UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KRISTIE BRYERTON, : No. 4:05-CV-1987

 :

Plaintiff, : (Notice of removal filed 9/30/05)

 :

v. : Judge Muir

 :

NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE :

COMPANY, :

 : 

Defendant :

ORDER

March 20, 2006

THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:

Plaintiff Kristie Bryerton initiated this action on

September 2, 2005, by filing a complaint in the Court of Common

Pleas of Clinton County, Pennsylvania. By way of a notice filed

on September 30, 2005, Defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance

Company (hereinafter “Nationwide”) removed the matter to this

court. Bryerton’s sole claim is that Nationwide has improperly

failed to pay her insurance claim for underinsured motorist

benefits. The relief she seeks is a declaratory judgment.

On February 10, 2006, the parties filed a document entitled

“Joint Submission of Stipulated Facts” which provides in relevant

part as follows: 

20. The sole issue before the Court in this declaratory

judgment action is whether Plaintiff is entitled to

underinsured motorist benefits pursuant to the Nationwide

policy, 5827D133576, and Endorsement 2360 to said policy.

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21. The parties agree that there are no genuine issues of

material fact and that it is appropriate for Your Honorable

Court to resolve this issue as a matter of law based upon

cross-motions for Summary Judgment to be filed by Plaintiff

and Defendant.

(Joint Submission of Stipulated Facts, ¶¶20, 21) 

On February 10, 2006, Bryerton filed her motion for summary

judgment. A brief in support of that motion was filed on

February 13, 2006. Nationwide filed its opposition brief on

February 20, 2006. Bryerton filed her reply brief on February

20, 2006.

On February 27, 2006, Nationwide filed its summary judgment

motion and a supporting brief. Bryerton filed her opposition

brief on March 8, 2006. Nationwide filed its reply brief on

March 14, 2006, thereby ripening both summary judgment motions

for disposition.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no

genuine issue of material fact which is unresolved and the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56©. Initially, the moving party has the burden of

demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corporation vs. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This

may be met by the moving party pointing out to the court that

there is an absence of evidence to support an essential element

as to which the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Id. at 325.

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Rule 56 provides that, where such a motion is made and

properly supported, the adverse party must show by affidavits,

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e). The United States Supreme Court has commented

that this requirement is tantamount to the non-moving party

making a sufficient showing as to the essential elements of its

case that a reasonable jury could find in its favor. Celotex

Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

The same standard governs cross-motions for summary

judgment. Continental Ins. Co. v. Kubek, 86 F. Supp. 2d 503, 505

n.2 (E.D. Pa. 2000)(Katz, J.)(citing Appelmans vs. Philadelphia,

826 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1987)). When considering such crossmotions “each motion must be considered separately, and each side

must still establish a lack of genuine issues of material fact

and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Nolen v.

Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 211, 213 (E.D. Pa.

1998)(Robreno, J.). With those principles in mind we turn to the

material facts of this case, all of which have been presented to

us in the parties’ “Joint Submission of Stipulated Facts.”

Plaintiff, Kristie Bryerton, is an adult individual residing

at 821 Woodward Avenue, Lock Haven, Clinton County, PA 17745. On

June 2, 2003, Plaintiff was, and still is, married to Justin

Bryerton, residing at 821 Woodward Avenue, Lock Haven, Clinton

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County, PA 17745. Plaintiff’s husband, Justin Bryerton, owned a

1996 Honda Accord motor vehicle.

The Bryerton vehicle was insured under a policy of motor

vehicle insurance issued by Horace Mann Insurance Company

(hereinafter “Horace Mann”). The Horace Mann policy contained

underinsurance motorist benefits in the amount of $15,000 per

person/$30,000 per occurrence. As a resident relative (wife) of

Justin Bryerton, Plaintiff, Kristie Bryerton, was an “insured”

under the Horace Mann policy for underinsured motorist benefits

on June 2, 2003.

On June 2, 2003, Kristie Bryerton was a passenger in the

1996 Honda Accord owned by her husband. The operator of the

vehicle was Kristie Bryerton’s father, David L. Masters. Other

occupants of the motor vehicle included David Masters’ wife (who

is Plaintiff’s mother), Sharon Masters, and Plaintiff’s husband,

Justin Bryerton.

On June 2, 2003, at approximately 7:22 p.m., David Masters

was driving the vehicle north on Route 64 in Walker Township,

Centre County, Pennsylvania. At that time and place, a vehicle

driven by Gloria Ring of 211 East College Avenue, Pleasant Gap,

Pennsylvania, was proceeding southbound on Route 64. Ms. Ring

attempted to pass a vehicle proceeding southbound in front of her

and, in doing so, lost control of her vehicle causing it to cross

the centerline and strike the Bryerton vehicle. All occupants of

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the Bryerton vehicle, including Plaintiff Kristie Bryerton,

suffered injuries as a result of the collision.

