U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

30–119 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

S. HRG. 115–302 

OPEN HEARING: NOMINATION OF GINA HASPEL 

TO BE THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL 

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 9, 2018 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman 

MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

ANGUS KING, Maine 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

KAMALA HARRIS, California 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio 

CHRIS JOYNER, Staff Director 

MICHAEL CASEY, Minority Staff Director 

KELSEY STROUD BAILEY, Chief Clerk 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

(III) 

CONTENTS 

MAY 9, 2018 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina ................ 1 

Warner, Mark R., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Virginia ........................ 3 

WITNESSES 

Chambliss, Saxby, former U.S. Senator from Georgia ......................................... 5 

Bayh, Evan, former U.S. Senator from Indiana .................................................... 7 

Haspel, Gina, nominated to be Director of Central Intelligence ......................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 14 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 

Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees .................................... 50 

Additional Prehearing Questions ........................................................................... 63 

Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 128 

Disciplinary Review Related to Destruction of Interrogation Tapes Memo 

(the Morell Memo) ................................................................................................ 204 

Former CIA Officers ................................................................................................ 212 

Former Senior National Security Officials ............................................................ 216 

Former Ambassadors ............................................................................................... 221 

Retired General and Flag Officers ......................................................................... 228 

Human Rights Watch .............................................................................................. 232 

The Center for Victims of Torture .......................................................................... 236 

National Council of Churches ................................................................................. 237 

NC Stop Torture Now .............................................................................................. 239 

T’ruah: The Rabbinic Call for Human Rights ....................................................... 240 

Laura Pitter Op-Ed, Senior National Security Counsel, Human Rights Watch 249 

Steven Cash ............................................................................................................. 252 

National Catholic Advocacy Organizations ........................................................... 257 

September 11th Families for Peaceful Tomorrows ............................................... 259 

Human Rights Coalition ......................................................................................... 260 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

(1) 

OPEN HEARING: NOMINATION OF GINA 

HASPEL TO BE THE DIRECTOR OF THE 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 9, 2018 

U.S. SENATE, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m. in Room 

SH–219, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Burr, Warner, Risch, Rubio, Collins, Blunt, 

Lankford, Cotton, Cornyn, Feinstein, Wyden, Heinrich, King, 

Manchin, Harris, and Reed. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA 

Chairman BURR. I’d like to call this hearing to order. I’d like to 

say at the beginning of this hearing it is the tradition of this committee to have nominees in front of us in open and closed session. 

It’s also incumbent on those who attend in the audience that they 

recognize the order that we expect. The Chair would announce 

now, I will not be lenient. If there are outbursts, you will be 

cleared from the room and it will be done immediately. So for the 

benefit of members and for the benefit of our witnesses, if you’re 

going to do it, do it fast, do it early, and be gone. 

I’d like to welcome our witness today, Acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Ms. Gina Haspel. Gina, congratulations on 

your nomination. 

Our goal in conducting this hearing is to enable the committee 

to begin consideration of Ms. Haspel’s qualifications and to allow 

for thoughtful deliberation by all members. She’s already provided 

substantive written responses to more than 100 questions presented by the committee and its members. Today, of course, members will be able to ask additional questions and to hear from Ms. 

Haspel in open and closed session. 

Gina, you’ve been asked to lead what I believe is one of our most 

treasured assets in this Nation during a period of profound change. 

The Central Intelligence Agency is one of the principal members of 

the United States intelligence community and is tasked with collecting foreign intelligence through human sources and by appropriate other means. 

The CIA operates in the shadows. Its officers are often undercover and sometimes work in hostile and austere environments. It’s 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

2 

not simply a job for many, but it’s a lifestyle, one that you have 

lived honorably for more than 30 years. 

The clandestine nature of the Agency’s work, however, is both its 

greatest capability and its most challenging liability, as its activities are outside the public view. We address that liability by calling 

upon the President to nominate individuals with unwavering integrity, and the Senate approves only those who we are assured will 

lead this organization lawfully, ethically, and morally. 

Gina Haspel was born in Kentucky, the oldest of five children, 

where she returned after attending high school in England. She 

originally told her father, who served in the United States Air 

Force, that she wanted to attend West Point, only to be gently reminded that West Point at the time did not admit women. 

That didn’t dilute her sense of service and, after graduating from 

the University of Kentucky, Gina went on to work as a contractor 

with the Tenth Special Forces Group. It was in Fort Devon that 

Gina learned about the CIA, a place where she could serve along 

with other women doing clandestine work around the world. 

Since her departure in 1985, Gina has developed an extensive 

overseas experience and served as chief of station in many locations. In Washington, she’s held numerous senior leadership positions, including Deputy Director, Deputy Director of National Clandestine Service. 

Gina, I’ve reviewed the material provided by you and have spoken to you personally many times. I believe your intellectual rigor, 

your honorable service, and outstanding judgment make you a natural fit to lead the CIA. 

I can assure you that this committee will continue to faithfully 

follow its charter and conduct vigorous and real-time oversight over 

CIA’s operations and activities. We will ask difficult and probing 

questions of you and your staff, and we will expect honest, complete, and timely responses. The American people allow the CIA to 

operate in the shadows because they have a trust in oversight and 

I take that responsibility seriously. 

Now, some may seek to turn this nomination into a trial about 

a long-shuttered program. I’d like to set the record straight and 

make clear to those in attendance and the American people that 

this hearing’s about—this hearing’s not about programs already addressed by executive order, legislation, and a court of law. It’s 

about the woman seated in front of us. 

Gina, I’ve reviewed your records closely. I’ve read your detailed 

and thoughtful answers to the committee’s prehearing questions, 

and I’ve spoken with you many times over the years. You are without a doubt the most qualified person the President could have chosen to lead the CIA and the most prepared nominee in its 70-year 

history. You have acted morally, ethically, and legally over a distinguished 30-plus year career. You have operated under authorities 

signed and granted by the President of the United States, at the 

direction of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and according to the legal guidance provided by the Attorney General of 

the United States. 

Those who have issues with programs or operations conducted 

years ago should address those concerns and their questions to 

former Presidents, former Directors, and former Attorney Generals. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

3 

This hearing is about how you will lead the Central Intelligence 

Agency into the future, not how you faithfully executed missions in 

the past. 

Moreover, you conducted yourself in such a way that your supervisors have uniformly praised your conduct over your lengthy career. Those supervisors commended you for frankness, firmness, 

and fairness, your moral courage, your integrity, your operational 

judgment and professional presence. They have commented on your 

leadership skills and success in creating a more inclusive and fair 

workplace, and admired your operating at great personal risk to 

collect intelligence necessary to keep America safe. 

Gina, you have the unique experience one only gains from growing up in the CIA. You have the moral strength to speak truth to 

power. You have learned from the past mistakes of your organization and made clear they will not be repeated. 

In the days after 2001, you did not just talk about what should 

be done, you personally volunteered to help with CIA’s response to 

attacks. You dared to step into the arena when our country needed 

you, and you have done so again today. For that, I am eternally 

grateful. 

I look forward to supporting your nomination and to ensuring its 

consideration without delay. I want to thank you for your willingness to serve your country, for your years of service, and I look forward to your testimony. 

I now recognize the Vice Chairman for any comments he might 

make. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to 

join you in welcoming Ms. Haspel. 

Gina, it’s nice to see you again and congratulations on your nomination. The position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 

is one of the most important in our government. The CIA Director 

serves as a key figure in our intelligence community. He or she 

leads the premier human intelligence agency in the world, the largest all-source analysis workforce in the intelligence community. 

The CIA Director is responsible for providing the intelligence 

that informs policymakers working on every major national security and foreign policy problem facing our country. As former Director Pompeo’s recent trip to North Korea demonstrated, the Director 

can also be tasked with unusual diplomatic missions. Directors also 

represent the face of the U.S. intelligence community to the entire 

world and they should be qualified for that task. 

Gina Haspel is among the most experienced people to be nominated for the position of Director of the CIA. While I remain disappointed that the Agency was not more forthcoming in providing 

and declassifying information about her service, she has served our 

Nation for 33 years in a variety of roles all over the world. 

I also understand that Ms. Haspel is the first operations officer 

in more than five decades who has been nominated to lead the 

Agency. And, as we see with some of the folks who are here, I know 

she enjoys broad support within its workforce. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

4 

But many people, and I include myself in that number, have 

questions about the message the Senate would be sending by confirming someone for this position who served as a supervisor in the 

Counterterrorism Center during the time of rendition, detention, 

and interrogation programs. Ms. Haspel has acknowledged the history of the program. She stated that the law has changed and the 

RDI program is no longer legal. She is committed to upholding the 

law. I appreciate that, but it is not enough. The secrecy inherent 

in the CIA’s work demands that the Director honor and follow the 

law, particularly in the dark spaces where the IC often operates 

and where the glaring light of public scrutiny is nonexistent. No 

one should get credit for simply agreeing to follow the law. That’s 

the least we should expect from any nominee and certainly from 

the Director of the CIA. 

