UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

v. 

NICHOLAS DOMBEK, DAMIEN 

BOLAND, ALFRED ATSUS, and 

JOSEPH ATSUS, 

Defendants. 

MEMORANDUM 

CR. NO. 3:23-CR-149 

(JUDGE MANNION) 

Presently before the court are Defendants Damien Boland, Alfred 

Atsus, and Joseph Atsus' motions to sever Defendant Nicholas Dombek's 

case and trial from theirs, (Doc. 96), and to dismiss Count 1 of the Indictment 

for failure to state an offense. (Doc. 100). Regarding their motion to sever 

moving Defendants argue that Defendant Dombek's alleged bad acts are 

more prevalent and serious than those they allegedly committed and thus 

they will be substantially prejudiced by a joint trial with him. The government 

opposes this request on the bases that moving Defendants have failed to 

show a joint trial will compromise a specific trial right and the court can avoid 

any prejudice to them from joint trial with a proper limiting instruction to the 

jury. Regarding their motion to dismiss moving Defendants argue the 

government's alleged conspiracy in Count 1 of the Indictment is actually an 

impermissible joinder of multiple conspiracies some of which fall outside the 

Case 3:23-cr-00149-MEM Document 161 Filed 10/10/24 Page 1 of 21
applicable statute of limitations. The government opposes this motion on the 

basis that the Indictment properly charges Defendants as members of a 

single conspiracy that allegedly occurred within the applicable statute of 

limitations periods. For the reasons discussed below the court agrees with 

the government as to both motions and will DENY them. 

I. Background 

On June 6, 2023, a federal grand jury sitting in Scranton, Pennsylvania 

returned an indictment charging the Defendants with one count of 

Conspiracy to Commit Theft of Major Artwork, Concealment and Disposal of 

Major Artwork, and Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. §371. Nicholas Dombek was further charged with eight counts 

of Concealment or Disposal of Major Artwork, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §668 

and §2, one count of Theft of Major Artwork, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §668 

and §2, and one count of Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §2314 and §2. Damien Boland was further charged 

with eight counts of Concealment or Disposal of Major Artwork, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. §668 and §2, and two counts of Theft of Major Artwork, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §668 and §2. Joseph Atsus was further charged with 

four counts of Concealment or Disposal of Major Artwork, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §668 and §2, and one count of Theft of Major Artwork, in violation of 

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18 U.S.C. §668 and §2. Alfred Atsus was further charged with three counts 

of Concealment or Disposal of Major Artwork, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §668 

and §2, and one count of Theft of Major Artwork, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§668 and §2. (Doc. 1 ). 

In Count 1 of the indictment the government specifically alleges that 

from August 1999 to June 2019 Defendants conspired with Thomas Trotta, 

Dawn Trotta, Frank Tassiello, Ralph Parry, and Daryl Rinker to steal objects 

of cultural heritage from museums around the country. During the nearly 

twenty years the conspiracy allegedly existed the government claims that 

Defendants and other conspirators conducted research to locate collections 

containing valuable pieces of artwork, antiques, sports memorabilia, and 

other items. Defendants and other conspirators would travel to these 

collections and conduct "reconnaissance" to determine if it was worth 

stealing a given object. Once a theft was agreed upon and planned, 

members of the conspiracy, including the moving Defendants, allegedly 

would meet at pre-arranged locations, travel to the museum or other target 

of the burglary, break in, smash or destroy the protective display cases, and 

steal and remove the objects on display. After the stolen objects were taken, 

members of the conspiracy, including the Defendants, would transport them 

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back to Northeastern Pennsylvania, where they would itemize, distribute, 

and break-down the stolen objects between the members of the conspiracy. 

Three locations in particular were allegedly utilized for these activities: 

the residence of Dombek, the residence of conspirator Dawn Trotta, and a 

bar owned and operated by Boland. At his residence Dombek allegedly 

stripped stolen items, including Yogi Berra's World Series Rings, of their 

gemstones and other valuable attachments before melting them down into 

easily transportable pieces of valuable metal. Dombek also allegedly burned 

or buried several paintings brought to his home. When he was arrested on 

related state charges Dombek went to the homes of Boland and conspirators 

Dawn Trotta and Darlyn Rinker, where he threatened them. He further is 

alleged to have attempted to buy a fatal amount fentanyl to kill a government 

witness and had in his possession a poison plant allegedly with the intent to 

use it for the same purpose. For this Dombek was also charged with witness 

intimidation. 

