UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

The Technical Services 

THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT: 

ON BEACHHEAD AND 

BATTLEFRONT 

by 

LidaMayo 

CENTER OF MIliTARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1991 





Foreword

For the fighting man in time of war, the crucible that proves or disproves

his training and his theories is combat with the enemy. So it is too with those

whose milieu is not the drill field but the drawing board, not the staff college but

the proving ground, those who design, develop, and maintain the weapons,

munitions, and vehicles of war. The crucible for the Ordnance Department, like

the individual fighting man, is the battlefield.

In previous volumes in the Ordnance Department subseries of The Technical

Services in the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, historians have told the preliminary stories, the complex, often frustrating saga of

planning munitions for war and of procuring and getting them to the troops

who use them. This, the third and final volume in the subseries, tells the climax

of the Ordnance role in World War II, the story of how the vast armory and its

administrators fared in combat.

In presenting this story of Ordnance in the overseas theaters, Mrs. Mayo has

concentrated logically on Ordnance at the level of the army headquarters, for

from this level munitions and fighting equipment flowed directly to the user.

While giving some attention to all theaters involved in the global story of

Ordnance administration, she has concentrated on the three main theaters as

representative of the problems, the improvisations, the shortcomings, the achievements worldwide.

From the dispatch of the first American observers to embattled Britain in

1941 to the last gunshots on Pacific islands in 1945, it is an exciting story as

befits the vital contribution of the tools of war to success or failure in battle.

Washington, D.C.

17 June 1966

HAL C. PATTISON

Brigadier General, USA

Chief of Military History

vii
The Author

Lida Mayo, a graduate of Randolph-Macon Woman's College, served as

historian with the Military Air Transport Service from 1946 to 1950, when she

joined the Ordnance Historical Branch, becoming its chief in June 1959. In 1962,

when Ordnance historical activities were transferred to the Office of the Chief

of Military History, she became a senior historian on its staff. She contributed

substantially to The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War

(1955), first of the three Ordnance volumes published in this series, and was

coauthor of the second, The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply

(1960). Other published works to her credit are Henry Clay (New York, 1943,

and London, 1944) and Rustics in Rebellion (Chapel Hill, 1950). Her articles

have appeared in American Heritage, Virginia Quarterly Review, Encyclopaedia

Britannica, and numerous professional journals. Mrs. Mayo is presently at work

on another volume in the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR

II: The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany.

viii
Preface

On a July evening in 1942 in the wilds of New Guinea, a sixteen-year-old

native Papuan houseboy named Gibson Duluvina proffered to Australian war

correspondent Osmar White some penetrating remarks on the writing of history.

They illustrate the author's dilemma in planning On Beachhead and Battlefront,

the third and last volume in the Ordnance series.

White, who was Gibson's taubada (master), took the boy along when he

went from Port Moresby far into the interior to cover guerrilla operations against

the Japanese from the wrecked gold mining town of Wau. One evening in an

abandoned cottage overshadowed by a mountain on whose slopes birds of

paradise were feeding, White began to question Gibson about the history of his

tribe. He got nowhere. Gibson remembered an old woman in his village who

had been a girl when the first white man's ship came to Port Moresby, but he did

not think her tales very interesting. Beyond that he knew no history.

"Taubada," he said suddenly, "white people say that they know just what

happened a thousand years ago. Is it true?" White explained that it was all

written down; that history had been written for thousands of years. Gibson was

silent in deep thought. Then he said, "Taubada, I can write." "Yes, Gibson,

I know." He wrote a beautiful copperplate hand taught him in a mission school.

"You write very well."

"Taubada, when I write, it is too hard very much to write the truth. To

write the words is hard, but I could never write all the words to tell all the truth.

To write at all I must make all the things seem easy. Then, when it is written,

it is not all the truth. . . ."1

To write all the words to tell all the truth about Ordnance overseas operations in World War II has been impossible, at least in the confines of one volume.

Therefore I have concentrated on the Mediterranean, European, and Southwest

Pacific theaters, covering the Central Pacific only as background for Okinawa

and omitting entirely, except for passing references, the South Pacific and ChinaBurma-India theaters. Nor have I attempted coverage of Ordnance operations

in Alaska or the Caribbean and Atlantic bases, except for a brief section on early

planning for Iceland. If I had been able to include all overseas theaters and

commands, this might have been a better book; on the other hand, it might

have been a worse one, certainly bulky and probably repetitious, since most of

the Ordnance problems are exemplified in the areas I have covered.

1

 Osmar White, Green Armor (New York: W. W. Norton, 1945), pp. 152-53.

ix
In those areas, the story has been centered in the main around the Ordnance

officer at army level. After corps was relieved of administrative responsibilities

early in the war, support to the combat forces flowed from army. Only from the

point of view of the Ordnance officers of the various armies have I described

Communications Zone Ordnance operations. For more detail on such operations

in the European theater, the reader is referred to Roland G. Ruppenthal's twovolume Logistical Support of the Armies in UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II.

On Beachhead and Battlefront was begun under contract by the Ordnance

Corps with the Bureau of Social Science Research of The American University.

Two years later the Ordnance Corps terminated the contract and transferred

the project to the Historical Branch, Office of the Chief of Ordnance. In the

summer of 1962 when the Office, Chief of Ordnance was abolished, the Office,

Chief of Military History took over project and author. Under all these auspices,

I have been assisted by a number of able people: in the contract phase

by Dr. Stanley L. Falk as junior historian on the project and Dr. Morris R. Short

as administrative assistant; in the Ordnance phase by Mrs. Irene House as

research historian and Mrs. Feril Cummings as administrative assistant; in the

OCMH phase by members of the General Reference Branch, particularly Miss

Hannah Zeidlik. Throughout all phases the exploration of the vast resources of

the World War II Reference Branch, National Archives and Records Service,

Alexandria, Virginia, has been made both profitable and pleasant by the efforts

of Mrs. Caroline Moore, Mrs. Hazel Ward, and above all, Mrs. Lois C. Aldridge,

who has not only been a discerning guide through the maze of records but a

valued adviser and friend. At the Military Records Branch, Federal Records

Center, Mrs. Virginia Nestor has been invariably helpful.

The book was completed under the direction of Brig. Gen. Hal C. Pattison,

Chief of Military History, and Dr. Stetson Conn, Chief Historian, to both of

whom I owe a great deal for wise counsel and unfailing support. Others in

OCMH to whom much is due for careful review of the entire manuscript and

detailed criticisms that have saved the author from many errors of fact and style

are the late Dr. John Miller, jr., Col. Albert W. Jones, Mr. Charles B. MacDonald, and Miss Mary Ann Bacon. The illustrations were selected by Miss

Ruth A. Phillips; the maps prepared by Mr. Billy C. Mossman; and the volume

was shepherded through the editorial process by Mrs. Loretto C. Stevens and

Mrs. Frances R. Burdette. Mrs. Muriel Southwick prepared the index.

Among "Those Who Served" I am grateful to many who read and commented upon all or parts of the manuscript including the wartime Chief of

Ordnance, Lt. Gen. Levin H. Campbell, Jr., the Ordnance officers of First,

Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fifteenth Armies, and the chief

Ordnance officers of the European and Southwest Pacific theaters. Numerous

other participants, both within and outside Ordnance, gave generously of their

time in interviews and made personal papers available.
To Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris I am particularly indebted for a statement

that illustrates how vital was Ordnance support on beachhead and battlefront:

"An army can fight on short rations and with ragged clothes, but when an army

is without ammunition and guns it is no longer an army."

For interpretations made and conclusions drawn, as well as for any errors

of omission or commission, the author alone is responsible.

Washington, D.C. LIDA MAYO

17 June 1966

xi

Contents

Chapter Page

I. TH E MILITARY MISSIONS ............ . 3

The Special Observer Group ........... . 3

Ordnance Plans for Iceland ............ . 7

The Lend-Lease Missions to the Middle East and China ... 9

Initiation Into Coalition Warfare .......... . 15

II. MIDDLE EAST KALEIDOSCOPE .......... . 17

T h e OMET's ................ . 1 8

Militarization ................ . 2 0

The Desert Proving Ground ............ . 23

Applying the Lessons .............. . 33

III. EARLY ARRIVALS IN AUSTRALIA ......... . 34

The Pensacola Convoy ............. . 34

Last-Ditch Efforts To Aid MacArthur ........ . 37

Planning the American Base ........... . 38

Port Operations ................ . 4 1

IV. THE BASE IN AUSTRALIA ............ . 44

Rounding Up Weapons and Ammunition ....... . 45

Ship Arming ................. . 4 6

Ordnance Forces Spread Thin ........... . 48

Geelong and the Ordnance Service Centers ...... . 52

Working With the Australians ........... . 54

USAAS Ordnance ............... . 5 5

Midsummer 1942: New Responsibilities ........ . 57

Preparations To Support the Move Northward ..... . 60

Responsibility for Motor Vehicles .......... . 61

V. SUPPORTING THE PAPUA CAMPAIGN ....... . 65

The Ordnance Officer Arrives at Port Moresby ..... . 66

The Crisis in Mid-September ........... . 68

The Sea Route to Buna ............. . 69

The Attack Begins — and Stalls .......... . 73

I Corps Takes Over .............. . 7 6

xiii
Chapter Page

V. SUPPORTING THE PAPUA CAMPAIGN—Continued

T h e Forward Bases ............... . 8 2

Captured Japanese Matériel ............ . 8 5

"A Poor Man's War" .............. . 85

VI. THE BASE IN THE BRITISH ISLES ......... . 88

Ordnance Troops in Magnet ........... . 91

Planning fo r Bolero .............. . 9 3

Preparations fo r Torch ............. . 10 1

VII. ORAN AND THE PROVISIONAL ORDNANCE GROUP ... 109

Tactical Plans ................ . 10 9

Ordnance Service: The Group Concept ........ . 112

The Landing at Oran .............. . 114

Th e Provisional Ordnance Group .......... . 11 8

The Move to Northern Tunisia ........... . 121

Planning fo r Central Tunisia ........... . 12 3

VIII. WITH II CORPS IN TUNISIA ........... . 128

T h e Supply Crisis ............... . 13 2

"Miracles o f Maintenance" ............ . 13 4

Niblo Leaves II Corps . ............. . 13 6

Supporting the Thrust Through Gafsa ........ . 138

T h e March t o Bizerte .............. . 14 2

"The End of the Beginning" ........... . 145

IX. THE SHORT CAMPAIGN IN SICILY ........ . 152

Plans fo r Husky ................ . 15 3

N e w Matériel ................ . 15 5

The Invasion Fleets Depart ............ . 158

T h e Landings ................ . 16 0

Colonel Nixon's Problems ............ . 16 4

"A Black Eye on Ordnance" ............ . 166

The Evidence at the End ............ . 169

X. SALERNO AND THE GROWTH OF FIFTH ARMY

ORDNANCE SERVICE ............. . 17 2

Niblo's Group Organization ............ . 17 4

"Hell i n th e Dunes" .............. . 17 7

"Uninterrupted" Ordnance Service ......... . 18 2

The Search for Better Organization ......... . 187

xiv
Chapter Page

XI. ANZIO AND ARTILLERY ............. . 191

Th e Ammunition Dumps ............. . 19 6

Anzio Annie and the Clamor for Heavier Artillery .... . 199

The 240-mm, Howitzer and the 8-inch Gun ...... . 201

"Balanced Artillery Firepower" .......... . 20 6

XII. ROME AND "THE FORGOTTEN FRONT" ....... . 209

The Allies Enter Rome ............. . 211

"The Forgotten Front" ............. . 21 3

Lessons of the Mediterranean Campaigns ....... . 213

XIII. ARMING FOR THE GRAND CAMPAIGN ....... . 219

New Methods of Supply ............. . 220

Motor Vehicle Assembly ............. . 22 3

Preparations for a Short Sea Voyage ......... . 224

Bomb Disposal ................ . 23 1

The Ordnance Plan for Neptune .......... . 232

"The Best-Equipped Fighting Force" ......... . 23 6

XIV. THE FAR SHORE IN NORMANDY .......... . 240

Omaha Beach ................ . 24 0

Utah Beach ................. . 24 7

Frustration in the Hedgerows ........... . 248

Expansion After Cobra: Third Army ......... . 258

XV. THE RACE ACROSS FRANCE ........... . 262

T h e Campaign i n Brittany ............ . 26 6

To the Seine and Beyond: First Army Ordnance ..... . 268

Third Army Ordnance in the Dash to the Moselle .... . 275

Seventh Army in Southern France .......... . 283

XVI. AT THE SIEGFRIED LINE IN BELGIUM ....... . 294

T h e Supply Famine .............. . 29 4

First Army Improvises .............. . 29 8

Frustration at the Ports and Depots ......... . 301

The Battle of the Ardennes ............ . 304

Bastogne and Third Army Ordnance ......... . 313

XVII. LESSONS OF THE ROER AND THE ARDENNES .... . 318

Ninth Army Ordnance ............. . 31 8

The Tank Duels on the Roer Plain ......... . 325

Attempts To Provide a Better Tank ......... . 328

The Zebra Mission of February 1945 ......... . 332
Chapter Page

XVIII. VICTORY IN GERMANY ............. . 339

Supplies for the Last Campaign .......... . 339

Across th e Rhine ............... . 34 2

Captured Enemy Matériel ............ . 34 6

Ordnance Technical Intelligence .......... . 34 8

After V- E Da y .............. . 34 9

XIX. FROM PAPUA TO MOROTAI ........... . 353

Developing th e Bases .............. . 35 7

New Weapons for Jungle Warfare .......... . 360

The Move Northward Begins With Dexterity ...... . 362

Support of Brewer in the Admiralties ........ . 368

Hollandia an d Aitape .............. . 36 9

The Geelvink Bay Operations: Wakde, Biak, Noemfoor ... . 377

The Sansapor Area in the Vogelkop ......... . 383

Morotai .................. . 38 3

XX. THE PHILIPPINES: LEYTE ............ . 387

The Ordnance Navy: The Shop and Depot Barges .... . 388

Planning fo r Leyte ............... . 39 2

A-Day an d After ............... . 39 6

The Costly Base at Leyte ............. . 402

Eighth Army Ordnance Arrives .......... . 403

Success o n Mindoro .............. . 40 4

XXI. THE PHILIPPINES: LUZON ............ . 407

Ordnance Plans for Luzon ............ . 408

Supporting the Lingayen Landings ......... . 411

T h e Advance Inland .............. . 41 7

Clearing the Visayan Passages ........... . 426

XXII. THE PHILIPPINES: THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS .... . 429

Palawan and Zamboanga ............ . 431

The Central Visayan Islands ........... . 432

Mindanao .................. . 43 5

XXIII. BOLDLY AIMING AT OKINAWA .......... . 443

A Strongly Fortified Island ............ . 444

The Advance in the Central Pacific ......... . 444

T h e Hawaiian Base .............. . 44 5

Tenth Army Plans and Preparations ......... . 447

The Landings on Kerama Retto .......... . 453

xvi
Chapter Page

XXIV. CRESCENDO ON OKINAWA ............ . 456

The Landings on Hagushi ............ . 456

Supporting the Assault on the Shuri Defenses ...... . 460

Siege Warfare With a Difference: The Cave Positions ... . 461

The Ordnance Build-up in the Mud ......... . 465

Supply by Water ............... . 467

Bloody Finale ................ . 47 0

Preparing fo r Japan .............. . 47 2

XXV. THE GUNS FALL SILENT ............. . 475

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ............... . 48 1

GLOSSARY ..................... . 48 3

CODE NAMES .................... . 48 9

BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS ............ . 492

INDEX ....................... . 49 9

Charts

No.

1. The U.S. Army Forces in Australia Ordnance Office, May 1942 ... 56

2. Early Command and Staff Organization of ETOUSA Established by ETO

General Order 19, 20 July 1942 ............. . 95

3. Organization of the Ordnance Section, AFHQ, November 1942 ... . 126

4. Ordnance Group Organization for First U.S. Army, 15 August 1944 . . 256

Maps

1. Lines of Communication in French North Africa. ....... . 110

2. OMAHA Beach and Beach Maintenance Area ......... . 241

3. UTAH Beach and Beach Maintenance Area .......... . 246

4. Tactical Progress, 25 July-12 September 1944 ......... . 264

5. First Army Ammunition Installations, 6 June-16 December 1944 . . . 272

xvii
Illustrations

Page

Capt. George B. Jarrett ................. . 23

U.S. 90-mm. and German 88-mm. Antiaircraft Guns ........ . 26

Two Sherman Tanks Moving Toward the Front ......... . 28

Bazooka ....................... . 3 0

The Priest, a Self-Propelled Howitzer ............. . 32

Col. Jonathan L. Holman ................. . 39

Convoy of Trucks Near Mount Isa, Queensland ......... . 52

Ordnance Warehouse, Australia ............... . 5 9

Port Moresby, 1942 ................... . 6 7

Part of the Trawler Fleet, Port Moresby ............ . 70

Japanese Bunker, Buna .................. . 7 5

Ammunition by an English Roadside ............. . 97

Trailer Supply Unit in England ............... . 105

Brig. Gen. Urban Niblo ................. . 113

Jeep Headed Inland, Algeria ................ . 115

Oran Harbor ..................... . 11 8

Antiquated French Equipment, Algeria ............ . 130

Ammunition Stored Under Trees, Tunisia ........... . 131

Strafed Supply Truck, Tunisia ............... . 13 3

Tiger Tank, Tunisia ................... . 13 9

Landing a t Gela, Sicily .................. . 160

DUKW's in Ship-to-Shore Operation, Sicily ........... . 162

155-mm. Gu n ..................... . 16 8

Ammo Jo e ...................... . 18 5

Th e Anzio-Nettuno Area ................. . 19 3

Tankdozer Used To Fight Ammunition Dump Fires, Anzio ...... . 199

Anzio Annie ..................... . 20 1

240-mm. Howitzer, Italy ................. . 20 3

Mauldin Cartoon .................... . 20 7

M4 Tank Pulling Battle Sleds ............... . 212

Panther Tank ..................... . 21 4

Brig. Gen. Henry B. Sayler ................ . 220

Hooded 105-mm. Howitzers, England ............. . 225

Testing Waterproofed 94-ton Truck, England .......... . 229

Testing an Amphibious Tank ................ . 230

Col. John B. Medaris .................. . 233

Rhino Ferry, Normandy Beach ............... . 242

Ammunition Dump Behind OMAHA Beach ........... . 24 5

Col. Nelson M. Lynde, Jr. ................. . 250

The Fire at Depot 101, France ............... . 252

Tank With Hedgerow Cutter ................ . 25 3

Tank Transporter, France ................ . 25 7

xviii
Page

Shells Stacked by Type, France ............... . 261

Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., and Col. Thomas H. Nixon ...... . 277

Heavy Maintenance Company, Verdun ............ . 27 9

Duckbill Extensions on Tank Tracks ............. . 281

Col. William C. Bliss, S. Sgt. Erling N. Salvesen, and Technicians

John E. Pavlik and Harcourt W. Swanson .......... . 310

Tanks Near Bastogne .................. . 31 5

Col. Walter W. Warner ................. . 319

Replacing Tracks on a Sherman Tank ............. . 323

M36 Tank Destroyers on Dug-in Ramps ............. . 324

Maj. Gen. Gladeon M. Barnes ............... . 334

Convoy of Pershing Tanks ................. . 335

Berryman Cartoon ................... . 33 7

Ordnance Conference in Paris, February 1945 .......... . 340

LCM's Being Moved to the Rhine .............. . 345

Colonel Medaris Examining Captured German Weapons . . . . . . . 346

Col. Philip G. Blackmore ................. . 354

Headquarters Office, Base Ordnance, Oro Bay, 1943 ........ . 360

Pulling a Truck From a Mudhole, Morotai ........... . 385

Unloading Supplies, Leyte ................ . 398

Col. Ward E. Becker .................. . 403

Lined Up To Pass Ammunition Ashore, Luzon .......... . 414

Sherman Tank and Japanese Medium Tank .......... . 423

LCM on the Way to Fort Pikit, Mindanao ........... . 439

Col. Robert W. Daniels .................. . 449

Long Toms ...................... . 45 8

Signal Corps Men in a Weasel, Okinawa ............ . 466

Cave and Flame-Throwing Tank, Okinawa ........... . 469

All illustrations are from Department of Defense files except the following: Captain Jarrett, page 23, Jarrett Collection; General Holman, page 39, Holman Personal

Files; Port Moresby, page 67, Australian War Memorial; Mauldin cartoon, page 207,

Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.; Colonel Medaris,, page 233, Medaris Personal Files;

Colonel Lynde, page 250, and Ordnance Conference, page 340, Lynde Personal Files;

General Patton and Colonel Nixon, page 277, Nixon Personal Files; Colonel Warner,

page 319, Warner Personal Files; Berryman cartoon, page 337, Evening Star, Washington, D.C.; Colonel Blackmore, page 354, Blackmore Personal Files; Colonel Becker,

page 403, Becker Personal Files; and Colonel Daniels, page 449, Daniels Personal Files.

xix

THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT:

ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

CHAPTER I

The Military Missions

Late in May 1941 London celebrated

War Weapons Week. Bands played in parks

bright with tulips; there were parades in

the spring sunshine. War Weapons Week,

said the London Times on 20 May, was "a

crushing reply to the Luftwaffe." These

were brave words. On 10 May there had

been a bad air raid, more than 3,000 persons killed or injured, 2,000 fires started,

and the House of Commons destroyed.

There was ever present the real fear of an

invasion of Great Britain, and elsewhere

the Empire was in danger. The Germans

were in possession of the greater part of

Europe, had occupied Tripoli and Libya,

and were threatening Egypt, the Suez

Canal, and the Near East.

The military leaders in London painted

a very black picture to the U.S. Army's

ranking Air officer, Maj. Gen. Henry H.

Arnold, who was in England for talks with

British Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles

Portal. Arnold did not overlook the possibility that they were deliberately trying

to paint the picture as black as they could

in order to influence the President of the

United States, but he concluded that they

were really desperate, "so desperate that

for once their cloak of conservatism was

cast aside; their inbred policy of understatement thrown into the discard. They

needed help, needed it badly, and were

frank to admit it."1

Yet War Weapons Week was not just

a valiant gesture. Weapons were on the

way. Deliveries on cash contracts placed

by the British in the United States were at

last coming through in volume; shipments

in March, April, May, and June 1941 were

two and a half times what they had been

in the last four months of 1940. And these

stocks of tanks and trucks and aircraft

would eventually—though not immediately—be tremendously augmented by

transfers made possible after the passage

of the Lend-Lease Act on 11 March 1941.

The United States' special representative

for lend-lease, Mr. W. Averell Harriman,

had been in London since mid-March.2

By May, Londoners were reading encouraging reports on the climate of opinion

in America. The publisher of the Saturday

Evening Post, hitherto isolationist, was

quoted in the London Times on 19 May

as saying that the Post had abandoned isolation; that the United States was "in the

war now. We are like a man who has

jumped off a springboard and hasn't yet

touched water. He isn't wet, but he hasn't

a chance of getting back on the springboard again."

The Special Observer Group

Behind the scenes, British leaders had

heartening news of a secret and very im1

 Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York:

Harper & Brothers), 1949, pp. 215, 235.

2

 Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease: Weapon

for Victory (New York; Macmillan, 1944), p. 99.
4 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

portant development in Anglo-American

relations—an unprecedented collaboration

in war planning between a neutral and a

belligerent nation. Late in January 1941

at the suggestion of Admiral Harold R.

Stark, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations,

representatives of the U.S. Army Chief of

Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations

and of the British Chiefs of Staff had begun in Washington a series of meetings

known as the American-British Conversations (ABC) to plan joint operations in

the event the United States entered the

war.3

The conferees agreed that the United

States, like Great Britain, had more to fear

from Germany than from any of the other

great powers, and that if the United States

entered the war the earliest American operations on foreign soil should take place in

the North Atlantic area. American air

forces would be sent to Great Britain to

help the Royal Air Force bomb Germany.

The first U.S. ground forces to go overseas

after Mobilization Day would be used to

garrison Iceland and to guard American

air and naval bases in the British Isles.

The Iceland garrison would protect convoys

from America and release British troops

for service in the Middle East and Mediterranean—"the hinge," according to Prime

Minister Winston S. Churchill, "on which

our ultimate victory turned."4

In order to facilitate continuous planning and co-ordination, the conferees

agreed to exchange military missions at

once. To head the American mission, General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of

the Army, selected an Air Corps officer because the first units to be sent overseas in

case of war would be primarily antiaircraft

and Air Corps. The man was Maj. Gen.

James E. Chancy, who had been sent to

observe the Battle of Britain in 1940. His

chief of staff was also an Air Corps officer,

Brig. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney. The rest

of the mission consisted of fifteen officers,

including five representing the General

Staff and one each from the Ordnance

Department, the Corps of Engineers, and

the Quartermaster, Signal, and Medical

Corps.

Because of delicate considerations of

neutrality, the true nature of the mission

was disguised. General Chancy was designated Special Army Observer, London,

and was responsible directly to the Chief

of Staff. His organization was called the

Special Observer Group (SPOBS). When

the members arrived in London by air via

Lisbon between 16 and 29 May, wearing

civilian dress, Londoners might easily have

taken them for part of the expanding staff

of the American Embassy. They were

housed on the top floor of the Dorchester

Hotel in rooms that were pleasant though

3

 Unless otherwise indicated, the material in this

chapter is based on the following volumes in

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II:

Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts

(Washington, 1964); Richard M. Leighton and

Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy,

1940-1943 (Washington, 1955); Maurice Matloff

and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942 (Washington, 1953); T.

H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to

Russia (Washington, 1952); Charles F. Romanus

and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China

(Washington, 1953); Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I: May 1941-

September 1944 (Washington, 1953). The Matloff

and Snell volume, Strategic Planning for Coalition

Warfare, has been used most extensively.

4

 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War:

The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1950), p. 5.
THE MILITARY MISSIONS 5

rather uncomfortably exposed to bombs.5

The Ordnance member of SPOBS was

one of the last of the group to arrive. He

was Lt. Col. John W. Coffey, a sandy-haired

man of medium build with a ruddy face

and a pleasant manner. Executive to the

chief of Field Service at the time of his

appointment to SPOBS, he had been selected by the General Staff without referral

to Maj. Gen. Charles M. Wesson, Chief

of Ordnance, or Brig. Gen. James K. Crain,

chief of Field Service, an unusual procedure, but Generals Wesson and Crain did

not object to the appointment since they

considered him an extremely competent

officer.6 With six other members of the

group, Coffey flew to Lisbon, where he was

held up several days waiting for a seat on

one of the crowded flights to London.7

When he arrived in London Coffey

found that SPOBS headquarters, the first

two floors of a bombed-out apartment

house at 18-20 Grosvenor Square, was not

quite ready for occupancy but that General Chaney and other early arrivals had

been meeting with British military leaders,

explaining the peculiar nature of the Special Observer Group and laying the groundwork for liaison between members of the

group and the British Chiefs of Staff

Organization and Service Departments.

The conferees agreed on the basic function of SPOBS: to insure that the machinery would be ready for a smooth, rapid,

changeover from peace to war if the United States declared war. In discussions on

the conduct of the war in general, the

British revealed that they had four main

objectives. First and most vital was defense

of the British Isles and the North Atlantic

shipping lanes; second in importance were

Singapore and the sea routes to Australia,

New Zealand, and the East Indies; third

were ocean routes all over the world; and

fourth was bolstering the British position

in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.8

On Monday following Colonel Coffey's

arrival, representatives of SPOBS and the

British War Office agreed that specific

aspects of the ABC-I war plan and RAINBOW 5, the American implementing war

plan, would be settled by four committees:

one to plan personnel, discipline, welfare,

and medical matters; a second to tackle

problems of accommodation, bases, maintenance, and movement; a third to handle

communication; and a fourth to cope with

antiaircraft defenses and the coast defense

of Iceland. General Chancy assigned Colonel Coffey to the second and fourth committees. Committee meetings began the

next day, 4 June, and on 5 June Colonel

Coffey inspected the British ordnance depot at Greenford, reporting that British

weapons seemed heavier and possibly sturdier than American, but that American

equipment was "more compact and modern."9

5

 [Henry G. Elliott], The Predecessor Commands,

SPOBS and USAFBI, pt. I of The Administrative

and Logistical History of the ETO, Hist Div

USFET, 1946 (hereafter cited as The Predecessor

Commands), MS, OCMH, pp. 20-28. 6

 (1) Interv with Maj Gen James K. Crain, 26

Oct 54. (2) Min, Wesson Conference, 5 May 41,

OHF. As Chief of Ordnance, General Wesson held

regular 11 o'clock conferences with his staff during

the 1940-42 period. 7

 Memo, Maj Gen John E. Dahlquist, 15 Jul 45,

Elliot Notes, Admin 322B.

8

 (1) Ltr, Maj. Gen Harold M. McClelland to

Maj Roland G. Ruppenthal, 9 Jul 46, Folder,

SPOBS Letters 1946, OCMH. (2) [William F.

Sprague] SPOBS: The Special Observer Group

Prior to the Activation of the European Theater of

Operations, October 1944 (hereafter cited as

Sprague History), pp. 17-19, 23-26, Admin 323A.

(3) Ltr, Chaney to Marshall, 18 Jun 41, WPD

4402-141.

9

 Sprague History, pp. 30-33.
6 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

The Special Observer Group found that

there were many differences between the

British and the American systems of supply, even in terminology. In the British

Army the word ordnance traditionally

meant almost everything needed to equip

a soldier, not only weapons and ammunition but clothing and other gear as well.10

The term quartermaster was even broader: the Quartermaster General was the

agent who supplied everything. He was

responsible for logistics just as the Chief

of the General Staff was responsible for

operations. Under him the supply services

were organized along functional rather than

commodity lines.

The Royal Army Ordnance Corps

(RAOC) was "the storeholding corps,"

responsible for the receipt, storage, and

issue of all supplies except fuel and rations

and specialist items of the Royal Engineers

and the Royal Medical Corps. It also inspected ammunition and made repairs. The

Royal Army Service Corps (RASC) was

responsible for transporting supplies by

motor truck, for storing and issuing fuel

and rations, and for performing some maintenance. The Royal Engineers was the work

service, constructing buildings and sharing

maintenance and repair responsibility with

RAOC and RASC. None of these three

supply services had anything to do with

procurement or design.11

The British had no organization similar

to the U.S. Army's Ordnance Department,

which designed, procured, and supplied all

armament. The U.S. Army Ordnance Department's Technical Staff was responsible

for research and development, its Industrial

Service for procurement, and its Field Service for supply. The Ordnance Department

maintained its own manufacturing arsenals

where in peacetime the art of the armorer

was kept alive.12 The British Army did not

control either the design or the procurement of its weapons. All military stores

were designed and procured by the Ministry of Supply, an organization entirely

separate from the War Office and staffed

largely with civilians. American officers

noted that within the ministry the authority for research and development was widely divided among many offices, a fact that

made it difficult for the British Government

to reach quick and sound decisions on vital

projects, and that there was confusion,

duplication, and conflict of interest between the procuring and using services.13

It was perhaps natural for American

Ordnance officers at first to look with a

critical eye on the British method of supplying weapons, so different from their

own. But as time went on, they came to

see that the complex mechanism had saving features that made it work. Most important of these were the typically British

administrative system of interlocking committees to obtain co-ordination and the

British spirit of co-operation.14

10

 Maj. Gen. A. Forbes, A History of the Army

Ordnance Services (London: Nedicia Society, Ltd.,

1929), III. 11

 Foreign Logistical Organizations and Methods,

a Report for the Secretary of the Army, 15 October

1947 (hereafter cited as Foreign Logistical Organizations), pp. 171-77, U168U5, TICAF. The Royal

Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME), a

maintenance agency, was not formed until October

1942.

12

 Constance McL. Green, Harry C. Thomson, and

Peter C. Roots, The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955),

ch. IV. 13

 (1) Foreign Logistical Organizations, pp. 159-

69. (2) Memo, Brig Gen Gladeon M. Barnes, Chief

Tech Div, for Maj Gen Levin H. Campbell, Jr.,

CofOrd, 3 Sep 42, sub: Report of United States

Technical Mission to Great Britain, O.O. 350.05/

1243. 14

 Foreign Logistical Organizations, p. 169.
THE MILITARY MISSIONS 7

Ordnance Plans for Iceland

The SPOBS-British liaison committees

had scarcely begun the work of indoctrination and co-ordination when a cable from

the United States turned their attention to

Iceland. On 24 May England's largest

and fastest capital ship, H.M.S. Hood, was

sunk in the North Atlantic by the German

battleship Bismarck in a howling spring

storm of snow and rain. German ships, U--

boats, and aircraft swarmed in and over

the waters between Greenland and Iceland.

The news a few days later that the people

of Iceland had overwhelmingly voted to

sever the last ties with the Danish king and

set up a republic brought clearly to the

minds of experienced observers the possibility that the new nation might move

closer to America.15

On 27 May President Franklin D. Roosevelt in a radio broadcast said that the war

was "approaching the brink of the Western

Hemisphere." Attacks on shipping along

the North Atlantic convoy route presented

an actual military danger to America, he

continued, and the German occupation of

Iceland or bases in Greenland would bring

war close to American shores. Repeating

the famous sentence, "The only thing we

have to fear is fear itself," he declared an

unlimited national emergency. Under the

headline, "America Ready to Fight," the

London Times printed the text of the

broadcast on Thursday, 29 May.

Early in June Roosevelt decided to accede to the wishes of the Icelandic Government that American troops be sent to relieve the British garrison in Iceland. The

British needed their troops elsewhere; Iceland, athwart the vital North Atlantic convoy routes, could not be left defenseless;16

leaders on both sides of the Atlantic called

to mind the saying, "Whoever possesses

Iceland holds a pistol firmly pointed at

England, America, and Canada."17 This

was the official explanation. Behind the

decision were convincing secret reports that

the Nazis were planning to invade the

Soviet Union. It therefore appeared much

more likely that the United States could

take action in Iceland without risking retaliation by the Germans.18

On 5 June General Chaney obtained

from Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson

permission to send a reconnaissance party

of seven SPOBS officers, including Colonel

Coffey, to Iceland immediately. The officers departed on 9 June, and in a week's

stay Colonel Coffey visited the British installations and made plans for Ordnance

support of the relief expedition. These were

the earliest detailed Ordnance plans for

a specific theater of operations.19

In general, RAINBOW 5 had contemplated

sending to Iceland one division reinforced

with special combat and service units, together with such air forces as the situation

dictated. The whole would constitute a

15

 London Times, May 26, 28, 1941.

16

 (1) Department of State Bulletin X (17 June

1944), "Iceland," p. 563. (2) U.S. Army Iceland

Base Command, Armed Guardians: One Year in

Iceland (Reykjavik (December 1942), p. 11. (3)

Messages Between the President of the United States

and the Prime Minister of Iceland, 14 Jul 41, WPD

4493-14.

17

 Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 138.

18

 (1) Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The

Framework of Hemisphere Defense, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1960), pp. 124-25. (2) For the fluctuations

between mid-1940 and mid-1941 in American planning with respect to Iceland, see Conn, Engelman,

and Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its

Outposts, pp. 461-72. 19

 (1) Memo, Brig Gen Leonard T. Gerow, Actg

ACofS, for TAG, 5 Jun 41, sub: Iceland Reconnaissance, WPD 4493. (2) The Predecessor Commands, pp. 40-41. (3) Sprague History, pp. 33-36.
8 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

task force, a term just coming into use in

the U.S. Army. Colonel Coffey's plans for

INDIGO, the code name for troop movements to Iceland, included detachments of

several types of Ordnance companies: the

medium maintenance company, which was

the backup company for the division's organic light maintenance company; the ammunition company, which received ammunition at the dumps where it was unloaded and issued to the unit ammunition

officer; the depot company, which stocked

and issued everything except ammunition;

and the aviation company, which supplied

bombs and kept the guns on the aircraft

in repair.20

The maintenance of ground weapons

and combat vehicles such as tanks (Ordnance did not yet have responsibility for

transport vehicles) was performed at three

levels, or echelons. First echelon consisted

of the proper care of weapons (sometimes

called preventive maintenance) and minor

repairs and was done by the individual

soldier. More difficult repairs requiring

special tools and skills, designated second

echelon, were done by the Ordnance units

assigned to the line organizations: the light

maintenance company assigned to the infantry division, often backed up by a medium maintenance company or detachment

(as in plans for INDIGO ); the medium

maintenance company assigned to the cavalry division; or the maintenance battalion

assigned to the armored division. Everything beyond the capacity of these accompanying, and thus highly mobile, Ordnance

units was sent to the rear. This was called

third echelon, and included all major overhaul or complete rebuild.21

In planning the Ordnance supplies that

would be needed for INDIGO, Coffey had

to adapt the rather general plans of RAINBOW 5 to local conditions. Iceland is essentially a volcanic island, its center a barren

tableland covered with lava flows and immense glaciers from which great turbulent

streams run down to the sea. The towns

are along the coast, which is so deeply indented with fjords that the coast line measures more than three thousand miles,

though the circumference of the island is

only about half that distance. On the southwest coast is the capital and principal port,

Reykjavik, in comparison with which the

other towns of the island are villages. The

three other ports that could be used to land

supplies during the winter were Akureyri

in the north and Seydhisfjördhur and Reydharfjördhur in the east. There were thus

three supply areas, the northwestern-western-southwestern area, the Akureyri area,

and the area served by the eastern ports.

Among the three areas there was no communication during the winter except by

sea, and the sole supplies available locally

were, as Colonel Coffey observed, "rock

and mutton."

 22

20

 (1) Memo, Gerow, Actg ACofS, for CofS, 21

Jun 41, sub: U.S. Forces for INDIGO, WPD 4493-15.

(2) For Ground Force organization at the time see

Kent R. Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer and Bell I.

Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1947); for other types of Ordnance

maintenance companies see Harry C. Thomson and

Lida Mayo, The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1960), ch. XXII.

21

 Thomson and Mayo, Procurement and Supply,

pp. 448-49. After the transfer of responsibility for

motor vehicles from Quartermaster to Ordnance in

September 1942, the system was expanded to five

echelons. 22

 (1) Memo, Chancy for CofS, 19 Jun 41, sub:

Report of Reconnaissance of Iceland (hereafter

cited as Iceland Recon Rpt), WPD 4493-20. (2)

Memo, Comdr D. L. Ryan for CNO, 2 May 41, sub:

Reconnaissance of Iceland by USS Niblack, WPD

4493-1.
THE MILITARY MISSIONS 9

The Royal Army Ordnance Corps had

base depots at Reykjavik and neighboring

Lagafell, and advance depots at Seydhisfjördhur and Akureyri. The depot at Reykjavik was, by American standards, really

a quartermaster installation, for not more

than 20 percent of the stock was ordnance

supplies in the American sense of the term.

That at Lagafell resembled a U.S. Ordnance depot, with a maintenance company

operating on the depot site. It was Lagafell

that Colonel Coffey recommended for the

American main base depot and shop, with

smaller depots at Seydhisfjördhur and Akureyri.

The most important and critical Ordnance problem in Iceland, in Coffey's opinion, would be ammunition supply. He

found the British storage "deplorable." Too

much of the ammunition was concentrated

in thin Nissen huts (which Coffey considered much inferior to the American portable igloo hut) or in the open. He recommended that two of the four British

ammunition depots be abandoned and the

remainder be considerably expanded and

reorganized in the interest of safety, and

that requirements for U.S. ammunition

troops be increased from a detachment to

a full company.23

The Ordnance plan for the Iceland

expedition is interesting because it indicates the factors that had to be taken into

account in planning overseas operations.

On the scale contemplated it was not put

into effect. Limitations on housing, storage,

shipping, and port facilities and legislative

restrictions on sending selectees out of the

United States caused repeated fluctuations

in the plans for the Iceland task force. On

7 July, the day President Roosevelt announced that U.S. troops would garrison

Iceland, about 4,000 marines landed, to

give effect to his words; a month later

1,200 men of the 33d Pursuit Squadron of

the Army Air Forces (AAF) landed, and

in mid-September a force of about 5,000

men of the 5th Division arrived as an advance detachment. Changes in the logistics planning for Iceland, by then a

responsibility of the administrative agency,

General Headquarters (GHQ), continued.

At one time in midsummer 1941, the War

Department proposed to group the Iceland

troops with those of Newfoundland and

Greenland for command purposes, but nothing came of this. In June 1942 the

island came under the European Theater of

Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA), for tactical purposes, though it continued to be administered and supplied

from the United States.

The Lend-Lease Missions

to the Middle East and China

By the summer of 1941 it was becoming

increasingly evident that each of the five

lend-lease agencies in the United States—

War, Navy, Treasury, and Agriculture Departments and the Maritime Commission

—would have to establish field organizations in the foreign countries receiving aid

to see to it that lend-lease materials were

not being wasted. The proposed groups

would not be concerned with policy, which

would be the responsibility of the local

lend-lease representative, but would furnish

advice and supervision to insure that the

American equipment was properly shipped

and stored, kept in good repair, and effectively used. To do the job in China, General Marshall approved a military mission

early in July and by September the Division of Defense Aid Reports (DDAR),

predecessor of the Office of Lend-Lease 23

 Iceland Recon Rpt.
10 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Administration, was suggesting that somewhat similar arrangements should be made

for England and the Middle East.24

The War Department had been aware of

the problem for some time and was already

contemplating sending groups to England

and Egypt, as well as China, to administer

several kinds of Army activities having to

do not only with types, quantity, and delivery of lend-lease matériel but also with

exchange of equipment and information

on new designs, reports on manufacturing

methods abroad, tests of American weapons in combat, and interchange of men

for training. The work had grown too

large in those countries to be handled by

the local military attaches. For England,

SPOBS had been the logical choice; and

when General Chaney was consulted in

August he was asked whether the Middle

East group, which also involved liaison

with the British, might not be a subsidiary

of the group in England.25

Chaney urged that a technical agency

composed of Signal, Air, and Ordnance

specialists be organized at once in England,

preferably under SPOBS, to co-ordinate on

research and manufacture with the British

and to supervise American service teams

and technical observers and report on the

performance of American weapons. He

thought the agency might also advise on

lend-lease "when the situation crystallizes."

After Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in

June, the situation on lend-lease was hazy;

aid might have to be extended to the Russians. Decisions on the final distribution of

equipment would have to be made at the

highest political levels, and it seemed to

Chaney unwise to make a definite plan

until the methods of lend-lease operation

were clearer.26

Late in September the Secretary of War

established under SPOBS the technical

agency Chaney wanted and also made

SPOBS the War Department agency for

military matters pertaining to lend-lease,

with emphasis on the supply and maintenance of American equipment. Details of

SPOBS's new duties were subsequently

worked out in conferences by War Department planners with Chaney when he was

on a trip to the United States, and in discussions with Harriman. By November it

was clearly understood that Chaney would

shoulder only the War Department's responsibilities for lend-lease, confining himself to technical matters and leaving the

political side to Harriman.27

The Middle East

Very early in the planning for lend-lease

missions it was decided that the Middle

East mission would be a separate group,

not under SPOBS; this mission was to become more and more important as news

came of German victories in the east. A

shift in the "strange, sombre warfare of the

desert," as Churchill called it,28 brought

24

 Memo, Maj Gen James H. Burns, DDAR, for

Secy War, 8 Sep 41, AG 400.3295. 25

 (1) Memo, Secy War for Burns, 2 Oct 41, AG

400.3295. (2) Draft Memo, Brig Gen Sherman

Miles, ACofS G-2, for CofS, 11 Jul 41, sub: Miscellaneous Activities in Foreign Countries, WPD 4549.

(3) Memo, Gerow, Actg ACofS, for TAG, 9 Aug 41,

sub: Proposed Administrative Missions in Great

Britain and the Middle East, WPD 4402-51.

26

 Msg. Chaney to CofS, 26 Aug 41, WPD 4402-

51.

27

 (1) Msg 57, AGWAR to SPOBS, 25 Sep 41.

(2) Memo, Gen Gerow for Maj Gen Richard C.

Moore, 17 Nov 41, sub: Letter to General Chaney.

(3) Ltr, Moore to Chaney, 19 Nov 41. All in AG

400.3295. 28

 Speech in House of Commons, "Progress of the

War," 27 Jan 42, in Hutchinson s Pictorial History

of the War, 24 December 1941-17 March 1942,

Walter Hutchinson, ed. (London & Melbourne:

Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., n.d.), pp. 101-07, 125-41.
THE MILITARY MISSIONS 11

Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel's Afrika

Korps to Egypt, threatening the Suez Canal; and Hitler's sweep eastward after his

invasion of the USSR endangered not only

Iraq but Iran, a country vital to England

for its vast oil fields and to the Soviet

Union for its passage to the Persian Gulf.

To forestall the Germans, Great Britain and

the USSR jointly occupied Iran.

In late July 1941 the British planned to

allocate 60 percent of all the American

lend-lease tanks to the Middle East and

contemplated asking the United States to

provide the equipment and personnel to

carry out a systematic program of overhaul

immediately for every tank in Egypt, and

later possibly a program for Iraq and

Iran.29 This idea went far beyond anything

that had been conceived up to that time.

When the first shipload of American light

tanks went out to Egypt in May 1941 the

Ordnance Department had had to consider

the problem of training British troops in

operation and repair. The British had requested that Ordnance mechanics be sent

on the same ship for that purpose, but

without result. General Wesson, Chief of

Ordnance, was inclined to believe that the

British ought to send their men to the

United States for training. In any case,

he did not have enough technicians to

spare for an all-out effort. The best he

could do was to send Capt. Joseph M.

Colby and four technical sergeants to

Egypt, Colby (attached to the military

attache's office at Cairo and soon to be

promoted to major) as an observer to see

how the U.S. tanks stood up in combat

and the sergeants to help train the British

on all types of American weapons. They

also helped to set up a base ordnance workshop and depot for American equipment

at the British depot at Tel-el-Kebir near

Cairo.30

At the British-American Atlantic Conference in August, or shortly thereafter, the

British specifically asked the Americans to

establish and operate depots in the Middle

East to stock and repair lend-lease munitions, and President Roosevelt found a

way to satisfy the request without violating

neutrality. On 13 September he asked the

Secretary of War to contract with American commercial companies to operate supply and maintenance depots in the Middle

East. The operation would mainly concern

aircraft and ordnance of all kinds. In addition to performing the functions usually

assigned to base and intermediate depots

in a theater of war, such as stocking spare

parts and providing maintenance facilities,

the depots would serve as instruction centers where British troops could be trained

in operating American equipment. Also,

the contractors would have to arrange for

port, railroad, and truck facilities. For the

maintenance of trucks and automobiles,

then a Quartermaster responsibility, the

President thought it might be necessary

later to establish Quartermaster depots also.

On all details of this vast undertaking, the

British authorities would have to be consulted. The Middle East Directive stated

flatly, "Their needs should govern."31

As a consequence, a large organization

was required to administer throughout the

Middle East the great maintenance and

29

 Rpt. War Office Meeting With Ministry of

Labour, 24 Jul 41, Folder, North African Military

Mission, Plans, Tab 24, OHF.

30

 (1) Wesson Conferences, 10, 12 May, 23, 27

Aug 41. (2) Ltr, Capt Colby to Brig Gen Earl

MacFarland, 27 Sep 41, AG 400.3295. (3) Colby,

Progress Report for the Period of August 1st to

January 9th, Folder, North African Military Mission, Reports, OHF. 31

 Memo, Franklin D. Roosevelt for Secy War, 13

Sep 41, AG 400.3239.
12 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

supply program the President had ordered,

an organization much more directly concerned with operations than the Egyptian

mission originally planned, and much more

extensive in scope and territory. The term

Middle East now embraced more than

Egypt. The German threat to Cairo from

the west called for depots elsewhere, south

of Suez and in Palestine, in the Red Sea

area; the German threat from the north,

involving Iraq and Iran and the necessity for furnishing arms to Russia, meant

depots in Iraq and Iran as far north as

Tehran.

The size of the area to be covered, the

fact that there would be more than one

British headquarters to deal with, and the

difference in the problems of immediate

aid to Britain and future aid to Russia,

brought the War Department to the decision to send not one military mission to

the Middle East but two—the Military

North African Mission (MNAM) and the

Military Iranian Mission (MIM). The

North African Mission was assigned as its

sphere of action "the theatre based upon

the Red Sea," including Egypt and the

Levant, an area under the jurisdiction of

British Middle East headquarters in Cairo.

The Iranian Mission was assigned to "the

theatre based upon the Persian Gulf," including Iraq, Iran, and western India as

far as Agra, falling partly within the area

of the British commander in Iraq, partly

in that of his superior, the Commanderin-chief, India. The mission in the Red Sea

area was to be headed by Brig. Gen. Russell

L. Maxwell, an officer with long experience in the Ordnance Department, and

the choice was appropriate, for the first

need in that area was the supply and maintenance of weapons. The mission in the

Persian Gulf area, an arid, primitive region

where construction and improvement of

transportation had to precede supply, was

to be headed by Brig. Gen. Raymond A.

Wheeler of the Engineers. In October

1941 a military mission to the USSR under Maj. Gen. John N. Greely was established, but it lasted only a few months,

partly because of the attitude of the Russians and partly because it overlapped to

some extent both the lend-lease organization in Moscow under Brig. Gen. Philip

P. Faymonville and the Iranian Mission.32

The two Middle East missions and the

China mission differed in several respects

from the Special Observer Group. The

main difference was that their lend-lease

responsibilities were heavier. SPOBS's lendlease functions were limited, thanks to the

presence of the Harriman office in London

and to the tendency of the British to go

direct to Washington. The Middle East

and China missions had instructions to

operate on a much larger scale.

China

In announcing the American Military

Mission to China (AMMISCA) on 26

August 1941 President Roosevelt defined

its function as the study of China's needs

for defense and the giving of advice and

suggestions on lend-lease aid. The head

of the mission, Brig. Gen. John Magruder,

defined the principal purpose more broadly as "increasing the effectiveness of the

Chinese forces."33 Magruder (who had

served for eight years as military attache

in China) and other old China hands in

32

 C. Bradford Mitchell, Ordnance Operations in

Middle East Theatre, October 1950 (hereafter cited

as Mitchell MS), MS, OHF. 33

 Memo, Magruder for CofS, 11 Aug 41, sub:

Military Mission to China, ASF International Div,

Missions Br, 334.8.
THE MILITARY MISSIONS 13

the War Department such as Maj. Haydon

L. Boatner of G-4 knew that aid to China

was in an entirely different category from

aid to England. The Chinese were asking

for more equipment than they could use

or even transport into China; moreover,

some of it was too complicated for the untrained Chinese soldier. Competent military

advice was badly needed.34

In General Magruder's advance party,

which left by air for China on 18 September 1941, was his chief of staff, Col.

Edward E. MacMorland, an Ordnance

officer. Stopping at Honolulu, Midway,

and Wake, which MacMorland found

"in a fever of defense preparations," and

at Guam—"practically defenseless"—the

party spent several days in Manila conferring with General Douglas MacArthur before flying via Hong Kong to Chungking.

Arriving in much-bombed Chungking on

9 October, the members of the mission

were surprised to find no blackout—electric lights were blazing. They were given a

fine brick building for their headquarters

and living quarters, with a pleasant garden

and a huge staff of servants, and were

immediately engulfed in a round of receptions and elaborate, fourteen-course

dinners.35

On MacMorland's recommendation, the

two Ordnance members of the China Mission were a specialist on arsenals and production, Lt. Col. Walter H. Soderholm,

and a specialist on maintenance, 1st Lt.

Eugene P. Laybourn.36 Soderholm came in

by air on 23 October. Laybourn was the

last to arrive, having stayed behind to participate in conferences on the 7-ton Marmon-Herrington tank that seemed the most

practical tank to furnish the Chinese, since

it was in production and could be used on

the primitive Chinese road net. With Lt.

Col. John R. Francis, the mission's tank

expert, and four or five other members of

the mission, including officers concerned

with the Burma Road, he arrived at the

port of Rangoon on the Silver Dawn the

second week of November and traveled

up the Burma Road, making firsthand

observations on a problem that had received a good deal of study—how to

transport the tanks from Lashio, the railhead, to Chungking.37

Soderholm conferred with Maj. Gen.

Yu Ta-wei, the Chinese Army's Chief of

Ordnance, and visited Chinese arsenals.

What he found in the twenty arsenals was

not encouraging. There were about a million rifles. There was a heterogeneous assortment of artillery from the arsenals of

Europe and Japan, about 800 pieces, but

spare parts and ammunition, especially for

the artillery brought from the Soviet Union,

were almost exhausted. The Chinese arsenals could make field artillery, mortars,

machine guns, rifles, and ammunition, but

for several months had been operating at

34

 (1) Ltr, Col Henry W. T. Eglin to Co-ordinator of Information, 12 Nov 41, ASF International

Div 319.1. (2) Memo, Maj Boatner for Lt Cols

Albert W. Waldron and Henry S. Aurand, 3 Jun

41, sub: Reorganization and Expansion of China

Defense Aid Activities, ASF International Div, Missions Br, 334.8. 35

 Col. E. E. MacMorland, "Mission to China,"

Army Ordnance, XXIV, 137 (March-April, 1943),

284-85.

36

 Memo, MacMorland for CofOrd, 20 Aug 41,

sub: Detail of Personnel for Military Mission to

China, ASF International Div, Missions Br, 200

Personnel-China Mission. 37

 (1) Hq AMMISCA Weekly Rpts, No. 2, 23

Oct 41, No. 9, 22 Nov 41. (2) Rpt, Maj Boatner,

7 Oct 41, sub: Conference—Reference to Details on

Republic of China Requisition No. C-39 for 240

7-ton Marmon-Herrington Tanks. (3) Rpt, Col

Eglin, Chief, Washington Detail AMMISCA, 29

Sep 41, sub: Weekly Report of Activities—Home

Office September 16 to September 27, 1941. All in

ASF International Div 319.1.
14 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

one-fourth capacity because of shortages

of raw materials. Powder and metal for

ammunition were almost nonexistent. The

most pressing need seemed to be for arsenal metals, explosives, and machinery,

and for finished small arms ammunition.

Next in importance were infantry weapons

and artillery. Members of AMMISCA

learned that most of General Yu's needs

for procurement had already been submitted by T. V. Soong, head of China Defense Supplies, Inc., the purchasing authority in the United States; and that Mr.

Soong's estimates had been based on thirty

Chinese divisions, a strength that had not

been finally approved by Generalissimo

Chiang Kai-shek. Until it was approved,

General Magruder radioed Secretary of

War Stimson, little more could be done on

matériel. In any case it seemed impossible

to obtain from the Chinese definite data

on what was most needed.38

Vagueness and procrastination on the

part of Chinese military leaders also hampered the Ordnance officers in making

plans for training Chinese soldiers in the

use of lend-lease arms. They learned that

the Generalissimo contemplated establishing two training centers, one near Kunming, the other near Kweiyang, but theChinese National Military Council hesitated to locate the centers or name their

commanders. On the all-important subject of tanks, it was not until 27 November

that Lt. Gen. Shueh Ting-Yao, in charge

of mechanized training, asked Colonel MacMorland what buildings and grounds would

be needed for an armored force training

school. Plans for the organization and use

of tank and scout car units had not gone

beyond the most rudimentary stage.39

The Chinese Army lacked not only weapons and training but also means of getting

supplies to the various fronts. For example,

west of the main railroad terminus at Kunming there were no roads. Only trails led

to the front and all supply was by coolie

or pack animal. It was obviously impossible

for the Chinese to launch a large-scale

offensive for a long time to come. In the

meantime, as General MacArthur had suggested to AMMISCA members on the stop

in Manila, the Chinese might have engaged

in guerrilla warfare behind the sprawling

front, but this they had failed to do. The

reason for the failure, General Magruder

bluntly reported, was to be found in China's

"lack of aggressiveness and initiative, and

in the age-long practice of Chinese commanding officers of regarding their soldiers

as static assets to be conserved for assistance

in fighting against their fellow-countrymen

for economic and political supremacy."40

Even had the Chinese leaders shown

more initiative and aggressiveness and provided better operating conditions, there

would still be the problem of getting matériel into the country. Because the Japanese controlled the east coast of China,

all supplies had to be landed at the port

38

 AMMISCA Weekly Rpts, No. 7, 21-27 Nov

41, and No. 8, 28 Nov-4 Dec 41, ASF International

Div 319.1.

39

 (1) Radio, MacMorland to AMMISCA.. 15

Nov 41. (2) Memo, Laybourn, 27 Nov 41, sub:

Memorandum of a Meeting of Chinese Army Officers

and Members of the American Military Mission on

November 27, 1941. at 2:30 P.M., ASF International Div 319.1. 40

 (1)Telg, The Military Mission to China to

the War Department (signed Magruder), Chungking, February 10, 1942, No. 256 AMMISCA, in

Department of State Publication 6353, Foreign

Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers

1942, China (Washington, 1956). (2) MacMorland, "Mission to China," p. 284. (3) Ltr, Francis

to Gerow, WPD WDGS, 12 Jan 42, WPD 4389-102.
THE MILITARY MISSIONS 15

of Rangoon in Burma, hauled up the Burma railway and highway to Lashio, and

then trucked over the Burma Road to

China. Members of AMMISCA considered

the Burma Road the worst logistical bottleneck of all. Congested with civilian traffic, lacking provisions for maintenance and

any semblance of orderly administration by

the Chinese, it permitted only a trickle of

matériel to get through. The growing seriousness of the transportation problem was

reflected in the figures on lend-lease shipments. Out of 110,864 long tons shipped

to China between May 1941 and April

1942, 67,828 consisted of trucks, petroleum,

and road building supplies, compared with

only 11,398 long tons of ordnance matériel,

of which 8,725 tons were ammunition.

Trucks and their spare parts accounted for

29,081 tons.

Some of these supplies were never delivered. After Pearl Harbor the Japanese

advanced into Burma, taking Rangoon and

cutting the Burma Road. The door to

China was closed. The primary mission of

AMMISCA was over; its members, feeling

that they were "buried here," without mail

or radios between late November and midJanuary, were anxious to get away. Colonel

Soderholm was recalled to Washington in

January. Early in March, Lt. Gen. Joseph

W. Stilwell arrived in Chungking to take

over command of all military forces in

China, Burma, and India, departing very

soon for Burma to supervise the two Chinese

armies engaged there with the Japanese.

While the fight for Burma was still going

on, Colonel MacMorland was shifted down

to Yunnan Province to act as chief adviser

for the Chinese Communications Zone.

Lieutenant Laybourn participated in the

unsuccessful effort to hold Burma and in

the grueling withdrawal. He was a member of the group led by General Stilwell

that had to abandon its vehicles on 6 May

and walk through the jungle for four exhausting days. When the party reached a

river flowing west and embarked on rafts,

Laybourn took the mules and a group of

Chinese overland to a rendezvous on the

border of India. Henceforth India was to

provide the bases from which China would

be supplied—first by air, and later by a

road from Ledo, in Assam, to Kunming—

and the main problem of the soon to be

activated China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater was to be a problem of transportation.41

Initiation Into Coalition Warfare

The military mission phase of the Ordnance Department's overseas operations,

beginning in May 1941 with the arrival of

the SPOBS Ordnance officer in London,

ended in England on 8 January 1942 when

SPOBS was transformed into U.S. Army

Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI); in

China on 4 March 1942 when the members of AMMISCA came under Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma

and India; and in the Middle East on 13

June 1942 when both MIM and MNAM

came under U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME).

In this phase, the Ordnance officers of

the missions were learning characteristics

of their future allies and were discovering

to what extent unfamiliar terrain and climate in faraway countries, some of them

more primitive than could have been imagined, would affect Ordnance operations.

Above all, they were learning the restrictions of coalition warfare, in which plans

41

 (1) Ltr, Francis to Gerow, WPD WDGS, 12

Jan 42, WPD 4389-102. (2) MacMorland, "Mission to China," p. 289.
16 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

depended on military conversations between

governments that frequently had differing

points of view.

The Ordnance task in the Middle East

missions was far greater than that in

SPOBS and AMMISCA because of the

large allocation of tanks to the Middle East

and because of the huge maintenance and

supply program ordered by the President's

Middle East Directive. In the months following Pearl Harbor, the task in the Middle East would become more difficult because plans would be constantly revised to

fit the shifting pattern of warfare in North

Africa and the changing requirements of

the Allies.
CHAPTER II

Middle East Kaleidoscope

Brilliant sunshine suddenly blotted out by

black rainclouds, clear air all at once hazy

with sandstorms, hot days followed by bitter

cold nights; above all, on a huge empty

plain the flash and smoke of marching

armies moving fast in complex patterns,

suddenly advancing or retreating, meeting

or veering off—this was the kaleidoscope of

warfare in the Western Desert. Scarcely

less kaleidoscopic were the changes in the

direction and scale of the American effort

in early 1942 to support Allied forces in

the vast expanse known as the Middle East.

At the outset, it seemed clear that a

major part of the American effort should

be to keep the British lend-lease tanks and

trucks in operation, especially the tanks.

In the fall of 1941 Lt. Gen. Sir Claude J.

E. Auchinleck, British commander in chief

in the Middle East, was preparing to move

into the Libyan desert to challenge Rommel's Afrika Korps. During the build-up

for the operation, Auchinleck had received

some 470 British tanks (300 of the cruiser

type, 170 of the more heavily armored "I"

or Infantry type), and 300 American Stuart

light tanks, but he was still below the

strength he thought necessary. Every tank

counted, for it took many weeks for a new

tank to come from England and longer

still for one to arrive from the United

States.1

After spending a morning in the desert

near Cairo watching a British brigade

demonstrating its new American Stuart

tanks, Auchinleck reported to Prime Minister Churchill that the men were delighted

with the reliability and endurance of the

Stuarts "when compared with our own

tanks, and are frankly amazed at the length

of time they can be kept in work without

having to go into the shops to be overhauled."

 2 The British tanks required frequent overhauls, and when a tank landed

back in the shops, it was usually out of action for about three months, since the Royal

Army Ordnance Corps workshops were

short of experienced tank mechanics and

had no repair equipment other than what

had been brought from England. There

was no engineering industry to speak of in

the Middle East.3

Following the President's Middle East

Directive, the British submitted in October

1941 a list of tasks that they would like the

U.S. Army to undertake in the Middle

East. They put at the top of the list the

overhaul of tanks. For this, two plants

were required—one was to be in Egypt and

1

 I. S. O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, III, September 1941 to September 1942

(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1960),

4. 2

 Ltr, Gen Auchinleck to Prime Minister, 29

Sep 41, quoted in John Connell (pseudonym for

John Henry Robertson), Auchinleck, A Biography

of Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck (London:

Cassell, 1959), p. 311. 3

 Playfair. The Mediterranean and Middle East

III, p. 4.
18 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

the other possibly at Bombay or Port

Elizabeth in South Africa. The second

task was the overhaul of motor transport

vehicles, and for this shops were required

not only in Egypt and South Africa but also

in Palestine. The third was the construction of a plant in Egypt to service "warlike" American equipment, including armament, instruments, and so on. These

were immediate requirements for North

Africa. More than a month later, after

General Wheeler had gone to India and

conferred with the British commander in

chief, the British outlined the tasks to be

performed in aid to the USSR and Great

Britain in Iraq and Iran. The first was a

base at Karachi to repair tanks; the second

was an Ordnance depot and workshop at

Tehran to service arms and equipment being shipped from Indian and Persian Gulf

ports to the Soviet Union.4

The Ordnance planning was the work of

Col. Francis H. Miles, Jr., who had been

designated Ordnance officer for both the

North African and the Iranian missions, an

arrangement that permitted a single plan

for the entire Middle East and the placing

of a contract for all activities (except motor

transport) with a single contractor, since all

tasks would be performed by a commercial

contractor, as the Middle East Directive

ordered. Miles approached several engineering companies with experience in foreign construction, and also the Chrysler

Corporation, which had been producing

tanks for the Ordnance Department. Contractors generally seemed reluctant to

undertake the job, some suggesting that it

ought to be a military enterprise; Chrysler

declined outright. The firm finally chosen

was the J. G. White Engineering Corporation. For automotive vehicles, General

Motors Overseas Operations (a division of

General Motors Corporation) accepted a

separate contract for all vehicles except

Fords, which required a separate contract

with the Ford Motor Company.5

The OMETs

Using the British requirements as a blueprint, Colonel Miles planned seven installations, which he called OMET's (Ordnance Middle East Tasks) : OMET 1—a

base depot at Bombay to serve the North

African and Iranian advance depots and

to act as the principal distribution, transfer, and assembly point for all material of

all services being sent to the Middle East;

OMET 2—a base depot at Port Elizabeth,

South Africa, for the overhaul of tank and

motor vehicle assemblies; OMET 3—an

intermediate depot at Asmara in Eritrea to

overhaul tanks and aircraft armament;

OMET 4—an intermediate depot at Karachi in India to overhaul tanks and motor

vehicles; OMET 5—a large advance depot

in the Cairo area to repair not only tanks

but also artillery, small arms, and instruments, and Signal and Engineer equipment;

OMET 6—an advance depot in Palestine

4

 (1) Ltr, Supply Committee to British Supply

Council in North America, 7 Oct 41. (2) Cable,

24 Nov, Gen Wheeler GHQ India to Gen Moore.

Folder, North African Military Mission, Plans,

OHF.

5

 (1) Capt Paul D. Olejar, Ordnance Activities in

the Middle East Missions, 15 Jun 44, note 12,

MS, p. xvix, OHF. (2) Mitchell, Ordnance Operations in Middle East Theatre, pp. 14-15. Unless

otherwise cited, the Mitchell study and Motter,

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, are the

principal sources for Ordnance base activities in

the Middle East. (3) Memo, Miles for Crain, sub:

Status of Ordnance Participation in the North

African and Iran Military Missions as of November 26. 1941 (hereafter cited as OMET Plan),

Folder. NAMM. Plans. Tab 11, OHF.
MIDDLE EAST KALEIDOSCOPE 19

primarily to repair instruments and optical

apparatus, but also to overhaul tanks;

OMET 7—the depot and workshop at

Tehran for equipment destined for the Soviet Union. The White Corporation estimated that the seven OMET's, some of

them underground to be bombproof, and

air-conditioned, would cost approximately

$71,000,000.6

Colonel Miles's plan, which the men in

the theater considered a "rather elaborate

scheme," objecting particularly to the time

involved in placing the OMET's underground, was hardly on paper before the

Pearl Harbor attack and other developments made revisions necessary. Miles,

flying via Hawaii to the Middle East, and

en route on 7 December, returned to the

United States. From Washington he sent

a cable to Cairo suggesting that Major

Colby, recently appointed acting Ordnance

officer for MIM and MNAM, conduct a

survey to determine whether changes were

necessary, primarily whether Karachi

rather than Bombay should be the main

point for Ordnance supply and repair in

the Middle East. After on-the-spot investigation by Colby and a survey by Miles

upon his arrival in Cairo in late January

1942, after the fast-moving tactical developments in the Western Desert in late

1941, and after a more careful assessment

of the problems posed by the President's

Middle East Directive, the OMET plan

was drastically revised.7

The fluidity of the warfare in North

Africa, beginning 17 November when

Auchinleck moved into the Western Desert

to challenge Rommel, raised questions not

only as to the feasibility of attempting to

support the operations by large fixed installations but also as to the wisdom of doing

so. When the battle was going well, as

when the British advanced far into Cyrenaica in December 1941, the evacuation of

damaged armor from Tobruk to shops in

Egypt, for example, meant a 1,500-mile

round trip over primitive railways and

sand-choked roads. When the battle was

going badly, as when Rommel made a

counterthrust into Egypt, there was the

possibility that the elaborate shops would

fall into enemy hands. It is not surprising

that the plans for the Port Elizabeth

OMET were soon quietly dropped; that

the Palestine depot, located near Tel-Aviv

at Tel-Litwinsky, was relegated to a minor

role; and that the depot at Asmara, about

1,100 miles south of Cairo, was scaled down

from a large, specially built intermediate

depot to a small arsenal housed in Italian

shops and used for the repair of small arms,

trucks, motorcycles, and tires and the manufacture of tools, parts, buckets, and other

small items. Only at Heliopolis, the OMET

near Cairo, was there eventually a tank

shop of any size in the Red Sea area.8

In the Persian Gulf area, the main base

depot (OMET 1) was located at Karachi

rather than at Bombay because Bombay

6

 OMET Plan, NAMM, Plans, Tab 11, OHF. 7 (1) Memo, unsigned rough draft [possibly

from NADiv CE], for Gen Wheeler, 20 Jan 42,

ASF International Div, Missions Br, 600.12 Iranian Mission Projects in Middle East. (2) Ltr, Capt

Alden K. Sibley, CE, to Mission Engineer, USMNAM, Washington, D.C., 27 Jan 42, sub: First

Interim Report on the Status of Engineer Construction in North Africa. (3) Cable, Miles to

Maxwell, 24 Dec 41. (4) Progress Rpt, Ord Sec,

USMNAM, 11 Jan 42-31 March 42. All in NAMM.

Rpts, Tabs 40, 17, 64, OHF. 8

 (1) Comments by Vail Motter on Dr. Mitchell's

Draft of Middle East Ordnance Activity, 2 Nov 50.

(2) Intervs with Cols Earl S. Gruver, Floyd C.

Devenbeck, Joseph A. McNerney, and Lt Col F.

G. White, 14 Sep 50. All in Mitchell MS Notes.

OHF.
20 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

was not being used as a port of entry on

account of the Japanese naval threat; moreover, Bombay was already overloaded with

supply activities and was in a monsoon area

that made open-air storage and shops impractical. The intermediate base planned

for Karachi was changed to Umm Oasr,

a Persian Gulf port designated as the point

for unloading Ordnance equipment.

OMET 7 at Tehran was canceled because

the Russians did not want tanks delivered

there, preferring Archangel; instead, a

mobile Ordnance unit would be sent to

Baghdad, where the British were organizing an armored division equipped with

American tanks.9

When Colonel Miles arrived in Cairo he

was faced with the immediate problem of

obtaining enough spare parts to keep the

American tanks operating. There were

then 505 M3 Stuart light tanks in Egypt

and Palestine (writing off 75 lost by enemy

action) and 70 M3 Grant mediums in

Egypt. The British controlled spare parts,

a function given them by the Middle East

Directive—to Ordnance one of the most

frustrating aspects of the President's directive—and the system they had set up

seemed to the Ordnance people extremely

cumbersome. From British Middle East

depots, on which the American depots

would draw, requisitions went to London

and thence to Washington, and supplies

returned through the same channels. The

differences in nomenclature and stockkeeping methods added to the confusion, for

when the Americans came to the British

depots to pick up the parts, the British often

did not know what they had in stock.

Miles made strenuous efforts to get spare

parts shipped direct from U.S. depots to

American shops in the Middle East, but got

nowhere. On their right to control spare

parts, the British remained adamant, and

the main American tank shop at Heliopolis was never able to obtain enough spare

parts to permit full-scale operation.10

Militarization

The War Department directive of 18

February 1942 that all mission activities be

militarized as speedily as possible gave the

Ordnance Department the opportunity to

terminate the contract with the J. G. White

Engineering Corporation, which up to that

time had done no more than initiate some

procurement and recruit a partial staff. No

contract workers had reached the theater.

The opportunity to terminate the contract

was welcomed, for by then Ordnance was

well aware of the problems it posed. The

corporation was inexperienced in Ordnance

operations; its letter of contract to operate

supply and repair depots for tanks and

miscellaneous Ordnance, Signal, Engineer,

Chemical Warfare, and other military

equipment also implied duplication of effort

and confusion as to responsibility. More

important than either of these considerations was the fact that there were inherent

dangers in assigning to a civilian contractor tasks that were essentially military.

9

 (1) AMSEG 170, Bullivant to Maxwell, 31

Jan 42, ASF International Div, Missions Br, MI

311.27, Cables, N. Africa. (2) Ltr, Colby to Maxwell, 18 Jan 42, sub: Survey of Proposed Ordnance

Establishments in Iraq, Iran, and India, copy.

NAMM, Rpts, Tab 17, OHF.

10

 (1) Memo, Miles for Crain, 9 Feb 42. sub:

Status of American Tanks, Egypt & Palestine. (2)

Memo, Lt Col Marshall E. Darby for Gen Crain,

5 Mar 42, sub: Status of Foreign Missions. (3)

Ltr, Gruver to Chief of Field Service, 18 Jul 42,

sub: Ordnance Service in the Middle East. (4)

1st Ind, Darby to Field Service, Exec Br [n.d.].

All in NAMM, Rpts, Tabs 28, 44, 74-76, OHF.
MIDDLE EAST KALEIDOSCOPE 21

The contractor might abandon the work, or

the employees could leave when they saw

fit. Civilian workers in a combat area

might be captured, in which case they did

not have the protection of military status, or

they might be killed. And the very nature

of Ordnance matériel argued against contract operations, for the storage, issue, and

repair of munitions was essentially too vital

an operation, and too vulnerable to sabotage and security violations, to be entrusted

to civilians.11

Yet the possibility that any Ordnance

troops could arrive in the Middle East immediately was very slim because of the

shipping and men needed in the build-up

in England in early 1942. It was even impossible for the Ordnance Section of the

Military North African Mission to obtain

its quota of 80 officers that spring, though

Lt. Col. Earl S. Gruver, who headed the

section after Colonel Miles went home because of ill health on 10 March, protested

strongly that the twenty officers on duty

with the mission were too few to handle

the heavy work load.12

The first Ordnance unit sent to the Middle East, the 525th Heavy Maintenance

Company (Tank), did not arrive until

22 June 1942, debarking from the Queen

Mary along with 12,000 British reinforcements picked up in Scotland, after a long

voyage around the Cape of Good Hope.

Gruver reported that "all of us here in the

Middle East were thrilled at their arrival,"

but there was considerable disappointment

when it was discovered that the company

had arrived without its hand tools or any

transportation, the latter a most serious

lack since the company had been designed

as a mobile maintenance unit to support

the British in the desert operations. While

waiting for its trucks to arrive, the company

was sent to the British Tel-el-Kebir tank

shop on the outskirts of Cairo, quartered in

tents dug into the sand, with a mess hall

described by the company historian as "a

large, canvas-covered building addicted to

tea, corn beef, and flies." But the stay at

the Tel-el-Kebir shop was short. Rommel,

having taken Tobruk on 21 June and won

a brilliant victory at Matruh a week later,

was at El 'Alamein at the beginning of July,

posing so serious a threat to Cairo that

many units were evacuated from the city,

including the American Ordnance company. On 2 July the company was sent by

ship to Asmara Arsenal in Eritrea and remained there about two months. Then it

was flown back to Cairo to open the Heliopolis tank shop. After the British breakthrough at El 'Alamein in November 1942,

the 525th was sent out with Lt. Gen. Sir

Bernard L. Montgomery's Eighth Army in

the pursuit of Rommel and helped the

British considerably in advanced workshops

at Benghazi and Tripoli. The 525th was

the only American company attached to

Eighth Army at the time.13

11

 (1) Memo, Robert P. Patterson, Under Secy

War for Secy War, 21 Jan 42, sub: Contracts

with Civilian Concerns for Overseas Facilities,

NAMM, Plans, Tab 10, OHF. (2) Memo, CofOrd

for ACofS G-3, 23 Jan 42, sub: Contracts with

Civilian Concerns for Overseas Facilities, O.O. 160/

111555 Misc. (3) Memo, Lt Col S. F. Clabaugh

for Gen Crain, 7 Mar 42, sub: Closing Out of Overseas Contracts and Militarization of Contract Activities, NAMM, Rpts, Tab 43, OHF. (4) Motter

Comments on Mitchell MS, OHF. 12

 (1) Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics

and Strategy, 1940-7543, pp. 506-07. (2) Ltr,

Gruver to CofOrd, 12 Jun 42, sub: Progress of

Ordnance Section, USMNAM, NAMM, Rpts,

Tab 79, OHF.

13

 (1) Robert J. Martinez, "Saga of the 'Great

525th,'" Army Ordnance, XXX, 156 (May-June

1946), pp. 326-28. (2) Ltr, Gruver to Chief of

Field Service, 23 Jun 42, sub: Status of Ordnance
22 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Not until mid-November 1942 did an

Ordnance unit designed especially for base

maintenance arrive in Egypt, the 1st Battalion of the 303d Ordnance Base Regiment.

It was an innovation, for only in the spring

of 1942 had the Ordnance Department

been able to get General Staff approval for

regimental organization. The battalion

commander set one company to work in the

Heliopolis tank shop, reinforcing it with

about fifty civilians; he employed his other

three companies in setting up a spare parts

depot, an artillery and fire control shop,

and a small arms shop. Though conditions

were primitive at first—shops not yet built

and the men quartered in tents—the shops

were in operation by the end of November.

But the shops were hardly shaken down and

ready to produce when the volume of work

fell off sharply. By the spring of 1943,

thanks to the success of the Eighth Army's

desert campaign, the sources of both damaged vehicles and replacement parts had

moved so far away that the shops could

get nothing to work with; in May the Heliopolis tank shop closed down. Tank maintenance men moved into vehicle maintenance, which in mid-1942 became an Ordnance responsibility and continued to be a

rather heavy task in support of the Ninth

Air Force's operation until early fall of

1943.14

As air operations also dwindled and the

war swept on and away from Egypt, the

only remaining Ordnance activity of any

importance in the area was the manufacture of cans and drums for oil and water,

undertaken for the British and performed

by the Overseas Steel Container Corporation under contract to the Ordnance Department. The contract, reminiscent of the

earlier arrangement with the J. G. White

Engineering Corporation, was signed on 8

February 1943, but the plant equipment

did not begin to arrive in the Middle East

until the following July and the operation

was on the whole so unsuccessful that it

was terminated on 1 November 1943.

Responsibility for the container plants

passed from Ordnance to the Quartermaster Corps on 9 February 1944.15

The tank shops and depots in the Persian

Gulf area, planned at the time when, as one

Ordnance officer put it, "the Mission bubble was being inflated,"

 16

 hardly got beyond the planning stage. At first designed

to support the British line of communications in Iraq, with a main base at Karachi,

an intermediate base at Umm Qasr, and

an advance base at Baghdad, the mission

was changed in early 1942 to supplying the

Soviet Union through Iran. The Iraqi

projects at Umm Qasr and Baghdad were

returned to the British in April 1942. BeProjects in the USMNAM, NAMM, Rpts, Tab 65,

OHF. (3) For the panic in Cairo, which the British called "The Flap," see J. A. I. Agar-Hamilton

and I. C. F. Turner, Crisis in the Desert MayJuly 1942 (Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

1952), pp. 281-84.

14

 (1) Maj. Gen. J. K. Crain, "Ordnance in the

Field," Ordnance, XXXIX (September-October,

1954), 329. (2) Memo, Brig Gen Harry L. Twaddle, ACofS, for TAG, 5 Mar 42, sub: Constitution and Activation of Certain Ordnance Units.

NAMM, Plans, Tab 16, OHF. (3) Roy F. Dunlap, Ordnance Went Up Front (Plantersville, S.C.:

Small-arms Technical Publishing Co., 1948), pp.

15-17. (4) Intervs with Gruver, Devenbeck, McNerney, and White. 14 Sep 50, Mitchell MS Notes.

OHF. 15

 For the conflict between the British and Americans over the can and drum program see Ltr, Col

Forrest C. Shaffer to Maj Gen L. H. Campbell,

9 Jul 43, Folder, General Levin H. Campbell's

Personal Correspondence (Overseas Material)

(hereafter cited as Campbell Overseas File), OHF. 16

 1st Memo Ind, Darby for Field Service, Exec

Br, Mil Missions Sec. 30 Jul 42, NAMM, Rpts.

Tab 77, OHF.
MIDDLE EAST KALEIDOSCOPE 23

CAPTAIN JARRETT

cause the Iranian route overland from

Karachi was not acceptable to the Russians, Karachi was also eliminated as a base

for USSR supplies and henceforth would

be concerned only with supply to the

China-Burma-India Theater.17

The Russians had very early made it

plain that they did not want a depot at

Tehran. To comply with their wishes, the

American planners late in 1941 decided

that the port for supply to the USSR would

be Bandar Shahpur, at the head of the Persian Gulf and at the beginning of the TransIranian Railway. When American tanks

began to arrive in numbers at Persian Gulf

ports in the summer of 1942, Ordnance

officers established a school at Bandar

Shahpur to teach Russians how to repair

them. It lasted only a few days. Word

came from Moscow that the tanks could

not be delayed but must be forwarded to

the front. An attempt to move the school

to Baku failed when the USSR refused to

grant visas to the three instructors.18

The Desert Proving Ground

Whatever the accomplishments and

frustrations of the Ordnance men in the

Middle East missions in attempting to provide base support to the Allies, Ordnance

was able to assist the British very materially with technical information on their lendlease weapons and ammunition. This effort, begun when Captain Colby and the

four sergeants were sent out to Egypt late

in the summer of 1941, was intensified in

February 1942 with the arrival in Cairo of

Capt. George B. Jarrett, who constituted

the one-man technical section of the

MNAM Ordnance Section. Early assigned as ammunition adviser to British

GHQ, he conducted demonstrations of new

U.S. ammunition and weapons and, at

General Maxwell's request, established a

17

 (1) Memo, Home Office MIM to Harry L.

Hopkins, 21 Feb 42, sub: Activities of the U.S.

Military Iranian Mission. (2) Memo, Home Office

MIM to Brig Gen Henry S. Aurand, 1 Apr 42,

sub: Iranian Mission Activities. Both in ASF

International Div, Missions Br, 319.1. (3) Motter

Comments on Mitchell MS, OHF. 18

 (1) Iranian Military Mission: History of Ordnance, Persian Gulf Service Command to January

1943, MS, OHF, p. 5. (2) Later, Ordnance was involved in the truck assembly plants (TAP) in the

Persian Gulf Command at Andimeshk (TAP I) and

Khorramshahr (TAP II). First operated under contract with General Motors Overseas Operations, after 1 July 1943 they were operated by three Ordnance medium automotive maintenance companies

(the 3474th, 506th, and 3455th), with the help of

native labor. For an interesting story on the operation, see Joel Sayre, "Persian Gulf Command," The

New Yorker (February 17, 1945). (3) For the

efforts to supply the Russians through Iran, see

Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy,

1940-1943, chs. XX, XXI.
24 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

school to train the British on American

ordnance.19

The Ordnance Section of MNAM

rendered even more important service in

the long run by providing expert firsthand

information to the technicians in the United

States on friendly and enemy equipment

at a date early enough to permit improvements in American weapons destined for

Europe in 1944. The great battles of 1941

and 1942 in the Western Desert, beginning

with the so-called Winter Battle around

Sidi Rezegh airfield near Tobruk between

late November 1941 and January 1942,

were an excellent proving ground.

Some early information was sent to the

United States by the American military

attache at Cairo, Col. Bonner F. Fellers,

who witnessed the beginning of the Winter

Battle and talked to British commanders,

but his reports were based largely on British sources—unofficial sources for the most

part, because the British were reluctant to

release official records on such touchy matters as the performance of American tanks

as compared with their own.20 The Ordnance members of the Military North African Mission, on the other hand, carefully

studied the crippled tanks brought back to

the British shop at Tel-el-Kebir, visited the

battlefields, and even managed to send

important German equipment to the

United States for testing by Ordnance at

Aberdeen Proving Ground.21

The Famous "88"

The most important enemy weapon

shipped to the United States from North

Africa at this early date was the multipurpose German 88-mm. gun. Developed

primarily as an antiaircraft (Flugabwehrkanone or Flak) gun at the end of World

War I, the 88 with its long range, its flat

trajectory, and its excellent sights was also

extremely useful as a weapon against

ground forces, especially as an antitank

(Panzerabwehrkanone or Pak) gun. It

had been tested in various employments in

1938—39 during the Spanish Civil War, but

under such good security that foreign observers (including American) could learn

little about it.22

In its antitank role the gun made its first

real impression on the British when Rommel used it to repel tank attacks in the June

1941 Eighth Army BATTLEAXE operation

at Halfaya Pass. The British discovered

then that it could penetrate the thickskinned Matilda infantry tank at distances

up to 2,000 yards. After the battle a member of Rommel's staff overheard a captured

British tank driver under interrogation expressing his indignation:

"In my opinion," said the Englishman,

with an unfriendly glance at a near-by 88, "it

is unfair to use 'flak' against our tanks."

A German artilleryman who was sitting on

his haunches near by, listening to the interpretation, interjected excitedly, "Ja, and I

think it most unfair of you to attack with

19

 (1) See above, p. 12. (2) G. B. Jarrett Middle East 1942, pp. 54, 91, MS Collection of Col. George

B. Jarrett (USARRet). 20

 Military Attache Rpts 2122 of 6 Jan 42 and

843 of 23 Feb 42, OKD 451.25/330.1 and OKD

451-25/333.1. 21

 (1) Ltr, Maxwell to Secy War, 10 Jan 42.

sub: Progress Report, United States Military North

African Mission, for the period November 22, 1941.

to January 10, 1942, Folder, Middle East (AfricanLevant), OHF. (2) Ltr, Gruver to CG U.S. Military North African Mission, 31 Mar 42, sub:

Progress Report, Ordnance Section, from January

11, 1942, to March 31, 1942, NAMM, Rpts, Tab 64,

OHF. 22

 (1) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, p. 247. (2) Brig. Gen. Henry

J. Reilly, "Proving Ground in Spain," Army Ordnance, XIX, 114 (May-June, 1939), p. 334 (3)

Mark S. Watson, "American Ordnance in Korea,"

Ordnance. XXXV, 186 (May-June, 1951), pp.

569-70.
MIDDLE EAST KALEIDOSCOPE 25

tanks whose armour nothing but an 88 will

penetrate."

 23

A diabolical employment was made possible by the fact that the Germans could

fire the 88 from its wheels. Several times

(until the ruse was discovered), Rommel

enticed the British to attack the gun by

using as bait an innocent-looking convoy

composed of a few trucks, with an 88 hidden among them under a paulin. Unmasking the 88, the Germans would fire it

from its wheels, still limbered up, and destroy the attackers.24

 After BATTLEAXE,

the Germans provided the 88 with a halftracked tow vehicle that enabled it to get

into action against ground targets very

quickly. They also became even more

adept at camouflaging it—no easy matter

for such a big gun.25

With only forty-eight of these guns,

Rommel in the first three days of the Winter

Battle used them with murderous effect

against the British armored forces. Major

Colby, after a trip to the Western Desert in

late December, reported that the most dangerous weapon to tanks was the 88-mm.

gun, firing armor-piercing (AP) ammunition. In a single action, the attack on Sidi

Omar 22 November 1941, a British brigadier with 51 thick-skinned infantry tanks

lost 47, most of them to 88-mm. antitank

fire. By the end of the Winter Battle, out

of 1,276 tanks sent to Libya, 674 were damaged and 274 were destroyed. Rommel's

Afrika Korps had so crippled the armor

that the British could not resume the offensive until May 1942.26

During the lull in the desert warfare,

Jarrett (now a major) visited the wreckage-strewn battlefield near Sidi Rezegh and

discovered an 88-mm. gun that Rommel

had been forced to leave behind. Well

aware of the importance of his find, he became even more interested when he paced

off the distance from the gun position to a

destroyed Matilda tank and recognized the

88 for the menace it undoubtedly was. The

big problem was to get the 88 sent to the

United States. All captured equipment

went to British shops in Alexandria, and

the British usually refused to release any

of it, being so short of weapons that they

repaired and reused all that they could.

Somehow Jarrett managed to obtain the

gun at the yards in Alexandria, and with

the help of Capt. William E. Summerbell

of the Military North African Mission and

a gang of mechanics he took it apart,

carted it in trucks to Cairo, and got it

aboard two DC-3 (C-47) airplanes bound

for Accra. There it was transferred to new

C-54's, just then coming into service, and

flown to the United States via Ascension

Island. When it arrived at Aberdeen Prov23

 (1) Heinz Werner Schmidt, With Rommel in

the Desert (London: Harrap, 1951), p. 65. (2)

J. A. I. Agar-Hamilton and I. C. F. Turner, The

Sidi Rezeg Battles 1941 (Cape Town: Oxford

University Press, 1957), pp. 45-46. (3) I. S. O.

Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, II,

1941 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,

1956), 173, 429. 24

 Ltr, Col George B. Jarrett to Lida Mayo, 5

Mar 64.

25

 Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East

III, p. 429.

26

 B. H. Liddell Hart, ed., The Rommel Papers

(London: Collins, 1953), p. 196. (2) Ltr, Col

Jarrett to Lida Mayo, 28 Mar 63. (3) Military

Attache Cairo #2122, 6 Jan 42, and Incl, Rpt

of Maj Joseph M. Colby on Visit to Western

Desert, Dec 17 to 23 incl, OKD 451.25/330.1.

(4) Connell, Auchinleck, p. 390. (5) Playfair, The

Mediterranean and Middle East III, 198-99. (6)

Msg, Military Attache Cairo to War Dept, 12 Jan

42, sub: Western Desert Tank Situation, File,

Cables Incoming, Paraphrase of Secret Messages

1941 (sic). This message notes: "Slow and inadequate repair facilities will cost the British many

months time before their 674 damaged tanks can

be rendered action trim."
26 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

THE U.S. 90-MM. AND THE GERMAN 88-MM. ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS (left and right,

respectively) at Aberdeen Proving Ground, 1943.

ing Ground the 88 was put together and

carefully studied. The findings contributed

to one of the most important weapon developments on the Allied side—the conversion of the American 90-mm. antiaircraft

gun to antitank use.27

Tank-to-Tank Battles in the Desert

On the relative merits of the German

and Allied tanks used in the desert campaigns, discussion raged at the time in bivouacs and messes and on the terraces of

Cairo, and continued long after the war to

rage on paper. A great deal of the argument concerned the penetrative power of

the tank guns employed in the Winter

Battle: the 2-pounder (40-mm.) guns on

the British tanks and the 37-mm. on the

American Stuarts versus the short-barreled,

low-velocity 50-mm. tank gun, Kwk

(Kampfwagenkanone) on the main German fighting tank, the Pzkw (Panzerkampfwagen) III. Less was said about

the short-barreled, low-velocity 75-mm.

Kwk on the Germans' secondary tank, the

27

 Ltrs, Col Jarrett to Lida Mayo, 28 Mar 63,

5 Mar 64.
MIDDLE EAST KALEIDOSCOPE 27

Pzkw IV, because it normally fired highexplosive (HE) rather than antitank ammunition.

Writing in 1959, Capt. B. H. Liddell

Hart, a British authority on tanks, concluded that the 2-pounder was a shade

superior to the short 50-mm. Kwk and that

the 37-mm. had considerably better penetration. He based his conclusion on figures published in 1956 in Volume II of the

official British history, The Mediterranean

and Middle East, by Maj. Gen. I. S. O.

Playfair.28 But General Playfair in his

Volume III, after further work on captured German documents, revised his figures to show that the 2-pounder was not

superior to the short 50-mm. Kwk and

that the 37-mm. (using capped ammunition) was only slightly better than the 2-

pounder.29 All figures on which these various calculations were made were for penetration of homogeneous armor plate. Beginning in late 1941 many of the Pzkw

Ill's and some of the Pzkw IV's had extra

face-hardened plates that would defeat the

2-pounder except at very short ranges. At

the time of the Winter Battle, Eighth Army

tank gunners complained that their 2-

pounder shot bounced off German armor.

Major Jarrett, who tested all German and

Allied tank guns while he was in Egypt,

contended that except at very short ranges

the British and American guns were ineffective against both the Pzkw III and the

Pzkw IV, while the short 50-mm. Kwk

and the short 75-mm. Kwk as well, whose

HE shells were capable of damaging tracks

and bogeys at 2,000 to 3,000 yards, did

much damage to all Allied tanks except

the Matildas.30

When the desert battles were resumed

at the Gazala Line with Rommel's attack

in late May 1942, Eighth Army had 167

new American tanks of a type far more

effective than the light Stuarts, which by

then had come to be employed mainly as

reconnaissance and observation vehicles.

The new tank was the M3 Grant. Its appearance was rather singular. Mounted in

the sponson (with very little traverse) was

the M2 75-mm. field gun with excellent

high-explosive effect; mounted in the turret

was the 37-mm. antitank gun. The Grant

was the only tank to fire both HE and AP

ammunition. The British crews liked it,

and the Germans were surprised by the

thickness of its armor, which enabled it to

get close enough to inflict deadly shellbursts on infantry and gun crews with its

75-mm. gun. One German antitank officer at Gazala considered the tank more

nearly a match for the Pzkw III and IV of

the time than anything the British had yet

sent into the desert. And the supply

seemed inexhaustible. In the British retreat—the "Gazala Gallop" that enabled

Rommel to enter Tobruk on 21 June 1942

—nearly half the 167 Grants were destroyed, mostly by 88-mm. guns, but more

Grants continued to arrive in Egypt, and

by the time of the battle of El 'Alamein in

October 1942 there were 210 Grants in

Eighth Army. By then, Montgomery also

had 270 of the best American tank yet 28

 (1) B. H. Liddell Hart, The Tanks: The

History of the Royal Tank Regiment and Its

Predecessors (New York: Praeger, 1959), II, 93,

154. (2) Agar-Hamilton and Turner in The Sidi

Rezeg Battles 1941, take much the same position

as Liddell Hart, and cite Playfair's Volume II. 29

 Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East

III, pp. 442-43; for the 37-mm. see p. 28.

30

 (1) Liddell Hart, The Tanks, II, 93, 156.

(2) Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East

II, p. 343. (3) Playfair, The Mediterranean and

Middle East III, p. 435. (4) Ltr, Col Jarrett to

Lida Mayo. 17 Sep 63, and incl.
28 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Two SHERMAN M4 TANKS MOVING TOWARD THE FRONT

produced—the M4 Sherman, mounting the

M3 75-mm. gun (with a somewhat longer

barrel, though little more velocity, than the

Grant's M2). The 75-mm. gun was

mounted in the first American 360-degree

turret. Because of its rather high silhouette, Rommel's men referred to it as the

"high-domed" Sherman, but they soon

learned to respect the "incredibly good"

armor on its turret.31

New German tanks had also begun to

arrive in the desert by May 1942. The

first was the Pzkw III Special, which had

more firepower and better armor and

which arrived in sufficient numbers to participate in the fighting at Gazala. It had

the long-barreled 50-mm. Pak 38 antitank

gun, now designated the Kwk 39; it also

had "spaced armor" (an extra 20-mm.

plate bolted four inches in front of the basic

50-mm. plate on the mantlet), which made

it remarkably resistant to armor-piercing

shot. By mid-June the Germans also had

a few Pzkw IV Specials, mounting the longbarreled, high-velocity Kwk 40 75-mm.

gun—the ominous forerunner of the formidable gun on the Panther tank that was

to be introduced in Italy. The guns on

both the "Specials" had considerably higher

muzzle velocity than those on either the

31

 (1) Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert, pp.

133-34, 185-89. (2) Liddell Hart, The Tanks, II.

155. (3) Agar-Hamilton and Turner, Crisis in the

Desert May-July 1942, p. 67. (4) Playfair, The

Mediterranean and Middle East III, pp. 243, 437.

(5) Jarrett. Middle East 1942, p. 173, MS, Jarrett

Collection.
MIDDLE EAST KALEIDOSCOPE 29

Grant or the Sherman, and also better ammunition. But these new tanks were very

scarce. At the start of the battle of El

'Alamein on 23 October 1942 the Germans

had only 88 Pzkw III Specials and 30

Pzkw IV Specials.32

After El 'Alamein Major Jarrett spent

considerable time examining wrecked

tanks. He concluded that most of the German tanks destroyed in the battle had either

been hit during Montgomery's "colossal"

artillery barrage at the start or had been set

afire by their own crews when they ran out

of gas. Finding only a few German tanks

showing evidence of Allied tank gun hits,

he was convinced that in tank-to-tank

battles "the Germans had out-gunned us."33

However, German tanks at El 'Alamein

had been badly outnumbered. Eighth

Army started the battle with more than

1,100 tanks and brought up 200 more during the action, while Afrika Korps had

barely 200 gun-armed German tanks, plus

280 poorly armed, thin-skinned Italian

medium tanks that had little effect on the

outcome. Moreover the German tanks did

not have complete freedom of maneuver

because of a gasoline shortage, and their

power plants were inferior to those on

American tanks. The mechanical reliability and mobility of the American tanks were

highly praised by the British, and Montgomery's skillful use of the plentiful Shermans in his desert victories at El 'Alamein

and after, backed by massive artillery barrages, was so impressive that the U.S. Army

became committed to the Sherman as the

main American tank of World War II.34

Antitank Weapons and Ammunition

Whatever the differences of opinion regarding the tanks in the desert battles, there

was general agreement then and later that

the German antitank weapons were superior to those of the Allies. The 88-mm.

was Rommel's most spectacular weapon of

this type, but it was by no means his only

effective one. Beginning in May 1941 and

continuing through 1942 the standard

equipment of German antitank batteries

was the Pak 38, a long-barreled, high velocity 50-mm. gun with a penetration nearly half as much again as the British 2-

pounder antitank gun, and a range in proportion. It also had an excellent sight that

gave it great accuracy and was so low to

the ground that it became almost invisible

when dug a foot deep into the sand and

covered with a camouflage net.35

The British brought to the desert warfare

in May 1942 a 6-pounder (57-mm.) antitank gun, which had a performance about

30 percent better than that of the Pak 38.

Much was hoped from "these venomous

little cannons"; but because there had been

too little time for men to train with them,

the weapons did not always live up to expectations.36

 In any case, by the time the

32

 (1) Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle

East III, pp. 436, 442-43. (2) Jarrett, Middle

East 1942, p. 173, MS, Jarrett Collection. (3)

Liddell Hart, The Tanks, II, 229; for a comparison

of all tank guns, German and Allied, see table,

page 98. 33

 Jarrett, Middle East 1942, pp. 174, 182-83,

MS, Jarrett Collection.

34

 (1) Liddell Hart, The Tanks, II, 229. (2)

The Germans referred to the Italian tanks as

rollende Sädrge—"mobile coffins." Agar-Hamilton

and Turner, The Sidi Rezeg Battles 1941, p. 36.

(3) Liddell Hart, The Rommel Papers, p. 196.

(4) Jarrett, Middle East 1942, p. 182, MS, Jarrett

Collection. (5) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, pp. 278—83. 35

 (1) Agar-Hamilton and Turner, The Sidi

Rezeg Battles 1941, pp. 10, 16, 33, 44-45. (2)

Crisis in the Desert, p. 11. 36

 Liddell Hart, The Tanks, II, 156, 202.
30 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

AIMING A BAZOOKA

6-pounder appeared the Germans had a

new antitank gun that considerably outmatched it. Major Jarrett, riding with a

British patrol between the British and German lines near Bir Hacheim in March

1942 was fired on by a German patrol with

a gun that seemed remarkably accurate.

After Rommel was driven off, leaving some

of his weapons behind, Jarrett found that

the gun was a 76.2-mm. Russian piece that

the Germans had captured by the thousands

in the early part of the war and adapted to

their own use, primarily as a Pak gun. By

May 1942, 117 of them had arrived at

Cyrenaica, and some appeared at Gazala

in a self-propelled version mounted on 5-

ton half-tracks or on tanks. At El 'Alamein

the 76.2 effectively supplemented Rommel's

dwindling supply of 88's—he was down to

twenty-four 88's in late October 1942. This

light and efficient gun, sometimes referred

to as the 76.2-mm. Putilov, was sent to

Aberdeen Proving Ground and led to the

serious study there of all Russian matériel.37

37

 (1) Ltr, Col Jarrett to Lida Mayo, 29 Mar

63. (2) Liddell Hart, The Tanks, II, 227-29.

(3) Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East

III, pp. 437, 442-43. (4) The 76.2-mm. gun sent
MIDDLE EAST KALEIDOSCOPE 31

The ammunition used in German antitank and tank guns contributed much to

their success. Calibers of 50-mm. and

larger had armor-piercing caps to help

penetration and ballistic caps to reduce air

resistance—a virtue possessed on the Allied

side only by the shot used in the American

37-mm. gun. Adapting captured 75-mm.

APCBC (armor-piercing-capped, ballisticcapped) ammunition for use in the American Grant tank's 75-mm. gun, which meant

reworking the rotating bands, was a major

effort in the Royal Army Ordnance Corps

workshops in preparing for the May 1942

offensive, an effort to which Major Jarrett

contributed so largely that he was decorated

by the British Government. Other very

effective German antitank rounds were the

AP-HE (armor-piercing, high-explosive)

fired by the 88, which had an explosive as

well as a "hole-punching" effect, and the

Panzergranate (Pzgr) 40, a tungsten-carbide-cored AP shot fired by most German

guns, though in small proportions because

of its scarcity.38

In the summer of 1942 the Germans

began using "hollow charge" ammunition

to increase the effect of their low-velocity

guns. This type of ammunition (which

the Americans called "shaped charge")

depends on its own explosive action rather

than the kinetic energy of the projectile.

It improved the armor-piercing action of

the short-barreled 75-mm. Kwk on the

Pzkw IV, and of the old French 75's of

World War I vintage that the Germans

had captured in large quantities at the

beginning of World War II and converted

to antitank use by mounting them on the

Pak 38 carriage.39

In September of 1942 a ship from America docked at Suez with some highly secret

cargo—600 bazookas, the first the men in

the theater had seen. Then known only

under the code name of THE WHIP, the

bazooka (so called because of its resemblance to a musical instrument improvised by a popular radio comedian of the

time) was a shoulder projector launching

an effective 2.36-inch antitank rocket. For

the first time in history a foot soldier had

a weapon specifically designed to penetrate

armor. When Jarrett took a sample to the

big British ammunition dump along the

Suez Canal and dissected it, he was amazed

to find in the rocket the German hollowcharge antitank principle; the secret had

been so well kept that he had not known

of the similar American shaped charge.

During a demonstration the bazooka

proved that at very close ranges it could

penetrate the 50-mm. armor plate of a

Pzkw III.40

to Aberdeen Proving Ground had the original

Russian chamber. Later the Germans rebored the

chamber to take German 75-mm. Pak ammunition,

which had a higher velocity than the Russian round.

Ltr, Col Jarrett to Lida Mayo. 5 Mar 64. 38

 (1) Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle

East III, pp. 442-43. 437-38. (2) Ltr. Col Jarrett

to Lida Mayo, 28 Mar 63. (3) Jarrett. Middle

East 1942, pp. 158-60, MS, Jarrett Collection. (4)

For application in the United States of information

in early reports from North Africa on the failure

of uncapped AP shot against German face-hardened armor, see Green, Thomson, and Roots. Planning Munitions for War, p. 372.

39

 (1) Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle

East III, p. 438. (2) Pamphlet, U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School, Things to See at the

Ordnance Museum (Aberdeen Proving Ground.

Md., 1963), p. 23. (3) Green. Thomson, and

Roots. Planning Munitions for War, pp. 212-13.

(4.) Leslie E. Simon. German Research in World

War, II (New York: J. Wiley and Sons. Inc..

1947), pp. 118-20. 40

 (1) Jarrett, Middle East 1942, pp. 158-61,

and Achtung Panzer: The Story of German Tanks

in WW II, pp. 160-62, both in MS, Jarrett Collection. (2) Green, Thomson, and Roots. Planning

Munitions for War. pp. 357-59.
32 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

THE PRIEST, A SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZER, EGYPT

After the demonstration, the British concluded that the bazooka was unsuitable for

desert warfare, since the desert provided

none of the concealment, such as trees or

bushes, that the bazooka operator needed

to hide him from small-arms fire until the

tank came close enough for his rocket to be

effective. Therefore they decided, reluctantly, not to employ bazookas in the

Middle East, and the shipment was presumably placed in storage. The first use in

North Africa was in the Tunisia Campaign

in the spring of 1943. By then the new

weapon was no longer a secret to the Germans. At the first demonstration in Washington, D.C., in May 1942 Soviet observers

had requested bazookas. Consequently, a

large shipment arrived in the USSR about

the same time as the arrival of the shipment to Egypt. Apparently the Germans

captured a bazooka in the Soviet Union

very soon thereafter and copied it in a

larger size, providing it with an 88-mm.

rocket. This copy, known as the Panzerschreck, was superseded by the Panzerfaust,

which was to do much damage in Europe

in 1944-45.41

41

 (1) Ltr, Col Jarrett to Lida Mayo, 20 May

66. (2) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, pp. 358-59. (3) Simon, German Research in World War II, pp. 187-88. (4)

For performance of the Panzerfaust in Europe,

see below, p. 333.
MIDDLE EAST KALEIDOSCOPE 33

Applying the Lessons

Thanks to very early reports on Rommel's use of antitank guns in the desert

battles, Montgomery had at El 'Alamein

an American self-propelled antitank gun,

which the British called the "Priest" because of its pulpitlike machine gun platform. It had been hastily devised in the

United States by mounting a 105-mm.

howitzer on an M3 tank chassis. Information from the desert gave great impetus to

the "tank destroyer" program already

initiated by the Ordnance Department;

also, it convinced Army Ground Forces

planners, including Lt. Gen. Lesley J.

McNair, commanding general of AGF,

that the proper adversary of the tank was

the antitank gun rather than another tank,

a conviction that to some extent hindered

Ordnance in developing a more powerful

tank than the Sherman. This was one

example of a tendency among U.S. Army

planners to apply the early experience of

the Allies without enough imagination or

flexibility. To cite another example, the

British experience with the Germans' deadly antitank Teller mines in Libya led to an

ambitious program in the United States for

developing an effective mechanical mine

exploder along the lines of the British Scorpion, a program that consumed much

money and effort and contributed little toward solving the mine problem.42

On the other hand, Americans learned

valuable lessons in the desert. First tested

in the desert were not only tanks and antitank guns and ammunition but also new

developments such as gyrostabilizers that

enabled the tank to fire while moving.

Some of the Shermans that arrived in

Egypt in the fall of 1942 were equipped

with the gyrostabilizers—an early model

not yet tested in combat. Also, Americans

gained useful experience on trucks and tank

transporters, the latter an early British invention that was to play an important part

in Europe, not only as a tank transporter

but as a cargo carrier. And the desert continued to be most productive in captured

enemy matériel; for example, shells of the

170-mm. gun, which was to inflict much

damage later in Italy, were first examined

after El 'Alamein. Following Jarrett's

pioneer efforts, an Ordnance seven-man

team went to Cairo in the summer of 1942

and sent by ship to Aberdeen Proving

Ground about 3,000 tons of assorted matériel for study. This team was the forerunner of the Ordnance Technical Intelligence Teams later sent to all theaters,

beginning with North Africa in December

1942.43

42

 (1) Col. H. W. Miller, "After the Tank,

What?," Army Ordnance, XXVI, 142 (JanuaryFebruary, 1944), p. 87. (2) Green, Thomson, and

Roots, Planning Munitions for War, pp. 315, 389-

94. (3) See also below, p. 331.

43

 (1) Jarrett, Middle East 1942, pp. 80-83,

170-71, 183, MS, Jarrett Collection. (2) Green,

Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War,

pp. 262, 342-43. (3) On tank transporters, see

below, pp. 122, 343. (4) Lt. Col. G. Burling Jarrett,

"Desert Salvage: An Account of the First U.S. Ammunition Detachment in Africa," Army Ordnance,

XXV, 140 (September-October, 1943), p. 354.
CHAPTER III

Early Arrivals in Australia

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the

spotlight swung away from the Middle

East. For the next three weeks it focused

on the west coast of the United States and

the Alaska-Hawaii-Panama triangle, where

defenses had to be bolstered. Following the

arrival of British Prime Minister Churchill

in Washington at the end of December, it

began to swing back toward the North

Atlantic. In January, the shock of the

crisis in the Far East, where the Philippines

were threatened, brought about another

quick shift of emphasis. The spotlight then

focused on Australia, where, with the dramatic arrival of the Pensacola convoy in late

December 1941, the Americans had begun

to build up a logistical base.1

The Pensacola Convoy

The U.S. naval transport Republic, just

returned from carrying troops to Iceland,

sailed from San Francisco for the Philippines on 21 November 1941 with the

ground echelon of the 7th Heavy Bombardment Group, an Army Air Forces unit of

B-17 bombers dispatched to bolster General MacArthur's air strength. The B-17's,

which could be flown across the Pacific,

were then being prepared for the long flight

at Hamilton Field, California. Taking off

on 6 December, they were over Oahu in

the midst of the attack on Pearl Harbor.2

Among the ground elements of the bombardment group aboard the Republic was

the 453d Ordnance (Aviation) Bombardment Company, one of three types of Ordnance companies designed to support the

three types of air groups—bombardment,

pursuit, and air base. Normally, an Ordnance bombardment company consisted of

6 officers and 181 enlisted men, and its

equipment was considerable: 40 bomb

trailers and 20 bomb service trucks to haul

them, 4 shop trucks for emergency repairs,

and 18 cargo and pickup trucks; but the

453d still did not have its full complement

of men and equipment since there had

been only ten days for preparation. Its

1

 Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and

Strategy, 1940-1943, pp. 165-67.

2

 (1) Brig Gen Julian F. Barnes, Report of

Organization and Activities, U.S. Forces in Australia, December 7, 1941-June 30, 1942 (hereafter

cited as Barnes Rpt), p. 8, photostat copy, OCMH.

(2) Ltr, Byrne C. Manson to Lida Mayo, 2 Jul

56, Manson File, OCMH. (3) Wesley F. Craven

and James L. Cate, eds., "The Army Air Forces

in World War II," vol. I, Plans and Early Operations: January 1939 to August 1942 (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1948), 199-200

(hereafter cited as AAF I). (4) The Barnes Report and the Manson File, consisting of Manson's personal files and correspondence between

Manson and the author have been relied upon

throughout this chapter. Other principal sources

have been two volumes in the series UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, both by

Louis Morton: The Fall of the Philippines (Washington, 1953) and Strategy and Command: The

First Two Years (Washington, 1962).
EARLY ARRIVALS IN AUSTRALIA 35

commander, 1st Lt. Byrne C. Manson, who

had been attending the Ordnance School

at Aberdeen, Maryland, had joined the

company on 1 November.3

Arriving at Honolulu on 28 November,

the Republic on the 29th joined a convoy

being escorted by the cruiser Pensacola and

the submarine chaser Niagara. Other

vessels in the convoy were three other transports, the Chaumont, the Meigs, and the

Holbrook, and three freighters, the Admiral

Halstead, the Coast Farmer, and the Bloemfontein, the last flying the Dutch flag.

Of the transports, only the Republic and

Holbrook carried troops and equipment.

The Chaumont and the Meigs carried aircraft, bombs, guns, antiaircraft ammunition, and general supplies; the entire deck

space of the Meigs was crowded with fifty

knocked-down A-24 dive bombers. The

small freighters were mainly loaded with

peacetime supplies for civilian shops in

Manila and Guam. The Bloemfontein

also carried passengers, mostly civilians,

some of whom were en route to China and

the Java area to serve as consultants in

setting up motor maintenance shops.4

Proceeding at approximately ten knots,

the speed of the slowest freighters, the Pensacola convoy took a southwesterly course

toward the Philippines through the South

Pacific instead of the usual westerly course

through the Japanese mandated islands.

Commander Guy Clark, the captain of the

Republic, told Brig. Gen. Julian F. Barnes,

the senior Army commander, that the

course was to be via Port Moresby, New

Guinea. On 6 December the convoy

crossed the equator, and there was the

largest Army shellback initiation up to that

time.

On 7 December at 1100 Commander

Clark received a radio message that Pearl

Harbor was being attacked. He assumed

that a radio operator had picked up a

message issued during naval maneuvers,

but a later message from the Commander

in Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, left no room

for doubt: "Japan started hostilities govern yourself accordingly." Over the Republic's intercom, Commander Clark made

the announcement: "Attention all hands,

a state of war exists between Japan and the

United States. Pearl Harbor has been

attacked. Good luck."

In the next few days the convoy prepared to defend itself. Brown and white

superstructures and lifeboats were painted

gray. Cargo was searched for deck weapons, since most of the ships had no means

of defense. The hold of the Republic

yielded four British 75-mm. guns, which

the men of the 453d lashed to the deck,

although there was no ammunition for

them. Tension in the convoy mounted

when a radio reported a Japanese task

force in the Ellice Islands, 300 miles off

the starboard quarter. A stop at Suva in

the Fiji Islands, ordered by the Navy on 8

December for the purpose of awaiting

3

 (1) Capt. John F. Foy, "The What and Why

of Aviation Ordnance," The Ordnance Sergeant,

II (December, 1941), 372-80. (2) Incls to Ltr,

Byrne Manson to Lida Mayo, 15 Feb 55, Manson

File.

4

 (1) For the importance at this time of the

maintenance of lend-lease trucks on the Burma

Road to China, see above, p. 15. (2) For the efforts

of the Dutch to bolster their defenses in the Netherlands Indies, including the construction of air bases

on Java with trucks and other lend-lease matériel,

see Maj. Gen. S. Woodburn Kirby, "History of the

Second World War, United Kingdom Military

Series," The War Against Japan, vol. 1, The Loss

of Singapore (London: Her Majesty's Stationery

Office, 1957), pages 72-76, and Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy. 1940-1943, page

88.
36 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

further orders, made possible a search for

additional weapons. The Ordnance men

found some American 75-mm. ammunition

on the Holbrook and improvised gun sights

and mounts. They also found a quantity

of .50-caliber aircraft guns with ammunition, and improvised pipe stands for them

on the boat deck.5

On 12 December the American troops

aboard the convoy were constituted Task

Force South Pacific, under the command

of General Barnes. General Barnes

appointed Lieutenant Manson Ordnance

officer and Lt. W. R. Clarke commander

of the Ordnance company. Soon afterward, messages from Washington and from

the Philippines made the task force's destination and mission clear. It was to proceed to the east coast of Australia and land

at Brisbane, where it would be met by Maj.

Gen. George H. Brett, an Air Corps officer

then in Chungking. Brett had been

directed to establish in Australia a service

of supply in support of the Philippines.

His assistant was to be Brig. Gen. Henry

B. Claggett, who had held an air command

in the Philippines and was on his way to

Australia from Manila. Upon debarkation at Brisbane, Task Force South Pacific

would become United States Forces in

Australia (USFIA).

The convoy arrived at Brisbane's outer

harbor, Moreton Bay, at noon on 22

December, escorted by Australian and New

Zealand warships. From Moreton Bay, a

sheet of blue water broken by small green

islands and edged by palm-fringed yellow

beaches, Brisbane is fourteen miles up the

Brisbane River. A harbor boat brought

Col. Van S. Merle-Smith, U.S. military

attache, and some Australian Army and

Navy officers to Moreton Bay and took

General Barnes and a small staff to Brisbane, where they established USFIA headquarters, the first American headquarters

in Australia, at Lennon's Hotel late in the

afternoon of 22 December. A logistical

and administrative command, it came

under General MacArthur's United States

Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE). That

evening General Claggett arrived, assumed

command of USFIA, accepted the staff

established aboard the Republic, and designated Barnes his chief of staff. General

Brett, who was completing his tour of the

Middle East, India, and China, did not

arrive from Chungking until 1 January

1942.

As the Pensacola and her convoy

steamed upriver, the men at the rails saw

cheering crowds along the banks. A city

of some 300,000 people, Brisbane is set in

an amphitheater of greenish blue hills. It

sprawled for miles on either side of the

river, the two portions connected by bridges

and small darting ferry launches. There

were a few tall granite buildings and smoking factories, but the city was somehow

reminiscent of a frontier town in the Wild

West, with pillared porticoes extending

over sidewalks in the business section and

low corrugated iron roofs covering warehouse sheds. The men at the rails saw

palms everywhere, and strange flowers in

the public gardens. Strangest of all, a few

days before Christmas it was midsummer in

Australia. For Brisbane, halfway down

the eastern coast, is subtropical, lying between the sparsely settled tropical north

5

 (1) Ltr, Byrne Manson to Lida Mayo, 2 Jul

56. (2) For indecision in the United States on the

fate of the convoy, which had very nearly been

ordered back to Hawaii on 9 December, see Morton, Strategy and Command, pages 148-51.
EARLY ARRIVALS IN AUSTRALIA 37

and the great cities of Sydney and Melbourne on the more moderate southeastern

coast.6

The troops debarked on the afternoon of

23 December and were taken to temporary

quarters at Amberley Field and two local

race tracks. The 453d Ordnance (Aviation ) Bombardment Company was assigned

to the Doomben race track about six miles

from the city. The Australian Army provided tents and messing facilities. By 26

December storage arrangements for Ordnance equipment had been completed in

the Hedley Park area, where Class II supplies (weapons and other basic equipment)

were stored in a wool warehouse and

ammunition in the yard of a local school.7

General Claggett's first task was to get

the cargoes of the Pensacola convoy north

to the Philippines in the Holbrook and the

Bloemfontein, the two fastest ships. With

the help of Australian stevedores, the U.S.

troops reloaded men and supplies and

assembled the aircraft, working straight

through a warm and sunny Christmas Day,

taking time out only for a Christmas dinner

of cold bologna sandwiches and milk. By

30 December the ships were loaded and

steaming north, but enemy successes in the

Philippines and the rapid Japanese advance

into the Netherlands Indies made it impossible for them to get through. When

General Brett arrived in Brisbane on New

Year's Day, he ordered the convoy to put

in at Darwin, on the northern coast of

Australia.8

Last-Ditch Efforts To Aid

MacArthur

Beginning in early January, an intensive

effort was made to ship rations and ammunition to General MacArthur's troops

in the Philippines in small, fast ships that

might break the Japanese blockade. At

the end of January, forty enlisted men and

several officers of the 453d Ordnance Company at Brisbane volunteered to serve as

an armed guard for the blockade runner

Don Isidro. From the enlisted men, fifteen were selected by Clarke, the commanding officer. To determine who would

command the unit, the officers tossed a

coin, and 2d Lt. Joseph F. Kane won.

Kane and his men began to arm the Don

Isidro, which was a small passenger liner

that had operated between islands of the

southwest Pacific. Since no other suitable

guns or mounts were available, they placed

five .50-caliber heavy machine guns on the

ship, improvising the mounts with the help

of a local manufacturer.

The ship left Brisbane on 27 January.

North of Australia she was attacked by

Japanese aircraft and after two successive

days of bombing and strafing, 19—20

February, was beached on Bathurst Island,

north of Darwin. A mine sweeper rescued

the survivors. Eight of the 15-man crew

from the 453d Ordnance Company were

wounded, several seriously. Kane, severely

wounded in the leg and foot, died of gan6

 (1) A History of the U.S.S. Pensacola with

Emphasis on the Years She Served in the Pacific

During World War II (San Francisco: Phillips

and Van Orden Co., Inc., 1946), p. 17. (2)

Charles W. Domville-Fife, Australian Panorama

(Bristol: Rankin Bros., n.d.), pp. 101-10. Pat

Robinson, The Fight for New Guinea, General

Douglas MacArthur's First Offensive (New York:

Random House, 1943), p. 13. 7

( 1 ) History of G-4, USAFIA, 7 Dec 41-Jul

42, pp. 1-2. (2) History of Ordnance Section.

USASOS, 23 Dec 41-2 Sep 42, p. 1.

8

 AAF Historical Studies 9, The AAF in Australia in 1942, Air University, Maxwell AFB, p. 13.
38 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

grene in an Australian hospital at Darwin.

He was the first member of the Ordnance

Department killed in the Southwest Pacific;

an ammunition depot at Geelong, across

the bay from Melbourne, was subsequently

named for him. The rest of the men from

the Don Isidro were attached to a platoon

of the 453d that Manson had sent up to

Darwin to help establish an air service

depot at Batchelor Field in support of air

units operating between there and the

Netherlands Indies.9

Two weeks after the Don Isidro left Brisbane another detachment of volunteers

from the 453d Ordnance Company was

assigned as gun crew to the small freighter

Coast Farmer for a trip to the Philippines.

Sailing from Brisbane on 10 February, the

Coast Farmer succeeded in reaching Mindanao in the southern Philippines, discharging its cargo, and returning safely.

One member of the Ordnance group who

had gone ashore to repair some machine

guns did not return before the ship sailed

and had to be left behind.10

Planning the American Base

General Brett saw little hope of sending

any effective help to the Philippines. He

favored building a base in Australia from

which the offensive could eventually be

taken through the Netherlands Indies and

the islands to the north. Hurrying to Melbourne, which was more nearly the actual

center of government than the new capital,

Canberra, he established his headquarters

there on 3 January in three rooms in Victoria Barracks, the location of Australian

military, air, and naval headquarters.

Brett immediately began a series of conferences with the Australian chiefs of staffs

that resulted in the formation of several

joint committees and in the emergence of

a general policy on how best the American

forces could be used and where.11

General Brett's main base would have to

be near a port and near a city, for it needed

docks, water, power, and good communications; these were not conflicting demands,

for all major Australian cities are port

cities. The interior of the great continent

is arid and undeveloped. The seven million people lived mostly along the eastern

and southeastern coast, more than two million of them in Sydney and Melbourne.

Sydney was ruled out by the Australian

naval chief of staff as an American Army

and Air base because of existing demands

and an extreme water shortage. The

choice of the Australians was Melbourne,

which they considered easier to defend than

Brisbane and other areas farther north.

General Brett preferred Brisbane. Following instructions from the War Depart9

 (1) History of Ord Sec, USASOS, 23 Dec 41-

2 Sep 42. (2) Rad, Melbourne to AGWAR, No.

311, 22 Feb 42, AG 381 (11-27-41) Sec 2C.. (3)

Rpt of Ord Activities, USAFIA, Feb-May 42,

OHF. (4) Official History of Headquarters USASOS, December 1941-June 1945 (hereafter cited

as History USASOS), pp. 92-93, and chs. viii-xi.

(5) Lieutenant Kane received the Purple Heart

posthumously. All of the enlisted men of the 453d

Ordnance (Aviation) Bombardment Company

aboard the Don Isidro also received the Purple

Heart for manning their guns until they were put

out of action, for extinguishing fires caused by the

bomb explosions, and for helping the wounded

(some despite their own wounds). GO 28, USASOS

SWPA, 11 Oct 42, 98-GHQ 1-1.13. These men were

among the last to receive the Purple Heart "for a

singularly meritorious act of essential service," according to AR 600-45 of 8 August 1932. Change 4

to AR 600-45, 4 September 1942, restricted the

award to those wounded in action against the enemy

or as a direct result of enemy action. 10

 (1) History of Ord Sec, USASOS, 23 Dec

41-2 Sep 42, pp. 1-2. (2) History USASOS, p. 93.

(3) Rpt of Ord Activities, USAFIA, Feb-May 42,

p. 1. 11

 Craven and Cate. AAF I, pp. 231-32.
EARLY ARRIVALS IN AUSTRALIA 39

COLONEL HOLMAN. (Photograph taken

after his promotion to brigadier general.)

ment to adapt his logistical plan to strategic

requirements, Brett decided to place all of

his bases in the north rather than in the

south. The primary base depot, for the

assembly, repair, and maintenance of all

types of aircraft, was to be at Brisbane.

There would be a secondary base depot,

for the assembly of light aircraft and such

repairs and maintenance as were possible,

at Townsville, a small resort town some

700 miles up the east coast. The advance

depot and main operating and first-line

maintenance base would be at Darwin, a

little tropical town on the northern coast

that had recently become important because it was the nearest jump-off point for

the Netherlands Indies—within three and

a half hour's flying time to the nearest

point in the Indies. The main debarkation point for U.S. troops would be Melbourne, preferred to Brisbane because of

the greater facilities available, particularly

water supply. At Melbourne a reception

and replacement center would be established where organizations could be formed

out of the new arrivals and training given

if necessary.

While the Americans and Australians

were conferring, the British and U.S. Governments established a command that included Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands

Indies, and the Philippines. Called the

ABDA (American - British - Dutch - Australian) Command, it was under Lt. Gen.

Sir Archibald Wavell with General Brett

as his deputy. In the second week in

January Brett departed for the Netherlands

Indies. His successor in Australia was

Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, but within

a few days Brereton was made deputy air

commander in the ABDA area, which

meant that he had to go to Java to command ABDAIR pending the arrival of the

commander, Air Marshal Sir Richard

Peirse. This made it physically impossible

for Brereton to continue command of

USFIA, now renamed USAFIA (United

States Army Forces in Australia). At

Brereton's request, General Wavell asked

General Marshall to relieve Brereton of his

responsibilities in Australia. Thereupon

Marshall authorized General Barnes to

assume command of USAFIA. Barnes

was now under Wavell's command, and

Brett as Wavell's deputy could issue orders

to him.

At Melbourne, the Ordnance Section of

USAFIA was headed by Lieutenant Manson, who had come from Brisbane, leaving

Lieutenant Clarke in charge of the Ordnance office there. Only a few officers to

form general and special staffs for the new

headquarters had arrived, flying to Aus-
40 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

tralia via North Africa, but they brought

the news that the headquarters group had

been "picked with care" by the War

Department and was on the way.12

The men selected for the USAFIA headquarters were dubbed the "Remember

Pearl Harbor" (RPH) Group. Consisting originally of thirteen experienced staff

officers ordered to San Francisco from

assignments all over the country, the group

sailed on the two liners President Coolidge

and Mariposa in the first major convoy

sent to Australia after Pearl Harbor.

Aboard the President Coolidge were the

Ordnance members of the RPH Group—

five officers and six enlisted men who were

to make up the Ordnance Section on the

USAFIA Special Staff. The ranking

officer was Lt. Col. Jonathan L. Holman,

whose most recent assignment had been in

the Lend-Lease Administration in Washington. The others were Capts. Bertram

H. Hirsch and Elwyn N. Kirsten, 1st Lt.

Spencer B. Booz, and 2d Lt. Wallace W.

Thompson.13

Along with the Remember Pearl Harbor

Group the two liners, loaded to capacity,

carried pursuit planes and large quantities

of bombs, ammunition, and aircraft maintenance equipment and supplies, as well as

signal and medical supplies and equipment.

Troops aboard the ships included AAF,

Engineer, and Signal units, and four Ordnance aviation companies. Most of the

passengers and cargo were scheduled to be

transshipped to ABDA area ports outside

Australia. A great deal of the cargo was

intended for troops slated to occupy New

Caledonia.14

When the Coolidge anchored in Melbourne harbor on the afternoon of 1 February, Colonel Holman, standing at the

rail of the huge liner, looked down at the

dock and saw a small officer anxiously

looking up and biting his fingernails. It

was Manson. In addition to the heavyresponsibilities that had been forced upon

him, he had a more recent cause for worry.

The 453d Ordnance (Aviation) Bombardment Company had been ordered from

Brisbane to Melbourne by train to join the

four Ordnance aviation companies aboard

the Coolidge and the Mariposa on the voyage to Java, but had suffered a series of

mishaps on the way. Rains following a

long period of dry weather had brought

floods that prevented the train from getting

through. Lieutenant Erickson, who was

in command (Clarke had been assigned to

the base section at Brisbane), had got the

men and equipment off the train and

loaded in the company trucks, but by that

time the roads were impassable, and they

had to return to Brisbane.15

The immediate task of Holman's RPH

staff and the Ordnance companies in the

convoy was to help tackle the problem

posed by the cargoes of the Coolidge and

the Mariposa, including about 2,500 tons

of bombs and ammunition. Unloading

12

 Ltr, Moore, DCofS to Brett, 19 Dec 41, copy

in OCT HB, SWPA Organization File. 13

 (1) Orders and correspondence dealing with

the RPH Group are in AG 370.5 (18 Dec 41) (4).

(2) Interv, Stanley Falk with Maj Gen Jonathan

L. Holman and Lt Col Elwyn N. Kirsten, 8 Oct 54.

14

 (1) Memo, Col C. P. Gross, Chief, Transportation Br, G-4, for CG, San Francisco Port of Embarkation, 31 Dec 41, sub: Vessels to Accompany

Convoy to "X." (2) Memo, Gross for CG, SFPOE.

1 Jan 42, sub: Distribution of Space on Coolidge

and Mariposa. Both in AG 400 (12-31-41). (3)

Memo, Brig Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, ACofS

WPD, for TAG, 18 Feb 42, sub: Information for

CG USAFIA Re POPPY [New Caledonia] Force,

AG 381 (11-27-41) Sec 2B. 15

 Interv with General Holman, 12 Apr 56.
EARLY ARRIVALS IN AUSTRALIA 41

and unscrambling the matériel piled on the

piers and removing it from the dock area

to storage took about ten days. Warehouses were scarce. Ammunition could be

stored in the open, and open storage was

soon in widespread use throughout Australia because of lack of materials and labor

to construct igloos. The men established

a temporary dump for bombs, fuzes, and

small arms ammunition in the Laverton

area of Melbourne and used a shed about

a mile from the port for classification and

sorting. Kensington, a Melbourne suburb,

was selected for the storage of general supply items. After some degree of order was

restored, the four Ordnance aviation companies sailed for Java.

Colonel Holman remained in Melbourne

only long enough to see that the unloading

of Ordnance material was proceeding well

and to establish the Ordnance office in the

Repatriation Building on tree-shaded St.

Kilda Road. He had been ordered north

to ABDA Command headquarters on Java.

Appointing Captain Hirsch Ordnance

officer, he departed for Darwin on 8 February. He arrived on 19 February, only

a few hours after the little port had suffered

its first Japanese air attack; his immediate

job was to help American artillery troops

then at Darwin in the difficult task of planning for the salvage and repair of Ordnance equipment from bombed and sunken

ships. The enemy raid was portentous, for

by that time invading Japanese forces had

ended Allied hopes of holding Java.

ABDA Command headquarters withdrew

from the island. The convoy with the four

Ordnance companies, then at sea off the

southern coast of Australia, was rerouted to

India. Colonel Holman returned to Melbourne where, on 25 February, he became

the USAFIA chief of Ordnance.16

Port Operations

In the early months of 1942, a great

deal of the time of the USAFIA Ordnance

Office was devoted to port operations. Between mid-January and mid-April, sixtyone "refugee" ships—ships at sea when the

war began, bound for the Philippines,

Hongkong, Singapore, or Java—were

diverted to Australian ports, with "distress

cargoes" amounting to nearly 200,000 tons

of rations, ammunition, weapons (mostly

machine guns), vehicles, and parts. Late

in February the POPPY Force of about

22,000 troops—the largest movement yet

attempted—landed in Australia, ultimately

bound for New Caledonia. The heavy

organizational equipment and other supplies of POPPY Force were shipped separately, and these cargoes had to be unloaded and then reloaded when the force

left for New Caledonia. Cargoes had been

loaded by hasty, untested methods and

were badly scrambled. Manifests were

vague, incomplete, or so inaccurate as to

make a physical search necessary.17

The Australian stevedores available to

help unload were usually middle-aged men.

16

 (1) History of Ord Sec, USASOS, 23 Dec

41-2 Sep 42, pp. 2-3. (2) Interv, Falk with Holman and Kirsten. (3) Rpt of Ord Activities.

USAFIA, Feb-May 42, p. 1. 17

 (1) James R. Masterson, U.S. Army Transportation in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1941-

1947 (hereafter cited as Masterson, Trans in

SWPA), Monograph 31, Transportation Unit, Historical Division, SSUSA, October 1949, pp. 255-

66, 268-69, OCMH. (2) Rpt of Ord Activities,

USAFIA, Feb-May 42. (3) Army Service Forces.

Control Division, Development of the United

States Supply Base in Australia, the Period of

Defense and Build-up (hereafter cited as Dev of

U.S. Supply Base in Australia), pp. 24. 55-58.

MS. OCMH.
42 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

capable of handling not more than 9 tons

per hatch per hour, as compared with the

25 tons that the U.S. troops could discharge. Their ways were exasperating.

They had a break in the middle of the

morning for smoking—called a "smoke-o"

—and another in the afternoon for tea,

with one man on the pier delegated to keep

the water hot for the tea; in this manner,

one impatient Ordnance officer noted, they

wasted two or three hours a day. They

would not work in the rain and observed

strict union regulations on hours, refusing

to work on Saturday afternoons or Sundays, even though ships were docking with

badly needed supplies, and threatening to

strike when troops were assigned to do the

emergency unloading.18

Ordnance officers at the ports found that

local laborers and untrained troops could

make tragic mistakes in handling military

stores, a discovery of this early period that

assumed greater importance as overseas

operations accelerated all over the world.

Lacking Ordnance Standard Nomenclature

Lists (SNL's) and technical manuals, often

they could not identify weapons, ammunition, and parts. They sometimes overlooked vital parts. The men loading the

Pensacola convoy ships for the Philippines,

for example, had spent days searching for

the trigger motors and solenoids that controlled the firing of the guns on the A-24

dive bombers so desperately needed by

General MacArthur. Afterward it was

discovered that the solenoids, nailed inside

the packing crates, had been overlooked

and had been burned along with the crates.

Replacements had to be rushed by air from

the United States.19

For port duty the 453d Ordnance (Aviation) Bombardment Company was divided

among three ports. The main body of the

company (less ninety men) was at Brisbane, with one platoon at Darwin and

another at Melbourne. The 453d continued to be the only Ordnance unit in

Australia until mid-March, when there

began to arrive the first elements of a

shipment of nine Ordnance aviation companies; one antiaircraft medium maintenance company (the 25th); and sections

of a depot and an ammunition platoon, all

sent from the United States in response to

a request by General Brett in January for

Ordnance troops. He had requested more

depot, ammunition, and maintenance men

than were sent, but the planners in Washington, intent at the time on reinforcing

the British Isles and thinking of Australia

as an air base only, had not been able to

comprehend the size of the port operations.

Moreover, the planners had originally intended to depend heavily on local labor,

not realizing that during three years of war

the best of Australia's manpower had been

drained off to the Middle East and elsewhere. It took the threat of a collapse of

ABDA to bring about a change in War

Department policy, and the dispatch of 18

 (1) Report, Information Furnished by Colonel

Henry, Chief Ordnance Officer, Port of Embarkation, San Francisco, Relative to His Inspection

Trip Throughout the South and Southwest Pacific

(5/25/43) (hereafter cited as SWPA Rpt (Henry)), Folder, SWPA Report (Col William J.

Henry), OHF. (2) Lt. Gen. George R. Brett with

Jack Kokoed, "The MacArthur I Knew," True

(October, 1949), p. 26.

19

 (1) Rads, Australia to AG, No. 723, 16 Mar

42, Maj Gen James A. Ulio, TAG, to CG USAFIA, Nos. 784 and 786, 21 Mar 42, all in AG 471

(10-1-41), Sec 2. (2) Interv with Captain L. B.

Coats . . . , 21 Apr 42, AAF, 385-E MethodsManners-Conducting Warfare. (3) Arnold, Global

Mission, p. 290.
EARLY ARRIVALS IN AUSTRALIA 43

more Ordnance troops to aid in building

up the base in Australia.20

20

 (1) Rpt of Ord Activities USAFIA, Feb-May

42. (2) Memo, Eisenhower for TAG, 16 Feb 42,

sub: Units and Supplies to be Dispatched to

SUMAC, AG 381 (11-27-41) Sec 2B. (3) Ltr,

AG to CG American Forces in Australia, 20 Dec

41, sub: G-4 Administrative Order—Plan X, AG

381 (12-20-41). (4) DF's, Maj Gen Brehon B.

Somervell to WPD, 15 Feb 42, and to G-3, 18

Feb 42, sub: Tables of Organization for "X," both

in G-4/33861.
CHAPTER IV

The Base in Australia

After the bombing of Darwin on 19 February, Japanese air attacks were expected

anywhere in Australia, at any time, possibly as a prelude to invasion. Americans

felt the tension in the streets of Melbourne,

crowded with refugees from Java, Malaya,

and Singapore and U.S. Army trucks and

soldiers, and darkened at night with a

brownout. On the primitive Australian

trains, where they dimmed the antiquated

gas lamps and lay down on leather benches

that pitched and rolled, Ordnance troops

felt that they were headed toward combat

zones. Raids on Darwin did continue for

some time, and several took place on the

northwestern coast at Broome and Wyndham. At Broome on 3 March, 35 or 40

people were killed (mostly refugees from

the Netherlands Indies) and 20 aircraft

were destroyed.1

The Japanese, having occupied Rabaul

in January, on 8 March moved into Lae

and Salamaua on the upper coast of eastern New Guinea, which put them in easy

bombing distance of Port Moresby, the

chief Australian outpost in New Guinea,

about 700 miles across the Coral Sea from

Townsville. This was the situation when

General MacArthur arrived in Australia

from the Philippines on 17 March. That

same day he was named by the Australian

Government as its choice for Supreme

Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area

(SWPA) and on 18 April officially

assumed command of the new theater.

MacArthur filled the top positions on his

staff with the men who had come with him

from Corregidor and who had served with

him in USAFFE. In addition to the existing American commands, consisting of

USAFFE (now a shadow command),

United States Forces in the Philippines

(USFIP), and USAFIA, MacArthur

established three tactical commands within

SWPA. These were Allied Land Forces

under an Australian, General Sir Thomas

Blarney; Allied Air Forces under General

Brett; and Allied Naval Forces, also under

an American, Vice Adm. Herbert F. Leary.

American ground forces were assigned to

USAFIA but came under General Blarney

for operational employment.2

1

 (1) Unless otherwise indicated the material in

this chapter has been based on the following: History

USASOS, cited above ch. III, n9(4); History of

Ordnance Section USASOS December 1941-September 1942; Reports of Ordnance Activities.

USAFIA, February-May 1942 and June 1942,

OHF; Reports of Ordnance Activities, USASOS

SWPA, July-October 1942, OHF. (2) Memo, Maj

Bertram H. Hirsch for COrdO, 21 May 42, sub:

Report of Inspection of Ordnance Services, Establishments and Co-ordination With Other Services

(hereafter cited as Hirsch Rpt). (3) Ltr, Hirsch

to COrdO, USAFIA, 6 May 42. Last two in

AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333 Inspections, KCRC.

(4) Dudley McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area—

First Year: Kokoda to Wau, Series 1 (Army), V,

of "Australia in the War of 1939-1945" (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1959), 75-77.

2

 Morton. Strategy and Command: The First

Two Years, pp. 247-55.
THE BASE IN AUSTRALIA 45

With the limited forces at his command,

there was little General MacArthur could

do for some time to come beyond checking

the enemy's advances toward Australia,

protecting land, sea, and air communications in the theater, and preparing for later

offensives. For the time being, air operations against the Japanese on New Guinea

and Rabaul and protection of Australian

airfields, coastal cities, and shipping were

the main effort. Support of air as well as

port operations was the first major task of

the USAFIA Ordnance office.3

Rounding Up Weapons

and Ammunition

Weapons and ammunition were urgently

needed to arm aircraft and defend airfields,

coastal cities, and ships, but little help could

be expected immediately from the United

States. The automatic system of Class II

and IV supply set up by the first War

Department plan for Australia, dated 20

December 1941, was aimed at building up

a 60-day level by 1 March 1942 and was

raised in early February to a 90-day level,

but it soon broke down for lack of shipping

and supplies. In any case it would take

time for the system to be effective and

there was an inescapable time lag involved

in the long voyage from San Francisco.

From the first, War Department policy

called for American commanders in Australia to obtain locally as many items as

possible, and for this purpose Holman had

brought with him credits for $300,000 in

Ordnance funds. Only partially used, and

later reimbursed by SWPA, these funds

were of major importance in the early days

in Australia. Part went into services and

materials for storing the ammunition that

came in the Coolidge and the Mariposa.

Ammunition, which was supplied automatically for the first six months of 1942, did

not present as serious a problem as weapons, though requests were made for more

bombs and ammunition for aircraft and

ground machine guns, antiaircraft guns,

and small arms.4

After 21 February 1942 all local procurement was done by the American

Purchasing Commission, established by

General Barnes to co-ordinate and control

all USAFIA purchasing, prevent competition, fix priorities, and work with U.S.

naval authorities. The commission was

composed of a representative from each

technical service and had a Quartermaster

chairman. The Ordnance member was

Maj. Bertram H. Hirsch. Unfortunately,

Australia's resources after three years of

war were meager. According to General

Brett, "There was plenty of money available to purchase what we wanted, but

heartbreakingly little of what we wanted

and needed."

 5

3

 (1) Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 408-19. (2)

Interv with Holman and Kirsten, 12 Apr 56. (3)

For Australian impressions of MacArthur—"outstanding in appearance and personality"—see McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area—First Year,

Kokoda to Wau, p. 18.

4

 (1) Ltr, AG to CG American Forces in Australia, 20 Dec 41, sub: G-4 Administrative Order—

Plan X, AG 381 (12-20-21). (2) Ltr, TAG to

CG Field Forces et al., 22 Jan 42, sub: Supply of

Overseas Departments, Theaters and Separate Bases,

AG 400 (1-17-42). (3) Memo, Somervell for

AG, 1 Mar 42, sub: Ammunition Supply Information for Australia, G-4/33861 sec IV. (4)

Barnes Rpt, cited above, ch. III, 2n(1). (5) Incl

to Ltr, Maj Gen Jonathan L. Holman (USA Ret)

to Brig Gen Hal C. Pattison, CMH, 3 Oct 63

(hereafter cited as Holman Comments 2), OCMH. 5

 (1) Barnes Rpt, app. 19, Historical Record,

General Purchasing Agent for Australia, pp. 1-3;

app. 15, Account of the QM Section, p. 8. (2)

Brett, "The MacArthur I Knew," True (October,

1949), p. 27.
46 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

The men on Holman's staff had to

round up weapons wherever they could.

In response to a request by General Brett

in March to arm Air Forces ground personnel with rifles and machine guns, Holman got about 10,000 Enfields from

distress cargoes and salvaged machine guns

from wrecked aircraft, improvising mounts

for them. To bolster seacoast defenses, the

Australians had some lend-lease 155-mm.

guns of World War I vintage. Captain

Kirsten, who was an expert on antiaircraft

weapons, and M. Sgt. Delmar E. Tucker of

Holman's office helped convert these guns

into coast artillery by supervising their installation on Panama mounts and instructing Australian personnel in their operation. This was an effort that continued

throughout most of 1942. Tucker, a

specialist on artillery, was so good in his

field that he was offered a commission in

Artillery, and so loyal to Ordnance that he

turned down the offer. He also made a

fine contribution, along with Captain

Kirsten, to the early and very important

ship arming project.6

Ship Arming

Australia had always depended heavily

on coastal shipping because its railways and

highways were inadequate even in peacetime. Railroads ran along the coast, with

feeder lines branching into the vast and

mostly uninhabited interior, but there were

no through trains in the American sense,

for lines linking the populous states of

Queensland, New South Wales, and Victoria had different gauges, so that every

time a state line was crossed, men and

freight had to change trains. Australia

had no major highways suitable for longdistance haulage; such roads as existed

were fit only for light traffic. Once the

Americans began building the logistical

bases, coastal shipping between Australian

ports became even more important, and

after the Japanese threat to Port Moresby

in March 1942, ship traffic northward increased immeasurably.7

The theater's early need for ships and

still more ships was partially met by the

temporary retention of transpacific merchantmen arriving from San Francisco, but

it very soon became plain that USAFIA

would have to acquire a local fleet to move

troops, equipment, and supplies within the

theater. A beginning was made when

twenty-one small Dutch freighters, which

had formerly operated in the Netherlands

Indies and had taken refuge in Australian

ports after the fall of Java, were chartered

from their owners, the Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPM). The KPM

vessels formed the backbone of the "X"

fleet of small freighters on which men and

cargoes were carried between Australian

ports, north to Port Moresby, New Guinea,

and eventually around the southern coast of

New Guinea north as far as Cape Nelson.

USAFIA also discovered the need for a

fleet of shallow-draft vessels that could

navigate among coral reefs and use primitive landing places far up the coast of New

Guinea and in the outlying islands. For

this purpose it obtained from the Australians a miscellaneous collection of luggers.

6

 (1) Interv with Holman and Kirsten, 12 Apr

56. (2) Memo, Maj Elwyn N. Kirsten for Col

Holman, 7 Sep 42, no sub, OHF.

7

 (1) S. J. Butlin, War Economy 1939-1942,

Series 4 (Civil) III, of "Australia in the War of

1939-1945" (Canberra: Australian War Memorial,

1955), 397-98. (2) AAF Study No. 9, pp. 34-36.
THE BASE IN AUSTRALIA 47

rusty trawlers, old schooners, launches,

ketches, yawls, and yachts, which became

known as the "S" fleet, sometimes called

the "catboat flotilla." Both of these makeshift fleets were under Army control and

remained so because the U.S. Navy, which

theoretically operated all seagoing vessels in

theaters of operations, maintained that it

did not have the resources to do so in

SWPA.8

The "X" and "S" fleets sailing out of

Australian ports were heading into dangerous waters and had to be armed against

enemy action. A large share of this responsibility, as well as the main responsibility for inspecting and servicing ships'

guns at the ports, fell on USAFIA Ordnance. The U.S. Navy was unable to help

in the early days, and the efforts of the

Royal Australian Navy were restricted to

vessels assigned to the theater by the British

Ministry of Transport, including most of

the KPM ships and several others of the

"X" fleet, but excluding ships of American

registry.9

Providentially there arrived in Australia

in the spring of 1942 a shipment of weapons that could be used on the USAFIA

fleets, particularly on the large and growing "S" fleet. The shipment had been

dispatched from the United States in midFebruary under the UGR Project initiated

shortly after Pearl Harbor by Col. Charles

H. Unger for the purpose of arming small

vessels to be used in running the Japanese

blockade of the Philippines. By the time

the shipment arrived the Philippines had

fallen. USAFIA's Small Ships Supply

Section fell heir to the weapons—fifty 105-

mm. howitzers, fifty 37-mm. antitank guns

on M4 carriages, five hundred .30-caliber

machine guns on Cygnet mounts, and a

quantity of miscellaneous equipment.10

The 105-mm. howitzers of the UGR

Project were intended to be exchanged for

75-mm. guns in the hands of troops already

in Australia; the 75's would then be employed in ship armament. Forty-nine 75-

mm. guns were rounded up from theater

resources. Of these, eight had been on

board a ship beached during the Japanese

raid on Darwin on 19 February. After

being under water for thirty-nine days, the

guns were salvaged, completely overhauled

under the supervision of Sergeant Tucker,

and sent to Melbourne for ship armament.

Only sample ship mounts for the 37's and

75's had come from the United States.

Holman's staff took the samples to Australian firms, supervised the manufacture of

mounts and adapters, and then used Ordnance troops to remove the guns from their

carriages and place them on the mounts.

Because they considered the Cygnet mount

for the .30-caliber machine gun unsuitable,

the USAFIA Ordnance men designed a

pedestal type of mount that would take

either the .30-caliber machine gun or its

preferred replacement, the .50-caliber

machine gun, and had about 200 manufactured in Melbourne. On the small ship

project, Ordnance worked closely with the

8

 (1) Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson,

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1957), pp. 430, 448-53. (2) Memo,

Kirsten for Chief Ordn Officer USASOS, 18 Feb

43, sub: Ship Arming (hereafter cited as Kirsten

Memo), Folder H-15-8, 13 May 43, OHF. (3) On

the question of Army versus Navy operation of the

local fleet in SWPA, see Robert W. Coakley and

Richard M. Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy,

1943-1945, a volume in preparation for UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, ch. XIX,

"Shipping in the Pacific War."

9

 Kirsten Memo.

10

 Ibid.
48 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

group headed by Colonel Unger, who had

over-all responsibility for small ship procurement and operation.11

The overworked USAFIA Ordnance

troops continued to service British, Dutch,

and Australian weapons as well as American. Some help came from Australian

maintenance experts and from Australian

Navy facilities, but this aid was not entirely

satisfactory, and an acute shortage of

American maintenance units complicated

the task.12

Ordnance Forces Spread Thin

The main problem of the USAFIA Ordnance officer was manpower—"first, last,

and always."

 13

 To supply Ordnance service at far-flung installations on the rim of

the island continent stretched his resources

to the utmost. By 3 March 1942 the

USAFIA commander had established six

base sections: Base Section 1 at Darwin,

Base Section 2 at Townsville, Base Section

3 at Brisbane, Base Section 4 at Melbourne,

Base Section 5 at Adelaide on the southern

coast, and Base Section 6 at Perth on the

west coast; and soon afterward, Base Section 7 at Sydney. Acting as service commands and communications zones, the base

sections received, assembled, and forwarded

all U.S. troops and supplies, and operated

ports and military installations. Until

early April, when 17 technicians and clerks

from the United States reported to

Holman's office and ground Ordnance

units began to arrive, the technical personnel that could be spared from aviation

Ordnance units were placed on special duty

to work at the ports.

The nine Ordnance aviation companies

that began arriving in mid-March were

immediately dispersed to support their

combat or air base groups. By the end of

April there were air base groups in the

Townsville, Brisbane, Melbourne, Sydney,

and Darwin areas, and small servicing

details at Adelaide and Perth. Combat

operations were centered in the north.

Moving to the Darwin and Townsville

areas, where Royal Australian Air Force

(RAAF) airfields were being supplemented

by fields constructed by U.S. Engineers,

bombardment and pursuit groups took

their own Ordnance companies with them.

As the groups sent out squadrons to cover

the danger areas on the northern coast,

Ordnance aviation companies were divided

into platoons to accompany them.14

The story of the 445th Ordnance (Aviation) Bombardment Company exemplifies

the strain placed on aviation companies.

Two platoons accompanying the 49th Pursuit Group (the first group to get into operation in Australia) when it moved from

Sydney into the Darwin area in mid-March

were split up in order to serve squadrons of

the 49th at different landing strips. This

duty consisted of unbelting, oiling, polishing, and rebelting all ammunition each

11

 (1) Ibid. (2) Intervs, Mayo and Falk with

Holman and Kirsten. (3) Memo, Somervell for

TAG, 15 Feb 42, sub: Armament for Small Ships,

G-4/33861. (4) Incl to 1st Ind, General Holman

to CofOrd, 15 May 56, Comments on Southwest

Pacific Campaign Histories (hereafter cited as

Holman Comments 1), OHF.

12

 (1) DF with Memo for Record, Somervell to

TAG, 3 Mar 42, sub: Spare Parts and Accessories

for Armament of Ships in Convoy Service to X,

G-4/33861 sec IV. (2) Kirsten Memo. (3) For

an example of the difficulties involved when American maintenance work was turned over to Australian civilians, see Brett, "The MacArthur I Knew,"

True (October, 1949), p. 26.

13

 Interv, Falk with Holman and Kirsten, 8

Oct 54. 14

 AAF Study No. 9, pp. 47-53, 94-95.
THE BASE IN AUSTRALIA 49

night, and stripping, oiling, and polishing

all guns every third night. At the beginning of May, one of the platoons was

attached to the 71st Bombardment Squadron and sent to operate the ammunition

dump at Batchelor Field. This air terminal was forty miles south of Darwin, so

far from any port or railhead that Quartermaster supplies could not get through and

the men had to obtain much of their meat

by hunting. In mid-May a fourth platoon

of the 445th was sent to New Caledonia.15

Dispersion of Ground Reinforcements

When the first large increment of ground

Ordnance troops arrived the second week

in April, it also was widely dispersed.

The troops had been sent from the United

States to support the first ground reinforcements sent to Australia. The reinforcements, dispatched as a result of a midFebruary warning message from General

Wavell, commander of ABDA, that the loss

of Java might have to be conceded, consisted of about 25,000 troops, including the

41st Infantry Division and 8,000 service

troops of which 700 were Ordnance—one

medium maintenance company, one depot,

and two ammunition companies. Early in

March, after the collapse of ABDA, a second infantry division, the 32d, was sent to

Australia at the request of Prime Minister

Churchill, who wanted to avoid bringing

an Australian division home from the then

critical Middle East battle zone. The 32d

Infantry Division brought with it another

medium maintenance company. These

were the last reinforcements of any size to

arrive in Australia for some time to come,

despite urgent requests by General Brett

for many more ground units, including

Ordnance units up to three ammunition

battalions, three maintenance and supply

battalions, and three depot companies.

There were not enough men available in

the United States or ships to carry them.16

The Ordnance companies that arrived

with the main body of the 41st Division at

Melbourne the second week in April were

the 37th Ordnance Medium Maintenance

Company, the 84th Ordnance Depot Company, and the 55th and 59th Ordnance

Ammunition Companies. The 84th Depot

Company established at Seymour (north

of Melbourne) the first Ordnance general

supply depot in Australia. Soon the new

arrivals were scattered all over Australia.

The 37th Ordnance Medium Maintenance

and the 55th Ordnance Ammunition Companies were sent to Brisbane to provide

service to air and antiaircraft units there

and at Base Section 2 at Townsville. The

84th, for many months the only depot company in Australia, furnished an officer and

15

 (1) Ibid., pp. 107, 129-30. (2) Ltr, 2d Lt

Morris F. Miller to Col Holman, 22 May 42. (3)

Ltrs, Maj Harry C. Porter to Ord Officer, USAFIA, and to Ord Officer, USAAS, 11 Jun 42, sub:

Report on Ordnance Activities in North-West

Area. (4) Memo, Capt J. C. Werner for Col

Holman, 23 Jun 42, sub: General Report on Trip

Through Base Sections 3, 2, 1 and 5 (hereafter

cited as Werner Rpt). Last four in AFWESPAC

Ord Sec 333 Inspections, KCRC.

16

 (1) Rads, AG from Australia, No. 491, 4 Mar

42, and No. 623, 12 Mar 42, AG 381 (11-27-4),

sec 3. (2) Memos, Brig Gen John H. Hilldring,

ACofS G-1 for TAG, 14 Feb 42, subs: Officer

Personnel Requirements to Place the Australian

SOS in Operation, and Enlisted Personnel Requirements ... . both in G-1/16368-42. (3) Memo.

Eisenhower for TAG, 7 Mar 42, sub: Request

for Additional Personnel and Supplies, AG 381

(11-2-41), sec 3. (4) Memo. Lt Col Clarence

H. Schabacker for Col Ott, 5 Mar 42, no sub,

in Movement Orders, 4656, AGF, RG 400 A 46-

169. (5) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for

Coalition Warfare: 1941-42, pp. 128-31.
50 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

five enlisted men to form the Ordnance

Section of Base Section 7 at Sydney, where

distress cargoes, chiefly Dutch, were piling

up. The 84th also supplied a detachment

to operate a general supply depot at Adelaide on the south coast, the headquarters

of the 32d Division.17

The 118th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company, commanded by 1st Lt.

Frederick G. Waite, arrived with the 32d

Division. The company landed without

its tools, equipment, repair trucks, or parts,

but the young commander managed to

acquire some distress cargo tools at the

Adelaide port. In the circumstances,

Waite remembered later, the job of supporting the division "was not done as well

and as thoroughly as we desired, or as the

combat troops had a right to expect" but

"did get done after a fashion." In addition, he had to send detachments to aid

port operations at Sydney, an antiaircraft

regiment at Perth, and the task force at

Darwin.18

It took the most careful planning by

Colonel Holman's office to make the best

use of the very scarce Ordnance troops.

The depot and ammunition sections that

had arrived in March were organized into

the 360th Ordnance Composite Company,

activated on 1 May, and sent about 100

miles north of Adelaide to operate at one

of the transshipment points on the overland

route to Darwin. Between Darwin and

the cities of the eastern and southern coasts

there was a gap in the railroad line of as

much as 600 miles. This had to be

bridged by truck or air transport. The

25th Ordnance Medium Maintenance

(AA) Company was given the job of supporting the 41st Infantry Division, but because this company was especially experienced in antiaircraft artillery, it had small

detachments at Brisbane, Townsville, and

Perth working on fire control instruments

and instructing other Ordnance companies

in that kind of maintenance. Out of the

effort at Townsville grew the very important Townsville Antiaircraft Ordnance

Training Center directed by the commander of the 25th, Capt. William A.

McCree.19

The necessity of splitting Ordnance companies into detachments placed a severe

drain on organic unit equipment. A single

machine shop truck might be adequate for

the work of a medium maintenance company, but when the company was split into

detachments operating in four separate

areas the men would need four trucks instead of one; an aviation bombardment

company would need additional truck

cranes; an ammunition company, a larger

supply of tarpaulins. All required more

messing equipment, and also water trailers

for operations in a country where water

was scarce. Mobile equipment operating

17

 (1) History of the 84th Ord Depot Co. (2)

Hirsch Rpt. 18

 (1) Lt Col Frederick G. Waite, Ordnance

Service Support Problems in Tropical Warfare.

Paper submitted to the faculty of the Armed Forces

Staff College, Norfolk, Va., May 1950, MS, Armed

Forces Staff College Library, copy in OHF. (2)

History USASOS, chapter on Base Sec 5. (3)

Holman considered Waite "an outstanding officer

in every way." Holman Comments 2.

19

 (1) On the composite company, see WD LO,

12 Feb 42, to CG's, Hawaiian Dept and USAFIA,

sub: Constitution and Activation of Units, in

Movement Orders. 5691, AGF, RG 400 A-45-169;

and Ltr with Incl, Capt P. H. Mulcahy to Ord

Officer USAFIA, 11 Jun 42, sub: Alice Springs.

AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333 Inspections. KCRC.

(2) Interv with Holman and Kirsten. 12 Apr 56.

(3) Rpt, Final Report of Lt Col William A.

McCree (hereafter cited as McCree Rpt), in Field

Service Key Personnel Rpts, OHF.
THE BASE IN AUSTRALIA 51

over poor roads, or none at all, required an

ample supply of spare parts.20

A Huge Continent With

Poor Transportation

For the first five months of 1942, the one

factor primarily affecting supply in Australia was transportation. This is amply illustrated by the story of the early effort to

transport ammunition from southern and

eastern ports to Darwin. It had to be sent

overland because the sea lanes to Darwin

were insecure, and the hardships reminded

one observer of the attempt to forward

supplies over the Burma Road.21

From Adelaide the rail line north

stopped at Alice Springs, which seemed to

one Ordnance officer a comparatively large

community for the outback—"actually

several houses and even curbs along the

street." From there, supplies were carried

forward in trucks operated by the Australians. About six hundred miles north, at

Birdum—one small building and three tin

shacks—there was a railroad to Darwin,

but it had small capacity, was antiquated

and in poor repair, and was chiefly useful

in the rainy season when the dirt road, in

some places only bush trail, was washed

out.

From Brisbane to Darwin, a distance of

2,500 miles, the railroads ran only as far

as Mount Isa, a small settlement that reminded some Ordnance officers of a mining town in Arizona or Nevada. There,

supplies were transshipped to Birdum by

Australian truck companies. Assuming

cargo space was available—not always a

safe assumption—a shipment normally took

about ten days. In early February one

load of 18,000 75-mm. shells was delayed

for ten days and finally arrived without

fuzes. It took another eight days to find

the fuzes and deliver them by air.22

Beginning in March regulating stations

were established along the routes to Darwin, but the length of time supplies were in

transit and the probability of losses en route

made necessary extra supplies to fill gaps in

the supply line. General Barnes warned

Washington that particular attention would

have to be given to ammunition shipments

from the United States because of the large

distribution factor involved in long hauls

and poor transportation.23

Looking for "lost" Ordnance supplies

and troops, reconnoitering for depot and

shop sites, the RPH officers who had

arrived with Colonel Holman spent weeks

at a time in the field, furnishing aid and

comfort to harassed officers at remote sta20

 (1) These needs were not limited to Ordnance, but reflect difficulties experienced by all

the technical services operating in Australia. ASF,

Cntrl Div, Dev of U.S. Supply Base in Australia,

pp. 50-54. (2) Col Frank A. Henning, Rpt on

Supply Operations in Australia, Sep 42 (hereafter

cited as Kenning Rpt). 21

 (1) Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation

Corps: Operations Overseas, p. 481. (2) Cable,

Melbourne to AGWAR No. 224, G-1/16368-40

(2-13-42). The observer was Col. Patrick J. Hurley (former Secretary of War and former Ambassador to New Zealand), whom General Marshall

had sent to Australia to study blockade-running to

the Philippines.

22

 (1) Werner Rpt. (2) Ltrs, Porter to Ord

Officer USAFIA and Ord Officer USAAS, 11 Jun

42, sub: Report on Ordnance Activities in NorthWest Area; Incl 1, Report on Alice Springs, to

Ltr, Mulcahy to Ord Officer USAFIA. 11 Jun 42,

both in AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333 Inspections,

KCRC. (3) Hirsch Rpt. (4) Ltr, Hirsch to COrdO

USAFIA, 6 May 42, AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333

Inspections, KCRC. 23

 (1) Rad, Melbourne to AG, No. 161, 5 Feb

42. AG 381 (11-27-41) sec 2A. (2) Because the

sea lanes were subject to attacks by the Japanese.

water shipments to Darwin were not possible before

October 1942. Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, p. 482.
52 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

CONVOY OF TRUCKS NEAR MOUNT ISA, QUEENSLAND

tions. "Believe me," Major Hirsch reported to Colonel Holman, "there's nothing

these chaps like better than to have a staff

officer out in the bush, making passes at the

flies on their faces and eating dust with

their food." These officers often traversed country so treeless and desolate that

by comparison the American desert seemed

"a garden of Eden." But sometimes there

were diverting adventures. Reconnoitering for an ammunition depot near Rockhampton, Major Hirsch received unexpected help from a bushman who "divined" for water with a forked stick; and

on a survey trip from Rockhampton to

Coomooboolaroo, Hirsch flushed two kangaroos at which he took a few shots with

his .45.24

Geelong and the Ordnance

Service Centers

Availability of transportation played an

important part in the selection of the first

important Ordnance installation in Australia. The ammunition that began piling

up on the docks at Melbourne in February

24

 (1) Ltr, Hirsch to COrdO USAFIA, 6 May

42. (2) Memo, Hirsch to COrdO USAFIA, 30

Jul 42. Both in AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333 Inspections, KCRC. (3) See also similar reports, same

file, from Kirsten. Booz, Thompson, and others.
THE BASE IN AUSTRALIA 53

and was dispersed around the city soon

presented such a hazard that a safer place

had to be found for it. With the help of

the Australian Army's Land Office, Hirsch

was able to acquire a site across the bay

from Melbourne at Geelong. The location was excellent because ammunition,

which was loaded first in ships for better

ballast and therefore unloaded last, could

simply be retained after the other supplies

were unloaded at Melbourne and sent

around to Geelong in the same ship.

When the 25th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company (AA) landed in Brisbane in mid-March, the main body of the

company (less detachments dispatched to

the four corners of Australia in support of

antiaircraft units) was sent to Geelong to

establish Kane Ammunition Depot.25

Out of the Geelong installation grew

Holman's concept of the Ordnance service

center, which included not only storage

(wholesale and retail) but maintenance

shops where a great deal of reclamation

and salvage work was done: everything

possible was saved from wrecked equipment, put into serviceable condition, and

reissued. Moreover the center was to become a staging area for Ordnance troops

and supplies that came there direct from

the ports instead of moving through a general staging area. When Ordnance troops

came off the ships they were sent immediately to a service center, where they got a

hot meal and a bed. And they could be

put to work at the center if their equipment had not come with them, as was

often the case. Early in January General

Brett had urged that basic essential equipment be sent on the same ship with the

units, or at least in the same convoy, but

the War Department then, and for six

months to come, considered it wasteful of

shipping space. The 25th Ordnance

Medium Maintenance Company, for example, had arrived without its shop trucks

containing its tools and machinery and for

that reason had been given the job of starting the ammunition depot.26

At an Ordnance service center Holman

could organize, train, control, and use

Ordnance troops as he thought best. The

opportunity for direct control and flexibility was to prove of great value, not only in

the early days when Ordnance units

arrived slowly and infrequently from the

United States but later when small teams

such as those for bomb disposal and technical intelligence came in. Instead of

being lost in a large general base, they

were under Ordnance control from the

start and were kept on Ordnance jobs.

Geelong became the model for the Coopers

Plains Ordnance Service Center at Brisbane, the first well-developed first-class

activity of this kind, which set the standard

for future operations. The concept was so

successful that it remained in effect in the

Southwest Pacific throughout the war.

After Holman became Chief of Staff,

Headquarters U.S. Army Services of Supply (USASOS), in October 1943, he was

instrumental in having the service center

concept applied to other technical services

as well as Ordnance.27

25

 (1) Interv with Holman and Kirsten, 12 Apr

56. (2) McCree Rpt.

26

 (1) Interv with Holman and Kirsten, 12 Apr

56. (2) McCree Rpt. (3) Air Corps units were

also hampered by the failure to unit load. AAF

Study 9, p. 39. 27

 (1) Interv with Holman and Kirsten, 12 Apr

56. (2) Holman Comments 1.
54 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Working With the Australians

Fine co-operation by the Australian

Army's Land Office, plus the benefits of

reverse lend-lease, made possible the establishment of a number of Ordnance installations by summer 1942. The Australians

helped in the location of ammunition depots, which according to the Ordnance

supply plan were to be established in the

western districts of each base section; after

Kane, the most important was the depot

at Darra, near Brisbane. In the populous

areas around Melbourne, Adelaide, and

Sydney, the Australians provided industrial

buildings for depots and shops, mostly wool

warehouses, some of them with good concrete floors and traveling cranes, and in

less industrialized areas, wool sheds, schoolhouses, small automobile shops and warehouses, a rambling frame orphanage, and

an old dance hall. Some of these buildings had their disadvantages. In transforming one wool shed into an Ordnance

maintenance shop, the Engineers had to

shovel their way through a "mixture of

dirt, old wool, hides and manure and the

place stunk to high Heaven."

 28

Ordnance officers found their opposite

numbers in the Australian Army eager to

co-operate. They provided not only depot

sites but trucking and other services and

facilities for training and maintenance. In

Schools conducted by the Australian Army,

men of the three Ordnance medium maintenance companies, for example, received

early training in British 40-mm. Bofors

antiaircraft guns and fire control equipment, and aviation Ordnance men learned

about bomb disposal. In the Brisbane and

Townsville areas, where facilities were expanding late in the spring, Australian maintenance shop officers had instructions to do

work for Americans under the same system and priority as for Australians. Late

in May Colonel Holman was planning to

help make up for the lack of a heavy maintenance company, which had been requested from the United States but not

received, by using a large fourth echelon

repair shop then being built by the Australians at Charters Towers, eighty-three

miles inland from Townsville.29

When lend-lease Ordnance supplies and

equipment began to arrive in quantities in

June, Holman's men helped unload and

distribute them, instructed Australian

troops in maintenance, and provided the

technical data requested by Australian

Army authorities, who were keenly interested in all U.S. weapons, ammunition, and

equipment brought into the theater. By

the end of May the USAFIA Ordnance

office was planning a definite project for

servicing American lend-lease tanks; and

experimental work was already under way

at Australia's Armored Fighting Vehicles

School at Puckapunyal near Seymour.30

Throughout the spring, Australian factories, shops, and other possible sources of

28

 (1) Hirsch Rpt and other Inspection Reports,

AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333 Inspections, KCRC. (2)

Memo, Hirsch for COrdO, USAFIA, 30 Jul 42,

AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333 Inspections, KCRC.

29

 (1) Holman Comments 1. (2) Memo, Kirsten

for Holman, 3 Jun 42 [report on trip to Base

Sections 3 and 7, 26-30 May], AFWESPAC Ord

Sec 333 Inspections, KCRC. (3) Hirsch Rpt.

(4) McCree Rpt. 30

 (1) Memo, J. L. H. [Jonathan L. Holman],

14 Jun 42, in Henning Rpt, Tab B and p. 16.

(2) Memorandum Covering Inspection Trip to

Seymour June 2, 1942, 3 Jun 42; (3) Memo,

Thompson for Holman, 17 Jun 42, sub: Inspection Trip to A.F.V., Puckapunyal, Vic., 16 Jun

42. Last two in AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333 Inspections, KCRC.
THE BASE IN AUSTRALIA 55

supply were thoroughly explored by the

USAFIA Ordnance men. They found a

plentiful supply of cleaning and preserving

materials, lumber, paints and oils, gas for

welding, and fire-fighting equipment; some

standard motor parts; and a limited supply

of abrasives, cloth and waste, tool steel,

and maintenance equipment and tools.

Moreover, the Australians were able to

manufacture some standard items of Ordnance equipment such as link-loading machines for .30-caliber and .50-caliber ammunition, arming wires and bomb fin retaining rings, leather pistol holsters and

rifle slings, machine gun water chests, and

cleaning rods and brushes for machine guns

and ramrods for larger weapons.

The USAFIA Ordnance Section designed many items and adapted others, such

as the gun mounts devised for ship arming

and airfield defense, to fit U.S. Army requirements. Jib cranes were developed to

facilitate the handling of bombs from railway cars to trucks and at the depots; a

scout car for line of communications units

was made by fitting a light armored body

on the chassis of small Canadian trucks

evacuated from the Netherlands Indies. A

rapid automatic link loader for machine

guns was copied from a U.S. Navy model,

and because reports from air units showed

that regular ammunition delinking, inspecting, cleaning, and relinking had to be done

to insure proper functioning of machine

gun feeding, a delinker similar to one designed by a U.S. Air Forces Ordnance officer was manufactured in Australia.

Many of the Ordnance items that the

Americans improvised or adapted in the

theater were accepted for their own use by

the Australians, who seemed to Holman's

staff to have great respect for American

equipment. Suggestions for inventions

poured into the USAFIA Ordnance office

from Australian soldiers and civilians; one

invention that amused Kirsten was a "disappearing bayonet," which was not visible

to the unsuspecting Japanese soldier until it

was suddenly sprung on him. With very

few exceptions, the inventors' ideas were

forwarded to Australian military authorities

in accordance with an agreement worked

out for the handling of such suggestions.31

USAAS Ordnance

The directive establishing the Southwest

Pacific Area under the command of General MacArthur on 18 April 1942 set up

separate organizations for Allied Land

Forces and Allied Air Forces, the former

commanded by Australia's General

Blamey, the latter by General Brett. On

27 April the United States Army Air Services (USAAS) was created and placed

under the command of Maj. Gen. Rush B.

Lincoln. For some time, there was confusion as to its exact responsibility; it was the

end of May before USAAS was officially

defined as an administrative, supply, maintenance, and engineering command operating under the commander of the Allied Air

Forces.32 (Chart 1)

The Ordnance Section of USAAS was

staffed with four officers and seven enlisted men from the USAFIA Ordnance

office and was headed by Maj. Robert S.

Blodgett, chosen for the job by Colonel

31

 (1) Interv with Holman and Kirsten, 12

Apr 56. (2) For inventive improvisations and suggestions see AFWESPAC Ord Sec 070 Inventions,

KCRC. (3) The only comment by the official

Australian Army historian on American equipment

at the time was that it was "adequate—partly of

last-war types and partly of later models." McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area—First Year, p. 33.

32

 (1) Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 421-22.
56 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

CHART 1—THE U.S. ARMY FORCES IN AUSTRALIA ORDNANCE OFFICE, MAY 1942

Source: USAFIA Ordnance Office, Organization Chart, Inclosure 2 to Report of Ordnance Activities, USAFIA, February-May 1942;

USAFIA Organization Chart, Inclosure 14c to Barnes Report.

Holman, who had served with Blodgett in

the United States and had a high opinion

of his ability. Two of the officers had

come south from the Philippines: Maj.

Harry C. Porter had flown from Corregidor and Maj. Victor C. Huffsmith had

had a perilous sea voyage from Manila to

Mindanao, sailing immediately after Pearl

Harbor in a small ship with detachments

of two Ordnance aviation companies, the

701st and 440th. Ordered to Australia on

29 April, he was on the last flight out of

Mindanao before the Japanese took over.33

Though the USAAS Ordnance Section

was divorced from the USAFIA Ordnance

Section, the two offices necessarily worked

33

 (1) Interv with Holman and Kirsten, 12 Apr

56. (2) Ltr, Maj Huffsmith to Brig Gen McFarland, 20 Nov 42, no sub, Folder, Troop Units

Reports, Miscellaneous Reports, OHF. For efforts

by Huffsmith and the Ordnance men to aid the

Visayan-Mindanao Task Force, see below, p. 440.
THE BASE IN AUSTRALIA 57

closely together, since in the early days of

SWPA air operations were the primary

effort. USAAS obtained its ammunition

and Ordnance major items from USAFIA.

Later, as the air operations grew and spread

over very large areas, the official connection

weakened. After Maj. Gen. George C.

Kenney on 4 August 1942 took over from

General Brett the command of the Allied

Air Forces, and the Fifth Air Force was

established, USAAS became a part of the

Fifth Air Force (in October redesignated

Air Service Command, Fifth Air Force).

The March 1942 organization by which

three major commands were established

under the War Department—ground, air,

and service—had its effect; and there were

presages of the reorganization that was soon

to shift control of Ordnance aviation troops

to Air Forces commanders. But between

Blodgett's and Holman's offices a good deal

of informal and very effective liaison continued, a circumstance that Holman attributed to Blodgett's excellent relationship

with Kenney and his loyalty to Ordnance.34

Midsummer 1942: New Responsibilities

Six months after the Pensacola convoy

landed with one Ordnance company, Ordnance strength in Australia stood at 145

officers and 3,500 enlisted men. There

were four ammunition companies (out of

twelve requested); three medium maintenance (out of five requested); one depot

(out of five requested); one composite; and

fifteen aviation companies—six air base,

six bombardment, and three pursuit. With

these men, most of whom had been in Australia less than three months, Colonel Holman had staffed five ammunition depots

and five maintenance and supply depots,

was providing Ordnance service to two

divisions and fifteen air groups, and was

handling incoming supplies and transshipments at seven ports.35

There were still grave shortages in supplies, notably in spare parts, tools, bombhandling equipment, and technical manuals. Much still remained to be done in

segregating stores and training troops; for

example, one young ammunition officer

complained that all his time was spent in

finding out where bombs, fuzes, and arming wires were stored, and teaching his

men "what to do, how to fuze and put

arming wires on, how to put bombs into

bomb bays . . . ." But depots and shops

were beginning to operate with some degree

of efficiency, especially in the Melbourne,

Adelaide, and Sydney areas. At the depot

in Adelaide, for example, items were correctly stored in bins and Standard Nomenclature List groups were segregated. Kane

Ammunition Depot near Melbourne was

becoming "an Ordnance show place."

 36

Transportation and communications between the southern cities and the northern

34

 (1) Interv with Kirsten and Holman, 12 Apr

56. (2) Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate,

eds., "The Army Air Forces in World War II,"

vol. IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan,

August 1942 to July 1944 (Chicago: University

of Chicago Press. 1950), 103 (hereafter cited as

AAF IV). (3) Maj William P. Fisher, Talk Given

. . . Before G-4 Officers WDGS, 20 Mar 42,

AAF, 385-E Methods-Manners-Conducting Warfare. (4) Air Ordnance Office, AAF, Ordnance in

the Air Forces, MS, May 1946, OHF.

35

 Ltr, Holman, COrdO USASOS to CofOrd,

7 Sep 42, sub: Report of Ordnance Activities,

USASOS SWPA, August 1942, in USASOS, Rpt

of Ord Activities, Jul 42-Jan 43. 36

 (I) Ltrs, San Francisco POE to Chief Transportation Service WD, 15 Jun 42, 3 Jul 42, sub:

Level of Supplies at SUMAC and POPPY, AG400 (1-

17-42) (2) sec 2. (2) Rpt, Ord Officer, Horn

Island, 6 Jul 42. (3) Memo, Hirsch for COrdO

USAFIA, 30 Jul 42. Last two in AFWESPAC

Ord Sec 333 Inspections, KCRC.
58 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

outposts were slowly improving. Bottlenecks were being eliminated from the road

north to Darwin and the use of Australian

teletype instead of straight mail from Melbourne to Darwin and Townsville shortened communications time considerably.

The Ordnance office at Townsville, which

according to Major Hirsch had been leading a "hand to mouth existence .. . mainly

because actual information of coming

events is either lacking entirely or delayed

beyond comprehension," was now "in the

throes of growing up."

 37

For the very real accomplishments that

spring and summer of 1942 in Australia in

the face of meager resources, Colonel Holman was given a large share of the credit

by the young officers of his USAFIA Ordnance staff. They admired not only his

brains and imagination but his enthusiasm

and his positive approach to problems. At

USAFIA staff meetings, Kirsten remembered later, "the Quartermaster would be

gloomy—couldn't cook with Australian

chocolate, etc.; the Engineer officer would

be gloomy—couldn't drive nails in Australian hardwood, etc.; but Holman (though

Ordnance was as bad off as any) would say

we can get this done in such and such a

time. Naturally this made such a good

impression he could get almost anything he

wanted." Also, Holman had the quality

of arousing loyalty. He selected capable

young officers and then backed them up.38

During the first half year in Australia,

the efforts of the USAFIA Ordnance office had been devoted mainly to support of

air and antiaircraft operations, supplying

armament and ammunition to the fighter

and bomber groups operating from Australian bases in defense of northern Australia

and New Guinea and to the antiaircraft

units at the ports and airfields and aboard

ships. In July, as the chill damp of an

Australian winter settled in Melbourne, the

USAFIA Ordnance office began preparations to support the New Guinea prong of

the first U.S. offensive in the Pacific, as

directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2

July. The offensive, an "island-hopping" operation of the kind soon to become familiar,

would be in three phases. The first, assigned to Vice Adm. Robert L. Ghormley's

South Pacific Area, was the capture of

Guadalcanal and other islands in the Solomons; the second, assigned to General MacArthur, was the capture of the remainder

of the Solomons and the northeastern coast

of the narrow Papuan peninsula in New

Guinea, where the Japanese held Lae and

Salamaua; and the third, also assigned to

MacArthur, was the capture of the Japanese stronghold of Rabaul and adjacent

areas in the Bismarck Archipelago. The

object was to halt the Japanese advance

toward the tenuous line of communications

between the United States and Australia

and New Zealand. The offensive was restricted to the few ships, troops, weapons,

and supplies that could be spared from the

preparations for an invasion of Europe.39

In Australia, the U.S. armed forces began preparing at once to capture the north37

 (1) Ltr, Hirsch to COrdO USAFIA, 2 May

42, AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333 Inspections, KCRC.

(2) Werner Rpt. 38

 Interv with Kirsten, 12 Apr 56.

39

 (1) Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1957), pp. 46-48. (2) John Miller, jr., Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1949),

pp. 1, 16-17. (3) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-42, pp. 258-65.

(4) Morton, Strategy and Command: The First

Two Years, pp. 301-04.
THE BASE IN AUSTRALIA 59

ORDNANCE WAREHOUSE, TOWNSVILLE

eastern coast of Papua. The 32d and 41st

Infantry Divisions, which along with the

7th Australian Infantry Division were to furnish the ground combat troops, were moved

to eastern Australia and started to train

for jungle warfare. Until the men were

ready, the Army Air Forces was to step up

its bombing operations. Engineer troops

had been sent to develop new airfields at

Port Moresby and at the small but important RAAF base at Milne Bay on the southeastern coast of Papua. These fields would

not be enough. For the recapture of Lae

and Salamaua, a major airfield on the

northeastern coast was necessary. A reconnaissance revealed a good site at Dobodura,

about fifteen miles south of Buna, a

native village and government station on

the northeastern coast of Papua almost

opposite Port Moresby, and on 15 July

GHQ SWPA directed the launching of

operations to occupy the Buna area between 10 and 12 August.

Within a week of this order, a Japanese

convoy was discovered moving on Buna.

Aided by bad weather that shielded it from

Allied air attacks, the enemy force reached

the area on the night of 21 July and began

landing. Allied bombing and strafing the

next morning had little effect; the Japanese

were soon securely established at Buna.

General MacArthur's G-2, Brig. Gen.

Charles A. Willoughby, believed that they

merely wanted the same favorable airfield

sites that had attracted the Allies. A Japanese advance overland on Port Moresby,
60 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

only 150 miles to the southwest, was not

ruled out, but it seemed highly improbable,

because between the northern and southern coasts of Papua rose the 13,000-foot

Owen Stanley Range. Over these mountains there were no roads, only narrow,

primitive footpaths that became precarious tracks as they wandered up rock faces

and bare ridges, then down rivers of mud

as they descended into the heavy jungle

below. Whatever the intentions of the

Japanese, the obvious course for General

MacArthur was to reinforce Port Moresby

and Milne Bay. He did so by ordering the

7th Australian Infantry Division to move

to these areas immediately. He also sent

forward engineers and antiaircraft units.40

Preparations To Support the Move

Northward

In early July when the New Guinea offensive was directed, Ordnance installations

were meager in northeastern Australia, the

logical support area for the coming campaign. At Brisbane, designated on 7

August the main base of supply, the 37th

Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company

was operating in the open air from shop

trucks at the edge of Doomben Race Track,

and a detachment of the 84th Ordnance

Depot Company was setting up a small

general supply depot in a converted orphanage building in Clayfield. Until then,

general supplies had been stored at Darra,

an ammunition dump operated by the 55th

Ordnance Ammunition Company with the

assistance of about 50 civilian mounted

guards and 50 civilian laborers.41

By the end of July, when the 32d Division had moved to Camp Cable, 30 miles

south of Brisbane, and the 41st had arrived

at Rockhampton, 400 miles to the north,

the USAFIA Ordnance office had secured

a tract at Coopers Plains south of Brisbane.

Here it began to build a large Ordnance

service center to house a maintenance shop

of 10,000 square feet, to be operated by the

37th Ordnance Medium Maintenance

Company, and a general supply depot of

20,000 square feet, to be operated by the

84th Ordnance Depot Company. The base

commander, Col. William H. Donaldson,

and his Ordnance officer, Lt. Col. William

C. Cauthen, managed to get both shop and

depot completed in September, and during

the fall the space was more than tripled.

At Rockhampton a maintenance shop and

a small general supply depot were being

established to service the 41st Division.

New ammunition depots were established

at Wallaroo, west of Rockhampton, and

Columboola, west of Brisbane; Darra was

enlarged. A transshipping warehouse was

built at Pinkenba from which weapons and

ammunition could be forwarded to Townsville and points north.42

At Townsville the Ordnance job became

heavier because of the transshipping operation, the concentration of antiaircraft units

in northern Australia and New Guinea, and

the need to support stepped-up bombing

operations. The 25th Ordnance Medium

Maintenance Company arrived there on 12

July to distribute and maintain sixty new

40

 Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 56-58, 70-73. 41

 (1) Memo, Capt Spencer B. Booz for Col

Holman, 1 Jul 42, AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333 Inspections, KCRC. (2) Werner Rpt.

42

 (1) Memos, Hirsch for COrdO, 30 Jul 42,

3 Aug 42, AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333 Inspections,

KCRC. (2) Ltr, Cauthen to COrdO USASOS,

2 Nov 42, sub: Report of Operations, October,

1942, with Incl, Ordnance Department Warehouse

Space—Covered, Brisbane Area, AFWESPAC Ord

Sec 370.2 Monthly Rpt of Opns B.S. 3, KCRC.
THE BASE IN AUSTRALIA 61

40-mm. Bofors antiaircraft guns. The men

found that many of the guns, either defective

to begin with or damaged in shipping, had to

be rebuilt. In addition to this task the

company operated an Ordnance shop and

depot—in a building formerly used to manufacture windmills—serviced ships' guns at

the port, and sent detachments to isolated

units of Coast Artillery. Reinforced by a

small detachment of the 59th Ordnance

Ammunition Company, the 55th Ordnance

Ammunition Company, which had already

furnished a detachment of thirty men for

Port Moresby, handled ammunition at the

wharf and operated the Kangaroo Transshipment Depot, on the north coast road

to Cairns. Transshipment by rail or boat

to Cairns, a small port north of Townsville, became important as the supply system to the combat zone evolved. Cairns

became a center for small ships into which

ammunition was reloaded for the run to

New Guinea and points on the Cape York

Peninsula. This system was developed to

relieve the congestion at Townsville; also

smaller and more frequent shipments of ammunition were thought to provide better

service with fewer losses. An ammunition

storage area was developed at Torrens

Creek (180 miles west of Townsville) to

support both New Guinea and Darwin

should the Townsville-Cairns area be cut

off, but it served for only a few air missions and shipments and never became

fully operational.43

In the general preparations for the Papua

Campaign, General MacArthur's headquarters moved from Melbourne to Brisbane. On 20 July USAFIA was discontinued and United States Army Services of

Supply, Southwest Pacific Area (USASOS

SWPA), was created and placed under the

command of Brig. Gen. Richard J. Marshall,

to whom were transferred all USAFIA personnel and organizations.44

 Maj. Gen.

