UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

The War in the Pacific 

LEYTE: THE RETURN TO 

THE PHILIPPINES 

by 

M. Hamlin CannoTI 

eLlYnR OF M I U TA I? Y f-IISTOR Y 

UNITED STA7ES II NN/)" 

WIISf-IIN(;TON, D.C. , 1993 





Foreword

With the Leyte Campaign the War in the Pacific entered a decisive stage.

The period of limited offensives, bypassing, and island hopping was virtually

over. American troops in greater numbers than ever before assembled in the

Pacific Theater, supported by naval and air forces of corresponding size, fought

and overcame Japanese forces of greater magnitude than any previously met.

Though the spotlight is on the front-line fighting, the reader will find in this

volume a faithful description of all arms and services performing their missions.

The account is not exclusively an infantry story. It covers as well the support of

ground fighting on Leyte by large-scale naval operations and by land-based air

power under the most adverse conditions. In addition, careful attention to

logistical matters, such as the movement of supplies and the evacuation of the

wounded, gives the reader a picture of the less spectacular activities of an army

in battle.

Washington, D.C.

30 January 1953

ORLANDO WARD

Maj. Gen., U.S.A.

Chief of Military History

vii
The Author

M. Hamlin Cannon received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History

from the American University of Washington, D.C. He is already known to

American historians for his writings on Mormon and Civil War history which

have appeared in historical journals. During World War II he served with the

Navy in Australia and New Guinea.

viii
Preface

The landing of the American forces on Leyte on 20 October 1944 brought to

fruition the long-cherished desire of General Douglas MacArthur to return to the

Philippine Islands and avenge the humiliating reverses suffered in the early days

of World War II. The successful conclusion of the campaign separated the

Japanese-held Philippine Archipelago into two parts, with a strong American

force between them. More important, it completed the severance of the Japanese

mainland from the stolen southern empire in the Netherlands Indies from which

oil, the lifeblood of modern warfare, had come.

The Leyte Campaign, like other campaigns in the Pacific, was waged on the

land, in the air, and on and under the sea. In this operation all branches of the

American armed forces played significant roles. Therefore, although the emphasis

in this volume is placed upon the deeds of the United States Army ground soldier,

the endeavors of the aviator, the sailor, the marine and the Filipino guerrilla have

been integrated as far as possible into the story in order to make the campaign

understandable in its entirety. At the same time, every effort has been made to give

the Japanese side of the story.

Obviously, to include every exploit of every branch of the armed forces, of the

Filipinos, and of the Japanese would be far beyond the compass of a single volume.

A careful selectivity was necessary throughout in order to avoid the Scylla of

omission while skirting the Charybdis of oversimplification. Despite these precautions, because of the nature of the available documentary evidence, I may have

unwittingly fallen into some of the very pitfalls that I tried to avoid.

I wish to express my sincere gratitude and thanks to the many people who have

given fully of their time and talents in the preparation of this volume.

Especial thanks are due to Dr. John Miller, jr., who, during his tenure as

Chief of the Pacific Section, Office of the Chief of Military History, carefully

reviewed the final draft of the manuscript. His sound advice and constructive

criticism eliminated many a roadblock. I wish, also, to thank Dr. Louis Morton,

Chief of the Pacific Section, under whose direction this volume was started; he

made constructive criticism of several of the chapters. Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian, Department of the Army, devoted much time and effort to

reviewing the manuscript and his many penetrating comments on the various

chapters were invaluable.

ix
Appreciation is due to the people of the Historical Records Section, Departmental Records Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, who helped to locate

source material and furnished working space for me and the records. To Mrs. Lois

Aldridge, Mrs. Frances Bowen, Mrs. Clyde Christian, Miss Margaret Emerson,

Mrs. Ellen Garrison, Mr. Robert Greathouse, Miss Matilda Huber, Mrs. Margarite

Kerstetter, Mr. Wilbur Nigh, Miss Sue D. Wallace, and Miss Thelma K.

Yarborough—thanks.

I wish also to thank the members of the U.S. Air Force Historical Division,

Air University, and the Naval History Branch, Naval Records and History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, for placing at my disposal the

pertinent air and naval records.

Thanks are also due to the members of the historical sections of the U. S.

Navy and the U. S. Air Force and to the many participating commanders of

various branches of the U. S. armed forces who read all or parts of the

manuscript.

The late W. Brooks Phillips started the editing of the manuscript. He was

succeeded by Col. B.A. Day, Chief of the Editorial and Publication Division, and

Mrs. Loretto Stevens. Mrs. Stevens also prepared the final copy for the printer.

Miss Mary Ann Bacon prepared the index.

Mrs. Martha Willoughby, in addition to accomplishing the arduous task of

interpreting my handwriting, typed many of the drafts of the manuscript and saw

that the subject and predicate agreed. Mrs. Wynona Hayden, Mrs. Stella Hess,

and Mrs. Michael Miller also typed parts of the manuscript. Miss Elizabeth

Armstrong painstakingly typed the final copy.

Mr. Wsevelod Aglaimoff and Lt. Col. Robert F. O'Donnell, as well as other

members of the Cartographic Branch, spent many months in research for and

preparation of the maps. At the time this volume was being prepared for publication, no reliable maps of Leyte were available. The maps for this volume are based

on the highly inaccurate maps used by the troops during the operation. The relief

in particular, as shown on these maps, has little in common with the terrain

configuration which confronted the troops. Thus, both military and geographical

information as given on the maps in the volume should be regarded only as an

approximation of the actual situation at the time of the battle.

Major Arthur T. Lawry selected and edited the photographs used in this

volume. Lt. Roger Pineau (USNR) furnished me the photograph of General

Suzuki. Mr. Israel Wice and his capable assistants in the General Reference

Branch were helpful at crucial stages of the manuscript.

My sincere appreciation and thanks go to Maj. Gen. Harry A. Maloney,

Chief of Military History, and to his successors, Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward and

Maj. Gen. Albert C. Smith, as well as to members of their staffs, for their

understanding and co-operation.

Washington, D. C.

15 June 1953

M. HAMLIN CANNON

x
Contents

Chapter

I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

T H E STRATEGIC PLAN ................ .

Preliminary Discussion .................. .

Plans Agreed Upon ................... .

T HE NATURE OF THE TARGET ............ .

Geography of Leyte ....................

The Resistance Movement on Leyte ............. .

Liaison Between Leyte and Australia ............. .

PLANS ARE MADE AND FORCES ARE READIED .... .

Estimate of the Enemy Situation .............. .

T h e Tactical Plan ................... .

T h e Logistical Plan ................... .

THE RETURN ......................

T h e Convoy Forms ................... .

Softening the Target ....................

Japanese Plan o f Defense ................. .

Securing the Channel Approaches ...............

The Convoy Enters Leyte Gulf ............... .

A DAY: 2 0 OCTOBER 1944 ............... .

Bombardment of the Shores of Leyte ............. .

X Corps Goes Ashore ................... .

XXIV Corps Goes Ashore ................. .

Bringing in Supplies ....................

T H E JAPANESE REACTION ............... .

The Air Forces ......................

The Battle of Leyte Gulf ................. .

The Japanese Reinforce the Leyte Garrison .......... .

SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE ........ .

T h e SHO Operations ................. .

Enlarging the 96th Division Beachhead ............ .

Catmon Hill Area .................... .

Page

1

1

8

10

10

14

18

21

21

23

35

40

40

42

45

54

58

60

60

62

72

80

85

85

88

92

103

103

107

114

xi
Chapter

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

XII.

XIII.

XIV.

XV.

XVI.

SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO ....... .

T h e Dulag—Burauen Road ................ .

Securing the XXIV Corps Beachhead Line ........... .

NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE ....... .

S a n Juanico Strait .................. .

Leyte Valley Entrance .................. .

NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO ....... .

Drive up Leyte Valley .................. .

Capture o f Carigara ................... .

LOGISTICS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS ............ .

Logistics ....................... .

Medical Support .................... .

Civil Affairs ...................... .

Relations With Filipino Refugees .............. .

THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART ONE ........ .

T h e Coastal Corridor .................. .

Battle of Breakneck Ridge ................. .

THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART TWO ........ .

Reinforcements ..................... .

32d Division Assumes the Offensive ............. .

Battle of Kilay Ridge .................. .

Central Mountain Range .................. .

MEASURE OF THE FIGHTING ..............

T he American Ground Forces ................ .

Japanese Warfare .................... .

BATTLE OF THE RIDGES ................ .

American Plans an d Preparations .............. .

Battle o f Shoestring Ridge ................. .

Battles of the Hills. ....................

T H E FALL O F ORMOC ................. .

Plan for Amphibious Movement ................

T h e Movement Overwater ................. .

Drive Toward Ormoc .................. .

Two Sevens Are Rolled in Ormoc .............. .

Page

124

124

133

146

146

157

168

168

179

184

184

192

198

200

206

206

211

221

221

223

227

235

244

244

251

253

253

257

266

275

276

280

284

290

xii
Chapter

XVII.

XVIII.

XIX.

XX.

XXI.

XXII.

BATTLE OF THE AIRSTRIPS .............. .

T h e American Dispositions ................ .

First Japanese Effort ................... .

Battle of Buri Airstrip .................. .

Attack From the Sky ....................

LOGISTICS ...................... .

Construction ...................... .

Supplies ........................ .

THE ENTRANCES TO ORMOC VALLEY ........ .

Southern Entrance to Ormoc Valley ............. .

T h e Mountain Passage .................. .

T h e Drive South .................... .

SEIZURE OF ORMOC VALLEY ............. .

Drive From the South to the Libongao Area .......... .

The 32d Division Resumes the Offensive ........... .

Debouchment From the Mountains .............. .

WESTWARD TO THE SEA ............... .

The 77th Division Goes West ............... .

X Corps Goes West ................... .

T h e Japanese Retreat .................. .

LEYTE IS LIBERATED ..................

The Eighth Army Assumes Control ............. .

T h e Road Ends ..................... .

Page

294

296

297

298

300

306

306

308

313

313

321

323

329

330

339

342

347

348

354

358

361

361

367

Appendix

A. GHQ OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NO. 70, 21 SEPTEMBER

1944 ........................... .

B. BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS .............. .

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................. .

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ................... .

INDEX ............................ .

371

378

380

383

391

xiii
Tables

No.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Sixth Army Daily Strength Reports, 12 November-25 December 1944 . .

Shipping Tonnage Discharged in Leyte-Samar Area, 28 October-25 December 1944 ........................ .

Airdrops by 11th Air Cargo Resupply Squadron, 11 November-25 December 1944 ...........................

U.S. Army Battle Casualties at Leyte, 20 October 1944-8 May 1945 . .

Sixth Army Battle Casualties by Arm or Service, 20 October-25 December

1944 ............................ .

Page

222

310

311

368

369

Charts

1.

2.

3.

Operational Organization for the Leyte Campaign ......... .

Organization of the Central Philippine Attack Force ........ .

Japanese Army Organization of Major Units for the Leyte Operation . .

25

29

48

Maps

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

Sixth Army Plan, 23 September 1944 .............. .

Situation in the Pacific, Mid-October 1944 ............ .

X Corps Landings, 20 October 1944 .............. .

XXIV Corps Landings, 20 October 1944 ............ .

96th Division Advance, 21-30 October 1944 ........... .

7th Division Advance to Dagami, 21-30 October 1944 ....... .

Securing the Tacloban Area, 21-23 October 1944 ......... .

Fight for Entrance to Northern Leyte Valley, 21-25 October 1944 . . .

Drive to Jaro, 26-29 October 1944 ............... .

Advance to Carigara, 30 October-2 November 1944 ........ .

Battle for Northern Entrance to Ormoc Valley, 3-15 November 1944

Battle for Northern Entrance to Ormoc Valley, 16 November-14 December 1944 ...........................

Shoestring Ridge, 23-25 November 1944 ............. .

Shoestring Ridge, 26-27 November 1944 ............ .

Battle of the Ridges, 5-12 December 1944 ............ .

Situation on Leyte, 7 December 1944 .............. .

Securing the Southern Entrance to Ormoc Valley, 7-15 December 1944 .

Japanese Attack on Burauen Airfields, 6 December 1944 ...... .

Mountain Passage, 25 November-22 December 1944 ........ .

Seizure of Ormoc Valley, 15-21 December 1944 ......... .

Opening the Palompon Road, 22-31 December 1944 ....... .

32

47

64

73

105

125

147

158

169

177

207

225

255

261

267

274

278

295

322

329

348

xiv
Illustrations

Conference at Pearl Harbor .....................

Guerrillas Prepare for Inspection a t Consuegra ............ .

Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita .................... .

Lt. Gen. Sosaku Suzuki .......................

Patrol of Company F, 6th Rangers ................. .

Convoy Off Leyte .........................

Landing Beaches ......................... .

Troops of the 1st Cavalry Division ..................

75-mm. M8 Self-Propelled Howitzers ................ .

Maj. Gen. Franklin C. Sibert ....................

Beach Area ........................... .

Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger and Col. Ruperto K. Kangleon ........

Unloading Supplies at Dulag ....................

Japanese Ai r Attacks ....................... .

A ir Strikes Against Japanese Installations .............. .

Antiaircraft Gun ..........................

Lockheed P-38 ......................... .

Japanese Convoy Under Attack .................. .

Landing Areas an d Leyte Valley .................. .

Crew of a Light Armored Car M8 ................. .

Filipino Civilian Guides U.S. Tank ................ .

San Vicente Hill ..........................

105-mm. Self-Propelled Howitzer M7 Firing ............ .

Dulag and Bayug Airstrips .....................

Maj. Gen. John R. Hodge .................... .

Disabled M 4 Tank ........................ .

Burauen ............................ .

Engineer Troops ......................... .

A Patrol From the 7th Cavalry ................... .

Maj. Gen. Verne D. Mudge .................... .

8-inch Howitzers Readied fo r Action ................ .

General MacArthur ....................... .

Proclamation to the People of the Philippine Islands ......... .

Tacloban ............................ .

Tank-Supported Infantrymen of the 34th Regiment .......... .

Palo .............................. .

Pastrana ............................ .

U . S . Antitank Platoon ...................... .

155-mm. Guns Firing on Carigara ..................

U. S. Patrol Crossing the Canomontag River ..............

Access Road From White Beach ...................

Page

5

15

51

51

56

61

63

66

70

71

75

79

81

87

95

97

98

100

106

109

113

118

120

126

127

132

134

140

149

150

151

153

154

156

160

162

172

174

180

182

186
Tanauan Airstrip ..........................

LST's Unloading at Tacloban Airfield .................

Road Conditions ......................... .

A Litter Squad Evacuates a Casualty ................ .

A Casualty Receives Treatment .................. .

An Operating Room at the Station Hospital, Tanauan ........ .

A Casualty is Evacuated by Ship to a Rear Area ........... .

An Officer of a Civil Affairs Unit .................. .

Refugee Area on Orange Beach Near Dulag ............. .

Engineers Remove Land Mines ................... .

View From the Ridges Looking North up the Limon Valley ...... .

American Troops in Limon .....................

Lt. Col. Thomas E. Clifford, Jr. ...................

Filipino Carriers Haul Supplies ................... .

Foothills of Central Mountain Range .................

General MacArthur and Maj. Gen. Archibald V. Arnold ....... .

Troops of the 77th Division Board LCI's at Tarragona ......... .

Convoy Carrying 77th Division Approaches Deposito ......... .

A Patrol of the 307th Infantry ....................

Aerial View of Ormoc .......................

Buri Airstrip ........................... .

San Pablo Airstrip .........................

Operational Losses at the Burauen Airfields ............. .

Approach Road to Quartermaster Service Center ........... .

Heavy Machine Guns Cover Crossing ................ .

U.S. and Japanese Tanks ......................

Japanese Dug-in Positions Along Highway Banks ........... .

Japanese Light Tank ....................... .

Palompon After Allied Bombings .................. .

Page

189

191

193

196

196

197

197

200

202

214

217

226

229

236

238

245

281

282

288

292

299

301

307

309

315

327

332

335

350

All illustrations but one are from Department of Defense files. The photograph of

Lt. Gen. Sosaku Suzuki on page 51 was contributed by Lt. Roger Pineau (USNR).

xvi
The U.S. Army Center of Military History

The Center of Military History prepares and publishes histories as required by the U.S. Army. It coordinates Army historical matters, including

historical properties, and supervises the Army museum system. It also

maintains liaison with public and private agencies and individuals to stimulate interest and study in the field of military history. The Center is located

at 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005-3402.

xvii
CHAPTER I

The Strategic Plan

"It is with the deepest regret that I must

inform you that conditions over which I

have no control have necessitated the surrender of troops under my command."

 1

With this message of 20 May 1942, from

Lt. Col. Theodore M. Cornell, U.S. Army,

to Bernardo Torres, Governor of Leyte, the

control which the United States had held

over the island since 1898 came to an end.

Nearly two and a half years were to elapse

before the sound of naval guns in Leyte

Gulf would announce to the world the opening of the Leyte Campaign, the first phase

of the re-entry of American forces into the

Philippine Archipelago.

The primary purpose of the Leyte Campaign was to establish an air and logistical

base in the Leyte area in order to support

operations in the Luzon-Formosa-China

coast area and particularly to nullify Japanese strength in Luzon. Leyte is one of the

Visayan Islands, which constitute the geographical heart of the Philippines. It was

hoped that the fertile Leyte Valley, broad

and flat, could be utilized for major airfields

and base sites from which large-scale operations could be launched against the rest of

the Philippines.

Preliminary Discussion

Behind the decision to go into Leyte lay

a series of strategically significant victories,

which had followed a staggering initial reverse. American prewar plans for the Pacific

had originally been based on the assumption

that only the United States and Japan would

be at war and that the U.S. Pacific Fleet

would be in existence.2 But the destruction

of the fleet at Pearl Harbor and the entrance

of Germany and Italy into the war nullified

these plans. The strategy of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff 3 in early 1942, therefore, was concerned chiefly with trying to limit the rapid

advance of the Japanese and with keeping

the line of communications to Australia

open. The Pacific Theater was divided into

command areas—the Southwest Pacific

Area, with General Douglas MacArthur as

1

 Philippine Municipal Government Reports,

Folder 2, App. DD, Guerrilla File 6910.23 (B),

Military Intelligence (MI) Library.

2

 Louis Morton, "American and Allied Strategy

in the Far East," Military Review, XXIX (December, 1949), 38. 3

 The Joint Chiefs of Staff were General George

C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army;

Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S.

Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations; General

Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air

Forces; and Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of

Staff to the Commander in Chief—the President of

the United States. The Joint Chiefs were responsible for the conduct of the war in the Pacific, subject to the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The latter were representatives of the United States

and the United Kingdom. The Joint Chiefs represented the United States.
2 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Supreme Commander (he referred to himself, however, as Commander in Chief), and

the Pacific Ocean Area (which included the

Central Pacific), with Admiral Chester W.

Nimitz as Commander in Chief.4

In 1942 and 1943 the Allied forces had

halted the Japanese at Papua and Guadalcanal and started to push them back. On 8

May 1943 the Joint Chiefs approved a

"Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan,"

which was endorsed by the Combined Chiefs

in December. The objective of the plan was

to secure the unconditional surrender of

Japan, an objective that might necessitate

an invasion of the Japanese home islands.

As such an invasion promised to be a "vast

undertaking," it would be necessary to secure a large supply base from which a great

aerial offensive could be mounted against

Japan. According to the original plan this

base was to be located in China, but the

Mariana Islands were afterward substituted

for China. The plan called for the acquisition of successive island bases which could

be used as "steppingstones," preferably those

which would shorten the sea route, provide

for its security, and at the same time deny to

the Japanese bases from which they might

interfere with the Allied line of communications. The main effort was to be through the

waters of the Pacific Ocean. Nimitz' operations were to be conducted west through the

Japanese mandated islands while MacArthur's proceeded northwest along the New

Guinea coast. The two series of operations

were to be mutually supporting.5

Although no specific islands were named

in the Strategic Plan, the Philippine Archipelago, because of its strategic position and

long possession by the United States, naturally loomed large in the planning. The

Philippines lie athwart all sea routes south

from Japan to the economically important

Netherlands Indies—rich in rubber, tin, oil,

and rice. The capture of the Philippines

would help to sever this line of communications and would furnish an excellent staging

area for attacks against China, Formosa, or

Japan. Aside from strategic considerations,

the liberation of the Islands was important

for reasons of Far Eastern politics and prestige.6

 The obligation of the United States to

the subjugated Filipino people could not be

lightly ignored. Furthermore, General MacArthur was imbued with a burning determination to return to the Philippine Islands

and avenge the humiliating defeats suffered

by the American forces in 1941 and 1942.

By the spring of 1944 the operations in

the Pacific were going so well that the successes had exceeded even the most optimistic hopes of any of the planning officers.

On 12 March the Joint Chiefs ordered General Mac Arthur to prepare plans for a

return to Mindanao, southernmost island

of the Philippines, with a target date of 15

November 1944.7 General MacArthur on

15 June issued a plan for his future operations. The entrance into the Philippines was

to be accomplished in two phases. The first

would be a preliminary operation on 25

4

 Memo, Gen Marshall and Admiral King for

President, 30 Mar 42, no sub, and two incls, "Directive to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific

Ocean Area" and "Directive to Supreme Commander in the Southwest Pacific," OPD ABC 323.31

POA (1-29-42), 1-B. 5

 JCS 287/1, Strategic Plan for the Defeat of

Japan, 8 May 43; CCS 417, Over-all Plan for the

Defeat of Japan, 2 Dec 43.

6

 United States Strategic Bombing Survey

[USSBS], Military Analysis Division, Employment

of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific Command

(Washington, 1947), p. 32. 7

 JCS to CINCSWPA, CM-IN 5137, 12 Mar 44.

CM-IN and CM-OUT numbers used in the footnotes of this volume refer to numbers on copies of

those messages in General Marshall's Message Log,

on file in the Staff Communications Office, Office

of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.
THE STRATEGIC PLAN 3

October into the Sarangani Bay area in

southern Mindanao in order to establish

land-based air forces to augment the carrierbased air support for the principal effort.

The major effort was to be an amphibious

landing operation with forces mounted from

New Guinea for the seizure on 15 November

of airfields and bases on Leyte.8 The latter

was to follow quickly on the heels of the

first operation in order to take full advantage of the surprise tactics.

Leyte occupies a commanding position in

the Philippine Islands. Because of its central

location, its repossession by the United

States would not only divide the Japanese

forces in the Philippines but would also provide an excellent anchorage in Leyte Gulf,

together with sites for bases and airfields

from which land-based aircraft could bomb

all parts of the Philippines, the coast of

China, and Formosa. To an even greater

extent than Mindanao, Leyte could be made

into an excellent springboard from which to

launch subsequent operations against the

Japanese in Formosa or in the rest of the

Philippines.

In his planning, General MacArthur

recognized that the Leyte operation, his

most ambitious to date, would require

"massed carrier-based air support" and all

of the "combined amphibious and naval

forces available at the time."

 9

By June 1944 General MacArthur's

forces had pushed up the New Guinea coast

to the island of Biak, about nine hundred

nautical miles southeast of Davao, Mindanao, while those of Admiral Nimitz were

poised to strike at Saipan some twelve hundred miles northeast of Davao. In most of

their previous campaigns the Americans had

struck with overwhelming force at weakly

held Japanese garrisons. Since the tide of

war was now so favorable to the Allied

cause, the Joint Chiefs thought that the Pacific timetable of pending operations might

be accelerated. On 13 June they had therefore asked Mac Arthur and Nimitz their

opinions with regard to three ways proposed

for speeding up operations: "(a) By advancing target dates of operations now

scheduled through operations against Formosa; (b) By by-passing presently selected

objectives prior to operations against Formosa; and (c) By by-passing presently selected objectives and choosing new ones

including the home islands." Although the

Philippine Islands were not explicitly named

as targets that might be bypassed, they were

certainly included by implication.10

On 18 June General MacArthur replied

to the query of the Joint Chiefs,11 and on 4

July Admiral Nimitz made known his opinions.12

 On the advancement of the target

dates, both commanders were in complete

agreement—it was impossible unless certain

conditions could be changed. The logistic

resources in the Southwest Pacific were

being strained to the limit to meet the fixed

target dates, while the strengthening of Japanese garrisons made it unlikely that the

Central Pacific could make its present

scheduled dates.

With respect to bypassing objectives prior

to the seizure of Formosa, MacArthur

thought it would be "unsound" to bypass

the Philippines and launch an attack across

the Pacific directly against Formosa—an

attack which would have the benefit of no

appreciable land-based air support and

8

 GHQ SWPA, RENO V, 15 Jun 44. 9

 Ibid.

10

 Rad, JCS to CINCSWPA and CINCPOA,

CM-OUT 50007, 13 Jun 44. 11

 Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, CM-IN 15058, 18

Jun 44. 12

 Rad, CINCPOA to COMINCH, CM-IN 2926,

4 Jul 44.
4 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

which would be based upon the Hawaiian

Islands, 5,100 miles away. In his opinion it

was essential to occupy Luzon and establish

land-based aircraft thereon before making

any move against Formosa.13 Nimitz stated

that in a series of informal discussions between his and MacArthur's planning officers, the latter anticipated the seizure in

early September of Morotai Island, 300

statute miles southeast of Mindanao. This

was to be followed in late October by a

limited occupation of the Sarangani Bay

area on Mindanao, which was to be used

primarily as a base for short-range aircraft.

The major operation was to be the occupation of Leyte about 15 November. Nimitz

thought that this timing was "optimistic."

He felt that the critical and decisive nature

of the Leyte operation required "practically

all available covering and striking forces, fire

support forces, and all available assault

shipping." If successful, however, the Americans would achieve air supremacy over the

Philippines. Therefore, since the inclusion

of the Leyte operation with that of Mindanao would expedite subsequent operations, Nimitz considered it "advisable."

 14

As to the feasibility of bypassing present

objectives and choosing new ones, including

the Japanese home islands, the two commanders were not in complete agreement.

MacArthur pronounced the concept "utterly unsound," since the available shipping

was limited to a seven-division lift and there

was insufficient air support. Nimitz thought

that no decision should be made until after

further developments.

The proposals disturbed General MacArthur, who concluded his message to the

Joint Chiefs with the following peroration:

It is my opinion that purely military considerations demand the reoccupation of the

Philippines in order to cut the enemy's communications to the south and to secure a base

for our further advance. Even if this were not

the case and unless military factors demanded

another line of action it would in my opinion

be necessary to reoccupy the Philippines.

The Philippines is American Territory

where our unsupported forces were destroyed

by the enemy. Practically all of the 17,000,000

Filipinos remain loyal to the United States

and are undergoing the greatest privation and

suffering because we have not been able to

support or succor them. We have a great national obligation to discharge.

Moreover, if the United States should deliberately bypass the Philippines, leaving our

prisoners, nationals, and loyal Filipinos in

enemy hands without an effort to retrieve

them at earliest moment, we would incur

the gravest psychological reaction. We would

admit the truth of Japanese propaganda to

the effect that we had abandoned the Filipinos and would not shed American blood to

redeem them; we would undoubtedly incur

the open hostility of that people; we would

probably suffer such loss of prestige among all

the peoples of the Far East that it would

adversely affect the United States for many

years. . . .15

In reply, General George C. Marshall,

Chief of Staff, cautioned MacArthur to "be

careful not to let personal feelings and Philippine politics" override the great objective,

which was to end the war. He also pointed

out that "bypassing" was not "synonymous

with abandonment."

 16

Admiral William F. Halsey, the commander of the Third Fleet, and his staff,

when they heard of the proposal, were enthusiastic about the possibility of bypassing

the more immediate objectives. But in contrast to Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of

Naval Operations, who wished to move di13

 Rad cited n. 11. 14

 Rad cited n. 12.

15

 Rad cited n. 11. 16

 Rad, CofS to CINCSWPA, CM-OUT 55718,

24 Jun 44.
THE STRATEGIC PLAN 5

CONFERENCE AT PEARL HARBOR brings together (left to right) General Douglas

MacArthur, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Admiral William D. Leahy and Admiral Chester

W. Nimitz.

rectly to Formosa, bypassing the Philippines,

Halsey felt it necessary and profitable to go

into the Philippine Archipelago, which he

considered to be "the vulnerable belly of

the Imperial dragon."

 17

 Halsey stated that

when Rear Adm. Robert B. Carney, his chief

of staff, was asked by King, "Do you want

to make a London out of Manila?" Carney

replied, "No, sir. I want to make an England

out of Luzon."

 18

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that

none of the currently selected objectives

could be bypassed. They continued, however, to search for means by which the tempo

of the war in the Pacific might be accelerated.

In the latter days of July, General

Marshall invited General MacArthur to

visit Pearl Harbor in order to confer with

Admiral Nimitz on future plans for the war

in the Pacific. MacArthur arrived on 26

July. To his surprise, the President of the

United States was present. President Roosevelt invited him and Admirals Halsey and

Nimitz to dinner. After dinner the President

drew out a map and, pointing to Leyte, is

reported to have said, "Well, Douglas,

where do we go from here?"

 19

17

 William F. Halsey, Admiral Halsey's Story

(New York, 1947), pp. 194-99. 18

 Ibid., p. 195.

19

 Information was furnished by Capt. Samuel

Eliot Morison, USNR, 22 January 1951, who stated

that Roosevelt had related the incident to him.

Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, who was not present,

states that MacArthur told him that the President

pointed to Mindanao when he made his remark.

Ltr, Gen Richardson to Gen Marshall, 1 Aug 44,

Book 21, OPD Exec 9.
6 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Although MacArthur had been given no

intimation that strategy was going to be discussed, he launched into a long talk on the

necessity of taking Luzon before moving

against Formosa. Nimitz did not enter into

the conversation. The following morning

the discussions were continued. Admiral

William D. Leahy, who was present, later

declared: "Both General MacArthur and

Admiral Nimitz felt that they did not require any additional reinforcements or assistance" for the scheduled operations.20

This Admiral Leahy considered most unusual.

Admiral Nimitz reported to Admiral King

that the conferences "were quite satisfactory.

The general trend of the discussion . . .

was along the line of seeing MacArthur into

the Central Philippines. . . ."

 21

There was no strong disagreement between General MacArthur and Admiral

Nimitz. Admiral Leahy said, "I personally

was convinced that they together were the

best qualified officers in our service for this

tremendous task, and that they could work

together in full agreement toward the common end of defeating Japan."

 22

Strong efforts were already under way to

accelerate operations in the Pacific. A shortage of shipping appeared to be the bottleneck which halted all attempts to speed up

the operational target dates. General MacArthur at Brisbane had been directing the

whole of his planning toward the reoccupation of the Philippine Islands, and on 10

July had issued a plan for all operations into

the archipelago. According to this plan the

conquest of the Islands was to be accomplished in four major phases.

The initial phase envisaged footholds in

the southern and central Philippines for the

establishment of bases and airfields from

which subsequent operations could be supported. The first operation, planned for 1

November 1944, was to be the seizure of the

Sarangani Bay area in southern Mindanao

for the purpose of establishing land-based air

forces to augment the carrier-based air support for the advance into Leyte. The Leyte

operation, the main effort of this series, was

to come on 22 November. Major air, naval,

and logistic bases were to be constructed on

the shores of Leyte Gulf for the control of

Leyte, Samar, and Surigao Strait, and for

the neutralization of the Japanese aerial

strength on Luzon.23 The other phases covered the occupation of Luzon and the consolidation of the Philippines.

On 26 July the Joint Chiefs agreed that

the primary purpose of the occupation of the

Leyte-Mindanao area was to establish air

forces there in order to reduce the enemy

air strength on Luzon. Some of Admiral

Nimitz' assault craft which were suitable for

shore-to-shore operations were to be transferred to General MacArthur. The Joint

Chiefs, therefore, asked their planners to

submit their views on the possibility of advancing the target date for Leyte to 15 November by compressing the intervals between contemplated operations or by the

elimination of certain scheduled operations.24

20

 Interv with Admiral Leahy, 5 Oct 50, OCMH. 21

 Memo, COMINCH for CofS, 9 Aug 44, OPD

ABC 384 Pacific (1–17–43). 22

 Interv with Admiral Leahy, 5 Oct 50, OCMH.

See also, Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, I Was

There (New York, 1950), pp. 247-52. In answer

to an inquiry about the conference made to the

director of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, the

author was informed that "a careful search of the

papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt in this Library has

not revealed any materials that would be pertinent

to the subject. . . ." Ltr, Herman Kahn to author,

20 Oct 50, OCMH.

23

 GHQ SWPA, MUSKETEER Plan, 10 Jul 44. 24

 Rad, JPS to Staff Planners of CINCPOA and

CINCSWPA, CM-OUT 71483, 27 Jul 44.
THE STRATEGIC PLAN 7

In furtherance of this directive, planning

officers from Washington met with General

MacArthur and his staff in Brisbane in the

early part of August and discussed means of

accelerating the target date for Leyte. General MacArthur told them that a substantial

interval between the operations at Sarangani Bay and Leyte was necessary. His

reasons were as follows: (1) the assault

shipping that was used for the Sarangani

Bay operation would have time to turn

around, reload, and then be used for the

Leyte operation; (2) in the interval six combat air groups could be installed in the Sarangani Bay area to support the Leyte operation ; and (3) the carriers would have sufficient time to execute two strikes before the

Leyte operation.25

The planners from Washington, however,

felt that there was sufficient assault shipping

in the Pacific without using the same craft

for both the Sarangani Bay and the Leyte

operations. An enumeration of the vessels

assigned to the Southwest Pacific and the

Central Pacific gave the areas more than a

six-division lift. As Brig. Gen. Frank N.

Roberts, chief of the Strategy and Policy

Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, in Washington, told

Col. William L. Ritchie, his deputy, who

was in Brisbane, "If you sit down and look

at those figures a bit you will see that there

should be sufficient assault lift for Leyte just

on playing the numbers racket, without

touching the shipping on Sarangani."

 26

Both Washington and Brisbane recognized that the operations in the LeyteSurigao area were necessary in order to

provide air bases, depot areas, and a fleet

anchorage for any future advance whether

in the Philippines, against Formosa, or by

a direct route into the Japanese homeland.

Consequently, the planners never seriously

entertained any idea of bypassing this area,

although they continued to probe for means

which would accelerate the target date.

The determination of the target date was

dependent upon the availability of assault

shipping and the desire of General MacArthur to have each successive advance supported by land-based aircraft. The existing

shipping was needed for operations already

scheduled. The planners concluded that additional shipping could be made available

if certain phases of the campaigns of Central Pacific forces into the Palaus, scheduled

to start on 15 September, were canceled or

set ahead of schedule. The alternatives were

to modify the concept of providing landbased air support for subsequent operations

or to execute the Sarangani Bay and Leyte

operations simultaneously.27 There the matter rested. Apparently the Joint Chiefs had

decided that the time was not opportune for

an acceleration of the target dates.

On 27 August General MacArthur furnished General Marshall a timetable for future operations by his forces. On 15 September a division and a reinforced regiment

were to seize Morotai in order "to protect

the western flank" and to provide landbased aircraft for advances northward. On

15 October a division less one regimental

combat team was to land in the Talaud

Islands northwest of Morotai in order "to

neutralize the [Japanese] western flank," to

establish air bases from which the neutralization of Mindanao and the western Visayan Islands could be accomplished, and

to set up a base for airborne troops. On 15

November two divisions were to land in the

25

 Tel conf, Washington and Brisbane, 7 Aug 44,

WD-TC 797. 26

 Tel conf, Washington and Brisbane, 10 Aug 44,

WD-TC 809. 27 Ibid.
8 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Sarangani Bay area in order to construct

bases for land-based aircraft that were to

support the Leyte operation. On 7 December a regimental combat team and a parachute battalion were to drop on Mindanao

and establish an airfield for fighter cover for

the aerial neutralization of the western Visayan Islands and southern Luzon. On 20

December five divisions were to land on

Leyte for the purpose of providing "major

air and logistic bases for operations to the

northward." The plan was predicated on

the assumption that there would be available in the Pacific sufficient amphibious lift

and fleet support.28

Plans Agreed Upon

On 1 September 1944 the Joint Chiefs of

Staff in their 171st meeting reviewed the

situation in the Pacific. The time had come

when it was necessary to issue a directive

for future operations in that area. After

much discussion, the Joint Chiefs left in

abeyance the question of what operation

should follow Leyte but "directed the Joint

Staff Planners to prepare, as a matter of

urgency, a directive to the Commander in

Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, and the

Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas,

to carry out the Leyte operation."

 29

Accordingly, on 8 September, the two

commanders were given the following missions: General MacArthur, after conducting the necessary preliminary operations,

was to take the Leyte-Surigao area on 20

December, with Admiral Nimitz furnishing

fleet support and additional assault shipping. Both commanders were to arrange for

co-ordination of plans and mutual support

of operations; to co-ordinate plans with

General Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding

General, United States Army forces, China.

Burma and India, in order to get maximum

support from that theater; and to arrange

with General Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, for supporting operations.30

Concurrently with the issuance of this directive, momentous events were taking place

in the Pacific. Admiral Halsey was in command of scheduled operations against the

Palau Islands. On 7 and 8 September aircraft from his carriers struck at Yap and the

Palau Islands, against which Admiral Nimitz had scheduled operations, and for the

next two days bombed Mindanao. On the

12th and 14th the bombers hit the central

Philippines in support of the operations

against the Palau Islands and Morotai.

Admiral Halsey advised Admiral Nimitz

that, as a result of the strikes, few serviceable

planes in the Philippines were left to the

Japanese, the bulk of the enemy's oil supplies was destroyed, there was "no shipping

left to sink," the "enemy's non-aggressive

attitude [was] unbelievable and fantastic,"

and "the area is wide open."

 31

 Halsey also

told Nimitz that one of his downed carrier

pilots had been told by his Filipino rescuers

that there were no Japanese on Leyte.32 He

therefore felt that it was time to accelerate

the operations in the Pacific, and he strongly

recommended that the intermediate opera28

 Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, CM-IN 24770, 27

Aug 44. 29

 Min, JCS 171st Mtg, 1 Sep 44.

30

 Rad, JCS to CINCSWPA and CINCPOA,

CM-OUT 27648, 8 Sep 44. 31

 Rad, Com3dFlt to CINCPOA, CM-IN 13120,

14 Sep 44. 32

 Rad, Com3dFlt to CINCPOA, CINCSWPA,

and COMINCH, CM-IN 12893, 13 Sep 44.
THE STRATEGIC PLAN 9

tions—Yap, Talaud, and the Sarangani Bay

area on Mindanao—be canceled. Leyte

could be seized immediately and cheaply

without any intermediate operations. Halsey's fleet could cover the initial landing

until land-based aircraft could be established. The force intended for the occupation of Yap could be made available to

General MacArthur.33

When this message was received, the

Combined Chiefs of Staff were attending a

conference in Quebec. The recommendations were transmitted to Quebec by Admiral Nimitz, who offered to place at MacArthur's disposal the III Amphibious Force,

including the XXIV Corps, which was loading at Pearl Harbor for Yap. General Marshall so informed General MacArthur and

asked his opinion on the proposed change

of target date.34

The message reached MacArthur's headquarters at Hollandia, on New Guinea,

while MacArthur was en route to Morotai

and observing radio silence. His chief of staff

advised General Marshall that although the

information from the rescued pilot that there

were no Japanese on Leyte was incorrect,

the intermediate operations could be eliminated. The 1st Cavalry Division and the

24th Infantry Division with sufficient service

troops were available for the Leyte operation; adequate air strength could be provided; the logistic support was practicable;

and the XXIV Corps could be used.35

General Marshall received this answer at

Quebec on 15 September while he, Admiral

Leahy, Admiral King, and General Arnold

were at a formal dinner given by Canadian

officers. The Americans withdrew from the

table for a conference. Within an hour and a

half after the message arrived, the Joint

Chiefs ordered MacArthur and Nimitz to

cancel the three intermediate operations of

Yap, Talaud, and Sarangani, co-ordinate

their plans, and invade Leyte on 20

October.36

Later that evening, as he was on his way

to his quarters after the dinner, General

Marshall received this message: "Subject to

completion of arrangements with Nimitz, we

shall execute Leyte operation on 20 October. . . . MacArthur."

 37

On 3 October the Joint Chiefs of Staff

directed General MacArthur to occupy Luzon on 20 December 1944, the date originally set for the entrance into Leyte.38

 The

decision had been made. General MacArthur was to return to the Philippine

Islands in force.

33

 Rad, Com3dFlt to CINCPOA, CM-IN 12893,

14 Sep 44. 34 Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the

United States Army, July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945,

to the Secretary of War (Washington, 1945), p. 71.

35

 Rad, CINCSWPA to JCS, CINCPOA, and

Com3dFlt, CM-IN 12636, 14 Sep 44. 36

 Rad, JCS to CINCSWPA, CINCPOA, and

Com3dFlt, 15 Sep 44, OCTAGON 31-A, CofS

CM-OUT Log, 15 Sep 44; Biennial Report, p. 71,

cited n. 34; General of the Air Force Henry H.

Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), pp.

529-30. 37

 Rad, CINCSWPA to JCS, CM-IN 17744, 15

Sep 44. 38

 Rad, JCS to CINCSWPA et al, CM-OUT

40792, 3 Oct 44.
CHAPTER II

The Nature of the Target

The Philippine Islands, the largest island

group in the Malay Archipelago, were discovered by Ferdinand Magellan in 1521.

They became a Spanish possession in 1565

and remained so until 10 December 1898

when they were ceded to the United States

by the Treaty of Paris as a result of the

Spanish-American war. In the spring of

1942 Japan secured military domination

over the Islands.

The Philippine Archipelago lay in the

geographical heart of the Far Eastern

theater of war. As a pivotal point of control the Islands were centrally placed in relation to Japan, China, Burma, French

Indochina, Thailand, British Malaya, and

the Netherlands Indies. Being the most

northerly part of the Malay Archipelago,

the Philippines were also close to the vital

areas of Japan and the Chinese-held areas

of the Asiatic mainland. Located southeast

of the continent, they occupy much the

same position with respect to the mainland

of Asia that the West Indies do with respect

to North America.

The Islands are among the remnants of a

great continent that once extended over the

space now occupied by the entire East Indies. There are some 7,100 islands and islets

in the Philippine Archipelago, which has a

land area of 114,830 square miles. Of these,

about 460 have an area of one square mile

or more and 2,773 are named. The Philippine Islands are divided into three main

groups—Luzon and adjacent islands in the

northern sector; the Visayan Islands in the

central portion, comprising Samar, Leyte,

and numerous others; and finally, in the

southern part, Mindanao and the Sulu

Archipelago. The Philippines had a prewar

population of about 16,000,000, of whom

14,550,000 were Christians, 678,000 were

Mohammedans, 626,000 were pagans, and

about 64,000 were Buddhists and Shintoists.1

Geography of Leyte

The northeastern Visayan group, which

consists mainly of Leyte and Samar, was

selected as the point of entrance into the

Philippines. Leyte had the higher potential

military value. The air distance from the

capital city of Tacloban to Manila is 295

miles. Leyte is a natural gateway to the rest

of the Philippines, and its possession would

greatly facilitate and support further operations to the north as well as expedite control

over the remaining islands in the Visayan

group.2

1

 MI Sec, WDGS, Survey of the Philippines, 3

vols., 15 Feb 43; Div of Naval Intel, Office, Chief

of Naval Opns, ONI 93, Field Monograph of the

Philippines, Jan 44; Allied Geographical Sec, GHQ

SWPA, Terrain Study 84, Leyte Province, 17

Aug 44; ASF Manual M365-1, Civil Affairs Handbook, Philippine Islands, 25 Apr 44. 2

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5. Unless otherwise stated the material on terrain is based upon this

report, pages 5-7.
THE NATURE OF THE TARGET 11

Leyte roughly resembles a molar tooth

with its crown toward Samar and its roots

pointing to Mindanao. The eighth largest

island in the Philippines, with an area of

2,785 square miles, it runs generally from

north to south, with an approximate length

of 115 miles and a width of 15 to 45 miles. It

is situated on one of the principal submerged shelves of the Philippine Archipelago, and the waters over the shelf have an

average depth of 22 fathoms.

The Terrain

The island is mainly volcanic in origin.

A range of mountains, the topographical

backbone of the island, extends southeast

from Biliran Strait in the north to Cabalian

Bay in the south and separates the Leyte and

Ormoc Valleys. All of southern Leyte is

mountainous and, militarily speaking, of

little importance. The northwest coast is also

rugged, and except for the port of Palompon

has little tactical significance. The heavily

forested central mountain range is composed of numerous knifelike ridges and

spurs and deep ravines and serves as an

effective natural barrier between the

island's eastern and western coastal areas.

It is a major obstacle to the rapid movement

of troops and can be utilized very effectively

in defending the island.

Leyte Valley, a broad and fertile plain,

stretches across the northeastern part of the

island from Leyte Gulf to Carigara Bay.

More than twenty-five miles wide along the

shore of the gulf, it is gradually narrowed

by the mountain ranges to the north and

south to less than ten miles as it reaches

Carigara Bay. Most of the island's population live in this valley, and here too are

most of the principal cities and airfields.

The main road net of the island runs

through Leyte Valley, a great number of

streams interlacing it. The numerous rice

paddies, centuries old, disrupt the natural

drainage of the valley. Rarely is the water

level more than a few inches below the surface. Even in the drier months, vehicular

movement is limited to the existing roads.

In 1944 these were poor, inadequate, and ill

suited for heavy military traffic. The best

of them had only a light bituminous surface

and were neither wide enough nor strong

enough for two-way military traffic.3 It was

hoped that Leyte Valley could be developed

into a large air and logistical base to support

further operations, but it was not well suited

for this purpose.

The shore line of Leyte Valley along

Leyte Gulf and San Pedro Bay affords the

best landing beaches on the island. This

coast is dangerous for beach landings during

northeast monsoon periods, when heavy

surf, high winds, and torrential rains imperil men, equipment, and shipping. July,

August, and September are the best months

for landing. In general there are good firm

sand beaches, onto which landing craft can

go directly. A road parallels the shore line,

but there are few exit roads from the beach

to this road and beyond. In many places

close to the shore there are swamps and rice

paddies which prevent rapid egress from the

beach. There are other good landing beaches

on the east coast of Ormoc Bay, but they are

crossed by innumerable creeks and streams.

Leyte Gulf is large and open, offering an

excellent anchorage for a considerable number of vessels, including those of largest size.

Carigara Bay, to the north of the island, is

3

 S.D. Sturgis, Jr., Brigadier General, U.S. Army

Air Engineer, USAF, Engineer Operations in the

Leyte Campaign, reprinted from The Military Engineer, November and December, 1947, and January,

1948, p. 4.
12 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

twenty miles wide, but shallow waters,

swamps, and the hilly terrain of its eastern

and western sides restrict its value for military operations. A narrow neck of the central mountain range separates the bay from

the northern end of Ormoc Valley. San

Juanico Strait, which separates Leyte from

Samar in the north, connects Carigara Bay

and San Pedro Bay, the latter being a

northern extension of Leyte Gulf. The strait

is thirteen and a half miles long with an

average width of a quarter to a half mile.

Small landing craft can navigate the channel, but there are strong tidal currents which

cause violent rips and swirls at many points.

Wedged in between the central mountain

range and the hill mass of the northwest

coast of Leyte, the Ormoc Valley, about five

miles wide in its largest part, extends from

Ormoc Bay to the north for fifteen miles

where a narrow neck of the central ridge

separates it from Carigara Bay. Through

the valley runs a narrow road, its northern

portion marked by steep grades and sharp

curves. Halfway along, a branch road zigzags its course to Port Palompon on the west

coast. Although most of the southern part of

the valley is under cultivation, there are

large patches of forest, scrub growth, and

cogon grass in the north.4

The largest city on the island, the provincial capital, is Tacloban, which lies at the

head of San Pedro Bay. As the only sizable

port in the area, it handles most of the outbound shipping, mainly from Leyte and

Samar. Its prewar population was about

31,000. Other important towns are Carigara and Barugo on the north coast; Baybay

and Ormoc, the leading ports on the west

coast; and Palo, Tanauan, and Abuyog

along the east coast. All the more significant

towns are situated on the main road system

of the island, and the larger coastal barrios

(villages) have roads of a sort.

The road system is divided into a northern

and a southern coastal road net. The former,

which is the better, was designed for the

transportation of agricultural produce from

the northern interior areas to Tacloban.

The latter is composed of narrow, roundabout roads that are constantly in need of

repair. The two systems are joined by a road,

scarcely better than a trail, which runs west

of Abuyog and corkscrews its way through

heavily forested mountains to Baybay. Another road, long, narrow, and broken in

parts, goes north from Baybay to Ormoc

and thence through the Ormoc Valley to

Carigara.

The Tacloban airstrip, the principal airfield on the island, was located on the Cataisan Peninsula, which lies just southeast

of Tacloban. The Japanese had constructed

another airfield, known as the Dulag airstrip, two miles west of Dulag; three

others—the Buri, Bayug, and San Pablo

airstrips— near Burauen, five miles west of

Dulag; and still another at Valencia in the

Ormoc Valley, eight miles north of Ormoc.

Control of the island of Leyte is dependent upon control of the Leyte and Ormoc

Valleys and their adjacent hills and mountains. Thus, before a successful movement

into Leyte Valley could be assured, control

of the high ground in the vicinity of Palo

would be essential. Continued dominance

over the valley is dependent upon control of

the high ground at its northwestern end in

the vicinity of Pinamopoan on Carigara

Bay, possession of which would preclude infiltration from Ormoc Valley. The control

of Ormoc Valley and use of the excellent

anchorage and harbor facilities of Ormoc

Bay is dependent upon control of the low4

 Allied Geographical Sec, GHQ SWPA, Terrain

Study 84, Leyte Province, 17 Aug 44, p. 43.
THE NATURE OF THE TARGET 13

land in the vicinity of Ormoc city and the

commanding hills to the east.

The People

In 1939 the total population of Leyte was

915,853, of whom more than 912,000 were

native Visayans of Malaysian stock. The

largest other group consisted of 3,076 Chinese, half of whom were engaged in retail

trade. There was a sprinkling of other national groups—40 Spaniards, 20 Germans,

81 from other European countries, 56 Americans, and 73 Japanese.

Because of their insular position and

somewhat primitive culture, the inhabitants

are primarily an agricultural and fishing

people. The principal crops are rice, sugar

cane, corn, and copra. Judged by Occidental

standards, the mode of farming is backward

and shows little tendency to progress. The

Filipinos who have been exposed to industrial life, however, have been able to adapt

themselves to employment in the limited

trade crafts and manufacturing on the

island.

According to his own standards, the Filipino lives well enough. His chief foods are

rice or corn, fish, camotes (sweet potatoes),

and occasionally chicken or other meat. The

men's clothing is simple; the average man

has several changes of cheap cotton shirts

and pants made of imported cotton cloth or,

in the more remote districts, from homespun

material.

Most of the dwelling houses are made of

bamboo and sheathed with palm leaves on

roof and sides. The material is gathered

locally and tied with rattan. The houses

rarely consist of more than two rooms, and

many are raised on piling, with space for the

family pig and chickens underneath. In one

of the rooms, or outdoors, is an open fireplace with a mud and stone hearth for cooking. There is little furniture, and in three

out of four families the personal possessions

would not be worth more than ten dollars.

Less than 5 percent of the people have a

rising standard of living. This higher standard is exemplified by a better type of habitation, which ranges from a three-room house

to a dwelling similar to that of the American

middle class. The diet of more prosperous

Filipinos is basically the same as that of

the poorer class, but it offers a greater

variety. Clothing follows the Occidental

fashion. The wealthiest people and those

with foreign education or contacts, who

make up less than 1 percent of the population, dress and live in the same manner as

Occidentals.

The Japanese, during their occupation,

governed through the old administrative

organization of the province. They and their

puppet officials also set up larger governing

bodies that exercised superior jurisdiction.

On 6 February 1944 the puppet president

of the Philippine Republic, Jose Laurel, appointed a commissioner who held supervisory power over the local governments in

the Visayan Provinces.

The governor of the province of Leyte,

who previously had been an elected official,

was appointed by the president. He was the

chief operative and administrative head of

the province and on all provincial administrative matters his decision was final. The

treasurer of the province, who reported directly to the governor, was its chief financial

officer and tax assessor. He collected all taxes

and license fees, national and local, and

prepared financial statements for the governor but he had no say in administrative

matters. The law officer of the province was
14 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

legal adviser to the governor and to the

municipal authorities. He could advise only

on administrative matters.

The Japanese Military Administration

maintained liaison between the Japanese

Army and the civil government. The military police collected military intelligence

and information and disseminated propaganda. The Japanese allowed only one political party on the Islands—the Kalibapi—

to which all government officials were required to belong. This party was one of the

principal propaganda agencies, being the

prime mover of the pacification programs

in the province, and exercised general

supervision over the local neighborhood associations. The latter helped in maintaining law and order, assisted the constabulary, and aided in the distribution of scarce

commodities.

It should be emphasized that during most

of the occupation there were few Japanese

on Leyte. Southern Leyte in general maintained the same Filipino institutions and

officials as in the prewar years. The heel of

the Japanese conqueror pressed but lightly

on most of the people of Leyte. Beginning

in early 1944, however, the Japanese Army

forces on the island were reinforced. From

that time forward the Filipinos had their

crops appropriated and in other ways were

subjected to the will of the Japanese.

Misery, hunger, and poverty became commonplace and a resistance movement grew.

The Resistance Movement on Leyte

The Organizing of Guerrilla Bands

A period of uncertainty and confusion

followed the surrender of the American and

Filipino forces in the Philippines in the

spring of 1942. Civilians and members of

the armed forces who did not surrender to

the Japanese Army fled into the hills. Some

went because they wanted to continue the

fight, others because they felt that the

chaotic conditions on the Islands would

afford unequaled opportunities for looting

and pillaging.

Once in the hills, the men formed themselves into guerrilla bands.5

 At first all of the

bands, because of their lack of money and

supplies, freely raided farms and storehouses

for food and equipment whenever they had

the opportunity. Moreover, there were real

bandit groups who frequently and wantonly

raped the countryside. For a time all of the

groups were discredited by the people.

Gradually, however, strong men emerged

who formed the guerrilla bands into semimilitary organizations. The leader of each

band, who was generally an ex-member of

the armed forces, gave himself a "bamboo

commission," usually considerably higher

than the one he had hitherto possessed.

The following oath of allegiance taken by

the members of one of the bands is probably

typical:

I do solemnly swear that I shall obey orders

from my superior officer; that I shall fight the

enemy of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the United

States of America whosoever and wherever

he maybe [sic] in the territory of the Philippines; that I shall never allow myself nor any

arm or ammunition to be caught by the

5

 Unless otherwise stated, material on the guerrillas is based upon the Guerrilla Papers, a collection

of disorganized, miscellaneous records by and about

the guerrillas in the Philippine Islands. It is located

in the Documents Files Section, G-2, Department

of the Army.

The records of the Leyte guerrillas are incomplete, inadequate, and controversial. Some of the

guerrilla bands had no records, and all that is known

of others is from violently prejudiced sources. Consequently, the full story of the guerrillas can probably never be told.
THE NATURE OF THE TARGET 15

GUERRILLAS PREPARE FOR INSPECTION AT CONSUEGRA

enemy; that I shall never turn traitor to my

country nor the United States of America;

and muchless [sic] reveal to the enemy any

secret of the Army to which I honorably belong; that I shall never abandon a wounded

brother in arms; that I join the United Forces

in the Philippines without personal or party

interest, but with the determination to sacrifice myself and all that is mine for FREEDOM and DEMOCRACY; that I shall protect the lives and property of all loyal Filipinos

everywhere.

I make this LOYALTY OATH without

mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

SO HELP ME GOD.6

For some time the various guerrilla bands

on Leyte operated separately, and there was

little or no co-operation between them. They

were united, however, in their hatred of the

Japanese. Jealousy and strife between

groups were rampant, but circumstances

gradually compelled the smaller bands to

submit to absorption, either by force or persuasion, into the larger and more powerful

groups. The fact that there were few Japanese on the island enabled the guerrillas

and loyal provincial officials to organize the

governments of most of the barrios.

All of the guerrillas declared that their

primary purpose was to aid the civilians,

maintain peace and order, and keep the

Japanese from abusing the people. They

also assumed control over various phases of

public activities—the allotment of food supplies, the issue of emergency currency, and

the punishment of criminals. The guerrillas

in northern Leyte depended upon voluntary

contributions to support them, while those in

southern Leyte levied a loyalty tax. Hard

money having been driven out of circulation,

the guerrilla units tried to issue paper, which

was acceptable only in those regions where 6

 24th Div G-2 Jnl, 22 Oct 44.
16 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

the particular unit was active. There was no

widespread circulation or acceptance of any

of the guerrilla money.

The most important of the guerrilla leaders on Leyte were Lt. Col. Ruperto K.

Kangleon and Brig. Gen. Blas E. Miranda.

Colonel Kangleon had served for twentyseven years in the Philippine Army and was

a graduate of the Philippine Academy and

General Service School. General Miranda,7

a former member of the Philippine Constabulary, was very hostile to the Japanese

and to anyone who surrendered to them.

He killed many former prisoners, whom the

Japanese had released, on the pretext that

they were enemy spies. Miranda was especially bitter toward Kangleon, a former

prisoner of the enemy.

Official recognition from General MacArthur's headquarters was slow in reaching

the guerrillas on Leyte, a fact that brought

about misunderstandings. General MacArthur had early established contact with

Col. Macario Peralta on Panay and Col.

Wendell Fertig on Mindanao. In the middle

of February 1943 MacArthur sent Lt.

Comdr. Charles Parsons, USNR, to the

Islands by submarine. Before his departure,

General Headquarters had established the

policies to be followed. The prewar military

districts, as of December 1940, were to be

revived.8 Since General MacArthur had received information that Colonel Fertig had

successfully created an effective guerrilla

organization on Mindanao and Colonel

Peralta one on Panay, he recognized them

as commanders of the 10th and 6th Military

Districts, respectively. Radio communication from MacArthur's headquarters informed Peralta and Fertig of the appointments on 21 February 1943. Commander

Parsons also carried formal letters, dated 13

February 1943, making these appointments.

Parsons safely reached the Philippines in

early March and established friendly relations with Colonel Fertig. While on Mindanao he made several local trips, one to

southern Leyte where he heard of Colonel

Kangleon who had escaped from the Butuan

prison camp and returned to his home.

Parsons visited Kangleon with the promise

that he would be made commander of the

9th Military District (Leyte and Samar),

and succeeded in persuading him to join

the guerrilla movement on Leyte.9

Until area commanders could be selected

for the 7th, 8th, and 9th (Leyte) Districts,

Peralta and Fertig had been authorized by

MacArthur's headquarters, through Parsons, to organize the guerrillas on neighboring islands, as well as on their own. Each

thought he was to organize the guerrillas

on Leyte. Peralta made contact with General Miranda on northwestern Leyte; Fertig

got in touch with Colonel Kangleon. Both

Peralta and Fertig told their contacts to

organize Leyte with the official sanction of

General MacArthur's headquarters. Consequently, Kangleon and Miranda each

thought the other to be a usurper.10

Miranda was adamant in his refusal to

treat with Kangleon. Colonel Kangleon

thought that Miranda should be ordered to

"forget his established kingdom," but if

this failed, he declared, the 92d Division,

7

 Miranda's rank is obscure. At various times he

is referred to as lieutenant, major, colonel, and

brigadier general. 8

 MI Sec, GHQ AFPAC, Intelligence Series,

Vol. II, Intelligence Activities in the Philippines

During the Japanese Occupation (hereafter cited

as Intelligence Activities in the Philippines),

App. 7.

9

 Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, p. 56. 10

 Ibid., pp. 16-18.
THE NATURE OF THE TARGET 17

commanded by himself, would "force . . .

Miranda to join us."

 11

The situation became extremely tense,

since both Kangleon and Miranda felt much

bitterness. In August 1943 Kangleon sent

a force against Miranda and during a clash

between the two parties some of the men

were killed. Miranda was routed and many

of his followers joined Kangleon.12 The

power of Miranda was broken. Kangleon

incorporated the other guerrillas on the

island into the 92d Division, and Leyte was

then unified under his command.

On 21 October 1943 General MacArthur

recognized Colonel Kangleon as the Leyte

Area Commander, and in a letter accompanying the appointment he told Kangleon

what he expected of him. "I desire that you

establish and maintain direct communication with this headquarters at your earliest

opportunity and thereafter you keep me

informed of major developments involving

enemy movement, dispositions and other

activity within your area and observation."

 13

Japanese Punitive Expeditions

In the latter part of 1943 the Japanese

military authorities tried to conciliate the

guerrillas, offering, in return for their surrender, not only freedom from punishment

but also jobs and the opportunity to resume

their normal family life. A great many

guerrillas took advantage of this offer of

amnesty and surrendered.14 Among the

guerrilla units that surrendered to the Japanese were those of Maj. Marcos G. Soliman

and other subordinates of General Miranda's command.15

 They gave themselves up

in January 1944, but General Miranda

himself refused to surrender and left for

either Cebu or Bohol.

After their attempts at pacification, the

Japanese launched more frequent and intensive patrols against the guerrillas. The

garrison troops that had been stationed on

Leyte were reinforced. Southern Leyte,

which had known few Japanese, was "reinvolved" on 8 December 1943. The guerrillas withdrew and hid in the interior. It

was thought that after a month the troops

would leave and be replaced by constabulary officers. But after two weeks the Japanese turned their attention to the civilians.

Some they arrested and imprisoned for days

without food and water, others they tortured

and executed. Houses were broken into,

property was looted, and food was stolen.

Spies were brought in from neighboring

islands to locate the guerrilla hideouts.

Since the people begged for action,

Colonel Kangleon held a meeting of his unit

commanders on 24 January 1944. With his

officers in unanimous accord, he issued an

order to fight, commencing on 1 February

1944. All officers and enlisted men of his

command signed a loyalty oath that they

11

 Memo, Col Kangleon for K-50-OCTOPUS

(probably for MacArthur), 23 May 43, Guerrilla

Papers. 12

 The estimates on the number of deaths vary considerably. In a letter to President Manuel Quezon

by Senator Carlos Garcia, dated 16 October 1943,

the deaths are mentioned as "several"; a manuscript by Mrs. Charlotte Martin, who was on Leyte,

says "many lives were lost"; and 1st Lt. Jack Hawkins, USMC, a guerrilla, stated in December 1943

that "over three hundred casualties were suffered

by the contesting sides." Guerrilla Papers. 13

 GHQ FEC, MI Sec, GS, Messages in the Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines, Kangleon 201 File, DRB AGO.

14

 Office of Strategic Services, Research and

Analysis Br, Rpt, Guerrilla Resistance in the Philippines, 21 Jul 44, Guerrilla Papers. 15

 ATIS, GHQ SWPA, Current Translations, 148,

6 Feb 45.
18 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

would not allow either themselves or their

weapons to be captured.

From 1 February until 12 June, according to Colonel Kangleon, the guerrillas in

southern Leyte had only 10 casualties. In a

report dated 18 May 1944, the Japanese

casualties were listed as 434 killed, of whom

4 were officers, and 205 wounded.

The Japanese commander in Leyte made

quite a different report. He stated that from

1 January to 31 August his forces had taken

part in 561 engagements with the guerrillas.

They had seized 7 vehicles; 7 generators;

37 radios and other items of wireless equipment; 1,556 weapons, including rifles, bayonets, and homemade shotguns; and 55,348

rounds of ammunition, as well as sticks of

dynamite. The Japanese declared that they

had taken 2,300 prisoners of war, including

3 Americans; that 6 Americans and 23,077

Filipinos had surrendered; 1,984 guerrillas

had been killed; and that the Japanese casualties amounted to 7 officers and 208 enlisted men killed, and 11 officers and 147

men wounded.16

In the month of October 1944 General

MacArthur's Military Intelligence Section

estimated that the strength of the guerrilla

92d Division was as follows: Headquarters,

Leyte Area Command, 23 officers and 107

enlisted men; 94th Regiment, 71 officers

and 1,210 enlisted men; 95th Regiment, 78

officers and 954 enlisted men; 96th Regiment, 37 officers and 710 enlisted men; total

strength, 209 officers and 2,981 enlisted

men.17

Colonel Kangleon stated that as a result

of guerrilla activities the Japanese sent out

fewer patrols, staying mainly in the towns.

The civilians, he claimed, were therefore

able to plant and harvest their crops. Despite these brave words the guerrillas were

definitely on the defensive, since Japanese

intelligence had accurate information on

their movements and strength. Nevertheless,

the Japanese also knew that the guerrillas

had established communication with General MacArthur in Australia and that they

were sending important information to

General Headquarters. This service the

Japanese were unable to cut off.

Liaison Between Leyte and Australia

After his arrival in Australia in March

1942, General MacArthur had maintained

radio contact with Corregidor until 6 May,

but because of conditions in the Philippines

radio communication with other parts of

the Islands was all but impossible.18 Before

its fall, Corregidor maintained radio contact with military commanders on the other

islands. Afterward, a few men escaped and

made their way to Australia. The sum of

information they brought was not large,

but it included the welcome news that guerrilla units were in existence all over the

Islands. In the summer of 1942 General

Headquarters began to receive messages

from the guerrillas in the Philippines,

though at first General MacArthur was not

sure that the messages actually came from

the guerrillas.

In August 1942 MacArthur decided to

get in touch with the members of the resistance movement in the Philippines, and for

this purpose he enlisted the services of Maj.

16

 ATIS, SWPA, Enemy Publications 359, Guerrilla Activities in the Philippines, 2 parts, 28 Apr 45,

passim, DRB AGO. Any resemblance between the

Japanese figures and those in Kangleon's reports is

purely coincidental. 17

 MI Sec, GHQ SWPA, G-2 Info Bull, The

Resistance Movement on Leyte Island, 7 Oct 44,

Doc Files Sec, G-2, Dept of Army. 18

 Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, p. 5.
THE NATURE OF THE TARGET 19

Jesus Antonio Villamor, who had escaped

from the Islands and who volunteered to

return.19 From August to December methods were devised and plans were made for

sending an intelligence party to the Philippines.20

 On 27 December 1942 Major Villamor received orders to return secretly to the

Islands by submarine with three other Filipino officers and two enlisted men.21

 They

were instructed to establish an intelligence

and secret service network throughout the

Philippines; develop a chain of communications within the Philippines and to Australia,

together with an escape route from the

Islands for the evacuation of important personages; build up an organization for

subversive activities, propaganda, limited

resistance, and sabotage; and make an intelligence survey to obtain information on

Japanese political, military, and civil intentions as well as the strength and disposition

of Japanese military, naval, and air forces.22

Armed with these instructions, Major Villamor returned to the Philippine Islands.

Slowly but carefully, from December 1942

to November 1943, he established an intelligence network that covered Luzon and the

Visayan Islands. His story is told in part as

follows:

I established this network principally with

the idea that this net would be entirely independent of all intelligence nets previously established by the guerrillas, believing that in

all probability you [General MacArthur] could

rely more on guerrilla intelligence activities

for the present. I wanted to establish something that would really be underground and as

secret as possible. For that reason, I took my

time about it. I took as much as two months

to train each individual man. I tried to impress on each man that after he left my place,

he would be on his own and that no matter

what happened to me or to the rest of the net,

he would carry on. I assured him that both

GHQ and I would have faith in him.23

Kangleon was largely responsible for the

Leyte radio network. This intelligence network did not cover the entire island but only

those positions over which he had control.

General MacArthur did not furnish any

considerable supplies for this net until

shortly before his return in October 1944.24

On 3 July 1944 Kangleon received seventy

tons of supplies; an additional shipment of

supplies and men followed on 20 July.25 This

allotment was in addition to money sent him.

The funds available to Kangleon consisted

of $50,000 in prewar currency ("only a few

hundred" of which were spent by him),

$225,000 in "bogus Japanese" currency,

and $479,198 in emergency currency

printed in the Islands and used for "army"

purposes.26

Several clandestine radio stations were in

operation on or near Leyte in June 1944.

These were primarily contact stations established originally to integrate more closely the

activities of the various guerrilla units with

the directives of Colonel Kangleon's headquarters, which was in touch with General

Headquarters. After the Leyte Area Command was recognized by General MacArthur, the first radio was sent to Leyte, but

the Japanese captured it early in 1944 before

19

 Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton considered Villamor "the most daring of the Filipino pilots." Lewis

H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries (New York,

1946), p. 58. 20

 Interv with Maj Villamor, 12 Oct 50. 21

 The party consisted of Major Villamor, 1st Lt.

R. C. Ignacio, 2d Lt. D. C. Yuhico, 2d Lt. E. F.

Quinto, Sgt. P. Jorge, and Sgt. D. Malie. 22

 AIB, GHQ SWPA, Instructions to Maj Villamor, 27 Dec 42, Guerrilla Papers.

23

 Villamor Rpt on Intel Net in Philippines, Guerrilla Papers. 24

 Intelligence Activities in the Philippines, p. 77. 25

 Ibid., App. 2. The number of men and the

amount and kinds of supplies are not given. 26

 Ibid., App. 1.
20 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

it could be put to use. Kangleon received a

new set from Mindanao. There were two

coastwatcher stations in operation—one in

southern Leyte and the other on Dinagat

Island. These furnished MacArthur information on the activities of the Japanese in

the area. Colonel Kangleon also used the

radio set in southern Leyte to maintain contact with Colonel Fertig on Mindanao.27

As a result of information received from

the intelligence network, on Leyte and in

other areas, together with information from

other sources, General MacArthur's intelligence officers were able to piece together a

reasonably accurate picture of the Japanese

units on Leyte, their strength, dispositions,

and fortifications.

Kangleon's network, however, was not as

active as most of the others in the Philippines that were operated by coastwatchers

and guerrillas. From March 1944, when

Kangleon's network was established, to October 1944, when the American forces returned, the monthly totals of messages

received by General Headquarters from

Leyte were as follows: March, 6; April, 7;

May, 7; June, 12; July, 13; August, 13;

September, 17; and October, 26.28

The guerrillas of the Philippine Islands

made far-reaching contributions to the war

effort. They were an extremely valuable

source of intelligence; their activities forced

the Japanese to retain in the Philippines

comparatively large forces which would

otherwise have been sent south; it is estimated that they killed from eight thousand

to ten thousand Japanese troops; and,

finally, they bolstered the morale, spirit, and

loyalty of the Filipino people.29 They kept

alive the hope and belief that the forces of

the United States would return and redeem

the Islands.

27 Ibid., passim.

28

 GHQ FEC, MI Sec, GS, A Brief History of the

G-2 Section, GHQ SWPA, and Affiliated Units,

Plate 10, facing p. 32, copy in OCMH. 29

 Office, Chief of Naval Opns, Guerrilla Activities

in the Philippines, 14 Sep 44, file OP-16 FE.
CHAPTER III

Plans Are Made and Forces

Are Readied

Estimate of the Enemy Situation

American knowledge of the Japanese

forces on Leyte was derived from many

sources.1 The guerrillas on Leyte and other

islands in the archipelago sent information

to Australia on the movements, dispositions,

fortifications, and defenses of the Japanese.

Commander Parsons, on his submarine trips

to the Islands, brought back with him important intelligence. Just before the invasion

an intelligence officer from Sixth Army and

one from the Seventh Fleet secretly went

ashore from a submarine and gathered material on Japanese coastal fortifications and

defenses in the beach area.

Much effort was expended before the invasion in mapping the island, but this work

was based on prewar maps and the results

were very inaccurate. Since much of the

island was under heavy fog for long periods,

the photomaps that were produced had little

value. They missed many important terrain

features and misplaced others by thousands

of yards. In general, however, the maps of

the beachhead areas were accurate.

In the spring of 1944 General MacArthur's headquarters received information

that the Japanese were starting to reinforce

their Philippine garrisons. An early estimate,

made in June, put the number of enemy

troops on the island at 20,000, a sharp increase over the 5,900 of the previous month.

The increase resulted from the movement to

Leyte from Samar of the veteran 16th Division, which had fought at Bataan, and the

arrival of 4,000 naval troops from the

Palau Islands.2 For the next month reports

flowed in to General Headquarters that the

16th Division was building coastal defenses

and air-raid shelters, and improving the airfields and garrison defenses of the island.3

In July 1944 the Americans received information that all was not going well in the

Japanese homeland. From a radio interception they learned that Premier Hideki Tojo

and his entire cabinet had resigned on 18

July. The Japanese message stated: "The

situation is the result of the period of

1

 Unless otherwise stated this section is based upon a report by Col H. V. White, G-2 Sixth Army,

sub: G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, 20 Sep 44, Sixth Army

Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 167-70.

2

 GHQ SWPA Philippine Monthly Combined

Sitrep, 15 Jun 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 15 Jun 44. 3

 GHQ SWPA Philippine Islands, G-2 Est of

Enemy Sit 4, 11-17 Jun 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 17 Jun

44; GHQ SWPA Philippine Islands, G-2 Est of

Enemy Sit 5, 18-24 Jun 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 24

Jun 44; AAF SWPA Intel Sum, Ser 216, GHQ G-3

Jnl, 13 Jun 44; GHQ SWPA Philippine Islands,

G-2 Est of Enemy Sit 6, 25 Jun-1 Jul 44, GHQ

G-3 Jnl, 1 Jul 44; GHQ SWPA Philippine Islands,

G-2 Est of Enemy Sit 7, 2-8 Jul 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl,

8 Jul 44; AAF SWPA Intel Sum, Ser 225, GHQ

G-3 Jnl, 14 Jul 44.
22 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

'sweating blood' and we sincerely regret

causing anxiety to the Emperor. We thank

the people at home and at the front for cooperating with the government. . . ."

 4

The tenor of the announcement and of subsequent statements made it abundantly

clear, however, that the Japanese were determined to do their utmost toward prosecuting the war to a successful conclusion.

Meanwhile, all the Japanese garrisons in

the Philippines were reinforced. The senior

headquarters in the western Pacific was

transferred from Singapore to Manila, and

the brigades in the Islands were being developed to divisional strength. Of the estimated 180,000 troops, 80,000 were believed

to be on Luzon, 50,000 in the Visayan Islands, and 50,000 on Mindanao. It was also

believed that the enemy air strength on the

Islands was being greatly increased. There

were 100 to 120 airfields in operation and

between 700 and 1,500 aircraft, of which

half were combat planes and the others

training aircraft.5

In September 1944 Sixth Army G-2

estimated that the Japanese forces on Leyte

consisted mainly of 16th Division units and

service troops—a total of 21,700 troops.

The 35th Army had just been activated on

Cebu and was to be charged with the defense of all the Visayan Islands. It was estimated that the Leyte garrison consisted of

the following combat troops: 20th Infantry

Regiment, 3,000; 33d Infantry Regiment,

3,000; 16th Division Reconnaissance Regiment, 1,000; elements of 102d Division,

1,700; 7th Independent Tank Company,

125; and 16th Division Headquarters

troops, 1,800. The total amounted to 10,625

men. In addition there were 1,000 basedefense troops and 10,075 service troops.

It was believed that the Japanese would

commit one division on the day of the landing and the equivalent of another division,

assembled from the tactical reserves on the

island, not later than three days after the

landing. For the next ten days, five to eight

regiments might be sent in from neighboring

islands. These would constitute the "maximum numbers of reinforcements predicated

upon the existence of conditions most favorable to the enemy."

 6 The enemy had an

undetermined number of tanks and armored

cars. The only artillery known to be available were some coastal defense guns emplaced along the east coast and some artillery

pieces on the hills overlooking Tacloban.

Sixth Army believed that on Leyte there

were five operational airfields; three probably operational or under construction;

seven nonoperational; and one seaplane

base. The two most important operational

airstrips were the one at Tacloban with

forty-five hardstandings and the one at

Dulag with twenty hardstandings. The Tacloban airstrip could accommodate both

bombers and fighters. At the time of the invasion, it was estimated that the Japanese

could oppose the amphibious movement

and the landing with 442 fighters and 337

bombers from airfields scattered throughout

the Philippines.

Although the possibility existed that the

Japanese Fleet, which was based in waters

near the home islands, might move to the

Philippines, such a move was considered

doubtful. It was believed that the principal

and immediate threats consisted of a strong

cruiser-destroyer task force; submarines;

and motor torpedo boats and similar craft. 4

 AAF SWPA Intel Sum. Ser 228, GHQ G-3 Jnl,

25 Jul 44. 5

 Notes, WIDEAWAKE Conference, 20 Jul 44,

GHQ G-3 Jnl, 24 Jul 44.

6

 Sixth Army G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, 20 Sep 44,

Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 170.
PLANS ARE MADE AND FORCES ARE READIED 23

Sixth Army concluded that the town of

Tacloban, with its important port and airfield, was the key to the Japanese defense of

the island. Consequently, a strong perimeter

defense of the town and the surrounding

area was expected. Since it was impossible

for the Japanese, with a limited number of

their troops on the island, to defend all of

the east coast, strong forces and emplaced

defensive positions were likely to be concentrated at road junctions and at the operational airfields. Mobile reserves would almost certainly be held in readiness at key

points in Leyte Valley, ready to be rushed to

the east coast areas under attack. It was

assumed that strong defenses were already

established in the Ormoc area and along

the northeast coast of Ormoc Bay, since the

port of Ormoc could be used to bring in

reserves from the other islands in the archipelago. A strong garrison was expected at

Carigara to protect the northern approaches

to Leyte Valley and to repel any amphibious

landing through Carigara Bay.

The plan for the liberation of Leyte called

for more men, guns, ships, and aircraft than

had been required for any previous operation in the Pacific. For the first time ground

troops from the Central Pacific and Southwest Pacific were to join and fight the foe

under a common commander. General

MacArthur, who had left Luzon in a motor

torpedo boat, was to return to the Philippines with a vast armada—the greatest

seen in the Pacific up to that time.

The Tactical Plan

The Southwest Pacific Area was the command responsibility of General MacArthur.

He had under his command Allied Air

Forces, Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney commanding; Allied Naval Forces, Vice Adm.

Thomas C. Kinkaid commanding; Allied

Land Forces, Gen. Sir Thomas Blarney

commanding; United States Army Services

of Supply (SWPA), Maj. Gen. James L.

Frink commanding; and ALAMO Force,

which was virtually Sixth Army, Lt. Gen.

Walter Krueger commanding.

On 31 August 1944 General MacArthur

issued his first formal directive covering

projected operations in the Philippines.

The Leyte operation was known as KING

II. The Southwest Pacific forces were to

"seize objectives in the Mindanao, Leyte

and Samar areas in order to establish air,

naval and logistic bases to cover subsequent

operations to complete the reoccupation of

the Philippines." The assigned target dates

were as follows: southern Mindanao, 15

November 1944; northwestern Mindanao,

7 December; and Leyte Gulf-Surigao

Strait area, 20 December. The Sixth Army,

covered by Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet

and supported by the Allied Air and Naval

Forces, was directed to carry out the three

operations.7 On 15 September General

Krueger received word that the Talaud and

Mindanao operations had been canceled

and that the target date—designated as

"A Day"—for the Leyte operation had been

advanced to 20 October.8

The American Forces

The immediate task assigned the forces of

the Southwest Pacific, supported by the

Third Fleet, was the seizure and control of

the Leyte Gulf-Surigao Strait area in order

to establish air, naval, and logistic bases to

support further operations into the Philippines. Before the invasion, air and naval

operations were to be conducted so as to dis7

 GHQ SWPA Warning Instns 5, 31 Aug 44. 8

 GHQ SWPA Warning Instns 5/1, 15 Sep 44.
24 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

organize Japanese ground and air defenses.

The ground operation was divided into three

phases. In the first phase overwater movement and minor amphibious operations to

secure entrance into Leyte Gulf were to take

place. The main effort, which constituted

the second phase, was to involve a major

assault to capture the airfields and base sites

in Leyte Valley and to open up San Juanico

and Panaon Straits. In the final phase, the

remaining portions of the island in Japanese

hands and the western part of southern

Samar were to be secured, and Surigao

Strait was to be opened.9 The target date

had been set for 20 October 1944.

General plans for the operation had long

since been worked out, but not until 20 September did General MacArthur issue his

final plan for the occupation of Leyte. It

was based upon the assumption that American forces were or would be established

along the Marianas-Ulithi-Palaus-Morotai

line and that the Japanese land and air

forces in the Philippines and Formosa would

have been "seriously crippled and that the

Japanese Fleet would elect to remain in

Empire waters" with only "light forces remaining in the vicinity of the Philippines."

The Japanese were expected to have one

well-supplied division in the area with only

limited ability to reinforce it from others of

the Visayan Islands and with all subsequent

supply deliveries cut off. It was assumed that

Japanese defenses would be concentrated in

the vicinity of the airfields in the Leyte

Valley and at Tacloban.

The command organization was as follows: General MacArthur was Supreme

Commander, but during the amphibious

movement and landing Admiral Kinkaid,

as commander of the Naval Attack Force,

was to be in command of all amphibious

operations. (Chart 1) Army officers, who

took control of their forces ashore, were to

continue under the Commander, Naval

Attack Force, until the next senior Army

commander assumed control. Upon his arrival ashore and after notification to Admiral Kinkaid, General Krueger was to take

control of the ground troops. General Kenney, as commander of the Allied Air Forces,

would report directly to General MacArthur.

Admiral Halsey, as commander of the

Third Fleet, was to co-ordinate his operations with those of General MacArthur but

he was responsible to Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area. The

Third Fleet was composed of Vice Adm.

Marc Mitscher's Fast Carrier Task Force,

together with miscellaneous elements. Mitscher's force was divided into four carrier

groups.10

The Allied Naval Forces, which consisted

principally of the U.S. Seventh Fleet under

Admiral Kinkaid, was to transport and

establish ashore the ground assault force.

The Central Philippine Attack Force consisted of three task forces. Task Force 77,

commanded by Admiral Kinkaid, was to

furnish direct air and naval support and was

composed of battleships, light and heavy

cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts, carriers, escort carriers, gunboat and mortar

flotillas, mine sweepers, auxiliary vessels,

and underwater demolition teams. The

transports and cargo ships of the Northern

Attack Force, Task Force 78, under Rear

Adm. Daniel E. Barbey, and the Southern

9

 GHQ SWPA Stf Study, KING II, 4th ed., 20

Sep 44. This study was not a directive but a basis

for planning the operation.

10

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opn Plan 8-44, quoted

in Annex A, CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA,

Oct 44, pp. 56-57, A-16-3/FF12, Ser 00397, 31

May 45.

26 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Attack Force, Task Force 79, under Vice

Adm. Theodore S. Wilkinson, were to transport and set ashore the ground troops. Task

Force 79 had been lent to General MacArthur by Admiral Nimitz for the operation.

The Allied Air Forces, principally the Far

East Air Forces under General Kenney, was

to neutralize hostile air and naval forces

within range of the Philippines. The Allied

Air Forces consisted of the Fifth Air Force,

commanded by Maj. Gen. Ennis P. Whitehead; the Thirteenth Air Force, commanded by Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett; the

Royal Australian Air Force Command

under Air Vice Marshal William D.

Bostock; and miscellaneous elements. On

order, the Fifth Air Force was to be prepared to take over the mission of furnishing

direct air support to the ground troops.

The United States Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area, commanded by

General Frink, was to furnish logistic support for the operation. The Eighth U.S.

Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Robert L.

Eichelberger, and the Allied Land Forces,

commanded by General Blamey, were to

take over missions previously assigned the

Sixth Army and to assist the latter in training, staging, and mounting the troops for

the Leyte operation.

The ground troops who were to attack

Leyte constituted a field army—the Sixth

Army, which had fought its way up the

New Guinea coast since April 1943 as

ALAMO Force. On 25 September 1944

ALAMO Force was dissolved and Sixth

Army assumed its tactical missions. General

Krueger was commanding general for all

these campaigns. The principal component

parts of Sixth Army were X and XXIV

Corps. The former consisted of the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions, under Lt.

Gen. Franklin C. Sibert, a seasoned commander who had successfully fought the

Japanese on New Guinea at Wakde-Sarmi.

The XXIV Corps, under Maj. Gen. John R.

Hodge, who had defeated the Japanese on

Guadalcanal, New Georgia, and Bougainville, was composed of the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions. In reserve were the 32d and

77th Infantry Divisions. The Sixth Army

Service Command was to perform engineer

functions on the island and give general

logistic support.

Approximately 174,000 troops were made

available for the initial assault phase of the

operation. About 51,500 of these made up

the XXIV Corps and 53,000 the X Corps.

In addition to these troops, the reserve 32d

and 77th Divisions had a strength of about

14,500 and 14,000 troops, respectively. All

of the assault divisions were reinforced

with tank battalions, amphibian truck and

tractor battalions, joint assault signal companies, and many attached service units. A

total of about 202,500 ground troops was

committed to the Leyte operation.11

Headquarters, Sixth Army, had never

participated as such in any campaign, but

as Headquarters, ALAMO Force, it had directed the operations up the New Guinea

coast. Both the X and XXIV Corps were

yet to be battle tested, though all their divisions with one exception had participated

in previous campaigns against the Japanese.

The 1st Cavalry Division had taken part

in the Admiralty Islands campaign; the 7th

Division had defeated the Japanese at Attu

and Kwajalein; the 24th Division had

fought in the Hollandia campaign; the 32d

Division had won the Papua Campaign and

11

 Sixth Army FO 25, 23 Sep 44, Annexes 6a-6f.
PLANS ARE MADE AND FORCES ARE READIED 27

been victorious at Aitape on New Guinea;

and the 77th Division had shared in the

victory at Guam. Only the 96th Division

was yet to be combat tested.12

General MacArthur's Warning Instructions 5 and Operations Instructions 70 were

used by each of the major commanders as a

basis for his own operations orders. Although each order was derived from the one

next above it, all were planned concurrently. There was need for constant intertheater, interservice, and intraservice conferences and discussions on all phases of the

plans as they evolved. Frequently the planning was made easier by using the work done

on plans for other operations. For example,

the logistical plan for the canceled Yap

operation was adapted with very little

change to the Leyte operation. The general

schemes of maneuver and the employment

of support forces which had been found

valuable in previous operations were also

adapted with minor variations to the plans

for Leyte.

Air Support

The Navy was to bear the brunt of furnishing air support in the early stages of the

campaign. By arrangement with Admiral

Nimitz, the Carrier Task Force from Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet was to strike

northern Luzon and Okinawa or Formosa,

or both, from A Day minus 10 to A minus 7.

From A minus 4 through A Day, strikes

were to be made on Luzon, the CebuNegros area, and the Leyte area in support

of the landings. As soon as the Palau air base

facilities would permit, shore-based air

forces from the Central Pacific were to operate in the Bicol area.13

The Allied Naval Forces was to furnish

carrier aircraft as protection for convoys

and naval task forces and, supplemented by

aircraft of the Third Fleet and the Allied

Air Forces, to provide direct air support for

the landings. In addition, it was to furnish

protective air support and cover by carrier

aircraft prior to A Day for the preliminary

landings in Leyte Gulf and for the mine

sweeping.14

General MacArthur assigned air support

missions to the Allied Air Forces. General

Kenney's airmen were (1) to make aerial

reconnaissance; (2) in co-ordination with

Third Fleet carrier-based aircraft, to neutralize hostile naval and air forces within

range of the Philippines from A minus 9 in

order to cover the movement of naval forces,

the landing, and subsequent operations; (3)

within capabilities and when requested by

Admiral Kinkaid, to protect convoys and

naval forces and provide direct support of

the landings and subsequent operations;

and (4) to destroy Japanese shipping and

installations in the Sulu and Arafura Seas

and the East Indies.15

On 24 September General Kenney issued

his order for the Leyte operation and assigned missions to the Allied Air Forces.

He designated General Whitehead's Fifth

Air Force as the Air Assault Force. It was

to support the operation by intensified air

activities against enemy installations, destroy

hostile air and surface forces in the Celebes

Sea and assigned areas in the Philippine

Archipelago, and provide air defense for

12

 Hist Div, Dept of the Army, Combat Chronicle,

An Outline History of U.S. Army Divisions,

passim, OCMH.

13

 CTF 77 Opns Plan, Ser 00022A, 26 Sep 44,

GHQ G-3 Jnl, 6 Oct 44; CINCPAC-CINCPOA

Opn Plan 8-44, cited n. 10, above. 14

 GHQ SWPA Opns Instns 70, 21 Sep 44. 15

 Ibid.
28 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

existing bases and forces in transit to Leyte

within range of its capabilities. It was also

to be prepared to establish, on order, landbased air forces on Leyte. The Thirteenth

Air Force was to support the missions of the

Fifth Air Force, while the Royal Australian

Air Force Command was to destroy Japanese installations and sources of raw materials in the Netherlands Indies.16

Aircraft from other theaters agreed to aid

in the operation. The Fourteenth Air Force

from the China-Burma-India Theater and

the Twentieth Air Force from the Central

Pacific were to conduct strikes against

Formosa. The Southeast Asia Command

was asked to schedule air offensives against

Burma and Malaya just prior to A Day.17

Naval Support

The Seventh Fleet under Admiral Kinkaid was assigned the following mission:

"by a ship to shore amphibious operation,

[to] transport, protect, land and support

elements of the 6th Army in order to assist

in the seizure, occupation and development

of the Leyte area of the Southern Philippines."

 18

 (Chart 2)

The Seventh Fleet was designated the

Naval Attack Force. For the operation Admiral Kinkaid organized two attack forces:

the Northern Attack Force (VII Amphibious Force), under Admiral Barbey, and

the Southern Attack Force (III Amphibious

Force), under Admiral Wilkinson. In addition, several subordinate units were created:

a bombardment and fire support group

under Rear Adm. Jesse B. Oldendorf; and

a close covering group, an escort carrier

group, a mine-sweeping group, and twelve

underwater demolition teams. The Northern

Attack Force was to transport and land

the X Corps, while the Southern Attack

Force was to do the same for the XXIV

Corps.

The task groups of the two attack forces

were to sortie from the mounting areas at

Manus in the Admiralties and Hollandia in

Netherlands New Guinea and rendezvous

en route to the objective area. Both were "to

land main elements as nearly simultaneously

as practicable at H Hour on 20 October."

Meanwhile, an advance group on 17 October was to land the 6th Ranger Infantry

Battalion on the islands guarding the approaches to Leyte Gulf. The task groups

were to regulate their speed of advance so

that they would arrive at the entrance of the

approach channel to Leyte Gulf at specified

times. The mine-sweeping group and certain

units of the bombardment and fire support

group which were to render fire support for

initial mine-sweeping operations were to arrive at 0600 on 17 October. They were

to be followed fifteen minutes later by

the attack group assigned to the island approaches. At 1000 on the same day the rest

of the bombardment and fire support group

were to arrive. Beginning at 2300 on 19

October the transports and LST's of the two

attack forces were scheduled to arrive in

successive groups. Their time of arrival was

also set so that each group would reach its

transport area in sufficient time to dispatch

the assault waves to the beach at the designated hour.19

On arrival in the objective area, the bombardment and fire support group was to

divide into northern and southern fire support units, which were then to move to their

respective target areas. The northern fire

16

 AAF SWPA Opns Instns 71, 24 Sep 44. 17

 FEAF, History of Far East Air Forces, I, 117,

AAF Hist Archives. 18

 GANF SWPA Opns Plan 13-44, 26 Sep 44. 19

 Ibid., Apps. 1 and 2 to Annex C.

30 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

support unit consisted of 3 old battleships—

the Mississippi, Maryland, and West Virginia—and 3 destroyers. The southern fire

support unit was composed of 3 battleships—the Tennessee, California, and Pennsylvania—13 destroyers, 3 light cruisers, 3

heavy cruisers, and 1 small seaplane tender.

The destroyers in the two target areas

were to furnish protection to the mine

sweepers and the underwater demolition

teams. The latter were to cover the northern

and southern beaches before A Day and

search out and destroy any obstacles, either

Japanese-made or natural, in the waters

surrounding the landing beach areas. The

mine sweepers were to start clearing Leyte

Gulf of fixed or floating mines on 17 October, three days before the main assault. On

the following days, including 20 October,

they were to make more intensive sweeps of

the channels and landing beach areas, with

the vessels going as close to shore as possible

without endangering gear.20

Admiral Oldendorf was to direct the

bombardment and fire support. The bombardment was to start on 17 October in

preparation for the landings on the island

approaches. The gunfire before 20 October

was for the purpose of rendering unserviceable both airfields and Japanese aircraft on

the ground, in addition to destroying guns

and emplacements, fuel storage and ammunition dumps, naval forces and shipping,

beach defenses and strong points, troops,

torpedo launching ramps, and torpedo

barges. Close fire support was to be given

to the underwater demolition teams and destructive fire was to be delivered against

enemy forces attempting overwater movements. Finally, night harassing fire was

scheduled to prevent any night attempts

of the Japanese to reconstruct the fortifications and airfields.

On 20 October the naval gunfire support

units were to cover the approach of the

transports to the unloading areas and to

furnish necessary counterbattery fire; thoroughly cover the landing beach areas from

the low-water line to approximately 400

yards inland; and closely support the landings with rockets, 4.2-inch mortars, and

gunfire of all caliber from the ships. After

the landings, the naval gunfire units were

to deliver fire on call and prevent the Japanese from either reinforcing or evacuating

the island.21

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed

Admiral Nimitz to support General MacArthur's operation against Leyte. Admiral

Nimitz ordered Admiral Halsey's Third

Fleet to "destroy enemy naval and air forces

in or threatening the Philippine Area." The

Third Fleet was also to protect the air and

sea communications along the Central Philippines axis. If an opportunity to destroy

major portions of the Japanese Fleet should

arise or could be created, such destruction

was to be the primary task of all naval forces

from the Central Pacific. Admiral Halsey

and General MacArthur were to arrange

the necessary measures for the co-ordination

of their operations.22

In support of the Leyte operation the

Third Fleet was to contain or destroy the

Japanese Fleet and to destroy enemy aircraft and shipping in the Formosa, Luzon,

Visayan, and Mindanao areas from 9 October through 17 October, and from A Day

for as long as necessary during the next thirty

20

 Ibid., App. 3 to Annex E.

21

 Ibid., App. 1 to Annex E. 22

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opn Plan 8-44, cited

n. 10, above.
PLANS ARE MADE AND FORCES ARE READIED 31

days, in order to "maintain their continued

neutralization." From 18 October until

such time as the escort carriers could assume direct support, the Third Fleet was to

destroy enemy ground defenses and installations in Leyte and adjacent areas. Finally,

the Third Fleet was to provide direct support by fast carrier aircraft for the landing

and subsequent operations.23

Submarines from both the Southwest

Pacific and Central Pacific were to support

the operations by maintaining an offensive

reconnaissance over the most probable

Japanese route of advance, maintaining observation and lifeguard services and furnishing weather reports and strategic patrols.

Submarines from the Central Pacific were

to patrol in the Formosa, Luzon, Tokyo

Bay, and Sasebo areas, while those from the

Seventh Fleet patrolled in the area of

Makassar Strait, the Celebes Sea, and the

Sulu Sea. Submarines from both areas were

to maintain a strong patrol in the Hainannorthern Luzon areas.24

The naval gunfire, the air support, and

the artillery fire were to be carefully co-ordinated. At every level from battalion to army

representatives from each support arm were

to co-ordinate the use of their support arms

against targets in their respective zones of

action. Requests for support were to be

screened as they passed through the various

echelons for approval. Commanders in the

field felt that the passage of requests through

many channels was time consuming and

consequently sometimes nullified what might

have been an immediate advantage. However, requests for support were usually acted

upon within an hour.

The Ground Forces

The ground forces designated for the

Leyte operation came from two different

theaters—the X Corps from the Southwest

Pacific and the XXIV Corps from the Central Pacific. The XXIV Corps, originally

intended for the Yap operation, had been

substituted for the XIV Corps, originally

intended for Leyte. As the new assignment

of the XXIV Corps placed it under the operational control of General MacArthur, it

was necessary that agreements on the coordination of operations be reached by the

commanders in chief of the two areas. The

XXIV Corps, with its original shipping, had

been turned over to General MacArthur.

During the combat phase at Leyte, General

MacArthur was to furnish the replacements

required by the XXIV Corps, but subsequent replacements were to be supplied by

Admiral Nimitz.25

The initial assault for the island of Leyte

was to begin in the dim half dawn of 17

October, when elements of the 6th Ranger

Infantry Battalion were to land under the

protection of naval gunfire and seize the

small islands that guarded the entrance to

Leyte Gulf. (Map 1) Harbor lights were to

be placed on Homonhon Island and the

northern tip of Dinagat Island in order to

guide the passage of the convoy into the

gulf. Since it was believed that there were

valuable mine charts on Suluan, that island

was added to the objectives of the 6th

Rangers.

General Krueger had wanted to use either

the reinforced 158th Infantry Regiment or

23

 GHQ SWPA Opns Instns 70, 21 Sep 44. 24

 CANF SWPA Opns Plan 13-44, 26 Sep 44.

25

 Memo, Rear Adm Forrest P. Sherman, Plans

Off POA, and Maj Gen Stephen J. Chamberlin,

ACofS G-3 SWPA, for CINCSWPA and CINCPOA, 21 Sep 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 21 Sep 44.
32 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

MAP 1

the reinforced 112th Cavalry Regimental

Combat Team to secure the island approaches to Leyte Gulf and the Panaon

Strait area. The 21st Infantry, which was

assigned the mission of securing the Panaon

Strait area, then could have remained with

the 24th Division, its parent unit, and the

6th Ranger Battalion could have been used

wherever and whenever needed. In addition, these missions would have been put in

the hands of a general officer who had an

experienced staff to assist him. Neither of

the desired regiments, however, could be

made available for the Leyte operation because of shortage of troops and previous

commitments.26

While the Rangers were seizing the small

islands, the mine sweepers and underwater

26 Ibid.
PLANS ARE MADE AND FORCES ARE READIED 33

demolition teams were to start clearing the

gulf of natural and man-made obstacles.

The fire support units were to move in and

start softening up the beaches. The completion of these missions would conclude the

first phase of the operation.

The second phase comprised "a major

amphibious assault to attack and destroy

hostile forces in the coastal strip TaclobanDulag inclusive, and to seize airdromes and

base sites therein; a rapid advance through

Leyte Valley to seize and occupy the Capooc an Carigara-Barugo area; [and finally]

open San Juanico and Panaon Straits...."

 27

In the very early hours of 20 October the

Northern and Southern Attack Forces were

to move to their appointed beach areas and

be prepared to disembark their assault

troops. The reinforced 21st Infantry Regiment was to go ashore at 0930 in the vicinity

of Panaon Strait at the extreme southeast

tip of Leyte and secure control of that entrance to Sogod Bay. To the north at 1000,

the X Corps was to land with two divisions

abreast in the Marasbaras and Palo areas.

About fifteen miles farther south, in the

Dulag area, the XXIV Corps was to go

ashore simultaneously with two divisions

abreast. The two corps would be so widely

separated and their objectives so divergent

that initially they could not be mutually

supporting. Even within the zones of action

of the two corps, the missions assigned the

divisions would limit the ability of the divisions to support each other.28

As General Krueger felt that the Japanese would offer the greatest resistance in

the north, the initial objectives of the X

Corps were limited to the seizure of Palo

and the capture of Tacloban and its airfield.

The northernmost unit, the 1st Cavalry Division, actually an infantry square division,

was to land with brigades abreast in the

Marasbaras area, advance to the north, and

seize Tacloban and its airstrip, the most important objective for A Day. Thereafter, the

division was to secure control over San

Juanico Strait. To the left of the 1st Cavalry

Division, the 24th Division was to go ashore

with regiments abreast in the Palo area,

seize Palo, and then advance northwest

through the Leyte Valley. The two divisions

were to converge on Carigara, at the northern end of Leyte Valley on Carigara Bay.29

In the XXIV Corps zone, the 96th Division with regiments abreast was to land in

the area between Dulag and San Roque,

and to secure that portion of Highway 1 in

its zone, Catmon Hill, and, finally, the

Dagami-Tanauan area. On its left the 7th

Division with regiments abreast was to go

ashore in the Dulag area. One element was

to go south and seize the Highway 1 bridge

and crossings of the Daguitan (Marabang)

River at Dao while the main force of the

division was to advance along the axis of the

Dulag—Burauen road and capture Burauen.

The 7th Division would then be in a position

to move north toward Dagami. All hostile

airfields in its zone of action were to be seized

and occupied. The division was to be prepared, on corps order, to seize Abuyog, to

the south, and Baybay, on the west coast,

destroying enemy forces on the west coast

and in the southern portion of Leyte.30

Completion of these missions of the X

and XXIV Corps would bring to an end the

second phase of the Leyte operation. By this

time, General Krueger hoped, the back of

the Japanese resistance would be broken.

27

 Sixth Army FO 25, 23 Sep 44. 28

 Ibid.; Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 23.

29

 X Corps FO 1, 30 Sep 44; 1st Cav Div FO 1,

2 Oct 44; 24th Inf Div FO 1, 1 Oct 44. 30

 XXIV Corps FO 3, 28 Sep 44; 96th Div FO 2,

10 Oct 44; 7th Div FO 9, 1 Oct 44.
34 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

With Leyte Valley and its airfields and base

sites firmly in the hands of the Sixth Army,

General Krueger's forces would be in a position to apply firmly the pincers on the remaining Japanese on the island. The X

Corps was to drive south down the Ormoc

Valley to Ormoc while the XXIV Corps was

to move north from Baybay along the shores

of Ormoc Bay and make juncture with the

X Corps. The remnants of the Japanese

forces, driven into the mountains of western

Leyte, would be unable to continue an organized resistance.31

The eastern shores of Leyte were chosen

for the initial landing, since the beaches on

this side were the best on the island, and

were the logical entrance to the important

airfields, base sites, and roads in Leyte

Valley.

Since the large number of naval vessels

required considerable room for landing the

assault troops and for maneuvering, the

landing beach areas of the two corps were

widely separated. In addition, the value of

the road net which connected Dulag with

the Burauen airfields formed an important

consideration in the determination of the

landing beach sites of the XXIV Corps.

"This latter factor—which took precedence

over the potentiality of strong enemy resistance from Catmon Hill—had determined

the selection of beaches in the Dulag area."

 32

Although it was recognized as necessary

for elements of the XXIV Corps to advance

south to Abuyog and then overland to Baybay in order to destroy the enemy forces on

the west coast, these maneuvers would leave

great gaps in the battle line if only four divisions were at first employed. General Krueger therefore asked General Headquarters

of the Southwest Pacific for additional combat troops, and during the progress of the

campaign General MacArthur made them

available.33

The Sixth Army was also troubled about

its reserve force. Although the 32d Division

at Morotai and Hollandia and the 77th Division at Guam had been designated as

Sixth Army Reserve, it would be impossible

for these units to arrive at Leyte before the

middle of November. The shortage of amphibious shipping made it necessary to

mount these divisions on the turnaround of

assault shipping. Since the floating reserve

would have to come from one of the assault

divisions, it was difficult to determine from

which division to take it. It was decided that

the 96th Division, considering its mission,

could best spare such a unit, and the 381st

Infantry of that division was therefore

selected.34

To summarize the mission of the Sixth

Army: on 17 October, the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion would seize Suluan, Dinagat, and Homonhon Islands, in the entrance

to Leyte Bay. At 0930 on 20 October, the

21st Infantry Regiment was to land in the

vicinity of Panaon Strait and secure control

of that entrance to Sogod Bay. At 1000 on

the same day the Sixth Army with the X

and XXIV Corps abreast would make a

major amphibious landing on Leyte. In the

north the X Corps, with the 1st Cavalry

Division and the 24th Infantry Division

abreast, after moving ashore in the Marasbaras and the Palo areas, would capture

Tacloban, its airfield, and Palo. In the south

the XXIV Corps with the 96th and 7th Infantry Divisions abreast would go ashore to

secure control in the Dulag area.35

31

 Sixth Army FO 25, 23 Sep 44. 32

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 23.

33

 Ibid. 34

 Ibid. 35

 Ibid., p. 20.
PLANS ARE MADE AND FORCES ARE READIED 35

The Logistical Plan

Construction

The decision to land on Leyte at the beginning of the rainy season and to construct

a major supply and air base thereon presented a serious problem to the engineers.

The poor soil, inadequate roads, and heavy

rains were obstacles that had to be met and

in some way overcome if the operation was

to be a logistical success. General MacArthur recognized the need for making use

of Leyte as a logistical base by creating for

the first time in the Southwest Pacific an

army service command and by detailing his

chief engineer, Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Casey, to

be its commander. ASCOM, as it was

called, was to provide the logistical services

required for the operation and to build and

operate the Army base facilities until the

United States Army Services of Supply

(SWPA) could take over. This transfer was

expected to take place about thirty days after

the assault troops first landed on the shores

of Leyte.36

General MacArthur directed the Sixth

Army to establish the following air facilities

in the Leyte area: by A plus 5, facilities for

two fighter groups, one night fighter squadron, one photo squadron, one medium

bomber group plus one squadron, three

patrol bomber squadrons, and one Marine

reconnaissance squadron; by A plus 30, additional facilities for two light bomber

groups, one air-sea rescue squadron, one

tactical reconnaissance squadron, and one

fighter squadron; additional facilities by A

plus 45 for one fighter group, one patrol

bomber squadron, two heavy bomber

groups, and one laboratory squadron; and

by A plus 60, further facilities for one photo

squadron, one patrol bomber squadron, two

troop carrier groups, and one combat mapping squadron.37

The final Sixth Army plan for the Leyte

operation directed ASCOM to establish

naval facilities in the Leyte area as well as

the aforementioned air facilities; to make

topographic and hydrographic surveys, followed by suitable changes in the plans for

the construction of bases, docks, roads, and

airdromes; to unload all units, supplies, and

materiel arriving in the area and to store

and issue supplies to ground and air units;

and, in co-operation with the Philippine

Civil Affairs Units, recruit and direct native

labor.38

The construction program as planned for

Leyte brought strong remonstrances from

the Sixth Army engineers. On 10 August

Col. William J. Ely, the executive officer,

protested against the employment of Leyte

as a major supply and air force base. The

reasons for his objections were prophetic.

The operation was to be launched during

the season of heavy rains in an area where

high winds and typhoons occurred. The

harbor was so shallow and so obstructed by

patches of coral that the approaches would

have to be as much as 800 feet long. The

fact that the flat Leyte Valley was interlaced

by many streams and flooded with rice paddies indicated that the soil was "most unstable." The condition of the soil and

drainage would require the hauling, frequently for long distances, of considerable

quantities of rock for the construction of

roads. The existing roads and bridges, in

most places so narrow as to permit only oneway traffic, would soon disintegrate under

the constant heavy rains and the pounding

of military vehicles. Colonel Ely forecast

36

 Ibid., p. 24.

37

 Ibid., p. 19. 38

 Sixth Army FO 25, 23 Sep 44.
36 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

that, in the light of past experience with

poor conditions of soil and drainage, the

construction and enlargement of the airstrips would be difficult. The shortage of engineer troops decreased the possibility of

providing major air and supply bases in

sufficient time to properly support further

operations. He concluded that "the construction mission cannot be satisfactorily accomplished with the engineer troops available, particularly during the first 90 days."

Colonel Ely gloomily summarized, "Perhaps we can mud and muddle through

again on a shoestring but the shoestring

must be frayed by this time and if it broke

we may lose our shirt as well as our shoe."

If the strategic plan were fixed, he recommended that one or more of the following

measures be adopted: (1) increase the number of engineer construction troops; (2)

shift the operation to an area where major

air and supply bases could be constructed

without encountering the adverse weather

and port conditions existing on Leyte; (3)

"decrease the tempo of the strategic plan";

and finally (4) decrease the scope of the air

and supply requirements. Nothing was to be

gained "by undertaking an overambitious

program from the beginning that cannot be

completed on a time schedule that will assure early and adequate support to future

operations."

 39

Col. Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr., Sixth Army

Engineer, forwarded Colonel Ely's report

with a strong concurrence to General MacArthur's engineer, but General Headquarters decided to proceed with the original

logistical plans for the operation.40

Supplies

The supplies required for the operation

involved staggering quantities. For an invasion force of 150,000 men, the War Department figures showed that, for the landing period alone, 1,500,000 tons of general

equipment, 235,000 tons of combat vehicles,

200,000 tons of ammunition, and 200,000

tons of medical supplies were required.

Thereafter, 332,000 tons of equipment

would be required every thirty days.41 According to the final plan, issued by General

Krueger on 30 September 1944,42 the units

of the Sixth Army, X Corps, and Sixth Army

Service Command, under General Casey,

which were to arrive at Leyte between 20

and 30 October were to take ashore a minimum of ten days' supply of all classes (except engineer supplies, which were to be

for at least thirty days), and two units of

fire.43 In this way the strain on ASCOM

supply units would be lessened, and

ASCOM, it was hoped, would have time to

establish dumps and make the necessary

supply installations. In addition to supplies

accompanying the assault troops, sufficient

quantities were to be brought into Leyte by

30 October to bring the total supplies for

the troops to the following figures, expressed

in days: thirty days of food, clothing, and

equipment; fifteen days of motor transport

fuel and distillate; and thirty days of other

petroleum products. There were also to be

five units of fire for combat troops and three

for service troops. The original plan had

called for a thirty-day supply of all petroleum products to be brought in by A plus 10,

39

 Memo, Col Ely, Exec Off, Sixth Army Engineer, for Col Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr., Sixth Army

Engineer; Air Evaluation Board SWPA, The Leyte

Campaign, pp. 400-403. 40

 Interv with Maj Gen George H. Decker, formerly CofS Sixth Army, 7 Sep 51.

41

 MI, GS, GHQ FEC, History of the United

States Army Forces in the Far East 1943-1945, p.

69.

42

 Sixth Army Admin O 14, 30 Sep 44. 43

 Sixth Army Admin O 14, Annex 4, 30 Sep 44.
PLANS ARE MADE AND FORCES ARE READIED 37

but this quantity was reduced when General

Krueger adopted a plan for the installation

by A plus 7 of bulk fuel storage. The XXIV

Corps supply levels were to remain the same

as those planned for the now-canceled Yap

operation, since the corps was already

loaded with supplies which were considered

adequate for the Leyte invasion.44

There were certain differences in the

loads carried by the X and the XXIV Corps.

The XXIV Corps embarked with a thirtyday supply of rations and medical supplies,

twenty days of clothing, weapons, vehicles,

fuels, lubricants, construction materiel, and

seven units of fire for all artillery and five

units for other types of weapons. Since the

type of equipment loaded had been selected

for the Yap operation, amphibian vehicles

were favored over wheeled vehicles. Less

than 50 percent of the Table of Equipment

allowance of general purpose vehicles and

dump trucks accompanied the units. Furthermore, many badly needed items of organizational equipment were carried by the

rear echelons, which did not arrive until

January 1945, after Leyte had been

secured.45

The supplies which were to accompany

the troops during the initial phases of the

Leyte operation were to come from bases in

New Guinea and the Central Pacific. Resupply shipping—to be called for as needed—was to be loaded at bases in the United

States, Australia, and, if necessary, New

Guinea.46 In addition, ten loaded liberty

ships were to be held in floating reserve,

eight at Hollandia and two in the Palaus.

Two of these were loaded with aviation

gasoline, two with fuel oil and lubricants,

two with ammunition for the air forces and

four with ammunition for the ground forces.

Admiral Nimitz was to furnish two of the

four last mentioned. Except for the LST's

transporting the XXIV Corps, each LST

arriving on 20 October was to carry thirty

tons of technical supplies for the air forces.

All LST's arriving from A plus 1 through A

plus 4 were to carry forty tons of similar

supplies.47 General MacArthur charged the

Commanding General, United States Army

Services of Supply (SWPA), with providing

the Sixth Army with all supplies, except air

force technical supplies, that would be

needed for the operation.48

An Army garrison force for Yap under

Maj. Gen. Roscoe B. Woodruff had been

scheduled to go with the XXIV Corps, and

at Admiral Nimitz' suggestion this force

was designated to accompany the corps to

the new target, Leyte, though the Southwest Pacific Area had never used an organization of this type.49

 It was hoped that the

force might be useful in taking over "housekeeping" duties and the development of rear

areas, thus relieving the assault commander

of those responsibilities. Incidentally, General Krueger made little use of the garrison

force. Units which furnished logistic support for carrier operations were also included and were to be assigned to the

Seventh Fleet. Admiral Nimitz was to continue furnishing logistic support to the

XXIV Corps until relieved by General

MacArthur.50

44

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 24. 45

 XXIV Corps Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 35. 46

 Ibid.

47

 Sixth Army Admin O 14, 30 Sep 44. 48

 GHQ SWPA Opns Instns 70, Annex 4, 21 Sep

44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 21 Sep 44. 49

 Ibid., p. 18. 50

 Rad, CINCPOA to CINCSWPA, 16119, 19

Sep 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 19 Sep 44; Info Rad,

CINCSWPA to CINCPOA, CX 18072, 20 Sep 44,

Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 21 Sep 44.
38 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Shipping

On 21 September, Pacific Ocean Areas

and Southwest Pacific Area reached an

agreement on resupply of ammunition for

the XXIV Corps. Arrangements were made

for loaded ships from San Francisco to be

sent to the Leyte area periodically to alleviate the shipping shortage.51

 It was expected that at least twenty-two cargo ships

would so arrive from San Francisco during

the operation.

The change in target dates and the substitution of the XXIV Corps for the XIV

Corps reduced the amount of amphibious

shipping available for the Leyte operation.

Consequently representatives of the Sixth

Army, the VII Amphibious Force, and the

Fifth Air Force met at General Krueger's

headquarters to work out the details for a

new shipping schedule. They made minor

changes in the dates for the movement of

convoys, and rearranged echelons, eliminating one.52

 The shipping for the XXIV Corps

and the ten resupply ships were to remain

the same as planned for Yap.53

The amphibious shipping allocated to

MacArthur was to be made available for

such turnaround shipping as would be required. The date of release of the amphibious vessels in order to mount subsequent

operations would be announced later, but

none were to be released for return to Nimitz' control without permission from MacArthur. An additional division lift, which

was not included, was to return the 77th

Division from Guam to Guadalcanal or to a

location indicated by Admiral Nimitz.54

On 25 September Sixth Army submitted

to General Headquarters a schedule of

cargo loadings of heavy shipping for the

Leyte operation and made suggestions as to

heavy shipping for direct movement of

troops. All troops and supply ships with the

assault convoy which were to depart from

Hollandia must arrive in that area not later

than A minus 9.55

The shipping instructions specified that

the ships were to be loaded for selective discharge; all resupply ships transporting rations, clothing, vehicles, weapons, and ammunition would be duplicate loaded;

loaded floating reserve ships would be provided; medical supplies would be top

loaded to avoid breakage and damage; and

sufficient stevedore gear would be placed

aboard each ship to handle its cargo. On 25

and 26 September General Krueger's transportation officer submitted to General

Headquarters the heavy shipping requirements for the overwater movement of cargo

and troops, respectively. It was considered

necessary to utilize "all types of shipping

from Navy LSM's, LST's, and assault transports to army controlled merchant ships and

troop carriers."

 56

 Additional shipping was

obtained by making use of that which had

carried the 1st Marine Division and the 81st

Division to Peleliu and Angaur in the

Palau Islands.57 The shipping specified

above was assembled at Manus and Hol51

 Memo, Adm Sherman, Plans Off POA, and

Gen Chamberlin, ACofS G-3 SWPA, for CINCSWPA and CINCPOA, 21 Sep 44, Sixth Army G-3

Jnl, 22 Sep 44. 52

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 19. 53

 GHQ SWPA Opns Instns 70, Annex 4, 21 Sep

44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 21 Sep 44.

54

 Ltr, GHQ SWPA to Comdr Allied Naval

Forces, 23 Sep 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 26 Sep 44. 55

 Ltr, Lt Col James W. Hill, Asst AG Sixth Army

to CINCSWPA and CG USASOS, 25 Sep 44, sub:

Heavy Shipping Requirements for KINO II Operation, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 25 Sep 44. 56

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, Rpt of Transportation Off, p. 270. 57

 CTF 77 Attack Plan A304-44, 2 Oct 44.
PLANS ARE MADE AND FORCES ARE READIED 39

landia and was assigned to the 1st Cavalry

Division and the 24th Division, which were

embarking, respectively, at those two ports.

The XXIV Corps, after leaving the Hawaiian Islands, was brought to Manus

where it remained in its original shipping.

On 8 October General Krueger asked the

commanding generals of X Corps, XXIV

Corps, and ASCOM, together with the

commanding officers of the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion and the 21st Infantry

Regiment, whether they would be able to

meet the target date for Leyte.58 Upon receiving affirmative replies, he laconically

informed General Headquarters: "Sixth

Army Forces designated for KING TWO

Operations are ready to meet KING TWO

Target Date."

 59

58

 Rads, CG Sixth Army to CG X Corps, CG

XXIV Corps, CG ASCOM, CO 21st Inf Regt, and

CO 6th Ranger Inf Bn, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 8

Oct 44. 59

 Rad, CG Sixth Army to GHQ SWPA, Sixth

Army G-3 Jnl, 10 Oct 44.
CHAPTER IV

The Return

For more than two years the high command of the Southwest Pacific had anticipated the promised return to the Philippines. That objective had governed nearly

all of the planning and most of the earlier

invasions. Now the day had arrived. Plans

had been made and troops and cargo were

aboard ships. The fleets of the Pacific Ocean

Areas and the Southwest Pacific Area were

about to join forces in a mighty assault

against the Philippines.

The Convoy Forms

That part of the VII Amphibious Force

which carried the 24th Infantry Division

and the Sixth Army Service Command assembled at the harbor of Hollandia, Netherlands New Guinea. In this force were over

470 ships, ranging in size from small rocketlaunching craft to 5,000-man troopships,

loaded and now waiting for the message to

weigh anchor and head for the Far Shore,

as Leyte was designated. They were scheduled to pick up that part of the force which

was carrying the 1st Cavalry Division from

Manus Island and then rendezvous with the

III Amphibious Force.

At 1600 on Friday, the thirteenth of October, the word was given and the great

fleet at Hollandia got under way for the target—Leyte—1,300 miles distant.1

 Minesweeping task groups had preceded it on 11

and 12 October.2 By sundown the convoy

was formed and the ships were darkened.

On 14 October the ships of the convoy

crossed the equator without ceremony. General quarters (battle drill) and abandon ship

drills were held. The part of the force carrying the 1st Cavalry Division was sighted during the day. On the following day the two

units joined and the convoy proceeded. On

17 October the convoy made visual contact

with the tractor groups of the III Amphibious Force. This force had come from Hawaii with the XXIV Corps to help in the

liberation of Leyte.3

XXIV Corps Afloat

In the early morning hours of 13 September the headquarters of XXIV Corps at

Schofield Barracks, Oahu, Hawaii, was

awake and active. Breakfast was served at

0330, and all men who had been informed

the day before that they were to embark for

an unknown shore shouldered their barracks

bags and carried them to waiting trucks.

By 0700 the men had been loaded on the

trucks, which took them to the narrow-gauge

Oahu railroad. In flat cars they traveled

some twenty miles to Honolulu Harbor. The

1

 Opns Rpt CTF 78 to COMINCH, Ser 00911,

10 Nov 44.

2

 Rpt, Capt Ray Tarbuck, USN, 3 Nov 44, GHQ

SWPA G-3 Jnl, 30 Oct 44. (Hereafter cited as

Tarbuck Rpt.) 3

 Opns Rpt CTF 78 to COMINCH, Ser 00911,

10 Nov 44.
THE RETURN 41

usual seeming delays followed, but eventually the hot, tired, and perspiring headquarters men boarded the George F. Clymer and

were assigned bunks. The Clymer was but

one unit of a large convoy that stretched

toward the horizon in every direction. At

1115 on 15 September the convoy got under

way for a destination believed to be Yap.

As the ships departed, word was received

that the Yap operation had been canceled

and that Leyte was to be their destination.

For the men on board, life fell into the monotonous routine common to all transports.

Reading, card and dice games, eating, sleeping, and interminable "bull sessions" helped

to pass the time.

On the 25th of the month the Clymer

anchored at Eniwetok Island, an anchorage

already crowded with hundreds of transports, warships, and cargo vessels. The men

were allowed to go ashore, where they were

given beer and other refreshments. The

XXIV Corps was notified that it would

leave for Manus, in the Admiralty Islands,

where further orders would be received and

the staging completed. The LST flotilla left

on 26 September and two days later the

transports followed. Maps, terrain studies,

and aerial photographs were distributed

and studied en route.4 At the same time the

XXIV Corps issued a tentative field order

which was distributed to lower unit commanders, who then held conferences and

issued tentative verbal field orders.5

Early in October the convoy crossed the

equator. On many of the ships ceremonies

were held transforming pollywogs into shellbacks, with the result that some of the men

preferred standing to sitting for a few days.

On 3 October the convoy arrived at Manus.6

The assault troops of the XXIV Corps were

transferred from AKA's to LST's. The 96th

Division on 9 October issued a final field

order for the Leyte operation. This order

allowed the regimental headquarters less

than forty-eight hours to complete final orders, plans, and maps, and distribute them

to the headquarters of the assault battalions.7

On 11 October the LST transports carrying the assault battalions filed out of the

Manus anchorage, and on 14 October the

rest of the convoy again formed and started

on the last stretch of the journey.8 Its progress was satisfactory, and on 15 October the

President of the United States sent his best

wishes for the success of the operation to

President Sergio Osmeña of the Philippine

Commonwealth, who was at sea with the

expedition.9 When the III Amphibious

Force rendezvoused with the Seventh Fleet,

the largest convoy ever seen in the Pacific

up to that time was formed.10

Composition of the Convoy

Thirty-four months had been spent in

building and preparing these combatant and

amphibious vessels. Practically none of them

were in existence at the time Corregidor was

besieged. Most of the 183 vessels of Task

Force 77 were warships, while Task Forces

78 and 79, the amphibious forces, consisted

mainly of transports, cargo ships, and a wide

variety of landing ships and craft. Fully 518

ocean-going vessels were included in Task

Forces 78 and 79.11

Of the vessels assigned to participate in

the operation, 157 were combatant ships:

6 old battleships, 5 heavy cruisers, 6 light

4

 96th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 20. 5

 7th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2. 6

 XXIV Corps Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4.

7

 96th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 25. 8

 XXIV Corps Hist Rpt for 1944, Sec Histories,

History of the Adjutant Generals Section from 8

April to 31 December 1944, pp. 10-11. 9

 Tarbuck Rpt. 10

 Ibid.

11

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt, Ser 00302-C, 31 Jan 45.
42 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

cruisers, 18 escort carriers, 86 destroyers, 25

destroyer escorts, and 11 frigates. There

were 420 transport vessels, including 5 command ships, 40 attack transports, 10 LSD's,

151 LST's, 79 LCI's, 21 LCT's, and 18

high-speed transports. The remainder included patrol, mine-sweeping, hydrographic, and service ships.12

The convoy did not include the combatant ships of Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet.

The main striking force of the Third Fleet

was Task Force 38, composed of four powerful carrier task groups, under Admiral

Mitscher. Each group contained fast carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and the newest

American battleships.13

After forming, the convoy proceeded

toward the target. At this time a disquieting

report was received from the meteorologists

on board the ships: a typhoon was headed

toward the Leyte Gulf area. Such a disturbance could be fatal to the expedition. A

severe storm did in fact lash the gulf area

from 14 through 17 October, but it gradually abated and the morning of A Day, 20

October, was clear. This favorable weather

augured well for a successful landing.

Softening the Target

Early Strikes

Allied aircraft had already visited the

Philippine Archipelago. The first aerial

strikes since 1942 were made in the early

fall of 1944. On 1 September B-24's from

New Guinea bases initiated their first largescale air attack against airdromes in the

Davao area, though bad weather prevented

the protective fighter escort from attacking

the target. The airborne defense encountered was surprisingly light—only three intercepting fighters opposed the strike. The

bombers dropped 100 tons of bombs, destroying 34 planes on the ground and killing

about 100 men.14 Two American bombers

were shot down and six received minor damages.15

 General MacArthur believed that the

Japanese were conserving their air strength

in order to concentrate it against anticipated

Allied landings.16

On 4 September the first aerial reconnaissance flights were made over Leyte.

During the period 9-14 September, Admiral

Mitscher launched a large-scale, carrierbased air assault against the Japanese air

defenses in the Philippine Islands in order

to protect the Palau and Morotai landings.

On 9 September aircraft from the carriers

attacked airdromes and installations in the

Mindanao area, destroying 60 aircraft on

the ground and 8 in the air. On 12 September the attack was directed against the

Visayan Islands. Of an estimated air

strength of 225 aircraft in the sector, 125

were destroyed on the ground and 75 in the

air. During the night of 12 September the

Japanese flew in reinforcements from

Luzon. A Third Fleet strike on 13 September against the reinforced air strength

destroyed an estimated 135 aircraft on the

ground and 81 in the air. On the 14th, the

Third Fleet planes encountered no enemy

air opposition but destroyed from 10 to 15

aircraft on the ground. The air strength

which the enemy had conserved for an

12

 CINCPAC and CINCPOA Rpt Opns in POA

in Oct 44, Ser 002397, 31 May 45. 13

 USSBS, Employment of Forces Under the

Southwest Pacific Command, p. 40.

14

 Japanese Studies in World War II, 14, Naval

Air Operations in the Philippine Area, 1942-45,

p. 18. (Monograph numbers cited in this volume are

file designations used by OCMH.) 15

 GHQ SWPA Sum of Enemy Sit 894, GHQ

G-3 Jnl, 2 Sep 44. 16

 Ibid.
THE RETURN 43

anticipated American invasion was thus

decimated. About 500, or approximately 57

percent of the 884 aircraft believed to be in

the Philippines, were rendered nonoperational or destroyed. This successful knocking out of the Japanese air strength in the

Philippine Islands was an important factor

in the decision to speed up the landing at

Leyte by two months.

On 21 September Central Pacific carrierbased aircraft directed their attention to the

Luzon area. In spite of their vigorous defense of the Luzon airfields, the Japanese lost

an estimated 110 aircraft in the air and 95

on the ground. These included not only

combat aircraft but also reconnaissance,

transport, and training planes. The remaining air strength in the area was estimated

to be 350 aircraft, of which 10 percent were

in Mindanao, 20 percent in the Visayan

Islands, and 70 percent in Luzon.

At the same time, the carrier-based aircraft made strong strikes against enemy

shipping in the central and southern Philippines. It was estimated that from 1 September to 15 September 105 merchant vessels

were sunk in those waters by carrier planes,

destroyers, cruisers, and submarines. Although exact information was lacking on the

number of enemy vessels present in the

Visayan and Mindanao areas, it was thought

that 50 percent of the Japanese merchant

marine in those areas was eliminated. A

successful attrition of the Japanese air and

naval strength in the Philippines had been

accomplished.17

The Third Fleet's carriers then started to

neutralize the approaches to the Philippine

Islands. The carrier-based aircraft launched

strikes against enemy aircraft staging areas

in the Ryukyus, of which Okinawa is the

largest and most important. As a result of

attacks on 10 October, they destroyed an

estimated 23 enemy planes in the air and 88

on the ground or in the water. Admiral Halsey reported that his flyers sank 1 subtender,

1 mine sweeper, 1 destroyer escort, 2 minecraft, 4 midget submarines, 20 cargo ships,

and 45 other craft. In addition, nearly as

many ships, mostly of small size, were damaged.18

 On 11 October the flyers struck at

Luzon.

Air and Naval Action

in the Formosa Area

The plans of the Third Fleet called for

strong carrier-based strikes against Formosa on 12 and 13 October. The four task

groups of Task Force 38 were assigned targets in the southern Formosa, northern

Formosa, central Formosa, and the Takao

areas, respectively. (Takao is a port city on

the southwest coast of Formosa.) After a

fast run on the night of 11-12 October the

carriers of Task Force 38 arrived in position

off Formosa in the early morning. Although

the Japanese were aware of the approach of

the task force, they made no attacks against

it before dawn. As the first fighters started

sweeps over their respective areas, heavy opposition developed, but it dropped markedly

during the day. From 12 to 14 October the

Japanese lost some 280 aircraft,19 while the

Americans lost 76. As a result of the operation, the Japanese lost half of their naval

air strength. This loss gave assurance that

17

 GHQ SWPA, Philippine Islands, G-2 Est of

Enemy Sit 16, 3-9 Sep 44; 905, 13-14 Sep 44; 914,

22-23 Sep 44; 916, 24-25 Sep 44; and 907, 15-16

Sep 44; GHQ G-3 Jnl, 9-25 Sep 44.

18

 CINCPAC and CINCPOA Rpt on Opns in

POA in Oct 44, Ser 002397, 31 May 45. 19

 Japanese Studies in WW II, 102, Philippine

Area Naval Operations, Oct-Dec 44, Part II, The

Battle of Leyte Gulf, pp. 4-11. (Hereafter cited as

Philippine Naval Opns.)
44 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

the U. S. forces would have air superiority

over the Leyte area on A Day.20

On the evening of 13 October the American heavy cruiser Canberra was torpedoed

eighty-five miles off Formosa. Admiral

Halsey kept his forces in the area another

day in order to afford protection to the

Canberra. Attacks, therefore, continued

against enemy aircraft, airfields, and installations. By this time, Japanese reinforcements had arrived. On the evening of 14

October an aerial torpedo hit the heavy

cruiser Houston.

Admiral Halsey decided to capitalize on

the damage inflicted on the two cruisers.

He ordered two task groups, which included

the battleships, to retire eastward out of

sight; he sent another of the task groups to

conduct intermittent air raids against northern Luzon; and he assigned the remaining

task group to protect the crippled Canberra

and Houston. Halsey instructed this last

task group to send out messages in the clear

begging piteously for assistance. He hoped

that by this ruse, which he called the "Lure

of the Streamlined Bait," the Japanese fleet

would be led to believe that this task group

was all that remained of the task force and

would therefore sweep down for the kill.

The two task groups which had retired eastward would then appear and engage the

enemy. The Japanese swallowed the bait

and dispatched destroyers and cruisers toward the "crippled" American force. Unfortunately, their search planes uncovered

the two task forces off Formosa, and the

Japanese surface ships hastily withdrew.

The enemy pilots made such greatly exaggerated claims of success that Imperial

General Headquarters decided to order out

the 2d Diversion Attack Force against the

Americans. The flying units of Carrier Divisions 3 and 4 were transferred to the 2d Air

Fleet. These air units proceeded to Formosa

on the 12th of October. Carrier Divisions 3

and 4, however, remained in the Inland Sea

until they sortied forth for the Battle of

Leyte Gulf.21 The exaggerated claims of the

Japanese air force were accepted jubilantly

on the home islands. The people felt that

the American Navy had indeed been given a

death blow, and the Finance Ministry distributed "celebration sake" to all households

in the country to commemorate the event.

The Tokyo radio made the unfounded claim

that "a total of 57 enemy warships including 19 aircraft carriers and four battleships

were sunk or heavily damaged by the Japanese forces . . . the enemy task forces lost

the majority of their strength and were put

to rout. . . ."

 22

 It also predicted that the

Allied losses would delay the invasion of the

Philippine Islands by two months.23

Admiral Halsey's reaction was to report

that "all 3d Fleet Ships reported by radio

Tokyo as sunk have now been salvaged and

are retiring towards the enemy."

 24

The convoy, as it steamed toward Leyte,

received the news of the United States success with considerable satisfaction. At this

time, however, Admiral Halsey announced

that the Third Fleet was being deployed for

action, since he was expecting the Japanese

to rise to his bait. Consequently the Third

Fleet, except for the current strike at Luzon,

could not furnish any more carrier support

for the operation.25 The Third Fleet task

20

 USSBS, Naval Analysis Div, The Campaigns

of the Pacific War (Washington, 1946), p. 283.

21

 Philippine Naval Opns, pp. 5, 85-86. 22

 AAF SWPA Intel Sum, Ser 247, GHQ G-3

Jnl, 29 Oct 44. 23

 AAF SWPA Intel Sum, Ser 246, GHQ G-3

Jnl, 22 Oct 44. 24

 Rad, Com3rdFlt to CINCPAC-CINCSWPA,

170352 Oct 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 17 Oct 44. 25

 Rad, Com3rdFlt to CINCPAC and var., H

2692, 0321, 15 Oct 44, AAF Hist Archives.
THE RETURN 45

group which went to the Luzon area successfully struck at enemy airfields and shipping. From 17 to 19 October it destroyed

an estimated ninety-nine enemy aircraft on

the ground and ninety-five in the air.26

Realignment of Air Support

On the heels of Admiral Halsey's announcement that no assistance in connection

with the Leyte landings could be expected

from the Third Fleet, Far East Air Forces

stated that the Fifth Air Force would support the Leyte operation as a "priority mission."

