U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

27–396 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

S. HRG. 115–303 

NOMINATION OF CHRISTOPHER SHARPLEY 

TO BE THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2017 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 

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(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman 

MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

ANGUS KING, Maine 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

KAMALA HARRIS, California 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio 

CHRIS JOYNER, Staff Director 

MICHAEL CASEY, Minority Staff Director 

KELSEY STROUD BAILEY, Chief Clerk 

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(III) 

CONTENTS 

OCTOBER 17, 2017 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina ................ 1 

Warner, Mark R., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Virginia ........................ 2 

WITNESS 

Sharpley, Christopher, nominated to be Inspector General of the Central 

Intelligence Agency .............................................................................................. 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 

Project on Government Oversight article dated October 16, 2017 ...................... 17 

Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees .................................... 36 

Additional Prehearing Questions ........................................................................... 50 

Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 69 

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(1) 

NOMINATION OF CHRISTOPHER SHARPLEY 

TO BE THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2017 

U.S. SENATE, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m. in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Burr, Warner, Risch, Collins, Lankford, Cotton, Feinstein, Wyden, Heinrich, King, Manchin, and Harris. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA 

Chairman BURR. I’d like to call this hearing to order. I’d like to 

welcome our witness today, Christopher R. Sharpley, President 

Trump’s nominee to be the next Inspector General of the Central 

Intelligence Agency. Chris, congratulations on your nomination. 

I’d like to start by recognizing the family that you brought with 

you here today. I understand your wife Kimberly is here. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, sir. 

Chairman BURR. As well as your sons Stefan and Aidan. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes. 

Chairman BURR. Stefan, Aidan, give me a wave. OK, good. 

[Stefan and Aidan wave.] 

Good. 

And your daughter Gillian and her husband James, good. And of 

course, your mother Joyce. Welcome. 

Our goal in conducting this hearing is to enable the committee 

to consider Mr. Sharpley’s qualifications and to allow for thoughtful 

deliberation by our members. 

Chris already has provided substantive written responses to 85 

questions presented by the committee and its members. Today, of 

course, members will be able to ask additional questions and to 

hear from Mr. Sharpley in this open session. 

Mr. Sharpley earned his B.A. from American University and received his master’s degree from the Naval Postgraduate School. In 

1981, he received a commission from the U.S. Air Force, where he 

trained as a special agent and a counterintelligence officer in the 

Air Force Office of Special Investigations. Chris continued to serve 

in the Air Force in a variety of posts, including as Director of Security, until he retired honorably from the Air Force in 2002. 

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Immediately following his retirement, Chris joined the Office of 

the Inspector General of the Department of Energy as a civilian 

Federal special agent. 

Since then, Chris has worked as the Deputy IG for Investigations 

and Inspections for the Department of Energy and helped to build 

the new OIG offices at the TARP program and the Federal Housing 

Authority. In 2010, Chris received the Presidential Rank Award for 

meritorious service for that work. 

In 2012, Chris retired as a Federal civilian law enforcement officer and started his career at the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Chris, if you don’t mind me saying, I don’t think you’re very good 

at retiring. 

[Laughter.] 

From 2012 to 2015, Chris served as Deputy Inspector General at 

the CIA. Since 2015, Chris has served as both Deputy and Acting 

IG of the CIA. 

Chris, independent and empowered Inspector Generals are critical to the integrity and efficient management of the intelligence 

community. And I trust that you will lead the CIA’s office with integrity and will ensure your officers operate lawfully, ethically and 

morally. 

As I mentioned to other nominees during their nomination hearing, I can assure you that this committee will continue to faithfully 

follow its charter and conduct vigorous and real-time oversight over 

the intelligence community, its operations, and its activities. We 

will ask difficult and probing questions of you, your staff, and will 

expect honest, complete and timely responses. 

Chris, I look forward to supporting your nomination and ensuring its consideration without delay. I want to thank you again for 

being here today, for your years of service to your country, both in 

law enforcement and in our military, and I look forward to your 

testimony. 

I now recognize the distinguished Vice Chairman for any opening 

statement he might make. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Mr. Sharpley. Good to see you again; and welcome, as well, 

to your family. Congratulations to your nomination to serve as Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency. 

I believe that the job of the Inspector General is critical to the 

effective operation of any agency. This committee relies upon the 

Inspector General of the intelligence agencies to ensure that the IC 

organizations are, one, obviously, using taxpayer dollars wisely; 

conducting their activities within the rule and spirit of the law; and 

supporting and protecting whistleblowers, whistleblowers who report fraud, waste and abuse. These IG functions are even more important in an organization like the CIA, which by necessity does 

not operate in the public. 

I appreciate that you’re the third IG nominee to come before this 

committee this year. I wish to express my hope that we’ll soon receive from the President a nominee for the position of the IG for 

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3 

the overall intelligence community. This position has been vacant 

since February, and I know you can’t affect this directly, but I’m 

very concerned about the number of changes occurring there. 

As I mentioned, Mr. Sharpley, I appreciated our meeting earlier 

this month. We talked about a number of important issues that you 

will face as the CIA IG I want to reiterate some of our discussion 

and ask you, for some of these same questions that we had in private, to address these questions in public. 

One, we discussed the importance of supporting and protecting 

whistleblowers. Today, I want to hear more about your plans to ensure all CIA employees know their rights and responsibilities, as 

well as the processes for them to report waste, fraud and abuse. 

And I’d like to hear a greater commitment from you on this issue. 

Your job—and we talked about, again, this in our conversation— 

is to be, I think, hard-hitting, to find problems, uncover abuses and 

recommend fixes. And you must guard your independence fiercely. 

I’d like to hear you reaffirm that that’s also your view of your role 

in this terribly important position. 

As you know as well, this committee completed a report on CIA’s 

detention and interrogation program, and specifically shared it 

with the Executive Branch to ensure that such abuses are not reported in the future. You and I discussed how your office both lost 

and then found its copy, the copy of the report, and how you decided to return it to the committee. We talked about the fact that 

I disagreed with your subsequent decision to return it. Today and 

in public, please describe how the report came to be lost and why 

you made the decision to return it to the committee. 

Finally, I want to get your reassurances that you will support 

this committee’s investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 

U.S. presidential election, something the Chairman and I and this 

committee, I think, has done some very good work on. 

Again, Mr. Sharpley, thank you for, echoing what the Chairman 

said, your service to our country. Thank you for being here today. 

Thank you for agreeing to accept another opportunity to continue 

to serve our country. I look forward to today’s discussion. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Thank you, Senator Warner. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Vice Chairman. 

Mr. Sharpley, would you stand, please, and raise your right 

hand? Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth—to give this committee the truth, the full truth and nothing but the truth, so help 

you God? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. I do, sir. 

Chairman BURR. Please be seated. 

TESTIMONY OF CHRISTOPHER SHARPLEY, NOMINATED TO BE 

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 

AGENCY 

Chairman BURR. Chris, before we move to your statement, it is 

practice of this committee that I ask you five standard questions 

that the committee poses to each nominee who appears before us. 

They just require a simple yes or no answer for the record. 

Do you agree to appear before the committee, here or in any 

other venue, when invited? 

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Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes. 

Chairman BURR. If confirmed, do you agree to send officials from 

your office to appear before the committee and designated staff 

when invited? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes. 

Chairman BURR. Do you agree to provide documents or any other 

materials requested by the committee in order for it to carry out 

its oversight and legislative responsibilities? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, I do. 

Chairman BURR. Will you both ensure that your office and your 

staff provide such materials to the committee when requested 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, I will. 

Chairman BURR. Do you agree to inform and fully brief, to the 

fullest extent possible, all members of the committee of intelligence 

activities and covert actions, rather than limit that only to the 

Chair and the Vice Chair? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, I do. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you very much. 

We’ll now proceed to your opening statement, after which I’ll recognize members by seniority for five-minute question time. Chris, 

the floor is yours. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Thank you, Chairman Burr. Chairman Burr and 

Vice Chairman Warner and members of the committee: I want to 

thank you for affording me the opportunity to appear before you 

today, as you consider my nomination to be the Inspector General 

of the Central Intelligence Agency. I’m honored and humbled that 

President Trump has placed his confidence in me to tackle the 

challenges of this important position. 

Chairman, if I may, at the risk of being redundant, I would like 

to speak to my background and experience that I believe qualify me 

to serve as the CIA Inspector General. I am grateful to have had 

an opportunity to serve our Nation over the past 36 years, a journey that began shortly after receiving a commission in the United 

States Air Force in 1981. 

My initial training was as a special agent counterintelligence officer in the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. The skills 

that I acquired prepared me for challenging assignments during 

my ten years of active-duty service and also prepared me for my 

service for another ten years in the Air Force Reserves. 

My assignments including commander and director of security, 

leading teams of counterintelligence and security specialists in support of highly classified special access programs. I retired honorably from the Air Force Reserves in 2002. 

Upon transitioning to the part-time reserves, I began my fulltime employment as a civilian special agent at the Department of 

Energy Office of Inspector General. I rose through the ranks to become the Deputy Inspector General for Investigations and Inspections, with program leadership responsibilities covering the Nation’s nuclear weapons complex and system of national laboratories. 

I was privileged to have been asked by two new Inspectors General, at the Special Inspector General for Troubled Asset Relief 

Program and the Federal Housing Finance Agency, to assist them 

in building brand new Offices of Inspector General, focused on deLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

5 

tecting and countering fraud in the efforts of the Federal Government to stabilize U.S. banking, securities and financial markets 

during the economic crisis of the 2008–2012 timeframe. 

In 2010, I received a Presidential Rank Award for meritorious 

service for my leadership in building investigative programs that 

identified billions in fraud and supported successful prosecutions 

that often returned significant dollars to the U.S. Treasury. 

In 2012, I retired from Federal service as a civilian special agent 

law enforcement officer. That is when my experience at CIA began. 

I was asked by then-CIA Inspector General David Buckley to compete for his deputy Inspector General position. 

Mr. Buckley informed me that he hoped I would bring the best 

practices I had gleaned from other IG-related leadership roles to be 

applied at the CIA Office of Inspector General. I answered that call 

and entered back into Federal service in 2012, where I served as 

Mr. Buckley’s deputy until his retirement in January 2015, and 

where I have served as Deputy and Acting Inspector General until 

now. 

Mr. Chairman, I strongly believe in CIA’s mission to preempt 

threats to our Nation and to further U.S. national security objectives. I also believe the mission of the Inspector General is essential at CIA. I have and continue to stand firmly behind the outstanding work of the CIA Office of Inspector General team of auditors, inspectors, investigators and support staff. 

As Acting Inspector General, I have issued over 100 classified reports, and have made nearly 350 recommendations to CIA leadership to strengthen key programs and operations and promote economy and efficiency across the CIA mission. 

I have further strengthened processes and procedures within the 

Office of Inspector General by incorporating professional standards 

and best practices utilized by Offices of Inspector General across 

the Federal community. 

I have endeavored, I believe successfully, to establish a reputation within CIA as an independent, objective and honest Acting Inspector General who does not hesitate to tackle the hard issues, 

speaks truth to power and is trusted by CIA officers assigned 

around the world and by the Director and his senior team. And it 

is my hope, as it certainly has been my objective, to gain the trust 

of this committee. 

If confirmed, I will continue to keep the committee informed of 

Office of Inspector General work, and I will continue to be responsive to committee concerns and queries. 

As I observe world events, it strikes me that the mission of the 

CIA has never been more important than it is right now. National 

security risks associated with North Korea, Iran, Russia and 

China, to name but a few, require CIA’s keen attention. 

As these risks increase and the world threat matrix rapidly 

changes, CIA appropriately responds, and, I believe, independent, 

robust and objective oversight becomes more vital. 

I have observed during my career that classified high-risk missions, big and small, do not receive the same level of public scrutiny and feedback that unclassified activities receive. And clearly, 

there’s good reason for that. This is why a capable Inspector General is needed, one who understands intelligence activities and who 

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6 

will independently and effectively audit, evaluate and investigate 

to ensure mission integrity and efficiency. 

I’m confident that the experiences and skills I’ve acquired 

throughout my career, and in particular as Acting Inspector General at CIA, have prepared me to fulfill the responsibilities of CIA 

Inspector General. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity to testify before you and the committee. I’m pleased to answer any questions 

you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sharpley follows:] 

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Insert offset folio 1 here 27396.001

Testimony of Christopher R. Sharpley 

Senate Select Committee of Intelligence 

· Confirmation Hearing for CIA l11Spector General 

October 17; 2017 

Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner, and members of the Committee, thank you for affording 

me this opportunity to appear before you today as you consider my nomination to be tbe Inspector 

General of the Central Intelligence Agency. I am honored and humbled that President Trump has 

placed his confidence in me to tackle tbe challenges of this important position. 

Mr. Chairman, before I proceed with my testimony, with the committee's indulgence, .I'd like to 

express my gratitude to my family who is here today, and who has been so supportive; my wife of 

33 years Kimberly, our three children, Gillian (and her husband James Carroll), Stefan, and Aidan, 

and my mother, Joyce Sharpley. There are also several friends in attendance who are here to show 

their support for me. I am flattered and tbankful for their presence today. 

Chairman Burr, ifi may, I would like to speak to my background and experience that I believe, 

qualify me to serve as CIA Inspector General. 

I am grateful to have had an opportunity to serve our nation over the past 36 years, a journey tbat 

began shortly after receiving a commission in the United States Air Force, in 1981. My initial 

training was as a special agent--counterintelligence officer in the Air Force Office of Special 

Investigations. The skills I acquired prepared me for challenging assignments during my ten years 

of active duty service, and during the ten years in the Air Force Reserves, that followed. My 

assignments included commander and Director of Security-leading teams of counterintelligence 

and security specialists in support of highly classified Special Access Programs. I retired honorably 

from tbe Air Force Reserves in 2002. Upon transitioning to tbe part-time Reserves, I began fulltime employment as a civilian federal special agent at the Department of Energy, Office of 

Inspector General. I rose through tbe ranks to become Deputy Inspector General for Investigations 

and Inspections, with program leadership responsibilities covering the nation's nuclear weapons 

complex and system of national laboratories. 

I was privileged to have been asked by two new Inspectors General at the Special Inspector General 

for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency, to assist them in 

building brand new Offices of Inspector General, focused on detecting and countering fraud in the 
8 

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Insert offset folio 2 here 27396.002

efforts by the federal govemm~nt to stabilize U.S. banking, securities and financial markets during 

the economic crisis of the 2008-2012 timeframe. In 2010, I received a Presidential Rank Award 

for Meritorious Service, for my leadership in building investigative programs that identified billions 

in fraud, and supported successful prosecutions that often returned significant dollars to the U.S. 

Treasury. In 2012, I retired from federal service as a civilian special agent-law enforcement 

officer. 

That is when my experience at CIA began. I was asked by then CIA Inspector General David 

Buckley to compete for his Deputy Inspector General position. Mr. Buckley informed me that he 

hoped I would bring the best-practices I had gleaned from other IG-related leadership roles, to be 

applied at the CIA Office of Inspector General. I answered that call, and entered back into federal 

service in 2012, where I served as Mr. Buckley's Deputy until his retirement in January 2015, and 

where I have served as Deputy and Acting Inspector General, until now. 

Mr. Chairman, I strongly believe in CIA's mission-to pre-empt threats to our nation and to further 

U.S. national security objectives. I also believe the mission of the Inspector General is essential at 

CIA. I have, and continue to stand firmly behind the outstanding work of the CIA Office of 

Inspector General Team of auditors, inspectors, investigators and support staff. As Acting Inspector 

General, I have issued over l 00 classified reports and have made nearly 350 recommendations to 

CIA leadership to strengthen key programs and operations, and promote economy and efficiency 

across the CIA mission. I have further strengthened processes and procedures within the Office of 

Inspector General, by incorporating professional standards and best-practices utilized by Offices of 

Inspectors General across the federal community. I have endeavored, I believe successfully, to 

establish a reputation within CIA as an independent, objective and honest Acting Inspector General, 

who does not hesitate to tackle the hard issues, speaks truth-to-power, and is trusted by CIA officers 

assigned around the world, and by the Director and his senior team. And, it is my hope, as it has 

certainly been my objective, to gain the trust of this Committee. 

If confirmed; I will continue to keep the Committee informed of Office of Inspector General work, 

and I will continue to be responsive to Committee concerns and queries. 

As I observe world events, it strikes me that the mission of the CIA has never been more important 

than it is right now. National security risks associated with North Korea, Iran, Russia and China, to 

name but a few, require CIA's keen attention. As these risks increase and as the world threat matrix 

rapidly changes, CIA appropriately responds and, I believe, independent, robust and objective 
9 

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oversight becomes more vital. I have observed during my career that classified, high-risk missions, 

big and small, do not receive the same level of public scrutiny and feedback that unclassified 

activities receive-and clearly there is good reason for that. This is why a capable Inspector 

General is needed-Qne who understands intelligence activities, and who will independently and 

effectively audit, evaluate and investigate, to ensure mission integrity and efficiency. I am 

confident that the experience and skills I have acquired throughout my career, and in particular as 

Acting Inspector General at CIA, have prepared me to fulfill the responsibilities of CIA Inspector 

General. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity to testify before you and the Committee. I am 

pleased to answer any questions you may have. 
10 

Chairman BURR. Mr. Sharpley, thank you for that testimony. 

