1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ANTHONY MICHAEL CASTELLO, : CIVIL NO. 4:24-CV-1032

: 

 Plaintiff, : 

 : 

 v. : 

 : (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

TYLER ARBOGAST, et al., : 

 : 

 Defendants. : 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Factual Background

 This pro se prisoner lawsuit comes before us for consideration of a motion to 

dismiss, (Doc. 21), which seeks the dismissal of some, but not all, of the plaintiff’s 

claims. With respect to this motion, the well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff’s complaint, 

which guide our consideration of the motion, recite as follows:

Anthony Castello is a prisoner housed in the Union County Prison. According 

to state court records, Castello was convicted of resisting arrest, public drunkenness, 

criminal mischief, and harassment in August of 2024 and received a nine-to-twenty 

four month sentence. Commonwealth v. Castello, CP-60-CR-0000190-2023. 

Castello alleges in his complaint that these charges arose out of a May 4, 2023

incident in which he experienced a medical emergency. (Doc. 1). State police 

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responded to this emergency, and according to Castello, he was brutally beaten at the 

scene. (Id.) Castello alleges that he suffered facial fractures, hematoma, pinched 

nerves, lacerations, contusions, and a concussion at the hands of the arresting 

troopers. (Id.) 

While the factual narrative in support of Castello’s complaint speaks solely in 

terms of an excessive force claim lodged against the arresting troopers, this complaint 

sweeps more broadly. In addition to an excessive force claim, which the individual 

defendants do not challenge in their motion, Castello alleges that the defendants 

engaged in false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. (Id.) The 

complaint also sweeps broadly in terms of the named defendants. In addition to 

naming the three arresting troopers as defendants, the complaint also names the 

Pennsylvania State Police and State Police Troop F command center as institutional 

defendants. (Id.) 

With Castello’s claims framed in this fashion, the defendants have filed a 

motion to dismiss many of these claims. While the defendants do not challenge the 

excessive force claim brought against the individual troopers, they have moved to 

dismiss the institutional defendants, and have further moved for the dismissal of the 

false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims against all 

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defendants. (Doc. 21). This motion is fully briefed and is, therefore, ripe for 

resolution. 

For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss will be granted.

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss – Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for 

the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for the 

legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 

Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal 

court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in 

recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our 

opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 

2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards 

have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more 

heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the 

possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

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be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all 

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc., 

20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s 

bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. 

Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court 

need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not 

alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of 

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a 

plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than 

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions 

will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level.” Id. 

In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has 

underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which 

relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, 

a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than 

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conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679. According to the 

Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a 

review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts 

that they must:

[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than 

conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal 

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be 

supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual 

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine 

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id., at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain 

more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations 

sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere 

speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated: 

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state 

a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the 

factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District 

Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but 

may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then 

determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to 

show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, 

a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. 

A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. 

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

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As the court of appeals has observed: 

The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for 

overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The 

plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard 

when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 

129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955). 

This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts 

“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the 

line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’ ” 

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 

132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012).

In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a threestep analysis: 

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead 

to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should 

identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, 

are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where 

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an 

entitlement for relief.” 

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 

129 S. Ct. at 1950).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, 

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attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 

268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] 

that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims 

are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White 

Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose 

contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but 

which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l 

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express 

Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a 

district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document 

integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without 

converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment”). However, the court 

may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when 

determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & 

Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).

B. The State Police Institutional Defendants and Individual Official 

Capacity Damages Claims Will Be Dismissed.

At the outset, in his pro se federal civil rights complaint Castello names the 

Pennsylvania State Police and State Police Troop F command center as institutional 

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defendants and seeks damages from this agency of state government. 

This he may not do. Indeed, Castello’s claims against the state police as an 

institution run afoul of basis and insurmountable legal obstacles:

First, as a matter of constitutional law, the Eleventh Amendment to the 

Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States 

shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced 

or prosecuted against one of the ... States....”, U.S. Const. amend XI. By 

its terms, the Eleventh Amendment strictly limits the power of federal 

courts to entertain cases brought by citizens against the state and state 

agencies. Moreover, a suit brought against an individual acting in his or 

her official capacity constitutes a suit against the state and therefore also 

is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).

Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, states, state agencies and state 

officials who are sued in their official capacity are generally immune 

from lawsuits in federal courts brought against them by citizens. 

Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). Under the Eleventh

Amendment, the Commonwealth's immunity exists as a matter of law 

unless waived by the state, or expressly and unequivocally abrogated by 

Congress. Congress has not expressly abrogated this constitutional 

immunity with respect to federal civil rights lawsuits against the 

Pennsylvania State Police and the Commonwealth clearly has not 

waived its immunity. Quite the contrary, the Commonwealth has 

specifically by statute invoked its Eleventh Amendment immunity in 42 

Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b). This, while Pennsylvania has, by law, waived 

sovereign immunity in limited categories of cases brought against the 

Commonwealth in state court; see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8522, Section 

8521(b), which flatly states that: “[n]othing contained in this subchapter 

shall be construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from 

suit in federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the 

Constitution of the United States.” 42 Pa. Con. Stat. § 8521(b).