The collision was caused by the negligence of Gloria Ring. 

At the time of the accident, Gloria Ring was insured under a

policy of insurance issued by Nationwide containing bodily injury

liability limits of $30,000 per occurrence. As a result of the

collision and injuries to the occupants of the Bryerton vehicle,

Nationwide, on behalf of its insured, Gloria Ring, paid its

policy limits of $30,000, which was divided among the injured

occupants of the Bryerton vehicle, i.e., Plaintiff Kristie

Bryerton, Justin Bryerton, David Masters and Sharon Masters. As

defined by the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial

Responsibility Act (75 Pa.C.S. § 1701, et seq.), Gloria Ring was

an “underinsured motorist.”

After exhaustion of the policy limits of Gloria Ring’s

Nationwide liability policy, Plaintiff Kristie Bryerton, Justin

Bryerton, David Masters, and Sharon Masters made claims for

underinsured motorist benefits from the Horace Mann policy

covering the vehicle they were occupying at the time of the

collision. The $30,000 underinsured motorist benefits provided

by the Horace Mann policy was divided among Plaintiff Kristie

Bryerton, Justin Bryerton, David Masters and Sharon Masters.

At the time of the collision, the driver of the Bryerton

vehicle, David Masters, was insured under another policy of motor

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vehicle insurance issued by Nationwide, Policy No. 5837D133576. 

Said policy provided underinsured motorist benefits in the amount

of $100,000 per person, $300,000 per occurrence. David and

Sharon Masters made claims for underinsured motorist benefits

under the aforesaid policy and were each paid the $100,000 limit

for an individual.

Plaintiff Kristie Bryerton made a claim for underinsured

motorist benefits under the aforesaid Nationwide Policy No.

5837D133576. Defendant Nationwide denied that Plaintiff was

entitled to underinsured motorist benefits under the policy. The

denial was based upon the applicable policy and endorsements,

specifically the “Other Persons” provision of endorsement 2360 as

communicated by Nationwide to Bryerton’s counsel by letter dated

March 15, 2005.

The relevant portion of Endorsement 2360 provides as

follows:

OTHER PERSONS

We will also pay compensatory damages ... to other persons

who ... [a]re not a named insured or an insured household

member for similar coverage under another policy ....

(Nationwide Policy Number 5837D133576, Endorsement 2360)

At the time of the collision, David and Sharon Masters

resided at 115 Beech Tree Lane, Lock Haven, PA. Plaintiff

Kristie Bryerton was not a named insured under the Nationwide

Policy No. 5837D133576.

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As a result of the parties’ agreement upon those facts, the

parties represent to us that 

[t]he sole issue before the Court in this declaratory

judgment action is whether Plaintiff is entitled to

underinsured motorist benefits pursuant to the Nationwide

policy, 5837D133576, and Endorsement 2360 to said policy.

(Appellants’ Brief, p. 2) Based upon the specific policy

language at issue, the definitive question is whether or not

Kristie Bryerton was “a named insured or an insured household

member for similar coverage under another policy.” (Nationwide

Policy Number 5837D133576, Endorsement 2360) With respect to the

applicable law, the parties further agree that in resolving the

issue presented to us we are to “apply Pennsylvania’s clear,

well-settled rules governing the interpretation of an insurance

contract.” Nationwide Mutual Inc. Co. v. Reidler, 2000 WL 424286,

*1 (E.D.Pa. April 19, 2000)(Katz, J.). 

Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that where a

policy provision is unclear and ambiguous, a court is required to

construe the language in favor of the policyholder. Madison

Construction Co. V. Harleysville Mutual Ins. Co., 557 Pa. 595,

606, 735 A.2d 100, 106 (1999). However, full effect should be

given to policy language which is clear and free from doubt. Id. 

“Contractual language is ambiguous ‘if it is reasonably

susceptible of different constructions and capable of being

understood in more than one sense.’” Id. (citations omitted). 

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In determining whether a provision of an insurance policy is

ambiguous, the terms or language in question are to be considered

in the context of the entire policy and not set apart from the

remaining provisions that are clear or free from doubt. Riccio v.

