1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

SAMUEL BLAUCH, : Civil No. 1:23-CV-1073 

 : 

 Plaintiff : 

 : 

 v. : (Magistrate Judge Carlson) 

 : 

MARTIN O’MALLEY,

1

 : 

Commissioner of Social Security, : 

 : 

 Defendant. : 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction 

Samuel Blauch was in his mid-twenties at the time of the alleged onset of his 

disability, a disability claim based upon a diagnosis that he experienced an autism 

spectrum disorder. Despite this diagnosis, Blauch had attained a bachelor’s degree 

in college. He had lived independently for a period of time in Washington, D.C. 

Blauch had also gone for several years during this period of alleged disability 

without any significant treatment or counseling for this autism spectrum disorder 

which was undetected and undiagnosed. Moreover, during a substantial period of 

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 Martin O’Malley became the Commissioner of Social Security on 

December 20, 2023. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Martin O’Malley is substituted for Kilolo 

Kijakazi as the defendant in this suit. 

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time encompassed by his disability claim, Blauch was actually employed as a front 

end associate in a grocery store. Three medical experts assessed the severity of the 

impact of Blauch’s autism diagnosis upon his ability to meet the mental demands of 

the workplace. While the results of these assessments differed somewhat from one 

another, the common thread in the assessments was the conclusion that this diagnosis 

did not completely preclude Blauch from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 

Given this information, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assigned to review 

Blauch’s case denied his claim for disability benefits finding that he could perform 

work limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks in a work environment free from 

fast-paced production involving only simple work-related decisions with few, if any, 

workplace changes, no interaction with the public, occasional interaction with 

coworkers but no tandem tasks, and occasional supervision. (Tr. 22). 

Blauch now challenges this decision arguing that the ALJ erred in assessing 

his severe and non-severe impairments, and in evaluating the medical opinion 

evidence. In considering these arguments, we are enjoined to apply a deferential 

standard of review, a standard of review which simply asks whether there is 

“substantial evidence” supporting the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) 

determination. With respect to this legal guidepost, as the Supreme Court has 

explained: 

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The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout 

administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency 

factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. ––––, ––––, 

135 S. Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantialevidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record 

and asks whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the 

agency’s factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 

305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis 

deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts, 

the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial 

evidence, this Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see, 

e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). It means—and means only—“such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S. Ct. 206. See Dickinson v. 

Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S. Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999) 

(comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearlyerroneous standard). 

Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). 

In the instant case, after a review of the record, and mindful of the fact that 

substantial evidence “means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,’” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154, we 

find that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings in this case. Therefore, 

for the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the decision of the Commissioner. 

II. Statement of Facts and of the Case 

A. Blauch’s Social, Educational, and Clinical History 

On June 14, 2021, Samuel Blauch filed applications for a period of disability 

and disability insurance benefits as well as for supplemental security income 

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pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. (Tr. 17). In both 

applications, Blauch alleged disability beginning July 1, 2019, due to a diagnosis of 

autism spectrum disorder. (Id.) Blauch was born in May of 1993, (Tr. 40), and was 

in his mid-twenties at the time of the alleged onset of his disability, making him a 

younger worker under the Commissioner’s regulations. (Tr. 28). 

Prior to the date of his alleged onset of disability, Blauch had demonstrated 

the ability to function independently at a high level. Thus, he had graduated from 

Mount St. Mary’s University earning a bachelor’s degree in political science in 2016. 

(Tr. 41-43, 47). Following his graduation, from 2018 through 2019 Blauch had lived 

away from home working for a nonprofit organization. (Tr. 45). At the time of his 

disability hearing, Blauch was residing with his parents and siblings. (Tr. 41). By his 

own account, Blauch was able to address his daily needs. He could dress and care 

for himself, prepare simple meals, read, use a computer, drive, and shop. (Tr. 42, 

242-252). 

While Blauch alleged that he had become disabled due to his autism spectrum 

disorder in July of 2019, the evidence reveals that this condition remained 

undetected and untreated for nearly two years throughout 2019 and 2020. Instead, 

Blauch was first diagnosed on the autism spectrum on March 30, 2021, when Dr. 

Melissa Hertrich at the Wellspan Center for Autism and Developmental Disabilities 

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conducted an evaluation of Blauch. (Tr. 289-98). That evaluation concluded that 

Blauch was experiencing an autism spectrum disorder “ although he is clearly high 

functioning.” (Tr. 293). Following this diagnosis, Blauch met with caregivers at 

Wellspan who recommended individual and family therapy and placed him on a 

Wellspan therapy waiting list. (Tr. 357). Recognizing the value of work for Blauch, 

Wellspan officials also recommended that he learn more about the Pennsylvania 

Office of Vocational Rehabilitation (OVR), which helps individuals with disabilities 

prepare for, obtain, or keep suitable employment. (Tr. 360). As of the date of 

Blauch’s August 2022 disability hearing, it was reported that he was still in the 

process of following up on this recommendation. (Tr. 53). Beyond these initial 

clinical encounters addressing his 2021 autism diagnosis, the medical record 

reflected no further counseling or treatment for this condition. 

The administrative record did reveal, however, that Blauch had actually been 

employed for up to thirty hours per week as a front end associate cart handler at a 

local grocery store from October 2021 through 2022. (Tr. 19-20, 41, 200-01). When 

questioned about this employment at his disability hearing, Blauch explained that he 

had obtained this job through an organization, Americans with Disabilities, stated 

that he worked thirty hours per week, and acknowledged that he could “probably” 

do ten more hours of work each week. (Tr. 41). 

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B. Medical Opinion Evidence 

No treating source has opined that Blauch’s autism is disabling. Instead, three 

non-treating sources have expressed opinions regarding the degree of impairment 

experienced by Blauch. While these three opinions differ somewhat, they all share a 

common theme. None of the opinions describe the severity of Blauch’s condition as 

wholly disabling and, for the most part, they characterize him as suffering from no 

more than moderate impairment in some spheres of workplace functioning. 