Robert L. Eichelberger arrived in August

with Headquarters, I Corps, to which were

assigned the 32d and 41st Divisions.

These changes affected Ordnance service to some extent, but no theater reorganization could compare in effect on Ordnance

with a War Department reorganization that

took place that summer. Early in August

1942 a cable from Washington to the Commander in Chief, SWPA, announced that

responsibility for the supply and maintenance of all motor vehicles was to be transferred from the Quartermaster Corps to

the Ordnance Department. USASOS received the news on 15 August, only two

weeks before the changeover was to become

effective, 1 September 1942.45

Responsibility for Motor Vehicles

The USASOS Ordnance office inherited from Quartermaster about 22,000 vehicles, of which some 15,000 were trucks,

ranging in size from the 1⁄4-ton jeep to the

4-ton 6x6; 3,000 were trailers; and 2,500

were sedans. The rest were ambulances,

43

 (1) McCree Rpt. (2) Rpts, Maj William A.

Weaver to COrdO USASOS [Reports of Operations for Months of Jul 42 and Aug 42], AFWESPAC Ord Sec 370.2 Monthly Rpt of Opns B.S.

2, KCRC. (3) Memo, Kirsten for Holman, 10

Sep 42, AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333 Inspections,

KCRC. (4) Holman Comments 1.

44

 (1) GO 17, GHQ SWPA, 20 Jul 42. (2)

GO 1, Hq USASOS SWPA, 20 Jul 42. 45

 (1) WD Cir 245, 25 Jul 42. (2) For Pacific

area reaction, see file AFWESPAC Ord Sec 020

Correspondence Relating to Transfer of Motor

Vehicle Activities from QM to Ord, KCRC. (3)

For background on the transfer in the United

States, see Thomson and Mayo, The Ordnance

Department: Procurement and Supply, pp. 282-84.

(4) Holman Comments 1.
62 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

motorcycles, and miscellaneous types. More

than 6,000 of the total, including most of

the sedans, had been purchased in Australia or obtained from Dutch distress cargoes.

Along with the vehicles, Ordnance inherited problems.46

First was the familiar problem of personnel. By agreement between Colonel Holman and Col. Douglas C. Cordiner, the

USASOS chief quartermaster, the Quartermaster motor transport officers were told

that they must remain with Ordnance for a

period of six months or a year (to be released to Quartermaster at the end of the

period if they wished). But there were only

ten of them at Headquarters, USASOS,

two of whom were in ill health, and only

seven at the various base section headquarters. The Quartermaster units concerned

with motor transport were assigned to Ordnance as of 1 August, but they were few.

Only four were in Australia: Company A,

86th Quartermaster Battalion (Light Maintenance), and the 179th Quartermaster

Company (Heavy Maintenance), stationed

at Mount Isa; Company C, 86th Quartermaster Battalion (Light Maintenance), stationed at Townsville; and Company A, 72d

Quartermaster Battalion (Light Maintenance), at Brisbane. In the cities a large

proportion of the repair work was being

done under contract by commercial automobile companies, which also stored and

distributed spare parts.47

The greatest need for repairs was often

far from cities and could only be met by

maintenance troops. Additional companies

had been requested by the USASOS quartermaster, but he had been told that they

would not be available before 1943; they

were not forthcoming even after Colonel

Holman on 10 September urged USASOS

to inform Washington that the vehicle

maintenance situation was fast approaching the critical stage. Throughout the fall

the heavy trucking operation in the Mount

Isa-Darwin area, carried on over rough

roads in clouds of dust, continued to tie up

a large portion of Holman's motor maintenance men. The arrival in Townsville of

shiploads of unassembled vehicles made

necessary the assignment of mechanics to

an assembly plant there, since no commercial assembly plants existed north of Brisbane.48

When Ordnance took over motor vehicles, shortages existed in certain types of

trucks, especially the versatile jeeps, which

could go anywhere and were particularly

valuable as staff cars. There were only

about 2,000 in the theater, and they were

beginning to be considered by everyone

"an absolute necessity"—so much so that

46

 Rpt, Lt Col Harry A. Cavanaugh, Motor Supply Parts and Maintenance Division, Procurement

and Distribution of Motor Vehicles Branch, 21

Aug 42 (hereafter cited as Cavanaugh Rpt),

AFWESPAC Ord Sec 020 Corres Re Trsfr of

Motor Vehicle Activities, KCRC. Colonel Cavanaugh had been General Motors representative

in Australia. Barnes Rpt, p. 65. 47

 (1) Holman Comments 1. (2) Cavanaugh

Rpt.

48

 (1) Cavanaugh Rpt. (2) Memo, COrdO for

G-4 et al., 10 Sep 42, no sub; Memo, J. L. H. to

G-3, 30 Sep 42, sub: Transfer of Organizations;

Ltr, COrdO to Motor Maintenance Officer, Rail

Head, Base Section 1, 6 Oct 42, sub: Transfer of

One Platoon of Company "C," 86th Ord Bn (Q)

to Base Section 1, for Temporary Duty; Ltr, Maj

Gen Marshall to CO Base Section 2, 14 Nov 42,

sub: Assembly of Motor Vehicles; all in AFWESPAC Ord Sec 200.3 Assignment of Personnel,

KCRC. (3) Memo, J. L. H. for G-3, 23 Jun 43,

sub: Motor Vehicle Assembly Companies, AFWESPAC Ord Sec 320.2 Strength, KCRC.

The automotive maintenance units transferred

to Ordnance from Quartermaster carried the designation "(Q)." Later, "automotive" became part

of the unit name and the "(Q)" was dropped.
THE BASE IN AUSTRALIA 63

they were freely stolen by one organization

from another. One day a jeep assigned

to Capt. John F. McCarthy, Ordnance officer of Base Section 2, disappeared from

the street in Townsville where he had

parked it and was next seen tied down on

an Australian flatcar scheduled to head

west with an Australian unit. Colonel

Holman commented, "This is the payoff."

During the build-up at Port Moresby it

was not safe to leave a jeep parked with the

keys in it. The shortage was so acute that

officers often had to thumb rides or walk

for miles.49

For most of the vehicles, particularly

jeeps, there were not enough spare parts.

The shipping shortage had made it impossible to build up a reserve stock (the ideal

was a 90-day reserve supply) and some

items were entirely lacking. When Maj.

Gen. LeRoy Lutes, deputy commander of

Services of Supply, visited Australia in October he noted that the spare parts situation was critical. Since San Francisco records showed that shipments had been

made, and since he believed "no doubt

many were bogged down on unloaded

ships," the fault lay in maldistribution.

Because of the poor railroad facilities it had

been hard to distribute parts to outlying

units from the large bulk storage U.S.

Army General Motors Warehouse on Sturt

Street, Melbourne. The answer was to

carry a complete stock at the base section

depots, but this would not be possible until

large stocks arrived from the United States,

a most unpredictable event because the

motor vehicle changeover had caused an

upheaval in the Ordnance distribution

system.50

In assuming his new responsibilities, Holman saw to it that the Quartermaster officers and units that came over were instructed in Ordnance procedures and that

his own Ordnance men learned motor

transport maintenance. A significant

change in the Ordnance system of maintenance came about that fall on instructions

from Washington. Since the 1930's, Ordnance had employed three levels of maintenance: first echelon, performed by the

line organization; second echelon, performed by Ordnance maintenance companies in the field; and third echelon, performed in the rear. Influenced by the

Quartermaster system, which used four

echelons, Ordnance planners instituted a

five echelon system. First and second

echelon work, now lumped together and

called organization maintenance, was done

by the using organization. Third echelon,

sometimes called medium maintenance,

was now done in the field in mobile shops.

It involved replacement of assemblies, such

as engines and transmissions, as well as

general assistance and supply of parts to

the using troops. Fourth echelon, commonly referred to as heavy maintenance, was

done in the field in fixed or semifixed shops.

Fifth echelon, the complete reconditioning

or rebuilding of matériel and sometimes the

manufacturing of parts and assemblies,

was done in base shops.51

4 9

 (1) Hirsch Rpt. (2) Werner Rpt. (3) Memo,

Capt W. A. Brown for COrdO, 11 Oct 42, sub:

Report of Survey of Motor Vehicles, Parts Supply

and Maintenance at MAPLE, Base Sections 2 and

3, AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333 Inspections, KCRC.

50

 (1) Lt. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, "Supply: World

War II," Antiaircraft Journal, LXXXXV (September-October, 1952), p. 4. (2) Cavanaugh

Rpt. (3) Barnes Rpt, p. 65. (4) Henning Rpt.

(5) For the upheaval in the United States, see

Thomson and Mayo, Procurement and Supply,

pp. 399-402. 51

 (1) Holman Comments 1. (2) Thomson and

Mayo, Procurement and Supply, pp. 448-49.
64 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

By October 1942 the four Quartermaster

motor maintenance companies had been

redesignated, three of them becoming Ordnance medium maintenance (Q) and the

fourth, heavy maintenance (Q). The

Quartermaster bulk parts storage depot in

Melbourne became Sturt Ordnance Depot,

and to it were transferred Ordnance parts

for scout cars, half-tracks, and other Ordnance vehicles, in order that all vehicle

requisitions could be filled in one place.

In the Brisbane and Sydney areas, where

parts had been stored and maintenance

mainly done in commercial shops, Colonel

Holman was planning to mesh motor transport installations with Ordnance supply

and maintenance activities when facilities

and personnel permitted. At Brisbane,

Colonel Cauthen worked out better methods for assembling crated vehicles, using an

outdoor assembly line supervised by Ordnance but operated by combat troop

labor provided by the receiving organization. At Townsville motor maintenance,

weapons maintenance and depot units,

civilian-operated motor parts depots, and

tire retreading plants were rapidly consolidated into an Ordnance service center,

its most important mission the supply and

maintenance of troops en route to New

Guinea.52

52

 (1) Holman Comments 1. (2) Rpt, Hirsch to

COrdO, 30 Sep 42, sub: Report of Ordnance

Activities, Base Section 4, AFWESPAC Ord Sec

370.2 Monthly Rpt of Opns B.S. 4, KCRC. (3)

Ltr, Kirsten to COrdO, 29 Aug 42, sub: Inspection

of Quartermaster Motor Transport Installations,

AFWESPAC Ord Sec 020, Corres Re Trsfr of

Motor Vehicle Activities, KCRC. (4) Ltr, Weaver

to COrdO, 10 Oct 42, sub: Report of Operations

for Month of September 1942, AFWESPAC Ord

Sec 370.2 Monthly Rpt of Opns B.S. 2, KCRC.
CHAPTER V

Supporting the Papua Campaign

The coast of New Guinea comes into

view after a three-hour flight north over

the Coral Sea from Townsville, Australia

—the huge island stretching out below the

air traveler "like a monstrous creature

slumbering in the tepid equatorial sea."

 1

On the map New Guinea looks like a birdshaped monster that is about to perch on a

slender peninsula jutting up from the northern coast of Australia, the head looking

toward the Philippines, the bony tail extending to a point south of the Solomon

Islands. The tail, bearing the towering

Owen Stanley Range, is the easternmost

part of Australia's Territory of Papua. At

the tip is a deep forked indentation, Milne

Bay. About halfway down the under side

of the tail is Port Moresby, the tiny copra

port that Australians in 1942 called "the

Tobruk of the Pacific."

Preparations were made in the summer

of 1942 for dislodging the Japanese from

Buna, on the northeast coast of Papua, and

General MacArthur on 11 August 1942

designated Port Moresby—code name

MAPLE—the U.S. Advanced Base. At the

time, the defense force consisted mainly of

Australians—a Royal Australian Air Force

squadron and about 3,000 infantrymen sent

up from Australia early in 1942 as a consequence of the Japanese occupation of

Rabaul, Lae, and Salamaua. The Americans on the scene in August 1942 were air,

antiaircraft, or service units. In late April

1942 two American fighter groups had

been dispatched to relieve the weary RAAF

units, and they were followed by an antiaircraft battalion, several Engineer units to

improve the two existing airstrips and build

new ones, and some Ordnance troops, including, by July, an Ordnance aviation

(air base) company, the 703d, an 11-man

detachment of the 25th Ordnance Medium

Maintenance Company to service the antiaircraft guns, and detachments of two ammunition companies, the 59th and 55th.2

Along with the Australians, the Americans

came under New Guinea Force (NGF),

created in mid-April 1942 by General Sir

Thomas Blarney, the Australian appointed

by General MacArthur to command Allied

Land Forces. At first New Guinea Force

1

 Geoffrey Reading, Papuan Story (Sydney and

London: 1946), p. 7.

2

 (1) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 27, 75. Unless otherwise indicated Milner's book has been

used throughout in the preparation of this chapter.

Other sources consulted, although not always cited

in detail include: Reports of Ordnance Activities

USASOS SWPA, November 1942-February 1943,

OHF; Report of the Commanding General Buna

Forces on the Buna Campaign, December 1, 1942-

January 25, 1943, OCMH. (2) Ltr, Lt Col Frederic H. Smith, Jr., to Director of Pursuit, Allied

Air Forces, AAF, 385-E, Methods—Manners—Conducting Warfare. (3) Memo, Kirsten for Holman,

3 Jun 42. (4) Memo, Capt S.B. Booz for Holman,

1 Jul 42, (5) Ltr, Weaver to Holman, 1 Jul 42,

sub: Report on Ordnance Situation at MAPLE.

Last three in AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333 Inspections, KCRC.
66 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

was commanded by Maj. Gen. Basil Morris,

head of the Australia—New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU), the service

that supplanted civil government in Papua

when white residents were evacuated or

called into military service. In mid-August

New Guinea Force came under another

Australian, Maj. Gen. Sydney F. Rowell,

who was in command until 24 September,

when General Blarney took over. General Blarney created Advance New Guinea

Force and placed it under the command of

Australian Lt. Gen. Edmund F. Herring.3

Rowell's New Guinea Force had been

considerably augmented the third week in

August by the arrival of elements of the

7th Australian Infantry Division, a unit

called back to Australia from the Middle

East and ordered by MacArthur to New

Guinea after the Japanese landings near

Buna in late July. Of the two brigades

ordered to Port Moresby, one arrived 19

August and immediately began moving up

the trail over the Owen Stanleys to reinforce the troops attempting to deny the trail

to the Japanese advancing from Buna.

Another brigade was landed on 21 August

at Milne Bay where a force was being built

up, including American engineer and antiaircraft troops, to improve and protect airfields.

The two Australian brigades of veterans

from the Middle East arrived just in time.

The Japanese, strongly reinforced at Buna

from Rabaul, launched an offensive across

the mountains toward Port Moresby on 26

August and at the same time landed a

sea-borne force, dispatched from Rabaul,

at Milne Bay.

The Ordnance Officer Arrives

at Port Moresby

A few days after this alarming development, the Ordnance officer of the new

U.S. Advanced Base arrived at Port

Moresby by air. He was Capt. Byrne C.

Manson, selected by Colonel Holman for

this important job because of his fine record as Ordnance officer of Base Section 4

at Melbourne. He was destined to pioneer

in New Guinea as he had pioneered in

Australia in the early days. On a morning in late August Manson arrived at Port

Moresby, coming down at one of the airstrips on a dusty plain several miles inland.

He rode in a jeep down arid brown hills

to the waterfront, where corrugated iron

roofs of stores and shipping offices were

blazing in the sun, and everywhere Manson saw the effects of the Japanese air

raids that had been battering the small

port since February: broken windows in

the empty bungalows in the hills and the

stores along the harbor, bomb craters and

slit trenches in the dirt roads that passed

for streets.4

The most immediate Ordnance problem

at Port Moresby was to increase the supply

of ammunition. Bombers and fighters

trying to stop the Japanese advance and

cut off Japanese supplies at Buna depended

on Ordnance dumps. Demands were

heavy: in two days 35 tons of bombs and

33,000 rounds of ammunition were used

up over Buna. Ammunition for American

ground troops—chiefly antiaircraft units—

was not as critical, but reserves had to be

built up. Stocks of weapons and weapons

3

 McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area—First

Year: Kokoda to Wau, pp. 42-43, 105, 236-39.

4

 (1) Manson File. (2) John Lardner, Southwest

Passage (New York, 1943), pp. 170, 175-77.
SUPPORTING THE PAPUA CAMPAIGN 67

PORT MORESBY, 1942

parts Manson found "so low and unbalanced as to be of no consequence." On

his way north he had placed requisitions

at Brisbane for a 90-day supply of maintenance spare parts and major item replacements and a 30-day supply of cleaning and

preserving materials, all to be shipped immediately. Motor maintenance parts were

sufficient for the moment, but more would

have to be ordered from Brisbane because there were more vehicles at the base

than had been estimated and larger reserves were desirable.5

The shortage of Ordnance personnel

was reminiscent of the early days in Australia, when of necessity the men available

did the work that had to be done, regardless of their specialties. Because Manson

had no depot troops, he planned to use his

antiaircraft maintenance detachment—

nearing the end of its assigned task—as

depot troops to receive and sort the expected shipments of supplies. A 72-man

motor maintenance platoon, which came

in by ship on 8 September but was unable

to set up a shop because its tools and equipment were still en route, was put to work

handling bombs and burning off areas

around ammunition dumps. Because

Papua was then in the midst of the dry

season, the danger of fire was ever present.

At the most important dump, the Central

5

 Ltr, Manson to COrdO USASOS SWPA, 13

Sep 42, sub: Ordnance Field Service Report of

Operations—Initial Report (hereafter cited as

Manson Rpt), AFWESPAC Ord Sec 370.2, Monthly Rpt of Opns Adv Base N.G., KCRC.
68 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Dump at Four-Mile Airdrome serving

three airfields, some fire-fighting equipment

was available, but it was primitive—barrels

containing water, and burlap bags to use

in smothering flames.6

On 15 September a grass fire spread to

the Central Dump. The flames moved

rapidly, sending up dense black clouds and

detonating bombs and ammunition with

thundering roars. Braving the intense heat

and great danger, more than a score of

Ordnance men attempted to extinguish the

flames with wet burlap bags; failing, they

tried to haul bombs and ammunition cases

to safety, risking their lives. Despite their

efforts, large quantities of bombs, fuzes,

fins, and arming wires, as well as 155-mm.,

37-mm., 20-mm., .50-caliber, and 45-

caliber ammunition were lost.7 This loss

of the ground ammunition was particularly

unfortunate because it occurred on the very

day the first U.S. combat troops arrived in

New Guinea.

The Crisis in Mid-September

At the end of the first week in September

the Japanese amphibious operation had

been repulsed at Milne Bay but the Japanese overland forces had advanced far

along the Kokoda Trail and were coming

uncomfortably close to Port Moresby. The

timely arrival of the third brigade of the

7th Australian Infantry Division on 9 September, however, and its prompt dispatch

up the Kokoda Trail, gave reassurance that

the Japanese attack would be stopped. In

an effort to hasten the enemy's withdrawal

by cutting in on his flank, MacArthur

ordered to New Guinea the 126th Infantry of the U.S. 32d Infantry Division. The

first men arrived by air on 15 September,

their fatigues still wet from the green

"jungle dye" applied the night before in

Brisbane.

Meanwhile, the Australians continued to

fall back before the Japanese onslaught

down the Kokoda Trail. They believed

that they could still contain the enemy,

and assured GHQ in Australia that the

best course was to withdraw to good defensive positions nearer their base on the

coast. Yet at MacArthur's headquarters

alarm mounted as the Japanese continued

to advance. By 16 September the Japanese were at Ioribaiwa, only thirty-five

miles north of Port Moresby. In the hills

behind the port men were digging trenches

and stringing barbed wire around "centers

of resistance"; at the airfields, crewmen

working on airplanes were wearing pistols.

MacArthur decided to send the 32d Division's 128th Infantry to Port Moresby immediately. The entire regiment was transported by air between 18 and 23 September—the greatest mass movement of troops

by the Air Forces up to that time.8

The threat to Port Moresby was soon

over. In the last days of September the

Australians, bringing up two 25-pounders

6

 (1) Memo, Kirsten for Holman, 7 Sep 42,

sub: Situation at MAPLE, 31 Aug to 6 Sep, Kirsten

Personal File, OHF. (2) Manson Rpt. (3) Unit

History of the 3425th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company (Q) (redesignation of Co A, 72d

Ord Medium Maint Bn (Q)), pp. 5-6. 7

 (1) Proceedings of a Board of Officers Convened at Port Moresby ... to Investigate . . .

the Damage to, and Loss of, Ordnance Property

Located at Central Dump . . . , Manson File,

OHF. (2) Robinson, The Fight for New Guinea,

pp. 124-25.

8

 For MacArthur's decision and the reaction of

the Australians, see McCarthy, South-West Pacific

Area—First Year: Kokoda to Wau, pp. 234-35,

242.
SUPPORTING THE PAPUA CAMPAIGN 69

and blasting the position at Ioribaiwa, discovered that the Japanese had withdrawn.

At the time it seemed that the enemy had

found it impossible to bring up enough

supplies over the Kokoda Trail, but, in

fact, the withdrawal was closely tied in

with Guadalcanal. Defeated there by the

U.S. Marines on the night of 13-14 September, the Japanese had decided to subordinate the Papua venture to the retaking of Guadalcanal and to withdraw for

the time being to their Buna beachhead.

To destroy the Japanese at Buna then

became the most pressing task for the

Allies. MacArthur planned a pincers

movement. The Australians were to continue to advance over the Kokoda Trail,

supplied by native carriers and airdrops.

The Americans were to advance by two

routes—one inland and one up the northern coast of Papua. The inland trail, the

mountainous Kapa Kapa-Jaure track,

was to be used by the 126th Infantry, the

coastal plain south of Buna was to be the

route of the 128th Infantry. The movement of the U.S. troops began in midOctober. As it turned out, only one battalion went over the difficult and precipitous Kapa Kapa-Jaure track. The discovery of adequate sites for airfields on or

near the coast, notably at Wanigela—a

little better than halfway between Milne

Bay and Buna—made it possible to transport most of the Americans by air over

the Owen Stanley Range to the north

shore of Papua. How they were to be

supplied after they got there was another

matter.

The Sea Route to Buna

As General MacArthur acknowledged at

the outset of the campaign to retake Buna,

"the successful employment of any considerable number of troops on the north

shore ... was entirely dependent upon lines

of communication." The logisticians responsible for establishing effective lines of

communication might well have been appalled by the task. The great mountain

barrier ruled out an overland supply route.

Supply by air would have to await the

capture and development of airfields closer

to the front; moreover, air transport at the

time was being strained to the utmost to

support, mostly by airdropping, the Australians on the Kokoda Trail and the

Americans on the inland track. The only

answer was supply by sea—an extremely

hazardous undertaking. The shores between Milne Bay and Buna are washed by

some of the most dangerous waters in the

world, foul with coral reefs, for which no

adequate charts then existed. On that

primitive coast, piers or jetties could not be

depended upon; the names on the map—

Wanigela, Pongani, Mendaropu, Embogo,

Hariko—do not indicate ports, but native

villages consisting of a few thatched huts

surrounded by coconut palms.

No landing craft of the kind that were

later to make island-hopping feasible were

then available to General MacArthur. He

had to depend on small, shallow-draft fishing vessels that could navigate the reefs and

approach close enough to the shore for supplies to be lightered through the breakers.

For months the Small Ships Section of

USASOS SWPA had been acquiring such

craft from the Australians. Its so-called

catboat flotilla could boast 36 at the beginning of July 1942: 19 trawlers, 4 harbor

boats, 4 steamers, 2 speed boats, 2 ketches,

2 motorships, 1 cabin cruiser, 1 schooner.
70 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

PART OF THE TRAWLER FLEET, PORT MORESBY

and 1 powered lighter. In early September the Small Ships men were establishing

an operating base at Port Moresby from

which their ships could carry ammunition

up and down the southern coast of Papua,

mainly from Port Moresby to Milne Bay.

Plans for the attack on Buna made it necessary to extend this operation to the northern coast and to expand it considerably.9

The Coastal Shuttle

Rations and ammunition for the troops

being flown over the Owen Stanley Range

to Wanigela in mid-October were loaded

on eight small trawlers at the Port Moresby

dock on 11 October under the supervision

of Lt. Col. Laurence A. McKenny, the

32d Division's quartermaster, who was responsible for getting the supplies forward.

The trawlers carried in addition to their

Australian or Filipino crews a detail from

the 32d Division's Quartermaster company

(the 107th), two or three men to a trawler,

9

 (1) Masterson, Trans in SWPA, cited above

ch. III, n17(1). (2) Memo, Kirsten for Holman,

7 Sep 42, sub: Situation at MAPLE, 31 Aug to 6

Sep, Kirsten Personal File, OHF.
SUPPORTING THE PAPUA CAMPAIGN 71

and two Ordnance men from 32d Division

headquarters, 1st Lt. John E. Harbert and

Technician 3 William C. Featherstone.

Getting under way next day, the two

trawlers in the lead, the King John (with

Colonel McKenny aboard) and the Timoshenko docked on 14 October at Milne

Bay, a harbor that was very important in

the plans for the coastal shuttle because it

was to be the main transshipment point—

the place from which supplies brought by

freighters from Australia were to be carried

forward in the small ships. At the head

of the bay, where in peacetime Lever

Brothers had operated one of the largest

coconut plantations in the world, dock and

port improvements were proceeding rapidly, in spite of swampy ground and mosquitoes that earned for Milne Bay the

reputation of being a malarial pesthole.

On the afternoon of 15 October the

trawlers sailed for Wanigela with an important new passenger—1st Lt. Adam

Bruce Fahnestock, head of the Small Ships

Section, who had been, before the war, a

well-known South Seas explorer.10

At Wanigela Colonel McKenny received something of a shock. Brig. Gen.

Hanford MacNider, commander of the

32d Division's coastal task force, told him

that some of the troops had had trouble

trying to march overland and would have

to be carried up the coast in the trawlers

and landed at Pongani. About a hundred

men of the 128th Infantry came aboard

the two trawlers, divided almost evenly

between them. The King John also took

on a New York Times correspondent,

Byron Darnton. Safely skirting the treacherous and uncharted reefs around Cape

Nelson, with the aid of native guides stationed at the bows to spot the reefs, the

two trawlers were preparing to land at

Pongani on the morning of 18 October

when a bomber (later determined to be an

American B-25) circled overhead and

dropped bombs that killed Fahnestock and

Darnton and wounded several men. The

rations and ammunition were saved and

carried ashore in the first landing on the

coast behind the Buna front.

By early November the coastal operation

had improved considerably. The Australians had charted the waters around Cape

Nelson and found that larger vessels (10 0

to 120 tons) could negotiate the reefs

around the cape. This discovery made it

possible to bring sizable shipments to a

transshipment point on the north shore of

the cape, Porlock Harbor, where the

trawlers took over. The larger boats,

which were operated by the Combined

Operational Service Command (COSC),

a consolidation of Australian and U.S. supply services effected on 5 October 1942,

brought in some Australian artillery—two

3.7-inch (94-mm.) pack howitzers (similar

to the American 75-mm. howitzer) and

four 25-pounder guns, of about 3.5-inch

caliber, firing a shell weighing 25 pounds.

These pieces were to be transported from

Porlock Harbor up the coast in a motordriven Japanese barge that had been left

behind when the Japanese were repulsed at

Milne Bay. By 16 November when the

attack on Buna was scheduled to begin,

10

 (1) Activities of 107th QM Det at Dobodura

(Papua), New Guinea, 27 Nov 42-5 Jan 43. Unless otherwise indicated, the account of the small

ships operation, 12 October-17 November 1942, is

taken from this source as well as from Milner's

Victory in Papua. (2) For the expeditions of the

Fahnestock brothers, Bruce and Sheridan, see their

book, Stars to Windward (New York: Harcourt,

Brace and World, Inc., 1938), and Time, vol. 38

(October 6, 1941), p. 58.
72 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

dumps had been established north of Pongani at Mendaropu, where Maj. Gen.

Edwin F. Harding, commanding general

of the 32d Division, had set up his command post, at Oro Bay, and at Embogo;

an advance dump was planned for Hariko,

where General MacNider was getting ready

to jump off.

Disaster at Cape Sudest

Between 1700 and 1800 on 16 November, three small ships and the Japanese

barge left Embogo for Hariko with the

bulk of the supplies for MacNider's attack

on Buna. The two-masted schooner

Alacrity departed first, then the trawler

Minnemura, followed by the barge; the

trawler Bonwin brought up the rear.

Though hostile planes had been reported

up the coast, the little flotilla had no air

cover—the American and Australian

fighter planes had left for Port Moresby in

order to get back to their bases before dark.

Deck-mounted machine guns were the

ships' only protection against aircraft.

Lieutenant Harbert, the Ordnance

officer of the coastal force, was in charge of

the Alacrity. Considerably larger than the

Minnemura and the Bonwin, she carried

all the reserve ammunition of the 128th

Infantry's 1st and 2d Battalions, about 100

tons, and forty native Papuans to help offload the material into outrigger canoes

and then transport it inland. The Alacrity also had the men and equipment of the

22d Portable Hospital and was towing a

steel barge carrying ammunition and a reconnaissance platoon of the 126th Infantry.

The Minnemura had aboard General

Harding, on a visit to General MacNider's

command post; Col. Herbert B. Laux, an

Army Ground Forces observer; and an

Australian war correspondent, Geoffrey

Reading. On the Japanese barge was

Brig. Gen. Albert W. Waldron, the 32d

Division Artillery officer, accompanied by

Col. Harold F. Handy, another AGF

observer. General Waldron was making

his second trip to the front. The preceding night he had brought up the two Australian mountain howitzers and he now

had on the barge two 25-pounders, together with their Australian crews and

ammunition. Bringing up the rear was

the Bonwin, loaded with oil drums and

carrying a few passengers, including

Colonel McKenny, two Australian news

cameramen, and several natives.11

Rounding Cape Sudest (about a mile

south of Hariko) at 1830, the Alacrity had

just dropped anchor in response to a signal

from the shore when her passengers saw a

formation of seventeen Japanese Zeros flying

very high and heading south. The Zeros

turned, swooped down in groups of threes,

and, using incendiary ammunition—described by one of the Australian gunners

on the barge as a "bright coloured rain of

death"12—strafed and bombed the little

flotilla. Soon the Bonwin and the barge

were sinking and the other two ships were

burning. The captain of the Minnemura

tried to run his ship inshore, but after

the Papuan native in the bow dived

overboard, swimming for the junglefringed beach, the trawler was soon

11

 (1) Ltr with Incls, Maj Gen Edwin F. Harding (USA Ret) to Lida Mayo, 9 Jul 63. (2) Ltrs,

Col Maxwell Emerson (USA Ret) to Lida Mayo,

10 Oct 64, 20 Oct 64 (with Incls). (3) Ltr, Col

John E. Harbert to Lida Mayo, 26 Oct 64. All in

OCMH.

12

 John W. O'Brien, Guns and Gunners (Sydney

and London, 1950), p. 171.
SUPPORTING THE PAPUA CAMPAIGN 73

hung up on a reef, a sitting duck for the

Zeros. General Harding swam safely to

shore from the Minnemura, as did General

Waldron from the barge, but Colonel

McKenny was killed; twenty-three others

were killed or drowned, and about a hundred men were wounded. Some survivors

who could neither swim to land nor get

into the ships' dinghies were picked up by

rescue parties sent out from shore. During

the night the Alacrity and the Minnemura

burned to the water line. For hours their

ammunition provided an impressive display

of pyrotechnics—shells, rockets, and Very

lights shooting into the tropical night like

Fourth of July fireworks.13

The only cargo saved was the ammunition on the barge being towed by the

Alacrity, and it might also have been lost

except for heroic action by Lieutenant

Harbert, who organized a party to pull the

barge to shore. He remained on the barge

in spite of repeated strafing, throwing overboard the flaming fragments that fell from

the schooner and extinguishing the fires

that started. His calmness steadied men

who had taken cover and his courage inspired them to resume work and save the

badly needed ammunition. For his extraordinary heroism he was awarded the

Distinguished Service Cross, along with ten

men of the two shore rescue parties who

also braved enemy fire.14

Because of the loss of the cargoes on the

small ships, General MacNider's offensive

had to be postponed until 19 November,

and even then it was difficult to bring the

supplies up to the front. Japanese bombings and strafings at Embogo and Mendaropu on 17 November put the remaining

trawlers out of commission, and the new

trawlers that arrived on 21 November also

suffered enemy air attacks. With the disruption for the time being of the small

ships operation, supplies were airdropped.

This method of supply had serious drawbacks. The difficulty of placing packages

at the desired point is revealed by the report of one 32d Division unit whose supplies fell half a day's march away from the

place where they were expected: "With a

day's search using 40 natives we may find

20%." Fragile Ordnance supplies such as

.30-caliber ammunition or 81-mm. mortar

shells were also damaged in the drop.

After an airstrip at Dobodura, in the neighborhood of Buna, was opened on 21

November, supplies could be landed, but

the lift of the largest cargo plane then available, the C-47, equaled only the pay load

of the 21⁄2-ton truck. Moreover, the

weather, the high mountains, poor landing

conditions, loading problems, and enemy

fighter attacks on the slow, unarmed transports always limited air shipments. The

best supply route to the Buna front was by

sea, and the disruption of the trawler operation was to have serious consequences.15

The Attack Begins—and Stalls

On the rainy morning of 19 November

13

 For a vivid account of the attack on the

Minnemura, see Reading, Papuan Story, pp. 146-

56.

14

 (1) GO 64, GHQ SWPA, 28 Dec 42. (2)

GO 1, GHQ SWPA, 1 Jan 43.

15

 (1) AAF Historical Studies 17, Air Action in

the Papuan Campaign, 21 July 1942-23 January

1943, pp. 68, 75, MS, Air University, Maxwell

AFB. (2) Craven and Cate, AAF IV, pp. 116-17.

(3) History of the 9th Ordnance Maintenance

Battalion, ch. ii, pp. 4-6, and app. 3. (4) 32d

Div, G-4 Sec Rear Echelon, Recapitulation of Air

Shipments, 13 Nov 42 to 20 Jan 43, Record of

Air Shipments (hereafter cited as 32d Div, G-4.

Air Shipments).
74 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

about two thousand men of the 32d Division began to move on foot through the

jungle to attack the Japanese entrenched

on a coastal perimeter about three miles

long, extending from Buna Village to a

coconut plantation at Cape Endaiadere.

The Americans were divided into two

forces, the left flank advancing toward the

Buna Village-Buna Mission area and the

right flank advancing toward the Cape

Endaiadere area. The two flanks were

only two or three miles apart, but were

separated by a swamp that took six or seven

hours to cross on foot. The forces were

armed with .30-caliber M1 and M1903

rifles, Browning automatic rifles (BAR's),

Thompson .45-caliber submachine guns,

and pistols. Their heavy weapons companies depended mainly on light .30-caliber

machine guns and 60-mm. mortars.

Other weapons for the attack were 81-mm.

mortars and 37-mm. antitank guns. Artillery support consisted of seven Australian

weapons—three 3.7-inch pack howitzers

and four 25-pounders.16

As the infantrymen moved forward they

were accompanied by Ordnance troops to

keep their weapons in repair. A few came

from the 32d Division's Ordnance Section

(the 32d's Ordnance company had been

moved out when the division was triangularized in December 1941);17

 most had

been obtained from the 37th Ordnance

Medium Maintenance Company. The

left flank was served by 1st Lt. Paul Keene,

10 men from the 37th, and 3 division

mechanics. Lieutenant Harbert, 8 men

from the 37th, and 2 division mechanics

were with troops on the right flank. In

the opinion of the 32d Division commander, Keene and Harbert were to demonstrate "amply . . . the capability of young

ordnance officers to operate continuously

under fire and under adverse conditions."

 18

Lt. Col. Tyler D. Barney, the 32d Division Ordnance officer who was soon to

arrive at the Dobodura airhead from Port

Moresby, recorded: "Perhaps at no time

in recent military history was ordnance

service rendered under so adverse and confused conditions."

 19

 From the very beginning, the combat troops had to fight the

jungle as well as the Japanese. They had

to wade through swamps that were sometimes neck-deep; when they came out, their

rifles and machine guns were full of muck

and their ammunition was wet. Tropical

storms cut off air support, the supply of food

and ammunition ran low, and the men

were soon depleted by heat, malaria,

dengue fever, and dysentery. They had

not been adequately trained for jungle

warfare and were demoralized by strange

jungle noises and Japanese sniping tactics.

Worst of all, the 32d Division troops had

not been prepared for the strong defenses

they encountered at Buna. Instead of

finding the tired, emaciated remnants of a

Japanese force that had expended itself in

the attack over the Owen Stanley Range,

they found the fresh, well-armed Special

Naval Landing Forces. They were entrenched in strong bunkers constructed of

foot-wide coconut logs, impervious to in16

 (1) Report, Force Ordnance Officer to Hq

32d Div, Ordnance Buna Operation (hereafter

cited as 32d Div Ord Rpt, Buna), p. 2b. (2) Rpt

of CG Buna Forces, p. 10, and Annex 3, Incl A,

Field Artillery Rpt, pp. 74-75. 17

 Final Rpt of Lt Col Tyler D. Barney, in Field

Service Key Personnel Rpts (hereafter cited as

Barney Rpt), OHF.

18

 32d Div Ord Rpt, Buna, p. 4a. 19

 (1) Barney Rpt. (2) History 9th Ord Maint

Bn, ch. ii, p. 16.
SUPPORTING THE PAPUA CAMPAIGN 75

JAPANESE BUNKER, BUNA

fantry weapons, bunkers so cleverly camouflaged with grasses and tree branches that

aircraft could not spot them. Even if

Army Air Forces planes had spotted them,

bombing and strafing in the dense jungle

would have endangered nearby friendly

troop concentrations. General Harding

quickly realized that tanks might be effective, but his efforts to obtain some of the

lend-lease Stuarts at Milne Bay were defeated by the transportation problem.

When the first tank was loaded on one of

the captured Japanese barges, the barge

sank. The only answer was artillery, but

the bunkers were so close to the ground

that the Australian 25-pounders were

usually ineffective.20

The 32d Division had arrived in New

Guinea without artillery because American

planners had doubted whether artillery

could be successfully used in jungle warfare. General Kenney had emphatically

stated that heavy artillery had "no place in

jungle warfare. The artillery in this

theater flies."21 Planners believed that

mortars, aircraft, and the few Australian

20

 (1) Ltr, Colonel Harbert to Lida Mayo, 26

Oct 64, OCMH. (2) McCarthy, South-West Pacific

Area—First Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 363. 21

 AAF Study 17, p. 72.
76 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

weapons could provide adequate support

for the infantry. Nevertheless, as an experiment, on 13 November a single 105-

mm. howitzer of Battery A, 129th Field

Artillery, 32d Division, was broken down,

and together with a gun crew, an Australian tractor, and about twenty-five rounds

of ammunition was flown to Port Moresby

from Brisbane. On 26 November, in support of General Harding's Thanksgiving

Day offensive, the howitzer with its crew,

tractor, and 100 rounds of ammunition was

flown to Dobodura in three DC—3 transport planes and put into position at the

front under the code name DUSTY.22

DUSTY was soon highly prized. When

it was fired with an HE projectile using

an M48 delay fuze it could destroy

Japanese bunkers. Considered by General

Waldron, the 32d Division artillery officer,

"a superb weapon, durable, accurate, and

with great firepower, . . . better by far than

anything the Japs had to bring against

us,"

 23

 the howitzer rendered excellent service—until its ammunition gave out. In

the first few days the initial shipment was

increased to nearly 400 rounds, all apparently HE. This was fired rapidly and in

about a week all the shells in Papua had

been expended. No adequate supply was

to be available until late in December.

One explanation was that Advance New

Guinea Force, which controlled the supply

of all artillery ammunition and was under

an Australian commander until 13 January, had given priority to the Australian

25-pounder ammunition; but the underlying reason was that transportation, by air

or sea, was unequal to demands. Because

of the lack of ammunition, DUSTY was

silent when most needed; and for the same

reason, the remaining three 105-mm. howitzers of Battery A, 129th Field Artillery,

flown to New Guinea by 22 November,

were not sent to the front but remained at

Port Moresby throughout the Papua Campaign.24

I Corps Takes Over

By the end of November the 32d Division's attack on Buna had bogged down.

General MacArthur, having set up his

headquarters at Port Moresby on 6 November, was, in the words of an Australian

historian, "in the grip of great disquiet."

 25

He sent to Australia for Lt. Gen. Robert L.

Eichelberger, commanding general of I

Corps, and, in a dramatic interview on 1

December, ordered him to take over command of all U.S. troops in the Papua

Campaign.

The change brought to Port Moresby

Col. Marshall E. Darby, Ordnance officer

of I Corps and commander of the 9th

Ordnance Maintenance Battalion, which

had arrived in Australia in October.

Darby was placed in command of the rear

detachment for Buna Force (Buna Force

was the new name for the American forward tactical command—a combination of

I Corps and 32d Division headquarters)

and thus had command of all troops under 22

 (1) Rpt of CG Buna Forces, Annex 3, Incl

A, Field Arty Rpt, pp. 74-75. (2) History 9th Ord

Maint Bn, ch. ii, pp. 7, 9, 21. (3) General George C.

Kenney, General Kenney Reports (New York:

Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944), pp. 140-41, 151. 23

 Maj. Gen. Albert W. Waldron, "Ordnance in

Jungle Warfare," Army Ordnance, XXVI (MayJune, 1944), 520.

24

 (1) History 9th Ord Maint Bn, ch. ii, apps.

5. 7. (2) 32d Div, G-4, Air Shipments. (3) Robert

L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo (New

York: The Viking Press, 1950), pp. 40-45. 25 McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area—First

Year: Kokoda to Wau, p. 371.
SUPPORTING THE PAPUA CAMPAIGN 77

the administrative control of I Corps in the

Port Moresby area. His small staff, never

exceeding four officers and six enlisted men,

included men from other corps staff sections as well as Ordnance. Ordnance

matters, which primarily concerned ammunition, were of major importance, but

Darby could not give his full time to them.

Also, he had many headquarters to deal

with—GHQ, Advance New Guinea Force,

the Fifth Air Force, and the Advanced

Base Section, New Guinea—from his point

of view, "a SNAFU mess . . . Battling

with GHQ—NGF—5th Air Force—Base

Sect—all wanting to run the war."

 26

Sometimes in order to get action Darby

felt he had to appeal directly to Base Section 3. On 2 December he bypassed normal channels—Advanced Base and GHQ

Advance Section—to radio directly to the

Ordnance officer at Base Section 3 for 800

rounds of 105-mm. ammunition by the

first air priority, pending the arrival of a

sea-borne supply. His reason for going

outside channels was that at the moment

the ammunition shipment "was the most

important thing in the world" and he

"couldn't trust anyone with it except the

Ordnance Department." When no ammunition had arrived by 6 December he

sent a sharp message to corps headquarters

in Australia explaining his needs and what

he had done, requesting the corps "to raise

a little hell" about the ammunition, and

pointing out that General Eichelberger had

"asked for 100 rounds per day for 10 days

starting 5 December and there isn't a single

damned round here." Nevertheless, weeks

went by before a steady flow of 105-mm.

ammunition reached the front; and in the

meantime, Darby was plagued at times by

shortages of other types as well.27

Ammunition Supply to Buna Force

In theory the ammunition plan for the

Papua Campaign calling for ten units of

fire—five in USASOS dumps at Port

Moresby and five in forward dumps—was

adequate; but transportation difficulties

made for a variable and irregular supply

in the forward areas. About 10 December

Buna Force attempted automatic supply

from SOS to forward dumps, but abandoned it a week later as impractical because

of frequent changes in needs, air priorities,

weather, and other factors. Troops expended ammunition by round and required

replenishment by rounds of specific types.

After 17 December supply was strictly on

the basis of a daily radio sent by Colonel

Barney from Dobodura to Port Moresby.28

Theater Ordnance officers tried to correlate issues at bases, losses through shipments, and expenditures by troops, but it

was exceedingly difficult to get expenditure

reports from the combat units because of

dispersion and the paper work involved.

One big unknown factor was always the

quantity lost in the jungle or bypassed at

small supply points when the fighting

deviated from the supply plan. From the

best information available, the highest expenditures in the campaign were of .30-

26

 History 9th Ord Maint Bn, app. 1.

27

 (1) Extracts, Ltrs, Rear Det to DCofS I

Corps, 6 Dec 42; Rear Det to AG I Corps, 11 Dec

42. Both in History 9th Ord Maint Bn, ch. ii,

app. 7. (2) 32d Div, G-4, Air Shipments. (3)

Chronicle Record of Events, Advanced Echelon,

Hqs I Corps, Since 30 Nov 1942, p. 3, 314.7

History-Buna Forces, in I Corps, AG Sec, KCRC. 28

 (1) Barney Rpt, p. 2. (2) History 9th Ord

Maint Bn, ch. ii, pp. 6-7, and app. 8, Ordnance

Lessons of the Buna Campaign, p. 2.
78 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

caliber ball ammunition for the M1 rifle,

45-caliber ammunition for the submachine

gun, and HE ammunition for the 81-mm.

mortar, which was unexpectedly employed

as a substitute for artillery.29

The high expenditure of .45-caliber

rounds for the submachine (Tommy) gun

was partly caused by the 32d Division infantrymen's preference for the Tommy gun

over the BAR. In contrast to the marines

on Guadalcanal, who swore by the BAR

(and objected to the Tommy gun because

it sounded like a Japanese weapon and

drew friendly fire), the Army troops in

Papua considered the BAR too heavy and

clumsy for quick use in the jungle and too

hard to keep in repair. High expenditures

of ammunition for the submachine gun,

as well as for the popular .30-caliber light

machine gun and M1 rifles, were also

caused by the fact that the 32d Division

troops had been inadequately trained for

the campaign—their first experience in

combat—and often failed markedly to exercise fire discipline and control, firing

many more rounds than were either anticipated or necessary. Firing was often

"wild and prolonged," reported the I

Corps G-3, "at imaginary targets or no

targets at all." The Japanese, who themselves displayed excellent fire discipline,

noted the poor habits of the American

soldiers. "The enemy is using ammunition

wildly," noted one Japanese in his diary.

To another it seemed that the Americans

shot "at any sound due to illusion," firing

light machine guns and throwing hand

grenades "recklessly." A third remarked

that the Americans were "in the jungle

firing as long as their ammunition lasts.

Maybe they get more money for firing so

many rounds." A possible shortage of

.30-caliber machine gun ammunition was

averted by taking the .30-caliber rounds

for the little-used BAR's from the 20-round

magazines and reloading them into fabric

belts for the machine guns.30

Larger quantities of 81-mm. mortar ammunition than had been anticipated were

needed because of the lack of 105-mm.

howitzer ammunition. The relatively

small area of the battlefield allowed the 81-

mm. mortar, often fired in batteries of six

or more pieces, to cover large portions of

enemy territory, and the slowness of the

advance permitted the mortars to move

forward fast enough to support the infantry.

Reports of duds in the 81-mm. heavy

rounds (M56) were probably due to the

fact that the rounds were being fired with

a short delay fuze that permitted the projectile to bury itself far enough in mud or

swamp water to smother the detonation,

leaving no crater. When the round was

fired with an instantaneous fuze and hit

on solid ground, a fine "daisy cutter" effect

was achieved. Though it could not destroy the stronger Japanese bunkers, the

mortar was still greatly feared by the

enemy and was considered by the commanding general of Buna Force as probably the most effective weapon used during

the campaign.31

At the end of the first week in December

a thousand rounds of 37-mm. canister am29

 (1) Holman Comments 1. (2) Rpt of Ord

Activities USASOS SWPA, Jan 43.

30

 (1) Rpt of CG Buna Forces, pp. 61, 65-66,

70. (2) 32d Div Ord Rpt, Buna. 31

 (1) Memos, Holman for Manson, 9 Jan 43,

no sub; Manson for Holman, 14 Jan 43, no sub.

Both in Manson File, OHF. (2) History 9th Ord

Maint Bn, ch. ii, pp. 11-12. (3) 32d Div Ord

Rpt, Buna, p. 6. (4) SWPA Rpt (Henry), cited

above, ch. III, n17(1).
SUPPORTING THE PAPUA CAMPAIGN 79

munition arrived unexpectedly at Port

Moresby by air and sea, transshipped via

Brisbane from the marines at Guadalcanal,

who had received large quantities in September. A projectile that dates back to

the Civil War, a canister is a metal cylinder

containing metal fragments. When fired,

it splits open, scattering its contents.

Colonel Barney radioed Australia for information on how to fire the canister and was

told to shoot it and find out. While experimenting, several men were wounded,

but after they had learned how to handle

and fire it the canister proved highly effective. Making possible the employment

against troops of the 37-mm. antitank gun

—hitherto of limited use because the

Japanese were not using tanks and because

its antitank round was not powerful enough

to destroy the thick Japanese bunkers—the

37-mm. canister ammunition discharged its

pellets with lethal, shotgun effect on troops

in the open and on those protected only

by brush or undergrowth.32

No American hand grenades reached the

front until mid-December because of difficulty with the fuzes. Until then the troops

used Australian fragmentation grenades,

which in some cases were preferred to the

American as being more powerful, more

dependable, and quicker to explode so that

the enemy had less time to pick up the

grenade and hurl it back. In other cases

the American was preferred in spite of its

tendency to emit sparks and give away the

position of the thrower at night.33 Neither

was effective against Japanese in bunkers,

nor was the antitank grenade (M9) of any

use against them. The Australians had

rifle grenades that could be fired through

the slit openings of the bunkers with devastating effect, but although the Americans

requested rifle grenades from Australia

early in the operation, they did not receive

any at the front during the Papua Campaign. An offensive hand grenade that

would kill or incapacitate all the defenders

in a given bunker by its blast effect would

have been of great value. To fill the need,

the Australians contrived an effective "blast

bomb" out of an Australian hand grenade,

two pounds of loose ammonal, a tin container, and some adhesive tape.34

The supply of bombs to the Fifth Air

Force from Major Manson's dumps at Port

Moresby was hampered at times because

Manson's crew could not always inventory

its stocks properly. This was especially

serious in the case of the fragmentation

bombs. General Kenney had discovered

that small bombs of this type equipped

with a supersensitive fuze that would

detonate them instantaneously on contact

even with foliage were most effective in the

jungle. He had used them in an attack

on Buna on 12 September, and they were

very much in demand as the Papua Campaign drew to a close early in January

1943. It was thought that there were

none left in New Guinea, until a search

32

 (1) Barney Rpt. (2) History 9th Ord Maint

Bn, ch. ii, pp. 10-11. (3) Miller, Guadalcanal:

The First Offensive, p. 123. 33

 (1) 32d Div Ord Rpt, pp. 3a, 6. (2) 32d Div,

G-4, Air Shipments. (3) Ltr, 1st Lt J. J. Phillips,

Jr., 703d Ord Co, to Ord Officer USASOS, 19

Dec 42, sub: Report of Ordnance Situation on the

Buna Front, AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333 Inspections,

KCRC. (4) Rpt, Col Harry T. Creswell and Maj

Charles W. Walson, Observer's Report South and

Southwest Pacific, Team 4 (hereafter cited as Observers Rpt Team 4), p. 59, Armored School Library, Fort Knox. 34

 (1) Notes, 26 Oct 42, Ordnance Conference

25 Oct 42 at Base Sec 3, p. 1, AFWESPAC Ord

Sec 337, KCRC. (2) 32d Div Ord Rpt, Buna, p.

6. (3) Observer's Rpt Team 4, p. 131.
80 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

through the USASOS dumps revealed

about 400 clusters on which there was no

record. The discovery came too late for

the bombs to be used in support of ground

operations in the Buna action.35

Maintenance in the Jungle

Working in oppressive heat—sometimes

in several feet of water—depleted by

disease, and lacking any repair equipment

other than the hand tools they carried, the

maintenance detachments under Keene

and Harbert "did a splendid job," reported

one Ordnance observer, "never more than

five or ten minutes behind the lines, with

no difficulty keeping up parts and making

repairs."

 36

Parts most in demand were main recoil

springs for submachine guns, rear sight and

bolt assemblies for M1 rifles, driving

springs and cocking levers for light machine

guns, and firing pins for 60-mm. and 81-

mm, mortars, and to obtain them the crews

cannibalized arms and equipment left on

the battlefield. Cannibalization was wasteful and was vigorously opposed by Colonel

Holman, who advocated the evacuation of

damaged weapons and vehicles to Ordnance service centers so they could be torn

down and rebuilt. In later campaigns in

the Pacific Holman was able to put this

procedure into effect but in Papua cannibalization was often the only way to get

parts. Weapons parts had been extremely

scarce in Australia ever since the 32d Division landed in May 1942. There was also

the problem of bringing up supplies. In

early December, when the first attacks by

Buna Force took place, only seven jeeps

and three 1-ton trailers had been flown into

Dobodura and were available (when roads

permitted) for carrying supplies to the

front. Most of the supply burden was

borne by carrier lines of Papuan natives,

laden mainly with rations and ammunition.37

Salvage represented about 90 percent of

the Ordnance maintenance task at the

front.38 Sometimes it was dangerous work.

There were times when maintenance men

braved enemy fire to retrieve weapons that

might otherwise have fallen into the hands

of the enemy. On one occasion, for example, Technician Featherstone, who had

participated in the earliest trawler operation, "with utter disregard for his own personal safety, volunteered and went forward

under heavy enemy fire to retrieve weapons

on the front lines which had been abandoned by the dead and wounded." For

this and other instances of gallantry in

action near Buna between 16 November

1942 and 3 January 1943, he was awarded

the Silver Star.39 More weapons could

have been saved if Keene and Harbert had

had more men to spare for the job. Additional Ordnance men were requested by

the 32d Division chief of staff early in December, but it was 3 January 1943 before

they arrived. For lack of salvage men.

35

 (1) Ltr, Maj Robert S. Blodgett to Col Holman, 13 Jan 43, no sub, AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333

Inspections, KCRC. (2) Kenney, General Kenney

Reports, pp. 12-13, 76, 93-94, 98. (3) Craven

and Cate, AAF IV, p. 106. (4) Green, Thomson,

and Roots, The Ordnance Department: Planning

Munitions for War, pp. 459-61. 36

 SWPA Rpt (Henry), p. 4.

37

 (1) Holman Comments 1. (2) History 9th

Ord Maint Bn, ch. ii, p. 17. (3) SWPA Rpt

(Henry), p. 4. (4) Barney Rpt, p. 2. (5) Memo,

15 Dec 42, sub: Ordnance Problems in Jungle

Operations, p. 2, AFWESPAC Ord Sec 438 Cleaning and Preserving Material, KCRC. 38

 Rpt of CG Buna Forces, Annex 4, p. 87. 39

 GO 12, Hq U.S. Forces Buna Area, 18 Jan 43.
SUPPORTING THE PAPUA CAMPAIGN 81

many rifles and machine guns abandoned

on the battlefield were damaged by rust beyond repair. The importance of battlefield salvage was one of the main Ordnance

lessons of the Papua Campaign.40

Materials to clean and oil the small arms

that had been carried through the swamps

were much in demand. Cleaning and preserving (C&P) materials had been in short

supply to begin with. Many of the M1

rifles had been issued without oil and thong

cases. Often when the men had the cases

they simply threw them away to lighten the

load they were carrying. By 3 December

the shortage of gun oil, small individual

containers for oil, brushes, cleaning rods,

and other C&P items was serious enough to

affect operations. One combat officer, observing that the first thing the men stripped

from the Japanese dead or wounded was

the neat bakelite oil case they carried, reported that gun oil was "very precious and

always short." Urgent messages characterized the condition of small arms at the

front as "deplorable" and "terrible."

 41

The cleaning and preserving items were

not available at Port Moresby. Twentyfive tons that had been awaiting shipment

on the docks at Brisbane had gone forward

by water in mid-November but were still

en route at the beginning of December.

One portion of this cargo especially needed

at the front consisted of 4,000 4-ounce

metal cans for gun oil, to be carried by the

individual soldier. On an urgent, first

priority requisition from Colonel Darby to

Brisbane, a new shipment of containers

went off immediately by air from Townsville. By the time it arrived additional

quantities were needed and Darby requested that 3,000 be shipped by air. Because planes out of Brisbane were

grounded, the containers had to go to

Townsville by passenger train and did not

arrive until five days after Darby's request,

a delay that evidenced some of the difficulties of supply by air. Nevertheless, air

was the only recourse in an emergency.

Air delivery of at least thirty gallons of gun

oil and six bales of patches, the shipment to

be duplicated every forty-eight hours, was

requested on 18 December. At that time

the stock of oil and patches in the fighting

area was reported to be zero. The men at

the front used Quartermaster motor oil and

captured Japanese C&P items and in the

jungle when these were unavailable greased

their small arms with candles, graphite

pencils, and ordinary Vaseline.42

By the end of December as sea transportation improved, increasing supplies of

cleaning and preserving materials began to

reach the front. But to those responsible

in Australia the situation was still critical.

Strenuous efforts were being made to improve the supply to Papua and to insure

that shortages of cleaning and preserving

materials would not recur. When the

supply of metal oil containers (demanded

in much larger quantities than had been

foreseen) was exhausted, Colonel Holman

drew on the Australian Army for 2-ounce

40

 (1) Advanced Base USASOS SWPA Ordnance Report of Operations, p. 2, AFWESPAC

Ord Sec 370.2 Monthly Rpt of Ord Opns Adv

Base N.G., KCRC. (2) Holman Comments 1. 41

 (1) History 9th Ord Maint Bn, ch. ii, pp.

15-16, and app. 8, p. 3. (2) 32d Div Ord Rpt,

Buna, p. 5. (3) Notes, 26 Oct 42, Conf 25 Oct

42 Base Sec 3. (4) Monthly Rpt of Opns, Nov

42, Base Sec 3, USASOS SWPA, AFWESPAC

Ord Sec 370.2, KCRC. (5) Odell Narrative, Dec

42, 12 Station Hospital, Australia, in Milner

Notes.

42

 (1) History 9th Ord Maint Bn, ch. ii, pp.

15-16, and app. 7. (2) Barney Rpt, p. 2. (3)

32d Div Rpt, Buna, p. 5.
82 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

plastic containers. He also attempted to

have oil and thong cases manufactured

locally. His staff experimented with different types of rust preventives for small

arms in the damp jungles and after six

months of tests came up with a lubricant

containing lanolin that withstood corrosion

under the severest conditions. The Papua

Campaign ended before the new lubricant

could be introduced for more than field

tests in combat, but it offered hope for

better maintenance in future jungle campaigns.43

The Forward Bases

In mid-December four lend-lease Stuart

tanks were landed by sea at Hariko, only a

few miles from the battlefield, an "amazing

achievement" in the opinion of General

Herring, commanding general of Advance

New Guinea Force. These tanks, and

those following a few days later, had little

effect on the battle for Buna; the light, fast

Stuarts, slowed by swamp mud choked

with kunai grass, were, in the words of the

Australian historian of the battle, "like race

horses harnessed to heavy ploughs"; moreover, they were "almost blind" because

tank vision, restricted at the best of times,

was shut off by the tropical growth.44 Yet

the fact that the tanks could be landed on

that coast at all, only a month after General Harding's ill-starred effort to bring

them up by barge from Milne Bay, showed

how far the sea supply operation had progressed in a very short time.

Sizable ships could now come into Oro

Bay, a harbor about fifteen miles southeast

of Buna. The 3,300-ton Dutch freighter

Karsik on the night of 11-12 December

brought the tanks from Port Moresby into

Oro Bay. Unloading was supervised by

Maj. Carroll K. Moffatt of Combined

Operational Service Command, who had

just arrived in the area with the first landing craft to reach the combat zone—six

Higgins boats (LCVP's) and two Australian barges. The tanks were transferred to

the barges, which were towed by motor

launches, and carried up the coast through

the reefs to Hariko. There the tank crews

drove them over the side of the barges onto

the beach.45

The establishment of an effective line of

supply by sea made it necessary to increase

Ordnance service at Oro Bay as well as

Milne Bay. For these forward bases Maj.

Byrne C. Manson recommended composite

companies of 6 officers and 180 men each,

including headquarters, ammunition, depot, weapons maintenance, and motor

maintenance men, but this was merely a

hope for the future.46 For the present he

had to send piecemeal detachments. At

Milne Bay a depot company began to

arrive on 26 November, but no effective

motor maintenance was possible until midDecember when Manson sent to Milne Bay

a detachment of his Port Moresby company, now redesignated the 3425th Ord43 nance Medium Maintenance Company (1) Memo, USASOS COrdO, R.H.E. [Maj

R. H. Einfledt] for Manson, no sub, 10 Jan 43.

(2) Memo, Manson for Einfledt, no sub, 14 Jan

43. Both in Manson File, OHF. (3) Monthly

Rpt of Opns, Jan 43, Base Sec 3, USASOS SWPA,

p. 1, AFWESPAC Ord Sec 370.2, KCRC. 44

 McCarthy, South-West Pacific — The First

Year: Kokoda to Wau, pp. 462, 517.

45

 Ibid., pp. 452-53. 46

 Manson to COrdO, 22 Nov 42, sub: Report

of Operations, November 1942, AFWESPAC Ord

Sec 370.2 Monthly Rpt of Opns Adv Base N.G.,

KCRC.
SUPPORTING THE PAPUA CAMPAIGN 83

(Q). At Oro Bay he could provide during the Papua Campaign only small detachments of headquarters, maintenance,

and depot troops, a number inadequate to

support growing operations. Even clerks

had to double as ammunition handlers.

Toward the end of the campaign the Oro

Bay Ordnance officer was "frantically calling for help and with good reason."47

The problem of motor maintenance

arose at Oro Bay in early December when

tracks for jeeps from Hariko and Dobodura

to the front were finally completed. From

dumps or open beaches, jeeps pulled their

1-ton trailers over primitive roads corduroyed with coconut logs and interspersed

with mudholes that played havoc with

springs, shock absorbers, and brake cylinders. The jeeps proved to be sturdily built

—no other motor vehicles could have operated under such conditions—but even the

jeeps had difficulty in the mud. When

tropical rains turned many areas into quagmires, oversized command car tires were

mounted on the jeeps, or, better yet, dual

wheels using standard tires were constructed for the rear axles of the vehicles.

The initial job of conversion to six wheels

was done almost overnight by half a dozen

men of the 3425th Ordnance Medium

Maintenance Company (Q) at Milne Bay.

Once this conversion proved workable, the

6-wheeled jeeps were prepared in Australia

for Papua.48

The Shortage of Base Personnel

and Supplies

To provide Ordnance service at three

major bases—Port Moresby, Milne Bay,

and Oro Bay—and at several minor bases,

Major Manson had only 650 men during

the entire campaign. The acute manpower shortage began in October, when the

arrival of the 32d Division troops greatly

increased the Ordnance load and at the

same time pre-empted the shipping needed

to transport base personnel. An 8-man

detachment of the 360th Composite Company and a 70-man detachment of the

55th Ordnance Ammunition Company

arrived in October, but the rest of the ammunition company and the maintenance

men—the 37th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company and the remainder of

Company A, 72d Ordnance Medium

Maintenance Battalion (Q)—did not

arrive until late November or early December. Supply shipments were also affected.

For three weeks in October not a single

cargo ship moved from Brisbane to New

Guinea. There was some improvement in

November, and small air shipments helped,

but it was early January before a regular

sea-and-air shipping schedule for Ordnance

matériel was established and large stocks

could be forwarded.49

47

 (1) Unit History, 818th Ord Depot Co. (2)

History 3425th Ord Medium Maintenance Co. (3)

History USASOS, ch. xvii, Base B at Oro Bay,

New Guinea, December 1942 to March 1944, pp.

74-75. 48

 (1) Ltr, Phillips to COrdO, USASOS, 19

Dec 42, sub: Rpt of Ord Situation on Buna Front.

(2) Rpt, Col Cavanaugh, 15 Feb 43, sub: Report

on Inspection Trip (hereafter cited as Cavanaugh

Rpt 15 Feb). Both in AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333

Inspections, KCRC. (3) History USASOS, ch.

xvii, pp. 37-38. (4) Memo, Manson for T/3 James

A. Tuthill et al., 3425th Ord Medium Maint Co,

15 Jan 43, sub: Letter of Commendation, in

History 3425th Ord Medium Maint Co. 49

 (1) For the personnel shortage see file, AFWESPAC Ord Sec 200.3 Assignment of Personnel,

KCRC, correspondence from September 1942-

January 1943, particularly, Ltrs, Manson to COrdO,

28 Sep 42, sub: Ammunition Personnel, and 27

Nov 42, sub: Ordnance Personnel. (2) Ltr, Maj

Nathan J. Forb to Col Cavanaugh, 5 Dec 42, sub:

Staff Visit MAPLE, AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333 Inspections, KCRC.
84 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

The motor maintenance problem, not

only new to Ordnance but new to the

Army under combat conditions, was staggering. The fleet of 845 vehicles at Port

Moresby in October had grown by midDecember to 2,500, and was increasing by

100 a week. An average of 4,000 tons of

cargo, Australian and American, was being

hauled every day from the docks, in addition to the hauling within the base of men,

water, rations, and ammunition. Over

roads badly corrugated, alternately very

dusty and very muddy, trucks operated

twenty-four hours a day with very little first

or second echelon maintenance. One unit

reported, "We are too busy hauling to stop

and grease the trucks." Many of the vehicles had arrived from Australia in poor

condition, damaged, sometimes demolished,

en route; some came with smooth tires,

some lacking ignition keys, and many without tools.50

Spare parts were scarce until January,

when heavy shipments began to come in.

By then it had become evident that no matter how many parts were sent, there would

never be enough as long as drivers continued to neglect first and second echelon

maintenance. Manson detailed an inspection team of one officer and three enlisted

men to visit motor pools, report on the condition and state of maintenance of each

vehicle inspected, and teach drivers the

danger of reckless driving and overloading.

The team brought about some improvement, but the base continued to be "littered

with broken down vehicles." The only

answer was more maintenance troops, including a heavy maintenance company,

but none were available.51

Heat, Disease, and Hunger

The shortage of Ordnance men at the

bases in Papua was aggravated by the hard

working conditions. An observer noted

that the heat made everyone "about 50%

efficient" ;52 many of the men suffered from

recurring attacks of malaria and other

diseases. Along with most of the other

troops in New Guinea, they did not have

enough food because of the shipping shortage. At Port Moresby one inspection

officer saw "hungry men working themselves beyond their capacity seven days a

week in an effort to provide Ordnance

service to troops whose numbers would

have ordinarily required five times the

Ordnance personnel available."

 53

 Refusing "to wring the last ounce of energy from

the men under my control merely to show

how much can be done with so few men,"

Manson sent strongly worded requests to

Colonel Holman for more personnel. Be50

 (1) Memo, Maj Spencer B. Booz for COrdO,

USASOS, 19 Dec 42. (2) Cavanaugh Rpt 15

Feb. (3) Ltr, Forb to Cavanaugh, 5 Dec 42. All

in AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333 Inspections, KCRC.

51

 (1) Monthly Rpt of Opns, Jan 43, Base Section 3, USASOS SWPA, p. 1, 370.2 AFWESPAC

Ord Sec, KCRC. (2) Cavanaugh Rpt 15 Feb.

(3) Memo, Manson for CG U.S. Advanced Base,

7 Jan 43, no sub. (4) Incl to Memo, Manson for

COrdO USASOS, 8 Jan 43, sub: Motor Maintenance. (5) Ltr, Manson to Holman, 11 Jan 43,

no sub. Last three in 200.3 Assignment of Personnel AFWESPAC Ord Sec, KCRC. 52

 (1) Ltr, Cavanaugh to Holman, 24 Jan 43.

(2) Ltr, Manson to Holman, 11 Jan 43, AFWESPAC Ord Sec 200.3 Assignment of Personnel,

KCRC. (3) Reports for period in file, AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333 Inspections, KCRC. (4) For

the disease rate see Memo, 32d Div Surgeon for

CG Buna Force, 15 Jan 43, sub: Health of Command, Final Report, in History 9th Ord Maint

Bn, ch. ii, app. 13. 53

 Ltr, Byrne C. Manson to Lida Mayo, 31 May

66, Manson file.
SUPPORTING THE PAPUA CAMPAIGN 85

yond a few depot men and a handful of

staff officers, Holman could do little, for

the men were not available.54

Under these circumstances, Major Manson did an outstanding job for which he

received the Legion of Merit. He kept

the flow of Ordnance supplies moving up

front; made inspection trips to forward

bases covering every road and installation

in New Guinea; planned intelligently; and

sent valuable reports and recommendations

back to Australia. All this was accomplished under great pressure, sometimes

when he himself was ill. By the last week

in January the I Corps medical officer was

afraid that Manson would "crack" unless

he was given more help and granted leave

to Australia.55

Captured Japanese Matériel

Toward the end of the campaign Major

Manson had to organize a technical section

on enemy munitions. Since September

1942 the Ordnance Department in Washington had been requesting captured

Japanese matériel. Colonel Holman had

been able to send only a few bombs and

fuzes, some obtained from an Australian

bomb disposal section at Port Moresby,

others from the Ordnance officers at Milne

Bay and Townsville. In the early stages

of the Papua Campaign, Advance New

Guinea Force—the Australian command

under which all Allied forces operated—

had responsibility for all Japanese matériel

sent into the Port Moresby area, including

that captured by Americans. The Australians were willing to furnish the Americans

reports, evaluations, and photographs, but

the weapons themselves went to an Australian Imperial Forces museum in Melbourne, and reports on important items,

such as a Japanese bullet that appeared

to be of an explosive or dum-dum type,

were sometimes very slow in arriving at American headquarters. The procedure was obviously unsatisfactory, and

during the autumn of 1942 Colonel Holman worked out a new system with the

Australians: if Americans captured the

items they got the first piece, the Australians the second, and vice versa. By January 1943 this new procedure was in effect,

and a 6-man detachment from a small

Ordnance technical intelligence unit that

had just arrived in Australia was earmarked for Port Moresby.56

"A Poor Man's War"

With the aid of better transportation to

the front, bringing in fresh troops and more

effective ammunition to batter down Japanese bunkers, the victory came at Buna on

54

 (1) Ltr, Manson to Holman, 11 Jan 43,

AFWESPAC Ord Sec 200.3 Assignment of Personnel, KCRC. (2) Holman Comments 1. 55

 (1) Ltr, Blodgett to Holman, 13 Jan 43, no

sub, AFWESPAC Ord Sec 333 Inspections. (2)

Ltr, Cavanaugh to Holman, 24 Jan 43; Memo,

Col Clinton J. Harrold, S-4 U.S. Advance Base,

for CG Advance Base, 25 Feb 43, sub: Commendation. (3) GO 42, USAFFE 29 Jul 43. All in Manson File. It was not until mid-April that Manson

was transferred to Australia. (4) Interv with Holman and Kirsten, 12 Apr 56

56

 (1) Rad 1780, Washington, D.C. to USASOS,

17 Sep 42. (2) Ltr, Holman to CofOrd, 14 Nov

42, sub: Samples of Japanese Munitions. (3)

Memo, J. L. H. for G-4 Supply, 4 Jan 43. All

in AFWESPAC Ord Sec 386.3 Captured Enemy

Ordnance and Ammunition, KCRC. (4) Memo,

Holman for Manson, 9 Jan 43; Ltr, Manson to

Holman, 14 Jan 43. Both in Manson File. (5)

History 9th Ord Maint Bn, ch. ii, pp. 12-13, and

app. 8, p. 3. (7) Interv with Holman and Kirsten,

12 Apr 56.
86 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

3 January. By 22 January all organized

Japanese resistance in Papua had ended

and "the long, heartbreaking campaign

was done." Fought in the "Green Hell"

of the jungle that took a heavy toll of men

and weapons, the campaign had been siege

warfare—the bitterest, most punishing, and

most expensive kind. And yet it had been

"a poor man's war."

 57

 There were never

enough men, and the amount of supplies

that could be brought forward from Australia to Port Moresby and from Port

Moresby to the front was restricted by the

scarcity of ships and aircraft. It was also

pioneer warfare. There had been little experience with either Japanese tactics or

with the Southwest Pacific climate and

terrain to guide planning.

The weapons carried by the Americans

were standard equipment, none of it designed especially for jungle warfare; the

jungle kit developed in the summer of 1942

consisted mainly of Quartermaster items.

General MacArthur, undoubtedly influenced by the Japanese use of lightweight

weapons, had asked the War Department

in August 1942 for special items to equip

his troops for jungle warfare in New

Guinea—light machine guns, small tractors, folding bicycles, pack horse equipment, and miscellaneous items. He also

wanted to use 60-mm. mortars instead of

105-mm. howitzers in his infantry cannon

companies and to replace the 105-mm.

howitzers in his artillery with 81-mm. mortars and 75-mm. pack howitzers. The

War Department made great efforts to

comply with these requests, but the few

special items that reached SWPA came too

late to be used in the Papua Campaign.58

Bayonets and jungle knives, desired before the campaign, were not employed except for such down-to-earth tasks as opening ration cans and scraping mud from

combat boots. In the heavy weapons companies, the light .30-caliber machine guns

replaced the more cumbersome heavies,

and 60-mm. mortars were sometimes substituted for the heavier 81-mm. pieces.

The few .50-caliber machine guns were

usually installed in semipermanent mounts

for antiaircraft defense of airstrips, supply

dumps, and other installations.59 In the

category of hand and shoulder weapons

perhaps the greatest complaint of the 32d

Division was the lack of carbines, the light

.30-caliber weapon developed as a substitute for the .45-caliber pistol. General

Harding began asking for them almost as

soon as his unit reached Australia, but

large-scale production did not begin until

the summer of 1942 and the demands of

other theaters prevented any shipments to

SWPA in time for use around Buna.60

For the infantrymen, the need had been

not so much for new lightweight weapons

57

 Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, pp.

18, 51, 61.

58

 (1) Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics

and Strategy, 1940-1943, pp. 410-11. (2) Waldron, "Ordnance in Jungle Warfare," Army Ordnance, XXVI (May-June, 1944), 520. 59

 32d Div Rpt, Buna, pp. 3, 5, and Annex,

Data on Armament Taken to and Brought Back

from New Guinea, Schedule 2. 60

 Ordnance officers differed in their opinions as

to the value of the carbine. General Holman has

observed that the carbine was well received when

it finally did arrive in the Pacific area. Holman

Comments 1. Brig. Gen. Robert W. Daniels, the

AGF Ordnance officer from 1942 to 1944, believed the Army was oversold on the carbine. The

Army needed a light, powerful weapon, but in

General Daniels' opinion the carbine turned out

to be about as powerful as a pistol and about as

handy as a rifle. Interv with Brig Gen Robert W.

Daniels, 5 Jun 63.
SUPPORTING THE PAPUA CAMPAIGN 87

as for greater quantities of certain supplies

already available, notably cleaning and

preserving materials. Combat in New

Guinea and Guadalcanal proved that in

the main the standard heavy equipment of

the infantry division was far more effective,

reliable, and durable than equivalent lightweight matériel. Army units fought over

whatever terrain they encountered without

noticeable change, using only a few items

of special equipment.61 The only special

Ordnance items developed in the theater

in 1942 were a light, 2-wheeled, jungle cart

for carrying ammunition from jeepheads

forward; a modification kit to convert a

jeep into a field ambulance in the jungle;

and a small ship or floating depot to carry

weapons, parts, and cleaning and preservation materials to combat troops at advance

bases.62

Many of the maintenance problems that

plagued Ordnance officers in this early

campaign were to recur not only in the

Pacific but in other parts of the world.

This was especially true of the motor maintenance problems. Planners in the fall of

1942 had not yet grasped the magnitude of

the task of supplying motor vehicles and

keeping them operating, a task transferred

from the Quartermaster Corps to the Ordnance Department by Lt. Gen. Brehon B.

Somervell, commanding general of Army

Service Forces, at a time when offensives

were soon to be launched from the base in

Australia and from the base in the British

Isles. The transfer was strongly opposed

by Maj. Gen. Levin H. Campbell, Jr.,

Chief of Ordnance, because he knew that

there would not be time to train Ordnance

men to handle this tremendous job. He

immediately appealed to all automobile

manufacturers and dealers to supply trained

men. They did so and, in his opinion,

saved the day for Ordnance.63

The Papua Campaign clearly showed

that automotive maintenance men as well

as automotive spare parts would be required in greater numbers than had ever

been anticipated. Another important lesson, applicable to all types of supplies, was

that packaging and methods of handling

would have to be improved. The campaign had demonstrated, moreover, the

danger of sending combat troops forward

without sufficient support at advance bases.

Lessons learned in the Papua Campaign

were too late to be applied to the first

offensive in the war against Germany, the

invasion of North Africa in November

1942. It was on a far grander scale than

the early Pacific campaigns, and the planning factors were different. In the Pacific,

planning had been conditioned by the

direction of the Japanese advance and the

necessity for a far-flung holding operation

at the same time. In the Atlantic, preparations in the spring of 1942 were undertaken in the midst of "vast confusion and

uncertainty" as to when and where to

attack.64

61

 Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and

Strategy, 1940-43, p. 411. 62

 (1) Rpt of Ord Activities USASOS SWPA,

Nov 42, Jan 43. (2) Memo, J. L. H. for G-4,

23 Sep 42, sub: Status of Development of Items

for Jungle Warfare, AFWESPAC Ord Sec 381

Preparations for War, KCRC. (3) Holman Comments 1.

63

 Ltr with Incl, Lt Gen Levin H. Campbell, Jr.

(USA Ret) to Brig Gen Hal C. Pattison, 30 Sep

63 (hereafter cited as Campbell Comments),

OCMH. For the arrival in the Middle East in

November 1942 of the first increment of the four

field maintenance regiments recruited with the aid

of the National Automobile Dealers Association, see

above, p. 22. 64

 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for

Coalition Warfare: 1941-43, p. 294.
CHAPTER VI

The Base in the British Isles

For six months after the attack on Pearl

Harbor the military planners in the United

States were so preoccupied with the war in

the Pacific that, as General Eisenhower expressed it, "the very existence of the London group was all but forgotten." In

accordance with the prewar decision that

if the United States entered the war the

Special Army Observer, London, would

assume command of the first U.S. Army

forces sent to the British Isles, General

Chaney on 8 January 1942 was designated

Commander, United States Army Forces in

the British Isles (USAFBI), and members

of SPOBS, sending home for their uniforms, became an Army headquarters.1

The new headquarters was not sufficiently informed by the War Department

either of the details of the immediate plans

made in Washington at the ARCADIA Conference late in December 1941, or, as time

went on, of the War Department's longrange plan for making the British Isles a

great operating military base. When General Eisenhower went to London in midMay 1942, he reported to Washington that

the USAFBI staff members were "completely at a loss in their earnest attempt to

further the war effort."

 2

In the summer and fall of 1941 the planning of Colonel Coffey and other members

of SPOBS had been founded on the ABC

reports, which contemplated the bombing

of Germany as the first U.S. combat effort

from a United Kingdom base. The War

Department's RAINBOW 5 plan of April

1941, founded on the ABC-1 Report, provided that the only ground forces to be sent

to the United Kingdom immediately after

a declaration of war would be 44,364

troops to defend naval and air bases in

Scotland and Northern Ireland, and a

"token force" of 7,567 men for the defense

of the United Kingdom, based in England.3

The ARCADIA Conference, the first wartime meeting of Prime Minister Churchill

and President Roosevelt, gave the ground

forces a new mission. President Roosevelt

agreed to assume at once the responsibility

for garrisoning Northern Ireland. The

1

 (1) Quote from p. 50 of Crusade in Europe,

by Dwight D. Eisenhower, copyright 1948 by

Doubleday & Company, Inc., reprinted by permission of the publisher. (2) Matloff and Snell.

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-

42, pp. 42, 111. Unless otherwise noted, this

chapter is based on Matloff and Snell, also on

Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, vol.

I, and Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and

Strategy, 1940-43. (3) Cable, USAFBI to AGWAR for WARGH, No. 37, 29 Jan 42, sub:

Shipment of Officers' Baggage, Admin 388, SPOBSTroops-Cables.

2

 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 49-50. 3

 (1) Annex 7 (Ordnance) to Basic Plan for

Token Force, Folder "Token Force," OPD-GHQ.

(2) Ltr, Chaney to TAG, 17 Dec 41, sub: Construction Program for U.S. Forces in the United

Kingdom, OPD-GHQ (Dr 2), Book one MAGNET

Miscellaneous Data. (3) Ltr, Gen Charles L. Bolte

(USA Ret) to Lida Mayo, 16 Jul 58.
THE BASE IN THE BRITISH ISLES 89

first consideration was to release British

troops for service in the Middle and Far

East, the second was to encourage the British people and to improve relations with

Ireland, an obvious danger spot should the

Germans invade England. The U.S. force

would have to be large. The original plan

for the Northern Ireland Sub-Theater provided for three infantry divisions and one

armored division, with supporting and

service troops and air forces, in all about

158,700 men. The troop movement was

code-named MAGNET. The figures for

ammunition supply, expressed in units of

fire (the specified number of rounds to be

expended per weapon per day in the initial

stages of an operation), were high: 30

units of fire for antiaircraft weapons,

armored units, and antitank units, and 20

units of fire for all other ground weapons.

They reflected the anxieties of the time.4

The first information the USAFBI

officers had on MAGNET came in a War

Department cable of 2 January. They

later learned from MAGNET officers that

the War Department had been working on

the plans before 20 December 1941 and at

least one SPOBS officer considered the failure to give General Chaney earlier warning

"hard to explain." None of them saw the

MAGNET plan until 20 February, when

Brig. Gen. Ira C. Eaker brought a copy to

London.5

The 2 January cable provided a certain

amount of data for the Ordnance officer of

USAFBI. The British would furnish antiaircraft protection for the time being, and

some armament. To save shipping space

and ease the drain on short supply, the

MAGNET light artillery units would not

bring their 105-mm. howitzers, but would

be furnished by the British with comparable 25-pounders. For help in determining the necessary adjustments and instructions on the British gun sight, with

which American troops were unfamiliar,

General Chaney borrowed from the U.S.

military attache in London two artillery

experts, who wrote a field manual and

maintenance handbook to be studied by

U.S. artillerymen on the voyage.6 In Washington the Ordnance Department was

called upon to furnish standard U.S. panoramic telescopes, graduated in millimeters,

together with newly designed adapters that

were necessary to place the telescopes on

the 25-pounder sight mounts. The British

would provide ammunition, 1,500 rounds

per gun, but Ordnance maintenance units

in MAGNET would bring spare parts and

4

 (1) Memo, Lt Col F. L. Parks, Secy Gen

Staff, for Gen and Spec Staffs GHQ, 6 Jan 42,

sub: Operations Plan, Northern Ireland SubTheater, OPD, G-3 370.09. (2) G-4 Plan, Folder,

Draft Annex 8 to Opn Plan MAGNET, Ordnance

Plan, Iceland OPD A2997 (hereafter cited as

G-4 Plan MAGNET). (3) The unit of fire varied

with the types and calibers of weapons; for example, it was 125 rounds for the 105-mm howitzer and 75 rounds for the 155-mm howitzer.

5

 Incl to Memo, Col Homer Case (SPOBS G-2)

for Hist Div WDSS, 19 Jul 46, and Memo, Maj Gen

J. E. Chaney for Maj Gen Edwin F. Harding, Chief,

Historical Div, 23 Jul 46, sub: Comments on the

Manuscript "The Predecessor Commands" (hereafter cited as Chaney Comments), Incl in folder

United States Army in World War II—European

Theater of Operations—Logistical Support of the

Army. SPOBS Letters 1946, OCMH. 6

 (1) Cable, CGFF to Special U.S. Army Observer in London, England, 2 Jan 42, OPD-GHQ

G-3 370.5 Troop Movements (MAGNET). (2)

Cable, U.S. Observer in London to Adj Gen, No.

352, 5 Jan 42, OPD-GHQ G-3 413.68 Range

Finding and Fire Control Equipment (Northern

Ireland) (hereafter cited as MAGNET 25-Pounder

file). (3) The Predecessor Commands, SPOBS

and USAFBI, pp. 114-15, MS, OCMH.
90 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

special repair tools.7

At the time General Chaney learned of

the MAGNET force, the first increment of

troops was estimated at 14,000, but ten

days later it was reduced to 4,000 in order

to accelerate troop movements to the Pacific area. Changes in troop strengths

caused by strategic as well as logistic considerations and lack of accurate and timely

information made planning difficult for

General Chaney's small staff of only twentyfour officers and eighteen enlisted men—a

headquarters smaller than that allotted to a

regiment. The Ordnance Section in early

January consisted of Colonel Coffey and

2d Lt. John H. Savage, a young tank expert who had arrived in London in late

November on detached service from Aberdeen Proving Ground. Most of the staff

sections had but one officer and one enlisted man. Since late fall of 1941, when

new duties had been assigned to SPOBS,

General Chaney had been submitting

urgent requests for more men, including an

Ordnance officer for aircraft armament, but

he had not received them. The inability of

his overworked staff to handle added tasks

was already creating "an extremely grave

situation" at the time he learned of the

MAGNET plans.8

On 7 January 1942 he asked for fiftyfour officers and more than a hundred enlisted men to form a nucleus USAFBI

headquarters, all to be dispatched at once

because of MAGNET, and all in addition to

his earlier requests. This number was the

minimum needed immediately. He estimated that the theater headquarters detachment, required eventually to serve the

United Kingdom, would need 194 officers

and 377 enlisted men.9

The War Department's response to these

requests was meager indeed. Though a

USAFBI headquarters force had been organized at Fort Dix, New Jersey, in early

February, the first increment, six officers,

did not arrive in England until 3 April.

The second increment, sixteen officers and

fifty enlisted men, did not come until 9

May. Brig. Gen. John E. Dahlquist, who

was Chaney's G-1, afterward considered

that the failure of the War Department to

provide personnel for the USAFBI headquarters was "probably the most significant

fact about the entire period from Pearl

Harbor to ETOUSA." To General Chaney,

the lack of personnel was "one of the vital

questions in any discussion of USAFBI."10

Colonel Coffey fared little better than

other members of USAFBI. He received

no additions to his staff from the United

States until May, when three officers and

nine enlisted men arrived, part of the Fort

Dix force. In the meantime he had obtained two officers in London, one a young

7

 (1) Ltr, Lt Col Robert W. Daniels, Ord Officer GHQ, to CofOrd, 3 Jan 42, sub: Adapters

for Sight Mounts for British 25 Pounder Field

Guns; Ltr, 8 Jan 42, sub: British Field Artillery

Equipment for Force MAGNET. Both in MAGNET

25-Pounder file. (2) 1st Ind, CofOrd to Ord Officer

GHQ, Army War College, 20 Jan 42, O.O. 475/

2722. 8

 (1) The Predecessor Commands, SPOBS and

USAFBI, p. 85. (2) Office of Technical Information, Office of Theater Chief of Ordnance European

Theater, Ordnance Diary ETO, 29 May 41 to 14

Sep 45 (hereafter cited as ETO Diary), MS,

OHF. (3) Cables, SPOBS to AGWAR, No. 177,

25 Nov 41; and No. 429, 16 Jan 42. Both in

Admin 388 SPOBS-Cables-Troops.

9

 Cables. SPOBS to AGWAR, No. 368, 7 Jan

42; SPOBS to WARGH, No. 12, 17 Jan 42. Both

in Admin 388 SPOBS-Cables-Troops. 10

 (1) Memo, Gen Dahlquist for Maj Gen

Charles L. Bolte, 22 Apr 46, in SPOBS Letters

1946, OCMH. (2) Incl to Memo, Chaney for

Harding, Chief, Historical Div, 23 Jul 46, sub:

Comments on the Manuscript "The Predecessor

Commands," SPOBS Letters 1946, OCMH.
THE BASE IN THE BRITISH ISLES 91

reservist called to active duty, the other an

officer from the U.S. Embassy, Lt. Col.

Frank F. Reed. Colonel Reed could not at

first give his full time to USAFBI headquarters since he had to continue for several months to gather technical information

for the military attache, who was also short

of personnel. The lack of adequate coverage in the Ordnance technical intelligence

field was a cause of concern to both Reed

and Coffey.11 In addition to new responsibilities, the important work of liaison and

co-ordination with the British, begun under

SPOBS, was continued. For example,

Coffey and Reed spent two days in February at the Training Establishment of the

Royal Army Ordnance Corps studying the

RAOC, and obtained copies of lectures to

send back to the United States to be used

in training Ordnance officers who were

going to sectors where their functions were

likely to be controlled by the British.12

Ordnance Troops in Magnet

Close co-ordination with the British was

essential in Colonel Coffey's plans for

MAGNET, for it was expected that American troops would use the shops and depots

near Belfast that were already serving the

British Troops in Northern Ireland. The

most important were a base depot and shop

at Kinnegar, and an ammunition depot on

a large, stone-walled estate, Shane's Castle,

at Antrim.13

The advance party of the first MAGNET

contingent arrived in London on 20 January. It consisted of officers of the 34th

Division, a National Guard unit commanded by Maj. Gen. Russell P. Hartle,

and included Hartle's divisional Ordnance

officer, Lt. Col. Grayson C. Woodbury.

Woodbury was briefed by Colonel Coffey

and other members of the USAFBI staff in

two days of conferences before he departed

for Belfast, wearing, in the interest of security, civilian clothing borrowed from Londoners. On 24 January an official announcement was made of the command,

which was to be called United States Army

Northern Ireland Force (USANIF).14

The first 4,000 MAGNET troops landed in

Belfast two days later on a murky, chill,

winter day. They were welcomed with

flags and bunting, bands, and speeches.

They were told by the British Air

Minister that they were entering a combat

zone, and they were made aware of the

fact as they went ashore. Above the sound

of marching feet, the cheers, the strains of

"The Star Spangled Banner," they heard

the crump of antiaircraft batteries firing on

German reconnaissance aircraft. For the

people of Belfast it was a stirring occasion.

Some were reminded of the arrival in

11

 (1) Monograph, Planning and Organization,

in series of MS volumes, Ordnance Service in the

European Theater of Operations (hereafter cited

as Ord Serv ETO), p. 9, OHF. (2) Monograph,

Personnel and Public Relations, same series, Annex 3, p. 3, OHF. (3) ETO Diary, p. 2, OHF. (4)

Cable, SPOBS to AGWAR, No. 177, 25 Nov 41,

in Admin 388, SPOBS-Troops-Cables. 12

 (1) Mil Attache Rpt, London, No. 46426,

2 Feb 42, sub: Ordnance Training, OKD 352.11/

7. (2) Ord Serv ETO, Planning and Organization,

p. 10.

13

 (1) Ltr, Capt W. H. Brucker to CG USAFBI,

7 May 42, sub: Training Aids and Facilities,

Northern Ireland, OPD-GHQ G-3, Training Aids

and Facilities Northern Ireland. (2) The Predecessor Commands, p. 98, MS, OCMH. 14

 (1) Ord Serv ETO, Planning and Organization, pp. 90-91. (2) Cable, SPOBS (Chaney) to

WARGH, No. 29, 23 Jan 42, in Admin 388

SPOBS-Troops-dables. (3) Lt Col Leonard

Webster, A History of United States Army Forces

in Northern Ireland (USANIF) from January 1,

1942 to May 31, 1942. MS, in North IrelandHistories.
92 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Northern Ireland of the American Expeditionary Forces troops in 1918.15

The uniforms of the American troops

added to the illusion. The men wore the

old "tin hats" of World War I. New helmets of the World War II type, an Ordnance item, had been available when

the men were equipped, but at General

Chaney's suggestion the War Department

had provided only the old model 1917 steel

helmets because there was a possibility that

men wearing the new type, which resembled

the German helmet, might be mistaken for

enemy troops by Northern Ireland home

guard night patrols.16

The possibility of an enemy invasion,

probably through neutral Eire, could not

be discounted. The operations plan for

MAGNET provided a "striking force" to be

composed of the 36th and 45th Infantry

Divisions and the 1st Armored Division,

and a "static," or holding force, composed

of the 34th Infantry Division, all under V

Corps. Later the 36th and 45th were

dropped and the striking force consisted of

V Corps troops, the 34th Division, and the

1st Armored Division, under the operational control of the commanding general of the

British Troops in Northern Ireland.17

No Ordnance troops arrived with the

first contingent, for they had been cut out

by GHQ when the first increment was reduced from 14,000 to 4,000, "a serious mistake," according to the GHQ Ordnance

officer, Lt. Col. Robert W. Daniels.18 Almost as soon as the first increment landed,

the problem of sorting and storing Ordnance supplies led General Chaney to cable

for a depot detachment. The movement

orders for the second MAGNET contingent

departing in February gave a high priority

to the 79th Ordnance Depot Company, but

the company ran into bad luck when its

ship, the USAT American Legion, developed engine trouble at Halifax and had

to turn back.19 The only Ordnance troops

that came in with the second MAGNET contingent of 7,000 men were those of the 14th

Medium Maintenance Company, which

was part of V Corps troops, and a 12-man

detachment from the 53d Ammunition

Company. They had to support the entire

MAGNET force, which had now swelled to

more than 10,000 men, for more than two

months.20

15

 (1) Belfast Telegraph, January 27, 1942. (2)

History 34th Div, ch. VIII. 16

 (1) G-4 Plan MAGNET. (2) Cable, Chaney

to AGWAR, No. 362, 6 Jan 42, sub: Reference

MAGNET, AG 381 (1-6-42) MSC. (3) Ltr, Secy

War to CG NYPE and QMG, 9 Jan 42, sub:

Supplies for Shipments 4525, 4558, and 5625, AG

370.1 (1-9-42) MSC-D-M. (4) 324,000 new type

helmets had been produced in 1940-41. Procurement, prepared by Richard H. Crawford and

Lindsley F. Cook, in Theodore Whiting, The

United States Army in World War II, Statistics,

9 Apr 52, p. 47, Draft MS, OCMH. 17

 (1) Cables, Marshall to SPOBS, No. 488,

7 Feb 42; Marshall to Chaney, 8 Apr 42; in

Admin 225, Northern Ireland Base Command (Directives), Cables, North Ireland. (2) Cables, Chaney

to CG USANIF, No. 465, 30 May 42, sub: Relief

of British Troops in Northern Ireland; Chaney to

AGWAR, No. 1894, 5 Jun 42, sub: Revision of

Northern Ireland Sub-Theater Plan; in Admin 388,

SPOBS-Cables-Troops. 18

 Memo, Daniels for Col Paul, G-4 GHQ, 14

Jan 42, sub: Ordnance Service, First Contingent

(MAGNET), OPD-GHQ G-3 320.2 Organization.

Units Strength (North Ireland). 19

 (1) Cable, USAFBI to AGWAR for WARGH,

No. 55, 31 Jan 42, sub: Second Contingent

MAGNET, Admin 388 SPOBS-Cables-Troops. (2)

Ltr, CGFF to ACofS WD, 28 Jan 42, sub: Troop

Movement to MAGNET, OPD-GHQ G-3 370.5

Troop Movements (MAGNET). (3) History 34th

Div, ch. VIII. (4) Cable, Marshall to CG USAFBI, 24 Feb 42, OPD-GHQ (Dr 1) G-3 311.23

Rads, Outgoing (USAFBI). 20

 (1) Troop List, OPD-GHQ G-3 370.5.

Troop Movements (MAGNET). (2) Cable, USANIF to USAFBI, No. S 30, sub: Location Troop

Units—Second MAGNET Contingent, Admin 388

SPOBS-Cables-Troops.
THE BASE IN THE BRITISH ISLES 93

The 79th Ordnance Depot Company and

another medium maintenance company,

the 109th, arrived in Northern Ireland less

than a week before the largest of all the

MAGNET increments came in—the bulk of

the 1st Armored Division aboard the Queen

Mary—on 18 May. With the 1st Armored

Division, Old Ironsides, and additional

units of the 34th Division and V Corps

that came in the two May convoys, the

number of U.S. forces in Northern Ireland

was more than tripled, rising to 32,202.

To provide a base should the V Corps be

assigned a tactical mission, the Northern

Ireland Base Command (NIBC) was organized on 1 June 1942, and all of the

Ordnance units were assigned to it except

the 109th Medium Maintenance Company,

which was assigned to the USANIF (V

Corps) striking force, and the maintenance

battalion that was organic to the 1st Armored Division.21

By 1 June 1942 ammunition depot

stocks held approximately five units of fire

of all types except armored division.

Ordnance organizational equipment was

approximately 100 percent complete.

Weapons of the 1st Armored Division were

being unloaded daily, and by 13 June all

of the division's tanks had arrived. Storage facilities were becoming cramped because the British had not departed as expected, but there was plenty of tentage and

every day new Nissen huts were taking up

more space in the green Irish countryside

and on the grounds of ancient estates.22

Planning for Bolero

As of 31 May 1942 most of the U.S.

Army ground forces in the British Isles were

in Northern Ireland: 30,458 out of a total

of 33,106 enlisted men in the British Isles

were in USANIF, as were 1,744 out of a

total of 2,562 officers.23 However, planning

was already under way in Washington for a

mammoth build-up in England. In April

General Marshall had gone to London and

obtained the consent of the British Prime

Minister and Chiefs of Staff for a major

offensive in Europe in 1943 or for an emergency landing, if necessary, in 1942. The

former bore the code name ROUNDUP, the

latter was called SLEDGEHAMMER, and the

detailed, long-range planning by the Washington staffs for the concentration of American forces in the British Isles was called

BOLERO. Until then, Washington planners

had been "thrashing around in the dark,"

as General Eisenhower put it, and plans

for the British Isles had gone no further

than the garrisoning of Northern Ireland

and the establishing of air bases in England

for the bombardment of Germany. Now

the United Kingdom was to be the main

war theater. BOLERO provided for the arrival of a million U.S. troops in the United

Kingdom by 1 April 1943.

When Marshall returned to the United

States from London he told Eisenhower

that General Chaney and other American

21

 (1) Memo, CGFF for ACofS G-3 WD, 27

Feb 42, sub: March Contingent of Forces for

British Isles. (2) Ltr, Secy War to CG NYPE,

28 Feb 42, sub: Priority for Shipment of Units

Overseas. Both in OPD-GHQ G-3 Book Two

MAGNET, Misc. (3) Ltr, Hartle to CG USANIBC

(Prov), 1 Jun 42, sub: Directive. (4) USANIF Station List. Last two in Admin 224 Northern Ireland. (5) History Northern Ireland Base Command (Prov) and Northern Ireland Base Section, 1 Jun 42-20 Dec 42, p. 3, Admin 597 North

Ireland Base Command Histories.

22

 G-4 Reports, USAFBI, 1 May-31 May 42,

AG 319.1 Periodic Rpts, Admin 323 SPOBS. 23

 Cable, Chaney to AGWAR, No. 1898, 5 Jun

42, sub: Strength Report, Admin 389, SPOBSAir Force.
94 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

officers on duty in London "seemed to

know nothing about the maturing plans

that visualized the British Isles as the greatest operating military base of all time."

Marshall sent Eisenhower to London to

outline plans and to bring back recommendations on the future organization and development of U.S. forces in Europe. After

an interview with Chaney, Eisenhower concluded that Chaney and his small staff

"had been given no opportunity to familiarize themselves with the revolutionary

changes that had since taken place in the

United States . . . They were definitely in a

back eddy, from which they could scarcely

emerge except through a return to the

United States."24

It might also be said that in Washington

there was widespread ignorance, even at

upper levels, as to the true nature of General Chaney's mission in London. General

Eisenhower referred to him as a "military

observer,"25 and General Eisenhower's

naval aide, Capt. Harry C. Butcher, referred to the work of the Special Observer

as "essentially a reporting job," rather than

"an action responsibility."26 Brig. Gen.

Charles L. Bolté, Chaney's chief of staff,

said later that he actually grew to hate the

name Special Observer Group, and added,

"I do not think that too much emphasis

can be laid on the fact that many of the

difficulties . . . arose from the misconception

that SPOBS was an information-gathering

agency, whereas it was really designed as

the nucleus for the headquarters of an

operational force which might or would

materialize if the United States entered

the war."

 27

Ordnance planning for BOLERO was soon

to be taken over by an organization other

than Colonel Coffey's staff. General Marshall and General Somervell had decided

to establish in England a Services of Supply organization paralleling that in the

United States. The officer selected to command it, Maj. Gen. John C. H. Lee, was

not given as much power as he wished, but

following a long controversy between SOS

and USAFBI, complicated by cloudy directives from the United States, he was

given the main job of building up stocks of

munitions in the British Isles. He selected

as his Ordnance officer Col. Everett S.

Hughes, who had held for two years the

very important job of chief of the Equipment Division, Field Service, in Washington. Hughes arrived in London by air on

8 June with his procurement officer, Col.

Gerson K. Heiss, and opened the Ordnance

Section at SOS headquarters, 1 Great

Cumberland Place. His chief of General

Supply, Col. Henry B. Sayler, his maintenance officer, Col. Elbert L. Ford, and his

chief of Ammunition Supply, Col. Albert S.

Rice, arrived from the United States later

in the month.28

When the European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA),

was established on 8 June 1942, Colonel

Hughes as senior Ordnance officer in the

theater became the Chief Ordnance Of24

 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 49-50.

25

 Ibid., p. 49.

26

 Capt. Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years

With Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), p. 6.

27

 Interv with Maj Gen Charles L. Bolte, 4

Oct 45, quoted in The Predecessor Commands, p.

262. 28

 (1) For the controversy over Lee's authority

see Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies,

vol. I, pp. 31-44. (2) For the SOS Ordnance

staff see Historical Monograph 117.1, Key Ordnance Military Personnel, pp. 47, 82-83, 146,

OHF.
CHART 1—EARLY COMMAND AND STAFF ORGANIZATION OF ETOUSA ESTABLISHED BY

ETO GENERAL ORDER 19, 20 JULY 42.

The above services operating under the Commanding General, SOS, maintained

senior representatives at Headquarters, ETOUSA, for the purpose of furnishingadvice on their services to the Theater Commander.

The above sections were primarily administrative

and had counterparts in the SOS whose duties

they often duplicated.
96 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

ficer, ETOUSA. (Chart 2) After the establishment of SOS, the Ordnance Section at

Headquarters, ETOUSA, was concerned

only with planning, technical advice, and

liaison, and as Colonel Hughes was mainly

occupied with the far greater responsibility

at SOS, he appointed Colonel Coffey his

special representative at ETOUSA headquarters. Most of Coffey's staff went over

to the Ordnance Section of SOS. The two

headquarters were soon to be separated by

about ninety miles. General Lee had early

in June decided to move SOS to Cheltenham, where the British could offer two

extensive blocks of buildings, built to accommodate the War Office in the event

London had to be evacuated. The additions to the Ordnance SOS staff that came

from the United States in mid-July went

direct to Cheltenham, Gloucestershire.

General Chaney served as theater commander less than two weeks and General

Eisenhower succeeded him on 24 June. In

the following month an important change

occurred in the Ordnance organization.

Colonel Hughes departed for the United

States on 10 July, returning to England

after a few weeks to become General Lee's

chief of staff. His successor at SOS was

Col. Henry B. Sayler. Eisenhower's General Order 19 of 20 July 1942 made Colonel

Sayler also the Chief Ordnance Officer,

ETOUSA.29

Storage for Weapons and

Ammunition

The first concern of Ordnance Service,

SOS, was the storage of weapons and other

general supplies, since it had been decided

that for the time being ammunition would

be shipped to British depots. The depot

system established by General Lee's staff

provided two types of depots—general

depots that stored supplies of more than

one technical service, and branch depots

for each service. General depots were

mainly for receiving large shipments from

the United States, storing them in their

original packages, and shipping them in

bulk to the technical branch depots for

issuance to troops. This was not a hard

and fast rule; some general depots issued

direct to troops. Branch depots received

matériel not only from general depots but

also from the zone of interior and from

local procurement, and sometimes they

served as bulk depots. An important planning consideration was the fact that existing British installations would have to be

used because there was little prospect for

new construction before 1 January 1943.30

The first Ordnance general supplies to

arrive and the only Ordnance SOS depot

company that landed in England that summer went to Ashchurch, eight miles from

Cheltenham, the largest and most modern

of the five U.S. general depots activated

on 11 July 1942. Recently built for the

British Royal Army Service Corps as a

depot for automotive supply and maintenance, it was situated in fertile Evesham

Valley at the foot of the Cotswold Hills,

fifty-one miles from the Bristol channel

ports, through which most of the American

supplies were expected to flow. Ten large

hangar-type warehouses and five smaller

ones provided a total closed storage space of

1,747,998 square feet, of which Ordnance

was assigned 378,200, an area second only

29

 Maj J. G. Detwiler, Historical Record of the

Ordnance Section, 2 Sep 42, Ord Serv ETO,

Planning and Organization, Annex 45.

30

 Ord Serv ETO, Ordnance Class II and IV

Supply, pp. 51-56, and Annex 5.
THE BASE IN THE BRITISH ISLES 97

AMMUNITION STORED IN HUTMENTS BY AN ENGLISH ROADSIDE

to the 1,014,200 square feet allotted to

Quartermaster's Motor Transport Service.

The major warehouses were of brick, with

gabled roofs and overhead roller suspension

doors. They were connected by macadam

roads that were lined with fences painted

with yellow and black stripes for better

visibility during blackouts. Mists settling

over the valley aided camouflage but gave

the whole installation a tone that was

"peculiarly sombre."

 31

A decision on the site of the first Ordnance branch depot in England was made

early in the summer. On 1 June Lt. Col.

David J. Crawford, who had arrived from

the United States late in May to reconnoiter for shop and storage space, reported

favorably on Tidworth, in southern England, the region from which the British

had agreed to withdraw their own troops

in order to make way for the Americans.

Tidworth was at the southeastern edge of

Salisbury Plain, the great chalk downs that

served as the main peacetime maneuver

area of the British Army. Site of a former

British tank and artillery shop, Tidworth

had a depot with 133,000 square feet of

shop space and 50,000 feet of storage space

in two buildings. There were good rail

and highway connections and a consider31

 (1) History of G-25 . . . Ashchurch, England, 11 July 1942-6 June 1944 (hereafter cited

as History G-25), pp. 2-6, Admin 512. (2)

History 80th Ord Base Depot Co, 14 Jul 42-31

Dec 43. (3) Col N. B. Chenault, Jr., History

General Supply Division, Annex to ETO Ord

Serv, Class II and IV Supply (hereafter cited as

Chenault History), OHF. (4) Memo, ACofS G-4

for Chief of QM Serv et al., 1 Sep 42, and incls,

ETO 319.1 Rpts, vol. I, 1942-43, KCRC.
98 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

able amount of open shed and garage

space. On 22 July Tidworth Ordnance

Depot, designated O—640, was activated.

Until September, when the 45th Ordnance

Medium Maintenance Company arrived, it

was operated entirely by British civilians.32

The Salisbury Plain area also contained

two of the three British ammunition supply dumps (ASD's) first used for ammunition shipments from the United States—

Savernake Forest and Marston Magna.

The Third, Cinderford, was in the Forest

of Dean near the Bristol ports. The British

ASD's were simply areas containing adequate road nets and enough villages to

provide railheads. Since the English

countryside was too thickly settled to permit depots in the American or Australian

sense, the British had stacked ammunition

along the sides of roads. If the roads ran

through an ancient forest or park with tall

trees to hide the stacks from enemy bombers, so much the better; in any case roadside storage made the ammunition easily

accessible, an important consideration at a

time when fear of German invasion was

always present. Each stack of artillery and

small arms ammunition was covered by a

portable corrugated iron shelter, or hutment, that was usually camouflaged by

leaves poured over a wet asphalt coating.

Bombs were stored in the open at Royal

Air Force (RAF) depots.33

The first U.S. ammunition depots were

activated on 2 August 1942 at Savernake

Forest (O-675), capacity 40,000 tons, and

Marston Magna (O-680), 5,000 tons. At

both, troops were to be billeted in whatever

buildings were available—the Marquess of

Aylesbury's stables, farmhouses, a cider mill,

and Nissen huts. But for some time to

come, all U.S. ammunition depots had to be

operated mainly by British RAOC troops.

When large shipments of ammunition began to arrive in late August, more depots

were needed. A site surveyed by the British

but not yet used was found in the Cotswolds, northeast of Cheltenham. Activated

as Kingham (O-670) on 11 September,

this depot became by early 1943 the largest U.S. ammunition depot in England.

On the same day that Kingham was activated, a fourth depot, O-660, was activated at the British ASD at Cinderford and

soon became the second largest U.S. ammunition depot. The sites for these four

depots were selected with ground force

ammunition in mind. For air ammunition,

three main depots of about 20,000 tons

capacity each were required in the first

BOLERO plan. Two were established in the

Midlands, near Leicester and air bases—

Melton Mowbray (O-690) and Wortley

(0-695), both activated 30 September.

The third was Grovely Wood (0-685) in

southern England, activated 2 September.

In the meantime, SOS began to store

bombs and other air ammunition at Savernake, Cinderford, Kingham, and Marston

Magna, which then became composite,

rather than ground force, depots.34

32

 (1) Memo, Col E. L. Ford for Chief Ord

Officer SOS for G-4 SOS, 23 Jul 42, sub: Ordnance Maintenance Facilities, ETO 400.242 Equipment—Storage, KCRC. (2) Hq SOS ETO, GO

11, 22 Jul 42, Admin 315, Southern Base Section—

General. (3) Station List, 4 Sep 42, p. 21, in

ETO 319.1 Rpts, vol. I, 1942-43, KCRC. 33

 Memo, Lt Col Neil H. McKay, Ammunition

Supply Br, Field Serv, for Chief of Field Serv,

5 Apr 43, sub Report on Ammunition Supply in

ETO (hereafter cited as McKay Rpt, 5 Apr 43).

34

 (1) SOS ETO, GO's No. 15, 2 Aug 42, and

No. 31, 11 Sep 42, General Orders SOS ETO

1942, in ETO Admin 315 Southern Base Sec—

General. (2) Depot histories in sec. VII, History

Ordnance Service SOS ETO, ETO Ord Sec,
THE BASE IN THE BRITISH ISLES 99

Motor Vehicles

The assignment to Ordnance of responsibility for motor vehicles on 25 July 1942,

effective 1 September, enormously increased

the work of the General Supply Division.

At the time it was hard for Ordnance officers in the European Theater of Operations to grasp the magnitude of the new

job; compared to weapons, combat vehicles, and fire control instruments, soon to be

referred to as "old Ordnance," the very

much simpler mechanism of trucks did not

at first seem to present much of a problem,

especially since Ordnance men were already familiar with parts and maintenance

considerations on combat vehicles. Later

these officers learned that while general

purpose vehicles involved comparatively

simple technical problems, the great number of trucks as compared with the number

of tanks and Ordnance special vehicles and

the incomparably rougher usage automotive

equipment received placed a very heavy

drain on manpower. In terms of manhours, automotive equipment was eventually estimated to constitute approximately 80

percent of the whole Ordnance job in the

ETO.35

Most of the motor vehicles that had been

coming in since late spring had been

shipped partly disassembled and crated in

order to save shipping space and had been

turned over to the British Ministry of Supply for assembly because the theater had

no American assembly plants and mechanics to do the work. Two methods of crating were used. The simplest was that

which kept each vehicle in its own crate,

with the wheels removed. These were

called "boxed" vehicles. The crates could

be easily stacked and bolted together, as

uncrated wheeled vehicles could not. The

second method required much more assembly work. It involved two kinds of

packing, either one vehicle in one or two

boxes, known as the single unit pack

(SUP), or two vehicles in from one to five

boxes (most commonly, one crate containing two chassis, the second two cabs, the

third, axles), known as the twin unit pack

(TUP). The SUP and TUP types were

called "cased" vehicles.

The TUP method, which saved about

two-thirds of the space required for an

uncrated vehicle, was far more economical

in space than the SUP method and came to

be preferred, especially for the 3⁄4-ton, 11⁄2-

ton, and 21⁄2-ton types. However, the

TUP method of crating contributed to

early confusion on how many vehicles there

were in the theater, of what types, and

where they were located. Often all three

crates did not come on the same ship: one

vessel would carry the cabs and chassis and

another would carry the axles; and the

two ships might dock at different ports.

Sometimes the crates were not marked and

had to be sent to an assembly plant and

opened before their contents could be determined. Then they would have to be

rerouted to the assembly plant designated

to handle the particular type of vehicle.36

KCRC. (3) Ammunition Supply Division History

Pre-D-day, in History Ord Service SOS ETO.

(4) British Paper, Southern Command Q(L),

Paper 4, Storage Space, 28 Jun 42, ETO 400.242

(Storage Space), KCRC. (5) McKay Rpt, 5

Apr 43. 35

 (1) Interv with Brig Gen Urban Niblo by Lida

Mayo, 28 Sep 55. (2) Interv with Maj Gen Henry

B. Sayler by C. Bradford Mitchell, 26 Sep 49,

Mitchell Notes, OHF. (3) Chenault History. (4)

Ord Memo 9, 1 Sep 42, Annex 29 to Ord Serv

ETO, Planning and Organization, p. 3.

36

 (1) Production Service Division, Industrial

Service, OCO, ASF, Packaging, Development of

in the Ordnance Department, 1941-1945, Project
100 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

The vehicles were assembled in British

civilian plants under the direction of the

British Ministry of Supply, an arrangement

that had been made when vehicles were a

Quartermaster responsibility. The code

name for the assembly work was TILEFER.

By 11 July 1942 the Ministry's TILEFER

organization had two assembly plants in

the Liverpool area, the Ford Motor Company at Wigan and Pearson's Garage in

Liverpool, and plans for others were under

way. After cased and boxed vehicles were

assembled and the few wheeled vehicles

that arrived (only about 20 percent of the

total) were reconditioned, the British drove

them to large parking lots, which they

called vehicle parks, to form pools from

which troops could be supplied. Two of

these parks, Aintree Racecourse and Bellevue, were near Liverpool. A third was at

Ashchurch (G-25).37

Ashchurch suddenly became important

to Ordnance planners when they learned

that motor vehicles were to be added to

other Ordnance responsibilities. Quartermaster's Motor Transport Service had

planned to make Ashchurch a primary

overseas motor base, operated by three

regiments—a depot regiment, a supply and

evacuation regiment, and a base shop regiment. The first unit of this large organization, which had been recruited from automobile plants, steel mills, and machine

shops in the United States, arrived on 19

August, but since its equipment did not

arrive until December, the men were assigned various duties, the most important

of which was operation of the vehicle park.

A tire repair company, the first of its type

to be organized, also arrived at Ashchurch

during August without equipment. It was

given the job of operating the three gas

stations and grease racks.38

The vehicle parks already in existence at

Ashchurch and in the Liverpool area were

adequate in the early summer. Few vehicles were coming into the ports, and those

that did arrive were likely to be held up in

assembly plants that were not yet in full

operation. Only 526 general purpose vehicles were assembled by the British in July.

Yet more vehicle parks would soon be

needed. General Eisenhower had informed

General Lee that the War Department was

contemplating shipping approximately

160,000 knocked-down vehicles in the early

fall.39 While this figure was overoptimistic,

the rate of arrival and assembly did rise

sharply in late August and early September.

By the end of 1942 the Ministry of Supply

had assembled a total of 33,362 vehicles.

Twelve vehicle parks with a total of 23,000

vehicles had been activated: in the Liverpool, Bristol, and Glasgow port areas as

near TILEFER assembly plants as possible; in

the east of England near air installations;

and in the south of England where ground

troops were concentrated. They were located on estates, on race tracks, and on

other open areas that had enough space

and adequate camouflage. Little or no

Supporting Paper No. 58, pp. 126-27, OHF. (2) construction was possible at any of the sites

Rpt, Sayler to CofOrd, 9 Nov 42, sub: Special

Report on Ordnance General Supplies (hereafter

cited as Sayler Rpt), and Incl No. 4. Both in Ord

Serv ETO, Class II and IV Supply, Annex 5,

OHF. (3) Chenault History. 37

 (1) Ord Serv ETO, Planning and Organization, p. 45. (2) Ord Serv ETO, Class II and IV

Supply, pp. 70, 125, 140.

38

 Hist of G-25, pp. 59-61, 66-67. (2) Ord Serv

ETO, Planning and Organization, Annex 2, Historical Record of Ord Sec Hq SOS (hereafter cited

as Hist Ord Sec SOS), OHF. 39

 Ltr, Lt Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower to CG

SOS et al., 13 Jul 42, sub: Assignment of Motor

Vehicles, Admin 236 Ord—Motor Vehicles.
THE BASE IN THE BRITISH ISLES 101

because neither the Engineer Corps nor

local labor was available and for some time

operations would depend almost solely on

British personnel, military and civilian.40

The officers to command the vehicle

parks were six men of Motor Transport

Service's TILEFER Section, who were transferred to Ordnance on 1 September when

a total of 14 motor transport officers and 27

enlisted men came into the Ordnance

Service, SOS. These six men, particularly

those who had been trained in the TUP

program, were considered by the Ordnance

Section to be some of the best officers in

the theater. But they were few in number

—three officers commanded two vehicle

parks each. Four of the parks were for

some time to come commanded by British

officers.41 Besides the Quartermaster motor

base and tire repair companies at Ashchurch, Ordnance received eleven Quartermaster companies and the large motor

transport depot at Rushden, Northamptonshire, serving air installations. Rushden

was designated 0-646, becoming, with Ashchurch and Tidworth, one of the three

primary Ordnance installations.42

At the time Ordnance received responsibility for motor vehicles in the theater,

the shortage of commissioned officers, which

had been a problem since SPOBS, was becoming acute. Ordnance officers were

needed not only at depots, shops, and

schools in the United Kingdom but also at

ports and at three of the four base sections

that were just being established: the Northern Ireland Base Section, which took over

from the Northern Ireland Base Command;

the Western Base Section, which included

the ports of Glasgow and Liverpool; and

the Southern Base Section, the concentration point for ground forces units in southern England. The Eastern Base Section,

mainly concerned with services to the air

forces, had no Ordnance section for some

time.43

Preparations for Torch

While base sections, depots, and shops

were passing from the planning to the operating stage, with their efforts directed toward BOLERO, decisions were being made

in London and Washington that were suddenly to change the direction of the effort

and to accelerate tremendously the pace of

the operations. By 25 July pressure on the

Allied Powers to establish a second front

before the spring of 1943—the date set for

BOLERO—had led to an agreement by the

Combined Chiefs of Staff to undertake an

invasion of North Africa in 1942, an operation to be known as TORCH.

Weeks of discussion followed on where

and when the landings would take place.

By 5 September the decision was reached

to make three simultaneous landings: one

at Casablanca by a Western Task Force,

mounted and shipped from the United

States; another at Oran by a Center Task

40

 (1) Ord Serv ETO, Class II and IV Supply,

pp. 65, 125-26. (2) Sayler Rpt and Incl 4 (map).

(3) Chenault History, p. 7. (4) Hist Div USFET,

The Administrative and Logistical History of the

ETO, 1946, pt. III, pp. 261-62, MS, OCMH. 41

 (1) Hist Ord Sec SOS. (2) Ord Serv ETO,

Class II and IV Supply, p. 65. (3) Ltr, Col S. L.

A. Marshall to Chief Ord Officer, USFET, 13

Jul 45, sub: Request for Historical Data Relating to Ordnance General Purpose Vehicles and

Incl, Admin 563 Ord-Histories. 42

 (1) Hq SOS ETOUSA, GO No. 36 and No.

52, 16 Sep and 9 Oct 42, Admin 315 Southern

Base Sec—General. (2) History G-25, p. 33.

43

 (1) Hist Ord Sec SOS. (2) Admin and Log

History of ETO, pt. II, vol. I, pp. 109-12, 113-

14. (3) Ord Serv ETO, Planning and Organization, pp. 106-07, 135-36.
102 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Force, predominantly II Corps; and a

third at Algiers, by an Eastern Task Force,

mainly British. Center and Eastern Task

Forces were to be mounted from the British

Isles. The target date was unsettled for

some time, varying from mid-October to

early November. By the time the tactical

plans were firm enough to furnish a definite

troop basis, there were only about two

months to plan, organize, collect supplies,

process troops, train for amphibious landings, and embark.44

General Eisenhower was made commander in chief of the expedition. At

Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ),

which was in charge of both logistical and

operational plans, a British officer, Maj.

Gen. Humfrey M. Gale, was to control

logistical planning. His deputy, Colonel

Hughes, became responsible for the U.S.

supply program for TORCH in the British

Isles. Colonel Ford, Sayler's maintenance

officer, became Ordnance officer of AFHQ

and took with him several members of the

SOS staff, including his assistant, Colonel

Crawford. Headquarters, ETOUSA, lost

a valuable officer to the Mediterranean

operation when Colonel Coffey left for the

United States to help prepare Western

Task Force. Center Task Force Ordnance

planning was in the hands of Col. Urban

Niblo, who had arrived in England that

summer as Ordnance officer of II Corps,

then commanded by Maj. Gen. Mark W.

Clark. Later, Clark became Eisenhower's

deputy and relinquished command to Maj.

Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall (II Corps' old

commander), who joined the planning

group on 10 October.45

Planning began in London in August in

an atmosphere of great secrecy. The staff

was literally locked up in Norfolk House;

officers could leave the building, but enlisted men, both British and American,

were confined to the building until the

landing was made. The chiefs of technical

services received little or no information on

the size of the force or the location of the

operation. Strenuous efforts were made

to maintain security and mislead the enemy.

For example, the British in attempting to

indicate that the first convoys were going

to India ordered typhus and cholera vaccine, which British forces used only in

India, and made a point of losing one or

two of the vaccine shipments so that the

losses were known. The effort to confine

knowledge of the "Special Operation" to

as few persons as possible also had undesirable effects. It deprived Ordnance

planners of staff help that they needed.

Lacking staff men to check their requisitions back to the zone of interior, Colonel

Hughes and Colonel Niblo inadvertently

requisitioned ammunition for the old

French gun of World War I, the 155-mm.

GPF, instead of the 155-mm. M1 with

which II Corps was equipped. As a result,

the 155-mm. M1 guns had to be left behind in England and could not be used in

44

 For a detailed account of the effect of indecision on logistical planning, see Coakley and

Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-45,

ch. XVI, "The Descent on North Africa."

45

 (1) Intervs with Col Russell R. Klanderman,

7 Dec 55, and Gen Niblo, 28 Sep 55. (2) Memo,

Chief Ord Officer AFHQ for CofOrd, 6 Jan 43,

sub: Historical Record of Ordnance Section

AFHQ, Incl, Historical Record (hereafter cited as

AFHQ Hist Ord Sec), O.O. 350.05/2260. (3)

George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the

Initiative in the West, UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, D.C., 1957),

pp. 46-47.
THE BASE IN THE BRITISH ISLES 103

the initial phases of the North African

campaign.46

In the Center Task Force and the small

U.S. contribution to Eastern Task Force

there would be 80,820 American troops,

including the 1st Infantry Division, then in

southern England, and the 34th Infantry

and 1st Armored Divisions, in Northern

Ireland. The job of equipping this force

fell to SOS headquarters at Cheltenham.

The base sections were as yet hardly more

than skeleton organizations. No accurate

figures on supplies existed, for there had not

been time to catalogue the mountains of

equipment that had been dumped in the

British ports during the summer. It was

known, however, that some Ordnance

items such as spare parts for tanks and some

calibers of ammunition were not available.

And it was probable that there were not

enough spare parts for motor vehicles.

Nobody knew how many trucks were in

England.47

On 8 September General Eisenhower

sent the War Department a requisition for

344,000 ship tons of material for the North

African operation, most of it to be shipped

to the United Kingdom by 20 October. In

Washington General Lutes of SOS, who

had visited England in the late spring and

had been concerned about the lack of U.S.

service troops there to receive, sort, and

identify U.S. material, believed that most

of the II Corps equipment was already in

the United Kingdom, but was scattered

throughout England and unidentified. Dismayed at the prospect of having to duplicate shipments that he was convinced had

already been made, he urged the SOS staff

in the ETO to "swarm on the British ports

and depots and find out where these people

have put our supplies and equipment."

 48

While undoubtedly some Ordnance

items had been "lost" because of misrouting or improper marking, it is unlikely that

Ordnance matériel in sufficient quantity

would have been uncovered even if there

had been enough trained depot men to

"swarm" efficiently. The Ordnance SOS

staff believed that there were not enough

Class II and IV supplies in the United

Kingdom to support the first phase of

TORCH. Most of the BOLERO cargo shipped

to England in July and August of 1942

consisted of Quartermaster items (including boxed vehicles) and construction equipment and special vehicles for the large contingent of Engineer troops sent to build

airfields, camps, and depots. There was

also a considerable backlog of Army Air

Forces matériel for units shipped early in

June. Requisitions forwarded to the New

York Port of Embarkation by the SOS Ordnance Service in July to build up the level

of supply had been canceled in view of the

current task force movements; the only

Ordnance Class II and IV material arriving in the summer consisted of automatic

shipments of 180 days of maintenance supply, based on the addendum and the number of major items shipped to the ETO

with the early units. Until the 1st Infan46

 (1) Col. A. T. McNamara, QMC, "The

Mounting of 'Torch' from England," Quartermaster Review, XXVII (July-August, 1947), pp.

12-13. (2) Niblo Interv, 28 Sep 55. 47

 (1) Howe, Northwest Africa, p. 679. (2)

Healey Memoir, p. 28, ETO Adm 510. (3) Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, pp. 87,

88 (notes for 5 and 6 Sep 42). (4) Chenault

History.

48

 Lt. Gen. Leroy Lutes, "Supply: World War II.

The Flight to Europe in 1942," Antiaircraft Journal, vol. 95 (May-June, 1952), pp. 8-10.
104 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

try Division arrived early in August, there

had been no ground combat forces in England. The division's weapons were not

preshipped; at the time, vehicles were the

only item of organizational equipment preshipped in sizable numbers.49

When the call came to support TORCH,

the 1st Division had not received any of

its field artillery and had only fractional

allowances of machine guns and special

vehicles. The fault lay in the system of

sending men on transports and their organizational equipment on cargo ships,

sometimes in different convoys, sometimes

arriving at different ports. The problem

of marrying units with equipment was not

a simple one at best, as the experience in

Australia had shown. In the case of

TORCH, where time was all-important, the

situation bordered on chaos. Two ships

that had set out from the United States

with 105-mm. howitzers for the 1st Division had failed to arrive; one went aground

in Halifax Harbor, Nova Scotia, and the

second, sent to replace the first, had to put

in at Bermuda because of shifting cargo.

On 12 September General Clark told Colonel Hughes that something would have to

be done quickly or "those men will be going

in virtually with their bare hands." Of the

ground forces in Northern Ireland, the 34th

Infantry Division had only old-style howitzers and lacked antiaircraft equipment

and tanks; the 1st Armored had only the

old model Grant M3 tanks.50

Even if there had been enough guns, it

was doubtful whether enough ammunition

had been provided. At the end of August

only 21,040 long tons of ground force ammunition were in the theater and on 14

September Colonel Hughes was forced to

admit that he had no assurance of an adequate ammunition supply for TORCH. A

very large proportion of the early ammunition shipments had been bombs. A great

deal of the artillery ammunition had arrived so damaged, because of poor packing,

stowing, and handling at shipside, that it

was unserviceable; moreover, in the ammunition depots the manpower problem was as

acute as it was in the general supply depots.

Only two ammunition companies arrived in

August, the 58th and 66th. Both stationed

at Savernake, they were undermanned because they had to furnish detachments for

other depots. In addition, their men had

not been sufficiently instructed in renovation, roadside storage, and operating at

night under blackout conditions. Between

12 September and 20 October a few Quartermaster motor transport men and about

2,500 Engineers were assigned to help, but

without the trained RAOC men, issue and

supply would have been almost impossible.51

In attempting to fill the huge requisition

of 8 September and subsequent ones, the

SOS staff in the zone of interior was hampered not only by lack of ships but by the

need to supply the very large Western Task

Force then being mounted from the United

49

 (1) Sayler Rpt. (2) Chenault History. 50

 (1) Healey Memoir, p. 30; (2) Butcher, My

Three Years With Eisenhower, p. 111 ; (3) Clark,

Calculated Risk, pp. 34, 55.

51

 (1) Ord Serv ETO, Ammunition Supply, p.

13. (2) McKay Rpts, 5 Apr 43. 19 Oct 42, ETO

319.1, Spec Rpts Ord, KCRC. (3) SOS GO No.

32, 12 Sep 42, No. 49, 4 Oct 42, No. 56, 20 Oct

42. All in Admin 315 Southern Base Sec General.

(4) Ltr, Lt Col S. A. Daniel, Chief Ammunition

Supply Div Ord Sec SOS, to Lt Col G. W.

Powell, OCO, 2 Jan 43, sub: Ordnance Service

in U.K., O.O. 350.05/2253.
THE BASE IN THE BRITISH ISLES 105

TRAILER SUPPLY UNIT IN ENGLAND

States. Working night and day in the

effort to fill General Eisenhower's needs,

SOS USA was able to send 131,000 ship

tons of equipment to England and to add

eight fully loaded cargo ships to the convoys by the time they sailed for North

Africa late in October. It was 1 October

before the first of the freighters sailed. In

the meantime, the Ordnance Section at

SOS ETOUSA did its best to supply the

alerted TORCH units from stocks in the

theater.52

All depots were combed for Ordnance

supplies. They were found in Quartermaster, Engineer, and Medical depots,

mixed with all sorts of other material. In

one instance, two 90-mm. guns were found

in a Quartermaster depot. The depots

worked 24-hour shifts, since manpower was

still spread thin. A second Ordnance depot company, the 78th, assigned to II

Corps, arrived in mid-September and was

divided between Tidworth and Ashchurch,

but it never received any of its table of

basic allowances equipment and could

not be used to best advantage. Working

against time, the depot men found enough

52

 (1) Lutes, "Supply: World War II, The

Flight to Europe in 1942," pp. 10-11. (2) Hist Ord

Sec SOS, p. 8.
106 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

replacement spares in the theater's maintenance stocks to supply major items. Spare

parts, for which there was a constant clamor, presented a far more difficult problem,

especially in the case of general purpose

vehicles. At the time, spare parts were

shipped overseas in boxed lots, that is, they

were boxed in quantities that were thought

to be sufficient to supply a hundred trucks

for the first year. The contents varied and

sometimes did not contain enough fastmoving parts, such as spark plugs. For

some vehicles there were not enough boxed

lots. To supply the thousands of 21⁄2-ton

trucks in the theater, less than one boxed

lot was received by the end of 1942. The

only solution was the dismantling of new

21⁄2-ton trucks in TUP boxes. Approximately 75 were dismantled at Tidworth

and the parts boxed and shipped to North

Africa.53

Almost all of the uncrated vehicles had

arrived short of tools. The British supplied

some tool sets for trucks, but their use was

limited because tools were based on British

vehicles, which used many nuts and bolts

of sizes different from those used in American trucks. Tools for the repair of "old

Ordnance" matériel were even harder to

obtain, and those that arrived were often

pilfered. Ordnance shop trucks arrived

assembled, and, entrusted to British drivers

on the journey from port to depot, were

frequently rifled. The commanding of-

-ficer of the 105th Ordnance Medium

Maintenance Company estimated that 22

out of 23 shop trucks received in the first

six weeks after the company's arrival in

the theater had been "effectively robbed";

and this was only one of many such reports. The Ordnance Procurement Division did obtain some other supplies from

the British, but local procurement was limited mostly to hardware, target material,

some parts common, and cleaning and

preserving material, including that used

for waterproofing.54

The new problem of waterproofing

material to enable trucks and tanks to

swim to the shore after they left the

ramps of landing craft became increasingly

important as preparations accelerated for

a major amphibious landing. Here the

British helped greatly, for they had developed a compound that would seal the

vital parts of vehicles and yet could be

easily stripped off after the landing.

Using this compound to seal engines, electrical systems, and running gear, and affixing metal and rubber tubing to extend

exhaust and intake outlets above the water,

Capt. Madison Post of the newly established Ordnance Engineering Division,

SOS ETOUSA, by 20 October evolved a

means of operating trucks in three feet of

salt water for a short period. Waterproofing tanks seemed simpler to the combat

forces, because the enveloping hull of the

tank made it unnecessary to waterproof

each individual component, but Ordnance

officers thought it considerably more complicated, since the hull had to be made

53

 (1) Sayler Rpt. (2) History 78th Ordnance

Depot Co. (3) Notes on Staff Conference 16

November 1942, Admin 453 Staff Conference

Notes, 1942. (4) Chenault History. (5) Memo,

G-4 for Chief Ord Serv, 23 Oct 42, sub: Memorandum No. W850-5-42, dtd 24/8/42, re: Automotive Parts Policy, and 2d Ind, ETO 451.01

Vehicle Parts and Accessories 1942, KCRC.

54

 (1) Sayler Rpt. (2) Chenault History. (3)

Ord Serv ETO, Planning and Organization, pp.

44-45.
THE BASE IN THE BRITISH ISLES 107

watertight, and it had many openings. To

keep the engines from being flooded, metal

"fording stacks" extending above the water

had to be fitted on the exhaust pipes. Because the stacks interfered with the traverse

of the turret they had to be quickly jettisoned after the landing so that the tanks

could go in shooting. Working closely

with the British, Ordnance officers rounded up large quantities of waterproofing

material—metal tubing, rubber garden

hose, sealing compounds, and a few British waterproofing kits—and arranged for

shipment of the material to Ballykinler, Ashchurch, Tidworth, and other places where

American troops were preparing for the

North African landings.55

The North African venture began from

the United Kingdom on 22 October 1942,

when a cargo convoy of 46 vessels left

British ports with supplies for the Center

and Eastern Task Forces. On 24 October

a second cargo convoy of 51 vessels sailed,

and on 26 October and 1 November the

first two troop convoys, of 41 and 17 vessels, respectively, departed with 68,463

American and 56,297 British troops. After

that, convoys left the base in the British

Isles at intervals of approximately one a

week through December. The first ten

cargo convoys carried among them 288,438

long tons of cargo, of which more than a

third was Ordnance matériel. Food and

clothing and similar Quartermaster supplies

constituted the largest amount of tonnage,

35.2 percent of the whole; vehicles were

next, 28.2 percent. Engineer supplies accounted for 12.8 percent, "old Ordnance"

for 11.1 percent, gas and oil, 7.9 percent.

Other technical services—Medical, Signal,

and Chemical Warfare—had less than 1

percent each.56

As the first assault elements headed out

into the Atlantic in a high wind and heavy

sea, zigzagging south in a wide arc, Colonel

Sayler in London began to assess the Ordnance effort in mounting TORCH. There

were two serious causes for concern—vehicles and spare parts. The troops did not

have their full table of equipment complement of trucks because it took too much

shipping space to transport wheeled vehicles. The units could take only about

60 percent, with the promise that the other

40 percent would be shipped to North

Africa in crates and assembled there. They

did not have enough spare parts of certain

kinds. The supply of automotive spare

parts in the theater had been unbalanced:

there had been sufficient for some makes

of vehicles and practically none for others.

To a certain extent the shortage was caused

by shortages in the United States, but it

was also attributable to confusion at the

New York Port of Embarkation. Enough

55

 (1) Intervs, Brig Gen Paul M. Robinett, 8

Nov 55, and G. L. Artamonoff, 14 Feb 56. (2)

1st Ind to Ltr, CG SOS, 20 Oct 42; Memo, AG

for Ord, 7 Oct 42, sub: Waterproofing Motor

Vehicles, and 1st Ind; Ltr, Capt Madison Post

to Chief Engrg Div, 3 Nov 42, sub: Report of

Contact with Experimental Station at Westward

Ho!, and other documents in ETO 451.01 Vehicle

Parts and Accessories 1942, KCRC. (3) ETO Ordnance Office Order 2, Change 1, 1 September 1942

established an Engineering Division to handle

technical information and prepare bulletins on

modifications and repair methods evolved in the

theater. Ord Serv ETO, Planning and Organization, Annex 29.

56

 MS TORCH—Its Relations With the European

Theater of Operations, pp. 39, 52-58, Admin 532—

TORCH Opn.
108 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

major items for maintenance purposes had

been furnished (on a 45-day basis, however) and on the whole, though some

major items had been cannibalized to

provide spare parts, Colonel Sayler thought

the forces departing for North Africa were

well equipped with Ordnance general

supplies.57

Ammunition supply officers believed that

units of the Center and Eastern Task

Forces had been supplied with sufficient

ammunition from British depots. Shortages

of certain types, notably antitank mines,

hand grenades, and pyrotechnics, had been

filled by procurement from the British.58

In supplying arms, vehicles, and ammunition for TORCH, Colonel Sayler's main

problem, like that of Colonel Holman in

Australia, had been lack of enough men

to do the job. At headquarters the staff

had to work far into the night, or all night,

to meet the time schedule since it was 50

percent understrength in officers, and the

depots and shops were in the same condition. In the field, where autumn rains

made seas of mud out of vehicle parks and

ammunition depots, Ordnance troops of

all kinds worked at whatever jobs had to

be done. From Rushden in late September and early October a depot company

and a maintenance company were sent to

unload ammunition at Braybrooke; at

Ashchurch a weapons maintenance company worked on motor transport. Engineer

troops and, later, field artillery troops had

to be borrowed to help the TILEFER organization operate vehicle parks. The British

Army continued to help. As preparations

quickened in late September, for example,

50 skilled packers and craters were sent

from the Hilsea RAOC depot to help with

the work at Ashchurch. Ordnance officers

gratefully acknowledged the debt they

owed the men of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps for help on general supplies

and on ammunition.59

The cables and letters sent from the

British Isles in the fall of 1942 had a

familiar ring to Ordnance officers in the

United States, for in many respects they

dealt with the same problems that were

stressed in cables and letters from Australia.

They had the same urgency and often

showed the same lack of comprehension

of the problems at home—the demands

of many theaters for limited stocks, the

upheaval caused by the new responsibility

for motor transport, the creaks and strains

of a war machine just getting into gear.

It was perhaps inevitable that theater commanders were affected by what General

Marshall called "localitis"—a local instead

of a global view of the war. To commanders in North Africa early in 1943

Marshall talked of Americans fighting in

water to their waists in the swamps of

Guadalcanal and New Guinea. His listeners were sure that when he flew to the

Southwest Pacific he would emphasize the

"tough going" Americans were encountering in North Africa.60

57

 (1) Sayler Rpt. (2) Notes on Staff Conference 16 Nov 42, ETO Admin 453 Staff Conference Notes, 1942. (3) Chenault History. 58

 (1) McKay Rpt, 19 Oct 42. (2) G-4 Periodic

Report, ETO (Quarter Ending 31 Dec 42).

59

 (1) Sayler Rpt. (2) McKay Rpt, 19 Oct 42.

(3) Ord Serv ETO, Class II and IV Supply, pp.

25-27. (4) Hist Ord Sec SOS, p. 8. (5) Hist

G-25, p. 11. 60

 Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower.

p. 324.
CHAPTER VII

Oran and the Provisional Ordnance

Group

Tactical Plans

When the assault convoy of the Center

Task Force headed into the cold Atlantic

on 26 October 1942, many of the men

aboard thought they were bound for the

USSR or Norway or Iceland. A few

thought they were returning to the United

States. Then the great armada turned

south. On the fifth day out, after the

ships had come into calm seas and sunshine, the men were told that they were

going to North Africa. Throughout the

convoy, officers were summoned to the

lounges of converted liners and the wardrooms of merchantmen and warships, and

the briefings began. The Center Task

Force would go ashore at three beaches in

the vicinity of Oran on 8 November at

0100, the exact hour when the Western

Task Force coming from the United States

was to land at Casablanca and the Eastern

Assault Force, mostly British, was to touch

down at Algiers.1

The purpose of the landings at Oran,

Casablanca, and Algiers was to secure bases

on the coast of North Africa. After the

bases were secured, there would be rapid

exploitation to acquire complete control

of French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia

and extend offensive operations against the

rear of Axis forces to the east. The next

object was the complete annihilation of

the Axis forces opposing the British forces

in the Western Desert. At El 'Alamein

Montgomery had launched his attack

against Rommel three days before the

TORCH convoy sailed from England. Undoubtedly Hitler would try to reinforce

Rommel through Bizerte and Tunis, the

best ports available to the Germans in Africa; therefore, the speedy capture of northern Tunisia was the main strategic purpose

of the Allied invasion of North Africa.

However, the Allied forces could not ignore the danger of German intervention

through Spain, which would cut the Mediterranean supply line. For this reason

the Americans at Casablanca and Oran

were to protect the rear in Morocco while

the British at Algiers rushed forward to

Tunisia.2 (Map 1) 1

 (1) Ernie Pyle, Here Is Your War (New

York: H. Holt and Company, 1943), p. 5. (2)

H. R. Knickerbocker et al., Danger Forward: The

Story of the First Division in World War II (Washington: The Society of the First Division, 1947),

p. 37. (3) Lowell Bennett, Assignment to Nowhere

(New York: Vanguard Press, 1943), p. 26.

2

 (1) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 106,

116, 121-22. (2) Samuel Eliot Morison, "History

of the United States Naval Operations in World

War II," Operations in North African Waters,
110 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

MAP I

During the Center Task Force briefings

on shipboard, pointers moving over large

detailed maps showed where the Oran

landings were to take place. The most

important was in the Gulf of Arzew, twenty-five miles east of the city, where there

were two coastal batteries and a French

garrison. A company of Rangers was to

spearhead the assault, followed by the

16th and 18th Regimental Combat Teams

(RCT's) of the 1st Infantry Division and

most of the tanks of Combat Command

B, 1st Armored Division. Simultaneously

with the landing at Arzew, the 26th Regimental Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, was to go ashore at Baie des AndaOctober 1942-June 1943 (Boston: Lttle, Brown

and Company, 1954), p. 16, quoting Combined

Chiefs of Staff Directive for Commander in Chief

Allied Expeditionary Force.
ORAN AND THE PROVISIONAL ORDNANCE GROUP 111

louses, twelve miles west of Oran and, with

the 16th and 18th RCT's from Arzew,

form a pincers movement on Oran. The

remaining tanks of Combat Command B

were to land fifteen miles west of Andalouses at Mersa Bou Zedjar. The two

mobile columns, consisting of light tanks,

armored infantry, engineers, and tank

destroyers were to strike inland and capture

airfields, which were to be held by parachutists until the aircraft of the Twelfth

Air Force could arrive.3

The flying columns had the bulk of the

Ordnance support of the Oran landings—

two companies of the 123d Ordnance

Maintenance Battalion, which was organic

to the 1st Armored Division. These com3

 Howe, Northwest Africa, p. 192. Unless otherwise noted this chapter is based on this source.
112 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

panics, a few air units, and a small detachment with the 168th Regimental Combat

Team of the Eastern Assault Force, were

the only Ordnance troops in the Mediterranean assault convoys.4

 Some 2,000 additional Ordnance troops were due in the

second convoy from England, expected

on D plus 3, and the following convoys,

coming in at regular intervals through December, would bring in other units that

would swell the total number of Ordnance

troops (to support base as well as combat

operations) to nearly 9,000.5

Ordnance Service: The Group

Concept

Aboard the Orbita in the assault convoy,

Colonel Niblo had been taking advantage

of shipboard freedom from routine to develop his final plan for Ordnance service

to II Corps. The plan, set forth in essence

as a standing operating procedure in the

last frantic weeks before the departure

from England, assembled Ordnance battalions—the maintenance battalion authorized for a normal corps, plus as many additional battalions as were needed for a

reinforced corps such as II Corps—under

an Ordnance group headquarters.6

In planning for the reorganization of

the Army after Pearl Harbor, General

McNair recommended that regimental organization be abolished in all branches except infantry and cavalry regiments of divisions and that its place be taken by

group headquarters, a small, nonadministrative unit for the training and tactical

handling of about four battalions. The

group concept provided a flexibility that

was impossible in large organic units such

as the regiment, because battalions were

not assigned to the group organically, but

were attached to it and detached from it

as circumstances required. The application of this principle to service units followed naturally as a means of providing

support for widely dispersed combat units

and was strongly advocated for Ordnance

units by General McNair's Ordnance officer, Col. Robert W. Daniels, especially

after Ordnance received greatly increased

responsibilities in the transfer of motor vehicle supply and maintenance in the summer of 1942.7

Meanwhile, the planning at the Office,

Chief of Ordnance, was directed toward

the older regimental organization for Ordnance troops. It had been initiated by

Brig. Gen. James K. Crain, chief planner

for Ordnance field service at the beginning

4

 (1) Miscellaneous Papers in Center Task

Force., Naval Shipping (Loading Plans) Oct-Nov

42. (2) Rpt, Col D. J. Crawford, Ordnance Service in Support of the Tunisian Campaign, Nov 20,

1942 to May 15, 1943 (hereafter cited as Ord

Serv Tunisian Campaign), p. 2, OHF. 5

 Standing Operating Procedure, II Corps Ordnance Service, 13 Oct 42, Annex A, II Corps

Ord Sec, Misc Corres, KCRC. 6

 (1) SOP, II Corps Ordnance Service, 13 Oct

42. (2) Interv with George L. Artamonoff, 14

Feb 56. (3) The normal corps was essentially the

same as the old type corps (which consisted organically of three infantry divisions plus specified

corps troops) but without the organic assignment.

At this period the trend was away from organic

assignment and the term type. Greenfield, Palmer,

and Wiley, Organization of Ground Combat Troops,

pp. 279-80. 7

 (1) Draft Memo (unused), Lt Gen L. J. McNair

for CofS U.S. Army, sub: Revision of Type Army

Corps and Army Troops (n.d.), and Memo, same

to same, sub: Organization of Service Troops, 8

Jan 43, both in AGF 320.2 Strength, Binder 17.

(2) Interv, Brig Gen Robert W. Daniels, USA

Ret, 5-6 Jun 63. (3) Brig Gen R. W. Daniels,

"Field Ordnance Service," Ordnance, XXXVIII.

No. 203 (Mar-Apr, 1954), 750-51.
ORAN AND THE PROVISIONAL ORDNANCE GROUP 113

COLONEL NIBLO. (Photograph taken

after his promotion to brigadier general.)

of World War II, and grew out of his experience in World War I. At that time

the largest Ordnance organization with the

combat troops consisted of a maintenance

company with each division, attached to the

division ammunition train, without equipment or supplies, and commanded by the

colonel commanding the train, who sometimes, Crain observed, put the Ordnance

men to such tasks as kitchen police duty or

washing trucks. Crain, then Ordnance officer of Second Army, concluded that Ordnance units ought to have their own housekeeping facilities, because otherwise they

were shackled to the unit that fed them;

that they ought to be concentrated for more

efficient service; and that they ought to be

under Ordnance command, or if that was

not possible, under Ordnance technical

supervision. The answer was battalion organization, which he learned about from

the French at Rheims in February 1918.

By 1940 he had succeeded in establishing

an Ordnance battalion in the U.S. Army

at corps level. In the formative 1940-42

period, he went further and made much

more ambitious plans, which envisioned

placing under the Ordnance officer at army

level an Ordnance brigade consisting of an

ammunition regiment and a maintenance

and supply regiment.8

During 1942 approval could not be obtained either for group or regimental organization for Ordnance troops in the combat zone, though the General Staff did

approve regimental organization for Ordnance overseas base maintenance units.

Niblo, who had been refused authority to

expand the II Corps Ordnance Section to

a size large enough to enable him to exercise

properly command control over his Ordnance battalions—ultimately five—favored

the group type of organization. With authorization from the II Corps commander,

Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall, he was

able to organize a group headquarters provisionally in the theater. There was not

time to wait for authorization from Washington, which might have delayed the formation of the group interminably.9

 On the

surface, five battalions, totaling nearly 5,000

men, seemed a rather large and "topheavy" Ordnance organization for a single

reinforced corps; but men who served with

it later in Tunisia considered it "very nearly

correct."

 10

8

 (1) Interv with Maj Gen James K. Crain, 17

Feb 54. (2) Maj Gen J. K.Crain, "Ordnance in

the Field," Ordnance, XXXIX, No. 206 (September-October, 1954), 327-29.

9

 (1) Interv with Niblo, 28 Sep 55, and Artamonoff Interv. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen John B. Medaris, USA Ret, to Lida Mayo, 2 Dec 63. (3) Ltr,

Niblo to Campbell, 1 Sep 43, Campbell Overseas

File, OHF. 10

 Rpt, Maj George T. Petersen, Ordnance

Operations in the Mediterranean Theater of Oper-
114 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

The II Corps Provisional Ordnance

Group (POG) in the planning stage consisted of two battalions, one composed

chiefly of heavy maintenance automotive

companies, the other of medium maintenance and ammunition companies. Niblo

intended to command the group himself,

with Lt. Col. Russell A. Rose as his executive, setting up his headquarters according

to the table of organization provided on 1

April 1942 for an Ordnance base regiment.

He planned to operate the Ordnance Zone

of Communications (SOS) facilities, which

would be his responsibility temporarily,

with an Ordnance base regiment coming

from the United States, one of the new base

shop organizations that were now ready to

be sent overseas.11

The Landing at Oran

As the convoy passed through Gibraltar

on the evening of 6 November, one question

uppermost in everybody's mind was the

attitude of the French. At Oran, ill will

toward the British might be expected, for it

was there that the Royal Navy had attacked the French Fleet, but the Americans

hoped to be received as friends. The first

landing craft to go ashore at Arzew were

equipped with loudspeakers through which

men especially chosen for their Americanaccented French were to shout "Ne tirez

pas! Vive la France!" To emphasize dramatically that the landing was American,

the 18th Regimental Combat Team carried

a mortar that would shoot an egg-shaped

bomb about two hundred feet into the air,

where it would burst into a magnificent

pyrotechnic display of the American flag

in color. There were four such sets of

fireworks, each capable of flinging the starspangled banner a hundred feet across the

sky.12

On the evening of 7 November the convoys of the Center and Eastern forces

separated off Oran. The Eastern Assault

Force proceeded to Algiers and the Center

Task Force turned south. One group of

transports stood into the Gulf of Arzew,

two others made contact with British

beacon submarines that guided them to

their beaches west of Oran.

In the Gulf of Arzew the landings began

about 0030 on 8 November. The Rangers

landed without much opposition and were

followed by infantrymen of the 1st Division. The French were taken by surprise.

They seemed to have no inclination to

regard the invaders as friends and liberators, but their fire was sporadic and uncertain since the landing craft were well concealed by smoke screens laid down by the

Royal Navy and the dispersed landings

confused and disorganized the defenders.

The only 1st Division unit that encountered

any firm resistance was the 18th Regimental Combat Team, advancing northwest of Arzew, and that was triggered by a

sergeant's impatience to "shoot the flag."

About 0300, a column of flame shot upward near the 18th Regimental Combat

ations (hereafter cited as Petersen Rpt, 14 Feb

45), Incl to Ltr, Gen Stilwell to CG's Second and

Fourth Armies, same sub, 14 Feb 45, Document

155.2-20, Armored School Library. 11

 (1) SOP, II Corps Ordnance Service, 13

Oct 42. (2) CTF, LO, 13 Nov 42, sub: Organization of Provisional Ordnance Group, II Corps,

II Corps Ord Sec Misc Corres, KCRC. (3) A

battalion of the 303d Ordnance Base Regiment,

the first unit of this new type of organization to

reach any theater of operations, was then on its

way to Egypt to work in the Heliopolis tank shop.

See above, p. 22.

12

 Knickerbocker et al., Danger Forward, pp.

24, 39.
ORAN AND THE PROVISIONAL ORDNANCE GROUP 115

JEEP HEADED INLAND OVER STEEL MATTING NEAR LES ANDALOUSES

Team's command post, emitting sparks

that hung in the sky for a moment and

then burst into the American flag in full

color. At last the French had a good

target. Mortar, machine gun, and rifle

fire converged on the new target and the

men at the command post had to scatter.13

The personnel ships carrying Colonel

Niblo and other staff officers entered the

Gulf of Arzew at sunrise. As the sun dispelled the early morning fog that hung

over the water and struck the slopes of the

mountains beyond the beaches, the men at

the rails of their ships could see the assault

columns fighting their way to the crest of

the heights above Arzew and later the

small groups of prisoners descending the

slopes to the town. They could see also the

operation of the flat-bottomed, ungainly

Maracaibos, forerunners of the LST's

(landing ships, tank). These shallow-draft

oil tankers, designed to sail Lake Maracaibo, Venezuela, and converted by the

British into tank-landing vessels, had a bow

landing ramp, closed while under way with

a pair of huge doors, that could be extended

with a ponton bridge section to cover the

span between ship and shoal water. The

bow openings were too narrow for medium

M3 tanks but could easily take light tanks.14

13

 (1) Morison, Operations in North African

Waters, pp. 231-35. (2) Knickerbocker et al.,

Danger Forward, p. 25.

14

 (1) McNamara, "The Mounting of 'Torch'

from England," pp. 13-14. (2) Robinett Interv.
116 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

The Maracaibos Misoa and Tasajera,

loaded to capacity with the light tanks,

half-tracks, towed guns, jeeps, and other

vehicles of Combat Command B, grounded

off the beach at Arzew about 0400. It took

nearly two hours to emplace the ponton

bridging, but in another two hours all the

vehicles had rumbled over the bridge,

splashed through the few feet of water, and

driven across steel matting laid on the sand

to their assembly area for de-waterproofing,

which was done by the tankers' own mechanics. The Maracaibos might not have

worked if the sea had not been calm, the

slope of the beach steep, and opposition

nonexistent, but fortune had favored the

landing. At 0820 the reconnaissance elements moved off, followed fifteen minutes

later by the flying column. The Ordnance

officers were gratified to observe that the

waterproofing had succeeded and could be

removed without difficulty.15

The Orbita was ten hours in the harbor

before the British naval officers, who were

short of landing craft, allowed anyone to

disembark. Late in the afternoon the sea

sprang up, and vehicles and supplies could

no longer be ferried onto the beaches but

had to be unloaded on the docks, which

were soon clogged. When Maj. George L.

Artamonoff, Niblo's operations officer, got

ashore on the evening of D-day he saw that

the quays were blocked with equipment

and that there had been no adequate provision for carrying it away. The unloading of motor vehicles seemed inordinately

slow.16

Fortunately, railway facilities at Arzew

were usable. The 1st Division's Quartermaster battalion commandeered a locomotive and five cars and with the help of a

native crew and an Engineer brigade

shuttled stores around docks and from

beaches to the Arzew railway station, which

served as a distribution point. A Transportation Corps officer by distributing C

rations to a French crew persuaded it to run

a trainload of ammunition from Arzew to

the 18th RCT, then fighting its way to

Oran. The next day the Quartermaster

battalion organized an ammunition, ration,

and water supply dump in a bivouac area

a few miles inland.17

While the mobile columns of tanks

mopped up the airfields and the 1st Division combat teams pressed toward Oran,

staff officers remained in Arzew, sleeping

on the stone floor of a schoolhouse the

night of D-day. Late on the second day,

word came from General Fredendall, still

aboard his ship, that the combat teams

were moving too slowly and that it was

imperative that Oran be taken the next

day, 10 November. Maj. Gen. Terry de la

Mesa Allen, commanding the 1st Infantry

Division, thereupon ordered the attack for

0715. Colonel Niblo sent Major Artamonoff forward at once so that he could

enter the city as soon as possible after its

capture to reconnoiter sites for Ordnance

15

 (1) Operation Report, Task Force Red, in

Center Task Force, Rpt on Opn TORCH, 13 Nov

42. (2) Ltr, Maj Artamonoff and Capt John Ray

to Ord Officer, CTF, 2 Dec 42, sub: Data on

Amphibious Operations (D Convoy). II Corps

Ord Sec Misc Corres, KCRC. 16

 (1) Ibid. (2) CTF, Lessons from Operation

TORCH, p. 4. (3) A few amphibious jeeps had

been used, but they were not particularly successful. Artamonoff Interv. 17

 (1) William F. Ross and Charles F. Romanus, The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the

War Against Germany, UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1965), p. 53.

(2) H. H. Dunham, Historical Unit, OCT, ASF,

Monograph, U.S. Army Transportation and the

Conquest of North Africa, 1942-1943 (hereafter

cited as Dunham MS), January 1945. pp. 86, 180.

MS, OCMH.
ORAN AND THE PROVISIONAL ORDNANCE GROUP 117

depots and dumps. Artamonoff started off

in a driving, sleety rain on the evening of

9 November and, in spite of the blackout

and unfamiliar terrain, late that night

caught up with the most advanced elements

of the 16th RCT. He spent the rest of the

night at Ferme St. Jean de Baptiste, on the

eastern outskirts of Oran. There at noon

the next day he saw a blue flag raised over

the city, the prearranged signal that Oran

had surrendered.18

The city's wide, palm-lined streets, bordered with modern office buildings and

sidewalk cafes, offered interesting contrasts. Most of the people were French and

Spanish, but there were Arabs in ragged

sheets, and gaunt dogs shared the streets

with horse-drawn carts. The few automobiles burned alcohol, and the odor pervaded the city. The beautiful harbor was

littered with wreckage, for the attempt on

D-day by the British cutters Hartland and

Walney to capture the batteries and wharves

and prevent sabotage had been a costly

failure. The quays were piled with merchandise, including thousands of barrels of

wine destined for export to Germany and

Italy.19

Soon after the Americans entered Oran

they learned that the landing of the Eastern Assault Force at Algiers had been successful. That of Western Task Force at

Casablanca had met stiff opposition, but

by 12 November Morocco was safely in

American hands. Of the three task forces,

Center was the only one, according to the

official history of TORCH, that "could subsequently claim to have won a decision

wholly by force of arms."

 20

 Elsewhere,

political considerations entered in. Nowhere did the French seem very much disposed to regard the Allies as liberators.

Except for a few scattered bursts of enthusiasm, the people lined up along the streets

of Oran were not friendly. The French

were cool and many of the Arabs, who had

been good subjects for Axis indoctrination,

were actively hostile and continued sniping

for some time.21

Major Artamonoff, who was in Oran

well ahead of Quartermaster and other

supply officers, and who had another advantage in being able to speak French

fluently, obtained good depot space at

Nouvelle Halle, the local market. On a tip

from French newspapermen, he found

comfortable quarters for Colonel Niblo and

the Ordnance staff at a villa just vacated

by the Italian naval delegation to the German-Italian Armistice Commission. Called

Villa Charpentier, located on Lotissement

Saint Hubert, it was about two miles from

the center of town, behind the Oran Tennis

Club. Offices and a mess were set up at

the tennis club when Colonel Niblo and

the staff arrived next day, 11 November.22

On the same day the first important

follow-up convoy from England arrived,

bringing a large contingent of Ordnance

troops and the rest of the staff. Disembarking at Mers-el-Kébir, the troops were met

by Major Artamonoff and taken to camps

in the countryside around Oran. They

found the sunny African climate a welcome

change from the cold English autumn. The

18

 Artamonoff Interv. 19

 (1) Morison, Operations in North African

Waters, pp. 225-30. (2) Pyle, Here Is Your War.

pp. 26-27. (3) Dunham MS, p. 195.

20

 Howe, Northwest Africa, p. 227. 21

 (1) Knickerbocker et al., Danger Forward,

p. 32. (2) Artamonoff Interv. 22

 (1) Ibid. (2) Memo, Niblo for AG CTF, 8

Dec 42, sub: Location of Ordnance Units, CTF,

320.2 II Corps Ord Sec KCRC.
118 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

ORAN HARBOR

arrivals included four "old Ordnance" companies: the 14th Medium Maintenance,

the 53d and 66th Ammunition, and the

30th Heavy Maintenance (Tank); and

two automotive maintenance battalions, the

87th Medium Maintenance and the 1st

Battalion of the 55th Heavy Maintenance

Regiment (Q), a unit that still carried its

old Quartermaster designation.23

The Provisional Ordnance Group

Colonel Niblo lost no time in organizing

his Provisional Ordnance Group. For the

1st Battalion of the group he took the 1st

Battalion of the 55th Heavy Maintenance

Regiment (Q) and added the "old Ordnance" maintenance companies and one

company of the 87th Medium Maintenance Automotive Battalion. For the 2d

Battalion of the group he took the 87th

Medium Maintenance Battalion (Q) (less

one company) and added the two ammunition companies. The mission of the 1st

Battalion was to furnish Ordnance service

(other than ammunition supply) for all

U.S. Army units within the geographical

limits of the towns of Oran and Arzew,

including the ports of those towns, and to

support the 2d Battalion with fourth echelon

work. The 2d Battalion was to furnish

23

 (1) Artamonoff Interv. (2) Ltr, Crawford to

Campbell, 28 May 43, in file Hist AFHQ Ord

Sec, OHF.
ORAN AND THE PROVISIONAL ORDNANCE GROUP 119

Ordnance service—except fourth echelon

repair—to all U.S. Army organizations outside Oran and Arzew. For the time being

this meant the Ste. Barbe-du-Tlelat area

south of Oran, where most of the troops

of the 1st Division and Combat Command

B were stationed.24 Since the units were

more or less static, the maintenance work

at first consisted of inspecting vehicles,

seeing that waterproofing had been removed and salt water damage repaired,

training drivers in preventive maintenance,

and reporting shortages of vehicles, tools,

and parts.25

The group's first and most important

job—and this fell to the 1st Battalion—

was to supply the trucks that were so

badly needed everywhere. The decision

to send on wheels only 60 percent of the

vehicles called for by tables of equipment,

to save shipping space, and to send the

rest unassembled in crates had worked

great hardship. Ordnance planners had

counted on local vehicles to help in the

emergency. Major Artamonoff had

orders to buy all he could find, and was

given $5,000 in silver for the purpose.26

The French trucks had been converted to

charcoal or alcohol and many were in

poor shape. Some dated from World

War I, some had been driven from Central Africa. Tires were worn and batteries

were a constant problem. Still, the

French trucks were very useful in the days

following the first landings and local

transport was so badly needed that even

horse-drawn wagons were pressed into

service within the port area. Therefore

it was important to get the American

vehicles unloaded and operating as quickly as possible.27

At Oran and Arzew the 1st Battalion

rendered "Driveaway Motor Service."

It set up assembly plants and maintenance

sections near the docks, assembled the

crated vehicles, and serviced the wheeled

vehicles, removing all waterproofing.

After this was done the men picked up

a pay load, preferably Ordnance Class II

supplies or Ordnance organization equipment, delivered it, and then turned the

vehicles in to the 1st Battalion Motor

Depot at Nouvelle Halle in Oran for issue

to Center Task Force units. The trucks

were so much in demand that many of

them were put into service without being

given a thorough road test.28 Some

could not be assembled or put into service

at all because of shortages. Some of the

twin unit pack crates containing 2 1⁄2-ton

trucks arrived without brake fluid and

24

 CTF, LO, 13 Nov 42, sub: Organization of

Provisional Ordnance Group, and Ltr, Colonel

Niblo to Commanding Officers, 1st and 2nd Battalion, Prov Ord Gp, 21 Nov 42, sub: Ordnance

Maintenance Service and incls, both in II Corps

Ord Sec, Misc Corres, KCRC. 25

 Memo, Maj B. Whitehouse for Commanding

Officer,1st Battalion, Provisional Ordnance Group

Center Task Force, 23 Nov 42 and Ltr, 2d Lt

Joe I. Milliken to Chief Ordnance Officer, Second

Corps, 6 Dec 42, sub: Motor Vehicle Inspection,

both in II Corps Ord Sec, Misc Corres, KCRC. 26

 Artamonoff Interv. When Ernie Pyle arrived

on 11 November, he found the Renault automobile

showroom full of new cars. In a few days the Army

had bought every car. Pyle, Here Is Your War, p.

26. Another correspondent commented on the "fantastic prices" paid for civilian cars and trucks.

Bennett, Assignment to Nowhere, p. 61.

27

 (1) Dunham MS, pp. 186-87, 259. (2) Artamonoff Interv. 28

 (1) Memo, Colonel Niblo for Commanding

Officers, 1st and 2d Battalions, Provisional Ordnance Group, 22 Nov 42, sub: Ordnance Service.

Ports of Oran and Arzew, and Memo, Niblo for

G-4, Center Task Force, 21 Nov 42, both in II

Corps Ord Sec, Misc Corres, KCRC. (2) MS,

History of Ordnance Service in the Mediterranean

Theater of Operations, Nov 42-Nov 45 (hereafter

cited as Hist Ord Serv MTO), ch. I, p. 18.
120 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

shock absorber fluid. Electrolyte for batteries was sometimes missing. French

laborers, who along with Arabs were used

in great numbers in the motor vehicle

operation, made unpredictable mistakes

in servicing the trucks. One day they

were found filling dry automobile batteries with wine from the casks on the

docks.29

Arab labor, as well as French, had its

drawbacks. The Arabs stole weapons

and ammunition; one newspaper correspondent reported that a whole native

village near Oran had armed itself and

was contemplating raiding a neighboring

village for booty and women. And they

were avid for cloth or anything to make

clothing. They cut the canvas tops out

of jeeps parked in the streets. At ammunition dumps they stole rope grommets

from the 155's to make shoes and opened

small arms boxes to steal the bandoleers.

On occasion they blew themselves up in

their eagerness to examine boxes of grenades. Many laborers were young or so

weak physically that they could hardly

lift heavy loads; and their disinclination

to work in the rain played havoc with

schedules once the rainy season set in.

Nevertheless, in the early days after the

Oran landings, Niblo made good use of

native workers.30

The Provisional Ordnance Group was

expanded when the second follow-up convoy arrived from England on 28 November. The convoy brought the headquarters and headquarters detachment of

the 62nd Ammunition Battalion, which

made possible the formation of the 3d

Battalion of the group, to which the two

ammunition companies were shifted. It

also brought two medium maintenance

and one depot company. These were

added to the group's 2d Battalion, which

was now given responsibility for all local

maintenance, leaving the 1st Battalion

free to concentrate on assembling crated

vehicles. The 3d Battalion operated

three ammunition dumps.31

The flexibility of the Provisional Ordnance Group was to be tested again very

soon. Just as the organization for the

support of the base and the troops around

Oran was taking shape, it had to be dismantled to furnish Ordnance service to

the battlefront in northern Tunisia. Under Gen. Sir Kenneth A. N. Anderson, the

British First Army, which was actually only

a skeleton outfit consisting of two infantry

brigades and one tank regiment, had lost

the race to capture Tunis and Bizerte and

was meeting heavy resistance from the

Germans who were pouring in from Italy.

To help the British, General Eisenhower

on 23 November, the day he arrived in

Algiers from Gibraltar, sent from Oran

Combat Command B of the 1st Armored

Division, and during late November and

29

 (1) Interv, 2 Jan 43, with Colonel Niblo, in

MS, Col Heavey, Personal Notes on Training

Activities in England and Observations in North

Africa, app. II (hereafter cited as Heavey Notes),

in Folder, "British Relations," Barnes File, OHF.

(2) Speech, Brig Gen Edward E. MacMorland,

Deputy Chief for Planning Ordnance Field Service,

Boston, 5 May 44, p. 9, OHF. 30

 (1) Bennett, Assignment to Nowhere, p. 58. (2)

Capt. William G. Meade, "Ammunition Supply in

the Mediterranean Theater of Operations," The

Ordnance Sergeant, VIII (October, 1944), 262-

63. (3) Artamonoff Interv.

31

 (1) Niblo Ltrs of 21, 27 Nov,1 Dec 42, and

CTF Admin Order No. 3, 20 Nov 42, all in II

Corps Ord Sec, Misc Corres, KCRC. (2) Special

Order No. 4, 23 Nov 42, Provisional Ordnance

Group II Corps Ord Sec, KCRC. (3) CTF Station List, 27 Nov 42, II Corps Ord Sec, 320.2,

KCRC.
ORAN AND THE PROVISIONAL ORDNANCE GROUP 121

The Move to Northern Tunisia

early December he also sent forward elements of the 1st Infantry Division.32

For the first Ordnance move forward,

Colonel Niblo selected his 1st Battalion,

Provisional Ordnance Group, and reorganized it. Under the headquarters of

the 1st Battalion, 55th Ordnance Heavy

Maintenance Regiment (Q), he placed

the 53d Ammunition Company, the 14th

Medium Maintenance Company, Company D of the 87th Medium Automotive

Maintenance Battalion, and the 78th Depot Company. Colonel Rose was the

commander of the new battalion. Niblo

ordered the unit to proceed to Souk el

Arba in northern Tunisia, the most forward airfield and supply base, about 750

miles from Oran. On arrival at l'Arba,

a town near Algiers, the battalion was to

come under the control of Colonel Ford,

Ordnance officer of Allied Force Headquarters, who had just arrived in Algiers

by air from England.33

The move had to be made by truck,

for the railroad east of Algiers was being

used to its limited capacity by the British,

and transportation by sea to the small

ports of Bône and Philippeville was too

dependent on weather, availability of

shipping, and freedom from enemy air

attack. Above all, trucks were needed

within the combat zone to make the Ordnance units completely mobile. The

advance elements of the 715-man 1st Battalion headed east under cover of darkness on the evening of 30 November and

all its 183 trucks were on the road,

escorted by fighter planes, by 10 December.34

Two days later orders came from Allied

Force Headquarters to send the 30th

Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company

(Tank) forward immediately with all the

replacement tanks, wreckers, and parts it

could transport. On the night of 10-11

December during the withdrawal from

Medjez el Bab, the focal point of enemy

attack, scores of combat vehicles—tanks,

half-tracks, and tank destroyers—had

bogged down in the mud and had to be

abandoned. The tanks were so badly

mired that the Germans themselves could

not extricate them. It was a crippling

loss. In its brief experience in action,

Combat Command B had lost 32 medium

and 46 light tanks. The combat vehicles

that remained were in poor condition.

Because of limitations on shipment by

railroad or by sea, most had made at least

part of the journey to the front on their

own tracks, which were already worn

from maneuvers in Ireland, for there had

not been time to replace them before sailing for Africa. Once in Africa, some of

the vehicles had gone overland all the way

32

 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 118-22. 33

 (1) Prov Ord Gp, II Corps, SO Nos. 8 and

16, 29 Nov, 13 Dec 42. (2) History AFHQ Ord

Sec, 6 Jan 43, OHF.

34

 (1) Ord Serv Tunisian Campaign, pp. 1-3.

(2) Logistical Plans Sect, AFHQ, Aide-Mémoire

on Logistic Limitations to Forces in North Africa,

11 Jan 43, in ASF Planning Div, Theater Br, 20

General, vol. I. (3) Dunham MS, pp. 206-10, 246.

(4) LO, CTF to CO Prov Gp, 30 Nov 42, and

memo, Prov Ord Gp for CG CTF, 1 Dec 42, sub:

Personnel and Matériel in Movement of 2d Echelon,

1st Battalion, POG, both in II Corps Ord Sec, 370.5,

KCRC. (5) By D plus 11 there were in Algeria four

AAF fighter groups minus one squadron. Wesley

Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., "The Army

Air Forces in World War II," II, Europe: TORCH

to POINTBLANK (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1949) (hereafter cited as Craven and Cate,

AAF II) , p. 82.
122 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

to the front since there had been no way

to carry them over the highways. A

tractor-trailer for transporting tanks had

been developed by the United States in

1941 at the request of the British, who

wanted them to rush tanks to danger

points if the Germans invaded England.

The British Eighth Army in Egypt was

equipped with the tractor-trailers and had

a tank delivery regiment to carry combat

vehicles from bases to the front. II

Corps had only ten tank transporters because the U.S. Army had not foreseen the

need for them. This need was one of

the earliest lessons learned in Tunisia.35

When the 30th Ordnance Heavy

Maintenance Company (Tank) left Oran

for Souk el Arba on the morning of 14

December, it took, in addition to its 25

shop trucks, 13 cargo trucks, miscellaneous light trucks, trailers, and jeeps, 4 40-

ton tank transporters, each carrying a

light tank (medium tanks could not be

unloaded from ships in time), and 2 10-

ton wreckers. The 30th also took all the

spare parts that were available in Oran

and additional supplies for the rest of the

1st Battalion, POG.36

The Ordnance convoys leaving Oran

between 30 November and 14 December

went east over a hard-surfaced, two-lane

road that presented few problems until

they got to the mountainous country beyond Algiers, where steep inclines slowed

the heavily loaded trucks and corkscrewturns all but defeated the heavy wreckers.

The depot company almost lost a van

over a cliff when a tire blew out, but

there were no major disasters.37 After

the four-day trip the convoys came down

from the Atlas Mountains into a flat valley and encamped in the neighborhood of

Souk el Arba. For the first few days,

until the winter rains set in, the position

was constantly attacked by German divebombers, which were stationed on concrete runways at Tunis and Bizerte,

whereas Allied aircraft were bogged down

in the mud far behind the lines.

This early Ordnance effort to support

the British First Army was short but

strenuous. The ammunition men, camouflaging their dump with the only vegetation they could find, some scrubby

growth resembling tumbleweed, sent detachments to Bone, where most of the

ammunition came in from Oran by sea,

and to the railheads at Duvivier and Souk

Ahras, to direct shipments by truck to

Souk el Arba. The maintenance men

ranged up and down the front in small

contact parties, sometimes consisting of a

single vehicle and a handful of men, visiting tankers, infantry units, and widely

dispersed antiaircraft units at the railhead

and in the small ports along the coast.

35

 (1) Rad, Freedom Algiers to CG, CTF, No.

9611, 12 Dec 42, II Corps Ord Sec, 370.5, KCRC. (2) Dispatch by Lt Gen K. A. N. Anderson,

"Operations in Northwest Africa from 8th November 1942 to 13th May 1943," 7 Jun 43, Supplement of 6 Nov 46 to The London Gazette, 5 Nov

46, pp. 5449-64. (3) Diary and Report of Brig

Gen Barnes on Trip to North Africa and United

Kingdom December 1942-January 1943, pp. 14,

19 and "Notes on General Barnes' Report," p. 6,

OHF. (4) Intervs, Colonel Crawford, 3 Jun 56,

and Robinett. 36

 (1) Ltr, CO POG to CG CTF, 14 Dec 42,

sub: Personnel and Matériel in Movement of 30th

Ord Co, II Corps Ord Sec 370.5, KCRC. (2)

Ltr, Col Niblo to Ordnance Officer AFHQ, 13

Dec 42, sub: Ordnance Service for US Troops in

ETF, II Corps Ord Sec, Misc Corres, KCRC. (3)

Special Order No. 16, 13 Dec 42.

37

 (1) NATOUSA Report, 1st Lt. Charles S.

Schwartz, The Field Operations of a Maintenance

Battalion, copy in OHF, pp. 3-4. (2) Hist 78th

Ord Depot Co, Jan 42-Dec 44, p. 4.
ORAN AND THE PROVISIONAL ORDNANCE GROUP 123

Planning for Central Tunisia

One detachment, on orders from AFHQ,

was sent south to central Tunisia to support a small U.S. parachute detachment

under the command of Col. Edson D.

Raff that was helping the French 19th

Corps on raiding and reconnaissance missions. All contact parties were in constant danger from German aircraft. By

the end of December, the II Corps Ordnance officer was asking Center Task

Force to equip every Ordnance technical

vehicle and truck with a machine gun for

defense.38

The men in Colonel Rose's battalion

were the first American supporting troops

at the front. Moreover, thanks to Colonel Niblo's "top-heavy" organization,

Ordnance was the only supply serviceable to send troops to Tunisia with the

combat troops during November and December 1942. The 78th Ordnance Depot Company also handled Signal Corps

supplies and acted as middleman in obtaining clothing, bedding, tools, and other

articles from the British and then issuing

them to all arms. There was an enormous demand for Ordnance supplies. In

the first week after its arrival the depot

company made enough issues to free six

of its nine huge vans for trips back to

Oran for restocking.39

To put an end to the "constant daily

shipping of piecemeal equipment, all of

which appears to be too little and too

late," Colonel Niblo urged Colonel Ford

to turn over the Ordnance job in northern

Tunisia to the whole Provisional Ordnance

Group. This would enable Niblo to send

more maintenance men and also would

allow him to set up a general supply depot

and large ammunition dump east of

Algiers. Colonel Ford agreed that a depot and shop should be established nearer

the front. The two officers in late December made a reconnaissance trip to

locate space in Constantine, the Algerian

city where the British First Army headquarters was located, but before they

could make arrangements a momentous

decision changed all plans.40

On Christmas Eve, General Eisenhower

returned to Algiers from a reconnaissance

of the front in northern Tunisia convinced

that the torrential rains, deep mud, and

stiffening enemy resistance had effectively

stopped General Andersen's advance and

that the best course was to go on the defensive for the time being, holding the airfields at Souk el Arba in the north and

Thélepte and Youks-les-Bains in the south

and protecting the flank on the south by

moving II Corps forward to Tebessa, the

Algerian border city that was the gateway

to central Tunisia. There the weather

would be better and, when sufficient reinforcements had been brought up, General

Fredendall could move east to the coast

at Sfax or Gabès and prevent Rommel's

38

 (1) Ord Serv Tunisian Campaign, pp. 2-5.

(2) Meade, Ammunition Supply in the MTO,

pp. 261-64. (3) Colonel Edson D. Raff, We

Jumped to Fight (NY: 1944), pp. 153, 163. (4)

Memo, Col John B. Medaris, Acting Ord Officer.

CTF, for ACofS G-4, CTF, 31 Dec 42, sub:

Memo Hq CTF, 28 Dec 42, in II Corps Ord

Sec 319.1, KCRC. 39

 (1) Petersen Rpt of 14 Feb 45. (2) Ord

Serv Tunisian Campaign, p. 3. (3) Hist 78th

Depot Co, p. 4.

40

 Ltrs, Niblo to Ordnance Officer, AFHQ, 13

Dec 42, sub: Ordnance Service for US Troops in

ETF, and 16 Feb 42, sub: Estimate of the Ordnance

Situation in II Corps, II Corps Ord Sec Misc Corres,

KCRC.
124 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Afrika Korps, then making a rapid A Long, Weak, Supply Line

strategic withdrawal to Tunisia from

Tripolitania, from joining Generaloberst

Hans-Juergen von Arnim's forces in the

Tunis-Bizerte area. An outline plan for

an attack toward Sfax, called SATIN, was

approved at AFHQ on 28 December.41

By 14 January 1943 final decisions on

Operation SATIN had been made in conferences between General Eisenhower,

General Anderson, General Alphonse Juin,

and General Fredendall at Allied Force

Headquarters in Constantine. The next

day Eisenhower flew to Casablanca to report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who

were attending an international strategic

conference there. SATIN provided that

Fredendall would first attack Gabès and

then proceed north up the coast to Sfax,

with a tentative D-day of 22 January.

Operating directly under AFHQ, II

Corps would consist of the U.S. 1st

Armored Division, the U.S. 26th Regimental Combat Team, the British 1st Parachute Brigade less one battalion, and the

French Constantine Division. Over the

protests of AFHQ logistics staffs, who

during the conferences at Constantine between 10-14 January "wailed that our

miserable communications could not

maintain more than an armored division

and one additional regiment,"42 Eisenhower firmly intended to assign to II

Corps three infantry divisions as soon as

they could be brought forward: the 1st,

the 9th (less the 39th Regimental Combat

Team), and the 34th.43

The logistics staffs had reason for their

wails. The supply line was very long

and very weak. The distance from Constantine—itself from 100 to 300 miles

from the front—to the nearest big port,

Oran, was 445 miles; Casablanca was

440 miles west of Oran. Base sections

had been planned early for both ports,

but on Christmas Eve, when Eisenhower

decided upon the movement to central

Tunisia, the Mediterranean Base Section

(MBS) at Oran had been in existence

only about three weeks, and the first echelon of the Atlantic Base Section at Casablanca was just arriving. Eventually

there was to be an Eastern Base Section

(EBS) at Constantine, nearer the front,

but it did not come into being until late

February 1943.44 (See Map 1.)

For most of the campaign in the spring

of 1943 supplies had to be brought 500 to

1,200 miles from ports of entry; moreover, the base sections at the ports were

just learning, as men had learned in Australia, how hard it was to operate in a

strange country far from home. Colonel

Heiss, the Ordnance officer of the Mediterranean Base Section, who, like other

rear area officers lacked depot equipment

such as record cards, bins, and lift trucks

and had to get along with a small inexperienced staff and untrained labor,

found that it took about eight months to

establish complete base facilities. In the

meantime, before he could build up his

41

 (1) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 124-

26. (2) Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 139-41. 42

 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 125. 48

 Ibid, pp. 125-26.

44

 (1) Col. Creswell G. Blakeney, comp., Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA (Naples,

Italy: G. Montanino, 1945), pp. 21, 23. (2) History

of Ordnance Operations Eastern Base Section, 13

Feb 43-1 Aug 43 (hereafter cited as Hist Ord EBS),

pp. 2, 10, OHF.
ORAN AND THE PROVISIONAL ORDNANCE GROUP 125

stocks he had to supply troops who

arrived in the theater without all the

weapons that their tables of basic allowances called for. The system that then

existed for equipping overseas forces provided that when a unit in the United

States received orders to go overseas it

packed its own equipment, addressed it to

itself, and shipped it to the port for delivery overseas. The equipment might

arrive long after the troops, or at a different port.45

The bases themselves were at the end

of a long overwater supply line. It

usually took about three months to get

supplies from the United States to the

theater, often much longer to obtain complete items. Supply officers came to regard delivery by ship as "probably the

most unsatisfactory method of supply that

the Devil could have invented."46 Sometimes the chassis of a truck would be on

one ship, the cab on another; projectiles

would arrive without their powder

charges, which were on another ship.

This situation was especially serious in the

early days, when part of a convoy might

be sunk or have to be diverted to a different port. The failure to load ships

with complete items was "the most severe

and general criticism" of supply coming

from the United States. There were

many other complaints from base sections

of thoughtless editing of requisitions, poor

marking and packing, and "just plain

negligence."

 47

The new theater had not yet established

its own organization. It was under

Allied Force Headquarters, a part of the

European Theater of Operations, until 4

February 1943, when the North African

Theater of Operations, United States

Army (NATOUSA), under General

Eisenhower was organized. On 12 February a Communication s Zone ,

NATOUSA, under Brig. Gen. Everett S.

Hughes, Deputy Theater Commander,

NATOUSA, was established; and a few

days later Services of Supply, NATOUSA,

assumed responsibility for supply and the

administration of the base sections. It

took time for all these relationships to be

straightened out and confusion during the

first few months of operation was inevitable.48

The problems for Ordnance were especially complicated because the thousands

of trucks used in the long haul to the battlefront had to be furnished and maintained by Ordnance. The responsibility

was new, and Ordnance was discovering

the burden it imposed. When General

Hughes took over the job as theater

deputy, he selected Ordnance's Colonel

Ford as his chief of staff because he realized that about 60 percent of his job

was ordnance supply and maintenance;

he felt "if we could lick the ordnance job,

we could lick anything easier than

that."

 49

45

 (1) Col. G. K. Heiss, "Ordnance Overseas:

Problems of Supply and Maintenance in the

Theater of Operations," Army Ordnance, XXVII

(July-August 1944), 92-93. (2) Memo, Somervell for Campbell, 20 Feb 43, O.O. 350.05/26141⁄2.

(3) History Ord Service MTO, ch. VII, p. 214. 46

 Ltr, Maj Gen E. S. Hughes to Gen Campbell,

12 Apr 43, Campbell Overseas file. OHF.

47

 Ltr, Col Carter B. Magruder to Gen Lutes,

16 Mar 43, ASF Planning Div, Theater Br, 20

General, vol. III. 48

 (1) Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pp. 20-24. (2) History Ord Service MTO,

ch. VII, pp. 214-16. 49

 Ltr, Hughes to Campbell, 12 Apr 43.
CHART 3—ORGANIZATION OF THE ORDNANCE SECTION, AFHQ, NOVEMBER 1942

(A)=AMERICAN (B)= BRITISH

Note: Most of the British part of the section accompanied the British First Army into the .theater under temporary assignment until AFHQ arrived in Algiers.

Source: History of Allied Force Headquarters, Part One, August-December 1942.
ORAN AND THE PROVISIONAL ORDNANCE GROUP 127

AFHQ Ordnance

In the first and most trying months of

the campaign in Tunisia, Ordnance crises

at the front had to be referred to the small

Ordnance Section at AFHQ. On 25

November Colonel Ford had brought to

Algiers a staff consisting only of his

executive officer, Maj. John G. Detwiler,

and one sergeant. His maintenance and

supply officer, Colonel Crawford, his ammunition officer, Lt. Col. Russell R.

