compete with all market 

participants. As the Committee considers potential trade remedies, we believe that unintended 

consequences can be minimized through recognizing the following: 

1.	 The North American aluminum industry is part of, and dependent on, a global supply 

chain, where the vast majority of our trading partners operate on market-based principles; 

2.	 The full aluminum value chain should be considered, given the ability for policy to 

redirect/shift values between upstream and downstream products; 

3.	 The threat to the North American aluminum industry stems from Chinese overcapacity 

and non-market based economic practices. 

Thank you. 
 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 64 

Testimony of
 

Heidi Brock, President and CEO of The Aluminum Association

 Section 232 Investigation on the Effect of Imports of Aluminum on U.S. National Security
 

June 22, 2017
 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify at this very important hearing. My name is Heidi Brock. I am 

the President and CEO of The Aluminum Association. 

The Aluminum Association represents companies along the aluminum value chain. Our membership 

consists of large, global companies, as well as small companies with a domestic or local focus. We 

represent primary producers of aluminum, producers of semi-fabricated products and aluminum 

recyclers, as well as industry suppliers. The U.S. aluminum industry supports nearly 713,000 direct, 

indirect and induced jobs, as well as $186 billion in economic output, more than 1 percent of U.S. Gross 

Domestic Product. Despite some market headwinds well-known to this panel, we are proud of the fact 

that this industry has committed or invested more than $2.3 billion in domestic plant expansions in the 

United States over the past several years. 

Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act authorizes the Department of Commerce to determine if imports 

threaten U.S. national security. There are three reasons why it is appropriate to look at aluminum as a 

strategic material, and the aluminum industry as a highly significant industrial contributor to national 

security. 

First, aluminum is used in numerous national defense applications, including major components of Army 

ground vehicles, jets flown by the Air Force, and warships deployed by the Navy, in addition to 

armaments. In short, aluminum is in some of the most conflict-ridden hotspots on the globe keeping 

America’s servicemen and women safe. 

Aluminum is also critical to our nation’s economic security. Aluminum is helping that airplane flying 

above, stay above you. It’s in the walls of homes and office buildings. It’s in the satellite that 

communicates with you, or the vehicle you drove to attend this hearing. 

All of this speaks to the versatility of the metal. Aluminum is lightweight, corrosion resistant, easily 

formed, highly conductive, highly reflective, non-toxic and durable. And, aluminum as a base metal can 

be combined with other materials to create and repurpose alloys for a wide variety of products. For 

example in 1954 there were 75 unique aluminum alloys registered at the Aluminum Association – today 

we have more than 540 active alloys that exist for different applications. 

If you look at military vehicles – when our industry combines aluminum with alloying agents – and then 

puts it through a heat treatable process, you have a metal that is strong enough to stop a bullet. And, 

aluminums strength and durability is trusted to handle some of the harshest conditions imaginable. 

The Army uses high-strength, blast-resistant aluminum in its vehicles. For the Humvee’s and 

Bradley fighting vehicles aluminum reduces weight, resists rust and stands up under tough 

conditions. 

x
 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 65 

Second, aluminum is a critically important material for the nation’s infrastructure. Aluminum products 

are essential for energy generation and transmission, for the construction of bridges and buildings, and 

for the machinery and equipment that build and maintain that infrastructure. 

And third, aluminum manufacturing and the products made from aluminum support significant 

economic activity that contributes to the well-being of Americans and fosters problem-solving 

innovations in packaging, jet planes, wind turbines, trucks and cars, electronics, among many other 

things. 

Thus, having a competitive, economically healthy U.S. aluminum industry is vital for the manufacturing 

and defense industrial base of the United States, and the many communities that depend on the jobs 

supported by our industry. 

As an industry, we have a unified position on a set of principles that we recommend be considered in 

the current investigation and any recommendations that might emerge from it. 

First, we respectfully ask that any trade remedies should specifically address Chinese overcapacity and 

its effects. 

Second, we also ask that trade remedies not impact current trading relationships between the U.S. and 

critical trading partner countries which have been determined by the Department of Commerce to be 

operating as market economies, especially Canada and the EU. 

And finally we ask that trade remedies have positive effects for the entire aluminum value chain, 

including both primary and downstream U.S. producers and their employees. 

I mentioned at the outset that the U.S. aluminum industry is united in recognizing Chinese overcapacity 

as the fundamental trade issue hurting the domestic industry today. As an association, we have been 

working with the different government agencies to address this acute and persistent problem. 

We have supported efforts by USTR in the context of government to government bilateral discussions to 

raise aluminum overcapacity in China as an issue that must be addressed. We have raised our concerns 

about Chinese mis-classification of fake semis to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. And, we have 

coordinated efforts with our colleagues in the aluminum industry in Canada, the EU, and other countries 

similarly affected by Chinese overcapacity. 

We have provided data and information to the U.S. International Trade Commission that is undertaking 

an investigation, at the behest of the House Ways and Means Committee, on the competitiveness of the 

U.S. aluminum industry. The USITC report is scheduled for release to the Committee next week. 

Ultimately, our view is that the best solution for the U.S. aluminum industry and the jobs its supports 

would be a negotiated agreement with China that results in measurable reductions in Chinese aluminum 

capacity and/or growth. That would address the problem directly and set the U.S. industry – both 

upstream and downstream -- on a course of expansion, rather than contraction, creating more jobs and 

more opportunities. 
 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 66 

Secretary Ross, I would like to thank you for initiating this investigation. Our industry appreciates the
 

attention the Commerce Department is giving to this important issue. 

On behalf of the members of Aluminum Association, we stand ready to assist in any way we can.
 

### 
 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 67 

Testimony by Ben Kahrs 

Sr. Vice President of Strategy, Technology and Corporate Development, Alcoa Corporation
 

Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Aluminum
 

By the U.S. Department of Commerce
 

June 22, 2017 

My name is Ben Kahrs and I’m Sr. Vice President of Strategy, Technology, and Corporate Development 

for Alcoa. On behalf of Alcoa Corporation, we welcome the Department of Commerce’s Section 232 

investigation on the effect of aluminum imports on U.S. national security. We support the 

Administration’s efforts to review the strategic importance of aluminum and to consider actions that will 

address unfair trade. 

Alcoa Corporation pioneered the modern aluminum industry in 1888 and has been a global leader for 

nearly 130 years. In November 2016, Alcoa Inc. separated into two companies – Alcoa Corporation and 

Arconic. Today, Alcoa Corporation is focused primarily on the upstream sector of the aluminum industry 

where we mine bauxite, refine it into alumina and smelt it into aluminum. In the U.S., we have five 

operating locations including two smelters and one rolling mill, with three other U.S. production 

facilities currently curtailed. Alcoa represents 47% of all U.S. aluminum smelting capacity. 

Aluminum is a critical component of airplanes; automobiles; smart buildings; consumer electronics; 

packaging; and more efficient power generation. Aluminum is also a vital component in defense 

applications used to protect national security, including armored vehicles and fighter jets. And while we 

believe there is the ability to produce enough high purity aluminum in the U.S. for defense applications, 

we see a risk to national security if there is not ample access to primary aluminum in North America or 

from other U.S. defense partners. In recent years, that supply has been threatened primarily due to one 

reason – the oversupply of aluminum being produced in China. 

Alcoa’s Position on Section 232 

Alcoa seeks to compete on a level playing field—where all producers are held to the same standard: that 

of creating value by operating in a safe, cost-effective, and environmentally sound manner. We believe 

that if the United States wants to ensure an ample supply of primary aluminum to help protect national 

security, three steps should be taken: 

1.	 Address overcapacity of aluminum in China, 

2.	 Protect the U.S. aluminum industry’s integrated, critical supply chain, and 

3.	 Provide a competitive environment for the U.S. aluminum industry including regulatory reform; 

long-term, affordable energy; and direct investment, including investments in research and 

development. 

Address China Overcapacity 

In 2000, China produced only 10% of the global supply of primary aluminum. Today, that number is 

about 55%. From 2000 until the financial crisis, China increased its production year-over-year, while at 

the same time its economy was growing at a record pace. China was essentially consuming all the 

aluminum they were producing. As China’s economic growth slowed, however, domestic Chinese 

capacity began to outpace its ability to absorb all its production. In fact, the primary aluminum surplus in 
 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 68 

China grew from only 144,000 metric tons in 2010 to 1.5 million metric tons in 2015. This year, China’s 

overcapacity is estimated to reach new heights, with a surplus of more than two million metric tons. 

That’s just slightly below Alcoa’s total global smelting operating capacity of 2.35 million metric tons and 

nearly half of all North American production in 2016. At the same time, the rest of the world is expected 

to have an aluminum deficit of about 1.5 million metric tons. 

In total, Chinese domestic customers consume roughly 30 million metric tons of primary aluminum 

annually. When compared to the 2 million metric tons of excess primary, 4 million metric tons of net 

semi-fabricated exports, and 9 million metric tons of curtailed capacity, China’s current overcapacity of 

15 million metric tons is 50% of its total consumption. This is equivalent to the total current supply from 

North America, South America, Europe, and the Middle East combined. 

We believe China is exporting its domestic problems. China unfairly subsidizes smelters to maintain 

employment and keep smelters on line when they should be curtailed. And while the Chinese 

government has committed to reducing production, in large part to meet environmental goals, there is a 

lack of credible data and transparency to show what actions have been taken. We believe that unfair 

subsidies for Chinese smelters persist – possibly in the form of tax breaks, loans, or lack of enforcement 

of policies on the books. Artificially cheap state-directed loans and coal, electricity and alumina for the 

Chinese aluminum sector violate international trade rules, undercutting global prices, and expanding 

China's global market share. The result has been a significant curtailing or shuttering of aluminum 

smelting capacity outside of China, with no greenfield investment in the U.S. 

Because of overproduction in China, aluminum prices never fully recovered from the global financial 

crisis, and remain 25 - 30% lower than before the crisis. And that overcapacity has had tremendous 

impact on the number of aluminum plants operating and jobs here in the U.S. and elsewhere in the 

world. Alcoa has closed, curtailed or divested 43% of smelting capacity and 35% of refining capacity 

since 2007. In the U.S., this has impacted more than 1,500 jobs in New York, Washington, Indiana and 

Texas in just the last couple of years. 

As such, the U.S. government should directly engage with the Chinese government to address the 

ongoing overcapacity problem in their aluminum industry and ensure that Chinese overproduction no 

longer spills out into the rest of the world. 

Protect Aluminum’s Integrated, Critical Supply Chain 

Outside of China, the aluminum industry has an integrated supply chain essential to the health of the 

entire aluminum value chain. Unencumbered trade flows between our vital trading partners, including 

Canada and Europe, are critical to the success of the U.S. aluminum industry. Alcoa’s smelters in Canada 

export 60% of their metal to the U.S., serving customers in 25 states and supporting our economy 

through downstream jobs. For example, Alcoa’s primary aluminum produced in Quebec is shipped to 

Iowa, where our aluminum fabricator customers turn it into automotive sheet. Our billet from Quebec is 

used by plants in Cleveland to make truck wheels. 

Because demand for aluminum is so strong for markets like automotive and construction, even if all 

idled primary aluminum capacity were restarted in the U.S., it would not be enough to fill the growing 

demand in this country. Our country has 1 million metric tons of idled capacity, but we currently face a 
 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 69 

deficit of primary aluminum of 4 million metric tons. We need to protect vital supply chains and the 

160,000 jobs that depend on them. Indeed, maintaining a diverse supply chain among longstanding 

allies and vital trading partners bolsters our national security. It doesn’t hurt our national security. 

Provide A Competitive Environment 

Providing a favorable business environment that allows our operations in the U.S. to compete globally is 

also essential to the long-term viability of the U.S. primary aluminum industry. We must have efficient 

regulatory policies, competitive energy prices and an environment that allows our plants to compete 

fairly. 

For example, on the environmental front in the U.S., we need regulatory policies that set realistic permit 

targets based on actual data rather than modeling programs that routinely produce results unverifiable 

in the real world. We need permitting processes to be updated to ensure efficient, timely processing of 

requests, and requirements should be based on what is achievable with today’s technology so we can 

continue to invest in our facilities. Furthermore, projects that have no impact or positive net 

environmental impact should receive expedited review with a common-sense outcome. 