 27

 At the same time the Seventh Fleet

requested intensive reconnaissance of San

Bernardino and Surigao Straits in the Leyte

area. This mission was assigned to the Fifth

Air Force, which was also charged with

neutralizing the Visayan airfields. The

Thirteenth Air Force was to expedite the

basing on Morotai of heavy bombers which

could be called forward in support when

requested by the Fifth Air Force. From 18

to 19 October the carrier aircraft of the

Seventh Fleet protected the convoy and

struck at small vessels and airfields in northern Mindanao as well as defense and communications installations and airfields on

Leyte.28

Although the missions Admiral Halsey

had assigned his carriers apparently prevented any aircraft of the Third Fleet from

participating in direct support of the landings, Halsey nevertheless ordered one of the

task groups to strike at the Leyte, Samar,

Cebu, and Negros areas on 18-19 October

and to provide direct air support for the

Leyte operation on 20 October.29 Moreover, by 18 October news was received that

the Japanese had discovered the ruse and

withdrawn their warships from the Formosa

area, thus leaving Admiral Halsey's forces

free to protect the operation by covering San

Bernardino and Surigao Straits.30

The carrier force of the Seventh Fleet was

to bear the brunt of the tactical air support.

By the afternoon and night of 17 October

the weather had cleared, and flying conditions were perfect as the carriers moved into

their operation areas the following morning.

The force was divided into three units: one

unit operated in the southern part of Leyte

Gulf to protect the landings at Panaon

Strait; another operated near the entrance

to the gulf in order to support the landings

of the Southern Attack Force at Dulag; and

the last operated southeast of Samar Island

to support the landings of the Northern Attack Force at Tacloban.

During 18 and 19 October, aircraft from

the carriers struck at enemy airfields on

Cebu, Negros, and Panay Islands. There

was very little enemy activity from the Japanese airfields in the Leyte area, since they

were still sodden from the recent storms. In

the two days' strikes, the Seventh Fleet aircraft destroyed an estimated thirty-six

enemy planes and damaged twenty-eight

more.31

Japanese Plan of Defense

The air blows on the Philippines served

as a warning that the Americans were ready

to return to the Islands—an event long ex26

 Air Evaluation Bd SWPA Rpt, Leyte Campaign—Philippines, 1944, p. 16. 27

 Hist of FEAF, pp. 261-63, AAF Hist Archives. 28

 Air Evaluation Bd SWPA Rpt, p. 16.

29

 Rad, Com3rd Flt to CTG 38.1, 160216, 16 Oct

44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 17 Oct 44. 30

 Tarbuck Rpt. 31

 CTG 77.4 Opns Rpt, Ser 00120, 15 Nov 44.
46 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

pected by the Japanese. By the end of June

1944, the Japanese military situation had

considerably worsened. The outer circle of

Japan's perimeter had been pierced and the

impetus of the American drive showed no

signs of slackening. (Map 2)

The Allied nations had hit the Japanese

from east and west and seriously interfered

with their seaborne commerce. Japan was

in grave danger of being separated from her

stolen southern area—the source of her raw

materials. Units within this area were also

being forcibly isolated from each other. The

fall of Saipan had brought about a "most

serious crisis." Premier Tojo was removed

and Kuniaki Koiso formed a new cabinet.32

In the summer of 1944 Imperial General

Headquarters had started to strengthen the

Philippines, the Ryukyus, the Kurile Islands,

and Japan itself—the "first line of sea defense." If the Allies landed forces in any

of these areas, the Japanese would concentrate their land, air, and sea forces and

attempt to repel the landing force. These

operations were known as the SHO (Victory) Operations. Defense of the Philippines

was SHO I.33

The Japanese strategy was simple. Japan

wished to remain in the war, and to do so

she must at all costs keep open the lines of

communication to the sources of her raw

materials in the Netherlands Indies.

In the first part of August 1944, the headquarters of the 14th Area Army, which was

to be charged with the defense of the Philippine Archipelago, was organized under the

command of the Southern Army, while the

35th Army, which was to defend the Visayan Islands, was established under the command of the 14th Area Army.34

The Philippine Islands were under the

jurisdiction of the Southern Army, whose

command organization was extremely complex. (Chart 3) The supreme commander

was Field Marshal Count Hisaichi Terauchi. There were four area armies in the

Southern Army: the 2d Area Army occupied Netherlands New Guinea, thence west

to Timor; the 7th Area Army was at Singapore; the Burma Area Army was at Rangoon; and the 14th Area Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Shigenori Kuroda, was in

the Philippines with its headquarters at

Manila. The Southern Army also had two

air armies and three garrison armies: the

3d Air Army in Singapore; the 4th Air

Army, consisting of two air divisions in the

Philippines and one air division in western

New Guinea; and a garrison army stationed

in Thailand, another in French Indochina,

and a third in Borneo. The commander of

the 14th Area Army maintained a staff liaison with the 4th Air Army but otherwise had

no control over it.

The 1st Air Fleet, under the command of

the Southwest Area Fleet, was stationed in

the Philippines, with headquarters at Manila. Admiral Soemu Toyoda, commander

in chief of the Combined Fleet with headquarters at Tokyo, controlled the entire

naval forces, including the Southwest Area

Fleet.35

32

 Japanese Studies in WW II, 72, Hist of Army

Section, Imperial General Headquarters, 1941-45,

p. 131. (Hereafter cited as Hist of Army Sec, Imperial GHQ.) 33

 Ibid., pp. 131-32.

34

 Japanese Studies in WW II, 6, 14th Area Army

Plans, 1944. (Hereafter cited as 14th Area Army

Plans.) 35

 The organization of Japanese forces is discussed

in detail in Hist of Army Sec, Imperial GHQ.
Map 2

THE RETURN 49

Plans for the 14th Area Army

The Japanese during the summer of 1944

anticipated that the United States forces

would return to the Philippine Islands, but

when and where were two questions for

which not even Tokyo Rose, the Japanese

radio propagandist, had the answers. Consequently, the Japanese wished to keep their

troops sufficiently mobile that reinforcements might be rushed to the point of contact. The original plan called for the main

defensive effort of the ground forces to be

made on Luzon, since there were too few

Japanese troops in the archipelago to defend

all of the Philippines. The Japanese Navy

and Air Forces, however, were to carry out

"decisive" actions in the central and southern Philippines.36

To General Kuroda fell the task of making and executing plans for the defense of

the Philippines by the 14th Area Army.

General Kuroda was essentially a realist.

Restated in June 1947 that in October 1944

he had told Maj. Gen. Seizo Arisue, Chief

of Army Intelligence, Imperial General

Headquarters, that "it would be best for

Japan to negotiate an immediate peace before the Americans could destroy our nation

by air power."

 37

 Kuroda thought that all

available land forces should be concentrated in the Luzon area in order to counterattack any American landing within the

Luzon perimeter. However, because of their

predominant aerial strength, the Americans

in their next attempt could unless they

made "some terrible mistake . . . land in

force and once ashore, could take the Philippines."

 38

 General Kuroda's plan was never

considered. Imperial General Headquarters'

plan for the defense of the Philippines called

for the employment of ten divisions and five

brigades: five divisions and two brigades in

Luzon, four divisions and two brigades in

the southern Philippines, and one division

and one brigade in China and Formosa.

The two units last mentioned would be

rushed to the Philippines as soon as the

American landing became imminent.39

When the Americans landed, all of these

units, acting in concert, were to participate

in fighting a decisive battle against the

American troops. This plan was never carried out in its entirety.

The Japanese occupation troops of the

Philippine Islands had grown soft and had

"no particular will to fight." In the spring

of 1944, there were only minor units available to set up an organized defense.

Imperial General Headquarters and the

Southern Army thought that because of the

many islands in the archipelago emphasis

should be placed on air power. Air attacks

could destroy the American forces before

they arrived at the landing areas or at least

before they could make appreciable gains.

The way could then be opened to turn a

defense into an offensive.40 General Kuroda

threw cold water on this plan by bluntly

stating:

That concept is good, but you cannot fight

with concept alone. Words alone will not sink

American ships and that becomes clear when

you compare our airplanes with theirs. That

is why the major battles have been occurring

on land. We can say that the power of our

air force is negligible at this time. No matter

36

 Hist of Army Sec, Imperial GHQ,, pp. 140-41. 37

 Interv, 2d Lt Stanley L. Falk with General

Kuroda, at Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, 13 Jun 47, copy

in OCMH.

38 Ibid.

39

 Hist of Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, pp. 132-33,

135, 140, and errata sheet to above. 40

 Maj Gen Yoshiharu Tomochika, The True
50 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

how much the Fourteenth Army devotes their

efforts toward air power, in actuality, should

there be a decisive fight, they must fight on

land. The preparation and conduct of an

operation, and the responsibilities thereof cannot be conducted by airplanes and air units.

The land army should initiate its own preparations. For example, for what purpose were

the group of air bases constructed at Davao

and Tacloban? Even though they are built,

they aren't used. It amounts to construction

for the use of the enemy.41

During the month of August, the Japanese devoted their main efforts toward

strengthening the air force. After the first of

September more emphasis was placed on

building up the ground troops while the air

preparations continued to some extent. The

Southern Army in late August ordered about

one half of a division to Sarangani and one

division to Davao against the wishes of the

14th Area Army. This meant a reshuffling

of the troops that had been moving and repairing defenses since the first part of August. "The order was carried out begrudgingly."

 42

Lt. Gen. Sosaku Suzuki, the commander

of the 35th Army, thinking that the American Army would land on 1 October, said:

"Contrary to what has been announced by

General Headquarters our air force cannot

be prepared and equipped in time, nor can

the Combined Fleet be depended upon. The

situation grows worse and for this reason

the land force preparations must be hastened. Yet, in spite of that, we must not discourage the air forces and should do as much

as possible to prepare aggressive aerial

opposition."

 43

In the middle of September, Imperial

General Headquarters decided to replace

General Kuroda with General Tomoyuki

Yamashita. Not only did General Kuroda

have a concept of the Philippine operations

that differed from that of his superiors, but

he was charged with neglecting his duty as

field army commander.44 Lt. Col. Seiichi

Yoshie of the Personnel Bureau of the War

Ministry, who had been sent to the Philippines to investigate personnel matters in the

Southern Army, said of the incident:

Stories reached the War Ministry that Lt.

Gen. Kuroda was devoting more time to his

golf, reading and personal matters than to the

execution of his official duties. It appeared

that his control over staff officers and troops

was not sufficiently strong and that there was

a good deal of unfavorable criticism of his

conduct among the troops. There were also

indications that discipline was becoming very

lax.

On 4 September 1944, I left Tokyo under

orders ... to investigate. As a result I obtained many statements substantiating the unfavorable stories in regard to Lt. Gen. Kuroda.

The recommendations of all the staff was

that Lt. Gen. Kuroda be relieved as soon as

possible, and be replaced by Gen. Yamashita

. . . who was a superb tactician and excellent

leader.45

General Yamashita, who was in Manchuria, received notification of his appointment on 23 September, and on the 9th of

October he assumed command of the 14th

Area Army.

46 On his arrival in the Philippines, he found conditions were "unsatisfactory." Of the eleven members of the old

staff only five were left and the new staff

Facts of the Leyte Operation, p. 8, typescript of

translation in OCMH. 41

 Ibid.

42

 Ibid., p. 9. 43

 Ibid., p. 8.

44

 Ibid. 45

 Statement of Lt Col Seiichi Yoshie, Circumstances Leading to the Relief of General Kuroda,

1 Oct 51, copy in OCMH. 46

 United States vs Tomoyuki Yamashita, Testimony of Yamashita, XXVIII, 3518-19, DRB AGO.
THE RETURN 51

GEN. TOMOYUKI YAMASHITA LT. GEN. SOSAKU SUZUKI

officers were unfamiliar with conditions in

the Philippine Islands.47 The state of affairs

was well exemplified by a remark of his new

chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Akira Muto, who arrived in the Philippines on 20 October from

Sumatra, where he had been in command

of the 2d Imperial Guards Division.48 Upon

being told that the Americans had landed

on Leyte, Muto is said to have replied,

"Very interesting, but where is Leyte?"

 49

Maj. Gen. Toshio Nishimura, one of

three assistants to Yamashita, states that the

planning for the Leyte campaign was "very

bad." The supply situation, however, was

favorable. Since Manila was the main depot

not only for the Philippines but also for

other places in the south such as Borneo and

Singapore, a sufficient amount of everything needed was at hand.50

There were two tactical concepts of defense of the islands in July and August 1944.

One was termed the policy of "annihilation

at the beachhead" and the other the policy

of "resistance in depth." The respective

merits of the two concepts were bitterly debated by their partisans. The proponents of

resistance in depth thought that the beach

defenses, which had been constructed with

a great deal of labor, were useless, since it

was believed they could not withstand naval

bombardment. On the other hand, the

friends of annihilation at the beachhead felt

that semipermanent beach fortifications

could withstand bombardment. Imperial 47

 Ibid., XXVIII, 3519-20. 48

 Ibid., Testimony of Muto, XXII, 2998. 49

 A. Frank Reel, The Case of General Yamashita

(Chicago, 1949), pp. 18-19.

50

 USSBS Interrog 418, Interrog of Maj Gen

Toshio Nishimura, 19-22 Nov 45, MS, OCMH.
52 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

General Headquarters, after studying the

battle lessons of the Pacific Campaign and

the actual effect of naval bombardment, decided to adopt the resistance in depth tactics

and instructed the entire army forces to

comply. Consequently, the various group

commanders abandoned their beach defenses with regret and began to build strong

fortifications in selected areas of the

interior.

 51

The control of the Visayan Islands and

Mindanao was vested in the 35th Army,

which was the equivalent of an American

army corps. General Suzuki, its commander,

compromised between the two concepts of

defense. At a meeting of the 35th Army unit

commanders in the middle of August 1944,

he stated that although the main battle was

to be fought away from the beaches some

troops should remain to resist the American

landings and "therefore part of the troops

must suffer premature losses."

 52

The 16th, 102d, 30th, and the 100th Divisions, which were in Leyte, Panay, and

Mindanao, were placed under the 35th

Army, whose headquarters was at Cebu.53

The Suzu Plan

On 17 August General Suzuki issued the

Suzu orders for the defense of the Visayan

Islands and Mindanao by the 35th Army.

The 100th Division was to protect the Davao

area on Mindanao while the 16th Division

would defend Leyte. Most of the 30th Division and two infantry battalions were

made mobile units which could be rushed to

annihilate the American force wherever it

landed. However, if the Americans landed

simultaneously on Davao and Leyte, the

main force of the 30th Division was to be

sent to Davao and the other mobile units

would go to Leyte.

In late August, Suzuki received orders to

dispose his troops as follows: a reinforced

division in the Davao area, three battalions

in the Sarangani Bay area, three battalions

in the vicinity of Zamboanga, two battalions

in the Jolo Islands, a "strong unit" in the

vicinity of Surigao, and one division in the

Leyte Gulf area. The 55th Independent

Mixed Brigade was to be assigned to the

35th Army. Units of the 16th Division

which were in Luzon were sent to the 16th

Division on Leyte. These elements, which

consisted of one engineer company, an independent transportation unit, and a medical unit, were placed under the commander

of the 33d Infantry Regiment.54

Lt. Gen. Shiro Makino, commanding the

16th Division, which was the major force

on Leyte, had directed his efforts since April

1944 toward the construction of defensive

positions on the island. The first line of defense, which was on the east coast in the

Dulag area, was practically completed by

the middle of October. The third defensive

line was in the middle of Leyte Valley in

the vicinity of Dagami. The second line of

defense was between the two others, while

the bulk of supplies was assembled in the

central mountain range at Jaro.

The distribution of the other troops at the

time of the American landings was as follows: one battalion of the 9th Infantry

Regiment in the Catmon Hill and Tanauan

district, and the main strength of the 33d

Infantry Regiment in the Palo and Tacloban

area. The larger part of the 33d Infantry

Regiment, which was less adequately trained

51

 Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 6. 52 Ibid.

53

 Ibid.

54

 Japanese Studies in WW II, 11, 35th Army

Operations 1944-45, pp. 14-20. (Hereafter cited

as 35th Army Opns.)
THE RETURN 53

than the other regiments, had arrived on

Leyte in mid-September from Luzon. Its

officers were unfamiliar with the terrain

and did not fortify their positions.55

On 17 October General Makino, having

heard that American warships had approached Leyte Gulf, alerted the 16th Division for the impending battle and ordered

all units to "shatter the enemy landing attempts."

 56

 On 18 October the 14th Area

Army received a report from the 16th Division which indicated that the latter was not

certain the vessels sighted off Leyte were an

enemy attacking force. They might be ships

seeking safety from the storms, or vessels

damaged in the naval battle off Formosa.

Consequently, 14th Area Army was not sure

that an attack was imminent at Leyte.57

Plans for the 4th Air Army

The principal assignment of the 4th Air

Army was to attack American transports

and interdict American shipping and, if

given the opportunity, to attack the American combatant vessels. The 4th Air Army

was also to give aerial support to the movement of reinforcements.58

In October the 4th Air Army issued a plan

for anticipated operations. In co-operation

with the Army and the Navy, the 4th Air

Army would attempt to destroy the American forces when they struck the Philippines. The Army air force in concert with

the naval air units would try to destroy

carrier-based planes and air bases. In operations against the American fleet, the Army

and Navy air units were to have "a unified

and tactful commitment." If the naval air

units could not co-operate the Army air force

was to venture a surprise attack with a few

planes. Dusk, night, and dawn attacks were

to be made against Allied air bases and all

means exerted to foil Allied attempts to

establish advance bases in the Philippines.

The main strength of the fighter units was

to move into the central and southern Philippines in order to destroy the principal American landing force. The mission of the Japanese 4th Air Army, operating from Mindanao, Celebes, and northern Borneo, would

be restricted to checking the current attempts on the part of the Americans to establish bases on Halmahera and western

New Guinea and the destruction of the

planes there. For this purpose the Japanese

air force would use bases in the southern

Philippines.

When the American convoy was sighted

moving toward the Philippines, the heavy

bombers were to deploy to the central and

southern Philippines and make preparations

for an immediate attack on the convoy after

it had arrived in the harbor. The fighter

units were to attack Allied aircraft and, if

the circumstances were propitious, were also

to attack the convoy. If the Americans

should attempt simultaneous landings at various points, the Japanese Army air forces

would "try to annihilate the landing parties

one by one,"

 59

 acting in concert with the

Japanese Navy.

Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae, the chief of staff

to the commander in chief of the Japanese

Third Fleet, was highly critical of the liaison

55

 Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 6. 5 6 16th Division Order 821, Tacloban, 17 October

1944, translation in App. C to Annex Y, 7th Div

Opns Rpt Leyte, DRB AGO. 57

 Japanese Studies in WW II, 7, 14th Area Army

Operations on Leyte, p. 4 (Hereafter cited as 14th

Area Army Opns Leyte.) 58

 USSBS Interrog 506, Interrog of Maj. Gen.

Yoshiharu Tomochika, Oct-Dec 44, p. 2, typescript

copy in OCMH.

59

 Japanese Studies in WW II, 5, 4th Air Army

Operations, 1944-45, pp. 1-50. (Hereafter cited as

4th Air Army Opns.)
54 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

between the Army and Navy air forces.

"The Army and Navy always quarreled

with each other. In theory they were supposed to cooperate and on the higher levels

it would work, but personalities were the

trouble."

 60

Japanese Navy Plans

On 21 July 1944 Admiral Toyoda received a directive which laid down the basic

policies for subsequent "urgent operations."

A great deal of the contracting empire was

abandoned. The Southwest Area, which

embraced the region from Manila to Singapore, was ordered to "maintain security of

resources areas, hold vital sectors for their

defense, and place emphasis on protection

for fleet anchorages." Thus the Japanese

planned to restrict battle "to the homeland

and to the island chain which protected the

last links" of the empire with the south. The

forces in the Japanese home islands, the

Ryukyu chain, Formosa, and the Philippine Islands were told to take "all measures

to expedite the establishment of conditions

to cope with decisive battle. In event of

enemy attack, summon all strength which

can be concentrated and hold vital sectors,

in general intercepting and destroying the

enemy within the operational sphere of

planes of our base air force."

 61

The success of Admiral Halsey's carrier

strikes against Formosa had considerably

weakened the strength of Japanese carrierbased planes, and less than one half of the

Army planes remained. The necessity of

sending reinforcements to Formosa also

weakened considerably the Japanese aerial

defense of the Philippines. The enemy became almost completely dependent upon

the remaining land-based planes.62 Within

their capabilities the Japanese had made

their plans and readied their forces, as the

American convoy steamed towards Leyte

to do battle.

Securing the Channel Approaches

Landings of the 6th Ranger Infantry

Battalion

The forward part of the convoy, which

was carrying the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Henry A.

Mucci, had experienced stormy weather

since leaving Hollandia, but by dawn of the

17th the storm had slackened, though the

ocean was still choppy. The transports carrying the reinforced 6th Ranger Battalion,

preceded by three mine sweepers, entered

Leyte Gulf.63

The USS Crosby, carrying Company D,

arrived on schedule off Suluan Island, the

outermost of the islands guarding Leyte

Gulf. For twenty minutes the cruiser Denver shelled the island. Under lowering skies

and in a driving rain which rendered impossible the anticipated air support,64

 Company D, under 1st Lt. Leslie M. Gray, disembarked from the transport and headed

for the island in landing craft. The mission

of the unit was to secure mine charts which

were believed to be located in a lighthouse

60

 USSBS, Interrogations, I, 160. 61

 James A. Field, Jr., The Japanese at Leyte

Gulf: The SHO Operation (Princeton, N. J., 1947),

p. 8.

62

 USSBS, Interrogations, I, 219; II, 500-504. 63

 Unless otherwise noted the account of the activities of the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion is

taken from the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion

Operations Report Leyte. 64

 Rad, CTG 77.2 to CTF 78, 17 Oct 44, GHQ

G-3 Jnl, 17 Oct 44.
THE RETURN 55

on the island. At 0805 the boats touched

shore.

The landing was unopposed. The men

immediately filed south 500 yards on a trail

along the coast and then headed east toward

the lighthouse. On the way, four buildings,

one of which contained a Japanese radio,

were found and set ablaze. The company

then continued along the trail. Suddenly

the enemy fired from a concealed position,

killing one man and wounding another.

When Company D went into attack formation, the enemy force disappeared into the

heavy jungle bordering the trail. The march

was resumed and the company reached its

objective without further incident. The

lighthouse, which had been damaged by

naval bombardment, and adjoining buildings were deserted.65

In searching the documents found in the

lighthouse, the company failed to turn up

the hoped-for enemy mine charts.66 It returned to the beachhead area and, finding

that the landing boats had been hopelessly

battered and broken up by the surf, formed

a perimeter for the night.

As Company D was moving along the

coast of Suluan Island, naval fire blasted

away at the extreme northwest coast of

Dinagat Island. At 0900 the first assault

waves of the 6th Rangers, minus Companies

D and B, started for the beach. Although

coral reefs approximately one hundred yards

offshore grounded the boats so that the men

had to wade the remainder of the distance,

the companies were all ashore by 1230. No

Japanese were on the island and the troops

accomplished their mission, the erection of

a navigation light at Desolation Point to

guide the movement of the main portion of

the convoy.

Company B of the 6th Rangers was to

have landed on Homonhon Island at the

same time landings were made on Suluan

and Dinagat. Its mission, too, was the emplacement of a navigation light, but bad

weather and choppy seas kept the troops

confined to the ship throughout the 17th.67

On the morning of the 18th, the ship's address system clanged out general quarters.

The men went below, put on their gear, and

checked their weapons. At 0900 the troops

were told to prepare to disembark. They

bolted up the ladders and spilled out over

the deck to the davits.68 The boats were

lowered and the first wave started for the

beach. At the same time the guns from the

destroyer and frigate which had escorted

the transport concentrated fire against the

shore line for twelve minutes. Three minutes later, the boats grounded on a coral

reef forty yards from the beach, and the

men waded the remaining distance to shore.

They encountered no resistance and at 1038

the company commander, Capt. Arthur D.

Simons, notified the battalion commander,

"Beachhead secured, supplies ashore. No

resistance. No casualties."

 69

 The company

set up a channel light.

By 18 October, steady white lights were

beaming from Dinagat and Homonhon

Islands to guide the convoy in to Leyte

Island. The one on Dinagat had a visibility

of twelve miles and that on Homonhon a

visibility of ten.70

65

 Co D, 6th Ranger Inf Bn, Opns Rpt Leyte. 66

 Msg, CTG 78.4 to Tancier, 18 Oct 44, Sixth

Army G-3 Wasatch Jnl, 18 Oct 44.

67

 Rad, GHQ to CofS, 17 Oct 44, GHQ G-3

Jnl, 18 Oct 44. 68

 Co B, 6th Ranger Inf Bn, Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1. 69

 Ibid.

70

 Rad, CTG 78.5 to CTF 77, 19 Oct 44, Sixth

Army G-3 Wasatch Jnl, 19 Oct 44.
PATROL OF COMPANY F, 6TH RANGERS, at Desolation Point (above), and investigating a native village on Dinagat Island (below).
THE RETURN 57

Mine Sweeping

The mine-sweeping plans contemplated

that the mine-sweeping group would arrive

on 17 October simultaneously with the

troops that were to storm Suluan, Dinagat,

and Homonhon Islands. On 11 October the

slow-moving mine sweepers lifted anchor at

Manus and departed for the objective area.

They rendezvoused near the Palaus with

the Dinagat force, which had left Hollandia

on 12 October. On 15 October they were

joined by the carriers and the beach demolition and bombardment and fire support

groups which had sortied from Manus on 12

October. On 14 October information was

received from guerrilla sources that there

were no underwater obstacles off the beaches

between Abuyog and Tacloban. Although

the northern Surigao Strait was mined, it

was considered doubtful whether the same

condition existed at the southern entrances

of Leyte Gulf.71 The mine-sweeping groups

that had left Hollandia on 11 October arrived in Leyte Gulf during the storm of the

evening of 16 October. Some of the mine

sweepers had been delayed by the storm

but were able to arrive in time to begin

sweeping the channels.72

In the early dawn of 17 October the mine

sweepers began their work on the channel

approaches to Suluan Island.73 By 0630 they

had accomplished their task and then began

to sweep the waters of the landing areas in

Leyte Gulf until the storm forced them to

suspend operations. At 1259 they resumed

sweeping with great difficulty. Until A Day,

intensive area and tactical mine sweeping

continued. The sweepers started at dawn

each day and worked continuously until

nightfall. By 19 October it was known that

the Japanese had heavily mined the approaches to Leyte Gulf but that there were

no mines within the gulf itself. The northern part of the main channel into the gulf,

however, was not considered safe.74 By the

same date sweeping had been completed in

the southern half, 186 mines having been

destroyed. At about 0135 on 19 October,

the destroyer supporting the mine-sweeping

units which were in the gulf struck a floating mine and while maneuvering away from

the area struck another. The ship was disabled and retired from action. By A Day, a

total of 227 mines had been destroyed and

a passage approximately six miles wide had

been cleared just north of Dinagat Island.

All ships were therefore directed to enter

Leyte Gulf through that portion of the

strait.75

As the mine sweepers came close to the

land, boats containing Filipinos moved out

to welcome the advance party of liberators.

The reception they met was not enthusiastic.

Admiral Oldendorf, the commanding officer of the bombardment and fire support

group, "suspected that some might have

come seeking information so detained them

aboard their respective ships. . . . Directed

no further patriots be taken aboard ship."

 76

Underwater Demolition Teams

The naval plans for the amphibious phase

of the operation contemplated the use of

seven underwater demolition teams—three

to cover the northern coast beaches and

71

 Rad, Parsons to CTF 77, 78, and 79, 14 Oct

44, Sixth Army G-3 Wasatch Jnl, 14 Oct 44. 72

 CTF 77 to COMINCH, Opns Rpt Leyte, Ser

00302-C, 31 Jan 45, p. 8. 73

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 31.

74

 Rad, CTG 77.5 to CTF 77, 19 Oct 44, Sixth

Army G-3 Wasatch Jnl, 19 Oct 44. 75

 Rpt, COMINCH, Amph Opns—Invasion of the

Philippines, COMINCH P-008, pp. 1-3. 76 CTG 77.2 to CTF 77, Sixth Army G-3 Wasatch

Jnl, 19 Oct 44.
58 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

four to cover the southern beaches. The

teams, starting A minus 2 (18 October),

were to locate underwater obstructions and

detonate mines. On 18 and 19 October the

underwater demolition teams made a reconnaissance of the landing areas, accompanied by destroyers which bombarded the

shores. The two days' reconnaissance disclosed no underwater obstacles or mines in

the vicinity of the proposed landing beaches.

The Convoy Enters Leyte Gulf

By the evening of 19 October the preliminary operations were almost completed.

The beaches had been surveyed and found

suitable for landing; mines had been cleared

from most of the main approach channel;

and the entrances to Leyte Gulf had been

secured.77

All ships were to be prepared to attach

paravanes (mine-cable cutting devices) on

signal at any time after noon on 19 October.78

 Since the mine sweepers had not sufficiently cleared the gulf, paravanes were

attached preparatory to entering it. The

mine sweepers were to have escorted the

convoy into the area, but since they would

not be ready for about two hours, the entry

was ordered to be made without them. The

convoy hugged the Dinagat shore line so

closely that the distance from the center of

the formation to the shore was only 3,800

yards.79 Some of the ships did not see the

signal light which had been placed on

Dinagat Island by the 6th Rangers and were

delayed on that account.

The convoy advanced without incident

toward the target area. On the 18th Admiral

Kinkaid radioed General MacArthur that

the operations were going well, though the

storm had somewhat delayed matters, and

the General was made "welcome to our

city."

 80

 MacArthur in reply said that he was

"glad indeed to be in your domicile and

under your flag. It gives me not only confidence but a sense of inspiration," and, probably thinking of the many arduous months

of planning and amphibious operations, he

added, "As Ripley says believe it or not we

are almost there."

 81

As the convoy came ever closer to the

target, the atmosphere aboard the vessels

became more and more tense. By 1800 on

19 October most of the vessels had arrived

outside the gulf. The Far Shore was now

near and could be seen vaguely in the distance. On board one of the vessels Protestant

and Catholic evening prayers were broadcast over the address system. Some of the

men felt that it gave them a lift, but many

felt that they were being administered the

last rites of their church.82

All vessels arrived on schedule. Because

the mine barrier in the entrance had not

been completely cleared, the ships entered

the gulf somewhat to the south of the center

of the entrance, avoiding the main channel

and keeping close to the northern point of

Dinagat Island. Fears that strong ebb tides

might impede progress of the slower vessels

through the entrance proved groundless.

Paravanes were retained until arrival in the

transport areas, but no mines were encountered.83

77

 Rpt, CTF 77 to COMINCH, Amph Opn

P-008, pp. 1-3. 78

 CTG 79.1 Movement Order, A173-44, 9 Oct

44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 16 Oct 44. 79

 Opns Rpt CTG 79.1 to CTF 79, Ser 00454,

26 Oct 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 15 Nov 44.

80 Msg, CTF 77 to CINCSWPA, Sixth Army G-3

Wasatch Jnl, 18 Oct 44. 81

 Msg, CINCSWPA to CTF 77, Sixth Army G-3

Wasatch Jnl, 18 Oct 44. 82

 Tarbuck Rpt. 83

 Opns Rpt CTF 79 to Com7thFlt, Ser 00323,

13 Nov 44, p. 71.
THE RETURN 59

Naval plans called for bombardment of

the enemy-held shores on A minus 2 (18

October), but because the water areas had

not been completely swept for mines by

that time, ships could not reach the bombardment area. On A minus 1, bombardment was chiefly for the purpose of providing effective support and coverage for the

underwater demolition teams. However,

many of the defenses and installations of the

enemy on or near the landing beaches, including buildings and supply dumps, were

neutralized or destroyed.

By the afternoon of 19 October, when it

had become apparent to the Japanese that

the Americans had returned to the Philippine Islands, General Suzuki put his defense

plan into effect. He ordered the 16th Division to annihilate the American force,

and, failing that, to interfere as much as possible with the use of Leyte airfields by the

American Army. The mobile units, including two battalions from the 30th Division,

were to speed to Leyte as fast as possible.

Finally, the headquarters of the 35th Army

was to move to Ormoc on the west coast of

Leyte on the 23d or 24th of October.84

Through the night of 19-20 October,

destroyers near the shore continued to shell

the Japanese forces on land. The American

forces were safely within Leyte Gulf—A

Day had arrived.

84

 Japanese Studies 11, 35th Army Opns, p. 24.
CHAPTER V

A Day: 20 October 1944

Bombardment of the Shores of Leyte

The waters of Leyte Gulf were glassy calm

as the convoys bearing the assault forces

steamed into their appointed positions off

the shores of Leyte in the very early morning

hours of 20 October 1944.

There were three stages of the naval gunfire support: the pre-A-Day bombardment,

A-Day bombardment, and close supporting

missions to be delivered after H Hour and

to continue until 24 October. A portion of

the fire support group in support of the

underwater demolition teams had bombarded the southern landing beaches and

the town of Dulag on 18 October, a process

which was repeated on the following day

in support of the underwater demolition

teams on the northern landing beaches.1

At 0600 on A Day, 20 October, the battleships assigned to the Southern Attack

Force opened fire on the beaches. A lone

Japanese plane appeared at 0612 over the

northern beaches, circled the convoy, and

despite gunfire from the Maryland and

West Virginia disappeared unscathed.2 At

0700 the battleships of the Northern Attack

Force commenced firing. For two hours the

six battleships, three to each attack force,

fired on the beaches. Since no specific targets

could be discerned or determined, the gunfire was directed at areas. Many enemy supply dumps and minor military installations

were destroyed. An observer reported:

Gray smoke plumes are rising from the

shores. Battleship Mississippi is now working

on the northern beaches. She is joined by the

Maryland whose fire has apparently caused

a large shore explosion. Jap ack-ack is fired

at spotting planes but the performance is

weak.

Battleships move inshore and renew their

constant thunder. Helldivers and Avengers

from our CVE's are heading toward the

shore. . . .3

At 0900 the battleships ceased their fire

and the cruisers and destroyers moved in

closer to the shore to deliver their scheduled

bombardment.4

At 0850 gunfire was suspended in the

vicinity of Catmon Hill, the most prominent

coastal terrain feature near Dulag, in order

to allow an air strike against installations in

the interior by the planes from the CVE's

of the amphibious force. During the day a

total of 500 sorties by more than 140 planes

were flown in direct support. Twelve direct

support missions were carried out, nine

against selected targets requested by ground

troops and three against targets of opportunity. Dawn and dusk fighter sweeps were

made against airfields.5 The aircraft from

1

 CTF 79 Opns Rpt, Ser 00323, 13 Nov 44. (All

naval records cited are in the Office of Naval Records and Library.) 2

 COMBATDIV4 Opns Rpt, Ser 0322, 28 Dec 44.

3

 Tarbuck Rpt. 4

 COMBATDIV 4 Opns Rpt, Ser 0322, 28

Dec 44. 5

 COMINCH P-008, pp. 2-8.
A DAY: 20 OCTOBER 1944 61

CONVOY OFF LEYTE at dawn on A Day.

the carriers, which were beyond the range

of the guns of enemy coastal defenses, did

not attempt secondary missions upon the

completion of a mission in the target area.6

The principal bombing and strafing targets were revetments, dispersal areas, supply dumps, and bivouac areas, together with

aircraft on islands near Leyte. Grounded

planes were strafed and destroyed. The

commander of the escort carriers made the

surprising estimate that aircraft from his

carriers had destroyed 125 planes on the

ground and damaged an additional 90

more in the first three days of this "close

support at a distance."

 7 Aircraft did not

bomb the shore line, since gunfire from the

vessels within the gulf was considered more

effective.

At 0900 the cruisers commenced bombarding the beaches. They were joined at

0930 by the destroyers. At 0945 the cruisers

and destroyers lifted their fire and directed

it at the inland areas, at the flanks of the

landing beaches, and at important roads

and towns.8

At 0800 the first anchor chains of the

vessels had rattled out; LCVP's were

quickly swung over the sides; boats circled

mother ships and moved to their rendezvous areas.9

 The LCI mortar and LCI rocket

ships took their places at the head of the 6

 Com3dAmph Force Opns Rpt, Ser 00317, 11

Nov 44. 7

 CTG 77.4 (Com Escort Carrier Group), Opns

Rpt, COMINCH P-008, 30 Apr 45, Part 2, pp. 9,

10.

8

 CTF 78 Opns Rpt, Ser 00911, 10 Nov 44. 9

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. Unless otherwise stated all records of tactical units are in DRB

AGO.
62 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

assault waves. It was now 0945, fifteen minutes before H Hour. The LCI's raced simultaneously to the shores of Leyte, raking the

landing beaches with rocket and mortar fire.

The bombardment grew heavier and more

monotonous. Hundreds of small boats,

flanked by rocket ships and destroyers,

headed toward the beaches; thousands of

rockets hit the beaches with the rumble of

an earthquake. It was impossible to distinguish one explosion from another in the unbroken roar.10

 Over a smooth sea a hot, brilliant, tropical sun beat down. The American

forces were ready to land.

X Corps Goes Ashore

Hours earlier reveille had sounded on

board the transports and the troops had

dressed by the red lights in the holds where

they were quartered. There was very little

talking. Many of the men sat on their bunks

giving their weapons a final check. Others

lay back and smoked in silence. A few sought

the chaplains.11

Missions of Sixth Army Summarized

The Sixth Army had been ordered to seize

and establish beachheads in the Dulag and

Tacloban areas and to secure the airfields

in order to provide naval and air bases; and

to seize such objectives in the Panaon Strait

area as would permit safe passage of naval

forces through the strait to the Camotes

Sea.12 To carry out the operation General

Krueger had assigned the 21st Infantry

Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, to gain

control of Panaon Strait; the XXIV Corps

was to secure the Dulag area and its airstrip;

and the 1st Cavalry Division of X Corps

was to land in the Marasbaras area and, by

advancing north, capture the Tacloban airdrome, the most important A-Day objective

for the Sixth Army. At the same time, the

24th Division, less the 21st Infantry, of the

X Corps was to seize Palo and advance

rapidly to the northwest.13 The seizure of

these areas would secure the important

coastal airstrips for future air operations, cut

off any Japanese attempts at reinforcement

from the southern Philippines through the

Mindanao Sea and Sogod Bay, secure the

important eastern entrances into the interior,

and enable the American forces to control

San Pedro Bay and San Juanico Strait.

The northernmost unit of X Corps, the

1st Cavalry Division, was to land in the

vicinity of San Jose (also called San Ricardo

and San Jose Ricardo) about three miles

north of Palo, on White Beach. White Beach

extended southward 2,000 yards from the

Cataisan Peninsula. There was an interval

of 1,500 yards between this beach and the

northern limit of Red Beach, which was also

2,000 yards long.14 The 24th Division, less

the 21st Infantry, was to land in the vicinity

of the town of Palo, on Red Beach. (Map 3)

1st Cavalry Division

White Beach had a fairly good landing

surface of white coral sand, but even at high

tide it was suitable only for shallow-draft

landing craft. Its average width was fifteen

yards at low tide, at which time a small

irregular bank two to three feet high appeared at the water's edge. The underwater

gradient was shallow, extending out half a

mile in places. An irregular fringe of coconut trees ran the length of the beach. In the 10

 Tarbuck Rpt. 11

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. 12

 GHQ SWPA Opns Instns 70, 21 Sep 44.

13

 Sixth Army FO 25, 23 Sep 44. 14

 CTF 77 Opns Rpt, Ser 00911, 10 Nov 44.
A DAY: 20 OCTOBER 1944 63

LANDING BEACHES. White Beach is in the foreground, with Red Beach, bounded by the

Palo River, beyond.

southern section this fringe was narrow, with

very wet and swampy cleared land behind it.

Highway 1 roughly paralleled the beach

about a mile inland.15

The roar of many guns could be heard

as the 1st Cavalry Division prepared to

disembark into landing boats, which were

to rendezvous at the line of departure 5,000

yards from shore. A pall of lazily billowing

yellow smoke obscured the shores of Leyte.16

The 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by

Maj. Gen. Verne D. Mudge, was to land on

White Beach with brigades abreast—the 1st

Brigade on the left (south) and the 2d Brigade on the right (north)—and advance

inland. The 1st Brigade, under Brig. Gen.

William C. Chase, was to reconnoiter the

hills on the west side of Tacloban Valley and

establish observation posts which would

command the entrances to the valley. The

2d Brigade, under Brig. Gen. Hugh F. Hoffman, had the most important mission of the

day. It was to advance northwest, capture

the Tacloban airdrome and seize the Cataisan Peninsula, reaching Cataisan Point, the

northern extremity of the peninsula, by

1400. Col. William J. Bradley's 8th Cavalry

Regiment of the 2d Brigade was held afloat

in division reserve and was to be prepared

to reinforce either the 1st or 2d Brigade.17

Flanked by rocket and gunboat LCI's,

and preceded by amphibian tanks, the 5th

and 12th Cavalry Regiments, which formed

the 1st Brigade, and the 7th Cavalry, which

with the 8th Cavalry (in reserve) composed 15

 CTF 78 Opns Plan 101-44, 3 Oct 44. 16

 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 17. 17

 1st Cav Div FO 1, 2 Oct 44.
Map 3
A DAY: 20 OCTOBER 1944 65

the 2d Brigade, raced for the shores of Leyte.

The escorting rocket ships laid down a heavy

barrage which covered the beach defenses

to a depth of 1,800 yards inland and left the

enemy incapable of organized resistance. As

the boats neared shore, only small arms and

machine gun fire opposed the landing.18 As

planned, the regiments landed abreast, the

7th Cavalry Regiment on the right (north),

the 12th Cavalry Regiment in the center,

and the 5th Cavalry on the left (south).

The 1st Squadron of the 7th Cavalry was

to land north of the 2d Squadron on the

northern end of White Beach, which at this

point coincided with the narrow neck of land

connecting the Cataisan Peninsula to the

rest of the island, and then go directly north

to secure the entire peninsula and the airstrip. On its left the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, was to land on the right flank of White

Beach, push inland, capture San Jose and a

bridge across the Burayan River northwest

of the town, and seize a beachhead line a

thousand yards west of Highway 1 and three

thousand yards from White Beach. The Cataisan Peninsula would then be sealed off.

Both squadrons landed on schedule, with

only slight opposition, and immediately began to execute their assignments. The 2d

Squadron, within fifteen minutes after

landing, knocked out two pillboxes on the

beach, killing eight Japanese in one and five

in the other. It then organized rapidly and

pushed on to secure its first objective, the

town of San Jose. In the town the squadron

engaged in a house-to-house search but

found few Japanese. By 1230 twenty-four

Japanese had been killed, San Jose was in

American hands, and the Cataisan Peninsula was sealed off. The 7th Cavalry Regiment established its command post on the

west side of the town at 1245. The troops of

the 2d Squadron then set out in a northwesterly direction astride the hard-surfaced, narrow San Jose-Tacloban road, but they were

slowed down by swamps and flooded rice

paddies on either side.19 At 1400 they crossed

the Burayan River on a bridge which the

33d Infantry Regiment had attempted to

destroy but had only damaged. The engineers strengthened the bridge so that the

medium tanks could cross, and at 1420 the

forward movement continued. By 1630 the

squadron had reached its objective—a point

3,000 yards from White Beach—and immediately set up its night perimeter.

The 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, landed

in amphibian tractors on the north end of

White Beach a few minutes after initial

assault waves of the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, had cleared the beach. It moved west

off the beach 100 yards, pivoted to the right,

and began to move up the Cataisan Peninsula. The squadron was expected to secure

the peninsula and the airstrip with great

speed. Engineer units had landed just behind it and were waiting to start work on

the airstrip as soon as it was seized. The 1st

Squadron met with only light enemy opposition, the chief obstacles being the swamps,

unoccupied pillboxes—each of which had to

be checked—and the numerous Filipino

shacks that afforded possible protection to

the enemy. By 1600 the squadron had secured the airstrip and the Cataisan Peninsula.20

 Later in the afternoon the squadron,

less Troop A, was withdrawn from the

18 peninsula. Unless otherwise stated the material on the 1st

Cavalry Division is taken from 1st Cav Div G-3

Jnl, 20 Oct 44, and 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte,

pp. 2-4.

19 7th Cav Regt Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 2-4. 20

 Ibid.
66 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

TROOPS OF THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION wade through a swamp to their A-Day

objective.

The 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments

landed on White Beach without incident at

exactly 1000. Immediately beyond the narrow landing beach was a deep swamp

through which the regiments must move to

reach Highway 1. The morass was often

waist deep, in places even up to the armpits,

and men of the advancing line of troops

cursed heartily as they floundered toward

the highway.21 Under such circumstances it

was impossible for the men to carry all of

their personal equipment, and they had to

make three trips in order to complete the

crossing of certain areas. At 1100 a reconnaissance platoon of the 5th Cavalry Regiment made physical contact with elements

of the 34th Infantry, 24th Division, on its

left. By 1500 both cavalry regiments were

on Highway 1. They pushed westward immediately toward the next objective—the

foothills west of the highway.22 Col. Royce

E. Drake, the commanding officer of the

5th Cavalry Regiment, went forward with

a patrol from F Troop. At 1900, about

three quarters of a mile south of Caibaan,

the patrol made contact with the enemy.

In the ensuing fight ten Japanese and one

American were killed and two Americans

wounded. At 1915 the 12th Cavalry Regiment closed in on its A—Day objective and

formed its night perimeter.23 The 5th

Cavalry Regiment formed its night perimeter at 2135, a few hundred yards short of

the objective.24

21

 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 17.

22

 1st Cav Brig Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2. 23

 12th Cav Regt Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 1-2. 24

 5th Cav S-3 Periodic Rpt 1, 20 Oct 44.
A DAY: 20 OCTOBER 1944 67

The first elements of the 8th Cavalry

Regiment, 2d Cavalry Brigade, the corps

reserve, moved to White Beach at 1040, and

by 1130 the entire reserve regiment was

ashore. The regiment continued in corps

reserve throughout the day and spent its

first night in the Philippines on the western

edge of San Jose.25

At 1400 General Mudge assumed command ashore of the 1st Cavalry Division and

by 1630 had established the divisional command post at San Jose.26

 Preceded by a

ground reconnaissance of the unit commanders, all of the 1st Cavalry Division artillery landed on White Beach at 1330 and

immediately established a position in the

vicinity of San Jose. Before nightfall all battalions had registered and were prepared to

fire, and beginning at 2115 the 61st Field

Artillery Battalion throughout the night delivered harassing fire on the hills south of

Tacloban.27 By the end of the day the division had secured the Cataisan Peninsula and

the Tacloban airstrip and, after crossing

Highway 1, had made physical contact with

the right flank of the 24th Infantry Division.28

24th Infantry Division 29

In the southern part of the X Corps zone,

to the left of the 1st Cavalry Division, the

24th Infantry Division (less the 21st Infantry), under Maj. Gen. Frederick A. Irving, was to land on Red Beach on the morning of A Day.30

 Although there were no underwater obstacles, mines, or barbed wire

along Red Beach, the water was too shallow

to permit vessels the size of LST's to come in

and make a dry landing. Red Beach was

narrow but consisted of firm sand. Back of

it was flat, marshy ground covered with

palm trees and jungle growth, extending

inland in a southwesterly direction from the

northern end of the beach. General Makino

had converted a small stream bed in this

area into a wide and deep tank trap which

paralleled the beach for 1,500 yards. Several

large, well-camouflaged pillboxes, connected

by tunnels and constructed of palm logs and

earth, were scattered throughout the area.

Between the swamp and a low range of hills

one and a quarter miles inland were open

fields and rice paddies. The most prominent

terrain feature was Hill 522 just north of

Palo. This hill commanded the beach area,

the town of Palo, and Highway 2, leading

into the interior. It was partly wooded, and

the 33d Infantry Regiment had interlaced it

with tunnels, trenches, and pillboxes.

From the beach a single deeply rutted

and muddy exit road ran south to the Palo

River, where it turned westward to Highway 1. The river was just north of the town

of Palo and roughly paralleled Highway 2,

which ran in a northwesterly direction from

Palo into the interior, between the hills

dominating this entrance to Leyte Valley.

The 24th Division was to occupy Palo,

advance with regiments abreast into the interior in a northwesterly direction,31

 occupy

the Capoocan—Carigara—Barugo area, and

secure Highway 1 between Palo and

Tanauan. The 19th Infantry on the left

(south) was to establish an initial beachhead, advance to the west and south, seize

Hill 522, and move on and capture Palo.

The 34th Infantry on the right (north) was

25

 8th Cav Regt Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5. 26

 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 19. 27

 1st Cav Div Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3, 1st Cav

Div Arty Unit Jnl, 20 Oct 44. 28

 1st Cav Div Msgs to X Corps, 20 Oct 44. 29

 Unless otherwise stated information in this subsection is taken from 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp.

2-10, and 24th Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Oct 44. 30

 X Corps FO 1, 30 Sep 44. 31

 Ibid.
68 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

to establish an initial beachhead, then move

westward into the interior and be prepared

to assist the 19th Infantry in the capture of

Hill 522.32

The assaulting forces, having been transferred to landing craft, met at the line of departure 5,000 yards from shore. After

grouping, they dashed for the landing

beaches, each regiment in column of battalions. The division landed at 1000 with

regiments abreast according to plan. The

Japanese allowed the first five waves to land,

but when the other waves were 3,000 to

2,000 yards offshore, they opened strong

artillery and mortar fire against them.33 A

number of the landing craft carrying the 1st

Battalion, 19th Infantry, were hit and four

of them sunk. There were numerous casualties: the commanding officer of Company

C was killed; a squad of the Ammunition

and Pioneer Platoon was almost wiped out;

and the Cannon Company suffered the loss

of two section leaders, a platoon leader, and

part of its headquarters personnel.

Among the vessels hit by Japanese artillery were four LST's, one of which was set on

fire. Of the five remaining, two were driven

away and three did not get in until much

later. The enemy fired upon the retiring

LST's, which carried with them the artillery and most of the tanks. The commanding officer of Headquarters Company and

the division quartermaster, together with

the latter's executive officer, were wounded.

Many of the division headquarters personnel were killed or wounded.

The first elements of the 3d Battalion,

34th Infantry, inadvertently landed 300

yards north of the assigned area and were

immediately pinned down by heavy machine

gun and rifle fire. The commanding officer

of the regiment, Col. Aubrey S. Newman,

arrived on the beach and, noting the situation, shouted to his men, "Get the hell off the

beach. Get up and get moving. Follow

me."

 34

 Thus urgently prompted, the men

followed him into the wooded area.

Company I was able to advance, but

Company K ran into a defensive position of

five pillboxes along a stream about seventyfive yards from the beach. It successfully

stormed these pillboxes with rifles, BAR's,

and hand grenades. The 3d Battalion then

halted for reorganization. Company L, the

reserve company, moved into the line south

of Company K to close the gap between the

19th and 34th Infantry Regiments, a gap

created when part of the 34th landed too

far north.

By 1215 the 34th Infantry had cleared

the beach area of the enemy, and the 3d

Battalion was ready to advance across an

open swamp to a line of trees 150 yards

away. A preparatory concentration by 81-

mm. mortars, tanks, and heavy machine

guns was first laid down. At 1230 the 3d

Battalion moved in. Although the going was

rough and the mud waist deep, the troops

reached the trees at 1300 and waited for

the mortars and machine guns to arrive.

The 3d Battalion then pushed on an additional 250 yards.

The 2d Battalion, 34th Infantry, passed

through the 3d Battalion, crossed Highway

1 at 1550, and dug in for the night 100

yards west of the highway.35

The 34th Infantry established contact

with the 1st Cavalry Division on the right

and the 19th Infantry on the left. The 1st

Battalion, 34th Infantry, remained in the

beachhead area.

32

 Ibid.

33

 19th Inf Regt Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1.

34

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 7. 35

 34th Inf Unit Rpt 1, 20 Oct 44.
A DAY: 20 OCTOBER 1944 69

To the south the 19th Infantry, with the

3d Battalion in the lead, had also struck

heavy opposition on its sector of the beach.

Through error the first waves of the regiment landed almost directly behind the 34th

Infantry and 800 yards north of the proposed landing point. The later waves landed

at the planned spot.

Company K did not land on schedule,

because its command boat broke down.

Going in under heavy fire, the company had

all its officers except one killed or wounded.

One of its platoons was unable to make

contact with the rest of the company until

the following day.

Company L, on the right, met little opposition on landing, established contact with

the 34th Infantry, and reached the initial

phase line 500 yards in from the beach.

Company I, on the left, encountered stiff resistance fifty yards off the beach. The defenses of the 33d Infantry Regiment in this

sector consisted of a tank ditch and light

automatic weapons, mortars, 75-mm. guns,

and light and heavy machine guns in prepared positions. Company I hit a group of

pillboxes and knocked out several of them

as well as a 75-mm. gun. In this action Pfc.

Frank B. Robinson played a spectacular role.

Crawling behind a pillbox, he dropped three

grenades into it and then reached down and

pulled the machine gun barrel out of line.

After a further advance of 200 yards, when

a flame thrower aimed at a pillbox failed

to ignite, he threw a bundle of lighted papers

in front of the pillbox. The operator of the

flame thrower then fired through the blaze

and the charge was ignited. By openly exposing himself to fire from a third pillbox,

Robinson enabled tanks to locate its position.36

During the next few hours platoons and

squads fought independently. The 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, drove into the interior

about 500 yards, where it reorganized, made

contact with adjacent units, and then established its perimeter on Highway 1.37

The 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, had

come in under intense fire in which several

boats were hit, and numerous casualties occurred. The battalion landed 300 yards

north of its selected area, moved in 200

yards, and then made a left, oblique turn in

order to reach its predetermined assembly

area. Company B suffered several casualties

when it ran into strong rifle and pillbox fire,

which pinned it down. The company was

ordered to break off fighting and move to

the northern edge of the Japanese positions.

Lt. Col. Frederick R. Zierath, the commanding officer of the battalion, ordered the selfpropelled guns to be brought up. They successfully neutralized the pillbox and a supporting position behind it. Company C,

landing on the left flank of the battalion,

was immediately pinned down by hostile

fire. Zierath ordered it to disengage and proceed to the designated assembly area. Company A, which was split by enemy fire, regrouped inland and reached the assembly

area just ahead of Company C.

The 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, arrived

at the beach just as the 1st Battalion was

bypassing the initial resistance. By noon its

first defense was formed around the beachhead. At 1245 Company E, with a rocket

launcher, silenced a 75-mm. gun which had

been firing on the LST's. In its advance the

company located two more 75-mm. guns

which had been abandoned. Company G

relieved Company E and prepared to move

along the beach road southwest toward Palo.

As the point started to move out at 1300 it 36

 Private Robinson was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. 37

 19th Inf Unit Rpt 1, 20 Oct 44.
70 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

75-MM. M8 SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZERS move in to support the infantrymen in

their advance from the beach.

was attacked by approximately a platoon

from the 33d Infantry Regiment which attempted to retake the gun positions. The

Japanese were repulsed by rifle fire, leaving

eleven dead.

At 1430 Company G, in resuming its advance, ran at once into a series of mutually

supporting pillboxes about 500 yards inland,

where the beach road turns to meet Highway 1. A stiff rifle fire fight followed, in

which the Americans suffered fifteen casualties. Since darkness was approaching, the

battalion broke off the action and dug in

along the road for the night.

While the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry,

was proceeding cautiously forward the 1st

Battalion was working toward Hill 522.

This hill, which rose directly from the river's

edge north of Palo, overlooked the landing

beaches and its upward trails were steep

and winding. Hill 522 presented the most

significant terrain feature which would have

to be overcome before the American forces

could push into the interior from Palo and

it constituted one of the chief objectives for

A Day. Three months earlier General

Makino had started to fortify it, impressing

nearly all of the male population of Palo

for the work. By A Day they had constructed

five well-camouflaged pillboxes of rocks,

planking, and logs, covered with earth.

Numerous tunnels honeycombed the hill;

the communications trenches were seven

feet deep.

During the preliminary bombardments

the Navy had delivered some of its heaviest

blows on the hill, and the bombardment

was continued by Battery B of the 13th Field
A DAY: 20 OCTOBER 1944 71

MAJ. GEN. FRANKLIN C. SIBERT (left), X Corps commander, confers with Maj. Gen.

Frederick A. Irving, commander of the 24th Division, at a forward command post.

Artillery Battalion and Battery A of the 63d

Field Artillery Battalion. The 1st Battalion

of the 19th Infantry sent reconnaissance

parties to locate a northern route to the hill.

The plan had been to move inland from the

extreme south of the beachhead, but that

area was still in Japanese hands. At 1430,

when scouts reported finding a covered

route on the northern side of the hill, the

1st Battalion immediately moved out in a

column of companies. The column had

barely started when Company A, in the

lead, was held up by enemy fire from the

five pillboxes. The remainder of the battalion moved north around Company A,

and, skirting the woods, attacked Hill 522

from the northeast, with Company C on the

right and Company B on the left.

The men, although tired from the day's

activity and strain, made steady progress

up the slope. As the troops moved upward,

American mortars started to shell the crest

of the hill. It was thought that this was

artillery fire and a request was made that

it be lifted. It came, however, from the

chemical mortars. After a short delay the

firing ceased. At dusk Company B reached

the first crest of the hill and was halted by

fire from two enemy bunkers. The company

thereupon dug in.

At the same time scouts from Company C

reached the central and highest crest of the

hill and espied about two platoons of Japanese coming up the other side. They shouted

for the remainder of the company to hurry.

Company C got to the top of the hill barely

ahead of the Japanese, and a sharp engagement took place in which about fifty Japanese were killed. Company C held the

highest crest of the hill. During this attack,
72 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

1st Lt. Dallas Dick was struck in the leg and

his carbine was shot from his hands, but he

continued to command his unit until his

evacuation forty-eight hours later.

During the night the Japanese made frequent but unsuccessful attempts to infiltrate

the company area and in the darkness they

carried away their dead and wounded.

During the action to secure Hill 522, fourteen men of the 1st Battalion were killed

and ninety-five wounded; thirty of the latter

eventually rejoined their units. General

Irving, who had assumed command of the

24th Division ashore at 1420, later said that

if Hill 522 had not been secured when it

was, the Americans might have suffered a

thousand casualties in the assault.

By the end of A Day, the division had

crossed Highway 1 and established physical contact with the 1st Cavalry Division

on its right flank. In spite of strong opposition on its left flank, the 24th Division had

secured Hill 522, which dominated the route

into the interior and overlooked the town

of Palo, the entrance point into Leyte Valley. Furthermore, the X Corps had now

secured a firm beachhead area averaging a

mile in depth and extending over five miles

from the tip of the Cataisan Peninsula to

the vicinity of Palo, and had captured the

important Tacloban airstrip on the Cataisan

Peninsula.

XXIV Corps Goes Ashore

While the X Corps was engaged in seizing

a beachhead and capturing the Tacloban

airfield, the XXIV Corps was carrying out

its mission more than fourteen miles to the

south. (Map 4} It was to land in the DulagSan Jose area and establish a beachhead between Dulag and Tanauan. The Dulag airstrip was the primary objective. The 7th and

96th Divisions—the 7th on the left (south)

and the 96th on the right (north)—made

the landings. The most prominent terrain

feature near the shore line is a short, fingerlike hill range between the mouth of the

Labiranan River and the village of Pikas.

Ranging from 400 feet at its southern extremity, known as Labiranan Head, to 1400

feet at Catmon Hill, southeast of Pikas, this

hill mass dominates the surrounding plain

for miles around. (The entire hill mass will

hereafter be referred to as Catmon Hill.)

The 9th Infantry Regiment, less one battalion, was guarding the Catmon Hill area

while the 20th Infantry Regiment, less one

battalion, was defending the Dulag area.38

Immediately northwest of Dulag and just

off the beach was a swamp,39 and along the

coast were coconut groves interspersed with

rice fields. Many streams and rivers cut

across the coastal plain.40 Between Dulag

and Labiranan Head was a good section of

firm sand beach, backed by a broad alluvial

plain extending ten miles inland.

96th 'Infantry Division

In the early morning hours of 20 October

the Southern Attack Force moved to a location off the shores of Leyte near the town of

Dulag. The 96th Division was to land with

regiments abreast in the area between the

Calbasag River and the town of San Jose—

the 382d Infantry on the left (south) and

the 383d Infantry on the right (north).

The southern half of the division's beachhead area was designated Blue Beaches 1

and 2, and the northern half was known as

Orange Beaches 1 and 2. The beaches had

38

 35th Army Opns, p. 27. 39

 CTF 79 Opns Rpt, Ser 00323, Encl A, 13 Nov

44.

40

 383d Inf Regt FO 6A, App. A, 30 Sep 44.
Map 4
74 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

an average length of about 525 yards. The

northern extremity of Orange Beach was

about ten miles from the southernmost beach

of the 24th Division in the X Corps sector.

The order to "land the landing force" of

the 96th Division came at 0845, and LVT's

immediately began to spill out of the LST's

and head for the line of departure. By 0930

the assault waves, preceded by the amphibian tank wave, had arrived at their appointed position 4,500 yards offshore.41

 At

the head of the column were LCI gunboats

which were to give fire support and act as

guides for succeeding waves. The assault

waves then headed for Blue and Orange

Beaches.

When the landing craft were within 100

yards of the shore, the LCI's fired into the

interior and to each side of the landing

beaches. Thereupon the amphibian tanks

began to fire directly beyond the beaches,

in front of the advancing assault forces. The

382d Infantry under Col. Macey L. Dill

landed at 0950 on Blue Beach, and the

383d Infantry under Col. Edwin T. May

landed ten minutes later on Orange Beach.

The 383d Infantry landed with two battalions abreast—the 2d Battalion on the left

and the 1st Battalion on the right. By 1045

both battalions had landed all of their assault troops and had advanced 1,200 yards

inland, encountering no resistance except

intermittent mortar fire from the 9th Infantry Regiment in the vicinity of Catmon

Hill.42 Immediately beyond the highway

the two battalions reached an unsuspected

swamp. The amphibian tanks bogged down

at 1045 and were unable to catch up with

the assault troops during the rest of the day.

Intermittent Japanese fire continued to fall

on the beach area. The 2d Battalion crossed

the swamp without encountering the enemy

and established its night perimeter 2,600

yards inland from the landing beaches.

The 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry, pushed

northwest through the barrio of San Jose,

which was on the beach, and along the

marshy ground and swamps on the south

bank of the Labiranan River for 2,200

yards. It crossed the river at 1610. Company

C placed a roadblock at the point where

Highway 1 crossed the Labiranan River.

After advancing 400 yards farther northwest the battalion ran into fire from elements of the 9th Infantry Regiment. At

1900 the battalion, still under enemy fire,

dug in for the night. At the close of the

day's action it was at the base of Labiranan

Head in a position which would permit an

attack to be launched on that terrain feature from the west.

The 3d Battalion, which had been held

afloat in regimental reserve, came ashore

at 1045. It mopped up in the rear of the

1st and 2d Battalions and established its

night perimeter 800 yards away from the

1st Battalion on the south bank of the

Labiranan River. During the day the 383d

Infantry Regiment, slowed by the terrain,

had advanced 2,600 yards inland.43

As heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire

fell on the beach, the 382d Infantry also

landed with two battalions abreast—the 2d

Battalion to the right (north) at Blue Beach

2 and the 3d Battalion to the left (south)

at Blue Beach 1. The 2d Battalion, though

momentarily stopped by debris on the shore,

was able to advance quickly and by 1025

had penetrated 300 yards inland. This gain

was increased to 700 yards by 1115. The

battalion crossed Highway 1 before it encountered the first defensive positions of the

9th Infantry Regiment, a series of zigzag 41

 CTG 79.2 Opns Rpt, Ser 0032, 4 Nov 44. 42

 383d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1. 43 Ibid.
A DAY: 20 OCTOBER 1944 75

BEACH AREA as seen from Hill 120.

deserted trenches roughly paralleling the

beach. Although the 2d Battalion met no

enemy opposition, the intense heat and the

swampy ground made progress slow. At

1630, when the battalion formed a perimeter for the night, it had pushed inland

approximately 2,500 yards.

The amphibian tractors carrying the 3d

Battalion, 382d Infantry, were held up by

the tank barriers of coconut logs and debris

on the beach, and the troops were forced to

debark at the water's edge. Several hundred

yards off the beach this battalion began to

receive heavy fire from Hill 120, which was

about 600 yards from the beach. The hill

dominated the regimental beach area 4 4

and was the A-Day objective for the battalion. The fire pinned down the battalion,

which thereupon called for mortar support

and naval gunfire. The resulting barrage

forced the Japanese out of their positions,

and at 1040 the battalion advanced and

captured Hill 120.

The 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry, which

had been in floating reserve, landed on Blue

Beach 1 and moved to the foot of Hill 120 to

support the 3d Battalion. Immediately beyond the hill there was a small meadow

rimmed by a deep swamp. The enemy fired

upon the hill throughout the day but could

not dislodge the 3d Battalion. This steady

fire and the presence of the swamp limited

the A-Day advance of the 3d Battalion to

1,300 yards inland from the landing beach.

At the end of the day, despite the swampy

terrain and the harassing fire of the Japanese, the 382d Infantry had advanced approximately 2,500 yards on the northern 44

 382d Inf Unit Jnl, 20 Oct 44.
76 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

flank and 1,300 yards on the southern flank.

Contact had been established at 1600 with

the 32d Infantry, 7th Division, on the left

flank, and the 383d Infantry, 96th Division,

on the right flank.45

At 1630 the assault forces of the 96th Division consolidated their positions and set up

defense perimeters for the night. During the

day the division had captured the barrio of

San Jose, established control over both sides

of the Labiranan River, captured Hill 120

overlooking the beach area, and progressed

well inland. Although all units of the division

fell considerably short of the objective for

A Day, this delay was due fully as much to

the swampy and difficult terrain as it was

to enemy resistance. The 381st Infantry

Regiment remained in Sixth Army floating

reserve throughout the day.46

Maj. Gen. James L. Bradley arrived

ashore at 1750, and at 1800 he assumed

command of the 96th Infantry Division.

The three light artillery battalions of the

division had landed and were in position by

1800.

7th Infantry Division

Concurrently with the landings of the

96th Division, the 7th Division, on the left,

was establishing a beachhead in its zone of

action just south of the 96th Division. At

0800 the assault troops of the 7th Division

began to clamber down the nets of their

transports into landing boats which were to

carry them in the dash for the shore.47 By

0815 they were boated and at the line of

departure.

The 7th Division was to land on Violet

and Yellow Beaches. Violet Beach extended 785 yards north from the northern

edge of Dulag. The northern half of Yellow

Beach, called Yellow Beach 2, which was

south of Violet Beach and contiguous to it,

was 400 yards long. Between the northern

and southern halves of Yellow Beach was a

swamp. The southern half of Yellow Beach,

Yellow Beach 1, was approximately 425

yards in length and was located south of

Dulag and north of the Daguitan River

mouth.

The 7th Division was to go ashore between the Calbasag and Daguitan Rivers

with regiments abreast—the 32d Infantry

on the right (north) and the 184th Infantry

on the left (south); the 17th Infantry, less

its 3d Battalion, was in reserve. The principal A-Day objectives were the barrio of

Dulag and its airstrip. The 3d Battalion,

17th Infantry, was to swing south and secure the bridge and the crossing of the

Daguitan River at Dao and the crossing

of the Talisay River.

The 32d Infantry, under Col. Marc J.

Logic, was to land on the northern and

southern portions of Violet Beach, drive into

the interior, and protect the right flank of

the division. The 184th Infantry, commanded by Col. Curtis D. O'Sullivan, was

to land on Yellow Beach 1 and Yellow

Beach 2 and then drive inland, directing its

main effort toward an early seizure of the

airfield west of Dulag. It was also to seize

and secure the crossings of the Daguitan

River.

After the landing waves had formed at

the line of departure, the landing craft

started for the beaches, preceded by the

45

 382d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2. 46

 96th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 33-37. 47

 Unless otherwise stated, the part of this subsection dealing with the 7th Infantry Division is

taken from the following: 7th Inf Div Opns Rpt

Leyte, pp. 3-5; 7th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Oct 44;

and 7th Inf Div FO 9, 1 Oct 44.
A DAY: 20 OCTOBER 1944 77

776th Amphibian Tank Battalion. As it got

ashore, the tank battalion received hostile

mortar and small arms fire that came from

a tank barrier of coconut palm logs near the

water's edge. The battalion overcame this

opposition fifteen minutes after landing and

advanced a distance of 200 yards inland to

positions from which it could support the

infantry.48 According to plan, the 32d and

184th Infantry Regiments followed abreast.

The 32d Infantry landed with two battalions abreast—the 2d on the right and the 3d

on the left. The regiment encountered minor

resistance at the beach, consisting of light

rifle fire and sporadic artillery and mortar

fire. By 1023 the 3d Battalion had landed

all its assault troops and by 1030 seven

assault waves of the 2d Battalion had

reached the shore. As the two battalions proceeded inland, they met opposition from the

enemy.

The 2d Battalion landed on the edge of a

cemetery in which were small groups of the

enemy very much alive. By 1100 these were

subdued by rifle fire and the battalion was

able to advance without difficulty into the interior. At about 1300 the 2d Platoon of

Company F, after advancing some 600

yards, ran into fire from three pillboxes concealed in the tall cogon grass on the right

flank. Tanks were brought up to knock out

the enemy pillboxes. The advance then continued. By 1315 the 2d Battalion made

physical contact with elements of the 96th

Division on the right. Shortly after 1400

the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 32d Infantry

made contact and reached Highway 1.49

Companies L and K of the 3d Battalion,

32d Infantry, landed abreast. Company L,

on the left, ran into heavy fire from Japanese

machine gunners who had waited until the

leading elements of the company exposed

themselves. The Japanese were entrenched

in bunkers emplaced in hedgerows and

banana groves. The pillboxes, which were

mutually supporting, were located at the

ends of the hedgerows and occasionally in

the middle of an open field. Each pillbox

had machine guns and antitank guns.

Company L suffered a number of casualties

and was pinned down. The enemy gunners

then turned to Company K and stopped its

forward movement. In the space of fifteen

minutes two officers and six men of the 3d

Battalion were killed, and one officer and

eighteen men wounded. Of the medium

tanks that had come ashore at 1030, three

were sent to support Company L and two

to support Company K. The latter two were

knocked out before they could adjust their

fire on the pillboxes. The leading tank sent

in support of Company L was knocked out

by a direct hit from an antitank gun. With

two tanks remaining, it was decided to hit

the flanks of the entrenched pillboxes at

1345. A platoon of Company K went to the

right and another platoon from the company to the left. Simultaneously the remaining elements of the two companies, coordinating with the tanks, assaulted the

pillboxes. The heavy volume of fire kept the

enemy guns quiet until they could be finished off with grenades. The pillboxes were

knocked out without further casualties.

Paralleling the route of advance of Company L were several hedge fences, behind

which were enemy machine guns and mortars. Although under heavy fire, the company was able to break through the first

barriers with the aid of the tanks. At 1630,

since the enemy fire continued in volume,

the 32d Infantry withdrew and established

a defensive position for the night. During

the day the 32d Infantry had reached a

48

 776th Amph Tank Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. 49

 32d Inf Unit Jnl, 20 Oct 44.
78 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

general line along Highway 1. The 2d Battalion had advanced 400 yards beyond the

highway and the 3d Battalion 100 yards.50

The 184th Infantry landed at 1000, two

battalions abreast—the 1st on the southern

half of Yellow Beach and the 3d on the

northern half. They encountered surprisingly little resistance on either beach and

were able to push inland at a much greater

speed than had been anticipated. The 3d

Battalion drove through the town of Dulag,

which lay directly in its path, to the DulagBurauen Highway. The 1st Battalion pushed

inland and reached the highway at 1210,

just fifteen minutes after the 3d Battalion.

At 1530 the two battalions established physical contact and maintained it throughout

the day as they continued their advance

along the highway. At 1255 the 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, landed on Yellow

Beach and went into regimental reserve on

the regiment's southern flank. As the advance of the 32d Infantry on the right

slowed up, Company G, 184th Infantry,

was committed to fill the gap which had

developed between the two regiments. At

1835 the 184th Infantry, although it had

failed to secure the Dulag airstrip, formed

its night perimeter along the edge of the

strip.51 At the end of the day the regiment

had no battle casualties, but three men had

been overcome by the heat. Eleven Japanese

had been killed in the regiment's zone.52

The 17th Infantry, less its 3d Battalion,

was kept in 7th Division reserve. The 3d

Battalion of the 17th had come ashore at

1500 on the southern end of Yellow Beach.

The battalion pushed west and south

through light opposition, seizing the bridge

over the Daguitan River at Dao, and by

2100 had established a bridgehead south of

the river and made contact with the 184th

Infantry on the right. At the end of the first

day's fighting the 7th Division had gained

possession of the Leyte shore in its zone and

penetrated inland 600 yards on the right and

nearly 2,300 yards on the left. It had also

reached the edge of the Dulag airstrip. By

nightfall the XXIV Corps had established

a firm beachhead line extending along the

coast from San Jose on the north to just below Dao on the south.

Seventy miles to the south the 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th Division, which

was detailed to land in the vicinity of

Panaon Strait on 20 October at 0930, half

an hour before the launching of the great

offensive, and to secure control of that entrance to Sogod Bay, successfully accomplished its mission. It encountered no

Japanese.

Thus at the end of A Day the Sixth Army

had succeeded in landing assault forces all

along the eastern coast of Leyte and was in

control of Panaon Strait. Its casualties

amounted to 49 men killed, 192 wounded,

and 6 missing in action. There remained a

gap of nearly ten miles between the X and

XXIV Corps. The Tacloban airstrip on the

Cataisan Peninsula had been secured and

the American forces were on the edge of the

airstrip at Dulag. Nearly as important as

the capture of the airstrip was the seizure

of Hill 522, which commanded the entrance

to the broad Leyte Valley at Palo. The advance echelon of General Headquarters had

opened on Leyte Island at 1200.53 On the

following day, when adequate communication facilities had been established, Generals 50

 32d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. 51

 184th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2. 52

 184th Inf Jnl, 20 Oct 44.

53

 Rad, GHQ SWPA to CG Sixth Army, Sixth

Army G-3 Rear Jnl, 21 Oct 44.
LT: GEN. WALTER KRUEGER AND COL. RUPERTO K. KANGLEON

of the guerrilla forces head for the beach (above). Krueger talks with men of the 7th Division

on the beach near Dulag (below).
80 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Krueger, Sibert, and Hodge assumed command ashore of the Sixth Army, X Corps,

and XXIV Corps, respectively.

Most of the 16th Division had withdrawn

during the naval and air bombardment

which took place just prior to the landing.

The immediate invasion of the troops after

this pounding enabled the Americans to secure most of the coastal defenses before the

enemy could regroup and return. As a consequence, the only Japanese forces encountered were those left behind to fight a delaying action. The meeting with the enemy in

force was yet to come.

Bringing in Supplies

While the assault forces were securing the

beaches of Leyte, supplies were being poured

in to support the operation. Within an hour

after the first assault wave hit the hostile

shores, rations, equipment, and other supplies were being rushed to the beaches.

Each man going ashore carried a change of

clothing in his pack, two days' supply of

emergency rations, one day's supply of D

rations, and two filled canteens, in addition

to his gas mask, weapons, and ammunition.

The Navy was responsible for transporting the troops and supplies to the target

area. Ships' companies unloaded the cargo

from the cargo vessels and transported it in

small craft to the beaches. Many of the ships

had been improperly loaded for the journey

to Leyte. The cargo should have been so

loaded that articles first needed would be the

last put on board; instead it had been stowed

haphazardly, with little attention given to

the problem of unloading.

As a result of the faulty stowage of supplies on the ships, many badly needed items

were at the bottoms of the holds, and articles

that would not be needed until later in the

operation were piled on top of them. The

supplies were set ashore in random fashion

and then were carelessly thrown on trucks

and other vehicles. This sort of handling

resulted in a loss of carrying capacity, in slow

removal of the loads, and in a consequent

delay in the return of vehicles to the landing

beaches.

The LSM's were used to very good advantage in the unloading of the APA's and

AKA's. Vehicles and supplies could be loaded on them without difficulty, and in addition, two hatches on the LSM's could be

worked at the same time. On each of the

APA's, AKA's, and LST's which carried

troops, a labor crew was detailed to remain

on board to assist in the unloading.54

At the beach, the Army took over the

cargo and moved the supplies to prearranged dumps. On the northern beaches in

the X Corps sector, the Army shore party

was composed of the 532d and 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiments of the 2d

Engineer Special Brigade. After landing,

these units facilitated the movement of

troops, vehicles, and supplies across the

beaches and controlled all unloading operations.55

 The 1122d and 1140th Engineer

Combat Groups supervised the unloading

in the XXIV Corps sector. They were assisted by naval beach parties from the VII Amphibious Force, which brought the cargo

ashore.

The beachhead areas at which the supplies were unloaded varied in quality and

depth. Most of the beaches on which the 7th

and 96th Divisions landed were very good,56

54

 Extracted Report of Landing on Leyte in the

Philippine Islands by an Australian Officer Attached

to the Northern Assault Force Landing at Red

Beach. Copy in OCMH. 55

 2d ESB Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1. 56

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, Engr Rpt, p. 232.
UNLOADING SUPPLIES AT DULAG on A Day (above), and (below) general view

of the beach area on 22 October 1944.
82 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

as contrasted with those in the X Corps area

where the 24th Infantry Division and 1st

Cavalry Division came ashore. The greatest

difficulty was encountered along Red Beach,

where the 24th Division landed. This stretch

of coast line was ill adapted to the unloading

of supplies, having poor exits and offering

few dispersal areas ashore.57

LST's approaching Red Beach were under intense enemy fire. Four of them received direct hits.58

 Nearly all of the LST's

were grounded 100 to 200 yards from the

beach. Only one of them was able to come

within forty to fifty yards of the beach, and

it succeeded in unloading its cargo of heavy

equipment only with considerable difficulty.59

 Another put off a bulldozer, which

disappeared in seven feet of water. With

difficulty the other LST's withdrew and returned to the transport area.60

The shore parties on both Red and White

Beaches (X Corps sector) did not land early

enough to effect a proper organization before the cargo began to come in. Although

the parties worked hard, they were undermanned, and it was necessary to augment

them by "volunteers" in order to unload the

large volume of cargo.61 It had been planned

to establish temporary beach dumps at the

point of unloading of each LST, but since

at Red Beach the LST's could not get

ashore, the plans had to be changed. These

craft were diverted to the 1st Cavalry Division's White Beach 2,000 yards north.

The LSM's and LCM's were able to discharge their vehicles in three or four feet

of water. Many of these, being poorly waterproofed, stalled and had to be pulled ashore.

Once there, the heavily loaded vehicles

churned up the sand, and many of them

sank so deeply that they had to be pulled

out.62

The strong resistance of the Japanese and

the difficult terrain limited the depth of the

24th Division's beachhead and prevented

the establishment of division dumps beyond

the beachhead areas. As a result, most of the

supplies and nearly all supporting and service troops had to be concentrated on the

first three or four hundred yards of the

beachhead. Fortunately there was no bombing or strafing of the area, and although the

development of exit roads was slow, the

congestion on the beach was cleared before

trouble developed.63

The diversion of the 24th Division's

LST's to the beaches of the 1st Cavalry Division naturally strained the facilities of the

beach and shore parties on White Beach.

The southern end of White Beach also

proved unsuitable for landing LST's, which

consequently were shifted to the northern

end.64 However, the Army shore parties organized White Beach immediately upon

landing. A two-way road was cleared along

the beach with military police directing traffic. Dump areas were marked off by white

ribbons, and sign posts were erected. The

supplies were unloaded from the landing

craft by roller conveyors and "fire brigade

methods" directly onto the waiting trucks

and trailers.65 After the ships had been un57

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, G-4 Rpt, p. 218. 58

 Ltr, CG 2d ESB to CG Sixth Army, 22 Oct 44,

2d ESB Jnl and Jnl File. 59

 CTU 78.1.7 Opns Rpt, COMINCH P-008,

Part 5, p. 2. 60

 Ltr, CG 2d ESB to CG Sixth Army, 22 Oct 44,

2d ESB Jnl and Jnl File. 61

 CTU 78.2.1 and 78.2.3 Opns Rpt, COMINCH

P-008, Part 5, p. 3.

62

 Lts, CG 2d ESB to CG Sixth Army, 22 Oct 44,

2d ESB Jnl and Jnl File. 63

 Maj F. W. Doyle to Brig Gen L. J. Whitlock,

Rpt of Observations, KING II Opn, 4 Nov 44,

GHQ G-4 Jnl, AGO KCRC. 64

 2d ESB Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6. 65

 Maj Doyle to Gen Whitlock, Rpt of Observations, KING II Opn, 4 Nov 44, GHQ G-4 Jnl.
A DAY: 20 OCTOBER 1944 83

loaded the shore parties consolidated all of

the supplies into dumps as rapidly as possible. The rations and ammunition, which

were loaded on fifteen LVT's, were kept

mobile to the rear of the troops.66

When Leyte was substituted for Yap as

the target, it had been decided that the 96th

Division should unload troops and supplies

at Leyte as rapidly as possible. Consequently,

supplies were unloaded with little regard for

the order in which items would be needed

ashore.67

There was no general unloading on the

beach in the XXIV Corps area until the late

afternoon of A Day, when water, rations,

and ammunition were sent ashore. For about

an hour the unloading proceeded satisfactorily, but the beach soon became congested.

The beach parties brought in the supplies

faster than they could be handled by the

shore parties.68 At one time more than eighty

loaded boats waited over five hours before

they could be unloaded. The slowness of the

shore parties in unloading the boats was not

entirely their fault. Many of the boats were

improperly loaded with mixed cargo, a situation which caused the boats to ship water.

They were forced to come in to the beach or

sink. The shore parties were also handicapped by a lack of workers. A shore

party of 250 men included headquarters

personnel, military police, and communications men, leaving only fifty or sixty workers.

The unloading was further retarded by lack

of sufficient mechanical equipment and

failure to make full use of available transportation.69

Loose cargo piled up on the beaches faster

than it could be taken to the dump sites.70

A deep swamp, 250 yards inland and parallel to Blue Beach, also limited the extension

of dumps in that area. The congestion

was relieved the next day, when the supplies

were taken to selected dump sites nearly as

fast as they could be removed from the boats.

In the Dulag area, the organization of

the shore party and its operations were well

co-ordinated.71

 In the initial phase the 7th

Division employed the "drugstore system"

whereby DUKW's carried the supplies directly to the front-line consumers of the division from specially loaded LST's which

had been anchored off the landing beaches.72

By using this method the division was able to

deliver critical supplies to the combat troops

within an hour after the request was received. At the same time, other supplies and

equipment could be put ashore without

interruption.

In the wake of the initial assault waves,

the engineer troops landed and began at

once to clear the beaches, prepare dump

sites, and build access roads. The men

worked around the clock in six-hour shifts.73

Within four hours the 7th Division's shore

party was prepared to start full-scale operations, and two hours later began to issue

supplies to the assault forces. Since the cargo

came ashore in nets, it was possible to use

cranes and bulldozers to good advantage.

The cargo was initially moved over the 66

 7th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, Supplementary Annex, p. 3. 67

 96th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 73. 68

 Rpt of Sup Off to CO Funston, 23 Oct 44, in

CO USS Frederick Funston Opns Rpt, Ser 0101,

31 Oct 44. The boat crews and beach parties had

been fortified with a lunch consisting of turkey

salad, ham and cheese, hot steak sandwiches, ice

cream, and cold fruit juices. The Army assault

troops carried K rations.

69

 Com3dAmph Force Opns Rpt, Ser 00317, 11

Nov 44. 70

 96th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 73-75. 71

 CTG 79.1 Opns Rpt, COMINCH P-008, Part

5, p. 15. 72

 7th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, G-4 Rpt. 73

 CTG 71.1 Opns Rpt, COMINCH P-008,

Part 5, p. 15.
84 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

landing beaches to regimental beach dumps

500 yards inland, and as vehicles landed

they were driven to temporary assembly

areas or directly to their organizations.74

Six hours after the first assault wave hit the

beaches the 7th Division abandoned the

floating drugstore system, since by that time

sufficient supplies had been brought ashore

to fill requisitions directly from the dumps.75

During the day a total of 107,450 tons of

supplies and equipment were discharged

over the beaches of the Sixth Army. Although the beaches in some instances were

extremely congested, steps had been initiated

to relieve the situation.

News of the success of the American forces

in establishing a beachhead on Leyte—the

first foothold in the Philippine Islands—was

joyfully received by the American nation.

The President radioed congratulations to

General MacArthur and added, "You have

the nation's gratitude and the nation's

prayers for success as you and your men

fight your way back. . . ." 74 76 7th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, G-4 Rpt. 75

 1140th Engr Const Gp Shore Party Opns Rpt

Leyte. 76 The New York Times, October 20, 1944.
CHAPTER VI

The Japanese Reaction

The Japanese undertook the defense of

Leyte with serene assurance. Their pilots

had erroneously reported the naval battle

off Formosa as a great victory and declared

that only remnants of the once strong American Navy remained. The defeatist attitude

of the summer of 1944 vanished.

During the summer there had been disagreement among the Japanese military

leaders. Imperial General Headquarters

felt that the decisive battle should be fought

on Luzon and only delaying actions taken

in other areas. To this the 14th Area Army

agreed. The Southern Army, on the other

hand, believed that it would be impossible

to wage a successful battle on Luzon if other

areas, especially the Visayan Islands, were

allowed to fall into American hands. Since

these islands, if captured, could be used as

Allied air bases, the decisive battle should be

fought whenever and wherever the Americans attacked.1

Confident that the U. S. fleet had suffered

grievously in the battle off Formosa, the

Japanese closed ranks and all the commands

agreed that the time was most opportune to

deliver the coup de grâce. The foolhardy

Americans would take a severe drubbing,

and Japan, after a long series of humiliating

and costly defeats, would regain the initiative. It was therefore a jubilant Imperial

General Headquarters that ordered its

armed forces to do battle with the Americans.

The essence of the Imperial General

Headquarters plan was simple. The American convoys and carriers were to be given

complete freedom in their journey to the

Philippine Islands. When they were sufficiently close to make retreat difficult, the

main strength of the Japanese Army, Navy,

and Air Forces would descend upon them

and deliver a knockout blow. If the operation were launched too early, the Americans

could annihilate the inferior Japanese air

strength before the battle could be fought;

if too late, the Americans could escape and

the objective would be lost. Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, was "patiently

waiting" for the opportune moment.2

The Air Forces

On the evening of 17 October the 4th

Air Army, upon receiving word that the

U. S. forces were in the vicinity of Suluan

Island, ordered the entire 2d Air Division

to attack the Americans. The main strength

of the fighter units was to be concentrated

in the central and southern Philippines

areas. Although bad weather prevented a

reconnaissance, the increase in American

air raids on the central and southern Philippines made it imperative for the Japanese to

1

 Japanese Studies in WW II, 21, Hist of Southern Army, 1941-45, OCMH. 2

 Hist of Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, p. 139.
86 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

attack with their main air force. The 2d Air

Division was ordered to move from Clark

Field on Luzon to Bacolod on Negros

Island. It was unable to do this because of

the bad weather, and it was therefore unable

to forestall the American landings. The

commander of the 4th Air Army decided on

21 October, as a result of the American

landings, to use the entire air force under his

command, employing the 7th Air Division

and the 30th Fighter Group, in addition to

the 2d Air Division. The 12th Air Brigade

of the 30th Fighter Group had just arrived

in the Philippines from Japan, via Shanghai, and it was necessary to employ this

brigade immediately because of the impending battle in Leyte Gulf.

All the various units were to launch an

attack against the American land forces and

shipping by the evening of 23 October. On

24 October there was to be a series of aerial

attacks, the first early in the morning with

the entire force; the second consisting of

two waves; the third by the entire force in

the evening; and during the night by waves

of heavy and light bombers and assault

planes.3

The Americans anticipated increased

aerial activity over Leyte, and therefore the

number of fighters was increased on 24 October to 36, on call from 0545 till dark, with

an additional 16 fighters ready for immediate action upon request. Twenty-eight of

the 36 were assigned to the attack force commanders and 8, retained by General Krueger, patrolled the beachhead area and provided additional fighters when and where

they were needed.

The Leyte area was subjected to a heavy

air assault on the same day, 24 October,

when an estimated 150 to 200 enemy planes

(mostly twin-engined bombers) approached

northern Leyte. Sixty-six were definitely

shot down and eighteen others were probably shot down.4

 On the American side,

forty combat air patrol and ten direct supporting planes participated in this engagement. Three American aircraft crashlanded—two on the Tacloban airstrip and

one in the water.5 Only a small percentage

of the American air activity was directed

toward the neutralization of the enemy air

force, as most of the available aircraft were

attacking the Japanese fleet. The Japanese

were determined to "make Leyte the decisive air battlefield as well as the decisive

ground and naval battlefield of the Philippines."

 6 For the first time since the Allied

counteroffensive in the Pacific had started

rolling, the Japanese, for an extended period, risked aircraft in great numbers in daylight raids as well as at night. The shipping

off Tacloban and Dulag and the Tacloban

airfield were the principal targets, though

other air installations on the island were hit.

An example of the enemy's dogged determination occurred during the evening and

night of 27 October. At twilight, twelve enemy fighters and dive bombers dropped 100-

pound bombs in the vicinity of Tacloban

and tried repeatedly but unsuccessfully to

strafe the Tacloban airstrip. After a lull, the

Japanese aircraft renewed the aerial assault

just before midnight and continued almost

uninterruptedly until dawn. Between 2332

and 0125, there were nine raids of two to

four planes each; between 0340 and 0450,

three raids of two to four planes each; and

between 0454 and 0555 five additional

planes made an attack on the area.7 The

3

 4th Air Army Opns, pp. 38-43.

4

 Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 24 Oct 44. 5

 Sixth Army G-2 Jnl, 24 Oct 44. 6

 Hist of V Bomber Command, Ch. 4, Jul-Dec

44, p. 73, AAF Hist Archives. 7

 Ibid., pp. 73-75.
JAPANESE AIR ATTACKS on shipping (above) and supply dumps (below) were a constant threat during the early days of the invasion.
88 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Tacloban airstrip frequently was "well illuminated" by burning aircraft.8

The 2d Air Division assaulted American

shipping from 24 through 28 October, but

because of the increasing necessity for giving

air cover to the convoys the main strength

of fighters of the 4th Air Army was used to

protect the transportation of reinforcements

of the 14th Area Army of Leyte. From 25

October on, the Bacolod airfield and the air

forces protecting the Japanese convoys going

to Leyte were attacked by American

bombers and suffered serious losses. Since

it had to participate in every phase of the

action, the losses of the 4th Air Army were

heavy.9

After 1 November the Japanese increasingly felt the American air power through

attacks upon their air bases and shipping.

Their fighter units, which had suffered considerable losses in protecting the convoys,

were ordered to counterattack. They were

not successful. At the same time the 4th

Air Army received orders to protect the

reinforcement convoys in the Manila area.

By this time the Japanese air forces' wings

had been clipped and "what had once been

a formidable weapon was transformed into

a sacrificial army of guided missiles."

 10

 The

suicidal kamikaze pilot became the sole

hope of the Japanese air forces.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf

Japanese Naval Plans

On 21 July the chief of the naval general

staff, Imperial General Headquarters, issued

a directive for subsequent "urgent operations."11

 The operational policy to be followed by the Combined Fleet was as follows :

1. Make utmost effort to maintain and

make advantageous use of the strategic status

quo; plan to smash the enemy's strength; take

the initiative in creating favorable tactical

opportunities, or seize the opportunity as it

presents itself to crush the enemy fleet and

attacking forces.

2. Co-operate in close conjunction with

the Army, maintain the security of sectors

vital to national defense, and prepare for

future eventualities.

3. Go-operate closely with related forces

to maintain security of surface routes between

Japan and vital southern sources of materials.12

On 26 July the chief of the naval general

staff informed Admiral Toyoda, Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, that the

future "urgent operations" were to be known

as the SHO (Victory) Operations. There

would be four SHO Operations. The first

was to cover the defense of the Philippine

Archipelago.13 It was essentially the last

chance for Japan to remain in the war. Said

Admiral Toyoda of the situation at the time

of the battle of Leyte Gulf:

Since without the participation of our

Combined Fleet there was no possibility of

the land-based forces in the Philippines having any chance against your forces at all, it

was decided to send the whole fleet, taking

the gamble. If things went well, we might

obtain unexpectedly good results; but if the

worst should happen, there was a chance

that we would lose the entire fleet. But I felt

that that chance had to be taken. . . .

Should we lose in the Philippines operations,

even though the fleet should be left, the shipping lane to the south would be completely

cut off, so that the fleet, if it should come back

8 to Japanese waters, could not obtain its fuel Hist of 7th Fighter Sq, 49th Fighter Gp, 86th

Fighter Wing, V Fighter Comd, Fifth Air Force,

Nov 44, p. 1, AAF Hist Archives. 9

 USBSS, Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 285. 10

 Ibid.

11

 Ibid.

12

 Ibid., App. 87, p. 292. 13

 Ibid., App. 88, p. 294.
THE JAPANESE REACTION 89

supply. If it should remain in southern waters,

it could not receive supplies of ammunition

and arms. There would be no sense in saving

the fleet at the expense of the Philippines.14

Since their carrier force was weak, the

Japanese had developed a plan based upon

the main gunnery strength of the fleet and

upon the land-based air forces. Battleships

and cruisers from a southern base were to

approach Leyte from the south, fight their

way to the landing beaches, and destroy Allied assault shipping. A decoy force was to

attempt to lure the U.S. carrier task force

away from the main action. Shore-based air

forces were to inflict maximum damage on

the American carrier forces whenever and

wherever possible, but once the invasion

came they were to conserve their strength

until the day of the landings, when all the

Allied assault shipping would be concentrated off the beaches and when their attacks on the U.S. carriers would assist the

advancing Japanese fleet. The plan was designed to get the Japanese naval gunnery

force into a position where it could do the

greatest damage. Little attention was paid

to getting it out. "The war had reached a

point where the Japanese fleet, hopelessly

outnumbered and, as imminent events

would prove, even more hopelessly outclassed, could not risk the fleet action it had

previously desired but was forced to expend

itself in suicidal attack upon the United

States transports."

 15

Upon receiving information on 17 October that American vessels were off the

shores of Suluan Island, Admiral Toyoda

immediately alerted his forces. On 18 October Toyoda, after intercepting American

messages dealing with the landings on the

island approaches to Leyte Gulf, activated

his plan for the defense of the Philippine

Islands. The target date (X Day) for the

fleet engagement was set for 22 October but

logistical difficulties caused a series of delays

and on 21 October Admiral Toyoda

changed X Day to 25 October. "From the

far corners of the shrinking Empire the

whole combatant strength of the Japanese

Navy converged on Leyte Gulf."

 16

The Naval Battle 17

The strongest Japanese naval force—the

1st Diversion Attack Force—moved from

the south, reached Brunei Bay in northwest

Borneo on 20 October, and after refueling

split into two parts and proceeded on its way

two days later. The main strength of the

1st Diversion Attack Force, under Admiral

Kurita, sailed northeast up the west coast

of Palawan (one of the Visayan Islands),

and then turned eastward through the

waters of the central Philippines to San

Bernardino Strait, while the smaller unit

commanded by Vice Adm. Shoji Nishimura

moved eastward through the Sulu Sea in

order to force an entrance at Surigao Strait.

The 2d Diversion Attack Force, commanded by Vice Adm. Kiyohide Shima,

after leaving the Pescadores on 21 October,

14

 USSBS, Interrogations, II, 317. 15

 USBSS, Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 281.

16

 Ibid., p. 284. 17

 It is not within the scope of this history to deal

with the ensuing battle between the Japanese and

American Navies. A full discussion of the "greatest

naval battle of the Second World War and the

largest engagement ever fought on the high seas"

would require a volume. Such a study is being prepared by Samuel Eliot Morison in his series of

studies on the U.S. Navy's part in the war. Two

excellent accounts—James Field's The Japanese at

Leyte Gulf, and C. Vann Woodward's The Battle

for Leyte Gulf (New York, 1947)—have already

appeared. The present volume attempts to present

only those facts needed to understand the effect of

the battle on land operations. (Quotation is from

Woodward, Battle for Leyte Gulf, p. 1.)
90 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

sailed south, past western Luzon, and after

refueling in the Calamian Islands, just south

of Mindoro, proceeded to follow and support the southern part of the 1st Diversion

Attack Force in forcing Surigao Strait.

The Main Body, consisting chiefly of partially empty carriers with a destroyer escort,

departed on the 20th, and on the evening of

the 22d turned southwest toward Luzon. It

was commanded by Vice Adm. Jisabuto

Ozawa. The Main Body was to act as a

decoy to draw off the main American

strength. The Japanese submarines off Formosa were ordered south toward the eastern

approaches to the Philippine Archipelago

and the 2d Air Fleet, shortly before 23 October, began to arrive on Luzon.18

There were two American fleets in

Philippine waters—the Seventh Fleet under

Admiral Kinkaid, whose superior was General MacArthur, and the Third Fleet under

Admiral Halsey, whose superior was Admiral Nimitz. The Seventh Fleet, which

consisted of 6 old battleships, 16 escort carriers, 4 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, 30

destroyers, and 10 destroyer escorts, had

escorted the convoy to Leyte and now stood

by to protect it as it unloaded. The Third

Fleet was composed of Task Force 38 under

Admiral Mitscher. It consisted of four task

groups which averaged 23 ships each, divided about as follows: 2 large carriers, 2

light carriers, 2 new battleships, 3 cruisers,

and 14 destroyers. The task force was to

secure air supremacy over the Philippines,

protect the landings, and apply unremitting

pressure on Japan. If the opportunity to

destroy the major portion of the Japanese

fleet should arise or could be created, that

destruction was to be its primary task.

The Japanese had 4 carriers, 7 battleships, 19 cruisers, 33 destroyers, and 2 battleship-carriers which carried no aircraft;

there were 108 planes on the carriers and

about 335 shore-based planes in the Luzon

area.19

On 23 October two American submarines, the Dace and the Darter, encountered the 1st Diversion Attack Force

and sank two heavy cruisers, the Atago and

Maya, off the western coast of Palawan.

The former was Kurita's flagship; its sinking forced the Japanese admiral to transfer

hurriedly to another vessel. The submarines

also seriously damaged another heavy

cruiser.

Upon receiving information that the

Combined Fleet was steaming toward the

Philippines, Admiral Oldendorf's fire support group of the Seventh Fleet moved to

the southern end of Leyte Gulf and formed

a battle line across the mouth of Surigao

Strait while motor torpedo boats patrolled

within the strait and about its southern entrance. Halsey's Third Fleet moved toward

San Bernardino Strait. The escort carriers

from Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet cruised off

Leyte Gulf.20

On the 24th, after receiving a report from

the submarine, the carriers of the Third

Fleet sent aircraft to search to the west and

southwest. These aircraft sighted the main

part of the 1st Diversion Attack Force south

of Mindoro, and sighted and attacked the

smaller force under Admiral Nishimura off

Negros, slightly damaging a battleship and

a destroyer. The aircraft of the carriers from

their position off San Bernardino Strait

struck repeatedly at Kurita's force while the

smaller Nishimura force was left to the

battleships in the gulf. One Japanese battle18

 USSBS, Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 284.

19

 Admiral Frederick C. Sherman, Combat Command: The American Aircraft Carriers in the

Pacific War (New York, 1950), p. 286. 20

 Field, Japanese at Leyte Gulf, pp. 81-82.
THE JAPANESE REACTION 91

ship of the 1st Diversion Attack Force was

sunk, one heavy cruiser rendered impotent,

and minor damage was inflicted on other

battleships. The Japanese were forced temporarily "to reverse course to westward."

 21

The aircraft from the Japanese 2d Air

Fleet attempted to aid the naval forces

which were moving eastward through the

Philippines. In co-operation with some aircraft from the Main Body, which was now

about 100 miles east of Luzon, they attacked

the northernmost unit of the American carriers. Halsey's airmen sighted and reported

the sacrificial Japanese Main Body in the

afternoon. Not knowing that this force consisted mainly of empty carriers and believing

that the 1st Diversion Attack Force had been

severely damaged, Admiral Halsey withdrew the battleships and carriers of his Third

Fleet and steamed north to meet the new

threat, leaving San Bernardino Strait wide

open. At midnight Kurita's 1st Diversion

Attack Force moved unmolested through

San Bernardino Strait and turned south

toward Leyte Gulf. The Japanese strategy

had worked.

In the early morning hours, Admiral

Oldendorf's warships destroyed the Nishimura force as it sailed into Surigao Strait.

Of two battleships, one heavy cruiser, and

four destroyers, only the cruiser and one

destroyer escaped from the strait, and the

cruiser, which had been damaged, was sunk

by aircraft from the U. S. carriers the next

morning.22 Admiral Shima's 2d Diversion

Attack Force, entering the same strait thirty

minutes after Nishimura's force, suffered

damage to a light cruiser that was hit by

American torpedo boats. Shima's force then

made an abortive attack, during which its

flagship was damaged by collision, and

withdrew without having engaged. The

Third Fleet far to the north fell upon the

decoy forces, sank all four carriers of the

Main Body, and thus "wrote an end to the

Japanese carrier air force."

 23

Admiral Kurita's 1st Diversion Attack

Force "for which so much had been sacrificed"

 24

 encountered Kinkaid's carriers and

destroyers off the coast of Samar. Admiral

Kinkaid was ill prepared to meet the main

thrust of the Japanese Navy, since his carriers were protected only by destroyers and

destroyer escorts. His "handling of the exceedingly difficult situation" was "superb."

 25

 The aircraft from his carriers under Rear Adm. Clifton A. F. Sprague rose

to the occasion and gave a "magnificent performance,"

 26

 continually attacking the

much stronger 1st Diversion Attack Force.

Kurita's forces sank one carrier, two destroyers, and one destroyer escort but lost

three heavy cruisers and had one crippled.

The American fighting strength was greatly

diminished at the very time it was needed to

protect the amphibious shipping that had

carried the Sixth Army, and which still lay

near the shores of Leyte Gulf. Just as it

appeared inevitable that Kurita would move

in and deliver the coup de grâce, he suddenly broke off the engagement and retired

toward San Bernardino Strait. After the war

he stated in justification of this strange

move: "The conclusion from our [the Japanese] gunfire and anti-aircraft fire during

the day had led me to believe in my uselessness, my ineffectual position, if I proceeded

into Leyte Gulf where I would come under

21

 USBSS, Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 285. 22

 Ibid.

23

 Ibid. 24

 Ibid. 25

 Ltr, Gen Krueger to Maj Gen Orlando Ward,

12 Sep 51, OCMH. 26 Ibid.
92 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

even heavier aircraft attack. I therefore concluded to go north and join Admiral Ozawa

for coordinated action against your northern

Task Forces."

 27

Said Admiral Sprague: "The failure of

the enemy main body and encircling light

forces to completely wipe out all vessels of

this Task Unit can be attributed to our successful smoke screen, our torpedo counterattack, continuous harassment of enemy by

bomb, torpedo, and strafing air attacks,

timely maneuvers, and the definite partiality of Almighty God."

 28

The battle for Leyte Gulf was over. It

had ended in a resounding victory for the

Americans, whose losses of 1 light carrier,

2 escort carriers, 2 destroyers, and 1 destroyer escort were small in comparison

with the Japanese losses of 3 battleships, 1

large carrier, 3 light carriers, 6 heavy

cruisers, 4 light cruisers, and 9 destroyers.29

As the Japanese retreated throughout

the 25th and 26th of October, carrier- and

land-based aircraft struck at the enemy vessels and inflicted fresh injuries upon them.

The Sixth Army summarized its view of

the probable consequences if the battle had

gone against the U.S. Navy as follows:

Had the [Japanese] plan succeeded the

effect on the Allied troops on Leyte in all

likelihood would have been calamitous, for

these troops would have been isolated and

their situation would have been precarious

indeed. If it had been victorious in the naval

battle, the Japanese fleet could have leisurely

and effectively carried out the destruction of

shipping, aircraft, and supplies that were so

vital to Allied operations on Leyte. An enemy

naval victory would have had an adverse

effect of incalculable proportions not only

upon the Leyte Operation, but upon the overall plan for the liberation of the Philippines

as well.30

The Sixth Army, however, was depicting

the worst of all possible contingencies.

Admiral Halsey's conclusion is quite different:

That Kurita's force could have leisurely

and effectively carried out the destruction of

shipping, aircraft, and supplies in Leyte Gulf

was not in the realm of possibilities. . . .

Kurita would have been limited to a hit-andrun attack in the restricted waters of Leyte

Gulf. He would further have been subjected

to the attack of the cruisers present in Leyte

Gulf. He would have been limited to minor

damage. . . . The statement that an enemy

naval victory would have an effect of incalculable proportions not only on the Leyte

operation, but upon the overall plan for the

liberation of the Philippines as well, can only

be premised on the thought that our naval

forces would be almost totally destroyed. The

prognostication of such a condition could be

reasoned on none of the facts existing during

this three days' engagement.31

The Japanese Reinforce the Leyte Garrison

The Japanese felt that the honors of the

battle were evenly divided and consequently

continued with their program of making

Leyte the decisive battle of the Philippines.

Although the American fleet had soundly

whipped the Japanese Navy, the Japanese

were still able to send reinforcements in

great numbers to their Leyte garrison. Because of the lack of sufficient aerial strength,

the Americans were unable to check the

steady flow of troops into the port of Ormoc.

27

 USBSS, Interrogations, I, 44. 28 CTU 77.4.3 Opns Rpt, Ser 00100, 29 Oct 44,

Incl B, p. 2. 29

 Woodward, Battle for Leyte Gulf, p. 229.

30

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 43. 31

 Ltr, Adm Halsey to Gen Ward, 6 Jul 51,

OCMH.
THE JAPANESE REACTION 93

American Aerial Retaliation

The carrier strikes of the Seventh and

Third Fleets up to and through A Day had

been most successful in forestalling any concentrated effort on the part of the Japanese

against the American shipping in Leyte Gulf

and the troops on the coastal strand. Thereafter, the Japanese unleashed a furious air

assault on the American forces and

shipping.32

At the same time, American aircraft from

the carriers struck at the Japanese troops

and their installations in close support of the

ground troops. The first called-for air strike

was at 0834 on 21 October against bridges

over streams that were not fordable along

the road leading from Ormoc to Carigara,

in order to prevent enemy movement along

this road.33 A total of 121 missions were

flown in support of ground units during the

first four days, of which only 33 had been

requested by the air liaison parties. The targets for these missions included artillery and

mortar positions, fuel and supply dumps,

bridges, pillboxes, and other installations,

together with trucks, armored vehicles, and

tanks. 3 4

During the initial stages of the campaign,

Navy flyers gave efficient close support to

the ground forces.35 The average time required to carry out each of these support

missions was approximately one hour,

though the usual difficulties of locating

friendly troops and pinpointing the target

were present. Enthusiastic reports on the

effectiveness of this co-operation from naval

air were made by the 7th Division. Members

of this division, which formerly had been

supported by Army and Navy air forces,

found Navy air support in the first days on

Leyte far more satisfactory than that which

the Army Air Forces had been able to provide in the past. They believed that this superiority was due to the system that the

Navy had worked out for directing strikes at

close-in targets without endangering friendly

ground forces, and to the Navy's use of rehearsals with ground units to establish mutual understanding and confidence.36

The Battle of Leyte Gulf interfered

greatly with the close support rendered by

the Navy, since the carrier-based planes had

to be withdrawn. The combat air patrol

assignments were also disrupted because of

surface engagements and the repairing of

the CVE's.37

At this time the Japanese had about

432,000 men in the Philippines, including

air force and construction units. Most of

them believed that they were well prepared

to meet the Americans. In fact a staff officer

of the 14th Area Army, upon hearing that

the Americans had landed on Leyte, is reported to have jumped up and exclaimed:

"Good, they have picked the place where

our finest troops are located."

 38

 It was also

thought that the American troops on Leyte

were "having a difficult time."

 39

 Nevertheless, General Yamashita, who had succeeded

32

 Hist of V Fighter Comd, Ch. 4, Jul-Dec 44,

p. 73, AAF Hist Archives. 33

 Sixth Army G-3 Wasatch Jnl, 21 Oct 44. 34

 Opns Rpt, CSA Seventh Flt to Comdr Seventh

Flt, no ser, 2 Nov 44. 35

 AAF Evaluation Bd POA Rpt 3, The Occupation of Leyte, Philippine Islands, pp. 27 and 15.

This report was prepared by Brig. Gen. Martin F.

Sranlon, who accompanied the XXIV Corps to

Leyte as an air observer for the Army Air Forces in

the Central Pacific. By close support is meant

operating to the immediate front of the first-line

troops.

36

 AAF Bd POA Rpt 3, p. 15. 37

 Opns Rpt, CSA Seventh Flt to Comdr Seventh

Flt, no serial, 2 Nov 44. 38

 USSBS Interrog 418, Interrog of Maj Gen

Toshio Nishimura, 19-22 Nov 45, p. 6, OCMH. 39

 14th Area. Army Opns Leyte, pp. 2-3.
94 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Kuroda as the commanding general of the

14th Area Army, sent the 1st Division and

other units to Leyte. The Japanese felt that

"if the decisive battle in Leyte results in

failure, it will upset the entire operation in

the Philippines and the decisive battle in

Luzon will be lost."

 40

By the 25th of October a battalion of the

55th Independent Mixed Brigade and one

of the 57th Independent Mixed Brigade

from Cebu, together with two battalions of

the 30th Division, had arrived on Leyte to

reinforce the 16th Division. Shortly after the

Sixth Army landed, the 35th Army commander, General Suzuki, received orders

from General Yamashita to undertake an

all-out offensive against the Americans. All

Japanese air, naval, and land forces were to

participate.41

On 22 October the 14th Area Army

asked the 55th Army how the 26th Division

and 68th Independent Mixed Brigade were

to be utilized if the Japanese decisively won

the pending naval battle. The 35th Army

stated that if the Japanese Navy were victorious, the units were to prevent the landing of more Americans at Leyte Gulf, but

if it were unsuccessful the troops were to be

landed at Carigara Bay. The optimism of

the Japanese was high. Said Maj. Gen.

Yoshiharu Tomochika, Chief of Staff, 35th

Army: "We were determined to take offensive after offensive and clean up American

forces on Leyte Island. . . . We seriously

discussed demanding the surrender of the

entire American Army after seizing General

MacArthur."

 42

 Then came the Battle of

Leyte Gulf.

Despite the setbacks caused by this disastrous sea battle, the Japanese continued

to send troops to Leyte through Ormoc. The

reinforcement of Leyte consisted of moving

five major units, in nine echelons: the 35th

Army moved as many of its units as possible

from Mindanao, Cebu, and Panay; the 1st

Division was sent down from Luzon on

1 November; then the 26th Division, the

68th Independent Mixed Brigade, and one

third of the 8th Division were sent from

Luzon in the order given.43

On 27 October the Fifth Air Force took

over the mission of supporting the Sixth

Army. As the airstrips were not in serviceable condition, only a small detachment—

the 308th Bombardment Wing—could be

sent in. Aircraft from the carriers continued

to give support. The Fifth Air Force felt

that it could best check the Japanese reinforcement program, and at the same time

give more lasting support to the ground

troops, by attacking the Japanese convoys

before they arrived in Leyte. The Fifth Air

Force intended also to attack large movements of land troops, concentrations, and

supply areas. Army Air Forces doctrine assigned close support as the third priority

mission of tactical air forces.44 Since there

were always insufficient aircraft for the missions assigned to the air forces, close support

of ground troops suffered.

The Allied Air Forces, which had been

given the mission of supporting the Leyte

operation, directed its main efforts against

airfields in bypassed areas. Two fighter

groups were on Morotai, one heavy bomber

group was on Noemfoor, off the north coast

of New Guinea, and two heavy bomber 40

 Ibid., p. 6. 41

 10th I&HS, Eighth Army, Stf Study of the

Japanese 35th Army on Leyte, Part I, pp. 3-4, copy

in OCMH. 42

 Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 13.

43

 14th Area Army Opns Leyte, pp. 17-18, 37, 52,

59, 93, 94, and 99. 44

 FM 100-20, 21 Jul 43, Command and Employment of Air Power, p. 16.
AIR STRIKES AGAINST JAPANESE INSTALLATIONS included attacks on Bacolod Airfield, Negros Island (above), and on shipping in Zamboanga harbor, Mindanao (below).
96 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

groups were on Biak; they completed 175

sorties in strikes against airfields on Mindanao and the Visayan area. The main targets of attack were on Mindanao and Cebu

and in the Negros area.45 The XIII Bomber

Command, which carried the burden of this

assault, was to neutralize targets previously

hit and protect the southwestern flank of

the American forces in the Philippines.

The 42d Bombardment Group (medium

bombers) in October flew the greatest number of sorties in the history of the group up

to that time.46

The heavy bombers (B-24's) of the 868th

Bombardment Squadron, operating from

Noemfoor, had as their main target enemy

shipping in the Makassar Strait. At the same

time, the B-24's that were within range of

the Sulu Sea struck at the Japanese Southern Fleet as it retreated after its engagement

with the Seventh Fleet. The fighters and

medium bombers, which had been used to

strike at targets on Mindanao, were alerted

to strike any enemy naval vessels that came

within range.47

While protecting the southwestern flank

of the American forces in the Philippines,

the XIII Bomber Command was extraordinarily busy on 26 October. Part of the

Japanese naval task force, consisting of three

battleships, five cruisers, and four destroyers,

had withdrawn from the Leyte area and was

in the Sulu Sea when sighted by the 307th

Bombardment Group. Twenty-eight B-24's

of the bombardment group made their principal targets two of the battleships—one of

the Kongo class and the other of the Yamato

class. Three of the planes were shot down as

the Japanese skillfully and evasively maneuvered their vessels so that none was sunk. At

the same time B—24's from the 5th Bombardment Squadron sighted and sank an

enemy light cruiser at a different location in

the Sulu Sea.48

General MacArthur had originally allocated the attack of all land targets in the

Philippines to the Allied Air Forces,49 and

although subsequent events occasioned a

modification of this order the Fifth Air

Force officially established its advance units

on Leyte at 1600 on 27 October and assumed operational control of land-based

aircraft.50 The 308th Bombardment Wing,

the advance echelon of the Fifth Air Force,

had two major duties included in its mission. It was to obtain air superiority over the

Philippines and to isolate the Japanese

forces on the battlefield of Leyte. In addition to these two principal tasks it was to

render maximum close support to the

ground forces, establish night fighter patrols and a system of courier aircraft, and

provide maximum protection to Allied

naval vessels.51 Among the Army flyers of

the 49th Fighter Group, an advance party

of the Fifth Air Force that arrived on 27

October, was Maj. Richard I. Bong, of the

9th Fighter Squadron, the leading ace of

the Army Air Forces. He celebrated his arrival by shooting down an enemy plane.52

45

 AAF Evaluation Bd, SWPA Rpt, Leyte Campaign, p. 32, AAF Hist Archives. 46

 Hist of XIII Bomber Comd, Oct 44, p. 5,

AAF Hist Archives. 47

 Ibid.

48

 Jane's Fighting Ships, 1947-48 (New York),

pp. 473-78: Hist of XIII Bomber Comd, Oct 44,

p. 4, AAF Hist Archives. 49

 Rad, GHQ to CG Sixth Army et al, Sixth

Army G-3 Rear Jnl, 28 Oct 44. 50

 Rad, CG Allied Air Forces to CG Fifth Air

Force, 27 Oct 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 1 Nov 44. 51

 Hist of 308th Bombardment Wing, Ch. 3, p. 4,

AAF Hist Archives. 52

 Hist of 9th Fighter Sq, Oct 44, AAF Hist

Archives.
THE JAPANESE REACTION 97

ANTIAIRCRAFT GUN in action at Tacloban airstrip, 27 October 1944.

On 28 October the Army flyers of the 7th

Fighter Squadron got their first enemy airplane on Leyte. Since there were "only"

three enemy air raids during the night, the

men were able to get some much needed

sleep.53

The 29th of October, however, was a day

of heavy action for the Army flyers, as described in a report of the 7th Fighter Squadron:

The 29th was a day that will be long remembered. . . . Two more Nips were added

to the unit's score; . . . the 49th Group's

500th victory. But more important at that

time was the fact . . . [that] the . . . road

between the strip and the camp collapsed

under army traffic. . . . The already long

hours were lengthened still more as pilots and

men were forced to arise between three and

four o'clock in the morning, make their way

to the barge at Tacloban, cross to the strip by

water and then sweat but the pre-dawn raids.

At night, the planes landing at dusk had

hardly hit the runway before . . . BOFORS

[40-mm. antiaircraft guns] went off and the

lights went out. Then down to the end of the

strip near the gas dumps, and another session

of sweating beneath A/A [antiaircraft] awaiting the barge for the trip back to Tacloban

and then to camp. Supper was served as late as 10 o'clock ... a few brave individuals

tried an alternate road to the south, swinging

out east to White Beach above Dulag and

then north along the beach to Tacloban

Strip. Japanese snipers soon put a stop to this

travel during the hours of darkness.

To add to the "big day"—29 October—

the weather observers reported a 50 knot gale

on the way. Working after dark, pilots and

linemen minus the regular tie downs and

using tent ropes and anything available secured the airplanes to jeeps, trucks, trailers

and tractors. At night, in camp, the small

53

 Hist of 7th Fighter Sq, Oct 44, pp. 5-6, AAF

Hist Archives.
98 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

LOCKHEED P-38 after Japanese raid on Tacloban airstrip.

typhoon hit and with it went three or four

tents, occupants of which awoke to find themselves thoroughly drenched and at odds with

the world, Leyte in particular.54

Although 29 October was the most difficult day on Leyte for the men of the 7th

Fighter Squadron, they were again disheartened the following day, when one of the

squadron's pilots was shot down by friendly

antiaircraft.55

During the first week of November, offensive operations by the Fifth Air Force were

primarily against targets in Ormoc Valley

and enemy shipping in Ormoc Bay. The barrios of Ormoc, Valencia, and Palompon

were the first land targets. Most of the

strikes, however, were against Japanese shipping in Ormoc Bay and in the vicinity of the

Camotes Islands.56

By 4 November a number of P-38's had

been destroyed by bombs and strafing, some

of which were completely burned up. To

cut down the aircraft losses, it was decided

to have planes of some of the squadrons use

the Bayug airstrip in the Dulag area. But

since this was a poor airfield which soon became overcrowded and subject to Japanese

air attacks, it was finally abandoned.57

On 3 November fifteen P-38's of the

49th Bomber Group struck "one of the most

lucrative strafing targets of their history."

 58

54

 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 55

 Ibid., p. 7.

56

 Hist of Fifth Air Force, Ch. V, pp. 42-43, AAF

Hist Archives; Rad, Sixth Army to GHQ, 3 Nov

44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 3 Nov 44. 57

 Ibid. 58

 Hist of V Fighter Comd, Jul-Dec 44, Ch. 4,

p. 64, AAF Hist Archives.
THE JAPANESE REACTION 99

In an early morning search for enemy shipping in Ormoc Bay the bombers found nothing, but on their return they sighted a

ten-mile-long convoy of trucks, artillery, and

tanks extending from Ormoc to Valencia.

The convoy was strafed and dispersed,

leaving twenty to thirty-five trucks destroyed

and many other vehicles, including two

tanks, in flames.59 However, two American

planes were shot down by enemy antiaircraft fire, four came in on single engines, and

all showed many bullet holes. The bombers

made no further strikes against the convoy,

"as all aircraft received extremely heavy

and accurate ground fire."

 60

The airmen of the Fifth Air Force continued to hit shipping in Ormoc Bay and in

the Camotes Islands, and they also achieved

success against bridges, airfields, troops,

camp areas, and transportation.61 Although

the number of Japanese air raids had diminished by 6 November, the Americans

could not yet feel that they were "out of the

rough."

 62

 There was insufficient direct air

support for the ground troops throughout

the operation and the Japanese continued

to send troops into Ormoc. The constant

stream of Japanese reinforcements coming

into Leyte augured ill for the success of the

operation.

The TA Operation

The TA Operation, by which name the

Japanese program for the reinforcement of

Leyte was known, continued from 23 October through 11 December. The numerical

weakness of the U.S. land-based aircraft

enabled the Japanese to land many thousands of troops and tons of supplies on

Leyte. Nine convoys in all were sent to the

port of Ormoc, on the west coast.63 As a

whole, however, the operation was "literally

gruesome" to the Japanese, since their transports and escort vessels were struck again

and again by American aircraft.

The first Japanese convoy had three echelons. The first consisted of a landing barge

and an auxiliary sailing vessel carrying

about 300 troops of the 102d Division. The

second echelon, whose composition was

identical with the first, carried about 150

troops of the same division. Both safely discharged their troops on 23 and 25 October,

respectively. The third echelon was made

up of 2 destroyers, together with 4 transports carrying about 2,000 men of the 30th

Division. The transports safely unloaded

their passengers on 26 October, but American airmen later sank the destroyers and all

but one of the transports. The remaining

vessel was damaged.

The second convoy consisted of three

echelons, composed of 3, 1, and 4 transports

respectively. The escorting vessels of the

third echelon, the only one that had an

escort, consisted of 6 destroyers and 4 coast

defense vessels. The escort vessels carried

the troops of the 1st Division: the first wave

about 1,000 men, the second about 100

headquarters men, and the third approximately 10,000 troops and about 9,000 ship

tons of provisions and ammunition. All vessels safely debarked their troops on 1 and 2

November.

The 5 transports of the third convoy carried about 2,000 troops of the 26th Division

and approximately 6,600 tons of supplies.

59

 Rad, COMAF5 to Sixth Army, 4 Nov 44, Sixth

Army G-3 Jnl, 5 Nov 44. 60

 Msg, 308th Bomb Wing to G-2 Sixth Army,

3 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 3 Nov 44. 61

 Hist of Fifth Air Force, Ch. 5, pp. 42-45,

AAF Hist Archives. 62

 OPD 319.1, Sec VII, Case 248, DRB AGO.

63

 Activities of the Japanese Navy During the

Leyte Operation, p. 94, A715 SWPA, Doc 2543.
JAPANESE CONVOY UNDER ATTACK in Ormoc Bay. A destroyer escort is blown

apart by a direct hit (above), and a large transport is straddled by bomb bursts (below).
THE JAPANESE REACTION 101

The convoy sailed from Manila on 9 November and was escorted by 1 submarine

chaser, 1 torpedo boat squadron, and 4 destroyers. On 10 November, when the convoy

reached the mouth of Ormoc Bay, American

airmen destroyed all of the escort vessels and

transports before they could unload their

troops and cargo.

Each of the two echelons of the fourth

convoy had 3 transports, but only the first

one had an escort—6 destroyers and 4 coast

defense vessels. The first echelon carried approximately 10,000 troops of the 26th Division and about 3,500 tons of supplies, including provisions, ammunition, and four

long-range guns. The second echelon carried about 1,000 men of the 1st Division.

Both discharged their troops safely on 9 November, a day earlier than the anticipated

arrival of the third convoy, but because of

American air action, they were able to get

only a limited part of the supplies ashore.

The fifth convoy was organized on the

same pattern as its predecessor, but the first

wave had a submarine chaser as an escort

while the second had a destroyer. This convoy, which left Manila between 11 and 25

November with an unknown number of

troops and quantity of supplies, was completely destroyed en route to Leyte.

The sixth convoy, composed of 2 transports, 2 submarine chasers, and 1 patrol

boat, carried approximately 2,500 tons of

provisions and ammunition. It entered Ormoc harbor on 28 November and had completed most of its unloading when the vessels were either sunk or set afire by U.S.

aircraft and motor torpedo boats.

There were four echelons in the seventh

convoy. The composition of the first two is

unknown, but it is known that the first echelon completed unloading at Ipil just south

of Ormoc on 30 November. The third and

fourth echelons, consisting altogether of 3

transports and 2 destroyers, also carried an

unknown number of troops and quantity of

supplies. As they were unloading at Ormoc

on 2 December, the vessels were attacked by

American airmen who sank one of the destroyers and damaged the other. The transports and the damaged destroyer returned to

Manila.

The 4 transports of the eighth convoy,

escorted by 3 destroyers and 2 submarine

chasers, carried about 4,000 troops—the

main body of the 68th Independent Brigade—and an unknown quantity of provisions and ammunition. It unloaded some of

its troops and a part of the cargo at San

Isidro on the west coast of Leyte on 7 December; but immediately thereafter, American aircraft sank the transports and heavily

damaged the destroyers.

There were two echelons in the ninth

convoy. The first echelon, which consisted of

5 transports, 3 destroyers, and 2 submarine

chasers, carried approximately 3,000 troops

of the 5th Infantry Regiment, 8th Division,

and about 900 tons of provisions and ammunition. In unloading at Ormoc on 11

December, 1 destroyer was sunk and 1 destroyer and 1 transport were damaged. The

remaining vessels then moved to Port Palompon on the west coast of Leyte and completed unloading. The second echelon consisted of only one transport and carried an

unknown number of troops and quantity of

supplies. It was able on 11 December to

elude the American airmen and complete

its unloading.64

After the war, General Nishimura, who

had been on the staff of the 14th Area Army,

made the amazing statement that nearly

80 percent of the vessels sent to Ormoc were

64

 Trans of Data on Reinforcement and Support

of the Leyte Island Campaign, ATIS Doc 16946.
102 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

sunk en route. Although most of the vessels

went down close enough to the Leyte shore

for the troops to swim ashore, the equipment

lost could not be replaced.65 It is estimated

that the Japanese landed more than 45,000

troops and something over 10,000 tons of

matériel.66

Even though the Japanese had not succeeded completely in their reinforcement

program, General Krueger was faced with

a far stronger foe than had been anticipated.

The Leyte Campaign was to be long and

costly and was to upset the timetable for the

impending Luzon operation. At the end of

A Day the American assault forces had

firmly established themselves on the shores

of Leyte, but the battle for the island was

yet to come.

65

 USSBS Interrog 506, Interrog of Maj, Gen.

Yoshiharu Tomochica et al., MS, OCMH. 66

 14th Area Army Opns Leyte, Appended Table 1.
CHAPTER VII

Southern Leyte Valley: Part One

The SHO Operations

In their preliminary planning, the Japanese considered that the defense of Leyte

would be only a delaying action. The defenders were to inflict as many casualties as

possible upon the invaders and also to prevent them from using the Leyte airfields, but

the decisive battle for the Philippines would

be fought on Luzon. As late as 10 October

the chief of staff of the 35th Army received

the following order from Manila: "Depending on conditions the 35th Army will prepare to dispatch as large a force to LUZON

ISLAND as possible."

 1

On 21 October, after receiving news of

the American landings, General Yamashita

activated SHO ICHI GO (Victory Operation Number One). He made it clear that

the Japanese Army, in co-operation with

"the total force of the Air Force and Navy,"

was to make a major effort on Leyte and destroy the American forces on the island. The

35th Army was to concentrate its forces

there. The 1st and 26th Divisions, the 68th

Brigade, and an artillery unit from the 14th

Area Army would be sent to augment the

35th Army troops. At the same time General

Suzuki received information that the Japanese Air Force and Navy would engage in

"decisive" battles in support. "The morale

of the 35th Army rose as a result."

The Japanese thought that only two

American divisions had landed on Leyte,

and that if the 1st, 16th, 30th, and 102d

Divisions engaged the Americans, a decisive

victory would be theirs. General Suzuki decided to send forward the following reinforcements to Leyte: the main force of the

30th Division, only three battalions of which

would remain in Mindanao; three infantry

battalions of the 102d Division; and one independent infantry battalion each from the

55th and 57th Independent Mixed Brigades. These forces were in addition to the

two battalions previously sent on 23

October.

General Suzuki believed that the Americans would attempt to join and strengthen

their beachheads in the vicinity of Tacloban

and Dulag before they tried to penetrate

inland. At the same time, since Catmon Hill

and the high ground west of Tacloban Valley were in Japanese hands, the 16th Division should be able to contain the Americans until reinforcements arrived.

He therefore issued orders based upon

these assumptions and also upon the assumption that the Japanese air and naval forces

would be victorious. The 35th Army was to

concentrate its reinforcements in the Carigara area. The principal elements of the

16th Division were to occupy Burauen and

Dagami, and the rest of the division would

1

 35th Army Opns, p. 30. Unless otherwise indicated, the following is based upon this study, pp.

30-34.
104 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

occupy Catmon Hill and the western plateau of Tacloban. The 16th Division was

to protect the concentration of the main

force of the 35th Army. The 102d Division

was to occupy the Jaro area and give direct

protection to the 1st and 26th Divisions and

the 68th Brigade. The 30th Division was to

land at Ormoc Bay in the Albuera area and

then advance to the Burauen area in coordination with the 16th Division and assist

the main force of the 35th Army. The 1st

Division was to land at Ormoc, the 26th

Division and 68th Brigade were to land at

Carigara. If the situation were favorable,

however, the 68th Brigade was to land in

the vicinity of Catmon Hill. After the main

elements of the 35th Army had assembled at

Carigara and the area southeast of it, they

were to move down Leyte Valley and annihilate the American forces in the Tacloban

area. All the important airfields, bases, and

roads were also in the valley.

The part of Leyte Valley where the Americans hoped air and supply bases could be

developed is a broad and level plain inside

a quadrangle formed by the main roads

linking Tanauan, Dulag, Burauen and Dagami. (Map 5) The region extending ten

miles westward from the stretch of coast

between Dulag and Tanauan to the foothills

of the central range is an alluvial plain, interlaced by many streams, in which swamps

and rice paddies predominate. Catmon

Hill, about half way between Tanauan and

Dulag, was the most prominent terrain feature near the shore line.

Catmon Hill is actually a series of hills

with many spurs. This hill mass starts at the

mouth of the Labiranan River above San

Jose where Labiranan Head meets Highway

1, the coastal road, and extends in a general

northwest direction to the vicinity of San

Vicente and Pikas where it drops abruptly

into the coastal plain. It is covered with

cogon grass about six feet high, in the midst

of which are found a few trees. The beach

areas between the Calbasag River on the

south and Tolosa on the north, together

with much of southern Leyte Valley, are

dominated by this hill mass.2

The 16th Division made use of the caves

on Catmon Hill for shelters, artillery positions, and supply dumps, and established

well-concealed coconut log pillboxes and observation posts at numerous vantage points

on the hills. Some of these pillboxes, with

good fields of fire and spider holes, were

emplaced in positions to cover the roads.3 A

spider hole was dug about five feet deep,

sometimes camouflaged with a removable

cover, and was large enough to contain a

man and his weapon.

The American prelanding naval bombardment destroyed a number of field pieces

of the 22d Field Artillery Regiment, which

was deployed in position along the first line

of defense. The gunfire also disrupted the

regiment's radio service, and direct communication with the 35th Army and the

14th Area Army headquarters was temporarily broken.4

After the heavy naval bombardment on

A Day and the subsequent landings by

American forces in the Dulag area, General

Makino moved the command post of the

16th Division to Dagami, a step which made

communications very difficult and inadequate. The troops of the division were then

disposed as follows: the 20th Infantry Regiment, though considerably diminished in

number, was holding Julita, and one of its

2

 Allied Geographical Sec, GHQ SWPA Terrain

Handbook 34, Tacloban, 25 Sep 44, p. 10. 3

 96th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 88. 4

 10th I&HS Eighth Army, Stf Study of Opns of

Japanese 35th Army on Leyte, pp. 2-3.
LANDING AREAS AND LEYTE VALLEY as seen from a captured Japanese observation post on Catmon Hill.

SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE 107

platoons patrolled the Daguitan River

banks; the main part of the 9th Infantry

Regiment was at Catmon Hill, while one

of its battalions occupied Tabontabon.5

At the end of 20 October the Sixth Army

was established on the shores of Leyte Gulf.

The X Corps was in the north near Palo

and Tacloban, and the XXIV Corps was

in the vicinity of Dulag, poised for a drive

into southern Leyte Valley. General Krueger

planned to push rapidly through Leyte

Valley and secure its important roads, airfields, and base sites before General Makino

could regroup the 16th Division and offer a

firm line of resistance.

Enlarging the 96th Division Beachhead

General Krueger had assigned the mission of seizing southern Leyte Valley to the

XXIV Corps. The 96th Division was to

seize Catmon Hill and its surrounding area,

together with the Dagami—Tanauan road.

The 7th Division was to proceed along the

Dulag-Burauen road, seize the airfields in

that area, and then proceed north to

Dagami.