Klanderman, and the rest of the staff—

two captains and three technical sergeants—left England on the fifth large

convoy, aboard the British troopship

Strathallan, which was torpedoed off

Oran on 21 December. All aboard were

picked up by British destroyers and

landed safely, but it was Christmas Day

before the AFHQ Ordnance office was

officially organized.50

Like other staff sections of AFHQ, the

Ordnance Section followed the principle

called "balanced personnel," that is, the

section was composed of Americans and

British in approximately equal strength—

nine Americans and eight British. Each

nationality, however, was organized along

different lines because of different connotations of ordnance. The British branch

included—in addition to sections devoted

to ammunition, weapons and other "warlike stores," vehicles, and tanks—sections

that handled clothing and signal and engineer stores. Another difference was

that the British branch did not perform

technical intelligence, which the British

assigned to their AFHQ G-2 (Combat Intelligence) Section. (Chart 3) On the

American side, technical intelligence was an

important function. Soon after his arrival

in Algiers, Colonel Crawford, who was to

succeed Colonel Ford as U.S. Ordnance

officer of AFHQ when Ford went to

NATOUSA with Hughes, was sent by

plane to Egypt to study British Eighth

Army equipment.51

American and British staffs of the

AFHQ Ordnance office were housed together in a building that had been a school

for girls, Ecole Sainte Genevieve. Colonel

Crawford was amused to find over the

door to Colonel Ford's office a reminder

of the former tenants—a sign, "Les

Violettes." The sign was the more incongruous because inside, along with the office

equipment, were stacked rifles and hand

grenades used to arm men of the French

resistance movement. The French were

trained in demolition work by Major

Artamonoff (who had arrived in Algiers in

late December to represent U.S. Ordnance

on the French Rearmament Commission),

and then dropped behind enemy lines disguised as Arabs.52

It was thus in an atmosphere of change

and confusion that the Ordnance effort to

support II Corps in Tunisia began. Notwithstanding the forebodings of the logistics

staff, nobody could yet tell how hard it was

to be.

50

 (1) Hist AFHQ Ord Sec. (2) History of

AFHQ, Part One, pp. 100-101. (3) History Ord

Service MTO, ch. VII, pp. 243-46.

51

 (1) History of AFHQ, Part One, pp. 67-71.

(2) Crawford Interv. 52

 (1)Crawford and Artamonoff Intervs. (2) History Ord Service MTO, ch. VII, p. 247. (3) For

the French rearmament program see Marcel Vigneras, Rearming the French, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, D.C.,

1957).
CHAPTER VIII

With II Corps in Tunisia

On the map Tunisia looks like a sea

horse, with its snout (Cap Bon) pointing

toward Sicily. The city of Tunis is the

eye; Bizerte sits on top of the head. The

chest protrudes east into the Mediterranean. The waistline, formed by the Gulf

of Gabes some 250 miles south of Bizerte,

is narrow, only about a hundred miles wide

from the port of Gabès to the Algerian

border, which forms the spiny upper back

of the sea horse. Below the waist, all is

desert; above it there are two irregular

mountain chains running more or less

north and south about twenty miles apart

and known as the Eastern Dorsal and the

Western Dorsal. It was in the half-desert,

half-mountain region of the lower chest

and waist, where bleak, rocky mountains,

or djebels, rise straight from barren plains,

a region that reminded Americans of Arizona and New Mexico, that the U.S. Army

began the war against Germany.

Part of the SATIN plan, a II Corps rush

to the coast to seize Gabès, thereby cutting

Rommel's line of communications from

northern Tunisia, was changed late in January. General Eisenhower decided, after

talks with General Sir Alan Brooke and

General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander at

the Casablanca Conference, to keep II

Corps in mobile reserve in the Tebessa

area, conducting only limited operations

and building up strength to attack when

the British Eighth Army caught up with

Rommel on the southern border of Tunisia.

At the time this decision was made General

von Arnim began to attack the Eastern

Dorsal passes, which were lightly held by

the French 19th Corps, and Rommel's rear

guard began to arrive in Tunisia. By 26

January the enemy was so strong at the

mountain passes and so determined to keep

the eastern coastal plains from Tunis to

Tripoli open for a joining of Rommel's and

General von Arnim's forces that the Allies

had to give up any thought of an immediate breakthrough to Gabès. They had all

they could do to plug the gaps in the mountains between Tébessa and the coast.1

Railroads, macadam roads, and camel

trails converged at the ancient Algerian

border city of Tébessa, which is encircled

by tall remnants of a golden-stoned wall

built when the Romans held North Africa.

A narrow-gauge railroad came south

through Algeria and then turned north; at

Haïdra it connected with a railroad southeast to Kasserine, a junction from which

rails ran east to the coast. Several highways

curved north through Haïdra and Thala.

One turned south toward the desert, winding its way past a gendarme's post, Bou

Chebka, on the border, passing through a

1

 (1) II Corps Opns Rpt Tunisia, 1 Jan-15

Mar 43, 202-0.3. (2) Eisenhower, Crusade in

Europe, p. 140. (3) Howe, Northwest Africa, pp.

373-83. Howe's volume has been relied upon

throughout this chapter.
WITH II CORPS IN TUNISIA 129

beautiful forest of fir trees—the only forest

in that part of Tunisia—and descending

onto a flat plain to reach the tiny FrenchArab town of Thélepte, which is surrounded by Roman ruins. Here the road

branched; the left fork led to the coastal

city of Sousse via Kasserine and Sbeïtla; the

right to Gabès via Fériana and Gafsa.

An oasis town of tall palms, flowering

gardens, and pink and white buildings,

about eighty miles south of Tébessa, Gafsa

is less than three hours' ride by automobile

from Gabès and was the logical take-off

point for a breakthrough to the coast. In

mid-January, when the Ordnance troops

came to central Tunisia, Gafsa was the

headquarters of the French-American

Tunisian Task Force, composed of a detachment of the French Algiers Division,

some French irregulars, and "Raff's Army"

of U.S. paratroopers, infantrymen, and

tank destroyers. The force had recently

been built up to about 4,000 men, and

Allied Force Headquarters had given it a

few pieces of artillery and some antiaircraft

guns, but it was still seriously short of

weapons. The French were equipped

with thin armor, mule-drawn carts, and

ancient trucks, all that the Axis Armistice

Commission had left them. Late in December Colonel Raff had received from

AFHQ and turned over to the French a

company of American M5 light "Honey"

tanks (Company A, 70th Tank Battalion,

Light), but after an encounter with German antitank guns at Pichon and long

hours in combat without maintenance, the

Honeys were of little use.2

By 20 January, when General Fredendall set up II Corps headquarters on a

pine-wood ridge just south of Tebessa,

more than 1,300 Ordnance troops had

arrived in central Tunisia.3 From northern Tunisia, Niblo had brought the bulk

of the 1st Battalion, 55th Ordnance Heavy

Maintenance Regiment (Q), now redesignated the 188th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Battalion (Q), 4

 and from Oran,

along with the Provisional Ordnance

Group headquarters, the headquarters of

the 42d Maintenance and Supply Battalion, which had just arrived from the

United States. He also brought from

Oran another ammunition company, the

66th, another medium automotive maintenance company, the 3485th, and a medium

weapons maintenance company, the 109th.5

Under the 42d Battalion, his heavy battalion, Niblo placed the 30th Ordnance

Heavy Maintenance Tank Company, which

set up shop in the woods at Bou Chebka; the

78th Ordnance Depot Company, which

parked its big vans and spread its dump

near Aïn Beïda, a few miles northwest of

Tebessa on the road to Constantine; and

the two ammunition companies, the 53d

and 66th, which established the main ammunition depot at Tébessa and ammunition supply points at Fériana, Sbeïtla, and

Maktar. Under the 188th Battalion,

Niblo assembled three medium maintenance companies, the 3485th and 3488th

for automotive work and the 109th for

2

( 1 ) Raff, We Jumped to Fight, pp. 66, 163,

190. (2) Memo, Ford for Niblo, 4 Jan 43. (3)

Ltr, Comdr 42d Maint and Supply Bn to Ord

Officer II Army Corps, 25 Jan 43, sub: A Company, 70th Tank Battalion. Last two in II Corps

Ord Sec, Misc Corres, KCRC. 3

 Journal of Events, 1-20-43 to 1-25-43, II

Corps Ord Sec, KCRC. 4

 Redesignated by War Department letter indorsed to II Corps 8 January 1943. 5

 Special Orders 11 and 14, II Corps Ord Sec

Special Orders 1 to 65, 1943, KCRC.
130 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

ANTIQUATED FRENCH EQUIPMENT ON RAILROAD CARS AT TEBESSA

weapons. Primarily for truck and antiaircraft repairs, this light battalion was

strung out from Tébessa to Gafsa and from

Tébessa to Maktar, with detachments at

the airfields at Thélepte and Fériana. All

maintenance units sent out contact parties

daily or weekly to the combat and service

elements in central Tunisia. Constant

road patrols were not possible because there

were not enough trucks.6

The equipment of the two Ordnance

battalions left something to be desired, for

most of it had been furnished under old

tables of organization and equipment written before Ordnance was made responsible

for motor vehicles. The 78th Ordnance

Depot Company, for example, had been

designed and equipped as a semimobile

company to stock "old Ordnance" supplies

for an army, with the bulk of the stock

under canvas or in a warehouse and the

vans used only to establish forward supply

points. Now, swamped with demands for

truck parts and assemblies in the forward

areas, the depot company was practically

immobilized and yet had no canvas to protect its stocks nor any barbed wire for

fences. The maintenance men also needed

lightproof and weatherproof shop tents and

were woefully short of shop trucks. Before

leaving Constantine for the front, Colonel

Niblo had appealed to Colonel Ford to

6

 (1) Ord Serv Tunisian Campaign, p. 5. (2)

Hq 42d Ord M&S Bn, Maintenance Memorandum

No. 3, 24 Jan 43. (3) Hq II Corps Admin Order

No. 6, 26 Jan 43, II Corps Ord Sec, 319.1, KCRC.

The 14th Medium Maintenance Company at that

time was still under the control of British First

Army. Ltr, 1st Lt Fred W. Winokur to Col Niblo,

9 Feb 43, sub: Conflict in Orders, and 1st Ind,

16 Feb 43, II Corps Ord Sec Misc Corres, KCRC.
WITH II CORPS IN TUNISIA 131

AMMUNITION STORED UNDER TREES NEAR SBEÏTLA

send more shop trucks, pointing out that

he was short three for welding, eight for

tank maintenance, eight for automotive repair, and one for instrument repair, adding

forcefully, "there are not enough red stars

or red stripes for me to put on this letter."

He had received only a few shop trucks

and some of these were not completely

equipped.7

From the beginning, the Provisional

Ordnance Group had to support a long

and very fluid front. General Anderson,

to whose British First Army the U.S. II

Corps was attached on 24 January, sent

U.S. tanks and infantry on long treks from

one mountain pass to another in an

attempt to stop German jabs at the Eastern

Dorsal from Fondouk and Faïd in the

north to Maknassy in the south. These

"long pointless forays," as the commander

of Combat Command B called them,8 were

7

 Ltrs, Niblo to Ordnance Officer AFHQ, 14

Jan 43, sub: Urgent Extraordinary Requirements

and 16 Feb 43, sub: Estimate of Ordnance Situation in II Corps (hereafter cited as Niblo Ltr of

16 Feb 43); Ltr, Capt John B. Scott to Ord Officer

II Corps, 5 Feb 43, sub: Operational Requirements

of the 78th Ord Co (D), and 1st Ind; Memo,

1st Lt Warren H. Spear for Rose, 7 Feb 43. All

in II Corps Ord Sec Misc Corres, KCRC. 8

 Robinett Interv. General Robinett commanded

Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division.
132 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

hard on tanks. The first job of the 42d

Battalion was to supply the 1st Armored

Division's organic maintenance battalion

with engines and tracks for Combat Command B's aging tanks, which were being

brought into the woods near Bou Chebka

for refitting after having fought hard and

traveled over long distances since their

arrival in North Africa.9

The second job was to provide enough

cargo trucks to bring supplies from Constantine to Tébessa. By 23 January seventy-five cargo trucks were urgently needed

for immediate replacement of actual losses.

Road transportation was vital since the

narrow-gauge railroad that ran south to

Tébessa from Ouled Rahmoun (the main

line station south of Constantine) could

bring in only about a third of the daily

tonnage needed by II Corps. The loss of

a single truck seemed to planners at

AFHQ "almost a tragedy."

 10

On 25 January, after the Casablanca

Conference, General Eisenhower told Generals Marshall and Somervell, then in

Algiers, of the desperate need for more

trucks and the requirement for tank transporters to save the tanks' tracks from the

damage inflicted by the long drag over the

mountains. General Somervell cabled to

Washington for 5,000 21⁄2-ton trucks

(1,500 on wheels), 400 11⁄2-ton trucks

(200 on wheels), 72 tank transporters,

2,000 trailers, and rolling stock. By almost superhuman effort, this enormous

shipment was assembled and sailed on 15

February; it reached the theater in early

March. In the meantime, according to

General Truscott, supply became "the absorbing problem in every headquarters in

North Africa."

 11

The Supply Crisis

Taking stock at the end of January,

Colonel Niblo found in the II Corps area,

or en route to it, only 35 spare tanks, of

which 20 were light M3's; 57, including

32 mediums, had been requisitioned.

Trucks of all kinds, not only the 21⁄2-ton

cargo trucks, but weapons carriers and

jeeps, were desperately short. Also badlyneeded were more binoculars and more

antiaircraft machine guns and mounts to

place on tank destroyers and vehicles.

The Allies had discovered that the Germans would strafe a single truck and repeat

the strafing if the fire was not returned.

The most serious parts shortages were those

for the 90-mm. and 40-mm. antiaircraft

guns, 155-mm. howitzers, carbines, and,

above all, parts for trucks.12

Early in February the automotive spare

parts shortage became acute. Colonel Niblo

warned Colonel Crawford, AFHQ Ordnance officer, that unless drastic action was

taken at once to obtain parts for the 6,000

or so trucks carrying ammunition, weapons,

9

 (1) George F. Howe, The Battle History of

the 1st Armored Division (Washington: Combat

Forces Press, 1954), p. 116. (2) Memo, Lt Col

H. Y. Grubbs for Col Niblo, 9 Jan 43, II Corps

Ord Sec Misc Corres, KCRC. 10

 (1) Memo, Medaris for ACofS G-4, 23 Jan

43, II Corps Ord Sec Misc Corres, KCRC. (2)

Truscott, Command Missions, p. 128.

11

 (1) Minutes of Conference Held at 3:00 P.M.

Hotel St. George by General Somervell, Jan 25,

1943, ASF Planning Div, Theater Br 20 Gen, vol.

II. (2) Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation

Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 165-66. (3)

Truscott, Command Missions, p. 128. 12

 (1) Troop Organization, Ordnance Units II

Corps, 27 Jan 43, II Corps Ord Sec 319.1.

KCRC. (2) Memo, Lt Col J. B. Medaris for

ACofS, G-4, 23 Jan 43, II Corps Ord Sec Misc

Corres, KCRC. (3) Heavey Notes. (4) Interv with

Col Niblo. 2 Jan 43.
WITH II CORPS IN TUNISIA 133

STRAFED SUPPLY TRUCK, TUNISIA

fuel, food, and other supplies along the

front, the tactical situation would be seriously affected. Of the trucks in the

Tébessa region, 95 percent needed repairs

in some degree, and the parts bins of the

3485th Ordnance Medium Automotive

Maintenance Company were almost empty.

Many of the vehicles were badly in need of

fourth echelon overhaul, having been

driven more than 15,000 miles without

adequate first, second, or third echelon

service, and thousands were headed for

deadline within two or three weeks unless

help came from the base.13

The boxed lots of spare parts sent under

the automatic supply system, each lot

theoretically furnishing enough parts for

100 vehicles for a year, contained too many

parts of some kinds and not enough of

others. Those most needed in Tunisia as

in other theaters were simple, fast-moving

items such as spark plugs, nuts, bolts, headlight bulbs, tire patches, and carburetors.

Another crying need was for engines. In

the boxed set of parts for 100 vehicles, only

18 were furnished; experience showed that

30 would have better filled the need. Reserve engines had to be on hand to replace

those taken out for overhaul, otherwise the

trucks would be deadlined. Not only engines, but clutches, generators, starters, and

other complete units were needed to a degree unusual for front-line maintenance.

This abnormal demand developed because

13

 (1) Niblo Ltr, 16 Feb 43. (2) Memo, Capt

Joseph M. Montgomery, 3485th Ordnance MM Co

(Q) for CO POG, 18 Feb 45, II Corps Ord Sec

Misc Corres, KCRC.
134 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

"Miracles of Maintenance"

adequate base shop facilities had not yet

been established.14

For prompt and adequate fourth echelon

maintenance behind the front, Colonel

Niblo wanted a heavy maintenance company at Constantine and on 5 January

found suitable buildings for a shop and

warehouse. By the end of January the

headquarters of the 5th Ordnance Battalion (Maintenance), relieved from the

POG and attached to the Mediterranean

Base Section, had arrived along with the

45th Ordnance Medium Maintenance

Company and one company of the 67th

Ordnance Battalion (Q), but neither company was trained in heavy maintenance

and both lacked fourth echelon tools and

equipment. In these early days, little or

no fourth echelon work was being done at

Oran, as the condition of some of the

trucks and tanks forwarded from there

showed. Out of 58 trucks received from

MBS early in February, 50 had to be

worked on by automotive maintenance

men before they could be delivered to the

users.15

Lacking both spare parts and support

from the rear, American resourcefulness at

the front accomplished results that one Ordnance officer called "miracles of maintenance."

 16

 The mechanics manufactured

parts and even such major items as range

drums and sight brackets, all of which

would normally be base shop work—if

there had been base shops close enough to

make them quickly. The commanding officer of the 3485th Ordnance Medium

Maintenance Company (Q) estimated

that half of the work of his company was

"semi-fourth" echelon. Of the vehicles

serviced by the 3488th Ordnance Medium

Maintenance Company (Q), 20 percent

would have been deadlined if the company

had not performed fourth echelon repairs,

including such difficult jobs as crankshaft

replacements.17

Wrecks brought into the shops were cannibalized. This expedient, normally reserved for nonrepairable items, was permitted by Colonel Niblo in the spare parts

crisis of early February on repairable items

that would have had to be evacuated to a

higher echelon. The solution was uneconomical and did not really solve the problem since, for example, there was only one

set of bearings on each salvaged truck,

and ten trucks might be waiting for bearings. But it was the only way to get parts.

Capt. Joseph M. Montgomery of the

3488th reported that the authority to salvage vehicles and reclaim the parts had been

the deciding factor in keeping the trucks

14

 (1) Ltrs, Crawford to Campbell, 3 Mar 43,

and to Lt Col G. H. Olmstead, 26 Feb 43. (2)

Memo, Capt D. D. Harwood for Maj F. P.

Leamy. All in Tank-Automotive Spare Parts Policy

Documents, World War II, OHF. (3) Ltr, Niblo

to Ord Officer, AFHQ, 14 Jan 43. (4) Rpt, Maj

Sills and Mr. Gay, Trip to North African Theater,

January 20-February 27, 1943, in Truman Committee File, OHF. 15

 (1) Niblo Ltr, 16 Feb 43. (2) History Hq

5th Ordnance Bn, pp. 3-4, II Corps Ord Sec,

KCRC.

16

 Ltr, Maj George T. Petersen to Gen Campbell, 28 Jun 43, Campbell Overseas file. 17 (1) Ltrs, Petersen to Campbell, 28 Jun 43,

and Brig Gen John A. Crane to CO 188th Ord

Bn, 12 May 43, sub: Commendation, both in

Campbell Overseas file. (2) Memo, Montgomery

for CO Hqs POG, 18 Feb 43, and Ltr, Lt Col

John F. Moffitt to CO 3488th Ord Medium

Maint. Co (Q), 15 Feb 43, sub: Fourth Echelon

Repairs on Vehicles and 1st Ind, both in II Corps

Ord Sec Misc Corres, KCRC.
WITH II CORPS IN TUNISIA 135

rolling; 75 percent of the jobs completed

by his company were made possible by

cannibalization.18

Up in the mountain passes, detachments

of the 1st Armored Division's maintenance

battalion also stripped many wrecked

items to make up for the shortage of weapons spare parts—making one good gun out

of two unusable ones. In devising machine gun mounts for vehicles, always a

pressing problem, the men used whatever

they could find on the battlefield; one

mount was made out of the aluminum landing gear of a Junkers 88 that had been shot

down. The barrel of a 37-mm. gun taken

out of a wrecked P-39 formed the axle for

a makeshift trailer and a disabled truck

provided the wheels.19

In the shop areas as well as in the combat zone men worked in helmets and had to

take to slit trenches when German dive

bombers came over. On the road, supply

trains and small service parties learned to

shift for themselves. They carried C rations in their trucks and cooked them on a

"desert stove" made by digging a small

hole, filling it half full of water, and pouring on top a small quantity of gasoline,

thus providing "a good, hot fire capable of

cooking almost anything." If there was no

opportunity to stop and cook, the men ate

their rations cold or wired them on the

exhaust manifold of the engine, heating

them on the run. For cooking, drinking,

and washing, they carried 5-gallon water

cans, two or three to a vehicle. Ordnance

mechanics doing contact work spent more

than half their time on the highway, covering hundreds of miles. These men were

therefore not available for work in the shop

areas, where the task of supporting French

and American forces that were strung out

over the long front was becoming increasingly harder.20

On 30 January the enemy took Faïd

Pass in the Eastern Dorsal and on 4 February Rommel crossed the Tunisian frontier. His first aim was to break up the

American forces in central Tunisia, because

he believed that the greatest danger to

his Tunisian bridgehead would be an

American offensive from Gafsa through to

Gabès. If such an attack were successful it

would separate him from von Arnim.

The Germans divided their offensive

forces into two prongs, sending one to Faïd,

breaking through the pass on 14 February,

and another prong up the Gabès-Gafsa

road.21

On both flanks the Americans began to

pull back to the Western Dorsal, evacuating Gafsa and Sbeïtla. On the night Gafsa

was evacuated in rain and blackout over a

narrow road choked, as an observer reported, "bumper to bumper, from head to

tail with tanks, artillery, infantry, French

Legionnaires, camels, goats, sheep, Arab and

French families with crying children, jackasses and horse-drawn carts," an Ordnance

detachment brought up the rear, pulling

tanks and vehicles out of ditches. At

Sbeïtla the last men to get out of town were

18

 Memo, Niblo to CO's 42d Ord Maint and Supply Bn and 188th Ord Medium Maint Bn, 2 Feb 43,

and Memo, Montgomery for CO Hq POG II Corps,

18 Feb 43, both in II Corps Ord Sec Misc Corres,

KCRC. 19Hist Ord Serv MTO, ch. I, p. 19, OHF.

20

 (1) Schwartz, The Field Operations of a

Maintenance Battalion, p. 6, OHF. (2) Niblo Ltr,

16 Feb 43. 21

 Liddell-Hart, The Rommel Papers, pp. 397-

407.
136 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

two Ordnance officers who were firing the

ammunition dump.22

Rommel occupied Gafsa and Fériana

and on 17 February overran Kasserine

Pass in the Western Dorsal. He caused

appalling losses in American men and

equipment, but achieved no lasting victory.

By 17 February the Americans had brought

up the 9th and 34th Infantry Divisions

from Oran and Casablanca, and the British

had sent their 26th Armoured Brigade from

northern Tunisia. After five days of hard

fighting, Rommel was forced to withdraw

to the coastal plain.

Niblo Leaves H Corps

In the midst of the German breakthrough Ordnance service was undergoing a crisis of its own. Colonel Niblo in a

forceful letter to Colonel Crawford on 16

February had pointed out the inadequate

Ordnance support from the rear at Constantine and Oran; the deterioration of the

trucks and tanks at the front; the dearth of

spare parts; and the impossibility of expecting the Ordnance troops in the field

without enough tools, time, or men to do

the whole job of keeping the combat men

armed and mobile. He concluded bluntly,

"we do not have any Ordnance policy for

the operation of Ordnance service in North

Africa."

 23

The rush of events in those early days of

1943 had indeed created a tangle in policy

and administration. The Ordnance organization had been cut to fit II Corps on

its arrival in North Africa in November as

an independent reinforced corps (Center

Task Force). Much had happened since

then. Fifth Army was organized in North

Africa on 4 January 1943, under Maj. Gen.

Mark W. Clark. On 5 January II Corps

was assigned to Fifth Army and thus in

theory reverted to a typical corps, a tactical

unit only; but in fact it continued to be a

reinforced corps since it remained the major

U.S. ground force combat unit in Tunisia.

General Clark, at the suggestion of General Marshall, turned over the field command in Tunisia to the II Corps commander, General Fredendall, and remained

at his Oujda (French Morocco) headquarters, planning and training for later

operations. Thus the Provisional Ordnance Group—for a short time renamed the

Provisional Ordnance Regiment (Field) —

remained in much the same situation as before. Though it was theoretically under

army, it was assigned to II Corps on 15

January.24

On 24 January, at a time when American forces had to rush in to close the gaps

in the front made by small but determined

German attacks against the weak French

forces, General Eisenhower attached II

Corps to the British First Army. He also

attached to the British First Army the

French forces, which along with Raff Force

had been operating directly under AFHQ.

This was the rather hazy situation when II

Corps set up headquarters in the Tébessa

area on 20 January. As commander of the

only U.S. Ordnance organization in central

22 Tunisia, Niblo, who was always inclined to (1) Lt. Col. W. C. Farmer, "Ordnance on the

Battlefield," Army Ordnance, XXVII (SeptemberOctober, 1944), p. 297. (2) Capt William G.

Meade, "Oran to Naples; The Story of an Ammunition Job Well Done," Army Ordnance, XXIX,

152 (September-October, 1945), p. 263. 23

 Niblo Ltr, 16 Feb 43.

24

 (1) Interoffice Communication, Ord Officer

II Corps for CofS II Corps, 28 Jan 43, and 3d

Ind, Hq II Corps to CG Fifth Army, 29 Jan 43.

Both in II Corps Ord Sec Misc Corres, KCRC. (2)

Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 140-41.
WITH II CORPS IN TUNISIA 137

be generous with Ordnance support, sent

out contact parties to U.S. tank and tank

destroyer battalions attached to the French

and supplied the French Ordnance squadron. Realizing that he was providing service on an army scale, which II Corps was

"more or less directed by AFHQ" to do,

he appealed to II Corps for a clear statement of policy, for an enlarged headquarters staff, and for permission to operate

"under general control of the Army Commander."

 25

The outcome was a II Corps command

decision that Ordnance maintenance service "until further administrative instructions are received from higher headquarters" would be furnished for "all U.S.

forces within the physical boundaries of the

II Corps and for all U.S. matériel in the

hands of the French within the same geographical boundaries"—that is, within a

line on the north running through ThalaKairouan-Sousse, on the south running

cast and west approximately twenty-five

miles south of Gabès (the line of demarkation between II Corps and the British

Eighth Army), and to the rear running

north and south through Tébessa.26

 On

the question of policy, General Fredendall

sent word by his G-4 that he wanted Ordnance service continued as a corps function

by corps troops "exactly as it is now being

done."

 27

 These orders were ambiguous, because contact parties had been accustomed

to servicing all American units they found

whether attached to II Corps or not; also,

the command decision did not expressly

forbid contacting and servicing units outside the area.28

Niblo continued his effort to support the

Raff Force and other American units attached to the French, but found it increasingly difficult. A request for ammunition

for some pack howitzers that had been

turned over to the French was refused by

the Mediterranean Base Section on the

ground that a directive from AFHQ was

necessary; and an urgent appeal to the II

Corps chief of staff for parts for the badly

crippled Honey tanks of Company A, 70th

Tank Battalion, attached to the French

Algiers Division at the front—"if this company is subject to control by II Corps"—

went unanswered. Citing his futile attempts

to furnish Ordnance service to the tank

company, Niblo on 12 February again appealed for a clarification of policy, this

time to Colonel Crawford at AFHQ, stating his conviction "that boundary lines of

various Corps do not figure in the normal

Army Ordnance supply and maintenance

of Army Combat troops which are assigned

or attached to the various Corps from time

to time."

 29

Less than a week after this letter was

written, General Fredendall relieved Niblo

25

 (1) Interoffice Communication, Ord Officer

II Corps for CofS II Corps, 28 Jan 43, and 3d

Ind, Hq II Corps to CG Fifth Army, 29 Jan 43.

Both in II Corps Ord Sec Misc Corres, KCRC.

(2) Hq 42d M&S Bn, Maintenance Memo No. 3,

24 Jan 43, II Corps Ord Sec 319.1, KCRC. 26

 Memo, Ord Officer II Corps for Exec POG.

30 Jan 43, 1st Ind, 30 Jan 43, and 2d Ind, 31

Jan 43, II Corps Ord Sec Misc Corres, KCRC. 27

 Memo, Col Robert W. Wilson, G-4 of II

Corps, for Col Niblo, 31 Jan 43, II Corps Ord

Sec Misc Corres. KCRC.

28

 1st Ind to Memo, Ord Officer II Corps for

Exec POG, 30 Jan 43, and Memo, Rose for Niblo,

4 Feb 43. Both in II Corps Ord Sec Misc Corres,

KCRC. 29

 Ltr, Capt Lee V. Graham, Jr. to CO MBS

(Constantine), 24 Jan 43, sub: Ammunition for

75-mm. Pack Howitzers, and 1st Ind, 7 Feb 43;

1st Wrapper Ind, Niblo to Ord Officer AFHQ, 12

Feb 43, and Incl #2; Ltr, Niblo to CofS, Hq II

Corps, 26 Jan 43, sub: Equipment of Company A,

70th Tank Battalion. All in II Corps Ord Sec,

Misc Corres, KCRC.
138 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

as Ordnance officer of II Corps. The reason, according to the impressions of men in

the field, was that Niblo had been extending

his services to Raff and the French forces.30

Fredendall had little confidence in the

French—a feeling shared by many British

and Americans; and he may have felt that

II Corps had all it could do to take care of

itself, the supply situation being what it was

over a long and overextended front. On

the other hand, he probably never saw with

his own eyes the wretched condition of the

battered U.S. light tanks attached to the

French or the frustration of men who were

denied the weapons they needed to fight

with. When the American Grant and

Sherman tanks of the 1st Armored Division

arrived in central Tunisia, the men of Raff

Force, according to their commander,

"stood at the Thélepte road junction watching the tanks as children do fire engines."31

Instead of visiting the front, Fredendall remained most of the time at his headquarters

in a deep ravine east of Tébessa. There

was a widespread feeling among subordinate commanders and staffs that he never

understood the situation as it was known to

the troops in the field.32

Colonel Niblo left II Corps on 17 February and went to Fifth Army, where he

succeeded Colonel Ford as General Clark's

Ordnance officer. His successor at II

Corps was Lt. Col. John B. Medaris, who

had been his assistant for some time. A

few days later an important change occurred at the top. The 18 Army Group

under General Alexander was established to

co-ordinate the British First and Eighth

Armies, the U.S. II Corps, and the French

19th Corps. Alexander's first act, in the

words of Maj. Gen. Omar N. Bradley who

was then acting as Eisenhower's special

representative at the front, was "to unscramble the chaotic commitment of units

on Anderson's front."33 The forces of

each nation were concentrated under the

nation's own command and given their

own sectors. The U.S. II Corps, formerly

attached to British First Army, early in

March came directly under 18 Army

Group, in a position parallel to the British

First and British Eighth Armies.

Supporting the Thrust Through

Gafsa

Colonel Medaris, the new Ordnance officer, had a big job on his hands. The German attack at Kasserine had swept away

hundreds of tanks, trucks, and weapons—

most of the 183 tanks, 194 half-track personnel carriers, 122 pieces of self-propelled

artillery, 86 artillery pieces, 213 machine

guns, and 512 trucks and jeeps that II

Corps lost between 21 January and 21 February. For some items the losses were

greater than the combined stocks of the

Atlantic and Mediterranean Base Sections.34

 Replacements were urgently

needed, for Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.,

who succeeded General Fredendall as commanding general of II Corps on 6 March,

had orders for a new offensive through

Gafsa and Maknassy to be launched during

the third week in March. The offensive,

conceived by General Alexander, was timed

to coincide with the Eighth Army's arrival

at the Mareth Line and was intended to

30

 Crawford Interv.

"Raff, We Jumped to Fight, p. 193. 32

 Truscott, Command Missions, pp. 145-46.

33

 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 36. 34

 Ord Serv Tunisian Campaign, pp. 8-9.
WITH II CORPS IN TUNISIA 139

TIGER TANK CAPTURED IN TUNISIA

help General Montgomery by threatening

one of the German flanks.

In planning for the offensive, Eisenhower

instructed Patton to study the lessons already learned in Tunisia. One of the most

important was how to deal with German

land mines—the bounding antipersonnel

mine and the big plate-shaped Teller antitank mine, twice as heavy as the American

and British mine. The Germans had used

mines lavishly and the British Eighth Army

had learned what they could do in the

great tank battles in Egypt and Libya; the

Americans now saw how effective they were

in guarding the mountain passes in Tunisia.

For their own defenses at Kasserine, II

Corps had had to bring to the front all the

antitank mines that were available in Casablanca and Oran; 20,000 were flown to the

most forward airfield, Youks-les-Bains, in

fifty-two planeloads.35

In some respects there were sobering

comparisons between U.S. and German

equipment. American tankers first encountered German armor in northern Tunisia

on 26 November 1942, when several 1st

Armored Division companies of M3 Stuart

tanks ambushed a small German force of

six Pzkw IV Specials with long, high-velocity 75-mm. guns and three or more Pzkw

35

 (1) History Ord Service MTO, ch. II, p. 7 and

ch. VII, p. 2. (2) Ord Serv Tunisian Campaign,

p. 7. (3) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, pp. 380-87.
140 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

III's with the long 50-mm. guns. Swarming around the German tanks, the Stuarts

with their 37-mm. guns firing on flank and

rear at close range managed to knock out all

the Pzkw IV's and one of the III's. However, this was a victory of superior numbers

rather than superiority of matériel. As in

the Western Desert, the Pzkw IV Specials

outgunned not only the little Stuarts but also

the Shermans. During the German attack

in the Pont-du-Fahs area in mid-January

1943, British antitank guns disabled and

captured a tank more powerful than the

Pzkw IV Special—the low-silhouette, thickskinned Pzkw VI Tiger, armed with an 88-

mm. gun. It was not used at Kasserine.

General von Arnim had only nineteen, sent

to him in November for combat-testing, and

he refused to release any of them to Rommel. The Tigers were still full of bugs and

had an inadequate engine. Their greatest

threat was their armament. The troops in

Tunisia had already learned to recognize

and respect the whip crack of the 88-mm.

gun.36 On the credit side for U.S. equipment at Kasserine was the artillery, which

put a great number of Rommel's tanks out of

action, astonishing his panzer division by its

accurate and rapid fire. Some of the captured Germans asked to see the American

155-mm. "automatic cannon."37 On the

whole, Rommel considered the Americans

"fantastically well equipped" and concluded that the Germans "had a lot to

learn from them organisationally."

 38

After Kasserine, Ordnance at the front

profited greatly from better organization in

the rear. Ordnance officers at AFHQ and

SOS quickly dispatched from Casablanca,

by every available means of transportation,

the weapons and tanks of the 1 Armored

Corps and other Fifth Army units. Trucks

came from Casablanca and Oran assembly

lines, and the thousands of wheeled trucks

Somervell shipped from the United States

arrived in the special convoy on 6-7 March.

By 15 March the shortages in trucks, tanks,

artillery, and machine guns had been made

up.39

Tanks were arriving in better condition

because the Mediterranean Base Section

shops at Oran, operating more smoothly

than before, rigidly processed the tanks as

they came into the port, fully kitted them,

and shipped them by coaster or tank landing vessels to Philippeville, where they were

driven overland to the bivouac of the 30th

Ordnance Company near Youks-les-Bains.

Early in March there was organized at

MBS the 2622d Ordnance Tank Transporter Company—the first company of its

kind in the U.S. Army. With its sixty

trailers the company could lift a battalion

of medium tanks and six spares in one

move, delivering them over long distances

that would otherwise materially have

shortened their serviceable lives. The first

week in April, two platoons were able to

take on the task of moving tanks and selfpropelled artillery south from Philippeville.40

36

 (1) The Rommel Papers, p. 406. (2) Brig

Gen Gordon C. Wells, Report of Observations in

the Mediterranean Theater, MTO Ord Sec 319.1

Reports General, KCRC. (3) For characteristics

of the Pzkw VI Tiger, see U.S. Army Ordnance

School text, Tank Data (July 1958), p. 57,

OCMH. The model encountered in Tunisia early

in 1943 was the Pzkw VI (H), developed by

Henschel & Sohn. MS, Achtung Panzer, p. 84,

Jarrett Collection. 37

 Hist Ord EBS, p. 13.

38

 The Rommel Papers, pp. 404-07. 38

 (1) Crawford Interv. (2) Ord Serv Tunisian

Campaign, p. 12, and Incl, Matériel Status Report,

II Corps and Attached Units, 15 Mar 43, OHF. 40

 (1) Ltrs, Crawford to Campbell, 3 Mar 43,
WITH II CORPS IN TUNISIA 141

Arriving at Constantine in mid-February

and inheriting the small 5th Ordnance Battalion (Maintenance) stationed there, Col.

Ward E. Becker, Ordnance officer of Eastern Base Section, found that he not only

had base section responsibilities but also had

to furnish support to II Corps that would

have been army responsibility if the corps

had been functioning normally under an

army instead of as an independent corps.

This meant pushing units forward. The

first move was to send the 5th Battalion—

soon reinforced by several newly arrived

maintenance companies, one of them the

heavy automotive type—down to Texas

(south of the railhead of Ouled Rahmoun

and eighty-nine miles from Tébessa on the

main supply route to II Corps), to keep the

truck fleet operating and to process new

armament arriving at Bougie and Philippeville. The battalion sent detachments to

the ports and railheads to drive the tanks,

self-propelled artillery, and trucks to the

shops, where they processed them, and then

drove them to II Corps under difficult conditions of blackout, steady rain, and enemy

raids. After II Corps advanced to Gafsa,

Eastern Base Section Ordnance Section

sent two maintenance companies (one

armament, one automotive) to Tébessa and

also took over the corps depot company

there and the principal corps and ammunition dump. The dump created a serious

problem, because EBS had received only

two ammunition companies and both were

needed to operate the base ammunition

depot at Ouled Rahmoun, where large

quantities of ammunition had been arriving

by rail from the west. Becker solved the

problem by successfully converting a company of mechanics into a provisional ammunition company.41

When the new offensive began, along

with the spring rains, on 17 March, II

Corps Ordnance Service had received some

reinforcement. A new type of heavy maintenance company designed to support a

field army, the 82d Ordnance Company

(Heavy Maintenance) (Field Army), was

assigned to the 42d Ordnance Battalion to

operate a heavy machine shop in support of

corps and divisional artillery. Colonel

Medaris moved the 42d Battalion, now

commanded by Maj. John F. Moffitt, 10

miles east of Tébessa to establish a heavy

maintenance base and sent the 188th Ordnance Battalion, which now included the

30th Heavy Maintenance Tank Company

and was commanded by Maj. George T.

Petersen, forward with II Corps in the attack. One medium maintenance company,

the 14th, which had been brought down

from northern Tunisia, was sent to Fondouk to support the 34th Division in a

British-American attempt to break through

the Eastern Dorsal at that point; the rest

of the 188th Battalion supported the effort

through Gafsa to draw German forces off

from the Mareth Line.42

The advance was easy at first; the enemy

had withdrawn toward the coast. The

corps took Gafsa and Maknassy without opposition and got into El Guettar, a date

in Tank-Automotive Spare Parts Policy Documents,

World War II, OHF. (2) Ltr, same to same, 28

Mar 43, Campbell Overseas File. (3) Ord Serv

Tunisian Campaign, p. 13.

41

 (1) Hist Ord EBS, pp. 2-3, 8-13. (2) Ord

Serv Tunisian Campaign, p. n. (3) History 5th

Ord Bn Hq and Hq Det, pp. 4-5, II Corps Ord Sec,

KCRC. 42

 (1) Ord Serv Tunisian Campaign, p. 12. (2)

Ltr, Petersen to Commanding Officers, All Units

Concerned, 18 Mar 43, sub: Maintenance Responsibility, and 2d Ind, Hq 42d Ord M&S Bn to

CO Prov Ord Gp, II Corps, 1 Mar 43, both in II

Corps Ord Sec Misc Corres, KCRC.
142 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

The March to Bizerte

palm oasis on the road to Gabès. Just

beyond El Guettar, in a region of bleak

hills and plains covered with short grass,

the Germans reacted strongly, counterattacking on 23 March with a panzer division

including some Tiger tanks, supported by

the Luftwaffe, which strafed and divebombed. So strong was the counterattack

during the week following that Gafsa itself

was threatened. The 188th Battalion,

which had followed II Corps headquarters

into Gafsa on 20 March, was organized for

defense. One company practiced firing

105-mm. howitzers, another was made into

an infantry heavy weapons company, and

the third was assigned an antitank and infantry role. A tremendous strain was

placed on the 53d Ammunition Company's

dump, manned by only half the company,

the other half having been left behind with

the 42d Battalion. On 23-24 March one

section of the 53d handled an average of

about 40 tons per man. Fortunately the

crisis was soon over and the Ordnance

units did not have to become combat units.

The Germans had only been fighting a

skillful guerrilla action in terrain that

favored them. At the end of March they

began to pull out. By then the Eighth

Army had broken the Mareth Line and

occupied Gabès and by the second week in

April was sweeping up the coast toward

northern Tunisia.43

The last battle against the Axis in North

Africa was to take place in northern Tunisia. In this battle, planned primarily as a

British First Armv and Eighth Army pincers

operation, General Alexander at first gave

II Corps a very minor part. The 9th Division was to be assigned to British First Army

to help the British left flank in the attack

on Bizerte, and the remainder of II Corps

was to stage a demonstration at Fondouk

against the enemy's right rear flank. But

Maj. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, who had

been acting as Patton's deputy and was to

succeed Patton as commander of II Corps

on 15 April, protested to General Eisenhower that the Americans had earned a

right to share in the final victory, fighting

under their own flag. Convinced that

Bradley was right, Eisenhower insisted that

II Corps be given a sector on the northern

front. General Alexander finally decided

to transfer II Corps across the rear of First

Army and place it on the northern flank

facing Bizerte.44

The II Corps march across the rear of

the British First Army took place during

the week beginning April 10. Supplies

were shifted north from the central dumps

near Tébessa in 5,000 trucks, most of them

furnished by the Eastern Base Section.

Unable to take main roads for fear of

blocking British lines of communication,

the great supply train made the trip in two

days in a driving rain over secondary

mountain roads. Ordnance units helped

move tanks and heavy artillery. From

Sbeïtla, where the 1st Armored Division

had been refitting and regrooming for the

move north, two platoons of the 2622d

Ordnance Tank Transporter Company,

supplied with additional tank transporters

by the British First Army, lifted the tanks

and carried them 200 miles in two nights

and a day to the new assembly area. The

43

 (1) Petersen Rpt of 14 Feb 45. (2) Hist 53d

Ord Amm Co, Jun-Dec 44. (3) Philip Jordan,

Jordan's Tunis Diary (London, 1943), p. 213.

44

 (1) Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 56-59.

(2) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 152.
WITH II CORPS IN TUNISIA 143

big guns of the 13th Field Artillery Brigade, in serious need of overhaul after

Kasserine and El Guettar, were repaired

during halts on the march north by a special detachment of 30 picked mechanics,

with 10 shop trucks, furnished by the 30th

Heavy Maintenance Tank Company.45

The headquarters of the Provisional Ordnance Group began the 5-day journey by

motor from Gafsa to Souk el Khémis on 13

April. The general assembly area for

service troops was near LeCalle and

Tabarka, on the northern coast road. The

42d Ordnance Battalion moved to a point

about ten miles east of Tabarka. The

188th Ordnance Battalion remained behind at Gafsa until 20 April to assist Eastern Base Section in the mammoth job of

battlefield clearance. The Americans had

left behind them a 3,000-square-mile area,

twice fought over, that was littered with

ammunition, tanks, gasoline and water

cans, clothing, and all kinds of scrap. Out

of the 20,544 long tons collected, more

than half was ammunition. There were

2,117 tons of badly needed motor parts.

From wrecked vehicles sent to the salvage

yard established by EBS at Tébessa, more

than $200,000 worth of parts was reclaimed.46

During the El Guettar-Maknassy operations Colonel Medaris began to use a new

type of company that he put together from

men and equipment of the 188th Battalion,

calling it the Provisional Ordnance Collecting Company. Its job was to go into the

forward area, whether the actual field of

battle or ground over which combat troops

had merely passed, and bring back all the

Ordnance matériel it could find, Allied or

enemy. This was a pioneer effort at battlefield recovery and evacuation. An

Ordnance evacuation company (TOE 9-

187) had been organized in the United

States in November 1942 but it had not yet

arrived in the theater; besides, it was

mainly for evacuating armor from collecting points to the rear, being equipped with

tank transporters rather than wreckers and

trucks. Theoretically, combat troops

cleaned up the battlefield, bringing damaged matériel to division or corps collecting

points where Quartermaster troops picked

it up, sent it back to depots, and if it was

repairable turned it over to the technical

service that had supplied it.47

Experience in Tunisia showed that the

combat troops did not have the time, manpower, or equipment to clear the battlefield. It took 4-ton and 10-ton wreckers,

plenty of 21⁄2-ton trucks, and men with

special skills—riggers, tank mechanics,

welders, and drivers who could handle tank

transporters and other special vehicles. To

get these, Medaris robbed the maintenance

companies of his 188th Battalion, pooling

45

 (1) Dunham MS, pp. 288-90. (2) Ord Serv

Tunisian Campaign, pp. 14-15. (3) Ltr, Petersen

to CofOrd, 14 Jun 43, sub: Ordnance General

Supply, Incl 4, Campbell Overseas File. 46

 (1) Ltr, Medaris to CO, Hq & Hq Det,

Prov Ord Group, II Corps, 12 Apr 43, sub: Travel

Orders, II Corps Ord Sec 370.5, KCRC. (2) Ord

Serv Tunisian Campaign, pp. 11-14. (3) Logistical

History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, 11 August 1942

to 30 November 1945, pp. 413-14.

47

 (1) Ltr, Medaris to CofOrd, 1 Jun 43, sub:

Ordnance Service (hereafter cited as Medaris Rpt

of 1 Jun 43), Incl 1, Ltr, CG II Corps to CinC

Allied Force, 29 May 43, sub: Facilities for the

Collecting and Evacuation of Ordnance Matériel,

O.O. 350.05/3725, copy in ORD 372/9. (a) WD

Ordnance Field Manual 9-10, 20 Apr 42, and

Change 3, 15 Apr 44, Recover, and Evacuation of

Matériel. (3) Ross and Romanus, The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany, p. 63. (4) First United States Army Report

of Operations (20 Oct 43-1 Aug 44), Annex 13.

app. 2, "Operations Division," pp. 84-85.
144 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

all evacuation and recovery equipment in

his collecting company. This was hard on

the maintenance companies, but the collecting company recovered a tremendous

amount of supplies that might otherwise

have been lost, and many of the items were

promptly returned to service. On one

occasion the equipment of an entire battery

of 90-mm. guns, badly shot up by enemy

artillery, was collected between 1700 of one

day and 0600 the next, and taken to an

Ordnance maintenance company, which

repaired it and got it ready for action by

1600 of the following day.48

Battlefield recovery was dangerous work,

often performed under fire since early

arrival at the scene was essential to keep

the matériel from being cannibalized by

combat troops, damaged further by enemy

action, or falling into the hands of the

enemy. Usually the company operated at

night, recovering equipment that had been

knocked out during the day. The men

had to learn not only how to work in blackout conditions, to operate mine detectors

and remove mines and booby traps, but

how to scout and patrol and defend themselves with small arms, bayonets, and even

divisional artillery. Self-reliance and discipline were stressed, for these men were

in a sense the Rangers of Ordnance. Until

the end of the Tunisia Campaign, they

operated very successfully within the limits

of the equipment available to them. Unfortunately, there was never enough equipment to do a complete job of recovery,

especially the job of recovering tanks.49

Unable to foresee the extent of mine

damage, the Ordnance Department was

late in furnishing tractors powerful enough

to evacuate tanks from the battlefield; in

March 1943 Colonel Crawford was forced

to admit, "we were all caught asleep."

Commanders of 1st Armored Division elements had observed on the northern front

in January that as soon as a German tank

was knocked out it would simply disappear,

towed off by another tank or a tank recovery vehicle. Colonel Crawford found

on his visit to the Middle East in January

that the British had an effective tractor,

the Scammell, to snake mine-damaged

tanks back to roads; at Kasserine it had

been used to save 68 tanks by a unit of

Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, the British maintenance agency.

In the United States the Ordnance Department, on the recommendation of General

Barnes, had in the fall of 1942 improvised

a tank recovery vehicle, the TS, by affixing

a crane to an M3 tank with a low compression engine, and by March 1943 some

of them were on their way to the theater

for the use of the combat troops of the 1st

Armored Division. There was no provision for heavy tractors either in the maintenance battalion of the armored division

or in the Ordnance heavy tank maintenance company. Realizing the importance of tank recovery, Colonel Crawford

in mid-February asked for a heavy recovery

platoon to be used as an adjunct to the

Ordnance heavy tank maintenance company. The 1st Provisional Ordnance Recovery and Evacuation Platoon arrived in

the theater in April and on 23 April was

assigned to the 188th Battalion, where its 48

 Medaris Rpt, 1 Jun 43, Incl 1. 49

 (1) History Ord Service MTO, Ch. II, pp.

10-11. (2) Ltr, Petersen to Campbell, 28 Jun 43,

Campbell Overseas File. (3) Maj William C.

Farmer, "Recovery of Matériel in Combat," The

Ordnance Sergeant, VII (May 1944), pp. 278-

81.
WITH II CORPS IN TUNISIA 145

heavy recovery and tank transporter equipment was made available to the collecting

company; but it was by then rather late in

the Tunisian day.50

"The End of the Beginning"

The final offensive against the Axis

forces in Tunisia was launched the third

week in April. It would take ten days of

the hardest infantry fighting yet encountered to defeat them and achieve what

Winston Churchill called "the end of the

beginning."51 The enemy was strongly

entrenched in a 120-mile arc around the

northeastern tip of Tunisia, from Enfidaville on the coast around to the rocky

djebels that stood like fortresses before the

plains leading to Tunis and Bizerte.

In the American sector two main roads

ran through the djebels to Mateur, the

Germans' main supply base. The northern and shorter road ran from Djebel

Abiod through Djefna; the southern began

at Bédja and skirted the Tine River valley.

General Bradley placed the 9th Infantry

Division at Djebel Abiod, with the Corps

Franc d'Afrique on its left, with orders to

avoid the main road and advance through

the Sedjenane valley to Bizerte. He

ordered the 1st Infantry Division to Bédja

to open the Tine valley floor so that the

1st Armored Division could break through

to Mateur. The jump-off date for the

attack, set by the British, was Good Friday,

23 April, but whether or not the Americans

could meet it depended on how fast supplies could be brought up to the front.52

A shortened supply line, stronger support from Eastern Base Section, and the

employment of new techniques learned

during early stages of the campaign made

possible an Ordnance build-up in a phenomenally short time. At Bone, the new

base port for II Corps, Eastern Base Section quickly amassed an ammunition depot

of about 9,000 tons. From Bone, ammunition and light Ordnance general supplies

were reloaded on tank landing craft and

balancelles (Mediterranean fishing boats)

and moved by night to the small shallowwater port of Tabarka behind the front.

From Tabarka the 66th Ammunition Company and the 78th Depot Company sent

the ammunition, spare parts, small arms,

and other matériel in trucks to forward ammunition supply points and maintenance

companies. Light tanks, half-tracks, and

light artillery were processed by the 45th

Medium Maintenance Company at an

EBS shop at Morris, ten miles east of Bone,

and went by the coast road to Bédja.

Medium tanks and the heavier self-propelled artillery, which were too heavy for

the bridges along the coast road, were

loaded on tank transporters and sent south

through Souk el Arba to Bédja. En route,

50

 (1) Ltr, Col D. J. Crawford to Maj Gen

Levin H. Campbell, Jr., 3 Mar 43. (2) Memo,

JWH for Colonel Magruder, 2 Feb 43, sub: Notes

on Talk by Major General Oliver, ASF Planning

Div, 20 Gen File, vol. I. (3) MS, Combat Maintenance, Armored Force Library. (4) Ltr, Col D. J.

Crawford to OCO, 1 Apr 43, sub: Technical Information Letter No. 2—Service Units, O.O. 320.2/

1178. (5) Ltr, Ch Ord Off NATO to CofOrd, 16

May 43, sub: Technical Information Letter No. 5,

O.O. 350.05/3416. (6) MS, Full Track, Armored

Tank Recovery Vehicles, OHF. (7) CO Provisional

Ordnance Group, 23 Apr 43, sub: Assignment of

Ordnance Units, II Corps Ord Sec Misc Corres,

KCRC. 51

 Winston Churchill, Speech, November 10, 1942,

in The End of the Beginning, War Speeches by Rt.

Hon. Winston S. Churchill, 1942, compiled by

Charles Eade (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1943). 52

 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 77-79, 88.
146 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

at Duvivier, they were groomed and combat-loaded by the 87th Heavy Tank Maintenance Company.53

The Americans attacked at dawn on 23

April in an explosion of artillery fire that

lit up the eastern sky. Artillery and infantry were to play the major role in this last

battle for Tunisia because Bradley was not

willing to expend his tanks in valleys dominated by the enemy, which was entrenched

on a succession of rocky hills. The fighting was a matter of attacking hill by hill,

on both the 9th Division and the 1st Division fronts. The last major obstacle on the

1st Division sector was a white, soaring

djebel known as Hill 609, northeast of the

railhead at Sidi Nsir. Bradley brought up

the 34th Division, which took the hill on

30 April. The way was then open for the

1st Armored Division to move to Mateur.

To the north the 9th Division, advancing

through a dense, breast-high thicket, outflanked the Germans' strong Djefna position. The enemy began to withdraw.

Mateur fell on 3 May and after some regrouping, during which Bradley's command post advanced from Bédja to Sidi

Nsir, II Corps resumed the attack on 6

May. The next day the forward halftracks of the 9th Division were clanking

into the rubble-filled streets of Bizerte, the

1st Armored Division was occupying Ferry -

ville, and British First Army tanks were

entering Tunis. On 9 May the Axis forces

in Tunisia surrendered.

In support of this battle, Colonel

Medaris had placed a battalion on each

flank of II Corps, the 188th near Bédja

behind the 1st Infantry Division and 1st

Armored Division on the south, the 42d

near Djebel Abiod behind the 9th Division

on the north. Both battalions supported

the 34th Division when it arrived between

the two flanks. Believing strongly that

Ordnance service ought to be "so far forward at all times that troops need not seek

it out, but merely by 'holding up their

hands' may have them filled with adequate

tools of war," Medaris sent his mechanics

up to the front to repair equipment or

bring it back to battalion shops and advanced the corps ammunition dumps "to

the absolute limit of reasonable safety."

 54

On a visit to the corps Ordnance installation between 30 April and 2 May, Col.

William A. Borden, an Ordnance research

and development specialist from the United

States, found that Medaris had instilled

"an adventurous spirit in his personnel so

that they are keen to go forward and keep

up with the front line troubles." Medaris

repeatedly sent his assistant, "a reckless boy

who fitted in here perfectly," to the front

lines to check on Ordnance service, using

a weapon-filled jeep that carried on a

pedestal an antiaircraft .50-caliber machine

gun and on the front a high angle iron to

cut the wire that the Germans sometimes

strung across the road to catch the heads of

jeep drivers. After touring the shops and

dumps in this jeep and talking to veterans

of central Tunisia, Borden observed:

"These Ordnance boys are tough experi53

 (1) Ord Serv Tunisian Campaign, pp. 15-16,

and Plate V. (2) Rpt, MacMorland to Chief of

Ordnance, 13 Jul 43, sub: Notes on Trip to

North African and European Theaters of Operation (hereafter cited as MacMorland Rpt of 13

Jul 43), pp. 13-17, OHF. (3) Ltr, Crawford to

Campbell, 28 May 43, in History AFHQ Ord Sec,

OHF. (4) Dunham MS, p. 287. (5) History 78th

Depot Company, p. 6.

54

 (1) Medaris Rpt of 1 Jun 43. (2) Rpt, Col

William A. Borden, Official Report of Observations

in North Africa and United Kingdom April 15,

1943-May 22, 1943 (hereafter cited as Borden Rpt

N.A. and U.K. 1943), Incl 17, OHF.
WITH II CORPS IN TUNISIA 147

enced men, front line troops. . . . Most of

them are seasoned and their outfits have

been through some severe combat."

 55

Medaris himself inspected his outfits

several times a week with a quick and critical eye, seeing to it that the shop trucks

in the treeless, rocky terrain were covered

with camouflage nets; the piles of ammunition were scattered to minimize the effects

of bombing; and the men did not congregate in mess lines and shop areas where

they could be spotted from the air. For

his own quarters at Bédja, his mechanics

had fitted up a trailer with a folding bunk,

a desk, maps, and electric lights that could

be connected to a power source. An idea

borrowed from the British and soon to be

adopted by most American commanders in

the field, the trailer provided a headquarters office that could be hooked to a truck

and quickly moved to a new location.

Medaris had learned that it was impossible

for an Ordnance officer to operate successfully from the rear echelon, as specified in

"the book."

 56

Colonel Borden and other observers from

the United States had been warned by

General Hughes that it was dangerous to

draw conclusions from the Tunisia Campaign because so few U.S. troops had been

involved. It was true that in some respects the experience had been too special

to be used as a guide; for example, II

Corps had not been operating normally, as

a typical corps under a typical army. For

this reason, Colonel Crawford and planners

in the United States were inclined to discount Medaris' recommendation that forward Ordnance service in the future flow

from corps rather than from army. The

planners felt that a vigorous Ordnance officer at army level would be just as successful as Medaris had been in delivering

service far forward—and in later campaigns army Ordnance officers (Medaris

was one of them) proved this to be true.57

The men in the field had learned a great

deal in Tunisia that was to be extremely

valuable to them when they went on to

Sicily, Italy, and France. They had experimented with Ordnance organization in

the field and with such important innovations as battlefield recovery. They had

made some important discoveries about

their equipment. One of them was the

need for radio transmitters to enable widely

dispersed Ordnance troops to communicate

with each other. Above all, Ordnance

men had learned that they could not operate by the book. Maintenance men had

discovered that it was "utterly impossible"

to operate the field shop prescribed by Field

Manual 9-10. Modern warfare required

repairmen to be much closer to the front,

more mobile, and more versatile than had

ever been contemplated. Furthermore,

the manual was out of date, for it had been

published in April 1942, before Ordnance

had been given responsibility for all motor

vehicles. Colonel Medaris had found that

85 percent of the Ordnance field maintenance task was automotive, including

55

 Borden Rpt N.A. and U.K. 1943, Incl 8, pp.

10-12, Incl 16, p. 1. 56

 (1) Ibid., Incl 8, p. 14, and Incl 16, p. 1.

(2) Medaris Rpt, 1 Jun 43.

57(1) Borden Rpt N.A. and U.K. 1943, Incl

9, p. 2, and MacMorland Rpt, 13 Jul 43, p. 3.

Both quote General Hughes. (2) Medaris Rpt, 1

Jun 43 and 1st Ind. (3) Ltr, Lt Col Joseph M.

Colby, Asst to Chief Tank-Automotive Center, to

CofOrd, 25 Aug 43 (1st Ind to Ltr CofOrd to Chief

Tank-Automotive Center), O.O. 350.05/4600.
148 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

tanks.58 American forces were dependent

on motor transport to a degree never before

known in the history of warfare. British

war correspondents were astonished by the

bumper-to-bumper truck traffic and the

number of jeeps. One of them tells the

story that in Gafsa an Arab denounced

three German spies dressed in American

uniforms, and when asked how he knew

they were spies answered, "Because they

were walking and had no jeep."

 59

The problem of getting enough spare

parts to take care of this flood of vehicles,

especially such simple, ordinary items as

tire patches, seemed almost unsolvable.

Another unexpected cause for concern in

Tunisia was the shortage of spare parts for

artillery. The war was turning out to be

an artillery war, especially a war of heavy

artillery: the 155-mm. howitzer, affectionately called "a faithful old dog" by artillerymen, and the 155-mm. Long Tom,

highly prized because it could deliver fire

up to 23,000 yards.60 By mid-February

1943, the twenty-four Long Toms had

been fired so often with supercharges to

obtain maximum ranges that their tubes

were beginning to wear out, and stocks of

parts dwindled. When there were no

parts, Ordnance mechanics made them in

their shop trucks.61

The book on ammunition supply was not

followed in several respects. Colonel

Niblo had always disliked and opposed the

provision of Field Manual 9-6 that predicated ammunition supply on the submission

of an ammunition status report every day

by every commander, from company level

up. He knew this procedure required a

great deal of paper work and created too

much traffic in the Ordnance officer's section; besides, the figures were often inaccurate. His substitute plan, put into effect

early in the Tunisia Campaign, was patterned after the basic load of the maintenance companies. Basic load ammunition

was the amount that could be carried in

the vehicles allotted for the purpose in

tables of basic allowances. No loads in

borrowed trucks were permitted. When a

commander needed ammunition, he sent a

man to the nearest ammunition supply

point with an order, signed by the division

ammunition officer, containing a certificate

that the ammunition was to replace expenditures. This requirement was to prevent divisions and smaller units from establishing dumps that might later have to be

abandoned. On the presentation of the

certificate, the unit was allowed to draw

all the ammunition it wanted—up to the

limit of its basic load. The supply point

sent a report to the II Corps Ordnance

officer every day.62

Experience in Tunisia had also demonstrated that the prescribed methods of

stocking ammunition supply points were

unrealistic. Automatic supply on the basis

of so many units of fire was not feasible

because of the wide variation in types and

58

 (1) Ltr, Petersen to CofOrd, 28 Jun 43, sub:

Ordnance Field Maintenance, Campbell Overseas

File, OHF. (2) Medaris Rpt, 1 Jun 43. (3) MacMorland Rpt, 13 Jul 43, pp. 5, 20. 59

 Jordan, Jordan's Tunis Diary, p. 213. 60

 Borden Rpt N.A. and U.K. 1943, Incl 19, p.

1; Incl 25, p. 2. Also, File, NATOUSA Rpts,

OHF. 61

 (1) MacMorland Rpt, 13 Jul 43. (2) Ltr, Brig

Gen John A. Crane to CO 188th Ord Bn, sub: Commendation, Campbell Overseas File.

62

 (1) Niblo Interv of 28 Sep 55. (2) History Ord

Service MTO, ch. II, p. 23. (3) Hq II Corps Adm

Order, 9 Feb 43, and Memo, Ord Off II Corps for

Ord Off 1st Armored Div, 11 Feb 43, both in II

Corps Ord Sec, Misc Corres, KCRC.
WITH II CORPS IN TUNISIA 149

quantities consumed. The War Department unit of fire was excessive on many

items, markedly so on small arms ammunition. II Corps had substituted for it a

"day of combat expenditure." Also,

Medaris had discovered that rail transportation of ammunition to the front could not

be depended upon because it required too

much advance planning.63

On the performance of weapons, Allied

and enemy, the Libyan desert rather than

Tunisia had been the proving ground.64

In Tunisia the Americans had encountered

three new German weapons, the Pzkw VI

Tiger tank; the Nebelwerfer, a five-tube or

six-tube cluster of rocket launchers

mounted on a gun carriage and fired electrically; and the long-range 170-mm. gun.

None had given very impressive performances. The tank, described by a British

correspondent as a "legendary flop,"

 65

 was

used rather gingerly, usually in conjunction

with Pzkw IV or Pzkw III tanks, and frequently broke down. The Nebelwerfer,

brought from the Russian front and first

employed briefly at Kasserine, had little

effect on the campaign. Though the

piercing screech of their long 150-mm. or

210-mm. rockets, earning for them the

nickname of "Screaming Meemies," was

hard on the nerves, the models that

appeared in Tunisia were inaccurate. The

170-mm. gun, first encountered at Maknassy in late March 1943, outranged any

American artillery in Tunisia by about

5,000 yards, but its ammunition was poor

and scarce, and the gun seems to have

made little impression on most American

observers. One significant piece of news

brought back to the United States by Colonel Borden was that the Germans had a

self-propelled 88-mm. gun. Pictures of it

were found on a German captured in

Tunisia.66

The most important new Allied weapon

employed was the M1 rocket launcher firing the M6 antitank rocket—the bazooka.

Task forces embarking for Northwest

Africa from the United States and England

had been equipped with bazookas at the

last moment. In the case of Western Task

Force, the weapons were brought to the

U.S. ports by plane from manufacturers all

over the country and distributed the night

the troops were going aboard ship. In

England the Center Task Force had little

time for training. On the evening before

embarkation for North Africa, one troop

commander shocked General Eisenhower

by saying that he was completely at a loss

"as to how to teach his men the use of this

vitally needed weapon. He said, 'I don't

know anything about it myself except from

hearsay.' " 67 Also, the bazooka had been

rushed into production very fast. There

63

 (1) Medaris Rpt, 1 Jun 43. (2) Air Forces

ammunition supply was entirely separate from that

of the ground forces. It went directly from ports

to Air Forces ordnance depots; and the one nearest the front was at El Guerrah, 25 miles south

of Constantine. Memo, Col William G. Young for

Chief, Military Training Division, 9 Jun 43, sub:

Information Desired by Military Training Division, O.O. 350.05/3720. (3) Crawford Interv. 64

 See above, pp. 23-33. 65

 Jordan, Jordan's Tunis Diary, p. 213.

66

 (1) Crawford Interv. (2) Borden Rpt N.A.

and U.K. 1943. (3) Memo, Hq 9th Inf Div Arty

to CO's, 26th, 34th, 60th and 84th Field Artillery

Bns, 4 Sep 43, sub: The German Nebelwerfer,

Annex F to AGF Bd Rpt, ETO No. 25. (4) Ltr,

Col George B. Bennett to Lida Mayo, 19 Nov 59.

(5) Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert, pp.

191, 213. (6) OCO Rpt, Heavy Self-Propelled

Artillery: Design, Development and Production, 1

Sep 44, app. C, Extracts, Military Reports from

Various Sources, pp. 62-65, OHF. 67

 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 94.
150 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

were so many reports of malfunctions that

the War Department suspended issue in

May 1943, pending modifications. In

these circumstances, it is understandable

that the bazooka did not play an important

part in the Tunisia Campaign. Visiting

the theater at the close of the campaign,

the commanding general of the Armored

Command could not find anyone who

could say definitely that a tank had been

stopped by bazooka fire.68

In April 1943, one of the first of the

specially trained Ordnance Technical Intelligence Teams arrived in the combat

area in Tunisia. Commanded by Capt.

George B. Bennett and attached to AFHQ

G-2, the team worked directly with Colonel Medaris. In a very short time it

proved to be extremely valuable not only

to II Corps Ordnance but to tactical commanders who came up against German

tanks, mines, and guns for the first time

and wanted information on the capabilities

of enemy weapons and means of defeating

them.69 Captain Bennett also earned the

gratitude of Ordnance tank designers by

sending to the United States the first Tiger

tank captured in Tunisia early in 1943.

Getting it to Algiers and aboard ship was

a feat that required considerable energy

and ingenuity. Lacking any standard

tank handling equipment, Bennett managed to get the 60-ton Tiger into the hold

of a Liberty ship with the help of two enlisted men and an improvised block and

tackle.70

At the "end of the beginning," the first

American ground effort in the war against

Germany, roads and fields in the battle

area were littered for miles with weapons,

tanks, and vehicles, including sand-colored

Afrika Korps trucks distinguished by a

small green palm tree painted on the door

—a reminder of service in the Middle East.

The trucks and other enemy equipment

and all salvage went to collecting points at

Mateur, the town to which Eastern Base

Section moved its headquarters the latter

part of May. Medaris sent the experienced 42d and 188th Battalions there to

help clear the Mateur-Bizerte area. Most

tanks, many of the small arms, and hundreds of trucks were destroyed, but large

quantities of usable matériel were recovered. Ammunition companies blew up

or burned out not only a great deal of

unserviceable ammunition but also thousands of rounds that had been transported

for some time out of their containers and

thus were considered of uncertain quality.

Some of this type might have been reclaimed if there had been enough facilities

to do the job. A detachment of one of the

ammunition companies set up a renovation

plant at Mateur, but it was too small to

68

 (1) Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics

and Strategy, 1940-43, p. 440. (2) Interv unnamed interviewer with Maj. Morgan, Stock Control Branch, Field Service Division, Office Chief

of Ordnance, Folder Notes—Ordnance Supply and

Activities North Africa and Sicily, OHF. (3)

Thomson and Mayo, Procurement and Supply,

p. 183. (4) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, p. 350. (5) Maj Gen Alvan

C. Gillem, Jr., CG Armored Command, to CofS

War Dept, 1 Aug 43, sub: Report of Observations

at European Theater of Operations and North

African Theater of Operations, Doc. 78.2-7, Armored School Library. 69

 (1) See above, p. 33. (2) Ltr, Col George B.

Bennett, to Linda Mayo, 19 Nov 59, OHF.

70

 (1) G. B. Jarrett, Achtung Panzer, p. 82. (2)

Press release, "Ordnance Intelligence Officers Exercise Ingenuity on Battlefields . . . ," Folder Enemy

Matériel, Barnes File, OHF.
WITH II CORPS IN TUNISIA 151

handle more than a fraction of the salvaged ammunition.71

Six months almost to the day after the

landing in North Africa, II Corps pulled

down its tents and headed west, back over

the mountains to the neighborhood of

Oran. In the long convoys, almost every

truck had a German or Italian helmet fastened to its radiator; jeeps and motorcycles

flew French flags or the black and yellow

death's head pennants that the Germans

used to mark their mine fields; the men

had Lugers, German field caps, goggles,

and other trophies. Tanned by the African sun and toughened by service close to

the front, Medaris and his staff arrived at

Oran late in May. There they found the

Mediterranean Base Section far along in

its preparations to support the next campaign and the tactical units engaged in an

intensive training program. Near Arzew,

General Clark had built a village with

streets and mock-up houses and stores to

accustom troops to street fighting. The

Allies were getting ready for the invasion

of Sicily.72

71

 (1) Hist Ord BBS, pp. 29-31, 36, 43-44.

(2) Ord Serv Tunisian Campaign, p. 17. (3)

Memo, Medaris for CO's, 42d Bn, 188th Ord Bn,

14 May 43, II Corps Ord Sec Misc Corres, KCRC.

(4) Meade, "Ammunition Supply in the MTO,"

p. 265.

72

 (2) Pyle, Here is Your War, p. 275. (2)

Clark, Calculated Risk, p. 173.
CHAPTER IX

The Short Campaign in Sicily

The decision to invade Sicily in order to

intensify pressure on Italy, divert German

forces from the Eastern Front, and cement

the Allied hold on the Mediterranean was

made at the Casablanca Conference late in

January 1943 by President Roosevelt and

Prime Minister Churchill, acting with the

Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Eisenhower was designated Supreme Commander, and General Alexander, his deputy, was placed in command of ground operations. By mid-February the planning

headquarters that Eisenhower set up in

Algiers, known as Force 141 from its room

number at the Hotel St. George, had chosen

the favorable July moon as the target date

and designated General Montgomery's

Eighth Army (Force 545) and General

Patton's I Armored Corps (Force 343) to

make the assault. The headquarters of I

Armored Corps was largely composed of

Patton's Western Task Force headquarters,

which had directed the landing at Casablanca. With the additional strength assigned to it for the invasion, the corps was

really an army, and was to be designated

Seventh Army on landing in Sicily. For

the present, to confuse the enemy and conceal the strength of the invasion forces, it

was called I Armored Corps (Reinforced).

Its major elements were to consist of II

Corps headquarters and six divisions—four

infantry, one armored, and one airborne.1

At the time his corps was given its mission, General Patton was in Tunisia commanding II Corps. He detailed a group of

officers to go to Algiers and represent him

in the nomination of troops for Force 343.

Among them was Col. Thomas H. Nixon,

his Ordnance officer. Nixon had helped

plan the landing at Casablanca, had come

to North Africa as Ordnance officer of the

Western Task Force, and had made an excellent record in establishing extensive Ordnance installations in the Port-Lyautey

area. A few years older than Niblo and

Medaris, he was described by Colonel Borden as "energetic and forward-looking,"

and was highly esteemed by Patton.2

1

 (1) The Conquest of Sicily from 10th July, 1943

to 17th August, 1943, Dispatch by His Excellency

Field-Marshal the Viscount Alexander of Tunis

. . . (supplement to The London Gazette, February 12, 1948), p. 1009. (2) Lt. Col. Albert N.

Garland and Howard McGaw Smyth, Sicily and

the Surrender of Italy, UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1965), chs.

I-V. Unless otherwise noted, this chapter is based

on this source. (3) Samuel Eliot Morison, "History of United States Naval Operations in World

War II," vol. IX, Sicily—Salerno—Anzio (Boston:

Little, Brown and Company, 1954), p. 15. (4)

Report of Operations of the United States Seventh

Army in the Sicilian Campaign (hereafter cited as

Seventh Army Rpt), p. a-2. 2

 (1) Memo, Borden for Campbell, 7 Jun 43;

Ltr, Col R. Sears to Campbell, 18 Aug 43. Both

in Campbell Overseas file. (2) Report of the

Ordnance Installation at Port-Lyautey, French

Morocco, MS, OHF.
THE SHORT CAMPAIGN IN SICILY 153

Plans for Husky

The Ordnance planning for the Sicily

Campaign (HUSKY) was based on the support of three large attack (subtask) forces

—CENT, DIME, and Joss. There was also

to be a small reserve force, KOOL (operating with DIME). The rest of the Seventh

Army was to follow when the beachheads

were secured. In all, one American armored

and four reinforced infantry divisions were

to be committed, about 228,000 men,

along with British and Canadian divisions

amounting to 250,000 men. Nobody expected an easy victory. Sicily, a mountainous, rugged country, offered every advantage to the defender and was thought

to be held by about 350,000 Axis troops

that could easily be reinforced from Italy

across the narrow Strait of Messina. The

Allied invasion of Sicily was to be the greatest amphibious operation yet attempted—

and was to remain the greatest in World

War II in terms of initial assault. There

were to be more than 3,200 vessels in the

vast armada, of which 1,700 were required

to carry American men and cargo. By the

end of the first week of operations, the

United States had landed 132,113 men,

25,043 vehicles, and 515 tanks.3

The proposed Ordnance troop list to

support the campaign consisted of 8 battalions of 41 companies: 3 battalions (2

maintenance, 1 ammunition) to support

the task forces, and 5 (4 maintenance, 1

ammunition) to follow with Seventh Army.

Colonel Nixon planned more depot companies, proportionally, than had been used

in the North African operations because of

the spare parts problem, and more heavy

maintenance companies because of the

growing importance of heavy and selfpropelled artillery.4

The Ordnance supply planning, supervised by Nixon's executive, Lt. Col. Nelson

M. Lynde, Jr., took three and a half months,

beginning at Rabat, Morocco, in midMarch, continuing at Oran—to which I

Armored Corps headquarters moved early

in April—and winding up at forward headquarters at Mostaganem the end of June.

The planners soon discovered, as the Center Task Force planners had learned in

England, that it was very hard to mount

an operation in an overseas theater. It was

especially hard for HUSKY planners because

they had no exact reports as to the weapons,

vehicles, and other major items on hand

with the troops at the time. Many of the

units assigned to the force were not yet

in the theater and others were still actively

engaged in the Tunisia Campaign. The

only way to order supplies for the units was

to find out from tables of basic allowances

(T/BA's), tables of equipment (T/E's),

and tables of organization (T/O's), Ordnance equipment charts, and special authorizations what they ought to have, and

to estimate the maintenance parts and

spare major items that would be needed,

modifying normal amounts according to experience in Tunisia. The planners had been

3

 (1) Morison, Sicily—Salerno—Anzio, pp. 12-13,

8. (2) H. H. Dunham, U.S. Army Transportation and the Conquest of Sicily, Monograph 13

(hereafter cited as Dunham Sicily MS), p. 1, MS,

OCMH. (3) Rpt, Lt Col Henry L. McGrath,

Ordnance Planning for Operation HUSKY (hereifter cited as McGrath Rpt), p. 6, Incl to Memo,

Field Service Div, Military Plans & Organization

Br, Theater Plans for Chief Industrial Div, 22 Sep

43, sub: Report of Ordnance Service in Sicilian

Campaign, O.O. 350.05/6491.

4

 (1) Seventh Army Rpt, Report of the Ordnance Officer, p. K-1. (2) Ltr, Nixon to Campbell, 10 Mar 43, Files of Travel and Insp Rpt

Unit, OCO Field Service.
154 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

directed to submit requisitions every two

weeks (for delivery thirty days later), without a cut-off date. They were told that

operations in Sicily would take four months.

General Patton, who disagreed with this

estimate, stating in Colonel Nixon's presence, "We'll either take Sicily in 60 days

or be forced off the island," finally secured

permission to stop requisitioning, but by

that time a tremendous amount of matériel

was on the way. Between 18 April and 15

July, 140,551 tons of Ordnance supplies,

including depot equipment, were ordered,

to be delivered in ten bimonthly convoys

labeled UGS-11 through UGS-2O. The

requisitions went from I Armored Corps to

SOS NATOUSA, which forwarded them

to the New York Port of Embarkation.5

During the spring months supply planners in North Africa became more and

more aware of the great power exercised by

the New York Port of Embarkation. The

port's Office of Overseas Supply scrutinized

all requisitions to see that the stocks ordered

did not exceed the maximum level prescribed by the War Department for

NATOUSA, which was enough supplies to

last for ninety days. This process of review,

known as editing, was bitterly resented by

the men in the theater, but was considered

essential by the port in order to keep any

one theater from being given more than its

fair share of supplies.

When enormous requisitions began to

come in from North Africa, the New York

port officials suspected that much was being

ordered that was already in the theater;

that, in fact, requisitioners were not first

examining stocks and then ordering but

were simply applying combat maintenance

factors to the standard T/BA's for the entire troop basis. All through the spring,

Army Service Forces tried to find out just

what was on hand in North Africa. Reports in February showed that Casablanca

had 270 days of supply and Oran 205, but

little was known specifically and it was

probable that the stocks were unbalanced;

for some items the levels were probably not

up to the authorized figure of 90. The

truth was that NATOUSA did not know

what it had in its depots. Most of the records were inaccurate because cards had

been posted by French or Italian clerks,

who were the only civilian help available

locally, but whose English was poor. For

great piles of equipment, unloaded helterskelter to let ships leave the docks promptly, no records existed. The G-4 Division

of the Mediterranean theater later admitted

that it was not until early in 1944 that

inventories at the depots in North Africa

"even approached a semblance of accuracy."

 6

Whatever the reason for editing, the

Ordnance men in the theater felt that their

requisitions ought to be filled because they 5

 (1) Ltr, Col Thomas Hay Nixon (USA Ret)

to Brig Gen Hal C. Pattison, 24 Sep 63 (hereafter cited as Nixon Comments), OCMH. (2)

Seventh Army Rpt, Report of the Ordnance Officer, p. K-1. (3) Col. T. H. Nixon, "Across the

Beachheads," Army Ordnance, XXVIII (MayJune 1945), p. 396. (4) For problems of estimating ammunition requirements at division level, see

"Task Force Ammunition Planning," by Lt. Col.

Wayne H. Snowden (3d Div Ordnance) in Military Review, vol. 26, No. 12 (March 1947), pp.

51-55.

6

 (1) Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, p. 58. (2) Memos, Lutes for Somervell, 11

Mar, 5 May, and 19 May 43, sub: Chronology of

a Certain Plan, ASF Planning Div, Theater Br,

Gen File 17. (3) Memo, CG ASF for ACofS

OPD, WDGS, 5 May 43, sub: Requisitions from

the North African Theater of Operations, ASF

Planning Div, Theater Br, Gen File 1. (4)

Minutes, Conference Held in the Office of Overseas Supply, NYPE, 22 Feb 43, ETO Ord Sec

400.37, KCRC.
THE SHORT CAMPAIGN IN SICILY 155

needed the matériel. They were willing to

use theater stocks, even though levels on

some weapons had been maintained by using

obsolete types such as the 1917 model 155-

mm. howitzer, but they could not use stocks

that were unrecorded and therefore unknown. On the whole, they felt that the

New York port was unrealistic in attempting to apply a prewar post-camp-and-station system to a vast, new, and unpredictable combat theater. And in addition to

the general editing on the basis of levels

of stocks, the Ordnance Section of the Office of Overseas Supply, headed by Col.

Waldo E. Laidlaw, was checking requisitions to see whether or not the item ordered

was listed in the addendum to the Standard

Nomenclature List; if not, the demand was

forwarded to the Chief of Ordnance and

the theater was advised that the item would

probably not be available. In this process

there were plenty of opportunities for mistakes on the part of the editors, as Colonel

Nixon knew from his own experience. The

preceding December he had ordered 2,000

fuzes to replace those lost in the Casablanca

landing, and had received exactly 11, which

was one-twelfth of a year's maintenance

according to the SNL's. In preparing for

HUSKY he appealed to General Campbell

to see that his requisitions for small, fastmoving items such as electrical parts, gaskets, and seals were filled, even though

they were excessive according to the SNL's,

and he won his point.7

New Matériel

While the heavy requisitions for HUSKY

were being dispatched to the United States,

the planners were also studying new types

of matériel. The Tunisia Campaign had

shown that some way had to be found to

combat land mines. The men in the Ordnance shops were working on a minedestroying vehicle similar to the British

Scorpion, which used steel chains attached

to a revolving roller to flail the ground in

front of a tank; but material for it was hard

to get locally. At Mostaganem the mechanics of the 83d Heavy Maintenance Company tried to make a mine-resistant vehicle

by lining the floor of a command car with

armor plating, but it was not a success. At

a demonstration attended by General

Patton, they tied a young goat to the seat

and set off a Teller mine underneath the

car. They reported that "the goat died

bravely."

 8

In Sicily the first bazooka model (the M1

launcher with the M6 rocket), which had

been suspended from issue at the end of the

Tunisia Campaign, was to be given another

chance. To make desirable modifications,

teams equipped with materials and tools

were being sent overseas from the United

States in July 1943; but the new model

(the M1A1 launcher and M6A1 rocket)

could not be produced in time for use in

Sicily. Convinced that the advantages of

the M6 rocket far outweighed its disadvantages, Ordnance officers in the theater

deplored the suspension, feeling that the 7

 (1) Seventh Army Rpt. Report of Ordnance

Officer, p. K-1. (2) Memo, Col Harry A. Markle,

Jr., for Col Hollis, 12 Sep 43, sub: Report on

Sicilian Operations, ASF Distribution Div, 319.1.

(3) Ltr, Ford to Campbell, 28 Apr 43, O.O.

350.05/31441⁄2. (4) Ltr, Coffey to Campbell, 20

Jul 43, Campbell Overseas File. (5) Minutes,

Conference Held in the Office of Overseas Supply,

NYPE, 22 Feb 43. (6) Ltrs, Nixon to Campbell,

17 Apr 43, 1 Jun 43, O.O. 350.05/3083 and 3653.

(7) Ltr (personal), CofOrd to Ord O, I Armd C

Reinf, 23 Jun 43, O.O. 350.05/37301⁄2. 8

 (1) Ltr, Nixon to Campbell, 10 Mar 43. (2)

Hist 83d Ord HM Co (Field Army) (Formerly

HM Co Tank), 16 Jun 41-Dec 44.
156 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

War Department had been too hasty. Colonel Coffey, Ordnance officer of SOS, requested reconsideration of the decision. He

was successful and the early bazooka was

again issued, but with restrictions on using

it at high temperatures because of the belief that the sensitivity of the rocket to heat

created the hazard of a premature explosion.9

Some twenty miles west of Mostaganem,

where amphibious exercises were going on

at Arzew and neighboring Port aux Poules,

there were some striking evidences of how

far amphibious warfare had advanced

since that November morning when the

Maracaibos Misoa and Tasajera had

grounded off Arzew. Men were using

LST's manufactured in the United States

from a British design based on the Maracaibo, and LCT's (landing craft, tank),

resembling floating flatcars, to take tanks,

guns, and vehicles close inshore. More interesting to Ordnance men were the 21⁄2-

ton amphibian trucks swimming through

the surf—the first DUKW's the men in the

theater had seen.10

This strange hybrid that could swim from

LST's to the shore and then waddle to inland dumps had been named by the engineers of General Motors: D for the year

1942, U for utility, K for front-wheel drive,

and W for two rear driving axles; and was

of course nicknamed the Duck. Its ancestor was the amphibious jeep used, though

without much success, in the North African

landings. In the spring of 1942 the method used on the jeep—that of wrapping

around it a watertight hull and adding a

rudder and a propeller—had been applied

to the 21⁄2-ton truck. The result was a

swimming truck that could carry 5,000

pounds of supplies, or 50 men, or a 105-

mm. howitzer ashore and then operate over

beach sand and coral. Army Service

Forces had at first opposed taking on a new

special vehicle, with all the maintenance

headaches involved, but when the problem

of landing on beaches became pressing in

the fall of 1942 General Somervell directed

Ordnance to procure 2,000. After spectacularly successful tests in late December

and early January 1943, the number was

increased to 3,000. The later models had

a central tire-control system that enabled

the driver to partially deflate tires so they

could travel over beach sand. A useful

accessory was the A-frame, or crane, for unloading cargo.11

The first DUKW's were sent to the South

Pacific, where warfare was primarily amphibious. They were used to expedite the

turnaround time of ships at places such as

Guadalcanal where there were no docks,

and were not contemplated for use in assault landings.12

 The DUKW's were first

9

 (1) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, p. 359. (2) Ltr, Coffey to Campbell, 21 Aug 43, Campbell Overseas File. (3) Ltr,

Medaris to Borden, 21 Aug 43, Folder NATOUSA

Report (Col Medaris to Col Borden), 9 Sep 43,

OHF. 10

 (1) Borden Rpt, p. 9. (2) Memo, Maj Gen

Wilhelm D. Styer to CofOrd, 12 Feb 43, sub:

Lessons Learned from Amphibious Operations in

North Africa, Incl, p. 11, Files of Travel & Insp

Rpt Unit, OCO Field Service.

11

 (1) National Defense Research Committee,

Division 12, Vol I, Transportation Equipment and

Related Problems (Washington, 1946), Chs. 1-4.

(2) Ltr Gen George C. Marshall to Dr. Vannevar

Bush, 14 Jul 43, and unsigned memorandum for

General Somervell, 15 Jul 43. Both in RCS 19—

Transportation Corps Historical Program File,

Amphibious Vehicles in World War II (hereafter

cited as TC Amphibious File). (3) Thomson and

Mayo, Procurement and Supply, pp. 284-86. 12

 (1) Memo, Col John M. Franklin for Deputy

Chief of Transportation, 30 Mar 43, sub: Shipment of 21⁄2-ton Amphibian Trucks Overseas.

(2) Memo, Lt Col L. W. Finlay for Brig Gen
THE SHORT CAMPAIGN IN SICILY 157

used by an invasion force in the Sicily

landings. General Eisenhower included

400 in a requisition for amphibious equipment on 3 March 1943. When they arrived at the invasion training center near

Oran they performed so well that everyone

wanted them. General Patton doubled his

request, and by early summer the theater

had more than a thousand.13

The DUKW had its faults. It was small,

hard to unload, performed poorly in mud,

was slow in the water (about 5 knots was

the best it could do), and was so bulky on

land that it blocked traffic on narrow roads.

As a new and very special vehicle, it was

going to present Ordnance with tough

maintenance problems, just as Army pessimists had predicted.14

 But in the spring of

1943 the DUKW's were new and as yet

untried under combat conditions. They

were easy to operate and seemed remarkably sturdy. They were hailed with great

enthusiasm by the men assembling the vast

invasion force along the coast of Africa,

and the fact that they were becoming available in large numbers, along with the

LST's, made possible a significant change

in the tactical planning for HUSKY.15

The first plans for the invasion had provided for a landing by the Americans on

the northwest corner of Sicily with the

object of capturing Palermo, a large city

with good docks. Early in May General

Montgomery insisted that, instead, the

Americans take over some of the assault

area allotted to the British on the southeastern coast, arguing that the enemy would

be too powerful to permit the wide dispersion of British forces. He won his point

and the plan was changed. Thus II Corps

was to attack in the crescent-shaped Gulf

of Gela, the 1st Division (DIME Force) to

take the town of Gela, and the 45th Division (CENT Force) to land in the east at

Scoglitti. Both were to drive inland to capture airfields; and a regiment of the 45th

was to make contact with Montgomery still

farther east, at Ragusa. Twenty miles

west of the town of Gela, General Truscott's

Joss Force, consisting of the 3d Division

and a combat team of the 2d Armored Division, was to land at the small port of Licata

and make contact with the II Corps on the

right. Since Palermo was not to be taken,

supplies would have to be brought in by

LST's and DUKW's and moved over the

beaches for the first thirty days.16

Wylie, et al., 28 Oct 43. (3) Report, Amphibian

Organization in the Pacific [1943]. All in TC

Amphibious File. 13

 (1) Dunham Sicily MS, pp. 47-48. (2) Borden Rpt, p. 18. 14

 (1) Seventh Army Report, Annex 12, First

Engineer Special Brigade, p. I-17. (2) Memo,

Brig Gen Robert H. Wylie for Lt Comdr Taylor,

Planning Division, OCT, 11 Sep 43, and unsigned manuscript of Feb 44 (hereafter cited as

DUKW MS), both in TC Amphibious File. (3)

J. Wallace Davies, "The Dead Dukw?" Army

Transportation Journal II (June 1946), p. 9. (4)

AFHQ, Notes on Chief Administrative Officer's

Conference N. A., Jun-Jul 43, ASF Planning Div,

20 Gen File, Vol III. (5) Rpt, Maj William H.

Connerat, Jr., Report on Ordnance in Sicilian

Campaign, Through 2 August 1943 (hereafter

cited as Connerat Rpt), p. 6, Incl to Ltr, Crawford to CofOrd, 24 Aug 43, sub: Technical Information Letter No. 2, O.O. 350.05/6491.

15

 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 163. 16

 (1) Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery

of Alamein, El Alamein to the River Sangro (Germany: Printing and Stationery Services, British

Army of the Rhine, 1946), pp. 70-72. (2)

Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 163-64. Many

Americans continued to believe that the original

plan was the better, and it later turned out that

Montgomery had overestimated enemy strength.

Ibid., p. 164.
158 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

The Invasion Fleets Depart

To support the task forces, Colonel Nixon

selected the 63d Ammunition Battalion,

which at Casablanca had been operating

one of the largest depots in North Africa;

the 43d Maintenance and Supply Battalion,

a Western Task Force unit; and the 42d

Maintenance and Supply Battalion, which

had been released by II Corps to Eastern

Base Section to work on battlefield clearance and help mount the Sicily operation in

the Bizerte area. Nixon kept his ammunition battalion under army, but assigned his

maintenance battalions to the tactical units,

the 43d to II Corps and the 42d to Joss

Force, which was later to become the

Provisional Corps. As in the later phases

of the Tunisia Campaign, the maintenance

battalions were combined third and fourth

echelon battalions with attached depot companies, but included some specialists that

were new—several companies devoted entirely to antiaircraft maintenance, one automotive company trained on DUKW's and

another equipped to supply spare parts, and

two platoons of a bomb disposal company.

Most of the maintenance battalions were to

arrive in Sicily after D plus 4. The assault

troops were to be accompanied by four ammunition companies, divided evenly between II Corps and Joss Force, and some

detachments for repairing DUKW's and

trucks.

CENT Force (primarily 45th Division),

arriving combat-loaded from the United

States in 28 transports on 22 June, was to

sail from Oran on 4 July; DIME Force

(primarily 1st Division) was to embark

from Algiers the following afternoon; and

Joss Force (primarily 3d Division) would

leave from Bizerte still later on 5 July. The

Ordnance troops to support not only DIME

but CENT, which had with it only the 45th

Division's organic light maintenance company, assembled near Algiers and spent

most of their time on the last-minute job of

waterproofing their vehicles. Waterproofing was still in the experimental stage.

There was a serious shortage of kits and

such materials as asbestos grease and flexible tubing, and no really satisfactory method of waterproofing trucks and jeeps had

been developed.17

During the latter part of June Colonel

Medaris, Ordnance officer of II Corps, and

most of Colonel Nixon's Ordnance Section

left Oran for Tunisia to board LST's for

the invasion. At Bizerte, where Force 343

was setting up a small base to handle supply

in the first stages of the battle, they found

feverish preparations. Harbor lights were

blazing all night, in spite of the risk of air

raids, so that loading could go on around

the clock. Here were concentrated the

LST's, LCI's (landing craft, infantry), and

LCT's upon which General Truscott's Joss

Force was to embark. In Joss, the first big

shore-to-shore operation, LCT's, which

were usually carried on the decks of LST's,

were to go under their own power, since

the Joss landing area in Sicily was not

much more than a hundred miles away;

smaller types of landing craft such as the

LCVP and the LCM (landing craft, mechanized ) were carried on the davits of LST's

and transports.18

17

 (1) Diary of Events, Ordnance Section II

Corps, 21 May to 23 Aug 43 (hereafter cited as

II Corps Ord Sec Diary), II Corps Ord Sec,

KCRC. (2) Connerat Rpt. (3) McGrath Rpt.

(4) Report on Sicilian Operations, 7 Sep 42,

ASF Distribution Div, 319.1. 18

 (1) Seventh Army Rpt, Report of the Ordnance Officer, p. K-1. (2) Ernie Pyle, Brave Men

(New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1944), p. 2. (3)

"Invasion Force," Army Ordnance, XXVI (MarchApril 1944), pp. 309-16.
THE SHORT CAMPAIGN IN SICILY 159

Near Ferryville the 42d Battalion was

waterproofing its vehicles for its D plus 8

landing and drawing supplies from a large

Ordnance depot installed by Eastern Base

Section in the seaplane hangars at the

French Navy Yard. In the shop section of

the depot there was an Ordnance unit with

an interesting history—the 525th Heavy

Maintenance Company (Tank), recently

arrived from Tripoli. Having crossed the

Western Desert with Montgomery's Eighth

Army and operated shops at Benghazi and

Tripoli, repairing everything from English

revolvers to captured German 88's, the company had been brought to Tunisia in early

June to prepare the tanks of the 2d

Armored Division for the invasion of Sicily.

There it came under U.S. control for the

first time in its year of overseas service. The

men had gotten along well with the British,

but never got used to tea.19

At Bizerte and Mateur were huge ammunition dumps. The Mateur dump,

where all marked ammunition for Sicily

was stored, had just lost about 2,200 tons

of ammunition in a fire that broke out on

30 June and spread quickly in a high wind.

The fire had been brought under control

by the 66th Ammunition Company and

maintenance men of the 188th Ordnance

Battalion, stationed nearby, who fought it

with tanks, trampling out fires carried over

the firebreaks and swirling the tanks to

throw dirt on the flames. In the midst of

thundering explosions and falling shell fragments, the tank crews had had several narrow escapes. In all, there were fourteen

casualties, but 10,000 tons of ammunition

had been saved.20

D-day was 10 July. On the bright, sunny

afternoon of 8 July the ships and landing

craft of Joss Force swarmed out of the

harbor and into the dark blue of the Mediterranean. Suddenly the men saw out at

sea the great invasion fleet of the CENT and

DIME Forces. To Ernie Pyle, aboard a

Joss Force ship, the armada standing on

the horizon was a sight he would never

forget. It "resembled a distant city. It

covered half the skyline, and the dullcolored camouflage ships stood indistinctly

against the curve of the dark water, like a

solid formation of uncountable structures

blending together. Even to be part of it

was frightening."

 21

The huge fleets joined and filed through

the Tunisian "War Channel." Then the

transports turned south, to deceive the

enemy, and the landing craft turned east.

All were to converge near Gozo, north of

Malta, where the approach dispositions for

Joss, DIME, and CENT were to form; but

as they sailed toward the meeting place

there was a piece of bad luck that threatened the whole invasion. After days of

calm a stiff norther—a true Mediterranean

mistral—began to blow on the morning of

9 July and became worse during the afternoon. The sea sprang up, rocking the

transports from side to side and pouring

over the little landing craft. By twilight it

seemed all but impossible to gather the

ships together in any kind of order, but the

19

 (1) Hist Ord EBS, p. 28. (2) History 525th

Ord HM Co, Tank, 1943. (3) Martinez, "Saga of

the 'Great 525th,' " pp. 326-28. (4) See also above,

p. 21.

20

 (1) Hist Ord EBS, pp. 39, 46. (2) Peterson

Rpt of 14 Feb 45, p. 13. 21

 Quote from p. 8, Brave Men by Ernie Pyle.

Copyright 1943, 1944 by Scripps-Howard Newspaper Alliance. Copyright 1944 by Holt, Rinehart

and Winston, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Holt,

Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
160 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

LANDING AT GELA. An LST loaded with ammunition burns offshore after a hit from a

dive bomber.

armada had proceeded too far to turn

back. Good seamanship saved the day and

shortly after midnight, when the first ships

of the three U.S. forces were within radar

range of Sicily, the wind began to die

down.22

The Landings

Off Gela, the men at the rails of the

DIME transports saw a long line of brilliant

yellow and orange lights. They were fires

in wheatfields started by Allied bombers.

While the mine sweepers combed the waters

off Gela, the transports hove to about seven

miles offshore, flanked by LST's and LCI's,

and began lowering men into landing craft.

Once in the craft, the troops took an hour

and a half to cover the distance to the beach

over a sea that was still running so high

that the little boats pitched and shuddered

and were all but drowned in great, roaring

waves. Searchlights from the shore played

over the boats and explosions were heard in

the neighborhood of Gela, but the apprehensions of the men were soon quieted, for

there was little opposition the first day except from dive bombers and artillery from

inland. The coastal area, lightly garrisoned

by Italian troops, had been taken by surprise.23

22

 Morison, Sicily—Salerno—Anzio, pp. 67-68.

23

 Jack Belden, Still Time to Die (New York

and London: Harper and Brothers, 1944), pp.

244, 251.
THE SHORT CAMPAIGN IN SICILY 161

The only serious resistance to the landings came on D plus 1 when the Hermann

Goering Division, which was a tank division, arrived on the Gela plain and very

nearly succeeded in breaking through to the

beachhead. The Germans were stopped by

1st Division artillery and infantry with

bazookas, powerfully aided by the guns of

the cruisers and destroyers offshore—the

most effective large-scale use of naval gunfire in land operations so far in the war. In

the afternoon, when Tiger tanks had come

up, self-propelled artillery and Sherman

tanks, landed from the reserve KOOL Force

that came in with DIME, knocked out about

one-third of the German tanks, including

ten Tigers, and drove off the rest. The

beachheads were saved, and on 12 July 1st

Division took its main objective, the Ponte

Olivo airfield.

The work of the bazooka in the landings

and throughout the campaign was watched

with great interest. One Ordnance observer claimed that bazookas accounted for

Pzkw IV tanks on four occasions; another

claimed a Pzkw VI Tiger, though admittedly the Tiger was knocked out by a lucky

hit through the driver's vision slot. On the

other hand, many officers preferred the

rifle grenade to the bazooka as a close-range

antitank weapon. An interesting discovery

made in Sicily was that the bazooka was

effective as a morale weapon against enemy

soldiers in strongpoints and machine gun

nests. It was no longer thought of only as

an antitank weapon, and in its new role

was so well liked by the troops that they

disregarded the restrictions on its use. At

high temperatures three barrel bursts did

occur, but fortunately no one was hurt.24

The first Ordnance officers ashore on

D-day were men of Medaris' II Corps staff,

Maj. William C. Farmer and Lt. Edward

A. Vahldieck, who landed at dawn with

infantry combat teams to find sites for ammunition dumps and collection points and

generally keep abreast of the tactical and

supply situation. During the morning the

1st Division's light maintenance company

got ashore, crossed the dunes, and bivouacked about a mile inland. Beyond the

beach were stone farmhouses, vineyards,

and, best of all, fields of ripe tomatoes and

watermelons—a delicious change from K

rations. To the left, on a small hill that

dominated the flat countryside, were the

whitewashed roofs and church spire of the

little gray stone town of Gela. The

swarthy, thin-faced Sicilians the Ordnance

troops saw at the farmhouses or driving

bright painted wagons down dusty roads

were friendly; and many of the Italian soldiers who came running out of pillboxes to

surrender seemed actually glad to see the

Americans. In spite of heavy bombing,

strafing, and artillery fire, in which 1st Lt.

Charles P. Bartow of the light maintenance

company was wounded, the II Corps Ordnance officers managed to spike a number

of the coastal defense guns.25

24

 (1) Connerat Rpt. (2) Ltr, Lt Col Frederick

G. Crabb, Jr., to Gen Campbell, 7 Sep 43, and

Ltrs, Medaris to Borden and Crawford, 21 Aug

43. All in NATOUSA Report (Col. Medaris to

Col. Borden), 9 Sep 43, OHF. (3) The Germans

reported capturing some bazookas, which they called

Ofenrohre (stovepipes) at Gela; however it seems

probable that their Panzerschreck, was copied from

a U.S. bazooka captured on the Russian front in the

fall of 1942. See Oberstlieutnant Hellmut Bergengruen, Der Kampf der Panzer division 'Hermann

Goering auf Sizilien, MS # T-2 (Fries et al), p.

53, OCMH; also see above, p. 32. 25

 (1) Lt. Col. W. C. Farmer, "Ordnance on

the Battlefield," Army Ordnance, XXVII (September-October 1944), p. 298. (2) II Corps Ord

Sec Diary, June, July 1943. (3) History 1st Ord

LM Co, p. 5. (4) Belden, Still Time to Die, pp.

260-63. (5) Pyle, Brave Men, pp. 20-22.
162 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

DUKW's IN SHIP-TO-SHORE OPERATION, SICILY

By the afternoon of D-day the beach

below Gela was piled for miles with boxes,

bags, and crates of every shape and description. All day the ships on the horizon had

been unloading their cargoes, mostly into

DUKW's. To everybody's great disappointment, the LST's could not get close

enough to open their great bow doors directly on the beach, for there were sand

bars beyond which the water leading to the

true beach was so deep that it could not be

forded. Ammunition and artillery had to

be brought ashore by the DUKW's. All

had been loaded in North Africa before embarkation, 100 with three tons of ammunition each, 28 with shore regiment equipment, and each of the remaining 16 with a

105-mm. howitzer. Four hours after the

first assault troops landed, the DUKW's

swarmed ashore and in a matter of minutes

the four batteries of 105-mm. howitzers

were in action. Ton upon ton of ammunition rolled in as the DUKW's raced back

and forth from ship to shore. A war correspondent, Jack Belden, described the

scene: "The rim of the horizon ten miles

out to sea was lined with transports . . . And

from the transports new hordes of tiny craft,

like water bugs, were scooting toward the

shore to add their own heaped-up loads and

the chattering of their own roaring engines

to the riot and the confusion already on the

beach."

 26

26

 (1) DUKW MS. (2) Connerat Rpt. (3)

Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, p. 106. (4) Belden,

Still Time to Die, p. 269.
THE SHORT CAMPAIGN IN SICILY 163

By late afternoon three LST's were able,

by rigging causeways, to unload vehicles

and men directly on the beach, but the

vehicles had hard going. The beaches

were mined, and, worse, the sand was soft.

The engineers had laid down wire matting,

but it could not accommodate all the

traffic; trucks sank to their hubcaps in the

sand, engines racing, as jeeps tried to pull

them out. Many stalled because their

motors or batteries had been corroded by

salt water during the landing; the waterproofing had not stood up under unexpectedly deep water. Soon the beach was

clogged with stalled and disabled vehicles.

All were badly needed to bring order out

of the mountainous piles of matériel on the

beaches.27

Unlike the trucks, the DUKW's, which

had desert-type tires as well as the automatic tire-deflating mechanism, ran easily

over the sand, and in the first days of the

invasion they were badly overworked on

land as well as at sea. When the combat

troops moved forward, nine DUKW's were

commandeered to rush ammunition to the

front twenty miles inland because other

vehicles could not get through the sandhills.

No sooner had they returned to the beach

than they were ordered to pull 105-mm.

howitzers, needed to stop a German tank

attack, over dunes as high as 180 feet.

The appearance at the front line of the

queer, high-sided vehicle completely mystified the enemy. Some thought it an amphibian tank; a hundred Italians were reported to have surrendered at first glance.

One DUKW was captured by the Germans, but they were apparently unable to

operate it, and it was recaptured by the

Americans twenty-four hours later in exactly the same spot.28

Long hauls over rough roads at high

speeds were hard on the DUKW's special

tires, salt water and sand damaged their

brakes, and overloading at shipside—some

DUKW's waddled ashore with as much as

seven tons aboard, showing only two or

three inches of freeboard above the water

—weakened their bodies. The thirty-nine

men of the 3497th DUKW Maintenance

Company who came ashore at Gela at

dawn on the morning after D-day had their

work cut out for them. They did not have

enough spare tires and parts for propellers,

and bilge pumps were sadly lacking. The

mechanics, by cannibalizing DUKW's that

were wrecked by mines or sunk offshore,

kept most of the fleet operating, against

great odds.29

In the British landing area also the

DUKW plagued the repairmen, but it did

so well that its faults seemed minor. The

commander of the task force that landed

the Eighth Army praised it highly; the

British Royal Army Service Corps reported

that it "revolutionized the business of beach

maintenance." A British commander

summed up the feeling of many when he

called the DUKW "a magnificent bird."

 30

27

 (1) Ibid., p. 267. (2) Ltr, 1st Lt Charles P.

Bartow, CO 1st Ord LM Co, to CG 1st U.S. Inf

Div, 12 Aug 43, sub: Lessons Learned in Operations, Folder, History 701st Ord LM Co. (3) Connerat Rpt.

28

 DUKW MS, pp. 2-3. 29

 (1) Connerat Rpt. (2) Rpt on Sicilian Campaign by Maj Gen John P. Lucas, quoted in Memo,

Brig Gen Robert H. Wylie for Lt Comdr Taylor,

Planning Div, OCT, 11 Sep 43, TC Amphibious

File. (3) Seventh Army Rpt, Rpt of First Engineer Special Brigade, pp. I-17. (4) DUKW MS,

pp. 10-11. (5) History 3497th Ord MAM Co,

pp. 2-3. (6) Ltr, Crawford to CofOrd, 19 Oct

43, sub: Technical Information Letter No. 15,

MTO Ord Sec 400.113, KCRC. 30

 (1) Rpt of Eastern Naval Task Force, Vice

Adm B. H. Ramsay, Commander, to CinC Medi-
164 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

DIME Force at Gela had run into more

opposition than had CENT Force at Scoglitti or Joss at Licata. At Scoglitti the

surf had been so strong that new beaches

had to be found, but by the afternoon of

11 July the 45th Division had succeeded in

taking one of its main objectives, the

Comiso airfield, had entered the large town

of Ragusa, and had stopped a German

counterattack at Biscari airfield with the

help of the newly arrived 82d Airborne

Division, plus a battery of 155-mm. field

artillery, a company of Sherman tanks, and

heavy fire from the Navy. That night,

General Bradley moved the II Corps command post two miles inland, and two days

later Maj. John Ray, the II Corps ammunition officer, made arrangements with the

Engineer beach group, which controlled

supplies on all beaches, to establish a dump

for the 45th Division at Vittoria, a town

seven miles inland on the coast road, the

first Allied ammunition supply point on the

island. The beaches at Scoglitti were

closed on 17 July. After the 17th, until a

better port was captured, supplies were to

be landed in the Licata area.31

Because of the early capture of port

facilities at Licata, the build-up there had

been easier than that at Gela and Scoglitti.

On D-day Truscott's Joss Force, consisting

of the 3d Infantry Division and Combat

Command A of the 2d Armored Division,

took Licata and advanced to occupy

strongpoints on the hills beyond. Before

dark the countryside far inland was

crowded with troops, vehicles, and thousands of boxes of ammunition. Command

posts were being established in orchards

and old buildings, field kitchens were being

set up to cook hot food. Next day Joss

Force began its move up the west coast and

by noon was well ahead of schedule.32

Colonel Nixon's Problems

On the afternoon of 12 July Colonel

Nixon went ashore at Gela with the rest of

General Patton's staff and helped to set up

the advanced command post, one echelon

in a school building, the other in a grove

north of town. As Ordnance officer of the

first U.S. army to take to the field in World

War II, Nixon had a pioneer job and had

to perform it under rather difficult circumstances. He had a very small staff, only

14 officers and 3 warrant officers; for so

large an operation as HUSKY he later estimated that he ought to have had at least 4

more officers and 30 enlisted men. He

had asked repeatedly for more men but

each time had been refused.33

The very rapidity of Seventh Army's advance made Ordnance support difficult. By

22 July General Truscott's Joss Force,

now designated Provisional Corps and

terranean, 1 Oct 43, Incl to "The Invasion of

Sicily" [dispatch 1 Jan 44 by Admiral of the

Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, to Supreme Commander, AEF, with Admiralty and Air Ministry

footnotes], 28 Apr 50 Supplement to the London

Gazette of 25 Apr 50, p. 2084. (2) The Story of

the Royal Army Service Corps, 1939-1945 (London, 1955), p. 254. (3) Rpt, Capt Frank Speir,

Lessons Learned, ASF Planning Div, Theater Br. 31

 (1) II Corps Ord Sec Diary, 11-13 Jul 43. (2)

Ltr, Maj John Ray to Ordnance Officer, II Corps,

26 Aug 43, sub: Ammunition Supply—Sicilian

Campaign (hereafter cited as Ray Ltr, 26 Aug 43)

in folder, II Corps Ammunition Supply Report

Sicilian Campaign July 10, 1943-August 15, 1943,

II Corps Ord Sec, KCRC.

32

 Pyle, Brave Men, pp. 20-22. 33

 (1) Seventh Army Rpt, p. B-6, and list of

staff at end, no pagination. (2) Connerat Rpt.

(3) Extracts from Notes of the Commanding General, Seventh Army, on the Sicilian Campaign,

MTO Ord Sec 400.113, KCRC.
THE SHORT CAMPAIGN IN SICILY 165

augmented with all the tanks of 2d

Armored Division (except Combat Command A), had raced northwest and captured the large port of Palermo. General

Bradley's II Corps advanced up the center

of the island and captured the hub of the

network of roads in the Caltanisetta-Enna

area. Then the 1st Infantry Division

headed east toward the Messina peninsula,

where the Germans were concentrated and

the British Eighth Army was stalemated.

The 45th drove north and captured San

Stefano on the northern coast.

The combat forces outran their Ordnance support. The 45th Division, for

example, moved so rapidly that until 27

July it had only its own 700th Light Maintenance Company to repair its guns and

vehicles. The 2d Armored Division, in its

fast run of about 200 miles in five days to

Palermo, starting 19 July from near Licata,

had only part of its own maintenance battalion—not more than 30 percent of the

support it would normally have demanded.

It encountered enemy opposition and had

to cross terrain that was extremely difficult

for tanks. The roads were mountainous,

flinty, and dusty, and at times cut by defiles from which bridges had been blown.

Not only tank tracks but truck tires, then

and throughout the campaign, suffered

from the narrow wagon-track roads covered with volcanic rock.34

General Patton, dashing about in a command car decked with oversize stars and

insignia or poring over maps in his office

with his G-3, planning the tactics of his

Seventh Army, seemed to General Bradley

to be "almost completely indifferent to its

logistical needs."35 On the other hand,

Colonel Nixon maintained that General

Patton put great emphasis on logistics but

preferred to delegate responsibility for supply to experts whose judgment he trusted.

With one exception (the Battle of the

Bulge) Patton never failed before every

operation to ask Nixon whether he was prepared to support it, and gave full weight

to Nixon's reply.36 The general's attitude

had also been illustrated by a remark he

had made in the presence of Lt. Col. Carter

B. Magruder of ASF during the planning

for the Casablanca landing of Western

Task Force. On that occasion Patton had

said to his G-4, Col. Walter J. Muller, "I

don't know anything about logistics. You

keep me out of trouble."

 37

Palermo was captured on 25 July, and

the port was quickly opened. Colonel

Nixon moved to Palermo with the rest of

Patton's staff, and the general established

himself in the Royal Palace. An Italian

aircraft factory, spared from bombing by

arrangement with the various air forces,

made an admirable Ordnance depot, eventually to be operated by two depot companies. The 42d Maintenance and Supply Battalion, which landed at Licata on 18

July, arrived in Palermo 28 July. Com34

 (1) Connerat Rpt. (2) Ltr, Crabb to Campbell, 7 Sep 43. (3) Ltr, Hq Maint Bn, 2d Armd

Div, to Ord, Armd Comd, Ft. Knox, sub: Maintenance Operations of Maintenance Battalion Detachment, 2d Armored Division during period of

July 10-31st 1943 Inclusive, Mitchell Notes, OHF.

(4) Combat Maintenance, Doc 179.1-5, p. 5, MS,

Armored Force Library. (5) Nixon Comments.

35

 (1) Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 145-46,

159-60. (2) Diary of Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas,

pt. I, Sicily (hereafter cited as Lucas Diary,

Sicily), OCMH. 36

 (1) Nixon Comments, (2) See also below, p.

316. 37

 Lecture, Lt. Gen. Carter B. Magruder, DCSLOG DA, Army Logistics, Command and General

Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 10 Apr

59, MS, OHF.
166 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

manded by Lt. Col. John F. Moffitt, it consisted largely of veterans of the Tunisia

Campaign, including the 991st Heavy

Maintenance Tank Company (the old

30th).38

The men of the 42d Battalion were assigned to maintain the Provisional Corps,

but by the time they had arrived, the

fighting around Palermo had dwindled to

mopping-up operations. The immediate

task of Seventh Army in early August was

to support II Corps. Bradley's corps now

included the 3d Division (replacing the

45th, retired for rest and refitting), which

was pushing east along the north coast road

toward Messina, slowed by mountainous

terrain and stiffening resistance. The 1st

Division, aided by the newly arrived 9th

Division and reinforced by a brigade of field

artillery, was stopped at Troina, near

Mount Etna, where the enemy had taken a

strong stand. The battle of Troina, in

which the greatest weight of II Corps was

committed, lasted from 3 to 6 August.

In attempting to support II Corps in the

battle of Troina, Colonel Nixon was handicapped by a woefully weak staff, especially

after he had to release his ablest officer,

Colonel Lynde, to become Ordnance officer of the Provisional Corps. He himself was working from 16 to 18 hours a

day, having to devote time to routine details

that subordinates could have handled. In

addition, information and reports came late

from the front because all correspondence,

including Ordnance, had to flow through

command channels. And he was hindered

from sending all-out Ordnance support to

II Corps because of the army's inflexibility

in the matter of men and supplies. Maj.

Gen. Geoffrey Keyes, Patton's deputy at

Palermo while Patton was ranging up and

down the front every day, jealously guarded

army's prerogatives and, far from agreeing

to the assignment of more Ordnance troops

to corps, insisted that all Ordnance troops

remain under army.39

On 3 August Colonel Medaris made the

5-hour trip from the 1st Division front back

to Palermo to protest that he was not getting enough support from army. The 43d

Ordnance Battalion did not provide him

with enough maintenance. He desperately needed another automotive repair company. He had no collection and evacuation point nearer than Palermo, and no

maintenance and supply facilities close to

the front. To get supplies his men had had

to race back to the beaches, sometimes

spending days going from dump to dump.

This in turn placed a heavy drain on transportation, for trucks and tires wore out

rapidly when operated continuously over

the lava rock roads of Sicily. He complained that Ordnance matériel in the

dumps was being stolen and diverted. And

he strongly protested that the supply of

ammunition had not been adequate to give

the II Corps commander complete tactical

freedom.40

"A Black Eye on Ordnance"

The reason for many of these troubles

was Seventh Army's supply system. In a

command decision very early in the campaign, General Patton gave the supply task

38

 (1) Col. T. H. Nixon, "Across the Beachheads," Army Ordnance, XXVIII (May-June

1945), P.396. (2) Connerat Rpt.

39

 (1) Connerat Rpt. (2) Bradley, A Soldier's

Story, p. 159. (3) II Corps Ord Sec Diary, Colonel

Medaris' Journal—3 August 1943 (hereafter cited

as Medaris Jnl of 3 Aug 43), p. 1. 40 Ibid.
THE SHORT CAMPAIGN IN SICILY 167

to the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, which

would act as an SOS, managing depots

beyond the beaches, right up to the front.

General Bradley thought it was a mistake.

Ordnance objected, but in vain. As Ordnance officers foresaw, the improper handling of ammunition by the Engineers was

"a black eye on Ordnance, even though the

fault lay elsewhere."

 41

Confusion was inevitable at the beach

dumps; it was when the ammunition began

to move inland that Ordnance officers began to worry. They observed that the

Engineers considered it just so much tonnage, moving small arms ammunition first,

because it was the easiest to handle, disregarding tactical requirements and the recommendations of their Ordnance liaison

officer. Three out of four ammunition

dumps established by Seventh Army were

overstocked with small arms ammunition

and never had enough 105-mm. and 155.

mm. artillery ammunition, which was what

II Corps wanted most. The expenditures

for small arms were surprisingly low and,

because of the mountainous terrain and

Allied command of the air, those for tank

and antiaircraft weapons were almost negligible. The only ammunition dump that

had enough artillery ammunition was so

far from both the north coast and the east

front that it took too long to send trucks

back to it over the narrow, mountainous

roads. One of II Corps' chief complaints

was that army did not have enough transport to move stocks far enough forward.

The dump at Nicosia, closest to the Messina

front, reached its artillery target only with

the help of corps transport.42

The main reason for confusion at the forward dumps was that the Engineers did not

make the best use of Ordnance ammunition

companies, which they controlled. The

headquarters men of the Seventh Army's

63d Ammunition Battalion, which landed

soon after D-day, could act only in an advisory capacity. The Engineers used technically trained ammunition troops as common labor and, over Ordnance protests,

did not give them any organic transportation. A few 21⁄2-ton trucks would have

enabled the ammunition detachments to

segregate types within the dumps and

would have facilitated issues immeasurably. When artillery ammunition finally

began to move, an Ordnance observer saw

in several advanced dumps all four types

of 105-mm. howitzer ammunition in one

stack, which made night issues extremely

difficult. Near the end of the campaign,

Colonel Nixon arranged for the 63d Ammunition Battalion to take over from the

Engineer special brigade the operation of

all forward dumps, but the battalion had

no transportation and came too late on the

scene to be of much help.43

Nixon believed that the problem created

by the Engineers' misuse of Ordnance

troops would have been corrected immediately if the troops had reverted to army

after the landing operations instead of remaining attached to corps, because he

would have had a prompt report on the

fiasco. As it was, it took some time for

41

 (1) Connerat Rpt, p. 11. (2) Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 145. 42

 (1) Connerat Rpt. (2) Ray Ltr, 26 Aug 43.

(3) Medaris Jnl of 3 Aug 43. (4) Maj. William C.

Farmer, "Beach Parties," Fire power (June 1944),

p. 6. 43

 (1) Connerat Rpt. (2) History 63d Ord Bn

(Ammunition), p. 28. (3) Ray Ltr, 26 Aug 43.

(4) Memo, Maj W. C. Farmer for Ordnance Officer, AFHQ, 3 Aug 43, sub: Ordnance Notes

Based on Sicilian Campaign, II Corps Ord Sec

319.1, KCRC. (5) II Corps Ord Sec Diary, 27

Jul 5-15 Aug 43.
168 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

HAULING A 155-MM. GUN INLAND, SICILY

Bradley to inform Patton of the situation

through command channels. The decision

to attach army Ordnance units to corps

without providing for reversion after landing was Nixon's own, and he afterward reproached himself for it—"a bitter lesson"

and one that was not forgotten when he

became Ordnance officer of U.S. Third

Army.44

It took heavy artillery to blast the enemy

out of his Etna position on the Messina

neck. The Germans had begun to dread

the Americans' "mad artillery barrages,"

which they nicknamed Feuerzauber or "fire

magic."

 45

 Keeping the guns operating was

the most serious Ordnance maintenance

problem of the last two weeks of the campaign. The problem began about 24 July

when several field artillery units were transferred from Provisional Corps to II

Corps, bringing II Corps artillery to 60 155-

mm. howitzers, 25 155-mm. guns, and 54

105-mm. howitzers. Most of the 155-mm.

howitzers were of the M1917 or M1918 type

and some of these, Ordnance officers surmised, had been used ever since World War

I. Many were already worn out, a few actu44

 Nixon Comments.

45

 Lucas Diary, Sicily, app. 1, quotes a letter of

29 July found in an abandoned German gun position near Troina.
THE SHORT CAMPAIGN IN SICILY 169

ally condemned, before they arrived in the

theater. Others had had hard service in

the Tunisia Campaign and afterward not

enough assemblies or parts had been

available in North Africa to do more than

patch them up. They began to fail the

first day they were fired in Sicily, and soon

18 were out of action. The new 155-mm.

M1 howitzers functioned much better, but

had all the idiosyncracies of a new weapon;

they also often arrived without spare parts

and such accessories as telescopes.46

To repair the guns and howitzers at the

Etna position Colonel Medaris had only the

18-man artillery section of his 83d Heavy

Maintenance Tank Company. None of the

men had ever worked on either the 155-

mm. howitzer or the 155-mm. gun, and

had no tools for either. Operating near

Nicosia, so close to the front that they could

plainly hear small arms fire, the men manufactured tools and reshuffled serviceable

assemblies. They sent out contact parties

to work at the gun positions at considerable risk; they lost two men, 2d Lt. Tom

P. Forman and Technician 5 Roland G.

McDorman, killed by an accidental explosion while working on a 155-mm. gun.47

Not until 8 August did the 42d Maintenance and Supply Battalion arrive at the

front with the experienced 991st Heavy

Maintenance Tank Company.48 By then,

the campaign was nearly over. The enemy

was withdrawing, although he slowed

the Allied advance as much as he could

with delaying actions and demolitions.

Along the north coast road, Truscott's

3d Division, aided by an adroit amphibious landing behind the enemy's front

at San Fratello, pushed quickly on to Messina. On 16 August a battery of 155-mm.

howitzers was wheeled into position on the

coast road and fired a hundred rounds

on the Italian mainland—the first U.S.

ground attack on the continent of Europe.

The next day Truscott's infantry was in

Messina, only a few minutes before an

officer from Montgomery's Eighth Army

raced in. The Germans had made good

their escape across the Strait of Messina—

but the battle for Sicily had been won.

The Evidence at the End

The Sicily Campaign ended thirty-eight

days after the landings on the beaches.

Short in time, it was a "first" in several

respects—the first massive amphibious

landing, the first use of DUKW's in an invasion, the first attempt to supply combat

forces for thirty days over beaches. It was

also the first test of army support of corps,

though not perhaps a really fair one because it was so brief.

General Bradley was critical of the Seventh Army for not giving him enough support; his supply officers, after an attempt

by army to borrow trucks from corps, re46

 (1) II Corps Ord Sec Diary, 17 Aug 43. (2)

Ltr, Medaris to Campbell, 15 Aug 43 (hereafter

cited as Medaris Ltr, 15 Aug 43), NATOUSA

Letter, Personal to Gen Campbell, 15 Aug 43, OHF.

(3) Ltr, Capt Ralph G. Atkinson to Col Medaris,

Ord Officer, II Corps, 11 Sep 43, sub: Report of

Operations, Armament Section (hereafter cited

as Atkinson Rpt), and appendices, File, Ordnance

Report II Corps Sicilian Campaign 10 July to 15

August 1945, OHF. Most failures of the 155-mm.

howitzers were due to the short life of the recoil

mechanism. See Project Supporting Paper No. 80,

Medium Artillery Weapons, Design, Development

and Production of the I55MM Howitzer and 4.5

Gun, OHF. 47

 (1) Hist 83d HM Co, pp. 24-25. (2) Atkinson

Rpt. (3) Medaris Ltr, 15 Aug 43. (4) II Corps Ord

Sec Diary, 10 Aug 43. 48

 1bid.. 8 Aug 43.
170 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

marked, "We seem to be backing Army

instead of Army backing us."

 49 Colonel

Medaris continued to maintain that corps,

not army, should be made responsible for

maintenance and ammunition service in

the forward areas.50

On the other hand, II Corps had moved

very fast in an advance as far from base as

an advance across France to the German

border would have been. The supply lines

had been long and difficult—more difficult, reported General Lucas (observer

for General Eisenhower) than Bradley

probably realized. Lucas, traveling from

Algiers to the front lines, saw no real breakdowns in supply, and praised the hardworking Seventh Army staff. Colonel

Nixon, convinced as were Niblo and Medaris, that Ordnance service ought to be as

close to the front as possible, had sent maintenance and ammunition men forward

from Palermo as soon as he became aware

of the need for them. They arrived too

late, but this was mainly because communications between army and corps were

never adequate. When General Lucas visited General Bradley at his command post

on 14 August, Bradley told him that army

did not maintain telephone lines to corps

and that no army staff officer had ever

visited him. On the vital matter of ammunition, Major Ray, Medaris' ammunition officer, was appalled at the lack of

liaison and communication between forward ammunition supply dumps, army

headquarters, and the Engineer special

brigade.51

The combat troops had had enough

weapons and ammunition, thanks to less

enemy opposition than had been anticipated

and to the sheer bulk of matériel. By

D-day plus 5 it was plain that too many

supplies had been brought in; army

stopped the flow after the UGS-11 convoy.

Of supplies shipped to Sicily, 50,714 long

tons were ammunition (7,500 were expended) and 18,617 long tons were Class

II and IV Ordnance supplies; the total for

Ordnance accounted for more than half of

the matériel supplied by all the technical

services. At the same time, many of the

weapons that had been taken from stocks

in North Africa were old or obsolete, and

there were never enough trucks and truck

parts to meet the insatiable demands.52

Ordnance service at the front in the

short campaign had indicated the need for

more automotive companies, proportionally; for a collecting company with recovery

and evacuation equipment; and for more

men trained on heavy artillery. It had

confirmed Medaris in his conviction that

versatility was more to be desired than specialization. Sicily had provided the first

experience with antiaircraft maintenance

companies, and it was disappointing. The

men were trained mainly to service directors, and the 40-mm. antiaircraft guns in

the forward areas seldom used director control. Ordnance officers strongly recommended that if such companies were kept,

they be trained also to repair vehicles, but

49 Medaris felt that a better solution was to

 (1) Ibid., 11 Aug 43. (2) Ltr, Bradley to

TAG, 1 Sep 43, sub: Report of Operation of II

Corps in the Sicilian Campaign. (3) Lucas Diary,

Sicily, 14 Aug 43. 50

 (1) Medaris Ltr, 15 Aug 43. (2) Ltr, Medaris to

Borden, 21 Aug 43, Folder NATOUSA REPORT

(Col. Medaris to Col. Borden) 9 Sep 43, OHF.

51

 (1) Lucas Diary, Sicily, 14 Aug 43. (2)

Seventh Army Rpt, Report of the Ordnance Officer, p. K-7. (3) Ray Ltr, 26 Aug 43. 52

 Msg, Algiers to War No. W-Q322, 6 Sep 43,

ASF Planning Div, Theater Br, 12 General.
THE SHORT CAMPAIGN IN SICILY 171

attach antiaircraft maintenance sections to

ordinary maintenance companies. Another

new type of company that was felt to be

wasteful of personnel was the bomb disposal company; most officers preferred separate squads.53

The ammunition companies had been

controlled by the Engineer special brigade.

Under this arrangement, reported Major

Ray, ammunition supply had been "characterized throughout the campaign by ignorance on the part of personnel in rear

areas, and by lack of control of types

shipped to forward areas."

 54

 Ray strongly

urged that Ordnance in the future keep

control of ammunition companies. He also

recommended a revision and simplification

of Ordnance Field Manual 9-6, which set

up ammunition supply procedures. Ray's

critique contained, in Medaris' opinion,

much food for thought and many practical

suggestions. When it was sent back to the

Ordnance Department, it was given respectful attention because it came from

actual battle experience in both North

Africa and Sicily and was used in revising

the manual.55

Before the summer of 1943 had ended,

Ordnance officers in the Mediterranean

had learned much about the use of men

and about supply methods and were able

to apply these lessons in several ways.

Colonel Coffey had set up in Oran a stock

control system that was eventually to help

locate unidentified, "lost" stocks; Colonel

Crawford and Lt. Col. William G. Hynds.

Coffey's assistant, had returned to the

United States and persuaded the New York

Port of Embarkation to edit requisitions

less stringently. Crawford had also arranged for an eye-witness report on Ordnance support of invasions. Beginning with

Sicily, he sent at least one representative

from his AFHQ section, temporarily assigned to army staff, to observe Ordnance

operations. Maj. William H. Connerat, Jr.,

of AFHQ went to Sicily with the first contingent. His report, submitted on 2 August 1943, was carefully studied by Colonel Niblo who, as Ordnance officer of Fifth

Army, was planning for Ordnance support of the invasion of Italy, soon to take

place.56

53

 (1) Ltr, Bradley to TAG, 1 Sep 43, sub:

Report of Operation of II Corps in the Sicilian

Campaign, app. F, p. 1. (2) Medaris Ltr, 15 Aug

43. (3) Connerat Rpt. (4) Farmer Memo, 3 Aug

43.

54

 Ray Ltr, 26 Aug 43. 55

 (1) Memo, Ray for Ordnance Officer II Corps,

15 Aug 43, sub: Informal Report to Chief of

Ordnance, O.O. 350.05/6136. (2) Medaris Ltr, 15

Aug 43. (3) Ltr, Campbell to Medaris, 9 Sep 43,

NATOUSA Letter, Personal to Gen Campbell, 15

August 1943, OHF. 56

 (1) Ltr, Campbell to Coffey, 4 Aug 43. (2)

Ltr, Coffey to Campbell. Both in Campbell Overseas File. (3) History Ord Serv MTO, ch. VII.

(4) Crawford Interv.
CHAPTER X

Salerno and the Growth of

Fifth Army Ordnance Service

A month before the invasion of Sicily,

Prime Minister Churchill told the House

of Commons that "the mellow light of victory" had begun to play upon the great

expanse of World War II. In Tunisia the

Axis forces had surrendered; fewer U-boats

were harassing the Atlantic shipping lanes;

on the Eastern Front the Russians had driven the Germans back to the Donetz River

Basin; in the Pacific, operations against the

Central Solomons and the Bismarcks Barrier were about to begin.

On the next move in Europe and the

Mediterranean, the British and Americans

were reaching agreement. At the BritishAmerican conference (TRIDENT) in Washington in May 1943 the Americans, who

wanted to get on with the attack across the

English Channel, had got the British to

agree to a target date of 1 May 1944 and

a force of 29 divisions, of which 4 American and 3 British would be withdrawn

from the Mediterranean; the British, who

wanted to invade Italy in order to pin down

as many German divisions as possible and

provide bases to bomb Germany from the

south, had obtained the assent of the Americans to another landing in the Mediterranean after Sicily.

At first Italy was not specified—could

not be, in the American view, until the

outcome in Sicily was known—and plans

made during the early summer encompassed several operations. By mid-July,

however, the chances for a short campaign

in Sicily looked so good that planning was

centered on Italy. Toward the end of the

month the prognosis looked better still.

Benito Mussolini was ousted from the Italian Government, and negotiations with

Marshal Pietro Badoglio, his successor, excited hopes that Italy would get out of the

war. To take advantage of an Italian collapse, the Allies on 26 July agreed that

General Eisenhower should plan to make

an amphibious assault in the vicinity of

Naples as soon as possible. The bay of

Salerno was determined upon, and the

operation, named AVALANCHE and set for

9 September, was assigned to General

Clark's Fifth Army, consisting of the U.S.

VI Corps and the British 10 Corps. As

soon after Sicily as possible, General Montgomery's Eighth Army would cross the

Strait of Messina in a diversionary operation. Both armies would come under General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander's 15th

Army Group.1

1

 (1) Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for

Coalition Warfare, 1943-44, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959),

pp. 160-61, 246. (2) Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, pp. 228-33. (3) Clark, Calculated Risk, pp.

174-79. (4) For the tactical history of early

operations in Italy see Martin Blumenson, Salerno
SALERNO AND THE FIFTH ARMY ORDNANCE SERVICE 173

Between the fall of Mussolini and the

invasion of Italy, begun by General Montgomery on 3 September, forty days of precious time were lost. In answering critics

who ascribed the delay to unnecessarily

prolonged negotiations with Marshal Badoglio, Prime Minister Churchill pointed

out that landing craft could not be withdrawn from Sicily until the first week in

August and then had to be taken back to

Africa for repair and reloading. General

Marshall, who was irritated by the slowness in mounting the operation, thought

the logistical officers too cautious.2 Whatever the reason for the delay, in those forty

days the Germans brought thirteen divisions

into Italy, occupied Rome and Naples, and

even held exercises to repel invaders at Salerno—the obvious spot for a landing, since

it was as far north as the Allies could go

and still have fighter cover.3

When the Fifth Army's first assault wave

neared shore before dawn on 9 September,

from the shore a loud speaker blared in

English, "Come on in and give up. We

have you covered!"

 4 Though this sounded

like a Wild West movie, the Germans were

not bluffing. Very nearly throwing the

invaders back into the sea, the Germans

pinned them down on the beaches for

about ten days before withdrawing north

to take up strong defensive positions that

kept the Allies in Italy, storming mountain

after mountain, until the end of the war in

Europe.

Beyond Naples, which fell on 1 October,

was the Volturno River and the strong

German Winter Line. That penetrated—

it took until mid-January 1944 in winter

mud to do it—there was the even stronger

Gustav Line anchored at Mount Cassino

and further protected by the swift Rapido

and Garigliano Rivers. To overcome the

Gustav Line and break out into the Liri

Valley leading to Rome, ninety miles away,

took four months of grueling struggle

through torrents of rain and snow and

lakes of mud. An attempt to hasten the

breakthrough by landing behind the German line at Anzio on the coast below

Rome did not succeed. Rome did not fall

until 4 June 1944, only two days before

D-day in Normandy. After the capture of

Rome, seven veteran divisions were drawn

off for the invasion of southern France.

The remainder, plus new divisions of varying nationalities, pushed forward in Italy,

but were caught by winter at the final

barrier in the high Apennines and could

not break through until March 1945.

Whatever the merits of this slow, arduous, expensive, and much-criticized battering operation up the Italian peninsula,

the campaigns required a heavy weight of

Ordnance support. Fortunately General

Clark had an Ordnance officer who was

more than equal to the job. Veteran of

TORCH and the Tunisia Campaign, Col.

Urban Niblo had shown that he was inventive, vigorous, and resourceful. He had

very definite opinions, especially as to the

organization of Ordnance service, but he

was always willing to profit by mistakes

to Cassino, a volume in preparation for the UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 2

 (1) Winston S. Churchill, "The Second World

War," Closing the Ring (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951), p. 156. (2) Interv, Gen George

C. Marshall by Maj Roy Lamson, Maj David

Hamilton, Dr. Sidney T. Mathews, and Dr. Howard

M. Smyth, 25 Jul 49, OCMH. 3

 (1) Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, 249-50.

(2) Rpt on Italian Campaign 3 Sep 43-2 May

45 from the viewpoint of the German High Command (written from German sources), p. 8,

OCMH. 4

 History Fifth Army I, 32.
174 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

and never hesitated to "throw away the

book" when necessary. In this ill-starred

theater, he was to need all the resourcefulness he could command.5

One problem in AVALANCHE plaguing

other Fifth Army sections, the Engineers

for example, did not trouble the Ordnance

Section. That was the difficulty of meshing British and American logistical support

of Fifth Army, which consisted of the U.S.

VI Corps and the British 10 Corps. In the

case of Ordnance, the differences in the

connotation of the word ordnance and in

the organizations that performed parallel

functions in the British and U.S. Armies

made separate services necessary. For that

reason the British 10 Corps had its own ordnance support, which was supplied from

the same line of communications (known

as Fortbase) that supplied Montgomery's

Eighth Army; Fifth Army Ordnance Service, organized by Niblo, supported the

American portion of Fifth Army—the portion soon to be predominant.6

Niblo's Group Organization

On 1 September 1943 Colonel Niblo sent

General Campbell a handwritten V-mail

note informing him that Colonel Rose

was that day giving birth to a new provisional Ordnance group, and added "bastard as it is, I have confidence it will live

and be even more successful than its predecessor." The unit was illegitimate because the War Department had not yet

given final approval to a permanent organization of this kind. During the summer of 1943 the Army Ground Forces

headquarters was working on a combat

zone Ordnance group organization, and

was even reported to favor an Ordnance

brigade to control the work of the groups.

But the War Department did not authorize group headquarters for AGF service

units until mid-October of 1943, and there

was no TOE for an Ordnance combat zone

group until the appearance of TOE 9-12

on 15 April 1944.7

Colonel Niblo's reason for jumping the

gun on the War Department was that he

wanted a staff that would be adequate to

"administer, operate, and command" Fifth

Army Ordnance service. On the day he

obtained his provisional group, 1 September 1943, a year had passed since Ordnance had received responsibility for supplying and repairing trucks and other vehicles. That task now accounted for about

80 percent of the total Ordnance work

load, yet the War Department had done

nothing to enlarge the army Ordnance

officer's staff, which was (prior to the establishment of the Provisional Ordnance

Group) limited to the 38 men (11 officers,

1 warrant officer, 26 enlisted men) provided in the table of organization for an

army headquarters (T/O 200-1) dated 1 5

 (1) Crawford Interv. (2) Brig Gen Urban

Niblo, Lessons of World War II, OHF. (3) Colonel

Borden reported to General Campbell that "General

Clark spoke very highly of Niblo and is very confident in his ability." Memo, Borden for Campbell,

7 Jun 43, sub: Outstanding Ordnance Officers Contacted, Campbell Overseas File. 6

 (1) Engineer History-Fifth Army-Mediterranean Theater, vol. I, p. 11, OHF. (2) History of

AFHQ, pt. Two, sec. 1, pp. 149, 179; sec. 4, pp.

513-14, OCMH. (3) Montgomery, El Alamein to

the River Sangro, pp. 116, 154.

7

 (1) Ltrs, Niblo to Campbell, 1 Sep 43; Campbell to Niblo, 17 Sep 43. Both in Campbell Overseas File. (2) Fifth Army GO 64, 1 Sep 43, 105-

1.13 (48999) General Orders-Fifth Army JanDec 43. (3) WD Cir 256, 16 Oct 43. (4) Memo,

CofS AGF for CG, AGF, 15 Jul 44, sub: Activation of Hq Detachment, Ordnance Groups and

Shipment of Ordnance Groups, ASF Planning

Div, Theater Br, ETO, vol. VII, Troop Units 1944.
SALERNO AND THE FIFTH ARMY ORDNANCE SERVICE 175

July 1942, a complement considerably less

than half the strength of the Quartermaster

Section of 84 men and far behind the Engineers with 72, and the Signal Corps with

66. Moreover, the Engineer and Signal

Sections were organized according to their

own service tables of organization, T/O

5-200-1 and T/O 11-200-1, respectively.8

In the fall of 1942 Ordnance planners

in the United States had tried to strengthen

the hand of the Ordnance officer at army

level. In the campaigns to come he would

have to carry a heavy burden of administration—from which corps was now freed;

his responsibility for motor transport was

certain to be enormous; and it seemed

very likely that other duties would require

efforts far beyond anything hitherto demanded of him. For example, the responsibility for recovering matériel from the battlefield, which required Ordnance troops

to be present in the combat zone, was cited

by General Campbell in November 1942

when he requested Army Service Forces to

redesignate the Ordnance Department a

supply arm, rather than a supply service.

General Somervell turned down the request.9

 Attempts to obtain War Department approval for an Army Ordnance

Command at army headquarters, with an

enlarged staff consisting of a headquarters and headquarters company organized

under T/O 9-200-1, also came to nothing.

General McNair's dislike of large army

headquarters and his horror of excess paper

work in the theaters made any sizable increase impossible during 1943.10

At Fifth Army—the first U.S. army activated overseas—Colonel Ford as Ordnance officer had tried to obtain an Army

Ordnance Command organized on an

operational basis, and Niblo had continued

the effort, but they had failed. By late

July, faced with the probability that Fifth

Army combat operations would require as

many as 36 Ordnance companies, Niblo

was ready to welcome "any workable solution or plan . . . rather than further delay

in search of a perfect T/O & T/E 9-200-

1."11 Reports that came back from the

Sicily Campaign showed clearly that an

Ordnance officer with a weak staff was

badly handicapped.12 In the end, Niblo's

answer was the group organization.

There was one important difference between the new group, which was designated

the 6694th Ordnance Group (Provisional),

and its predecessor, the 1st Provisional Ordnance Group. Instead of commanding it

himself, as he had the POG when he

formed it as Ordnance officer of II Corps,

Colonel Niblo placed his executive officer,

Colonel Rose, at the head, delegating to

8

 (1) Niblo Interv of 28 Sep 55. (2) Ltr, Niblo

to Chief Ord Officer, NATOUSA, 20 Jul 43, sub:

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Fifth

Army Ordnance Command, History Ord Service

MTO, vol. I, ch. II, Annex F. (3) WD Table

of Organization No. 200-1, 1 Jul 42, Headquarters, Army. 9

 Ltr, Campbell to CG Services of Supply, n.d.,

sub: Redesignation of the Ordnance Department as

a Supply Arm; 1st Ind, 2 Dec 42, ASF Planning

Div. Both in Folder Ordnance Department. Gen

Styer's File.

10

 (1) Memo, Col Robert W. Daniels, AGF Ord

Officer, for Key Ord Officers, 24 Nov 42, sub:

Ground Force Ordnance Units, History Ord Service MTO, vol. I, ch. II, Annex H. (2) Greenfield.

Palmer, and Wiley, The Organization of Ground

Combat Troops, pp. 359-61. (3) Ltr, Medaris to

Daniels, 8 Nov 43, no sub, ETO Ord Sec 320.3

Organization of British Army, KCRC. (4) WD

T/O 200-1 as revised 26 Dec 43. 11

 Ltr, Niblo to Chief Ordnance Officer NATOUSA, 20 Jul 43, sub: Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Fifth Army Ordnance Command, and Incls 1-6, Hist Ord Serv MTO, vol. I,

ch. II, Annex F. 12

 (1) MacMorland Rpt, pp. 19-20. (2) Connerat Rpt, p. 11.
176 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

him all operation and command of army

Ordnance battalions and envisaging the

Ordnance Section of Fifth Army headquarters as a policy-forming, advisory, and

planning unit only.13 Rose, after commanding two battalions in the early part

of the Tunisia Campaign, had gone to

Fifth Army with his old commander, and

in April had been sent to the British Eighth

Army to study its organization.14

For the important job of maintenance

and supply officer of the Fifth Army Ordnance Section, Niblo had Colonel Moffitt,

who also had come to North Africa with

him. Moffitt had served as a battalion

commander throughout the Tunisia Campaign and had gone to Sicily as commander

of the 42d Ordnance Battalion. After the

Sicily Campaign was over Colonel Medaris, on leaving for England to become

Ordnance officer of First Army, recommended Moffitt to succeed him as Ordnance officer of II Corps. However, Niblo

was able to obtain his services and Moffitt

reported for duty in August 1943. With

the 20 men in Rose's headquarters and the

31 planned for the advance and rear echelons of Niblo's staff, there were 51 experienced men for staff duties and command

operations.15

Having succeeded in obtaining an adequate staff, Niblo went a step further in

planning Fifth Army Ordnance Service. He

wanted a second group headquarters to be

used to control the composite battalions

sent forward in direct support of VI Corps,

but such a unit was not available in the

theater and could not be obtained from the

War Department. Some three months

later, after the strength of the German resistance was evident to all, Niblo was able

to organize three groups—one for forward

third echelon work, one for ammunition

supply, and one for operations in the rear.16

For the time being, however, he placed

under the 6694th Ordnance Group the four

battalions planned for the campaign: one

for ammunition; one for third echelon support of the VI Corps infantry divisions;

one for repair of corps and army trucks,

DUKW's, and other motor vehicles; and

one to do fourth echelon work on tanks

and other heavy maintenance.17

The group headquarters and most of the

battalions were to land in Italy on D plus

12, 21 September, when the bulk of Fifth

Army was scheduled to arrive. The American D-day combat forces were VI Corps

headquarters, the 36th Infantry Division

(fresh from the United States), one tank

battalion, and a floating reserve consisting

of a reinforced regimental combat team of

the veteran 45th Division. The Americans

were to land at Paestum, the British 10

13

 Ltr, Crawford to CofOrd, 29 Feb 44, sub:

Technical Letter No. 19, MTO Ord Sec 400.113,

KCRC. 14

 Ltr, Rose to Niblo, 2 May 43, sub: Report

on Special Duty with the Eighth Army, MTO

Ord Sec 319-1, KCRC. 15

 Ltr, Niblo to CG Fifth Army, 2 Oct 43, sub:

Initial Bi-Weekly Report of Army Ordnance Service,

Covering the Period 9 September to 30 September,

1943, Incl 1, Organization of Army Ordnance Service as existing on 30 September 1943, Fifth Army

Ordnance Officer's Bi-Weekly Reports to the Army

Commander, Book Number 1, OHF. (Hereafter

these reports will be cited as Niblo Rpt, with appropriate date.)

16

 (1) Ltr, Crawford to CofOrd, 29 Feb 44,

sub: Technical Letter No. 19, MTO Ord Sec

400.113, KCRC. (2) Army Ordnance Administrative Instructions 28, 10 Dec 43, sub: Army Ordnance Service, in Niblo Rpts, OHF. Unless otherwise indicated, all Army Ordnance Administrative

Instructions hereafter cited are from this file. 17

 Outline Plan AVALANCHE Operation, 26 Aug

43, Annex II, pt. II, U.S. Troops, RED VAULT

(Fifth Army).
SALERNO AND THE FIFTH ARMY ORDNANCE SERVICE 177

Corps with two divisions a few miles farther

north, near Salerno. The AVALANCHE

plan of 26 August was based on the assumption that the Italian resistance would

approximate that in HUSKY—which was

very little—and that Germany's commitments in the USSR would continue to hold

the bulk of the German ground and air

force on the Soviet front.18

Optimism grew after Italy's surrrender

to the Allies on 3 September. Aboard

ship just before sailing with the D-day convoy on 5 September, General Clark seemed

to think there would not be much opposition. He even talked of the possibility that

one of his follow-up divisions might land as

far north as Rome. Some of the newspaper correspondents understood General

Eisenhower to say that the Allied forces

would be in Rome by mid-December or

very soon thereafter. The British were

optimistic too. On the evening of 7 September a member of Admiral Sir Andrew

B. Cunningham's staff came aboard the

Boise, one of the ships in the D-day convoy

then steaming toward Italy, with the news

that the landing in the harbor of Salerno

would be unopposed.19

These miscalculations were not fatal to

the Allied cause, although they came near

being so to the American beachhead on

the evening of 14-15 September, when

General Clark was faced with the possibility of being driven back to the sea.20

 Their

main effect was to disarrange the schedule

of the follow-up landings. The necessity

for sending in fresh combat troops ahead

of time, out of proportion to the service

elements already landed, placed a great

strain on the supporting units. Additional

combat troops were landed in Italy while

the Ordnance companies assigned to support them were still in North Africa and

Sicily. Niblo's carefully worked out task

assignments soon had to be revised. After

II Corps was sent to the aid of VI Corps

early in October, his whole organization

had to be taken apart, reorganized, and

considerably enlarged. By mid-November

the 6694th Ordnance Group was comparable in size to a brigade. The Italian campaign was destined to be the first real test

of Ordnance field service in direct support

of ground forces; according to Colonel Coffey, "the first true large-scale proving

ground."

 21

"Hell in the Dunes"

Colonel Niblo planned carefully for

AVALANCHE. The report on Sicily by Maj.

William H. Connerat, Jr., had shown clearly that more weapons and ammunition had

been landed there than the men could

18

 (1) Ibid. (2) The D-day convoy carried

105,000 C rations to feed the 15,000 prisoners that

VI Corps was expected to capture in the first

seven days. RED VAULT Fifth Army G-4 History

of Opn AVALANCHE—Salerno, Jul-Oct 43. 19

 (1) Truscott, Command Missions, p. 247. (2)

Christopher Buckley, The Road to Rome (London,

1945)5, p. 226. (3) George Biddle, Artist at War

(New York: Viking Press, 1944), p. 126. (4)

Alan Moorehead, Eclipse (New York: CowardMcCann, 1945), p. 60.

20

 Clark, Calculated Risk, p. 198. See Morison,

Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, pp. 293-94, for the plan to

shift troops from the American to the British

beachhead. 21

 (1) Memo, Col Garland H. Williams for

Director, Planning Div, 6 Jan 44, sub: Notes on

Italian Campaign, Folder, Lessons Learned, ASF

Planning Div, Theater Br. (2) Col Niblo, quoted

in AGF Board Report, 26 Nov 43, sub: Comments

from North African Theater, ASF Planning Div,

Theater Br, General File 17. (3) Army Ordnance

Admin Instr 2, 14 Oct 43. (4) Ltr, Coffey to

Niblo n.d., quoted in Army Ordnance Admin Instr

15, 9 Nov 43, OHF.
178 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

classify or segregate. For the Italian landing, Niblo scaled down the amount of supplies, arranging for the bulk to come in on

the convoy due on D plus 12, and sent in

more Ordnance troops. He also took along

some experienced officers to direct beachhead operations. As commander of the

AVALANCHE maintenance battalion, the

45th, he had Lt. Col. Henry L. McGrath,

who was Colonel Crawford's executive at

AFHQ Ordnance Section and had been an

observer of the landing in Sicily. To direct ammunition operations Niblo was able

to obtain Maj. Daniel F. Shepherd, Crawford's ammunition officer. The DUKW

repair expert in the landing was Capt.

Herbert A. Suddard of the Amphibian

Vehicle School at Fifth Army's Invasion

Training Center, who had made a study of

DUKW maintenance in the invasion of Sicily. There was nothing wrong with Niblo's

planning—but Salerno was to be quite different from Sicily.22

On the evening before D-day, as the attacking forces were sailing toward the Gulf

of Salerno on a calm sea silvered by the

moon, General Eisenhower's voice over the

radios announced to the troops the surrender of Italy. Shouts from the whole

fleet echoed over the Mediterranean. In

his cabin on the Ancon General Clark was

discussing with his staff "such pleasant possibilities as a direct move into Naples Harbor" ; one Air Forces unit was so certain of

landing at Naples that it dewaterproofed

its vehicles aboard ship. Some infantrymen of the 36th Division proposed to go

in with unloaded weapons, some complained that they would not have a chance

to fight.23

What they got was "hell in the dunes."

 24

As the assault forces neared the beaches the

Germans opened up with artillery, mortar,

and machine gun fire. The machine gun

fire came from the most seaward dunes,

about 20 to 70 yards behind the shore line;

artillery fire from farther back, where a

flat plain extended inland three to five

miles before giving way to a mountain

range. Tanks roamed the plain and even

came down to the beaches; two of them

fired on small landing craft and had to be

driven off by gunfire from an LST. Mine

fields and heavy shellfire closed two of the

southernmost beaches for several hours.

The dodging, circling landing craft and

DUKW's were forced to land wherever they

could. But in spite of the German barrage,

which increased with the first light, the

cursing, sweating shore parties made roads,

laid out beach dumps, and began to unload. By midmorning the situation was

better. Naval guns (at first silent to gain

surprise) had gone into action; the men on

the beaches had driven back tanks with bazookas and the invaluable 105-mm. howitzer; and the infantry, recovering from the

first shock, climbed out of foxholes and

began to push out toward the hills. By

midafternoon men, vehicles, and supplies

were crossing the beaches at a fast pace.25

2 2

 (1) Crawford Interview. (2) Interv with

McGrath, 8 May 57. (3) Ltr, Crawford to OCO,

19 Oct 43, sub: Technical Information Letter

No. 15, MTO Ord Sec 400.113, KCRC.

23

 (1) Clark, Calculated Risk, p. 187. (2) Belden, Still Time to Die, p. 291. (3) Capt Madison

Post for Gen Coffey, 14 Oct 43, sub: Trip Report

(hereafter cited as Post Rpt), p. 5, Folder, Fifth

Army Operation AVALANCHE, Report of Captain

Madison Post, OHF. (4) Company E History, in

History 531st Engr Shore Regt, 2d Bn, 20 Aug30 Sep 43, p. 9. 24

 History Co E, p. 12. 25

 Company histories in History 531st Engr

Shore Regt, 2d Bn and 3d Bn, 20 Aug-3O Sep 43.

For the best detailed official account of the land-
SALERNO AND THE FIFTH ARMY ORDNANCE SERVICE 179

The Ordnance men began landing at

0900. There were detachments from seven

companies: two ammunition, the 66th and

the 2652d (provisional); two automotive

maintenance, the 3485th and the 3486th,

the latter primarily for DUKW's; two medium maintenance, the 46th and the 28th,

the latter primarily for antiaircraft maintenance; and a depot, the 189th. All were

ashore by 1900 and working in the Engineer dumps and motor pool. For the first

three days they were attached to the 531st

Engineer Shore Regiment; on 12 September they reverted to VI Corps and -were

placed under the newly arrived 45th Ordnance Battalion headquarters, all except

the men of the DUKW repair company,

who were left under the Engineers a few

days longer to work at the beachheads.26

As a result of the disrupted landing plans

and congested beaches, Ordnance shop

trucks, tools, and other equipment were

late getting ashore or were landed on the

wrong beaches and could not be found.

All the detachments except the 46th's were

without proper tools and equipment for

the first three or four days. This was especially serious for the truck and DUKW

mechanics, who always bore most of the

maintenance burden in beachhead operations. With only hand tools and almost

no spare parts, the men did their best,

cannibalizing wrecked vehicles and borrowing tools from the Engineers until D

plus 3, when the technical vehicles of the

46th, the bulk of the company, and about

200 tons of supplies landed. The little 18-

man detachment of the 189th Depot Company was perhaps worse off than any other

unit. It had no jeeps to use in searching

the beaches or any trucks or cranes to use

in hauling and stacking the mountainous

supplies piled haphazardly on the beaches.

Without transportation, the men even had

trouble getting rations and water.27

The ammunition men were better off

than they had been in the invasion of Sicily, but the confusion that everyone had

come to expect in amphibious operations

was just as great. For example, a box containing most of the 155-mm. howitzer

primers got lost among the piles of rations

and other supplies and caused a dangerous

shortage in 155-mm. howitzer ammunition

in the first few days. Ammunition arrived

at the dumps in nearly every combination

conceivable; a single DUKW would bring

in as many as 21 types. But unlike their

predecessors in HUSKY, the ammunition

detachments in AVALANCHE had 21⁄2-ton

trucks to use in arranging their dumps and

could thus segregate types and make issues

without errors. This time, there was no oversupply to burden transportation, and Ordnance, not the Engineers, was in control.

Major Shepherd got ashore shortly after

noon on D-day to supervise the beach

dumps, unofficially; on D plus 2 he was officially attached to the Engineer shore regiment to control all ammunition and saw to it

that there were no shortages. For being able

to anticipate the combat troops' requirements and thus get critical ammunition

unloaded on time, for "unselfish devotion

to duty, coolness under fire, and capable

ings see Vice Adm H. K. Hewitt, The Italian

Campaign, Western Naval Task Force, Action

Report of the Salerno Landings, September-October, 1943, Jan 45 (hereafter cited as Western

Naval Task Force Rpt). 24

 (1) Post Rpt, p. 7. (2) History 531st Engr

Shore Regt, 20 Aug-30 Sep 43, pp. 3, 9-10. (3)

45th Ordnance Battalion (M&S), Historical Record, 1 Sep to 30 Sep 43. 27

 Post Rpt, pp. 7-9.
180 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

leadership," he was given a commendation

by General Clark.28

Colonel McGrath, who arrived with the

headquarters of the 45th Ordnance Battalion on the evening of D plus 2, and

Major Shepherd ran the show very competently for the first twelve days. Niblo's

invasion staff paid off handsomely. Captain Suddard, sent to Maiori with an Ordnance detachment of 4 officers and 50 enlisted men to support Colonel Darby's Ranger Task Force, worked hard and long

under enemy shellfire and bombing. For

this he received a promotion to major—the

first battlefield promotion of an Ordnance

officer or of any service branch officer.29

McGrath rounded up the Ordnance detachments scattered along the beaches and

assembled them at his battalion bivouac

area two miles north of Paestum, the ruins

of an ancient town just behind the American beaches, distinguished by a conical

stone watchtower and the Doric columns of

two temples. On the morning of the 13th,

the day the Germans counterattacked, he

set off in his jeep to make contact with the

combat troops and the next day sent out

contact parties from the 46th Ordnance

Company to service and resupply the weapons of the infantry and tank battalions that

had staved off the German advance at the

danger point near the Sele River.30

The first job tackled by the 45th Battalion as a whole was dewaterproofing. By

mid-September, areas for this important

work had been set aside behind the

beaches; until then only the air intake pipes

and a little of the grease had been removed

from the vehicles. Many vehicles were

operating without air cleaners, or without

oil in air cleaners, in the clouds of dust

that were everywhere; batteries and gear

cases had not been given proper attention.

McGrath sent details from his companies

to the dewaterproofing areas to make certain that the vehicles were properly checked

and to be sure that air cleaners were installed and filled. Trucks became even

more immediately important when it was

discovered that because of a favorable

beach gradient and good weather—there

were only small waves, no surf—they could

be backed up to landing craft to be loaded

and then driven to inland dumps.31

Supplies and reinforcements were pouring in. By 20 September the 82d Airborne

Division was ashore, the 3d Infantry Division and the rest of the 45th had been

brought forward from Sicily, and the 34th

Infantry Division was on the way from

North Africa. By then the beachhead was

secure, the enemy was withdrawing, and

the 3d and 45th Divisions were beginning

28

 (1) Post Rpt, p. 10. (2) App. No. E, G-4

Hist Rpt, Ord Sec, Period 9 September to 31

December 1943, RED VAULT Fifth Army Office

of the Ord Officer, 9 Sep-Dec 43. (3) Niblo Rpt,

31 Oct 43, Incl 6. (4) Ltr, Maj William O.

Green, Div Ord Off, to CG 36th Inf Div, 24 Sep

43, sub: Ordnance Report, Operation AVALANCHE,

in Opn AVALANCHE Staff Sec Rpts 36th Inf Div

9-21 Sep 43. (5) Maj Daniel F. Shepherd, Report on Operation of Ammunition Supply in Operation AVALANCHE. 12 Dec 43, ETO Ord Sec 320.1,

KCRC. 29

 (1) Crawford Interv. (2) Ltr, Niblo to CO's

45th Ord Bn and 62d Ord Bn, 20 Sep 43, sub:

Ordnance Support for Ranger Task Force, History

Ord Serv MTO, ch. IV, pt. I, app. C. (3) Interv

with Marshall S. David, 20-21 Jun 57. (4) VI

Corps G-4 Jnl, 11 Sep 43.

30

 (1) Jnl 11-14 Sep in 45th Bn History. (2)

History 46th Ord Medium Maint Co, Sep 43. The

46th lost two men, an officer and an enlisted man

"last seen crossing the Sele River in a jeep, not

thereafter heard from." Ibid. For the counterattack and its repulse see Fifth Army History, vol.

I, pp. 37-41. 31

 (I) Jnl 15-16 Sep in 45th Bn History. (2)

Post Rpt, pp. 4-6, 12.
SALERNO AND THE FIFTH ARMY ORDNANCE SERVICE 181

the advance northward toward the next objective, the Volturno River. The advance,

slow in getting under way because of the unexpected resistance on the beaches, was

further impeded by the Germans' skillful

delaying tactics in blowing bridges and

planting land mines in the path of the invaders. It was 1 October before the British

10 Corps, advancing up the coast, entered

Naples. The wrecked port, by "a miracle

of reconstruction"

 32

 was placed in operation

by 15 October but until then, as the U.S.

VI Corps continued to press north of Naples

in pursuit of the enemy and the first elements

of II Corps headquarters began to arrive

from Sicily, supplies had to come from the

Salerno dumps.33

The inland dumps were managed better

than they had been at Sicily, for at Salerno,

because of the insistence of General Clark's

G-4, Col. Ralph H. Tate, the service

chiefs, not the Engineer beach group, had

control after 12 September; and fortunately plans had called for an abnormally

large build-up of twenty days' supply over

the beaches. These supplies helped tremendously when more combat troops had

to be brought in than originally planned.

Even so, Colonel Tate "sweated blood" in

attempting to get supplies to the front in

the fifteen days before the port opened.34

For Colonel Niblo there was a stroke of

bad luck early in the game.

The greatest blow for Ordnance in

AVALANCHE came on 21 September after

the ordeal of the dunes was over. It took

place not on land, but at sea where fifteen

Liberty ships of the D plus 12 convoy were

waiting to come in. One of them, the S.S.

William W. Gherard, carried the depot

stocks and organic equipment of the 189th

Ordnance Depot Company—16 vans and

other vehicles loaded with weapons and

spare parts. Also aboard were the supplies

of three other companies—all the organic

equipment of the 529th Heavy Maintenance

Company (Tank), as well as 30 days' supply of replacement vehicles and spare parts;

three tank recovery units belonging to

the 477th Evacuation Company; and 183

boxes of bulk-stored spare parts destined

for the 46th Medium Maintenance Company.35

The danger from the guided bombs that

sank one merchant ship and badly damaged

another in an earlier convoy seemed to

have abated, but submarines were beginning to worry the Navy. Three U-boats

were reported in the southeast Tyrrhenian

Sea in the late afternoon of 20 September.

The next morning the Gherard was torpedoed near Point Licosa. The tug Moreno

tried to beach her, but fire broke out in

holds containing gasoline and ammunition,

making salvage impossible. By dark all the

men aboard except one had been saved,

but the ship was a total loss.36 So went

down "all," reported Colonel Niblo, "repeat all, Ordnance Class II supplies to support operation AVALANCHE." The worst

effect was the loss of all the spare parts

that had been counted on for maintenance

to D plus 17.37

Niblo requested replacements immediate32

 Clark, Calculated Risk, p. 217. 33

 Truscott, Command Missions, p. 254. 34

 (1) Interv, Brig Gen Ralph H. Tate by Dr.

Sidney T. Mathews, 19 Jan 49, pp. 3-5, OCMH.

(2) VI Corps G-4 Jnl.

35

 Niblo Rpt, 2 Oct 43. 36

 Western Naval Task Force Rpt, 50-52, 100-

101. The Gherard was one of three merchant ships

out of nearly a hundred Allied craft of all types

sunk or damaged in the invasion, most of them by

bombs or shellfire. Ibid., pp. 206-09. 37

 (1) Niblo, quoted in AGF Board Report, 26

Nov 43. (2) Niblo Rpt, 31 Oct 43.
182 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

ly, but they did not arrive until 1 December, when the second big convoy came in.

In the meantime there was the problem of

resupplying small arms lost in battle—

carbines, rifles, pistols, and bayonets—and

supplying the newly landed combat troops,

of which some 4,000 arrived without hand

weapons. These items were short in North

Africa: SOS NATOUSA had advised

that it could not arm replacements and

maintain the reserve as well. "There must

be an explanation," commented Colonel

McGrath, "but I wonder if it would be

convincing to a doughboy short something

he needs to fight with."

 38

Watches and binoculars were in very

short supply. Some of the antiaircraft units

who shot down friendly planes in the first

ten days complained that many of their

observers could not identify Allied markings in time because they had no field

glasses. Field artillery and tank destroyer

units also suffered from the shortage. Pilferage accounted for some of the watch

and binocular losses, but it was also true

that more were needed for mountain fighting, which required a great number of patrols and observation posts, than had been

called for in tables of equipment.39

"Uninterrupted" Ordnance Service

As the infantry divisions pushed north

from Salerno to Cassino along the edge of

the Neapolitan plain—the Campania felix

of green winter wheat, Lombardy poplars,

and orchards—and into rocky hills and

somber mountains blanketed with rain

clouds and reverberating with the roar of

guns, the Ordnance units followed close

behind. By the end of October Colonel

Rose's 6694th Ordnance Group headquarters, which had landed with the D plus 12

convoy, had 7 battalions with 29 companies, a total of nearly 6,000 men. Most

of the men were veterans of Sicily or Tunisia. They came from Palermo or Bizerte

on LST's and LCT's with their shop trucks,

cargo trucks, vans, and jeeps, and found

Italy a welcome change. The men of the

525th Heavy Maintenance Tank Company, the unit that had served with the

British in the Libyan desert, had the first

fresh fruit they had tasted since they left

home in May of 1942.40

On arrival, the battalion commanding

officers were given their task assignments.

The 42d and 45th Ordnance Battalions

were to provide third echelon maintenance

and supply support to II Corps and VI

Corps, respectively; the 62d Ammunition

Battalion was to operate army forward

ASP's and rear dumps; the 87th Battalion

was to repair corps and army trucks,

DUKW's and other motor vehicles; the

188th was to furnish third echelon maintenance to all tank and tank destroyer

groups; the 197th was responsible for evacuation and fourth echelon work; and the

2630th, a new unit organized in North

Africa, was to provide third echelon maintenance and supply to all the antiaircraft

units in Fifth Army.41

The third echelon companies were given 38

 (1) Ibid., 2 Oct, 28 Nov 43. (2) RED VAULT

Fifth Army, G-4 History Opn AVALANCHE-Salerno, p. 7. (3) ASF Information Letter NATOUSA

#2, 14 Oct 43, Incl C, McGrath Report on Operation AVALANCHE (hereafter cited as McGrath Rpt). 39

 (1) McGrath Rpt. (2) Interv, Mathews with

Tate. (3) Ordnance Weekly Bulletin No. 2, 30 Oct

43.

40

 (1) History 525th Ord Heavy Maint Co, Tk.

1943. (2) Niblo Rpt, 14 Oct 43. 41

 (1) Army Ordnance Admin Instr 2. 14 Oct

43. (2) Niblo Rpt, 14 Nov 43, Incl 5. (3) Jnl

45th Ord Bn 18-19 Sep in History 45th Ord Bn.
SALERNO AND THE FIFTH ARMY ORDNANCE SERVICE 183

definite assignments to support a specified

infantry division or artillery, tank, tank

destroyer, antiaircraft or other unit. Colonel Niblo was convinced from a study

of the Tunisia and Sicily Campaigns that

it was inefficient to place Ordnance troops

geographically in certain areas with the

general task of supporting all combat units

that might be passing through. Therefore

he gave firm instructions that when the

line units moved the Ordnance units moved

too, as closely behind as logistics would

permit, sending out contact parties daily

to combat units. He ordered the group

commander, the battalion commander, or

the company commander to make periodic

calls on the commanding officer of the

combat unit being supported to keep him

informed of the mission and location of

his Ordnance troops and the condition of

his Ordnance matériel, and to offer and

request co-operation in solving communications and other problems. Niblo did

everything he could to instill in his men the

conviction that every major combat unit

was entitled to support at all times. His

slogan throughout the Italian campaign was

"UNINTERRUPTED Ordnance Service."

 42

In placing Ordnance units close behind

the combat troops, with definite assignments, Colonel Niblo had the enthusiastic

suport of Colonel Tate, the Fifth Army

G-4, who wanted to keep supply service

troops under army control for greater flexibility and at the same time give no cause

for complaints that support was too far to

the rear, a complaint often heard about

the Sicily Campaign. Another advantage

in Tate's eyes was that the men in the division or corps and the Ordnance men

"would get to know each other and the

ordnance outfit would take great pride in

repairing and servicing the equipment of

the outfit it worked with."

 43

 This feeling

was fostered when Niblo sent the 42d Battalion to the vicinity of Avellino to act as

"host" or "welcoming committee" to the

units of II Corps that were ferried from

Sicily in October, and drove up the Italian

coast. The 42d selected bivouac areas,

provided guides and signs, and, after organizing the staging area, repaired and conditioned all weapons and vehicles so that

they were ready for action when the corps

moved into the combat zone.44

The policy of moving Ordnance companies when their combat units moved had

to be modified in late January 1944 when

the War Department was reorganizing and

regrouping certain combat units, such as

nondivisional artillery, tank, and tank destroyer battalions, so that they would be

more sensitive to the surge of battle. The

constant regrouping and shifting made it

too difficult for the Ordnance maintenance

companies, limited in number, to keep up.

Therefore, as a general policy, maintenance and supply responsibility was transferred from one Ordnance company to another as required. The old company forwarded to the new company within twentyfour hours an envelope containing complete, up-to-date records of the status of

Ordnance support to the combat unit involved, a process described by Niblo as the

"simple transfer of the record of business

with a customer from one branch office to

another." The Envelope System, as it was

called, made it possible for one company 42

 (1) Army Ordnance Admin Instr 2. 14 Oct

43; see also later administrative instructions. (2)

Ltr, Rose to Campbell, 17 Oct 43, Campbell Overseas File.

43

 Interv, Mathews with Tate. 44

 Niblo Rpt, 14 Oct 43.
184 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

to pick up quickly where another left off,

and gave excellent results.45

Poop Sheets and Purple Blurbs

In the interest of UNINTERRUPTED

Ordnance Service, Colonel Niblo believed

in keeping his Ordnance units as well informed as possible. He expanded the usual

Army Ordnance Administrative Instructions, prescribed in the Ordnance field

manual, to include revised task assignments

and policies, useful technical information,

and items of interest. He also took steps to

keep his Ordnance commanders informed

on the movement and equipment of the

combat forces. He knew from his own experience how vital such information was.

For example, learning for the first time at

a conference that a unit was coming in with

different weapons than those he had

planned for, he had to leave the conference in order to stop some trucks that had

already started and get them to return to

base and pick up the proper ammunition

and spares.46

Beginning early in November 1943 he issued Ordnance commanding officers down

to battalion level a daily top secret Ordnance Operations Bulletin giving the tactical situation, including the location of the

combat units, and the Ordnance situation. Copies went also to Ordnance officers at AFHQ, SOS Peninsular Base Section (PBS), and corps and divisions, more

than thirty copies in all. Because purple

ink was the only kind available in Naples

for multicopy, the bulletins got the name of

purple blurbs. The cover sheet bore the

insignia of Fifth Army Ordnance Service,

which was a robot holding up a flaming

bomb superimposed on the Fifth Army

sleeve insignia.47

The number and frequency of the mimeographed bulletins and instructions that

poured out of the Fifth Army Ordnance

office during the fall of 1943 earned for

Colonel Rose the title of Poop Sheet Pappy; and one battalion commander complained that "the makeup of my battalion

keeps shifting with the ebb and flow of

poop-sheets from Nib."

 48

 Nevertheless, the

publications were undoubtedly helpful.

General Coffey, Ordnance officer of SOS

NATOUSA, considered the Fifth Army

Ordnance Administrative Instructions "the

finest thing in their line" he had ever seen,

and the Operations Bulletins were considered by Headquarters, Fifth Army, one of

the outstanding contributions by Ordnance

to the Italian campaign.49

Ammo Joe

Ammunition was the subject of Army

Ordnance Administrative Instruction 1.

Colonel Niblo gave ammunition supply, always of the first importance, particular attention because in several respects it was a

pioneering operation. For the first time

there existed an ammunition battalion able

to operate tactical ammunition supply

points. In North Africa such battalions

45

 (1)Army Ordnance Admin Instr 39, 31 Jan

44. (2) Ltr, Crawford to CofOrd, 7 May 44, sub;

Technical Information Letter # 21. MTO Ord

Sec 400.113, KCRC. 46

 Niblo Interv.

47

 Copies of these publications are in OHF. 48

 Ltrs, Lt Col John G. Detwiler to Col D. J.

Crawford, 28 Sep, 16 Dec 43, MTO Ord Sec

319.1, KCRC. 49

 (1) Ltr, Coffey to Niblo, copy in Army Ordnance Admin Instr 15, 9 Nov 43. (2) Hq Fifth

Army, Training Memo 12, 15 July 1944, Lessons

Learned in the Battle from the Garigliano to

North of Rome.
SALERNO AND THE FIFTH ARMY ORDNANCE SERVICE 185

AMMO JOE

had been used only at large depots; in

Sicily, the ammunition battalion sent forward at the end of the campaign did not

have enough transportation to furnish adequate support. In Italy the 62d Ammunition Battalion, commanded by an exceptionally capable officer, Lt. Col. William

H. Jaynes, and closely controlled by Colonel Niblo (since the 6694th Group had

no ammunition officer), operated forward

and rear ASP's stocking all Class V supplies, Engineer and Chemical Warfare as

well as Ordnance.

During the first few months of the Italian campaign the ammunition battalion effected several innovations. One, a new requirement of Fifth Army, was the submission to higher headquarters at 1800 every

day of a report giving the amount of ammunition (by types) expended in the previous twenty-four hours, and the amount

on hand at the end of the period. Another

was the first effective segregation of artillery ammunition by lot number. A third

was a guide service that prepared maps and

made signs showing the way to the ASP's.

For the signs, two men at battalion headquarters, Sergeant Offenbacher and Pfc.

Arko, made a sketch of "Ammo Joe," a

striding soldier carrying aloft a huge shell.

This figure, appearing on signs, ammunition maps, and messenger vehicles, became

the symbol, and Ammo Joe the nickname,

of Fifth Army ammunition supply.50

The segregation of artillery ammunition

by lot number, successful for the first time

in the war, promised to be a great step forward in ammunition supply. Experience

in Tunisia and Sicily had convinced artillerymen that the best results in barrage fire

could be obtained only by the use of one

lot of ammunition, that is, ammunition

manufactured by one manufacturer under

the same conditions and thus uniform.

Mixed lots produced shot dispersion that

made it unsafe for infantrymen to approach closer than fifty yards to their own

artillery fire.51 Early in the Italian campaign, the artillerymen asked Ordnance for

a considerable amount of one lot of ammunition to fire close-support missions.

The request was not unreasonable, for

every lot of ammunition had a code number, given to it at the time of manufacture, 50

 (1) Niblo Rpts, 2 Oct 43, Incl 2; 31 Oct 43,

Incls 9, 13. (2) Meade, Ammunition Supply in the

Mediterranean Theater of Operations, pp. 266-68.

(3) Crawford Interv. (4) Memo, Maj. J. H.

Mathewson for Col D. J. Crawford, 26 Jan 44, sub:

Ammunition Supply in Italy (hereafter cited as

Mathewson Rpt), MTO Ord Sec 400.113, KCRC.

Copies of the mimeographed maps are in History

62d Ammunition Bn, Jan-Dec 43.

51

 (1) Ltr, Maj Gen J. P. Lucas to Theater

Commander, 26 Aug 43, sub: Sicilian Campaign,

OHF. (2) AGF Board Rpt NATO, No. 119. (3)

Memo, Somervell for CG NYPOE, 3 Nov 43, sub:

Report on Trip to NATOUSA by Gen Goodman,

and Incl, ASF Planning Div, Theater Br, 12 General.
186 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

but it brought groans from the Ordnance

ammunition men. They had tried sorting

by lot number in North Africa but had had

to give up; the effort not only took more

labor than could be spared but gave discouraging results. For example, at Bou

Chebka the 53d Ammunition Company

had found 112 different lots in 150 bundles

of 105-mm. ammunition. There were no

more than three bundles of any one lot, and

the average lot size was 1 1/3 bundles.

After the request in Italy, Ordnance resumed the attempt, and Niblo tried a new

method of sorting. Instead of physical

labor at one stage of the process, he used

paper work. The ammunition handlers

tore down a stack of ammunition and recorded the lot numbers on paper. Then

the depot office men tabulated the results

of the sorting. If there were more than 17

bundles for any lot, they were collected at

one point, marked Specially Segregated

Ammunition, and shipped under this designation to forward ASP's. Lots of 5 to 17

bundles were left separated and were not

consolidated and moved until more ammunition of the lot showed up.52

Ammo Joe was congratulated by Brig.

Gen. Thomas E. Lewis, Fifth Army Artillery officer. Colonel McGrath reported

to Colonel Crawford, "Niblo is definitely

the darling of the Artillery boys since he

made effective the segregation of ammunition by lot number. This is accomplished

and it's working. Tom Lewis and Joe Burrill get lyric every time they speak of it.

Seriously it is undoubtedly a tremendous

help to the Artillery man and represents

the solution of what seemed to be an insoluble problem." In the United States,

the War Department, beginning in late

January 1944, stopped the shipment overseas of lots in small quantities.53

Lot sorting, the submission of new reports, the layout and operation of forward ASP's in difficult terrain and rainy

weather, all placed a heavy drain on ammunition manpower and equipment. More

clerks, carpenters, sign painters, truckdrivers, and laborers, and more trucks, water

trailers, stoves, and other necessities were

required than were provided by TOE's,

which had not, as late as March 1944,

even begun to catch up with the lessons

learned in the Mediterranean theater. All

the companies had more than twice as

many trucks and trailers as their T/E

called for, having taken them from maintenance stocks, and they needed still more,

for most companies operated two or more

ASP's. Ordnance often had to draw additional trucks from a pool set up by Fifth

Army's Transportation Section, and it took

careful planning and co-ordination with

Transportation to make possible the daily

shipment of enough ammunition to forward ASP's.54

The ammunition labor problem was

solved by hiring Italian civilians. At the

end of November, Fifth Army Ordnance

was using a thousand-man Italian work

battalion, broken down into five "Italian

companies," with one each attached to the

52

 Meade, Ammunition Supply in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, p. 266.

53

 (1) Fifth Army Arty Info Memo of 3 Nov

43, quoted in O.O.B. 4, 13 Nov 43. (2) Ltr, McGrath to Crawford, 21 Nov 43, MTO Ord Sec 319.1,

KCRC. (3) Ltr, Secy War to Commander-in-chief,

SPA, CG's ETO, NATO . . . , 25 Jan 44, sub:

Mixed Ammunition Lots, Fifth Army AG 471 Ammunition, KCRC. 54

 (1) Mathewson Rpt, p. 6. (2) Meade, Ammunition Supply in the Mediterranean Theater of

Operations, p. 262 (3) Bykofsky and Larson, The

Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, pp.

221-22.
SALERNO AND THE FIFTH ARMY ORDNANCE SERVICE 187

five companies of the 62d Ordnance Ammunition Battalion. The Italians were

paid 87 cents a day, with 30 cents deducted

for their food, and received their clothing,

mostly from captured Italian Army stores.

Their discipline was semimilitary, for most

of them were ex-soldiers, and on the whole

they were good workers. The greatest advantage was that they were attached to the

ammunition companies and could be taken

wherever the company moved, so that labor

was a more or less constant factor instead

of a variable one.55

Forward ASP's normally stocked two

units of fire of artillery ammunition and

one unit of fire for all other weapons.

Reserve ASP's doubled that amount, but

this target was raised or lowered whenever

availability of transportation, capability of

resupply, or previous battle experience dictated a change. Issues were made to the

combat forces according to the system used

in North Africa, that is, upon the presentation of a transportation order signed by

the division ammunition officer or special

unit ammunition officer certifying that the

ammunition was required to replace a like

amount expended in combat and was not

in excess of the unit's basic load.56

By 9 November 1943, two months after

the landing at Salerno, theater stocks of

Ordnance Class V supplies, built up on the

basis of ten units of fire at the base section for all weapons, reached the astronomical figure of 320,500 long tons. Though

shortages in certain types of artillery ammunition, especially for the 105-mm. howitzer, were already causing some anxiety,

there was hope at Fifth Army headquarters

that better transportation, the ironing out

of difficulties in setting up the Peninsular

Base Section, and the substitution of actual

theater experience on daily expenditures of

artillery ammunition (1/3 of a unit of fire)

for the War Department's estimate (1⁄4 of

a unit of fire) would soon solve the problem of resupply.57

The Search for Better Organization

The Allied advance was stopped temporarily in mid-November by mountainous terrain, the stubborn resistance of the

enemy, and the rains, which, increasing

since October, had swelled the Volturno

River, deepened the mud, and made life

miserable for the weary troops. General

Alexander ordered Fifth Army to halt its

attack for two weeks. Colonel Niblo took

advantage of the lull to reorganize his Fifth

Army Ordnance Service. He had never

given up the idea of a forward group headquarters to control all army third echelon

maintenance and supply support of combat

troops, and the arrival of the newly organized 2630th Ordnance Battalion gave

him a headquarters to use for this purpose.

Obtaining approval from NATOUSA to

reorganize the battalion under TOE 9-312

as a group headquarters commanded by a

full colonel, he placed under the 263Oth

the 42d, 45th, 188th, and 87th Battalions,

and also the French third echelon battalion, the 651st Maintenance Battalion,

which had been organized to operate Ordnance support for French troops. To com55

 (1) Niblo Rpt, 13 Dec 43, Incl 1. (2) Meade,

Ammunition Supply in the Mediterranean Theater

of Operations, p. 268. 56

 (1) Niblo Rpt, 2 Oct 43, Incl 2. (2) Petersen,

Rpt 14 Feb 45.

57

 (1) History Ord Service MTO Nov 43-Nov

45, vol. II, ch. VII, OHF. (2) Ltr, CG Fifth

Army to CG Peninsular Base Sec, 24 Nov 43,

sub: Ammunition Supply, Incl 5 to Niblo Rpt,

28 Nov 43.
188 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

mand the forward group headquarters he

selected Lt. Col. George L. Artamonoff,

who had for most of the past year been

working with the French Rearmament

Commission in Algiers.58

Another and more sweeping reorganization took place a few weeks later. Colonel

Niblo again brought Colonel Rose into his

main command headquarters as executive

and converted the 6694th Group, now

commanded by Lt. Col. William H. Jaynes,

into a field headquarters charged with

all fourth echelon maintenance, supply,

evacuation, distribution, and salvage within

Fifth Army. The change brought the command of all Ordnance groups and battalions directly into Niblo's hand; it was

now plain that delegating authority to the

commander of the 6694th Group had been

a mistake. The introduction of the group

headquarters between the Ordnance officer

and the battalion commanders had resulted

in the multiplication of paper work and in

conflicting orders to battalions. It had also

slowed the reaction time of Ordnance supply service. Often weaknesses in the service

had attained formidable proportions before

Niblo was aware of them.59

Part of the trouble in the earlier organization had been caused by dissension

between Colonel Rose as commander of

the 6694th Group, and Colonel Moffitt,

Niblo's staff officer for maintenance and

supply. One lesson learned in these early

campaigns was that "the military art is a

most personal one."60 Rose worked hard,

but was considered un-co-operative by several of his closest colleagues; Moffitt was

able, but was described by a fellow officer

as having "a genius for irritating people."

On one occasion the Fifth Army G-2 reported Rose and Moffitt for their language

to each other over the telephone. In January 1944 both men were forced to leave

Fifth Army Ordnance office because of

illness. Moffitt, suffering from jaundice

and overwork, came down with pneumonia

and was taken to the hospital in Naples,

where he died in March. Rose contracted

dysentery and was transferred to an easier

job as Ordnance officer of Northern Base

Section in Corsica, which had been captured by the Allies in October and was

being developed as an air base.61

Personalities aside, it was no easy matter

to evolve an efficient Ordnance command

organization in Italy at that stage of the

war. The best Niblo could do during the

first winter of the Italian campaign was to

obtain from NATOUSA authority to activate a new group to use as headquarters—

the 2660th Ordnance Group (Provisional),

organized on 7 January 1944 at Caserta,

in the baroque royal palace (the Versailles

of Naples) occupied by Fifth Army headquarters. The group provided an adjutant

and better organization, though it did not

increase the size of Niblo's staff. The Ordnance Section was simply transferred to the

2660th on temporary duty, while remaining assigned to the Headquarters and 58

 (1) Army Ordnance Admin Instr 21, 25 Nov

43. (2) Ltr, Detwiler to Crawford, 26 Nov 43,

MTO Ord Sec 319.1, KCRC. (3) Artamonoff Interv. (4) Crawford Interv. 59

 (1) Army Ordnance Admin Instr 28, 10 Dec

43. (2) Ltr, Crawford to CofOrd, 29 Feb 44, sub:

Technical Information Letter No. 19. (3) Ltr,

McGrath to Crawford, 16 Dec 43, MTO Ord Sec

319.1, KCRC.