Before we begin, it’s my intention to move to a committee vote 

on this nomination early next week. Therefore, for planning purposes I would encourage members, if they have additional questions for the record after today’s hearing, that those be submitted 

by the close of business tonight. I would also remind members that 

we are in open session. Therefore, questions should reflect that 

fact. 

The Chair would recognize himself for up to five minutes. 

As CIA’s Inspector General, you’ll be responsible for overseeing 

a large organization whose work in most cases must be done in secret. But the work of the IG’s office can provide that critical point 

of transparency for employees and, quite frankly, for this committee. How do you plan to continue your efforts to ensure that all 

CIA employees and contractors are fully aware of the CIA’s OIG 

and its function? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, sir. Within CIA, there is an awareness program. People are required to take certain training on an annual 

basis. The procedures and processes for making a complaint to the 

CIA Inspector General are incorporated in that training. 

We have a significant outreach effort that—we speak with all incoming employees, new employees, and we give briefings on whistleblower, whistleblower reprisal whenever the opportunities arise 

at conferences, et cetera. 

Beyond that, we have an extensive. I think a very mature, I’m 

certain a very mature, whistleblower hotline program and whistleblower retaliation program. I have had the opportunity, Senator 

Burr, over the years to build two whistleblower hotline programs 

from the ground up, at Special Inspector General’s office, also at 

FHFA, and to make improvements to two others, one at Energy 

and the one here at CIA. 

I’m very proud of the practices that we have put in place that 

now give CIA officers and those contractors with staff-like access 

to systems the ability to make a confidential, anonymous or an 

open complaint to us at any given time. 

The processes I’ve put in place ensure that every complaint that’s 

received and concern that’s received is given a review by the senior 

staff of the Office of Inspector General so that particular skill sets, 

such as audits, inspections or investigations, are able to look at an 

issue differently, with a different perspective, and say whether they 

think that that particular complaint or concern should be handled 

in this way or that way. 

Chairman BURR. What do you see as the biggest challenge for 

the CIA’s OIG? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Our biggest challenge, sir, is one of recruitment 

and retention. We use the systems that are in place by the CIA, 

their recruiting and onboarding processes, to also recruit our folks. 

And there is a, in my opinion, inefficient process of onboarding people at CIA. And it’s one that I feel so very strongly about that I’ve 

recently initiated a review to examine. 

For every person that I want to bring on, so if I can—if I identify 

an individual that meets a certain requirement to be an auditor or 

an investigator—I have to give three conditional offers of employment. So I know that, statistically, two out of the three I will lose 

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over the period of time from the time I give the conditional offer 

to the time that they would onboard. 

And for every conditional offer of employment, I have to conduct 

five interviews. So to fill 10 slots in an organization that does receive turnover, because we’re highly trained in the Office of Inspector General and many other mission areas would like the services 

of my folks—so if I want to fill 10 slots, I have to offer 30 conditional offers of employment. And in order to do 30 COEs, I need 

to do 150 interviews. 

That’s an onerous process and an onerous statistical outlay. So 

our biggest challenge right now is the process of onboarding folks. 

And I would say that is the most prominent of our challenges. 

Chairman BURR. Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to go back, first of all, to the discussion we had in the 

office and following up on the Chairman’s comments about protecting whistleblowers. I’d like to again—you mentioned the fact of 

building some of these whistleblower programs at other agencies. 

I’d like you to talk a little bit more about what else you could do, 

particularly with the unique nature of the CIA since it has to operate in private, what you can do not only on the hotline, but also 

on programs in terms of preventing retaliation. 

Specifically, in answers to written questions you said you would 

try to beef up these programs and beef up whistleblower protections. You said—but rather than offering some specifics, you talk 

about bringing in an outside expert to help advise you. Could you 

also describe what kind of outside expert that would be? Would it 

be somebody from government? And take us through your commitment to the whistleblower protections; and particularly, since we’ve 

seen increased amounts, I believe, of retaliation and reprisals, how 

we can prevent that on a going-forward basis to those whistleblowers? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Thank you, Senator. 

Whistleblowing and the programs that the Offices of Inspector 

General put in place are essential to the success of any Office of 

Inspector General. In every program that I have built, you need to 

build a program where there’s confidence by whistleblowers or 

those raising concerns about a particular issue that they feel, and 

are, in fact, comfortable providing information. If they’re not comfortable providing information, they won’t come to you, and then 

you can’t fulfill your mission of exploring fraud, waste, and abuse 

and mismanagement and these issues. 

So it is—it’s critical to the success of every Office of Inspector 

General, in particular at CIA because of the nature of the mission, 

meaning that everything’s compartmented and people are scattered 

around the world doing mission. 

The first thing that I did to improve the whistleblowing program 

at CIA is ensure that we had a robust outreach program. Senator 

Warner, I described a little bit earlier today about what that program was about and we talked in private. But the main thrust of 

that outreach is to ensure that, no matter where a CIA officer or 

a CIA contractor with access to our system is located around the 

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plaint or sharing of concern with our office and they are guaranteed confidentiality if they seek it. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. But how do you go about improving? 

You said you would look at outside experts. Talk, speak to that for 

a moment, because I only have two minutes left. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. All right, Senator. I am very comfortable, sir, 

with the program that we have, that it is effective. But we know 

from the type of work that we’re in, which is independent assessments and evaluations of the effectiveness of the various programs 

around—so I know that, even though I’m comfortable with the program that I have, it would be appropriate and prudent for me to 

invite others in. 

There are individuals within the IG community that are known 

to have very solid, very large programs. Some of them are Postal, 

some of them are Department of Energy. When I refer to this in 

my pre-hearing questionnaire, I’ve already asked my chief of staff 

to reach out to these groups, these individuals, and ask for an independent assessment of the programs that I’ve put in place—not 

just our outreach programs, but our education program, our education effort, and our ability to assess objectively and independent 

each complaint as it comes in to ensure it’s handled in a timely 

fashion and that individuals, if they’re concerned about retaliation, 

that we move promptly as a priority to address those issues, so 

that any potential wrongdoing or adverse personnel action against 

them can be prevented promptly and quickly. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. I know a number of my members on 

this side of the aisle are going to ask somewhat in depth about the 

RDI study, and I will allow them to get into the point of your reasoning for returning it. 

But one thing that did come up, obviously, was how the report 

was lost and then re-found. I think I owe you the opportunity to 

try to offer me the same—offer the public the same explanation you 

offered me in my office. And then, the fact that it was lost and 

found, was anyone held accountable for that losing of it as well? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Thank you, Senator Warner. I’d be happy to discuss those issues. I know that is on the minds of a number of the 

committee members, and I understand. It’s an important issue and 

it’s an important report. So if I briefly go through the explanation: 

We received a copy of the committee’s RDI study—6,000-page, 

highly classified—in December of 2014 and it was provided to us 

on a disk. The then-Inspector General ordered that the report be 

uploaded to a classified Office of Inspector General system and that 

was done. 

Shortly thereafter, we received guidance that the report should 

not be placed into any system because of an ongoing litigation, a 

FOIA litigation, Freedom of Information Act litigation in the D.C. 

circuit, with the Department of Justice and others. So an e-mail 

was sent back to the organization that had uploaded, back to our 

investigative organization, where the classified system is held, to 

delete the report and to take the disk containing the study and 

place it in a classified safe. 

The report was deleted from the system. But the individual, the 

IT administrator responsible for the uploading of the report and for 

handling the disk, the media, did not receive that e-mail. 

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13 

The processes in place at CIA, and at CIA OIG, when we take 

a report off of media in order to control classified when we place 

it onto our classified systems is to destroy that diskette. 

So, some time later, several months later, when requested did we 

have the disk, where was it, as I recall to the best of my knowledge, I asked where the disk was. Nobody could find the disk. I informed the committee that we could not find the disk. Then I initiated an investigation, an internal investigation to ensure that the 

disk was nowhere, to find out exactly what happened to it. 

Testimony given to us by the IT administrator was that the disk 

had been shredded and he was—this particular IT administrator 

was unaware of the deletion of the document from our system, and 

had shredded the disk. 

Several months later, during the course of an individual departing, leaving employment and retiring, they were going through 

their classified safe and they found the disk. Coincidentally and a 

bit embarrassing—it was an embarrassment to me—coincidentally, 

the litigation with the—on the FOIA issue had ceased at that time. 

It was done, and part of the conclusion of that litigation was that 

the document was a Congressional document. 

I informed the committee that we had found the disk. I also 

opened another investigation to continue to find out what happened, how was it that we could find testimony that this diskette 

was shredded when it had not been shredded. 

The bottom line was we found the individual, who had since left 

employment from the Office of Inspector General and the CIA, and 

that person told us that it was essentially a guess. They don’t remember actually shredding the disk, but they felt, because they 

had shredded other media, they had shredded that disk as well. 

It’s embarrassing and I have apologized. And it was also right 

around that time that, in response to a request from the chair of 

the committee that produced the study to return that study on the 

disk, that I made an independent judgment to return the disk. I 

stand by that judgment. The judgment and decision to return the 

disk is not a reflection on what I feel the quality of the report was 

or the efforts that went into it. It was a five-year effort, a 6,000- 

page report, and I understand its value to the committee and its 

value for history’s sake. 

I do have an unclassified copy of the executive summary, as well 

as a classified copy of the executive summary, in my possession. 

So those were—those were the circumstances. The individual responsible for giving the wrongful, if you will, or the incorrect testimony is no longer employed with us. I have since changed the processes at CIA OIG to ensure that something like this cannot happen 

again, so that there’s a second decision level on all shredded media, 

even though the processes—we’ve never undergone something like 

that in the past. That process is in place. I stand by it, and I am 

convinced that nothing like this would ever happen again. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Risch 

Senator RISCH. Mr. Sharpley, thank you for taking the time to 

meet with me. I thought you were candid and answered the questions appropriately and fully as far as I was concerned. So thank 

you for that. 

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14 

Mr. Chairman, any other questions I have would be for a classified setting. I will save them for either there or submit them for 

the record in a classified fashion. Thank you. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

And I thank you for meeting with me. I did hear the disk story 

from you. I have one question: When did you inform the committee 

that you had found the disk? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Senator, I don’t have the specific date in front of 

me, but as soon as I found the disk I called up and informed the 

staff chiefs about that I found it. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. If you could find the day, I would appreciate 

knowing this. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I have a special interest in this. I was chairman of the committee when the report was done, and have a great 

belief—to my knowledge, not a fact has been refuted in that 7,000- 

page report or the 500-page summary to date. 

So the point of distributing it to the departments was in the hope 

that they would read it, not look at it as some poison document, 

and learn from it. I very much doubt that that has happened, and 

I really look forward to its declassification. I think the time is coming very shortly when it should be declassified, and I’m heartened 

to see that, increasingly, members of Congress agree with that. 

So let me, if I can, go to a document that I just received having 

to do with a whistleblower situation. And I’m going to read a little 

bit and then ask you for your comment. It points out that ‘‘The 

Sharpley nomination comes at a time when the intelligence community’s handling of whistleblowers has begun to attract questions 

from lawmakers and the public.’’ They point out one instance of a 

man by the name of Ellard and says that this highlights the community’s continuing struggle to deal with the issue. 

The document, dated February 2017, appears on the official letterhead of the Office of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and details what it describes as serious flaws in procedures 

used to investigate retaliation cases across the intelligence community. Bearing the title, ‘‘Evaluation of Reprisal Protections Pertaining to Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information,’’ it 

is unclassified. The author’s name is redacted. 

I would ask that you send a copy of that document to our office, 

to the Intelligence Committee’s office. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Senator, I am unfamiliar with that document. I 

am not aware of its contents or really can speak to—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Have you looked for it? It’s on the Office of 

the IG of the—on the letterhead of the IG of the Intelligence Community. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, Senator. The ICIG did not make me aware 

of it as the Acting IG at CIA. So this is the—this is the first I’m 

hearing of this particular program. 

But there’s something you said, Senator, if I may respond. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, let me read the conclusion. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, ma’am. 

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15 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Because it’s stark: ‘‘The deficiencies in reprisal protections policies, procedures and standards in the evaluated agencies are causing a failure to provide reprisal protections 

for individuals making protected disclosures,’’ end quote. 

In the context of the document, quote, ‘‘’Protected disclosures,’’’ 

end quote, ‘‘refer to legally sanctioned revelations of alleged wrongdoing by intelligence employees to their superiors or others in the 

government designated to receive the information.’’ 

The document states that, and I quote, ‘‘A complainant alleging 

reprisal for making a protected disclosure has a minimal chance to 

have a complaint processed and adjudicated in a timely and complete manner,’’ end quote. So then it says—and then I’ll let you 

speak—‘‘In response to damaging leaks, then-President Obama 

issued Presidential Policy Directive 19, PPD/19, parts of which 

were enacted into law, establishing procedures under which whistleblowers could report waste, fraud and abuse without fear of retaliation.’’ 

The document I’m reading from also has a couple of cases of people that have been retaliated against that I won’t go into right now. 

But I’m interested that you have not seen this document. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, Senator Feinstein. Thank you. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So do you know of which—of what I am 

speaking? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Senator, I do not. I do not—I’m not in possession 

of that document. I am unaware of it. Senator—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, let me give you the title. It says ‘‘CIA 

Inspector General Nominee Has Three Open Whistleblower Retaliation Cases Implicating Him.’’ It’s by a man by the name of Adam 

Zagorin and this is the Project on Government Oversight. That’s 

the letterhead. 

So what do you know about this, and three cases? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. 

I recently read an article by this gentleman. Senator, I’m unaware of any open investigations on me, the details of any complaints about me. So it’s hard for me to respond to that. But I 

would say, if there are complaints, if there are investigations out 

there and I’m unaware of it, that wouldn’t be—I put it this way: 

I support a process that’s in place that would protect the confidentiality of anyone or the anonymity of anyone who wanted to bring 

a complaint forward on an Acting IG or anybody else, any other official. 

As an Acting Inspector General who works in the world of confidentiality, anonymity, etcetera, I think it’s very important that 

we recognize these processes and that we, frankly, as I said before, 

we honor them. They’re our bread-and-butter. But I can’t speak to 

specifics because I don’t know about it, Senator. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. No, I understand what you’re saying. 

Mr. Chairman, I’d ask that this document be put in the record 

so that Mr. Sharpley can take a good look at it. 

And perhaps you would let us know in writing what is fact and 

what is fiction. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. I would be pleased to do that, Senator Feinstein. 

If I may take one moment, with respect to the document you’re referring to, that it has done an assessment of, you know, that 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

16 

there’s a minimal ability of people who have been retaliated 

against to have their particular issue looked at in a timely fashion, 

and this is across the ICIG. I can’t speak for the rest of the Inspectors General across the IC. I can speak for the CIA Office of Inspector General, and I challenge the validity of those statements. I feel 

very strongly about our whistleblower retaliation program and our 

whistleblower hotline program. We handle all, all concerns, whether they’re involving a potential crime or mismanagement, or about 

an individual, under the quality standards that are put out from 

the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. 

I’m very proud of our program. So I don’t know where that’s coming from. I’m unaware of any assessments that have been accomplished on the CIA OIG from the outside, for anyone to make those, 

those claims. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. At the Senator’s request, without objection, it 

will be included into the record. 

[The material referred to follows:] 

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17 

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Insert offset folio 37 here 27396.037

CIA Inspector General Nominee Has Three 

Implicating 

Topics: Whistleblower Protections 

Wbistleblower Retaliation Cases 

Related Content: Watching the Watchdogs, CIA, Inspector General Ovcrsigllt 

October 16, 20171 Adam Zagorin 

President Trump's nominee to be the Central Intelligence Agency's Inspector General-its top 

independent watchdog--is named in at least three open whistleblower retaliation cases, the 

Project On Government Oversight has learned. The nominee, Christopher Sharpley, faces a 

confirmation hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee tomorrow. 

Sharpley became the CIA's Inspector General in 2012 and has been the CIA's Acting 

Inspector General since 20!5 departure of David Buckley, who was appointed to head 

the otTice under President Obama. Sharpley attracted headlines last year when he deleted the 

of a controversial Senate report documenting the CIA's history of using 

interrogation involving torture, embarrassing the Agency and prolonging its dispute 

over the issue with Congress. 

"There's no question that information about outstanding retaliation cases involving Sharpley 

should be fully disclosed before members of Congress are asked to approve such a key CIA 
18 

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Insert offset folio 38 here 27396.038

officiaL'' 

-Senior Republican Senate Staffer 

One of the most important duties of an Inspector General is to enforce high professional and 

ethical standards in their agency, Yet in Sharpley's case the White House has selected a leader of 

the CIA's key watchdog division-which depends on whistleblowers to report waste, fraud, and 

other abuses--someone who has several unresolved allegations of retaliation against 

whistleblowers, Two of the were lodged with the Inspector General of the 

Intelligence Community, and is now before the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission. 