General Bradley's scheme of maneuver

for the 96th Division specified a movement

into the interior from the beachhead area in

a northwesterly direction with regiments

abreast—the 383d Infantry on the right

(north) and the 382d Infantry on the left

(south). The 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry,

was to capture Labiranan Head and secure

Highway 1 as far north as San Roque. The

rest of the regiment was to proceed inland,

bypass Catmon Hill at first, and then, after

artillery, naval bombardment, and air

strikes had neutralized it, to capture Catmon

Hill and the adjacent high ground.

The 382d Infantry was to proceed inland

in a northwesterly direction and seize Anibung, which was erroneously believed to

have an airfield. The regiment was then to

be ready to advance either to the north or

to the west.6

At the end of A Day the assault troops

of the 383d Infantry, commanded by Colonel May, were approximately 2,500 yards

inland. The forward positions of the 1st

Battalion were 400 yards up the sides of the

ridge running north from where the troops

had crossed the Labiranan River. The 3d

Platoon of Company C had established a

roadblock at the highway crossing; the 2d

Battalion, protecting the regimental southern boundary, had advanced 2,600 yards

inland from Orange Beach 1; and the 3d

Battalion had established a night perimeter

800 yards southwest of the 1st Battalion on

the southern bank of the Labiranan River.7

The 382d Infantry, under Colonel Dill,

had made a successful landing on A Day.

The 2d Battalion, on the right, had pushed

inland 2,700 yards, while the 3d Battalion,

on the left, had gained 1,300 yards; the 1st

Battalion was in reserve. Contact had been

established with the 32d Infantry, 7th Division, on the 382d Infantry's left, and with

the 383d Infantry on its right.8

Labiranan Head

During the night of 20-21 October the

361st Field Artillery Battalion fired upon

Labiranan Head in support of the 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry.9

 In addition naval

guns, supporting the 96th Division, fired

harassing and interdicting missions against

5

 35th Army Opns, pp. 22-23.

6

 96th Div FO 2, 10 Oct 44. 7

 383d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. 8

 382d Inf Unit Rpt 1, 20 Oct 44. 9

 361st FA Bn Opns Rpt Leyte.
108 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

possible enemy positions and lines of communication.10

 At 0810 on 21 October an air

strike was registered on Labiranan Head,

followed by a three-hour naval and artillery

barrage.

The 382d Infantry was to move inland,

maintain contact with the 7th Division, and

forestall any Japanese attempt to reach the

beaches. Concurrently, the 1st Battalion,

383d Infantry, would advance on Catmon

Hill from Labiranan Head while the 2d and

3d Battalions of the regiment would swing

around the northwest end of Catmon Hill

and squeeze the Japanese in a pincers.

At 1130 an assault force commanded by

Capt. Hugh D. Young of the 1st Battalion,

383d Infantry, attacked the Japanese position on Labiranan Head. This assault force,

a composite company, consisted of a platoon

each from A, B, and C Companies, together

with the weapons platoon from C Company.

The troops moved up the ridge and within

ten minutes after starting destroyed one

machine gun and drove off the crew of

another. Under cover of mortar fire, the

Japanese retired to the next ridge.

In co-operation with the advance of Captain Young's force, the 3d Platoon of Company C, which had established the roadblock

at the Highway 1 crossing of Labiranan

River on A Day, moved out just below

Labiranan Head and hit the Japanese flank.

The platoon met a strongly entrenched

enemy position which consisted of seven

pillboxes guarding ten 75-mm. guns. There

were also six coastal guns but only two of

these had been even partially assembled.

When the men of the platoon got within

twenty feet of the enemy position, they received fire from the two flanks and the

front. After knocking out a machine gun

nest the platoon withdrew.

Lt. Col. Edwin O. List, the commanding

officer of the 1st Battalion, then ordered

Captain Young to advance northward up a

covered draw and secure a small hill in the

rear of the enemy force. As the troops advanced up the hill, they observed smoke

coming from Labiranan Head. Company D

thereupon placed mortar fire on the position which contained the ten 75-mm. guns.

At 1430 Captain Young requested that the

fire be lifted; this was done, and the advance

continued.11

At 1600 Captain Young reported that his

troops had secured Labiranan Head. At the

same time, friendly naval gunfire shelled

Young's troops.12 This gunfire was not

stopped, since there were known Japanese

positions in the vicinity and it was believed

to be of more lasting importance to knock

them out than to hold this one position.

Captain Young evacuated Labiranan Head

and withdrew his troops, who swam across

the Labiranan River and formed a night

perimeter on the south bank. At the end of

the day the front lines of the rest of the 1st

Battalion, 383d Infantry, were along the

northern banks of the Labiranan River and

on the high ground 800 yards west of

Labiranan Head.13

During the night the 361st, 363d, and

921st Field Artillery Battalions delivered

harassing fires on the positions of the 9th

Infantry Regiment on Labiranan Head.14

The following morning, Captain Young's

force rejoined the 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry. The 921st Field Artillery Battalion

continued to pound the enemy emplacements until 1200 and then supported the

attack as the 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry,

10

 96th Div Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5.

11

 382d Inf Unit Jnl, 21 Oct 44. 12

 96th Div G-3 Jnl, 21 Oct 44. 13

 383d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9. 14

 921st FA Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6.
SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE 109

CREW OF A LIGHT ARMORED CAR M8 prepares to fire on enemy positions in the

Labiranan Head sector.

with Companies A and C as lead companies,

moved up the slopes of Labiranan Head.

The antitank platoon of the 1st Battalion

set up its 37-mm. guns in a position from

which it could rake the south side of Labiranan Head from the river and support the

advance of Company C on the left. The

platoon knocked out four pillboxes and two

machine guns and then directed fire on the

enemy 75-mm. guns. Companies A and C

pushed aside the Japanese and at 1630

reached the crest of the hill, their objective.

They immediately dug in, consolidated the

position, and then formed a night perimeter

from which the entire beach area from San

Roque to Dulag could be observed.15

At 1930 the Japanese centered a counterattack on Company A on the right flank of

the 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry. A combined concentration from the 921st, 361st,

and 363d Field Artillery Battalions repelled

this assault.16 While Labiranan Hill was

being secured, a force consisting of the 3d

Platoon, Company C, the 1st Platoon, Company D, 763d Tank Battalion, the 1st Platoon, Cannon Company, and the battalion

Antitank Platoon pushed along Highway 1,

secured San Roque, and set up a roadblock.17

 From the 23d to the 26th of October the 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry, patrolled the Labiranan Hill-San Roque area

and protected the right flank of the 96th

Division as the rest of the division slogged

through swamps and rice paddies to the

south.

15

 383d Inf Unit Jnl, 22 Oct 44.

16

 921st FA Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. 17

 383d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 10.
110 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Battling the Swamps

At 0840 on 21 October the 2d and 3d

Battalions, 383d Infantry, which were to

go in a northwesterly direction around Catmon Hill and isolate the Japanese force on

the hill, moved out westward. They advanced through swamps and rice paddies

but met no Japanese during the day. At

1640, when they established a night perimeter, the 2d Battalion was 300 yards north

of Tigbao and the 3d Battalion with the

regimental command group was 1,100 yards

northeast of the barrio and south of Catmon

Hill.18

The 382d Infantry, while protecting the

left flank of the 96th Division, was to advance rapidly into the interior and seize

Tigbao.19 During the night of 20-21 October artillery fire from an unknown source

fell in the sector of the 2d Battalion, killing

three men and wounding eight others. At

0800, on 21 October, the 2d Battalion,

382d Infantry, moved out, followed at 0812

by the 3d Battalion. These troops, like the

2d and 3d Battalions of the 383d Infantry,

were confronted with waist-deep swamps

which made the going slow and arduous.

The 3d Battalion, 382d Infantry, immediately after moving out, ran into enemy pillboxes constructed of coconut logs and defended by machine guns and riflemen. At

first the troops bypassed the pillboxes but at

1030 Company K went back and wiped

them out. In addition to the morass through

which the troops were moving, numerous

empty pillboxes slowed up the advance,

since each of them had to be checked.20 At

1430, because there was a gap between the

2d and 3d Battalions, Colonel Dill committed the 1st Battalion to close the line.

The battalions then advanced abreast and

kept lateral contact with the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 383d Infantry on their right.

At 1630, when the battalions established

their night perimeters, they were far short

of their objective.21

At 1745 Colonel Dill directed all of the

battalions of the 382d Infantry to move out

at 0800 on 22 October—the 1st Battalion

was to capture Tigbao and Bolongtohan

and then push on to Hindang; the 2d Battalion was to proceed toward Anibung; and

the 3d Battalion, on the right of the 1st Battalion, was to proceed to the northwestern

edge of Bolongtohan.22

Since it was known that the Japanese

were strongly entrenched on Catmon Hill,

General Bradley had decided to bypass the

hill temporarily. His plan called for the 2d

and 3d Battalions of the 383d Infantry to

envelop Catmon Hill from the south and

then move north to make contact with the

24th Division at Tanauan.23 On the morning of 22 October, Colonel May of the 383d

Infantry asked General Bradley for permission to attack Catmon Hill from the south

with his 2d and 3d Battalions. General

Bradley refused the request and ordered

Colonel May to continue the enveloping

movement he had started on 21 October.24

Later on that morning, therefore, the 2d and

3d Battalions, 383d Infantry, moved out

north-northwest. Encountering a deep

swamp at 1130, the troops turned northwest. This move did not materially help the

situation, since they found that they had exchanged the swamp for rice paddies. The

advance units reached Anibung at 1630

18

 Ibid., p. 9. 19

 382d Inf FO 2, 21 Oct 44. 20

 382d Inf Unit Jnl, 21 Oct 44.

21

 382d Inf Unit Rpt 2, 21 Oct 44. 22

 382d Inf Unit Jnl, 21 Oct 44. 23

 96th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 38. 24

 96th Div G-3 Jnl, 22 Oct 44.
SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE 111

without encountering any Japanese. By

1800 all units had closed in on the vicinity

of Anibung and set up a night perimeter

400 yards north of the barrio.

Few supplies had been brought forward

because the vehicles of the battalions had

advanced only 200 yards when they bogged

down. The troops hand-carried their weapons and communications equipment, while

civilians with about eight carabaos

 25

 helped

carry the supplies. In the transportation of

supplies forward, ammunition was given

priority over rations and water, even though

the supply of the latter items, which had

been issued to the troops before landing,

was nearly exhausted. The men made free

use of coconuts for food and drink.26

At 0800 on 22 October the three battalions of the 382d Infantry moved out. By

0900 the 1st and 2d Battalions had pushed

through Tigbao, whereupon the regimental

commander changed the orders for the day.

He ordered the 2d Battalion to take Bolongtohan, the 1st Battalion to seize Canmangui,

and the 3d Battalion to go into reserve.27

The 1st and 3d Battalions of the 382d

Infantry made contact with each other at

1152. When patrols from the 1st Battalion

did not find any Japanese at Canmangui,

the battalion proceeded toward Bolongtohan. Upon nearing Mati, the 1st Battalion

encountered an entrenched position of the

enemy and by outflanking the position was

able to knock it out. The Japanese fought

a delaying action and withdrew during the

afternoon. At 2000 the battalion formed its

night perimeter at Mati. The other battalions of the regiment encountered no Japanese during the day's progress inland, and

formed their night perimeters at 1800—the

2d Battalion 800 yards east of Bolongtohan

and the 3d Battalion 500 yards southeast

of Tigbao. During the day the 382d Infantry had pushed forward approximately

2,000 yards.28

At 2300 on 22 October General Makino

issued an order for the defense of the island

by the Japanese 16th Division. He organized his troops into the Northern and Southern Leyte Defense Forces. The Southern

Defense Force was to protect the DulagBurauen road and the airfields in the vicinity of Burauen. It was in the zone of action

of the 7th Division. The Northern Leyte Defense Force 29

 was to remain on Catmon

Hill, the high ground south of Tanauan,

and the high ground south of Palo. Elements were to be in the vicinity of Tabontabon and Kansamada, and a unit was to

protect the artillery positions north of Catmon Hill. The 16th Engineer Regiment

(less three platoons) was to be prepared to

demolish the roads connecting Dagami and

Burauen and those connecting Dagami and

Tanauan, in order to check the advance of

American tanks. Simultaneously, the main

force of the unit was to secure the road

running northwest from Dagami to Tingib.

The division reserve and command post

were to be in the vicinity of Dagami.30

At 0900 on 23 October the 2d Battalion,

383d Infantry, sent a patrol to investigate

the enemy situation west of Pikas and near

the Guinarona River. At 1130 the patrol reported that there were a few Japanese on a

25

 A carabao is a domesticated native water

buffalo that is used extensively in the Philippines

as a beast of burden. 26

 383d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. 27

 382d Inf Unit Jnl, 22 Oct 44.

28

 382d Inf Unit Rpt 3, 22 Oct 44. 29

 This unit consisted of the 9th Infantry Regiment (less the 2d Battalion) and two batteries of

the 22d Field Artillery Regiment. 30

 96th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex C, Part

III, Trans, KAKI Operational Order A-387, 22

Oct 44.
112 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

hill near Pikas. The 2d and 3d Battalions,

383d Infantry, moved out at 1200 with the

2d Battalion in the lead. At 1430 Company

G, the leading company, surprised some

Japanese who were swimming in the Guinarona River. They were "literally caught with

their pants down."

 31

 The leading companies

were able to rout the enemy and continue

the advance despite small forays which were

broken up; about fifty of the enemy were

killed. At 1810 the 2d Battalion, 383d Infantry, reached the high ground on the north

bank of the Guinarona River, 600 yards west

of Pikas. A force of approximately 100 Japanese attacked the battalion as it was establishing a night perimeter. Fortunately the

Americans, just fifteen minutes before, had

put their machine guns and mortars in position and were thus able to fire their weapons

immediately and repulse the attack. The 3d

Battalion, 383d Infantry, closed in on the

area at 1900 and each battalion set up a

perimeter for the night.32

During the day the regiment received a

small quantity of supplies by Filipino and

carabao trains and by airdrop from Navy

planes. The amount of food came to about

one-half ration for each man. On the following day Colonel May ordered the 1st

Battalion, 383d Infantry, to remain in position until a supply route could be established.33

Early on 24 October General Bradley told

Colonel May to hold his present positions

and sent out patrols to find roads, trails,

and solid ground that could be used as or

converted into supply routes to the rear.34

The communications between the regiment

and the 96th Division were very hard to

maintain, since the only radios the troops

could move inland were hand-carried sets

of short range.

In the early morning hours of 25 October

a division reconnaissance patrol, with light

tanks and a motorized engineer platoon,

went along Highway 1 with the mission of

reconnoitering the highway as far north as

the Binahaan River and making contact

with the X Corps. By 1300 the patrol

reached the river near Tanauan and found

a damaged bridge. By 1600 the bridge had

been repaired and the patrol pushed

through Tanauan and made contact with

Company K of the 19th Infantry, 24th Division, the first between the X and XXIV

Corps since the landing.

The 382d Infantry spent 23 October

patrolling. Contact was established and

maintained between all of the battalions

of the regiment during the day. Although

the forward movement was slowed to allow

much-needed supplies to come up, an advance of 600 yards was made. As the regiment advanced farther inland it became

apparent that the entire area was composed

of swamps and rice paddies. The roads

were only muddy trails and were impassable

for wheeled vehicles. The M29 cargo carriers and LVT's were pressed into service

to carry supplies, but the numerous streams

and waist-deep swamps soon halted all

vehicular traffic. The task of supply and

of evacuation of wounded soon assumed

staggering proportions. For days the troops

had had little food since priority had been

given to the indispensable ammunition.

Filipino and soldier carrying details were

the only means by which the front lines

could be supplied.35

31

 Orlando R. Davidson, J. Carl Willems, and

Joseph A. Kahl, The Deadeyes, The Story of the

96th Infantry Division (Washington, 1947), p. 23. 32

 383d Inf Unit Rpt 4, 23 Oct 44. 33

 96th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 3, 24 Oct 44. 34

 96th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 41. 35 382d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2.
SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE 113

FILIPINO CIVILIAN GUIDES U.S. TANK to Japanese positions in Julita.

On the morning of 24 October General

Bradley ordered the 382d Infantry to have

its 2d Battalion close in on Anibung. The

3d Battalion was to occupy Hindang and

the 1st Battalion was to proceed through

Hindang to a position about 500 yards

farther north.36

At 0830 the 1st and 3d Battalions, 382d

Infantry, moved astride the narrow trail that

led to Tabontabon, with the 3d Battalion

echeloned to the right rear. The 1st Battalion passed through Bolongtohan at 0930

and moved on in a northwesterly direction

toward Hindang. At 1105, as the 1st Battalion was pushing through Hindang, it

came under enemy rifle fire. The Japanese

had dug spider holes under the huts, and a

trench extended along the western end of

the barrio. The 1st Battalion, assisted by

troops from Company B, 763d Tank Battalion, moved through the town, leaving the

3d Battalion the job of mopping up. The 3d

Battalion reached Hindang at 1530 and immediately attacked the enemy force there.

The Japanese offered only slight resistance

and then fled, abandoning thirty-six wellconstructed defensive positions. At 1610 the

barrio was secured.

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, after driving through Hindang with Companies A

and C abreast, came upon a strong enemy

position some 200 yards beyond the town

on the left flank of Company A. A platoon

of the Cannon Company and some light

tanks had managed to get forward. The

tanks and flame throwers flushed the Japanese into the open where they were met by

the fire of American riflemen who were waiting for them. By 1600 the enemy strong 36

 96th Div G-3 Jnl, 24 Oct 44.
114 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

point was secured and the battalion moved

northwest and formed a night perimeter at

1700.

The 2d Battalion reached Anibung without incident. The airfield believed to be in

the vicinity of the barrio proved nonexistent.

At the end of the day the regiment had advanced approximately 2,200 yards. The 2d

Battalion was at Anibung, the 3d Battalion

was just beyond Hindang, and the 1st Battalion was in a position to move northwest

against Aslom.37

On the morning of 25 October the 1st

and 3d Battalions, 382d Infantry, moved

out in a northwesterly direction toward Aslom, with the 3d Battalion on the right, while

the 2d Battalion moved out in a northwesterly direction toward Kanmonhag. The

Japanese had withdrawn during the night,

leaving only scattered riflemen to oppose the

advance.

In their advance, the battalions were supported by elements of the 763d Tank Battalion. At Aslom the two battalions encountered a strongly fortified position of five

gun emplacements and four pillboxes, which

the tanks were able to knock out.38 The 1st

Battalion formed its night perimeter near

Aslom while the 3d Battalion pushed north

1,500 yards and formed its perimeter.

The 2d Battalion encountered only abandoned pillboxes on its front and left flank

during its advance. At 1200 a patrol which

reconnoitered Kanmonhag found no resistance, and the battalion pushed on to form

its night perimeter on line with the 3d

Battalion.39

During the first six days of the operation,

the Casualties of the 96th Division amounted to 5 officers and 89 enlisted men killed,

17 officers and 416 enlisted men wounded,

and 13 enlisted men missing in action.40 In

the same period the division had killed an

estimated 531 Japanese and had taken one

prisoner.41

Catmon Hill Area

By the end of 25 October the 1st Battalion of the 383d Infantry was in position

to attack Eabir Hill, while the 2d and 3d

Battalions, remaining in position near Pikas,

had sent vigorous patrols into Tabontabon,

San Victor, and San Vicente. The 2d and

3d Battalions of the 382d Infantry were beyond Aslom while the 1st Battalion was

still at that point. By this time the supply

line had been opened up and the main

swamps had been traversed. The 96th Division was deep in southern Leyte Valley

and had isolated a strong enemy force on

Catmon Hill. The way was now open for

the division to launch an attack against

Tabontabon, bypass the positions of the

9th Infantry Regiment on Catmon Hill,

and secure the remainder of its beachhead

area.

Taking Tabontabon

By 23 October the 383d Infantry, less

the 1st Battalion, had crossed the Guinarona River and established a position

west of Pikas. Having been ordered by

General Bradley to hold this position, the

regiment limited its activities to patrolling.

While awaiting orders to advance, Colonel

May decided to give battle training to

37

 382d Inf Unit Rpt 5, 24 Oct 44. 38

 763d Tank Bn Unit Rpt 1, 25 Oct 44. 39

 382d Inf Unit Rpt 6, 25 Oct 44.

40 96th Div G-l Daily Strength Rpts, 20-25 Oct

44.

41

 96th Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 5, 25 Oct 44.
SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE 115

various units by sending them out on

patrolling missions to observe the enemy.42

Tabontabon and San Victor were assigned

to the 3d Battalion commander as a training mission for one of his companies, while

San Vicente Hill was assigned to the 2d

Battalion commander for the same purpose.

Tabontabon was a key point, since it was

one of the main 16th Division supply centers.

Company K, which had been selected

by the 3d Battalion commander for the

first mission, sent patrols into the Tabontabon-San Victor area on the afternoon of

24 October. The patrol sent to Tabontabon

found that the 9th Infantry Regiment had

extensively fortified the barrio. There were

deep foxholes and machine gun emplacements dug in under the houses. None of the

positions appeared to be occupied, but at

the end of the town the patrol saw approximately twenty-five Japanese preparing their

evening meal. Tabontabon was a fairly

large barrio on the Guinarona River, with

several blocks of shops and houses, including a church and several two-story buildings, the axis of the town running east and

west.

On the basis of information brought by

the patrol, it was decided to have Company

K move out the following morning to seize

Tabontabon. At 0645 on 25 October Company K, reinforced, advanced and at 0730

took covered positions 200 yards east of the

barrio. Under the plan for attack the 1st

Platoon was to approach the northeastern

edge of the village by a covered route, and

await the completion of an artillery concentration scheduled for 0800. After the

artillery preparation a squad from the platoon was to enter and reconnoiter for possible enemy positions. At the same time,

the 2d Platoon, with a similar mission, was

to enter Tabontabon from the southeast

side. The 3d Platoon was to be prepared

to support the action of either the 1st or

the 2d. Machine guns and mortars were

placed in such a way as to give direct

support to both platoons.

Because of unexplained communication

difficulties, the artillery did not deliver its

scheduled fire at 0800. Each platoon, however, sent a squad into Tabontabon. As soon

as advance elements of both platoons entered the town they came under intense

rifle and mortar fire from enemy positions

under the houses. It was obvious that the

Japanese had heavily reinforced the barrio

during the night. The reinforcements consisted of a battalion from the 9th Infantry

Regiment.43

The rest of the 1st and 2d Platoons

came up and a fire fight ensued. The 3d

Platoon was sent in at 1000 to support the

1st Platoon, and in response to a request for

reinforcements, a rifle platoon from Company I was brought up at 1040. The commanding officer of Company K advised the

3d Battalion by radio that he could take

Tabontabon with an additional rifle company but could not do so with his present

force without suffering heavy casualties.

The battalion commander ordered him to

withdraw. The withdrawal, under supporting fire from the 3d Platoon, Company K,

the platoon from Company I, and mortar

and machine gun fire from the weapons

company, was successfully accomplished at

1155. At 1240 Company K rejoined the

battalion. 42

 Unless otherwise stated the account of the

patrol to Tabontabon is taken from 383d Inf

Opns Rpt Leyte, Patrol to Tabontabon, 25 Oct

44, Incl 1. 43 35th Army Opns, p. 28.
116 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

General Bradley ordered the 383d Infantry to direct the patrols of the 3d Battalion

elsewhere, since the 382d Infantry had been

assigned the mission of securing Tabontabon. During the forthcoming attack the

383d Infantry was to protect the flank of

the 382d, whose 2d and 3d Battalions were

to launch a co-ordinated attack on the town.

On 26 October the 2d Battalion of the 382d

Infantry moved west and established contact with the 3d at 1200. After an artillery

concentration had been placed on the town

the two battalions moved out.

By 1600 they had forded the shoulderdeep Guinarona River under heavy enemy

fire and had reached the edge of Tabontabon. As the battalions slowly pushed their

way to the outskirts of the barrio, they came

under heavy fire. Elements of the 9th Infantry Regiment had dug in under the

houses, and connecting trenches honeycombed the streets from one strong point

to another. At twilight, after heavy artillery fire, the enemy launched a strong

counterattack which forced the battalions to

withdraw to the river bank, where they

established perimeters for the night.44 Until

midnight, mortar fire from the 9th Infantry

Regiment fell in the 2d and 3d Battalion

areas.

At 2100 the 96th Division artillery commenced firing on the town and continued

to fire throughout the night. The 1st Battalion, less Company B which had been left

at Aslom to guard supplies, had by now

joined the rest of the regiment. At 1000 on

27 October the 382d Infantry launched a

co-ordinated attack against Tabontabon

with the 2d and 3d Battalions. As Companies I and K of the 3d Battalion started

to wade the Guinarona River, Colonel Dill,

the regimental commander, called to the

men to follow him and then dashed across

the bridge, which was swept by enemy rifle

fire. The 3d Battalion followed him over

the bridge and to the southeast corner of

the barrio.45 The troops met considerable

opposition from elements of the 9th Infantry

Regiment who were hidden in the tall cogon

grass. After a short fire fight the two battalions worked their way slowly through the

western portion of the town and then advanced northwest. Although they met fire

from several pillboxes, there was no organized resistance. Night perimeters were set up

about a mile northwest of Tabontabon with

the 3d Battalion on the left side of the road

and the 1st Battalion on the right.46

The 2d Battalion, which had hit the center of the town, encountered stiff and determined opposition. Company F proceeded

cautiously down one street as Company G

went through the middle of the second block

on its right. The Japanese had riflemen and

machine guns under the houses and on the

second floors of the large buildings. By noon

the two companies had worked their way

through to the northern edge of the town,

where they encountered the enemy entrenched in force.

The Japanese had placed machine guns

to cover the exits from the barrio. The guns

were aimed down each street and so placed

that each gun was protected by another.

Since in Company G men were dropping

from heat exhaustion, Company E was sent

in to relieve Company G. At the same time,

the 2d Platoon of the Cannon Company

moved forward, but its howitzers were unable to direct their fire effectively. Late in

the afternoon, since it had become apparent

44

 382d Inf Unit Rpt 7, 26 Oct 44.

45

 Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, p. 37. 46

 382d Inf Unit Rpt 8, 27 Oct 44.
SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE 117

that the 2d Battalion would not be able to

secure the town before nightfall, the troops

were called back to the center of the town,

where the 2d Battalion set up its night

perimeter.47

During the night the Japanese counterattacked, but American artillery and mortar fire broke up the assault.48

 At 0800 on

28 October the 2d Battalion continued the

attack and succeeded in knocking out the

enemy resistance northeast of the town, an

action which enabled the battalion to move

out north of Tabontabon at 1200. Leaving

Company G to clear the area immediately

outside the town, the 2d Battalion proceeded along the road toward the road

junction at Kiling.49 In spite of determined

opposition, the Japanese supply center of

Tabontabon had at last been taken and

approximately 350 Japanese killed in the

area. During the three days of fighting, the

2d Battalion had thirty-four men killed and

eighty wounded.

Capture of Catmon Hill

The capture of Catmon Hill falls into

two separate and distinct actions—the operations of the 383d Infantry in the San

Vicente sector and the assault of the 381st

Infantry against Catmon Hill.

On 24 October a Japanese prisoner stated that the fortifications on San Vicente

Hill, the northern tip of Catmon Hill, were

guarded by elements of the 9th Infantry and

20th Infantry Regiments of the Japanese

16th Division.50 On the morning of 26 October the regimental commander ordered

Company E, 383d Infantry, under Capt.

Jesse R. Thomas, to make a reconnaissance

in force of San Vicente Hill.51 Upon receiving his orders, Captain Thomas made his

plans. The 1st Platoon was to move forward

and take the left nose of the hill, operating

on the right of the 2d Platoon. The 3d Platoon was to move into an assembly area fifty

yards behind the line of departure.

On the morning of 26 October the 155-

mm. howitzers of the 363d Field Artillery

Battalion laid a ten-minute concentration

on the crest of the hill. This fire was ineffective, since it was too far ahead of the

troops. At 1000 the platoons of Company

E moved through the tall cogon grass to

the edge of an open field approximately 200

yards from the base of the hill. The men

were under orders not to fire until fired

upon. As the leading elements of the two

platoons entered the field, the 9th Infantry

Regiment opened fire with rifles and mortars. The 3d Platoon then moved up into

position along the line of departure, prepared to support the attack. Since the 2d

Platoon was not under heavy fire, it was

ordered to move to the foot of the hill and

take a position from which it could support

by fire the advance of the 1st Platoon.

Enemy mortars were dropping shells around

the center of the area, but American mortars silenced them.

The 2d Platoon reported that it was 100

yards from the base of the hill. The 2d

Battalion commander, Lt. Col. James O.

McCray, moved into the company command post, about seventy-five yards behind

the attacking platoons at the edge of the

open field. This sector began to receive

47

 Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, p. 38. 48

 382d Inf Unit Rpt 9, 28 Oct 44. 49

 Ibid.

50

 383d Inf Opns Rpt, p. 5.

51

 The operations report of the 383d Infantry for

the Leyte Campaign has an "Account of Eyewitnesses Made Immediately Following the Action,"

which is Inclosure 2 to the report. Unless otherwise

stated these statements are the basis for this account

of the action on San Vicente Hill.
118 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

SAN VICENTE HILL

heavy fire from the right side of the hill and

several men on the edge of the field were

hit. Colonel McCray crawled up and

started to help drag the wounded men to

cover. At the same time he ordered the battalion to open fire against the hill with all

weapons except artillery, but an undetermined number of enemy riflemen in the

rear of the command post and on the left

flank of the company started firing into the

command post.

Colonel McCray continued to bring back

wounded men. At this time Captain Thomas

was overcome by the heat, and the executive officer of Company E, 2d Lt. Owen R.

O'Neill, took over. He ordered the withdrawal of the force. It was now 1335 and

the company, under continuous fire since

1000, had been unable to advance. Captain

Thomas revived and again assumed command, directing the withdrawal and the

bringing back of the wounded. The body

of Colonel McCray, who had sacrificed his

life while dragging the wounded from the

hill, was found about twenty yards from the

command post. The withdrawal was completed.

From 27 to 29 October, the actions of

the 2d and 3d Battalions, 383d Infantry,

were limited to reconnaissance patrols in

the vicinity of the town of San Vicente and

San Vicente Hill in attempts to find the

strong positions of the enemy on the hill.

At 0930 on 30 October Colonel May

ordered the battalions to renew the attack

from positions near the Guinarona River.

The two units jumped off at 1300. The 3d

Battalion advanced along the north bank

of the Guinarona River, one company going

through Pikas and the rest of the battalion
SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE 119

making a wide swing through a coconut

palm grove and open fields. The 2d Battalion moved along the south bank of the

Guinarona River, one company following

a trail from Pikas to San Vicente and the

rest of the battalion going directly to San

Vicente Hill, which was taken without

opposition since the enemy force had withdrawn. The 3d Battalion went through the

barrio of San Vicente without difficulty

but encountered some small arms fire along

the river 300 yards north of the village.

Both battalions formed their night perimeters near the river.

At the same time, the eastern slopes of

Catmon Hill were being assaulted by elements of the 381st Infantry, which had

been in Sixth Army reserve through 26 October. On 27 October Sixth Army had released the 381st Infantry to XXIV Corps

control. At 1330 on the same day General

Bradley ordered the regiment to relieve on

the following day the 1st Battalion, 383d

Infantry, which had been on Labiranan

Head since 22 October. It was then to attack and capture Catmon Hill.

Catmon Hill had been under steady

naval and artillery fire since A Day—20

October. The 96th Division artillery had

constantly fired on targets of opportunity by

day and harassed enemy positions in the

area during the night. Starting at 2100 on

27 October, the 105-mm. howitzers of the

361st Field Artillery Battalion, the 155-mm.

howitzers of the 198th Field Artillery Battalion, a battery of 155-mm. howitzers from

the 363d Field Artillery Battalion, and the

75-mm. howitzers from the 780th Amphibian Tank Battalion were to deliver harassing fires on the hill until 1030 the following

day. At that time all of the artillery units

were to commence firing successive concentrations beginning at the bottom of the hill

and working to the top in fifty-yard bounds.

After the 381st Infantry, less the 3d Battalion, attacked at 1200 on 28 October, the

artillery was to fire concentrations in front

of the troops as they advanced.52

In making his plans for the capture of

Catmon Hill, Col. Michael E. Halloran,

commander of the 381st Infantry, decided

to have the 1st Battalion make an enveloping movement from the northeast while the

2d Battalion pushed west along the main

ridge. The 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry,

from its position on Labiranan Head, would

support the attack by fire. On the morning

of 28 October the 381st Infantry, less the 3d

Battalion, moved into position for the attack.

After a thirty-minute preparation by the

artillery, the 381st Infantry jumped off to

the attack at 1200.

The 1st Battalion, 381st Infantry, moved

to the foot of the hill, where it received "a

bloody nose" from fire coming out of wellentrenched positions. It withdrew under

cover of smoke and established a night

perimeter in the vicinity of its line of departure. The 2d Battalion, however, met no

enemy resistance and advanced rapidly. At

the close of the day the battalion was just

short of Labir Hill.53 During the night the

Americans expended 3,000 rounds of artillery ammunition on Catmon Hill, chiefly in

front of the 2d Battalion sector. The plans

for 29 October called for a morning attack

by the 2d Battalion, supported by fire from

the 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry, which had

not yet been relieved; the 1st Battalion,

52

 96th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 45. Unless otherwise stated the section dealing with the capture of

Catmon Hill is based on 381st Inf Opns Rpt Leyte,

pp. 3-3c. 53

 381st Inf Unit Rpt 4, 28 Oct 44] 381st Inf Unit

Jnl, 29 Oct 44.
120 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

105-MM. SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZER M7 FIRING on Japanese positions on

Catmon Hill.

381st Infantry, was to seek a new lane of

approach and attack at noon.

After a thirty-minute artillery preparation, the 2d Battalion, 381st Infantry, moved

out at 0830. With the support of a platoon

of light tanks, the battalion easily secured

both Labir and Catmon Hills. By 1300 the

position had been consolidated. The 1st

Battalion, 381st Infantry, supported by the

massed fire of forty-five tanks and the Regimental Cannon Company, jumped off at

1200. The troops moved through a heavily

fortified area, and at 1600 they established

physical contact with the regiment's 2d Battalion.

During the heavy pounding of Catmon

Hill, the main body of Japanese troops,

the 9th Infantry Regiment, had withdrawn

from the hill on 26 October, unknown to the

Americans, and rejoined the main force of

the 16th Division in the Dagami area.54

At last Catmon Hill had been secured.

The 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry, was relieved and passed to the Sixth Army reserve.

The 381st Infantry's command post was

moved north of San Roque, and at 1800 its

3d Battalion rejoined the regiment south of

this position. During 30 and 31 October the

entire Catmon Hill area was mopped up—

fifty-three pillboxes, seventeen caves, and

numerous smaller emplaced positions were

destroyed by demolition charges. The last

enemy stronghold threatening the landing

beaches had been removed.

54

 35th Army Opns, p. 34.
SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE 121

Convergence on Kiling

Since the main force of the 96th Division

was centered in the vicinity of Catmon Hill,

General Bradley had decided to secure the

northern limits of the corps beachhead

line—the road running from Tanauan to

Dagami—concurrently with the assault on

Catmon Hill. On 25 October Colonel Halloran had ordered the 3d Battalion of the

381st Infantry to move north along Highway 1 to Tanauan and thence southwestward along the Tanauan-Dagami road to

Dagami. At the same time the 17th Infantry,

7th Division, was advancing north toward

Dagami on the Burauen-Dagami road. At

0830 on 26 October the reinforced 3d Battalion of the 381st Infantry moved out.55

The forward movement was halted by a

bridge that had been mined and partially

blown out. The battalion forded the river

and the advance continued without tanks or

vehicles, while engineers from the 321st Engineer Battalion deactivated the mines and

repaired the bridge. The tanks and vehicles

then rejoined the battalion. Two platoons

supported by tanks were sent forward to

guard the two bridges south and east of

Tanauan. En route, the platoons received

some machine gun and rifle fire from a hill

between Vigia Point and Tanauan. During

the night the enemy made his presence

known by three rounds of mortar fire and

by sporadic rifle fire on the bridge guards.

At 0800 on 27 October the march was

renewed. The troops again came under fire

from the hill between Vigia Point and

Tanauan. After a delay of two hours, in

which artillery fire was placed on the hill,

the advance continued and the entrance

into Tanauan at 1145 was unopposed. The

battalion then turned southwestward along

the Tanauan-Dagami road toward Kiling,

which is about midway between Tanauan

and Dagami. The 3d Battalion had gone

about two miles along the road when it came

under fire from 75-mm. guns, mortars, and

machine guns. Two hours were required for

Company A, 763d Tank Battalion, and two

flame-thrower tanks to reduce this resistance.56

 Seven pillboxes and three 75-mm.

guns were destroyed and a command post

was captured. A night perimeter was established on the road, at 1700, and only sporadic rifle fire occurred during the night.

At 0800 the following day the 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry, moved out and about

1500 the advance element entered Kiling.

An attack supported by Battery C, 361st

Field Artillery Battalion, was launched

against the enemy about 1630. The Japanese countered with heavy machine gun,

mortar, and rifle fire. The attack continued

without success until 1800, when the 3d

Battalion withdrew under a smoke screen

and established a night perimeter about

1,000 yards east of Kiling. Battery C, 361st

Field Artillery, fired intermittently during

the night to prevent any Japanese attack

against the perimeter.57

At 0800 the following morning—29

October—the 3d Battalion, supported by

tanks and artillery, moved out against Kiling. On the outskirts of the barrio the battalion met stubborn and determined resistance where the Japanese, with machine

guns, mortars, and rifles, fought "to the last

man." The resistance was overcome, and

by 1500 the Americans occupied the town,

55

 The reinforcements consisted of a platoon

from the Cannon Company, 381st Infantry; one

platoon from Company A, 321st Engineers; Company A, 763d Tank Battalion; one platoon from

Company A, 321st Medical Battalion; and Battery

C, 361st Field Artillery Battalion.

56

 763d Tank Bn S-3 Periodic Rpt 3, 27 Oct 44. 57

 381st Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 3-3a.
122 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

which was honeycombed with emplacements and entrenchments. At 1600 the 3d

Battalion, 381st Infantry, was relieved by

the 2d Battalion, 382d Infantry, which had

come up from Tabontabon by truck. At

1800 the 3d Battalion, 381st Infantry, returned by truck to the area north of San

Roque.58

From Tabontabon two important roads

lead to the Tanauan—Dagami road. One of

these runs in a northeasterly direction and

meets the Tanauan-Dagami road at Kiling; the other goes in a northwesterly direction and meets the road at Digahongan

about one and a half miles east of Dagami.

Colonel Dill ordered the 1st and 3d Battalions, 382d Infantry, to pass through

Tabontabon on 27 October and then to

proceed northwest along the latter road to

Digahongan. They were then to go northeastward along the Tanauan—Dagami road

and at Kiling join the 2d Battalion, which

was to proceed northeast along the road

from Tabontabon to Kiling.

The 1st and 3d Battalions, with the 3d

Battalion in the lead, moved out of Tabontabon and advanced about three quarters

of a mile to Kapahuan where they established night perimeters. During the night

the Japanese charged the perimeter of the

1st Battalion. The attack was repulsed with

only three casualties to the battalion, while

about one hundred of the enemy were

killed.

At 0830 on the 28th the 1st and 3d Battalions jumped off abreast along both sides

of the narrow road for Digahongan—the

1st Battalion on the right and the 3d Battalion on the left. At 1200, when the

battalions were about two miles northwest

of Tabontabon, they encountered a strongly

fortified position. The 16th Division had

built coconut pillboxes and many spider

holes, which were supported by two 70-mm.

howitzers and a number of 50-mm. mortars. Flame throwers and demolition teams,

supported by the artillery, knocked out this

fortified area. Taking their dead and

wounded, the enemy withdrew. The American troops then advanced under protection

of artillery fire toward the road junction

at Digahongan, which they reached at 1500.

During the day the battalions had been

harassed by numerous hidden riflemen,

mines, and booby traps.

The 1st Battalion was to move east

toward Kiling. The 3d received orders to

stay and guard the road junction at Digahongan, nicknamed Foxhole Corners, where

it went into night perimeter. At 1600 the

battalion successfully repulsed a counterattack by about 200 Japanese. In the meantime the 1st Battalion moved as far east

on the Digahongan-Kiling road as Kansamada, where it established a night perimeter. During the night several small

enemy groups of six to eight men each tried

to enter the battalion lines but were driven

off.59

The 3d Battalion spent 29 October in

patrolling the area around Digahongan and

guarding the road junction. It broke up one

enemy attack by about thirty men. At 0800

the 1st Battalion moved out from Kansamada toward Kiling against scattered enemy fire but at 1130 the troops were stopped

by heavy automatic fire which came from

pillboxes astride the road. Shortly afterward

the enemy artillery opened up and the 1st

Battalion was forced to withdraw about a

thousand yards to a point where it established a perimeter.60

 During the fight Lt.

Col. Jesse W. Mecham, the commanding

58

 Ibid.

59

 382d Inf Unit Rpt 9, 28 Oct 44. 60

 382d Inf Unit Rpt 10, 29 Oct 44.
SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE 123

officer of the battalion, was mortally

wounded. His last order to the battalion

was that the troops should not risk their

lives to get his body out.61 That night, however, Maj. Joseph R. Lewis, who had assumed command of the battalion, led a

small party forward and recovered the body

of Colonel Mecham.

During the night the 9th Infantry Regiment withdrew. On 30 October the 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry, found no opposition

during its advance forward to Kiling and

at 1030 established contact with the 2d Battalion, 382d Infantry. The 2d Battalion,

less Company G, had moved out of Tabontabon on the northeast road to Kiling on 28

October, spending the night on the outskirts of the town.

The units of the 96th Division spent the

next three days in patrolling and mopping

up. The division had secured the beachhead area of the XXIV Corps in its zone

of action. Its units had seized the Catmon

Hill mass, which dominated the landing

beaches, had traversed and cleaned out the

inland swamps, and had secured the important communications center and supply

dump of Tabontabon and the main portion of the significant Tanauan-Dagami

road. Since landing they had killed an

estimated 2,769 Japanese and taken 6

prisoners in their zone of action.62 The cost

had not been light. Casualties of the 96th

Division since 25 October had been 13 officers and 132 enlisted men killed, 30 officers

and 534 enlisted men wounded, and 2 officers and 88 enlisted men missing in

action.63

61

 Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, p. 41.

62

 96th Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 13, 2 Nov 44. 63

 Compiled from 96th Div G-l Daily Strength

Rpts, 26 Oct-2 Nov 44.
CHAPTER VIII

Southern Leyte Valley: Part Two

Before the invasion, the Japanese had

reached the conclusion that if and when the

Americans landed on Leyte it would be in

the Dulag area, and their greatest efforts

had therefore been directed toward making

that area impregnable. General Makino,

commanding general of the 16th Division,

had stationed the following units in the

Dulag sector: the 20th Infantry Regiment,

commanded by Col. Keijiro Hokoda; elements of the 22d Field Artillery Regiment;

the 54th Air Field Company, commanded

by Comdr. Kazumasa Kumazawa; and the

7th Independent Tank Company.1 At 0300

on 21 October, General Makino withdrew

from the Dulag area to Dagami and established his command post in that sector.2

The effective fire of the preliminary naval

bombardment had driven the Japanese

from the landing beaches.

The Dulag-Burauen Road

The beachhead quadrangle of the XXIV

Corps was bounded, generally, by the

Dulag-Burauen-Dagami-Tanauan road.

The sections of the road bordering the

northern edge of the quadrangle (Dagami

to Tanauan) and the eastern edge (Tanauan to Dulag) were, in general, in the 96th

Division zone of action. The southern and

western sides of the quadrangle were assigned to the 7th Division. The road that

ran along the coast between Dulag and

Tanauan was a one-way thoroughfare

which soon disintegrated under the heavy

rainfall and military traffic. (Map 6)

Besides the Dulag airstrip, which was

approximately one mile west of the town,

there were three other airfields in the zone

of action of the 7th Infantry Division. The

San Pablo airstrip was approximately five

miles west of Dulag and two miles east of

Burauen. Its runway extended generally

east to west with a width of 164 feet and a

length of 4,920 feet. The field was overgrown with weeds and had not been occupied by the Japanese. The Bayug airstrip

was just north of the highway and a half

mile east of Burauen. It had a runway approximately 5,000 feet long. The Buri airstrip, the most important one in the 7th

Division zone, was about one mile northeast

of Burauen, ran in a general east-west direction, and was also 5,000 feet long.3

Halfway to Burauen

General Hodge ordered the 7th Division

to capture the Dulag airfield and then drive

west along the Dulag-Burauen road to seize

Burauen and its airfields. After this was

1

 7th Inf Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 2, 21 Oct 44,

and Rpt 4, 23 Oct 44. 2

 35th Army Opns, p. 27.

3

 Fifth Air Force Opns Instns 6, Engr Annex, 28

Sep 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 30 Sep 44.
Map 6
DULAG AND BAYUG AIRSTRIPS as they appeared in 1946. Dulag is above.
SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO 127

MAJ. GEN. JOHN R. HODGE, XXIV Corps commander, outlines plans to his staff at

corps headquarters in Dulag.

done, the division was to turn north along

the Burauen—Dagami road and capture Dagami.4

 The 32d Infantry was to protect the

division's right (north), maintain contact

with the 96th Division, and, if necessary,

help the 184th Infantry on its left to secure

the Dulag airstrip west of the town of Dulag.

Securing the airstrip was to be the main

effort of the 184th Infantry.5

At the end of A Day (20 October), all

the assault battalions of the 32d and 184th

Infantry Regiments of the 7th Division

were ashore. The 32d Infantry was on the

right (north) flank and the 184th Infantry

on the left (south) flank. The 32d Infantry

had advanced just beyond Highway 1 in

the area northwest of Dulag.6 The 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, was on the southern

edge of the Dulag airstrip, while the 1st

Battalion of the regiment was directly left

of the 3d, and the 2d Battalion was in

reserve.7 The 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry,

protecting the left flank of the XXIV Corps,

was across the Daguitan River at Dao;8 the

1st and 2d Battalions of the same regiment

were to remain in division reserve.

The 7th Division had scarcely established

itself for the night of 20 October when the

Japanese launched two small-scale tank attacks against the perimeter of the division.

Since a gap existed between the 184th and

4

 XXIV Corps Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6. 5

 7th Inf Div FO 9, 1 Oct 44.

6

 32d Inf Regt Jnl, 20 Oct 44. 7

 184th Inf S-3 Periodic Rpt 1, 20 Oct 44. 8

 17th Inf Unit Jnl, 20 Oct 44.
128 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

32d Infantry Regiments, Company G of the

184th was committed to fill the space. As

the men of the company were digging in

for the night, three tanks from the 7th Independent Tank Company came down the

road and sprayed the area with machine

gun fire, but the fire was high and there were

no casualties. Though the company fired

rifles, bazookas, and mortars against them,

the tanks escaped without injury. An hour

later, when one of the tanks returned, it was

knocked out and its crew were killed by a

rifle grenade. An enemy scout car then

dashed down the road, and its occupants

killed two men and wounded three others.

The 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, had

established its night perimeter on the edge

of the Dulag airfield, with its right flank on

the Dulag-Burauen road. At 0130 three

Japanese medium tanks moved along this

road. Pfc. George W. Tilk of Company M

stopped one of these, as it came into range,

with one shot from his bazooka. The other

two tanks continued down the road but on

their return trip they were destroyed—one

by the battalion supply detail and the other

by Pfc. Johnnie Johnson with his bazooka.9

The uneasy repose of the 7th Division was

again broken at 0400 on 21 October when

six enemy tanks attacked the sector of the

3d Battalion, 184th Infantry. Within thirty

minutes the battalion knocked out two of

the tanks and forced the others to retreat.10

The next disturbance was at 0530 when

about fifty Japanese launched a limited

counterattack against the night perimeter of

Company K, 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry,

with light machine gun and rifle fire. The

Americans broke up the attack with machine guns, mortars, and artillery.11

 Daylight revealed thirty-five enemy dead in

front of the company perimeter, and there

was evidence that others had been dragged

away.

Maj. Gen. Archibald V. Arnold, commander, ordered the 184th and 32d Infantry Regiments of the 7th Division to

move west toward the Burauen airstrips

abreast. Since a gap of several hundred

yards existed between the two regiments,

the battalions of the 184th Infantry were

ordered to veer to the right. At 0800 the

7th Division attacked, the 184th Infantry

on the left and the 32d Infantry on the

right. There were four battalions in the

assault, from left to right: 1st Battalion,

184th Infantry; 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry; 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry; and 2d

Battalion, 32d Infantry.12

As the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, moved

forward, it encountered Japanese entrenched in positions along the hedgerows.

Knocking out these positions from hedgerow to hedgerow greatly retarded the advance. The 3d Battalion on the left faced

an impassable swamp. In order to establish

contact with the 184th Infantry and cover

the area, Company I moved around the

left side of the swamp, and Company L

went around the right; Company K was

to cover the gap between the 2d and 3d

Battalions until the 2d Battalion could

close it.

There was an enemy strong point between

the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 32d Infantry, but since Colonel Logic was anxious to

9

 Lt Russell A. Gugeler, Battle for Dagami, pp.

10-11, MS in OCMH. The author, a combat historian attached to the 7th Division after the operation, knew many of the participants and has been

able to give details that do not appear in the official

records. Much of the material in this chapter is

based on his manuscript. 10

 184th Inf Unit Jnl, 21 Oct 44.

11

 32d Inf Regt Jnl, 21 Oct 44. 12

 7th Div, Detailed Division Narrative, King II,

p. 4, DRB AGO.
SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO 129

continue the advance of the regiment and

straighten the line between the battalions,

he ordered the battalions to bypass the

strong point, while the 1st Battalion under

Maj. Leigh H. Mathias was ordered to move

from its assembly area and reduce it. The

lines were straightened somewhat, but the

swamps and the heavy foliage made contact

very difficult.

The 2d and 3d Battalions came under

fire from 75-mm. guns emplaced in bunkers;

tanks reduced these bunkers and the advance continued. A report of the 32d Infantry boasts that "the reduction of pillboxes

was right down our alley."

 13

 By 1520 the 3d

Battalion, 32d Infantry, had reached the

regimental beachhead line; shortly thereafter the 2d Battalion came abreast of the

3d.

The 1st Battalion of the 32d Infantry,

however, experienced difficulty in reducing

the bypassed strong point, which it reached

in the middle of the afternoon. The Japanese defenses consisted of one 75-mm. and

one antitank gun emplaced in bunkers and

four machine guns in pillboxes; these were

completely surrounded by an elaborate system of trenches and foxholes and were occupied by approximately two platoons of riflemen.14

 When the battalion reached the position, Companies A and B, with Company A

on the right, were on a line behind five medium tanks and one M8 self-propelled 75-mm.

howitzer from the Cannon Company. As

the troops moved across an open field

toward a hedgerow, the Japanese opened

fire upon Company A. Company B also

received fire as it moved beyond the hedgerow. After several men had been killed and

others wounded, Company B halted until

the Japanese positions could be neutralized

by the tanks and the howitzer.

As the tanks emerged from the hedgerow

they came under heavy fire from the Japanese antitank gun. Although some of the

tanks were hit, no serious damage was done;

but the howitzer received a direct hit that

set it ablaze and exploded its ammunition.15

The crew abandoned the burning vehicle.

Pfc. Fedele A. Grammatico crawled up

under enemy fire, removed the machine

guns, which were intact, and brought them

safely back behind the lines. In the meantime, Company A tried to advance and

knock out the enemy antitank gun but the

Japanese stopped the company with direct

fire.

Both companies were halted. The struggle resolved itself into a battle between the

tanks and the Japanese in entrenched positions. The tanks finally silenced the enemy,

and the infantrymen moved in with rifles

and bazookas and cleared out the foxholes.

After the reduction of this strong point, the

1st Battalion tried to overtake the 2d and

3d Battalions. This was not possible, and at

1800 the 1st Battalion formed its own perimeter.

The 184th Infantry found little opposition in its area, but excessive heat and the

difficulty of maintaining communication in

the high cogon grass rendered its progress

difficult. At 0900 the regiment secured the

Dulag airstrip and continued its forward

movement against sporadic rifle and machine gun fire. Contact had been broken

with the 32d Infantry, and at 1245 a gap

of 3,000 yards existed between the regiments. At 1515 the 184th Infantry was

ordered to hold up its advance and establish contact with the 32d.16

 It had advanced

13

 32d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5. 14

 Ibid.

15

 Ibid.

16

 184th Inf Regt Jnl, 21 Oct 44.
130 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

approximately 1,000 yards beyond the

division beachhead line.

On 21 October an unidentified Japanese

soldier wrote in his diary:

Finally the enemy's gunfire and bombardment has reached our field and road area

(except the runway). Gunfire seems to fade

to Dulag area during the night. It seems that

enemy tanks are approaching San Pablo vicinity. We are preparing for them. . . . Barracks and fuel dumps are to be burned. I am

awaiting the opportune moment. . . .

I feel alive during the night and dead

during the day. Though life and death are

separated by a thin sheet of paper I will not

die until I see a face of a Yankee.17

During the night of 21-22 October all

field artillery battalions delivered harassing

fires, and just before the assault they fired

a fifteen-minute barrage.

At 0800 the 32d Infantry moved out to

the attack. The 2d Battalion on the right

faced difficult and swampy terrain lying

along the winding, steep-banked Calbasag

River, which the troops had to cross twelve

times during the day's advance. In the afternoon a platoon of amphibian tractors and

another of amphibian tanks were sent to

the aid of the battalion, and engineers from

the 13th Engineer Battalion constructed

temporary bridges over the river when

necessary.18 The 3d Battalion of the regiment paced its speed of advance with that

of the 2d.

In the meantime the 1st Battalion overtook the others and at 1000 moved to the

right of the 3d Battalion, bringing the three

units into line. Earlier, at 0925, the 3d

Battalion was advancing just to the right

of the Dulag—Burauen road when it received enemy artillery fire, which came

from four 75-mm. field pieces to the rear

of a hedgerow 600 to 700 yards ahead.

When the companies reached the hedgerow, Company L received heavy fire from

four machine guns which had been emplaced to protect the field pieces.

Light machine guns and mortars were

brought up, and the 31st Field Artillery

Battalion placed a five-minute concentration on the enemy strong point. Three tanks

from Company C, 767th Tank Battalion,

were poised for an assault. As soon as the

artillery lifted its fire, the tanks dashed forward and destroyed one machine gun and

one 75-mm. field piece immediately. The

tanks then covered the rest of the area with

machine gun fire until Company L moved

up and destroyed the remaining gun positions with rifles and grenades. The action

ended at 1240.

As the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, was

destroying the artillery position, Company

G of the 2d Battalion received heavy enemy

machine gun and rifle fire near the banks of

the Calbasag River. The 3d Platoon of

Company G walked into an ambush of

machine guns, which fired from two pillboxes under native shacks. The platoon was

pinned down, having suffered ten casualties

from the first burst of fire. To keep the advance moving, Company G remained behind to knock out the bunkers while Company F went forward to continue the advance with Company E. Since the swamps

prohibited the use of tanks, and the mutually

supported pillboxes prevented envelopment,

and since the nearness of friendly troops

made the use of artillery dangerous, all of

Company G was held up. The 3d Platoon

hugged the ground until darkness enabled it

to withdraw.

At 0900 on 22 October, planes from the

Seventh Fleet bombed the Japanese fortifications in front of the 184th Infantry. As

17

 7th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, App. C to Annex 2. 18

 13th Engr Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6.
SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO 131

on the previous day, the heat, tangled foliage, and deep swamps, rather than enemy

action, slowed the advance of the regiment.

Since the 184th Infantry's rate of advance

was more rapid than that of the 32d Infantry, orders were issued to the 184th after

it had moved forward an additional 2,800

yards to hold its position until the 32d Infantry could close the gap.19

 The 184th

maintained contact with the 3d Battalion,

17th Infantry, by means of patrols.

The 184th Infantry waited most of the

day for the 32d to come abreast. By 1800

the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 32d Infantry

had advanced approximately half the distance to Burauen. The 3d Battalion, 17th

Infantry, on the southern flank of the division, sent out reconnaissance patrols, which

encountered small groups of the enemy

1,000 to 1,200 yards south. The rest of the

17th Infantry moved into an assembly area

in the vicinity of the Dulag airfield.20

Changes in Plans

On the evening of 22 October both General Makino, commander of the 16th Division on Leyte, and General Arnold, commander of the 7th Division, made changes

in their plans.

The 16th Division was divided into the

Northern and Southern Leyte Defense

Forces. The Northern Leyte Defense Force,

consisting of the 9th Infantry Regiment reinforced by elements of the 22d Field Artillery Regiment, would defend the Catmon

Hill area against the 96th Division. The

Southern Leyte Defense Force, which opposed the 7th Division, was composed of the

20th Infantry Regiment, less one battalion,

the 2d Battalion of the 33d Infantry Regiment, the 7th Independent Tank Company,

and two platoons of the 16th Engineer Regiment. Some troops were to occupy the area

in the vicinity of San Pablo and the Calbasag River. The main force was to be centralized in a prepared position near Hindang. Another group was to occupy Julita,

from which it would make small night raids.

At the same time part of this force was to operate along the right bank of the Daguitan

River, protecting the 16th Division's right

flank. Another unit of approximately 600

troops was composed of the 98th Airfield

Battalion, the 54th Airfield Company, and

air-ground service units. It was to occupy

the key positions—the high ground west

of Burauen, the south end of Burauen, and

the Buri airfield—and thus prevent the

Americans from using the airfield and stop

the advance of American tanks along the

road. The main strength of the artillery (22d

Field Artillery Regiment, less the 6th Battery) would support the Southern Leyte

Defense Force. The engineers were to be

prepared to demolish the road between

Dagami and Burauen and between Dagami

and Tanauan. The main force of the engineers was to secure the road connecting Dagami, Hiabangan, Rizal, and Tingib. A

naval unit was to protect a supply dump east

of Dagami, and all remaining units, together

with the 16th Division command post,

would occupy positions in the vicinity of

Dagami.21

Three of the four airfields in the zone

of the XXIV Corps were in the vicinity of

Burauen. General Arnold wished to seize

them as soon as possible, and at the same

time he was anxious to advance so rapidly

that the Japanese would not have time to

19

 7th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 3, 22 Oct 44. 20

 Ibid.

21

 96th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex C,

Part III, Trans, KAKI Operational Order A-837,

22 Oct 44.
132 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

DISABLED M4 TANK on the Dulag-Burauen road.

construct additional fortified positions near

the airfields. He accordingly rearranged

the assault troops. The 17th Infantry, less

the 3d Battalion, with the 2d Battalion,

184th Infantry, attached, was ordered to

pass through the 184th and 32d Infantry

Regiments at 0830 on 23 October, attack

west astride the Dulag—Burauen road, and

capture the San Pablo airfield. The 767th

Tank Battalion, in support of the regiment,

was either to precede the 17th Infantry or

to operate with it, as the terrain permitted.

It was to jump off from the vicinity of the

Dulag airfield thirty minutes earlier than

the assault units of the 17th Infantry. The

32d and 184th Infantry Regiments were to

follow 1,000 yards behind the 17th.22 It was

hoped that this "flying wedge" formation

would catch the Japanese off balance and

that the rear elements of the wedge would

be able to take care of any disorganized

enemy units that had been bypassed.

On to Burauen

The flying wedge was very successful.

The tanks of the 767th Tank Battalion

moved out at 0730 on the morning of 23

October. Though one of the tanks was

knocked out about 3,000 yards west of

Julita at 1000, the others reached the western edge of Burauen at 1712 and scattered

the enemy forces in that area. At 0800 the

assault units of the 17th Infantry jumped

off, 400 yards to the rear of the tank bat- 22

 7th Div FO 11, 22 Oct 44.
SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO 133

talion. Because of the narrow front the column of troops was elongated, and it was not

until shortly after 0900 that the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, was able to move forward. Because of the difficult terrain and

the blazing heat, the infantrymen experienced difficulty in keeping up with the tanks.

The troops encountered sporadic opposition

during the day, passed rapidly through the

barrios of Julita and San Pablo, and secured San Pablo airfield. At 1115 General

Arnold notified Colonel Logic that the 32d

Infantry was to be responsible for the right

flank of the 7th Division's zone of action,

less the 200-yard front covered by the 17th

Infantry.

At 1700 the units prepared their night

perimeters, the 1st Battalion of the 32d, 400

yards south of the San Pablo airstrip; the

3d Battalion, 1,500 yards north of Julita;

and the 2d Battalion in division reserve, 500

yards southeast of Julita.23 At the same time

the 17th Infantry was on the west end of the

San Pablo airfield.24 The 184th Infantry,

minus the 2d Battalion, was south of the

highway between San Pablo and Julita.

During the day's action, the commanding

officer of the Japanese 20th Infantry Regiment was killed.25

 The action for the next

few days resolved itself into two separate

engagements—the seizure of the Buri airstrip and the battle for Dagami.

Securing the XXIV Corps Beachhead Line

Burauen

The 7th Division attacked at 0830 on 24

October, using the same formation employed on the previous day except that the

1st Battalion, 184th Infantry, reverted to

regimental reserve. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 17th Infantry, continued along the

road to Burauen; the 32d Infantry crossed

San Pablo airfield and then went to the

right in a north-northwest direction toward

the Buri airstrip. The 2d Battalion, 17th

Infantry, fought its way through the northeastern part of the town of Burauen and

managed to reach the road to Dagami. As

the main part of Burauen is south and west

of the road, the barrio was in the zone of

the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, which was

advancing along the left side of the road.

The 17th Infantry reached the edge of

Burauen at 1030. As the troops explored

the situation, they found that though there

was no organized resistance in the town,

scattered throughout Burauen were elements

of the 20th Infantry Regiment, dug in under

the buildings in spider holes and armed

with satchel charges, Bangalor torpedoes

made of bamboo, and antitank mines.26

As the American tanks moved through

the barrio, some of the Japanese jumped out

of their spider holes and held explosive

charges against the tanks in an attempt to

destroy them at the cost of their own lives.

The assault forces of the 17th Infantry, despite the difficulty of flushing the enemy

from the spider holes under the buildings,

made steady progress and by 1400 had

mopped up and secured the town. The battalions re-formed and were ready to go

north to Dagami.

The Buri Airstrip

At 0800 on 24 October, Colonel Logic

was transferred to the headquarters of the

7th Division and Lt. Col. John M. Finn 23

 32d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6. 24

 7th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 4, 23 Oct 44. 25

 35th Army Opns, p. 28.

26

 17th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, The Battle for

Dagami, Annex A, p. 1.
134 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

BURAUEN is searched for the enemy by troops of the 17th Infantry.

assumed command of the 32d Infantry.

Colonel Finn ordered the 1st Battalion, 32d

Infantry, to advance to positions across the

San Pablo airfield and then continue the

attack northwest toward the Buri airstrip.

The 2d Battalion remained in division reserve.

The Buri airfield was northeast of Burauen, with a heavily wooded area on its

northern edge. On the northern and western

edges the Japanese had constructed pillboxes in the high grass and heavy brush, together with mutually supporting machine

gun pillboxes interlaced with extensive

trench systems. On the southern side of the

airstrip the enemy had twenty strong field

fortifications. Approximately 1,000 enemy

troops were defending the sector—elements

of the 20th Infantry Regiment, the 98th

Airfield Battalion, and the 54th Airfield

Company. The airfield had been extensively

mined with 100-pound aerial bombs buried

nose up in the runway and scattered

throughout the dispersal area. Some of these

bombs had electric fuzes and could be

detonated by enemy troops hidden in foxholes a short distance away.27

The 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, met no

resistance as it moved out from the vicinity

of the San Pablo airstrip at 1123, but when

the battalion was 1,000 yards northwest of

the airfield it ran into well-camouflaged

enemy positions. About 1400 the battalion

attacked the emplacements with Company

A on the right, Company C on the left,

and Company B in reserve on the right rear

of Company A. In the face of intense enemy

resistance, Company A moved forward and

27

 7th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 7.
SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO 135

placed heavy rifle and machine gun fire on

the Japanese positions, which crumpled

under the attack.28

Although Company C fought valiantly

to keep abreast of Company A, the bulk

of the enemy strength was in front of it.

Heavy machine gun fire on its left flank

and in front pinned the company down

and kept it from moving forward. This delay

created a gap between the two companies

which a platoon from Company B was

ordered to fill.

When he found that Company C could

not move, Major Mathias, commander of

the 1st Battalion, started out to locate Company A but was wounded before he could

reach it. Maj. Robert C. Foulston, Jr., the

battalion's executive officer, assumed command of the battalion as Major Mathias was

evacuated.

Intense enemy rifle and machine gun fire

hit both of the flanks and the front of Company C and forced the company to start a

confused withdrawal. The 2d Platoon

pulled back, but four of its men were cut

off from the others and went the wrong way.

These men, picking up another who was

seriously wounded, proceeded three quarters of a mile behind the Japanese lines before they discovered their mistake. To cover

the withdrawal of the rest of the company a

holding force, consisting of one platoon from

Company C and one platoon from Company B, together with a section of heavy

machine guns, was set up about 500 yards

to the rear of Company C.

As Company C started its withdrawal, the

enemy moved forward. Keeping well concealed, the Japanese edged forward and

laid down a heavy volume of rifle, machine

gun, and mortar fire on the troops, but the

holding force stopped the advance. An intense fire fight broke out in which both sides

suffered many casualties. The Americans

held on grimly.

At 1530 Colonel Finn ordered the 3d

Battalion, 32d Infantry, to move to the left

of the 1st Battalion, but the swamps and

heavy foliage made progress slow. By 1630

the 3d Battalion was 600 yards to the left

rear of the 1st Battalion.

During the fight Colonel Finn went forward. Grasping the seriousness of the situation, he ordered the 1st Battalion to withdraw to San Pablo airstrip and sent one platoon of the 3d Battalion to assist the 1st

Battalion in its withdrawal. The rest of the

3d Battalion was to protect the withdrawal

of the 1st. The troops rapidly carried out

the orders and withdrew to the airstrip.

The 2d Battalion, released from division

reserve that evening, moved up on line with

the 3d Battalion. The 32d Infantry formed

a defensive perimeter for the night.29

During the day the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, captured a Japanese private, Isamu

Nakamaru, who had been a mechanic with

the 7th Independent Tank Company. He

informed his captors that his company originally had eleven tanks. Eight of these were

lost in the action near Julita; the others were

at Buri but were out of commission. All the

tanks were obsolete and had been used

mainly to clear and roll the airstrips.30

On the morning of 25 October the 49th

Field Artillery Battalion fired concentrations from 0800 to 0830 in front of the 32d

Infantry and covered an area of 400 yards

on each side of the Buri airstrip.31 At 0700

the 3d Battalion moved to the right and in

front of the 1st. The 32d Infantry was to

28

 32d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 7.

29

 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 30

 Attachment to 7th Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 5,

24 Oct 44. 31

 49th FA Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4.
136 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

move out at 0830 with the 2d and 3d Battalions abreast, each battalion to be preceded by a platoon of tanks.

At 0830 the battalions attacked, both advancing 1,500 yards before they encountered any serious obstacle. The 2d Battalion

on the right ran into the system of bunkers

that protected the Buri airstrip. The 3d Battalion halted and waited for the 2d to overcome the bunkers and move forward.

Though an antitank gun was brought up to

fire on the bunkers, two futile attacks were

launched against them and it became apparent that the 2d Battalion would be considerably delayed. Colonel Finn therefore

ordered the 3d Battalion to advance and

secure the edge of the Buri airstrip, and,

with its reserve company, to close the gap

thus created.

Colonel Finn also ordered the 1st Battalion to move closer to the right flank of the

3d and prevent an enemy envelopment.

Meanwhile, strong patrols which the 3d Battalion had sent to within 300 yards of the

airstrip reported that they had encountered

only one strong point in the 3d Battalion's

zone of advance. In order that the 3d Battalion could be certain it was moving in the

direction of the airstrip, Colonel Finn requested an artillery liasion plane to drop a

flare over the southwest edge of the airfield.

After this was done the battalion resumed

its attack and at 1700 reached the edge of

the airstrip. Fortunately the battalion immediately went into a defensive position, for

at 1715 a sharp enemy assault had to be repulsed with machine gun and rifle fire.32

Meanwhile the 2d Battalion probed at

the bunkers located at the edge of the heavy

woods on the northern fringe of the Buri

airfield. These defenses consisted of three

bunkers connected by an elaborate system

of trenches and spider holes. Both flanks of

the 2d Battalion received machine gun fire,

which became heavier upon any attempt to

carry out an enveloping movement. Under

cover of fire from American heavy machine

guns, the 2d Battalion withdrew its

wounded. It then formed a night perimeter

and waited for heavier supporting weapons

to be brought up.

On the following day the 2d Battalion

was to move from its night perimeter on a

400-yard front and secure the western end

of the airstrip. The 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, was to follow the 1st Battalion and protect the regiment from an attack from the

north. Each of the assault battalions was to

have attached a platoon of medium tanks

and a platoon from the Cannon Company.33

On the morning of 26 October, the 49th

Field Artillery Battalion for ten minutes

concentrated its fire for 500 yards on each

side of the airstrip. At 0800 the 32d Infantry attacked. The artillery fire had been

effective, and the 2d Battalion knocked out

the pillboxes that had stopped its advance

the previous day. Aided by tanks, the battalion was able to advance 700 yards along

the south side of the airstrip by 1700.

The 1st battalion, on the right, passed

through the 3d and attacked west on the

north side of the airstrip on a 400-yard front

toward the other end of the airstrip. The

1st Battalion immediately encountered a

highly intricate system of pillboxes and

bunkers, which slowed the attack until the

tanks arrived. From that time on, a fiercely

contested struggle continued throughout the

afternoon. The battalion employed tanks,

32

 32d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 8. 33

 32d Inf FO 6, 25 Oct 44.
SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO 137

antitank guns, artillery, and mortars to cover

its advance, and destroyed many bunkers

with grenades, demolition charges, and

automatic rifles.34

Company B bore the brunt of the assault

and, fighting tenaciously, had battled

through 900 yards of the fortified area by

1700. The 1st and 2d Battalions made contact on the edge of the airstrip and formed

their night perimeters; the 3d Battalion

protected the rear. During the night the 32d

Infantry repulsed several light counterattacks.

On the following day, 27 October, the

time for the attack was set an hour earlier

in the hope that the Japanese would be

caught off guard. At 0700 the 32d Infantry

moved out, with the assault battalions in

the same formation as on the previous day.35

To their happy surprise the troops encountered little opposition as they readily secured

bunker after bunker. The 20th Infantry

Regiment had spent its strength. The American troops found enemy dead "in every

bunker, trench, foxhole and bush," and

wreckage of enemy 75's, machine guns,

grenade launchers, and rifles was scattered

about. More than 400 Japanese dead were

found in the sector of the 1st Battalion.36

The infantrymen encountered only an occasional rifleman while mopping up. By

1130 the Buri airstrip was secured.

On 28 October the 2d Battalion was

alerted to move to Abuyog at 0400 on the

following day. The 3d Battalion was ordered

to move to Guinarona for possible attachment to the 17th Infantry, which had committed all three of its battalions in the fight

north along the Burauen-Dagami road.

On to Dagami

After securing the barrio of Burauen at

1300 on 24 October, the 17th Infantry

had rested for an hour before attacking

along the Burauen—Dagami road.37 The 2d

Battalion, 184th Infantry, remained attached to the 17th. As the 17th Infantry

started north, a patrol of four jeeps was

sent ahead to reconnoiter. It encountered

a strong force of the enemy on a road that

forked off to the Buri airfield, and after a

short but determined fire fight the enemy

withdrew north. On its return the patrol

reported that the road to Dagami had been

mined with aircraft bombs that were buried

nose up in the road and covered with palm

fronds and other vegetation. A platoon

from Company A, 13th Engineer Battalion,

removed the mines and the column continued forward.

About 1530 the right flank of the 17th

Infantry came under mortar and machine

gun fire which came from a ridge north of

Burauen and east of the road to Dagami.

The ridge was about 700 yards long, 50

feet high, heavily wooded, and covered with

dense undergrowth. Most of the fire seemed

to be coming from an eastern spur that overlooked the Bayug and Buri airfields. On the

left (west) of the road the terrain was flat

and marshy.

At 1630 the 17th Infantry began to form

its night perimeter on the southern edge of

the ridge. The 1st Battalion protected the

left (west) flank and tied in at the road

with the regiment's 2d Battalion. The lines

of the 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, covered

the forward line of the ridge that extended

34

 32d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9. 35

 32d Inf FO 7, 27 Oct 44. 36

 32d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9.

37

 Unless otherwise stated the material on the

drive to Dagami is based on 17th Inf Opns Rpt

Leyte, Annex A, The Battle for Dagami, pp. 1-9.
138 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

to the rear where the 2d Battalion, 184th

Infantry, held the entrance to the eastern

finger. The perimeter of the 2d Battalion,

184th Infantry, extended south to tie in with

the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry.

Only the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry,

was able to set up its night perimeter without

incident. The 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry,

ran into determined resistance but was able

to establish a firm bivouac for itself, using

the vacated enemy positions. The 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, received scattered rifle

fire but did not encounter any of the enemy.

During the night the 2d Battalion, 184th

Infantry, and the 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, were harassed by patrols of ten to twenty

Japanese each, probing for a break in the

lines.

Shortly after nightfall there were two

abortive charges against the American lines.

As soon as the troops heard the enemy, they

called for protective fire, which prevented

any of the Japanese from entering the lines.

The enemy, however, continually fired into

the area throughout the night. Earlier in the

day an American tank had bogged down in

a swamp to the left of the road, and the

crew was forced to abandon it under fire,

leaving the guns intact. During the night

the Japanese captured the tank and sprayed

the areas of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry,

and the regimental command post with the

tank's 37-mm. and machine guns, and with

four of their own machine guns. Fortunately the bullets passed harmlessly over the

heads of the troops.

During the night Lt. Col. Francis T.

Pachler discussed plans for the following

day, 25 October, with his battalion commanders. He was faced with a choice between two courses of action. On the one

hand, he could take advantage of the tactical surprise occasioned by his rapid advance.

attempt to bypass the Japanese forces on

the ridge, and make a dash along the

Burauen—Dagami road, disregarding losses

that might be inflicted on his flank; or, on

the other hand, he could destroy the enemy

forces on the ridge before advancing to

Dagami. The first alternative must allow for

a strong possibility that fire from the 32d

Infantry, which was pushing west, might

fall upon the 17th Infantry if it continued

its advance before the Buri airfield was

secured. After prolonged discussion, Pachler

decided to destroy the enemy forces on the

ridge before proceeding to Dagami.

Colonel Pachler therefore ordered the 1st

Battalion, 17th Infantry, to remain in its

present position until the 2d Battalion,

echeloned to its right rear, could swing up

on line facing north. While waiting for the

2d Battalion to move up, the 1st Battalion

would send a strong reconnaissance patrol

along the road north to the barrio of Buri

to determine Japanese strength, and the

condition of the road and terrain. The 2d

Battalion, 184th Infantry, would attack and

destroy the enemy force on the finger of the

ridge and then come up, also facing north.

The patrol moved out at 0730 on 25 October. A rifle platoon mounted the tops and

sides of five tanks and headed north towards

Buri. On its way, the platoon encountered

and killed Japanese troops who were emplaced in spider holes and coconut log pillboxes under buildings, but a destroyed

bridge at the edge of Buri prevented any

further advance. The platoon returned at

nightfall with the report that the road to

Buri was clear and that it had killed fortynine of the enemy.

The 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, made

its move without incident. The 2d Battalion,

184th Infantry, advancing from its position

on the heavily wooded eastern finger of the
SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO 139

ridge, was forced to meet and destroy the

enemy force with bayonets and grenades.

Its progress was slow until a platoon of the

Cannon Company and a platoon of medium

tanks made a wide encircling movement

through the Bayug airstrip and were able to

bring fire to bear on the Japanese. By 1300

the enemy threat was removed and the battalion commenced its swing to the north

to join the other two battalions. At dusk the

three units were in line; the combat teams

had advanced 400 yards and formed their

night perimeters.

At 1700 Colonel Pachler rearranged his

troops and made plans for the following

day. The 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, was

detached to guard the ridge. The 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry, which had been

guarding the divisional left flank south of

Dao since A Day, was brought forward by

truck to rejoin the regiment. The 17th Infantry would move out along the highway

in a column of battalions—the 1st, 2d, and

3d.38

The 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, moved

out at 0700, Company A on the left (west)

and Company C on the right (east). Since

the tanks were forced to remain on the road

because of swamps on either side, tank support was reduced to a platoon. After having

moved about 300 yards beyond the line of

departure, Company C ran into a small

pocket of enemy resistance which it soon

destroyed with hand grenades and small

arms fire; twenty-one of the enemy were

killed and one was captured. Company A

also met and overcame some resistance from

enemy in foxholes in its zone, but was not

held up. At 1000 the 1st Battalion received

machine gun fire to its front and observed

a movement in the marsh on its right flank.

When the heavy machine guns and 81-mm.

mortars were brought to bear upon the

marsh, approximately sixty Japanese began

to run across the open fields. The 4.2-inch

mortars of the 91st Chemical Company also

fired on the fleeing enemy.

When the forward elements were about

1,100 yards south of Ginogusan, Company

A encountered a rice paddy to its front. One

platoon of the company went left to move

around the rice field, and the support platoon was committed to close the gap thus

created. As the leading elements got past the

field, an enemy force, which was entrenched just beyond it, started firing. The

rear elements of the 1st Battalion immediately closed in and killed fifteen of the enemy with grenades and small arms fire. In

the meantime, Company C encountered

about twenty-five Japanese who had dug in

under native shacks. Two tanks were called

up, and after they had knocked over the

shacks the infantrymen closed in and destroyed the enemy.

During this action the 3d Platoon of

Company F, 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry,

reinforced by one squad of the antitank

platoon of the battalion Headquarters Company, established a roadblock on one of the

roads that led to the Buri airfield. The

troops came under rifle and machine gun

fire from their front. Within a few minutes

the platoon leader and two other men were

killed and another man was wounded. The

platoon withdrew about one hundred yards

and called for an 81-mm. mortar concentration on the area. The rest of Company F

was committed against the Japanese south

flank.

In the face of heavy fire Company F

pushed through the difficult terrain and

forced the enemy to withdraw. However,

four Japanese machine guns remained in 38

 17th Inf FO 3, 25 Oct 44.
140 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

ENGINEER TROOPS of the 13th Engineer Battalion rebuild a bridge near Burauen.

position and fired into the company. The

leader of the antitank squad, though

wounded in both legs, ran back to the battalion command post and asked for tanks in

support. A cannon platoon which was sent

up silenced the enemy guns. While continuing the fight during the enemy withdrawal,

the company evacuated its wounded on improvised bamboo litters.

Company F was then relieved by the 2d

Battalion, 184th Infantry, which established

a roadblock nearer the main highway.

Company F rejoined its battalion and the

regiment formed its night perimeter about

600 yards south of Guinarona. The night

was comparatively peaceful except for a

minor bombing in the 2d Battalion area.

The troops of the 17th Infantry were ordered to move out on 27 October in a column of battalions in the following order:

3d, 2d, and 1st, with a distance of 500 yards

between battalions.39 Since aerial photographs showed that all the bridges had been

blown, a platoon of the 13th Engineer Battalion was attached to the 3d Battalion.

At 0700 the regiment moved out, with

the 3d Battalion in the lead, on a 100-yard

front on both sides of the highway. The

tanks were forced to stay on the road. The

3d Battalion was able to cross a small stream

south of Guinarona, although the bridge

had been damaged. When it reached the

northern bank of the stream the battalion

ran into the enemy. Approximately twenty

Japanese were dug in around a schoolhouse, with two machine guns mounted in

the building. Company K, the lead company, under cover of machine gun and

39

 17th Inf FO 4, 26 Oct 44.
SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO 141

mortar fire, successfully stormed the schoolhouse and killed seventeen of its defenders.

The engineer troops from the 13th Engineer

Battalion advanced and quickly repaired

the bridge, after which the rest of the 17th

Infantry moved forward. Since the bridge

north of Guinarona was also damaged, the

same tactics were used. The infantrymen

of the lead company crossed the stream and

stood guard while the engineers repaired the

bridge. For 2,500 yards the advance continued, unopposed except for small groups

of Japanese. The heavy machine guns of

the regiment fired from the flanks of the

American forces and covered the swamps

on both sides of the road. The 17th Infantry went into night perimeter about

2,200 yards south of Dagami and about 200

yards south of a demolished stone bridge.

As the regiment started to dig in, enemy

rifle and machine gun fire fell on the front

of the 3d Battalion but mortars returned

the fire and silenced the enemy. Although

there was sporadic air and ground activity

during the night, no attempt was made to

penetrate the lines of the regiment.

Entrance Into Dagami

The 17th Infantry learned from Japanese

prisoners that in addition to elements of the

20th Infantry Regiment in the Dagami

sector, the following units were present: the

2d Battalion, 33d Infantry Regiment (about

200 men), together with scattered elements

of the 16th Engineer Regiment and the 9th

Infantry Regiment.40

The Japanese had firmly established

themselves in positions in depth about 1,000

yards south of Dagami. These defenses consisted of mutually supporting pillboxes

made of logs and sandbags, from which the

Japanese could deliver interlocking bands

of machine gun fire. They were situated on

higher ground and could be approached

only across open rice paddies.41

As the American forces came close to

Dagami, the 17th Infantry was moving

north along the Burauen-Dagami road, and

the 382d Infantry, 96th Division, was approaching the road between Dagami and

Tanauan.

Lt. Col. Kakuda, the commander of the

Japanese Central Area Unit of the 20th

Infantry Regiment, issued a series of operational orders. At 1800 on 27 October he

ordered the 20th Infantry Regiment to take

a position southwest of Dagami and annihilate the Americans.42

The 17th Infantry estimated that there

were from 1,500 to 2,500 Japanese in the

vicinity to oppose the regiment's advance

and that about 500 of these withdrew from

Dagami in orderly fashion.43 The commander of the 17th Infantry prescribed a

column of battalions for the attack of 28

October. The 2d Battalion would pass

through the 3d Battalion, and the attack

north would be in the order of 2d, 1st, and

3d. All of the supporting arms were attached

to the 2d Battalion for its attack.44

At 0730 the 2d Battalion attacked and

immediately met very strong opposition.

The stone bridge and road were in the

40

 7th Inf Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 9, 28 Oct 44.

Unless otherwise stated the entrance into Dagami

is based upon 17th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex A,

The Battle for Dagami, pp. 1-9.

41

 7th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9. 42

 Central Area Unit Opns Order 2, 27 Oct 44,

trans in App. C to Annex 2, 7th Div Opns Rpt

Leyte. 43

 17th Inf FO 5, 27 Oct 44. 44

 These were the Cannon Company, a platoon of

the Antitank Company, a platoon of the 13th Engineer Battalion, 767th Tank Battalion, and the 91st

Chemical Company minus the 1st and 3d Platoons.
142 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

middle of a strip of waist-deep swamp 100

yards wide, which funneled out to form a

larger swamp. A crescent-shaped coconut

grove lay beyond the swamp, one end in

front of the road and the other bent to the

south about 800 yards west of the road. The

road and the curve in the coconut grove

divided the swamp into three segments—

one on each side of the road, and the third

west of and parallel to the road. In the face

of intense rifle, machine gun, and mortar

fire coming from an unknown number of

Japanese, Company F and three tanks managed to cross the creek. The tanks continued

north up the road. As Company F waded

through the waist-deep swamp, it pushed

through direct enemy fire and past a large

tank trap and found a line of pillboxes to

its front and left flank.

The company commander ordered his

unit to hold its position and then returned

south of the bridge to bring up more tanks.

The 1st Platoon of Company F moved to

the left rear to protect that flank, which was

receiving considerable enemy fire. As the

company commander rushed back to get

the tanks, about twenty Japanese attacked

the 1st Platoon in an attempt to envelop

the left flank of the company. The platoon

leader ordered his men to hold their fire

until the enemy was only five yards away,

and nearly all of the Japanese were killed

in the initial volley. The platoon held its

ground to prevent any further enveloping

attempts by the Japanese. Meanwhile, Company F's commanding officer found that no

tanks were available, since they could not

cross the weakened bridge. He returned to

Company F and ordered it to retire to the

tank trap, reorganize, and evacuate the

wounded.

In the meantime, in order to relieve the

pressure on Company G (on the right),

which had run into somewhat the same

situation, Lt. Col. William B. Moore, the

battalion commander, committed Company E to the right (east) flank. Company

E initially encountered determined opposition but managed to flank the enemy and

assist Company G in its sector. At the same

time the engineer troops of the 13th Engineer Battalion, working feverishly under

heavy fire, tried to repair the damaged

bridge. One of the armored bulldozers lost

three drivers, successively, to enemy fire.

Under the close supervision of Colonel

Moore, who was in the front lines, the 2d

Battalion pressed the attack. Two M8

armored cars were brought wide around the

right flank in order to avoid the swamp.

With their aid, Companies E and G rolled

up the cast flank of the 20th Infantry Regiment and broke through the pillboxes in

their own area.

Company C was committed to the left

of Company F in order to aid it. Although

this move was partially successful, Company C found itself pinned down by an

enemy force entrenched in pillboxes and

zigzag trenches. Since the Japanese defense

line extended beyond the regiment's left

(west) flank and around it to the south,

Company B was committed further left to

hit the southern flank of the enemy.

Although Company B could not break

through the line, it was able to locate the

enemy right flank and neutralize the fire

on that flank.

One of the three tanks that had gone

north in the morning returned at 1400 and

was guided into the sector of Company F.

With all of its guns blazing, the tank broke

through the enemy fortifications, and Companies C and F were then able to move in

and mop up the enemy. The other two tanks

had gone up the road some 250 yards when
SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO 143

they met antitank fire which completely

destroyed one and immobilized the other,

trapping its crew. As soon as the bridge was

made passable, two M8's, a medium tank,

and a squad from Company F were sent to

rescue the trapped crew. While the medium

tank and the infantry covered the damaged

tank, the M8's drew up to it and allowed

its crew to escape into their open turrets.

The detail withdrew, having suffered no

casualties, and the immobilized tank was

then destroyed.

At dusk the 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry,

and the committed companies from the 1st

Battalion pushed some 300 yards beyond

the enemy strong point and formed a perimeter defense for the night.45

 Company B on

the far left flank was withdrawn and closed

into the perimeter. Although machine gun

and mortar fire came from the left line of

fortifications, there was no major action on

the part of the Japanese. A few of the

enemy, attempting to crawl through a

trench into the position of Company F, became ensnarled in the concertina wire and

were then destroyed by grenades.

Since the 2d Battalion had borne the

brunt of the fighting on 28 October and had

suffered numerous casualties, the regimental

commander decided to have the battalion

drop back into reserve. Although the drive

to Dagami was to continue, the north-south

line of enemy pillboxes on the left flank of

the regiment could not be ignored. At 0800

on 29 October the regimental lines were to

be reorganized so that the 3d and 1st Battalions, less Company B, would pass through

the 2d Battalion, which would become the

regimental reserve. Company B with a platoon of M8's would attack the flank and

rear of the enemy in the left line of pillboxes.

At 0800, under cover of a heavy artillery

concentration from the 49th Field Artillery

Battalion, the 1st and 3d Battalions, 17th

Infantry, passed through the 2d Battalion

without incident. Company B, reinforced by

the platoon from the Cannon Company,

moved out to destroy the enemy force on the

regiment's left flank. The company fought

the Japanese from pillbox to pillbox, catching the enemy on his flanks and rear by

rifle and machine gun fire, together with

time-burst fire from the self-propelled howitzers. This completely demoralized the Japanese, some of whom threw down their arms

and tried unsuccessfully to escape. More

than 120 enemy dead were counted in the

area. The 1st Battalion entered the southern

part of Dagami without encountering serious resistance. It then came under artillery

fire from the hills west of the town.

The 3d Battalion proceeded east of the

road in a column of companies in the order

L, K, and I, and met no serious opposition

until it reached a cemetery south of Dagami.

Overgrown with weeds seven to ten feet

high and containing stone crypts built off

the ground, the cemetery was divided by a

path running east to west. As Company L

moved into the burial ground, Company I

swung around the right (east) side to come

into position for the night. The leading elements of Company L passed through the

cemetery and Company I moved into position without incident, but as the 1st Platoon

of Company L, the reserve platoon, crossed

the path, a headstone tilted back and from

the open grave four Japanese opened fire

45

 During the day's action, Pfc. Leonard C. Brostrom of Company F and Pfc. John F. Thorson of

Company G so distinguished themselves that they

were awarded the Medal of Honor. Private Brostrom

singlehandedly destroyed a pillbox and killed six

Japanese before collapsing from his wounds. Private

Thorson sacrificed his life to save his comrades by

throwing himself upon an enemy grenade that

landed in his platoon's defensive position.
144 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

with an American Browning automatic

rifle and other small arms. The small arms

of the 1st Platoon had no effect and it became necessary to bring forward a flame

thrower to burn the enemy out. At the same

time the platoon received fire from other

open graves, from which the Japanese had

removed the bodies. By punching holes

through the stone they used the crypts as

individual foxholes. The platoon broke into

small units and pushed through the cemetery, destroying the enemy forces wherever

they could be located.

Company K, which followed Company I,

placed two platoons abreast behind Company L. As it came through the weeds past

the cemetery path a Japanese officer

charged on the right flank with his saber

and wounded one man before he could be

brought down. Since the platoons were also

receiving heavy fire from the tombs, the

commander of Company K drew his men

back to the path where they reorganized.

Preceded by a battery of six flame throwers,

the men then marched shoulder to shoulder

through the cemetery and burnt out the

enemy. About 1900 the regiment completed

the action and formed its night perimeter.

During the fighting, the regimental operations officer, hearing the heavy fire and

not being able to communicate with the

3d Battalion headquarters, called Company

K direct to ascertain if the Japanese had

broken through the American lines. "Hell

no," was the reported reply, "we're breaking through theirs and fighting for our

bivouac."

 46

 During the night small infiltration parties of Japanese tried unsuccessfully

to penetrate the regiment's defenses, and

sporadic artillery fire was received from the

hills west of Dagami.

By 1040 on 30 October Dagami was

securely in American hands, and the 17th

Infantry continued to mop up for the rest

of the day. The 19th Infantry Regiment of

the 24th Division, X Corps, across the

Binahaan River north of Dagami, was

reached by an airdrop message from the

artillery spotter plane, and patrols reached

the 382d Infantry of the 96th Division on

the east. The mission of the 17th Infantry

Regiment—securing the town of Dagami

and effecting junction with the X Corps and

the 96th Division—was completed. The

regiment spent the next two days in mopping up and patrolling the area around

Dagami.

The 7th Division had secured the limits

of its beachhead line, but the southern

approaches to the line had not yet been

secured. The road farther south, running

across the island from Abuyog on the east

coast to Baybay on the west coast, offered

a potential route along which the Japanese

might pour in reinforcements.

At 0530 on 29 October the 2d Battalion,

32d Infantry, left Burauen for Abuyog via

Dao and the coastal road, Highway 1. Its

progress was impeded by muddy roads and

the previous destruction of the bridge over

the Bito River. The battalion, less one

company, crossed the river by DUKW's at

0940 and by 1000 was in Abuyog, having

encountered no Japanese. The 7th Cavalry

Reconnaissance Troop, acting as an advance guard for the battalion, pushed west

from Abuyog inland four miles on the road

toward Baybay.

On 30 and 31 October the 2d Battalion,

32d Infantry, remained at Abuyog, but on

the latter day it sent Company G, reinforced, toward Baybay on the Abuyog-Baybay road, which corkscrewed through the

mountains for about twenty-seven miles be46

 17th Inf Opns Rpt, Battle for Dagami, App.,

p. 9.
SOUTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO 145

tween the east and west coasts. The company encountered no Japanese. On 1

November no forward progress was made,

but all elements of the 2d Battalion, 32d

Infantry, patrolled. On 2 November Company G moved along the road and closed

in on Baybay at 2200.

Far to the south the 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Division, had been engaged

since A Day in extensive patrolling of the

Panaon Strait area. On 31 October the 1st

Battalion, 32d Infantry, left the Bayug airfield for Dulag and at 2200 sailed from

Dulag to relieve the 21st Infantry. The battalion arrived at Panaon Island at 0700 on

1 November and during the day effected

the relief of the 21st Infantry, which then

moved north to rejoin the 24th Division.47

The initial mission of the 7th Infantry

Division—to land between the Calbasag

and Daguitan Rivers, advance rapidly inland along the axis of the Dulag-Burauen

road, seize hostile airstrips in its zone of

action, secure the Burauen—Dagami road,

and protect the XXIV Corps' left (south)

flank—had been accomplished.

Since landing, the 7th Division had killed

an estimated 4,211 Japanese and had taken

19 prisoners.48 Up to 1000 on 1 November,

32 officers and 290 enlisted men of the division had been killed; 48 officers, 1 warrant

officer, and 777 enlisted men wounded; 15

officers and 223 enlisted men injured; and

21 enlisted men were missing in action.49

By 2 November, General Hodge's XXIV

Corps had finished its assigned role for the

second phase of General Krueger's plan for

the capture of the island of Leyte. It had

seized the southern part of Leyte Valley

with its important roads, airfields, and potential base sites. An element of the corps

had pushed to the west coast of the island,

and was preparing for the move toward the

important port of Ormoc as part of the

third phase of the plan. General Makino

had been forced to give up his Dagami

headquarters and other positions on the

heights overlooking the town. Far to the

north, the X Corps was engaged in securing

the northern part of Leyte Valley.

47

 7th Div G-3 Periodic Rpts 10-14, 29 Oct-2

Nov 44.

48

 7th Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 13, 2 Nov 44. 49

 7th Div G-l Weekly Rpt 2, 31 Oct 44, Incl 2,

Part 2, 1 Nov 44; 7th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, G-1

Rpt.
CHAPTER IX

Northern Leyte Valley: Part One

By the evening of 20 October the Tacloban airfield and Hill 522, overlooking the

town of Palo at the northern entrance to

Leyte Valley, were in the hands of the X

Corps. The night of 20-21 October was free

from enemy activity in the sector of the 1st

Cavalry Division, and the exhausted troops

were able to obtain an unquiet rest during

their first night in the Philippines. Having

secured the Tacloban airfield they were in

position to march on Tacloban, the capital

of Leyte, the following morning. Tacloban

is situated on a peninsula at the head of San

Pedro Bay. A string of low hills, stretching

from Anibong Point along the base of the

peninsula to the southeast, commands the

approaches to the town.1 Throughout the

night the 61st Field Artillery Battalion delivered harassing fires on the hills south of

the town.2 (Map 7)

San Juanico Strait

Drive Toward Caibaan

General Krueger wished to push rapidly

through Leyte Valley and secure its important roads and airfields before the Japanese could regroup and offer a firm line

of resistance. In the north, securing San

Juanico Strait would prevent any of the

enemy from crossing over from Samar.

Control of the road that led through the

interior of northern Leyte Valley would give

the possessor a firm hold on the northern

part of the valley. With a successful twopronged attack—elements of the 1st Cavalry Division driving north along San Juanico Strait and units of the 24th Infantry Division pushing along Highway 2—the X

Corps would arrive at Carigara Bay. At that

point the corps would be in position to contest any Japanese amphibious movement

through Carigara Bay, and at the same

time elements of the corps could drive south

through Ormoc Valley and secure the important port of Ormoc.

Preceded by a naval and air bombardment and a preparation by the 61st Field

Artillery Battalion,3 the 1st Cavalry Division

at 0800 on 21 October resumed the assault

against the Japanese.4 The division was to

capture Tacloban and then secure control

over San Juanico Strait.5 The 7th Cavalry,

2d Brigade, had been assigned the mission

of seizing Tacloban,6 which was defended

by elements of the Japanese 33d Infantry

Regiment.7

On the morning of 21 October the 1st

Squadron, 7th Cavalry, joined the regi1

 7th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, Part II, Annex 2,

Terrain Study of Operational Areas, pp. 1-3. 2

 1st Cav Div Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2.

3

 Ibid., p. 3. 4

 1st Cav Div Msgs to X Corps, 21 Oct 44. 5

 1st Cav Div FO 1, 2 Oct 44. 6

 7th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. 7

 35th Army Opns, p. 28.
Map 7
148 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

merit's 2d Squadron in a drive on Tacloban.

At 0800 the 7th Cavalry moved with squadrons abreast, the 1st Squadron on the right

and the 2d Squadron on the left, astride the

highway leading to Tacloban. Although the

squadrons found the terrain extremely

swampy and movement difficult, by 1400

the 1st Squadron was on the outskirts of the

town and the 2d was halted at the foot of

a hill overlooking Tacloban. The Japanese

had dug into the hills overlooking the capital. The division artillery then shelled the

hill and the high ground to the north.8 At

1500 the fire was lifted and the forward

movement proceeded.

The men of the 1st Squadron entered

Tacloban to conduct a house-to-house

search for concealed Japanese. They received a tumultuous welcome from the Filipinos who lined the sides of the narrow

streets, waving American flags and urging

gifts of eggs and fruit upon the troopers.9

They were also welcomed by the governor

of the province. The 2d Squadron, on the

other hand, was held up by an estimated

200 Japanese who were entrenched in pillboxes and foxholes and behind the dense

vegetation that covered the hilly area. As

heavy fire from the enemy pinned down the

troops, Col. Walter H. Finnegan, the regiment's commanding officer, sent the Antitank Platoon and elements of the Regimental Weapons Troop in support of the

2d Squadron, where that unit faced the

southern end of the hill mass.10

The Weapons Troop was ordered to lay

aside its automatic weapons and assault the

hill with rifles, but it was pinned down by

intense fire from an enemy bunker to the

immediate front. Pfc. Kenneth W. Grove,

an ammunition carrier, volunteered to clear

the Japanese from the position. He worked

his way through the underbrush to the flank

of the bunker, then charged in the open

against its front and killed the gun crew.11

The advance then continued.

The movements of the Weapons Troop

and the Antitank Platoon were successful,

and by 1800 the southern half of the hill

and the town of Tacloban were in American

hands. Shortly after the seizure of the

capital, General Mudge, the division commander, inspected the town from a medium

tank. At one point, where the Japanese had

turned over a truck to form a roadblock,

the general personally received the surrender

of forty Formosan laborers.12 The regimental command post was established in the

building that had housed the Leyte Intermediate School for Girls.

The following day, after an intensive

mortar, artillery, and air bombardment on

a hill southwest of Tacloban, the 2d

Squadron of the 7th Cavalry moved out

against the hill at 0820. Although the terrain was rugged, the position was overrun

by 1100. The 1st Squadron spent the day

mopping up the town in search of the

enemy. At 1108 General Mudge released

the 8th Cavalry, commanded by Colonel

Bradley, to 2d Brigade control.

By the end of 22 October the capital of

Leyte and its hill defenses were securely in

American hands. The 7th Cavalry was one

day ahead of schedule, a fact partly explained by the unexpectedly light resistance

of the Japanese and partly by the vigor of

the 7th Cavalry's advance.13

On the morning of 22 October the 8th

Cavalry made a "victory" march through

8

 1st Cav Div Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. 9

 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 19-20. 10

 7th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4.

11

 He was awarded the Silver Star. 12

 X Corps Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 18. 13

 2d Cav Brig Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 3-4.
A PATROL FROM THE 7TH CAVALRY moves along Avenida Rizal in Tacloban

(above). Flag-waving Filipinos greet the American troops (below).
150 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

MAJ. GEN. VERNE D. MUDGE (in tank) confers with Brig. Gen. William C. Chase

in Tacloban.

liberated Tacloban and went into perimeter to the west of the 7th Cavalry on the

hills overlooking the town. Troop C went

to Anibong Point in order to guard the

brigade flank from a suspected Japanese

barge landing through San Juanico Strait.

Shortly after the command post was

opened at 1830, the 8th Cavalry received

orders for the 1st Squadron to depart at

0700 on the following day. It was to pass

through the 7th Cavalry and secure the

bridge crossing the Diit River so as to protect the 2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry. The

latter was directed to move northwest across

the mountains, seize Santa Cruz, which was

on Carigara Bay about sixteen miles northwest of Tacloban, and locate the remnants

of the Japanese who had opposed the 7th

Cavalry in its advance through the city.

The 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry, passed

through the 7th Cavalry at 0900 on the

morning of 23 October. By nightfall the

squadron had crossed and secured the Diit

River bridge and routed small groups of the

enemy. The 2d Squadron experienced difficulty in securing Filipino carriers for the

trip up the Diit River and across the unmapped and unknown mountains to Santa

Cruz. It resolved the situation by driving a

truck through the streets and seizing every

able-bodied Filipino in sight. These "volunteers" were sufficient to get the squadron to

its night bivouac on the Diit River. The

"indignant carriers [then] dissolved into the
NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE 151

8-INCH HOWITZERS READIED FOR ACTION against an enemy strong point

southwest of Tacloban.

jungle."14 The 2d Squadron established its

perimeter near the village of Diit.

Meanwhile, the 1st Brigade of the 1st

Cavalry Division had been ordered to move

west on 21 October. This maneuver was

designed to protect the southern flank of

the 2d Brigade and to prevent the Japanese

from reinforcing their troops in Tacloban.

The 1st Brigade moved out at 0800 toward

Caibaan, the 12th Cavalry on the right

and the 5th Cavalry on the left.15 Troop B

of the 12th Cavalry advanced toward the

barrio of Utap, and though it ran into enemy opposition it was able to secure the

town after being reinforced by the regimental and brigade reconnaissance platoons.

Swampy ground made the going very difficult. The troops captured a large Japanese supply dump which contained quantities of foodstuffs, vehicles, and equipment,

and valuable documents.16

The 1st and 2d Squadrons of the 5th

Cavalry advanced abreast toward Caibaan

and the high ground beyond the town. They

encountered only sporadic rifle fire in

Caibaan but at the foot of one of the hills

they met determined opposition from about

half a company of Japanese. After an ex14

 8th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 6-7. 15

 At 0500 on 21 October Colonel Drake, the

commanding officer of the 5th Cavalry, was killed

while inspecting the regimental perimeter defenses

in the vicinity of Caibaan. 5th Cavalry Opns Rpt

Leyte, p. 2. 16

 1st Cav Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 2, 21 Oct 44.
152 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

change of fire, the Japanese signified they

wished to surrender by waving a white

flag. The heavy machine guns were brought

into position and the American soldiers

signalled for the Japanese to disrobe in

order to forestall their using concealed

grenades or other weapons. The Japanese

opened fire and wounded five men. The

automatic weapons then returned the fire,

killing thirteen of the enemy. The remaining Japanese withdrew over the hill, and

contact was lost.

There was no enemy activity in the 5th

Cavalry's sector during the night of 21-22

October, and at 0645 the advance elements

of the 1st Squadron began to move up the

steep east slope of a hill west of Caibaan.

The squadron continued its advance, and

at 1200 engaged in a short skirmish between

the hill and Caibaan, killing ten Japanese.

The difficult terrain, rather than the Japanese, slowed the advance. Hampered by tall

cogon grass, which cut off every breeze, the

troops struggled up steep slopes and sharp

ridges. Exposed to the hot sun and burdened

with equipment and ammunition, they were

soon exhausted. At 1447 the 5th Cavalry

received orders to halt all forward movement until further notice. The 1st Squadron

was in bad condition physically, since it

had been steadily on the move for a day

and a half and had consumed all its rations

and water. At the end of the day, 22 October, the squadron was still at the base of

the hill, but the rest of the regiment had

reached Caibaan.17 On the following day

elements of the 5th Cavalry were sent to

Tacloban to act as a guard of honor for

General Mac Arthur. The other units remained in position.18

Restoration of Civil Government

The guard of honor, consisting of 1st Lt.

John Gregory and thirty enlisted men of the

5th Cavalry, arrived at Tacloban later on

23 October. President Osmeña of the

Philippine Commonwealth was also present,

having come ashore for the occasion.19 A

simple but impressive ceremony was held in

front of the municipal building of Tacloban,

though the interior of the edifice was a

shambles of broken furniture and scattered

papers. A guard of honor of "dirty and tired

but efficient-looking soldiers"

 20

 was drawn

up in front of the government building.

General MacArthur broadcast an address

announcing the establishment of the Philippine Civil Government with President Osmeña as its head. Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland then read the official proclamation.

President Osmeña spoke appreciatively of

American support and of the determination

of the Filipinos to expel the enemy. "To the

Color" was sounded on the bugle, and the

national flags of the United States and the

Philippines were simultaneously hoisted on

the sides of the building. Colonel Kangleon

of the guerrilla forces was then decorated

with the Distinguished Service Cross.

Few Filipinos except representatives of

the local government were present for the

ceremony. Apparently the inhabitants had

not heard of it, or did not know that they

were permitted to attend. Information

quickly spread, however, that the civil government had assumed control, and as General MacArthur and his party left town the

civil population cheered them.21

17

 5th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 2-3. 18

 1st Cav Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 4, 25 Oct 44.

19

 5th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. 20

 Rpt, Capt Ray Tarbuck, USN, Observers Rpt

of King II Opn, 3 Nov 44, GHQ G-3 Jnl, 30 Oct

44.

21

 Ibid.
NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE 153

GENERAL MACARTHUR announces the establishment of the Philippine Civil Government. Seen in the front row, left to right, are: Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney, Vice Adm. Thomas C.

Kinkaid, Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, General MacArthur and

President Sergio Osmeña.

Drive up the Strait

Though the 1st Cavalry Division had

secured Tacloban and the region surrounding it, there remained the important task of

seizing San Juanico Strait to prevent the

Japanese from bringing in reinforcements

from Samar. San Juanico Strait, connecting

the Leyte Gulf with Samar Sea, forms a narrow passage between Leyte and Samar Islands. Highway 1 ends on its western shore,

some fourteen miles north of Tacloban at

Guintiguian, a small barrio two miles

north of San Isidro. A ferry between Guintiguian and La Paz, just across the strait

on Samar, links the road networks of the

two islands. The 2d Brigade's mission was to

seize Guintiguian on Leyte; La Paz on

Samar (including the establishment of a

bridgehead on the north bank of the Silaga

River, three miles northeast of La Paz);

and Babatngon on the north coast of Leyte.

By shore-to-shore operations it was also to

seize Basey on the island of Samar and the

area north and west of it.22

General Hoffman had been warned that

his 2d Brigade would be assigned the mission of securing San Juanico Strait and

possibly landing on Samar; he therefore

directed an overwater reconnaissance of the

22

 2d Cav Brig FO, 22 Oct 44.

NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE 155

sector. Consequently, on 23 October the

staff officers of the 8th Cavalry and of the

1st Squadron of the regiment boarded an

LCI at the Tacloban dock. The landing

craft made the trip through San Juanico

Strait to the barrio of Babatngon on Janabatas Channel without incident. On the return trip, the officers observed some Japanese positions which overlooked the ferry

crossing at the Guintiguian landing on

Leyte. The party made a brief reconnaissance of the Guintiguian side of the ferry

landing and of La Paz on the Samar side.

There was no enemy contact.23

As a consequence General Hoffman, in

issuing his orders for the next day, assigned

the following missions: the 1st Squadron,

7th Cavalry, under Maj. Leonard E. Smith

would embark at 0630 on 24 October, and

move overwater to seize the town of Babatngon. This operation would seal off the

western entrance into San Juanico Strait.

Troop C, reinforced, of the 1st Squadron,

8th Cavalry, under Maj. F. Raymond King,

was also to embark at 0630 from Tacloban

and move north to seize the ferry crossing

between Guintiguian and La Paz. At the

same time the rest of the 1st Squadron, 8th

Cavalry, under Lt. Col. Mayers Shore,

would drive north along the highway and

effect a juncture with C Troop at Guintiguian.24

The 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, sailed

for Babatngon at 1030 on 24 October. The

trip was uneventful, and at 1330 the squadron arrived at Babatngon, sent out security

patrols, and established a perimeter defense.

On 25 October the Japanese launched an

air attack, hitting an LCI in the Babatngon

harbor. Eight men were killed and seventeen

wounded, all of them Navy personnel.25

For the next few days the 1st Squadron,

7th Cavalry, made a series of overwater

movements through Carigara Bay and exploited the lack of any strong Japanese resistance along the northeast coast of the

Leyte Valley.26

Reinforced Troop C of the 1st Squadron,

8th Cavalry, was ready to sail by 0630 on

24 October but was delayed by a Japanese

air attack on the shipping in Tacloban harbor and San Pedro Bay, made by about fifty

medium bombers and Army fighters. Before

they could reach the beachhead area, many

of the Japanese planes were shot down by

Navy combat air patrol fliers, who also beat

off another wave of about thirty more

planes. Two of the American planes crashlanded on the Tacloban airfield, while a

third landed in the water.27 There was minor

damage to American shipping.

One of the Japanese planes crashed less

than 200 yards from elements of Troop C

but the force got under way. The troopers,

after running down and killing five Japanese in a canoe, arrived at La Paz, Samar,

their destination, without further excitement and established a roadblock on the

road leading to Basey.

The 1st Squadron of the 8th Cavalry,

which was to travel overland by Highway

1 to make junction with Troop C at the

ferry crossing, broke camp at 0700 on the

morning of the 24th. The squadron was

accompanied by a platoon" of light tanks and

weapons carriers with rations and ammunition. Since the passage was through enemyheld territory and over unfamiliar terrain,

23

 8th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 7. 24

 2d Cav Brig FO 3, 23 Oct 44.

25

 7th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 6-7. 26

 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 24-25. 27

 Rad, CG Sixth Army to G-2 Sixth Army, Sixth

Army G-2 Jnl, 24 Oct 44.
TACLOBAN from the air (above). Close-up of the dock area (below), showing San Juanico

Strait and the island of Samar in the background.
NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE 157

and since the strength of the Japanese forces

was unknown, it was estimated that it would

take the squadron a minimum of two days

to cover the sixteen and a quarter miles between the two forces. The commanding officer of the squadron, however, by utilizing

stream-crossing expedients to the utmost in

snaking tanks and vehicles across the many

intersecting streams and by driving the

troops, was able to complete the difficult

march to Guintiguian and go into perimeter

with all his men except a rear guard at 2130

on the same day. At the end of 24 October,

the 8th Cavalry, less the 2d Squadron, was

in a position from which it could defend its

beachhead on Samar.28

At 2300 an estimated hundred Japanese

from the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, attacked the roadblock which had

been established on the road leading to

Basey. The Japanese opened up with machine gun fire and tossed several grenades

against the position. The defenders repelled

the attack with machine gun and mortar

fire, but for the remainder of the night "confusion reigned supreme and the odds and

ends were not rounded up until the next

morning."

 29

 During the next three days the

8th Cavalry consolidated its position and

extended its perimeter to include a bridgehead on the Silaga River.

By the end of 27 October the 1st Cavalry

Division had seized Tacloban and gained

control of San Juanico Strait. Because of

supply difficulties the 2d Brigade on 25

October had ordered the 2d Squadron, 8th

Cavalry, to discontinue its movement toward Santa Cruz, to remain in bivouac

along the upper reaches of the Diit River

and patrol that area. At this time the casualties of the 1st Cavalry Division amounted

to 4 officers and 36 enlisted men killed, 14

officers and 185 enlisted men wounded, and

8 enlisted men missing in action.30 During

the same period, the division reported it had

killed 739 of the enemy and had taken

prisoner 7 Japanese, 1 Formosan, and 1

Chinese.31

The opposition had been light—much

lighter than had been expected. Elements

of the division had therefore been sent south

to reinforce the 24th Division, which had

borne the brunt of the Japanese opposition

in the X Corps sector in its drive through

northern Leyte Valley toward Carigara

Bay.

Leyte Valley Entrance

Defense at Pawing

At the end of 20 October the 24th Division had established a firm beachhead near

Palo, averaging a mile in depth, and had

secured Hill 522 which overlooked Palo.32

(Map 8) The 24th Division was to seize

Palo and drive astride the road that ran

northwest through the Leyte Valley to Carigara. The 34th Infantry, in the vicinity of

Pawing, had its 2d Battalion, commanded

by Lt. Col. James F. Pearsall, Jr., 100 yards

west of Highway 1, with the northern elements of the battalion in contact with the

5th Cavalry of the 1st Cavalry Division on

the right. The 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry,

was just short of the highway. The leading

elements of the 19th Infantry were on Hill

522.33

28

 8th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 7-9. 29

 Ibid.

30

 1st Cav Div G-l Daily Strength Rpts, 20-27

Oct 44; 8th Army Opns Rpt, p. 14. 31

 1st Cav Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 8, 27 Oct 44. 32

 Unless otherwise stated the subsection is based

upon the 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 1-39. 33

 34th Inf Unit Rpt 1, 21 Oct 44, 34th Inf Jnl,

21 Oct 44.
158 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

MAP 8

At 0100 on 21 October three companies

of Japanese,34 part of the 33d Infantry Regiment,35 under cover of darkness and aided

by heavy machine gun and mortar fire,

struck from the south along Highway 1. The

leading elements made a double envelopment of the American flanks while the main

force came down the road and attacked the

perimeter of the 2d Platoon of Company G.

By 0200 the enemy, still employing machine

gun and mortar fire, had pushed to within

a few yards of the American positions and

had killed or wounded everyone but Pvt.

Harold H. Moon, Jr., in the first two positions.

The Japanese then centered their fire

upon Private Moon, who, although

wounded by this fire, replied with his sub34

 34th Inf Unit Rpt 2, 34th Inf Jnl, 21 Oct 44. 35

 35th Army Opns, p. 28.
NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE 159

machine gun. An enemy officer attempted

to throw grenades at Moon's position and

was killed. The Japanese then brought up

a light machine gun to within twenty yards

of his position. Moon called back the range

correction to friendly mortars which

knocked out the machine gun. For over four

hours he held back the enemy. At dawn

an entire platoon with fixed bayonets

charged toward him. From a sitting position

he fired into the Japanese, killed eighteen,

and repulsed the attack. He then stood up

and threw a grenade at a machine gun that

had opened up on his right. He was hit and

instantly killed.36 The Japanese then resumed their attack, but the remnants of

Moon's platoon fixed bayonets, charged,

and succeeded in breaking through the

enemy line.

In the meantime the enemy hit the perimeter of Company L. For several hours the

Japanese felt out the company positions,

and then, covered by three machine guns,

they charged in platoon strength on the east

side of the company's perimeter. The company, supported by mortar fire, retaliated

and assaulted the Japanese in front of the

perimeter. Attempted movements around

both the enemy flanks failed. A frontal assault, protected by fire from both flanks,

was then successfully made by the company,

and the Japanese force was routed. There

were 105 enemy dead in the immediate area

of the company.

By this time it was dawn, and Pearsall's

men began extensive countermeasures.

Concentrated mortar fire was laid down,

and, since Japanese artillery was shelling

the American positions, artillery and air

strikes were requested. At 0900 Battery A

of the 63d Field Artillery Battalion fired

150 rounds on the Japanese.37

At a point 1,500 yards south of Pawing

naval flyers from the Seventh Fleet strafed

the enemy and, in co-operation with the

artillery fire, successfully broke the back of

the offensive. The enemy scattered into

the rice paddies. Members of the 2d Battalion were then able to go down the road

and mop up. More than 600 Japanese were

killed during the engagement.38 Company

G, which had borne the brunt of the attack,

lost fourteen men killed and had twelve

wounded.

The battalion had scarcely finished breakfast when at 1000 it was given the mission

of seizing a hill mass immediately west of its

position at Pawing. After artillery and naval

gunfire had been placed upon the hill for

fifteen minutes,39 E Company was to take

the northern knoll of the hill mass and F

Company to take the southern knoll. It was

not until 1400, however, that the attack

jumped off. Company E met no opposition,

and within twenty-five minutes was able to

occupy its objective.

Company F, commanded by Capt. Paul

Austin, had more difficulty. Its objective

was a steep hill, heavily covered with cogon

grass ten to twelve feet high, which limited

visibility to a few feet. A trail ran west from

a small clump of trees to the top of the hill,

and then south along the crest of the ridge

where the grass was only six inches high.

The company proceeded west in a column

of platoons and at 1430 reached the foot of

36

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 12. Private Moon

was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

37

 63d FA Bn Unit Rpt 1, 21 Oct 44, 63d FA

Bn Opns Rpt Leyte. 38

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 13. This casualty

figure from the 24th Division Operations Report

seems excessive. 39

 34th Inf FO 4, 21 Oct 44, 34th Inf Unit Jnl,

21 Oct 44.
160 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

TANK-SUPPORTED INFANTRYMEN OF THE 34TH REGIMENT attack a

hill near Pawing.

the hill. At the western edge of the group of

trees, the 1st and 3d Platoons turned left

and advanced directly toward the highest

point of the hill. The 2d Platoon, with machine guns, continued up the path.

As the 2d Squad of the 1st Platoon

reached the crest and as the 1st Squad had

nearly done so, an estimated 200 Japanese

from the 33d Infantry Regiment opened

fire upon the troops with rifles and two machine guns that were emplaced upon a knoll

overlooking the trail. Enemy riflemen also

rolled grenades down upon the 1st Squad.

These actions pinned down both of the

squads.

Protected by the machine gun fire, other

enemy riflemen worked north along the

reverse slope of the ridge and began to

throw grenades down upon the 2d Platoon. The Japanese possessed a seemingly

inexhaustible supply of grenades, which

they rolled down upon the Americans with

telling effect. Company F was unable to

advance. By 1500 the 1st and 2d Squads of

the 1st Platoon were forced off the forward slope. The 2d Platoon also had been

unable to go ahead, and the company had

suffered fourteen casualties. Captain Austin ordered his company to disengage for

reorganization. Since the American mortars could not fire directly upon the Japanese for fear of hitting friendly troops, they

were forced to fire over the enemy and

gradually shorten the range as the American troops disengaged. Consequently the

fire at first was not too effective. By 1600
NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE 161

the reorganization was complete, but Colonel Pearsall decided to delay the attack

until artillery support could be obtained.

Company F formed its night perimeter 500

yards from Pawing.

The following morning arrangements

were made for an air strike by Navy flyers

on the positions of the 33d Infantry Regiment on the hill. It was not until afternoon,

however, that the strike could be effected.

At 1345 the 63d Field Artillery Battalion

marked with smoke the right and left limits

for the air strike.40 At 1410 naval dive

bombers bombed and strafed the hill for

ten minutes with very good results, and the

Japanese power to resist was broken.41 Captain Austin's Company F, accompanied by

Colonel Newman, the regimental commander, then moved out. Supported by artillery fire, Company F captured the entire

ridge by 1515 without a single casualty. The

Pawing area was now securely in American

hands. Farther south the 19th Infantry was

engaged in fulfilling its mission of capturing

the town of Palo.

Capture of Palo

At the end of the first day's fighting, C

Company of the 19th Infantry had just

secured the top of Hill 522 and Company

B at dusk had been pinned down at the

southern crest. The following morning artillery fire effectively knocked out some

enemy pillboxes on the north crest. Both

companies then simultaneously launched

an attack down the far slope of the hill.

In the sharp fight that followed fifty Japanese from the 33d Infantry Regiment were

killed and the hill was secured.42 It was not

until late in the day, however, that supplies

could be brought to the troops and the

wounded be evacuated. The 1st Battalion

spent the next few days mopping up the

area and sealing off the tunnels with

grenades.

On the beach the 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, on the morning of 21 October waited

for naval gunfire to knock out positions

that blocked the beach road to Palo. These

defenses consisted of mutually supporting

well-constructed pillboxes reinforced with

logs and earth, with intercommunicating

trenches and foxholes. They were designed

to be used in resisting attacks from the beach

and from the north. After an all-night

mortar concentration, naval gunfire was

directed against the positions, and at 1400

the 3d Battalion attacked. When within

200 yards of a road bend, Company I and

elements of the Antitank Company, leading

the main assault, met strong resistance,

which forced the company to dig in. The

other companies occupied the same positions they had held the previous day.43

During the night Company C of the 85th

Chemical Battalion, expending 500 rounds

of ammunition, laid intermittent fire from

the 4.2-inch mortars on the Japanese

positions.44

At 0900 on 22 October the 3d Battalion,

with Company I in the lead, attacked with

the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, which had

been released from division reserve, on its

left flank. This co-ordinated advance pushed

past the defensive positions of the 33d Infantry Regiment, many of which had been

abandoned. The positions of the 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, were taken over by

the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry. The latter

battalion patrolled the road and eliminated 40

 63d FA Bn Unit Rpt 2, 22 Oct 44. 41

 24th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 3, 22 Oct 44. 42

 19th Inf Unit Rpt 2, 21 Oct 44.

43

 Ibid. 44

 85th Chemical Mortar Bn Hist 1943-44, p. 28.
PALO, with the Palo River and the slopes of Hill 522 in the background (above), and the junction of Highways 1 and 2 (below).
NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE 163

scattered Japanese pockets of resistance

south to the Palo River.

The 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, was to

secure Palo, which is situated about one mile

inland on the south side of the Palo River.

The town is an important road junction,

the meeting point of the Leyte Valley and

east coast road systems. The coastal road,

Highway 1, which goes through Palo,

crosses a steel bridge over the Palo River on

the edge of the town. Highway 2, a one-lane

all-weather road for most of its length, extends west to Barugo and Carigara.45

 Just

outside Palo are two hills, one on each side

of the highway, which guard the entrance

into the interior. The Americans termed

them Hills B and C. Elements of the 33d

Infantry Regiment were guarding Palo.46

Early in the morning of 21 October, the

2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, moved west

through enemy machine gun and rifle fire

and bypassed the enemy defensive position

that had held it up the previous day. At

1155 the battalion reached the junction of

the beach road and Highway 1. During the

movement two men were killed and two

wounded. At the road junction, the battalion dispersed with machine gun fire a

column of about thirty-five Japanese moving south on Highway 1. Artillery fire was

then laid on a grove of trees, west of the

road, to which the enemy had fled. As the

battalion proceeded south along the highway between the road junction and the

bridge, it came under artillery fire from an

undetermined source. The tempo of the

march into Palo was accelerated—"the

troops wanted to move as rapidly as possible

from that vicinity. They double timed across

the bridge."

 47

 At 1500 they entered Palo

without further opposition.48

The residents of the town were crowded

into the church. As the Americans entered,

the church bell rang and the Filipinos came

out and greeted the troops. After the first

exuberant welcome had subsided, the soldiers ordered the civilians back into the

church until they could secure the town. In

the house-to-house search, the troops found

some booby traps made from coconuts49

and encountered Japanese entrenched under and between houses in the western sector

of the town. Although the battalion had

expected to outpost the entire town, the

menace of the Japanese appeared so threatening that a night perimeter was established around the town square.

Defense of Palo

During the early part of the night there

was continuous rifle fire from individual

Japanese. The 13th Field Artillery Battalion had arrived and began to fire on the

roads leading into the town, expending

some 300 rounds of ammunition. At midnight some Japanese ammunition stored in

a house exploded, and the ensuing fire lasted

for three hours. At 0400 on 22 October elements of the 33d Infantry Regiment counterattacked along Highway 2 50

 but were

repulsed by fire from the outposts. The enemy then struck at the juncture of the left

flank of Company F and the right flank of

Company G. The 81-mm. mortars of the

2d Battalion fired on this point, expending

all their ammunition. In the meantime Battery B of the 13th Field Artillery Battalion

45

 Allied Geographical Sec, Terrain Study 84,

Leyte Province, 17 Aug 44. 46

 35th Army Opns, p. 28.

47

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 16. 48

 Ibid.; 19th Inf Unit Rpt 2, 21 Oct 44. 49

 24th Div G-2 Jnl, 21 Oct 44. 50

 24th Div G-2 Jnl, 22 Oct 44.
164 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

and elements of the 63d Field Artillery Battalion moved up to within a hundred yards

of the front outposts and fired. The enemy

stubbornly continued to fight, throwing

"everything he had into the attack."

 51

At the same time nearly a platoon of the

enemy came out at the curve of the beach

road and started toward the bridge on

Highway 1 at Palo, but these troops were

dispersed by light machine gun fire. Artillery fire forced the Japanese to withdraw,

and they were thrown back on all fronts.52

Though the battalion had lost 16 men

killed and 44 wounded, it had killed 91

Japanese. After the engagement, the battalion requested additional ammunition,

supplies, and equipment, and transportation

for the wounded.53 The requests were complied with, though not without danger since

the Japanese had mined the road.

At 1330 the regimental headquarters of

the 19th Infantry moved into Palo. The

regiment's 3d Battalion relieved the 2d Battalion at the same time, thus enabling the

latter to attack Hill B at 1425.54 The 3d

Battalion spent the rest of the day and the

following day mopping up in Palo and

sending probing patrols southward in order

to make contact with the XXIV Corps.55

A patrol in Palo killed seven Japanese

dressed in civilian clothing, one of whom, a

lieutenant, had his insignia pinned inside his

clothes.56

On the night of 23 October Col. Tatsunosuke Suzuki, the commanding officer of

the 33d Infantry Regiment, led a raiding detachment, armed with rifles, sabres, grenades, and mines, into Palo from the southwest.57

 Using Filipino civilians in front of

them, the men of the detachment tricked

the guards at the outpost into believing that

they were guerrillas. The Japanese were

thus able to capture two machine guns and

a 37-mm. gun. They penetrated to the town

square and charged, throwing explosives

into houses, trucks, and a tank, and broke

into an evacuation hospital where they

killed some wounded. They then moved toward the bridge and mounted the captured

machine guns on it,58 firing until their ammunition was exhausted and then abandoning the guns. The American guards on the

other side of the bridge, however, were able

to fire upon the bridge and its approaches

so effectively that they killed fifty Japanese,

according to a count made the next morning. The raid was completely broken up,

and sixty Japanese, including Colonel Suzuki, were killed. The American casualties

were fourteen killed and twenty wounded.

The 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, had sent

Company K to reconnoiter to the south and

if possible make contact with the XXIV

Corps. On the morning of the 24th the

company entered San Joaquin to the south

of Palo. By 1600 the town had been secured

and the company was prepared to defend

it. Engineers began to repair the damaged

bridge so that armored units could proceed

southward along Highway 1. On the morning of 25 October Company K advanced

south from San Joaquin and by 1200 had

secured positions on the north bank of the

Binahaan River, from which patrols were

sent into Tanauan. At 1430 the patrols met

a motorized unit of the 96th Division, establishing contact for the first time between

the X and XXIV Corps. The rest of the 51

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 18. 5 2 19th Inf Unit Jnl, 22 Oct 44. 53

 Ibid. 54

 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56

 19th Inf Unit Rpt 3, 22 Oct 44.

57

 35th Army Opns, p. 28. 58

 GHQ Observer to G-2 Sixth Army, Sixth

Army G-2 Jnl, 24 Oct 44.
NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE 165

battalion moved out of Palo the same morning and was able to advance rapidly with

little opposition and set up a perimeter at

Castilla, 8,000 yards southwest of Palo.

Thus the northern and southern approaches to Palo and the beachhead area

east of the town had now been secured.

But on the western edge of Palo were the

two hills athwart Highway 2 and blocking

passage into Leyte Valley. Hill B on the

southern side of the highway and Hill G

on the northern side would have to be

secured before the Americans could advance. Preliminary reconnaissance had revealed that these hills were strongly held,

and since the 24th Division, contrary to

expectations, had encountered considerably

stronger opposition than the 1st Cavalry

Division, General Sibert decided to detach

the 1st Brigade from the 1st Cavalry Division and place it under X Corps control.

The 2d Squadron of the 5th Cavalry remained in position on the high ground west

of Tacloban, while the regiment's 1st

Squadron moved into position in Pawing,

to relieve the 2d Battalion, 34th Infantry.

The 12th Cavalry assembled in the vicinity

of Marasbaras in X Corps reserve.59

Capture of Hill C

At 0800 on 23 October the 1st Battalion,

34th Infantry, commanded by Maj. Edwin

N. Edris, and the 1st Platoon, 603d Tank

Company, assembled 500 yards north of

Hill 522 preparatory to launching an attack

on Hill C.60 It was reported that 300 Japanese were in a strong defensive position between Hills C and 331, the latter located

west of Pawing. Consequently, an air strike

was called for and delivered on the area,

after which the battalion started for Hill C.

The first obstacle encountered was a small

ridge known as Hill Nan, and just beyond

this ridge was another hill mass known as

Hill Mike. Company B advanced up Hill

Nan in a skirmish line. When the company

neared the crest of the ridge, a machine gun

200 yards to its front opened up, and at the

same time the Japanese from dug-in positions on the reverse slope began to throw

grenades over the crest. The company was

halted. Three times during the afternoon

it reached the crest, only to be driven back

by enemy fire. Several counterattacks were

repulsed, but the machine gun was not

silenced.

At 1800 the company received orders to

disengage so that artillery fire might be laid

upon the enemy positions. The Japanese

immediately counterattacked. An American

lieutenant and a sergeant of the company

rushed to the crest with grenades which they

threw upon the advancing Japanese. This

action enabled the company to disengage

and return to the assembly area with only a

few casualties.

During the night artillery and 4.2-inch

mortar fires were placed on the ridge. As a

result, on the following day, 24 October, the

1st Battalion secured it without meeting

any resistance. With this ridge in American

hands, the 3d Battalion was able to pass

through the 1st Battalion and secure without opposition Hill Mike, the last remaining obstacle before Hill C. During the night

artillery pounded Hill G.

On the morning of 25 October the 3d

Battalion, 34th Infantry, moved out to attack Hill C, with Companies I and K

abreast.61 Although the troops found the

hill difficult to climb, elements of Company 59 1st Cav Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 3, 24 Oct 44. 60

 34th Inf FO 5, 22 Oct 44, 34th Inf Unit Jnl,

23 Oct 44. 61

 Fragmentary FO, 34th Inf Jnl, 25 Oct 44.
166 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

K reached its crest without opposition. The

enemy started his usual tactics of throwing

grenades over the crest of the hill at Company I as it neared the top. Since the company had suffered many casualties, a platoon from Company K was sent to reinforce

Company I. Finally, at 1700, the company

took the crest of the hill and dug in for the

night.

The 2d Battalion, 34th Infantry, which

had been relieved by the 1st Squadron, 5th

Cavalry, moved out of Pawing at 0700 on

24 October. At 1030 it received orders to

seize a small hill southeast of Hill C. With

Company E in the lead, the battalion proceeded in single file up the hill, which was

covered with cogon grass. As it had hitherto

been the practice of the Japanese to withhold their main fire until the Americans

neared the top of a hill, the troops expected

little opposition before reaching the crest.

But while the company was still a considerable distance from the top, elements of the

33d Infantry Regiment opened up with

rifles, machine guns, and grenades. This

fire pinned the company down, and the men

immediately sought concealment in the

cogon grass. Light machine guns were

brought up, but, because of the steepness of

the slope, they were ineffective. Artillery

and mortars fired for two hours against the

entrenched Japanese positions. At 1610

Company E renewed the attack and this

time secured the hill with little opposition.

The 34th Infantry now occupied the hills

on the north side of Highway 2.

Seizure of Hill B

On 22 October the 3d Battalion of the

19th Infantry had relieved the 2d Battalion

of the regiment at Palo, and the regimental

commander ordered the 2d Battalion to

proceed against Hill B.62 Earlier, the 2d

Battalion had sent patrols out preparatory

to attacking the hill. The 13th Field Artillery Battalion laid maximum supporting

fires on Hill B as naval bombers strafed it.63

The 2d Battalion moved out to the attack at

1425, and the concentrated artillery fire enabled it to secure without resistance a ridge

east of Hill B and then push on down the

road toward the hill. But as Company E, the

lead company, reached the foot of Hill B, it

was met by a large group from the 33d Infantry Regiment coming east down the road

and around the hill. The Japanese had left

riflemen dug in on the steep banks of the

road and had posted others in the trees

along the road. Some of these riflemen allowed part of the American troops to pass

and then opened fire. A sharp fire fight

broke out in which Company E killed an

estimated hundred of the enemy before

being forced to withdraw to the ridge, where

the 2d Battalion dug in for the night. During

the night the 13th Field Artillery fired on

Hill B. At 0730 the following day the 2d

Battalion sent out two patrols to scout the

enemy positions. The patrol on the right

flank was stopped by machine gun fire at a

point 200 yards west of the ridge and was

forced to return. Mortar fire was placed on

the enemy machine guns, after which the 2d

Battalion advanced, reaching what was believed to be the crest of Hill B at 1530.64

As the forward progress was more difficult

than had been expected, the 2d Squadron

of the 12th Cavalry was sent to relieve the

1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, which had been

engaged in mopping up Hill 522.65 This

62

 19th Inf Unit Jnl, 22 Oct 44. 63

 Ibid.