When the indictment in this case was filed moving Defendants were all 

timely arraigned and released. However, Dombek fled into the woods of 

Northeastern Pennsylvania and remained at large until he surrendered on 

January 1, 2024. After a year of delays, in part caused by Dombek's flight, a 

joint trial of Dombek and moving Defendants is scheduled to begin on 

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January 13, 2025. All other conspirators except Darlyn Ricker, who passed 

away on April 18, 2024, have pied guilty and are now awaiting sentence. 

II. Legal Standards 

A. Motions to Sever 

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b), defendants may 

properly be joined in a single indictment "if they are alleged to have 

participated in the same act or transactions or the same series of acts or 

transactions." Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). However, [i]f joinder is improper under 

Rule 8, "the Court must order separate trials." United States v. Johnson, 

2022 WL 2657113, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 8, 2022) (citing United States v. 

Walker, 657 F.3d 160, 170 (3d Cir. 2011)) ("Rule 8 requires severance where 

defendants were improperly joined."). Even if defendants are properly joined 

under Rule 8, "the Court may sever defendants or offenses under Rule 14 

'[i]f it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder 

of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder 

for trial together."' Id. at 3 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 14). Further, "a district court 

should grant a severance under Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a 

joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants or 

prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence." 

Id. (quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993)). 

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Thus, there is a "heavy" burden on the defendant to show "clear and 

substantial prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair trial." Id. (quoting United 

States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 568 (3d Cir. 1991 )). Additionally, "[e]ven 

when the risk of prejudice is high, less drastic measures than severance 

(such as limiting instructions) 'often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice."' 

Id. (quoting Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539). As such, "the appropriate question for 

the Court on a motion under Rule 14 is whether the jury can 'reasonably be 

expected to compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to the separate 

defendants in view of its volume and limited admissibility."' Id. (quoting 

United States v. Serubo, 460 F. Supp. 689, 694 (E.D. Pa. 1978)); see also 

United States v. Jones, 2016 WL 3067010, *26 (W.D. Pa. June 1, 2016) 

("Rule 14 provides the court discretion to order separate trials of counts, 

sever the defendants' trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires, 

if joinder of offenses appears to prejudice either the defendant or the 

government.") (citations omitted). 

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B. Motions to Dismiss 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 provides that an indictment "must 

be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts 

constituting the offense charge." Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1 ). An indictment is 

sufficient if it "(1) contains the elements of the offense intended to be 

charged, (2) sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared 

to meet, and (3) allows the defendant to show with accuracy to what extent 

he may plead a former acquittal or conviction in the event of a subsequent 

prosecution." United States v. Viti/lo, 490 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2007) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, "no greater specificity than 

the statutory language is required so long as there is sufficient factual 

orientation to permit the defendant to prepare his defense and to invoke 

double jeopardy in the event of a subsequent prosecution." United States v. 

Rankin, 870 F.2d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 1989). 

"Generally, an indictment will satisfy these requirements where it 

informs the defendant of the statute he is charged with violating, lists the 

elements of a violation under the statute, and specifies the time period during 

which the violations occurred." United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 595 (3d 

Cir. 2012). A court should uphold an indictment "unless it is so defective that 

it does not, by any reasonable construction, charge an offense." United 

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States v. Willis, 844 F.3d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Additionally, "[i]n considering a defense motion to dismiss an 

indictment, the district court [must] accept[ ] as true the factual allegations 

set forth in the indictment." United States v. Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257, 265 (3d 

Cir. 2011 ) ( citation omitted). "If the allegations in the indictment do not suffice 

to state an offense, Rule 12(b)(3)(8) authorizes dismissal; however, 

"dismissal[] may not be predicated upon the insufficiency of the evidence to 

prove the indictment's charges." United States v. Manganas, 2017 WL 

2547310, *2 (M.D. Pa. June 13, 2017) (citing United States v. DeLaurentis, 

230 F.3d 659, 660-61 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Unless there is a stipulated record, or 

unless immunity issues are implicated, a pretrial motion to dismiss an 

indictment is not a permissible vehicle for addressing the sufficiency of the 

government's evidence.")). 