For those in the chamber who have argued that no one who participated in the RDI program should ever be promoted—I know 

there are some who feel that—and while I have expressed on many 

occasions my own objections to the RDI program, I think we have 

to recognize at that time, the country had just been attacked. People throughout the government were frightened of more imminent 

attacks and did not know what to do, and the RDI program was 

absolutely an outgrowth of that fear. There are many at the Agency 

who participated in the program who believed that what they were 

doing was both legal and authorized by the then-President. 

What I’m not willing to do, however, is to justify this dark period 

in our history or to sweep away the decision to engage in torture. 

I believe the RDI program was wrong and we need to make sure 

it never happens again. 

Ms. Haspel, what the committee must hear and what I must 

hear is in your own view of the RDI program today, given the benefit of time and hindsight, should the United States ever permit detainees to be treated the way the CIA treated detainees under the 

program, even if you believed it was technically legal? Most importantly, in your view was that program consistent with American 

values? 

We must hear how you would react if the President asked you 

to carry out some morally questionable behavior that might seem 

to violate a law or treaty. How will you respond if a secret DOJ 

opinion authorizes such behavior and gives you a quote, ‘‘Get Out 

of Jail Free Card’’? On that day, if ordered to take such actions 

that are inconsistent with American values, will you say yes and 

follow the orders? Will you keep Congress in the dark? 

Ms. Haspel, I encourage you to take these issues seriously and 

to address them at length. My vote on your confirmation will be 

greatly influenced by how you address these questions today. 

I know the committee and I in particular would want to hear 

about also your interaction with respect to the 2005 decision to destroy the CIA interrogation tapes. What role did you play? And if 

given the chance, would you do it again? 

In the same vein, I would like to know your views from that time 

on about informing Congressional leadership. Given the necessary 

secrecy of the Agency’s activities, it is fundamental to our system 

of checks and balances that you be extremely forthcoming with this 

committee, with the Chairman, and with me as Vice Chairman. I 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

5 

expect you to look for reasons to read us in rather than looking for 

excuses to keep us out of the loop. 

Ms. Haspel, you should consider carefully how you might deal 

with morally questionable requests in the future. If confirmed, you 

will face a White House and frankly, in my belief, a President who 

does not always seem interested in hearing, much less speaking, 

the truth. The President seems incapable or unwilling to accept the 

facts that might contradict his views or his policy preferences. Indeed, there have been some in this Administration, even some in 

the President’s own appointees, who have been attacked for telling 

a truth in public that contradicts the White House narrative. You 

simply cannot allow the prospects of such attacks from dissuading 

you of speaking truth to power. I am interested to know how you 

view your relationship with the President and how you will approach encouraging him and engaging with him. 

We have seen on many occasions that this President has no 

qualms about completely circumventing members of his own Administration, even when making policy that falls within their agencies’ jurisdictions. At the end of the day, do you believe you’ll be 

in the room when it matters? And if you’re in the room, will the 

President listen to you when you tell him something is a bad idea? 

Finally, Ms. Haspel, I will end with what I hope is an easy, but 

critical, request. As you know, this committee continues its investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election. I will expect 

your commitment to continuing cooperation with us and with the 

Mueller investigation in the future. I hope you will agree that it 

is critical that both of these investigations be permitted to proceed 

independently and completely towards their own conclusions without White House interference. 

Gina, again congratulations on your nomination and for your 

very important work on behalf of our country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman BURR. I thank the Vice Chairman. 

It’s now an honor to recognize two of our former colleagues. Welcome to each of you, and I will recognize Senator Chambliss and 

then Senator Bayh for their introductions. 

Senator Chambliss. 

STATEMENT OF SAXBY CHAMBLISS, FORMER U.S. SENATOR 

FROM GEORGIA 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to you, Vice 

Chairman Warner, distinguished members of the committee. It’s an 

honor for me to be here with you today along with my dear friend 

and former colleague Senator Bayh and also with our mutual 

friend Gina Haspel, obviously President Trump’s nominee to be the 

leader at the CIA. 

It’s hard to believe it’s been a little over three years since I sat 

on your side of the dais and, while I miss my personal relationship 

with each one of you, I do not miss the daily decisions that you’re 

having to make. But thank goodness all of you are here to do that. 

I’ve known and admired Gina Haspel for many years. In fact, I 

met her as a member of this committee, no doubt traveling to one 

of the many garden spots that CIA officers have been deployed 

around the globe. Gina is a consummate intelligence professional 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

6 

who is unwaveringly honest and objective, which is exactly the type 

of person we need leading the men and women of the CIA today. 

The world in which we live gets more complex each and every 

day. Today we’re fighting terrorism on several different continents, 

major world powers like China and Russia are becoming increasingly more aggressive, the threats from rogue regimes, cyber attacks and weapons of mass destruction are increasing. All the 

while, the international cooperation and stability continue to deteriorate. The world in which we live needs experience at the helm 

of the CIA. 

Gina Haspel joined the CIA during the Cold War and has played 

a part in keeping our country safe ever since. She has served with 

distinction for over 30 years, working at almost every level of the 

National Clandestine Service. For her contribution, she’s been 

awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit, the George H.W. Bush 

Award for Excellence for Counterterrorism, the Donovan Award, 

and a Presidential Rank Award. 

Gina’s nomination is also significant because, if confirmed, she 

would be the first female Director of the CIA in the Agency’s history, an achievement that is long overdue considering the incredible contribution over the years that women have made to the mission at the CIA. 

Throughout her career at the CIA, Gina has held many leadership positions, but also taken on some of the most demanding and 

least rewarding assignments that the Agency has to offer. Gina 

joined the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center in the wake of 9–11, putting herself at risk when her country needed her the most. As the 

committee well knows, these jobs require long hours, are nerveracking, and come with great personal risk. 

It’s difficult to talk about all of Gina’s accomplishments over her 

30-plus year career at the CIA in an open setting, but I know that 

each of you has reviewed her extensive record. Gina has been criticized in the press for some of her work done at the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center. Frankly, I find this criticism very troubling. In 

2011, as you all know, Mike Morell reviewed Ms. Haspel’s conduct 

related to the CIA’s destruction of the interrogation tapes and determined her actions to be appropriate and found no fault in the 

performance of her duties. 

We all have very strong feelings about the counterterrorism programs that the CIA carried out following 9–11. However, responsibility for these programs rests with the Commander in Chief and 

the senior leadership at the CIA, not Gina Haspel. When a CIA officer is carrying out authorities granted to them by the President, 

at the direction of their superiors, in a way that is determined to 

be lawful by the Attorney General, they should not be punished, 

period. 

I hope I’ve made the case for Gina, but I also hope you won’t just 

take my word for it. Gina’s nomination is being supported by a 

broad spectrum of national security professionals who have served 

in both Republican and Democratic administrations. Intelligence 

community leaders like Henry Kissinger, Jim Clapper, Bob Kerry, 

Mike McConnell, Mike Hayden, Leon Panetta, John Brennan, and 

many others. In today’s political climate, I cannot name the last 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

7 

time that so many former intelligence professionals agreed on a 

single nominee. 

Everything I’ve said to this point is part of the public record and 

I now want to close by putting a personal touch on this nomination. 

During my 2 years on the HPSCI and 12 years on this committee, 

I traveled overseas extensively for the purpose of conducting oversight of the intelligence community. A lot of that travel was with 

Chairman Burr and with Senator Feinstein. With only a couple of 

obvious exceptions, we visited with the intelligence community personnel in every hot spot in the world. On several of those stops, we 

visited with Gina Haspel. Never were we less than significantly impressed by the leadership that Gina was giving to the Agency. 

Every member here knows the mission of the CIA, but I’d just 

like to say to the general public the written stated mission at the 

CIA, which is: to preempt threats and further U.S. national security objectives by collecting intelligence that matters; producing objective all-source analysis; conducting effective covert action as directed by the President; and safeguarding the secrets that help 

keep our Nation safe. 

No one is better prepared, more focused, or more capable to carry 

out that mission than is Gina Haspel. Mr. Chairman, Gina is a 

proven leader who knows the Agency and the threats we face. She 

is ideally suited to become the next and first female Director of the 

CIA. Everybody on this committee has an obligation to vet her 

nomination thoroughly and I know you will. But at the end of the 

day, I urge you to support her nomination and send it to the floor 

so that her nomination can be confirmed by the Senate of the 

United States. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. 

Senator Bayh. 

STATEMENT OF EVAN BAYH, FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM 

INDIANA 

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner, members of the committee, former colleagues, and current 

friends. Let me begin by thanking each of you for your service and 

vital work performed in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Senator Chambliss and I know firsthand the important responsibility each of you bears, and I’m sure I speak for millions of 

our fellow citizens when I thank you for carrying it out in such an 

exemplary manner. 

It’s a pleasure to be with you again to introduce Gina Haspel. My 

connection to this committee, Mr. Chairman, is longstanding. In 

fact, my father Birch Bayh served on this panel when it was first 

created in the aftermath of the Church hearings, which documented the essential need for Congressional oversight of our intelligence community, a role this nominee strongly supports. 