Blauch was initially evaluated in September of 2021 by Dr. John Gavazzi, a 

non-treating, non-examining state agency expert. (Tr. 61-67). At that time Dr. 

Gavazzi characterized Blauch’s autism as a severe impairment, (Tr. 63), but 

determined that Blauch was mildly impaired with respect to his ability to understand, 

remember, apply information as well as adapt to workplace changes and interact 

with others. (Tr. 64-65). Dr. Gavazzi found that Blauch was moderately impaired in 

terms of his ability to adapt, interact with others, and manage himself. (Tr. 64). 

However, according to the doctor Blauch was not significantly limited in many areas 

of workplace activity, including: The ability to be aware of normal hazards and take 

appropriate precautions; the ability to travel in unfamiliar places or use public 

transportation; the ability to set realistic goals or make plans independently of others; 

the ability to ask simple questions or request assistance; and the ability to maintain 

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socially appropriate behavior and to adhere to basic standards of neatness and 

cleanliness. (Tr. 64). Given these findings, Dr. Gavazzi concluded that Blauch could 

“perform one- or two-step, routine tasks in a stable environment.” (Tr. 66). 

Four months later, on January 26, 2022, a consulting examining source, Dr. 

Leah Bielski, rendered a second opinion regarding Blauch’s limitations and 

capabilities. (Tr. 470-76). Dr. Bielski’s report of this examination noted that Blauch 

had completed a bachelor’s degree and was working thirty hours per week as a cart 

attendant at a grocery store. (Tr. 470). Upon examination, Dr. Bielski found that 

Blauch’s speech was fluent; his insight and judgment were good; his thought 

processes were coherent and goal oriented; and his intellectual functioning was 

average. (Tr. 471-72). Dr. Bielski determined that Blauch was mildly impaired in 

terms of his ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions and 

make simple workplace decisions. (Tr. 474). According to the doctor, Blauch would 

face moderate impairments when it came to complex decision-making, as well as 

interacting with the public, coworkers, and supervisors. (Tr. 474-75). Only in the 

arena of responding to workplace changes in routine did Dr. Bielski deem Blauch to 

be markedly impaired. 

Finally, On February 2, 2022, a non-examining state agency expert, Dr. 

Edward Jonas, provided a third assessment of Blauch’s ability to meet the 

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intellectual and emotional demands of the workplace. (Tr. 75-83). This assessment 

took into account the full body of clinical evidence as well as all of the prior medical 

opinions. (Id.) In this regard, Dr. Jonas found Dr. Bielski’s opinion to be only 

partially persuasive since it overstated Blauch’s adaptation impairments. (Id.) Given 

the overall paucity of clinical evidence, Dr. Jonas indicated that there was 

insufficient evidence to fully assess at Step 3 Blauch’s ability to understand, 

remember, or apply information; interact with others; concentrate, persist, or 

maintain pace; and adapt or manage himself. (Tr. 78). However, Dr. Jonas went on 

to opine that Blauch presented as moderately impaired with respect to his ability to 

understand, remember, or apply information; interact with others; concentrate, 

persist, or maintain pace; and adapt or manage himself. (Id.) The doctor also 

determined that Blauch was moderately impaired in his ability to understand and 

remember detailed instructions; interact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public; 

or complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions and perform at 

a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. (Tr. 

81-82). However, the doctor found that Blauch was not significantly impaired in 

multiple spheres of workplace conduct, including: The ability to carry out very short 

and simple instructions; the ability to carry out detailed instructions; the ability to 

maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; the ability to perform 

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activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within 

customary tolerances; the ability to sustain an ordinary routine without special 

supervision; the ability to work in coordination with or in proximity to others without 

being distracted by them; the ability to make simple work-related decisions; the 

ability to be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate precautions; the ability to 

travel in unfamiliar places or use public transportation; and the ability to set realistic 

goals or make plans independently of others. (Id.) 

Having made these findings Dr. Jonas concluded that Blauch: 

[I]s able to carry out short, simple instructions. He can make simple 

decisions. He appears able to accept instruction and to carry out 

directives. Stress tolerance is somewhat limited. The functional 

limitations resulting from the claimant's MH impairments do not 

preclude him from meeting the basic mental demands of simple routine 

tasks on a sustained basis. 

(Tr. 82). 

C. The ALJ Hearing and Decision

It was against this equivocal medical backdrop that Blauch’s disability claim 

came to be heard by the ALJ on August 16, 2022. (Tr. 36-58). At the hearing, Blauch, 

his mother, and a Vocational Expert testified. (Id.) In his testimony, Blauch 

acknowledged working thirty hours per week at a local grocery store. (Tr. 41). When 

asked by the ALJ if he could perform another ten hours a week, Blauch stated: “I 

think I probably could do it.” (Id.) In her testimony, Blauch’s mother emphasized 

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the degree to which her son’s autism impaired his ability to adapt to workplace 

changes, but described this impairment in terms which were less than fully disabling, 

stating that Blauch would become a “little agitated” when confronted by change. (Tr. 

50). 

Following this hearing, on September 1, 2022, the ALJ issued a decision 

denying Blauch’s application for benefits. (Tr. 17-30). In that decision, the ALJ first 

concluded that Blauch met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act 

through September 30, 2023. (Tr. 19). The ALJ determined that Blauch had, in fact, 

engaged in substantial gainful activity from October 2021 through the present but 

prior to October 2021 there had been a continuous twelve-month period during 

which the claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity. (Tr. 19-20). 

At Step 2 of the sequential analysis that governs Social Security cases, the 

ALJ found that Blauch’s autism was a severe impairment. (Tr. 20). At Step 3, the 

ALJ determined that Blauch did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed 

impairments. (Tr. 20-22). 

Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ fashioned a residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”), considering Blauch’s limitations from his impairment, stating that: 

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds 

that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full 

Case 3:23-cv-01073-MCC Document 15 Filed 11/26/24 Page 10 of 37
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range of work at all exertional levels but with the following 

nonexertional limitations: work is limited to simple, routine, repetitive 

tasks in a work environment free from fast-paced production involving 

only simple work-related decisions with few, if any, workplace 

changes, no interaction with the public, occasional interaction with 

coworkers but no tandem tasks, occasional supervision. 

(Tr. 22). 

Specifically, in making the RFC determination, the ALJ considered the sparse 

clinical evidence, the medical opinions, and Blauch’s self-described activities. In 

particular, the ALJ observed that: 

At the hearing on August 16, 2022, the claimant testified that he lives 

with his parents and his two siblings. They have a pet dog and he 

sometimes helps take care of it. He currently has a part-time job at the 

grocery store as a cart handler; he works about 30 hours per week. He 

thinks that if they needed him to work 10 more hours a week, then he 

could do it. He can dress and shower by himself. He can use a 

microwave and an oven. Sometimes he does grocery shopping. He does 

not vacuum, sweep, or do the laundry or dishes. He sometimes takes 

out the trash if he is asked. He has a driver’s license and drives to work, 

to the gas station, and to his friend’s house about 10 minutes away; he 

sees his friend once or twice a month. He has a checking account that 

he shares with his mother but he does not write checks; he has only 

written a check maybe one time. He uses a debit card. His mother 

maintains the balance on his checking account. He lived away from 

home for a year from around 2018 to 2019 while he was volunteering 

at a non-profit in D.C. He used to work at Goodwill where he sorted 

through donations but he was fired because he was not fast enough. He 

noted that the job he has now allows him to work alone and at his own 

pace. He confirmed that he spends a lot of things for which he has an 

obsessive interest and thus will “let other things go.” 

(Tr. 23). 

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The ALJ also carefully evaluated the medical opinions, none of which found 

Blauch’s autism to be wholly disabling, stating that: 

The undersigned has fully considered the medical opinions and prior 

administrative medical findings as follows: 

At the request of Disability Determination Services (DDS), the 

claimant’s records were reviewed by John David Gavazzi, Psy.D., on 

September 10, 2021, when the claim was at the initial level of 

consideration. On February 2, 2022, Edward A. Jonas, Ph.D., 

independently reviewed the records when the claim was at the 

reconsideration level. Dr. Gavazzi found a severe mental impairment 

and opined that for the current evaluation, the claimant has a mild 

limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information, a 

moderate limitation in interacting with others, a mild limitation in 

concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and a moderate 

limitation in adapting or managing oneself, while Dr. Jonas found 

insufficient evidence through the date last insured of September 30, 

2021 but opined that the claimant has moderate limitations in all areas 

of mental functioning. Dr. Jonas also opined that the claimant can meet 

the basic mental demands of simple routine tasks on a sustained basis 

(Exs. 3A; 4A; 5A; 8A). 

Dr. Gavazzi’s opinion is supported by citations to relevant evidence 

showing an impairment of autism spectrum disorder level 1 but 

functional activities of daily living, completion of college level courses, 

and no prescriptions for psychotropic agents or inpatient psychiatric 

admissions (Exs. 3A/5-6; 4A/5-6). However, it is not consistent with 

subsequent evidence, including Exhibit 9F, which was reviewed by Dr. 

Jonas and established some limitations in interpersonal functioning and 

stress (Exs. 5A/5; 8A/5). As support for his finding of insufficient 

evidence, Dr. Jonas explained that the claimant was last seen by a 

treatment provider in around May 2021 and that there was no detailed 

mental status examination prior to and proximal to the date last insured 

(Exs. 5A/4; 8A/4). This opinion is not consistent with recent earnings 

that extend the claimant’s date last insured to September 30, 2023 (Ex. 

8D), with a file that contains medical records from March 2020 through 

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June 2022. However, Dr. Jonas’s opinion as to the current evaluation is 

consistent with evidence received at the hearing level that confirms 

limitations due to the claimant’s autism but no recent treatment (Exs. 

5F; 10F). Therefore, Dr. Gavazzi’s opinion is unpersuasive, while Dr. 

Jonas’s opinion is partially persuasive. 

At the request of DDS, the claimant’s records were reviewed by State 

agency medical consultants who opined that there are no severe 

physical impairments (Exs. 3A; 4A; 5A; 8A). The undersigned finds 

these opinions to be persuasive because they are supported by citations 

to relevant evidence demonstrating the claimant’s asthma has been 

asymptomatic for many years with normal respiratory exams, no 

significant physical limitations alleged, and no recent treatment for 

asthma (Exs. 3A/3; 4A/3; 5A/3; 8A/3). They are also consistent with 

evidence received at the hearing level that shows no recent medical 

treatment for any physical impairment (Exs. 5F; 6F; 7F; 10F; 11F). 

The opinion of consultative examiner Leah Bielski, Psy.D., at Exhibit 

9F is somewhat supported by the claimant’s presentation during the 

evaluation and his performance on mental status testing. The claimant 

reported feeling apathetic and he had poor eye contact as well as a flat 

affect. However, he was cooperative. His recent and remote memory 

skills were mildly impaired but his attention and concentration were 

intact. His intellectual functioning was estimated to be average and his 

general fund of knowledge was appropriate to experience. Furthermore, 

his insight and judgment were good (Ex. 9F/4-5). It is unclear why Dr. 

Bielski opined that the claimant has a marked limitation in responding 

appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work 

setting, other than merely indicating that the claimant has autism 

spectrum disorder (Ex. 9F/8). The claimant reported that he is able to 

dress, bathe, and groom himself on a daily basis. He does cleaning as 

needed. He is able to manage his money and drive (Ex. 9F/5). Dr. 