The constitutional protections afforded to the states under the Eleventh

Amendment also expressly apply to the state agencies that are integral 

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parts of Pennsylvania's criminal justice system like the Pennsylvania 

State Police. Therefore, the “Eleventh Amendment bars claims for 

damages against the P[ennsylvania] S[tate] P[olice], a state agency that 

did not waive its sovereign immunity.” Atkin v. Johnson, 432 F. App'x 

47, 48 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, as a matter 

of statutory interpretation, the plaintiff cannot bring a damages action 

against this state agency or state officials in their official capacity since 

it is also well settled that a state, a state agency, or a state official acting 

in an official capacity is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, the principal federal civil rights statute. Will, 491 U.S. at 71.

Andresen v. Pennsylvania, No. 1:20-CV-989, 2021 WL 9273956, at *5 (M.D. Pa. 

July 16, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:20-CV-989, 2021 WL 

9273955 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2021).

Simply put, Castello’s federal civil rights claims for damages against the State

Police are barred both by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution 

and by cases construing the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, 

since the State Police as an agency of state government cannot be sued in this fashion 

in federal court, the State Police and State Police Troop F command center as 

institutional defendants will be dismissed as institutional defendants from this action.

Likewise, Castello may not bring damages claims against individual

defendants solely in their official capacities. As to such official capacity claims, it is 

well established that, “[r]elying on the plain language of § 1983 and Congress's intent 

in enacting the statute, the Supreme Court has held that a state and state officers acting 

in their official capacities are not ‘persons’ against whom a claim for money damages

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under § 1983 can be asserted.” Boone v. Pennsylvania Off. of Vocational Rehab., 

373 F.Supp.2d 484, 498 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 

491 U.S. 58, 64, 71 n. 10 (1989)). Of course, Castello may still maintain these 

damages claims against the individual trooper defendants in their individual 

capacities. Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 303 (3d Cir. 2016) (section 

1983 “has long provided for money damages against state officials sued in their 

individual capacities”). In this regard, we construe the complaint as making such 

individual capacity damages claims in addition to any official capacity claims. See

Jones v. Garman, No. 1:21-CV-01715, 2022 WL 21756146, at *4 (M.D. Pa. May 10, 

2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:21-CV-01715, 2022 WL 

21756143 (M.D. Pa. June 2, 2022). 

B. Castello’s Malicious Prosecution, False Arrest, and False 

Imprisonment Claims Should Be Dismissed. 

Castello also asserts that the individual defendants, Troopers Arbogast, Horan, 

and Bowers, violated his Constitutional rights by engaging in a malicious prosecution 

and asserts claims of false arrest and false imprisonment alleging that the officers did 

not have probable cause to arrest him, despite his subsequent conviction. These

federal constitutional claims implicate Castello’s rights under the Fourth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution, which provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 

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effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 

and now Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 

Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 

and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const., amend. IV. Under the Fourth Amendment, an arrest without probable 

cause is a constitutional violation that may be redressed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See

Walmsley v. Philadelphia, 872 F.2d 546, 551 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Patzig v. O'Neill, 

577 F.2d 841, 848 (3d Cir. 1978)).

However, as currently pleaded these claims fail as a matter of law. At the 

outset, any malicious prosecution claims set forth in Castello’s complaint fails 

because they rest upon a fatally flawed legal premise. At bottom, the plaintiff seeks 

to bring a civil rights action premised on claims of malicious prosecution despite the 

fact that he was convicted at trial, sentenced, and has not set aside or overturned these 

convictions.

This he cannot do. Quite the contrary, it is well settled that an essential element 

of a civil rights malicious prosecution claim is that the underlying criminal case must 

have been terminated in favor of the civil rights claimant. Therefore, where, as here, 

the civil rights plaintiff brings a malicious prosecution or false arrest claim based 

upon a state case that resulted in a conviction, the plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of 

law. The Third Circuit has aptly observed in this regard:

The Supreme Court has “repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates 

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a species of tort liability.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483, 114 

S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383(1994) (quoting Memphis Community 

School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 

249 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Given this close relation 

between § 1983 and tort liability, the Supreme Court has said that the 

common law of torts, “defining the elements of damages and the 

prerequisites for their recovery, provide[s] the appropriate starting point 

for inquiry under § 1983 as well.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 483 (quoting Carey 

v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978)). 