All three complainants had brought earlier employment law claims that did not prevaiL The three 

current cases claim retaliation, a different offense than previously alleged. One case also charges 

sex and age discrimination. 

lt remains unclear whether Sharpley or the CIA has disclosed to Congress a complete list of the 

open matters, or any details concerning them, lfnot, Congress may still learn about them through 

other avenues: key members of a confirming committee are often provided any FBI files that 

contain details of cases involving the nominee, potentially including criminal or administrative 

matters, Such material, if it is available, is likely to be of interest for the Senate Intelligence 

Committee, which must examine Sharpley's fitness for office, as well as to members of the 

Whistleblower Protection Caucus and of the lull Senate, who will be required to vote on his 

confirmation. 

The CIA would not reveal what, if anything, may have been disclosed to Congress concerning 

Sharpley, but a spokesman did issue a statement to POGO, 

Sharpley "has 36 years of investigative, law enforcement and IG experience," a CIA spokesman 

told POGO. "His credentials and qualifications to be CIA !G are obvious and substantiaL We 

look forward to his quick and justified confirmation'' 

"Whether there are any complaints or investigations Mr, Sharpley is not something we 

could confirm or comment on, What we can say is that Mr. has had a sterling 5-year 

career at CIA and there have never been any findings of wrongdoing or misconduct of any sort 

by Mr, Sharpley during his tenure here,'' the CIA spokesman said. 

POGO also reached out to Sharpley's former boss, David Buckley, Citing the open matters at 

issue, he declined to comment 

A senior Republican Senate staffer who spoke to POGO made it clear that Congress has a needto-know: "There's no question that information about outstanding retaliation cases involving 

Sharpley should be fully disclosed before members of Congress are asked to approve such a key 

CIA ofTiciaL'' 
19 

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One of with the whistleblowers who has complained about Sharpley is Jonathan Kaplan, a 

recently retired 33-year veteran investigator at the Agency. He alleges that he was retaliated 

against by Sharpley and others because of his legally protected communications with the Senate 

and House Committees on Intelligence and with the Intelligence Community's Ofiice of the 

Inspector General. 

Kaplan says he had gone to the Committees and others with a concern that the CIA lG's 

investigative and oversight capabilities were being compromised. Soon after, he said, retaliators 

including Sharpley placed false and derogatory information in his personal security file at the 

Agency, leading to the loss of his security clearance, rendering his continued CIA employment 

untenable. "From my personal observation and Mr. Sharpley condoned retaliatory 

actions against CIA employees including me, ethical and professional standards 

are not being met;· Kaplan said. 

Internal Intelligence Document: Spy Agencies Don't Follow Law or Regulation 

The Sharpley nomination comes at a time when the Intelligence Community's handling of 

whistleblowers has begun to attract increasing questions from lawmakers and the public. In one 

instance earlier this year, the Department of Defense overruled the firing of George Ellard. 

Inspector General of the National Security Agency, even after a high-level appeals panel found 

he had retaliated against a subordinate. 

Ellard's case highlights the Intelligence Community's continuing struggle to deal with the issue 

effectively. 

Yet the creation of a workable internal whistleblower system has become a priority following the 

damaging and highly classified leaks of Edward Snowden and others, who have claimed fear of 

retaliation to justify making their own public disclosures, instead of going through designated 

internal channels. 

In that context, Sharpley's alleged acts of retaliation form part of a broader pattem plaguing 

America's spy agencies, a pattern cited in a document obtained by POGO that was also supplied 

to Congress. 

The document dated February 2017, appears on the official letterhead of the Oftice of the 

Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and details what it describes as serious flaws in 

procedures used to investigate retaliation cases across the intelligence Community. Bearing the 

title, "Evaluation of Reprisal Protections Pertaining to Whistleblowers with Access to Classified 

Intbrmation,1

' it is unclassified. The author's name is redacted. 

Its conclusion is stark: ''The deficiencies in reprisal protections policies, procedures, and 

standards in the evaluated agencies are causing a failure to provide reprisal protections for 

individuals making protected disclosures." ln the context of the document, "protected 

disclosures" refer to legally sanctioned revelations of alleged wrongdoing by intelligence 

employees to their superiors or others in the government designated to receive the information. 
20 

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The document states that, "A complainant alleging reprisal for making a protected disclosure has 

a minimal chance to have a complaint processed and adjudicated in a timely and complete 

manner .... " 

In response to damaging leaks, then-President Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 19 

(PPD-19), parts of which were enacted into law, establishing procedures under which 

whistleblowers could report waste, fraud, and abuse without fear of retaliation. 

But the document produced by the Intelligence Community's IG, which covers 17 U.S. spy 

agencies, found that many components are not following, "legally mandated ... policies, 

procedures and standards ... Causing non-substantiation of reprisal claims, incomplete 

investigations, and for complaints not to be processed.'' The document says "these deficiencies 

arc significantly undermining the intent ofPPD-19 and strongly there has been no 

impact by PPD-19 to protect whistleblowers in the evaluated 

As evidence, the document reports that the Intelligence Community IG substantiated "only one 

reprisal allegation" during a six-year period stretching from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 

2016, and that case took 742 days to complete-well beyond the 240-day limit prescribed in 

regulation. The document does not mention the substantiated retaliation case against Ellard, the 

NSA !G, whose termination was subsequently overtumed. 

A spokesperson for the Intelligence Community lG offered no comment. 

Turmoil In CIA Investigations 

Sharpley's alleged acts of retaliation appear to spring from a little-known period when an 

investigation unit of the CIA's Office of Inspector General was experiencing unusual turmoiL 

According to a series of memoranda and other records obtained by POGO, including some 

documents previously the conflict began 

following then-President Obama's appointment of David Buckley, a fonner Congressional 

staffer, as CIA Inspector General in 2010. Buckley recruited Sharpley as his deputy, and the pair 

executed wide-ranging personnel and management changes in the office's investigation division, 

then staffed with more than 30 people. Among other things, the changes were designed to 

introduce criminal investigation techniques in which many staff were untrained. 

One employee's memo from October 2012 cites actions featuring an element of"cruelty and 

malice" by IG management as sweeping changes were imposed on a group of veteran 

investigators, many of whom were over 40, a fact that later led to charges of age discrimination. 

Beyond that, some memos cite a "hostile work environment," and "abruptly relieving certain 

managers and investigators of substantive investigative case work." At another point, the memo 

says, "The reorganization .. , is the latest in a series of intimidating and bullying tactics employed 

to move out current !NV (investigation division) staff members and make room for new hires." 

One member of the !NV staff told POGO that Sharpley was the office "enforcer." Another memo 

describes an occasion when Sharpley and a colleague summarily disbanded an !NV unit -as its 

four senior staffers were told to join a newly-created group to investigate leaks. "There is only 
21 

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one problem," the memo goes on to say, "this OlG has no ongoing leak investigations. So, these 

senior special agents and managers hardly have any meaningful reasons to show up to work. 

except for preserving their spaces until they are graciously ushered out the door by Buckley 

and/or Sharpley." 

At another point, the memo accuses CIA IG management of "misuse of position, abuse of 

resources, including unnecessary use of !G subpoenas, corruption, waste of taxpayer funds, and 

more. These are the very elements than an lG expected to prevent and protect the Agency 

against.'' 

Buckley and his management team, including Sharpley, were well aware of their employees' 

discontent. Roughly ten or more complaints were brought to an Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission unit inside the CIA to consider evidence of workplace violations, hut did not return 

findings that supported the claims. In 2014, Buckley and Sharpley referred some of the matters 

to the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (C!G!E)-a federal 

government-wide group comprised of all Inspectors General created by law. It declined to look 

into the matter, but brought in an outside examiner to do a report, That report found only minor 

deficiencies. 

However, some of these same matters involving Sharpley, POGO has been told, are still being 

reviewed by the Intelligence Community lG as part of still-open retaliation complaints against 

him. One case involving Sharpley is slated to be reviewed by an administrative judge of the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 

Underscoring the stakes, Senator Angus King (I-ME) in 

last year that the inspector general is "one ofthe most in 

government, particularly in the intelligence agencies, which don't have the oversight that other 

more public agencies do." 
22 

Chairman BURR. I would also ask staff, if I understood Senator 

Feinstein’s reading of this document, it is the ICIG who holds that 

document; it is not the CIA IG So I would say to staff, we need 

to request that document from the Intelligence Community’s IG, 

okay? 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sharpley, just to close out this line of questioning, without 

commenting directly on any specific allegations or claims that may 

or may not have been made against you, have you ever retaliated 

against any whistleblower either within the CIA’s IG’s office or any 

other Federal agency? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. No, Senator, I have not. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Sharpley, I want to commend you for being a very productive 

Inspector General. As I understand it, the CIA Office of Inspector 

General has issued more than 100 audits and inspection reports 

and made more than 340 recommendations to the agency to improve efficiency and effectiveness in just the last year. 

One of the committee’s top priorities is to make sure that each 

of the intelligence agencies is doing everything that it can to minimize the risk posed by insider threats. Insiders have repeatedly exposed devastating amounts of highly classified information. I noted, 

therefore, with great interest that your office conducted a review 

of the agency’s insider threat programs and activities. 

Without getting into any classified information, could you confirm whether the agency has fully implemented all of the IG’s recommendations with respect to that audit or inspection regarding 

insider threats? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, Senator Collins. Thank you very much. It’s 

a very important question and this is an extremely important issue 

having to do with CIA mission. They have not implemented all of 

our open recommendations. 

Some time ago, a few years back, I initiated an insider threat initiative, as we’ve referred to it, where we’ve issued over 26 reports 

and 64 recommendations addressing a number of areas in insider 

threat, having to do with security clearances, polygraph exams, 

physical threats in the workplace, privileged user and access to the 

information system, et cetera, across the board. 

This is a very important area that you bring up. That said, I 

know that the—and I won’t speak for the Director, but he has 

placed an emphasis on the Counterintelligence Mission Center, 

who carries out, along with the Office of Security, programs and 

mission involving insider threat. And I know that the Director has 

taken a particular interest in this area. And they have done a lot 

of work on insider threat. 

But a lot more work needs to be done. And even though I am in 

the process now of issuing a capping report that will summarize all 

the work that we’ve done, as I described, and also add to the affray 

some additional areas that we’ve examined, that does not mean 

that I am going back off the issue of insider threat. This continues 

to be an area of challenge for the CIA. And in fact, I’ve emphasized 

that in my recent issuance of the highest challenges that the agency has to address. So it’s a very important area. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

23 

Senator COLLINS. I’m very glad to hear that. I would ask that 

you keep the committee fully apprised of your efforts in this area 

and in particular identify to the committee recommendations that 

have not been implemented, because they’re really—that’s really 

hard to understand, given the egregious breaches that have occurred in the intelligence community. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, Senator, I commit to do that. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sharpley, as we talked about, I am very troubled about your 

decision to return your copy of the torture report. The report was 

sent to your office so that lessons could be learned, not just about 

torture, but a variety of topics, including Inspector General oversight. 

I just believe your decision sets a terrible precedent for the committee’s current and future work. If your office and the committee 

are going to be erasing historical records because somebody down 

the road is unhappy about them, our country is going to need a lot 

of erasers. 

So, hypothetically, I’d like to ask you: What if, a few years from 

now, after this committee has sent your office a report on Russia’s 

interference in our election, a future chair of the committee says 

he doesn’t like the report and wants it returned. What would you 

do? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Well, sir, I avoid hypothetical answers to hypothetical questions of any course. 

Senator WYDEN. Okay, then let me just ask it this way. How 

does your decision not set a terrible precedent? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. My decision, Senator, was in response to a request from the Chair and that’s—that was the trigger for my returning the report. 

Senator WYDEN. So you’re obligated to follow the law. I don’t see 

why the law doesn’t govern this, but maybe I’m missing something. 

I mean, your highest obligation is to follow the law, and I guess 

you’re saying that you made your judgment on the basis of other 

factors. You were asked for it and that was that. 

But I got to tell you, I don’t like the concept of your office picking 

and choosing which investigative reports you’re going to keep. And 

that’s the inescapable conclusion about all this. I followed the business about the shredded disk and then you found it, but you still 

returned it. And I’d like to know anything else that may have driven your judgment here? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Senator, it’s very straightforward. I made an 

independent judgment to return the report at the request of the 

chair of the committee that produced the report. 

Senator WYDEN. But you’re not concerned about your obligation 

to follow the law and you’re not concerned about a precedent? I 

mean, it seems to me this sets a horrible precedent, which is why 

I asked you about, say, somebody down the road in the future saying they’re concerned about the Russian report. You’re not concerned about setting any precedent here? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. No, sir. We’re talking about a hypothetical, once 

again, and—— 

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24 

Senator WYDEN. I’m asking you about something that conceivably could happen and because of the decision you’ve made, it certainly sets a precedent for in effect your office kind of picking and 

choosing which investigative reports you’re going to keep. 

I’m going to oppose your nomination because I think our highest 

duty here is to follow the law and the idea that the chair asked 

for it and that governed your judgment isn’t acceptable to me. 

Now let me ask you one other question if I might. My colleagues 

have mentioned this question of whistleblowers and you brought up 

CIA contractor whistleblowers. Now, this is just a yes or no answer: Do you believe that whistleblower protections should extend 

to CIA contractors? This is an area where there’s been bipartisan 

interest. My colleague Senator Collins over the years has been very 

interested in whistleblowers. So, yes or no, do you believe whistleblower protections ought to extend to CIA contractors? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, I do. 

Senator WYDEN. Okay, making some progress. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Lankford. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sharpley, good to see you again. Thanks for the long visit we 

had. We walked through a lot of issues in a private and classified 

setting. I wanted to be able to follow through on a couple of those 

conversations. 

As you know full well, the Office of Inspector General is the eyes 

and ears of this committee. This committee has oversight over all 

the intelligence entities, but we’re very dependent on the independent investigations, the ongoing investigations that are happening within the Inspectors General office. 

That’s you, so I want to be able to get some clarity from you on 

this as well. Covert operations are especially difficult and there is 

occasionally a perception that ‘‘covert’’ doesn’t mean they have 

oversight. So do covert operations have oversight and should they 

have oversight, the same as any other operation? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. The answer, Senator—and it’s good to hear from 

you again, sir—is yes and they do. I review all covert action efforts 

at least every three years and those reports are available to the 

committee, sir. 

Senator LANKFORD. Do you have the resources that you need to 

be able to fulfill that requirement to have oversight on covert operations? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. I currently do, Senator. 

Senator LANKFORD. So you’ve been there a while. This is a season where you—going into a permanent nomination here, you have 

a little more time to be able to focus on things that are a longer 

look. Are there structural changes that you can look at, at this 

point, either within your office or around the agency, that you 

would say we need to take a long look in these areas? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, Senator, there are. Thank you for the question. If I am confirmed, my intent is to do a top to bottom review 

of our organizational structure—that should not worry my staff— 

to ensure that our resources are focused in the right places so we 

can use them most efficiently. 

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25 

There are areas of covert action that I believe that we could 

focus, I think, a little more effectively on. And as an Acting Inspector General, you don’t want to make far-reaching organizational 

changes, particularly if there are others being in the nomination 

process. So if confirmed, I would go ahead and look at those programs. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you. 

Let me ask one final question about metrics for success. It is a 

challenge of any organization, especially an organization that has 

such a difficult task as the CIA has, to be able to measure success. 

So for dollars that are invested from the American people, that are 

to be overseen by this committee, and that you have the responsibility and oversight of as well, how will you work with the agency 

to break down into individual operations and into units within CIA 

to make sure that they are looking at metrics for success, that 

those metrics are being evaluated, whether that’s the right measurement to be able to use, and that they’re actually hitting the target? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, Senator. I agree with you that measures of 

effectiveness are very important. We’re spending a lot of taxpayer 

funds here on matters that don’t see the light of day. And I think 

it’s important from a business enterprise standpoint and from a 

risk valuation standpoint, that they have—that certainly covert action, and other areas of the CIA mission, have measures of effectiveness in place. 

They—those areas are typically examined when we conduct an 

audit or an inspection. And as we spoke, sir, you’ll find that in 

many of our reports if they—if they’re not there, that we’ll make 

a recommendation that goes to the area of, you need to look at this 

and examine whether this is—if this is effective or if this is efficient. 

And that really goes to the, if you will, metrics of our overall approach, our standards of how we conduct our audits, our inspections to a different—in a different respect, our investigations. But 

I think one way of ensuring that an organization is running efficiently, or whether it’s effective is to, again, look at the measures 

of effectiveness. And I commit to continue to look in that area. 

Senator LANKFORD. That’s great. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Heinrich. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Sharpley, as the deputy and then the Acting IG, did you read 

the Senate Intelligence Committee’s full report on the CIA’s torture 

and interrogation techniques? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Senator, no I didn’t. 

Senator HEINRICH. Why not? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. I had no opportunity to read it. The report was 

placed in a classified information system within the Office of Inspector General and very shortly thereafter deleted from that system. And then the disk we thought was shredded. It was not. It 

had been misplaced. 

Senator HEINRICH. It seems to me that it’s awfully hard to learn 

the potential lessons of that report if—if it wasn’t consumed and 

read and processed in your office. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

26 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Senator, I have had the opportunity to read the 

unclassified—— 

Senator HEINRICH. Most of us read the executive. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes. 

Senator HEINRICH. However, there were certainly chapters that 

dealt specifically with the operations of the IG’s office that, it 

seems to me, would’ve been something you’d want to be able to 

process to make sure that, if mistakes were made, they weren’t 

made again. 

Did you consider that before returning the report? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Senator, again, my decision to return the report 

is not a reflection of the value that I place on the report. 