Bielski’s opinion is, at most, partially consistent with the other medical 

evidence of record that establishes no more than moderate limitations 

in all areas of mental functioning including adapting or managing 

oneself (Exs. 1F; 2F; 4F; 5F; 10F). Accordingly, Dr. Bielski’s opinion 

is only partially persuasive. 

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(Tr. 26-27). 

 Having arrived at this RFC assessment, the ALJ found at Step 4 that Blauch 

could perform his past relevant work at the grocery and concluded at Step 5 that 

there were other jobs which existed in substantial numbers in the national economy 

which Blauch could perform. (Tr. 28-29). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that 

Blauch did not meet the stringent standard for disability set by the Act and denied 

this claim. (Tr. 30). 

This appeal followed. (Doc. 1). On appeal, Blauch contends that the ALJ erred 

in his assessment of Blauch’s severe impairment, autism; failed to adequately 

consider other nonsevere medical conditions; and neglected to adopt all of Dr. 

Bielski’s findings when crafting the RFC in this case. This case is fully briefed and 

is, therefore, ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the 

decision of the Commissioner. 

III. Discussion 

A. Substantial Evidence Review – the Role of this Court

 When reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s 

application for benefits, this Court’s review is limited to the question of whether the 

findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial evidence in the 

record. See 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 

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(3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp.2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012). 

Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but 

rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Substantial 

evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not 

substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a 

conflict created by the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 

1993). But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be 

“something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two 

inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision] 

from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 

383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In determining if the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” 

Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). 

The Supreme Court has recently underscored for us the limited scope of our 

review in this field, noting that: 

The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout 

administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency 

factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. ––––, ––––, 

135 S.Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantialCase 3:23-cv-01073-MCC Document 15 Filed 11/26/24 Page 15 of 37
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evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record 

and asks whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the 

agency's factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 

305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis 

deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts, 

the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial 

evidence, this Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see, 

e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). It means—and means only—“such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S.Ct. 206. See Dickinson v. 

Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999) 

(comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearlyerroneous standard). 

Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154. 

The question before this Court, therefore, is not whether the claimant is 

disabled, but rather whether the Commissioner’s finding that she is not disabled is 

supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application 

of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, 

at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote 

a lack of substantial evidence”) (alterations omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F. 

Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The Secretary’s determination as to the status of 

a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v. 

Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal 

matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp.2d at 536 (“[T]he court has plenary review 

of all legal issues . . . .”). 

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Several fundamental legal propositions which flow from this deferential 

standard of review. First, when conducting this review “we are mindful that we must 

not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 

F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d 

Cir. 2005)). Thus, we are enjoined to refrain from trying to re-weigh the evidence. 

Rather our task is to simply determine whether substantial evidence supported the 

ALJ’s findings. However, we must also ascertain whether the ALJ’s decision meets 

the burden of articulation demanded by the courts to enable informed judicial 

review. Simply put, “this Court requires the ALJ to set forth the reasons for his 

decision.” Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000). 

As the Court of Appeals has noted on this score: 

In Burnett, we held that an ALJ must clearly set forth the reasons for 

his decision. 220 F.3d at 119. Conclusory statements . . . are 

insufficient. The ALJ must provide a “discussion of the evidence” and 

an “explanation of reasoning” for his conclusion sufficient to enable 

meaningful judicial review. Id. at 120; see Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 

501, 505 & n. 3 (3d Cir.2004). The ALJ, of course, need not employ 

particular “magic” words: “Burnett does not require the ALJ to use 

particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his 

analysis.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505. 

Diaz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009). 

 Thus, in practice ours is a twofold task. We must evaluate the substance of the 

ALJ’s decision under a deferential standard of review, but we must also give that 

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decision careful scrutiny to ensure that the rationale for the ALJ’s actions is 

sufficiently articulated to permit meaningful judicial review. 

This principle applies with particular force to legal challenges, like the claim 

made here, based upon alleged inadequacies in the articulation of a claimant’s 

mental RFC. In Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 212 (3d Cir. 2019), the 

United States Court of Appeals recently addressed the standards of articulation that 

apply in this setting. In Hess, the court of appeals considered the question of whether 

an RFC, which limited a claimant to simple tasks, adequately addressed moderate 

limitations on concentration, persistence, and pace. In addressing the plaintiff’s 

argument that the language used by the ALJ to describe the claimant’s mental 

limitations was legally insufficient, the court of appeals rejected a per se rule which 

would require the ALJ to adhere to a particular format in conducting this analysis. 

Instead, framing this issue as a question of adequate articulation of the ALJ’s 

rationale, the court held that, “as long as the ALJ offers a ‘valid explanation,’ a 

‘simple tasks’ limitation is permitted after a finding that a claimant has ‘moderate’ 

difficulties in ‘concentration, persistence, or pace.’” Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 

F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2019). On this score, the appellate court indicated that an ALJ 

offers a valid explanation a mental RFC when the ALJ highlights factors such as 

“mental status examinations and reports that revealed that [the claimant] could 

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function effectively; opinion evidence showing that [the claimant] could do simple 

work; and [the claimant]’s activities of daily living, . . . . ” Hess v. Comm’r Soc. 

Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 214 (3d Cir. 2019). 

 In our view, the teachings of the Hess decision are straightforward. In 

formulating a mental RFC, the ALJ does not need to rely upon any particular form 

of words. Further, the adequacy of the mental RFC is not gauged in the abstract. 

Instead, the evaluation of a claimant’s ability to undertake the mental demands of 

the workplace will be viewed in the factual context of the case, and a mental RFC is 

sufficient if it is supported by a valid explanation grounded in the evidence. 