64

 19th Inf Unit Rpt 4, 19th Inf Unit Jnl, 23 Oct

44.

65

 1st Cav Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 3, 24 Oct 44.
NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART ONE 167

relieved battalion was given the mission of

attacking Hill 85, to the south of Palo,

where the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance

Troop had located a strong enemy position.

During the night the artillery placed concentrated fire upon Hill 85.

At 0800 on 24 October the men of the

2d Battalion moved out, attempting to

complete the capture of Hill B.66 They were

held up by well-emplaced pillboxes and foxholes on the highest crest of the ridge, having discovered that the crest they had first

occupied was not the true crest. Since the

33d Infantry Regiment seemed to be well

emplaced on the hill, Lt. Col. Robert B.

Spragins had his battalion move to the

right. It took up a position overlooking a

narrow asphalt road that ran from Highway 2 to a Japanese supply dump to the

south. Colonel Spragins decided to attack

Hill B from this position on the following

morning.

The 13th Field Artillery Battalion again

pounded the enemy positions on the hill during the night. On the morning of 25

October the 2d Battalion attacked with

Companies G and E abreast. The troops

moved down the slope, across the road, and

up the hill, with no opposition. On reaching the crest, they were met by heavy fire

that came from well-constructed emplacements. Some of these positions were six feet

deep and five feet wide. Very heavy fighting

broke out in which the companies were

barely able to hold their positions. The 11th

and 52d Field Artillery Battalions fired in

front of Hill B,67 and the enemy fire was

silenced. Company E was forced back, but

Company G held on.

Although the hill was in American hands,

the hold was very precarious. Colonel

Spragins therefore moved the rest of the

battalion up to Company G and ordered

the latter to move out to a far ridge in

order to secure the hill firmly. This move

was accomplished at twilight. The rest of

the battalion moved out to join Company G.

Starting in the dark, the battalion lost

its way. At midnight the troops came to the

true crest of the ridge where the enemy had

an observation post surrounded by prepared

positions. All were empty. The Japanese had

formed the habit of going to the villages for

the night and returning in the morning to

man their posts. The night movement of the

battalion "literally caught them napping

away from their defenses."

 68

 The battalion

had not reached Company G, but it set up

a defensive perimeter for the night. The hills

guarding Leyte Valley were now in American hands.

During the day the 1st Battalion, 19th

Infantry, secured complete control of Hill

85 without opposition. The battalion found

an abandoned position, mortar ammunition, and six dead Japanese.

By the end of 25 October the X Corps

had made substantial progress toward securing northern Leyte Valley. After capturing Tacloban, the 1st Cavalry Division had

pushed north and secured control over San

Juanico Strait. The 24th Division had secured Palo and the hill fortresses that

blocked the entrance into northern Leyte

Valley. The corps was now in a position to

launch a drive into the interior of the valley. 66 19th Inf Unit Jnl, 24 Oct 44. 67

 24th Div Arty Unit Rpt 3, 26 Oct 44. 68

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 27.
CHAPTER X

Northern Leyte Valley: Part Two

General Krueger had expected stronger

Japanese resistance in the zone of action of

the 1st Cavalry Division than in that of the

24th Division. He had therefore thought it

safe to release the 21st Infantry for the landings at Panaon Strait. When events proved

otherwise, a portion of the strength of the

1st Cavalry Division was shifted into the

zone of the 24th Division to enable the latter

to free itself of responsibility for rear areas

and direct its effort to the advance into

Leyte Valley.1 (Map 9)

Drive up Leyte Valley

The Japanese planned to fall back into

the mountains if the Americans were successful in seizing the Tacloban airfield.

They expected to take with them "munition

sufficient for one and one-half units of fire

for one division . . . and food for 20,000

men for six month [s]."2 The rapid advance of the Americans, however, prevented

the execution of this plan. After 25 October

the remaining elements of the 33d Infantry

Regiment withdrew to a position about

three and three-fourths miles northeast of

Jaro.3 When the American forces had taken

the hills dominating the entrance into Leyte

Valley and overlooking Highway 2, Lt.

Gen. Sosaku Suzuki, the commander of the

35th Army, concentrated his forces around

Jaro on the southern edge of Leyte Valley.

The 41st Regiment of the 30th Division and

the 169th Independent Battalion of the 102d

Division, both of which had but recently

arrived on Leyte as reinforcements to the

16th Division, on 26 October were ordered

to proceed from Carigara to Jaro. On the

same day the 17th Independent Battalion,

102d Division, moved toward Jaro.4

The 34th Infantry Advances

Into the Valley

After the successful capture of Hills B

and C, the 24th Division resumed its attack west. With the 1st Cavalry Division

protecting the 24th Division's northern

flank, the 34th Infantry was to proceed

westward into the interior along Highway

2. The 19th Infantry, as the 24th Division's southern prong, was to follow an almost parallel route to Pastrana.5

 The 1st

Cavalry Brigade was to relieve the combat

troops of the 24th Division in the rear areas

in order to enable the division to continue

its advance into the interior.

Highway 2 was a one-lane all-weather

road, twelve feet wide with four-foot

shoulders. It had a crushed rock and gravel

1

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 38. 2

 14th Area Army Opns Leyte, pp. 2-3. 3

 35th Army Opns, p. 35.

4

 10th I&HS, Eighth Army, Staff Study Opns

of Japanese 35th Army on Leyte, Interrog of Maj

Gen Yoshiharu Tomochika, CofS 35th Army, Pt.

I, p. 2. 5

 24th Div FO 3, 0700, 25 Oct 44.
NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO 169

MAP 9

surface. In general it ran through level

ground, with occasional groves of light

timber, bamboo, and abaca. Much of the

area was under cultivation. At Santa Fe a

one-lane all-weather branch road ran four

miles south to Pastrana, at which point a

seasonal one-lane road ran southward for

about five miles to Dagami and another

northwest for about eight and a half miles

to Jaro.

At 1000 on 26 October the 2d Battalion

of the 34th Infantry, commanded by Colonel Pearsall, moved out of its assembly area

at Malirong in a column of companies and

pushed westward on Highway 2. The battalion met slight resistance at the Malirong

River bridge, but mortar fire knocked out

the enemy opposition, and the advance continued. Since the battalion encountered few

Japanese, the flank protection, which had to

traverse difficult terrain, was called in, and

the advance then proceeded at a much more

rapid pace. The 2d Battalion met, and killed

or routed, small groups of the enemy. It

crossed streams where the bridges had been

destroyed. The 3d Engineer Battalion put

temporary structures in for two of these

bridges in order that the first elements might

proceed, and it placed a Bailey bridge over

a third stream. The 1st Battalion, which

followed the 2d, used Japanese handcarts

to transport supplies between the destroyed

bridges and the forward troops.6 By 1730

Colonel Pearsall had all of his battalion in

Sante Fe. The following day, Lt. Col.

Thomas E. Clifford, Jr., who had become

6

 34th Inf Unit Jnl, 26 Oct 44.
170 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

the commanding officer of the 1st Battalion,

pushed his unit through the 2d Battalion

and advanced 7,000 yards without opposition to the Mudburon River, where the

troops established their night perimeter at

1545.7

Mainit River Bridge

On the morning of 28 October Colonel

Clifford ordered the 1st Battalion to move

out in a column of companies along Highway 2 toward the town of Alangalang about

a mile and a quarter northwest. At 0900 the

battalion moved out. Company A, the lead

company, entered Alangalang without incident, set up local security, and then fell to

the rear of the battalion, which passed

through Alangalang8 without pausing and

moved toward the Mainit River about one

and a half miles farther on.

As Company C reached the Mainit River

it made contact with the enemy, who had

dug in on both steeply sloping banks of the

river at the steel bridge crossing. The company suffered five casualties. It was opposed

by the remaining elements of the 33d Infantry, which had been considerably mauled

by the Americans.9 Company C withdrew

300 yards as Companies B and A pressed

forward on the left side of the road under

continuous rifle fire. Colonel Pearsall's 2d

Battalion had followed the 1st Battalion,

and both units were to make an assault

against the 41st Infantry Regiment, which

had arrived in the area. Three batteries of

the 63d Field Artillery Battalion shelled the

enemy positions for a depth of 300 yards on

the eastern side of the river and 100 yards

on the western side.

After the artillery concentration was over,

the two battalions were to move out to the

attack—the 1st on the left and the 2d on

the right. The regimental commander ordered the 1st Battalion to attack, destroy

the enemy resistance, and secure the eastern

bank of the river. Five tanks were to follow

in the rear of the assault companies and

fire at targets of opportunity. Five hundred

yards away, to the right of the 1st Battalion,

Companies E and F of Pearsall's battalion

were to cross the river, destroy enemy resistance on the western side, and then go

south on Highway 2 to contact the enemy

at the bridge.10

The 1st Battalion moved to the water's

edge, where it was pinned down by enemy

fire. Companies E and F of the 2d Battalion, however, were able to push north

500 yards through the heavy brush, and

amid a driving rain they managed to ford

the river unobserved. Once on the other

side they charged the entrenchments of the

41st Infantry Regiment on the river, with

Company F in the lead. As Company F

neared the bridge it overran three mortar

positions without stopping but was finally

halted by heavy machine gun fire. After the

company's 60-mm. mortar had knocked

out the machine gun, the unit continued to

advance and passed the bridgehead before

it ran out of ammunition. Company E then

relieved Company F, while the latter set

up heavy machine guns to silence enemy

machine guns in the woods to the west.

By 1500 the bridge was in American hands.

The Japanese had placed a demolition

7

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 27 Oct 44. 8

 There is an interesting anecdote about the town:

"Sergeant [Charles W.] Capps and Pvt. [Harold

O.] Mottlet of G-3 got some help from a Jap

sniper when they were hunting for Alangalang on

a situation map. There was a 'ping' and they hit

the dirt. When they resumed work they found a

bullet puncture practically through Alangalang on

the map." 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 78. 9

 Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 15. 10

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 28 Oct 44.
NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO 171

charge on the bridge, but the American

advance had been so swift that the enemy

never had an opportunity to set off the

charge.

The 3d Battalion had meanwhile moved

up to the rear of the other two battalions

and established contact south of Santa Fe

with the 19th Infantry, which was protecting the southern flank of the division.

Seizure of Pastrana

On 25 October the 3d Battalion, 19th

Infantry, advancing toward Pastrana, had

pushed against slight opposition into Castilla and established a perimeter there.11

 On

the morning of the same day, Maj. Elmer

C. Howard, the battalion commander, told

Lt. Col. George H. Chapman, Jr., of the

19th Infantry that he had learned from the

Filipinos that there was no organized resistance along the three miles from Castilla

to Pastrana. He therefore asked permission

to go to Pastrana and establish a roadblock. Colonel Chapman told Major Howard to stay out of Pastrana but to send patrols to locate defenses around the town.12

Colonel Chapman later rescinded this order, and at 1300 on 26 October Major Howard moved his battalion out from Castilla to

attack Pastrana, which was 5,000 yards

southwest of Santa Fe. Company I, the lead

company, proceeded over a trail that was

too narrow to accommodate vehicles. At

1600 the point of Company I reached the

outskirts of Pastrana but came under heavy

enemy fire. The battalion pulled back and

then attacked with Companies I and K

abreast. The companies were stopped by

fire that came from an unusual fortification—a star-shaped fort, with a tin roof,

which looked like three or four native shacks

in a cluster. The sides were banked with

earth, over which grass had been allowed to

grow—a feature so exceptional that it

aroused suspicion and gave away the nature of the installation. Pillboxes flanked

the fortification, which was backed by a

system of trenches. Colonel Chapman ordered another attack at 1630, but casualties

were so heavy that the troops dug in after

getting within 100 yards of the fortress.

At 1750 Battery C, 11th Field Artillery

Battalion, placed fire on the fortification,

but after forty-two rounds of ammunition

had been expended, the battery reported

that the muddy ground "caused [the] guns

to go out of action."

 13

 From 1850 to 1905,

Battery A of the 14th Field Artillery delivered harassing fire on Pastrana,14

 and from

2200 to 2400 the 13th Field Artillery Battalion took over the task of placing fire on

the sector around the town.15 With the coming of daylight, the 4.2-inch and 81-mm.

mortars took up the shelling. The night-long

pounding of the Japanese positions around

Pastrana was so effective that on the morning of 27 October Company K of the 3d

Battalion was able to move around the town

and establish a roadblock at a demolished

bridge a few hundred yards southwest. The

rest of the day the 3d Battalion, assisted by

Colonel Zierath's 1st Battalion, which had

followed the 3d Battalion, mopped up in

the town and sent out patrols to investigate

the terrain and enemy dispositions west and

south of the town.

The 19th Infantry was to continue to protect the southern flank of the 24th Division,

11 19th Inf Unit Rpt 6, 25 Oct 44, 19th Inf Unit

Jnl, 25 Oct 44. 12

 19th Inf Unit Jnl, 25 Oct 44.

13

 11th FA Bn Unit Rpt 6, 28 Oct 44. There was

no report for 27 October. 14

 Ibid.

15

 13th FA Bn Unit Rpt 7, 27 Oct 44.
172 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

PASTRANA was left a mass of smoldering ruins after the shelling of 26-27 October.

which was driving toward Carigara, by

moving toward Jaro—the proposed assembly point of the 35th Army, On the morning

of 28 October, Colonel Zierath had the 1st

Battalion establish a roadblock north of the

Binahaan River in the vicinity of Macalpe.

The 2d Battalion pushed forward to Tingib

and established a perimeter there. For the

next two days the 19th Infantry sent out

patrols in all directions; they met only scattered resistance from the Japanese. On 29

October Company K left Pastrana and

established a roadblock at Ypad. On the following day it moved south from Ypad to

Lapdok, where it established contact with

elements of the XXIV Corps. On the 30th

two platoons from Company C encountered

about 100 Japanese at Rizal. The enemy

fought aggressively, but resistance ceased

after artillery fire had been placed on the

town. It was estimated that the majority of

the enemy force was killed. As a result of the

skirmishes and patrols, General Makino was

unable to establish contact between elements of the 16th Division at Dagami and

those at Jaro.16

Fall of Jaro

At the crossing of the Mainit River, a

one-lane all-weather branch road runs

southwest for about three and a half miles

to Jaro, and then northwest along the western edge of Leyte Valley for about ten and

a half miles to Carigara on the north coast.

At Jaro many dirt roads and trails branch

out in all directions.

The drive of the 24th Division toward

Carigara was continued as the 34th Infan16

 35th Army Opns, p. 43.
NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO 173

try, protected by the 19th Infantry on its

flank, moved toward Jaro. After the seizure

of the Mainit River bridge, two tanks of

the 1st Platoon, 603d Tank Company, attached to the 34th Infantry, scouted north

and made contact with forward elements of

the 2d Squadron of the 8th Cavalry, which

had arrived in the San Miguel area.

On the evening of 28 October Colonel

Newman issued orders to the 34th Infantry

for the following day. The 3d Battalion, under Lt. Col. Edward M. Postlethwait, was

to pass through Colonel Clifford's 1st Battalion and Colonel Pearsall's 2d Battalion

and resume the offensive with Company L

in the lead. From Cavite the battalion would

move southwest along the road to capture

Jaro. Company L would be sufficiently in

advance to make reconnaissance of the route

before the rest of the battalion arrived.17

At 0900 on 29 October, Company L

moved out from Cavite, meeting no resistance until an hour later when it ran into

some of the enemy at a point about 100

yards from Galotan.18 The leading scout

spied a man, whom he thought to be a

Filipino, dashing into a shack. When he

shouted for the man to come out, the scout

was shot in the head. The company came

on and killed the man. It then came under

machine gun fire. Platoons attacked from

both flanks against Galotan. Since the

enemy troops had dug in under the shacks,

it was slow, bloody work digging them out

with rifles and grenades. The 3d Platoon,

which had been in reserve, closed in when

the center of the town was reached and

helped finish the job. In the meantime another unit of the company. which had been

sent to the right on a wide enveloping movement, came under fire from a wooded knoll.

Artillery and mortar fire soon drove the Japanese off. Unable to retreat westward, the

enemy moved northward down a stream

bed and set up a defensive position 500 yards

west of the road and opposite the center of

the advancing column of the 3d Battalion.

Fortunately, since the Antitank Platoon had

displaced forward by sections, one section

was in position at this point and was able to

quickly eliminate the enemy threat. The 3d

Battalion resumed its march and secured

Jaro at 1700 without further difficulty.

By this time the 19th Infantry had gained

control of the area south and east of Jaro.

Junction between the 34th Infantry and

19th Infantry was accomplished on 31 October when the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry,

moved into Jaro. Other elements of the 19th

Infantry were engaged in mopping up in

the Pastrana sector. The 19th and 34th

Infantry Regiments had been able to advance rapidly in their drives through Leyte

Valley, had maintained contact with the

1st Cavalry Division, and had arrived within

ten miles of Carigara Bay.

By 28 October the XXIV Corps had

nearly secured the southern portion of Leyte

Valley. General Sibert was anxious to have

the X Corps advance rapidly to the shore

of Carigara Bay and thus bring all of the

valley under control of the Sixth Army. The

24th Division was relieved by the 1st

Cavalry Division of responsibility for protecting the rear areas from Santa Fe to

Cavite. The 24th Division, thus freed, was

to continue pressing the attack to its front

with the utmost vigor.19

The American advance had been so

rapid that General Suzuki did not have

sufficient time to put into effect his plan

17

 34th Inf Unit Jnl, 28 Oct 44. 18

 The battalion journal laconically notes that

Company L "meets slight resistance—kill appx.

50 Japs and continues." 3d Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl,

29 Oct 44. 19

 X Corps FO 3, 28 Oct 44.
174 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

U.S. ANTITANK PLATOON under enemy fire at Jaro. Soldier in foreground is taking

cover behind a 37-mm. antitank gun M3.

for making Jaro the assembly ground for

the 35th Army. He was forced to use the

Carigara area as the new point of rendezvous for his troops. On the evening of 28

October Colonel Newman planned his attack for the remaining distance to Carigara.

He hoped that the troops would make a

swift passage, but later events proved that

the Japanese intended to contest the advance bitterly.

Drive From the North

At the close of 27 October the 7th Cavalry, less the 1st Squadron, was in reserve,

while the 1st Squadron was at Babatngon

sending patrols along the north coast of

Leyte and the southwest coast of Samar.

The 1st Squadron of the 8th Cavalry was

patrolling Samar in the La Paz area and

the 2d Squadron of the regiment was patrolling from its bivouac area in the upper

reaches of the Diit River. In order to protect the rear of the 24th Division in its forward advance, the 1st Squadron of the 12th

Cavalry, which had been in reserve, was ordered to Castilla. The squadron closed on

Castilla at 1200 on 28 October.20

In accordance with orders from General

Sibert, General Mudge reassigned the various elements of the 1st Cavalry Division.

On 28 October General Hoffman issued

orders for his 2d Cavalry Brigade to move

toward Carigara. The 2d Squadron, 8th

Cavalry, was to establish a base at San

Miguel, secure Cavite with one troop, patrol and mop up the north and northwest

20

 1st Cav Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 8, 28 Oct 44.
NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO 175

area up to and including the Barugo road,

and maintain contact with patrols of the

1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, that would be

operating southeast from Barugo. The 1st

Squadron, 7th Cavalry, while maintaining

a platoon at Santa Cruz and a troop at

Babatngon, was to move to the BarugoCarigara area and mop up and patrol the

area to the south and southeast.21

In accordance with this plan, Troop C

of the 7th Cavalry was to proceed by water

from Babatngon to Barugo and then overland to feel out the enemy position in Carigara. Troop C, under 1st Lt. Tower W.

Greenbowe, on 28 October made the overwater and overland movements without

incident. The troop entered the eastern end

of Carigara without opposition, but as it

neared the main intersection it received fire

from several buildings. In anticipation of

this contingency, the men of Troop C had

been well deployed when they entered the

town, and were able to return the fire immediately. As the fight progressed, the

Japanese transported their dead and

wounded to five trucks near the beach road.

The fire fight continued until late in the

afternoon when Lieutenant Greenbowe

withdrew his force to Barugo, and evacuated his dead and wounded with him. The

enemy had suffered an estimated 75 casualties ; Greenbowe's force had 3 men killed, 9

wounded, and 1 missing. The mutilated

body of the missing man was found later.22

Since intelligence reports stated that as

many as 5,000 Japanese were in Carigara,

General Sibert decided that the attack on

the town should be a two-division operation.

While the 24th Division was fighting its

way up the road from Jaro to Carigara, additional 2d Cavalry Brigade units assembled in the Barugo area. The 1st Squadron

of the 7th Cavalry joined its C Troop at

Barugo on 29 October; the 2d Squadron,

8th Cavalry, moved from San Miguel to

Barugo on 31 October; and the advance

headquarters of the 7th Cavalry Regiment

and the 2d Cavalry Brigade arrived at

Barugo on 31 October and 1 November,

respectively. Attached to the 7th Cavalry

Regiment was the 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, which closed into the Barugo area on

1 November via Cavite and San Miguel.23

Drive to Tunga

On 29 October the Japanese had

prepared new plans for the defense of

Leyte. In order to simplify planning, the

35th Army headquarters was relieved of

command responsibility for Samar by the

14th Area Army. Almost simultaneously,

the 35th Army received the erroneous report

that the Japanese naval forces had destroyed a large part of the U. S. Navy on 24

and 25 October in engagements off Leyte

and that the losses would prevent the Americans from continuing the operation. On the

contrary, the American naval forces had

secured a decisive victory. The Japanese reverse seriously affected General Suzuki's attempt to put his new plans for the 35th

Army into effect.

The plans provided for the calling up of

the 102d Division from Panay and the 1st

and 26th Divisions from Luzon. These divisions were to land at Ormoc and then pro21

 2d Cav Brig FO 6, 28 Oct 44. 22

 2d Cav Brig Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6.

23

 The 5th Cavalry Regiment had moved behind

the 34th Infantry on its advance along Highway 2

to the Mainit River bridge. When the 34th Infantry

moved south to Jaro the 5th Cavalry took over

the Cavite area and, during the Carigara attack,

the regiment (less its 2d Squadron) was responsible for the protection of the line of communication

from Cavite to Barugo. 5th Cav Opns Rpt, p. 5;

1st Cav Div FO 6, 1 Nov 44.
176 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

ceed in three columns northward along

Highway 2 through Ormoc Valley to the

shores of Carigara Bay. They were then to

advance eastward and destroy the American forces in the area between Tacloban

and Tanauan. Since it was assumed that

Carigara would remain in Japanese hands,

the 68th Brigade, serving as 35th Army reserve, was expected to land in the north in

the vicinity of Carigara. At the same time

the 30th Division was to land at Albuera on

the west coast and drive overland to

Burauen, in order to support the operations

of the main body of the 35th Army.24

Although the American naval victory

and rapid advance of land forces prevented

the Japanese from bringing this plan to full

fruition, sizable enemy forces opposed the

drive of U.S. troops toward Carigara.

About 28 October the 41st Infantry Regiment moved from Carigara to the southeast section of Jaro. The 169th Independent

Infantry Battalion of the 102d Division, together with a battalion (Tempei Battalion]

of the 57th Independent Mixed Brigade,

was in the Carigara area. The advance

elements first engaged the Americans about

30 October.25 These units, however, continued out past Jaro and took up positions

in the mountains.

On the night of 29 October the 34th Infantry had captured Jaro and was about

ten miles from Carigara along the JaroCarigara highway. (Map 10) At 0800 on

30 October Colonel Newman ordered the

3d Battalion of the 34th Infantry to start for

Carigara down the highway. As the battalion left the outskirts of Jaro, with Company L in the lead, it came under fire from

Japanese who were dug in under shacks

along the road. Upon a call from the commanding officer of Company L, the tanks

came up in a column, fired under the shacks,

and then retired. The leading platoon was

drawn back so that artillery fire might be

placed on the Japanese, but the enemy could

not be located precisely enough to use the

artillery. Colonel Newman then ordered

a cautious movement forward without artillery support, a squad placed on each side

of the road and two tanks in the center. The

squads had advanced only fifty yards when

Japanese fire again pinned them down.

When Colonel Newman came forward

and discovered why the advance was held up

he declared, "I'll get the men going okay."

 26

Upon hearing that the regimental commander was to lead them, the men started

to move forward. The Japanese at once

opened fire with artillery and mortars, and

Colonel Newman was hit in the stomach.

Although badly wounded he tried to devise

some means of clearing the situation. After

sending a runner back with orders to have

Colonel Postlethwait fire on the Japanese

position, he said, "Leave me here and get

mortar fire on that enemy position."

 27

 As

soon as possible Colonel Newman was put

on a poncho and dragged back to safety.28

Meanwhile the troops, unable to move

forward, broke contact with the Japanese in

an orderly fashion. Lt. Col. Chester A.

Dahlen, the regimental executive officer, assumed command and at 1209 ordered that

the attack be resumed.29 The 3d Battalion

was to move northwest along the road to

Carigara for 3,000 yards and then set up a

night perimeter. The 2d Battalion, in sup24

 10th I&HS Eighth Army, Stf Study of Opns of

Japanese 35th Army on Leyte, Part I, p. 5; Part IV,

p. 3, OCMH. 25

 10th I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study of Japanese

102d Division on Leyte and Cebu, passim, OCMH.

26

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 33. 27

 Ibid., p. 34. 28

 Colonel Newman was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. 29

 34th Inf Unit Jnl, 30 Oct 44.
NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO 177

MAP 10

port astride the highway, was to secure the

high ground 500 yards northwest of Jaro,

while the 1st Battalion was to move to the

town of Jaro from its position at the Mainit

River bridge.

The artillery concentrated its fire on the

area to the front, and at 1230 the 3d Battalion renewed the attack with Company K

on the left of the road and Company I on

the right. After the troops had proceeded

about 200 yards, heavy artillery, machine

gun, mortar, and rifle fire pinned them

down. Company L in the rear thereupon attempted a flanking movement to the left

across an open field but came under heavy

fire from a ridge that commanded the road.

All the companies were forced to pull back.

At the end of the day's action, the forward

elements were still on the outskirts of Jaro.

During the night, the 11th, 52d, and 63d

Field Artillery Battalions fired continuously

in support of the 34th Infantry. The corps

artillery placed harassing and interdiction

fire along the Jaro-Carigara road.30

On the morning of 31 October Colonel

Dahlen ordered the 3d Battalion to move

toward Tunga along the Jaro-Carigara

road. The 2d Battalion was to pass through

30

 24th Div Arty Unit Rpt 8, 31 Oct 44.
178 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

the 3d along the highway, and the 1st Battalion was to be prepared to follow the 2d.31

The 19th Infantry was to protect the rear

of the 34th Infantry and forestall any attempt by the Japanese to send reinforcements from north of the Binahaan River.

The 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, was to

move to Jaro via Tingib and Macanip to

assist the 34th Infantry.32

At 0820 the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry,

supported by the 2d Battalion, attacked

along the Jaro-Carigara highway. Company L went down the highway and then

to the rear of the hill from which it had been

repulsed the previous day; Company I

moved forward astride the road; and Company K was in reserve. As advanced elements of Company I reached a stream, they

came under intense fire but moved to a position from which they could attack the reverse slope of the hill. Other elements of the

company moved off the road to the top of the

hill. When they pushed westward along

the crest they discovered another hill behind

it.

In the meantime the troops that had attacked the reverse slope came under intense

fire from the second hill. Concentrated fire

was laid on the second hill and a heavy

machine gun was sent to the top of the first.

Company I, protected by the fire, was thus

able to assault and take the first hill. Company K, the reserve company, thereupon

occupied the hill. These assaults drove the

enemy into Company L, which was at the

foot of the hill. A determined three-hour

fight followed, and, although at one time

elements of the company were driven across

the highway, the company retaliated and

eventually cleared the area of Japanese.

While this fight was going on the 2d Battalion, with Company E as the point, moved

along the highway toward Tunga. At 1130

the Japanese opened fire on Company E

at the Ginagan River. Tanks, which had

been brought up, fired with machine guns

at the enemy positions on the left of the road.

The Japanese retaliated with mortar and

artillery fire, pinning down an antitank gun

crew and Company E's mortar section. The

artillery fired a concentration on the Japanese positions and the advance was able to

continue.

At 1430 the enemy reopened fire on the 2d

Battalion at the Yapan River. Company G

was in the lead, with the 2d Platoon on the

left of the road and the 3d Platoon on the

right. Company E was on Company G's

left flank. With all the troops in a skirmish

line, the 2d Battalion, with tanks, moved

down the road to attack. When Company

G came under fire the tanks went to its assistance, and the Japanese then concentrated their fire on the armor.

Meanwhile Company E pushed down the

left side of the road but was halted by fire

from an enemy pillbox on a knoll. A selfpropelled 105-mm. howitzer was brought

up, and fire from this weapon completely

disorganized the Japanese and forced them

to desert their position. When the howitzer

had exhausted its ammunition, another was

brought up to replace it. By this time, however, the enemy's artillery was registering

on the spot and the second was disabled before it could fire a shot.

Elements of the 41st Infantry Regiment,

protected by artillery, gathered in front of

Company E and emplaced machine guns in

a position from which they could enfilade

the company. Thereupon Company E committed its reserve platoon to its left flank but

shortly afterward received orders to protect

31

 34th Inf Unit Jnl, 31 Oct 44. 32

 19th Inf Unit Jnl, 31 Oct 44.
NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO 179

the disabled howitzer and dig in for the

night. A tank was sent up to cover the establishment of the night perimeter. Company G

received orders to fall back and dig in for

the night, and upon its withdrawal the Japanese concentrated their fire on Company E.

Although badly shaken, Company E held on

and protected the howitzer. A tank was sent

forward to tow the weapon, but since it was

untowable because of broken treads the crew

sent a shell through it to prevent its use by

the enemy. Company E then disengaged and

fell back through Company F, as Company

G had done.

Under the protective cover of night, the

41st Infantry Regiment retreated.

During the day the 19th Infantry had followed closely, protecting the rear of the

34th Infantry and the southern flank of the

24th Division and blocking off the enemy

escape routes. That night General Irving

gave the plan of action for the following

day—1 November—for the 24th Division.

The 19th Infantry was to continue to block

the enemy escape routes and protect the

southern flank of the division along the

Binahaan River east from Tingib to Yapad,

move a battalion into Jaro, establish a roadblock in the vicinity of Jaro, and protect the

line of communications behind the advance

of the 34th Infantry as far as Gibucauan.

The 34th Infantry was to continue advancing along the Jaro-Carigara highway, seizing every opportunity to make a wide envelopment, especially from the northeast.33

In accordance with this order, Companies A and B, 34th Infantry, were sent at

0820 to make a wide flanking movement

eastward to Tuba and then strike at Tunga

from the northeast. At 0900, after patrols

had reported no enemy contact, the 2d Battalion moved on down the Jaro-Carigara

highway.

Both battalions proceeded rapidly. At

0900 the 1st Battalion was in Tuba, and at

1100 the 2d had passed through the scene

of the previous day's fighting and was in

Giagsam. The troops found much materiel,

including two 37-mm. guns and numerous

range finders, machine guns, rifles, packs,

and helmets, which the enemy had left in

his precipitous flight. Both battalions closed

on Tunga. They paused for rest and then

moved on down the highway toward Carigara. At 1600 when the 34th Infantry

formed its perimeter for the night, its advance unit, the 1st Battalion, was 1,000

yards from Sagkanan, and its rearmost unit,

the 3d Battalion, was at Tunga.34

On the previous day the regimental headquarters had moved into Jaro. It had been

a bloody road to Carigara, but the 24th

Division was knocking at the back door for

admittance as the 1st Cavalry Division on

the north was demanding entrance at the

front door.

Capture of Carigara

By 31 October it became evident to the

Americans that there was unusual activity

on the part of the Japanese, who were apparently building strong defensive positions

around Carigara and pouring reinforcements into the town. Statements by reconnaissance parties and reports from guerrillas

led to the belief that 2,000 to 3,000 Japanese were in the town and its environs.35

The enemy was capable of bringing up a

considerable number of reinforcements

along the Ormoc road, or of attacking the

33

 34th Inf Unit Jnl, 31 Oct 44.

34

 34th Inf Unit Rpt 13, 34th Inf Jnl, 1 Nov 44. 35

 One guerrilla unit estimated the number of

Japanese as high as 5,000.
180 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

155-MM. GUNS FIRING ON CARIGARA

American left flank from the south.36 The situation remained unchanged on 1 November.

Plans of X Corps

In view of the apparent strength of the

Japanese defenders, General Sibert felt that

no means should be left untried to insure

the successful reduction of the strong point.

Both the corps and division artillery were to

fire on the town, with a heavy 15-minute

preparation from 0745 to 0800 on the front

of the 24th Infantry Division to a depth of

1,000 yards. Immediately thereafter a series

of concentrations covering 1,000 yards in

depth would be fired from 0800 to 0840,

advancing at the rate of 100 yards every

four minutes. All available artillery except

one light battalion of the 24th Infantry Division would then fire in front of the 1st

Cavalry Division to a depth of 1,000 yards

from 0845 to 0900. Thereafter the artillery

of each division would support its own

division.37

The 2d Brigade, reinforced, was to seize

Carigara from Barugo,38 while the 34th Infantry would attack along the Jaro-Carigara highway. General Hoffman of the 2d

Cavalry Brigade commanded the attack

against Carigara. In preparation for the

combined assault, the forces of the 1st Cavalry Division had been gathering in the

Barugo area.

On 1 November General Hoffman arrived at Barugo, examined the troops, and

made last-minute arrangements. The assault

from the north was to be in a column of

36

 X Corps G-2 Periodic Rpt 10, 31 Oct 44.

37

 X Corps FO 5, 1 Nov 44. 38

 1st Cav Div FO 6, 1 Nov 44.
NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO 181

squadrons: 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry; 2d

Squadron, 8th Cavalry; and the 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, in reserve. The squadron

last mentioned was to establish and maintain communication with the 34th Infantry,

which was to move out in a column of battalions, wait on the outskirts of Carigara

until the town had been secured by the 2d

Cavalry Brigade, and then flank the town

and move on to Capoocan.39

During the day of 1 November and the

night following, General Suzuki withdrew

his troops from Carigara and established

very strong positions in the mountains southwest of the town in the vicinity of Limon.

By "clever deception as to his strength and

intentions," the enemy completely deluded

the Americans into believing that his major

force was still in Carigara.40

Seizure of Carigara

Unaware of the Japanese withdrawal, the

Americans proceeded with the execution of

their plans. During the American artillery

fire on the morning of 2 November some of

the shells landed in the sector of the 7th

Cavalry, an accident which delayed the attack until 0935. At that hour the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, followed by the 2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry, jumped off. Since the

bridge over the Canomontag River had been

destroyed by the enemy and the river was not

fordable, it was necessary to utilize native

canoes, only two of which were available.

This procedure consumed much time, but by

1130 the troops completed the crossing.

Troop E, 5th Cavalry, made contact with

the 34th Infantry at 1100. Since the troops

encountered no resistance, the 1st Squadron,

7th Cavalry, followed by the 2d Squadron,

8th Cavalry, entered the town at 1200 and

established a perimeter. General Mudge,

the commander of the 1st Cavalry Division,

entered the town with the assault cavalry

troops.41 The 2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry,

outposted the western and southern sections

of the town. Patrols from the 34th Infantry

were already in Carigara.

At 0800 on 2 November the 34th Infantry moved out, the 1st Battalion leaving its

bivouac area 1,000 yards southeast of Sagkanan and going down the highway, followed by the 2d Battalion, less Company G,

and the 3d Battalion. Company G of the 2d

Battalion was to reconnoiter the western

side of Carigara in case an enveloping

movement became necessary.42

By 0900 the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry,

reached a small bridge at the outskirts of

Carigara and awaited word from the 1st

Cavalry Division. After a wait of one and a

half hours, patrols were sent into the western

portion of Carigara, but they reported no

enemy contact. All was quiet and the town

deserted. The battalion then skirted Carigara and proceeded along the coast toward

Capoocan. It encountered difficulty in

crossing the Carigara River, since the bridge

had been destroyed, but was able to get as

far as Balud, where it set up a night perimeter after being halted by enemy fire. The

2d Battalion moved to the Carigara River,

where it dug in for the night and was rejoined there by G Company. The 3d Battalion set up its perimeter just behind the

2d, and the regimental headquarters of the

34th Infantry was set up in Carigara.

In the advance through northern Leyte

Valley the 24th Division had lost 210 killed,

39

 34th Inf FO 7, 2 Nov 44. 40

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 38.

41

 7th Cav Unit Jnl, 2 Nov 44. 42

 34th Inf Unit Jnl, 2 Nov 44.
U.S. PATROL CROSSING THE CANOMONTAG RIVER (above). Engineer

troops replacing a Capoocan River bridge blown up by retreating Japanese.
NORTHERN LEYTE VALLEY: PART TWO 183

859 wounded, and 6 missing in action, but it

had killed an estimated 2,970 Japanese and

taken 13 prisoners.

With the capture of Carigara, the second

phase of General Krueger's plan for the

liberation of Leyte was completed. Panaon

and San Juanico Straits, respectively south

and north of the island, had been seized.

Elements of the Sixth Army were on the

west coast in the vicinity of Baybay on the

shores of Ormoc Bay, and others were at

Carigara near the northern entrance to Ormoc Valley. The two forces were poised for

a co-ordinated drive toward Ormoc Valley—the last important Japanese stronghold

on the island. Nearly all the tactically significant airfields and ports, together with

Leyte Valley, were in the hands of the Sixth

Army. Victory appeared to be in sight—but

continued reinforcement of the island by the

Japanese and delay in the construction program for building Leyte Valley into a major

air and supply base were matters of grave

concern.
CHAPTER XI

Logistics and Civil Affairs

The old saw that for want of a horseshoe

nail the kingdom was lost is applicable in

some degree to the story of logistics on the

island of Leyte. Fortunately the outcome

in Leyte was less serious than that recounted

in the proverb. But the cumulative effect

of many unfavorable conditions, each capable of being overcome in itself but each

entangled with the others, resulted in a protraction of the campaign and a slowing of

the schedule for future operations in the

Pacific.

Despite the forebodings of Sixth Army

engineers with regard to developing major

logistical and air bases in Leyte Valley, General MacArthur had assigned logistical

missions to the Sixth Army which, even

under the best of circumstances, would have

taxed its facilities to the utmost. General

Krueger thought that in the planning stages

greater emphasis should have been placed

on an appreciation of terrain when selecting landing beaches and their exits, as well

as sites for base development, airdrome construction, and headquarters installations.

Terrain information should have been carefully analyzed by competent personnel in

order that tactical and development plans

could be based on the utilization of suitable

terrain. The target dates and phase lines

should have been flexible enough to allow

for unsatisfactory terrain features. "Airdromes cannot be built speedily across rice

paddies and swamps; bivouac areas, depots

and dumps cannot properly be established

in swamps and rice paddies."

 1

Logistics

Scarcely had the assault troops landed

when the gloomy predictions of Colonel Ely

that conditions of soil and weather on the

island would make it unfit for the establishment of major bases began to be realized.

Nevertheless, the necessity for early establishment of land-based air forces to support

the operation made it imperative that the

engineers start work immediately on rehabilitation of existing airfields. Before this

task could be carried out, however, it would

be necessary to strengthen and widen the

roads in order to move heavy construction

equipment to the airfields. A breakdown of

the transportation system for even a few

days could affect adversely all aspects of the

Leyte operation. Because of the shortage of

engineer troops, the lack of road metal, and

the continuous traffic, the construction and

maintenance of roads presented a critical

and continuing problem.

Road Construction

The troops found their progress greatly

hampered by the poor quality of roads leading to the interior of the island. The type of

soil made it difficult to provide sufficient ap1

 Ltr, CG Sixth Army to CG X Corps et al,

25 Nov 44, p. 24.
LOGISTICS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS 185

proach roads and to maintain all-weather

roads. Drivers did not dare come too near

the edge of the pavement in passing, even

on the major two-lane roads, since their

vehicles would probably become mired on

the shoulder. The edges of hard-surfaced

roads broke down under the constant wear

until the roads were no longer wide enough

for two-way traffic. Vehicles would often

sink to their axles on the shoulders of the

highway and on the many access roads, and

frequently the roads into camp areas became

unsuitable for traffic of any sort.2

In the 24th Division zone the engineers

undertook to build an ancillary road, from

the beachhead area to the existing coastal

road, over the deep swamps and flooded rice

paddies. After twenty-four hours' labor they

abandoned the project as not feasible and in

a few days rebuilt a trail that skirted the

swamp along higher ground. This new

thoroughfare was pronounced an "excellent" three-lane egress road.3

By utilizing a narrow road leading inland

to Highway 1, egress from the 1st Cavalry

Division beachhead area was accomplished.

Since the road forked near the beach and

ran north to Cataisan Point it became an

access road to the Tacloban airfield. All supplies were routed along Highway 1 into the

interior. When this road went to pieces under the heavy rains of 25 October, no means

remained of getting overland from the area

of the 24th Division to that of the 1st Cavalry Division. The open country back of the

Dulag area made the road problems of the

XXIV Corps zone a little more manageable

than those in the X Corps area. Dulag itself

offered graveled streets for traffic, but unfortunately only one very narrow road, with

deep ditches on both sides, led west toward

the mountains. With the coming of heavy

rains, this road was chewed to bits by heavy

traffic.

In order to preserve the roads as far as

possible, the transportation officer of the

Sixth Army decided to allow their use only

to vehicles having the highest priority and

to hold the transportation of civilians to a

minimum. He forbade the use of trucks and

other heavy vehicles for carrying personnel

when lighter transportation was available.4

Throughout the Leyte operation, though the

engineering troops worked unceasingly, the

condition of the roads remained a tremendous unsolved problem. A rainfall of 23.5

inches during the month of November

forced a continuous contest with the mud,

and men and equipment employed on the

airstrips had to be diverted to the roads,

some of which were closed for days at a time

while under repair. Traffic censuses were

made as a basis for many corrective measures that were introduced to control, reduce,

and equalize the flow of traffic. Supplies

were issued at night to avoid congestion at

peak periods. ASCOM made strong efforts

to keep the road construction equipment in

use and in workable condition, and placed

stress upon provision for proper drainage.

Filipino pick-and-shovel crews were used as

much as possible. In spite of these measures,

at the end of November the condition of the

roads was "a major hindrance to base development and operations."

 5

Airfields

The condition of the airstrips produced

an even more perplexing problem than the 2

 Hist of Fifth Air Force, Ch. 5, pp. 34-35. AAF

Archives. 3

 Sturgis, Engineer Operations in the Leyte Campaign, p. 6. Unless otherwise cited, the material on

construction is taken from this study.

4

 Draft of Memo, 30 Oct 44, Sixth Army G-4 Jnl,

30 Oct 44. 5

 ASCOM Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 8-9.
ACCESS ROAD FROM WHITE BEACH under repair (above). Filipino road workers

on Route 2 (below).
LOGISTICS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS 187

roads. Immediately upon their arrival, engineer reconnaissance parties followed the

assault infantry and examined the various

sites which had been selected during the

planning for airfields. By 22 October they

reported that all the proposed airdrome sites

except Tacloban were unfit for use during

the rainy season.

Elements of the Sixth Army had captured

both the Dulag and Tacloban airstrips

within twenty-four hours after landing, but

the Dulag airstrip was found to be out of

use and unserviceable.6 Since the Tacloban

field was shorter than had been estimated

and was in need of resurfacing, it was necessary to construct practically a new airfield.

Although Japanese air resistance was moderate for the first few days and the weather

temperate, progress was slow because of

the condition of the roads and congestion

of traffic. Trucks bearing gravel moved at

a snail's pace.

On 25 October the 7th and 8th Fighter

Squadrons of the 49th Fighter Group assisted in the work on the Tacloban strip.

The 8th Squadron was dismayed. The entire Cataisan Peninsula, on which the airstrip was located, was an "unadulterated

bog" and the "confusion was awe inspiring." Labor details were called to work

and then dismissed. Upon returning to their

bivouac area, they would be recalled, and

the process repeated.7 On 25 and 26 October the Japanese air force came over the

airfield in great waves. Many times the men

were forced to drop their tools and sprawl

into gullies and slit trenches as the Japanese

"returned for more blood."

 8

With the naval battle of Leyte Gulf under

way, activities on the airfield were further

hampered. Construction crews attempted to

lay a base of coral on the airfield for the

steel matting at the same time that Navy

planes used the field for emergency landings.

About a hundred aircraft used the field on

25 October, and twenty-five of these were

destroyed in crash landings, one of which

set the fuel dump afire at night.9 In spite

of enemy air raids, the landing of naval aircraft, and the wrecked planes littering the

airstrip, construction continued. By 30 October some aircraft were arriving and making satisfactory landings on the runway,

which at that time had nearly 4,000 feet of

matting.10

On 27 October the Fifth Air Force took

over the mission of supplying air support.

Because of the poor condition of the airstrips and the scarcity of available aircraft,

however, it was announced on 31 October

that only "sporadic bomb support by the

heavy bombers" and strafing could be accomplished. Work on the airstrips had

barely got under way at the end of October.11

At the same time General Casey, commanding the Army Service Command,

painted a dark picture of the future. He

stated that the construction of airfields in the

Dulag area would require more effort than

had been anticipated during the planning

phase, since the Japanese, contrary to expectations, had placed little or no surfacing material on the runways and since soil conditions were such that an eight-inch sand and

gravel base covered with steel mat would be

6

 RAD, CTF 78 to CG Sixth Army, MG 1280,

22 Oct 44, Sixth Army G-3 Wasatch Jnl, 23 Oct 44. 7

 Hist 8th Fighter Squadron, October 1944, p. 7,

AAF Archives. 8

 Hist 7th Fighter Squadron, October 1944, pp.

4-5, AAF Archives.

9

 Opns Rpt, Comdr Support Aircraft to Comdr

Seventh Fleet, no serial, 2 Nov 44. 10

 Hist 8th Fighter Squadron, 49th Fighter Group,

86th Wing, V Fighter Command, Fifth Air Force,

October 1944, p. 7, AAF Archives. 11

 Rad, Col Quinn to the 6, 8, and 9 Air Liaison

Parties, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 31 Oct 44.
188 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

required to support bomber traffic.12 Furthermore, the labor crews that were to have

been used in airfield construction were being

diverted to road building, still further reducing "the already insufficient amount of engineer effort available for drome construction."

 13

 Aside from labor shortages, the

chief causes for the disappointing delay in

airfield construction were poor soil conditions, enemy air raids, and rain.14

 Under

such inauspicious circumstances, the Allied

Air Forces undertook the mission of furnishing air support on Leyte. Because of the

poor condition of the airfields, only a token

force from the Fifth Air Force was able to

come in.

Much ingenuity was exercised by the engineers in overcoming difficulties. In enlarging the Tacloban airstrip, one of the greatest

impediments to progress was the limited

supply of coral for surfacing the runways.

The engineers conceived the idea of having

the dredge Raymond, which had been

brought forward to dredge the navigational

channel, used to pump coral from the channel bottom onto the runways. The 2,800-

horsepower pumps could transport solid

matter one mile through pipes that extended

across the bay and onto the land, and they

could also raise the dredged matter as much

as 300 feet above sea level. The engineers

found that this pipeline was the quickest

way to transport material to the Tacloban

airstrip, though mechanical difficulties sometimes developed.15

Despite constant work on the morasses

that constituted the San Pablo and Buri airfields, these strips continued to be in a generally unusable condition. Finally, on 25 November, ASCOM dropped all construction

work on them. The Fifth Air Force, however, felt that it was necessary to continue

using the Bayug airfield, and at least one

aviation battalion remained at work on that

strip.

When work on the airstrips at Buri and

San Pablo was abandoned, the Sixth Army

units thus released began the construction

of a new airfield on the coast at Tanauan,

midway between Tacloban and Dulag. This

field became operational on 16 December

1944.16 The fact that the main part of the

Fifth Air Force was unable to displace forward to Leyte made it possible for the Japanese to reinforce their Leyte garrison and

thus prolong the campaign.

Although his engineers, before the opening of the campaign, had protested vigorously to General Headquarters against the

establishment of a major base upon Leyte,

General Krueger felt constrained to take the

responsibility. Said he:

There is no doubt that if I could have

made adequate airdromes available on Leyte

as scheduled we would have had ample air

forces on hand to stop all Jap reinforcements

from coming in. But this proved to be impossible, because of terrific rains that flooded all

level areas on the island. In consequence, we

lacked the air support necessary adequately

to support the operation. This was not the

fault of the Allied Air Force, however, but

mine.17

Base Construction

After the assault troops had cleared the

beach areas, a perplexing problem came to

the fore. In the plans for the Leyte operation

12

 Ltr, Maj Gen Hugh J. Casey, CG ASCOM, to

Gen Krueger, CG Sixth Army, 31 Oct 44, Sixth

Army G-4 Jnl, 7 Nov 44. 13

 Ibid.

14

 Hist Fifth Air Force, Ch. 5, p. 33, AAF Archives. 15

 Hist of Engineer Corps in the Pacific, Ch. VI,

Philippine Campaign, pp. 327-29. Copy in OCMH.

16

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 69. 17

 Ltr, Gen Krueger to Gen Ward, 13 Aug 51,

OCMH.
LOGISTICS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS 189

TANAUAN AIRSTRIP built to replace San Pablo and Buri airfields.

General Krueger had assigned to the various

commands areas for such facilities as their

supply dumps and hospitals. Upon arrival

on Leyte, the Army Service Command discovered that many of the sites were swamps;

the tactical situation delayed reconnaissance

for others.

Throughout November the allocation of

areas to the units continued to present difficulties. On 12 November General Krueger

formed the Area Allocation Group, which

consisted of representatives from MacArthur's General Headquarters, the Sixth

Army, the Air Forces, the Navy, and the

Army Service Command. The various units

submitted requests for particular areas to

this group, which accepted or rejected the

requests, or allocated different sites. Since

many of the applicants wished to be in the

Tacloban area, some of the requests could

not be granted because of insufficient space.

Many of the sites best suited for hospitals

or storage were occupied by MacArthur's

advance-headquarters and other headquarters. The search of ASCOM for suitable

storage areas continued throughout the

month.18 On 28 November General Krueger

moved the Sixth Army command post from

Tanauan to Tolosa so that an airstrip could

be constructed in the Tanauan area.19

By 20 November General Krueger's program for hospital construction was far behind schedule. Of the eight hospitals

planned for the area only one was as much

as 34 percent complete, and one was only

5 percent complete.20 The lack of hospital

facilities, which continued throughout De18

 Army Service Comd Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 6, 9. 19

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 69. 20

 5201st Engr Const Brig Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5.
190 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

cember, was somewhat offset by the rate of

evacuation and the use of hospital ships and

LST's operating under naval medical procedure. Next to airfields and roads the

construction of hospitals was given priority.

But "an adequate number of engineer battalions ... to do justice to the original

requirements" was not available. At the

same time General Krueger ordered that

the hospitals be given first priority on

structural materials and on portable buildings. No lumber, including ship dunnage,

could be used in constructing quarters for

either officers or enlisted men until the hospitals were completed.21

 All units that could

be spared from airdrome and road construction were used to build either hospitals

or port and POL (petrol, oil, and lubricants) installations.

As for port facilities, the Japanese failed

to destroy two existing deepwater berths at

Tacloban. Despite numerous enemy aerial

attacks on these docks and on shipping, no

material damage resulted. By 1 December

ASCOM had constructed an additional

dock and several lighterage wharves. During November the Army Service Command

established, in addition to the main supply

base at Tacloban, a subbase at Dulag for

the southern areas and a supply point at

Carigara for the troops of X Corps.22

Supplies

Since the assault troops had brought

with them only limited supplies and ammunition and since they were deep inside

Japanese territory and 1,500 miles from

their nearest supply base, at Hollandia, the

need for immediate establishment and

stocking of supply bases was especially

urgent.23

Because some of the LST's offshore in the

vicinity of Hill 522 and Palo were heavily

shelled by the Japanese on A Day, the

remaining LST's were directed to the Cataisan Peninsula, where many of them

discharged their loads on the Tacloban airfield, over which the supplies were scattered.

The proposed runway and dispersal areas

were strewn with hundreds of vehicles, together with thousands of tons of ammunition, rations, and petroleum products.

Since there was only one egress road, the

airstrip became tremendously congested.24

Another important cause of the congestion was the dictum of General Headquarters that certain airfields were to be operational by an early date. The Air Forces had

therefore loaded the vessels with a considerable number of service troops and a quantity of equipment which could not be used

until the airfields were in operation. When

construction of the airfields was delayed,

these troops and equipment were unemployed for many days, thus cluttering the

beaches and adding to the congestion. Ironically, because of limited shipping space,

they had displaced "engineers and other

service troops which would have been of

great value."

 25

On 8 November an estimated 120,000

American troops were on Leyte. The rations

of some of these were on board the vessels

that had brought them to the island, and

cargo was not being discharged at a satis21

 Sturgis, Engineer Opns in Leyte Campaign,

p. 15. 22

 Army Service Comd Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9 ;

Memo, G-4 Sixth Army for DG ASCOM, 11 Nov

44, Sixth Army G-4 Jnl, 11 Nov 44.

23

 Sturgis, Engineer Opns in Leyte Campaign,

p. 5. 24

 Ibid., p. 6. 25

 Ltr, Gen Decker, formerly CS Sixth Army, to

Gen Ward, 9 Jul 51, copy in OCMH.
LOGISTICS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS 191

LST'S UNLOADING AT TACLOBAN AIRFIELD. The causeways leading from the

beach to the ships were built by bulldozers scraping sand and earth to each ship as it landed.

factory rate. Col. William N. Leaf, the supply officer of the Sixth Army, did not believe

that more than sufficient rations, clothing,

and construction equipment to meet minimum requirements could be unloaded unless the discharge capacity of the ports was

substantially increased. While this condition

was not entirely satisfactory, it was not as

bad as appeared, since incoming units

brought and discharged thirty days' supply

for themselves.26 General Krueger set up a

committee to determine the priority of discharge for the various classes of cargo. On

9 November the committee gave top priority

to the following items, in order of preference: ammunition, 1,400 tons a day; rations, 1,000 tons a day; bridge timber, no

specified amount; landing field mats, 500

tons a day; and aviation gasoline, 1,000

drums a day.27

On 27 November the priorities committee

reviewed the status of shipping in the harbors and established new priorities for the

unloading of cargo. In order of priority, the

following commodities were given preference: rations, ammunition, landing mats,

and aviation gasoline.28 Not all the vessels

followed the priorities that had been set up

for the discharge of cargo. General Krueger

ordered that "appropriate disciplinary ac26

 Memo, G-4 Sixth Army for Transportation

Sec Sixth Army, 8 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-4 Jnl,

8 Nov 44.

27

 Rpt of Conference on Establishment of Priorities, 9 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-4 Jnl, 30 Nov 44. 28

 Rpt of Conference on 27 Nov for the Establishment of Unloading Priorities, 28 Nov 44, Sixth

Army G-4 Jnl, 30 Nov 44.
192 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

tion" be taken against any Army personnel

who were responsible.29

Since successive resupply convoys arrived at Leyte before vessels of the preceding

echelon had been unloaded, thus congesting

the harbor, and since the Japanese were

bombing the vessels, the assistant G-4 of

Sixth Army suggested on 2 December that

the number of vessels to be called forward

from the rear area to be kept to an absolute

minimum.30 The time allocated for the discharge of cargo was steadily increased: from

20 October to 3 November it was twelve

hours a day, from 4 November to 8 November eighteen hours a day, and from 9 November until Christmas, twenty-four hours

a day.31

During the first thirty days the supplies

in tons, stockpiled on Leyte or available on

board ship for discharge, over and above

current needs, increased as follows: 20 October, 30,313; 21 October through 30

October, 128,051; 31 October through 9

November, 193,838; and from 10 November through 19 November, 319,418.32

After the supplies were ashore and stored,

the problem of getting them to the divisions

and thence to the front-line troops presented

tremendous difficulties. Nearly all types of

transportation were utilized. As the roads

disintegrated, more and more dependence

was placed upon water transportation.

Naval vessels and amphibian vehicles were

used to carry the supplies as close as possible

to the front-line troops, and motor vehicles

transported them for the remaining distance

whenever feasible. At other times the troops

and Filipino civilians often had to handcarry supplies to the assault forces. In addition there were many airdrops to troops who

were otherwise completely cut off from the

rest of the Sixth Army.

Medical Support

As the assault forces moved across the

beaches, medical units accompanied them.

The 110th Portable Surgical Hospital supported the operations of the 6th Ranger

Infantry Battalion in the islands of Leyte

Gulf. In the northern part of Leyte the 19th

and 27th Portable Surgical Hospitals went

ashore with the 1st Cavalry Division in the

Tacloban area, while the 16th Portable

Surgical Hospital supported the 24th Infantry Division in the Palo area. The 38th

and 58th Evacuation Hospitals also landed

on A Day in the X Corps zone but did not

establish themselves in positions to receive

patients. In the zone of action of XXIV

Corps in the vicinity of Dulag, the 7th and

96th Infantry Divisions were accompanied

by the 51st and 52d Portable Surgical Hospitals, the 394th Medical Clearing Company, and the 644th and 645th Medical

Collecting Companies. Later in the day a

platoon from the 69th Field Hospital landed

and before nightfall was ready to receive

patients. Earlier on the same day the 7th

Portable Surgical Hospital had accompanied the 21st Infantry Regiment to

Panaon Strait.33

Evacuation of Casualties

General Bradley attached to each assault

battalion a platoon from one of the collecting companies of the 96th Division Medical

29

 Ltr, CG Sixth Army to CG ASCOM, 30 Nov

44, Sixth Army G-4 Jnl, 1 Dec 44. 30

 Memo, Asst G-4 Sixth Army to QM et al.

Sixth Army, 2 Dec 44, Sixth Army G-4 Jnl, 2 Dec

44.

31

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 218. 32

 Memo, G-4 Sixth Army to Transportation Off,

27 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-4 Jnl, 27 Nov 44.

33

 Rpt of Surgeon, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte,

p. 262.
ROAD CONDITIONS. Disintegration of the roads greatly increased the supply problem.

Filipino carriers unload an amphibious LVT(4) (above); carriers for the 1st Cavalry Division

near Carigara (below).
194 LEYTE: THE RETURN THE PHILIPPINES

Battalion. These platoons landed with the

assault waves, collected the casualties on the

beach, gave them the necessary treatment,

and then evacuated them to designated

ships by landing craft. After the Navy beach

parties had established aid stations the medical units cleared casualties through them.34

As the battle moved on beyond the

beaches, the remaining medical units came

ashore and hospitals were put into operation.

For the first few days, however, the medical

units evacuated all casualties to naval vessels

in the harbor, whereupon the vessels sailed

for a rear area base. It frequently happened

that a man with a minor wound or illness,

or a nonbattle injury, would be well and fit

for further duty by the time the vessel

reached the rear area.35

After the campaign had progressed beyond the beaches, both the corps evacuated

to rear areas only those casualties who required prolonged hospitalization. The Filipino civilian employees of the Army and

members of the Filipino armed forces received treatment but were not evacuated

from the island without approval from Sixth

Army headquarters. Wounded or sick Japanese prisoners were segregated in the hospitals but, otherwise, they received the same

treatment as other patients.36 Within three

days after landing, the XXIV Corps set up

a field hospital which was ready to receive

patients on the following day. Consequently,

all casualties who had already been evacuated to the ships but who required hospitalization for less than fifteen days were brought

ashore and held in the shore party medical

section or admitted to the hospital.37

Co-operation between the medical services of the Sixth Army and those of the Seventh Fleet was excellent. Col. William A.

Hagins, Sixth Army Surgeon, praised the

medical service of the Seventh Fleet in unstinting terms: "The LST's equipped to provide surgical service conformed to the highest professional standards and they, together

with the APH's (transports for wounded)

and the small PCE(R)'s (patrol craft,

escort (rescue)) formed a floating hospital

reserve that varied between 3,000 and 5,000

beds. Without this service, which relieved

the hard pressed hospitals of many cases, the

level of medical and surgical care on Leyte

would certainly have been sub-standard."

 38

After the action had progressed beyond

the beaches, the evacuation of troops became more difficult. Each medical collecting company of the 96th Division was furnished nine 1⁄4-ton trucks and three other

cargo carriers. The swamps and steep hills

precluded the use of trucks, however, and

the number of cargo carriers was insufficient

for the task. The latter were most useful in

evacuating casualties across swamps and

rice paddies. It was necessary to use litter

bearers in the mountains, but the narrow

trails permitted the use of only two men to

carry each litter. For some unexplained reason, attempts to use Filipinos as litter bearers were not successful.39

 The 24th Division,

unlike the 96th, found the Filipinos to be

excellent litter bearers and recommended

their use whenever possible, since they were

willing workers who conserved the efficiency

of a combat unit by replacing the combat

soldiers.40 34

 96th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 95. 35

 Rpt of Surgeon, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte,

p. 262. 36

 X Corps Rpt of Medical Service Leyte Campaign, pp. 3-4. 37

 XXIV Corps Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 38.

38

 Rpt of Surgeon, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte,

p. 263. 39

 96th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 95-96. 40

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 197.
LOGISTICS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS 195

Medical Treatment

With very few exceptions, all casualties

were treated within one hour after the

wound had been inflicted. At the forward

aid stations the wounded soldier received

only initial treatment necessary before

evacuation to the collecting station. When

the casualty arrived at that point, he was

bathed and prepared for further evacuation

to a clearing station. There the necessary

surgery was performed to make the patient

safe for further evacuation, and he was then

taken to a rear area. Because of the swamps

and steep hills in the 96th Division sector,

the time lag in evacuation from the forward

aid station to the clearing station varied

from one hour to thirty hours.41 In the 24th

Division zone, the clearing stations remained mobile. Only in rare instances,

where it was impossible to remove patients

because of heavy fighting, was a casualty

more than four hours in reaching the clearing station.42

Initial measures at the aid stations consisted of treatment for shock, stopping hemorrhage, administering plasma, applying

splints, and dressing wounds. At the clearing stations and portable surgical hospitals,

the initial surgical care consisted mainly of

débridements, emergency laparotomies, and

amputations. The medical officer performed

surgical operations in these forward medical

facilities only when it was thought that the

wounded soldier could not stand the arduous trip to the rear or when his condition

would not permit the delay necessary for

evacuation.43

A great many chest wounds and compound fractures were treated. The fractures

were cleansed, injured tissue was removed.

and a splint or cast applied. The biggest

problem in fractures was the immobilization of the humerus. If the nerves could be

readily found they were anchored. Plasma

was extensively used, and whole blood, considered indispensable by the surgeons, was

generally available.44

In the first days of the Leyte Campaign,

because of the prelanding bombardment,

more civilians than soldiers required treatment by medical units. In the 7th Division

sector for the first two days, 75 percent of

the medical facilities of the only clearing

company in operation were used in caring

for civilian casualties. On 24 October the

Army established a separate hospital on

Leyte for civilians.45

The Sixth Army made a survey of 519

patients who died from injuries suffered in

battle. Of these 1 died of bayonet wounds, 2

of blast concussion, 249 of gunshot wounds,

170 of fragment wounds, and 97 of unclassified injuries, many of which were believed to have been inflicted by bomb or shell

fragments. The location of the gunshot

wounds was as follows: 66 in the abdomen,

21 in the back, 7 in the buttocks, 67 in the

chest, 49 in the head, 18 in the lower extremities, 9 in the upper extremities, 3 of

multiple character, and 9 of unclassified

location. Of the fragment wounds 25 were

in the abdomen, 7 in the back, 6 in the

buttocks, 30 in the chest, 33 in the head, 37

in the lower extremities, 11 in the upper

extremities, 12 multiple, and 9 unclassified.46

Medical Supply

The Sixth Army plan called for the assault troops to go in with five days' medical

41

 96th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 96. 42

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 134. 43

 Ibid.

44

 Ibid.

45

 7th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Medical Rpt, App. C

to G-4 Rpt, p. 5. 46

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 263.
A LITTER SQUAD EVACUATES A CASUALTY in mountainous terrain.

A CASUALTY RECEIVES TREATMENT at a forward aid station.
AN OPERATING ROOM AT THE STATION HOSPITAL, TANAUAN

A CASUALTY IS EVACUATED BY SHIP TO A REAR AREA
198 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

supplies. The other units would go in with

thirty days' supply. The original plan provided for 300,000 troops over a sixty-day

period only. Thereafter, it was expected

that Sixth Army would depend upon resupply shipping and the diversion to Leyte

of shipments intended to fill theater requirements of the Southwest Pacific area. The resupply shipping consisted of medical

maintenance units. Since the average medical maintenance unit contained less than

700 items as compared to the 3,000 to 3,500

items eventually needed for a balanced supply, the medical plan of the X Corps called

for loading three days' supply on their organic transports and on their personnel.

The rest of the supplies were bulk loaded.

The X Corps also had an emergency resupply of two medical maintenance units, one of

which was never unloaded because of

damage to the ship on which it was

carried.47

When the XXIV Corps was ordered to

prepare for the Yap operation, the 7th Division began to make its medical plans. After

receiving permission to take a thirty-day

supply for 22,000 men on its assault shipping, the division separated the stock into

two sections, consisting of a ten-day supply

and a twenty-day supply. The former was

packed in ten identical units with one unit

to a pallet, each weighing 1,840 pounds and

having a volume of seventy-two cubic feet.

One of these units was allotted to each battalion of the division and one to the division

headquarters. The twenty days' supply was

packed in three identical units, each weighing about 21,648 pounds and having a volume of about 864 cubic feet.48

The 24th Division drew approximately

thirty tons of medical supplies from the base

medical supply. The division then mobileloaded twenty of these tons on five 21⁄2-ton

trucks and assigned a truck to each collecting company. The remaining medical supplies were bulk loaded. Each medical unit

also carried a five-day supply for immediate

use upon commitment.49

When put into practice, however, this system of the 24th Division was not entirely

satisfactory. Because of the rapid advance

of the assault troops and the lack of transportation, the system of supply became an

acute problem. Resupply became co-ordinated with the chain of evacuation. Forward

units would submit informal requisitions to

the clearing companies at the second echelon

of evacuation, whereupon the supplies

would be issued and brought forward by

ambulances on their return to the front.

The clearing companies would submit

requisitions to the main dump. The difficulty of resupply can be appreciated when

considerations of time and distance are

understood. For instance, the round trip

from Carigara to Tacloban, where the main

dump was located, amounted to about

seventy miles.50 As greater and greater dependence was placed upon human carriers

to bring out the wounded and bring in supplies, it proved indeed fortunate that the

Sixth Army had established amicable relations with the Filipino civilians.

Civil Affairs

Although the United States Government

had interested itself in the civil affairs of the

Philippines as early as 13 January 1944, it

was not until 10 November, after the Leyte

Campaign had been launched, that General 47

 Army Service Forces Monthly Rpt, Sec 7,

Health, Jun 45, p. 10. 48

 7th Div Medical Rpt, App. C to G-4 Opns Rpt

Leyte, p. 3.

49

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 135-36. 50

 Ibid., p. 136.
LOGISTICS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS 199

MacArthur received his first directive on

civil affairs. Between the two dates strong

disagreements developed between the War

and Interior Departments as to who should

administer civil affairs in the Islands. The

Interior Department insisted that a civil

representative of the High Commissioner

of the Philippines should accompany the

assault troops, and General MacArthur was

equally insistent that he should not. The

President finally resolved the question in

favor of MacArthur.51 Lacking a directive

from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General MacArthur devised his own policy for civil affairs during the reoccupation of the Philippines.

The formulation of this policy may be

said to have started on 22 July 1944 with a

memorandum from Brig. Gen. Bonner F.

Fellers, personnel officer of General Headquarters, to General MacArthur. He stated

that although President Manuel Quezon

had established a Division of Civil Affairs

in the Philippine Army, the actual work

would have to be done by the United States

Army. General Fellers, therefore, recommended that General Headquarters immediately assume full responsibility for civil

administration during the reoccupation. Administration in the occupied areas should

be done, however, in the name of the Philippine Commonwealth and in complete co-operation with its official representatives.52

On 30 August General MacArthur issued

a directive creating a civil affairs unit in his

headquarters and outlining the broad policies that were to be followed in the Philippines.53

 This directive was subsequently expanded on 28 September

 54

 but it was not

until 9 October, eleven days before the landing on Leyte, that MacArthur issued detailed instructions on the procedures to be

followed.55

During the combat stage General Krueger, the senior tactical commander, was to

be responsible for such civil administration

and relief as would be possible under the

existing tactical situation. General MacArthur would delegate the administration of

civil affairs and relief in the liberated areas

as promptly as possible to the authorized

representatives of the Commonwealth Government. The only restrictions placed upon

the Filipino people were to be those required

by military necessity. By arrangement with

General MacArthur the Philippine Commonwealth was, in general, to determine the

guilt or innocence of suspected collaborationists, though the U. S. Army commanders were to retain complete authority to

deal with the suspects if necessary.

General MacArthur also established the

financial policies to be followed. A new series

of Philippine Treasury certificates called

"Victory Pesos" would be introduced in the

liberated areas. The exchange rate would

be two for an American dollar. All prewar

currency and all emergency currency officially determined to be bona fide would be

accepted at face value. All other Philippine

or enemy currency would be worthless.

Wage rates to be paid Filipino labor were

established and ceiling prices consistent with

the approved wage scale were set.

General Krueger delegated authority for

civil administration and relief to Generals

Hodge and Sibert for their respective corps

areas. The commanding general of the

51

 History of Civil Affairs Div, WD Special Staff,

Philippines, pp. 1-17, typescript in OCMH. 52

 Memo, Gen Fellers for CINCSWPA, 23 Jul

44, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific, Report on Civil

Affairs (2 vols), II, 1. 53

 GHQ SWPA Staff Memo 35, 30 Aug 44; Rpt

cited n. 52, pp. 6-9.

54

 GHQ SWPA Staff Memo 40; Ibid., 28 Sep

44, pp. 12-15. 55

 GHQ SWPA, Standing Operating Procedure

Instns 26, 9 Oct 44: Ibid., pp. 22-42.
200 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

AN OFFICER OF A CIVIL AFFAIRS UNIT pays off civilian workers with the new

"Victory Pesos."

Army Service Command was responsible for

the recruitment and maintenance of civilian

labor. General MacArthur attached to the

Sixth Army eight Philippine civil affairs

units, which were to assist the field commanders in the administration of civil affairs

and relief. Two of these were retained by

Sixth Army, two were attached to each of

the corps, and two to the Army Service

Command.56

As soon as the conflict had passed by an

area, a civil affairs unit of the Sixth Army

stepped in and started to restore the normal

community life. Temporary appointments

of Filipino officials were made, such appointments going to men who had been

screened by the Counter Intelligence Corps

or who were sponsored by Filipinos whose

loyalty was unquestioned. In nearly every

case the Philippine Commonwealth ratified

these appointments. In every area reached

by the Sixth Army, civil officials were appointed as soon as the tide of battle passed,

and without exception cordial relations were

established. The civil affairs officers of the

Sixth Army did not attempt to interfere

with civil operations unless requested to do

so, or unless the military situation made it

necessary.

Relations With Filipino Refugees

While the American assault forces were

hitting the shores of Leyte, a delegation of

Filipinos boarded the Blue Ridge and gave

General Irving of the 24th Division infor56

 Sixth Army Admin O 14, Annex 8, Civil Affairs

Plan, 30 Sep 44.
LOGISTICS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS 201

mation regarding conditions on the island.

They received a cordial welcome, the Filipino steward's mates giving them much of

their spare clothing.57

Many refugees who had been driven from

their homes by the naval bombardment

came into the American lines on the beaches

seeking comfort and aid. These Filipinos

had been without food or water for a considerable time, some of them for as long as

twenty-four hours. Many of those who had

remained in foxholes during the naval shelling were badly shaken up.

Palo Sector

In the area around Palo

 58

 fifty to seventyfive civilians had arrived by nightfall on A

Day, 20 October. The Army gave them

food and drink and then quartered them in

two houses on the beach. By the following

morning the influx of Filipinos had become

very great and the arrival of many more

was expected. The civil affairs officers therefore secured two more dwellings, had latrines dug, and maintained constant policing of the area, which was finally encircled

by wire enclosures. The Army set up an

evacuation hospital unit in the bivouac area

to take care of the wounded and sick. A baby

was delivered in an emergency obstetrical

tent, "both mother and child faring well."

Wells were dug to provide water for washing. During 21 October between 1,500 and

2,000 refugees crowded into the area. By

22 October the congestion had become so

great that a larger site was imperative. General Sibert decided to move the civilians to

Palo, even though the town had not yet

been cleared of Japanese. After an Army

chaplain had said Mass, the refugees proceeded on foot, in single file, to Palo. The

Army adopted this mode of advance in

order to minimize interference with troops,

supplies, and equipment and also to protect

the refugees from mines and booby traps

which the Japanese had placed on the

shoulders of the road. Many of the civilians

carried all of their effects with them; children, as young as three or four years, were

impressed into carrying their share of the

family's meager possessions.

Because of the inpouring of refugees from

surrounding districts, Palo suddenly grew

from a normal population of about 6,000 to

one estimated at 12,000 to 15,000. Nearly

5,000 people with their animals crowded

into a church and its adjacent compound.

Sanitary conditions were very bad.

The Army fed these refugees from captured stocks of rice and appointed a force of

civilian police. After a survey of the area,

the Army instituted sanitary measures for

cleaning up the church and its compound,

with removal and burial of the dead animals.

Civilian laborers who had been checked for

their loyalty undertook the burial of American and Japanese dead and the unloading

of ships in the harbor. The Army disarmed

all Filipinos except guerrillas and enforced

security regulations, which prohibited civilians from appearing on the streets after dark.

As more military units entered the town,

5.000 of the refugees were moved to its

outskirts. The Army set up a hospital in the

compound and surgeries in the schoolhouses,

with separate wards for men and women.

Teachers and other qualified women assisted

as practical nurses. Within one week the

Army had organized the town and begun

work toward rehabilitation.

57

 Tarbuck Report. 58

 The material on refugees in the Palo area is

taken from 24th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex 13,

pp. 146-48.
202 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

REFUGEE AREA ON ORANGE BEACH NEAR DULAG

Dulag Sector

On the beaches of XXIV Corps a naval

civil affairs unit controlled the Philippine

civilians.59 This unit arrived ashore at 0700

on 21 October. The area which had been

previously allocated for a civilian compound

was found to be a swamp. Approximately

1,500 refugees were scattered around the

landing beaches. The Army assembled these

and moved them to a new site in the town

of Dulag, but the location had undergone a

three-day naval bombardment which had

reduced it to smoldering rubble. The Army

recruited laborers to clean the area.

The military police assisted in control of

the civilian population and procured and

distributed food and water. A medical officer and several enlisted men from the 7th

Division gave medical aid to large numbers

of civilians who were treated for minor

wounds, injuries, tropical ulcers, and other

ailments. By 22 October the medical officer

had referred at least 100 of the more serious

cases to an Army field hospital near by.

Fifteen unclaimed and unidentified civilian

dead were buried in the Filipino cemetery.

By the morning of 22 October, since the

civilian population of Dulag had grown to

approximately 10,000, General Hodge issued orders to move the refugees to a new

location. By 23 October, when a suitable

place had been found, the number of refugees had risen to approximately 30,000.

The mass migration to the new location,

which was two miles from Dulag, was most

59

 Material on refugees in the Dulag area is based

on the Report of Naval Civil Affairs Unit, 7 Dec 44,

7th Inf Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Incl 1, App. G to

Annex 1.
LOGISTICS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS 203

difficult, and not until the civil affairs officers had sent food and water to the new

site could civilians be persuaded to move.

The selected area measured about 1,000 by

600 yards and consisted of a coconut grove

and a beach. Except for its inadequate size

and its infringement upon military installations, it was completely satisfactory. After

24 October the civilians were removed from

camp and sent back to their home villages

as soon as the latter were declared secure.

Issuing of Supplies

By the morning of 24 October the Sixth

Army was taking care of some 45,000 people, most of the population of about fifty-six

communities. Although at first there was a

shortage of food and water, by 24 October

there was an adequate supply. Before that

time the Army supplied the civilians with

C and K rations, since it could not locate

an appreciable quantity of the civilian food

supplies. Seventy percent of these supplies,

consisting of fish, rice, and meat, were later

found and distributed by the civil affairs

officers.

The Army originally distributed food to

individuals but later made distribution

through leaders in the barrios until it could

establish a general store. The civil affairs

officers distributed 28,700 full rations, fifty

cases of condensed milk for infant use, and

five tons of captured Japanese rice. About

5,000 full rations were stolen or not accounted for. An Army purification unit set

up a 3,000-gallon canvas water tank and

furnished water to the area.

A general store was in operation by 26

October for the sale of necessities. Clothing,

rice, biscuits, salmon, and candles were the

items most in demand. Some articles were ill

adapted to the use or customs of the Filipinos. "The people would not buy or use

the 4,000 rat traps or the rolls of toilet paper

furnished nor would they buy or use canned

or powdered milk."

 60

 Prices were fixed at

prewar levels.

The civil affairs units of the Sixth Army

opened about 500 schools in the principal

barrios, those in Tacloban being the first to

open. Many school buildings were either

rebuilt or repaired under the direction of

civil affairs officers and with funds furnished

by them. Since there were no primary textbooks, in one instance the civil affairs units

mimeographed a series of three schoolbooks

which were illustrated by an Army artist.

The teachers of Leyte not only provided excellent service in school work but also acted

as relief workers, sanitarians, and assistants

in the dispensaries and hospitals.

At first, a number of improvised hospitals

were opened up. When the civilian hospital

supplies arrived, however, modern hospitals

were established at Tacloban, Baybay, and

Carigara. These were staffed by local doctors and nurses, but the civil affairs unit

continued to furnish food and supervision.

Twenty-seven permanent dispensaries were

also established. These were greatly needed,

since the Japanese had not given the people

any medical aid and had stopped all preventive medical measures. Dental treatment

was given to more than 2,000 Filipinos, and

smallpox inoculations were administered to

more than 8,000. Also, when they seemed

to be required, inoculations were given for

typhoid, typhus, and cholera.

The prescribed amount of civilian medical supplies proved to be inadequate, a situation which placed an undue burden upon

60

 Civil Affairs, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte,

p. 279.
204 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

the medical units and facilities of all echelons of the Sixth Army. The food supplies,

however, were more than adequate. The

sizes of clothing and shoes were often too

large and there was not a sufficient supply

of women's and children's garments. On the

island 10,000 tons of civilian supplies were

landed, of which 6,830 tons were distributed. About 1,102 tons of rice were sold or

given away, a figure which does not include

captured Japanese stocks of rice. More than

400,000 refugees were fed and 287,000 relief clients were cared for.61

 By 25 December

the relief rolls included only the aged, sick,

and infirm, and members of families without

a breadwinner.

Recruitment of Filipinos

"Hundreds of self appointed guerrillas

whose only claim to participation in the

guerrilla organization was a recently realized

ambition to be of service to their country

and to their allies" confronted the assault

forces on the beachheads. These individuals

caused endless confusion, since it was practically impossible for the Americans to distinguish between the genuine guerrilla and

his opportunistic counterfeit. After the first

few days, however, the Army made contact

with guerrilla headquarters and established

liaison with the bona fide guerrillas.62

General Krueger made the guerrillas a

part of his armed forces, and they became a

source of additional strength to the Sixth

Army. These men frequently operated and

patrolled in enemy-held territory and

brought the Americans valuable information on Japanese movements and dispositions; the unit commanders of Sixth Army,

however, tended to discount reports from

such sources with regard to the size of Japanese forces. The guerrillas also guarded

supply dumps and depots, bridges, and other

installations in the rear areas.

The generosity of the American soldier in

giving away supplies made it difficult to recruit civilian labor. Since gifts of food to

prospective laborers diminished their incentive to work, the Sixth Army issued an

order prohibiting such gifts. As early as 21

October the Army got in touch with political

and labor leaders to serve as advisers and

assistants, telling them from day to day how

many laborers would be needed. The Filipino leaders were very co-operative and

made arrangements to secure the necessary

labor. Good results were obtained by enlisting the support of local leaders, especially

the parish priests. General Krueger declared: "In all reported instances, the

priests lent willing assistance and their information on individuals and conditions

was found reliable and outstandingly impartial."

 63

 As the fighting reached past

Carigara and Dagami and into the central

mountain range the Filipinos acted as supply carriers for the troops and worked on the

roads and trails. At one time there were as

many as 8,000 Filipinos engaged in this

labor. Army furnished transportation to the

site of the work and paid wages according

to the Commonwealth Government wage

scales.

Throughout November the logistical situation on Leyte remained bad. Work on

roads, together with that on airfields and

other installations, consisted largely of temporary expedients. The difficult problem of

getting supplies ashore and to the troops had

61

 Ibid., p. 279. 62

 1st Gav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 22-23.

63

 Ltr, CG Sixth Army to CG X Corps and others,

25 Nov 44.
LOGISTICS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS 205

not been completely solved, a situation

which hampered the progress of the tactical

troops. The lag in construction of airdromes

made it impossible for land-based air forces

to give adequate close air support to the

ground forces. This lack of support was another handicap to General Krueger's men

as they fought their way into the mountains.
CHAPTER XII

The Mountain Barrier: Part One

The successful completion of the campaign for the entire Leyte Valley on 2 November enabled General Krueger to embark

on the next phase of his plan for the liberation of Leyte.

This action was to consist of two drives

converging on Ormoc: one south through

Ormoc Valley by X Corps and the other

north from Baybay by XXIV Corps. The

remaining Japanese on the island would thus

be forced into the mountains west of Ormoc

Valley where they could not offer effective

organized resistance. At first, while some

elements of the XXIV Corps continued to

push west to reinforce the troops on the

shores of Ormoc Bay and mopped up in

southern Leyte Valley, the X Corps was to

secure control of the coast of Carigara Bay

from Carigara to Pinamopoan. With the

completion of this assignment, the northern

elements of the Sixth Army would be in a

position to drive south along Highway 2

which twisted and turned through the northern mountains and central plains of Ormoc

Valley to the port of Ormoc.1 (Map 11)

General Sibert ordered elements of the

1st Cavalry Division to occupy Carigara

while the 24th Division secured the coastal

corridor that ran from Carigara to Pinamopoan and then drove south along Highway

2 and occupied Ormoc. A battalion from

the 24th Division was to move to the Jaro

area and protect the 155-mm. howitzers of

the 947th Field Artillery Battalion which

was to assist the advance south by covering

a trail that ran from Jaro to Ormoc.2

Since the 21st Infantry had encountered

virtually no opposition in the vicinity of

Panaon Strait and since it was desirable

that the regiment rejoin the 24th Division,

General Krueger on 30 October had directed General Hodge to relieve the 21st

Infantry with one battalion of the 32d Infantry.3

 General Irving ordered the 34th

Infantry to continue its attack and secure

Capoocan. When the town was captured

the 19th Infantry was to move into it on 4

November while the 34th Infantry continued the drive west and secured Pinamopoan.4

The Coastal Corridor

Capoocan and Pinamopoan

At 0700 on 3 November the 34th Infantry moved west from its perimeter at Balaud in a column of battalions, with the 1st

Battalion, under Colonel Clifford, in the

lead. The 1st Battalion entered Capoocan

at 0755 and within ten minutes had

secured the town.5

At 0830 the battalion moved out and continued west along the coastal road to Pina1

 Sixth Army FO 28, 3 Nov 44.

2

 X Corps FO 6, 3 Nov 44. 3

 Sixth Army FO 27, 30 Oct 44. 4

 24th Div FO 5, 2 Nov 44. 5

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 3 Nov 44.

THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART ONE 207

mopoan. After an advance of about 1,000

yards, Company B, the point, encountered

an enemy force, estimated at about 100 men,

entrenched on the west bank of a stream.

The column halted and placed mortar fire

on the Japanese but failed to dislodge them.

The company then withdrew while the howitzers of the 63d Field Artillery Battalion

pounded the enemy position.

In the meantime a platoon of Company

B moved south to secure a ridge which paralleled the road. When the platoon located

some Japanese dug in on the reverse slope

Colonel Clifford sent Company A to its assistance. The guides took Company A over

the wrong trail and the troops ran into the

strong enemy entrenchments well concealed

by underbrush on the western bank of the

stream. Company A launched a frontal

assault, but after the first platoon had passed

the hidden positions the Japanese opened

fire and forced the company to withdraw.

Colonel Clifford rushed Company C to the

assistance of Company A, ordering it to deploy around the left flank of Company A

and onto the next ridge. The platoon from

Company B returned to its morning position.

Companies A and C then started against

the Japanese emplacements on the opposite

bank of the stream.6 The leader of the advance squad of Company A was killed and

Sgt. Charles E. Mower assumed command.

As he started to lead his men across the

stream, Sergeant Mower was severely

wounded. From his exposed position in the

middle of the stream he directed his squad

in the destruction of two enemy machine

guns and numerous riflemen, but he was

killed when the Japanese turned their fire

against him. Sergeant Mower was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

At 1530 Colonel Clifford withdrew Company A. After the 63d Field Artillery Battalion had blasted the ridge parallel to the

road, Company B attacked, while Company

C made its envelopment around the south

flank and destroyed the Japanese pocket of

resistance. At 1800 the 1st Battalion formed

its night perimeter.7

Earlier, at 1430, Company K had made

a reconnaissance in amphibian tractors from

Capoocan to a point just west of Pinamopoan. Since it encountered heavy enemy

fire, the company withdrew and returned to

Capoocan.8

During the night the 11th and 63d Field

Artillery Battalions massed their fires and

laid interdiction fire up and down the highway. Under cover of darkness, the Japanese

force opposing the 1st Battalion withdrew.

On the following morning patrols sent out

by the 1st Battalion scouted 1,000 yards to

the front but encountered no enemy. The

battalion therefore moved out at 0730 to

Colasian where it set up a defensive position.

The 2d and 3d Battalions then passed

through the 1st. The 2d Battalion entered

Pinamopoan and dug in, while the 3d

passed through the town and continued west

along the highway 1,700 yards. There it

set up a defensive position just short of a

ridge of hills that was later to be known as

Breakneck Ridge.9 Between Capoocan and

Pinamopoan the Japanese had abandoned

three 75-mm., one 40-mm., and five 37-mm.

guns, together with ammunition dumps,

signal equipment, and many documents.

The 34th Infantry found some land mines

on the road and destroyed them. Since the

regiment had quickly secured the coastal

6

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 3 Nov 44.

7

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 3 Nov 44. 8

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 39-40. 9

 Ibid., p. 40.
208 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

corridor and had started to move down

Highway 2, the X Corps was now in a

position from which it could drive south.

Defense of the Coastal Corridor

Some elements of the 26th Division had

arrived on Leyte during the naval battle,

and on 1 November most of the 1st Division

and the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment of the 26th Division landed at Ormoc.

The 1st Division, which had been activated

in Tokyo, had served in Manchuria during

the "China Incident" and had been transferred to Shanghai in August 1944. Though

it had no combat experience, this division

was considered by General Tomochika to

be the best equipped division of the Japanese

Army. Under the command of Lt. Gen. Tadasu Kataoka, it had been held in reserve

by Imperial General Headquarters for the

decisive battle, and it was sent to Manila

with great expectations.10

The arrival of these troops was in accord

with a plan devised after the Battle of Leyte

Gulf. The 102d Division, coming from Panay, and the 1st and 26th Divisions, sailing

from Luzon, were to land at Ormoc. General Suzuki planned to have these troops

move north along the Ormoc-Limon road

(Highway 2) through Ormoc Valley, from

which they were to diverge in three columns

and capture the Carigara-Jaro road. After

seizing the road, the Japanese troops were

to advance east and destroy the American

forces in the area between Tacloban and

Tanauan. After the 1st Division had secured

Carigara, the 68th Brigade was to land in

the north as 35th Army reserve. At the

same time the 30th Division was to land at

Albuera on Ormoc Bay and advance over

mountainous trails to Burauen and later

neutralize all resistance in the Dulag area.11

When General Suzuki received information that the Americans had secured Carigara, he realized that it would be impossible

to drive toward San Pedro Bay with the

Americans on his left flank. He believed,

however, that the reinforced 1st Division

could easily wipe out the American forces

in the Carigara area. On 3 November he

ordered the 1st Division to speed up its

passage through Ormoc Valley and the

102d Division to consolidate its forces with

those of the 1st Division for an all-out attack to annihilate the American troops near

Carigara. The 26th Division was to advance

on Jaro.12 No alternative to this plan had

been prepared in case the projected operations were not successful.13

 On 3 November,

American aircraft struck at the 1st Division

as it moved up Ormoc Valley in a ten-milelong convoy of trucks, tanks, and artillery.

They destroyed about thirty trucks and left

two tanks burning. The aircraft received

heavy and accurate ground antiaircraft fire,

and two of the planes were shot down by the

Japanese.14

10

 Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 18.

11

 10th I&HS, Eighth Army, Stf Study of Opns of

Japanese 35th Army on Leyte, Part I, p. 5. 12

 Ibid., Part I, pp. 5-6. 13

 Ibid., Part IV, p. 2, interrog of Col Junkichi

Okabayashi, CofS 1st Div. Colonel Okabayashi

makes the following statement about Japanese

planning: "It is not the ordinary practice in the

Japanese Army for higher headquarters to provide

unit commanders with alternate plans. When conferences are held between unit commanders and the

staff of higher headquarters, all possible alternatives are, of course, discussed. At any rate, unit commanders are invariably oriented with the general

plan of higher headquarters. In the event an original order cannot be carried out because of the

changing battle situation, the responsibility for

making changes in plans devolves upon the commander of the unit concerned." 14

 Rpt of Sixth Army G-3 Liaison Sec, 3 Nov 44.

Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 3 Nov 44.
THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART ONE 209

The lack of defense at Carigara had come

as a surprise to General Krueger, since the

Americans had observed the Japanese reinforcing the area. General Suzuki had

cleverly concealed from the Americans his

strength and intentions and thus had gained

time for a withdrawal by a "very successful"

delaying action.15 At the same time, the

57th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Division

had been able to move north through Ormoc

Valley and establish itself in the northern

mountains surrounding Highway 2.

The bringing in of reinforcements by the

Japanese brought into sharp focus the lack

of American aerial strength on Leyte. Although the Fifth Air Force had numerous

aircraft in the rear areas, these could not be

brought forward because of the very poor

condition of the available airstrips. The

few aircraft based on Leyte could not prevent the flow of additional enemy forces into

the island or give direct support to the

ground troops of Sixth Army.

Since the Japanese had been able to send

without difficulty about 13,500 troops into

the Ormoc area, General Krueger recognized that they were capable also of landing

troops on the shores of Carigara Bay. This

landing, if successful, would isolate the

American forces in the Carigara area. To

meet this threat, several courses of action

were open to General Krueger: he could devote the full energy of the X Corps to preparing a defense against a sea force attack;

he could disregard the threat and have the

X Corps push vigorously south and secure a

position on ground south of Limon, which

was about two and a half miles southwest

of Pinamopoan, before the Japanese could

build defensive positions; or, finally, he

could advance south with some elements,

leaving others to guard the Carigara area.

If the Japanese Navy and amphibious assault forces entered Carigara Bay, the possibilities for effective countermeasures were

not very promising. The escort carriers of

the Seventh Fleet, greatly weakened by the

Battle of Leyte Gulf, could not give support,

and it was quite possible that any assistance

that could be furnished by the Third Fleet

might not arrive in time.

Ranking officers of the Seventh Fleet,

however, did not believe it likely that the

Japanese would launch an amphibious assault through Carigara Bay. The reasons

given were as follows: The Japanese had

never made an assault landing against defended beaches in the past; they were short

of equipment to make a sustained amphibious assault; and they would be landing in

the face of the combined fire of the X Corps

artillery which would cover the beachhead

area from positions well behind the

beaches.16

Although General Krueger realized that

the high ground in the Limon area was the

key to operations farther south, he decided

that the threat to the Carigara area could

not be ignored. Since he had insufficient

forces to drive south and at the same time

to prepare the Carigara area for defense, on

4 November he directed General Sibert to

protect the Carigara area from a seaborne

attack before the advance to the south was

continued. At the same time the X Corps

was to send out units to explore for trails that

led from Daro, about three miles southwest

of Jaro, to Ormoc with the view of emplacing an artillery battalion of 155-mm. guns

within effective firing range of Ormoc.17

15

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 38.

16

 Memo, Maj Reppert for Col Clyde D. Eddieman, Rpt of Conf with Rear Adm William M.

Fechteler, 5 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 5 Nov 44. 17

 Ltr of Instns, CG Sixth Army to CG X Corps,

4 Nov 44, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 199.
210 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

General Sibert immediately told General

Irving to defer until further orders the advance south by the 24th Division. At the

same time he directed Generals Irving and

Mudge to have their divisions prepare defenses to ward off a seaborne attack against

the Barugo-Carigara-Capoocan area. Patrols of the 24th Infantry Division and the

1st Cavalry Division were to maintain contact at the Carigara River.18

General Mudge thereupon ordered the

1st Cavalry Brigade to patrol the CarigaraJaro road and to protect the movement of

supplies and troops along the road. The 2d

Cavalry Brigade was to establish two squadrons in the Carigara-Barugo area to protect

the seaward approaches to the area, guard

the bridge between Barugo and Carigara,

and maintain the security of San Juanico

Strait. The brigade was to be prepared to

reinforce the 24th Division.19

General Irving, also, redisposed his forces.

All the field artillery battalions had been at

Carigara but, with the issuance of the order

to protect the coast of Carigara Bay, the

13th and 52d Field Artillery Battalions

moved to Colasion Point on 4 November,

while the 63d and 11th took positions east

and west of Capoocan.20

On 5 November General Sibert returned

the 21st Infantry to the 24th Division and

recommended that General Irving send the

regiment to Pinamopoan to relieve the battle-weary 34th Infantry.21

 By the end of the

day the 1st and 3d Battalions, 21st Infantry,

had relieved the 34th Infantry and were on

the edge of Breakneck Ridge west of Pinamopoan.22

The American aircraft made two strikes

at the convoy of the 1st Division as it moved

north up Highway 2. The first one at about

1430 destroyed about thirty trucks, several

tanks, and an ammunition dump and killed

fifty to seventy-five men and thirty to forty

horses. The second strike at about 1745 hit

trucks loaded with Japanese soldiers who

scattered when attacked. All the vehicles

were camouflaged with palm leaves.23

By 6 November, since the X Corps had

disposed its force to protect the seaward

approaches and since the Navy had given

assurance that an amphibious assault was

unlikely, General Krueger felt that the attack south could be continued. He was

anxious to have the Sixth Army drive rapidly down Highway 2 and secure the port

of Ormoc, through which the Japanese had

reinforced the Leyte garrison. He also

wished to guard against the possibility that

the Japanese, as more and more of their

troops moved up Ormoc Valley, would attempt to debouch into northern Leyte

Valley. He therefore directed General Sibert

to expend his main effort in the drive south

but also to send elements of his force into

the mountains east of Ormoc Valley. These

units were to seize the mountain passes and

secure positions in the Daro area from which

the artillery could deliver long-range fire

upon Ormoc in support of the advance

south. At the same time, elements of the

XXIV Corps were to guard the mountain

passages into southern Leyte Valley.24

18

 Ltr, CG X Corps to CG's 24th Div and 1st Cav

Div, 4 Nov 44; X Corps G-3 Jnl, 5 Nov 44. 19

 1st Cav Div FO 7, 4 Nov 44. 20

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 103. 21

 X Corps Opn Plan, 5 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-3

Jnl, 5 Nov 44.

22

 24th Div Opns Sum, 5 Nov 44, X Corps G-3

Jnl, 5 Nov 44. 23

 Msg, G-2 X Corps to G-3 Sixth Army, 5 Nov

44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 6 Nov 44. 24

 Sixth Army FO 29, Nov 44.
THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART ONE 211

Battle of Breakneck Ridge

The Battle Begins

On 5 November General Sibert instructed

the 24th Division to complete the relief of

the 34th Infantry and at the same time to

push strong, aggressive patrols to the south.

The 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, was to

protect a battalion of 155-mm. guns, which

was to deliver long-range fire on Ormoc,

about fourteen miles to the southwest. The

attack south was to begin on 7 November.25

Accordingly, General Irving ordered the

21st Infantry, after the completion of its

relief of the 34th Infantry, to reconnoiter

Breakneck Ridge to its front on 6 November

and on the following day to launch its drive

south. A battalion of the 19th Infantry was

to move to Pinamopoan and protect the line

of communications of the 21st Infantry as

the attack progressed. The rest of the 19th

Infantry was to move to the mountains in

the vicinity of Daro and Jaro to protect the

226th Field Artillery Battalion and secure

the mountain passes that led into Leyte

Valley.26

The 21st Infantry relieved the 34th Infantry in the vicinity of Pinamopoan without difficulty and sent out strong patrols to

Breakneck Ridge. One of these patrols was

led by Lt. Col. Frederick R. Weber, the regimental commander.

Breakneck Ridge, over which Highway 2

corkscrewed its way between Pinamopoan

and Limon for about 7,200 yards, was actually a hill mass with many spurs branching

off from an irregularly shaped crest line toward the shores of Carrigara Bay to the

north and the Levte River valley to the

south. Shoulder-high cogon grass was thick

on the low ground, and the pockets between

the hills were heavily forested. The valleys

were deep, with precipitous sides. The 1st

Division had heavily fortified the area, taking advantage of the innumerable thickly

wooded pockets that served as natural forts.

The Japanese had also built an elaborate

system of trenches and other defensive positions and had honeycombed the area with

spider holes. Many of the latter were on reverse slopes some distance below the crests

and were protected from direct fire. In front

of each spider hole the enemy had cut fire

lanes through the cogon grass, which was

left so short that even a crawling soldier

would be exposed to fire. The constant rainfall made the hills slippery and treacherous,

and, more important, provided a protective

curtain in the day and covered movements

of the enemy at night.27

On 5 November, before the relief of the

34th Infantry, Maj. Kemuel K. Blacker,

leading an artillery forward observer's party

from the 32d Field Artillery Battalion and a

patrol from the 34th Infantry, had reconnoitered far forward on Breakneck Ridge to

the top of a knoll, later called OP Hill,

which was some 2,500 yards west of Pinamopoan, and was directing fire from that

point.28 The party was attacked by a group

of about platoon strength from the 57th

Infantry Regiment and took refuge in an

abandoned position. At 1230 Colonel Weber

ordered the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry,

to move out to the party's assistance. Company K, on the right side of the highway,

was able to secure the northern approaches

25

 X Corps Amendment to FO 6, 5 Nov 44. 26 24th Div FO 7, 5 Nov 44.

27

 Col William J. Verbeck, A Regiment in Action

(n. p., n. d., copy in OCMH), p. 16; 24th Div

Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 42. 28

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 42.
212 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

to the hill and rescue the observation party,

though it ran into heavy machine gun and

rifle fire. In the meantime Company I

moved to the left and against stiff resistance

secured a ridge later known as Corkscrew

Ridge, which was about 1,200 yards southeast of OP Hill and which formed the southeastern spur of Breakneck Ridge. Since both

companies needed more ammunition, vehicles with the required supply were sent up

along the road. After hidden Japanese riflemen had punctured the tires, the vehicles

withdrew and the ammunition was carried

up by hand. A platoon of riflemen from

Company I cleared out the enemy position

but received mortar fire from an unknown

source.29

Both companies were so far in advance

of the rest of the 21st Infantry that only limited supplies of ammunition and rations

could reach them. As the afternoon hours

wore on, the pressure from the 57th Infantry increased but the companies dug in

and held their positions. During the night

they repulsed three counterattacks of about

fifty men each.30 On the following morning

the 57th Infantry placed mortar fire upon

the companies,31 augmented at first by fire

from one artillery piece and later by fire

from a four-gun battery.32 The intensity of

this fire forced the companies to withdraw

from their position and rejoin the rest of the

3d Battalion on the beach near Colasion.33

During the day the 1st Battalion tried

unsuccessfully to secure positions to support

the attack through Breakneck Ridge. At

the close of 6 November the 57th Infantry

of the 1st Division securely occupied Breakneck Ridge and its northern approaches.

For the assault the following day, General

Irving attached the 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, to the 21st Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, had reorganized about

2,000 yards east of Pinamopoan. The 1st

Battalion was on the regiment's right, the

2d Battalion was in the center astride the

highway, and the 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, was on the 21st Infantry's left.34

The 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, was the

object of a night attack that started at 2000

and lasted for two hours. The enemy used

mortars and grenades against the battalion

but was unable to penetrate its perimeter.35

Colonel Weber ordered the 21st Infantry

to be prepared to move out at 0800 on 7

November. The assault was to be made in

column of battalions, the 2d Battalion in the

lead, with a spur of Breakneck Ridge as the

initial objective. This spur or branch ridge

extended east and west across the road 400

yards south of the front line. General Irving

ordered the 52d Field Artillery Battalion to

mass its fire immediately in front of the

troops for fifteen minutes just before they

jumped off and then to shift its fire to the

ridge. Attached to the 2d Battalion for support were a platoon from the 44th Tank

Company, a company from the 85th Chemical Battalion, and a company from the

63 2d Tank Destroyer Battalion.36

At 0940 the 308th Bombardment Wing

bombed the headquarters of General Suzuki at Ormoc and strafed the highway

near by. Ormoc had also been under constant fire from the battalion of 155-mm. guns

in Jaro, at a range of 25,000 yards. Only a 29

 24th Div G-3 Jnl, 5 Nov 44. 30

 24th Div G-2 Jnl, 6 Nov 44. 31

 Rad, Maj Clark, X Corps, to G-2 Sixth Army,

BA 669, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 6 Nov 44. 32

 Msg, S-2 21st Inf to CG 24th Div, 6 Nov 44,

24th Div G-2 Jnl, 6 Nov 44. 33

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 42.

34

 Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 7 Nov 44. 35

 Msg, S-2 21st Inf to G-2 24th Div, 7 Nov 44,

24th Div G-2 Jnl, 7 Nov 44. 36

 21st Inf FO 19, 7 Nov 44, 24th Div G-3 Jnl,

8 Nov 44.
THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART ONE 213

few houses were left standing after the bombardment was completed.37

The troops moved out as scheduled. Company E, on the west of the road, reached the

branch ridge at 0915 and came under fire

from enemy automatic weapons on the right.

Company G ran into about 200 men from

the 3d Battalion, 57th Infantry Regiment.

They were well entrenched at a bend of the

road on the forward slope of the high

ground, and Colonel Weber had the selfpropelled guns of the tank destroyer battalion brought forward. These fired into the

pocket, and although they killed the commander of the 3d Battalion the unit held

fast.38 Weber then called two tanks forward,

but as they moved along the road a Japanese

soldier jumped out of the high cogon grass

and disabled one of the tanks by planting a

magnetic mine against it. The other tank

then withdrew.39

General Sibert was dissatisfied with the

progress of the 21st Infantry and felt that

Colonel Weber was not sufficiently aggressive. Accompanied by his G-2, Col. William

J. Verbeck, he visited the command post of

Colonel Weber at noon. Dispensing with the

usual command channels and in the presence of General Irving, he relieved Colonel

Weber and made Colonel Verbeck the commanding officer of the 21st Infantry. Colonel

Weber was retained in the regiment as its

executive officer.40

Colonel Verbeck ordered Company L, in

support of the 2d Battalion, to make a wide

flanking movement to the east and secure

the ridge which had been denied to Company G. The company moved out at 1630

but was unsuccessful. As it withdrew it made

contact with Company F which had successfully pushed forward but because of an unexplained misunderstanding of orders had

withdrawn.41 Night perimeters were established on the edge of Breakneck Ridge.

On the same day Colonel Chapman,

commander of the 19th Infantry, ordered his

2d Battalion to send a reinforced rifle company to Hill 1525 about 2,600 yards southeast of Limon, seize this ground, and, in

support of the advance south by the 21st

Infantry, direct artillery fire on Highway 2.

Company G, 19th Infantry, moved out on

this mission with only two thirds of a ration

per man, since its kitchens were still in the

Jaro area. The guides with Company G lost

their way, and the company set up a night

perimeter after a patrol had located a strong

enemy position on a ridge west of its course.

The company position was thought to be in

the vicinity of Hill 1525, but it was actually

far east of the hill.42

As the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, had

failed to secure the ridge 400 yards to its

front, Colonel Verbeck that night ordered

the battalion, with Company L attached, to

continue the attack toward the ridge after

an artillery barrage on the following morning. The 1st Battalion was to secure Hill

1525, establish contact with the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, and from the hill

envelop the southern flank of the 1st Division.43

On the morning of 8 November a

typhoon, moving in from the west, swept

37

 Msg, 308th Bombardment Wing to Sixth Army,

7 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 7 Nov 44. 38

 Msg, CO 21st Inf to CG 24th Div, 7 Nov 44,

24th Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Nov 44; 35th Army Opns, p. 57. 39

 Msg, S-3 21st Inf to GG 24th Div, 7 Nov 44,

24th Div G-2 Jnl, 7 Nov 44. 40

 Interv with Col Verbeck, 26 Sep 51. Colonel

Verbeck stated that for the remainder of the campaign Colonel Weber was an excellent and loyal

executive officer.

41 Msg, S-3 21st Inf to G-3 24th Div, 7 Nov 44,

24th Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Nov 44: 24th Div Opns Rpt

Leyte, p. 43. 42

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 43. 43

 24th Div G-3 Jnl. 7 Nov 44.
214 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

ENGINEERS REMOVE LAND MINES from a bridge on Breakneck Ridge.

over the entire island. Jan Valtin, a member of the 24th Division, graphically describes it: "From the angry immensity of the

heavens floods raced in almost horizontal

sheets. Palms bent low under the storm,

their fronds flattened like streamers of wet

silk. Trees crashed to earth. In the expanse

of ... [cogon] grass the howling of the

wind was like a thousand-fold plaint of the

unburied dead. The trickle of supplies was

at a standstill. On Carigara Bay the obscured headlands moaned under the onslaught of the . . . seas. Planes were

grounded and ships became haunted things

looking for refuge. Massed artillery . . .

barrages to the summit of Breakneck Ridge

sounded dim and hollow in the tempest.

Trails were obliterated by the rain. The sky

was black."

 44

 In the midst of the storm, the

infantry attacked.

The 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, effectively used flame throwers to drive the

enemy troops out of spider holes and caves.45

Although shelled by sporadic artillery fire,

the battalion continued to advance. Strong

elements of the 57th Infantry hotly contested the American assault. Meanwhile

Company E pushed farther along the road

until it was halted at the site of a bridge

which had been destroyed by the enemy. The

Japanese had flanked the site with emplacements from which rifle, automatic weapons,

and mortar fire resisted the frontal attack of

44

 Jan Valtin [Richard J. Krebs], Children of

Yesterday (New York, The Readers Press, Inc.,

1946), p. 187. 45

 24th Div G-3 Jnl, 8 Nov 44.
THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART ONE 215

the company.46 At nightfall Company E fell

back to its morning position. The 57th Infantry continued to make a determined

stand against the 2d Battalion. Concealed

Japanese riflemen fired continuously on the

front, flanks, and rear of all positions and

small enemy detachments infiltrated

through the lines. In concert with the attack

of the 2d Battalion, the 1st Battalion had

moved out that morning toward Hill 1525.

Since the maps were grossly inaccurate, the

precise location of the hill was unknown,

but the battalion reported that it had

reached the southern slope of the hill at

1600 and was digging in under automatic

weapons fire. At 0700 the 2d Battalion, 19th

Infantry, under Colonel Spragins, moved

out through a driving rain and over precipitous trails to join the battalion's Company

G. During the day Company G drove the

enemy off the ridge where the company's

advance had been halted the previous afternoon. In their flight the Japanese abandoned much equipment, most of which was

new. Of more importance, a significant field

order of the 1st Division was found on the

body of a Japanese officer.

When the consolidation of the battalion

was made, Colonel Spragins determined

that he was east of Hill 1525 as shown on

the maps. Although the battalion was in a

position to observe Leyte Valley, it would

have to move westward in order to get a

view of Ormoc Valley. At 1530 Colonel

Spragins therefore sent Company E to occupy a ridge 1,000 yards to the west. The

battalion then dug in for the night.47 On the

following morning General Irving placed

the battalion under the operational control

of the 21st Infantry.

Immediately in front of the 21st Infantry

was a Japanese force estimated to be of

battalion strength. To the east was an undetermined number of enemy machine guns.

In front of Company E a bridge was out

and tanks could not pass. On the steep sides

of the gulch around this bridge site, elements

of the 57th Infantry with rifles, automatic

weapons, and mortars stopped all attempts

of Company E to move forward.48

Through the night torrential rains fell.

At dawn of 9 November two begrimed,

soaked, and weary battalions of the 21st Infantry jumped off to the attack, the 2d Battalion, less Company F, on the west side of

the road and the 3d Battalion on the east.

Heavy artillery preparations had already

pounded the Japanese front lines. As the attack progressed, mortars and artillery placed

fires on targets of opportunity. In destroying

pockets of resistance in the gulch, grenades,

rifles, and flame throwers were used, together with heavy machine guns.

At 0930 Company I, 21st Infantry,

reached the crest of the intermediate ridge

on the east side of the road which ran southward toward the center of Breakneck Ridge.

An hour later Company E, 21st Infantry,

moved out from the perimeter it had held

for two days. Its mission was to cut west of

the road and secure the commanding high

ground in the rear of the emplaced Japanese

at the bridge site where the advance of the

company had been stopped on the previous

day. At the same time Company L, 21st Infantry, passed through Company I and attacked the center of Breakneck Ridge as

Company G started a wide envelopment to

the west from Company E's position to assault OP Hill from the west. Artillery forward observer parties went with the com46

 24th Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 20, 8 Nov 44. 47

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 45.

48

 Msg, CO 21st Inf to CofS 24th Div, 8 Nov 44,

24th Div G-2 Jnl, 8 Nov 44.
216 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

panics and called artillery fires on targets of

opportunity.

At 1150 Company L encountered determined opposition from enemy rifle and mortar fire but doggedly pushed ahead for several hours and secured the top of the ridge.

Company G reached its objective, but upon

receiving intense enemy fire was forced to

retire to the eastern slopes of a ridge 300

yards to the north, where it reorganized.

Company E also reached its objective and

then formed its night perimeter. At 1815

the Japanese launched a counterattack

against the perimeter of Company G but

the attack was repulsed. For the night a

platoon of heavy machine guns was attached to each rifle company to protect its

perimeter.

Since the position of the 2d Battalion,

19th Infantry, had by this time become

clear, Colonel Verbeck ordered the battalion to move from the east and to relieve

the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, on Hill

1525. One company was to be established on

a ridge overlooking Highway 2 while the

remainder of the battalion was to block the

trail that passed Hill 1525.49 The 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, was to push westward

from its position on Hill 1525 and cut the

Ormoc road some 1,800 yards south of Limon in order to forestall the escape of Japanese troops from Breakneck Ridge. Company A was to remain on the hill and hold

it until the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry,

arrived.

The 1st Battalion, less Company A,

jumped off at 0730. After it had advanced

about one and a half miles and was within

sight of Highway 2, the battalion was halted

by heavy enemy fire from the front and both

flanks. It renewed the attack and informed

Colonel Verbeck that it was moving slowly

northwest and was less than a mile from

Limon. In the meantime the enemy attacked

Company A on Hill 1525, and the company

was able to maintain its position with difficulty. Because of this fight and the fact that

no contact had been established with the 2d

Battalion, 19th Infantry, Colonel Verbeck

ordered the battalion to rejoin Company A.

The troops therefore returned and took part

in the fight to repel the Japanese. The 1st

Battalion withstood the enemy force until

1400, when an estimated battalion of fresh

troops from the 57th Infantry was thrown

into the fight.50 The Americans then broke

off the engagement, and the battalion, covered by Company A, withdrew from Hill

1525 to the vicinity of Pinamopoan.51

Information that the 1st Battalion, 21st

Infantry, was being attacked on Hill 1525

reached the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry,

shortly after noon as it was on its way to

relieve the 1st Battalion. Colonel Spragins

pushed forward immediately with two companies, hoping to reach the 1st Battalion by

1500, but progress was slowed by steep,

slippery slopes that were often blocked by

huge fallen trees. At 1630, without having

heard any sounds of battle, which they had

hoped would guide them to the 1st Battalion's position, the troops reached what

they believed to be the western slopes of

Hill 1525. Patrols reported no contact either

with friendly or enemy units and the 2d

Battalion set up its night perimeter.

"At this time," states the 24th Infantry

Division operations report on Leyte, "it began to dawn on all concerned that Hill 1525,

as shown on the map, was not a single hill

mass, but a long ridge of many knolls and

hilltops."

 52

49

 Msg, G-3 24th Div to G-2 24th Div, 9 Nov 44,

24th Div G-2 Jnl, 9 Nov 44.

50

 24th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 21, 9 Nov 44. 51

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 47. 52

 Ibid., p. 48.
THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART ONE 217

VIEW FROM THE RIDGES LOOKING NORTH UP THE LIMON VALLEY

Breakneck Ridge: Second Phase

On 9 November the Japanese 26th Division arrived at Ormoc in three large transports with a destroyer escort. The troops

landed without their equipment and ammunition, since aircraft from the Fifth Air

Force bombed the convoy and forced it to

depart before the unloading was completed.

During the convoy's return, some of the

Japanese vessels were destroyed by the

American aircraft.53

The arrival of these troops was in accord

with a plan embodied in the order which

had been taken from the dead Japanese officer on the previous day. This plan envisaged

a grand offensive which was to start in the

middle of November. The 41st Infantry

Regiment of the 30th Division and the

169th and 171st Independent Infantry Battalions of the 102d Division were to secure

a line that ran from a hill 3,500 yards northwest of Jaro to a point just south of Pinamopoan and protect the movement of the 1st

Division to this line. With the arrival of the

1st Division on this defensive line, a coordinated attack was to be launched—the

1st Division seizing the Carigara area and

the 41st Infantry Regiment and the 26th

Division attacking the Mt. Mamban area

about ten miles southeast of Limon. The

way would then be open for a drive into

Leyte Valley.54

General Krueger was quick to realize the

significance of this order. Since General Suzuki apparently wished to make the mountains of northern Leyte the battleground for

53

 35th Army Opns, p. 59.

54

 Ibid.; Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 50;

Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 9 Nov 44.
218 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

the island, Krueger disposed his forces to

meet the enemy threat. The X Corps was to

continue its drive south down Highway 2

but at the same time was to dispose units

in the central mountain range to protect the

exits from Ormoc Valley into Leyte Valley.

The XXIV Corps was to send a reinforced

regiment into the hills northwest of Dagami

to prevent any Japanese from infiltrating

into Leyte Valley, and the corps was also to

be prepared to assist elements of the X Corps

that guarded the trail running from Daro to

Dolores, a village about six miles northeast

of Ormoc. A regiment of the XXIV Corps

was to be placed in Sixth Army Reserve at

Dagami, where the central mountain range

began.55

General Sibert then ordered the 24th Division to continue its attack south. The 112th

Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, under

Brig. Gen. Julian W. Cunningham, which

was expected to arrive on 14 November,

was to relieve elements of the 1st Cavalry

Division that guarded the beaches in the

Carigara-Barugo area. The 1st Cavalry

Division was then to drive southwest from

the central mountains and relieve some of

the pressure against the 24th Division.56

General Hodge at the same time ordered

the 96th Division to seize the high ground

between Jaro and Dagami, secure all routes

of exit from the west coast through the central mountain range, and send patrols

through the passes to the west coast of Leyte.

The division was also ordered to maintain

in the vicinity of Dagami one infantry regiment in Sixth Army Reserve. At the same

time elements of the 7th Division had

reached the shores of Ormoc Bay in the vicinity of Baybay and were ordered to send

patrols toward Ormoc and to prepare the

route for a future advance in strength.57

If the attention of the Japanese could be

fastened upon the X Corps in the north and

northeast, it might be possible for General

Krueger to put into effect his plan to send a

strong force from the XXIV Corps over

the mountains far to the south along the

Abuyog—Baybay road to the eastern shores

of Ormoc Bay in order to reinforce elements

of the 7th Division already there. This force

was to drive north toward Ormoc while elements of the X Corps pushed south toward

the town along Highway 2. It might even

be possible later to land an amphibious

force, perhaps as large as a division, at a

point just below Ormoc. But first it was allimportant that the Japanese be contained

in Ormoc Valley and that their attention

continue to be directed to the north.58

On 9 November General Irving ordered

the 24th Division to launch a co-ordinated

assault on the following day to drive the

1st Division from Breakneck Ridge and also

deny it commanding ground from which

the Japanese could conduct delaying actions

just south of the barrio of Limon. (See Map

11.) The 21st Infantry was to drive south

along Highway 2 and the 2d Battalion,

19th Infantry, was to proceed west from its

position on the east flank of the enemy and

establish a roadblock on Highway 2 about

2,000 yards south of Limon. The 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, was to make a wide

enveloping movement around the west flank

of the 57th Infantry and seize the high

ground known as Kilay Ridge which was

about 700 yards from Highway 2 and west

of the proposed roadblock of the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry. General Irving announced : "Success of the Leyte Campaign

55

 Sixth Army FO 30, 11 Nov 44. 56

 X Corps FO 12, 12 Nov 44.

57

 XXIV Corps FO 23, 10 Nov 44. 58

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 57.
THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART ONE 219

depends upon quickly and completely destroying hostile forces on our front."

 59

By the morning of 10 November the 1st

Battalion, 21st Infantry, had reorganized

and re-equipped itself. The 2d and 3d Battalions of the regiment were disposed along

a ridge southwest of Pinamopoan. The companies of the two battalions were intermingled.60

The rains continued to pour down upon

the troops, and the thick mud was slippery

and treacherous underfoot. After the artillery had fired a ten-minute concentration

on Breakneck Ridge, the 21st Infantry attacked at 0945. Company A, the lead company, passed through Company E and

pushed south. At 0955 Company G seized

OP Hill. Simultaneously, Company I moved

to the site of the destroyed bridge 300 yards

east of OP Hill. Company L moved toward

the high ground 300 yards southeast of its

position and at 1120 secured this ground.

Colonel Verbeck then ordered the 1st

Battalion to attack a ridge 200 yards to its

front by maneuvering through the defiles on

each side of the enemy-held spur. The maneuver was unsuccessful and the 1st Battalion resumed its former position.61

 The

Japanese resisted all efforts of the 2d Battalion to move down the reverse slope of

OP Hill.62 During the day the 1st Battalion,

34th Infantry, and the 2d Battalion, 19th

Infantry, moved out to secure the commanding positions south of Limon.63

The ten guns of the 2d Battalion, 1st Artillery Regiment of the 1st Division, were

moved to a position east of Limon where

they could be used to assist the 57th Infantry Regiment.64 During the night of 10-11

November the 57th Infantry severed the

telephone lines from the headquarters of the

21st Infantry to all of the regiment's

battalions.

That night the American artillery fired

heavy interdiction fires, and before 0900 on

11 November it delivered preparations, including white phosphorus shells, on enemy

pockets and strong points on Breakneck

Ridge. Company C of the 85th Chemical

Battalion maintained constant harassing

fires on the reverse slopes of the east ridge

and OP Hill, at the rate of approximately

two 4.2-inch mortar rounds every five minutes.65

 Colonel Verbeck attached Company

L to the 2d Battalion.

The 21st Infantry resumed the attack at

0900 with the 1st and 2d Battalions abreast,

the 1st Battalion to the north of OP Hill and

the 2d Battalion south and west of the parts

of Breakneck Ridge previously captured.

Strong elements of the 57th Infantry

from the south and from positions in the

wooded ridges east of Corkscrew Ridge immediately fired upon the 2d Battalion and

pinned it down for the rest of the day. The

1st Battalion encountered little opposition

until it reached a point about 300 yards

south of the crest of Breakneck Ridge, where

the Japanese strongly resisted. The troops

then moved west of the enemy left flank

about 200 yards to enable the tanks from

Company A, 44th Tank Battalion, to make

an attack against the main position of the

57th Infantry on Breakneck Ridge.66

The tanks proceeded along Highway 2 up

Breakneck Ridge and down its reverse slope.

They destroyed an estimated twenty-five en59 emy positions which contained automatic 24th Div FO 8, 9 Nov 44. 60

 24th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 22, 10 Nov 44. 61

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 49. 62

 24th Div G-2 Jnl, 10 Nov 44. 63

 Ibid., pp. 53, 61.

64

 35th Army Opns, p. 60. 65

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 49. 66

 24th Div G-3 Jnl, 11 Nov 44.
220 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

weapons. One tank got stuck when it went

off the edge of the road. As darkness approached, its crew was rescued by another

tank which then put a 75-mm. shell into the

stalled vehicle to prevent its use by the

Japanese.67

At 1600 the 308th Bombardment Wing

dropped twenty-eight 500-pound bombs on

the Valencia airfield in the middle of Ormoc

Valley and twenty-four 500-pound bombs

on a Highway 2 bridge in the vicinity of the

airfield.68

At nightfall the 1st Battalion had secured

its objective, a ridge 300 yards to the southwest of OP Hill, and all positions were consolidated. During the night the 226th and

465th Field Artillery Battalions placed harassing fire on the enemy positions. In order

to shake the morale of the Japanese, the

artillery fired its rounds at exact five-minute

intervals but scattered the fire throughout

the enemy-held area.69

On the morning of 12 November the 3d

Battalion, supported by six tanks and a platoon from the 632d Tank Destroyer Battalion, moved out along the road skirting

the crest of Breakneck Ridge. By 1115 it had

passed over the crest and was moving down

the reverse slope. After the 3d Battalion

crossed the hill, the 1st Battalion attacked

on the right of the road with the mission of

enveloping the Japanese left (north) flank.70

There was little resistance, and soon after

1200 the crest of Breakneck Ridge was in

the hands of the 21st Infantry. But shortly

afterward the 2d Field Artillery Battalion

of the 1st Division shelled the regiment and

stopped all forward advance.71

On 13 November the 1st and 2d Battalions took up the fight, with machine guns

from the vicinity of OP Hill firing in support. The 1st and 2d Battalions advanced

600 and 400 yards, respectively. By 14 November it appeared to General Irving that

the 21st Infantry had eliminated nearly all

resistance on Breakneck Ridge. The regiment controlled the ridge proper, but several

adjacent spurs, notably Corkscrew Ridge,

were still controlled by the 57th Infantry.

On 15 November the 1st Battalion, the most

advanced unit, was about 1,500 yards north

of Limon. On 16 November the 128th Infantry of the 32d Division relieved the 21st

Infantry. The battle of Breakneck Ridge

had not been an easy one for the 21st Infantry; it had lost 630 men killed, wounded,

and missing, together with 135 men from

other causes. By actual count it had killed

1,779 Japanese.72

67

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 50; 44th Tank

Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2. 68

 Msg, 308th Bombardment Wing to Sixth Army,

11 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 11 Nov 44. 69

 X Corps Arty S-3 Periodic Rpt 22, 12 Nov 44.

70

 24th Div G-3 Jnl, 12 Nov 44; 24th Div Opns

Rpt Leyte, p. 50. 71

 24th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 24, 12 Nov 44;

35th Army Opns, p. 62. 72

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 51.
CHAPTER XIII

The Mountain Barrier: Part Two

By the middle of November both the

Americans and the Japanese realized that

the struggle for the island of Leyte was going

to be long and costly—far longer and costlier

than either had anticipated.

On 9 and 10 November, Field Marshal

Hisaichi Terauchi, the senior officer of the

Japanese forces in the Philippines, held a

series of conferences on the progress of the

campaign. General Yamashita, commanding general of the 14th Area Army, strongly

urged that the Leyte operation be discontinued and offered reasons for this stand:

There was little likelihood that additional

reinforcements would reach the Philippines,

and the vital manpower needed for the defense of Luzon would be drained off uselessly at Leyte. The naval battle of Leyte

Gulf, he also thought, had been "unsatisfactory" and there was reason to believe that

the air battle off Formosa had been equally

disappointing. The shortage of shipping and

escort strength greatly aggravated the already difficult problem of troop transportation. Finally, the land operations were not

proceeding favorably.1 But Yamashita's

superior, Field Marshal Terauchi, commanding general of the Southern Army,

insisted that the reinforcement program be

continued and that the battle for Leyte be

brought to a successful conclusion. General

Yamashita is said to have replied, "I fully

understand your intention. I will carry it

out to a successful end."

 2

Reinforcements

At the same time General Krueger was

anxious to complete the third phase of the

American campaign, the two-pronged drive

toward the port of Ormoc. He felt, however,

that there were insufficient troops to both

protect the mountain passes into Leyte Valley and make the drives toward Ormoc.

In preparing for the Leyte Campaign,

General Krueger had asked that the units

which were to participate be embarked with

a 10 percent overstrength. This request was

disapproved. Just before the embarkation,

however, he received 5,000 untrained replacements.3

 He had also requested that during the course of the operation 18,800 replacements be delivered to the combat zone,

the first 10,000 to arrive by A plus 10. During the first thirty days of the operation he

would need the following replacements:

14,300 Infantry, 1,300 Field Artillery, 1,130

Corps of Engineers, 750 Medical Corps, 375

Antiaircraft Artillery and Coast Artillery,

185 Quartermaster Corps, 185 Ordnance, 1

 GHQ FEG, MI Sec, Hist Div, Statements of

Japanese Officials of World War II, Vol. II, p. 687,

Statement of Maj Gen Toshio Nishimura [Asst

CofS 14th Area Army], copy in OCMH.

2

 Ibid., I, 541. 3

 G-1 Rpt, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 152.
222 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

TABLE 1—SIXTH ARMY DAILY STRENGTH REPORTS, 12 NOVEMBER-25 DECEMBER 1944

Source: Sixth Army Operations Report Leyte, 20 October-25 December 1944, p. 153.

185 Signal, and all others 375. Approximately 6 percent of these should be

officers.4

As the fighting extended into the mountains, the lack of sufficient replacements began to be greatly felt. At no time did General

Krueger know when replacements would

arrive, or whether they would be combat

or service troops, or what their individual

specialties would be. During the course of

the operation he received only 336 officers

and 4,953 enlisted men as replacements.

To add to these difficulties, General MacArthur's headquarters used figures for "assigned strength" rather than "effective

strength," that is, the number actually present with a unit, in computing the need for

replacements. Such figures gave an entirely

erroneous picture, since evacuations were to

change rapidly the figures for medical installations, and dispositions reports were delayed for long periods. For example, on 12

November the assigned strength of the

Sixth Army was only 289 officers and 1,874

enlisted men short of its Table of Organization strength, but its effective strength

was 1,050 officers and 11,754 enlisted men

short of the Table of Organization strength.

By 20 December this shortage had pyramided to about 21,000—considerably more

than a division. (Table 1) General Krueger was seriously concerned about the situation, especially since nearly 79 percent of

the casualties occurred in the infantry.5

Fortunately, the 32d and 77th Infantry

Divisions—the Sixth Army reserve—were

due to come in soon or had already done so,

and there were on the island additional units

that were to have used Leyte as a shipping

area for subsequent operations. The availability of the 11th Airborne Division, under

Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Swing, and the 112th

Cavalry Regimental Combat Team,6 under

General Cunningham, was most timely.

They could be used to help guard the mountain passes into Leyte Valley and also to give

support to the drive of X Corps south down

the Ormoc Valley.

At the same time General Krueger proposed that as soon as there were sufficient

troops and supplies available, an amphibious landing be made near Ormoc to capture

4

 Ltr, CG Sixth Army to CINC SWPA, 29 Aug

44, sub: Replacements for Forthcoming Opn,

Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 29 Aug 44.

5

 Ltr, Gen Krueger to Gen Ward. 12 Sep 51,

OCMH. 6

 This unit was a separate regimental combat team.
THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART TWO 223

the town. This operation would speedily reduce the Japanese opposition south of Ormoc, cut the enemy's line of communication

at Ormoc, and place the hostile forces in

Ormoc Valley "in a vise which could shortly

squeeze them into extermination."

 7

The supporting naval forces, however,

could not make available sufficient assault

and resupply shipping to mount and support such an operation. The Navy also

thought that there was insufficient air support on the island to insure the safe arrival

of a convoy into Ormoc Bay. There was a

strong possibility that severe losses might

result from the suicide bombing techniques

of the Japanese pilots. General Krueger

therefore set aside his plan until it could be

introduced at a more opportune time.8

When the 11th Airborne Division arrived,

General Krueger could attach it to the

XXIV Corps in southern Leyte. General

Hodge could then relieve some of the troops

that had been guarding the mountain entrances into the valley and also send additional support to the troops on the shores of

Ormoc Bay, thus enabling the XXIV Corps

to launch a strong drive toward Ormoc

from the south.

General Krueger originally had planned

to have the 32d Division, under Maj. Gen.

William H. Gill, establish control over southern Samar, but in view of the limited number of Japanese on that island, he decided to

make use of the division to add momentum

to the attack of X Corps and to give rest to

the weary troops of the 24th Division.9 On

14 November General Krueger therefore directed General Sibert to relieve the units of

the 24th Division with elements of the 32d

Division. At the same time, the 112th Cavalry was attached to the 1st Cavalry Division

in order to give impetus to the attack.10

32d Division Assumes the Offensive

General Sibert made arrangements for

the introduction of the 32d Division and the

112th Cavalry into the battle. The 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion,

34th Infantry, which had reached positions

overlooking Highway 2 south of Limon,

were to remain in those locations and temporarily under the operational control of

General Gill. The 112thCavalry was to

operate in the mountains between Ormoc

and Leyte Valleys and assist the 1st Cavalry

Division in a drive to the southwest toward

Highway 2. A regimental combat team from

the 32d Division was to relieve the 21st Infantry on Breakneck Ridge. Another regiment from the division would mop up in

the vicinity of Hill 1525 and prepare to

assist in the drive south. Elements of the

division were to relieve the units of the 24th

Division in the Daro area, from which the

artillery had been shelling Ormoc. The 24th

Division artillery was to support the advance of the 32d Division until relieved.11

The flanks of the 32d Division were protected. The 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, had

established a roadblock on Highway 2,

about 2,000 yards south of Limon, and the

1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, was on the high

ground known as Kilay Ridge, which was

700 yards from the road and west of the

roadblock of the 2d Battalion, 19th

Infantry.

General Gill directed the 128th Infantry

of the 32d Division, commanded by Col.

John A. Hettinger, to pass through the 21st

Infantry and attack south astride Highway 7

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 62. 8

 Ibid.

9

 Ibid.

10

 Sixth Army FO 32, 14 Nov 44. 11

 X Corps FO's 12-15, 12-16 Nov 44.
224 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

2, to push through Breakneck Ridge, and to

capture Limon, 1,500 yards to the south.

Colonel Hettinger ordered the regiment to

move out on 16 November at 0800 with

battalions abreast—the 3d Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. William A. Duncan,

on the right (west) of Highway 2, and the

1st Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. James

P. Burns, on the left.12 (Map 12)

The forward elements of the 1st and 3d

Battalions moved out of their assembly areas

on time. They were followed by the remainder of the troops as fast as rations and

ammunition could be distributed. The battalions assembled immediately in the rear

of the 21st Infantry and at 1200 pushed

through that regiment and entered upon

their first battle on Leyte.13

Colonel Hettinger ordered Colonel Burns

to overcome the enemy opposition on Corkscrew Ridge. The 1st Battalion made little

progress. Company A was immediately

pinned down by machine gun, mortar, and

rifle fire, and Company B went forward

only 150 yards. The 3d Battalion encountered no opposition and advanced to a point

350 yards south of its line of departure, from

which Company M delivered machine gun

fire and Company L rifle fire at long range

on the enemy in the vicinity of Limon.14

On the morning of 17 November the 1st

Battalion reached the slopes of Corkscrew

Ridge, where it dug in. At 0737 the 3d

Battalion moved out along Highway 2 with

companies abreast—Company K on the

right and Company L on the left. Company

K met no resistance, advanced about 1,000

yards., and reached a ridge about 500 yards

north of Limon. Elements of the 57th Infantry stopped Company L almost immediately, but a platoon from the company

moved fifty yards west around the pocket

of resistance and destroyed it. The company

then continued its advance to the ridge.15

Companies K and L dug in on the ridge

for the night.16

On the following morning Colonel Hettinger ordered the 3d Battalion to hold its

position until the 1st Battalion could come

abreast. The 3d Battalion therefore limited

its activities to sending out patrols. The 1st

Battalion again attacked Corkscrew Ridge

but made very limited gains.