My own decade of service on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, including with many of you, was, to say the least, eventful. Like today, we faced Russian hostility, Iranian regional ambitions, an expansionist China, an erratic North Korea, cyber threats, 

and much, much more. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

8 

But unlike today, and thank God for that, on September 11, 

2001, we experienced a tragedy that indelibly defined those years 

when a group of suicidal fanatics killed almost 3,000 innocent men, 

women, and children. It was the deadliest attack on our homeland 

in half a century. 

Who can forget the image of the Twin Towers falling? Who can 

forget the images of people leaping to their deaths to escape the 

flames? When would the next attack come? How many more Americans would die? 

Throughout it all, this committee was an oasis of bipartisanship—no Democrats, no Republicans, just Americans working together to protect our country. Gina Haspel has done and if confirmed, will do likewise. 

She is a lifelong intelligence professional, does not come from the 

world of politics, and may be the most nonpartisan individual ever 

nominated for Director of Central Intelligence. It is instructive that 

former DCIs of both parties endorse her nomination, including 

Leon Panetta, John Brennan, and Michael Hayden. Each of these 

men has been blunt in their criticism of some aspects of the current 

Administration, but all support Gina Haspel. 

Ms. Haspel, as has been noted, is without question the most 

qualified person ever nominated for this position. For 33 years, she 

has worked to defend America from those who would harm us. She 

has served on the front lines and she has served with some who 

now are memorialized with gold stars on the wall in Langley, in 

tribute to their ultimate sacrifice. She knows the cost of freedom. 

She is a clear-eyed, hard-nosed expert on Russia at a time of 

mounting threats from that nation. And if confirmed, as Senator 

Chambliss noted, she would be the first woman to serve as DCIA, 

sending a clear message that advancement in the intelligence community is based on merit, not impeded by prejudice. 

Finally, she had the unenviable, weighty responsibility of protecting American lives during times of maximum danger, while also 

remaining true to our core values. As Senator Warner indicated, 

questions will be asked today, and they should be asked today, 

about whether the right decisions were always made. And you 

should probe deeply to determine whether, if mistakes occurred 

during that difficult time, were lessons learned, and whether the 

hard-won wisdom will inform our future conduct. Under a Director 

Haspel, I am confident it will. 

If approved by this panel and confirmed by the Senate, Gina 

Haspel will obey the rule of law. She has the experience and 

strength to speak truth to power. She’s devoted to protecting Americans from those who would harm us and doing so consistent with 

our fundamental values, because she knows that it is those ideals 

that are our ultimate source of strength and those principles that 

make America the exceptional Nation she has sworn to defend. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator Bayh. 

On behalf of the committee, I thank both of you for your service 

to the country and to your willingness to be here for the introduction. I would now excuse you from that table. 

Ms. Haspel, I’d ask you to stand and raise your right hand. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

9 

Do you solemnly swear to give the committee the truth, the full 

truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Ms. HASPEL. I do. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you. Please be seated. 

TESTIMONY OF GINA HASPEL, NOMINATED TO BE DIRECTOR 

OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 

Chairman BURR. Ms. Haspel, before we move to your statement, 

I’ll ask you to answer five standard questions the committee poses 

to each nominee who appears before us. They just require a simple 

yes or no answer for the record. 

One: Do you agree to appear before the committee here or in any 

other venue when invited? 

Ms. HASPEL. I do. 

Chairman BURR. Two: If confirmed, do you agree to send officials 

from your office to appear before the committee and designated 

staff when invited? 

Ms. HASPEL. I do. 

Chairman BURR. Three: Do you agree to provide documents or 

any other materials requested by the committee in order to carry 

out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? 

Ms. HASPEL. I do. 

Chairman BURR. Four: Will you both ensure that your office and 

your staff provide such materials to the committee when requested? 

Ms. HASPEL. I will. 

Chairman BURR. And five: Do you agree to inform and fully brief 

to the fullest extent possible all members of the committee of intelligence activities and covert action, rather than only the Chair and 

the Vice Chairman? 

Ms. HASPEL. I do. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you very much. 

We’ll now proceed to your opening statement. Ms. Haspel, the 

floor is yours. 

Ms. HASPEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Burr, Vice 

Chairman Warner, and members of the committee: Thank you for 

the opportunity to appear before you today. I want to thank Senators Chambliss and Bayh for the kind words and support. 

I would also like to take just a moment to recognize a few guests 

who have come today, including: Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence and my good friend, Sue Gordon; CIA Chief Operating Officer, Brian Bulatao; Mrs. Susan Pompeo—thank you for 

coming—the best ambassador I ever worked for, Ambassador Louis 

Susman; and two dear mentors of mine, senior CIA officers and 

then later senior IC officials, Mary Margaret Graham and Charlie 

Allen. 

I am here because I have been nominated to lead the extraordinary men and women at the Central Intelligence Agency. Men 

and women who are our country’s silent warriors. These dedicated 

professionals spend much of their careers in difficult far-flung outposts of the globe, striving to make our fellow Americans more secure at home. It has been the privilege of my professional life to 

be one of those CIA officers. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

10 

Now, I have been asked by President Trump to lead this workforce and to continue the work that Mike Pompeo and I began a 

little more than a year ago, ensuring that CIA is postured to meet 

the complex challenges our Nation faces. Those challenges include: 

a changing, but still lethal, threat from terrorist groups; a nuclear 

threat against the continental United States from a rogue state; destabilizing Iranian adventurism; an aggressive and sometimes brutal Russia; and the long-term implications of China’s ambitions on 

the global stage. 

While these challenges are daunting and offer few easy answers, 

I am confident the United States and the American people have the 

resolve to meet them head-on. If I am confirmed as Director, you 

have my solemn commitment that I will position this Agency to 

provide the intelligence support our country needs to meet the 

challenges of today and those of tomorrow. 

I welcome the opportunity to introduce myself to the American 

people for the first time. It is a new experience for me, as I spent 

over 30 years undercover and in the shadows. I don’t have any social media accounts, but otherwise I think you will find me to be 

a typical middle class American, one with a strong sense of right 

and wrong and one who loves this country. 

I was born in Kentucky and, while my family has deep roots 

there, I was an Air Force brat, and we followed my father to postings all over the world. My childhood overseas instilled in me a 

deep love for foreign languages and cultures, but also a deep understanding of the vital role of American leadership in combating aggression abroad. 

I joined CIA in 1985 as a case officer in the Clandestine Service. 

From my first days in training, I had a knack for the nuts and 

bolts of my profession. I excelled in finding and acquiring secret information that I obtained in brush passes, dead drops, or in meetings in dusty alleys of third world capitals. 

I recall very well my first meeting with a foreign agent. It was 

on a dark, moonless night, with an agent I’d never met before. 

When I picked him up, he passed me the intelligence and I passed 

him an extra $500 for the men he led. It was the beginning of an 

adventure I had only dreamed of. 

The men who ran CIA in those days leaned forward in giving me 

the right opportunities to succeed or fail. When a very tough, oldschool leader announced that I was his pick to be chief of station 

in a small but important frontier post, a few competitors complained to me directly: Why would they send you? I owe that leader 

much for believing in me at a time when few women were given 

these opportunities. 

While I could have done without some of the long nights sleeping 

on the floor of my station, I was proud of the work we did there, 

including the successful capture of two major terrorists in the wake 

of the Africa embassy bombings, a counter-proliferation operation 

that went our way, and the dismantlement of a local terrorist cell. 

Altogether, I have served seven tours in the field, four as chief 

of station, including hardship assignments in distant posts and 

more recently in the capital of a major U.S. ally. By any standard, 

my life at the Agency—and it has been my life—has exceeded all 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

11 

of my expectations from that January day when I first took the 

oath to today. 

There were few senior women leading at CIA in those days, and 

we are stronger now as an organization because that picture is 

changing. I did my part, quietly and through hard work, to break 

down some of those barriers. And I was proud to be the first 

woman to serve as the number two in the Clandestine Service. 

It is not my way to trumpet the fact that I am a woman up for 

the top job at CIA, but I would be remiss in not remarking on it, 

not least because of the outpouring of support from young women 

at CIA and indeed across the IC, because they consider it a good 

sign for their own prospects. 

My experience and success as an operations officer led to three 

leadership positions in the Clandestine Service, and one year ago 

I was asked to serve as Deputy Director of CIA. The reaction of the 

workforce to a rare nomination of one of their own to be Director, 

someone who has been in the trenches with them, has been overwhelming. I am humbled by their confidence that I can successfully 

lead this Agency and inspired to work harder than ever to maintain that trust. 

They know that I don’t need time to learn the business of how 

CIA works. I know CIA like the back of my hand. I know them, 

I know the threats we face, and I know what we need to be successful in our mission. 

I have played a leading role this past year in setting us on the 

right path, and I intend on continuing on that path if I am confirmed as Director. Our strategy starts with strengthening our core 

business, collecting intelligence that helps policymakers protect our 

country, and advance American interests across the globe. It includes raising our investment against the most difficult intelligence 

gaps, putting more officers in the foreign field where our adversaries are, and emphasizing foreign language excellence. Finally, it 

involves investing in our partnerships, both within the U.S. Government and around the globe. 