60

 Truscott, Command Missions, p. 546. 61

 (1) Artamonoff, Crawford, and McGrath Intervs. (2) Ltr, McGrath to Crawford, 16 Dec 43,

MTO Ord Sec 319.1, KCRC. (3) O.O.B. 118,

Incl 1, Niblo Rpt, 3 Apr 44. Moffitt was promoted

to full colonel the day before he died; Niblo was

with General Clark when he pinned on Moffitt's

eagles in the hospital. Ibid.
SALERNO AND THE FIFTH ARMY ORDNANCE SERVICE 189

Headquarters Company, Fifth Army (T/O

200-1). It was far from an ideal solution. Niblo came to feel that an army

Ordnance brigade was the answer, with

the brigade commander to administer a

small staff section at army headquarters as

well as to command all Ordnance groups.

But brigade organization, early advocated

by Maj. Gen. James K. Crain, had been

disapproved by the General Staff and was

not achieved during World War II.62

With the few men allotted in T/O 200-1,

the 2660th Group operated through four

office divisions: one for maintenance and

general supply, one for ammunition and

bomb disposal,63 one for administration,

and one for operations and inspection.

It controlled three large field headquarters, furnishing ammunition, third echelon

maintenance and supply, and fourth echelon support to Fifth Army. The whole organization contained nearly seven thousand

men, including some of the French units

that had been coming into Italy from

North Africa since mid-December. The

field headquarters were also using thousands of Italian civilian laborers for maintenance work as well as for Class II and

IV and ammunition supply.64

Niblo announced in a bulletin that the

January reorganization was to be the last

one. This announcement was received with

joy by officers in the field who had found

it hard to adjust to the many changes that

had taken place since October. One of

them commented, "This is a historic moment, and I think long overdue—so hope

it sticks."65 It did stick, in essentials,

though some changes were later made. The

most important took place in May 1944,

when the 2630th Ordnance Battalion (Provisional) became the 53d Ordnance Base

Group, the 6694th Ordnance Group (Provisional) became the 55th Ordnance Base

Group, and the 56th Ordnance Base

Group was activated to control the army

ammunition battalions, relieving the 62d

Ordnance Ammunition Battalion of the

dual function of group and battalion.66

Later changes were made necessary by

the departure of units to the European

Theater of Operations, but the pattern of

organization remained the same—that of

having one field headquarters to operate

third echelon service, another, fourth echelon supply and evacuation, and a third, ammunition. The 2660th Ordnance Group

(Provisional) remained the command

headquarters through the rest of the Italian

campaign, twenty long months, including

two winters.67

62

 (1) Niblo Rpt, 13 Jun 44, Incl 1. (2) Hq Fifth

Army GO 2, 7 Jan 44. (3) Brig Gen Urban Niblo,

Lessons of World War II, OHF. (4) Crain "Ordnance in the Field," Ordnance, XXXIX (Sep-Oct

54), P. 329. 63

 The removal of unexploded bombs was the

responsibility of the Base Section Ordnance officer. At first the main job was removing bombs

(German and Allied) from Naples and other

ports; but later, as the skies were cleared of German aircraft, the bomb disposal men were used

to destroy uncertain ammunition in captured

enemy dumps. Bomb disposal squads (1 officer and

6 enlisted men each) were attached to the Fifth

Army Ordnance ammunition battalions for administration and supply. See History Ord Service

MTO, vol. II, ch. VII, p. 323; and Niblo Rpt, 17

Apr 44, Incl 2.

64

 (1)Niblo Rpt, 22 Jan 44, Incls 3 and 5.

(2) Fifth Army Station List 13 Dec 43, 10, 17

Jan 44. (3) Ltr, Crawford to CofOrd, 29 Feb 44,

sub: Technical Letter No. 19. 65

 Ltr, Detwiler to Crawford, 25 Jan 44, no sub.

MTO Ord Sec 319.1, KCRC. 66

 (1) Niblo Rpt, 30 May 44. (2) From the

two forward groups, the 53d and 56th, the word

"Base" was later dropped because it was a misnomer, Niblo Rpt, 25 Jul 44. 67

 (1) Niblo Rpts, 12 Jul 44, Incl 3; 25 Jul 44,

Incl 9. (2) Brig Gen Urban Niblo, Lessons of World

War II.
190 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

In November 1943 General Coffey criticized the Fifth Army Ordnance organization for having too much fourth echelon

service. Army then had eleven heavy

maintenance and four depot companies located not very far from Naples, where the

Peninsular Base Section was being organized; theoretically army would not need so

much heavy maintenance, and the situation created the danger of undue dispersion

of spare parts, already a "serious headache."

 68

 Nevertheless, Niblo, bolstered

by the recommendations of Fifth Army

ground force Ordnance officers that he

retain full control of such service, went

ahead with plans to establish a large base

shop and depot in the army area. By late

January Colonel Jaynes's 6694th base

group had three strong battalions: a supply battalion, the 5th; a battalion for evacuation and salvage, the 87th; and a heavy

maintenance battalion, the 197th.69

It was fortunate that Niblo established

his big army rear area, for Peninsular Base

Section was not able to furnish adequate

support for several months. Locating and

establishing working space in crowded and

rubble-strewn Naples took time. Base section Ordnance units and equipment were

slow in arriving. In January the Peninsular Base Section in Naples had only three

heavy maintenance companies, and one of

them was on loan from Fifth Army. The

most urgent job of PBS Ordnance units in

the early months was not fourth echelon

work but vehicle assembly and third echelon repair of the thousands of trucks used

in rehabilitating the port and the city. Effective Ordnance fourth echelon maintenance support of the army was not available in the PBS until the middle of February 1944; there was no fifth echelon support until the following July.70

Near Capua, an old fortress town on

Highway 7 on the Volturno River, Colonel Jaynes operated a large field arsenal

housed in Italian Army buildings and

manned by men who were veterans by now

of several campaigns, men who, according

to General Clark, "had discovered the hard

way that necessity is the mother of invention." Jaynes's mechanics, helped by hundreds of Italian civilians and by the concentration of machine tool equipment, rebuilt weapons and vehicles and manufactured parts and special equipment on a

mass-production basis. One example of a

big industrial operation was the brake repair work done in the shop on trucks and

jeeps whose brakes had been damaged by

the mud that piled up on highways after the

torrential rains of late 1943. In early 1944,

the Capua Arsenal handled many more

crises on the Cassino front in the grueling

months of mountain fighting, which General Clark called "the most difficult months

of the entire campaign."

 71

 Beginning in

late January the arsenal also had to help

solve some of the unprecedented problems

of the Anzio beachhead.

68

 Ltr, Brig Gen John W. Coffey to Col Niblo,

quoted in Niblo Rpt, 9 Nov 43. For support of

this position in the United States, see Report of

G-4 Conference on Organization for Maintenance,

Maintenance Doctrine and Policies Governing the

Distribution of Spare Parts, held 26 February 1944,

ASF Maint Div 451.9. 69

 (1) Niblo Rpts, 9 Nov 43; 20 Nov 43. (2)

Organization Chart, 20 Jan 44.

70

 (1) History Peninsular Base Section, North

African Theater of Operations United States Army,

vol. II, 28 Aug 43-31 Jan 44, ch. 18, KCRC. (2)

Petersen Rpt, 14 Feb 45. (3) McGrath Interv. (4)

History MTO Ord Service, ch. IV, pt. 3, p. 96,

OHF. 71

 (1) Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 342, 334. (2)

Petersen Rpt, 14 Feb 45. (3) Crawford Interv.
CHAPTER XI

Anzio and Artillery

An American Ordnance unit that could

boast a battle history dating back to Tobruk blamed its presence at Anzio on its

proclivity for always being in the worst

place at the worst time. At Anzio and

Nettuno, two neighboring resort towns on

the coast south of Rome, the Allies were

pinned down by the Germans for four

months on a small beachhead about seven

miles deep and fifteen miles wide. Every

inch of it was under German artillery fire.

Nobody was safe. Depot men, repairmen,

truck drivers, clerks, all were as likely to

be hit as a man in the front lines. The

very sidewalks of Anzio had shell holes in

them. Military police were occasionally

killed while directing traffic. In the first

two months Ordnance lost 14 men killed

and 78 wounded. The total battle casualties for the whole period at Anzio, 22 January-24 May 1944, were about 5,000

killed in action and nearly 16,000 wounded.1

Prime Minister Churchill, who by midDecember 1943 had become convinced

that only an amphibious end run around

the German Winter and Gustav Lines

could break the "scandalous" impasse on

the Italian front, needed all of his famous

powers of persuasion to get the Combined

Chiefs of Staff to agree to an amphibious

landing in the Anzio-Nettuno area about a

hundred miles north of Naples.2 The Allied generals might have been more enthusiastic about the operation, known as

SHINGLE, had they been permitted a really strong force of at least three divisions,

but the scarcity of landing craft limited

SHINGLE to two: the British 1st Division

and the U.S. 3d Division, both under VI

Corps.3

The landing early on the morning of 22

January 1944 went off well. The weather

was good, and the only enemy forces encountered were a few outposts, some drunken Germans riding in a staff car, and a

battalion or so of panzer grenadiers sent

to Anzio for a rest, many of whom were

captured in their beds. Anzio and Nettuno, with their pink and white villas and

seaside hotels rising from a beach about

three miles long, were like ghost towns because after the invasion at Salerno the Ger1

 (1) Martinez, "Saga of the 'Great 525th,'" p.

328. (2) Pyle, Brave Men, pp. 159, 161. (3)

History Ord Service MTO, ch. IV, pt. 2, p. 82,

OHF. (4) Truscott, Command Missions, p. 550.

(5) DA Rpt, Army Battle Casualties and Non-battle

Deaths in World War II ... 7 Dec 41-31 Dec 46,

p. 92, OCMH.

2

 Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 427-29. 3

 Intervs, Sidney T. Mathews and others with

Field Marshal Alexander, Gen George C. Marshall,

Gen Mark W. Clark, Maj Gen John P. Lucas, and

Brig Gen K. W. D. Strong, all in Misc 314.82

Interviews — Mediterranean by Mathews, Smyth

and Watson, OCMH. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, German commander in Italy, told a newspaper correspondent in January 1946 that the

Allies' "basic error" at Anzio was using "a halfway measure as an offensive." Truscott, Command Missions, p. 550.
192 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

mans had evacuated the civilians from the

strip of land, about twelve miles in depth,

behind the coast. Beyond Nettuno in the

American sector were farmlands reclaimed

from the Pontine Marshes in Mussolini's

heyday, a resettlement project on which

canals had been dug and modern farmhouses, community centers, and straight,

tree-lined roads had been built.4

Here the advance was halted at the end

of January. With astonishing speed the

Germans brought in divisions from northern Italy, France, and elsewhere, while still

holding at Cassino. Thus the Anzio operation did not accomplish its main objective,

which was to draw off enough German

divisions from the Cassino front to allow

the Allies to make a quick breakthrough

there. Bitterly frustrating months were in

store for the Anzio force until the build-up

for the May 1944 drive on Rome was completed. Though the force was not strong

enough to break out of the beachhead, it

did hold under fierce counterattacks, and

throughout the spring managed to contain

more than a dozen German divisions that

might otherwise have been used against

the Normandy landing or on other Allied

fronts. This, and the heavy German losses

in men and supplies, seemed to Allied commanders to be worth the high cost of

Anzio.5

Supporting an embattled beachhead for

months on end called for careful planning.

One innovation that saved much time on

resupply was introduced into the Mediterranean theater by Col. Ralph H. Tate,

Fifth Army G-4. Trucks (21⁄2-ton) were

packed with five tons each of either ammunition, POL (petrol, oil, and lubricants), or rations— one type to a truck—

at Naples, then backed into LST's. When

they arrived at Anzio they ran straight

from the LST's to the dumps, discharged

their cargoes, and returned to an empty

LST to be sent back to Naples, refilled

with supplies, and dispatched on the next

turnaround. A truck-loaded LST could

be emptied in about an hour, instead of

the twelve hours usually required for a

bulk-loaded LST; consequently it was in

that much less danger of being shelled and

bombed; also, the speed of the operation

made for great flexibility, since VI Corps

could ask for specific supplies one morning

and receive them the next. Artillery, heavy

engineer equipment, and build-up supplies

came in on Liberty ships and were unloaded by DUKW's and LCT's. Intelligent planning made it possible to land

from Libertys and LST's an average of

almost 4,000 tons of supplies a day between

January and May.6

By the end of January, when the 45th

Infantry Division and the 1st Armored

Division (less Combat Command B) had

4

 (1) Truscott, Command Missions, pp. 309-

10. (2) Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, p. 341. (3)

David Interv. 5

 (1) Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 213.

(2) Truscott, Command Missions, pp. 550-51.

(3) For the Anzio operation as a whole see

Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, MS, OCMH. (4)

Rpt, Gen H. Maitland Wilson, 16 Apr 45, sub:

Allied Commander's Dispatch—Italian Campaign

8 Jan-10 May 44, 95-ALI-0.5 (hereafter cited as

Wilson Rpt, 16 Apr 45).

6

 (1) Intervs with Brig Gen Ralph H. Tate and

Col Edward J. O'Neill, G-4 VI Corps, by Sidney

T. Mathews, OCMH. (2) RED VAULT Fifth Army

Hist Rpt G-4 Sec, Dec 43-May 44 (Phase IV).

(3) Wilson Rpt, 16 Apr 45. (4) The practice of

loading trucks in advance in order to speed the

unloading of LST's was used in the South and

Southwest Pacific beginning in June 1943. John

Miller, jr., CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of

Rabaul, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1959), p. 178.
ANZIO AND ARTILLERY 193

THE ANZIO-NETTUNO AREA

been brought from Naples, the Allies had

at Anzio a force of 68,886 men, 508 guns,

and 237 tanks.7 Fascinated by "the steady

thundering flow of heavy war traffic,"

Ernie Pyle stood by a road near Anzio one

day and noted, "of the first twelve vehicles

that passed each was something different.

There was a tank, and a great machine

shop on heavy tractor treads that shook the

earth as it passed, and a jeep of a one-star

general, and a 'duck,' and a famous American six-by-six, and a prime mover trundling the great Long Tom gun with its slim,

graceful barrel pointing rearward. Then

came a command car, and a stubby new

gun covered with canvas—on four rubbertired wheels—and an ambulance, and a

crew of wire stringers, and a weapons carrier. Then a big self-propelled gun on

tractor treads, and finally another duck to

start the heterogeneous cycle over again."

 8

Anzio was a good test of the flexibility

of the Fifth Army Ordnance organization.

On 27 December 1943 Colonel Niblo informed the officers of the 45th Ordnance

Battalion—the forward battalion support7

 Wilson Rpt, 16 Apr 45. 8

 Pyle, Brave Men, p. 187.
194 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

ing VI Corps—that they were going to

handle Ordnance service at Anzio. Only

the headquarters was nominated to go.

The companies then under the battalion

were relieved, and Maj. Marshall S. David,

commanding officer of the battalion, was

allowed to select the companies he wanted.

He selected from the 42d Battalion the 14th

Medium Maintenance Company, which

was already supporting the 3d Division;

from the 87th Battalion, the 45th Medium

Maintenance Company, a good all-around

company; from the 188th Battalion, the

3407th Medium Maintenance Company

(Q), experienced in the maintenance of

DUKW's; from the 197th Ordnance Battalion, a detachment of the 525th Heavy

Maintenance Company (Tank); and from

the 62d Ammunition Battalion, the 66th

and 58th Ammunition Companies. In the

assault wave, only the ammunition companies went in entire; the maintenance

companies were represented by small advance detachments totaling a hundred men,

nearly half of them for DUKW maintenance. The rear detachments were scheduled to proceed overland and join their

units as the attack progressed toward

Rome.9

When it became obvious that the operation was not going according to plan, the

rear detachments were hastily loaded on

LST's and brought to the beachhead, arriving in the middle of a storm four days

after D-day. The combat troop build-up a

few days later of another infantry division,

half an armored division, and additional

field artillery, tank destroyer, and antiaircraft battalions made it necessary for

Niblo to add to his Ordnance strength

another medium maintenance company

skilled in artillery maintenance, the 101st,

an antiaircraft maintenance company, the

262d, and a depot company, the 77th.

He also sent in a detachment of the 476th

Tank Evacuation Company and a platoon of the 2622d Tank Transporter Company to provide wrecker service for tanks

mired in muddy fields or immobilized by

mines. Anzio by then had 1,886 Ordnance men, of whom 73 were officers.10

Major David, who landed on the evening of D-day, gave Maj. Madison Post,

his maintenance officer, the job of supervising dewaterproofing, and set up the

45th Ordnance Battalion headquarters

and the Ordnance depot in a group of

buildings arranged in a quadrangle around

a courtyard, a compound formerly used

by an Italian Army elite corps. Parts

were stored in the horse stalls of the

stables. Profiting by his experience at

Salerno, when he had to break crates open

in order to find out what was in them,

David had ordered an inventory in a

waterproof envelope to be tacked onto

each box of supplies; he carried with him

a master packing list showing the part

number, correct nomenclature, quantity,

and box number of each item shipped.

This master list was extremely useful in

operating the depot.

Across the field from the compound, the

45th Medium Maintenance Company

was bivouacked around a villa with palm

trees. The men of the 525th Tank Mainte9

 (1) Memo, Detwiler, CO 45th Ord Bn, for

Ordnance Officer Fifth Army, 7 Apr 44, sub:

Ordnance Operations in the Anzio Beachhead

(hereafter cited as Detwiler Rpt), in Personal Papers

of Marshall S. David (hereafter cited as David

File). (2) David Interv. (3) Niblo Rpt, 22 Jan 44,

Incls 1 and 5.

10

 Niblo Rpts, 5 Feb, Incl 1; 21 Feb, Incl 3; and

4 Mar 43, Incl 2.
ANZIO AND ARTILLERY 195

nance Company found some buildings at

Nettuno with concrete floors that made

them ideal for shops; and the 3407th

Medium Maintenance Company (Q) set

up its DUKW shop area on hard ground

north of Nettuno. The 14th Maintenance Company, supporting the 3d Division, was closer to the front than any other

company, but nowhere was the front far

away. From the roof of the compound

Major David could see the front lines and

the hills from which the German artillery

was methodically shelling the beachhead.11

The heaviest maintenance job for the

first two weeks was DUKW repair. Three

hundred American DUKW's were used to

land supplies from the Liberty ships anchored far offshore. So many were put

out of commission by slippery and congested roads, night driving and unloading, rough weather, enemy action, and

carelessness on the part of drivers, that the

one DUKW repair company was swamped

and had to have help from other Ordnance maintenance companies. Fortunately on this strange topsy-turvy front,

where no rules seemed to apply, truck

maintenance was not a serious problem.

Distances were short, the traffic within

the beachhead was severely restricted, and

the turnaround trucks that came in on the

LST's were serviced in Naples. Fortunately also, Ordnance supplies were

plentiful compared with those on other

battlefronts. Fifth Army, expecting VI

Corps to break out of Anzio in a few

weeks, had set the supply level at fourteen

days. Major David (with Niblo's tacit

consent) had gone far beyond this level,

requisitioning at the beginning for thirty

days from Naples, sixty days from North

Africa, and ninety days from the United

States. The supply position was strengthened further in early February when Fifth

Army took over resupply, until then handled by VI Corps.12

Supplies were adequate and supply distances were short, but the success of the

support operation depended largely on

careful planning by Ordnance officers and

the initiative and adaptability of Ordnance troops. Entrenching their vehicles

and equipment, the troops worked under

front-line conditions at any jobs that came

their way: repairing DUKW's, fighting

fires at ammunition dumps, doing guard

duty at Fifth Army headquarters, practicing to convert themselves into combat

troops in case of an enemy breakthrough.

For its important contribution to the landing and early operations at Anzio, Fifth

Army Ordnance Service received the

thanks of the VI Corps Ordnance officer

and the congratulations of General

Clark.13

The Ordnance men slept, whenever

they were able to sleep in the noise and

frequent alerts, wherever they could. At

first they tried abandoned houses and

apartments, which offered protection from

the cold, damp, sometimes snowy weather.

11

 (1) David Interv. (2) Detwiler Rpt. (3) Ltr,

Crawford to OCO, 7 May 44, sub: Technical Information Letter #21, KCRC.

12

 (1) Detwiler Rpt. (2) Rpt of Survey of Automotive Spare Parts Situation in NATOUSA and

ETOUSA Jan 44-Mar 44, ASF Planning Div,

Theater Br. (3) David Interv. After the beachhead

became stabilized, Colonel Tate raised the supply

level to 30 days, and increased it to 40 days just

before the drive on Rome. Interv, Mathews with

Tate. (4) Comments enclosed in Ltr, Lt Col Marshall S. David (USAR, Ret), to Brig Gen Hal C.

Pattison, 11 Oct 63 (hereafter cited as David Comments). A huge salvage dump was also established

at Anzio. Ibid. 13

 Ltr, Lt Col Walter G. Jennings to Ord Off,

Fifth Army, 11 Feb 44, sub: Appreciation, and

1st Ind, David File.
196 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

but soon found they had to go underground in foxholes, slit trenches, and wine

cellars. The billets of the 77th Depot

Company, for example, ranged all over

Anzio—"From deep caves 40 feet underground at the water's edge, through old

wine cellars two levels below the street,

through rooms in an old medieval fort,

through a magazine in an open field filled

with Italian high explosives, to the billet

of a couple of second looeys on the top

floor of the tallest building on the highest

hill in the town of Anzio."

 14

Paradoxically in this strange place, the

safest company was the one nearest the

front lines because most of the German fire

passed over it, to fall on the harbor and

port; also, the company at the front had

room to disperse. In the crowded area

around Anzio-Nettuno were the heaviest

Ordnance casualties and the worst cases

of "Anzio Anxiety" or "Nettuno Neurosis," caused by the strain of constant

shelling and bombing, added to overwork.

One night 5O-kilo bombs fell near the spot

where two officers of the 45th Medium

Maintenance Company were sleeping on

cots. One was wounded; the other suffered such a case of shock that he had to

be evacuated from the beachhead. At

the end of February Major David was

relieved and sent down to the Fifth Army

Rest Center at Sorrento. He found it

difficult to forget "the nightmare of the

past month."

 15

On 1 March Niblo sent Lt. Col. John

G. Detwiler from the Cassino front to

Anzio to succeed Major David as commander of the 45th Battalion. In March

a small detachment from the 2660th Ordnance Base Group (Provisional) headquarters also arrived to serve as an Ordnance advance command post. Early in

May Colonel Detwiler was given command of all Ordnance troops at the beachhead, including an ammunition battalion

that had been sent forward from Naples.16

The Ammunition Dumps

One of Major David's greatest worries

had been his ammunition dumps. Until 2

February he had no battalion ammunition officer and never had enough men to

handle the vast quantities of ammunition

that poured into the beachhead from Dday on. Of all the cargo aboard the

truck-loaded LST's 60 percent was ammunition, and more (about one-fourth of

the total amount received) came in on

Liberty ships, LCT's, and LCI's (landing

craft, infantry). The field storage of ammunition was perhaps the most critical

problem for Ordnance at Anzio.17

By mid-March 1944 about 40,000 tons

were on the ground in a small area, exposed to enemy bombing and shellfire.

On D-day the 66th Ammunition Com14

 (1) Quote from Lt. John Delehanty, "Company

A, Anzio," April-May 1945 issue of Fire power,

quoted by permission of the Editors, American Ordnance Association, Washington, D.C. (2) Lt. Norman L. Holland, "A Day on Anzio," Firepower

(October 1944). (3) Lt. Clyde L. Lerner, "Bivouacs," Firepower (April-May 1945), p. 11. 15

 (1) Detwiler Rpt. (2) Ltr, Maj Marshall S.

David to Mrs. Marshall S. David, 1 Mar 44, David

File.

16

 (1) Ltr, Col D. J. Crawford to OCO, 7 May

44, sub: Technical Information Ltr #21. (2)

Niblo Rpt, 19 Mar 44, Incl 1. (3) O.O.B. 187,

27 May 44. 17

 (1) History Ord Service MTO, ch. IV, pt. 2,

pp. 85, 88. (2) At first the commanding officer of

the 58th Medium Maintenancs Company acted as

battalion ammunition officer. He was succeeded by

the maintenance officer of the 45th Battalion, who

had had ammunition experience in North Africa.

David Comments.
ANZIO AND ARTILLERY 197

pany opened a large ammunition supply

point, capacity about 20,000 tons, a mile

north of Nettuno, and during February

that company and the 58th Ammunition

Company, broken down into detachments, opened and operated four more,

each with a capacity of from 1,600 to

6,000 tons. Working under combat conditions, the men manhandled enormous

quantities of the heavy and dangerous

material. Between 22 January and 31

March nearly 86,000 long tons were

brought to the ASP's.18

It was a bigger job than two companies

could manage. The ammunition men

were mostly clerks accustomed to depending for labor on their attached Italian

labor companies. David had been refused

permission to bring in Italians during the

assault phase;19 and only about fifty civilians were available at Anzio. Some help

came from the Cassino front on 2 February, when Niblo sent to Anzio 300 men

from the Italian labor companies and

Capt. James F. Fisher and three enlisted

men from the 62d Ammunition Battalion,

but this was still not enough. Following

a complaint to army by Maj. Gen. Lucian

K. Truscott, Jr., who took over command

of VI Corps on 23 February, of "deplorable conditions" in the ammunition dumps,

Niblo sent to Anzio the 684th Ammunition Company, accompanied by its attached labor company of 140 Italians.20

The arrival of the 684th meant that

three-fifths of the ammunition troop

strength of Fifth Army was now at the

beachhead, since only two out of five companies remained with the 62d Ammunition Battalion on the Cassino front. It

soon became evident that an ammunition

battalion headquarters would have to be

brought forward. None was available.

Niblo solved the problem by converting to

ammunition work his 87th Battalion headquarters, then administering evacuation

and fourth echelon automotive repair at

Capua. Transferring its companies to the

197th Ordnance Battalion, he dispatched

the 87th headquarters to Anzio on 10

March and attached to it the three ammunition companies at the beachhead. He

named Captain Fisher (soon promoted to

major) the commanding officer and gave

him Capt. Paul S. Blandford, Jr., of the

62d Ammunition Battalion as his executive

and "Fire Chief."21

A fire occurred in one or the other of the

dumps nearly every night, beginning on 7

February, when the first ASP was hit, until

late May. The men fought the first fires

with hand shovels and dirt, the only equipment they had. Later they got some 40-

gallon foamite fire extinguishers and

mounted them on half-tracks so they could

get closer to the blaze. But it was the

tankdozer that saved the day.22

18

 History Ord Service MTO, ch. IV, pt. 2, pp.

82, 85-88 and apps. C, D. 19

 David Interv. One heavy maintenance company

commander was so determined to take his Italian

laborers with him that he smuggled them aboard his

LST disguised as GI's. Lt. O. B. Rosstead, "Italian

Labor," Fire power (December 1944), p. 14 20

 (1) Rpt, Capt James F. Fisher, Ammunition

Supply at the Anzio Beachhead (hereafter cited

as Fisher Rpt), 1 Apr 44, Annex 3 to O.O.B. 140.

(2) Truscott, Command Missions, p. 339. (3)

Fifth Army Main Headquarters to CG Fifth Army

Rear (2660th Ordnance Group), 28 Feb 44, Incl

2 to History 62d Ord Ammunition Bn for Feb 44. 21

 (1) Niblo Rpt, 19 Mar 44. (2) O.O.B. 11,

12 Mar 44. (3) Crawford, Technical Information

Letter #21. (4) History Hq and Hq Det 87th

Ord Bn 1944. 22

 (1) History Ord Service MTO, ch. IV, pt.

2, pp. 90-94. (2) History Hq and Hq Det 87th

Ord Bn, Apr and May 44. (3) O'Neill Interv.
198 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Fighting fires with tanks, which protected the men, had first been tried in

Tunisia. At Anzio Maj. John Merrill, VI

Corps ammunition officer, suggested putting a bulldozer blade on the front of a

tank to scoop up the dirt.23 Early in April

Niblo turned the problem over to his 197th

Ordnance Battalion at Capua. Its heavy

tank maintenance companies got bulldozer

blades from the Engineers and welded them

to M4 tanks and T2 tank recovery units

(M3 tanks equipped with cranes). Four

of these units were shipped to Anzio and

distributed among the ammunition dumps

hardest hit by fires. They were an immediate success, smothering fires with dirt

and extinguishing those that could not have

been controlled any other way. In May

Niblo was able to obtain from the Engineers kits for installing bulldozer blades on

M4 tanks. The kits had been designed in

the United States for modifying tanks so

that they could excavate mines, and had

just arrived in the theater.24

The tankdozer led to the development of

the L-shaped storage bunker. In Anzio's

dangerous and limited area, where proper

dispersion was not possible, the first requirement was to keep fires from spreading from

one stack to another. At first straight

trenches were dug, but they were often

flooded, since the water table at Anzio was

very near the surface. Also, there was not

enough space between the trenches to fight

fires effectively. Captain Blandford developed a system of storing all ammunition

above ground in a series of L-shaped dirt

bunkers, each containing about 30 tons,

with the corner of the L toward the enemy

artillery positions for better protection

against shellfire. Along the sides were

piled large quantities of loose soil that could

be pushed by a tankdozer over a burning

stack.25

After the tankdozers went into action in

April, manned by courageous volunteers

from the Ordnance ammunition companies,

losses fell from an average of 40 tons per

fire to 10 tons. For the whole Anzio period

only 3,807.9 tons were lost by fire. Casualties from this source were remarkably light.

On 17 March 1944 Pfc. Gordon J. Eigenberger, a first-aid man of the 87th Battalion's medical unit, was killed by exploding 155-mm. shells when enemy bombs

started a fire in the ASP north of Anzio, but

no other deaths were caused by fires in the

dumps. Thirty ammunition men were

wounded by shells or personnel bombs—

thin-case bombs full of small shot that

scattered widely when the bomb burst.

Three men of the 66th Ammunition Company were killed on 12 February by personnel bombs dropped on their bivouac

area.26

In spite of dangerous working conditions

and storage problems in the dumps, about

52,000 long tons of ammunition had been

issued by the end of March. Most of it

was artillery ammunition. During the

major German offensive, from 16 to 20

February, prisoners taken by the Allied

23

 (1) See above, p. 159. (2) O'Neill Interv. 24

 (1) Niblo Rpt, 26 Jun 44, Incl 5, Fire Fighting Equipment for Ammunition Supply Points. (2)

Ltr, Maj Arra S. Avakian, Ord Sec Hq NATOUSA, to OCO, 29 May 44, sub: Mine Exploder,

T1E3; First Interim Report on Field Test of Two

in NATOUSA, O.O. 476/1083.

25

 (1) History Ord Service MTO, ch. IV, pt. 2, pp.

89, 91, 94. (2) Mathewson Rpt. (3) Lt. Col. John

G. Detwiler, "Ordnance at Anzio," Army Ordnance,

XXVIII, 148 (January-February 1945), p. 101.

(4) "Ordnance Roll of Honor," Army Ordnance,

XXIX (September-October 1945), p. 253. 26

 (1) History Hq and Hq Det 87th Ord Bn,

1944. (2) David Interv. (3) Fisher Rpt.
ANZIO AND ARTILLERY 199

TANKDOZER USED To FIGHT AMMUNITION DUMP FIRES, ANZIO

forces said that the "terrific" and "continuous" artillery fire of the Americans

caused heavy casualties, cut off food supplies

and communications, and brought some

units to the verge of panic. At the peak of

the attack, for every shell the enemy artillery fired, VI Corps threw back from ten to

twenty. The artillerymen of one of the

Long Tom batteries, veterans of Tunisia,

Sicily, and the Salerno-Cassino operation,

told Ernie Pyle that they had fired more

rounds "sitting there in one spot on the

Anzio beachhead" than they had in the

entire year preceding, and that another battery had fired more in four hours one night

than in the previous eight months. A

tremendous supply of ammunition was

needed to offset the advantage the Germans had in possessing guns of longer range

and larger caliber.27

Anzio Annie and the Clamor

for Heavier Artillery

At the end of the first week of February

1944 the men at the beachhead heard the

"thundering scream," as they described it,

of enormous German shells, the largest the

27

 (1) History Ord Service MTO, ch. IV, pt. 2,

p. 85. (2) Pyle, Brave Men, p. 175. (3) For official German reports, beginning 3 February, on

the Allies' "accurate and strong artillery, which is

abundantly supplied with ammunition," see German Military Document Section, Military Intelligence Div, War Dept, The German Operation

at Anzio (hereafter cited as German Mil Doc Sec

Rpt on Anzio), pp. 28ff., OCMH.
200 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Americans had yet encountered on any

front. They saw geysers two hundred feet

high when the big shells fell into the sea;

they saw thick-walled three-story buildings

demolished, an ancient Roman cave split

open, a whole cemetery plowed up, "unburying the dead." Ordnance experts

studying the fragments determined that the

shells were 280 millimeters or 11 inches in

diameter and fired from a railroad gun

with a range of about 63,000 yards or 36

miles.28

By 2 February the Germans had brought

down from the north several railroad guns

to counter the naval gunfire that Salerno

had led them to expect. The largest was

the 280-mm. rifle, nicknamed Anzio Annie

or the Anzio Express by the Allied troops.

With a barrel 65 feet long, Anzio Annie

was drawn by a diesel-electric locomotive

and accompanied by four cars, one of which

bore a turntable on which the gun was

mounted to obtain traverse when firing.

Another was an air-conditioned car for carrying powder. On 7 February the Germans used 280-mm. guns to shell Allied

ships off Anzio and Nettuno. After that

date the weather began to clear and the

monsters were so vulnerable to air attack

that they could probably be used only

sporadically if at all. They may have been

sent back up the coast as protection against

the threat of an Allied amphibious assault

at Civitavecchia, which the Germans continued to expect. Two 280-mm. guns were

discovered on a railroad siding at Civitavecchia after the fall of Rome. Their

names were Leopold and Robert. Leopold

was shipped to Aberdeen Proving Ground,

where careful study of several unorthodox

design features led to the development of

the postwar U.S. 280-mm. "atomic gun."

 29

Because of Allied air superiority, railroad

guns had to be kept in tunnels most of the

time; they were rolled out and fired at

night or on cloudy days and then hauled

back into the tunnels. Early in March the

German High Command offered to send

down to Anzio a 280-mm. railroad battery

and one even more powerful, a 320-mm.

Czechoslovakian railroad battery; but the

commanding general of the German Fourteenth Army at Anzio reported that no

suitable tunnels were available, since the

tunnel farthest to the south gave an effective

range of only three kilometers in front of

the main German line of resistance. Two

weeks later the Fourteenth Army was expecting a railroad battery of 320-mm. guns,

but it does not appear that they ever arrived.

The railroad guns most used at Anzio were

a battery of 210-mm. kept in a tunnel west

of Albano, not far from Castel Gandolfo,

the Pope's summer palace.30

Every time a shell from a large longrange gun hit the Anzio beachhead, and

they continued to hit regularly until the

breakout in May, the troops blamed it on

Anzio Annie, but the Germans had a formidable array of heavy artillery in addition

to the railroad guns: 220-mm. howitzers,

210-mm. howitzers, and 170-mm. guns.

28

 (1) T/Sgt. Milton Lehman, "Anzio Express,"

Firepower (June-July 1945), p. 16. (2) David Interv.

29

 (1) Lehman, "Anzio Express," Firepower

(June-July 1945), p. 16. (2) Journal of the Fourteenth Army, in German Mil Doc Sec Rpt on Anzio,

pp. 27, 36. (3) Lt. Col. W. L. Nicholson, The

Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945, Official History of

the Canadian Army in the Second World War,

vol. II (Ottawa, 1956), p. 390. (4) Rpt on

280-mm. German gun in 01-343-44 C, Source:

Ord Intell Unit D, Ord Tech Intel Files. 30

 (1) Journal of the Fourteenth Army. (2)

Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 325-26. (3) Truscott,

Command Missions, p. 337. (4) AGF Board Rpt

NATO, No. 126, 2 Mar 44, Field Artillery.
ANZIO AND ARTILLERY 201

ANZIO ANNIE, from a German water color.

The 170's, on surrounding hills, possessing

a range of about 30,000 yards, did more

damage than the railroad guns. On 16

February, when the Germans began their

big counteroffensive, they fired 454 rounds

from six 170-mm. guns and only 50 rounds

from two 210-mm. railroad guns. On 29

February they had eighteen 170-mm. guns,

Tom which they fired 600 rounds; and on

that day they fired only 12 rounds from

their 2l0-mm. railroad guns.31 The railroad

guns were freaks; but Anzio Annie symbolized a bitter truth—the Germans had in the

170-mm. a gun that outranged the best gun

the Allies had, the 155-mm. Long Tom,

with its maximum range of 25,700 yards.

It was at Anzio that the clamor for heavier

artillery began.32

The 240-mm. Howitzer and

8-inch Gun

On the Cassino front the Allied forces

had by 22 February 1944 in addition

to sixty 155-mm. Long Toms, twelve

31

 (1) Sidney T. Mathews, "The Drive on

Rome," ch. V, p. 73, MS, OCMH. (2) German

Mil Doc Sec Rpt on Anzio, pp. 54, 74.

32

 Interv, General Marshall by Lamson, Hamilton, Mathews, and Smyth, 25 Jul 49, OCMH.
202 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

240-mm. howitzers, which had a range

slightly less than the Long Tom but a projectile more than three times as powerful.

The 240-mm. howitzer and the 8-inch gun

were the heaviest mobile U.S. artillery

weapons. The designers had intended that

both use the same mount, in line with the

Ordnance Department's policy of pairing a

gun (a long-barreled cannon of high muzzle velocity) with a howitzer (a shortbarreled cannon of low muzzle velocity,

firing shells in a relatively high trajectory)

of approximately the same caliber. Next

in power in the gun-howitzer pairs were the

155-mm. gun and the 8-inch howitzer, and

last were the 4.5-inch gun and the 155-mm.

howitzer, which were considered medium,

rather than heavy, artillery.33

The theater had not requested the 240-

mm. howitzers. Early in October 1943

the commanding general of NATOUSA

had asked the War Department for 55

tubes for 155-mm. guns, needed because

the guns had been fired so much of the time

at extreme ranges, necessitating the use of

supercharge ammunition, that the tubes

were beginning to wear out. In reply to

this request, Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer,

chief of staff of Army Service Forces,

cabled that the tubes were not immediately

available and asked whether the theater

could use the 240-mm. howitzer for some

missions then assigned to the 155-mm.

gun.34

At the time, the U.S. commanders in

Italy were not eager for the 240-mm. howitzer. General Lucas, then commander of

VI Corps, was "doubtful of the value of the

240 howitzer in this country." The Fifth

Army Artillery officer thought that both the

240-mm. howitzer and the 8-inch gun

would be "quite useful," but that "the

road net and mountains make their movement and employment extremely difficult."

 35

 Nevertheless, the theater agreed

to accept two battalions of 240-mm.

howitzers and also asked for two battalions

of 8-inch howitzers, which had a range of

18,500 yards. The four battalions were to

be used "for destruction of field fortifications and to relieve 155-mm. M1 units of

many missions which are now causing rapid

destruction [of] gun tubes."

 36

Two battalions of 8-inch howitzers were

in position on the main Italian front by 20

November 1943 and were immediately successful, especially for close support of infantry, because of their accuracy and

power. The 240-mm. howitzers were delayed because the heavy tractor designed to

move them was not yet available. The

Ordnance Department recommended that

the T2 tank recovery vehicle, with modifications, be used. In spite of the Field Artillery Board's objections, the T2 was

decided upon, and the 240-mm. howitzers

were shipped before the end of 1943.37

Successfully moved by the T2 tank recovery vehicle, two batteries of 240-mm.

howitzers were in position near Mignano on

33

 Maj. Gen. Gladeon M. Barnes, Weapons of

World War II (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co.,

Inc., 1947), PP. 124-39. 34

 Msg, Styer to CG NATO, No. 9745, 9 Oct

43, ASF Planning Div, Theater Br, Class II.

35

 Rpt, Director of Intelligence, ASF, n.d., sub:

Report from AGF Board Report, 26 Nov 43, ASF

Planning Div, Theater Br, General File 17, Lessons Learned. 36

 Msg, Algiers to WAR No. W 2842/9222, 1c

Oct 43. ASF Planning Div, Theater Br, Class II 37

 (1) AGF Board Rpt NATO No. 107, 10 Jar

44, pp. 3.0-31. (2) Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower

No. 2228, 9 Nov 43; also, Msgs and Memos, 15-

24 Nov in ASF Planning Div, Theater Br, Clas

II. (3) Memo, CG ASF for CofOrd, 30 Oct 43, sub

240-mm. Howitzer and Prime Mover; 1st Ind, 3

Nov 43, in Rpt, OCO Tech Div, 240-mm. Howitze:

Materiel, OHF.
ANZIO AND ARTILLERY 203

240-MM. HOWITZER IN THE SAN VITTORE AREA

2 7 January and began tiring next day. Both

battalions of 8-inch howitzers were in action

on the Cassino front by the end of the third

week in February. Remarkably accurate,

with a very small expenditure of ammunition the howitzers demolished important

bridges behind the German lines, notably

the bridge at Pontecorvo funneling traffic

from the south and west into the Liri

Valley. They were extremely effective

against big buildings in Cassino and other

heavy masonry structures, especially when

used with the concrete-piercing fuze. According to a British artillery brigadier, the

fire of the 240-mm. and 8-inch howitzer

batteries was largely responsible for the

ultimate reduction of the monastery at Cassino.38

The heavy howitzers were ideal for the

main Fifth Army front, which was "howitzer country," because they could deliver

a heavy weight of explosive on the reverse

38

 (1) Narrative, 698th Field Arty Bn, Feb-Dec

44. (2) AGF Board Rpts NATO, No. 126, 2 Mar 44,

and No. 168, 10 Jul 44. (3) Rpt, Col J. M. Roamer,

13 May 44, sub: Ammunition Supply, NATO, ASF

Planning Div, Theater Br, General File 17, Folder,

Lessons Learned.
204 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

slopes of mountains. In operations in the

high Apennines after the capture of Rome,

Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther considered

the 240-mm. howitzer the most generally

satisfactory artillery weapon Fifth Army

had. Late in March 1944 twelve 8-inch

howitzers and two 240-mm. howitzers were

sent from the Cassino front to Anzio. In

their first mission they demolished a tower

in Littoria, a strong German observation

point that the Germans had been using to

direct fire on the port.39

In such special situations the howitzers

were invaluable, but the answer to the German 170-mm. gun was the 8-inch gun,

which had a range of 35,000 yards, outranging the 170-mm. by about 5,000

yards.40 The Caliber Board Report of 1919

had recommended the development of a

long-range 8-inch gun along with the longrange 240-mm. howitzer, and the Chief of

Field Artillery had asked the Chief of Ordnance in January 1940 to procure pilot

models of both, but the Army's interest in

heavy artillery had lapsed in the early years

of the war when the Germans were demonstrating so spectacularly the effectiveness of

dive bombers and tanks. It revived after

Tunisia, where the U.S. forces had come up

against the 170-mrn. gun for the first time.

Returning from North Africa, General McNair on 15 May 1943 had stated, "Instead

of artillery becoming an arm which is tending to fade out of the picture under the

pressure of air power or tanks, it is there in

the same strength and importance that it

had in the [first] World War."

 41

 The 240-

mm. howitzer, rather than the 8-inch gun,

however, received most of the benefit from

the renewed interest in heavy artillery.

The 240-mm. howitzer was standardized

in the spring of 1943, the 8-inch gun in

December 1943. General McNair considered the ammunition for the 8-inch gun

unsatisfactory; there was also trouble with

the carriage. Though originally it was

thought that the same mount could be used

for both the heavy howitzer and the gun,

the 65-degree elevation for the howitzer

could not be accommodated to the plus

10-degree elevation of the gun, and therefore another carriage for the gun had to be

devised.42

Field Artillery officers wanted to wait

until the gun and carriage were improved

before sending them to the battlefield. The

Ordnance Department took the position

that although improvements were desirable, the guns ought to get into action.

General Campbell urged General Somervell early in July 1943 to speed the production of the 8-inch gun as well as the 240-

mm. howitzer; a few days before Salerno

General Barnes, the head of Ordnance's

Research and Development Division, told

the AGF Ordnance officer that the guns

were all right "and not to be using them

is wasting a tremendous amount of fire39

 (1) Transcript, Telephone conversation with

General Gruenther, CofS Fifth Army, 4 Nov 44,

Folder, Telephone Conversations of Gen McNarney, CG MTOUSA, 4 Nov 44 to 22 Sep 45,

MTOUSA/Office Secretary of General Staff Files,

KCRC. (2) O.O.B., 3 Apr 44, Annex 1, OHF. (3)

Truscott, Command Missions, pp. 338-39. 40

 Barnes, Weapons of World War II, p. 137,

quoting General Lewis, Fifth Army Artillery officer.

41

 (1) New York Times, 16 May 43. (2) See

also statement by Brig Gen Robert V. Maraist,

Artillery Officer of 1st Armored Div, 16 Jun 43,

quoted in OCO Rpt, Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery, 1 Sep 44, p. 65, OHF. 42

 Memo, McNair, CG AGF, for CG ASF, 12

Apr 43, sub: Heavy Field Artillery; and OCM

20328, 17 Mar 43, in Rpt, OCO Tech Div, 240-

mm. Howitzer Materiel, OHF.
ANZIO AND ARTILLERY 205

power which is definitely needed in operations on the continent."

 43

It took Anzio Annie to clinch the argument, for until she spoke the theater was in

no hurry for the big gun. When Brig.

Gen. Gordon M. Wells, chief of Ordnance's

Artillery Division, visited the Cassino front

during Christmas week 1943 he noted that

the German 170-mm. gun outranged all

Allied artillery in the theater, making it necessary to move the 155-mm. guns far forward for effective counterbattery action;

that the 8-inch gun would no doubt provide

the proper remedy; and that Fifth Army,

though still concerned about the transportatation problem, intended to request 8-inch

guns "as soon as they are ready for issue."

 44

A battalion was in fact then ready but it

was earmarked for the ETO. Colonel

Crawford, Ordnance officer of AFHQ,

suggested during the first week of January

that some of the big guns might be diverted

to Italy, but Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Rooks,

AFHQ G-3, replied that though later developments might disclose a need for an 8-

inch gun battalion, he could see no prospect

of being able to accept such a battalion for

several months. Six weeks later, in midFebruary 1944, Fifth Army wanted 8-inch

guns immediately, to be used by a converted

155-mm. howitzer battalion without waiting until men for an 8-inch gun battalion

could be trained and equipped.45

Four 8-inch guns arrived in Italy at the

end of April 1944 and were assigned to the

240-mm. howitzer battalions. Two went

to the Cassino front, two to Anzio. The

ammunition for them arrived just in time

for the big guns to add their roar to the

great salvo from Cassino to the sea that

heralded the beginning of the battle for

Rome on 11 May. They silenced 170-mm.

guns emplaced deep in enemy territory;

they harassed areas the Germans had hitherto considered safe; and to intensify the

effect on the enemy's morale, Ordnance

troops had bored holes in the windshield of

the shell to produce a scream. In the

Anzio breakout, beginning 23 May, the

8-inch guns shattered power and railway

stations in Albano, cratered roads, and

generally hampered the retreat of the Germans. In moving the big guns and howitzers forward on both fronts in the drive for

Rome, the T2 tank recovery vehicle justified the confidence the Ordnance Department had placed in it. The use of the 8-

inch guns and 240-mm. howitzers on the

Italian front was nevertheless comparatively brief. After the capture of Rome, the

shipment of guns to the high-priority European theater began and by November 1944

none of the 8-inch guns and 240-mm. howitzers were left in Italy.46

43

 (1) Memo, General Campbell for General

Somervell, 6 Jul 43, sub: Heavy Mobile Artillery,

in OCO Rpt, 240-mm. Howitzer Materiel, OHF.

(2) Barnes Diary, 4 Sep 43, OHF; and see OCO

Rpt. 8" Gun Materiel, OHF. (3) For efforts by

Ordnance to get heavy artillery and heavy artillery

ammunition into production, see Thomson and

Mayo, Procurement and Supply, pp. 100-103, 144-45-

44

 Memo, Wells for CofOrd, 5 Feb 44, sub: Report of Observations in the Mediterranean Theater

(hereafter cited as Wells Rpt, 5 Feb 44), Folder

Gen Wells' Trip to Battle Areas #1.

45

 (1) Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, No. 6251,

2 Jan 44. (2) Memo, Crawford for G-3 AFHQ,

3 Jan 44, sub: 8-Inch Guns. (3) Memo, Rooks

for Ord, 6 Jan 44, sub: 8-Inch Guns. All in MTO

Ord Sec 472 Guns (General) 1944, KCRC. (4)

Col G. G. Eddy, Rpt of New Weapons Board, 27

Apr 44, pp. 39, 51, OHF. (5) AGF Board Rpt,

NATO, No. 126, 2 Mar 44. 40

 (1) AGF Bd Rpts, NATO, Nos. 168, 171.

(2) Narrative, 698th Field Arty Bn, Feb-Dec 44.

(3) Mathewson Rpt, p. 8. (4) Rpts of Opns of

II Corps in the Italian Campaign 1 Apr-30 Jun
206 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

"Balanced Artillery Firepower"

For most of the Italian campaign, the

brunt of the long-range heavy artillery duels

was borne by the 155-mm. Long Toms.

Massed close behind the front lines and

fired for 90 percent of the time (instead of

the conventional 20 percent) at maximum

range with supercharge ammunition, they

performed nobly. This unorthodox use,

which had begun in Tunisia, soon wore out

the tubes. A correspondent who visited an

Ordnance heavy maintenance company

near the Volturno River has left a vivid

description of the tube-changing operation,

which "looked like a meeting of dinosaurs.

Heavy wreckers with long-necked cranes

sparred and maneuvered through the mud.

One eight-wheeled wrecker with an enormous boom backed up to the gun and the

boom was hooked to the worn-out gun barrel. A second wrecker edged its way up,

until its winch was in position to ease the

great gun carriage forward. When the old

tube had been extracted, the new one, as

long as a telephone pole, and weighing

9,500 pounds, was lifted into the air. To

act as counterbalance for the heavy breech

end while the tube was being lowered into

place, a group of men jumped up and sat

astride the muzzle end of the gun like a row

of schoolboys on a seesaw."

 47

Tubes and other gun parts wore out so

fast that the criteria of supply—the time

factor and the number of guns—were

meaningless. When this became apparent

in the fall of 1943, Colonel Niblo came forward with a suggestion that the time factor

be ignored and that the supply of gun tubes,

gas check pads, and other items be based

on the only factor that really counted—the

number of rounds fired. Aware that tubes

began to wear out after about 1,200 rounds,

causing thrown rotating bands and short

bursts, he suggested that with every 1,200

rounds of 155-mm. M1 gun ammunition

requisitioned, one gun tube and three gas

check pads be authorized.48

Colonel Crawford at AFHQ followed up

with an official recommendation that spare

guns or gun tubes and spare gas check

pads be provided on the basis of the amount

of ammunition manufactured for the weapons, and General Wells, chief of Ordnance's

Artillery Division, backed him up. Unfortunately, the policy could not be put into

effect because there were not enough of the

items, especially the tubes, in the United

States. The stalemate at Anzio and the increased effort on both fronts brought alarming demands for tubes. NATOUSA asked

for 192 in February 1944—96 for immediate replacement and 96 to be shipped not

later than 15 March. That many were not

available. By robbing the Navy, the European theater, the British, and troops in

training in the United States, 144 could be

made available, but only 48 replacements

could be provided by 15 March. Colonel

Niblo therefore had to inform the Fifth

Army Artillery officer that for two or three

44, II Corps Ord Sec, KCRC. (5) O.O.B. 154, 24

Apr 44 through 195A, 4 Jun 44, OHF. (6) Telephone Conversations of Gen McNarney, 4 Nov 44

to 22 Sep 45. On 2 June two captured 170-mm.

guns took some of the pressure off of the two 8-

inch guns at Anzio. O.O.B. 193, 2 Jun 44, OHF. 47

 Margaret Bourke-White, They Called it "Purple Heart Valley" (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944), p. 77.

48

 (1) Ltr, McGrath to Crawford, 26 Nov 43,

MTO Ord Sec 319.1, KCRC. (2) Ltr, Maj Allen

S. Jorgensen to OCO, 22 Nov 43, sub: Technical

Letter No. 17, Incl, Ordnance Technical Notes

(Italian Campaign), MTO Ord Sec 400.113,

KCRC.
"Ordnance? Ah'm havin' trouble with mah shootin' arn."

From Up Front by Bill Mauldin. Copyright 1944 by United Feature

Syndicate, Inc. Copyright 1945 by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.

Reproduced by permission of Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
208 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

months restrictions would have to be placed

on firing the Long Toms.49

This experience confirmed Niblo in the

belief that firepower was the sum of five

factors: first, a complete round of ammunition; second, a gun tube that had not

reached the limit of its serviceability; third,

equilibrators (if applicable) to elevate the

muzzle properly; fourth, a recoil system

that met certain standard pressure tests;

and fifth, a serviceable gas check pad. He

was convinced that gun tube, equilibrators,

recoil system, and gas check pad must be

arranged for, beginning with the manufacturing program and ending with the distribution over the zone of combat, in proper

proportion to the amount of ammunition

supplied. He called this concept "balanced

artillery firepower," and it was the subject

of considerable discussion in Ordnance supply circles in May 1944.50

 As yet it was

only theory. As the battle for Rome began,

a battle in which artillery was to play a

great role, Niblo was forced to confess that

"we are keeping just one jump in front of

the sheriff in trying to make our ammunition, tubes and recoils balance out and still

meet tactical demands."

 51

49

 (1) Ltr, Crawford to OCO, 29 Feb 44, sub:

Technical Letter No. 19, MTO Ord Sec 400.113,

KCRC. (2) Ltr, Brig Gen Gordon M. Wells to

Col G. N. Taylor, 22 Dec 43; and Ltr, Crawford

to Wells, 3 Mar 44. Both in Folder Gen Wells'

Trip to Battle Areas #1. (3) Memo, Col Frank

A. Bogart for Gen Lutes, 26 Feb 44, sub: Gun

Tubes for North Africa, and Incl, Status of Tubes

for the 155-mm. M1 Gun, ASF Planning Div, Theater Br, Folder, North Africa. (4) O'Neill Interv. (5)

Interv, Mathews with Tate. (6) Petersen Rpt, 14

Feb 45.

50

 (1) O.O.B. 162, 2 May 44. (2) Petersen Rpt,

14 Feb 45. (3) Ltr, Crawford to Wells, 17 May 44,

Folder, Gen Wells' Trip to Battle Areas #1. 51

 Ltr, Niblo to Wells, 20 May 44, Folder, Gen

Wells' Trip to Battle Areas # 1.
CHAPTER XII

Rome and "The Forgotten Front"

Preparations for the May offensive began

in March on both the Anzio front and the

Cassino front. On the Cassino front forces

were regrouped. To break through the

Gustav Line, where mountain and town

had defeated American, New Zealand, and

Indian troops, General Alexander brought

his Eighth Army from the Adriatic coast

For a simultaneous attack on the mountains

that bordered the Tyrrhenian Sea, he

shifted the Fifth Army—II Corps and the

French Expeditionary Corps—westward to

the lower Garigliano River. Under the

cover of an elaborate deception plan designed to make the Germans expect an amphibious landing at Civitavecchia, the

changeover took place in the last two weeks

in March. At the same time, II Corps

underwent a reorganization. The 34th Division was sent to Anzio and the 36th Division was taken out of the line. Their places

were taken by two divisions fresh from the

United States, the 88th and 85th.1

The Ordnance forward maintenance

group, which still bore the misleading designation of the 2630th Battalion (Provisional), moved to an area around Cascano on

Highway 7 near the center of the new army

zone south of the Garigliano. The men

were glad to get away from the bloody

Cassino front. Bombs dropped on Venafro

by an Allied formation trying to bomb the

town of Cassino on the night of 15 March,

for example, had just cost the 42d Battalion

of the forward group one man killed and

eleven wounded. In the Garigliano sector

there was a lull throughout April. The

maintenance men were able to concentrate

on repairing or replacing equipment, sending contact parties to the new divisions,

calibrating field artillery pieces, and checking spare parts. Army depots were fairly

close to the front and the shortage of spare

parts that had caused such anxiety during

the winter had been somewhat relieved;

General Wells had gotten action on the

shortage as soon as he returned home in

January.2

At the Anzio beachhead, spare parts

were more plentiful than at any other time

in the history of Fifth Army Ordnance.

To provide insurance against a hit on the

depot in the town of Anzio, Colonel Detwiler removed half the supplies, splitting

each SNL group vertically, to an Italian

ammunition loading plant one mile south

of Nettuno, a building enclosed in a large

earth bunker and fairly safe from enemy

action. With the arrival of a second depot

1

 (1) Interv, Field Marshal Alexander, by S. T.

Mathews 10-15 Jan 49, OCMH. (2) For the

deception plan, see Fred Majdalany, The Battle

of Cassino (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), pp.

254-57.

2

 (1) Histories 2630th, 188th and 42d Ord Bns

for 1944. (2) Rpt Opns II Corps Italian Campaign, 31 Mar-30 Apr 44. (3) Ltr, Campbell to

Niblo, 17 Jan 44; also other corres, Folder, Gen.

Wells' Trip to Battle Areas #1.
210 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

company early in April, the 201st (borrowed from Peninsular Base Section), Detwiler had enough manpower to operate the

twin depots effectively. Every job in

both depots was handled by two men, one

from the 77th Depot Company and one

from the 201st, so that when the drive to

Rome began, the 77th could load its 16

vans and follow, while the 201st could continue to operate both depots after PBS took

over the beachhead.3

On both fronts Ordnance mechanics created several ingenious devices to enable

troops to advance through German defenses. At Anzio they made a portable

artillery observation tower that folded into

the bed of a truck, and they converted

Italian farm tractors into driverless prime

movers (called "mangle buggies") to tow

long strips of primacord that would blow

up barbed wire entanglements or detonate

mine fields. At the Capua arsenal on the

Cassino front they modified tank grousers,

using a six-inch extension to the usual

grousers, to help tanks cross the Pontine

Marshes beyond the coastal mountains, and

they manufactured "battle sleds."

 4

The battle sled, invented by Brig. Gen.

John W. O'Daniel (Truscott's successor as

commander of the 3d Division), was half

a torpedo shell, just large enough to hold

one soldier lying down. Six were hooked

together and attached to each side of a

tank and the twelve sleds were pulled forward in the paths made by the tank's

tracks, enabling an infantry squad to accompany a tank without being exposed to

small arms fire and antipersonnel mines.

After O'Daniel sent Ordnance a sketch of

what he wanted, Colonel Jaynes and his

staff developed a model with runners, to

prevent heat from friction, and made the

sleds in an atmosphere of the greatest

secrecy in a field near the Capua shops.

They set up a production line, using 80

welding sets in stalls under a big circus

tent, and with the expert supervision of

Sergeant Sellfors as chief welder, Fifth

Army and PBS mechanics working in 8-

hour shifts manufactured 360 sleds between

29 April and 14 May.

All the sleds were used in the breakout

at Anzio. The worst impediments were

ditches and mines that immobilized the

tanks. In one regiment a platoon of tanks

and four sets of sleds failed to get into

action because of rough ground and the

loss of several tanks from mines; in another,

the results were negligible because the terrain was unsuitable; in a third unit, the

towed infantry, supported by the tanks,

took a strongly fortified house. Infantrymen were not enthusiastic about the sleds

because they felt like "dead ducks" lying

so close behind the tanks. General

O'Daniel felt that the combat test was not

conclusive, and that these special devices

should be employed against organized positions when terrain and antitank defenses

permitted. Half the sleds were salvaged

from the battlefield and used in the invasion of southern France.5

3

 (1) History Ord Service MTO, ch. IV, Part

2, p. 83. (2) Detwiler, "Ordnance at Anzio,"

Army Ordnance, XXVIII, 148 (January-February

1945), P. 102. 4

 (1) Niblo Rpt, 30 May 44. (2) Clark, Calculated Risk, pp. 343-44. (3) After Action Report Maint Bn 1st Armd Div 1 Jan-May 44, D

844.13, Armored School Library. The Capua

shops also manufactured thousands of rifle grenade

adapters and supplied the hospitals with such

items as mosquito-bar frames and X-Ray equipment. Histories 881st and 529th Ord Heavy Auto

Maint Cos, Jan-Dec 44.

5

 (1) Truscott, Command Missions, p. 360. (2)

O'Neill Interv. (3) David Interv. (4) History 529th

Ord HAM Co, Jan-Dec 44.
ROME AND "THE FORGOTTEN FRONT" 211

In preparation for the "big shoot" that

began the drive on Rome, Ordnance men

handled thousands of tons of ammunition.

Beginning at 2300 on 11 May, in what

General Clark called "perhaps the most

effective artillery bombardment of the

campaign," 173,941 rounds of artillery ammunition of all types were fired in twenty -

four hours. The 2652d (later 236th)

Ammunition Company serving II Corps

made a remarkable record. On 11, 12,

and 13 May a detachment, helped by 200

Italians, handled about 2,500 tons a day

at the ASP for divisional weapons; and a

detachment of only 25 men with the help

of 100 Italians completely stocked a 1,700-

ton ASP for artillery in twenty-four hours.6

At Anzio and on the main front massed

artillery fire, in which all guns within a

corps were concentrated on a single objective, played a spectacular part in the Allied

advance. The Germans were awed by the

lavish use of ammunition; prisoners of war

said that the intensity, accuracy, and

volume of the Allied artillery fire, exceeding anything they had experienced on the

Russian front, caused "a general feeling of

helplessness, panic, and confusion" in the

ranks. At Anzio a refinement of this technique was employed. Allowing for the difference in the time of flight of the shells of

the various guns, the weapons were so fired

as to insure that all shells reached the target simultaneously (called time on target,

or TOT). The results disrupted enemy

supply lines and shattered morale. German

officers said their men trembled when it

began.7

The attack jumped off and though there

was bitter fighting in the Fifth Army sector

for the first few days, the French Expeditionary Corps and II Corps advanced

steadily. By 19 May the Germans were

retreating toward their next defensive position, the Hitler Line, at Terracina. On

21 May there was a symbolic union with

the Anzio beachhead when a II Corps 8-

inch gun below Monte Biagio and a VI

Corps 8-inch gun at Anzio fired on the

same target, the town of Sezze. Terracina

fell on 24 May. Next day the Allies

pushed into the Pontine Marshes and

joined the forces coming from the beachhead. Ordnance units moved on the heels

of the combat forces; on 29 May at Littoria

the forward group headquarters was joined

by its 45th Battalion. To supply the fastmoving attack Colonel Tate had sent army

trucks from rear areas with rations, gasoline, ammunition, and engineering equipment to points designated by the divisions

and unloaded material from the tailgates of

the trucks into division vehicles. He used

this method until the troops from the main

front joined the force from Anzio; thereafter, all Fifth Army troops were supplied

out of Anzio until the port of Civitavecchia

was opened.8

The Allies Enter Rome

The Allies entered Rome on 4 June

1944, nine months after the landing at

Salerno. In that time 11,292 Americans

of Fifth Army had died in action. Twentytwo Ordnance men had been killed and

6

 (1) Clark, Calculated Risk, p. 346. (2) Mathewson Rpt. (3) History 236th Ord Ammunition Co,

1944. 7

 (1) AGF Board Rpts NATO, No. A-Misc100, Field Artillery, 22 May 44; No. 171, FA,

15 Jul 44. (2) Field Artillery Information Letter

#8, 30 May 44. (3) Truscott, Command Missions,

p. 337. 8

 (1) Histories 2630th and 42d Ord Bns. (2)

Interv, Mathews with Tate.
212 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

M4 TANK PULLING BATTLE SLEDS AROUND A CURVE to demonstrate sleds' flexibility,

Nettuno, Italy.

165 had been wounded. Operating ammunition dumps under shellfire, making

repairs under front-line conditions in the

rain and mud, changing gun tubes at the

battery sites, they had suffered many hardships, notably at Anzio, where 14 of the

22 had lost their lives in the first two

months.9

Ordnance men had learned to make the

best of things. At Anzio they had dug an

underground movie theater, called the

"Diggers' Dream"; and when their rations

improved in April they were grateful for

such luxuries as "old fashioned eggs" and

Coca Cola, "enjoyed with the symphonic

shell whining while dining."10 On the

main front of "mules, mountains and

mud," they had become accustomed to

getting along with a heterogeneous collection of human beings of many kinds and

nationalities, including turbaned Indians,

Scottish bagpipers, French Goumiers, and

a battalion of Japanese-Americans. In the

foxholes around Cassino Colonel David

had even found some sailors who had left

their ships and gotten rides to the front to

do some fighting. The French Goums

with their burnooses, their old Enfield rifles,

and their women—each tabor (battalion)

had forty women who, observed General

9

 (1) Clark, Calculated Risk, p. 365. (2) History Ord Service MTO, ch. IV, pt. 2, p. 82.

10

 After Action Rpt Maint Bn 1st Armd Div,

1 Jan-May 44.
ROME AND "THE FORGOTTEN FRONT" 213

Lucas, "look after the wounded and perform other functions"—were an unfailing

source of interest, as were the French Ordnance companies who took the tools out of

their shop trucks, stacked them on the

ground, and used the trucks as house trailers. All this was instructive and sometimes amusing. But on the whole, as Ernie

Pyle reflected in the plane carrying him

from Italy to England, "it had been bitter.

Few of us can conjure up any truly fond

memories of the Italian campaign."

 11

"The Forgotten Front"

Two days after Fifth Army entered

Rome, the Allies landed in Normandy.

Preparations for the cross-Channel attack

had been going on since the fall of 1943.

With the end of the campaign in Sicily,

men began to leave the Mediterranean for

England, and by December 1943, when

General Eisenhower departed to command

OVERLORD, Italy was already becoming a

secondary theater. After the capture of

Rome, Army planners concentrated on the

defeat of Germany in the European Theater

of Operations. The invasion of southern

France (DRAGOON) by Seventh Army,

which was mounted from Naples in August

1944, took from General Clark all of VI

Corps (3d, 36th, and 45th Divisions) and

the French Expeditionary Corps, and

robbed Colonel Niblo of a great many of

his men, enough to form two Ordnance

groups. The attrition continued; Italy

sank to such a low priority on the list of

theaters that by the winter of 1944-45 the

men there began to feel that they were on

a "forgotten front."

 12

Because of the low priority for supplies

for Italy after Rome's capture, Fifth Army

was forced, more than any other army, to

make the best of what was already available in the theater. Whenever there was a

lull in action, combat areas were combed

and guns, vehicles, clothing, equipment of

every kind damaged or abandoned during

battle were returned to the supply services.

Quartermaster and Ordnance ran extensive

salvage and reclamation facilities, far beyond those normally expected of a field

army. In the fall of 1944 Colonel Niblo

(who was to become a brigadier general

before the year was out), moved his heavy

maintenance companies from Capua to

Florence and there in the Fiat automobile

plant set up what he called his "Willow

Run" operation, a huge repair shop in

which hundreds of Italian mechanics supervised by Ordnance men completely rebuilt

trucks and jeeps by assembly-line methods.

With living quarters for the Ordnance

troops above the shop and overhaul and

depot sections set up in the Fiat garage

near the main plant, the installation became

one of Fifth Army's "show centers" during

the winter of 1944-45.13

Lessons of the Mediterranean

Campaigns

During the long winter evenings on the

comparatively quiet front in northern Italy,

waiting for supplies and replacements to

build up for the spring offensive in 1945,

11

 (1) David Interv. (2) Diary of Maj Gen John

P. Lucas, Part II, Italy, 10 Dec 43. (3) Pyle, Brave

Men, p. 200.

12

 Clark, Calculated Risk, p. 423, quoting Representative Clare Boothe Luce. 13

 (1) Truscott, Command Missions, pp. 458-59.

(2) Niblo Rpt, 22 Aug 44, Incl 1. (3) Booklet,

Fifth Army Ordnance Operations: Po Valley Campaign, OHF.
214 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

PANTHER TANK

combat commanders and staff officers had

leisure for the first time to look back upon

the campaigns in the Mediterranean. Fifth

Army had had fifteen months of continuous

combat in Italy. The memories of many

of the officers, including Niblo, went back

two years to North Africa.14

Matériel

By early June 1944, the Allied forces in

the Mediterranean had encountered most

of the weapons that the Germans were

counting on for the defense of France.

Land mines had been sown as lavishly in

Italy as in North Africa, with the addition

of the particularly vicious antipersonnel

Schuetzenmine. In Italy first appeared

the Panther tank; the self-propelled 88-

mm. gun, as well as a new model of the 88,

the Flak 41, which had a longer range,

more muzzle velocity, and greater armor

penetration than the American 90-mm.

gun; and the miniature Goliath tank, a

small, crewless, remote-controlled explosives

container. Except for the Goliath, which

was a failure, this was an impressive array

of new weapons. The best counterweapon 14

 Niblo, Lessons of World War II.
ROME AND "THE FORGOTTEN FRONT" 215

the Allies had was still their field artillery,

received in Italy in larger calibers than had

yet been employed as field artillery in

World War II. The trial of new American weapons such as the bazooka was inconclusive in the Mediterranean because

the theater received them in early models

before improvements had been made. The

improved models were reserved for Europe,

as were the first of the American multiple

rocket launchers, inspired by the German

Nebelwerfer.15

The Panther tank (Pzkw V), which the

Germans designed to supplant the Pzkw

III and IV as their main fighting tank,

carried a 75-mm. gun (Kwk 42), even

longer than the long-barreled 75-mm. on

the Pzkw IV Special, with a muzzle velocity of 3,066 feet per second as compared

with the 2,050 muzzle velocity of the 75-

mm. gun on the U.S. M4 Sherman tank.

In addition to an excellent suspension system, the tank had a long, sloping frontal

plate (copied from the Soviet T34 tank)

that was hard to penetrate. A distinctive

feature was the turret, with its sloping

walls. The Panther did not appear until

the drive on Rome had reached the Liri

Valley. By that time, the Germans' supply routes had been so wrecked by Allied

bombing that gasoline was in short supply,

which severely limited tank operations.

When the Allies got to the Hitler Line in

the mountains they found installed there

turrets taken from Panther tanks.16

Most of the Mediterranean campaigns

had been fought in the mountains, in country that was not, to use a British word,

"tankable." It was mainly a war of artillery, infantry—and mules. One of the most

surprising developments of the war was the

necessity, beginning in northern Tunisia,

of supplying isolated units by pack train.

Scouring the countryside for mules and

equipment, each division organized its own

train of from 300 to 500 animals—"the

most peculiar collection of little jackasses,

packsaddles, ponies, and gear of all description."

 17

 From Sicily onward, with one

exception, the Germans had natural barriers of swift rivers and high mountains of

which they took full advantage, using

snipers, machine pistols and guns, artillery,

blown bridges, and mines.

The exception was Anzio, and it was

there in the flat farmlands, where the terrain was more nearly like that of the battlegrounds of France and Germany, that the

most fruitful lessons had been learned

about weapons. The Germans in their

attempts to drive the Allies from the beachhead had brilliantly employed their selfpropelled 88-mm. Hornets and Elephants

for harassing fire. They would bring the

guns up to the perimeter of the beachhead,

fire twenty or thirty rounds, and then

quickly withdraw before the Allies could

get the range. Self-propelled artillery was

not new to the Allies, who had been using

tank destroyers in that role for some time,

15

 (1) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, p. 387. (2) Memo, Maj Gen

G. M. Barnes for Gen Campbell, 6 Apr 44, sub:

Comparison of German and American Weapons,

Barnes-Campbell Corres, Barnes File, OHF. (3)

Eddy Rpt. 27 Apr 44. (4) AGF Board Rpt NATO

No. 91, Dec 1943.

16

 (1) U.S. Army Ordnance School, APG, Tank

Data, July 1958, pp. 59, 185. (2) Rpts, No. 7266-

44, 01-340-44; No. 70802, 01-349-44, in Files

Dev Div, OCO-D, copies in OHF. (3) Jarrett,

Achtung Panzer, pp. 71-75, MS, Jarrett Collection.

The first known capture of a Panther was on the

Russian front around November 1943. Ibid., p. 71. 17

 Lucas Diary, Italy.
216 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

but until the beachhead experience with the

German 88's, there was little interest in

self-propelled heavy artillery; most combat

commanders preferred towed guns. In

spite of the using arms' indifference, however, the Ordnance Department had developed a motor carriage for the 155-mm.

gun, and it was ready in time to be used

with good effect in Europe.18

"Much was fomenting at the time of the

Anzio expedition," General Marshall later

remembered; it was then that field commanders abandoned the position that only

light, mobile artillery was wanted and "began yelling for heavy artillery."

 19

 Largely

because of the foresight of the Ordnance

Department, which had always advocated

longer ranges and heavier projectiles, Fifth

Army got the 8-inch gun in time to use it

in the drive on Rome. After the end of

the war in Europe when General Truscott

said that he had never taken his division,

his corps, or his army into combat without

the certain knowledge that the Germans

had American artillery outranged and outcalibered,20

 he could only have been thinking of the 280-mm. and 210-mm. railroad

guns. But railroad guns, demanding tracks

and tunnels, had limited use, to say the

least. Against the German 170-mm. gun,

which was the real long-range artillery

menace on both Italian fronts in spite of

the poor quality of its ammunition, Truscott admitted, the 8-inch gun put the

Allies "on better than an even footing."

 21

In the Mediterranean theater as in all

the others, it was hard to say which was

more important—the gun that fired the

ammunition at the enemy or the truck that

brought the ammunition to the gun position. General Lucas called the 21⁄2-ton

truck "the greatest military vehicle ever

invented." Trucks and jeeps continued to

win golden opinions from all; DUKW's

and other automotive matériel such as tank

transporters and tank recovery vehicles had

been invaluable. The Ordnance shop

truck gave excellent service and had an

unexpected use as a command post trailer,

beginning in North Africa. In the field,

Ordnance men put a cot across one end,

placed a desk and map boards on one side

and cushioned seats on the other, and even

fitted in a clothes closet and a wash basin

with hot and cold running water, making

"a very comfortable little house."22 By

February 1944 seventy were being constructed in the Ordnance shops at Naples.

The most elaborate was General Clark's,

which had fine mahogany furniture and a

specially woven rug of virgin wool.23

Supply

The Mediterranean operations taught a

great deal about supply. In the important

nine months between Salerno and Rome,

Colonel Niblo gave considerable study to

the resupply of Class II, IV, and V items, 18

 (1) Truscott, Command Missions, p. 338. (2)

Wells Rpt, Feb 44. (3) Eddy Rpt, 27 Apr 44. (4)

Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions

for War, pp. 316-17. (5) Field Artillery Information Letter #3, 17 Mar 44, Fifth Army 475.1,

KCRC. 19

 Interv, Marshall, 25 Jul 49. 20

 Ltrs, Detwiler to Campbell, 4 Jun 45; Campbell to Detwiler, 14 Jun 45, Folder Artillery Fifth

Army, OHF.

21

 Truscott, Command Missions, p. 339. On the

large proportion of duds among 170-mm. projectiles, which "remained a source of curiosity throughout the campaign," see Lucas Diary, 19 Nov 43. 22

 Lucas Diary, Italy, 8 Sep, 20 Oct, 15 Nov 43. 23

 (1) Eddy Rpt, 27 Apr 44, pp. 44-45. (2)

David Interv.
ROME AND "THE FORGOTTEN FRONT" 217

"the paramount problem of Combat Zone

Ordnance Service." The conclusion was

that doctrine and methods were not sufficiently realistic or flexible. One reason for

early shortages in artillery ammunition in

Italy had been the fact that production

rates in the United States had been based

on experience in North Africa, where much

smaller amounts had been used. Class II

and IV supplies were inadequate at times

because tables of equipment did not provide enough guns or trucks to meet special

situations and this caused a drain on maintenance stocks.

Automotive spare parts were nearly always scarce. There were of course problems of distribution, but in Niblo's opinion

the main trouble was the too low estimate

made in Washington of the spare parts that

would be needed. Washington's estimate

was based on the theory that 50 percent of

the trucks issued would be replaced with

new trucks when they broke down—and

the replacement vehicles did not exist.

Mortality tables for certain types of spare

parts, notably brake linings, were sadly inadequate for deep mud and other conditions of the Italian campaign. At the end

of the Tunisia Campaign Ordnance planners in the United States had begun a

revision of SNL addenda to reflect actual

consumption rates with the help of experience data from the field, much of it contributed by Colonel Moffitt of Niblo's staff;

but the effects of the re-evaluation could

not be felt for some time. On the whole,

men in the theater considered that resupply had been computed on an outmoded

basis—the amount of matériel that would

be consumed in a month or a year—rather

than on the basis that really counted, which

was the amount of ammunition that would

be shot by a gun, or the number of miles

a truck would travel. They had learned

that it was useless to furnish thousands of

rounds of artillery ammunition if gun tubes

to fire the ammunition were not available;

useless to furnish gasoline if there were not

enough tires to keep the vehicles operating.24

To make up for shortages caused by

defects in the supply system, Niblo had had

to use imagination and ingenuity. Extremely "Ordnance-minded," according to

General Tate, "he never permitted supply

to lag."

 25

 Niblo saw to it that his ammunition men renovated unserviceable ammunition and recovered usable fuzes; a great

deal of this work was done at Anzio. His

collecting companies cleared the battlefields, using techniques learned in Tunisia,

and turned over to fourth echelon shops

every vehicle and weapon that could be repaired or cannibalized. He had learned

from experience that more than 50 percent

of certain critical spare parts had to be

obtained in this way.26 He used native

labor and native machinery and materials on a scale larger than had ever before

been attempted. On the Cassino front

alone, by May 1944 Fifth Army Ordnance

Service was employing an average of 3,300

Italian laborers a day; the Fifth Army

24

 (1) O.O.B. 21, 30 Jun 44, Lessons Learned

in the Italian Campaign. (2) Intervs, Niblo of 28

Sep 55; O'Neill; and Tate. (3) AGF Board Rpt

No. A-105, 6 Jan 44. (4) Ltr, CofOrd to Deputy

Theater Cmdr, NATO, 29 Jan 44, O.O. 350.057

9049/2. (5) Niblo Rpt, 16 May 44, Incl 1. 25

 Interv, Mathews with Tate. 26

 (1) Niblo Rpts, 25 Jul 44, Incl 4; 12 Jul 44,

Incl 2. (2) The first Ordnance Ammunition Renovation Company in the theater was activated by

PBS on 26 July 1944. Ltr, Maj Gen Thomas B.

Larkin to CG Northern Base Section, 29 Jul 44,

Fifth Army 471 Gen, Vol. VIII, KCRC.
218 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

engineer was using 1,200, the quartermaster, 250.27

Many officers of the various supply services had become convinced that base sections were outmoded. By the time base

sections were established and operating, the

front had moved too far away. Their

shops and depots ran on union hours and

consequently, as Colonel Crawford expressed it, "did not respond to the surge of

battle." This was apparent in North

Africa early in the Mediterranean operations and continued to be true in Italy.

The discovery about base sections was one

lesson that was applied to the planning for

Europe. It led to the organization of an

Advance Section to furnish close support to

the armies. In January 1944 a party of

ETO Advance Section officers visited Italy

and North Africa to gather information on

base section operations in the Mediterranean.28

Organization

The most important gain for Ordnance

in the Mediterranean campaigns was the

emergence of an effective organization in

the combat zone. Group organization,

first tried in Tunisia, had been expanded in

Italy and had proved that it was flexible

enough to meet the ever-changing demands

of battle commanders. It worked so well,

according to testimony by General Tate,

that Ordnance, except for inherent shortages in certain spare parts and ammunition,

never caused the Fifth Army G-4 any

worries. The use of a group headquarters

to command Ordnance troops was so successful that it was copied by the Fifth Army

engineer and Fifth Army signal officer

(though not, in spite of Tate's urging, by

the quartermaster). The Fifth Army

engineer considered that the very considerable advantage he gained by having all

Engineer troops under his direct command

was "the primary administration lesson

learned during the Italian campaign."

 29

Niblo's employment of three group headquarters in the field, under the command

group, had been equally successful. The

group system was used in Europe and after

the war became the standard organization

of Ordnance service in the field army.30

In armies of the future, weapons would

be different, methods of supply would

change, new training would produce new

skills, but men would not change very

much. For Ordnance, perhaps the most

useful lesson of the Mediterranean campaigns was a lesson in what men could do:

what the Ordnance officer of an army

could do to create an efficient organization;

what Ordnance company, battalion, and

group commanders could achieve in close

support of combat operations; what Ordnance troops could accomplish and endure.

27

 (1) RED VAULT 5th Army G-4 Hist Rpt

Feb-11 May 44. (2) Fifth Army Training Memorandum 12, 15 Jul 44, Lessons Learned in the

Battle from the Garigliano to North of Rome. 28

 (1) Intervs, Niblo, 28 Sep 55; Crawford. (2)

Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies I, pp.

211-12.

29

 (1) Interv, Mathews with Tate. (2) Campbell

Comments. (3) Engr History Mediterranean Theater—Fifth Army, vol. II, 1943-45, P- 266. 30

 (1) Rpt of the General Board, United States

Forces, European Theater, Study 101 (hereafter

cited as USFET Bd Rpt 101), The Employment

of Ordnance Staff Sections, Ordnance Combat

Service Units, and Ordnance Service Units in the

European Campaign, ch. 6, sec 2. (2) DA FM

9-10, Aug 51, p. 36-40.
CHAPTER XIII

Arming for the Grand Campaign

From the Mediterranean, from the

United States, from Guadalcanal and

Kwajalein, commanders enplaned for England to begin the grand campaign of the

war—the invasion of Europe. Lt. Gen.

Omar N. Bradley, commander of First

Army, which was to spearhead the invasion, arrived in England in October 1943.

By the end of October his staff was hard

at work in the Gothic buildings of Clifton

College at Bristol. The staff had to plan

for the entire U.S. assault force of about

600,000 men, assigned or attached to First

Army during the invasion and the first

two weeks in Normandy, the heaviest responsibility placed on any staff at field

army level during the war. Fortunately

the planners did not have to depend on

theory but could draw on a year of combat

experience in the Mediterranean. Many

of the staff had served with Bradley in II

Corps. Among them were his G-4, Col.

Robert W. Wilson, and his Ordnance

officer, Col. John Bruce Medaris.

Medaris brought with him extensive

data, based on his service in Tunisia and

Sicily, that was used by Brig. Gen. Henry

B. Sayler, Chief Ordnance Officer, ETOUSA, in planning support for the vast

operation. In the march on Germany

there were eventually to be five U.S. armies,

two American army groups. At the beginning, First Army was to be under the 21

Army Group along with the Second British

and First Canadian Armies. When Third

Army landed on the Continent in August

an American group was to be formed, the

12th (called in the planning stage the 1st

U.S. Army Group, or FUSAG), to which

would be assigned the First, Third, and

eventually the Ninth and Fifteenth Armies.

And from the Mediterranean, landing at

Marseille in Operation DRAGOON, there

would come another American group, the

6th, composed of the Seventh U.S. Army

and the French 1st Army. By May 1945

the five U.S. armies on the Continent would

total 1,703,613, a mighty force indeed

when compared with the 231,306 Americans Fifth Army had had in Italy at its

peak.1

Sayler had been Chief Ordnance Officer,

ETOUSA, since July 1942, had been promoted to brigadier general in the spring of

1943, and was to become a major general

in June 1944. A longtime friend and classmate of General Eisenhower, he was one of

only two technical service chiefs who were

West Pointers. His friendships in the theater and his excellent relationship with his

chief in Washington were definite assets to

Ordnance. And he had the loyal support

1

 (1) Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1951), pp. 114-15- (2)

USFET Bd Rpt 101, app. 16. (3) Forrest C.

Pogue, The Supreme Command, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954),

p. 542. (4) Fifth Army History, pt. VI, p. 139.
220 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

COLONEL SAYLER. (Photograph taken

after his promotion to brigadier general.)

of his two staffs—the ETOUSA planning

staff in London (usually referred to as APO

887) and the operating SOS staff in Cheltenham (APO 871). Sayler's deputy in

Cheltenham, Col. Joel G. Holmes, wrote to

General Campbell, "If Ordnance is a success over here, and you can be damn sure

it will be, Henry Sayler is the fellow responsible for it. Every officer here has confidence in his ability and leadership, and

we are all back of him one hundred percent."

 2

New Methods of Supply

The ETOUSA SOS organization had

learned a great deal about supply in the

year after the TORCH convoys sailed for

North Africa. One important lesson was

the folly of shipping troops to a theater

ahead of their equipment. To prevent this

from happening again, and to take advantage of an excess of cargo space available to ETOUSA in 1943, when troops

were being sent to the Mediterranean, the

theater persuaded the War Department to

ship T/E allowances in advance of the

units; moreover, to ship them in bulk, not

marked for any particular unit. This procedure was unprecedented and took a great

deal of urging on the part of the theater

and ASF, but it was finally put into effect

in the summer of 1943. It was never entirely successful for at least two reasons: in

the summer and early fall of 1943 it was

hard to obtain stocks in the United States

because of the theater's comparatively low

priority at the time; later, the increasing

troop movements crowded out cargo space

in the ships. The system nevertheless was

an improvement over the old one.3

Early in 1944, the War Department

asked the theater to submit its requirements

for "special" matériel—over and above

T/BA's and T/E's—that would have to be

procured in the United States for use by the

supply services on the Continent. These

items were called PROCO (projects for

continental operations). For Ordnance,

they meant from the start vehicles and

more vehicles, of all types: tractors and

2

 (1) Memo, Sayler for G-3 ETOUSA, 22 Oct

43, ETO Ord Sec 370.09 Requirements for Personnel and Troops 1943, KCRC; (2) Interv, Maj

Gen Henry B. Sayler, 19 Mar 58; (3) Ltr, Holmes

to Campbell, 5 Jun 44, OCO-D Field Service

Operations, Overseas File, 1944.

3

 (1) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the

Armies, I, 132-36. Unless otherwise indicated this

chapter has been based on this source. (2) Ord

Serv ETO: Plan and Organ, p. 206; Class II and

IV Supply, Ann 1, Historical Notes, General Supply

Division, MS, Lt Col Nathan B. Chenault, Jr. (hereafter cited as Chenault History). (3) Rpt, General

Board, United States Forces, European Theater,

Ordnance Class II and IV Supply in European

Theater of Operations, Ord Sec Study 99 (hereafter

cited as USFET Bd Rpt 99), p. 17.
ARMING FOR THE GRAND CAMPAIGN 221

trailers for its own depot companies;

wreckers; gasoline tank trailers; tank transporters; staff cars; trucks for other services,

mainly the Engineers and the Air Forces;

beach kits of spare parts. In March 1944

the theater cabled the War Department for

weapons and vehicles to replace those that

First Army expected to lose in its first

month of operations. This was a new kind

of PROCO item, but it was approved, and

the shipment helped greatly in the early

operations.4

Another innovation was introduced in

July 1943 with the decision to package 45

days of supply "amphibiously," that is, so

that supplies would be waterproof and thus

would not deteriorate when they went over

the beaches. This posed a hard problem

for the men of the theater Ordnance staff:

since the packaging would have to be done

in the United States—men, materials, and

transportation to do it in England were

lacking—should all of one particular item

for the entire 45 days be sent over as one

shipment or several shipments? The men

did not know the detailed plans for the

landing on the Continent, and indeed the

plans were not firm; but they did know that

two or more forces would have to be supplied along more than one supply route.

They decided that the huge amphibiously

packed stocks—16,000 long tons of spare

parts in 450,000 individual boxes—ought

to be shipped from the United States according to their "group" designation. All

Ordnance general supplies belonged in one

of 26 groups, each designated by a letter of

the alphabet, for example, Group A consisted of automatic weapons and mortars,

Group B hand and shoulder arms, and so

on.5 Spare parts for each of these groups

were shipped in 26 individual "bricks" and

maintained their identity to their final point

of destination on the European continent.

The special packaging held up well. After

the Normandy landings, an examination of

thousands of boxes showed no deterioration.6

For the Ordnance men at Cheltenham

the new supply methods meant first of all a

search for more depot space and vehicle

parks. In 1942 there had been two Ordnance branch depots, Tidworth in the

Southern Base Section (SBS) and Rushden

in the Eastern Base Section (EBS), and

Ordnance sections in six general depots—

Ashchurch, Taunton, and Hilsea in SBS

and Barry, Moreton-on-Lugg, and Sudbury

in the Western Base Section (WBS). In

1943, as labor and materials became available, branch depots were activated at Warminster for combat vehicles and at Castle

Bromwich for tools, and Ordnance had

obtained space at two more general depots,

Coypool at the port of Plymouth and Wem

near Liverpool. Five vehicle parks had

been added to the six in existence in 1942.

This amount of space had been planned for

theater reserve stocks in BOLERO and was

obviously inadequate for OVERLORD.

The program for the advance shipment

of T/BA and T/E matériel alone, which

went into effect in July 1943, entailed a

sizable expansion in storage space: for example, the preshipped equipment for one

4 infantry division included 2,089 vehicles. (1) Memo, Col Robert A. Case for Director

of Supply, 18 Feb 44, sub: Report of Visit to

Headquarters, SOS ETO, Incl 1, Tab M, ASF

Distribution Div 400 ETO, 16-23 Feb 44. (2)

Memos on PROCO projects in ASF Planning Div,

Theater Br, ETO. (3) Chenault History.

5

 Thomson and Mayo, Procurement and Supply,

pp. 356-57. 6

 Chenault History.
222 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

To take care of preshipment and other

OVERLORD requirements, Ordnance activated two additional branch depots, Devizes and Upper Ballindery; obtained sections at four general depots—Lockerly Hall,

Boughton, Histon, and Honeybourne—and

added five vehicle parks. The twelve

BOLERO depots were expanded or modified

to fit into the new plan, making it necessary for certain bulk depots to act as issue

depots also. Acres of Nissen huts covered

the countryside.7

To see that the troops arriving in the

theater got what they needed from the

depots but not more than they were entitled

to, Col. Graham B. Trainer and his General

Supply Division staff at Cheltenham kept a

close check on supplies. A simple, workable system of stock control, which was

based on the traditional Ordnance Provision System (the submission by depots of a

stores report monthly on each "group" of

matériel and special reports as required on

critical major items) and which had been

in effect since early 1943, was considerably

expanded. Clear-cut instructions on how

to identify and report the matériel were

issued to all general supply depots. Scanning ships' manifests, port records, and

Transportation Corps forecasts of troop

arrivals, Trainer's staff arranged for the

storage of incoming equipment at the

proper depot and issued credits for it when

the troops arrived; thus no requisitions

were required.8

Keeping records on the equipment supplied to thousands of units meant long hours

of painstaking work for the men at Cheltenham. Approximately 350 different types

of units came into the theater during the

build-up, each with a different T/BA and

T/E; besides, many units had special authorizations, which complicated the problem immeasurably. Not all could be

equipped with full T/E, for many weapons

or vehicles were in critical supply in the

United States or had to be left behind because of limitations on shipping. In order to

provide Headquarters, ETOUSA, with accurate, current information on what was on

hand with the troops or in the depots and

what was required, the General Supply

Division prepared a Monthly Matériel

Status Report. This was an exceedingly

difficult job, since reports from units in the

field and information on ships' manifests

were scanty and unsatisfactory, but it was

finally accomplished after an exhaustive

examination of requisitions, shipping orders,

reports, and all sorts of documents, and was

so successful that the other technical services used the report as a model.9

The Ordnance SOS troops to handle the

vast tonnages that were expected began to

arrive in the United Kingdom in the late

summer of 1943, but the planners could not

predict the arrivals with any degree of confidence. There were constant changes in

requirements, availability, and shipment

dates for the units; as one of the General

7

 (1) Ord Serv ETO, Class II and IV Supply,

pp. 56—57, 502-03; and Annexes 1, 16, 17, 19. (2)

ComZone Staff Confs 3 Jan-25 Jun 44, notes for 10

Jan, Admin 457 Staff Conference Notes 1944. 8

 (1) Manuals, Chief Ord Officer Hq SOS

ETOUSA, APO 871, Standard Operating Procedure for Ordnance Service General Supply Depots

in the European Theater of Operations; Hq ETOUSA, Standing Operating Procedure for the Issue

of Initial Organizational Equipment to U.S. Forces

in the U.K., 28 Mar 44, Ord Serv ETO, Class II

and IV Supply, Annexes 20, 37. (2) Memo, APO

871 for APO 881, 19 Oct 43, sub: Answers to G-4

Questions for Army Ground Force Observers—

Ordnance, ETO Ord Sec 320.1 Organization of

Ordnance Department, KCRC. 9

 Ord Serv ETO, Class II and IV Supply, pp.

84-86.
ARMING FOR THE GRAND CAMPAIGN 223

Supply men put it, "the jig-saw puzzle was

never completed, for it seemed that a few

pieces were always missing."

 10

One of the most important missing pieces

was a new type of company that had been

counted on to move trucks from docks or

assembly plants to vehicle parks, operate

the parks, and if necessary deliver the

trucks to the troops—the motor vehicle distributing (MVD) company. Badly needed

during 1942, the MVD companies did not

begin to arrive until July 1943, and only

twelve of the nineteen scheduled for the

theater between that date and May 1944

ever arrived. It took months to orient and

train the new arrivals. With every unit in

the theater clamoring for trucks, Ordnance

had to rely heavily on British manpower,

civilian and military. The greatest help

came from two British military units, the

6th Vehicle Reception Detachment, which

in November 1943 was still operating three

of the busiest parks, and the 435th General Transport Company, which in October

1943 moved 60 percent of the vehicles

driven from the ports or assembly plants to

the parks. Both outfits received the everlasting gratitude of the men at Cheltenham.11

Motor Vehicle Assembly

In midsummer 1943 there was a flurry of

anxiety about another type of Ordnance

unit—the motor vehicle assembly (MVA)

company, which put together cased vehicles. The greatest worry that summer concerned 21⁄2-ton trucks; the vehicle parks

had few left. Thousands were going to be

needed in the fall to fill the T/BA requirements of incoming combat and service

troops. At the same time, crates containing cased trucks were piling up at an

alarming rate because the British TILEFER

plants, which were assembling British and

Canadian trucks as well as American, were

falling behind. General Sayler cabled for

two MVA companies in addition to the

two already requested and asked that all

four be expedited. But these units were

also badly needed in the Pacific, and in the

CBI where a great motor base was being

set up at Calcutta. Only three arrived between August and December and one of

them had to spend weeks in further training.12

On 7 August 1943 General Sayler ordered Ashchurch to start assembling 21⁄2-ton

trucks on 16 August. This very large order,

to be filled in a very short time, went to the

622d Base Automotive Battalion, which

had no mechanics trained in assembly

work, and, what was worse, none of the

special equipment considered essential, such

as overhead cranes, roller conveyors, and

power tools. There was also at the time

no SOP. Fortunately, the 622d had an

energetic and enterprising commander,

10

 Chenault History. 11

 (1)Ord Serv ETO, Class II and IV Supply,

pp. 22, 32-37, 93-99. (2) Ltr, Holmes to DCofOpns

APO 871, 29 Nov 43, sub: British Units Operating

in U.S. Establishments, ETO Ord Sec 37O-A Activation, Inactivation, Designation and Redesignation of

Units, KCRC.

12

 (1) Memo, Ord Service APO 871 for Chief

Ord Officer APO 887, 8 Jul 43, sub: Status of

Assembly of 21⁄2-ton, 6x6, Trucks (Long Wheel

Base and Short Wheel Base), and Incl; Memo,

Chief of Services APO 871 for Ord APO 871;

both in ETO Ord Sec, O.S. 45I-A, Assembly

TILEFER 1943, KCRC; (2) Memos, Ord APO 871,

1 Aug 43; and Sayler, 3 Sep 43, in ETO Ord Sec

370.09 Requirements for Personnel and Troops

1943, KCRC. (3) Histories 144th and 145th, 146th,

147th, 150th, 436th, 497th Motor Vehicle Assembly Cos. (4) ASF Plans Div, Theater Br, Diary

Jun-Dec 43.
224 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Maj. William R. Francis, who went to

Treforest and studied the British Austin

Motor Works assembly operation. "Yank

ingenuity," as he expressed it, did the rest.

With the help of two capable assistants,

M. Sgt. Leroy Bell, shop foreman, and Pvt.

George Phillips III, a time and motion

study expert, he got the assembly line in

operation by 18 August. Production rose

when three newly arrived depot companies

and the 497th MVA Company made a

second shift possible. In the first three

months of operation Ashchurch assembled

5,000 trucks.13

On a smaller scale, Ordnance that fall

began assembling 21⁄2-ton trucks at Taunton and lighter cased vehicles, such as jeeps

and water trailers, at Hedge End (Tidworth) and eight other depots and vehicle

parks. Between May and the end of December 1943, Ordnance troops accounted

for about 43 percent of the 60,703 general

purpose vehicles assembled in England.

But this kind of work began to slacken toward the end of 1943 because the cased

vehicles of the most wanted types were not

arriving in sufficient numbers. General Lee,

commanding general of SOS, directed that

the crates that came in were to be sent to

Ministry of Supply plants in order to keep

them operating at capacity, even though

U.S. plants were idle, because the British

plants would be badly needed in the spring

when the theater's Number 1 priority would

bring enormously increased shipments.

The location of most of the U.S. assembly plants caused a further cut-down in

Ordnance assembly in the spring of 1944.

The already overburdened British railways

could not take on the task of transporting

the heavy crates from ports to inland depots

and parks. Eight of the U.S. plants closed

down; by D-day only Ashchurch and Bromborough (0-631), established near Liverpool in January 1944, were left. Most of

the seven MVA companies that arrived between January and May 1944 were sent to

work in British case dumps near the ports.14

Preparations for a Short Sea Voyage

By the end of January 1944 the massed

weapons of war were everywhere, strange

against the background of the quiet English

countryside: hooded 90-mm. guns in a

farmyard; row after row of Sherman tanks

and half-tracks in an open field, white stars

camouflaged with splashes of mud; acres

of trucks, with extra gas and water cans on

their running boards, in a park where huge

trees spread their bare branches; miles of

steel ammunition bays along narrow lanes.15

In London, where night and the blackout closed in early on days already darkened

by rain and fog, firm planning had begun

for the landing on the coast of Normandy,

described in the ETOUSA Preparation for

Overseas Movement (POM) as a "Short

Sea Voyage." General Eisenhower had

arrived in the theater and approved Montgomery's recommendation to land five divisions on D-day, three British and one American on the Calvados coast, and one American on the Cotentin coast north of the

13

 (1) History G-25, pp. 70-78. (2) Ord Serv

ETO, Class II and IV Supply, Annex 54, "TUP

Assembly Plant, U.S. General Depot G-25."

14

 (1) Ord Serv ETO, Class II and IV Supply,

pp. 72-74, 127-39; (2) Ltr, Maj Gen N. G. Holmes

to Brig Gen Frank S. Ross, 14 Sep 43, sub: Import

of Boxed Vehicles on Behalf of U.S. Forces. (3)

Ltr, Col Leo J. Dillon to Chief Ord Officer, SOS

ETOUSA, APO 871, 5 Dec 43, sub: Motor Vehicle

Assembly in SBS; and 1st Ind, 8 Dec 43. Last two in

ETO Ord Sec O.S. 451-A Assembly TILEFER,

KCRC. 15

 Life, vol. 16 (21 February 1944), 67-72.
ARMING FOR THE GRAND CAMPAIGN 225

HOODED 105-MM. HOWITZERS STORED NEAR ASHCHURCH, ENGLAND

Carentan estuary. Eisenhower, who wanted

"enough wallop in the initial attack," was

also urging at least one airborne division, to

be dropped behind the Cotentin force; this

was not firm, but had to be taken into account in the planning. Also, D-day had

been postponed until the end of May in

order to gain an extra month's production

of landing craft and increase the chance

that the Russians would at the same time

be attacking on the Eastern Front.16

At General Sayler's London headquarters, a handsome four-story town house at

38 Grosvenor Square with an iron-railinged areaway and long drawing room

windows taped against bomb concussion,

plans for the Ordnance support of the invasion were taking shape. Because of the

unhappy experience of TORCH, when excessive emphasis on security had required

Ordnance men to work with little factual

information, planning for OVERLORD was

to a very great extent delegated to the technical services. Detailed planning was also

delegated to base sections, armies, corps,

and air forces.17

General Sayler gave his "operating agencies"—ground forces and air forces Ordnance officers and the SOS Ordnance Section—the responsibility for determining

basic data such as weight and volume of

16

 Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 111-18.

17

 (1) Ordnance History, vol. I, ETO Ord Sec,

KCRC. (2) Col. A. T. McNamara, "The Mounting of 'Torch' from England," Quartermaster Review, XXVII (July-August 1947), p. 13.
226 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

units of supply and logistical factors; for

nominating, training, and equipping Ordnance units; for regulating issues of Ordnance material and planning for waterproofing; for establishing the amount of

ammunition to accompany troops; and for

preparing weapon lists, vehicle lists, ammunition tonnages, and similar data. He

gave his base section Ordnance officers the

responsibility for nominating their own

units and supplementing them when necessary with men from other supply services

or with British civilians; for providing supply points, repair shops and temporary ammunition supply points in the concentration,

marshaling, and transit areas; and for establishing procedures for issuing Ordnance

supplies and ammunition to troops moving

through those areas.18

Having drawn up a general plan outlining these areas of responsibility, Sayler then

took action to co-ordinate the plans of his

key Ordnance officers. Since December

1943 he had been distributing to them a

weekly news letter and a useful Monthly

Statistical Report containing the latest information on Ordnance organization, installations, manpower, and supplies, including forecasts of incoming cargo. Late in

January he called the key Ordnance officers together for the first of a series of conferences held throughout the spring at 38

Grosvenor Square, against a background of

damask walls, marble mantelpieces, and

blackout curtains drawn night and day.

At the first conference, on 2 February

1944, there were present General Sayler

and four members of his London staff;

Colonel Holmes and eight members of his

staff from Cheltenham; Colonel Medaris

and his assistant, Lt. Col. John Ray; two

Air Ordnance officers, Col. William R.

Maxwell of the Ninth Air Force and Col.

Selby H. Frank of the Ninth Air Force

Service Command; the Ordnance officer of

XV Corps, Col. William I. Wilson; and

the four base section Ordnance officers,

Col. Leo J. Dillon of Southern, Lt. Col.

Arthur V. Harrington of Northern Ireland,

Lt. Col. D. M. Pearson of Eastern, and Lt.

Col. F. E. Smith of Western. There were

also present that day representatives from

two new organizations: Lt. Col. J. H. Reynolds from the G-4 section of General

Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters, Allied

Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) and Lt.

Col. Russell R. Klanderman, assistant Ordnance officer of Advance Section (ADSEC),

Communications Zone.19

Established provisionally at the end of

December 1943, under the command of

Col. Ewart G. Plank, ADSEC had been

created to follow the armies more closely

than a base section was able to do. It was

one of the fruits of experience in the Mediterranean campaigns, and in naming it the

use of the word base was carefully avoided.

Attached to First Army in the planning

and invasion stage, ADSEC was to take

over army rear installations about D plus

15 or plus 20 and from then until D plus

41, when the Forward Echelon, Communications Zone (FECOMZ), was to take 18

 (1) Tentative Draft of General Plan of Chief

Ordnance Officer ETO for Mounting Cross-Channel Operations, 29 Jan 44, ETO Ord Sec 381

Plans, KCRC. (2) Ltr, Sayler to Distribution, 27

Jan 44, sub: Ordnance Plans for Mounting CrossChannel Operations. (3) Ordnance Plan, 2 Feb

44. Last two in ETO Ord Sec O.S. 334 Meetings

and Conferences General, KCRC.

19

 Hq ETOUSA Ord Sec, Notes on Conference

to Develop Ordnance Plans for Mounting CrossChannel Operations, 6 Feb 44, Incl 1, ETO Ord

Sec O.S. 334 Meetings and Conferences General,

KCRC.
ARMING FOR THE GRAND CAMPAIGN 227

over, it was to be the sole support organization on the Continent. After that it was to

move forward across Europe with the

armies. Mobility was the watchword. Ordnance in ADSEC had not only the responsibility for anticipating the needs of the

combat forces and sending supplies forward, but for heavy maintenance work as

close behind the armies as the tactical situation permitted. The Ordnance Section

was activated on 25 January 1944 and the

Ordnance officer, Col. Benjamin S. Mesick,

worked closely with Colonel Medaris, first

in Bristol and later in London.20

Two officers who were present at the first

conference attended subsequent conferences

in new roles. Col. Harold A. Nisley, Sayler's deputy in London, became Ordnance

officer of First Army Group; and Col. E. M.

Webb of the Cheltenham SOS Ordnance

Section became Ordnance officer of the

Forward Echelon, Communications Zone.

Both were concerned primarily with the

build-up on the Continent after the beachhead had been secured, and worked with

21 Army Group rather than First Army.

Late in the spring another officer whose

planning was directed toward the second

phase of operations appeared at the conferences, the Ordnance officer of Third

Army, which was scheduled to become

operative in France in August. For a brief

time Col. Levi M. Bricker had the assignment; he was soon succeeded by Col.

Thomas H. Nixon, brought from Sicily by

his old commander, General Patton.21

Throughout the vital planning months

of February and March, interest centered

on the three men most directly concerned

with Ordnance in the invasion—Colonel

Medaris, Colonel Maxwell of Ninth Air

Force, and Colonel Dillon of Southern Base

Section, where the U.S. troops were to

stage before embarking. The heaviest burden fell on Medaris. He had three very

important jobs: to equip First Army's

troops; to train its Ordnance units; and to

make detailed plans for the invasion. By

10 February, when he joined the NEPTUNE

Planning Group in London to plan for

Ordnance in the invasion, the equipping

and training programs were well in hand.

Working closely with the Cheltenham

Ordnance staff, he had established the

methods by which First Army troops were

to receive their T/E equipment from SOS

depots and had made recommendations on

the extra weapons and vehicles and on

special equipment such as beach packs that

would be required. He had furnished SOS

with spare parts data based on experience

in the Mediterranean, relating for example,

gun tubes and artillery parts to rounds of

ammunition and vehicle assemblies to expected miles of operation.22

He had also done some hard thinking on

ammunition supply. On his recommendation, a board of officers composed largely of

tactical commanders established basic loads

20 for all ground force units; his estimates (1) Memo, Col James H. Stratton for Chief

of Services, 28 Dec 43, sub: Headquarters, Advance Section, Communications Zone, ETO Ord

Sec O.S. 381 Plans, KCRC. (2) Col. Benjamin

S. Mesick, "Feeding the Ordnance Flame," Logistics, I, 3 (April 1946), p. 21. (3) ADSEC

COMZ, Office of the Ordnance Officer, Operational Memorandum No. 5, Ordnance Service,

Advance Section, Communications Zone, 25 May

44, Ord Serv ETO, Plan & Organ, Annex 41.

21

 (1) 12th Army Group Report of Operations

(Final After Action Report), vol. XII, pp. 119-

20. (2) Hq ETOUSA Command and Staff Conf,

7 Mar 44, Admin 456, Staff Conference Notes.

(3) Minutes, Meetings of Ordnance Officers, 21

Apr, 19 May 44, 12th Army Group 337 Administrative Meetings. 22

 First Army Rpt I, Annex 13, pp. 95-97.
228 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

were used by the theater in determining the

theater level of ammunition supply and in

preparing a new unit of fire. He realized

the futility of some of these efforts, for he

was aware that ammunition supply was,

after all, a tactical problem rather than a

problem of supply.23 General Patton,

speaking before General Lee's staff conference at Cheltenham on 31 January 1944,

pointed out that some days the Army did

not fight, "some days you fight a good deal

and some days part of the Army fights and

others all of the Army fights." Units of fire,

said Patton, applying a quotation from

Bernard Shaw on policy, were "designed by

knaves to make a trap for fools."

 24

Medaris had made preparations for

training his First Army Ordnance units.

On 15 February 1944 his office published

a Standing Operating Procedure for Combat, issued well in advance of the landings

so that the men might become familiar with

it. A copy went to every unit commander

in First Army.25 Ordnance battalions

destined to land in Normandy with the

Engineer special brigades were trained at

ETOUSA's Assault Training Center on the

Devon coast. When Medaris' army depot

and ammunition companies arrived in England, he trained them in SOS depots until

army depots and ammunition supply points

could be established. He put his heavy

maintenance companies to work modifying tanks and other equipment on which

changes had to be made and gave them

special mass-production jobs to be performed in an almost impossibly short time.

One was the installation of Quad 50 machine guns (four heavy .50-caliber machine

guns mounted on the M45 turret, usually

carried on a wheeled trailer) on 321 surplus

half-tracks—an Ordnance field modification, unrecognized and unauthorized, which

antiaircraft units and even assault troops

were to find surprisingly valuable in Europe.

Another job of this kind was armor-plating

the floors of 510 armored cars. To selected

mechanics, intensive training was given in

antiaircraft, tank gyrostabilizer and DUKW

maintenance. After several amphibian exercises early in the year demonstrated the

need for more training on DUKW's, Ordnance SOS headquarters set up a school at

Breandown, on the south side of Bristol

Channel.26

The theater Ordnance staff was in a

position to help considerably in the important problem of waterproofing. In April

1943 Sayler had established an Ordnance

Experimental Station (O-617) on the north

Devon coast at Bideford, the "little white

town" where Kingsley had written Westward Ho!; at a neighboring seaside resort

called Westward Ho! the British had been

working on the problem since 1942. The

Ordnance station under the command of

Lt. Col. Ray C. Conner, an officer who had

had considerable experience in the Mediterranean, tested and improved materials

and prepared instruction manuals. Begin23

 (1) Ibid., pp. 64-65. (2) Col. J. B. Medaris,

"Field Service in the First Army," Army Ordnance,

XXVIII (January-February 1945), p. 66. 24

 ComZ Staff Confs 3 Jan-25 Jun 44. 25

 Ltr, First Army Commander to All Unit Commanders, United States Army, sub: Ordnance Standard Operating Procedure for Combat, 21 Feb 44,

and Incl, OHF.

26

 (1) Hq ETOUSA Ord Sec, Notes on Conference to Develop Ordnance Plans for Mounting

Cross-Channel Operations, 6 Feb 44, ETO Ord

Sec O.S. 334 Meetings & Conferences General,

KCRC. (2) ComZ Staff Confs, 3 Jan-25 Jun 44,

notes for 7 Feb, 3, 30 Apr 44. (3) First Army

Rpt I, Annex 13, p. 91. (4) Ltr, Maj Gen J. B.

Medaris (USA Ret) to Brig Gen Hal C. Pattison, 28

Oct 63, OCMH. (5) Report of Ordnance Projects

1 Jan 1944 to 1 Jun 1944, Ordnance Reports

First Army Misc, Jun-Aug 44, OHF.
ARMING FOR THE GRAND CAMPAIGN 229

TESTING WATERPROOFED 3⁄4-TON TRUCK, ENGLAND

ning in December 1943, the station trained

Ordnance troops to instruct the individual

drivers, who were to do the actual waterproofing on their own vehicles. By May

1944 the school had trained more than a

thousand First Army officers and men.27

A new contribution to amphibious warfare that was attracting a good deal of attendon in these busy months of preparation

was the DD (duplex-drive) swimming

tank. The British had developed a canvas

float, or water wing, that would enable a

tank to leave its LCT, swim to the beach,

and go in firing. It was one of several new

devices tested by Maj. Gen. Sir P. Hobart

of the British Army and his 79th Armoured

Division at their research center on the

coast of Suffolk. The British called these

contraptions "Hobo's funnies." Some had

been designed to make a tank more effective against infantry, others to aid the assault Engineer units in detonating mines

and removing other obstacles. The Crocodile tank carried a flame thrower; the

27

 (1) Ltr, Sayler to OCO, 4 Nov 44, sub:

Report of Waterproofing Activities ... 15 March

1943 to 15 July 1944, O.O. 350.05/15/43. (2)

Presentation by Col Holmes, 21 May 44, ComZ

Staff Confs 3 Jan-25 Jun 44. (3) Ord Serv ETO,

Ord Tech Services, Sec VI, Annexes 1-13. (4)

Report, Maj William E. Renner, Ordnance in ETOUSA Jun 45 (hereafter cited as Renner Rpt), pp.

8-11, OHF.
230 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

TESTING AN AMPHIBIOUS TANK

CDL (Canal Defense Light, a name given

to mislead the enemy), a powerful

searchlight to illuminate the battlefield and

blind enemy troops; the Crab, a revolving

flail for exploding mines; the Bulldozer, a

blade that could dig up mines and do many

other useful jobs. Not all were British inventions; some were American or American

adaptions of British devices.28

These and other new developments, such

as the Snake—lengths of pipe filled with

explosives for the demolition of mines,

wire, and other obstacles—were studied by

a First Army board, of which Colonel

Medaris was senior member, established to

consider the adoption of specialized equipment. The board also studied an interesting little vehicle, the Weasel, or M29 light

cargo carrier, a small tracked carrier that

had been developed in 1942 to carry supplies over snow during possible operations

in Norway. Little was known about it in

England, but the fact that it was said to

operate successfully in mud and swamps as

well as snow indicated that it might be

28

 (1) Maj. Gen. Sir Francis de Guingand, Operation Victory (London: Hodder and Stoughton,

Ltd., 1947), pp. 352-53. (2) Liddell Hart, The

Tanks, II. 321-28. (3) Bradley, A Soldier's Story,

pp. 255-56. (4) For use of the bulldozer tank, or

tankdozer at Anzio, see above, p. 198. (3) The

Japanese had used tanks with searchlights in their

attack on Milne Bay in New Guinea in late August

1942. Milner, Victory in Papua, p. 83.
ARMING FOR THE GRAND CAMPAIGN 231

useful in the invasion, especially on the

swampy Cotentin coast.29

Bomb Disposal

One highly secret subject that demanded

a good deal of attention in plans for the

invasion was bomb disposal. Within the

United Kingdom agencies such as the

Royal Engineers, Royal Navy, and Royal

Air Force had the responsibility for

neutralizing unexploded bombs (UXB's),

but when the armies moved to the Continent, the task in the U.S. communications

and combat zones would fall on U.S. Ordnance.

It was a particularly troublesome problem because at the beginning nobody had

realized all of its ramifications. After the

1941 London blitz, the Ordnance Department had set up a bomb disposal school at

Aberdeen Proving Ground, under the directorship of Col. Thomas J. Kane, to train

men to destroy enemy bombs that might fall

on the United States. In July 1943 a bomb

disposal company got into action in the

Mediterranean, in Sicily with Seventh

Army. For TORCH there had been available in ETOUSA only a few Engineers,

hastily trained. After TORCH some training had been possible in England, with the

help of the British, directed by Col. Philip

Schwartz, Ordnance officer of the Eighth

Air Force, who supplied some bomb disposal men to the Twelfth Air Force in

North Africa.30

General Sayler had early foreseen the

importance of the UXB work and by May

1943 had on his staff a bomb disposal officer, transferred from Eighth Air Force, to

plan for ground and service forces as well as

air forces. As reports came in from the

Mediterranean, it became clear that the

bomb disposal men would have to deal with

bombs that had been dropped by Allied

aircraft as well as those dropped by the

enemy, and with artillery duds, booby

traps, captured enemy ammunition, and

other hazardous matériel. Also, experience showed the value of teaching all troops

to recognize and report the hazards when

they saw them—a subject called bomb

reconnaissance. A school for this purpose

was set up at Bristol under the operation of

V Corps, with a miniature village, a museum of objects dropped from the air, and

instructors from the Royal Engineers school

at Rippon. When the first bomb disposal

company sent to England, the 234th,

arrived in the fall of 1943 it was given the

responsibility for all training in bomb

reconnaissance.31

Colonel Kane arrived in England to be29

 (1)Ltr, Medaris to CG First U.S. Army, 2

Feb 44, sub: Adoption of Specialized Equipment

for Use Within First Army, and Incls, 12th Army

Group, 337 Conferences. (2) On the development

of the Weasel and its use in Italy, see National

Defense Research Committee, Transportation

Equipment and Related Problems (Summary Technical Report of Division 12, NDRC, vol. I)

(Washington, 1946), pp. 141-43, 115; also, Clark,

Calculated Risk, p. 417.

30

 (1) Ltr, Kane to Statistical and Historical

Section, P&R Division, Nov 44, sub: History of

the Bomb Disposal Organization in the European

Theater of Operations (hereafter cited as Bomb

Disposal History) Ord Serv ETO, Ord Tech Services, Sec V, Annex 8. (2) Rpt Seventh Army, p.

K-6. (3) Ltr, Schwartz to CG Eighth Air Force,

19 Dec 42, sub: Review of Accomplishments of

Ordnance Section, O.O. 350.05/2221-2300 1943. 31

 (1) Bomb Disposal History. (2) History Ord

Service MTO, vol. II, ch. VII, p. 323. (3) Ltr,

Chief Ord Officer to Commandant, Bomb Disposal

Hq, Aberdeen, 1 Oct 43; sub: Bomb Reconnaissance

Training in the United Kingdom, Ord Serv ETO,

Ord Tech Services, Annex 16. (4) Ltr, Col Kane to

Maj Martin L. Ehrmann, 20 Jun 44, no sub, Ord

Serv ETO, Ord Tech Services, sec. V, Annex 13.
232 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

come Sayler's bomb disposal officer in

March 1944, bringing with him eleven officers from the Aberdeen school. Some of

them were assigned to base sections and

armies, some to Sayler's Bomb Disposal

Division. This division issued an information bulletin, called Fuze News, and did a

great deal of liaison on equipment with

the Royal Navy, Royal Engineers, and

Royal Air Force. Though the British had

been in the business nearly five years, they

adopted several American tools and procedures. The most striking difference- between U.S. and British equipment was in

weight: the British weighed nearly two

tons, the American only 200 pounds. The

supply of the equipment to the users was

managed almost singlehanded by Capt.

Schuyler V. C. Larkin of the Bomb Disposal Division.32

Colonel Kane's greatest problem was the

organization of the men who were to do

the dangerous job on the Continent. The

War Department was sending them to the

theater in squads of one officer and six

enlisted men, instead of in companies.

This decision was the result of observers'

reports on the Sicily Campaign that the

bomb disposal company wasted manpower. After arrival in England, the squads

were given on-the-job training by the British; but, in Kane's opinion, the War Department had not made adequate provision

for the administration and housekeeping

of these units, which he thought were likely

to be "kicked about as a step-child" by

units to which they were assigned or attached. He recommended that the 234th

Bomb Disposal Company, broken down

into platoons, be utilized for administration. As time for the invasion drew near,

Colonel Medaris suggested earlier phasing

of the bomb disposal company to the Continent, in order to support the squads.33

The Ordnance Plan for Neptune

On D-day the Americans were to land

in Normandy on two beaches divided by

the Carentan estuary. The beach on the

right, going in, was called UTAH. The

force landing here, VII Corps under Maj.

Gen. J. Lawton Collins, had First Army's

first mission, to advance up the Cotentin

peninsula and capture the port of Cherbourg. Collins was to land with the 4th

Division; two airborne divisions, the 82d

and 101st, were to be dropped inland;

and in the week following D-day, two

more infantry divisions, the 90th and the

9th, were to land on UTAH. The beach

on the left, called OMAHA, adjoined the

British beaches. Here the V Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow,

with the 1st Division and an attached regiment of the 29th Division on D-day and

the 2d and 2d Armored to follow in a few

days, was to advance south to Caumont

and hold while VII Corps captured Cherbourg and the British held the German

forces near Caen. Then V Corps, assisted

after D plus 6 by XIX Corps with the

28th and 3Oth Infantry Divisions and the

3d Armored, would be joined by VII

32

 (1) Ltr, Kane to Ehrmann, 20 Jun 44. (2)

Bomb Disposal History. (3) Ltr, Sayler to Campbell, 5 Jun 44, sub: Report on ETO Ordnance

Activities, O.O. 350.05/12435.

33

 (1) Kane to Ehrmann, 20 Jun 44. (2) Bomb

Disposal History. (3) Min, Conf of Ordnance Officers held 21 Apr 44, Office Chief Ord Officer,

ETO, 12th Army Group 337 Administrative Meetings. (4) For the recommendation on the bomb

disposal company following the Sicily Campaign,

see above, p. 171.
ARMING FOR THE GRAND CAMPAIGN 233

COLONEL MEDARIS

Corps after the capture of Cherbourg. First

Army with three corps abreast would, in

General Bradley's words, "pivot on the

British position like a windlass in the direction of Paris," advancing first to the south

to isolate the Brittany peninsula, then east

to the Seine.34

Colonel Medaris planned to place the

greatest weight of Ordnance manpower

—nine battalions— on OMAHA Beach to

support the main Army effort to the south.

He intended this group to be, eventually,

the forward support organization in the

march across France. UTAH was to receive an Ordnance group of five battalions. Later the UTAH group, transferring its forward support battalions to the

OMAHA group in exchange for rear support battalions, would become responsible

for all Ordnance service in army rear.

Except for OMAHA'S main army rear

depot and heavy shop battalions, the organization of the two groups was at the

outset roughly the same: an ammunition

battalion, the first to be landed; a forward

third echelon maintenance and battlefield

clearance battalion for each corps; an

army support battalion to back up each

forward battalion with fourth echelon

maintenance, a field depot, a collecting

point, and evacuation facilities; and an

army intermediate battalion to back up

the support battalions, repair army trucks,

evacuate damaged matériel to rear shops,

and handle bomb disposal in the Army

area. The fourteen battalions in these

two groups were all to be ashore by D plus

15, and were carefully phased to provide

Ordnance support within three days after

the arrival of the tactical units. The forward battalions had definite assignments

to support certain corps; the medium

maintenance companies of these forward

battalions had assignments to support specified divisions.35

Remembering the confusion that had

existed on the beaches in Sicily, Medaris

planned to place a considerable amount

of Ordnance support behind the men who

had the task of getting the troops and supplies ashore. Behind each of the three

engineer special brigades (one to handle

UTAH, two for OMAHA) he placed a battalion consisting of an ammunition company, a medium automotive maintenance

company especially trained on DUKW's

and LVT's (landing vehicles, tank), and

a bomb disposal squad. This insured

34

 (1) Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 239-41.

(2) Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 180-88.

35

 First Army, Opn NEPTUNE, Annex 8, Ordnance

Plan, 25 Feb 44 (hereafter cited as Ordnance NEPTUNE Plan), (2) First Army Rpt, I, Annex 13, pp.

56-60.
234 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

enough Ordnance men to repair vehicles

on the spot or dig them out of the sand

and drag them to collecting points; to

handle ammunition over the beaches and

place it in inshore dumps; and to assist

Medaris' staff in identifying and loading

Class II supplies.36

Medaris was determined that the combat forces would not be starved for Ordnance supplies in the crucial early days of

the invasion. Very early in his planning,

while the experience in Sicily was still fresh

in his mind, he provided that Ordnance

units going into the forward areas would

carry with them as many supplies as they

could. In NEPTUNE they would even

drive or tow ashore the vehicles and

wheeled guns that would be needed as replacements, and the reserve vehicles would

be packed with spare parts and other Class

II supplies. In this way enough could be

carried in to last fifteen days. The arrangement economized on lift; more important, it kept vital items in Ordnance

hands. One obstacle stood in the way of

the plan: there were more replacement

vehicles than there were Ordnance men to

drive them. Medaris overcame it characteristically. Realizing that the First Army

G-1, Col. Joseph J. O'Hare, had the

problem of providing transportation for

the men who were going to France as replacements, Medaris borrowed the replacement men to drive the replacement vehicles, first putting them through a program of driver training. The planning

for Class V was more difficult. Because

of the limited capacity of the beaches there

were arbitrary tonnage limitations that did

not provide much insurance against abnormal losses. Assault divisions were authorized to carry quantities in excess of

their basic loads if they had the transportation; and to this problem DUKW's provided the answer.37

In planning the operation of Ordnance

service in NEPTUNE Medaris was able to

profit from two important lessons he had

learned in North Africa. One was the

need for collecting companies to bring

back damaged matériel from the battlefield. He had had to improvise such a

company in Tunisia but now had four

evacuation companies (TOE 9—187) that

could be converted into collecting companies by adding more trucks, wreckers,

and tank recovery vehicles and subtracting

tank transporters. In the process he gained

manpower, for the evacuation company

had fifty-eight more enlisted men and one

more officer than the collecting company

required. He used the men thus gained

to put into effect the second important lesson—the need for a radio net between

Ordnance units in the field. The men

were sent to Signal Corps schools and the

network was set up in the United Kingdom before D-day.38

Toward the end of the planning period

Medaris relieved all nondivisional Ordnance troops except bomb disposal squads

from attachment to corps. While authorizing each corps Ordnance officer to communicate directly with the commander of

the battalion supporting his corps and the

36

 Ordnance NEPTUNE Plan.

37

 (1) Minutes, Ord Conference, 15 Nov 43,

ETO Ord Sec O.S. 381 Plans, KCRC. (2) Ordnance NEPTUNE Plan. (3) Colonel O'Hare agreed

to lend his replacement men very reluctantly, because he was afraid he would not get them back.

Actually, every one of them was returned to him in

Normandy. Interv, Maj Gen Floyd A. Hansen,

15 Sep 60. 38

 First Army Rpt I, Annex 13, pp. 84-86.
ARMING FOR THE GRAND CAMPAIGN 235

commander of the corps ammunition supply points, and delegating to the battalion

commander authority to locate his elements in accordance with the direction of

the corps Ordnance officer, Medaris kept

in his own hands the control of his Ordnance men.39

Colonel Medaris was convinced that it

was an "absolute necessity" for him to

have direct command of First Army Ordnance troops, believing strongly that subsidiary control exercised through staff channels would cause delays that might be disastrous. But he was faced with the same

problem Niblo had had. First Army headquarters, like that of Fifth Army, was still

organized under the T/O 200-1 of 1

July 1942, with an Ordnance Section

that was woefully inadequate. How was

Medaris to exercise command without a

headquarters competent to issue orders?

He thought the T/O 9-200-1 for an

Army Ordnance Command, Headquarters

and Headquarters Company, proposed in

November 1942 by Col. Robert W. Daniels, AGF Ordnance officer, which provided 19 officers, 2 warrant officers, and

80 enlisted men, would serve his purpose,

if 6 enlisted men to operate a switchboard

and wire net were added. As yet T/O

9-200-1 had not been published—held

up, visitors from Washington told him,

until the complete T/O for army headquarters was approved and published.

Pending final approval, Medaris asked

First Army for authority to reorganize his

Ordnance Section under T/O 9-200-1

provisionally. He was refused and had to

be content with a slight increase in staff.

Starting with 18 officers, 1 warrant officer,

and 33 enlisted men, he gained 3 officers

and 12 enlisted men in April 1944, following the revision of T/O 200-1 in December

1943. The antiquated table of organization was not the only handicap. There

was also the difficulty of obtaining officers

who were qualified to tackle the complicated problems posed by OVERLORD.

For that reason the First Army Ordnance

office was not completely organized until

after D-day.40

On 18 March 1944 General Bradley

gave his special staff officers "operational

control" of their troops, a concept borrowed from the British. He delegated to

them certain specific functions: transfer of

men between units, except in unusual

cases; movement of troops within the army

zone; issuance of normal operating orders

and training directives; reallocation of supplies; and recommendations on such matters as efficiency reports, promotions, and

reclassifications. Colonel Medaris did not

consider that this arrangement gave him

actual command—"the complete command set up" that Niblo had in Fifth

Army—but it did eventually give him complete freedom of action with respect to his

troops, and wide latitude for operation in

the technical channel, mainly because he

had a good working relationship with his

two commanders, first Bradley and then

39

 Ltr, Medaris to Ord Officers, V, VII, XIX

Corps, 6 Apr 44, sub: Army Ordnance Battalions

in Support of Corps, app. 6 to USFET Bd Rpt

101.

40

 (1) Ltr, Medaris to Daniels, 8 Nov 43, ETO

Ord Sec 320.3 Organization of British Army,

KCRC. (2) Ltr, Medaris to CofS First Army, 23

Oct 43, sub: Command of Ordnance Units Assigned or Attached to Army, ETO Ord Sec 320.1

Organization of Ordnance Department, KCRC.

(3) Ltr, Connerat to Ord Officer AGF, 9 Nov 45,

sub: Ordnance Organization Within Army Headquarters, Incl 1, 1st Ind, Folder, Organization of

Army Ordnance, AGF Ord Off Files.
236 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges, who commanded First Army after General Bradley

left in August to take command of 12th

Army Group. Medaris learned early in

the campaign that the confidence of his

commander was his greatest asset.41

The policy of operational control was

adopted in all the armies in the European

campaign—Third, Seventh, Ninth, and

Fifteenth as well as First. Still, none of

the army Ordnance officers had the complete command that Niblo exercised. The

effectiveness of operational control varied

according to the men and their commanders. Colonel Nixon, Patton's Ordnance officer in Third Army, considered

that it amounted to actual command. At

the other extreme, there was "the Ordnance Officer who cannot breathe without

G—4 approval, who does not receive a

single document without its coming in and

out through G-4 and who cannot issue a

single instruction unless over the signature

of the AG . . . ," as Medaris noted in

November 1944. He felt that such compartmentation led to decisions by men unqualified to make them, for the average

G-4 had no Ordnance training; also it

hampered the army Ordnance officer in

his dealings with Ordnance officers at

corps and division level. Medaris continued to believe that the Ordnance officer

of an army ought to be given by T/O a

command organization that was so definitely intended for the purpose that his

army commander would have to conform.

With this contention General Campbell,

Chief of Ordnance, was in "complete

agreement."

 42

Yet the question of a command organization for the army Ordnance officer was

not answered during the war or even in

the postwar period. Though the Ordnance section of the USFET Board favored such an organization and recommended that it take the form of a brigade

headquarters and headquarters company,

nothing was done. Tactical commanders

generally opposed it, including Medaris'

own commanders. General Sayler felt that

it would never come about and that the

only practical solution was for the Ordnance officer to work through his commanding general. Brig. Gen. Harold A.

Nisley, Ordnance officer of the 12th Army

Group, agreed. Nisley came to believe

that if the Ordnance officer of a major

field force "sold himself and Ordnance

service properly to his own Headquarters"

and if the Ordnance officers at lower

echelons were properly indoctrinated with

the idea of liaison and co-operation with

the Ordnance officer at the higher level,

most of the problems would be solved.43

"The Best Equipped Fighting Force"

Though Medaris lacked Niblo's command organization, he had the advantage

of First Army's prestige as the spearhead

of a campaign on which everything hinged.

He had based his plan for NEPTUNE

41

 (1) First Army History I, pp. 16-17; (2)

Ltr, Medaris to Campbell, 8 Nov 44, Folder, Medaris Report to General Campbell, OHF. (3) Medaris, "Field Service in the First Army," Army Ordnance, XXVIII (Jan-Feb 45), p. 67.

42

 (1) USFET Bd Rpt 101, app. 5, p. 2. (2)

Ltr, Medaris to Campbell, 8 Nov 44. (3) Campbell Comments. 43

 (1) USFET Bd Rpt 101, p. 28. (2) For

Niblo's advocacy of the brigade, see above, p. 189.

(3) Interv, Maj Gen Henry B. Sayler, 19 Mar 58.

(4) Personal Ltr, Col Harold A. Nisley to Brig Gen

J. H. Hinrichs, 15 Jul 52, in File, Rpt of Frank

Panel, OHF.
ARMING FOR THE GRAND CAMPAIGN 237

on the assumption that the men he needed

to operate Ordnance service would be

furnished him; and they were, even though

there was a general shortage of Ordnance

troops, not only in the theater but in the

United States. It was done by taking

units from SOS and even Third Army,

which would not become operational on

the Continent until August and therefore

had a longer time for build-up.44

The theater made strenuous efforts to

bring Medaris' two group headquarters

from the United States in time. The group

headquarters designed to administer battalions in support of field forces—the organization that Niblo had fought for so

long—did not have a table of organization

(TOE 9-12) until 15 April 1944. Two

group headquarters were available in the

United States, the 51st and the 52d. After

urgent cables from General Eisenhower,

who even suggested shipment by unescorted

ship, the 52d was scheduled to arrive before

the end of April; but the 51st could not

possibly arrive until late May, too late for

NEPTUNE. As a substitute for the 51st,

Medaris was given the 224th Base Group

Headquarters (T/O 9-312), which had

been assigned to FECOMZ.45

In the matter of supplies, the theater

went to great lengths to equip First Army.

An important supply mission that included

44

 (1) Minutes, Conf of Ordnance Officers APO

887, 28 Mar, 21 Apr, 19 May 44, 12th Army

Group 337 Administrative Meetings. (2) 12th

Army Group (FUSAG) Daily Journal, Ordnance

Section, Mar-Jul 44. 45

 (1) Msgs, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 3 Apr, 14

Apr 44. (2) Msgs, Marshall to Eisenhower, 12

Apr, 16 Apr 44. (3) Ltr, Eisenhower to FUSAG,

FUSA, FECOMZ, and ADSEC, 20 May 44, sub:

Ordnance Troop Requirements and Assignments,

Incl 1. All in 12th Army Group 322 Ordnance

Units. (4) Min, Conf of Ordnance Officers, APO

887, 21 Apr 44.

the theater chiefs of all technical services

was sent to the United States in March.

As a member of this mission, Sayler

speeded action on the advance shipment

of T/E equipment and depot stocks,

and the dispatch to the theater of

ammunition (principally for artillery),

PROCO projects, and such special nonstatus items as tool sets. He urged that

some of the ships scheduled to carry supplies direct from the United States to the

Continent (the floating depots devised to

solve the problem of port congestion in the

United Kingdom) be loaded by commodity or "type," and he obtained approval

for loading 30 ships solely with trucks and

11 with ammunition. This would enable

him as Ordnance officer of the Communications Zone to call forward specific cargoes

quickly on demand of the using arms.46

The European theater gained an immense

advantage when it convinced Army Service

Forces and the New York Port of Embarkation that it had a good stock control

system. As a result, in Europe the Ordnance supply officers had far less trouble

with the editing of requisitions than had

those in the Mediterranean.47

The ETOUSA supply men paid tribute

to the "magnificent job" done by Army

Service Forces and New York Port of Embarkation in meeting their demands.48

 In

the United States a close check was kept

46

 (1) Ltr, Brig Gen Royal B. Lord to Gen

Somervell, 1 Apr 44, sub: Rpt on ETOUSA Supply Mission to United States, Incl 8. (2) Digests

of Teletype Confs, 29 Apr, 1 May 44. Both in

ASF Planning Div, Theater Br. (3) Ord Serv ETO,

Class II & IV Supply, pp. 88, 526, and Annex 1. 47

 (1) Sayler Interv. (2) Lt. Gen. Leroy Lutes,

"Supply: World War II," Part II, Antiaircraft

Journal, vol. 96 (January-February 1953), p. 3. 48

 Daily Journal, ACofS G-4, 16 May 44, Admin

475.
238 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

on shortages and shipments were expedited

if necessary. When word came from the

theater that the DUKW's, which were

wearing out from use in training and amphibious exercises, would need more parts

than had been anticipated, ASF shipped

six tons of critical parts by air. The War

Department released additional quantities

of ammunition. As D-day drew near,

very few shortages existed either in spare

parts or ammunition, and those were

caused by shortages in the United States.

Special arrangements were made for shipping scarce types, such as 81-mm. mortar

ammunition, as soon as they became available. Missions from ASF, NYPE, and the

technical services were sent to England

throughout the spring to check on supplies

and demonstrate new types of equipment.

Experts came over to help solve special

problems. Late in March 1944, when 21

Army Group became concerned about the

difficulty of segregating 105-mm. howitzer

ammunition by lots, Ordnance sent Col.

Leslie E. Simon, director of the Ballistic

Research Laboratory, to the theater to conduct test firings, and the data he obtained

was used successfully to classify the ammunition.

Certain Ordnance items, chiefly vehicles,

that could not be sent in time from the

United States were obtained, one way or

another, in England. First Army got tank

transporters from the British and 21⁄2-ton

trucks from the Red Cross and even from

SHAEF headquarters, swapping 11⁄2-ton

trucks for them. For other items that

were not available anywhere, such as 10-

ton ammunition trailers, there were substitutes that would do. Perhaps the most

serious shortage was in Ordnance shop

trucks, which were in demand not only for

their original purpose but, as in the Mediterranean, for mobile command posts.

Some were obtained by robbing Third

Army and the Field Force Replacement

Service. With these, the Ordnance men

trusted that they could get by for the first

thirty days after the invasion, when more

shop trucks were expected from the United

States.49

Toward the end of the cold, uncomfortable English spring of 1944, the troops

moved into their marshaling camps in

southern England. Taking stock, the men

at headquarters began to feel repaid for the

months of hard work and worry. The

chief of operations of ASF, General Lutes,

came to England to make an exhaustive

last-minute survey of the plans and preparations; he assured General Eisenhower

that the invasion could be supported.

General Sayler reported to General Campbell that First Army was "probably the

best equipped fighting force in the history

of warfare." Medaris and the combat

commanders seemed satisfied.50 Indeed, at

the last high-level conference at General

Montgomery's headquarters three weeks

before D-day, attended by King George

VI himself, Prime Minister Churchill was

somewhat alarmed by "the amount of

paraphernalia." He was reminded of

49

 (1) Memo, CG ASF for Maj Gen John E. Hull,

29 Apr 44, sub: Supply Situation for the European

Theater of Operations, ASF Planning Div, Theater

Br. (2) Ltr, Holmes to Campbell, 5 Jun 44. (3)

Daily Journal ACofS G-4, Mar-May 44. (4) Hq

ComZ Staff Conference Notes 1944, 10 Apr 44-21

May 44. (5) 12th Army Group (FUSAG) Daily

Journal, Ordnance Section Mar-Jul 44. 50

 (1) Lutes, "Supply: World War II," Part II,

Antiaircraft Journal, vol. 96 (January-February

1953), P.9. (2) Ltr, Sayler to Campbell, 12 Jun

44, sub: Report on ETO Ordnance Activities,

O.O. 350.05/12489. (3) Ltr, Holmes to Campbell,

5 Jun 44.
ARMING FOR THE GRAND CAMPAIGN 239

Admiral Cunningham's story of seeing

dental chairs being landed at Algiers during Operation TORCH. And remembering

the swarm of vehicles on the Anzio beachhead, he even became concerned about

what he called "an excess of motor-cars."

 51

The conference ended; the top commanders began a round of visits to the

troops waiting for D-day in the marshaling

areas; and Churchill wrote in General

Montgomery's "private book," "on the

verge of the greatest adventure with which

these pages have dealt, I record my confidence that all will be well. . . ."

 52

51

 Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 615-16. 52

 Ibid., p. 616.
CHAPTER XIV

The Far Shore in Normandy

Waiting their turn on D-day to make the

11 -mile run from the transport area in the

English Channel to OMAHA Beach, the

Ordnance ammunition team aboard LST

376 looked over the side with mounting

concern. The first waves of the invasion

—the tank-laden LCT's (some carrying

DD swimming tanks) and the infantry—

had gone off on schedule in the darkness;

but as day broke, a hazy, misty morning,

the men saw that there was a nasty chop

in the Channel with swells running high,

and that the small craft circling around

their LST were having trouble.

A few minutes before H-hour (0630),

Lt. James N. McPartland, the commanding officer of the 56-man team, started for

the shore to reconnoiter for an ammunition

dump site, getting rides for himself, Sgt.

Sam Godino, and Pvt. Albin E. Petrovich

in DUKW's carrying 105-mm. howitzers.

Their destination was Fox Green Beach, in

the eastern sector of OMAHA, but they did

not get very far. Sergeant Godino's

DUKW became waterlogged and had to

be towed back to the LST by a Coast

Guard cutter. It sank just as the last man

jumped onto the deck ladder. A few

minutes later another Coast Guard cutter

brought in Private Petrovich, who had

been hauled out of his foundering DUKW.

The men saw no more of Lieutenant

McPartland and presumed him lost,

though actually he had been rescued and

carried back to England.

Shortly after the DUKW debacle the

rest of the team headed for the shore in a

Rhino ferry. This was a barge—made of

ponton units and propelled by outboard

motors—that was big enough to carry 2/1⁄2-

ton trucks as well as men. Towed across

the channel by the LST's, the Rhinos were

another innovation of this invasion. Unlike

the swimming tanks, of which only 5 of the

32 destined for the eastern sector of

OMAHA survived the heavy sea, the Rhinos

were virtually unsinkable, but they were

unwieldy and slow. During the long, rolling voyage the ammunition men, who had

a good chance of being the first Ordnance

men ashore, had time to review what they

had been told about the terrain and the

job they were to do.

Omaha Beach

The part of the Normandy coast forever

to be known as OMAHA had a wide tidal

flat with an embankment of coarse shingle.

(Map 2) Beyond the shingle was a level

shelf of sand with patches of marsh grass,

then bluffs cut by four ravines forming exits

to inland villages. Near Colleville, the

village on the extreme east, to be located

by its church steeple, the men on the Rhino

were to set up a dump in support of the

37th Engineer Combat Battalion. They

were the first team of the 616th Ordnance
THE FAR SHORE IN NORMANDY 241

MAP 2

Ammunition Company. About two hours

later they were to be joined by the third

team, attached to the 348th Engineer Combat Battalion, which was to set up another

dump in the neighborhood. The second

team, which the rest of the company called

the "home guard," was to come in next

day to reinforce the two dumps. All were

a part of the 251st Ordnance Battalion,

assigned to the 5th Engineer Special Brigade, and for months had been training in

England with the Engineers. The first and

third teams had participated in the FABIUS

dress rehearsal in May.

About 1300, nearly three hours behind

schedule, the Rhino approached the shore.

The men saw shell explosions and vehicles

afire on the beach. The barge ahead of

them was hit several times and burst into

flames. One LCI ordered them back;

another told them to go in. The men put

on their pistol belts and packs, loudly cursing the heavy loads, while praying under

their breaths. When they approached the

shore a second time, they were again

warned by an LCI with a loud-speaker to

"Get the Hell away from the beach."

"And so," as the historian of the company recorded,

our rhino continued to meander amongst

the myriad number of LCT's, LCI's, LCVP's,

destroyers and cruisers. All this time the

harsh, dry cough of the large naval guns

aboard nearby French cruisers boxed our

ears and caused us to jump nervously. We

saw the powder flash before we heard the

blasts. We timed the interval between the

smoke and the blast to kill time. We

cheered the destroyers as they spewed their

small shells directly into the face of the

enemy, while their hulls almost scraped along

the sandy bottom. We were chilled and wet

from the cold drizzle, as we huddled together

in those two and a half ton trucks for
242 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

RHINO FERRY DISCHARGING MEN AND SUPPLIES ON A NORMANDY BEACH

warmth and the confidence breeded by close

proximity with others.1

German shells were dropping in the

water around them. After dark the beach

was lit up by the fire of the enemy's big

guns and mortars. Toward midnight the

ammunition men found themselves in the

midst of some LST's that had come close

to the shore to take off the wounded.

The Rhino tied up alongside one of them

for the night, just as the Luftwaffe came

over and dropped a bomb whose flight the

men could follow by its "eerie, fear-striking

whistle"; the bomb fell into the water. The

men from the Rhino scrambled up the

landing net to the top deck of the LST,

found some blankets, and fell asleep to the

racket of the antiaircraft guns. So ended

D-day for the first team of the 616th

Ammunition Company.

The third team got ashore on D-day.

The men left the transport Dorothea L.

Dix on LCVP's, which looked somethinglike iron bathtubs. They were faster than

the barges but less steady; most of those

aboard were desperately seasick. The front

ramps were lowered about 1330 into waistdeep water. Scuffling ashore, the Ordnance troops saw dead and wounded men

sprawled on the shingle, and found themselves lying side by side with infantrymen

1

 History 616th Ord Ammunition Co, 19 Nov

43-Jun, Oct-Nov 44.
THE FAR SHORE IN NORMANDY 243

of the 1st Division's 26th Infantry. Shell

fragments were hitting all around them,

cutting trousers and lifting helmets from

heads and bodies from the ground. The

Ordnance men crawled behind a wrecked

LCI and LCT, edged farther up the beach

behind stalled half-tracks, and at last

reached shelter at the base of the bluff,

leaving three wounded men, one fatally,

behind them on the rock-strewn sand.

Meanwhile, another boatload of twelve

ammunition men followed troops of the

26th Infantry up the hill to the outskirts

of Colleville, where they tried to set up an

ammunition supply point, but they found

things too hot for them and returned to

the beach. All dug in for the night and

tried to sleep through the falling flak and

German bombs. Just before dawn a messenger told the men to prepare to advance

to the front lines as replacements for infantry, but nothing came of this.

The men on the luckless Rhino got

ashore next day and were able to help the

third team unload the first munition-laden

LCT to come in. Working under mortar

fire, they carried 155-mm. shells across the

wide stretch of shingle and stacked them

among the tarpaulin-covered dead.2

Before the day was over, the commanding officer of the 616th located a 9-man

party from 251st Ordnance Battalion headquarters, which had landed on the wrong

beach. These men had a harrowing story

to tell. Capt. Harold G. Ordeman had

landed in a DUKW at E-1 Beach on Dday at 0830, when the beach was still

under small arms fire as well as mortar and

artillery fire. He had to pull four men

from a burning craft and extinguish the

flames from the clothing of a sailor who

had been knocked unconscious by an explosion. Maj. Karl H. Zornig came in at

1230 but was wounded and had to be

evacuated to England. The rest of the

party, landing later in an LCT in the midst

of an artillery barrage that effectively

pinned the men down, spent the afternoon

helping the wounded. Sometime during

the day a few men of the 3466th Medium

Automotive Maintenance Company got

ashore in an LCVP, but the rest of the

company and the bomb disposal squad

were held offshore in the cumbersome

Rhinos.3

In the western sector of OMAHA, where

the 74th Ordnance Battalion was assigned

to the 6th Engineer Special Brigade, even

fewer Ordnance men got ashore, but some

of them could claim the distinction of being

the first Ordnance men to land in Normandy, since the first team of the 3565th

Medium Automotive Maintenance Company hit the beach forty-five minutes before

H-hour. Later in the day a small party of

two officers and sixteen men drawn from

the 618th Ammunition Company and the

2

 (1) Ibid. (2) Ernest Hemingway, who was in

one of the LCVP's that left the Dix, wrote a

vivid account of the Fox Green Beach landings,

"Voyage to Victory," Colliers, vol. 114, No. 4

(July 22, 1944), pp. 11-13, 56-57- (3) For the

OMAHA landings see Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 305-28. Unless otherwise indicated this

chapter is based on Harrison's volume and on

Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, I.

(4) Samuel Eliot Morison, "History of United

States Naval Operations in World War II," The

Invasion of France and Germany: 1944-1945,

pp. 110-54.

3

 (1) History 2515st Ordnance Battalion, 11 FebAug 44. (2) History 5th Engr Special Brigade,

Opn Rpt NEPTUNE, 6-26 Jun 44, p. 19. (3)

Monograph, Capt Reynold A. Atlas, The Operations of Ammunition Depots in Normandy from

D-Day to the Battle of St. Lô, 6 June-25 July

1944, The Infantry School, 1946 (hereafter cited

as Atlas Monograph), copy in OHF.
244 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

27th Bomb Disposal Squad also landed in

this sector. There was little they could do

beyond helping the medics. When more

ammunition men came in next day, the

Engineers sent them to a point near Colleville to set up the first ammunition dump,

with the help of ammunition men from the

5th Engineer Special Brigade. The dump

planned at Vierville could not be opened

for several days, and when it was opened

it was so near the front lines that rounds

were taken from their boxes at the dump

and carried by hand to the artillery batteries.4

The second team of the 3565th Automotive Company got ashore D plus 1. The

men had been trained mainly on beach recovery, and there was plenty of that type

of work to do, for the beaches were strewn

with flaming wrecks; but somehow in the

confusion of the landing the company

found itself counted as part of an infantry

battalion. Marching inland with the infantrymen, the Ordnance men joined in

the early mopping-up operations in the

Vierville-Louvieres area and suffered heavy

casualties.5

All along the 5-mile stretch of OMAHA,

the invasion had been costly. The transports and LST's had been anchored too far

offshore and in the strong current and high

waves that followed the storm of 5 June,

the small craft headed for the shore had

been carried off course, so that hardly any

units landed as planned. The Germans

had good beach defenses, notably deadly

underwater obstacles with mines attached,

and they had a full infantry division whose

presence had been missed by Allied intelligence. Nevertheless, the men on the

beaches were pushing inland by the afternoon of D-day, climbing over the bluffs

whenever they were stopped at the exits.

Wave after wave of follow-up troops came

in on succeeding days.

Among them were the battalions that

Colonel Medaris had planned for the support of V Corps. Two companies of the

100th Ordnance Ammunition Battalion

were ashore by early afternoon of 8 June,

helping in the Engineer dumps until ASP

501 (later Depot 100) was set up a few days

later at Formigny under the supervision of

Colonel Ray, Medaris' ammunition officer,

who had arrived at OMAHA early on Dday. The first job was sorting, for the ammunition had been unloaded so hastily that

any effort to land it from the ships in separated types had been wasted. Trucks and

jeeps drove up with the ammunition still

in landing nets; men with cranes had simply picked up the nets, tossed them to the

top of the pile, and pulled the nets from

under. The result was a huge mass twenty

feet high that included small arms ammunition, high explosives, blasting caps, chemical shells, and propellent charges. The

Ordnance men set up a roller conveyor and

began to dig their way through the pile.

It was slow, dangerous work.6

Shortly after midnight on 11 June the

headquarters of the 177th Ordnance Battalion, the First Army maintenance battalion attached to V Corps, was ashore at

4

 (1) History 6th Engr Special Brigade, 6 Jun20 Jul 44. (2) 1st Sgt. Bernard W. Steele, ETO,

Letter to Editor, Firepower, vol. II, No. 1 (JuneJuly 1945). (3) History 100th Ord Ammunition

Bn, p. 28. (4) Ord Serv ETO, Ammunition Supply,

Annex 41, OHF. 5

 Col. W. R. Slaughter, "Ordnancemen Are Combat Troops," Firepower, vol. I, No. 5 (FebruaryMarch 1945), p. 5.

6

 (1) History 100th Ammunition Bn. (2) Interv, Lt Edwin J. Best, 618th Ord Co, with Maj

William E. Renner, in Renner Rpt.
THE FAR SHORE IN NORMANDY 245

AMMUNITION DUMP BEHIND OMAHA BEACH

Dog Green Beach. When the commanding officer was able to get in touch with

the command posts of V Corps and First

Army Ordnance, he learned that he had

lost an entire medium automotive maintenance company, the 3422d, and twentyseven enlisted men of Detachment B of the

526th Heavy Maintenance Company

(Tank) when LST 1006 was sunk in the

English Channel by a German torpedo in

the early hours of 9 June. Eleven men

and two officers of Detachment B had been

rescued but were carried back to England,

and all the company's equipment had gone

down with the ship. Two medium maintenance companies had come ashore safely,

along with Detachment A of the 526th.

In spite of its misfortunes, the 526th Heavy

Maintenance Company "performed a

heroic task in refitting, repairing, and keeping in operation badly needed tanks," according to a Bronze Star citation presented

to its commanding officer, Capt. Francis

F. Poppenburg. On the day after the

arrival of the 177th Battalion headquarters,

12 June, Colonel Medaris organized First

Army Ordnance Service at OMAHA.7

7

 (1) History 177th Ord Bn 1944. (2) History

526th Ord Heavy Maint Co (Tank) Jan-Dec 44.

(3) History 72d Ord Group, 1944.

THE FAR SHORE IN NORMANDY 247

Utah Beach

Compared to the bloody landings on

OMAHA Beach, the landings on UTAH

Beach, on the Cotentin peninsula northwest

of the Carentan estuary, were easy. The

beach itself, nine miles long, was easier to

cross. (Map 3) There was a gentle slope

of wet sand, then a few yards of dry sand,

and behind that a low concrete wall against

a belt of dunes partly covered with beach

grass. Inland were flooded pasture lands

for a mile or two, crossed by causeways

leading from the beach; to secure these

causeways, two airborne divisions, the 101st

and 82d, had been dropped beginning at

0115 on D-day.

The sea was calmer at UTAH than at

OMAHA, beach obstacles were fewer and

less formidable, and although artillery shelling continued for some time from the

heights at the northern and southern end of

the beaches and some damage was suffered

from the Luftwaffe, the assault forces encountered nothing like the hail of enemy

fire that had met the OMAHA landings.

The Germans sent their remote-controlled

miniature tanks to blow up the boats as

they beached, but the little Goliaths were

no more successful here than they had been

at Anzio. By nightfall on D-day, most of

the assault units of the 4th Division had

reached their first objective on the main

highway between Carentan and Ste.-MereEglise, and dumps were quickly established

in the dune area to relieve the congestion

on the beach.

Ordnance troops assigned to the 1st Engineer Special Brigade got ashore early on

D-day. At 1030 (H plus 4) an advance

party of the 191st Ordnance Battalion and

4 officers and 56 men of the 625th Ammunition Company landed. The experienced

team of the 625th had supported the engineers in Exercise TIGER.8

 Next morning,

when the first of the preloaded ammunition

LCT's came in, the whole 625th was ashore

and the first beach dump was set up about

600 yards behind Tare Green Beach.

That afternoon a British destroyer brought

in the commanding officer and some headquarters men of First Army's 101st Ammunition Battalion, who had been rescued

from the USS Susan B. Anthony twentytwo miles offshore when she struck an

enemy mine and sank. In the next few

days, through the joint efforts of the 101st

Ammunition Battalion and the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, the first inland dump

was established near Audouville-la-Hubert.

In spite of some enemy shelling and bombing, mostly at night, the dump was soon

operating smoothly.9

Most of the ammunition was brought to

the beach by DUKW's. Some care was

taken to see that these vehicles did not become overworked, as they had been in the

invasion of Sicily. At transfer points on

the beach the loads, still in cargo nets, were

lifted out by cranes and placed in trucks

that took them to the dumps; the DUKW

drivers had such definite orders not to drive

inland that even General Bradley, who

visited UTAH on 7 June, was unable to get

a ride in one to VII Corps headquarters.

The 1st Engineer Special Brigade's DUKW

maintenance company, the 3497th (vet8

 In TIGER, the 625th Company lost 12 men

when their LST was sunk by a German E-boat,

and shortly before the invasion 7 men were killed

and 13 injured when the company's rear echelon

CP at Falmouth was bombed. History 625th Ammunition Co 1 Dec 42-Jan 46. 9

 (1) Opn Rpt, 1st Engr Special Brigade,

NEPTUNE Opn (UTAH Beach), 6 Jun 44-24 Oct

44, Annex 4, Incl B; Annex 6, Incl F. (2) History

Hq & Hq Det 101st Ord Ammunition Bn, 27 Aug

42-12 Nov 45. (3) Atlas Monograph.
248 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

erans of Sicily) did not land until D plus 3,

but was not needed earlier.10

The first Ordnance maintenance company on UTAH (except for the division

light maintenance companies) was First

Army's 2d Medium Maintenance Company, assigned to the 4th Division. This

was Ordnance's oldest company, with a

history dating back to Chateau-Thierry and

the Meuse-Argonne in World War I; it

was soon given a chance to show that it

could live up to its traditions. Landing on

8 June, the 2d looked like a combat team,

for according to Medaris' plan for maintenance companies to carry as many replacement items as possible, it brought artillery

in calibers from 40-mm. antiaircraft guns

to 155-mm. howitzers and almost every

type of combat and general purpose vehicle, each vehicle combat-loaded with ammunition, gas for 150 miles, and food for

three days. While the men were unloading this formidable cargo from their Liberty ships into pitching LCT's and Rhinos,

with an M4 tank swaying in midair, German planes swooped out of the low-hanging clouds and attacked them with bombs

and machine guns. When the men got

to the beach they met severe fire from a

German shore battery that killed three men

of the company and wounded seven so seriously that they had to be sent back to

England.

Until 15 June, when units of the 184th

Ordnance Battalion arrived, the 2d supported not only the 4th Infantry Division

but also the 9th and 90th Infantry Divisions, the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions,

and VII Corps troops. Its wreckers were

almost immediately put to work clearing

the littered causeways, and its replacement

stocks were drawn on to reoutfit a complete

battalion of the 90th Infantry Division that

had lost all its equipment in the landings.

The 2d Medium Maintenance Company

set up the first Ordnance supply point on

the Continent in two fields at St. Hubert,

as well as the first Ordnance collecting

point and medium maintenance shop. On

13 June, moving north on the heels of the

4th Infantry Division, the company opened

a shop in a field only two and a half miles

from Montebourg, where a hard battle was

being fought. In the next field was a battalion of 155-mm. howitzers that made

sleep almost impossible, but nobody had

much time to sleep anyway, for the work

went on long after dark by flashlight in

blackout tents.11

Frustration in the Hedgerows

The two beachheads were joined on 13

June, the day after the 101st Airborne

Division entered the town of Carentan. In

the following two weeks VII Corps under

General Collins sealed off the neck of the

Cotentin peninsula and captured Cherbourg. General Bradley had scheduled a

simultaneous attack east toward St. Lô by

VIII Corps, committed on 15 June under

Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton; but on 19

June OMAHA and UTAH Beaches were hit

by a violent northeaster that continued for

several days. Ammunition ships could not

be unloaded, and it was Medaris' "unfortunate responsibility" to advise Bradley that

10

 (1) Atlas Monograph. (2) Bradley, A Soldier's

Story, p. 281. (3) History 1st Engr Special Brigade, Annex 6, Incl F.

11

 (1) History 2d Ord Medium Maint Co, JanDec 44. (2) Capt. Fred A. Tadini, "The Ol' 2nd,"

Firepower, vol. II, No. 2 (August-September 1945),

pp. 2-3.
THE FAR SHORE IN NORMANDY 249

there was not enough ammunition to support two attacks. Bradley chose to postpone Middleton's attack.12

After the capture of Cherbourg, VII

Corps, moving to the region south of

Carentan, and VIII Corps, strung out

across the Cotentin neck, began to prepare

for the push to the highway that ran from

Coutances to St. Lô along a ridge that

roughly marked the end of the Normandy

shoulder and the beginning of the main

body of France. VII and VIII Corps

would be aided on their left by XIX Corps

(committed 13 June under Maj. Gen.

Charles H. Corlett), separated from the

VII Corps sector by the Carentan Canal.

Left of XIX Corps, General Gerow's V

Corps was in the relatively quiet part of the

front that joined the British near Caumont.

By the end of June, on the 4O-mile U.S.

front that stretched from the bulge at Caumont to the west Channel shore of the

Cotentin, there were two airborne divisions

(overdue for relief), nine infantry divisions,

and two armored divisions. First Army

now had more men than the combined

forces of Patton and Montgomery in the

Sicily Campaign.13

To provide Ordnance support for this

huge force, Colonel Medaris had fourteen

battalions in Normandy or en route. Behind each corps he positioned a battalion to

furnish forward area support, operate a

corps collecting point, and perform recovery and evacuation; within these forward

battalions the medium maintenance companies had definite assignments to support

specified divisions. Behind each forward

battalion there was eventually to be an

army support battalion to do fourth echelon work on weapons and vehicles, keep

artillery and tanks in condition, and operate an army collecting point. The army

area around Isigny was to receive a depot

battalion for all Class II and IV supply,

and near it a main army fourth echelon

battalion and a battalion to inspect and recondition matériel in the hands of units relieved from combat. In the beach area

was placed an army battalion to do antiaircraft maintenance, dispatch vehicles to

the depot battalion, and generally perform

liaison with the Engineer beach brigades.

Of the two ammunition battalions, one

was to operate Depot 101 and ASP's for

VII and VIII Corps, the other to operate

Depot 100 and ASP's for V and XIX

Corps.14

In the VII and VIII Corps sector, all

battalions, including ammunition, came

under the 224th Ordnance Base Group; in

the V and XIX Corps sector, they came

under the 52d Ordnance Group when it

set up headquarters in Normandy at Blay

on 28 June, the day after its arrival from

England. With the 52d headquarters

came Col. Nelson M. Lynde, Jr., who had

been acting as Medaris' deputy in England.

Lynde became the maintenance and supply

officer of First Army Ordnance Section. A

capable officer with long experience in the

Mediterranean, he added considerable

weight to Medaris' staff at the time the

major operation southward from the beachheads began.15

The advance began early in July, and it

12

 Ltr, Maj Gen J. B. Medaris (USA Ret) to

rig Gen Hal C. Pattison, 28 Oct 63, OCMH. 13

 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 315.

14

 Hq Ord Service First U.S. Army, Operations

Orders No. 3, 22 Jun; No. 5, 28 Jun; No. 6, 9 Jul;

No. 16, 17 Jul 44, OHF. 15

 (1) Hq Ord Service First U.S. Army, Operations Order No. 5, 28 Jun 44; (2) History 52d

Ord Group, 21 Aug 43-13 May 45.
250 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

COLONEL LYNDE

was evident from the first that terrain and

weather were going to make the going

painfully slow. First Army was in hedgerow country—orchards and pastures cut

into tiny fields, each field fenced in by

dense hedges of shrubs and small trees

growing out of embankments up to ten feet

high, often flanked by drainage ditches or

sunken roads. Rain made lakes of the

Cotentin marshes on the VII and VIII

Corps fronts and turned even the high

ground into sticky mud. And the weather

prevented planes from giving close support.

The hedgerows could conceal anything

from an enemy sniper to an antitank gun

and could stop tanks, which, unable to

climb the embankments without exposing

their vulnerable underbellies, had to wait

for openings to be blown with TNT.

Hardly anywhere could a man see beyond

the field ahead of him. It was frustrating,

depressing warfare, almost like the fighting

some of the officers had experienced on

Guadalcanal. After a few days of it, General Bradley limited the objective considerably. The objective was now the highway between Lessay and St. Lô. Even so,

it was not attained until 18 July, when St.

Lô was captured. After seventeen days of

heroic effort that cost some 40,000 casualties, First Army had not advanced more

than seven miles at any point along the

wide front.16

In the lonely skirmishes with a hidden

enemy the troops had used a great deal of

ammunition, "spraying the hedgerows"

with machine gun bullets, one Ordnance

officer noted, as though with a hose, and

lobbing grenades and mortar shells over

the embankments. They had also used a

great many more smoke shells than had

been expected. White phosphorus was

useful to clean out nests of snipers, for it

caused nasty burns and the Germans soon

learned to dread it; and a good deal of

smoke was used for signaling to aircraft.

Watching the St. Lô attack, war correspondents were reminded of battlefields

sketched in an illustrated history of the

Civil War, with smoke lying in the valleys

and hanging over the fields and little

patches of woods.17

The reserves of infantry and artillery ammunition that had been accumulated during June were rapidly depleted. On 14

16

 (1)Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1961), p. 175. (2) Pyle, Brave Men

p. 256. 17

 (1) Interv, Maj Gen Floyd A. Hansen, 15

Sep 60. (2) Ord Office Jnl, XIX Corps AAR, 30

Jun 44, Annex D to sec. IV. (3) Pyle, Brave Men

p. 302. (4) Ralph Ingersoll, Top Secret (Nev

York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p. 173. (5) Robert

J. Casey, This Is Where I Came In (New York:

Bobbs-Merrill, 1945), p. 183.
THE FAR SHORE IN NORMANDY 251

July Bradley began to restrict the amount

of these types that could be fired. This

proved to be a satisfactory method of

rationing, preferable to restricting the

amount that was issued, but any kind of

rationing was hated by the combat commanders and was naturally disheartening to

Medaris and his ammunition officer,

Colonel Ray, all the more so because they

felt that they were not wholly to blame.

They had predicted long before the invasion that such types as 57-mm. HE and 81-

mm, mortar ammunition would be needed

in quantity, but both were still scarce. No

57-mm. HE except the little they could

borrow from the British was on the Continent. In the case of the 81-mm., they

suspected that it was in fact available in

the holds of ships lying offshore in the

Channel, but because ships' manifests were

either inaccurate or missing altogether, they

could not be sure.18

Medaris and Ray were on the right

track. The continuing shortage of ammunition for the 81-mm. mortar—a common,

standard item—puzzled Brig. Gen. Raymond G. Moses, 12th Army Group G-4,

until an investigation revealed that the reason was not only a sudden increase in consumption but inaccurate records on the

amount available. Hasty and indiscriminate unloading of ships offshore and the

inability of the receivers to identify and

thus report correctly on the huge stocks

dumped on the beaches were problems that

also affected supplies for weapons and vehicles, especially spare parts. But ammunition was First Army Ordnance's main concern in the early days in Normandy.19

Medaris always maintained that ammunition supply was simple if you knew all

the time just how much you had and where

it was. Unfortunately, this state was seldom attained. In the early stages of the

European campaign, the forward ASP's

ran smoothly enough, but in the large

depots in the rear (Depot 101 supplying

VII and VIII Corps in the UTAH area and

Depot 100 supplying V and XIX behind

OMAHA ), where large tonnages were arriving from the beaches night and day, in

good and bad weather, the men were unable to report accurately on their stocks.

Neither the men in the First Army battalions nor the men in Advance Section

battalions that began arriving to take over

the depots in mid-July had had enough

training in handling ammunition under

such hard conditions, nor had they been

trained in fighting fires. When a fire

broke out at Depot 101 on the afternoon of

12 July, with a chain of explosions that

rocked the dump and jumped across the

hedgerows, setting off artillery shells and

strewing burning phosphorus, the men fled

and made little or no effort to fight it.

The fire burned for almost four hours before Medaris could arrive with bulldozers,

tankdozers, and Engineer troops to apply

the dirt-throwing techniques that Ordnance had learned in the Mediterranean.

It was not brought under control until

0200 of the next day, and then just short

of an area containing 450 tons of TNT.

As it was, several of the night shift ammu18

 (1) First Army Rpt I, Annex 13, p. 70. (2)

Ltr, Ray to Ord Officer, First United States Army,

APO 230, 11 Aug 44, sub: Ammunition Supply

Report, France, 1-31 July 1944, Folder, Ordnance

Reports First Army Misc Jun-Aug 44, OHF. (3)

AGF Board Rpt No. 114, Ammo and Weapons

for 1st Army, 14 Jul 44.

19

 (1) Entry for 24 Jul 44, 12th AG Daily Jnl,

Ord Sec. Mar-Jul 44. (2) Ltr, Medaris to Pattison, 28 Oct 63. (3) Hansen Interv.
252 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

THE FIRE AT DEPOT 101 IN THE HEDGEROWS BEHIND UTAH BEACH

nition men sleeping in the bivouac area

were killed and about 1,500 tons of ammunition were lost.20

Compared with the difficulty of ammunition supply, the maintenance burden in

the hedgerow battles was not heavy. The

forward medium maintenance companies

were mainly concerned with the truckloads

of muddy, rusting, sometimes bloodstained

rifles that came to their small arms sections.

In this congested area, little truck maintenance beyond the repair of battle damage

was needed. The Ordnance units had

time to improvise several field expedients

to help the infantrymen break through the

hedgerows. One successful effort provided

a more sensitive fuze for the bazooka projectiles, thus enabling the weapon to blow

gaps in the hedgerows; another modified

the carbine to deliver brief bursts of full

automatic fire, thereby increasing the quick

reaction of infantry firepower in this type

of fighting. In the rear, First Army's

20

 (1) USFET Board Rpt, Ammunition Supply

and Operations, European Campaign, Ordnance

Section, Study Number 100, app. 4. (2) Ltr, Ray

to Ordnance Officer, FUSA, APO 230, 11 Aug 44.

(3) Atlas Monograph. (4) History 101st Ammunition Bn.
THE FAR SHORE IN NORMANDY 253

TANK WITH HEDGEROW CUTTER AND SANDBAGS

heavy shop battalion, the 25th, manufactured a number of devices requested by the

combat commanders—a sight for the rifle

grenade launcher, special mounts for

machine guns, a simple type of periscope

for peering over the hedgerows, and, most

important of all, an attachment to enable

tanks to penetrate the hedgerows.21

The Hedgerow Cutters and the

Cobra Breakthrough

By mid-July, budding inventors in the

First Army had produced several devices

to be attached to the front of a tank to dig

into the hedgerows. The best was contributed by Sgt. Curtis G. Culin, Jr., of

V Corps' 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance

Squadron, a light tank unit. The contrivance itself, a strong iron fork with five

straight tines, was developed by an officer

21

 (1) Pyle, Brave Men, pp. 286-87. (2) Intervs,

Capt Homer C. Doman, Maintenance Officer, 83d

Ord Bn; Lt Col Howard M. Elliott, CO 25th Ord

Bn; by William M. Hines, Sr., in Hines, History of

the General Purpose Vehicle 1941 to 1945 (hereafter cited as Hines History), pp. 299-302, OHF.

(3) Lt. Col. James D. Sams, "Ordnance Improvisation in the Combat Zone," Military Review,

XXVIII, 2 (May 1948), pp. 32-36. (4) Ltr, Medaris to Pattison, 28 Oct 63. (5) First Army Rpt

I, Annex 13, p. 91.
254 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

of the squadron's maintenance unit, Lt.

Steve Litton, who used the angle iron bars

or tetrahedrons that the Germans had emplaced off the beaches to rip the bottoms

out of landing boats. At a demonstration

attended by General Bradley and Colonel

Medaris, the hedgerow cutter, or Rhinoceros, showed that it could slice through

the matted roots in the embankments, enabling the tank to pass through the hedgerow instead of climbing it. The vulnerable

underbelly of the tank was not exposed,

and the nose was down, so that the guns

were in a better firing position.22

The hedgerow cutter model came at a

providential time, less than a week before

the planned jump-off for Operation COBRA.

COBRA was the breakthrough south of the

Periers-St. Lô road by three VII Corps

infantry divisions to open a gap through

which a motorized infantry division was

expected to dash fifteen miles southwest to

Coutances, bottling up the Germans that

were blocking the VIII Corps front; two

armored divisions were to go on to

Avranches and turn the corner into Brittany. Beyond the Periers-St. Lô road the

armor had to cross a belt of hedgerow

country—the hilly, true bocage—before it

could get to the plains beyond; it was essential that the tanks get through the bocage

quickly. Bradley ordered Medaris to put

hedgerow cutters on as many COBRA tanks,

light and medium, as possible. As it

turned out, the jump-off had to be postponed for a week because poor weather

conditions grounded the bombers; but

there was still not much time.23

Medaris arranged a demonstration at his

25th Battalion headquarters. He organized a large crew of welders and skilled

mechanics from his maintenance companies, pooling their facilities for mass production, and sent his tank transporters to

the beaches to round up tetrahedrons.

They were plentiful enough. The critical

item was welding material. Medaris had

requisitioned what seemed to the supply

agencies enormous amounts of it during the

preparations for OVERLORD. Experience

had taught him that it would be needed by

the service sections of his maintenance companies because they would have to do a

great deal of manufacture whenever the

inevitable crises in supply arose. With the

backing of Colonel Wilson, the First Army

G—4, he not only cleaned out all the welding rod in the depots in England, carrying

to the Continent every pound he could, but

he took action to increase the supply. His

foresight was rewarded. When he flew

back from Normandy to obtain enough

welding rod to make the hedgerow cutters,

it was available; emergency action would

have been useless at this point. The evening Medaris left for England, a sudden

and acute shortage of oxygen-acetylene

cylinders was discovered. Though scarce

in the United Kingdom, the cylinders were

rounded up and delivered by air before

breakfast next morning, an operation that

was watched with amazement by Montgomery's chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Sir

Francis de Guingand, who was visiting at

Bradley's headquarters at the time. In

forty-eight hours First Army Ordnance

22

 (1) Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 206. (2) Operations Report, Ordnance

Section V Corps, 6 Jun-31 Jul 44, p. 4. (3) W.

L. White, "Sergeant Culin Licks the Hedgerows,"

Reader's Digest, vol. 56, no. 334 (February 1950),

81-84. Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 330. 342.
THE FAR SHORE IN NORMANDY 255

men made nearly 300 hedgerow cutters,

and in a week three out of every five tanks

to be used in the breakthrough were

equipped with them.24

Many of the tanks equipped with hedgerow cutters also carried on their fronts piles

of sandbags or extra pieces of armor plate,

for the crews knew that the tanks, which

had been used up to now largely as mobile

pillboxes, did not have armor thick enough

to withstand the German guns. This had

been discovered in North Africa. Also,

neither the 75-mm. gun on most of the

Shermans nor the 138 new 76-mm. guns

(in reality 3-inch guns specially designed

for tank use) that arrived in Normandy

on 20 July would penetrate the frontal

armor of the German Tigers and Panthers.

The tankers could only hope that after the

Shermans broke out of the bocage and got

on the plains beyond, they could outmaneuver the German tanks, whose long guns

made them hard to handle. For the artillerymen the picture was much brighter.

When the COBRA breakthrough began on 25

 July, First Army had some of the big

pieces that had been so prized in Italy,

eighteen 240-mm. howitzers and six 8-inch

guns. They also had 48 of the new selfpropelled 155-mm. gun, M12, the first

self-propelled field gun sent overseas.25

Supplies and service troops had been

pouring in over the beaches while the frustrating hedgerow battles were being fought.

By 25 July there were 18 divisions of combat troops on the Continent (the two airborne divisions had been withdrawn).

Though the build-up of service troops was

not in proportion, it was still enough to

enable Medaris to reinforce and improve

his First Army Ordnance service. By the

end of July he had three new group headquarters—the 51st, 71st, and 72d. The

51st relieved the 224th (released to

ADSEC) as the forward organization

paralleling the 52d Group; the 71st took

over the ammunition battalions and the

task of supervising all army ammunition

operations, including ASP's and army

depots; and the 72d assumed the operations in the main army area, commanding

four battalions that ran the main shop and

depots and did the inspection-and-refitting

and evacuation work.26 (Chart 4)

The evacuation battalion, formed in

mid-July, was a tribute to the usefulness of

tank transporters, not only for hauling

tanks but for moving all kinds of cumbersome supplies, like the tetrahedrons that

were used in making the hedgerow cutters.

The huge vehicles, with their long skeletonized trailers, were awkward and slow, and

on the narrow, twisting roads of the hedgerow country were cursed by the convoys

that piled up behind them; but they were

invaluable. By pooling his three evacuation companies Medaris had a tremendous

24

 (1) First Army Rpt I, Annex 13, p. 92. (2)

History 177th Ord Bn 1944, Journal Entries 14-23

Jul 44. (3) Ltr, Medaris to Pattison, 28 Oct 63.

(4) Col J. B. Medaris, "Field Service in the First

Army," Army Ordnance, XXVIII, 148 (JanuaryFebruary 1945), p. 67. (5) De Guingand, Operation Victory, p. 395. (6) On the use of the tank

transporters see Sgt. S. W. Dobrans, "Nellie's a

Lady," Firepower (June-July 1945), p. 7. 25

 (1) Col W. R. Slaughter, Report of Observations in ETOUSA [14 Jul-4 Sep], 20 Sep 44

(hereafter cited as Slaughter Rpt), p. 30. (2)

Memo, Gen Barnes for General Campbell, 11 Oct

44, sub: History of Tank Guns. Both in Barnes

File, OHF. (3) Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp.

322-23. (4) First Army Rpt I, Annex 13, p. 80.

(5) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, pp. 316-17. 26

 (1) FUSA Ord Service, Operations Order 19,

30 Jul 44, OHF. (2) First Army Rpt I, Annex 13,

p. 88.
CHART 4—ORDNANCE GROUP ORGANIZATION FOR FIRST U.S. ARMY, 15 AUGUST 1944
THE FAR SHORE IN NORMANDY 257

A TANK TRANSPORTER HAULING AMMUNITION, FRANCE

amount of lift that could be used for a mass

movement in an emergency. Normally the

battalion brought heavy matériel back from

collecting points, moved supplies between

main shop and depot and out to the forward units, and in a pinch helped the forward collecting companies.27

The crews of the forward collecting

companies, known as the "Diesel Boys"

from their diesel-powered M19 tank transporters, operated close to the front, often

under fire, employing road patrols with

wreckers to clear broken-down tanks and

vehicles from main routes of advance under

severe enemy bombardment. Ernie Pyle,

who accompanied crewmen from the 974th

Evacuation Company (Collecting) when

they retrieved a German tank on the Carentan front one night in July, was impressed

by their bravery and skill. He also noted

their ability to make themselves comfortable

back in the bivouac area, in tents strung

out along the hedgerows. One driver even

had a feather bed that he had got from a

French family. "The average soldier

couldn't carry a feather bed around with

him, " commented Ernie, "but the driver

of an M-19 could carry ten thousand

feather beds and never know the difference."

 28

During the slow fighting in the hedge27

 (1) FUSA Ord Service, Operations Order 16,

17 Jul 44, OHF. (2) Slaughter Rpt, p. 24.

28

 (1) History 974th Ord Evacuation Co (Coll)

Feb 43-May 45. (2) Pyle, Brave Men, pp. 290-95.

(3) Slaughter Rpt, p. 4.
258 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

rows, Colonel Medaris had been disturbed

to find many Ordnance units settling down

with a feeling of permanence, even in tents.

To prepare them for the breakthrough that

everybody hoped would open the door for

a rapid advance across France, he frequently issued movement orders without warning

and (it seemed to the troops) without reason. These moves jarred the men out of

fixed habits and helped them to regain the

flexibility of thought and action that were

going to be needed after St. Lô.29

Expansion After Cobra:

Third Army

The COBRA breakthrough, aided by one

of the greatest saturation bombings of the

war, was a brilliant success. In the last

five days of July, First Army captured not

only Coutances but Avranches, the gateway from Normandy into central France.

General Eisenhower had directed on 25

July that U.S. ground troops on the Continent be regrouped into the First and

Third Armies, the two armies to be controlled by 12th Army Group, which would

be commanded by General Bradley. On 1

August Bradley went to 12th Army Group,

leaving First Army (V, VII, and XIX

Corps) under the command of General

Hodges. Third Army (VIII, XV, and XX

Corps) was given to General Patton, who

had been impatiently waiting on the Cotentin peninsula since early July.30

Third Army Ordnance men began arriving on the Continent the second week in

July. Crossing beaches under a night sky

made brilliant by streaming, crisscrossing

antiaircraft tracers and the wink of the

high-altitude 90-mm. shells, they could see

in the distance a "red booming sky," where

the hedgerow battles were being fought on

a front only a few miles away. As they

proceeded inland to Bricquebec, the Third

Army concentration area near Cherbourg,

they saw evidences of what the invasion

had cost—"heaps of rubble where houses

had once been, things which had once been

men, piles of shell cases, scattered equipment, crashed gliders," the cemetery at Ste.-

Mere-Eglise filling up with white crosses.

They found the ruins of Montebourg and

Valognes still hot. At Bricquebec, waiting

in the apple orchards and hedgerows for

Third Army to go into action, the ammunition men collected abandoned U.S. and

enemy ammunition, and the maintenance

men made hedgerow cutters for Patton's

tanks, obtaining welding material through

the good offices of the Navy, which not

only supplied tons of welding rod and many

bottles of oxygen and acetylene from its

own stocks, but procured quantities of

these scarce articles for Third Army in

England, delivering them at Cherbourg.31

By 1 August there were about 10,000

men in Third Army Ordnance Service,

including the men that were transferred

from First Army (most of them supporting VIII Corps). Those assigned but not

yet arrived would bring the number to

around 15,000. Colonel Nixon, Patton's 29

 Medaris, "Field Service in the First Army,"

Army Ordnance, XXVIII, 148 (Jan-Feb 45),

p. 67. 30

 (1) Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 204.

(2) After-Action Report, Third U.S. Army, 1

August 1944-9 May 1945 (hereafter cited as

Third Army Rpt), vol. II, Staff Section Reports,

Command, p. 2.

31

 (1) Third Army Ordnance Unit Histories,

ETO Ord Sec Histories, KCRC. (2) Third Army

Rpt, vol. II, Ordnance, p. 6. For strenuous attempts

to obtain welding material in France, see History

984th Depot Co, ETO Ord Sec, KCRC.
THE FAR SHORE IN NORMANDY 259

Ordnance officer, had organized them in

England under the now familiar group

system, the forward maintenance and supply battalions (each battalion supporting a

corps) and the intermediate battalions

(supporting the forward battalions as well

as corps and army troops) under a forward

group; the fourth echelon battalions under

a rear group; and the ammunition battalions under an ammunition group.32

Because of personnel shortages in the

United States and the higher priority accorded First Army and ADSEC, Nixon

had been forced to improvise. He had

only two group headquarters, the 69th

controlling the forward and intermediate

battalions and the 70th controlling the rear

shops and depots, and both had been obtained by converting battalion headquarters

already in the theater into group headquarters. He had no ammunition group headquarters until September, when the 82d

was organized; in the meantime, the 313th

Ammunition Battalion acted as a group

headquarters. By mid-May, after First

Army and ADSEC had been satisfied, all

types of Ordnance units were scarce and the

War Department had informed the theater

that the units expected in the next three

months would be fewer than had been anticipated because they were not available in

the United States. Nixon's most serious

shortages were in depot, evacuation, heavy

tank maintenance, and ammunition companies, and ammunition battalion headquarters. A few maintenance companies

were furnished to him from FECOMZ, but

he had to supplement his single ammunition battalion headquarters by converting

three maintenance battalion headquarters

to ammunition.33

An even more serious cause for concern

was supply. Again the reason was low

priority. In England in the spring of 1944

First Army's requirements had so drained

the theater's stocks that Third Army Ordnance Service had only about 50 percent of

its basic load, and had no reserves of major

items. The planners intended to fill its

needs from the huge stocks being shipped

from the United States, but congestion at

the British ports made this impossible. During May, tonnage made available to Ordnance amounted to only 31 percent of that

expected. The commodity-loaded ships

that were to go directly to the Continent

would probably relieve the situation, but

there was little hope from this quarter until

late in the summer. In the meantime, it

was doubtful whether Third Army would

receive more than 75 percent of its T/E

vehicles before it went into combat.34

As a result of the "poor relation" position of Third Army in England, many of

its Ordnance units arrived on the Continent in July with shortages not only in

their basic load of spare parts but in such

32

 Third U.S. Army Outline Plan, Opn OVERLORD, Annex 2, Troop Basis, Third Army Rpt,

vol. I.

33

 (1) Third Army Rpt, vol. II, Ordnance, pp.

2-6. (2) Memo, CofS for CG AGF, 12 Jun 44,

sub: Activation of Hqs and Hqs Detachment,

Ordnance Group. (3) Ltr, Secy War to CG ETO,

20 Jun 44, sub: Activation of Headquarters and

Headquarters Detachments, Ordnance Groups.

Last two in ASF Planning Div, Theater Br. (4)

Rpt of Meeting of Ordnance Officers, 19 May 44,

12th Army Group 337 Conference Meetings. (5)

12th U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) Daily Journal,

Ordnance Section, 19 May 44. 34

 (1) Intervs, Col Nixon, 25 Aug 45; Col Harry

H. Gibson, CO 79th Ord Bn, 26 Jul 45, in Hines

History, pp. 303, 306. (2) USFET Gen Bd Rpt

No. 99. (3) Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, p. 109. (4)

12th Army Group (FUSAG) Daily Journal, Ordnance Section, 6 May, 9 May 44.
260 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

essentials as shop trucks and tools; the

79th Battalion at Bricquebec, for example,

had only between 60 and 70 percent of the

tools it needed. These shortages were relieved to a great extent by the efforts of a

representative that Nixon had left behind in

Cheltenham, who arranged for most of the

scarce articles to be brought to the Continent by units arriving later. Again the

evacuation companies with their big tank

transporters came in handy for hauling

supplies. Several truck companies were

used to deliver spare parts, not only for the

Third Army depot and maintenance companies, but for the 2d French Armored

Division attached to Third Army. This

division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Jacques Leclerc and composed in part of the

famous Leclerc Column that had fought in

Tripolitania and Tunisia, was to be committed after the breakout, an earlier commitment than was at first planned. To expedite its equipment, as well as to speed

the supply of tools and equipment of his

own Ordnance units, Nixon made two trips

to England in July.35

When Third Army became operational

on 1 August, its Ordnance supply units had

little stock other than organically carried

replacement items, spare parts, and ammunition. But there was the probability

that additional stocks could be obtained

from ADSEC. Brig. Gen. James H. Stratton, COMZ G-4, had established a policy

that all First Army stocks in COMZ depots

on the Continent that were excess to First

Army's needs would be released at once to

Third Army. On supplies requested by

both armies, urgent command action would

be taken, and allocation between the two

armies would be made by 12th Army

Group, which had just set up headquarters

in a bombed-out orphanage building at

Periers. On the whole, except for a few

shortages, the situation was considered

fairly good at the beginning of August.