The U.S. aluminum industry also faces power rates that are approximately twice as high per megawatt 

hour as those in neighboring Canada. Other countries that prioritize domestic aluminum production, 

including China, choose to offset natural disadvantages like this with direct government investment. 

In addition, our production facilities would benefit from investment in innovative technologies in the 

form of a public-private partnership to advance our smelting industry to the next generation. With 

investment in research and development and commercialization of technological breakthroughs, we can 

work together to ensure the competitiveness of existing smelters and secure jobs in the U.S. By 

collaborating on advanced technology development, the U.S. aluminum industry can meet increasing 

demand from industries such as transportation, construction, and consumer goods for our lightweight, 

energy efficient product. 

We encourage the U.S. government to look at how environmental, energy and investment policies could 

help bolster the aluminum industry in the U.S., ensuring we have ample supply of primary production 

that helps our national and economic security. 

In conclusion, Alcoa greatly appreciates the U.S. government’s sustained commitment to addressing the 

challenges facing our industry, including addressing overcapacity. We look forward to the findings of the 

Section 232 investigation and remain committed to continued engagement on these critical issues. We 

stand ready to provide any additional information required. 

Thank you very much. 
 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 70 

Testimony of
 

Mr. Daniel Langer
 

Vice President 

PHB, Inc. of Fairview and Erie, PA 

before the U.S. Department of Commerce
 

232 Investigation of Aluminum Imports on National Security
 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear on behalf of PHB Inc. with facilities in 

Fairview and Erie, Pennsylvania. Founded in 1906, PHB, Inc. is a U.S.-based 

supplier of aluminum and zinc die castings, CNC die casting machining, molds and 

tooling. We ask that the Department consider the impact its decisions will have on 

the entire supply chain, particularly American defense suppliers using aluminum. 

An ITAR-registered company, PHB has over 500 employees in Northwest 

Pennsylvania, manufacturing castings for some of the largest corporations in the 

United States. Our employees make critical products for the defense, automotive, 

appliance, and lighting industries, among others. Last year alone, we produced 

more than 15 million castings and poured nearly 50 million pounds of alloy. 

With over 100 years of aluminum die casting experience, our company is one of 

the global leaders in aluminum castings. We typically use Aluminum 360, 380, 383 

and 413. We also use Zinc-Aluminum ZA-8, ZA-12 and ZA-27. As a supplier to 

the U.S. military, we manufacture military radio castings used by all branches of 

the U.S. military and special operations forces around the word. 

Aluminum consumers like PHB in Pennsylvania are critical to national security. 

Not only are we the customers setting the demand, but we are the U.S. suppliers 

helping meet the needs of our warfighters. PHB is a critical part of the defense 

industrial supply chain, and any disruptions in our raw materials can send a ripple 

effect throughout the military. 
 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 71 

 In fact, we are already facing significant challenges ourselves from imports of 

aluminum castings from India. While I know Washington focuses much of its 

attention on excess Chinese aluminum, and rightly so, I encourage the Department 

to look at imports of aluminum in downstream products from around the globe. 

Having a strong and growing domestic aluminum supply is critical not only to 

national security, but also to economic growth. While PHB does not import any 

aluminum directly, we do purchase globally produced secondary aluminum 

through our domestic suppliers. This means we rely on globally priced and readily 

available raw materials. We are very concerned that restricting imports or placing 

tariffs on aluminum will simply lead to more castings coming into the U.S. with 

foreign aluminum - all duty free. Shifting the injury to another part of the defense 

supply chain will not help U.S. aluminum producers, but cause all of us to lose. 

We strongly urge the Department to not only look at the impact of imported 

aluminum on national security, but also on products primarily manufactured from 

aluminum. Downstream suppliers like us are often family small businesses, and we 

already face a number of challenges. 

Our company continues to grow to meet the needs of our defense and other 

customers. But we are very concerned about an increase of imports castings and 

other aluminum containing products from India, China, and elsewhere. We ask that 

the Department take a broader look at the aluminum market place and not take 

action that will shift the injury to our industry by giving imported castings with 

cheap aluminum a free pass. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this important issue. 
 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 72 

Written Submission by Arconic, Inc. 

United States Department of Commerce’s
 

Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Aluminum Written Testimony
 

June 20, 2017
 

Arconic appreciates the opportunity to provide comment to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s 

investigation into the national security implications of aluminum imports under Section 232 of the Trade 

Expansion Act of 1962. We value the Administration’s engagement with the aluminum industry and 

interest in our support to defense platforms and critical infrastructure. Arconic is proud to be a partner 

to the U.S. military providing engineered products that increase survivability, reduce weight and 

enhance performance across air, land and sea platforms. We submit that a healthy U.S. aluminum 

industry is critical to national security and that solutions identified during this investigation should 

support all segments of the aluminum value chain, including mid- and downstream value-add producers. 

We look forward to working with the Administration to ensure an outcome that supports U.S. 

competitiveness and advances our national security. 

Legacy of U.S. Manufacturing Innovation 

Arconic works with our customers to solve complex engineering challenges, transforming the way we 

fly, drive, build and power. Our businesses have helped shape the aerospace, automotive, and building 

industries since the days of the Wright brothers and Henry Ford, and the first modern downtowns. 

Today, our aluminum engineered solutions are found on cars from bumper to bumper, on aircraft from 

nose to tail, and across modern skylines from New York to Seattle. We constantly seek out ways to 

advance cutting-edge technologies, from metal powders optimized for 3D-printed aerospace 

components to next-generation automotive alloys that are 40 percent more formable and 30 percent 

stronger than those used today. Arconic is tremendously proud of our 22,750 employees in the United 

States who are critical to our success. Since 2009, Arconic has invested more than $3.1 billion to 

modernize our U.S. facilities, adding more than 2,600 high-quality, advanced manufacturing jobs in the 

process. 

Economic Impact and Face of the Aluminum Sector in the U.S. 

Across the nation, the aluminum industry directly employs 161,000 workers and generates $75 billion in 

direct economic output and an additional $111 billion in indirect economic output. Non-primary 

segments of the industry represent 97 percent of the jobs in the sector and produce intermediate and 

finished aluminum goods like extrusions, forgings, flat-rolled products, forged wheels, and jet engine fan 

blades. Between 2013 and 2016, growth in these segments led total jobs in the industry to increase 3% 

from 156,744 to 160,888. The number of jobs involved in sheet, plate, foil, extrusions, and coatings 

operations saw an 8% increase in employment, while those related to foundry operations grew 14% and 

metal service centers by 6%. 

Investing and Innovating to Strengthen the U.S. Defense Industrial Base 

Arconic is proud to serve as a leading aluminum products supplier to U.S. Department of Defense 

platforms and original equipment manufacturers, delivering affordability and performance through our 

innovation to every branch of the U.S. military. Today Arconic aluminum rolls, flies and sails on over 80 

major defense programs of record produced across 45 plants in the United States. Armor plate 

manufactured at Davenport, Iowa can be found on nearly every new U.S. combat and tactical vehicle 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 73 

program of record. Single-piece aluminum bulkheads forged in Cleveland, Ohio, form the ‘backbone’ of 

the world’s most advanced military aircraft – the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter – and save 300 to 400 pounds 

per jet and up to 20 percent in costs. The demand for aluminum on critical U.S. military platforms is 

expected to grow significantly over the next five years, driven by the planned ramp up of programs like 

the Joint Strike Fighter and Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. Demand for cold-rolled aluminum alone – for 

armor plate and marine applications – is expected to triple by 2021. 

We collaborate on R&D with the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps on alloys and 

manufacturing processes that improve survivability, mobility, and performance. For example, in 

partnership with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Army Research Laboratory, 

we developed the largest single-piece, forged aluminum hull designed for future ground combat 

vehicles. By eliminating welded seams used in today’s manufacturing processes and tailoring thickness 

where needed to maximize protection, we can provide troops with twice the blast protection of a 

traditional welded hull. We work with the U.S. Air Force to develop next-generation propulsion and 

airframe structural components for aircraft through the Metals Affordability Initiative, a consortium 

dedicated to leveraging government and industry resources to reduce costs and lead time associated 

with producing metallic aircraft components. We helped re-engineer the flight deck and mission bay tie 

downs for the Littoral Combat Ship and Expeditionary Fast Transport vessel, taking tons of weight off 

those platforms. 

Arconic has a long history of manufacturing partnerships with the U.S. Department of Defense, including 

those that helped build the world’s widest aluminum rolling mill in Davenport, Iowa and the 50,000-ton 

forging press in Cleveland, Ohio, which produces some of the largest closed die forgings for the 

aerospace and defense sectors in the world. Through these investments, we help ensure robust 

industrial capacity, supporting military readiness and enhancing the country’s technological edge in 

manufacturing processes and material solutions. Arconic has continued to invest in these assets over 

the years, including a recent $100 million upgrade to the Cleveland forge and nearly $500 million in 

investment at Davenport, Iowa over the last five years. 

Arconic’s defense portfolio is overwhelmingly commercial item, leveraging the best of our innovation 

developed for commercial applications to meet the unique needs of the warfighter. Our defense 

products are manufactured across hundreds of commercial flowpaths as we do not have dedicated 

defense assets. To best maintain the health of our advanced aerospace and defense product lines, we 

rely on a strong backlog across our product portfolio to include commercial business in automotive, 

industrial, and packaging. The allows us to optimize mix across our plants and produce our parts in the 

most efficient and cost effective manner possible. 

Regarding high purity aluminum, new defense platforms have a production ramp rate that will generate 

more demand and requirements that call for higher purity aluminum than legacy defense programs. This 

increase is fueled by important programs that are in low-rate production moving to full-rate production 

in the years ahead, including the Joint Strike Fighter and Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. Arconic created a 

refining process that produces high purity aluminum using high-yield fractional crystallization though 

R214 units at our rolling mill in Davenport, Iowa. As the only industrial scale producer of high purity 

using this process, we currently produce about half of our current demand. Further, Arconic accounts 

for a majority of total U.S. demand of high purity aluminum. The R214 process is reliable, efficient and 

can produce the highest levels of purity. 
Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 74 

Finally, U.S. mid- and downstream producers rely on primary aluminum imports. The majority of imports 

are Canadian in origin and produced at factories that are considered part of the U.S. defense industrial 

base by statute – Title 10 U.S.C. §2500(1). Moreover, it is a preferential source from a market 

perspective due to its low transport costs to the U.S. and reliable energy supply found in native 

hydroelectric power. Even if primary producers brought all U.S.-based smelters back on line tomorrow, 

we would not have enough primary aluminum to satisfy domestic demand. Action on primary aluminum 

imports would do little to address global overcapacity and potentially harm the U.S. defense industrial 

base by disrupting the integrated North American supply chain. 

+++++++++++++++++++++ 

Arconic looks forward to working with the U.S. Department of Commerce and Administration on this 

investigation. We firmly believe that a sustainable and targeted solution that keeps the overall 

aluminum industry healthy and considers the needs of producers across the aluminum value chain is 

critical to supporting the U.S. defense industrial base. 
 

 

I 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 75 

Section 232 National Security Investigation of Aluminum Imports 

Testimony of Billy Hughes 

June 22, 2017 

Good morning. My name is Billy Hughes. I am a proud veteran of the U.S. 

military and have worked in the aluminum industry for the past 10 years. 

appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today about the importance of domestic 

aluminum production to U.S. national security and why Section 232 relief is 

necessary for our industry. 

I have been a Reduction Services Superintendent at Century Aluminum’s 

Hawesville, Kentucky facility for the past two years. In this role, I administer the 

activities of the potlines as well as the cell relining of those pots. I am on the floor 

day in and day out to ensure that we produce the highest quality aluminum products 

possible. Prior to this position, I worked for eight years at Alcoa’s Warrick, Indiana 

smelter, both as a process control operator and a potline supervisor. I left Warrick 

in 2015, just before the smelter was forced to shut down in 2016. 

For the past 10 years, aluminum has been a big part of my life and the lives of 

my friends and family. I am grateful for my job at Hawesville and am luckier than 

most to still have a job in this industry. However, I am concerned that without much 

needed relief, this will not be the case for much longer. 