We must do everything we can to follow through on these investments and to make CIA as effective as it can possibly be, because 

the American people deserve no less than CIA’s best effort. This is 

especially true when it comes to confronting threats from North 

Korea, Iran, Russia and China. Today CIA officers are deployed 

across the globe, sometimes at significant personal risk, collecting 

critical human and technical intelligence. I have spent my entire 

career driving operations and if confirmed, I will be able to leverage that experience beginning on day one. 

I knew that accepting the President’s nomination would raise 

questions about CIA classified activities and my career at the 

Agency. I also understand that it is important for the American 

people to get to know me so they are able to judge my fitness for 

this position. So over the last few weeks we have leaned forward 

to make more information about my record public. We have also 

shared details on every aspect of my career through classified channels with this committee, as well as with the rest of the Senate. 

I think it is important to recall the context of those challenging 

times immediately following 9/11. For me, I had just returned to 

Washington from an overseas posting and I reported for duty on 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

12 

the morning of 9/11. I knew in my gut when I saw the video of the 

first plane hitting the tower in Manhattan that it was bin Laden. 

I got up and I walked over to the Counterterrorism Center as the 

CIA compound was evacuated and I volunteered to help. I didn’t 

leave for three years. We worked seven days a week and I even had 

friends who postponed weddings and having babies. The men and 

women of CIA were driven and charged with preventing another 

attack. 

The first boots on the ground in Afghanistan were my colleagues’. The first casualty in Afghanistan was a CIA officer and 

colleague. And it was CIA who identified and captured the mastermind of 9/11 in a brilliant operation. I am proud of our work during 

that time. The hard lessons we learned from that experience inform 

my leadership of CIA today. 

In light of my counterterrorism experience, I understand that 

what many people want to know about are my views on CIA’s 

former detention and interrogation program. I have views on this 

issue and I want to be clear. Having served in that tumultuous 

time, I can offer you my personal commitment clearly and without 

reservation, that under my leadership, on my watch, CIA will not 

restart a detention and interrogation program. 

CIA has learned some tough lessons from that experience. We 

were asked to tackle a mission that fell outside our expertise. For 

me, there is no better example of implementing lessons learned 

than what the Agency took away from that program. In retrospect, 

it is clear, as the SSCI Majority report concluded, that CIA was not 

prepared to conduct a detention and interrogation program. 

Today, the U.S. government has a clear legal and policy framework that governs detentions and interrogations. Specifically, the 

law provides that no individual in U.S. custody may be subjected 

to any interrogation technique or approach that is not authorized 

by and listed in the Army Field Manual. I fully support the detainee treatment required by law and, just as importantly, I will 

keep CIA focused on our collection and analysis missions that can 

best leverage the expertise we have at the Agency. Like I said, we 

learned important lessons following 9/11. 

As both a career intelligence officer and as an American citizen, 

I am a strong believer in the importance of oversight. Simply put, 

experience has taught us that CIA cannot be effective without the 

people’s trust, and we cannot hope to earn that trust without the 

accountability that comes with Congressional oversight. 

If we cannot share aspects of our secret work with the public, we 

should do so with their elected representatives. For CIA oversight 

is a vital link to the open society we defend. It’s a defining feature 

of the U.S. intelligence community and one of the many things that 

distinguishes us from the hostile services we face in the field. 

If confirmed as Director, I will uphold the Agency’s obligations to 

Congress and ensure that oversight works on behalf of the American people. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the committee 

for the hard work that is put into the oversight process and for the 

vital support that this committee provides the officers at CIA. 

CIA has given me a lot over the past three decades: a calling and 

service to my country; some real-life adventures; and the profound 

satisfaction of serving with some of the most talented and honorLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

13 

able men and women in our government. If confirmed, I hope to 

repay the debt I owe to this remarkable Agency by drawing on my 

experience. I know what my fellow officers need from me and I 

know what our Nation needs from CIA, and that is truth, integrity, 

and courage. 

Again thank you for allowing me the opportunity to appear before you today and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Haspel follows:] 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

14 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 1 here 30119.001

Statement for the Record 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency Gina Haspel 

May9, 2018 

Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner, members of the committee: Thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today. I am here because I have been nominated to lead the 

extraordinary men and women at the Central Intelligence Agency- men and women who are our 

country's silent warriors. These dedicated professionals spend much of their careers in difficult, 

far-flung outposts of the globe, striving to make our fellow Americans more secure at home. It 

has been the privilege of my professional life to be one of those CIA officers. 

Now, I have been asked by President Trump to lead this workforce and to continue the work that 

Mike Pompeo and I began a little more than a year ago: ensuring that CIA is postured to meet the 

complex challenges our nation faces. Those challenges include a changing but still lethal threat 

from terrorist groups; a nuclear threat against the continental United States from a rogue state; 

destabilizing Iranian adventurism; an aggressive and sometimes brutal Russia; and the long-term 

implications of China's ambitions on the global stage. 

While these challenges are daunting and offer few easy answers, I am confident the United States 

and the American people have the resolve to meet them head on. If I am confirmed as Director, 

you have my solenm commitment that I will position this Agency to provide the intelligence 

support our country needs to meet the challenges of today, and those of the future. 

I welcome the opportunity to introduce myself to the American people for the first time - it is a 

new experience for me as I spent over 30 years under cover and in the shadows. I don't have any 

social media accounts, but otherwise I think you will find me to be a typical middle class 

American- one with a strong sense of right and wrong and one who loves this country. 

I was born in Kentucky, and while my family has deep roots there, I was an Air Force "brat" and 

followed my father to postings all over the world. My childhood overseas instilled in me an 

appreciation for foreign languages and cultures, but also a deep understanding of the vital role of 

American leadership in confronting aggression abroad. 

I joined the CIA in 1985 as an operations officer in the Clandestine Service. From my first days 

in training, I had a knack for the nuts and bolts of my profession. I excelled in finding and 

acquiring secret information that I obtained in brush passes, dead drops, or in meetings in dusty 

back allies of third world capitals. I recall my first foreign agent meeting was on a dark, 

moonless night with an agent I'd never met before. When I picked him up, he passed me the 

intelligence and I passed him extra money for the men he led. It was the beginning of an 

adventure I had only dreamed of. 

The men who ran CIA in those days leaned forward in giving me the right opportunities to 

succeed or fail. When a very tough, old school leader announced that I was his pick to be Chief 

1 
15 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 2 here 30119.002

of Station in a small but important frontier post, a few competitors complained to me directly 

"why would they send you?" I owe that leader much for believing in me at a time when few 

women were given these opportunities. While I could have done without the long nights, 

sleeping on the floor of my station, I was proud of the work we did there including the successful 

capture of two major terrorists, a counterproliferation operation that went our way, and the 

dismantlement of a local terrorist cell. 

Altogether, I have served seven tours in the field-four as Chief of Station-including hardship 

assignments in distant posts and, more recently, in the capital of a major US ally. 

By any standard, my life at the Agency- and it has been my life -has exceeded all of my 

expectations, from that January day when I took my oath to today. There were few senior women 

leading at CIA in those days, and we are stronger now because that picture is changing. I did my 

part - quietly and through hard work- to break down those barriers. And I was proud to be the 

first woman to serve as the number-two in the Clandestine Service. It is not my way to trumpet 

the fact that I am a woman up for the top job, but I would be remiss in not remarking on it - not 

least because of the outpouring of support from young women at CIA who consider it a good 

sign for their own prospects. 

My experience and success as an operations officer led to three leadership positions in the 

Clandestine Service, and one year ago, I was asked to serve as Deputy Director of CIA. The 

reaction of the workforce to a rare nomination of one of their own to be Director-someone who 

has been in the trenches with them -has been overwhelming. I am humbled by their confidence 

that I can successfully lead this Agency and inspired to work harder than ever to maintain that 

mutual trust. 

They know that I don't need time to learn the business of what CIA does. I know CIA like the 

back of my hand. I know them, I know the threats we face, and I know what we need to be 

successful in our mission. 

I have played a leading role this past year in setting us on the right path and I intend on 

continuing on that path if I am confirmed as Director. 

Our strategy starts with strengthening our core business: collecting intelligence to help 

policymakers protect our country and advance American interests around the globe. It includes 

raising our investment against the most difficult intelligence gaps, putting more officers in the 

foreign field where our adversaries are, and emphasizing foreign language excellence. And, 

finally, it involves investing in our partnerships- both within the US Government and around the 

globe. 

We must do everything we can to follow through on these investments and to make CIA as 

effective as it can possibly be, because the American people deserve no less than CIA's best 

effort. 

This is especially true when it comes to confronting threats from North Korea, Iran, Russia, and 

China. Today, CIA officers are deployed across the globe, sometimes at significant personal 

2 
16 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 3 here 30119.003

risk, collecting critical human and technical intelligence. I have spent my entire career driving 

operations and, if confirmed, I will be able to leverage that experience against these hard targets 

beginning on day one. 