B. Initial Burdens of Proof, Persuasion, and Articulation for the ALJ 

To receive benefits under the Social Security Act by reason of disability, a 

claimant must demonstrate an inability to “engage in any substantial gainful activity 

by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can 

be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 

C.F.R. §404.1505(a). To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe 

physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous 

work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. 42 

U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. §404.1505(a). To receive benefits under Title II of 

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20 

the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she contributed to the 

insurance program, is under retirement age, and became disabled prior to the date on 

which he or she was last insured. 42 U.S.C. §423(a); 20 C.F.R. §404.131(a). 

In making this determination at the administrative level, the ALJ follows a 

five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a). Under this process, 

the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in 

substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) 

whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether 

the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant 

is able to do any other work, considering his or her age, education, work experience 

and residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4). 

Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ must also assess a claimant’s residual 

functional capacity (RFC). RFC is defined as “that which an individual is still able 

to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).” Burnett v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. 

§§404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1). In making this assessment, the ALJ considers all of 

the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including any non-severe 

impairments identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her analysis. 20 C.F.R. 

§404.1545(a)(2). 

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21 

There is an undeniable medical aspect to an RFC determination, since that 

determination entails an assessment of what work the claimant can do given the 

physical limitations that the claimant experiences. Yet, when considering the role 

and necessity of medical opinion evidence in making this determination, courts have 

followed several different paths. Some courts emphasize the importance of medical 

opinion support for an RFC determination and have suggested that “[r]arely can a 

decision be made regarding a claimant's residual functional capacity without an 

assessment from a physician regarding the functional abilities of the claimant.” 

Biller v. Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 962 F. Supp. 2d 761, 778–79 (W.D. Pa. 2013) 

(quoting Gormont v. Astrue, Civ. No. 11–2145, 2013 WL 791455 at *7 (M.D. Pa. 

Mar. 4, 2013)). In other instances, it has been held that: “There is no legal 

requirement that a physician have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts 

in the course of determining an RFC.” Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App’x 6, 11 

(3d Cir. 2006). Further, courts have held in cases where there is no evidence of any 

credible medical opinion supporting a claimant’s allegations of disability that “the 

proposition that an ALJ must always base his RFC on a medical opinion from a 

physician is misguided.” Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214–15 (W.D. 

Pa. 2015). 

Case 3:23-cv-01073-MCC Document 15 Filed 11/26/24 Page 21 of 37
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These seemingly discordant legal propositions can be reconciled by 

evaluation of the factual context of these decisions. Those cases which emphasize 

the importance of medical opinion support for an RFC assessment typically arise in 

the factual setting where a well-supported medical source has identified limitations 

that would support a disability claim, but an ALJ has rejected the medical opinion 

which supported a disability determination based upon a lay assessment of other 

evidence. Biller, 962 F.Supp.2d at 778–79. In this setting, these cases simply restate 

the commonplace idea that medical opinions are entitled to careful consideration 

when making a disability determination, particularly when those opinions support a 

finding of disability. In contrast, when an ALJ is relying upon other evidence, such 

as contrasting clinical or opinion evidence or testimony regarding the claimant’s 

activities of daily living, to fashion an RFC courts have adopted a more pragmatic 

view and have sustained the ALJ’s exercise of independent judgment based upon all 

of the facts and evidence. See Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App'x 6, 11 (3d Cir. 

2006); Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214–15 (W.D. Pa. 2015). In either 

event, once the ALJ has made this determination, our review of the ALJ's assessment 

of the plaintiff's RFC is deferential, and that RFC assessment will not be set aside if 

it is supported by substantial evidence. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d 

Cir. 2002); see also Metzger v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1483328, at 

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*5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Metzgar 

v. Colvin, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1479426 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2017); Rathbun 

v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-00301, 2018 WL 1514383, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 

2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-301, 2018 WL 1479366 

(M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2018). 

At Steps 1 through 4, the claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating 

the existence of a medically determinable impairment that prevents him or her in 

engaging in any of his or her past relevant work. Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. Once this 

burden has been met by the claimant, it shifts to the Commissioner at Step 5 to show 

that jobs exist in significant number in the national economy that the claimant could 

perform that are consistent with the claimant’s age, education, work experience and 

RFC. 20 C.F.R. §404.1512(f); Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. 

The ALJ’s disability determination must also meet certain basic substantive 

requisites. Most significant among these legal benchmarks is a requirement that the 

ALJ adequately explain the legal and factual basis for this disability determination. 

Thus, in order to facilitate review of the decision under the substantial evidence 

standard, the ALJ's decision must be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory 

explication of the basis on which it rests.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d 

Cir. 1981). Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved and the ALJ must indicate 

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which evidence was accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for 

rejecting certain evidence. Id. at 706-07. In addition, “[t]he ALJ must indicate in his 

decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis for 

his finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999). 

C. Legal Benchmarks for the ALJ’s Assessment of Medical Opinions 

The plaintiff filed this disability application after a paradigm shift in the 

manner in which medical opinions were evaluated when assessing Social Security 

claims. Prior to March 2017, ALJs were required to follow regulations which defined 

medical opinions narrowly and created a hierarchy of medical source opinions with 

treating sources at the apex of this hierarchy. However, in March of 2017, the 

Commissioner’s regulations governing medical opinions changed in a number of 

fundamental ways. The range of opinions that ALJs were enjoined to consider were 

broadened substantially, and the approach to evaluating opinions was changed from 

a hierarchical form of review to a more holistic analysis. As one court as aptly 

observed: 

The regulations regarding the evaluation of medical evidence have been 

amended for claims filed after March 27, 2017, and several of the prior 

Social Security Rulings, including SSR 96-2p, have been rescinded. 

According to the new regulations, the Commissioner “will no longer 

give any specific evidentiary weight to medical opinions; this includes 

giving controlling weight to any medical opinion.” Revisions to Rules 

Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence (“Revisions to Rules”), 

2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, at 5867–68 (Jan. 18, 2017), see 

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20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Instead, the Commissioner 

must consider all medical opinions and “evaluate their persuasiveness” 

based on the following five factors: supportability; consistency; 

relationship with the claimant; specialization; and “other factors.” 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)-(c), 416.920c(a)-(c). 