Ill. Discussion 

A. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count 1 

Moving Defendants argue that Count 1 of the Indictment improperly 

joins multiple distinct conspiracies as a single conspiracy in violation of 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b). According to the moving 

Defendants there are significant time gaps between the acts alleged in the 

indictment. For example, they highlight a 6-year time gap between the theft 

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of Christy Matthewson's jersey from Keystone College, the first alleged overt 

act of the conspiracy, and the next alleged act. Additionally, they claim the 

government's alleged conspiracy can be divided into at least three other 

distinct time periods that represent, at that least, three separate 

conspiracies. First are the burglaries of the Everhart Museum and Space 

Farms Zoo & Museum in November 2005 and June 2006 respectively. 

Second are the burglaries of the Lackawanna Historical Society, Scranton 

Country Club, Ringwood Manor, and Sterling Hill Mining Museum between 

July 201 O and July 2011 . Third is the theft of sports memorabilia from the 

USGA Golf Museum and Library in May 2012, the National Racing Museum, 

and Yogi Berra Museum and Learning Center both in October 2014. 

Furthermore, between July 2016 and April 2019 the government's 

allegations make no mention of Boland. They also make no mention of Alfred 

Atsus after December 2012 or Joseph Atsus after October 2014. 

Based on these distinctions moving Defendants assert that the 

Indictment includes acts beyond the applicable 5 year statute of limitations 

period and to the extent the Indictment includes conduct that occurred prior 

to June 6, 2018, it must be dismissed. Moving Defendants further claim that 

the mere fact the conspiracy, or in their view multiple conspiracies, were kept 

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secret does not allow the government to argue the statute of limitation is 

tolled for each of those conspiracies. 

In response the Government contends that paragraphs 6 through 15 

of Count 1 sufficiently allege a common purpose of a conspiracy, "to steal 

from the care, custody, and control of various museums certain objects of 

cultural heritage; knowing that certain objects of cultural heritage had been 

stolen ... received, concealed, exhibited, or disposed of the objects, and 

transported in interstate or foreign commerce goods, wares, merchandise, 

securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to 

have been stolen, converted, or taken by fraud ... " (Doc. 1, 1J6). Specifically, 

the indictment alleges that the Defendants and other conspirators used 

nearly identical methods to conduct each theft as well as transport, conceal, 

and dispose of the stolen items. 

Likewise, the Indictment alleges extensive overlap of participants in 

Count 1. Dombek and Boland are involved, in some way, with nearly every 

alleged theft. Joseph Atsus is alleged to have actively participated in the 

burglaries of Keystone College, the Everhart Museum, Space Farms Zoo & 

Museum, Ringwood Manor, Scranton Country Club, Sterling Hill Mining, 

Museum, and the Yogi Berra Museum & Learning Center. Joseph Atsus is 

also alleged to still be actively concealing the items stolen from the Everhart 

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Museum, Space Farms Zoo & Museum, and Ringwood Manor. Alfred Atsus, 

while not alleged to have been an active participant in as many thefts as the 

other defendants, is still alleged to be actively concealing the artwork and 

other objects of cultural heritage stolen from the Everhart Museum, Space 

Farms Zoo & Museum, and Ringwood Manor. 

Regarding the moving Defendants' assertion that the multiple and 

sometimes years long delays between the overt acts listed in Count 1 

bespeak multiple distinct conspires, the government counters that the 

detailed targeting, planning, and execution of each museum burglary 

required delays between each act. During the time between overt acts the 

conspirators did not take a break from their criminal activity but instead 

continuously worked towards committing their next crime. Similarly, 

regarding the moving Defendants assertion that Count 1 is at least, in part, 

barred by the applicable statute of limitation, the government retorts that one 

of the common goals of the conspiracy, namely the continued concealment 

of the stolen objects of cultural heritage, is a continuing crime. The time gaps 

between thefts do not indicate the end of a conspiracy if one of the goals of 

that conspiracy is to continue to conceal the items stolen in previous thefts. 