Senator HEINRICH. Did you consider reading the report before returning the report so that you could do your job more effectively? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. No I did not. 

Senator HEINRICH. Why not? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. I did not have an opportunity to sit down and 

read the report because at the time the—with the timeline, the 

time we found the report, the request, right around that same 

time, had come in requesting the report be returned. I accepted—— 

Senator HEINRICH. But you returned it based on your own independent judgment. So you could’ve taken the time to read the report and then return the report. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. I could have, sir, yes. 

Senator HEINRICH. But you chose not to. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. I chose not to, given the time at hand. 

Senator HEINRICH. You said that it was your independent judgment to return the report. Walk us through that. That doesn’t give 

us a lot of detail. What was your—what was your thinking? And 

what was your legal basis for why you decided that? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. I conducted no legal basis, Senator. I’m not an attorney and I did not look at it. It was very straightforward. From 

my standpoint, the conclusion of the litigation determined that the 

report was a Congressional document and the chair of the committee that produced the report requested that I return it. I made 

the independent judgment to return it. 

Senator HEINRICH. Did the vice chair request that you return it, 

or just the chair? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. I don’t recall what the letter said or what the request was. 

Senator HEINRICH. Did you think through the implications of 

what that might mean for future reports? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. I don’t recall beyond what I’ve already testified 

to. 

Senator HEINRICH. Could you see how people would be concerned 

that a decision in this case might set a precedent for future cases? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. I can understand the concern, yes. 

Senator HEINRICH. So with regard to the report itself and the 

loss and then the, finally, finding that report once again, the story 

that it’d been shredded which turned out not to be the case, you 

said it was testified to by a former employee that it was essentially 

a guess. That doesn’t inspire a lot of confidence in how something 

as important as this document, as important as this report to the 

IG’s operation, would be handled within the office. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

27 

Can you speak to how you’ve addressed that in subsequent—for 

subsequent media? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, Senator. I’d be pleased to. The individual 

who was responsible for handling the disk is the individual who 

said they shredded it. When we found that disk and went back to 

speak with that individual, who is no longer an employee of ours 

or the CIA, he said—he shrugged his shoulders and said: ‘‘It was 

a guess. I don’t actually remember seeing it being shredded. I—I 

just had a stack of media and—and thought that I shredded it.’’ 

Senator HEINRICH. I can see how an employee would—who had 

a stack of media on their desk would have that reaction. I’m just 

thinking that something as important as this maybe should have 

required a higher level of attention. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, sir. So the changes that I referred to when 

we were talking about this earlier, changes I referred to, is that I 

put in place that there must be a supervisory-level approval before 

any media is shredded. So that way if other instructions have come 

out and for some reason it misses the IT administrator in the future, there will be a quality assurance, if you will, in place to review and authorize the shred, and that way we’ll avoid something 

like this happening in the future. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator Heinrich. 

Before I turn to Senator King real quick: Since most of your 

questions deal with the request I made of this IG and a request 

I made of every agency of the Federal Government that had copies 

of the RDI report, let me set the stage. 

The stage is that this was battled on our behalf by the Justice 

Department of the Obama administration. They didn’t have to do 

it. They believed that it was a committee document. They fought 

it in court. We won in the District Court, the D.C. Court of Appeals. The last court was the United States Supreme Court and 

they ruled there that this was committee property. 

I appreciate the fact that members disagree with the actions of 

the chairman, but I made a determination when I initiated the belief that this was a committee document that there was precedent, 

there was precedent here, and you’re right the next chairman can 

determine that they’d like to push this out. There was never a committee vote to push this out. That was a unilateral decision. 

So I made the decision to pull it back in and, with the exception 

of several copies, all have been returned. In every case, lawyers 

within those agencies made a determination, based upon the court 

process, that I had every right to make the request and that they 

were, in most cases, if not all cases, obligated to return them. 

So I share that with you to give you a little bit of history and 

maybe you won’t necessarily condemn Mr. Sharpley for doing something that I think is extremely important, responding to the chairman of the committee. 

Senator King. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Not to belabor this issue too much, but when you made the decision to return the document did you consult with anyone? Did you 

consult with the General Counsel or anyone other than yourself in 

making that decision? 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

28 

Mr. SHARPLEY. My counsel, my IG counsel. 

Senator KING. And what was the nature of that advice? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Just that it was my decision, I was making a decision to return this; what are the circumstances surrounding the 

issues, is anything else I should know? And the answer was: No, 

this is your—this is your judgment to respond to the chair. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

I think you have one of the most important jobs in the United 

States Government, because a secret agency in a democracy is an 

anomaly. I would argue it’s a necessary anomaly, but it’s still an 

anomaly, because the transparency and accountability that applies 

to virtually every other aspect of the United States Government 

isn’t present by necessity. 

That means those of us, including you and us, who are given— 

the responsibility of providing really the only oversight of this 

agency is especially awesome in my view. And I just want to have 

your commitment that you realize that this is a different job qualitatively in my view than the IG of the Department of Agriculture 

or even the Pentagon. Do you understand the weight of this, this 

position? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Absolutely, Senator. As I said in my opening remarks, it’s my belief that programs that are highly classified—the 

more classified they are, they see the less light of day. They don’t 

share best practices. They focus on mission and they’re not necessarily focused on efficiency and effectiveness. And I think it’s— 

when you’re dealing with those types of programs, as I have in Defense with special access programs and at Energy with nuclear 

weapons programs—here at CIA, that’s all they do, very, very classified areas, very classified missions—you need an IG to look at 

this and shine that flashlight, shine that light on those activities 

to ensure that they’re adhering to the law, that the programs are 

being run in an efficient and effective manner, and, as I’ve discussed with you in our private discussions, to give the taxpayer a 

seat at the table to make sure that their money, hard-earned 

money, and their taxes are being utilized properly. 

Senator KING. And that their Constitution is being abided by. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. That’s correct. Yes, sir. 

Senator KING. Now, Senator Coburn and I a couple of years ago 

had a provision in the authorization bill that instructed the GAO, 

which has people with full clearance, to do some analysis of the 

siting of physical facilities and whether we were efficiently utilizing 

those facilities. That report occurred. Do you view the GAO as a 

possible ally in your work? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, Senator, I do. I understand that GAO is 

working at the request, at the direction of the oversight committees. There are policies and procedures that are at CIA and across 

the Office of Director of National Intelligence dealing with the work 

with the GAO. 

I’ve worked with GAO in the past, and my only concern that I 

have—and this really falls back into my lap—is to reach out to 

GAO when they start work and do work at Central Intelligence 

Agency, that they check with us to ensure that the work that we’ve 

done—and we may have products that are useful, and this would 

be inefficient if we’ve already done work, independent work in that. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

29 

Senator KING. I wouldn’t want the GAO to add to the inefficiency. I understand your concern. But what you’re telling me is 

that you in certain situations would view the GAO as an ally, as 

an asset of your office. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, I would. 

Senator KING. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

One final question. Do you view checking on or reviewing the integrity of the analytic process and the intelligence production process as part of your bailiwick in terms of your responsibility? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, Senator, I do. 

Senator KING. I think I want to emphasize that, because there’s 

a grave danger. And you indicated, I think, earlier, talking about 

mission and operations, that there’s a danger of contamination of 

intelligence product because of commitment to the mission, if you 

will. And again, you’re one of the few bulwarks against that in this 

system of oversight of what is otherwise a secretive agency. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, sir. I agree with that. We do have a body of 

work that we have looked at analytic objectivity. We plan in the 

coming year and out years, if I am confirmed, to continue our work 

in that area. I think it’s a very important area. 

Senator KING. I want to emphasize the importance of that, because if you look back over the past 50 years, many of our foreign 

policy disasters were based upon skewed intelligence, based upon 

the desires of the policymakers, whether it was the Bay of Pigs, 

Vietnam, Iraq, whatever. And so I want to really emphasize that 

analytic integrity, it seems to me, and objectivity is an absolutely 

key function because human nature is always to tell the boss what 

they want to hear. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Sure. 

Senator KING. And you are one of the people that sits astride 

that process, and I hope you’ll take that responsibility especially 

seriously. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Senator, I understand your concern. I share it. 

You have my commitment to take that—to take on that issue and 

continue to look at it. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Sharpley, for being here today. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Thank you, sir. 

Senator MANCHIN. Having your family with you for support, I appreciate that. And the fact that you served as Inspector General at 

a variety of levels, maybe you might want to explain how that prepared you for the job that we’re asking you to do or that you’re asking us to confirm you to do—— 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator MANCHIN [continuing]. That put you in that unique position. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator, I’d be pleased to do 

that. 

I fortunately had an opportunity many years ago, back in the 

nineties, to be a part of a group, the predecessor of the Council of 

Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency, the President’s 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

30 

Council on Integrity and Efficiency, to be a part of the development 

of the quality standards for investigations and the quality standards for inspections. Those standards are sort of benchmark best 

practices for oversight. They have since then matured and changed 

slightly, but the basic practices are there. 

When I arrived at CIA IG, the reason I was asked to come 

aboard or compete for the position and come aboard and decided to 

take it was because I wanted to make sure that the processes utilized by our inspections, audits, and investigative groups use those 

standards. 

And that’s exactly what I did. I’ve implemented those standards 

across our mission set. Having had the opportunity to stand up, be 

a significant part of standing up, two brand-new Offices of Inspector General at the Special Inspector General for Troubled Asset Relief Program at Federal Housing and Finance Agency, I was able 

to utilize that knowledge, those skills that I had obtained from the 

previous period of time, and put them to work at those organizations. And those organizations have been very successful supporting prosecutions that have returned billions to the U.S. Treasury. That same approach I’ve used at CIA Office of Inspector General. 

Senator MANCHIN. Let me just—a couple of things I want to go 

over. Being a former governor myself and Senator King here, we 

know how having full control over your budget gives you the flexibility to do the things where you think it’s most important. Do you 

feel—I’m sure you looked at the budget now. Are you siloed? Are 

you able to move money to where you know the critical need is? 

How important is that for you? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Senator—thank you, Senator. The discussion that 

you and I had in this area caused me to sit back on my heels, sort 

of stand back on my heels and reconsider this. 

Senator MANCHIN. You might want to tell people a little bit what 

we talked about, because there were areas you identified you 

weren’t able to do what needs to be done because—but you had 

money in other siloes that could help you do it. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Right. There are various siloes. One silo of money 

is used for salaries and awards, the other used for contracting and 

travel, this type of thing. 

Senator MANCHIN. Yes. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. And the policy of the CIA is that you can’t blend 

those monies. You can’t cross the monies across the silo. But we 

had a discussion, I thought it was very productive and I appreciated it. And that is—and I appreciate the chair and vice chair’s 

advice in this area as well. And that is, if there were a way to move 

money across, it would allow me to address issues and needs that 

I have. For example, when—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Not that you need more money, even though 

everybody needs more money. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Everyone needs more money. 

Senator MANCHIN. But if you don’t have more money, how to be 

more efficient. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. That’s correct. This is a discussion on the efficient 

use of money. So I’ve asked my attorney to address this with the 

agency, to see if there’s a way that I can’t do that. And we are now 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

31 

doubling down and addressing that to see if there is a way that we 

can do it. 

So again, I would ask the—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Let us know if we can help. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, sir. And I would ask the committee’s support 

if we’re not able to do it for a legal reason that I’m unaware of. 

But as it stands currently, I’m going to attack this and see if we 

can do it a little bit more efficiently. 

Senator MANCHIN. I’ve got two more quick questions. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes. 

Senator MANCHIN. First of all, the most important: What do you 

think is the greatest security risk that the United States of America faces? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Well, outside of the threats to our Nation—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Yes—— 

Mr. SHARPLEY [continuing]. Whether it be—— 

Senator MANCHIN [continuing]. That are obvious. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes. Outside of the threats, it is ensuring the integrity of our intelligence programs and that those involved in the 

various intelligence missions remain dedicated and true to their 

oath. 

That is why I have taken or done a lot of work in the area of 

insider threat and how to strengthen the systems of the agency to 

ensure that when people do run astray, staff members or contractors, that we have systems in place that work, that we can detect 

it and counter it. 

Senator MANCHIN. And then finally, if you are asked by the 

President to render your assessment and evaluation, do you feel 

confident you can speak truth to power? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. I absolutely do feel confident I can speak truth 

to power. And if you would ask the current director and the former 

two directors, they would tell you the same. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, sir. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Harris. 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. 

So I think you know, we all know, that it’s very important that 

politics not shape the work that we do in our intelligence agencies 

and in the intelligence community. Can you tell this committee 

whether as Acting IG, if you’ve ever been asked or experienced any 

effort to limit your full independence since you’ve been the Acting 

IG? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Thank you, Senator Harris. That is a very good 

question. Senator Harris, I don’t know if you remember our—when 

you were Attorney General in California, I worked at SIGTARP 

and you were very helpful, and I thank you again for your—— 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. 

Mr. SHARPLEY [continuing]. Help there. There has never been a 

time under any director that I’ve worked—or am I aware of, anyone trying to undermine the independence of this Office of Inspector General. I think it’s very clear that the reputation that I’ve 

built at CIA, that that is something that I don’t think anyone 

would attempt. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

32 

But certainly, independence is written into the very fabric of our 

processes. At every opportunity, conferences, onboarding, new employees, etcetera, we emphasize the importance of independence. I 

know that this director, Director Pompeo, is very aware of that and 

I’m sure very supportive of my independence. 

Senator HARRIS. And will you commit to this committee that if 

ever you are in any way talked with or anyone indicates that they 

hope you might do one thing or another, that you will report that 

to this committee? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Absolutely, Senator. You have my commitment. 

Senator HARRIS. And have you—I believe in fact that you have 

faced some resistance that has prevented you from getting access 

to information that you need to fully assess a situation in terms of 

performing your oversight responsibilities. Will you commit today 

to notifying this committee if in the future you face any resistance 

whatsoever in your efforts to obtain information that is necessary 

for you to pursue your responsibilities? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Senator, I do commit to that. I’m unaware of any 

circumstance since I’ve been the Acting Inspector General or as 

deputy where anybody has either encumbered or tried to or have 

been successful at not providing us the information we need to do 

our important oversight role. 

Senator HARRIS. Well, please rely on this committee to help you 

if you need help in accomplishing that goal. 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator HARRIS. And there’s been a lot of discussion about whistleblowers. I understand that you have not or were not aware of 

the POGO, the Project on Government Oversight, report that was 

released yesterday regarding three open cases involving allegations 

that you and others committed retaliation against whistleblowers. 

But, obviously, this is a serious concern. 

I’m going to assume that right after this hearing you’re going to 

familiarize yourself with what’s in that report. And my request to 

you is that you then immediately, and before we need to vote on 

your confirmation, report back to this committee in writing your 

analysis and your perspective on the contents of that report. Are 

you willing to do that? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Senator, I don’t want to—I want to make sure 

that I don’t conflate the two. There was a POGO article that refers 

to a report that was written by the ICIG. I’m unfamiliar with the 

report from the ICIG. 

With respect to the POGO article, I am aware of that they cite 

the complaints that are against me on retaliation just because it 

was brought up in this hearing. I’m unaware of any ongoing investigations or the details of any complaints and have no—no action, 

or conclusions of wrongdoing have been made about my career or 

anything that I’ve done. 

Senator HARRIS. So as it relates then to the ICIG letter that was 

referred to earlier by Senator Feinstein, will you familiarize yourself with the contents of that and report back to this committee 

your perspective on what that says about these three cases? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Yes, Senator. I commit to doing that. 

Senator HARRIS. Okay. And you obviously understand that when 

we are talking about the importance of whistleblowers, for those 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

33 

folks to come forward and report what they know it’s an intimidating process. They are putting their jobs on the line. They are 

certainly opening themselves up to the likelihood of retaliation and 

if they don’t have confidence in the system, it is likely, one, that 

they will not report to the IG; but two, equally likely that, wanting 

their information to get out and to have transparency and sunlight 

on the issue, that they are even prone probably to leak that information to the press. 

So we are talking often, however, about classified information, 

which creates its own problems when that classified information is 

leaked to the press. So will you commit to improving and strengthening the systems that are currently in place to ensure that there 

is no retaliation whatsoever when whistleblowers come forward? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Senator, I can investigate concerns about retaliatory actions and I commit to you that we will continually improve 

upon our systems and our programs in place. 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator Harris. 

Any member seek any additional questions? Seeing none—— 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Can I just ask one question? 

Chairman BURR. Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Mr. Sharpley, a lot of concern about 

whistleblower issues and I understand—my understanding at least, 

if there is an ICIG, you might not be aware of the contents of that, 

that investigation in the normal course. 

But one thing that I’ve looked at—and I didn’t offer this amendment earlier because there was not full-fledged support, but that 

there would be granted to the IC, to the IC community, stay authority, which I know you are familiar with, which in effect would 

make sure that a whistleblower would be able to request the head 

of the agency to hold harmless a valid whistleblower from being 

reprised, retaliated against. 

Most all the rest of the Federal Government has those kind of 

stay authority protections. I know we talked about this briefly in 

my office. Do you believe that the employees—even though that 

this is not going to be in law, but do you believe that the employees 

at CIA ought to have this type of protection that every other Federal employee has had since 2001? 