Although the new regulations eliminate the perceived hierarchy of 

medical sources, deference to specific medical opinions, and assigning 

“weight” to a medical opinion, the ALJ must still “articulate how [he 

or she] considered the medical opinions” and “how persuasive [he or 

she] find[s] all of the medical opinions.” Id. at §§ 404.1520c(a) and 

(b)(1), 416.920c(a) and (b)(1). The two “most important factors for 

determining the persuasiveness of medical opinions are consistency and 

supportability,” which are the “same factors” that formed the 

foundation of the treating source rule. Revisions to Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. 

5844-01 at 5853. 

An ALJ is specifically required to “explain how [he or she] considered 

the supportability and consistency factors” for a medical opinion. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c (b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). With respect to 

“supportability,” the new regulations provide that “[t]he more relevant 

the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented 

by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior 

administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical 

opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id. at §§ 

404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). The regulations provide that with 

respect to “consistency,” “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or 

prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other 

medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more 

persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical 

finding(s) will be.” Id. at §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2). 

Under the new regulations an ALJ must consider, but need not 

explicitly discuss, the three remaining factors in determining the 

persuasiveness of a medical source's opinion. Id. at §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 

416.920c(b)(2). However, where the ALJ has found two or more 

medical opinions to be equally well supported and consistent with the 

record, but not exactly the same, the ALJ must articulate how he or she 

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considered those factors contained in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5). 

Id. at §§ 404.1520c(b)(3), 416.920c(b)(3). 

Andrew G. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:19-CV-0942 (ML), 2020 WL 5848776, at 

*5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020). 

 Oftentimes, as in this case, an ALJ must evaluate various medical opinions. 

Judicial review of this aspect of ALJ decision-making is still guided by several 

settled legal tenets. First, when presented with a disputed factual record, it is wellestablished that “[t]he ALJ – not treating or examining physicians or State agency 

consultants – must make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations.” Chandler 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011). Thus, when evaluating 

medical opinions “the ALJ may choose whom to credit but ‘cannot reject evidence 

for no reason or for the wrong reason.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d 

Cir. 2000) (quoting Mason, 994 F.2d at 1066). Therefore, provided that the decision 

is accompanied by an adequate, articulated rationale, it is the province and the duty 

of the ALJ to choose which medical opinions and evidence deserve greater weight. 

 Further, in making this assessment of medical evidence: 

An ALJ is [also] entitled generally to credit parts of an opinion without 

crediting the entire opinion. See Thackara v. Colvin, No. 1:14–CV–

00158–GBC, 2015 WL 1295956, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2015); 

Turner v. Colvin, 964 F. Supp. 2d 21, 29 (D.D.C. 2013) (agreeing that 

“SSR 96–2p does not prohibit the ALJ from crediting some parts of a 

treating source's opinion and rejecting other portions”); Connors v. 

Astrue, No. 10–CV–197–PB, 2011 WL 2359055, at *9 (D.N.H. June 

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10, 2011). It follows that an ALJ can give partial credit to all medical 

opinions and can formulate an RFC based on different parts from the 

different medical opinions. See e.g., Thackara v. Colvin, No. 1:14–CV–

00158–GBC, 2015 WL 1295956, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2015). 

Durden v. Colvin, 191 F.Supp.3d 429, 455 (M.D. Pa. 2016). Finally, where there is 

no evidence of any credible medical opinion supporting a claimant’s allegations of 

disability “the proposition that an ALJ must always base his RFC on a medical 

opinion from a physician is misguided.” Cummings, 129 F.Supp.3d at 214–15. 

D. Legal Benchmarks for the ALJ’s Assessment of a Claimant’s 

Alleged Symptoms 

The interplay between the deferential substantive standard of review that 

governs Social Security appeals, and the requirement that courts carefully assess 

whether an ALJ has met the standards of articulation required by law, is also 

illustrated by those cases which consider analysis of a claimant’s reported pain. 

When evaluating lay testimony regarding a claimant’s reported degree of pain and 

disability, we are reminded that: 

[T]he ALJ must necessarily make certain credibility determinations, 

and this Court defers to the ALJ's assessment of credibility. See Diaz v. 

Comm'r, 577 F.3d 500, 506 (3d Cir.2009) (“In determining whether 

there is substantial evidence to support an administrative law judge's 

decision, we owe deference to his evaluation of the evidence [and] 

assessment of the credibility of witnesses....”). However, the ALJ must 

specifically identify and explain what evidence he found not credible 

and why he found it not credible. Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d 

Cir.1994) (citing Stewart v. Sec'y of Health, Education and Welfare,

714 F.2d 287, 290 (3d Cir.1983)); see also Stout v. Comm'r, 454 F.3d 

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1050, 1054 (9th Cir.2006) (stating that an ALJ is required to provide 

“specific reasons for rejecting lay testimony”). An ALJ cannot reject 

evidence for an incorrect or unsupported reason. Ray v. Astrue, 649 

F.Supp.2d 391, 402 (E.D.Pa.2009) (quoting Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 

1058, 1066 (3d Cir.1993)). 

Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 612–13 (3d Cir. 2014). 

Yet, it is also clear that: 

Great weight is given to a claimant's subjective testimony only when it 

is supported by competent medical evidence. Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 

606 F.2d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1979); accord Snedeker v. Comm'r of Soc. 

Sec., 244 Fed.Appx. 470, 474 (3d Cir. 2007). An ALJ may reject a 

claimant's subjective testimony that is not found credible so long as 

there is an explanation for the rejection of the testimony. Social 

Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96–7p; Schaudeck v. Comm'r of Social 

Security, 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999). Where an ALJ finds that 

there is an underlying medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the 

individual's pain or other symptoms, however, the severity of which is 

not substantiated by objective medical evidence, the ALJ must make a 

finding on the credibility of the individual's statements based on a 

consideration of the entire case record. 