What was once a thriving industry, the domestic primary aluminum industry 

has all but disappeared. In my time in the industry, I saw how conditions 

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Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 76 

deteriorated as China expanded production and crashed prices. As just one example, 

in the industry, our bonuses are often based on company performance. This means 

that as the market started to get bad, so did bonuses. Sometimes there were no 

bonuses. Conditions got so bad that by early 2016, smelters throughout the industry 

were closing. My former smelter at Warrick was one of them, eliminating more 

than 300 jobs, including my brother’s. 

Today, I feel fortunate to work at Hawesville – the last remaining U.S. 

smelter that makes high-purity aluminum. However, even that facility is at risk. 

Over the past five years, Hawesville has issued two separate notices that it would 

permanently shut down operations in 60 days. Lucky for us, on both occasions, the 

smelter was able to pull its business back from the brink, but not without layoffs. In 

the past two years alone, the facility has been forced to let hundreds of workers go 

and has been scrapping unused machinery for cash to help get by. Hawesville could 

easily become the next aluminum smelter to go under unless relief is granted. 

I would stress that the production of high-purity aluminum requires highly 

technical skills that are not easily replaceable. The high-purity production process is 

complex and leaves no room for error. The process is part art, part science. Even 

the slightest amount of impurities can throw the entire pot off. When these jobs go, 

so do the specialized skills needed to produce the high-purity aluminum. 

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Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 77 

The domestic industry’s problems have taken its toll on its workers and 

families. Many who have lost their jobs remain unemployed to this day. Not a 

week has gone by where I don’t receive a call from a former colleague looking for 

work. Our communities have also suffered. Like Hawesville, smelters are typically 

located in small family-friendly towns. When their largest employer is forced to 

shut-down or reduce jobs, the whole town feels it. 

As a veteran of the U.S. army, I know first-hand how important aluminum is 

to the men and women that put their lives on the line for their country. I served in 

both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom following 

September 11. When I first arrived in Iraq in 2003, Humvees were literally folding 

up like soda cans. They were simply no match for an IED. We were losing our 

soldiers left and right because our vehicles provided little protection from roadside 

bombs. At the time, members of my unit were forced to line our vehicles with scrap 

metal, sandbags, and bulletproof vests for added protection. 

By the time that my younger brother arrived in Iraq for duty in 2008, 

conditions had thankfully improved. The Army began using high-purity aluminum 

alloy in its vehicles, which is significantly more effective at absorbing a blast. One 

can only imagine how many U.S. soldiers’ lives were saved because of this switch. 

I fully agree with Secretary Ross that primary aluminum and the high-purity 

aluminum produced by the Hawesville smelter is a “hugely important thing to 

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Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 78 

defense.” My fear is that if we allow imports to continue entering the U.S. market
 

and harming U.S. production and workers, the domestic aluminum industry will 

become a thing of the past and our national security will suffer. It is critical that we 

maintain the capability to produce aluminum, and are not forced to depend on 

unreliable and unsafe sources of supply to meet this need. I know how important 

aluminum is to protecting our soldiers and wouldn’t want to depend on imports from 

the Middle East or elsewhere during a time of war or other national emergency. For 

these reasons, I ask that you grant broad and immediate Section 232 relief for the 

domestic aluminum industry. 

On behalf of myself, my colleagues and friends, and our families, thank you 

for your time and attention. 

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Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 79 

Testimony of Alf Barrios, 

Chief Executive, Rio Tinto Aluminum
 

with respect to the 

Section 232 National Security Investigation of Aluminum Imports 

Hearing of June 22, 2017
 

Good morning, my name is Alf Barrios and I am the chief executive of Rio 

Tinto Aluminum. I sit on the Rio Tinto Executive Committee and serve as the 

company’s country sponsor for Canada and the United States. 

Rio Tinto appreciates this opportunity to offer comments to assist the 

Department of Commerce and Department of Defense in the Section 232 national 

security investigation of aluminum imports. Rio Tinto commends President Trump, 

Secretary Ross and Secretary Mattis for focusing attention on the vital role that 

aluminum plays in the United States defense capability. My comments today will 

highlight the essential nature of aluminum to the North American integrated supply 

chain that is the basis of that capability. 

I. Rio Tinto background 

Rio Tinto is a leading global mining and metals company that focuses on 

finding, mining and processing essential mineral resources. We have been in 

business for more than 140 years, and some of our longest-operating assets are 

located in the United States. We produce a diverse suite of minerals and metals that 

are the necessary inputs for everything from telecommunications to transportation. 

One of our major products is aluminum, largely produced in North America. 
Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 80 

A. Rio Tinto’s operations in the United States 

Rio Tinto is proud to have operations in the United States that have provided 

critical minerals to U.S customers for well over 100 years. The heart of our global 

borates business is based in Boron, California, where the Boron mine began 

operations in 1872. Our Bingham Canyon mine in Salt Lake City, Utah is a fully 

integrated copper, gold and molybdenum mine that has operated for 110 years. At 

this site, Rio Tinto operates one of only three copper smelters in the United States. 

Rio Tinto is also investing for the future, prioritizing mineral exploration in 

North America that will support future U.S. manufacturing demand. To date, Rio 

Tinto has invested over $1.3 billion to develop the Resolution Copper Mine in 

Superior, Arizona. This mine will require $6 to 8 billion of investment over the 

next several years, and is one of the largest private investments currently pending 

in the U.S. permitting process. Rio Tinto’s operations, such as those in Utah, 

California, and Arizona are strong contributors to the United States economy and 

employment. 

Rio Tinto’s role in the North American supply chain 

Rio Tinto is a significant contributor to the integrated manufacturing supply 

chain in North America. Rio Tinto is the largest producer of primary aluminum in 

North America, and our smelters have a long history of supplying U.S. 

manufacturers, particularly U.S. defense-related manufacturing. 
 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 81 

The integrated North American supply chain provides significant benefits 

for the United States economy and American workers. Aluminum produced in 

Canada is a vital input for U.S manufacturers. 

II. Historic defense cooperation between the United States and Canada 

The United States and Canada have treated each other as indispensable 

partners in national defense for nearly a century. The Canadian-American defense 

industrial alliance, known as the Defense Production Sharing Program, pre-dates 

the U.S. entry into the Second World War. In 1940, Canada and the United States 

established the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, which still operates today. The 

Hyde Park Declaration of 1941 allowed American-made war material to be 

produced in Canada and provided to Great Britain. 

Close defense coordination between the U.S. and Canada continues today. 

For over twenty years, the U.S. has defined its national technology and industrial 

base to include Canada. In 1987, the two countries established the North American 

Technology and Industrial Base Organization, which promotes a cost-effective, 

healthy technology and industrial base that responds to both countries’ security 

needs. As these actions make clear, Canada is a strong partner to the United States 

in national security. 
 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 82 

III. Rio Tinto supports the U.S. defense and manufacturing bases 

Finally, Rio Tinto plays a critical role in supporting the U.S. manufacturing 

base. Seventy-five percent of Rio Tinto’s Canadian aluminum production is 

shipped to the U.S., where we have sales in more than 35 states. Among many 

historical examples of Rio Tinto’s operations in North America, and their 

connection to the defense supply chain, is our Shipshaw hydropower plant. This 

plant was built in 1943 with encouragement and support from both the U.S. and 

Canadian governments. At that time, the plant proved vital in the ramp-up of allied 

defense manufacturing capability. Today it is a key component of our SaguenayLac-Saint-Jean hydroelectric power network, which feeds the aluminum smelters 

that provide reliable aluminum supplies to North American customers. 

* * * 

The United States has long considered Canada’s resources and 

manufacturing capabilities to be a vital part of the North American defense 

industrial base. Consistent with U.S. law and policy, Rio Tinto has long been a 

proud partner to the U.S. government, private industry, and local communities. We 

look forward to continuing and deepening these relationships. 
Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 83 

Flexible Packaging Association (FPA) Testimony
 

Public Hearing 

for 

Section 232 Investigation on the Effect of Aluminum Imports 

on U.S. National Security
 

June 22, 2017
 

My name is Alison Keane, and I am President and CEO of the Flexible Packaging 

Association (FPA). FPA is the voice of U.S. manufacturers of flexible packaging and their 

suppliers. The association’s mission is connecting, advancing, and leading the flexible 

packaging industry. Flexible packaging represents over $30 billion in annual sales in the 

U.S. and is the second largest and one of the fastest growing segments of the packaging 

industry. The industry employs over 80,000 workers in the United States. Flexible 

packaging is produced from paper, plastic, film, aluminum foil, or any combination of these 

materials, and includes bags, pouches, labels, liners, wraps, rollstock, and other flexible 

products. With respect to aluminum foil, this packaging includes everyday food and 

beverage products such as Hersey Kisses; Pringles; Dannon Yogurt; and Capri Sun, as well 

as health and beauty items and pharmaceuticals, such as Tylenol; Clinic Plus; and Gillette 

Shaving Cream. Aluminum foil is also used by the flexible packaging industry for medical 

device packaging to ensure that the products packaged, such as absorbable sutures, human 

tissue, and artificial joints, maintain their efficacy at the time of use. 

This Section 232 investigation, initiated under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,

seeks to determine what, if any, effects imports of aluminum have on national security. FPA 

is not aware of any impacts aluminum foil imports for use in the packaging industry has on 
Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 84 

U.S. national security. FPA supports efforts to protect domestic manufacturing and ensure 

national security. However, any such efforts must consider the impact and consequences 

on all U.S. manufacturing industries. Accordingly, the scope of these actions must be limited 

to address the specific objectives. Aluminum foil imports necessary for the packaging 

industry, and without application for national defense, should be excluded from 

consideration. In its investigation, the Administration is to consider a range of factors 

related to national security, including the economy and the effects of foreign competition 

on the economic welfare of domestic industries, including impacts on employment. Any 

import restrictions on aluminum foil will have a significant negative impact on the flexible 

packaging industry and its employment in the U.S. 

This investigation is paralleling an International Trade Commission (ITC) 

investigation of Chinese aluminum foil imports based on a petition from The Aluminum 

Association, claiming that dumped and subsidized aluminum foil from China is causing or 

threatening injury to the domestic aluminum foil industry. The ITC petition seeks steep

import duties exceeding 140% to be applied to imported Chinese aluminum foil. The 

unintended consequences of potential remedies under this investigation, combined with 

any imposed through the ITC probe on the ability for the flexible packaging manufacturers 

to get the aluminum foil necessary to create innovative and functional packaging for food,

beverages, candy, and pharmaceuticals, would be the loss of flexible packaging jobs in the 

U.S.

 Aluminum foil used by the flexible packaging industry is not manufactured in the 

U.S. in the quantities and qualities needed. Failure to invest, and quality lapses, including 

gauge, width, and lack of appropriate alloys all contribute to the fact that the U.S. producers 

of aluminum foil are not able to serve the U.S. flexible packaging industry. In fact, the ITC, at 
 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 85 

its preliminary hearing on March 30, 2017, found that domestic ultra-thin foil production 

“may be limited or nonexistent.” The ITC also found that “Despite their [The Aluminum 

Association’s] arguments about economic harm by imports, domestic aluminum foil 

manufacturing jobs declined by only “137 workers from 2014-2016.” To put this number in 

perspective, again, domestic flexible packaging manufacturing jobs are estimated at 80,000.

The negative impact on American jobs of cutting off the supply of aluminum foil for flexible 

packaging manufacturing will far outweigh any job benefits that are envisioned by the ITC 

and Section 232 investigations. Thus, high tariffs or quotas will only lead to U.S. companies 

sourcing aluminum foil from other non-U.S. manufacturers; Chinese suppliers of printed or 

otherwise converted aluminum foil products entering the U.S. market, since these products 

are not included in the actions; and/or U.S. companies moving flexible foil packaging 

production outside the U.S., thereby reducing U.S. jobs. There is simply no scenario where 

U.S. aluminum foil manufacturers benefit, and in most cases, U.S. flexible packaging jobs 

will be lost. 