Instead, the alleged ongoing concealment of stolen items indicates that the 

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charged conspiracy continued uninterrupted between each theft, and was 

one, continuous, criminal agreement. 

On all these issues the court agrees with the government. To prove a 

conspiracy against the United States in the Third Circuit, the government 

must prove that: 

1) two or more persons agreed to commit an offense against the 

United States, as charged in the indictment; 

2) the defendant was a party to or member of that agreement; 

3) the defendant joined the agreement or conspiracy knowing of 

its objectives to commit an offense against the United States and 

intending to join together with at least one other alleged 

conspirator to achieve those objectives; that is, that the 

defendant and at least one other alleged conspirator shared a 

unity of purpose and the intent to achieve a common goal or 

objective, to commit an offense against the United States; and 

4) at some time during the existence of the agreement or 

conspiracy, at least one of its members performed an overt act 

in order to further the objectives of the agreement. 

See Third Circuit Criminal Jury Instruction. §6.18.371A. Additionally 

conspirators need not have knowledge of all other members of a conspiracy, 

nor of all of their activities in support of the conspiracy. 3d Cir. Model Criminal 

Jury Instructions 6.18.371 D ('The government need not prove that (name) 

knew everything about the conspiracy or that (he) (she) knew everyone 

involved in it, or that (he) (she) was a member from the beginning."); see also 

United States v. Lester, 282 F.2d 750, 753 (3d Cir. 1960) (single conspiracy 

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to transport stolen property in interstate commerce "committed whether or 

not the parties comprehend its entire scope, whether they act separately or 

together, by the same or different means, known or unknown to some of 

them.") 

Moreover, the question of whether a single conspiracy or multiple 

conspiracy exists is a fact question to be decided by a jury. Smith, 789 F.2d 

at 200. The only consideration in a Rule 12 motion to dismiss is whether the 

allegations in the Indictment, taken as true, sufficiently allege a single, timely 

indictment. See Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 595-596. To extent there is any variance 

at trial between the indictment and evidence the Third Circuit has identified 

three factors to determine if a single conspiracy existed: "overlap of 

participants, identity of purpose, and identity of method." United States v. 

Schurr, 775 F.2d 549 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Maker, 751 F.2d, 

614, 625-626) (3d Cir. 1984). Even though the court need not apply these 

factors at this stage of the proceeding, it notes that government has so far 

sufficiently alleged overlap of participants with a shared purpose and method 

to conspire to steal, transport, conceal, and dispose of items of cultural 

heritage. Time gaps between overt acts alone do not preclude the existence 

of a conspiracy. 

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The fact that the indictment does not mention moving Defendants with 

regards to new burglaries between or after certain dates also does not mean 

they were no longer part of the conspiracy. Once the prosecution has proved 

both the existence of a conspiracy across a period of time and the 

defendant's participation in that conspiracy, the burden falls on the defendant 

to establish his withdrawal prior to the completion of the period. United States 

v. Williams, 974 F.3d 320, 368 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Smith, 568 U.S. at 113). 

If a defendant does not show "some [affirmative] act to disavow or defeat the 

purpose" of the conspiracy, then he must "incur the guilt" attendant upon its 

continuance. Id. (citing Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369-70 (1912) 

( overruled on other grounds.) Here moving Defendants point to no such 

affirmative acts. To the contrary the indictment alleges that irrespective of 

their participation in new burglaries, moving Defendants still contributed to 

the conspiracy by continuing to conceal the items stolen in prior burglaries. 

This continued concealment is also why moving Defendants statute of 

limitations argument fails. 

Moving Defendants are correct that there is five-year statute of 

limitation to charge conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. §371 that runs from the last, 

not the first, overt act alleged. 18 U.S.C. §3282; see also Fiswick v. United 

States, 329 U.S. 211 , 216 (1946); United States v. Gordon, 335 Fed. App'x. 

