IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ERIC MAPLE, :

:

Plaintiff :

:

v. : CIVIL NO. 4:CV-06-360

:

JEFFREY A. BEARD, :

:

: (Judge Jones)

Defendant :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

April 3, 2006

THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:

This pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was initiated by

Plaintiff Eric Maple (“Plaintiff” or “Maple”), an inmate presently confined at the

State Correctional Institution, at Camp Hill, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Camp Hill”). 

The complaint is accompanied by an application requesting leave to proceed in

forma pauperis. For the reasons set forth below, Maple’s complaint will be

dismissed, without prejudice, as legally frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

Named as Defendant is Secretary Jeffrey A. Beard of the Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections (“DOC”). Maple describes Beard as being statutorily

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responsible for the actions of the DOC. Plaintiff states that on or about January

28, 2004, officials at his former place of confinement, the Greene State

Correctional Institution, at Waynesburg, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Greene”) made a

formal recommendation that he be placed in the prison’s Special Management

Unit (“SMU”) . Unidentified DOC “decisionmakers” allegedly approved the

recommendation and Maple was placed in the SMU that same day. (Rec. Doc. 1,

¶ 6).

As a result of his SMU placement, Plaintiff avers that he was subjected to

“extreme isolation,” “continuously restrained,” and deprived of various privileges

and rights afforded to prisoners housed in general population. (Rec. Doc. 1, ¶ 7). 

His complaint maintains that he was not provided with sufficient due process prior

to being placed in the SMU. He specifically alleges that he was not provided with

the factual basis for the decision to place him in the SMU.

On July 27, 2004, Maple was transferred by the DOC to the SCI-Camp Hill

SMU. As of the filing of this action, the Plaintiff purportedly remains confined in

the SMU. His complaint seeks monetary damages as well as declaratory and

injunctive relief.

DISCUSSION:

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1 Indisputably meritless legal theories are those "in which it is either readily

apparent that the plaintiff's complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or that the

defendants are clearly entitled to immunity from suit." Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d

192, 194 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Sultenfuss v. Snow, 894 F.2d 1277, 1278 (11th Cir.

1990)). 

3

28 U.S.C. § 1915 imposes obligations on prisoners who file civil actions in

federal court and wish to proceed in forma pauperis. § 1915(e)(2) provides:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may

have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the

court determines that (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B)

the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

Consequently, federal courts reviewing civil rights complaints filed by

persons wishing to proceed in forma pauperis may determine that process should

not be issued if the complaint is malicious, presents an indisputably meritless legal

theory, or is predicated on clearly baseless factual contentions. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774

(3d Cir. 1989).1

 In Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995),

the Third Circuit added that "the plain meaning of 'frivolous' authorizes the

dismissal of in forma pauperis claims that . . . are of little or no weight, value, or

importance, not worthy of serious consideration, or trivial." "The frivolousness

determination is a discretionary one," and trial courts "are in the best position" to

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determine when an indigent litigant's complaint is appropriate for summary

dismissal. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). 

In order to state an actionable civil rights claim under § 1983, a plaintiff

must plead two essential elements: (1) that the conduct complained of was

committed by a person acting under color of state law, and (2) that said conduct

deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution

or laws of the United States. Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628,

638 (3d Cir. 1995); Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1141-42 (3d

Cir. 1990). 

Civil rights claims brought cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat

superior. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather,

each named defendant must be shown, via the complaint's allegations, to have

been personally involved in the events or occurrences which underlie a claim. See

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials,

546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976). As explained in Rode:

A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal

involvement in the alleged wrongs. . . . [P]ersonal involvement

can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of

actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of

participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however,

must be made with appropriate particularity. 

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Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.

Based on the nature of Plaintiff’s allegations, he is clearly attempting to

establish liability against Secretary Beard under a theory of respondeat superior. 

The complaint contains no factual averments showing that the Defendant had any

personal knowledge, participation, or acquiescence in any constitutional

misconduct. Maple fails to allege any facts which could establish that Beard

knowingly permitted any unconstitutional treatment to occur. Therefore, since

Plaintiff is attempting to establish liability against Secretary Beard solely on the

basis of his supervisory capacity, the complaint is subject to dismissal under the

standards developed in Rode.

In addition, it appears that Maple’s request for injunctive relief, that

Secretary Beard be directed to order that the Plaintiff be returned to general

population, is seeking a mandamus-type remedy. The only federal statute under

which a party may seek mandamus relief from a federal court is 28 U.S.C. § 1361. 

It provides in its entirety:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any

action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or

employee of the United States or any agency thereof to

perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.

Since Plaintiff is requesting that this Court compel a state official to

perform a duty, there is no proper jurisdiction under § 1361 or any other federal

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2 The dismissal of this action does not relieve Plaintiff of the obligation to pay

the full filing fee. Until the filing fee is paid in full, the Administrative Order

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statute. Consequently, dismissal of the request for injunctive relief for lack of

jurisdiction is also appropriate. 

Moreover, mandamus is a drastic measure "to be invoked only in

extraordinary situations." Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 934 (3d Cir. 1996)

(quoting Allied Chem. Corp v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980)). The

Supreme Court in Allied added that a mandamus petitioner has the burden of

establishing a clear and indisputable right to relief. Id. at 35. See also Kerr v.

United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976). In Kerr, the court noted that

in order to receive mandamus relief, the party seeking it must "have no other

adequate means to attain the relief he desires. . . ." Id. Maple does have other

means available to him, specifically, he may submit his request for relief to the

appropriate Pennsylvania state court.

In conclusion, since the Plaintiff's complaint is "based on an indisputably

meritless legal theory" it will be dismissed, without prejudice, as legally frivolous. 

Wilson, 878 F.2d at 774. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice as

frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i).

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case.2

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previously issued in this case is binding on the Warden of SCI-Camp Hill, as well as

the Superintendent of any correctional facility to which Plaintiff is transferred. 

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3. Any appeal from this Order will be deemed frivolous, without

probable cause and not taken in good faith.

s/ John E. Jones III

John E. Jones III

United States District Judge

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