Elements of the 57th Infantry had dug in

on the reverse slope of the ridge, and heavy

jungle prevented complete observation of

these enemy positions. The Japanese regiment had placed automatic weapons to

command the only routes of approach, thus

forcing the American troops to move uphill

in the face of hostile fire. The 2d Artillery

Battalion had placed its guns so that they

covered Highway 2.17

The 1st Battalion continued to besiege

Corkscrew Ridge until 20 November, while

the 3d Battalion remained on the ridge overlooking Limon. Late in the afternoon of 21

November, Colonel Hettinger ordered the

128th Infantry to seize Limon, and then

move south to secure a bridge-crossing over

a tributary of the Leyte River. The 1st Battalion was to contain the enemy on Corkscrew Ridge. The two assault battalions of

the regiment got into position on the ridge

north of Limon, the 2d Battalion on the

12

 128th Inf FO 4, 15 Nov 44. 13

 3d Bn, 128th Inf, Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1. 14

 128th Inf Unit Rpt 1, 16 Nov 44.

15

 Capt Julius A. Sakas, The Operations of the

3d Battalion, 128th Infantry ... at Limon . . .,

p. 29, Advanced Infantry Officers Course, 1949-50,

The Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga. 16

 128th Inf Unit Rpt 2, 17 Nov 44. 17

 35th Army Opns, p. 66; 128th Inf Opns Rpt

Leyte, p. 2.

THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART TWO 225

east side of Highway 2 and the 3d on the

west side.18

During the night the 120th Field Artillery Battalion delivered harassing fire along

the road between Limon and the Limon

bridge.19 At 0800 the assault troops moved

out. The 3d Battalion met little opposition,

but the 2d met strong resistance from the

57th Infantry.20 Company I encountered no

resistance as it moved along a bluff which

was just west of the town and which overlooked Limon and the bridge. Company K

and the 2d Battalion pushed through Limon

and at 1400 the leading elements crossed a

tributary of the Leyte River south of the

town. A determined Japanese counterattack

forced back the left flank of the 2d Battalion

and exposed Company K. A sudden flood

of the stream, caused by heavy rains, cut off

the advance elements of Company K south

of the river from the rest of the company.

These troops moved to the right and joined

Company I on the bluffs. The rest of the

company and the 2d Battalion established a

night perimeter along a ridge east of the village. The 3d Battalion, less Company K,

established itself for the night around the

positions of Company I that overlooked the

bridge and the tributary of the river.21

On 23 November the 128th Infantry

straightened out its lines and consolidated

its positions. For the next three days activity

was limited to extensive patrols and the

placement of harassing fire on an east-west

ridge that overlooked the highway about

1,000 yards south of Limon. Entrenched on

this ridge, elements of the 1st Division successfully resisted until 10 December all

efforts of the 32d Division to dislodge

them.22

With the occupation of Limon, the battle

of Breakneck Ridge was over, but a number

of bypassed pockets of resistance were not

eliminated until mid-December. The battle

cost the 24th and 32d Divisions a total of

1,498 casualties, killed, wounded, and missing in action, as compared with an estimated

5,252 Japanese killed and 8 captured.23

The Japanese had failed in their attempt

to block off Highway 2 at the northern entrance to Ormoc Valley. In no small measure, the establishment and maintenance of

a roadblock south of Limon by the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, and the defense of

Kilay Ridge in the rear of the Japanese

front lines by the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, had made this achievement possible.

(See Map 11.) Under constant fire and

greatly outnumbered, these units had prevented General Suzuki from sending additional troops into Limon. From 12 to 23

November the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry,

had defended the roadblock under extremely difficult conditions. The operations

report of the 24th Division graphically summarizes the deeds for which the battalion

received a presidential citation:

These bearded, mud caked soldiers came

out of the mountains exhausted and hungry.

Their feet were heavy, cheeks hollow, bodies

emaciated, and eyes glazed. They had seen

thirty-one comrades mortally wounded,

watched fifty-five others lie suffering in

muddy foxholes without adequate medical

attention. Yet their morale had not changed.

It was high when they went in and high

when they came out. They were proud that

they had rendered invaluable aid to the main

forces fighting in ORMOC CORRIDOR,

18

 128th Inf Unit Rpt 6, 21 Nov 44; 128th Inf

Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. 19

 32d Div Arty Unit Rpt 2, 20 Nov 44. 20

 X Corps G-2 Jnl, 23 Nov 44. 21

 X Corps G-3 Periodic Rpt 34, 22 Nov 44;

X Corps G-2 and G-3 Jnls, 22 Nov 44.

22

 32d Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 7. 23

 X Corps Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 29.
AMERICAN TROOPS IN LIMON (above), and taking cover there as enemy shells hit

the area (below).
THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART TWO 227

by disrupting the Japanese supply lines and

preventing strong reinforcements from passing up the ORMOC ROAD. They were

proud that they had outfought the Emperor's

toughest troops, troops that had been battle

trained in Manchuria. They were certain

they had killed at least 606 of the enemy

and felt that their fire had accounted for

many more. And they were proud that this

had all been accomplished despite conditions

of extreme hardship. Two hundred and fortyone of the battalion's officers and enlisted

men were hospitalized for skin disorders, foot

ulcers, battle fatigue, and sheer exhaustion.24

The 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, under

Colonel Clifford, operated west of Highway

2 on Kilay Ridge, behind the Japanese front

lines. It "wrote a brilliant page in the history

of the campaign"

 25

 but, since its influence

on the situation was not appreciated until

later and since it affords an excellent example of a battalion fighting independently,

the operation of "Clifford's Battalion" will

be discussed separately.

Battle of Kilay Ridge

When General Krueger told General

Sibert to push the X Corps south with all

possible speed down Highway 2 toward

Ormoc, the latter had selected the 24th Division to make the drive. General Irving

wished to protect the sides of the road and

prevent the Japanese from sending reinforcements north up the highway. On 9

November he therefore ordered the 34th

Infantry to send a battalion around the

Japanese west flank to harass the enemy's

rear and thus relieve the pressure that was

holding up the frontal attack of the 21st

Infantry on Breakneck Ridge.

Nipponese Caught Napping

At 0100 on 10 November Colonel Dahlen,

commander of the 34th Infantry, alerted

the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, for an amphibious landing to take place at 0700. The

battalion had been in contact with the

enemy for twenty-one days and was reduced

to an effective strength of 560 men. The 1st

Battalion, with an observer's party from the

63d Field Artillery Battalion, was ordered to

move from Capoocan in eighteen LVT's

and proceed seven miles northwest up the

coast of Carigara Bay.26 It was then to move

inland and seize Kilay Ridge, which was

west of the Ormoc road some 3,000 yards

behind the Japanese front lines.27

At 0700 the battalion, under Colonel

Clifford, moved out, taking every available

man on the mission and leaving only a

minimum of cooks and drivers behind.

Since the troops had to hand-carry their

equipment the Headquarters Company left

the antitank guns behind, and Company D

took only one section of heavy machine guns

and one section of 81 -mm. mortars. Colonel

Clifford used the men thus released to carry

other weapons and ammunition. Because

of the scant time allowed by the orders, the

battalion left without sufficient rations.

At 0750 Clifford's battalion went aboard

the LVT's and at 0930 arrived at its destination. Debarking without opposition it

pushed rapidly inland and at 1145 reached

a hill approximately one mile from the

landing area. At dusk the 1st Battalion

reached a ridge in the vicinity of Belen and

about 2,000 yards north of Agahang.

24

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 59. 25

 X Corps Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 27.

26

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 10 Nov 44. 27

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 61. Unless otherwise stated this subsection is based on the above

report, pages 61-68.
228 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

There it set up a night perimeter. Since his

maps were inaccurate, Colonel Clifford relied upon the services of Filipino guides

from this time until the end of the mission.

The rugged and muddy hillsides, made considerably worse by almost constant rain and

fog, were similar to those encountered by

other units fighting in the area.

At 0730 on 11 November Colonel Clifford sent out patrols to pick up a promised

airdrop of rations. The battalion had been

without food since the morning before. At

0910 Colonel Dahlen ordered Colonel Clifford not to move on to Agahang, which was

about 3,800 yards northwest of Limon, until

he received rations. The rations were not

forthcoming but at 1400 Dahlen told Clifford to obtain the promised rations at Agahang, to which the battalion then proceeded.

No supplies were received, but Filipinos furnished the unit with bananas, cooked rice,

boiled potatoes, and a few chickens. A night

perimeter was set up.28

At 0850 on the following day Colonel

Clifford's men received their first airdrop

of rations. Ten minutes later the commanding officer of the 1st Battalion of the guerrilla

96th Infantry made contact with Colonel

Clifford and gave him a resume of the

enemy situation. (The guerrillas rendered

invaluable aid to the 1st Battalion, 34th

Infantry, throughout the Kilay Ridge episode by furnishing intelligence and protecting the rear of the unit.) The battalion

moved out at 1200 for Consuegra near the

Naga River and entered the town at 1240.

At 1310 Colonel Clifford outlined to the

officers the plan for the next two days. For

the rest of the day, the battalion was to advance to Cabiranan and bivouac for the

night. On the morning of 13 November it

was to split into two columns and make a

fast advance by separate routes to Kilay

Ridge, where it would reorganize. As Colonel Clifford was briefing his officers, LVT's

entered Consuegra with rations for the

troops. The LVT's had left Carigara Bay,

passed through Biliran Strait, gone down

Leyte Bay and into the Naga River, and

then proceeded up the river to the vicinity

of Consuegra.

At 0855 on 13 November a column of

Filipino men, women, and children entered

the perimeter and brought approximately

thirty-five boxes of rations from Consuegra.

The battalion left the area at 0930 and

reached the ridge without opposition.

Trenches and prepared gun positions without a man in them honeycombed the ridge

from one end to the other. It was evident

that elements of the 1st Division had intended to occupy the area in the latter stages

of the battle for Limon.29

Kilay Ridge ran from southeast to northwest, with its northern tip about 2,500 yards

directly west of Limon and its southern end

about 3,000 yards south and slightly west

of the same point. The ridge was approximately 900 feet high and though narrow in

some places in others it widened to 400

yards. The summit was broken into a series

of high knolls from which the entire Limon

area and some parts of the Ormoc road

could be observed. A view of the latter feature was obstructed to some extent by a

ridge, hereafter called Ridge Number 2, between Kilay and the road. Kilay Ridge was

about 3,900 yards southwest of Breakneck

Ridge. It would be necessary to maintain

control of Kilay Ridge and deny its use to

the enemy in order to give complete support

to units advancing south from Breakneck

Ridge.

28

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 11 Nov 44. 29 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 13 Nov 44.
THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART TWO 229

LT. COL. THOMAS E. CLIFFORD, JR., discusses plans with his staff as Filipino

guerrillas look on.

Preliminary Attack

On 14 November Colonel Clifford ordered his battalion to entrench itself along

the ridge in positions that would afford the

best tactical advantage. The battalion established strong points and observation posts on

the knolls, placed blocks on the trails leading

through the area, and sent out reconnaissance patrols to locate enemy positions. Colonel Clifford made arrangements to utilize

the Filipinos as carriers. These men were to

use a trail on the north end of the ridge and

bring supplies to the battalion from a supply

dump at Consuegra. The first human pack

train arrived in the area at 1010 with

twenty-eight cases of rations and a supply

of batteries for the radios.30

At 1125 enemy artillery shelled the southern end of the ridge and twenty minutes

later shifted its fire to the Limon area. The

battalion did not succeed in establishing

physical contact with the 2d Battalion, 19th

Infantry, which was operating east of the

road, but it was able to make radio contact.

Throughout the day, patrols of the battalion

were active in searching out enemy positions.

On 15 November Company A sent a patrol to Ridge Number 2, which was 600

yards east of the battalion's positions and

which overlooked the Ormoc road. The pa30

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 14 Nov 44.
230 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

trol found numerous enemy emplacements

and approximately fifty Japanese, who began firing with mortars. After killing five of

the Japanese the patrol retired.31 During the

day the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance

Troop reported to Colonel Clifford and was

assigned the mission of patrolling the west

flank of the battalion. Although patrols

from the 1st Battalion pushed east of the

Ormoc highway south of Limon, they again

were unable to make contact with the 2d

Battalion, 19th Infantry. On 16 November

Colonel Clifford again sent out patrols

which tried, still unsuccessfully, to establish

physical contact with this battalion.32

A platoon from Company B, on 17 November, carried on a running fire fight with

the Japanese and forced its way past Ridge

Number 2. It crossed the Ormoc road and

made contact with the 2d Battalion, 19th

Infantry, at its roadblock. A line of communication between the battalions could

not be established because of the strong

enemy forces between them. At the same

time parts of Companies B and D engaged

the enemy on Ridge Number 3, six hundred

yards south of Ridge Number 2 and slightly

lower. Approximately 200 of the enemy

with rifles, machine guns, mortars, and

artillery were entrenched on Ridge Number

3. The American fire killed at least fifty

Japanese. A patrol from Company D probed

the Japanese defensive position but was

forced to retire with two men missing and

one wounded. Then Company B entered

the fray, and the fire fight grew in intensity.

The Japanese directed fire from at least

three automatic weapons as well as strong

rifle fire against the Americans.

Colonel Clifford went to investigate and

found Company B engaged in a bitter fight.

While he was there the company sustained

six casualties. One of the men had been shot

through the thigh and was unable to walk.

Since the heavy underbrush and bad trails

made it impossible for two men to carry

him on a litter, Colonel Clifford carried the

wounded soldier on his back for about a mile

to the command post, over a difficult mountain trail which ran for several hundred

yards in the bed of a swift stream.33 Colonel

Clifford was awarded a Distinguished

Service Cross.34

At nightfall Company B was separated

from the rest of the battalion. Colonel Clifford decided to pull the company off the

ridge and replace it with Company C. He

was determined to hold what he had "at

all costs."

 35

 During the day General Sibert

attached the battalion to the 32d Division.

Red Badge of Courage

At daylight on 18 November Colonel

Clifford brought heavy machine guns into

place on the perimeter of the battalion and

began to fire on the enemy positions on

Ridge Number 3, catching a group of about

twenty-five Japanese who were cooking

their breakfast. At 0700 a carrying party

with rations and medical supplies moved out

toward the besieged Company B, and at

1100 Company C started forward to relieve the company. Colonel Clifford decided

to displace a platoon at a time during the

day. Under intense rifle fire, Company C

succeeded in relieving Company B. The fire

fight continued throughout the day, and

approximately fifty more Japanese were

31

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 15 Nov 44. 32

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 16 Nov 44.

33

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 17 Nov 44. 34

 Curiously enough, while on leave in the United

States, he had been caught without his dog tags

and arrested for "impersonating an officer." 24th

Div Opns Dpt Leyte, p. 78. 35

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 17 Nov 44.
THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART TWO 231

killed. At 1200 the battalion conducted

burial services for Henry Kilay, a Filipino

soldier and guide who had served the battalion well.36

 During the night and continuing into 19 November, Japanese heavy

machine guns fired into the perimeter on

Ridge Number 2.

In the meantime the enemy began to deliver heavy fire against Company B, which

had moved to the south flank of the battalion

on Kilay Ridge. Colonel Clifford estimated

the Japanese assault force to be one reinforced company well equipped with mortars

and light machine guns. By 0905 on 19 November the Japanese had destroyed one

heavy machine gun and had begun a flanking movement to the east of the southernmost outpost of Company B.

The artillery liaison party moved south

and directed artillery fire on the enemy. By

1150, however, Company B was being surrounded and its ammunition was very low.

Colonel Clifford made a reconnaissance of

the area and ordered the besieged company

to fall back 100 yards to the north and set

up a strong point with the assistance of Company A. The next morning Company A was

to attack and retake the knoll from which

Company B had been forced to retire. Because of strong Japanese resistance, the gradual attrition of the battalion's forces, and

the "extreme scarcity" of ammunition, Colonel Clifford also decided to have Company

C withdraw from Ridge Number 2 to Kilay

Ridge on the following morning.37

Rain fell constantly upon the troops and

churned the surface of the ridge into a

"slick mass of mud and slime."

 38

 Men were

tired. With insufficient rations, broken sleep

in sodden foxholes, and constant harassing

fire, many had sickened. Fever, dysentery,

and foot ulcers were commonplace.

Early on the morning of 20 November

Company C withdrew silently in the rain

without the knowledge of the Japanese, who

threw an attack of company strength

against the position thirty minutes after it

had been vacated. Company C established

a strong position 200 yards south of the battalion command post. The artillery fired intermittently on the enemy to the south until

1200, when it concentrated its fire in front

of Company B. So intense was the rain that

although artillery shells were falling only

150 yards away, the artillery liaison party

had to adjust the fire almost entirely by

sound. At 1225 Company B moved out in

an effort to retake the knoll from which the

enemy had launched his attacks the previous

day, but it came under intense rifle and

mortar fire which forced it to retire. At this

point the battalion's supply of ammunition

became critically low.39

The downpour continued through the

night and the next day. Patrols, sent to

search for a means of flanking the Japanese,

were unsuccessful, but they brought back

information which made it possible to place

artillery and mortar fire on enemy positions.

At 1430 Colonel Clifford received the report

that two strong Japanese columns were converging on the battalion from the southeast

and northeast. One of the platoons from

Company C moved to the north end of the

ridge to assure that the supply line to Consuegra would be kept open. A carrying party

from Consuegra brought in rations and at

36

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 18 Nov 44. Jan

Valtin in Children of Yesterday, page 247, states

that Henry Kilay was the owner of the ridge. Properly the ridge bears his name. 37

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 19 Nov 44.

38

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 63. 39

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 20 Nov 44.
232 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

1705 the battalion received an airdrop of

blankets, ammunition, and litters.40 There

was no major enemy contact.

The rains persisted during the night and

the next day, 22 November. Throughout the

morning, patrols probed the area. At 1130

the battalion received an airdrop of ammunition, medical supplies, and ponchos. The

main perimeter lines were comparatively

quiet until 1430 when the enemy pinned

down Company B with heavy fire and assaulted Company A. These attacks rapidly

grew in intensity. The Japanese with fixed

bayonets charged against the perimeters and

almost completely surrounded both companies.

At 2000, since the enemy completely surrounded Company B, Colonel Clifford ordered the company to break through and

withdraw through Company A to the rear

of the battalion command post. Under cover

of machine gun and artillery fire, the company withdrew. When a litter train of the

wounded was ambushed, one of the bearers

was killed by enemy fire.

Within the new perimeter of Company B,

750 yards north of the battalion command

post, Colonel Clifford established a rear

command post and all communications

moved to it. From this new location the mortars from Company D began to fire in front

of Company A, the most advanced company. The battalion cached all supplies and

ammunition in case the enemy should suddenly break through. The rains continued.

Colonel Clifford made tentative plans to

withdraw during the night but abandoned

them when General Gill ordered him to hold

the ridge at all costs. Advance elements of

the 32d Division had entered Limon, and

the withdrawal of Clifford's battalion would

have left their western flank completely

exposed.41

Fortunately the Japanese did not follow

up the attacks on 23 November, but there

was scattered automatic weapons and artillery fire. Next day American artillery and

mortar fire repulsed a small enemy attack

at 0830. A platoon from the battalion

slipped through the enemy lines and brought

information on the situation to General

Gill. It returned with orders that the battalion was to hold fast. Two airdrops of supplies, although they drew enemy fire, were

successfully recovered.

For the next two days there was comparative quiet in the sector except for patrol

activity and intermittent fire. At 1000 on

25 November, General Gill sent Colonel

Clifford the following message: "You and

your men are doing a superb job. Hang on

and keep killing the Japs. . . ."

 42

At nightfall on 25 November, however,

the semiquiet was shattered when an enemy

force armed with automatic weapons, mortars, and artillery began a heavy assault

against the perimeter of Company A. The

company beat off the attack with losses to

both forces. On the following morning,

Colonel Clifford had Company C relieve

Company A. At 1630 Colonel Dahlen informed him that he, Clifford, was "in a tight

spot," since the 32d Division could give "no

immediate help," and advised him to "use

artillery and hang on."

 43

 It became apparent that the Japanese were so disposed that

they could launch attacks from different

directions. Further evidence to this effect

was supplied on 27 November, when a

Japanese patrol of almost platoon strength

40

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 21 Nov 44.

41

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 22 Nov 44. 42

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 25 Nov 44. 43

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 26 Nov 44.
THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART TWO 233

got astride the supply line to Consuegra on

the northern front of Kilay Ridge. A patrol

from Company B dispersed the unit and

killed three of the enemy. Colonel Clifford

estimated that elements of the 1st Regiment

were disposed as follows: a minimum of one

reinforced company was south of him, at

least two reinforced companies were on the

ridge about 1,000 yards to the east, and a

strong but unknown number of the enemy

opposed him on the west. If this last force

pushed northward Clifford's supply line to

Consuegra would be severed. From 1725 to

2020 on 27 November, Company C came

under a strong long-range attack from

enemy positions on the ridge to the east. A

patrol from the 128th Infantry, 32d Division, brought Colonel Clifford the welcome

information that reinforcements were en

route.

The Main Effort

At 1000 on 28 November the battalion repulsed a small party of the enemy that attacked from the south. There was a lull

until 1930 when the Japanese unleashed a

strong effort to drive the defenders from

Kilay Ridge and recapture it. The opening

was marked by 90-mm. mortar fire upon the

outposts of the battalion. Heavy weapons

from the ridge on the east then began firing

as at least two machine guns and many

small arms began to rain lead from the west.

The enemy fire rose to a crescendo as the

mortars joined in and directed their heaviest

fire at a platoon of Company C on the

southwestern end of the ridge. The Japanese

began to deploy troops, apparently in an

attempt to reach a gulch to the west of

the battalion's positions. A heavy assault

was launched from the south against Company C.

By 1955 the mortars of the battalion were

brought to bear against the advancing

Japanese as the crews worked in feverish

haste to break up the assault. At 2015, although Company C now had mortar support, the enemy charged with bayonets and

grenades. Fighting was at close quarters

and the Japanese began to infiltrate the forward positions. An hour later the advance

platoon of Company C pulled back to join

the company, which had been cut off from

the rest of the battalion. The fire fight continued throughout the night with constant

rifle fire, numerous attempts at infiltration

by the Japanese, and intermittent mortar

fire.44

At dawn on 29 November the Japanese

forces were still on the ridge in strength and

their automatic weapons began to fire anew.

All forward elements of the battalion were

under attack and Company C was still

separated from the rest of the battalion. A

reinforced platoon from Company B, at

0730, was able to break through to Company C, kill six of the enemy, and seize two

machine guns en route. As Company C's

ammunition was practically exhausted,

Colonel Clifford immediately sent a carrying party forward. Since the Japanese had

blocked off the trail immediately after the

passage of the platoon from Company B,

the carrying party was pinned down.

In the meantime two carrying parties

from Consuegra entered the perimeter of the

battalion with food and ammunition. One

carried the "Thanksgiving ration of roast

turkey and . . . fresh eggs." The battalion

therefore hoped for "a good meal" if the

situation permitted.45

Colonel Clifford urgently requested General Gill to send reinforcements. At 1325

44

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 28 Nov 44. 45

 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 29 Nov 44.
234 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Gill told Clifford that he had ordered the

2d Battalion, 128th Infantry, 32d Division,

to proceed to Kilay Ridge immediately and

come under Clifford's control. Colonel Clifford forcibly reopened the trail to Company

C and had food and ammunition brought

into the forward position. A short time later,

Company G, 128th Infantry, arrived and

Clifford immediately committed it to reinforce Company C. The remainder of the 2d

Battalion, 128th Infantry, arrived at 1835

and was held in reserve. (See Map 12.)

The action for 1 December began at 0800

when a patrol from Company B proceeded

down a draw to the west of Kilay Ridge.

The patrol was to swing wide and approach

the right rear almost directly south of the

enemy-held knolls on Kilay Ridge. These

were thought to be the Japanese strong

points and were the objectives for the day.

A preparatory concentration from supporting artillery and from mortars of both battalions was first laid. The heavy machine

gun section of the 128th Infantry moved

into the draw to the west and set up its guns

on the right flank of the ridge in order to be

in a position to fire across the face of the

ridge when the main assault began. Company E of the 128th Infantry then passed

through Company C and launched an attack against the Japanese-held knolls on the

southeastern end of the ridge. Heavy and

light machine gun fire from Company C

protected the flanks of Company E.

The company took the first knoll easily,

but heavy fire from behind a huge log on

the second knoll halted Company E. Company A sent a bazooka team forward to

knock out the position and Company C

sent all of its grenades forward, but by 1320

the Japanese soldiers were still resisting all

attempts to dislodge them. The patrol from

Company B returned at 1345 with the report

that it had been to the rear of its objective

and had seen no enemy activity. No unit

made any further progress that day. At 1720

General Gill ordered Colonel Clifford to

withdraw the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry.46

At 0925 on 2 December, Company E,

128th Infantry, attacked the knolls at the

south tip of Kilay Ridge, while Company F

moved down the ridge and swung to the

right to attack the ridge to the south—the

objective of the two-battalion assault. The

1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, withdrew one

unit, but at 1245 Colonel Clifford received

orders to halt all further withdrawals pending orders from the commanding officer,

128th Infantry. By then Company E had

taken its objective but Company F had encountered determined resistance fifty yards

from the top of the ridge. It doggedly advanced and by 1625 reached the crest and

dug in, though still receiving hostile mortar

fire.

The next day examination of the battlefield where the two battalions had been

fighting revealed numerous enemy dead and

the following abandoned equipment: three

70-mm. mountain guns, four heavy machine

guns, seventeen light machine guns, one 90-

mm. mortar, and many rifles, pistols, sabers,

and field glasses. Documents containing valuable intelligence were also found. On 4 December the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry,

started to withdraw. During the next two

days elements of the battalion moved

through Consuegra and Calubian to Pinamopoan. The battalion had lost 26 men

killed, 2 missing, and 101 wounded, but it

46

 The message to Colonel Clifford, a former allAmerican football player from West Point, concluded: "You and your men have not been forgotten. You are the talk of the island, and perhaps

the United States. Army beat Notre Dame 59 to 0,

the worst defeat on record." 24th Div Opns Rpt

Leyte, p. 67; 1st Bn, 34th Inf, Unit Jnl, 1 Dec 44.
THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART TWO 235

estimated that it had killed 900 men of the

1st Infantry Regiment. The 1st Battalion,

34th Infantry, had acquitted itself well. It

had prevented the Japanese from reinforcing the Limon forces and imperiling the 32d

Division. For its work the battalion received

the presidential unit citation.

Central Mountain Range

1st Cavalry Division

As elements of the X Corps were pushing

south on Highway 2 through Breakneck

Ridge, other units from the corps were engaged in securing the central mountain

range that divided Leyte and Ormoc Valleys in order to prevent any Japanese forces

from debouching into Leyte Valley. General

Suzuki had ordered the 1st Division commander to place the 57th Infantry in the

Limon area while the 1st and 49th Infantry

Regiments were to go to the central mountain range. The two regiments last mentioned were to prevent any American attempts to infiltrate into Ormoc Valley and

to exploit any favorable opportunity to break

through into Leyte Valley. About 8 November the 102d Division, including its signal,

artillery, and engineer units, arrived at Ormoc and General Suzuki immediately sent

them into the mountains of central Leyte.47

General Krueger had already anticipated

this movement and had stationed elements

of the X and XXIV Corps at the principal

entrances into Leyte Valley. On 10 November General Mudge sent elements of the 1st

Cavalry Division to patrol the area extensively.48

The northern mountains between Ormoc

and Leyte Valleys were high and rugged,

with precipitous sides. The area was heavily

forested, and there were many ground

pockets which constituted natural, heavily

wooded fortresses for the Japanese. The very

few trails in the sector were scarcely better

than pig trails. The area had not been properly mapped and at all times the troops were

seriously handicapped by insufficient knowledge of the terrain. The nearly constant

rainfall bogged down supply and made the

sides of the hills slippery and treacherous.

From 5 November through 2 December,

elements of the 1st Cavalry Division extensively patrolled the central mountain area

and had many encounters with small forces

of the enemy. At all times the supply situation was precarious.

The 1st Cavalry Division utilized motor

transport, LVT's, tractors and trailers, native carriers, and airdrops to get supplies to

forward troops. Motor transport hauled supplies from the warehouses in Tacloban to

Carigara, a distance of thirty miles. At this

point LVT's of the 826th Amphibian Tractor Battalion hauled the supplies, through

rice paddies churned into waist-deep morasses, to Sugud, three miles south of Carigara. The supplies were manhandled from

the LVT's into one-ton two-wheeled cargo

and ammunition trailers, which were towed

by the tractors of the artillery battalions that

fired in support of the division. The tractors

wound their way laboriously into the foothills through boulder-strewn streams and up

steep inclines that made it necessary for the

tractors to be arranged in tandem. There

was always mud, which made traction difficult, and the LVT's were better able than

the tractors to navigate through slick, soft

mud which had little body texture.

The 12th Cavalry established high in the

foothills, at the entrance to the passes

through the mountains, a supply base that

47

 35th Army Opns, pp. 47-48. 48

 1st Cav Div FO 9, 10 Nov 44.
236 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

FILIPINO CARRIERS HAUL SUPPLIES over slippery mountain trails for the 12th

Cavalry.

was also a native camp, a hospital, and a

rest camp. About 300 Filipino carriers were

kept here under the protection of the guerrillas. The carriers had been hired for six

days at a time and were not allowed to leave

without a pass from their Filipino leader.

This precaution was necessary, since the

ration-carrying assignment was extremely

arduous.

Under armed escort, the long train of

carriers, two men to each fifty-pound load

of rations, ammunition, and other types of

supply, began immediately to struggle forward from the supply camp over narrow,

slippery trails, across waist-deep rivers and

streams, and through heavy undergrowth.

In the never-ending climb to gain altitude,

it took five hours to traverse a track that

measured less than three miles. At the base

of a vertical descent of more than 500 feet,

there was a second supply base, the relay

station. From this station it was another

day's forced march to the forward troops.

An additional 300 Filipinos were stationed

at the relay station in the mountain wilderness, surrounded by elements of the enemy.

These carriers made the last half of the

tortuous journey, while the others returned

to the base camp for resupply. It took four

days to get supplies from the warehouses to

the front-line troops.49

49

 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 43-45.
THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART TWO 237

The 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat

Team, under General Cunningham, had

arrived at Leyte on 14 November.50 At this

time the 21st Infantry was advancing very

slowly along Breakneck Ridge, against

strong resistance, and the units of the 1st

Cavalry Division were spread thinly over

the central mountain area.51 In order to

strengthen the defense line, the 112th Cavalry was committed upon its arrival and

passed to the control of X Corps.52 On 15

November General Sibert attached the

112th Cavalry to the 1st Cavalry Division

and ordered it to operate in the Carigara

area.53 General Mudge directed the 112th

Cavalry to assume, on 16 November, the

responsibility for beach defenses in the Capoocan—Carigara—Barugo area and to mop

up in the Mt. Minoro area about 3,000

yards south of Capoocan.54

The 112th Cavalry patrolled the Mt.

Minoro area until 22 November. In accord

with General Krueger's desire to relieve

some of the pressure that was being exerted

against the 32d Division in its drive south

down Highway 2, General Mudge on 23

November ordered the 112th Cavalry to

move southwest from Mt. Minoro toward

the highway. The combat team encountered

sporadic resistance and on the morning of

30 November reached a ridge about 2,500

yards east of Highway 2 and about 5,000

yards southeast of Limon.55 A strongly entrenched enemy force on the ridge resisted all

attempts of the 112th Cavalry to dislodge it.

The ridge was covered with a dense rain

forest, and the lower slopes were thickly

spotted with bamboo thickets and other extremely dense vegetation. Clouds covered

the tops of the peak and rain fell almost continuously, churning the ground into ankledeep mud. Visibility was limited to only a

few yards. The enemy defensive field works

consisted of foxholes, prone shelters, communication trenches, and palm-log bunkers.

These positions presented no logical avenue

of approach. They were complete perimeters

and employed all-round mutually supporting automatic weapons fire. Although the

fields of fire were limited, the weapons were

so effectively placed that they covered all

approaches.56

The strong resistance made further progress impossible and the 112th Cavalry established its perimeter. During the night the

Japanese subjected the 1st and 2d Squadrons, 112th Cavalry, to heavy artillery fire

and launched several patrol attacks against

the perimeter of the 2d Squadron. The night

assaults were beaten off.57

The next two days were spent by the 2d

Squadron, 112th Cavalry, in trying unsuccessfully to dislodge the Japanese from the

ridge. At 1310 on 2 December the 112th

Cavalry received orders to move northnorthwest toward the Leyte River, from

which point they were to send out patrols to

make contact with units of the 32d Division.58

 At this time, however, the 112th

Cavalry was still opposed by a strong enemy

force. Troop A nevertheless moved out to

make contact with the 32d Division and to

reconnoiter to the west for further enemy

concentrations and for routes by which the

112th Cavalry could advance to Highway 2.

50

 112th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1. 51

 Sixth Army G-3 Periodic Rpt 514, 14 Nov 44. 52

 Sixth Army FO 32, 14 Nov 44. 53

 X Corps FO 14, 15 Nov 44. 54

 1st Cav Div FO 11, 14 Nov 44. 55

 X Corps G-3 Periodic Rpt 47, 5 Dec 44.

56

 7th Cav Opns Rpt, Leyte, Part IV, S-2 Rpt,

Tactical and Technical Characteristics of the

Enemy, pp. 2, 5. 57

 1st Cavalry Division G-3 Periodic Rpt. 42,

1 Dec 44. 58

 112th Cav S-2 and S-3 Jnls, 2 Dec 44.
238 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

FOOTHILLS OF CENTRAL MOUNTAIN RANGE are patrolled by elements of the

1st Cavalry Division.

On 3 December, after an artillery concentration, Troop G, 2d Squadron, 112th Cavalry, started out toward the enemy-held

ridge. The slope was so precipitous that the

troops could not climb and shoot at the same

time. The Japanese were able to throw grenades upon Troop G without exposing

themselves, and the troop retired to the bottom of the hill. An artillery concentration

was called for and delivered on the ridge,

after which the troop again started up the

hill. The Japanese, however, quickly regained their former positions after the artillery fire ceased and again repulsed Troop G

with grenades and small arms fire. The

troop withdrew to its former position at the

bottom of the hill. For the remainder of the

day, the artillery placed harassing fire on

the enemy strong point while patrols probed

to the south and west around the flanks of

the Japanese position, seeking better avenues

of approach.59

Troop A journeyed without incident toward Highway 2, at 1415 on 3 December

made contact with the left rear of the 126th

Infantry west of Hill 1525, and at the end

of the day was moving southwest to make

contact with the leading elements of the

126th Infantry. No contact had been made

with the enemy and there was little sign of

enemy forces. The 1st Squadron received

orders to proceed to the Leyte River and

locate a dropping ground.60

59

 1st Cav Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 45, 4 Dec 44;

112th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6; 112th Cav S-2 and

S-3 Jnl, 3, 4 Dec 44. 60

 112th Cav S-2 and S-3 Jnl, 3, 4 Dec 44; 112th

Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6.
THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART TWO 239

Henceforward, until 10 December, the 2d

Squadron, 112th Cavalry, was stalemated

by the strongly entrenched Japanese force.

Each day repeated attacks were made

against the enemy position, but to no avail,

and patrols that probed the flanks of the

enemy to discover a means of enveloping the

hostile force had no success. On 8 and 9 December the 1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry,

attempted to locate and cut off the supply

line of the Japanese force that was holding

up the advance of the 2d Squadron.61

On 10 December the 2d Squadron, 7th

Cavalry, which had been in the BarugoCapoocan area, relieved the 2d Squadron,

112th Cavalry, which passed to the control

of Sixth Army. In the meantime the 1st

Squadron, 112th Cavalry, less Troop A had

moved west toward the Leyte River. Troop

A reached the left flank of the 126th Infantry. The progress of the 1st Squadron

was slow because of the hilly terrain, but on

the morning of 7 December it arrived at the

Leyte River and established physical contact

with Troop A and the 126th Infantry.62 At

the end of 10 December, the 1st Squadron,

112th Cavalry, was on the Leyte River.

The 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, after relieving the 2d Squadron, 112th Cavalry,

sent out patrols to study the terrain and attempt to find avenues of approach to the

flanks and rear of the enemy strong point

which had long held up the 2d Squadron,

112th Cavalry. An aerial reconnaissance

was made of the area. The aerial observer

reported that the Japanese position was

"definitely as bad" as the 2d Squadron,

112th Cavalry, had reported it to be, and

that the approach from the rear was even

worse than the one from the front.63

The 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, spent 11

December in sending out patrols on both

sides of the enemy-held ridge. The Japanese

let the patrols through and then fired,

wounding two of the men. The patrols then

returned. An artillery concentration was

placed upon the enemy position, and at 1245

the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, moved out

behind a barrage which lifted twenty-five

yards at a time. One platoon attacked frontally while the other platoons attempted to

flank the Japanese. The platoon on the right

flank suffered three casualties and was immediately pinned down. After the other

platoons got to within fifty yards of a Japanese machine gun position, they also were

pinned down. At 1600 they dug in for the

night at the base of the hill.

During the engagement fifteen to twenty

enemy bunkers were observed on each side

of the ridge and four machine guns were

definitely spotted. A night infiltration party

armed with hand grenades, rifles, and

knives was sent to knock out these bunkers.

It destroyed two machine guns and killed

four Japanese.

At 0730 on the morning of 13 December,

the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, moved out

and came under fire from two Japanese

machine guns well emplaced on a cliff. The

ridge narrowed to ten feet with sixty-degree

slopes, making forward passage almost impossible. The troops were pinned down. In

the meantime, Troop F of the squadron

worked south in an attempt to envelop the

rear of the enemy force but was unable to

do so and returned. The 2d Squadron estab61

 112th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 6-8; 112th

Cav S-2 and S-3 Jnl, 4-10 Dec 44; 1st Cav Div

G-3 Periodic Rpts 46-51, 5-10 Dec 44; 1st Cav

Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 46-50. 62

 112th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 6-8; 1st Cav

Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 47-50; 112th Cav S-2

and S-3 Jnl, 4 Dec 44, 6-9 Dec 44; 1st Cav Div G-3

Periodic Rpts 46-51, 10 Dec 44. 63

 112th Cav S-2 and S-3 Jnl, 10 Dec 44.
240 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

lished night perimeters near the same positions it had held the previous night.

On the following morning the 75-mm.

and 105-mm. artillery and the 4.2-inch and

60-mm. mortars began to register heavy fire

on the Japanese strong point. At 1200

Troop G of the 2d Squadron jumped off,

attacking the enemy position frontally while

Troop F moved in from the rear. Employing

flame throwers, Troop G steadily pushed

forward and by 1445 had knocked out four

enemy bunkers and destroyed several machine guns. Of more importance, it was

fifty yards beyond the enemy front lines.

Troop F also continued to advance. By the

end of the day the enemy force had been

rooted off the high ground, and the 2d

Squadron, 7th Cavalry, was in firm possession of the ridge. The unit captured a

quantity of enemy ordnance, including 12

light and 3 heavy machine guns, 9 grenade

launchers, and 73 rifles, together with considerable quantities of grenades and ammunition. Before the ridge was secured, "over

5000 rounds of artillery fire had been

placed on [the] . . . position without appreciably affecting it."

 64

The 96th Division

By the end of October the XXIV Corps,

having secured the southern part of Leyte

Valley, the Dulag-Burauen-Dagami-Tanauan road net, and all airfields in the area,

was ready for the next phase of its mission.

General Hodge thereupon immediately initiated operations whereby the XXIV Corps

was to liberate southern Leyte concurrently

with the drive of the X Corps in the north.

General Hodge's plan called for the 96th

Division to make a holding attack east of

the mountains while the 7th Division

drove north from Baybay up the coast

of Ormoc Bay.65 He therefore ordered

the 96th Division to defend the Tanauan—

Dagami—Burauen—Dulag area and to relieve

as rapidly as possible all elements of the 7th

Division in the area. Finally it was to mop

up all enemy forces in its zone and to furnish

security for all the principal roads and installations in the area.66

 General Bradley on

2 November ordered Colonel Dill's 382d

Infantry to relieve the 17th Infantry of the

7th Division in the vicinity of Dagami, to

send strong reconnaissance and combat patrols into the hills to the west and northwest,

and to destroy all enemy forces encountered.67

General Suzuki was desirous of pushing

through to Leyte Valley, one of the best entrances to which was through the Dagami

sector. At the foot of the central mountain

range, Dagami was the center of a network of roads that led to all parts of Leyte

Valley and to the airfields. Since it was one

of the key positions for control of the valley,

its recapture would be of great advantage

to the 35th Army. Just west of Dagami, the

central mountain range served as a natural

fortification. The mountains consisted of a

series of ridges separated by deep gorges

which were usually covered with a dense

tropical growth. At key points in the area,

the 16th Division had built coconut-log and

concrete pillboxes.

There were substantial parts of the 9th,

20th, and 33d Infantry Regiments of the

16th Division in the mountains west of

64

 112th Cav S-2 and S-3 Jnl, 9-14 Dec 44; 7th

Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 11-12; 112th Cav

Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 7-9; 1st Cav Div G-3 Periodic

Rpts 53-56, 12-15 Dec 44.

65

 XXIV Corps Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9. 66

 XXIV Corps FO 22, 8 Nov 44. This order confirmed previously issued oral orders. 67

 96th Div FO 3, 2 Nov 44.
THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART TWO 241

Dagami. In the latter part of October the

16th Division became short of food and General Makino asked that it be supplied by air.

The 4th Air Army therefore attempted with

six light bombers to supply the division, but

for some unexplained reason it failed. The

16th Division henceforward was forced to

supply itself and forage off the land.68

On 2 November the 382d Infantry started

to relieve the 17th Infantry. The 2d Battalion at 1500 relieved the 3d Battalion, 17th

Infantry, just north of Dagami and at 1430,

the 1st Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion,

17th Infantry, about 1,000 yards west of

Dagami.69

Elements of the 16th Division were entrenched on "Bloody Ridge," a small promontory on the left side of the road west of

Dagami just short of Hitomnog in front of

the 382d Infantry. A waist-deep swampy

rice paddy was between the ridge and the

road. The 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry,

after moving into this area engaged the

enemy, but at nightfall it broke off the fight

and established its night perimeter.

At 0805, the 1st Battalion renewed the

attack and met increased heavy resistance as

it advanced through the rice paddy. The

companies came under mortar and automatic weapons fire at 1445 as they came into

the open.

The Japanese took full advantage of the

exposed troops and from machine guns and

mortars delivered heavy fire which immobilized the 1st Battalion. The unit was unable to move in any direction until nightfall,

when, with the aid of some artillery smoke,

the troops began to withdraw. "Men threw

away their packs, machine guns, radios and

even rifles. Their sole aim was to crawl back

through the muck and get on solid ground

once more. Some of the wounded gave up

the struggle to keep their heads above the

water and drowned in the grasping

swamp."

 70

 After every officer in Companies

B and C had been killed or wounded, 1st

Sgt. Francis H. Thompson took charge and

organized the evacuation. He silenced an

enemy machine gun and also assisted in removal of the wounded. As a result of his

leadership both companies successfully withdrew and reorganized.71

At 1745 five enemy planes strafed the

battalion. The advance units of the 1st Battalion withdrew some 300 yards in order to

consolidate their defensive positions for the

night. During the day Company E of the

2d Battalion reached Patok, and Company

G moved out at 2100 to reinforce the 1st

Battalion.72

During the night of 3-4 November the

16th Division launched a strong counterattack of an estimated two-company

strength against the perimeter of the 1st

Battalion. Mortar and artillery fires repulsed

the assault. There was no further enemy

activity during the night. On the morning

of 4 November the 1st Battalion moved out

against light resistance, advancing about

800 yards and past the scene of the bitter

fighting of the previous day. Colonel Dill

ordered the 2d Battalion (minus Company

E) and one platoon from Company G to

move west from Dagami and join the 1st

Battalion. The 2d Battalion joined close behind the 1st Battalion in a column. At 1430

the 1st Battalion encountered increased

68

 14th Area Army Opns Leyte, p. 8. 69

 382d Inf Unit Rpt 14, 2 Nov 44.

70

 Orlando Davidson, J. Carl Willems, and Joseph

A. Kahl, The Deadeyes: The Story of the 96th

Infantry Division (Washington, Infantry Journal

Press [now Combat Forces Press], 1947), p. 49. 71

 Sergeant Thompson was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. 72

 96th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 54; 96th Div G-3

Periodic Rpt 14, 3 Nov 44; 382d Inf Unit Rpt 15,

3 Nov 44; Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, p. 49.
242 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

enemy resistance and committed its reserve

company on the left flank. The 2d Battalion

received orders from Colonel Dill to move

up to the left flank of the 1st, but the 2d

arrived too late for the two battalions to

launch a co-ordinated assault before nightfall. They therefore consolidated their positions for the night, having advanced about

1,000 yards.73

The night of 4-5 November was not

quiet. The Japanese delivered harassing fire

on the 1st Battalion, and at 2205 elements

of the 16th Division launched a heavy assault against the perimeter of the 2d Battalion. An artillery concentration immediately stopped the attack, and the Japanese

fled, leaving 254 dead and wounded behind

them.

The following morning, after the artillery

had fired a preparation in front of the 1st

and 2d Battalions, the two battalions renewed the attack at 0900 and two companies from the 3d Battalion protected the

regimental left (south) flank. The battalions

advanced about 1,000 yards before they encountered any strong resistance. The defenses of the 16th Division consisted of a

great many concrete emplacements, concealed spider holes, and connecting trenches.

By nightfall, at 1700, the two battalions, assisted by the tanks from Company A, 763d

Tank Battalion, successfully reduced the enemy to their front and captured the ridge.

Each battalion formed its own perimeter

and made plans to renew the attack on 6

November.74

At 0830 the 1st Battalion, with light tanks

in support, moved out in the attack westward against a strong enemy force that was

well entrenched in foxholes and pillboxes.

Each of these defensive positions had to be

reduced before the advance could continue.

At 1300 the 2d Battalion moved to the high

ground on the right flank of the 1st. The 1st

Battalion encountered a strong concrete enemy pillbox which was believed to be a command post, since there were no firing apertures. As grenades had no effect it became

necessary finally to neutralize the pillbox by

pouring gasoline down the ventilation pipes

and setting it afire. Two officers and nineteen

enlisted men of the enemy were killed in the

pillbox. The Japanese continued to fight

tenaciously. There was no withdrawal, but

by the end of the day only isolated pockets

of enemy resistance remained.75

The Japanese 16th Division was taking

a bad beating. Its supply of provisions had

run out. All the battalion commanders, most

of the company commanders, and half the

artillery battalion and battery commanders

had been killed. On the night of 6 November the 16th Division contracted its battle

lines and on the following day took up a

new position in the Dagami area. The new

position ranged from a hill about four and a

half miles northwest of Dagami to a point

about three and three-fourths miles northwest of Burauen.76

On 7 November all three battalions of

the 382d Infantry engaged the enemy and

maintained constant pressure against his

positions. The 1st and 3d Battalions advanced west, while the 2d Battalion drove

north and west. The 3d Battalion encoun73

 Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, p. 51; 96th Div

Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 54; 382d Inf Unit Rpt 16,

4 Nov 44; 96th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 15, 4 Nov 44. 74

 Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, p. 51; 382d Inf

Unit Rpt 17, 5 Nov 44; 96th Div Opns Rpt Leyte,

p. 55; 96th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 16, 5 Nov 44;

763d Tank Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5.

75

 96th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 55; 382d Inf

Unit Rpt 18, 6 Nov 44. 76

 35th Army Opns, pp. 57-58.
THE MOUNTAIN BARRIER: PART TWO 243

tered the more determined resistance. Advancing, preceded by tanks, it met heavy

enemy machine gun and rifle fire. A large

enemy force assaulted the troops at close

quarters and tried to destroy the tanks, but

when the 382d Infantry introduced flame

throwers and supporting machine guns, the

attackers fell back in disorder. The regiment

overran the Japanese defensive positions

and killed an estimated 474 of the enemy.77

Company E of the 2d Battalion had remained in the Patok area, engaged in patrolling and wiping out isolated pockets of

enemy resistance.

On 8 November strong patrols from the

1st and 2d Battalions probed west into the

hills. They encountered the left flank of the

enemy supporting position at a point about

2,600 yards west of Patok. A very heavy

rainfall on the night of 8-9 November made

an assault against the position impossible on

9 November. After all-night artillery fire,

the 1st and 3d Battalions moved out at 0900

on 10 November. They met no resistance,

but progress was slow because of the

swamps. By 1225 the two battalions, supported by a platoon of light tanks, occupied the ridge formerly held by elements of

the 16th Division. The 1st Battalion had advanced 2,500 yards.78

 The 382d Infantry

had destroyed all organized enemy resistance

in its sector and removed the threat to

Dagami.

By this time General Krueger was devoting the main effort of the Sixth Army toward

preventing the 35th Army from debouching

into Leyte Valley. The 96th Division received orders from General Hodge to halt

the relief of the 7th Division and to move

north to the Jaro-Palo road and secure the

mountain entrances in that sector. The 7th

Division was to relieve the 96th Division on

the Dagami—Burauen road. A regiment was

also to be made available for immediate

motor movement to the north and another

for a proposed operation on northern

Mindanao.79

The 96th Division moved to the mountains northwest of Dagami and sent extensive patrols info the central mountain range

along a ten-mile line that extended from

Dagami to Jaro. Constant small contacts

with the enemy continued until the end of

the campaign. The 7th Division patrolled

the Burauen area.

The Sixth Army had prevented the

Japanese from debouching into Leyte Valley. The X Corps had secured Limon, the

entrance to Ormoc Valley, and was in a position to drive south down the valley to the

port of Ormoc. Although General Krueger's

troops had performed well, they had made

mistakes which gave their commander

serious concern. 77

 382d Inf Unit Rpt 19, 7 Nov 44. 78

 382d Inf Unit Rpt 22, 10 Nov 44. 79

 XXIV Corps Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 11.
CHAPTER XIV

Measure of the Fighting

By the latter part of November, the Fighting on the island had entered a crucial stage.

The additional troops received from General

MacArthur had enabled General Krueger

to put into effect his squeeze play against

the Japanese. While the X Corps continued

to apply unremitting pressure on the 1st and

102d Divisions in the northern mountains

of Ormoc Valley near Limon, elements of

the XXIV Corps would drive north against

the 26th Division along the shores of Ormoc

Bay toward Ormoc.

General MacArthur had full confidence

in the ability of General Krueger to carry

out this plan and thus bring the Leyte Campaign to a successful conclusion. Once having given the Sixth Army commander the

assignment for the operation, General MacArthur did not interfere with General Krueger's prosecution of the battle. But from his

headquarters on Leyte, he closely followed

the progress of the campaign, frequently

visited the command posts of the Sixth Army

units, and made available to General Krueger additional troops upon request.

Similarly, General Krueger allowed his

corps commanders to exercise their independence of judgment and kept his orders

to the minimum. He, too, made frequent

visits to the front lines, observed the progress of the fighting, inspected the living conditions of the men, and noted the status of

the construction program. General Krueger's concern is made evident by a critique

issued on 25 November in which he analyzed

the performance of the Sixth Army on

Leyte.1

The Americans had had time to test their

experience on Leyte against past operations,

as well as to determine the good and bad

features of their training and tactics and the

performance of their weapons and to contrast them with those employed by the Japanese. An evaluation of American methods

at this point serves to explain in concrete

terms the nature of the fighting that had

occurred and of that which would occur in

the critical days ahead.

The American Ground Forces

Tactics

Following the customary procedure, the

divisions went ashore with two regiments

abreast. Within the regiments there were

variations, some going ashore with the battalions abreast and others with the battalions

in column. The size of the landing beach and

the nature of the expected opposition determined the type of landing formation that

was employed. Once ashore, the nature of

the tactical situation resulted in numerous

1

 Ltr, CG Sixth Army to CG X Corps et al., sub:

Mistakes Made and Lessons Learned in K-2 Operation, 25 Nov 44, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, pp.

204-212. Unless otherwise stated this chapter is

based upon General Krueger's critique.
MEASURE OF THE FIGHTING 245

GENERAL MACARTHUR AND MAJ. GEN. ARCHIBALD V. ARNOLD at

Headquarters, 7th Division.

independent actions by subordinate units.

The formation most frequently used was the

normal one of two units in the assault and

one in reserve.

Frontal assaults were usually employed

against enemy positions, and not enough

use was made of envelopments. When envelopments were tried they were nearly

always successful. It was sometimes advantageous to bypass isolated enemy strong

points, leaving them to be mopped up by

the follow-up units.

Although the primary mission of the infantry is to close with the enemy and destroy or capture him, the natural reluctance

of American infantrymen to engage the

enemy in close quarters had to be overcome.

There were several instances in which the

American attacking force felt out the Japanese position and then sat back to wait it

out. In one area no progress was made for

four days. On several occasions strong

combat patrols of platoon or company

strength were sent to feel out enemy positions, but as soon as they made contact with

the Japanese the patrols withdrew. They

accomplished nothing except to determine

the presence of an unknown number of

enemy soldiers.

If more than minor resistance was encountered, the troops frequently fell back

and called for fire from supporting weapons.

On one occasion a company called for

artillery fire upon a roadblock and then

withdrew 350 yards while the concentration

was delivered. After the lifting of the artil-
246 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

lery fire, it was very difficult to reorganize

the company and get it back to the objective.

Meanwhile the Japanese had again covered

the roadblock and the whole process had to

be repeated.

The American soldiers were too roadbound. Sometimes resistance along the road

stopped the advance of an entire division.

This opposition could have been eliminated

quickly by the employment of simple envelopments and flanking attacks. Although the

presence of swamps, jungle, and rice paddies

tended to channelize the attack, the Japanese had displayed superior adeptness, and

willingness to go into the swamps and stay

there until rooted out.

The standard employment of artillery in

close support of the infantry again proved

to be very effective and was used extensively.

However, since the artillery fire enabled the

infantry to secure many heavily fortified

positions with few casualties, the infantrymen tended to become too dependent upon

the artillerymen and expected them to do

the work of the infantry. General Krueger

insisted that the infantry must be prepared

to close in immediately after the cessation of

the artillery fire.

The Americans had developed a strong

tendency to telegraph their punches. In the

morning, before an assault by the infantry,

the artillery pounded the Japanese positions,

after which the mortars opened up. The

mortar fire nearly always lasted for a half

hour, and then the infantry moved out.

Upon occasion, the infantry did not attack

immediately after the preparation by the

supporting weapons. This delay gave the

Japanese time and opportunity to regroup

and consolidate their forces, and thus nullified the effects of the preparatory fires.

Parenthetically, it may be remarked that

although the actual casualties per artillery

shell were few, the cumulative effect of the

heavy and prolonged fire of the artillery and

mortars was very great. Col. Junkichi Okabayashi, chief of staff of the Japanese 1st

Division, estimated that the losses sustained

by the division were distributed as follows:

by artillery, 60 percent; by mortars, 25 percent; by infantry fire, 14 percent; and by

aircraft, 1 percent.2

The employment of tanks singly, or in

small groups, materially aided the infantrymen, since the tanks could be used effectively to reduce enemy pillboxes and to

flush out bamboo thickets. Although light

tanks were more mobile it was found that

the mediums were more efficient in reducing pillboxes. For successful employment, it

was necessary that the tanks have close infantry and engineer support. In some instances the tanks secured objectives when

no infantrymen were present to consolidate

and hold the positions. For example, a regiment supported by a tank battalion received

orders to attack and secure an objective. The

tanks quickly moved out and secured the

objective with little resistance. Since the

infantrymen did not arrive during the day,

the tanks withdrew at nightfall. During the

night the Japanese mined the area and four

of the tanks were lost when they returned

next morning.

Likewise, tanks were often disabled because the engineers had failed to remove

mines and give support in the crossing of

streams. In one case, the engineers failed to

repair a bridge, which collapsed after three

tanks had crossed over it. The Japanese completely destroyed one of the tanks and disabled the other two. It was necessary for the

Americans to destroy the disabled tanks

2

 10th I&HS Eighth Army, Stf Study of Japanese

35th Army on Leyte, Interrog Col Okabayashi, pp.

5-6.
MEASURE OF THE FIGHTING 247

with their own gunfire in order to prevent

their use as stationary pillboxes by the

enemy.

It was found advantageous to establish a

night perimeter before dusk. An early establishment of the perimeter enabled the troops

to take effective countermeasures against

Japanese infiltrations and night assaults.3

The soldiers also had an opportunity to become familiar with their surroundings and

were less likely to fire indiscriminately during the night. In spite of this precaution,

there was considerable promiscuous firing

during the night and at dawn. One corps

commander effectively stopped this practice in his command post area by the adoption of two simple measures. First, he employed a reserve battalion to cover an area

extending outward for one mile and when

no Japanese were found the fact was announced over the loudspeaker. Second, any

man caught firing before dawn was immediately court-martialed and fined fifty dollars.

"There was very little promiscuous firing

thereafter."

 4

Although there were three war-dog platoons available for the Leyte operation,

their combat value was practically nil.

The unit commanders to whom they were

attached knew little of their capabilities or

limitations. Some expected the dogs to spot

a Japanese position exactly at a distance of

200 or more yards. One unit took the dogs

on a four-day patrol without sufficient dog

rations. Another unit attempted to use dogs

in a populated area; the presence of so many

civilians thoroughly confused the dogs.

In general, the troops found that their

training had been sound and that the methods which in the past had been employed in

overcoming the Japanese were also useful

on Leyte. It was felt, however, that greater

emphasis in training should be placed on

night patrols and night movements near the

enemy lines, as well as on closer co-ordination between the infantry and the supporting weapons. Finally, it was believed that

the service troops should be given training

in basic infantry tactics and prepared to

maintain their own defenses.5

All units were in agreement that there

could be "no substitute for aggressive leadership."

 6 An infantry unit could be no better

than its leaders. General Krueger said in

this connection:

Infantry is the arm of close combat. It is

the arm of final combat. The Jap is usually

most tenacious particularly when in entrenched and concealed positions. Individual

enemy soldiers will remain in their holes until

eliminated. Although the supporting arms are

of great assistance, it ultimately becomes the

task of the small infantry units to dig them

out. The American soldier has demonstrated

on many battlefields that he can and will do

it, but he must be aggressively led. There can

be no hesitating on the part of his leaders.7

Welfare of the Men

At the same time, in order to obtain the

best results from the troops, the unit commanders must concern themselves with the

well-being and comfort of their men. Many

commanders were indifferent to such matters. One corps, for example, had sufficient

rations of all types available, but the meals

served the men were poorly prepared and

monotonous. Another corps, at the time it

landed, was prepared to live indefinitely on

3

 7th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex, Tactics, n. p. 4

 Krueger's Critique, Sixth Army Opns Rpt

Leyte, p. 205.

5

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Incl 1 to Annex 3,

n. p.

6

 Ibid.

7

 Krueger's Critique, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte,

p. 205. Italics are Krueger's.
248 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

field rations. As late as ten days after the

landing, no unit—not even any of the fixed

installations, including higher headquarters—operated a mess or served hot meals.

Some units did serve hot coffee after the

first few days.

Although there was considerable rain and

mud, few units made a genuine effort to get

their men under shelter even when the

tactical situation permitted. Night after

night, officers and men slept in wet foxholes

even when no enemy troops were within

shooting distance. "It must never be forgotten," said General Krueger, "that the

individual soldier is the most important

single factor in this war. . . . He is expected to do a lot including risking his life.

But to get the most out of him he must have

the feeling that everything possible under

existing circumstances is being done for his

well being and comfort. This is a prime responsibility of command. . . ."

 8

Weapons and Vehicles

The basic weapons—the U.S. .30-caliber

rifle Model 1903, the U.S. .30-caliber rifle

Ml, the BAR, bayonets, and grenades—

with which the rifle squads and the individual soldiers of the heavy weapons company were equipped were generally satisfactory and notably superior to comparable

weapons of the Japanese.

The troops used a variety of hand grenades. The white smoke grenade was considered to be defective and was frequently

discarded. The white phosphorus grenade

was extensively used, mainly as an antipersonnel weapon. It was thrown with telling

effect into foxholes, caves, and heavy underbrush. An Australian grenade was introduced, but because the troops were unfamiliar with its use, it was not too successful.

Incendiary hand grenades were effectively

used against enemy weapons, ammunition

dumps, and supplies. Colored grenades were

employed to mark strips for the air dropping

of supplies.9 The fragmentation grenade

was most favored by the troops, and after

that the phosphorus grenade.10

The Browning automatic rifle was very

popular, the best results being obtained

when two were allotted to a squad. The increased fire power thus obtained was very

effective in night defense.

The 81-mm. mortar continued to be

highly esteemed as a close support infantry

weapon. The 4.2-inch chemical mortars of

the attached chemical mortar battalions

were extensively employed, affording excellent results when emplaced on firm ground.

On marshy or swampy ground, however,

their base plates would sink and cause inaccurate firing or put the weapons out of commission. The most popular mortar was the

60-mm., which was very mobile and especially suitable for use in close terrain. This

mortar fired an illuminating shell which was

used constantly for night defense, but its

base plate also tended to sink into the

ground.

Flame throwers were employed with very

good effect in reducing strongly fortified positions. The M2-2 flame thrower was an

excellent incendiary weapon against bamboo thickets and shacks. The cartridge type

was considered to be more satisfactory, since

the spark-ignited flame thrower was not dependable in rainy weather. The flame

8

 Ibid., p. 206.

9

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 113-14. 10

 7th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex, Effectiveness

of Weapons, n. p.
MEASURE OF THE FIGHTING 249

thrower was considered "a very important

factor in overcoming the enemy's inherent

'will to resist.' " 11

The .50-caliber machine gun again

proved its value in defense, being highly

effective not only against ground targets but

also against aircraft. The 96th Division

found the Thompson submachine gun excellent for use by patrolling units but "some

difficulty . . . has been encountered with

the M3 machine gun in its failure to feed

properly."

 12

The 7th Division found the 75-mm. selfpropelled howitzer, because of its superior

mobility, to be the most effective infantry

weapon for reduction of Japanese pillboxes.

The 105-mm. howitzers of the field artillery

battalions again proved their worth by the

speed, accuracy, and effectiveness of their

fire. The greater striking range of the 155-

mm. howitzer had special value for general

support missions.

Demolition charges were used effectively

by patrols for the destruction of enemy ammunition dumps in inaccessible locations

and not salvageable because of the tactical

situation. Except for this purpose, demolitions were not extensively used.13

The 37-mm. gun was an antitank weapon

only occasionally employed by the 7th Division because there were few Japanese

armored vehicles against which to use it.

The excessive difficulty of manhandling it

into a position from which fire could be delivered against Japanese pillboxes and machine guns rendered it ineffective for that

purpose. The 90-mm. guns of the antiaircraft artillery had a considerable number of

erratic bursts because of corroded fuzes and

worn fuze setting lugs.

The tanks and tank destroyers could have

been used more frequently and with greater

versatility. Situations often arose in which

an infantry platoon was held up by enemy

machine gun and mortar fire, but "the use

of indirect artillery fire was impracticable

either because of overhead cover for the enemy weapons or because of undue risk to our

enveloping infantry." General Krueger

recommended that the infantry employ direct fire by the tanks or tank destroyers. He

felt that "the tank destroyer commanders

lacked aggressiveness and skilled direction."

 14

 The tank destroyer commanders

admitted that they were idle but added that

the infantry had not called for them. The

tanks and tank destroyers were ideal weapons for the destruction of machine guns,

mortars, and other heavy infantry weapons,

but the infantry commanders seemed to be

unaware of their capabilities. Many commanders employed their armored vehicles

down the middle of the road when they

could have used them more effectively on

the flanks and for envelopments.

The 96th Division found the Cannon

Company's self-propelled 105-mm. howitzer

extremely mobile in swamps and mountainous terrain. It was able to go several miles

farther up the mountains than any other

vehicle and gave excellent support in covering the mountain passes.15

The cargo carrier M29 (weasel)

proved to be a most useful supply vehicle.

The commanders used it for reconnaissance

and visits to units in isolated areas and over

roads that were impassable to wheeled vehicles. It also was employed to carry sup- 11

 96th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 85. 12

 Ibid. p. 83. Presumably the .45-caliber submachine gun M3 is intended by the term "M3

machine gun." 13

 7th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex, Effectiveness

of Weapons, n. p.

14

 Krueger's Critique, Sixth Army Opns Rpt

Leyte, p. 208. 15

 96th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 82.
250 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

plies and to evacuate the wounded from inaccessible areas. The weasel was much less

destructive of roads than any of the other

tracked vehicles, but the tendency to use it

on dry roads resulted in worn-out tracks and

excessive maintenance requirements.

The 96th Division found the DUKW to

be an excellent vehicle when waterborne

but on land, regardless of the condition of

the roads and terrain, it was not half as

effective as the 21⁄2-ton cargo truck. On

roads the DUKW was a traffic hazard and

an obstacle to other cargo traffic.16

The 7th Division landed with seventeen

one-ton trailers. They were found to be of

little value and the division recommended

that they should not be used in any future

operation unless a hard-surfaced, allweather road net existed at the anticipated

target.17

Intelligence

General Krueger pointed out that

prompt, aggressive reconnaissance should

have been instituted immediately upon the

landing of the troops. The fact that knowledge of the terrain was very limited before

the assault—inaccuracies in the distances on

existing maps were as high as 50 percent—

gave urgency to the need for immediate

reconnaissance.

The sources of information on the Japanese were as follows: ground and aerial

reconnaissance, Filipino civilians, guerrillas,

captured documents, and prisoners. Air

observation was of limited value because of

the Japanese ability at camouflage and because the inclement weather prevented

aerial observation of many areas. The tendency of the Filipinos to say "yes" to everything was also a handicap. In general, the

guerrilla reports were more accurate than

those of civilians. Considerable information

was obtained from patrols, which were

especially valuable for on-the-spot intelligence.

In interrogating prisoners the best results

were obtained by employing Nisei, who obtained more information from prisoners

when the latter were not subjected to questioning by an officer through an interpreter.

Since most of the prisoners had been separated from their units for a considerable

time and were seriously wounded, their

information was sparse and generally out

of date.

Captured documents were the most fruitful source of intelligence. Although the

Japanese made a few attempts to destroy

dog tags and other means of identification

before going into battle, they were not too

successful. The fact that General Krueger

obtained information on the proposed

ground offensive of the Japanese for the

middle of November from papers found on

the body of a Japanese officer was not an

isolated incident. Many officers carried on

their persons sets of orders and maps.

The Japanese received much of their information on the American order of battle

from broadcasts emanating from San Francisco. At first, the Japanese on the island

were unable to find out the American order

of battle for Leyte but within a few days the

Americans gratuitously furnished them the

information. Said General Tomochika:

At the time of the landing, 35th Army

Headquarters did not know the number or

name of the American units which had landed

. . . but within a day headquarters learned.

. . . We found out ... by tuning in on the

San Francisco broadcasts; Japanese troops

in the combat area were unable to determine

16

 Ibid., p. 95. 17

 7th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex, Deficiencies

in Equipment, n. p.
MEASURE OF THE FIGHTING 251

their identity. From the same source, we later

obtained information which was of considerable help in planning. In fact, that was the

only way we could get information. . . .

Information was always received through the

San Francisco broadcast before reports from

our front line units reached headquarters.

. . . Since the information came much sooner

from the American broadcast than from the

Japanese communications, the Army Headquarters depended on the American broadcasts for much intelligence.18

Japanese Warfare

The 24th Division found the Japanese

troops on Leyte to be better trained in combat and more skillful than those the division

had encountered during the HollandiaTanahmerah Bay operation.19

 In general

the Japanese fought a delaying action, and

when forced to yield ground they would fall

back to previously prepared positions. During a bombardment by American heavy

weapons, the enemy troops would withdraw

but when the fire lifted they would quickly

reoccupy the vacated positions.20

The 21st Infantry was impressed with the

Japanese "excellence in battle" on Breakneck Ridge. There were few instances of

"reckless charges, needless sacrifices or failure to observe known tactical principles."

The most notable characteristics exhibited

were the excellent fire discipline and the

effective control of all arms. Without exception individual soldiers withheld their fire

until it would have the greatest possible

effect. The heaviest firing would generally

start about 1530 and increase in intensity

until about dark, the fire being accompanied

by counterattacks from the front and on the

flanks. These assaults usually came when

the Americans' energy and ammunition

were at their lowest point during the day

and when they would prevent proper consolidation of the front lines before dark.21

The Japanese employed reverse slope defense tactics with much skill and were successful in utilizing terrain for their defensive

positions. Caves and other natural formations were exploited to the limit and positions were dug in deeply and expertly camouflaged. The Japanese frequently sacrificed fields of fire for cover and concealment,

a fact which made it very difficult for the

Americans to locate hostile positions.

Captured documents indicated that the

Japanese attacks were generally well conceived but that there were not enough troops

at the time of the assault. The documents

also gave repeated indications that units

either did not receive their orders or did not

reach the appointed place on time. The

Japanese employed two main types of attack. The first, which was similar to that

employed by the Americans, utilized a base

of fire from supporting weapons, followed

by infantry fire and movement. This type of

attack was not usually accompanied byartillery or mortar support. The other

method consisted of a localized charge in

which the Japanese by sheer force of numbers tried to crack the American lines. The

heavy weapons fire of the Americans was

nearly always able to break up both types

of attack. Enemy forces, generally in small

numbers, tried repeatedly to infiltrate

through the American lines. The objectives 18

 10th I&HS Eighth Army, Stf Study of Japanese

35th Army on Leyte, Interreg Gen Tomochika, pp.

2-3.

19

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 86. 20

 96th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 88.

21

 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex, Enemy Tactics on Breakneck Ridge, n. p.
252 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

were artillery pieces, supply dumps, and key

installations. Rarely did they accomplish

even minor damage.

Artillery weapons were seldom used by

the Japanese to maximum effect. The

gunnery techniques were "remarkably undeveloped" and inefficient, the pieces being

used singly or in pairs and only rarely as

batteries. Their fire was never massed. The

gun positions generally were well constructed but they were frequently selected

with such high regard for concealment that

the fields of fire were limited. The use of

mines and demolition charges was poor, the

mine fields being hastily and obviously laid.

The troops were well trained and led by

officers imbued with a sense of duty. Consequently, "as long as any officers remain alive,

the remnants of a ... force are capable

of determined action."

 22

The Japanese view of American methods

was summed up by General Tomochika as

follows: "The strong points of the American strategy in the Leyte Operation were

numerous but the two outstanding points

were (1) the overwhelming striking power

of the American Army, and (2) the American operations were planned in minute detail and on the whole were carried out

scrupulously."

 23

22

 7th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex, Japanese

Opns, n. p. 23

 10th I&HS, Eighth Army, Stf Study of Opns of

Japanese 35th Army on Leyte, Interrog Gen Tomochika, p. 26.
CHAPTER XV

Battle of the Ridges

American Plans and Preparations

With the securing of the beachhead areas

in the last week of October and the first days

of November, General Krueger was ready

to launch that part of his plan that concerned a drive north along the west coast of

Leyte. Since a preliminary reconnaissance

indicated that there were not a great many

Japanese troops in the southern half of the

island, elements of the 32d Infantry had

already started to push west through the

mountains to the west coast along the road

from Abuyog to Baybay. After the attention

of the Japanese had been diverted to the

struggle in the northern mountains, the X

Corps could launch a drive against Ormoc,

proceeding north from Baybay on Highway 2 along the shores of the Camotes Sea

and of Ormoc Bay. At the same time elements of the X Corps—the 24th Division

and later the 32d Division—could drive

down the Ormoc corridor to Ormoc. The

enemy forces would then be caught between

the jaws of a trap, with their freedom of

maneuver limited and most of their strength

employed in defensive action. But the need

for blocking the exits from the central mountain range and the scarcity of combat troops

made it necessary for General Krueger to

postpone sending a strong force to the shores

of the Camotes Sea until additional reinforcements arrived on Leyte in the middle

of November. General Hodge was to be prepared, however, to send strong elements of

the XXIV Corps over the mountains.

American Plans

On 30 October General Hodge directed

the 7th Division to move elements, not to

exceed one battalion, over the mountain

road from Abuyog to Baybay, the western

terminus of the road. He also ordered the

7th Division to be prepared to move to the

west coast when relieved in the Burauen

area.1 In anticipation of this plan, the 2d

Battalion, 32d Infantry, had moved to

Abuyog on 29 October to occupy and defend that area. Company G had spearheaded the advance to Baybay. On 2 November General Arnold alerted the main

body of the 32d Infantry, under Colonel

Finn, for a move to Abuyog.

1

 XXIV Corps FO 12, 30 Oct 44. The operations

of the 7th Division on the western coast of Leyte

were more adequately covered than any other action in the Leyte campaign. Capt. Tucker Dean and

1st Lt. Russell A. Gugeler, two combat historians,

prepared very complete manuscripts on the battle

of Shoestring Ridge. Gugeler's Battle of the Ridgelines and Dean's King II: the Liberation of Leyte,

on file in the Office of the Chief of Military History,

have much information that is not given in the

official reports. In addition Col. John M. Finn, who

commanded the 32d Infantry which bore the brunt

of the Shoestring Ridge battle, wrote an account of

the engagement that appeared in the September

and October 1945 issues of the Infantry Journal.

(Unless otherwise stated, this chapter is based upon

these accounts and the 32d Infantry Operations

Report Leyte, pp. 10-26.)
254 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

As soon as word was received that the

Americans were on the west coast, General

Suzuki, believing these forces to be a small

unit of American and Philippine troops,

sent a company from the 364th Battalion

south from Ormoc to hold Albuera until

the 26th Division could arrive.2 Albuera was

important tactically, since from it ran a

mountain trail that the Japanese had tried

unsuccessfully to develop into a road to the

Burauen airfield in Leyte Valley.

On 9 November the 26th Division landed

at Ormoc after a rough voyage from Manila. The transport vessels had been repeatedly attacked by Allied aircraft, which damaged many of the landing barges and ship

hatches. These damaging attacks hindered

the unloading of equipment, which did not

proceed as planned. Many of the landing

barges were run aground and destroyed by

Allied aircraft, and the transports were

forced to sail away before being completely

emptied. They carried most of the ordnance,

provisions, and munitions of the division

with them. On their return trip, all the vessels were sunk by aircraft. The division consequently came ashore underequipped. The

strength of the 26th Division consisted of

Division Headquarters, one battalion of the

11th Independent Infantry Regiment, three

battalions of the 13th Independent Infantry

Regiment, and the 2d Battalion of the 12th

Infantry Regiment. These units had only

light, portable weapons, and none was

equipped with machine guns except a battalion of the 13th Independent Infantry

Regiment.

General Suzuki had intended to use the

26th Division in the Carigara area but the

arrival of American forces in the Baybay

area forced him to change his plans. On 13

November he received word from Manila

that the 26th Division was to be used in the

Burauen area and consequently the main

force of the 26th Division was directed to

Albuera. General Suzuki first sent the 13th

Independent Infantry Regiment, under Col.

Jiro Saito,3 but eventually the entire 26th

Division, including the division headquarters, was committed to the Albuera area.

As the troops of the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, moved over the mountains to Baybay, guerrillas informed them that about

three hundred Japanese soldiers were pushing south toward the Abuyog—Baybay road.

These enemy troops were "six marauding

units" of the company which had been sent

south to make contact with the American

forces and contain them until the 26th Division could arrive.4

 Company E set up an

ambush, killed many of the Japanese, and

forced the others to disperse.

By this time the appearance of Japanese

reinforcements going north from Ormoc

caused General Krueger to shift the weight

of the Sixth Army to the north to meet the

new threat, and to order General Hodge

to hold up on the relief of the 7th Division

in the Burauen area. It was not until after

the arrival of the 11th Airborne Division

that the 7th Division, on 22 November, was

able to move in force to the west coast.5

At 1025 on 14 November General Arnold

ordered Colonel Finn to start moving the

32d Infantry north to the Damulaan-Cari2

 The Japanese historians make the following

ambiguous statement: "The Army had doubts as to

the authenticity of this broadcast, but from past experience with U. S. broadcasts, the Army estimated

it to be a small unit of U. S. and Philippine troops

which had landed there." 35th Army Opns, p. 51.

Unless otherwise stated the part of this section

dealing with Japanese plans is based upon this study,

pp. 51-84.

3

 Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 24. 4

 Ibid., pp. 51-52. 5

 XXIV Corps Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 11-12.
BATTLE OF THE RIDGES 255

MAP 13

dad area and to be prepared to advance

upon Ormoc on further orders.6 The units

of the 32d Infantry moved to their assigned

areas near the Palanas River, and both the

Japanese and Americans made ready their

positions for the clash. (Map 13) The battle

that was about to be fought over the ridge

lines along the Palanas River was later

called the "Battle of Shoestring Ridge" by

troops of the 32d Infantry. This name applied to the supply technique rather than

to any terrain features of the ridge, since

the supply of the 32d Infantry throughout

the battle was precarious. Said Colonel

Finn: "The old slogan 'Too little and too

late' became 'Just enough and just in time'

for us."

 7

The Palanas River runs in a southwesterly

direction between two ridges that end

abruptly on reaching the road. The ridges

slope sharply toward the river and are separated by a narrow valley. Colonel Finn chose

to stand on Shoestring Ridge, the southernmost of the two, which rises steeply from

the fields. Its northerly face drops precipitately for more than 125 feet to the valley,

6

 Fragmentary Order, CG 7th Div to CO 32d Inf,

14 Nov 44, 7th Div G-3 Jnl, 14 Nov 44.

7

 Col. John M. Finn, "Shoestring Ridge," Infantry Journal, LVII, 3 (September, 1945), 47.
256 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

where dense bamboo thickets cover the river

banks. The main body of the ridge is covered

with cogon grass, interspersed with palms

and bamboo, growth being especially heavy

in the gullies. Between the western tip of the

ridge and the sea are rice paddies and

clusters of palm trees, while at a point 3,000

yards northeast of the road the ridge falls

into a saddle and then rises to join Hill 918.

Offensive Preparations

While the 26th Division was building up

positions on the opposite bank of the Palanas

River, Colonel Finn had to solve problems

that existed to the rear. Since enemy barges

still operated freely a few thousand yards

offshore and two Japanese destroyers had

cruised by, General Arnold thought that the

enemy might try to land forces and seize

Baybay in order to separate the American

units and sever their line of communications. There were only three infantry battalions on the west coast. The mud and

floods on the narrow route that connected

this force with the source of supplies at

Dulag, on the east coast, made the road so

undependable that the 7th Division could

not rely on a quick transfer of reinforcements to the west.

Lt. Col. Charles A. Whitcomb's 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, had moved from Baybay to a position just south of the 2d Battalion on 21 November

 8

 and established defensive positions in depth. To have increased

the defensive strength on Shoestring Ridge

would have placed the bulk of the forces in

a position where they would be surrounded

if the Japanese breached their line. General

Arnold, to prevent such an envelopment,

directed that the 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, should not be used to reinforce the

front lines without his permission.9 This order left only Lt. Col. Glenn A. Nelson's 2d

Battalion, 32d Infantry, to hold the front.

The 1st Battalion had been sent to the vicinity of Panaon Strait to relieve the 21st Infantry. In addition to the infantry there was

a concentration of artillery at Damulaan for

support. Batteries A and B of the 49th Field

Artillery Battalion (105-mm. howitzer) had

moved up and registered fire by 21 November,10

 and on the morning of 23 November

Battery B of the 11th 155-mm. Marine Gun

Battalion arrived at Damulaan.11 The regimental Cannon Company brought two more

pieces, which boosted the total to fourteen.

All the artillery pieces were only about 1,500

yards behind the front lines, concentrated

in a small area in the vicinity of Damulaan.

The light weapons were situated so that their

fire could be placed as far forward as possible, and the 155-mm. guns were in positions from which they could shell Ormoc.12

The defenses of the infantry and the artillery

were consolidated on ground that afforded

the best protection.

A platoon from the 7th Reconnaissance

Troop patrolled the road between Baybay

and Damulaan, and a platoon of light tanks

from the 767th Tank Battalion at Damulaan was the only armor on the west coast.13

8

 7th Inf Div G-3 Periodic Rpt, 21 Nov 44. 9 7th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Nov 44.

10

 7th Inf Div G-3 Periodic Rpt, 21 Nov 44. 11

 7th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 23 Nov 44. The 11th

155-mm. Gun Battalion and the 5th 155-mm.

Howitzer Battalion were Marine artillery units and

part of the V Amphibious Corps artillery which had

been designated for Yap. With the cancellation of

that operation, these two battalions had been assigned to the XXIV Corps as part of the corps

artillery for Leyte. 12

 Msg, XXIV Corps to 7th Inf Div, 21 Nov 44. 13

 32d Inf Regt S-3 Periodic Rpt, 23-24 Nov 44.
BATTLE OF THE RIDGES 257

For several days preceding the 23d of November, Filipinos moving to the south

through the lines reported that large enemy

forces were massing on the opposite side of

the Palanas River and emplacing field guns.

Artillery observers on Shoestring Ridge

could see the Japanese constructing trenches,

machine gun pits, and other installations on

the opposite ridge. The Japanese forces consisted of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 13th Independent Infantry Regiment, and two battalions from the 11th and 12th Independent Infantry Regiments.14 Colonel Saito

was ordered to hold back the American advance, which threatened to cut off a trail

the Japanese had been building at Albuera

over the mountains to Burauen.

On 23 November the defenses of the 32d

Infantry were stretched very thin. Because

of the great distance involved it was not

possible to have a continuous front line extending from the sea to the mountains, and

therefore some passages of approach had

to be left open to the enemy. Only the

longest and most difficult were undefended.15

 The main defensive sector of the

32d Infantry, just south of the Palanas

River, was astride the highway and on that

part of the ridge which overlooked the regiment's artillery and command post installations. The defensive sector of Companies F

and G was 1,500 yards in width. Company

F occupied the flat, marshy land between

the sea and the hills to the east. The men

built barricades of dirt and sandbags at

intervals of seventy-five yards and mined

the area in front of them. Company E and

guerrillas of Companies F and G, 94th Philippine Infantry, which were attached to the

2d Battalion, were on a ridge that extended

to Hill 918. Some guerrillas were also outposted between Companies G and E. Regimental headquarters was at Baybay.16

 "The

main strength of the line was American guts

and fighting spirit."

 17

 During the night,

Battery B of the 11th 155-mm. Gun Battalion had moved in and was in position at

0800 to start firing. The battery was so well

camouflaged that during the ensuing engagement it was never discovered by the

enemy. The regiment now had in support

two batteries of 105-mm. howitzers and one

of 155-mm. guns.

Battle of Shoestring Ridge

The Battle Begins

At about 1830 on 23 November, the 26th

Division opened up the long-expected attack.18

 The signal for the commencement of

hostilities was an artillery concentration, the

first rounds of which fell in the area of Battery A, 49th Field Artillery Battalion. The

next rounds were scattered. Enemy mortars

joined the artillery and concentrated their

fire on the front lines of the 32d Infantry.

Counterbattery fire of the 105-mm. howitzers from Battery B of the 49th Field Artillery

temporarily silenced the Japanese fire. At

2000 the enemy artillery and mortars again

opened up against the front lines of the 32d

Infantry and cut all communications between the 2d Battalion and the regimental

headquarters at Baybay. Communications

were later re-established by relay from the

3d Battalion at Caridad.

14

 32d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 22. 15

 Ibid., p. 17.

16

 That evening General Arnold, acting on instructions from the Sixth Army that "guerrillas not

be given missions beyond their capabilities," ordered

Colonel Finn to use guerrillas only as outposts and

not as part of the main line of resistance. 7th Inf

Div G-3 Jnl, 23 Nov 44. 17

 32d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 17. 18

 35th Army Opns, p. 74.
258 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

At 2100 the Japanese infantry launched a

well-planned attack, supported by artillery,

mortars, and machine guns, against the

lines of Company E. Although the company

retaliated with all weapons at its command,

the Japanese continued to come on, despite

heavy casualties, through the covered draws,

high cogon grass, and bamboo thickets. The

guerrilla outpost between Companies G and

E withdrew when the Japanese attacked

Company E. The enemy force, which consisted of two reinforced rifle companies from

the 13th Independent Infantry Regiment,

seized portions of the ridge and dug in.

Colonel Nelson, the commander of the 2d

Battalion, ordered Capt. John J. Young,

commanding officer of Company E, to withdraw his troops. Since the Japanese had

penetrated the lines and were digging in,

the withdrawal was difficult. At about 2200,

when Capt. Roy F. Dixon, commanding

officer of Company G, received word that

Company E was to withdraw to a position

behind Company L and thus leave the right

flank of Company G exposed, he ordered

the right platoon leader to move his right

from a position in front of the ridge to one

on the ridge facing east, refusing this flank.19

The two right squads moved back and secured the right of Company G.

At dawn on 24 November Colonel Nelson

re-formed the 2d Battalion. A patrol from

Company F went to the Palanas River and

found no enemy troops. At 0800 three companies moved to the east toward Hill 918.

The troops succeeded in pushing back a

Japanese force that had penetrated south of

the Palanas River and east of Hill 918.

Colonel Finn ordered Company K to move

up from Caridad, and he attached it to the

2d Battalion.

Battery C of the 57th 105-mm. Howitzer

Battalion, which had just arrived, was

placed on the left, south of the Bucan

River.20 By 1800 the troops had regained

some of the ground lost the previous night

and occupied a perimeter approximately

2,000 yards long and less than 1,500 yards

deep.

During the day, as far as their limited ammunition would allow, the artillery units

fired at enemy troop concentrations and possible observation posts. The service troops

worked feverishly to move badly needed ammunition to the front lines. The two most

critical items were 105-mm. and 81-mm.

ammunition, and by nightfall the front lines

had received 1,400 rounds of the first item

and 1,600 rounds of the second. General

Arnold attached the 1st Battalion, 184th

Infantry, to the 32d Infantry but Colonel

Finn was forbidden to commit it to action

without permission from the 7th Division.

Japanese Counterattack

The enemy forces did not wait. That

night, under a full moon, they attacked

American positions with great ferocity,

opening the engagement with the heaviest

artillery barrage the 32d Infantry had yet

experienced.21 The first rounds fell on the

front-line troops, but the fire then shifted

and centered on Battery A, 49th Field Artillery Battalion, and the infantry and artillery command posts in the rear at Damulaan. At the same time the enemy pounded

the front lines of Companies G, L, E, and K

with heavy mortar fire. Additional mortars

joined the battle and shifted the greater

19

 32d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 18.

20

 49th FA Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 10. 21

 Msg, CO 32d Inf to CG 7th Div, 25 Nov 44,

32d Inf Unit Jnl, 25 Nov 44.
BATTLE OF THE RIDGES 259

part of their fire against Battery B. The cannoneers held fast and returned the fire.

After this thirty-minute artillery and

mortar preparation, the Japanese 13th Independent Infantry Regiment attacked the

front lines of the Americans, concentrating

the assault against three main positions:

the right flank of Company G, the draw

between Companies L and K, and the

center of Company K. At the same time,

combat patrols moved from the north

against Companies F and G. The companies

easily threw back these patrols.

Colonel Nelson ordered all supporting

weapons of the 2d Battalion to fire. All three

artillery batteries fired at the maximum rate

for seven minutes, while the mortars placed

their fire directly on the assault force in

order to chop it up or drive it back into the

artillery fire. Colonel Nelson then put the

Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon of the

2d Battalion and a squad from Company B,

13th Engineer Battalion, in previously prepared positions between Companies G and

E. Company G was thus able to strengthen

its lines at the heaviest point of pressure and

repel the frequently repeated assaults.

At about 1900 a strong force of the enemy

gathered on the ridge in front of the right

flank of Company L. The American mortars

fired on the ridge but the American machine

guns kept silent in order to conceal their

locations. A group of about fifty Japanese

came to within thirty yards of the right

platoon of Company L and showered it

with grenades. Mortar fire also fell on this

platoon, and at the same time the platoon

of Company K in the draw came under

heavy fire. At least twelve emplaced machine guns, in addition to those carried up

by the assaulting troops, raked the positions

of Companies K and L with intense fire.

Company L employed all weapons and

threw back the assault with heavy casualties

to the Japanese.

Company K did not fare so well, since it

was operating at little more than half

strength and there were only nineteen men

in the platoon that guarded the draw on the

company's left flank. Under the protection

of machine gun and mortar fire, the Japanese moved against the platoon, which was

ringed by machine gun fire that cut off any

avenue of withdrawal. The platoon seemed

to be faced with imminent extermination.

A Marine machine gunner from the 11th

155-mm. Gun Battalion, who was stationed

on the high ground just south of the draw

of the besieged platoon, opened fire and

knocked out the enemy machine guns which

had cut off the line of withdrawal. He then

directed his fire against the Japanese

weapons on the ridge across the draw and

raked the ridge from one end to the other.

After the enemy guns had been silenced the

platoon made an orderly withdrawal to the

foot of the ridge to positions on its right

rear, from which it could cover the draw.22

Many enemy dead were left in the vacated

positions.

The Japanese then attempted to break

through the center of Company K's line, but

were driven off by the use of artillery, together with the mortars, machine guns, grenades, and rifles of the company. For the

rest of the night the Japanese kept probing

the left flank of the company and placing

machine gun and mortar fire along the entire line. At one time about twenty-five of

22

 "The platoon leader, a technical sergeant, insisted that the Marine gunner either transfer to the

Army or he would have to transfer to the Marines,

as he couldn't get along without him." (Finn,

op. cit., p. 52.) A check of Marine Corps records,

and interviews with Marine Corps historians and

Colonel Finn failed to disclose the name and rank

of the Marine gunner.
260 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

the enemy pushed past the outer perimeter

to within fifty yards of the perimeter of the

command post and set up two machine

guns. Headquarters personnel, medical men,

and engineers who were manning the perimeter drove the group off.

Meanwhile, the Japanese forces in front

of Company L withdrew and were regrouping, preparatory to launching a new attack.

Since there was no artillery observer with

the company, 1st Lt. William C. Bentley, of

the Cannon Company, with two men went

to a vantage point from which they could

observe the draw and the ridge where the

enemy force was assembling. Lieutenant

Bentley directed an artillery concentration

on the draw. Three times the Japanese tried

to pierce the right flank of Company L and

three times the artillery drove them back

with heavy casualties. The enemy then tried

unsuccessfully to get through the left flank

of the company. The front line of Company

L had comparative quiet for the rest of the

night, except for a few infiltrators.

Having failed to pierce the front lines, the

26th Division troops tried desperately to

knock out the artillery supporting the 32d

Infantry—Batteries A and B of the 49th

Field Artillery Battalion receiving the heaviest blows. Battery B had all four of its guns

knocked out, but by "cannibalizing" the

damaged guns the battery had one of them

back in operation by dawn. The enemy shelling gradually slackened in intensity, and by

0400, except for occasional outbursts of fire,

all was quiet.

At dawn of 25 November each company

sent scouting patrols 2,000 yards to its front

in order to forestall any Japanese attempts

to move in. The patrols remained out all day.

The front lines were reinforced by Company I, which moved into the draw between

Companies K and L. The troops prepared

positions but occupied them only at night,

since they were located in a swampy rice

paddy. Headquarters and B Battery of the

57th Field Artillery Battalion moved into the

Damulaan area to provide additional artillery support. Four 105-mm. howitzer batteries and one 155-mm. gun battery were

then available. The troops of the 3d Battalion reverted to the control of the 3d Battalion commander, Colonel Whitcomb. Because of the intense firing during the night,

the ammunition in the front lines had been

nearly exhausted, but a sufficient supply was

brought forward to the guns by the next

evening.

At 2200 the enemy, using the same tactics

as on the previous night, again assaulted the

eastern positions of the 32d Infantry with

approximately one battalion, after an artillery preparation. Although apparently well

led and well organized, they were in less

strength than before and were driven back,

but not without a grenade battle and some

hand-to-hand fighting.

While the infantry troops were thus engaged, eight Japanese led by an officer

moved unnoticed along the Bucan River

about one and a half miles south of the Palanas River. Coming up on the right of B

Battery, 49th Field Artillery Battalion, these

enemy troops threw a shower of grenades at

the gun crews and tried to clamber over the

river bank and get at the guns. One man

made it, and by placing a satchel charge

behind the breechblock of a howitzer he put

it permanently out of commission. All of the

Japanese were killed.

The troops of the 32d Infantry spent the

26th of November improving their positions,

moving automatic weapons, restocking ammunition, and securing much-needed rest.

The only important change in the lines was

the moving of B Company, 184th Infantry,
BATTLE OF THE RIDGES 261

MAP 14

less one platoon, into the position of B Battery, which was made part of A Battery.23

(MAP 14)

Bloody Bamboo Thicket

At 2100 Colonel Saito renewed the assault against the American position, following the pattern set by the previous night

actions. The Japanese first laid down mortar and machine gun fire,24

 and then heavyweapons fire of the 13th Infantry Regiment

hit the right platoons of Company G, shifting to the east in about fifteen minutes. Immediately afterward, about a battalion of

Japanese infantry attacked Company G,

while twelve machine guns started to fire

from a ridge 1,200 yards to the east. The

Japanese moved into the fire of their own

heavy weapons. The 32d Infantry, using all

of its artillery batteries, mortars, machine

guns, and rifles, started throwing lead

against the enemy force as fast as its men

could load and fire. The Japanese, employing an estimated fifty machine guns, con23

 Msg, 32d Inf to 7th Div, 1520, 26 Nov 44, 32d

Inf Unit Jnl, 26 Nov 44. 24

 Msg, 32d Inf to 7th Div, 2213, 26 Nov 44, 32d

Inf Unit Jnl, 26 Nov 44.
262 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

tinned to come on. "All hell broke loose"

 25

as the enemy shot off flares to guide their

own artillery fire. The sharp declivity in

front of the American lines did not allow

for a close concentration of friendly artillery

fire. Just as it appeared that the lines were

to be overrun, some more enemy flares went

up, and the Japanese withdrew, covered by

heavy machine gun and mortar fire. Colonel

Finn, taking advantage of this fortunate circumstance, hastily rearranged riflemen to

fill gaps caused by casualties and replenished

his ammunition supplies. The mortars of the

regiment continued to fire into the draw.

After a short lull Colonel Saito renewed

the attack. There was no preparatory artillery fire, but the mortars and machine guns

introduced the assault. The attack did not

seem as determined as the previous one,

though the number of troops was apparently

about the same. The 32d Infantry again

called down all types of fire upon the enemy.

Elements of the 13th Infantry Regiment

continued to advance, although "the carnage was terriffic,"

 26

 and attempted to pass

through the American lines. A strong enemy

group moved into a bamboo grove on a

nose in front of the center platoon of G

Company. From this position the enemy

launched an attack which the company

resisted with grenades and bayonets. As

Colonel Finn later reported: "The battle

continued to flare up and die down as the

valiant soldiers fought like devils to hold

our lines."

 27

 The 81-mm. mortars from the

mortar platoon of H Company fired 650

rounds in five minutes, and fire from the

60-mm. mortars was "practically automatic."

 28

 After an hour's intense fighting,

the enemy force withdrew.

The Japanese had not attacked the left

flank of G Company. These troops heard

the battle raging to the right and the sounds

of the Japanese forming below them. A noncommissioned officer in charge of a listening

post sent a man to get permission for his

three-man group to withdraw. After receiving permission he shouted the order from

a distance of fifty yards. As the men from

the listening post started back, they were

joined by the left platoon and two squads

from the center platoon. Within forty-five

minutes the two platoons, less one squad,

plus the section of heavy machine guns, were

moving south on the highway. "There was

no thought in their minds that the withdrawal was not authorized."

 29

 After proceeding down the road 250 yards they met

the executive officer of Company H who

ordered them back. It was too late, the

damage was done. Though the left platoon

was able to regain its position without

trouble, the two squads from the center

platoon found the enemy well dug-in in the

bamboo thicket where the squads had been.

It was later learned that there were about

two hundred hostile troops with twenty

machine guns in the thicket.

The Japanese were within the American

lines and in a position from which they could

fire on A Battery and the flanks of Companies E, L, I, and K.30

 Colonel Finn immediately took steps to contain the penetrators.

The reserve platoon from I Company

moved behind E Company to face north in 25

 The Japanese give the number of enemy troops order to stop any enemy troops moving south

as two and a half battalions while the 32d Infantry

estimated it as three battalions. 35th Army Opns,

p. 78; 32d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 22. 26

 32d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 22. 27

 Ibid., p. 23.

28

 Ibid.

29

 Ibid.

30

 Msg, CO 32d Inf to CG 7th Div, 0220, 27 Nov

44, 32d Inf Unit Jnl, 27 Nov 44.
BATTLE OF THE RIDGES 263

along the high ground. The squad of the

center platoon of Company G that had remained in position was faced to the west in

order to forestall any attempt to roll up the

line of G Company. That part of G Company which had withdrawn was moved

along the high ground behind E Company

where it established contact with the rest of

G Company that faced the bamboo thicket.

The right of F Company was turned south

along the highway. Although the enemy

could not be denied access to the flat, open

ground leading to Damulaan, the rear of E

and G Companies was protected and the

flat ground could be covered by fire. The

Japanese apparently did not realize the predicament of the Americans, since they made

no attempt to exploit it.

At the same time that G Company was

fighting, the other companies, E, L, and I,

were also hit, though the assault was not so

heavy as the one against G Company. The

commanding officer of E Company, next to

G Company, felt that the situation left him

"in a hell of a spot,"

 31

 but he held his position. The Japanese steadily persisted in their

pressure against the lines of the companies

and the fighting continued throughout the

night. The defenders yielded no ground and

effectively used many supporting fires to disrupt the attack of the 26th Division. The

Americans counted 400 Japanese dead the

next morning, but casualties of the 32d Infantry, despite the heavy fighting, had been

surprisingly light. For the twenty-four hour

period ending at 1430 on 27 November,

four officers and fifteen enlisted men had

been wounded and one enlisted man killed.32

Colonel Finn made plans for the recapture of the ground lost by G Company, and

General Arnold made available to him part

of the 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry, which

was at Caridad. The 1st Battalion, less B

Company and two platoons from C Company, left Caridad at 0415 on 27 November,

and by 0515 it was in Damulaan in readiness for the assault. Company G, 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, was also available.

At the same time, the enemy was in the

midst of preparing new plans. The Japanese

felt that if they could recapture the Burauen

airfields, all the American forces on Leyte

would be in jeopardy. General Suzuki

therefore ordered his troops to prepare for

an operation at Burauen. In order to concentrate the 26th Division for his daring

move across the mountains to strike at the

Americans in the vicinity of the Burauen

airfields, General Suzuki risked his right

flank, leaving only a detachment consisting

of the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment,

one and one-half battalions of the 13th Independent Infantry Regiment, and one

battery of the 26th Artillery Battalion with

two mobile guns to prevent the Americans

from reaching Albuera and cutting off the

base of his attack. At the same time, staff

members of the 26th Division moved south

to direct operations against the 7th Division.33

These Japanese measures were taken just

as General Krueger was able to reinforce the

attack toward Ormoc. The commanding

officer of the 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry,

at dawn on 27 November got his troops

ready for the drive toward Albuera. He

moved his battalion behind L and E Companies, 32d Infantry. Because of the limited 31

 Msg, CO 32d Inf to S-3 2d Bn, 0305, 27 Nov

44, 32d Inf Unit Jnl, 27 Nov 44. 32

 Msg, 32d Inf to 7th Div, 1443, 27 Nov 44, 32d

Inf Unit Jnl, 27 Nov 44. 33

 35th Army Opns, p. 84.
264 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

area involved, the battalion commander decided that only A Company would make the

attack. The artillery, mortars, and machine

guns placed heavy fire on the bamboo

thicket. At 0855 the troops moved out but

were stopped by heavy machine gun fire

after they had advanced about 200 yards.

They then withdrew about fifty yards while

the artillery and mortars again covered the

area.34 A second attack was also halted, and

A Company again pulled back. At 1430 a

very heavy artillery concentration was

placed on the thicket.35 Immediately thereafter C Company moved in swiftly and

cleared out and secured the area by 1600.

A total of 109 enemy dead was counted and

twenty-nine machine guns were removed.

The defensive perimeters of the 32d Infantry were set up. With the addition of the

1st Battalion, 184th Infantry, the lines were

much stronger. During the night of 27 November elements of the 13th Independent

Infantry Regiment made minor attempts to

infiltrate through the lines but were easily

repulsed.

By now the Sixth Army had received substantial reinforcements. General Hodge

therefore ordered the 7th Division to assemble all forces in the Baybay area as rapidly

as the logistical situation would permit.36 By

27 November sufficient troops had assembled to enable him to order General Arnold

to make "an early and vigorous attack" to

destroy the Japanese in the area and then

capture Ormoc.37 On 28 November all the

assault elements of the 7th Division, with the

exception of the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry,

which was patrolling in the vicinity of Panaon Strait, were either on the eastern shore

of the Camotes Sea or on the way there. The

1st Battalion, 184th Infantry, and the 2d

and 3d Battalions, 32d Infantry, were still

engaging the enemy at a bamboo thicket on

Shoestring Ridge south of the Palanas River

and east of Damulaan.38

The troops of Colonel Finn's 32d Infantry were weary. They had prevented the

Japanese 26th Division from going south

along the eastern shore of the Camotes Sea

and had held back the best the enemy had

to offer. General Arnold desired that the 7th

Division push through the enemy lines with

two regiments abreast toward Ormoc. The

tired 32d Infantry was to be drawn back

and replaced by the 184th and 17th Infantry Regiments.

On 28 November, after receiving orders

from General Arnold, the commanding officer of the 184th Infantry, Col. Curtis D.

O'Sullivan, outlined to his battalion commanders the new roles they were to play.

The 184th Infantry was to relieve the 32d

Infantry and then attack to the front and

cover the division's left sector. The 1st Battalion of the regiment was to relieve Company F, 32d Infantry, from the beach inland

to a clump of trees held by the enemy 600

yards inland. Parts of Companies A and C

were already at the edge of the grove. The

2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, with the 57th

Field Artillery Battalion in direct support,

was to relieve Companies G and E of the

32d Infantry, tie in with Company L of the

32d Infantry, and attack in the direction of

Hill 918. The 3d Battalion, in regimental

reserve, was to take a position in San Agustin. The 32d Infantry was to fall back to

Tinagan.39 At 1700 the 2d Battalion, 184th

34

 32d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 24; Msg, 2d Bn to

32d Inf, 27 Nov 44, and Msgs, Exec Off 32d Inf to

CO 32d Inf, 1005, 1120, and 1210, 27 Nov 44, 32d

Inf Unit Jnl, 27 Nov 44. 35

 32d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 24. 36

 XXIV Corps FO 28, 22 Nov 44. 37

 XXIV Corps FO 30, 27 Nov 44.

38

 7th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 40, 28 Nov 44. 39

 184th Inf Unit Jnl, 1200, 28 Nov 44.
BATTLE OF THE RIDGES 265

Infantry, relieved the 2d Battalion, 32d

Infantry, at Damulaan.40

At 1945 on 28 November elements of the

26th Division attacked from the southeast

and northeast the right flank of Company

A, 184th Infantry, at the bamboo thicket

and pushed it back fifty yards. Battery B,

57th Field Artillery Battalion, fired at the

southern point of the enemy infiltration and

also 100 yards to the west.41 The Japanese

attack was stopped, and the 1st Battalion

held fast and dug in.42

Company E, 2d Battalion, hurriedly

moved into a position from which, if requested, it could support the 1st Battalion.

The 81-mm. mortar section of the 2d Battalion was prepared to place fire in front of

the zone of Company A, and two platoons

from Company C were in position to fill a

gap existing between the 1st and 2d Battalions.43

 By 2045 the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, and the 2d and 1st Battalions, 184th

Infantry, were on a line from right to left.44

The night was quiet except for sounds of

enemy activity in front of the 2d Battalion.45

At 0900 on 29 November Company A

of the 1st Battalion and Company F of the

2d Battalion, after a mortar barrage, attacked to retake the lost ground and to overrun the Japanese position in the bamboo

thicket. They regained the ground without

opposition, but as the troops approached

the thicket they met strong resistance. For

the rest of the day the battle seesawed back

and forth as elements of the 184th Infantry

and the 26th Division contested for control

of "Bloody Bamboo Thicket," as it came to

be called. Between 1820 and 1920, Company A repulsed three heavy enemy attacks

and killed an estimated fifty to eighty

Japanese.46 At 1800 Companies A and F

made a co-ordinated but unsuccessful attack

against the Japanese. They dug in for the

night in positions from which they successfully withstood enemy attacks.47

The following morning both battalions

sent patrols to scout out the strength and

installations of the enemy. At 1045 Company A, which had been in action for several

days, was relieved by Company C and

moved to the old position of the latter.48

At 1400, after a ten-minute artillery preparation, Company C and two platoons from

Company F on its right were to move out

toward a ridge 150 yards north in order to

strengthen the lines and secure positions on

the commanding terrain—part of which was

the bamboo thicket over which Company A

and the enemy had fought.

The companies moved out on time and

met little resistance until they had penetrated twenty to thirty yards into the thicket,

when the enemy strongly opposed any further advance. The troops of the 184th Infantry, however, steadily pushed on, and by

1603 Company C, with the platoons from

Company F just behind it, had cleared the

bamboo thicket. Since the line of Company

C extended over a wide front, it was tightened and shortened and tied into Company

B. By 1730 the troops of Companies C and

F had consolidated their positions and

formed a night perimeter on the forward

slope of the ridge.49 Shoestring Ridge was

firmly in American hands.

40

 184th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6. Unless otherwise stated the material on the 184th Infantry is

based on this operations report of the regiment. 41

 184th Inf Unit Jnl, 2005, 28 Nov 44. 42

 184th Inf Unit Jnl, 2045, 28 Nov 44. 43

 Msg, S-3 2d Bn to 184th Inf, 2010, 28 Nov 44,

184th Inf Unit Jnl, 28 Nov 44. 44

 Msg, CO 184th Inf to CG 7th Div, 2045, 28

Nov 44, 184th Inf Unit Jnl, 28 Nov 44. 45

 184th Inf Unit Jnl, 0125, 29 Nov 44.

46

 184th Inf Unit Jnl, 2020, 29 Nov 44. 47

 184th Inf S-3 Periodic Rpt 42, 30 Nov 44. 48

 184th Inf Unit Jnl, 30 Nov 44. 49

 Ibid.
266 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Battles of the Hills

The attempts of the 26th Division to drive

the Americans back had been checked, but

the front lines remained practically the same

as they had been at the outset of the battle

for Shoestring Ridge. It had become apparent that the most one regiment could do was

to conduct a holding action and that if the

7th Division was to continue the advance it

would be necessary to commit a stronger

force against the Japanese. Elements of the

26th Division were by now firmly ensconced

in the hills that overlooked Highway 2 and

were in a position to contest bitterly any forward movement of the 7th Division.

A series of sharply edged ridges with many

spurs, heavily overgrown with bamboo

thickets and high cogon grass, rose from the

coastal plain to the central mountain range.

(Map 15) One of these, Hill 918, was especially important tactically, since from it

one could observe the entire coast to the

south, and as far as Ormoc to the north.

About four fifths of a mile northeast of Hill

918 was the barrio of Kang Dagit, and about

one and a half miles north of the hill was

Kang Cainto.50 Other important high points

were Hill 380, between the Palanas and

Tabgas Rivers and about one and a third

miles east of Balogo on Highway 2, and Hill

606, between the Tabgas River and Calingatngan Creek and approximately one and

a third miles east of Calingatngan on Highway 2.

General Arnold wished to attack north

with two regiments abreast. He therefore

ordered Colonel O'Sullivan to send out a

strong patrol to the front of the 184th Infantry but not to attempt any advance until

the 17th Infantry could arrive from the east

coast. On 3 December, when most of the

17th Infantry had reached the west coast,

General Arnold called a meeting of his regimental commanders. He told them that the

7th Division was to renew the attack north

at 0800 on 5 December with regiments

abreast, the 17th Infantry on the right and

the 184th Infantry on the left, and secure

the Talisayan River about three and a half

miles north, together with the intervening

enemy positions on Hills 918, 380, and 606.

The boundary between the regiments was to

be roughly 2,000 yards from the beach.51

At this time the front-line units of the 26th

Division, which had been occupying a hill

about two miles northwest of Damulaan,

withdrew to the Palanas River and a hill

northeast of the river. A battalion of the 26th

Division was on the western slope of a hill

north of the river.52

On 4 December the 184th Infantry prepared for the attack and sent patrols from

the 1st and 2d Battalions to the front. These

patrols penetrated as far north as Balogo.

The 17th Infantry spent the day in moving

forward the various elements of the regiment.53

 By nightfall the units of the 7th

Division were in readiness for the offensive

which was to start the following morning.

Hill 918

On 4 December General Arnold ordered

Lt. Col. O'Neill K. Kane to move the tanks

of the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion by

water under cover of darkness to a position

1,000 yards at sea to the west of Balogo, the

next coastal town, about a mile to the north

50

 Cainto is also known as Caintic. The Army

spelling, Cainto, will be followed here.

51

 184th Inf Unit Jnl, 3 Dec 44. 52

 35th Army Opns, p. 91. 53

 17th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex B, The Battle

of the Ridgelines, p. 1. Unless otherwise stated, the

part played by the 17th Infantry during this engagement is based upon the above report, pp. 1-9.

BATTLE OF THE RIDGES 267

of the front lines. The tanks at dawn on the

5th were to assault the beaches in that vicinity and fire on the town and on the north

slopes of hills and ravines in the area. These

movements of the tank battalion were to be

closely co-ordinated with the 184th and 17th

Infantry Regiments, into whose areas the

attack was to be made.

At 0635 on the 5th, the tank battalion in

a column formation started to move north

over water. The tanks advanced toward Balogo until they were at a point offshore

about 200 yards from the town. They then

continued north in a column formation and

fired into the town of Tabgas. At the mouth

of the Tabgas River, just short of Tabgas,

the tanks attacked in line formation. Moving

ashore at 0700, they sent approximately

2,550 rounds of 75-mm. ammunition in

direct fire against the northern slopes of the

hills that confronted the 7th Division.

The tanks completed their mission, took

to the water again, and headed north for a

mile to reconnoiter the area around Calingatngan. They then turned south and started for the bivouac area. On the return,

Colonel Kane, elated over the success of

their previous landing and wishing to use up

the remaining ammunition, ordered the

tanks to land 500 yards south of the Tabgas

River. From here the tanks fired and then

withdrew unhindered by enemy fire. At

1045 they were back in their bivouac area.54

At 0800 on 5 December the 184th and

17th Infantry Regiments moved out with the

184th Infantry on the left. The 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry, on the extreme left,

reached the Palanas River without incident

and without having to fire a single shot.55

The Japanese historians, however, claimed

that one of the amphibian tanks was set on

fire and that the 2d Battalion, 12th Independent Infantry Regiment, repulsed the

advance of the 184th Infantry.56

There were numerous finger ridges inland

which were cut by deep ravines and gorges

that came to within a few hundred yards

of the coast line. The entrenched Japanese,

using reverse slope tactics, were able to deliver deadly fire on the advancing infantry.

In many cases the reverse slopes were so

steep that effective artillery fire could not

be placed upon them.57 The 2d Battalion,

184th Infantry, moved forward slowly toward a small hill which faced the Palanas

River, and at 0858 it encountered enemy

small arms fire from the western slope of the

hill. Using grenades, the battalion pushed

forward, but at 0938 the Japanese opened

up with three light machine guns. The supporting weapons of the 2d Battalion fired

on the enemy positions to the front. At 1037,

as the battalion reached the military crest

of the hill, the Japanese launched a small

counterattack on the left flank of Company

E. This attack was repulsed, but the companies continued to receive small arms and

machine gun fire.

At 1325 the 1st Battalion renewed its advance and proceeded without incident, finding the situation "very quiet" to its front.

At 1435 the battalion dug in for the night

approximately 300 yards south of Balogo.58

The 3d Battalion moved through the gap between the 1st and 2d Battalions and across

the front of the 2d Battalion on the right

toward Hill 380, which consisted of a series

of ridges. As the 3d Battalion advanced toward the hill, it came under machine gun 54

 Armor on Leyte, a research rpt prepared by

Committee 16, Officers Advanced Course, The Armored School, 1948-49, Ft. Knox, Ky., May 1949,

pp. 89-91, copy in OCMH. 55

 184th Inf. Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 7.

56

 35th Army Opns, p. 93. 57

 Armor on Leyte, p. 89. 58

 184th Inf Unit Jnl, 5 Dec 44.
268 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

fire on each flank. With artillery support,

the troops reached the top of the second

ridge of Hill 380 and dug in, nine of the men

having been wounded.59 At 1635 the battalions of the 184th Infantry received orders to set up night defense positions in

depth and to hold the "positions at all

costs."

 60

 Colonel O'Sullivan decided that

the 3d Battalion was to bear the brunt of the

advance of the 184th Infantry on 6 December and push on to Hill 380.61

On the right of the 184th the 17th Infantry had had a busy day in working

toward its objective, Hill 918. At 0800 on

5 December the 1st and 2d Battalions of the

17th Infantry, with the 1st Battalion on the

left, had moved through the 32d Infantry.

At 0906 the advance elements of the 1st

Battalion secured a ridge south of the main

ridge leading from Hill 918, and at 1000

the entire battalion closed on this ridge. In

the face of sporadic rifle and machine gun

fire, the leading platoons pushed forward to

secure a ridge that led west from Hill 918.

As the advance platoons neared the crest of

this ridge, they received intense rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire to the front and

on both flanks from the 2d Battalion, 12th

Independent Infantry Regiment. At the

same time the rest of the battalion, in attempting to reach a forward ridge and support the leading platoons, also encountered

cross fire that came down the intervening

draw. As enemy gunfire pinned down the

troops, the 1st Battalion lost contact with

Company G, 2d Battalion, and a gap developed between the 1st and 2d Battalions.

The 12th Independent Infantry Regiment, quickly alert to exploit this opportunity to drive a wedge between the two

forces, threw approximately a company

armed with machine guns and mortars into

the gap. Although they did not penetrate

completely, the enemy troops were able to

secure a position which would make any

forward movement of the 1st Battalion very

costly. The 1st Platoon of Company B and

the 3d Platoon of Company A were still out

on the forward ridge and cut off from the

rest of the battalion. The reserve platoon of

Company A tried an envelopment around

the right flank of the 1st Battalion but was

stopped by the enemy in the gap. Company

C moved up to protect the rear of Company

A. Eventually the forward platoons withdrew to the battalion lines and preparations

were made for the night. Under cover of

darkness the 1st Battalion reorganized and

moved into positions on top of the first

ridge.62

Earlier that day the 2d Battalion had

driven forward with Company E on the

right and Company G on the left. Company

E went east along the Bucan River for approximately 1,000 yards and then turned

northeast to ascend Hill 918. At first, however, the company had to secure a small

ridge southwest of Hill 918 on which was

a small but dense banana grove. Company

E encountered and destroyed a small enemy

force on this ridge, after which the company

reorganized and at approximately 1300 began to ascend Hill 918 itself. When Company E reached the military crest of the hill,

the Japanese began heavy firing with grenade launchers and at least three machine

guns. The enemy fire swept the crest of the

hill and prevented any movement over the

lip of the ridge.

Meanwhile, Company G went to the left

of Company E and secured a small ridge

about 1,200 yards from the line of departure 59 Ibid.

60

 Ibid.

61

 Ibid. 62

 17th Inf Unit Jnl, 5 Dec 44.
BATTLE OF THE RIDGES 269

and west of Hill 918. The advance platoon

of Company G then received fire from automatic weapons that were emplaced in a

draw to the left front of the platoon. The

rest of the company attempted to move

around to the right of the ridge but also encountered automatic weapons fire coming

from another draw. Since high cogon grass

covered the area, observation was limited

to a matter of inches. At about 1300, elements of the 13th Independent Infantry

Regiment counterattacked through a gap

between Company G and Company A of the

1st Battalion. A machine gun platoon,

which was thrown in to plug the gap, succeeded in stopping the attempted Japanese

advance.

Company G, however, continued to be

pinned down by the enemy fire directed at

its front. Company F, the reserve company,

was then committed to take a position between G and E Companies. Its mission was

to come abreast of Company E, take Hill

918, and then turn west and wipe out the

resistance in front of Company G. At 1415

Company F moved up Hill 918 and reached

Company E without opposition.

Three spurs led down from Hill 918. The

one occupied by Company E ran southwest,

that occupied by Company F ran west, and

the third ran northwest. As the two commanders started to launch a co-ordinated

assault from their respective spurs, their

companies received a concentration of about

fifty rounds of mortar fire but pushed

through this fire and secured the crests of

both spurs. They immediately came under

automatic weapons and rifle fire from the

northwest ridge.

Since the left flank of Company F was in

the tall cogon grass, it was practically impossible for the company to observe the

enemy. On the other hand, Company E

was on bare and open ground which exposed it to machine gun and mortar fire

from Hill 918. Both companies also came

under long-range machine gun fire from the

vicinity of Kang Dagit, northeast of Hill

918. It was impractical to attempt an envelopment to the right, since the flank of

Company E rested on a deep ravine which

ran to the bed of the Bagan River. An envelopment to the left would have necessitated going down the hill, circling behind

Company G, and attacking east from the

positions of the 1st Battalion. Because of

these unfavorable conditions, Companies E

and F with their wounded withdrew to

make a line with Company G.63

In support of the advance of the 17th

Infantry, the 49th Field Artillery Battalion

fired 577 rounds of ammunition during the

day. The fires "varied from knocking out

machine guns to fire on mortars and on

troops in the open."64 The 17th Infantry

had forced the 1st Battalion, 12th Independent Infantry Regiment, to start withdrawal to a hill farther north. At the same

time, Japanese engineer and artillery units

at Albuera "were erecting anti-landing

obstacles along the beach and putting up

antitank defenses."

 65

At the end of 5 December the 17th Infantry had secured the ridge west of Hill 918

and the 184th Infantry had secured a line

extending from the beach 300 yards south

of Balogo east to the high ground southeast

of the Palanas River. Company K, 32d Infantry, had filled a gap that had existed

between the 17th and 184th Infantry Regiments, while the 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, had crossed the Palanas River and,

advancing up the southwest slope of Hill

63

 Ibid. 64

 49th FA Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 13. 65

 35th Army Opns, p. 93.
270 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

380, reached the top of the first ridge. There

were no enemy attacks during the night.

Hill 380

General Arnold ordered the regiments to

capture all of Hill 918, the northern slope of

Hill 380, and the Palanas River valley. The

1st and 2d Battalions, 17th Infantry, aided

by the 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, were to

move northeast until their front lines were

on an east-west line south of the Palanas

River. They were then to launch an attack

to the north and capture the slope of Hill

380 in their zone of action. The 3d Battalion,

17th Infantry, was to attack to the north on

the eastern slope of Hill 918 and capture the

slope of Hill 380 in its zone of action. The

184th Infantry was to capture the northern

slope of Hill 380 and assist the 17th Infantry in its movement north.66

The 184th Infantry started out at 0800

on 6 December with the 1st Battalion on

the left and the 3d Battalion on the right.

Supported by eight tanks, the 1st Battalion

pushed through rifle fire, moved into Balogo, and cleared the town. The battalion

commander then ordered Company B to

seize a ridge just east of Balogo. Though the

company temporarily secured the ridge, at

1155 the Japanese drove the men off. At

1210 artillery and mortar fire was placed

against the Japanese positions on the ridge.

As soon as the supporting fire lifted, at 1305,

Company B sent a platoon through Company K to hit the ridge from the right flank.67

Company B secured the ridge at 1510 but

fifty yards farther north on the southern

slope of the next ridge strong elements of the

26th Division had dug in, making it impossible for the troops to move forward. Before

the jump-off of the 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, a platoon from Company K secured

the first ridge north of the battalion position.

At 1000 the rest of the battalion reached

the top of Hill 380 and secured an enemy

field artillery observation post from which

it could see enemy activity in a deep valley

north of Hill 380. Elements of the 26th Division set up machine guns and delivered mortar and artillery fire on Hill 380 throughout

the afternoon.68 The 1st and 3d Battalions,

184th Infantry, covered by mortar and artillery fire, set up night perimeters, the latter

on Hill 380 and the former on the ridge east

of Balogo. The 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry,

remained in the Palanas River valley

throughout the day.

The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 17th Infantry jumped off abreast. The 1st Battalion

reached the ridge which led west from Hill

918 and overlooked the Palanas River,

where it found strong enemy positions that

had been abandoned. While the 1st Battalion reorganized, advance platoons, one

each from Companies B and C, went across

the Palanas River to the next ridge, which

overlooked the Tabgas River. The 1st Battalion, in conjunction with the 2d Battalion,

184th Infantry, followed the platoons at a

distance of about 500 yards. Company B

moved behind a "protective nose" which led

south from the main ridge and Company C

pushed "a knife edge east of Company B."

 69

As Company C reached a point just short

of the main ridge, the men moved in single

file and were pinned down by heavy machine gun cross fire from both flanks and to

their front. Company B, attempting to envelop the entrenched enemy from the west,

66

 184th Inf FO B, 5 Dec 44. 67

 184th Inf Unit Jnl, 6 Dec 44.

68

 184th Inf S-3 Periodic Rpt 48, 6 Dec 44; 7th

Div G-3 Jnl, 6 Dec 44. 69

 17th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, Annex B, The Battle

of the Ridgelines, p. 4.
BATTLE OF THE RIDGES 271

encountered heavy fire on its left front,

which made any envelopment in that direction impossible. At 1500 a strong column of

the enemy counterattacked the left flank of

Company C, but six machine guns from

Company D broke up the enemy attack.

The 1st Battalion dug in for the night halfway up Hill 380.70

Meanwhile, at 0800, the 2d Battalion,

17th Infantry, had started for Hill 918. The

49th Field Artillery Battalion established a

smoke screen on the hill to cover the advance of the infantry,71

 and at 1100 Company E reached the crest of the hill. A patrol

located a trail that led down to the Palanas

River. As Company E moved down this

trail, Company G, though under machine

gun fire, pushed straight ahead through the

saddle to its front.72 By 1715 all elements

of the 2d Battalion had reached the Palanas

River and were moving left to establish contact with the 1st Battalion. From dug-in positions in the dense bamboo thickets on the

northern bank of the river, the Japanese

opened fire upon the 2d Battalion. Nothing

serious developed, however, and the troops

formed their night perimeters. The elements

of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 17th Infantry,

were now in contact on a line along the

Palanas River.73

The 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry, swung

to the extreme right towards Kang Dagit

and Kang Cainto in order to hit Hill 380

from the east, but it was hampered by

ravines two to three hundred feet deep.

Though the advance was very slow, the 3d

Battalion in a column of companies with

Company L in the lead was able to reach

Kang Dagit where it closed for the night.74

At the end of the day the 7th Division

had secured the barrio of Balogo, had overrun Hill 918 and occupied Kang Dagit, and

had established elements of the division on

the banks of the Palanas River and on part

of Hill 380.

The night of 6-7 December was quiet.

General Arnold ordered the 7th Division

to attack north at 0800 on 7 December and

secure Hills 380 and 606. The 184th Infantry was to capture the high ground south

of the Tabgas River.75 Colonel Pachler

ordered the 17th Infantry, with its 1st Battalion on the left and its 2d Battalion on the

right, to attack north to secure the portion

of Hills 380 and 606 in its sector. The 3d

Battalion, 17th Infantry, was to secure Kang

Cainto and to be prepared to attack Hill

380 from the east or to continue north. At

0630 patrols went out to make reconnaissance and determine the enemy strength and

dispositions to their front.76

At 0913 the 184th Infantry moved out.

It met little opposition, and at 1643 the regiment reached the high ground overlooking

the Tabgas River and dug in for the night.77

At dawn the 17th Infantry sent out patrols. The one from the 1st Battalion located

an enemy heavy machine gun, two light machine guns, and a mortar, emplaced 150

yards from the battalion's lines. When the

patrol returned, mortar fire was placed on

the position and it was wiped out. The 1st

Battalion moved out at approximately 0900.

Though long-range fire fell on the troops

and small arms fire hit the left flank of Com- 70

 17th Inf Unit Jnl, 6 Dec 44. 71

 49th FA Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 13. 72

 32d Inf S-3 Periodic Rpt, no number, 6 Dec

44; 7th Div G-3 Jnl, 6 Dec 44. 73

 17th Inf Unit Jnl, 6 Dec 44.

74

 Ibid. 75

 184th Inf FOG, 6 Dec 44. 76

 184th Inf Unit Jnl, 7 Dec 44. 77

 Ibid.
272 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

pany C, the men continued to push forward.

The battalion found several ridges leading

up Hill 380—a knifelike ridge in front of

Company C and a double ridge in the form

of a horseshoe, with its closed end toward

the hill, in front of Company B.

Company B moved across the double

ridge while Company C forced its passage

through machine gun and rifle fire across the

closed part of the horseshoe. At 1600 the

two companies re-established contact on the

northernmost ridge leading to Hill 380. At

1630 the Japanese with machine guns

launched a counterattack against the right

flank of the 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry,

and the left flank of the 1st Battalion, 17th

Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 184th, was

pinned down but did not yield any ground.

The troops on the front lines of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, at first were forced

back slightly but in a few minutes regained

the lost ground. They dug in for the night

on the crest of the ridge.78

After its dawn patrols had reported on 7

December, the 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry,

jumped off to the attack. Company E

secured the first of the three spurs leading

from Hill 380, and continued forward to the

middle spur in the face of light fire that

came from in front of the company in the

area the 17th Infantry wished to secure.

Presently the fire grew to considerable intensity and the company's section of light

machine guns and two platoons of heavy

machine guns moved onto the middle spur,

where they neutralized the enemy position.

While this action was going on, Companies G and F moved to the first spur.

Company G received orders from the battalion commander to make a wide envelopment of Hill 380 and then assault the hill

from the east. At 0930 the company

dropped below the military crest of the

southern slope of Hill 380 unobserved and

made its way very slowly over the steep terrain and through the thick cogon grass. At

1200 the 49th Field Artillery Battalion laid

a five-minute preparatory fire in front of

the battalion.79 The American troops then

routed the surprised Japanese defenders and

killed the majority of them as the others fled

into the mountains northeast of the hill.

Apparently realizing that Hill 380 was

the key to defense of the Tabgas River valley

and Hill 606, troops of the 26th Division

poured long-range machine gun fire from

Hill 606 into Company G and at the same

time halted the company with small arms

fire from the immediate left along the ridge.

At 1355, after a heavy mortar barrage,

about fifty men from the 26th Division

counterattacked the positions of Company

G, but the company held firm and mowed

down the attackers with fire from its rifles

and automatic weapons. The position on the

hill was maintained.

Although Company G occupied the top

of Hill 380, it was not in a position to aid

the advance of Company E. The Japanese

troops were dug in on the reverse slopes and

could only be rooted out by close-in fighting.

The commanding officer of the 2d Battalion

committed Company F down the main spur

from the east, supported by Companies E

and G and the machine guns from Company H. As soon as Company F started

down the ridge, the enemy concentrated

fire upon it both from the north and the

west. In a matter of minutes Company F

was reduced to a point where the number

78

 17th Inf Unit Jnl, 7 Dec 44. 79

 49th FA Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 13.
BATTLE OF THE RIDGES 273

of its riflemen hardly equaled one platoon.

The company commander secured an additional platoon from Company G and renewed the assault behind a concentration of

100 rounds of 60-mm. mortar fire and 80

rounds of 81-mm. mortar fire. The attack

succeeded, and the enemy force was overrun and annihilated. Company E thereupon

moved to the main ridge and helped mop

up the area.80

At 0700 the 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry,

moved out, reaching the source of the

Palanas River at 1400. An enemy force of

about fifty men was observed in a natural

bowl to its immediate front. The battalion

placed long-range rifle and machine gun fire

on the group as two platoons from Company K attacked from the flank. They

destroyed the entire Japanese force without

any casualties to the American troops. The

3d Battalion then crossed the Palanas River

and went into night perimeter at Kang

Cainto. At 1907 eight rounds of artillery

fire fell into the area, killing seven men and

wounding eighteen others.81

At the end of the day the 184th Infantry

was on the banks of the Tabgas River and

the 17th Infantry had secured Hill 380,

which commanded the Tabgas River valley.

Although several days of hard going still

lay ahead before the 7th Division was to

reach its objective, the Talisayan River, the

backbone of the Japanese resistance had

been broken and the Battle of the Ridges

was virtually won. The division had

achieved what the Japanese had considered

impossible. It had pushed through Leyte

over the tortuous mountain road between

Abuyog and Baybay, it had held the enemy

back at Shoestring Ridge, and it had then

pushed north along the shores of Ormoc

Bay toward Ormoc, decimating the right

flank detachment of the 26th Division in the

process. General Suzuki had been forced to

send south much of his tactical strength,

which was to have been used for the defense

of Ormoc. The 7th Division had assisted in

no small way in tightening the ever-shortening noose about the Japanese who remained

on the island.

On this day, 7 December, the 77th Division landed at Deposito just below Ormoc.

The 26th Division was caught between two

strong American divisions. It was doomed.

At this point the action of the 7th Division

merged with that of the 77th Division in the

drive of the XXIV Corps against Ormoc.

80

 17th Inf Unit Jnl, 7 Dec 44. 81

 Ibid.
Map 16
CHAPTER XVI

The Fall of Ormoc

It was a time for decision. By the first of

December the two adversaries had taken the

measure of each other, but neither felt satisfied with the progress of the campaign.

The tide of battle was slowly turning

against the Japanese. They had wagered

major stakes that the battle of Leyte should

be the decisive one of the Philippines. Someway, somehow, the Japanese felt, they must

regain the initiative or Leyte, for which so

much had been sacrificed, would be lost to

them. The days had dwindled to a precious

few.

Imperial General Headquarters was loath

to write off the Leyte Campaign. A daring

plan was conceived whereby the ground and

air forces, working in close co-ordination,

would attempt to wrest the initiative from

General Krueger's forces. Before the main

effort, suicide aircraft carrying demolition

teams were to crash-land on the Dulag and

Tacloban airstrips and render them unfit

for use. Thereafter, the 2d Raiding Group of

the 4th Air Army would transport two paratroop companies to the Burauen airfields.

The paratroops in conjunction with elements of the 35th Army, including the 26th

Division, would then seize the Burauen airfields. The time was to be the evening of 5

December. With the loss of the airfields, the

U.S. Sixth Army, it was hoped, would be

in a perilous situation.1

General Krueger was also making plans.

By the middle of November strong elements

of the Sixth Army were trying to force their

way into the Ormoc Valley and others were

on the eastern shore of Ormoc Bay. The

plan of General Krueger was simple. He

wanted to secure control of the valley and

the port of Ormoc and thus force the Japanese into the mountains near the western

coast, from which they could escape only by

sea.

At this time the XXIV Corps was with

difficulty driving west and north from the

center of the island. The 96th Division was

engaged in mopping up in the mountains

overlooking Leyte Valley. Units of the 7th

Division, far to the south, were moving westward toward Baybay on the shore of the

Camotes Sea. The 1st Cavalry Division and

the 24th and 32d Infantry Divisions of the

X Corps were making slow progress in driving down the Ormoc corridor from the

Limon—Pinamopoan—Carigara area.

Several courses of action were now open

to General Krueger. He could concentrate

on the drive of the 32d Infantry Division

and the 1st Cavalry Division south down

the Ormoc corridor, or on the advance of

the 7th Division north along the coast of

Ormoc Bay from Baybay to Ormoc. A third

course also presented itself. An amphibious

overwater movement might be attempted by

landing troops just below Ormoc in the

midst of the enemy force, thus dividing the

1

 Japanese Studies in World War II, 7, 14th

Area Army Opns Leyte, pp. 10-13, OCMH.
276 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Japanese strength. After landing, the troops

could push north, seize Ormoc, and then

drive up the Ormoc corridor and effect a

juncture with elements of the X Corps. This

move, though highly hazardous, would considerably shorten the Leyte Campaign if successfully carried out.

In mid-November, therefore, General

Krueger proposed that an amphibious

movement and a landing at a point just below Ormoc be made. At that time, however,

the naval forces did not have the necessary

assault and resupply shipping on hand to

mount and maintain such an operation and

to execute as well the Mindoro operation

scheduled for 5 December. Since there was

insufficient air support, the local naval commander felt that a convoy entering Ormoc

Bay might be in jeopardy and that Japanese

suicide bombing tactics could cause heavy

losses. Unable to secure the necessary assault

shipping, General Krueger temporarily set

aside his plan.2

Plan for Amphibious Movement

On 30 November General MacArthur

postponed for ten days the Mindoro operation.3

 The postponement would make available the amphibious shipping and naval support that were necessary for a landing in the

Ormoc area. From a naval point of view,

however, the operation was very precarious,

since the Japanese were still making aerial

attacks that could seriously damage the shipping needed for the forthcoming Mindoro

and Luzon operations. After careful consideration of the risks involved, Admiral Kinkaid decided to make available to General

Krueger the shipping required for an amphibious movement to a point below

Ormoc.4

After issuing a warning order on 1 December, General Krueger on 4 December

ordered the two corps to make their "main

effort," starting 5 December, toward the

defeat of the enemy forces in the Ormoc

area. The X Corps was to advance "vigorously south astride Highway 2 so as to support the effort made by the . . . XXIV

Corps." The commanding general of the

XXIV Corps was to arrange with the commander of the naval task group for the

shipping and naval gunfire support necessary to transport and land a division just

below Ormoc. General Hodge, also, was to

arrange with the commanding general of the

Fifth Air Force for close air support for the

landing and subsequent operations ashore.5

The 77th Division was selected to make the

amphibious movement to the Ormoc area.