FPA shares the same goal as the domestic aluminum foil producers who want more 

American jobs and understands the importance of protecting national security. The 

Administration should find ways to work together to improve our country’s 

competitiveness. Everybody loses in unfair trade cases, especially the American consumer. 

The ITC’s preliminary findings make it clear that this case is not going to result in any 

benefit to aluminum foil producers and the unintended consequences of including

aluminum foil in any Section 232 remedy will be more damaging to the U.S. manufacturing 

industry and the economy than the benefits sought.

Thank you. 
 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 86 

Can Manufacturers Institute 

Oral Presentation on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Aluminum 

Presented by Robert Lauterbach
 

June 22, 2017
 

Thank you Secretary Ross for inviting me to speak today. 

My name is Robert Lauterbach, and I am the Vice President of Global Sourcing at Ball 

Corporation. Today, I am testifying on behalf of the Can Manufacturers Institute, CMI, whose 

member companies produce approximately 90 billion aluminum beverage cans every year, 

resulting in $11B in economic activity, and employ 10,000 individuals in 23 states. We 

respectfully request that Commerce and President Trump exclude the Aluminum Products we 

purchase from any upcoming trade action. 

To make the products we sell, we must purchase large quantities of aluminum cansheet, 

aluminum slugs, and aluminum ingot (herein after referred to as Aluminum Products). The 

names of these products along with their corresponding HTS codes are provided in the hand-out. 

To assist Commerce in your analysis, we offer following reasons why you should exclude these 

Aluminum Products from any tariff or other trade remedy. 

1.	 The Aluminum Products that we purchase do not have defense applications. 

2.	 US aluminum producers have shifted their focus away from the lower value added 

commodity products that we purchase to higher margin, higher value added aluminum 

products, such as those used by the US Military. On the other hand, the products that are

being imported into the US in large quantities are lower value added commodity products 

without military applications, such as aluminum foil used for food, aluminum fin stock 

for the HVAC industry, and building and construction aluminum. 
Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 87 

3.	 We purchase the vast majority of our cansheet from the US, or in the case of aluminum 

ingot, from long-time strategic allies such as Canada. In fact, only 2% of the Aluminum 

Products that we import into the US come from China. 

4.	 Bauxite, the main source of aluminum, is not mined in the US. Because of high energy 

costs and the low concentration of bauxite in US soil, it will not be mined in the US, even 

with a tariff on imported aluminum. 

5.	 The importation of bauxite, alumina, and the Aluminum Products we purchase is properly 

characterized as blameless trade, and it would be unfair to punish US based companies 

who depend on such blameless trade. The decline in US primary aluminum production is 

a result of an increase in US energy prices relative to other regions, an exponential 

increase in domestic aluminum scrap availability, lack of investment in smelting assets, 

and a long-term decline in primary aluminum consumption per capita. 

6.	 Imposing tariffs on the Aluminum Products we purchase would have the unintended 

consequence of harming US-based can manufacturers, while benefitting foreign cansheet 

companies doing business in the US. Let me explain: three of the four major suppliers of 

aluminum cansheet in the US are foreign-owned companies - Novelis, Constellium and 

Tri-Arrows Aluminum - and tariffs will raise prices and increase their profits but not 

make the US aluminum industry any stronger. 

7.	 The trade action proposed would likely result in the loss of high paying can 

manufacturing jobs and compromise the competitiveness of the US downstream 

aluminum users. 

8.	 Trade remedies would have a chilling effect on investments in our industry. Over the last 

5 years, CMI companies invested well over $1B in US manufacturing facilities. Even a 

small tariff will result in greater uncertainty about prices, supply, financing, and would 

dramatically curtail investment and hiring in the US. 
Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 88 

9.	 Finally, a tariff on Aluminum Products would have a two-fold impact: First, consumers 

would pay more, ultimately harming US consumers that rely on affordable canned 

products; and second, our products would be unfairly taxed making cans less competitive 

when compared to plastic and glass. 

With these concerns in mind, we respectfully request that Commerce draw a distinction between 

the Aluminum Products that we purchase, and those very different forms of advanced Aluminum 

Products with military and national defense applications. Drawing this distinction would be in 

the best interests of the companies that make up CMI, our valued employees, and American 

consumers. 
1 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 89 

Testimony of James A. McGreevy III 

President and Chief Executive Officer
 

The Beer Institute
 

Thank you for this opportunity to provide the U.S. beer industry’s views on the 

Department’s investigation. I speak today on behalf of the Beer Institute. The Brewers 

Association and the American Beverage Association join us in our written submission. 

The Beer Institute represents American brewers of all sizes, as well as importers and 

industry suppliers. There are currently over 5,000 brewers responsible for billions of dollars in 

American trade and commerce. Brewers and their wholesale and retail partners directly or 

indirectly employ 2.23 million Americans who earn more than $103 billion in wages and 

benefits. 

A majority of the volume of beer sold in the U.S. comes in aluminum cans and aluminum 

bottles. While 98% of our cansheet is domestic, imported primary aluminum is an essential 

input. Tariffs or other measures limiting the importation of primary aluminum or cansheet will 

hurt the economic activities and jobs our industry supports. 

Imports of primary aluminum for cansheet manufacture do not threaten U.S. national 

security. First, U.S. smelters and reliable U.S. trading partners can satisfy military demand. 

Second, the competitive challenges that U.S. smelters face are the result of factors unrelated to 

imports – aging facilities, high energy costs, and the strong U.S. dollar. 

We urge the Secretary to look at solutions other than tariffs or import restrictions. But if 

the Secretary does recommend tariffs or import restrictions, we ask for the exclusion of cansheet 

and its inputs. Our written comments will include a more specific list of the most relevant 

products. 

ActiveUS 163420388v.1 
 

2 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 90 

Today, I would like to speak to another issue that should be part of the Department’s 

inquiry: serious irregularities in the trading of primary aluminum contracts and in the storage of 

aluminum at warehouses approved by the London Metals Exchange (the “LME”). These 

irregularities seriously distorted the aluminum market and cost aluminum users billions of 

dollars. 

This issue dates to 2010, when aluminum users, industry analysts, U.S. and foreign 

regulators and Congress first began to express concerns about the aluminum market. 

As background, most industrial users of primary aluminum normally buy metal directly 

from producers on direct, long-term contracts. The LME is a market of last resort. Smelters use 

the system to sell excess stock when there is oversupply, and users turn to it in times of extreme 

shortage. Direct supply contracts also reference the LME price. A U.S. aluminum user pays the 

LME price plus a physical market premium, which everyone calls the “Midwest Premium.” The 

Midwest Premium should reflect the full logistical cost of sourcing metal from the most viable 

supply hubs, which might be a regional producer, an LME warehouse, or a major off-shore 

supplier. 

Starting in 2010, however, the aluminum market took a serious turn. Owners of LME 

warehouses began to stockpile primary aluminum. They did this by paying aluminum smelters 

to overproduce in an already oversupplied market. The warehouses competed directly with 

industrial users for primary aluminum. This metal was sold under warrant through the LME and 

went into storage in LME warehouses, not into the physical market. 

A second practice was the payment of financial incentives to warrant holders, mostly 

financial investors with primary aluminum stored in LME warehouses. The goal was to get the 

ActiveUS 163420388v.1 
 

 

3 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 91 

metal into a warehouse exit queue and once loaded out, right back into an affiliated LME 

warehouse. 

These so-called “merry-go-round” transactions inhibited the normal flow of metal to the 

market. The warehouses were effectively hoarding the metal and withholding it from the open 

market. This artificially inflated the overall price of aluminum, increasing the financial 

investors’ returns. 

The combined impact was to eliminate the LME system as a market of last resort. No 

one could buy primary aluminum through the LME without extraordinary delays – as long as 

two years. 

Although production of primary aluminum exceeded consumption by one to two million 

tons per year, the market behaved as if there was a shortage. Aluminum flowed into the LME 

warehouses, but the freely available supply decreased. 

The manipulation also had a dramatic effect on the Midwest Premium. In the first three 

weeks of 2014 alone, the Midwest Premium experienced a dramatic 67 percent increase! And, in 

January 2015, it hit an all-time high. 

The grossly inflated Midwest Premium became an outsized factor for every aluminum 

user’s cost and risk. 

Aluminum users pushed the LME to enact rules reforms. Those who benefitted from the 

financial incentives and the increased Midwest Premiums resisted. 

In November 2014, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations issued a 

report on this problem. It concluded that there were “troubling issues involving conflicts of 

interest, market distortions, and the potential to gain unfair trading advantages” which “likely 

ActiveUS 163420388v.1 
4 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 92 

added billions of dollars in costs to a wide range of aluminum users, from beer makers to car 

manufacturers to defense companies that make warships for the Navy.” 

The LME enacted reforms that resulted in significant market corrections, including a 

71% drop in the Midwest Premium by mid-2015. The market began normalizing. 

Manipulation of the market may not, however, be over. We’ve seen new spikes in the 

Midwest Premium over the last nine months, again in a way that appears disconnected from 

market fundamentals. 

There are two reasons I want to share this background. 

First, as the Secretary considers whether to recommend import adjustments, keep in mind 

the negative impact that restrictions on supply of primary aluminum will have on our industry 

and that of other aluminum users. We just exited a period when artificial restrictions in the 

market distorted prices and hurt aluminum users. Import restrictions would likely have a similar 

effect, leading to higher costs and, in turn, lost sales. Lost sales would mean lost government 

revenue and job losses. 

Second, a high Midwest Premium coupled with a strong U.S. dollar makes the U.S. 

market attractive to global aluminum suppliers and draws additional imports. Therefore, if the 

concern is imports of primary aluminum, it would be a good idea to evaluate the role 

manipulation of the Midwest Premium played in creating the current situation. 

The Department has trade remedy tools that it can use in a targeted manner to address 

unfair trade practices – as it did in its recent scope determination concerning Chinese aluminum 

pallets and its recently initiated investigation of aluminum foil imports from China. We urge the 

Secretary to recommend the continued use of such targeted actions, consistent with U.S. trade 

remedy laws and regulations and with our international commitments. 

ActiveUS 163420388v.1 
5 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 93 

We also urge the Secretary to consider that energy costs are the key factor driving smelter 

competitiveness. U.S. producers are at a severe energy cost disadvantage relative to their foreign 

competitors. Lower energy costs help smelters and may encourage investment in U.S. rather 

than other countries. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. While aluminum imports do 

not threaten our national security, there are actions that the Secretary should recommend to the 

President – including further scrutiny of Midwest Premium manipulation and policy changes 

focused on lowering energy costs to smelters – that will improve the competitiveness of the 

domestic aluminum industry and industries, like ours, that need aluminum. Thank you. 

ActiveUS 163420388v.1 
 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 94 

Section 232 Investigation on the Effect of Imports of Aluminum on U.S. National Security 

Written submission of Hydro 

Hydro is a global aluminium company with production, sales and trading activities throughout the 

value chain, from bauxite, alumina and energy generation to the production of primary aluminium 

and rolled products as well as recycling. Headquartered in Norway, the company has 13,000 

employees involved in activities in more than 40 countries. In the US, Hydro is a supplier of rolled 

aluminium and other metal products. The company has two dedicated aluminium remelting facilities 

in Kentucky and Texas with 127 employees in total. In addition, Hydro operates a technology centre 

in Zeeland, Michigan. The research conducted is to find and improve advanced solutions for 

aluminum in our end markets1

. 

Hydro has serious concerns regarding the distortion of trade flows resulting from overcapacities in 

the aluminium market caused by state interventions, especially in China. Therefore, we welcome all 

evidence-based inquiries into the current situation faced by the aluminium industry. The crisis 

caused by overcapacity requires decisive governmental reaction. However, Section 232 investigation 

and imposition of unilateral trade barriers are not the appropriate tools to address aluminium 

overcapacities. Any trade barriers such as additional tariffs or quotas would lead to market 

distortions and diversion of trade from the US to other parts of the world and would fail to provide a 

lasting solution. 