Mr. SHARPLEY. Senator, I support any improvement on protections to whistleblowers. I fully support them. I am not aware in my 

five-plus years at CIA where having stay authority would have 

changed the circumstance. That doesn’t mean that something 

couldn’t happen in the future where that authority could be used 

effectively. So I do support—— 

Vice Chairman WARNER. I just believe, in light of some of the 

concerns raised and echoing both Senator Harris and Senator King 

in terms of the importance of this job, our job and your job, because 

of the unique nature of the agency operating in secret, I do think 

going the extra mile that there would be this approach, in terms 

of holding harmless a valid whistleblower’s complaint against any 

type of reprisal from the agency itself is terribly important. And 

should you be confirmed, I hope that you will—you would bring 

that message back to the agency. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

34 

Mr. SHARPLEY. You have my commitment, Senator. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Sharpley. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Vice Chairman. 

Mr. Sharpley, thank you for your testimony to the committee. 

I will repeat that it’s my intention to move this nomination next 

week and I would urge members, if they have additional questions, 

to make those questions available before the end of business today. 

Kimberly, thank you for being here to support your husband. To 

you, your children, and to your mother, it’s great to have you here 

for this. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:52 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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Supplemental Material 

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36 

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SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

INTELLIGENCE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY 

PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES 
37 

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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY 

PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES 

PART A- BIOGRAPIDCAL INFORMATION 

L NAME: Christopher Robert Sharpley 

2. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 21 May 1957; Trenton, New Jersey 

3. MARITAL STATUS: Married 

4. SPOUSE'S NAME: Kimberly A. Bauer·Sharpley 

5. SPOUSE'S MAIDEN NAME IF APPLICABLE: Kimberly A. Bauer 

6. NAMES AND AGES OF CHILDREN: 

[INFORMATION REDACTED) 

7. EDUCATION SINCE HIGH SCHOOL: 

INSTITUTION DATES ATTENDED DEGREE RECEIVED DATE OF DEGREE 

Naval Postgraduate School 

The American University 

July 1984- July 1986 

August 1979- May 1981 

MA 

BA 

July 1986 

May 1981 

8. EMPLOYMENT RECORD (LIST ALL POSITIONS HELD SINCE COLLEGE, INCLUDING 

MILITARY SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF EMPLOYER, POSITION, TITLE OR DESCRIPTION, 

LOCATION, AND DATES OF EMPLOYMENT.) 

Employer Positionffitle Location ~ 

CINO!G Acting Inspector General Washington, DC January 2015- Present• 

ClNO!G Deputy Inspector General Washington, DC July 2012- Present 

Federal Housing Deputy IG for Investigations Washington, DC November 2010 -July 2012 

finance Agency/OlG 
38 

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Insert offset folio 25 here 27396.025

Special inspector General Deputy Speciai!G/Investigations Washington, DC 

TARP (S!GTARP) 

Dept ofEnergy/OlG Deputy !G for Investigations & 

Inspections 

Special Agent-in-Charge 

Washington, DC 

Dept. of Energy/O!G Washington, DC 

Dept. ofEnergy/O!G 

Dept. of Energy/OIG 

Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge Albuquerque, NM 

Air Force Office of 

Special Investigations 

(AFOSl) 

Special Agent 

Special Agent (Civilian) 

U.S. Air Force (Reserves) Commissioned Officer 

(AFOSI) Special Agent- Director 

Livermore, CA 

Boston, MA 

Secretary of Air Force 

Special Projects 

January 2009- November 2010 

March 2003 - January 2009 

April 1998 - March 2003 

June 1995 -April 1998 

January 1993 -June 1995 

June 1992-January 1993 

June 1992 - October 2002 

U.S. Air Foree (Active) 

(AFOSI) 

Commissioned Officer 

Special Agent - Commander 

(Washington, DC, Japan, January 1982-June 1992 

Oakton,CA) 

• For periods during this time I reverted back to Deputy Inspector General. 
39 

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9. GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE (INDICATE EXPERIENCE IN OR ASSOCIATION WITH FEDERAL, 

STATE, OR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING ADVISORY, CONSUL TA T!VE, HONORARY, OR 

OTHER PART-TIME SERVICE OR POSITION. DO NOT REPEAT INFORMATION ALREADY 

PROVIDED IN QUESTION 8): 

Please see Question #8. 

l 0. INDICATE ANY SPECIALIZED INTELLIGENCE OR NA T!ONAL SECURITY EXPERTISE YOU HAVE 

ACQUIRED HAVING SERVED IN THE POSITIONS DESCRIBED IN QUESTIONS 8 AND/OR 9. 

Education, military experience and extensive service within the Inspector General Community have afforded 

me substantial exposure to the intelligence community and broader national security arena. I earned a master's 

degree in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a bachelor's degree in 

Administration of Justice from The American University. ! received my commission in the U.S. Air Force as a 

distinguished graduate of the Air Force R.O.T.C. military leadership program at Howard University. During 

my 35+ years in military and public service, I received professional training in counterintelligence collections, 

analysis and operational tradecraft; counterterrorism tradecraft; and the full range oflaw enforcement 

procedures and methodologies. As a military officer and as a civilian senior executive !led and directed 

intelligence, security or investigative activities involving sensitive national security matters associated with the 

DoD, CIA, OIA, NSA, and NRO missions. As Deputy Inspector General for Investigations and Inspections at 

the Department of Energy, I directed Office of Inspector General activities associated with the nation's nuclear 

weapons complex and system of national laboratories. 

Since assuming responsibilities as CIA Deputy Inspector General in 2012, and also through my experience 

serving as Acting Inspector General for the past two and one half years, I have gained significant knowledge 

about CIA programs and operations. I direct independent audits, inspections, and investigations related to the 

CIA mission, making recommendations for positive change. I also direct investigative activities to detect, deter 

and investigate fraud, waste, and abuse. With these skills and knowledge, and in carrying out my 

responsibilities as Acting Inspector General, I interact effectively with CIA leadership, SSC!, HPSCI, SA C-D, 

HAC-D, the Inspectors General from the Intelligence Community, IG members and staff of the Council of 

Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), the Department of Justice, and the President's 

Intelligence Oversight Board, regarding intelligence and national security related matters. 

II. HONORS AND A WARDS (PROVIDE INFORMATION ON SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS, 

HONORARY DEGREES, MILITARY DECORATIONS, CIVILIAN SERVICE CITATIONS, OR ANY 

OTHER SPECIAL RECOGNITION FOR OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OR ACHIEVEMENT): 

I received a 20 I 0 Presidential Rank Award (meritorious) for my work in building fraud investigative and 

financial intelligence programs, as Deputy Special Inspector General for Investigations, Special Inspector 

General forthe Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARF), during the U.S. banking and financial insurance 

crisis of2008 - 2010. The programs under my leadership assisted the Department of Justice successfully 

prosecute individuals and entities for perpetrating billions of dollars in fraud. My successes also lad to the new 

Inspector General of the Federal Housing Finance Agency asking me to assist him in building similar Office of 

Inspector General programs associated with Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks, as 

they entered into Federal conservatorship. -

As a military officer I received Achievemen~ Commendation and Meritorious Service medals for acts and 

service during my active and reserve careers. I received several other unit citations and firearms marksmanship 

awards. I was a Distinguished Graduate from the Air Force R.O.T.C. program at Howard University, 

Washington, DC, where I received my U.S. Air Force commission in 198 i. 
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12. ORGAN!ZA TIONAL AFFILIATIONS (LIST MEMBERSHIPS IN AND OFFICES HELD WITHIN THE 

LAST TEN YEARS IN ANY PROFESSIONAL, CIVIC, FRATERNAL, BUSINESS, SCHOLARLY, 

CULTURAL, CHARITABLE, OR OTHER SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS): 

ORGANIZATION 

International Association of 

Financial Crimes Investigators 

National Rifle Association 

OFFICE HELD 

Advisor to the Board* November 20 ll -Present 

Member 2009, 20!1- Present 

• l serve in this role in my official capacity. If confirmed, I intend to resign from this position. 

13. PUBLISHED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES (LIST THE TITLES, PUBLISHERS, BLOGS AND 

PUBLICATION DATES OF ANY BOOKS, ARTICLES, REPORTS, OR OTHER PUBLISHED 

MATERIALS YOU HAVE AUTHORED. ALSO LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEECHES OR REMARKS YOU 

HAVE MADE WITHIN THE LAST TEN YEARS FOR WHICH THERE IS A TEXT, TRANSCRIPT, OR 

VIDEO.) !F ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE A COPY OF EACH REQUESTED PUBLlCATlON, TEXT, 

TRANSCRIPT, OR VIDEO? 

None. 

PART B- QUALIFICATIONS 

14. QUAL!FICA TIONS (DESCRIBE WHY YOU BELIEVE YOU ARE QUALIFIED TO SERVE IN THE 

POSITION FOR WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED): 

The skills I've acquired through education, military service, law enforcement training, performing successfully 

in several key leadership roles, as well as my record of performance as Acting and Deputy Inspector General at 

CIA O!G, the Deputy Inspector General for Investigations at FHF A, the Deputy Special Inspector General for 

Investigations at S!GTARP and the Deputy Inspector General for Investigations and Inspections at Energy, 

quality me to fill the position of CIA Inspector General. In my current capacity as Acting Inspector General, l 

have satisfied CIA Inspector General statutory obligations-strengthening Agency program and operational 

internal controls, working successfully with the Department of Justice on allegations of fraud, providing 

effective leadership to CIA OIG and the·broader Inspector General Community, and communicating 

effectively with the oversight committees and CIA leadership. 

PART C- POLITICAL AND FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS 

15. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES (LIST ANY MEMBERSHIPS OR OFFICES HELD IN OR FfNANC!AL 

CONTRIBUTIONS OR SERVICES RENDERED TO, ANY POLITICAL PARTY, ELECTION 

COMMITTEE, POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE, OR INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATE DURING THE 

LAST TEN YEARS):. 

I donated $100 to the campaign of presidential candidate Donald Trump, and to the best of my recoliection, 

$25 each to the campaigns of presidential candidates Mitt Romney and John McCain. 
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16. CANDIDACY FOR PUBLIC OFFICE (FURNISH DETAILS OF ANY CANDIDACY FOR ELECTIVE 

PUBLIC OFFICE): 

None. 

17. FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS 

(NOTE: QUESTIONS 17 A AND B ARE NOT LIMITED TO RELA TIONSH!PS REQUIRING REGISTRATION 

UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT. QUESTIONS 17 A, B, AND C DO NOT CALL FOR 

A POS!TJVE RESPONSE IF THE REPRESENTATION OR TRANSACTION WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE 

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTION W1TH YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT 

IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE.) 

A. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REPRESENTED IN ANY CAPACITY (E.G. EMPLOYEE, 

ATTORNEY, OR POLITICAL/BUSINESS CONSULTANT), WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, A 

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, 

PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCH RELATIONSHIP. 

No. 

B. HAVE ANY OF YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S ASSOCIATES REPRESENTED, IN ANY CAPACITY, 

W1TH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENTITY CONTROLLED 

BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCH RELATIONSHIP. 

No. 

C. DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE RECEIVED ANY 

COMPENSATION FROM, OR BEEN INVOLVED IN ANY FINANCIAL OR BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 

WITH, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR ANY ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN 

GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. 

D. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REGISTERED UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS 

REGISTRA TlON ACT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. 

18. DESCRIBE ANY LOBBYING ACTIVITY DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, OTHER THAN IN AN 

OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT CAPACITY, IN WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE ENGAGED FOR 

THE PURPOSE OF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INFLUENCING THE PASSAGE, DEFI!AT, OR 

MOD!FICA TION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION, OR FOR THE PURPOSE OF AFFECTING THE 

ADMINISTRATION AND EXECUTION OF FEDERAL LAW OR PUBLIC POLICY. 

None. 
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PART D ·FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST 

19. DESCRIBE ANY EMPLOYMENT, BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP, FINANCIAL TRANSACTION, 

INVESTMENT, ASSOCIATION, OR ACTIVITY (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, DEALINGS 

WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON YOUR OWN BEHALF OR ON BEHALF OF A CLIENT), 

WHICH COULD CREATE, OR APPEAR TO CREATE, A CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE POS!TION 

TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINA TED. 

None. 

20. DO YOU INTEND TO SEVER ALL BUSINESS CONNECTIONS WITH YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYERS, 

FIRMS, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES AND/OR PARTNERSHIPS, OR OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 

EVENT THAT YOU ARE CONFIRMED BY THE SENATE? IF NOT, PLEASE EXPLAIN. 

I am employed by CIA as the Acting Inspector General and Deputy Inspector GeneraL I have no other 

business connections. 

21. DESCRIBE THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS YOU HAVE MADE OR PLAN TO MAKE, IF YOU 

ARE CONFIRMED, IN CONNECTION WITH SEVERANCE FROM YOUR CURRENT POSITION. 

PLEASE INCLUDE SEVERANCE PAY, PENSION RJGHTS, STOCK OPTIONS, DEFERRED INCOME 

ARRANGEMENTS, AND ANY AND ALL COMPENSATION THAT WILL OR MIGHT BE RECEIVED 

IN THE FUTURE AS A RESULT OF YOUR CURRENT BUSINESS OR PROFESSIONAL 

RELATIONSHIPS. 

I am employed by CIA as the Acting Inspector General and Deputy Inspector GeneraL I have no other 

business connections. 

22. DO YOU HAVE ANY PLANS, COMMITMENTS, OR AGREEMENTS TO PURSUE OUTSIDE 

EMPLOYMENT, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, DURJNG YOUR SERVICE WITH THE 

GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. 

23, AS FAR AS CAN BE FORESEEN, STATE YOUR PLANS AFTER COMPLETING GOVERNMENT 

SERVICE. PLEASE SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS, 

WRITTEN OR UNWRITTEN, CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT AFTER LEAVING GOVERNMENT 

SERVICE. IN PARTICULAR, DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS, UNDERSTANDINGS, OR OPTIONS 

TO RETURN TO YOUR CURRENT POSITION. 

! have no immediate plans, agreements or understandings regarding post-government service, written or 

otherwise. 

24. IF YOU ARE PRESENTLY IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE, DURJNG THE PAST FIVE YEARS OF SUCH 

SERVICE, HAVE YOU RECEIVED FROM A PERSON OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT AN OFFER OR 

EXPRESSION OF INTEREST TO EMPLOY YOUR SERVICES AFTER YOU LEAVE GOVERNMENT 

SERVICE? IF YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. There is currently no understanding of post-government employment, implied or otherwise. However, I 

have during the past five years explored post-government employment opportunities, none of which still exist 

nor am I still pursuing. l followed appropriate ethics requirements on these occasions. 
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25. IS YOUR SPOUSE EMPLOYED? IF YES AND THE NATURE OF THIS EMPLOYMENT IS RELATED 

IN ANY WAY TO THE POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE SEEKING CONFIRMATION, PLEASE 

INDICATE YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYER, THE POSITION, AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THE 

POSITION HAS BEEN HELD. IF YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT IS NOT RELATED TO THE 

POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED, PLEASE SO STATE. 

My spouse is employed. Her employment is not related in any way to the position for which I have been 

nominated. 

26. LIST BELOW ALL CORPORA T!ONS, PARTNERSHIPS, FOUNDATIONS, TRUSTS, OR OTHER 

ENTITIES TOWARD WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OR IN 

WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE HELD DIRECTORSHIPS OR OTHER POSITIONS OF TRUST 

DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS. 

NAME OF ENTITY DATES HELD SELF OR SPOUSE 

Virginia Tennis Association Secretary January- August 20 13 Spouse 

Sharpley Family Trust Co-Grantor/Co-Trustee September 2014- Present Self & Spouse 

27. LIST ALL GIFTS EXCEEDING $100JN VALUE RECEIVED DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS BY 

YOU, YOUR SPOUSE, OR YOUR DEPENDENTS. (NOTE; GIFTS RECEIVED FROM RELATIVES 

AND GIFTS GIVEN TO YOUR SPOUSE OR DEPENDENT NEED NOT BE INCLUDED UNLESS THE 

GIFT WAS GIVEN WITH YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND ACQUIESCENCE AND YOU HAD REASON TO 

BELIEVE THE GIFT WAS GIVEN BECAUSE OF YOUR OFFICIAL POSITION.) 

My wife and l were invited by the CIA Officers Memorial Foundation to attend the Ambassador Richard M 

Helms Award Ceremony on 4 March 2015 and 14 April20!6. The market value of attendance for each person 

was $1,000, fora total of$2,000 per event. 

28. LIST ALL SECURITIES, REAL PROPERTY, PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS, OR OTHER INVESTMENTS 

OR RECE!V ABLES WITH A CURRENT MARKET VALUE (OR, IF MARKET VALUE IS NOT 

ASCERTAINABLE, ESTIMATED CURRENT FAIR VALUE) IN EXCESS OF $!,000. (NOTE: THE 

INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE A OF THE DISCLOSURE FORMS OF THE 

OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT 

CURRENT VALUATIONS ARE USED.) 

Please see my submitted nominee OGE Form 278e, dated !5 June 2017, for complete information. 