In planning for the Leyte operation the

Sixth Army had designated Maj. Gen.

Andrew D. Bruce's 77th Infantry Division,

then on Guam, as the second of its two reserve divisions. As a result of the successes

in the first days of the campaign, however,

General MacArthur thought it would not

be necessary to use the division on Leyte.

On 29 October, without General Krueger's

concurrence, General MacArthur transferred control of the division from General

Krueger to Admiral Nimitz, Commander

in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area.6 Shortly

afterward the Japanese began their reinforcements of Leyte and a captured Japa2

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 62. 3

 Rad, CINCSWPA to AGWAR, CM-IN 2966,

30 Nov 44.

4

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt, pp. 69-70. 5

 Sixth Army FO 36, 4 Dec 44. 6

 Rad, MacArthur to Halsey, Nimitz, and Krueger,

CM-IN 29353, 29 Oct 44. General Krueger later

wrote: "The 77th Division was actually taken away

from me without my knowledge and I complained

about it." Ltr, Gen Krueger to Gen Ward, 13 Aug

51, OCMH.
THE FALL OF ORMOC 277

nese field order revealed that an all-out

offensive would be launched against the

Americans in the middle of November.

These developments led General MacArthur

to request Admiral Nimitz to divert the 77th

Division, which was on its way to New

Caledonia, to the Tacloban area on Leyte.7

Admiral Nimitz acquiesced and told General MacArthur that the division was being

sent to Manus. After its arrival there, operational control over it would pass to General

MacArthur.8

Upon arrival of the 77th Division at

Seeadler Harbor on Manus at 1330, 15 November, General MacArthur ordered it to

go to Leyte and come under the control of

General Krueger.9 After the ships' stores had

been replenished, the convoy sailed out of

the anchorage at 1700, 17 November, and

made the voyage to Leyte without incident.10

 The units commenced landing on the

eastern shores of Leyte in the vicinity of

Tarragona and Dulag about 1800, 23 November, and came under the control of General Krueger who assigned the division to

General Hodge. From 23 to 25 November

it was engaged in unloading the transports

and establishing bivouac areas.

On 19 November, while it was still at sea,

General Krueger had ordered the 77th Division to furnish immediately after landing

a ship-unloading detail of about 1,200 men

for the projected operation at Mindoro.11

At 1600 on 27 November the detail, a battalion of the 306th Infantry, boarded LCI's

at Tarragona Beach and departed for the

staging area for the Mindoro operation.

In conformity with General Krueger's

plans, General Hodge ordered the 77th Division to make preparations for the amphibious operation below Ormoc. (Map 17)

It was to be assisted by the 7th Division,

which was to attack and capture the high

ground south of the Panilahan River. General Bruce, once ashore, was to direct and

co-ordinate the attack of the 7th Division

with that of the 77th Division.12 General

Krueger informed General Hodge that he

did not approve of this arrangement and

added that such co-ordination as was necessary should be exercised by Hodge as corps

commander.13

At a point about three and a half miles

southeast of Ormoc was the barrio of

Deposito where the 77th Division was to

land. Along the eastern shore of Ormoc

Bay, south from Ormoc, there were many

areas which offered suitable landing

beaches. These were crossed by numerous

rivers and streams which discharged into

Ormoc Bay. None of these would be a

handicap, since all could be forded except

during the monsoon season. The beach area

selected, though narrow, was suitable for

landing, having a surface of hard sand and

gravel that could be used as a road by

vehicles.

7

 Rad, MacArthur to Nimitz, CM-IN 10478, 10

Nov 44. 8

 Rad, Nimitz to MacArthur, CM-IN 10683, 10

Nov 44. 9

 Rad, GHQ to Comdr Allied Naval Forces, CX

52239, 16 Nov 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 17 Nov 44. 10

 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2. 11

 Memo, CofS XXIV Corps for G-3 XXIV

Corps, 19 Nov 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 23 Nov

44.

12

 XXIV Corps FO 33, 4 Dec 44. In a lecture

delivered before the Command and General Staff

College on 19 January 1951, General Bruce indicated that his previous study of the Civil War was

helpful in planning for the 77th Division's part in

the operation: "May I suggest that you do not sell

short the study of history. One does not parallel

history, but the previous study of Jackson's Valley

Campaign in friendly territory influenced the mind

OCMH. 13

 Ltr, Gen Krueger to Gen Ward, 13 Aug 51,

of the Division Commander in this campaign."
Map 17
THE FALL OF ORMOC 279

The terrain was level for about a mile and

a half inland from the beach, and then rose

gradually to a height of twenty to thirty

feet. Half a mile farther inland, the mountain slopes began. Highway 2, which was

ten feet wide and composed of sand and

gravel, ran along the entire length of the

east coast of Ormoc Bay. Several roads ran

from Highway 2 to the beach: one was

about a hundred yards south of the Baod

River and skirted the rice paddies in the

middle of the landing beach area; another,

just south of the rice paddies, extended

inland about two miles from the beach.14

Naval Plans

When the naval forces were informed

that the overwater movement to Ormoc

would take place and that the Mindoro

operation was postponed, the shipping reserved for the Mindoro operation was

turned over to the Ormoc force. Rear Adm.

Arthur D. Struble was given command of

Task Group 78.3, which was to transport

and land the 77th Division, together with its

supplies and equipment, in the Ormoc Bay

area and support the landing by naval

gunfire.15

Admiral Struble divided his task group

into six units, in addition to the destroyer

which was his flagship. These consisted of:

a Fast Transport Unit of eight transports;

a Light Transport Unit of twenty-seven

landing craft and twelve LSM's (medium

landing ships); a Heavy Transport Unit of

four LST's (tank landing ships); an Escort

Unit of twelve destroyers; a Mine-Sweeping Unit of nine mine sweepers and a

transport; and a Control and Inshore Support Unit made up of four LCI (R)'s (infantry rocket landing craft), two submarine

chasers, and one tug. The landing was to be

made between the Baod and Bagonbon

Rivers but clear of the Bagonbon River

delta. The northern half of the beach was

called White I and the southern half White

II. Six destroyers would bombard the landing beaches.

The line of departure was fixed at 2,000

yards from the beach, but if the shore fire

became heavy the line of departure would

be moved back 1,000 yards. There would be

five assault waves with two LCI (R)'s flanking the first wave to the beach. Each craft

would fire so as to cover the sector of the

beach in its area to a depth of 600 yards.

After completion of the bombardment the

LCI(R)'s would reload and remain on the

flanks to engage targets of opportunity.

Air Support Plans 16

The Fifth Air Force would provide both

day and night air cover for the journey of

the assault convoy to the target, for the landings, and for the return convoy. It was estimated that on 5 December, for the journey

to the target, seventeen night fighter sorties

and seventy-two day fighter sorties would be

required. Protection would also be furnished

by the bombers, and forty-six aircraft would

be available on call for strikes against enemy

installations and targets of opportunity, as

well as for special missions.

On the day of the landings, the tempo

would be accelerated. There would be nine14

 77th Div FO 13, App. 4 to Annex Baker; Allied

Geographical Sec, GHQ SWPA, Terrain Study 84,

Leyte Province, 17 Aug 44; Allied Geographical Sec,

GHQ SWPA, Special Rpt 55, Airfields, Landing

Beaches and Roads—Samar, Leyte, and Dinagat

Group, 10 Jul 44. 15

 Opn Plan Comdr Task Group 78.3, Attack

Order Comphib Grp NINE, 5-44, 1 Dec 44.

16

 Fifth Air Force Fighter Cover Plan for Ormoc

Bay Opn, 731.326, AAF Hist Archives.
280 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

teen night fighter sorties and ninety-six day

fighter sorties; ten flights of forty bombers

to cover the beachhead; six flights of twentyfour bombers to cover the return of the

assault convoy; and eleven night fighters to

cover the LST and main assault convoys,

the beachhead, and the return convoy.

There would also be available sixteen bombers for interception or additional cover for

the beachhead and convoy; twenty-four P47's for interception, ground support, and

attacks against enemy shipping or targets of

opportunity; sixteen P-40's for ground

strikes; and thirty-four F4U's for cover or

interception.

The 77th Division continued to assemble

its troops on Tarragona Beach, on the east

coast of Leyte, and during the night of 5

December the loading of supplies and

equipment on the landing ships began. The

loading was slowed by frequent air alerts.

The division had previously been told that

the convoy would be unable to stay in the

landing area more than two hours and consequently there was no attempt to bulk load

supplies, since they would take too long to

unload. All supplies and equipment to support the initial assault had to be mobileloaded, that is, loaded on the vehicles taken

with the division so that the supplies could

be brought ashore in the vehicles upon debarkation. There were only 289 vehicles in

the initial convoy, including tanks, M8's,

and M10's that could not carry supplies.

The LVT's (tracked landing vehicles) were

filled with supplies rather than troops in

order that they could be discharged from

the landing ships into the water and go

ashore fully loaded. Furthermore, since the

supplies were mobile they could be moved

either by water or inland by motor.17

 The

77th Division gave the highest priority to

ammunition, water, and rations.

About 0700 on 6 December the assault

shipping rendezvoused off Tarragona and

Rizal Beaches, and one hour later the assault

troops began to board the vessels. The loading was completed at 1200 and the convoy

assembled offshore from Dulag to await the

arrival of the twelve escorting destroyers.

The Movement Overwater

The Convoy Sails

Two mine sweepers swept the Canigao

Channel between Leyte and Bohol on 27

November and again on 4 and 6 December,

but they encountered no mines of any sort.18

At 1200 on 6 December the convoy's escorting destroyers departed from San Pedro Bay

and moved to the point of rendezvous offshore, near the Tarragona—Rizal area. The

principal convoy was formed and got under

way at 1330, having been preceded by four

slower-moving LST's escorted by two destroyers. The commander of the destroyer

unit gave additional protection to the transports with four destroyers until 2300, when

the destroyers departed for a prelanding raid

on Ormoc Bay. They were also to intercept

any Japanese surface vessels that might be

attempting to bring reinforcements into

Ormoc harbor.

The journey through Leyte Gulf, Surigao

Strait, and the Camotes Sea was uneventful.

Several unidentified planes flew over the

convoy but did not launch an attack. The

only alert during the voyage was about

twilight on the 6th of December, when an

unidentified group of eighteen bombers

flew over the formation in the direction of

17

 Ltr, Gen Bruce to Gen Ward, 16 Aug 51,

OCMH.

18

 Opns Rpt, CTU 78.3.6 to COMINCH, Ser

0017, 22 Dec 44, Off Nav Reds and Library.
THE FALL OF ORMOC 281

TROOPS OF THE 77TH DIVISION BOARD LCI'S AT TARRAGONA

Tacloban. The convoy encountered numerous small native craft en route and checked

several of these but found no Japanese.19

Throughout the night the vessels steamed

toward the target. Silently they took their

stations in Ormoc Bay, off the coast of Deposito, before dawn. At 0634 on 7 December

an enemy shore battery opened fire, which

was answered at 0640 as the destroyers commenced firing upon their assigned targets.

Behind Ipil, in the vicinity of the northern

fire support group, a number of enemy

3-inch gun positions were observed. The destroyers took the positions under fire and

quickly silenced them. At 0655 a large number of Japanese were observed in the town

of Albuera and these also were taken under

fire. The destroyers covered the landing

beaches until ordered to lift fire just as the

first wave of the landing party was approaching the beach.20

As the American convoy steamed into position, it received word that an enemy convoy was on the way to Ormoc with reinforcements. Aircraft of the V Fighter Command

flew to intercept the Japanese vessels, which

comprised six transports and seven escort

vessels. During the morning occurred one of

the most intense aerial battles of the Leyte

Campaign. Fifty-six P-47's of the 341st and

347th Fighter Squadrons dropped ninetyfour 1,000-pound and six 500-pound bombs

on the enemy shipping and strafed the vessels. The Army and Marine land-based air- 19

 Opns Rpt, CTU 78.3.5 to COMINCH, 056-

60/A163, Ser 0016, 22 Dec 44, Off Nav Rcds and

Library. 20

 Ibid.
CONVOY CARRYING 77TH DIVISION APPROACHES DEPOSITO (above).

Bombardment of enemy positions at Ipil (below), with stack of sugar mill visible. Village is near

center of picture.
THE FALL OF ORMOC 283

craft destroyed two cargo vessels and two

passenger transports.21 Nearly all the available American aircraft were engaged in the

attack. General MacArthur in his daily communique estimated that the entire convoy

was wiped out and that 4,000 enemy troops

lost their lives.22

"Land the Landing Party"

The landing of the first wave, scheduled

for 0630, was delayed until 0707 to take

advantage of better light for the naval bombardment. There were to be five waves for

each regiment.23 At 0701 the first wave of

small landing craft left the line of departure

and raced for the shore. The first wave was

landed at 0707, co-ordinating its spacing

and timing with that of the LCI(R)'s supporting the landing. There was no opposition, and the troops moved inland.

The dispatch and landing of the fourth

wave of LCI(R)'s was delayed because the

third wave had been unable to disembark

the troops and retract according to schedule. The fifth wave of LSM's was delayed

for the same reason. Since the tide was rapidly falling and the sand bar was exposed, a

tug was used in several instances to pull the

craft off. At 1100 the commander of the task

group pulled out, leaving behind one LCI

and four LSM's stranded on the beach. The

tug left at the same time, and Admiral

Struble ordered the grounded craft to retract at high tide and proceed back to San

Pedro Bay under cover of darkness.24

With the departure of the landing waves

for the shore, the destroyers turned their

fire upon targets adjacent to the landing

beaches. The Laffey at 0830 opened fire

against some enemy troops approaching the

barrio of Ipil from the north and turned

them back. At 0930 the Conyngham fired

upon a possible concentration south of Ipil

and at 1000 this destroyer's shore fire control

party requested additional support against

enemy troops that were moving into Ipil.25

At 0820 the Japanese launched a strong

aerial offensive against the American vessels

in Ormoc Bay. The enemy air attacks continued for nearly nine and a half hours.

The Fifth Air Force, beginning at 0700,

gave air cover throughout the day and "did

an excellent job."

 26

 Upon a number of occasions, however, the enemy airplanes

slipped through the antiaircraft fire and the

air protection and hit the shipping. Japanese

suicide aircraft struck and badly damaged

five vessels. At 0945 the destroyer Mahan

and the high-speed transport Ward received

such damaging blows that they later had to

be sunk by gunfire.27 The Japanese made

21

 The Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee,

Japanese Naval and Merchants Shipping Losses

During World War II by all Causes (Washington,

1947), p. 77. 22

 Hist of V Fighter Command, Ch. 4, pp. 62-63,

AAF Hist Archives. 23

 77th Div FO 13, 4 Dec 44, Annexes 5 and 6.

In each small landing craft there were thirty-six

men—a platoon leader or sergeant, messenger, aid

man, flame thrower and bazooka operators, a rifle

squad, and a machine gun or mortar crew. The composition of the second wave was about the same.

The third wave, consisting of LCI's, included engineer and heavy weapons personnel, artillery units,

and other troops and vehicles. The fourth wave

consisted of LCI's and the fifth wave of LSM's.

24

 Opns Rpt, CTU 78.3.7 to COMINCH, no

serial, 17 Dec 44, Off Nav Rcds and Library. 25

 Opns Rpt, CTU 78.3.5 to COMINCH, Ser

0016, Off Nav Rcds and Library. 26

 Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 7 Dec 44. 27

 "By a coincidence, Commander W. W. Outerbridge, USN, the commanding officer of the O'Brien,

which sank the Ward by gunfire, had been the commanding officer of the Ward at Pearl Harbor on

7 December 1941, when that vessel fired the first

shot of the war in sinking a Japanese submarine

attempting to enter Pearl Harbor, just three years

previously to the day." CINCPAC-CINCPOA

Opns in the Pacific Ocean Areas During the Month

of December 1944, Ser 002910, 25 Jun 45, p. 41,

Off Nav Rcds and Library.
284 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

sixteen different raids on the shipping, during which an estimated forty-five to fifty

enemy aircraft attacked the formation.

Thirty-six of these were believed to have

been shot down.28

The landing waves arrived ashore without incident and without casualties. Within

thirty-five minutes the advance echelon of

division headquarters, including the assistant division commander and the general

staff sections, were ashore.29 Approximately

2,000 men were placed on a 1,000-yard

beach every five minutes. Mobile-loading of

supplies had made this speed possible.

"Logistically it was a difficult operation to

push that mass of troops and equipment on

a beach in so short a time and had there

been any considerable unexpected enemy

mortar or artillery fire at any time during

the period, great casualties might have resulted."

 30

 At 0930 General Bruce assumed

command ashore.

Japanese Plans

Until the middle of November, the commander of the Japanese 35th Army had

failed to put any beach obstacles along the

shores of Ormoc Bay,31 since he believed

that there was little likelihood of an American thrust up the bay. General Suzuki

thought that the Americans would be deterred by the presence of a Japanese naval

base on Cebu in front of Bohol Strait. As

American naval activity increased along the

coast in the last part of November, however, the Japanese finally conceded that

there was "a great possibility" of an American landing at Ormoc Bay. By the middle

of the month the Ormoc Defense Headquarters was organized under the command of

Colonel Mitsui, the commanding officer of

the Shipping Unit. The main force of the

Defense Headquarters was the Shipping

Unit, but the Antitank and Antiaircraft Gun

Units, the Automatic Gun Company, and

other units were added. In addition, all

units then in Ormoc were temporarily

placed under Colonel Mitsui. The enemy

plan of defense was simple. At the town of

Ormoc the Japanese, from their main defensive positions, were to stop the advance

and then, gathering as much strength as

possible, they were to counterattack.

The Japanese defenses, however, were

not completed at the time of the American

landings. Only individual trenches had been

dug along the coast, and the field positions

in the northern part of Ipil were elementary.

Upon being alerted that the Americans had

landed, the Shipping Unit of Colonel Mitsui

took up its main defensive positions in the

Ipil area. At the same time, troops of the

Nonaka Battalion of the 30th Division, consisting of an infantry company and a machine gun company, were placed under the

command of Colonel Mitsui. The major

part of the 30th Division remained on Mindanao. The American strength was estimated to be one regiment.

Drive Toward Ormoc

Ipil

The assault elements of the 77th Division

advanced inland immediately after landing.

The 1st Battalion of Col. Vincent J. Tanzola's 305th Infantry, with two companies

28

 Opns Rpts, CTU 78.3.5, Ser 0016, 22 Dec 44;

CTU 78.3.3, Ser 082, 22 Dec 44. Both in Off

Nav Rcds and Library. 29

 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 11. 30

 Study, Hq Army Ground Forces, 319.1/3

(POA), 16 May 45, in OPD 319.1 Sec. XII. 31

 The material in this subsection on Japanese

planning is based on Japanese Studies in World

War II, No. 11, 35th Army Opns, 1944-45, pp.

94-98, OCMH.
THE FALL OF ORMOC 285

abreast, was to seize the crossings over the

Bagonbon River in the vicinity of Highway

2.32 The 307th Infantry was to move rapidly

inland and establish an initial beachhead

line about 1,300 yards east near a bridge

over the Baod River. The 305th Infantry

landed in a column of battalions with the

1st, 3d, and 2d Battalions going ashore in

that order. The 1st and 3d Battalions moved

rapidly inland to the objective while the 2d

Battalion remained in regimental reserve.

The 307th Infantry also reached the bridge

without difficulty. In the town of Deposito,

enemy foxholes had been dug in the tall grass

and apparently were to be used only as a

protection against Allied air attacks, since

they had no field of fire. Immediately upon

landing, a reconnaissance patrol went to locate a trail leading from the beach to Highway 2. About 300 yards north of the Bagonbon River, the patrol found a small access

road which was put to immediate use.33 The

initial beachhead line was achieved within

forty-five minutes after landing. Most of the

Japanese 26th Division which had been in

the area were either moving over the mountains to participate in a battle for the Burauen airfields or were engaging the 7th

Division south of Deposito. Little besides

service troops remained to oppose the 77th

Division.

General Bruce originally had planned to

hold the beachhead line, establish a defensive position, and await the arrival of additional supplies and reinforcements on the

following day. But because of the lack of organized resistance, the speed with which the

troops moved inland, and his desire to fully

exploit the situation before the Japanese

could counterattack, he very early decided

to continue the attack northward astride the

highway and extend the division's beachhead to Ipil.34

The 307th Infantry (less the 2d Battalion

which was on Samar), under Col. Stephen

S. Hamilton, together with the 2d Battalion

of Col. Aubrey D. Smith's 306th Infantry,

which was attached to the regiment after the

landing, was ordered by General Bruce to

move northward and take Ipil.35 At about

1045, with the 1st Battalion in the lead, the

regiment moved out northward astride

Highway 2 toward Ipil. At the same time the

division artillery was in position to support

the advance. The 306th Field Artillery Battalion had been previously placed in the 7th

Division area at a position from which it

could fire as far north as Ipil and 6,000 yards

inland.36 At first there was little enemy opposition, but the troops observed many wellcamouflaged foxholes under the houses, and

many stores of Japanese food and ammunition.

Within ten minutes after starting, the 1st

Battalion, 307th Infantry, was 300 yards

north of Deposito and by 1215 had advanced 500 yards farther north. Japanese

resistance became heavier as the troops

neared Ipil. The remaining troops of the

Nonaka Battalion of the 30th Division, consisting of an infantry company and a machine gun company, had landed at Ormoc

from junks and "fought bravely" under the

command of the Shipping Unit.37 The

enemy had emplaced machine guns, and in

one instance a cannon, in dugouts under the

32

 305th Inf FO 1, 5 Dec 44, 77th Div G-3 Jnl,

8 Dec 44. 33

 77th Div S-2 Recon Rpt for Leyte, p. 1.

34

 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 12; 305th Inf

Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1; 307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte,

p. 3. 35

 Msg, 307th Inf to CG 77th Div, 7 Dec 44, 77th

Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Dec 44. 36

 Msg, Lt Col Douglas C. Davis, Div Arty, to CG

77th Div, 7 Dec 44, 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Dec 44. 37

 35th Army Opns, p. 97.
286 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

houses.38 By 1455 the 307th Infantry was on

the outskirts of Ipil, but its advance was temporarily held up when the Japanese exploded one of their ammunition dumps.39

By 1740 the 1st Battalion had cleared the

barrio and set up a night perimeter on its

northern outskirts. The regiment had killed

an estimated sixty-six Japanese and had

captured one prisoner of war, a medical

supply dump, a bivouac area, and numerous

documents.40

The 305th Infantry during the day moved

south to the Bagonbon River without serious opposition. Patrols of platoon strength

were sent to scout out enemy positions and,

if possible, establish contact with the 7th

Division which was fighting north along the

coast from Baybay. These patrols went as

far south as the Panalihan River, destroying

three food dumps and knocking out an

enemy pillbox.41

During the afternoon enemy aircraft that

were molesting the shipping dropped some

bombs ashore but no appreciable damage

resulted. The division artillery established a

command post approximately 200 yards inland on the southern banks of the Baod

River. As the beachhead line extended, the

artillery moved to the northern banks of the

river. This position afforded better cover

and concealment. The artillery fired on

enemy machine guns, mortars, and troops.42

At 1640 General Bruce issued orders for

the regiments to consolidate their positions

and form night perimeters. The 77th Division had established a two-mile beachhead

extending from Ipil in the north to the

Bagonbon River on the south and had

penetrated inland nearly a mile.

General Bruce's plan at this time was to

push forward vigorously and capture

Ormoc, after which he would drive north,

take Valencia, and make contact with elements of the X Corps. Each day he would

"roll up his rear" to form a defensive perimeter at night. Patrols would be sent east to

locate enemy concentrations and destroy

them by artillery fire, and at the same time

other patrols would move to the east to

search out routes and Japanese dispositions

with a view to taking Valencia from the

east.43

In planning for the amphibious landing,

the Fifth Air Force had ordered the 308th

Bombardment Wing to conduct bombing

and strafing missions, in addition to providing cover for the movement.44

 The plans for

8 December called for the 308th Bombardment Wing to be prepared on request to

bomb Camp Downes—a prewar military

post south of Ormoc—maintain a close vigilance over Ormoc, and continue the overhead air patrols.45

 The 307th Infantry was

to move north at 0800 astride Highway 2

and seize Camp Downes. The 305th Infantry was to withdraw from the south and

move north in support of the attack of the

307th Infantry and at the same time protect

the southern and southeastern flanks of the

division. The 902d Field Artillery Battalion

and Company A of the 776th Amphibian

Tank Battalion would support the attack. At 38

 307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3; Msg, S-2

307th Inf to 77th Div, 7 Dec 44, 77th Div G-3 Jnl,

7 Dec 44. 39

 Msgs, 307th Inf to G-3 77th Div, 1055, 1215,

1445, 7 Dec 44, 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Dec 44. 40

 307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3; Msg, 307th

Inf to G-2 77th Div, 7 Dec 44, 77th Div G-2 Jnl,

7 Dec 44. 41

 305th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1. 42

 77th Div Arty Opns Rpt, pp. 2-3.

43

 Observers Rpt, 20 Dec 44, Col Paul L. Freeman, Operation in the Ormoc area, OPD 319.1

SWPA (20 Dec 44) Sec X. 44

 308th Bombardment Wing Fragmentary FO

341-C, 6 Dec 44, Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 9 Dec 44. 45

 Msg, XXIV Corps to Sixth Army, 8 Dec 44,

Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 8 Dec 44.
THE FALL OF ORMOC 287

least two patrols of the 305th Infantry would

be sent south to disrupt enemy communications. All other units of the division, were to

be prepared to move north on division

order.46

Camp Downes

Immediately north of Ipil, Colonel Mitsui

had constructed a few small strong points,

each of which consisted of two coconut log

pillboxes, several trenches, and foxhole emplacements for machine guns. Between these

positions and Camp Downes were groups of

enemy riflemen and machine gunners on the

banks of the streams and at the ends of

wooded ridges that extended from the northeast toward the highway. They had dug in

at the bases of the trees and on the edges of

the bamboo clumps. In the sector between

Ipil and Camp Downes the highway was

nine feet wide, with three-foot shoulders,

and surfaced with coral or gravel. Fields of

sugar cane or grassy hills lay east of the road,

which was fringed with clumps of acacia or

coconut trees. At least one reinforced enemy

company had taken up its last defensive

stand at Camp Downes. Less than a mile

from Ormoc, Camp Downes had been an

important Philippine Army and Constabulary camp before the war. The plateau on

which it was situated lay east of the highway

and commanded all approaches, most of

which were open and without cover. A

ravine ran along the southern side of the

barrio. At Camp Downes the Japanese had

placed thirteen machine guns, two 40-mm.

antiaircraft guns, and three 75-mm. field

pieces under the porches and in the foundations of buildings. These were well camouflaged and mutually supporting and were

protected by concealed riflemen.47

As the 77th Division consolidated its positions in Ipil, the Japanese started to use reinforcements to check any further advance

toward Ormoc. The 12th Independent Infantry Regiment had been assembling at

Dolores, northeast of Ormoc. On the night

of 7 December its commander, Colonel Imahori, ordered the newly arrived Kamijo

Battalion, which consisted of two companies, to co-operate with the Shipping Unit

under Colonel Mitsui in delaying the advance of the American forces until the arrival of the main body of the 12th Independent Infantry.48 By the morning of 8

December it became evident to the 77th Division that it had surprised the enemy.

At 0615 enemy planes flew over the command post area, and ten minutes later one

of these was shot down by antiaircraft fire.49

At 0800 Colonel Hamilton's 307th Infantry

moved out.50 By 1000 the regiment was 200

yards north of Ipil, but it encountered more

determined resistance when it reached the

Panalian River at 1200. General Bruce ordered the attacking force to continue north

with the objective of reaching the ravine

just south of the Camp Downes plateau.

The 307th Infantry was to make the assault

and employ if necessary all reserves, while

the 2d Battalion of the 306th Infantry continued to be attached to the regiment in

support. The 902d Field Artillery Battalion,

46

 77th Div FO 14, 8 Dec 44.

47

 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, G-2 Sum 3, App. 2;

Allied Geographical Sec, GHQ SWPA, Terrain

Study 84, Leyte Province, 17 Aug 44, pp. 57, 60,

65.

48

 35th Army Opns, p. 98. 49

 Msg, G-2 Observer to G-2 77th Div, 8 Dec 44,

77th Div G-2 Jnl, 8 Dec 44. 50

 Msg, 307th Inf to 77th Div, 8 Dec 44, 77th Div

G-2 Jnl, 8 Dec 44.
288 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

A PATROL OF THE 307TH INFANTRY warily approaches a river crossing near Camp

Dowries.

Company A of the 776th Amphibian Tank

Battalion, and Company A of the 88th

Chemical Weapons Battalion were also to

continue their support. Farther south, the

305th Infantry would move north to defend

the bridgehead at the Baod River and the

77th Reconnaissance Troop would move at

1330 to an area 500 yards north of the Panilahan River to clear out a position for the

division command post.51

Upon receiving its mission, a platoon

from Company A of the 776th Amphibian

Tank Battalion moved over water toward

Camp Downes to secure information on the

dispositions of the Japanese. The platoon

proceeded north 500 yards offshore to the

vicinity of Panalian Point where it received

heavy enemy artillery fire from Camp

Downes. The platoon returned and reported the location of the enemy artillery.52

The 902d Field Artillery Battalion thereupon shelled the Japanese artillery positions.53

The assault units of the 307th Infantry

steadily pushed out against determined

opposition in which the enemy used rifles,

mortars, and small artillery from dug-in

positions along finger ridges and streams.

The Japanese had a prepared position 1,000

yards in depth from which they swept the

rice fields which the troops had to traverse,

but fire from the American automatic weapons and mortars forced the Japanese to fall

back.54 An enemy company counterattacked

51

 77th Div FO 15, 8 Dec 44.

52

 776th Amphib Tank Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 18. 53

 77th Div Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. 54

 307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 3-4.
THE FALL OF ORMOC 289

and hit Company A of the 88th Chemical

Battalion. The Japanese were repulsed on

two separate occasions—the first time at

1320 and the second at 1520, when in company strength they charged the Americans.

The chemical company stopped both

charges with high explosive and white

phosphorus shells.55 The 307th Infantry

pressed forward, capturing considerable

quantities of small arms and artillery ammunition, and by nightfall had advanced some

2,000 yards. The 1st Battalion, 306th Infantry, was to relieve the regiment's 2d

Battalion, which had been attached to the

307th Infantry as an assault battalion.56

Colonel Tanzola's 305th Infantry during

the day protected the southern and southeastern flanks of the 77th Division in its advance northward. At night the regiment's

defensive perimeter centered around Ipil but

extended as far south as the Baod River.57

The Japanese forces suffered greatly in

the course of the day. The commander of

the Kamijo Battalion was severely wounded

and the battalion itself had many casualties.

Consequently, the Tateishi and Maeda Battalions of the 12th Independent Infantry

Regiment, which had been alerted to join

the Kamijo Battalion, were ordered to take

positions north of Ormoc, on the night of

9 December.58 The Japanese troops in the

sector opposing the 77th Division were two

companies totaling 100 men of the 1st Battalion, 12th Independent Infantry, with

three machine guns and two battalion guns;

three companies totaling 250 men of the 3d

Battalion of the same regiment with nine

machine guns, two battalion guns, and four

antitank guns; sixty men with three machine guns from the 30th Division; a paratroop unit of eighty men; a ship engineer

unit of 500 men; and 750 personnel from

the Navy. The total effective military

strength was 1,740 men.59

At 0400 on 9 December the first resupply

convoy arrived carrying with it the rest of

the 306th Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 306th

Infantry, was placed on the eastern flank

which connected the 305th Infantry on the

south with the 307th Infantry on the north.

Its mission was to protect the east and center

of the beachhead. At 0530 the batteries of

the 902d Field Artillery Battalion fired 110

rounds on a harassing mission and at 0820

they fired 192 rounds in preparation for the

attack by the infantry against Camp

Downes.60 The 1st Battalion, 306th Infantry,

was to pass through the 2d Battalion, 306th

Infantry, and continue the attack with the

3d Battalion, 307th Infantry, on the left.

The 1st Battalion, 307th Infantry, would

protect the regimental right flank.61 After

the artillery concentration the 307th Infantry at 0830 moved out toward Camp

Downes.

The 307th Infantry inched slowly forward. It became evident that the Japanese

had regrouped and emplaced the forces on

ridges and high ground which overlooked

all possible approaches to Camp Downes

and Ormoc. In selecting his defensive positions the enemy used "excellent judgment"

 62

 and defended the area with at least

two companies heavily reinforced with

automatic weapons. The assaulting forces

received intense small arms and artillery

fire.63

55

 Company A, 88th Chemical Bn, Jnl, 8 Dec 44. 56

 307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 3-4. 57

 305th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 1-2. 58

 35th Army Opns, p. 98.

59

 Ibid., p. 106. 60

 902d FA Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. 61

 307th Inf Unit Jnl, 8 Dec 44. 62

 307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. 63

 Msg, CG 77th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 9 Dec

44, 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 9 Dec 44.
290 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

The 902d Field Artillery Battalion supported the attack from positions north of the

Baod River. The 305th Field Artillery Battalion, which had just arrived, was sent forward to support the attack.64

 At one of the

Japanese strong points that had been overrun were found eleven heavy machine guns,

two 40-mm. antiaircraft guns, and three

75-mm. guns. At 1700, Japanese aircraft

strafed the regiment and inflicted several

casualties. At 1750, however, the 307th Infantry entered Camp Downes, secured the

area, and established a night perimeter. Its

total advance for the day was about one

thousand yards.65

At 1245 the 305th Infantry, which had

been protecting the southern flank of the

division, received a new assignment from

General Bruce. The 2d Battalion of the

305th Infantry was to protect the division's

rear by taking a position just south of Ipil.

The 1st and 3d Battalions were to move

north of the Panilahan River and 1,000

yards to the east in order to complete an allaround defense of Camp Downes.66

 At 1345

the battalions moved north. As soon as the

307th Infantry entered Camp Downes, General Bruce ordered his forward command

post into that area, and the advance echelon

of his headquarters moved out. Upon its

arrival at the selected camp site, a coconut

grove on a hill just south of Camp Downes,

the advance echelon became involved in a

fire fight between the 307th Infantry and

the enemy forces on the hill. It dug in under

fire in the new area. The Japanese defenders

were driven out of the coconut grove as the

rest of the command post moved in.67

During the day the 307th Infantry had

advanced about 1,000 yards and captured

Camp Downes. The 305th Infantry had secured the area northeast of Camp Downes

and protected the northeastern flank of the

77th Division. The 306th Infantry had

moved into an assembly area 600 yards

north of Ipil.68

Two Sevens are Rolled in Ormoc

At 1830 General Bruce issued verbal

orders for the attack on 10 December.

Ormoc was the target. The 307th and 306th

Infantry Regiments were to move out

abreast. The 307th Infantry would attack

along the highway to its front while the

306th Infantry would move to the northeast and attempt to envelop the opposing

enemy force. The 305th Infantry initially

was to remain in position and defend its

part of the line.69

Ormoc, the largest and most important

commercial center in western Leyte, possessed a concrete and pile pier at which a

vessel with a sixteen-foot draft, and two

smaller vessels, could anchor at the same

time.70 On the route to Ormoc and in the

town itself, the Japanese dug strong defensive positions. The favored sites were in bamboo thickets, on reverse slopes, along creek

beds, and under buildings. Individual spider

holes about six feet deep were covered with

logs and earth and "beautifully camouflaged." Against such positions, artillery and

mortar fire did little more than daze the de64

 77th Div Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. 65

 307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. 66

 Msg, G-3 77th Div to S-3 305th Inf, 9 Dec 44,

77th Div G-3 Jnl, 9 Dec 44. 67

 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 14-15.

68

 306th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6. 69

 77th Div Plan of Action for 10 Dec 44, 77th

Div G-3 Jnl, 9 Dec 44; 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte,

pp. 15-16. 70

 Allied Geographical Sec, GHQ SWPA, Terrain

Study 84, Leyte Province, 17 Aug 44, pp. 10, 22,

60, 69.
THE FALL OF ORMOC 291

fenders. Each position had to be searched

out and destroyed.71

On 9 December the commander of the

Japanese 35th Army ordered the four companies of the 12th Independent Infantry

Regiment to return to their regiment from

positions north of Ipil and to be prepared to

help defend the Ormoc area.72

In preparation for the assault against

Ormoc, the 902d Field Artillery Battalion

at 0830 established an observation post at

Camp Downes. At 0920 the battalion fired

100 rounds of ammunition during a tenminute period in front of the area which the

attacking forces were to traverse. At 0930

the artillery fire was directed at enemy positions observed in Ormoc.73

 General Krueger

made arrangements with Admiral Kinkaid

for LCM's, LCV's, and LVT's to operate

along the coast at dawn and nightfall for

an indefinite period.74

At 0900, Company A of the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion with its 75-mm.

howitzers moved into Ormoc—the first

American troops to enter the city. The 2d

and 3d Platoons of the company moved

through the streets and sent high explosives

and smoke shells into the buildings occupied

by the Japanese.75 The enemy defenders

were also hit from the bay. LCM (R)'s from

the Navy came overwater, moved near the

Ormoc pier, and fired their rockets into the

center of the town. As the rockets were being

fired, the crews of the LCM's engaged the

enemy defenders on the pier in a small arms

fight, the antiaircraft machine guns on the

LCM's exchanging fire with the Japanese

rifles and machine guns. After the last of the

rockets were launched the LCM's withdrew,

still under small arms fire.76

Colonel Smith's 306th Infantry was to

move to the northeast with the 1st and 3d

Battalions abreast and forestall any attempt

to reinforce the Ormoc garrison. At 0945

the commanding officer of the 306th Infantry announced that both battalions had

moved out on time.77 The 1st Battalion on

the left encountered only light opposition

during the day. The 3d Battalion met light

resistance in two deep ravines but was able

to push through without difficulty. Throughout the day, however, the regiment received

harassing fire from well-concealed riflemen,

each of whom generally worked alone. By

1600 the 1st Battalion was at a bridge on

Highway 2 north of Ormoc and the 3d

Battalion was within 500 yards of the 1st

but was slowed by the necessity for maintaining contact with the regiment's 2d Battalion.

This unit had been committed on the right

in order to secure contact with the 305th

Infantry.78

At 0930 the troops of the 307th Infantry

moved out.79 They encountered little resistance until they neared the outskirts of

Ormoc, where a deep ravine lay between the

southern edge of the town and the front lines

of the advancing troops. An enemy force,

which had dug in on both sides and along

the top of this ravine, had to be rooted out

with bayonets, grenades, and mortars. In

spite of the determined enemy resistance,

American casualties were very light. Enter- 71

 Observers Rpt, 20 Dec 44, Col Freeman, Oper- ing the western part of the city, the 307th

ation in the Ormoc Area, OPD 319.1, SWPA (20

Dec 44) Sec X. 72

 35th Army Opns, p. 97. 73

 902d FA Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. 74

 Rad, CG Sixth Army to CTF 77, 9 Dec 44,

Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 9 Dec 44. 75

 776th Amphib Tank Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 19.

76

 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 16; Msgs, 307th

Inf to 77th Div, 1110, 1130, 10 Dec 44, 77th Div

G-2 Jnl, 10 Dec 44. 77

 306th Inf Unit Jnl, 10 Dec 44. 78

 306th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6. 79

 307th Inf Opns Rpt, p. 4.
292 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

AERIAL VIEW OF ORMOC after the bombardment. In the middle background is the

Antilao River, with the mountains of western Ormoc Valley in the distance.

Infantry hit the front line of the Mitsui Unit

on the left flank of the 12th Independent

Infantry Regiment.80

Ormoc "was a blazing inferno of bursting white phosphorus shells, burning houses,

and exploding ammunition dumps, and over

it all hung a pall of heavy smoke from burning dumps mixed with the gray dust of destroyed concrete buildings, blasted by ...

artillery, mortar, and rocket fire."

 81

The 306th and 307th Infantry Regiments squeezed the enemy like a tube of

toothpaste. The 306th Infantry enveloped

the northeast flank, while the drive of the

77th Division up the shore of Ormoc Bay

banished any hopes that the Japanese might

have entertained of escaping southeast by

Highway 2. The Japanese were squeezed

through Ormoc to the north.

Left behind, however, were some defenders who heroically but hopelessly fought to

delay the American advance. Situated in

spider holes beneath the buildings, they

stubbornly fought back until overcome.

Street by street, house by house, the 307th

Infantry cleared Ormoc, which was a scene

of gutted buildings and rubble. Many ammunition and signal supply dumps were

captured, including a church that had been

80

 35th Army Opns, p. 107. 81

 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 16.
THE FALL OF ORMOC 293

filled with artillery and small arms ammunition.82

As his troops were reducing Ormoc, General Bruce made a report to the commanding

general of the XXIV Corps on the status of

the attack and referred to a promise that had

been made by the commanding general of

the Fifth Air Force: "Where is the case of

Scotch that was promised by General Whitehead for the capture of Ormoc. I don't drink

but I have an assistant division commander

and regimental commanders who do. . . ."

 83

At the same time that the 77th Division

was entering Ormoc, the 32d Division was

pushing southward toward Ormoc Valley,

the 11th Airborne Division was working

westward over the mountains toward the

town, and the 7th Division was pushing

northward along the eastern coast of Ormoc

Bay in an attempt to make a juncture with

the 77th Division. General Bruce advised

General Hodge: "Have rolled two sevens in

Ormoc. Come seven come eleven."

 84

The 307th Infantry pushed through the

town and at 1730 established a night perimeter on the banks of the Antilao River on the

western edge of Ormoc where it tied in with

the front line of the 306th Infantry. At long

last, Ormoc was in American hands.

In its drive north the 77th Division killed

an estimated 1,506 Japanese and took 7

prisoners.85 Its own casualties were 123 men

killed, 329 wounded, and 13 missing in

action.86

On 7 December, the 7th Division moved

north from its position about seven miles

south of Deposito to join the 77th Division,

which had landed that day at Deposito. It

advanced with two regiments abreast—the

184th Infantry on the left and the 17th Infantry on the right. The regiments made

slow progress as they pushed over a series of

hills and river valleys. On the night of 9-10

December the Japanese who were caught

between the 7th and 77th Divisions withdrew into the mountains. At 1000 on 11

December an advance element, the 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, reached Ipil and established contact with the 77th Division.

The XXIV Corps was now in undisputed

control of the eastern shore of Ormoc Bay

and the town of Ormoc. The capture of

Ormoc had very important effects. It divided the Japanese forces and isolated the

remaining elements of the enemy 26th Division. It drew off and destroyed heretofore

uncommitted enemy reserves, thus relieving

the situation on all other fronts, and it hastened the juncture of the X Corps with the

forces of the XXIV Corps. It denied to the

Japanese the use of Ormoc as a port,

through which so many reinforcements and

supplies had been poured into the campaign.

Finally, the Japanese were unable to use

Highway 2 south of Ormoc and were driven

north up Ormoc Valley.87 General Krueger

had realized an important part of his plan

for the seizure of Ormoc Valley, since sealing off the port of Ormoc would enable the

Sixth Army to devote its major effort toward

completion of that plan.

82

 307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 4. 83 Msg, CG 77th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 1400,

10 Dec 44, 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 10 Dec 44. 84

 Msg, CG 77th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 1645,

10 Dec 44, 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 10 Dec 44. 85

 77th Div G-2 Summary Leyte Opns. 86

 77th Div G-l Daily Strength Rpts, 7-10 Dec

44. 87

 77th Div G-2 Summary Leyte, No. 3.
CHAPTER XVII

Battle of the Airstrips

Immediately after Pearl Harbor, American submarines began to attack Japanese

shipping to the Netherlands Indies. From

the beginning they were successful. In September 1943 the submarines accelerated

the tempo of their attack. The Japanese lost

to the submarines "tremendous tonnages of

shipping ... all over the ocean. No route

was secure from their attack; no ship was

safe south of Honshu."

 1 By the early fall

of 1944 the Japanese line of communications to the Netherlands Indies was virtually

cut.

With American land-based air strength

on Leyte increasing steadily, a strong possibility existed that the line of communications between the Japanese homeland and

the South Pacific area would be completely

severed, especially if the main American

air force should move up from New Guinea

to Leyte. Imperial General Headquarters

felt, therefore, that the Dulag and Tacloban

airfields must be neutralized, and the

Burauen airfields in southern Leyte Valley

seized before the American air force could

establish itself in strength on the island.

Japanese control of the airfields would also

facilitate the movement of Japanese supplies to the island and greatly assist the

ground operations of the 35th Army.2

In the latter part of November, Gen.

Tomoyuki Yamashita, commanding general of the 14th Area Army, sent a liaison

officer from his headquarters in Manila

with orders to Lt. Gen. Sosaku Suzuki, the

35th Army commander, at Ormoc. General

Yamashita is quoted as saying: "If the construction of air bases on Leyte is permitted to

continue, the communications between the

Southern areas and the homeland will be

cut and this would be a serious situation.

Therefore, we must occupy Burauen airfield

as soon as possible and at the same time

neutralize Tacloban and Dulag airfields.

Moreover, we must annihilate the enemy's

air power."

 3

Therefore, in a desperate attempt to gain

the initiative, the Japanese embarked on a

rash scheme to seize the airfields of Leyte.

Their plan entailed a co-ordinated effort by

both the ground and air forces. Beginning

on 23 November and continuing through

27 November, the army air force was to

launch a campaign to eliminate American

air resistance. On the night of 26 November,

aircraft carrying specially trained demolitionists were to crash-land on the Dulag and

Tacloban airstrips and put them out of

commission.4

1

 USSBS, The War Against Japanese Transportation, 1941-1942 (Washington, 1947), p. 48. 2

 Japanese Studies, 11, 35th Army Operations

1944-45, p. 74, OCMH.

3

 Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 23. 4

 Japanese Studies in World War II, 7, 14th

Area Army Operations on Leyte, p. 11; 10th I&HS,

Eighth Army, Stf Study of Japanese 35th Army on

Leyte, Part III, The Part Played by the Japanese

Air Force . . . p. 5.
BATTLE OF THE AIRSTRIPS 295

MAP 18

Plans were made for the 3d and 4th

Airborne Raiding Regiments to descend

from Luzon on the Burauen airfields. The

26th Division, together with the 16th Division, which had fought the Americans in

Leyte Valley, and the 68th Independent

Mixed Brigade of the 35th Army were to

infiltrate through the mountains and attack

and capture the Burauen airfields. The 16th

Division was to move from its position in the

mountains west of Dagami toward Buri,

the northernmost of the Burauen airfields.

Elements of the 26th Division which were

engaging the 7th Division on the shores of

Ormoc Bay were to break off the fight,

move over the mountains, and attack Bayug

and San Pablo, the southernmost of the

Burauren fields. (Map 18) If all went well

they were to proceed east and capture the

Dulag airfield, on the shores of Leyte Gulf.

The airborne assault was to be made on the

night of 5 December. The ground troops

were to arrive early on the morning of 6 December and assist in the attack.

Because he felt that he had not made

sufficient preparation, General Suzuki requested that the attack be postponed until

7 December. General Yamashita disapproved this request, but since bad weather

was forecast for 5 December, he sent a message to General Suzuki changing the date

of attack to the night of 6 December. This

information was immediately transmitted

to the 26th Division. At the same time, efforts were made by General Suzuki's headquarters to relay the information to the 16th
296 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Division, but because of radio difficulties

General Makino never received the

message.

General Makino, after receiving the order

for the airborne attack on the night of 5

December to be followed with an attack by

his forces on the following morning, concentrated the remaining strength of the 16th

Division into one battalion. General Suzuki

personally took command of the Burauen

operation, and on 1 December he and a part

of his staff moved east into the mountains

near Burauen. General Tomochika was left

in command of the Ormoc forces.5

Unwittingly, the Japanese were flogging

a dead horse. General Krueger had stopped

all work on these airfields on 25 November.

The American Dispositions

The Sixth Army planners for the Leyte

operation had not envisaged the employment of the 11th Airborne Division during

the campaign. This division, commanded

by Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Swing, was to have

staged on Leyte for subsequent operations.6

On 22 November, however, General

Hodge ordered the relief of the 7th Division,

minus the 17th Infantry, by the 11th Airborne Division in order to free the 7th Division for the drive up the eastern shore of

Ormoc Bay. On the same day the 11th Airborne Division, along with the 17th Infantry, less the 2d Battalion, was ordered to

seize and secure all exits from the mountains

into Leyte Valley in its area. The division

was then to advance through the central

mountain range, and secure the western

exits from the mountains in order to assist

the attack of the 7th Infantry Division in its

drive north toward Ormoc.7 Upon receipt

of this order, General Swing assigned to the

units of the 11th Airborne Division the mission of securing the mountain exits.

General Swing immediately started to relieve elements of the 7th Division and by 28

November the relief was completed. For

several days the 11th Airborne Division sent

patrols to the west and maintained small

security guards at the Buri and Bayug airfields.

There were three airstrips—San Pablo,

Bayug, and Buri—north of the DulagBurauen road in the area between San Pablo

and Burauen. Both the Bayug and San

Pablo airfields were on the Dulag-Burauen

road. The Buri airstrip was almost directly

north of the Bayug airstrip. The land between the Bayug and Buri airstrips was flat

for a distance of about 800 yards. The

northern half of this flat land was a swamp,

sometimes five feet in depth. At the northern end of the swamp was a narrow stream,

about fifteen feet wide, which ran along the

base of a plateau. This plateau, which was

directly north of the Buri airfield, was forested with palm trees and jungle growth.

Buri airfield lay between the swamp and the

plateau.8

By 27 November information from captured documents and prisoners interrogated

by units of the Sixth Army indicated that

the enemy was planning a co-ordinated

ground and airborne attack to seize the airfields in the Burauen area. The intelligence

officers of the XXIV Corps, however,

thought that the Japanese were not capable

of putting this assault plan into effect. The

American patrols operating west of Burauen

had found no new trails being constructed

5

 35th Army Opns, pp. 80-84. 6

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 62.

7

 XXIV Corps FO 28, 22 Nov 44. 8

 149th Para-Glider Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1.
BATTLE OF THE AIRSTRIPS 297

nor any old ones being extensively used.

Furthermore, the American forces had

blocked all known trails leading east over the

mountains into the area. Although the

enemy might be able to make an airborne attack, "he is not at this time capable of

launching a co-ordinated ground airborne

attack of major proportions in the Burauen

area."

 9

Despite the trail blocks, however, elements

of the 16th Division were able to descend

upon the Buri airstrip from the mountains

southwest of Dagami. Only one battalion of

the 26th Division, which was to have attacked the airfields in the Burauen area on

7 December, ever reached the area. The

movement over the mountains was difficult,

and it was not until the night of 10-11 December that the unit arrived west of Burauen. It made a half-hearted attack, which

was repulsed by elements of the 11th Airborne Division.10

Although the intelligence officers of the

XXIV Corps believed there was no possibility of a co-ordinated ground and aerial

assault, General Hodge alerted the XXIV

Corps to a possible enemy paratroop landing. All units were directed to strengthen

local defenses and establish in each sector a

twenty-four-hour watching post. All men

were to be armed and wear helmets, or to

have arms and helmets within reach at all

times. In the event of any unusual enemy

activity, the headquarters of the XXIV

Corps was to be notified immediately.11

In order to protect the airfields more adequately, a company of the 77th Division

was furnished to the 11th Airborne Division

to defend the Dulag airfield, while the latter division held one battalion alerted at

Burauen in readiness to move against hostile

forces at any of the three airfields in the

area.12 One battalion of the 306th Infantry

Regiment and a platoon each from Companies A and B of the 767th Tank Battalion

were stationed north of Burauen; the regiment was to be prepared to assemble two

companies near the headquarters of the Fifth

Air Force for motor movement in defense

against airborne attack, and to maintain

security detachments at the Bayug and Buri

airstrips.13

First Japanese Effort

In the meantime the first phase of the

Japanese plan to regain the initiative had

begun. At 0245 on 27 November, three

enemy air transports with lights on flew

over Leyte Gulf at an altitude of about fifty

feet. Ten minutes later one of these aircraft

crash-landed in the water about twenty-five

yards offshore in the area of the 728th

Amphibian Tractor Battalion, which was

about two miles south of Rizal and about

three miles north of Tarragona.

A guard from the battalion, assuming the

plane to be friendly, approached it and

climbed on the wing to offer assistance. The

Japanese emerged from the plane and threw

grenades at the guard. The men of the

tractor battalion, hearing the noise, came on

and killed two Japanese with small arms

fire. Three others, however, escaped and

reached a swamp west of the landing point. 9

 XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Rpt 39, 27 Nov 44. 10

 11th Airborne Div After Action Rpt, 18 Nov11 Dec 44. 11

 Msg, CG XXIV Corps to CG 7th Div et al,

27 Nov 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 27 Nov 44.

12

 Msg, G-3 XXIV Corps to CG 11th AB Div,

28 Nov 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 28 Nov 44, and

Sixth Army G-3 Periodic Rpt 528, 28 Nov 44. 13

 11th Airborne Div FO 3, 29 Nov 44.
298 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Ten or twelve more of the enemy moved

south along the beach in the surf and also

disappeared into the swamp.14

One of the other two planes crash-landed

on the Buri airstrip and all its occupants

were killed. The remaining plane crashed on

the beach near the Bito River, north of

Abuyog. Opposite, across the river, elements

of the 11th Airborne Division were encamped.15

 With the exception of one soldier,

who was killed at dawn, all of the Japanese

in this plane escaped. The 728th Amphibian

Tractor Battalion found many demolition

charges abandoned in the plane. In view of

this discovery, and the fact that the enemy

made no attempt to follow up the landing

by an airborne attack in force, the Americans concluded that the Japanese were on

a suicide mission of demolition and destruction in the Dulag and Burauen airfield areas.

Although the operation caused no damage,

Radio Tokyo informed the Japanese people

that it was "most successful." If the enemy

believed that his attempt had been sucessful, however, the possibility existed that

other airborne troops would be landed,

either as raiding parties or in force.16

By 5 December the XXIV Corps was

lulled into a sense of false security. The

2d Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry,

which had been in the Burauen area, had

rejoined its regiment, which was fighting for

the mountain passes on the trail to Albuera.

The 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry, on the

northwestern approaches to the airfields, reverted on 5 December to the control of the

77th Infantry Division, which was embarking for the Ormoc operation. The only infantry unit in the Burauen area at the time

of the Japanese attack was the 1st Battalion,

187th Glider Infantry (less one company),

which was on San Pablo airfield. The G-2

periodic report on 5 December at 2000

stated with regard to the general situation

in the Burauen-Dagami-Mount Alto area:

"An examination of reports of action in this

area since 1 Nov may well warrant the assumption that organized resistance has

about ceased."

 17

 But before morning, the

remnants of the Japanese 16th Division hit

the Buri airfield.

Battle of Buri Airstrip

On or about 2 December General

Makino, commanding general of the 16th

Division, had assembled from the hills southwest of Dagami the remaining elements of

the division. The total strength thus massed

was only about 500 men. The men rested,

and then marched on toward the Buri airstrip. On the way, American artillery and

tank fire killed approximately 200 of them.

The remaining force moved to a new location—a deep gorge about 6,500 yards

southwest of Dagami. On 5 December, this

force was to move out of the gorge, join the

paratroopers, and launch a combined assault

against the Buri airstrip.

14

 728th Amph Tractor Bn Unit Rpt 30, 27 Nov

44, and 20th Armored Gp Unit Rpt 5, in 20th

Armored Gp Opns Rpt Leyte. 15

 The history of the 11th Airborne Division tells

the following story about the landing of the third

plane. "An antiaircraft machine gun crew, which

outfit is forgotten now, was in position on the alert

for enemy aircraft. When the plane landed and

came to a halt, they called across the small river:

'Need any help?' 'No, everything OK,' someone

yelled back, and the machine gun crew went back

to watching the skies for enemy aircraft." Maj.

Edward M. Flanagan, Jr., The Angels, a History

of the 11th Airborne Division, 1943-1946 (Washington, 1948), p. 34. 16 XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Rpt 43, 1 Dec 44,

XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 2 Dec 44; XXIV Corps G-2

Periodic Rpt 45, 3 Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl,

4 Dec 44. 17

 XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Rpt 47, 5 Dec 44.
BATTLE OF THE AIRSTRIPS 299

BURI AIRSTRIP as it appeared in 1946.

The Americans later learned from interrogated prisoners that the morale of the men

of the 16th Division was very low at that

time. They were living on coconuts and

bananas, since the officers had taken the few

remaining rations. Wounded men in the

force had been abandoned.18

The 16th Division was still unaware that

the target date for the Burauen operation

had been postponed to the night of 6 December, and consequently proceeded with its

plans to attack the Buri airstrip on 6 December at 0630—over fourteen hours before

the paratroopers were scheduled to land.

On the night of 5-6 December, approximately 150 Japanese made their way

quietly toward the Buri airstrip.

At 0600, the 287th Field Artillery Observation Battalion, northwest of Burauen,

saw elements of the Japanese 16th Division crossing the main road south of the

battalion's position and heading east toward

the Buri field. The battalion immediately

relayed this information to the XXIV Corps

headquarters.19 After crossing the road, the

enemy moved into the swamp near the airfield. One Japanese unit of about 15 men,

armed with a machine gun, stationed itself

at a Filipino shack 300 yards west of the

highway in order to cover the road.20

At the Buri strip were about 47 men from

the 287th Field Artillery Observation Bat18

 XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Rpt 50, 8 Dec 44,

XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 9 Dec 44.

19

 Msg, Corps Arty to G-2 XXIV Corps, 0710,

6 Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 6 Dec 44. 20

 Msg, 96th Div to CG XXIV Corps, 1350, 6

Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 6 Dec 44.
300 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

talion and 157 miscellaneous troops.21

Small units of engineering troops and a

signal company were at the foot of the bluff,

on the northern edge of the strip.

At 0630, the 16th Division launched its

surprise attack. Led by a Filipino,22 the Japanese broke into the American bivouac area

while the men were still asleep. Some were

bayoneted while in their blankets, or before

they could seize their weapons. Others held

the Japanese off until they could retreat,

shoeless and in their shorts and undershirts,

either up the bluff to the headquarters of the

V Bomber Command, or to the road, where

an infantry company had come up in support.23

 The service troops were "firing at

everything that moves and . . . probably

inflicting casualties among our troops."

 24

The Japanese from the 16th Division entrenched themselves in the woods north of

the airstrip.

Meanwhile, General Hodge ordered that

the 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry, be released

from the 96th Division and placed under the

operational control of General Swing of the

11th Airborne Division. The battalion was

to proceed immediately to the aid of the two

companies of the 11th Airborne Division in

the Buri airfield area. General Hodge emphasized that the area was "critical" and

"must be kept closed." It would be "dangerous" to let the enemy "get into the service

troops along the road and around airfields."

 25

 One reinforced company of the

1st Battalion was already in the area and the

rest of the battalion made ready to follow.26

Small patrols of combat troops held the

enemy forces in check. At 1030 one patrol

killed seventeen Japanese north of the Buri

airfield, and another killed three of the

enemy west of the airstrip. The 1st Battalion

of the 187th Glider Infantry was moved

from the San Pablo airfield to the Buri area

and went into position near the airfield.27 By

1800 on 6 December, the enemy had been

driven off the Buri airfield, though pockets

of resistance still remained on the edges of

the airstrip. The battalion encountered a

portion of the 16th Division east of the strip

and destroyed it.28 Forty of the enemy were

known to be dead, and it was believed that

as many more had also been killed.

Attack From the Sky

San Pablo Airstrip

The Japanese air transports were scheduled to be over the airfields at 1840 on 6

December, with an escort of fighter aircraft.

Fighters were to neutralize the airstrips and,

just before the paratroopers jumped, medium bombers were to strafe the Buri, San

Pablo, and Bayug airstrips. At the same time

light bombers were to hit antiaircraft positions between San Pablo and Dulag and

points west. Fifty-one aircraft in all (transports, bombers, and fighters) were assigned

to the operation. The transports were allotted as follows: twenty to the Buri airstrip,

nine to San Pablo airstrip, six to Bayug airstrip, and two each to the Tacloban and

21

 Msg, 287th FA Obsn Bn to XXIV Corps, 1350,

6 Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 6 Dec 44. 22

 This man was later caught and turned over to

the Filipino guerrillas. 23

 Combat History, 5th Bomber Command, 8 June

44-May 45, pp. 5-6, AAF Archives. 24

 Msg, 11th Airborne Div to XXIV Corps, 1220,

6 Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 6 Dec 44. 25

 Msg, CG XXIV Corps to CG 96th Div, 1400,

6 Dec 44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 6 Dec 44.

26

 96th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 47, 6 Dec 44. 27

 XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Rpt 48, 6 Dec 44,

XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 7 Dec 44. 28

 Flanagan, The Angels, p. 49.
BATTLE OF THE AIRSTRIPS 301

SAN PABLO AIRSTRIP as it appeared in 1946.

Dulag airstrips. Each transport carried fifteen to twenty men.29

The Japanese parachutists were well

drilled as to their mission. The operation

was to be divided into five phases. The first

phase was to begin with the jump-off. The

men, immediately after landing, were to attack and destroy aircraft on the ground, and

one element was to attack the barracks and

communications. This phase was to end

when the moon rose. In the second phase,

ending about 2230, the troops would destroy

materiel, ammunition dumps, bridges, and

remaining barracks. During the third phase,

from 2330 to 0300, the paratroopers were

to destroy the remaining aircraft and installations. In the fourth phase, lasting from

0300 to 0600, they were to build defensive

positions. In the fifth phase, from 0600 on,

preparations were to be made for future

operations.

There were to be three assault waves. The

first wave would consist of the headquarters

unit with approximately 25 men; the signal

unit with 7; the 1st Company with 100; the

2d Company with 86; the construction company with 97; and a platoon with 50 men.

The second would be composed of 9 men

from the headquarters unit; the 3d Company; the Heavy Weapons Company; and

the signal unit. The final wave would consist of the remaining troops—about 80

men.30

29

 Air Evaluation Board, SWPA, Leyte Campaign,

p. 174, AAF Archives.

30

 Msg, GG XXIV Corps to CG Sixth Army, 1440,

9 Dec 44, XXIV G-3 Jnl, 9 Dec 44; XXIV Corps

G-2 Periodic Rpt 50, Incl 1, 8 Dec 44, XXIV Corps

G-3 Jnl, 9 Dec 44. Both are translations of Japanese

documents giving plans for the airborne attack.
302 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Just before dark, thirty-nine Japanese

transports with supporting bombers and

fighters roared over the Burauen airfields.

Several incendiary bombs fell on the San

Pablo strip, setting a gasoline dump afire

and burning a liaison plane. Approximately

eighteen enemy aircraft were shot down.

Parachutists began to descend from the

transports. The commander of the 3d Regiment with about 60 of his men dropped on

the Buri strip, while between 250 and 300

parachutists landed near the San Pablo

strip.31

The parachutists, immediately after landing, ran up the north and south sides of the

San Pablo strip. They talked in loud tones

and allegedly called out in English, "Hello—

where are your machine guns?" Most

of the enemy forces assembled on the north

side of the airstrip. They burned three or

four more liaison planes, a jeep, several

tents, and another gasoline dump, throwing

ammunition on the latter.

The only American troops in the area, a

small detachment of the 11th Airborne Division, consisted of elements of the 127th

Airborne Engineer Battalion, the signal

company, Headquarters Battery of the division artillery, special troops as well as Air

Corps service troops. During the night of

6-7 December, confusion reigned on the

airstrip. There was uncontrolled and disorganized firing and much difficulty arose in

establishing a co-ordinated command.32

At dawn, after most of the paratroopers

had assembled on the San Pablo airfield,

they moved north and west to the northern

edge of the Buri airstrip and joined elements

of the 16th Division.

At the San Pablo airstrip, Lt. Col. Douglas C. Davis, the commanding officer of the

127th Airborne Engineer Battalion, organized the miscellaneous service troops into an

infantry unit to protect the San Pablo airstrip. The 674th Parachute Field Artillery

Battalion, which was at the mouth of the

Bito River, north of Abuyog, was to leave its

guns at that place and come to the assistance

of Colonel Davis' force. At daylight, the

troops of the 127th Airborne Engineer Battalion moved out toward the airstrip and

met the 674th Field Artillery Battalion, under Col. Lukas E. Hoska. The artillery battalion swung into line and the two units

moved out as a provisional infantry regiment under Colonel Davis—the airborne

engineers on the left and the artillery battalion on the right.

They encountered strong resistance to the

west of the San Pablo airstrip. After advancing north of the strip, the engineers ran out

of ammunition. The field artillery battalion

went forward to a coconut grove, also to the

north of the airstrip. The gap between the

two units was closed by a strong patrol. Since

the food and ammunition situation remained

uncertain, the composite force went into a

perimeter in defense of San Pablo strip,

where it remained for the next few days.33

Buri Airstrip

On the night of 6-7 December, the Air

Corps service personnel had abruptly quitted

the Buri airfield, leaving behind carbines,

rifles, grenades, small arms ammunition,

and machine guns. 2d Lt. Rudolph Mamula

of the 767th Tank Battalion had been or31

 Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, pp. 67-68;

Flanagan, The Angels, pp. 40-50; 408th Airborne

QM Co, Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 10-11; CG 11th AB

Div to CG XXIV Corps, 2205, 6 Dec 44, XXIV

Corps G-3 Jnl, 7 Dec 44. 32

 Rpt, Capt Charles Bellows to G-3 XXIV Corps,

8 Dec 44, Investigation of Enemy Paratroopers,

XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 8 Dec 44.

33

 127th AB Engr Bn Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 1-2;

Flanagan, The Angels, p. 51.
BATTLE OF THE AIRSTRIPS 303

dered to take charge of the situation, co-ordinate the action of forces on the airstrip, and

recover abandoned armament and ammunition. Apparently he was unsuccessful, because later in the day the Japanese made

"the best use" of the same arms and ammunition. By the middle of the morning, on

7 December, the enemy had completely occupied the Buri airstrip.

In anticipation of the landing of Japanese paratroopers, General Krueger had

requested General MacArthur to release elements of the 38th Division for employment

against the enemy airborne troops. The 38th

Division had arrived on Leyte to stage for

future operations. General Headquarters assigned the 149th Infantry to the control of

the commanding general of the Sixth Army;

two battalions of the 149th Infantry were

in turn released on 6 December to the control of General Hodge, the commanding

general of XXIV Corps, who put them under the operational control of the 11th

Airborne Division for employment against

parachutists in the Burauen area. The remaining battalion of the 149th Infantry was

alerted for the movement in the Burauen

area on twenty-four hours' notice.34

The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 149th

Infantry, 38th Division, were alerted at

0200 on 7 December for movement to the

San Pablo airstrip. The advance elements

of the 1st Battalion were greeted at the San

Pablo airstrip by General Swing, who is reported to have said: "Glad to see you. I am

General Swing of the 11th Airborne Division. We've been having a hell of a time

here. Last night approximately seventy-five

Jap paratroopers dropped on us of which

we have accounted for about fifty. Fifteen

hundred yards from here on an azimuth of

273° is another airstrip just like this one.

Between here and there are about twentyfive Jap troopers. It is now 1400. I want

that strip secure by nightfall."

 35

The commanding officer of the 1st Battalion decided to attack with Companies

A and C abreast, Company A on the right,

with approximately a 200-yard frontage for

each company. A section of heavy machine

guns was attached to each unit, and a platoon of 81-mm. mortars from Company D

was to support the attack from positions on

the San Pablo airstrip.

Moving out at 1430, the troops covered

the first 400 yards without incident but were

stopped by a rain-swollen swamp. Since attempts to bypass the swamp were fruitless,

the men were forced to go through it. The

water was shoulder-high in places, and the

companies lost contact during the crossing.

Company A proceeded to the Buri airstrip,

arriving there about 1630. Company C,

which had been delayed by a slight skirmish

with the enemy, did not arrive until about

1800. Because of the lateness of the hour and

the fact that observation had shown there

were "many more Japanese" on the north of

the airstrip than had been estimated by

General Swing, it was decided to establish

perimeters for the night.36

By the end of 7 December the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry, had established a toe

hold on the southwestern fringe of the Buri

strip. During the day the 1st Battalion,

187th Infantry, northwest of the Bayug airstrip, had received machine gun fire from

an estimated enemy platoon just west of the

Burauen-Dagami road. This enemy force

was contained throughout the day as ad34

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 72.

35

 Maj Martin C. Grigg, The Operations of the

1st Battalion, 149th Infantry ... in the Battle

for the Buri Airstrip . . ., pp. 6-7, OCMH. 36

 Ibid.
304 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

vances were made southeast toward the Buri

airstrip. At 1630 the 1st Battalion, 187th

Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry, established contact at the western

end of the Buri airstrip. The 1st Battalion,

382d Infantry, 96th Division, had been

placed under the control of the 11th Airborne Division. At dusk of 7 December, it

took a position near the 1st Battalion, 149th

Infantry.37 At 2000 the sector was reported

quiet. It was impossible to estimate the total

number of American and Japanese casualties for the day, but it was believed to be

large.38

During the night of 7-8 December, the

Japanese brought forward two machine

guns and emplaced them directly in front of

Company A of the 1st Battalion, 382d Infantry. At dawn the machine guns opened

up. Their low, grazing fire pinned down the

company, but Pfc. Warren G. Perkins, in

the face of enemy bullets, located the guns

and called mortar fire upon the site. The

mortar concentration, falling within fifty

yards of Perkins, silenced the machine guns

and startled the Japanese. Pvt. Ova A. Kelley took advantage of the confusion and

charged with his Ml rifle and a carbine.

Kelley killed eight of the enemy before he

himself was slain.39 The rest of Company A

followed Kelley and secured the edge of the

airstrip where it set up a perimeter. During

8 December the Americans consolidated

their positions.

At 1045 on 9 December the 1st Battalion,

149th Infantry, attacked north with Companies A, B, and C on a line. The companies

got across the airstrip but then came under

fire from Japanese weapons emplaced on

high ground to the north. The 1st Battalion

therefore withdrew to the southern edge of

the strip. During the day it had killed fifty

of an enemy force estimated to consist of two

hundred men. The 2d Battalion remained

in position throughout the day.40

At twilight the assault companies of the

1st Battalion, 382d Infantry, were sent out

in various directions to locate enemy patrols

said to be converging upon the airfield. Only

a few mortar men and headquarters personnel were left behind to guard the perimeters.

At midnight approximately 150 Japanese

attacked. The headquarters and service

troops with rifle fire, together with the mortar men, stopped the charge. They killed

fifty of the enemy and suffered seven

casualties.41

On 10 December, after a half-hour artillery concentration, the 1st Battalion, 149th

Infantry, attacked with Companies A and C

abreast, and Company B in the rear. After

the 1st Battalion had pushed north 300 yards

across the airstrip, Companies A and C

moved northwest while Company B went to

the northeast. The companies cleared the

airfield area of individual riflemen and destroyed small pockets of enemy resistance.

The 1st Battalion went into perimeter at

1700 on the Buri airstrip. The 2d Battalion

remained in position throughout the day.42

At 1930 the Japanese launched their final

concentrated attack against the airfields.

They began to fire at the administration

buildings of the Fifth Air Force, and some of

the bullets went through the plywood walls

of the house of Maj. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead. "The General ducked a bullet, ordered 37

 Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, p. 67. 38

 Rpt, Capt Charles Bellows to G-2 XXIV Corps,

8 Dec 44, Investigation of Enemy Paratroopers,

XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 8 Dec 44. 39

 Private Kelley was posthumously awarded the

Medal of Honor.

40

 149th Inf S-3 Periodic Rpt, 9 Dec 44, 149th

Inf Opns Rpt Leyte. 41

 Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, p. 69. 42

 149th Infantry S-3 Periodic Rpt, 1800, 10 Dec

44, 149th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte.
BATTLE OF THE AIRSTRIPS 305

someone to find out who the blankety-blank

was responsible and that he'd blanketyblank better stop or think up a blanketyblank good reason."

 43

A staff officer immediately started to investigate the situation. He got Lt. Col. Paul

V. Kaessner of the 8th Aviation Signal Battalion on the telephone. The following conversation is reported to have ensued:

"Colonel," he said sternly, "you've got to

stop that promiscuous firing down there immediately!"

"Like to, sir," answered the colonel, "but

the Japs . . ."

"Japs," shouted the staff officer, "that can't

be Japs. That fire is coming from our fifties."

"That's right . . . and the Japs are doing

the shooting!"

"Where in the hell did the Japs get our machine guns?"

"How in hell should I know, sir?"

"The bullets are coming right through the

general's quarters."

"Tell the general to get down on the floor.

Incidentally, that yelling you hear is a Banzai

raid on our mess hall."

 44

The air force personnel were pushed

back until they reached the hospital, where

they halted and held. They then counterattacked and drove the enemy away from

the area. The Japanese left thirty of their

dead behind them.

This action was the last major effort of

the Japanese against the Burauen airfields.

Only a little more than a battalion of the

26th Division, which was to have assisted

the 16th Division, managed to reach the airstrips, and it had arrived in a very disorganized condition. Immediately afterward,

General Suzuki, the commanding general

of the 35th Army, learned that the 77th

Division had landed just below Ormoc on

the eastern coast of Ormoc Bay. Since

Ormoc was the southern entrance to Ormoc

Valley, it was highly important that the

town be defended at all costs. General

Suzuki therefore ordered that the operations

against the Burauen airfields be discontinued

and that all troops repair to Ormoc Valley.

The return through the mountains was difficult. Nearly all organization was lost, and

the Japanese made their way back through

the mountains as scattered individuals.45

The air transports allotted to Tacloban

were destroyed by antiaircraft fire, while

those destined for Dulag crash-landed, killing all their occupants.46

The Japanese had failed to achieve any

major objective. Though they had destroyed

minor fuel and supply dumps and a few

American aircraft, delayed airfield construction, and isolated Fifth Air Force headquarters for five days, they had not appreciably delayed the Leyte operation.47

The Japanese attempt to take the initiative away from the Americans had failed.

The Sixth Army was at the northern and

southern entrances to Ormoc Valley. Elements of the X Corps had been battering

for a long time at the northern portal. With

the capture of Ormoc, the XXIV Corps

had sprung the lock on the southern doorway and was in a position to drive north

and thus relieve some of the pressure being

exerted against the X Corps.

The arrival of the XXIV Corps at the

entrance to Ormoc Valley brought the

critical logistical situation on the island of

Leyte to the fore. The tenuous supply line

already had been stretched very thin, and,

with the 77th Division extending its lines,

a strong possibility existed that it might snap

altogether.

43

 Maj Herbert O. Johansen, "Banzai at Burauen,"

Air Force, Vol. 28, No. 3, March 1945, p. 7. 44 Ibid.

45

 Japanese Studies, 11, p. 86, OCMH. 46

 Air Evaluation Board, SWPA, Leyte Campaign,

p. 174, AAF Archives. 47

 Ibid.
CHAPTER XVIII

Logistics

The conquest of Leyte was taking longer

than had been anticipated. The decision of

the Japanese to make Leyte the decisive battleground of the Philippines had forced the

Americans to commit not only the reserve

32d and 77th Infantry Divisions but also the

112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team,

the 11th Airborne Division, and elements

of the 38th Infantry Division. The inability

of the Americans to establish considerable

land-based air forces on Leyte, as well as

the unexpected Japanese reinforcement program, had retarded the campaign. Not only

was the timetable of future operations in the

Pacific upset, but a strong possibility existed

that it would not be feasible to establish a

major logistical and air base on the island—

the primary purpose of the operation.

The construction program on Leyte was

hampered by conflicting priorities and, as

had been foreseen, very poor terrain, bad

weather conditions, and a shortage of service

personnel.

Construction

Retelling the disagreements and describing the conflicts that arose over the everchanging needs of the Army, Navy, and Air

Forces would be involved, tedious, and unprofitable. But the progress of the construction program must be recounted, since it had

direct bearing not only on the Leyte Campaign but also on the Mindoro and Luzon

operations.

Airfields

The importance of the development of

the airfields cannot be overemphasized. The

inability of the Sixth Army to meet its construction dates on the airstrips, because of

poor soil conditions and heavy rains, prevented the U.S. forces from stopping the

flow of Japanese reinforcements and made

it impossible for the Allied Air Forces to

give sufficient land-based air support to the

ground troops. It also forced a postponement of the Mindoro operation. It is well,

therefore, to summarize just what had been

accomplished in airfield construction.

Work on the Tacloban airstrip had been

handicapped at first by the heavy concentration of troops, supplies, and equipment in

the area during the early stages of the operation. Thereafter, work was further hampered by the insufficient supply of coral for

surfacing the runway and by the very heavy

traffic concentrated on the haul road because of the necessity for unloading cargo

over White Beach. By 25 December, 1 runway, 50 dispersal areas, 536,000 square feet

of alert apron, 1 diagonal taxiway, 1 parallel dispersal taxiway, and 8,943 feet of additional dispersal taxiways had been constructed.
LOGISTICS 307

OPERATIONAL LOSSES AT THE BURAUEN AIRFIELDS forced their abandonment and the construction of the field at Tanauan.

The Dulag airfield was located on the flat

flood plain of the Marabang River. The

difficulties encountered were numerous:

time lost because of excessive rains that

amounted to thirty-five inches in forty days;

air alerts; very poor drainage, which required the construction of a system of dragline trenches to the river; and very poor

access roads. The access roads required an

excessive expenditure of time, labor, and

material in order to maintain traffic to the

airfield. One runway, 2 alert areas with

gravel surface and 2 with mat surface, 1

matted transport parking area, 133 dispersal

areas, and 24,200 feet of dispersal taxiways

were constructed by 25 December.

In the latter part of November all construction work was stopped on the three airfields in the Burauen area, but not before

considerable time and effort had been expended in futile attempts to make the airfields usable.1

 Since these airfields could not

be made serviceable, General Krueger received permission from General MacArthur

to construct an airfield in the Tanauan area,

and moved his headquarters from Tanauan

to Tologosa on 28 November in order that

construction might be started. The new site

had a good sandy surface, its drainage was

satisfactory, and it proved to be an excellent

location for an airfield. By 16 December the

field became operational, and by the 25th

there had been completed 1 runway with

mat surfacing, 1 overrun, 90,000 square

feet of warm-up area, 120,000 square feet of

1

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 233.
308 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

alert apron, 1 parallel taxiway, and 26 large

dispersal areas.2

Roads

The rehabilitation of roads presented

problems as vexatious as those in airfield

construction. In southern Leyte Valley, the

road that ran from Dulag through Burauen

to Dagami soon became impassable for

about two miles on each side of Burauen.

This section of the road was completely rebuilt by dumping approximately three feet

of gravel over it. The remainder of the road

was kept open most of the time by permitting

only one-way traffic. The other roads were

just as bad. After heavy rains the road in

the Army Service Command area was frequently under at least two feet of water. The

streets in Tacloban disintegrated so rapidly

that much engineer effort was required to

keep them open. Such maintenance was

necessary to assure continued operation of

the many supply and administrative facilities located in the city.3

 The roads on the

west coast were, if possible, even worse.

Upkeep of the roads in general required a

"profligate expenditure of engineer troops."

It was found that a battalion could accomplish no more in a month than a platoon

could have carried out in a week under good

weather conditions. The roads required a

rock or gravel foundation one to three feet

thick, whereas a road-metal surface of three

to four inches on an earth base was normally adequate. Since priority was given to

work on the principal roads and airfields,

the construction of access roads, as well as

hardstands for hospitals, depots, and other

needed installations was greatly delayed. In

this connection General Krueger stated:

"This, in turn, greatly affected the supply

situation, including construction materials,

by lack of access to the depots, lack of storage space into which to discharge ships, and

lack of facilities and spare parts to permit

repair and servicing of engineer heavy

equipment as well as other critical transportation and combat vehicles."

 4

On 21 December General Krueger estimated that after the elimination of certain

projects on which informal agreements had

been reached, the extent of completion by

5 January of the other projects would be as

follows: main supply roads, 50 percent;

access roads, 20 percent; Air Forces installations (exclusive of air depot and assembly

plants), 44 percent; hospitals, 40 percent;

base supply and services, 25 percent; oil and

aviation gasoline storage (exclusive of naval

oil storage which had not been started), 50

percent; Navy installations, 20 percent; and

headquarters construction, 40 percent.5 The

gloomy prognostications of Sixth Army engineers had proven all too true.

Supplies

Inland Movement of Supplies

As the roads on Leyte became more and

more unserviceable, greater reliance was

placed on the use of naval vessels to transport supplies and personnel to various parts

of the island. The Transportation Section,

Sixth Army, maintained a small-boat pool

that was used extensively to transport light

cargo and personnel between Tacloban, San

Ricardo, Palo, Tanauan, Tolosa, Dulag, and

2

 Ibid., pp. 69, 233. 3

 Ibid., p. 233.

4

 Ltr, CG Sixth Army to CINCSWPA, sub: Construction Program, 21 Dec 44, Sixth Army G-4

Jnl, 24 Dec 41. 5

 Ibid.
APPROACH ROAD TO QUARTERMASTER SERVICE CENTER at Tacloban

after a heavy rain (above). The 7th Cavalry motor pool on 17 December 1944 (below).
310 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

TABLE 2—SHIPPING TONNAGE DISCHARGED IN LEYTE-SAMAR AREA, 28 OCTOBER-25

DECEMBER 1944

Catmon Hill.6 LCM's were widely employed

on the northern and eastern coasts of the

island and LSM's operated on the west

coast.7 (Table 2)

The troops that were fighting in the

mountains were frequently supplied by airdrops by the 11th Air Cargo Resupply

Squadron from supplies that were available

in the Leyte area. From about the middle of

November until the latter part of December,

1,167,818 pounds of supplies were either

dropped or delivered by air. (Table 3) Two

hundred and eighty-two plane loads of supplies were dropped, a total of 2,776 parachutes being used. Because of the nature of

the terrain and the proximity of the Japanese, the proportion of airdropped supplies

that could be recovered varied from 65 to

90 percent. Approximately 60 percent of the

parachutes were recovered and returned to

the 11th Air Cargo Resupply Squadron.8

Supplying the West Coast

The landing of the 77th Division on the

west coast of Leyte brought into sharper

focus the difficult job of giving adequate

logistical support to the tactical units. The

Sixth Army supply lines were tenuous. There

was a shortage of shipping, and furnishing

supplies to the troops fighting in the mountains was especially difficult.

In planning for the amphibious movement of the 77th Division, the resupply shipping set up for the division was as follows:

on 9 December, two days after the division's

landing at Deposito, 12 LSM's and 4 LCI's

would bring in supplies; on 11 December,

12 LSM's and 5 LCI's would bring in additional supplies; and on 13 December 12

LSM's and 4 LCI's would carry further

supplies to the division. Thereafter, 3 LSM's

would be assigned the task of supplying the

77th Division.9

6

 Rpt of Transportation Off, Sixth Army Opns

Rpt Leyte, p. 270. 7

 Ibid.

8

 G-4 Rpt, Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 218.

9

 Msg, G-3 XXIV Corps to G-4 XXIV Corps,

n. d. (probably 4 Dec 44), XXIV Corps G-4 Jnl,

Annex, Vol. III.
LOGISTICS 311

TABLE 3—AIRDROPS BY 11TH AIR CARGO RESUPPLY SQUADRON, 11 NOVEMBER-25 DECEMBER

1944

Source: Report of Transportation Officer, Sixth Army Operations Report Leyte, p. 271.

The Japanese had sunk two LSM's near

Baybay on 4 December and damaged several other vessels during the Deposito landing.10

 Because of the extreme shortage of

shipping that resulted, General Hodge suggested to General Bruce on 8 December that

thirty trucks, which had been scheduled for

delivery on the first two convoys of resupply

shipping, be sent overland along the

Abuyog-Baybay mountain road and used

to shuttle supplies of the division between

the two towns. These supplies could be sent

forward to the 77th Division when its beachhead merged with that of the 7th Division.11

On the following day the first resupply for

the 77th division left Abuyog in a convoy of

trucks which went over the mountains to

Baybay, where LCM's took the cargo and

moved it to the area of the 77th Division.12

At 2100 on 10 December, General Hodge

notified General Bruce that the second echelon of resupply was to arrive at 2359 on the

following day at any beach that General

Bruce desired. The supplies consisted of

10

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 79.

11

 Msg, CG XXIV Corps to CG 77th Div, 8 Dec

44, XXIV Corps G-4 Jnl, Annex, Vol. III. 12

 Msg, CG XXIV Corps to Col Gillette, 9 Dec

44, XXIV Corps G-4 Jnl, Annex, Vol. III.
312 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

40,000 rations, 1,000 gallons of 80-octane

gasoline, 500 gallons of diesel oil, 100 tons

of ammunition, and 10 tons of medical supplies. Certain tactical and service units were

also to be sent forward. The third echelon,

which was scheduled to arrive on the west

coast on the night of 14-15 December, was

to consist of the remaining units of the 77th

Division and "considerable resupply."

 13

As the tide of battle swept the 77th Division farther northward, its line of supply and

that of the 7th Division became very thin.

About 15 December the supply officer of the

XXIV Corps summarized the situation to

the corps chief of staff. Between 19 and 25

December three resupply echelons, consisting of twenty-four LSM's and five LCI's

carrying 3,250 tons of supplies, were to arrive on the west coast. He believed this

amount was insufficient. According to his

calculations, the daily requirements for two

divisions in heavy fighting were 500 tons of

supplies. He estimated that the supplies of

the 77th Division could not last beyond 18

December. By 19 December the division

would be in short supply unless 100 truck

loads of supplies could be sent over the

mountains before that time. The convoy that

was to go forward on the 19th would carry

only two days' supplies and there would be a

three-day interval before the arrival of the

next convoy. The XXIV Corps, therefore,

was faced with the problem of moving 200

truck loads of supplies during those three

days merely to keep even. After 25 December, one and a half days' supply would be

sent overwater every three days. Since the

supply officer of the XXIV Corps had strong

doubts that the road would stand "a movement involving 300 trucks every three days"

it was believed that the supply situation

would steadily worsen.14

On 15 December General Krueger sent a

radio message to Admiral Kinkaid reviewing

the critical supply situation and requesting

that sufficient amphibious shipping be made

available immediately to carry supplies to

the forces on the west coast. Admiral Kinkaid acquiesced, and on 22 December a

resupply convoy arrived at Ormoc with

"sufficient supplies and equipment to alleviate the critical situation."

 15

By 26 December a general level of five to

ten days' supply of all classes had been built

up, a level that was maintained throughout

the rest of the operation. The XXIV Corps

utilized to the maximum the available space

on the LSM convoys, and units on the west

coast employed all available motor transportation to supplement the tonnage on the

convoys. Finally, the supplies were pooled

in dumps at Ipil and Ormoc and then allotted to the units.

On 25 December General Hodge received

a Christmas message from his supply officer:

"Best wishes for Merry Xmas and a New

Year filled with supplies, resupplies, more

supplies and no supply worries."

 16

The serious logistical situation was to

affect definitely the progress of the Sixth

Army as it fought its way into Ormoc Valley—the last important enemy stronghold

on the island.

13

 Msg, CG XXIV Corps to CG 77th Div, 10 Dec

44, XXIV Corps G-4 Jnl, Annex, Vol. III.

14

 Memo, G-4 XXIV Corps to CofS XXIV Corps,

n.d. (probably 15 Dec 44), XXIV Corps G-4 Jnl,

Annex, Vol. IV. 15

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 80. 16

 XXIV Corps G-4 Jnl, 25 Dec 44.
CHAPTER XIX

The Entrances to Ormoc Valley

General Bruce's quick exploitation of the

surprise landing of the 77th Division just

below Ormoc had resulted in the capture of

Ormoc on 10 December. With each successive advance, he had displaced his entire

division forward. General Bruce, as he

phrased it, preferred to "drag his tail up the

beach."

 1

With the seizure of Ormoc, General

Krueger's Sixth Army had driven the main

elements of the Japanese 35th Army into

Ormoc Valley. The Japanese were caught in

the jaws of a trap—the 1st Cavalry Division

and the 32d Infantry Division were closing

in from the north and the 77th Infantry

Division from the south. General Krueger

ordered the X and XXIV Corps to close

this trap upon the Japanese.

Southern Entrance to Ormoc Valley

Japanese Plans

When General Suzuki, the commander of

the Japanese 35th Army, ordered the action

against the Burauen airfields, his anticipations had been high. Accompanied by his

chief of staff and six other staff officers, he

had gone to the headquarters of the 26th

Division, in the mountains near Lubi, in

order to supervise the operation personally.

General Tomochika, the deputy chief of

staff, remained at Ormoc because of the advance of the Americans up the west coast,

and took command of operations in the

area.

A mixed battalion, consisting of four companies, reinforced the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment. This regiment, under

Colonel Imahori, was to be prepared at a

moment's notice for action in the Ormoc

sector.2 The 16th and 26th Divisions received orders to retreat westward and establish defensive positions in the Ormoc Valley.

The 16th Division, which had less than 200

men, had ceased to exist as a fighting unit.

The Japanese decided that henceforward

their operations would be strictly defensive.

The 26th Division started to withdraw

through the mountains, but its orders to retreat were very hard to carry out. The Americans had blocked the road, and the 11th

Airborne Division units, which had advanced west from Burauen, were attacking

in the vicinity of Lubi. As a result, the staff

officers of General Suzuki's 35th Army "disbanded and scattered." General Suzuki

passed through the American lines and

reached the command post at Huaton, four

miles north of Ormoc, on 13 December; his

chief of staff arrived there the following day.

As for the 26th Division, "all contact with 1

 Maj Charles V. McLoughlin, Operations of the

XXIV Corps in the Invasion of Leyte Island, pp.

29-30. Advanced Infantry Officers' Course, 1947-

48, Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga. 2

 35th Army Opns, p. 86.
314 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

the Division was lost by Army Headquarters

until the early part of March."

 3

In the meantime General Tomochika had

prepared new plans. On 6 December he

was told by a staff officer of the 1st Division,

which was fighting the 32d Division in the

north, that the 1st Division had "reached

the stage of collapse."

 4 The mission of the

1st Division was then changed to one of

defense. Colonel Imahori by the night of

7 December had sent two companies south.5

These companies, known as the Kamijo

Battalion, were destroyed at Ipil by the

77th Division in its march to Ormoc.

Colonel Imahori, fearful that the rest of his

detachment would suffer the same fate,

ordered his main force, the Tateishi and

Maeda Battalions, to construct positions

north of Ormoc. The remnants of the

Kamijo Battalion established a position

northeast of Ormoc. In his plan for the

parachute attack on the Burauen airfields,

General Suzuki had decided to use as a part

of his attacking force the 4th Air Raiding

Landing Unit. In view of the unfavorable

situation that had developed, the 14th Area

Army commander, General Yamashita, decided that after the 4th Air Raiding Landing Unit landed at the Valencia airfield it

was to be kept in the Ormoc area. From 8

to 13 December approximately 500 men

from the unit arrived in the Ormoc area,

and were attached to the Imahori Detachment. They had traveled only at dawn or

dusk to avoid detection.

At the same time, "in order to ease the

difficult Leyte Island Operation," General

Yamashita dispatched from Luzon to assist

the troops in the Ormoc sector the Takahashi Detachment, composed of the 5th Infantry Regiment of the 8th Division, an

artillery battalion, a company of engineers,

a transportation company, and a Special

Naval Landing Force of 400 men with four

light tanks and sixteen trench mortars. In

order to suppress the guerrillas, who were

active in the Camotes Islands off the west

coast of Leyte and who were guarding the

entrance to Ormoc Bay, the area army commander ordered a detachment, known as

the Camotes Detachment, to those islands.

This detachment was composed of one battalion (less two companies) of the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, an artillery battery, and an engineering platoon.

The transports carrying the troops to the

Ormoc area underwent a severe aerial bombardment from American aircraft. As a consequence, only the Special Naval Landing

Force arrived at its target. On the same day

the transports carrying the Takahashi and

Camotes Detachments were forced to put in

at Palompon on the west coast. The subsequent advance of these detachments toward

Ormoc was greatly delayed.

On 9 December the 77th Infantry Regiment, the last of the Japanese reinforcements for Leyte, landed at Palompon and

moved to Matagob. General Suzuki intended to assemble and integrate these units

and to launch a counteroffensive against

Ormoc starting on 17 December.6

3

 Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 25;

14th Area Army Opns Leyte, p. 13. 4

 Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 25. 5

 General Tomochika was unqualified in his praise

of the commander of the Imahori Detachment. He

said, "Colonel Imahori had good personality and

was a good leader. His subordinates were willing

to join the suicide squads when the American forces

increased in number. We did not have any worries

about the attacking Americans on this detachment's

front because the suicide squads brought good results . . . Ibid., pp. 19-20. 6

 35th Army Opns, pp. 87-89.
THE ENTRANCES TO ORMOC VALLEY 315

HEAVY MACHINE GUNS COVER CROSSING of the Antilao River by men of the

77th Division at Ormoc.

Cogon Defenses

On 10 December General Bruce devised

a new scheme of maneuver: the 77th Division was to break loose from its base and use

Indian warfare or blockhouse tactics. At

night each "fort" was to establish an allround defense from any Japanese night attacks. In the daytime, an armed convoy was

to go "from fort to fort." The Filipino guerrillas were to guard the bridges and furnish

intelligence.7

By nightfall of 10 December the 77th

Division had cleared Ormoc. (See Map 17.)

The front lines of the 307th Infantry were

on the western outskirts of the town along

the bank of the Antilao River, a stream

which flows past the entire western side of

Ormoc. At the city's northern edge the river

is crossed by Highway 2, which then proceeds directly north about 300 yards west

of the river and parallel to it for a distance

of about 1,000 yards. The 306th Infantry

on the right of the 307th Infantry had come

abreast of that regiment at twilight.

General Bruce's plan for 11 December

provided for a limited attack north to enable the division to straighten out its lines.

The 305th Infantry in the afternoon would

come between the 306th Infantry on the

right and the 307th Infantry on the left.

The 305th Infantry was to be prepared to

attack on the morning of 12 December with

battalions abreast, one on each side of the

highway.8

7

 Ltr, Gen Bruce to Gen Ward, 16 Aug 51,

OCMH. 8

 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 11 Dec 44.
316 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

At 0930 on 11 December the 306th and

307th Infantry Regiments jumped off with

the 307th Infantry on the left. The assault

battalions of the 307th Infantry and the 1st

Battalion, 306th Infantry, attempted to cross

the Antilao River but came under heavy fire

and were pinned down.

The fire came from a well-fortified position of the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment on the north bank of the river at

Cogon, a small barrio on Highway 2 just

north of Ormoc. The enemy position was on

a small elevated plateau, adjacent to Highway 2, overlooking the river to the south and

rice paddies to the east and west. Innumerable spider holes had been constructed

throughout the area. The principal defensive

position, slightly east of Cogon, was in the

vicinity of a three-story reinforced concrete

building that had been converted into a

blockhouse. The well-camouflaged positions, with the exception of the fortress, were

so situated in the underbrush and the

waist-high cogon grass that it was impossible

to detect them at a distance of more than

ten feet. From these positions the Japanese

could command the bridge over the Antilao

River and deny the U.S. troops the use of

Highway 2 to the north. An estimated reinforced battalion with machine guns, antitank guns, and field pieces, together with

small arms, defended the area.

The artillery fired on the enemy front

lines, which were only twenty-five yards in

front of the American assault troops, but

failed to dislodge the Japanese. The assault

battalions of the 307th Infantry and the 1st

Battalion, 306th Infantry, thereupon delivered point-blank fire from their tank destroyer guns, amphibian tank guns, light

and medium machine guns, and infantry

weapons on the Japanese position but still

could not overcome it. The lack of shipping

had prevented the division from taking its

medium tanks with it. Unable to move forward, the battalions established their front

lines and perimeters for the night along a

line just north of Ormoc.

On the division's right, the 3d Battalion,

306th Infantry, moved forward against increasingly strong resistance from the 12th

Independent Infantry Regiment. After advancing about 1,000 yards the 3d Battalion

encountered a well-entrenched position. Elements of the 12th Independent Infantry

Regiment had dug in on a steep ridge in

front of which was a deep ravine. Eight hundred yards of rice paddies lay between this

position and the one opposing the other

battalions, though both positions were part

of the same defensive system. The artillery

placed fire upon the ridge. Although able to

utilize only a company and a half against

the enemy position, the 3d Battalion, under

cover of the artillery fire, attacked and succeeded in gaining a foothold on the ridge.

The 12th Independent Infantry Regiment

at the same time directed two unsuccessful

counterattacks against the right flank and

rear of the 3d Battalion. Since the forward

elements on the ridge were vulnerable and

any further advance would have exposed

both flanks of the 3d Battalion, the commanding officer of the 306th Infantry at

1600 ordered the 3d Battalion to withdraw

the forward units on the enemy-held ridge

and consolidate its position.9

At 1600 the 2d and 3d Battalions, 305th

Infantry, moved north of Ormoc and took

up the position held by the 1st Battalion,

306th Infantry, between the 307th Infantry

9

 77th Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 15, 11 Dec 44; Company A, 88th Chemical Bn, Jnl, 10 Dec 44; 306th

Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 8; 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte,

p. 18; 307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5; 77th Div

G-3 Jnl, 11 Dec 44; 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 17,

12 Dec 44.
THE ENTRANCES TO ORMOC VALLEY 317

on the left and the 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry, on the right. The relieved battalion

was ordered to take a position to reinforce

the 2d and 3d Battalions, 306th Infantry.

The 1st Battalion, 305th Infantry, remained

just south of Camp Downes as the extreme

right flank of the 77th Division.10

In his plan for the drive of the XXIV

Corps up Ormoc Valley, General Hodge

ordered the 7th Division to "continue the

attack as directed and coordinated" by

General Bruce.11 To strengthen the Ormoc

defenses, elements of the 7th Division were

scheduled to be brought forward. General

Bruce planned to attack daily towards Valencia, which was about six and a half miles

north of Ormoc. The 77th Division would

eventually cut loose from the Ormoc defenses and take up each night an all-round

defense. The supply convoy, protected by

strong guards, would move along Highway

2 and measure its advance by that of the

assault units. The 305th Infantry was to

proceed along Highway 2 and the 306th

Infantry, while protecting the division right

flank, was to be prepared to proceed 2,000

to 3,000 yards east of Highway 2, move

north through the hills to a point due east

of Valencia, and then turn west across Highway 2 and capture that town. The 307th

Infantry, while protecting the division left

flank, was to be prepared to relieve the

305th Infantry. The artillery of the division

at the outset was to support the advance

from Ormoc and eventually move with the

forward element of the 77th Division when

the latter cut loose from the Ormoc sector.12

Enemy Night Landings

At 2330 on 11 December the 77th Division beach defense units observed a Japanese

convoy, which was transporting the Special

Naval Landing Force, steaming into Ormoc

Bay with the apparent intention of landing

at Ormoc. The Japanese evidently thought

that Ormoc was still in their hands. The first

craft noticed by the U.S. forces was a landing barge with about fifty men, heading

directly for the Ormoc pier. By the time the

barge came within range of the shore weapons, all shore units were alert and waited

with guns trained upon it. They withheld

their fire until the barge was within fifty

yards of the pier and then all weapons converged their fires upon the craft. The first

rounds squarely hit the barge, which immediately burst into flames. The Japanese

clambered atop the gunwales and are reported to have screamed, "Don't shoot,"

under the mistaken notion that their forces

still occupied Ormoc.

The harbor was lit up by the burning

barge and 60-mm. illuminating shells. During the night the Americans discovered that

another enemy vessel, about the size of an

LST, had pulled into shore northwest of the

town under cover of darkness and was busily

engaged in discharging troops and equipment. The tank destroyer guns of the 307th

Infantry, emplaced along the beach within

1,000 yards of the vessel, opened fire on it

while forward observers from the 902d Field

Artillery Battalion directed artillery fire

upon the landing area and inland. The

enemy vessel attempted to pull out to sea,

but after proceeding less than fifty yards it

burst into flames and sank. About 150 men,

two tanks, a number of rifles, mortars, and

machine guns, and a quantity of ammunition had been unloaded before the vessel

10

 305th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2; 306th Inf

Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 8; 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte,

p. 18; 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 17, 12 Dec 44. 11

 XXIV Corps FO 33, 4 Dec 44. 12

 Ltr, CG 77th Div to CG XXIV Corps, sub:

Future Plans, 11 Dec 44, 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 12

Dec 44.
318 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

sank, but most of the supplies, including

four ammunition trucks, had been destroyed

by American fire while the vessel was unloading.

The early dawn of 12 December revealed

another ship of the same type farther west

near Linao. The artillery, mortars, and tank

destroyer guns opened up against this vessel

as it fled along the shores of Ormoc Bay, and

their fire followed until it was out of range.

Before the fire ceased, heavy clouds of smoke

billowed from the vessel as it moved at a

snail's pace. During the night the American

fire had to be closely co-ordinated, since

American vessels, including a resupply convoy, were in the bay. Not a single U. S. craft

was damaged.

Troops of the Special Naval Landing

Force who had disembarked got in touch

with Colonel Imahori, who immediately ordered them to go to Highway 2 as the reserve unit of the 12th Independent Infantry

Regiment. It was impossible for them to

carry out the order, since the 77th Division

had advanced north from Ormoc. They

thereupon decided to join a naval airfield

construction unit at Valencia, but again they

failed. In the latter part of December, the

men of the Special Naval Landing Force

were in the eastern part of the Palompon

area without having taken part in the battle

for the Ormoc corridor.13

Battle of the Blockhouse

Because the fighting on the previous day

had been extremely intense, General Bruce

on 12 December consolidated his positions

and brought forward supplies and supporting artillery. The front-line units sent out

strong combat and reconnaissance patrols to

the front and flanks to secure information

on the dispositions of the Japanese."14

Throughout the day and night the artillery

battalions of the division placed harassing

and interdiction fires on the enemy positions

across the Antilao River.15

The 902d and 305th Field Artillery Battalions, two batteries of the 304th Field Artillery Battalion, and one battery of 155-mm.

howitzers from the 306th Field Artillery

Battalion fired continuously for five minutes

on the morning of 13 December at the

enemy position in front of the 305th Infantry. So intense was the fire that the enemy

soldiers were bewildered and streamed toward the front lines of the division where

they were cut down in great numbers by

machine gun and small arms fire. The Japanese in and around the concrete building,

however, lay low and weathered the barrage.

General Bruce attached Col. Paul L.

Freeman, an observer from the War Department General Staff, to the 305th Infantry.

Colonel Freeman was made the commander

of a special attack force, consisting of Companies E and L, which was to storm the

blockhouse. The 305th Infantry, which was

to make the main effort, had the 3d Battalion on the right of Highway 2 and the 2d

and 1st Battalions on the left of the road.

The 3d Battalion in a column of companies

moved out at 0830. In support of the 305th

Infantry, the 2d Platoon, Company A, 88th

Chemical Battalion, fired on and silenced

two enemy machine guns. The Japanese

held their fire until the infantrymen were

upon them, making it necessary for the artillery to fire at very close range. The fire from

the 305th Field Artillery Battalion came to

13

 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 18-19; 305th

Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5; 35th Army Opns, p 8.

14

 77th Div G-2 Jnl, 13 Dec 44. 15

 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 20-
THE ENTRANCES TO ORMOC VALLEY 319

within fifty yards of the American front

lines.

After Company I, the lead company,

reached the ridge at 0925, K Company

moved up and attempted to consolidate the

3d Battalion's position by making an oblique

turn to the right flank of Company I. It was

hit at 1155 by the first of five counterattacks

by the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment. The enemy preceded the infantry assault by artillery, mortar, and automatic

weapons fire. The 3d Battalion estimated

the enemy force to be a reinforced battalion.

All of the counterattacks were driven off

with heavy casualties on both sides.

The 2d Battalion, 305th Infantry, on the

left of the highway, jumped off at 0830 in a

column of companies, Company F leading.

At 0845 the troops ran into concentrated

automatic weapons fire, which pinned them

down. Company G moved around the left

flank of Company F and also came under

heavy fire. A Japanese force estimated as

two reinforced companies opposed Companies F and G. With the right flank of

Company F on the blockhouse, the 2d Battalion pivoted on this point until the line ran

in a generally northern direction from the

blockhouse and faced toward the east. The

1st Battalion faced north and tied in with

the 307th Infantry on its left. Colonel Freeman's special attack force was unable to

move forward. The 3d Battalion held the

commanding ground east of Highway 2.

The battalions of the 305th Infantry arranged co-ordinating fires that covered all

open spaces.16

The 307th Infantry moved westward

along the Ormoc-Linao road to forestall

any enemy reinforcements and counterattacks from that direction. The troops encountered few Japanese. The 307th Infantry in its advance of 1,000 yards took the

barrio of Linao and captured three artillery

pieces and two antiaircraft guns, as well as

ammunition for those weapons.17

The 306th Infantry, protecting the right

flank of the 305th, received no opposition

during the day but assisted the attack of the

305th Infantry by fire. Patrols of the 306th

Infantry explored the area in the vicinity of

Donghol, about two miles northeast of Ormoc, but made no contact with the enemy.18

Although the 77th Division had extended

its western boundary during the day by

about 1,000 yards, the front lines in the

center remained generally where they had

been in the morning. The 1st and 2d Platoons of Company A, 88th Chemical Battalion, laid a continuous smoke screen in

front of the troops from 0930 to 1630, enabling the aid men to remove the wounded

from the front lines and carry them to the

rear.19

During the night of 13-14 December the

artillery of the 77th Division delivered harassing and interdiction fires to the front,

the principal target being the concrete house

that had withstood the onslaught of the previous two days. The 1st Battalion, 305th

Infantry, received enemy mortar fire during

the night, and both it and the 2d Battalion

received light machine gun fire in the early

morning hours. The 2d Battalion destroyed

one machine gun with mortar fire.

At 0930 on 14 December Colonel Freeman prepared his special assault force to

16

 307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 3-4; Company

A, 88th Chem Bn, Jnl, 0900, 13 Dec 44; 77th Div

Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 20-21; 77th Div Arty Opns

Rpt Leyte, p. 5; 77th Div G-2 Jnl, 13 Dec 44.

17

 307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5; 77th Div

Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 21; 77th Div G-2 Jnl, 0850,

13 Dec 44. 18

 306th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 8; 77th Div Opns

Rpt Leyte, p. 21. 19

 Company A, 88th Chem Bn, Jnl, 0930, 1000,

13 Dec 44; 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 21.
320 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

renew the attack. Before the jump-off, artillery and mortars laid their fire on the blockhouse and beyond. Under cover of artillery

fire the troops cautiously moved out at 1030

with Company L on the right and by 1105

they had advanced 100 yards. Company L

knocked out two pillboxes with flame

throwers and a tank destroyer gun. Company E found every step of the way contested. The troops used hand grenades and

bayonets and literally forced the enemy out

of the foxholes in tough hand-to-hand

fighting.20 Capt. Robert B. Nett, the commanding officer of Company E, although

seriously wounded, refused to relinquish his

command. He led his company forward and

killed seven Japanese with his rifle and

bayonet. Captain Nett was awarded the

Medal of Honor.

While Company E was so engaged, Company L on its right advanced through dense

foliage and burnt the Japanese out of their

foxholes and the bamboo thicket with flame

throwers. The company was assisted by

armored bulldozers from the 302d Engineers. For a hundred yards on all sides of

the blockhouse, the enemy had dug many

deep foxholes only a few yards apart. All

the foxholes were covered, some with coconut logs and earth, and others with improvised lids of metal and earth. One was

protected by an upturned bathtub. The

armored bulldozer drove over the positions,

its blades cutting off the tops of the foxholes,

after which small arms fire into the holes

killed the occupants. The crews of the tank

destroyers not only fired point-blank at

targets but opened the escape hatches and

dropped grenades into the foxholes.21 At

1240 the blockhouse, or what remained of

it, was secured.

In the meantime the 1st Battalion, 305th

Infantry, flanked the blockhouse at 1225

and wheeled 1,000 yards to the east, cutting

off the enemy line of communications on

Highway 2. The 3d Battalion, 305th Infantry, remained on the high ground. By

1510 the crossroad north of Ormoc was

taken. At the end of the day, the front lines

of the 305th Infantry ran south to north

along Highway 2 with Company L in the

blockhouse sector. A large pocket of the enemy, which had been bypassed by the 1st

Battalion, was centered generally in front

of the 2d Battalion. The 307th Infantry was

on the left flank of the 305th, while the 1st

Battalion, 184th Infantry, which had relieved the 306th Infantry, was on the right

flank in Ormoc.22

During the day the 307th Infantry continued its mission of protecting the left flank

of the 77th Division in its northward advance and sent patrols and a strong reconnaissance force, consisting of two reinforced

rifle companies, one dismounted cannon

platoon, and four tanks, west to the banks

of an unnamed river near Jalubon. The reconnaissance force killed twenty-one of the

enemy, also capturing and destroying great

quantities of Japanese materiel and supplies. By the time the perimeter of the 307th

Infantry was established in the late afternoon of 14 December, as reported by General Bruce, "the coast line from Ormoc to

Jalubon was dotted with fires and the explosions of burning Japanese ammunition

dumps."

 23

20

 305th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5. 21Ltr, Gen Bruce to Gen Ward, 16 Aug 51,

OCMH.

22

 305th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5; 77th Div G-3

Periodic Rpt 20, 15 Dec 44: 77th Div Opns Rpt

Leyte, p. 22; 77th Div G-2 Summary Leyte Opn,

p. 2; 77th Div Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5. 23

 "This force succeeded in destroying 6 amphibious tanks, 7 landing barges, 1 eighty-foot twomasted schooner, 50 tons of ammunition, approximately twenty-five tons of miscellaneous supplies,

4 40-mm. AA guns, 4 20-mm. AA guns, 1 77-mm.
THE ENTRANCES TO ORMOC VALLEY 321

Two other patrols, composed of volunteers from the 306th and 307th InfantryRegiments, reconnoitered approximately

3,000 yards to the west of the 307th Infantry for possible trails for a wide envelopment.24

 These patrols met only scattered

groups of the enemy and advanced within

2,000 yards of Valencia, returning with the

information that an envelopment was

feasible.25 During the day the 184th Infantry relieved the 306th Infantry of its

mission of holding the coastal defenses,

freeing the latter unit for an enveloping

movement to the north.

On 15 December the 77th Division consolidated its lines and sent out small patrols.

The enemy continued to be very active in the

sector of the 305th Infantry. During the

night the artillery operating in the 1st Battalion sector knocked out four 21⁄2 -ton

trucks and killed seventeen of the enemy,

while the 2d Battalion beat off two Japanese counterattacks. In the 3d Battalion

sector all was quiet.

By 15 December the port of Ormoc had

been sealed off. It was through this port that

the Japanese had sent in a profusion of men,

supplies, and equipment, thus prolonging

the battle for the island beyond the time anticipated in the original American plans for

the operation. The 77th Division estimated

that for the period from 11 through 15 December it had taken 9 prisoners and killed

3,046 of the enemy.26 Its own casualties

were 2 officers and 101 enlisted men killed,

22 officers and 296 enlisted men wounded,

and 26 enlisted men missing in action.27

The Mountain Passage

As a result of General Suzuki's abortive

attempt to seize the Burauen airfields, a

number of Japanese soldiers remained in the

mountains west of Burauen. Most of these

were from the 26th Division and they were

trying to rejoin the main part of the 35th

Army in Ormoc Valley. Earlier, the 11th

Airborne Division had started out over the

mountains from Burauen in order to relieve

enemy pressure on the eastern flank of the

XXIV Corps in its drive toward Ormoc.

(Map 19)

Mahonag

Just west of Burauen the central mountain range rises abruptly from Leyte Valley

to peaks that are 4,000 feet or more in height.

Many of the deep, precipitous gorges were

impassable even for foot soldiers. No roads

went through the mountains but there were

short footpaths from one locality to another.

Some of these trails led over boulder-strewn,

swiftly running streams and frequently

bridged deep gorges with a single log where

a slip meant a drop of thirty to forty feet.

The paths were often so steep that footholds

had to be cut into the hillsides, and soldiers

were forced to use their hands to avoid falling as much as forty to a hundred feet.28

dual purpose gun [probably a 75-mm. gun], several

machine guns, a radio transmitter and generator, 1

seacoast range finder and had burnt about half the

town of Linao in order to destroy Japanese positions

dug in that vicinity. . . .

Although the force was unable to carry back

much of the equipment it captured owing to its

small size and the necessity of mobility, it managed

to return 1 seacoast range finder, 1 large radio transmitter and 2 20-mm. AA guns." 77th Div Opns Rpt

Leyte, p. 23. 24

 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 22. 2 5 Ibid., pp. 22-23; 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt

20, 15 Dec 44; 306th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9;

307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9.

26

 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpts Nos. 17-21, 13-16

Dec 44. 27

 77th Div G-l Daily Strength Rpts, 11-15

Dec 44. 28

 188th Prcht Regt Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 1.
322 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

MAP 19

On 25 November the 511th Parachute

Infantry Regiment moved west from Burauen for Mahonag, ten miles away. The

almost impassable terrain, heavy rainfall,

and pockets of lurking Japanese made passage very difficult. It was impossible for the

regiment to move as a unit. In small parties,

sometimes even less than a squad, the 511th

moved forward. "The journey to Mahonag

defies description. Sucking mud, jungle

vines, and vertical inclines exhausted men

before they had marched an hour. Though

it rained often during any one trip, still there

was no drinking water available throughout

the journey."29 The 3d Battalion, 511th

Parachute Infantry Regiment, after considerable hardship entered Mahonag on 6 December.30

On 9 December the 2d Battalion, though

encountering heavy fire from enemy machine guns, mortars, and rifles, pushed

steadily forward and established contact

with the other units of the 511th Parachute

Infantry Regiment at Mahonag. For several

days thereafter, this regiment was busily engaged in sending out patrols. Company G,

patrolling in force for two miles to the front,

was cut off from the rest of the regiment,

which was held down because of strong

enemy action. On 13 December the 32d Infantry pushed northeast from Ormoc Bay

in an effort to make juncture with the 11th

Airborne Division and assist it in moving

out of the mountains.

Drive of 32d Infantry

The 32d Infantry also encountered very

precipitous hills and its advance was bitterly

contested by the Japanese. By the evening of

14 December the regiment had considerably

reduced the distance between itself and the

511th Parachute Infantry.

At 0700 on 15 December, as the 3d Battalion was moving out, a patrol of six men

from Company G, 511th Parachute Infantry, entered the battalion's lines. The rest of

Company G was only 700 yards east of the

ridge. The patrol reported that Company G

had been cut off from the rest of the regiment for four days and was without food.

29

 511th Prcht Inf Regt Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6;

11th Airborne Div Special Study Leyte, p. 5. 30

 During the movement Pvt. Elmer E. Fryar of

Company E was killed on 7 December when he voluntarily got in the way of enemy fire in order to

shield his platoon leader. Private Fryar posthumously received the Medal of Honor.
THE ENTRANCES TO ORMOC VALLEY 323

The 3d Battalion encountered only slight

resistance and at 0950 was on top of the

ridge. A platoon moved out to make contact

with Company G of the 511th Parachute

Infantry. The platoon reached the company, and at 1855 Company G entered the

lines of the 3d Battalion, which fed and

sheltered its men for the night.

In the meantime the 1st Battalion had

moved out at 0800 and encountered scattered resistance. To the east and south of

the 32d Infantry was an impassable canyon,

several hundred feet deep. In order to reach

the 511th Parachute Infantry, it would be

necessary for the regiment to go either north

for an undetermined distance or down the

ridge toward the coast and then up again.

A third possibility involved crossing the

Talisayan River in the foothills several miles

to the west. With these facts in mind Colonel

Finn asked his executive officer, "Are we to

actually contact the 511th personally [?]

What is the purpose of the contact and are

we to lead them out by hand[?]"

 31

At the same time, General Arnold advised

the 511th Parachute Infantry of the situation and that "present orders" from General

Hodge required the displacement of the 32d

Infantry from its positions in order to wipe

out pockets of resistance that remained near

Ormoc. The 511th Parachute Infantry was

to make every effort to drive toward the

position of the 32d Infantry, since the latter

would soon be withdrawn. The 511th would

then have to fight it out alone. General Arnold finally decided that the 1st and 3d Battalions, 32d Infantry, would be withdrawn

and that the 2d Battalion, which was fresher,

would move up and attempt to establish

contact with the 511th Parachute Infantry.32

At 0700 on 16 December the 2d Battalion started eastward along the south bank

of the Talisayan River. For the next few

days the battalion made slow progress, meeting and destroying small groups of the

enemy pushing west. As the troops advanced

they were confronted with steep and heavily wooded ridges which were separated by

gorges several hundred feet deep. The Japanese, well concealed by the heavy foliage

and entrenched in caves, were most difficult

to dislodge, but the distance between the 2d

Battalion and the 511th Parachute Infantry daily diminished. On 20 December the

2d Battalion was held up by the terrain and

strong enemy opposition on two ridges to its

front. For the next two days the battalion

pounded at the Japanese force in attempts

to dislodge it. At this time the distance between the 2d Battalion and the 511th Parachute Infantry had narrowed down. Enemy

resistance was overcome on the morning of

22 December. In the meantime the 187th

Glider Infantry Regiment passed through

the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment and

continued the attack. At 1330 on 22 December the 2d Battalion of the 187th Glider Infantry Regiment passed through the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, and pushed on to the

coast. The difficult mountain passes had

been overcome.33

The Drive South

Regrouping of Japanese Forces

When the Americans took Limon, the

key point of entrance on Highway 2 into

Ormoc Valley from the north, the Japanese

31

 32d Inf Unit Jnl, 15 Dec 44. 3 2 32d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 29-30: 32d Inf

S-3 Periodic Rpt, no number, 15 Dec 44; 32d Inf

S-2 Periodic Rpt, no number, 15 Dec 44; 32d Inf

Unit Jnl, 15 Dec 44. 33

 32d Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 30-31; 32d Inf

Unit Jnl, 16 to 22 Dec 44; 11th Airborne Div Opns

Rpt Leyte, p. 10.
324 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

forces were thrown into confusion. The

Americans, unknown to themselves, had successfully divided the Japanese 1st and 102d

Divisions that had been charged with the defense of northern Leyte. The Japanese were

forced to regroup their various units in an

attempt to correct the rapidly deteriorating

situation along their front lines. The strong

American infantry assaults, which had been

co-ordinated with heavy mortar and artillery fire, induced General Kataoka, the

commanding general of the 1st Division,

to redistribute his forces along Highway 2.

34

The onslaught of the X Corps had forced

General Suzuki to abandon the earlier plan

of advancing the 35th Army north along

three widely separated routes. Instead he

had to concentrate the main strength of the

1st Division along the highway to check the

American advance. The plan to use the 1st

Division as a strong offensive force had to be

discarded in favor of using it in a strictly

defensive role.

The 1st Division had suffered much: as

of 2 December, 3,000 of its men had been

killed or wounded. Furthermore, one third

of the infantry weapons of the 1st Infantry

Regiment and two thirds of those belonging

to the 57th Infantry Regiment had been

rendered inoperable. The infantry was short

of grenades and ammunition for the 50-mm.

grenade dischargers. "The men were suffering from the effect of continuous fighting,

from lack of provisions, overwork, and especially from the lack of vitamins."

 35

By this time communications between the

1st Division and other units had broken

down. Telephonic and telegraphic communications between the division and 35th

Army headquarters were out for long

periods of time, and liaison between the

division headquarters and front-line units

was carried out by messengers moving on

foot. The supply lines had also broken down.

The 1st Division Transport Regiment found

it virtually impossible to supply food and

ammunition to the 1st and 57th Infantry

Regiments and the 1st Artillery Regiment.

General Kataoka grouped his forces along

Highway 2 in the Limon-Pinamopoan area

in order to concentrate the maximum

strength along Highway 2. The 1st Reconnaissance Regiment was to attack the left

flank of the 32d Division,36 which was already opposed by the 57th Infantry in the

Limon sector; the 1st Battalion, less Company 3, and the 2d Battalion, plus Company

11, of the 49th Infantry were to occupy the

1,900-yard sector two miles southeast of

Limon in order to hold back American

forces in that area; and the 1st Artillery

Regiment was to defend its prepared positions south of Limon. The troops of the 1st

Engineer Regiment and other noncombat

units were issued small arms and ordered to

take part in the defense of Highway 2.37

34

 The part of this section dealing with Japanese

plans and maneuvers is based upon the following

documents: Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn;

35th Army Opns; 10th I&HS, Eighth Army Stf

Study, Opns of Japanese 35th Army on Leyte. 35

 35th Army Opns, p. 91.

36

 The 1st Reconnaissance Regiment could not

carry out this assignment, since it had been attacked

by a larger American force. 37

 General Tomochika made the following comments on the 1st Division:

The personnel were brave but the officers lacked

sufficient training in modern warfare and it finally

did not live up to the expectations of its leaders.

The division commander, Lt. Gen. Kataoka worried

about the loss of his troops, lacked brave command

ability and did not establish any set battle policy.

[He refused to commit one of his important units to

the defense of Highway 2.] . . . therefore the Chief

of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff and senior staff officers were dispatched from Army to Division on three

different occasions to urge General Kataoka to submit to these orders. . . . Regardless of how much

we urged General Kataoka to change his views he

would not budge. Colonel Ikeda, the Chief of Staff
THE ENTRANCES TO ORMOC VALLEY 325

Drive of the 32d Division

In order to support the amphibious landing of the 77th Division at Deposito and its

subsequent movement northward, General

Krueger had ordered the X Corps to make

its main effort, beginning on 5 December,

by advancing vigorously south astride Highway 2 from the vicinity of Limon.38

 Acting

on Corps orders, General Gill prepared to

move out with two regiments abreast. The

32d Division consolidated its positions on 5

December, and readied itself for a strong

assault south down Highway 2.39 (See Map

12.)

The 127th Infantry had pushed past the

3d Battalion, 128th Infantry, which was

south of the Leyte River and west of Limon.

The 127th encountered very determined resistance from the Japanese entrenched on

the high ground 1,000 yards south of the

Leyte River bridge. The well-camouflaged

enemy defenses consisted of numerous foxholes and ten-foot-deep spider holes, many

of which were connected by interlacing

communication trenches.

The terrain that the troops traversed was

adapted to defensive fighting, and the 1st

Division took full advantage of this fact.

There were deep ravines and steep hills

where the enemy had dug in on both the

forward and reverse slopes. The entire area

was covered by heavy rain forest with dense

underbrush. The nearly constant rainfall

made observation difficult and the maps for

the area were very inaccurate.

By 12 December the 32d Division had

"detoured" around the 1st and 57th Infantry Regiments of the 1st Division and was

assaulting the Japanese artillery positions

south of Limon. On this date the division

straightened out its lines, established physical contact between the assault battalions,

resupplied the assault units, and sent out

patrols. The sector in which the greatest Japanese resistance was encountered continued

to be that of the 2d Battalion, 126th Infantry. Employing mortars and four tanks,

this battalion was able to make only limited

gains.40

During the night of 12-13 December the

artillery battalions of the 32d Division fired

harassing missions near the perimeters of the

126th and 127th Infantry Regiments and

southward on Highway 2 as far as the vicinity of Lonoy.

The 14th Area Army had planned to land

the 39th Infantry Regiment and an artillery

company from the 10th Division near Carigara on 16 December, but in view of the

American 77th Division's advance to Ormoc

the plan was canceled on 11 December. On

13 December General Suzuki attached an

of the 1st Division [until 13 December] was partially

deaf and further because of a former lung ailment,

he was unsuited to hold his important position.

(Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn p. 18.)

General Tomochika was less than fair to the 1st

Division. From its positions in the mountains of

nothern Leyte, the division contested every foot of

advance of the X Corps. General Krueger said of

the 1st Division: "This unit more than any other

hostile unit on Leyte was responsible for the extension of the Leyte Operation." (Sixth Army Opns

Rpt Leyte, p. 41.) 38

 Sixth Army FO 36, 4 Dec 44. 39

 During the action of 5 December, Pfc. William

A. McWhorter sacrificed his life that a companion

might live. He deliberately held next to his body and

away from his comrade a Japanese grenade which

had been thrown into his position. The charge exploded and killed him instantly but did not harm

his companion. He was awarded posthumously the

Medal of Honor.

40

 "However for a patrol from Company I [127th

Infantry] it was a red letter day in that the patrol

found a bottle of U.S. Golden Wedding Wiskey

[sic] at an evacuated Jap hospital. It was consumed."

127th Inf Unit Jnl, 12 Dec 44. See also 127th Inf

Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9; 126th Inf Unit Jnl, 12 Dec

44; 32d Div G-3 Jnl, 12 Dec 44; 32d Div Leyte Opn

Diary, pp. 21-22.
326 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

infantry company of about 100 men from

the 102d Division to the 1st Division in order to strengthen the latter's lines.

On the morning of 13 December the 2d

Battalion, 126th Infantry, with the assistance of its tanks and heavy mortars, pushed

past the Japanese who had held up its advance. In the face of most determined

opposition the battalion moved south, destroying the pockets of resistance which had

been bypassed. At the end of the day the 2d

Battalion had advanced 400 yards to a position 200 yards north of a roadblock set up

by the 3d Battalion, 126th Infantry. The 3d

Battalion, less Company L, which was to remain on the high ground overlooking the

road, was to attack south on the east side of

Highway 2 and come abreast of the 1st

Battalion, 126th Infantry.

At 1521 the 3d Battalion reported that six

enemy tanks were coming up the highway.

After heavy fighting, the Japanese tanks

withdrew at nightfall and returned to the

south. The 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry,

the southernmost unit of the division, made

plans to dislodge the enemy force between

it and the 3d Battalion. The contested

ground consisted of an open space 600 to

700 yards long and 200 to 300 yards wide, at

the southern end of which were two knolls.

The 1st Battalion had men on both knolls

but did not control the northern end of the

sector where the Japanese had dug in and

were using machine guns, mortars, and

rifles. The 1st Battalion charged against the

Japanese and rooted them out with grenades

and mortar fire. Except for this action, only

slight gains were registered during the day.

The men of the battalion were hungry, having been without food since the previous

afternoon. The commanding officer of the

battalion renewed a request for additional

rations and ammunition, since the one-third

ration that had been received the day before

was insufficient.

The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 127th

Infantry received orders from the regimental commander to advance south with

the 1st Battalion on the left, pinch out the

3d Battalion, 126th Infantry, and link up

with the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry. The

1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, moved out

in a column of companies and had advanced 400 yards when it encountered forty

to fifty Japanese on a ridge to its front,

about 150 yards west of the road. The

enemy threw blocks of TNT and grenades

against the battalion, effectively pinning

down the troops. A night perimeter was

established.

The 2d Battalion, 126th Infantry, moved

abreast of the regiment's 1st Battalion

throughout the day. Its advance was bitterly

contested by the Japanese, who employed

machine guns, mortars, and rifles against

the battalion, which dug in for the night

under fire.41 At 1630 the 11th Field Artillery

Battalion fired upon fifteen Japanese who

were walking along the road south of Lonoy

and killed twelve of them.42

The night of 13-14 December was not

quiet. At 2300 an enemy force from the 1st

Infantry Regiment broke into the command

post of the 126th Infantry. The Japanese set

up a machine gun in the area and attacked

with grenades and rifles. Bitter hand-tohand fighting ensued but by 0325 the enemy

force was evicted and the area had quieted

down. At 0630, with the coming of dawn,

the Headquarters Company got things in

order and everyone was "happy to hear

sound of comrade's voices." Six Japanese

41

 32d Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 27, 13 Dec 44; 32d

Div Opns Diary Leyte, pp. 23-24; 126th Inf Unit

Jnl, 13 Dec 44. 42

 32d Div Arty Daily Rpt, 14 Dec 44.
U.S. AND JAPANESE TANKS. Camouflaged U.S. tanks are shown (above) on Highway

2, between Limon and Lonoy. Burning Japanese tanks (below) are checked by 127th Infantry

troops north of Lonoy.
328 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

were killed and two Americans and two Filipinos wounded.43

On 14 December nearly all battalions of

the 127th and 126th Infantry Regiments

were engaged in moving slowly forward and

maintaining physical contact with each

other. At 1045 the air observer of the 11th

Field Artillery Battalion located what appeared to be a camouflaged four-gun position at a point 300 yards northeast of Lonoy.

The battalion fired upon the site and the

Japanese fled from the position. The 11th

Field Artillery Battalion again fired into the

same general area at 1315 and set a supply

and ammunition dump and three buildings

on fire. At 1530 the battalion and the corps

artillery massed their fires in order to cover

all of Lonoy.44 At 1730, the 127th Infantry

destroyed two enemy tanks going north.

The 126th Infantry, on the same day,

moved forward in a column of battalions.

The 1st Battalion made a limited advance,

since it was very short of ammunition and

completely out of food. It did establish a

roadblock, however, and made contact with

the 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry. The 2d

Battalion, the northernmost unit of the

126th Infantry, moved slowly behind the

3d Battalion of the regiment. An interval of

about 250 yards existed between the two battalions. The Japanese in front of the 32d

Division, especially in the sector of the 3d

Battalion, had strongly entrenched themselves and resisted the 3d Battalion from

both sides of the highway.

Every bend of the road was lined with . . .

foxholes dug into the banks of the road and

spider holes dug underneath the roots of trees

and under logs on the hillsides. It was bitter,

close hand to hand fighting and because of the

steepness of the terrain, the denseness of the

tree growth, the inaccuracy of maps and nearness of adjoining units, artillery and mortar

fire could not be used to its full advantage in

reducing these positions.45

The main Japanese defensive line had

been reached. By 14 December the 32d Division had advanced more than two miles

south of Limon. The 77th Division had

crushed the Cogon defenses and was in a position to drive north and make juncture with

elements of the X Corps. The northern and

southern entrances to Ormoc Valley were

denied to the Japanese. The jaws of the

Sixth Army trap were starting to close.

43

 126th Inf Unit Jnl, 14 Dec 44. 44

 32d Div Arty Daily Rpt, 14 Dec 44.

45

 32d Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 12; X Corps G-3

Jnl, 14 Dec 44; X Corps G-3 Periodic Rpt, X

Corps G-3 Jnl, 14 Dec 44; 32d Div G-2 Jnl, 14

Dec 44; 126th Inf Unit Jnl, 14 Dec 44; 127th Inf

Unit Jnl, 14 Dec 44; 32d Div Opns Diary Leyte,

p. 24; 12 7th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9.
CHAPTER XX

Seizure of Ormoc Valley

General Krueger wished the two corps

to attack aggressively through Ormoc Valley toward Valencia, about six and a half

miles north of Ormoc. The X Corps, pushing south along Highway 2, was to seize the

high ground north of Valencia and the

XXIV Corps was to continue its drive north,

capture Valencia, and establish contact

with the X Corps. (Map 20) Driving north

along Highway 2, the 77th Division was to

seize Valencia and its airfield and effect a

juncture with the X Corps to separate the

enemy forces in the mountains east of its

zone of action from those on the west coast

in the Palompon area. General Bruce was

to co-ordinate all artillery fires and air support missions in the Ormoc-Valencia area.1

After the seizure of Ormoc, although the

35th Army still controlled Ormoc Valley,

the Sixth Army had closed the northern and

southern entrances. There remained available to the Japanese as a principal port only

Palompon. A road from this town through

the mountains joined Highway 2 in the

vicinity of Libongao and constituted the

only main route from the west coast of Leyte

to Ormoc Valley. The Americans noticed

that the Japanese were moving supplies,

men, ammunition, and artillery to the

Valencia area and concluded that the Japanese would make a defensive stand in

Valencia.2

By the end of 15 December the forces of

General Bruce had cleared the Japanese defenders from the Ormoc area and were

ready for the next phase of the drive north

up the Ormoc corridor. Reports made the

previous day by the reconnaissance patrols

from the 306th and 307th Infantry Regiments indicated that there was little enemy

resistance to the west of Highway 2. These

led General Bruce to decide in favor of a

plan for enveloping the enemy from the

west. The 306th and 307th Infantry were

to strike the flanks and rear of the Japanese

defending the highway and thus permit a

more rapid advance along this road by the

305th Infantry.3

General Hodge had informed General

Bruce that the commanding general of the

Sixth Army desired to have the attack

pushed "with all possible vigor." The operations of the 77th Division were to depend

upon the situation and conditions then

existing.4 On 14 December General Hodge

visited General Bruce, who explained his

plans. General Hodge thought they were

"sound"

 5

 and later told General Bruce to

keep his plans flexible in order to take advantage of every break to speed the advance

north. It was imperative that the XXIV

1

 XXIV Corps FO 37, 18 Dec 44. 2

 Sixth Army G-2 Wkly Rpt 68, 13 Dec 44, p. 14.