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236, 238-239 (3d Cir. 2009). However, two of the substantive offenses 

Defendants are charged with conspiring to commit have a twenty-five-year 

statute of limitation. 18 U.S.C. §3294. In any event, since the indictment here 

was filed on June 6, 2023, the indictment must otherwise allege that at least 

one overt act occurred after June 6, 2018. See United States v. Reitmeyer, 

356 F.3d 1313 (3rd Cir. 2004) (limitations period begins when the crime is 

complete, not when it is discovered.); see a/so Grunewald v. United States, 

353 U.S. 391 , 396-97 (1957) (where substantiation of a conspiracy charge 

requires proof of an overt act, it must be shown both that the conspiracy still 

subsisted within the three years prior to the return of the indictment, and that 

at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiratorial agreement was 

performed within that period.) Here the government has alleged twenty-two 

overt acts, which occurred after June 6, 2018. 

The Indictment further alleges five overt acts that began prior to that 

date but continued after it, namely the ongoing concealment of stolen 

property from Keystone College, Everhart Museum, and Space Farms Zoo 

& Museum. As previously referenced the continued concealment of the 

stolen objects is a continuing crime because that offense requires the 

continuing actions of the concealing party, namely controlling, transporting, 

and otherwise securing the stolen items. See United States v. United States 

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Gypsum Co. , 600 F.2d, 414, 417 (3d Cir. 1979). Such acts of concealment 

are alleged to be part of the original conspiracy charged here and differ from 

acts of concealment taken merely to hide the existence of an already 

completed plot that cannot be used to extend a statute of limitations. Thus, 

the statute of limitations would not begin to run here until the alleged 

concealment of stolen items is complete, i.e., the item is discovered or 

destroyed. As the Indictment alleges that some of the moving Defendants 

have continued to conceal some of the stolen objects of cultural heritage 

through the present Count 1 of the Indictment is timely. 

Accordingly Count 1 of the Indictment properly charges Defendants as 

members of single conspiracy within the applicable statute of limitations 

periods, and moving Defendants motion to dismiss that count will be 

DENIED. 

B. Defendants' Motion to Sever Defendant Dombek 

Moving Defendants argue that trying them alongside Defendant 

Dombek would create a serious risk that the jury will not be able to make a 

reliable judgment about their guilt or innocence. Given the complexity of this 

case moving Defendants argue the risk for jury confusion is high. Since the 

government may seek to present evidence of Dombek's misconduct at a joint 

trial that would otherwise be inadmissible against them they assert the jury 

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could also accidently attribute Dombek's bad acts to them. Specifically, they 

note concerns about Dombek's decades of other crimes preceding the 

conspiracy alleged here as well as burglaries Dombek allegedly committed 

with other conspirators, namely Thomas Trotta, but not moving Defendants. 

In the same vein moving Defendants assert a jury in a joint trial may wrongly 

attribute Dombek's "near-familiar relationship" with Trotta to them. 

Moving Defendants further assert that allegations against Dombek are 

"inflammatory and qualitative different" from the evidence against them 

because they involve the destruction of historic cultural artifacts like Yogi 

Berra's World Series Rings and witness intimidation including alleged 

attempts to poison a government witness. Moreover, when arrest warrants 

issued in this case moving Defendants were promptly arraigned and 

released, while Dombek went into hiding. Moving Defendants claim that such 

allegations may lead the government to seek a consciousness of guilt jury 

instruction against Dombek that would not be appropriate in their cases. As 

such, moving Defendants claim that a joint trial will substantially prejudice 

their defenses and severance of their cases from Dombek is necessary. 

In response the government asserts that allegations one defendant in 

a conspiracy was more culpable or participated in conduct which was more 

severe or violent that other conspirators, does not meet the high burden 

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required for severance. According to the government the allegations against 

only Dombek are also intrinsic to the crimes charged against all Defendants. 

Namely Dombek is alleged to have threatened violence against his coconspirators in order to protect himself and prevent the discovery of the 

conspiracy. As such, the evidence against Dombek is relevant to prove the 

existence of the conspiracy, and would still be admissible in moving 

Defendants' trial, even if severed from Dombek. Likewise, Dombek's flight to 

avoid arrest and close relationship with Trotta could also be admissible 

against moving Defendants in any severed trial because they are also 

relevant to the existence of the conspiracy. The government further notes 

that regardless, moving Defendants had a close relationship with Trotta 

having allegedly participated in a criminal conspiracy with him for nearly 

twenty years. To the extent there is still any potential for spillover evidence 

in a joint trial the government claims that evidence can be properly mitigated 

by the court with an instruction to the jury to consider each defendant and 

each charge separately. 