29. LIST ALL LOANS OR OTHER INDEBTEDNESS (INCLUDING ANY CONTINGENT LIABILITIES) IN 

EXCESS OF $10,000. EXCLUDE A MORTGAGE ON YOUR PERSONAL RESIDENCE UNLESS IT IS 

RENTED OUT, AND LOANS SECURED BY AUTOMOBILES, HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE, OR 

APPLIANCES. (NOTE: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE C OF THE 

DISCLOSURE FORM OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED BY 

REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT CONTINGENT LIABILITIES ARE ALSO INCLUDED.) 

P-lease see my.submitted.nomineeOGE Form 278e, dated 15 June 2017, for.complete.information. 
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30. ARE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE NOW IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR OTHER FINANCIAL 

OBLIGATION? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE BEEN IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR 

OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE 

EVER BEEN REFUSED CREDIT OR HAD A LOAN APPLICA TlON DENIED? IF THE ANSWER TO 

ANY OF THESE QUESTIONS IS YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. 

3!. LIST THE SPECIFIC SOURCES AND AMOUNTS Of ALL INCOME RECEIVED DURING THE LAST 

FIVE YEARS, INCLUDING ALL SALARIES, FEES, DIVIDENDS, INTEREST, GIFTS, RENTS, 

ROYALTIES, PATENTS, HONORARIA, AND OTHER ITEMS EXCEED!NG $200. (COPIES OF U.S. 

INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR THESE YEARS MAY BE SUBSTITUTED HERE, BUT THE!R 

SUBMISSION IS NOT REQUIRED.) 

20!2 20!3 2014 2015 2016 

[INFORMATION REDACTED] 

32. IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE THE COMMITTEE WITH COPIES OF YOUR AND YOUR SPOUSE'S 

FEDERAL INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS? 

Yes. 

33. LlST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU AND YOUR SPOUSE FILE ANNUAL INCOME TAX 

RETURNS. 

Federal, Commonwealth of Virginia. 
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34. HAVE YOUR FEDERAL OR STATE TAX RETURNS BEEN Tiffi SUBJECT OF AN AUDIT, 

INVESTIGATION, OR INQUIRY AT ANY TIME? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS, INCLUDING 

Tiffi RESULT OF ANY SUCH PROCEEDING. 

No. However, ! neglected to include income from the sale of stock on my 1994 tax return and the IRS later 

billed me for the amount owed, approximately $200. I paid the amount in full and disclosed the matter to 

security officials at my then-employer, DOE. 

35. IF YOU ARE AN ATTORNEY, ACCOUNTANT, OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL, PLEASE LIST ALL 

CLIENTS AND CUSTOMERS WHOM YOU BILLED MORE THAN $200 WORTH OF SERVICES 

DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS. ALSO, LIST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU ARE 

LICENSED TO PRACTICE. 

Not applicable. 

36. DO YOU INTEND TO PLACE YOUR FINANCIAL HOLDINGS AND THOSE OF YOUR SPOUSE AND 

DEPENDENT MEMBERS OF YOUR IMMEDIATE HOUSEHOLD IN A BLIND TRUST? IF YES, 

PLEASE FURNISH DETAILS. IF NO, DESCRJBE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS FOR A VOIDING ANY 

POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST. 

No. A review of my financial holdings and those of my spouse determined there are no conflicts of interest. 

37. IF APPLICABLE, LIST THE LAST THREE YEARS OF ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORTS 

YOU HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO FILE WITH YOUR AGENCY, DEPARTMENT, OR BRANCH OF . 

GOVERNMENT. IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE A COPY OF THESE REPORTS? 

Annual OGE Form 278 for2015, AIU1ual OGE Form 278e for2016 and 2017, and Nominee OGE 278e dated 

15 June 2017. Yes, l will provide. 

PARTE- ETHICAL MATTERS 

38. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING OR CITED FOR A 

BREACH OF ETHICS OR UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BY, OR BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A 

COMPLAINT TO, ANY COURT, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, PROFESSIONAL AS SOdA TlON, 

DISC!PUNARY COMMITTEE, OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL GROUP? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAfLS. 

No, I have not been the subject of a disciplinary proceeding or cited for a breach of ethics or unprofessional 

conduct ! am aware of complaints made against the CIA OlG and previous O!Gs where I was employed, but I 

am not aware of any where I was the subject. 

39. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN INVESTIGATED, HELD, ARRESTED, OR CHARGED BY ANY FEDERAL, 

STATE, OR OTiffiR LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY FOR VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL 

STATE, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION, OR ORDINANCE, OTHER THAN A MINOR 

TRAFFIC OFFENSE,.OR NAMED AS A DEFENDANT OR OTHER WISE IN ANY .INDICTMENT OR 

INFORMATION RELATING TO SUCH VIOLA TlON? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. 
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40. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN CONVICTED OF OR ENTERED A PLEA OF GUlL TY OR NOLO 

CONTENDERE TO ANY CRIMINAL VIOLATION OTilER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE? IF 

SO, PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. 

41. ARE YOU PRESENTLY OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A PARTY IN INTEREST IN ANY 

ADMINISTRA TlVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CIVIL L!TIGA TION? iF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE 

DETAILS. 

No. I am unaware of ever having been a party of interest in any agency proceeding or civil 

litigation. However, I am aware of complaints being made against the CIA OIG generally or the fonner 

Inspector General, where I have been interviewed and submitted affidavits. 

42. HAVE YOU BEEN INTERVIEWED OR ASKED TO SUPPLY ANY INFORMATION AS A WITNESS OR 

OTHERWISE IN CONNECTION WITH ANY CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION, FEDERAL, OR 

STATE AGENCY PROCEEDING, GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION, OR CRIMINAL OR CIVIL 

LITIGATION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. Although l was not interviewed,! am aware generally of congressional inquiries involving CIA OIG. 

43. HAS ANY BUSINESS OF WHICH YOU ARE OR WERE AN OFFICER, DIRECTOR, OR PARTNER 

BEEN A PARTY TO ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CRIMINAL OR CIVIL 

UTIGA TION RELEVANT TO THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINA TED? IF SO, 

PROVIDE DETAILS. (WITH RESPECT TO A BUSINESS OF WHICH YOU ARE OR WERE AN 

OFFICER, YOU NEED ONLY CONSIDER PROCEEDINGS AND LITIGATION THAT OCCURRED 

WHILE YOU WERE AN OFFICER OF THAT BUSINESS.) 

No, not applicable. 

44. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ANY INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATION? IF SO, 

PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. However, I understand generally that ! am named as a witness in an administrative proceeding involving a 

former CIA Inspector General. 

PART F- SECURITY INFORMATION 

45. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DENIED ANY SECURITY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASS!FIED 

INFORMATION FOR ANY REASON? !F YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN IN DETAIL. 

No. 

46. HAVE YOU BEEN REQUIRED TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATfON FOR ANY SECURITY 

CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN. 
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Yes. Prior to my employment at CIA I took three 'counterintel!igence''polygraph examinations related to 

security clearances and access to sensitive nuclear weapons and defense Special Access Program data. I have 

taken two 'full-scope' polygraph examinations associated with my employment at CIA. 

47. HAVE YOU EVER REFUSED TO SUBMIT TO A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION? IF YES, PLEASE 

EXPLAIN. 

No. 

PART G- ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

48. DESCRIBE IN YOUR OWN WORDS THE CONCEPT OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF U.S. 

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN PARTICULAR, CHARACTERIZE WHAT YOU BELIEVE TO BE 

THE OBLIGA T!ONS OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES OF THE CONGRESS RESPECTIVELY IN THE 

OVERSIGHT PROCESS. 

Both the National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949, as amended, specifically Section 17 that 

created the CIA O!G in 1989, require that the intelligence oversight committees be kept fully informed. I 

believe congressional oversight is essential to ensuring that national security objectives are furthered, and that 

laws are followed. The independent work of the CIA OIG helps inform the committees in this regard. The 

issuance of CIA OIG Semiannual Reports, summarizing audit, inspection and investigative activities, along 

with the sharing of completed audit and inspection reports, supports an open avenue of communications 

between the OIG and the committees. I have supported these established mechanisms while serving as the 

Acting Inspector General at CIA. I believe unfettered communications between the OIG and the committees is 

one of the hallmarks of OIG independence, and is essential to ensuring an exchange of ideas and key concerns. 

49. EXPLAIN YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 

OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. 

The Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency is independent and objective, and maintains effective 

communications with the Director, CIA and his senior team, and importantly, the congressional oversight 

committees. The Inspector General is responsible for promoting economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in 

CIA programs and operations, by conducting independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations. 

The Inspector General detects and deters fraud, waste and abuse within CIA. Audit and inspections work 

focuses on priority and high-risk mission areas in order to achieve the broadest positive impact. Annual 

planning for audit and inspections work is coordinated with key stakeholders to help ensure that limited 

resources are directed most effectively. Investigative activities involving allegations of crimes and civil 

negligence, although conducted independently, are accomplished in collaboration with the Departtnent of · 

Justice, and when appropriate, in coordination with the CIA Office of General Counsel. Whistleblowers and 

others raising concerns are provided anonymous or confidential methods to share concerns without fear of 

reprisal, and are protected by the Office of Inspector General from reprisal. These activities are reported in 

Semiannual Reports to the CIA Director and the oversight committees. The Inspector General is an active 

member of the Intelligence Community Inspector General Forum (IC IG Forum) and the Council of Inspectors 

General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), maintaining a productive relationship with their membership in 

order.to share best practices and identify opportunili"' for collaboration where overlapping agency mission· 

interests are identified. In order to accomplish the OIG mission, the Inspector General builds and maintains a 

professional and diverse workforce, and provides opportunities for staff development and professional growth, 
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AFFIRMATION 

l~tsr/JIIfrf( tt ~P' uf'(, DO SWEAR THAT THE ANSWERS l HAVE 

PROV ED TO THIS QUEST!ONNX"!RE ARE ACCURATE AND COMPLETE. 

{}) '5&rJn1 

(Date)/ 

[SIGNATURE] 

[SIGNATURE] 
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TO THE CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE: 

In connection with my nomination to be the Inspector General of the Central 

Intelligence Agency, I hereby express my willingness to respond to requests to 

appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate. 

[SIGNATURE] 
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

INTELLIGENCE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

for 

Mr. Christopher Shln·n,IPv 

upon his nomination to be 

the General of the 

I ofl9 
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CIA IG Access to Information 

QUESTION I 

By statute, the CIA IG "shall have access to any employee or any employee of a 

contractor of the Agency whose testimony is needed for the performance of his duties. In 

addition, [he] shall have direct access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, 

recommendations, or other material which relate to the programs and operations with respect to 

which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this section." 

a. What is your understanding of the reach of this provision? 

The statute is clear in its intent: the CIA Office of the Inspector General (OIG), 

consistent with its mission, has access to all CIA staff and contractors, reports, 

documents and data. This requirement is also spelled out in Agency regulations. 

This has been the practice since my arrival in July 2012, and if confirmed, I will 

continue to enforce it. 

b. Please describe how you would resolve, including what remedies you would 

pursue, if you were refused such access. 

I have requested periodically that the Office of General Counsel send an email to 

its representatives across the CIA mission, outlining these requirements. I have 

advised my staff to refer to Agency regulations and these emails if they receive 

any push-back regarding production. In any case, I would have my senior staff 

speak with the appropriate leadership in such an occurrence and if problems 

persisted I would intervene. In the highly unlikely event I was unable to resolve 

the issue I would notify the Director and the congressional intelligence 

committees of the matter. 

c. What is your view of the appropriate use of subpoena authority? 

The ·oiG issues subpoenas when seeking information from non-government, but 

affiliated, entities and persons in support of mission-related audit, inspection and 

investigative activities. 

d. What Is your view of how tbe OIG balances independent confirmation of 

information, for example through document review, and accepting CIA 

representations to OIG personnel? To what extent should IG reports include 

caveats with regard to information the IG bas not independently confirmed? 

The OIG conducts oversight work in conformance with standards and bestpractices issued by the Council of Inspectors General (CIGIE), of which we are a 

member. These standards are written into our procedures and practices. Each 

discipline, i.e. audits, inspections and investigations, undergoes a periodic peerreview by another CIGIE member Offices of Inspector General to ensure 

compliance with these standards. CIGIE standards require that our work is 

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independent, objective and lacks bias, undergoes due professional care and is 

thorough. Although anecdotal evidence assists our work in identifying issues, 

our practice is to require independent verification in order for a conclusion to rise 

to the level of a finding. 

Sources of Complaints and Protection of Whistleblowers 

QUESTION2 

By statute, the CIA IG "is authorized to receive and investigate complaints or information 

from any person concerning the existence of an activity constituting a violation of laws, rules, or 

regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and 

specific danger to the public health and safety." 

a. If confirmed, what steps would you take to inform individuals, within or 

outside of the U.S. Government, of their opportunity to provide such 

complaints or information to the CIA IG? 

The CIA OIG has developed and maintains a robust complaints Hotline, where 

whistleblowers and others can report concerns regarding fraud, waste, abuse and 

mismanagement in an anonymous, confidential or open manner. I define a 

whistleblower in the broadest sense of the term and meaning. This is a top 

priority at CIA OIG, as whistleblowers are a critical source of information that 

keeps our government honest, efficient, and accountable. I believe 

whistleblowing is essential to the national security and intelligence mission of the 

CIA. Federal laws, Executive Directives, and Agency Regulations strongly 

encourage Agency employees to disclose allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse to 

appropriate authorities. Federal laws and Agency Regulations also protect 

whistleblowers from retaliation for reporting allegations of wrongdoing. 

If I am confirmed as CIA IG, as I have as Acting and Deputy CIA Inspector 

General, I will manage the CIA OIG Hotline, through which whistleblowersemployees, contractors, and others, can report concerns regarding fraud, waste, 

abuse and mismanagement involving Agency programs and operations. Within 

our Hotline program, I have developed a Complaint Coordination Committee 

(CCC), made up of senior O!G managers, that assesses all complaints and 

allegations received by the OIG. The CCC reviews each matter to determine how 

it should be handled, i.e., refen·ed for consideration as an investigation, audit, or 

inspection, or whether the issue should be raised to component management for 

informational purposes or further action. Any allegations of possible retaliation 

against a whistleblower are handled as a priority. The CIA OIG lnvestigations 

Office has developed specific whistleblower retaliation training for investigators, 

and whistleblower retaliation complaints are given a dedicated reporting track on 

the diG Hotline web site. [ regard whistleblower retaliation as a separate 

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program from our Hotline, even though related concerns are typically received 

through our Hotline. 

Our Hotline and Whistleblower progr<~ms include an outreach component. At 

CIA, all new Agency employees receive a briefing by senior CIA OIG staff 

explaining the Hotline program, how concerns and complaints are handled by the 

OIG, and how they can report concerns in an anonymous, confidential or open 

manner. The briefing includes an explanation on whistleblower protections, and 

why such protections are important. Senior OIG staff attend senior Agency staff 

conferences where Hotline and Whistleblower retaliation program information is 

presented. In order to expand access to reporting channels, CIA OlG has 

developed an internal web-based system-referenced above, that allows those 

with access to CIA systems-worldwide, the ability to report concerns and 

complaints anonymously, confidentially or openly. While visiting stations and 

bases, I conduct All-Hands meetings with CIA staff where I convey my 

philosophy in this area, and conduct open-door visits with management and line 

staff. 

At CIA buildings within the Washington Metropolitan Area, posters advising all 

staff of their obligations to report fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement to the 

OJG are displayed. Agency sponsored training that includes instructions on how 

to report fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement, either anonymously, 

confidentially or openly, as well as an explanation of the protections that are 

afforded them, is required to be taken by CIA staff. 

b. What formal policies and processes a:re in place to inform employees of their 

right to provide information to the CIA IG and to detect and protect against 

:reprisal for making complaints or disclosing information to the CIA IG? 

In addition to the processes described above, Agency Regulations designate CIA 

OlG as the point of contact for employees to report allegations of reprisal for 

making protected disclosures to appropriate authorities under relevant 

whistleblower laws and regulations. As stated, the OIG is also responsible for 

reviewing and investigating allegations of whistleblower reprisal for the 

CIA. The OIG reviews allegations of reprisal in compliance with applicable laws, 

directives, and regulations, such as Presidential Policy Directive 19 (PPD-19). 

c. Do you see any need fo:r additional actions, policies, or processes to protect 

whistleblowe:rs? 

Although the CIA OIG Hotline and whistleblower retaliation programs are strong, 

we are always seeking to strengthen our mission capabilities. To this end we are 

in the process of having an independent expert examine our Hotline and 

whistleblower retaliation programs and make recommendations for possible 

improvements. 

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CIA lG Review of Covert Actions 

QUESTIONJ 

Under an arrangement between the CIA IG and the congressional intelligence committees 

begun in 2001, the CIA IG conducts a detailed review on each authorized covert action program 

every three years, which has been extremely helpful for our congressional oversight. 

a. Do you plan to continue this practice? If not, why not? 

Yes. I believe this continuing work is important to ensure accountability and 

promote efficiency. 

b. Are there other CIA programs that should have the same kind of regular, 

periodic, oversight from the CIA IG's Office? 

OIG conducts the following regular, periodic work: 

1. Covert Action Reviews 

2. Independent Audit of the CIA's Financial Statements. 

3. Independent Evaluation of CIA's Information Security Program and Practices 

required by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA). 