I knew that accepting the president's nomination would raise questions about CIA classified 

activities and my career at the Agency. I also understand that it is important for the American 

people to get to know me so they are able to judge my fitness for this position. So over the last 

few weeks, we have leaned forward to make more information about my professional record 

public. We have also shared details on every aspect of my career through classified channels 

with this Committee, as well as with the rest of the Senate. 

I think it is important to recall the context of those challenging times immediately following 

9/11. For me, I had just returned to Washington from an overseas posting and I reported for duty 

the morning of 9/11. I knew in my gut when I saw the video of the first plane hitting the Tower 

in Manhattan that it was Bin Ladin. I got up from my desk and, like many others, walked over to 

the Counterterrorism Center and volunteered to help. I didn't leave for three years. We worked 

seven days a week, and I even had friends who postponed weddings and having babies. The men 

and women of CIA were driven to prevent another attack. The first boots on the ground in 

Afghanistan were my colleagues. The first U.S. casualty in Afghanistan was a CIA officer and it 

was CIA who identified and captured the mastermind of 9/11 in a brilliant operation. I am proud 

of our work during that time. The hard lessons we learned from that experience inform my 

leadership of CIA today. 

In light of my counterterrorism experience, I understand that what many people around the 

country want to know about are my views on CIA's former detention and interrogation program. 

I have views on this issue, and I want to be clear. Having served in that tumultuous time, I can 

offer you my personal commitment, clearly and without reservation, that under my leadership 

CIA will not restart such a detention and interrogation program. 

CIA has learned some tough lessons, especially when asked to tackle missions that fall outside 

our expertise. For me, there is no better example of implementing lessons learned than what the 

Agency took away from the detention and interrogation program. In retrospect it is clear, as the 

SSCI Majority Report concludes, that CIA was not prepared to conduct a detention and 

interrogation program. 

Today, the US Government has a clear legal and policy framework that governs detentions and 

interrogations. Specifically, the law provides that no individual in US custody may be subjected 

to any interrogation technique or approach that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field 

Manual. I fully support the standards for detainee treatment required by law, and just as 

importantly, I will keep CIA focused on our collection and analysis missions that can best 

leverage the expertise found at the Agency. 

Like I said, we learned important lessons following 9/11. As both a career intelligence officer 

and an American citizen, I am a strong believer in the importance of oversight. Simply put, 

experience has taught us that CIA cannot be effective without the people's trust. And we cannot 

hope to earn that trust without the accountability that comes with Congressional oversight. 

3 
17 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 4 here 30119.004

If we can't share aspects of our secret work with the public, we should do so with their elected 

representatives. For CIA, oversight is a vital link to the open society we defend. It's a defming 

feature of the US Intelligence Community, and one ofthe many things that distinguishes us from 

the hostile services we face in the field. 

If confirmed as Director, I will uphold the Agency's obligations to Congress and ensure that 

oversight works on behalf of the American people. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the Committee for the hard work that is put into the 

oversight process, and for the vital support that you provide to my fellow officers. 

CIA has given a lot to me over the past three decades-a calling in service to my country, some 

real-life adventures, and the profound satisfaction of serving with some of the most talented and 

honorable men and women anyone could ever meet. 

If confirmed, I hope to repay the debt I owe to this remarkable Agency by drawing on my 

experience. I know what my fellow officers need from me and, I know what our nation needs 

from CIA-truth, integrity, and courage. 

Again, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to sit before you today, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

### 

4 
18 

Chairman BURR. Ms. Haspel, thank you for that testimony. 

Let me inform members that we will have a five-minute round 

of questions. We will recognize members based upon seniority. I 

would ask all members to adhere to the five-minute timeframe and 

I would remind members that we are in an open session; therefore, 

classified questions and/or answers would not be appropriate for 

this period. When we have completed the open session, we will immediately move to a closed session where every question will be answered, I am certain. 

The Chair recognizes himself for up to five minutes. 

Ms. Haspel, let’s just dig right into it. There’s been much debate 

and much news coverage about Jose Rodriguez, the former Director 

of the National Clandestine Service, and his decision to direct the 

destruction of the detainee interrogation videotapes. Can you describe for members your role in those events? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, yes I can. In 2005—I believe it was fall of 

2005—I was chief of staff to the Deputy Director for Operations, 

that is head of the Clandestine Service. The tape issue had lingered at CIA for a period of about three years. I believe the tapes 

were made in 2002, and over time, there was a great deal of concern about the security risks posed to CIA officers who were depicted on the tapes. 

Those security issues centered on the threat from Al-Qaeda 

should those tapes be irresponsibly leaked. Mr. Rodriguez, who was 

the DDO at the time, the Deputy Director for Operations, has been 

very up-front and has made it clear on a number of occasions publicly that he and he alone made the decision to destroy the tapes. 

I would also make it clear that I did not appear on the tapes, 

as has been mischaracterized in the press. However, as chief of 

staff, and I believe like everyone at the Agency at that time, we 

were extremely concerned about the security risk that was posed 

to our officers. We were aiming to do two things: to adhere to U.S. 

law, but at the same time reach a resolution that would protect our 

officers. 

There were numerous legal consultations over a period of years 

at the Agency. Our lawyers were very consistent in saying to us 

that there was no legal requirement to retain the tapes, no legal 

impediment to disposing of the tapes. I’m not a lawyer, but I believe the basis for that judgment was the fact that there was a 

complete and written detailed record of the interrogations; and at 

CIA, the official record is the cable record. We use that for all of 

our operations. 

There were two reviews done of the tapes to compare them to the 

written record. One of those was undertaken by the Office of General Counsel. The second was undertaken by the Office of the Inspector General. In both cases, they found that the written record 

was detailed, accurate and complete. So the consistent legal advice—it never changed—was that there was no legal requirement 

to retain the tapes. 

But, there were some policy objections to disposing of the tapes. 

So, our job in the Office of the Deputy Director for Operations was 

to arrange consultations with senior leaders at the Agency. 

At the time the tapes were destroyed, Mr. Rodriguez asked me 

to prepare a cable because he was going to have another conversaLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

19 

tion with then Director of the Agency to talk about this issue 

again. I did so. 

A couple of days later, he released the order, he believed on his 

own authority. He took the decision himself and he said it was 

based on his own authority. I asked him if he had had the consultation with the Director at the time as planned and he said he 

decided to take the decision on his own authority. 

There were three investigations, three looks at the tapes, inquiries, that I know about. One was undertaken by HPSCI, the House 

Oversight Committee. I never saw a report on that, but the chairman at the time said that he found no fault with my actions. There 

was a Department of Justice investigation that was closed without 

charges after, I think, more than two years. 

And then, there was an internal investigation of the issue conducted by one of my predecessors, Mr. Morell, who found no fault 

with my actions and that my decisions were consistent with my obligations as an Agency officer. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you for that answer. 

Recognizing my five minutes is now up, I recognize the Vice 

Chairman. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to follow-up on the question around the tapes, Ms. 

Haspel. November 4 of 2005, then Senator Levin introduced legislation to create a commission modeled on the 9/11 Commission, to 

look into the Agency’s treatment of detainees. Three days later, you 

drafted the cable. Four days later, the tapes were destroyed. Were 

you aware of Senator Levin’s actions? The timing seems very close 

to acting on behalf of potential Congressional action. 

And in Mr. Morell’s statements, there were comments that your 

superior, Mr. Rodriguez, was aware that two White House counsels, the counsel to the Vice President, the DNI and the DCIA and 

the HPSCI ranking member had all expressed opposition or reservations about the destruction of the tapes. 

So were you aware of those facts that Mr. Rodriguez was at least 

aware of, and were you aware of the actions of Senator Levin when 

you drafted your memo and then had the tapes subsequently destroyed? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator Warner, what I recall were the security 

issues surrounding the tapes. I don’t recall pending legislation. I 

just don’t recall that. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. What about the issue of all of the counsel, the counsel to the Vice President, DNI, HPSCI ranking member, the fact that there was—— 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I don’t know if I was aware of all of those, 

but I knew there were—there was disagreement about the issue of 

the tapes outside the Agency, and that is why we were working toward a meeting with the then Director, to talk about those issues 

and how we addressed those concerns of people outside the Agency. 

So I was working toward resolution within a process. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Well, with that overhang—and I know 

other members will raise this—the timing seems—I hope I can get 

some more clarity on the timing. I want to make sure I take my 

time, though. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

20 

I heard your statement about the fact that if you’re confirmed 

there will never be an interrogation program under your leadership. And you addressed the issue of the fact that it is against the 

law. The question I have: With the benefit of hindsight, do you believe the program in terms the interrogation program was consistent with American values? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, as we sit here today and with some distance between us and the events of 9/11, the Congress, and indeed 

our Nation, have had an opportunity to have a debate about the 

interrogation standards we want to use as the United States of 

America. We had decided to hold ourselves to a stricter moral 

standard. For DOD, that is defined in the Army Field Manual. I 

support the United States holding itself to that stricter moral 

standard and I support the Army Field Manual. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. But, Ms. Haspel, that is answering on 

a legalistic—we’re asking you to take on a position. I understand 

with RDI you were downstream, not part of the policymaking. But 

if you’re entrusted with this responsibility, we need, I need, to at 

least get a sense of what your moral code says about those kind 

of actions. Because there is the potential that this President could 

ask you to do something—he obviously believes in these procedures—but even if he asked you to do something that is not directly related to detention interrogation. But if he asked you to do 

something that you believe is morally questionable, even if there is 

an OLC opinion that in effect gives you a ‘‘Get Out of Jail Free’’ 

card, what will you do in that action when you are the Director of 

the CIA? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, my father is watching today. He served 33 

years in the Air Force. My parents gave me a very strong moral 

compass. I support the higher moral standard that this country has 

decided to hold itself to. I would never ever take CIA back to an 

interrogation program. 