Huge stocks were piled under tarpaulins on

the beaches, which were now able to handle

30,000 long tons a day. Cherbourg had

been opened on 19 July; and high hopes

existed that Brest and other Brittany ports

—prime objectives in the OVERLORD

planning—would soon be in American

hands.36

The task of capturing Brest was given to

Patton and Patton generated confidence.

Bradley reported to General Eisenhower

that he and his men felt "pretty cocky"

about the future.37 After the dank battles

in the hedgerows, the southward sweep of

the armies was exhilarating. First Army

turned southeastward toward Vire to drive

back the enemy's center and hold open the

corridor at Avranches. Third Army drove

southwest into Brittany and made brilliant

progress. By 4 August, Patton had captured

Rennes and had armored units as far as

Loudeac, in the center of the peninsula.

The weather turned warm and clear, so

that air support was always possible; the

enemy seemed shattered in this region, and

the French Maquis were rising.

35

 (1) Third Army Rpt, vol. II, Ordnance, p.

6. (2) Interv, Gibson, in Hines History. (3) On the

ad French Armored Division, see Marcel Vigneras,

Rearming the French, UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1957), p. 10;

and Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 239.

30

 (1) Col. T. H. Nixon, "Across the Beachheads," Army Ordnance, XXVIII, 150 (MayJune 1945), p. 398. (2) 12th Army Group

(FUSAG) Daily Journal, Ord Sec, 1-5 Aug 44.

(3) Rpt on General Weaver's Conference of 15

Jul 44, ETO Ord Sec O.S. 334 Meetings and Conferences General, Feb 43-Jul 44, KCRC. 37

 Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 200.
THE FAR SHORE IN NORMANDY 261

SHELLS STACKED BY TYPE TO FACILITATE ISSUE, FRANCE

Things looked so good that General

Montgomery, who until 1 September, when

SHAEF arrived on the Continent, was to

have operational control of all Allied forces,

made a major change in the tactical plan.

Using First Army as a holding force, he

ordered Third Army to leave only one

Corps, the VIII, to clear Brittany and to

make its main effort in a wide sweep eastward from Rennes toward Laval and

Angers. Eisenhower reported to Marshall

"Patton has the marching wing . . . ."

 38

38

 Ibid., p. 209.
CHAPTER XV

The Race Across France

"The time you saw the American Army

on the move was after Avranches," wrote

an observer. After the capture of Avranches on 31 July 1944, bulldozers and

scrapers were clearing the roads of the German wreckage left in the wake of the great

sweep of Allied bombers and strafers. The

main roads were almost bumper to

bumper with vehicles. There were long

trains of 21⁄2-ton trucks, sometimes forty

or fifty in a train; tank transporters with

huge cabs; refrigerator trucks like boxcars; trucks piled high with telegraph

poles or little nests of boats, stacked like

saucers, for river crossings. There were

generals' caravans and service units' mobile

workshops. Between the supply convoys,

batteries of artillery squeezed themselves,

and sometimes there was a tank on its own

treads, though more often the tanks took

the side roads or made their own roads

across the fields to keep from blocking the

march. In and out among the big vehicles

scurried the jeeps, climbing the sides of the

roads to get through.1

On the run, Colonel Nixon took over the

Ordnance units supporting VIII Corps,

which was by then already headed for

Brest. The story of the 665th Ammunition Company shows how fast things were

moving. For the breakout after COBRA,

one officer and 25 men of the 665th (they

called themselves the Secret 25) had been

selected by Medaris to operate a rolling

ASP on ten tank transporters, each loaded

with fifty tons of ammunition, to follow the

armored columns and make issues directly

from the transporters. This plan was

abandoned because of the quick success of

the breakout and the small amount of ammunition expended; but the company

marched close on the heels of the 4th and

6th Armored Divisions, and was so far

ahead of the mine sweeping Engineers that

on 29 July the men had to drive cattle

through their ASP site at Muneville to

clear it of mines. Here they set up another

rolling ASP on 198 Quartermaster trucks

and continued south at a fast clip. At the

one bridge leading into Avranches they ran

into heavy German bombing. Two men,

Technician 5 Robert H. Bender and Pvt.

Joseph Keyes, remained all night at this

dangerous spot to direct the trucks to their

next ASP south of Avranches. The company arrived at its new area so early that it

had to clear the site of snipers. Two days

later, on 5 August, the 665th was attached

to Third Army.2

Through the bottleneck at Avranches

Colonel Nixon brought the bulk of his Ordnance units down from Bricquebec on 6-7

August. With only a few hours' notice, the

1

 Ingersoll, Top Secret, p. 192.

2

 (1) History 665th Ammunition Co, in ETO

Ord Sec, KCRC. (2) Slaughter Rpt, p. 3.
THE RACE ACROSS FRANCE 263

men threw their duffle bags into their trucks,

skinned their shins jumping on tailgates,

and were off on the long journey down

dusty, bombed-out roads that became progressively more obstructed with the traffic

of combat units and the wreckage left behind by the Germans. The historian of one

depot company moving through La Haye

du Puits, Coutances, and Gavray to Avranches found "each town an awful monument

to hell itself. The stench of unburied

bodies lying in the unmerciful summer sun

was overpowering at times, as the convoy

rolled slowly on through a red clay dust

which clung savagely to the skin and

blinded the eyes." To avoid the jam of

military traffic, one Ordnance battalion

took a back road not on any map; others

moved by edging into traffic with about

seven vehicles at a time; and some had to

wait in line by the hour to cross bridges or

intersections.3

The Ordnance men arrived at Avranches in the middle of the severest air bombardment Third Army had ever received.

The Germans, counterattacking at Mortain in an attempt to drive a wedge between First and Third Armies, not only

bombed and strafed the bridge at Avranches but plastered the neighborhood.

Near midnight on 6 August, just after the

573d Ammunition Company arrived at

Depot 1 in an apple orchard near Folligny,

the Luftwaffe came over and destroyed

about a thousand tons of ammunition.

Explosions rocked the area for days. Ordnance depot and maintenance companies

moving through Avranches down to the

Foret de Fougeres in Brittany passed

through St. Hilaire-du-Harcouet while it

was still burning and were bombed and

strafed on the road. The 344th Depot

Company had nine men killed and eighteen

wounded.4

Having assembled his rear group—his

heavy maintenance companies and main

army depots—under the trees at Fougeres,

Nixon's first effort was to bring down more

supplies from Normandy. His units in the

Bricquebec area, with little stock on 1

August other than the organic replacement

items they carried, spare parts and ammunition, had been able to draw on the ADSEC

depots in the Cotentin to some extent.

Bringing additional supplies down through

the Avranches bottleneck was not easy.

Ammunition was brought forward on what

became virtually a day-to-day basis, and in

emergencies tank transporters and the

trucks of maintenance units were used.5

After Avranches, Nixon faced a logistician's nightmare—the support of an army

that was split into two segments, traveling

very fast in opposite directions. The VIII

Corps was headed west through Brittany,

the XV Corps was headed east toward the

Seine. By the time Nixon had got his three

heavy depot companies down to Fougeres

on 8 August, more than 200 miles separated VIII Corps' 6th Armored Division,

which was at the gates of Brest, and XV

Corps' four divisions (90th and 79th Infan3

 (1) Col. T. H. Nixon, "Across the Beachheads,"

Army Ordnance, XXVIII, 150 (May-June 1945),

p. 398. (2) Histories, 904th Heavy Automotive

Maint Co, 841st Depot Co, 314th Bn, and other

histories in ETO Ord Sec, KCRC.

4

 (1) George S. Patton, War As I Knew It

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 194.7), P.101 .

(2) Histories in ETO Ord Sec, KCRC. (3) Nixon

blamed the ammunition losses at Depot No. 1 on

the mistake of stocking the depot according to

"the book." Thereafter stocks were spread out, 8 tons (2 truckloads) to a stack and no other serious

losses occurred. Nixon Comments. 5

 Nixon, "Across the Beachheads," p. 398.
264 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

MAP 4

try, 5th Armored and 2d French Armored)

at Le Mans. By that time the newly organized XX Corps' one infantry division was

advancing south to the Loire. With Nixon's

main source of supply eighty miles north in

Normandy, his line of communications began to look like an inverted, distorted T.

His solution to his problem was to hold the
THE RACE ACROSS FRANCE 265

main stock of supplies at pivotal points so

that even if it became necessary to operate

daily convoys west and south, the bulk of

the supplies was never moved far from the

road east, the road that the supplies would

eventually follow when the main part of

the army advanced toward the Seine. This

axis of advance had been explained to
266 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Nixon by Patton when they were still in

England, about a week before they embarked for Normandy.6

 (Map 4)

The Campaign in Brittany

The VIII Corps was fighting in the west

for the Brittany ports, with elements of the

6th Armored Division near Brest, the 4th

Armored Division approaching Lorient on

the southern coast, and a reinforced infantry division attacking St. Malo on the

north. The VIII Corps mission lessened in

importance as Third Army drove east.

Even if the Breton ports were usable after

being pounded by American air and artillery and wrecked by the Germans, they

would still be so far to the west that they

would place an intolerable burden on transportation. But Eisenhower and Bradley

were unwilling to write off the ports and

the attack continued, though it became

more or less a subsidiary operation with low

priority. The VIII Corps began to feet

like an orphan.

Most of the Germans were contained in

the ports, but there were pockets of resistance throughout the peninsula, stragglers

and snipers who roamed the countryside

like brigands, concealing themselves in the

woods and hedgerows. Supply convoys

had to have armed escorts; to some Americans the supply trucks racing along in

clouds of dust were reminiscent of stagecoaches making a run through Indian

country. Everyone had to know how to

fight. Eleven Ordnance men of the 531st

Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank) on

the way to Brest to deliver tanks and combat cars were ambushed by the enemy at

Pontlion. Pursuing the Germans into the

woods, they bagged 3 German officers and

99 enlisted men, and released a captured

Air Forces captain.7

The Ordnance officer of VIII Corps, Lt.

Col. John S. Walker, had been warned that

the forces in Brittany could not expect

much in the way of supplies. No more

tanks, either light or medium, or tank

tracks were to be forthcoming from Third

Army. An appeal to Third Army for ten

jeeps and trailers met with no encouragement. Walker was told that the divisions

would be refitted at the end of the peninsular campaign, and he got the impression

that Nixon thought the campaign would

not last long. In the meantime, the corps

would have to get along with what it had.

Once in a while the men of the 24th Ordnance Battalion supporting the corps were

able to pick up some German supplies.

The 300th Antiaircraft Maintenance Company, for example, got some badly needed

electrical equipment from an abandoned

German broadcasting station near Brest,

braving mortar fire to enter the building.

This find was a matter of luck. The captured German depots were generally disappointing.8

Soon Walker's greatest cause for concern

was a shortage of ammunition. The attack

on St. Malo beginning 6 August had been

unexpectedly costly. The Germans were

dug in behind the thick walls of an ancient

6

 (1) Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, pp.

380-82, 424-29. Unless otherwise noted, this chapter

is based on that source and on Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, I and II. (2) Nixon,

"Across the Beachheads," p. 398. (3) Nixon Comments, p. 14.

7

 (1) R. W. Grow, "An Epic of Brittany," Military

Review, vol. XXVI, No. 11 (February 1947), P. 9.

(2) History 531st Heavy Maint Co (Tank), p. 8.

(3) Slaughter Rpt, p. 3. 8

 VIII Corps, Misc Jnls, Aug 44, Ord Sec of

G-4 Jnls.
THE RACE ACROSS FRANCE 267

citadel and had not only 88-mm. guns but

210-mm. coastal guns turned around to

fire inland. The attackers, with the bulk

of VIII Corps heavy artillery, including

two battalions of 8-inch guns and one of

240-mm. howitzers, were hampered by a

shortage of artillery ammunition at the

start of the 10-day siege. For several days

some of the heavy pieces had to be restricted

to four rounds a day. By mid-August,

when St. Malo surrendered, partly as a

result of direct hits by 8-inch guns, VIII

Corps was convinced that even more heavy

artillery and considerably more artillery

ammunition, would be needed for the allout attack on Brest.9

As the big siege weapons moved westward toward Brest, Colonel Walker and

Col. Gainer B. Jones, the corps G-4, drove

to Third Army headquarters near Le Mans

to submit VIII Corps ammunition estimates—an initial stockage of 8,700 tons,

plus maintenance requirements totaling

11,600 tons for the first three days. Colonel

Nixon felt that Walker's demands were

excessive and if satisfied would jeopardize

support of Patton's advance to the east.

He informed Colonel Jones that VIII Corps

was basing its figures on more troops than it

would have for the operation. Walker

inferred that Third Army intended to reduce

the attacking force because it had calculated that Brest would surrender about 1

September, after only a show of force. In

the end, Nixon allotted VIII Corps only

5,000 tons of ammunition.10

The VIII Corps commander, Maj. Gen.

Troy H. Middleton, "raised all manner of

hell," sending an urgent request personally

to 12th Army Group and finally going

straight to General Bradley, who with General Patton made a flying visit to Middleton's headquarters and agreed that the newly opened Brittany Base Section would take

over the supply of VIII Corps, which would

be authorized to deal directly with COMZ

without going through army. This did not

help matters much, for there was still the

problem of poor transportation, complicated by the gasoline shortage; inadequate

communications; and, toward the end,

little enthusiasm for the operation on the

part of COMZ planners, who regarded

the costly siege of Brest as wasteful and

unnecessary after the capture of Antwerp

and Le Havre on 4 and 12 September,

respectively. It took repeated and vigorous

action by Middleton, including refusal to

resume the attack on Brest until his ammunition supply was assured, to get results. Ammunition supply began to improve beginning 7 September. Large

shipments came by rail and also by LST's

from England, which were unloaded on an

emergency beach near Morlaix on the

northern coast of Brittany. The ammunition company that supported the siege from

a huge dump near Pleuvorn calculated that

22,500 tons were expended by the time

Brest fell on 18 September. Some 11,000

tons were left over to be shipped east by

rail to the German border, and in the meantime the dump was even able to fill a rush

9

 Third Army Rpt, vol. II, Arty Sec, pp. 3-4. 10

 (1) Ltrs, Gainer B. Jones and Col John S.

Walker to R. G. Ruppenthal, 9 Jun 50, 15 May

50, Folder, Ruppenthal Ltrs, OCMH. (2) Interv,

Col Thomas H. Nixon (USA Ret), 19 May 61,

and Nixon Comments, p. 16. (3) A second request from VIII Corps for 3,500 tons, made directly to 12th Army Group a few days later had no

better luck. The Group Ordnance Section recommended approval, but Colonel Nixon and the

Third Army G-4 persuaded the Group G-4 to take

no action. 12th AG Ord Sec Daily Jnl, 21 Aug 44.
268 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

order for 270 truckloads to support Patton's dash eastward across France.11

To the Seine and Beyond:

First Army Ordnance

While Third Army was in Brittany and

making its spectacular end run to Le Mans,

First Army was intent on taking the important road junctions of Vire and Mortain. These junctions were needed in order

to contain the bulk of the German forces,

which were in First Army's sector, and

provide protection for the Avranches corridor. According to the original plan First

Army would then join with the British and

Canadians on the north in a drive to the

Seine.

The plan was changed, at General

Bradley's suggestion, when the Germans

launched their strong though unsuccessful

counterattack at Mortain on 7 August, because it then appeared possible for the

Americans and British to encircle the Germans and trap them. The upper jaw of

the vise would be a line from Tinchebray

east to Falaise; the lower jaw, a line from

Flers east to Argentan. By closing the gap

of fifteen miles or so between the two easternmost towns, the Allies hoped to trap the

bulk of the German forces in France in an

area that would later be known as the

Argentan-Falaise pocket. Both American

armies were involved. In the First Army

area, a corridor curving south and east

between 21 Army Group and Third Army,

the plan was for XIX and VII Corps to

make a converging attack in the Mortain

area and then move north toward the 21

Army Group line at Flers and Argentan,

respectively, and for V Corps to move

southeastward from Vire to Tinchebray.

In the Third Army sector, Patton's XV

Corps at Le Mans was to make a 45-degree

turn north and advance toward Argentan.

(See Map 4.)

Getting under way on 10 August, Third

Army's XV Corps, spearheaded by the 5th

Armored and 2d French Armored Divisions, was in the neighborhood of Argentan

on 13 August. The First Army attack

started on 12 August, when the Germans

withdrew from Mortain. By 15 August V

Corps had Tinchebray, XIX Corps was

making contact with the British several

miles west of Flers, and VII Corps was in

position to protect the XV Corps left near

Argentan. On that day Bradley directed

Patton to turn the bulk of XV Corps eastward toward the Seine, leaving the 2d

French Armored and one infantry division

to hold the "Argentan shoulder," aided by

an infantry division from Third Army's

XX Corps. Next day, 16 August, the Germans in attempting to force their way out

of the Argentan-Falaise gap launched a

series of strong counterattacks at the shoulder ; and though V Corps had been brought

down from Tinchebray, the three First

Army corps and the British were unable to

prevent part of the German forces from

escaping through the gap between 18 and

20 August.

11

 (1) Ltr, Lt Gen Troy H. Middleton (USA

Ret), to R. G. Ruppenthal, 19 Jun 50, Folder

Ruppenthal Ltrs, OCMH. (2) 12th AG Ord Sec

Jnl, 23 Aug 44. (3) History 665th Amtnunition

Co, ETO Ord Sec, KCRC; for support by an

Ordnance observer of the ammunition company's

figure on expenditures, see Ltr, Col Theodore A.

Weyher to Col G. M. Taylor, 26 Sep 44, no sub,

O.O. 350.05/16317. (4) USFET Gen Bd Rpt No.

58, Ammunition Supply for Field Artillery, pp. 21-

23. (5) The best account of the supply troubles in

Brittany and indecision about the ports is in Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, I, pages

528-37, II, pages 46-49.
THE RACE ACROSS FRANCE 269

Then the pursuit began—to the Seine

and beyond. The XV Corps already had

a bridgehead across the Seine at MantesGassicourt on 20 August; on 24 August it

was passed to First Army and with XIX

Corps was given the mission of aiding the

British to cut off the enemy on the lower

Seine. First Army's V Corps was given the

mission of liberating Paris. Its VII Corps

bypassed Paris on the right and headed

north. In the last days of August, Bradley

turned First Army north to Belgium to

block the German retreat, and by 2 September XIX Corps, moving infantrymen in

trucks taken from artillery and antiaircraft

units, was in Belgium at Tournai. That

same day, the day after SHAEF became

operational on the Continent, Eisenhower

directed First Army to an axis between

Cologne and Koblenz, pointing Third

Army toward a line from Koblenz to Mannheim. South of Paris, Third Army with

XX, XII, and XV Corps, the last lately

returned from First Army, began its rapid

dash eastward to the Moselle.

The advance across France by First and

Third Armies was one of the swiftest in the

history of warfare. The armies came out

of the hedgerow country to the hills, then

down into the plain; through pockets of

German resistance and through towns that

were ruined and towns untouched. History

was being made each day, but "was never

noticed," Ernest Hemingway reported,

"only merged into a great blur of tiredness

and dust, of the smell of dead cattle, the

smell of earth new-broken by TNT, the

grinding sound of tanks and bulldozers, the

sound of automatic-rifle and machine-gun

fire, the interceptive, dry tattle of German

machine-pistol fire, dry as a rattler rattling;

and the quick spurting tap of the German

light machine guns—and always waiting

for others to come up."

 12

At the time First Army began the movement designed to trap the Germans in the

Argentan-Falaise pocket, Medaris' Ordnance Service had taken the shape that it

was to retain, with few modifications,

throughout the European campaigns. Behind each corps were two battalions, one a

forward battalion to do third echelon maintenance and operate a collecting point, the

other a support battalion that not only did

fourth echelon repair and heavy tank maintenance as required, but operated a forward

depot. Medaris was a firm believer then

and always in the integration of supply responsibilities with maintenance responsibilities in the forward area. The battalions

behind XIX and V Corps came under the

52d Ordnance Group. Normally those

under VII Corps would also have come

under that group, but in the action to close

the Argentan-Falaise gap and in the first

week or so of the pursuit they were too far

away. Therefore until early September,

when VII Corps arrived in the neighborhood of Paris, its Ordnance battalions were

placed under the 51st Ordnance Group,

whose primary mission was support of

army troops—divisions in reserve, army artillery, army tank battalions, Quartermaster

trucks. This was to be the pattern for the

future: when distances or road conditions

made it impracticable for the 52d to cover

all corps areas, or when as many as four

corps were fighting under First Army, the

51st Ordnance Group took on support of a

corps; likewise, when necessary, 52d Ordnance Group supported army troops located in corps areas. The 72d Ordnance Group ran the main army shop and

12

 Ernest Hemingway, "The G.I. and the General," Collier's, vol. 114, No. 19 (November 14,

1944), p. 11.
270 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

the supply, refitting, and evacuation battalions. The 71st Ordnance Group controlled two ammmunition battalions of six

companies each, one battalion to operate

forward ASP's, the other to run the main

army ammunition depot that held army reserve ammunition and stocked the ASP's.13

(See Chart 4.)

In the very rapid advance of First Army

from the St. Lo area to the western border

of Germany between 1 August and 12 September 1944, First Army Ordnance troops

had their first experience of blitzkrieg warfare. Medaris furnished the group commanders with excellent planning data by

giving them timely information on the tactical situation and prescribing phase lines

that Ordnance units had to clear at specified times in order to furnish proper support to the combat elements. After the pursuit began around 20 August, the forward

Ordnance units, which had been kept highly mobile, made long jumps forward with

relative ease during the good summer

weather. On 22 August the command

post of the 52d Ordnance Group moved

70 miles, from Beaumesnil to Les MeslesSur-Sarthe; two days later, 120 miles to La

Loupe, where it stayed only six days before

displacing forward 70 miles to the Paris

area. From Paris, where the 52d took on

the support of VII Corps in addition to

that of V and XIX Corps, group headquarters moved on 5 September 90 miles

to Laon, and on 18 September made another 90-mile jump forward that took it

over the Belgian border. By that time,

some of the Ordnance companies supporting the XIX and VII Corps were well into

Belgium. A few days later those supporting V Corps were in the Ardennes near

Bastogne.14

At the beginning of September, when

elements of the 52d Ordnance Group were

starting to move north of Paris, units of the

51st and 72d Groups (as well as the 71st

Ammunition Group) were still near the

army service area at La Loupe. But a new

army supply area far to the north, at Hirson

near the Belgian border, was opened on 6

September and soon these rear and army

support groups were also on the move, some

of the elements covering as much as 200

miles a day. The movement of the main

army Ordnance depot under the 72d Group

was immeasurably aided by the addition to

the evacuation battalion of 64 trucks late

in August, when it was decided that much

of the depot stock was unsuited to hauling

by tank transporters. The trucks not only

moved between three and four thousand

tons of depot stocks but were also extremely

useful in such tasks as carrying supplies

from rear to forward units and hauling

ammunition.15

To get the ammunition forward when

First Army began the swing east in midAugust 1944, Medaris organized behind the

fast-moving VII Corps a mobile ASP—the

only large-scale mobile ASP operated to any

extent by any of the armies. For this pur13

 (1) FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug 44-22 Feb 45

(hereafter cited as First Army Rpt 2), Annex 9, p.

14. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen John B. Medaris to Lida

Mayo, 2 Dec 63, OCMH. (3) History, 52d Ord

Group, 21 Aug 43-13 May 45. (4) FUSA Ord Sec

Opns Order No. 26, 4 Sep 44, in First Army Ord

Rpts 1-30 Sep 44, AAR's (monthly) First Army

(hereafter cited as FUSA Ord Monthly Rpts),

KCRC.

14

 (1) First Army Rpt 2, Annex 9, p. 13. (2)

Histories - 52d Ord Gp, 1944; Hq & Hq Det &

Med Det, 48th Ord Bn, 1944; 252d Medium Maint

Co, 10 Apr-Dec 44; 71st Ord Bn, 1944; and 177th

Ord Bn, 1944. 15

 (1) First Army Rpt 2, Annex 9, p. 13; map,

app. 5. (2) Unit History 72d Ord Gp 1944. (3)

Evacuation and Transportation Sec, app. III to

FUSA Ord Monthly Rpt Sep 44.
THE RACE ACROSS FRANCE 271

pose he arranged for the 102d Quartermaster Truck Battalion with five companies

and 225 trucks to be attached to the 71st

Ordnance Group. The ASP was organized in two echelons. The forward echelon,

operated by the 619th Ammunition Company, issued directly to combat units from

its 125 trucks, sometimes at the gun positions, and sent its empty trucks and requests

for ammunition back to the rear echelon,

about twenty miles to the rear. The rear

echelon, operated by the 587th Ammunition Company, filled the requests of the

forward echelon and sent convoys back to

Depot 106, about 100 miles to the rear.

Starting out from the area of St. Hilairedu-Harcouet on 15 August, the ASP moved

seventy miles in five days to Sees, via Corro'n and Lassay, and remained there until

the closing of the Argentan-Falaise gap,

when the eastward progress of First Army

made necessary the opening of a new depot

at La Loupe. In its 11-day period of

operation, from 14 to 25 August 1944,

the mobile ASP handled 13,156 tons of

ammunition—6,615 received and 6,541

issued.16 (Map 5)

Front and rear echelons of the mobile

ASP were protected by a battery each from

the 197th Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons

Battalion (Self-propelled). This battalion

possessed some weapons that were of particular interest to the Ordnance Section of

First Army. They were the M16B halftracks with the quadruple .50-caliber

(Quad-50) machine guns, improvised in

England before the invasion. Sixteen had

been allotted to each antiaircraft automatic

weapons battalion assigned or attached to

First Army. Lightly armored and clumsy

though they were, the M16B's had distinguished themselves in the beachhead phase,

not only in antiaircraft defense but as assault weapons in support of infantry. Beyond the Seine, as the skies began to clear

of German planes, they were frequently

used in a ground role and were notably

effective later on at Aachen. The 197th

Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion, after its support of the mobile ASP

and a short stay at Le Bourget Airport outside of Paris, was attached to the 71st Ordnance Group on 5 September and continued the protection of ASP's established

beyond the Seine.17

The new ammunition depot at La Loupe

was hardly in operation before the stocks

had to be moved forward, first to Hirson

and then to Liege, in Belgium. This movement required nearly a thousand trucks.

Quartermaster battalions fell far short of

this number and had to be helped by trucks

taken from heavy artillery and antiaircraft

units temporarily immobilized behind the

Seine. For the lift from the Seine to Hirson, army Ordnance vehicles of all types

were used. The 71st Ammunition Group,

though inexperienced in large-scale trucking, managed to establish an army ammunition depot near Liege by 11 September.

Shipments began to come in almost immediately by rail: for the first time since 16

 (1) Hist 100th Ammunition Bn, pp. 41, 77, 97.

(a) AGF Bd Rpt No. 1150, USFET, Ordnance

Questionnaire, 31 Jul 45. (3) First Army Rpt 2,

Annex 9, pp. 3, 53. (4) FUSA Ord Monthly

Rpts, Ammunition Supply, Rpt 1-31 Aug 44 and

Incl "SOP for Motorized Ammunition Supply

Points," OHF. (5) Orgn Hist 587th Ord Ammunition Co, 30 Dec 42-Dec 44. (6) History -

197th AAA AW Bn (SP), Jun-Dec 44.

17

 (1) History 197th AAA AW Bn (SP), Jun-Dec

44. (2) First Army Rpt 1, Annex 11, p. 261. (3)

Ltr, Medaris to Pattison, 28 Oct 63, OCMH. (4)

For the conversion of the quad .50-caliber machine

gun mount M51 to the M16B self-propelled mount,

see above, p. 228.


274 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

D-day First Army had a good railhead

close to the front.18

During the period of breakout and purSuit in late August and early September,

there were times when front and rear Ordnance units were 200 miles apart, and at

one time during the fast advance through

northern France and Belgium, the distance

increased to 375 miles. The link that held

these units together was the radio net that

Medaris had planned and prepared for

back in England. He had kept it in operation during June and July mainly for

training purposes, since it had not been

really needed in the beachhead phase.

Now it came into its own, saving hours,

sometimes days, in the transmittal of requests and the delivery of critical supplies

to far-flung combat units and performing

invaluable services in many ways; for example, ammunition men on the march

could be directed to establish new ASP's as

far forward as possible. Above all, the

radio net provided firm control of all types

of supplies. Medaris and his staff knew at

all times what was on hand, where it was,

and what was needed.19

In attempting to get the supplies forward

in the period of fast pursuit, First Army

Ordnance men had a taste of battle more

than once. A maintenance unit delivering

half-tracks to the combat forces on the

road to Paris ran into a German column

and lost fifteen men; another, on 29 August near Chartres, captured 48 Germans.

The men following closely behind XIX

Corps on its rapid march north to Tournai

risked even more encounters, for they were

cutting across one of the main routes of

the German retreat. On 2 September two

officers who were making a reconnaissance

for an ASP, Capt. Allan H. Reed of the

100th Ammunition Battalion headquarters

and Maj. Jack C. Heist, XIX Corps ammunition officer, were ambushed by German troops near Thiant and both were

killed, along with the driver of their jeep,

Technician 4 Zan D. Hassin.20

Next day, while Colonel Medaris was

sitting in his office in a partially wrecked

building outside Charleroi in Belgium,

reading the depressing report on the death

of the ammunition men and their jeep

driver, he himself had a narrow escape.

Suddenly the windows were rattled by a

violent explosion, followed by a deep rumble that sounded like thunder, though the

day was warm and sunny. One of the Germans' new giant rockets, the V-2, had

passed over the house and buried itself in

a ravine nearby. Against the earlier V-1

—the buzz bomb—antiaircraft guns gave

some degree of protection, but against this

monster, carrying a ton of high explosives

in its nose, there was no defense. Medaris

reflected that the missile was probably not

aimed at First Army headquarters. Intelligence reports had indicated that the Germans intended to use the V-2 against cities,

and Medaris concluded that it had simply

fallen short of its target. But he now had

18

 Hist 100th Ammunition Bn. 19

 (1) Sams, "Communications in Army Ordnance Service," pp. 48-49. (2) Medaris, "Field

Service in the First Army," p. 67. (3) Ltr, Medaris to Pattison, 28 Oct 63. (4) First Army Rpt

2, Annex 9, pp. 14-15. (5) In contrast to the

reliable information on stocks possessed by First

Army Ordnance, the lack of such information on

the part of Third Army Ordnance (which had

no radio net) was criticized by 12th Army Group

Ordnance during this period. Entries 26 Aug to 11

Sep 44, Daily Jnl Ord Sec 12th Army Group.

20

 (1) "Report from France," Firepower, vol. I,

No. 3 (October, 1944), pp. 2-3. (2) Hists, 3456th

Ord MAM Co and 100th Ammunition Bn. (3)

Jnl Ord Sec, Annex D to sec IV, AAR Hq XIX

Corps, 30 Sep 44.
THE RACE ACROSS FRANCE 275

firsthand evidence that the V—2 was at last

operational. After examining the shattered

fragments of the rocket in the ravine, he

instructed his technical intelligence officer

to inform technical intelligence teams in

the forward area, and combat troops as

well, of the discovery, and to alert them

to be on the look-out for V-2 "hardware."

Medaris then turned his attention to the

more urgent problem of supplying ammunition to the advancing forces.21

The ammunition men were doing their

best to keep up in the race. A day or so

after the V-2 incident, a party of about

fifty men of the 57th Ammunition Company, commanded by Capt. Jack Carstaphen, routed 47 members of the 22d Grenadier SS Regiment from some barricaded

farmhouses on the outskirts of Driancourt.

With the loss of one man, Pvt. Allen Johnson, killed by a direct grenade hit, and one

wounded, they killed 35 Germans and captured the rest. Such an encounter, a smallscale replica of the unexpected VII Corps

battle at the Mons pocket, was more or

less accidental. The real resistance on the

First Army front would come later, at the

Siegfried Line.22

Third Army Ordnance in the Dash

to the Moselle

While XV Corps was crossing the Seine

at Mantes and passing to First Army, General Patton's two corps to the south, the

XX and newly formed XII Corps, were

bypassing Paris. Having cleared the south

flank along the Loire, the XX Corps with

the 7th Armored and 5th Infantry Divisions turned north and liberated Chartres

on 18 August; crossed the Seine and liberated Reims on 30 August; and by 1 September was across the Meuse at Verdun.

The XII Corps, with the 4th Armored

and 35th Infantry Divisions, left Le Mans

on 15 August and was in Orleans the next

evening; after a short halt to protect the

southern flank and wait for supplies to

come up, it was on its way again. Advancing abreast of XX Corps to the south,

XII Corps had three bridgeheads over the

Meuse by I September. (See Map 4.)

This Third Army sweep across France

was faster than any of the planners had

anticipated. No sooner had Nixon drawn

a line beyond which his 69th Group would

operate—furnishing Ordnance service to

all troops passing through the forward area,

providing roadside repair patrols to keep

the roads clear of wrecks, helping corps to

set up collecting points for damaged matériel 

would have to be moved eastward again.

Nixon himself, visiting corps to straighten

out administrative tangles in his forward

battalions or dashing back to Laval to 12th

Army Group to get help on supply, was on

the road most of the time. Because of the

long supply lines and very fluid situation,

the combat troops had been authorized to

carry ammunition in excess of their basic

loads, using Quartermaster trucks, for it

was extremely hard for the ammunition

trains to catch up. Sometimes ammunition convoys were diverted to points as

much as 20 miles beyond their original

destinations and when they arrived at a

new area they would have to wait while

it was cleared of enemy troops. Often the

21

 (1) Maj. General John B. Medaris, U.S. Army,

Ret., Countdown for Decision (New York: G. P.

Putnam's Sons, 1960), pp. 48-52. (2) Hansen Interv. 22

 History 57th Ord Ammunition Co, 6 Feb 41-

31 Mar 45.
276 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

first stocks for an ASP would remain on

wheels for three or four days.23

The 573d Ammunition Company supporting XX Corps operated a rolling ASP

of about 500 tons from 28 August to 2

September, issuing from its trucks direct to

using units. Crossing the Marne at Fontainebleau on 30 August the company

"rolled," according to its historian, "into

the Wine incident." Near La Neuville the

men saw a soldier coming out of a large

cave carrying a case of wine. Jumping

out of the trucks, they raided the cave (over

the halfhearted protests of their lieutenant)

and loaded up. "Then the 'Rolling ASP'

rolled on. Half of the wine was given

away to the French people and other 'GI's'

along the highway but there was enough

left in the Company for four 6x6 trucks to

haul." After "a wineful night" at La

Neuville, the company went on 200 miles

to set up an ASP near a World War I

cemetery at Dombasle-en-Argonne, five

miles behind a hot fight at Verdun. A

squadron of German fighter planes roared

in on the tail of the convoy but did no

damage. The ASP was soon set up with

the help of a hundred truckloads of ammunition from a big depot just established

at Nemours, in the forest south of Fontainebleau.24

The forward maintenance battalions behind XX and XII Corps had the problems

that had arisen in the earlier experience

behind XV Corps at Argentan. The battalion commanders had to move their companies so fast that there was not time to

clear each movement with the commander

of the 69th Ordnance Group. After a conference on 31 August with the commander

of the 185th Battalion behind XII Corps,

the group commander, and the corps Ordnance officer, Nixon decided that army

would establish the general direction of the

movement and the battalion commander

would disperse the companies forward on

the request of the corps Ordnance officer.25

It was hard to keep the intermediate

battalions close enough behind the forward

battalions to be of much help, especially

since Nixon (unlike Medaris) had no radio

net to enable the group commander to keep

in close touch with his far-flung forces.

One intermediate antiaircraft maintenance

company, the 305th, spent the last week of

August bivouacked on a steep hill near

Pinthiviers, accessible only by roads too

primitive to take heavy equipment. No

work came in. An object of great curiosity

to the French farmers, who came in droves

every day to stare at them, the men spent

their time swimming in a stream nearby,

"card playing, and cooking as we had by

this time started to trade for eggs and potatoes and the odor of French fries hung

over the area at all times." The idyll was

over on 31 August, when the company was

dispatched across the Seine a hundred miles

to Sommesous. Some of the heavy maintenance companies in the intermediate battalions were not sent forward but were

transferred to the Third Army rear echelon

group to help in the vehicle shops.26

By the end of August Nixon had brought

his rear group—his heavy shops and main

23

 (1) Third Army Rpt II, Ord Sec, pp. 7-8, 10.

(2) Slaughter Rpt, pp. 4-5, 20. Nixon's staff, like

Medaris', had been augmented in England. USFET

Bd Rpt 101, p. 4. 24

 (1) History 573d Ammunition Co, ETO

Ord Sec Histories, KCRC; (2) Third Army Rpt

vol. II, Ord, p. 12.

25

 XII Corps Jnls, Ord Jnl, 31 Aug 44. 26Histories, 305th Maint Co (Antiaircraft); 902d

Heavy Auto Maint Co, ETO Ord Sec, KCRC.
THE RACE ACROSS FRANCE 277

GENERAL PATTON AND COLONEL NIXON

army depots—more than a hundred miles

forward, from Le Mans to the forest south

of Fontainebleau. The group had gained

considerable experience in a 10-day stay

at Le Mans, where for the first time the

men had encountered vehicles damaged by

use rather than enemy action. At Nixon's

direction they had set up a control point,

to which all material meant for repair, exchange, and salvage was taken and then

assigned to maintenance companies, so that

the flow of work was regulated and controlled. This experience was invaluable

when they got to Fontainebleau, for there,

as one battalion commander later remembered, "the maintenance job really began

to bloom." Into the control point a

steady stream of wreckers dragged enormous

quantities of tanks, trucks, and weapons

damaged by enemy guns and mines and by

hard wear in the fast pursuit. To do the

big repair job the mechanics cannibalized

to the utmost, for Third Army still lacked

its basic load of spare parts. The unexpectedly heavy demand for tracks on light

tanks, tires for the tank transporters, parts

for artillery, and motors for medium tanks

could not be met at all, and awaited more

support from the rear.27

27

 (1) Gibson Interv in Hines History. (2) Histories, 904th HAM Co, 889th HAM Co, ETO Ord

Sec, KCRC. (3) Third Army Rpt vol. II, Ord, p.

9. (4) Third Army G-4 Rpts 29 Aug, 5 Sep 44,

12th AG 319.1 G-4 Rpts (TUSA) vol. I.
278 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

The rapid advance of the Third Army

had stretched the line of communications

from about 50 miles on 1 August to more

than 400 miles by 1 September. COMZ,

with headquarters at Valognes on the

Cotentin peninsula until the move to Paris

in mid-September, had been able to get

only three base sections opened: Normandy

Base Section in the Cherbourg area; Brittany Base Section in the rear of VIII

Corps; and Seine Base Section in Paris,

which was concerned mainly with the administration of civil relief and the supply

of COMZ installations in the city. The

first week in September two base sections

that might have been more immediately

useful to Third Army were activated (in

addition to Channel Base Section in the

Le Havre—Rouen area)—Oise at Fontainebleau and Loire at Orleans, but in this

early period they had all they could do to

support their own units. The bulk of supplies still lay in the Cherbourg and beach

areas; the railways that might have carried

them eastward to the Seine had been pretty well knocked out by American bombers.

The fast Red Ball truck operation inaugurated by Brig. Gen. Ewart G. Plank

of ADSEC with the remark, "Let it never

be said that ADSEC stopped Patton when

the Germans couldn't,"

 28

 brought 89,000

tons of supplies from beaches to army

dumps in the Chartres-La Loupe-Dreux

triangle between 25 August and 5 September but most of this cargo consisted of

rations, gasoline, and ammunition.29 For

spare parts and other maintenance needs,

the forward Ordnance depots had to depend on the cargo space in replacement

vehicles. New trucks and jeeps were loaded

with spare parts at the beaches and driven

to Fontainebleau by men from replacement

companies sent to Third Army from England. Replacement tanks, hauled by tank

transporters in order to conserve tracks,

arrived with spare tracks wrapped around

them. ADSEC helped when it could, but

for a great many of his supplies Nixon had

to send Third Army trucks and tank transporters all the way back to Cherbourg.

The journey of three days or more over

congested roads was made even harder by

the gasoline shortage. The trucks of the

main armament depot company had to

travel 250 miles back to the beach in order

to get gasoline to haul weapons from Cherbourg.30

 About this time General Patton

heard a rumor which he "officially . . .

hoped was not true" that his Ordnance

men were passing themselves off as members of First Army in order to draw gasoline from First Army dumps. He commented, "To reverse the statement made

about the Light Brigade, this is not war

but it is magnificent."

 31

After a halt of five days because of the

gas shortage in early September, Patton's

army continued its advance toward the

Saar. It was stopped at the Moselle on 25

September by Eisenhower's decision to immobilize Third Army in order to throw all

28

 Interv, Lt Col V. H. Williams Jr., Transportation Sec ADSEC, by William M. Hines, Sr., in

Hines Hist, vol. II, p. 319. 29

 For a breakdown on Red Ball tonnages 25

August-5 September, see COMZ G-4 Hist III,

pp. 3, 7, Admin 553.

30

 (1) Nixon Interv. (2) Third Army Rpt II,

G-4, p. 12, Ord Sec, p. 9. (3) Third Army G-4

Rpts, 29 Aug 44, 12th Army Gp 319.1 G-4 Rpts

(TUSA), vol. 1. (4) Rpt of Lt Col Nathan B.

Chenault, Supply Officer Ord Sec COMZ, quoted

in Hines History, vol. II, p. 334. (5) Histories

3537th Ord Medium Automotive Maint Co, 458th,

471st, 489th Evacuation Cos, and 344th Depot Co,

ETO Ord Sec, KCRC. 31

 Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 125.
THE RACE ACROSS FRANCE 279

550TH HEAVY MAINTENANCE COMPANY, VERDUN

support to the drive to the Ruhr in the

north by the British and the First U.S.

Army. When Patton's advance was

stopped, XII Corps had crossed the Moselle

at Nancy and established a bridgehead

beyond. The XV Corps, which had by

then returned to Third Army from First

Army and was protecting the southern

flank, was beyond the river at Charmes

and was abreast of XII Corps in the neighborhood of Luneville. On the northern

part of Third Army's front, XX Corps had

a bridgehead at Arnaville, but had been

unable to take the heavily fortified city of

Metz. Thereafter, restricted to limited

objective attacks, the army could do little

until November, when the offensive was

resumed. Across the Lorraine border in

Germany, Patton was slowed down by the

Siegfried Line and by the increasing shortages in men, ammunition, and tanks.32

By mid-September Nixon's rear group

was on the move again, from Fontainebleau to the Moselle, some 225 miles east,

where Third Army was besieging Metz in

an area that was studded with place names

recalling World War I—Verdun, St. Mihiel, the Argonne. Nixon did not move

all the companies forward at once, but

with the help of ADSEC employed a

leapfrogging system that he was to use ef32

 (1) Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 423. (2)

For Third Army operations 1 Sep-15 Dec 44, see

H. M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1950).
280 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

fectively for the rest of the campaign in

Europe. He sent a maintenance company

of his rear group into the forward area to

work in each collecting point and to repair

matériel, if possible, rather than subject it

to further damage by evacuation. When

this company moved on, it left its unfinished work to be taken over by a company from a rear control point. The second company left its unfinished work to

an ADSEC maintenance company that

had been assisting it at the control point.33

During the lull in operations beginning

in mid-September, Nixon was able to organize a group for ammunition supply, the

82d, using men from the headquarters of

his 313th Battalion, which had been acting as a group until that time. Another

innovation in Third Army ammunition

supply that took place about this time was

the use of roadside storage. This strung

out the ASP's, increasing the total mileage,

and hampered operations in areas far forward when tactical units had to use the

roads. For example, it took an armored

division two whole days to pass through the

ASP of one company, causing the ammunition men (according to their historian)

"very much grief and sorrow," but roadside storage took the dumps out of fields

that were every day becoming deeper and

deeper in mud.34

The fine weather that had made Fontainebleau so attractive (along with the first

post exchange issue, first mail, and, for

most of the men, a day's visit to Paris)

continued only a week or so in Lorraine.

Toward the end of September the autumn

rains began. The men were operating their

shops and dumps in the open, for Patton

had never permitted them to use garages

or other shelters in towns, fearing that they

would lose their mobility, but French mud,

as much a reminder of World War I as the

trenches that still gashed the fields, soon

made work all but impossible. Trucks had

to be winched out of it and jacks sank.

Rain filled foxholes and soaked clothing.

Men's fingers were numb with cold. By

October the decision to stay in the open

had to be rescinded. There was a scramble for shelter in the towns, all units competing for factories, garages, stables, and

the French barracks or caserns that were

numerous in this fortress region. The forward battalions found buildings around

Pont-a-Mousson and the rear were divided

among St. Mihiel, Commercy, Toul, Neufchateau, and Nancy. Many of the buildings were in bad shape, without roofs or

windows, between German demolitions and

U.S. bomber attacks, but the Ordnance

mechanics knew how to repair the damage,

and even manufactured stoves as winter

came on. After the Ardennes breakthrough

in December, units moved on to Luxembourg, but some of the rear companies

went into even better accommodations at

Metz and stayed until spring.35

33

 (1) Third Army Rpt vol. II, Ord, p. 10; (2)

Nixon Interv. 34

 (1) Msg, AGWAR, from Marshall, to ETOUSA to Eisenhower, 25 Aug 44, WAR — 84540;

Ltr, Eisenhower to CG 12th Army Gp, 11 Sep 44,

sub: Activation of 82d Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Ordnance Group; and Memos, 12th Army Gp Ord for G-4, and G-4 for

G-3, 19 Sep 44. All in 12th Army Gp 322 Ordnance Units. (2) History, 82d Ord Gp, 27 Sep-Dec

44. (3) Histories, 573d, 574th, 62Oth Ammunition

Companies.

35

 (1) Unit Histories ETO Ord Sec, KCRC.

(2) Gibson Interv, in Hines History, vol. III, pp.

427-29, OHF. Gibson, noting that mud was bad

all the way back to the ADSEC area, told of the

order from a general to the commander of the

78th Ordnance Battalion (ADSEC) to "get rid of

the dirty mud." Ibid., p. 427.
THE RACE ACROSS FRANCE 281

INSPECTING DUCKBILL EXTENSIONS ON TANK TRACKS

During the fall of 1944, working within

sound of the big guns blasting away on the

Third Army front between Metz and

Verdun, the Ordnance men tried to repair the damage done in the race across

France and to get Patton's army ready

for the next offensive. To give the tanks

better flotation in the mud, they widened

tracks by welding to the end connectors

four-inch-square metal cleats called duckbills or duckfeet. Back in Paris, Communications Zone had contracted with French

plants to do the job, but the effort required to send the end connectors (there

were 164 on each medium tank track) to

the factories made it simpler for Third

Army to do a great deal of the work in its

own shops, obtaining the metal cleats from

local manufacturers. Much needed help

with tank engines came from the GnomeRhone works in Paris, which by October

was well into production on engine overhaul, thanks to an early September contract with First Army. This contract was

later taken over by Communications Zone.

Increasing COMZ support, the opening of

ADSEC shops in Verdun, better rail service

from the ports, and cannibalization and

the conversion of captured German weapons made it possible for Third Army to
282 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

make up most of its losses in tanks and

weapons by December.36

Trucks were another matter. The story

of the automotive maintenance men continued to be a story of "sweat and grease,

of engines and axles, of wrecks and repairs."

 37

 Most of the wrecks came from

the Quartermaster truck companies operating Red Ball and other emergency hauling

projects. The heavy cost of the Red Ball

operation, which had been extended until

16 November in order to move 315,225

long tons from Normandy to forward depots or to Paris for transfer to trains, was

becoming all too plain. In the belief that

the war would soon be over, Communications Zone had tacitly but deliberately abandoned preventive maintenance in the interest of speed and was admittedly paying "a

terrific price."

 38

Careless drivers and reckless drivers fired

by "push 'em up there" slogans had run

their trucks day and night at high speeds

over rough roads without giving them even

the most elementary care. The trucks had

been badly overloaded: the 21⁄2-ton trucks

had been made to carry six to ten tons.

Overloading was ruinous to axles and hard

on tires. Tires were already badly damaged from lack of care and the condition

of the roads, which had become doubly

hazardous from the jagged metal of C

ration cans that the troops had thrown

away.39

Tires for trucks and jeeps were scarce

all over the world. Any real help on the

problem in the ETO had to await the output of French factories that were just getting into operation as 1944 ended. No

production in quantity could be expected

for several months—not until bomb-damaged plants were repaired and raw materials delivered. The men in Third Army

and ADSEC rounded up spares, robbed

1-ton trailers and even 37-mm. gun carriages, and did their best to save repairable

tires with the meager amount of tire repair

equipment they had. Until January 1945

the theater had only one tire repair company, the 158th, with enough equipment

to operate. The company was split into

six teams: two teams were attached to

First Army, two to Third Army, and two

remained with ADSEC.40

The idea of using small mobile tire repair units of one officer and 14 men (rather

than companies) to go to the trucks and

repair minor damage before it became

major had been handed to the Ordnance

Department by Quartermaster along with

the responsibility for trucks in the summer

of 1942. Nothing was done about it until

36

 (1) Ord Serv ETO, Local Procurement and

Industrial Service, pp. 47-59, 73-86, OHF; (2)

Unit Histories, ETO Ord Sec, KCRC; (3) Third

Army G-4 Rpts Sep-Dec 44, 12th AG 319.1 G-4

Rpt (TUSA), vol. I. 37

 History 992d HAM Co, ETO Ord Sec, KCRC. 38

 COMZ G-4 History, sec. III, pp. 10, 15,

Admin 553. 39

 (1) Ibid., pp. 33-45; (2) Intervs, Brig Gen

James H. Stratton, COMZ G-4; Col James McCormack, Jr., Movements Br, G-4, 12th AG; by

William M. Hines, Sr., in Hines History, vol. II,

pp. 308, 341, 428-29. (3) Third Army G-4 Rpts,

Oct-Dec 44, 12th AG 319.1 G-4 Rpts (TUSA)

vol. 1. (4) USFET Bd Rpt No. 97, Operation of

Ordnance Roadside Service Stations, p. 8. 40

 (1) For Ordnance tire procurement in France

(which, along with rebuild of tank and truck engines and the manufacture of duckbills, constituted

the three major Ordnance local procurement programs), see Ord Serv ETO, Local Procurement and

Industrial Service, pp. 88-102, OHF. (2) COMZ

G-4 History, sec. V, p. 48, Admin 553. (3) History

ADSEC Ordnance, p. 18, ETO Ord Sec, KCRC.

(4) The 156th Tire Repair Company arrived in

southern France to support Seventh Army in October

1944, but had to wait for its equipment. Capt. Shelton C. Till, "Rubber Men," Firepower, vol. II, No. 1

(June-July 1945),PP. 8-9.
THE RACE ACROSS FRANCE 283

the fall of 1943, when experience in the

Mediterranean, especially with the damage

done to tires by the lava roads in Sicily,

pointed the need for some change of system. Thereafter, it took a year of study,

consultation, authorization, the development of electrical equipment, the preparation of a TOE, and tests, before procurement was even begun. In the meantime,

the six teams of the 158th Tire Repair

Company augmented their supplies with

synthetic material captured from the Germans or bought locally, and improvised the

extra equipment they needed. They made

(according to the ADSEC Ordnance historian) "one of the most spectacular records of achievement in Ordnance Service."41

For truck and jeep parts, the Third

Army Ordnance men combed collection

points to obtain the most critical items—

axles, transfer cases, and steering assemblies. Nixon sent searchers all the way

back to Cherbourg, since as late as midDecember more than half of all Class II

and IV supplies were still in Normandy and

Brittany because of the priority that had

been given to ammunition, food, and gasoline on the move forward. When parts

were not available at all, Nixon's 79th Battalion employed French firms to make

them, or made them in its own shops. The

ingenuity of American mechanics was amply demonstrated in this area as in many

others; for example, they made a tool for

straightening bent axles and adapted British axles to American vehicles. One interesting example of ingenuity was a magnetic road sweep to be used by an Engineer

construction battalion in clearing roads of

the jagged metal litter so damaging to

tires.42

Around Christmas, Third Army Ordnance men got some help on truck and jeep

parts from a neighbor. In exchange for

40,000 duckbills, they received a quantity

of brake hose and lining for trucks and

distributor rotors and carburetors for jeeps

from Seventh Army, which had just extended its western boundary to St. Avoid in

order to support Third Army during the

German counteroffensive in the Ardennes.

Seventh Army, mounted in Italy and landed

near Marseille in Operation DRAGOON on

15 August 1944, had come north up the

Rhone Valley in an advance comparable

to First and Third Armies' race across

France.43

Seventh Army in Southern France

A landing in southern France—first

called ANVIL, later DRAGOON—was during

most of 1942 considered by American planners an integral part of the cross-Channel

attack. A force mounted in the Mediterranean theater was to land in the Marseille-Toulon-Riviera area on the Normandy D-day, drawing off German divisions

41

 (1) History ADSEC Ordnance, p. 18. (2)

OCO, Requirements, Development, Production,

Distribution and Conservation of Tires for Army

Motor Vehicles — 1942-1945 (Project Supporting

Paper No. 53), vol. I, ch. V, pt. 3, Mobile Tire

Repair Platoon, OHF. (3) Memo, Ord APO 871

for Chief Ord Officer APO 887, 19 Dec 43, Folder

Theaters Europe (ETO) Jan 43 to Dec 44. (4) Ltr,

Holmes to CofOrd, 16 May 44, sub: Comments on

Mobile Tire Repair Platoons, O.O. 451.92/4652.

42

 (1) Gibson Interv in Hines History, vol. III,

pp. 428-29. (2) Unit Histories, ETO Ord Sec,

KCRC. (3) Third Army G-4 Rpts, Oct-Dec 44,

12th AG 319.1 G-4 Rpts (TUSA), vol. I. 43

 (1) Third Army G-4 Rpts, 26 Dec 44, 12th

AG 319.1 G-4 Rpts (TUSA), vol. I. (2) Report

of Operations, he Seventh United States Army in

France and Germany 1944-1945 (Heidelberg, 1946)

(hereafter cited as Seventh Army Rpt 1944-45),

II, 495.
284 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

from the Normandy invasion and forming

a pincers with First Army. The British

had never been enthusiastic about the operation, for they disliked the thought of

weakening the drive in Italy, and in the

early spring of 1944, after the stalemate at

Anzio and Cassino, they began actively to

oppose it. But the American planners,

from President Roosevelt down, never

wavered in their determination to make the

landing in southern France. The only

change they would agree to was a postponement, and this was dictated late in

March by necessity. Landing craft were

too scarce to permit an attack in southern

France simultaneous with the cross-Channel attack.

It was argued that DRAGOON would support OVERLORD ; open the large port of Marseille; and give the French army now being

equipped in the Mediterranean a share in

the liberation of France. These arguments

did not move Churchill, who continued to

oppose DRAGOON, preferring to keep the

forces in Italy strong enough to go on to

Istria and Trieste. Montgomery at last

endorsed DRAGOON, but halfheartedly. He

came later to consider it "one of the greatest strategic mistakes of the war."

 44

Though the trumpet, on the British side

at least, gave an uncertain sound, AFHQ

prepared for the battle. Planning began

at Algiers on 12 January 1944 in a rambling white building on a hill overlooking

the city, the Ecole Normale of Bouzareah,

behind a high security fence of rusty

barbed wire. The planning staff, known

as Force 163, was mainly composed of

officers brought from Seventh Army headquarters in Palermo, for the Seventh was

to be the American army in the invasion.

On this staff the Ordnance representative

was Colonel Nixon. A week or so later

Rear 163, a small staff of logistical

planners, was established in a department

store in Oran, and here the chief Ordnance

planner was Lt. Col. Herbert P. Schowalter, who had been Nixon's supply officer in Palermo.45

According to plans developed for

DRAGOON in the spring of 1944, three

crack American infantry divisions—the

3d, 36th, and 45th—were to be brought

from Italy and organized under VI Corps

with General Truscott as commander.

DRAGOON would also have one mixed

British and U.S. airborne task force. The

French, coming in after D-day, were to

contribute seven divisions, under the

1st French Army.

The Seventh Army commander was

Maj. Gen. Alexander M. Patch, a newcomer to the theater, but well known for

his Guadalcanal campaign. He had been

in command of IV Corps, then in training in the United States, and he brought

with him to Africa IV Corps officers to fill

the Seventh Army staff positions left

vacant when Patton went to England.

General Patch arrived in March. His

Ordnance officer, Col. Edward W. Smith,

44

 (1) Robert Ross Smith and Richard Kugler,

Riviera to the Rhine, chs. I and II, MS in preparation for UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II. Unless otherwise noted, this section is based

on this manuscript. (2) Marshall Interv of 25 Jul

49. (3) Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), pp.

57-71. (4) Vigneras, Rearming the French, p.

119. (5) The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G. (Cleveland

and New York: World Publishing Co., 1958), p.

199.

45

 (1) Nixon Interv. (2) Ltr, Herbert P. Schowalter to Lida Mayo, 27 Jan 64, OCMH.
THE RACE ACROSS FRANCE 285

joined Seventh Army Ordnance at Oran

in April.46

By the time Colonel Smith arrived, the

Ordnance plans for the invasion of southern France were well along. They had

been initiated by the Ordnance AFHQ

staff in Algiers under Lt. Col. William H.

Connerat, Jr., who had become acting

Ordnance officer of AFHQ after Colonel

Crawford's departure for the United

States. His principal assistant was Crawford's executive, Lt. Col. Henry L.

McGrath. Both men were thoroughly

experienced. Connerat as Crawford's

supply officer had been lent to Colonel

Nixon for the Sicily Campaign and had

made a careful study of the operations in

Sicily, a study that was used in the planning for Salerno. McGrath was a veteran of three landings—Fedala, Sicily,

and Salerno; in the Salerno landings he

had commanded the AVALANCHE maintenance battalion.

Using Salerno as a guide, Connerat

and McGrath computed basic loads and

initial stocks of ammunition, major items,

and spare parts, and figured troop requirements for DRAGOON. They were

well aware from their own experience

how important it was to get ammunition

men, DUKW mechanics, and depot detachments on the beachhead as early as

possible. For the move inland after the

landing, they planned to support Seventh

Army and 1st French Army with one ammunition battalion, the 62d, and two

maintenance and supply groups—the 55th

Ordnance Group for forward, third echelon work and the 54th in the rear for

supply, evacuation, and fourth echelon

repair. McGrath himself was to command the 55th Ordnance Group, and he

hand-picked his battalions and companies

from veterans of the Mediterranean campaigns. These AFHQ plans were turned

over to Force 163. Nixon departed for

Europe in April 1944, and the final planning, based on the AFHQ plans, was done

by Colonel Schowalter in Oran. After the

liberation of Rome in June, the troop list

for the invasion became firm; VI Corps

was moved down to Salerno for training,

and in July AFHQ and Seventh Army

planners went to Italy to supervise the

mounting of DRAGOON from Naples.47

Airborne Ordnance Men

During the familiar flurry of preparing

for another invasion, there was one new

element—the training of airborne Ordnance men. In the Normandy landings,

Ordnance support troops did not accompany the paratroopers but followed by sea.

In DRAGOON the Ordnance men would go

in by glider with the 1st Airborne Task

Force, which was to be dropped behind the

beach on D-day. The men selected came

from the 3d Ordnance Medium Mainte46

 (1) Seventh Army Rpt 1944-45, I,1-12. (2)

Brig. Gen. Edward W. Smith, "Ordnance in Seventh

Army," Army Ordnance, XXIX, 151 (July-August

1945), P. 66.

47

 (1) History Ord Service MTO, V, ch. V,

101-02, 174-76, and app. 22 to ch. VII, Ordnance

in the North African and Mediterranean Theater

of Operations as Recalled by Colonel Connerat

(hereafter cited as Connerat Memoir), OHF. (2)

Intervs, Crawford, 3 Jun 56, Col McGrath, 8 May

57, and Col W. H. Connerat (USA Ret.), 14

Aug 64. (3) Hq Force 163, Annex 4 to Ord Admin

Instrs 1, p. 2, in AGF Bd Rpt, ETO, No. 761, G-4

Matters, 25 Mar 45, 4-3.761/45 (12866). (4) Connerat, 1st Ind to Ltr, Pattison to Connerat, 12 Sep

63. (5) At one point in the later planning phase,

Colonel McGrath flew to England to arrange for

quick transport of weapons to Naples. David Comments.
286 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

nance Company, the second oldest Ordnance outfit, which had supported the 3d

Infantry ("The Marne") Division in

World War I and again in Sicily in World

War II. From a detachment of two

officers and sixty-nine enlisted men who

were sent in mid-July to the Airborne

Training Center near Rome to service pack

artillery, clean and issue small arms, install wire cutters on jeeps, and mount

stretcher racks on jeep hoods, an advance

echelon of two officers and twenty-five men

was selected to fly in with the paratroopers

and support them for the first seven days,

until the rear echelon could come in by

sea.48

This advance echelon of twenty-five men

was to be split into three seven-man teams,

each team equipped with a jeep and a

quarter-ton trailer loaded with 750 pounds

of parts and tools. On landing, each team

would join one of the three 1st Airborne

Task Force combat teams. Of the four

men not on the teams two were to operate

ammunition points upon landing and two

were to accompany Maj. Christian B. Hass,

task force Ordnance officer, and 1st Lt.

Max E. Clark, commanding officer of the

detachment, to set up a resupply point and

perform liaison. The first week in August

the men of the "airborne" group were sent

to Marcigliano for three days of glider

training, to learn how to load their jeeps

and trailers aboard the glider and lash

them down so that they would not break

loose during flight. After this course they

were given orientation flights and, finally,

one practice landing. The men's excitement over the new experience mounted

when they received orders making them

bona fide glider troops, entitled to flight

pay. They also acquired during training

a mascot that their commanding officer

described as "a congenial monkey."

Having "distinguished himself greatly in

the knots and lashings course," the monkey

was inducted into the Army and christened

"Jeepo."

 49

Jeepo was aboard when the seven gliders

carrying the Ordnance men soared aloft

from Lido di Roma airfield on the afternoon of D-day, 15 August, towed by a

C-47 bound for France. Each of three

gliders carried a jeep and one or two of the

men; four carried a trailer and six or seven

men each. The four-hour flight over the

blue sea was smooth and uneventful.

Fifteen minutes after they passed the coast

line of France, which the men recognized

by the breakers far below, they spotted

their landing sites, very familiar from the

aerial maps they had studied during training. They were over enemy territory but

luckily there was no flak, only a lurch as

the tow ropes parted.

Some of the gliders were damaged in the

landing; several lost a wing when they

struck a tree or another grounded glider,

and the one carrying two men and Jeepo

lost its undercarriage and most of its nose.

No one was injured, however, and after

a night in a wood exposed to German

machine rifle and artillery fire, the Ord48

 (1) For Ordnance support of 101st Airborne

Division in OVERLORD, see History 801st Airborne

Ord Maint Co for Oct 42-45. (2) History 1st

Airborne Task Force, Opn and Supporting Docs,

107-81.4 (18564 5 Aug 44). (3) "Second Oldest,"

Firepower, II, No. 1 (June-July 1945), n.p. (4)

History 3d Ord Medium Maint Co, 15 Feb 1918-

Dec 1944. (5) History 1st Det 3d Ord Medium

Maint Co, Aug, 15 Sep 44.

49

 (1) History 1st Det 3d Ord Medium Maint

Co, Aug, 15 Sep 44. (2) Opn Rpt 1st Airborne

Task Force, 15 Jul-Sep 44, Sec I, 107-81.2. (3)

History 1st Airborne Task Force, Opn and Supporting Docs, p. 8, 107-81.4.
THE RACE ACROSS FRANCE 287

nance teams with their jeeps and trailers

joined their combat teams. They went to

work at once, repairing pack howitzers,

sights, small arms, jeeps, and captured vehicles and collecting plane-dropped ammunition, which they delivered under fire to

the howitzer batteries. Enemy opposition

was generally light, for the Germans had

been surprised by the airborne landings and

had been unable to bring up reserves. On

17 August the three Ordnance teams

moved into a German quartermaster depot,

acquired a German truck and sedan, and

were able to make contact with the 3405th

Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company on the beach.50

The Fast Pursuit up the Rhone

The landings on the three beaches, beginning at 0800 on 15 August, had been

remarkably successful. The Ordnance

planners at AFHQ considered them "textbook landings"—the best yet achieved in

the Mediterranean. The timing was excellent. The German defenses were

nothing like as formidable as in Normandy, the weather was fine, and the water

was so shallow in most places that the

waterproofing that had been applied was

not needed. When Colonel McGrath

arrived at the pink villa near the beach at

Ste. Maxime where he had arranged to

meet the VI Corps Ordnance officer, Col.

Walter G. Jennings, at 0812, he found

Jennings waiting with his watch in his

hand. It showed that McGrath was exactly two minutes late.51

Attached to the 40th Engineer Regiment during the landings, McGrath and

several members of his 55th Ordnance

Group headquarters acted as observers and

advisers at Ste. Maxime for a week, then

moved forty-five miles inland to Brignoles

to wait for the rest of the staff, who arrived

with the executive officer, Lt. Col. Marshall

S. David, on 27 August. By then, the

forward army Ordnance companies (organized temporarily under the 45th Ordnance Battalion) supporting the three infantry divisions and VI Corps were accompanying the combat forces on their rapid

march up the Rhone Valley in pursuit of

the retreating German Nineteenth Army.

It was 31 August before group headquarters, traveling some 178 miles in a single

day, caught up with them at Crest, just

northeast of Montelimar, and it was there

that the 55th Ordnance Group was organized. It was composed of the 45th Ordnance Battalion with the 14th, 45th, and

46th Medium Maintenance Companies,

and the 43d Battalion. The 43d, which

consisted of an antiaircraft medium maintenance company, the 261st, a field army

heavy maintenance company, the 87th, and

a medium automotive maintenance company, the 3432d, had the task of supporting corps and army troops. Also attached

to the group, but for operations only, were

three French Ordnance battalions, now

50

 (1) History 1st Det 3d Ord Medium Maint

Co. (2) Hist, 1st Airborne Task Force, Opn and

Supporting Docs. (3) Opn Rpt, 1st Airborne Task

Force 15 Jul-Sep 44, Sec III. (4) Lecture, Harris

W. Hollis, The Operations of the First Airborne

Task Force in the Invasion of Southern France —

15-20 August 1944 . . ., Armed Forces Staff College

Library.

51

 (1) Truscott, Command Missions, p. 414. (2)

Eric Sevareid, Not So Wild A Dream (New York:

A. A. Knopf, 1946), p. 439. (3) Connerat Memoir.

(4) Ltr, Maj L. Ballard to Chief Ord Officer

NATOUSA, 4 Sep 44, sub: Observations in Ordnance Service and Supply in Southern France, Folder 319.1-1944, OCO-D Field Service Opns. (5)

McGrath Interv.
288 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

advancing up the west bank of the Rhone

with elements of French Army B. The

French army had landed after Seventh

Army and was mainly engaged in opening

Toulon and Marseille.52

Like the medium maintenance companies, the army ammunition companies

outstripped their controlling headquarters

(the 62d Ordnance Ammunition Battalion), since they had been attached

to the divisions on 20 August and had

moved forward with them. This attachment was essential during the period of

rapid pursuit, because the divisions carried

a large supply of ammunition in addition

to basic loads. By 27 August army had a

sizable ASP in operation inland at Aix-enProvence; and by 1 September the most

forward ammunition company, the 66th,

had succeeded in establishing an ammunition supply point as far north as Montelimar. Next day the companies were relieved from divisions and attached to the

45th Ordnance Battalion.53

At Montelimar the American forces had

failed to trap the Germans, but American

artillery and tanks had done considerable

damage. For miles beyond, the road was

lined with the shattered remnants of German tanks, trucks, guns, dead men and

dead horses; and on the railroad to the

north were hundreds of cars loaded with

wrecked enemy weapons, including no less

than six or seven railway guns like Anzio

Annie—of great interest to the VI Corps

veterans of Anzio. The pursuit continued,

with VI Corps on the east bank of the

Rhone and the French on the west trying

to intercept and destroy the enemy before

he could reach the Belfort Gap and withdraw to his West Wall fortifications. The

generals were already planning a juncture with the U.S. Third Army around

Dijon and a concerted drive east, perhaps

through Strasbourg into Germany.54

Lyon fell on 3 September and the front

continued to move so rapidly that in order

to keep up with the Ordnance battalions

the 55th Group headquarters had to move

north 68 miles on 4 September to Bourgoin,

about 45 miles southeast of Lyon. By this

time the simple matter of distance had

placed unusual responsibilities for supply

on this forward group and made necessary

several unorthodox methods. For one

thing, the 77th Ordnance Depot Company, the field depot which had been

attached to the 43d Ordnance Battalion

and was also supporting the 45th, could

not get resupply readily from the two depot

companies in the 54th Ordnance Group,

which by 3 September was only beginning

to move north from the beaches. To

maintain closer supervision over the supply

situation, Colonel McGrath placed the

depot company under his own group

headquarters. By agreement with army

Ordnance, still far to the rear, he also

took on the job of allocating critical major

items to replace battle losses and items sent

back from the front in unserviceable condition, leaving only the TOE shortage

52

 Histories, 55th Ord Group, 15 Aug-Dec 44;

45th Ord Bn, May-Jun, Aug, Sep-Dec 44. 53

 (1) Memo, Col Walter G. Jennings for ACofS

G-4, 19 Aug 44; and Col O'Neill's Jnl. Both in VI

Corps G-4 Jnl, 1-31 Aug 1944, and supporting

papers. (2) History Ord Service MTO, ch. V, pp.

172-73.

54

 (1) Seventh Army Rpt 1944-45, Vol I, pp.

213-17, 220-21, 249-50. (2) Donald G. Taggart,

ed., History of the Third Infantry Division in

World War II (Washington: Infantry Journal

Press, 1947), p. 222. (3) Truscott, Command

Missions, pp. 432-36.
THE RACE ACROSS FRANCE 289

problem for the army Ordnance Section.

The new system made possible delivery of

an item to the troops within twenty-four

hours after the depot company received a

requisition. It worked so well that it was

continued even after army moved up; but

it placed an additional drain on group

headquarters, already too thin in officers

because of an inadequate T/O. McGrath

continually had to fill it out with officers

from battalions and even companies.55

At Bourgoin, so far forward that one of

the officers had to take time out to assist

the French Maquis in the capture of two

German snipers, the group not only felt the

manpower pinch, but another and more

painful one—the pinch of hunger. Ordnance companies were attached to corps

and divisions and could draw from advance dumps, and normally Ordnance

group headquarters could be attached to a

company for rations; but the companies

were spread out so far and were moving

so rapidly that this was now impossible.

Army dumps, some still on the beach, were

the only resource, and in the period of fast

pursuit, group headquarters had to send

a truck back from 43 to 298 miles to bring

up food. There were times when the men

had only two K rations a day instead of

the three they were allotted. Buying from

the countryside was strictly prohibited.56

One other resource was discovered by a

sergeant at group headquarters who was

reading a copy of Stars and Stripes that

arrived one day early in September. It

contained the news that the Red Ball Express serving Third Army was operating on

a route about 160 miles to the left of

Seventh Army. Sergeant DeMartini pondered the story and then went to Colonel

McGrath with a proposal that group do

some "horse-trading." Though the group

was poor in food, it was rich in souvenirs

—helmets, pistols, rifles, dress daggers that

the Germans were abandoning in their

rapid retreat up the Rhone. These objects were of little interest to veterans of

the Mediterranean campaigns, who already

had all they wanted, but undoubtedly

would interest men newly arrived in

France. The sergeant proposed to load

two trucks with souvenirs, take them to a

Red Ball depot, and trade them for food.

There was an order forbidding communication with Third Army, but Colonel

McGrath, sorely tempted, consented, and

the sergeant, accompanied by Capt. George

B. Bennett and 1st Lt. Hueston L. J. Pinkstone of the Ordnance Technical Intelligence Team, took off with his two truckloads across the Rhone at a fast clip into

the dangerous no-man's land—occupied

neither by Allied nor by German forces—

that lay between Seventh and Third

Armies.

Three days later McGrath was awakened

in the middle of the night with the news

that the trucks had returned. DeMartini,

smoking a cigar, pulled back the tarpaulins

and displayed his trophies—huge sides of

beef and mutton and whole pigs hanging

from hooks; 200 boxes of cigars, and a

truckload of 10-in-1 rations, candy, and

cigarettes. He had got everything he

wanted; and provided a story that would

55

 (1) History 55th Ord Group 15 Aug-Dec 44.

(2) McGrath Interv. (3) The group headquarters,

later expanded from 40 to 130 men, performed

many functions normally army. It had a finance

unit and dental team attached, and operated a very

successful special service club for enlisted men.

David Comments. 56

 (1) History, 55th Ord Gp, 15 Aug-Dec 44;

and Daily Jnl, 5-6 Sep 44. (2) McGrath Interv.
290 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

be told and retold whenever group veterans got together.57

The Halt on the Upper Rhine

The official junction between Seventh

and Third Armies took place on 11 September near Dijon. The DRAGOON phase

in southern France was now over. On 15

September 6th Army Group, controlling

Seventh Army and 1st French Army, was

formed and placed under the operational

control of SHAEF. At Marseille, which

capitulated on 28 August, Continental

Base Section had been set up and was soon

to split into Delta Base Section and Continental Advance Section (CONAD)—the

southern equivalent of ADSEC. But the

changeover in logistical support from the

Mediterranean theater to the European

theater was very gradual. COMZ

ETOUSA wanted control, and late in

October set up a subcommand known as

Southern Line of Communications

(SOLOC) which became operational on

20 November. Theoretically the transfer

to ETOUSA took place on that date; but

pending the opening of Antwerp, the burden actually fell on COMZ MTOUSA

until February 1945.

By the time the first Liberty ships berthed

at Marseille on 15 September, the line of

communications extended to the foothills of

the Vosges Mountains, 425 to 500 miles to

the north. Here, as in the OVERLORD

area, railroad transportation could not be

depended upon for some time because

bridges and tunnels had been destroyed by

Allied bombers and enemy demolitions.

Therefore a tremendous strain was placed

on trucks, which were needed not only for

transporting supplies forward to the combat zone but for port clearance and other

jobs incidental to setting up a base. In

Marseille, space was found for Ordnance

supplies on race tracks and exhibition

grounds and excellent shop buildings in an

automobile factory. Outside the city,

twenty miles to the northwest at Mirimas,

Ordnance officers discovered an ammunition depot that was literally made to order,

with a railroad where a hundred European

freightcars could be loaded at a time,

permanent buildings fenced in for security,

and 50,000 acres of flat, well-drained land

plentifully supplied with roads. It was a

depot built by the United States Army in

1918, but never used.58

To handle such huge installations, to

serve the new divisions that were soon to

land at Marseille, and to furnish forward

support when CONAD moved north to

Lyon, more Ordnance companies were

needed than were available. Ammunition

companies were particularly short; and

CONAD was so hard pressed for depot

companies that the Ordnance officer of

Continental Base Section even considered

requesting the 77th Ordnance Depot Company from Seventh Army. To a large extent the French, who were responsible for

clearing Marseille, had been depended

upon for service troops; but experience

showed that the French Ordnance units,

composed largely of French colonials—

Senegalese, Indo-Chinese, and Goumiers—

were only half as effective as their U.S.

counterparts. Realizing that the southern

forces were badly deficient in many types 57

 (1) McGrath and David Intervs. (2) Ltr, Col

George B. Bennett to Lida Mayo, 10 Nov 59,

OHF. Renner Rpt, pp. 32, 38-49.
THE RACE ACROSS FRANCE 291

of Ordnance units, General Sayler of

ETOUSA arranged weeks ahead of the

transfer to ETOUSA to send down a number of companies from 12th Army Group

and ETOUSA COMZ, and to divert to

Marseille several shipments from the

United States.59

In the forward areas, pending the rehabilitation of the railroads, Seventh Army

Ordnance Section mobilized all vehicles

not in use, provided Ordnance drivers, and

sent special convoys back to Marseille to

pick up critical supplies. This emergency

supply line, known as "The Flaming Bomb

Express," used everything from jeeps to

tank transporters, and was continued until

8 October, when a railhead opened in the

Vesoul area. By the third week in October, rail shipments were arriving even

farther north, at Epinal; but they were

irregular and did not always deliver the

supplies most needed. For some time to

come, Ordnance trucks still had to make

trips back to Marseille.60

In the Seventh Army area as well as

that of Third Army local resources were

thoroughly explored to keep men and supplies moving. The roads soon began to

fill with strange vehicles ingeniously

adapted in Ordnance shops—a German

bakery van, a Paris bus, and civilian vehicles of all kinds. At Besangon one Ordnance company discovered some 300 European cars—Renaults, Fiats, and other

makes—that the Germans had seized and

stored in a warehouse. Many of them

were little better than wrecks, but the

mechanics by cannibalizing for parts were

able to put about a third of them into

shape. With a final coat of olive drab

paint, they were soon in use as staff and

command cars.61

After a lull during most of October,

Seventh Army began in mid-November the

offensive over the Vosges Mountains that

brought it to the Rhine at Strasbourg

early in December. The assault over

rugged terrain in snow and mud, against

German resistance that stiffened as the

Allies approached the Rhine, was costly in

matériel. Often trucks and jeeps had to

be operated off the road over undergrowth

or on roads littered with shell fragments,

wire, and nails, which were ruinous to tires

and tubes. There was a clamor for automotive spare parts. New divisions such as

the 100th and 103d had arrived without

their basic loads, and the trucks of the

divisions that had fought through the Mediterranean campaigns were wearing out and

needed not only parts but major assemblies

and windshields. Tanks were also a source

of worry, especially in the newly arrived

14th Armored Division, which had turned

in its equipment in the United States and

been supplied in Marseille with light tanks

that the 2d French Armored had used in

North Africa and Italy. One unexpected

59

 (1) Msg LAX 13230, COMZ NATOUSA

ADV to Sixth Army Group, 30 Oct 44; and Ltr,

Col D. C. Cabell, Ord Officer CBS, to Ord Officer

SOS NATOUSA, 24 Sep 44, sub: Div of Troop

Units Between Continental Advance and Delta

Base Secs. Both in MTO Ord Sec, 370.5 Assignment of Troops, vol. III, KCRC. (2) Ltr, Sayler

to C of Ord, 18 Oct 44, sub: Rpt on ETO Ord

Activities, Barnes File Overseas Ltrs (Europe).

(3) For French Ordnance units generally, see

History Ord Service MTO, ch. V, "Comments on

Ordnance Service Activities in the French Forces

as Presented by U.S. Liaison Personnel on Duty

with the First French Army," pp. 187-211, OHF. 60

 (1) History Ord Service MTO, ch. V, p. 182.

(2) Seventh Army Rpt, 1944-45, II, 533-45.

61

 (1) Renner Rpt, p. 20. (2) T/Sgt Milton Lehman, "400 Miles of Trouble," Firepower, I, No. 4

(December 1944), 9.
292 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

demand was for grenade launchers needed

by infantrymen for close-in fire support.62

The transfer of XV Corps (79th Infantry and 2d French Armored Divisions)

from Third Army to Seventh on 29 September, the addition of the 44th Division

shortly afterward, and the arrival of the

100th and 103d Infantry Divisions, 12th

and 14th Armored Divisions, and elements

of the 42d, 63d, and 70th Infantry Divisions before the end of 1944, placed a

heavy burden on Seventh Army Ordnance

Service because the new divisions seemed

nearly always to arrive ahead of the Ordnance units sent to support them. Also,

the changes in the tactical situation during

December, requiring the movement and

regrouping of shops and depots, complicated the task of support. Late in November General Eisenhower changed the direction of 6th Army Group's advance. After

the capture of Strasbourg, 1st French

Army was to concern itself with the liquidation of the Colmar Pocket, an area

held by the Germans between Strasbourg

and Mulhouse, and Seventh Army was to

attack northward and assist Third Army

in breaking the Siegfried Line west of the

Rhine. But in mid-December, just as

Seventh Army was preparing for its thrust

into the Saar-Palatinate, the Germans

struck in the Ardennes. Third Army had

to be wheeled north to help First Army

fight the Battle of the Bulge. Seventh

Army, receiving Patton's right flank corps

and responsibility for some twenty-five

miles of the front on the Upper Rhine,

went on the defensive until the big push

into Germany got under way in March.63

In January 1945 an Ordnance observer

from the States, Maj. William E. Renner,

visited the headquarters of the 55th and

54th Ordnance Groups, then located within ten miles of each other near Sarrebourg

in the Vosges, twenty-five miles forward of

Seventh Army headquarters. He was impressed by their policy of "12-hour delivery"—the delivery of replacements for

combat losses within twelve hours after the

loss was reported. They had an excellent

reputation for service. They had applied

to good effect the techniques they had

learned in the Mediterranean, the "Envelope System," for example, and the issuance of informative operations bulletins

along the lines of those originated by Niblo.

They had achieved a workable organization whereby the 54th's main mission was

support of the 55th, the two groups operating close together geographically and

functionally.64

They had worked under several handicaps. One was the inexperience of the

Seventh Army Ordnance officer, Col.

Edward W. Smith (a brigadier general

before the winter was over); consequently,

an unduly large share of the responsibility

for Seventh Army Ordnance Service had

of necessity fallen on his operations officer,

Colonel Artamonoff, and the commander

of his forward group, Colonel McGrath.

Other handicaps were the weariness of the

Ordnance men and the age of Seventh

Army matériel. By February 1945 the

55th Ordnance Group had two companies

62

 (1) 6th Army Group, Weekly G-4 Periodic

Rpts, Seventh Army, 14 Nov-1 Jan 45. (2) SHAEF,

6th AG 319.1 Daily Rpts, vol. I, 7 Nov-30 Dec 44.

63

 (1) Seventh Army Rpt, 1944-45, II, 396-503.

(2) Histories 55th, 54th Gps, Aug-Dec 44. (4)

USFET Board Rpt 101, app. 13, Memo from Capt

J. C. Yates. 64

 (1) Renner Rpt, pp. 35-36. (2) History 54th

Group for Dec 44.
THE RACE ACROSS FRANCE 293

that had served thirty months overseas.

Trucks, tanks, and guns brought from the

Mediterranean were wearing out, and

some of the ammunition was old. Major

Renner noted ammunition boxes and propelling charges that had been in Iceland,

England, North Africa, Sicily, and Italy

"and they looked it!"65

It had been difficult to get new supplies

from the United States. The "southerners" felt that the War Department considered them stepchildren, and even the

men in the OVERLORD area were inclined

to agree. To 12th Army Group, the 6th

Army Group operations, though acknowledged to be valuable and valorous, were

still a "sideshow." Priority on supplies

and men went to First Army, which all

through the fall and winter had held the

limelight in Belgium.66

65

 (1) Sayler, Crawford, and David Intervs and

Interv, Harold R. Johnson, 22 Jun 61. (2) Hist

55th Ord Group. (3) Renner Rpt, p. 19.

66

 (1) Renner Rpt, p. 18. (2) Ingersoll, Top

Secret, pp. 297-98. (3) Interv, Brig Gen Harold

A. Nisley, 29 Oct 58.
CHAPTER XVI

At the Siegfried Line in Belgium

On the evening of 11 September 1944

elements of First Army were on the German border. Several V Corps patrols

crossed the Our River and stood on German soil, where they gazed curiously at

concrete pillboxes and hunted for souvenirs

before they returned to their own lines.

Next day the advance was halted all along

the First Army front until the artillery ammunition needed to assault the Siegfried

Line could be brought up, supposedly a

matter of only a few days. By 11 September, Medaris' 71st Ordnance Ammunition Group had brought enough ammunition forward in its big trucking operation

to establish a sizable army depot near

Liege. At Liege for the first time since

D-day army had a good railhead close to

the front, and shipments began to come

in almost immediately by rail. But a serious famine in all kinds of supplies, an aftermath of the fast pursuit, was about to

affect all the armies. On the First Army

front the halt at the Siegfried Line was to

be a long one.1

In the army area around the Liege railhead Ordnance units found shelter as cold

weather came on in schoolhouses, factories,

and other buildings abandoned by the Belgians for lack of coal to heat them. One

unit, the 51st Ordnance Group, found

temporary billets in a moated chateau that

the Germans had used as a "baby factory"

—a home for unmarried Belgian girls who

had children by German soldiers. Ammunition companies of First Army, like those

of Third Army about this time, began to

use roadside storage as fields became

muddy, or they stacked their ammunition

along village streets. These companies remained at the Siegfried Line during October and November when only limited gains

could be made, such as the capture of

Aachen by VII Corps on 21 October.

The VII Corps then became First Army's

northernmost, since XIX Corps passed to

Ninth Army. When V Corps was pulled

north to protect VII Corps' right flank in

the Hürtgen Forest, VIII Corps was

brought from Brittany to hold in the

Ardennes.2

The Supply Famine

In late summer and early fall of 1944,

First Army was feeling acutely the shortage

of Class II and IV supplies—weapons, 1

 (1) Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line

Campaign, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1963), pp. 1-14, 36-37.

Unless otherwise noted, this chapter is based on this

source and on Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the

Armies, vol. II. (2) History 100th Ord Ammunition

Bn, p. 47.

2

 (1) Histories 25th Ord Bn, 590th Ord Bn, and

100th Ammunition Bn. (2) Medaris, "Field Service in the First Army," p. 67. (3) FUSA Ord

Monthly Rpt, Sep, Annex II to sec IV. (4) Renner

Rpt, P. 39.
AT THE SIEGFRIED LINE IN BELGIUM 295

trucks, and parts—which had been neglected in the rush to get rations, gas, and

ammunition forward. More tanks, jeeps,

light armored cars, rifles, mortars, and grenade launchers had been needed ever since

the summer hedgerow fighting. During

August and September the most critical

shortages were medium tank engines, tank

tracks, and tires. In the period of fast

pursuit the tanks, described by Ernest

Hemingway as "smashing around like so

many drunken elephants in a native village," had suffered badly. First Army's

precious supplies of tank engines and

tracks, brought up over the beaches with

so much effort, had been expended in the

job of refitting the tanks of XV Corps

when it passed temporarily from Third

Army to First Army control late in

August.3 During October, because of the

transportation crisis, trucks of all kinds became extremely scarce, and the stock of

spare parts, as well as engines for trucks

and jeeps, reached the lowest level of the

whole European campaign. The assault

on the Siegfried Line brought shortages in

artillery matériel—gun tubes, equilibrators,

and recoil mechanisms.4

Communications Zone opened Ordnance

Base Depot 0-619 in Cherbourg on 20

August and 0-644 in Paris in October.

Theoretically army placed its requisitions

through a regulating station, which forwarded them to the theater's chief Ordnance officer, and Communications Zone

sent the supplies in replacement vehicles,

or, later, by rail. But First Army supplies

either did not arrive, or, if they did, they

were the wrong supplies. On one occasion near Liege, the army supply battalion

simply took the locomotive off one end of

the train, put it on the other end, and sent

back the whole trainload of supplies.

During September First Army received

only 9.8 percent of its total requirements

for Ordnance spare parts and assemblies.

And even in early October there were no

tires or tank tracks and parts in ADS EC

depots, although these items had been

critical for months.5

It is debatable how much better Communications Zone could have done, granted

the sheer speed of the advance from St. Lo

to the German border; the strain on truck

transportation imposed by the destruction

of rail lines by bombing; the failure to clear

the ports; and bad guesses in the United

States as to battle losses in tanks and the

number of trucks and all kinds of vehicular

spare parts that would be needed. Ordnance supply officers at Communications

Zone, when taken to task by 12th Army

Group, maintained that with the exception

of a very few critical items their troubles

were "purely transportation"; that the supplies were still afloat off the coast of

France because G-4 did not give them a

high enough priority for unloading. Their

position was supported by Col. Waldo E.

Laidlaw, Ordnance officer of the New

York Port of Embarkation, who reported

to 12th Army Group headquarters at

3

( 1 ) FUSA Ord Monthly Rpt. (2) Ernest

Hemingway, "Battle for Paris," Collier's, Vol. 114,

No. 14 (September 30, 1944), 67. (3) XV Corps

G-4 Jnl, Annex 4, Aug 44. (4) Ltr, Medaris to

Pattison, 28 Oct 63. 4

 First Army Rpt 2, Annex 9, p. 8.

5

 (1) FUSA Ord Monthly Rpt, Sep. (2) Interv,

Lt Col Lyman O. Heidtke, CO 310th Ord Bn, by

William M. Hines, Sr., 3 Aug 45, in Hines History,

vol. III, OHF. (3) First Army G-4 Report No.

5, 6 Sep 44, 12th AG files, 319.1 G-4 Rpts

(FUSA), Vol. 1. (4) Lt Alfred H. Marshall, Jr.,

"A History of ADSEC Ordnance," p. 13, ETO

Ord Sec files, KCRC.
296 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Verdun on 25 September that fifty-six

ships containing Class II supplies were being held offshore because they could not be

unloaded.6

These explanations did not satisfy First

Army Ordnance officers, who stormed 12th

Army Group headquarters repeatedly for

help on supply. Some of their complaints

were received with reservations: First Army

had a reputation for asking for the moon.

On the other hand, First Army Ordnance

men felt that there were times when Communications Zone actually hindered supply.

During the first two weeks in September,

at the height of the pursuit, Communications Zone moved its entire 11,000-man

headquarters from Valognes to Paris, upanchoring its operations and creating a

major tieup in communications, transportation, and supply in general. Brig. Gen.

Royal B. Lord, who was Lt. Gen. John C.

H. Lee's chief of staff at Communications

Zone and who had ordered the move, justified it on the necessity for better communications facilities than were available in

Valognes. General Sayler agreed, emphasizing the need for closer liaison with the

rear echelon in England. Eisenhower and

Bradley sharply disapproved of the

"stampede to Paris."7

One COMZ effort that was for a considerable time more of a handicap to Ordnance than a help (however useful to

other services) was the operation of the

Red Ball Express, which was extravagant

of trucks, parts, and tires at a time when

they were precious. First Army Ordnance

accused COMZ depot men of the sin (unforgivable in Medaris' eyes) of not knowing what they had. The depot men on

their part complained of the difficulty of

determining what was wanted, because

nomenclature on many army requisitions

differed from nomenclature on depot stock

cards. Whatever the cause, this stumbling

block forced Medaris to place liaison men

at Depots 0-619 and 0-644 to identify

"lost" parts. At times both First and

Third Army Ordnance Sections had to

send their own trucks back to ports as well

as to COMZ depots. On 4 October, for

example, 25 First Army Ordnance vans

with 100 drivers went all the way back to

Cherbourg to pick up supplies. This was

much too reminiscent of Sicily.8

Local Procurement

Experience in France and in the Mediterranean had taught Medaris an important

lesson about supplies. He expressed it in

6 two sentences: "Never base a plan of (1) Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation

Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 301-18. (2)

Interv, Maj Gen Everett S. Hughes by William M.

Hines, Sr., 19 Jul 45, in Hines History, Vol. III,

pp. 623-26, OHF. (3) Daily Jnl Ord Sec 12th

AG, 15, 25 Sep 44. 7

( 1 ) Daily Jnl Ord Sec 12th AG, entries for

September. (2) Intervs by R. G. Ruppenthal with

Brig Gen Raymond G. Moses, G-4 12th AG, 13

Aug 51, and Maj Gen Royal B. Lord, 9 Aug 51;

and Intervs by F. C. Pogue with Maj Gen Robert

W. Crawford, G-4 SHAEF, and Lt Gen Walter

B. Smith, CofS SHAEF, 5 May 48, all in OCMH

Interviews. (3) Comments by Maj Gen Henry B.

Sayler (USA Ret), Incl to Ltr to Brig Gen Hal

C. Pattison, 8 Oct 63 (hereafter cited as Sayler

Comments), OCMH. (4) Bradley, A Soldier's

Story, p. 406. (6) Medaris Interv. 8

( 1 ) Ibid. (2) Sayler Comments. (3) For the

world-wide obstruction to supply caused by mistakes in item identification, see Thomson and

Mayo, Procurement and Supply, pp. 395-98. (4)

First Army Rpt 2, Annex 9, p. 6. (5) FUSA Ord

Monthly Rpt, Oct, Supply Div, p. 2. (6) Interv,

Col Wilton B. Moats (USA Ret), CO of 51st

Ord Group, 2 Mar 61, OHF. (7) Elliot Interv in

Hines History, vol. III, p. 424. (8) For Third

Army experience see Nixon Comments.
AT THE SIEGFRIED LINE IN BELGIUM 297

action on the theory that you will have

enough. Base it on a probable scarcity

and be ready to manufacture the supplies

not on hand."

 9

Late in August he instructed his maintenance companies that fifth echelon repair

would have to be the rule rather than the

exception and that every available man

would have to be used to place back in

service as much equipment as possible.

As army shop facilities were necessarily

limited, Medaris then turned to French

factories. Paris provided the first real

opportunity for local procurement since

very little had been possible in Normandy,

where the few existing factories had been

destroyed. On 6 September Medaris sent

four officers to Paris to scout the possibilities for rebuilding tank engines; repairing

and retreading tires; buying civilian cars;

and obtaining oxygen and acetylene for

gas cylinders.10

Though civilian cars were in short supply, considerable help came from purchases

such as gas cylinder fillings and special

helmets for tank crews, which are worn to

protect heads from injury within the tank.

A French helmet of pressed aluminum

with a leather insert was approved by First

Army's Armored Section and 278 had been

delivered by mid-September. But factory

output was severely limited by lack of electric power and materials, especially mateials for rebuilding tires. The most immediate result of this effort at local

procurement was the First Army contract

to overhaul—not rebuild—tank engines.

One afternoon Col. Nelson M. Lynde, Jr.,

Medaris' maintenance officer, and Col.

Floyd A. Hansen, his executive officer,

drove to Paris in a jeep to look for a site

for an automotive dump. Along the way

Lynde noticed the large Gnome-Rhone factory, which manufactured engines. He

was immediately interested because he had

200 unserviceable tank engines that he had

brought over to the Continent, having been

unable to get them overhauled in England.

He had carried the engines across France

on tank transporters, awaiting the time

when Ordnance companies could obtain

enough parts by cannibalization to do the

work. He found out that Gnome-Rhone

was willing to take on the overhaul job,

and after the first engines the company

sent back to Ordnance for testing were

found to be satisfactory, Gnome-Rhone

was given a contract to overhaul the 200

engines at $500 an engine. The contract

was filled in about two weeks, and First

Army Ordnance got the tank engines in

late September, the only ones it was to get

for four months. After the engines were

completed, Communications Zone took

over the contract.11

When Communications Zone became

operational in Paris the second week in

September, its Ordnance Section's Procurement and Fiscal Division (later renamed

the Industrial Division) undertook an engine rebuild program, contracting with

other firms in and around Paris for both

tank and truck engines. Truck engines

were more and more in demand as the

effects of Red Ball continued to be felt.

But it took a long time to get the French

shops started. Obtaining coal and electricity, training the workers, and above all,

9

 Medaris, "Field Service in the First Army,"

p. 67. 10

 FUSA Ord Monthly Report, Sep 44.

11

 (1) FUSA Ord Monthly Rpts, Sep and Oct.

(2) Hansen Interv and Interv with Maj Gen Nelson M. Lynde, Jr. (USA Ret), 10 Nov 64. OCMH.
298 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

finding the parts (especially bearings)

needed in rebuild involved a long and

arduous process. No real results were

possible until early 1945. For most of the

autumn of 1944 the Gnome-Rhone plant

was the only factory in production.12

In Belgium where big manufacturing

centers were close behind the front and

where industrialists would presumably be

far easier to work with than German firms

would be after First Army moved into

Germany, Medaris started a local procurement program on a grand scale. At

Liege he negotiated a sizable contract with

Fabrique Nationale des Armes de Guerre,

which had extensive metalworking facilities

and also, as holder of all Browning patents,

was able to make small arms and small

arms parts as well as parts for heavy artillery carriages. Help on tire manufacture,

recap and retread, came from the Liege

plant of Engelbert and Company, which

could handle work on tires and tubes of

all sizes, even those for the huge tank transporters, especially after the capture of

Malmedy brought into army stocks fifty

tons of German buna and two tons of

Japanese gum rubber.

During October, as these contracts began to bear fruit, other services, especially

Quartermaster, began to take advantage of

local facilities, but Ordnance was the

leader and continued local procurement

on a scale unheard of at army level. In

spite of shortages in raw material, fuel,

power, and skilled labor, and the destruction wrought by German V-1 bombs, between September 1944 and February 1945

First Army Ordnance obtained from firms

in Liege and from others as far west as

Brussels more than a thousand different

badly needed items, some of them in considerable quantities. In November Medaris

assigned the administration of this ambitious program to the 185th Battalion of

the 72d Ordnance Group as its sole

mission.13

First Army Improvises

During the halt at the Siegfried Line

First Army Ordnance even managed with

the help of civilian resources to improve

some of its matériel. Combat forces had

complained that 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars, which had been scarce ever since the

hedgerow battles in Normandy, were inaccurate. At the request of Colonel Lynde.

COMZ sent 1st Lt. George L. Herter to

investigate. Herter was energetic and inventive. By living with the mortar crews

of several infantry divisions he found out

the faults of the mortars, corrected them

in two models, and had the models tested

12

 (1) For the COMZ Ordnance effort on engine

rebuild, tires, and extended end connectors (the

three major programs) see Ord Serv ETO, Local

Procurement and Industrial Service, OHF, and

Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, II,

488-92. (2) An unsigned letter of 26 September 44,

in FUSA Ord Monthly Rpt for September, by a

First Army officer stationed at the Gnome-Rhone

plant stated: "Evidently First Army has started

something in engine rebuilding as General Christmas

from Tank Automotive Center, Detroit, was here

yesterday. He seemed well pleased. . . ." But the

report of the Christmas mission to ETOUSA indicates that General Christmas was under the impression that the Gnome-Rhone operation was an

undertaking of COMZ Ordnance Section. 80—S

Report on Visit to ETOUSA, 10/23/44, Brig Gen

John K. Christmas, Col. H. R. White and Col. T. A.

Weyher, p. 7.

13

 (1) FUSA Ord Monthly Rpts, Sep, Oct, Nov

44; (2) First Army Rpt 2, Annex 2, pp. 116-17

and Annex 9, p. 11; (3) Ord Serv ETO, Local

Procurement and Industrial Service, pp. 119-27

(4) Entry on visit of Col. Lynde, FUSA, to 12th

AG Hqtrs on 16 Oct 44 (asking 12th AG to "force

COMZ into more local procurement of critical

items"), Daily Jnl Ord Sec 12th AG.
AT THE SIEGFRIED LINE IN BELGIUM 299

in combat. First Army then contracted

with J. Honres Artillerie, a manufacturer

near Liege that had formerly made the

Stokes Brandt mortar, to rebuild all mortars according to Herter's specifications.

This project, completed between September and December under the supervision of

Herter and three inspectors from the 25th

Ordnance Battalion, greatly improved the

accuracy of the mortars and all but eliminated maintenance troubles. J. Honres

Artillerie also manufactured from captured

matériel more than 200 complete 60-mm.

mortars and mortar sights.14

An important artillery item was also improved. Gas check pads had been wearing out at an alarming rate—a repetition

of the experience in Italy, where the life

of the pad was estimated at only about 300

rounds. An examination of two German

gas check pads found with 155-mm. guns

emplaced in the Maginot Line had revealed

that they were quite different from their

American counterparts, which were made

of wire mesh, paraffin, and asbestos, and

were so fragile that they had to be handled

carefully. The German pads were made

of synthetic rubber, were tough, and

seemed to have an almost indefinite life.

Tested in an American gun, one lasted

1,800 rounds before it was cut by a defective split-ring. Fortunately, the manager of Engelbert and Company was

familiar with the composition used in the

German pad and could duplicate it.

Molds for all calibers were machined and

production started at five per caliber a day.

The new pads were cheap and relatively

indestructible; their life exceeded that of

the tube.15

Manufacture and Improvisation in

Army Shops

Many of the items procured in Belgium

were truck engine parts needed for First

Army's own engine rebuild program.

Medaris early planned a big assembly line

operation in his own shops, for his experience had left him with little faith in supply from the rear. First Army's requirement for truck engines had been estimated

at 800 a month. In the five months after

D-day First Army had received only 562

from COMZ—actually the number was

162, for in July First Army Ordnance Section had turned in 400 to base depots

because there was no transportation to

move them. Later, when Medaris sent

truckloads of damaged engines back to

Paris, he found that they were disappearing into COMZ stocks—until he began

sending them back under armed guard,

two men to a truck, with orders to release

damaged engines only in exchange for

good ones. COMZ's engine rebuild program was just beginning to get under way

in mid-December and any real increase in

production had to await a big shipment of

parts from the United States later in the

month.16

14

 (1) FUSA Ord Monthly Rpt for Sep. (2)

First Army Rpt 2, Annex 9, pp. 11-12. (3) For

one assistant division commander's appreciation of

the "splendid" new 60-mm. mortar, see Memo,

Maj Gen John E. Hull, ACofS OPD, for Brig

Gen William A. Borden, 29 Mar 45, sub: Comments on German Bazooka and Various American

Weapons, OPD 471.61. (4) Lynde Interv.

15

 (1) First Army Rpt 2, Annex 9, p. 12. (a)

Ord Serv ETO, Local Procurement and Industrial

Service, pp. 123-24. (3) Lynde Interv. 16

 (1) FUSA Monthly Rpt for Oct, app. III, p. 2;

(2) Medaris Interv. (3) Personal Ltr, Col Dillon,

Chief Maint Div, Off of Chief Ord Officer, COMZ

ETOUSA, to Gen Campbell, 12 Dec 44, no sub,
300 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

First Army rebuild of engines and other

major assemblies for trucks, such as carburetors, starters, generators, axles, and

transmissions, had began the second week

of October at Verviers, a town at that time

less than 12 miles from the front lines,

which had been selected as headquarters

for the main shop battalion because it was

as far forward as the battalion could move

until First Army crossed the Rhine. At

Verviers Ordnance found two excellent

buildings, each large enough to accommodate the complete shop of a heavy automotive maintenance company, with room

to billet the men. There were also some

valuable legacies from the Germans, who

had used the town for rebuilding their own

equipment. The two companies selected

for the rebuild job, the 868th Heavy Automotive Company and the 900th, found

benches, engine stands, shop racks, and

even double-decker beds and wall lockers.

Base shop equipment such as rigs and

dollies they had to improvise, since they

had only fourth echelon equipment.

Working long hours, sometimes under

blackout conditions, frequently in danger

from buzz bombs, and constantly plagued

for lack of certain parts that could not be

obtained locally, the men made a remarkable record, rebuilding 783 major assemblies during October, of which 304 were

engines.17

A good deal of work was done in First

Army shops in the neighborhood of Liege

on gun tubes, recoil mechanisms, and other

artillery parts, because in the assault on the

Siegfried Line artillery was playing an important role as it had in Italy. One major

Ordnance effort, for which the artillerymen were grateful, was aimed at keeping

the very few M12 self-propelled guns shooting. The M12, made by mounting the

old 1918 French GPF 155-mm. gun on

a tank chassis, had been developed by the

Ordnance Department and accepted without much enthusiasm by Army Ground

Forces, which had authorized the manufacture in the United States of only a hundred. First Army had three battalions and

at first had been doubtful whether they

would be of much use. But the mount

proved to be remarkably sturdy and "the

old GPF tubes," the Artillery officer reported, "again spoke with authority on

French soil." The M12's had been able

to keep up with the armored divisions in

the race across France as no other medium

or heavy artillery could. They were especially valuable at the Siegfried Line because they could be brought up to within

a few hundred yards of the strong concrete

fortifications, closer to the target than had

hitherto been possible for heavy artillery.18

This employment in direct fire made

possible a somewhat bizarre repair job on

the tube of an M12 received one day in

November in an Ordnance tank maintenance shop in Maastricht, Holland. The

O.O. 350.05/15446/2. (4) Dillon, Report on Engine Rebuild, European Theater of Operations, 28

May 45, OHF. 17

 (1) FUSA Ord Monthly Rpt for Oct, app.

III, Incl 1. (2) History 868th Heavy Auto Maint

Go, 26 June 44-31 Dec 44. (3) Elliot Interv in

Hines History.

18

 (1) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Plannning

Munitions for War, pp. 316-17. (2) For the

"battle" by Ordnance to gain approval of even

100 M12's, see Campbell Comments. (3) Rpt by

Arty Off, First US Army, "The 155-mm. Gun SP

M12," in "Memoranda, First United States Army

Artillery Information Service," Dec 44, pp. 16-

21, Barnes file, OHF. (4) Memo, Lt Col D. A

Hoppock for Tank and Motor Transport Div, 26

Mar 45, quoting AGF Bd Rpt MTO #A-281

Barnes file, OHF.
AT THE SIEGFRIED LINE IN BELGIUM 301

tube had been hit on its side about six

inches from the muzzle. No replacement

tubes were to be had, and the gun was

badly needed. At the suggestion of the

maintenance officer, with the concurrence

of the artillerymen and the corps Ordnance

officer, the problem was solved by sawing

about a foot off the muzzle end of the tube,

and the gun was returned to action.19

In the reduction of Aachen the M12's

were invaluable. On 18 October one

M12 battalion at a cost of only sixty-four

rounds neutralized an observation post and

nine buildings—one of them a movie

theater occupied by a company of German

infantrymen, all of whom were either killed

or wounded. The German colonel who

had commanded the city afterward spoke

of the M12's with "considerable consternation," according to a G-2 report, swearing

that a shell from one of them had pierced

three houses before exploding and wrecking the fourth. The M12 carriages were

so scarce (there were no replacements) that

it was a real loss when one of them was put

out of action by the enemy in October.

First Army Ordnance men salvaged the

gun, recoil mechanism, and top carriage,

and installed them in a cargo carrier

M30, an outstanding feat of improvisation,

for the piece went back into action and

worked well. The crew promptly dubbed

it "Miss Carriage 1944."

 20

Frustration at the Ports and Depots

Shortly before midnight on 3 October a

telephone call from Colonel Ray, Medaris'

ammunition officer, to 12th Army Group

headquarters at Verdun gave warning of a

crisis in ammunition supply. Ray was

thoroughly angry. The day before, First

Army had received a TWX from 12th

Army Group granting for the period 5-13

October somewhat larger expenditure rates

for scarce artillery ammunition than had

hitherto been possible. That same day

General Hodges had jumped off for Aachen.

Then Communications Zone had placed

zeroes opposite requisitions for virtually all

of the ammunition. As an example, Ray

cited the case of the HE shell for the 105-

mm. howitzer M3. The 12th Army

Group had authorized 25,000 rounds but

COMZ had been unable to fill requisitions.

What was the use, Ray wanted to know,

of authorizing expenditures if the ammunition was not available? He believed

that 12th Army Group did not in fact

know what was available or what effect

the expenditures would have on stocks in

reserve.21

Ray was a little hard on 12th Army

Group. General Moses, Group G-4, had

suspected that COMZ's figures on availability were too optimistic and had simply

decided to call its bluff. COMZ was the

real culprit, for it had counted as assets

stocks on ships still afloat off the Normandy beaches and ports, placing too much

confidence in a program it had begun the

last of September to accelerate unloading.

Communications Zone could not deliver

for two reasons: at Cherbourg higher au19

 Lt. Col. James D. Sams, "Ordnance Improvisation in the Combat Zone," Military Review,

XXVII, 2 (May 1948), p. 35. 20

 (1) Rpt by Artillery Officer, First US Army,

"The 155-mm. Gun SP M12." (2) FUSA Ord

Monthly Rpt, Oct 44, app. III, Incl 4. (3) Ltr, Maj

Gen Henry B. Sayler to OCO, 7 Nov 44, sub: Supplementary Reply to Technical Information Letter

Number 17, dtd 31 Aug. 44, O.O. 350.05/15254.

21

 Daily Jnl Ord Sec, 12th Army Group, 2-3

Oct 44.
302 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

thority gave priority to troop debarkations,

and at the beaches autumn storms had virtually stopped operations. There were

thirty-five ammunition ships offshore that

could not be unloaded. These facts were

brought to light at the next 12th Army

Group allocation meeting on 9 October,

which because of the crisis was attended by

the ammunition officers of First, Third,

and Ninth Armies.

As a result of this meeting and a highlevel conference held at 12th Army Group

on 11 October, two steps were taken to

see that the armies were supplied. First,

12th Army Group sent a planeload of

officers to Paris to get authority from General Lee to speed up unloading; second, it

declared a moratorium on supply to the

armies until stocks were built up in COMZ

depots at Soissons, Liege, and Verdun.

The end date of the build-up was set at 7

November on the following basis: 10 days

to set up priorities and get the ships

berthed; 10 days to unload; 4 days for

shipment to COMZ depots; and 8 days

for armies to place requisitions and start

receiving.22

Not only the ammunition shortage but

the very critical shortage of Class II supplies, especially trucks, was threatening to

delay the November offensive. The supply conference General Bradley called on

11 October brought together representatives of SHAEF, 12th Army Group, and

First, Third, and Ninth Armies to find a

way out of the crisis. Bradley later remembered with some amusement that when

Patton, accompanied by his chief of staff

and G-4, arrived and saw Medaris he immediately sent for Colonel Nixon, warning

his chief of staff to be on his guard against

Medaris and Wilson, the First Army G-4.

"I know them both," he said, remembering II Corps, "they once worked for me."

 23

As the conferees explored the supply

situation, it became plain that there was

little that could be done for the moment,

beyond prodding Communications Zone to

step up port operations. During most of

the fall of 1944, shipping was the bottleneck. To make way for such high-priority

items as weapons, tires, antifreeze, and

spare parts, virtually no general purpose

vehicles were shipped in November and

December; the War Department had cut

down on shipping because of the theater's

inability to unload. Ships were actually

being returned from the ETO partially unloaded; by mid-November some 36,000

tons of supplies—the unloaded cargoes on

some thirteen to fifteen vessels—were being

set up for return to the United States.24

General Bradley, impatient with what he

called Field Marshal Montgomery's "tardiness" in the north, believed that the remedy for the ammunition shortage lay in

opening Antwerp, the port nearest the

front lines. Captured early in September,

Antwerp could not be used until the Germans had been cleared from the approaches

to the Schelde estuary. But opening the

port (the first vessel docked there on 28

22

 (1) Interv, Moses by R. G. Ruppenthal. (2)

12th Army Group Rpt, Vol XII, p. 141. (3) Min,

Ammunition Allocation Meeting of 9 Oct 44 and

Rpt of Trip to ComZ 14 Oct 44 in Daily Jnl

12th AG Ord Sec 9, 14 Oct 44. (4) Nisley Interv.

(5) USFET Bd Rpt No. 28, Ammunition Supply

for Field Artillery, pp. 24-29.

23

 (1) 12th AG Ord Sec Jnl, 11 Oct 44; (2)

Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 431; (3) Patton,

War As I Knew It, p. 129. 24

 (1) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the

Armies, II, p. 243; (2) Memo, Maj Gen LeRoy

Lutes, Director, Plans and Operations, ASF, for the

Director of Supply, ASF, 22 Nov 44 [no sub], ASF

Distr Div 400 ETO.
AT THE SIEGFRIED LINE IN BELGIUM 303

November) helped ammunition only indirectly. Buzz bomb attacks by the enemy

made the harbor too dangerous for ships

loaded with explosives, so that very little

ammunition was ever landed there except

90-mm. antiaircraft shells for the defense

of the city. The diversion to Antwerp of

other classes of supply did free Le Havre

and Cherbourg to handle more ammunition than had hitherto been possible.

By January 1945, it had become all too

plain that there was not enough production in the United States of badly needed

mortar and artillery shells. This fact

came out in answers to Eisenhower's urgent

cables in the fall of 1944, in the findings

of the Bull Mission that he sent back to

the States in November, and in the investigation by General Somervell when he

visited the theater in January, accompanied

by General Campbell. Somervell came

home convinced that all the resources of

the United States ought to be directed toward supplying the European theater with

the critical calibers of ammunition it

needed. By then, time was running out.

Production started up, but the effect would

not be felt in the theater until April, when

expenditures were dropping. Again, ships

were turned around and sent home unloaded—completing the cycle of frustration at the ports.25

Using a great deal of German ammunition, some of it fired from captured German guns, and employing tanks, tank destroyers, and antiaircraft guns (all of which

had fairly plentiful stocks of ammunition)

as artillery, the armies somehow managed

on their scanty rations until COMZ stocks

were built up. At the end of November

enough ammuntion had accumulated to

allow VII Corps, which was pushing slowly to the Roer against strong defenses, to

fire reasonable amounts of nearly all types,

though V and VIII Corps were still inadequately supplied.26

By mid-December, thanks to the belated

build-up, the level of Ordnance general

supplies in the armies was the highest since

D-day, with the exception of a few items

like truck engines. In the case of First

Army, the Ordnance Section took a good

share of the credit for bringing supplies

forward from depots. While admitting

that there was some improvement in rail

transportation during November, Medaris'

staff attributed most of the improvement in

supply to its active liaison with COMZ

and its continued use of army transportation and army drivers to haul supplies to

the front.27

This view was supported by Maj. Gen.

LeRoy Lutes, Director of Plans and Operations, Army Service Forces, when he made

a visit to the European theater early in

December. He found 53 percent of the

scarce Class II and IV items far back in

Normandy and Brittany, and noted that

25

 (1) Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 431. (2)

Ord Serv ETO, Ammunition Supply, pp. 91-93,

161-62. (3) Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, p. 322. (4) Gables

1 Oct 44-12 Mar 45 in vol. 12, General File,

BOLERO, ASF Theater Br, Planning Div files. (5)

Diary (unsigned) of General Campbell's trip to

Europe and Italy 6-31 Jan 45, Barnes file, OHF.

(6) For problems in ammunition manufacture and

supply, see Lt. Gen. Levin H. Campbell, Jr., The

Industry-Ordnance Team (New York: McGrawHill Book Co., Inc., 1946), pp. 255-74.

29

 FUSA Ord Monthly Rpt, Nov 44, app. I. 27

 (1) 12th AG Rpt, Vol XII, p. 144. (2) FUSA

Ord Monthly Rpt, Nov 44, app. IV. During November FUSA received by rail 172 tanks and fulltracked vehicles, 129 other vehicles, and 2,229

tons of bulk supplies; by Army Ordnance vehicles

and drivers, 1,510 vehicles and 1,133 tons of bulk

supplies. Ibid.
304 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Medaris was employing a hundred men as

field agents to follow up First Army shipments. To General Somervell, who backed

up Lutes's findings on his own visit to ETO

a month later, the worst reflection on Communications Zone that came to his attention was the fact that Medaris was forced

to have "100 bloodhounds ranging over the

entire Communications Zone in order to

locate the items for and fill his requisitions."

 28

The Battle of the Ardennes

At half past five on the morning of 16

December, a black winter morning, German artillery shells began to light up the

sky all along the broad front held by VIII

Corps in the hitherto quiet region of the

Ardennes. Later in the day shells from

long-range railway guns similar to Anzio

Annie began falling on supply dumps in the

rear, at Roetgen, Eupen, Malmédy, Verviers, and St. Vith—not only in the VIII

Corps sector but also in the southern half

of the V Corps front; by nightfall there

were indications that a strong German

counteroffensive was under way in the

lightly held section between the two corps.29

Danger at Malmédy

The first Ordnance units threatened

were those at Malmédy, supporting V

Corps in its drive to the Roer dams. At

Malmédy were the headquarters of the

86th Ordnance Battalion and the 100th

Ordnance Ammunition Battalion; several

miles to the east near Waimes was ASP

126, operated by the 57th Ordnance Ammunition Company. By the morning of 17

December it seemed quite possible to First

Army headquarters that this ammunition

supply point, which was strung out for

three miles along a hard-surfaced road running northeast out of Waimes, would be

overrun by the enemy. Medaris ordered

the commander of the 100th Battalion to

get ready to blow up all mines, bangalore

torpedoes, grenades, and other items likely

to be of use to the Germans, and to evacuate, if it was not too hazardous to men

and equipment, the rest of the ammunition,

especially scarce artillery and mortar shells.

Reports that came in to First Army were

more and more alarming. Shortly after

noon, Colonel Ray took off in his jeep to

supervise the evacuation.30 (See Map 5.)

As soon as the commanding officer of the

100th, Maj. Alfred G. Garr, received Medaris' order, he sent Capt. John N. Lee of

his staff to ASP 126. Lee found the enemy

close at hand. Stationing guards around

the perimeter to warn him of the approach

of the Germans, he sent two officers and

ten men of the 57th Ordnance Ammunition Company to prepare mines and engineer demolition materials for the destruction of the ASP. This they accomplished

in forty-five minutes, using three miles of

prima cord. No matériel could be evacuated because the forty-five trucks arranged for by the Ordnance officer of V

Corps could not get through the traffic on

the congested roads and never arrived.

Neither did Colonel Ray, for he was captured by the Germans near Waimes.

At 1430 small arms fire as well as artil28

 Rpts by Lutes and Somervell quoted in Hines

History, vol. III, pp. 562-79, OHF. 29

 (1) First Army Rpt 2, p. 103. (2) For a

detailed tactical account of the Battle of the

Ardennes, see Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle

of the Bulge, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1965). 30

 History 100th Ammunition Bn, p. 58.
AT THE SIEGFRIED LINE IN BELGIUM 305

lery fire could be clearly heard at the ASP

office, and the guards reported that the

enemy was about a mile away. Captain

Lee drove out to investigate, saw enemy

troops supported by tanks, and gave orders

to fire the prima cord and evacuate the

ASP. With a great roar some 200 tons of

explosives went up. The 57th loaded its

men, its records, and some primers and

fuzes on its own trucks and began to pull

out for Depot 125 near Liege—just in time,

for the Germans were closing in on their

bivouac area.31

Next morning four men who went back

to make a final check of the company

quarters—Captain Carstaphen, the company commander (who had led a charge

that killed thirty-five Germans at Driancourt early in September), 1st Lt. Arnold O.

Putnam, M. Sgt. Chester A. McKinney

and Pfc. Daniel Barber—narrowly escaped

capture. Putnam and Barber were surprised by two German soldiers and forced

to get down from their jeep and walk toward the enemy lines, hands over their

heads. They broke away and managed to

make their way to safety through a hail of

machine gun bullets. Hearing the gunfire,

Captain Carstaphen ran to the door of the

building he had been inspecting, opened

fire with his submachine gun, and killed

both Germans.32

Pulling the 86th Ordnance Battalion

out of Malmédy was an extremely difficult

operation, for it was the back-up battalion

for V Corps, and its depot company, the

202d, had some 600 tons of stock that had

to be saved. Aware of the situation by

noon of the 17th, Medaris called on the

72d Ordnance Group at Verviers to provide the lift, and with the help of the tank

transporters of the main army evacuation

battalion (the 6th) and the trucks of the

main depot battalion (the 310th) the job

was done by nightfall. The last man out

of Malmédy was said to be the commanding officer of the 202d. While the loading was going on, the area was under artillery fire, and some of the men of the 86th

got into combat. Members of its heavy

maintenance (field army) company, the

514th, took two tank destroyers out of its

shops to help stop the enemy. They lost

the tank destroyers, but claimed two Panther tanks.33

Malmédy was saved by the valor of a few

men from an Engineer combat battalion,

the 291st, who defended the roads with

such skill and tenacity that the Germans

bypassed the town on the south. But by

the evening of the 17th the main First

Army Ordnance depot at Aywaille was

threatened. When Pfc. William Coleman

of the 334th Ordnance Depot Company,

who had been helping at Malmédy, got

back to his company with his truck—after

a circuitous 7-hour drive in blackout during which he had a close call from being

captured—he was given a bazooka and

sent to help hold a crossroads against German tanks.34

Defense of Aywaille

The defense of Aywaille was in the capable hands of Colonel Lynde, who had been

sent to the depot by Medaris with orders to

31

 (1) History 100th Ammunition Bn, p. 58. (2)

V Corps Ord Sec Rpt for Dec, AAR, Ord Sec, V

Corps, European Campaign, Aug—Dec 44. 32

 Hist 100th Amm Bn, pp. 58-59.

33

 FUSA Ord Sec Monthly Rpt for Dec, app.

II, pp. 6-7; app. III, p. 1; app. IV, p. 2. 34

 (1) First Army Rpt 2, Vol I, p. 105. (2)

Booklet, The Flaming Bomb: The Story of Ordnance in the ETO, p. 23, OHF.
306 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

hold out as long as possible in order to buy

time for evacuation of the considerable

stocks—6,000 tons of bulk stock on the

ground and 1,518 vehicles in the vehicle

park. Lynde organized a task force composed of the four depot companies and one

motor vehicle distributing company of the

310th Ordnance Battalion; the automatic

weapons antiaircraft battalion that had

been protecting the vehicle park; a company of Engineers; and a Belgian guard

company. Some armed with bazookas,

others manning depot tanks, these men set

up roadblocks around the depot.35

Shortly after noon on 18 December

Lynde received word from First Army Ordnance that his task force would be bolstered

by the 74Oth Tank Battalion, due to arrive

that evening. The catch in this piece of

good news was that the 74Oth had no tanks.

It was one of four tank battalions under

9th Armored Group that had been in training for the highly secret Canal Defense

Light (CDL), a project to employ powerful searchlights mounted on M3 medium

tanks to illuminate the battlefield and blind

the enemy. The project had been abandoned by 12th Army Group and the CDL

tanks put in storage. The 74Oth was to be

converted to a standard tank battalion but

as yet had not received any Shermans and

was being used to flush German paratroopers out of the woods around First Army

headquarters at Spa. By the time the

commander of the 74Oth reported at Aywaille, about dark on 18 December, Lynde

had received a report that German armor

was less than twelve miles to the east. He

directed the Ordnance vehicle park to issue

to the 740th anything the men could

drive and shoot. The tankers found about

15 medium tanks that could be made operable. They worked on them all night and

all next morning, and also acquired from

the park an assortment of tank destroyers,

assault guns, and light tanks, including two

new M24's that had just arrived from the

United States. Thus equipped, by noon on

19 December they were in position to defend Aywaille. Two hours later, on orders

from General Hodges, the 740th was pulled

out and attached to the 3Oth Infantry Division, which was having trouble with advancing German armor.36

The original "Lynde's Task Force"

manned defenses until 22 December, when

combat forces arrived on the scene. By

that time the depot stocks had been evacuated under the direction of Lt. Col. Lyman

O. Heidtke, the 310th Battalion commander, who had been ordered to find a

suitable spot west of the Meuse River and

set up his depot. With the help of the tank

transporters of the 6th Evacuation Battal35

 (1) FUSA Ord Monthly Rpt for Dec. (2)

Ltr, Maj Gen Nelson M. Lynde, Jr., to Brig Gen

Hal C. Pattison, 10 Oct 63 (hereafter cited as

Lynde Comments), OCMH. Lynde believed that

Aywaille was a target for the Germans because

one of the depot companies had numerous drums

of antifreeze that were mistaken from the air for

POL. Ibid.

36

 (1) Lynde Comments. (2) For the disbandment of the CDL project see ltr, Lee to CG UK

Base, 24 Sep 44, sub: Reorganization of 9th

Armored Group, 12th AG Files 913, and below,

p. 321. (3) Lt. Col. George Kenneth Rubel, Daredevil Tankers: The Story of the 740th Tank Battalion, United States Army (n.p., 1945), pp. 53-

56, 242-43. The tankers called the M24's "Panther

Pups" because of their resemblance to the German

Panther tank, Ibid., p. 107. These two M24's were

in the depot by mistake, somehow diverted from the

first shipment of 20, all consigned to Ninth Army.

There was considerable consternation when the

head of the familiarization mission discovered that

the 740th Tank Battalion had carried them off.

Memo, Col James E. B. McInerney for Col Walter

W. Warner, Ord Officer NUSA, 28 Dec 44, in

folder ETO (McInerney) (Rpt of Visit), 4 Jan 45,

X-577-O, OHF.
AT THE SIEGFRIED LINE IN BELGIUM 307

ion, whose drivers maneuvered their big

clumsy rigs skillfully through heavy traffic,

and with the co-operation of Advance Section, which promptly furnished fifty-four

additional truck-tractors needed to move

the vans, all critical items were behind the

Meuse by the evening of 19 December and

three days later most of the rest of the

stocks had been moved. By that time the

temperature had dropped to freezing. The

last of Heidtke's vans cleared the hills behind Aywaille only minutes before ice made

the roads impassable. As for the Germans,

they never arrived, but at one time had

been within five miles of the depot.37

The VIII Corps Sector

In the meantime, the prong of the German thrust had penetrated deep into the

VIII Corps sector, seriously threatening

and in places overrunning the Ordnance

units supporting the corps, which were

strung out along the Luxembourg border

from St. Vith south to Neufchateau. In

this hilly, wooded, snow-covered country

the attack was like a nightmare. Before

dawn on 16 December, 14-inch shells from

railway guns began falling on St. Vith; up

ahead on the 106th Division front in the

Schnee Eifel, red and green flares flickered

over the treetops, a strange light, like

moonlight, came down from the low clouds

that the German were using as reflectors

for searchlights; and German infantrymen

in white snow suits advanced yelling (someone said it sounded like the Rebel yell)

ahead of white tanks.38

The 106th Division held in the Schnee

Eifel for the time being; but artillery shells

continued to crash down on St. Vith. A

good many of them fell in the area of the

92d Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company. This unit, dispatched to St. Vith

only a few days before by the 590th Battalion to support the 106th, was pulled

back fifteen miles to Gouvy, but the German tide, flowing north and south around

the island of resistance at St. Vith, soon

caught up with the 92d. Shortly after

noon on the 18th as the men were finishing

chow, "all hell broke loose." A German

column came up and began directing artillery, mortar, and small arms fire on the

company, while panzers poured fire into

the shop area. The 92d took off for

Rochefort, fifty miles to the rear; but when

it reached there two of its officers and sixtythree men were missing. These men had

stayed behind at Gouvy to finish shop work

on artillery and tanks, and they continued

to work under shelling all afternoon. At

night under cover of darkness they made

their way to a low hillside behind the shop

area and held it for five days, setting up

roadblocks with wrecked and burning vehicles and killing the German patrols that

came up the road.39

On the same day as the attack at Gouvy,

18 December, the Germans overran ASP

128, a few miles north of Bastogne. Here

again, the Ordnance men stayed as long as

they could. Men of the 619th Ordnance

Ammunition Company were issuing ammunition in Subdepot 1 while the fighting

was going on in Subdepot 3, but soon they

had to pull back to Champion, abandoning 37

 (1) Lynde Comments. (2) FUSA Ord Monthly Rpt for Dec, p. 2 and app. II, pp. 13-14; app.

III, p. 2; app. IV, p. 2. (3) The Flaming Bomb,

p. 22. 38

 Col. R. Ernest Dupuy, St. Vith: Lion in the

Way (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949),

pp. 21, 28. 39

 History 92d Ordnance Medium Maint Company for Dec 1944, ETO Ord Sec, KCRC.
308 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

almost 2,000 long tons of ammunition to

the enemy. They did, however, manage to

take with them stocks of a very important

secret item—the POZIT or VT (proximity) fuze. This new fuze, radio-operated

and triggered by reflection from the target, had been developed early in the war,

but in order to keep the design out of the

hands of the Germans its use had been restricted to use by the Navy in antiaircraft fire

over water and by a few antiaircraft batteries in England until October 1944, when

it was released by the Combined Chiefs of

Staff for ground warfare. Eisenhower intended to employ the fuzes in artillery shells

for the first time in Europe on Christmas

Day 1944, at the beginning of a new drive

into Germany. Teams of instructors had

been visiting the front for several weeks,

and in the comparatively quiet VIII Corps

sector, served by ASP 128, a demonstration

had been planned for 18 December. The

fuzes were evacuated from the dump just

in time to save them for an important role

in the Battle of the Ardennes.40

The Germans were advancing with astonishing rapidity. Hardly was ASP 128A

at Champion established when it too was

in danger of being overrun. By 20 December the VIII Corps sector was cut in two.

Because of the split and because of his concern for the safety of the Ordnance troops

in this precarious situation, Medaris attached the ammunition companies and the

590th Maintenance Battalion to the VIII

Corps Ordnance officer, Colonel Walker.

On 21 December along with VIII Corps

they passed to Third Army.41

The last link between the VIII Corps

Ordnance units and First Army was Major

Garr, the commanding officer of the 100th

Ordnance Ammunition Battalion. Starting south from Aachen on 19 December to

check on operations at ASP 128A, he discovered at VIII Corps headquarters that

ASP 128A would have to be evacuated. A

large rail shipment had been diverted from

ASP 128 to 128A, and Major Garr found

himself involved in the desperate attempt

to shuttle the shipment—no freight cars

carrying 45,000 rounds of 105-mm. howitzer and 10,000 rounds of 155-mm. howitzer ammunition—to Bertrix. Arriving at

the Bertrix railhead early on the morning of

20 December with the men and equipment

evacuated from ASP 128A—2 ammunition

companies, a Quartermaster service company, an antiaircraft battery, a platoon of

armored infantry with 5 half-tracks, 20

Quartermaster trucks, and 4 MP's—he

organized this force for the defense of the

railhead, set up his command post in the

office of the stationmaster, and began issuing ammunition out of the freight cars to

VIII Corps units.

Later on in the morning he co-ordinated

plans for defense with Lt. Col. George H.

Wells, the commanding officer of the 590th

Maintenance Battalion, which had arrived

in Bertrix from Neufchateau the day before, setting up its shops and bins in the

town square and opening its mess facilities

to casuals and stragglers. Wells took four

medium tanks and a half-track out of his

heavy maintenance shop, manned them

with an officer and 20 mechanics of the

40

 (1) History 100th Ammunition Bn, p. 59;

(2) FUSA Ord Rpt Dec 44, p. 3 and app. II,

P. 75 (3) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, pp. 363-66; (4) AGF Bd

Rpt, ETO, No. 457, Pozit Fuzes, 15 Dec 44, 4-

3.457/44; (5) Dupuy, St. Vith: Lion in the Way,

P. 25.

41

 (1) History 100th Ammunition Bn, p. 59. (2)

Medaris, Letter of Instructions No. 3, 19 Dec 44,

FUSA Ord Monthly Rpt, Dec 44, app. II.
AT THE SIEGFRIED LINE IN BELGIUM 309

553d Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank), and sent them out to set up

roadblocks at vital junctions; but shortly

after noon enemy tanks were reported and

the 590th got ready to pull out. Garr was

left with the job of defending Bertrix until

he could get his freight train rolling again.

Sending out his armored infantrymen and

antiaircraft battery to take over the roadblocks, Garr persuaded the Bertrix chef

de gare to supply him with some locomotives and got his train on the road south

about midnight. At Florenville he received

instructions from Colonel Walker to proceed to the railhead at Virton, on the

French border. Arriving there the next

afternoon, he again organized his task force

for defense and spent the night issuing ammunition to units of the 28th Division.

Next day an advance party of Third Army's

150th Battalion arrived to take over, and

Major Garr returned to First Army.42

North of the Bulge

When he returned he found that all of

First Army Ordnance Service except the

direct support units was pulling back behind the Meuse, roughly in the area from

Liege west to Namur and north to Tongres

and St. Trond, with the 72d, 51st, and

52d Group headquarters centered around

Huy, the new location of First Army headquarters, and the main ammunition depot

now located at Advance Section Depot

O-610 west of Liege. Medaris had ordered

the move on 19 December in order to clear

the roads for the tactical troops. The situation north of the bulge was still of the kind

described in dispatches as "fluid." For example, ASP 126 near Waimes had been

officially evacuated early in the battle, but

every day a detachment of one officer and

twenty enlisted men from the 57th Ammunition Company was able to return and

issue ammunition from one end of the ASP,

although it was under enemy artillery and

machine gun fire. There is a story that

while the Americans were issuing at one

end, the Germans were issuing at the other.

True or not, it illustrates the fantastic character of this battle.43

Alarming rumors were spreading through

the First Army area, and some of them

were true. Medaris passed along a warning from G-2 that 150 Germans in American uniforms, in American jeeps, with identification tags and papers, were behind the

Allied lines. These were the men of Otto

Skorzeny's Operation GREIF sent to spy on

vital installations, disrupt communications,

change road signs, and generally cause confusion. One of the Germans impersonated

an MP at a road junction and directed an

entire American regiment down the wrong

road as it was hurrying south to fight. At

Aywaille on the night of 18 December three

of the GREIF men in a U.S. jeep, with GI

dogtags and drivers' licenses, $900 in American money and 1,000 British pound notes,

and plenty of demolition material, were

caught in the 178th Ordnance Depot Company area by three men of the company,

S. Sgt. Erling N. Salvesen, Technician 5

John E. Pavlik, and Technician 5 Harcourt W. Swanson. German paratroopers

were also dropped behind the lines. None 42

 (1) History 100th Ammunition Bn, pp. 59-

62. (2) VIII Corps Ord Sec Jnl for Dec 44, in

VIII Corps Staff Sec Jnls, L.540, Envelope 29.

(3) History 553d Ord Heavy Maint Co (Tank),

ETO Ord Sec, KCRC.

43

 (1) FUSA Ord Monthly Rpt Dec 44, app.

II, pp. 5-12, and Exhibit 23, FUSA Ord Serv

Letter of Instructions No. 3, 19 Dec 44; (2)

History 100th Ammunition Bn, p. 59.
310 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

COLONEL BLISS SALUTES SERGEANT SALVESEN AND TECHNICIANS PAVLIK AND

SWANSON after they received Bronze Stars for capturing three German spies of Operation

GREIF.

of these spies did any great damage, but

they contributed to the shock and confusion

of the sudden enemy attack that had already

scattered units and disrupted communications.44

Telephone communications from First

Army headquarters were either uncertain

or suspected of being tapped by the enemy,

and close to the front they had broken

down entirely; the last wire communication

the 52d Group had with any of its units

was the telephone call that ordered the

86th Battalion to withdraw from Malmédy

on the afternoon of 17 December. Teletype was out more often than not, and messenger service was all but impossible, what

with the constant movement of units, the

uncertainty of the battle, and the traffic

congestion on the rough and icy roads.

Radio was the only dependable means of

getting reports and issuing orders.45

Medaris' radio net, which had been extremely useful in the two or three weeks of

fast pursuit in August and early September,

was not really needed after the Ordnance

44 units settled into semipermanent installa- (1) Robert E. Merriam, Dark December (New

York: Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 1947), pp. 126-

30. (2) FUSA Ord Monthly Rpt Dec 44, app. II,

p. 14. (3) Hist 178th Ord Depot Co, 21-31 Dec

43-1944. (4) Hist 334th Ord Depot Co, 20 NovDec 43-Dec 44.

45

 (1) FUSA Ord Sec Monthly Rpt, Dec 44,

app. II, p. 3. (2) Col. James D. Sams, "Communications in Army Ordnance Service," Military

Review, XXVII, 1 (May 1947), p. 53.
AT THE SIEGFRIED LINE IN BELGIUM 311

tions before the Siegfried Line because wire

communications were good and messenger

service was excellent. Daily messenger

service was maintained between the 52d

Ordnance Group and the First Army Ordnance officer and between the group and

each of its six battalions. After 1 October,

teletype—a tremendous saving in time over

delivery by messenger—came into use between army Ordnance, groups, depots, and

ASP's for conveying allocations and supply

status reports, which were too long for

transmission by radio.46 Following the

capture of Aachen on 21 October, wire

communications became so reliable, except

in the remote Ardennes area, that army

radio circuits to V and VII Corps were

closed down.47

The fact that the Ordnance radio net

was not really needed during the long autumn pause at the Siegfried Line did not

pass unnoticed at First Army headquarters. Hodges' chief of staff, Maj. Gen.

William B. Kean, was critical of Medaris'

"radio empire" and finally, about the

middle of the second week in December,

ordered the Ordnance net taken off the air.

There was nothing to do but comply:

Medaris issued written orders closing

down the net. But at the same time,

he issued verbal orders to retain all equipment and personnel.48

 By that time he had

a number of well-trained men; First Army

Signal Service for some time had been

operating a school especially for training

Ordnance personnel as radio operators.49

When the Germans struck suddenly in

the Ardennes, threatening the First Army

supply dumps, General Kean sent for Medaris and ordered him to pull his supplies

back. Medaris pointed out that he could

not because he had no radio net. Kean

knew Medaris well, for he had served with

him a long time. He said, "I'll bet you

could put it back in two hours. Now do it,

and don't come back to me." Within two

hours, Medaris was sending out orders by

radio, and within two days, after operators

had been recalled to headquarters and additional equipment procured from Signal,

the whole net (except for the previous hookup with corps), was in operation.50

With the aid of the radio net, Medaris

got about 85 percent of his depot stocks out

of reach of the enemy, and for the duration

of the Battle of the Bulge never lost contact

with his First Army Ordnance units. He

could keep the men from panicking; could

pick up the radio and reassure them, telling

them where the Germans were and what

to do. This kind of central control and

reassurance was immensely valuable. And

the radio net came to be valuable not only

to Ordnance but to G-3, which relied on

it at times for information on where the

combat units were.51

Medaris' first order over the radio net

was: "Evacuate... but stay in business.

Our troops need your service now, more

than ever." His men responded bravely.

Depot men, even while they were loading

up their stocks to pull out, continued their

task of supply; at Aywaille, for example,

they issued directly to combat units, some

of whom were quoted as expressing "no

little pleasure at having the Main Army

46

 (1) Ibid. (2) Hist 100th Amm Bn, p. no.

At one time the 100th tried to use pigeons, but

without much luck. Ibid. 47

 First Army Rpt 2, Annex 8, Signal Section Rpt,

p. 177. 48

 Medaris Interv 49

 First Army Rpt 2, Annex 8, Signal Sec Rpt,

p. 183.

50

 (1) Medaris Interv. (2) FUSA Ord Monthly

Rpt Dec 44, app. II, p. 3. 51

 Medaris and Nisley Intervs.
312 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Depot so handy for the first time since the

Normandy days."52 Ammunition men

kept ASP's open as long as they could, even

while under enemy fire; and maintenance

men made repairs on the run. The 590th

Battalion, for instance, managed to complete 4,000 repair jobs on the 100-mile

trek from St. Vith to Neufchateau. The

recovery crews followed close on the heels

of the infantry counterthrusts over the icy.

foggy, roads to drag back big guns and

tanks that had been knocked out by the

enemy or abandoned by retreating units.

One crew saved eight huge 240-mm. howitzers, in good working order, that had been

abandoned. Another brought back a great

trophy—a German 71-ton Tiger Royal

tank.53

Every American tank that could be recovered and put back in operation was a triumph, because First Army units that bore

the brunt of the first Bulge attacks had suffered heavy losses in armor. Every replacement tank in Ordnance stocks was immediately committed, but there was still a

serious shortage—all the more serious because the First Army command felt that

tanks would be the determining factor in

restoring its position later. There was one

resource within the theater—the plentiful

Shermans held in reserve by Field Marshal

Montgomery's 21 Army Group. On 19

December, Medaris, who knew how ample

these stocks were, went to 21 Army Group

headquarters at Brussels to appeal to Montgomery's "Q" (Quartermaster—in American terms, G—4) for the loan of a moderate number. He was turned down on the

ground that every tank Montgomery had

was vitally needed by his own group.54

The next day, 20 December, as a result

of Eisenhower's decision to place all American forces north of the Bulge under Montgomery, First Army passed temporarily to

21 Army Group. The following morning,

some 300 Shermans were rolling out of

Brussels to the shops of Medaris' 72d Ordnance Group at Landres, together with a

number of British 25-pounders with 30

days of ammunition. Then began a strenuous effort to get the tanks ready for battle.

By friendly agreement between Medaris

and the First Army Signal officer, Col.

Grant Williams, Signal radio installation

and repair teams were already operating

with Ordnance tank maintenance companies. With their assistance and that of a

few hundred Belgian laborers and volunteers from a battalion of Irish Guards, three

Ordnance companies made the tanks battleready—U.S. radios installed, tanks combatloaded with rations and ammunition, and

duckbill tracks applied—in the remarkably

short time of ninety-six hours. After the

production line went into operation, tanks

were being issued out the front door of the

shop as fast as others came in the back.55

In the realignment of forces that took

place on 20—21 December, VIII Corps

went to Third Army and First Army received XVIII Airborne Corps. This corps

consisted of an airborne division hitherto

52

 FUSA Ord Monthly Rpt for Dec, app. II, p. 14. 53

 (1) "Bulge Battle," Firepower, Vol. I, No. 6

(April-May 1945), p. 9; (2) Merriam, Dark December, p. 132; (3) FUSA Ord Sec Monthly Rpt, Dec, app. III, Incl 4.

54

 (1) During December First Army lost about

400 medium tanks. First Army Rpt 2, I, p. 64,

and Annex 9, p. 23. During the Battle of the Bulge,

the total First Army tank losses were 510. USFET

Board Rpt, Ord Sec Study No. 96, Requirement

for Ordnance Recovery Company. The 21 Army

Group's reserves in the United Kingdom totaled

1,900. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the

Armies II, p. 241. (2) Ltr, Medaris to Pattison,

28 Oct 63. 55

 (1) Ibid. (2) Lynde Comments.
AT THE SIEGFRIED LINE IN BELGIUM 313

held in reserve, the 82d; scattered remnants

of the 106th Division; Combat Command

B of the 9th Armored; and the 7th Armored

Division. Its mission was to hold north of

the Bulge. To suppore XVIII Corps, Medaris took the 83d Battalion that had been

backing up the 590th (now far south at

Neufchateau with VIII Corps) and converted it to a forward battalion, stationing

it south of Liege; to back up the 83d he

used the 178th, which had hitherto been

employed only administratively to augment

the 52d Group headquarters, as a backup

battalion, assigning to it the usual depot,

automotive maintenance, and heavy tank

maintenance companies. Thanks to Medaris' training program, the changeover

was accomplished smoothly.56

A maintenance company supporting 7th

Armored Division had already covered itself

with glory. On the afternoon of 19 December, Company C of the 129th Ordnance

Maintenance Battalion had manned a roadblock on the Ourthe River at Ortho, using

three bazookas, two machine guns, twenty

riflemen, and a half-track salvaged from a

knocked-out antiaircraft unit. Company C

held the riverbank under shellfire from a

German self-propelled 88-mm. gun and two

tanks until early evening, when help arrived. Actions like this, according to the

official tactical history of the battle, "contributed mightily to the German decision

which turned an entire armored corps from

the road west and plunged it into profitless

adventures in a side alley."

 57

Bastogne and Third Army

Ordnance

While the action at Ortho was taking

place, the 101st Airborne Division was setting up its defenses at Bastogne. Along

with the 82d Airborne Division, the 101st

had been pulled out of SHAEF reserve on

17 December; but instead of going to First

Army with the XVIII Airborne Corps,

the 101st had been sent from Mourmelon,

its rest camp near Reims, to bolster the

shattered VIII Corps front. The division

left in such a hurry that it lacked a good

deal of its individual equipment, such as

overshoes and helmets; its ammunition

and grenade pouches were not full; and

it had only a few truckloads of 105-mm.

howitzer shells.

Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, acting

commanding officer of the 101st, was not,

however, particularly worried. COMZ had

been notified by 12th Army Group to equip

the 101st on highest priority, and with the

help of Oise Section the division's organic

426th Airborne Quartermaster Company

and 801st Airborne Ordnance Company

were putting together a convoy of eighty

vehicles loaded with supplies. On the

morning of 19 December the convoy started

east from Mourmelon to Bastogne. The

Ordnance company traveling with it was

thoroughly experienced; it had been supporting the division since the landing at

UTAH Beach, including the drop in Operation MARKET-GARDEN in which fifteen men

of the company had gone in by glider.58

56

 FUSA Ord Monthly Rpt Dec 44, app. II,

pp. 11-12; and Incl 19, FUSA Ord Sec Operations Order No. 38, 22 Dec 44. 57

 (1) History 129th Ord Maint Bn, Sep, Oct,

Nov 18-21 Dec 44, Jan-Aug 45. (2) Cole, The

Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, p. 320.

58

 (1) Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge,

p. 461. (2) 12th Army Group, Daily Jnl Ord Sec,

18 Dec 44. (3) History 426th Airborne QM Co,

101st Airborne Div, 6 Jun-12 Jul, Dec 44-Feb 45,

Apr-May 45. (4) History 801st Airborne Ord

Maint Co, Oct 1942-45.
314 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

After a journey of more than a hundred

miles through rain and snow, the convoy

reached the division rear area about five

miles west of Bastogne near midnight and

was told to remain at a crossroads in the

woods. The men had just parked their

trucks on Highway N4 facing west when

a German armored patrol attacked. Two

of the end vehicles received direct hits;

four more were abandoned by their

drivers, who took to the woods. Pulling

out in the greatest confusion, the convoy

headed west, then south, winding up at

VIII Corps headquarters at Neufchateau

next morning. En route the 801st Airborne Ordnance Company had lost several jeeps, trucks, howitzers, and trailers,

including a valued British airborne arcwelding trailer. The men did not give up

the attempt to reach their division. The

commanding officer of the 801st, Capt.

John L. Patterson, managed to make his

way to Bastogne with two trucks containing 500 gallons of gasoline. He went back

to bring the rest of the convoy forward,

but by this time the Germans had closed

the road. On 21 December, VIII Corps

ordered the Ordnance and Quartermaster

companies out of Neufchateau, which was

becoming too congested, and sent them

ten miles south to Orsainfaing. There

they remained until after the Third Army,

coming up from the south, had opened

a narrow corridor into Bastogne on 26

December.59

The news of the crossroads debacle in

the service area on the night of 19-20 December came to McAuliffe in the form of

a laconic message, "Evidence indicates

service troops have disappeared." He immediately sent a message to corps asking

for Quartermaster and Ordnance help.

He had already explored the resources in

Bastogne itself. Slim stocks of food and

ammunition had been left behind by VIII

Corps, and the tankers had even discovered eight new undelivered tanks, complete with their Ordnance crews, which

were forthwith inducted into Combat

Command B, 10th Armored Division. On

the first day of the siege a young supply

sergeant of the 101st had made a dash to

the rear and brought back about 1,550

rounds of M2 105-mm. howitzer ammunition through German shelling and small

arms fire. McAuliffe knew by then that

his supply route was closed. But he was

full of confidence on the morning of 22

December when he replied "Nuts!" to the

Germans' demand for surrender. He had

received word that Third Army's 4th

Armored Division was on its way north

to relieve him and he had been promised

resupply by air. The first drop, on the 23d,

was disappointing, for it did not bring in

enough artillery ammunition, McAuliffe's

greatest need; at one time on 24 December the airborne batteries were down

to 10 rounds per gun and the field artillery units were running low. But the drops

on the 24th and 26th (the biggest airlift

day, with 289 planes) eased the shortage

and on the 26th the 4th Armored Division opened its 300-yard corridor into the

town, through which next day a convoy

of more than a hundred vehicles, escorted

by 4th Armored Division tanks, arrived

59

 (1) History 801st Airborne Ord Maint Co, Oct

1942-45, and AAR, 6 Jun 44-Dec 45. (2) History

426th Airborne QM Co, 101st Airborne Div, 6 Jun12 Jul, Dec 44-Feb, Apr-May 45. (3) Colonel S.

L. A. Marshall, Bastogne, The Story of the First

Eight Days (Washington: Infantry Journal Press,

1946), pp. 71-72. Marshall's account is taken from

an interview with Lt. Col. Carl W. Kohls, G-4 of

the 101st.
AT THE SIEGFRIED LINE IN BELGIUM 315

TANKS OF THE 4TH ARMORED DIVISION NEAR BASTOGNE

from Orsainfaing.60

The siege of Bastogne was over, but the

battle was not. When the 801st Airborne

Ordnance Company arrived in Bastogne

over snow-covered roads at dusk on 29

December, it was greeted by an enemy

artillery and strafing attack that continued

for days. On that fateful day of 26 December when the siege was lifted, the main

German thrust toward Antwerp had been

blocked by First Army at the Meuse, and

the Germans had turned south to attack

Bastogne in force. Now the task of stopping them belonged to Third Army, which

was battling its way north through

Luxembourg.

General Bradley had ordered Third

Army to the relief of Bastogne on the night

of 18 December. In less than a week

Patton turned the bulk of his army, with

its guns, supplies, and equipment, from its

bridgehead at the Saar north into the new

offensive, a trek of 50 to 75 miles over

difficult terrain and in bitter cold. From

his office window in the city of Luxembourg Bradley watched the Third Army

columns as they marched north, day after

day, night after night through the streets of

the city, the tank commanders at their turrets with their faces wrapped in woolen

scarves, the troops huddled in their canvas60

 (1) Marshall, Bastogne: The First Eight Days,

pp. 70-71, 133-34. (2) Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, pp. 467-70, 480. (3) Leonard

Rapport and Arthur Northwood, Jr., Rendezvous

With Destiny (Washington: Infantry Journal Press,

1948), pp. 596-97.
316 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

topped trucks, wearing heavy overcoats still

caked with the mud of the Saar. This 90-

degree movement of an army on very short

notice was a remarkable feat of generalship;

and it depended to a great extent on what

Bradley characterized as a "brilliant effort" on the part of Patton's staff. Patton

himself gave his Ordnance officer, Colonel

Nixon, a large share of the credit.61

In breaking the news to his staff, Patton

said, "You will support this operation even

though it is impossible to do so." Nixon

himself felt that Ordnance support was

made possible then, as in previous crises,

by Patton's custom of keeping his Ordnance officer fully informed of his plans

and authorizing him to act in his general's

name. If information had had to go

through orthodox G—4 channels, support

would have arrived too late.62

Within thirty minutes after Patton gave

his order, Nixon had runners out to block

the roads and turn the ammunition trucks

toward Luxembourg. He also quickly diverted all incoming rail shipments of ammunition to the northern flank of the Third

Army boundary, detailing a maintenance

battalion headquarters to help co-ordinate

the shipments. Nixon used every kind of

transportation he could lay his hands on

to move forward ammunition that was on

the ground. By 26 December he had

opened at Mamer an ASP to support the

two Third Army corps that were attacking

to the north, the III and XII Corps, and

another near Robelmont to support VIII

Corps in conjunction with the rail siding

at Virton. Behind corps ASP's, Depot 32

near Audun-Le-Roman, previously scheduled to be turned over to ADSEC, was

now heavily restocked and immediately

became very active; ADSEC Depot O-611

was instructed to make retail issues to

combat units regardless of existing credits.

All types of ammunition had to be provided at as many points as possible, since

Nixon did not know the exact composition

of the troops that had become dependent

on Third Army for support.63

First Army tactical and service troops

that had become separated from their commands now came under Third Army, with

the Ordnance units directly under Nixon's

control. Some of the combat organizations were badly crippled, not only from

battle losses but from accidents on the icy

roads.64 One observer in the Ardennes

reported that "you would have thought an

armored column had gone mad to watch

its vehicles careening off trees, crashing

through the corners of houses on turns.

The thirty-three-ton tanks spun crazily on

the gentlest slopes, sometimes turning completely around two or three times before

they came to rest. In a day's move, an

armored division might lose several hundred of its vehicles, wrecked, mired, overturned. The maintenance crews blew on

their fingers and sweated with their gear

as they came up behind and tried to find

places to anchor their cables so that they

could pull the casualties back onto something on which they could run."65

 To

61

 (1) AAR, 801st Airborne Ord Maint Co., 6

Jun 44-Dec. 45. (2) Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp.

472-73. (3) Col. William Whipple, "Logistical

Problems During the German Ardennes Offensive,"

Military Review, XXVIII, 1 (April 1948), 23. (4)

Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 196. 62

 (1) Interv, Col Thomas H. Nixon (USA Ret),

18 Feb 64, OCMH. (2) Nixon Comments, pp. 20-21.

63

 (1) Nixon Interv of 19 May 61. (2) Third

Army Rpt II, Ord Sec, p. 18. (3) History ADSEC

Ordnance, p. 20. 64

 Third Army Rpt II, Ord Sec, p. 17. 65

 Ingersoll, Top Secret, p. 248.
AT THE SIEGFRIED LINE IN BELGIUM 317

provide better traction, the maintenance

companies welded steel "tacks" or cleats

to the tracks, scrounging welding equipment from the neighborhood when they

lacked it, improvising the cleats, and working night and day. One unit, by cutting

steel cubes from the side of the track itself

and welding them on the track face, was

able to report: "Within a few days every

tank on our schedule was equipped and

clopping across the ice like a mountain

goat."

 66

Freeing his forward group for work in

the north, Nixon turned over all maintenance west of the Moselle and south of

Luxembourg to his rear group, the 70th,

which got considerable help from a COMZ

base armament maintenance battalion (the

607th) at Nancy on supplies and repair

work in the area south of Metz. From his

own office in Nancy he sent several men

to Luxembourg to act as a forward liaison

group and report on troops, installations,

and shortages.67

The effort involved in getting Third

Army Ordnance support forward in a hurry is illustrated by the experiences of the

841st Depot Company and the 32d Medium Maintenance, both assigned to the

forward Ordnance battalion behind XII

Corps, the 314th. The commanding officer of the 841st received orders on 21

December to move his entire depot, as well

as a pool of combat vehicles and heavy

trucks, to Luxembourg at once from Saaralbe (east of the Saar River in France),

a distance of a hundred miles. The convoy was on the road by noon—163 vehicles, more vehicles than the company had

men, manned by every driver they could

borrow. On the way, the convoy was

strafed twice by German planes, but incurred no damage and arrived that night

at Dudelange on the Luxembourg border.

Finding the town covered with snow in

the light of a full moon the men parked

their vans around the town hall. By morning they had issued 25 tons of parts and

small arms and several combat vehicles.

That night the 32d Medium Maintenance

convoy arrived, having traveled ninety

miles from Oermingen (near Saare Union), and set up shop in a school yard on

a windswept hill.

By New Year's Day of 1945 both companies had pushed north again, the 841st

to the city of Luxembourg (rendering

"splendid service" to XII Corps, according to the commanding officer, Maj. Gen.

Manton S. Eddy). The 32d had traveled

even farther, over a winding road through

a forest to the village of Gonderange,

where it remained—working in the cold

streets, or in cowsheds or any covered space

they could find—until the Battle of the

Bulge was won and Third Army had

moved on to take its place in the movement of all the armies into Germany.68

66

 (1) Third Army Rpt II, Ord Sec, p. 20; (2)

Capt. Fred A. Tadini, "The Ol' 2nd," Firepower,

II, 2 (August-September 1945), p. 4. 67

 Third Army Rpt II, Ord Sec, pp. 17-20.

68

 (1) Capt. Lenard C. Fuller, CO of the 841st,

Letter to the Editor, in "Mail and Record," Firepower, II, 2 (August-September 1945). (2) Histories, 841st Ord Depot Co., pp. 73-81, 96; 32d

Ordnance Medium Maint Co. Both in ETO Ord

Sec Histories, KCRC.
CHAPTER XVII

Lessons of the Roer and the Ardennes

In preparing for the coming battle for

Germany, army commanders had some sobering reflections on the quality of some of

their weapons—notably tanks. Painful lessons had been learned not only in the

Ardennes but in Ninth Army's offensive on

the Roer plain in November 1944. In

this short but bloody battle Ninth Army,

the latest to enter the European campaign,

had earned the respect of the seasoned

veterans of First and Third Armies and

justified its proud code name, CONQUER.

Ninth Army Ordnance

"Unlike the noisy and bumptious Third

and the temperamental First, the Ninth remained uncommonly normal," according to

General Bradley.1 One reason for the normality of Ninth Army was its youth. Though

it resented being called a new army, because its headquarters had worked together for two years, first in the United

States and later in England, in terms of

the European campaign it was young, and

in a sense it was like a family's youngest

child that arrives when father is coming

up in the world. Not until mid-November did Ninth Army have the responsibility for supporting a full-scale offensive. By

then, the worst of the period of hard times

in supply was over, and the opening of

Antwerp a few weeks later heralded the

beginning of the era of plenty.

Arriving on the Continent at the end of

August, the Ninth's headquarters on 5 September assumed command of one corps,

the VIII, with the mission of reducing the

Brittany peninsula and protecting the south

flank of 12th Army Group along the Loire.

At that time VIII Corps was operating as

an independent corps with direct access

to Communications Zone, an arrangement

that continued until the reduction of Brest

on 18 September. After Brest and the

mass surrender of the German forces along

the Loire following DRAGOON, Ninth Army

was sent with VIII Corps to a quiet sector

in southern Belgium and Luxembourg between First and Third Armies, with a defensive mission only; it remained there for

most of October, a small army indeed, for

VIII Corps had only two divisions. Then

the Ninth was ordered to take over a small

portion of the 12th Army Group zone

north of Aachen to build up for a drive

to the Rhine in conjunction with First

Army. Relinquishing VIII Corps to First

Army, Ninth on 22 October moved its

command post to Maastricht, in the Dutch

panhandle, taking over XIX Corps, which

was already in position near Aachen with

two infantry divisions, the 30th and 29th,

and one armored, the 2d. On 8 November, a second corps was added, the XIII.

Ninth was still a small army compared with 1

 Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 453.
LESSONS OF THE ROER AND THE ARDENNES 319

COLONEL WARNER

First and Third, and was to be concentrated on a very much narrower front than

either.2

The Ordnance officer of Ninth Army,

Col. Walter W. Warner, had not been affected by the supply famine in September

and October on anything like the same

scale as Medaris and Nixon; nor had he

shared their unhappy experiences in the

Mediterranean. For his part, Warner ascribed his good supply situation mainly to

his excellent relationship with Communications Zone, which he cultivated by refusing

to blame COMZ for all deficiencies, and

by refraining from demanding priorities.

When Medaris' executive officer, Col.

Floyd A. Hansen, noted one day that

Ninth Army was receiving more supplies

than First Army and telephoned COMZ

to ask why, he was told that the men at

COMZ were going to look after Warner

because they figured Medaris and Nixon

could look after themselves.3

If Ninth Army's late arrival in the

theater was an advantage in terms of supply, it was a disadvantage in terms of service troops, for it occurred at a time when

6th Army Group in the south was clamoring for supporting units. Warner arrived

on the Continent with one medium maintenance company only, and had to build

up his Ordnance service from scratch.

When the long move from Brittany to Belgium took place, most of the companies he

was to acquire were still with First and

Third Armies, and others were en route

from England or the United States. No

sooner had he begun the concentration of

men and supplies in Belgium and Luxembourg than orders came to move to Holland. Communications Zone and Advance

Section came to his assistance with transportation and supplies, but the supplies that

poured in added to his manpower problem

because he had only one depot company.4

When the Ordnance Ninth Army manpower build-up began around Maastricht,

the next problem was to find locations

for the Ordnance companies in an area

crowded with American and British troops

and soggy with November rains. Ammunition depots and vehicle parks were set up

at roadsides. Maintenance and depot com2

 (1) Renner Rpt, p. 37. (2) Conquer: The

Story of Ninth Army, 1944-1945 (Washington:

Infantry Journal Press, 1947), pp. 20-82. (3) Ord

Serv ETO, Class II and IV Supply, pp. 465-68,

OHF. (4) For the plans for the drive to the

Rhine, see MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, pp. 390-407. 3

 (1) Interv, Col Walter W. Warner, USA Ret,

12 Jun 64. (2) Hansen Interv.

4

 (1) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the

Armies, II, pp. 299-301; (2) Col. W. W. Warner,

"Ordnance at the Front," Army Ordnance, XXIX,

151 (July-August 1945), pp. 99-101.
320 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

panics found shelter in factories, or even

caves, or worked in the open on paved

streets. In the congested Maastricht area,

many of the newly arrived Ordnance

troops saw their first German V-1 bombs,

at night, a steady, orange-red flame against

the black sky, and day and night heard

their motors, variously described as a "roaring thunder" or a "guttural burble." Most

of the V-1's passed over on their way to

Antwerp, but some exploded in the neighborhood of Maastricht. There were many

random explosions of mammoth shells fired

from giant artillery weapons like the V-3

(Vergeltungswaffe), which had been originally designed by the Germans to fire on

London from the Belgian and Dutch

coasts.5

In organizing his Ordnance service,

Colonel Warner favored the system adopted

by Medaris of having two forward maintenance and supply groups. At the time

Warner arrived in Maastricht, he had two

group headquarters, the 59th and 60th,

which he intended to use as forward groups.

Shortly before XIII Corps became operative, Warner asked 12th Army Group for

an additional group to supervise his base

operations. Since none was available, he had

to revise his plans. Keeping the 59th as a

forward group, he reorganized the 60th as

a rear group. It was February of 1945

before he was authorized his third maintenance and supply group, the 79th. At the

time the big push began in February, his

59th Ordnance Group had the job of supporting XIII and XIX Corps and certain

Ninth Army troops; the 79th had the task

of supporting the newly added XVI Corps,

the bulk of the Ninth Army troops, and all

troops operating with the British Army. In

both cases support of corps followed the

now familiar ETO pattern of two battalions

behind each corps, one for direct third

echelon, the other a backup support battalion with depot and heavy maintenance

companies.6

Warner had no ammunition group. Instead he used two ammunition battalions,

one to operate forward ammunition supply points, the other to operate the army

ammunition depot. By mid-February his

65th Ordnance Ammunition Battalion with

six companies was operating a depot serving all army troops as well as XIX Corps;

his 335th Ordnance Ammunition Battalion

(whose headquarters had been converted

from a maintenance battalion headquarters) with four companies was operating

ASP's behind XVI and XIII Corps as well

as supplying all U.S. troops under the operational control of the British Second Army.

Both battalions were administered by the

ammunition section of Warner's office, and

in his opinion placed too heavy a load on

the section. Consolidation under a group

headquarters would have been an advantage; but no ammunition group headquarters was available.7

5

 (1) Ibid., p. 100. (2) Conquer, pp. 110-11.

(3) Hist 300th Ord Maint Co AA, KCRC. (4)

John Toland, Battle: The Story of the Bulge (New

York: Random House, 1959), p. 352. (5) Leslie E.

Simon, German Research in World War II (New

York: John Wiley and Sons, 1947), pp. 191-93.

6

 (1) 12th Army Gp Daily Jnl Ord Sec, 13 Nov

44. (2) Ltr, CG NUSA to CG 12th Army Gp,

13 Nov 44, sub: Request for Ordnance Support

and Inds; ltr, Eisenhower to CG 12th Army Gp,

10 Jan 45, sub: Activation of Headquarters and

Headquarters Detachment, 79th Ordnance Group,

all in 12th Army Gp, 322 Ordnance Units. (3)

Organization Br, G-4, Hq 12th Army Gp, Notes

on Service Troops, 18 Jul 45, Gen Nisley's File.

(4) NUSA Ord Office History Period Ending 31

January 1945, Ninth Army G-4 Rpts. 7

 (1) Hq Ninth US Army, Adm Order 7, 25

Feb 45, in AGF Bd Rpt, ETO, No. C-Misc-60.
LESSONS OF THE ROER AND THE ARDENNES 321

Certain types of Ordnance companies

remained scarce, notably ammunition,

depot, evacuation, heavy tank maintenance, and heavy automotive maintenance.

For these there was active competition between 12th Army Group and COMZ,

group maintaining that COMZ could depend on civilian labor, and COMZ countering with the argument that the civilian

labor pool had run dry.8

Before the November offensive began in

the Ninth Army sector, Warner received

three companies that had an interesting

history, one depot, the 333d, and two

heavy tank maintenance, the 554th and

538th. They had been training under

heavy security wraps for eighteen months

to support the American force that was

part of the British Canal Defense Light project. When 12th Army Group, unable to

find any use for the CDL tanks because of

the fast-moving action in the fall and summer of 1944, disbanded the project force

on 4 November, two of the project's four

battalions were converted to standard tank

battalions and the rest to mine exploder

battalions equipped with dozer tanks,

Crabs, Centipedes, and mine exploders

T1E1 and T1E3. The need for some

means of dealing with mines became plain

when the Allies began to invade Germany.

On home soil the Germans reacted strongly with belts of mines, as well as crack

panzer divisions.9

Ninth Army's first offensive, in conjunction with First Army, took place across the

Roer plain—a right-angle triangle of about

200 square miles bounded by the Wurm

River, the Roer, and a line northeast from

Aachen. On the Ninth's north flank, XIII

Corps with two infantry divisions, the 84th

and the 102d, and the 7th Armored Division in reserve, was to cross the Roer at

Linnich. To the south, XIX Corps with

the 29th and 30th Infantry Divisions and

the 2d Armored Division was to seize a

crossing of the Roer at Juelich. Once

across the Roer, both corps were to push

northeast to the Rhine at Duesseldorf. The

attack was to be spearheaded by the 2d

Armored Division. Its first job was to

attack toward Linnich, seizing the high

ground around Gereonsweiler, a mile or so

short of Linnich, and holding it until XIII

Corps was committed. Then the division

was to move to the Juelich area and prepare to help the infantry make a river crossing there.10

Behind XIX Corps, which was to make

the first and the main effort, was the 59th

Ordnance Group's 48th Ordnance Battalion, with a medium maintenance company

behind each infantry division, a medium

automotive maintenance company to repair

corps vehicles, a medium maintenance

company for corps artillery, and a heavy

tank maintenance company behind the 2d

(2) Ltr, Warner to Ray, 7 Dec 45, no sub, AGF

Ordnance Officer's Files, Organization of Army

Ordnance. 8

 Ltrs from 12th Army Gp Comdr to CG ETO,

18 Aug 44, sub: Ordnance Troops and 1st Ind,

and to SHAEF, 19 Feb 45, sub: Allocation of

Ordnance Service Troops, 12th Army Gp, 322 Ordnance Units. 9

 (1) Msg 12th Army Gp to CG COMZ, 28

Oct 44, QX 22914, 12 AG 322 Ordnance Units.

(2) 12th Army Gp 319.1 G-4 Rpts (NUSA), No.

9, 14 Nov 44. (3) Ltr, Capt Marshall T. White,

CO 538th Ord HM Co (Tk) to CG Ninth U.S.

Army, 23 Nov 44, sub: Status of this Organization,

and Inds, 12th Army Gp 322 CDL. (4) Final Hist

Rpt, Armored Fighting Vehicles and Weapons

Sec, Hq ETO, USA ... 6 June 1944 to 24 May

1945 (hereafter cited as AFV&W Sec Rpt), pp. 2-3,

ETOUSA & USFET/ Armored Fighting Vehicles &

Weapons Sec files, KCRC. 10

 For the tactical history of the battle of the Roer

plain, see MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, pp. 497-574.
322 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Armored Division's own maintenance battalion. The 48th Ordnance Battalion had

come to Ninth Army from First Army

along with XIX Corps, which the battalion

had been serving since its arrival in France

in mid-June.11

For the coming offensive Ordnance preparations consisted mainly of inspecting artillery tubes and replacing worn-out end

connectors and duckbills on the 2d Armored

Division's tanks. These preparations were

dictated by terrain, weather, and experience. Unlike the Hürtgen Forest, the

Roer plain was tank country—a low, flat

tableland of beet and cabbage fields that

provided excellent fields of fire though

little concealment. The fields were crisscrossed by roads connecting numerous

small villages whose thick-walled stone

houses would make splendid defensive positions for the Germans. Not the least consideration was the mud created by November rains. Without the duckbills, the narrow-tracked American tanks would be road

bound and would be unable to use the

flanking tactics that were their best hope

of defeating German armor.12

During the First Army breakthrough

battles in July and August, the 2d Armored

Division tankers had learned how to fight

German Panther and Tiger tanks with

their M4 Shermans. They knew that the

ammunition of the 75-mm. gun with which

most of the M4's were armed (a lowvelocity shell about 13 inches long, as

compared with the 28- to 30-inch highvelocity 75-mm. shell of the Panthers)

would not penetrate at any range the thick

frontal armor of the Panthers and Tigers,

but could damage the sides and rear.

Therefore the tankers had used wide encircling movements, engaging the enemy's

attention with one platoon of tanks while

another platoon attacked from the rear.

They had suffered appalling losses: between 26 July and 12 August, for example,

one of 2d Armored Division's tank battalions had lost to German tanks and

assault guns 51 percent of its combat personnel killed or wounded and 70 percent

of its tanks destroyed or evacuated for

fourth echelon repair. But by using flanking tactics and by enlisting artillery support to fire directly on enemy tanks, the

Americans had won their battles and even

managed to inflict heavy losses on the

Germans.13

By the time the Roer offensive began,

the 2d Armored Division's firepower had

been stepped up to some extent. About

half the division's M4's were armed with

the 76-mm. gun.14 With this gun, firing

the new but scarce tungsten-carbide-cored

HVAP ammunition, the tankers could

penetrate the front belly plate of the Panther at 300 yards and at 200 yards had a

sporting chance (about one to four) of

penetrating the front slope plate. The

division's tank destroyer battalion had also

recently been equipped with the new M36

destroyers mounting the 90-mm. gun. And

11

 Hist, Hq & Hq Det & Med Det, 48th Ord

Bn 1944. 12

 (1) XIX Corps After-Action Rpt, Sec IV,

Ord Sec Jnl, Nov 44. (2) Lt Col E. A. Trahan,

ed., A History of the Second United States Armored Division, 1940 to 1946 (Atlanta, Ga.: Albert Love Enterprises, n.d.), ch. V, no pagination.

13

 (1) Ibid. (2) First Army Ordnance Service

pamphlet, How to Kill a Panther (based on actual

tests against captured Panther tanks), FUSA Ord

Sec Monthly Rpt Jan 45, Incl 9 to app. III, KCRC. 14

 Armored School Research Report, Hell on

Wheels in the Drive to the Roer (Fort Knox, Ky.,

May 1949), p. 12. This report is largely drawn

from firsthand accounts by members of the 2d

Armored Division.
LESSONS OF THE ROER AND THE ARDENNES 323

REPLACING TRACKS ON A SHERMAN TANK

XIX Corps was strong in artillery support,

with thirteen corps battalions of which

three were allotted to the 2d Armored

Division. There seemed to be no good

reason why 2d Armored should not repeat

the successes of its tank battles in France;

that is, assuming it was not bogged down

in the mud. At the Wurm River in October one of the tank battalions had 63 percent of its M4's knocked out when they

were slowed down by mud. Therefore,

when the 2d Armored moved out onto the

Roer plain on 16 November, three-fourths

of the tanks had duckbills, and as added insurance against being mired, all of them

carried, lashed to their rear decks, bundles

of slender nine-foot logs that could be

placed under the tracks.15

General Simpson warned his Ninth

Army staff to expect "one hell of a fight" ;

but that was what a general was expected

to say before an offensive. Actually the

commanders were optimistic. They anticipated only a delaying action on the Roer

plain; most of them thought XIX Corps

could reach the Roer in five days. What

they did not know was that the Germans

were determined not to allow a breakthrough, for they were already planning

their December counteroffensive in the

Ardennes.

15

 (1) How to Kill a Panther. (2) History Second

Armored Division, ch. VI. (3) Hell on Wheels, p.

11. (4) AFV&W Sec Rpt, p. 20.
324 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

M36 TANK DESTROYERS OF 2D ARMORED DIVISION ON DUG-IN RAMPS near the

Roer River.

Moving out on 16 November, immediately after an air effort in support of First

and Ninth Armies, involving more than

two thousand American and English heavy

bombers—the largest close support bombing of the war—XIX Corps gained up to

two miles, capturing seven small towns.

Only half of the 2d Armored Division,

Combat Command B, was committed. Its

tankers found they could traverse the mud

in second gear, and soon the countryside

was littered with the jettisoned logs. A

few tanks were mired down. More were

immobilized by mines, but they were not

totally lost, for only the tank tracks were

damaged, and they could be replaced in

twentv-four hours.16

By midafternoon the northernmost of

Combat Command B's three task forces

had captured Immendorf and the southernmost task force was entering Puffendorf,

an important crossroads village. It was in

the center, at Apweiler, the town nearest

the high ground at Gereonsweiler, that the

first serious resistance was encountered.

Here the center task force ran into such

violent antitank fire that it had to fall

back and dig in for the night. The

medium tank company lost fourteen of its

sixteen tanks. No German tanks had yet

been sighted, but throughout the night outposts reported that tanks could be heard

churning behind the enemy lines.17

16

 On 16 November, Combat Command B lost 14

tanks to mines and only 6 to mud. Of these, 2 of

the mired tanks were back in action before the

day's end; and 8 victims of the mud or mines

came back the next day. MacDonald, Siegfried Line

Campaign, p. 530. 17

 Hell on Wheels, pp. 28-38.
LESSONS OF THE ROER AND THE ARDENNES 325

The Tank Duels on the Roer Plain

On the 17th, shortly after dawn, as two

tank battalions of the 2d Armored Division's 67th Armored Regiment were drawn

up on a slope outside Puffendorf, ready to

attack toward Gereonsweiler, the men of

the 1st Battalion saw long, high-velocity

shells plowing furrows in the soft earth between their tanks. Then out of the heavy

morning mist came a German tank; two

Tigers and four Panthers moved out of the

woods on the western fringe of Gereonsweiler. There was a hit; one of the Shermans went up in flames, then another and

another and another, as the Germans got

the range. Soon the tanks of the 2d Battalion were also being thinned by murderous fire from the big tanks. The Germans,

alarmed by the speed of the American advance on the first day of the offensive, had

brought up elements of the strong 9th

Panzer Division—veteran of the Russian

front—to Gereonsweiler and were attacking at Puffendorf with a force estimated by

2d Battalion at twenty to thirty Panthers

and Tigers.18

The battle at Puffendorf was tank

against tank: on both sides the infantry

was pinned down by artillery fire. The

Germans had the advantage of position:

the Americans were hemmed in by sloping

ground that made flanking movement impossible. The Shermans fought back desperately, stepping up to attempt to slug

it out with their 75-mm. and 76-mm. guns,

but the tanks that got close enough for their

guns to be effective were quickly cut down

by enemy fire. And when the American

tankers did score direct hits on the German tanks, their shells ricocheted off the

thick armor and went screaming into the

air. One Sherman fired fourteen rounds

of 76-mm. ammunition at a Tiger before

it had any success at all—and the next

moment was destroyed by another Tiger.

When some companies were down to three

or four tanks and ammunition was running low, both battalions sent back for the

90-mm. tank destroyers to come up. With

the help of these "can-openers," as the

tankers called the tank destroyers, the Germans were beaten off, but at heavy cost to

the two battalions in tanks and men. The

second day's action on the Roer plain cost

the 2d Armored Division 38 medium

tanks, destroyed or knocked out, and 19

light tanks; 56 men killed, 281 wounded,

26 missing; and all but a few of these

losses were incurred at Puffendorf.19

At the end of the day the American

tanks were ordered to withdraw to the protection of the stone buildings of Puffendorf.

The Germans did not counterattack.

They were extremely short of infantry;

their own tanks were having trouble getting through the sticky mud caused by con18

 (1) History 67th Armored Regiment (Brunswick, Germany, 1945) pp. 105, 200. (2) Total

commitment of Panthers and Tigers on 17 November was estimated by Ninth Army at 45. Conquer,

p. 89.

19

 (1) History 67th Armored Regiment, pp. 106-

08, 198-99. (2) Hell on Wheels, p. 45. (3) MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 533. (4)

Total German losses at Puffendorf are difficult to

determine. 67th Armored Regiment's 1st Battalion

claimed only 4 German tanks (2 to Shermans, 2 to

tank destroyers). History 67th Armored Regiment,

p. 107. Whether any of these were Mark IV's is not

known. There were some Mark IV's at Puffendorf.

AAR, 67th Armd Regt Jun-Dec 44. The 702d Tank

Destroyer Battalion claimed 25 German tanks destroyed between 16 and 30 November, at a cost of

only eight of the battalion's M36 (90-mm.) tank

destroyers. See Maj M. L. Zimmerman, Report on

90-mm. Gun Motor Carriage M-36, 16 Dec 44, p.

6, Incl to Memo, Borden for OCO, 11 Jan 45,

Folder C-555-S, ETO, 11 Jan 45, OHF.
326 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

tinuing rains; and their commanders knew

that the 2d Armored Division's Combat

Command A, with the 66th Armored

Regiment, had arrived on the evening of

17 November.20 But though the Germans

failed for whatever reason to follow up

their advantage, they stopped 2d Armored

Division's attack cold for two days. Not

until 20 November did enough ammunition and reinforcements arrive to make

possible a successful three-task-force attack

on Gereonsweiler, preceded by intense artillery concentrations; and it was not until

28 November, after six days of bitter,

house-to-house fighting in Merzenhausen,

that the 2d Armored Division reached the

Roer.

Artillery, according to The Siegfried

Line Campaign, played an important part

in the battle of the Roer plain. Artillery

had pinned down the German infantry,

and according to the Germans the weakening of their infantry was responsible for

their loss of ground. Artillery had also

cost the Germans some tanks. And the

big "heavies," the battalion of 8-inch guns

and two battalions of 240-mm. howitzers

under the 34th Field Artillery Brigade,

played a spectacular role. With the help

of observer planes furnished by the XXIX

Tactical Air Command, they demolished

two important enemy bridges over the

Roer with a remarkably small expenditure

of their scarce ammunition.21

The American tanks came off less creditably in the battle of the Roer plain. The

tankers, deprived by the terrain and mud

of their ability to outflank the enemy, by

the congestion in the area of their usual

artillery direct support, and by bad

weather of much assistance from the air,

had fought magnificently; but they had

become disillusioned about the ability of

their tanks to defeat German armor.

"Our men no longer have as much confidence in their armor and guns as they

used to have," one of the 2d Armored

Division tankers said two days after the

Roer plain offensive. Another said, "The

Germans have been improving steadily ever

since we met them in Sicily," and "Our

Ordnance Department needs to get on the

ball."

 22

This was not merely a momentary reaction from battle-weary men. After the

war an Armored School report, prepared

with the assistance of 2d Armored Division

tank commanders who had participated in

the action, stated that the most important

factor in the set-back at Puffendorf on 17

November—"the biggest tank battle in 2nd

Armored experience"—was "the inferiority

of our tanks in guns, armor, and maneuverability."

 23

At the time of the Roer plain offensive

the tankers had been impressed by the

superiority of the wide German tank tracks,

which barely sank in the ground, while the

American tracks made trenches. The

tankers complained that the Shermans

were too slow to get quickly out of the way

of antitank fire (as the light tanks could);

that their suspensions, of the volute spring

type, adversely affected maneuverability

20

 Hell on Wheels, p. 47, and app. II. 21

 (1) MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 562. (2) Hell on Wheels, app. II. (3)

Histories, 34th FA Brigade; 702d TD Bn; 265th

and 256th FA Bns; and 211th FA Group. (4)

Conquer, p. 94.

22

 Interview with seven officers and men of 2d

Armored Division, in Ninth Army Operations IV,

Offensive in November, Part Two, ch. 15, pp. 253-

54.

23

 Hell on Wheels, pp. iii, 5, 56.
LESSONS OF THE ROER AND THE ARDENNES 327

(most considered the torsion bar suspension

superior in maneuverability and reliability); that their silhouette was too high;

and that their armor was not much better

than that of the tank destroyers. Above

all, the tankers complained of their guns.

They had seen their 75-mm. and 76-mm.

shells bounce off the front plate of the

Panthers as well as the Tigers—"like hitting them with a pea-shooter." The 76-

mm. gun was better than the 75-mm. but

did not have enough velocity to keep the

tank out of the range of the more powerful

German tank guns, which were effective at

3,000 to 3,500 yards. At practical ranges

the 76-mm., even with HVAP ammunition, would not successfully penetrate the

glacis plate of the Panther. "The guns

are ineffective, the crews know it, and it

affects their morale," the tank commanders

stated. They concluded that the British

had the right idea when they threw away

the 75-mm. guns on their lend-lease Shermans and mounted their 17-pounders.

The 2d Armored Division tankers believed

that their own Shermans could easily

mount a 90-mm. gun.24

Some assessment of the 90-mm. as an

antitank gun was possible after the commitment of the 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion's M36 tank destroyers in the

November Roer plain battles. The shell

of the 90-mm. gun would ricochet off the

7-inch front armor plate of the Tiger tank

at 3,000 to 3,500 yards; to be effective,

the tank destroyers had either to get closer

or attack the more vulnerable sides, and

this fact the enemy evidently knew, for he

had usually managed to keep his Tigers

at a distance and expose only their heavily

armored fronts.25 But to say that the 90-

mm. would not defeat the frontal armor

of the Tiger is not to condemn it as an

antitank gun. The Tiger, cumbersome

and underpowered for its great weight, was

mainly valuable when the Germans were

in a commanding position, as at Puffendorf,

dug in on the defensive. Against the Panther, which most experts considered the

Germans' best tank, the 90-mm. gun was

far more effective than the 76-mm. In

the tank battles on the Roer plain during

November, the 67th Armored Regiment

with three battalions of Shermans could

claim only five Panthers; the 702d Tank

Destroyer Battalion armed with 90-mm.

guns claimed fifteen.26

Not only on the Roer plain, but to a

lesser extent in the Hürtgen Forest, where

the wooded, boggy terrain kept the tanks

road-bound, was there growing frustration

with the performance of the Shermans,

especially those with the 75-mm. gun.27

And in the Battle of the Bulge, one division

commander's wish for a tank with armament to cope adequately with the German

Panthers and Tigers was echoed "prayer24

 (1) Interviews, Ninth Army Operations IV,

Offensive in November. (2) AGF Board Rpt, ETO,

No. 572, Proposed Changes in Organization and

Equipment, 28 Jan 45, 4-3. 572/45. (3) How to

Kill a Panther.

25

 History 702d Tank Destroyer Bn, Jun-Aug,

Sep-Dec 44; Jnl 17-21 Nov. 26

 (1) A/A Rpts 67th Armored Regiment and

702d TD Bn. (2) For opinions on the superiority

of the Germans' Panthers over their Tigers see:

B. H. Liddell Hart, The Tanks, II, 455 and app.

V; Col. G. B. Jarrett, "The Combat Efficiency of

Tanks—Can It Be Expressed Numerically?", Armored Cavalry Journal, LIX, 2 (March—April

1950), p. 95 and Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 322.

27

 MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, pp.

421-24. For losses in the Hürtgen Forest from

mines, mud, and antitank guns (German armor

was not committed here to any great extent) see

pp. 448-63.
328 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

fully or profanely—wherever the enemy

panzer divisions appeared out of the

Ardennes hills and forests."

 28

 Lacking

such armament, the tankers stalked the

German tanks, maneuvering to get a shot

at flank or tail from behind the protection

of walls and buildings, or lying in wait in a

village lane until a German tank, advancing usually under cover of darkness or fog,

got close enough for a kill broadside.

With these tactics, with the help of individual heroic actions by tankers and by

infantry with bazookas, and with the assistance of the ever-dependable artillery, the

onrushing tide of the big German tanks

was stemmed; but at great cost in American men and tanks. Between 20 November 1944 and 28 December 1944, losses in

75-mm. and 76-mm. Shermans amounted

to 636.29

Attempts to Provide a Better Tank

By 1945 the tankers urgently needed

a more powerful gun than the 76-mm.

Firepower was their first consideration.