4. Review of the CIA's compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and 

Recovery Act (IPERA). 

5. Risk assessment of purchase and travel card programs. 

6. Independent Audit of the DNI' s Financial Statements. 

7. Independent Attestation of CIA's Assertions Concerning Security and 

Availability of the Commercial Cloud Services System. 

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 

QUESTION4 

On May 24, 2016, this Committee passed its Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2017, S. 3017. The bill includes two provisions that affect the CIA IG: section 309 requires 

the IG for each Intelligence Community element to implement a policy that places limitations on 

certain employees of IG offices, and section 412 amends the Central intelligence Agency Act of 

1949 to authorize the CIA IG to consider certain positions as law enforcement officers for 

purposes of calculating retirement eligibility and entitlements. 

a. What are your views of these provisions? 

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My understanding of Section 309 language is that it is intended to preclude OIG 

staff from possible conflicts of interest and to be free from impairments to 

independence. I believe current Agency and OIG policies achieve these 

objectives. Agency ethics requirements address the prevention of personal and 

external impairments for all CIA officers. At CIA OIG, career staff rotational 

assignments are not mandated, and Agency staff on rotation to CIA OIG are 

prevented from conducting oversight work associated with offices, missions, and 

projects, to which they have materially contributed to during the previous three 

years. CIGIE standards are clear in this regard, that staff are to remain clear from 

conflicts and impairments, in fact or perceived. During my tenure at CIA OIG, I 

have found no deviations from this standard by OIG staff. 

My understanding of Section 412 is that it is intended to afford FERS Special 

Law Enforcement pay and retirement authorities to qualified criminal 

investigators at CIA OIG. I support this authority, as it enables CIA OIG to 

attract trained criminal investigators in support of the critical investigative 

mission at CIA. Absent this authority, criminal investigators working for other 

Offices of Inspector General and other law enforcement agencies would lose such 

retirement coverages if they carne to work at CIA OIG, and newly trained CIA 

OIG criminal investigators would be incentivized to leave CIA OIG to work for 

other agencies in order to obtain such retirement coverages. 

b. How would a limitation on employee's activities impact your duties and 

responsibilities, and execution thereof, if confirmed as CIA IG? 

With respect to Section 309, I believe current practices may satisfy the intent of 

the Section and would minimally impact my duties and responsibilities. 

Regarding Section 412, this language would significantly and positively .impact 

my ability to attract and retain criminal investigative talent at all levels of the 

career service, which is essential for maintaining a robust and healthy 

investigative cadre 

c. Do you have an opinion on whether CIA OIG officers should be armed as 

law enforcement officers? Does this provision provide the relief you need to 

hire law enforcement officers as investigators? 

First, I sincerely appreciate the support of the Committee in providing legislative 

language that serves to strengthen the CIA OIG investigative mission. 

As a law enforcement officer with near 35 years of experience, during 30 of 

which I carried a ftrearm, I believe criminal investigators should be sufficiently 

trained and equipped to defend themselves and those around them from imminent 

harm. In the criminal investigative profession, despite best efforts to control the 

working environment, officers are never certain of the circumstances they will 

encounter-what is believed to be a benign witness interview could evolve into a 

confrontation with an armed and dangerous criminal. 

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Personnel and Budgetary Resources 

QUESTIONS 

By statute, the CIA IG has "final approval of . . . the selection of internal and external 

candidates for employment with the Office of Inspector General; and ... all other personnel 

decisions concerning personnel permanently assigned to the Office of Inspector General, 

including selection and appointment to the Senior Intelligence Service, but excluding all 

security-based determinations that are not within the authority of a head of other Central 

Intelligence Agency offices." In addition, the CIA IG "shall transmit a budget estimate and 

request through the Director to the Director of National Intelligence" specifying certain amounts 

requested for each fiscal year. 

a. If confirmed, what changes (if any) would you consider or make in tlte 

present CIA OIG, with respect to organization, staff qualifications, training, 

budget, or otlter features relevant to the effective performance of tlte Office? 

The CIA OIG team of professional auditors, inspectors, investigators and support 

staff are among the best in public service, and I anticipate that they will continue 

to produce world class work. The CIA OIG budget has remained flat for years 

despite growth in the CIA's mission and corresponding budget. CIA OIG budget 

requests have been submitted through FY 2019. If confirmed, I would initiate a 

review of the structure of the CIA OIG and determine staff requirements in order 

to perform optimal oversight. 

b. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe tltat tlte use of contractors 

to perform such functions Is appropriate? 

CIA OIG staff recruiting and vacancy levels are to a large extent affected by an 

onerous recruiting process at CIA. Despite efforts by CIA to improve this 

process, onboarding times can take many months, with only one out of every 

three Conditional Offers of Employment resulting in actual employment. I 

believe contractors are best used in support areas such as IT, research and report 

production, when onboarding fails to provide required personnel, and critical 

support related vacancies must be filled in order to meet mission requirements. 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

QUESTION6 

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Pursuant to Section 348 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20 l 0, the 

Director of National Intelligence has issued a directive on the access of the Comptroller General 

to information in the possession of an element of the Intelligence Community. 

a. Please describe yiS\Jr understanding of the role of GAO in assisting Congress 

in oversight that relates to such information. 

Both the ODNl and CIA have issued policies regarding cooperation with the 

Comptroller General, through the General Accountability Office (GAO). 

Accordingly, the Agency provides GAO access to CIA information related to 

matters under GAO review to the fullest extent possible, and consistent with 

national security and the protection of intelligence sources and methods. GAO 

interaction is principally with the Agency directly, which coordinates with 

mission components in order to facilitate the GAO's efforts. GAO has minimal 

interaction with the CIA OIG, except to ensure avoidanqe of duplicative oversight 

efforts. 

b. Please describe your views on what coordination between the CIA IG and 

GAO would be desirable to assure full coverage of oversight requirements 

while avoiding conflict or duplication, and while assuring the protection of 

classified information from inappropriate disclosure. 

Please see 'a.' above. 

c. Please describe any concerns you may have regarding the use of GAO to 

assist in the conduct of oversight of the IC. 

Beyond coordination with CIA OIG to ensure avoidance of duplication, my 

concerns are that appropriate controls are maintained over sensitive national 

security information in the possession of GAO, and that GAO work is conducted 

at the invitation of the congressional oversight committees. I believe CIA OIG 

maintains the capability to address most CIA-related issues of interest to the 

Committee. 

CIA lG Work Plan 

QUESTION7 

If confirmed, how will you determine the investigations and reports that are necessary or 

desirable to complete each year? 

If confirmed, I will continue to address CIA OIG investigative, audit and 

evaluative work in accordance with processes I have established as the Acting 

Inspector General. Audit and inspections work will be planned for the following 

fiscal year essentially using four considerations: (1) the previous year's OIG 

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reporting on CIA's Management Performance Challenges, (2) solicited feedback 

from OIG's principle stakeholders-namely CIA senior leadership and the 

congressional intelligence committees, (3) mandated annual and periodic work, 

and (4) insights from OIG professional staff based on !heir cumulative 

observations during previous 

OIG fieldwork. Within this framework, CIA OIG's work is prioritized, and if 

new areas of interest are raised following the conclusion of our planning efforts, 

they may be inserted into the work lineup, as appropriate. Investigative work is 

predominantly reactive in nature, and is determined by the assessment of 

allegations and concerns received by our investigative component from the OIG 

Hotline, directly from whistleblowers and others, using established CIGIE 

standards, Attorney General Guidelines, and OIG practices and procedures. All 

CIA OIG processes have undergone peer-review by other CIGIE member Offices 

of Inspector General and have been assessed as compliant with CIGIE standards. 

QUESTIONS 

Would you anticipate developing a work plan for each year in office? Do you plan to 

consult with the intelligence oversight committees in Congress in advance on your work plan? 

Why or why not? 

Yes. I would continue to develop an Annual Workplan and coordinate with the 

intelligence committees on the development of each Workp!an. Please also see 

Question #7. 

ConsuUanonsaboutReporls 

QUESTION9 

Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for the CIA IG to 

consult with officials in the CIA, or other officials of an IC element outside an office of an IG, 

before issuing a report, regarding the findings and recommendations in the report? 

CIA OIG practices and procedures include issuing draft reports to the CIA before 

a final report is issued. This allows !he CIA to evaluate and fully understand !he 

findings and recommendations, including CIA OIG support for its positions on 

the issues or concerns found. In this sense, CIA sees audit and inspections reports 

before they are issued, although I might not characterize it as a consultation. This 

practice is used throughout the Inspector General Community, and is not intended 

to, nor has it resulted in undermining OIG independence, in my experience. 

CIA OIG conducts IT related oversight, such as the Independent Attestation of 

CIA's Assertions Concerning Security and Availability of the Commercial Cloud 

Services System. Multiple intelligence agencies use the Commercial Cloud. This 

work is relied upon by the Offices of Inspector General of the user agencies. 

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Before work begins, CIA OIG advises the other OIGs of areas that will be 

covered in the audit. 

QUESTION tO 

To the extent that you believe such consultation is appropriate, what steps, if any, do you 

believe the IG should take to keep a record of the consultation and record the results in the text 

of the report? 

Please see Question #9. These interactions are appropriately recorded in the work 

papers of CIA OIG staff. 

QUESTION11 

Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for senior 

officials to request that the CIA IG not investigate or review a particular matter, as provided in 

50 u.s.c. § 403q(b)(3)? 

Section 17 of The CIA Act of 1949, authorizes the Director of the Central 

Intelligence Agency to prohibit the initiation, carrying out or completion of an 

OIG audit, inspection or investigation, if he determines that such prohibition is 

necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States. The law 

also requires him to inform the congressional intelligence committees, should he 

take such actions. I am not aware of this authority ever having been exercised, 

nor can I think of circumstances under which doing so would be appropriate. 

QUESTION12 

Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for senior 

officials to request that the CIA IG not issue a report on a particular matter, as provided in 50 

u.s.c. § 403q(b)(3)? 

Please see Question # 11. 

QUESTION13 

Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for 

senior officials to request that the CIA IG change findings, recommendations, or 

other pertinent material in a report on a particular matter? 

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Independence is the foundation of an Inspector General's credibility, and to the 

best of my knowledge, I have never removed a finding and/or a recommendation 

from a report at the request of a senior official. 

All CIA OIG reports follow CIGIE Standards, which are validated under an 

independent peer-review process. In order to qualify as a finding, each must 

contain four elements: Condition, Criteria, Cause and Effect. If these elements 

don't exist then a finding cannot be supported. Recommendations are designed to 

address the findings. If a finding is determined not to be supported it may be 

changed to an 'observation'. 

QUESTION14 

Do you commit to working directly with the congressional intelligence committees and 

providing information directly to the committees, rather than through the CIA's Office of 

Congressional Affairs? 

Yes. This has been my practice as Acting Inspector General and will continue to 

be, if I am confirmed. 

QUESTION15 

What is your position on the role of the CIA IG to monitor CIA adherence to 

congressional intent and direction? 

Part ofthe work of CIA OIG has been to examine CIA's compliance with the law, 

regulations and guidelines, which include those containing congressional intent 

and direction. 

QUESTION16 

Do you commit to consult with the intelligence oversight committees in Congress to help 

determine CIA adherence to congressional intent and direction? Why or why not? 

Yes. A strong relationship between CIA OIG and the congressional intelligence 

committees is essential for effective oversight 

QUESTION17 

Please also describe your views on the appropriate relationship between the CIA IG and 

the CIA Office of General Counsel with regard to legal issues. Do you commit to independently 

analyzing legal issues related to the role, responsibilities and functions of the OIG? 

Yes. The role, responsibilities and functions of the CIA OIG with respect to legal 

issues are well established. Thus, while it is important that CIA OIG and CIA 

General Counsel consult rigorously on matters of joint interest such as working 

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with the Department of Justice litigation issues and OIG investigations, I would 

rigorously challenge changes to those norms or new interpretations. 

Major Challenges, Problems, and Priorities 

QUESTION18 

In your view, what are the major challenges, problems, and priorities facing the CIA IG' s 

Office? 

There are two: recruiting and onboarding process, and a flat budget. Recruiting, 

and hence, retention at CIA OIG continues to be a challenge and the vacancy rate 

varies between lO- 15 percent. We use the Agency's recruiting and onboarding 

process, which has historically taken months from a COE being made to a 

prospective employee, to their entry into the workforce. Principally due to that 

lengthy onboarding process we lose two of every three candidates we offer a 

COE. CIA is currently taking action to improve the onboarding process, which 

should go a long way to addressing this challenge. That said, I have directed an 

independent review of this process in order to inform CIA decision-makers of 

possible additional areas requiring attention. · 

Attrition among CIA OIG staff stems from a higher rate of turnover among our 

junior audit staff to positions within the Agency and at higher grades to other 

OIGs. Attrition of our newly trained investigators stems primarily from their 

desire to acquire FERS Special law enforcement retirement coverage at other 

agencies-<:overage we have begun to integrate following the passage of the 

Intelligence Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2017. 

CIA OIG budget and staffing levels have. remained flat for many years, even as 

the Agency's mission and budget has expanded. Additional staffing and 

corresponding increases would enable CIA OIG to expand its oversight work 

across Agency programs and operations. 

QUESTION19 

If confi11Tled, how do you plan to address those challenges, problems, and priorities? 

I have recently hired a recruiting specialist who has already increased CIA OIG 

recruiting activities. We have initiated a review of the CIA's onboarding process. 

Additionally, if confi11T!ed, I will initiate a comprehensive review of the CIA OIG 

organization and its mission requirements. That review will serve to inform a 

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Travel 

dialogue with the Director and with the oversight committees regarding the CIA 

OIG Fiscal Year 2020 budget and future mission requirements. 

QUESTION20 

Please list your official foreign travel while serving as the Acting Inspector General 

starting in February 2015. Please include dates of travel, location, and specific purpose 

including topic of CIA IG activity. 

Foreign travel was conducted in conjunction with planned CIA OIG fieldwork, 

including audits inspections and investigations. I conducted All-Hands meetings 

with local staff to message the role and responsibilities of the CIA OIG, and to 

strengthen communications. While visiting, I opened my temporary office to staff 

who typically shared operational challenges and issues, complaints and concerns, 

engaged in general discussions, and even asked career advice-all while I 

expressed appreciation for the their service and sacrifice. 

Since 2015, I have travelled to nine countries, and have spent 41 days in the field. 

If confirmed, I will continue to travel to ensure that CIA OIG's mission is 

communicated to the field. 

I have sent a classified annex containing the locations and dates of my travel. 

Staffing 

QUESTION21 

You have served as Acting IG for over two years. Please provide your assessment of the 

staff levels and performance of the CIA IG staff. 

The CIA OIG team is performing admirably, and since February 2015, we have 

issued over 100 audit and inspection reports and have made 340 recommendations 

to the Agency to improve efficiency and effectiveness in key areas such as Covert 

Action, Insider Threat, information security, financial systems and other 

operational and program activities. CIA OIG has received, assessed and 

processed over 1150 whistleblower complaints through the Hotline and initiated 

approximately 115 investigations. 

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As stated, if confirmed, I will initiate a comprehensive review of the CIA OIG 

organization and its mission related requirements. That review will serve to 

inform a dialogue with the Director and the oversight committees regarding the 

FY 2020 budget and future mission requirements. More could be accomplished 

with more resources. 

QUESTION22 

Do you have enough staff to accomplish your mission? 

Please see Questions 5 and 21. 

QUESTION23 

Are there areas in which you need additional support? 

Yes. As I've discussed in Question #18, CIA OIG budget and staffing levels have 

remained flat for many years, even as the Agency's mission and budget has 

expanded. Additional staffing and accompanying budget would enable CIA OIG 

to expand its oversight work across Agency programs and operations. CIA OIG 

could improve its oversight capabilities if given the authority to convert 

unobligated funds designated for staff salary costs to use in acquiring contractor 

support in critical mission areas such as IT and report production. The authority 

to convert these funds would provide CIA OIG operational flexibility and 

strengthen mission capabilities. 

QUESTION24 

What policy changes do you need to strengthen the work of the CIA IG? 

Please see Question #23. The authority to convert unobligated funds originally 

designated for staff salaries, when those positions remain unfilled due to 

challenges in CIA's onboarding process. These funds would provide CIA OIG 

operational flexibility and strengthen mission capabilities. 

QUESTION25 

Do you have sufficiently cleared staff to conduct studies into sensitive and highlycompartmented activities at the CIA? Are there mission areas in which the CIA IG does not 

have access, or has been denied access? 

My staff maintains sufficient clearances to obtain access to sensitive and highlycompartmented activities. There are no mission areas, data, documentation or 

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Whistleblower 

staff to which CIA OIG does not have access. My staff and I have not been 

denied access to any such information or personnel. 

QUESTION26 

To your knowledge, have you ever been the subject of a whistleblower complaint? If 

yes, please provide dates and content of each complaint of which you are aware. 

No. I am aware of complaints made against the CIA OIG, the former CIA 

Inspector Generai, and previous OIGs where I was employed, but I am not aware 

of any where I was the subject. 