First of all, CIA follows the law. We followed the law then. We 

follow the law today. I support the law. I wouldn’t support a 

change in the law. But I’ll tell you this: I would not put CIA officers at risk by asking them to undertake risky, controversial activity again. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Ms. Haspel, my question is this: On a 

going-forward basis, if this President asked you to do something 

that you find morally objectionable, even if there is an OLC opinion, what will you do? Will you carry that out, that order, or not? 

I mean, we’re entrusting you in a very different position if you’re 

confirmed. I just need to know what your response to that would 

be. 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, my moral compass is strong. I would not 

allow CIA to undertake activity that I felt was immoral even if it 

was technically legal. I would absolutely not permit it. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. So you would not follow the order if you 

felt it was—— 

Ms. HASPEL. No. I believe that CIA must undertake activities 

that are consistent with American values. America is looked at all 

over the world as an example to everyone else in the world and we 

have to uphold that, and CIA is included in that. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

21 

Chairman BURR. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Haspel, thank you for undertaking this and thank you for 

your many years of service with the CIA. 

For my colleagues, I’m going to tell you right at the outset: I’m 

going to support this nomination. I don’t take that lightly. I’ve had 

the opportunity to review all the materials that have been provided. But more importantly than that, I’ve known Ms. Haspel for 

the ten years I’ve been on this committee and had the opportunity 

to work with her over those years and even visit you out in the 

field when you were at the garden spots that—— 

Ms. HASPEL. I remember. 

Senator RISCH. Right. 

In any event, for my colleagues, I can report to you that during 

this time I have always found Ms. Haspel to be open, to be forthcoming, and to be truthful. And that is incredibly important as we 

exercise the things that we have to do as far as authorizing, as far 

as financing, and as far as oversight of what this really, really important work is that the CIA does. 

So for that, Ms. Haspel, you will be rewarded with my vote, and 

I feel very comfortable about that, and I sincerely appreciate your 

openness as we’ve met over the years and I’ve had the opportunity 

to ask you about the things that I needed to know as I discharge 

my obligations. 

I’m also persuaded greatly by the former directors, both Republicans and Democrats, who are enthusiastically supporting your appointment to this. I think that is very important. 

I’m also persuaded by something that I think other members of 

this committee have probably run across, and that is we all from 

this committee deal regularly with our partners in intel from foreign countries. As you know, that’s critically important to the job 

of the CIA and the other 16 intelligence agencies. Those relationships, those contacts, those dealings we have with those foreign 

agencies, are very important. 

And I have to tell you that uniformly people who I have discussed your taking on this job have been very enthusiastic about 

it. They know you. They trust you. The trust of this Agency is so 

important when we deal with the Five Eyes or amongst the Five 

Eyes or with other intelligence partners. So thank you for that. 

Also, I deal with a lot of the employees at the CIA. They are incredibly enthusiastic about your appointment to this, so thank you 

for that. 

For the American people who are watching this, I can tell you 

that everybody sitting on this side of the table regularly hears 

things that cause us to not sleep very well at night. As the head 

of this Agency, I can tell you I will sleep better at night knowing 

you’re directing these efforts, so thank you for that. 

Thank you for undertaking what you are undertaking. I know 

that you have thought about this carefully. If the press reports are 

right, you’ve been up and down a little bit on this. But the American people will be very grateful for your service. 

Let me ask a question as we close here. You know, over the ten 

years—I came here just as the investigation on the interrogation 

thing was starting, and I participated, other members of the comLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

22 

mittee here participated, in that. And there was a real tension between not just the CIA, but the other intelligence agencies, because 

of the way the oversight was being done by this committee. 

My impression is, and it’s a clear impression, that the relationship between the Agency, CIA, and the other intelligence agencies, 

has evolved to a very different place than where it was when I first 

got here. Could you talk about that a little bit, please? 

Ms. HASPEL. Thank you for that question, Senator. I think it’s a 

very important question. When Mike Pompeo and I took the reins 

at Langley about 15 months ago, we decided to concentrate on four 

initiatives. And one of those is partnerships, and it involves two 

areas: first, our partnerships with our other IC partners in the U.S. 

Government, but even more broadly than that. 

There are many important partnerships for CIA and, as you say, 

those partnerships are critical because it’s a complex world. 

There is no more important partnership than the one between 

CIA and DOD. I have had the absolute honor and privilege to sit 

at the table with Secretary Mattis and General Dunford these last 

15 months, to work with the JSOC commander and the other combatant commanders. I don’t think that very important relationship 

has ever been in a better place. Likewise, NSA is our sister agency. 

We’re very close. And of course, our relationship with the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation is critical to the national security of this 

country. 

But you mentioned something else that’s important and it’s a bit 

of an unheralded story. But the intelligence services of our closest 

allies do amazing things for the national security of this country 

each and every day. And I can’t talk very much about it in this 

open session, but they do incredible things that advance our national security on the terrorism and proliferation fronts in particular, and we owe a great deal of gratitude to those allies. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you for that. 

Chairman BURR. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, Ms. Haspel. 

Ms. HASPEL. Good morning, Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. While many nominees have classified backgrounds, you are very unique. You have 30 years of undercover experience. Accordingly, we asked the Agency that your records be 

declassified—I think I signed three letters in that regard—to make 

an informed decision and because the public should be aware of the 

background of its leaders. 

Instead, the CIA selectively declassified only small pieces of information to bolster your nomination, while keeping damaging information under wraps. Given the CIA’s refusal to make your 

record public, I’m very limited in what I can say. I think as you 

know, I like you personally very much. This is probably the most 

difficult hearing in my more than two decades I have ever sat in, 

but let me begin. 

In his memoir, Former CIA Counsel General John Rizzo described how in 2005 Jose Rodriguez was promoted to be Deputy 

CIA Director for Operations and installed as his chief of staff an 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

23 

officer from the Counterterrorism Center who had previously run 

the interrogation program. Is that you? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I’m so pleased you asked me that question. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Yes or no will do. 

Ms. HASPEL. No. And for the record, if you have your staff check, 

Mr. Rizzo has issued a correction. 

It is true that it is hard in a secret—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Excuse me. My understanding is that he—— 

Ms. HASPEL. That is not accurate. 

Senator FEINSTEIN [continuing]. Has recently confirmed that it 

was you. 

Ms. HASPEL. No. He issued a correction. 

When people write books—I didn’t read Mr. Rizzo’s book, so I 

didn’t even know that was out there. Mr. Rizzo—and actually I 

read about it in the ‘‘Washington Post’’ last night. Erik Wemple I 

believe wrote a story talking about the failure of certain organizations to correct their facts, and that was one of them; and he noted 

that Mr. Rizzo, about ten days ago—he was wrong. He didn’t factcheck. And that has been corrected. 

I never even served in that department, nor was I the head of 

it. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Let me read directly his quote from the book: 

‘‘Several weeks later, Porter promoted Jose Rodriguez to the position of Deputy Director for Operations, Jim Pavitt’s former job. 

Once more, Jose installed as his chief of staff an officer from the 

Counterterrorism Center who had previously run the interrogation 

program. Between them, they were the staunchest advocates inside 

the building for destroying the tapes.’’ 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I did not run the interrogation department. 

In fact, I was not even read into the interrogation program until 

it had been up and running for a year. I never served—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Were you an advocate for destroying the 

tapes? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I absolutely was an advocate if we could 

within and conforming to U.S. law and if we could get policy concurrence to eliminate the security risk posed to our officers by 

those tapes and the consistent legal—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Were you aware of what those tapes contained? 

Ms. HASPEL. No, I never watched the tapes. But I understood 

that our officers’ faces were on them and that that was very dangerous at a time when there were unauthorized disclosures that 

were exposing the program. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. But it also exposed how the program was 

conducted, because they were tapes of the actual interrogation of 

certain—of 92 detainees, as I understand it. 

Ms. HASPEL. No, the tapes were recordings of only one detainee. 

It was 92 tapes of one detainee. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. All right. Well, thank you for that. 

Let me—in November and December of 2002, did you oversee the 

enhanced interrogation of al-Nashiri, which included the use of the 

waterboard as publicly reported? Yes or no? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, anything about my classified assignment 

history throughout my 33 years we can talk about in this afterLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

24 

noon’s classified session. There are guidelines on, as you know, existing classification guidelines. 