The second was speed. Armor came off

a poor third, for most believed there was

more safety in speed and maneuverability

than in armor. Maj. Gen. Ernest H. Harmon, commander of 2d Armored Division

and one of the foremost armored commanders of the war, spoke for the majority

of his fellow tankers when he described the

characteristics the tank should have as

"First: gun power; Second: battlefield

maneuverability; Third: as much armor

protection as can be had after meeting the

first two requirements, still staying within a

weight that can be gotten across obstacles

with our bridge equipment."

 30

 The main

reason the tankers welcomed the 200 uparmored M4 (M4A3E2) "assault tanks"

(promoted by Army Ground Forces but

opposed by Ordnance) that got into action

in the fall of 1944 was that the tankers

needed more armor in order to get close

enough to the German tanks for their 75-

mm. and 76-mm. guns to be effective.31

An attempt by the Armored Force

Board in the fall of 1943 to provide the

M4 with a more powerful gun, the 90-

mm., had failed. Ordnance had begun

development work on the 90-mm. antiaircraft gun to adapt it for use on tanks and

gun motor carriages early in the war, after

reports from Cairo had indicated that the

Germans in Libya were successfully using

their 88-mm. gun against tanks, and the

new antitank 90-mm. was standardized as

the M3 in September 1943. Thereupon,

the Armored Force Board, believing that

the M4 tank was the one tank that could

be delivered in time for the invasion of

28

 Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, p.

125. 29

 (1) Ibid, (2) Telephone conversation between

Gen Lutes and Gen Somervell in Record of Telephone Conference Held on 1 January 1945 at

1550 at Paris, ETO Ord Sec, Misc 1943-45,

KCRC. (3) For statements by tank commanders,

taken immediately after the Bulge, on the superiority of German tanks to American tanks, see the

Armored Force Command and Center, Study No.

27 (hereafter cited as Study No. 27), p. 33, Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946.

30

 (1) Letters to Editor, "Sum and Substance,"

Armor, vol. LIX, No. 4 (July-August 1950), pp.

22-29. (2) Ltr, McInerney to Campbell, 20 Dec

44, no sub, Overseas Letters (Europe) Barnes File,

OHF. 31

 (1) For the development of the M4A3E2 see

Maj. D. L. McCaskey, The Role of the Army

Ground Forces in the Development of Equipment,

Study No. 34, pp. 43-45, Hist Sec, AGF. (2) Ltr,

Col Colby to Mr. F. Gordon Barber, 14 May 47,

no sub, Barnes File, OHF. (3) MFR, G-4 for

CofS Army Gp. 31 Dec 44, sub: Assault Tanks,

12th Army Gp, G-4 File 87 Tanks and Armored

Cars.
LESSONS OF THE ROER AND THE ARDENNES 329

Europe, recommended that the 90-mm.

gun be installed on a thousand M4A3

tanks. Maj. Gen. Gladeon M. Barnes,

chief of the Ordnance Department's Research and Development Service, refused

to go along with the recommendation; and

General McNair turned it down on the

advice of his G-3, Brig. Gen. John M.

Lentz.32

Barnes had nothing against the 90-mm.

gun; on the contrary, he and Col. Joseph

M. Colby, chief of the Development and

Engineering Department at the Ordnance

Tank-Automotive Center in Detroit, had

done everything they could to get it to the

battlefield on a gun motor carriage, over

the determined opposition of Army Ground

Forces, whose New Developments Division

continued to insist that 75-mm. and 76-

mm. guns were adequate. Thanks largely

to Barnes's efforts, backed up by the Tank

Destroyer Board, the M36 self-propelled

90-mm. got to Europe in time to play its

part in the Roer plain battles. But

Barnes did not want the 90-mm. on the

M4 tank. He believed that the gun was

too heavy for the tank; that it produced

"too much of an unbalanced design."

 33

At the time, Barnes was in the thick of

a fight, which he still hoped to win, to get

a better tank than the M4 to the battlefield

in 1944- The new T20 series tank, authorized by Services of Supply (later ASF)

in May of 1942, was designed with more

armor protection, lower silhouette, and

more speed than the M4. By early spring

of 1943, the Ordnance effort was concentrated on the T23. Wider, heavier, and

lower than the M4, with wider tracks and

therefore lower ground pressure, it had a

rear drive and an electrical transmission,

which made it much easier to operate.

The T23 was highly maneuverable and

could do 35 miles an hour, as compared

with the 29 miles of the fastest M4; its

frontal armor was 3 inches thick, about an

inch thicker than that of most of the

M4's.34 The design, according to an impartial observer, "would have kept the

United States in the forefront of medium

tank development."35 In April of 1943,

ASF authorized Ordnance to procure 250

of these new tanks.36

Very early in the development work on

the new medium tank, in the fall of 1942,

Ordnance found that it was possible to

mount the 90-mm. gun on the T23-

Barnes was all for it, and was strongly

supported by General Campbell, Chief of

Ordnance; but Maj. Gen. Jacob L.

Devers, then commanding general of the

Armored Force, refused to go along, and

in the end the T23 mounted the 76-mm.

gun. In an effort to get more firepower,

Ordnance produced a second design, the

T25 mounting the 90-mm. gun; and a

third, the T26, with the 90-mm. gun, an

additional inch of armor, and tracks five

inches wider. Ordnance recommended

32

 (1) Ltr, Nisley to Sayler, 11 Jun 47, no sub,

Barnes File, OHF. (2) Ltr, Brig Gen Joseph A.

Holly (USA Ret) to Lida Mayo, 12 Dec 60,

OCMH. (3) OCO Technical Division, Medium

Tank T20 Series, Chronology, Entry for 13 Sep

43, OHF. 33

 (1) Barnes, MS on 90-mm gun; and Ltr to

Gen. Campbell, 11 Oct 44, sub: History of Tank

Guns. Both in Folder, Tank Guns (Over-all),

Barnes file, OHF. (2) Medium Tank T20 Series,

Entries for 13 Sept and 7 Oct 43. (3) Colby to

Barber, 14 May 47.

34

 (1) Medium Tank T20 Series, May 42-Mar 43.

(2) Catalogue of Standard Ordnance Items: Tank

and Automotive Vehicles, 1 June 1945, p. 23. 35

 Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, Armor: A History

of Mechanized Forces (New York: Frederick A.

Praeger, 1960), p. 197. 36

 OCM 20342, 24 Apr 43.
330 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

that 40 of the 250 new tanks authorized

be of the T25 type, and that 10 be T26's,

and ASF approved. All had the electrical

transmission.37

Then began the battle to get the new

tanks accepted by the using arms. Unfortunately, the electrical transmission laid

the tanks open to some cogent objections.

It added about 3,800 pounds to the weight,

increasing the ground pressure and adding

to the difficulty of getting the T25 and

T26 over Bailey bridges (and on European

railroads), even after the revision of AR

850-15 in August 1943, raising the Engineers' tank weight limitation for bridges

to 35 tons. Also, prolonged tests of the

T23 at Fort Knox, Kentucky, by the

Armored Board indicated that the electric

drive would require excessive maintenance.

For these reasons, the T23 was ultimately

considered unsatisfactory by Army Ground

Forces for use in overseas theaters. Because of the weight consideration, the decision was made in August 1943 to convert

the T25 and T26 to torquematic transmission; in this form they were redesignated the T25E1 and T26E1.38

Even with the weight objection removed,

it seemed all but impossible to sell Army

Ground Forces on the new tanks. Ground

Forces was sold on the M4, so easy to ship

and to handle; it was committed to the

"exploitation" role of armor; it had not

as yet had any experience with armored

operations comparable to that of the Germans in Russia, which had led the Germans to develop the Panther and Tiger

tanks. General McNair had no objection

to "experimenting" with 90-mm. tanks,

but felt that by supplying them AGF would

be encouraging tank versus tank battles instead of giving antitank work to the field

artillery and tank destroyers to which he

thought it belonged. In October 1943

General Barnes's urgent recommendation

for immediate production of 500 each of

the new tanks, T25E1 and T26E1, and the

T23 was turned down.39

The first breakthrough in the T25E1

and T26E1 program came a few weeks

later when General Devers cabled from

London a request for the highest priority

for the T26. In January 1944, ASF authorized an additional 250. Though this

was better than 10, it was only a fraction

of what Ordnance wanted, and Barnes

continued to press urgently for a thousand

90-mm. tanks. But General Moore of the

New Requirements Division, AGF, continued to oppose the program; as late as

mid-April 1944, AGF came up with the

astonishing request that 6,000 T25E1 and

T26E1 tanks be produced with the 75-

mm. and 76-mm. gun. It took action by

the European theater to get the 90-mm.

tank program moving. Shortly before Dday, the theater asked that 75-mm. and

76-mm. tank production be stopped, and

that in the future 25 percent of the tanks

be armed with the 90-mm. gun and 75

37

 (1) Medium Tank T20 Series, entries for 1 Oct

42; 11, 13, 15, 20, 29 Mar 43. (2) OCM 20342, 24

Apr 43. 38

 Medium Tank T20 Series, entries for 10, 23

Aug. 43, 10 Sep 43; and (on abandonment of T23),

app., Memo, CG ASF to CofS, U.S. Army, 29 Apr

44, sub: Medium Tank T-23, Barnes File, OHF.

39

 (1) Ogorkiewicz, Armor: A History of Mechanized Forces, pp. 198-99. (2) General Heinz

Guderian, Panzer Leader (N.Y.: Dutton, 1952),

pp. 276-77. (3) The Medium Tank T20 Series,

entries for 13 Sep, 4, 9 Oct 43; and app., Memo

CG ASF for Ch of Ord, 4 Oct 43, sub: Employment of the Medium Tank, M4, Armed with the

76-mm. Gun M1, Barnes File, OHF. (4) Campbell

Comments.
LESSONS OF THE ROER AND THE ARDENNES 331

percent with the 105-mm. howitzer.

Maximum production was requested with

the following priorities: (1) the T26E1

(now redesignated a heavy tank); (2) the

T25E1; and (3) the M4A3 with the 90-

mm. gun or 105-mm. howitzer. By January 1945 the ratio of 90-mm. gun tanks

to 105-mm. howitzer tanks had been reversed. The theater wanted four 90-mm.

gun tanks to one 105-mm. howitzer tank,

primarily because of the greater penetrative

power of the 90-mm., but also because

combat experience had revealed several

deficiencies in the 105-mm. howitzer tank,

most important the lack of a power

traverse.40

After D-day, the disillusionment with

the 76-mm. gun increased with further

experience on the battlefield. Bradley

noted that the 76-mm. often "scuffed rather

than penetrated" the heavy armor of the

German Panthers and Tigers. Aware that

the British could pierce the thick-skinned

Panther with their 17-pounder mounted

on the Sherman, which they called the

Firefly, he asked General Montgomery to

equip one M4 in each U.S. tank platoon

with a 17-pounder. This effort came to

nothing for two reasons: first, Ordnance

in England was overloaded with British

orders; and second, the combat units were

too short of tanks to spare any to send to

England for the purpose. Bradley's solution for the time being was to use towed

90-mm. guns to form a secondary line of

defense behind his Shermans.41

When Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Holly, chief

of ETOUSA's Armored Fighting Vehicles

and Weapons Section, returned to the

United States in July 1944 to urge the

shipment of more self-propelled 90-mm.

guns, he looked into the possibility of getting a tank mounted with the 90-mm. gun.

Obviously, the best bet for quick results

was still to mount the gun on the M4, the

tank already in large production. In

Detroit Holly saw an M4 modified by

Chrysler to carry the 90-mm. and thought

it had "tempting possibilities." But the

T26E1 production had been initiated already and had such high priority that no

delivery of the modified M4 could be

promised before January 1945. By that

time the T26E1 would be coming off the

production line in limited numbers: 10

were scheduled for October, 30 for November, 50 for December, 125 for January, and 200 for February. The decision,

therefore, was to abandon modification of

the M4 and devote all facilities available

to furthering the production of the

T26E1.42

After the production of the first ten

T26E1's, tests showed that certain modifications were necessary, including the provision for more ammunition stowage.

After these changes were made, the tank

was redesignated heavy tank T26E3, and

was standardized as the M26 (General

40

 (1) The Medium Tank T20 Series, entries for

18 Oct; 10, 13, 16 Nov; 9 Dec 43; 20, 31 Jan; 10,

13 Apr 44; and appens, memo, CG ASF for Ch of

Ord, 8 Jan 44, sub: Change in the Army Supply

Program, Medium Tank, T-26; and ltr, CG AGF

to CG ASF, 1 June 44, sub: New Production of

Medium Tanks. (2) AFV&W Sec Rpt, pp. 9-10,

and memo, Brig Gen Frank A. Heileman for TAG,

14 Dec 44, sub: Shipment of Medium Tanks to the

European Theater of Operations, ASF Dist Div 400

ETO.

41

 (1) Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 322-23. (2)

First Army Rpt 2, Vol. III, p. 5. (3) AFV&W Sec

Rpt, p. 21. 42

 (1) AFV&W Sec Rpt, p. 20; (2) Ltr, Gen

Holly, AFV&W Sec ETOUSA, to Col E. K. Wright, Armored Sec FUSAG, 25 Jul 44, no sub,

12th Army Gp 470.8 Tanks and Armored Cars.
332 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Pershing).43 General Barnes insisted that

of the first 40 off the production line, 20

be sent overseas simultaneously with the

shipment of 20 to Fort Knox for tests.

Army Ground Forces objected, urging that

the tests be made before the tanks were

shipped overseas; but Barnes (threatening

to go to General Marshall if necessary)

appealed to Maj. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell,

assistant chief of staff G-4, and won his

point. The 20 T26E3's were in Europe

before the end of January 1945.44

The Zebra Mission of

February 1945

As head of a technical mission (ZEBRA)

to introduce the new tanks to the European

theater, General Barnes, accompanied by

Col. Joseph M. Colby of the Tank-Automotive Command, Col. George Dean

of the Armored Branch, AGF New Developments Division, two Ordnance captains,

a representative from General Motors, and

a gunner from Aberdeen Proving Ground,

arrived in Paris on 9 February 1945. First

there were conferences with Eisenhower

and other SHAEF and COMZ officers, including Sayler and Holly, at which it was

decided to get the twenty tanks into action

as soon as possible. Eisenhower assigned

them to 12th Army Group, and Bradley

sent them all to First Army, dividing them

equally between the 3d and 9th Armored

Divisions. By mid-February the tanks

had been delivered to the 559th Ordnance

Battalion at Aachen, training was under

way, and Barnes had embarked on a series

of visits to army group, army, corps, and

division commanders.45

In addition to introducing the T26E3's,

the purpose of the ZEBRA mission was to

obtain as much information as possible on

the performance of Ordnance matériel in

Europe, especially such new matériel as

the M24 light tank (armed with a new 75-

mm. gun) that had begun to arrive in the

theater in December 1944. Barnes was

also very much interested in the performance of self-propelled field guns. As an

improvement on the M12 with the M1918

155-mm. gun, which had given an excellent account of itself, he had sent to the

theater one experimental model of a gun

motor carriage, the T83, mounting the M1

(Long Tom) 155-mm. gun; and another

experimental model, the T89, mounting an

8-inch howitzer. Both were sent to VII

Corps for testing. Other items on which

the planners in the United States wanted

reports were bazookas and rockets fired

from multiple rocket launchers. Before

D-day, 4.5-inch artillery rockets (designed

to be fired either from aircraft or from the

ground) had been sent to the European

theater. They were fin-stabilized, that is,

stabilized in flight by fins that opened when

the rocket left the tube. Two types of

multiple launchers had been provided: the

T27, an 8-tube launcher on a fixed framework mount, which could be fired either

from the ground or the bed of a truck, and

43

 OCM 26038, 14 Dec 44, and OCM 27123,

29 Mar 45. 44

 (1) The Medium Tank T20 Series, entries for

12, 14, 18, 22 Dec 44. (2) Memo, Maxwell for CG

ASF, and CG AGF, 19 Dec 44, sub: Shipment of

T26E3 Heavy Tanks to the European Theater of

Operations; Memo, CG ASF for CofOrd, 22 Dec 44,

sub: Establishment of Priority for Issue of the

Heavy Tank, T2631; MFR. All in ASF Distrib Div

400 ETO. (3) AFV&W Rpt, p. 22.

45

 Ltr, Maj Gen G. M. Barnes to Maj Gen L. H.

Campbell, Jr., 6 March 45, sub: Report of Heavy

Tank Mission (hereafter cited as ZEBRA Rpt),

OHF.
LESSONS OF THE ROER AND THE ARDENNES 333

the T34, a 60-tube cluster to be mounted

on the Sherman tank.46

In his conversations with the commanders in Europe, Barnes described new

matériel that was not yet ready for shipment: a "supervelocity" 90-mm. gun, the

T15, with which he said a large portion of

the T26E3 tanks were to be equipped; and

three heavy tanks, the T28, an "assault

tank" weighing 90 tons with twelve inches

of armor, mounting the new 105-mm. antiaircraft gun; and the T29 and T30, which

were similar in chassis to the T26 series,

but mounted, respectively, the 105-mm.

gun and the 155-mm. Barnes also had

photographs of the new 57-mm. and 75-

mm. recoilless rifles and a wheeled mount

for a multiple rocket launcher, the T66,

which would fire a new 4.5-inch rocket

that did not depend on fins, being "spinstabilized"—rotated by a flow of gases

through eight canted vents.47

The response to the ZEBRA mission

showed plainly that theater needs could be

summed up in two words: firepower and

mobility. The commanders liked the

T26E3 Pershing tank and would have

liked it even better if it had carried the

T15 90-mm. gun. They liked the light

tank M24 very much. They had been

converted to self-propelled field guns by

the M12, and wanted large quantities of

such guns of the Long Tom and 155-mm.

howitzer type. They did not want the

T23 tank with the electrical transmission.

Most commanders were not very much interested in the very heavy T28, T28, and

T30 tanks, for they did not see how these

tanks could be got over roads and bridges.

They were definitely interested in the recoilless rifles. On the performance of the

bazooka, opinions varied. The general

feeling was that it was good but ought to

be better. One assistant division commander complained that "we're still using

the model we started with" while the Germans have "taken our bazooka idea and

improved upon it." The Germans had

produced more deadly antitank weapons of

this type in their Panzerschreck and Panzerfaust, both of which, however, were extremely dangerous to the user. The Panzerfaust, a recoilless weapon firing a

hollow-charge grenade, would pierce seven

or eight inches of armor plate. Some U.S.

combat officers collected all they could get

their hands on for their troops; one tank

officer considered the Panzerfaust "the

most concentrated mass of destruction in

this war."48

The 4.5-inch ground rocket had been

used very little. First Army, converting a

105-mm. howitzer battalion into a rocket

battalion with the T27 launcher early in

November 1944, had employed the rockets

a few times in Hürtgen Forest in midNovember with "excellent results," accord46

 (1) ZEBRA Rpt. (2) Barnes, Weapons of World

War II, pp. 185-86.

47

 (1) ZEBRA Rpt. (2) Green, Thomson, and

Roots, Planning Munitions for War, p. 353. Spinstabilization, which made the rocket more accurate,

was copied from a captured German rocket. Ibid.

48

 (1) Ltr, Brig Gen R. B. Lovett for ETO

Theater Comdr, to CG ASF, 7 May 45, sub: Report

on Heavy Tank Mission, O.O. 350.05/19549. (2)

Ltr, Barnes from Hodges, 11 Mar 45 app. I to ZEBRA

Rpt. (3) Jarrett, Achtung Panzer, pp. 160-62, MS,

Jarrett Collection. (4) Memo, Hull, ACofS OPD

for Borden, 29 Mar 45, sub: Comments on German

Bazooka and Various American Weapons, OPD

471.61. (5) Ltrs, 30 Oct 44, 14 Jan, 15, 23 Feb 45,

29 Apr 45, Personal Letters, Lt Col John K. Boles,

Jr., Third Armored Division, copies in possession of

Dr. Sidney T. Mathews. (6) On the need for a more

powerful American bazooka, see AGF Bd Rpt, ETO,

No. 572, 28 Jan 45, 4-3.572/45.
334 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

GENERAL BARNES, during ZEBRA mission.

ing to General Hodges; but the artillerymen were not enthusiastic, disliking the inaccuracy of the rocket and the smoke and

flash that attracted counterbattery fire.

Because of the smoke and flash, a "shoot

and scoot" technique was evolved, using

the launchers on trucks, weapons carriers,

or, preferably, jeeps. The need for more

inherent mobility in the mount and better

accuracy in the rocket led commanders to

believe that the new T66 launchers on a

wheeled mount, firing the new spin-stabilized rocket, would be quite valuable. As

to the T34 launcher on the Sherman tank,

First Army did not want it because of the

disadvantages of mounting the launcher on

the tank. One Third Army tank battalion

that did employ the T34 briefly was appreciative of the morale effect of this great

concentration of firepower, but recommended that the launchers be mounted on

light tanks rather than M4's. They had

found the difficulty of jettisoning the

launchers resulted in the loss of the Sherman tank as a fighting vehicle.49

At the time of the ZEBRA mission, interest naturally was centered on the Pershing tank. Although the theater refused

to subscribe to a blanket statement that the

Pershing with the M3 gun was superior to

the Panther or Tiger, all commanders considered it a step in the right direction and

wanted all the Pershing tanks they could

get as soon as possible. In the meantime

they would settle for the M4 with the 76-

mm. gun and as much HVAP ammunition

as was available. They emphatically

wanted no more M4's with the 75-mm.

gun.50 When Colonel Colby tried to sell

the battalion commanders of the 3d

Armored Division on the Shermans they

already had (being unable to offer them

anything better on a large scale immediately), he ran into a hornet's nest. After

the heavy casualties of the winter, they

were beginning to regard the 75-mm.

Shermans as deathtraps.51

49

 (1) Ltr, Hodges to Barnes, 11 Mar 45. (2)

The 4.5-inch T27 had been first introduced in

combat in the Lorient sector in Brittany in midOctober 1944 by the 94th Division, but its use

there was brief and inconclusive. Lt. Lawrence G.

Byrnes, ed., History of the 94th Infantry Division

in World War II (Washington: Infantry Journal

Press, 1948), p. 48. (3) AGF Bd Rpt, ETO, No.

427, 4.5 Rockets and Launcher T-27, 5 Dec 44,

4-3.427/44. (4) Unit Rpt of Action - 18th Field

Arty Bn, 4 Jul-Sep, Nov-Dec 44. (5) First Army

Rpt 2, Annex 5, p. 50. (6) History 702d Tank Bn,

Jan-May 45. 50

 (1) Ltr, Lovett for ETO Theater Commander

to CG ASF, 7 May 45. (2) Ltrs to Gen Barnes from

Gens Bradley, Hodges, Collins, Rose, and Palmer,

2-11 Mar 45, app. to ZEBRA Rpt. 51

 (1) Boles Ltrs, 27 Jan, 23-24 Feb, 1, 6 Mar

45. (2) At least one tanker in 2d Armored Division had six M4's shot out from under him during

the war. Letters to Editor, "Sum and Substance,"

Armor, vol. LIX, No. 5 (Sep-Oct 50), p. 22.
LESSONS OF THE ROER AND THE ARDENNES 335

CONVOY OF PERSHING TANKS MOVES THROUGH A GERMAN TOWN

Before Barnes returned to the United

States, he asked General Campbell by teletype on 5 March 1945 to ship immediately

all the Pershings available, as well as all

available HVAP ammunition for the 76-

mm. and 90-mm. guns; and to expedite

the production of the T15 90-mm. gun and

ammunition and the shipment of the

twenty-five T83 self-propelled guns produced in February. Campbell promised

to do "everything humanly possible" to get

the Pershings to the theater on the highest

priority, and was backed up by ASF's

Theater Branch after a personal cablegram

from General Eisenhower to General Somervell on 8 March. But the tanks would

not effect the outcome of the war in

Europe.52

On 23 March, 157 Pershings left the

United States and another 53 were at port

or en route. By the time they arrived, the

armies were on their way into Germany.

When General Borden, on a visit to the

theater, caught up with Third Army in

Frankfurt on 8 April, he discovered that

Patton had not yet received any Pershings.

Ninth Army had received nineteen by the

end of March but as late as mid-April

none had been issued to troops because

Ninth's armored units had been moving so

fast that they had not had time to spare

52

 Report of Teletype Conference, 5 Mar 45,

app. F to ZEBRA Rpt.
336 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

tank crews to send back for training. In

the last two weeks of April, the Pershings

began to arrive in greater quantity. Third

Army, for example, had ninety by the end

of the month. On V-E Day there were

310 in the theater, of which about 200

had been issued to troops. But because of

the difficulty of transporting them, and the

time required to train crews in maintenance and operation, it is safe to say that

the only Pershings that got into effective

action were the 20 experimental models

that First Army had received in February.53

As to the T15 90-mm. gun, only one got

to the theater. When Borden visited

SHAEF headquarters on 2 April, the first

question General Eisenhower asked him

was when the tanks with the "super guns"

would arrive. The earliest date Borden

could give him was June. Eisenhower

said he hoped to have the Germans licked

by then.54

Lacking the Pershings, the war was

fought with the M4 Shermans, which continued to pour off the production lines.

At the time of the Rhine crossings, 7,620

were in theater stocks. About 40 percent

were of the 76-mm. gun type, but attempts

to provide HVAP ammunition for the 76-

mm. were hampered by the shortage of

tungsten carbide. Because of production

difficulties, receipts of HVAP before 1

March 1945 were less than two rounds per

gun per month. By January 1945 there

were enough M4's to enable the 12th

Army Group to make a last-ditch effort

to provide better firepower by installing the

British 17-pounder. Here again the limiting factor was ammunition. British 17-

pounder ammunition supply could support

only 160 17-pounder American Shermans

and by the time the first of them arrived

in the combat area, the war was ending.55

Shortly before the drive into Germany,

the American press broke the story that

American tanks were inferior to those of

the enemy. Hanson W. Baldwin in the

New York Times and the editor of the

Washington Post demanded to be told

why; and the story traveled to Europe.56

Questioned by American correspondents at

a press conference in mid-March, General

Patton publicly defended American tanks.

He also wrote a letter to Lt. Gen. Thomas

T. Handy, Deputy Chief of Staff, which

the War Department released to the American papers, stating that while the Tiger

would destroy the Sherman head on, the

Sherman could usually manage to attack

from the rear and avoid a slugging match;

moreover, the Sherman was incomparably

more reliable and long-lived, as well as

easier to ship and handle, than the Tiger.

Patton wrote the letter because he wanted

53

 (1) Ltr, Maj Gen G. M. Barnes to Col J. M.

Colby, 23 Mar 45, no sub, Overseas Letters (Europe), Barnes file, OHF. (2) Trip Rpt, Brig Gen

William A. Borden and Lt Col Harry Turner, 24

Apr 45, Borden Personal file, OHF. (3) AAR

for Period ending 31 Mar 45, Ninth Army G-4

Rpts, Ord Sec. (4) 12th Army Gp Ord Sec Jnl,

entries for 7 Apr-24 May 45. (5) Third Army

Rpt, vol. II, Ord, pp. 27-28. (6) Major Supply

Problems in Oversea Theaters During the Fiscal

Year 1945 and ASF Performances in Meeting

Oversea Supply Needs, p. 5, ASF Planning Div,

Theater Br files. (7) AFV&W Sec Rpt, p. 22. (8)

On the length of time required to train crews in

maintenance and operation see Ltr, G. B. Jarrett

to Lida Mayo, 11 Dec 63 and incl, Ltr, Col Robert

J. Icks (USA Ret), to G. B. Jarrett, 8 Dec 63,

OCMH. 54

 (1) Ltr, Lovett for ETO Theater Comder to

CG ASF, 7 May 45. (2) Borden Rpt, 24 Apr 1945.

55

 (1) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the

Armies, vol. II, pp. 454, 457-58. (2) AFV&W Sec

Rpt, pp. 20-21. 56

 Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, p. 278. The Baldwin article appeared

in the New York Times of January 5, 1945.
LESSONS OF THE ROER AND THE ARDENNES 337

How CARTOONIST BERRYMAN SAW THE TANK CONTROVERSY. From the Washington, D.C., Evening Star, March 25, 1945.

to stop what he called "the foolish criticism" of American tanks which he believed

was having a bad effect on the morale of

the soldiers at the front.57 But privately

he had stated to a visiting Ordnance officer,

just after the Battle of the Bulge, "Ordnance takes too God Damn long seeking

perfection at the expense of the fighting

men, and you can tell that to anyone at

Ordnance." The officer believed that

Patton was expressing the feelings of the

57

 (1) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, p. 278; (2) Washington Post,

28 Mar 45 and Washington Evening Star, 27 Mar

45; (3) Patton, War As I Knew It, p. 263.
338 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

using arms.58 It was natural enough for

the tankers at the front to blame Ordnance

for the heavy casualties they had suffered

fighting in the Shermans.

Who was to blame? The Army Ground

Forces New Developments Division criticized Ordnance for spending too much

time on developing and promoting the T23

tank with the electrical transmission, which

was not wanted, and the heavy tanks M6,

T28, T29, and T30, which the AGF had

turned down repeatedly because of road

and bridge limitations.59 General Barnes

and Colonel Colby maintained that the

best American tank of the war, the Pershing, had been developed in the face of

"bitter opposition" by the using arms.

Colby believed that if AGF had given the

go-ahead early enough, the Pershing could

have been available in quantities for the

beachhead landings on D-day; and the

record supports his belief.60

58

 Ltr, Capt Cleves H. Howell, Jr., to Chief,

Research & Development Service, OCO, 2 Feb 45,

sub: Overseas Mission, OHF. 59

 McCaskey, The Role of Army Ground Forces

in the Development of Equipment, pp. 37-61. 60

 (1) Col. Joseph M. Colby, "From Designer to

Fighter," Armored Cavalry Journal, LIX, 1 (January-February 1950), p. 14. (2) Ltr, Colby to

Barber, 14 May 47. (3) See T20 Chronology

cited above, p. 329, n32(3). The AGF's objection

to the electrical transmission had been removed as

early as August 1943, when torquematic transmission was installed in the T26.

The pros and cons of the tank controversy have usually been discussed in

terms of the argument between Army

Ground Forces and Ordnance tank designers in the United States. Ordnance

officers in the European theater recognized

a third point of view—that of many officers

of the Armored Force, especially those in

the theater. While it was true that the

Armored Force officers could not wholly

agree among themselves, there was a strong

feeling among them that the Pershing

could not (for whatever reason) be got to

the theater in time to be of any real value,

and therefore the first priority on tank development should be to eliminate the bugs

from the M4 and then to modify it to take

the 90-mm. gun.61 If only as insurance

against the failure of the Pershings to get

into action, this modification of a thousand M4's might well have been attempted

when it was first proposed by the Armored

Force Board in September 1943. In retrospect it seems to have been worth trying,

and if successful it would in some measure

have provided the tankers with the firepower they needed in Europe, from the

breakout to the last defenses on the Rhine.

61

 Ltrs, Nisley to Sayler, 11 Jun 47; Holly to

Mayo, 12 Dec 60; and Medaris to Pattison, 28 Oct

63.
CHAPTER XVIII

Victory in Germany

By mid-February 1945 the time had

come for simultaneous blows against Germany from east and west. In the east, the

Red Army, having renewed its winter

offensive in mid-January and captured

Warsaw, had reached the Oder. On the

western front, in the center the U.S. First

and Third Armies had driven the Germans

from the Bulge and in the south, U.S.

Seventh and French 1st Armies had driven

them out of the Colmar Pocket, their

bridgehead on the upper Rhine. In the

north, Ninth Army, operating with the

British 21 Army Group, had pushed the

Germans across the Roer in the narrow but

stubbornly held region between Linnich

and Düren.

Supplies for the Last Campaign

On 24 February 1945 General Sayler

called a meeting in Paris of all the top

Ordnance officers in Europe—the first

such meeting since the invasion in June

1944. From SHAEF, army groups,

armies, Continental Advance Section, Advance Section, and base sections they came

to the six-story Marignan building at 33

Champs Elysees that housed the Communications Zone Ordnance office. Over the

building flew an Ordnance flag—the

familiar yellow flaming bomb on a red

field; and as the conferees passed through

the lobby they saw over the elevators a sign

that read: "Let no soldier's ghost ever say

—Ordnance service let me down."

 1

Col. Benjamin S. Mesick came from

SHAEF, General Nisley from 12th Army

Group, and Col. William I. Wilson from

6th Army Group. For the first time, both

army groups were looking to Communications Zone for support, for on 12 February

the Southern Line of Communications supporting U.S. Seventh and French 1st

Armies had been dissolved. This added

Continental Advance Section and Delta

Base to the COMZ sections. Brig. Gen.

Selby H. Frank, formerly Ordnance officer

of SOLOC, had become Sayler's deputy,

and was presiding at the conference; General Smith, Ordnance officer of Seventh

Army, was present, accompanied by Colonel Le Troadec of 1st French Army and

Colonel Artamonoff. From the northern

group of armies came Medaris and Nixon,

and also Lynde in a new role as Ordnance

officer of Fifteenth Army, which was not

yet operational, although its command post

had been set up in Paris early in January.

Warner was absent, for he had pressing

business elsewhere. The day before,

1

 (1) Min, Ordnance Staff Officers Meeting. . .

February 24-25, 1945 (hereafter cited as Ord Staff

Offs Mtg) Ord Serv ETO, Plan and Organ, Annex

43, OHF. (2) "Planned Victory: Top Ordnance

Officers Confer in the European Theater," Army

Ordnance, XXIX, 151 (July-August 1945), p. 74.

(3) Sayler's flag is now in the Ordnance Museum,

APG.
340 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

THE ORDNANCE CONFERENCE IN PARIS, FEBRUARY 1945. Left to right, Colonel

Lynde, Fifteenth Army; Colonel Wilson, 6th Army Group; Colonel Le Troadec, 1st French

Army; Colonel Medaris, First Army; Colonel Nixon, Third Army; General Sayler, Chief

Ordnance Officer, ETO; General Frank, Deputy Chief Ordnance Officer, ETO; General Nisley, 12th Army Group; Brig. Gen. Edward W. Smith, Seventh Army; Col. G. S. Kennedy,

representing Colonel Warner, Ninth Army.

Ninth Army (attached to Field Marshal

Montgomery's 21 Army Group) had

launched its attack across the Roer that

signaled the beginning of the American

final push in Germany.2

How well would the coming campaign

be supported? COMZ officers indicated

that little improvement could be expected

in ammunition supply until fall; on specific

wanted items like HVAP and POZIT

fuzes, everything depended on unpredictable shipments from the United States.

On the other hand, the weapons situation

was good except for a few items such as

heavy artillery tubes. Automotive supply

—a matter of the greatest importance in a

war of movement—was improving. Truck

engines would be short until sometime in

May, but tires and tubes were coming off

production lines in France and Belgium

in increasing numbers: 35,000 were expected in February as compared with

5,000 in January. On the whole, Communications Zone considered the supply

situation "very favorable."

 3

The assembled officers were assured that

the armies could count on well-stocked

general supply depots. There were four

types of depots handling Ordnance Class

II supplies on the Continent: (1) base, of

which there were two, one at Cherbourg

and one at Marseille, both with the function of relieving the ports and supporting

2

 (1) Ord Staff Officers Mtg; (2) Hist Ord

Serv ETO, Plan and Organ, pp. 192, 200-202,

236, OHF.

3

 (1) Ord Staff Officers Mtg, p. 26; (2) For

details on the ammunition and Ordnance Class II

and IV supply situation at this time see Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol II,

pp. 441-43, 453-54.
VICTORY IN GERMANY 341

the intermediate depots; (2) intermediate,

to support the armies; (3) distribution, to

support COMZ units; and (4) advance or

mobile depots to follow the armies. The

Ordnance officers of the armies were most

interested in the intermediate depots;

Medaris, for one, stated bluntly that as far

as First Army was concerned, advance depots were of no value. They were told

that there would eventually be three intermediate depots on the Continent. One,

O-644 at Paris, had been in operation for

some time; O-656 had just been completed

at Antwerp and would be open on 15

March to take over from O-644 the job of

serving First and Ninth Armies; a third

was to be located in the neighborhood of

Nancy to serve the U.S. Seventh and

French 1st Armies.4

Communications Zone's optimistic forecasts were received with reservations by the

Ordnance officers at army level, for most

of them had been badly disillusioned by

their experiences with supply in the fall of

1944. Considerable skepticism on Communications Zone's ability to support the

offensive adequately was aired during the

discussions on the second day of the conference. One problem had been plaguing

the armies for some time—the shortage of

Ordnance service units, particularly tank

and other heavy maintenance companies,

depot, evacuation, and ammunition companies. COMZ agreed at the conference to

assign to the armies from its own service

troops a limited number of those most

urgently needed.5

Toward the end of the meeting, there

was a lively discussion on a topic that had

been introduced by Colonel Mesick of

SHAEF—what to do with captured or surrendered enemy matériel. The basic

directive had been issued in September

1943 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

It provided that all usable captured enemy

matériel that the theater commander did

not need was to be reported to the London

Munitions Assignments Board and that all

unusable matériel, or battle scrap, would

be reported to the Combined Raw Materials Board. After the Normandy invasion, especially after the optimistic predictions at the end of September 1944 that

there would be a collapse or surrender of

the enemy, SHAEF had attempted to set

up guidelines for implementing the directive; the latest directive, then being formulated, declared that disposal would be a

COMZ responsibility, with ADSEC and

CONAD troops taking over progressively

from army troops. The catch in this, as

Mesick admitted, was that SHAEF did not

plan for ADSEC and CONAD to go into

Germany. The heavy burden would presumably fall on the armies, and would take

a tremendous amount of Ordnance manpower, especially the task of collecting and

guarding captured ammunition.

The disposition of enemy matériel, "the

most difficult thing ahead of us," according

to Medaris, was not settled at the conference. In discussing it Medaris made an

4 interesting estimate of the coming cam- (1) Ord Staff Officers Mtg, pp. 17-19; (2)

For a discussion of problems of Ordnance ETO

depot operations in the spring of 1945, including

the changeover in the stock numbering system,

see a trip report by Lt. Col. Gerard M. Ives of the

Ordnance Department, 12 Apr 45, quoted in Hines

History, vol. III, pp. 546-61, OHF.

5

 (1) Ord Off Mtg, pp. 50-53, 74. (2) 12th Army

Gp Ord Sec Rpt, entries 17 Dec 44 to 9 Mar 45.

(3) Ltr, CG 12th Army Gp to SHAEF, 10 Feb 45,

sub: Allocation of Ordnance Service Troops, 12th

Army Gp, 322 Ordnance Units.
342 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

paign: "In the Armies we do not see any

possibility of formal surrender. I do not

think we quite see eye to eye with the

statement that we will fight our way to the

Russian lines. From our G-2 reports we

expect a progressive collapse . . . perhaps

a platoon will surrender one day, a battalion

another, a Division the next and then a

Regiment." The coming defeat of Germany, he believed, would not end in "the

type of surrender where you sit on a rampart and wave a white flag."

 6

Across the Rhine

Ninth Army crossed the swollen Roer in

the rain before dawn on 23 February as

part of Operation GRENADE, 21 Army

Group's offensive from the Roer to the

Rhine. The first elements, infantrymen of

the 30th, 29th, 102d, and 84th Divisions,

crossed in assault boats, preceded by

a 45-minute artillery preparation from a

thousand guns that shook the earth and

illuminated the sky along the narrow 30-

mile Ninth Army front from Düren on the

south to Roermond on the north. Next

day, after the infantry had established a

bridgehead, tanks, tank destroyers, field

artillery and division supply trains crossed

on bridges constructed by the Engineers.7

Thanks to Ninth Army Ordnance, the

firepower of the tank destroyers and tanks

had been considerably increased before the

Roer crossing: two tank destroyer battalions had been converted from 3-inch

guns to 90-mm. guns; one M5 light tank

battalion had been supplied with the new

M24 tanks; and the 76-mm. gun had been

substituted for the 75-mm. in the M4A3E2

"assault tanks." The advance armor met

stiff resistance on the east bank of the

Roer by remnants of several German panzer divisions, but this was momentary.

Time was running out for the enemy.

Some of the German tankers were forced

to fight as infantry because they had no

gasoline; and on 28 February, when the

weather cleared, the panzers suffered punishing attacks from American fighterbomber pilots who claimed sixteen tanks. At

one point fighter pilots swooped down on

a slugging match between Shermans and

Tigers and damaged six of the Tigers.8

By 11 March, Ninth Army's XIX, XIII,

and XVI Corps had closed to the Rhine,

and GRENADE was over. But Ninth Army

had lost its chance to capture a bridge

when the last one in its sector was blown

by the Germans on 5 March, and its

chance of being the first American army

over the Rhine, for First Army crossed over

its bridge at Remagen on 7 March. By

order of Field Marshal Montgomery, who

wanted the crossing co-ordinated with that

of his British and Canadian armies, Ninth's

Rhine crossing (code name FLASHPOINT)

was not to take place until 24 March.9

Colonel Warner's efforts to provide Ordnance support for both GRENADE and

FLASHPOINT were essentially similar, for

both operations involved a river crossing

with a fast-moving action anticipated on

the far bank. Also, in both operations

there was a delay of about two weeks before the jump-off (in GRENADE to allow

the Roer to subside after the dams were

broken, and in FLASHPOINT because of

Montgomery's plan) that gave him time to

6

 Ord Staff Officers Mtg, pp. 38-43, 69-73. 7

 Conquer, pp. 161-75.

8

 (1) NUSA Ord Rpt, 15 Feb 45. (2) Conquer,

p. 181. 9

 Conquer, pp. 199-243.
VICTORY IN GERMANY 343

bring up supplies. He was able to keep

his ammunition stocks at around 40,000

tons. His Class II and IV supply situation was good at the time of the Rhine

crossing, partly because losses at the Roer

were lighter than expected, partly because

he had expedited the flow of tanks and

other items by close liaison with COMZ

depots and by using army personnel to bring

supplies into the army area. In February

and March, Ninth Army received 484

Sherman tanks. To provide the armored

forces with quick replacements, Warner set

up a mobile depot to supply armored

equipment to front-line troops, operating

it with a converted antiaircraft maintenance company, the 300th. The forward

issue depot was so successful in GRENADE

that it was repeated in FLASHPOINT. It

was not easy to keep the heavy equipment

moving. For one thing, the Class 40 Engineer bridges over the Rhine would not

take a tank transporter with its load.

Drivers had to unload tanks at the bridge,

drive them across, and load them again on

the opposite side. But in spite of these

and other troubles, the forward issue depot

managed to keep within usable distance of

even the speedy 2d Armored Division in its

dash to the Elbe, and for this feat received

a handsome commendation from the

tankers.10

The versatility of Ordnance maintenance

companies was also demonstrated by the

use of a heavy tank maintenance company

to process and test the hundred LVT's

used by XVI Corps in the initial Ninth

Army Rhine crossing. The company was

augmented with all the Ninth Army Ordnance men who had had any experience

with LVT maintenance, and the problem

of nonexistent spare parts was met by cannibalizing the LVT's that had been

wrecked in the Roer crossing. The LVT's

were especially valuable in the Rhine crossing because they required no special river

entrances or exits. The other Navy landing craft that were used, the LCM's and

LCVP's, and the Seamules were much

heavier and harder to handle.11

Evacuation companies with M25 tank

transporters were used to help the Navy

bring the assault boats up to the Rhine.

This was done not only in the Ninth

Army crossing but in Third Army crossings around Mainz on 22-23 March.

The Navy men would lash a huge cradle

to the transporter with ropes, lift the big

LCM with a crane so that the transporter

could drive under it, and then lower the

craft into the cradle, creating "a monster

on wheels" (as one Third Army historian

described it), seventy-two feet long and

more than seventeen feet high. For the first

time, the big M25 tank transporters looked

small. When the strange, unwieldy convoys made their journeys to the Rhine,

towns had to be bypassed because the rigs

could not turn sharp corners, roads had to

be widened, bridges reinforced, communications wires lifted so that they would not be

torn down, and obstacles ahead blown up

by demolition squads. When the monsters

reached the Rhine, leaving behind them in

places a wake of branches from trees along

10

 (1) NUSA Ord Rpts for Feb, Mar, Apr; (2)

Hist 300th Maintenance Company AA, with ltr, Lt

Col Allan L. Harts, Ord Off 2d Armored Division to

Ordnance Officer NUSA 26 Apr 45, sub: Commendation, in ETO Ord Sec Files, KCRC; (3)

Hist 486th Evac Co, 23 May 45, ETO Ord Sec,

KCRC.

11

 (1) NUSA Ord Sec Rpt 15 Mar 45. (2) Hist

561st Ord HM Co (Tank), 15 Feb 43-7 Nov 45.

(3) Conquer, p. 246.
344 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

the roads, the transporter crews backed

them into the water and unloaded the landing craft, working up to the zero hour

under shellfire from German 88's across the

river. Sometimes they had trouble shaking off their loads. One Ninth Army transporter after being hit by an 88 shell had to

be completely submerged before the landing craft could be pulled free.12

When Seventh Army crossed the Rhine

in the Worms area on 26 March, all of the

four front-line American armies were on

the far bank, leaving the Fifteenth behind

as a semioccupation army. First Army,

breaking out of the Remagen bridgehead,

joined elements of Ninth Army at Lippstadt

on 2 April, thus encircling the huge Ruhr

industrial area. First Army then sent III

and XVIII Corps west and north to join

with other elements of Ninth Army in

cleaning out the Ruhr pocket and directed

V and VII Corps east toward Leipzig and

the Hartz Mountains. Part of Ninth Army

also kept going east; on the evening of 11

April, 2d Armored Division's Combat Command B, having covered 226 miles in nineteen days, was at Magdeburg and Schönebeck—the first Americans to reach the

Elbe. By 19 April all resistance in the

Ruhr pocket had ceased and First Army's

V and VII Corps stood on the west bank

of the Mulde River, where a few days later

they made contact with the Russians.

Meantime, Third Army had been turned

south to aid Seventh in mopping up southern Germany.13

Ordnance service to all the armies was

mainly concerned with pushing supplies

forward and keeping the trucks rolling. By

the second week in April two rail bridges

were in operation over the Rhine, one at

Wesel, the other at Mainz, but rail traffic

beyond the Rhine did not supplant truck

transportation until about the last two

weeks of the war in Europe, after the armies

in the north were halted at the Elbe and

Mulde.14 With the help of Quartermaster

truck companies, the considerable lift provided by the tank transporters of the evacuation battalions, which carried not only

tanks but gasoline and ammunition, and

by loading the Ordnance companies and

replacement vehicles with all they could

carry, the armies moved their supplies forward. The main problem was keeping up

with the fast-moving combat troops along

a 200-mile front. Enemy resistance—consisting toward the end mainly of sporadic

fire from 88-mm. antiaircraft guns, small

arms, and Panzerfausts—grew weaker

every day.

When the supply and maintenance trains

set out the roads were bad, disintegrating

from the spring thaw and from the winter's

pounding by heavy military vehicles; but

once the trucks got past the West Wall and

onto the Rhine plains they could make excellent time. Sometimes the Ordnance

units were ahead of the infantry and armor,

getting into combat and taking prisoners;

sometimes, bypassing pockets of enemy

resistance, they even got ahead of the Germans. One Third Army ammunition company (the 620th) had its ammunition sup12 ply point overrun by German troops at- Histories 458th, 471st, 486th, and 498th Ord

Evacuation Cos, KCRC. 13

 (1) Seventh Army Rpt, Vol III, pp. 755-

837; (2) Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp. 528-31;

(3) Conquer, p. 298; (4) FUSA Ord Sec Rpt 1

Apr-8 May 45.

14

 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies,

Vol II, pp. 409-12.
VICTORY IN GERMANY 345

LCM's BEING MOVED TO THE RHINE FOR THIRD ARMY CROSSING

tempting to escape to the east, and lost to

the enemy eleven men killed or wounded.15

Speeding over the autobahns, the Ordnance men were reminded of the race

across France the preceding fall. The

autobahns were wide enough for ammunition supply points to be strung out along

their edges, though the ASP's were hardly

set up until they had to be moved forward.

Everywhere the men found excellent, if

temporary, shop space and living quarters

in factories, breweries, and German barracks, and thanks to their earlier experience

they were veterans, able to move forward

with what First Army Ordnance Section

described as "almost circus-like" precision,

breaking bivouac and setting up shops and

ASP's in new areas without interrupting

their service to the combat forces.16 And

victory was in the air. By mid-April 12th

Army Group was rounding up trumpets

and drums for the V-E Day celebration,

instructing the armies to supplement their

meager supplies of band instruments with

German instruments to be found in the

huge stocks of enemy matériel that were

being overrun in every sector.17

15

 (1) Histories 974th Ord Evacuation Co (Coll)

Feb 43-May 45; 107th Medium Maint Co, and

other unit histories. (2) Third Army Rpt II, Ord

Sec, p. 29.

16

 (1) FUSA and NUSA Ord Sec Rpts, March,

Apr 45; (2) Seventh Army Rpt III, pp. 735-77;

(3) 12th Army Gp Ord Sec Rpt 10 Mar-9 May

45; (4) ADSEC Ord Sec Hist, pp. 21-26; (5)

Histories 7th, 107th, 126th, 255th, 302d MM Cos;

300th and 305th MM Cos (AA); 889th HAM Co;

85th and 552d HM Cos (Tk); 100th and 101st

Amm Bns. 17

 SHAEF Daily Report from 12th Army Group,

11 Apr 45, SHAEF G-4 319.1 Daily Reports to

ACofS G-4-12th Army Group Vol I 1945.
346 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

COLONEL MEDARIS EXAMINING CAPTURED GERMAN WEAPONS

Captured Enemy Matériel

German towns yielded stacks and piles

of rifles, pistols, shotguns, knives, bayonets,

ammunition, demolition charges, hand

grenades, and Panzerfausts that had been

turned in to the burgomeister by the townspeople; the Ruhr and other manufacturing

regions yielded big industrial plants; and as

the armies penetrated deeper into Germany

they came upon ordnance depots, ammunition dumps, and proving grounds abandoned by the fleeing Wehrmacht. The

tactical units who discovered these great

stores had the job of protecting them, particularly such items as small arms, explosives, grenades, Panzerfausts, and boobytrap components that could easily be used

by enemy snipers or saboteurs. Thereafter,

procedures for handling captured weapons,

ammunition, and other ordnance items

varied between First, Ninth, and Third

Armies—the three armies in whose areas

the greatest amounts of captured enemy

matériel were found.

Anticipating the size of the job, on 17

March 1945—a few days before the breakout at the Remagen bridgehead—Medaris

set up in his First Army Ordnance Section

an Enemy Property Division, consisting of

three officers and six enlisted men, and

gave it responsibility for enemy matériel.
VICTORY IN GERMANY 347

For the task of locating, guarding, controlling, inventorying, and disposing of it,

he used a new battalion headquarters just

assigned to him, the 190th, placing under it

an evacuation company (collecting), a

depot company, an ammunition company,

a heavy maintenance (field army) company, and a bomb disposal platoon and

squad. Augmented with hired Italian

displaced persons and additional trucks,

and working under the Enemy Property

Division, the battalion collected, examined,

and catalogued enemy installations and

matériel, on occasion sending out search

parties to supplement the information received from tactical units. In April, as

hundreds of installations of an ordnance

nature were uncovered, the search teams

were given "targets"—especially vital factories, plants, and dumps—to look for; and

the battalion received another ammunition

company and two bomb disposal squads to

help evacuate and safeguard vast quantities of enemy ammunition and explosives.

Ammunition was found not only in enemy

dumps, but around gun positions, along

roads, on rail cars, and underground, and

was the greatest problem of all.18

Ninth Army early in April gave its three

corps the responsibility for policing captured and overrun matériel, instructing

them to use for this purpose any units under

their control that were not engaged in combat and to use a minimum of army Ordnance units. Corps collecting points for

this type of matériel were to be operated

separately from army collecting points.

Later in the month, when combat had virtually ceased, corps delegated the job to the

divisions.19 In Third Army, beyond assigning to the 82d (Ammunition) Ordnance

Group the task of disposing of captured or

abandoned equipment that threatened security, Nixon did not set up any special

machinery for dealing with captured enemy

matériel, but by the end of April the problem had become so great that he was contemplating the assignment of an Ordnance

battalion to handle it. In Seventh Army,

the job was handled by the forward Ordnance Group, the 55th, which was furnished by the rear group with a heavy automotive company to provide men for investigating, inventorying, guarding, and

evacuating captured enemy matériel.20

In all the areas, a great deal of enemy

ammunition was exploded under the supervision of the heroic, indispensable bomb

disposal squads. For this dangerous work

the squads had not been adequately trained.

Their training had been directed toward

handling enemy bombs, which were the big

threat at the time the squads were formed.

But very early in operations on the Continent, after the Luftwaffe was all but

driven from the skies, "bomb disposal" became a misnomer (except for the Air Forces

units), because the main job was the disposal of enemy munitions on the ground.

This was especially true of units serving

the armies: between D-day and V-E Day

the work of Army bomb disposal squads

in terms of tonnages was 92 percent munitions and only 8 percent bombs; that of the

COMZ squads was 82 percent munitions 18

 FUSA Ord Rpts Mar 45, apps. III and VIII

and Apr 45, apps. II and VIII. A successful experiment with air searchers for ammunition proved that

a trained observer could not only distinguish types

of ammunition from the air but even estimate tonnages. App. VIII to Rpt of Mar 45, p. 3.

19

 (1) Ninth Army Ord Sec for period ending

30 Apr 45; (2) AAR XIII and XIX Corps Ord

Secs Apr 45. 20

 (1) Third Army Rpt II, Ord Sec, p. 27; (2)

Hist 55th Ord Group, Apr 45.
348 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

and 18 percent bombs. The lack of training in handling munitions was reflected in

the very high casualty rate. Out of 972

U.S. bomb disposal men in the European

theater, including officers and enlisted men,

111 were killed or wounded in their operational role. Thirty-nine were killed and 48

were wounded handling munitions, only 4

killed and 20 wounded handling bombs.

In addition, four were killed and nine

wounded in combat.21

Occasionally the German dumps and factories yielded artillery ammunition that

could be fired from American guns. In

some areas 88-mm. guns and 155-mm.

enemy howitzers as well as ammunition

were turned over to the American artillerymen to use in combat. At the Zeiss Optical

Plant in Jena First Army picked up valuable optical equipment. On the whole,

however, the armies used little captured

equipment except motor vehicles and such

automotive parts as springs, gaskets, and

bearings. When First Army near Zehla

Mehlis ran into one of the largest centers

of small arms manufacture in Germany—

more than fifty manufacturers of pistols,

shotguns, and rifles—it evacuated most of

the weapons to Communications Zone. On

the other hand, in the advance toward the

Elbe one First Army division, the 69th,

was using 60 German sedans, 50 buses, 150

trucks, and 250 trailers.22

Of particular interest to Ordnance in the

great stocks of captured matériel were the

intelligence items—specimens of new German weapons that would be sent to the

United States for study, notably the V-1,

V-2, and other rocket weapons. They

were found not only at factories, laboratories, and proving grounds, but in boxcars

on railroad sidings and hidden in mines

and tunnels. Investigating and reporting

on these important finds was the job of the

Ordnance Intelligence Teams that were

attached to all the armies.

Ordnance Technical Intelligence

When combat troops came across new

German weapons, normally they reported

them to the army Ordnance officer, who

passed the information on to the Ordnance

Technical Intelligence Teams. By February 1945 each army had such a team,

consisting of four officers and from four to

six enlisted men (most on temporary duty

from Aberdeen Proving Ground), as well

as technicians, a clerk, an interpreter, and

a draftsman. Often corps or division commanders called on the teams for information on the characteristics and capabilities

of new enemy equipment, and this knowledge was immensely helpful to the commanders in planning tactics and developing

Countermeasures.23

Behind the army teams were smaller

teams attached to ADSEC and CONAD

and a 14-man COMZ team (5 officers, 9

21

 (1) Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning

Munitions for War, pp. 147-49; (2) Bomb Disposal

squad histories in ETO Ord Sec files, KCRC; (3)

Ord Serv ETO, Ordnance Technical Services, Sec

V, Bomb Disposal, pp. 21-35; (4) USFET Bd

Rpt, Ord Sec, Study No. 100, p. 38. (5) For early

plans and organization in the ETO (pre-invasion)

see above, pp. 231-32. 22

 (1) FUSA Ord Sec Rpt Apr 45, app. VIII.

(2) Ord Serv ETO, Personnel and Public Relations, Annex 1. (3) AAR, XIX and XIII Corps

Ord Secs, Apr 45. XIII Corps recaptured 15 American trucks near Klotze Forest and discovered that

the Germans had taken excellent care of them.

Ibid. 23

 (1) Ord Serv ETO, Ordnance Technical Services, Sec I, Enemy Equipment Intelligence, pp.

8-14, 19-21, OHF; (2) For background, recruitment, and training of the Ordnance Intelligence

teams in the U.S. see Green, Thomson, and Roots,

Planning Munitions for War, pp. 259-67.
VICTORY IN GERMANY 349

enlisted men). All reported to COMZ

Ordnance Section's Enemy Equipment Intelligence Branch (EEIB), headed by Col.

Holger N. Toftoy, which consisted of 12 officers, 17 enlisted men, and a civilian technician, and was organized into seven units:

Special Advisors, Field Coordinators, Shipping and Requirements, Drafting, Library,

Reports, and a staff unit composed of specialists on ammunition, small arms, and

automotive, artillery, fire control, and

underwater-mine matériel.24

When the big push into Germany began,

the armies advanced so rapidly that the tactical units did not have time to report new

items; for this reason a good deal of enemy

matériel was discovered by the men of the

intelligence teams, who had a "search list"

supplied them by EEIB's Shipping and Requirements Section. SHAEF had decreed

that the first specimen of each item discovered be shipped to England, because the

U.S. Army had no proving ground in Europe. The second specimen would be sent

to Aberdeen Proving Ground. The EEIB

men resented the arrangement but could

do nothing about it, since higher authority

refused to sanction the establishment of an

American proving ground on the Continent.25

After the Rhine crossing, the teams were

swamped. They had to investigate every

lead, no matter how unprofitable; they had

to explore huge installations, many of which

were underground, and sometimes had to

seek out the inventor of a new weapon in

order to fill in the details; often they had

to evacuate important items to safer areas.

By mid-April the pressure on the army

teams had become so great that most of the

EEIB staff had to be sent forward to help

them, and Sayler was cabling home for

twelve more officers and twenty-two more

enlisted men. Items of the greatest importance for future Ordnance research had

been discovered—V-1, V-2 and other types

of rocket matériel; new artillery, such as

the German 128-mm. gun mounted on a

Russian carriage; and new ammunition

like the 88-mm. incendiary shrapnel antiaircraft shell—and time was short. With

inadequate means and manpower, Colonel

Toftoy soon felt, as he reported to Paris,

like a "mouse trying to chew down a huge

oak tree." His problems were increased

rather than lessened with the arrival of the

Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee (CIOS) teams sent out by the Combined Chiefs of Staff early in 1945 because

he had to furnish assistance to these groups.

And the demands of the field forces continued up to V-E Day; for example, commanders were demanding identification

photographs of Russian tanks in preparation for the meeting of the American and

Soviet forces at the Elbe.26

After V-E Day

On the evening of 7 May 1945, the radio

announced Germany's unconditional surrender. V-E Day, proclaimed as 8 May,

was celebrated by Ordnance units in the

five armies in various ways. Many were

given a holiday—for some of the veterans

of the Mediterranean in the Seventh Army

24

 Ord Serv ETO, Ordnance Technical Services,

Sec I. 25 Ibid.

26

 (1) Toftoy Report of Activities 1-15 Apr 45

in Ord Serv ETO, Ordnance Technical Services,

Sec I. (2) On the search for rocket matériel and

scientists see MS, William H. Peifer, Army Rockets,

Missiles and Satellites, ch. III, Operation Paperclip, OCMH.
350 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

area, the first official holiday in more than

two years of service overseas. In other

areas the men attended special church services and then returned to work; or played

ball, or held long discussions about what

the future held for them. In First Army

on 9 May there were company and battalion

formations and addresses by Medaris and

the group commanders. There was no wild

rejoicing; many of the men took the news

with "sober faces," feeling that their job

was only half done.27

The immediate job for the maintenance

men was to catch up on the backlog of

work that had accumulated during the

drive into Germany; the next was the inspection and repair of the weapons and vehicles that were going to the Pacific. Ninth

Army inaugurated on V-E Day an ambitious program for the classification and calibration of artillery weapons. The work

was done at Hillersleben, the great German

artillery proving ground near Magdeburg,

where the Ordnance men found technical

facilities on a scale that had no counterpart

in the United States—according to one

unit, "a maintenance company's dream."

Here the big guns and howitzers, some of

which had been in constant service since the

landings in North Africa, were test-fired,

star-gaged, given new tubes and recoil

mechanisms if necessary, and generally

made ready to play their part in the war

against Japan. The Hillersleben operation was singled out by a Senate subcommittee that visited the proving ground on

26 May as an example of the prompt, efficient, and generally "businesslike job"

being done in reconditioning weapons for

redeployment.28

Redeployment planning had begun in the

United States at the end of July 1944, with

1 October 1944 as the assumed date of the

collapse of Germany. Later revisions of

mid-March 1945, in effect on V-E Day,

had provided that economically repairable

items going to the Pacific would be repaired

in the European theater to the limit of

available facilities. The major portion of

this task fell obviously to Communications

Zone, which set up collecting points in the

ADSEC areas at which equipment turned

in by combat units was inspected, classified,

and shipped back to appropriate COMZ

shops. Tanks and other heavy tracked

matériel, for example, were to be turned in

to Depot O-6022, set up in a steel mill at

Butzbach near Frankfort, and then shipped

back for fifth echelon repair to Depot O690 in Brussels.29

 Ammunition—to the limit

of packaging material available—was to be

sent direct to the Pacific. Requirements

for that area were greatest in heavy artillery ammunition (on which ETO had long

had priority), mortar ammunition, grenades, rockets, and small arms.30

27

 Histories, 261st and 300 th MM Cos (AA),

553d HM Co (Tk), 45th and 212th Ord Bns, and

59th Ord Gp.

28

 (1) Ninth Army Ord Sec for period ending

15 May 45. (2) Col. W. W. Warner, "The Nazi

Race for Superweapons: Hillersleben Proving

Ground a Model of German Research," Army

Ordnance, XXIX, 153 (November-December 1945),

pp. 420-22. (3) The Hillersleben Proving Grounds,

Ord Serv ETO, Personnel and Public Relations,

Annex 1. (4) Hist 16th MM Co., 24 May 45,

KCRC. (5) 79th Cong, 1st Sess, Senate Rpt No.

no, Part 2, Investigation of the National Defense

Program, pp. 10, 30. 29

 (1) OCO, Office Chief of Planning, FS, "Field

Service Plan for Demobilization and Redeployment," Book II [hereafter cited as FS Plan Bk II]

app. B, sec. III, p. 4, OHF. (2) Hines History,

Vol V, pp. E-353-54, E-362. 30

 FS Plan, Book II, Ord Amm Implementation

of the ASF Basic Supply Plan, Period I, p. 2 and

Revised Ammo Table, 15 Mar 45.
VICTORY IN GERMANY 351

The hardest problem for the planners

was what to do about wheeled vehicles—

not the special purpose type like DUKW's

and tank transporters, which had to be

reconditioned and redeployed to the maximum because they were scarce in the

United States—but the general purpose

vehicles. Most of these had seen hard

service in Europe. How many were worth

repairing? Ordnance planners estimated

that 60 percent would be recoverable; of

these vehicles, 30 percent could be shipped

to the Pacific without major overhaul, 35

percent would be repaired in Europe before shipment to the Pacific, and the remaining 35 percent would be returned to

the United States for repair and return to

stock.31

These figures had to be revised drastically downward after V-E Day. To obtain

a firsthand report on how many trucks

were repairable, and whether there were

enough factories, men, and parts overseas

to do the job, General Somervell early in

June 1945 sent to European and Mediterranean theaters a committee of civilians

from industry, accompanied by Maj. Gen.

Julian S. Hatcher, chief of Ordnance's

Field Service. These men were asked to

take into account the liberated areas' desperate need for trucks to haul such essentials as food, fuel, and building materials.

Basing their findings on Ordnance serviceability standards for overseas shipment,

they reported that only about 35 percent

of the jeeps and trucks (excluding trailers)

in the ETO could be reconditioned in the

theater for redeployment. They recommended that the rest be turned over to the

liberated areas. Discussions on the feasibility of returning trucks to the United States

for repair continued in the United States

throughout the summer of 1945. A study

made in Ordnance Field Service after V-J

Day, showing the cost of returning vehicles

from the ETO, indicated that it was uneconomical to return to the United States

any general purpose vehicles from overseas theaters.32

Long before decisions on the redeployment of matériel were firm, the machinery

for the redeployment of men got under

way. When First Army headquarters was

pulled out of the line shortly after V-E Day,

destined for the Pacific via the United

States, First Army Ordnance units were

assigned to Ninth and Third Armies. By

the end of May a general reshuffling and

realignment of Ordnance units in all the

armies had begun.33 Within the units,

there were drastic changes brought about

by the War Department's redeployment

criteria, announced shortly after V-E Day.

All men over forty-two years of age were

eligible for discharge, as were all those with

an Adjusted Service Rating (ASR) of

eighty-five points, based on length of service, service overseas, combat service, and

parenthood. The rest would be divided

between Category I, men who would remain in Europe, and Category II, men who

would be redeployed to the Pacific, either

31FS Plan, Bk II, Appendices on Quantities &

Procedural Details, Second Revised Edition, 15

Mar 45, app. G-1.

32

 (1) Hines History, Vol V, pp. E-229-31 and

Vol VI, pp. E-502-14. Of the 102,027 21⁄2-ton

trucks on hand in the ETO on 1 June 45 (after

deduction of 15,394 for Army of Occupation and

overhead) only 35,709 could be reconditioned.

Ibid., p. E-507. (2) ASF Maint Div Files, 451

Vehicles July 1945. (3) Hist, OCO Field Service,

Vol XII, Part 1, Demobilization History, OHF. 33

 (1) G-4 Rpt No. 35, 15 May 45, 12th Army

Gp, 319.1 G-4 Rpts (NUSA), Vol I. (2) 12th

Army Gp Ord Sec Jnl, 7 May 45.
352 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

directly or through the United States.34

The point system played havoc with the

Ordnance units, for like most service organizations they contained many older men

with families, as well as many who had

arrived in England or the Mediterranean

early in the war. Some of the units were

all but wiped out, especially in the Seventh

Army area; for example, the headquarters

of the 55th Ordnance Group had to be

entirely reconstituted because all of the men

were veterans with long service in the Mediterranean; their commanding officer, Colonel McGrath, with 136 points, was the

lowest man in his unit on points. In all

the armies, the replacements for high-point

Ordnance men were generally unskilled

and therefore unsuited to the enormous

task of reconditioning the flood of damaged

matériel that poured into Ordnance installations.35

In the case of the Ordnance men not

eligible for discharge, some preferred going

to the Pacific to staying with the Army of

Occupation, for their memories of Europe

were sad and bitter—"too many white

crosses," as one First Army officer put it—

too many friends killed or missing.36 Among

the missing, none had been mourned more

sincerely than Colonel Ray, the First Army

ammunition officer, who had not been seen

after he left headquarters in his jeep for

Waimes on that fateful December afternoon when the Germans struck in the Ardennes.37

 But Ray's story had a happy ending.

Shortly before V-E Day he telephoned the

First Army Ordnance office from a German prisoner of war camp in the Third

Army area. A car was dispatched for him,

and he was brought back amid general

rejoicing (the memo from Bradley to Patton

requesting his return received thirteen endorsements en route) in time to sail for the

United States with the rest of the First

Army staff, bound for the Pacific.38

At the staging areas for units going to the

Pacific, the men were given maps and lectures on the climate and terrain. They

were shown a movie, On to Tokyo. They

studied Japanese tactics, and the island-byisland advance by the American forces on

the other side of the world. Operations in

the war against Japan had come a long

way since the early victory in Papua.39

34

 FS Plan, Book II, apps. A, F. 35

 (1) USFET Bd Rpt No. 101, pp. 25-26, 30.

(2) Hist, 3406th MAM Co, Jan-May, Aug-Sep 45.

(3) McGrath Interv. 36

 Interv with Wilton B. Moats, former CO 51st

Ord Gp, 2 Mar 61.

37

 See above, p. 304. 38

 Hansen Interv. 39

 (1) History 3544th Medium Auto Maint Co.

(2) Seventh Army Rpt 1944-45, III, p. 837. (3)

Conquer, p. 362.
CHAPTER XIX

From Papua to Morotai

At the time the Allied forces in England

were arming for the grand campaign in

Europe, the Allied forces in the Pacific

were beginning the campaign that was to

take them to the Philippines, Iwo Jima,

and Okinawa. It was a two-pronged drive.

In the Central Pacific the big push from

Hawaii to Okinawa began with the capture

of bases in the Gilbert Islands in November

1943.1 In the Southwest Pacific by October 1943 the Allies, having landed at Lae

and Salamaua and seized a good airfield at

Nadzab, had advanced up the New Guinea

coast as far as Finschhafen. This small

advance accounted for only about 150 miles

of the 2,500 miles that stretched north from

Buna to Manila; but at least it was a beginning, and in the nine months that had

gone by since the end of the Papua Campaign, the U.S. forces in SWPA had come

a long way in terms of strength and experience.2

There was now an American army in the

Southwest Pacific. General MacArthur's

request early in 1943 for a tactical organization higher than corps had resulted in the

activation of Sixth Army under the command of Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger. The

advance elements of its headquarters arrived in Brisbane by air on 7 February

1943. Among them were Krueger's Ordnance officer, Col. Philip G. Blackmore,

and his Ordnance Section's automotive officer, Maj. Ray H. Brundidge, who had

come over to Ordnance from the Quartermaster Corps. Five days later Blackmore's

operations officer, 1st Lt. Clifton B. Nelson, and three of the Ordnance Section's

fifteen enlisted men arrived at Brisbane on

the second flight group and opened an office at Sixth Army's new headquarters at

Camp Columbia, about ten miles west of

Brisbane. The rest of Sixth Army's Ordnance Section came by sea, landing from

the Klip Fontein on 17 April. Among

them were two additional key officers:

Capt. Joseph L. Douda, an expert on weapon and optical instrument repair; and 1st

Lt. Clinton A. Waggoner, an ammunition

expert.3

By the time the rear echelon arrived,

Colonel Blackmore and the first group had

had two months to get acquainted with the

1

 For Ordnance support in the Central Pacific,

see below, pp. 445-53. 2

 For the Lae-Salamaua-Nadzab-Finschhafen

operations, see John Miller, jr., CARTWHEEL:

The Reduction of Rabaul, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959),

ch. XI.

3

 (1) History of Ordnance Section, Headquarters

Sixth Army, 27 January 1943-15 December 1945

(hereafter cited as History Sixth Army Ord Sec),

pp. 3, 7, OHF. (2) Comments on MS chs. XIX

through XXI, Brig Gen Philip G. Blackmore (USA

Ret) (hereafter cited as Blackmore Comments),

OCMH. Douda, described by Blackmore as "a

little fellow with a wonderful smile," was an experienced machinist. When Krueger was promoted

to general, Douda made his 4-star insignia, using

Australian silver money. Ibid.
354 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

COLONEL BLACKMORE

Ordnance men in USASOS and the base

sections, to find out the amount and kind

of Ordnance stocks in the theater; to become familiar with the Ordnance units that

were going to be assigned to Sixth Army;

and to learn something about the job ahead

of them. Sixth Army was small to begin

with, in comparison with the armies being

readied for the European campaign, but it

included all the tactical U.S. Army units

in the Southwest Pacific Area, and they

were widely scattered. Under Sixth Army

came General Eichelberger's I Corps with

the two divisions that had fought in Papua,

the 32d and the 41st. The 32d had been

sent back to Australia and was undergoing

training near Brisbane; the 41st was still in

the Dobodura region in Papua getting

ready for further operations in New Guinea

under Australian command. The 1st

Marine Division (under General Krueger's

operational control) had been sent to Melbourne after the hard fighting on Guadalcanal.4

 Among the smaller units under

Sixth Army, some in Papua, some in Australia, were two antiaircraft brigades, a

parachute infantry regiment, an infantry

regiment, and a field artillery battalion.

And up the coast from Brisbane in northern Queensland was a unit on which a

great deal depended, the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, which was specially trained in

amphibious operations.5

Amphibious landings were vital to MacArthur in the execution of his mission—

Task 3 as ordered by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff directive of 2 July 1942—the reduction of Rabaul, the great Japanese base in

the Bismarck Archipelago. By amphibious

landings, MacArthur would seize air and

naval bases in the Bismarck Archipelagoeastern New Guinea-Solomons area, bases

that would render Rabaul impotent. For

his beach landings he needed amphibian

engineers and he needed landing craft. The

2d Engineer Special Brigade arrived in

Australia early in 1943 with the Southwest Pacific's first DUKW's, but getting

the landing craft took longer. Because all

deck space on cargo ships bound for Australia was needed for planes, the bulky

LCVP's had to be shipped knocked down

and it took a long time to get the assembly

plant at Cairns in operation and then to

accomplish training with the new craft.

In May when the first detachment of amphibian engineers took off from Brisbane

for Port Moresby no LCVP's were avail4

 (1) Hq Sixth Army, Rpt of Ord Activities for

Feb-Mar 43, OHF. (2) For the Guadalcanal story

see Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive. 5

 (1) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, p. 7. (2)

Gen. Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1953),

p. 6.
FROM PAPUA TO MOROTAI 355

able. They took with them ten LCM's

obtained from the Navy.6

The time was getting ripe for MacArthur's next move. Late in April, about a

week after the Ordnance Section's rear

echelon arrived at Camp Columbia, bits of

information began trickling into the Ordnance office about a proposed operation to

take two small islands in the Solomon Sea,

Woodlark and Kiriwina, north of the southeastern tip of Papua. Troop dispositions

were a regimental combat team reinforced

with field and antiaircraft artillery and

supporting service units, mounted for the

assault on Woodlark from Townsville and

on Kiriwina from Milne Bay. The Ordnance Section men assumed that it was only

a command post exercise, but after two

weeks of computing requirements for supply and resupply and planning Ordnance

troop support, they learned that the operation was real. It was called CHRONICLE

and D-day was set at 30 June 1943.

For the assault on Woodlark a 6,868-

man task force composed of the 112th

Cavalry reinforced by a Marine battalion

and supporting units (including a U.S.

Navy construction battalion to build an airstrip and roads) and appropriately designated LEATHERBACK was sent to Townsville from the South Pacific. The task

force brought with it three officers and 102

enlisted men who were former members of

the maintenance platoon of a South Pacific

Quartermaster truck company but were

now Ordnance. To this unit the Sixth

Army Ordnance Section attached officers

and men to handle ammunition work and

repair weapons, thus creating a Provisional

Ordnance Company of 5 officers and 112

enlisted men, which was to make an excellent record under the ingenious and expert

leadership of Capt. Francis J. Connelly.

For the assault on Kiriwina, BYPRODUCT

Task Force (approximate strength 8,415),

composed of the 158th Infantry reinforced

with artillery units and service troops, including Army engineers to build roads and

an airstrip, was assembled from various

stations in the Australia-New Guinea area

and concentrated at Milne Bay. For BYPRODUCT the Ordnance troop plans were

almost the reverse of those for LEATHERBACK. The 158th Infantry had been intended for use primarily as an on-foot

jungle scouting and patrolling unit; therefore its 35-man organic Ordnance maintenance detachment, the 4th, was designed

only to repair weapons. A sizable detachment of motor maintenance men (3 officers

and 72 enlisted men), as well as a 50-man

ammunition detachment, had to be added,

and even this relatively large force of automotive repair men was not able to overcome the handicap of miserable roads.7

After the plans for the operation were

final, part of the Ordnance Section moved

up to Milne Bay with a detachment of

Headquarters, Sixth Army, in mid-June.

The men found conditions at Milne Bay

6

 (1) Miller, CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of

Rabaul, pp. 5-6. (2) Brig. Gen. William F. Heavey,

Down Ramp! The Story of the Army Amphibian

Engineers (Washington: Infantry Journal Press,

1947), pp. 28, 48-50. (3) Office of the Chief

Engineer, General Headquarters, Army Forces,

Pacific, "Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, 1941-

1945," vol. IV, Amphibian Engineer Operations

(hereafter cited as Engineers of SWPA IV) (Washington, 1959), pp. 38-48.

7

 (1) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, pp. 8-9, 11-

12, and app. C. After Woodlark, the Provisional

Ordnance Company was disbanded and its personnel transferred to the 3142d Ordnance Medium

Maintenance Company. (2) Krueger, From Down

Under to Nippon, p. 21. (3) Miller, CARTWHEEL:

The Reduction of Rabaul, pp. 53-54. (4) Blackmore Comments.
356 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

(USASOS Base A) disheartening. In the

Ordnance area at Waga Waga, muddy and

full of water holes, the depot office was

housed in a little thatched roof hut with a

quarter wall of sago palm and a rough

plank floor. Stocks of small arms, optical

instruments, watches, and cleaning and

preserving materials were crammed in two

small canvas-covered frame structures,

along with boxes of parts that had been

broken open to make issues (there were no

bins) or to search for parts (there were no

exterior markings or packing lists). Other

broken boxes were piled on dunnage, some

of them covered with canvas, many open

to the rain. All types of ammunition were

piled together in the mud, exposed to the

rain, and unrecorded beyond an estimate

of the total tonnage of all types. There were

very few men in the depot office, and only

small detachments of maintenance, depot,

and ammunition companies. To Colonel

Blackmore and his staff the Ordnance

situation was "very dark indeed."

 8

The picture was made even darker by a

situation peculiar to Sixth Army. In their

efforts to help mount CHRONICLE the Sixth

Army Ordnance men were afflicted by a

curious malady: a case of dual personality.

In early May 1943, just before making his

first moves against Rabaul, General MacArthur set up a U.S. task force directly

under General Headquarters known as

ALAMO Force (code name ESCALATOR) to

conduct tactical operations in Woodlark,

Kiriwina, and New Britain. Its commander was Krueger and its headquarters was

virtually Sixth Army headquarters. This step

removed Sixth Army from the control of

Allied Land Forces, commanded by General Sir Thomas Blamey. The double

role was to present Krueger and his staff

with a great many perplexing difficulties.

The use of three different designations (including ESCALATOR) created uncertainty

and confusion; and Blackmore's men were

not always sure in which capacity they

were acting, whether as Sixth Army, for

conducting administration and training

not connected with tactical operations, or

as ALAMO Force, for supporting tactical

operations.9

The landings on Woodlark and Kiriwina

went off on schedule 30 June 1943.

There were no Japanese on the islands

and the only opposition came in two small

bombing attacks on Woodlark. The operation provided no real test of the Ordnance planning; for example, there was

no way of knowing whether the ammunition estimates were correct because there

were no expenditures except antiaircraft.

But CHRONICLE was important because it

was the first combat operation of ALAMO

Force, and the orders from GHQ constituted standing operating procedure for

subsequent landings. From the operation

the Ordnance Section of Sixth Army

learned two important lessons. One was

the procedure for computing supply requirements. The other was a lesson that

Ordnance men had learned in the Mediterranean by mid-1943 and in the European

theater later: that effective supply from

the rear (in this case USASOS) depended

largely on the amount of personal co-ordination, including follow-up on the filling

of requisitions and the loading of supplies,

8

 History Sixth Army Ord Sec, pp. 10-11.

9

 (1) Ibid., pp. 9-10. (2) Krueger, From Down

Under to Nippon, p. 10. (3) Miller, CARTWHEEL:

The Reduction of Rabaul, p. 29.
FROM PAPUA TO MOROTAI 357

that could be done by the Ordnance section of an army.10

The problems of furnishing good Ordnance service to the combat forces were

compounded in the Southwest Pacific. In

island warfare, the normal tasks of inspecting combat equipment before battle, repairing or replacing unserviceable weapons; assisting with supplies and ammunition; and seeing to it that the combat

troops' supporting Ordnance units were

up to standard became very complicated.

Combat forces were staged on an island,

in some cases two or more islands, at long,

Overwater distances from the army command post. Transportation, mostly by

air, was uncertain and slow, for tropical

rainstorms often held up flights and even

when the weather was good there was always a tremendous backlog of high priority cargo and men. Officers sent out on

inspection missions were sometimes absent

from headquarters for considerable periods

of time.11

Another drain on staff was caused by

the tactics of the campaign. MacArthur's

march to the Philippines involved a series

of overlapping operations. Before one

operation was completed, plans and preparations had to be made for the next

one. While supporting the build-up of

Woodlark and Kiriwina as air bases, for

example, Blackmore and his staff had to

make Ordnance plans for the landings on

the island of New Britain, an operation

which was to begin in December 1943 and

was known as DEXTERITY. In the meantime the Ordnance Section had to help

develop three important bases: Advance

Base A, at Milne Bay (code name PEMMICAN ); Advance Subbase B at Oro Bay

(code name PENUMBRA); and Advance

Subbase C at Goodenough Island (code

name AMOEBA ). This base effort was required because General MacArthur, on a

visit to Milne Bay and Oro Bay a few days

before D-day for CHRONICLE, was so disturbed by conditions at both bases that he

placed Krueger in charge of developing

them, and also of developing the base at

Goodenough Island. In the intensive effort that followed, co-ordinated by Krueger's G-4, Col. Kenneth Pierce, Colonel

Blackmore was one of the staff members

who carried the heaviest load. Krueger

gave these men credit for outstanding

work.12

Developing the Bases

Milne Bay had a deep harbor that made

it possible to bring Liberty ships to its

docks direct from the United States; also,

its sky was so often overcast that the harbor

was protected to a great extent from air

attack. It was encircled by mountains,

but on the north shore at Ahioma there

was a coastal plain a mile deep and six

miles wide that provided space for shore

installations and a staging area. In May

of 1943 Ahioma had been selected for the

main base and docks, replacing the earlier

port of Gili Gili about fifteen miles west,

which was thereafter used as a supply point

for the Australians and the air units at the 10

 (1) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, p. 11. (2)

For the best account of the CHRONICLE operation,

see Miller, CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of

Rabaul, pp. 49-59. 11

 (1) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, pp. 4-5. (2)

Blackmore Comments.

12

 (1) Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon,

p. 24. (2) Ltr, Krueger to MacArthur, 14 Jul 43,

no sub, ALAMO Force—Operation DEXTERITY, G-4

Journal (hereafter cited as DEXTERTY G-4 Jnl),

11 May-15 Jul 43.
358 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

neighboring airstrips. Along with its advantages, Milne Bay had very definite disadvantages. It rained all the time, and

the mountain streams that cut through the

coastal plain at many points were subject

to flash floods. There was mud everywhere. Disease was rampant, even among

the natives; the place had the reputation

of being one of the most deadly malarial

regions in the world. By March of 1943

the base surgeon had brought the rate

down to 780 cases per 1,000 men (from

2,236 per 1,000 at the time of the Papua

Campaign), and Krueger's surgeon was to

reduce it even more; but the threat of

malaria and other diseases persisted, and

the steaming heat was debilitating.13 The

heat, the monotony, and the creeping

jungle with its hidden dangers (a soldier

had been killed by a crocodile near Port

Moresby) gave men, so one Ordnance officer reported, "a sort of growing horror

of the place."

 14

Colonel Blackmore's immediate problem was to provide shelter for the Ordnance stores from the constant rain, and

some form of hard flooring or dunnage

for his shops, warehouses, and ammunition dumps. At times the mud was so

soft and deep that bombs and heavy artillery shells were known to sink from sight.15

All of the ammunition and, in the early

period, most of the Ordnance supplies

were stored on the south shore at Waga

Waga, which was across the bay from

Ahioma and accessible only by water because miles of swamps separated it from

the north shore installations. Waga Waga

had a wharf that would accommodate three

Liberty ships and four miles of graveled

or unimproved roads. Some 5,000 tons

of ammunition were stored in the area in

piles of 15 to 20 tons. Before the end of

July the 636th Ordnance Ammunition

Company, which had arrived 15 July, had

got all but about 500 tons of it on coconut log dunnage and covered as much of

it as they could with tarpaulins to protect

it from the rain. Some twenty natives were

employed to construct rough sheds, using

tree trunks as supports and tarpaulins as

cover until the supply of tarpaulins ran

out, and then cutting bamboo, nipa, and

other native grasses to make thatched roofs.

To support the coming operations, about

52,000 tons of ammunition were planned

for Waga. This meant enlargement and

improvement of the wharf, the storage

area, and the roads, and considerably more

manpower to help load and discharge vessels as well. The native force used in

constructing ammunition shelters was more

than tripled.16

To take care of the expansion of general supply stocks and repair work necessary in the coming operations, warehouses

and shops were to be constructed in the

13

 (1) Office of the Chief Engineer, General

Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific, "Engineers of

the Southwest Pacific, 1941-1945," vol. VI, Airfield and Base Development (hereafter cited as

Engineers of SWPA VI) (Washington, 1951), pp.

102-16. (2) Military History of Milne Bay, USASOS, Sep 42-May 44, p. 2. 14

 Lt Col Frederick G. Waite, Ordnance Service

Support Problems in Tropical Warfare (hereafter

cited as Waite Paper), pp. 12-13, MS, Armed

Forces Staff College Library. 15

 Waite Paper, p. 15.

16

 (1) Engineers of SWPA VI, 107-08, 113, and

see Map 8, op. cit. p. 103. (2) Ltr, Lt Col Michael

F. Rockel, Jr., to CO Advance Subbase A, 25 Jul

43, sub: Status Report, Storage Area, Waga,

DEXTERITY G-4 Jnl 3. (3) Rpt, Maj John F.

McCarthy, Experience at Advance Base A, in Hist

Base B Oro Bay Oct 42-Feb 44. (4) Memo, Col

Kenneth Pierce for CofS, 9 Aug 43, DEXTERITY

G-4 Jnl 4.
FROM PAPUA TO MOROTAI 359

depot area around Ahioma on the north

shore. By mid-July some prefabricated

huts made in Australia were beginning to

come in, but meantime shelters were built

like those at Waga Waga, with thatched

roofs and wide eaves. Colonel Blackmore

wanted concrete floors for his repair shops

and warehouses, but he usually had to be

content with gravel, which was obtainable

locally. Repair shops for vehicles got priority for the hardstandings because the most

pressing need at Milne, as in every port

and base around the world, was to keep

the trucks operating, and here the climate

and terrain worked against the mechanics.

Mud cut out brake linings; salt water corroded parts; batteries were affected by heat

and road shock; overloading and fast driving over rough roads broke springs; and

carelessness about first and second echelon

maintenance aggravated all these troubles

and caused many more. The decision to

ship crated vehicles direct to Milne in order to save time made it necessary to set

up an assembly line operation. At first it

was quite primitive, laid out along roads

and protected only partially from the rain

by canvas covers; but by November 1943

the Ordnance "Little Detroit" operation

had been housed in prefabricated buildings

and was turning out, working two shifts, as

many as 120 vehicles a day. Combat troop

labor was used to solve the manpower

problem.17

Oro Bay, 160 miles by air up the New

Guinea coast from Milne and 20 miles by

road south of Buna, was in some respects

potentially a better place for a base than

Milne Bay. The terrain was more suitable

and the climate was less oppressive. On

the other hand, it was visited more often

by Japanese bombers because it did not

have Milne's habitually overcast sky. During the spring months of 1943 Oro Bay

had suffered severely from Japanese bombers.18

 It was also far behind Milne Bay

in port development: not until August

were there docks for Liberty ships. A tremendous amount of construction was necessary, such as building a road to the air

base deep in the interior at Dobodura,

laying secondary roads to serve the dumps

and depots around the port, and building

shelters for supplies. A sizable Ordnance

service center was planned on 150 acres

of grassland along the Eroro River, and

a new and improved ammunition area

near Hanau, which was to become the important Hanau Ammunition Depot.19

 The

immediate task was to furnish Ordnance

support to the 41st Division, then engaged

in the Lae-Salamaua campaign with New

Guinea Force.20

Port and road conditions at Goodenough, a small mountainous island off

17

 (1) Memos between ALAMO Force G-4 and

CofS, DEXTERITY G-4 Jnl, 31 Jul-6 Aug 43. (2)

Historical Record Base A Ordnance Operations

from November 1942 to April 1944, in History

Milne Bay USASOS. (3) Incl to Memo, Borden for

CofS, 9 Nov 43, sub: Summary of Observations

SWPA and SPA, OHF. (4) Engineers of SWPA VI,

p. 114. (5) For effects of the tropics on motor

vehicle operation see Waite Paper, pp. 18-19. (6)

Blackmore Comments.

18

 (1) Engineers of SWPA VI, pp. 116-34. (2)

For the damage to shipping in the harbor from

air attacks at this period see A Soldier's Diary, in

Hq Base B (Oro Bay), History Port Det E, 22

Jun 42-May 43. 19

 (1) Corres., Blackmore and others, Jul-Aug

43, DEXTERITY G-4 Jnls 1, 3, 5. (2) McCree Rpt. 20

 For Ordnance support in the Salamaua campaign see Report on Ordnance Phase of Salamaua

Campaign, by Major Ward C. Howard, Ordnance

officer, 41st Div, OHF. Adequate support was not

possible, in the opinion of Colonel Blackmore, because of the lack of small ships. Blackmore Comments.
360 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

HEADQUARTERS OFFICE, BASE ORDNANCE, ORO BAY, 1943

the southeast coast of Papua, were very

similar to those at Oro Bay. Here also

was a suitable harbor—Beli Beli Bay—but

dock construction for Liberty ships was not

possible until August, and a tremendous

amount of road building and construction

work was required.21 In natural beauty,

Goodenough lived up to its name and reputation of being one of the most beautiful of the western Pacific islands. To the

historian of one Ordnance unit "it far surpassed expectations—rolling hills covered

with alternate patches of tall rank grass

and timber land . . . filled with cool, rockfilled mountain streams."

 22

New Weapons for Jungle Warfare

Late on the evening of 5 October 1943,

about two months before the DEXTERITY

operations were to begin, there arrived at

Sixth Army headquarters in Brisbane a

group of six experts sent out from the

United States by General Marshall to find

out what weapons were most needed for

21

 Engineers of SWPA VI, pp. 138-46.

22

 History 3469th Ord Medium Maint Co, 25

Oct 43-25 Feb 44.
FROM PAPUA TO MOROTAI 361

jungle warfare. Col. William A. Borden

of the Ordnance Department was in charge

of the group, which was composed of

Ordnance officers with the exception of

one officer each from the Corps of Engineers and the Chemical Warfare Service.

Borden brought with him in the plane

several new items, the most important of

which were the 4.5-inch rocket developed

by Ordnance and the 4.2-inch mortar developed by the Chemical Warfare Service.

These and other items were exhibited and

tested at a series of demonstrations held in

the Southwest and South Pacific Areas

throughout October.23

Borden had high hopes of demonstrating

that the 4.5-inch rocket would destroy Japanese coconut log bunkers such as those

encountered at Buna. But the perverse

rockets refused to perform as well as they

had at the Aberdeen Proving Ground.

They were erratic in flight, and were relatively ineffective. The men in the theater,

who had been impressed by the performance of the lone 105-mm. howitzer at

Buna, felt that the answer to the bunker

was conventional artillery, especially 105-

mm, and 155-mm. howitzers, and that the

most pressing need was for tractors to get

these pieces through jungle mud. General

Krueger was very much impressed by the

4.2-inch mortar. The 4.2-inch mortar had

been used to fire several types of shells, and

had now been equipped by Chemical Warfare Service with a high explosive shell.

The flame thrower, also a Chemical Warfare item, was well liked. Perhaps the most

popular Ordnance item displayed was the

rifle grenade, adapted from the 60-mm.

mortar shell, affixed to the M1 rifle and

used not only for firepower but for signaling. Little interest was manifested in the

4.5-inch rocket except for its possible use

in barrage fire from landing craft. At a

demonstration the preceding spring,

Krueger had seen the 2d Engineer Special

Brigade fire a 4.5-inch rocket projector

mounted on a DUKW.24

In discussions with the commanders,

Borden found generally that they were hesitant about introducing any new equipment for fear of increasing their supply

problems, which were already serious

enough, and that they were for the most

part satisfied with the weapons already in

the theater. They had achieved some success in the limited use of light tanks, and

believed that both light and medium tanks

could be used in the jungle if wider tracks

were installed. Bazookas had yet to prove

themselves in the Pacific, but there were

plenty of them in the theater. In Africa

the early models had been withdrawn from

use in May 1943 because of malfunctions,

and the necessary modifications had not

yet been completed on all of them, but improved models continued to be produced.

On the whole, SWPA felt that the most

pressing need was for more weapons, immediately. General MacArthur, who was

23

 (1) Memo, Borden for CofS, 9 Nov 43, sub:

Summary of Observations SWPA and SPA, OHF.

(2) The 4.5-inch rocket was the early fin-stabilized

type, developed primarily as an aircraft rocket.

Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions

for War, pp. 443-50. See also, above, p. 332. (3)

For development of the 4.2-inch mortar, first used

in Sicily in July 1943, see Leo P. Brophy, Wyndham D. Miles, and Rexmond C. Cochrane, The

Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to

Field, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1959). In 1949 responsibility for the mortar was transferred to Ordnance.

Ibid., p. 129.

24

 (1) Memo, Borden for CofS, 9 Nov 43, sub:

Summary of Observations SWPA and SPA. (2)

Engineers of SWPA IV, p. 45.
362 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

"most appreciative of the effort being made

to provide him better equipment" instructed Borden to "cut corners and red

tape." Air shipment was authorized for

large quantities of rifle grenades and 4.2-

inch mortar matériel. Borden reported

from SWPA: "All admit that the Buna

campaign was on a shoestring, and they

do not expect to operate that way."

 25

The Move Northward Begins

With Dexterity

Early in August Colonel Blackmore had

been called to Brisbane to co-ordinate with

GHQ and other headquarters his plans for

Ordnance support of DEXTERITY. The object of DEXTERITY was to seize Cape Gloucester on the northwestern tip of New

Britain, the largest island in the Bismarck

Archipelago. Establishing control over

western New Britain would provide airfields for the capture or neutralization of

the Japanese base at Rabaul on the northeastern tip of New Britain, and would

protect the right, or Vitiaz Strait, flank of

MacArthur's march up the New Guinea

coast. Shortly before the main effort at

Cape Gloucester, a diversionary landing

was to be made on the southern coast of

New Britain at a place near Gasmata that

was thought to provide facilities for an

emergency airfield. The Cape Gloucester

Task Force, designated BACKHANDER, was

composed largely of elements of the 1st

Marine Division. The Gasmata Task

Force, designated LAZARETTO, consisted

mainly of the 126th Regimental Combat

Team of the 32d Division. The rest of

the 32d Division became ALAMO Force

reserve. In October the combat units

began the movement north from Australia

to their staging areas: the 1st Marine Division moved from Melbourne to Goodenough Island and the Milne Bay and

Oro Bay areas and the 32d Division from

Camp Cable, Queensland, to Goodenough

Island and Milne Bay and both began

training in jungle warfare and amphibious

operations. By 21 October Milne Bay had

become so congested that Krueger moved

ALAMO Force headquarters to Goodenough,

where it was accommodated in tents and

native huts. To the dismay of the headquarters men on Goodenough, in one 24-

hour period they were drenched with 27

inches of rain.26

Plans for DEXTERITY were well advanced when GHQ discovered that the

area around Gasmata was unsuitable for

airfield development. The Gasmata operation was therefore canceled and LAZARETTO Task Force was dissolved. But General

Krueger felt that a secondary landing on

the south shore should still be made in

order to divert the enemy's attention from

Cape Gloucester, and Arawe was decided

upon. Since only about 500 Japanese were

known to be in the Arawe area, a smaller

25

 (1) Memo, Borden for CofS, 9 Nov. 43. (2) For

later experience in New Guinea with tanks, see Capt

Randolph V. Foster, Armor in Jungle Operations,

1 May 48, monograph, Armored School Library, Ft.

Knox. (3) Rpt of Ord Activities, USASOS, Oct 43,

OHF. (4) The bazooka turned out to be fairly useful

against Japanese bunkers, mostly for concussion effect against the occupants; but battery failure was

frequent because of jungle moisture. Tech Intel

Rpts, 473, 2 Oct 44; 1275, 30 Nov 44; 115, 1 Dec

44, OKD 338/109, OKD 338/195, OKD 338/175.

26

 (1) Memo, Capt Clifton B. Nelson for ACofS,

G-4, ALAMO Force, 8 Aug 43, sub: Planning for

Next Operation, DEXTERITY G-4 Jnl 4. (2) ALAMO

Force, Report of the DEXTERITY Operation (Arawe,

Cape Gloucester, Saidor), 15 Dec 43-10 Feb 44

(hereafter cited as ALAMO Force, Rpt DEXTERITY

Opn). (3) Blackmore Comments.
FROM PAPUA TO MOROTAI 363

task force composed mainly of the 112th

Cavalry Regimental Combat Team and

called DIRECTOR was set up for the new

south shore landing. The invasion date for

DIRECTOR was set at 15 December; that for

BACKHANDER was 26 December.27 These

dates represented a postponement of about

a month from the original landing dates

to allow more time for the development of

Oro Bay as the major supply point for

both task forces, and also to provide facilities for an advance staging area at Langemak Bay (code name REDHERRING) in the

Finschhafen area, far up the coast of New

Guinea and almost directly across Dampier

Strait from Arawe. Finschhafen had been

captured by New Guinea Force early in

October.28

Cape Gloucester and Arawe

For the Sixth Army G-4 DEXTERITY

planners at Goodenough, the principal

problems were Ordnance problems—vehicle distribution and ammunition. Everybody was clamoring for trucks and jeeps.

In October a truck company and two evacuation hospitals arrived at Milne Bay without any vehicles and had to be supplied.

Everybody was pressuring, especially the

marines. Refusing to credit any assurance

of resupply, the 1st Marine Division insisted on having everything it would need

issued to it at once. The marines presented another serious "headache for Ordnance"— they possessed trucks which were

not Army issue. Parts for these had to be

scrounged from other Marine outfits. As

for ammunition, the quantities to be distributed to the task forces were a serious

problem, since experience data were lacking. And even more pressing was the problem of keeping the ammunition dry. At

Nassau Bay the 41st Division had been

complaining that about 65 percent of its

artillery ammunition had been received in

such bad shape that the powder had to be

removed and dried out and other work

done before it could be fired.29

These problems and many others plagued

Krueger's Ordnance staff in planning

for support of DEXTERITY. The operation

took place at a time when the planners had

also to assist in the build-up of the bases

at Milne Bay and Oro Bay, and at a time

when the Pacific had low priority on supplies and service troops. The planners

were hampered not only by a shortage in

Ordnance supplies and troops but also

by uncertainty as to the amount of supplies that were actually needed. In this

respect they suffered from handicaps peculiar to SWPA. There was no Ordnance officer on MacArthur's tactical

staff; therefore GHQ decisions were made

without the benefit of expert Ordnance

advice. There were changes and delays

before the troop lists were made final. In

any case, consumption rates in SWPA

varied widely from the normal. In this

dilemma the supply experts at Sixth Army

Ordnance Section devised a simple but

effective system for stocking maintenance

27

 Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon, p. 28.

28

 Logistic Instructions 39/SOS, Based on GHQ

Operations Instructions 38, DEXTERITY G-4 Jnl

16, 3-6 Dec 43.

29

 (1) Memos, Col Kenneth Pierce and others,

Aug, Oct-Nov 43, in DEXTERITY G-4 Jnls 4, 10,

12, 15. (2) Blackmore Comments. When the time

came to sail, much of the Marine equipment had

to be left behind because of the lack of ship's space.

Ibid. (3) For a detailed discussion of the deterioration of ammunition in the tropics see Waite Paper,

pp. 14-18.
364 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

and depot companies. They set the level

of supply at thirty days and required the

companies to submit requisitions every

fifteen days for items required to maintain the level, computing quantities on the

basis of consumption for the previous

fifteen days. In putting the new system

into effect, the experts had to surmount

several obstacles. The first 15-day figures had to be multiplied by at least three

to cover the necessary delay before a shipment could be received. Good requisition

clerks were scarce. Mail service between

bases was so poor that requisitions had

to be delivered by officer courier. But

this requisition system worked so much

more satisfactorily than the "semiautomatic" system used by other supply services

that the commanding officer of the U.S.

Advanced Base, USASOS, was soon recommending that it be adopted by the

other services.30

During 1943 the Sixth Army Ordnance

Section did not have the help of a corps

Ordnance staff (I Corps was not employed

in combat operations until April 1944) and

even lacked battalion headquarters to assist in the detailed planning for combat

support. It had to make very detailed

parts estimates to supply the maintenance

companies. Another problem was that

often Ordnance units would be pulled out

of USASOS and placed under army control without sufficient time for conversion

from base units to field units; and after one

operation was over, would revert to

USASOS until time for the next operation.

The few available Ordnance units had to

be torn apart and spread thin.31

The experience of the 622d Ordnance

Ammunition Company was typical. Arriving at Milne Bay in mid-September (having landed in Australia from the United

States only two weeks before), the company

was attached to the First Provisional Ordnance Center in the Ahioma area and

worked the rest of the month erecting

warehouses and on other labor details. The

men spent October at Waga Waga helping

the 636th Ordnance Ammunition Company operate the Dingo Ammunition

Depot. In November one officer and ten

enlisted men were placed on detached

service with the 3469th Ordnance Medium

Maintenance Company to support the

DIRECTOR (Arawe landing) force. The

rest of the company sailed for Oro Bay to

support the BACKHANDER (Cape Gloucester) force, along with the 263d Ordnance

Medium Maintenance Company.32

The DIRECTOR force staged at Goodenough (ALAMO Base 1) and used REDHERRING, in the Finschhafen area (ALAMO

Base 2) as a rear base. The 112th Cavalry

Regimental Combat Team and other combat elements were to proceed to Arawe

from Goodenough in APD's (high-speed

destroyer-transports) and go ashore on 15

December in amphibian tractors, LVT (A) 's

(Buffaloes), and LVT (1)'s (Alligators),

landing craft, and rubber boats. On

the invasion, one officer and fifty men of

the 3469th accompanied the assault forces

in LCT's to handle supplies and ammunition, another officer and twelve men went

in to perform maintenance; and two ser- 30

 (1) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, pp. 13, 37.

(2) Blackmore Comments. (3) Ltr, Col Emer

Yeager to CG ESCALATOR, 12 Jul 43, sub: Supply

of Intermediate and Advanced Bases from Base

Section Depots, DEXTERITY G-4 Jnl 1.

31

 (1) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, pp. 14, 32-

34. (2) Blackmore Comments. 32

 History 622d Ammunition Co, 1943-45.
FROM PAPUA TO MOROTAI 365

geants from the ammunition company went

along to supervise ammunition storage.33

Aided by a bombardment at first light

by seven naval destroyers and accompanied

by two DUKW's firing 4.5-inch barrage

rockets—the first use of such rockets in a

SWPA landing—the main assault force

made a successful run to the beach at

Arawe in Buffaloes and Alligators and had

arrived at its final objective by midafternoon. Japanese planes bombed and

strafed constantly, but the only serious

opposition on land was directed against a

smaller force in rubber boats attempting to

land before dawn in another sector. Enfilade fire from enemy machine guns and

a 25-mm. dual-mounted antiaircraft gun

sank twelve of the fifteen boats, and some

of the men drowned while they were trying to free themselves of their equipment.

A single salvo from a destroyer finally

silenced the enemy guns.34

One of the first jobs for the Ordnance

shore party at Arawe was to supply rifles

and submachine guns to the men who had

lost their weapons in the sinkings, a job

that was made easier by the nearness of

the base at Langemak Bay. In all sectors

weapons were generally either lost or completely demolished by bomb fragments, so

that little repair work came in. The maintenance party spent part of its time collecting captured Japanese weapons, but

most of it in disposing of enemy bombs.

There was heavy bombing and little effective defense against it, because the longexpected battery of 90-mm. antiaircraft

guns did not arrive until the end of January. The Ordnance men along with the

combat troops lived on C rations and slept

in rat-infested trenches. On the night of

Christmas Eve, one of them looked up

from his trench and saw a Japanese plane

dropping a red and green flare, "as though

he were helping us to celebrate Christmas."

There were no casualties among the Ordnance troops, "but if men can be battle

scarred without drawing blood," their historian reported when the first of these

troops returned to Finschhafen, "these men

were good examples, completely fagged,

nervous, dirty, bedraggled but with good

moral [sic] and grinning, glad to get

back."

 35

The Ordnance men supporting the

BACKHANDER force—two combat teams of

the 1st Marine Division—did not suffer as

much as those in DIRECTOR from Japanese

air attacks but had to contend with another

assault from the heavens in the form of

torrential downpours of rain. When the

invasion forces set out from Oro Bay on

LST's on the afternoon of Christmas Eve,

accompanied by sizable detachments from

the 263d Ordnance Medium Maintenance

Company and the 622d Ordnance Ammunition Company, the weather was clear

and hot; but the day after the landing on

26 December (Christmas Day across the

International Date Line) the northwest

monsoon struck Cape Gloucester bringing

solid walls of water that lasted for hours

(and were to recur every day for months)

and howling winds that sent huge trees

crashing down in the jungle. And when

the marines got over the narrow beaches

and hacked their way through the jungle,

they came upon a deep and treacherous

swamp for which their maps had not pre33

 Hist, 3469th Ord Medium Maint Co, 25 Oct

43-25 Feb 44. 34

 (1) ALAMO Force, Rpt DEXTERITY Opn. (2)

Hist, 3469th Ord Medium Maint Go has a description of a captured 25-mm gun. 35

 Hist, 3469th Medium Maint Co.
366 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

pared them. For this reason the Marine

shore party (under which the Ordnance

men worked) concentrated the dumps

along the narrow strip of firmer ground

just off the beaches. Supplies had to be

carried forward in amphibious tractors;

heavy artillery (the marines had 155-mm.

guns) and Sherman tanks bogged down.

But Japanese resistance was sporadic, and

in the end the marines achieved a comparatively economical victory that contributed to the neutralization of Rabaul

and made the coast of New Guinea safe

from a Japanese land invasion across the

Vitiaz Strait.36

To the men at Sixth Army Ordnance

Section, the New Britain campaign was

memorable for complaints from artillerymen about receiving mixed lots of artillery

ammunition. This was the first Pacific

campaign in which American artillery (as

well as the medium tank) was used to any

extent. Because the first shipments of

artillery ammunition to SWPA had consisted of many lots of only a few rounds

each, segregation by lot number had been

as difficult there as in other theaters. Maj.

Philip Dodge, the first ammunition storage

expert sent out to SWPA, was able to give

the artillerymen some helpful suggestions

on fire adjustment; but any real alleviation

of the situation had to await later shipments of larger lots.37

Saidor

The New Britain campaign had hardly

begun when the attention of GHQ focused

on a new landing on the coast of New

Guinea, as a result of the successes of New

Guinea Force at Salamaua, Lae, and

Finschhafen. In mid-December ALAMO

Force received a directive to add a landing

at Saidor, 110 nautical miles up the coast

from Finschhafen, to the DEXTERITY operation. For this purpose Krueger set up the

MICHAELMAS Task Force, composed of the

126th Regimental Combat Team of the

32d Division (originally intended for the

Gasmata landing), reinforced by artillery

and antiaircraft units, Engineers, and other

service units, placed it under the command

of the assistant commander of the 32d

Division, and gave it the job of seizing

Saidor on 2 January 1944. The task force

staged at Goodenough. By early morning

of New Year's Day 1944 the APD's and

LCI's carrying the assault forces were on

their way, preceded by the slower LST's

carrying heavy equipment and bulk supplies.38

36

 (1) Annex D to AdminO No. 2-43, BACKHANDER Force, Ordnance Plan, 14 Nov 43, in 1st

Marine Division, Cape Gloucester Operation, Phase

I) 1943-44. (2) History 622d Ord Ammunition Co,

1943-45. (3) Lt. Col. Frank O. Hough (USMCR)

and Maj. John A. Crown (USMCR), The Campaign in New Britain (Historical Branch, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1952), Marine Corps

Monograph, foreword by Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd,

Jr. Casualties on New Britain were 310 killed in

action, 1,083 wounded; on Bougainville, under

essentially similar conditions, a considerably greater

number of marines facing considerably fewer Japanese lost 423 killed in action, 1,418 wounded. Ibid.,

p. 183.

37

 (1) Blackmore Comments. (2) AGF Bd Rpt

SWPA 55, Field Artillery in the Arawe Operation.

(3) The 105-mm. howitzers performed well except

for trouble with the recoil mechanism, caused

mainly by neglect of preventive maintenance at the

battery. The M10 tank destroyers and 90-mm, antiaircraft guns were also used as supporting artillery.

AGF Bd Rpt SWPA 41, 29 Feb 44. 38

 (1) AdminO 5 to accompany FO 7, 22 Dec

43, and Annex 2 to AdminO 5, Ordnance Plan,

26 Dec 43, both in ESCALATOR (ALAMO Force)

FO and AdminO 5 (MICHAELMAS (Saidor) Opn),

22 Dec 43-8 Jan 44. (2) AGF Bd Rpt SWPA 28,

19 Feb 44, Organization of MICHAELMAS Task

Force.
FROM PAPUA TO MOROTAI 367

Aboard one of the LCI's was the task

force Ordnance officer, Capt. Argyle C.

Crockett, Jr., commander of the 21st Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company,

with eight men from his company and three

officers to supervise ammunition operations, antiaircraft maintenance, and bomb

disposal. Also aboard to assist in the initial

landings was an 8-man detachment of the

59th Ordnance Ammunition Company, an

experienced company with a long record of

service in SWPA, which also furnished a

32-man detachment to operate an ammunition depot in the Cape Cretin area

where the MICHAELMAS Force's resupply

point (code name SHAGGY) was located.

Along with the task force Ordnance staff,

the assault forces were accompanied, for

contact Ordnance work, by a detachment

of thirty men from the 732d Ordnance

Light Maintenance Company (the 32d

Division's own Ordnance company) many

of whom were veterans of the Papua Campaign. In several respects the Ordnance

plans for Saidor differed from those for

the other, smaller, DEXTERITY operations.

For the first time, in recognition of the

baleful effect of the tropics on fire control

equipment, a small antiaircraft repair team

went along. This policy was to be continued in future operations. Also, a much

smaller proportion of ammunition men was

allotted for the MICHAELMAS landings than

for the other operations.39

Saidor differed from the other DEXTERITY operations in another respect. It dispensed with a preliminary air bombardment to insure surprise. An effective naval

bombardment was provided by the destroyers, and as the first landing wave of LCV's

neared the beaches there was a rocket

barrage, this time by LCI's rather than

DUKW's. The landings met with little opposition. For the Ordnance area, including the ammunition dump, maintenance

shops, and bivouac area, the staff selected

a place in dense timber between two creeks,

but the access road was so poor that the

ammunition had to be dumped on the

beach.40

On 8 January 1944 the bulk of the 21st

Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company

arrived at Saidor on an LST. After preparing their bivouac area by digging foxholes and covering them with logs and

slinging hammocks from trees, the men

set up their shop area, bulldozing a road

through it and dispersing their working

sections around the perimeter. But they

had hardly begun work on their first repair

jobs, and the evacuation of the Japanese

matériel turned in to them, when the rains

began on 14 January. The roads into and

out of the shop area soon became impassable as torrents of rain continued to fall.

In spite of efforts to bring in gravel to

put down on shop floors, vehicles and other

heavy equipment bogged down and even

after repairs were made could not be

returned to the combat men. Parts had

to be hand-carried or hauled out in trailers

towed by tractors. Men sank ankle-deep

or even knee-deep in mud. Little work

39

 (1) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, app. C, p. 2.

(2) History 59th Ammunition Co. (3) History 21st

Medium Maint Co, ch. V. (4) At this period Ordnance antiaircraft mechanics who had been trained

on the 3-inch antiaircraft gun were not proficient on

the 90-mm, equipment used by antiaircraft troops

in the theater. Later, teams of specialists trained at

Frankford Arsenal on the 90-mm. director came out

by air. Blackmore Comments; Rpt of Ord Activities,

USASOS, Jun 43.

40

 (1) Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon,

pp. 36-37; (2) History 21st Ord Medium Maint

Co, ch. V.
368 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

could be done, except repair of watches

and instruments, until a new shop area was

set up in mid-February on sandy, rocky

soil.41

On 31 January Headquarters, ALAMO

Force, moved from Goodenough Island to

Cape Cretin (SHAGGY), where ALAMO

Force Supply Point 2 was located. Here

the 3469th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company, reinforced with a 20-man

detachment from a depot company, was

operating the Ordnance maintenance and

general supply facilities, and the 59th Ordnance Ammunition Company, using troop

labor, was operating the ammunition

dump. On 27 February Headquarters,

Sixth Army, arrived at Cape Cretin from

Brisbane. For the first time, the Ordnance

Section was together and the men were

spared the necessity of long trips for coordination. The ALAMO Force Ordnance

staff, while continuing supervision over

Ordnance operations at Kiriwina, Woodlark, Goodenough, Arawe, Cape Gloucester,

and Saidor, had to plan for support of the

assault on the Admiralties by Task Force

BREWER, 29 February 1944, and for the

first large-scale SWPA invasion, that of

Hollandia, New Guinea, by RECKLESS

Task Force early in April.42

Support of Brewer in the

Admiralties

Capture of the Admiralty Islands, lying

some 200 miles north and east of New

Guinea and used during 1943 by the Japanese as staging points for aircraft flying

between Rabaul and the northern New

Guinea coast, would not only protect the

Allied advance up the New Guinea coast,

but would also provide an excellent offensive base for the march to the Philippines.

Of the two main islands, the larger, Manus,

was big enough for extensive shore installations and had an airdrome. There was

also an airdrome at the very much smaller

island of Los Negros, which was separated

from Manus by a shallow, creeklike strait,

and extended in a rough horseshoe curve

to form Seeadler Harbor, one of the finest

natural harbors in the world. The sights

were set at first on the seizure of the Seeadler Harbor area, which MacArthur assigned to ALAMO Force in November 1943.

On 13 February 1944, after planning was

well under way, he expanded the mission

to the seizure of all the Admiralties, with a

target date of 1 April.43

The main combat element of BREWER

was the 1st Cavalry Division, staging at

Oro Bay. The division was "dismounted,"

having exchanged its horses for jeeps, but

retained a good deal of cavalrylike esprit

de corps; it was an old-fashioned square

division, composed mostly of Regulars, and

its regiments had proud histories of service

in the Civil War and Indian wars. Reinforced with antiaircraft, artillery, and other

support units, some of them furnished by

the South Pacific Area, BREWER represented at this stage a huge force of more

than 45,000 men. Colonel Blackmore

planned to back up the division's own 27th

41

 History 21st Ord Medium Maint Go, ch. V. 42

 History Sixth Army Ord Sec, p. 16,

43

 (1) Historical Division, U.S. War Department, "American Forces in Action," The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division (29

February-18 May 1944) (Washington, 1945), pp.

1-10. (2) Miller, CARTWHEEL: The Reduction

of Rabaul, pp. 316-19. (3) For detailed maps,

pictures, and description of terrain see Engineers

of SWPA VI, pp. 208-22.
FROM PAPUA TO MOROTAI 369

Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company

(which he considered an outstanding company) with the 287th; to send in an entire

ammunition company, the 611th; and because the early troop list included a company of medium tanks supplied by the Marine division at Cape Gloucester, he added

an 11-man detachment of the 3608th Ordnance Tank Maintenance Company—the

first tank maintenance detachment planned

for an ALAMO operation.44

This planning for BREWER went out the

window on 24 February when General

MacArthur, having been informed by the

Air Forces that Allied bombers flying as

low as twenty feet over the Admiralties had

not been fired on and had seen no signs of

Japanese, ordered an immediate 1,000-

man "reconnaissance in force" on Los Negros, with D-day set at 29 February. The

landing was successful; but a sharp counterattack by the Japanese showed that they

were on the island in considerable force.

Reinforcements bringing the BREWER Force

to more than 19,000 men were rushed in,

and the battles, which expanded to Manus

Island, continued until May. The changes

in plan considerably altered the Ordnance

support of the operation. In the scramble

for transportation, the 287th Ordnance

Medium Maintenance Company was left

behind at Milne Bay. The main support

of the 1st Cavalry Division came from its

own organic company, the 27th, to which

a 5-man detachment of the 267th Maintenance Company (AA) had been attached

in January, before the 27th left Australia.45

Two contact parties of the 27th Medium

Maintenance Company (each consisting of

2 officers and 24 men) landed on Los Negros with the second combat echelon on 9

March; the antiaircraft maintenance men

landed next day. An 11 -man detachment

from the 611th Ordnance Ammunition

Company had accompanied the early assault forces, but the ammunition company

did not arrive until 13 March. In the

meantime, ammunition had been successfully airdropped in considerable quantities to front-line troops by Quartermaster troops in B-17's, who followed the

airdrop with strafing by machine guns, pinning down the Japanese long enough to

allow the cavalrymen to retrieve their shells.

A serious hazard to the Ordnance troops

in BREWER was the presence of Japanese

antipersonnel mines. Twenty minutes after

one of the 27th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company's contact parties landed at

Momote Airdrome on Los Negros, an

enlisted man of the party was killed by

a mine and an officer was seriously

wounded.46

Hollandia and Aitape

As soon as the Admiralties operation

was successful, MacArthur ordered ALAMO

Force to begin planning for a jump up the

44

 (1) Maj. B. C. Wright, The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II (Tokyo: Toppan Printing

Co., Ltd., 1947), pp. 1-2. (2) Annex 1 to FO 9,

21 Feb 44, ESCALATOR (ALAMO Force) FO's 9-11,

26 Feb 44-1 Mar 44. (3) History Sixth Army Ord

Sec, app. C, p. 2. (4) Blackmore Comments.

45

 (1) Miller, CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of

Rabaul, pp. 319-50. (2) History 287th Medium

Maint Co. (3) History 267th Medium Maint Co

(AA) 26 Oct 43-Sep, Dec 44. (4) For the use of

tanks in this operation see AGF Bd Rpt 62, Tank

Employment in the Admiralty Islands. 46

 (1) Rpt, BREWER TF (Admiralty Islands) 24

Jan-18 May 44, RED VAULT-SWPA. (2) History 27th Ord Medium Maint Co. (3) History

611th Ord Ammunition Co. (4) For an interesting
370 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

New Guinea coast to the Hollandia area

in Netherlands New Guinea, some 450

miles west and north of Saidor, a move

that would bypass the concentration of

Japanese at Wewak. The object was to

develop at Hollandia a supply point and

an air base from which heavy bombers

could hit the Palau Islands and Japanese

air bases in western New Guinea and on

Halmahera Island. There were also good

anchorages in the area at Humboldt Bay,

on whose shore stood the little village of

Hollandia, and at Tanahmerah Bay,

twenty-five miles west. Between the two

bays stood the formidable Cyclops Mountains; behind the mountains in the interior

was a flat plain on which the Japanese had

built three airfields. The general plan of

the Hollandia operation was to achieve

amphibious landings simultaneously at

Humboldt Bay and Tanahmerah and to

strike inland in a pincers movement to seize

the airfields. The GHQ instructions, 7

March 1944, also directed ALAMO Force

to effect a landing at Aitape in British New

Guinea, about halfway between Hollandia

and Wewak. The objective there was to

seize airfields and provide flank protection

for the Hollandia operation against a Japanese attack from Wewak. The code

name for the whole Hollandia-Aitape operation Was RECKLESS.47

Hollandia: "A Battle of Terrain"

The Japanese by March 1944 had developed the Hollandia area into their main

rear base in New Guinea. Humboldt Bay

was the New Guinea terminus of their

supply line from Japan via the Philippines

—the place where troops and supplies were

landed from freighters and transshipped by

small craft and barges down the New

Guinea coast. It was not expected that the

enemy would give it up without a stiff

fight. General Krueger planned a sizable

task force (code name BEWITCH) of about

56,000 men, commanded by Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, and consisting mainly

of I Corps with the 24th Infantry Division

and the 41st Infantry Division (less the

163d Regimental Combat Team, which

was going to Aitape). It also included a

company of medium tanks from the 1st

Marine Division. RECKLESS was to be the

first U.S. operation of corps proportions

in the Southwest Pacific Area since the

Papua Campaign. The Humboldt Bay

landing was to be made by the LETTERPRESS Landing Force from the 41st Division, that at Tanahmerah Bay by the

NOISELESS Landing Force of the 24th Division. D-day for both was 22 April.48

In support of the Hollandia force Eichelberger's Ordnance officer, Colonel Darby,

had the 35-man headquarters of the 194th

Ordnance Battalion, which had arrived in

Milne Bay from the United States at the

end of January 1944. These men had

spent two months training at Milne Bay,

assigned to USASOS, and had then been

account of ammunition airdrops in BREWER, as

well as DIRECTOR and BACKHANDER, see William

H. Peifer, Supply by Sky, Quartermaster Corps

Historical Studies, Series II, No. 2 (Washington,

1957), pp. 44-47. 47

 A full account of the operation is in Robert

Ross Smith, The Approach to the Philippines,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1953), pp. 13-83. Unless otherwise

indicated the remainder of this chapter is based on

Smith's volume.

48

 (1) Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon,

pp. 61-62. (2) Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to

Tokyo, pp. 100-102.
FROM PAPUA TO MOROTAI 371

sent to Finschhafen on 30 March to be assigned to I Corps.49

 By the beginning of

1944, the very tight situation in the Southwest Pacific on Ordnance troops was beginning to ease, thanks generally to highlevel decisions in Washington to furnish the

Pacific more support and especially to General Somervell's recommendations after his

trip to the theater in September 1943.

Using recent arrivals in the theater, General MacArthur's G-3 was able to allot to

RECKLESS two ammunition companies, a

depot company, and two medium maintenance companies, which, with antiaircraft

repair and tank detachments and the 41st

and 24th Divisions' organic maintenance

companies, brought the Ordnance troop

list for the operation up to 1,246 men, a

very much larger proportion of Ordnance

troops to combat troops than had been yet

furnished for any SWPA operation.50

The main effort was to be made at

Tanahmerah Bay, because Japanese defenses were thought to be concentrated at

Humboldt Bay. The NOISELESS Landing

Force, therefore, was given the heaviest

weight of Ordnance troops—the headquarters of the 194th Ordnance Battalion;

the l71st Ordnance Depot Company; the

410th Ordnance Medium Maintenance

Company (plus two antiaircraft repair

teams and one tank maintenance detachment) ; and the 642d Ordnance Ammunition Company— all in addition to the 24th

Division's own 724th Ordnance Light

Maintenance Company. The LETTERPRESS Landing Force at Humboldt Bay

received the 287th Ordnance Medium

Maintenance Company (plus two antiaircraft repair teams and a tank maintenance

detachment) and the 649th Ordnance Ammunition Company, in addition to the 41st

Division's 741st Ordnance Light Maintenance Company (minus the detachment

going to Aitape). In both landings the

first assault elements, on APD's or LCI's,

were to carry with them as much ammunition as they could; the second elements on

LST's, APA's (attack transports), or

LSD's (landing ships, dock) would carry at

least two units of fire; and the follow-up

LST's in the assault echelons would carry

enough ammunition to bring artillery, mortar, and grenade ammunition up to six

units of fire, other types up to five units of

fire. With regard to Class II supplies, the

maintenance companies were to carry, in

accordance with established ALAMO practice, 15 days of supply initially (the light

maintenance companies for divisional

troops, the medium maintenance for nondivisional) ; the depot company 30 days;

resupply to both landings would be 15 days

on the first available transportation and

thereafter by requisition. The resupply

point was Base F at Finschhafen.51

The convoy of transports, freighters,

LST's, and LCI's that steamed through the

Vitiaz Strait on its way to Hollandia,

escorted by Navy battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and carriers, was incomparably the

49

 History 194th Ord Bn, Jan-19 Apr 44. 50

 (1) Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for

Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1950),

pp. 396-97. (2) Extract, SWPA Answers to Questionnaire Used on Gen Somervell's Trip 1943, 18

Oct 43. (3) 1944 Troop Requirements, 16 Sep 43.

(4) 1st Ind, Maj Gen LeRoy Lutes to Control

Div ASF, 28 Oct 43. Last three in Folder, Log.

No. 59-134, OCMH. (5) Hist Sixth Army Ord

Sec, app. C, p. 3.

51

 AdminO 7 to accompany FO 12, 6 Apr 44,

and Annex 2, Ordnance Plan, 8 Apr 44. Both in

ALAMO Force-Opn "G" (RECKLESS-Hollandia),

G-4 Journal, 3-16 Apr 44.
372 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

largest yet to sail for a SWPA landing—so

vast that it was almost unbelievable to General Eichelberger, who remembered the lean

days in 1942. The Southwest Pacific

seemed indeed to have broken what he had

called "our lease in Poorhouse Row."

 52

And the cargo aboard the ships, as well as

the landing plans, showed that the RECKLESS planners had taken to heart the lessons in DEXTERITY and BREWER. Aboard

were 155-mm. guns because it had been

demonstrated that heavy artillery was

needed to penetrate the jungle and destroy

bunkers; medium tanks, because they had

proved better than light tanks; and heavy

engineer equipment for roadbuilding, to be

put ashore promptly, because experience

had shown that it was useless to land trucks

without first building roads. Many of the

trucks aboard the LST's were loaded with

supplies, ready to be driven to the dumps

and then unloaded and returned to their

LST's, because the technique of "mobile

loading," begun in CHRONICLE, had proved

its worth. Previous operations had also

shown the need for ample boat and shore

engineer regiments of men trained to unload bulk cargo quickly; and the necessity

for prompt resupply of all items.53

After steaming north on a 300-mile detour around the Admiralties to deceive the

Japanese, the ships turned south and about

midnight on 21 April, the task forces separated, NOISELESS reaching Tanahmerah

Bay shortly before sunrise, and LETTERPRESS reaching Humboldt Bay about the

same time. When the naval bombardment lifted there was little or no reaction

from the enemy to either landing; it later

turned out that the few Japanese on the

coast had fled to the hills, some of them

leaving their breakfast tea and rice still

warm in their dugouts. The enemy had

been taken completely by surprise.54

The task force landing at Tanahmerah

Bay was in for a most unpleasant surprise:

the nature of the terrain. Firsthand information had been lacking because a scouting

party sent there in a submarine in March

had not returned; and aerial photography

had been misleading. The photographs

failed to reveal that only thirty yards behind the main landing beach, Red Beach 2,

was a mangrove swamp so deep as to be

utterly impassable; in spots men sank to their

armpits. This was the area that had been

selected for the supply dumps. When the

LST's ground to the beach and began to

disgorge their cargo, the narrow beach was

soon jammed. Strenuous efforts by the

engineers to build a corduroy exit road

across the swamp were useless. The tanks

and artillery, first off the LST's, sank in the

soft beach sand and mud. The mobileloaded trucks had to remain on the LST's

and impeded the efforts of the engineers to

hand-carry the bulk supplies from the ships.

The plan had been to move weapons and

supplies immediately by road from Red

Beach 2 to Red Beach 1 (a beach whose

coral reef made it inaccessible to all except

small landing craft), where there was

thought to be a road leading inland to the

airfields. This plan had to be abandoned

because terrain between the two beaches

52

 Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, pp.

97, 102-03. 53

 (1) ALAMO Force, Rpt DEXTERITY Opn. (2)

Rpt, BREWER TF (Admiralty Islands) 24 Jan-18

May 44, RED VAULT-SWPA. (3) Krueger, From

Down Under to Nippon, p. 41.

54

 Samuel Eliot Morison, "History of United

States Naval Operations in World War II," New

Guinea and the Marianas: March 1944-August

1944, vol. VIII (Boston: Little, Brown & Co.,

1953), pp. 76, 81-82.
FROM PAPUA TO MOROTAI 373

was so rugged that it defeated the efforts

of the engineers to build a road quickly.

Some equipment, including a company of

medium tanks, was transported by LCM's

and LCVP's to Red Beach 1; but there the

tanks remained, for the road leading inland

at the little settlement of Dépapré at Red

Beach 1 turned out to be only a narrow

track.55

Except for small teams of mechanics

from the 724th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company attached to the munitions

and motor officers of the regimental combat

teams, the only Ordnance men in the

Tanahmerah landings were those of the

642d Ordnance Ammunition Company.

The 724th was not scheduled to land until

D plus 2; by that time General Eichelberger

had decided to divert all future landings,

as well as his command post, to the Humboldt Bay area. For the first three days

the 642d performed, according to the 24th

Division Ordnance officer, "miracles of

strength" at Red Beach 2 in cutting ammunition out of "the mess on the beach"

and shipping it to Red Beach 1. On the

fourth day an officer and ten men of the

company were sent up the Dépapré trail

to establish an ammunition dump for the

21st Infantry Regiment's drive to the interior airfields; but they found that it was

impossible for even a jeep to negotiate the

narrow, winding trail. All ammunition

had to be hand-carried. Giving up any

thought of a dump, they simply attached

themselves to the ammunition officer of the

21st Infantry and kept going. Next day

the infantrymen by pushing themselves to

the limits of their strength reached the airfield area and were rewarded by an airdrop of ammunition.56

For the landings at Humboldt Bay better

information on terrain had been available.

Of the two sandspits at the entrance to

Jautefa Bay, the northernmost contained

White Beaches 1 and 2, the southernmost,

White Beach 3. Within Jautefa Bay was

Pim, a little settlement with a jetty, and

from it a track led to the interior airfields.

At Pirn was White Beach 4. Pirn was also

connected with a track to the village of

Hollandia, to the north of White Beach 1.

Immediately north of White Beach 1, between it and Hollandia, was Pancake Hill,

one of the first objectives to be seized after

landing because Japanese artillery emplaced

there could threaten all the beaches. But

the Japanese had fled. The first Ordnance

maintenance men ashore, two mechanics

and a supply man from the 287th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company, attached to the 41st Division, proceeded to

Pancake Hill and found a Japanese antiaircraft gun with the canvas covering still

on it.57

On the beaches below, the unloading of

the LST's proceeded without opposition.

The 649th Ordnance Ammunition Company, attached to an engineer boat and

shore regiment, landed early on the morning of D-day and worked all day and the

next unloading ammunition from LST's and

directing sorting and stacking. By the evening of D plus 1 the northern sandspit, on

which White Beaches 1 and 2 were located, was becoming extremely congested.

55

 (1) Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo,

has an account of the fate of the scouting party,

pp. 128-34; (2) For the best account of the Red

Beach 2 fiasco, see Engineers of SWPA IV, pp.

268-78.

56

 History, Tanahmerah Bay Landing Force, April

22, 1944-June 6, 1944, Annex 12, Ordnance Report. 57

 History 287th Ord Medium Maint Co, 3 Apr23 May 44.
374 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

It was only 100 yards deep, and all along

it were piles of Japanese supplies scattered

by the air bombing and naval bombardment prior to the landings, some of them

still smoldering. The engineers had made

slow progress on exit roads because of

swampy or rugged terrain; and the congestion was made even worse by the necessity for basing antiaircraft and artillery

units along the sandspit. Sometime during

the day a much larger detachment of Ordnance maintenance men from the 287th

Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company

arrived and joined the D-day group on

Pancake Hill.58

By dark on D plus 1, the ammunition

men had completed their LST unloading,

started the movement of ammunition to

their dumps, and then retired to the foxholes

they had dug on D-day in the "slots" behind the seven D-day LST's. That night,

sometime between 2200 and 2300, a lone

Japanese bomber came over and, guided

by the smoke from the Japanese stores,

dropped a bomb on a Japanese ammunition dump below Pancake Hill, starting a

fire that spread to an American gasoline

dump and was soon completely out of hand,

creating a night of terror for the men on

the beach. Among those hardest hit were

the Ordnance ammunition men. Of the

30 men and 1 officer in Slot 1, nearest the

Japanese dump, the officer and about 18

men were wounded, and 7 were reported

missing in action. The rest of the company,

after evacuating the wounded men at

the risk of their own lives, returned to

help fight the fire, rolling gasoline drums

into the ocean, attempting to build a fire

break, and trying to evacuate equipment.

Technical Sergeants Erickson and Kaltenberger manned bulldozers and succeeded

in pulling out 40-mm. guns and equipment

until one bulldozer was hit by a falling tree

and the other disabled in the swamp behind the beach.59

The fire raged for two days. Observers

in the offshore LST's, some of which had

been diverted from the Tanahmerah Bay

landing, saw for more than a mile along

the sandspit great billowing clouds of

smoke and walls of flame, creating a fierce,

eerie glare in which rockets, signal flares,

and white phosphorus shells sprayed out in

all directions. They heard the spitting

crackle of small arms ammunition between

the crashing, rumbling roar of barrage after

barrage of artillery shells.60 Almost all of

the supplies brought ashore on D-day and

D plus 1 were destroyed, a loss estimated

at $8,000,000; worse than that, in the

opinion of the troops, was the fact that the

combat men making their way over the

trail inland from Pim had to get along on

half rations and little ammunition until the

offshore LST's could be unloaded. Of

necessity, White Beach 3, the southern sandspit, had to be used, which added fresh

trouble, for this beach had a gradual slope

offshore that prevented LST's from coming

closer than forty yards. Men had to wade

out waist-deep to help unload; vehicles

leaving the ramps were stalled or drowned

out and damaged by the salt water, for

58

 (1) Ibid. (2) History 649th Ord Ammunition

Co, 18 Apr-20 May 44. (3) Engineers of SWPA

IV, pp. 284-96.

59

 History 649th Ord Ammunition Co, 18 Apr20 May 44. 60

 (1) Office of the Chief Engineer, General

Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific, "Engineers of

the Southwest Pacific, 1941-1945," vol. VIII,

Critique (hereafter cited as Engineers of SWPA

VIII) (Washington, 1950), p. 157. (2) Hollandia

Opn, 1st Corps Hq Co, 22 Apr-5 Jun 44.
FROM PAPUA TO MOROTAI 375

only D-day vehicles had been waterproofed.

When another detachment of the 287th

Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company and the 741st Ordnance Light Maintenance Company arrived on White Beach 3

on 25 April, acting as a composite company, the men found that salt water rust

and corrosion accounted for most of their

repair work.61

Gradually the congestion on White Beach

3 lessened as the engineers managed to

shuttle equipment and supplies in LCM's

and LCVP's across shallow Jautefa Bay

to White Beach 4. General Eichelberger

came ashore on D plus 3 and set up I Corps

command post at Brinkman's Plantation;

next day, 26 April, the combat troops of

the 41st Division met those of the 24th

Division, and the airfields were secured.

Much mopping up remained and much

work was needed before Hollandia became

a great base, but RECKLESS had succeeded.

Critics pointed out the great cost in supplies,

the folly of landing too much too soon in

too small an area. The tanks, for example, could not be used, and aircraft gasoline had been landed in quantities immediately when it was known that it would be

several days before the airfields could be

opened. Yet the planners had had to take

into consideration the possibility that Japanese air or naval forces would cut or interrupt the flow of supplies. One solution

was to hold the LST's offshore and unload

only the equipment and supplies that could

be used immediately. But the LST's

could not be tied up for long, because they

were badly needed for resupply, or in other

areas of the vast Pacific operations. About

a hundred cargo ships, which could not

be accommodated at the two-ship floating

dock, had to remain unloaded in the harbor for several months. The value of

offshore "floating warehouses," already

under consideration, became more apparent.62

Aitape: the Persecution

Task Force

The landing at Aitape was made on

schedule on the morning of 22 April.

Here as at Hollandia, the Japanese (chiefly

service troops) fled after the air and naval

bombardment, offering little or no opposition. The landing beach, designated Blue,

was better than the beaches at Hollandia

and behind it lay ample firm ground for

the supply dumps. By the evening of Dday, seven LST's had been unloaded, roads

were under construction, and the airfields

that were the main object of the landing

area were in Allied hands.63

To provide Ordnance support for the

task force of about 12,000 men (mainly

the 163d Regimental Combat Team of

the 41st Division), the planners had allotted the entire 49th Ordnance Medium

Maintenance Company; an 11-man detachment of the 629th Ordnance Ammuni61

 (1) Engineers of SWPA IV, pp. 299-302. (2)

History 287th Medium Maint Co, 3 Apr-23 May

44. (3) Comments 741st Light Maint Co, in 41st

Inf Div, LETTERPRESS (Humboldt) (LF) Hollandia

Campaign (23 May 44), Lessons Learned in Hollandia Opn, p. 13. Both companies found the

"composite" operation unsatisfactory. Ibid.

62

 (1) Engineers of SWPA IV, pp. 292-93, especially footnotes 288 and 292. (2) 41st Inf Div . . .

Lessons Learned in Hollandia Opn. (3) Blackmore

considered the failure to unload the cargo ships—

of about 10,000 tons capacity—perhaps the worst

feature of the Hollandia operation, even though

it was questionable how much of their cargo was

really needed at the moment. Blackmore Comments. 63

 Engineers of SWPA IV, pp. 313-21.
376 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

tion Company; the usual 4-man antiaircraft repair team from the 253d Company;

and about one-third of the 41st Division's

light maintenance company, the 741st.

The advance 20-man detachment from the

49th landed on D-day, followed on D plus

1 by a small detachment with the ammunition and antiaircraft repairmen. The

repairmen lacked tools, parts, trucks, and

equipment; except for their hand kits, their

supplies and equipment had been bulkloaded on an AK, the Etamin, that was

only about 5 percent offloaded on D-day.

The Ordnance men who came ashore on

D-day soon found some captured Japanese

trucks, and by cannibalizing got three of

them in running condition. They managed to get their welding equipment out of

the Etamin and onto one of the captured

trucks, but a shortage of landing craft

slowed down the unloading of the rest of

their gear. On D plus 6 the unlucky

Etamin was hit by a Japanese bomb and

all cargo was lost. The Ordnance men

were badly hampered by lack of tools and

parts until the rest of the 49th Ordnance

Medium Maintenance arrived on D plus

8, 30 April.64

Less than a week later the 49th Medium

Maintenance and other Ordnance units

were preparing to leave Aitape to participate with the 163d Regimental Combat

Team in the next operation up the New

Guinea coast beyond Hollandia—the seizure of the Wakde-Sarmi area, scheduled

for mid-May.

Relieving the 163d Regimental Combat

Team, the 32d Division was brought up

from Saidor as the main combat element

of PERSECUTION Task Force. Before the

end of June the Aitape airfields and the

west flank were secure; but on the east

flank in the region of the Driniumor River

about eighteen miles east of Aitape, there

had been increasingly heavy clashes with

Japanese patrols. MacArthur's headquarters had reliable information from

radio intercepts that the Japanese at

Wewak were planning an attack early in

July. Reinforcements consisting of two

regimental combat teams and the 43d

Division were ordered to Aitape, and because more than two divisions were now

involved, General Krueger sent for XI

Corps headquarters, placing the task force

under the XI Corps commander. Until

the arrival of the 43d Division the third

week in July with its organic 743d Ordnance Light Maintenance Company and

supporting medium maintenance company,

the 288th, plus the 611th Ordnance

Ammunition Company, all Ordnance

support for the 32d Division and the

two combat teams was furnished by the

32d's own 732d Ordnance Light Maintenance Company, its backup medium

maintenance company, the 21st, and

eleven men of the 611th Ammunition

Company. The first job was to lay out

a bigger ammunition dump (the old dump

had exploded and burned on 16 May, the

day after the departure of the 629th's detachment) and unload 4,000 tons of ammunition still in the holds of ships in the harbor. This was done by using a labor force

of about 300 combat troops and 40 natives

to clear out the kunai grass and cut dunnage. Native labor supplied by the Australia-New Guinea Administrative Unit

64

 (1) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, app. I, p.

3. (2) History PERSECUTION (Aitape) TF, 22

Apr-4 May 44. (3) History 49th Ord Medium

Maint Co, 12 Apr-Jun 44. (4) Engineers of

SWPA IV, p. 323.
FROM PAPUA TO MOROTAI 377

force was also used by the 21st Medium

Maintenance Company to build warehouses and sheds for the task force Ordnance depot, and here again the Australians helped by supplying prefabricated

building material.65

Early in July, reports that a large concentration of the enemy was coming up

from Wewak made it necessary to organize

the Ordnance men into task force reserves;

weapons were issued, and pillboxes were

constructed. The counterattack never got

as far as Aitape; but eastward on the

Driniumor a full-scale battle developed

that placed heavy demands on weapons

and ammunition, especially ammunition

for the 105-mm. howitzers. When the

43d Division, a South Pacific Area unit

that had seen hard service in the Solomons,

arrived from New Zealand, it was found

that 76 percent of its weapons were unserviceable; parts had to be found and the

weapons repaired. Throughout the Driniumor campaign Ordnance teams were sent

to the front lines to keep the weapons operating. There was a tremendous expenditure of ammunition, estimated by XI

Corps to be the largest expenditure of artillery ammunition in any campaign up to

that time in the Southwest Pacific. Areas

inaccessible by boat or truck were reached

by an unprecedented airdrop of ammunition, estimated at 150 tons. The most

important result of the battle of the Driniumor was that it destroyed several Japanese divisions that might have impeded the

Allied forces in their march to the Philippines. Months before the battle ended on

25 August, other SWPA forces had made

huge jumps in the advance; indeed even

before Driniumor began a landing had

been made at Arare, New Guinea, 275

miles north of Aitape and opposite the

island of Wakde.66

The Geelvink Bay Operations:

Wakde, Biak, Noemfoor

Long before the landings at Hollandia

and Aitape, MacArthur had set his sights

on the island of Biak, at the northern entrance of Geelvink Bay, some 325 miles

northwest of Hollandia. A big coral island

about 45 miles long and 20 miles wide,

Biak had a flat coastal plain on which the

Japanese had built three airstrips capable

of development into heavy bomber bases.

These were needed not only for the advance of Southwest Pacific forces to the

Philippines but also for the Central

Pacific's Mariana and Palau operations.

The island seemed even more desirable

after the discovery that weather and terrain

made Hollandia's airfields unsuitable for

the immediate employment of heavy bombers. The only really good bases for that

purpose were still, by May 1944, far in

the rear in the Admiralties and at Nadzab

in eastern New Guinea.67

Wakde-Sarmi

As a preliminary to the attack on Biak,

the seizure of the small island of Wakde,

65

 (1) Ord Activities Aitape Opn, XI Corps, 26

Jun-26 Aug 44. (2) History Det 629th Ord Ammunition Co, 9 Mar 43-12 Sep 44. (3) 32d Inf

Div, 4 May-25 Aug 44, 332-ORD-0.3. (4) History

21st Medium Maint Co.

66

 (1) Ord Activities Aitape Opn. (2) 43d Div

Opn Rpt Aitape Campaign, 29 Jun-25 Aug 44.

(3) History 732d Ord Light Maint Co. (4) History

21st Medium Maint Co. 67

 (1) AAF IV, pp. 617-23. (2) For Ordnance

support at Nadzab, see Ordnance in the Air Forces,

prepared by Air Ordnance Office, AAF, May 1946,

pp. 48-49, MS, OHF.
378 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

about two miles off the coast of New

Guinea, some 120 miles west of Hollandia,

seemed essential. Wakde had a good

coral-based airstrip, from which fighters

could protect the Biak landing; also there

was thought to be in the region between

Wakde and Sarmi (a settlement about

twenty-five miles west) a fairly heavy concentration of Japanese that might menace

the Allied advance. A report from air

reconnaissance that the Sarmi area was

"fuller of Nips and supplies than a mangy

dog is with fleas" prompted a change in

plans from a landing near Sarmi to one in

the Arare-Toem area opposite Wakde. A

landing there by TORNADO Task Force,

composed mainly of the experienced 163d

Regimental Combat Team of the 41st

Division, went off on schedule at dawn on

the morning of 17 May 1944. The next

step, the capture of the small island of

Insoemanai, less than a third of a mile off

Wakde, and the emplacement there of

heavy weapons to protect the Wakde operation, was accomplished by the 2d Battalion of the 163d Regimental Combat

Team without opposition. Next day a

landing was made on Wakde by the 1st

Battalion of the 163d and one company of

the 2d Battalion. They encountered stiffer

opposition than had been expected; Japanese in some force were hidden in caves

or deep coconut-log bunkers; but by 20

May Wakde was secure. The heaviest

fighting was to come later on the mainland.68

An Ordnance maintenance detachment

of three officers and 29 enlisted men of the

49th Ordnance Medium Maintenance

Company went ashore near Arare on Dday about H plus 45. Mindful of the

fiasco at Aitape, they took with them

enough supplies and equipment to last five

days. In addition to their wrecker they

had two mobile-loaded trucks, one loaded

with parts (in bins) and a number of rifles

and machine guns, the other with complete

welding equipment. The detachment was

well rounded, consisting of one instrument

repairman, two armorers, two spare parts

clerks (who doubled as extra automotive

mechanics and armorers), two welders,

three antiaircraft and fire control mechanics, fourteen automotive mechanics, two

men to assist the bomb disposal officer, and

one cook. They immediately sent out

teams to start vehicles that had flooded out

during the landing; to tow waterlogged

vehicles, using the wrecker; to assist at the

antiaircraft command post; and to help

unload the LST's. By noon they had also

found a suitable spot about a mile west of

Toem, between the artillery and infantry

command posts and set up their shops

under a big tarp. Next day, 18 May,

during the assault on Wakde the men had

a chance to display the ingenuity that was

often called upon in Pacific landings.

When a Sherman tank dropped into seven

feet of water as it left the ramp of its LCM,

they recovered it with their wrecker, hauled

it to their shop, flushed all parts, and removed not only the engine but the entire

wiring system, which had to be cleaned

and dried. Some of the drying was done

in the kitchen range; and when new parts

were necessary (they had no spare parts

for tanks) the mechanics made them out

of tin cans, wire, and shell cases. The

tank was back in operation in twenty-four

hours.69

68

 (1) AAF IV, p. 620. (2) Engineers of SWPA

IV, pp. 340-52. 69

 History 49th Medium Maint Co., 12 Apr-Jun 44.
FROM PAPUA TO MOROTAI 379

Ammunition support of the TORNADO

Task Force was supplied by a 93-man

detachment of the 629th Ordnance Ammunition Company. The advance echelon of three officers (including a bomb disposal officer) and forty enlisted men got

ashore in the Arare-Toem area on D-day,

17 May, and set up a dump to receive

the ammunition coming off the LST's.

They had instructions to sort the artillery

ammunition by lot number as it was unloaded (mixed lots continued to be a constant problem in the Pacific as in Europe)

but found this impossible. Here, as in

many landings all over the world, the

drivers of the dump trucks in their hurry

to get rid of their cargo and get back to

the ships simply dumped it on the ground

without waiting for it to be unloaded. In

this process, a good deal of the artillery

ammunition was so badly damaged that

it could not be used. The arrival on 21

May of the 158th Regimental Combat

Team, of which two battalions were to be

dispatched immediately to Sarmi and supplied from the task force dump, increased

ammunition problems and caused concern

over a possible shortage of small arms and

mortar ammunition before supplies could

be unloaded from ships in the bay.70

By the time the rest of the ammunition

detachment and the remainder of the 49th

Medium Maintenance Company arrived

a few days later, the threat of a Japanese

breakthrough in the Toem area and the

shortage of combat troops had made it

necessary for all the Ordnance men to set

up rifle and machine gun defenses around

their shops and dumps. The 49th had

supplemented its five machine guns at one

point with a captured Japanese machine

gun. Toward the end of May the Japanese did attack in the area but were repulsed; and though the threat remained

and for days the Ordnance men had to

work all day and stand guard at night, the

heaviest fighting on the mainland took

place in the Maffin Bay area to the west,

toward Sarmi. The battle was to continue

until well into July, after the 6th Division

had been brought in. Enemy strength in

the area had been badly underestimated

and resistance was stubborn; the Japanese

were deeply entrenched in caves and bunkers and hard to root out. This was to be

even more true on Biak.71

Biak

The Biak operation, begun by the HURRICANE Task Force (41st Division less 163d

Regimental Combat Team) on 27 May,

only ten days after Wakde, differed in

many respects from anything undertaken

by the Southwest Pacific forces up to that

time. The landing place was selected by

a process of elimination. The island is

boot-shaped, and a large part of it is covered with rain forest growing out of high

coral ridges; the Japanese had built their

airfields on a flat inland terrace along the

sole of the boot. In that area were reasonably good beaches near the villages of

Mokmer and Bosnek. Mokmer, near the

main Japanese airfield, was known to be

heavily defended; therefore Bosnek (to

the east) was selected. At Bosnek were

two possibly usable jetties. The entire

southern coast of Biak is surrounded by a

coral reef, which made it necessary to use

70

 History Det 629th Ord Ammunition Co, 9 Mar

43-12 Sep 44.

71

 (1) History 49th Ord Medium Maint Co. (2)

History Det 629th Ord Ammunition Co.
380 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

LVT's and DUKW's, carried to the reef

in LST's, for the landing.

The Ordnance support for the force of

nearly 21,000 men (twice as many as for

Wakde) was fairly heavy: to the 41st Division's own light maintenance company, the

741st, was added the backup company, the

287th Ordnance Medium Maintenance;

an entire ammunition company, the 649th;

and detachments from the 253d Ordnance

Maintenance Company (AA), 3608th

Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company

(Tank) and 724th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company, totaling about 600

men.72

On D-day (for Biak called Z-day), the

ammunition company was ashore early

and by mid-morning had set up ten bays

along the beach road. With the help of

more than a hundred combat troops, the

company managed during the afternoon

to unload the LVT's and DUKW's from

eight LST's. In late afternoon Japanese

planes came over and bombed and strafed

the beach, but the bombs were all duds

and the strafing not much more effective.

Another air attack early next morning

caused no casualties among the ammunition men. They continued unloading until about 1030, when orders came through

to rush as much 105-mm. ammunition to

the combat units as possible. The 3d Battalion of the 162d Infantry, advancing

along the beach road to Mokmer Drome

against light opposition, had run into

serious trouble west of Mokmer village.

From caves in the cliffs that rose sharply

up from the beach, the Japanese suddenly

poured down on the men a withering fire.

As soon as the ammunition men got the

order, they loaded twelve trucks and sent

them forward, some of the men going

along as guides and gunners on the armed

vehicles. Attempts to unload on the beach

road met with mortar and gunfire. The

gun crews suffered heavy casualties. One

driver returned with six wounded men on

his truck. The next effort to get the ammunition to the beleaguered men was made

by boats, which could move along the shore

out of range of Japanese fire and then

dart inshore at full speed. The 649th

loaded nine LVT's with ammunition,

using four of its own men as guides and

gunners, and delivered it in this manner

to the battalion, returning safely late in the

evening. Next morning another attempt

to deliver ammunition in LVT's and

LCM's was called off when word came

that the battalion was being evacuated.73

The action west of Mokmer resulted in

the first tank-against-tank battle in the

Southwest Pacific. On 28 May a platoon

of Shermans sent forward on the coast

road met some Japanese light tanks and

drove them back. In this skirmish the

Shermans had the aid of fire from destroyers offshore, and the damage to three

of the Shermans was caused by Japanese

artillery fire. The first real tank battle

occurred next day, when the armor-piercing ammunition of the Shermans' 75-mm.

guns destroyed the Japanese tanks, whose

37-mm. gunfire was wholly ineffective

against the American tanks.74 Rooting

the Japanese out of the honeycomb of

caves that dominated Mokmer Drome was

a difficult and costly operation, requiring

considerable reinforcements. In mid-June

72

 History Sixth Army Ord Sec, app. C, p. 4.

73

 History 649th Ord Ammunition Co, 21 May23 Sep 44. 74

 Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, p.

140.
FROM PAPUA TO MOROTAI 381

I Corps was brought in, and General

Eichelberger assumed command of HURRICANE Task Force vice Maj. Gen. Horace

H. Fuller of the 41st Division, who left the

theater, being succeeded as division commander by Brig. Gen. Jens A. Doe. It

was late in June before organized resistance

ended, and for weeks thereafter there were

threats of suicide attacks by the 4,000 Japanese that remained on the island.75

The 287th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company suffered several casualties.

The advance party of one officer and fifty

enlisted men, arriving on Z plus 6 (2 June)

and acting as stevedores all day to unload

needed supplies from the LST's, was

attacked by enemy aircraft while on its way

to a bivouac area that evening, and one

man was wounded. After the arrival of

the rear echelon on 5 June, the bivouac

area became even more dangerous, for

about 75 yards behind it, a battery of 155-

mm. M1 guns began firing over it toward

Mokmer Drome. As the men were preparing to move out on the morning of 7

June, a muzzle burst from one of the guns

killed one of the men and wounded five

others. The company was not able to get

its shops set up until 9 June on the beach

near Warwe and when it did, the work

from nondivisional units and the overflow

jobs from the 741st Ordnance Light Maintenance Company poured in: trucks damaged by rough roads and water holes;

DUKW's damaged by coral reefs; weapons malfunctioning from constant firing;

and all problems made worse by lack of

preventive maintenance. But the men of

the 287th, veterans of several difficult operations, knew the value of initiative and

ingenuity. They improvised parts and

used Japanese equipment, reconditioning

some 200 Japanese trucks and putting two

Japanese lathes to good use in their shops.

Remaining at Biak as USASOS troops

after Base H was established there, they

were for a long time in danger from small

bands of scattered Japanese. In September and October they captured three Japanese in their area.76

Noemfoor

The third Geelvink Bay operation, designated TABLETENNIS, was an invasion on 2

July 1944 of Noemfoor, a small circular

island about halfway between Biak and

the Vogelkop Peninsula of New Guinea.

The Japanese were using the island as a

staging area for troops moving to reinforce

Biak; they had also constructed or partially

completed three airdromes on it. The

capture of Noemfoor would protect Biak

as well as the sea lanes to the west of Biak;

it would also provide airfields from which

Allied fighters and bombers could cover

the advance to the Vogelkop. Seizure of

the airdrome sites was the principal mission of the assault force, which was the

158th Regimental Combat Team (brought

up from Wakde-Sarmi), reinforced and

designated CYCLONE Task Force. Of the

5,500 service troops assigned to the 8,000-

man combat element some 3,000 were to

be used for airdrome construction.

Like Biak, Noemfoor is almost surrounded by coral reefs; the landing plans 75

 For interesting firsthand descriptions of the

caves see Harold Riegelman; Caves of Biak, pp.

145-55, and Col. Jack W. Rudolph, "Kuzume Makes the Team," Military Review, XXV, No. 2

(May 1945), pp. 17-23. 76

 History 287th Ord Medium Maint Co.
382 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

were therefore similar to those for Biak:

to beach LCI's and LST's at the reef and

unload their cargoes into LVT's and

DUKW's for the assault run to the shore.

The reef was narrowest at a point on the

northwestern coast, which was selected as

the landing place. It was near Kamiri

Airdrome, which had the advantage of

placing the assault troops immediately on

their objective. Yet it also put them ashore

at the point where Japanese defenses were

expected to be strongest. For this reason

the landing was preceded about an hour

after sunrise on 2 July by the heaviest naval

bombardment yet delivered in the Southwest Pacific. There was no opposition to

the landing; the few Japanese, a far

weaker force than had been expected, fled

to the interior, where some of them were

found wandering about stunned by the

bombardment. Around 0900 Japanese

mortar and 70-mm. artillery shells fell for

a short time on the beachhead and reef,

setting one DUKW afire and exploding a

truckload of ammunition. Few casualties

occurred among the assault troops; the

highest casualty rate was suffered by

ground accidents to paratroopers of the

503d Parachute Infantry who began arriving 3 July. With the help of the paratroopers, mopping-up operations continued

until the little island was declared secure

on 31 August.

On D-day at Noemfoor, thirty-nine men

and four officers (including a bomb disposal

officer) of the 629th Ammunition Company had gone in with the assault forces.

Two days later the rest of the 90-man detachment of the company assigned to the

operation (less a small rear echelon) was

at Noemfoor. With some help from combat troops on unloading ships and

DUKW's, by 10 July the men had succeeded in setting up a satisfactory dump

on a coral ledge along Kamiri Drome.

The bomb disposal officer, assisted by a

6-man squad, found that many of the

roads and some of the beach and jungle

area were mined with Japanese antipersonnel bombs, buried so that only the fuze was

visible. But most of his work on Noemfoor was with duds dropped by Allied lowaltitude bombers, and artillery shells and

rockets fired in the heavy naval bombardment.77

Maintenance support for TABLETENNIS

was provided by the 49th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company. The advance

30-man echelon, plus the usual 4-man antiaircraft team, got ashore shortly after Hhour. The antiaircraft team stayed with

the antiaircraft units, drying out and repairing equipment damaged by salt water.

The other men, who brought with them a

welding truck and two depot trucks, set up

shop on the Kamiri airstrip. Their first

job was repairing vehicles drowned out

during the landing; then mechanics were

sent out to all combat units to inspect and

repair weapons. The welders were kept

busy on Engineer and captured Japanese

construction equipment, since construction

work had begun at Kamiri Drome on Dday. By 25 July, Kamiri and neighboring Kornasoren (plans for the third airfield, Namber Drome, were discarded)

were ready to support the impending invasion of the Vogelkop Peninsula.78

77

 History Hq Det 629th Ord Ammunition Co,

22 Jun-18 Jul 44. 78

 (1) History 49th Ord Medium Maint Co

(Noemfoor Opn), 22 Jun-Aug 44. (2) History

Sixth Army Ord Sec app. C, p. 4.
FROM PAPUA TO MOROTAI 383

The Sansapor Area in the Vogelkop

The last operation in New Guinea,

known as GLOBETROTTER, took place near

Cape Sansapor on the northwest coast of

the Vogelkop Peninsula. The date was

30 July 1944. In the thirteen months since

the landings on Kiriwina and Woodlark,

ALAMO Force had advanced 1,500 miles

on the road to the Philippines. Time after

time, landings had been selected by General MacArthur that would leap over and

cut off Japanese centers of resistance; and

the Vogelkop was one of them. Bypassing the Japanese base at Manokwari,

which faced Noemfoor across Geelvink Bay,

Southwest Pacific forces would go ashore

140 miles up the coast in an area that the

Japanese had not thought worth defending.

The Japanese had no airfields in the area

—a clearing that looked to Allied reconnaissance planes like a partially cleared airstrip turned out to be a native garden

area.79

The task force for the operation, called

TYPHOON and consisting mainly of the 6th

Division, less one regimental combat team,

was staged in the Toem-Maffin Bay area.

Ordnance support consisted in addition to

the bulk of the division's own light maintenance company (the 706th) of a medium

maintenance company, the 48th; an ammunition company, the 622d; tank and

antiaircraft maintenance detachments; a

bomb disposal squad; and a 63-man supply platoon of the 849th Ordnance Depot

Company—the only depot men used in any

New Guinea campaign other than Hollandia.80

On D-day, two battalions of the 1st Infantry landed without opposition on Cape

Opmarai, and a reconnaissance troop

landed on two small islands off the peninsula, Middleburg and Amsterdam, also

without opposition. Next day a third battalion of the 1st Infantry moved by water

from Cape Opmarai to Cape Sansapor

and found no Japanese there or in the

neighboring village of Sansapor. On Dday a detachment of two officers and fortysix enlisted men of the 622d Ordnance

Ammunition Company landed from LST's

and began setting up their dumps and by

11 August all of the company were in the

Cape Opmarai area. Nearly a week later,

on 17 August, the depot and medium

maintenance men arrived. On that day a

fighter airstrip on Middleburg Island became operational; and on 3 September an

airstrip on the mainland near Mar was

ready for bomber operations. Other than

Japanese bombers coming over to drop

bombs of the type used against parked aircraft, no enemy appeared. The Ordnance

men spent their time building huts over

their ammunition stacks and improving

their shop areas. A big boost to morale in

September was the long-awaited issue of

beer to troops in the forward areas.81

Morotai

The final Southwest Pacific landing between New Guinea and the Philippines

was appropriately named INTERLUDE.

The time was 15 September 1944 and the

79

 Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon, pp.

116-21. 80 History Sixth Army Ord Sec, app. C, pp. 1-4.

81

 (1) ALAMO Force, Rpt on the GLOBETROTTER

(Sansapor) Opn, 30 Jul-31 Aug 44. (2) History

622d Ord Ammunition Go, 1943-1945. (3) History

48th Ord Medium Maint Co, Jul-Sep 44. (4)

History 1st Supply Plat, 849th Ord Depot Co, JulAug 44.
384 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

place was Morotai, an island off the north

coast of Halmahera, selected in order to

bypass strongly garrisoned Halmahera and

yet stay within range of air support from

Sansapor. The major combat elements

selected by ALAMO Force for the operation

were Headquarters, XI Corps, the 31st

Infantry Division, and the 126th Regimental Combat Team of the 32d Infantry

Division, constituting TRADEWIND Task

Force, a force about twice the size of that

selected for Sansapor. Ordnance support

in addition to the 31st Division's organic

light maintenance company (the 731st)

and a detachment of the 32d's 732d, consisted of an ammunition company, the

623d; two medium maintenance companies, the 259th and 291st; the bulk of

the 849th Ordnance Depot Company; a

small detachment of the 3608th Ordnance

Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank);

two antiaircraft maintenance teams from

the 3073d Ordnance Maintenance Company; and the 100th Bomb Disposal Squad.

This was a total force of 932 Ordnance

troops—the largest since Hollandia—and

for the first time since Hollandia all nondivisional units were placed under a battalion headquarters, the 194th, the same

battalion used at Hollandia.82

Like most of the islands the men of the

Southwest Pacific had become familiar

with, Morotai was mountainous and covered with rain forest. The only place suitable for airfields was a lowland area on

the southwest end, from which slender Gila

Peninsula extended toward Halmahera.

General Krueger wanted to land simultaneously on the east and west sides of this

peninsula, but his plan was vetoed by the

Navy for several reasons, not the least important of which was that landings on both

sides would interfere with the effective employment of naval gun fire. Consequently, two beaches were selected on the west,

White Beach on the peninsula and Red

Beach some 1,500 yards north on the mainland. At both beaches on 15 September

the task force landed unopposed.83 Unopposed, that is, by the enemy. It

was definitely opposed by the terrain.

General Krueger remembered later that

the beach conditions "were the worst we

had seen in our operations, and that was

saying a lot." On the offshore reefs were

coral heads and boulders that caught the

landing craft, as well as deep holes and

fissures that all but submerged the vehicles

and men. Inshore, under a thin covering

of sand, was sticky clay and mud in which

trucks, artillery, tractors, and bulldozers

bogged down. A better beach had to be

found, and on the afternoon of D-day one

was found on the east side of the peninsula,

Blue Beach, where landing craft were unloaded beginning on D plus 1.

 84

The commander of the 194th Ordnance

Battalion landed on Red Beach with the

advance detachment of the 291st Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company

and set up a service station on the beach to

get the stalled vehicles operating. Two

antiaircraft maintenance teams also got

ashore on D-day and quickly managed to

repair damage to the antiaircraft guns that

had been submerged in salt water. Men

of the 291st lent a hand with the heavy

equipment and the welding of broken

82

 (1) ALAMO Force Rpt on the Morotai (INTERLUDE) Opn, 15 Sep-4 Oct 44. (2) History Sixth

Army Ord Sec, app. C, p. 5.

83

 ALAMO Force Rpt on Morotai Opn. 84

 Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon, pp.

125, 129.
FROM PAPUA TO MOROTAI 385

PULLING A TRUCK FROM A MUDHOLE, MOROTAI BEACH. Other stranded vehicles

await rescue.

parts. The big 94-man ammunition detachment, accompanied by the bomb disposal squad, was split between Red Beach

and White on D-day, receiving and segregating the ammunition coming off the

LST's. The rest of the unit (less the rear

echelon) landed next day by LST on the

eastern side of the peninsula. The depot

men and the 259th Ordnance Medium

Maintenance Company arrived later,

several days after General Krueger declared the Morotai operation at an end on

4 October. Soon after its arrival the depot company was alerted for early departure as part of the MIKE I (Luzon)

operation, and for some time to come the

efforts of the whole 194th Battalion were

devoted to repairing or replacing the equipment of the combat units that were going

to the Philippines.85

The time and place for the invasion of

the Philippines was decided upon on the

other side of the world on the night after

D-day at Morotai. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff, then attending the Quebec Conference, received a message from Admiral

William F. Halsey, delivered by Admiral

Chester W. Nimitz, recommending that

plans for an assault on Mindanao on 15

85

 (1) History 194th Ord Bn, 3 Jan-4 Nov 44.

(2) Histories 3d and 4th Maint AA Teams, Morotai Opn, in History 3073d Ord Maint Co, 15 Aug9 Oct 44. (3) History 623d Ord Ammunition Co,

21 Aug-8 Oct 44.
386 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

November be canceled and that MacArthur

and Nimitz make a joint assault on Leyte on

20 October. Halsey's advice was based on

the success of his raids with the new Essex

class aircraft carriers off the coast of the

Philippines, which had revealed the weakness of the enemy's air defenses. His recommendations seemed sound to the Joint

Chiefs. After MacArthur's consent was

received on the evening of 15 September,

the decision was made for the return to the

Philippines.86

86

 (1) Samuel Eliot Morison, American Contributions to the Strategy of World War II (London:

Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 63. (2) M.

Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1954), p. 9.
CHAPTER XX

The Philippines Leyte

By midsummer of 1944 "the clans were

gathering at Hollandia," observed General

Eichelberger, "A sure sign always that a

major campaign is ahead."

 1 Late in June

Headquarters, Sixth Army (the designation ALAMO Force had been dropped in

May), arrived from Cape Cretin and by

August the Engineers' two sawmills were

whirring to turn out lumber for buildings

to house also the headquarters of the Southwest Pacific Area; United States Army

Forces in the Far East; United States Army

Services of Supply; Base G; Far East Air

Force; and General Eichelberger's Eighth

Army (activated on 7 September 1944).

For a time the entire output of one mill

was reserved for General MacArthur's

headquarters, located inland on beautiful

Lake Sentani against the backdrop of the

towering Cyclops Mountains.2 General

MacArthur intended to lead in person the

return to the Philippines. The primary

objective was Luzon—the MIKE I operation. But first, airfields and bases for the

ultimate assault had to be established.

That was the purpose of the landing on the

Leyte coastal plain—the KING II operation. Planning for MIKE I and KING II

went on simultaneously at Hollandia.3

Close to the coast near Humboldt Bay

the shelters for Base G depots were being

built with prefabricated materials shipped

from Australia. Base G, however, never

became the major supply base in New

Guinea. Base F at Finschhafen, which

had a deeper harbor, continued to be first.

But the Hollandia base was developed on

a very large scale and is inseparably associated with the Philippines operations.4

Among the earliest Ordnance efforts was

the enlargement, chiefly by building huts in

the native fashion, of the Hollandia Ordnance Service Center that had been set up

by the maintenance and depot companies

of the 194th Ordnance Battalion, which

had participated in RECKLESS. An effort

was also made to get the ammunition in

Nichols Ammunition Depot off the ground

and on coconut dunnage, and under

shelter as much as possible. On Pie Beach

a detachment of the 3608th Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank) put up a shop

building to repair tracked vehicles and a

vehicle assembly plant was being considered for the dock area.5

1

 Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, p.

163. 2

 (1) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, p. 16. (2)

Engineers of SWPA VI, pp. 235-36. 3

 Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines,

pp. 1-9. Unless otherwise indicated tactical details

in this chapter are based on this source. 4

 (1) Engineers of SWPA VI, p. 236. (2) Alvin

P. Stauffer, The Quartermaster Corps: Operations

in the War Against Japan, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1956),

p. 89. 5

 Base G, History Hollandia, Jul-Aug 44.
388 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Lt. Col. Frederick G. Waite helped plan

for the support of the Leyte operation, first

as Ordnance officer of Base G, and later

as assistant executive officer at Base G

headquarters. He was an old hand in the

Southwest Pacific, having arrived in Australia in May 1942. His experiences in

New Guinea, beginning at Milne Bay, had

left him with few illusions about the effect

of the tropics on Ordnance matériel and

Ordnance men. He knew the damaging

effect of heat and moisture on ammunition,

optical equipment, weapons, and trucks,

and the demoralizing effect of jungle warfare on men.6

Waite also knew well the supply problems involved in supporting assault landings on beaches where there were no roads,

docks, hardstands, or buildings. It took

time, sometimes several months, to construct the necessary facilities. He knew

there was what he called a "dead" period

of supply between the time the organic load

was consumed and the time when base

issues could be efficiently made, and a

similar "dead" maintenance period before

shops could be set up. In the Leyte operation he hoped that for the first time these

dangerous gaps in maintenance and supply

could be eliminated. Waite had for

several months been working on the "floating shops" and "floating depot" that were

going to be employed for the first time in

the Philippines operations.7

The Ordnance Navy: The Shop

and Depot Barges

In January 1944 a ship to carry spare

parts was proposed by General Campbell

in a memorandum for General Somervell,

commanding general of Army Service

Forces:

I have an idea floating around in my head

on which I would like to give you my thinking. When you and I were boys down

South the huckster used to come around

with all sorts of things in his wagon and the

housewives would buy whatever they wanted.

This was a very convenient way of replenishing the larder.

Why should we not have an ASF spare

parts ship stocked with miscellaneous assortments of fast moving spare parts of all the

Services. Experts from each of the Services

would man this floating depot, and parts

would be those shipped to the various

Theaters of call. . . .8

At the time, there was a definite shortage of shipping; no vessel of the size

contemplated could be spared. In the Normandy invasion the use of commodityloaded ships as floating depots or floating

warehouses, although convenient and often

necessary, was sharply criticized because it

immobilized urgently needed ships. Such

use was finally prohibited by the Joint

Chiefs in December 1944. In the Pacific

the floating depot or offshore LST was extremely vulnerable to enemy air attack, as

had been demonstrated by the lone enemy

bomber at Hollandia.9

Not until April 1945 did General Somervell act on General Campbell's suggestion.

Three multiple-deck cargo vessels were

selected for use by Ordnance. The Nevadan was to be stocked mainly with weapons parts; the Susan Luckenbach with

6

 (1) Base G, History Hollandia, Jul-Aug 44.

(2) Waite Paper. 7

 Ibid.

8

 History Planning Division, ASF, vol. 2, p. 258;

vol. 9, p. 215. 9

 (1) Bykofsky and Larson, The Transportation

Corps: Operations Overseas, pp. 108, 311. (2)

Blackmore Comments.
THE PHILIPPINES: LEYTE 389

transport vehicle parts, and the Marymar

with parts for tanks and other tracked

vehicles. A similar type of vessel was

selected for the Engineers; two C1 -M-AVI

vessels were designated for the Transportation Corps and one for the combined use

of Signal, Chemical Warfare, and Medical

services. To get the ships allocated, prepare

plans for conversion, and do the job took

many months. Significantly, the last delay

was caused by the V-J Day celebrations in

the shipyards. It was September 1945 before the three Ordnance ships, loaded with

420 carloads of spare parts, sailed. While

they were on the way, it was decided that

they would not be needed by the occupational forces in Japan, and they were returned to be discharged at U.S. ports.10

The inspiration for preparing in the

United States floating maintenance shops

for Pacific island bases came from a member of the ASF Maintenance Division in

the spring of 1944. The ship contemplated

was the small shallow-draft Baltic coaster;

but as none was available the Transportation Corps suggested that concrete ships or

barges be considered. The concrete barge

was decided upon and by 3 May 1944

plans were well enough along to be presented in some detail, with a blueprint, to

the commanders of the Southwest Pacific

and Pacific Ocean Areas. The barge, approximately 265 feet long and 48 feet wide,

was to house on its main deck technical

repair shops to do maintenance up to fifth

echelon for all types of army equipment,

and in its lower holds and 'tween-deck

holds storage for spare parts and assemblies.

The boat deck was to carry a 50-ton landing barge plus a 30-ton crane to lift it into

the water, and was to be equipped with

40-mm. antiaircraft guns and machine

guns. The maintenance men would have

comfortable quarters on the boat deck.11

Only two of these barges were planned,

one for the Southwest Pacific and one for

the Pacific Ocean Areas. Each was an ambitious, million-dollar project, completely

equipped with machinery and tools, and

possessing such features as air conditioning

for the instrument shops and dehydrated

compartments to provide rustproof storage.

Planning went on for months, including

consultations with theater commanders and

conferences between members of the technical services. As Ordnance service was

considered predominant, a TOE of 103

Ordnance men was agreed upon, with four

Medical, one Engineer, nine Signal, and six

Transportation men (as boat crew) attached, and essential equipment for all.

The Ordnance men were given special

training on Chesapeake Bay in boat drill

and landing operations. Not until late

1944 did construction of the barges get

under way and the first was not expected

10

 (1) History Planning Div, ASF, vol. 2, pp.

259-62, vol. 9, app. 20-A. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen Julian

S. Hatcher to CG OCO-D, 12 May 45, sub: Floating Spare Parts Depots. (3) Memo, same to same,

25 May 45, and 1st Ind. (4) Memo, Brig Gen Henry

C. Wolfe, Dir Planning Div ASF, for Deputy Dir

Plans & Opns, ASF, 1 Sep 45, sub: Random Notes

of Major Importance during Gen Scott's Absence,

18 Aug-31 Aug 45, ASF Theater Br Planning

Div Files. (4) Lt Col C. R. Petticrew, "Ordnance

Depots Afloat: A New Idea in Amphibious Warfare," Army Ordnance, vol. XXX, 154, (JanuaryFebruary 1946), pp. 56-58.

11

 (1) Memo, Brig Gen Frank A. Heileman for

TAG, 3 May 44, sub: Floating Maintenance

Barges for Various Island Bases in the Pacific

Theaters, with Incls, and MFR, AG 560 (3 May

1944). (2) "Base Shops Afloat," Firepower (February-March 1945), pp. 2-3. (3) Maj Albert D.

Lueders, "Maintenance Afloat," The Ordnance

Digest, (April 1945), pp. 16-18.
390 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

to become available in the United States

until February 1945.12

In the meantime, the USASOS Ordnance officers in the Southwest Pacific had

taken matters into their own hands, as men

in the theaters all over the world had

learned to do, without waiting for the

lengthy planning processes in the United

States to bear fruit. Since the fall of 1942

they had been aware of the need for

floating depots and shops to solve the serious problem of what Waite termed "supply

strangulation" on assault beaches—the 60-

day to 90-day period that elapsed between

the time an advance base was first occupied

and the time its subdepots were set up and

operating. By the spring of 1943 Colonel

Holman had in operation a fleet of small

ships to deliver parts, replacement weapons, and cleaning and preserving materials

to Ordnance maintenance companies in

forward areas and to evacuate unserviceable equipment and captured enemy matériel. The ships carried small shops aboard

to repair the small arms being evacuated.13

During the leapfrogging operations up the

New Guinea coast the value of this fleet

became even more apparent and planning

was directed toward somewhat larger ships

and more emphasis on shop work. The

main obstacle was finding the ships. The

ideal vessel for the purpose was the LST,

which could move under its own power,

but LST's were too scarce to be even considered. The best available substitute was

the 265-foot BCL (barge, concrete, large)

constructed by the Maritime Commission

for the Navy in National City, California,

and towed across the Pacific behind Liberty ships.14

By June of 1944, the most pressing Ordnance need in this respect was for fifth

echelon shop barges. ALAMO Force had

made its way up the New Guinea coast as

far as Biak, and distances were becoming

too great to make it practicable to ship

unserviceable unit assemblies back to base

shops at Milne Bay. About the time the

first concrete barges arrived at Milne Bay

in September 1944, the tools and equipment to outfit them were also available,

since a base shop at Milne was closing

down and the entire plant of a shop at

Sydney, Australia, was being shipped to

Base F at Finschhafen. The Ordnance

men at USASOS were planning four

barges, each with a capacity of rebuilding

ten engines a day plus five each of the other

vehicle unit assemblies such as axles, and

also with some facilities for repairing weapons and accessories. The job of outfitting

and operating the barges was given to the

141st Ordnance Base Automotive Maintenance Battalion at Finschhafen.15

As soon as the barges arrived, Capt.

Elroy C. Leoppard and 2d Lt. Dwight E.

Wheeler of the 141st Battalion went down

to Milne Bay, loaded fifth echelon equipment on BCL 3056 and started back to

Finschhafen, arriving 27 September to

begin the job of outfitting Ordnance's first

floating shop. With the help of Waite and 12

 (1) MFR's, other Corresp, in AG 560 (3 May

44) Floating Maint Barges for Various Island Bases

in Pacific Theaters; also in USAFFE AG Sec 560

Barges, Book 2, KCRC. (2) The barge destined

for POA did not arrive at Hawaii until 6 July

1945, and was still in Hawaii on V-J Day. History

312 1st Ord Floating Maint Barge, 12 Oct 45. 13

 (1) Rpt of Ord Activities, USASOS-SWPA,

Nov 42, OHF. (2) Blackmore Comments.

14

 (1) Ltr, CG USASOS to CG USAFFE, 3 Dec

44, sub: Concrete Barges, USAFFE AG Sec, 560

Barges, Book 2, KCRC. (2) Waite Paper. 15

 (1) Rpt of Ord Activities, USASOS, Jun,

Jul 44; (2) History Off Ord Officer, Base A, Sep

44 in History Milne Bay, USASOS.
THE PHILIPPINES: LEYTE 391

Lt. Col. Walter A. Brown, Maintenance

officer, USASOS, and under the direction

of Captain Leoppard, who was to become

the first Ordnance barge commander, a

detail of a hundred men of the 141st

worked three shifts a day on this pioneer

operation. The barge was ready on 18

November. It had a wooden superstructure, with two hold levels below the main

deck and eight hatches to each deck. The

superstructure supported an electrically

operated monorail hoisting system; at each

of the four main deck doors a cargo boom

could be lowered, which permitted use of the

monorail lift over small craft or amphibians.

On the top deck were quarters for the 3 officers and 121 men who were to operate the

shop (Detachment A, 141st Ordnance Base

Automotive Maintenance Battalion), but

the quarters were to be occupied only during operation at a base. When the barge

was being towed, the men had to be moved

by some other means of transportation.

The mission of the detachment, activated

1 January 1945, was to rebuild worn-out

engines, assemblies, and power train units,

and to operate a small but complete service

section, in which almost any kind of tool

and special equipment could be made. The

barge, now designated USASOS Floating

Shop 4, departed for Leyte in February

1945. She turned out to be an unlucky

little vessel, for she suffered two explosions

that cost lives; in the second, occurring late

in August, an explosion in No. 4 Starboard

Hold killed four men and seriously

wounded seventeen. But she did fine work

at Leyte.16

A second concrete barge, BCL 3058, arrived in Finschhafen in October, was similarly fitted out, and was functioning before

the end of December as Floating Shop 6.

Her mission was to clean up much of the

New Guinea backlog before moving on to

the Philippines. In March 1945 she was

sent to Hollandia, where there was a tremendous backlog. The barge was anchored

offshore at Pim Jetty (with her maintenance men located at the Hollandia Ordnance Service Center) and furnished with

two 80-foot barges and an LCM to facilitate offshore operations. The Ordnance

officers at Base G had estimated that there

were enough reclaimable engines and assemblies on hand to keep the floating shop

busy for three months; but the need in the

Philippines was greater, and after only ten

days of operation at Hollandia the barge

departed in April for Manila.17

A third shop barge was designed for a

very special use—as a floating tire repair

shop. The tire problem was as hard to

solve in the Pacific as it was in other theaters, and the arrival of one of the new and

scarce tire repair companies, the 166th, at

Finschhafen in April 1944 was welcomed

in the Southwest Pacific as such companies

had been welcomed in Europe. As in Europe, the company was broken down into

detachments, one operating as part of the

141st Battalion in Finschhafen and the

other running a tire shop at Milne Bay.

The company's equipment was long delayed. When it was unloaded at Finsch16

 (1) History Off of Ord Officer, Base A, Sep

44. (2) Rpt of Ord Activities, USASOS, Sep, Oct

44. (3) History 141st Ord Base Automotive Maint

Bn, May-Nov 44. (4) History Floating Shop 4

Prov-Det A, in History 141st BAM Bn, Jan-Nov

45. (5) History Base F, Feb 45, in History Finschhafen, Jan 44-May 45. (6) Waite Paper; for a

photograph of the barge, Fig. 12. (7) "Ordnance

Curb Service," Army Ordnance, XXVIII, 150

(May-June 1945), p. 332. 17

 Rpt of Ord Activities, USASOS, Nov 44, Jan

45. (2) History Off Ord Officer Base G, in History

Hollandia Staff Sections, Mar-Apr 45.
392 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

hafen on 2 December 1944 plans were

drawn up for installing it in a barge, and

the work got under way under the direction

of Colonel Brown as soon as BCL 3064

arrived on 20 December. This barge also

had some bad luck when a harbor tug

towing a steel crane rammed her side on

20 January 1945 and punched a hole in

Starboard Hold No. 3; but repairs were

quickly made and the shop installation was

completed on 28 January. Floating Tire

Repair Shop 11, as she was called, arrived

at Manila on 10 June and a few days later

was tied up in the Pasig River alongside

Floating Shop 6.18

While the work on the shop barges was

going forward at Finschhafen, another

vessel in the Ordnance fleet was being

readied at Milne Bay—a depot barge, made

possible when BCL 3060 was turned over

to Ordnance on 20 November 1944. With

a dead-weight capacity of 2,500 tons, the

depot barge was intended to supplement

maintenance facilities and to effect prompt

resupply of parts in forward areas where

there were no USASOS depots. The work

of installing bins for the storage and issue

of parts was begun immediately by a detail

from the 318th Ordnance Depot Company,

supervised by Colonel Brown until Colonel Waite arrived to take over late in November. There was a very short deadline

of 15 December, but it was met. For their

contribution in hard work and initiative,

Sgts. Edwin S. Coe, William R. Willson,

and Orville L. Shields, and Pvt. George H.

Bucholtz received handsome commendations from Waite. The barge, designated

USASOS Floating Depot 9, and operated

by a detachment of two officers and thirtyone enlisted men from the 172d Ordnance

Depot Company (mostly transferred from

the 318th), was supplied as much as possible from stocks in Milne Bay (thus helping in "rolling up the rear"), then moved

up to Finschhafen and Hollandia to complete its stocks. Certain automotive parts

were in short supply everywhere and stocking took longer than had been expected.

The depot barge did not arrive at Leyte

until April 1945.19

Planning for Leyte

Because D-day now meant to everybody the Normandy landing on 6 June

1944, General MacArthur designated the

Leyte date of 20 October 1944 as A-day.

This was by far the largest operation yet

undertaken in the Pacific. For the first

time, there would be two armies, Sixth

Army to go in first, Eighth Army to follow

up. And for the first time there would be

an organization to provide logistical support in advance of USASOS, an organization comparable to the Advance Section,

Communications Zone, which had been

attached to First Army in the Normandy

invasion.20

18

 (1) Rpt of Ord Activities, USASOS, Nov 44

and Jan 45. (2) History 166th Ord Tire Repair

Co, Jun 43-May 49, Apr 44-Dec 45. (3) History

Det 166th Ord Tire Repair Co, Sep-Nov 44 and

Jan-Feb 45.

19

 (1) Rpt of Ord Activities, USASOS, Nov 44,

Jan 45. (2) History Ord Officer Base A, Nov, Dec

44, Jan 45. (3) History Ord Officer Base G, Feb

45. (4) History Ord Office, Intermediate Sec,USASOS, Nov 44-Jan 45. (5) History 318th Ord

Depot Co, 1944-45. (6) History 172d Ord Depot

Co, 1944-45. (7) Waite Paper. (8) For use of

Floating Depot 9 at Cebu in May 1945 see below,

p. 435. 20

 Samuel Eliot Morison, "History of United

States Naval Operations in World War II," vol.

XII, Leyte, June 1944-January 1945 (Boston,

Little, Brown and Company, 1958), p. 114, n. 4.
THE PHILIPPINES: LEYTE 393

ASCOM

The USASOS advance organization was

designated Army Service Command

(ASCOM). With the invasion of the

Philippines in mind United States Army

Services of Supply had established ASCOM

in Brisbane on 23 July 1944 and given it

two missions: first, to set up the new bases

that would be needed in the Philippines

(later to be turned over to USASOS);

second, to provide logistical support for

Sixth Army immediately after the landings. The base mission dictated that it be

largely an Engineer outfit, and the commander was Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Casey,

MacArthur's chief engineer. ASCOM

arrived at Hollandia from Brisbane on 5

September. General Casey set up headquarters adjacent to Sixth Army headquarters and by 14 September his planning for

KING I (the Mindanao landing) scheduled for 15 October and KING II (Leyte),

scheduled for 20 December, was nearly

complete. On 15 September, the day

ASCOM was attached to Sixth Army, the

KING I operation was canceled and the

date of KING II was advanced to 20 October. Next day the ASCOM men who

were going to run the base at Leyte were

organized into Headquarters, Base K.21

The Ordnance officer of Base K was Col.