In the aluminium industry, a significant number of companies have operations on both side of the 

Atlantic. These companies, Hydro being one of them, have intra-company trade flows, they import 

and export, and conduct R&D on both continents. Such companies would be particularly negatively 

affected by imposition of trade barriers by the US. Moreover, the US has a structural deficit position 

on aluminium. Hence, introduction of tariffs or quotas would result in higher prices for American 

customers, such as the automotive sector, and lost revenues for US companies exporting to and 

having operations in Europe due to trade diversions (i.e. indirect consequences). 

Any outcome of the Section 232 investigation must avoid unintended consequences for the 

integrated US aluminium supply chain. Tariffs or quotas imposed on European (EU/EEA) or Canadian 

aluminium would be examples of such unintended consequences. Both Canada and Europe have 

been long-standing commercial and military partners of the US, and are characterized by strong 

market economies and legal systems based on the same principles. The Canadian and European 

aluminium industry stand in fair competition to each other and to their American counterpart and 

they do not pursue any unfair trading practices. Therefore, we would like to kindly request the 

Department of Commerce to exclude transatlantic imports from the scope of any potential measures 

introduced resulting of the Section 232 Investigation on the Effect of Imports of Aluminum on U.S. 

National Security. 

Finally, we would like to encourage the US Administration to address the fundamental cause of the 

global aluminium crisis which is the overcapacity in primary aluminium present stemming from 

practices which are not compliant with the international trade law. The request from March 2017 to 

the G20 countries from the aluminium associations of the US, Canada and Europe to handle the 

overcapacity, is one route. Another route is utilising the WTO dispute settlement system like the 

1

 Hydro is also 50% owner of the aluminium extrusion company SAPA, which has 23.000 employees 

worldwide and over 6.000 in the US. 
 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 95 

United States’ WTO complaint against the alleged Chinese subsidies to primary aluminium producers 

launched 12 January 2017. The WTO-dispute settlement mechanism is based on clearly defined and 

accepted rules and will not cause market distortions. 
 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 96 

Testimony of
 

Garney B. Scott III, President and CEO, Scepter, Inc. 

United States Department of Commerce

 Section 232 Investigation on the Effect of Imports of Aluminum on U.S. National Security 

June 22, 2017 

Thank you. My name is Garney Scott. I am the President and CEO of Scepter, Inc. My company is 

primarily engaged in the recycled aluminum market. I am here today in my capacity as Chairman of the 

Aluminum Association, a position I have been privileged to hold since October 2015. 

The Aluminum Association represents the entire aluminum value chain – from primary producers, to 

recyclers, to fabricators, and their suppliers. Our members employ 161,000 workers have 

manufacturing operations in 35 U.S. states, and account for 70 percent of the aluminum and aluminum 

products shipped in North America, creating $186 billion in economic activity. 

The domestic industry remains a leader in innovative aluminum technologies and applications, but is at 

a juncture where it will either be able to take advantage of growth opportunities, or will continue to be 

irreparably injured by unfair trade practices that undermine its ability to do so. Our industry has been 

hurt, and its future is threatened by global oversupply. More specifically, the U.S. industry is being 

harmed by massive Chinese overcapacity resulting from substantial subsidies by the Government of 

China, such that China’s capacity now far exceeds its domestic demand. 

China’s huge and growing aluminum oversupply has distorted the world market and adversely impacted 

U.S. producers of both primary and downstream products. Chinese oversupply has put severe 

downward pressure on world prices, which in turn has resulted in the shuttering of U.S. aluminum 

smelters and semi-fabricating facilities. 

We have major concerns about China’s rapid and aggressive expansion into value-added downstream 

products and their history of circumvention of U.S. duties through misclassification and/or 

transshipment through third countries. To bring its production into line with its domestic needs, and not 

export its oversupply, China needs to eliminate market-distorting policies and close or idle, at least 2MM 

metric tons of smelter and semi-finish annual plant capacity. 

The trends in Chinese capacity, production, and exports have had enormous negative impacts on the 

U.S. aluminum industry, and have adversely affected an industry that is a vital component of our U.S. 

defense industrial base. In order for the U.S. aluminum industry to supply these defense needs and 

continue to provide jobs in our communities, we need to be competitive and economically healthy. 

Absent actions that ensure robust and healthy commercial markets in the United States for aluminum 

and aluminum products, domestic producers will not be able to sustain their mills and facilities that also 

produce aluminum products that are vital for defense applications. 

The U.S. aluminum industry embraces competition that is fair and transparent. We believe that it is vital 

that the Chinese government: 

Address the negative effects of long-running rampant overcapacity in both the primary and 

downstream sectors by closing smelters and semi-fabricating mills until demand can meet 

x
x

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 97 

supply – this includes, at a minimum, forcing inefficient, unpermitted, and antiquated facilities 

to close; and 

Pursue policies that align with its own stated sustainable development goals and eliminate 

subsidies, lending, and other incentives that artificially support its aluminum industry, and its 

resulting pricing practices that negatively affect world markets through its exporting of 

aluminum. 

A 232 remedy should address the negative impacts of Chinese overcapacity in the United States and 

help protect an industry that is vital to the country's national and economic security. U.S. border 

measures will not fully address the problems we face because the domestic aluminum industry 

competes globally and has international supply chains. 

Unless a broader agreement is negotiated to reduce and eliminate the massive overcapacity in China, 

the negative effects will persist and continued to threaten the U.S. industry's long-term health and 

vibrancy. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

### 
Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 98 

Section 232 National Security Investigation: Aluminum Imports 

Steve J. Casey 

Senior Director, Procurement 

Bemis Company, Inc. 

2301 Industrial Dr, PO Box 669 

Neenah, WI 54956 

Phone: 920-527-7376 

sjcasey@bemis.com 

Introduction 

Bemis Company, Inc. (“Bemis”), a manufacturer of packaging headquartered in Neenah, 

Wisconsin, believes it has a useful perspective to provide to the Secretary of Commerce and the 

Department of Commerce as they develop their analysis and recommendations for the President 

pursuant to the Section 232 national security investigation of aluminum imports. Bemis is 

concerned that potential measures resulting from the aluminum investigation could inadvertently 

have a negative impact on the supply of aluminum foil used in manufacturing flexible packaging 

in the United States, with potentially negative consequences for Bemis’ customers, competitive 

position and employment. 

Any import restrictions on aluminum foil, and especially the ultra thin foil used in flexible 

packaging, could negatively affect our business in the United States, given that (1) there is not 

adequate capacity in the United States to meet our quantitative and qualitative needs, and (2) our 

products compete with imported packaging that would not be covered by any measure impacting 

foil imports. Accordingly, Bemis respectfully submits that aluminum foil should be excluded 

from any eventual measures recommended to the President pursuant to the investigation of 

national security effects of aluminum imports. 
Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 99 

Bemis, its products and its employment 

Bemis manufacturers packaging for the largest food, consumer products, and medical device 

companies in the world. Though we are not a household name, our products are found in 

virtually every isle of the grocery store. Our products keep the food you buy safe and fresh 

through distribution and keep patients safe during surgery. We have 59 facilities in 12 countries 

and about 17,500 employees worldwide. Within the United States, Bemis has 31 manufacturing 

plants in 14 states and almost 9,000 employees. The states with the largest number of Bemis 

employees are Wisconsin, Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania. 

As a core part of its packaging business, Bemis uses aluminum foil for barrier to protect the food 

and medical supplies that go into our packaging. Without aluminum foil many food and medical 

products would be less safe and subject to higher waste through distribution. While Bemis 

sources a large percentage of its aluminum in the United States, there is only one domestic 

producer of converter foil, and that firm’s entire capacity is not enough to supply Bemis’ annual 

requirements. In addition, a large portion of Bemis’ foil requirements are for ultra thin foil of 

gauges less than 0.0003 inches thick. Such ultra thin foil is used for applications like ketchup 

packets, cream cheese packaging, powdered food and beverages, and medical device packages. 

Bemis’ customers such as Kraft/Heinz, McCormick, and Becton Dickinson require this thin 

converter foil, but U.S. foil producers do not want, or are unable, to make gauges under 0.0003 

inches. As such, Bemis has been required to source this key material from offshore suppliers. 

Measures to restrict imports could negatively impact the U.S. economy and employment 
Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 100 

Bemis operates in a highly competitive domestic and international market. Many of Bemis’

aluminum foil containing products compete with suppliers of packaging from outside the U.S. 

Increased prices or quotas for aluminum foil will open the door for imports of finished packaging 

resulting in a loss of market share, profitability and ultimately employment. 

We are not aware of any significant defense production needs for aluminum packaging foil. The 

only military application we have identified for aluminum packaging foil is for Meals Read to 

Eat (“MREs”). However, MREಬs are typically made with a thicker foil than Bemis uses which 

can be easily sourced domestically. 

Finally, we understand the importance of protecting domestic manufacturers in key industries. 

To the extent that the Secretary and the Department are concerned about distortions in the 

aluminum foil market, we note that the ongoing trade remedy proceedings before the Department 

of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission provide an appropriate tool to 

address any needed corrections. Those proceedings, entailing thorough factual and market 

research and analysis, are at a preliminary stage. The present Section 232 investigation should 

not be used to restrict imports of aluminum foil for commercial uses as the result would be grave 

economic consequences to the domestic manufacturing facilities of Bemis, other packaging 

producers, and our customers with no increase in defense security. 

Thank you, I would be happy to answer questions. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 101 

WRITTEN TESTIMONY by Jorge Vazquez 

before the US Commerce Department on US national security and aluminum imports, 

at the public hearing scheduled to be held on June 22, 2017, in Washington, DC. 

1.		 My name is Jorge Vazquez, Founder, Managing Director and Chief Intelligence Officer of HARBOR Aluminum Intelligence LLC. 

2.		 HARBOR is an independent, privately-owned research firm based in Austin, Texas, that specializes in the analysis of the global 

aluminum industry and its various sub markets. We compile, develop, and analyze aluminum industry data and market 

intelligence for more than 300 companies across the globe and throughout the aluminum supply chain. 

3.		 Every year, HARBOR’s integrity and specialized knowledge brings the aluminum market together for the HARBOR’s Aluminum 

Outlook Summit, the world’s largest aluminum industry conference with over 515 delegates from 250 companies around the 

world. A third of the delegates that attend this Summit are from upstream industries (smelting, alumina, bauxite and carbon 

products), another third from downstream industries (aluminum mill products and castings, aluminum manufacturers, endusers) and a final third from service companies (banks, traders, brokers, analysts, consultants, warehousing, logistics 

companies, government agencies, law firms). 

4.		 My testimony is factual. 

5.		 Over 98% of the 9.2 million mton of aluminum products the US consumed in 2016 were produced in the United States. By 

aluminum products I mean mill products (flat rolled products, extrusions, wires & cables, powder, forgings) and castings. 

6.		 Net US imports of aluminum products have declined in the last ten years (not increased), both in absolute and relative terms. 

From 250k mton in 2006 (2.5% of US consumption) to 147k mton in 2016 (1.6% of US consumption). Ten years ago, the US 

was a net importer of aluminum foil, sheet, plate, and extrusions. Today, it is a net exporter of cansheet (over 220k mton) and 

other sheet and plate products, has a balanced position in extrusions, and is only a net importer of foil. 

7.		 Moreover, US net aluminum products trade balance with Canada and Mexico has improved noticeably in the last ten years. Net 

exports of aluminum products to NAFTA partners have more than tripled, from 227k mton in 2006, to 690k mton in 2016. In 

turn, the US has increased its net imports of feedstock (primary aluminum and scrap) from its NAFTA partners from 2.0 to 2.3 

million mton. 

8.		 In fact, the US is a net exporter of cansheet to the world. Over 98% of the cansheet the US annually consumes is produced 

domestically. While the US imports only 50k mton of cansheet, it exports 279k mton mainly to Mexico and Canada. 

9.		 Contrary to what many may imagine, the US has an aluminum trade surplus with China. However, this trade surplus has 

deteriorated in the last ten years. In 2006, the US had a net aluminum trade surplus of 660k mton with China (net exports of 

895k mton of scrap vs net imports of 135k mton of extrusions and foil). Today, the US has a smaller net export position of 

169k mton (next exports of 690k mton of scrap vs net imports of 500k mton of foil, sheet & plate). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 102 

10.		 US military demand for aluminum products (mill products and castings) is more than 99% sourced from US producers. In fact, 

US production of aluminum products is about 45 times larger than US military aluminum demand volumes. All of the aluminum 

aerospace plate used by the US military is produced in US aluminum rolling mills. HARBOR estimates that these mills could 

increase military aluminum aerospace plate production by a factor of 4x if needed by increasing capacity utilization or moving 

away from commercial aerospace plate production. 