And I should go back to your first point, which is very, very important, about why we haven’t declassified more about my history. 

There are existing classification guidelines that apply to operational activity of any officer. It has been suggested to me by my 

team that if we tried to declassify some of my operational history, 

it would help my nomination. I said that we could not do that. It 

is very important that the Director of the Central Intelligence 

Agency adhere to the same classification guidelines that all employees must adhere to, because there are very good reasons for 

those classification guidelines. Exposing operational information 

can be damaging to sources and methods, as you know, but there 

is also a physical risk to officers who go out to the far ends of the 

globe and conduct dangerous missions and they believe that their 

participation in those dangerous missions will be protected. It 

would be a security risk if we started declassifying associations between CIA officers and particular terrorist or terrorist operations. 

So I am adhering to the existing guidelines and I believe that it 

is important and that I could not stand before the CIA if I sought 

for short-term gain to declassify my operational history. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. The Senator’s time has expired. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Ms. Haspel, when I joined this committee seven years ago I knew 

as much about the CIA as the average American. Obviously, I 

know a lot more these days. Much of it can’t be shared, but there’s 

two things that I can. The first is that it’s very easy to sit back 

and criticize the work of the Agency with the benefit of hindsight. 

And the second, is that the Agency is made up of some of the 

smartest, most talented professionals that I’ve ever encountered in 

any field in my time in public service or beyond. These are men 

and women that could be making a lot of money in the private sector, but instead they’ve chosen to serve our country, many in the 

shadows, many at the risk of their own lives, all to keep us safe. 

By the way, they sacrifice this money, this time with their family, 

this normal life in many cases, in defense of the freedoms, including the freedoms of the protesters who often smear them and the 

activists who often slander them. 

Ms. Haspel, you embody everything that I respect and admire 

about the men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency and 

I support you, not just because of your qualifications, but because 

I want a young CIA trainee or case officer, I want today’s operational officers, I want today’s station chiefs, I want today’s—all of 

these professionals, to know that they too can one day be sitting 

where you are sitting today and have the opportunity to lead this 

Agency. 

And I would ask, if someone like you, with your history, with 

your record of service and sacrifice and excellence, if someone like 

you cannot be confirmed to head this Agency, than who can? And 

if someone like you is smeared in this process, what message are 

we sending to the young men and women who today are serving 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

25 

our country in the same roles in which you have served our country 

over the last 30 years. 

And I thought it was important for that to be part of the record 

today because as much as anything else, this hearing is not just 

about your nomination. For me, it is also about the men and 

women who serve us, of which I said at the outset, you embody the 

best of the men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency. 

On a policy front, I want to ask you about U.S.-China relations. 

For decades, American foreign policy towards China has been rooted in the belief that as they prospered economically they would embrace democracy, they would embrace the global rule of law. That 

consensus I think by all accounts has been catastrophically wrong. 

Today China is undertaking a comprehensive effort to supplant the 

United States and to undermine us. And they’ve benefited from the 

greatest transfer of wealth in history, through the theft and the 

forced transfer of intellectual property. They use unfair trade and 

other practices to undermine our industrial and technical base. 

They gather and exploit data at an unrivaled scale. They’re building the most capable and well-funded military in the world second 

to ours. 

So my question, first and foremost: Is the Agency, as it stands 

today, equipped and structured to meet this multifaceted challenge? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, thank you for that question. One of the 

first things Mike Pompeo and I looked at when I returned to the 

Agency from overseas in early 2017 is how we’re doing on the hard 

targets—that’s what you’re talking about—China, Iran, Russia and 

North Korea. 

Of course, our investment in counterterrorism has to be very significant. We have to be vigilant and we can’t take our eyes off that 

ball. But there are more strategic threats and you talked about one 

them, China, China’s rise as a global power. CIA has a very important role in monitoring China’s rise as a global power. China’s efforts to diminish U.S. influence, not only in the Pacific, but all 

around the world; China’s unfair trade practices, and China’s overt 

and illicit efforts to steal U.S. technology and know how and intellectual property. 

We, with the support of this committee, are raising our investment on each of these hard targets. We have incredible expertise 

on China at the Agency. It is a very strong team. I’m very proud 

of our analysts. It is a subject that a week doesn’t go by that either 

the President asks for an expert briefing or Secretary Mattis asks 

for someone to come over and brief him on China issues. We have 

a good program, but your more general point is that we have to do 

more and we have to invest more on each of these hard targets. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, I recently introduced legislation with Senator Cotton that would block the U.S. government from buying or 

leasing telecommunication equipment from Huawei or ZTE Corporation. Beyond government purchase, I would ask you, just for 

the citizens that are watching; if you were just an everyday American or even someone involved in any sort of sensitive work, would 

you purchase a Huawei phone or connect your phone or computer 

to a Huawei or ZTE network? 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

26 

Ms. HASPEL. Well, Senator, as I mentioned, I don’t even have a 

social media account, but I wouldn’t use Huawei products. 

Chairman BURR. The Senator’s time has expired. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Haspel, thank you very much for your courtesy in meeting 

with me yesterday. However, I regret to have to say there is no 

greater indictment of this nomination process than the fact that 

you are deciding what the country gets to know about you and 

what it doesn’t. And so far, the American people have only been 

given information that is designed to help you get confirmed. Everything else has been classified. So I’ve got some questions. I 

think they’re fairly short and some I hope we can do yes or no. 

Now, you publicly released the Morell report, which some have 

cited as reflecting favorably about your involvement in the destruction of interrogation tapes. Do you have any objection this morning 

to the public release of the Durham investigation, which would give 

the American people more information on the same topic, in which, 

does not come from the CIA? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, just to be clear, the request for the declassification of the Morell memo was in response to a member on this 

committee. I have not read the Durham report and I don’t know 

the classification. So let me take that for the record if I may? 

Senator WYDEN. But do you have any objection? 

Ms. HASPEL. Well, I haven’t seen it, so I haven’t read it. So I 

don’t know. 

Senator WYDEN. Well, I’m going to ask you about this in the classified session. But I think in the name of fairness with respect to 

your role on these issues, this ought to be made public just the way 

the Morell report was. 

Now, on Sunday the ‘‘Washington Post’’ reported that unnamed 

officials were pushing back against accusations that you supported 

torture, in one of our biggest papers in the country. Between 2005 

and 2007 the program was winding down. The CIA was capturing 

fewer detainees and waterboarding was no longer approved. During 

that time, did you ever call for the program to be continued or expanded? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I think, like all of us who were in the 

Counterterrorism Center and working at CIA in those years after 

9/11, we all believed in our work. We were committed. We had been 

charged with making sure the country wasn’t attacked again. And 

we had been informed that the techniques in CIA’s program were 

legal and authorized by the highest legal authority in our country 

and also the President. So I believe I and my colleagues in the 

Counterterrorism Center were working as hard as we could, with 

the tools that we were given—— 

Senator WYDEN. Ma’am—— 

Ms. HASPEL [continuing]. To make sure that we were successful 

in our mission. 

Senator WYDEN. My time is short and that, respectfully, is not 

responsive to the question. That was a period where the Agency 

was capturing fewer detainees, waterboarding was no longer approved and especially in light of that ‘‘Washington Post’’ story, I 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

27 

would really like to have on the record whether you ever called for 

the program to be continued, which it sure sounds to me like your 

answer suggested. You said: Well, we were doing our job; it ought 

to be continued. That troubles me very much, because you were the 

chief of staff to the Deputy Director for Operations. It’s a senior position. So I’m quite troubled by that response. 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, may I just say that—— 

Senator WYDEN. Of course. 

Ms. HASPEL [continuing]. I don’t know which ‘‘Washington Post’’ 

story you’re referring to, but let me say this about myself. After 9/ 

11, I didn’t look to go sit on the Swiss desk. I stepped up. I was 

not on the sidelines. I was on the frontlines in the Cold War and 

I was on the frontlines in the fight against Al-Qaeda. 

Senator WYDEN. I respect that. 

Ms. HASPEL. I’m very proud of the fact that we captured the perpetrator of 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. I think we did extraordinary work. To me, the tragedy is that the controversy surrounding the interrogation program, which as I’ve already indicated to Senator Warner I fully understand that, but it has cast a 

shadow over what has been a major contribution to protecting this 

country. 

Senator WYDEN. I respect a number of those points. I just am 

trying to get some answers here to questions that I think are particularly relevant. 

According to a press story today about the destruction of the interrogation videotapes, Jose Rodriguez told you in advance that he 

was going to take matters into his own hands. Did that conversation happen? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, no, it did not. Mr. Rodriguez indicated to 

me that he planned to discuss it with the then Director Goss. 

Senator WYDEN. Let me see if I can get one last question in on 

it. When did you become aware that the cable authorizing the destruction of the interrogation videotapes had been sent? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, as chief of staff, it’s a desk-bound job, so 

I was at my desk at least 12 hours every day, and I could see my 

computer screen. So it was shortly after Mr. Rodriguez, who sat 

right across the hall from me, had released the cable. 