Otto M. Low, the commanding officer of

the 230th Ordnance Base Group. Lately

arrived from the United States, this was the

second Ordnance group headquarters in

the Southwest Pacific. It was to act as

headquarters of the Base K Ordnance Section and at Leyte was to control two Ordnance battalions with some nine companies, several of the "heavy" type. Colonel

Low and two members of his staff were to

go ashore at Leyte on A plus 2, the rest of

the men on A plus 6. On 6 October group

headquarters moved into the KING II staging area at Hollandia, which the men considered "a hole of the first water," with a

mess run by an Australian mobile kitchen

unit "that put out small quantities of almost inedible food when it felt like it."22

Theoretically, Army Service Command

would relieve the Sixth Army Ordnance

staff of considerable work and provide an

immediate base of supply and evacuation

in support of the Ordnance troops behind

the combat units. It was also expected to

provide an easy means of transition into

USASOS operations. There were, however, some disturbing reflections. ASCOM

headquarters had had little time to organize and train; and the delay in moving

from Brisbane to Hollandia had made impossible the close co-ordination with the

Sixth Army Ordnance Section that was so

desirable during the planning period. Another handicap, which could not be foreseen, but which was to be a real drawback

to smooth Ordnance operations, was a

change in ASCOM Ordnance officers several times during the early stages of the

Leyte campaign.23

21

 (1) History Army Service Command, 23 Jul26 Dec 44. (2) History Base K, 16 Sep 44-31 Dec

45.

22

 (1) History Ord Sec Base K, Nov 44, in

History Base K. (2) History 230th Ord Base Gp,

Oct-Nov 44. (3) The first Ordnance group headquarters to arrive in SWPA was that of the 226th

Ordnance Base Group, which came in May 1944,

and after July acted as Ordnance Section of Base

F. History Hq & Hq Det 226th Base Depot (formerly Hq Det, 226th Base Gp), May-Dec 44. 23

 History Sixth Army Ord Sec, p. 17.
394 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Blackmore's Problems: Time

and Distance

For D-day in Europe the First Army

Ordnance planners had had months of

preparation. For A-day in the Pacific, the

planning of the Sixth Army Ordnance Section was measured in weeks rather than

months. The Leyte planning was made

even more difficult by major changes in the

troop lists only five weeks before A-day.

Conferences at Brisbane during the summer had contemplated landings by X Corps

with the 1st Cavalry and 40th Infantry Divisions in the area of Tacloban, Leyte's

capital, and the XIV Corps with the 24th

and 37th Infantry Divisions about twenty

miles south of Tacloban in the Dulag area.

When on 15 September A-day was changed

from 20 December to 20 October, the 40th

and 37th Divisions had to be ruled out

because they could not be brought forward

in time from western New Britain and the

Solomons. Instead of the 40th Division,

X Corps took over the 24th Division, which

had made a good record in RECKLESS at

Tanahmerah Bay; and instead of XIV

Corps, a corps from the Pacific Ocean

Areas, the XXIV (7th and 96th Infantry

Divisions) was substituted. The XXIV

Corps could be diverted to the Southwest

Pacific because its operation against Yap

Island had just been canceled.24

During the planning period the assault

units were widely scattered. The XXIV

Corps was still loading out of Hawaii when

the change in plan was announced on 15

September. The corps commander, Maj.

Gen. John R. Hodge, flew to Hollandia

with his G-4 to participate in the Leyte

planning, but the big convoy itself, after

reassembling at Eniwetok on 25 September,

arrived at Manus in the Admiralties on 3

October and it was there that the final

plans were made and orders issued. The

troops had been aboard ship since 27

August. The 1st Cavalry Division, which

had been the main force in the capture of

these islands earlier in the year, was still in

the Admiralties. The only combat elements at Hollandia were the 24th Infantry

Division and the Rangers of the 6th Ranger

Infantry Battalion who had been given the

job of securing the approaches to Leyte

Gulf before A-day.25

In calculating the Ordnance units that

would be needed to support the Leyte operation, the Sixth Army Ordnance Section

planners once more (as in the earlier

SWPA operations) fervently wished that

MacArthur had had an Ordnance officer

on his staff to give him some expert advice.

They felt that the Ordnance units assigned

by GHQ for Leyte were entirely inadequate, both in numbers and types. In this

opinion they were not alone, for all of the

Sixth Army special staff officers, as well as

the commanding general of ASCOM, felt

that they had themselves been shortchanged by GHQ. The Engineers especially had put in a strong bid for more troops

because they knew that a landing in the

fall or winter—the rainy season on Leyte—

would require a herculean effort in building airfields and a base to support future

operations. The Engineers were turned

down; GHQ had become accustomed to

operating on a shoestring, and had become

so confident that it was even holding back

for the Luzon operation some of the scarce

24

 Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon, p.

143.

25

 (1) Opns Rpt, Leyte, XXIV Corps, 20 Oct-25

Dec 44. (2) CofS XXIV Corps Section Histories 8

Apr 44-3 Jan 45. (3) Morison, Leyte, pp. 114-15.
THE PHILIPPINES: LEYTE 395

service units that might have been used

for Leyte—a bad decision, according to the

Sixth Army G-4, who felt that the units

might have been employed in KING II and

picked up on Leyte for use in the Luzon

operations. The shortage was further aggravated by the limited shipping space

available for the invasion: units needed

early in the operations were to arrive late

because they had been assigned to movement on later echelons.26

At Leyte the job of the Sixth Army Ordnance officer, Brig. Gen. Philip G. Blackmore (recently promoted from colonel),

was twofold: to exercise technical supervision and control over all Ordnance service; and to co-ordinate with USASOS to

insure that the right supplies came forward

at the right time. In the Tacloban landing in the north, all Ordnance companies,

divisional and nondivisional, were to be

attached to either the 24th Division or the

1st Cavalry until A plus 4, when X Corps'

246th Ordnance Battalion would take

over the ammunition companies and the

nondivisional maintenance companies. The

maintenance and depot companies were to

carry with them thirty days of supply and

the ammunition companies, five units of

fire. Supply planning for the XXIV Corps,

which was to land at Dulag in the south,

had already been done, for better or worse,

when the corps loaded at Hawaii. Aboard

ship were twenty days of Ordnance Class

II supply and five units of fire. After the

landing the XXIV Corps Ordnance battalion headquarters was to be attached to

ASCOM, along with all Ordnance nondivisional companies except an ammunition

company behind each division (along with

a bomb disposal squad and an antiaircraft

detachment each) and one heavy tank

maintenance company, which would furnish all corps maintenance support.27

So much for planning. As it turned out,

time and distance made intelligent supply

planning all but impossible. Constantly

alert to changes in the troop list, Blackmore's staff lost no time in placing requisitions with USASOS; but the truth was,

there were not enough Ordnance supplies

in the theater and not enough time for requisitions to be filled from San Francisco,

which took a minimum of 120 days. The

advance of two months in the invasion date

was even worse than it first appeared, for

Leyte is 1,250 miles from Hollandia, and

the slow LST's carrying part of the troop

list had to start on 4 October to get there

on time. Moreover, it was impossible to

make the best use of the supplies that were

available in the Southwest Pacific because

the USASOS bases were strung out from

Brisbane to Biak, and supplies could not be

transshipped in time since there were not

enough ships. This lack of shipping affected not only resupply requisitions, but,

more alarmingly, even the immediate am26

 (1) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, p. 18. (2)

(2) Ltr, CG ASCOM to CG USASOS, 23 Sep

44 sub: Deficiencies in Service Units for K-2

Operations. (3) Memo, K. P. (Col Kenneth

Pierce) DCofS Hq Sixth Army for CofS, 25 Sep

44, no sub. Last two in G-4 Jnl KING II Opn,

26 Aug-2 Oct 44.

27

 (1) Hq Sixth Army, Annex 2 to AdminO 14,

Ord Plan, 30 Sep 44. (2) Hq X Corps, Annex 5

to AdminO 1, Ord Plan, 30 Sep 44. (3) Hq XXIV

Corps, Ord Plan, Annex Item to AdminO 2, 2

Oct 44. All in G-4 Jnl, KING II Opn, Leyte, 26

Aug-12 Oct 44 (4) Sixth Army Rpt, Leyte Opn,

20 Oct-25 Dec 44, p. 24. (5) In General Blackmore's opinion, Brig. Gen. Francis A. Englehart,

chief Ordnance officer of USAFICPA, had done

a fine job in getting equipment and supplies in

Hawaii for the troops of XXIV Corps. Blackmore

Comments.
396 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

munition requirements and the basic loads

of maintenance and depot companies.28

In the case of one maintenance company,

there was an element of bad luck. This

was the 207th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company at Finschhafen, ordered to

the Admiralties on 18 September to support the 1st Cavalry Division in the Leyte

landing. Glad to leave New Guinea's mud

and rain, the men loaded all their equipment aboard the Liberty ship Don Marquis

and sailed for the Admiralties on the evening of 25 September. The next evening

as the ship was approaching Manus she

was rammed by a tanker, the Missionary

Ridge, and began listing heavily. Fire

broke out and spread and many were injured. Because the ship's crew pre-empted

the lifeboats, the Army men and Navy gun

crews had to lower the injured over the

side on rafts improvised from hatch covers

and then jump overboard. One Ordnance

man was lost, Pvt. Harry K. Rhodes, who

was last seen swimming near some burning

oil; and twelve were injured. The company lost most of its equipment and after

being rescued and carried to the naval base

on Manus Island even had to be outfitted

with Navy clothing. Thus the 1st Cavalry

Division lost the company that had been

counted on to back up its own organic Ordnance company in the assault on Leyte.

The 292d Ordnance Medium Maintenance

Company at Oro Bay was substituted for

the 207th, but in the three days between

the time it was alerted, 22 October, and

the sailing date of 25 October sufficient

supplies and equipment could not be made

available and the unit did not arrive at

Tacloban until 13 November.29

A-Day and After

On Friday afternoon, 13 October 1944,

the convoy got under way at Hollandia,

five hundred ships carrying X Corps headquarters and the 24th Infantry Division to

Leyte. As they started out, Humboldt Bay

was choppy, a bad sign of the coming

typhoon season; also the fact that the day

was Friday the thirteenth probably did not

pass unnoticed. But it was to be an uneventful voyage in clear weather over calm

seas. On the 15th they were joined by the

convoy from the Admiralties with XXIV

Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division. The

plan was for XXIV Corps (the Southern

Attack Force) to proceed to the anchorage

at Dulag early on the morning of A-day

and for X Corps (the Northern Attack

Force) to steam toward the Tacloban area.

Two beaches had been designated for the

X Corps landing: White on the north,

nearest Tacloban, was assigned to the 1st

Cavalry; Red on the south near the village

of Palo was assigned to the 24th Infantry

Division.

Just before the huge fleet—the largest

naval attack force ever to sail the Pacific—

entered Leyte Gulf, there were two pieces

of good news: the Rangers had secured the

28

 (1) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, pp. 18-19.

(2) Rpt of Ord Activities, USASOS, Sep 44. (3)

Morison, Leyte, p. 114.

29

 (1) History 207th Ord Medium Maint Go

1944 and Apr-Oct 44. (2) The accident cost not

only equipment of the 207th, but also that of the

248th and 249th Port Companies, and the 98th

Radar Maintenance Unit; also, 280 tons of ammunition, 8 liaison planes, six 105-mm. howitzers,

and 27 TD-9 tractors were lost. Memo, F. L. M.

Executive, 27 Sep 44, G-4 Jnl, KING II Opn,

Leyte, 26 Aug-2 Oct 44. (3) Ordnance Rpt in

Sixth Army Leyte Rpt, p. 239; and History 292

Ord Medium Maint Go, 1944.
THE PHILIPPINES: LEYTE 397

islands at the mouth of the gulf (an operation called by Samuel Eliot Morison

"Clipping the Cat's Whiskers"); and a

hurricane previously reported near Manila

was said to be moving northward. By

dawn of A-day, when the ships eased into

the transport area, there had been no sign

of the enemy except a lone plane that circled high overhead and disappeared into

the mist; and the first rays of the sun that

broke out of a bank of clouds over Samar

fell on a glassy sea. The 24th Division historian reported, "So far the gods were with

us."

 30

And in general the gods continued to

favor KING II. The Leyte assault beginning at 1000 was less difficult than many

other amphibious landings in the Pacific.

The Japanese had withdrawn from the

beachhead areas, a fortunate circumstance

since the usual preliminary bombardment

by U.S. Navy ships had accomplished little

beyond cutting the tops from trees.31 By

the end of the day successful landings had

been made along the east coast and on

Panaon Island at a comparatively low cost

in Sixth Army casualties—49 killed, 192

wounded, 6 missing. Landings at Red

Beach met resistance. From well-camouflaged concrete pillboxes and coconut log

bunkers behind the beach the Japanese

directed machine gun, mortar, and 75-mm.

artillery fire at the 24th Division's landing

craft; and at Hill 522 near Palo, commanding not only the beaches but the entrance to Leyte Valley, they had a strongpoint interlaced with tunnels, trenches, and

pillboxes. The division Ordnance officer

when he went ashore shortly before noon

was pinned down on the beach for fortyfive minutes by mortar and machine gun

fire. The beach itself aided the enemy,

for it was too shallow to permit the LST's,

which had no pontons for a causeway, to

get close enough to unload. Standing offshore, the big craft presented easy targets

to Japanese mortars: four were hit and

one was set afire.32

At the southern end of Red Beach, two

LST's carrying the 636th Ordnance Ammunition Company were more fortunate:

they were not hit, although some of the

men on board were injured by shell fragments. The two LST's were forced to

withdraw to the transport area and were

not able to unload until next day, when

ponton units were brought up from Dulag.33

 When the men of the 636th did

get ashore, so much Japanese fire was still

directed on the beach that the ammunition

had to be thrown down with no thought of

dunnage and little effort at segregation.

Construction of the Red Beach dump could

not start until 22 October, when the division's own 724th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company reported in to help with

men and equipment. By that time the

division G—4 and ammunition officer had

taken four truckloads of critical machine

gun, rifle, and mortar ammunition forward. Up on White Beach, things were

better. The 1st Cavalry Division met little

30

 (1) History 24th Infantry Division Landing

Team, 20 Oct 44-25 Dec 44. (2) Morison, Leyte,

p. 117. 31

 (1) Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea

Cate, eds., "The Army Air Forces in World War

II," V, Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki (hereafter

cited as Craven and Cate, AAF V) (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 356. (2)

Blackmore Comments.

32

 (1)Morison, Leyte, pp. 134-35. (2) Kenney,

General Kenney Reports, p. 448. 33

 (1) History KING II Opn, 636th Ord Ammunition Co, Oct-25 Dec 44. (2) nth Field Arty

Bn-Leyte Campaign, 22 Oct-12 Nov 44.
398 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

UNLOADING SUPPLIES ON A LEYTE BEACH

enemy resistance, and the 595th Ordnance

Ammunition Company was able to put

down dunnage, most of it lumber salvaged

from the landings, and to segregate its

stocks by types.34

In XXIV Corps' landing at Dulag,

where the 96th Division came ashore on

Blue and Orange Beaches and the 7th

Division landed on Violet and Yellow

Beaches, the only ammunition men ashore

on A-day were those supporting the 96th

Division—the 632d Ammunition Company,

divided into two detachments, one to establish an ammunition supply point, the other

to establish the division water, ration, and

miscellaneous dump. On the 7th Division's beaches, 11-man teams of the 707th

Ordnance Light Maintenance Company,

coming ashore with only their hand kits,

their arms filled with spare parts and their

pockets stuffed with all the wrenches and

hardware they could carry, had the additional task of setting up the small beach

ammunition dumps. They were immediately busy repairing shot-up LVT's, and

the division acutely felt the need of an

34

 (1) "Leyte Landing," Firepower (June-July

1945), p. 12. (2) Ordnance Rpt, Annex 9 to Rpt

of 24th Div Landing Team, 20 Oct-25 Dec 44,

pp. 124-25.
THE PHILIPPINES: LEYTE 399

ammunition company on A-day.35

Sixth Army Ordnance Section had

helped to plan many SWPA landings, but

had never participated in a landing until

Leyte. An advance detachment landed

on A plus 2, and by A plus 11 the whole

section was ashore. The men soon discovered that their worst problem was getting

the ammunition to the combat troops who

had already begun to advance inland, X

Corps headed northwest through the Leyte

Valley toward Carigara on Leyte's northern coast, XXIV Corps southwest toward

Baybay on the western coast at the narrow

waist of the island.36

To begin with, the process of getting the

ammunition from the ship to the beach

was painfully slow because it had to be

lightered ashore. The distance from ship

to shore might be considerable, for the

Navy did not want the dangerous ammunition ships too close to the beach. And

when the time came for unloading, it was

hard to get at the most wanted types of

ammunition. The trouble was greatest in

the X Corps area, for ships arriving from

SWPA bases had not been loaded with this

problem in mind. When the Ordnance

men at White Beach, for example, looked

into the holds of two Liberty ships offshore

they were dismayed to find that they could

not dig out the critical items without moving an immense tonnage of cargo. The

only solution was to unload everything—

thus increasing the congestion on the beach.

Considerable confusion on the beach already existed because the Navy shore party,

which called the ships in, was in radio communication with Navy transports only.

Steel airfield matting was laid on the beach

to get the ammunition trucks down to the

water but it curled up and cut out hydraulic brake lining. At White Beach the

soil was well drained, but in many places

the ground was swampy or covered with

rice paddies and could not be used without

more help from the Engineers than was

available. In short, there had not been

time for careful planning for dump sites

or for proper co-ordination.37

At Dulag in the XXIV Corps landing

area, the terrain and the arrangements for

unloading were better. In the 7th Division area on Beach Violet 1, for example,

two LST's combat-loaded with bulk ammunition served as floating supply points

for emergency requirements until A plus

3. But ironically enough, on this beach

Ammunition Supply Point 2 had hardly

been set up when Japanese air attacks

during the battle for Leyte Gulf wiped out

these advantages. On the night of 25

October, a Japanese bomb set fire to the

ASP, blowing up the entire dump and destroying not only all of the division's ammunition but 80 percent of the Class II

supplies and 20 percent of the vehicles of

the 707th Ordnance Light Maintenance

Company, located nearby. General Blackmore had to direct X Corps ammunition

ships down to Dulag, for about one third

of all the XXIV Corps ammunition was

gone.38

35

 (1) Rpt 632d Ord Ammunition Co (Leyte

Assault), 20 Oct-25 Dec 44. (2) 7th Inf Div, Opn

Rpt KINO II, G-4 Rpt, app. D. (3) "Leyte Landing," Firepower (June-July 1945), p. 10. 36

 History Sixth Army Ord Sec, p. 17.

37

 (1) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, pp. 19-20.

(2) Sixth Army Rpt of the Leyte Opn, p. 210.

(3) Ltr, Brig Gen W. J. Heavey to CO Sixth

Army, 13 Dec 44, sub: Preliminary Report on 2

ESB Activities in Leyte Landing, in Jnl and Jnl

File, K-II Opn, 2d Engr Special Brigade, 16 Sep25 Dec 44. (4) Blackmore Comments. 38

 (1) 7th Inf Div, Opn Rpt KING II. (2)

Memos, Blackmore and G. W. P., Asst G-4, to X
400 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

This catastrophe, occurring on the evening when the transfer of responsibility

from division to corps was to take place,

added to the burdens of the corps Ordnance officer, Lt. Col. William Menoher,

which were already heavy enough. Instead of a battalion for normal corps support, he had been allotted in corps shipping one company only. He had selected

the 284th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance

Company (Tank) as the best tooled and

equipped company available, and had

ordered it to bring all the supplies it could

carry. The 284th, especially trained on

amphibious vehicles such as the LVT's

(with which XXIV Corps was liberally

supplied), was awarded the Meritorious

Service Unit Plaque for its service at Leyte.

But there was a limit to what one company could do. Not until almost two

months after A-day did Menoher receive

his other corps Ordnance units and when

they did arrive, they were promptly

assigned to ASCOM. In the meantime,

Menoher's ammunition section had to

maintain and supply ASP's and, pending

the arrival of a depot company, his supply

section had to function as a depot company when the first XXIV Corps resupply

ship arrived. These resupply ships, long

ago requisitioned by POA (before the

corps' departure from Oahu) for direct

shipment from the United States to Leyte,

arrived early and saved the day on Ordnance Class II supply. They were to be a

godsend not only to XXIV Corps but to X

Corps as well.39

The Ordnance Officer of X Corps, Col.

Duncan G. McGregor, had a battalion

headquarters, the 246th. When corps

took over from the divisions on 25 October,

the battalion was built up with the two ammunition companies on Red and White

Beaches, the 636th and 595th, and a

medium maintenance company, the

3498th. The maintenance men, landing

on 24 October in support of the 24th

Division's own light maintenance company,

had had their hands full, issuing small arms

and working on antiaircraft guns during

their first three days ashore. They worked

out of their shop trucks until 29 October,

when they found a suitable dump area

near Marasbaras on the Palo-Tacloban

road. One of the biggest jobs of the

3498th was to keep the artillery firing.

The X Corps had two battalions of 155-

mm. guns and a battalion each of 8-in.

and 155-mm. howitzers and all were undergoing hard service in the attack on the

town of Carigara, on the northern coast of

Leyte. Lacking parts for these guns,

mechanics worked around the clock to

manufacture them. Many of the men

were constantly on the road doing contact

work at the firing batteries. Things improved when the company was moved up

to Tunga (five miles south of Carigara)

in mid-November, but the men were always overworked. For most of the campaign, the 3498th was the only maintenance company in the corps Ordnance

battalion.40

Whatever the troubles of the maintenance men in both X and XXIV Corps, Corps Transportation Officer, 26 Oct 44, in Sixth

Army G-4 Jnl, KING II Opn. 39

 (1) XXIV Corps Section Histories, G-4 and

Ord Rpts. (2) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, p.

19. (3) History 284th Ord Heavy Maint Co (Tank)

1945.

40

 (1) History Hq and Hq Det 246th Ord Bn,

KING II Opn, 9 Oct 44-4 Jan 45. (2) History

3498th Ord Medium Maint Co, 15 Oct-25 Dec

44. (3) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, p. 39.
THE PHILIPPINES: LEYTE 401

the big Ordnance problem at Leyte

throughout the campaign was ammunition

supply. Before the end of October it was

apparent that the Japanese were making

a strong fight for Leyte. Japanese reinforcements poured into Ormoc on the west

coast; bombing and strafing attacks began

to increase by 25 October. In defense of

U.S. ships in the harbors and supply installations on the beaches, the 40-mm. and

90-mm. antiaircraft batteries fired enormous quantities of ammunition; and as the

combat troops raced across the island to

the west coast they met stiffening resistance

that required heavy concentrations of fire

from the artillery battalions.41

At times certain types of artillery ammunition were so low at the gun positions that

they had to be rushed from the ship to the

waiting gunner. Sometimes the types

needed were not available and restrictions

on expenditures had to be imposed. The

Sixth Army Ordnance historian attributed

the serious ammunition situation to lack of

the required types in the theater, delay in

unloading ships, and the dearth of suitable storage areas.42

 The dumps on the

crowded beaches were dangerously vulnerable to enemy action. On 1 November

a bomb explosion at X Corps' White Beach

ammunition dump, operated by the 595th

Ordnance Ammunition Company, killed

one man of the company and wounded six

so badly that they had to be evacuated.43

These troubles were compounded by bad

weather beginning in early November.

When the 636th Ordnance Ammunition

Company established on 4 November the

X Corps forward ASP 6 near Tunga, the

men were able to stack the ammunition

without dunnage on well-drained slopes

camouflaged by the shadows cast by groves

of palm trees. Three days later a typhoon

struck Leyte with howling winds that bent

the palms low and blew heavy rain into

almost horizontal sheets. The rainy season had begun. Torrents of rain fell

throughout November and December.

The ammunition bogged down and it took

strenuous efforts by the men, aided by

Filipino laborers, to provide dunnage of

palm logs, ammunition containers, and

stones. Ammunition trucks coming in

from the 3O-mile trip back to White Beach

(the round trip took six to eight hours)

had to be worked around the area by bulldozer and tractor-crane.44

The crisis in ammunition supply occurred the second week in November in

the X Corps sector during the attack on

the mountains barring the entrance to the

Ormoc Valley. The important i5-milewide corridor ran south from Carigara Bay

on the northern coast to Ormoc on the

northwestern coast, where the Japanese

had landed. A detachment of the 595th

Ordnance Ammunition Company had established Ammunition Supply Point 7 at

Pinamopoan, a village on Carigara Bay at

the head of the corridor, within sound of

the big guns supporting the battle of

41

 (1) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, pp. 19-20.

(2) History, 246th Ord Bn, KING II Opn, 9 Oct

44-4 Jan 45. 42

 (1) 24th Inf Div, Leyte, Annex 9, Ord Rpt,

p. 125. (2) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, p. 19. 43

 (1) History 595th Ord Ammunition Co, 10

Sep 42-Aug, Nov-Dec 44. (2) History 246th Ord

Bn-KING II Opn.

44

 (1) History KING II Opn, 636th Ord Ammunition Co, Oct-25 Dec 44. (2) History 246th

Ord Bn, KING II Opn, 9 Oct 44-4 Jan 45. (3)

"Leyte Landing," Firepower (Jun-Jul 45), p. 12.

(4) For a description of the typhoon see Jan Valtin, Children of Yesterday (New York: The Reader's Press, 1946), pp. 187-88.
402 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Breakneck Ridge. For weeks the men

were harassed by enemy sniping, artillery

fire, and bombing. This ASP was supplied

by amphibious operations like those of an

initial landing. All ammunition came in

by LVT—either direct from White Beach

up the water route around the northeastern tip of the island and into Carigara Bay,

or from the town of Carigara on the bay

where it had been brought up by truck

from Tunga. After the middle of December the ammunition supply problem eased

considerably.45

By that time the fighting was almost

over. The two XXIV Corps divisions had

crossed to the west coast by the AbuyogBaybay road, and the. 7th Division had

pushed north through mountain ridges in a

difficult and expensive advance that resembled the campaign in Sicily in 1943.

On 7 December the 77th Division made an

amphibious landing south of Ormoc and

four days later captured Ormoc, the

enemy's main supply base on Leyte. On

the X Corps front, the 32d Division

(which had relieved the 24th) and the 1st

Cavalry Division had advanced south as

far as Valencia by 16 December. A desperate effort by the Japanese to reinforce

their troops on 11 December had been defeated by the Fifth Air Force. On 25 December the 77th Division captured Palompon—the only harbor of any importance

that remained in Japanese hands—and

General MacArthur declared organized

Japanese resistance on the island at an end.

Only mopping-up operations remained.

The Costly Base at Leyte

In the attempt to build a base at Leyte,

the Engineers' gloomy predictions about

bad weather were more than fulfilled; and

in the all-important task of airfield construction were other unhappy circumstances that stemmed directly from the

decision to advance the date of the Leyte

landing and to eliminate the steppingstone

operation on Mindanao. At Leyte the

SWPA forces were 800 miles from the

nearest fighter base and 1,000 miles from

the nearest bomber base. Therefore it was

vital to improve the best Japanese airfield,

located on the Tacloban peninsula, but it

was impossible to do so immediately. Lack

of adequate maps of the beaches during

the planning phase, mainly because Leyte

had been beyond range of land-based

photographic aircraft, had led to the LST

debacle at Red Beach, resulting in the diversion of LST's to the Tacloban airfield

site. There thousands of tons of ammunition, supplies, and equipment had been

unloaded and had to be hauled out over

one narrow access road before construction

could even begin.46

By 27 October the Tacloban strip could

receive some of Morotai's P-38 fighters,

but the field was still a long way from being

fully operational when the Japanese stepped

up their air attacks on the beaches and

shipping in Leyte Gulf at the beginning of

November, and by that time some of the

scarce P-38's had to be sent to Ormoc.

The Navy's aircraft carriers, which were

to serve until such time as the airfields were

ready, were beginning to feel the effects of

hard fighting in the battle of Leyte Gulf, as

well as kamikaze and submarine attacks,

and for days at a time in November were

pulled off to strike at Luzon. The Japanese had begun effective night air opera45

 History 246th Ord Bn, KING II Opn, 9 Oct

44-4 Jan 45. 46

 Engineers of SWPA VI, pp. 283, 286, 290.
THE PHILIPPINES: LEYTE 403

COLONEL BECKER

Eighth Army Ordnance Arrives

tions and for a good part of November

they had air supremacy over Leyte Gulf

after sundown.47

This air warfare had tragic consequences

for two Ordnance ASCOM companies

aboard the troopship Jeremiah M. Daily,

the 3483d Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company and the

168th Ordnance Depot Company. On

the afternoon of 12 November, anchored

off Leyte awaiting debarkation,48 the Daily

was strafed and bombed by Japanese aircraft. An enemy plane crashed into the

bridge, burst into flames, and fell into a

forward hatch, spewing burning gasoline

on ten drums of range fuel on the deck

that exploded and burned furiously. The

deck became an inferno of blazing gasoline

and scalding steam from shattered pipes;

and in the forward hold a bomb explosion

killed or severely wounded many of the

men. Twenty-eight men of the Ordnance

maintenance company were killed, the

total casualties of the company amounting

to 75 percent of its strength. The depot

company had 6 men killed, 5 wounded,

and 22 missing. Some of the Ordnance

equipment and supplies were saved, but

a good deal of the maintenance company's

equipment was damaged by water or the

salt used to put out the fires.49

A month after the landing at Leyte,

General Eichelberger and members of his

Eighth Army staff, including his Ordnance

officer, Col. Ward E. Becker, arrived at

the Tacloban airstrip. Eichelberger's mission was to take control at Leyte as soon

as the first phase of the campaign was

over in order to free Sixth Army for the

final planning for Luzon. For the past

month, since 22 September, Eighth Army

headquarters had had a similar job in

New Guinea and had been training, staging, and mounting Sixth Army units for

both Leyte and Luzon.50

47

 (1) Craven and Cate, AAF V, 369-85. (2)

Morison, Leyte, pp. 348-50. (3) Kenney, General

Kenney Reports, p. 475. (4) An airstrip located on

the flat flood-plain of the Marabang River could

be used for emergency landings, but because of

rain and mud could not be made operational for

fighter planes until 19 November. Engineers of

SWPA, VI, p. 298, and Craven and Cate, AAF

V, 373-74. 48

 There was said to be a standing order that

troops must be taken off ships within twenty-four

hours of arrival; but this was not done. Blackmore

Comments. 49

 (1) History Ord Branch Base Sec [3] Jun

44-Jan 45. (2) History 168th Ord Depot Co, OctDec 44. (3) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, app.

C, p. 5. (4) History 3483d Ord Medium Auto

Maint Co, 8 Apr 42-Nov 46. 50

 (1) Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo,

pp. 172-73. (2) History Eighth United States

Army Ordnance Section (hereafter cited as History

Eighth Army Ord Sec), p. 23, OHF.
404 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Success on Mindoro

Colonel Becker was new to the theater,

having arrived from the United States in

midsummer, but he was not new to overseas operations, for he had had long service as Ordnance officer of Eastern Base

Section in North Africa. His first action

in New Guinea was to send the members

of his Ordnance Section out to get firsthand information on the equipment of the

combat troops and Ordnance units at staging areas along the coast from Morotai to

Oro Bay and over to Gloucester in New

Britain. They reported that one of the

most serious problems was the scarcity of

waterproofing kits. As there would not be

enough time before the Luzon landing to

receive the needed amounts from San

Francisco, the only answer was improvisation in the theater. Another cause for

worry, an old story everywhere by now,

was the bad condition of trucks and

other equipment, caused by poor driving,

overloading, and neglect of first and second echelon maintenance. For help on

this problem, Becker authorized Maj. John

Foreman of his Maintenance Division to

organize and supervise an inspection team,

using men of the 207th Ordnance Medium

Maintenance Company who had little to

do otherwise, since they had lost all their

equipment in the sinking of the Don Marquis off Manus Island in the Admiralties.

The team, to be transported around New

Guinea in two C-47's, was being organized

in the Admiralties at the time Becker left

for Leyte.51

Eighth Army's new headquarters was

twenty miles down the coast from Tacloban at Telegrafo, a place characterized

by General Eichelberger as "a swamp and

a mudhole and nothing more."

 52

 Rain,

mud, and the rough fighting X Corps had

encountered in the west around Breakneck Ridge made it necessary for GHQ to

postpone the Eighth Army takeover from

5 to 26 December. In the interval, Becker

sent some members of his office to work

closely with their opposite numbers at Sixth

Army, and others, unofficially, to visit the

Ordnance units on Leyte. After 26 December all Ordnance units on the island

hitherto assigned or attached to Sixth

Army went either to Base K, USASOS,

established on the same date, or to Eighth

Army, which assumed control of X and

XXIV Corps.53

The Ordnance units who were going to

take part in the invasion of Luzon were

coming up from the south, from other

Southwest or South Pacific bases. And at

the time Eighth Army took over on the island, 299 of the Sixth Army Ordnance

men—the 292d Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company, half of the 643d Ordnance Ammunition Company, small

detachments of the 267th Ordnance Antiaircraft Maintenance and 724th Ordnance

Light Maintenance Companies, and the

100th Bomb Disposal Squad—were not on

Leyte, but far to the north, supporting the

beachhead at Mindoro.

51

 (1) History Eighth Army Ord Sec, pp. 7-10,

and app. D, OHF. (2) Minutes, Conference Eighth

Army Hq, 6 Nov 44, in G-4 Jnl File, Hollandia

Opn Eighth Army 12 Jul 44-15 Jan 45. (3) History 207th Ord Medium Maint Co, 1944.

Nothing demonstrates more clearly the

dizzying stop-and-start of operations in the

52

 Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, p.

173. 53

 Rpt, CG Eighth Army, Leyte-Samar Operation (Including Clearance of the Visayan Passages),

26 Dec 44-8 May 45, pp. 72-78 (Ord Rpt).
THE PHILIPPINES: LEYTE 405

Philippines than the story of the 292d Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company.

Landing at Tacloban from Oro Bay on

the night of 13 November 1944, the company was rushed by truck up to Tunga

and worked there a little less than two

weeks, when it was attached to the Western Visayan Task Force, destined to invade

Mindoro, the large island lying on the

southern flank of Luzon and separated

from it by the 8-mile-wide Verde Island

passage. MacArthur had decided that air

bases on Mindoro were essential to the

protection of convoys moving toward Lingayen Gulf as well as to assist with air

strikes at Luzon and elsewhere. Since the

island was known to be lightly held, a

small force composed mainly of two regimental combat teams (one a "clippedwings" parachute outfit ) was all that was

needed. The invasion date for the Mindoro operation (called LOVE III) was set

for 1 December, and on 28 November the

advance 119-man echelon of the 292d

began boarding its LST in San Pedro Bay.

The men remained aboard in the bay for

almost two weeks. Bad weather slowed

the development of the Leyte airfields

counted on to provide air coverage for the

operation and the invasion date was postponed to 15 December.54

Moving out into the dangerous northern

waters on the afternoon of 12 December,

the convoy was attacked the following afternoon by Japanese aircraft. The flagship Nashville was severely damaged by a

kamikaze crash-dive; but the LST's were

not hurt and landed safely on the morning of 15 December, designated as U-day.

In many respects, U-day at Mindoro was

unique in the history of Pacific island-hopping. The weather was good; the beaches,

located in the southwestern corner of the

island, were hard sand that could carry the

heaviest vehicles; the invaders were met

not by Japanese but by friendly Filipinos,

some waving American flags; and the unloading, under the thoroughly experienced

532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment,

proceeded in record time, because the Engineers had brought with them a 1,200-

man labor detail taken from X and XXIV

Corps units on Leyte. All the Ordnance

men were ashore early on U-day and soon

had their dumps and shops in operation

near the town of San Jose. On Christmas

Day the ammunition men invited twentyfive Filipino guests to share their turkey

dinner.55

At the same time, there were many evidences that in approaching so close to

Luzon the invaders were entering an extremely sensitive area. Bombing by Japanese aircraft was a daily occurrence, and

on the day after Christmas the beachhead

had the very unusual experience of being

attacked by the Japanese Navy. Shortly

before midnight an enemy task force

approached so close to the breaches that the

men on the shore could see the white glare

of its antiaircraft fire as it attempted to

repel Allied aircraft. Proceeding slowly

down the coast, the ships kept up a run54

 (1) History 292d Ord Medium Maint Co,

1944. (2) Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the

Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1963), p. 25.

(3) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, app. C., p. 7.

(4) Engineers of SWPA IV, p. 509.

55

 (1) Engineers of SWPA IV, pp. 510-14. (2)

History 292d Ord Medium Maint Co, 1944. (3)

History Det 643d Ord Ammunition Co, Nov-Dec

44. (4) More ammunition in terms of units of fire

went in with this attack force than went in with

any other; no resupply was needed. Blackmore

Comments.
406 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

ning bombardment. Shells fell on airfields

four miles inland, and on the Ordnance

installations. But no great damage was

done, and after about forty-five minutes

the ships retired under constant attack by

Allied bombers and PT boats.56

The air raids continued on land and sea.

The resupply convoy arrived on 30 December crippled by Japanese attacks. On the

whole, the small LOVE III operation cost

more in sunk and damaged transport shipping than any other operation in SWPA.57

But by 1 January 1945 Mindoro was firmly in Allied hands. On that date control

passed to Eighth Army. By then Sixth

Army's assault forces for Luzon were

steaming north from New Guinea, New

Britain, the Admiralties, and bases as far

away as the Solomons and New Caledonia,

heading for the greatest operation yet

attempted in the Pacific—the massive landing on Lingayen Gulf scheduled for 9

January 1945.

56

 (1) Engineers of SWPA IV, p. 516. (2) History 292d Medium Maint Co, 1944. (3) History

643d Ord Ammunition Co, Nov-Dec 44.

57

 Armed Forces Staff College, 0-39: Conf-Historical Presentation, Leyte-Luzon, I, p. 8, Armed

Forces Staff College Library.
CHAPTER XXI

The Philippines: Luzon

To most Americans Leyte was only a

name on a map. Luzon was far more:

it was Manila and Corregidor and Bataan

and the Spanish-American War. To the

Army, especially the older men in Sixth

and Eighth Armies who had served in the

Philippines in peacetime, Luzon and the

southern islands had long and deep associations: legends of the Moro Insurrection;

Zamboanga in Mindanao, immortalized by

the barracks-room song about the tail-less

monkeys; cool Baguio, the summer capital

in the mountains of Luzon; lovely tropical

evenings in Manila, one of the beautiful

cities of the world.1

To the men in the huge task force convoys that began passing through Leyte Gulf

4 January 1945, Luzon meant a return to

civilization. Many of them had not seen

a city in two years or more; all were weary

of thatched huts, the steaming jungle, the

lonely beaches. Of the four divisions

selected for the assault on Luzon the 43d

was picked up at Aitape, the 6th at Sansapor. Both were under I Corps, the

earliest corps headquarters to arrive in the

Southwest Pacific Area. The other two

divisions, under XIV Corps, came from

the Solomons and New Britain—the 37th

embarked at Bougainville and the 4Oth at

Cape Gloucester. The plan was for both

corps to land on the southern beaches of

Lingayen Gulf, the I Corps on the left

near San Fabian, ultimately to contain and

attack the Japanese concentrations in

northern Luzon. The XIV Corps, landing on the right near Lingayen, was to

head for Manila. Offshore in ready reserve Krueger had the 25th Division from

Noumea as well as an airborne division, a

regimental combat team, an armored

group, and a Ranger battalion.2

Ordnance units down at Hollandia,

Finschhafen, Milne Bay, and other bases

from Sansapor to Bougainville had more

time to prepare for this landing than for

any other in memory. Back in October

they had begun cleaning and overhauling

weapons and vehicles, issuing new ones

when they could; binning parts, stocking

vans, and crating ammunition. Maintenance units destined to operate close to the

front lines, like the 6th Division's 48th

Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company at Sansapor, mounted their shop

equipment on trucks and trailers and built

kitchen trucks. The last job for all, usually

done on the loading beaches, was supervising the waterproofing of all vehicles.

1

 (1) Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo,

pp. 200-201. (2) Krueger, From Down Under to

Nippon, p. 241.

2

 (1) Stanley A. Frankel, The 37th Infantry

Division in World War II (Washington, 1948), p.

204. (2) Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, pp.

29-32. Unless otherwise indicated the tactical story

of the Luzon campaign is based on this source.
408 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

By early December at the more remote

bases like Bougainville, long lines of vehicles, their drivers dozing in the hot sun,

were waiting their turn to be loaded in the

LST's, Liberty ships, and Navy transports

that crowded the harbors; and huge stacks

of supplies on the shores were being reduced to the tune of screaming winches.3

Well before Christmas the Ordnance

troops at Bougainville were aboard ship and

sailing out of the harbor toward Luzon.

There was a stop at Huon Gulf off Lae,

where the 37th Division rendezvoused with

the 40th Division and the Navy conducted

a landing rehearsal; another stop at Manus

in the Admiralties where the men had a

chance to go ashore and spend Christmas,

enjoying the Navy's ample supply of beer.

For many of them it was the third Christmas away from home. Two days after

Christmas the slow LST's got under way

and by the night of New Year's Eve the

whole XIV Corps convoy was swinging

north of the equator, headed for the control point southwest of the Palaus where it

was to rendezvous on 3 January with the

I Corps convoy coming up from New

Guinea.4

Like other Ordnance companies in this

S-day armada, the 37th Division's 737th

Ordnance Light Maintenance Company

was dispersed—part traveling on a transport, part on an LST, and part on a

Liberty ship. Dispersal was the general

policy, to insure against the loss of any

entire unit in a ship sinking; it was also,

in the case of the Ordnance men, to provide detachments on each ship for dewaterproofing on arrival. During the long

monotonous voyage, each detachment

naturally thought it had the worst of it.

The men aboard the Australian transports

complained of the eternal mutton served at

every meal and the eternal tea which, according to the 37th Division historian,

almost brought on another Boston Tea

Party. The Navy transports were abominably crowded. The LST's bobbed like

corks and the bunks in their bottom decks

were almost unbearably hot. The Liberty

ships had no bunks at all, for they were not

equipped to carry troops. The men of the

737th's detachment brought cots aboard

the Liberty Kathryn L. Bates and proceeded to astonish the merchant crewmen

by their ability to make themselves at home.

On the deck crowded with vehicles and

cargo, they put down their cots and built

a kitchen, showers, and latrines, tying

shelter halves and canvases to anything

available. Some of the men, reported

their historian, "built their homes between

ration boxes"; and toward the end of the

voyage as the kitchen took away the

rations, complained of being eaten out of

house and home.5

Ordnance Plans for Luzon

At Leyte General Blackmore, preparing

for his own departure for Luzon, was easier

in his mind about MIKE I than he had

been about any operation in the Southwest

3

 (1) History 1st Ord Bn, M-1 Opn, Oct 44-13

Jul, Dec 45. (2) History 48th Ord Medium Maint

Co 1944-46. (3) Frankel, The 37th Infantry Division in World War II, p. 205. 4

 (1) Frankel, The 37th Infantry Division in

World War II, pp. 208-16. (2) Samuel Eliot

Morison, The Liberation of the Philippines (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1959), p. 115.

5

 (1) History 737th Ord Light Maint Co, 1

May 44-Aug 45. (2) History 48th Ord Medium

Maint Co, 1944-46. (3) Frankel, The 37th Infantry

Division in World War II, pp. 208-11.
THE PHILIPPINES: LUZON 409

Pacific up to then. He was especially

happy because he had been able to talk

General MacArthur's G-4 into allowing

Sixth Army three more ammunition ships

than GHQ had proposed. On the question of manpower, he thought he was

going to have enough men, for the first

time, to take care of maintenance and supply. He would have liked to have more

ammunition companies, but he knew he

could depend to some extent on civilian

labor. Also, there were some comforting

reflections on terrain and the nature of the

campaign. For the first time in his two

years of island-hopping, he was going to

be able to furnish Ordnance service to

Sixth Army with some degree of orthodoxy.

There would be extensive overland operations that would enable him to use an

army Ordnance service center and the

army ammunition supply points procedures outlined in Ordnance field manuals.6

To operate the service center the 189th

Ordnance Battalion was attached to army,

with two medium maintenance companies,

an antiaircraft maintenance company, and

a heavy field army maintenance company.

For ammunition supply army had the

259th Ordnance Battalion with seven companies to operate the ammunition supply

points. Blackmore was also able to augment his staff section with the headquarters of the 12th Ordnance Battalion. These

troops, together with three bomb disposal

squads, totaled more than two thousand

men, a striking contrast to the 7-man bomb

disposal squad that was all that the Sixth

Army Ordnance officer had attached at

Leyte.7 Another striking contrast to Leyte

was the amount of time for planning. A

representative of Sixth Army Ordnance

Section had been at Hollandia working

with the Luzon planning group since

August and during the fall Blackmore was

able to call to Leyte for consultation the

commanders of his army battalions as well

as the Ordnance officers of I and XIV

Corps.8

Each division in addition to its own

organic light maintenance company would

land with a backup medium maintenance

company attached, plus an ammunition

company (to revert to army later) and a

bomb disposal squad. In I Corps, the 6th

and 43d Divisions were each taking along

also a detachment of the 3608th Ordnance

Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank)

(which had been doing excellent work at

Pie Beach, Hollandia) to provide immediate Ordnance service on the beaches to

tanks and other tracked vehicles. When

I and XIV Corps took over on S plus 2,

the maintenance battalion of each corps

was to assume control of the medium maintenance companies from divisions and

bring in heavy maintenance support—tank

and field army, and a depot company.9

As far as Army Service Command was

concerned, Blackmore's co-ordination was

easy because the Ordnance Section of Base

M—ASCOM's operating group for Luzon

—had been at Tacloban since 12 November, working with Sixth Army Ordnance

Section and Base K. Base M's Ordnance

6

 (1) Blackmore Comments. (2) History Sixth

Army Ord Sec, pp. 21-22. 7

 Ibid., p. 23, and app. C, pp. 5, 7.

8

 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 9

 (1) I Corps History of Luzon Campaign 1945,

pp. 229-30. (2) XIV Corps, Report of Ord Officer 9 Jan-15 Jun 45, Sec I, General Supply &

Maintenance, AGF 319.1. (3) Hq 6th Inf Div,

Annex 2 to AdminO 1, Ordnance Plan, 28 Nov

44. (4) Hq 43d Inf Div, Annex 4 to AdminO 1,

Ordnance Plan, 28 Nov 44. Both in G-4 Jnls,

M-1 Opns, Sixth Army.
410 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Section, like that of Base K, was operated

by one of the Ordnance group headquarters that began arriving in the Southwest

Pacific in the summer of 1944—the 229th

Base Group, whose commander, Lt. Col.

John H. Henderson, became the Ordnance

officer of Base M. On 10 December the

group was reorganized under TOE 9-312

of 13 September 1944 and redesignated the

226th Ordnance Base Depot. In keeping

with ASCOM's mission of relieving army

from logistic responsibility in the base area

(target date, S plus 20), Henderson's staff

planned base service centers, to be operated

by the 9th Ordnance Battalion with two

depot companies, four automotive maintenance companies (two of them of the

heavy type), a heavy field army maintenance company, and an antiaircraft maintenance company. ASCOM ammunition

dumps were to be operated by ammunition

companies independent of the battalion.10

The supply planning was easier than for

Leyte. All units were directed to bring to

the far shore in the assault period (S-day

to S plus 12) 30 days of supply and 5 units

of fire for the combat troops. This had

also been the requirement for the Leyte invasion, but the advance in date for the

KING II operation had made it impossible

to meet. For Luzon, the 3O-day supply

requirement was generally met in I and

XIV Corps, but because of theater shortages and the scarcity of interisland shipping

all combat units did not have their 5 units

of fire for all weapons before embarkation.

For most weapons, however, the ammunition requirement was met by both corps,

an achievement attributed by XIV Corps

to its earlier alert for KING II and by I

Corps to the "magnificent cooperation" of

Col. John H. Woodberry, Chief Ordnance

Officer, USASOS, who arranged to have

a considerable amount of ammunition

brought up from other bases by FS (fast

supply) boats and by C-47, C-46, and B17 aircraft. With regard to all types of

supply, the scales in favor of success were

considerably weighted by the postponement

of the MIKE I operation for twenty days,

from 20 December 1944 to 9 January

1945.11

Not the least advantage of the delay was

the further opportunity to study maps and

books on Luzon that provided valuable advance information on suitable sites for ammunition dumps and bivouacs for Ordnance units. Corps planners had time to

make their selections and to co-ordinate

them with shore party commanders, divisions, and army. At Sixth Army headquarters, planners made tentative assignments to the various services of areas where

their installations would be located; they

had seen with their own eyes the confusion

after the Leyte landing, when representatives of the services rushed around selecting

sites "like men staking out claims in a gold

rush." At Luzon the area assigned for the

10

 (1) History 226th Ord Base Depot, 15 Oct

44-1 Oct 45. (2) Hq Army Service Command,

Base M Ordnance Supply and Service Plan, 30

Nov 44, G-4 Jnl, M-1 Opn, Luzon, 16-19 Dec 44,

Sixth Army. (3) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, app.

C, p. 9. (4) Memo, P. G. B. [Blackmore] to

ACofS, G-4, 2 Dec 44, sub: Date of Assumption

of Responsibility by Base M for Unloading of Ships

and for Logistic Responsibility. (5) Memo, W. N.

L. [Leaf] to Ordnance Officer, 3 Dec 44. (6) Memo,

P.G.B. to ACofS, G-4, 4 Dec 44. Last three in G-4

Jnls, M-1 Opns, Sixth Army.

11

 (1) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, p. 27. (2)

XIV Corps, Rpt of Ord Officer, 9 Jan-15 Jun

1945, Sec II, Ammunition, p. 20, AGF 319.1. (2)

I Corps History Luzon Campaign 1945, pp. 228-

29.
THE PHILIPPINES: LUZON 411

army Ordnance service center was near

Lingayen Gulf, at Calasiao, and the Sixth

Army Ordnance planners had the further

advantage of enlarged aerial photographs

of the area to assist them in laying out the

center.12

By New Year's Day 1945, the long and

arduous staff work was over. The Luzon

Attack Force began steaming out of Leyte

Gulf on 2 January, headed by a group of

mine sweepers and a gallant old fleet of

battleships and cruisers (some of them survivors of Pearl Harbor) to bombard the

invasion beaches. A few days later, General MacArthur went aboard the light

cruiser Boise and General Krueger and key

members of his staff boarded the command

ship Wasatch. On the afternoon of 4

January the convoys coming up from below the equator began to pass through

Leyte Gulf, to head south down Surigao

Strait, then west through the Mindanao

Sea, then north through the Sulu Sea and

then north up the west coast of Luzon

toward the last major landing in the Southwest Pacific.

Supporting the Lingayen Landings

Before sunrise on S-day the invasion convoys were safely in their transport areas in

Lingayen Gulf. In the dim light of early

morning the men on the decks could see all

around them hundreds of ships riding a

gentle ground swell. Beyond on either

side were mountain ranges covered by lowlying clouds. Ahead, the 20-mile stretch

of flat landing beaches was hidden in a

haze thickened by a pall of smoke pierced

here and there by bursts of orange. The

old battleships and cruisers were shelling

the beaches. They had been battered by

kamikaze attacks in the gulf on 6 January

and were still being sporadically attacked,.

but their guns were still firing, the shriek

and distant rumble of the bombardment

echoing over the water.13

As the first rays of the sun broke over

the Caraballo mountains, the ships in the

transport area began discharging their

landing craft. The assault troops scrambled down the cargo nets of their transports

and into the waiting LVT's, which then

headed for the beaches, preceded by LCI

gunboats and amphibious tanks. All of

this followed a pattern that was by now

familiar. The men who had planned the

landings were veterans of many amphibious operations with the benefit of the largescale experience at Leyte. As at Leyte,

the LST's were grounded some distance

from shore, but this time they had their

ponton causeways, which splashed down

around 1100. Also, at Lingayen Gulf

there was a more liberal use of LVT's,

invaluable in the terrain behind the

beaches—a region of rice paddies, fish

ponds, and swamps, through which meandered many streams and several good-sized

rivers.14

This region had one thing in its favor.

It was such poor defensive terrain that the

Japanese had concluded that it would be

12

 (1) I Corps History of Luzon Campaign

1945, p. 230. (2) History Sixth Army Ord Sec,

pp. 20, 23.

13

 (1) Morison, The Liberation of the Philippines, p. 125. (2) Col. Robert Armory, Jr., and

Capt. Reuben M. Waterman, eds., Surf and Sand:

The Saga of the 533d Engineer Boat and Shore

Regiment and 146 1st Engineer Maintenance Company 1942-1945 (hereafter cited as Surf and

Sand) (Andover, Mass: Andover Press Limited,

1947), PP. 134-36. 14

 Morison, The Liberation of the Philippines,

p. 127.
412 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

futile to attempt to hold it; instead, they

had concentrated their forces in the mountainous area east and northeast of Lingayen

Gulf. In the first week after the invasion

enemy artillery shelled the extreme left of

the landing forces in the I Corps area, but

elsewhere little or no opposition was encountered. At the XIV Corps beachhead

on the right flank, the landings were virtually unopposed except for a few air raids.

The XIV Corps Beachhead

From right to left, the 40th Division

landing was made on the extreme right

over Orange and Green Beaches near the

town of Lingayen and, next left, the 37th

Division on Yellow and Crimson Beaches

near Binmaley.

A few Ordnance officers attached to

combat units got ashore in the early waves

on the 40th Division beaches and three

sergeants with a wrecker came in on an

LSM around noon. Later in the afternoon a sizable detachment of the Division's

own 740th Ordnance Light Maintenance

Company (accompanied by nine men of

the backup 263d Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company) landed from a Navy

transport. By evening it had set up its

bivouac area in the town of Lingayen,

which boasted a much-battered but still

recognizable capitol building in the

Grecian style. These men were joined by

a bomb disposal squad, which had been

given the job of clearing the bombs and

duds from the quickly captured Lingayen

airstrip. Next day Japanese air raids occurred at sunrise and after sunset, but no

damage was done. The division's regimental combat teams were moving south

at such a fast clip, ferried over the rivers

in the indispensable LVT's, that the maintenance company's first effort had to be

devoted to sending out contact parties to

perform maintenance on the run.15

On the 37th Division's beaches, only a

small detachment of the 737th Ordnance

Light Maintenance Company landed on

S-day. Moving to their assembly area

about two miles inland between the towns

of Binmaley and Dagupan, the men saw

their first signs of civilization—billboards

advertising Texaco gas and Pepsodent

toothpaste, and, according to the 37th

Division's historian, "real houses, roads,

people dressed in Western clothes, and

pretty girls who spoke English. After

three years of virgin jungle and unattractive headhunters, this was something!"16

On S-day forward elements of the 37th

pushed inland ten miles to San Carlos but

it was several days before the 737th could

catch up with them because a delay in unloading its equipment had deprived the

company of the men and trucks it needed

to make the move. It was 16 January

when the men pulled their shop trucks into

a coconut grove near the town, hung out

their sign, and were ready for business. It

was here that they made a significant contribution to the drive on Manila. At a

railroad siding in San Carlos the infantrymen had discovered six flatcars but no

locomotive. The Ordnance men converted two jeeps to locomotives by flanging

15

 (1) 740th Ord Light Maint Co, Daily Journal,

Jan-Dec 45, Folder, Historical Rpts 740th Ord

Co (LM), 29 Mar-Jun 45. (2) Morison, The

Liberation of the Philippines, p. 136. (3) XIV

Corps, Rpt of Ord Officer, 9 Jan-15 Jun 45, Sec

I, General Supply & Maintenance, pp. 5-8. (4)

G-3 Operations Rpt, 594th Engr Boat & Shore

Regt, 25 Nov 44-13 Feb 45. 16

 Frankel, The 37th Infantry Division in World

War II, p. 25.
THE PHILIPPINES: LUZON 413

the rims on their wheels, and by 19 January the jeep-hauled Manila Railroad

from San Carlos to Bayambang, twelve

miles to the south, was in operation. Later

extended to Tarlac, the railroad helped to

make up for the shortage of trucks, a

shortage created by the lack of ship space

to bring them to Luzon.17

Corps took over command on S plus 2.

By then advance echelons of the 90th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance (Tank), the

120th Ordnance Medium Maintenance,

the 3149th Ordnance Medium Automotive

Maintenance, and the 3007th Ordnance

Depot Companies were landing, but they

could not get into operation for some time

because they did not have high enough

priority to get their equipment unloaded

from the ships. For example, the men of

the 3149th (who called themselves the

"Forty-Niners") expected their equipment

on S plus 12 but were not able to get fully

into operation until almost a month after

S-day. All of these companies (plus the

263d Ordnance Medium Maintenance)

came under the XIV Corps Ordnance Battalion, the 1st, when it landed on 15 January. The battalion had to wait five days

before it could get enough vehicles unloaded to move inland to San Carlos.

There it set up a salvage yard in order to

obtain parts from wrecked vehicles.18

Ammunition presented no particular

problem in XIV Corps in the assault phase.

The 55th and 614th Ordnance Ammunition Companies landed on S-day, attached

to the 40th and 37th Divisions, respectively, and remained attached to the divisions

until taken over by army. Unloading was

slowed somewhat by the high surf in Lingayen Gulf, and the usual confusion existed

at the initial dumps, where all types of

ammunition were thrown down without

adequate segregation; but ASP's operated

by small detachments of the ammunition

companies were quickly leapfrogged forward in close support of the combat troops.

At the beginning, firing was light in the

XIV Corps area and remained so for some

time. When Sixth Army assumed control

of ammunition supply ashore on 24 January, army's main concern was meeting the

demands of I Corps.19

The I Corps Landings

The I Corps' two Blue Beaches, to the

left of XIV Corps' Crimson and separated

from it by the Dagupan River, were much

like the XIV Corps beaches—flat and subject to "wet landings," especially after the

six- to ten-foot surf that began to break

on 10 January. Here too there was no

ground opposition: the 6th Infantry Division's landings went off on schedule. The

assault troops continued in LVT's for

2,000 yards before debarking, and then

advanced across sand dunes, muddy rice

paddies, and fish ponds until by nightfall

they had taken all objectives and made

17

 (1) History of 737th Ord Light Maint Co.

(2) Frankel, The 37th Infantry Division in World

War II, p. 229. (3) Krueger, From Down Under

to Nippon, p. 229. 18

 (1) XIV Corps, Rpt of Ord Officer, 9 Jan15 Jun 45, Sec I, General Supply & Maintenance,

pp. 8-10. (2) History 90th Ord Tank Maint Co,

1945- (3) History, 1st Ord Bn, M-1 Opn, Oct

44-13 Jul, Dec 45. (4) Col. O. E. Hurlbut, "Manila," Logistics, II, 2 (October 1946), p. 20. The

Forty-Niners were destined to be the first Ordnance company to enter Manila. Ibid.

19

 (1) XIV Corps, Rpt of Ord Officer, 9 Jan15 Jun 45, Sec II, Ammunition, pp. 23, 25. (2)

History Sixth Army Ord Sec, pp. 27-28.
414 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

LINED UP To PASS AMMUNITION ASHORE, LINGAYEN GULF, LUZON

contact with XIV Corps.20

In addition to its own 706th Ordnance

Light Maintenance Company, the 622d

Ordnance Ammunition Company, most of

the 48th Ordnance Medium Maintenance

Company, and the 108th Bomb Disposal

Squad, 6th Division had for Ordnance

support in the landing phase a 14-man

detachment of the 3608th Ordnance Maintenance Company (Tank), which was fortunate because a good part of the maintenance work in the first few days was caused

by LVT track trouble, as well as by the

rough surf that broke the transfer cases in

trucks." As the division was short of transportation, maintenance men moving inland

on the heels of the combat units, first to

Santa Barbara, then to Villasis, and on 29

January to Guimba, continued to give first

priority to truck maintenance. They were

better off for supplies than the Ordnance

men in XIV Corps, for their equipment

was landed earlier, but they still had to

resort to cannibalization to get needed

parts. On 5 February the 48th Ordnance

Medium Maintenance Company, with the

tank maintenance men, was relieved of

attachment to the 6th Division and came

under corps' 243d Ordnance Service Battalion.21 20

 (1) Opns Rpt, 3d Engr Special Brigade, Jan

45. (2) I Corps History Luzon Campaign 1945, pp. 25-26. 21

 (1) History 706th Ord Light Maint Co, M-1
THE PHILIPPINES: LUZON 415

On the left of all the landing beaches

were the three White Beaches allotted to

the 43d Infantry Division. White Beach

3—separated from the Blue Beaches by the

mouth of the Bued River—was worse than

any other and was soon abandoned, for

the LST's grounded so far out that they

could be unloaded only with the greatest

difficulty, and the smaller craft were

stopped by an offshore sandbar. To the

extreme left, White Beaches 1 and 2 (soon

consolidated and called White Beach) were

better than any other beach as far as terrain was concerned, for they were higher

and therefore suitable for "dry landings."

This turned out to be a mixed blessing because when the high. Surf arose on 10 January, skippers began diverting their ships

to this beach, with or without orders, and

the congestion mounted. White Beach was

closer to the Japanese concentrations than

any other beach, and the landing parties

were soon made uncomfortably aware of

this fact. Mortar and artillery fire began

during the landings on S-day, was intensified next day, and then dwindled.22

The beach was under artillery fire when

the 743d Ordnance Light Maintenance

Company started coming ashore on the

morning of S-day. The commanding

officer, Lt. Col. Leon P. Sutton, and two

men of the company, Sgt. Stanley V.

Fisher and Pfc. Robert W. Walter, were

wounded by shell fragments, as was the

43d Division's Ordnance officer. During

the barrage, Technician 4 Percy H. Kief

saw some vehicles that had bogged down

in deep water in the line of fire. Grabbing

a tractor that belonged to some other unit,

he hauled the vehicles to safety under fire,

a gallant action for which he received the

Silver Star. The company's automotive

and armament contact teams early got to

work on dewaterproofing and maintenance.

By early afternoon all the men were ashore

and most had reported to the bivouac area

in San Fabian.23

Luckily the division ammunition dumps

set up by the 578th Ordnance Ammunition

Company escaped the Japanese shelling, as

did the backup medium maintenance company, the 288th, which spent the first two

days at the beach helping to unload gas

and ammunition. But the 288th had a

bad scare after it moved down to San

Fabian on 13 January. Late that evening, just as it had set up its command

post in an abandoned storeroom near a

battery of field artillery, it found itself on

the receiving end of a barrage of 970-

pound shells.24

They came from "Pistol Pete," a Japanese 3O5-mm. howitzer hidden in a ravine

Luzon Campaign 9 Jan-3O Jun 45. (2) History

622d Ammunition Co 1943-45. (3) History 48th

Ord Medium Maint Co, 1944-46. (4) History

3608th Ord Tank Maint Co, 9 Jan-June 45. (5)

Engineers of SWPA IV, p. 533. (6) Sixth Army

Ordnance Section estimated that LVT's, and

DUKW's as well, required at least two hours of

maintenance for every hour of operation, but, as

General Blackmore observed, "of course they almost never get it, so their life was short." Blackmore Comments. 22

 (1) Engineers of SWPA IV, pp. 536-39. (2)

Opns Rpt, 3d Engr Special Brigade Jan 45. (3)

I Corps History Luzon Campaign 1945, p. 25.

(4) Surf and Sand, p. 144. (5) The congestion

on 10 January was soon remedied; when General

Blackmore arrived at White Beach on an LST on

S plus 4 (13 January) he found "little confusion."

By then the only action from the Japanese was a

large mortar shell every hour or so. Blackmore

Comments.

23

 History 743d Ord Light Maint Co, 6/42-

9/45. 24

 (1) I Corps History Luzon Campaign, p. 230.

(2) History 288th Ord Medium Maint Co, JanJun 45.
416 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

about eight miles inland between the towns

of Damortis and Rosario. Pistol Pete had

"introduced himself with appropriate

gusto," according to an Engineer historian,

at San Fabian shortly after midnight on

S-day. After the first "awe-inspiring"

burst, "the society for the improvement of

foxholes sprang full-blown into life." The

men of the 288th dived into their foxholes

and, though several casualties were reported in the area during the 5-hour barrage, escaped damage except to their

nerves. They had their revenge on 4 February when a detail consisting of Technician 3 Primo Degli-Uomini and Technician 3 Earl V. Larsen was sent forward to

strip one of the howitzers which had just

been captured. For doing so under enemy

sniper fire, both men received Bronze Stars.

Pistol Pete had been hard to locate, for the

Japanese were adept at hiding the few big

howitzers they had. During the Luzon

campaign one was found cleverly camouflaged by a house on rails that could be

rolled back when the howitzer was fired,

and to add to the effect a small grove of

banana trees had been planted around the

emplacement.25

Heavy artillery fire on the evening of Sday slightly damaged some of the vehicles

of the 12-man 3608th tank maintenance

detachment, which had landed early on

the White beaches attached to a company

of the 716th Tank Battalion and had

moved that evening to Palapad. On 12

January the detachment made a night

march with the tank battalion to San

Jacinto, where it found an advance party

of its parent organization preparing to set

up shop. The main body of the company,

landing on the White beaches on S plus 2,

had its hands full in the first few days repairing LVT's. After the 43d Division

began probing toward the Japanese concentrations in the Damortis-Rosario area,

the mechanics had to repair crippled tanks,

though this was relatively a minor problem.

In their counterattacks the Japanese were

using their medium tank 97. Armed with

a high-velocity 47-mm. gun, it did some

damage to American Shermans, but was

nothing like as formidable as the German

tanks encountered in Europe. Examining

Japanese tanks destroyed by the Shermans,

General Blackmore could not believe they

had been very effective.26

On S plus 2, reinforcements arrived that

were to help I Corps in its tough sector.

The 158th Regimental Combat Team was

landed on the extreme left on Red Beach

—actually an extension of White Beach 1

—with the mission of advancing north up

the coast and protecting the corps' left

flank; in a few days it was attached to the

43d Division. With the regimental combat team came the 49th Ordnance

Medium Maintenance Company, whose

advance detachment on the first night

ashore received a visit from Pistol Pete—

eight of the twenty rounds that fell that

night landed within a 100-yard radius of

the Ordnance men's bivouac area. Next

day they moved to a new area protected 23

 (1) Surf and Sand, p. 141. (2) History 288th

Ord Medium Maint Co, Jan-Jun 45. (3) Office,

Chief of Ordnance, Catalogue of Enemy Ordnance

Materiel, vol. II, Japanese, p. 116.3. (4) Maj.

Edward M. Flanagan, Jr., The Angels: A History

of the nth Airborne Division 1943-1946 (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948), p. 106.

26

 (1) History, Luzon Campaign, 3608th Ord

Tank Maint Co, 9 Jan-Jun 45. (2) I Corps

History Luzon Campaign, pp. 231-32. (3) Office,

Chief of Ordnance, Catalogue of Enemy Ordnance

Materiel, vol. II, Japanese, p. 8.1. (4) Blackmore

Comments.
THE PHILIPPINES: LUZON 417

by a range of hills, and when the rest of

the company (who had been employed in

unloading ships in the harbor) arrived, the

men were sent out on contact parties to

support the rapidly advancing combat

team. One party of mechanics came

under mortar and small arms fire when it

had to go up to the front lines to repair an

M7 gun motor carriage. On 20 January

the company was attached to the Corps'

243d Ordnance Service Battalion at San

Jacinto.27

When opposition developed near the

White Beaches on S plus 2 Krueger decided to land his reserve, the 25th Division

(less one regimental combat team still in

reserve), the 13th Armored Group, and

the 6th Ranger Battalion. The Rangers

landed in the Dagupan area, while the

tankers and the division, which brought

with it the 725th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company, went in on White

Beach 3. The division indeed had the

distinction of landing on the narrowest

beachhead the Engineers had ever seen

—a strip of land that was not over fifty

yards wide at the mouth of the Bued River;

but the landing was accomplished most

efficiently, especially considering the

amount of impedimenta involved. The

25th Division was rich. It had brought

from the South Pacific a generous supply

of stores, supplies, and equipment—including sixty days' supply of post exchange

items, beer and cigarettes. Headquarters

I Corps saw to it that the wealth was

shared.28

The Advance Inland

In view of the enemy resistance in the I

Corps area, General Krueger wanted to

postpone the big XIV Corps push down

the Central Plains toward Manila until the

end of January, when the arrival of reinforcements—the 32d Infantry and 1st

Cavalry Divisions and the 112th Cavalry

Regimental Combat Team would enable I

Corps to aid actively in the drive, at the

same time staving off the threat of counterattacks in the northeast. But MacArthur

was anxious to capture Clark Field as

quickly as possible. The airstrips in the

Lingayen area were inadequate for the

heavy bomber facilities needed immediately; moreover, they would very likely be

washed out when Luzon's rainy season began in April. Intelligence reports indicated that there would not be too much

opposition in the Central Plains. If there

was strong resistance in the Clark Field

area, MacArthur pointed out, the planned

landing in February by XI Corps just

north of Bataan would overcome it. At

the outset, I Corps could be echeloned to

protect XIV Corps' left rear, while at the

same time containing the main concentrations of Japanese in its own sector.

Krueger was only half persuaded but he

had to comply. He ordered XIV Corps

to begin its advance south on the Central

Plains on 19 January.

At that date the two corps still had

logistical responsibility—four days beyond

the S plus 6 date on which Col. William

N. Leaf, the Sixth Army G-4, had planned

for ASCOM to take over responsibility for

unloading at the beaches and delivery to

corps dumps. Colonel Leaf had planned

for ASCOM to take over full responsibility

27

 (1) Engineers of SWPA IV, p. 542. (2) History 49th Ord Medium Maint Co, 25 Feb 42-Jun

45.

28

 (1) Surf and Sand, p. 145. (2) History 725th

Ord Light Maint Co, 11 Jan-Jun 45, RED VAULT

25th Inf Div. (3) I Corps History Luzon Campaign, p. 168.
418 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

on 29 January—a safe date, he felt, since

the two corps, bringing with them 30 days

of Class I to IV supplies and 5 units of fire,

would theoretically not require resupply

from ASCOM dumps until well into February. In the planning phase General

Blackmore had been disturbed about these

assumptions as applied to ammunition. He

regarded the setting of a fixed date for

Army Service Command to take over as

"not too close to the realities." He knew

all too well the risks involved in an amphibious landing—the uncertainty of

weather, the possibility of being unable to

get the ammunition ashore in time. At

Manus Island, for example, the Ordnance

men had been obliged to arrange for airdrops of ammunition because the ships in

the harbor could not be unloaded. Ships

had to be unloaded from the top down,

to keep them from turning over, and artillery ammunition was usually at the bottom; also, ships with ammunition aboard

had to stay at some distance from other

ships and from the shore for reasons of

safety. Unloading nearly always took

longer than expected; and after the stocks

were deposited at the beach, there might

not be enough trucks to carry them forward. Blackmore had reminded Leaf that

at Leyte the corps had to control the issue

of ammunition for several days beyond the

date set for ASCOM to take over. The

same thing might happen at Luzon.29

In the case of Luzon, the high surf, the

lack of bridges inland, and the extreme

shortage of trucks were largely to blame

for delays. The ASCOM Ordnance units

got ashore very early. Base M's operating

battalion, the 9th, landed on 10 January

with the 212th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company. An advance party hiked six miles inland the same

day. Mangaldan (near San Jacinto),

twelve miles inland, was the site for the

Base M Ordnance Service Center, and in

a few days the mechanics were busy with

the help of Filipino laborers constructing

warehouses, offices, and bivouac areas,

using bamboo poles with tarps for covering.

On 12 January the ammunition officer

arrived in the area with the 629th Ordnance Ammunition Company, which had

just spent a night under artillery fire on

White Beach where one of its sergeants

was killed in his foxhole. Badly shaken by

this experience, the men nevertheless began

setting up that day the first of the three bays

of the Mangaldan Ordnance Ammunition

Depot. The 615th and 577th Ammunition Companies arrived on 21-22 January.

But no ammunition was received until 26

January.30

Getting the Ammunition Forward

By the time Sixth Army assumed control

of ammunition ashore on 24 January, it

had become apparent—to Colonel Leaf as

well as General Blackmore—that centralized unloading of ammunition ought to

have taken place much earlier, so that

army, which was, in Colonel Leaf's words,

"the best judge of overall requirements,"

could have put the weight of effort where

it was most needed. At that time, XIV

29

 (1) Memo, W. N. L., G-4, to Ord Officer,

3 Dec 44. (2) Memo, P. G. B., O.O., to ACofS,

G-4, 4 Dec 44. Both in G-4 Jnls, M-1 Opns,

Sixth Army. (3) Blackmore Comments.

30

 History Base M Ordnance, 20 Nov 44-15

Feb 45, and Incl, History 629th Ammunition Company, 314.7, AFWESPAC/Base M, Military History of Base Ordnance & Depot Organizations.
THE PHILIPPINES: LUZON 419

Corps was meeting little resistance in its

drive on Clark Field and Manila and

therefore its expenditures were light. I

Corps, on the other hand, was heavily engaged on the left flank and its expenditures

were so great that by 19 January the total

155-mm. howitzer and 81 -mm. mortar ammunition ashore amounted to only 2.6

units of fire. The first task was to supply

I Corps, and the quickest way to do it was

to divert to it some of XIV Corps' initial

supply. The next task was to get the ammunition unloaded from the Liberty ships

that were still waiting out in the gulf because the light expenditures by XIV Corps

had created the unfortunate impression

that early unloading of resupply ships was

not necessary. By 24 January unloading

had begun on one of them at Port Sual, on

the extreme right flank, where Base M had

planned Sual Ordnance Ammunition

Depot. But Port Sual was too far away

to do I Corps much good; indeed, it was

so difficult to get transportation to move

the ammunition forward to XIV Corps

that the depot was soon closed out. It was

27 January before the first resupply ship

in reach of I Corps could be unloaded.31

It was now plain that the truck shortage

was limiting the usefulness of Base M's

Mangaldan Ordnance Depot, which was

too far from the beach and too far from

I Corps. Therefore the 577th Ordnance

Ammunition Company was sent to Rabon,

up the coast behind I Corps, to set up the

Rabon Ordnance Ammunition Depot and

receive ammunition from the waiting

Liberty ships. The terrain was bad. Also,

few Filipinos were available to help operate the depot. Most of the natives were

hungry, however, so by rounding up supplies of rice and fish and providing sleeping

quarters, the company managed to attract

more than two hundred laborers. The

615th Ordnance Ammunition Company

was moved up to Damortis, but this spot

turned out to be dangerously close to

enemy artillery fire. On 3 February the

company was moved to an area south of

Rabon to set up the Davis Ordnance Ammunition Depot, which became the main

Base M ammunition depot. With the

help of 850 Filipino laborers it was in operation by 11 February. In April when

Mangaldan was closed out, Davis received

the 629th Ordnance Ammunition Company, which had been split between Mangaldan and Sual.32

The three Base M ammunition companies made a remarkable record. Between 17 and 26 February, they came

close to meeting Sixth Army's quota of

2,000 tons to be unloaded daily from ships

in the harbor and 1,200 tons to be sent

forward daily to the combat troops. In

order to do this they had to work around

the clock and take the risks incurred in

night operations. These risks were painfully demonstrated at Davis near midnight

on 22 March when, as usual, lights were

on in the depot office and the company

area, and the headlights of trucks and amphibians receiving and discharging ammunition were being used to illuminate the

31

 (1) Sixth Army Rpt on Luzon Campaign, vol.

III, p. 58. (2) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, pp.

27-28. (3) History Base M Ordnance, 20 Nov 44-

15 Feb 45, p. 9. (4) For getting ammunition

forward where it was most needed, General Blackmore gave his ammunition officer, Lt. Col. Clinton

A. Waggoner, credit for "a wonderful job." Blackmore Comments.

32

 (1) History Base M Ordnance, 20 Nov 44-

15 Feb 45, pp. 9-11. (2) History 577th Ord Ammunition Co, 10 Sep 42-31 Oct 45.
420 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

storage bays. A Japanese plane came over

and bombed and strafed the depot, destroying about 3,200 tons of ammunition.

The bombs killed two men, Pfc. Marvin H.

Helms, who was working in the small arms

bay, and Pfc. Agapito Castillo of the

Philippine Guerrilla Force, who was doing

guard duty, and seriously injured Pfc. John

F. Hamilton. Flying fragments wounded

many others and destroyed most of the

property and equipment in the bivouac

area. There were many acts of simple

heroism: 2d Lt. James R. Lewis saved all

the ammunition in one bay by picking up a

burning 155-mm. round and carrying it to

a safe distance; and 1st Lt. Walter J.

Miners, Pfc. John Anderson, and Pfc. Leo

Sullivan risked their lives by going to the

aid of the wounded.33

Beginning early in February, the strenuous and even heroic efforts of the

ASCOM units were devoted to supplying

the drive on Manila. By the end of January expenditures were mounting in XIV

Corps. West of Clark Field in the 40th

Division's sector, the Japanese, entrenched

in hills and caves, were putting up a hard

fight. Quantities of artillery ammunition

were needed to blast them out of their

positions. The 37th Division was racing

toward Manila. On the extreme left flank,

I Corps' 1st Cavalry Division and 6th

Infantry Division had encountered considerable resistance in the San Jose region in

their attempt to break the Japanese line

of communications from the north. In

the battle of Manila, beginning 3 February

and lasting a month, tremendous quantities

of artillery ammunition were expended.

General MacArthur had vetoed the use of

bombing; therefore the conquest of the city

depended on the use of artillery to blast

the Japanese out of buildings, culminating

in the furious barrages, including those of

a battalion of big 240-mm. howitzers,

against the thick-walled buildings in the

Intramuros sector—the old Walled City.34

By 31 January, Sixth Army had established an ammunition supply point at San

Miguel (near Tarlac) which, though some

forty miles from the operations at Manila,

was in reasonable distance of the operations west of Clark Field. But it was

something else again to stock it adequately.

Rail shipments had been disappointingly

small; combined rail and truck shipments

from Port Sual and Base M amounted to

only about 400 tons a day. The ASP's

supporting I Corps were even worse off—

remaining base trucks could supply only

about 150 tons a day. This was not too

serious in the case of I Corps, because its

units could more readily get back to the

Lingayen Gulf depots. But XIV Corps

had to send ammunition trains from 90 to

150 miles back to the beaches.35

The XIV Corps, hardest hit, charged

that army had not moved the ASP's close

enough behind the combat troops. Both

XIV and I Corps blamed army for not

adequately stocking the ASP's, for not providing a margin of safety; indeed XIV

Corps made the accusation that a deliberate policy existed of withholding ship33

 (1) History Base M Ordnance, 20 Nov 44-

15 Feb 45, pp. 10-11. (2) History 615th Ord Ammunition Co, 25 Jan-Oct 45.

34

 XIV Corps Rpt, Japanese Defense of Cities

as Exemplified by the Battle for Manila, 1 Jul 45,

Armed Forces Staff College Library. 35

 (1) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, p. 27. (2)

USAFFE Bd Rpt 281, AGF Questionnaire, Ord

Sec, 30 Apr 45, p. 5. (3) Memo, P. D. H., Asst

G-3, for CofS, II Feb 45, sub: Capacity for Forward Movement of Supplies, Sixth Army G-4 Jnl

M-1 Opns, 6-14 Feb 45.
THE PHILIPPINES: LUZON 421

ment of ammunition to forward ASP's

until a combat shortage occurred.36 The

Sixth Army Ordnance Section acknowledged the fact of the artillery ammunition

shortage, but placed the blame not only on

a shortage of trucks but, going further

back, on the fact that it took the experience

at Leyte to convince GHQ that more artillery ammunition would be needed than had

been planned. Therefore, requisitions

were submitted too late to allow prompt

resupply; the loading of the ships in the

United States was dangerously delayed.

Also, of the few resupply ships that did

arrive in the theater from the United States,

two had had to be diverted to Leyte for

the initial supply of the XI Corps, which

landed on the west coast of Bataan 29

January in the MIKE VII operation, and

the nth Airborne Division, which landed

south of Manila two days later in the

MIKE VI operation.37

In mid-February when USASOS took

over logistic responsibility from Sixth Army,

including the reassignment of ammunition

companies and the reorganization of Army

Service Command headquarters as Luzon

Base Section, USASOS, the artillery ammunition situation was so serious that

Blackmore suggested limiting the rate of

expenditure in XIV Corps—always a

measure dreaded by commanders. Maj.

Gen. George H. Decker, Sixth Army chief

of staff, refused to go along with the recommendation, relying on the accelerated

unloading of the resupply ships. But the

shortage was never really eased. Manila's

port facilities could not be used to any

great extent until well into April because

the once beautiful city had become such a

shambles that extensive clearing and repair

work had to be done. In the meantime, ammunition already ashore in Luzon had to

be diverted to Eighth Army's operations in

the Southern Islands. In the last phase of

the campaign, when the main effort was

directed toward blasting the Japanese out

of the mountains of northern Luzon, rigid

restrictions on artillery and 81-mm. mortar

ammunition had to be imposed, limiting

artillery to one-tenth of a unit of fire per

day and mortars to one-eighth.38

Problems of Maintenance

and Supply

The expectation that the Luzon Campaign would be adequately supplied with

maintenance companies was soon dispelled.

In the far-flung operations the medium

maintenance companies were spread thin.

Fortunately, with the exception of 105-mm.

M2A1 howitzers, on whose tubes there was

a consistent stripping of lands (the surface

of the bore between the grooves), there

were no unexpected maintenance problems

on weapons. On supply, I Corps was

handicapped in the early stages of the campaign by its inability to supply weapons to

38

 (1) XIV Corps, Rpt of Ord Officer, 9 Jan15 Jun 45, Sec II, Ammunition, pp. 25-26. (2)

I Corps History Luzon Campaign, p. 148. 37

 History Sixth Army Ord Sec, pp. 27-28.

38

 (1) Telephone conversation, Col Kiefer, Arty

Officer Sixth Army, and Gen Blackmore, 1420, 14

Feb. (2) Memo, P. D. H., Ass't G-3, to G-3, 12

Feb 45. Both in Sixth Army G-4 Jnl M-1 Opns,

6-14 Feb 45. (2) History Sixth Army Ord Sec,

p. 29. (3) I Corps History Luzon Campaign, p.

231. I Corps continued to criticize army, charging

that slowness in processing ammunition reports, on

which allocations were made, sometimes resulted in

ammunition dropping to precariously low levels,

specifically citing one morning in the Balete Pass

area when the battery of extremely valuable 240-

mm. howitzers found itself with only three rounds

to start its day's firing mission. Ibid., p. 148.
422 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

guerrillas. Before the invasion, Sixth

Army had set up an operational project to

bring 15,000 hand and shoulder automatic

weapons for reissue to guerrillas, with I

Corps delegated to bring in 25 percent of

these weapons with an Ordnance maintenance company by S plus 4. At the last

moment, USASOS informed Sixth Army

that it could not supply the project. In

the later stages of the campaign, when the

system for collecting Japanese weapons improved, several hundred Japanese small

arms, automatic weapons, and even some

artillery pieces were processed through

Ordnance shops in I Corps for reissue to

guerrillas.39

Vehicles accounted for most of the maintenance troubles—tanks as well as trucks.

The Japanese tanks on Luzon with their

47-mm. high-velocity gun were capable of

inflicting far more damage than the Japanese tanks on Leyte with the 37-mm. Operation of the Shermans over steep mountain trails caused propeller shafts to fail;

and the synthetic rubber of the tracks

would not stand up during long-distance

driving over hard-surface roads. Tank

parts were often unavailable because Sixth

Army Ordnance had had no experience on

which to base requisitions. Parts lists in

Ordnance catalogues were unrealistic.

Perhaps because of the limited experience

with tanks on Leyte, only two tank maintenance companies were sent to Luzon—

the 3608th, attached to I Corps, and the

90th, attached to XIV Corps. Neither

company was experienced in field repair.

There were no tank repair men at Base M,

the army service center, or the USASOS

base at Manila. The two tank maintenance companies served seven divisions,

three tank battalions, three tank destroyer

battalions, and two amphibious tractor

battalions. One very serious problem was

that of bringing the tanks back from the

battlefield to the shops. Luzon had no

tank transporters until 14 February, when

two M25's were received by the 3608th.

One of these was sent down to XIV Corps

to do recovery work on 6 March. By that

time disabled tanks were scattered all over

the area.40

Above all, trucks were the big problem.

Constant operation over long distances

took its toll; the neglect of preventive maintenance seriously affected operations, a

lesson that the truck drivers never seemed to

learn. Replacement vehicles went out of

the Ordnance shops as fast as they came in.

Certain parts, as well as tires and tubes,

soon became critically short. By the end

of the first month of the Luzon operation,

the number of trucks on deadline was

mounting.41

At a time when Sixth Army was already

short of trucks, the arrival of the 32d

Division on 27 January was the last straw.

Brought up from Leyte, it landed minus

164 of its table of equipment vehicles, and

of the few cargo trucks left to it, 70 were

in such bad condition that they had to be

towed off the LST's. Unlike the 6th,

25th, 37th, and 43d Divisions, which had

39

 (1) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, pp. 24, 31.

(2) I Corps History Luzon Campaign, pp. 229,

231. (3) For important guerrilla operations in the

conquest of Northern Luzon, see Smith, Triumph

in the Philippines, pp. 464-67.

40

 (1) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, p. 31. (2)

History, Luzon Campaign, 3608th Ord Tank Maint

Co. (3) XIV Corps, Rpt of Ord Officer 9 Jan15 Jun 45, Sec I, General Supply and Maintenance,

p. 10. (4) Blackmore Comments. 41

 (1) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, p. 30. (2)

XIV Corps, Rpt of Ord Officer, 9 Jan-15 Jun 45,

Sec I, General Supply and Maintenance, p. 12.
THE PHILIPPINES: LUZON 423

SHERMAN TANK PASSING A BURNING JAPANESE MEDIUM TANK, LUZON

received many new vehicles before arriving

in Luzon and besides had had a long training period before departure to get their old

ones into shape, the 32d had received few

new ones (only 25 cargo trucks), and had

been actively engaged until Christmas 1944

on the west coast of Leyte under conditions

that were a maintenance man's nightmare

—mountain roads, rain every day, mud so

bad that one of the men swore at the time,

"it flows uphill." It had been virtually

impossible for the division's own 732d Ordnance Light Maintenance Company, kneedeep in mud, and often under enemy fire,

to set up adequate second or third echelon

facilities or even to get up to the front in

time to bring back damaged vehicles—before they could reach them, the wrecks

were stripped of their parts by passing

troops until they were beyond repair.

Leyte had been the hardest operation in

the 32d Division's history in SWPA, going

back to the Papua Campaign.42

As soon as Maj. John E. Harbert, commanding officer of the 732d Ordnance

Light Maintenance Company, got ashore

near San Fabian, he went to General Blackmore with the story on the vehicles, describing the wretched conditions at Leyte,

44

 (1) I Corps History Luzon Campaign, p. 231.

(2) Sixth Army Rpt on Luzon Campaign, vol. III,

p. 58. (3) History 732d Ord Light Maint Co, 27

Jan-3O Jun 45. (4) History Eighth Army Ord

Sec, pp. 170-89.
424 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

pointing out that the 32d had participated

in five successive operations within the past

ten months—Saidor, Aitape, Morotai,

Leyte, and Luzon—and warning that if

maintenance and parts were not soon forthcoming, 40 percent of the remaining vehicles would be on deadline. Harbert (soon

to be promoted to lieutenant colonel) was

a man whose words carried weight, for he

had a long and highly creditable record in

the Southwest Pacific, having been with

the division since Buna, and (as a lieutenant) having received the Distinguished

Service Cross for his service at Cape Sudest

in November 1942.43

Blackmore had a high opinion of Harbert, but undoubtedly he had heard hardluck stories before. While acknowledging

the bad effects of the mud on Leyte, he was

inclined to blame primarily the 32d Division's poorly instructed or careless drivers

for the condition of the trucks. He also

blamed the division for not providing good

second echelon maintenance, particularly

for not following Sixth Army instructions

on brake maintenance. He inclined to the

theory that the table of equipment provided

too many trucks per division, and felt that

truck companies should be given priority

on trucks. Pressure on army by the division G-4, artillery officer, and Ordnance

officer was necessary in order to obtain the

release of eighteen cargo trucks to the 32d

Division from ASCOM. For maintenance and parts supply the 32d had to

depend solely, for the time being, on the I

Corps 243d Ordnance Battalion, located

at Balungao, whose two medium maintenance companies and one depot company

were unable to keep up with the heavy

work load.44

By 13 February Maj. Gen. Innis P.

Swift, commanding general of I Corps, was

so thoroughly alarmed by the condition of

the cargo trucks in the 32d Division (111

were then on deadline) that he appealed

to the Sixth Army G-4 for help. Colonel

Leaf could only promise that priority

would be given to unloading a resupply

ship then in the harbor, that air shipment

of critical parts would be arranged for; and

that thirty-five replacement trucks would

be furnished by army's 318th Ordnance

Depot Company—when the trucks became

available.45 In the meantime, the 32d

Division, advancing slowly and painfully

up the Villa Verde Trail in northern Luzon

against strong Japanese opposition, continued to suffer from a severe shortage of

trucks. And it had more bad luck on 24

April when its 732d Ordnance Light

Maintenance Company was bombed.

The company's supply platoon, established

in a building on the town square in Tayug,

suffered a direct hit from a Japanese bomb

that killed eight men—Technician 3

William F. Tyree, Jr., Technician 4 George

E. Seekell, Technician 5 Clarence H. Carlson, Technician 5 Oliver T. Romine, Pfc.

Charles P. Sternburgh, Pfc. Donald A.

Gabriel, Pfc. L'Phillip Lightner, and Pvt.

James G. Vorhauer. Thirteen men were

wounded, some of them in attempting to

rescue their comrades from the furiously

burning building. All of the platoon's

43

 (1) History 732d Ord Light Maint Co, 27

Jan-30 Jun 45. (2) On Harbert, see above, p. 73.

44

 (1) Memo, P. B. G., O.O., to ACofS G-4, 16

Feb 45, G-4 Jnl Sixth Army, 14-18 Feb 45. (2)

Blackmore Comments. (3) History 732d Ord Light

Maint Co, 27 Jan-30 Jun 45. 45

 (1) Ltr, Swift to Leaf, 13 Feb 45. (2) Ltr,

Leaf to Swift, 19 Feb 45. Both in G-4 Jnl Sixth

Army, 14-18 Feb 45.
THE PHILIPPINES: LUZON 425

maintenance stocks, including quantities of

machine guns, rifles, and carbines were

destroyed.46

Though not as badly off as the 32d, the

other I Corps divisions participating in the

conquest of northern Luzon also felt the

pinch on replacement vehicles and automotive parts. One Ordnance unit felt that

the terrain features had been "sadly neglected" in computing the automotive supply logistics for this operation in difficult

mountainous country, and the Sixth Army

Ordnance officer agreed.47 For all types

of maintenance, in the early stages of the

operation, I Corps had to depend on its

own 243d Ordnance Battalion, located

down at Balungao—a 95-mile round trip

from Damortis.48 And in the rapid advance north after 19 April, when I Corps

broke through the Balete Pass, almost all

Ordnance maintenance had to be evacuated to Base M because there were not

enough maintenance companies in I Corps

or army to provide the close support

needed. Early in April Base M had moved

most of its shops up the west coast to San

Fernando, La Union, leaving two companies at Mangaldan to provide support

for units in the area.49

Little or no evacuation from I, XIV, or

XI Corps to Sixth Army was possible because army for most of the Luzon Campaign had no heavier Ordnance facilities

than corps. Two heavy maintenance

companies had been planned for the Sixth

Army Ordnance Service Center, the 511th

Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company

(Field Army) to arrive on 13 January and

the 959th Ordnance Heavy Automotive

Maintenance Company to arrive on 18

February, both to be attached to the center's operating battalion, the 189th; but

the 511th did not land until 10 February,

and by the time the 959th arrived on 1

March, it was sent first to help out at Base

M and later sent to the Luzon Base Section

in Manila.50 During the time the Sixth

Army center operated at Calasiao near the

Lingayen Gulf, its maintenance work was

mainly contact party work and refitting the

43d Division, with the help of the I

Corps' own 243d Ordnance Battalion. On

10 March the center was moved down to

San Fernando, Pampanga (about forty

miles north of Manila) and remained there

until the close of the campaign. After 1

April, when the 189th Battalion went to

Philippine Base Section, the center was

operated by the 12th Ordnance Battalion.

By that time, XI and XIV Corps were

evacuating unserviceable material to the

USASOS base in Manila.51

The XI Corps, employed for most of the

spring in a campaign designed to protect

Manila from Japanese forces dug in in the

mountains north and northeast of the city,

and to increase Manila's water supply by

capturing the dams in the region, had received on 15 March XIV Corps' Ordnance

battalion, the 1st. This battalion, set up

in the Kim Bee Foundry Building in Grace

48

 (1) History, 732d Ord Light Maint Co, 27

Jan-30 Jun 45. (2) The Ordnance Digest, vol. 27,

No. 12 (December 1945), p. 3. 47

 (1) History 733d Ord Light Maint Co, 15

Feb-30 Jun 45. (2) Blackmore Comments. 48

 (1) History 732d Ord Light Maint Co, 27

Jan-30 Jun 45. (2) History 733d Ord Light

Maint Co, 15 Feb-30 Jun 45. 49

 (1) I Corps History Luzon Campaign, p. 150.

(2) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, p. 31. (3) History Base M Ordnance, pp. 6-8.

50

 (1) History Sixth Army Ord Sec, p. 31. (2)

History 189th Ord Bn, Jan-Dec 45. 51

 (1) Hist 189th Ord Bn. (2) History 12th Ord

Service Bn, Nov 44-3 Aug 45. (3) History Sixth

Army Ord Sec, p. 31.
426 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Park on the outskirts of Manila, had a field

army heavy maintenance company, the

99th, which sent out contact parties to the

men fighting in the mountains, and did an

immense amount of rebuild work in its

shops.52

After mid-March, XIV Corps had no

Ordnance battalion. During the rest of

the Luzon Campaign, it was to operate

over a wide area south of Manila, with the

object of securing the southern coast of

Luzon, thus helping to clear the Visayan

Passages—the shipping route through the

central Philippines.

Clearing the Visayan Passages

Early in February General MacArthur

had decided that a shorter, safer shipping

route from the United States through the

San Bernardino Strait (between Luzon

and Samar) and then through the Sibuyan

Sea and the Verde Island Passage (between Mindoro and Luzon) to Manila,

was essential. This route would save some

500 nautical miles over the route taken by

the Lingayen Gulf convoys and would be

much less hazardous for small ships. He

therefore gave General Krueger the job of

clearing the southern coast of Luzon, including the far-flung southeastern Bicol

Peninsula, delegating to Eighth Army the

task of making safe the islands to the south

of the route. Another valuable objective

in Krueger's task was the early opening of

Batangas Bay on the south-central coast

of Luzon, for there MacArthur wanted to

develop an extensive base and staging area

for the invasion of Japan. For the operation, Krueger took the 11th Airborne Division (plus the 158th Regimental Combat

Team), which was already in southern

Luzon, having landed at Nasugbu in the

MIKE VI operation; and the 1st Cavalry

Division, sent down from the operations

northeast of Manila. The 11th Airborne

was ready to move on 7 March; the 1st

Cavalry Division a week later.

It was to be a shoestring operation. Few

Ordnance units were available to support

it. Corps troops had only the 90th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company

(Tank) sent from Grace Park fifty miles

south to Cablubany, Laguna, where it remained throughout the campaign, performing maintenance for all service troops as

well as the tankers. Supply requisitions

were submitted to the 3007th Ordnance

Base Depot Company, which had been detached from XIV Corps and attached to

Base X at Manila. The nth Airborne

Division already had a 10-man detachment

of the 643d Ordnance Ammunition Company, attached to its own 711 th Ordnance

Light Maintenance Company; it was now

given the 3498th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company. The 1st Cavalry Division

had the 120th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company to back up its organic 27th

Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company.

The 27th, already the proud possessor of

a Gold Star awarded by the commanding

general of the 1st Cavalry Division for its

contribution to the Leyte Campaign, had

just covered itself with glory in the street

fighting in Manila when a contact party

from the company, cut off by the enemy

in a flame-lit street, had armed itself with

rifles and machine guns and accounted for

52

 (1) For the reduction of the Shimbu Group

north of Manila, see Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 367-418. (2) History 1st Ord Bn, M-1

Opn, Oct 44-13 Jul, Dec 45. (3) History 99th

Ord Heavy Maint Co. (Field Army), Jan-Jun,

Oct 45.
THE PHILIPPINES: LUZON 427

four truckloads of Japanese. For individual heroism in this action the leader of the

contact party, Staff Sgt. Charles Stearns,

was awarded the Silver Star and a battlefield promotion to second lieutenant.53

The southern Luzon campaign was characterized by hard fighting in the mountains

and hills to which the defenders had withdrawn, notably at Mt. Macolod, where the

Japanese had emplaced the one 305-mm.

howitzer they had in the region. The

stiffest opposition was found at the Mt.

Malepunyo concentration. Tanks, bulldozers and flame throwers were used to blast

the Japanese out of their caves, together

with heavy air and artillery bombardments.

The last phase of the campaign was a

shore-to-shore operation by the 158th Regimental Combat Team to secure the Bicol

Peninsula. The 158th embarked at Lemery and landed at Legaspi on 1 April. To

support it, a hand-picked detachment of

seventy men from the nth Airborne Division's backup 3498th Ordnance Medium

Maintenance Company was attached to

the 158th Regimental Combat Team. The

detachment was landed from LST's during

the first week, accompanied the regimental

combat team on its march inland, and

during May also supported the 5th Cavalry

Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division

which was engaged in the neighborhood.

At first, weapons required considerable repair, an effort to which the welders and

machinists of the service section—"the unsung heroes of an Ordnance maintenance

unit," according to the company historian

—made an invaluable contribution by

manufacturing parts. Later occurred the

old problem of truck maintenance after the

long hauls over rough roads. The meeting of the 158th Regimental Combat Team

with the 5th Cavalry on 2 May signaled

the end of Sixth Army's task of clearing

the northern shores of the Visayan Passages.54

Sometime before the end of the southern

Luzon campaign, the port of Batangas,

captured 11-12 March by the I58th Regimental Combat Team and under development before the end of March by engineers

of the 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, was receiving Ordnance supplies.

These went to a 36-man detachment of the

versatile 90th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank), which set up a

provisional XIV Corps Ordnance Depot,

receiving 383,350 pounds of Ordnance

matériel, consisting of vehicles, cleaning

and preserving materials, and automotive

parts, which were issued to the maintenance companies. It operated for about

thirty days, at which time USASOS Base

R took over.55

On the southern side of the San Bernardino Strait—across the strait from the

Bicol Peninsula—lay the northern coast of

the island of Samar. The task of clearing

this coast and adjacent islands was given

by Eichelberger to the Americal Division.

Samar and offshore islands were secured in

53

 (1) XIV Corps, Rpt of Ord Officer, 9 Jan15 Jun 45, Sec I, General Supply and. Maintenance,

p. 10. (2) History 90th Ord Tank Maint Co,

1945. (3) Rpt CG Eighth Army on the Nasugbu and Bataan Operations, MIKE Six and MIKE

Seven, pp. 62-63. (4) History 27th Ord Medium

Maint Co, 1st Cav Div (Luzon Campaign), JanJun 45.

54

 (1) For the Legaspi landings see Engineers of

SWPA IV, pp. 582-86. (2) XIV Corps, Rpt Ord

Officer, 9 Jan-15 Jun 45, Sec I, General Supply

and Maintenance, p. 11. (3) History, Det 3498th

Ord Medium Maint Co, 17 Mar-Jun 45. 55

 (1) Engineers of SWPA IV, pp. 580-81. (2)

XIV Corps, Rpt of Ord Officer, 9 Jan-15 Jun 45,

Sec I, General Supply and Maintenance, p. 11.
428 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

about two weeks, beginning 19 February,

by a reinforced battalion of the 182d

Infantry and on 3 March elements of a

reinforced battalion of the 132d Infantry landed with little or no opposition on larger islands to the west, Ticao

and Burias. In both cases Ordnance support was provided by small contact teams

of the division's organic 721st Ordnance

Light Maintenance Company. Matériel

damaged beyond the capability of the

teams was evacuated to Leyte and resupply

came from Base K on Leyte.56

Clearance of the rest of the islands

athwart the shipping lanes in the Visayan

Passages was the responsibility of the 24th

Division, based on Mindoro. Northeastern

Mindoro and Marinduque (except for one

small pocket) had been secured by the

Western Visayan Task Force's diversionary

operations in January. The first job for

the 24th Division was to invade the islands

to the extreme west in order to control the

Verde Island Passage; the second, to clear

the central islands in the Sibuyan Sea east

of Mindoro. Both tasks were accomplished between 23 February and 5 April,

mainly by reinforced companies or battalions of the 19th and 20th Infantry,

aided by guerrillas who later took on garrison duties. As was the case in the

Americal Division's sector, the 24th Division elements drew ammunition from their

division dumps and were supported by contact parties from their organic light maintenance company, the 724th. Damaged

matériel was evacuated to Mindoro.57

Soon after the completion of their tasks

in clearing the Visayan Passages, the Americal and 24th Divisions were to be involved

in a much more ambitious operation—

Eighth Army's campaign to clear the southern Philippines.

56

 (1) A detailed account of the Americal Divisions' straits operation is in Capt. Francis D. Cronin, Under the Southern Cross: The Saga of the

Americal Division (Washington: Combat Forces

Press, 1951), ch. 12. (2) Rpt CG Eighth Army,

Leyte-Samar Operation (including Clearance of

the Visayan Passages), p. 77. 57

 Rpt of Eighth Army, Leyte-Samar, p. 77.
CHAPTER XXII

The Philippines: The Southern Islands

On the morning of 28 February 1945

with an assault on the long, narrow, westernmost Philippine island of Palawan,

Eighth Army began a campaign to capture

the bypassed islands south of Luzon and

Leyte. MacArthur wanted air bases on

Palawan, on the Zamboanga Peninsula of

Mindanao, and on the Sulu Archipelago

to support a reoccupation of North Borneo.

The rest of the islands—the central group

of Panay, Negros, Cebu and Bohol, and

southernmost Mindanao—he wanted for

political considerations, to complete his

return to the Philippines.

This series of successive operations was

to be known as the VICTOR operations.

The first four—VICTOR III and IV (the

earliest) against Palawan and Zamboanga

and VICTOR I and II against the central

islands—were to be on a fairly small scale,

reminiscent of the New Guinea landings.

They were to be accomplished by a reinforced division or less, VICTOR III and IV

by the 41st Division, sent up from Biak via

Mindoro; VICTOR I by the 40th, brought

down from Luzon; VICTOR II by the

Americal, coming from Leyte. VICTOR V

against Mindanao, the second largest

island in the Philippines and reported to

be strongly held by the Japanese, was to

be a much larger operation. Here the

principal combat units were to be the 24th

Division from Mindoro and the 31st Division, brought up from Sansapor and

Morotai, both under X Corps.1

The major landings on these southern

islands were to be made at the rate of one

a week—a speed that would have seemed

fantastic to the planners on New Guinea

in early 1944. The VICTOR operations

were evidence of how far the art of amphibious warfare had advanced in the short

space of a year. The Eighth Army Ordnance planners could now estimate with a

degree of certainty the amount and kind

of Ordnance troops, equipment, and supplies that would be needed and when they

would be needed. They had learned a

great deal about such matters as loading

and unloading, waterproofing and dewaterproofing, bomb disposal, and other techniques. Early in the VICTOR program, the

Eighth Army Ordnance officer, Col. Ward

E. Becker, issued a folder of general instructions along these lines, prepared by

his operations officer, Col. Thurman W.

Morris, based on the combined experience

of various Ordnance officers who had participated in the New Guinea, Leyte, and

Luzon operations, and distributed it to all

corps and division Ordnance officers under

Eighth Army control, and also to all Eighth

Army Ordnance unit commanders.2

1

 (1) Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, pp583-86. Unless otherwise indicated the tactical

details in this chapter are from this source. (2)

History Eighth Army Ord Sec, pp. 32-34. 2

 (1) History Eighth Army Ord Sec, p. 32. (2)

Hq Eighth Army, Office of the Ord Officer, Ord-
430 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

One subject treated at some length in

Becker's instructions was the old problem

of truck drivers' neglect of their vehicles.

In the Luzon Campaign, failure to perform

first and second echelon maintenance had

not only increased the requirement for

third and fourth echelon work, but had

resulted in a seriously high deadline of

badly needed trucks. Many commanders

had insisted that first and second echelon

maintenance was impossible during the

early stages of an operation when the

trucks had to be operated practically

around the clock. Becker argued that experience had shown that this was not the

case; that a few trucks at a time could be

pulled out for weekly second echelon and

that daily first echelon was imperative.

What was needed was stricter maintenance

discipline; and to prove this point he cited

experience in the MIKE VII operation.

There the XI Corps Ordnance officer, Col.

Robert K. Haskell, had achieved excellent

results by persuading his commanding general to station two inspection teams, each

composed of an officer (not an Ordnance

officer), two Ordnance mechanics, and an

MP, along the main supply route to make

spot checks two days after the landing.

The inspection took only five minutes and

no commander objected to having his vehicles stopped. When the teams found evidence of maintenance neglect, command

letters went out signed by the XI Corps

commanding general. Becker strongly recommended that inspection teams be used

in all future Eighth Army operations.3

An inspection team was to be provided

the VICTOR operations, not by corps and

division commanders, but by the Eighth

Army Ordnance Section. This was the

team (composed of men taken from the

207th Ordnance Medium Maintenance

Company) organized in the Admiralties

the preceding fall. Using a system worked

out by the Eighth Army Ordnance Section,

the team inspected a sample of each unit's

Ordnance matériel. If the rating on the

sample was less than "excellent" a complete inspection of the unit's matériel was

undertaken. After this was done, the rating for the division as a whole was sent to

the division's commanding general in a

personal letter from General Eichelberger

along with information on the relative

standing of the division among all the divisions under Eighth Army. The same

method was applied to corps. Eichelberger's personal interest and his personal

letters to the commanding generals

"worked wonders."

 4

In regard to supply, the VICTOR invasion

forces were different from previous SWPA

forces. They were going to travel light.

Realizing that resupply would be easier

than it had been in past operations because

seas around the Philippines were now free

of large Japanese warships, the submarine

danger had lessened, and the Allies had

control of the skies (although there was still

the threat of kamikazes), Eichelberger's

G-4, Col. Henry C. Burgess, decided that

the VICTOR operations would be conducted

on a basis of only 15 days of Class II and

IV supply instead of the customary 30 or nance Procedures, 18 Mar 45, OHF. (3) Personal

Ltr, Col Becker to Gen Campbell, 1 Apr 45, OHF. 3

 (1) Ordnance Procedures, p. 26. (2) Ordnance Rpt, Rpt of the Commanding General

Eighth Army on the Nasugbu and Bataan Operations, p. 119.

4

 (1) Ltr, Col Ward E. Becker (USA Ret) to

Lida Mayo, 21 Sep 63, OCMH. (2) For the organization of the team, see above, p. 404.
THE PHILIPPINES: THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS 431

60. This seemed to General Eichelberger

a common-sense approach to the problem

of supply. In preceding campaigns the

difficulty in unloading ships had demonstrated that there was such a thing as oversupply. If an emergency arose in the

coming operations, supplies could be quickly

dispatched from Base K on Leyte or the

Eighth Army supply point on Mindoro by

FS boats.5

Palawan and Zamboanga

The main element of the Palawan Task

Force in the VICTOR III operation was the

186th Regimental Combat Team of the

41st Division. Since the rest of the division was to conduct the VICTOR IV operation against Zamboanga, the 41st's supporting Ordnance companies—the 741st

Ordnance Light Maintenance Company,

the backup 119th Ordnance Medium

Maintenance Company, the 623d Ordnance Ammunition Company, and a detachment of the 267th Maintenance (AA)

—were divided fairly evenly between

VICTOR III and VICTOR IV. The VICTOR

III force also had a bomb disposal squad,

which was not necessary for VICTOR IV

because the 623d Ammunition Company

had an organic bomb disposal squad—the

only ammunition company in the Southwest Pacific so organized. All staged from

San Jose, Mindoro, for it was at Mindoro

that the 41st had been stopped on its way

to Luzon and diverted to Eighth Army and

VICTOR. These two earliest VICTOR operations were of considerable interest to

Becker and his staff. Maj. Ray D. Vane

of the Eighth Army Ordnance Operations

Division was sent on VICTOR III as task

force Ordnance officer; and to VICTOR IV

Becker sent an observer, Maj. H. V. Flett

of the Canadian Army.6

Splitting the Ordnance companies between the two operations posed problems.

Because it was impractical to split the

third echelon tool sets of the 119th

Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company, nearly all the tools of the automotive

third echelon sets and about 75 percent of

the automotive men went to VICTOR III,

leaving only a small percentage for VICTOR

IV. As it turned out, most of the repair

work on Palawan was on vehicles. Weapons were no problem, for there was little

or no resistance: the few Japanese on the

island fled to the hills.7 The landing at

Puerto Princesa was accomplished without

opposition. Here the men of the 41st

Division (who called themselves the "Jungleers") saw the first town they had seen

in three years, with macadam streets,

churches, schools, and "real houses" in a

setting of brilliant bougainvillea; and, enjoying the luxury of once again sleeping

under a roof, got "great delight" (according to their historian) from "such simple,

everyday operations as turning on and off

water faucets and opening and closing

doors and windows."

 8

The VICTOR IV landing on Zamboanga

on 10 March 1945 (here called J-day) was

5

 (1) Eighth Army AdminO 6, 17 Feb 45, in

Eighth Army G-4 Jnl, VICTOR III. (2) Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, p. 233. (3) History Eighth Army Ord Sec, pp. 215-16.

6

 History Eighth Army Ord Sec, pp. 32-33,

215-16, 219. 7

 History 119th Ord Medium Maint Co, Opns

Rpt, VICTOR III and IV Operation, 20 Feb-20

Jun 45. 8

 William F. McCartney, The Jungleers: A History of The 41st Infantry Division (Washington:

Infantry Journal Press, 1948), p. 142.
432 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

not so easy. From the hills behind the

coastal plain the Japanese directed mortar

and artillery fire on the beaches and might

have done a great deal of damage if they

had had better aim and better ammunition.

All the Ordnance troops except for part of

the light maintenance company and the

bulk of the 119th's detachment, which

came in a week later, got ashore on J-day,

including a small detachment of the 3608th

Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company

(Tank) obtained from Sixth Army. By

nightfall the men were unloading ammunition in their dump area, which was on the

reverse slope of a small hill, screened from

enemy observation. However, the top of

the hill had a POL dump, easily observable

by the Japanese, who next morning hit the

dump and started a fire. Under the direction of the division Ordnance officer, Lt.

Col. Ward C. Howard, the Ordnance men

quickly moved their trucks to a safer area

and then returned with flame throwers

to burn off a firebreak and tractors to

build revetments. For his "quick thinking

and heroic action" during the emergency,

Colonel Howard was awarded the Oak

Leaf Cluster to the Bronze Star.9

Naval and air bombardment soon

silenced the enemy guns. The combat

troops moved inland and after a few days

of heavy fighting in the hills, by the end of

March had cleared the peninsula and were

moving down into the Sulu Archipelago.

During the operations on the Archipelago,

a l7-man contact party of the 741st Ordnance Light Maintenance Company, accompanying the 163d Regimental Combat

Team, set up a shop near the old Moro

City of Jolo, once beautiful but now in

ruins.10

The Central Visayan Islands

The islands south of Mindoro and west

of Leyte—Panay, Negros, Cebu, and

Bohol—were the richest part of the Philippines except for the area around Manila.

Cebu City was the second largest city in

the Philippines and Iloilo (capital of

Panay) the third. Along the coastal plains

were sugar plantations and sugar centrals;

in the interior were jungle-covered mountains to which the Japanese, if they followed their usual policy, might be expected

to retire. As it turned out, Panay and

Negros were already largely in the hands of

the guerrillas. When the 40th Division

landed on the southern coast of Panay in

the VICTOR I operation on 18 March, the

amphibious forces were greeted by guerrillas on the beach; and two days later when

the spearheading tankers reached Iloilo,

they found themselves surrounded by

laughing, cheering Filipinos throwing flowers. The Japanese had departed, after

setting fires that, along with American

bombing, left the city gutted; the ruins

were still blazing.11

The 40th Division was staged by Sixth

Army (in a reversal of the usual procedure

in which Eighth staged for Sixth). It

brought down from Luzon in addition to

its own organic Ordnance company (the

740th) the 259th Ordnance Medium

9

 (1) 41st Inf Division, Office of the Ord Officer,

16 Jan-27 Jun 45, Opns Rpt VICTOR IV Opn.

(2) History 741st Ord Co (Light Maint), 21

Jan-20 Jun 45. (3) History 623d Ord Ammunition Co, 10 Mar-20 Jun 45.

10

 History 741st Ord Co (Light Maint), 21 Jan20 Jun 45. 11

 Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, p.

209.
THE PHILIPPINES: THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS 433

Maintenance, detachments from the 558th

Ordnance Heavy Maintenance (Tank),

the 611th Ordnance Ammunition, and the

3073d Ordnance Composite (AA) Companies, and a bomb disposal squad, the

184th. They encountered no special Ordnance problems. Arriving in Iloilo on 22

March, the maintenance men set up an

Ordnance service center and were able to

find competent civilian mechanics to assist

them. The 259th also operated a civilian

garage, using Filipino mechanics, to repair

civilian vehicles that were found on the

island and that could be leased by Eighth

Army to relieve its transportation shortage.

For once, there was no shortage of automotive spare parts. The Panay operation

was highly successful; within eleven days

one battalion of the division was able to

handle the remaining Japanese forces.

The rest of the division was then free to

undertake the second part of VICTOR I, the

liberation of the westernmost part of the

neighboring island of Negros (Negros Occidental), making the short crossing on 29

March. In this operation the division took

only Ordnance contact teams to perform

emergency repairs. Disabled equipment

was evacuated by LCM's and other small

craft to the Iloilo Ordnance Service

Center.12

The Ordnance support for VICTOR II

against Cebu and neighboring eastern

Negros (Negros Oriental) and Bohol was

similar to that for VICTOR I. Here the

principal combat unit was the Americal

Division, coming from Leyte and depending on Base K for its supplies. It was supported by its organic maintenance company (the 721st), the 106th Ordnance

Medium Maintenance, the bulk of the

578th Ordnance Ammunition Company,

and a bomb disposal squad, the 183d. In

addition it had half of the antiaircraft

maintenance team that had gone in on

VICTOR I and a detachment of the same

tank maintenance company, the 558th,

that had a detachment on Panay.13

Within five minutes after the landing on

the east coast of Cebu at Talisay on 26

March (E-day), it was plain that the bomb

disposal and tank maintenance men were

going to have their work cut out for them.

The first assault wave had hardly hit the

beach when eight LVT's were knocked out

by land mines. These were not conventional land mines, but shells and bombs,

varying in size from 60-mm. mortar shells

to 250-pound aerial bombs, buried upright

at 10- to 15-foot intervals with the fuzes

protruding through the loamy, vine-covered surface. The mine field, about thirty

yards from the water's edge, stalled the

advance for about an hour and a half on

the narrow beach, the assault troops

crowded shoulder to shoulder, two and

three deep, until the Engineers could clear

a path through it.14

Nowhere in the Philippines had such

beach defenses been encountered. Nor

was this all. Roads leading inland and

into Cebu City were heavily mined, and

mines were found scattered throughout the

12

 (1) History Eighth Army Ord Sec, p. 33. (2)

Ordnance Rpt in Rpt of the Commanding General

Eighth Army on the Panay-Negros and Cebu

Operations, VICTOR I and II, pp. 152-53. (3)

Memo, Lt Col Deobald, Hq Eighth Army, for

Colonel Burgess, ACofS G-4 26 Mar 45, sub:

VICTOR-One Operation, Eighth Army G-4 Jnl and

Jnl File, Victor I. (4) History 740th Ord Co (Light

Maint), 29 Mar-30 June 45.

13

 History Eighth Army Ord Sec, p. 33. 14

 Rpt of the Commanding General Eighth Army

on the Panay-Negros and Cebu Operations, VICTOR

I and II, pp. 61-64.
434 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

hills to which the Japanese had retreated.15

And when on 1 April a small force crossed

Cebu Harbor and landed on Mactan

Island, four LVT's were lost to mines.

It was at Mactan that the great navigator

Ferdinand Magellan had met his death in

an amphibious operation on 28 April

1521.16

The bomb disposal squad, split into two

teams, was faced with a big task, but with

the help of disposal officers of the 57th Engineer Combat Battalion it performed a

real service in disarming the buried shells

and bombs and in removing American

parafrag and antipersonnel bombs, especially those that hung on trees and buildings and endangered artillery going into

position. The tank recovery teams were

exceedingly busy evacuating the LVT's

from the beaches at Talisay and Mactan

Island and bringing back damaged tanks.

The men had no tank transporters and had

discovered that the l0-ton wrecker was inadequate for handling armored vehicles,

but they managed by combining the

wrecker with a tank or tractor.17 It was

dangerous work. On 13 April a recovery

crew composed of men from the 106th

Medium Maintenance Company and the

558th's tank maintenance detachment came

under heavy enemy mortar, machine gun

and sniper fire when they went after a tank

hit by a mine on top of a hill near Go

Chan Hill. After retiring and taking

cover, they saw that two infantrymen were

lying on the hill seriously wounded. Sgt.

Thorban H. Murray, Technician 5 James

E. Newland, and Technician 5 John E.

Noud returned to the hilltop and rescued

the infantrymen under continuous enemy

fire. All received the Silver Star.18

Cebu City, sometimes called "Little

Manila," was almost as battered as its

namesake. Heavy billows of smoke could

be seen for miles. An Eighth Army G-4

officer looking for warehouse space found

the city a wreck, its roofs pitted with holes,

so that it was a problem to get supplies and

equipment out of the weather.19 The

578th Ordnance Ammunition Company

found an ingenious solution to this problem.

Having landed early on E-day and set up

dumps, first on Talisay Beach and then at

Mabolo north of the city (until infiltrating

Japanese caused uneasiness about the possibility of fires being started), the company

moved the ammunition to the railroad depot in Cebu City and put the ammunition

in boxcars. This not only protected it

from rain but contributed to safety, because

the cars could be dispersed throughout the

railroad yards.20

As no depot company was included in

the operation, the 106th Ordnance

Medium Maintenance Company had to set

up the army supply point. The company's

advance supply platoon (reinforced) was

in Cebu City on E plus 2, but before the

rest of the company got there two resupply

15

 Ibid. 16

 (1) History 106th Ord Medium Maint Co,

Apr 45. (2) Charles McKew Parr, So Noble a

Captain (New York, 1953), pp. 358-62. (3) War

Diary-Journal, 1-3 April 1945, in 57th Engr Combat Bn Historical Record, Eighth Army VICTOR II

Operation, 26 Mar 45-20 Jun 45, OCE. 17

 History Eighth Army Ord Sec, VICTOR II

Operations Rpt, pp. 238, 242.

18

 History 106th Ord Medium Maint Co, Apr

45.

19

 Ltr, Bill Underhill to Lt Col Corrigan, no

date, no sub, Eighth Army G-4 Jnl and Jnl Files,

VICTOR II. Underhill also reported regretfully that

the distillery had been destroyed by the Japanese

and there was no "bonafide liquor" in the area. 20

 (1) History Eighth Army Ord Sec, p. 244.

(2) Ord Rpt in Rpt of CG Eighth Army on the

Panay-Negros and Cebu Opns, p. 152.
THE PHILIPPINES: THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS 435

ships came in, one from Leyte, the other

from the United States, and the Ordnance

men were swamped at the outset. In order

to get the supply point operating, the platoon had to borrow men from the company's advance automotive and armament

platoons to bring the ships' cargoes to the

supply point from the docks, where they

had been unloaded by men from the 721st

Ordnance Light Maintenance Company.

When the bulk of the 106th arrived on 3

April, it built shelters for its stocks and

shops with the help of fifty Filipino

laborers.21

On 10 May USASOS Floating Depot 9

arrived in the harbor from Leyte, but it

turned out to be not much help on the

supply problem. The 106th's supply platoon, having been notified by Eighth Army

that all requisitions submitted to Base K at

Leyte after 10 April would be processed by

the barge, had canceled all unfilled requisitions then on hand. The barge, however,

could not fill any of these requisitions and

did not have enough stock to bring the

army supply point to the established level.

Then began the weary process of re-requisitioning from Base K. On 15 June, Base S

was established at Cebu.22

Between 11 April and 20 June Eighth

Army completed its central Visayan campaign by sending out combat teams to clear

Bohol and southeastern Negros (Negros

Oriental). They were supplied from Cebu

and were accompanied by ammunition detachments and maintenance contact teams.

The teams, the Americal Division Ordnance officer reported, had benefited from

lessons learned at Leyte and Samar and

were more effective in this operation than

any in the past.23

Mindanao

The last landings in the Philippines took

place on Mindanao, where MacArthur had

originally intended to begin his Philippines

campaign before optimism in September

1944 had brought about the decision to

make the long jump to Leyte.24 Mindanao

was huge, mountainous, primitive, and

thinly populated, with a large percentage

of its population the Moros that had given

the U.S. Army so much trouble a generation before. It had only one city worthy

of the name—Davao, at the head of Davao

Gulf, which indents the southern coast.

Eichelberger had wanted to make a direct

amphibious landing in Davao Gulf as the

quickest way of ending the campaign, for

here were located large concentrations of

Japanese. But by early spring of 1945

when the assault was planned, the Okinawa

campaign was in progress and the Navy

did not feel it could provide adequate protection for such an ambitious expedition.

Therefore Army planners decided to land

on the western coast at Illana Bay and

march overland to Davao, putting the 24th

Division ashore at Malabang on 17 April

(R-day), and the 31st in the same area

on 22 April.25

21

 (1) History Eighth Army Ord Sec, pp. 240-

41. (2) History 106th Ord Medium Maint Co,

Apr 45. 22

 (1) For the history of USASOS Floating

Depot 9, see above, ch XVIII, p. 11. (2) History

Eighth Army Ord Sec, pp. 244-45.

23

 History Eighth Army Ord Sec, pp. 244-46. 24

 Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines,

P. 9. 25

 Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo,

p. 218.
436 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

The Landing on lllana Bay

The Mindanao landing differed in two

respects from any other amphibious operation in the Philippines. One was the

greater use of small landing craft: no large

Navy transports were involved. The beach

at Malabang was suitable only for small

craft. A shore-to-shore operation from

Zamboanga, on the other side of Moro

Gulf, was planned. Though Zamboanga

was a peninsula of Mindanao, for purposes

of military planning it was not considered

a part of Mindanao but rather an island,

for the mountains between the peninsula

and the mainland were so steep that the

principal contact had always been by

boat.26

The 533d Engineer Boat and Shore

Regiment, in charge of the landing, swung

its LCVP's from the davits of LST's and

made the daring (and as it developed later,

very fortunate) decision to bring down from

Lingayen and Mindoro to Zamboanga a

huge fleet of little LCM's, under their own

power. Ninety-nine of them, some carrying a DUKW or a truck, made the 338-

mile voyage nonstop, each boat carrying

enough fuel drums to keep it going. Luckily the trip was blessed with good weather

and glassy seas, and all the boats arrived at

"Zambo" in time for the men aboard to

spend several days preparing for the invasion, resting up and getting acquainted

with the Moros. While they were at Zamboanga they received a message from the

flagship of the naval convoy that the landing would not be made at Malabang but

at Parang, twenty miles down the west

coast of Mindanao.27

The last-minute change in the assault

plan was the second circumstance that

distinguished VICTOR V. Planners had always considered that an amphibious operation, once launched, could no more be redirected than an arrow once the bowstring

was released. For the decision to do so

there were compelling reasons. While at

sea, the task force commanders received

word from Col. Wendell W. Fertig, head

of the guerrilla forces on Mindanao, that

Malabang was already in the hands of the

guerrillas. The task force therefore decided to send only a battalion to Malabang

and to make the main landing at Parang.

Recognizing that the risk in the change in

plans would affect the Engineer boat and

shore regiment most of all, the commander

of the 24th Division preceded the announcement of the decision with the words,

"We will now have one minute of silent

prayer for the 533d."

 28

 Miraculously, all

of the assault waves landed on schedule on

the right beach on the morning of R-day,

17 April, and met no opposition except for

a small sniper party.29

A 68-man detachment of the 578th Ordnance Ammunition Company was aboard

an LST in the bay on R-day, watching the

bombing and naval bombardment. The

men got ashore next day, but had hardly

started to build bays for the Parang dump

and to segregate ammunition on a roundthe-clock basis (setting up a generator to

provide light, so they could work at night),

when they were sent forward. First a

small detachment went to Cotabato to set

up a dump in support of fast-moving X

Corps troops and a few days later the rest

26

 Ibid., pp. 216-17. 27

 Surf and Sand, pp. 163-67.

28

 Surf and Sand, p. 168. 29

 (1) Ibid., p. 171. (2) Eichelberger, Our

Jungle Road to Tokyo, p. 219.
THE PHILIPPINES: THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS 437

of the men went up the Mindanao River

in LCM's on an 11 -hour trip to Fort Pikit

in the interior.30

Inland Support by Water and Air

The river expedition into the interior

was one of the most interesting features of

the Mindanao campaign—an operation

suggesting to many the Federal gunboats

operating on the Mississippi in the Civil

War. Immediately on landing at Parang,

a regimental combat team of the 24th Division had started overland on Highway 1

for Fort Pikit, and soon discovered that the

highway was little more than an overgrown

trail and that the Japanese had blown

nearly all the bridges. There was also a

water route into the interior. Parallel to

the highway as far as Fort Pikit (thirty-five

miles by land, about eighty-six by water)

meandered the muddy Mindanao River.

Little was known about it, but the Engineers believed they could navigate it with

their shallow-draft landing craft. Some of

their LCM's already had rockets, others

were now converted to gunboats with light

and medium artillery and designated

LCMG's. The little flotilla, which included a number of LCM's and LCVP's

carrying troops of the 21st Infantry,

started upriver on R plus 1, attacking river

towns, from most of which the Japanese

appeared to have recently fled, and being

met along the way by canoes filled with

cheering guerrillas or curious Moros.31

At first the voyage seemed to the Engineers "a pleasant novelty—fascinating

scenery, cheery greetings from each barrio,

and dead calm, but a little went a long

way. The heat was the most oppressive

the men had experienced overseas, night

runs were a terrific strain on the helmsmen,

and snags and flotsam caused much damage."

 32

 By 21 April when the river force

was at Peidu Pulangi, where the Mindanao

River becomes the Pulangi, it was some

twenty miles in advance of the overland

force moving up Highway 1 and had been

reinforced by two battalions of the 34th

Infantry and three Navy PGM's (patrol

gunboats, medium), which were converted

submarine chasers. The unit commanders

of the river force sent part of the infantry

overland to Fort Pikit and proceeded with

the rest by water around a wide bend in

the river. The landing craft got there first.

The gunboats had to fall back because

they could not get past the wreckage of a

bridge (formerly carrying Highway 1 over

the river) ; therefore the glory of taking

Fort Pikit belonged to the crews of the

LCMG's. They overran the fort that

gave the place its name—an old Filipino

constabulary fort—and when the infantrymen arrived they saw atop its square stone

tower the American flag flying from a

boathook. Between 20 and 28 April the

amphibian engineers managed to ferry

three regimental combat teams to Pikit.

Later the river became the main supply

route into the interior.33

30

 History 578th Ord Ammunition Co (VICTOR

V, Opn), 12 Apr-30 Jun 45. 31

 (1) Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo,

pp. 220-21. (2) Morison, The Liberation of the

Philippines, pp. 244-46. (3) Engineers of SWPA

IV, pp. 642-43. (4) Hq X Corps, G-4 Historical

Report of the VICTOR V Operation, 17 Apr 45 to 30

Jun 45, pp. 7-9.

32

 Surf and Sand, p. 187. 33

 (1) Engineers of SWPA IV, p. 647. (2) Surf

and Sand, p. 185. (3) Hq X Corps, G-4 Historical

Rpt, p. 8. (4) History Eighth Army Ord Sec, p.

252. (5) Ltr, Col Charles E. Brokaw to Col Burgess, 10 May 45, no sub, Eighth Army G-4 Jnl

and File VICTOR V, Book II.
438 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

The substitution of water transportation

for motor transport was a blessing to the

Ordnance maintenance men because it relieved them for the first two or three weeks

of the usual heavy burden of truck repair.

At Parang, on the coast, X Corps' 194th

Ordnance Battalion, landing on 22 April

with the 310th Ordnance Depot Company,

the 642d Ordnance Ammunition Company, and detachments of the 291st Ordnance Medium Maintenance and 3608th

Heavy Maintenance (Tank) Companies,

could devote its attention to setting up the

Parang Ordnance Service Center on a hillside near the remains of Fort Mago, which

was built in 1900. The service center

was on the site of old Camp Luna, whose

concrete sidewalks and barracks floors,

found in cornfields and potato fields, were

useful to the maintenance and depot men.

The 642d took over the dump left by the

578th and soon had its hands full dealing

with the ammunition that came in with the

31st Division, which also landed on 22

April.34

By the end of the first week in May

the Ordnance battalion at Parang had been

bolstered by the arrival of the 509th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company

(FA), the 108th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company, and the rest of the

291st. By then it had become necessary

to send medium maintenance men forward

to support the 24th and 31st Divisions.35

The 24th Division, having seized the important road junction at Kabacan about

nine miles north of Pikit where Highway 1

joins Sayre Highway (which runs northward almost 150 miles to Macajalar Bay

on Mindanao's north coast), then turned

south on Highway 1, captured Digos on

Davao Gulf, pushed north via Talomo and,

entering Davao on 3 May, attacked the concentration of Japanese in the hills north of

the city. The 31st Division, sent forward to

Kabacan, was advancing up Sayre Highway—a highway in name only, the men

discovered, for at times it disappeared in

quagmires and toward the north became

hardly more than a mountain trail. The

trail here was cut by gorges that were not

only deep but bridgeless, for the Japanese

had destroyed the ramshackle wooden

bridges that formerly spanned them.

In the 24th Division's sector the 108th

Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company

was sent to the Davao area to back up the

724th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company. The 108th made the trip by water

on LST's around the southern coast of

Mindanao, landing at Talomo on 7 May,

and remaining in the Davao area until the

end of the campaign. Trucks were sent

back to Parang for parts and supplies until

the rainy season set in and the overland

route became impassable; thereafter the

supplies came by water or by air.

Ordnance bomb disposal men, urgently

needed after the 24th Division reached

Digos, arrived by air. At the beginning of

the Mindanao campaign plans based on

previous experience in the Pacific with unexploded bombs and shells had allotted one

squad to each division—the 181st to the

24th Division and the 182d to the 31st.

But as the 24th Division approached

Davao, it found that (as at Cebu) the

Japanese were using buried bombs and

artillery shells as mines. Mine clearance

was an Engineer function, but the removal

34

 (1) History Eighth Army Ord Sec, p. 255.

(2) History 194th Ord Bn. (3) History 310th

Ord Depot Co, Mar-Jun 45. 35

 History 194th Ord Bn.
THE PHILIPPINES: THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS 439

LCM CARRYING TROOPS UP MINDANAO RIVER TO FORT PIKIT

and disposal of bombs and shells belonged

to Ordnance. The 181st, an excellent

squad, did what it could, but had to have

help. Three additional squads were

brought in by air—one of them the unique

squad belonging to the 623d Ordnance

Ammunition Company.36

The 31st Division depended for Ordnance support in its arduous advance mainly on its 731st Ordnance Light Maintetenance Company, which did not arrive at

Parang until 3 May, though small contact

teams had accompanied the division's regimental combat teams. When the light

maintenance company did arrive, it was

dispatched to a point twelve miles north of

Kabacan, and stayed there two weeks,

until the road beyond was made passable

for trucks as well as jeeps. When the

company moved on, division ordered to

Kabacan, to help with the very heavy automotive repair job, a 33-man detachment

from the 108th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company on Davao Gulf. In the

36

 (1) Opn Rpt 108th Ord Medium Maint Co

(Mindanao Campaign), 11 Mar 43-30 Jun 45. (2)

History Eighth Army Ord Sec, 255-57, 259. (3)

Location of Service Units, 22 May 45, Eighth

Army G-4 Jnl, and File VICTOR V, Book II.
440 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

meantime, a 20-man maintenance team

from the 291st Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company had been sent from

Parang to serve corps troops at the small

inland base set up at the end of the river

supply route at Pikit, from which supplies

were trucked nine miles forward to Kabacan.37

Because the condition of Sayre Highway

did not permit truck haulage, the 31st

Division had to be supplied by air. Ammunition was carried from Parang across

Illana Bay by boat to Malabang, then

trucked to Malabang airfield for airlift to

the front. At first, until the capture of

Maramag airstrip near Sayre Highway the

second week in May, supplies had to be

airdropped. For ammunition, parachutes

were used whenever possible, but the parachute supply was soon exhausted and much

of the ammunition was free-dropped—an

extremely wasteful measure, for only about

30 percent was recoverable, and about half

of that recovered was so damaged that it

was unusable.38

The Move to Macajalar Bay

The problem of supplying the 31st Division as it advanced slowly and painfully up

Sayre Highway was compounded by the

heavy seasonal rains. The roads on the

150-mile overland route from Parang to

the upper valley were washed out by torrential downpours; Sayre Highway broke

down under the weight of army vehicles;

at times supplies had to be carried forward

by plodding Carabao. General Eichelberger decided that the time had come to

establish a new supply base on the north

coast of Mindanao at Bugo on Macajalar

Bay. From there supplies could be moved

by a fairly good road sixteen miles inland

to Del Monte airfield and flown to the

various airfields along the highway.39

On the morning of 10 May 1945 (called

Q-day), a task force composed mainly of

the 40th Division's 108th Regimental

Combat Team (to be reinforced 14 May

by a battalion from the Americal Division)

landed against light opposition near Bugo

and five days later had secured Del Monte

airfield.

Del Monte, really a complex of several

fields, had haunting associations with the

fall of the Philippines. Here, early in December 1941, a hasty attempt had been

made to expand a landing strip into a

heavy bomber base for some of the B-17's

at Clark Field, on Luzon, a heroic effort

to which two Ordnance aviation companies had made valiant contributions—

the 701st Air Base and the 440th Bombardment, sent to Mindanao from Clark Field

ahead of the bombers. One detachment,

preparing to sail at the time of Pearl Harbor, was aboard ship in Manila Bay when

Nichols Field was bombed, and had a hairraising journey from Luzon through dangerous waters; another lost three men in

the sinking of the Corregidor, which was

struck by a floating mine. The men who

did arrive safely at Del Monte found them37

 (1) History 731st Ord Light Maint Co, V-5

Opn (Central Mindanao), 19 Apr-30 Jun 1945.

(2) History 291st Ord Medium Maint Co, 10

Mar-Jul 45. (3) History Eighth Army Ord Sec,

PP. 253, 256-57. (4) Ltr, Brokaw to Burgess, 10

May 45, no sub, Eighth Army G-4 Jnl and File

VICTOR V, Book II. 38

 (1) Hq X Corps G-4 Historical Rpt, Incl 6,

Ord Rpt, pp. 6-7. (2) Peifer, Supply by Sky, pp.

52-54.

39

 (1) Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo,

p. 230. (2) Eighth Army Operational Monograph

on the Mindanao Operation, 11 Apr-Jun 45, p. 46.
THE PHILIPPINES: THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS 441

selves living under conditions of extreme

hardship and in danger from Japanese

bombing attacks. Since there were no

antiaircraft weapons on Mindanao, they

built mounts for .50-caliber machine guns

salvaged from wrecked aircraft, and ended

by manning about half of them. In late

December the B-17's took off for a safer

base in Australia and thereafter Del Monte

was used only as a base for an occasional

bombing raid (and for General MacArthur's last stop on his way to Australia).

With the arrival of Brig. Gen. William F.

Sharp's Visayan-Mindanao Force, which

was poorly equipped and had no Ordnance

support, the aviation Ordnance men took

on the task of repairing ground weapons and

made antitank mines by filling pineapple

juice cans with dynamite and improvising a

firing mechanism. In May 1942 the Japanese came.40

Not far from the American landings on

Macajalar Bay in May 1945 was the great

Del Monte pineapple plantation—where

Trillions of pineapples had lain rotting after

the arrival of the Japanese. In the beach

area the old canning plant was still partly

usable for storing rations, and a concrete

unloading dock built by the Del Monte

Company was helpful in beach operations,

inland at Del Monte airfield the detachnent of the 623d Ordnance Ammunition

Company that had accompanied the task

force began setting up a dump; and when

detachments of the 106th Ordnance

Medium Maintenance and 558th Ordlance Heavy Maintenance (Tank) ComDanies came in on Q plus 5, they established

their shops in the same area. All had their

troubles. The maintenance men were immediately busy with repair work caused by

accidents on the narrow, winding, slippery

roads and with maintaining engineer equipment for which no maintenance provision

had been made. The ammunition men

suffered from lack of dunnage and the

scarcity of civilian labor. The operation

had been hastily mounted. Supply figures

had not been entirely accurate and airdrops had to be resorted to not only for

ammunition but for automotive parts.41

In late May the base at Parang began

its movement to the Bugo—Del Monte area

on Macajalar Bay. Following the pattern

of most Mindanao supply operations, the

move was accomplished mainly by water.

Part of the 291st Ordnance Medium

Maintenance Company, which had been

carrying the maintenance load at Parang,

made the two-day voyage around Zamboanga on three LSM's loaded with about

half the company, 7 trucks, 21 trailers, and

90 tons of supplies. The rest of the men

in the company with 21 vehicles made the

trip by LST to Malabang and then traveled overland by wretched roads to the

northern coast at Illigan, where LCM's

ferried them to Bugo. The whole journey

took about as long as the trip around Zamboanga. The greatest problem for Ordnance was moving the 310th Depot Company with its 1,500 tons of stock. The

"Ordnance Navy" came to the rescue.

Floating Depot 9, which had been brought

from Cebu, was loaded with about 750

40

 (1) Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 187-88,

.20-22, 406-07, 418. (2) Ltr, Maj Victor C.

Huffsmith to Brig Gen Earl McFarland, 20 Nov

.2, no sub, Folder, Troop Units Reports, Miscelineous Reports, OHF.

41

 (1) Edward Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre in

Mindanao (New York: Longmans, 1946), p. 65.

The guerrillas had run their automobiles on alcohol distilled from the pineapples. Ibid. (2) Ltr,

Gardner to Burgess, 20 May 45, no sub, Eighth

Army G-4 Jnl and File VICTOR V, Book II. (3)

History Eighth Army Ord Sec, pp. 261-62.
442 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

tons of parts and on its deck carried the

depot's knocked-down prefabricated buildings. The rest of the stock was sandwiched in on Libertys, LST's, LSM's, and

any other available shipping. Most of the

men went overland in company and replacement vehicles, following the same

route taken by the maintenance company.

In mid-June the new Ordnance service

center was being set up on a grassy plateau

about two miles from the beach near

Bugo.42

By that time the campaign in Mindanao

was virtually over. The 108th Infantry,

in a rapid advance down Sayre Highway

slowed only by supply problems, made contact with the 31st Division on the afternoon

of 23 May. After a period of mop-up

and pursuit, including a landing on the

northeastern coast at the Agusan River,

General Eichelberger declared the Mindanao operation closed on 30 June 1945.

Some encounters with the enemy continued

in minor operations such as a landing to

clear the Sarangani Bay area on 4 July;

but except in remote parts of Mindanao

and in northern Luzon, organized resistance by the Japanese in the Philippines

was at an end.

On 1 July 1945 in preparation for the

invasion of Japan a drastic regrouping of

forces took place, which affected Ordnance

as well as combat units. Except on Mindanao, almost all of the Ordnance units

on the southern islands and all on Luzon,

except the minimum required to operate

USASOS (now redesignated AFWESPAC)

bases, went to Sixth Army, which was to

spearhead the coming invasion in Operation OLYMPIC. In order to allow Sixth

Army time to get ready for OLYMPIC,

Eighth Army was to take over in northern

Luzon. After OLYMPIC, Eighth was to

combine with Tenth Army in a massive

assault on Japan called CORONET.43 These

ambitious plans were made possible by the

success of a bloody campaign waged by

Tenth Army throughout the spring of 1945

to conquer Okinawa, the big island in the

Ryukyu chain that lay far to the north of

Luzon, at the threshold of Japan.

42

 (1) History 291st Ord Medium Maint Co, 10

Mar-Jul 45. (2) History 310th Ord Depot Co,

Mar-Jun 45. (3) History 194th Ord Bn. (4)

History Eighth Army Ord Sec, p. 257. (3) Hq X

Corps, G-4 Historical Rpt, Incl 6, Ord Rpt, p. 2. 43

 History Eighth Army Ord Sec, pp. 35-36.
CHAPTER XXIII

Boldly Aiming at Okinawa

Farewell, dear Isle!—on thee may ne'er

The breath of civil discord blow!

Far from your shores be every fear,

And far—oh! far—the invading foe!

So wrote Mr. Gillard, an officer of His

Britannic Majesty's Ship Alceste, when his

ship set sail on 27 October 1816 from

Okinawa. During a sojourn of more than

a month on the island, officers and men of

the Alceste and her sister ship the Lyra had

been enchanted by the landscape, the low,

pine-crowned hills, the valleys of cultivated

fields and meandering rivers with pretty

villages and villas on their banks surrounded by brilliant foliage, the picturesque houses of the capital city of Shuri

rising row on row to the summit of a hill

crowned by the king's palace embowered

in lofty trees.

Most of all, they had been charmed by

the people of Okinawa, so gentle and hospitable, who had come out in canoes to

welcome them, bringing jars of fresh water

and baskets of boiled sweet potatoes and

fish. The Englishmen, who had recently

been subjected to what they considered the

"cold repulsive manners" of the Koreans

and the "boorishness" of the Chinese mandarins, responded gratefully and during

their stay established friendships most unusual in the annals of nineteenth century

voyages. When the time came to say

good-bye, the bearded noblemen of Okinawa in their long girdled robes and flat

turbans were so choked with tears that

they could not speak as they presented farewell gifts of pipes, fans, and knives to the

"Engelees." Weighing anchor, the British

sailors saw vast crowds assembled on the

heights above the harbor. Their last

glimpse of the island was of people standing on the sea wall beating gongs and

waving umbrellas, handkerchiefs, and fans.1

Notwithstanding Mr. Gillard's fervent

wish, the invading foe was never very far

from the shores of his "dear Isle" after

Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry by

his visit to Okinawa in 1853 alerted Japan

to the possibility of foreign aggression at

her doorstep. Okinawa, the central island

in the Ryukyu chain extending from

Japan to Formosa, is only about 350 miles

south of the southernmost Japanese province of Kyushu. The most likely aggressor

was China, to which for centuries the government of the Ryukyu (known to the

Chinese as Liu Ch'iu) Islands had paid

tribute and to which its people had close

ties, being by blood a mixture of Chinese,

Malay, and Ainu strains. Alarmed by the

claims of the Chinese to the islands in the

1870's, the Japanese announced their annexation of the Ryukyus and in 1879 deposed the king, sent in troops to occupy

1

 George H. Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an

Island People (Rutland, Vt.: C. E. Tuttle Co.,

1958), pp. 252-58. For a picture of the scene at

the sea wall see Plate 15, p. 262.
444 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Shuri castle, meeting only passive resistance,

and made the Ryukyus a prefecture of

Japan. The islands contributed little to

the Japanese economy; the people were

poor, looked down upon by the Japanese

as backward rustics; the prime value of

Okinawa (the great island or "Great

Loochoo") was as a bastion to the defenses

of the Japanese homeland.2

A Strongly Fortified Island

In the spring of 1944 the Japanese

strongly fortified the island, pouring in

troops, building airfields, and conscripting

all able-bodied Okinawans for the army

proper or a 20,000-man Okinawa Home

Guards force. The preparations were accelerated in midsummer 1944 after the

capture of the Marianas in the Central

Pacific by the American forces. Concluding that the Americans were now "boldly

aiming" at Okinawa, the Japanese constructed extensive fortifications in the caves

on the southern part of the island, arming

them with more and better artillery than

they had ever before employed in the

Pacific.3

The Americans were indeed aiming at

Okinawa. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in

the directive dated 3 October 1944 ordering General MacArthur to seize and

occupy Luzon, ordered Admiral Nimitz,

Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas,

to invade the Ryukyus. For this operation, called ICEBERG, Nimitz had ample

resources. For the assault on Okinawa,

an island only 60 miles long and from 2

to 18 miles wide, and the seizure of small

offshore islands, he had more combat

troops than MacArthur had for the Lingayen landings on Luzon. With supporting

elements drawn from the Southwest Pacific,

the South Pacific, and even from the

European theater (made possible by the

late landing date, finally fixed at 1 April

1945), ICEBERG was to bring together the

greatest concentration of land, sea, and air

forces ever used in the Pacific. Supply

was plentiful, assured by the decision at

the Washington Conference in May 1943,

TRIDENT, that the Central Pacific would

have priority over the Southwest Pacific

in the advance on Japan.4

The Advance in the Central

Pacific

Until Okinawa, the Central Pacific had

been mainly a Navy theater, with the

Marine Corps carrying most of the burden

of the amphibious and ground fighting.

In the first large-scale campaign, that

against the Gilberts and Marshalls beginning 20 November 1943 and ending 2

February 1944, a regimental combat team

of the 27th Infantry Division (which had

been doing garrison duty in Hawaii since

March 1942) was employed on Makin,

Kwajalein, and Eniwetok; and the 7th

Division (which had arrived in Hawaii

from the Aleutians in mid-September

1943) was used at Kwajalein; but all

Army units were attached to the Marine V 2

 Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island

People, pp. 354, 381-82, 459, 463-66. 3

 Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A.

Gugeler, and John Stevens, Okinawa: The Last

Battle, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1948), pp. 85-92. Unless

otherwise indicated, this chapter is based on this

source.

4

 (1) Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 29.

(2) Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love, Seizure

of the Gilberts and Marshalls, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington,

1955), pp. 12-14.
BOLDLY AIMING AT OKINAWA 445

Amphibious Corps commanded by Lt.

Gen. Holland M. Smith; and at Tarawa,

the hardest battle of the campaign, there

were no Army combat troops. The second

campaign, fought in the Marianas between

15 June and 10 August 1944, was also

largely a Marine Corps show, under V and

III Amphibious Corps, with Marine generals commanding the landing forces on

Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, and Lt. Gen.

Holland M. Smith in over-all command.

Here the Army combat elements were the

27th Division and the 77th Division—the

first operation for the 77th, which had

arrived in Hawaii from the United States

during April and May 1944. Also used

in the Marianas were artillery battalions of

XXIV Corps, the only Army corps in the

Central Pacific, organized in Hawaii in

1944. The corps was originally intended

for the campaign in the Western Carolines

(the Palaus and Ulithi Atoll), 15 September to 24 November 1944, but the plans

were changed; the first operation for

XXIV Corps was to be Leyte. An Army

division, the 81st, participated in the Western Carolines, but it was under the Marine

III Amphibious Corps.5

These campaigns to capture small islands

(brief actions except in the Palaus) differed greatly, as may be imagined, from

the long haul up the New Guinea coast in

the Southwest Pacific. For such operations, the Ordnance support that could be

provided by the divisions' own light maintenance companies was generally sufficient,

with the assistance of small detachments of

tank mechanics and ammunition men sent

forward from Hawaii.6 After the Gilberts

and Marshalls campaign, the 7th and 27th

Divisions were returned to Hawaii for rest

and for rehabilitation of their equipment.

In the Marianas, heavy matériel such as

guns, tanks, and LVT's was sent back for

overhaul in the Ordnance shops on Oahu.

Ammunition left over from these island

operations and excess to the needs of the

garrison forces was either moved forward

to new operations or returned to Oahu for

renovation.7

The Hawaiian Base

There had been an Ordnance organization in Hawaii since 1913, when a depot

was sent out from Benicia Arsenal in California to Fort Kamehameha on the southern coast of Oahu. During World War I,

the Hawaiian Ordnance Depot was moved

to Fort Shafter, near Honolulu, and a few

years later it also had a maintenance company and a depot detachment at Schofield

Barracks in the interior. After Pearl Harbor, all types of Ordnance service at both

locations were considerably expanded. By

the time the big push in the Central Pacific

got under way in late 1943, two Ordnance

centers were in operation, one at Schofield

to serve the North Sector of Oahu, the

other at Shafter to serve the South Sector.

There was also, because of the changeover

of motor transport from Quartermaster to

5

 Army participation in the Central Pacific campaigns is described in the following volumes of

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR

II: Philip A. Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas

(Washington, 1960); Crowl and Love, Seizure

of the Gilberts and Marshalls; and Smith, The Approach to the Philippines.

6

 (1) History 81st Ord Co (Heavy Maint)

(Tank), APO 957, 1 Jan 44-31 Mar 44. (2) History 68th Ord Ammunition Co, Okinawa Opn, AprJun 45. 7

 Report of Visit to Pacific Ocean Area by Brig

Gen Julian S. Hatcher, 9 September-12 October

1944: Hawaiian Islands, Saipan, Tinian and Guam

(hereafter cited as Hatcher Rpt).
446 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Ordnance in mid-1942, a sizable Ordnance

Automotive Depot, divided between the

two locations. The main ammunition

storage area was at Aliamanu Crater

(where maximum use was made of tunnels

dug into the mountains), with subdepots

at Diamond Head and Ulupau and another planned for Ewa.8

Not until July 1944 was there a communications zone organization in the Central Pacific. When Lt. Gen. Robert C.

Richardson, Jr., assumed the top Army job

in the area—that of Commanding General,

United States Army Forces, Central Pacific

Area (USAFICPA)—in June 1943, he

appointed a board to study the communications zone problem and on its recommendation decided to stick to the conventional general and special staff, with a

limited number of support functions assigned to an Army Port and Service Command. As his chief Ordnance officer he

selected Col. Francis A. Englehart, chief of

the Military Plans and Organization

Branch, Field Service, Office of the Chief

of Ordnance, who had been recommended

by the Chief of Ordnance as "a very sincere, earnest and hard-working officer."

A few months after Englehart's arrival in

mid-January 1944, General Richardson

reported that he was "taking hold of the

Ordnance in his accustomed efficient manner with excellent results."9

At the time Richardson assumed command, the Hawaiian Islands had a defensive mission. Feeling that this role would

have to be changed immediately to one of

preparations for offensive operations, he

instituted a vigorous training program,

establishing a Unit Jungle Training Center

in two Oahu valleys, and even (in anticipation of amphibious operations) a school

to teach swimming. As the pace of the

war in the Pacific accelerated beginning in

1944, the job of training increased, and also

the task of seeing that the new divisions

staging in Hawaii on their way to action

were properly equipped. On 1 July 1944

General Richardson, whose command on 1

August was to be redesignated U.S. Army

Forces Pacific Ocean Areas (USAFPOA),

established the Central Pacific Base Command (CPBC), giving it responsibility not

only for the defense of Hawaiian and adjacent islands but also for logistical support

and planning for Army units stationed or

staging in Hawaii and for the maintenance

of supply levels at advance bases as directed. The Central Pacific Base Command did not include units and installations

assigned to the forward areas, and in this

respect differed sharply from United States

Army Services of Supply in the Southwest

Pacific. Also, because of the growing

practice of direct shipment from the United

States to forward areas without a stop in

Hawaii, the most important front-line supply function of Central Pacific Base Com8

 (1) Ordnance History: Extracts, History of

the Hawaiian Department and Historical Records

74th Ordnance Company (Depot), June 1, 1913-

June 30, 1939. (2) Historical Rpts Hawaiian

Ordnance Depot, 1941-43. (3) Organization and

History of Ordnance Automotive Depot, August 1,

1942 to June 30, 1943. (4) History Hq 17th Ord

Bn, 21 Apr 44. (5) Ltr, Maj Harold A. Strohman,

Hq Ord Depot, to Ord Officer, HUSAFIGPA, 12

Apr 44, sub: Historical Report Quarter Ended 31

March 1944, Folder, Headquarters Ordnance Depot, USAFICPA, OHF. (6) Memo, Col William

C. Crosby for Director of Supply, ASF, 12 Dec 44,

sub: Report on Trip to Pacific Ocean Areas, apps.

to Storage Operations December 1941-December

1945, ASF Historical Monograph, app. I.

9

 (1) Rpt of Lt. Gen. Brehon Somervell on Central Pacific Area, 13 Sep 43, OCMH. (2) Ltrs,

Campbell to Richardson, 22 Jan 44. no sub;

Richardson to Campbell, 13 May 44, no sub.

Campbell Overseas File, OHF.
BOLDLY AIMING AT OKINAWA 447

mand in the later campaigns was to act as

an emergency supply point. After the

Marianas campaign, plans were made for

a Western Pacific Base Command at

Saipan (about 3,500 miles west of Oahu)

to provide faster emergency service, but it

was not activated until 25 April 1945—

almost a month after the Okinawa landings. On Okinawa, base development was

to be the responsibility of Tenth Army.10

Tenth Army Plans and Preparations

Tenth Army, activated in the United

States in June 1944, the only field army

employed in Central Pacific operations,

was in several respects different from armies

in other theaters. Organized not only for

combat but also for base operation and

development, it was a joint force composed

of Navy and Marine units as well as

Army, and was employed under the operational direction of Admiral Nimitz. Its

commanding general was commonly referred to as COMGENTEN, according to

Navy usage. At the same time, Tenth

Army was under the administrative direction of General Richardson for all Army

units assigned to it.11 The command relationships (never satisfactory to General

Richardson) were intricate and delicate.

The success of this large joint undertaking

depended in no small measure on the

diplomacy of COMGENTEN—Lt. Gen.

Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., a ruddy-faced,

white-haired gentleman (son of the Confederate general of the same name) fresh

from Alaska, where for four years he had

commanded the Alaskan Department. In

the Aleutians he was involved in a campaign that was a brief example of interservice co-operation.12

Buckner brought some of his Tenth

Army staff with him from Alaska; others

came from the European Theater of Operations and from important jobs in Washington. As his Ordnance officer he was

able to secure Col. Robert W. Daniels,

chief Ordnance officer of Army Ground

Forces, who, since the beginning of his duty

in Washington in July 1941 as General

McNair's Ordnance officer, had had a big

share in plans for reorganizing and modernizing Ordnance service in the field

army.13 In this culminating planning

effort in the Pacific, Daniels was faced with

hard problems when he arrived on Oahu

in September 1944, not the least of which

concerned interservice co-ordination. The

"Expeditionary Troops" for which Tenth

Army was responsible consisted of Army

units under XXIV Corps; Marine units

under III Amphibious Corps; Army and

Marine air units under the commanding

general of Tenth Army's tactical air force;

10

 (1) Ltr, Richardson to CofS, U.S. Army, 15

Mar 46, sub: Final Report of Commanding General, Army Forces, Middle Pacific (hereafter cited

as Final Rpt COMGENAFMIDPAC), ASF Planning Div, Theater Br. (2) History of Central

Pacific Base Command During World War II, vols,

1 and 6, 8-5.7 AA, OCMH. (3) Hatcher Rpt.

(4) History Western Pacific Base Command, vol.

1, 8-5.7 CA, OCMH. 11

 Tenth Army Action Report Ryukyus, 26 March

to 30 June 1945, p. 1-0-1.

12

 (1) Final Rpt of COMGENAFMIDPAC. (2)

Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the

United States and Its Outposts, pp. 266-68. (3)

Robert Sherrod, On To Westward (New York:

Duell, Sloan and Pearce, Inc., 1945), p. 259. (4)

Samuel Eliot Morison, "History of United States

Naval Operations in World War II," Aleutians,

Gilberts and Marshalls: June 1942-April 1944

(Boston: Little, Brown and Company), pp. 3-66. 13

 Brig. Gen. R. W. Daniels, "Field Ordnance

Service," Ordnance, XXXVIII, No. 203 (MarchApril 1954), 750-52.
448 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

certain naval construction and service

units; and a composite of Army, Navy, and

Marine units (mostly service units) under

the Commanding General, Army Garrison

Force. Because of the mixture of forces,

Buckner's staff sections were augmented

with Navy and Marine officers. Ordnance received a marine, Lt. Col. David

S. McDougal. Daniels considered him "a

grand chap," and characterized co-operation between Marine Corps and Army as

"outstandingly fine."

 14

The initial preparation, movement, and

supply of the various units of the Expeditionary Troops were the duty of various

commanders: Commanding Generals,

Pacific Ocean Areas and Central Pacific

Base Command for Army troops; Fleet

Marine Force Pacific and Fleet Marine

Service Command for the Marine Corps;

Commanding General, POA, through

Commanding General, AAF POA, and

the Central Pacific Base Command for

Army air units; and ComAirPac through

ComServPac for Navy and Marine Air

units. It was Daniels' job to insure that

the troops were ready for combat, that the

equipment coming from these various

sources made for a balanced force, and

that all activities were properly co-ordinated.15

All Army Ordnance units in ICEBERG,

except organic units of divisions and certain attached Ordnance units, were assigned to a new organization somewhat

different from that used for logistical support in any other operation. This was the

Island Command (ISCOM), established

at Oahu on 13 December 1944 under the

command of Maj. Gen. Fred C. Wallace

of Army Garrison Force. In the early

stages of the Okinawa operation, its responsibilities were to be similar to those of

Army Service Command in the Southwest

Pacific, but unlike ASCOM, which was

attached to Sixth Army in the early phases

and later reverted to USASOS, Island

Command was assigned to Tenth Army

and remained so, becoming the agent for

executing Tenth Army's base development

mission. As such it would command garrison forces on Okinawa, including Marine

and Navy as well as Army, and would be

responsible for defense of the island after

it was secured. In this later period, in

keeping with the heavy base responsibilities,

Island Command was to receive several

Ordnance group headquarters: one to administer general supply and ammunition

depots; another to administer maintenance

shops; and a third (a new type, a base

depot group) to control base armament

and base automotive battalions. The Ordnance officer for Island Command was Col.

Ray O. Welch, who had had long experience on Hawaii, first at the Ordnance

Automotive Depot and later as General

Supply Officer of Central Pacific Base

Command's Ordnance Service.16

14

 (1) Tenth Army Action Report Ryukyus, ch.

11, sec. XIV, Ordnance (hereafter cited as Tenth

Army Ord Action Rpt), pp. 1-3. (2) Report of

the Ordnance Officer Tenth Army, ICEBERG Operation (hereafter cited as Rpt Ord Officer Tenth

Army), p. 1, and Annex D, OHF. (3) Daniels Interv. 15

 Rpt Ord Officer Tenth Army, pp. 1-2.

16

 (1) Rpt Ord Officer Tenth Army, Annex D,

p. 3. (2) Island Command Okinawa (ISCOM),

Island Command Operation Plan No. 1 LEGUMINOUS, Feb-Apr 45, pp. 11-12, 15; app. B,

Annex XII, Ordnance Plan, pp. 1-2. (3) Island

Command (ISCOM) G-4 Daily Jnl 15 Dec 44-30

Jun 45, p. 14. (4) Central Pacific Base Command—History of Ord Service, 10 Aug-31 Dec

44. (5) Interv, Col Ray O. Welch (USA, Ret),

23 Jun 61.
BOLDLY AIMING AT OKINAWA 449

COLONEL DANIELS

Re-equipping and Supplying the

Combat Troops

Neither Colonel Welch nor any member

of his section had ever taken part in an

amphibious operation; therefore, in planning Ordnance support in the battle for

Okinawa, they relied mainly on XXIV

Corps experience at Leyte. An ammunition company was to go in with each of

the three U.S. Army divisions, the 7th,

77th, and 96th; and in a few days the

supply sections of the divisions' own light

maintenance companies were to be bolstered by a detachment of the 196th Ordnance Depot Company, sent to Leyte from

Oahu. For the period when corps took

over, after the beachhead was secured,

Welch attached to XXIV Corps the same

heavy tank maintenance company that had

served in the Leyte landings, the 284th

(experienced on LVT's), plus a medium

maintenance company, a depot company,

and a detachment of an antiaircraft maintenance company. No battalion headquarters was included in the initial troop

list. Later the 209th Ordnance Battalion

headquarters was added at the request of

the commander of the 1st Engineer Special

Brigade. The headquarters of this brigade, a veteran unit that had participated

in landings from Oran to Normandy, had

been obtained from the European theater

to handle the shore party work in the Army

phase when Island Command took over,

for ISCOM was inexperienced in shore

operations. Attached to the brigade, the

209th Battalion headquarters was to take

over the ammunition and depot companies

from divisions and corps and use them to

operate the shore dumps. Later, in the

base operations period the 209th and battalions yet to arrive would be assigned to

the 61st Ordnance Group.17

Central Pacific Base Command went all

out to re-equip the five infantry divisions

planned for Okinawa, backed up by greater

resources in the United States than were

available for any other operation in the

Pacific. When the cargo vessels laden with

supplies for the three XXIV Corps divisions that had been fighting in the Philippines—the 7th, 77th, and 96th—were unloaded at Leyte, the veterans of the

Southwest Pacific who did the unloading

could hardly believe their eyes. Every17

 (1) Island Command (ISCOM) Action Report, 13 Dec 44-30 Jun 45, pp. 3-0-1, and ch. 8,

sec. XIII, Ordnance, pp. 1-2, 11-12. (2) 1st Engr

Special Brigade Action Report, Okinawa Campaign, 9 Apr-31 May 45, ch. III, p. 4. (3) History 209th Ord Bn, Okinawa Opn, Apr-Jun 45.

(4) For the story of the 1st Engineer Special

Brigade at Okinawa see Heavey, Down Ramp!, pp.

176-84.
450 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

thing was new—jeeps, trailers, machine

guns, mortars, howitzers, tanks. As General Eichelberger observed, "We had never

seen such wonderful gear!" And the

same was true of the two divisions being

staged in the South Pacific, the 27th at

Espiritu Santo and the 81st at New Caledonia.18

The copious supply of Army vehicles on

Okinawa was to be a source of constant

astonishment to the marines, accustomed as

they were to move by foot, to fight for

quick decisions in small areas. In this operation they seldom had to walk, "Being

as how we are working with the Army on

this invasion," one Marine officer explained

to a war correspondent, "and have the

loan of some of their vehicles, of which

they got more than there are in the city

of Detroit."

 19

Plans for keeping these vehicles operating occupied a good deal of the time of the

Ordnance Sections of AFPOA, CPBC, and

Tenth Army. A 30-day supply of spare

parts was provided in blocks (for immediate use before the depots were set up) and

sets (to facilitate requisitioning from depot

stocks). Vehicle spare parts were relatively plentiful. The crying need for better

first and second echelon maintenance on

trucks was met by setting up Tenth Army

spot check teams to enforce maintenance

discipline. Perhaps the greatest problem

on vehicles in the planning stage was that

of tire repair, increased by the responsibility for repairing Engineer earth-moving

equipment. Experience had shown, especially at Saipan, that an enormous number

of tire injuries would be inflicted on engineer equipment working around airfields

by bomb fragments and shell fragments.20

Experience in previous Pacific campaigns

was carefully studied in planning ammunition supply for Okinawa. As a result,

extra artillery ammunition was provided.

Twenty-two resupply AK's (auxiliary cargo ships) were requested, also six LST's

to carry a cushion of artillery ammunition

for quick discharge on the beach. The

Navy could furnish only 19 AK's and 5

LST's for the invasion phase, but established an emergency operational reserve in

the Marianas. Though tremendous quantities of ammunition were expended on

Okinawa, the only really serious shortages

were shell for the 81-mm. mortar, white

phosphorous (WP) shell for all calibers,

and illuminants.21

Taking into account known Japanese

tactics, Tenth Army Ordnance Section

planned minor modifications on some of

the equipment issued to combat troops.

These modifications mainly concerned

tanks. The "backscratcher" was an arrangement of five M2A1 antipersonnel

mines, mounted around the base of the

tank turret, that could be fired electrically

from within to protect the tank from suicide attacks by Japanese foot soldiers

armed with "satchel charges" (crude

wooden boxes filled with explosives), molo18

 (1) Rpt Ord Officer Tenth Army, Annex A,

p. 1. (2) Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo,

pp. 183-84. 19

 John Lardner, "A Reporter on Okinawa: 1—

Suicides and Bushwhackers," The New Yorker,

(May 19, 1945), p- 35; "A Reporter on Okinawa:

II—The Tomb Life," The New Yorker, (May 26,

1945), P. 46.

20

 (1) Rpt Ord Officer Tenth Army, Annex A,

pp. 2-3; Annex B, p. 1. (2) Hatcher Rpt. (3) Ltr,

Col Frazer W. Rodman, Asst Ord Officer Tenth

Army, to Lt Col Raymond F. Ranges, ASF, 27

Aug 45, no sub, ASF Planning Div, Theater Br. 21

 Rpt Ord Officer Tenth Army, Annex C, pp.

1-2.
BOLDLY AIMING AT OKINAWA 451

tov cocktails, grenades, or other devices.

Thirty backscratcher kits were manufactured by the 393d Heavy Maintenance

Company (Tank) on Oahu and flown to

Leyte and Espiritu Santo. For protection

against Japanese antitank magnetic mines,

the Ordnance Section recommended that

all tanks be painted on their vertical surfaces with enamel mixed with beach sand

and this was done for one very important

battalion being readied on Oahu, the 713th

Armored Flame Thrower Battalion. Also,

a flotation device similar to that used on

the "swimming tanks" in the Normandy

landings was installed on the Shermans of

one Army tank company and half a

Marine company.22

The Okinawa landings, however, were

to be coral reef landings. The armored

LVT—the LVT(A)—was a lightly armored amphibian tractor usually called the

amphibian (and sometimes, confusingly,

the "swimming") tank, or "amtank." It

was not designed to operate as a tank but

as a personnel carrier, and was mainly

counted on to provide close fire support for

the assault troops and to act as a land tank

until tanks could be brought ashore. The

LVT(A) was first used in this manner at

Saipan, though not very successfully; for

one reason, the amtanks were too thinskinned to withstand enemy artillery

attacks. In getting ready for the Okinawa

invasion, machine shops on Oahu were

busy adding more armor protection. Also,

an ambitious program for modifying

DUKW's was under way, of which a

major part was devoted to installing guards

to protect propellers from damage by coral

heads.23

What of New Weapons?

For this last battle of the war no important new Ordnance matériel, in the sense

of newly developed items such as the M26

(Pershing) tank, was available. At the

time of the plans and preparations for ICEBERG, late 1944 and early 1945, the sights

in the United States were set on Europe;

and until the experience on Okinawa the

Pacific was satisfied with the Sherman

tank. But there had for some time been

an awareness of the need for heavier artillery, specifically heavier howitzers than the

155-mm. A mission sent out by the War

Department to study the effectiveness of

U.S. and Japanese weapons in the Marshalls spent five months, from 31 January

1944 to 30 June 1944, in the Central and

Southwest Pacific. The head of the mission, Col. Claudius H. M. Roberts of the

Ordnance Department, reported on 31

July 1944 that both theaters had urgently

requested 8-inch and 240-mm. howitzer 22

 (1) Tenth Army Action Rpt Ryukyus, 20

Mar-30 Jun 45, p. 11-XIV-15. (2) Rpt Ord

Officer Tenth Army, Annex E, pp. 1-7. (3) German Panther tanks captured in Italy in the late

spring of 1944 were found to be covered with an

antimagnetic-mine paste that looked like rough

plaster. The rough surface kept the mine magnets

from functioning. Jarrett, Achtung Panzer, pp. 30,

73, MS, Jarrett Collection. (4) For a good picture

of a swimming M4 going in at Okinawa, see George

McMillan, The Old Breed: A History of the First

Marine Division in World War II (Washington:

Infantry Journal Press, 1949), p. 361.

23

 (1) Samuel Eliot Morison, "History of United

States Naval Operations in World War II," Victory

in the Pacific (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), p. 149. (2) Crowl, Campaign in the

Marianas, pp. 44-45; 85-86. (3) Monograph,

Maj. Howard C. Hooker, Amphibian Tank Battalion on Saipan, 1 May 48, Armored School Library, Ft. Knox. (4) Lt William H. Funk, Report

on the Activities of Ordnance Overseas Maintenance and Modification Amphibian Team, 25 May

45.
452 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

battalions, anticipating "larger land masses

where much of the operations will be conducted beyond range of covering naval

gunfire or in terrain defiladed against flat

trajectory fire." The request came at a

time when heavy artillery and heavy artillery ammunition were in short supply, and

when Europe had the highest priority.

Only one battalion of 8-inch howitzers was

shipped to Oahu to go in with XXIV

Corps artillery in the Okinawa operation,

because there was not enough ammunition

to support more than one battalion. The

only 240-mm. howitzer battalion sent to

the Pacific went to Luzon; furthermore,

here also ammunition was scarce. On another recommendation pertinent to the

Okinawa operation—the need for illuminating shell for all mortars and artillery

from 75-mm. through 155-mm. because of

Japanese tactics in night raiding and infiltration—the response was equally discouraging. The only illuminating shell

reportedly available in any quantity was

that for the 60-mm. mortar.24

Colonel Daniels thought good use could

be made of Canal Defense Light tanks.

The Japanese in their campaign in Malaya

had successfully made end runs at night

along the coast, landing tanks from boats,

and could be expected to do the same thing

along the coast of Okinawa. Against such

attacks, the CDL's with their blinding

searchlights might be used to very good

effect. General Buckner had never heard

of the CDL's but after having been furnished a description he gave Daniels permission for a flight to Washington to round

up a company. When Daniels got to

Washington, he found that all of these special tanks had gone to England for shipment to France, but that he might expect

some in several months. Accordingly, he

put in a request for about 18 or 20 CDL's,

and an officer and men trained in operating them. They did not arrive until late

June 1945, after the Okinawa campaign

was over.25

Not only on tanks and artillery but on

new items such as the 57-mm. and 75-mm.

recoilless rifles and VT fuzes, Europe had

priority. In March 1945 the Ordnance

Department sent fifty of each caliber recoilless rifle to Europe, with ammunition

and instructors, for special operational use.

The best Tenth Army Ordnance could do

was to obtain a promise that a demonstration team would be sent to Okinawa after

the invasion. The team arrived with two

recoilless rifles of each type on 19 May

1945. In late April a team arrived to

demonstrate the use of VT fuzes in ground

combat (first used in this manner in the

Ardennes), one of several teams sent to

the Pacific that spring. Neither the recoilless rifle nor the VT fuze had any real

effect on the outcome of the Okinawa

24

 (1) Report of Mission to Pacific Theaters, 31

January to 30 June 1944, prepared by WD Mission

for the Chief of Staff, 31 July 1944 (hereafter

cited as Roberts Rpt), pp. 34-35, 38. (2) Ltr,

COrd to CG ASF, 3 Oct 44, sub: Report of Mission to Pacific Areas, 31 January to 30 June 44,

p. 5. Both in OHF. (3) Thomson and Mayo,

Procurement and Supply, pp. 100-103. (4) Hq

XXIV Corps Artillery, Action Report, Ryukyus

Campaign, 31 March to 30 June 1945, pp. 1, 27.

(4) Conf, 0-28 Historical Presentation—Okinawa,

1948-49, pp. 8-9, Armed Forces Staff College

Library.

25

 Ltr, Brig Gen Robert W. Daniels to Lida

Mayo, 23 Nov 63, OCMH. When the CDL's

arrived Daniels got one ashore and showed it to

Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, who had succeeded Buckner as Commanding General of Tenth Army. Stilwell was impressed. Ibid.
BOLDLY AIMING AT OKINAWA 453

campaign.

The only significant new ground matériel on Okinawa was contributed by the

Chemical Warfare Service. The effectiveness of flame against Japanese bunkers and

other strong fortifications had been demonstrated in January 1943 at Guadalcanal,

where the first portable flame thrower was

employed. Army Ground Forces soon

thereafter wanted to mount a flame gun

in a tank but tanks were scarce; it was

spring of 1945 before four obsolete light

tanks rigged with flame guns were shipped

to the Pacific from the United States and

they went to Luzon—the only "main armament" flame throwers produced in the

United States to see combat. In the meantime, Chemical Warfare Service officers in

Hawaii went ahead on their own without

waiting for action from the United States,

just as Ordnance officers in various theaters

had learned to do in similar situations.

With the assistance of the marines, Chemical Warfare Service installed a Canadian

flame thrower in an obsolescent M3A1

tank, the only tank that could be obtained

from Ordnance. Called the Satan, it was

so successful at Saipan and Tinian in

assaulting dugouts, canefields, buildings,

and caves that Tenth Army requested that

large capacity flame throwers, with the

flame gun enclosed in a 75-mm. tube, be

installed on 54 Sherman tanks. With a

strong assist from the Seabees, this was

done, and the 713th Provisional Flame

Thrower Tank Battalion landed with Shermans early in the Okinawa operation.

According to General Richardson, the

flame throwing Shermans were "of incalculable value. In fact, the Infantry

and the Marines came to rely on this weapon of warfare as their greatest support."

 27

The Landings on Kerama Retto

No landing in the Pacific involved such

important—and daring—preliminaries as

the landing on the western coast of Okinawa on 1 April 1945, a day called L-day.

Sacrificing the element of surprise to the

need for an advance base for ship refueling

and repair, the Navy decided to seize on

26 March, nearly a week before L-day, a

small group of rocky islands fifteen or so

miles west of southern Okinawa known as

the Kerama Retto. For this purpose a

Western Islands Attack Force was formed.

As the 77th Infantry Division was to be

the Army element, men of the division's

own 777th Ordnance Light Maintenance

Company plus the attached 693d Ammunition Company and 193d Ordnance

Depot Company detachment had the interesting prospect of being the first Ordnance men ashore in ICEBERG.28

26

 (1) Col. Rene R. Studler, "Recoilless Rifles,"

Army Ordnance, XXIX, no. 152 (September-October 1941), p. 233. (2) Rpt Ord Officer Tenth

Army, Annex E, pp. 7-8; Annex C, p. 14. (3)

Combat Analysis Sec, Opns Div, WDGS, Extracts

from Operations Reports on Reduction of Japanese

Cave-type Fortifications, Part II, 1 Jun 45, p. 2.

(4) Memo, Col Rene R. Studler for Chief Research

and Development Service, OCO, 16 Jun 45. Last

two in Folder, Cave Warfare, Barnes File, OHF.

(5) For difficulties with the VT fuze see Ordnance Periodic Summaries, Tenth Army, 29 Apr10 Jun 45, Folder, G-765-S, POA, 29 Apr 45,

OHF.

27

 (1) Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field, pp. 153-56. (2) Final Rpt COMGEN AFMIDPAC, p. 5. (3) Pacific Warfare Board

Report 76, 6 Nov 45, sub: Future Organization and

Employment of Main Armament Flame Thrower

Tanks. 28

 (1) Morison, Victory in the Pacific, pp. 88,

117-20. (2) History ICEBERG Phase (Kerama Retto-Keise Shima) Opns, 77th Inf Div, 26-31 Mar

45.
454 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

As the ships of the Western Islands

Attack Force approached the Kerama

islands in the early hours of 26 March

1945, the setting moon made a golden

path on the East China Sea. Soon the sky

lightened; streaks of light from the coming

dawn appeared in the east and revealed the

invasion fleet—the Navy carriers and destroyers and the ships carrying the 77th

Infantry Division. In the slow tractor

flotilla that had left Leyte on 20 March

were 22 LST's, 14 LSM's and 40 LCI's.

In the faster convoy leaving two days later,

were 20 transport and cargo vessels. Briefings on shipboard had indicated that few

if any Ordnance men, after all, would be

landed in this invasion. The plan was for

three regimental combat teams of the 77th

to make successive landings on the eight

small islands, clear them of Japanese, and

return to their ships. On only one island,

Zamami, would a small garrison force remain to protect radio intelligence, air

warning, air weather, and small boat installations planned for the island. If all

went well, very likely the Ordnance maintenance, depot, and ammunition men

would simply remain aboard their transports in readiness for the next 77th Division operation. But an invasion is a tricky

thing, and the Ordnance men were to be

involved in the one serious mishap of this

one.29

Plowing through the waves of the East

China Sea, rolling with the swells and kicking up white foam as she moved toward

Kerama Retto at dawn on 26 March, the

cargo vessel carrying the 777th Ordnance

Light Maintenance Company was suddenly attacked by a Japanese bomber. With

a shrill whistle followed by an explosion, a

bomb crashed through the forward deck

into the cargo compartment, flooding the

hold and submerging the Ordnance vehicles and equipment. The deck shook violently, the ship lurched, and only a quick

shift of ballast kept her from sinking. She

lay helpless for days waiting for a tug,

while the combat troops were successfully

securing all the Kerama islands. Her cargo was unloaded into landing craft, with

the help of ninety men from the 693d Ordnance Ammunition Company put ashore

on Aka Shima; most of it went to Zamami

for reconditioning and salvage. There remained the problem of the 23 trucks and

17 trailers still lying under water in the

hold. The dripping vehicles were hoisted

over the side into landing craft and taken

to the tiny little island of Aegenesluku

nearby, where they were beached and

towed inland by a bulldozer landed from

another ship. Also put ashore was a 31-

man detachment from the 777th Ordnance

Light Maintenance Company, along with

truckdrivers and tools and spare parts.

On the barren little island inhabited only

by five inquisitive goats, the men spent

eight days, provided daily with food, water,

and other supplies by boat, completely reworking the vehicles and thus saving them

to play their part later on Ie Shima and

Okinawa.30

Nor was this the end of bad luck for the

Ordnance men with the Western Islands

Attack Force. After the successful inva29

 (1) Morison, Victory in the Pacific, pp. 131.

(2) History 77th Inf Div, 26-31 Mar 45, pp. 10,

34.

30

 (1) Capt. S. K. Cecil, "Okinawa," Firepower

(August-September 1945), p. 6. (2) History 693d"

Ord Ammunition Co, Okinawa Opn, and Yearly

Rpt, Apr-Jun 45. (3) History 777th Ord Light

Maint Co, 26 Mar-3O Jun 45. (4) History 77th

Inf Div, 26-31 Mar 45, p. 34.
BOLDLY AIMING AT OKINAWA 455

sion of the Kerama Retto, the transports

carrying the re-embarked 77th Division

retired southward to wait for orders for the

next operation, the capture of the island of

Ie Shima far to the north off the Okinawan

coast. At evening on 2 April this group

came under severe attack by kamikazes.

One of them crashed the attack transport

Goodhue, carrying most of the 693d Ordnance Ammunition Company. The Ordnance men escaped injury, but 24 soldiers

and sailors were killed and 119 were

wounded.31

In the meantime, there had taken place

the surprising landings on Okinawa.

31

 (1) Morison, Victory in the Pacific, pp. 176-

77. (2) History 693d Ord Ammunition Co, Okinawa Opn, Apr-Jun 45.
CHAPTER XXIV

Crescendo on Okinawa

The men aboard the invasion fleet off

the coast of Okinawa on Easter Sunday

morning, 1 April 1945, had been told in

shipboard briefings as they steamed north

and west from Leyte, Guadalcanal, Hawaii,

and other Pacific bases, that Okinawa was

likely to be a bigger and tougher operation

than Iwo Jima. The casualty reports

from Iwo made this a gloomy reflection indeed. Aboard the Montauk, the command ship from Hawaii, Easter services

were held at 0400, and Colonel Welch,

Ordnance officer of Island Command

(ISCOM), observed that about 75 percent

of those who attended would not have gone

to church back home.1

The beaches selected for the L-day landing were known as the Hagushi beaches,

after a village at the mouth of the Bishi

River about halfway down the five-milelong landing area. North of the river two

Marine divisions, the 1st and 6th under III

Amphibious Corps, landing abreast, were

ordered to capture Yontan airfield behind

their sector and then advance north to the

narrow neck of the island and east to the

coast. South of the river, the 7th and

96th Infantry Divisions under XXIV Corps

were to capture Kadena airfield and advance east and south. In addition to the

77th Division, which was to be available

for special operations after Kerama Retto,

Tenth Army also had the 2d Marine Division to make a feint against the east coast

of Okinawa and the 27th Infantry Division to serve as floating reserve. As area

reserve, the 81st Infantry Division, under

the control of CINCPOA, was to stand by

in New Caledonia. The plans for this big

invasion force were based on the belief that

the Japanese would put up a hard fight

for the two airfields behind the Hagushi

beaches.

The Landings on Hagushi

At sunrise, anxious faces at the rails of

the transports were straining for the first

look at Okinawa through gaps in the smoke

of the heaviest concentration of naval gunfire ever to support a landing. It was a

beautiful morning, just enough offshore

breeze to blow the smoke back. The rising

sun, in the words of Samuel Eliot Morison

(who stood at the rail of the battleship

Tennessee), cast "a peach-like glow" over

the calm sea. But the air was not calm,

filled as it was with the deep booming of

the naval cannon, the rumble of exploding

bombs, and the crack of rockets.2

1

 (1) Morison, Victory in the Pacific, p. 146.

(2) Welch Interv.

2

 (1) Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle, p. 69. (2) Morison, Victory in the Pacific, has

a vivid eye-witness account of the landings, pp.

146-55.
CRESCENDO ON OKINAWA 457

To this familiar overture to an amphibious operation was added one rather novel

contribution, the roar of 155-mm. guns

based on an offshore island. Using a technique successfully employed at Kwajalein,

Tenth Army had emplaced two battalions

of Long Tom guns on Keise Shima, a

group of coral islets that had been secured

by the 77th Division on 31 March following the Kerama Retto operation. From

Keise, about eight miles southwest of Hagushi and about eight miles west of the Okinawan coastal town of Naha, the artillerymen had the job of prohibiting enemy

reinforcements from moving toward the

landing beaches from the south.3

Before the sea, air, and land bombardment had lifted, the LVT's were issuing

from the LST's and forming waves that

followed the pattern set at Saipan (like

Okinawa, a coral reef landing)—first, the

LVT (A)'s (the amtanks), next the troopcarrying LVT's, all guided to their assigned

beaches by control craft flying colored pennants to match the beach designations:

from left to right, green or red for the 6th

Marine Division; blue or yellow for the 1 st

Marine Division; purple or orange for the

7th Infantry Division; and white or brown

for the 96th Infantry Division. Lined up

behind the first assault waves were the

landing craft—LCVP's, LCM's, LSM's,

LST's. Of particular interest to the Ordnance Island Command men on the

Montauk were the LSM's carrying the

"swimming" Sherman tanks.4

The bombardment increased as the first

waves approached the shore at 0830, and

then suddenly stopped until nothing could

be heard except the rumble of shells that

were falling inland. In those first nervous

waves, the tense men stumbling ashore had

"steeled themselves to meet almost anything—except the Sabbath calm which

greeted them."5 Crossing the narrow

strip of sand and climbing the 10-foot sea

wall, the infantrymen and marines to their

utter surprise were able to go in standing

up6—no crouching, no foxholes, for there

was no enemy resistance beyond some

sporadic and ineffective sniper fire. They

found themselves on farmlands peaceful

and still in the brisk spring sunshine. Maj.

Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., of the 1st

Marine Division expressed the general feeling when he said with a smile, "There was

a lot of glory on Iwo, but I'll take it this

way."