11.		 US production of high purity aluminum (P0406 and P0202) is estimated by HARBOR to be 117k mton per year, essentially three 

times larger than what the US military consumes every year (42k mton). Moreover, existing US high purity aluminum inventories, 

held mainly by one player, can cover almost 2 years of US military high purity consumption. 

12.		 What if US production of high purity aluminum ceases to exist? Well, the US military could alone produce its entire high purity 

aluminum needs using fractional crystallization technology (with an investment of around $25 million and at an operating cost 

we estimate to be only 2% higher than current market prices for high purity aluminum). This technology is readily available in 

the US and currently operates at commercial levels. 

13.		 US primary aluminum production has been in decline since 1980 (when production peaked at 4.66 million mton). This decline 

started several decades before the Middle East and China became relevant primary aluminum producers. 

14.		 Has China overproduced primary aluminum and caused US smelters to close? Consider four things: 

a) US smelting production had already decline 40% (from 1980 to 2001) by the time China’s primary production and 

consumption started to take off in 2002, 

b) Average cash profit margins for smelters outside China (US included) have been higher (28% vs 25%) in the last 12 years 

(2002-2016) than in the previous 12 years, prior to when China’s primary aluminum production and consumption took off 

(1990-2001), 

c) China’s total primary aluminum stocks today equate to approximately 4 weeks of consumption vs 30 weeks of consumption 

outside China (in the rest of the world) and, 

d) China does not export primary aluminum (having a 15% export tax on all primary aluminum exports). 

15.		 The US, just as other developed economies like Japan and Germany, has experienced an organic long term decline in primary 

aluminum production as result of: 

a) an exponential increase in domestic aluminum scrap availability (requires 20 times less energy to process than primary 

aluminum), 

b) high electricity prices relative to other developing countries, 

c) lack of investment in smelting assets (smelters old) and, 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 103 

d) a long-term decline in aluminum consumption per capita (urbanization and industrialization peak reached several decades 

ago). 

16.		 Moreover, the decline in US primary aluminum production in the last 5 years has been particularly driven by a strong rally in the 

US dollar, which appreciated around 20% over this period. This appreciation has pushed US smelters, already the world’s oldest 

(44 years old on average), and least energy efficient (14.6 MW/hr per mton of primary aluminum produced) to become the 

most expensive producers in the Western World. 

17.		 It is conclusive and technically clear to me that growing US primary aluminum imports have been a natural economic effect of 

the gradual long term decline in un-competitive US primary aluminum production. Not vice-versa. Imports of primary aluminum 

have stepped in to fill the gap that a decline in un-competitive domestic primary production has created since 1980. Net 

imports have increased from around zero in 1990 to over 4 million mton in 2016. 

18.		 Net US primary aluminum imports represent 43% of the feedstock the US needs to produce aluminum products. This is in line 

with other developed economies like Germany (44% of feedstock is imported primary aluminum), UK (44%), and Japan (58%) 

which use domestic scrap as their primary feedstock (between 43-48% of total feedstock used). 

19.		 No primary aluminum is imported into the US from China. Around 54% of US primary aluminum imports come from Canada, 

19% from the Middle East, 16% from Russia and 6% from Latin America. 

20.		 Again, declining US primary aluminum production is part of an organic and long-term economic maturity process where the US 

economy and aluminum industry (like other developed countries such as Germany, Japan and the UK) have moved away from 

low-value, energy-intensive, and less competitive industrial segments to more profitable and energy efficient economic 

sectors (value-added aluminum and manufacturing products, services, hi-tech). 

21.		 Japan and Germany are useful and comparable examples of this maturing process that allows them to be more energy efficient 

and produce value add products. Since 1987, Japan has been importing basically all its primary aluminum needs but has 

become a net exporter (150k mton) of value add aluminum products (foil, sheet and plate, and even extrusions). Germany’s 

primary aluminum production has been declining since 1984 and produces today less primary aluminum than the US (546k 

mton vs 818 kmton). However, Germany is a significant net exporter (450 k mton) of value added aluminum products (foil, 

sheet and plate). 

22.		 It is my technical view that any artificial increase in US smelting competitiveness via limitation or taxing of primary aluminum 

imports, will negatively impact the competitiveness of the US downstream aluminum industry which today is 11 times larger 

than the US smelting industry in mton produced and about 50 times larger in direct jobs generated (3,000 smelting jobs vs 

150,000 downstream industry jobs). 

23.		 Indeed, exports of value add US aluminum products like cansheet, extrusions and foil to Mexico and Canada would decline in a 

significant way if the US were to impose any type of restriction and/or duty on primary aluminum that translates into any US 

primary aluminum price inflation. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 104 

24.		 Unlike steel, aluminum is a global commodity. It’s price is determined by the forces of physical and financial demand and supply 

that interact each day in the London Metal Exchange. 

25.		 However, my analysis of prices and physical transactions in the US aluminum market is leading me to believe that an 

artificial/inorganic increase in the Midwest Premium (regional price) may have attracted more primary aluminum imports than 

otherwise may have occurred. I can provide this analysis upon request. 

26.		 What does the aluminum industry thinks about a potential restriction and/or duties on US imports of primary aluminum? In a 

live poll conducted during HARBOR’s 10th Aluminum Outlook Summit on June 7, 2017 (518 industry delegates, 78% were either 

CEO’s, Managing Directors or Vice Presidents, 30% upstream, 30% downstream and 30% services): 98% of respondents 

believed no duties should be imposed at all on US imports of primary aluminum. Moreover, 78% of respondents believed that 

US aluminum imports pose no threat to US National Security. I can provide these live poll results upon request. 

Sincerely, 

Jorge Vazquez 

Founder and Managing Director 

HARBOR Aluminum Intelligence 
 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 105 

Prepared Remarks of Charles Koetting
 

Owner of C-KOE Metals, L.P – Euless, Texas
 

Presented to 

232 Investigation on Aluminum Imports
 

Department of Commerce 

22 June 2017 

My name is Charles Koetting. I am the owner of C-KOE Metals, L.P. located in Fort Worth, Texas. 

C-KOE manufactures aluminum pellet that is used by major chemical companies and is used to 

alloy metals. An average of 71% of our production is sold domestically, 9% sold into China, and 

20% into other foreign countries. 

1.	 Cost of aluminum production in the United States is higher than anywhere in the world1. 

This is due primarily to the cost of energy1, which is 38% of the total cost of aluminum2. 

Aluminum can be produced in Canada for approximately 12 cents/pound less than in the 

United States1. Other countries have similar advantages over us. 

In the year 2000, there were 21 operating smelters in the U.S. Today there are only two 

companies in the U.S. operating a total of 5 smelters; only 2 of which are at capacity. The 

average age of theses smelters is 44 years versus less than 10 years for those in Asia and 

the Middle East.1 The U.S. smelters are operating with a distinct disadvantage because of 

their old technology and the higher cost of electricity. 

2.	 The U.S. has a large downstream aluminum industry which is at least ten times larger than 

the smelting industry and which creates a vastly greater number of jobs. It will become 

less competitive and lose potentially many more jobs with the higher costs imposed by 

any tariff. 

3.	 C-KOE produces aluminum products in purity grades from P1020 to 99.998% pure. 

Currently, U.S. producers can only produce purity as high as P0101. We sell much higher 

purity products to the titanium and defense industries. In fact, C-KOE is the only approved 

supplier of high-purity aluminum used in the domestic manufacture of titanium alloys 

used in aerospace and military applications. We import high-purity aluminum from over 

10 suppliers across the globe. A tariff will affect the prices of material that cannot even 

be produced in the United States. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 106 

4.	 The cost for aluminum in supplier and customer contracts written in the U.S. is based on 

the London Metal Exchange and the Midwest Transaction indexes. Costs move up and 

down with the market. There has never been a tariff on primary aluminum in the U.S. 

and therefore, contracts do not anticipate nor consider tariffs. If a tariff is passed, it will 

cause havoc in the market. 

For instance, at C-KOE, we buy and sell on the same market. Our contracts with our 

suppliers and customers allow for the price of aluminum to go up and down based on the 

indexes. This allows us to sign contracts as long as 4 years, since the rise and fall of 

aluminum price is covered. We then add a fixed cost per pound to convert the aluminum 

to pellets. This conversion cost covers our direct costs as well as overhead and profit. If 

a tariff is imposed, C-KOE would have to pay it, with no way to recoup it. We would soon 

be bankrupt. Margins are small in this industry and tariffs could cause the failure of many 

companies, such as C-KOE. 

5.	 In 2015, the U.S. Military only used 42,000 Metric Tons of high purity aluminum. The U.S. 

production capacity was 192,000 Metric Tons, of which 75,000 Metric Tons were idle. In 

addition, there were 75,000 Metric Tons in U.S. domestic inventory1. This equates to 4.6 

times the production capacity with 1.8 times the inventory of military usage. 

In conclusion: Why on earth do we need a tariff on high purity aluminum: 

3⁄4 To protect two companies currently operating in the U.S., who have chosen to stay with 

outdated technology in a country with extremely high energy costs? 

3⁄4 Who already have 4.6 times as much capacity as the military needs when we have 1.8 

years of inventory. 

3⁄4 When any tariff would create havoc in the downstream market, cause downstream 

producers to be less competitive, cause bankruptcies and cause a higher loss of jobs than 

any tariff purports to protect. 

3⁄4 Why do we want to protect all of this when these aluminum purities are available in many 

countries throughout the world? 

3⁄4 Is our military, all at once, going to go to war with every country in the world that has 

aluminum producers? Will we no longer have allies, such as Canada, the source of 63% 

of U.S. imports between 2010-20133. 

I am strongly opposed to actions and steps taken to adjust aluminum imports because they are 

totally unnecessary. 
Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 107 

References: 

(1) 10th Annual Harbor Aluminum Summit, June 2017, Chicago, IL. Harbor Aluminum 

Intelligence LLC is an independent, privately owned research firm based in Austin, Texas, 

that specializes in the global aluminum industry and its various sub markets. HARBOR 

complies develops and analyzes aluminum industry data and market intelligence for more 

than 300 companies across the aluminum supply chain and around the globe. 

(2) Aluminum Insider, April 2016 

(3) USGS Survey, January 2015 

Submitted by: 

Charles Koetting 

Owner and CEO 

C-KOE Metals, L.P. 