QUESTION27 

Please describe your view of the CIA IG's role with regard to whistleb!owers. Please 

address each of the following and provide specifics on how tbe OIG has addressed each of tbe 

following during your tenure as Acting IG: 

Please see Question #2. I define a whistleblower in the broadest sense of the term 

and meaning. Anyone providing allegations and concerns to the CIA OIG is 

regatded as a whistleblower, and is afforded all appropriate protections. 

• Outreach and training across the CIA with regard to whistleblower rights 

and access to the OIG; 

Whistleblower rights and training along with gaining access to the OIG are 

addressed by the Agency in mandatory 'No FEAR Act' training requirements, 

regulations, and can be viewed on the CIA OIG web site-available to staff and 

contractors with staff-like Agency system access. Also, the Agency addresses 

Whistleblower Protection under the Equity Assurance section of its Employee 

Central website. 

• Timely and thorough investigations of whistleblower complaints; 

Timeliness and thoroughness are standatds by which all CIA OIG investigations 

ate conducted, and they are incorporated into our procedures. Anyone providing 

allegations and concerns to the CIA OIG is regarded as a whistleblower, and is 

afforded all protections from reprisal. 

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• Whlstleblower protections and responses to allegations of reprisals; and, 

allegations of reprisal; 

CIA OIG follows processes based upon PPD-19 and ICD-120 guidance, which 

are incorporated into our Investigations Manual and our Whistleblower Reprisal 

Investigations Handbook for Investigators. Allegations received are assessed to 

determine if the complainant has standing, made a protected disclosure to an 

authorized recipient, and suffered an adverse personnel action or action on their 

security clearance. Investigative activity determines if there is a causal 

relationship between the protected disclosure and the adverse personnel or 

security clearance action. Reports of findings are issued to the appropriate level 

decision-maker(s) for appropriate action. 

• Management of whistleblower caseloads within the OIG; 

The Whlstleblower caseload is managed similarly to all investigations. Cases are 

assigned to criminal investigators who work under Assistant Special Agents in 

Charge, and who follow our Investigations Manual and Whlstleb!ower Reprisal 

Investigations Handbook for Investigators. All cases are entered into our Case 

Management System and the system employs appropriate access controls. 

Reports are written in accordance with our procedures and issued to CIA 

decision-makers. 

• Notification to Congress regarding whistleblower complaints. 

The CIA OIG notifies the congressional oversight committees of the status of all 

of its investigations, including whistleblower retaliation cases, through our Semi 

Annual Reports and on an ad hoc basis during discussions between Committee 

staff and CIA OIG staff. 

QUESTION28 

What is your view of the role of the CIA IG in managing and investigating whistleblower 

complaints? How much of a priority will you make managing and investigating whistleblower 

complaints if confirmed as the CIA IG? 

Please see Question #27. 

QUESTION29 

Will you seek to strengthen the CIA IG's role relative to whistleblower protections? If 

yes, how will you strengthen the whistleblower protection activities of the CIA IG? 

Please see Questions #2 and #27. Additionally, although the CIA OIG Hotline 

and whistleblower retaliation programs are strong, more can always be done. As 

such, I have initiated an independent review of these programs to identify possible 

ways to strengthen them. 

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QUESTION30 

To proactively protect CIA employees and contractors from potential retaliation, do you 

support providing CIA employees with the same stay authority that is afforded almost every 

other federal employee? 

Independence 

The CIA OIG appreciates the Committee's support on the issue of providing 'stay 

authorities'. Although we certainly are not opposed to having the authority, we 

have never had a need for it 

QUESTION31 

In general, what would be your approach to ensuring the independence of the Office of 

the Inspector General of the CIA, if you are confirmed as the next CIA IG? 

Messaging on the importance OIG .independence is a very effective weapon in 

deterring any efforts to compromise it. Both the CIA OIG senior staff and I 

routinely reference and discuss the importance of IG independence at new 

employee briefings, manager conferences, and with senior staff. This message is 

reinforced internally among the CIA OIG staff. Independence is the foundation 

of an IG's credibility in the eyes of his principal stakeholders. Any efforts to 

undermine it should-arid will, if I am confirmed-be met with a swift response. 

Duties of the Position 

QUESTION32 

One of the key statutory responsibilities for the CIA IG is: "to provide policy direction 

for, and to plan, conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the inspections, 

investigations, and audits relating to the programs and operations of the Agency ... " Please 

explain how you have, as the Acting CIA IG, determined the agenda for the IG's inspections, 

investigations, and audits. How will you solicit and incorporate congressional concerns into 

your plans? 

As Acting Inspector General, I have provided policy direction for, and have 

conducted, supervised and coordinated independently, the inspections, audits and 

investigations involving the programs and operations if the CIA. I have issued 

over 100 classified audits and inspections and have initiated over l 00 

investigations .. These audits and inspections are uncompromising. If confirmed, I 

will continue to address CIA OIG investigative, audit and evaluative work in 

accordance with processes I have established as the Acting Inspector General. 

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Audit and inspections work will be planned for the following fiscal year 

essentially using four considerations: (l) the previous year's OIG reporting on 

CIA's Management Performance Challenges, (2) solicited feedback from OIG's 

principle stakeholders--namely CIA senior leadership and the congressional 

oversight committees, (3) mandated annual and periodic work, and (4) insights 

from OIG professional staff based on their cumulative observations during 

previous OIG fieldwork. The final CIA OIG Workplan has been and will 

continue to be, if I am confirmed, a reflection of my independent assessment and 

priorities for conducting oversight work of CIA programs and operations. 

As I have previously stated, investigative work is predominantly reactive in 

nature, and is determined by the assessment of allegations and concerns received 

by our investigative component from the OIG Hotline, whistleblowers and others, 

using established CIGIE standards, Attorney General Guidelines, and OIG 

practices and procedures. All CIA OIG processes have undergone peer-review by 

other CIGIE member federal Offices of Inspector General and have been assessed 

as compliant with CIGIE standards. 

QUESTION33 

What do you believe are the five most important reports completed under your leadership 

of the CIA IG since February 2015? Please provide a brief description of why you believe each 

of these reports were important. 

I have issued over l 00 audit and inspection reports, including nearly 350 

recommendations for positive change in the programs and operations of the CIA. I have listed 

specific reports in the classified annex to this document. 

Relationship of CIA 1G and JC lG 

QUESTION34 

Please describe any potential overlap or conflict between the CIA IG and the ICIG that 

you have experienced in your role as Acting CIA IG or you may anticipate, if confirmed. 

There have been no conflicts between the CIA OIG and the IC OIG during my 

tenure as Acting Inspector General. In fact, my senior staff and I have supported 

and fully participated in the IC IG Forum, including sub working groups such as 

Deputy, legal, audit, inspections evaluations, awards and others on an ad hoc 

basis. 

With respect to overlap, I have authorized the CIA OIG to conduct the 

independent attestation of the Financial Statement of the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence (ODNI) under agreement with the ODNI and CIA, and share 

the results of that work with the IC IG. Financial systems and certain processes 

that support the ODNI are administered by the CIA. Those same systems are 

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RDl 

audited by CIA OIG auditors while also conducting the independent attestation of 

CIA's Financial Statement. As such, with efficiency and cost savings in mind, I 

have conducted the ODNI audit on a reimbursable basis. I currently have one 

highly qualified auditor on a Joint Duty Assignment to the IC IG. 

QUESTIONJS 

Please describe the legal basis on which you divested the OIG of its sole copy of the 

Committee's Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. 

To the best of my recollection, upon recei:ving a disk containing the Committee's 

RDI Study in December 2014, my predecessor decided to upload the report to the 

classified CIA OIG system. Shortly thereafter, we received guidance not to 

upload the report pending ongoing Freedom of Information Act litigation in the 

DC Circuit Court. My predecessor directed the report be deleted from the CIA 

OIG system and the disk preserved. After we deleted the report from our system 

we were told by our technical staff that the disk had been destroyed. In 2016, 

almost one year later, we discovered the disk had not been destroyed, but had 

remained secure in a safe. On conclusion of the FOIA litigation that determined 

the Study was a congressional record, and in response to a request from the 

Committee Chair, I made the judgement to returo the disk to the Committee. I 

understand this was consistent with the actions of other Executive Branch 

recipients. 

QUESTION 36 

Was the OIG's copy of the Committee's Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program a federal record under the Federal Records Act? Please explain your reasoning for this 

determination. 

Please see Question #35. 

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SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

INTELLIGENCE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

Post-hearing Questions 

for 

Mr. Christopher Sharpley 

upon his nomination to be 

the Inspector General of the 

Central Intelligence Agency 

October 24,2017 
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t. You mentioned during your testimony that you are"comfortable" with existing wllistlebiower 

programs. Do you plan any enl!aneements? If yes, what eohancements to the existing activities, 

Including ontreadl, will you lmplemcot? 

Answer: I have built Whistleblower Programs at the two newest Offices of Inspector General and have 

been recognized for that work, along with other accomplishments, whco awarded a Presidential Rank: 

Award for Meritorious Service. Since arriving at CiA 010 in July 2012, I have taken actions to 

strengthen the CIA 010 Whistleblower Program. In an effilrt to further strengthen the program I have 

contacted spaciallsts within the Council oflnspactors Oaneral on Integrity and Bfficiancy (CIOlB) 

community, who are recognized as having expertise In managing whistleblower programs. If confirmed, 

my Intent is to request these specialists review CIA 010 whlstleblower processes and consider possible 

recommendations for further improvements. 

2. Please provide the eurreot set of' performance measures used by the Office of tile Jnspcetor 

GeneraJ to measure suceess,lndudlng measures to track tile timeliness and quality of 

wlllstleblower lnvastlgatlons. 

Answer: The CIA 010 published its Ojfwe of lnspectOI' Ge/'UII"QI Strategic Plan in October 2014, which 

in eddition to providing mission, vision and values statements, outllnas currant organizational goals and 

objectives. Thase serve as general guideposts for our auditors, inspectors, investigators and support 

tesms. CIA 010 is a member ofC!GIB and as such, we adhere to the published CIOIB Genere! and 

Qnalitstlve Standards. Adherence to these standards is a measure of the professional caliber and 

performance of member OIOs. The Standards specifically identifY timeliness, along with objectivity, 

professionalism, thoroughness, end independence, as principlas of operation. We avoid establishing 

numerical measures thet could give the appearence of1111dermining our objectivity, e.g., pre-establishing 

a number of findings and recommendations, or investigations that will be opened, for the year. One 

additional valuable messure we use Is the positive impact our work. has on Agency programs and 

operations. We highlight "positive impact" stemming tom our findings and recommandations in our Semiennual Reports (SARs) to the Diractor, which are provided to the intelligance oversight committees. 

Regarding all whistleblower investigations, we follow CIGIE Quality Standards for Investigations, 

which are reflected in our Investigations Procedures Manual and our investigatOrs have received related 

training. esse Prograss Reviews are colldqcted between investigators and their supervisors regularly, to 

ensure investigations are conducted in a timely, efficient, thorough, and objactive manner. CIA 010 

participateS in the CIG!B peer review process, and our professional components are reviewed every three 

years. Our reprisal investigations are subject to an appeal process, which includes Bxtemat Penel 

Reviews chaired by the Intelligence Community Inspector Oeneral. 

3. I appreciate your support for authorities that wlllllalp protect CIA whistlebtowers from 

retaliation, Including stay authority. In both your testimony and written response, you expressed 

support for stay authority, but noted "we have never had a need ft!r it." Given that stay authority 

must be requasted by a whistleb!ower to avoid a posalble retaliatory net, how are you able to assess whether there has been a need for It? Do you believe a proactive stay authority could prevent 

retaliatory actions? 

Answer: I support stay authority for whislleblowers, so long u the provisions do not imerfere with other 

authorities designed to protect national security. To clarifY my previous responses, my understending is 

that stey authority is most useful in situations where an action, such as rsmova! or security clearsnce 

revocation, has not yet been taken. Whlstleblower retaliation complaints brought to my office's attention to date have typically alleged that the personnel/security action has already occurred and therefore, use 

of a stay would not be an option. However, l believe that stay authority could be used to delay 
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secondary related actions such as preventing Joss of employment associated with the initial alleged 

retaliation action. 

4. In conversations wltil past CIA Inspectors General, Clley have raised concerns tllat tile lack of 

sumelent accesses by OIG staff could atreet the OIG's ability to praperly conduet audits and 

perform evaluations. Some audits and evaluations were In lllgbly compartmented programs or 

offices. In your responses to pre-bearing questions, and In the hearing on October t '7tb, you 

testified that you had not experleaced any Issues wltllaeeess during your tenura as Deputy 

Inspector General. On reports within tile last tbree years: 

Answer: I agree with the point mede by the former lnspecton General. To clarifY, as Acting Inspector 

General since Feb!'Wil'Y 20 IS, I have never been denied access to data, systems, persoooel and/or 

programs. Due to tha sensitive nature of the CIA mission and of' natiolllll security matters genemlly, 

controlling access to highly classified information is crucial. There have been a limited number of times 

when 010 staff' were required to obtain progmm "read-ins" before gaining access to compartmented 

progrsms. There have also been a limited number of times when 010 staff have been required to have 

updeted security processes prior to read-ins and access. Further, them have been a limited number of 

occasions when Agency statrhave questioned whather 010 should have access to certain data based on 

the "need-to-know" principle. In these instances, senior OlO staff interceded and the access and data wem made available. My assessment Is that none of the above instances wem attempts to obstruct tile 

010, but wem instead Intended to protect sensitive data by Agency staff unfamiliar with 010 authorities. 

All audits and evaluatioll!l were properly conductad in s.ccordlll'lce with 010 standards and praetices. 

a. Please provide a list ef repom, audita, or evaluations across tile ntlre CIA that l!aye not been 

conducted beeause IG personnel lacked the ability to access erltleal data, systems, or 

personnel; 

Answer: To my understanding, .there ara no such reports, audits, or eve!uations. 

b. Please provide a list ofiG reports, audits, or evaluafioiiS which have experiengd delm In 

accessing data, systems, or personnel due to aeeesses, security elearances, or restricted 

handling limitations. Explain where tbesa delays may have changed or lmpscted outcomes; 

Answer: Them has been one report, involving one specific compartmented progmm, whem thare was a delay, but the delay did not ch!!llga or impact the outcome. The delay Involved arranging access for an 

expert ftom another U.S. intelligence agency on temporll!)' duty to ssslst with CIA 010 work. 

e. Please report on Instances where an IG report's tlndi!ll!!! oontldgg leyel has been diminished or downgraded due to an iaabillty to properly access full data, full systems, or personnel; 

Answer: To my undentanding, them ara no such instances. 

d. Please explain to tile Committee, during your tenure as aeting CIA IG, wilat barriers wu 

eliminated, or what effort!! you !Hiderteol!. to improve access that caused you to testif.Y tbat the 

IG bas not experienced any Issues with filii aecess to data, systems, or personnel In performing 

quality IG audits and evaluatieos. 

Answer: I have ndesvored to strengthen the professionalism of CIA OlO lllld dernonstmte the value of 

our work to the CIA mission. Additionally, l have strengthened communicetions at all levels so that the 

OIG mission is understood and them Is clsrity regerding prsctices, procedures and approach. I believe 

this has bolstemd 010 professional credibility. l have engaged senior Agency staff in our ermual 

Workpl!!ll process so their concerns regerding possible problems in high-risk mission areas ara 

understood by my staff. My working relationship with Agency leadership is one of opermess and a 

willingness to speak truth-to-powef'-independence is never compromised. l have periodically 

collaborsted with the Office ofGeneml Counsel (OOC) to cmnmunicate the existence ofOIO access authorities to OOC lawyers supporting progmms and operatioll!l across the Agency mission. This 

proactive effort has raised awareness shead of possible misunderstandings. The value of the 010, to 
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both the CIA mission and key stakeholders, remains strong when there is good communication, trust, 

independence, objectivity end credibility. 

S. Tile CIA Wlllstleblower policy lklcument. AR 13-6, Is dnssified and designated "FOR CIA 

INTERNAL USE ONLY." For every other IC agency, these pollc:les are unelasslfteli and available 

for public: review. Will you commit to reviewing these poides. declassifying them, and posting 

them to a public-fadng website? 

Answer: I believe every individual subject to this regulation should have access to it, and it is my 

understsnding that Agency staff as well es contractors with access to Agency systems can readily access it. If confirmed, I will consult with appropriate Agency offidals who have such authority to ascertain 

whether the Agency will release Ibis regulation, in whole or in part. 

6. On what date did you find the missing disk containing tile full cllll!Sifled Senate Intelligence 

Commlttae Report on CIA's Rendition, Detention, and lnterreptlc:n Program? Wbon did )'011 

Inform tile Committee tilat youllad found tile missing disk? 

Answer: The disk containing the full classified Senate Select Committee Report on CIA's Rendition, 

Detention, and rnterrogation Program was discovered by 010 steff in a secured safe in the CIA 010 

vault on 23 November 20Hi. Between 23 and 25 November 2016 (Thanksgiving fell on the 24111), I 

placed seperete telephone calls to Messrs. Chris Joyner and Mike Cesey, Majority and Minority Staff 

Directors, to inform them. Neither were aveilable, so I left eech a voicemai! advising the disk had been 

found. I briefed Messrs. Joyner end c&sey together, in person, on IS December 20 16 regarding the 

elrcimlstances surrounding the found disk.