3

 Ltr, Gen Bruce to Gen Ward, 16 Aug 51,

OCMH. 4

 Msg, CG XXIV Corps to CG 77th Div, 13 Dec

44, XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 13 Dec 44. 5

 Msg, CG XXIV Corps to G-3 Sixth Army, 14

Dec 44, Sixth Army G-3 jnl, 14 Dec 44.

330 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Corps secure control of the roads north before the Japanese could establish positions.

Drive From the South to the Libongao Area

Seizure of the Road Junction

According to its plan of attack for 16

December the 305th Infantry, from the

vicinity of Cogon, was to continue its assault

north on Highway 2, liquidate the remaining enemy forces in Cogon, and finally secure a large defensive position centered

around the road junction north of Cogon.

All three battalions of the regiment were to

consolidate around the point while the 306th

and 307th Infantry Regiments were to drive

toward Valencia.

The Cannon and Antitank Companies

and the heavy weapons units of the other

two regiments were attached to the 305th

Infantry for movement only and were to be

used solely in case of emergency. These units

were to be sent to the 306th and 307th

Infantry Regiments upon call by those

regiments.

At 0930 on 16 December the assault units

of the 305th Infantry moved out. The 1st

Battalion, on the left of Highway 2, was to

attack north, and the 3d Battalion, on the

right of Highway 2, was to attack north and

then northeast to effect a juncture with the

1st and 2d Battalions at the road junction

north of Cogon. The 2d Battalion was to

attack east to flank the enemy positions

along the highway. The operation was to be

assisted by artillery.

During the morning the artillery in support of the 1st Battalion knocked out two

antitank guns, a heavy machine gun, and

an enemy dugout position. At 1035 the 1st

Battalion had advanced several hundred

yards. As the 3d Battalion came forward,

Company L moved in on the right flank of

the 1st Battalion. At 1100 the 2d Battalion

had reached the enemy positions along the

highway and by 1215 had cleared out the

enemy pocket and the road in its sector. A

light tank platoon from the 706th Tank Battalion was attached to the 1st Battalion at

1255 in order to assist the battalion in clearing the Japanese from their foxholes. Although progress was slow, it was thorough.

The localized envelopments of the enemy's

right (west) flank resulted in the capture of

Cogon at the end of the day. The 305th Infantry advanced 400 yards north of the

road junction and established night positions around it.6

Envelopment of Valencia

In the meantime, the 306th and 307th

Infantry Regiments had been ordered to

make a series of sweeping envelopments on

the Japanese right (west) flank toward

Valencia. The 307th Infantry was to move

northwest about six and a quarter miles

through the barrios of Jalubon, Liloan, and

Bao to Catayom on the Bao River, then

swing northeast to the barrio of San Jose and

continue northeast to the Valencia airstrip.

The 306th Infantry was to follow the 307th

Infantry northwest and then drive east and

cut Highway 2.7

The 306th Field Artillery Battalion,

though in general support, was to give

priority to the 307th Infantry. The 902d

and 305th Field Artillery Battalions were to

support elements of the reconnaissance

6

 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 24-25; 305th Inf

Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 5; 305th Inf Unit Rpt 11, 16

Dec 44; 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 22, 16 Dec 44;

77th Div G-3 Jnl, 16 Dec 44. 7

 XXIV Corps FO 37 (Confirmatory of Oral and

Fragmentary Orders), 18 Dec 44; 77th Div FO 17,

15 Dec 44.
SEIZURE OF ORMOC VALLEY 331

troops operating on each flank of the division. The artillery battalions would fire in

the regimental zones of action only on call

from or with the approval of the regiments.8

On 16 December the 307th Infantry

crossed the line of departure on time. Since

there were no roads and the route was across

rice paddies, through waist-deep rivers, and

over terrain impassable for vehicles, the

troops hand-carried their supplies. Arrangements were also made for Filipinos to carry

supplies, and, as the advance progressed,

more and more Filipinos joined the column

of the 307th Infantry for this purpose.9 The

regiment met only scattered resistance.

Some Japanese troops encountered in the

vicinity of Liloan were dispersed. At 1525

leading elements of the 307th Infantry

passed through Bao and moved on toward

San Jose. On the outskirts of that barrio, the

troops met and destroyed two platoons of

the enemy. At 1645 the 307th Infantry dug

in for the night in San Jose. The regiment

had covered eight miles, a rapid rate of advance considering the nature of the terrain

and the load carried. At 2340 General Bruce

told the 307th Infantry that an incendiary

air strike would be made on Valencia before

0900 the following day and that the regiment was to hold its present position until

further orders.10

At 0900 on 16 December the 306th Infantry moved past the initial point of departure on the northwestern edge of Ormoc.

At 1035 the regiment was 1,000 yards west

of the starting point and close "on the tail"

of the 307th Infantry. The 306th waited

until the 307th cleared and then moved

north. Although it did not encounter any

Japanese its progress was very slow because

the route of advance ran through deep rice

paddies. At 1730 the regiment established

its night perimeter about 700 yards southsouthwest of Tipic.11

 During the day the

305th Infantry had cleared Cogon and occupied defensive positions around the road

junction north of the town.

The Japanese had constructed defensive

positions along Highway 2 in the southern

part of Ormoc Valley. At the road junction

of Highway 2 with the road to Liloan were

many trenches three to four feet deep and

parallel to the highway. Trenches had also

been dug along the sides of a machine gun

emplacement that occupied a slight elevation commanding Highway 2 both to the

north and to the south. On both sides of the

road from Cogon to Catayom foxholes lined

Highway 2, in the ditches and under the

shacks. Some of these positions were dug on

a slant and were six to seven feet deep. At

Tambuco the foxholes extended along the

highway for 400 yards, with machine gun

emplacements on the sides of the foxholes.

Other positions along Highway 2 consisted

of poorly integrated foxholes and machine

guns that covered the road. The field artillery pieces between Tambuco and Catayom

were placed along the highway, with the

exception of a 75-mm. gun that guarded

a bridge and was well concealed inside a

roadside shack.12

The 14th Area Army had planned to reinforce the 35th Army by dispatching the

Takahashi Detachment, which consisted of

the 5th Infantry Regiment, one artillery

8

 77th Div FO 17,15 Dec 44. 9

 Ltr, Gen Bruce to Gen Ward, 16 Aug 51,

OCMH. 10

 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 16 Dec 44; 77th Div G-3

Periodic Rpt 22, 16 Dec 44; 77th Div Opns Rpt

Leyte, p. 25; 307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6.

11

 306th Inf Unit Jnl, 16 Dec 44; 77th Div G-3

Periodic Rpt 22, 16 Dec 44; 77th Div Opns Rpt

Leyte, pp. 24-25; 306th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9. 12

 MI Div, War Dept, "Leyte Field Fortifications,"

Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 57 (April,

1945), pp. 108-10.
332 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

JAPANESE DUG-IN POSITIONS ALONG HIGHWAY BANKS delayed the advance of the 77th Division north of Ormoc.

battalion, and one engineer company and

one transport company each from the 8th

Division, together with the Ito Naval Landing Force of 400 troops from Luzon.

The 77th Infantry Regiment had landed

at Palompon on or about 9 December from

Cebu and moved to Matagob where, after

assembling its troops, it began to move

southeast toward Huaton, the new headquarters of the 35th Army. Huaton was a

small barrio on Highway 2 about three and

a half miles north of Cogon. On 13 December General Suzuki, the commander of the

35th Army, arrived at Huaton from the

Burauen area. After the 12th Independent

Infantry Regiment, the 4th Airborne Raiding Regiment, the Mitsui Shipping Unit,

the Ito Naval Landing Force, and the 77th

Infantry Regiment were assembled, General

Suzuki on 15 December ordered an attack,

which was to start 17 December, against the

American forces in the Ormoc area.13

The fall of Cogon and the envelopment

to the west forced General Suzuki to change

his plans again. The 305th Infantry had

captured the positions of the Tateishi Battalion of the 12th Independent Infantry

Regiment, and the position of the 77th Infantry Regiment was greatly weakened. As

the attack against Ormoc could not be successfully completed, the 12th and 77th Infantry Regiments were to carry out a delaying action.14

Since the fall of Valencia might break the

organized resistance of the Japanese in Ormoc Valley, General Bruce decided to push

13

 35th Army Opns, pp. 99-101. 14

 Ibid., p. 101.
SEIZURE OF ORMOC VALLEY 333

forward rapidly and take the barrio before

the enemy could regroup.15 General Krueger

asked General Whitehead for air strikes

against Valencia. If the weather permitted,

a strike would be made at 0900 and another

would be delivered on call. In addition,

nearly all available artillery of the division

that could arrive within firing distance, as

well as the 226th Field Artillery Battalion

from positions east of the mountains near

Daro, would shell the town until ordered to

lift the fire.

The 305th Infantry was to drive rapidly

north on Highway 2 and clear out the Japanese for a distance of 200 to 300 yards on

each side of the road, even though it might

mean bypassing groups of the enemy on the

flanks. A patrol from the regiment was to

operate east of its sector to locate enemy

forces. The 306th Infantry was to drive

rapidly east toward Highway 2 and then

advance north up the highway, clearing a

lane 200 to 300 yards wide. At a point 500

to 600 yards north of Cabulihan, it was to

await further orders. The regiment was to be

prepared to send a battalion south to assist

the 305th Infantry in its advance.

General Bruce organized an armored column to carry rations and ammunition to the

306th and 307th Infantry Regiments. This

column, which was to move north on Highway 2, consisted of five light tanks from the

7th Division, the Cannon and Tank Destroyer Companies of the 306th and 307th

Infantry Regiments, part of Company C,

302d Engineer Battalion, a platoon from the

305th Infantry, and sufficient LVT's to

carry men and supplies. An artillery observer

accompanied the column.

Elements of the 302d Engineer Battalion

were to repair immediately the highway between Ormoc and Valencia and at night retire within the nearest infantry defensive

perimeter. The order was summed up as

follows: "The action will be pressed with

the utmost vigor by careful planning but

every effort will be made to save casualties."

 16

At 0830 on 17 December the 305th Infantry moved out along Highway 2. At 1000

the 1st Battalion reported that it was advancing at the rate of 100 yards every ten

minutes against light opposition. By 1145

the 305th Infantry was fighting through

Tambuco. At a road junction just north of

Tambuco, it eliminated some enemy resistance and the advance slowed down. The

regiment moved forward to a point about

300 yards north of the road junction and

established its night perimeter, which extended 300 yards to the northeast along the

Tambuco-Dolores road in order to forestall

any Japanese counterattacks from that

direction.17

On the same day the 306th Infantry

pushed its attack northeast at 0800. The

advancing troops almost immediately encountered Japanese who, apparently taken

by surprise, were unable to offer organized

resistance. At 1040, when the forward elements were 1,000 yards southwest of Cabulihan, the opposition stiffened and the regimental commander therefore committed

the 3d Battalion on the left of the 2d Battalion. The advance continued. As the regiment neared Highway 2, resistance became

more intense. The 306th Infantry encountered the Japanese who were fleeing northwest from the assault of the 305th Infantry

15

 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 26, 27.

16

 77th Div FO 18, 17 Dec 44; 77th Div Opns

Rpt Leyte, pp. 25-26. 17

 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 17 Dec 44; 77th Div G-2

Jnl, 17 Dec 44; 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 27;

305th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6; 77th Div G-3

Periodic Rpt 23, 17 Dec 44.
334 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

and the heavy artillery that accompanied it.

(Unknown to the Americans, General

Suzuki and his staff were among the retreating Japanese. Suzuki succeeded in escaping

to Libongao, where he established a new

headquarters for the 35th Army.) At 1440

the 306th Infantry reached Highway 2

between Catayom and Cabulihan and

proceeded north toward Cabulihan, its

objective. Advance elements of the 3d Battalion reached the outskirts of the town but

withdrew three or four hundred yards to

take advantage of more commanding terrain. After combat patrols had cleared the

area, the 306th Infantry established its night

perimeter five hundred yards south of

Cabulihan at 1600.18

General Bruce had ordered the 307th Infantry to remain in San Jose until further

notice. Since the guerrilla forces had reported a large number of Japanese in the

area, General Bruce had made arrangements

to soften the sector with an aerial bombardment and artillery fire before the infantry

attack. In response to Bruce's request, fifteen

P-40's from the V Fighter Command had

been made available by General Whitehead

for an air strike against the Valencia area.

The 155-mm. guns of the 226th Field

Artillery Battalion at Daro began firing on

Valencia and the airstrip on the morning of

17 December and hit a Japanese ammunition dump. At 1245 the artillery fire was

halted for the air strike, and for fifty minutes

the area was bombed and strafed. With the

conclusion of the air attack, at 1335, the

artillery began anew to pound the area.

"The medium artillery . . . reached out

from Ormoc and the 'Long Toms' . . .

from Daro joined in the fighting."

 19

 In the

meantime the 902d Field Artillery Battalion

moved forward to a point from which it

could support the advance of the 307th Infantry. At 1415 the artillery fire stopped

and the 307th Infantry moved out astride

the San Jose-Valencia road toward Valencia. Though the artillery fire and aerial bombardment had driven some of the Japanese

from the area, a strong well-equipped force,

including a number of paratroopers, remained to oppose the 307th Infantry. The

regiment pushed forward, however, and at

1640 its leading elements were on the southwestern edge of the airstrip and within 1,000

yards of Valencia. The 307th Infantry

formed its night perimeter on the edge of

the airfield and made preparations to continue the attack on 18 December.20

During 17 December, despite the disorganization of the Japanese forces, Colonel

Imahori of the 12th Independent Infantry

Regiment tried to reach Ormoc, but he was

unsuccessful.21 A few enemy artillery shells

landed in the Ormoc area but that was all.

General Bruce wrote later: "The men got

a laugh because the General's latrine, unoccupied, was struck. He wished about that

time that he had remained up front which

he had reached by landing in a cub plane

on an unimproved jungle road."

 22

On the morning of 18 December, since

supplies and ammunition for the 306th and

307th Infantry Regiments were becoming

dangerously low, General Bruce pushed the

armored column vigorously forward through

18

 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 17 Dec 44; 306th Inf Unit

Jnl, 17 Dec 44; 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 23, 17

Dec 44; 306th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 9; 35th

Army Opns, pp. 101-103.

19

 Ltr, Gen Bruce to Gen Ward, 16 Aug 51,

OCMH. 20

 307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 7; 77th Div

Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 5-6; 77th Div G-3 Jnl,

17 Dec 44; 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 27; 77th

Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 23, 17 Dec 44. 21

 35th Army Opns, p. 101. 22

 Ltr, Gen Bruce to Gen Ward, 16 Aug 51,

OCMH.
SEIZURE OF ORMOC VALEEY 335

JAPANESE LIGHT TANK destroyed during the fighting along Highway 2. Note dugouts

in the sides of banks behind the tank.

the 305th Infantry. The column swept past

enemy strong points and succeeded in bringing supplies to both regiments.

The attack of the 305th Infantry was consequently delayed. The 3d Battalion of the

regiment, however, jumped off in a northeast direction on the Dolores road in order

to cut off any Japanese reinforcements from

that area. At 0945 the rest of the 305th

Infantry started out along Highway 2 and

encountered little resistance. By 1400 the

battalions had passed through the barrios

of Dayhagan and Huaton (the former

and short-lived headquarters of General

Suzuki), and knocked out fifteen enemy

trucks and three tanks. The 3d Battalion

proceeded northeast from the road junction

along the road to Dolores, and crushed all

resistance. The battalion then moved west

toward Highway 2, leaving a platoon behind

to seal off the Dolores road from Highway 2.23

At 0830 on 18 December the 306th Infantry renewed its attack. At first the 2d

Battalion moved south astride Highway 2

in order to make contact with the 305th

Infantry, which was pushing north along the

highway, but since there was little resistance

the battalion withdrew and rejoined the

regiment. As the rest of the regiment continued north it met moderate opposition but

pushed ahead steadily. The troops encountered many strong points along the road but

no organized main line of resistance.

23

 305th Inf Unit Rpt 15, 18 Dec 44; 77th Div

G-2 Jnl, 18 Dec 44; 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 18 Dec 44;

77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 24, 18 Dec 44; 305th

Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 6; 77th Div Opns Rpt

Leyte, p. 28.
336 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

The 306th Infantry proceeded astride the

highway against moderate to strong opposition. An enemy force estimated as two battalions had dug in under the houses and in

foxholes along the sides of the road. The

Japanese tried to halt the advance with

heavy machine guns and a few mortars, but

without avail. Patrols from the 306th Infantry made contact with the 305th Infantry

at 1500. The 306th Infantry reached the

southern edge of Valencia at 1630 and tied

in with the 307th Infantry. Night perimeters

were established.24

At 0830 on 18 December the 307th Infantry from the southwestern edge of the

Valencia airstrip renewed the attack. There

was no opposition and at 0905 the airfield

and the town of Valencia were in the hands

of the regiment. General Bruce considered

the heavy artillery and aerial assaults of the

previous day "most effective." The airfield

was in "fair" condition; it was safe for light

aircraft and with minor repairs could be

made suitable for other aircraft. The 307th

Infantry spent the rest of 18 December consolidating its positions and conducting extensive patrols to the north and east. At 1630

it established physical contact with the

306th Infantry.25

In three days of relatively fast fighting

and maneuvering the 77th Division had

shaken the Japanese forces badly and disrupted the plans of General Suzuki. The

307th Infantry, by making a wide envelopment of the west flank, had captured Valencia and its airfield, and the 306th Infantry, making a smaller envelopment, had

bisected Highway 2 at Cabulihan while the

305th Infantry moved up the highway from

Cogon. All of southern Ormoc Valley from

Ormoc to Valencia, a distance of about six

and a half miles as the crow flies, was securely in American hands. All units were in

contact and ready for the next phase of their

mission.

Drive to Palompon Road Junction

Since elements of the XXIV Corps had

been able to make more rapid progress

through Ormoc Valley than the X Corps

units, General Krueger on 19 December

enlarged the zone of action of the XXIV

Corps to include Libongao, the barrio just

below the juncture of Highway 2 with the

Palompon road.26 General Hodge thereupon

ordered the 77th Division to continue north

and seize Libongao and then to secure the

Palompon road and establish contact with

the X Corps.27

General Bruce ordered the 305th Infantry to assume responsibility for the defense

of Valencia and its airfield, and thus free

the 306th and 307th Infantry Regiments

for new assignments. The 307th was to move

north astride Highway 2 to Libongao and

then continue to the junction with the

Palompon road. The 306th was to move

across country and strike northwest toward

the Palompon road. Although its advance

would parallel that of the 307th, the 306th

was to be about 2,300 yards west of the other

regiment. After reaching the Palompon road

in the vicinity of the Togbong River the

306th Infantry would strike west for the

crossing and then move east to the road

24

 306th Inf Unit Jnl, 18 Dec 44; 77th Div G-2

Jnl, 18 Dec 44; 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 18 Dec 44; 306th

Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 9-10; 77th Div Opns Rpt

Leyte, p. 28; 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 24, 18

Dec 44. 25

 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 18 Dec 44; 77th Div G-3

Periodic Rpt 24, 18 Dec 44; 307th Inf Opns Rpt

Leyte, p. 7; 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 28.

26

 Sixth Army FO 39, 19 Dec 44. 27

 XXIV Corps FO 38 (Confirmatory of Oral and

Fragmentary orders), 21 Dec 44.
SEIZURE OF ORMOC VALLEY 337

junction. The 304th, 305th, and 902d Field

Artillery Battalions were to remain in the

Valencia area while the 306th Field Artillery Battalion was to be prepared to move

forward on call.28

At Libongao, General Suzuki prepared

his defense. In the area he had his headquarters guard and a part of the 4th Airborne Raiding Regiment, in addition to a

field artillery battalion, an engineering company, and a transportation company. An

advance battalion of the Takahashi Detachment arrived in the sector from Palompon

on the night of 17 December. General Suzuki ordered it to proceed south from Libongao and destroy the American forces in

the Valencia area.29

As the 307th Infantry advanced north at

0900 on 19 December, it became apparent

that General Suzuki had organized a defense

of the highway. Many machine gun and

light artillery emplacements were dug in

along the road, and the enemy resistance

became more determined as the troops

moved north. A force estimated to be of battalion strength was dug in in depth along

streams and ridges. With the use of grenades

the 307th routed the defenders, the battalion

from the Takahashi Detachment. The 307th

Infantry pushed steadily north and at 1800

established a night perimeter; it had advanced nearly three miles and captured

much enemy equipment during the day.30

The 306th Infantry moved out at 1100

and proceeded rapidly, without meeting resistance, to a point about 500 yards south

of the Palompon road where it encountered

elements of the 5th Infantry Regiment. At

1530 a battery of artillery and infantry

mortars and machine guns fired upon the

Japanese. In co-ordination with fire from

these weapons, the 306th Infantry was then

able to push forward. At 1800, though patrols from the regiment had reached the

Palompon road, the regiment itself dug in

for the night at a point 300 yards south of

the Palompon road.31

On 20 December, after a five-minute

artillery preparation to its front, the 307th

Infantry moved out at 0830 and encountered the "strongest fortified positions"

since it had left Camp Downes. The Japanese 5th Infantry Regiment and other elements of the 1st Division resisted any forward advance. By 1000 the 307th Infantry

had "mowed down" and annihilated two

suicide counterattacks of fifty men each on

its right flank. An additional force, estimated at 2,000 men, well equipped with

machine guns, mortars, and a limited

amount of artillery, opposed the 307th Infantry from hastily constructed defensive

positions. The attack of the enemy forces was

not well co-ordinated; consequently the

regiment, though slowed down, was able to

continue forward. At 1549 the leading elements of the 307th Infantry were at

Libongao. The enemy defensive fire increased in intensity on the northern outskirts of the village. At 1710, about 200

yards north of Libongao, the regiment repulsed a force estimated to consist of 200

Japanese armed with machine guns and

mortars. The 307th Infantry established its

night perimeter about 1,000 yards south of

the road junction. During the day the regiment had captured many tons of ammunition and materiel in supply dumps, to- 28

 77th Div FO 19, 19 Dec 44. 29

 35th Army Opns, p. 103. 30

 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 19 Dec 44; 77th Div G-3

Periodic Rpt 25, 19 Dec 44; 307th Inf Unit Jnl,

19 Dec 44; 307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 7.

31

 306th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 10; 306th Inf

Unit Jnl, 19 Dec 44; 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 19 Dec 44;

77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 29; 77th Div G-3

Periodic Rpt 25, 19 Dec 44.
338 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

gether with more than thirty enemy trucks.

The 307th Infantry put many of the latter

into serviceable condition and made immediate use of them.32

For the same day, 20 December, the

306th Infantry, on the left of the 307th, was

assigned the mission of advancing to the

Palompon road. Upon reaching the road,

the 1st Battalion on the left would turn west

along it to seize a bridge crossing the

Togbong River and the 3d Battalion would

turn east to seize the junction of the road

and Highway 2.33 During the night the

enemy artillery heavily shelled the sector of

the regiment. After a ten-minute artillery

preparation the assault battalions moved out

at 0830, and by 0925 they had reached the

Palompon road. Each of the battalions

thereupon started to execute its part of the

mission.

The 1st Battalion pushed steadily forward

and reached the eastern banks of the Togbong River at the bridge crossing, the bridge

itself having been destroyed by the enemy.

From a commanding ridge upon the western

banks of the river, just north of the bridge

site, a Japanese force estimated to be a battalion in strength opposed any further advance. The company on the left forced a

passage across the river south of the bridge

site, but the company on the right, despite

repeated attempts, was unable to cross the

river. At 1630 the 1st Battalion received

orders to take up a night defensive position

on the eastern banks of the river. During the

night the enemy unsuccessfully launched

three counterattacks against the 1st Battalion. In the morning the battalion counted

more than 400 Japanese dead around its

position.

The 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry, upon

reaching the Palompon road turned east

and encountered steadily increasing enemy

opposition. By 1500, however, Company K

reached the road junction. At the same time

the 3d Battalion received orders to withdraw west 300 yards so that the 307th Infantry could register unrestricted fire to its

front. This withdrawal was carried out and

the 3d and 2d Battalions of the 306th Infantry established night positions 300 yards

west of the road junction.

At 1900 General Bruce ordered the 306th

Infantry to deliver harassing fire on the enemy forces to the west during the night of

20-21 December and the 307th Infantry to

fire 500 yards to its front up Highway 2 and

east of the highway.34

The Japanese 5th Infantry Regiment had

assembled in the Libongao sector with orders

to proceed to the Valencia sector, but the

77th Division had advanced so rapidly that

it was attacking the 35th Army Headquarters. The Takahashi Detachment suffered

heavy casualties and withdrew to Matagob,

on the Palompon road between Palompon

and Libongao. The field artillery battalion

and the engineering and transportation companies that had been left at Matagob were

absorbed by the Takahashi Detachment. On

21 December General Suzuki ordered the

regiment to make a defensive stand, so that

the main force of the 35th Army could withdraw to the Palompon sector on the shore of

the Camotes Sea.35

32

 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 26, 20 Dec 44; 77th

Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 31; 77th Div G-2 Jnl, 20

Dec 44; 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Dec 44; 307th Inf

Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 7-8; 307th Inf Unit Jnl,

20 Dec 44. 33

 306th Inf FO 11, 19 Dec 44.

34

 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 30-31; 77th Div

G-3 Jnl, 20 Dec 44; 77th Div G-2 Jnl, 20 Dec 44;

306th Inf Unit Jnl, 20 Dec 44; 306th Inf Opns Rpt

Leyte, pp. 10-11; 77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 26,

20 Dec 44. 35

 35th Army Opns, pp. 103-104.
SEIZURE OF ORMOC VALLEY 339

During the night of 20-21 December the

77th Division artillery expended half a unit

of fire, intermittently bombarding enemy positions west of the 77th Division and to the

east of Highway 2. The bombardment was

the most intensive made by the 77th Division

during the campaign. Just before renewal

of the attack on 21 December, the artillery

delivered a concentrated thirty-minute preparation. General Bruce ordered the 306th

Infantry to move out at 0630. Since the 1st

Battalion was short of ammunition, it was

to await the arrival of Company E, which

had been attached to the battalion, with additional ammunition. At 1250, having received the ammunition, the battalion moved

out and at 1330 secured the ridge (overlooking the bridge site), which had blocked

its advance the previous day.

Immediately afterward General Bruce

ordered the battalion to proceed west along

the Palompon road and secure the bridge

over the Pagsangahan River. The ridge was

thereupon outposted as the 1st Battalion

withdrew to prepare for continuation of the

assault, but elements of the 5th Infantry

Regiment drove the outposts off the ridge

and immediately occupied it. At 1500 the

1st Battalion attacked unsuccessfully in an

effort to retake the position. It formed a

night perimeter at the river crossing at 1600,

and at 0750 concentrated a ten-minute

artillery preparation on the enemy positions

on the ridge. The 1st Battalion then moved

out toward the high ground and secured the

ridge within twenty minutes, the Japanese

offering only slight resistance.36

The 77th Division had reached the

Palompon road. In its drive north the division had destroyed the major elements of

the 5th and 77th Infantry Regiments and

the 4th Airborne Regiment.

The 32d Division Resumes the Offensive

Elements of the X Corps were slowly

moving south in an attempt to effect a

juncture with the XXIV Corps. On 14

December the 126th and 127th Infantry

Regiments of the 32d Division had pushed

south down Highway 2 against very determined resistance and through mountainous

terrain to the main defense line of the 1st

Division. The Japanese were well entrenched on a series of ridges overlooking

Highway 2. A heavy rain forest covered the

ridges and the deep ravines in between. The

enemy had carefully selected his defensive

positions and camouflaged his machine

guns, which were flanked by hidden riflemen. Targets could not be spotted beyond

a range of about seventy-five feet. The employment of mortars was very limited because of the lack of visibility, and the hazards of tree burst were equally dangerous

to both the Japanese and the Americans.

The troops had to "approach within spitting

distance of the [Japanese machine] guns"

before they could locate the weapons.37

For the next few days the regiments of the

32d Division fought valiantly against a foe

that limited the division's advance to a few

score yards a day. Of the many acts of individual bravery, those of Pfc. Dick J. Vlug

and Sgt. Leroy Johnson were outstanding.

Private Vlug single-handedly destroyed five

enemy tanks that were moving north along

the highway. Sergeant Johnson threw himself upon an enemy grenade that killed him

36

 306th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 11-12; 306th

Inf Unit Jnl, 21 Dec 44. During this action Pfc.

George Benjamin, Jr., a radio operator from Company A, killed the crew of a machine gun nest at

the cost of his life. He was posthumously awarded

the Medal of Honor. 37

 32d Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 30, 16 Dec 44.
340 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

but did not hurt those comrades near him.

Both men were awarded the Medal of

Honor.

On the morning of 17 December advance

elements of the 126th Infantry were about

4,000 yards south of Limon. After a preparation of heavy mortar fire the 1st Battalion

moved out at 0730, encountering about a

platoon of the enemy on a knoll 300 yards

east of the road. A bitter fire fight broke out

and continued throughout the day. The

battalion was unable to advance farther and

set up a night perimeter. During the fight

the 1st Battalion captured four enemy machine guns.

In the zone of the 2d Battalion, east of

the highway, all the battalion's mortars,

machine guns, and 37-mm. guns, together

with four medium tanks, massed their combined fires on the enemy positions to the

front. These positions consisted of numerous

foxholes, pillboxes of coconut logs, and

L-shaped fortifications dug into the mountain sides. A rain of steel descended upon the

Japanese on the high ground directly east

of the battalion. This preparatory fire had

excellent results and the 2d Battalion, after

moving out at 1100, quickly secured the

ridge and consolidated its position. It captured three 47-mm. antitank guns, three

75-mm. mountain guns, and two 70-mm.

battalion guns. About 150 of the enemy were

killed by the preparatory fire and the battalion attack.

Company I, 3d Battalion, quickly secured and destroyed a roadblock that the

enemy had constructed the previous day.

Accompanied by the four tanks, the company then advanced down the highway just

behind the 2d Battalion without encountering opposition. For the rest of the day the 3d

Battalion protected the road and patrolled

five or six hundred yards to the rear. The

127th Infantry to the south remained in

position awaiting the 126th Infantry.38

By the following morning, 18 December,

the 126th Infantry was on a line that extended east of Highway 2. To the front of

the regiment, elements of the 1st Division

occupied three positions on an east-west line

approximately 800 yards in length and extending across Highway 2. There were actually three ridges along this line. The first

ran north and south beside the road, and

on it was located the western position of the

enemy. From this site the Japanese were able

to roll hand grenades down on the road.

About 200, yards to the east was another

strongly fortified north-south ridge, east of

which was a small valley with a banana

grove. Still farther east was a small knoll

upon which was located a strong enemy

defensive position. An estimated two reinforced enemy companies, well supported by

automatic weapons and well dug in, occupied this position. The whole area was covered with a dense rain forest, and it was

impossible to spot any Japanese fortified

position more than thirty yards away.

Before the troops moved out, the mortars

and tanks placed heavy fire on the Japanese

positions for twenty minutes. At 1010 on 18

December the 126th Infantry attacked with

the 1st Battalion on the right and the 2d

Battalion on the left. In advancing to the

ridge nearest the road, the American troops

received considerable small arms fire just

east of the road. The 1st Battalion moved

ahead up the ridge east of the road and by

1230 it had advanced 200 yards to the top

of the ridge. The Japanese resisted strongly

and heavy fighting occurred in which both

sides used machine guns, grenades, and

38

 32d Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 31, 17 Dec 44; 32d

Div G-3 Jnl, 17 Dec 44; 126th Inf Unit Jnl, 17

Dec 44; 32d Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 31, 17 Dec 44.
SEIZURE OF ORMOC VALLEY 341

bayonets. By 1800 the 1st Battalion was in

firm possession of the ridge. The 2d Battalion, supported by machine guns and mortars, was able to creep up through the forested ravine to within thirty yards of the

enemy position on the knoll before it was

fired upon. A bitter engagement then ensued. After five hours of intense fighting the

battalion drove the Japanese defenders off

the knoll. The 1st and 2d Battalions formed

their night perimeters within fifty yards of

the enemy front lines. The 3d Battalion of

the 126th Infantry moved south along the

road and closed the gap between the 126th

and 127th Infantry Regiments.39 The artillery fired upon several buildings about 800

to 1,500 yards southwest of the forward elements of the 32d Division. Lucrative artillery targets were practically nonexistent.40

On the morning of 19 December the

126th Infantry followed the same procedure

that had been used the previous day. A

heavy machine gun and mortar concentration was placed upon the Japanese positions

on the crest of a ridge fifty yards to the front.

At 1100 the 126th Infantry moved out with

battalions abreast, the 1st Battalion on the

right and the 2d on the left. Six heavy machine guns immediately fired on the left

flank of the 1st Battalion. The battalion

withdrew and placed a concentration of

more than 200 rounds of mortar fire on the

position while its machine guns raked the

Japanese force "fore and aft." The troops

then renewed the assault but the Japanese

continued to resist. Elements of the 1st Division had dug in on the top and both sides

of a ridge and had utilized caves to construct a defensive position in which there

were more than 100 foxholes with communicating trenches. Heavy fighting continued throughout the day. The 1st Battalion used mortars, flame throwers, white

phosphorus grenades, hand grenades, rifles,

and supporting flanking fire from its heavy

and light machine guns, but was able to

advance only seventy-five yards. Although

the battalion overran many emplacements,

a determined Japanese force remained to be

overcome when the battalion established its

night perimeter on the eastern slope of the

ridge.

The 2d Battalion, 126th Infantry, encountered only scattered rifle fire that came

principally from the enemy position on its

right flank. During its advance the battalion

delivered flanking machine gun and rifle

fire in support of the 1st Battalion on its

right. By 1200 the 2d Battalion had advanced 200 yards and secured the area in its

zone of action. At 1530 the 1st Squadron,

112th Cavalry, which had been protecting

the eastern flank of the 32d Division, relieved the 2d Battalion, which withdrew to

an assembly area in the rear.

During the night of 19-20 December, the

commanding officer of Company B, 126th

Infantry, which had borne the brunt of the

enemy resistance, placed one platoon of the

company along the eastern side of the ridge

and another platoon on the western side. At

the same time he continued the pressure

from the south. Throughout the night the

company kept firing at known enemy positions and the sector in general. The company

commander also required each of his men

to throw hand grenades periodically. At first

light and without any breakfast the troops

rushed the enemy position. The Japanese

had lost the power to resist and by 1000 the

company had taken the last of the three enemy positions. Two hundred Japanese dead

were counted in the area.

39

 32d Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 32, 18 Dec 44; 32d

Div G-3 Jnl, 18 Dec 44; 126th Inf Unit Jnl, 18

Dec 44. 40

 32d Div Arty Daily Rpt, 18 Dec 44.
342 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

At 1245 on 20 December the 127th Infantry took over the conquered sector and

the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, withdrew

to an assembly area in the rear.41

Debouchment From the Mountains

Since the 32d Division had borne the

brunt of the assault, General Sibert ordered

the 1st Cavalry Division to make the main

attack south. It was to assist the advance of

the 32d Division to a bridge 1,000 yards

north of Lonoy and then move south and

make contact with the 77th Division.42 The

1st Cavalry Division had been operating in

the central mountain chain on the eastern

flank of the 32d Division and had been opposed by the 102d Division. The latter, after

its arrival at Ormoc, had gone directly into

the mountains in the vicinity of Mt. Pina.43

The 102d Division did not play a significant

role in the Leyte campaign.

The 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat

Team had moved south on the eastern flank

of the 32d Division. The 1st Squadron of

the 112th Cavalry had been able to keep

pace with the 32d Division, but the 2d

Squadron had encountered a very strong

enemy force on a ridge overlooking the

Leyte River south of Limon. The Japanese

resisted all the squadron's efforts to dislodge them. The 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry,

relieved the 2d Squadron, 112th Cavalry,

and on 14 December it had succeeded in

overcoming the Japanese and had seized the

ridge.

Spearhead of the Assault

While the 112th and 7th Cavalry Regiments were busily engaged in defending the

east flank of the 32d Division in its push

south along Highway 2, the 12th Cavalry

was mopping up enemy groups entrenched

in the mountains farther to the east. Particularly strong enemy resistance had been

encountered in the Mt. Badian and Hill

2348 sector, which was about five miles

northeast of Kananga, a barrio on Highway

2.44 In the process of reducing the Japaneseheld area, it was estimated that an enemy

force of 500 to 600 men had been wiped out.

From 28 November to 9 December, the 12th

Cavalry remained in the Mt. Badian and

Hill 2348 sector, sent out westward patrols,

and slowly moved westward.

On 10 December, General Sibert decided

to have elements of the 1st Cavalry Division

debouch from the mountains onto Highway

2 south of the 32d Division and in the Lonoy

area. This move was to be concurrent with

the expected advance of the 32d Division

down the highway.45 The 1st Squadron,

12th Cavalry, was in the vicinity of Mt.

Cabungaan, and the 2d Squadron, on Hill

2348, was 2,000 yards northeast of the 1st

Squadron. An enemy strong point existed

to the north of the perimeter of the 1st

Squadron. The 12th Cavalry spent 10 December in making preparations for a twosquadron assault against this enemy force.

The plan was for the 1st Squadron to attack at 0830 while the 2d Squadron from

Hill 2348 supported the attack by enveloping the left flank of the enemy. In further41

 32d Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 33, 19 Dec 44; 32d

Div G-3 Jnl, 19 Dec 44; 126th Inf Unit Jnl, 20

Dec 44; 32d Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Dec 44. 42

 X Corps FO 22, 20 Dec 44. 43

 10th I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study of Opns of

Japanese 102d Division on Leyte and Cebu, Interrog of Maj Chuji Kaneko, p. 3.

44

 Unless otherwise stated the part of this subsection dealing with the 12th Cavalry is based on:

12th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 20-30, 76-85; 1st

Cav Div G-3 Periodic Rpts 51-63, 10-22 Dec 44;

and 12th Cav Unit Rpts 54-65, 11-22 Dec 44. 45

 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 52; 1st Cav

Div FO 17, 10 Dec 44.
SEIZURE OF ORMOC VALLEY 343

ance of this plan Troop E of the 2d Squadron moved off Hill 2348 at 0800 toward the

southwest and dug in for the night just

north of Mt. Cabungaan.46

On the morning of 11 December, an intense mortar and artillery concentration was

placed upon the enemy position in front of

the 1st Squadron. The fire was so close that

fragments frequently fell on the waiting assault troops. After this fire, the 1st Squadron

with Troop A in the lead moved out at 0715.

At the same time Troop E attacked from

the northeast. The enemy defenses consisted

of seven or eight pillboxes and many caves

dug into the very rugged terrain. The men

of Troop A, closely followed by Troop B,

charged up the hill "throwing grenades and

firing from the hip."

 47

 The hill fell to the

1st Squadron at 1003 after very heavy handto-hand fighting. Troop E had been held

up by the terrain and was unable to assist

the 1st Squadron. After the capture of the

Japanese position, patrols established contact with Troop E at 1200. The regimental

reconnaissance platoon returned from the

vicinity of Lonoy with the information that

the Japanese had prepared strong defensive

positions in that area. The platoon had

gained a good observation point 900 yards

east of Lonoy.48 The next several days were

spent in sending out patrols and moving the

2d Squadron to the position of the 1st

Squadron.

On 14 December, the 12th Cavalry was

ordered to continue west to Highway 2 and

assist the advance of the 32d Division, to

establish a roadblock on the highway, and

to attack the hostile forces to the north between it and the 32d Division.49

 In furtherance of this order, the 1st Squadron, less

A and C Troops, moved west on 15 December toward a previously reconnoitered area

that was about 1,800 yards east of the

barrio of Lonoy. This site, a banana plantation, was chosen for its observation facilities to the west and as an excellent dropping

ground for supplies. The 1st Squadron, having encountered little opposition, closed on

the area before dusk. Thereupon the rest

of the regiment was ordered to close in on

the area before nightfall on 17 December.

Lonoy

The 12th Cavalry on 18 December sent

out patrols to Lonoy, Kananga, and to the

northwest to make contact with the nearest

friendly troops. The patrols to Lonoy and

Kananga, although they ran into scattered

groups of the enemy, were able to locate

suitable approaches to Lonoy for their

squadrons.50

At 2235, on 18 December, the 12th

Cavalry received orders to move out the

following morning, seize Lonoy, and be prepared to seize Kananga. The commanding

officer of the regiment decided to have the

1st and 2d Squadrons move out abreast with

the 2d Squadron on the left. During the entire night the artillery was to deliver harassing fire on the highway north of Lonoy and

on the area between the routes of approach

of the two squadrons.

After a preparation on 19 December, the

1st and 2d Squadrons moved out at 0800.

The 1st Squadron met only light, sporadic

resistance. The troops observed many Jap46

 12th Cav Unit Rpt 53, 10 Dec 44; 1st Cav

Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 52, 11 Dec 44. The spelling

of Mt. Cabungaan used here follows that of the

maps employed by the combat troops. The Board

of Geographic Names gives the spelling as Mt.

Cabungangan. 47

 12th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 24. 48

 12th Cav Unit Rpt 54, 11 Dec 44; 1st Cav

Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 53, 12 Dec 44.

49

1st Cav FO 18, 14 Dec 44. 50

 1st Cav Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 60, 19 Dec 44.
344 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

anese proceeding north along the highway

and had mortar and artillery fires placed

upon them. At 1200, the 1st Squadron seized

Lonoy, captured much enemy equipment,

and destroyed many supply dumps. The 1st

Squadron moved to assist the 2d Squadron

in the capture of a knoll southeast of the

barrio. The 1st Squadron closed on the knoll

about 1400, and aided the assault of the 2d

Squadron by fire and by sending a troop

east to assist it.

The 2d Squadron jumped off on schedule

but at 0930, when it was 800 yards short of

its objective, the squadron came under

heavy rifle and machine gun fire from the

thick woods. The 271st Field Artillery Battalion placed fire on the area and a great

many of the enemy were killed, the remainder fleeing south. The squadron received

additional machine gun fire from the north

but a patrol quickly silenced it. In the meantime the mortar platoon from Troop D, in

support of the 1st Squadron, fired upon

Lonoy. The Japanese immediately responded with fire from a 105-mm. gun,

which they had cleverly concealed in the

gap between the two squadrons and about

600 yards from the regimental observation

post at which the gun directed its fire. The

enemy gun killed one man and wounded

fifteen others of the command-post group.

The heavy machine guns from the Weapons

troop and the artillery from the 271st Field

Artillery Battalion began concentrating their

fires upon the enemy gun. The Antitank

Platoon was sent out to destroy the gun and

its crew. Following the machine gun and

artillery fire, the enemy gun was silent for

about half an hour. It then suddenly opened

up against the 2d Squadron at a range of

about 300 yards. The enemy fire resulted in

tree bursts which killed five men and

wounded fifteen others. Troop G, which suffered the most casualties, and the Antitank

Platoon immediately turned and attacked to

the north to destroy the gun. The 2d Squadron, less Troop G, renewed the attack towards Lonoy, receiving scattered rifle fire.

At 1730 it reached Lonoy and was in contact

with the 1st Squadron.

Meanwhile, Troop G sideslipped to the

west and with the Antitank Platoon attacked

and destroyed the enemy gun and four of

its crew. A patrol located another enemy

105-mm. gun but, because of darkness and

point-blank fire from the weapon at a range

of about twenty-five feet, it was unable to

knock out the gun. At 2200 Troops G and

H, the medical group, and the Antitank

Platoon formed a joint night perimeter.51

Late that night the regimental commander ordered the 2d and 1st Squadrons

of the 12th Cavalry to move south on the

morning of 20 December along Highway 2

in a column of squadrons, with the 2d

Squadron in the lead. During the night, in

preparation for this advance, the 271st Field

Artillery Battalion fired 1,096 rounds on

Kananga, on the road north of Lonoy, and

on sectors occupied by the enemy artillery.

This fire destroyed the enemy 105-mm. gun.

At 0715 on the morning of 20 December

the 2d Squadron, less Troop G, moved out

and immediately came under heavy fire

from enemy forces that had dug in underneath houses and behind small pieces of

cover along the road. The squadron eliminated these pockets of resistance by direct

fire and by flanking movements on both

sides of the highway. At 1200 the 2d Squadron forced the Japanese off a ridge which

was just east of the highway and about 500

yards north of Kananga. The squadron then

51

 1st Cav Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 61, 20 Dec 44;

X Corps G-2 Periodic Rpt 59, 19 Dec 44; 1st Cav

Div G-3, Jnl, 19 Dec 44.
SEIZURE OF ORMOC VALLEY 345

encountered heavy rifle and machine gun

fire that came from a coconut grove and

some houses about 200 yards south of the

ridge.

In the meantime, the 1st Squadron, at

0830, moved south to support the attack of

the 2d Squadron. At about 1230, the 1st

Squadron arrived behind the ridge occupied

by the 2d Squadron and then continued

south, at 1500, seizing and completely dominating a ridge about fifty yards east of Kananga. The 2d Squadron and a platoon

from the 1st Squadron attacked north, parallel to the highway, and by nightfall

cleaned out the coconut grove and set up a

night perimeter.

General Mudge, commanding general of

the 1st Cavalry Division, said of the 12th

Cavalry:

As a result of the stout-hearted efforts of

the 12th Cavalry Regiment, elements of the

Division are within 2,500 yards of making

contact with forward elements of the 77th

Division. Considering the fact that the regiment has been reduced to 50% strength by

the rigors and deprivations of 40 days in the

mountains, the display of courage, stamina,

and drive on the part of the 12th Cavalry is

a credit to the best traditions of the United

States Cavalry.52

During the night General Mudge ordered

the 12th Cavalry to move out at 0800 21

December, seize Kananga, and then make

physical contact with the 77th Division,

which was pushing north from Libongao.

He attached the 1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry,

to the 12th Cavalry.

Juncture of Forces

On the morning of 21 December the 1st

and 2d Squadrons of the 12th Cavalry, supported by the 271st Field Artillery Battalion,

moved out in a co-ordinated assault against

Kananga. The 1st Squadron attacked from

the north while the 2d Squadron drove in

from the ridge on the east. The first elements

of the regiment reached Kananga at 1157

and by 1425 the 12th Cavalry was in the

town. The regiment methodically cleared

out every hut, ferreted out each Japanese,

and destroyed every installation. While the

mopping up was going on, patrols from the

12th Cavalry pushed to the south to make

contact with the 7 7th Division.

The regimental commander ordered the

commander of the 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry, to push east at 0730 on 21 December

along the Palompon road to the juncture of

the road with Highway 2 and then turn

north for 1,000 yards and attempt to establish contact with the 1st Cavalry Division.

The 3d Battalion moved out on time, and

within fifteen minutes reached the road

junction and turned north. The battalion

had gone only 200 yards north when its

left-flank company came under intense fire

from a ridge overlooking the road. The 2d

Battalion complied with orders from the

regimental commander to "put out something" on the 3d Battalion's left flank and

sent out one rifle company to envelop the

enemy position. This move relieved the pressure to some extent but the advance was

still slow and costly.

In the meantime, the 307th Infantry

reached the road junction at 0800, having

advanced without incident. With the slowing up of the 306th Infantry, General Bruce

ordered the commander of the 307th Infantry Regiment to send forward additional

troops. The 2d Battalion, 307th Infantry,

and the Cannon and Antitank Companies

of the regiment were sent to the front to reinforce the 306th Infantry. This maneuver 52

 1st Cav Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 62, 21 Dec 44.
346 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

was successful and the attacking forces

pushed forward.

At 1645, the 306th Infantry and Troop

A of the 12th Cavalry made physical contact. At 1115 on 22 December, Col. John H.

Stadler, the commanding officer of the 12th

Cavalry, representing General Mudge, met

General Bruce at a bridge south of Kananga. The X and XXIV Corps had joined

hands. Highway 2 was at long last open

for its entire distance from Ormoc to

Pinamopoan.53

The Ormoc Valley, in which the Japanese had so tenaciously resisted the American advance, was now securely in the hands

of the Sixth Army. The northern and southern prongs of the trap had closed. There

remained only Palompon as an exit for the

Japanese forces. To the securing of that

port, the X and XXIV Corps, acting in

concert, could concentrate their main efforts. Plans had been readied. The Sixth

Army was poised in a position from which

it could drive westward to the sea and bring

the Leyte campaign to a successful conclusion. 53

 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 21 Dec 44; 77th Div G-3

Periodic Rpt 27, 21 Dec 44; 77th Div Opns Rpt

Leyte, pp. 31-32; 307th Inf Unit Jnl, 21 Dec 44;

307th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 8; 306th Inf Unit

Jnl, 21 Dec 44; 306th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp.

11-12.
CHAPTER XXI

Westward to the Sea

The co-ordinated pressure exerted from

the north and south on the Japanese forces

in the Ormoc area had compelled the commander of the 35th Army to make successive

changes in his plans. General Suzuki had

abandoned the aerial and ground assault

against the Burauen airfields, transferred

the field base of the 35th Army from Ormoc

to Palompon and, finally, had found it

necessary to order the remaining Japanese

units on Leyte to retreat to the hills behind

Ormoc Valley. General Tomochika said

afterward, "The best that the 35th Army

could do from then on was to hold out as

long as possible."

 1

The northwestern mountains of Leyte

west of Ormoc Bay provided a difficult

barrier to any movement toward the northwest coast. The area was the last one available to the Japanese either for escaping from

Leyte or for staging defensive actions. In

general, the terrain was rough, increasing

in altitude from broken ground and low

hills in the north to steep rocky ridges and

high hills in the south. The northern part

was either under cultivation or covered with

cogon grass. Toward the south, the cultivated fields and grasslands were gradually

supplanted by dense forests.

Palompon had been extensively used by

the Japanese as an auxiliary port of entry to

Leyte. The town was the western terminus

of the road that ran north and eastward

across the northwestern hills to join Highway 2 near Libongao. (Map 21) It was

this road junction that the X and XXIV

Corps had seized. The Palompon road, as

it was called, followed the lower slopes of

the hills until the flat interior valley floor

was reached. The confining hills were steepsided with many knife-edged crests.2

 Such

was the area into which the forces of the

Sixth Army had driven remnants of the

Japanese 35th Army.

When the 77th Infantry Division and the

1st Cavalry Division joined forces on 21

December just south of Kananga, Highway

2 between Ormoc and Pinamopoan was

opened to the Americans. The Sixth Army,

anxious to deliver the coup de grâce, arranged its troops for a four-division thrust

to the west coast on a long front. In the south

the 77th Division was to drive west along

the Palompon road. To its right (north)

there would be, from left to right, the 1st

Cavalry Division and the 32d and 24th Infantry Divisions. The Sixth Army had

started the Leyte Campaign with two corps

on a four-division front and was ending its

part in the campaign with two corps on a

four-division front. 1

 10th I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study of 35th

Army on Leyte, Part 1, p. 24, Interrog of Maj Gen

Yoshiharu Tomochika.

2

 Sixth Army G-2 Wkly Rpt 69, 20 Dec 44, pp.

14-18.
348 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

MAP 21

The 77th Division Goes West

Overwater to Palompon3

Guerrillas had informed General Bruce

that the bridges on the road that wound

through the mountains from the vicinity of

Libongao to Palompon either were intact

or could be quickly repaired. General Bruce

decided to verify this by having an engineer

patrol work with the guerrillas and by having a reconnaissance made over the area in a

cub plane. On 19 December General Bruce

directed that a fast-moving force be organized to operate along the road to Palompon.

The engineers later informed him that because of the condition of many of the bridges

it would be impossible to send an advance

column along the road.4

3

 Unless otherwise indicated, this subsection dealing with the 77th Division is based upon the following: 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 32-35;

77th Div Supp Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 1-8, 28-29;

77th Div G-3 Periodic Rpts 33-37, 27-31 Dec 44;

77th Div G-2 Summary Leyte Campaign; 305th

Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 7-8; 305th Inf Hist Rpt

1944, pp. 5-7; 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 23-30 Dec 44;

77th Div Admin O 7, 24 Dec 44; 77th Div FO 20,

19 Dec 44; 77th Div FO 22, 24 Dec 44; 1st Bn,

305th Inf, FO 3, 23 Dec 44; 305th Inf Unit Jnl,

25 Dec 44-2 Jan 45.

4

 Ltr, Gen Bruce to Gen Ward, 16 Aug 51,

OCMH.
WESTWARD TO THE SEA 349

On 21 December General Hodge, anticipating the juncture of the X and XXIV

Corps, ordered the 77th Division to be prepared after that event to move rapidly west

and seize the Palompon area.5 On 22 December General Krueger, acting on a recommendation that had been made by General

Bruce through General Hodge,6 informed

Admiral Kinkaid that it might be possible to

expedite the capture of Palompon by having

an infantry battalion, utilizing amphibian

vehicles and LCM's, make an amphibious

movement from Ormoc to the vicinity of

Palompon. He therefore asked Admiral

Kinkaid if naval support to escort and guide

this movement could be furnished for either

the night of 23-24 or that of 24-25 December. If possible, the amphibious force should

have a destroyer escort.7 Admiral Kinkaid

stated, in reply, that because of preparations

for other operations it would be "most difficult" to provide a destroyer escort but that

he could furnish a PT escort which he believed would be sufficient protection.8

 This

was satisfactory to General Krueger and he

ordered the XXIV Corps to make plans for

the amphibious movement.9 In turn General Hodge told General Bruce to prepare

for the operation.

On 22 December, General Bruce put his

plan into operation. The 1st Battalion, 305th

Infantry, was to make the amphibious landing in the vicinity of Palompon while the

2d and 3d Battalions were to proceed west

along the Palompon road, after moving in

trucks from Valencia to the Palompon road

near the Togbong River. Previously, on 21

December, Battery A of the 531st Field

Artillery Battalion (155-mm. gun) was

brought with a great deal of effort to a position near San Jose from which it could fire

on Palompon, which the guerrillas and civilians had received instructions to evacuate.10

The 1st Battalion was to commence loading at 1400 on 23 December at Ormoc.

The convoy was to be protected en route by

patrol torpedo boats and close air support.

Upon arriving at Palompon at 0500 on 25

December, the mortar-firing LCM's were to

bombard the shore before the assault forces

moved in. Beginning 23 December, the artillery of the 77th Division was to bombard

Palompon and to continue as long as Lt.

Col. James E. Landrum, the task force commander, desired it.11

The 1st Battalion was to move ashore on

the beach about 1,500 yards north of Palompon with Companies C and B in assault,

Company C on the left. Its mission was to

destroy the enemy force in Palompon and

then turn north.12

In support of the proposed landing, aircraft from the Fifth Air Force bombed Palompon on 23 December. The results were

"hot stuff," an overenthusiastic observer reported, claiming that "only half of two

houses were left standing in the whole

town."

 13

On 23 December, the reinforced 1st Battalion moved to Ormoc to prepare for the

5 amphibious landing and at 1930 on 24 XXIV Corps FO 38, 21 Dec 44. 6

 Ltr, Gen Bruce to Gen Ward, 16 Aug 51,

OCMH. 7

 Rad, CG Sixth Army to CTF 77, 22 Dec 44,

Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 22 Dec 44. 8

 Msg, CTF 77 to CG Sixth Army, 23 Dec 44,

Sixth Army G-3 Jnl, 23 Dec 44. 9

 Memo for Col Guerard, unsigned, 23 Dec 44,

XXIV Corps G-3 Jnl, 23 Dec 44.

10

 Ltr, Gen Bruce to Gen Ward, 16 Aug 51,

OCMH. 11

 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 25 Dec 44. 12

 77th Div FO's 20 and 21, 19 Dec 44; 1st Bn,

305th Inf, FO 3, 23 Dec 44. 13

 Rad, 9th Air Liaison Party to Fifth Air Force,

X Corp G-3 Jnl, 24 Dec 44.
350 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

PALOMPON AFTER ALLIED BOMBINGS. Note bomb craters in foreground.

December the troops embarked.14 The convoy departed at 2000. The vessels included,

in addition to the mechanized landing craft,

the LVT's of the 718th and 536th Amphibian Tractor Battalions. They made the

tedious ten-hour trip without incident as

far as enemy action was concerned, although three of the LVT's "sank owing to

mechanical failure."

The vessels took position off the landing

beaches on the morning of 25 December.

After the 155-mm. guns of the 531st Field

Artillery Battalion had fired from positions

near San Jose, twelve and a half miles east

of Palompon, the mortar boats of the 2d

Engineer Special Brigade softened up the

beaches. The landing waves then started for

the shore, the first wave landing at 0720 and

the last one at 0755. They received no hostile

fire.

"Meanwhile," wrote General Bruce,

"the Division Commander could stand it

no longer and called for a plane, flew soon

after daylight across the mountains and seaward, located the amphibious forces still at

14

 In addition to the 1st Battalion, 305th Infantry, the Special Task Force included: the Amphibian Tractor Company; Company A, 776th

Amphibian Tank Battalion; one platoon of Company D, 706th Tank Battalion; three guns from the

regimental Cannon Company; the 2d Platoon of

Company A, 302d Engineer Battalion; a detachment from Company A, 302d Medical Battalion;

the 292d JASCO detachment; the 305th Field

Artillery Battalion; a detachment of the 306th Field

Artillery Battalion; a detachment from Battery A,

531st Field Artillery Battalion. 77th Div Opns Rpt

Leyte, p. 33.
WESTWARD TO THE SEA 351

sea, . . . witnessed the preparatory fires by

the 155-mm. guns and that from the mortar

boats . . . saw them going in ... and

advance to the beach. (He obeyed a rather

boyish impulse and flew from 25 to 50 feet

above the heads of the troops in the assault

boats and leaned out, giving a boxer's

victory sign with both hands.)"

 15

The troops quickly organized on the

beach. A light fast armored column moved

north to clear the road and to forestall any

Japanese counterattack from that direction

as the rest of the task force went rapidly

south through the barrio of Look to Palompon, which fell at 1206. This closed the last

main port of entrance on the island to the

Japanese. Within four hours after hitting

the beaches the battalion had secured the

barrios of Buaya and Look as well as Palompon, and had strong patrols operating to the

northeast and south. The troops met no

opposition at any point. It was doubtless

with great satisfaction that General Bruce

sent the following message to the Commanding General, XXIV Corps: "The 77th

Infantry Division's Christmas contribution

to the Leyte Campaign is the capture of

Palompon, the last main port of the enemy.

We are all grateful to the Almighty on this

birthday of the Son and on the Season of

the Feast of Lights."

 16

 The 1st Battalion

received "warm congratulations and

thanks" from General Krueger.17

The 1st Battalion occupied a defensive

position in the vicinity of Look on 25 December, and rested on 26 December, which

was Christmas Day back home. It spent the

next five days sending out patrols and awaiting the arrival through the mountains of the

rest of the 305th Infantry. On 30 December,

Company C made a reconnaissance in force

and an amphibious landing at Abijao, about

seven miles north of Palompon. The company overcame some Japanese resistance

and burned down the town to prevent its

reoccupation. It then pushed 1,300 yards

north and established radio contact with elements of the 1st Cavalry Division, which

had pushed through the mountains to the

vicinity of Villaba.18

The Palompon Road

The Palompon road wound through the

mountains and crossed many rivers, over

which some forty bridges would have to be

built or repaired. It ran northwest two and

a half miles from the Togbong River to the

barrio of Humaybunay and then cut sharply

to the southwest for about four miles to

Matagob, at which point it went into the

hills almost directly south for about 2,000

yards, and then turned south-southwest for

1,000 yards. At this point it turned and

twisted to the southwest for approximately

five and a half miles to the vicinity of San

15

 Maj Gen A. D. Bruce, The Operations of the

77th Division in Leyte, 19 January 1951, pp. 27, 28,

MS in OCMH. 16

 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 25 Dec 44. 17

 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 26 Dec 44. It is possible that

the weary soldiers were more interested in the following administrative order of General Bruce:

1. Supply

a. Rations

(1) Turkey ration—distribution from Valencia ration dump at 0900, 25 Dec 1944. Ration

and mess personnel will exercise great care and

speed in handling turkey and keep covered at all

times.

(2) Organization commanders will serve

turkey to every man in this command on 26 Dec

1944. The Division commander has made arrangements for air drop to troops located in areas not

accessible by road.

General Bruce wished the troops to have turkey

on the same day that Christmas is observed in the

States. 77th Div Admin Order 7, 24 Dec 44. 18

 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 32-35 and

Supplemental Opns Rpt, pp. 1-8, 305th Inf Opns

Rpt Leyte; 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 26-30 Dec 44.
352 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Miguel, from where it arched 3,500 yards

to Look, on the Camotes Sea.

The Japanese had pockmarked Matagob

and the area surrounding it with foxholes

and emplacements and had dug spider holes

under the houses. South of Matagob, where

the road climbed into the hills, the enemy

had utilized natural caves, gullies, and

ridges on both sides of the road and dug

many deep defensive positions. Some of

these were eight feet deep, two feet in diameter at the top, and widened to six feet at the

bottom. The Japanese had emplaced machine guns in culverts and had constructed

several well-camouflaged coconut log pillboxes on the forward slopes of the ridges.

An excellent, almost invisible installation,

which served as an observation post, was dug

in on the forward slope of a ridge about

three miles north of San Miguel. It had a

concealed entrance on the reverse slope.

From this post eight miles of the road to

the north and east could be observed.

The Japanese 5th Infantry Regiment was

the principal enemy unit in the sector, although remnants of other units retreating

west from Highway 2 were in the area. The

following Japanese units were identified:

1st, 3d, and 6th Batteries of the 8th Field

Artillery Regiment; elements of the 8th Division Signal Unit; the 8th Transport Regiment; and the 8th Engineer Regiment.

Although intelligence officers estimated that

there were between 2,000 and 3,000 enemy

troops in the sector, only a force of about

battalion strength opposed the 305th Infantry. The rest had scattered into the hills

to the northwest.

At 0700, on 22 December, the 2d Battalion, 305th Infantry, left Valencia followed at 1035 by the 3d Battalion. The 2d

Battalion crossed the Togbong River, moved

through the 1st Battalion, 306th Infantry,

and at 1030 attacked along the Palompon

road. The battalion had advanced 1,600

yards northwest by 1230 and secured the

Pagsangahan River crossing. The assault

continued with the 3d Battalion coming up

on the right flank of the 2d. The battalions

moved through rice paddies and through

Humaybunay and established a night

perimeter about one mile southwest of the

barrio.

The 302d Engineer Battalion, which followed behind the assault battalions, fought

the "battle of bridges."

 19

 The engineers

worked around the clock, frequently without

any infantry protection, to restore the

bridges as soon as possible. The bridges were

to be sufficiently strengthened initially to

support 21⁄2-ton truck traffic for infantry

supply, then they were to be reinforced to

carry 20 tons in order to bring M8's forward,

and eventually to 36-ton capacity to carry

the M10's. General Bruce had hoped that

sufficient Bailey bridges could be made

available for important crossings to carry

traffic while engineers built wooden bridges

under the Bailey bridges. Only a limited

number of Bailey bridges were furnished,

however, and engineer progress to the west

was slowed down.20

The assault battalions of the 305th Infantry that were astride the Palompon

road spent a quiet night. They had before

them the enemy's strongly fortified positions

at Matagob. At 0830 on 23 December, the

2d Battalion moved out, followed at 1130

by the 3d Battalion. The 2d Battalion moved

forward west of the road while the 3d advanced east of the road. Intermittent enemy

rifle fire fell upon the 2d Battalion but it

pushed ahead steadily. At 1500, the 2d Bat19

 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 35. 20

 77th Div and 305th Inf Opns Rpts Leyte; 77th

Div G-3 Jnl, 22 Dec 44.
WESTWARD TO THE SEA 353

talion was 500 yards beyond Matagob and

the 3d was 300 yards behind the 2d. The

troops came under heavy fire from two enemy 75-mm. guns on the hills west of Matagob and suffered several casualties. The mortars and artillery with the 305th Infantry

silenced the Japanese guns. The regimental

commander issued orders for the battalions

to move out for the assault at 1000 on the

following day against the regimental objective, a road bend that was 2,000 yards to

its front. The 2d Battalion set up its night

perimeter in place while the 3d Battalion

withdrew to a point 1,000 yards east of Matagob. The regimental command post

moved from Humaybunay to the 3d Battalion perimeter.21

During the night the Japanese made several attempts to penetrate the American

lines. The 3d Battalion destroyed a demolition squad that entered its position, while

the 2d Battalion beat back one attack at

0245 and another one, which was accompanied by mortar fire, at 0630. The 305th

Infantry killed an estimated 100 Japanese

with no casualties to the regiment.22

At 1000 on 24 December the assault

troops jumped off. The Japanese resistance

was light and intermittent, but American

progress was slow because of the rough,

irregular hills in which the enemy had

established positions in foxholes, spider

holes, and caves. Since it was not possible

to bypass these positions, the regiment had

to clear each one before the advance could

continue. The force received some artillery

fire but a mortar platoon from Company A,

88th Chemical Weapons Battalion, silenced

the enemy guns. At 1500 the battalions set

up their night perimeter 500 yards short of

the road bend. During the night a Japanese

force of twenty men, which tried to penetrate the defenses of the 3d Battalion, was

killed.23

At 0800 on 25 December the attack was

renewed, but made very slow progress. The

enemy, dug in in small pockets along the

road, resisted stubbornly. The 3d Battalion

advanced 200 yards and was pinned down

by machine gun, mountain gun, and rifle

fire. The 2d Battalion attempted to envelop

the enemy strong point on the Japanese

right (south) flank but was repulsed.24

On 26 December the regiment limited its

activity to patrolling. Since it was Christmas

Day in the States, "All guns of the Division

Artillery fired ... at ... 1200 as a salute to the nation on Christmas Day. This

was followed by one minute of silent prayer

for the dead and wounded of the 77th Division."

 25

 That night General Bruce ordered

the troops to build bonfires and sing, and

employ other ruses in the hope that the

Japanese might believe that the troops were

celebrating Christmas and might therefore

try to enter the defensive perimeters. These

ruses were unsuccessful in the sectors of the

assault battalions, but a similar one employed in the area of the regimental command post attracted some Japanese patrols,

which were either destroyed or driven off.

At dawn on 27 December the 3d Battalion moved around the Japanese left flank

toward the high ground six hundred yards

from the line of departure. Despite enemy

artillery and machine gun fire and the difficult terrain, the battalion reached the objective, killing 160 Japanese. The remainder

fled to the hills.

21

 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 35; 77th Div G-3

Jnl, 23 Dec 44; 305th Inf Opns Rpt, p. 7. 22

 77th Div G-3 Jnl, 24 Dec 44.

23

 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 36. 24

 77th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 37; 77th G-3 Jnl,

25 Dec 44; 305th Inf Unit Rpt No. 19, 25 Dec 44. 25

 77th Div Supplemental Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 2.
354 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

When it became apparent that the Japanese resistance was strong and determined

and might unduly delay the progress of the

305th Infantry, General Bruce decided to

move the 2d Battalion of the regiment overwater to the vicinity of Palompon at the

western terminus of the road. The 2d Battalion could then attack east along the road

while the 3d Battalion continued the attack

west. The Japanese defenders would thus be

under fire on their front and rear. This eastern attack force, which was called the Provisional Mountain Force, moved to Ormoc

and thence, after arrangements had been

made with the naval representatives of

Krueger's staff, overwater by LCM's to Palompon. It arrived at the latter without incident at 1500 on 28 December. On the same

day the 3d Battalion, reinforced, continued

the attack westward. The Japanese resisted

strongly with small arms fire from pillboxes

and with artillery. The 3d Battalion advanced approximately 1,000 yards during

the day.26

At 0800 on 29 December, the 3d Battalion moved out. The battalion had advanced 650 yards at 1000 when it encountered very determined resistance from

an enemy force in very well camouflaged,

dug-in positions. The troops were pinned

down for the rest of the day. The Provisional Mountain Force moved out of Look

at 1200 to a position from which it could

launch its assault eastward along the road.

At 0930 on 30 December the 305th Infantry struck along the Palompon road,

the 3d Battalion driving west, and the Provisional Mountain Force attacking east.

The Mountain Force encountered only scattered resistance until 0930, when the Japanese, from well-entrenched positions in the

precipitous sides of the road at a point about

four miles east of Palompon, directed strong

machine gun fire along the road. The

Mountain Force dug in for the night on high

ground overlooking the point at which its

advance had been halted. The 3d Battalion

succeeded in overcoming the opposition

which had halted it the previous day, and

pushed forward to a point about 1,000 yards

southwest of Tipolo. The Japanese had emplaced artillery on curves in the road and

could fire directly on the advancing American troops. Although the 305th Infantry

lost one tank to enemy artillery fire, it was

able to destroy three 75-mm. guns and

capture two others intact.27

During the night, the Japanese force withdrew; only scattered troops were left to

delay the advance. At 0800 on 31 December, the assault forces of the 305th Infantry

resumed the attack, and encountered only

sporadic rifle fire. At 1225 at a point two

miles northeast of San Miguel the 3d Battalion and the Provisional Mountain Force

met. This ended all organized resistance

along the Palompon road and secured an

overland route from Highway 2 in the

Ormoc Valley to Palompon on the west

coast.28 The 77th Division made the astounding estimate that for the period from

21 through 31 December 1944, it had

killed 5,779 Japanese, taken 29 prisoners,

and had lost 17 men killed, 116 wounded,

and 6 missing in action.29

X Corps Goes West

Meanwhile, to the north of the 77th Division, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division

and the 32d Infantry Division had turned

26

 Ibid., p. 4; 305th Inf Supplemental Opns Rpt,

p. 2.

27

 Ibid., p. 5. 28

 Ibid., p. 6. 29

 77th Div G-l Casualty Rpts; 77th Div Supplemental Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 2-7.
WESTWARD TO THE SEA 355

off Highway 2 and were pushing over the

mountains to the west coast.30

The 1st Cavalry Division

With the clearing of Highway 2 and the

junction of the X and XXIV Corps at a

point just south of Kananga, the 1st Cavalry

Division was in readiness to push toward

the west coast in conjunction with assaults

by the 77th Division on its left and the 32d

Division on its right. The troops were on a

2,500-yard front along Highway 2 between

Kananga and Lonoy.

On the morning of 23 December the assault units of the 1st Cavalry Division moved

out from the highway and started west.

None encountered any resistance. The 1st

Squadron, 12th Cavalry, established a night

perimeter on a ridge about 1,400 yards

slightly northwest of Kananga. The 1st

Squadron, 5th Cavalry, set up a night

perimeter 1,000 yards north of that of the

1st Squadron, 12th Cavalry, while the 1st

Squadron, 7th Cavalry, dug in for the night

on a line with the other two squadrons.

This first day's march set the pattern for

the next several days. The regiments pushed

steadily forward, meeting only scattered resistance. The chief obstacles were waist-deep

swamps in the zone of the 12th Cavalry.

These were waded on 24 December. The

tangled vegetation and sharp, precipitous

ridges that were henceforward encountered

also made the passage slow and difficult.

On 28 December, the foremost elements

of the 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments

broke out of the mountains and reached the

barrio of Tibur on the west coast, about

2,800 yards north of Abijao. By nightfall

on the following day, the 7th Cavalry

was also on the west coast but farther

north. In its advance it had encountered and destroyed many small, scattered

groups of the enemy, most of whom showed

little desire to fight. The regiment arrived at

Villaba, two and one-half miles north of

Tibur, at dusk, and in securing the town

killed thirty-five Japanese.

During the early morning hours of 31 December, the Japanese launched four counterattacks against the forces at Villaba.

Each started with a bugle call, the first attack beginning at 0230 and the final one at

dawn. An estimated 500 of the enemy,

armed with mortars, machine guns, and

rifles, participated in the assaults, but the

American artillery stopped the Japanese and

their forces scattered. On 31 December, the

77th Division began to relieve the elements

of the 1st Cavalry Division, which moved

back to Kananga.

On the morning of the 30th of December,

the 7th Cavalry had made physical contact

northeast of Villaba with the 127th Infantry, 32d Division, which had been driving

to the west coast north of the 1st Cavalry

Division.

The 32d Division

On 22 December the 127th Infantry had

reached Lonoy and made contact with the

7th Cavalry. On the following day the

troops rested.31 The 128th Infantry had been

30

 The subsection dealing with the elements of

the 1st Cavalry Division is based upon the following: 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 59-69; 1st

Cav Div Supplementary Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 1-7;

1 Cav Div FO No. 21, 24 Dec 44; 1st Cav Div G-3

Periodic Rpts Nos. 65-84, 23 Dec 44-11 Jan 45;

1st Cav Div G-2 Periodic Rpts Nos. 64-75, 23 Dec

44-3 Jan 45; 5th Cav Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 28-29;

1st Cav Div Arty Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 21-22; 1st

Cav Div Brig Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 6-7; 12th Cav

Unit Rpts Nos. 66-68, 23-25 Dec 44; 5th Cav S-3

Periodic Rpt 72, 2 Jan 45; 1st Cav Div G-3 Jnl,

26-31 Dec 44. Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte and 8th

Army Opns Rpt Leyte. 31

 127th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 13.
356 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

engaged in sending out patrols throughout

the Limon area from 11 to 18 December.

These patrols were successful in wiping out

pockets of resistance that had been bypassed

by the advance forces of the 32d Division in

the division's drive along Highway 2 to the

south. On 20 December, the 128th received

orders from General Gill to prepare for a

move to the west coast.32

Both the 127th and 128th Infantry Regiments sent out patrols on 23 December to

reconnoiter the terrain. At 0800 on 24 December the two regiments started for the

west coast. Throughout the march to the

sea, they encountered only small parties of

the enemy, who put up no effective resistance, but heavy rains, dense, almost impassable forests, and steep craggy hills slowed

the advance.

The commanding officer of the 127th

Infantry said of the hills encountered on 24

December:

The morning was spent in climbing to the

top of a mountain ridge. The climbing was

difficult but as we later found out, the descent

was much worse. The trail led almost perpendicular down the side. After reaching the bottom, another ridge was encountered, this

almost straight up, everyone had to use hand

holds to pull themselves up. All in all there

were seven ridges from the bottom of the first

descent to the first possible bivouac area.33

The hills were less rugged from then on.

On the morning of 25 December, the 1st

Battalion, 127th Infantry, encountered and

dispersed 300 to 400 Japanese. Throughout

the march both regiments received supplies

by airdrop, which was not completely satisfactory since none of the drops was made at

the requested time and frequently there was

a wide scattering of supplies.

On the afternoon of 29 December the two

regiments were on their objectives: the

128th Infantry on the high ground overlooking Tabango and Campopo Bays and

the 127th Infantry on the high ground overlooking Antipole Point, approximately three

miles to the south. Patrols were sent out to

scout the terrain and establish contact with

the 1st Cavalry Division on the south and

with the 24th Infantry Division on the

north.34

The 24th Infantry Division 35

The 24th Division, after having been relieved by the 32d Division on Breakneck

Ridge, had protected the rear areas on a

trail leading from Jaro to Ormoc. Two

weeks before the march to the west coast a

large Japanese convoy had been attacked

by U.S. aircraft and forced into San Isidro

Bay on the northern part of the west coast.

Although the vessels were destroyed, some

of the troops were able to get ashore. On 9

December they headed toward Calubian,

on Leyte Bay about six miles northeast of

San Isidro. General Woodruff, who had replaced General Irving on 18 November,

ordered Colonel Clifford's 1st Battalion,

34th Infantry, which had been defending

Kilay Ridge, to wipe out the part of the

enemy force that had landed at San Isidro

and fled northeastward to the vicinity of

Calubian.

32

 128th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 11. 33

 127th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 13.

34

 32d Div Supplementary Opns Rpt Leyte, pp.

1-5; 127th Inf Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 12-14; 32d

Div Leyte Opn Diary, pp. 31-43; 128th Inf Opns

Rpt Leyte, pp. 10-12. 35

 The material in this subsection is based upon

24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 73-76; 34th Inf Unit

Jnl, 9-30 Dec 44; 34th Inf Unit Rpts Nos. 51-71,

9-29 Dec 44; 2d Bn, 34th Inf, FO No. 8, 26 Dec

44; 34th Inf FO No. 17, 18 Dec 44; 34th Inf FO

No. 18, 26 Dec 44; 24th Div G-3 Periodic Rpts

Nos. 45-67, 2-25 Dec 44; 24th Div FO No. 12, 8

Dec 44 and FO No. 13, 17 Dec 44.
WESTWARD TO THE SEA 357

At 2300 on 21 December, Colonel Clifford notified Colonel Dahlen, the commanding officer of the 34th Infantry, that a Japanese force of about 160 men was at Tuktuk,

about four miles south of Calubian. He

added that at 0800 on the following morning the 1st Battalion would move out and

destroy the force.

At 0300 a force consisting of a platoon

from Company C and a platoon from Company A moved toward the high ground

northwest of Tuktuk in preparation for the

assault, but because of very poor trails the

force was delayed. In the meantime four

LVT's with a platoon of mortars moved

over water to Tuktuk. At 0830 the attack

started, with machine guns mounted on the

LVT's and mortars furnishing supporting

fire. The Japanese resistance was sporadic,

although some mortar fire was received. As

the troops of the 34th Infantry neared the

barrio, the enemy defenders broke and fled,

and the town was deserted as the soldiers

entered. Approximately thirty enemy dead

were counted in the barrio and vicinity. The

fleeing enemy force was later destroyed by

patrols that worked over the sector. The

Japanese had obviously been looting because linens, silverware, and women's clothing were found in their packs. One soldier

had a baby's high chair tied on the top of

his pack.

On 23 December, Col. William W. Jenna,

former commanding officer of the 34th Infantry, returned from sick leave in the States

and assumed command of the 34th Infantry. With his arrival plans were expedited

to clean up the northwestern end of the

Leyte peninsula in conjunction with the assaults of other units of the Sixth Army.

From 23 to 26 December, extensive

patrolling was conducted along the west

coast of the Leyte peninsula. On 26 December the 34th Infantry issued orders for

clearing the part of the Leyte peninsula in

its zone. The 1st Battalion was to secure all

trails and high ground in the interior, prevent any enemy movement to the north and

to the east, and, finally, be prepared to assist

the 2d Battalion in the capture of the San

Isidro Bay area.

At 2245 on 26 December the LCM's at

Villalon (a barrio on Biliran Strait and

about six miles northwest of Calubian) began to load Companies F and G. By 2300

the embarkation was completed and the

craft moved to Gigantangan Island, arriving

there fifteen minutes after midnight. The

troops disembarked and slept. At 0530 they

again embarked and proceeded to Taglawigan, arriving there at 0730. After strafing

the shore the companies landed, meeting no

resistance. At the same time Company F

completed its assignment without opposition, pushing east and south and encircling

Taglawigan. Before noon, some elements

of the 2d Battalion were moving overland to

Daha, about two miles to the south, while

others had re-embarked and were making

an overwater movement toward it. By noon

Taglawigan and Daha had fallen to the 2d

Battalion.

Company G, reinforced, left Company F

at Daha, re-embarked on the landing craft,

and headed toward the San Isidro Bay area,

6,000 yards to the south. As the convoy

neared San Isidro, it came under machine

gun fire from the barrio and the hills to

the southwest. A frontal attack on the town

was abandoned and the landing craft moved

to the southwest of the jetty to make their

landing. The LVT's mired in the mud

about 100 to 150 yards offshore. The rest

of the force, which was in the LCM's, waded

ashore. Some of the troops from the LVT's

met with great difficulty in trying to get
358 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

ashore but the LVT's finally succeeded in

retracting and picked them up. Approximately 150 soldiers with supplies for the

task force returned to Gigantangan Island.

The convoy had only one casualty.

In the meantime, the 1st Battalion had

received orders at 1300 to take San Isidro.

The battalion moved overland from Calubian and at nightfall it dug in on the high

ground overlooking San Isidro.

At 0800 on 28 December, the co-ordinated assault was made against San Isidro,

with elements of the 2d Battalion attacking

from the north while the 1st Battalion attacked from the east. The troops encountered light resistance, the Japanese defenders

being only partially armed. Fifty-five of the

enemy were killed and one prisoner was

taken. By 1230, the 1st Battalion was outposting San Isidro.

With the capture of San Isidro, the last

main point on the Leyte peninsula was safely

in the hands of the 34th Infantry. The

troops moved south along the coast and destroyed small, poorly equipped groups of the

enemy. One group of Japanese, whose only

weapons were bayonets attached to bamboo

poles, tried hopelessly to break through the

lines.

On 1 January 1945, the 77th Division

was ordered to relieve the 32d and 24th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division. The relieved divisions were to move to

staging areas and prepare for future operations.

The Japanese Retreat

Condition of Japanese Forces

The morale and physical condition of the

Japanese Army were very low. With the

juncture of the American X and XXIV

Corps, the 35th Army had begun to disintegrate. Desertion became common. The

wounded would not assemble with their

units. The problem of the wounded became

serious since there were no proper facilities

for medical treatment. General Tomochika

later said: "Commanders employing persuasive language frequently requested seriously wounded soldiers at the front to commit suicide; this was particularly common

among personnel of the 1st Division and it

was pitiful. However the majority died

willingly. Only Japanese could have done a

thing like this and yet I could not bear to

see the sight."

 36

Those of the slightly wounded that could

not march with the able-bodied soldiers

walked by themselves. They became separated from their units and some, although

able to do so, refused to rejoin their outfits,

giving their wounds as an excuse. In addition there were deserters who fled to the hills.

The 35th Army began the policy of sending

the slightly wounded back to the front lines.

Many of the service units, such as the Mitsui

Shipping Unit and the air corps ground

crews, refused to fight since they were not

trained as combat troops. "Even the artillery

and antiaircraft units retreated without facing the enemy. Their excuse was that they

were not trained to fight as infantry and

were useless without their guns."

 37

Doubtless, some of the unwillingness of

the Japanese service troops to serve on the

front lines was due to their physical condition. When the 1st Division arrived on Leyte

on 1 November it brought with it enough

food and ammunition for one month, and

by 1 December this supply was exhausted.

On 3 December an additional one-half

month's supply was brought in at Ormoc;

36

 Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 28. 37

 Ibid., p. 29.
WESTWARD TO THE SEA 359

but this was destroyed or captured by the

77th Division in its advance. Consequently

after the 1st of December all Japanese troops

on Leyte "were on a starvation diet and had

to live off the land."

 38

 The 1st and 57th

Infantry Regiments were the principal sufferers. The men were forced to eat coconuts,

various grasses, bamboo shoots, the heart

fibers of coconut tree trunks, and whatever

native fruits or vegetables they could forage.

When the troops received orders to withdraw to the west coast of Leyte, "they were

literally in a starved condition, . . . many

instances occurred in which men vomited

seven to ten times a day because they could

not digest some of the food due to their

weakened stomachs."

 39

The 1st Division abandoned much equipment, ammunition, and rations along the

highway through the Ormoc Valley. Many

of the stragglers and deserters clothed and

fed themselves with the abandoned materiel.

The chief of staff of the 35th Army stated

that when the Americans captured army

headquarters, he left the headquarters without any clothing. However, he picked up "a

new uniform and sufficient food while on

the road."

 40

Withdrawal Plans

On 19 December, General Suzuki, the

commander of the 35th Army on Leyte, had

received word from the 14th Area Army in

Manila that henceforth the 35th Army was

to subsist on its own resources and what it

could obtain within its operational area.41

On the same day, probably because of the

information received from Manila, General

Suzuki ordered a conference of the staff

officers of the 1st and 102d Divisions. At

this meeting, General Suzuki ordered the

1st Division to retreat to the northern sector

of the Matagob area and the 102d Division

to the southern part of the same sector. At

Matagob the divisions were to reorganize for

a counterattack. The order did not give any

specific time for the withdrawal; each division was to take action according to the situation in its sector. On 20 December, General Suzuki moved his headquarters farther

west to a point approximately three and a

half miles north of Palompon.42

On 21 December, the 102d Division,

which had about 2,000 men, began to withdraw to the vicinity of Matagob. The division, having failed to get in touch with the

35th Army, moved to the west coast near

Villaba, approximately ten miles north of

Palompon.43 It made contact with the 1st

Division at the end of December, and also

with the 68th Infantry Brigade and the 5th

Infantry Regiment, which were already in

that sector.44 The 1st Division also began to

withdraw on 21 December, making the

withdrawal in two columns. The southern

column consisted of about six hundred men

of the 49th Infantry Regiment, 1st Division

Transport Regiment, and other units. On

its way west, it was met on 23 December by

the 68th Brigade which, unaware of the loss

of the Ormoc road, was proceeding toward

the highway. The brigade joined the southern column, which reached the Bagacay

38

 10th I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study of the

Japanese 35th Army on Leyte, Interrog of Col

Junkichi Okabayashi [CofS 1st Div] pp. 10-11. 39

 Ibid.

40

 Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 28. 41

 35th Army Opns, p. 114.

42

 Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 27. 43

 35th Army Opns, p. 115. 44

 10th I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study of Japanese

102d Division on Leyte and Cebu, Interrog of Maj

Chuji Kaneki [G-2 102d Division], p. 5.
360 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

sector the following day. (The barrio of

Bagacay is six miles northeast of Villaba.)

The northern column also had about six

hundred men and consisted of elements of

the Division Headquarters, the 1st Infantry

Regiment, the 57th Infantry Regiment, and

other units. The detachment was forced to

cut its way through dense jungle. On 25

December it was attacked by the Americans

and further decimated. That night the

northern and southern columns met at

Bagacay and on the following day started

towards Matagob. On the 28th, following

orders from General Suzuki, they turned

north and established defensive positions on

the eastern slope of Mt. Canguipot, two and

a half miles southeast of Villaba.45

As the Japanese, pursued by the forces of

the X and XXIV Corps, spiritlessly retreated toward the mountains of western

Leyte, Imperial General Headquarters notified the Japanese people: "Our forces are

still holding the Burauen and San Pablo airfields and continue to attack the enemy positions. Our forces are fighting fiercely on the

eastern mountain slopes near Ormoc and

Albuera.46

45

 10th I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study of Japanese

35th Army on Leyte, Part IV, Col Junkichi Okabayashi, Opns of the 1st Division on Leyte, p. 18. 46

 Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 25.
CHAPTER XXII

Leyte Is Liberated

On 15 December, General MacArthur

had directed General Eichelberger's Eighth

Army to be prepared to assume control of

nearly all Sixth Army units in the Leyte area

at 0001 on 26 December 1944 in order to

relieve the Sixth Army for future operations.

The Eighth Army was to relieve the Sixth

of all duties and missions in the area except

certain ones dealing with logistics and construction. These were assigned to the

USASOS (SWPA). The Allied Naval and

Air Forces were directed to continue, in

support of the Eighth Army, the missions

which hitherto had been specified for the

Sixth.1

In furtherance of General MacArthur's

instructions, General Krueger issued orders

covering the transfer to Eighth Army control of certain Sixth Army units. On 21

December he named the units over which

he was relinquishing control as of 0001, 26

December, and stated that the responsibility

for continuing assigned duties and missions

in the area would then pass from him to

the Commanding General, Eighth U.S.

Army, the Commanding General, USASOS

(SWPA), and the Commander, Allied

Naval Forces.2

General Eichelberger, also, prepared orders for the forthcoming transfer of authority. The supply and evacuation procedures

of the Sixth Army would remain in effect.

The X and XXIV Corps would "continue

on their present assigned missions of destroying Japanese wherever found, and . . .

be prepared to conduct overland or amphibious shore to shore operations to seize

enemy supply points and bases, and ports

of entry."

 3

On 25 December, when elements of the

77th Division had seized Palompon, the last

important port on Leyte, General MacArthur declared that all organized resistance had ended. He said in a message to

General Krueger: "Heartiest congratulations on capture of Palompon. This closes a

campaign that has had few counterparts

in the utter destruction of the enemy's forces

with a maximum conservation of our own.

It has been a magnificent performance on

the part of all concerned."

 4

The Eighth Army Assumes Control

On 26 December, General Eichelberger

assumed control of all combat units in the

Leyte—Samar area. It was not until the first

part of January 1945 that the American

troops secured the west coast of Leyte.

Thereafter only isolated pockets of enemy

resistance remained.

Assembly of Japanese Forces

On 25 December 1944, General Yamashita, commanding the 14th Area Army, 1

 GHQ SWPA Opns Instns 81, 15 Dec 44. 2

 Sixth Army FO 40, 9.1 Dec 44.

3

 Eighth Army FO 8, 20 Dec 44. 4

 Quoted in Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 84.
362 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

notified General Suzuki, the 35th Army

commander, that he had written off the

Leyte Campaign as a loss; henceforward

the 35th Army on Leyte would be selfsustaining and self-supporting, the units on

Leyte would be transferred to other areas,

and, finally, the units on the island would be

assembled at a point from which raiding

operations could be conducted. Since these

orders were ambiguous and apparently contradictory, General Suzuki asked that the

message be repeated but he never received

an answer. Accordingly, in the latter part

of December, he sent his chief of staff to

Manila for further clarification of the orders.

The chief of staff arrived at Manila, by way

of Cebu, in late January, but he was unable

to obtain any further information for General Suzuki.

The decision of General Yamashita to

abandon the Leyte operation followed a

series of rapidly moving events. On the 14th

of December, he canceled an optimistic

plan for an amphibious assault through the

shallow waters of Carigara Bay against

Carigara, an assault that had been scheduled for 16 December. This cancellation followed the sighting of an Allied convoy en

route to Mindoro.5 The convoy reached

Mindoro and the troops landed successfully

on 15 December. On 19 December, two

days prior to the junction of the X and

XXIV Corps on Highway 2, General

Yamashita told General Suzuki that he

could no longer send any reinforcements

and supplies to Leyte and that the 35th

Army would have to become self-supporting. On the same day, General Yamashita

assigned to the defense of Luzon three divisions that Imperial General Headquarters

had earmarked for Leyte. Shortly afterward,

at a conference with representatives from

the Southern Army and Imperial General

Headquarters, the representative from the

latter told General Yamashita to forget the

Leyte operation.

In the meantime, General Suzuki interpreted his orders to mean that units of the

35th Army would assemble at a common

point at which they could be self-supporting.

He had selected the western area of Matagob—Palompon in the vicinity of the road

leading from Highway 2 at Libongao over

the mountains to Palompon on the west

coast. Palompon was to have been used as

the rear center of the line of communications and the army headquarters was to

have been established at Kompisao, but the

seizure of Palompon on 25 December by

the 77th Division forced Suzuki to change

the location of his army headquarters.6 He

then selected as a base of operations an area

in the vicinity of Ginabuyan that overlooked

Silad Bay and was about three kilometers

north of Villaba.

The new area was a plateau with an elevation of about 1,200 feet, heavily forested

and having rocky eastern and western slopes

that made it "a natural fortress." From it

one could command a view of Ormoc Valley

to the east and the Camotes Sea and Cebu

to the west. There were a few Filipino huts,

and cultivated fields and coconut groves, interspersed with salt beds, lay along the

beach. The area "was admirably suited for

an extended period of defensive action."

 7

General Suzuki ordered the units of the 35th

Army that were retreating westward to repair to the vicinity of the new base of operations. 5

 See M. Hamlin Cannon and Robert Ross Smith,

Luzon and the Southern Philippines, a forthcoming

volume in this series.

6

 35th Army Opns, p. 119. 7

 Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 32.
LEYTE IS LIBERATED 363

The units continued to straggle westward

towards the selected area. By 1 January,

most of them had taken up positions in the

Balanac sector, which was about three and

a half miles southeast of Villaba and overlooked the Palompon road. They had been

hard pressed. The 68th Brigade and the 1st

Division made contact and successfully concentrated south of Villaba in early January.

The 12th Independent Regiment (the

Imahori Detachment), the Mitsui Shipping

Unit, the 4th Airborne Raiding Regiment

and the remaining troops of the 77th Infantry Regiment, which had been operating

northeast of Ormoc, reached the southern

Matagob area about the middle of January.

It was not until the beginning of February

that these units made contact with the 35th

Army. The few remaining elements of the

16th Division stayed in the vicinity of

Valencia until the end of February. The

26th Division also remained in this area

until the middle of January, when it moved

west and established contact with the 35th

Army.8

The 102d Division presented certain difficulties. There had been instances of forty

to fifty deserters fleeing to Cebu or Negros

on boats they had built for themselves.

Deserters that were apprehended were

court-martialed. General Suzuki for some

time had been out of touch with Lt. Gen.

Shimpei Fukue, the commanding general

of the 102d Division, which was in the Mt.

Pina area. By chance, one of Suzuki's officers learned that Fukue was planning to

evacuate to Cebu. General Suzuki was incensed since he and his staff felt that Fukue

"was violating the military code in taking

these steps without consent." He thereupon

sent the following message to Fukue: "Lt.

General Fukue and his headquarters will

remain in Leyte and at the same time I am

attaching other units and groups in the

Visayan and Mindanao sectors to your Division. General Fukue and his Chief of Staff

will report to me in person at Army Headquarters." The commander of the 102d Division did not answer but his chief of staff

sent the following reply: "We appreciate

the efforts of Army but at the present time

we are very busy preparing for retreat. The

division commander and chief of staff are

unable to report to Army Headquarters."

 9

General Suzuki was "entirely displeased"

with the reaction of Fukue and sent his chief

of staff, General Tomochika, to investigate

the situation. When Tomochika arrived he

found that Fukue, with his chief of staff and

some headquarters personnel, had already

left for Cebu. This fact was communicated

to General Suzuki by Tomochika, who states

that "for several days I had a difficult time

in consoling the general."

 10

 The sequel to

these events was that General Suzuki relieved General Fukue of his command and

ordered him to remain on Cebu until he

received further orders. Upon the arrival of

Suzuki in Cebu in the spring of 1945, Fukue

was sentenced to confinement for thirty

days. General Suzuki asked Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo for authority to

court-martial General Fukue; no reply was

forthcoming. General Fukue was released

and later returned to command of the 102d

Division.11

In the meantime, the leaderless 102d Division, with a strength of approximately

2,000 men, crossed Highway 2 north of Libongao and reached the southern area of

8

 35th Army Opns, pp. 115-16.

9

 Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 29. 10

 Ibid., p. 30. 11

 10th I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study of Opns of

Japanese 102d Division on Leyte and Cebu, App.,

p. 3; Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, pp. 29-

31.
364 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Matagob about 24 December. The troops

failed to contact the 35th Army and after

remaining for a short time at Matagob

moved to the vicinity of Villaba.

The units that arrived on the west coast

were much understrength and very poorly

equipped. All artillery had been lost. There

were only five to ten machine guns per regiment in addition to individual weapons.

Each man had an average of sixty rounds

of ammunition and several hand grenades.

On the 30th of December, General Yamashita sent the following message to General

Suzuki:

Sixty days have already elapsed since the

American forces invaded Leyte Island, during which period the Thirty-fifth Army, under

the forceful leadership of its commander, has

waged many a heroic battle against superior

enemy forces and in the face of numerous

difficulties. The Army gave a great blow to

the enemy. Moreover, the Thirty-fifth Army

by containing the opposing enemy for this

long period of time deprived him of freedom

of action for the coming operation, thereby

facilitating the general conduct of our operations in this battle and rendering great services

to our cause. I am deeply impressed, particularly with the fact that the Takachiho Unit

captured the hostile airfield at BURAUEN

after the Thirty-fifth Army, despite its inferiority in equipment and number of men,

and the stoppage of supply, made a timely

and resolute attack against the enemy with

the commander himself leading them. However, the enemy, who has increased his material power and war potential, now threatens,

solely on the strength of his material superiority, to bear down on Luzon Island despite the

heroic and desperate efforts of our sea and

air forces as well as of the Thirty-fifth Army.

In view of the sudden change in the situation,

we shall seek and destroy our enemy on Luzon

Island, thereby doing our part in the heroic

struggle of the Army and avenging many a

valiant warrior who fell before the enemy.

As munitions have not been supplied adequately, I cannot keep back tears of remorse

for tens of thousands of our officers and men

fighting in Leyte Island. Nevertheless, I

must impose a still harder task upon you.

Please try to understand my intentions. They

say it is harder to live than to die. You, officers

and men, be patient enough to endure the

hardships of life, and help guard and maintain the prosperity of the Imperial Throne

through eternal resistance to the enemy, and

be ready to meet your death calmly for our

beloved country. I sincerely instruct you as

above.12

General Suzuki took steps to make the

force on Leyte self-supporting. In January

1945, he established two principles for his

troops. First, the troops were to utilize as

much of the local food and material as possible and plant sweet potatoes and Indian

corn. Second, all provisions in the area outside of the operation base were to be purchased. The execution of the first part of

his first precept worked reasonably well but

the constant American air raids and

mopping-up operations prevented the Japanese from being too successful in planting

and harvesting the corn and potatoes. They

were also not very fortunate in purchasing

supplies from outside the area, although

some supplies were obtained each time the

men could pass through the American

protective screen.

The Japanese arrived on the western

shores of Leyte at the end of the harvest season. They secured large quantities of provisions which the Filipinos had stored and

also a great number of coconuts and sweet

potatoes. The soldiers used the carabaos of

the island as meat and obtained salt from

sea water. For vegetables, the army's chief

reliance was upon wild ferns, tokay grass,

and wild spinach.

12

 Msg, Gen Yamashita to Gen Suzuki, 1535, 30

Dec 44. Translation of HS-23A, file of 35th Army

Headquarters documents held by former Maj. Takahash Kohet, P8, GHQ FEC, MI Sec, AXIS. Copy

in OCMH.
LEYTE IS LIBERATED 365

In conclusion, "although there was not

enough food to increase the fighting power

of the Army, no one died of starvation and

some units stored enough supplies for two

to three months."

 13

The Mop-up

By the end of December, most of the

enemy troops were in northwest Leyte, west

of Highway 2 and north of Palompon. Another large enemy concentration was located

in the hills south of Palompon.14

The mop-up of any operation is dangerous, difficult, and unglamorous, but it is

highly essential. The activities of the 7th

Division on Leyte during January and

February 1945 are typical of the large-scale

mop-up in which many small units are sent

out daily in all directions. This division was

assigned all of the west coast area south of

a line from Palompon to Valencia. Its

records state that the division "sent out as

many as forty combat patrols daily to hunt

down and destroy thousands of Japanese

stragglers wandering throughout the

area."

 15

Eight divisions were engaged in mopping

up for varying lengths of time on Leyte, but

only an outline of their activities will be

attempted here. The operation may be divided into three phases: XXIV Corps

activities from 1 January to 15 February

1945; X Corps activities from 1 January

to 24 February 1945; and Eighth Army

Area Command operations from 24 February to 8 May 1945.16

During the XXIV Corps phase, the 11th

Airborne Division encountered an enemy

force well dug in on the southern slopes of

Mt. Majunag, five miles northwest of

Burauen. After much bitter hand-to-hand

fighting the Japanese were destroyed. The

96th Division engaged in extensive patrolling, relieved the 11th Airborne Division,

and relieved the X Corps of all tactical

responsibility east of the mountains. The

7th Division sent out numerous patrols in

the southern part of the island, and sent out

a reinforced battalion that destroyed all

enemy forces in the Camotes Islands. The

77th Division, which operated in the northwestern part of the island, cleared up many

pockets of enemy resistance.

In the X Corps phase, the island of Samar

was cleared of Japanese troops. The Americal Division, advance elements of which

arrived on 24 January, extensively patrolled

both the islands of Leyte and Samar.

During the Eighth Army Area Command

phase, the constant searching out of isolated

groups of enemy soldiers continued. In addition to the Americal Division, the 1st Filipino Infantry Regiment patrolled Leyte. On

8 May, the control of the Eighth Army over

the area came to an end.17

The Japanese Withdrawal

At the time that General Suzuki made

his plans for the units of the 35th Army on

Leyte to become self-sufficient, he felt that

there were too many soldiers on the island

to make the plan fully effective. General

Suzuki decided therefore to transfer to other

islands those who, because of their good

physical condition and morale, would be

able to withstand the rigors of a long fight.

13

 35th Army Opns, pp. 120-24. 14

 Eighth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. 15

 Ibid., p. 9. 16

 Eighth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3. Unless

otherwise cited, this subsection is based upon this

operations report, pp. 1-18. 17 Eighth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, pp. 7-17.
366 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Consequently the sick, weak, and wounded

were dropped from the units that were to

be withdrawn.18 General Suzuki also considered the selection of the location of the

new headquarters for the 35th Army. Since

there were 15,000 Japanese residents in and

around Davao on Mindanao, it was finally

decided to remove the army headquarters

to Davao. As a preliminary step, the 1st Division was to be sent to Cebu.19

General Suzuki had plans drawn up

showing the order of precedence by which

the units on Leyte were to be withdrawn

and their destinations. All available landing

barges on Leyte and additional vessels from

Cebu and other areas would be used. The

order of the proposed withdrawal and the

destinations of the units were as follows:

1st Division

41st and 77th Infantry Regiments

102d Division

26th Division

Takahashi Detachment

Units of the 68th Independent

Mixed Brigade

northern Cebu and

later to Negros

Mindanao

Visayan area

Bacolod sector of

Negros

northern Cebu

northern Cebu

General Suzuki and 35th Army Headquarters would leave Leyte about the same

time as the 26th Division. The 16th Division, the 68th Independent Mixed Brigade,

and other small units were to remain on

Leyte and would be under the command of

Lt. Gen. Shiro Makino, the 16th Division

commander.20

When these plans were announced Lt.

Gen. Tadasu Kataoka, the commanding

general of the 1st Division, suggested that

as the 1st Division had lost so many men

and officers in the Leyte operation it might

be better to use the 68th Independent Mixed

Brigade, which had fresh troops and would

be better suited for the assignment to Cebu.

He was overruled.21 There were, however,

other officers who were more anxious to

leave Leyte. General Tomochika later

wrote: "Many of the troops rushed to join

this movement and Staff Officer Nakamura

experienced difficulty in controlling them.

However, quite a number of men succeeded

in transferring without the commander's

orders. The commander was displeased because only a small number of staff officers

were willing to stay on Leyte."

 22

On the morning of 12 January, four

launches arrived at Abijao to begin evacuation of the 1st Division. The Americans

attacked and damaged the vessels, but three

were repaired. By 2300, with the embarkation of the first party, composed of elements

of the 49th Infantry and Division Headquarters, the evacuation got under way.

This group left Abijao at 0130 on 13 January and reached Tabogon, in northern

Cebu, about 0730. At about the same time,

the remnants of the 57th Infantry reached

Cebu. The rest of 1st Division Headquarters,

the 1st Infantry Regiment, and part of the

1st Transport Regiment left Leyte on the

18th, and on the 20th the rest of the 49th

Infantry Regiment and the 1st Division

Transport quitted the island.

Between the 13th and 20th of January

the three launches, each carrying about

seventy men, made four round trips. After

the second trip, the Americans spotted the

operation. The hiding place of the craft at

Tabogon was frequently strafed by aircraft

and shelled by submarines and motor torpedo boats, which kept the channel waters

18

 Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 34. 19

 35th Army Opns, pp. 118, 127. 20

 Ibid., pp. 127-28.

21

 10th I&HS, 35th Army Opns on Leyte, Part IV,

Opns of Japanese 1st Division on Leyte, pp. 19-20. 22

 Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, p. 34.
LEYTE IS LIBERATED 367

under sharp surveillance. On the night of

the 20th, American aircraft sank three

launches. Although additional craft were

sent up from Liloan on Cebu, these were

also sunk. It was impossible to evacuate any

more personnel until the middle of March.23

The number of men from the 1st Division evacuated to Cebu was estimated to

be as follows: 1st Division Headquarters,

73; 1st Infantry Regiment, 72; 49th Infantry Regiment, 208; 57th Infantry Regiment,

178; and 1st Transport Regiment, 212; a

total of 743 men. The equipment evacuated

included 332 rifles, 4 heavy machine guns,

11 light machine guns, 5 grenade launchers,

and a small amount of small arms ammunition.24

 In addition several hundred men

obtained their own transportation and left

for other islands in the Philippines.

The Road Ends

From 20 January on, the remaining

Japanese forces stayed in the Villaba sector,

hoping that succor would come. On 20

January General Tomochika "waited on the

beach" for a boat that never came. The men

were "plunged into the depths of despair."

Time passed. On the evening of 17 March,

two Japanese vessels appeared. General

Suzuki and part of his staff boarded the

craft and at 0030, 18 March, left the island

of Leyte. For days the vessels sailed from

island to island in the Visayas only to find

that they were too late. The Americans were

already in possession. On the evening of 16

April, the vessel bearing General Suzuki was

bombed by American aircraft off the coast

of Negros Island and Suzuki was killed.25

The Leyte Campaign had ended.

The liberation of Leyte had been accomplished at no slight cost. During the peak

month, January 1945, there were 257,766

American Army, including Air Forces,

troops on Leyte.26 The total Army casualties

for the Leyte Campaign were over 15,500,

including more than 3,500 killed and nearly

12,000 wounded. (Tables 4 and 5)

It is impossible, with data now available

to determine with any degree of exactitude

the number of Japanese who participated in

the campaign or their casualties. The estimates of the Sixth and Eighth Armies vary

greatly, as do those of the various Japanese

sources. The Sixth Army estimated that it

had killed 56,263 and captured 389 men.27

and that as of 26 December 1944 when it

relinquished control to Eighth Army about

5,000 of the Japanese remained on the islands of Leyte and Samar.28

 The Eighth

Army estimated that, for the mop-up period

from 26 December 1944 to 8 May 1945, it

23

 10th I&HS, 35th Army Opns on Leyte, Part IV,

Opns of Japanese 1st Division on Leyte, pp. 21-22. 24

 Ibid., p. 21.

25

 During his travels, General Suzuki composed

two poems which he presented to his "dear brother

Tomochika." One of these, entitled "A Farewell

Poem," ran as follows:

Every soldier must expect to sacrifice his life

in War,

Only then has his duty been done;

Be thankful that you can die at the front,

Rather than an inglorious death at home.

Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, pp. 34-39. 26

 Strength Accounting Br, AGO, STM-30, 1 Feb

45. These figures must be treated with caution as

they include, in addition to those who had actually

participated, troops who were merely staging on

the island and had played no part in the operation.

It is important to remember that at all stages of

the Leyte Campaign troops and units were constantly coming and going. 27

 Sixth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 84. 28

 Eighth Army Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 3.
368 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

TABLE 4—U.S. ARMY BATTLE CASUALTIES AT LEYTE, 20 OCTOBER 1944-8 MAY 1945

a

 Estimated.

Source: Reports of the Commanding Generals, Eighth U. S. Army, Inclosure 1, and Sixth U. S. Army, on the Leyte-Samar Operation, p. 155.

killed and found dead 24,294 and captured

439 Japanese.29 General Eichelberger stated

that his forces killed "more than twentyseven thousand Japanese."

 30

The Japanese historians of the Leyte operation estimate that the total strength of their

army ground troops was 70,000 men.31 General Tomochika, the chief of staff of the

35th Army, was interrogated several times

after the war. On one occasion he estimated

that the total number of Japanese involved

in the Leyte operation, including naval and

air personnel and those who lost their lives

in transports sunk en route to Leyte, was

59,400 men, approximately one fifth of all

Japanese forces in the Philippine Islands.32

On another occasion General Tomochika

estimated that 61,800 Japanese had been on

Leyte, and that 13,010 were alive and

48,790 had been killed by 17 March 1945.33

In the plan for the defeat of Japan the

objective sought in reconquering the Philippines was not only to liberate the Filipinos

29

 Ibid., p. 16. 30

 Robert L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to

Tokyo (New York, 1950), p. 181. 31

 35th Army Opns, p. 126.

32

 10th I&HS, Eighth Army Stf Study of Opns of

Japanese 35th Army on Leyte, Interrog of Gen

Tomochika, pp. 9-10. 33

 Tomochika, True Facts of Leyte Opn, Interrog

of Gen Tomochika, p. 7.
LEYTE IS LIBERATED 369

TABLE 5—SIXTH ARMY BATTLE CASUALTIES BY ARM OR SERVICE, 20 OCTOBER-25 DECEMBER

1944

Source: Sixth Army Operations Report Leyte, 20 October-25 December 1944, p. 155.

but also to cut off the Japanese from the

rich empire that they had acquired in the

Netherlands Indies, and at the same time to

establish a base for the final assault on the

enemy's homeland. As early as 1942 Allied

submarines had begun to gnaw at the lifeline between Japan and its new empire, rich

in rubber, tin, rice, and, above all, in oil,

without which Japan could not remain in

the war. By the fall of 1944 the submarines

had virtually cut this lifeline, which ran past

the Philippines. The loss of the Philippines

to the Allies would finally sever it.

The object of the Leyte Campaign had

been to force an entry into the Philippines

and establish a solid base for their reconquest. It had accomplished this object,

though the base had not been secured and

developed as promptly or as effectively as

the planners had anticipated. The construction program on the island had been a disappointment. Leyte never became a major

air base. But the campaign had other and

more important effects that had not been

foreseen when it was launched. In their

determination to make Leyte the decisive

battle of the Philippines, the Japanese had

committed the major portions of their fleet

and air force in a vain attempt to stay the

American advance. In the Battle of Leyte

Gulf the Japanese Navy suffered irreparable

damage—all of the carriers were lost and

most of the capital ships were sunk or damaged. The air force was now almost

completely dependent upon the suicidal

kamikaze pilot. Finally, the dispatch of

reinforcements and supplies to Leyte had

seriously crippled the defenses of Luzon—

the strategic heart of the Philippine Archipelago.
370 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

The Americans had established an air

base in the midst of the Japanese-held

Philippine Islands—a base within medium

bomber range of Luzon, the principal American target in the archipelago.34

 As General

Yamashita, commanding officer of all Japanese Army troops in the Philippines later

said: "After the loss of Leyte ... I

realized that decisive battle was impossible. . . ."35

Three years of hard fighting over jungle

trails had finally brought the U.S. forces

back to the Philippines. Ahead lay months

of weary struggle but ultimate victory was

no longer in doubt.

34

 See Cannon and Smith, Luzon and the Southern Philippines.

35

 U. S. Military Commission, U. S. Army Forces

Western Pacific, United States of America vs

Tomoyuki Yamashita, Testimony of General Yamashita, XXVIII, 3527.
Appendix A

GHQ Operations Instructions Number 70, 21 September 1944

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

A. P. O. 500

21 September 1944.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS)

NUMBER ........... . 70}

1. a. See current Intelligence Summaries and Annex No. 3—Intelligence.

b. Allied Forces occupy the line: MARIANAS-ULITHI-PALAUMOROTAI and control the approaches to the southern and eastern PHILIPPINES.

c. The THIRD FLEET, Admiral W. F. Halsey commanding, covers and

supports the LEYTE GULF-SURIGAO STRAIT Operations by:

(1) Containing or destroying the Japanese Fleet.

(2) Destruction of hostile air and shipping in the FORMOSA, LUZON, VISAYAS and MINDANAO areas during the period A—9

through A—3 and from A Day through A+30 as necessary to maintain their continued neutralization.

(3) Destruction of ground defenses and installations and shipping in

the objective and adjacent enemy supporting areas from A—2 until

the escort carriers assume the mission of direct support.

(4) Providing direct support of the landing and subsequent operations

by fast carrier aircraft as required.

d. Coordination of operations of THIRD FLEET and SOUTHWEST

PACIFIC Naval and Air Forces will be published later.

e. I Time (Zone-9) of Z Time will be used during the operation.

2. a. Forces of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, covered and supported by

the THIRD FLEET, will continue the offensive to reoccupy the PHILIPPINES

by seizing and occupying objectives in the LEYTE and western SAMAR areas,

and will establish therein naval, air and logistic facilities for the support of subsequent operations.

b. Target Date for A Day: 20 October 1944.

c. Forces

(1) SIXTH US ARMY—Lt General Walter Krueger, US Army. As

constituted, less elements assigned by subsequent orders to EIGHTH

US ARMY.
372 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

SIXTH US ARMY reserve:

77th US Infantry Division—GUAM

6th US Infantry Division—CAPE SANSAPOR, DUTCH NEW

GUINEA. Forces allocated for the operation as designated in Annex No. 1. Tentative Troop List for the Operation. The exact composition of the landing force as designated by Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY.

(2) FIRST AUSTRALIAN ARMY—Lt General V. A. H. Sturdee,

CBE

As constituted.

(3) EIGHTH US ARMY—Lt General Robert L. Eichelberger, US

Army.

As later specified.

(4) ALLIED NAVAL Forces—Vice Admiral T. C. Kinkaid, US

NAVY.

As reinforced.

(5) ALLIED AIR Forces—Lt General George C. Kenney, US Army.

As constituted.

(6) USASOS—Maj General J. L. Frink, US Army.

As constituted.

3. a. The SIXTH US ARMY, supported by the ALLIED NAVAL and

AIR Forces, will:

(1) By overwater operations seize and occupy:

(a) Objectives in the TACLOBAN and DULAG areas in LEYTE

and such adjacent areas as are required to initiate and insure

uninterrupted naval and air operations therefrom.

(b) Objectives in the HOMONHON and DINAGAT ISLANDS

and such adjacent areas prior to the main assault in LEYTE

as will insure the uninterrupted access for amphibious shipping

into LEYTE GULF.

(c) Objectives in the PANAON STRAIT area that will permit

passage of naval forces through the PANAON STRAIT for

operations in the CAMOTES SEA. This objective will be

secured simultaneously with (1) (a) above.

(2) Establish control of SAN JUANICO STRAITS in order to permit

passage of naval forces through the SAN JUANICO STRAITS

for operations in the SAMAR SEA.

(3) In subsequent operations, establish control over the remainder of

LEYTE ISLAND; occupy and consolidate the western portion of

southern SAMAR to include the TAFT-WRIGHT Highway and

seize objectives that will permit opening of SURIGAO STRAITS

for naval operations.
APPENDIX A 373

(4) Prepare to conduct such operations as may be later directed by

this headquarters to:

(a) Complete the consolidation of SAMAR.

(b) Destroy or contain hostile garrisons in the VISAYAS.

(5) Occupy and defend sites for radar and air warning installations

as arranged with the Commanders ALLIED NAVAL and AIR

Forces.

(6) Assume control of and direct the operations of FILIPINO Forces

of the 9th Military District (LEYTE-SAMAR).

(7) Establish facilities for minor naval operations at the earliest practicable date in the LEYTE-SAMAR area as arranged with the

Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces and initiate the establishment

of naval, air and logistic facilities for the support of subsequent

operations to reoccupy the PHILIPPINES as directed in Annex No

4, Logistics, and Annex No 6, Engineer, and as later directed by this

headquarters.

(8) Establish air facilities in the LEYTE area with objectives as

follows:

(a) First Objective:

Immediately following the assault and by a+5 for:

(b) Second Objective:

Additional by A + 15.

(c) Third Objective:

Additional by A+30.

(d) Fourth Objective:

Additional by A+45.

(e) Fifth Objective:

Additional by A+60.

( f ) As later designated.

1 fighter gp (P-38)

1 fighter gp (P-40)

1 night fighter sq

1 tactical reconnaissance sq

1 photo sq

1 medium bomb gp plus 1 sq

P. O. A.

3 PBY sqs (tender-based)

1 VMRsq (Marine)

2 light bomb gps (A-20)

1 air-sea rescue sq

1 tactical reconnaissance sq

1 fighter gp (P-38)

1 fighter gp (P-47)

l PB4Ysq (AirEch)

2 heavy bomb gps

1 LAB sq

1 photo sq (F-5)

l PB4Ysq (Air-Ech)

2 troop carrier gps

1 combat mapping sq (Air

Ech)
374 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

b. The Commanding General EIGHTH US ARMY, supported by the

ALLIED NAVAL and AIR Forces will:

(1) Relieve the SIXTH US ARMY of missions in NEW GUINEA,

the ADMIRALTIES, NEW BRITAIN, and the MOROTAI area

as later directed by this headquarters.

(2) Prepare to relieve the SIXTH US ARMY in the VISAYAN area

as later directed by this headquarters.

(3) Assist the Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY by training,

staging and mounting units of the SIXTH US ARMY in the

EIGHTH US ARMY area of responsibility as arranged with the

Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY.

c. The FIRST AUSTRALIAN ARMY, supported by the ALLIED

NAVAL and AIR Forces, will continue:

(1) The defense of naval and air installations within assigned areas

of combat responsibility.

(2) The neutralization of Japanese forces within assigned areas,

seizing every opportunity for the destruction of hostile forces,

d. The Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces, while continuing present

missions, will:

(1) Transport and establish landing forces ashore in the LEYTE

GULF-SURIGAO STRAIT area as arranged with the Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY

(2) Support the operations by:

(a) Providing air protection for convoys and naval task forces and

direct air support for the landing and subsequent operations, supplemented as arranged with the Commander THIRD FLEET

and the Commander ALLIED AIR Forces.

(b) Arranging direct air support and cover with carrier aircraft for

minesweeping and preliminary landings in the LEYTE GULF

area during the period A-2 to the time escort carriers assume the

mission of direct support on A Day.

(c) Transporting supporting troops and their supplies as required to

the LEYTE GULF-SURIGAO STRAIT area in naval assault

shipping.

(d) Denying Japanese reinforcement of the LEYTE area from the

SAMAR, western VISAYAS and northeastern MINDANAO

areas.

(e) Clearing the SURIGAO STRAIT area of hostile naval forces

and shipping and sweeping the SURIGAO STRAIT to open it

for naval operations and shipping in the CAMOTES SEA and

adjacent waters, in conjunction with operations of the SIXTH

US ARMY.
APPENDIX A 375

(3) Provide submarine offensive reconnaissance along probable routes

of hostile naval forces and of water-borne reinforcements and

supplies.

(4) Provide lifeguard services as required.

(5) Transfer to the Commander ALLIED AIR Forces the mission of

direct air support when land-based fighters and light bombers are

established in the LEYTE area, at a time as arranged with the Commander ALLIED AIR Forces.

(6) Escort and protect shipping on the lines of communication into

the LEYTE and SAMAR areas.

(7) Establish in VISAYAN waters, naval forces required to support

current and future operations.

e. The Commander ALLIED AIR Forces, while continuing present missions, will:

(1) Support the operation by:

(a) Providing aerial reconnaissance and photography as required.

(b) Neutralizing, in coordination with carrier and land-based aircraft of the THIRD FLEET, hostile naval and air forces in areas

within range in the PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO, intensifying

the neutralization in the western VISAYAS and MINDANAO

areas from D—9 to cover the movement of naval forces, the landing and subsequent operations. (Cooperation of air operations of

the THIRD FLEET and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Air Forces

will be published later.)

(c) Providing protection of convoys and naval forces and direct support of the landing and subsequent operations within capabilities

and as requested by Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces.

(d) Assuming the mission of direct support of the operations in the

LEYTE-SAMAR area at the earliest practicable date after the

establishment of fighters and light bombers in the LEYTE area, as

arranged with the Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces.

(2) Continuing the destruction of hostile naval and air forces and

shipping in the ARAFURA and CELEBES SEA areas and by initiating strikes on northeastern BORNEO and the SULU ARCHIPELAGO at the earliest practicable date; denying use of naval facilities

in the SULU ARCHIPELAGO to the Japanese and protecting the

western flank of the operation.

(3) Destroying hostile installations and sources of war materials in

Eastern NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.

(4) Establishing and operating radar and air warning facilities as required in the LEYTE-SAMAR area, as arranged with the Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY.
376 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

(5) Establishing air forces in the LEYTE area in the priority as listed

in paragraph 3a (8).

x. (1) For the coordination of planning the Commander ALLIED

NAVAL and AIR Forces will cause their respective close support

commanders to report to the Commanding General SIXTH US

ARMY, who is charged with the coordination of plans.

(2) A brief of the coordinated plan of operations will be furnished this

headquarters by the Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY by

5 October 1944.

(3) Commanders ALLIED NAVAL and AIR Forces, SOUTHWEST

PACIFIC AREA, will submit to this headquarters by 1 October 1944

their respective plans for general support to be afforded by their forces

during the period of operations.

(4) During the amphibious movement and landing, the Commander

Naval Attack Forces is in command of the amphibious operations;

his command continues until the landing forces are established ashore.

Command of the forces ashore is then passed to the Landing Force

Commanders. The exact time of transfer of command from the Commanders Landing Forces will be announced by radio. The controlling

considerations for fixing the time when the landing forces are established ashore will be as agreed by the Commander ALLIED NAVAL

Forces and the Commanding General SIXTH US ARMY, and

will be announced by them to this headquarters and appropriate

subordinates.

(5) For coordination of land-based and naval aircraft in support of

the operation, see Standing Operating Procedure Instructions

Number 16/1, this headquarters, dated 10 August 1944.

(6) To coordinate the attack of THIRD FLEET carrier aircraft, the

Commander ALLIED NAVAL Forces, in concert with the Commander ALLIED AIR Forces and Commanding General SIXTH

US ARMY, will furnish the Commander THIRD FLEET at the

earliest practicable date the following:

(a) Schedule and tracks of echelons.

(b) Target maps of air and surface bombardment.

(c) Communication plans.

(d) Naval gunfire plans.

(e) Other plans and data necessary for the support of the operation

by the fast carrier forces.

(7) Areas of responsibility for naval and air operations of the THIRD

FLEET and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Forces will be designated

later.

(8) Instructions for long range reconnaissance, and bombing and attack

restrictions will be issued in subsequent Operations Instructions.
APPENDIX A 377

(9) Annex No. 1 indicates the tentative troop list for the Operation, and

Annex 2 indicates the troop movements for the concentration.

4. See Annex No. 4—Logistics, (to be issued later)

5. a. See Annex No. 5—Communications,

b. Command Posts.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS—HAWAII

THIRD FLEET—AFLOAT

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA—

HOLLANDIA

Rear Echelon—BRISBANE

Advanced Echelon—LEYTE (date and hour of opening to be

announced later)

SIXTH US ARMY—LEYTE (as announced by Commanding

General SIXTH US ARMY)

Rear Echelon—HOLLANDIA

FIRST AUSTRALIAN ARMY—LAE

EIGHTH US ARMY—HOLLANDIA

ALLIED NAVAL FORCES—HOLLANDIA

Rear Echelon—BRISBANE

ALLIED AIR FORCES—HOLLANDIA

Rear Echelon—BRISBANE

UNITED STATES ARMY SERVICES OF SUPPLY—HOLLANDIA

Rear Echelon—BRISBANE

By command of General MacARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND,

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,

Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ S.J.Chamberlin,

S. J. CHAMBERLIN,

Major General, G.S.C.,

Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

ANNEXES: (Omitted)
Appendix B

Basic Military Map Symbols*

Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within a

triangle an observation post, and within a circle a supply point.

Military Units—Identification

Antiaircraft Artillery

Armored Command

Army Air Forces

Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery

Cavalry, Horse

Cavalry, Mechanized

Chemical Warfare Service

Coast Artillery

Engineers

Infantry

Medical Corps

Ordnance Department

Quartermaster Corps

Signal Corps

Tank Destroyer

Transportation Corps

Veterinary Corps

Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing symbol

with the arm or service symbol:

Airborne Artillery

Airborne Infantry

*For complete listing of symbols see FM 31-30, from which these are taken.
APPENDIX B 379

Size Symbols

The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or above

the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying arm or service

symbol indicate the size of military organization:

Squad

Section

Platoon

Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight

Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron

Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT following

identifying numeral)

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force Wing

Division or Command of an Air Force

Corps or Air Force

Army

Group of Armies

EXAMPLES

The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the unit

designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent unit to which

it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below boundary lines designate

the units separated by the lines:

Company A, 137th Infantry

8th Field Artillery Battalion

Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division

Observation Post, 23d Infantry

Command Post, 5th Infantry Division

Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry

Weapons

Machine gun

Gun

Gun battery

Howitzer or Mortar

Tank

Self-propelled gun
List of Abbreviations

AA

AAF

Admin O

AFPAC

AGO

AGS SWPA

AGWAR

AIB GHQ SWPA

AKA

Amph

APA

APH

Arty

ASCOM

ATIS

BAR

Bn

Br

Bull

Cav

CCS

CG

CINC

CINCPAC

CINCPOA

CINCSWPA

CM-IN

CM-OUT

CO

CofS

Com3dFlt

COMINCH

CTF

CTG

CTU

CVE

Antiaircraft

Army Air Forces

Administrative Order

U.S. Army Forces, Pacific

Adjutant General's Office

Allied Geographic Section, Southwest Pacific Area

Adjutant General, War Department

Allied Intelligence Bureau, General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area

Cargo Ship, attack

Amphibious, amphibian

Transport, attack

Transport for wounded

Artillery

Army Service Command

Allied Translator and Interpreter Section

Browning automatic rifle

Battalion

Branch

Bulletin

Cavalry

Combined Chiefs of Staff

Commanding General

Commander in Chief

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area

Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area

Classified Message, incoming

Classified Message, outgoing

Commanding Officer

Chief of Staff

Commander, Third Fleet

Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet

Commander, task force

Commander, task group

Commander, task unit

Aircraft carrier, escort
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 381

Div

DNI

DUKW

Engr

ESB

FA

FE

FEAF

FEC

Flt

FM

FO

G-2

G-3

G-4

GHQ SWPA

Gp

GS

Hist

Hq

HRS DRB AGO

Inf

I&HS

Instns

Intel

JCS

Jnl

LCI

LCI (R)

LCM

LCM (R)

Log

LSD

LSM

LST

Ltr

LVT

M29

MC

MI

Mil

Division

Division of Naval Intelligence

Amphibian, 21⁄2 -ton, 6x6 truck, used for short runs from

ship to shore

Engineer

Engineer Special Brigade

Field Artillery

Far East

Far East Air Forces

Far East Command

Fleet

Field Manual

Field Order

Intelligence section of divisional or higher staff

Operations section of divisional or higher staff

Supply section of divisional or higher staff

General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area

Group

General Staff

History, historical

Headquarters

Historical Records Section, Departmental Records Branch,

Adjutant General's Office

Infantry

Information and Historical Service

Instructions

Intelligence

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Journal

Landing craft, infantry

Landing craft, infantry (rocket)

Landing craft, mechanized

Landing craft, mechanized (rocket)

Logistics

Landing ship, dock

Landing ship, medium

Landing ship, tank

Letter

Landing vehicle, tracked

Weasel

Medical Corps

Military Intelligence

Military
382 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Msg

Mtg

OCMH

OCNO

Off

ONI

OP

OPD

Opns

PCE (R)

POL

Prcht

QM

Rad

Rcds

Regt

Rpt

S-2

S-3

Sec

Ser

Sq

SSUSA

Stf

SWPA

Tel Conf

USA

USASOS

USMG

USN

USNR

USSBS

WD

WDGS

Wkly

Message

Meeting

Office of the Chief of Military History

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Officer

Office of Naval Intelligence

Observation post

Operations Division, War Department

General Staff

Operations

Patrol craft, escort (rescue)

Petrol oil and lubricants

Parachute

Quartermaster

Radiogram

Records

Regiment

Report

Intelligence section of regimental or lower staff

Operations section of regimental or lower staff

Section

Series

Squadron

Special Staff, U.S. Army

Staff

Southwest Pacific Area

Teletype Conference

U.S. Army

U.S. Army Services of Supply

U.S. Marine Corps

U.S. Navy

U.S. Naval Reserve

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey

War Department

War Department General Staff

Weekly
Bibliographical Note

Records and studies on the Leyte operation fall into eleven general classes: Joint

Chiefs of Staff records, U.S. Army Air

Forces records, U.S. Army records, U.S.

Marine Corps records, U.S. Navy records,

guerrilla records, Japanese studies, interviews, manuscript histories, special studies,

and published works.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Records

The official records of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, as well as those of the Combined

Chiefs of Staff, are now in the custody of

the Research Analysis Section, Joint Chiefs

of Staff. They consist primarily of the formal papers and minutes of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. An almost complete file of these

JCS and CCS papers and minutes was kept

for the Army during the wartime period

by the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff and is now in the

possession of the G-3 Division, the successor

to the Operations Division. This Army file

contains plans for projected operations, the

working papers of the Army planning personnel, and correspondence with officers in

the Pacific theaters, as well as the copies of

the JCS and CCS minutes and papers.

Army Air Forces Records

The archives of the United States Army

Air Forces contain manuscript histories of

the various units and commands, written

during or shortly after the war. The quality

of these varies considerably. The following

histories are of especial value for a study of

the Leyte Campaign: those of the 7th, 8th,

and 9th Fighter Squadrons of the 49th

Fighter Group, 86th Fighter Wing, V

Fighter Command, Fifth Air Force; V

Fighter Command; V Bomber Command;

XIII Bomber Command; Fifth Air Force;

Thirteenth Air Force; and Far East Air

Forces. Two studies are also useful: Far

East Air Forces Staff Study Operation KING

II, 12 July 44; and Fifth Air Force Fighter

Cover Plan for Ormoc Bay Operation, file

731.326.

Army Records

The voluminous Army records on the

Leyte Campaign vary considerably in quality and content. The documents range from

messages between the Chief of Staff and

theater commanders to company journals.

The Chief of Staff's Log, 1944, which is

in the Staff Communications Office, Office

of the Chief of Staff, contains the daily high

level radiograms and telephonic communications between Washington and the theaters. These give a concise daily summary of

the strategic situation throughout the world,

shed considerable light on joint and combined command, and summarize important

plans and decisions.

Most of the records of General MacArthur's headquarters are in Japan. Available in the Historical Records Section of the

Adjutant General's Office is a nearly complete file of the G—3 journals for the entire

war period. The "Top Secret" messages are
384 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

not included. In addition there is a nearly

complete file of Allied Translator Interpreter Section, GHQ SWPA, "Current

Translations" and "Enemy Publications."

The Allied Geographical Section, GHQ

SWPA, made terrain studies of the geographical regions in the Southwest Pacific

Area. Although they contain errors three of

these were of value—Special Report 55, Airfields, Landing Beaches and Roads, Samar,

Leyte and Dinagat Group, 10 July 1944;

Terrain Study 84, Leyte Province, 17 August 1944; and Terrain Handbook 34, Tacloban, 25 September 1944. The Military

Intelligence Section prepared information

bulletins on the guerrillas that were of some

use. These are: The Resistance Movement

on Leyte Island, 7 October 1944, and The

Resistance Movement on Samar Island, 10

October 1944.

The records of the Sixth Army for the

campaign are very complete and in excellent

condition. In addition to a fine operations

report, there are complete G-2, G-3, and

G-4 journals. These journals contain the

daily messages, reports, and memoranda exchanged between Sixth Army, General

Headquarters, responsible naval commanders, and subordinate units of the Sixth

Army, as well as planning papers, periodic

reports of Sixth Army and subordinate units,

field and administrative orders, interrogations, and estimates of the enemy situation.

For the period after 26 December 1944 the

operations report of the Eighth Army is

useful.

The operations report of the X Corps is

helpful but too brief. The journals (G—2,

G-3, and G-4) of the corps, however, are

good. The XXIV Corps prepared an inadequate and incomplete operations report

and its journals as a whole are inferior to

those of the X Corps. The sections and subsections of the headquarters of the XXIV

Corps completed "histories." These consist

mainly of photographs of individuals and

notations of changes in personnel. The "history" of the Sixth Army Service Command

is poor and there are few records of

ASCOM in the Historical Records Section,

Adjutant General's Office.

The records of the 1st Cavalry Division

and subordinate units are generally adequate, although those of the two brigades

are inferior to those of the division and of

the regiments. The narrative of the operations report of the 7th Division is inferior

but the appendixes are excellent and very

complete; the journals of the division are

good. In general the operations reports and

journals of the infantry regiments are very

helpful. The operations report of the 32d

Infantry is excellent and a model for a perfect regimental operations report. In contrast, the operations reports and journals of

the 11th Airborne Division and subordinate

units are very poor and incomplete. The

24th Infantry Division prepared a superb

operations report and kept good journals.

The records of the regiments of the division

are sparse and incomplete and their operations reports are either inadequate or nonexistent. The records and operations reports

of the 32d Division and its regiments are

extremely sketchy and inexact. The 38th

Division used Leyte as a staging area; when

the Japanese parachuted into the Burauen

airfields, its 149th Infantry was committed.

The operations report of that regiment for

the resultant action is far too brief. The 77th

Infantry Division and its regiments have

very good operations reports but their journals are inadequate. The operations reports

and journals of the 96th Division are good.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 385

The journals and operations reports of the

Americal Division are only fairly good.