American Republic Insurance Co., 453 Pa.Super. 364, 373, 683 A.2d

1226, 1231 (1996). Moreover, a court is not to distort or alter

the meaning of contractual terms in an effort to find an

ambiguity in the contract. Madison Construction Co., 557 Pa. at

606, 735 A.2d at 106. “[T]he court should read policy provisions

so as to avoid ambiguity and not twist the language or rewrite

the contract to create doubts where none exist.” Nationwide

Mutual Ins. Co. v. Reidler, 2000 WL 424286, *2 (E.D.Pa. April 19,

2000)(Katz, J.)(citing Medical Protective Co. v. Watkins, 198

F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1999); Northbrook Ins. Co. v. Kuljian

Corp., 690 F.2d 368, 372 (3d Cir.1982); Madison Construction Co.,

557 Pa. 595, 606, 735 A.2d 100, 106 (1999)).

Our analysis begins with the provisions of the policy

relating to underinsured motorist coverage. The policy

endorsement at issue, number 2360, provides in relevant as

follows:

COVERAGE AGREEMENT

YOU AND A RELATIVE

We will pay compensatory damages, including derivative

claims, which are due by law to you or a relative from the

owner or driver of an underinsured motor vehicle because of

bodily injury suffered by you or a relative. ...

Case 4:05-cv-01987-MM Document 28 Filed 03/20/06 Page 8 of 12
1. Bryerton does not contend that she qualifies for coverage

because she is a “relative” of David masters. The definition of

“relative” in the policy covers only those who live in David

Masters’s household. Bryerton does not live in that household and

therefore is not a “relative” of Masters as that term is defined in

the policy.

9

OTHER PERSONS

We will also pay compensatory damages, including derivative

claims, which are due by law to other persons who ... [a]re

not a named insured or an insured household member for

similar coverage under another policy ....

(Nationwide Policy Number 5837D133576, Endorsement 2360) The

bold terms which are not upper case are defined in the policy.1

 

Kristie Bryerton argues that she is not “a named insured or

an insured household member for similar coverage under another

policy.” She concedes that if she falls into either category

described in that sentence, then she is not entitled to

underinsured motorist benefits. 

We will first consider whether Kristie Bryerton was “an

insured household member for similar coverage under another

policy.” (Id.) Bryerton’s position is that she

is not a household member of the policyholders ... and

therefore, Plaintiff should qualify for coverage under this

condition. “Household member” must be interpreted to modify

the policyholders, the Masters, as this is the Masters’

insurance policy and there is no other express language

referring to whom “household member” is supposed to modify.

(Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, pp. 3-4).

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The potential insurance coverage of members of the Masters’s

household is addressed in the first paragraph of Endorsement

2360, entitled “You and a Relative.” The term “relative” is

defined to mean “one who regularly lives in your household.”

(Nationwide Policy Number 5837D133576, p. 2) The “household”

mentioned in the second paragraph in Endorsement 2360 does not,

as Bryerton would have us conclude, refer exclusively to the

Masters’s household. 

When both the first and second paragraphs of Endorsement

2360 are considered, as Pennsylvania law requires us to do, we

are of the view that “an insured household member for similar

coverage under another policy” refers to any other policy.

According to the undisputed facts, Kristie Bryerton received

underinsured motorist benefits pursuant to the policy issued by

Horace Mann. Moreover, “[a]s a resident relative (wife) of

Justin Bryerton, Plaintiff, Kristie Bryerton, was an ‘insured’

under the Horace Mann policy for underinsured motorist benefits

on June 2, 2003.” (Joint Submission of Stipulated Facts, p. 2,

¶6) According to those undisputed facts, Kristie Bryerton was

“an insured household member for similar coverage under another

policy.” (Nationwide Policy Number 5837D133576, Endorsement 2360)

In her motion for summary judgment, Bryerton also argues

that her coverage under the Horace Mann policy cannot be

considered “similar” because the total dollar amount of coverage

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under the Horace Mann policy was substantially less than that

provided under the Nationwide policy. We are of the view that in

considering whether coverage is “similar” the relevant

consideration is the qualitative nature, and not the quantitative

amount, of the coverage. We view the Horace Mann coverage to be

similar to the Nationwide coverage because the insurance at issue

in both policies was for underinsured motorist benefits.

Nationwide’s refusal to provide underinsured motorist

benefits under its policy is supported by the policy’s language. 

We will grant Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment and deny

Kristie Bryerton’s summary judgment motion.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Nationwide’s summary judgment motion (Document 23) is

granted.

2. Kristie Bryerton’s summary judgment motion (Document

17) is denied.

3. The Clerk of Court shall enter a declaratory judgment

in favor of Nationwide providing that the language in

Endorsement 2360 of Nationwide Policy No. 5837D133576

disqualifies Kristie Bryerton from receiving

underinsured motorist coverage under that policy.

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4. The Clerk of Court shall close this case.

 s/Malcolm Muir 

 MUIR, U.S. District Judge

MM:ga

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