McKean v. Colvin, 150 F.Supp.3d 406, 415–16 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (footnotes omitted). 

Thus, we are instructed to review an ALJ’s evaluation of a claimant’s subjective 

reports of pain under a standard of review which is deferential with respect to the 

ALJ’s well-articulated findings but imposes a duty of clear articulation upon the ALJ 

so that we may conduct meaningful review of the ALJ’s conclusions. 

In the same fashion that medical opinion evidence is evaluated, the Social 

Security Rulings and Regulations provide a framework under which the severity of 

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a claimant's reported symptoms are to be considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 

416.929; SSR 16–3p. It is important to note that though the “statements of the 

individual concerning his or her symptoms must be carefully considered, the ALJ is 

not required to credit them.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 363 

(3d. Cir. 2011) (referencing 20 C.F.R. §404.1529(a) (“statements about your pain or 

other symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled”). It is well settled in 

the Third Circuit that “[a]llegations of pain and other subjective symptoms must be 

supported by objective medical evidence.” Hantraft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d 

Cir. 1999) (referring to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529). When evaluating a claimant’s 

symptoms, the ALJ must follow a two-step process in which the ALJ resolves 

whether a medically determinable impairment could be the cause of the symptoms 

alleged by the claimant, and subsequently must evaluate the alleged symptoms in 

consideration of the record as a whole. SSR 16-3p. 

First, symptoms, such as pain or fatigue, will only be considered to affect a 

claimant's ability to perform work activities if such symptoms result from an 

underlying physical or mental impairment that has been demonstrated to exist by 

medical signs or laboratory findings. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b); SSR 

16–3p. During the second step of this credibility assessment, the ALJ must determine 

whether the claimant's statements about the intensity, persistence, or functionally 

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limiting effects of his or her symptoms are substantiated based on the ALJ's 

evaluation of the entire case record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c), 416.929(c); SSR 16–

3p. This includes but is not limited to medical signs and laboratory findings, 

diagnoses, and other medical opinions provided by treating or examining sources, 

and other medical sources, as well as information concerning the claimant's 

symptoms and how they affect his or her ability to work. Id. The Social Security 

Administration has recognized that individuals may experience their symptoms 

differently and may be limited by their symptoms to a greater or lesser extent than 

other individuals with the same medical impairments, signs, and laboratory findings. 

SSR 16–3p. 

Thus, to assist in the evaluation of a claimant's subjective symptoms, the 

Social Security Regulations identify seven factors which may be relevant to the 

assessment of the severity or limiting effects of a claimant's impairment based on a 

claimant's symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). These factors 

include: activities of daily living; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of 

the claimant's symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, 

effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the claimant takes or has taken to 

alleviate his or her symptoms; treatment, other than medication that a claimant has 

received for relief; any measures the claimant has used to relieve his or her 

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symptoms; and, any other factors concerning the claimant's functional limitations 

and restrictions. Id.; see Koppenaver v. Berryhill, No. 3:18-CV-1525, 2019 WL 

1995999, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2019), report and recommendation adopted sub 

nom. Koppenhaver v. Berryhill, No. 3:18-CV-1525, 2019 WL 1992130 (M.D. Pa. 

May 6, 2019); Martinez v. Colvin, No. 3:14-CV-1090, 2015 WL 5781202, at *8–9 

(M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2015); George v. Colvin, No. 4:13–CV–2803, 2014 WL 

5449706, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2014). 

E. The ALJ’s Decision is Supported by Substantial Evidence. 

In this setting, we are mindful that we are not free to substitute our 

independent assessment of the evidence for the ALJ’s determinations. Rather, we 

must simply ascertain whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence, a quantum of proof which is less than a preponderance of the evidence but 

more than a mere scintilla, Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401, and “does not mean a large 

or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce, 487 U.S. 

at 565. Judged against these deferential standards of review, we are constrained to 

find that substantial evidence supported the decision by the ALJ that Blauch was not 

disabled. Therefore, we will affirm this decision. 

In reaching this result we note that the ALJ’s decision simply needed to credit 

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Blauch’s testimony to conclude that he was not disabled since Blauch testified under 

oath that he could probably work forty hours per week in his current profession as a 

front end grocery store associate. This admission, standing alone, provided 

substantial evidence supporting a finding that Blauch was not totally disabled. 

For his part, Blauch launches a threefold challenge to this disability 

determination. First, he argues that the ALJ did not adequately take into account his 

severe impairment—autism—in evaluating this disability claim. We disagree. Fairly 

read, the ALJ’s decision gave a comprehensive, balanced and thorough assessment 

of the severity of Blauch’s autism. This assessment, however, acknowledged several 

immutable facts. For example, the ALJ observed that Blauch’s autism was 

undetected for much of the period of alleged disability, a factor which suggested that 

the condition was not so patent and clear that it would have been wholly disabling. 

The ALJ also noted that Blauch was diagnosed as high functioning, a diagnosis that 

was fully in accord with his activities of daily living which included employment 

and attaining a bachelor’s degree. Further, the ALJ’s decision was completely 

consistent with the medical opinions which were found to be persuasive. Those 

opinions noted that Blauch’s autism, for the most part, imposed only mild to 

moderate limitations upon his ability to meet the demands of work. There was no 

error here. 

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Blauch’s second argument fares no better. On appeal Blauch contends that the 

ALJ erred in failing to address more fully what the plaintiff characterizes as 

nonsevere impairments like learning disabilities, anxiety, depression, isolation, flat 

affect, apathetic moods, and memory impairments. In our view, this argument 

confuses two distinct concepts: impairments and symptoms. In this regard, as one 

court has aptly observed: 

[A] legal distinction exists between the ALJ's treatment of symptoms

and impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1528. 