 7

Through gaps in the sea wall blasted by

naval gunfire rolled amtanks and DUKW's

carrying 4.2-inch mortars. The swimming

Sherman tanks did not go in with the leading waves, and when they did take to the

water, it was discovered that reef conditions

made their flotation equipment worse than

useless. Standard Shermans, landed directly from LCM's at the reef edge, got

ashore more easily. In any case, the firepower of the swimming tanks (greater than

that of the amtanks) was not needed.8

Since there was no opposition, the supply

3

 History (Ryukyus) 420th Field Arty Group, 31

Mar-Jun 45, p. 25.

4

 (1) Morison, Victory in the Pacific, pp. 141,

152. (a) Welch Interv.

5

 From The Deadeyes: The Story of the 96th

Infantry Division, by Orlando R. Davidson, J. Carl

Willems, and Joseph A. Kahl, copyright 1947 by

Infantry Journal Press (now Association of the U.S.

Army), p. 85. 6

 McMillan, The Old Breed: A History of the

First Marine Division in World War II, p. 359. 7

 Sherrod, On to Westward, p. 280. 8

 (1) Rpt Ord Officer Tenth Army, Annex E,

p. 7. (2) Welch Interv. (3) 7th Infantry Division

Operation Report, Ryukyus Campaign, pp. 35, 101.
458 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

PREPARING LONG TOMS TO FIRE ON OKINAWA FROM KEISE SHIMA

DUKW's followed quickly in the wake of

the assault troops. On the 96th Division

beaches an advance party of officers and

supply men of the 796th Ordnance Light

Maintenance Company was ashore by 1030

in three DUKW's that it had combatloaded at Leyte with emergency parts,

cleaning and preserving materials, and

weapons. The destination of these men

was Sunabe, a little coastal town behind

White Beach 2, but when they reached it

they found that it had been leveled by the

air and naval bombardment and that their

designated site was a heap of smoldering

rubble and debris. That afternoon they

started out to find a better place for their

supply dump and found it about a mile

and a half east, across the road from a

small deserted village.9

Rolling inland, past checkerboard fields

of barley, sugarcane, sweet potatoes, and

cabbages, and houses roofed with red tiles,

they could hardly help thinking that Okinawa was a pleasanter place than the

Philippines. The most striking feature of

the inland scene was the circular coral

tomb built into almost every hillside, said

by some to represent a turtle's back, because of the low domed roof, and by others

to represent a womb. For centuries the

Okinawans had thus interred their dead,

9

 History 796th Light Maint Co, Ryukyus Campaign, 1 Apr-30 Jun 45.
CRESCENDO ON OKINAWA 459

first coffining the body in a seated position

(some said in a fetuslike position), later

removing the bones and placing them on

shelves in ceramic pots. The Army had

issued strict instructions against entering

these tombs, but after sundown on L-day

the air became chill and "more than one

shivering doughboy," reported the 96th

Division historian, "sought sanctuary

among the 'ancestors' in their snug homes

that first cold night." The top of a tomb

was to serve Colonel Daniels, Tenth Army

Ordnance officer, as the foundation of his

tent when Tenth Army command post was

set up next day near Yontan airfield.10

By nightfall of L-day most of the rest of

the 796th Ordnance Light Maintenance

Company was ashore, bivouacked at Sunabe, and the 632d Ordnance Ammunition

Company was ashore also, setting up its

first dump about 150 yards inland from the

beach with ammunition brought in by

DUKW and LVT. But here men of the

632d worked with heavy hearts for the

company had suffered sadly in the landings. A lieutenant and eighteen enlisted

men of the company had been drowned

when their LCVP capsized at the coral

reef.11

A few miles up the coast on the 7th Infantry Division's beaches, the main group

of the 707th Ordnance Light Maintenance

Company, consisting of sixty-seven men

and the commanding officer, were ashore

on Purple Beach 1 at 1400 on L-day.

Moving to a point south of Kadena airfield

to set up the bivouac, they were immediately busy with shore party work, returning

to the beaches where the 644th Ordnance

Ammunition Company was establishing its

first ASP, and the army (196th) depot

detachment was laying out a supply dump.

The 707th had some trouble getting the

division Ordnance supplies ashore, but this

was less serious than it might have been

because the XXIV Corps Ordnance companies, which began landing on L-day,

were also located in the Kadena area.

The division Ordnance company acknowledged that it received "splendid service"

throughout the campaign from the corps

183d Ordnance Depot Company.12

The rest of the 707th Ordnance Light

Maintenance Company was split up into

11-man detachments, one behind each of

7th Division's regiments. Landing on the

day after L-day, the detachments moved

immediately down to Koza and set up a

third echelon shop in support of the division's rapid advance. In the first few days

after the invasion, spectacular gains were

made in all sectors. By 4 April, in the

north the 6th Marine Division had cut

Okinawa in two at the line Nakodamari to

Ishikawa (the L plus 15 line) and the 1st

Marine Division had reached the eastern

shore. In the south the 7th Infantry Division, having also reached the east coast on

10

 (1) Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, pp. 87-

88. (2) Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island

People, pp. 218-19. (3) Brigadier General William

A. Borden's Observations in the Pacific, 7 July

1945-20 August 1945, p. 12, MS in Borden Personal File, OHF. (4) Daniels Interv. 11

 (1) History 796th Ord Light Maint Co,

Ryukyus Campaign. (2) History 632d Ord Ammunition Co, Okinawa, 12 Mar-13 Aug 45.

12

 (1) History 707th Ord Light Maint Co, Ryukyus Campaign, Opns on Okinawa, 1 Apr-30 Jun

45. (2) History Okinawa Opn, 644th Ord Ammunition Co, Apr-Jun 45. (3) XXIV Corps, Ordnance Operations Rpt, Okinawa Campaign, 24

Mar-21 Jun 45. (4) Walking along Purple and

Orange Beaches on 9 April, Samuel Eliot Morison

was impressed with the "order and cleanliness" of

the XXIV Corps sector. Morison, Victory in the

Pacific, p. 175.
460 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

the heights commanding Nakagusuku Bay,

was ready to drive south to join the 96th

Division, which had turned south and

arrived at the narrow waist of southern

Okinawa. The 96th had now reached the

outposts of the Shuri defenses.13

Supporting the Assault on the

Shuri Defenses

Following closely behind the combat

troops, an advance party of the 796th

Ordnance Light Maintenance Company

made a long jump forward on 5 April to a

point less than a mile west of Futema and

about a mile from the 96th Division's front

lines. Next day, after the rest of the company had arrived, enemy shellfire began to

fall in the company's area. This was but

a taste of what was happening in the combat zone. The Japanese were reacting

strongly with machine gun, mortar, antitank, and artillery fire of great volume

and intensity. At noon on 8 April three

674-pound projectiles—the biggest the men

had ever seen—came screaming into the

96th Division lines. They came from a

320-mm. spigot mortar emplaced on one

of the ridges. The "boxcars," as the shells

were nicknamed, traveled so slowly and

were so large that the men swore they

could see them coming. Unless a direct

hit was scored the boxcars buried themselves in the earth, digging craters as big

as swimming pools, and did little damage

(beyond that caused by the rocks thrown

into the air) except to the nerves of the

soldiers already under strain from shelling

by the more effective 150-mm. pieces.14

As a result of the intensity of the enemy

resistance, which stopped the 96th Division

cold at Kakazu Ridge the second week in

April and was also being felt strongly on

the 7th Division front, the 27th Infantry

Division was landed on the southern Hagushi beaches and sent down the west coast.

But as serious as the need for more combat

troops was the need for more artillery ammunition before the attack could be

resumed.15

At the same time the Japanese began to

resist on land at the outposts of the Shuri

defenses, they began to resist by kamikaze

attacks. On 6-7 April they inflicted heavy

damage on the shipping off Okinawa. In

Kerama roadstead kamikazes crashed into

two Victory ships converted to ammunition

carriers, the Logan and the Hobbs. Abandoned by their merchant marine crews, the

vessels drifted, burning and exploding, for

over a day, until the U.S. Navy sank

them.16 The loss of these two ships contributed to the ammunition crisis but by no

means caused it. The main cause was inability to unload the ships off the XXIV

Corps beaches. Getting the ammunition

ashore was in the opinion of the ISCOM

Ordnance officer the biggest Ordnance

problem on the beachhead.17 There were

not enough men to do it, nor enough equipment of the right kind. Until the 61st

13

 (1) History 707th Ord Light Maint Co, Ryukyus Campaign. (2) Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, pp. 95-100.

14

 (1) Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, pp. 97-98.

(2) For the 320-mm. and 150-mm. Japanese mortars

see OCO, Catalogue of Enemy Ordnance Materiel,

vol. II: Japanese, pp. 126-27. 15

 Opn Rpt, Ryukyus Campaign, XXIV Corps,

Apr-Jun 45, p. 26.

16

 Morison, Victory in the Pacific, pp. 195-96. 17 (1) Opn Rpt, Ryukyus Campaign, XXIV

Corps, Apr-Jun 45, p. 80. (2) Welch Interv.
CRESCENDO ON OKINAWA 461

Ordnance Ammunition Company came in

with the 27th Division, the XXIV Corps

beachhead area had only two ammunition

companies, the 644th with the 7th Division

and the 632d with the 96th Division. The

632d arrived crippled from the accident at

the reef. The 644th for the first two days

was operating most of the time on the

beach at less than half its strength. It had

been obliged to leave two platoons aboard

three LST's to act as ship's platoons, and

on L plus I had to send one platoon inland

to set up an advance dump. At first the

644th had to do all unloading by hand, for

it had no cranes. All the ammunition

companies keenly felt the need for heavy

equipment such as dump trucks and bulldozers, which were lacking either because

they were not provided in the tables of

equipment or because they had been left

behind as a result of limitations on assault

shipping.18

Native labor, depended upon for ammunition operations in other campaigns,

did not exist on Okinawa. The Okinawans who emerged from the caves and

tombs to which they had fled during the

preliminary bombardment were mostly

children or old people—"under six or over

sixty," one officer noted; there were no

young men and very few young women.

All looked miserable and undernourished.

The most wretched were the bearded old

men in their black kimonos or filthy blue

smocks. One 70-year-old man seemed to a

Time correspondent "one of the most pitiable of God's creatures"; while being

treated by a medical corpsman for a bayonet wound inflicted by the Japanese before

they evacuated his village, "he tried repeatedly to rise from the stretcher, in an

unknowing, fearful manner."

 19

Lacking native labor, the 1st Engineer

Special Brigade had used tactical units

when it took over shore party operations on

9 April. Three antiaircraft battalions and

an armored group furnished more than

700 men for labor in the ammunition

dumps for periods from four days to two

weeks. A Quartermaster company was

also pressed into service. And when three

ammunition companies designated to set

up army ammunition depots began to

arrive on 16 April—the 61st, the 68th, and

the 693d (diverted, except for a detachment, from the 77th Division's Ie Shima

operation) —they were used as handlers on

the beaches for varying periods until 6

May.20

Siege Warfare With a Difference:

The Cave Positions

By such efforts, enough artillery ammunition was rushed to the front to enable

XXIV Corps to launch a full-scale attack

on the first Shuri defenses on 19 April. In

planning the attack, Pacific Ocean Areas

placed great confidence on massed artillery

fire, assisted by naval bombardment and air

bombing, to blast the Japanese from their

hill positions. These were the tactics—

fairly standard for mountain warfare—that

had been employed in Italy. It is significant that when they failed on Okinawa, 18

 (1) Pacific Warfare Board Report No. 66,

sub: Report on Okinawa Operation-Ordnance,

Incl #1 (Action Rpt, 209th Ord Bn), pp. 1-2. (2) History 644th Ord Ammunition Co, Okinawa

Opn, Apr-Jun 45. (3) Rpt Ord Officer Tenth Army, Annex C, p. 4.

19

 Sherrod, On to Westward, pp. 281-82. 20 1st Engineer Special Brigade, Action Report, Okinawa Campaign, 9 Apr-31 May 45, ch. IX, pp.

27-28.
462 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

as fail they did, General Buckner referred

to a proposed second landing as "another

Anzio."

 21

The reason for the failure was the

enemy's intelligent and effective use of the

deep caves that honeycombed the limestone

hills of southern Okinawa. This became

clear only after the hard fighting and heavy

casualties of the assault on the first Shuri

defenses, 19-24 April. During the action

a newspaper correspondent explored a typical cave position:

In the face of a rocky hill was a narrow

horizontal slit five feet long and eighteen

inches high, with pine log for header and

low growing bushes for camouflage. At a

distance of a hundred feet it could not be

seen.

We had to wriggle through on our bellies

to reach the interior of the cave. There in

a room about 15 feet square was a Japanese

antitank gun mounted on pneumatic-tired

wheels. Piled high around three walls were

cases of ammunition, some high explosive,

some of armor-piercing variety.

From that room a drift or tunnel ran 125

feet through the hill, opening on another

side. At intervals along its length were

other rooms in each of which large quantities

of ammunition were stored.

From the slit through which we entered

the gun crew commanded the field of fire

covering the broad, level plain across which

American tanks had to advance to reach

Kakazu Ridge.

The cave was finally spotted and artillery

was trained on it, but "Our gunners might

just as well have tried to level the Rock of

Gibraltar. Their high trajectory fire from

howitzers landed on the round top and

steep sides of the hill but accomplished

nothing more useful than showering the

cave mouth with dust. Aerial strikes were

equally ineffective."

 22

Against positions like these a great deal

of the artillery ammunition put ashore with

such strenuous efforts was undoubtedly

wasted. The Tenth Army Ordnance

officer estimated that between 1 April and

2 May it took 1.65 tons of ground ammunition (not counting air and Navy) to kill

one Japanese. Direct fire by self-propelled

155-mm. guns or 8-inch howitzers might

have been effective if Tenth Army had had

any such weapons (the only self-propelled

artillery consisted of three battalions of

105-mm. tank destroyers); on the other

hand, self-propelled guns were too vulnerable to be brought up very close to their

targets.23

Heavy Tank Losses

The tanks were having a hard enough

time against the withering Japanese fire,

especially fire from the 47-mm. antitank

gun, which was accurate and deadly. The

gun was small and easily concealed and its

high muzzle velocity would send a projectile through any part of a medium tank except the glacis plate. At Kakazu on the

morning of 19 April in the 27th Division's

sector, Company A of the 193d Tank Battalion lost four tanks from a single 47-mm.

piece firing only sixteen shots and later in

the day had many more cut down by artillery fire, some of them the scarce and

21

 Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle,

P. 259.

22

 Dispatch by Gordon Cobbledick in Cleveland

Plain Dealer, dateline Okinawa, April 21, quoted

in Davidson et al., The Deadeyes, p. 302. 23

 (1) Borden Observations in the Pacific JulAug 45, pp. 14, 18, OHF. (2) Ordnance Periodic

Summary, 3 Jun 45, p. 2, File, Tenth Army ORD

Summaries, G-765-S POA, OHF. (3) Tenth

Army Action Rpt Ryukyus, p. 11-VI-8.
CRESCENDO ON OKINAWA 463

valued flame throwers. The company returned with only eight out of thirty tanks—

the greatest loss suffered by American

armor in any single engagement on Okinawa.24

Six of the tanks lost in this action at

Kakazu were destroyed by satchel charges

placed by Japanese suicide squads that

seemed to spring out of the grass beside the

tank, sometimes forcing turret lids open

and throwing in grenades that killed the

tankers. These squads of three to nine

men did not cause as many tank casualties

as the 47-mm. gun, but they continued to

be a constant source of danger. Each

man of the squad had his own job: one

would blind the tank with smoke grenades,

another would force it to button up by

hurling fragmentation grenades, another

would immobilize it with a mine under the

track. The final act was destruction of the

tank and crew by a satchel charge.25

Against such tactics, Tenth Army Ordnance in Hawaii had devised the backscratcher but just what it accomplished was

hard to determine. Only a few were actually mounted on Army tanks, none on

Marine tanks. In one case the device

wounded rather than killed the attacker; in

another, rain shorted the circuit so that the

mine did not detonate. The few times the

backscratcher appeared to be effective,

friendly fire took equal credit for destroying the enemy.26

The test of the sanded paint applied to

the tanks of the 713th Armored Flame

Thrower Battalion for protection against

magnetic mines was also inconclusive, for

the battalion encountered no mines of this

type.27 Antitank mines did, however, account for about 31 percent of all tank

losses on Okinawa. Luckily there were

few antipersonnel mines among them to

interfere with tank recovery. The problem in bringing back the tanks was the lack

of enough tank recovery vehicles to do an

adequate job. Often after a tank was immobilized by a mine, satchel charge, or

antitank projectile, or because it had simply

thrown a track or bogged down in bad

terrain, it was abandoned by its crew, and

if not recovered by nightfall it would be

demolished at leisure by the returning

Japanese.28

By the end of May, the four Army tank

battalions and the one armored flame

thrower battalion had suffered 221 tank

casualties, not counting Marine losses.

Among the 221 tanks put out of action, 94

(including at least 12 of the irreplaceable

flame throwers), or 43 percent, had been

completely destroyed. The effort by Tenth

Army Ordnance to make up these losses

was painfully unproductive. To begin

with, losses on such a scale had not been

anticipated. In the planning, a small

reserve stock of 13 medium tanks was to be

placed on Saipan for fast emergency shipment to Okinawa. These were sent for

on 25 April. But even this small reserve

had not been established on Saipan. The

tanks had to be ordered from Oahu and

did not arrive at Okinawa until 10 June—

24

 Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle,

pp. 203-04. (1) Armor on Okinawa, A Research

Report Prepared by Committee 1, Officers Advanced Course, The Armored School, 1948-49

(Fort Knox, May 1949), p. 72, MST-S 1-ARM.2

1949.1, OCMH. (2) For the effectiveness of the

47-mm. gun see Daniels Interv. 25

 Armor on Okinawa, p. 72. 26

 (1) Ordnance Summary, 4 May 45. (2) Rpt

Ord Officer Tenth Army, Annex E, p. 6.

27

 Rpt Ord Officer Tenth Army, Annex E, p. 6. 28

 (1) Armor on Okinawa, pp. 74, 144. (2)

Ordnance Summaries, 22, 23 May 45.
464 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

some ten days before the campaign was

virtually over. An additional shipment of

65 Shermans and 25 tank recovery vehicles

was requested from Oahu on 28 April.

They were shipped on 20 May and did not

arrive until 15 July—almost two weeks

after the campaign had been declared

officially at an end.29

Because of the delay, all serviceable

medium tanks were stripped from the 193d

Tank Battalion (the unit crippled at

Kakazu) and distributed to other tank battalions. By early May the tankers were

asking for a tank heavier than the Sherman,

with a weapon of higher muzzle velocity

and thicker armor plate. The M26 Pershings seemed to be the answer. In midMay (after V-E Day) twelve were requested from the United States, but they

were not received until August. In the

meantime, to provide better protection

against the 47-mm. gun, the Ordnance

tank maintenance companies welded steel

track sections to the side sponsors, turret

sides, and glacis plate of the Shermans, and

also used armor plate from wrecked tanks

to reinforce the sponson and shield the

suspension system.30

In the end, however, the best defense for

the Sherman turned out to be the infantrymen who accompanied it as part of the

tank-infantry team, a truth forcibly

brought home to commanders in the catastrophe at Kakazu where the tanks had been

operating alone. In the early assault on

the Shuri defenses, the Japanese, who knew

the value of the infantryman, attempted to

pin down the infantry with artillery and

mortar fire, often successfully. But as the

long bloody battle for Shuri dragged on

through April and May, the Tenth Army

commanders learned about cave warfare

and how to win it. They directed artillery

fire on cave entrances, forcing the Japanese

gunners back into their tunnels; then infantry and tanks closed in, the infantry protecting the tanks from the suicide squads.

Having gained a foothold, the troops could

move down on cave openings from above,

sealing them with flame or explosives, a

method that General Buckner called "blowtorch and corkscrew."

 31

Shortages in Mortars and

Mortar Ammunition

This type of warfare demonstrated again

the usefulness of mortars, which could drop

projectiles into Japanese positions on top

of the hills and on the reverse slopes, and,

moreover, could be hand-carried. The

Chemical Warfare Service's 4.2-inch rifled

mortar was extensively used and was a

great favorite with the marines. Observers believed that the 155-mm. mortar developed by Ordnance in its jungle warfare

program would have been most effective;

however, this remained speculation, for

none was available. Since the 155 was

lacking, the cry arose for more 81-mm. and

60-mm. mortars. This demand was more

easily met by Tenth Army Ordnance than

that for medium tanks because these light

29

 (1) Rpt Ord Officer Tenth Army, Annex A,

pp. 4-5. (2) Tenth Army Action Rpt Ryukyus, p.

11-XIV-8. (3) Personal Ltr, Col Frazer W. Rodman, Asst Ord Officer, Tenth Army, to Lt Col Raymond F. Ranges, Hqs ASF, 27 Aug 45, no sub, ASF

Planning Div, Theater Br. 30

 (1) Rpt Ord Officer Tenth Army, Annex A,

p. 5; Annex E, pp. 10-11, with pictures of reinforced

tanks. (2) Ordnance Summaries, 4, 13, 15, 17,

24 May, 10 Aug 45. (3) Capt. S. K. Cecil, "Okinawa," Firepower, (August-September 1945), p. 6.

31

 Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle,

p. 256.
CRESCENDO ON OKINAWA 465

weapons could be supplied by air. On 9

May a hundred 81-mm. and thirty 60-mm.

mortars were requested from Oahu and

the entire reserve stock of twenty-seven 81-

mm. mortars on Saipan was called forward, all shipments to be made by air.

All of the Saipan mortars were on Okinawa four days later, those from Oahu in

about ten days. For this quick reaction

two infantry commanders expressed "great

satisfaction and thanks."

 32

Tremendous quantities of mortar as well

as artillery ammunition were expended in

the assault on Shuri. By mid-May, XXIV

Corps had fired 268,904 rounds of 81-mm.

mortar ammunition—six times as much as

it had expended during the first six weeks

of the Leyte Campaign—and stocks were

running alarmingly low. On 21 May

Tenth Army requested Oahu to ship

100,000 rounds by air. Nothing like that

amount was available in Hawaii, but the

Central Pacific Base Command responded

so promptly with what it had, aided by the

962d Ordnance Ammunition Renovation

Company, that it received a radio of appreciation from General Buckner. A total of

36,000 rounds came in by Air Transport

Command and Naval Air Transport Service planes in two shipments, the first arriving 28 May, the second on 9 June. It was

reported that combat troops cheered loudly

when told of their arrival.33

Certain types of mortar shells continued

to be the most critically short ammunition

items of the campaign, not only the 81-

mm. light round with the superquick M52

fuze, but the 60-mm. mortar illuminating

shell. Illuminants of all kinds, including

trip flares, became crucially important because the Japanese on Okinawa made skillful use of their customary tactics of night

counterattacks and infiltration. These tactics had been stressed in the Roberts report

of July 1944. But the hope that the 60-

mm. mortar illuminating shell would be

available in sufficient quantity was not

fulfilled. The first large shipment of

20,480 rounds did not arrive at Okinawa

until 24 June. In this dilemma the Navy

came to the rescue, providing XXIV Corps

with about 75 percent of its illumination.

Most effective was the Navy's 5-inch star

shell, usually fired by destroyers.34

The Ordnance Build-up in the Mud

By the end of the third week in May,

Tenth Army had reached the inner ring of

the Shuri defenses at the narrow waist of

the island, the line known as Naha-ShuriYonabaru. This had been accomplished

by bringing the entire Marine III Amphibious Corps (the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions) down from the north early in May

(sending the 27th Division up to take over

the marines' garrison duties in the north- 32

 (1) Maj. Charles S. Nichols, Jr., USMC and

Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Okinawa: Victory in the

Pacific (Historical Br, Hq U.S. Marine Corps,

1955), P. 272. (2) Observations of XXIV Corps

by Lt Col Walter J. Preston, Jr., 1 May 45, in

Extracts from Operations Reports on Reduction of

Japanese Cave-type Fortifications, pt. II, 1 Jun 45,

Folder Cave Warfare, Barnes File, OHF. (3) Rpt

Tenth Army Ord Officer, Annex A, p. 4. (4) Ordnance Summaries, 9, 12, 13, 23, 25 May 45.

33

 (1) Ordnance Summary, 20 May. (2) Tenth

Army Action Rpt Ryukyus, pp. 11-XIV-24, 11-

XIV-51. (3) Rpt Ord Officer Tenth Army, Annex

C, p. 7, and Incl H. (4) Quarterly Historical Report, 962d Ordnance Ammunition Renovation Company, 10 Jul 45. 34

 (1) XXIV Corps Ordnance Operations Rpt,

Okinawa Campaign, 26 Mar-21 Jun 45, p. 4.

(2) On the Roberts Rpt, see above, p. 452. (3) Rpt

Ord Officer Tenth Army, Annex C, p. 8. (4) Ordnance Summaries, 19 May, 24 Jun 45. (5) Morison,

Victory in the Pacific, p. 245.
466 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

SIGNAL CORPS MEN IN A WEASEL, OKINAWA

ern area); by committing the 77th Infantry Division after its capture of Ie Shima

at the end of April; and by the hard, costly

tactics of digging the Japanese out of their

caves. To support the two Marine and

three Army divisions now in the line, Ordnance companies had been landing almost

every day. In addition to the 209th Ordnance Battalion, which now controlled

three Marine ammunition companies as

well as six Army, the 1st Engineer Special

Brigade had a second battalion headquarters, the 192d, to control depot operations,

and had established a second Army depot

on the east coast. Island Command, which

was to release the 1st Engineer Special Brigade on 31 May, had received an Ordnance battalion headquarters, the 214th,

and its first Ordnance group headquarters,

the 61st, and was in the process of establishing two Ordnance service centers, the

northern and the southern, under the

group.35

Then the rains came. Until 21 May

the weather had been good, but that day

35

 (1) Ordnance Summaries, 29 Apr, 4, 10, 12,

24 May. (2) History 192d Ord Bn, 27 Apr-21

Jun 45. (3) Rpt Ord Officer Tenth Army, Annex

D, pp. 3-5. (4) Rpt Tenth Army Ryukyus Campaign, p. 11-XIV-5. (5) For rearrangement of

Marine ordnance service to some extent along the

lines of Army ordnance, see Rpt Ord Officer Tenth

Army, p. 2.
CRESCENDO ON OKINAWA 467

strong gusts of wind and an overcast sky

heralded the beginning of the season that

the Okinawans call the "plum rains." The

downpour began during the night and continued until 5 June, bringing a total of

twelve inches of rainfall. Rivers flooded,

fields became lakes, and roads were washed

out. At one ammunition supply point ammunition stacks located near a small stream

were caught in swift-flowing torrents and

carried several yards downstream; when

the flood subsided, some of the crates were

found in the branches of trees five feet from

the ground. Tanks were mired, and trucks

could not get through to bring up ammunition and food. The little tracked Weasel

(cargo carrier M29C), which up to that

time had been of little use, assumed new

importance, though there were places where

the mud was so heavy that neither the

Weasel nor the LVT could get through.

The M5 tractor performed better, and was

used by the contact parties of the divisional

light maintenance companies and also to

bring up ammunition. But at many front

positions supplies had to be carried in, and

casualties carried out, by men up to their

knees in water or mud. During the last

week in May, Tenth Army was virtually

bogged down.36

This seemed "awfully tough luck" to

General Buckner,37 because just at this time

intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese, severely crippled by the American attacks during May, were withdrawing south

from Shuri. Despite the mud, which was

still so deep that supply trucks had to be

dragged through quagmires by winches or

bulldozers, Buckner ordered his two corps

to drive rapidly forward. On the morning

of 29 May, a Marine company had already

penetrated to Shuri Castle. Two days

later the III Amphibious Corps and the

XXIV Corps joined lines south of Shuri

and at dawn on 1 June began the pursuit.

Three weeks of hard fighting were ahead.

On the left of the advance, the 7th Division,

having captured the little port of Yonabaru

on the east coast on 22 May, cleared Chinen

Peninsula. Wading over green, rainsoaked hills and meeting slight resistance,

by 4 June the division had reached the

soggy banks of the Minatoga River at the

southern base of the peninsula. On the

right of the advance, III Amphibious Corps

attacked the Oroku Peninsula, which was

across the bay from Naha (captured 27

May) and contained Naha airfield. Here

it had much harder going than the left

flank, for the Okinawa Base Force composed of naval units and home guards put

up a stubborn fight with mines, machine

guns, and 40-mm. antiaircraft fire, aided

by the mud that prevented the marines

from using their tanks. But clearing

weather and an amphibious landing enabled the marines to clear the peninsula

by 12 June. In the center of the general

advance that began 1 June, XXIV Corps

by 5 June had come up against the last

Japanese defense line, dug into the deep

caves of the formidable Yaeju-Dake-YuzaDake escarpment. There XXIV Corps

faced an enemy that was determined to

fight to the last man.

Supply by Water

When the roads were washed out in late

May and early June, Tenth Army got its

supplies to the front by the same means

36

 (1) Cecil, "Okinawa," Firepower (AugustSeptember 1945), p. 7. (2) Rpt Ord Officer Tenth

Army, Annex A, p. 10. 37

 Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle,

P. 423.
468 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

employed by Eighth Army during the rainy

season on Mindanao—air and water. Most

of the airdrops were to the 1st Marine Division (561 out of a total of 830 plane loads),

which between 30 May and 9 June was

supplied almost entirely by air. On 6 June,

when XXIV Corps was getting ready to

jump off in its large-scale attack on the

southern escarpment, 76 plane loads of

supplies were dropped to XXIV Corps and

III Amphibious Corps, chiefly water, rations, small arms and mortar ammunition,

and grenades. But the bulk of the ammunition for both corps came by water,

along the east coast for XXIV Corps and

the west coast for III Amphibious Corps.38

The west coast had the advantage of the

Hagushi beaches. The III Amphibious

Corps had early established a supply route

using DUKW's from Hagushi to the mouth

of the Asa Kawa River, where the main

advance dump was located. On 1 June

after the roads went out, efforts were made

to survey and buoy channels at that point

so that LCT's and LSM's could be used

and also to clear away the hulks in the

harbor of Naha to permit LCM landings.

These were not entirely successful. The

main dependence at Naha continued to be

an offshore LST and an AK (the Wesleyan

Victory) loaded with ammunition, plus a

fleet of about seventy DUKW's operating

out of Hagushi. South of Naha the troops

were supplied by thirty-four LVT's making a daily run from Hagushi.39

On the east coast, by the end of May two

discharge beaches were in operation on

Nakagusuku Bay—Awashi and Kuba.

From these beaches water, fuel, and ammunition to support XXIV Corps were carried by LCM's and LCT's to Yonabaru,

where two platoons of the capable and experienced 644th Ordnance Ammunition

Company were on hand to set up an advance dump. When the roads from the

rear became impassable, Island Command

brought up a Victory ship, the Berea Victory, loaded with 7,200 tons of ammunition, and anchored it off Yonabaru to serve

as a floating ASP. Thereupon, the XXIV

Corps Ordnance officer then instituted an

effective "amphibian" adaptation of the

normal ammunition control system. A

crew from the 644th was sent aboard the

Berea to select and place aboard the lighters the required types of ammunition, on

shore-to-ship radio orders from the XXIV

Corps ammunition officer. When the ammunition arrived on the beach, troops were

waiting there to receive their loads directly

from the lighters, thus cutting down the

handling to such an extent that in several

instances the ammunition reached the gun

positions within six hours after the request

had been made. Later an LST was also

brought to Yonabaru as a floating ASP.

After the Chinen Peninsula was cleared,

two LST's served the same purpose at the

little port of Minatoga, which was close

behind the XXIV Corps front. By these

means, XXIV Corps was assured enough

ammunition to mount its final attack.40

38

 (1) Conf, 0-28 Historical Presentation-Okinawa, p. 31, Armed Forces Staff College Library.

(2) Tenth Army G-4 Periodic Reports, 5, 8 Jun

45, in Hq Tenth Army G-4 Periodic Reports

Ryukyus Campaign, 27 Mar-5 Jul. 45. (3) Rpt

Ord Officer Tenth Army, Annex C, pp. 4, 8. 39

 (1) Tenth Army G-4 Periodic Reports, 1, 2,

3 Jun 45. (2) ISCOM Action Rpt, pp. 7-XI-2 and

8-XIII-9. (3) Rpt Ord Officer Tenth Army, Annex C, p. 8.

40

 (1) Tenth Army G-4 Periodic Rpts, 1-14 Jun

45. (2) XXIV Corps Ordnance Operations Report, Okinawa Campaign, p. 4. (3) ISCOM Action Rpt, pp. 8-XIII-8, 9, 13. (4) Journal XXIV

Corps Ordnance Section II Jun 45. (5) History

209th Ord Bn, Annex 2. (6) History 644th Ord

Ammunition Co, Okinawa Opn. A third platoon
THE PROBLEM AND THE SOLUTION. Above, entrance to a cave held by the Japanese; below, a flame-throwing tank fires into an enemy-held cave.
470 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Ordnance Class II supplies were also

sent on the east coast water route from

Kuba to Yonabaru, mainly in LCT's. The

first attempt to use DUKW's very nearly

ended in disaster, for it was made on the

morning of 4 June when a typhoon east of

Okinawa kicked up heavy seas. A convoy

of six DUKW's loaded with Ordnance,

Medical, Signal, and Quartermaster supplies and commanded by Capt. W. A.

Gore, the assistant Ordnance officer of 7th

Infantry Division, ran into rough water and

after several hours of fighting wind and

waves lost one of the DUKW's and had to

return to shore. Luckily no men were

lost.41

When the last major overland supply

route for XXIV Corps disintegrated in the

mud, the Engineers concentrated on keeping the roads running south from Yonabaru to Minatoga in operation. From

dumps at these two east coast ports the

corps was mainly supplied for the rest of

the campaign. The 7th Infantry Division's 707th Ordnance Light Maintenance

Company was moved to Yonabaru the second week in June. The 96th Division's

Ordnance company, the 796th, was not

sent there because of a lack of shipping

space to make the voyage around from the

west coast. Later, clearing weather enabled the company to move overland to

Kamizato, south of Yonabaru, where it was

close behind the XXIV Corps lines.42

Bloody Finale

From the last great escarpment to the

cliffs that mark the southern shore of Okinawa, the Japanese disputed every rod of

territory with machine gun fire, extensive

mine fields, and effective use of their dwindling supply of 47-mm. and other artillery

pieces. They no longer had any hope of

winning the battle, only of prolonging it,

and prolong it they did until 22 June, killing

more than 1,500 Tenth Army men and

wounding more than 6,600. Among those

killed was the Tenth Army commander,

General Buckner—the only army commander to die in action in World War II.

It was the terrain that enabled the enemy to hold out as long as he did—the deep

caves and rocky cliffs that had to be burnt

out and stormed—but he could not indefinitely withstand the full weight of armament that Tenth Army brought to bear in

this small area. After the rains stopped on

5 June the southern tip of the island lay

open under the spring sunshine to the bombers, to the Navy guns offshore, and to the

Long Toms emplaced on the heights of

Shuri, so that targets could be hit at will.

By 10 June the roads had dried from mud

to dust, therefore the tanks and direct fire

artillery could be brought up.43

Relatively free from the antitank artillery fire that had done so much damage

before Shuri, the American tanks could

operate more freely and aggressively. The

"blowtorch and corkscrew" method of attacking cave openings was materially improved when the men of the 713th Armored

Flame Thrower Battalion attached to the

flame thrower a 200-foot hose to spray

of the 644th was sent to Naha early in June, and

in mid-June the fourth and last platoon was sent

to Yonabaru. 41

 (1) S-4 Jnl & Msg File 7th Inf Div, Ryukyus

Campaign Apr-Jun 45. (2) Cecil, "Okinawa," Firepower (August-September 1945), p. 7. 42

 (1) S-4 Jnl & Msg File 7th Inf Div, Ryukyus Campaign 9 Jun 45. (2) History 796th Ord

Light Maint Co, Ryukyus Campaign. (3) Journal

XXIV Corps Ordnance Section, 6 Jun 45.

43

 History (Ryukyus), 420th Field Arty Group, 31

Mar-Jun 45, p. 41.
CRESCENDO ON OKINAWA 471

napalm on places inaccessible to the tank.

Also (in a reversal of their former roles)

flame throwers and other tanks were used

to protect infantrymen from the bands of

machine gun fire that were causing heavy

casualties. The tanks carried combat reinforcements to the front lines in their hulls,

as well as supplies of blood plasma, water,

and ammunition, and brought back the

wounded.44

The Japanese resisted to the water's edge.

Many chose to commit suicide rather than

surrender. The last act of the bloody drama

took place on the seaward side of a rocky

cliff on the southern shore. There before

dawn on the morning of 22 June the commander of the Japanese forces on Okinawa

and his chief of staff emerged from the

entrance of their last cave headquarters and

committed hara kiri.45 This marked the end

of organized resistance on Okinawa. The

mop-up phase took ten days longer. Reaching the southern end of the island, XXIV

Corps and III Amphibious Corps turned

north to the Naha-Yonabaru valley, cleaning up pockets of resistance and destroying

enemy soldiers who might escape to engage

in guerrilla warfare in the north, as the

Japanese had been ordered to do by their

general in his last written order, dated 18

June. In the final days of the campaign

and in the mop-up phase, infiltration by

Japanese—many disguised in Okinawan

kimonos—who were being driven north by

the combat troops was a real danger to men

in rear installations, some of whom, reported the 96th Infantry Division historian,

"got a chance to put notches in their seldom-used firearms." A few Japanese were

killed in the sector of the division's light

maintenance company, but by setting up

outposts on surrounding hills the Ordnance

men kept the infiltrators out of their company area.46

During the last two weeks in June, 80,-

ooo Okinawan civilians crawled out of the

caves on the southern tip of the island. A

third or more were wounded. There were

few able-bodied men among them; they

were mostly women, old men, and children. As they plodded north in long

columns they saw that the Okinawa they

had known was gone. Villages had been

leveled, the city of Naha laid waste, the

ancient capital of Shuri reduced to coralstone and red-tile rubble, a "crater-of-themoon landscape"47

 of utter desolation.

Around the ruins of Shuri Castle remained

only remnants of its massive ramparts and

only blackened skeletons of its great trees.

Nothing was left of the great gates, the

temples, the gardens.48

In the "typhoon of steel" (as the Okinawans called it)49

 that had swept over the

island, about 110,000 Japanese had lost 44

 During the 5-day battle for Kunishi Ridge,

12-17 June, 47-mm. and other artillery shells destroyed or damaged 21 tanks when they were roadbound in a rice paddy region; but this appears to

have been the only serious tank loss. Appleman,

et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle, p. 452. By 12

June, the sound of Japanese artillery "had faded

from its April rumble to a faint whisper." Ibid,

p. 462. 45

 For a Japanese account of the scene see Edmund G. Love, Hour Glass: The 7th Infantry

Division in World War II (Washington: Infantry

Journal Press, 1950), pp. 481-82.

46

 (1) Davidson, et al., The Deadeyes, p. 190.

(2) History 796th Ord Light Maint Co, Ryukyus

Campaign. 47

 Appleman, et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle,

p. 402. 48

 Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island

People, p. 470. It was estimated that more than

62,000 Okinawans had perished, of which some

47,000 were civilians who had been unable to find

refuge in caves or tombs. Ibid., p. 472. 49

 Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island

People, p. 472.
472 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

their lives and 7,400 had been taken prisoner. The American casualties—Army,

Marine, and Navy—were 11,689 killed and

missing and 34,559 wounded. The ratio

of American to enemy losses was not so

high as it had been at Tarawa or Saipan or

Iwo Jima, but those were smaller, shorter

campaigns. On Okinawa more American

lives had been lost than in any other campaign against the Japanese.50

Preparing for Japan

Even before Okinawa was officially declared secure on 22 June, the Ordnance

men were preparing to support the invasion

of the Japanese homeland. The first task

was to re-equip the infantry divisions, giving priority to the 77th, which was already

loading out for Luzon to go to Japan with

Sixth Army. Colonel Welch of Island

Command had set up at the Ordnance

service centers a policy of straight exchange

—a serviceable item in exchange for an unserviceable one, whether watch or gun.

Most of the vehicles turned in had been

damaged by the deep mud, which was

particularly hard on brake linings. Otherwise—in striking contrast to almost every

other campaign of the war—the mortality

on trucks and other vehicles at Okinawa

had not been great. There had not been

long distances to travel in this siege warfare operation; maintenance discipline had

been effectively enforced in Tenth Army

by spot inspections; and, for once, spare

parts had been relatively plentiful. On

weapons, the only serious cause for concern was a shortage of 105-mm. howitzer

tubes. These had been requisitioned by

Tenth Army, but were short because shipment had been slow.51

While the work of re-equipping the divisions was going on, Ordnance base troops

had been landing to do their part in the

development of Okinawa as the last great

base of World War II. A visitor from the

United States, landing on the hot and

humid afternoon of 19 July, found the

island "a beehive of activity—air and

ground," and was "immediately impressed

with the extent of roads well paved and

the mass of busy traffic," noting in his diary

that "tented groups are all over the place

and the usual air of American business and

ingenuity. What people we are to come

out here and be so well established so

quickly."

 52

This observer was the ubiquitous Brig.

Gen. William A. Borden, director of the

New Developments Division, War Department General Staff, making his fifth visit

to overseas theaters—his first was to Tunisia in the spring of 1943. His mission on

Okinawa was to let the commanders know

50

 (1) Appleman, et al., Okinawa: The Last

Battle, pp. 473-74. This account gives Marine,

casualties as 2,938 killed and missing, 13,708

wounded; Navy as 4,907 killed and missing and

4,824 wounded. The official Army casualty figures

are 3,844 killed in action and missing and 16,027

wounded (of which 995 died of wounds). D/A

Final Rpt, Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle

Deaths in World War II ... 7 December 1941-

31 December 1946, p. 95. (2) Col. George A.

Harvey, "Okinawa," Military Review, XXVI, 5

(August 1946), p. 72. (3) In the campaign for

Luzon and the Southern Philippines, the combined casualties of Sixth and Eighth Armies were

10,300 killed and 36,550 wounded. Smith, Triumph

in the Philippines, p. 652.

51

 (1) Jnl, Hq and Hq Det, 61st Ord Group,

17-30 Jun 45, in History Hq and Hq Det, 61st

Ord Gp, 44, 24 Mar-Jun 45-46. (2) Welch Interv.

(3) Personal Ltr, Rodman, Asst Ord Officer Tenth

Army, to Ranges, ASF, 27 Aug 45, Folder, X-O

Opns, ASF Planning Div, Theater Br. (4) Jnl

XXIV Corps Ord Sec, 11 Jun 45. 52

 Borden Observations in the Pacific, Jul-Aug

45, pp. 1, 12, OHF.
CRESCENDO ON OKINAWA 473

what was being done in the United States

to provide them with new equipment and

techniques for the assault on Japan. With

regard to the Ordnance Department, he

could tell the commanders that a cave warfare program had been started on 25 May,

sparked by a memorandum from General

Stilwell, then commanding general of Army

Ground Forces, to General Marshall, stating that the terrain in Japan lent itself to

dug-in positions in depth.53

In initiating the program, Maj. Gen.

Gladeon M. Barnes, chief of the Ordnance

Research and Development Division, made

the point that Ordnance already had

powerful weapons applicable to cave warfare. Foremost among them were selfpropelled artillery—the 90-mm. gun on the

M36 carriage and the 155-mm. on the M40

carriage—and the M26 Pershing tank. To

supplement these weapons for particular

situations were the 57-mm. and 75-mm.

recoilless rifles, which could be manhandled

into position, and a series of mortars for

indirect fire. The catch was that except for

twelve Pershings that were on their way to

the Pacific, most of these weapons were

still in Europe or the United States. The

first step in the cave warfare program was

to get them out to the Pacific; and Barnes

warned the Ordnance division chiefs that

"we do not have a couple of years in which

to do it." The second step was to get out

an ASF booklet on cave warfare. In its

final form, dated 24 June 1945, to which

not only Ordnance but Engineers and

Chemical Warfare Service contributed,

other Ordnance items listed were the M24

light tank (highly maneuverable in rough

terrain) and several experimental weapons

such as the self-propelled 8-inch howitzer,

the 4.5-inch multiple rocket launcher, and

a ground-launched, rocket-propelled, 250-

pound bomb......54

A booklet on how to fight cave warfare

could only seem ironical to veterans of the

Okinawa campaign; however, the commanders were generally receptive to the

Ordnance recommendations on desirable

weapons. At Tenth Army headquarters,

General Borden encountered General Stilwell himself, who had arrived on 23 June

to replace General Buckner. Stilwell,

wearing his old campaign hat, said that he

was in favor of heavy self-propelled artillery and the Pershing tanks. General

Hodge, the XXIV Corps commander,

whom Borden interviewed at his headquarters near the ruins of Shuri Castle, had

more specific ideas, based on his experience

throughout the campaign. He wanted selfpropelled artillery for precision fire against

point targets because he had discovered that

mass artillery fire against cave positions

only drove the Japanese into their holes

and wasted ammunition. He wanted the

Pershing tank, the main armament flame

thrower tank, and the recoilless rifle. He

also stressed the importance of flares and

star shells, the latter in calibers up to 155-

mm., for night operations. Hodge's recommendations on weapons were given point

by a tour Borden afterward made of the

island—from the north, where combat

teams of the 27th Division were still killing

Japanese, to the south, where the 7th Divi- 53

 (1) Ibid., p. 1. (2) Minutes, Meeting with

General Borden 14 May 1945, 15 May 45, sub:

Equipment for Use Against Japan, and Incl. (2)

OCO, Special Division Chiefs Meeting, 25 May 45,

sub: Cave Warfare in the Pacific Theater. Both

in Folder, Cave Warfare, Barnes File, OHF.

54

 ASF, Special Technical Intelligence Bulletin

No. 10, Cave War, 24 Jun 45, Folder, Cave Warfare, Barnes File, OHF.
474 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

sion was also still flushing them out of

caves. The tour convinced the visitor that

the terrain of Okinawa was "far more

rugged than anyone who had not seen it

can imagine."

 55

On 24 July General Borden departed for

Manila and spent the following three weeks

in the Philippines, visiting Leyte, the southern islands, and the mountains of northern

Luzon, where fighting was still going on,

and interviewing commanders of Sixth and

Eighth Armies on the weapons they wanted

for the assault on Japan. On 15 August

as he was leaving his hotel for the airport

to return to the United States, he was told

that a radio had been received from President Truman stating that the Japanese had

accepted the U.S. surrender terms. The

war was over.56

55

 Borden Observations in the Pacific, Jul-Aug

45, pp. 12-19. 56

 Ibid., pp. 20-57.
CHAPTER XXV

The Guns Fall Silent

On the pleasant summer evening of 15

August 1945 Americans were still fighting

in the mountains of northern Luzon. In

the 32d Division sector, a walkie-talkie

said "The war's over," and a grimy sergeant replied, "Yeah, all over these

damned mountains." Japanese sniping and

banzai attacks continued until General Yamashita surrendered to the 32d Division

on the morning of 2 September. But for

most of the men the war was really over.

In the area where the 37th Division was

mopping up, a combat team at Cabagan

got the news from the loud triumphant

ringing of the village church bells. A

platoon out on patrol came marching back

to its company perimeter in formation at

right shoulder arms, to the cheers of the

entire company. Rifle volleys were fired

into the evening sky. Far up on the banks

of the Cagayan River in the tents of the

737th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company, the men were writing letters home

and preparing to go to bed when they

heard the news over the radio. Luckily

for the celebration that followed, Sergeant

Nussbaum had just broken out a beer

ration.1

On Zamboanga, where the 41st Division was training for the invasion of Japan,

the men got the first news of peace from

the firing of guns and flares aboard ships

in the harbor. As the news spread there

was more firing of weapons and "a feeling

of relief and thankfulness that the whole

bloody mess had come to an end."

 2 On

Okinawa, where the fighting had been

most bloody, there was a glorious celebration. Guns boomed, tracer bullets streaked

through the night in every direction, sirens

screeched, and searchlights fingered the

sky. One group of the 96th Division had

a ringside seat in Buckner Bay aboard ships

that were about to take them to the Philippines for rest and rehabilitation before they

went on to Japan. The men of another

group of the same division who had just

arrived off Luzon were deeply moved as

they gazed at Corregidor and Bataan.3

The guns fell silent. The task of assessment became foremost—assessment, in the

case of the Ordnance Department, of the

weapons and vehicles, and the Ordnance

doctrine and organization that had been

employed in the two-ocean war. In Europe such discussions had been going on

for several months. Indeed, by V-E Day

little on the subject of weapons could be 1

 (1) Maj. Gen. H. W. Blakeley, The 32d Infantry Division in World War II (Madison, Wis.,

n.d.), p. 265. (2) Frankel, The 37th Infantry

Division in World War II, p. 359. (3) History

737th Ord Light Maint Co, 1 May-31 Oct 44;

Nov 44-3 Feb 45; Apr-Aug 45.

2

 McCartney, The Jungleers, p. 157. 3

 Davidson, et al., The Deadeyes, p. 235.
476 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

added to the findings of General Barnes's

ZEBRA Mission of February 1945.4 The

Ordnance item that came under the sharpest fire from combat commanders was the

Sherman tank with the 75-mm. gun. Most

commanders liked the design of the new

Pershing tank with the 90-mm. gun, but

few had received it in time to determine

how well it performed in combat. The

only really revolutionary new American

weapon that got overseas in time for widespread combat use was the 2.36-inch rocket and launcher known as the bazooka

and first used in the Tunisia Campaign

in the spring of 1943. Experience had

proved that it was valuable in many ways

but that it was not powerful enough to

disable a German Panther or Tiger tank

at practicable ranges. The German handcarried weapon of this type, the Panzerjaust, was considerably more powerful.

Comparing American with German

weapons in the spring of 1945, General

Eisenhower reported to General Marshall

that, with the exception of German tanks,

"only the German bazooka may be considered superior to an item of ours."5

American pistols, rifles, and machine guns

were well liked. American artillery came

off well in the assessment. Even so dedicated a tanker as General Patton admitted

that the war "was largely won by the

artillery."6 Star performers were the 155-

mm. gun and the 105-mm., 8-inch, and

240-mm. howitzers. The 90-mm. antiaircraft gun did well in its antitank role,

though many experts placed it second to

its German counterpart, the famous 88-

mm. Effective artillery techniques and the

good quality of American ammunition

compensated in many cases for the more

advanced design of some of the German

guns. Rockets used as artillery had little

chance to prove themselves. Artillerymen

disliked the fin-stabilized 4.5-inch rocket

mainly because it was inaccurate. The

more accurate spin-stabilized model with a

suitable mount did not arrive in the European theater in time to make a significant

contribution to victory. Artillerymen of

World War II concluded that "the surface

has only been scratched in the development

of rockets."

 7

Experience had shown that mobility was

almost as greatly to be desired as firepower.

Commanders had been converted to selfpropelled artillery by the success of the

M12 155-mm. gun on its gun motor carriage and wanted all artillery ultimately to

be self-propelled. In the motor transport

field, 2 1/2-ton trucks and jeeps had been

plentiful and durable; the trucks withstood

an unbelievable amount of punishment

from careless or unskilled drivers. One

real innovation on the American side was

the DUKW, which made an invaluable

contribution to amphibious warfare both

in Europe and in the Pacific.

In the Pacific, commanders had been

satisfied with the Sherman tank, which was

better than anything the Japanese could

bring against it; indeed they considered

standard American Ordnance matériel of

all types generally superior to Japanese

counterparts. No new items such as the

4

 For findings of the ZEBRA Mission, see above, PP. 333-34. 5 Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 26 Mar 45,

Eisenhower Personal File. 6

 AGF Rpt 1032, Artillery Conference, Third

U.S. Army, I2th Army Gp 319.1.

7

 Conclusions and Recommendations Based on

Committee Studies at the Field Artillery Conference, Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, 18-29 March 1946.
THE GUNS FALL SILENT 477

Pershing tank and self-propelled artillery

were in great demand in the Pacific until

the large-scale cave warfare on Okinawa.

This was fortunate, because none were

available until after V-E Day; until then,

Europe had come first. Lacking such

weapons, the flame thrower Sherman tank

—a field improvisation by the Chemical

Warfare Service—carried the main burden

of cave warfare. There was only limited

use of the bazooka in the Pacific. Nor

were the commanders impressed by tests

of the few experimental 4.5-inch artillery

rockets sent to the theater. The main role

of the artillery rocket in the Pacific was to

serve as armament for landing craft, and

for this purpose the Navy's 4.5-inch rocket was preferred. American ammunition

in most calibers was dependable and effective in the Pacific as in Europe. The

only type seriously lacking was the illuminating shell, useful because of Japanese

night infiltration tactics.8

Twenty years after V-J Day, arguments

on the relative effectiveness of the weapons

of World War II seem almost as bootless

as the heated controversy raging in England during the first decade of the twentieth century on whether the lance should

replace the sword as the cavalryman's

principal weapon. More instructive is a

study of the reasons offered for the ineffectiveness of some of the American weapons when compared with their German

counterparts. The report of the Army

Ground Forces Equipment Review Board

in June of 1945 was critical of the Ordnance Department; on the other hand,

General Barnes, chief of Ordnance's research and development organization,

blamed the using services for acting as a

brake on the efforts of the Ordnance Department to arm the U.S. troops adequately. Between these two points of view

was the position of the Ordnance Section

of Army Ground Forces, of which the

executive officer, Lt. Col. George T. Petersen, had had long service overseas in Tunisia and Italy. Colonel Petersen and Col.

Edwin P. Mechling, Ordnance officer of

Army Ground Forces, pointed out, "The

policy of our development has too often

been a mere copying of revolutionary enemy equipment," and asked, "Why can't

we be first with the revolutionary development?" They concluded that the using

arms by being too specific and too rigid

in the characteristics they required in new

weapons had not encouraged revolutionary improvements. Army Ground Forces

had lacked foresight. On the other hand,

the Ordnance Department had not sufficiently consulted Army Ground Forces

during the design stages of new equipment.

Better understanding between the technician and the combat officer was essential;

one way of achieving it would be the assignment of Ordnance officers experienced

in development and design to duty with

troops, another would be to detail combat

officers to Ordnance

 9

Along with evaluating weapons development, the Ordnance officers who had

served in the field with the combat forces

evaluated the Ordnance doctrine that had

8

 (1) Roberts Rpt, 31 Jul 44. (2) Borden Observations, Jul-Aug 45.

9

 (1) Maj Gen Gladeon M. Barnes, USA Ret,

Comments on manuscript of Green, Thompson,

and Roots, Planning Munitions for War, Incl to

Ltr, Gen Barnes to Maj Gen Orlando Ward, 25

Jan 52. Copy in OHF. (2) Memo, Mechling and

Petersen for Ground Plans Section, 20 Aug 45,

sub: Comments of Ground Ordnance Section on

Equipment Review Board AGF Study, Files Ord

Officer, 400, Supplies and Equipment.
478 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

been published and taught in the schools

between World War I and World War II.

Most considered it antiquated. Conceived

largely in terms of the fixed position warfare of World War I, it had provided a

system too rigid and too formal, with complex administrative arrangements that

would have made it impossible for Ordnance

support to keep up with fast-moving tactical troops—if the system had been followed. Of necessity, Ordnance officers at

army level had simply discarded it and

evolved their own individual systems. No

two were exactly alike, and this had complicated the training problem and introduced other problems, but success in devising workable systems in the field produced

in most theaters, in the opinion of postwar

Army Ground Forces Ordnance officers,

"at least an approximation of good effective Ordnance service."

 10

The initiative of Ordnance officers overseas had brought about better organization

in the field at an early date in the war.

The Provisional Ordnance Group established in Oran in November 1942 antedated considerably the first Ordnance

group authorized in the United States in

April 1944, and was the pattern for the

Ordnance support system in all the armies

in the European theater. Ordnance officers

overseas also had to devote considerable

thought and effort to making the best use

of certain types of Ordnance companies.

Several companies were overspecialized;

for example, the tank maintenance company that supported tank and tank destroyer battalions only, wherever located,

and the antiaircraft maintenance company

that supported all antiaircraft combat units

no matter how widely scattered. The use

of such companies caused much confusion,

unnecessary travel, and congestion of the

road net. Some companies—such as the

evacuation company for moving armor

from collecting points to the rear—had no

place in the army area. On the other

hand, certain Ordnance missions developed

in every army area for which no suitable

company existed.11 One such mission was

that of bringing back all types of Ordnance

material from the battlefield This problem the Ordnance officer of First Army

solved in England by converting the evacuation company into a collecting company

and using the men left over to man his

radio net. Setting up a radio net to control Ordnance operations was one of the

most valuable of all field expedients.

The need for better communications

with Ordnance officers at corps, group,

and battalion level, who were usually widely dispersed, was only one of many problems arising from the size and complexity

of the Ordnance organization that was essential if the modern field army was to be

adequately supported. Many Ordnance officers at army level, faced with the task

of directing their large organization, felt

that they had not been adequately prepared for the job. Usually well trained

in technical subjects, they learned that they

would have benefited from training in

business administration or management.

Furthermore, the field army Ordnance officer was obliged not only to administer

10

 Brig Gen H. A. Nisley, Ordnance Service with

the Army Ground Forces, an address delivered to

the graduating class, Associate Basic Ordnance

Officers' Course, The Ordnance School, 31 October 1947, p. 4, app. 4 of Minutes of Army

Ground Forces Ordnance Conference, Ft. Monroe,

Va., 1-5 March 1948. 11

 Nisley Address, 31 Oct 47.
THE GUNS FALL SILENT 479

his own organization but also in nearly

all the armies had to engage in manufacturing, using indigenous labor, materials,

and facilities on a scale unheard of in the

past.12

Because of the ever-present need for field

improvisation to meet unpredictable situations, many participants in World War II,

looking back, felt that the prime Ordnance lesson was that good Ordnance

service to the combat troops depended

largely on the intelligence, resourcefulness,

and good judgment of the Ordnance officer sent overseas. Of him might be demanded the one characteristic Field Marshal von Runstedt demanded in an infantryman: "To learn quickly."13

 General Campbell, wartime Chief of Ordnance, regarded the selection of capable

officers for the field as one of his primary

duties, having been profoundly influenced

by a remark made to him just after World

War I by Brig. Gen. John H. Rice, chief

Ordnance officer of the American Expeditionary Force, "that if he had to go

through the war again he would spend

95% of his time selecting men for particular jobs, and the other 5% he would

spend in reading the newspapers!"

 14

In World Wars I and II there had been

a considerable number of capable men to

choose from. The Ordnance Department

had attracted them. A man's desire to belong to a respected organization, one to be

proud of, seemed to officers with wide experience in World War II to be very

strong—perhaps the strongest of all motivations.15

 The importance of esprit de corps

increased rather than lessened as warfare

became more and more mechanized. In

the words of a British military critic, "the

mechanical impersonality of war requires

to be counteracted by the greatest moral

stimulus."16 Whether large impersonal

logistical organizations such as those established in the early 1960's at the time of

the abolition of the Office, Chief of Ordnance, would be able to recruit the best

men remained to be seen.

Planning the future organization of Ordnance service to field forces in the immediate postwar years, the seasoned veterans of overseas service in World War II

were determined not to fall into the common error of "fighting the last war." Believing that push-button warfare was at

least ten years away, they planned for an

interim period in which they envisioned

increased requirements for dispersion, as

compared with World War II, and a very

high requirement for mobility. Beyond the

ten-year period the planners refused to go,

because at that time "we might have to

fight a wholly new type of war, the general shape of which is only dimly seen at

present."

 17

12

 (1) Niblo, Ordnance Lessons Learned During

World War II. (2) Ind by Brig Gen Philip G.

Blackmore, USA Ret, to Ltr, Lida Mayo to Blackmore, 6 Jan 64, OCMH. 13

 Danger Forward, p. 398. 14

 (1) Ltr, Lt Gen Levin H. Campbell, Jr., USA

Ret, to Harry C. Thomson, 29 Apr 49. OHF. (2)

Campbell Comments.

15

 Intervs with Maj Gen Nelson M. Lynde, USA

Ret, 10 Nov 64 and Gen Bruce C. Clarke, USA

Ret, 16 Nov 62.

16

 J. A. Terraine, "A Soldier's Soldier," The

Spectator, June 7, 1957, p. 742. 17

 Nisley Address, 31 Oct 47.

Bibliographical Note

To explore with any hope of success the

tons of records that arrived in U.S. ports

in shipload after shipload at the close of

World War II, the historian must quickly

decide where to begin. In research for

the present volume, the most obvious place

to look first was the Ordnance Section of

the European, Mediterranean, and Southwest Pacific theaters. The records of the

European and Mediterranean theater Ordnance Sections were found to be abundant

and good. In the Southwest Pacific Area,

because of differences in organization and

situation, the files of the Ordnance officer

of the United States Army Services of Supply were the most fruitful sources.

Of particular interest because of the

scheme of this volume were the records of

the Ordnance officers of the various armies.

All were different. By far the most voluminous were those of the Ordnance officer of Fifth Army, who issued a daily

mimeographed Ordnance Operations Bulletin with many annexes—reports on specific operations, inspections, tests of new

weapons, and so on. Next in bulk were

the very full typewritten monthly after

action reports of the Ordnance officer of

First Army, appended as annexes to the

First Army after action reports. The Ninth

Army Ordnance officer's somewhat briefer

monthly reports were included in Ninth's

monthly G-4 reports. The best sources for

Third Army in Europe as well as Seventh

Army in Sicily (the Ordnance officer was

the same) are the Ordnance annexes to the

final reports of those armies. For Seventh

Army Ordnance in southern France the

best sources are 6th Army Group weekly

G-4 reports for Seventh Army and the

monthly reports of two Ordnance groups.

In the Southwest Pacific, the Ordnance

officers of Sixth and Eighth Armies produced book-length histories of their operations, reproduced for wide distribution. The

Tenth Army Ordnance officer prepared a

very full typewritten report, with copious

annexes, of operations on Okinawa.

Other valuable manuscript sources were

the files of the I2th Army Group, particularly the daily Ordnance Section Journal; the G-4 journals of armies, task forces

(especially in the Southwest Pacific), and

corps; and the after action reports of

tactical units.

The periodic reports of Ordnance groups,

battalions, and companies yielded rich returns. Many of the company histories are

perfunctory and most are hard on the eyes,

being written usually either with a worn

typewriter ribbon or in longhand; but a

surprising number tell very vividly what

the men did, saw, and felt.

Preoccupation with records generated in

the theaters should not lead the historian

to overlook records accumulated throughout the war by headquarters in the United

States concerned with overseas operations.

The Army Service Forces files were rich

in Ordnance material, particularly those

of the Maintenance and Distribution Divisions and the Planning Division's Theater

Branch. The files of the Army Ground

Forces Ordnance officer contributed much,

as did the AGF Board Reports on Ordnance subjects.
482 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

The best single collection of Ordnance

primary sources was close at hand in the

Historical Branch, Office, Chief of Ordnance: long, informative personal letters

to the Chief of Ordnance from Ordnance

officers serving overseas at many levels;

mission reports, notably those of the early

Middle East missions; travel reports and

key personnel final reports. In addition

to this type of material, the Historical

Branch files included lengthy manuscript

histories, in several volumes, of the ETO

and MTO Ordnance Sections; two file

cabinets of data on weapons turned over

to the branch by Maj. Gen. Gladeon M.

Barnes (cited as Barnes File); a set of

the Ordnance studies prepared by the

U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET)

Board; and miscellaneous papers of considerable importance. These holdings of

the Ordnance Historical Branch, cited in

the footnotes as OHF (Ordnance Historical Files), were deposited in the Federal

Records Center, General Services Administration, Alexandria, Virginia, when the

Office, Chief of Ordnance, was abolished.

They were later transferred to the National

Archives.

The National Archives, the principal repository for U.S. Army records of World

War II, may be assumed to be the location

of documents cited in this volume unless

another repository is indicated. The second largest collection of pertinent official

Army records of the period was at the time

of writing located in the Army Records

Center, Kansas City, Missouri (cited as

KCRC), which in 1960 was absorbed

by the Federal Records Center, General

Services Administration, Kansas City,

Missouri.

The information in the official records

has been supplemented by the author's interviews and correspondence with participants. These are filed in OCMH. Other

interviews, unless otherwise specified, are

filed in OCMH.

Among the printed sources the most

valuable were the volumes published by

the Office, Chief of Military History, in

the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II, almost every one of

which has been used in the preparation

of this volume. The author has also frequently consulted the multivolume "History of United States Naval Operations in

World War II" by Samuel Eliot Morison;

"The Army Air Forces in World War II"

series, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and

James Lea Cate; two Marine Corps monographs, The Campaign in New Britain

by Lt. Col. Frank O. Hough and Maj.

John A. Crown, and Okinawa: Victory in

the Pacific by Maj. Charles S. Nichols, Jr.,

and Henry I. Shaw, Jr.; and several volumes in the official war histories of the

United Kingdom and Australia. Published histories of U.S. armies, corps, divisions, and battalions have been cited

throughout. Memoirs and biographies

have been useful, and the numerous books

by war correspondents have added color

and interest. The most important magazine articles were those written by Ordnance men with firsthand knowledge of

overseas operations and they appeared most

often in Ordnance (formerly Army Ordnance), Military Review, and Firepower.
Glossary

AA

AAA

AAF

AAR

ABC

ABDA

ACofS

Actg

Admin

AdminO

ADSEG

AFB

AFHQ

AFWESPAC

AG

AGF

AGWAR

AMMISCA

AP

APD

Armd

ASCOM

ASD

ASF

ASP

AW

BAM

BAR

BCL

Bd

Br

BS

CBI

CBS

CDL

CinC

Comdr

Antiaircraft

Antiaircraft artillery

Army Air Forces

After action report

American-British Conversations (January-March

1941)

American-British-Dutch-Australian (Command)

Assistant Chief of Staff

Acting

Administration; administrative

Administrative order

Advance Section (on Continent)

Air Force Base

Allied Force Headquarters (Mediterranean)

U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific

Adjutant General

Army Ground Forces

Code letters for War Department messages

American Military Mission to China

Armor-piercing

High-speed transports

Armored

Army Service Command (Southwest Pacific)

Ammunition supply dump (British)

Army Service Forces

Ammunition supply point

Air warning

Base automotive maintenance

Browning automatic rifle

Barge, concrete, large

Board

Branch

Base Section

China-Burma-India

Continental Base Section

Canal Defense Light

Commander in Chief

Commander
484 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

CMH

CofOrd

CofS

COMGENAFMIDPAC

COMGENTEN

COMZ

CONAD

Conf

COrdO

CP

C&P

CPBC

CTF

DCofS

DD

DDAR

Det

DUKW

EBS

EEIB

Engr

ETF

ETO

ETOUSA

FA

FECOMZ

Flak

FS

FUSA

FUSAG

G-1

G-2

G-3

G-4

GHQ

Gp

HAM

HB

HE

Chief of Military History

Chief of Ordnance

Chief of Staff

Commanding General, Army Forces, Mid-Pacific

Commanding General, Tenth Army

Communications Zone

Continental Advance Section (Europe)

Conference

Chief Ordnance Officer

Command post

Cleaning and preserving

Central Pacific Base Command

Center Task Force (North Africa)

Deputy Chief of Staff

Duplex drive

Division of Defense Aid Reports

Detachment

21⁄2-ton amphibious truck

Eastern Base Section (Mediterranean and

England)

Enemy Equipment Intelligence Branch

Engineer

Eastern Task Force (North Africa)

European Theater of Operations

European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

Field army; field artillery

Forward Echelon, Communications Zone

(Europe)

Flugabwehrkanone, German antiaircraft gun

Fast Supply (ships)

First U.S. Army

1st U.S. Army Group

Personnel section of divisional or higher staff

Intelligence section of divisional or higher staff

Operations and training section of divisional or

higher staff

Supply section of divisional or higher staff

General Headquarters

Group

Heavy automotive maintenance

Historical Branch

High explosive
GLOSSARY 485

HM

HVAP

Incl

Ind

Insp

Instr

Interv

ISCOM

Jnl

KCRC

Kwk

LCI

LCM

LCT

LCVP

LM

LSM

LST

LVT

LVT (1)

LVT (A)

Maint

MAM

MBS

MFR

MIM

Min

MM

MNAM

M&S

Msg

MTO

MTOUSA

MVA

MVD

N.A.

NAMM

NATO

NATOUSA

N.G.

NGF

NIBC

Heavy maintenance

High-velocity, armor-piercing

Inclosure

Indorsement

Inspection

Instructions

Interview

Island Command (Okinawa)

Journal

Kansas City Records Center

Kampfwagenkanone, German tank gun

Landing craft, infantry

Landing craft, mechanized

Landing craft, tank

Landing craft, vehicle and personnel

Light maintenance

Landing ship, medium

Landing ship, tank

Landing vehicle, tracked

Landing vehicle, tracked, unarmored, Alligator

Landing vehicle, tracked, armored (turret type)

Maintenance

Medium automotive maintenance

Mediterranean Base Section

Memo for record

Military Iranian Mission

Minutes

Medium maintenance

Military North African Mission

Maintenance and supply

Message

Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

Motor vehicle assembly (company)

Motor vehicle distributing (company)

North Africa

North African Military Mission

North African Theater of Operations

North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

New Guinea

New Guinea Force

Northern Ireland Base Command
486 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

NUSA

NYPE

OCM

OCO

OCT

OHF

OMET

O.O.

O.O.B.

OPD

Opn

Ord

Orgn

Pak

PBS

Plng

POA

POE

POG

POM

POZIT fuze

PROCO

Prov

Pzkw

QM

RAAF

Rad

RAF

RAOC

RASC

RCT

Recn

REME

RPH

Rpt

SBS

Sec

Secy

Serv

SFPOE

SHAEF

SNL

Ninth U.S. Army

New York Port of Embarkation

Ordnance Committee Minutes

Office of the Chief of Ordnance

Office of the Chief of Transportation

Ordnance Historical. Files

Ordnance Middle East Tasks

Ordnance Office

Ordnance Office Bulletin

Operations Division

Operation

Ordnance

Organization

Panzerabwehrkanone, German antitank gun

Peninsular Base Section (Italy)

Planning

Pacific Ocean Areas

Port of Embarkation

Provisional Ordnance Group

Preparation for Overseas Movement

European theater term for proximity fuze or VT

Projects for continental operations

Provisional

Panzerkampfwagen, German tank

Quartermaster

Royal Australian Air Force

Radiogram

Royal Air Force

Royal Army Ordnance Corps

Royal Army Service Corps

Regimental combat team

Reconnaissance

Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

Remember Pearl Harbor (Group)

Report

Southern Base Section (England)

Section

Secretary

Service

San Francisco Port of Embarkation

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force

Standard Nomenclature List
GLOSSARY 487

SOLOC

SOPAC

SOS

SP

SPA

Spec

SPOBS

SS

SSUSA

Sub

SUP

SWPA

TAG

TAP

T/BA

TC

TD

T/E

Tech

TICAF

Tk

T/O

TOE

TUP

TUSA

U.K.

USAAS

USAFBI

USAFFE

USAFIA

USAFICPA

USAFIME

USAFPOA

USANIBC

USANIF

USASOS

USAT

USFET

USFIA

USFIP

Southern Line of Communications

South Pacific Area; South Pacific Force

Services of Supply

Self-propelled

South Pacific Area

Special

Special Observer Group

Special Staff

Special Staff, U.S. Army

Subject

Single unit pack for vehicles

Southwest Pacific Area

The Adjutant General

Truck assembly plants

Table of basic allowances

Transportation Corps

Tank destroyer

Table of equipment

Technical

The Industrial College of the Armed Forces

Tank

Table of organization

Table of organization and equipment

Twin unit pack for vehicles

Third U.S. Army

United Kingdom

United States Army Air Services

United States Army Forces in the British Isles

United States Army Forces, Far East

United States Army Forces in Australia

United States Army Forces in Central Pacific

Area

United States Army Forces in the Middle East

United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas

United States Army Northern Ireland Base

Command

United States Army Northern Ireland Force

United States Army Services of Supply

U.S. Army transport

United States Forces in the European Theater

United States Forces in Australia

United States Forces in the Philippines
488 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

USMNAM

USSR

UXB

VT

WBS

WD

WDGS

WPD

U.S. Military North African Mission

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Unexploded bomb

Proximity fuze

Western Base Section (England)

War Department

War Department General Staff

War Plans Division
Code Names

ALAMO

AMOEBA

ANVIL

ARCADIA

AVALANCHE

BACKHANDER

BATTLEAXE

BOLERO

BREWER

BYPRODUCT

CENT

CHRONICLE

COBRA

CONQUER

CORONET

CYCLONE

DEXTERITY

DIME

DIRECTOR

DRAGOON

ESCALATOR

FABIUS

FLASHPOINT

GLOBETROTTER

GRENADE

HURRICANE

HUSKY

ICEBERG

INDIGO

INTERLUDE

JOSS

Task force directly under GHQ SWPA

(MacArthur).

Advance Sub-Base C, Goodenough Island.

Early plan for the invasion of southern France.

U.S.-British conference in Washington, December

1941-January 1942.

Invasion of Italy at Salerno.

Task force for Cape Gloucester.

British Eighth Army operation at Halfaya Pass,

June 1941.

Build-up of U.S. troops and supplies in United

Kingdom for cross-Channel invasion.

Task force for Admiralties.

Task force for Kiriwina.

Scoglitti beaches, Sicily.

Invasion of Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands.

First Army operations in the Cotentin, France,

July 1944.

Code name for Ninth Army.

Plan for invasion of Honshu at the Tokyo plain.

Task force for Noemfoor.

Invasion of New Britain.

Gela beaches, Sicily.

Task force for Arawe area.

Invasion of southern France.

Code name for ALAMO Force.

May 1944 dress rehearsal for invasion of

Normandy.

Ninth Army crossing of the Rhine.

Operations in northwest New Guinea near Cape

Sansapor.

21 Army Group offensive from Roer to Rhine.

Task force for Biak.

Invasion of Sicily.

Invasion of the Ryukyus.

Plan for movement of U.S. troops to Iceland.

Operations on Morotai.

Licata beaches, Sicily.
490 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

KINO I

KING II

KOOL

LAZARETTO

LEATHERBACK

LETTERPRESS

LOVE III

MAGNET

MAPLE

MICHAELMAS

MIKE

NEPTUNE

NOISELESS

OLYMPIC

OMAHA

OVERLORD

PEMMICAN

PENUMBRA

PERSECUTION

POPPY

RAINBOW

RECKLESS

ROUNDUP

SATIN

SHAGGY

SHINGLE

SLEDGEHAMMER

SUMAC

TABLETENNIS

THE WHIP

TIGER

Plan for operations on Mindanao, canceled.

Invasion of Philippines at Leyte, October 1944.

Reserve force for Sicily.

Task force for Gasmata, New Britain.

Task force for Woodlark.

Task force tor Humboldt Bay, New Guinea.

Mindoro operation.

Movement of the first U.S. forces to Ireland.

U.S. advance base at Port Moresby.

Task force for Saidor, northeast New Guinea.

Series of plans for operations on Luzon.

Actual 1944 operations within OVERLORD. Used

for security reasons after September 1943.

Task force for Tanahmerah Bay, New Guinea.

Plan for March 1946 invasion of Kyushu, Japan.

U.S. V Corps beach in Normandy, June 1944.

Allied cross-Channel invasion of northwest

Europe, June 1944.

Advance Base A, Milne Bay, New Guinea.

Advance Sub-base B, Oro Bay, New Guinea.

Task force for Aitape, New Guinea.

Name for force to be sent to New Caledonia in

early 1942.

Various plans prepared between 1939 and 1941 to

meet Axis aggression involving more than one

enemy.

Task force for Hollandia, New Guinea.

Plan for major U.S.-British cross-Channel operation in 1943.

U.S. II Corps operation against Sfax, Tunisia,

January 1943, canceled.

MICHAELMAS task force resupply point at Cape

Cretin, New Guinea.

Invasion of Italy at Anzio.

Allied plan for a limited cross-Channel attack in

1942.

Early code name for Australia.

Operation at Noemfoor Island, New Guinea.

Early code name for the bazooka.

U.S. VII Corps full-dress rehearsal for UTAH

assault, Slapton Sands, England, April 1944.
CODE NAMES 491

TlLEFER

TORCH

TORNADO

TRADEWIND

TRIDENT

TYPHOON

UTAH

VICTOR

ZEBRA

Code name for assembly of boxed and cased

American vehicles in British Isles under the

British Ministry of Supply.

Allied operations in French north and northwest

Africa, November 1942.

Task force Arawe-Toem area, New Britain.

Task force for Morotai, New Guinea

U.S.-British conference held in Washington, May

1943.

Task force for Cape Sansapor, New Guinea.

U.S. VII Corps beach in Normandy, June 1944.

Series of operations in central and southern

Philippines.

Barnes mission to Europe, February 1945.
Basic Military Map Symbols

Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within

a triangle an observation post, and within a circle a supply

point.

Military Units—Identification

Antiaircraft Artillery .................................. .

Armored Command................................... .

Army Air Forces...................................... .

Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery ........... .

Cavalry, Horse ....................................... .

Cavalry, Mechanized.................................. .

Chemical Warfare Service.............................. .

Coast Artillery ....................................... .

Engineers ........................................... .

Infantry. ............................................ .

Medical Corps ....................................... .

Ordnance Department................................. .

Quartermaster Corps.................................. .

Signal Corps ......................................... .

Tank Destroyer....................................... .

Transportation Corps.................................. .

Veterinary Corps...................................... .

Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing

symbol with the arm or service symbol:

Airborne Artillery..................................... .

Airborne Infantry..................................... .
BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS 493

Size Symbols

The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or

above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying

arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization:

Squad .............................................. .

Section.............................................. .

Platoon ............................................. .

Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight ................. .

Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron ......... .

Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT following identifying numeral) .......................... .

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force

Wing............................................. .

Division or Command of an Air Force.................... .

Corps or Air Force .................................... .

Army............................................. .

Group of Armies.................................... .

EXAMPLES

The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the

unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent

unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below

boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines:

Company A, 137th Infantry ........................ .

8th Field Artillery Battalion......................... .

Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division........... .

Observation Post, 23d Infantry...................... .

Command Post, 5th Infantry Division ................ .

Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry .......... .

Weapons

Machine gu n ........................................ .

Gun................................................ .

G u n battery ......................................... .

Howitzer or Mortar ................................... .

Tank ............................................... .

Self-propelled gu n .................................... .


UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War Department

Chief of Staff : Prewar Plans and Preparations

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945

The Army and Economic Mobilization

The Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground Forces

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops

The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service Forces

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western Hemisphere

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the Pacific

The Fall of the Philippines

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive

Victory in Papua

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls

Campaign in the Marianas

The Approach to the Philippines

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

Triumph in the Philippines

Okinawa: The Last Battle

Strategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy

Salerno to Cassino

Cassino to the Alps

The European Theater of Operations

Cross-Channel Attack

Breakout and Pursuit

The Lorraine Campaign

The Siegfried Line Campaign

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge

The Last Offensive
The Supreme Command

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II

The Middle East Theater

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India Theater

Stilwell's Mission to China

Stilwell's Command Problems

Time Runs Out in CBI

The Technical Services

The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War

The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field

The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany

The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor

Theaters

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War

The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply

The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany

The Signal Corps: The Emergency

The Signal Corps: The Test

The Signal Corps: The Outcome

The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special Studies

Chronology: 1941-1945

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945

Rearming the French

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt

The Women's Army Corps

Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors

Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces

The Employment of Negro Troops

Manhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial Record

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Japan

Index

Aachen, 294, 301, 311, 318, 332

ABC, 4, 5, 88

ABDA Command, 39-42, 49

ABDAIR, 39

Aberdeen Proving Ground, 24, 25, 30, 33, 200, 231,

349

Abuyog, 402

Adelaide, 48, 50, 51, 54, 57

Admiral Halstead, 35

Admiralty Islands, 368-69

Advance Base A (Milne Bay), 357

Advance New Guinea Force, 66, 76, 77, 82, 85

Advance Section (ADSEC), Communications Zone,

ETOUSA, 226-27, 251, 259, 260, 263, 278-82,

295, 307, 319, 341, 348

Advance shipments, 220, 221-22, 237

Advance Subbase B (Oro Bay), 357

Advance Subbase C (Goodenough Island), 357

Advanced Base Section, New Guinea, 77

Aegenesluku Island, 454

Ahioma, 357, 359, 364

Aïn Beïda, 129

Aintree Racecourse, 100

Air Commander, American-British-DutchAustralian Command (ABDAIR), 39

Air Forces

Fifth, 57, 77, 79, 402

Eighth, 231

Ninth, 22

Twelfth, 111, 231

Air Service Command, Fifth Air Force, 57

Airborne Corps, XVIII, 312-13, 344

Airborne Divisions

11th, 421, 426

82d, 164, 180, 232, 247, 248, 313

101st, 232, 247, 248, 313-14

Aitape, 370, 375-76

Aix-en-Provence, 288

Akureyri, 8, 9

Alacrity, 72-73

ALAMO Force, 356, 362, 366, 368, 369-70, 383-84,

390

Albano, 200, 205

Alexander, General Sir Harold R. L. G., 128, 138,

142, 152, 172, 187, 209

Alexandria, Egypt, 25

Algeria, 109, 128

Algiers, 102, 109, 117, 120, 127, 152, 158, 284, 285

Aliamanu Crater, 446

Alice Springs, 51

Allen, Maj. Gen. Terry de la Mesa, 116

Allied Air Forces, SWPA, 44, 55

Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), 102, 121, 123,

124, 125, 129, 132, 136, 137, 140, 150, 171

Ordnance Section, 127

planning for DRAGOON, 284-85, 287

Allied Land Forces, SWPA, 44, 55, 65, 356

Allied Naval Forces, SWPA, 44

Amberley Field, 37

American-British Conversations. See ABC.

American-British-Dutch-Australian Command.

See ABDA Command.

American Legion, 92

American Military Mission to China (AMMISCA),

12-16

American Purchasing Commission, 45

Ammunition. See also Ammunition, U.S.

Ammo Joe, 185-86

antitank, 31-32

artillery, 104, 198-99, 250, 366

"balanced artillery firepower," 206-08

basic load, 148, 229-30

captured, use of, 31, 33, 303, 346-48, 347n

combat supply, Europe, 263, 270-71, 275-76,

308-09, 311-12, 316

combat supply, Mediterranean; 179, 187, 211

combat supply, Pacific, 369, 373, 377, 379, 380,

399, 418-21, 440, 468

high expenditure of, by U.S. troops, 77-78, 211,

250, 377, 419, 462, 465

improper handling of, Sicily, 167-68

loss by fires, 67-68, 73, 159, 198, 252, 263n, 374,

399

lot sorting, 179, 185-86, 238, 244, 366, 379

rationing, 251, 267, 421

redeployment of stocks, 350

resupply methods and problems, 187, 206-08,

217, 395-96

shortages, Europe, 104, 166, 187, 251, 266-67,

279, 301-03, 314

shortages, Pacific, 76-77, 420-21, 421n, 452, 460-

61, 464-65

storage, 9, 41, 98, 196-98, 280, 294, 358

supply to Air Forces, 149n

supply stocks, Europe, 9, 93, 170, 184-86, 198-

99, 227-28, 251, 267-68, 267n, 294, 303, 340

supply stocks, Mediterranean, 148

supply stocks, Pacific, 45-46, 66, 77-80, 363, 401-

02, 413, 418, 450

units of fire, 89, 89n, 148-49, 187, 228, 395,

405n, 410

Ammunition, German, 27, 30, 31, 349

Ammunition, U.S.

57-mm. HE, 251
500 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Ammunition, U.S.—Continued

75-mm., 322

81-mm. mortar, 78, 251, 465

105-mm., 77, 186

HE, 76, 78, 301

HVAP, 322, 327, 335, 336, 340

"shaped charge," 31

small arms, 77-79

Ammunition supply dumps (ASD's), British, 98

Ammunition supply points (ASP's)

ASP 126, 304, 309

ASP 128, 307, 308

ASP 501, 244, 249, 251

in Europe, 148, 164, 167, 184-87, 196-98, 211,

248, 249, 251, 287, 345

floating, 468

mobile or "rolling," 262, 270-71, 276

in Pacific, 398-401, 420-21, 435

AMOEBA (Advance Subbase C), Goodenough Island, 357

Amphibious operations

Europe, 221, 228, 229, 240-48, 283-85, 287

Mediterranean, 116, 153, 156-57, 160-61, 169,

172-73, 178-79, 191-92

Pacific, 354, 397, 418, 429, 436, 457

Amphibious trucks. See Trucks, DUKW's.

Amsterdam Island, 383

Ancon, 178

Anderson, Pfc. John, 420

Anderson, General Sir Kenneth A. N., 120, 123,

124, 131

Andimeshk (TAP I), 23n

Angers, 261

Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion, 197th,

271

Antiaircraft repair teams, 367, 367n

Antrim, 91

Antwerp, 267, 302-03, 315, 318, 320

ANVIL, 283. See also DRAGOON.

Anzio, 173, 191-212, 215, 217

Anzio Annie, 199, 200, 201, 288

APD's, 364, 366

Apweiler, 324

Arare, 377, 378, 379

Arawe, 362, 364-65

l'Arba, 121

ARCADIA Conference, 88

Ardennes, 292, 294, 304-17, 327-28

Argentan-Falaise pocket, 268-69

Arko, Private, 185

Armored Corps, I, 140, 152, 153-54. See also

Army, Seventh.

Armored Divisions. See also Combat Commands,

Armored Divisions,

1st, 92, 93, 103, 104, 111, 124, 132, 135, 138,

139, 142, I44-46, 192

2d, 157, 159, 165, 232, 318, 321-23, 325-27,

334n, 343

Armored Divisions—Continued

3d, 232, 332, 334

4th, 262, 266, 275, 314

5th, 264, 268

6th, 262, 263, 266

7th, 275, 313, 321

9th, 332

12th, 292

14th, 291, 292

Armored Fighting Vehicles School (Australia), 54

Armored Flame Thrower Battalion, 713th, 451, 453,

463, 470

Armored Force Board, 328, 330, 338

Armored Groups

9th, 306

13th, 417

Armored Regiments

66th, 326

67th, 325, 325n, 327

Army, First, 176, 219, 227, 228, 235, 236, 251, 253,

261, 263, 281, 339

advance across France, 268-74

Ardennes, 292, 306, 309-12, 315, 316

and captured matériel, 346-48

and COBRA operation, 254, 255, 258

and Normandy invasion, 249-50

Ordnance plans for OMAHA, 232-33, 236-38

Ordnance Service, 245, 255, 269, 274, 296, 309

priority of men and supplies, 259, 293

Remagen crossing, 342, 344

Roer offensive, 321-24

Siegfried Line and supply famine, 294-304

tanks and rockets, 332-34, 336

after V-E Day, 350-52

Army, Third, 219, 236, 258, 263, 266-67, 281-83,

289-92, 302, 336, 339, 343, 344

Ardennes campaign, 314-17

Argentan-Falaise pocket, 268-69

Brittany campaign, 260-61

and captured matériel, 347

Ordnance Service, 258-59, 274n

supply and personnel shortages, 258-60

sweep across France, 275-80

Army, Fifth, 136, 138, 182, 187-89, 195, 209, 211,

213

Administrative Instructions, 184

and artillery weapons, 202-05, 216

and daily ammunition expenditure reports, 185

Ordnance Service, 174-77, 184, 186, 187, 190,

193, 195, 217

Salerno landing, 172-73

Army, Sixth, 356, 368, 387, 403, 404, 406, 424, 442

assumes control of ammunition ashore, 413, 418,

420

central Visayan Islands, 432

Leyte assault, 397-99

Ordnance Section, 355, 356, 363-64, 366, 415n,

421, 422
INDEX 501

Army, Sixth—Continued

Ordnance Service Center, 411, 425

planning for Leyte, 392-94

planning for Luzon, 409-11

units under, 353-54

Army, Seventh, 236, 339, 344

and captured matériel, 347

Ordnance Service, 292

Sicily Campaign, 152, 153, 164-67, 169-70

southern France, 213, 219, 283-93

Army, Eighth, 387, 392, 403-04, 406, 426, 429-30,

435, 442

Army, Ninth, 219, 236, 294, 302, 318-20, 335, 350

and captured matériel, 346-47

and Rhine crossing, 342-44

and Roer offensive, 321-24, 339-40

Army, Tenth, 442, 447-50, 456-70

Army, Fifteenth, 219, 236, 339, 344

Army Garrison Force (Oahu), 448

Army Ground Forces (AGF), 33, 174, 204, 300.

See also McNair, Lt. Gen. Lesley J.

and new tanks, the Roer and the Ardennes, 330-

32, 338

and 90-mm. gun, 329

and Ordnance Department, 477

Army Ground Forces Equipment Review Board,

477

Army Group, 21 (British), 219, 227, 238, 268, 312,

339, 342

Army Groups, U.S.

1st, 219

6th, 219, 290, 292, 293, 319

12th, 219, 236, 258, 260, 267, 267n, 274n, 275,

291, 293, 295, 301-02, 306, 313, 318, 320-21,

332, 336, 345

15th, 172

18th, 138

Army Port and Service Command, 446

Army Service Command (ASCOM), SWPA, 393,

395, 400, 409-10, 417-18, 420, 424

Army Service Forces (ASF), 87, 154, 156, 175,

237, 238, 329-30, 335. See also Somervell, Lt.

Gen. Brehon B.

Arnaville, 279

Arnim, Generaloberst Hans-Juergen von, 124, 128,

135, 140

Arnold, Maj. Gen. Henry H., 3

Artamonoff, Lt. Col. George L., 116-17, 119, 127,

188, 292, 339

Artillery. See also Guns; Howitzers; Mortars.

Allies' best counterweapon, 214-15

Army's interest in heavy, 153, 204, 216

assessment of, 476

"balanced artillery firepower," 206-08

captured German, use of, 348

comparison of U.S. and German, 139-40, 149,

215, 476

effectiveness at Kasserine, 140

Artillery—Continued

gas check pads, 299

gun-howitzer pairing policy, 201-05

need for heavy artillery at Anzio, 201, 204

need for heavy artillery in Pacific, 451-52

in Roer offensive, 326

self-propelled, 153, 215-16, 332, 469, 473

support by British in MAGNET, 89

Artillery, Australian, 71, 72, 74, 75

Artillery, British, 26, 27, 29, 54, 61, 89, 331, 336

Artillery, French, 31, 102, 300

Artillery, German, 24-31, 30n, 33, 139-40, 149,

200-201, 204-05, 214-16, 267, 304, 328, 344,

348-49, 476

Artillery, Japanese, 380, 415-16, 460, 462, 470

Arzew, 110, 114-16, 118, 119, 151, 156

Asa Kawa River, 468

Ashchurch, 96, 100, 101, 106-08, 221, 223-24

Asmara, 18, 19, 21

Atlantic Base Section, 124, 138

Atlantic Conference, 11

Atlas Mountains, 122

Auchinleck, Lt. Gen. Sir Claude J. E., 17, 19

Audouville-la-Hubert, 247

Audun-le-Roman, 316

Austin Motor Works (Treforest), 224

Australia, 34, 36, 38, 42-43, 46-48, 51-52

Australia-New Guinea Administrative Unit

(ANGAU), 66, 376

Australian Army, 53-55

Australian 7th Infantry Division, 59, 60, 66, 68

AVALANCHE, 172-81

Avellino, 183

Avranches, 254, 258, 260, 262-63

Awashi, 468

Aylesbury, Marquess of, 98

Aywaille, 305-07, 306n, 309, 311

Badoglio, Marshal Pietro, 172, 173

Baghdad, 20, 22

Baie des Andalouses, 110, 111

Baku, 23

"Balanced personnel" concept, 127

Balancelles, 145

Baldwin, Hanson W., 336

Balete Pass, 42in, 425

Ballykinler, 107

Balungao, 424, 425

Bandar Shahpur, 23

Barber, Pfc. Daniel, 305

Barges, concrete, 388-92

Barnes, Maj. Gen. Gladeon M., 144, 204, 338, 473,

477 on 90-mm. gun controversy, 329

on tank controversy, 329-30, 332

ZEBRA Mission, 332, 333, 335, 476

Barnes, Brig. Gen. Julian F., 35, 36, 39, 45, 51

Barney, Lt. Col. Tyler D., 74, 77, 79
502 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Barry, 221

Bartow, 1st Lt. Charles P., 161

Base F (Finschhafen), 387, 390

Base G (Humboldt Bay), 387, 391

Base K (ASCOM), SWPA, 393, 404, 409-10, 428,

435

Base M (ASCOM), SWPA, 409, 418-20, 425

Base R (Luzon), 427

Base S (Cebu), 435

Base sections, 48-50, 101, 103, 124-25, 218.

See also by individual name.

BaseX (Manila), 426

Bastogne, 270, 307, 313-16

Bataan, 421

Batangas Bay, 426, 427

Batchelor Field, 38, 49

Bathurst Island, 37

Battle of the Bulge. See Ardennes.

Battle sleds, 210

BATTLEAXE, 24, 25

Battlefield recovery, 143-45, 175, 234, 312

Bayambang, 413

Baybay, 399, 402

Bayonets, 86, 144

Bazookas. See Rocket launchers.

Beaumesnil, 270

Becker, Col. Ward E., 141, 403, 404, 429-30, 431

Bedja, 145-46, 147

Belden, Jack, 162

Belfast, 91-92

Belfort Gap, 288

Beli Beli Bay, 360

Bell, M. Sgt. Leroy, 224

Bellevue, 100

Bender, Tech. 5 Robert H., 262

Benghazi, 21, 159

Bennett, Capt. George B., 150, 289

Berea Victory, 468

Bertrix, 308-09

Besancon, 291

Biak, 377, 379-81

Bicol Peninsula, 426, 427

Bideford, 228

Binmaley, 412

Bir Hacheim, 30

Birdum, 51

Biscari airfield, 164

Bismarck, 7

Bismarck Archipelago, 58, 354

Bizerte, 109, 120, 122, 124, 128, 142, 145-46,

158-59

Blackmore, Brig. Gen. Philip G., 353, 356-59, 362,

368-69, 395, 399, 408-09, 415n, 416, 418, 421,

423-24

Blarney, General Sir Thomas, 44, 55, 65, 66, 356

Blandford, Capt. Paul S., Jr., 197, 198

"Blast bomb," 79

Blay, 249

Blodgett, Maj. Robert S., 55-57

Bloemfontein, 35, 37

Boatner, Maj. Haydon L., 13

Bohol, 433, 435

Boise, 177, 411

BOLERO, 93-94, 98, 101, 103

Bolte, Brig. Gen. Charles L., 94

Bomb disposal, 189n, 231-32, 347-48, 382, 433-34,

438-39

Bomb Disposal Squads, 189n, 234

27th, 244

100th, 384, 404

108th, 414

181st, 438, 439

182d, 438

183d, 433-34

184th, 433

Bombardment Group (Heavy), 7th, 34

Bombardment Squadron, 71st, 49

Bombay, 18-20

Bombs, 79, 189n, 231. See also Bomb disposal.

Bone, 121, 122, 145

Bonwin, 72

Booz, 1st Lt. Spencer B., 40

Borden, Brig. Gen. William A.

North African visit, 146-47, 149, 152, 174n

European visit, 335-36

Pacific visits, 361-62, 472-74

Bou Chebka, 128, 129, 132, 186

Bougainville, 407, 408

Boughton, 222

Bougie, 141

Bourgoin, 288, 289

"Boxcars" (England), 460

Bradley, Lt. Gen. Omar N., 138, 219, 233, 235,

254, 266, 267, 296

ammunition shortages, 251, 302

Ardennes, 315-16

new tanks and artillery, 331-32

Normandy, 247-50

Sicily Campaign, 164-70

Tunisia Campaign, 142, 145, 146

12th Army Group operations, 258, 267-69

Braybrooke, 108

Breakneck Ridge, 402, 404

Breandown, 228

Brereton, Maj. Gen. Lewis H., 39

Brest, 260, 262, 263, 266, 267, 318

Brett, Maj. Gen. George H., 36-39, 42, 44-46,

49, 53, 55, 57

Bricker, Col. Levi M., 227

Bricquebec, 258, 260, 262

Brignoles, 287

Brisbane, 36-37, 49, 50, 61, 353

base section, 38-40, 48, 53-54, 60, 62, 64, 67, 77,

81, 393-94

Bristol, 231

British troops in Northern Ireland, 91, 92
INDEX 503

British units

Armoured Brigade, 26th, 136

Armoured Division, 79th, 229

Army, First, 120, 122, 123, 131, 136, 138, 142,

146

Army, Second, 219, 320

Army, Eighth, 21, 22, 24, 27, 29, 122, 127, 128,

137-39, 142, 152, 163, 165, 169, 172, 174,

176, 209

Army Group, 21, 219, 227, 238, 268, 312, 339,

342

Corps, 10, 172, 174, 176-77, 181

Division, 1st, 191

General Transport Company, 435th, 223

Parachute Brigade, 1st, 124

Vehicle Reception Detachment, 6th, 223

Brittany Base Section, 267, 278

Brittany campaign, 260, 261, 266-68

Bromborough, 224

Brooke, General Sir Alan, 128

Broome, 44

Brown, Lt. Col. Walter A., 391, 392

Browning automatic rifles (BAR's), 74, 78

Brundidge, Maj. Ray H., 353

Brussels, 312, 350

Bucholtz, Pvt. George H., 392

Buckner, Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar, Jr., 447, 452,

462, 464-65, 467, 470

Bued River, 415, 417

Bugo, 440-42

Bull Mission, 303

Buna, 59, 65, 66, 69-71, 73, 74, 76, 79-80, 82,

85, 86

Buna Force, 76-78, 80

Burgess, Col. Henry C., 430

Burias, 428

Burrill, Col. Joseph R., 186

Butcher, Capt. Harry C., 94

Butzbach, 350

Cablubany, Laguna, 426

Caen, 232

Cairns, 61, 354

Cairo, 12, 18, 21, 33

Calasiao, 411, 425

Caliber Board Report of 1919, 204

Caltanisetta, 165

Calvados coast, 224

Camp Cable, 60

Camp Columbia, 353, 355

Campbell, Maj. Gen. Levin H., Jr., 87, 155, 174,

174n, 175, 204, 236, 335, 479

investigation of ammunition shortages, 303

90-mm. gun controversy, 329

proposal for floating depots, 388

Canadian Army, First, 219

Canal Defense Light (CDL), 230, 306, 321, 452,

452n

Cannibalization

in Europe, 108, 277, 281, 291, 343

in Mediterranean, 134-35, 163, 179, 217

in Pacific, 80, 376, 414

Cape Cretin, 367, 368

Cape Endaiadere, 74

Cape Gloucester, 362, 365

Cape Nelson, 46, 71

Cape Opmarai, 383

Cape Sansapor, 383

Cape Sudest, 72-73

Captured matériel. See also Ammunition.

German, 24-25, 30, 33, 150, 200, 258, 266, 281,

283, 299, 303, 341, 346-48

Japanese, 81, 85, 376, 381, 422

Capua Arsenal, 190, 197, 198, 210, 210n

Carbine, .30-caliber, 86, 86n, 132, 252

Carentan, 247, 248, 249

Carentan estuary, 225, 232

Carigara, 399, 400, 401-02

Carlson, Tech. 5 Clarence H., 424

Carstaphen, Capt. Jack, 275, 305

Casablanca, 101, 109, 117, 124, 136, 139, 140, 154,

158, 165

Casablanca Conference, 128, 132, 152

Cascano, 209

Caserta, 188

Casey, Maj. Gen. Hugh J., 393

Cassino front, 192, 197, 201, 203-05, 209, 212, 217

Castillo, Pfc. Agapito, 420

Castle Bromwich, 221

Casualties

in Europe, 245, 247n, 250, 263, 322, 325, 348

in Mediterranean, 191, 198-99, 211-12

Ordnance, 73, 191, 198, 211-12, 247n, 263, 348,

374, 381, 403, 420, 424

in Pacific, 73, 366n, 374, 381, 403, 420, 424, 455,

470, 471-72, 47in, 472n

"Catboat flotilla," 47, 69-70

Caumont, 232, 249

Cauthen, Lt. Col. William C., 60, 64

Cavalry Division, 1st, 368-69, 394, 395-96, 397-

98, 402, 417, 420, 426

Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 102d, 253

Cavalry Regiments

5th, 427

112th, 355, 363, 364, 417

Cave warfare, 462, 464, 470-71, 473

Cebu, 433-34, 435

Central Pacific Base Command, 446-47, 449, 465

Champion, 307-08

Chaney, Maj. Gen. James E., 4, 5, 7, 10, 88-90,

92, 93-94, 96

Channel Base Section, 278

Charleroi, 274

Charmes, 279

Charters Towers, 54

Chartres, 275
504 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Chartres-La Loupe-Dreux triangle, 278

Chaumont, 35

Cheltenham, 96, 103, 220, 221-23, 226, 227

Chemical Warfare Service, 361, 453, 464

Cherbourg, 232-33, 248-49, 258, 260, 278, 283,

295. 296, 301, 303

Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, 14

Chief of Field Artillery, 204

Chief of Ordnance, 112, 204. See also Campbell,

Maj. Gen. Levin H., Jr.; Wesson, Maj. Gen.

Charles M.

China Defense Supplies, Inc., 14

China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater, 15, 23

Chinen Peninsula, 467

Christmas, Brig. Gen. John K., 298n

CHRONICLE, 355-57, 372

Chrysler Corporation, 18, 331

Chungking, 13, 15

Churchill, Winston S., 4, 10, 34, 49, 88, 93, 145,

172, 173, 191, 238-39, 284

Cinderford, 98

Civitavecchia, 200, 209, 211

Claggett, Brig. Gen. Henry B., 36, 37

Clark, Commander Guy, 35

Clark, Maj. Gen. Mark W., 102, 104, 136, 151,

172, 173, 174n, 177, 178, 180, 188n, 190, 195,

211, 213

Clark, 1st Lt. Max E., 286

Clark Field, P.I., 417, 440

Clarke, Lt. W. R., 36, 37, 39, 40

Clayfield, 60

Cleaning and preserving materials, 81-82, 87

Coast Farmer, 35, 38

Coastal shipping, SWPA, 46-48, 70-73

COBRA, 254-58

Coe, Sgt. Edwin S., 392

Coffey, Brig. Gen. John W., 5, 7-9, 88, 90-91, 94,

96, 102, 156, 171, 177, 184, 190

Colby, Col. Joseph M., 11, 19, 23, 25, 329, 332,

334, 338

Coleman, Pfc. William, 305

Colleville, 240, 243, 244

Collins, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton, 232, 248

Colmar Pocket, 292, 339

Cologne, 269

Columboola, 60

Combat Commands, Armored Divisions

CCA, 2d, 164-65, 326

CCB, 1st, 110, 116, 119, 120, 121, 131-32

CCB, 2d, 324, 324n, 344

CCB, 9th, 313

CCB, 10th, 314

Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), 101, 124, 191,

308, 341, 349

Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee

(CIOS), 349

Combined Operational Service Command (COSC),

71, 82

Combined Raw Materials Board, 341

Comiso airfield, 164

Commercy, 280

Communications, 57-58, 170, 267, 310-11

Communications Zone (COMZ), ETOUSA, 260,

267, 278, 281-82, 290-91, 295-97, 298, 299,

301-02, 303, 304, 313, 318, 319, 321, 339-41,

349, 35° Communications Zone, MTOUSA, 290

Communications Zone, NATOUSA, 125

Communications zone organization, Pacific, 446

Connelly, Capt. Francis J., 355, 359

Conner, Lt. Col. Ray C., 228

Connerat, Lt. Col. William H., Jr., 171, 177, 285

Constantine, 123, 124, 132, 134, 136, 141

Contact parties, 130, 135, 137, 169, 180, 417, 426

Container plants, 22

Continental Advance Section (CONAD),

ETOUSA, 290, 339, 341, 348

Continental Base Section, 290

Contractors, civilian, 18, 20-21, 62

Convoys, supply, 107, 122, 154, 170, 177n, 182,

275, 371-72, 454

Coomooboolaroo, 52

Coopers Plains Ordnance Service Center, 53, 60

Cordiner, Col. Douglas C., 62

Corlett, Maj. Gen. Charles H., 249

CORONET, 442

Corps

I, 61, 76-78, 354, 364, 370, 371, 375, 381, 407,

409-10, 413-17, 419, 420, 421-22, 42in, 425

II, 102-03, 105-06, 112, 113-14, 122-24, 128-51,

152, 157-58, 161, 164, 165, 166, 168, 170, 177,

181, 182, 183, 209, 211

III, 316, 344

IV, 284

V, 92-93, 231-33, 244-45, 249, 258, 268-70,

294, 303-05, 344

VI, 172, 174, 176-77, 179, 181-82, 191, 192,

195, 197, 199, 204, 213, 284-85, 287-88

VII, 232-33, 248-50, 254, 258, 268-69, 270, 275,

294, 303, 332, 344

VIII, 248-50, 254, 258, 261, 262, 263, 266-67,

267n, 294, 303-04, 307-08, 312, 313-16, 318

X, 394, 396, 399, 400, 401, 404, 429, 436

XI, 376, 377, 384, 421, 425

XII, 269, 275-76, 279, 316, 317

XIII, 318, 320-21, 342, 348n

XIV, 394, 407-10, 412-14, 417, 418-19, 420-21,

422, 425-26

XV, 258, 263, 268-69, 275, 279, 292, 295

XVI, 320, 342, 343

XIX, 232, 249, 258, 268-70, 274, 294, 318,

320-22, 323-24, 342

XX, 258, 264, 268-69, 275-76, 279

XXIV, 394, 395, 396, 398-400, 402, 404, 445,

447, 449, 452, 456, 459, 461, 465, 467, 468, 471

Provisional (Sicily), 158, 164-66, 168
INDEX 505

Corregidor, 440

Cotabato, 436

Cotentin peninsula, 224, 231, 232, 247-50, 258, 263

Coutances, 249, 254, 258, 263

Coypool, 221

Crain, Maj. Gen. James K., 5, 112-13, 189

Crawford, Col. David J., 97, 102, 127, 132, 136,

137, 144, 147, 171, 178, 186, 205, 206, 218

Crest. 287

Crockett, Capt. Argyle C., Jr., 367

Culin, Sgt. Curtis G., Jr., 253

Cunningham, Admiral Sir Andrew B., 177, 239

Cyclops Mountains, 373

Cygnet mount, 47

Cyrenaica, 19, 30

Dagupan River, 413, 417

Dahlquist, Brig. Gen. John E., 90

Damortis, 419

Daniels, Col. Robert W., 86n, 92, 112, 235, 447,

448, 452, 459

Darby, Col. Marshall E., 76-77, 81, 370

Darby, Col. William, 180

Darnton, Byron, 71

Darra Ammunition Depot, 54, 60

Darwin, 37-39, 41, 42, 44, 47-51, 61, 62

Davao, 435, 438

David, Lt. Col. Marshall S., 194-96, 197, 212, 287

Davis Ordnance Ammunition Depot, 419-20

Dean, Col. George, 332

Decker, Maj. Gen. George H., 421

Degli-Uomini, Tech. 3 Primo, 416

De Guingand, Maj. Gen. Sir Francis, 254

Del Monte airfield, 440-41

Delta Base Section (Marseille), 290, 339

DeMartini, Sergeant, 289

Depapre, 373

Depots. See also Floating depots.

No. 32, 316

No. 101, 249, 251

No. 106, 271

No. 125, 305

226th Base, 410

O-610, 309

O-611, 316

O-619, 295, 296

O-644, 295, 296, 341

O-656, 341

O-690, 350

O-6022, 350

Darra Ammunition, 54, 60

Davis Ammunition, 419-20

Dingo Ammunition, 364

established in Europe, 9, 96-101, 221-22, 278,

290, 295, 319-20, 340-41, 343

established in Mediterranean theater, 11-12, 18-

24, 129-30, 134-35, 190

Depots—Continued

established in Pacific, 38-43, 60-61, 82-85, 357-

60, 387-88, 402-03, 418-19, 440-42

floating, 87, 237, 375, 388, 392, 435, 441-42

Hanau Ammunition, 359

Hawaiian Ordnance, 445

Hilsea RAOC General, 108, 221

Kane Ammunition, 49, 53, 54, 57

Kangaroo Transshipment, 61

Mangaldan Ammunition, 418-19

Nichols Ammunition, 387

Rabon Ammunition, 419

Sturt Ordnance, 64

Sual Ammunition, 419

Tidworth Ordnance, 98, 101, 106, 107, 221,

224

Desert warfare, 33

Detwiler, Col. John G., 127, 196, 209-10

Devers, Maj. Gen. Jacob L., 329, 330

Devizes, 222

DEXTERITY, 357, 362-66

"Diesel Boys," 257

Digos, 438

Dijon, 288, 290

Dillon, Col. Leo J., 226, 227

Dingo Ammunition Depot, 364

Disease, SWPA, 84, 358

Distress cargoes, 41, 46, 50, 62

Division of Defense Aid Reports (DDAR), 9

Divisions. See Airborne Divisions; Armored Divisions; Australian 7th Infantry Division; British

units; Cavalry Division, 1st; German units;

Infantry Divisions.

Djebel Abiod, 145, 146

Djefna, 145, 146

Dobodura, 59, 73, 74, 76, 77, 80, 83, 359

Dodge, Maj. Philip, 366

Doe, Brig. Gen. Jens A., 381

Dombasle-en-Argonne, 276

Don Isidro, 37-38, 38n

Don Marquis, 396, 404

Donaldson, Col. William H., 60

Doomben Race Track, 37, 60

Dorothea L. Dix, 242, 243n

Dorsal, Eastern, 128, 131, 135, 141

Dorsal, Western, 128, 135-36

Douda, Capt. Joseph L., 353, 353n

DRAGOON, 213, 219, 283-90

Driancourt, 275

Driniumor River, 376, 377

Dudelange, 317

DUKW's. See Trucks, DUKW's.

Dulag, 395, 396, 398, 399

Duren, 339, 342

Duvivier, 122, 146
506 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Eaker, Brig. Gen. Ira C., 89

Eastern Base Section (Algeria), 124, 141, 142-43,

145, 150, 158-59

Eastern Base Section (England), 101, 221

Eddy, Maj. Gen. Manton S., 317

Egypt, 11, 12, 18, 20, 33, 139

Eichelberger, Lt. Gen. Robert L., 61, 76-77, 354,

370, 372-73, 375, 381, 387, 403-04, 427, 430- 31, 435, 440, 442, 450

Eigenberger, Pfc. Gordon J., 198

Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 88, 93, 96, 100, 476

European campaign, 258, 261, 266, 269, 278,

292, 296, 303, 312

Italian campaign, 172, 177, 178

new matériel, 308, 332, 335, 336

North African operations, 102-03, 120, 123-25,

128, 132, 136, 139, 142, 149

OVERLORD planning, 213, 224-25, 237

Sicily Campaign, 152, 157

El 'Alamein, 21, 27, 29, 30, 33, 109

El Guerrah, 149

El Guettar, 141, 143

Elbe River, 344

Ellice Islands, 35

Embogo, 72, 73

Enfidaville, 145

Engelbert and Company (Liege), 298, 299

Engineer Boat and Shore Regiments

532d, 405

533d, 436

592d, 427

Engineer Combat Battalions

37th, 240

57th, 434

291st, 305

348th, 241

Engineer Regiment, 4Oth, 287

Engineer Shore Regiment, 531 st, 179

Engineer Special Brigades

1st, 166, 170-71, 247, 449, 461, 466

2d, 354, 361

5th, 241, 244

6th, 243

Englehart, Brig. Gen. Francis A., 395n, 446

Enna, 165

Envelope System, 183-84, 292

Epinal, 291

Erickson, Lieutenant, 40

Erickson, Technical Sergeant, 374

Eroro River, 359

ESCALATOR, 356. See also ALAMO Force.

Etamin, 376

Eupen, 304

European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

(ETOUSA), 9, 94-96, 99, 102, 220, 231, 237,

291

European Theater of Operations (ETOUSA)

—Continued

Advance Section, 218

Assault Training Center, 228

General Supply Division, 99, 222

Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM), 224

FABIUS, 241

Fabrique Nationale des Armes de Guerre (Liege),

298

Fahnestock, 1 st Lt. Adam Bruce, 71

Faid, 131

Faid Pass, 135

Falaise, 268

Farmer, Maj. William C., 161

Faymonville, Brig. Gen. Philip P., 12

Featherstone, Tech. 3 William C., 71, 80

Fellers, Col. Bonner F., 24

Feriana, 129, 130, 136

Ferme St. Jean de Baptiste, 117

Ferryville, 146, 159

Fertig, Col. Wendell W., 436

Fiat automobile plant (Florence), 213

Field Artillery Battalion, 12th, 76

Field Artillery Board, 202

Field Artillery Brigades

13th, 143

34th, 326

Field Manual 9-6, 148, 171

Field Manual 9-10, 147

Finschhafen, 363, 364, 365, 371, 390, 391

Firefighting, 68, 197-98, 251

Fisher, Capt. James F., 197

Fisher, Sgt. Stanley V., 415

Flame throwers, 229, 361, 453

"Flaming Bomb Express," 291

FLASHPOINT, 342-43

Flers, 268

Flett, Maj. H. V., 431

Floating depots, 87, 237, 388, 392, 435, 441-42

Floating shops, 388, 389-92

Florenville, 309

Foggia, 181

Folligny, 263

Fondouk, 131, 141, 142

Fontainebleau, 277-79

Force 141, 152

Force 163, 284, 285

Force 343, 152, 158

Force 545, 152

Ford, Brig. Gen. Elbert L., 94, 102, 121, 123, 125,

127, 130, 138, 175

Ford Motor Company, 18, 100

Foreman, Maj. John, 404

Foret de Fougeres, 263

Forman, 2d Lt. Tom P., 169
INDEX 507

Formigny, 244

Fort Dix, 90

Fort Pikit, 437, 440

Fort Shafter, 445

Fortbase, 174

Forward Echelon, Communications Zone

(FECOMZ), ETOUSA, 226-27, 237, 259

Francis, Lt. Col. John R., 13

Francis, Maj. William R., 224

Frank, Brig. Gen. Selby H., 226, 339

Fredendall, Maj. Gen. Lloyd R., 102, 113, 116,

123-24, 129, 136-38

French-American relations (North Africa), 114,

117, 138

French Rearmament Commission, 127, 188

French units

Army, 1st, 219, 284, 290, 292, 339

Army B, 288

Battalion, 651 st Maintenance, 187

Corps, 19th, 123, 128, 138

Corps Franc d'Afrique, 145

Corps, French Expeditionary, 209, 211, 213

Division, 2d Armored, 260, 264, 268, 291-92

Division, Algiers, 129, 137

Division, Constantine, 124

Fuller, Maj. Gen. Horace H., 381

Futema, 460

Fuze, M48, 76

Fuze, VT, POZIT, 308, 340, 452

Fuze News, 232

Gabes, 123-24, 128-29, 135, 137, 142

Gabriel, Pfc. Donald A., 424

Gafsa, 129, 130, 135, 136, 138, 141-43

Gale, Maj. Gen. Humfrey M., 102

Garigliano River, 173, 209

Garr, Maj. Alfred G., 304, 308, 309

Gasmata, 362

Gavray, 263

Gazala, 27, 30

Geelong, 38, 49, 53

Geelvink Bay, 377-82

Gela, 157, 160-64

General Headquarters (GHQ), SWPA, 356, 362,

363, 366, 394-95, 404

General Headquarters (GHQ), U.K., 9, 92

General Motors Corporation, 156

General Motors Overseas Operations, 18, 23n

General Motors Warehouse (Melbourne), 63

George VI, 238

Gereonsweiler, 321, 324, 325, 326

German-Italian Armistice Commission, 117, 129

German units

Afrika Korps, 11, 17, 25, 29, 124, 150

Army, Fourteenth, 200

Army, Nineteenth, 287

German units—Continued

Division, 9th Panzer, 325

Division, Hermann Goering, 161

Regiment, 22d Grenadier SS, 275

Gerow, Maj. Gen. Leonard T., 232, 249

Ghormley, Vice Adm. Robert L., 58

Gili Gili, 357

Glasgow, 101

GLOBETROTTER, 383

Gnome-Rhone factory, 281, 297-98, 298n

Godino, Sgt. Sam, 240

Goliath, 214, 247

Gonderange, 317

Goodenough Island, 357, 359-60, 362-64, 366

Goodhue, 455

Gore, Capt. W. A., 470

Gouvy, 307

Gozo, 159

Greely, Maj. Gen. John N., 12

Greenford, 5

Greenland, 7

GREIF, 309

GRENADE, 342-43

Grenade launchers, 292, 295

Grenades, 78-80, 361-62

Group organization concept, 112-14, 218, 237,

259, 28gn

Grovely Wood, 98

Gruenther, Maj. Gen. Alfred M., 204

Gruver, Lt. Col. Earl S., 21

Guadalcanal, 58, 69, 79, 87

Guerrillas (Philippines), 422, 428

Guimba, 414

Gun carriages, 204, 216, 332, 335

Gun-howitzer pairing policy, 202-05

Guns

4.5-inch, 202

8-inch, 202-05, 216, 255, 267

37-mm. AT, 27, 31, 47, 74, 79, 140

37-mm, tank, 26

40-mm. AA, 132, 401

75-mm., 47

75-mm. M2 tank, 27-28, 31

75-mm. M3 tank, 28, 215, 255, 322, 325, 327-30,

332, 334, 380, 476

76-mm., 255, 325, 327-31, 334, 336, 342

90-mm. AA, 26, 132, 328-31, 338, 366n, 367n,

401, 476

90-mm. MS AT, 328, 342

90-mm. M36 self-propelled, 322, 327, 329

90-mm. T15 tank, 333, 335, 336

105-mm. AA, 333

155-mm. GPF (World War I), 102

155-mm. M1 (Long Tom), 102, 145, 168-69,

201-02, 205, 206-08, 332, 333, 400, 457, 476
508 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Guns—Continued

155-mm. M12 self-propelled, 255, 300-301, 332,

333, 476

280-mm. "atomic gun," 200

antitank guns, 24-26, 29-33

tank guns, 26-29

Gustav Line, 173, 191, 209

Gyrostabilizers, 33

Hagushi beaches, 456, 460, 468

Haïdra, 128

Halfaya Pass, 24

Half-track, M16B, 271

Halsey, Admiral William F., 385-86

Hamilton, Pfc. John F., 420

Hamilton Field, 34

Hanau Ammunition Depot, 359

Handy, Col. Harold F., 72

Handy, Lt. Gen. Thomas T., 336

Hansen, Col. Floyd A., 297, 319

Harbert, Maj. John E., 71-73, 74, 80, 423-24

Harding, Maj. Gen. Edwin F., 72-73, 75, 76, 82,

86

Hariko, 72, 82, 83

Harmon, Maj. Gen. Ernest H., 328

Harriman, W. Averell, 3, 10

Harrington, Lt. Col. Arthur V., 226

Hartland, 117

Hartle, Maj. Gen. Russell P., 91

Haskell, Col. Robert K., 430

Hass, Maj. Christian B., 286

Hassin, Tech. 4 Zan D., 274

Hatcher, Maj. Gen. Julian S., 351

Hawaiian Base, 445-47

Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, 445

Hedgerow cutters, 253-55, 258

Heidtke, Lt. Col. Lyman O., 306-07

Heiss, Col. Gerson K., 94, 124

Heist, Maj. Jack C., 274

Heliopolis, 19-22

Helms, Pfc. Marvin H., 420

Hemingway, Ernest, 243n, 269, 295

Henderson, Lt. Col. John H., 410

Herring, Lt. Gen. Edmund F., 66, 82

Herter, 1st Lt. George L., 298-99

Highway 1 (P.I.), 437-38

Hill 609 (Tunisia), 146

Hillersleben, 350

Hilsea RAOC General Depot, 108, 221

Hirsch, Maj. Bertram H., 40, 41, 45, 52, 58

Hirson, 270, 271

Histon, 222

Hitler, Adolf, 10, 11, 109

Hitler Line, 211, 215

Hobart, Maj. Gen. Sir P. C. S., 229

Hobbs, 460

Hodge, Maj. Gen. John R., 394, 473

Hodges, Lt. Gen. Courtney H., 236, 258, 301, 306,

334

Holbrook, 35, 36, 37

Hollandia, 370-75, 387, 393, 396

Hollandia Ordnance Service Center, 387

Holly, Brig. Gen. Joseph A., 331, 332

Holman, Brig. Gen. Jonathan L., 40-41, 45-46,

50, 51, 53-54, 56-58, 62, 63-64, 66, 80, 81-82,

84-85, 86n, 390

Holmes, Col. Joel G., 220, 226

Honeybourne, 222

Hood, 7

Hospital, Portable, 22d, 72

Howard, Lt. Col. Ward C., 432

Howitzers

8-inch, 202-03, 332, 400, 451-52, 476

75-mm. pack, 86

105-mm., 33, 47, 76, 86, 162, 168, 331, 361,

366n

105-mm. M2A1, 421

155-mm., 132, 140, 148, 168-69, 169n, 202, 333,

361, 400

155-mm. (World War I), 155, 168

240-mm., 202-05, 255, 267, 451-52, 476

Huffsmith, Maj. Victor C., 56

Hughes, Brig. Gen. Everett S., 94-96, 102, 104,

125, 127, 147

Humboldt Bay, 370, 371, 372, 373-75, 396

Huon Gulf, 408

Hurley, Col. Patrick J., 51n

Hürtgen Forest, 294, 327, 333

HUSKY, 153-69, 177

Huy, 309

Hynds, Lt. Col. William G., 171

ICEBERG, 444, 448, 453-70

Iceland, 4, 7-9

Ie Shima, 461, 466

Igloo hut, 9, 41

Illana Bay, 435, 436

Illuminating shell, 452, 465, 477

Iloilo, 433

Immendorf, 324

Improvisation and inventions

in Europe, 210, 230, 252-55, 258, 283, 291,

299-301, 317

in Mediterranean, 134, 156

in Pacific, 36, 37, 55, 378, 381, 450-51

INDIGO, 8

Infantry Divisions

1st, 103-04, 110, 114, 116, 119, 121, 124, 145-

46, 157-58, 161, 165, 166, 232

2d, 232

3d, 157, 158, 164, 166, 169, 180, 191, 213, 284,

286
INDEX 509

Infantry Divisions—Continued

4th, 232, 247, 248

5th, 9, 275

6th, 379, 383, 407, 409, 413-14, 420, 422

7th, 394, 398, 399, 402, 444-45, 449, 456, 457,

459-60, 467, 470, 473-74

9th, 124, 136, 142, 145, 146, 166, 232, 248

24th, 370, 375, 394-95, 396-97, 428-29, 435,

437, 438

25th, 407, 417, 422

27th, 444-45, 450, 456, 460, 461, 465, 473

28th, 232, 309

29th, 232, 318, 321, 342

30th, 232, 306, 318, 321, 342

31st, 384, 429, 435, 438-40, 442

32d, 49-50, 59-61, 68, 71-76, 78, 80, 83, 86,

354, 362, 376, 402, 417, 422-24, 475

34th, 91-93, 103, 104, 124, 136, 141, 146, 180, 209

35th, 275

36th, 92, 176, 178, 209, 213, 284

37th, 394, 407, 408, 412-13, 420, 422, 475

40th, 394, 407, 408, 412, 413, 420, 429, 432

41st, 49-50, 59-61, 354, 359, 363, 370, 373, 375,

379-80, 429, 431, 475

42d, 292

43d, 376-77, 407, 409, 415, 416, 422, 425

44th, 292

45th, 92, 157-58, 164-66, 176, 180, 192-93, 213,

284

63d, 292

69th, 348

70th, 292

77th, 402, 445, 449, 453-55, 456, 457, 466, 472

79th, 263, 292

81st, 445, 450, 456

84th, 321, 342

85th, 209

88th, 209

90th, 232, 248, 263

94th, 334n

96th, 394, 398, 449, 456-58, 460, 470, 475

l00th, 291, 292

102d, 321, 342

103d, 291, 292

106th, 307, 313

Americal, 427-29, 433

Infantry Regiments

1st, 383

16th, 110, 117

18th, 110, 114-16

19th, 428

20th, 428

21st, 373, 437

26th, 110, 124, 243

34th, 437

39th, 124

Infantry Regiments—Continued

108th, 440, 442

126th, 68, 69, 72, 362, 366, 384

128th, 68-69, 71-72

132d, 428

158th, 355, 379, 381, 416, 426, 427

162d, 380

163d, 370, 375-76, 378, 432

168th, 112

182d, 428

186th, 431

503d Parachute, 382

Insoemanai, 378

Inspection missions

to Europe, 238, 303-04, 332-35

to Pacific, 451-52, 472-74

INTERLUDE, 383-85

Ioribaiwa, 68, 69

Iran, 11, 12, 18, 22

Iraq, 11, 12, 18, 22

Isigny, 249

Island Command (ISCOM), SWPA, 448-49, 466,

468

Italian campaign, 173-213

J. G. White Engineering Corporation, 18-20, 22

J. Honres Artillerie (Liège), 299

Japan, preparations for invasion of, 472-74

Japanese units Okinawa Base Force, 467

Okinawa Home Guards, 444

Special Naval Landing Forces, 74

Jarrett, Maj. George B., 23, 25, 27, 29-31, 33

Jautefa Bay, 373, 375

Java, 39, 40, 41, 49

Jaynes, Lt. Col. William H., 185, 188, 190, 210

Jennings, Col. Walter G., 287

Jeremiah M. Daily, 403

Johnson, Pvt. Allen, 275

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 58, 354, 385-86, 444

Jolo, 432

Jones, Col. Gainer B., 267

Juelich, 321

Juin, General Alphonse, 124

Jungle cart, 87

Jungle warfare, special weapons and equipment,

86-87, 360-62

Kabacan, 438-40

Kadena airfield, 456, 459

Kakazu Ridge, 460, 462, 463

Kaltenberger, Technical Sergeant, 374

Kamiri Airdrome, 382

Kamizato, 470

Kane, 2d Lt. Joseph F., 37-38, 38n

Kane, Col. Thomas J., 231-32

Kane Ammunition Depot, 49, 53, 54, 57
510 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Kangaroo Transshipment Depot, 61

Kapa Kapa-Jaure track, 69

Karachi, 18-20, 22

Karsik, 82

Kasserine, 128, 136, 138-40, 143, 144, 149

Kathryn L. Bates, 408

Kean, Maj. Gen. William B., 311

Keene, 1st Lt. Paul, 74, 80

Keise Shima, 457

Kenney, Maj. Gen. George C., 57, 75, 79

Kerama Retto, 453-55

Kesselring, Field Marshal Albert, 191in

Keyes, Maj. Gen. Geoffrey, 166

Khorramshahr (TAP II), 23n

Kief, Tech. 4 Percy H., 415

KING I, 393

KING II, 387, 393, 396-402

King John, 71

Kingham, 98

Kinnegar, 91

Kiriwina, 355-56

Kirsten, Capt. Elwyn N., 40, 46, 55, 58

Klanderman, Lt. Col. Russell R., 127, 226

Klip Fontein, 353

Knives, jungle, 86

Koblenz, 269

Kokoda Trail, 68, 69

Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPM),

46-47

Koza, 459

Krueger, General Walter, 353, 353n, 356, 357, 361,

362, 366, 370, 376, 384-85, 407, 411, 417, 426

Kuba, 468, 470

Kunishi Ridge, 471n

Kunming, 14, 15

Kweiyang, 14

La Haye du Puits, 263

La Loupe, 270, 271

La Neuville, 276

Labor force, combat troops used as, 359, 376, 461

Labor force, local

Europe, 186-87, 189, 190, 197, 197n, 211, 217-

18, 312, 347

North Africa, 120, 154

Pacific, 37, 41-42, 358, 376-77, 401, 418, 419,

433, 461

Lae, 44, 58, 59, 65

Lagafell, 9

Laidlaw, Col. Waldo E., 155, 295

Landres, 312

Langemak Bay, 363, 364, 365

Laon, 270

Larkin, Capt. Schuyler V. C., 232

Larsen, Tech. 3 Earl V., 416

Lashio, 13, 15

Laux, Col. Herbert B., 72

Laval, 261, 275

Laybourn, 1st Lt. Eugene P., 13, 15

LCI's, 158, 160, 366, 371, 382

LCM's, 158, 343, 355, 375, 436, 457, 468

LCT's, 156, 158, 192, 364, 468, 470

LCVP's, 82, 158, 242, 343, 354-55, 375, 457

Le Bourget Airport, 271

Le Havre, 267, 303

Le Mans, 264, 268, 275, 277

Le Troadec, Colonel, 339

Leaf, Col. William N., 417-13, 424

Leary, Vice Adm. Herbert F., 44

LeCalle, 143

Leclerc, Maj. Gen. Jacques, 260

Ledo di Roma airfield, 15

Lee, Lt. Gen. John C. H., 94-96, 100, 224, 228,

302

Lee, Capt. John N., 304, 305

Legaspi, 427

Lemery, 427

Lend-lease, 3, 9-17, 23, 54

Lentz, Brig. Gen. John M., 329

Leoppard, Capt. Elroy C., 390-91

Les Mesles-Sur-Sarthe, 270

Lessay, 250

Lessons learned

in Europe, 296-97, 318, 322-23, 326-28, 333-34,

476

general, 477-79

in Mediterranean, 33, 122, 139, 143, 147-50,

155, 169-71, 183, 185, 213-18, 220, 232, 234,

255, 296-97

in Middle East, 24-33

in Pacific, 81, 86-87, 356-57, 372, 375, 435,

450-52, 473, 476-47

Lever Brothers, 72

Lewis, 2d Lt. James R., 420

Lewis, Brig. Gen. Thomas E., 186

Leyte Campaign, 392-403, 423

Libya, 33, 139, 149

Licata, 157, 164, 165

Liddell Hart, Capt. B. H., 27

Liege, 271, 294, 295, 298, 300, 302, 309, 313

Lightner, Pfc. L'Phillip, 424

Lincoln, Maj. Gen. Rush B., 55

Lingayen Gulf, 405, 407, 411-17

Linnich, 321, 339

Lippstadt, 344

Liri Valley, 173, 203, 215

Litton, Lt. Steve, 254

Littoria, 204, 211

Liverpool, 100, 101

Loading and unloading operations. See also Port

operations.

in Europe, 162-63, 179-80, 192, 192n, 237, 244,

247-48, 302

in North Africa, 116

in Pacific, 40-41, 372, 373-75, 375n, 380, 397-

99, 413, 415, 418-19, 460-61, 468
INDEX 511

Lockerly Hall, 222

Logan, 460

Loire Base Section, 278

Loire River, 318

London Munitions Assignments Board, 341

Lord, Brig. Gen. Royal B., 296

Lorient, 266

Los Negros, 368, 369

Loudeac, 260

LOVE III, 405-06

Low, Col. Otto M., 393

LSM's, 457

LST's, 156-58, 160, 162, 163, 192, 240, 245, 364,

366, 371-72, 374, 375, 380, 382, 390, 402,

457, 468

Lucas, Maj. Gen. John P., 170, 202, 213, 216

Lunéville, 279

Lutes, Maj. Gen. LeRoy, 63, 103, 238, 303-04

Luxembourg, 315, 316, 317

Luzon Base Section, 421, 425

Luzon Campaign, 407-28

LVT's, 343, 380, 382, 411, 415n, 457, 468

LVT(1)'s, 364

LVT (A)'s, 364, 451, 457

Lynde, Col. Nelson M., Jr., 153, 166, 249, 297,

298, 305-06, 306n, 339

Lyon, 288

Maastricht, 300, 318, 319-20

Mabolo, 434

Macajalar Bay, 440, 441

MacArthur, General Douglas, 13, 14, 36, 37, 44-45,

55, 58, 60, 353, 356, 361-62, 368-69, 377,

383, 386, 429

amphibious landings, 354-55

Papua Campaign, 65, 68, 69, 76, 86

Philippines invasion, 387, 402, 405, 411, 417,

420, 426

McAuliffe, Brig. Gen. Anthony C., 313-14

McCarthy, Capt. John F., 63

McCree, Capt. William A., 50

McDorman, Tech. 5 Roland G., 169

McDougal, Lt. Col. David S., 448

McGrath, Lt. Col. Henry L., 178, 180, 182, 186,

285, 285n, 287, 288-89, 292, 352

McGregor, Col. Duncan G., 400

Machine guns

.30-cal., 47, 74, 78, 86

45-cal. (Thompson), 74, 78

.50-cal. heavy, 37, 47, 86, 228, 271

McKenny, Lt. Col. Laurence A., 70-73

McKinney, M. Sgt. Chester A., 305

MacMorland, Col. Edward E., 13-15

McNair, Lt. Gen. Lesley J., 33, 112, 175, 204, 329,

330

McNarney, Brig. Gen. Joseph T., 4

MacNider, Brig. Gen. Hanford, 71-73

McPartland, Lt. James N., 240

Mactan Island, 434

Maffin Bay, 379

Magdeburg, 344

MAGNET, 89-93

Magruder, Lt. Col. Carter B., 165

Magruder, Brig. Gen. John, 12-14

Maintenance and repair. See also Motor vehicles;

Tanks; Weapons.

control points, 277, 280

inspection teams, 84, 430, 450

shops, 17-19, 22, 299-300, 359, 367-68

training personnel for, 11, 14, 24

Maintenance and supply of Ordnance matériel, 48,

252

by civilian contractors, 18, 20-21, 62

echelon system, 8, 63, 297

in the jungle, 80-81

by Middle East Directive, 11-12, 16

problems in the Philippines, 421-26

transfer of responsibility by envelope system,

183-84

Mainz, 343, 344

Maiori, 180

Maknassy, 131, 138, 141, 143, 149

Maktar, 129

Malabang, 436, 440

Malaya, 39

Malmédy, 298, 304-05, 310

Mamer, 316

Mangaldan Ordnance Ammunition Depot, 418-19

Manila, 420, 421, 425-26

Manila Railroad, 413

Mannheim, 269

Manson, Maj. Byrne C., 35-40, 66, 67, 79, 82, 83,

84, 85, 85n

Mantes, 275

Mantes-Gassicourt, 269

Manus Island, 368, 369, 394, 396, 404, 408

MAPLE, 65

Maquis, 260, 289

Marabang River, 403

Maracaibos, 115-16

Maramag, 440

Marasbaras, 400

Marcigliano, 286

Mareth Line, 138, 141, 142

Marinduque, 428

Marine Corps units

Amphibious Corps, III, 445, 447, 456, 465, 467,

468, 471

Amphibious Corps, V, 444-45

Division, 1st, 354, 362, 363, 365-66, 370, 456,

457, 459, 465, 468

Division, 2d, 456

Division, 6th, 456, 457, 459, 465

Mariposa, 40, 45

MARKET-GARDEN, 313

Marne, 276
512 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Marseille, 284, 288, 290-91

Marshall, General George C., 4, 9, 39, 93-94, 108,

132, 136, 173, 216, 360

Marshall, Brig. Gen. Richard J., 61

Marston Magna, 98

Marymar, 389

Mateur, 145, 146, 150, 159

Matruh, 21

Maxwell, Maj. Gen. Russell L., 12, 23, 332

Maxwell, Col. William R., 226, 227

Mechling, Col. Edwin P., 477

Medaris, Col. John Bruce, 138, 141, 146-47, 149,

150-51, 176, 219, 226-28, 230, 232, 238, 244,

248, 249, 251, 254, 258, 262, 270, 275, 296,

302, 303, 312, 350

Ardennes campaign, 304, 305, 308, 309

battlefield recovery program, 143-44

establishment of Enemy Property Division,

346-47

First Army Ordnance Service, 245, 255-57

local procurement program, 296-99

operational control of Ordnance troops, 234-37,

269

Ordnance planning for OMAHA, 233-34

Ordnance staff meeting, Paris, 339, 341-42

radio net, 274, 310-11

Sicily Campaign, 158, 166, 169, 170

Mediterranean Base Section, 124, 134, 137, 138,

140, 151

Medjez el Bab, 121

Meigs, 35

Melbourne, 38-42, 47, 48, 52, 54, 57

Melton Mowbray, 98

Mendaropu, 72, 73

Menoher, Lt. Col. William, 400

Merle-Smith, Col. Van S., 36

Merrill, Maj. John, 198

Mers-el-Kébir, 117

Mersa Bou Zedjar, 111

Merzenhausen, 326

Mesick, Col. Benjamin S., 227, 339, 341

Messina, 165, 166, 168, 169, 172

Metz, 279, 280, 281

Meuse River, 275, 306-07, 309, 315

Middle East Directive, 11, 16-20

Middleburg Island, 383

Middleton, Maj. Gen. Troy H., 248-49, 267

Mignano, 202

MIKE I, 387, 408-26

MIKE VI, 421

MIKE VII, 421

Miles, Col. Francis H., Jr., 18-20, 21

Military missions, 4-7, 12-24

Milne Bay, 59-60, 65-66, 68, 70-71, 75, 82-83,

85, 355-59, 362-64, 370, 390, 392

Minatoga, 468, 470

Mindanao, 38, 435-42

Mindoro, 404-06, 428

Mine exploders, 33, 230, 321

Miners, 1st Lt. Walter J., 420

Mines, 33, 139, 155, 214, 321, 369, 450-51, 463

Mines, British, 33, 155

Mines, German, 33, 139, 155, 214, 451n

Mines, Japanese, 369, 451, 463

Ministry of Supply, 6, 99-100

Ministry of Transport, 47

Minnemura, 72-73

Mirimas, 290

Misoa, 116, 156

Missionary Ridge, 396

Moffatt, Maj. Carroll K., 82

Moffitt, Col. John F., 141, 166, 176, 188, 188n,

217

Mokmer, 379-80

Momote Airdrome, 369

Mons pocket, 275

Montauk, 456, 457

Montebourg, 248, 258

Montelimar, 288

Montgomery, Lt. Gen. Sir Bernard L.

European operations, 224, 238-39, 261, 284,

312, 331, 342

Mediterranean operations, 21, 27, 29, 33, 109,

139, 152, 157, 172-74

Montgomery, Capt. Joseph M., 134

Moore, Maj. Gen. Richard C., 330

Moreno, 181

Moreton Bay, 36

Moreton-on-Lugg, 221

Morison, Samuel Eliot, 397, 456

Morlaix, 267

Morotai, 383-85

Morris, 145

Morris, Maj. Gen. Basil, 66

Morris, Col. Thurman W., 429

Mortain, 263, 268

Mortars, 74, 78, 86, 298-99, 361-62, 361n, 464-65

Moselle, 269, 278-79

Moses, Brig. Gen. Raymond G., 251, 301

Mostaganem, 153, 155, 156

Motor vehicles. See also Tanks; Trucks.

assembly, 62, 64, 99-101, 190, 223-24, 359

captured German, use of, 348, 348n

maintenance, Europe, 213, 252, 282, 297, 299-

300, 312

maintenance, Mediterranean, 18, 119-20, 125,

130-31, 134-35

maintenance, Pacific, 83-84, 87, 382, 404, 414,

422-26, 430, 441, 454

reconditioning for Pacific, 351

responsibility transferred to Ordnance, 22, 61-64,

62n, 87, 99, 108, 112, 125, 175, 445-46

shortages, Europe, 170, 179, 186, 238, 259, 295

shortages, North Africa, 107, 119, 121

shortages, Pacific, 62, 376, 413, 422-25
INDEX 513

Motor vehicles—Continued

spare parts, shortages, Europe, 106, 107-08, 170,

181, 217, 259, 277, 283, 291, 295, 376

spare parts, shortages, North Africa, 119, 130-

31, 132-34, 148

spare parts, shortages, Pacific, 63, 84, 87, 422

supply, Europe, 220-21, 260, 340

supply, North Africa, 132, 140

supply, Pacific, 363, 450

Mount Cassino, 173, 203. See also Cassino front.

Mount Isa, 51, 62

Mt. Macolod, 427

Mt. Malepunyo, 427

Mourmelon, 313

Mulde River, 344

Muller, Col. Walter J., 165

Muneville, 262

Munitions Assignments Board (London), 341

Murray, Sgt. Thorban H., 434

Mussolini, Benito, 172, 173

Naha-Shuri-Yonabaru line, 465, 467, 468, 471

Nakagusuku Bay, 468

Nancy, 279, 280, 317

Naples, 173, 181, 190, 213, 285

Nashville, 405

Nassau Bay, 363

National Automobile Dealers Association, 87n

Natives. See Labor force, local.

Negros, 433, 435

Nelson, 1st Lt. Clifton B., 353

Nemours, 276

NEPTUNE, 227, 233-34, 236-37

Netherlands Indies, 37, 38, 39

Nettuno, 191-92, 195, 196, 209

Neufchâteau, 280, 307, 312-14

Nevadan, 388

New Britain campaign, 357, 362-66

New Caledonia, 40, 41, 49

New Guinea, 44-46, 61, 65, 68, 75, 76, 83-84,

86-87

New Guinea Force (NGF), 65-66

New York Port of Embarkation, 103, 107, 154-55,

171, 237, 238

Newland, Tech. 5 James E., 434

Niagara, 35

Niblo, Col. Urban

as Ordnance Officer, Fifth Army, 171, 173, 174n,

178, 180-81, 184-86, 188n, 193-94, 196-98,

213-14, 218

as Ordnance Officer, II Corps, 102, 112, 115-17,

123, 129-32, 134, 136-38, 148

organizes Fifth Army Ordnance Service, 174-77

organizes forward group headquarters, 187-90

organizes Provisional Ordnance Group, 113-14,

118-21

resupply, 206-08, 216-17

"Uninterrupted" Ordnance Service, 182-84

Nichols Ammunition Depot, 387

Nicosia, 167, 169

Nimitz, Admiral Chester W., 385-86, 444, 447

Nisley, Brig. Gen. Harold A., 227, 236, 339

Nissen huts, 9, 93, 98, 222

Nixon, Col. Thomas H.

European operations, 262-63, 263n, 264-67,

267n, 275-76, 278, 283, 284, 302, 316-17,

339, 347

leapfrogging system, 279-80

OVERLORD planning, 227, 236

Sicily Campaign, 152-55, 158, 164-68, 170

Third Army shortages, 258-60

Noemfoor, 381-82

Normandy Base Section, 278

North African Theater of Operations (NATOUSA), 125, 127, 187, 188, 202, 206

Northern Base Section (Corsica), 188

Northern Ireland, 88, 89, 93, 101, 104

Noud, Tech. 5 John E., 434

Nussbaum, Sgt. Clifton, 475

O'Daniel, Brig. Gen. John W., 210

Oermingen, 317

Offenbacher, Sergeant, 185

O'Hare, Col. Joseph J., 234, 234n

Oise Base Section, 278, 313

Okinawa, 443-44, 447-53, 456-72

Okinawa Base Force, 467

Okinawa Home Guards, 444

OLYMPIC, 442

OMAHA Beach, 232-33, 240-44, 248

Oran, 101, 109-11, 114-20, 122, 124, 129, 134,

136, 139-40, 151, 153, 154, 158, 171, 284

Orbita, 112, 116

Ordeman, Capt. Harold G., 243

Ordnance, British definition, 6

Ordnance Battalions, 113, 158, 184-85, 255

1st, 413, 425-26

5th, 134, 141, 190

6th, 305, 306-07

9th, 76, 410, 418

12th, 409, 425

24th, 266

25th, 253, 254, 299

42d, 129, 132, 141-43, 146, 150, 158-59, 165-

66, 169, 176, 182, 183, 187, 194, 209

43d, 158, 166, 287, 288

45th, 178-80, 182, 187, 193-94, 196n, 211, 287,

288

48th, 321-22

62d, 120, 182, 185, 187, 189, 194, 197, 285, 288

63d, 158, 167

65th, 320

67th, 134

72d, 83

74th, 243
514 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Ordnance Battalions—Continued

78th, 280n

79th, 260, 283

83d, 313

86th, 304, 305, 310

87th, 118, 121, 182, 187, 190, 194, 197, 198

100th, 244, 304, 308, 311n

101st, 247

123d, 111

129th, 313

141st, 390-91

150th, 309

177th, 244-45

178th, 313

184th, 248

185th, 276, 298

188th, 129, 141-43, 144, 146, 150, 159, 182, 187,

194

189th, 409, 425

190th, 347

191st, 247

192d, 466

194th, 370-71, 384-85, 387, 438

197th, 182, 190, 194, 197, 198

209th, 449, 466

214th, 466

243d, 414, 417, 424, 425

246th, 395, 400

251st, 241, 243

259th, 409

310th, 305, 306

313th, 259, 280

314th, 317

335th, 320

559th, 332

590th, 307-09, 312, 313

607th, 317

622d, 223

2630th, 182, 187, 189, 209

Ordnance Companies 8, 34, 82, 100, 143, 170-71,

182-83, 217, 234, 257, 259, 260, 290, 319, 321,

343, 421, 478

2d Medium Maintenance, 248

3d Medium Maintenance, 285-86

14th Medium Maintenance, .92, 118, 121, 130n,

141, 194-95, 287

21st Medium Maintenance, 367, 376, 377

25th Medium Maintenance 42, 50, 53, 60-61, 65

27th Medium Maintenance, 368-69, 426-27

28th Medium Maintenance, 179

30th Heavy Maintenance 118, 121, 122, 129, 140,

141, 143, 166.

32d Medium Maintenance, 317

37th Medium Maintenance, 49, 60, 74, 83

45th Medium Maintenance, 98, 134, 145, 194,

196, 287

46th Medium Maintenance, 179, 180, 180n, 181,

287

Ordnance Companies—Continued

48th Medium Maintenance, 383, 407, 414

49th Medium Maintenance, 375-76, 378, 379,

382, 416

53d Ammunition, 92, 118, 121, 142, 186

55th Ammunition, 49, 60, 61, 65, 83, 413

57th Ammunition, 275, 304-05, 309

58th Ammunition, 104, 194, 196n, 197

59th Ammunition, 49, 61, 65, 367, 368

61st Ammunition, 460-61

66th Ammunition, 104, 118, 129, 145, 159, 179,

194, 196-98, 288

68th Ammunition, 461

77th Depot, 194, 196, 210, 288, 290

78th Depot, 105, 121, 123, 129, 130, 145

79th Depot, 92-93

82d Heavy Maintenance, 141

83d Heavy Maintenance, 155, 169

84th Depot, 49, 50, 60

87th Heavy Maintenance, 146, 287

90th Heavy Maintenance, 413, 422, 426, 427

92d Medium Maintenance, 307

99th Heavy Maintenance, 426

101st Medium Maintenance, 194

105th Medium Maintenance, 106

106th Medium Maintenance, 433-35, 441

108th Medium Maintenance, 438-39

109th Medium Maintenance, 93, 129-30

118th Medium Maintenance, 50

119th Medium Maintenance, 431-32

120th Medium Maintenance, 413, 426

156th Tire Repair, 282n

158th Tire Repair, 282-83

166th Tire Repair, 391

168th Depot, 403

171st Depot, 371

172d Depot, 392

178th Depot, 309

183d Depot, 459

189th Depot, 179, 181

193d Depot, 453

196th Depot, 449, 459

201st Depot, 210

202d Depot, 305

207th Medium Maintenance, 396, 396n, 404,

430

212th Medium Maintenance, 418

234th Bomb Disposal, 231, 232

236th Ammunition, 211

253d Maintenance, 376, 380

259th Medium Maintenance, 384, 385, 432-33

261st Medium Maintenance, 287

262d Maintenance, 194

263d Medium Maintenance, 364, 365, 412, 413

267th Medium Maintenance, 369, 404, 431

284th Heavy Maintenance, 400, 449

287th Medium Maintenance, 369, 371, 373-75,

380, 381
INDEX 515

Ordnance Companies—Continued

288th Medium Maintenance, 376, 415-16

291st Medium Maintenance, 384, 438, 440, 441

292d Medium Maintenance, 396, 404-05

300th Maintenance Company, 266, 343

305th Maintenance Company, 276

310th Depot, 438, 441 -42

318th Depot, 392, 424

333d Depot, 321

334th Depot, 305

344th Depot, 263

360th Composite, 50, 83

393d Heavy Maintenance, 451

410th Medium Maintenance, 371

440th Aviation Bombardment, 56, 440

445th Aviation Bombardment, 48-49

453d Aviation Bombardment, 34, 35, 37, 38, 38n,

40, 42

476th Tank Evacuation, 194

477th Evacuation, 181

497th Motor Vehicle Assembly, 224

506th Medium Automotive, 23n

509th Heavy Maintenance, 438

511th Heavy Maintenance, 425

514th Heavy Maintenance, 305

525th Heavy Maintenance, 21, 159, 182, 194-95

526th Heavy Maintenance, 245

529th Heavy Maintenance, 181

531st Heavy Maintenance, 266

538th Heavy Maintenance, 321

553d Heavy Maintenance, 309

554th Heavy Maintenance, 321

558th Heavy Maintenance, 433, 434, 441

573d Ammunition, 263, 276

577th Ammunition, 418, 419

578th Ammunition, 415, 433, 434, 436, 438

587th Ammunition, 271

595th Ammunition, 398, 400, 401

611th Ammunition, 369, 376, 433

614th Ammunition, 413

615th Ammunition, 418, 419

616th Ammunition, 240-41, 242, 243

618th Ammunition, 243-44

619th Ammunition, 271, 307-08

620th Ammunition, 344-45

622d Ammunition, 364, 365, 383, 414

623d Ammunition, 384, 431, 439, 441

625th Ammunition, 247, 247n

629th Ammunition, 375, 376, 379, 382, 418, 419

632d Ammunition, 398, 459, 461

636th Ammunition, 358, 364, 397, 400, 401

642d Ammunition, 371, 373, 438

643d Ammunition, 404, 426

644th Ammunition, 459, 461, 468, 470n

649th Ammunition, 371, 373, 380

665th Ammunition, 262

684th Ammunition, 197

693d Ammunition, 453-55, 461

Ordnance Companies—Continued

700th Light Maintenance, 165

701st Aviation, 56, 440

703d Aviation, 65

706th Medium Maintenance, 383, 414

707th Light Maintenance, 398, 399, 459, 470

711th Light Maintenance, 426

721st Light Maintenance, 428, 433, 435

724th Light Maintenance, 371, 373, 380, 397,

404, 428, 438

725th Light Maintenance, 417

731st Light Maintenance, 384, 439

732d Light Maintenance, 367, 376, 384, 423, 424

737th Light Maintenance, 408, 412, 475

740th Light Maintenance, 412, 432

741st Light Maintenance, 371, 375, 376, 380,

381, 431-32

743d Light Maintenance, 376, 415

777th Light Maintenance, 453, 454

796th Light Maintenance, 458-60, 470

801st Airborne, 313-15

841st Depot, 317

849th Depot, 383, 384

868th Heavy Automotive, 300

900th Heavy Automotive, 300

959th Heavy Maintenance, 425

962d Ammunition Renovation, 465

974th Evacuation, 257

991st Heavy Maintenance, 166, 169

2622d Tank Transporter, 140, 142, 194

2652d Ammunition, 179, 211

3007th Depot, 413, 426

3073d Maintenance, 384, 433

3142d Medium Maintenance, 355:1

3149th Medium Maintenance, 413, 413n

3405th Medium Maintenance, 287

3407th Medium Maintenance, 194, 195

3422d Medium Maintenance, 245

3425th Medium Maintenance, 82-83

3432d Medium Maintenance, 287

3455th Medium Maintenance, 23n

3466th Medium Maintenance, 243

3469th Medium Maintenance, 364, 368

3474th Medium Maintenance, 23n

3483d Medium Maintenance, 403

3485th Medium Maintenance, 129, 133, 134, 179

3486th Automotive Maintenance, 179

3488th Medium Maintenance, 129, 134

3497th DUKW Maintenance, 163, 247-48

3498th Medium Maintenance, 400, 426, 427

3565th Medium Maintenance, 243-44

3608th Heavy Maintenance, 369, 380, 384, 387,

409, 414, 416, 422, 432, 438

Ammunition Renovation Company, 217n

motor vehicle assembly companies, 223-24

motor vehicle distributing company, 223

"old Ordnance" companies, 118

Provisional Ordnance Collecting Company, 143
516 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Ordnance Companies—Continued

Provisional Ordnance Company, SWPA, 355

Ordnance Department, 20, 22, 33, 85, 89, 144, 171

advocates self-propelled and heavy artillery, 216

and AGF controversy, 477

Artillery Division, 205, 206

and gun-howitzer pairing policy, 202-05

and military missions, 5-15

organization, 6

Ordnance Experimental Station (England), 228

Ordnance Groups

51st, 237, 255, 269, 270, 294, 309

52d, 237, 249, 255, 269, 270, 309-11, 313

53d, 189, 189n

54th, 285, 288, 292

55th, 189, 285, 287, 288, 292, 347, 352

56th, 189, 189n

59th, 320

60th, 320

61st, 449, 466

69th, 259, 275, 276, 317

70th, 259, 317

71st, 255, 270-71, 294

72d, 255, 269-70, 305, 309, 312

79th, 320

82d, 259, 280, 347

224th, 237, 249, 255

226th, 393n, 410

229th, 410

230th, 393

2660th, 188-89, 196

6694th, 175-77, 182, 185, 188-90

Provisional (North Africa), 114, 118-21, 123,

129, 131, 134, 136, 143, 175

Ordnance Maintenance Detachment, 4th, 355

Ordnance matériel. See also types by name.

identification and cataloguing, 103, 251, 296

Monthly Matériel Status Report, 222

"old Ordnance," 99, 106, 107, 130

Ordnance Middle East Tasks (OMET's), 18-20

Ordnance observers, 11, 147, 171

Ordnance Operations Bulletins, 184, 292

Ordnance Provisional Center, First, 364

Ordnance Provisional Recovery and Evacuation

Platoon, 1st, 144

Ordnance Provisional Regiment (Field), 136. See

also Ordnance Groups, Provisional (North

Africa).

Ordnance Regiments

55th Heavy Maintenance (Q), 118, 121, 129

303d Base, 22, 114n

Ordnance Service, reorganizations, 112-14, 174-

77, 187-90

Ordnance service centers, 52-53, 409-11, 466, 472.

See also by individual name.

Ordnance Staff Officers' Meeting, Paris, 339-42

Ordnance support to combat forces

Admiralties, 368-69

Ordnance support to combat forces—Continued

Aitape, 375-76

Ardennes, 313, 316-17

Australia, 49-50

British First Army, 122-23

east of Rhine, 342-45

Geelvink Bay, 380, 382

handicaps, 292-93, 357

Hollandia, 370-71

Iceland, 92-93

Italy, 173-74, 177, 179-80, 182-83, 194-95

Kiriwina, 355-57

Morotai, 384

New Britain, 364-65

North Africa, 117-18, 129-30, 141-42, 146

Okinawa, 448-49, 458-60

OVERLORD, 233-34, 240-44, 247-48, 249, 263,

270

Papua, 74, 82-83

Philippines, 409-10, 414, 426-28, 431-33, 438-

40

Roer, 320-21

Saidor, 367-68

Sansapor, 383

Sicily, 153, 157-58, 164-66

southern France, 285-88, 292

Woodlark, 355-57

Ordnance technical intelligence, 33, 85, 91, 127,

150, 275, 348-49

Ordnance troops. See also Ordnance support to

combat forces.

adaptability of, 195, 218

as airborne Ordnance men, 285-87

misuse of, 167-68

organization after V-E Day, 351-52

organization of units, 320, 395

training of, 54, 87, 91, 228-29, 231, 251

Ordnance troops, shortages of

in Europe, 164, 166, 237, 259, 289

in Pacific, 42, 48, 49, 67, 83-85, 87, 363, 394,

460-61

in U.K., 92, 101, 104, 108

Ordnance units, operational control of

in Europe, 235-36, 288, 316, 344-45

in Mediterranean, 137, 166-68, 183-84

in Pacific, 57, 364, 448

Orleans, 275, 278

Ormoc, 401, 402

Oro Bay, 72, 82-83, 357, 359, 362, 363

Oroku Peninsula, 467

Orsainfaing, 314, 315

Ortho, 313

Oudjda, 136

Ouled Rahmoun, 132, 141

Our River, 294

OVERLORD, 221-22, 224-48, 260, 284

Overseas Steel Container Corporation, 22

Owen Stanley Range, 60, 65, 66, 69, 70, 74
INDEX 517

Packaging and handling methods, 87, 99, 104, 106,

119, 221

Paestum, 176, 180

Palapad, 416

Palawan, 429, 431

Palermo, 157, 165, 166

Palestine, 18, 20

Palo, 397, 400

Palompon, 402

Panaon Island, 397

Panay, 432

Panzerfaust, 32, 333, 476

Papua Campaign, 58-59, 65, 67-68, 73-87

Parang, 436, 438-41

Paris, 270, 295, 296, 297

Patch, Maj. Gen. Alexander M., 284

Patterson, Capt. John L., 314

Patton, Maj. Gen. George S., Jr., 138-39, 142, 168,

228, 258, 260, 266-68, 302, 476

Ardennes campaign, 315-16

Sicily Campaign, 152, 154-55, 157, 165-66

sweep across France, 278-79, 280

tanks, 335, 336-37

Pavlik, Tech. 5 John E., 309

Pearl Harbor, 34, 35

Pearson, Lt. Col. D. M., 226

Pearson's Garage, Liverpool (assembly plant), 100

Peirse, Air Marshal Sir Richard, 39

PEMMICAN, 357

Peninsular Base Section, 187, 190, 210

Pensacola convoy, 34-37, 42, 57

PENUMBRA, 357

Périers, 254, 260

Persian Gulf area, 12, 22, 23

Perth, 48, 50

Petersen, Lt. Col. George T., 141, 477

Petrovich, Pvt. Albin E., 240

Philippeville, 121, 140, 141

Philippine Base Section, 425

Phillips, Pvt. George, III, 224

Pichon, 129

Pierce, Col. Kenneth, 357

Pilferage, 106, 182

Pirn, 373, 391

Pinamopoan, 401

Pinkenba, 60

Pinkstone, 1st Lt. Hueston L. J., 289

Pinthiviers, 276

Pistol, -45-cal., 86

Pistol Pete, 415-16

Plank, Brig. Gen. Ewart G., 226, 278

Planning, Ordnance, 42, 87, 112, 147, 154, 175,

217, 259. See also Supply planning.

Playfair, Maj. Gen. I. S. O., 27

Pleuvorn, 267

Point Licosa, 181

Pongani, 71

Pont-a-Mousson, 280

Pont-du-Fahs, 140

Fonte Olivo airfield, 161

Pontecorvo, 203

Pontine Marshes, 192, 211

Pontlion, 266

Poppenburg, Capt. Francis F., 245

POPPY, 41

Porlock Harbor, 71

Port aux Poules, 156

Port Companies

248th, 396n

249th, 396n

Port Elizabeth, 18, 19

Port-Lyautey, 152

Port Moresby, 44, 46, 59-61, 63, 65-66, 68, 70, 76-

77, 79, 83-86

Port operations, 41-42, 295, 302-03, 359

Port Sual, 419, 420

Portal, Air Marshal Sir Charles, 3

Porter, Maj. Harry C., 56

Post, Maj. Madison, 106, 194

Preserving materials. See Cleaning and preserving

materials.

President Coolidge, 40, 45

"Priest," 33

Procurement, local

in Australia, 45

in Europe, 281, 283, 297-99

in North Africa, 119

in U.K., 106, 108, 238

Projects for continental operations (PROCO),

220-21

Puckapunyal, 54

Puerto Princesa, 431

Puffendorf, 324-26

"Purple blurbs," 184

Pursuit Group, 49th, 48

Pursuit Squadron, 33d, 9

Putnam, 1st Lt. Arnold O., 305

Pyle, Ernie, 119n, 159, 193, 199, 213, 257

Quartermaster Battalions

72d (Light Maintenance), 62, 64

86th (Light Maintenance), 62, 64

102d Truck, 271

Quartermaster Companies

107th, 70

179th (Heavy Maintenance), 62, 64

426th Airborne, 313

Quartermaster Motor Transport Service, 97, 100,

101

Quebec Conference, September 1944, 385

Queen Mary, 21, 93

Rabat, 153

Rabaul, 44-45, 58, 65, 354, 356, 362, 366

Rabon Ordnance Ammunition Depot, 419

Radar Maintenance Unit, 98th, 396n
518 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Radio nets, 234, 274, 274n, 276, 310-12

Raff, Col. Edson D., 123, 129

Raff Force, 129, 136-38

Ragusa, 157, 164

Railways

Australia, 46, 51

Europe, 278, 290, 295

North Africa, 116, 132

U.K., 224

RAINBOW 5, 5, 7, 8, 88

Ranger Infantry Battalion, 6th, 394, 396-97, 417

Rangers (North Africa), no, 114

Rangoon, 13, 15

Rapido River, 173

Ray, Lt. Col. John, 164, 170, 171, 226, 244, 251,

301, 304, 352

Reading, Geoffrey, 72

Recoilless rifles, 452, 473

Red Ball Express, 278, 282, 289, 296, 297

Redeployment planning, 350-52

REDHERRING, 363, 364, 371

Reed, Capt. Allan H., 274

Reed, Lt. Col. Frank F., 91

Reims, 275

Remagen, 342, 344

"Remember Pearl Harbor" (RPH) Group, 40-41,

51

Renner, Maj. William E., 292, 293

Rennes, 260, 261

Republic, 34-36

Resupply, 182, 288-93, 371, 395, 435. See also

Ammunition, resupply methods and problems.

assumption by Fifth Army, 195

by floating depots, 388-92

lessons learned, 216-17

ships, 400, 421

Tate's innovation in Italy, 192

Reydharfjördhur, 8

Reyes, Pvt. Joseph, 262

Reykjavik, 8, 9

Reynolds, Lt. Col. J. H., 226

Rhine River, 291, 321, 342-44

Rhino ferry, 240, 243

Rhinoceros, 254-55, 258

Rhodes, Pvt. Harry K., 396

Rice, Col. Albert S., 94

Rice, Brig. Gen. John H., 479

Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C., Jr., 446, 447, 453

Rifles, 46, 74, 78, 361, 452, 473

Rippon, 231

Road building, 359, 372-73

Robelmont, 316

Roberts, Col. Claudius H. M., 451-52

Rochefort, 307

Rocket launchers

M1 (Bazooka), 31-32, 149-50, 155-56, 161,

161n, 215, 252, 332-33, 361, 362n, 476

T27, 332, 333, 334n

Rocket launchers—Continued

T34, 333, 334

T66, 333, 334

Rocket launchers, German

Nebelwerfer, 149, 215

Panzerschreck, 32, 161n, 333

Rockets

2.36-inch, 31

4.5-inch, 332, 333-34, 354, 361, 36in, 365, 476-

77

M6, 149, 155

Rockets, German

88-mm., 32

150-mm., 149

210-mm., 149

V-1, 274-75, 298, 320, 348, 349

V-2, 274, 348, 349

V-3, 320

Rockhampton, 52, 60

Roer, 303, 304, 321-28, 339, 342

Roermond, 342

Roetgen, 304

Rome, 173, 177, 192, 205, 208, 211

Romine, Tech. 5 Oliver T., 424

Rommel, Generalleutnant Erwin, 11, 19, 21, 24-25,

27, 30, 109, 123, 128, 135-36, 138, 140

Rooks, Maj. Gen. Lowell W., 205

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 7, 9, 11, 12, 88, 284

Rose, Lt. Col. Russell A., 114, 121, 123, 174, 175-

76, 182, 184, 188

ROUNDUP, 93

Rowell, Maj. Gen. Sydney F., 66

Royal Air Force, 4, 231-32

Royal Army Ordnance Corps, 6, 9, 17, 31, 91, 98,

104, 108

Royal Army Service Corps, 6, 96, 163

Royal Australian Air Force, 48, 65

Royal Australian Navy, 47

Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, 6n, 144

Royal Engineers, 6, 231-32

Royal Navy, 114, 231-32

Ruhr, 279, 344

Rushden, 101, 108, 221

Ryukyus, 443-44. See also Okinawa.

"S" fleet, 47

Saar, 278, 315

Saaralbe, 317

Saar-Palatinate, 292

Saidor, 366-68

St. Avoid, 283

St. Hilaire-du-Harcouet, 263, 271

St. Hubert, 248

St. Lo, 248-49, 250, 270

St. Malo, 266-67

St. Mihiel, 280

St. Vith, 304, 307, 312

Ste. Barbe-du-Tlelat, 119
INDEX 519

Ste. Maxime, 287

Ste.-Mère-Eglise, 247, 258

Salamaua, 44, 58, 59, 65

Salerno, 172, 173, 177, 178, 181, 285

Salvage operations, 80-81, 134-35, 143-45, 150-

51, 213. See also Battlefield recovery.

Salvesen, S. Sgt. Erling N., 309

Samar, 427-28

San Carlos, 412-13

San Fabian, 415-16

San Fernando, 425

San Fratello, 169

San Jacinto, 416, 417

San Jose, 405, 431

San Miguel, 420

San Stefano, 165

Sansapor, 383, 407

Santa Barbara, 414

Sarangani Bay, 442

Sarmi, 378-79

Sarrebourg, 292

Satan (flame thrower), 453

"Satchel charges," 450-51, 463

SATIN, 124, 128

Savage, 2d Lt. John H., 90

Savernake Forest, 98, 104

Sayler, Maj. Gen. Henry B., 94, 96, 107-08, 291,

296, 339, 349

bomb disposal training, 231

OVERLORD planning, 219-20, 223, 225-26, 228,

236-38

tank controversy, 332

Sayre Highway, 438-40

Sbeïtla, 129, 135, 142

Scammell tractor, 144

Schelde estuary, 302

Schnee Eifel, 307

Schofield Barracks, 445

Schönebeck, 344

Schowalter, Lt. Col. Herbert P., 284, 285

Schwartz, Col. Philip, 231

Scoglitti, 157, 164

Seamules, 343

Searchlights

Canal Defense Light, 230, 306, 321, 452

Japanese, 230n

Sedjenane Valley, 145

Seeadler Harbor, 368

Seekell, Tech. 4 George E., 424

Sees, 271

Seine, 263-65, 268-69, 278, 275

Seine Base Section, 278

Sele River, 180

Sellfors, Sergeant, 210

Services of Supply (SOS)

ETOUSA, 105, 106, 107n, 220, 225, 237

NATOUSA, 125, 140, 154, 182, 284

SWPA, 53, 61-62, 69-70, 77, 80, 354, 355-56,

Services of Supply—Continued

SWPA—Continued

364, 393, 395, 421, 422, 442

U.K., 94, 96, 98, 101, 103, 105, 220, 227, 228

United States, 104

Seydhisfjördhur, 8, 9

Seymour, 49

Sezze, 211

Sfax, 123-24

SHAGGY, 367, 368

Sharp, Brig. Gen. William F., 441

Shepherd, Maj. Daniel F., 178, 179-80

Shepherd, Maj. Gen. Lemuel C., Jr., 457

Shields, Sgt. Orville L., 392

SHINGLE, 191-92

Ship arming (SWPA), 46-48

Shortages, 50-51, 57, 83-84. See also Ammunition;

Motor vehicles; Ordnance troops, shortages of;

Spare parts; Tanks; Weapons.

binoculars, 132, 182

cleaning and preserving materials, 81-82

food, 84, 289

gasoline, 267, 278

landing craft, 376

manpower, 90-91, 279

shipping, 51, 63, 104, 359n, 388, 395, 413

tires, 277, 282-83, 295

tools, 57, 106, 259-60, 376

watches, 182

Shueh Ting-Yao, Lt. Gen., 14

Shuri defenses, 460, 461-67, 471

Sibuyan Sea, 428

Sicily Campaign, 152-71, 175, 183, 185, 232

Sidi Nsir, 146

Sidi Omar, 25

Sidi Rezegh airfield, 24, 25

Siegfried Line, 279, 292, 294-95, 300, 311

Silver Dawn, 13

Simon, Col. Leslie E., 238

Simpson, Lt. Gen. William H., 323

Skorzeny, Otto, 309

SLEDGEHAMMER, 93

Smith, Brig. Gen. Edward W., 284-85, 292, 339

Smith, Lt. Col. F. E., 226

Smith, Lt. Gen. Holland M., 445

Snake, 230

Soderholm, Lt. Col. Walter H., 13, 15

Soissons, 302

Solomons, 58

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 87, 94, 132, 140,

156, 175, 335, 351, 371

approves floating depots, 388

heavy artillery, 204

investigation of ammunition shortages, 303-04

Sommesous, 276

Soong, T. V., 14

Souk Ahras, 122

Souk el Arba, 121-23
520 ON BEACHHEAD AND BATTLEFRONT

Souk el Khémis, 143

Sousse, 129, 137

Southern Base Section (England), 101, 221, 227

Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC), 290,

339

Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), 44, 47, 55, 59,

86, 363-64

Soviet Union, 10, 11, 18

Spa, 306

Spare parts. See also Cannibalization; Motor vehicles; Tanks; Weapons,

boxed lots, 106, 133

resupply, 388-92

shortages, 57, 153, 163, 181, 259, 277, 376

Special Naval Landing Forces, 74

Special Observer Group (SPOBS), 4-7, 10, 12, 15,

16, 88-89, 90, 91, 94, 101

Standard Nomenclature Lists (SNL's), 42, 57, 155,

217

Stark, Admiral Harold R., 4

Stars and Stripes, 289

Stearns, S. Sgt. Charles, 427

Sternburgh, Pfc. Charles P., 424

Stilwell, General Joseph W., 15, 452n, 473

Stimson, Henry L., 7, 10, 11

Stock control system, 171, 222, 237, 251, 274, 274n,

296

Storage, 37, 92-93, 198, 221-22, 358-59. See also

Ammunition supply dumps; Ammunition supply points; Depots.

Strasbourg, 291, 292

Strathallan, 127

Stratton, Brig. Gen. James H., 260

Sturt Ordnance Depot, 64

Styer, Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D., 202

Sual Ordnance Ammunition Depot, 419

Sudbury, 221

Suddard, Maj. Herbert A., 178, 180

Sullivan, Pfc. Leo, 420

Summerbell, Capt. William E., 25

Sunabe, 458, 459

Supply, 55, 104, 125, 132-34, 294-96, 303, 340-41, 363, 395. See also Ammunition; Motor vehicles; Resupply; Weapons,

by air, 73, 81, 438, 440

by airdrop, 69, 73, 314, 440, 441, 468

British system, 6

Class II and IV, 45, 103, 119, 170, 181, 216-17,

234, 249, 283, 294-96, 302, 303, 340, 343, 371,

430-31

Class V, 185, 187, 216-17, 234

days of supply, Mediterranean, 154, 181, 195,

195n days of supply, Pacific, 45, 67, 364, 371, 395,

410, 430

days of supply, U.K., 103, 221

inventories, 154, 194

lessons learned in Mediterranean, 216-18

Supply—Continued

lines of communications, 69-70, 82, 109, 124-25,

145, 170, 264-65, 275, 278, 290

new methods in OVERLORD, 220-21

by pack trains, 215

priorities, 213, 259-60, 293, 350, 363

by rail, 51, 149, 271-74, 281, 291, 294, 303, 303n,

308-09, 316, 344, 413, 420

requisitions, 154-55, 171, 195, 237, 295, 301,

364, 421, 422

by ship, 37, 70-73, 125, 157, 437-38, 467-70. See also Coastal shipping, SWPA.

of troops in combat, 211, 263

by truck, 152, 142, 145, 260, 263, 270, 271, 278,

290-91, 295, 303, 303n, 344, 420

to USSR, 18, 20, 23, 32

Supply planning

for Australia, 38-43

for Hollandia, 372

for Iceland, 7-9

for Italy, 177-78, 192

for Japan, 472-74

for last German campaign, 339-41

for Middle East, 16, 18-24

for NEPTUNE, 227-28, 233-34, 236-37

for New Britain, 363-64

for North Africa, 101-08

for Okinawa, 449-53

for OVERLORD, 221-22, 225-39

for Philippines, 392-96, 407-08, 410-11, 429-31

for Sicily, 153-69

for southern France, 284-85

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force

(SHAEF), 238, 261, 269, 290, 341, 349

Susan B. Anthony, 247

Susan Luckenbach, 388

Sutton, Lt. Col. Leon P., 415

Suva, 35

Swanson, Tech. 5 Harcourt W., 309

Swift, Maj. Gen. Innis P., 424

Sydney, 38, 48, 50, 54, 57

Tabarka, 143, 145

Tables of organization and equipment (TOE), 174-

75, 187, 189, 234, 235, 237

TABLETENNIS, 381-82

Tacloban, 394-96, 402, 405, 409

Tactical Air Command, XXIX, 326

Talisay, 433, 434

Talomo, 438

Tanahmerah Bay, 370, 371, 372-73

Tank Battalions

70th, 129, 137

193d, 462, 464

716th, 416

740th, 306, 306n

Tank Destroyer Battalion, 702d, 325n, 327

Tank Destroyer Board, 329
INDEX 521

Tank destroyers, 33, 322, 325, 327, 366n

Tank recovery teams, 434

Tank recovery vehicles, 144-45, 202, 205, 216, 463

Tank transporters, 33, 122, 132, 216, 255, 257, 260,

343, 422

Tankdozer, 197-98

Tanks. See also Tanks, U.S. comparison of U.S. and German, 139, 326-28,

476

duckbills attached, 281, 322, 323

electrical transmission, 330, 338n

lend lease, 11, 17, 54

losses, 25, 121, 312n, 322-24, 324n, 325, 325n,

328, 462-64, 471n

maintenance and repair, 11, 17, 22, 23, 25n, 132,

140, 281, 297-98, 298n, 312, 422

performance of, 24, 26-29, 139-40, 326-28, 416,

470-71

production controversy, 328-32, 338

reconditioning for Pacific, 350

shortages, 132, 279, 291, 295, 312

spare parts, 20, 278, 295, 422

Tanks, British

Crocodile, 229

duplex-drive (DD) swimming tank, 229

Matilda, 24, 27

Tanks, German

Pzkw III, 26-27, 31, 139-40, 149

Pzkw III Special, 28-29

Pzkw IV, 26-27, 31, 149, 161

Pzkw IV Special, 28-29, 139-40

Pzkw V (Panther), 214, 215, 215n, 255, 322,

325, 325n, 327, 331

Pzkw VI (Tiger), 140, 149, 150, 161, 255, 322,

325, 325n, 327, 331

Tiger Royal, 312

Tanks, Italian, 29

Tanks, Japanese, 380, 416, 422

Tanks, U.S.

M3 Grant, 20, 27-28, 104, 115, 138, 306

M3 Stuart, 17, 20, 27, 75, 82, 132, 139-40

M4 Sherman, in Europe, 161, 255, 312, 322-23,

325, 326-31, 334, 334n, 336, 338

M4 Sherman, in North Africa, 27-29, 33, 138,

140

M4 Sherman, in Pacific, 380, 416, 422, 451, 453,

457, 464, 476-77

M4A3 Sherman, 329, 331

M4A3E2 Sherman, 328, 342

M5 "Honey", 129, 137

M24, 306, 306n, 332, 333, 342

M26 Pershing, 331-32, 464, 473

7-ton Marmon-Herrington, 13

T20 series, 329-35, 338

TAP I (Andimeshk), 23n

TAP II (Khorramshahr), 23n

Tarlac, 413

Tasajera, 116, 156

Task forces

1st Airborne, 285-86

BACKHANDER, 362, 363, 364-66

BEWITCH, 370

BREWER, 368-69

BYPRODUCT, 355

CENT, 153, 157-59, 164

Center, 101-03, 107-10, 114, 117, 119, 123, 136,

149

CYCLONE, 381

DIME, 153, 157-61, 164

DIRECTOR, 363, 364-65

Eastern, 102-03, 107-08, 109, 112, 114, 117

French-American Tunisian, 129

HURRICANE, 379-81

Joss, 153, 157-59, 164-65

KOOL, 153, 161

LAZARETTO, 362

LEATHERBACK, 355

LETTERPRESS, 370-72

MICHAELMAS, 366-67

NOISELESS, 370-73

Palawan, 431

PERSECUTION, 375-76

RECKLESS, 370-76

South Pacific, 36

TORNADO, 378-79

TRADEWIND, 384

TYPHOON, 383

Western, 101-02, 104, 109, 117, 149, 152, 165

Western Islands Attack Force, 453-55

Western Visayan, 405, 428

Tate, Col. Ralph H., 181, 183, 192, 195n, 211, 217,

218

Taunton, 221, 224

Taxas, 141

Tayug, 424

Tébessa, 123, 128-30, 132, 136-37, 141, 143

Tehran, 12, 19, 20, 23

Telegrafo, 404

Tel-el-Kebir, 11, 21, 24

Tel-Litwinsky, 19

Tennessee, 456

Terracina, 211

Thala, 128, 137

Thélepte, 123, 129, 130, 138

Thompson, 2d Lt. Wallace W., 40

Thompson submachine gun, 74, 78

Ticao, 428

Tidworth Ordnance Depot, 98, 101, 106, 107, 221,

224

TIGER, 247, 247n

TILEFER, 100, 108, 223

Timoshenko, 71

Tinchebray, 268

Tine River valley, 145

Tire repair, 282-83, 298, 340, 391, 450

Tobruk, 19, 21, 27
522

Toftoy, Col. Holger N., 349

TORCH, 101-08, 109-17

Torrens Greek, 61

Toul, 280

Toulon, 288

Tournai, 269, 274

Townsville, 39, 48-50, 54, 58, 60-62, 64, 81, 85,

355

Tractor, M5, 467

Trainer, Col. Graham B., 222

Treforest, 224

TRIDENT, 172, 444

Tripoli, 21, 159

Troina, 166

Trucks. See also Motor vehicles.

54-ton (jeep), 83, 216, 476

1⁄4-ton amphibian, 156

11⁄2-ton, 132

21⁄2-ton, 106, 119-20, 132, 192, 216, 223-24,

282, 476

carrier, cargo, M29C (Weasel), 230, 467

DUKW, in Europe, 162-63, 169, 192, 195, 216,

228, 234, 247, 476

DUKW, in North Africa, 156-57

DUKW, in Pacific, 156, 354, 380, 382, 415n 451,

458, 468, 470, 476

shop, 130-31, 216, 238, 260

Truscott, Maj. Gen. Lucian K., 132, 157, 158, 164,

169, 197, 216, 284

Tucker, M. Sgt. Delmar E., 46, 47

Tunga, 400, 401, 405

Tunis, 109, 120, 122, 124, 128, 146

Tunisia, 109, 113, 120, 122-24, 128-29, 215

Tunisia Campaign, 32, 127, 135-51

Twin unit pack (TUP), 99, 106, 119

Tyree, Tech. 3 William F., Jr., 424

UGR Project, 47

Umm Qasr, 20, 22

Unger, Col. Charles H., 47, 48

"Uninterrupted" Ordnance Service, 182-84

Upper Ballindery, 222

U.S. Advanced Base (Port Moresby), 65, 66

U.S. Army Air Services (USAAS), 55-57

U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma, and India, 15

U.S. Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE), 36, 44

U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (USAFPOA), 446

U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific (AFWESPAC),

442

U.S. Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA), 39-41,

44-48, 50, 54-58, 60, 61

U.S. Army Forces in British Isles (USAFBI), 15,

88-91, 94

U.S. Army Forces in Central Pacific Area (USAFICPA), 446

U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME),

15

U.S. Army Northern Ireland Force (USANIF), 91,

93

U.S. Asiatic Fleet, 35

U.S. Forces in Australia (USFIA), 36, 39

U.S. Forces in the Philippines (USFIP), 44

U.S. Navy, 47, 343, 384, 465

USFET Board, 236

UTAH Beach, 232-33, 247-48

Vahldieck, Lt. Edward A., 161

Valencia (Leyte), 402

Valognes, 258, 278, 296

Vane, Maj. Ray D., 431

Vehicle parks, 100-101, 221-22

Vehicles. See Motor vehicles; Tanks; Trucks.

Venafro, 209

Verde Island passage, 428

Verdun, 275-76, 281, 296, 302

Verviers, 300, 304, 305

Vesoul, 291

VICTOR I, 429, 432-33

VICTOR II, 429, 433-35

VICTOR III, 429, 431

VICTOR IV, 429, 431-32

VICTOR V, 429, 435-42

Vierville, 244

Villa Verde Trail, 424

Villasis, 414

Vire, 260, 268

Virton, 309, 316

Visayan-Mindanao Force, 441

Visayan Passages, 426-28

Vitiaz Strait, 362, 366, 371

Vittoria, 164

Vogelkop Peninsula, 381-83

Volturno River, 173, 187

Vorhauer, Pvt. James G., 424

Vosges Mountains, 291

Waga Waga, 356, 358, 364

Waggoner, Lt. Col. Clinton A., 353, 419n

Waimes, 304, 309, 352

Waite, Lt. Col. Frederick G., 50, 50n, 388, 390,

392

Wakde, 377-78

Waldron, Brig. Gen. Albert W., 72-73, 76

Walker, Lt. Col. John S., 266-67, 308, 309

Wallace, Maj. Gen. Fred C., 448

Wallaroo, 60

Walney, 117

Walter, Pfc. Robert W., 415

Wanigela, 69-71

War Department, 9, 86, 88, 100, 103, 154, 183,

220-21, 232, 238, 259

and the bazooka, 150, 156

and lend-lease matériel, 10

and military missions, 12, 20

and Ordnance group organization, 174-76
INDEX 523

War Department-Continued

and plans for MAGNET, 89, 90, 92

and policy in Australia, 38-39, 40, 42, 45, 53

and redeployment planning, 351-52

and shipment of supplies, 186, 220, 302

War Office, British, 6, 96

War Weapons Week, 3

Warminster, 221

Warner, Col. Walter W., 319, 320-21, 339, 342-43

Wasatch, 411

Waterproofing, 106-07, 116, 158, 163, 180, 228,

404

Wavell, Lt. Gen. Sir Archibald, 39, 49

Weapons. See also Guns; Howitzers; Machine guns;

Rifles. effectiveness in World War II, 477

for jungle warfare, 86, 360-62

maintenance and repair, 80-81, 135, 168-69, 252,

300-301, 377, 382, 400

new weapons demonstrations, 23, 238, 332-34,

360-61, 452

Pacific's need for new weapons, 86, 451-53, 473

performance in Tunisia, 149

redeployment to Pacific, 350

shortages, in Europe, 104, 277, 295

shortages, in North Africa, 129, 132, 135, 148

shortages, in Pacific, 66-67, 80, 422

supply, 45-46, 140, 170, 340, 421-22

Weasel, 230, 467

Webb, Col. E. M., 227

Welch, Col. Ray O., 448-49, 456, 472

Welding material, 254, 258

Wells, Lt. Col. George H., 308-09

Wells, Brig. Gen. Gordon M., 205, 206, 209

Wem, 221

Wesel, 344

Wesleyan Victory, 468

Wesson, Maj. Gen. Charles M., 5, 11

Western Base Section, 101, 221

Western Desert, 19, 24-27, 109, 140

Western Pacific Base Command, 447

Wewak, 370

Wheeler, 2d Lt. Dwight E., 390

Wheeler, Brig. Gen. Raymond A., 12, 18

WHIP, 31

Wigan, 100

William W. Gherard, 181, 181n

Williams, Col. Grant, 312

Willoughby, Brig. Gen. Charles A., 59

Willson, Sgt. William R., 392

Wilson, Col. Robert W., 219, 254, 302

Wilson, Col. William I., 226, 339

Winter Line, 173, 191

Woodberry, Col. John H., 410

Woodbury, Lt. Col. Grayson C., 91

Woodlark Island, 355-56

Worms, 344

Wortley, 98

Wurm River, 323

Wyndham, 44

"X" fleet, 46-47

Yaeju-Dake-Yuza-Dake escarpment, 467

Yamashita, General Tomoyuki, 475

Yonabaru, 467, 468, 470

Yontan airfield, 456

Youks-les-Bains, 123, 139, 140

Yu Ta-wei, Maj. Gen., 13, 14

Zamami, 454

Zamboanga, 429, 431-32, 436, 475

ZEBRA Mission, 332-35, 476

Zehla Mehlis, 348

Zeiss Optical Plant (Jena), 348

Zornig, Maj. Karl H., 243

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1991 261-877/20014

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