The Supreme Court applied this rule in Heck to an inmate’s § 1983 suit, 

which alleged that county prosecutors and a state police officer 

destroyed evidence, used an unlawful voice identification procedure, 

and engaged in other misconduct. In deciding whether the inmate could 

state a claim for those alleged violations, the Supreme Court asked what 

common-law cause of action was the closest to the inmate’s claim and 

concluded that “malicious prosecution provides the closest analogy . . . 

because unlike the related cause of action for false arrest or 

imprisonment, it permits damages for confinement imposed pursuant to 

legal process.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 484. Looking to the elements of 

malicious prosecution, the Court held that the inmate’s claim could not 

proceed because one requirement of malicious prosecution is that the 

prior criminal proceedings must have terminated in the plaintiff’s favor, 

and the inmate in Heck had not successfully challenged his criminal 

conviction. Id. 

Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 155-156 (3d Cir. 2000).

Thus, “our precedents are clear that § 1983 plaintiffs alleging arrest and 

prosecution absent probable cause may bring malicious prosecution claims under the 

Fourth Amendment but are entitled to relief only if they are innocent of the crime for 

which they were prosecuted.” Washington v. Hanshaw, 552 F. App’x 169, 173 (3d 

Cir. 2014) (citing Hector, 235 F.3d at 156). Therefore, “a plaintiff claiming malicious 

prosecution must prove actual innocence as an element of his prima facie case.” 

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Steele v. City of Erie, 113 F. App’x 456, 459 (3d Cir. 2004). See Guider v. Evans, 

No. 1:14-CV-00331, 2014 WL 2472123, at *6-7 (M.D. Pa. June 2, 2014).

In the instant case, it is clear that Castello has not achieved a favorable 

termination of this state prosecution since he currently remains convicted of these 

state offenses. Since a favorable termination of the plaintiff’s state criminal case is a 

prerequisite to any civil rights claims based upon allegations of false arrest or 

malicious prosecution, the immutable fact of Castello’s state court conviction defeats 

these claims and compels dismissal of this complaint. In short, this complaint is based 

upon the fundamentally flawed legal premise that the plaintiff can sue the state 

for malicious prosecution even though he has not prevailed in the underlying state 

case. Since this premise is simply incorrect, this complaint fails as a matter of 

law. See Fleming v. Yates, No. 1:21-CV-349, 2021 WL 1899870, at *6 (M.D. Pa. 

Mar. 16, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 1:21-349, 2021 WL 

1499315 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2021); Galloway v. Kane, No. 1:15-CV-1007, 2015 WL 

3953112, at *5–6 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2015).

Likewise, in order to make out a false arrest claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate 

that police lacked probable cause to arrest. Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 

628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995). Thus, proof that probable cause was lacking is essential to 

any § 1983 claim arising out of the arrest or detention of an individual. For purposes 

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of the Fourth Amendment, probable cause to arrest exists “whenever reasonably 

trustworthy information or circumstances within a police officer's knowledge are 

sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has 

been committed by the person being arrested.” U.S. v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d 

Cir. 2002) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). An arrest by a police officer 

without a warrant “is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is 

probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.” 

Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). In conducting an inquiry into 

whether probable cause to arrest existed, a court should consider the totality of the 

circumstances presented, and “must assess the knowledge and information which the 

officers possessed at the time of arrest, coupled with the factual occurrences 

immediately precipitating the arrest.” United States v. Stubbs, 281 F.3d 109, 122 (3d 

Cir. 2002).

Although “[t]he probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or 

quantification,” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003), all interpretations of 

probable cause require “a belief of guilt that is reasonable as opposed to certain.” 

Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Hill v.

California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971)). Probable cause “does not require the same 

type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to support 

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a conviction.” Wright, 409 F.3d at 602 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 

149 (1972)). Accordingly, the evidentiary standard for probable cause is significantly 

lower than that required for conviction. Id. (citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 

31, 36 (1979)); see also Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding 

that probable cause requires only a “fair probability” that a person committed the 

relevant crime). Because an arrest is made with probable cause if at the moment it 

was made the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge “were sufficient 

to warrant a prudent man in believing that [the suspect] had committed or was 

committing an offense,” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964), the constitutional 

validity of an arrest does not turn on whether the suspect actually committed any 

crime. Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2003).

Thus, “[t]he determination that probable cause exists is fundamentally a factual 

analysis that must be performed by officers at the scene. It is the function of the court 

to determine whether the objective facts available to the officers at the time of arrest 

were sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that an offense was being committed.” 

United States v. Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197, 1206 (3d Cir. 1984). Although officers on 

the scene may draw inferences and make deductions that might elude an untrained 

person, United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981), “an officer's inferences 

and deductions can only justify a warrantless arrest if the government satisfies its 

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burden of establishing the probable cause necessary to support the arrest.” Myers, 

308 F.3d at 255. 

In this case, Castello’s Fourth Amendment allegations of false arrest and false 

imprisonment are fatally flawed in a fundamental way: the plaintiff has alleged no 

facts whatsoever which would support a claim that the responding officers plainly 

lacked probable cause to arrest him, and he was ultimately convicted of the crimes 

for which he was arrested. Given these immutable facts, these claims also fail and 

will be dismissed.

An appropriate order follows.

S/ Martin C. Carlson 

 Martin C. Carlson 

 United States Magistrate Judge

DATED: December 2nd, 2024

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