An impairment must result from anatomical, physiological, or 

psychological abnormalities which can be shown by medically 

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 20. C.F.R. § 

404.1508. “A physical or mental impairment must be established by 

medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory 

findings, not only by [the plaintiff's] statement of symptoms.” 

Id. The Social Security Administration defines signs, symptoms, and 

laboratory findings as follows: 

• Signs: are “anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities 

which can be observed, apart from your statements (symptoms). Signs 

must be shown by medically acceptable clinical diagnostic techniques.” 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1528(b). 

• Symptom: the individual's own description or statement of his or her 

physical or mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1528. The next 

sentence of the regulation clarifies: “[the plaintiff's] statements alone 

are not enough to establish that there is a physical or mental 

impairment.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1528(a); See Veal v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

618 F.Supp.2d 600, 606 (E.D. Tex. 2009). 

Case 3:23-cv-01073-MCC Document 15 Filed 11/26/24 Page 33 of 37
34 

Lundy v. Colvin, No. 6:14-CV-61-WSS-JCM, 2016 WL 11585712, at *4 (W.D. 

Tex. May 16, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. W-14-CV-61, 2016 

WL 11585707 (W.D. Tex. June 3, 2016). 

 In this case, the factors which Blauch characterizes as inadequately addressed 

impairments, appear instead to be symptoms of his autism. Indeed, Dr. Hertrich’s 

March 30, 2021, evaluation of Blauch expressly described many of these factors as 

symptoms of autism, rather than separate impairments. (Tr. 289-91). Given the 

doctor’s description of these factors as symptoms of autism, we find no error in the 

ALJ’s treatment of these matters. Consistent with Dr. Hertrich’s evaluation, these 

behavioral issues were properly encompassed within the autism diagnosis. There 

was no further duty of articulation and analysis that was needed here. 

 Finally, Blauch contends that the ALJ erred in assessing the medical opinion 

evidence and specifically argues that the ALJ incorrectly assigned greater persuasive 

power to the non-examining source opinion which were rendered without the benefit 

of the full clinical record. This final argument fails both as a matter of law and as a 

matter of fact. 

 First, as a matter of law, it is clear that “[t]he ALJ–not treating or examining 

physicians or State agency consultants–must make the ultimate disability and RFC 

determinations.” Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361. Further, in making this assessment of 

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35 

medical opinion evidence, “[a]n ALJ is [also] entitled generally to credit parts of an 

opinion without crediting the entire opinion.” Durden, 191 F.Supp.3d at 455. 

Moreover, “[s]tate agent opinions merit significant consideration,” in this disability 

analysis. Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361. Further, the fact that a state agency opinion 

preceded some other analysis or medical evidence does not mean that the opinion 

should be automatically discounted. As the Third Circuit has explained: 

[B]ecause state agency review precedes ALJ review, there is always 

some time lapse between the consultant's report and the ALJ hearing 

and decision. The Social Security regulations impose no limit on how 

much time may pass between a report and the ALJ's decision in reliance 

on it. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

Moreover, in this case, the ALJ’s decision actually afforded the least 

persuasive power to the earliest opinion rendered in this case, Dr. Gavazzi’s 

September 2021 opinion. The ALJ then concluded that the most recent opinion, Dr. 

Jonas’ February 2022 medical opinion, which considered the January 2022 

examination results reported by Dr. Bielski, had the greatest persuasiveness. Thus, 

as a factual matter, the ALJ did precisely what Blauch argues should have been done: 

he focused on this most recent and comprehensive medical opinion in evaluating this 

disability claim. 

Case 3:23-cv-01073-MCC Document 15 Filed 11/26/24 Page 35 of 37
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In the final analysis, the ALJ’s decision in this case, which found that that 

Blauch could perform work limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks in a work 

environment free from fast-paced production involving only simple work-related 

decisions with few, if any, workplace changes, no interaction with the public, 

occasional interaction with coworkers but no tandem tasks, and occasional 

supervision, was entirely consistent with settled caselaw, which holds that: “as long 

as the ALJ offers a ‘valid explanation,’ a ‘simple tasks’ limitation is permitted after 

a finding that a claimant has ‘moderate’ difficulties in ‘concentration, persistence, 

or pace.’” Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2019). On this 

score, it is well-settled that an ALJ offers a valid explanation for a simple task RFC 

when the ALJ highlights factors such as “mental status examinations and reports that 

revealed that [the claimant] could function effectively; opinion evidence showing 

that [the claimant] could do simple work; and [the claimant]’s activities of daily 

living, which demonstrated that [s]he is capable of engaging in a diverse array of 

‘simple tasks[.]’” Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 214 (3d Cir. 2019). The 

ALJ fulfille his duty here, and substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusions. 

In closing, the ALJ’s assessment of the evidence in this case complied with 

the dictates of the law and was supported by substantial evidence. This is all that the 

law requires, and all that a claimant can demand in a disability proceeding. Thus, 

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37 

notwithstanding the argument that this evidence might have been viewed in a way 

which would have also supported a different finding, we are obliged to affirm this 

ruling once we find that it is “supported by substantial evidence, ‘even [where] this 

court acting de novo might have reached a different conclusion.’” Monsour Med. 

Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190–91 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Hunter Douglas, 

Inc. v. NLRB, 804 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1986)). Accordingly, under the deferential 

standard of review that applies to appeals of Social Security disability 

determinations, we find that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s evaluation of 

this case. 

IV. Conclusion 

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the final decision of the 

Commissioner denying these claims will be AFFIRMED. 

An appropriate order follows. 

 s/ Martin C. Carlson

 Martin C. Carlson 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

DATED: November 26th, 2024. 

Case 3:23-cv-01073-MCC Document 15 Filed 11/26/24 Page 37 of 37