NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JENNIFER P.,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, D.D.,

Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 17-0583 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD33054

The Honorable M. Scott McCoy, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

David W. Bell, Attorney at Law, Higley

By David W. Bell

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix

By JoAnn Falgout

Counsel for Appellee DCS

FILED 6-26-2018
JENNIFER P. v. DCS, D.D.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

J O H N S E N, Judge:

¶1 Jennifer P. ("Mother") appeals the superior court's order 

severing her parental rights to her child, arguing that the court erred in 

finding that severance was in her child's best interests. Because substantial 

evidence supports the court's best-interests finding, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother has a long history of abusing various drugs and 

alcohol. In August 2016, the Department of Child Safety ("DCS") received 

a report that Mother was addicted to heroin and other drugs and was 

bringing along her child, then six years old, when she visited her drug 

dealer. DCS filed a dependency petition, alleging that Mother had 

neglected her child because of her substance abuse and mental-health 

issues.1 A drug-treatment center diagnosed Mother with a substance-abuse 

disorder involving heroin and opiate pills. A psychologist who examined 

Mother reported that she displayed attitudes and beliefs that were 

inappropriate for a parent, and he recommended that her child not be 

returned to her care until she demonstrated that she was sober for six 

months to a year. The superior court found the child dependent as to 

Mother in November 2016.

¶3 During the dependency, DCS referred Mother to various 

services, but Mother did not consistently participate in them. After initially 

complying, Mother's participation in group therapy became sporadic. 

Mother missed most of the scheduled drug tests throughout the 

dependency, giving various excuses for missing those tests. In December 

2016, Mother tested positive for oxycodone at a methadone clinic where she 

was receiving treatment. At another methadone clinic, Mother tested 

positive for methamphetamine and opiates other than methadone in 

 

1 DCS also alleged the child was dependent as to his father, and the 

court ultimately severed his parental rights when it severed Mother's. The 

father is not a party to this appeal.
JENNIFER P. v. DCS, D.D.

Decision of the Court

3

January 2017, and she tested positive for methamphetamine again in April 

2017. In August 2017, police arrested Mother for an outstanding warrant 

and found drug paraphernalia in her possession. In September 2017, 

Mother was closed out of drug treatment for lack of compliance. DCS also 

provided Mother with a referral to a parent-aide service, but Mother was 

closed out of that service because of lack of contact. Mother also did not 

consistently take advantage of the opportunity for supervised visits with 

her child.

¶4 After removing the child from Mother's care in 2016, DCS 

placed him with his half-sister and the half-sister's father, where he

remained throughout the dependency. The child formed strong bonds with 

both his half-sister and her father and enjoyed being with them; he also did 

well in school and participated in extracurricular activities. The half-sister's 

father provided a safe and stable home and was willing to adopt the child.

¶5 DCS moved for severance in August 2017 on grounds of 

chronic substance abuse pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") 

section 8-533(B)(3) (2018) and nine months' time in care pursuant to A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B)(8)(a).2 At the close of evidence at the severance hearing on

December 11, 2017, the court stated it would terminate Mother's parental 

rights on both grounds and ordered DCS to file proposed findings of fact 

and conclusions of law. DCS did so, and the court entered a formal order 

incorporating the findings and conclusions.

¶6 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) 

(2018), 12-120.21(A)(1) (2018) and -2101(A)(1) (2018).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Mother does not contest the grounds for severance; she 

argues only that insufficient evidence supported the superior court's 

finding that severance was in the best interests of her child. In particular, 

Mother argues DCS failed to show that her child would affirmatively

benefit from severance or suffer a detriment if severance were denied.

¶8 Termination of parental rights requires clear and convincing 

evidence of a statutory ground set out in § 8-533(B), Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't 

of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12 (2000), and proof by a preponderance 

of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child, see Kent 

 

2 Absent material revision since the relevant date, we cite a statute's 

most current version.
JENNIFER P. v. DCS, D.D.

Decision of the Court

4

K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 41 (2005). Because the superior court "is 

in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the 

credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts," we will affirm an order 

terminating parental rights if it is supported by reasonable evidence. Jordan 

C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009).

¶9 DCS can establish that severance is in the best interests of the 

child "by either showing an affirmative benefit to the child by removal or a 

detriment to the child by continuing in the relationship." See Jesus M. v. 

Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282, ¶ 14 (App. 2002). When the 

superior court severs a parent-child relationship, the court "must include a 

finding as to how the child[] would benefit from a severance or be harmed 

by the continuation of the relationship." Xavier R. v. Joseph R., 230 Ariz. 96, 

99-100, ¶ 11 (App. 2012); see also A.R.S. § 8-538(A) (2018) (order terminating 

parental rights "shall recite the findings on which the order is based"). We 

do not reweigh the evidence and defer to the superior court's factual 

findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. 

Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004). A finding of fact is not clearly 

erroneous unless no reasonable evidence supports it. Id.

¶10 "In combination, the existence of a statutory ground for 

severance and the immediate availability of a suitable adoptive placement 

for the child[] frequently are sufficient to support a severance order." Ariz. 

Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 335, ¶ 8 (App. 2004). In Mary 

Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 50-51, ¶¶ 20-22, we affirmed the superior court's bestinterests finding when the child was in an appropriate adoptive placement

and the mother had a history of substance abuse that rendered her unable 

to parent.

¶11 Here, similar facts dictate the same result. The court 

supported its conclusion that severance would serve the child's best 

interests by finding that "[t]he child is residing in an adoptive placement 

which is meeting all of his needs" and that severance would further the 

adoption, "which would provide the child with permanency and stability."

¶12 The evidence supports the court's findings. Mother's 

caseworker testified the child was in an adoptive placement that was

meeting his needs and he would benefit from the stability of a permanent 

home. The caseworker's testimony was substantial evidence of the

adoptive placement and its attendant affirmative benefits of permanency 

and stability. The substantial evidence of a suitable adoptive placement, 

coupled with Mother's chronic substance abuse, sufficiently supports the 

finding that severance was in her child's best interests.
JENNIFER P. v. DCS, D.D.

Decision of the Court

5

¶13 Mother argues that the superior court did not "give proper 

weight" to other evidence, including excerpts from DCS reports showing 

that Mother and her child expressed love for each other, the child enjoyed 

his visits with Mother and would express sadness when those visits would 

end, and Mother interacted appropriately and positively with the child 

during visits. Mother contends that if the court had properly considered

the totality of circumstances, its only possible reasonable conclusion would 

have been that severance would harm the child more than it would benefit 

him. But we do not reweigh the evidence and will affirm a severance order 

when substantial evidence supports it, as it does here. See Mary Lou C., 207 

Ariz. at 47, ¶ 8.

¶14 Finally, Mother suggests that the superior court misconstrued 

the severance statute as requiring termination when there are grounds for 

severance and the child is in an adoptive placement. She cites no record 

support for this argument, however, and we see none.

CONCLUSION

¶15 Because Mother did not challenge the grounds for severance 

and substantial evidence supports the superior court's finding that 

severance was in the child's best interests, we affirm the order severing

Mother's parental rights.