3528 House Anderson Road 

Euless, Texas 75040 

817-925-2456 

charles@ckoemetals.com 

ABOUT CHARLES KOETTING 

Charles Koetting is a successful entrepreneur who began his career as an industrial general 

contractor. His educational background in economics, along with his keen business sense, 

allowed him to realize the potential of a small aluminum recycling facility. Through his vision, 

C-KOE Metals has become a predominant source of high purity aluminum for users around the 

world. Charles is the driving force behind the long-term business relationships, recruiting and 

retaining highly qualified staff and the steady financial growth. In addition to C-KOE Metals, 

Charles has founded more than 40 other successful enterprises in property development, 

construction, and manufacturing industries. 
 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 108 

1000 N. Rand Road, Suite 214 

Wauconda, IL 60084 

Phone: (847) 526-201O 

Fax: (847) 526-3993 

mail@aec.org 

www.aec.org 

SECTION 232 ALUMINUM INVESTIGATION
 

AEC PRESENTATION
 

x	 GOOD MORNING 

x	 I AM JEFF HENDERON, PRESDIENT OF THE ALUMINUM EXTRUDERS 

COUNCIL, THE ‘AEC” 

x	 THE AEC HAS OVER 100 U.S. MEMBERS WHO ARE MANUFACTURERS OF 

ALUMINUM EXTRUSIONS 

x	 OUR MEMBERS, AND THEIR SUPPLIERS, EMPLOY OVER 35,000 WORKERS 

DIRECTLY, AND NEARLY 100,000 INDIRECTLY, IN HUNDREDS OF PLANTS 

SPREAD OVER 35 STATES 

x	 WE APPLAUD THE ADMINISTATION’S INITIATION OF THIS INVESTIGATION 

– AS IT RECOGNIZES THE EXTEREME IMPORTANCE OF THE US ALUMINUM 

INDUSTRY AND ITS WORKERS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE 

UNITED STATES 

x	 IN THIS INVESTIGATION, “ALUMINUM” SHOULD BE DEFINED BROADLY TO 

INCLUDE BOTH PRIMARY ALUMINUM AND SEMI-FABRICATED ALUMINUM 

ITEMS 

x	 INDEED, ALUMINUM IS PRODUCED ON A PRODUCTION CONTINUUM. 

x	 AT ONE END ARE PRODUCERS OF PRIMARY OR “UNWROUGHT” 

ALUMINUM, MAINLY IN THE FORM OF INGOT. 

x	 PRIMARY ALUMINUM IS INTENDED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY FOR FURTHER 

PROCESSING INTO A SEMI-FABRICATED FORM, SUCH AS, SHEET, COIL, 

FOIL, PLATE AND EXTRUSIONS, ALL OF WHICH FALL ON THE OTHER END 

OF THE ALUMINUM CONTINUUM. 
Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 109 

x	 THE THRESHOLD QUESTION IN THIS INVESTIGATION IS WHETHER 

ALUMINUM IS “ESSENTIAL” TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 

x	 THE ANSWER IS “YES” 

x	 NUMEROUS FINISHED PRODUCTS MADE WITH ALUMINUM ARE CRITICAL 

TO THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE – WHICH WE WILL ADDRESS IN 

DETAIL IN OUR WRITTEN SUBMISSION 

x	 INDEED, NOT ONLY IS A THRIVING ALUMINUM INDUSTRY CRUCIAL TO 

OUR NATION’S NATIONAL SECURITY, CERTAIN FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL 

POLICIES POSE A SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO THE U.S. ALUMINUM INDUSTRY 

x	 THIS IS PARTICULARLY THE CASE WITH CHINA, AND MORE RECENTLY 

MALAYSIA AND VIETNAM 

x	 WHILE ALUMINUM’S DEFENSE APPLICATIONS ARE EXTREMELY 

IMPORTANT, PROTECTING THAT SEGMENT OF THE MARKET ALONE IS NOT 

SUFFICIENT, ON ITS OWN, TO ENSURE THE CONTINUATION OF A VIABLE 

U.S. ALUMINUM INDUSTRY. 

x	 RATHER, THE ENTIRE U.S. ALUMINUM PRODUCTION CONTINUUM MUST 

BE PROTECTED 

*** 

x	 SO, WHAT IS REQUIRED TO PROTECT THE U.S. ALUMINUM INDUSTRY? 

x	 WELL, FIRST YOU MUST UNDERSTAND THE ALUMINUM CRISIS 

x	 THE CRISIS CONFRONTING THE U.S. ALUMINUM INDUSTRY IS CHINA, 

PLAIN AND SIMPLE 

x	 AS WITH OTHER CRITICAL INDUSTRIAL SECTORS, CHINA’S ALUMINUM 

STRATEGY IS TO CONTINUE TO BUILD PRODUCTION CAPACITY AND 

EMPLOY TENS OF THOUSANDS OF EXCESS WORKERS BY ARTIFICIALLY 

INCREASING ALUMINUM OUTPUT 

x	 CHINA USES MASSIVE SUBSIDIES AND OTHER PROTECTIONIST AND 

ENVIRONMENTALLY-DESTRUCTIVE POLICIES TO ACCOMPLISH THESE 

MARKET-DISTORTING OBJECTIVES 

x	 UNLESS PRESIDENT TRUMP AND THIS ADMINISTRATION TAKE DECISIVE, 

CORRECTIVE ACTION, THE U.S. ALUMINUM INDUSTRY’S ABILITY TO 
 

Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 110 

CONTINUE PRODUCING DEFENSE AND OTHER CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 

ITEMS MAY BE SET BACK PERMANENTLY OR DESTROYED 

x	 THE U.S. ALUMINUM INDUSTRY HAS PAID THE PRICE FOR CHINA’S SELFINTERESTED POLICIES, AS HAS OUR NATIONAL SECURIT 

x	 7 YEARS AGO, THE AEC LED THE CHARGE IN BRINGING ANTIDUMPING & 

COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES AGAINST CHINESE ALUMINUM 

EXTRUSIONS 

x	 SINCE IMPOSITION OF THE ORDERS, THE CHINESE HAVE WORKED 

OVERTIME DEVISING MULTIPLE TRANSSHIPMENT AND OTHER EVASION 

SCHEMES TO AVOID THE DUTIES 

x	 SIMILARLY, THE CHINESE ARE DEVEOPING PRODUCTION IN THIRDCOUNTRIES, INCLUDING MALAYSIA AND VIETNAM. 

x	 FOR EXAMPLE, IN VIETNAM, TO AVOID CHINA’S EXPORT TAX ON PRIMARY 

ALUMINUM, THE PRODUCTS ARE FABRICATED INTO EXTRUSIONS AND 

EXPORTED TO CHINESE-OWNED FACILITIES IN VIETNAM, WHERE IT IS 

REMELTED AND EXTRUDED AGAIN FOR EXPORT TO THE UNITED STATES 

IN VIOLATION OF OUR ORDERS. 

x	 CHINA’S PRACTICES HAVE HAD A DEVASTATING IMPACT ON THE U.S. 

ALUMINUM INDUSTRY, AS THEY HAVE FUNDAMENTALLY DISTORTED THE 

US MARKET 

*** 

x	 LET ME HIGHLIGHT HOW THE AEC BELIEVES THAT THE ADMINISTRATION 

SHOULD ADDRESS THE ALUMINUM CRISIS 

x	 KEY TO OUR RECOMMENDATIONS IS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION MUST 

ENSURE THAT ITS ACTIONS DO NOT REINFORCE OR EXACERBATE THE 

EXSITING DISTORTIVE CHINESE POLICIES. 

x	 AS SUCH, THE AEC DOES NOT SUPPORT THE IMPOSITION OF TARIFFS OR 

OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF PRIMARY ALUMINUM, AS THAT 

WILL SIMPLY REINFORCE CHINA’S ALUMINUM POLICY GOALS – 

ESPECIALLY SINCE CHINA DOES NOT EXPORT PRIMARY ALUMINUM! 

x	 IMPOSING TARIFFS ON PRIMARY ALUMINUM WOULD ADVERSELY IMPACT 

THE ABILITY OF U.S. SEMI-FABRICATED PRODUCERS, INCLUDING AEC’S 

MEMBERS AND CUSTOMERS, TO COMPETE AGAINST IMPORTS OF THEIR 

PRODUCTS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. 
Appendix B: Public Hearing Testimony Page 111 

x THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD INSTEAD SEEK TO RESTORE THE 

ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF THE U.S. ALUMINUM PRIMARY INDUSTRY AS A 

WHOLE BY ADDRESSING THE UNDERLYING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 

THAT HAS MADE THE PRIMARY INDUSTRY INCREASINGLY LESS 

COMPETITIVE 

*** 

x TO THE EXTENT THE ADMINISTRATION DETERMINES THAT TARIFFS /OR 

OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF PRIMARY ALUMINUM ARE 

NECESSARY, IT SHOULD ENSURE THAT U.S. PRODUCERS OF SEMIFABRICATED PRODUCTS, INCLUDING EXTRUSIONS, ARE NOT NEGATIVELY 

IMPACTED 

x REGARDING EXTRUSIONS, THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD IMPOSE DUTIES 

ON ALUMINUM EXTRUSIONS FROM COUNTRIES THAT ARE ALLOWING 

CHINA TO EVADE OUR ORDERS 

x THANK YOU 

* * * 
 

 

 

       

                 

       

       

APPENDIX C: Background on the Aluminum Industry 

Page 1

Aluminum is the most abundant naturally occurring metal in the Earth’s 

crust, and it is an essential element of modern life. Virtually every person in the 

United States, and indeed most of the world, uses aluminum every single day. 

More aluminum is consumed today than at any point in the 125-year history of the 

metal’s commercial production. Lightweight, corrosion resistant, easily formed, 

highly conductive, highly reflective, durable and recyclable—aluminum is a highly 

useful material for manufacturers. It offers a wide range of options for product 

innovation and process improvements. Aluminum is critical to modern mobility, 

increasing sustainability, and the national economy. 

Aluminum is used in a wide variety of applications, and global demand for it 

is expected to grow at an annual rate of 3.8 percent.1 Transportation applications, 

including aircraft and automobiles, account for 41 percent of domestic 

consumption, followed by packaging with 20 percent, building construction with 

15 percent, electrical with eight percent, and machinery with seven percent.2

 One 

of the factors driving increasing demand for aluminum is its ability to reduce 

weight, thereby improving energy efficiency. 

Aluminum originates from bauxite, an ore typically found in the topsoil of 

various tropical and subtropical regions; the United States is not a significant 

source of bauxite as it cannot be economically extracted here. Once mined, 

aluminum within the bauxite ore is chemically extracted in a refinery into alumina, 

an aluminum oxide compound. In a second step, the alumina is smelted to produce 

pure aluminum metal. (See Figure C-1). 

The domestic aluminum industry directly employs nearly 161,000 workers 

and generates $75 billion a year in direct economic output.3

 For each aluminum 

industry job, an additional 3.4 employment positions are created elsewhere in the 

economy. In total, 713,000 U.S. jobs are supported by the production, processing 

and use of aluminum. When all suppliers and related business functions are taken 

into account, the industry drives $186 billion in economic output—more than one 

percent of GDP.4 

1 The Aluminum Association

2 U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Series, January 2017

3 The Aluminum Association

4 The Aluminum Association
 

 

 

APPENDIX C: Background on the Aluminum Industry 

Page 2

The aluminum industry can be divided into three basic segments: upstream, 

downstream, and secondary. The upstream sector includes primary or 

“unwrought” aluminum production, in which aluminum is produced from raw 

materials. It includes companies engaged in bauxite mining. After extraction, the 

bauxite is sent to a refinery, where it is processed into alumina (aluminum oxide). 

The alumina is then sent to a smelter, where it is transformed into primary 

aluminum. Primary aluminum is mainly produced in the form of ingots and billets, 

and is the starting block for the production of aluminum products. Major U.S. 

players in the primary aluminum industry include Alcoa, Inc. and Century 

Aluminum. 

Primary aluminum production is highly electricity intensive; electricity can 

account for up to 40 percent of the costs of production. For this reason, primary 

aluminum production facilities are often located near sources of lower cost energy, 

such as hydroelectric power. Although incremental technological progress has 

been made over the past several decades, electric power costs remain a critical 

issue for this industry. Aluminum smelters in the U.S. have incurred hikes in 

electricity costs as long-term lower-cost supply contracts with power suppliers 

have expired. Efforts to find low-cost revolutionary primary metal production 

technology have been ongoing for half a century, but a breakthrough has yet to be 

achieved. 

The majority of U.S. aluminum production today is based on recycled scrap, 

called secondary production. The United States is the world’s leading producer 

of secondary unwrought aluminum, due to its long established aluminum recycling 

industry. The secondary production process begins with extracting used aluminum 

from waste streams (from both the manufacturing process and from post-consumer 

sources) and getting it ready for recycling. 

Once the scrap is collected and sorted, it is melted in a furnace and turned 

into molten aluminum. This molten aluminum may be kept in its liquid state, or 

cast into large slabs called ingots or billets. In some cases, alloying elements are 

added to the liquid aluminum in order to produce the desired metal for a specific 

product type. Aluminum ingots may be rolled back into a sheet product (like can or 

auto body sheet) while billets can be extruded into a shaped product. By 

reprocessing scrap aluminum, secondary production uses only 10 percent of the 

electricity required for primary aluminum smelting. This energy efficiency has 

been the driving force for the rise of the secondary production sector over the past 

the three decades. 
                            

   

Aluminum: The Element of Sustainability; The Aluminum Association, September 2011 and USGS Mineral

Commodity Series.