There are "histories" and operations reports

of small independent or attached units, but

these are frequently one to three pages in

length and very incomplete. Finally, it

should be noted that the operations reports of the various artillery units are in the

main poor and incomplete and the journals

are highly technical.

Marine Records

Special Action Report of Corps Artillery,

V Amphibious Corps, 28 December 1944.

Navy Records

The naval records that were consulted

include the operation plans and reports by

naval commanders. Copies of most of these

are among the records of the Historical Records Section, Adjutant General's Office,

Department of the Army. All of the

documents are in the files of the Office of

the Naval Records and Library, Department of the Navy.

Guerrilla Records

There is in the Office of the Chief of

Military History a large, completely disorganized collection of heterogeneous materials by and about the guerrillas in the Philippine Islands. These are incomplete, inadequate, and controversial. Some of the guerrilla bands had no records and all that is

known of others is from violently prejudiced

sources. Some of the American guerrillas

published books on their experiences. These

are impressionistic, generally replete with

derring-do, and consequently possess scant

value as sources. The Combat History Division, G-l Section, AFWESPAC, prepared

a four-volume work—"Triumph in the Philippines," the third volume of which, entitled

"Guerrillas: Enemy Occupation," is colorful, but poor history.

Japanese Studies

At the cessation of hostilities, General

MacArthur ordered the former Japanese

War and Navy Ministries to prepare studies

on Japanese plans and operations in World

War II. The resulting studies, translations

and originals, of which those mentioned below deal with the Leyte Campaign, are on

file with the Office of the Chief of Military

History. Although there are errors in dates,

designations of units, and frequently in facts,

these are the best sources for information on

Japanese plans and operations. An exception is the independent study by General

Tomochika, which despite its garish title is

very good and contains much human interest. Tomochika, evidently a man of strong

prejudices, at times was unduly critical of

some of his fellow officers. Japanese Studies

used in this volume are:

Tomochika, Maj. Gen. Yoshiharu, The

True Facts of the Leyte Operation, typescript of translation, 10th I&HS, Eighth

Army, 3 December 1946

Japanese Studies in World War II, 5, 4th

Air Army Operations, 1944–45

————, 7, 14th Army Operations on

Leyte

————, 11, 35th Army Operations,

1944-45

————, 14, Naval Operations in the Philippine Area, 1942-45

————, 21, History of the Southern

Army, 1941-45
386 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

————, 72, History of the Army Section, Special Studies

Imperial General Headquarters, 1941-45

————, 102, Philippine Area Naval Operations, October 1944-December 1944,

Part II, The Battle of Leyte Gulf

Interviews

The following U.S. Army officers furnished the author valuable information on

the Leyte Campaign: Lt. Gen. Robert L.

Eichelberger, Maj. Gen. George H. Decker,

Col. W. J. Verbeck, Col. Fred Weber, Col.

Sidney F. Mashbir, Col. John M. Finn,

Capt. Francis Cronin, Capt. Robert Ross

Smith, and 1st Lt. James J. Frangie. Fleet

Admiral William D. Leahy, Lt. Comdr.

Henry M. Dater, Lt. Comdr. Russell L.

Harris, Lt. Comdr. Philip A. Crowl and Lt.

Roger Pineau of the U.S. Navy were very

co-operative, helping to clear up moot points

that arose. Capt. Samuel E. Morison furnished information on the Pearl Harbor

Conference of July 1944.

Manuscript Histories

There are in the files of the Office, Chief

of Military History, the following manuscript histories of certain phases of the campaign :

Dean, Captain Tucker—The Liberation

of Leyte. A preliminary work based principally upon the earlier study by Capt. Russell

A. Gugeler.

Gugeler, Captain Russell A.—The 7th

Division on Leyte. A good study although

poorly documented.

History of the Engineer Corps in the

Southwest Pacific, Chapter VI, Philippine

Campaign.

There are available in the Office, Chief

of Military History, copies of special studies

that bear upon the Leyte Campaign. As a

group they are capably done, although, ofcourse, some are better than others.

Air Evaluation Board, POA, Leyte Campaign, 1944. Highly critical of Army close

air support.

Committee 16, Officers Advanced

Course, The Armored School, Fort Knox,

Kentucky, Armor on Leyte, May 1949.

Division of Naval Intelligence, Office of

the Chief of Naval Operations, O. N. I.

No. 93, Field Monograph of the Philippines,

3 parts, III, Visayan Islands, January 1944.

Grigg, Maj. Martin C., The Operations

of the 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry . . .

in the Battle for the Buri Airstrip . . . Advanced Infantry Officers Class, 1948-1949,

The Infantry School, Fort Benning,

Georgia.

MacLaughlin, Maj. Charles V., Operation of the XXIV Corps in the Invasion of

Leyte Island, Advanced Infantry Officers

Class, 1947-1948, The Infantry School,

Fort Benning, Georgia.

Military Intelligence Division, War Department, "Leyte Field Fortifications,"

Tactical and Technical Trends, April 1945.

Military Intelligence Service, General

Staff, War Department, Survey of the

Philippines, 3 volumes, 15 February 1943.

National War College, Analytical Study,

Japanese Opposition at Leyte and Okinawa,

1948.

Fellers, Col. Bonner F., Psychological

Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area,

1944-45, 15 March 1946.

Staff Study of Operations of the Japanese

35th Army on Leyte, typescript of transla-
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 387

tion, 10th I&HS, Eighth Army (not dated),

4 parts.

Staff Study of Operations of the Japanese 102d Division on Leyte and Cebu,

typescript of translation, 10th I&HS, Eighth

Army (not dated).

United States Strategic Bombing Survey,

Employment of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific Command, February 1947.

Williams, Maj. E., Intelligence Activities

During the Japanese Occupation (not

dated).

Publications

Arnold, General Henry H., Global Mission (New York, Harper and Brothers,

1949).

Cronin, Capt. Francis D., Under the

Southern Cross, The Saga of the Americal

Division (Washington, Combat Forces

Press, 1951).

Davidson, Orlando R., Williams, J. Carl,

and Kahl, Joseph A., The Deadeyes: The

Story of the 96th Infantry Division (Washington, Infantry Journal Press (now Combat Forces Press), 1947). A divisional history definitely above the average.

Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea

Gate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World

War II: V, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki (Chicago, University of Chicago Press,

1953).

Eichelberger, Robert L., Our Jungle

Road to Tokyo (New York, The Viking

Press, 1950).

Field, James A., Jr., The Japanese at

Leyte Gulf, The Sho Operation (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1947). An

excellent study based upon Japanese documents and interrogations. There are many

superb photographs, maps, and charts.

Flanagan, Maj. Edward M., Jr., The

Angels: A History of the 11th Airborne Division, 1943-1946 (Washington, Infantry

Journal Press, 1948). A popular history

written for the men of the division.

Halsey, Fleet Admiral William F., and

Bryan, Lt. Comdr. J., Admiral Halsey's

Story (New York, Whittlesey House, 1947).

An interesting and popular account, of value

in showing Halsey's strong interest in an

early return to the Philippines.

Johansen, Maj. Herbert O., "Banzai at

Burauen," Air Force, XXVIII, 3 (March,

1945). A popular account based entirely on

American sources.

Kenney, George C., General Kenney Reports (New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce,

1949).

Karig, Capt. Walter, USNR, Harris, Lt.

Comdr. Russell L., and Manson, Lt. Comdr.

Frank A., Battle Report, Victory in the

Pacific (New York and Toronto, Rhinehart

and Co., Inc., 1949) (5 vols.), V. A highly

readable journalistic salty account based

upon documentary sources and interviews.

There are many excellent photographs.

Leahy, Fleet Admiral William D., I Was

There (New York, Whittlesey House,

1950). Excellent. Based entirely on his diary

and notes written at the time.

Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of

the United States Army, July 1, 1943, to

June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War

(Washington, 1945).

The Medal of Honor (Washington,

1948). A history of the Congressional Medal

of Honor and the official citations of the men

who had been awarded the medal.

Morton, Louis, "American and Allied

Strategy in the Far East," Military Review,

XXIX, 12 (December, 1949). An excellent

analysis of prewar strategy up to the summer

of 1941.
388 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Reel, A. Frank, The Case of General

Yamashita (Chicago, The University of

Chicago Press, 1949). An able pleading for

General Yamashita by one of his defense

counsel at his trial as a war criminal.

Sturgis, Brig. Gen. S. D., Jr., "Engineer

Operations in the Leyte Campaign," reprint

from The Military Engineer, November,

December 1947, and January 1948.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey,

Pacific, Naval Analysis Division, prepared

two studies on the Pacific campaigns which

are valuable for the student of the Leyte

operation. The Campaigns of the Pacific

War (Washington, 1946) is excellent for

a study of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The

Interrogations of Japanese Officials (2 vols.,

n. d.) contains much highly important material but it should be remembered that the

interrogated Japanese officers were naturally desirous of making a good case for

themselves and at the same time were

anxious to give an answer which would

please the interrogator.

Valtin, Jan [Richard J. Krebs], Children

of Yesterday (New York, The Reader's

Press, 1946). An excellent popular account

of the activities of the 24th Division.

Verbeck, Col. W. J., A Regiment in

Action, (n. p., n. d., privately printed,

copy in OCMH). The story of the 21st Infantry Regiment which consists mainly of

excerpts from the operations reports and

journals of higher echelons.

Woodward, C. Vann, The Battle for

Leyte Gulf (New York, The Macmillan

Co., 1947). An extremely readable popular

account based upon American and Japanese sources and interviews with which Dr.

Woodward became acquainted while an

officer on duty with the Office of Naval

Intelligence during the war. The book is

valuable in spite of a few minor errors of

fact.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War Department

Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945

The Army and Economic Mobilization

The Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground Forces

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops

The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service Forces

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western Hemisphere

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the Pacific

The Fall of the Philippines

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive

Victory in Papua

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls

Campaign in the Marianas

The Approach to the Philippines

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

Triumph in the Philippines

Okinawa: The Last Battle

Strategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy

Salerno to Cassino

Cassino to the Alps

The European Theater of Operations

Cross-Channel Attack

Breakout and Pursuit

The Lorraine Campaign

The Siegfried Line Campaign

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge

The Last Offensive

The Supreme Command
390 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II

The Middle East Theater

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India Theater

Stilwell's Mission to China

Stilwell's Command Problems

Time Runs Out in CBI

The Technical Services

The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War

The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field

The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany

The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor

Theaters

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War

The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply

The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany

The Signal Corps: The Emergency

The Signal Corps: The Test

The Signal Corps: The Outcome

The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special Studies

Chronology: 1941-1945

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939—1945

Rearming the French

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt

The Women's Army Corps

Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors

Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces

The Employment of Negro Troops

Manhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial Record

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Japan
Index

A Day

deployment of U.S. forces at end of: 107

operations: 60-84

results of naval bombardment on: 104

Abijao: 351, 355, 366

Abuyog: 12, 33, 34, 57, 137, 144-45, 218, 253-54,

273, 298, 302, 311

Admiralty Islands: 26, 28

Aerial photographs: 41

Aerial reconnaissance. See Reconnaissance, aerial.

Agahang: 227-28

Air Assault Force. See Fifth Air Force.

Air attacks, Japanese

on airfields: 86-88, 187

on shipping: 86-88, 93, 155, 192

on troops: 86, 93, 241, 290

on U. S. naval units: 91, 155

Air attacks, U. S.

A Day: 60-62, 80

on airfields: 94, 99, 220

in Arafura Sea: 27

on artillery positions: 93, 99

on Bacolod airfield: 88

on bridges: 93, 99

against Burma: 28

on Camotes Islands: 98, 99

on Cebu: 27, 45, 96

in Celebes Sea area: 27

in close support: 130, 159, 161

on convoys in Ormoc Valley: 208, 210

on Davao area: 42

on East Indies: 27

effect of, on Japanese tactics: 54

estimate of results of, A Day: 61, 93

on Formosa: 27, 28, 43-44

on Japanese aircraft: 155

on Japanese ground troops: 93, 99

on Japanese naval units: 86, 88, 90-91, 96, 99-

102

on Japanese shipping: 27, 45, 88, 96, 98, 99-102,

217, 254, 366-67

on Labiranan Head: 108

on Leyte: 27, 45

on Luzon: 27, 43, 44, 45

against Malaya: 28

on Mindanao: 8, 96

on mortar positions: 93

on Negros: 27, 45, 96

northern Leyte Valley: 146, 148

on Okinawa: 27

on Ormoc: 98, 212-13

in Ormoc area: 283-84, 286

on Palaus: 8

Air attacks, U. S.—Continued

on Palompon: 98, 349

on Panay: 45

on Philippines: 23-24, 27, 42-43, 85-86

plans to launch, against Japan: 2

on Ryukyus: 43

on Samar: 45

in Sulu Sea: 27, 96

on supply dumps: 93

on Valencia: 98, 331, 333, 334

on Visayan Islands: 96

on Yap: 8

Air bases: 3-4. See also Airfields.

establishment of, planned: 6, 7-8, 23-24, 28,

35-36, 62

Japanese plans to attack: 53, 85

need of: 1, 3, 7

shortage of troops to construct: 36

Air Force, Japanese. See Japanese Air Force.

Air Forces, U. S. See Fifth Air Force; Thirteenth

Air Force; Twentieth Air Force.

Air losses, Japanese: 42-44, 45, 54, 86, 88, 96, 284

Air losses, U.S.: 42, 43, 86, 96, 98-99, 208

Air plans, Japanese: 53-54, 86

Air plans, U. S.

to combat Japanese air offensive: 86

against Japan: 2

for Leyte Campaign: 2-3, 6, 8, 27-28, 45

missions of Fast Carrier Task Force: 27, 45

missions of Fifth Air Force: 26, 94

mission of Task Force 77: 24

Air superiority, Allied

attained over Leyte: 43-44

Kuroda on effect of: 49

over Philippines: 4, 6, 7

Air support, U.S.: 7-8. See also Air plans, U.S.;

Fifth Air Force; Twentieth Air Force.

on A Day: 60-61

close naval, of ground troops: 93

estimate of: 93

factors affecting: 93-94

lack of, in attack on Formosa: 3-4

lack of, in 6th Ranger operations: 54

MacArthur on availability of, 1944: 4

for Ormoc operation: 276, 279-80

Air units, Allied. See also Allied Air Forces; Fifth

Air Force; Thirteenth Air Force; XIII Bomber

Command; Twentieth Air Force.

5th Bombardment Squadron: 96

V Fighter Command: 281

7th Fighter Squadron: 96-98

9th Fighter Squadron: 96

11th Air Cargo Resupply Squadron: 310
392 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Air units, Allied—Continued

42d Bombardment Group: 96

49th Bomber Group: 98-99

49th Fighter Group: 187

307th Bombardment Group: 96

308th Bombardment Wing: 94, 96, 212-13, 220,

286

341st Fighter Squadron: 28

347th Fighter Squadron: 281

868th Bombardment Squadron: 96

Airborne Battalions

2d, 187th Glider: 324

2d, 511th Parachute Regiment: 322

3d, 511th Parachute Regiment: 322

127th Engineer, 302

Airborne Division, 11th: 254, 293

commander of: 296

and defense of airfields: 296-98, 298n, 300,

302-05

in Mahonag area: 322

missions of: 222-23, 313

mopping-up operations of: 365

Airborne operations, Japanese: 294-96, 300-305

Airborne Regiments

187th Glider: 298, 300, 303-04, 323

511th Parachute: 298, 322-23

Aircraft, Japanese: 8, 22, 30, 42, 61

Aircraft carriers, Japanese: 89-91

Aircraft carriers, U.S.: 7, 8, 24, 40-41, 43, 57,

60-61, 85, 90-92

Airdromes. See Airfields.

Airdrops: 112, 228, 231-32, 235, 310, 356

Airfields: 99. See also Air bases; towns as main

entries.

Bacolod: 86, 88

Bayug: 12, 98, 124, 137, 139, 188, 295, 296, 297,

300

Burauen: 34, 111, 254, 263, 275, 285, 294-97,

298-305, 307, 313-14, 321-22

Buri: 12, 124, 131, 133-38, 139, 188, 296-300,

302-05

Clark Field: 86

condition of: 94, 98

constructed by Japanese on Leyte: 12

construction of: 35-36, 185-88, 204, 306-08

Davao: 42, 50

Dulag: 12, 22, 62, 72, 76, 78, 107, 124-29, 131,

132, 187, 275, 294-95, 297, 298, 305, 307

estimate of Japanese: 21-23

Japanese attempt to retake: 294-305

Kuroda on construction of Japanese: 49-50

on Leyte: 1, 3, 6, 24, 33, 45, 59, 60-62, 103, 107.

See also airfields by name.

on Mindanao: 45

San Pablo: 12, 124, 132-34, 135, 188, 276, 295,

300-303

Airfields—Continued

Tacloban: 12, 22, 33, 34, 50, 62, 63, 65, 72, 78,

86-88, 97-98, 146, 168, 185, 187, 188, 190,

275, 294, 305, 306

Tanauan: 188, 189

Valencia: 12, 220, 314, 329, 330, 334, 336

in Visayan Islands: 45

Airstrips. See Airfields.

Aitape: 27

AKA's: 41, 80

ALAMO Force: 23, 26. See also Sixth Army, U. S.

Alangalang: 170

Albuera: 104, 176, 208, 254, 257, 263, 269, 298

Allied Air Forces: 306. See also Air units, Allied;

Fifth Air Force; Thirteenth Air Force; Royal

Australian Air Force.

command of: 23, 24, 26

composition of: 26

missions of: 23, 26, 27, 94-96, 188, 361

Allied Land Forces: 23, 26. See also Sixth Army,

U.S.; X Corps; XXIV Corps.

Allied Naval Forces. See also Seventh Fleet; Central Philippine Attack Force; Task Force 77;

Task Force 78; Task Force 79.

command of: 23, 24-26

composition of: 24-26, 28-30

missions of: 23, 24-26, 27-30, 31, 361

Ambush. See Tactics, Japanese.

Ammunition: 38, 80, 83

shortage of: 231, 233

supply of: 36, 37-38, 111

supply operations for: 232, 236

Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon, 19th Infantry:

68

Amphibian tanks. See Tanks, U.S., amphibian.

Amphibian tractors: 65, 75, 130

Amphibian truck battalions: 26

Amphibious forces: 41-42. See also III Amphibious

Force; VII Amphibious Force.

Amphibious operations: 175

casualties during: 68, 69, 70, 72

command of: 24

on east coast of Leyte: 60-80

Leyte to Samar: 153-57

logistical operations in, A Day: 80-84

mine sweeping: 57

in northwest Leyte: 357

at Ormoc: 222-23

in Ormoc area: 275-84, 291

in Palompon area: 348-51, 354

plans for: 3, 23-39, 74

of 6th Rangers: 54-55

underwater demolition teams: 57-58

on west coast of Leyte: 266-67

Anchorages. See Harbor facilities; Ports.

Anguar: 38

Anibong Point: 146, 150

Anibung: 107, 110-11, 113, 114
INDEX 393

Antiaircraft fire, Japanese: 60, 96, 99, 208

Antiaircraft fire, U.S.: 98

Antilao River: 293, 315-16, 318

Antipolo Point: 356

Antitank Companies:

of the 17th Infantry: 141n

of the 307th Infantry: 345

APA's: 80

APH's: 194

Area Allocation Group: 189

Arisue, Maj. Gen. Seizo: 49

Armies, Japanese. See Japanese Army units, Armies.

Armies, U. S. See Eighth Army, U.S.; Sixth Army,

U. S.

Army Service Command. See Sixth Army Service

Command.

Arnold, Maj. Gen. Archibald V.

and advance on Burauen: 131-33

command of: 128

in Ormoc Valley: 323

tactical plans of: 252, 254-56, 257n, 263, 266,

270

Arnold, General Henry H.: 1n, 8, 9

Artillery, Field. See Field Artillery Battalions.

Artillery, Japanese

air attack on: 93, 99

estimate of: 22

use of: 68, 74, 77, 212

Artillery, U.S.: 130, 148, 163-64

Catmon Hill: 119-20

close support: 135, 136-37, 138, 159, 161, 163,

165, 166, 212, 231, 239-40, 318-19

concentrated preparations: 180

failure to land, A Day: 68

Krueger on: 246

on Labiranan Head: 107-08

San Vicente Hill: 117

at Shoestring Ridge: 256, 257-58, 260, 261

at Tabontabon: 115-17

Arafura Sea: 27

ASCOM: See Casey, Maj. Gen. Hugh J.; Logistics; Sixth Army Service Command.

Aslom: 114

Assault craft: 6-8. See also by name.

Atago: 90

Attu: 26

Austin, Capt. Paul: 159-61

Australia: 18, 37

Australian Air Force. See Royal Australian Air

Force.

Avengers: 60-62

Awards. See by name.

B-24's: 42, 96

Babatngon: 153-55, 174-75

Bacolod: 86, 88, 366

Bagacay: 359

Bagonbon River: 279, 285, 286

Bailey bridges: 169, 352

Balanac: 363

Balud: 181

Balaud: 206

Balogo: 266-67, 269-71

Bao: 330-31

Bao River: 330

Barbed wire: 67

Barbey, Rear Adm. Daniel E.: 24-26, 28. See also

Northern Attack Force; Task Force 78.

BAR's. See Weapons, U.S., Browning automatic

rifles.

Barugo: 12, 33, 67, 163, 175, 175n, 180-81, 210,

218, 237, 239

Basey: 153, 155, 157

Bataan: 59

Battalions, Japanese. See Japanese Army units, Battalions.

Battalions, U. S. See Airborne Battalions; Engineer

Battalions; Field Artillery Battalions; Infantry

Battalions; Tank Battalions; Tractor Battalions.

Battle of the Hills: 266-73

Battle of Leyte Gulf: 44, 86, 93, 208, 369

effect of, on Japanese tactics: 94

effect of, on U. S. tactics: 92

Japanese estimate of: 221

Japanese tactics for: 89

operations: 89-92

results of: 92

Battleships, Japanese: 89, 90-91, 92, 96

Battleships, U.S.: 24, 41-42, 44, 90

California: 30

Maryland: 30, 60

Mississippi: 30, 60

Pennsylvania: 30

Tennessee: 30

West Virginia: 30, 60

Baybay: 12, 33-34, 144-45, 183, 203, 206, 218,

240, 253-54, 256, 257, 273, 275, 311

Bayug. See Airfields, Bayug.

Bazookas. See Weapons, U.S., rocket launchers.

Beach demolition teams: 57

Beachheads

on Homonhon Island: 57

on Leyte: 67, 72

on Samar: 157

on Suluan Island: 55

Beaches. See Landing beaches.

Belen: 227-28

Benjamin, Pfc. George, Jr.: 339n

Bentley, 1st Lt. William C.: 260

Biak: 3, 94-96

Bicol: 27

Biliran Strait: 11

Binahaan River: 112, 144, 164, 172, 178, 179

Bito River: 114, 298, 302
394 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Blacker, Maj. Kemuel K.: 211

Blamey, General Sir Thomas: 23, 26. See also

Allied Land Forces.

Bloody Bamboo Thicket: 261-65

Bloody Ridge: 241

Blue Beach. See Landing beaches, Blue.

Blue Ridge: 200-201

Boad River: 279, 285, 286, 287, 289, 290

Bohol: 17, 280

Bohol Strait: 284

Bolongtohan: 110, 111, 113

Bombardment, naval: See Naval bombardment.

Bombardment and fire support group: 28-30, 57,

60, 90, 91

Bombers, Japanese, estimate of: 22

Bombers, U.S.: 45. See also B-24's.

Bombs, Japanese, used as mines: 134, 137

Bong, Maj. Richard I.: 96

Booby traps, Japanese: 122, 163

Borneo: 46, 51, 53, 89

Bostock, Air Vice Marshal William D.: 26

Bougainville: 26

Bradley, Maj. Gen. James L. See also 96th Infantry

Division.

assumes command ashore: 76

command of: 76

and medical support: 192-94

tactical plans of: 107, 110, 113, 114, 119, 121,

240

Bradley, Col. William J.: 63, 148. See also Cavalry

Regiments, 8th.

Breakneck Ridge: 207, 210, 228, 235, 237, 251, 356

battle of: 211-20, 223-25

description of: 211

Brereton, Lt. Gen. Lewis H.: 19n

Bridgeheads: 78, 157

Bridges: 138, 140

air attacks on: 93, 99

Bailey: 169, 352

Burayan River: 65

Carigara River: 181

condition of: 35

construction of: 130

Daguitan River: 33, 76, 78

at Dao: 33, 78

Mainit River: 170-71, 173, 175n, 177

Malirong River: 169

Palo River: 163, 164

at Tanauan: 112, 121

repaired: 65, 112, 140, 164, 169

Brisbane: 6, 70

British Malaya: 10

Brostrom, Pfc. Leonard C.: 143n

Browning automatic rifles, U. S. See Weapons, U.S.,

Browning automatic rifles.

Bruce, Maj. Gen. Andrew D.: 311. See also Infantry

Divisions, 77th.

assumes command ashore: 284

Bruce, Maj. Gen. Andrew D.—Continued

command of: 276

in Palompon area: 348-49, 350-51, 351n, 352,

353-54

and Ormoc operation: 276-77, 277n, 285-87,

290, 293

and Ormoc Valley operations: 313, 315, 317-18,

320, 329, 332-36, 339, 346

Brunei Bay: 89

Buaya: 351

Bucan River: 258, 260, 268

Bulldozers: 82, 83, 320

Bunkers, Japanese: 71, 77, 129

Burauen: 12, 78, 103-04, 121, 137, 138, 144, 145,

176, 240, 243, 253, 254, 257, 297, 308, 313,

322, 365

advance on: 124-33

airfields: 34, 111, 263, 275, 285, 294-97, 298-

305, 307, 313, 314

plans to take: 33

Burayan River: 65

Buri: 12, 395

airfield: 124, 131, 133-39, 188, 296-300, 302-05

Burma: 10, 28

Burns, Lt. Col. James P.: 224

Butuan prison camp: 16

Cabalian Bay: 11

Cabiranan: 228

Cabulihan: 333-34, 336

Caibaan: 66, 146-52

Calamian Islands: 90

Calbasag River: 72, 76, 104, 130, 131, 145

California: 30

Calingatngan Creek: 266

Calubian: 234, 356-58

Camotes Islands: 98, 99, 314, 365

Camotes Sea: 62, 253, 275, 280, 338, 351-52, 362

Camp Downes: 286-90, 317

Campopo Bay: 356

Canberra: 44

Canigao Channel: 280

Canmangui: 111

Cannon Companies

of the 17th Infantry: 141n, 143

of the 19th Infantry: 68

of the 23d Infantry: 129

of the 32d Infantry: 136, 256, 260

of the 305th Infantry: 350n

of the 307th Infantry: 345

of the 381st Infantry: 120, 121n

of the 382d Infantry: 113-14, 116-17

Caomontag River: 181

Cape Sansapor: 26

Capoocan: 33, 67, 181, 206, 207, 210, 227, 237,

239

Capps, Sgt. Charles W.: 170n

Carabaos, use of, in supply operations: 111, 111n
INDEX 395

Cargo carriers, M29: 112

Caridad: 254-55, 257, 258, 263

Carigara: 12, 67, 93, 157, 163, 168, 198, 203,

204, 206, 208-10, 218, 235, 237, 275, 325

advance on: 169-79

capture of: 179-83

center for Japanese reinforcements: 103-04

estimate of enemy forces at: 23

plan to take: 33

as supply base: 190

Carigara Bay: 11-12, 23, 33, 94, 146, 150, 155,

157, 173, 175-76, 206, 209, 210, 211, 227, 228

Carigara River: 181, 210

Carney, Rear Adm. Robert B.: 5

Casey, Maj. Gen. Hugh J.: 35-36, 187-88, 199-200

Castilla: 165, 171, 174

Casualties, guerrilla: 17n, 18

Casualties, Japanese: 114, 123, 145

in area of 77th Division attack: 354

at Breakneck Ridge: 220

for Campaign: 367-68

at Hill 522: 71-72

in Ormoc area: 293

in Ormoc Valley: 321

in northern Leyte Valley: 157, 181-83

as results of guerrilla operations: 18, 20

at Shoestring Ridge: 263

at Tabontabon: 117

Casualties, U.S.

A Day: 78

at Breakneck Ridge: 220, 225

for Campaign: 367

causes of: 195

evacuation of: 112, 140, 161, 189-90, 192-94,

198

of 1st Cavalry Division: 157

at Hill 522: 72

in landing operations: 68-69

of 96th Division: 114

of 77th Division: 293, 321, 354

at Shoestring Ridge: 263

at Tabontabon: 117

of 24th Division: 181-83

Cataisan Peninsula: 12, 62-65, 72, 78, 187, 190

Cataisan Point: 63, 185

Catayom: 330, 331, 334

Catmon Hill: 33, 34, 52, 60, 72, 74, 107, 110, 114,

120-21, 123, 131, 308-10

description of: 104

Japanese tactics at: 111

Japanese defense of: 104-07

operations at: 117-20

plans to take: 107, 108, 268

U. S. tactics at: 110-111

Cavalry Brigades. See also Cavalry Division, 1st;

Cavalry Regiments; Cavalry Squadrons.

1st: 63, 151, 165, 168, 210

2d: 63-65, 146, 151, 153, 174-75, 180-81, 210

Cavalry Division, 1st: 9, 26, 40, 67, 68, 72, 82, 167,

185, 223. See also Cavalry Regiments; Cavalry

Squadrons; X Corps.

A-Day operations of: 62-67

A-Day tactical plan for: 33, 62-63

advance on Ormoc Valley: 235-40

casualties of: 157

combat experience of: 26

commander of: 63

deployment of: 275

lateral liaison: 157, 173, 210

medical support of: 192

missions of: 33, 34, 62, 146, 153, 168, 173, 206,

210, 218, 313, 347

in northern Leyte Valley: 146-57, 173-75, 179-

81

in Ormoc Valley: 342-45

in Palompon area: 351, 355-56, 358

shipping for, planned: 38-39

Cavalry Reconnaissance Troops

7th: 144, 256

24th: 167, 230

77th: 288

Cavalry Regiments

5th, 1st Division: 165, 180-81

A-Day: 63-65, 66

advance on Caibaan: 151-52

advance on Carigara: 175, 175n

command of: 66, 151n

honor guard for MacArthur: 152

in Ormoc Valley: 345

in Palompon area: 355

at Pawing: 166

7th, 1st Division: 155, 174

A-Day operations of: 63-65

advance on Carigara: 175, 181

advance to Ormoc Valley: 239-40

advance on Tacloban: 146-48, 150, 377

command of: 148

missions of: 146, 155, 175, 180-81

in Ormoc Valley: 342

in Palompon area: 355

8th, 1st Division:

A-Day operations of: 67

advance on Caibaan: 148, 150-51

advance on Carigara: 175, 180-81

command of: 63, 148

missions of: 150, 174-75

secures San Juanico Strait: 153—57

12th, 1st Division: 174, 235-36

A-Day operations of: 63-66

advance on Caibaan: 151

at Hill 522: 166-67

at Marasbaras: 165

in Ormoc Valley: 342-46

in Palompon area: 355
396 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Cavalry Regiments—Continued

112th: 222, 306

command of: 218

advance to Ormoc Valley: 237-39

Krueger on use of: 31-32

missions of: 218, 223, 237

in Ormoc Valley: 341, 342

Cavalry Squadrons

1st, 5th Regiment: 355

advance toward Caibaan: 151-52

advance on Carigara: 175n

missions of: 165

in Ormoc Valley: 345

at Pawing: 166

2d, 5th Regiment: 151-52, 165, 175, 180-81

1st, 7th Regiment: 355

A-Day operations of: 65

advance on Carigara: 175, 180-81

advance on Tacloban: 146-48

casualties of: 175

commander of: 155

missions of: 65, 175

on Samar: 174

at San Juanico Strait: 155

2d, 7th Regiment: 174

A-Day operations of: 65

advance to Ormoc Valley: 239–40

advance on Tacloban: 146-48

landing area of: 65

missions of: 65

in Ormoc Valley: 342

1st, 8th Regiment: 150, 153-57, 174

2d, 8th Regiment

advance on Caibaan: 150-51

advance on Carigara: 181

lateral liaison: 173

missions of: 150, 174, 180-81

in northern Leyte Valley: 174, 175

1st, 12th Regiment: 151, 174-75, 342-45

2d, 12th Regiment: 166-67, 432-45

1st, 112th Regiment: 238-39, 341

2d, 112th Regiment: 238-40, 342

Cavite: 173-75, 175n

CCS. See Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Cebu: 17, 22, 27, 45, 94, 96, 284, 332, 362-63,

366-67

Celebes: 53

Celebes Sea: 27, 31

Central Pacific Area: 1-2, 23, 31, 43

air support from, for Campaign: 27-28

missions of naval forces of: 30

plans for operations in: 7

progress in, June 1944: 3

shipping in: 17

as source of supply for Campaign: 37

Central Philippine Attack Force: 24. See also Allied

Naval Forces.

Chapman, Lt. Col. George H., Jr.: 171, 213

Chase, Brig. Gen. William C.: 63. See also Cavalry

Brigade, 1st.

Chemical Battalions

85th: 161, 212, 219

88th: 288-89, 318, 319, 353

91st: 139, 141n

Chemical mortars: See Mortars, chemical.

Chief of Naval Operations. See King, Admiral

Ernest J.

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. See Marshall, General

George C.

China: 1, 2, 3, 10, 49

China-Burma-India theater: 8, 28

"China Incident": 208

Cities. See by name.

Civil affairs, Philippines: 152, 198-204

Clark Field: 86

Clifford, Lt. Col. Thomas E., Jr.: 230n

in advance on Carigara: 169-70, 173

in advance on Pinamopoan: 206-07

awarded Distinguished Service Medal: 230

commands: 169-70

at Kilay Ridge: 227-34, 234n

in northwest Leyte: 356-57

Close air support: See Air support.

Coastwatchers: 20

Coconuts, use of as food: 111

Cogon: 316-17, 328, 330-32, 336

Colasian: 207, 212

Colasian Point: 210

Combined Chiefs of Staff: 1n, 2, 9

Combined Fleet: 45. See also Battle of Leyte Gulf;

Japanese naval units.

absence of, in Philippine waters, prerequisite for

Leyte Campaign: 24

in action off Formosa: 44

command of: 46, 54, 88

co-operation with Army: 53-54

estimate of use of: 22

missions of: 46-48, 54

and missions of Central Pacific naval forces: 30

operations of: 89-92

plans of: 46-49, 88-89

Suzuki on ability of: 50

Command, Allied

for Campaign: 24-26

co-ordination of: 27, 31

line of: 23, 24, 31, 244

for Ormoc operation: 277

Command, Japanese: 46, 50-51

Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet. See King, Admiral Ernest J.

Communications

difficulties of: 115

effectiveness of: 112

radio: 19-20, 112

supply of: 111

Third Fleet to protect: 30
INDEX 397

Construction: 306-08. See also Logistics.

Consuegra: 228, 229, 231-32, 234

Contact, lateral. See Lateral liaison.

Convoys, Japanese

attacked: 93, 98-99, 208, 210, 281-83

reinforcing Leyte forces: 99-102

Convoys, U.S.: 38, 216

composition of: 40, 41-42

entrance into Leyte Gulf: 58-59

formation of: 38, 40-41, 55-57

protection for: 27

Conyngham: 283

Coral reefs: 55

Corkscrew Ridge: 212, 219, 220, 224-25

Cornell, Lt. Col. Theodore M.: 1

Corps, U. S. See XIV Corps; X Corps; XXIV

Corps.

Corregidor: 18, 41

Counter Intelligence Corps: 200

Counterattacks, Japanese. See Tactics, Japanese,

counterattack.

Crosby: 54

Cruisers, Allied: 24, 30, 41-42, 90

A-Day operations of: 60-61

Canberra: 44

Denver: 54

Houston: 44

Cruisers, Japanese: 22, 89, 91, 92, 96

Atago: 90

Maya: 90

Cunningham, Brig. Gen. Julian W.: 218, 222, 237.

See also Cavalry Regiments, 112th.

CVE's: 60, 93

Dace: 90

Dagami: 33, 52, 103-04, 107, 111, 120-21, 122,

123, 127, 131, 133, 145, 169, 172, 204, 218,

240-41, 295, 296-97, 298, 303-04

advance on: 137-45

defenses at: 141

description of: 141-42

as Japanese command post: 124

mopping-up operations in area of: 241-43

Daguitan River: 76, 78, 104-07, 127, 131, 145, 307

Daha: 357

Dahlen, Lt. Col. Chester A.: 176-78, 227, 228, 232,

357

Damulaan: 254-55, 256, 260, 263, 264, 266

Dao: 33, 78, 127, 139, 144

Daro: 209, 210-11, 218, 223, 333, 334

Darter: 90

Davao: 3, 42, 50, 52, 366

Davis, Lt. Col. Douglas C.: 302

Dayhagan: 335

Defenses, Japanese

against air attacks: 42-43

at Aslom: 114

at Breakneck Ridge: 211, 215, 224

Defenses, Japanese—Continued

at Burauen: 133

at Buri airfield: 133-34, 136

on Catmon Hill: 104, 111

at Dagami: 141

along Highway 2: 331, 337, 339

at Hill 522: 70

at Hill B: 166, 167

at Hindang: 113

intelligence on: 21

of Jolo Islands: 8

at Labiranan Head: 108-09

at landing beaches: 30, 51-52, 59, 65, 74-75

in Leyte Valley: 52-53

on Luzon: 49

in Ormoc area: 284, 287, 290-91

in Ormoc Valley: 316, 320, 340

at Palo: 161

in Palompon area: 352

at Pastrana: 171

at Shoestring Ridge: 257

in southern Leyte: 124, 128, 129, 131

at Tabontabon: 115, 116

Defenses, U.S., at Shoestring Ridge: 257

Demolition charges: 120, 137, 249

Demolition teams, naval. See Underwater demolition teams.

Denver: 54

Deployment, Japanese

August 1944: 46

in Dagami sector: 141

intelligence on: 21

in landing areas: 104-07

in Leyte Valley: 168, 175-76

of 16th Division: 124, 131

of Southern Army: 50

at Tacloban: 146

of 35th Army: 52, 103-04

Deployment, U. S.

air forces: 98

of forces at end of A Day: 107

Deposito: 273, 277, 281, 285, 293, 310-11, 325

Desolation Point: 55

Destroyer escorts, U.S.: 24, 41, 91, 92, 280

Destroyers, Japanese: 22, 96, 101

Destroyers, U.S.: 24, 30, 42, 55, 90, 91, 92, 280

A-Day operations of: 60-62

bombardment by: 58, 59

Conyngham: 283

and floating mines: 57

Laffey: 283

Mahan: 283

missions of: 30

O'Brien: 283n

Dick, 1st Lt. Dallas: 71-72

Digahongan: 122

Diit: 151

Diit River: 150, 174
398 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Dill, Col. Macey L.: 107, 122. See also 382d

Infantry Regiment,

command of: 74

at Dagami: 240-42

at Tabontabon: 116

tactics of: 110

Dinagat Island: 20, 31, 34, 55-58

Distinguished Service Crosses

Kangleon, Lt. Col. Ruperto: 152

Newman, Col. Aubrey S.: 176n

Robinson, Pfc. Frank B.: 69n

Thompson, 1st Sgt. Francis H.: 241, 241n

Distinguished Service Medal, Clifford, Lt. Col.

Thomas E.: 230

Divisions, square. See 1st Cavalry Division.

Divisions, U.S. See Airborne Division, 11th; Cavalry Division, 1st; Infantry Divisions; Marine

Division, 1st.

Dixon, Capt. Roy F.: 258

Dogs, use of: 247

Dolores: 218, 287, 333, 335

Donghol: 319

Drake, Col. Royce E.: 66, 151

DUKW's: 83, 144

Dulag: 12, 34, 76, 78, 83, 86, 97-98, 103-04, 107,

109, 111, 130, 145, 185, 188, 192, 208, 240,

256, 277, 280, 300, 308

airfield: 22, 72, 124-29, 131-32, 187, 275, 294-

95, 297, 298, 305, 307

amphibious operations in area of: 33, 45, 60, 62,

72

control of civilians in area of: 202-03

description of: 72

Japanese defenses in area of: 52, 124

as supply base: 190

Duncan, Lt. Col. William A.: 224

East Indies: 27

Edris, Maj. Edwin N.: 165

Eichelberger, Lt. Gen. Robert L.: 26, 361, 368

Eighth Army: 26, 361-67

Ely, Col. William J.: 35-36, 184

Engineer Battalions

3d: 169

13th: 130, 137, 140-41, 142, 259

127th Airborne: 302

302d: 320, 333, 350n, 352

321st: 121, 121n

Engineer units, Japanese: 52

Engineer units, U. S. miscellaneous: 65

2d Special Brigade: 80, 350

532d Boat and Shore Regiment: 80

592d Boat and Shore Regiment: 80

1122d Combat Group: 80

1140th Combat Group: 80

reconnaissance by: 112

shortage of: 36

Engineers

and construction program for Leyte: 35—36

logistical operations of: 80, 83

missions of: 26, 35

problems of: 35-36, 184-90

repair bridges: 65, 112, 121

use of: 348

Eniwetok: 41

Envelopments, U. S. See Tactics, U.S., envelopment.

Escort carriers: 24, 28, 31, 42

Evacuation, Japanese: 30

Evacuation of casualties. See Medical operations,

evacuation of casualties.

F4U's: 280

Far East Air Forces: 26, 45

Far Eastern policy: 2

Fast Carrier Task Force: 24, 27

Fellers, Brig. Gen. Bonner F.: 199

Fertig, Col. Wendell: 16, 20

Field Artillery Battalions

11th: 167, 171, 177, 326-28

13th

at Colasian Point: 210

at Hill 522: 70-71

at Hill B: 166-67

at Palo: 163-64

at Pastrana: 171

14th: 171

31st: 130

49th: 143

at Buri airfield: 135, 136

at Hill 380: 269, 271, 272

at Shoestring Ridge: 256, 257, 258, 260

52d: 167, 177, 210, 211, 212

57th: 258, 260, 264-65

61st: 67, 146

63d

advance on Carigara: 170, 177

advance on Pinamopoan: 207

at Capoocan: 210

at Hill 522: 71

at Kilay Ridge: 227

at Palo: 164

at Pawing: 159-61

120th: 225

198th: 119

226th: 211, 220, 333, 334

271st: 344

287th Observation: 299-300

304th: 318, 337

305th: 290, 318-19, 330-31, 337, 350n

306th: 285, 318, 330-31, 337, 350n

361st: 107-09, 119, 121, 121n

363d: 108, 109, 117, 119

465th: 220

531st: 349, 350, 350n
INDEX 399

Field Artillery Battalions—Continued

674th Parachute: 302

902d

in drive on Ormoc: 286, 287-90, 291

in Ormoc Valley: 317, 318, 330-31, 334,

337

921st: 108-09

947th: 206

Fifth Air Force

airfields for: 188

command of: 26

establishes units on Leyte: 96

missions of: 26-28, 38, 45, 94, 187

operations of: 98-99, 217, 283-84, 286, 349

plans of: 94

reinforcements for: 45

shortage of airfields for: 209

tactical plans for: 276, 279-80

V Amphibious Corps: 256n

Fighters, Japanese: 22, 42

Filipinos. See also Native labor.

care of: 201-03

guerrilla activities of: 14-20

as guides: 228, 230-31

impressment of, by Japanese: 70

medical treatment of: 194, 195

reaction to invasion: 57, 148, 152, 163

recruitment of: 204

religion of: 10

as source of intelligence: 250, 257

and supply operations: 111, 112, 228, 229, 235,

331

supply to: 203-04

Finance ministry, Japanese, on Allied losses off

Formosa: 120-21

Finn, Lt. Col. John M.

at Buri airfield: 135-36

command of: 133-34

in Ormoc Valley: 323

at Shoestring Ridge: 254-55, 257n, 258, 259n,

262-64

Finnegan, Col. Walter H.: 148

Flame throwers. See Weapons, U.S., flame throwers.

Flanagan, Maj. Edward M., Jr.: 298n

Food. See Rations.

Formosa: 1, 4, 45, 90

discussed at Hawaii conference, July 1944: 6

Japanese reaction to action off: 54, 85

neutralization of Japanese forces on, prerequisite

to Leyte Campaign: 24

plans for attack on: 2-3, 7, 27, 28, 30-31

Third Fleet action off: 43-44

Fortifications, Japanese. See Defenses, Japanese.

Fourteenth Air Force: 28

XIV Corps: 31, 38

Foxhole Corners: 122. See also Digahongan.

Freeman, Col. Paul L.: 318-20

French Indochina: 10, 46

Frigates, U.S.: 42, 55

Frink, Maj. Gen. James L.: 23, 26. See also Services

of Supply, SWPA.

Fulston, Maj. Robert C., Jr.: 135

Fryar, Pvt. Elmer E.: 322n

Fukue, Lt. Gen. Shimpei: 363

G-2. See Intelligence, U. S.

Galotan: 173

Garcia, Carlos: 17n

General Headquarters, SWPA: 16, 18-20, 36, 38,

39

George F. Clymer: 41

Giagsam: 179

Gibucauan: 179

Gigantangan Island: 357-58

Gill, Maj. Gen. William H. See also Infantry Divisions, 32d.

command of: 223

in Ormoc Valley: 325

tactical plans of: 223-24, 232-34, 234n, 356

Ginabuyan: 362

Ginagan River: 178

Ginogusan: 139

Grammatice, Pfc. Fedele A.: 129

Gray, 1st Lt. Leslie M.: 54

Greenbowe, 1st Lt. Tower W.: 175

Gregory, Lt. John: 152

Grenades, Japanese. See Weapons, Japanese, grenades.

Grenades, U. S. See Weapons, U.S., grenades.

Grove, Pfc. Kenneth W.: 148, 148n

Guadalcanal: 2, 26, 38

Guam: 27, 34, 38, 276

Guerrilla movement, Philippines: 14-20. See also

Fertig, Col. Wendell; Kangleon, Col. Ruperto;

Miranda, Brig. Gen. Blas E.; Parsons, Lt.

Comdr. Charles; Peralta, Col. Macario.

intelligence on Carigara: 179

at Kilay Ridge: 228

in Ormoc Valley: 314, 315

after Sixth Army landing: 201, 204

as source of intelligence: 250, 254, 348

use as troops in Campaign: 257n

Gugeler, Lt. Russell A.: 128n

Guinarona: 137, 140-41

Guinarona River: 111-12, 114, 116, 118-19

Guintiguian: 153-55, 157

Gun fire support units, naval: 30

Guns, Japanese: 30

37-mm.: 179

75-mm.: 69, 108-09, 121, 129, 130, 137, 353, 354

105-mm.: 344

antitank: 77, 129

coastal: 108

estimate of emplacement of: 22
400 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Guns, U.S.

M3 machine: 249, 249n

37-mm.: 249

.50-caliber machine: 249

75-mm.: 240

90-mm. antiaircraft: 249

155-mm.: 209, 211, 212-13, 256, 256n, 257, 349,

350

antitank: 109, 136-37

self-propelled: 69, 213

tank destroyer: 317, 320

Thompson submachine: 249

used by Japanese: 138, 164

Hagins, Col. William A.: 194

Hainan: 31

Halloran, Col. Michael E.: 119, 121

Halmahera: 53

Halsey, Admiral William F.: 27, 30, 42, 54, 90, 91.

See also Third Fleet.

on air attacks on Ryukyus: 43

on Battle of Leyte Gulf: 92

on bypassing objectives before Philippines: 4-5

on carrier support for Leyte Campaign: 44-45

to command operations in Palaus: 8

in line of command: 24

on operations in Pacific: 8-9

ordered to support Sixth Army: 23

orders air attack on Philippines: 45

and San Bernardino-Surigao Straits operation:

45

at strategy conference in Hawaii, July 1944: 5

and Third Fleet action off Formosa: 44

Hamilton, Col. Stephen S.: 285, 287

Harassing fire: 67, 75-76, 119, 130, 225

Harbor conditions: 35

Harbor facilities: 12

Harbor lights: 31, 55, 58

Hawaiian Islands: 3-4, 5-6, 39, 40

Hawkins, 1st Lt. Jack, USMC: 17n

Headquarters, ALAMO Force: 26

Headquarters, Leyte Area Command (guerrilla) : 18

Headquarters, Sixth Army: 26, 78

Headquarters, SWPA: 222

Headquarters, XXIV Corps: 41

Hettinger, Col. John A.: 223-25

Hiabangan: 131

Highway 1. See Roads, Highway 1.

Highway 2. See Roads, Highway 2.

Hill 85: 167

Hill 120: 75

Hill 331: 165

Hill 380: 266, 267-68, 269-73

Hill 522: 67-68, 70-72, 78, 146, 157, 161, 165,

166, 190

Hill 606: 266, 271, 272

Hill 918: 256, 257, 258, 264, 266-71

Hill 1525: 213, 215, 216, 223, 238

Hill 2348: 242-43

Hill B: 163, 164, 165, 166-67, 168

Hill C: 163, 165-66, 168

Hill Mike: 165

Hill Nan: 165

Hindang: 110, 113, 131

Hitomnog: 241

Hodge, Maj. Gen. John R.: 145, 206, 243. See also

XXIV Corps.

and advance on Burauen: 124-27

assumes command ashore: 80

and civil affairs on Leyte: 199, 202

commands XXIV Corps: 26

and defense of airfields: 300, 303

in Ormoc Valley: 317, 323

and Ormoc Valley operations: 329, 336

and plans for Ormoc operation: 276, 277, 293

and supply problems: 311, 312

tactical plans of: 218, 223, 240, 253, 254, 296,

297, 300, 349

Hoffman, Brig. Gen. Hugh F.: 63, 153-55, 174-75,

180-81

Hokoda, Col. Keijiro: 124, 133

Hollandia: 9, 26, 28, 34, 37, 38-39, 40, 54, 57,

190, 251

Homonhon Island: 31, 34, 55-57

Honolulu: 40

Honshu: 294

Hoska, Col. Lucas: 302

Hospitals: 192-93, 236

attacked: 164

construction of: 189-90

for Filipinos: 201, 203-04

ships as: 194

sites for: 189

Houston: 44

Howard, Maj. Elmer C.: 171

Howitzers, Japanese

70-mm.: 122

75-mm.: 119

Howitzers, U. S.

75-mm.: 291

75-mm. self-propelled: 129, 249

105-mm.: 119, 240, 249, 257, 260

105-mm. self-propelled: 178-79, 249

155-mm.: 117, 119, 206, 249, 256, 257, 260, 318

self-propelled M8's: 142-43

Huaton: 332, 335

Humaybunay: 351—52

Hydrographic ships: 42

Ignacio, 1st Lt. R. C.: 19n

Imahori, Col.: 287, 313-14, 314n, 334

Imperial General Headquarters: 49, 208, 275, 360,

362, 363

co-ordination between services: 88

and defense of Philippines: 49-50, 51-52

and deployment of naval forces: 44
INDEX 401

Imperial General Headquarters—Continued

naval plans of: 88

orders reinforcement of Pacific bases, summer

1944: 46

plans for defense of Philippines: 85

and replacement of Kuroda: 50

Suzuki on defense plans of: 50

tactical plans of: 294

Improvisations, Japanese. See Tactics, Japanese,

improvisations.

Improvisations, U.S. See Tactics, U.S., improvisations.

Infantry Battalions, Japanese. See Japanese Army

units, Battalions.

Infantry Battalions, U. S. See also Infantry Divisions, U.S.; Infantry Regiments, U. S.

1st, 17th Regiment: 241

advance on Burauen: 133

advance on Dagami: 137-40, 141, 142-43

at Battle of the Hills: 268-72

at end of A Day: 127

missions of: 132, 138

2d, 17th Regiment

advance on Burauen: 133

advance on Dagami: 137-40, 141-43

at Battle of the Hills: 268-71, 272-73

commander of: 142

at end of A Day: 127

missions of: 132, 138

3d, 17th Regiment: 132, 241

A-Day operations of: 78

advance on Burauen: 131

advance on Dagami: 139, 140-41, 143-44

at Battle of the Hills: 270, 271, 273

missions of: 76

results of A-Day operations: 127

1st, 19th Regiment

A-Day operations of: 68, 69-72

advance on Carigara: 171-72, 173

commander of: 171

at Hill 522: 161, 166-67 at Hill 85: 167

missions of: 166-67, 178, 211

2d, 19th Regiment

A-Day operations of: 69-70

advance on Carigara: 172

advance on Ormoc: 223, 225-27, 229-30

at Breakneck Ridge: 213, 215, 216

commander of: 167, 215

at Hill B: 166-67

missions of: 163, 166, 213, 218, 219, 223

at Palo: 163-64

3d, 19th Regiment

A-Day operations of: 69

advance on Carigara: 171-72

casualties of: 164

at Castilla: 165

commander of: 171

Infantry Battalions, U.S.—Continued

3d, 19th Regiment—Continued

lateral liaison of: 112

missions of: 212

at Palo: 161, 164, 166

at San Joaquin: 164

1st, 21st Regiment: 212, 213, 215, 216, 219-20

2d, 21st Regiment: 212-16, 219, 220

3d, 21st Regiment: 211-12, 213, 215-16, 219,

220

1st, 32d Regiment

advance on Burauen: 129, 130, 131, 133

commander of: 129

in Mahonag area: 323

missions of: 134, 136, 256, 264

ordered to Panaon Strait: 145

securing Buri airfield: 134-37

2d, 32d Regiment: 131, 134, 135, 144-45

A-Day operations of: 77-78

advance on Burauen: 128-29, 130, 133

advance on Ormoc: 243-54

commander of: 256

in Mahonag area: 323

securing Buri airfield: 135-37

at Shoestring Ridge: 256, 257-59, 261-64

3d, 32d Regiment

A-Day operations of: 77-78

advance on Burauen: 128-30, 133

at Battle of the Hills: 269-70

commander of: 256

in Mahonag area: 322-23

missions of: 128, 135, 136

securing Buri airfield: 135-37

at Shoestring Ridge: 257-60, 262-63,

264-65

1st, 34th Regiment: 173

A-Day operations of: 68

advance on Carigara: 169-70, 179, 181

advance on Ormoc: 218, 219

advance on Palo: 161

advance on Pinamopoan: 206-07

casualties of: 234-35

commander of: 165, 169-70

at Hill C: 165

at Kilay Ridge: 225-35

missions of: 177-78, 223

in northwest Leyte: 356—58

2d, 34th Regiment

A-Day operations of: 68

advance on Carigara: 169, 170-71, 173,

178-79, 181

casualties of: 158-59

commander of: 157

at Hill C: 166

missions of: 176-77

in northwest Leyte: 357-58

at Pawing: 158-61

at Pinamopoan: 207
402 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Infantry Battalions, U.S.—Continued

2d, 34th Regiment—Continued

results of A-Day operations: 157

3d, 34th Regiment

A-Day operations of: 68

advance on Carigara: 171, 172-73, 176-78,

179, 181

at Breakneck Ridge: 207

at Capoocan: 207

commander of: 173

at Hill C: 165-66

missions of: 173, 176

at Pawing: 159

results of A-Day operations: 157

1st, 126th Regiment: 326, 328, 340-42

2d, 126th Regiment: 325-26, 328, 340-41

3d, 126th Regiment: 326, 328, 340-41

1st, 127th Regiment: 326

2d, 127th Regiment: 326, 328

1st, 128th Regiment: 224-25

2d, 128th Regiment: 224-25, 234

3d, 128th Regiment: 224-25, 325

1st, 149th Regiment: 303-04

2d, 149th Regiment: 303, 304

1st, 184th Regiment: 133

A-Day operations of: 78

at Battle of the Hills: 266, 267-68, 270

missions of: 128

in Ormoc: 320

results of A-Day operations: 127

at Shoestring Ridge: 258, 260-61, 263-65

2d. 184th Regiment: 133

A-Day operations of: 78

advance on Burauen: 127—28

advance toward Dagami: 137-39, 140

at Battle of the Hills: 266 ,267-68, 270

missions of: 132

at Shoestring Ridge: 256, 264-65

3d, 184th Regiment

A-Day operations of: 78

advance on Burauen: 128

at Battle of the Hills: 267-68, 269-70, 272

missions of: 128, 264

results of A-Day operations: 127

1st, 305th Regiment

in drive on Ormoc: 285

mission of: 290

in Ormoc Valley: 317, 318-20, 321, 330, 333

in Palompon area: 349-51

2d, 305th Regiment

in drive on Ormoc: 285

mission of: 290

in Ormoc Valley: 315, 316, 318-20, 321,

330

in Palompon area: 349, 352-54

3d, 305th Regiment

in drive on Ormoc: 285

mission of: 290

Infantry Battalions, U.S.—Continued

3d, 305th Regiment—Continued

in Ormoc Valley: 315, 316, 318-20, 321,

330, 335

in Palompon area: 349, 352-54

1st, 306th Regiment: 289, 291, 316-17, 338-39

2d, 306th Regiment

in drive on Ormoc: 287, 289, 291

missions of: 285

in Ormoc Valley: 317, 333, 335, 338, 345

3d, 306th Regiment: 298

in drive on Ormoc: 289, 291

in Ormoc Valley: 316-17, 333-34, 338, 345-

46

1st, 307th Regiment: 285-86, 289

2d, 307th Regiment: 285

1st, 381st Regiment: 119-20

2d, 381st Regiment: 119-20

3d, 381st Regiment: 119-22

1st, 382d Regiment: 107

A-Day operations of: 75

advance to Kiling: 122-23

at Aslom: 114, 116

commander of: 122-23

in Dagami area: 241-43

and defense of the airfields: 304

missions of: 110, 111, 113, 122, 300

operations: 110, 111, 113-14

2d, 382d Regiment: 122, 123

A-Day operations of: 74-75, 107

casualties of: 117

in Dagami area: 241-43

missions of: 110, 111, 113, 116

operations of: 110-11, 114

at Tabontabon: 116-17

3d, 382d Regiment: 110, 113, 114, 242-43

A-Day mission of: 75

A-Day operations of: 107

advance to Kiling: 122

missions of: 116, 122

operations of: 110, 111, 113-14

at Tabontabon: 116

1st, 383d Regiment: 114, 120

A-Day operations of: 74

at Labiranan Head: 108-09, 118-19

at Labir Hill: 114

missions of: 107, 108, 112, 119

results of A-Day operations of: 107

2d, 383d Regiment: 110

A-Day operations of: 74

commander of: 117

missions of: 108, 110, 117, 118

operations of: 110, 111-12

at Pikas: 114

results of A-Day operations of: 107

at San Vicente Hill: 117-19

3d, 383d Regiment: 114

on A Day: 115-16
INDEX 403

Infantry Battalions, U.S.—Continued

3d, 383d Regiment—Continued

missions of: 108, 110, 118

operations of: 110, 111, 112

results of A-Day operations of: 107

at San Vicente Hill: 118-19

at Tabontabon: 115-16

6th Ranger: 58

casualties of: 55

commander of: 54

confirms target date: 39

Krueger on use of: 32

medical support of: 192

missions of: 28, 31, 34, 55

operations of: 54-55

Infantry Divisions, Japanese. See Japanese Army

units, Divisions.

Infantry Divisions, U. S. See also Infantry Battalions, U.S.; Infantry Regiments, U. S.

7th: 80-82, 111, 256, 273, 285, 295, 333. See

also Infantry Regiments, U.S., 17th, 32d, and

184th; XXIV Corps.

A-Day operations of: 72, 76-78, 83-84

casualties of: 145

combat experience of: 26

deployment of: 275, 293

estimate of Army and Navy air support: 93

lateral liaison of: 76, 107-08, 286

medical support: 192, 195, 198, 202

missions of: 33, 107, 124-27, 145, 218, 243,

253, 266, 271, 277

mopping-up operations of: 365

on one-ton trailer: 250

results of A-Day operations: 127

secures XXIV Corps beachhead line: 133-45

on 75-mm. self-propelled howitzer: 249

supply problems: 83-84

on 37-mm. gun: 249

tactical plans: 34, 240, 254

zone of action: 124

24th: 32, 144-45, 200-201, 275. See also Infantry Regiments, U.S., 19th, 21st, and 34th;

X Corps.

A-Day operations of: 67-72, 78-80, 82

available for Campaign: 9

casualties of: 181-83, 225

combat experience of: 26

commander of: 67

drive on Ormoc: 206-08, 210-20

at Hollandia: 40

Irving assumes command ashore: 72

on Japanese training: 251

landing area: 33, 67, 80-82

lateral liaison: 67, 112, 185, 210, 356

medical support of: 192, 194, 195, 198

missions of: 33, 34, 62, 67-68, 157, 168,

206, 210, 218, 223, 253, 347

in northwest Leyte: 356-58

Infantry Divisions, U.S.—Continued

24th—Continued

operations in northern Leyte Valley: 157-67,

168-74, 176-83

results of A-Day operations: 157

shipping for: 38-39

tactical plans of: 33, 62, 347

32d: 34, 220, 222, 230, 232, 237, 306. See also

Infantry Regiments, U.S., 126th, 127th, and

128th; X Corps.

casualties of: 225

combat experience of: 26-27

at Kilay Ridge: 234

lateral liaison: 238

missions of: 26, 223, 253, 347

in Ormoc Valley: 275, 293, 313, 324, 325-

28, 339, 342, 343

in Palompon area: 354-56, 358

strength of: 26

38th: 303-04

77th: 222, 298, 305, 306, 361, 362, 365. See

also Infantry Regiments, U.S., 305th, 306th,

307th; XXIV Corps.

casualties of: 293, 321, 354

combat experience of: 27

commander of: 276

and defense of the airfields: 297

landing area of: 273

lateral liaison of: 293, 342, 345

missions of: 277, 329, 336, 349, 358

mopping-up operations of: 365

in Ormoc area: 276-79, 280, 284-87,

289-90, 293

in Ormoc Valley: 313-15, 319-21, 325-28,

339, 342, 345

in Palompon area: 347, 349, 354-55, 358

shipping for: 38

strength of: 26

supply problems: 310-12

81st: 38

96th: 26, 27, 34, 41, 76, 83, 131. See also Infantry Regiments, U.S. , 381st, 382d, and

383d; XXIV Corps.

A-Day operations of: 72-76

advance to Kiling: 121-23

casualties of: 114, 123

in Catmon Hill area: 114-23

commander of: 76

and defense of the airfields: 300, 303-04

on DUKW: 250

enlarges its beachhead area: 107-14

landing area of: 33, 72-74, 80

lateral liaison: 77, 127, 144, 164

medical support of: 192-95

missions of: 33, 34, 107, 218, 243

mopping-up operations of: 240-43, 275, 365

on 105-mm. self-propelled howitzer, 249

results of A-Day operations of: 76
404 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Infantry Divisions, U.S.—Continued

96th—Continued

tactical plans of: 107

on Thompson submachine gun: 249

zone of action: 124

Americal: 365

Infantry Regiments, Japanese. See Japanese Army

units, Regiments.

Infantry Regiments, U. S. See also Infantry Battalions, U.S.; Infantry Divisions, U. S.

17th, 7th Division: 240, 241, 264, 293

A-Day operations of: 76, 78

advance on Burauen: 132-33

advance on Dagami: 121, 137-44

at Battle of the Hills: 266-67, 268-73

commander of: 138

estimate of enemy forces in Dagami: 141

lateral liaison: 131

missions of: 144, 296

results of A-Day operations: 127

19th, 24th Division

A-Day operations of: 67-72

advance on Carigara: 171-73, 179

at Breakneck Ridge: 211, 212, 213, 215,

216, 218, 219

commander of: 171, 213

in drive on Ormoc: 223, 225-27, 229-30

headquarters moved to Palo: 164

at Hill B: 166-67

lateral liaison of: 112, 144, 171, 229-30

missions of: 67, 166, 168, 171-72, 178, 206,

223

at Palo: 161-65

presidential citation: 225-27

results of A-Day operations: 157, 161

21st, 24th Division: 67, 168

A-Day operations of: 78, 145

at Breakneck Ridge: 211-16, 218-20, 223-

24, 227, 237

casualties of: 220

confirms target date: 39

commander of: 211, 213

on Japanese training: 251

Krueger on use of: 31-32

medical support of: 192

missions of 32, 33, 34, 62, 206, 210, 223-24

at Panaon Strait: 32, 33, 78, 145, 206, 256

32d, 7th Division: 138, 268, 269

A-Day operations of: 77-78

advance on Baybay: 144-45, 253

advance on Burauen: 128-33

at Buri airfield: 133-37

casualties of: 263

commander of: 76, 133-34

landing area of: 76

lateral liaison: 76, 107, 127-28, 129, 131

in Mahonag area: 322-23

missions of: 127, 128, 134, 253

Infantry Regiments, U.S.—Continued

32d, 7th Division—Continued

results of A-Day operations: 127

at Shoestring Ridge: 254-65

tactical plans of: 76

34th, 24th Division: 210-11

A-Day operations of: 66-69

advance on Carigara: 169-71, 172-73,

175n, 176-79, 181

advance on Ormoc: 206-08, 211, 218, 219

advance on Palo: 161-63

amphibious operations of: 227

commander of: 68, 357

at Hill C: 165-66

at Kilay Ridge: 225-35

lateral liaison: 66, 157, 171, 173, 181, 229-

30

missions of: 67-68, 168, 180, 206, 223, 227,

277

in northwest Leyte: 365-58

at Pawing: 157-61

results of A-Day operations: 157

126th, 32d Division: 238-39, 325-28, 339-41

127th, 32d Division: 325, 326, 328, 339, 340,

341-42, 355-56

128th, 32d Division: 220, 223-25, 233, 234, 325,

355-56

149th, 38th Division: 303-04

158th: 31-32

184th, 7th Division: 256, 258, 265, 273, 293

A-Day operations of: 78

advance on Burauen: 127-28, 129-30, 131,

132, 133

advance toward Dagami: 137-39, 140

at Battle of the Hills: 266-68, 269-70, 271-

72

commander of: 76

landing area of: 76—77

lateral liaison: 127-28, 129, 131

missions of: 76, 127, 128

in Ormoc Valley: 320, 321

results of A-Day operations: 127

at Shoestring Ridge: 260-61, 263-64

305th, 77th Division

in advance on Ormoc: 284-85, 286, 288,

289-90, 291

commander of: 284

missions of: 284-85, 286-87

in Ormoc Valley: 315, 316-17, 318-20, 321,

329, 330, 331, 333-36

in Palompon area: 349-51, 352-54

306th, 77th Division: 297, 298, 352

in advance on Ormoc: 287, 289, 290, 291,

292, 293

commander of: 285

missions of: 277, 285, 291
INDEX 405

Infantry Regiments, U.S.—Continued

306th, 77th Division—Continued

in Ormoc Valley: 315-17, 319-21, 329-31,

333-37, 338-39, 345

307th, 77th Division

in advance on Ormoc: 285-86, 287-90, 291,

292-93

commander of: 285

missions of: 285, 286

in Ormoc Valley: 315-17, 319, 320-21,

329-31, 333, 334, 336-38, 345

381st, 96th Division: 34, 76, 117, 119-22

382d, 96th Division: 114, 122

A-Day operations of: 74-75

advance to Kiling: 122-23

advance on Tanauan: 141

at Buri airfield: 304

casualties: 110, 117

commander of: 74

expands beachhead: 110, 111, 112, 113-14

landing area of: 72

lateral liaison: 144

missions of: 107, 108, 110, 113, 122, 300

mopping-up operations in Dagami area:

240, 241-43

results of A-Day operations: 107

at Tabontabon: 116-17

383d, 96th Division: 120

A-Day operations of: 74

commander of: 74

expands beachhead: 110-12

landing area of: 72

missions of: 107-08, 110, 119

results of A-Day operations: 107

at San Vicente Hill: 117-19

at Tabontabon: 114-16

Infiltration, Japanese. See Tactics, Japanese, infiltration.

Intelligence, Japanese: 18, 250-51, 254n

Intelligence, U. S.

on Carigara: 179-80

coastwatchers: 20

on condition of landing beaches: 57

estimate of: 9

estimate of enemy strategy: 22-23

estimate of enemy strength: 8, 21-22, 42-43

estimate of enemy forces: 141

estimate of guerrilla strength on Leyte: 18

estimate of political situation in Japan, July

1944: 21-22

from guerrillas: 250, 254, 348

from Filipinos: 200-201

Kangleon mission: 17, 19-20

Krueger on: 250

of mine charts on Suluan: 31

Parsons mission: 16

from prisoners of war: 135, 141, 296

results of guerrilla movement: 20

Intelligence, U.S.—Continued

of survivors of Corregidor: 18

Villamor mission, 1942: 19

Ipil: 101, 283, 287, 289, 290, 293, 312, 314

operations at: 284-87

Irving, Maj. Gen. Frederick A.: 200-201, 210,

213, 220, 356. See also Infantry Divisions,

U.S., 24th.

assumes command ashore: 72

command of: 67

tactical plans of: 179, 206, 210, 211, 212, 215,

218-19, 227

Jalubon: 320, 330

Janabatas Channel: 155

Japan: 3, 10, 86

MacArthur on: 4

missions of Japanese forces in: 54

plan for invasion of: 2

reaction to action off Formosa: 44

reinforcement of: 46

route to: 7

situation in, July 1944: 21-22

Japanese Air Force: 49, 85-88. See also Air plans,

Japanese; Japanese Army units; Japanese naval

units.

Japanese Army: 14, 20. See also Imperial General

Headquarters; Japanese Army units,

condition of, December 1944: 358-60

moves reinforcements to Leyte: 14

tactics of, as results of Leyte Campaign: 361-67

Japanese Army units. See also Imperial General

Headquarters.

Armies

2d Area: 46

3d Air: 46

4th Air: 46, 53-54, 85-86, 88, 241, 275

7th Area: 46

14th Area: 46-52, 53, 85, 88, 93-94, 101-02,

103, 104, 175, 221, 294, 314, 325-26, 358,

361-62

35th: 22, 46, 50, 52, 59, 94, 103-04, 168,

173-74, 175-76, 208, 240, 243, 275, 284,

291, 294, 295, 305, 313, 322, 324, 329,

331-32, 334, 338, 347, 358, 359, 361-64,

365-66

Burma Area: 46

Southern: 46, 49-50, 85, 221, 362

Divisions

1st: 94, 99, 101, 103, 104, 175, 208, 209,

210, 211, 213, 215, 217, 218, 219, 225,

228, 235, 314, 324-26, 324n-325n, 337,

339, 340, 341, 358-59, 363, 366-67

2d Air: 85-86, 88

2d Imperial Guards: 51

7th Air: 86

8th: 94, 314, 332

10th: 325
406 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Japanese Army units—Continued

Divisions—Continued

16th: 21-22,52-53,59,80,94, 103-07, 111,

120, 122, 124, 131, 168, 172, 240-42,

295-96, 297, 298-300, 305, 313, 366

26th: 94, 99-101, 103-04, 175-76, 208, 217,

254, 256, 260, 263, 264-65, 266, 270,

272, 273, 275, 285, 293, 295-97, 305,

313-14, 322, 363, 366

30th: 52, 59, 94, 99, 103-04, 168, 176, 208, 217, 284, 285, 289

100th: 52

102d: 22, 52, 99, 103-04, 168, 175-76, 208,

217, 235, 324, 326, 342, 359, 363-64, 366

Brigades

12th Air: 86

28th Independent Mixed: 366

55th Independent Mixed: 94, 103

57th Independent Mixed: 94, 103, 176

58th Independent Mixed: 314

68th Independent Mixed: 94, 101, 103, 104,

123, 176, 208, 295, 359-60, 363, 366

Regiments

1st Artillery: 219, 324

1st Engineer: 324

1st Infantry: 233, 235, 324, 325, 326, 359,

360, 366-67

1st Reconnaissance: 324, 324n

1st Transport: 324, 359, 366-67

3d Airborne Raiding: 295

4th Airborne Raiding: 295, 332, 337, 339,

363

5th Infantry: 101, 314, 331, 337, 338, 339,

359

8th Engineer: 352

8th Field Artillery: 352

8th Transport: 352

9th Infantry: 52, 72, 74-75, 107, 108, 111n,

114-17, 120, 131, 141, 157, 240-41

11th Independent Infantry: 254, 257

12th Independent Infantry: 208, 257, 263,

267, 268, 269, 287, 289, 291-92, 313,

316, 318, 332, 334, 363

13th Independent Infantry: 254, 257, 258-

59, 261-62, 263, 264, 269

16th Engineer: 111, 131, 141

16th Reconnaissance: 22

20th Infantry: 22, 72, 104, 117, 124, 131,

133, 134, 137, 141, 142, 240-41

22d Field Artillery: 104, 111n, 124, 131

33d Infantry: 22, 52-53, 65, 67, 69-70,

131, 141, 146, 158, 160, 161, 163, 164,

166, 167, 168, 170, 240-41

39th Infantry: 325

41st Infantry: 168, 170, 176, 178-79, 217,

366

49th Infantry: 235, 324, 359, 366-67

Japanese Army units—Continued

Regiments—Continued

57th Infantry: 209, 211, 212, 213, 215, 216,

218, 219-20, 224, 225, 235, 324, 325,

359-60, 366-67

77th Infantry: 314, 332, 339, 363, 366

Battalions

2d Field Artillery: 220, 224

26th Artillery: 263

98th Airfield: 131, 134

169th Independent: 168, 176, 217

171st Independent Infantry: 168, 217

364th Independent Infantry: 254

Kamijo: 289

Moeda: 314

Nonaka: 284

Tateishi: 314

Miscellaneous

1st Division Headquarters: 366

2d Raiding Group: 275

7th Independent Tank Company: 22, 124,

128, 131, 135

16th Division Headquarters: 22

30th Fighter Group: 86

35th Army Headquarters: 338, 366

54th Airfield Company: 124, 131, 134

Camotes Detachment: 314

Imahori Detachment: 314, 363

Mitsui Shipping Unit: 363

Northern Leyte Defense Force: 111, 131

Ormoc Defense Headquarters: 284

Southern Leyte Defense Force: 111, 131

Takahashi Detachment: 314, 331-32, 337,

338, 366

Japanese defenses. See Defenses, Japanese.

Japanese dispositions. See Dispositions, Japanese.

Japanese Fleet: 86, 96. See also Combined Fleet;

Japanese naval units.

Japanese fortifications. See Defenses, Japanese.

Japanese garrison armies: 3-4, 46

Japanese home islands. See Japan.

Japanese intelligence. See Intelligence, Japanese.

Japanese Military Administration, on Leyte: 14

Japanese naval craft. See by name.

Japanese naval units. See also Combined Fleet.

1st Air Fleet: 46

1st Diversion Attack Force: 89-92

2d Air Fleet: 44, 90, 91

2d Diversion Attack Force: 44, 89-91

Carrier Division 3: 44

Carrier Division 4: 44

Ito Naval Landing Force: 332

Main Body: 90-91

Southern Fleet: 96

Southwest Area Fleet: 46

Special Naval Landing Force: 314, 317-18

Third Fleet: 53-54
INDEX 407

Japanese Navy. See Combined Fleet; Japanese

Fleet; Japanese naval units.

Japanese occupation, of Leyte: 17-18

Japanese resistance, Krucger on: 33-34

Japanese seaplane bases. See Seaplane bases, Japanese.

Japanese strength. See Strength, Japanese.

Japanese tactics. See Tactics, Japanese.

Jaro: 52, 104, 168-69, 172-74, 175, 175n, 176,

177-78, 179-80, 206, 208, 209-10, 211-13,

217, 218, 243, 356

JASCO, 292d: 350n

JCS. See Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Jeeps. See Trucks, 1⁄4-ton.

Jenna, Col. William W.: 357

Johnson, Pfc. Johnnie: 128

Johnson, Sgt. Leroy: 339-40

Joint Chiefs of Staff: 1n

approve strategic plan for defeat of Japan: 2

ask opinion of Pacific commanders, June 1944: 3

on bypassing objectives in Pacific: 5

and cancellation of Pacific operations: 9

and civil affairs in Philippines: 199

direct Nimitz to support Leyte operation: 30

and plans for Leyte operation: 6-8

and plans for Mindanao operation: 2-3

on primary purpose of Leyte Campaign: 6

set target dates: 9

strategic plans of, 1942: 1-2

and strategy conference in Brisbane, August

1944: 7

Joint Staff Planners: 8

Jolo Islands: 52

Jorge, Sgt. P.: 19n

JPS. See Joint Staff Planners.

Julita: 104, 131, 132-33, 135

Kaessner, Lt. Col. Paul V.: 305

Kakuda, Lt. Col: 141

Kalibapi: 14

Kamikaze: 88, 275, 276, 283, 369

Kananga: 342, 343, 344-46, 347, 355

Kane, Lt. Col. O'Neill K.: 266-67

Kangleon, Lt. Col. Ruperto: 16-20, 152

Kang Cainto: 266, 266n, 271, 273

Kang Dagit: 266, 269, 271

Kanmonhag: 114

Kansamanda: 111, 122

Kapahuan: 122

Kataoka, Lt. Gen. Tadasu: 208, 324, 366

Kelley, Pvt. Ova A.: 304, 304n

Kenney, Lt. Gen. George C.: 23, 24-26, 27. See

also Allied Air Forces.

Kilay, Henry: 231, 231n

Kilay Ridge: 218, 223, 356

battle of: 225-35

Kiling: 117, 121-23

King, Admiral Ernest J.: 1n

on bypassing Philippines: 4-5

at Quebec Conference, September 1944: 9

and strategy conference in Hawaii, July 1944: 6

King, Maj. F. Raymond: 155

KING Two: 39. See also Leyte Campaign; Sixth

Army.

Kinkaid, Vice Adm. Thomas C..: 58, 90, 91. See

also Allied Naval Forces.

and amphibious operations in Palompon area:

349

commands of: 23, 24, 26, 28

and plans for Ormoc operation: 276, 291

and plans for Seventh Fleet operations: 28-30

and supply of XXIV Corps: 312

Koiso, Kuniaki: 46

Kompisao: 362

Krueger, Lt. Gen. Walter: 37, 38, 102, 145, 183,

237, 351, 361. See also Sixth Army.

assumes command ashore: 78-80

on Campaign: 244-50

and civil affairs in Philippines: 199

commands of: 23, 24, 26

and construction of airfields: 307

and construction of roads: 308

and drive on Ormoc: 221-23, 227

on effect of terrain on Campaign: 184

on 1st Division: 325n

forms Area Allocation Group: 189

and Guerrillas: 204

on Japanese resistance on Leyte: 33

on lack of airfields: 188

and Leyte airfields: 296, 303

and line of command: 244

and logistics: 191-92

and Ormoc Valley operations: 313, 325

plans for capture of Leyte Valley: 107

and plans for Leyte Campaign: 31-32, 33-34,

36-37, 39, 62, 86

and rear area security: 235

and strength of Sixth Army: 221-23

and supply problems: 312

tactical plans of: 206, 209, 210, 217-18, 243,

253, 254, 263, 275-77, 291, 293, 329, 333, 336,

349

and tactics in northern Leyte Valley: 168

transfers units to Eighth Army: 361

and XXIV Corps mission: 107

Kumazawa, Comdr. Kazumasa: 124

Kurile Islands: 46

Kurita, Vice Adm. Takeo: 89, 90-92

Kuroda, Lt. Gen. Shigenori: 94. See also Japanese

Army units, Armies, 14th Area.

command of: 46

on effect of Allied air superiority: 49

on Imperial General Headquarters concept of

defense of Philippines: 49-50
408 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Kuroda, Lt. Gen. Shigenori—Continued

on negotiated peace with Allies in October 1944:

49

and plans to defend Philippines: 49

relieved of command: 50-51

Kwajalein: 26

Labir Hill: 114, 119, 120

Labiranan Head: 74, 104, 119

description of: 72

operations at: 107-09

Labiranan River: 72, 74, 76, 104, 107, 108

Laffey: 283

Landing beaches

Blue: 72-75, 83

bombardment of: 30, 33, 59, 60, 61-62

choice of: 34

clearing of: 30

condition of: 34, 58

description of: 80-82

Dulag: 33

intelligence on: 21

Japanese defense of: 74-75

Labiranan: 33

Marasbaras: 33

Orange: 72-74, 107

Palo: 33

Panaon Strait: 33

Pawing, 33

Red: 62, 67-72, 82 on San Pedro Bay: 11

X Corps area: 33

XXIV Corps area: 33, 72

and underwater obstacles: 57

Violet: 76, 78

White: 62-67, 82-83, 306

White I: 279

White II: 279

Yellow: 76-77, 78

Landing craft: 11-12, 41, 54-55, 72-73, 76

APH's: 194

LCI's: 42, 61-62, 63, 74, 153-55, 283, 283n, 310, 312

LCI(R)'s: 61-62, 279, 283

LCM's: 82, 291, 310, 311, 349, 357

LCM(R)'s: 291

LCT's: 52

LCV's: 291

LCVP's: 61

PCE(R)'s: 194

loss of, in landing operations: 68

Landing operations. See Amphibious operations.

Landrum, Lt. Col. James E.: 349

La Paz: 153-55, 174

Lapdok: 172

Lateral liaison

1st Cavalry Division-24th Division: 185, 210

5th Cavalry-34th Infantry: 157, 181

Lateral liaison—Continued

X Corps-XXIV Corps: 112, 165, 172

17th Infantry-184th Infantry: 131

17th Infantry-382d Infantry: 114

19th Infantry-8th Cavalry: 173

19th Infantry-34th Infantry: 171, 173, 229-30

32d Infantry-184th Infantry: 127-28, 129, 131

112th Cavalry-32d Division: 238

112th Cavalry-126th Infantry: 238-39

184th Infantry-77th Division: 293

Laurel, Jose: 13

LCI's: 42, 61-62, 63, 74, 153-55, 283, 283n, 310,

312

LCI(R)'s: 61-62 279, 283

LCM's: 82, 291, 310, 311, 349, 357

LCM(R)'s: 291

LCT's: 42

LCVP's: 61

Leaf, Col. William N.: 191

Leahy, Admiral William D.: 1n, 6, 9

Lewis, Maj. Joseph R.: 123

Leyte: 1, 10, 21, 22

Allied plans for operations on: 23-34

Army relations with Filipino civilians: 200-204

civil affairs: 198-200

culture of: 13-14, 18

description of: 10-13, 22, 35-36

guerrillas on. See Guerrilla movement.

importance of: 3, 10

Japanese occupation of: 13-14, 17-18

maps of: 21

population of: 13, 14

Leyte Area Command (guerrilla): 17, 19-20

Leyte Bay: 34, 228, 356

Leyte Campaign

air support for: 27-28

effect on Luzon operation: 102

field orders issued for: 41

forces for: 24-26

logistical support for: 36-37

naval support for: 28-31

Nimitz considers advisability of: 4

plans for: 7-9, 23-34

prerequisites for: 24

purpose of: 1, 6, 7, 8, 28, 32-33, 35

results of: 368-70

shipping for: 38-39

Sixth Army plan for: 35

and strategy conference in Hawaii, July 1944:

5-6

target date for: 6-9, 23-24, 39

Leyte Gulf: 1, 6, 11, 12, 53, 107, 153, 280. See also

Battle of Leyte Gulf.

on A Day: 60

air support of operations in: 27

assault convoy in: 58-58

ground forces of operations in: 31—32

importance of: 3, 7, 11
INDEX 409

Leyte Gulf—Continued

mines in: 57

operations in: 34, 54-57

plans for operations in: 23-24, 30, 31-32, 45

weather conditions in, A Day: 42

Leyte River: 211, 224-25, 238-39, 325, 342

Leyte Valley: 1, 23, 33-34, 72

description of: 11, 35, 67, 104

estimate of enemy defense in: 24

importance of: 11-13

mopping-up operations in: 206

operations in: 107-23, 124-45, 146-67, 168-83

rear area security in: 210, 218, 222, 223, 235,

241-43

road conditions in: 11

Liaison, lateral. See Lateral liaison.

Liberty ships: 37

Libongao: 329, 330, 334, 336-38, 345, 347, 362,

363

Liloan: 330-31, 367

Limon: 181, 208, 209, 211, 213, 216, 217, 218,

219, 220, 223-25, 228, 230, 232, 235, 237-

38, 243, 275, 323-25, 328, 340, 355-56

Linao: 318, 319

Lines of communication, Japanese: 46, 294

Lines of communication, U.S.: 1-2, 18-20, 256-59

List, Lt. Col. Edwin O.: 108

Logic, Col. Marc J.: 76, 128-29, 133

Logistics. See also Supply operations.

A-Day unloading operations: 80-84

airfield construction: 185-90, 204-05

base construction: 188-90, 204-05

bases on Leyte: 1, 6, 7

plan, Ely recommendation on: 35-36

plans for Leyte operation: 35-37

problems of: 306-12

resources in SWPA, June 1944: 3

road construction: 184-85

shipping for Leyte operation: 38-39

and Sixth Army Service Command: 26

and SOS SWPA: 26

supplies for Filipinos: 203-04

supply of troops: 190-92, 195-98

traffic control: 185

Lonoy, operations in area of: 325, 326-28, 342-44,

355

Look: 351-52, 354

LSD's: 42

LSM's: 38, 80, 82, 279, 283, 283n, 310-11

LST's: 28, 37, 38, 41-42, 68, 69, 74, 80, 82, 83,

190, 194, 279-80

Lubi: 313

"Lure of the Streamlined Bait": 44

Luzon: 1, 10, 19, 23, 90, 91, 94, 175, 208

air attacks on: 27, 44-45

air supremacy over: 8

as area of main defense in Philippines: 85

Luzon—Continued

discussed at strategy conference in Hawaii, July

1944: 6

effect of Leyte Campaign on operations on: 102

estimated Japanese strength on: 22

and Japanese plans: 49, 103

MacArthur on occupation of: 4

naval bombardment of, planned: 30

neutralization of Japanese strength on: 1, 6

operations on: 306

plans for occupation of: 6

submarine operations against: 31

tactical plans for: 276

target date for occupation of, set by JCS: 9

LVT's: 74, 83, 112, 227, 228, 235, 291, 333, 350,

357-58

Macalpe: 172

Macanip: 178

MacArthur, General Douglas: 6, 9, 23, 24, 27, 30,

31, 36, 37, 58, 84, 94, 96, 184, 303, 307

to attack along north coast of New Guinea: 2

and civil affairs in Philippines: 198-200

directed by JCS to carry out Leyte Campaign: 8

gives timetable for future operations, August

1944: 7

and guerrilla movement in Philippines: 16-20

on Japanese air defenses for Leyte: 42

on Japanese casualties in Ormoc area: 283

on JCS tentative plans of June 1944: 3-4

on Leyte: 244

and Leyte Campaign: 1-2, 3, 6, 9, 23, 24, 26,

27, 31, 34, 35, 37, 38

on Leyte Campaign: 361

in line of command: 24

orders Eighth Army to relieve Sixth Army: 361

and plans for Ormoc operation: 276-77

and recapture of Philippines: 2

at strategy conference in Brisbane, August 1944: 7

at strategy conference in Hawaii, July 1944: 5-6

Supreme Commander, SWPA: 1-2, 23, 24

at Tacloban: 152

Machine guns, U. S. See Guns, U.S., Machine.

Mahan: 283

Mahonag: 322

Mainit River: 170-71, 173, 175n, 177

Makassar Strait: 31, 96

Makino, Lt. Gen. Shiro: 104, 107, 145, 172, 295-96,

366

alerts 16th Division: 53

command of: 52

and defenses on Red Beach: 67

and deployment of 16th Division: 124, 131

and fortifications on Hill 522: 70

and Leyte airfields: 298

and tactical plans for 16th Division: 52-53

tactics for defense of Leyte: 111
410 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Malay Archipelago: 10

Malaya: 28

Malie, Sgt. D.: 19n

Malirong: 169

Malirong River: 169

Mamula, 2d Lt. Rudolph: 302-03

Manchuria: 50, 208

Mandated islands. See Japanese mandated islands.

Manila: 10, 46, 51, 54, 88, 101, 103, 208, 254, 294

Manus: 28, 38, 40, 41, 57, 277

Maps

accuracy of: 21, 215, 216, 228, 250, 325

distributed to Headquarters, XXIV Corps: 41

Marabang River: 307. See also Daguitan River.

Marasbaras: 33, 34, 62, 165

Mariana Islands: 2, 24

Marine Division, 1st: 38

Marine units

5th 155-mm. Howitzer Battalion: 256n

11th 115-mm. Gun Battalion: 256, 256n, 257,

259

Marshall, General George C.: 1n, 9

at Quebec Conference, September 1944: 9

on recapture of Philippines: 4

receives Pacific timetable from MacArthur: 7-8

and strategy conference in Hawaii, July 1944:

5-6

Martin, Charlotte: 17n

Maryland: 30, 60

Matagob: 314, 332, 338, 351-53, 359, 362, 364

Mathias, Maj. Leigh H.: 129, 135

Mati: 111

May, Col. Edwin T. See also 383d Infantry Regiment.

and battle training for 383d Infantry: 114-15

at Catmon Hill: 118-19

command of: 74, 107

and operations at Catmon Hill: 110-111

Maya: 90

McCray, Lt. Col. James O.: 117-18

McWhorter, Pfc. William A.: 325n

Mecham, Lt. Col. Jesse W.: 122-23

Medals. See by name.

Medals of Honor

Benjamin, Pfc. George, Jr., 339n

Brostrom, Pfc. Leonard C.: 143n

Fryar, Pvt. Elmer E.: 322n

Johnson, Sgt. Leroy: 339-40

Kelley, Pvt. Ova A.: 304n

McWhorter, Pfc. William A.: 325n

Moon, Pvt. Harold H., Jr.: 158-59, 159n

Mower, Sgt. Charles E.: 207

Nett, Capt. Robert B.: 320

Thorson, Pfc. John F.: 143n

Vlug, Pfc. Dick J.: 339-40

Medical Battalions

302d: 350n

321st: 121n

Medical operations

evacuation of casualties: 112, 140, 161, 164,

189-90, 192-94, 198

for Filipinos: 201, 203-04

supply: 36-37, 38, 195-98

treatment: 195

Medical units, Japanese: 52

Medical units, U.S.: 192-94. See also Medical

Battalions.

Medium tanks. See Tanks, medium.

Military Intelligence Section, GHQ SWPA: 18

Mindanao: 9, 10, 11, 20, 52, 94, 96, 103, 243, 284,

366

air attacks on: 8, 42, 45

as base for 4th Air Army: 53

bases to be established on: 23

estimate of Japanese strength on: 22

guerrillas on: 16

naval bombardment of, planned: 30-31

neutralization of: 7

operations on, canceled: 23

plans for seizure of: 2-3, 6

Suzu plan for defense of: 52

target dates for: 23

Mindanao Sea: 62

Mindoro: 90, 276, 277, 279, 306, 362

Mine charts, Japanese: 31, 55

Mine sweepers, U.S.: 24, 42, 54, 58

mission of: 32-33

operations of: 27, 28-30, 40, 57-58

in Ormoc operation: 280

Mines, Japanese

antitank: 133

land: 121, 122, 137, 164, 207

magnetic: 213

Mines, U. S.

land: 257

naval: 30, 57, 58, 67

Miranda, Brig. Gen. Blas E.: 16-17, 16n

Mississippi: 29, 60

Mitscher, Vice Adm. Marc.: 24, 42, 90. See also

Fast Carrier Task Force.

Mitsui, Col.: 284, 287

Moon, Pvt. Harold H., Jr.: 153-59, 159n

Moore, Lt. Col. William B.: 142

Mopping-up operations: 237

after Campaign: 365

in Dagami area: 240, 241-43

Morale, Filipino: 20

Morale, Japanese: 49-50, 93-94, 103

Morale, U.S.: 245-46, 247-48

Morison, Capt. Samuel Eliot, USNR: 5n

Morotai Island: 8, 9, 34, 94

air support of operations on: 42

as base for air support of Leyte Campaign: 45

plans for capture of: 4, 7

security of, prerequisite to Leyte Campaign: 24

Mortar flotillas: 24
INDEX 411

Mortars, Japanese: 77

50-mm: 122

90-mm.: 233

air attacks on: 93

use of: 68, 69, 74, 77, 108, 117, 212

Mortars, U.S.

4.2-inch: 30, 165, 171, 240

4.2-inch chemical: 71, 139, 161, 248

60-mm.: 170, 240, 248, 262

81-mm.: 68, 139, 163, 171, 248, 262, 265, 303

on LCI's: 61-62

use of: 75, 108, 112, 117, 128, 158-59, 160, 166, 207, 318

Motor torpedo boats, Japanese: 22

Motor torpedo boats, U.S.: 90, 91, 101, 349, 366

Mottlet, Pvt. Harold O.: 170n

Mower, Sgt. Charles E.: 207

Mt. Alto: 298

Mt. Badian: 342

Mt. Cabungaan: 342-43

Mt. Canguipot: 360

Mt. Majunag: 365

Mt. Mamban: 217

Mt. Minoro: 237

Mt. Pina: 242

Mucci, Lt. Col. Henry A.: 54

Mudburon River: 170

Mudge, Maj. Gen. Verne D.: 63, 67, 148, 174, 181,

210, 235, 237, 345. See also Cavalry Division,

1st.

Muto, Lt. Gen. Akira: 51

Naga River: 228

Nakamaru, Pvt. Isamu: 135

Native labor. See also Filipinos.

plans for use of: 35

recruiting of: 150-51, 201, 204

use of: 111, 112, 185, 192, 194

Naval Attack Force: 24. See also Seventh Fleet,

U. S.

Naval bases: 6, 23, 62

Naval bombardment: 161

A Day: 80

of Catmon Hill: 119

close support: 146, 159, 281, 283

of Dingat Island: 55

effect of: 124

effect of, on Japanese defenses: 104

of friendly troops: 108

of Homonhon Island: 55

on Labiranan Head: 107—08

of Leyte: 58-62, 70, 75

plans for: 28-30, 33

of Suluan Island: 54

Naval forces, Japanese. See Japanese naval units.

Naval support: 30, 60, 276, 279

Naval losses, Japanese: 90-91, 92, 96

Naval losses, U.S.: 68, 91-92

Negros: 27, 45, 90, 96, 363, 366, 367

Nelson, Lt. Col. Glenn A.: 256, 258

Netherlands Indies: 2, 10, 28, 46, 294

Netherlands New Guinea: 46. See also New Guinea.

Nett, Capt. Robert B.: 320

New Caledonia: 277

New Georgia: 26

New Guinea: 2, 3, 9, 26-27, 28, 37, 42, 46, 53, 294

Newman, Col. Aubrey S.: 68, 161, 173, 174, 176

Night perimeters

appraisal of: 247

attacks on: 112, 127-28, 258-60

defense of: 158-59

Nimitz, Admiral Chester W.: 6, 8, 9, 27. See also

Pacific Ocean Area.

command of: 2, 24

and control of 77th Division: 276-77

on JCS tentative plans of June 1944: 3-4

in line of command: 24

and plans for Leyte operation: 8-9, 24-26, 30,

31, 37-38

at strategy conference in Hawaii, July 1944: 5-6

Nishimura, Vice Adm. Shoji: 89-91

Nishimura, Maj. Gen. Toshio: 51, 101-02

Noemfoor: 94, 96

Northern Attack Force: 24, 45, 60-62. See also VII

Amphibious Force; Task Force 78.

Oahu: 40

O'Brien: 283n

Ohmae, Capt. Toshikazu: 53-54

Okabayashi, Col. Junkichi: 208n, 246

Okinawa: 27

Oldendorf, Rear Adm. Jesse B.: 28, 30, 57, 91.

See also Bombardment and fire support group.

O'Neill, 2d Lt. Owen R.: 118

Operations Instructions 70: 27

OP Hill: 211-12, 215-16, 219, 220

Orange Beach. See Landing beaches, Orange.

Ormoc: 12-13, 34, 92, 93, 94, 98-99, 104, 145, 146,

175-76, 206, 208, 209, 210-11, 216, 217, 235,

243, 254, 273, 296, 305, 312. See also Ormoc

Valley.

advance on: 218, 280-93

bombed: 212

estimate of enemy defenses around: 23

Japanese reinforcements arrive at: 99-102, 254

operations in area of: 313-28, 334, 336, 349-50,

354, 356

plans for drive on: 221-23, 253, 254-55, 263-64,

266, 275-80

shelling of: 256

30th Army headquarters moved to: 59

Ormoc Bay: 11, 12, 34, 98-99, 101, 104, 183, 206,

218, 223, 240, 253, 273, 275, 276, 277-84,

296, 305, 314, 318, 322

Ormoc Valley: 11, 34, 98, 146, 176, 305, 362

description of: 12
412 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Ormoc Valley—Continued

importance of: 12

Japanese tactical plans for: 208, 217

operations in: 222, 227, 313-28, 329-46

U.S. tactical plans for: 206, 209, 217-18

Osmena, President Sergio: 41, 152

O'Sullivan, Col. Curtis D.: 76, 264, 266, 268

Outerbridge, Comdr. W. W.: 283n

Ozawa, Vice Adm. Jisabuto: 70, 92

P-38's: 98

P-40's: 280

P-47's: 280, 281

Pachler, Lt. Col. Francis T.: 138, 139, 271

Pacific Fleet, U.S.: 1

Pacific Ocean Areas: 2, 24, 38

Palanas River: 255, 257, 258, 260, 266, 267-68,

269-71, 273

Palaus: 7, 8, 21, 24, 27, 37, 38, 42, 57

Palawan Island: 89-90

Palo: 12, 34, 67, 72, 78, 107, 111, 146, 157, 166,

167, 190, 243, 308

advance on: 161-63

control of civilians in: 201

defense of: 163-65

importance of: 163

Japanese defenses at: 161

plans to take area of: 33, 62, 67, 69-70

Palo River: 67, 161-63

Palompon: 11, 12, 98, 101, 314, 318, 329, 332,

359, 361, 362, 365

operations in area of: 336-39, 345, 346, 347-54

Panalian Point: 288

Panalian River: 287

Panaon Strait: 24, 32-33, 34, 45, 62, 78, 145, 168,

183, 192, 206, 256, 264

Panay: 16, 45, 52, 94, 175, 208

Panilahan River: 277, 286, 288, 290

Papua: 2, 26-27

Paravanes: 58

Parsons, Lt. Comdr. Charles: 16, 21

Pastrana: 168-69, 171-72, 173

Patok: 241, 243

Patrol boats, Japanese: 101

Patrol boats, U.S.: 42

Patrols, Japanese: 17

Patrols, U. S. See also Reconnaissance, U. S.

air: 86

5th Cavalry Regiment: 66

in Ormoc area: 286

probing: 164, 166

security: 155, 161-63

submarine: 31

northern Leyte Valley: 174-75

training of: 114-16

24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop: 230

Pawing: 157-61, 165, 166

PCE(R)'s: 194

Pearl Harbor: 9

Pearsall, Lt. Col. James F., Jr.: 157-61, 169, 170,

173

Peleliu: 38

Pennsylvania: 30

Peralta, Col. Macario: 16

Perkins, Pfc. Warren G.: 304

Pescadores Islands: 89-90

Philippine Academy and General Service School: 16

Philippine Army units

1st Filipino Infantry Regiment: 365

6th Military District: 16

7th Military District: 16

8th Military District: 16

9th Military District: 16

10th Military District: 16

92d Infantry Division: 16-17

94th Infantry Regiment: 18, 257

95th Infantry Regiment: 18

96th Infantry Regiment: 18, 228

Philippine Civil Affairs Units: 35

Philippine Islands: 9, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28

air attacks on: 8, 27-28

air supremacy over: 4

Carney on: 5

civil affairs in: 198-200

description of: 10

guerrillas in. See Guerrilla movement.

importance of: 2, 10

Japanese occupation of: 13, 14

Japanese plans for defense of: 22, 46-54

JCS on bypassing: 3

MacArthur on: 3-4, 6

neutralization of Japanese forces in, prerequisite

to Leyte Campaign: 24

population of: 10

restoration of Civil Government in: 152

and strategy conference in Hawaii, July 1944:

5-6

Pikas: 72, 104, 111-12, 114, 118

Pillboxes, Japanese: 77, 93, 104, 108-09

Pinamopoan: 12, 206-07, 209, 210, 211, 212, 216,

217, 234, 275, 324, 346, 347

Pincers movement. See Tactics, U.S., pincers.

Planning. See Air plans, U.S.; Strategic plans,

U.S.; Tactical plans, U. S.

Ports

Baybay: 12

facilities of: 190

Ipil: 101

Ormoc: 12, 23, 92, 94, 98, 99-101, 145, 206, 210,

221, 243, 275, 290

Palompon: 11, 101

San Isidro (west Leyte): 101

Tacloban: 12, 23, 190

Takao, Formosa: 43

Postlethwait, Lt. Col. Edward M.: 173, 176
INDEX 413

Presidential citation, of 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry: 225-27

President of the United States. See Roosevelt, President Franklin D.

Prisoners of war, Japanese: 18, 114, 117, 250

Provisional Mountain Force: 354. See also Infantry

Battalions, 2d, 305th Regiment.

PT boats. See Motor torpedo boats, U.S.

Quebec Conference: 9

Quezon, President Manuel Luis: 17n, 199

Quinto, 2d. Lt. E. F.: 19n

Radios. See Communications, radio.

Rangers. See Infantry Battalions, 6th Ranger.

Rangoon: 46

Rations: 36, 38, 80, 83, 111, 112

Raymond: 188

Rear area security, Leyte Valley: 210, 218, 222,

223, 235, 241-43

Reconnaissance: 66

aerial: 27, 42, 45, 140, 239, 348

armored: 351

by 1st Cavalry Brigade: 63

by 1st Cavalry Division: 343

in force: 117-18

ground: 67, 111-12, 114-16, 118, 131, 136, 165,

172, 174, 179, 181, 211, 229-30, 231, 238, 318, 319, 320, 320n

in Hill 522 area: 71

Krueger on: 250

mechanized: 137, 138, 142, 164, 173

motorized: 112, 207, 211

naval air: 90-91

overwater: 153-55, 266-67

submarine: 31

by underwater demolition teams: 57—58

Red Beach. See Landing beaches, Red.

Regimental combat teams. See 112th Cavalry Regiment.

Regiments. See Airborne Regiments; Cavalry Regiments; Infantry Regiments.

Reinforcements, Japanese: 176, 208-09, 217

effect of Sixth Army success on: 62

for Formosa: 54

intelligence on: 22, 24

for Kurile Islands: 46

for Leyte: 14, 17, 21, 59, 86, 88, 92, 93-94, 99,

103-04

at Limon: 225

at Ormoc: 99-102, 254

in Ormoc Valley: 317-18

in Pacific: 46

for Philippines: 49

policy on: 49

prevention of: 30, 150, 151

for Ryukyus: 46

TA Operation: 99-102

Reinforcements, Japanese—Continued

Terauchi on: 221

Reinforcements, U.S.: 31-32, 34, 221-23, 253

Rescue operations: 31, 35

Resistance movement, Philippines. See Guerrilla

movement.

Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C.: 5n

Ridge Number 2: 228, 230-31

Ridge Number 3: 230

Rifles. See Weapons, U.S., Browning automatic

rifles.

Ritchie, Col. William L.: 7

River crossing operations: 140—41

Rivers

Antilao: 293, 315-16, 318

Bagonbon: 279, 285, 286

Bao: 330

Binahaan: 112, 144, 164, 172, 178, 179

Bito: 114, 298, 302

Boad: 279, 285, 286, 287, 289, 290

Bucan: 258, 260, 268

Burayan: 65

Calbasag: 72, 76, 104, 130, 131, 145

Calingatngan: 266

Canomontag: 181

Carigara: 181, 210

Daguitan: 76, 78, 104-07, 127, 131, 145, 307

Diit: 150, 174

effect of, on construction program: 35

Ginagan: 178

Guinarona: 111-12, 114, 116, 118-19

Labiranan: 72, 74, 76, 104, 107, 108

Leyte: 211, 224-25, 238-39, 325, 342

Mainit: 170-71, 173, 175n, 177

Malirong: 169

Marabang: 307. See also Daguitan.

Mudburon: 170

Naga: 228

Palanas: 255, 257, 258, 260, 266, 267-68,

269-71, 273

Palo: 67, 161-63

Panilahan: 277, 286, 287-88, 290

Silaga: 153, 157

Tabgas: 266, 267, 270, 271, 273

Talisay: 76

Talisayan: 266, 273, 323

Togbong: 336, 338, 349, 351-52

Yapan: 178

Rizal: 131, 172, 280, 297

Roadblocks. See Tactics, Japanese, roadblock;

Tactics, U.S., roadblock.

Roads

Abuyog-Baybay: 12, 144-45, 218, 253, 254, 273,

311

Baybay-Damulaan: 256

Baybay—Ormoc: 12

Burauen-Dagami: 121, 124-27, 131, 133, 137,

138, 145, 243, 296, 303-04
414 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Roads—Continued

condition of: 11, 12, 35-36, 97, 112, 124

construction of: 35, 184-85, 204, 308

Dagami-Tanauan: 107, 111, 121, 122, 123, 124,

131

Dagami-Tingib: 111

Dulag-Burauen: 33, 78, 107, 111, 124-33, 145,

308

Highway 1: 33, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72,

74-75, 77-78, 104, 107, 109, 112, 121, 127,

144, 153, 155, 157-58, 163, 164, 185

Highway 2: 67, 146, 163, 165, 166, 167, 168-70,

175-76, 206, 208-09, 210, 211, 213, 216, 218,

219, 223-25, 227, 235, 237, 253, 266, 276,

279, 285, 292, 315-16, 317-19, 320, 323-26,

329-30, 331-36, 338, 339, 340, 342, 343, 344,

345-46, 347, 352, 355, 365

Jaro-Carigara: 176-80, 208, 210

Jaro-Palo: 243

Ormoc-Carigara: 12, 93

Ormoc-Limon: 208-16

Ormoc-Linao: 319

Ormoc-Valencia: 99

Palo-Carigara: 157

Palompon: 347-54

Palompon-Highway 2: 336-39, 345, 362-63

in Red Beach area: 82

San Jose-Valencia: 334

Tambuco-Dolores: 333, 335

Roberts, Brig. Gen. Frank N.: 7

Robinson, Pfc. Frank B.: 69, 69n

Rocket launchers: 30, 69

Rocket launching craft: 10, 62

Roosevelt, President Franklin D.: 5, 5n

and civil affairs in Philippines: 199

on landing on Leyte: 84

and Osmena: 41

at strategy conference in Hawaii, July 1944: 5-6

Royal Australian Air Force: 26, 28

Ryukyu Islands: 43, 46, 54

Sagkanan: 179, 181

Saipan: 3, 46

Saito, Col. Jiro: 254, 257, 262

Samar: 10, 11, 12, 21, 91, 146, 361, 365

air attacks on: 45

bases to be established in: 23

control of: 6

operations on: 153-57, 174, 223

plan to secure: 24

as point of entry: 10

under Japanese occupation: 14

Samar Sea: 153

San Bernardino Strait: 45, 89, 90-91

San Francisco: 38

San Isidro (northwest Leyte) : 356-58

San Isidro (west Leyte) : 101, 153

San Isidro Bay: 356, 357

San Joaquin: 164

San Jose (cast Leyte) : 62, 65, 67, 72, 74, 76, 78

San Jose (northwest Leyte) : 331, 334, 349, 350

San Jose Ricardo. See San Jose (east Leyte).

San Juanico Strait: 12, 62, 150, 167, 183, 210

description of: 153

importance of: 146, 153

plan to secure: 24, 33

securing: 152-57

San Miguel: 173, 174, 175, 351-52, 354

San Pablo: 12, 131

airfield: 124, 132-34, 135, 188, 295, 296, 300-

303

San Pedro Bay: 11-12, 62, 146, 155, 208, 280, 283

San Ricardo: 308. See also San Jose (east Leyte).

San Roque: 33, 107, 109, 120, 122

San Vicente: 104, 114, 117, 119

San Vicente Hill: 115, 117-19

San Victor: 114-15

Santa Cruz: 150, 175

Santa Fe: 169, 171, 173

Sarangani Bay: 3, 4, 6-8, 9, 50, 52

Sarmi: 26

Sasebo: 31

Scanlon, Brig. Gen. Martin F.: 93n

Schofield Barracks, Oahu: 40

Seeadler Harbor: 277

Service Command, Sixth Army. See Sixth Army

Service Command.

Service ships: 42

Services of Supply, SWPA: 23, 26, 37

Services of Supply, USA: 35

VII Amphibious Force: 28, 33, 38, 40, 80

Seventh Fleet, U.S.: 21, 24-26, 28-30, 33, 96

close support by: 130, 159, 161

command of: 28, 90

composition of: 28, 90

effect of air strikes by: 93

effect of Battle of Leyte Gulf on: 209

and medical support of Sixth Army: 194

missions of: 28, 31, 45, 90

operations of, 90, 91

rendezvous with III Amphibious Force: 41

requests aerial reconnaissance: 45

results of air attacks by: 45

Shanghai: 86, 208

Shima, Vice Adm. Kiyohide: 89, 91

Shipping, Japanese

attacks on: 8, 27, 30, 43, 45, 96, 98, 99-102,

281, 294

effect of attacks on: 45-46

for reinforcement of Leyte forces: 99-102

Shipping, U. S.

air attacks on: 86, 88, 93, 114, 190, 192

availability of: 7

for Campaign: 7-8, 31, 37-39

cargo: 38, 41

MacArthur on availability of: 4
INDEX 415

Shipping, U.S.—Continued

MacArthur's control of: 38

for Ormoc operation: 276

shortage of: 6, 34, 38

troop: 34, 38, 40-41

SHO ICHI GO (Victory Operation Number One):

46, 103

SHO (Victory) Operations: 46, 88

Shoestring Ridge: 273

battle of: 257-65

defenses at: 256, 257

description of: 255-56

Shore, Lt. Col. Mayers: 155

Shortages

of aircraft: 92, 99, 209, 223

of ammunition: 231-33

of labor troops: 188

of naval forces: 223

of rations: 111, 112, 228

of shipping: 316

of tanks: 316

of troops: 32, 253

Sibert, Lt. Gen. Franklin C.: 165, 174, 211. See

also X Corps.

assumes command ashore: 78-80

at Breakneck Ridge: 213

and civil affairs on Leyte: 199, 201

command of: 26

and drive on Ormoc: 223, 227

tactical plans of: 175, 180, 206, 209-10, 211,

218, 223, 230, 342-43

Signal Battalion, 8th Aviation: 305

Signal companies, assault: 26

Silaga River: 153, 157

Silver Star, to Grove, Pfc. Kenneth W.: 148, 148n

Simons, Capt. Arthur D.: 55

Singapore: 22, 46, 51, 54

Sixth Army: 21-22, 26, 28, 34, 36, 84, 91, 94. See

also Infantry Divisions, U.S.; Infantry Regiments, U.S.; Krueger, Lt. Gen. Walter.

and ALAMO Force: 23, 26

on Battle of Leyte Gulf: 92

combat experience of: 26-27

composition of: 26, 34, 36

effect of success of: 62

at end of A Day: 78-80, 107

logistical problems of: 184-92

MacArthur orders SOS SWPA to supply: 37

missions of: 23, 34, 35, 62

releases the 381st Infantry to XXIV Corps: 119

relief of: 361

and shipping schedule for Campaign: 38

strength of: 26

tactical plans for: 206, 209, 217-18

target date confirmed by: 39

transportation officer for: 38

Sixth Army Headquarters. See Headquarters, Sixth

Army.

Sixth Army Reserve: 34, 76. See also 77th Infantry

Division; 32d Infantry Division.

Sixth Army Service Command: 36

command of: 35

confirms target date: 39

at Hollandia: 40

MacArthur creates: 35

mission of: 26, 35

operations on Leyte: 184-204

6th Ranger Infantry Battalion. See Infantry Battalions, 6th Ranger.

Smith, Col. Aubrey D.: 285, 291

Smith, Maj. Leonard E.: 155

Smoke screens. See Tactics, U.S., smoke.

Sogod Bay: 33, 34, 62, 78

Soliman, Maj. Marcos G.: 17

Southeast Asia Command: 28

Southern Attack Force: 45, 60-62, 72. See also

Task Force 79; III Amphibious Force.

Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) : 1, 23, 31, 35

MacArthur commander of: 23

missions of, in Leyte Campaign: 23-24

and shipping for Leyte Campaign: 38

and use of garrison forces: 3 7

Southwest Pacific Forces: 28

Spragins, Lt. Col. Robert B.: 167, 215, 216

Sprague, Rear Adm. Clifton A. F.: 91-92

Squadrons, air: 35

Squadrons, Cavalry. See Cavalry Squadrons.

Stadler, Col. John H.: 346

Stilwell, General Joseph W.: 8

Strafing. See Tactics, U.S., Strafing.

Strategic bombing. See Air attacks; Air support,

strategic.

"Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan": 2

Strategic plans, Japanese: 46, 54, 85, 88, 103

Strategic plans, U. S.

conference in Hawaii, July 1944: 5-6

JCS plan for defeat of Japan: 2

for operations in Pacific: 8-9

for operations in Philippines: 1, 3, 6-8, 23-24

prewar, for Pacific: 1

Streett, Maj. Gen. St. Clair: 26

Strength, Japanese

estimate of, in Philippines: 21-23, 24, 93

on Leyte: 8, 103

neutralization of, planned: 1, 6

in Ormoc area: 289

in Ormoc Valley: 313-14

plan to reduce, before invasion: 24

reduced by air attack: 8

Strength, U.S., of Sixth Army: 221-23

Struble, Rear Adm. Arthur D.: 279, 283

Sturgis, Col. Samuel D.: 36

Submarine chasers, Japanese: 101

Submarines, Japanese: 22

Submarines, U.S.: 16, 19, 21, 31, 90, 294, 366

Sugud: 235
416 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Sulu Archipelago: 10

Sulu Sea: 27, 31, 89, 96

Suluan Island: 31, 34, 54-55, 57, 85, 89

Sumatra: 51

Supply, Japanese: 24, 51, 99-102, 240-41

Supply, U.S. See Logistics; Supply operations.

Supply bases, U.S.: 35

construction of, planned: 23, 35

need of, for invasion of Japan: 2

shortage of troops to construct: 36

strategic importance of, in Leyte: 11

Supply dumps, Japanese: 30, 52, 59, 60-61, 93, 151

Supply dumps, U.S.: 80, 82, 83-84, 189

Supply operations, U.S.: 112

airdrop: 228, 232, 235, 356

amphibious: 227, 228, 284

from beachhead: 114

at Breakneck Ridge: 212

effect of terrain on: 111

for guerrilla movement: 19

hand-carry: 228, 229, 233-34, 236

for Leyte Campaign: 35, 36-37

methods: 111, 112, 333, 334-35

in Ormoc Valley: 317

problems: 308-12

Support, naval. See also naval units by name.

for Campaign: 23, 31, 44, 45, 74

direct, of 6th Rangers: 31

for underwater demolition teams: 59

Supreme Commander, SWPA. See MacArthur,

General Douglas.

Surigao: 7

Surigao Strait: 45, 280

and Battle of Leyte Gulf: 89-91

control of: 6

Japanese defenses: 52

mines in: 57

plans to secure: 23—24, 45

target date for: 23

Sutherland, Lt. Gen. Richard K.: 152

Suzu Plan: 52-53, 59. See also Philippines,

Japanese plans to defend; Tactical plans,

Japanese.

Suzuki, Lt. Gen. Sosaku: 225, 273. See also Japanese Army units, Armies, 35th.

command of: 50, 52, 94

death of: 367

on defense of Philippines: 50

disagrees with General Headquarters on air

power: 50

estimates U. S. tactics: 103

headquarters bombed: 212

issues Suzu Plan: 52-53

and Leyte airfields: 294-96, 305, 313, 321-22

ordered to take the offensive: 94

orders 16th Division to defend Leyte: 59

and Ormoc operation: 284

Suzuki, Lt. Gen. Sosaku—Continued

and Ormoc Valley operations: 313-14, 324, 325-

26, 332, 334-35, 336, 337, 338

receives orders on troop deployment: 52

and reinforcements for Leyte: 103-04

tactical plans of: 52, 103-04, 168, 173-76, 181,

208-09, 235, 240, 254, 263, 347, 359

tactics after Leyte Campaign: 361-62, 364-67

Suzuki, Col. Tatsunosuke: 164

Swamps: 11, 72, 83

effect of on operations: 65-66, 74, 75, 76, 110

Swing, Maj. Gen. Joseph M.: 222, 296, 300, 303

See also Airborne Division, 11th.

TA Operations. See Reinforcements, Japanese.

Tabango Bay: 356

Tabgas: 267

Tabgas River: 266, 267, 270, 271, 273

Tabogon: 336

Tabontabon: 107, 111, 114, 115, 122

description of: 115

importance of: 123

Japanese defenses at: 115, 116

operations at: 115-17

Tacloban: 10, 12, 24, 34, 57, 78, 97, 103-04, 107,

151, 153, 155, 165, 176, 189, 198, 203, 208,

235, 308

advance on: 146-50

airfield: 22-23, 63, 65, 67, 72, 86, 146, 168,

185, 187, 188, 190, 294, 300-301, 305, 306

description of: 146

importance of, to Japanese: 23

Japanese air attack on: 86-88

Japanese defenses at: 22, 52

Kuroda on airfields: 49-50

MacArthur at: 152

plans to take area of: 33, 45, 62

port facilities at: 190

Tacloban Valley: 63, 103

Tactical plans, Japanese

appraisal of: 251-52

for Battle of Leyte Gulf: 89

for defense of Ormoc: 284, 287, 290-91

for defense of Philippines: 49-53

for Leyte Campaign: 111,221,275

for Leyte Valley: 168, 175-76, 263

naval, for defense of southwestern Pacific: 54

for Ormoc Valley: 208, 208n, 217, 235, 254,

313-14, 321-22, 323-25, 331-32

to retake airfields: 294-96, 300-301

of Suzuki for Leyte: 103-04

Tactical plans, U. S.

air forces, for Campaign: 27-28

for drive on Ormoc: 206, 209, 217-18, 221,

222-23

ground forces for Campaign: 31-34

at Hill 522: 71

for Leyte Valley: 107
INDEX 417

Tactical plans, U.S.—Continued

naval forces for Campaign: 28-31

for northern Leyte Valley: 146, 168, 174-75,

180-81

for operations on Leyte: 23-34

for Ormoc area: 275-80, 284-85, 313, 315

for Palompon area: 347

of 7th Division: 131-32

for west coast of Leyte: 253, 254-57, 266

Tactics, Japanese

on A Day: 78-80

airborne: 294, 300-301

ambush: 130

antitank: 111, 133

artillery: 252, 257-58

camouflage: 251

at Catmon Hill: 111

counterattack: 69-70, 75-76, 109

deceptive: 151-52, 164, 209

demolition: 252

double envelopment: 158-59

envelopment: 142

flanking: 231

improvisations: 134, 137, 143-44

infiltration: 12,44, 72, 89, 251, 260, 295

mine: 246, 252

offensive: 257

preinvasion estimate of: 22-23

at Red Beach: 68-70

reverse slope: 251, 267

roadblock: 148

sniper: 97

suicide bombing: 88, 275, 276, 283, 369

Tactics, U. S.

airdrop: 228, 232, 235, 310

artillery: 119, 246

blockhouse: 315

against bunkers: 148

at Catmon Hill: 110-11

deceptive: 353

defense in depth: 256

envelopment: 110, 119, 138-39, 207, 215, 218,

220, 246, 330

flanking: 177, 179, 213, 234, 239, 246

frontal assault: 245

improvisations: 69, 188

Indian: 315

infiltration: 239

mopping-up: 237, 240, 241-43, 365

pincers: 33-34

rear area security: 210, 218, 222, 223, 235, 241-

43

roadblock: 74, 83, 155, 157, 171-72

smoke: 119, 121, 241

strafing: 159, 161

tank-infantry: 77, 113-14, 130, 133, 136, 142-43,

178, 246-47, 270

withdrawal: 115, 118, 119, 135

Taglawigan: 357

Takao, Formosa: 43

Talaud Islands: 7-9, 23

Talisay River: 76

Talisayan River: 266, 273, 323

Tambuco: 331, 333

Tanahmerah Bay: 251

Tanauan: 12, 33, 52, 67, 72, 104, 110, 111, 112,

121, 122, 123, 124, 131, 141, 164, 176, 188,

189, 208, 240, 307, 308

Tank barriers, Japanese: 67, 69, 74-75, 77

Tank Battalions

44th: 212, 219

706th: 330, 350n

763d: 109, 113, 121, 121n, 242

767th: 130, 132,141n, 256, 297, 302-03

776th Amphibian: 77, 266-67, 286, 288, 291,

350n

780th Amphibian: 119

Tank Company, 603d: 165, 173

Tank Destroyer Battalion, 632d: 212, 220

Tank destroyers, 96th Division on: 249

Tanks, Japanese: 22, 128

Tanks, U.S.: 69, 133, 280

amphibian: 63, 74, 130

at Buri airfield: 136-37

failure to land: 68

Japanese defenses against: 111, 133

Krueger on: 246-47, 249

light: 120, 155, 242, 243, 333

medium: 65, 77, 129, 139, 340

reconnaissance by: 112, 138—39

use of: 68, 113, 114, 121, 132-33, 170, 178, 213,

219-20

used by Japanese: 138

Tanzola, Col. Vincent J.: 284-85, 289

Tarbuck, Capt. Ray: 60

Target dates

acceleration of, in Pacific in 1944: 7

for air attacks: 27

for all Philippines: 23

for assault convoy: 38

JCS on, June 1944: 3

for Leyte: 4, 6, 8-9, 23-24, 28, 30, 31, 34, 36,

39, 42

for Leyte Campaign, Japanese Finance Minister

on: 44

for Leyte Gulf: 23, 30

for Luzon Campaign: 9

MacArthur's, for 15 September-20 December

1944: 7-8

for Mindanao: 7-8, 23

for Morotai: 4, 7

for naval attacks: 30

for Palaus: 7

for Sarangani Bay: 4, 6

for Talauds: 23
418 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Target dates—Continued

for transfer of responsibilities from ASCOM to

SOS: 35

Targets of opportunity: 60, 119, 170, 216

Tarragona: 277, 280, 297

Task Force, Fast Carrier. See Fast Carrier Task

Force.

Task Forces

38: 42, 43-44, 90. See Fast Carrier Task Force.

77: 24, 41

78: 24, 41

79: 26, 41

Task Group 78.3: 279

Tennessee: 30

X Corps: 31, 37, 67, 74, 78-80, 145, 222. See also

Cavalry Division, 1st; Infantry Divisions, U.S.,

24th, 32d.

A-Day operations of: 62-72

combat experience of: 26

commander of: 26

composition of: 26

confirms target date: 39

deployment of: 210, 235, 275-76

effect of tactics of, on Japanese plans: 324

at end of A Day: 107

juncture with XXIV Corps: 346

landing area of: 33

lateral liaison of: 112, 165, 172

medical support of: 192, 198

missions of: 33-34, 62, 206, 209, 218, 253, 276,

313, 325, 329, 361

mopping-up operations of: 365

operations in northern Leyte Valley: 146-67,

168-83

progress of, in Ormoc Valley: 336, 339, 346

roads in zone of: 185

strength of: 26

supply of: 190

transport for: 28

unloading operations of: 80—83

Terauchi, Field Marshal Count Hisaichi: 46, 221

Terrain. See also geographical and topographical

entries.

Catmon Hill: 104

eastern Leyte: 347, 351-52

effect of, on medical support: 194

effect of, on operations: 65-66, 74, 76, 110-11,

112, 129, 130-31, 133, 152

effect of, on troops: 135

of Hill 522: 70

of Leyte: 10-13

Krueger on effect of, on Campaign: 184

Leyte Valley: 104, 109

in Mahonag area: 319-22

northern Leyte Valley: 168-69

between Ormoc and Leyte Valleys: 235-36, 238

in Ormoc area: 287

in Ormoc Valley: 340

Terrain—Contiued

in Pawing area: 159

of Red Beach: 67

of Shoestring Ridge: 255-56

of Suluan Island: 55

of XXIV Corps landing area: 72

of White Beach: 62-63

Thailand: 10, 46

III Amphibious Force: 9, 28, 33, 40-41

Third Fleet, U.S.: 4, 24, 27, 45, 209. See also

Task Force 38.

air attacks by: 42-43

commander of: 24, 90

composition of: 24, 42, 90

effect of air strikes by: 93

missions of: 9, 23-24, 27, 30-31, 44, 45, 90

operations of: 43-44, 90-91

Thirteenth Air Force, U.S.: 26, 28, 45

XIII Bomber Command, U.S.: 96

Thomas, Capt. Jesse R.: 117, 118

Thompson, 1st Sgt. Francis H.: 241, 241n

Thorson, Pfc. John F.: 143n

Tibur: 355

Tigbao: 110, 111

Tilk, Pfc. George W.: 128

Timor: 46

Tinagan: 264

Tingib: 111, 131, 172, 178, 179

Tipic: 331

Tipolo: 354

Togbong River: 336, 338, 349, 351-52

Tojo, Premier Hideki: 21-22, 46

Toyko: 46, 208

Tokyo Bay: 31

Tokyo Rose: 49

Tologosa: 307

Tolosa: 104, 189, 308

Tomochika, Maj. Gen. Yoshiharu: 347

on condition of the Japanese Army: 358

on defense of Leyte: 94

on 1st Division: 324n-325n

and General Fukue: 363

on Japanese casualties: 368

and Ormoc Valley operations: 313, 314, 314n

on U.S. strategy: 252

Torpedo barges, Japanese: 30

Torpedo boats, Japanese: 101

Torpedo launching ramps, Japanese: 30

Torres, Bernardo, Governor of Leyte: 1

Towns. See by name.

Toyoda, Admiral Soemu: 46, 54, 88-89. See also

Combined Fleet.

Tractor Battalions, Amphibian: 26

536th: 350

718th: 350

728th: 297, 298

826th: 235
INDEX 419

Tractors, amphibian: 65, 75, 130

Trails: See Roads.

Training, Japanese, 24th Division on: 251

Training, U. S.

Krueger on: 247

of 383d Infantry: 114-15

Transportation units, Japanese: 52

Transports, Japanese: 99-102

Transports, U.S.: 41. See also LST's.

attack: 38, 42

George F. Clymer: 41

improper loading of cargo: 80

troop: 38, 40, 54, 55, 76

Ward: 283, 283n

Trenches, Japanese: 67, 70

Troops, shortage of. See Shortages, of troops.

Trucks. See Vehicles, 1⁄4-ton trucks, 21⁄2-ton trucks.

Tuba: 179

Tuktuk: 357

Tunga: 177, 179

Twentieth Air Force: 8, 28

XXIV Corps: 9, 33, 34, 37, 38, 93n, 119, 133, 145,

173, 275. See also Hodge, Maj. Gen. John R.;

Infantry Divisions, U.S., 7th, 96th.

A-Day operations of: 72-76, 107

beachhead secured: 123

civil affairs in area of: 202

combat experience of: 26

commander of: 26

composition of: 26

confirms target date: 39

en route to Leyte: 10-41

in Hawaii: 40

issued field orders: 41

juncture with X Corps: 346

landing area: 33, 80-82

lateral liaison with X Corps: 112, 165, 172

medical support of: 194, 198

missions of: 33-34, 62, 72, 107, 206, 210, 218,

253, 276, 313, 322, 329-30, 361

mopping-up operations of: 365

offered to MacArthur: 9

and operations in Ormoc Valley: 223

ordered to Manus: 41

progress of, in Ormoc Valley, 336, 346

replacements for: 31

results of A-Day operations of: 78—80

roads in zone of: 185

shipping for: 28, 31, 38, 39

strength of: 26

supply for: 36-38

supply problems: 312

unloading operations of: 83-84

zone of action: 124

Typhoons. See Weather conditions, typhoons.

Ulithi, security of, prerequisite to Leyte Campaign:

24

Underwater demolition teams: 24

missions of: 30, 32-33, 57-58

naval support of: 60

operations of: 58

Underwater obstacles: 67

Units of fire, plan for supply of: 36-37

U. S. Army intelligence. See Intelligence, U. S.

U. S. Department of Interior: 198-99

U. S. Fleet: 85

U. S. Navy intelligence. See Intelligence, U. S.

U. S. Pacific Fleet. See Pacific Fleet, U. S.

U. S. Seventh Fleet. See Seventh Fleet, U. S.

U. S. Sixth Army. See Sixth Army, U. S.

U. S. Third Fleet. See Third Fleet, U. S.

U. S. War Department: 36, 198-99

Utap: 151

Valencia: 12, 98-99, 286, 317, 318, 321, 349, 352,

365

airfield: 220, 314

operations in area of: 329-31, 333, 334, 336-37,

338

Valtin, Jan: 213-14, 231n

Vehicles

1⁄4-ton truck: 137, 194

21⁄2-ton truck: 198, 250

M8's: 280

M10's: 280

cargo carrier M29: 249-50

DUKW: 250

one-ton trailer: 250

supply of: 36-37

tank destroyers: 249

tanks. See Tanks.

Weapons carriers: 155

Weasel: 249

Verbeck, Col. William J.: 213-14, 213n, 216, 219

Vigia Point: 121

Villaba: 351, 355, 359-60, 362-63, 367

Villages. See by name.

Villalon: 357

Villamor, Maj. Jesus Antonio: 18-19, 19n

Villamor mission: 19, 19n

Violet Beach. See Landing beaches, Violet.

Visayan Islands: 1, 10, 19, 22, 24, 85, 96, 366

air attacks on: 42

air supremacy over: 7-8

estimate of Japanese strength in: 22

Japanese plans for defense of: 22, 46

neutralization of: 7-8, 30, 45

Suzu Plan for defense of: 52-53

Vlug, Pfc. Dick J.: 339-40

Wakde: 26

War Ministry, Japanese: 50

Ward: 283, 283n
420 LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES

Warning Instructions 5: 27

Weapons, Japanese. See also Artillery, Japanese;

Guns, Japanese; Howitzers, Japanese

Bangalore torpedoes: 133

grenades: 159, 160, 165, 166, 212

satchel charges: 133

Weapons, U.S. See also Guns, U.S.; Howitzers,

U.S.; Mortars, U. S.

appraisal of: 248-49

Browning automatic rifles: 68, 138

flame throwers: 69, 113, 121, 144, 214, 240, 243,

246, 341

grenades: 68, 69, 77, 128, 130, 137, 161, 165

rocket launchers, 2.36-inch: 128, 129, 243

Weather conditions

on A Day: 42, 60, 62

effect of, on air operations: 97-98

effect of, on convoy: 58

effect of, on Japanese air operations: 85-86

effect of, on supply operations: 235

effect of, on troops: 75, 118, 129, 131, 133, 152,

213-14, 215, 219, 231

on Leyte: 11, 21, 35, 185

and mine sweeping operations: 57

monsoons: 11

predicted for time of landing operations: 35

reports of, by submarine: 31

on San Pedro Bay: 11

in 6th Ranger operations: 54, 55

typhoons: 35, 42, 213-14

Weber, Lt. Col. Frederick R.: 211-13, 213n

West Virginia: 30, 60

Whitcomb, Lt. Col. Charles A.: 256, 257

White, Col. H. V.: 21n

White Beach. See Landing beaches, White, White I,

White II.

Whitehead, Maj. Gen. Ennis C.: 26, 293, 304, 333.

See also Fifth Air Force.

Wilkinson, Vice Adm. Theodore S.: 26, 28. See

also Task Force 79.

Withdrawals. See Tactics, U.S., withdrawals.

Woodruff, Maj. Gen. Roscoe B.: 37, 356. See also

Garrison force, U. S.

X Day: 89

Yamashita, General Tomoyuki: 294-96. See also

Japanese Army units, Armies, 14th Area.

activates SHO ICHI GO: 103

command of: 50-51, 93-94

on conditions in 14th Area Army: 50-51

on Leyte Campaign: 221, 364, 370

orders Suzuki on the offensive: 94

and Ormoc Valley operations: 314

replaces Kuroda: 50-51

sends reinforcements to Leyte: 93-94

tactics of, after Leyte Campaign: 361-62

Yap: 8, 9, 27, 31, 37, 38, 41, 83

Yapad: 179

Yapan River: 178

Yellow Beach. See Landing beaches, Yellow.

Yoshie, Lt. Col. Seiichi: 50-51

Young, Capt. Hugh D.: 108-09

Young, Capt. John J.: 258

Ypad: 172

Yuhice, 2d Lt. D. C.: 19n

Zamboanga: 52

Zierath, Lt. Col. Frederick R.: 69, 171-72

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1993 0 - 333-162 : QL 2