The court again agrees with the government. The mere fact the 

Dombek is accused of more evocative conduct does violate moving 

Defendants' specific trial rights or prevent a jury from making a reliable 

judgment about their guilt or innocence. See United States v. McG/ory, 968 

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F.2d 309, 340 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. DePeri, 778 F.2d 963, 

983 (3d Cir. 1985); ("The introduction of evidence more damaging to one 

defendant than another does not entitle the seemingly less culpable 

defendant to a severance."); see also United States v. Heilman, 377 Fed. 

App'x. 157, 200 (3d Cir. 2010) (severance not warranted in a drug trafficking 

case where one defendant also was accused of violent conduct); United 

States v. Davis, 39 F.3d 173, 183 (3d. 2005) (severance denied where 

evidence was stronger against co-defendants, including evidence of codefendant fleeing from police); United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 730 

(3d Cir. 197 4) ( severance denied although evidence against co-defendants 

was "much more substantial"). Thus, the moving Defendants have not 

carried their heavy burden of showing clear and substantial prejudice from a 

joint trial. 

Additionally, the Third Circuit has long expressed a preference for joint 

trials whereas here defendants are charged with conspiracy. See United 

States v. Ward, 793 F.2d 551 , 556 (3d Cir. 1986) (participants in a single 

conspiracy should ordinarily be tried together for purposes of judicial 

efficiency and consistency, even if evidence against one is more damaging 

than that against another.); see also United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 

205 (430 F. 3d 190) ("We have long held that a defendant is not entitled to a 

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severance merely because evidence against a co-defendant is more 

damaging than the evidence against the moving party." (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). In cases where defendants are alleged to have 

participated in a single conspiracy, a joint trial on both the conspiracy and 

related counts "aid[s] the finder of fact in determining the full extent of the 

conspiracy and prevent[s] the tactical disadvantage to the government from 

disclosure of its case." United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1094 (3d Cir. 

1996); see also United States v. Green, 2024 WL 3945118 *4 (3d Cir., 

August 27, 2024) ("Our default procedure is thus to conduct a joint trial of 

defendants who are indicted together ... "). Additionally, the Government 

alone has proffered that this case will involve between 45-90 witnesses, all 

of who would have to be recalled in a severed trial. It is clear that severance 

would not further judicial efficiency or consistency. Given that moving 

Defendants have not shown a clear and substantial prejudice making a joint 

trial manifestly unfair, the court sees no reason to diverge from this default 

procedure here. 

The government is also correct that the court can mitigate any 

prejudice caused by a joint trial with a proper limiting instruction rather than 

granting the more extreme remedy of severance. See Third Circuit Model 

Criminal Instructions 3.12 through 3.15; Lore, 430 F.3d at 206 Uury 

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instructions are persuasive evidence against prejudice); see a/so United 

States v. Brown, 849 F.3d 87, 92 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 

538-39, (1993) (citation omitted) ("Rule 14 does not require severance even 

if prejudice is shown; rather, it leaves the tailoring of the relief to be granted, 

if any, to the district court's sound discretion."); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 

U.S. 200, 211 , (1987) (When the risk of prejudice is high, a district court is 

more likely to determine that separate trials are necessary, but less drastic 

measures, such as limiting instructions, often will suffice to cure any risk of 

prejudice.). A limiting instruction here will address the moving Defendants' 

concerns without undermining judicial economy or placing the government 

at tactical disadvantage. Accordingly, moving Defendants' motion to sever 

will be DENIED. 

IV. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, the court will DENY moving Defendant's 

motions to sever and dismiss. (Docs. 96 and 100). An appropriate order 

follows. 

DATE: October 10, 2024 

23-149-02 

~-'T'-· Y E. MANNION 

Unitecl S ates District Judge 

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