5
  

     

APPENDIX C: Background on the Aluminum Industry 

Page 4

Two main manufacturing techniques used to make downstream aluminum 

products are casting and forging. Casting is a way of forming aluminum into 

intricate shapes. The automotive industry is the largest market for cast aluminum, 

which is often used in transmission housings, engine parts, mounts, and suspension 

parts. Aluminum cookware is another cast product in everyday use. 

Forging, in which aluminum billets are pressed or squeezed under pressure, 

is used to produce high-strength parts used in aerospace and automotive 

applications including pistons, gears, and wheels. 

Figure C‐1.

Source: The Aluminum Association
Appendix D: Trade Actions Related to Aluminum 

Page 1 

At the request of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and

Means, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) launched an 

investigation on April 6, 2016 to examine the U.S. aluminum industry and global 

aluminum trade. The USITC investigation examined industry characteristics, 

factors related to increased capacity, competitive strengths and weaknesses, recent 

trade trends, and the effect of government policies on production and trade of 

aluminum. The USITC also assessed the impact of foreign government policies in 

select countries on their domestic production, consumption, exports, and prices of 

aluminum. USITC’s report was made public in June 2017. 

In January 2017, the United States delegation launched a World Trade 

Organization (WTO) trade enforcement complaint concerning China’s subsidies to 

certain producers of primary aluminum. The United States alleges that the Chinese 

Government has provided low-cost financing and inputs to its primary aluminum

producers, which displaced and impeded U.S. imports of primary aluminum into 

China and the global market, suppressed global prices, and increased China’s 

global market share.

1

 The complaint contends that Chinese subsidies appear to 

have caused serious prejudice under WTO rules to U.S. interests. The USTR 

requested consultations with China at the WTO regarding China’s subsidies to its

primary aluminum producers since 2007, but to no avail. 

In April 2017, the USITC determined in an antidumping investigation that 

there is a reasonable indication that imports of aluminum foil from China are 

subsidized and sold in the United States at less than fair value. Because of the

ruling, the U.S. Department of Commerce continued to conduct its portion of the 

antidumping and countervailing duty investigations to determine if the U.S. 

industry had been injured by these unfairly traded imports. 

The investigations were started in March 2017 at the request of the 

Aluminum Association Trade Enforcement Working Group and are the first trade 

action ever initiated by the Association. The U.S. Department of Commerce 

announced its preliminary determination on August 8, 2017. The investigation 

determined that exporters of foil from China received subsidies ranging from 16.56 

percent to 80.97 percent. The final determination is scheduled to be announced 

early in 2018. 

Twelve years ago, U.S. production accounted for about 84 percent of all domestic 

aluminum foil consumption. Today that has dropped to 69 percent. During the 

1 https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/trade_bulletins/May%202017%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf
     

Appendix D: Trade Actions Related to Aluminum 

Page 2 

same time, Chinese imports grew from essentially zero percent of the total U.S. 

aluminum foil market in 2004 to 22 percent of the market in 2017.2

 

The aluminum foil investigation follows actions taken on aluminum

extrusions from China. In June 2015 the U.S. Department of Commerce 

established dumping margins of 32.79 percent ad valorum for aluminum extrusions

shipped by 39 companies. However, due to the limited scope of these 

antidumping and countervailing duty investigations, any remedies will not be

applicable to the broader aluminum industry. WTO rules require cases to be very 

specific as to product and origin; they therefore are easily avoidable by means of 

transshipment. 

On May 26, 2011, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued CVD and AD 

orders on imports of certain aluminum extrusions from China. Commerce issued 

the orders after determining that imports of this product are subsidized and are 

being sold in the United States at less than fair value, and the USITC determined 

that a U.S. industry is materially injured by such imports. In 2016, Commerce and 

USITC initiated five-year “sunset” reviews of these orders. Both agencies 

determined that there was a need to continue these orders, and on April 17, 2017 

Commerce published a notice continuing them. 

2 Aluminum Association
         

                           

              

     

Appendix E: Global Excess Aluminum Production 

Page 1 

There is widely acknowledged massive overcapacity and oversupply in the 

world aluminum market, as a direct result of the dramatic increase in aluminum 

production, primarily in China, over the past 15 years. This oversupply has had a 

devastating effect on the worldwide aluminum industry. As a result, a number of 

countries, including the United Kingdom, Japan, and the European Union members 

banded together with the United States through the WTO in December 2017 to 

confront China over its excess industrial capacity. 

The situation was described in detail in hearings held by the International 

Trade Commission as part of their ongoing investigation and in written 

submissions provided to the USITC.1 Many of the organizations that testified, 

including Century Aluminum (Kentucky), various members of the downstream

aluminum industry in the United States, and Canadian, European and Russian 

producers, stated that the world's primary aluminum producers are effectively being 

decimated by Chinese overcapacity (See figure D-1), and by the unfair practices of 

Chinese aluminum producers. The pressure on the U.S. and the global aluminum 

industry posed by Chinese excess production is also highlighted in the U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission’s 2016 Annual Report to Congress.2

The public comments received as part of this investigation and testimonies 

given during the public hearing held on June 22, 2017 were nearly unanimous in 

describing the devastating impact that Chinese overcapacity and unfair trade 

practices have had on the domestic aluminum industry, both upstream and 

downstream sectors. (See Appendix A.) 

In 2000, China produced about 11 percent of the world’s primary aluminum; 

in 2017, it produced more than 50 percent.3

 It is by far the world’s largest producer 

of aluminum, as well as the world’s largest consumer of aluminum. China’s 

massive investments in infrastructure and its role as the world’s largest assembler 

of electronic equipment (which has substantial aluminum content) accounts for its 

increase in domestic aluminum consumption. The Chinese aluminum industry, 

with the strong support of its government, has expanded far beyond its domestic 

needs, and is unresponsive to market signals. It defies manufacturing economics. 

1 Public transcripts available through https://edis.usitc.gov/edis3‐external/external.svc

2 U.S.‐China Economic and Security Commission “Sector Spotlight: U.S. Aluminum Sector Under Pressure from

China.” USCC Annual Report to Congress, 2016

3 Aluminum Association
        

                             

               

                     

4 World Aluminum Institute

5 Cited in U.S.‐China Economic and Security Commission “Sector Spotlight: U.S. Aluminum Sector Under Pressure

from China.” USCC Annual Report to Congress, 2016.

6 Bloomberg. China's Aluminum Glut May Worsen as Capacity Growth Sustained.
     

         

     

         

             

 

Appendix E: Global Excess Aluminum Production 

Page 3 

Figure D-1 – Global Primary Aluminum Production 

Figure D-2 – Global and Chinese Primary Aluminum Production and Capacity 

2012-2016 

(Millions of Metric Tons) 

PRODUCTION 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 

China 20.3 22.1 24.4 31.4 31.0

Rest of World 25.6 25.5 26.1 26.1 26.6

Total 45.9 47.6 50.5 57.5 57.6 

China as a % Total 44.2% 46.4% 48.3% 54.6% 53.8%

CAPACITY 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 

China 26.9 32.0 35.0 38.6 40.1

Rest of World 30.1 30.9 31.9 32.6 32.4

TOTAL 57.0 62.9 66.9 71.2 72.5 

China as % of Total 47.2% 50.9% 52.3% 54.2% 55.3%

Source: U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2013‐2016
             

         

Appendix E: Global Excess Aluminum Production 

Page 4 

China’s excess aluminum production is flooding global markets in the 

form of exports, which totaled 3.9 million metric tons in 2016. This figure is over 

four times U.S. production. 

Figure D-3 – China’s Aluminum Exports 

United States

14%

Vietnam 11%

Japan 8%

India 5%

South Korea 5%

Thailand 4%

All Others 53%

Source: China Customs, accessed through Global Trade Atlas.

Total export quantity: 3.9 million metric tons.

Figure D-4 – China’s Aluminum Exports by Partner Country, 2016 
 

                         

Appendix E: Global Excess Aluminum Production 

Page 5 

The impact that Chinese overproduction has had on the U.S. aluminum 

industry is twofold. Chinese overcapacity has suppressed global aluminum prices. 

As a global commodity traded on metal exchanges such as the London Metals 

Exchange (LME), prices are primarily driven by global supply and demand, 

regardless of where the aluminum is produced. Thus, the impact of Chinese 

overcapacity has been transferred to the U.S. aluminum market. The LME market 

price for aluminum fell 39 percent between 2007 and 2016. 

The most direct and dramatic effect has been on U.S. primary aluminum 

producers (smelters). Eight U.S. smelters have either closed or curtailed 

production since 2014, leaving only two fully operational at 100 percent capacity; 

in contrast, China has 180 operational smelters. The decline in U.S. production has 

occurred despite growing demand for aluminum both in the U.S. and abroad. With 

the flood of excess Chinese aluminum, the price of aluminum in world markets 

plummeted in recent years to levels at which U.S. smelters could not continue to 

operate profitably. In an industry with high fixed costs, many domestic producers 

have not survived the prolonged period of low prices. 

Despite promises by the Chinese Government to curtail capacity, there has 

been little voluntary shutdown of production. In fact, some plants that had closed 

in 2015 have been restarted. Primary output by Chinese smelters for the first 5 

months of 2017 was up nearly 9 percent from 2016 levels. And while the Chinese 

Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) has approved 30 million 

tons of smelting capacity, the country’s total capacity is estimated to be 43 million 

tons, suggesting that there is 13 million tons of illegal capacity.7 

The overcapacity situation has had an impact, beyond smelters, on the entire 

continuum of aluminum production. Chinese industrial policy is designed to 

capture control of the entire value chain from primary aluminum through 

downstream products. Chinese policy discourages export of primary aluminum 

through a 15 percent export tax; Chinese downstream aluminum producers are able 

to obtain primary aluminum at a price advantage on the Shanghai Futures 

Exchange, which regularly has price advantage compared to the LME. Moreover, 

Chinese downstream aluminum producers are able to profit from at VAT rebate on 

their exports of between 13-17 percent. Thus, the excess Chinese aluminum 

production is not being exported in the form of unwrought aluminum; rather, it is 

being processed into sheet, plate, foil and other semi-manufactures, which are then 

7 Bloomberg Intelligence, “Political Curtailment Alone Can’t Alleviate China Overcapacity,” June 25, 2017.
 

                 

                                 

   

                             

       

Appendix E: Global Excess Aluminum Production 

Page 6 

being exported to the United States (and elsewhere) at record levels (see Figure D3). Furthermore, China’s interest and skill in value-added aluminum products is 

increasing – progressing from simple manufactures such as extrusions and foil and 

targeting growth sectors such as automotive plate. 

As a result of these unfair prices advantages, U.S. imports of semifabricated aluminum products from China grew 183 percent between 2013 and 

2015, before leveling off in 2016.8

 Some of these imports into the United States 

are come directly from China, but China is also exporting to other countries in Asia 

such as Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand for transshipment into U.S. markets (see 

Figure D-4). 

There is growing evidence that some of the semi-manufactures traded 

around the world are in fact being remelted as a substitute for primary aluminum. 

One company testified9

 that in some cases, semi-fabricated products from China, 

such as coil and rod, are being offered at prices below the LME-based price of 

primary metal. This price advantage occurs because the Chinese tax system 

discourages the export of primary aluminum through an excise duty of 15 percent, 

whereas exports of semi-finished goods are encouraged through a value-added tax 

rebate. Moreover, while the U.S. has imposed antidumping/countervailing duties 

on certain aluminum products (e.g., extrusions) from China, transshipping these 

items through other countries such as Vietnam circumvents these duties.10 

While the impact of Chinese overcapacity on downstream U.S. producers 

has been limited to date (in part because of growing demand for aluminum in such 

sectors as automotive) it is apparent that the entire U.S. aluminum sector is 

vulnerable to the market distortions that China is causing. 

8 Aluminum Association, based on U.S. Census Bureau statistics

9 Statement of Henry Gordinier, CEO of Tri‐Arrows Aluminum, Inc., before the U.S. Department of Commerce, June

22, 2017

10 Testimony of Garney Scott, Chairman of the Aluminum Association, before the U.S. International Trade

Commission, September 29, 2016