Senator WYDEN. I’m over my time. I’ll ask some more about this 

in the classified session. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Jack Reed and I co-sponsored the McCain-Feinstein bill 

that banned waterboarding and other enhanced interrogation techniques because we viewed them as contrary to American values 

and tantamount to torture. So let me ask you a series of questions. 

First, were you involved in any way in the creation of the enhanced 

interrogation program? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I was not, and I was not read into the program until about a year into its existence. 

Senator COLLINS. Were you a senior manager at the CIA at the 

time that the program was created? 

Ms. HASPEL. No. I had just returned from an overseas posting. 

I was a GS–15. I was not yet a member of the Senior Executive 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

28 

Service. I was assigned as a deputy group chief—that’s pretty far 

down the totem pole—in a program that had nothing to do with the 

detention and interrogation program. 

Senator COLLINS. You said that the program had already been in 

effect for some time before you were read into it. What was your 

reaction when you learned of the program? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, it was a new subject for me. As I said, we 

lacked interrogation expertise at the Agency. We didn’t have interrogators. I was told that interrogation experts had designed the 

program, that the highest legal authority in the United States had 

approved it, and that the President of the United States had approved it, as well as a trusted leadership at the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Senator COLLINS. Have your views of the program evolved in the 

years following the attacks on our country on 9/11? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, they have. I think it’s very important. I 

think for any leader as you go through a career, you have to learn 

the leadership lessons. I’m not going to sit here with the benefit of 

hindsight and judge the very good people who made hard decisions 

who were running the Agency in very extraordinary circumstances 

at the time. But, as I mentioned to Senator Warner, this country 

has had the opportunity to reflect because we have some space. 

We’re not fearing another attack, and we have deliberated about 

the standard we want to use in interrogations, and that is the 

Army Field Manual. 

The very important thing to know about CIA is we follow the 

law. We followed the law then and we follow the law now. But I 

would never permit CIA to resume an interrogation program. 

Senator COLLINS. So that’s a very good segue into a very important question. As a candidate, President Trump repeatedly expressed his support for waterboarding. In fact, he said we should 

go beyond waterboarding. So if the CIA has a high-value terrorism 

suspect in its custody and the President gave you a direct order to 

waterboard that suspect, what would you do? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I would advise, I do not believe the President would ask me to do that. But we have today in the U.S. government other U.S. government entities that conduct interrogations. DOD uses the Army Field Manual and they conduct battlefield interrogations, and CIA has incredible expertise it can bring 

to the table in support of those interrogations. 

The FBI has its authorities to conduct interrogations. And, as 

you know, we have the High-value Interrogation Group. So I would 

advise anyone who asks me about it that CIA is not the right place 

to conduct interrogations. We don’t have interrogators and we don’t 

have interrogation expertise. 

So I believe that that would be my—the reason I have been nominated is that people have some respect for my views on these 

issues. My experiences during those days after 9/11 inform my 

views. I’m extremely knowledgeable and I’m also extremely knowledgeable about the price CIA working level men and women out in 

the trenches paid for decisions made after 9/11. 

Senator COLLINS. So debriefing a source is very different from interrogating a detainee. Should the CIA even be in the business of 

interrogating detainees? 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

29 

Ms. HASPEL. We don’t—we’re not in the business of interrogating—— 

Senator COLLINS. That’s for the HIG, is what you’re saying? 

Ms. HASPEL. Well, we’re not in the business of interrogating detainees. As you said, there’s a big difference between interrogation 

and simple question and answer. Having access, direct access to a 

terrorist, is extremely valuable for intelligence collection and we do 

that. But CIA does not today conduct interrogations. We never did 

historically and we’re not getting back in that business. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. The Senator’s time has expired. 

Senator Heinrich. 

Senator HEINRICH. Ms. Haspel, you didn’t actually answer the 

question. What would you do if the President ordered you to get 

back in that business? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, the President has selected me to give 

him—— 

Senator HEINRICH. That’s a yes—— 

Ms. HASPEL [continuing]. Advice. I would not restart under any 

circumstances an interrogation program at CIA, under any circumstances. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you. 

You have repeatedly said that at the time the CIA’s use of interrogation techniques like waterboarding were determined to be 

legal. Now, there was an opinion written by the Office of Legal 

Counsel. I don’t believe those actions were ever legal. They certainly didn’t meet the bar set by either the Geneva Conventions or 

our own Army Field Manual, and I’m not aware of a single court 

ruling that affirmed that opinion. 

Today I’m not really interested in whether you believe those 

techniques were legal, but I am interested in the question that 

Senator Warner asked you. We got a very legalistic answer to that 

question. Let me ask you again: Were these the right thing to do? 

Are they consistent with American values fundamentally? What do 

you believe? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I believe very strongly in American values 

and America being an example to the rest of the world. That is why 

I support the fact that we have chosen to hold ourselves to a stricter moral standard. 

Senator HEINRICH. But that’s about Congress and all of us. I 

want to know what you think. 

Ms. HASPEL. I think that we should hold ourselves to a stricter 

moral standard and I would never allow CIA to be involved in coercive interrogations. 

Senator HEINRICH. Where was that moral compass at the time? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, that was 17 years ago. You know, CIA, like 

the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps, is an organization, it’s 

a large bureaucracy. And when you’re out in the trenches at farflung outposts in the globe and Washington says, here’s what we 

need you to do, this is legal, the Attorney General has deemed it 

so, the President of the United States is counting on you—— 

Senator HEINRICH. No, I know you believed it was legal. 

Ms. HASPEL [continuing]. To prevent another attack—I’m sorry? 

Senator HEINRICH. I know you believed it was legal. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

30 

I want to see, I want to feel, I want to trust that you have the 

moral compass that you said you have. You’re giving very legalistic 

answers to very fundamentally moral questions. 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, you know, we’ve provided the committee 

every evaluation since my training report when I first joined in 

1985. In all of my assignments, I have conducted myself honorably 

and in accordance with U.S. law. My parents raised me right. I 

know the difference between right and wrong. 

Senator HEINRICH. Let’s move on to the videotapes. You told me 

earlier this week that you supported the decision of the CIA’s Deputy Director of Operations to order the destruction of those videotapes depicting the use of EIT’s. Would you still support that order 

today? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I would not. I think it’s—as I said, it’s very 

important that people learn. Experience is a good teacher and the 

piece that was missing from the tapes was making sure that we 

had all the stakeholders’ concurrence. 

There’s also another very important leadership lesson; and as Director of CIA, when your officers are concerned about their physical 

security, you can’t let it languish in your inbox—— 

Senator HEINRICH. Absolutely, I agree. 

Ms. HASPEL [continuing]. For three years with no action. 

Senator HEINRICH. We should support that security. 

Why couldn’t the Agency have simply digitized that video and 

then blacked out the faces of any agents in those videos? Why actually destroy the videotapes? Doesn’t that feel like a cover up, even 

if it isn’t? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I don’t think we were worried about official 

release. This was at a time when the entire program was the subject of unauthorized leaks and someone was found guilty of those 

unauthorized leaks. So the concern was an irresponsible leak of our 

officers’ faces to the world, not an official release. 

Senator HEINRICH. No, I understand that. But if you would 

blacked out the agents’ faces, destroyed the videotapes, and then 

kept a digital record, that would’ve addressed those security concerns. 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I’m just not a technical person, so I 

don’t—— 

Senator HEINRICH. It’s not that complicated. 

Ms. HASPEL. Well, Senator, I don’t know if that was considered 

or not. 

Senator HEINRICH. Do you think that a transcript that says ‘‘the 

detainee continued to scream’’ or ‘‘the detainee appeared to be 

drowning’’ has the same gravity, the same reality, as an actual 

video? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I never saw the videos. I do know that we 

keep very complete and almost verbatim records in our cable traffic. But I think that the issue was the security risk posed our officers. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. The gentleman’s time’s expired. 

Senator Blunt. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

31 

Ms. Haspel, you know, we haven’t really mentioned the broad 

support that you have had publicly from Democrats, Republicans, 

people who’ve run this Agency in the past, people you have associated with. Frankly, people that this committee has, members on 

this committee have shown great respect and regard for, have 

shown that same respect and regard for you. 

I heard General Hayden, the former CIA Director, say the other 

day that he would be incredibly comfortable when the President 

was making decisions—he may have said maybe even more than 

comfortable. He said he would feel more secure, or something like 

that, if you were the person in the room. 

That’s really what we’re talking about right now. We’re not talking about what happened 17 years ago. We should be talking about 

what might happen 17 days or 17 weeks from now. I thought General Hayden actually captured my exact feelings on this topic: the 

importance of you being in the room, your mastery of the facts, 

your broad understanding of what has happened during your career all over the world, the cause, the result, the relationships, all 

of those things. 

This is a term I think is often overused and I try not to use it 

very often, but it is ‘‘truth to power.’’ You’re in the room; you understand the facts. Talk about your sense of obligation to present 

those facts and to speak truth to power at a moment when it matters. 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, thank you. Truth to power is one of CIA’s 

most important missions. Like with any new administration, CIA 

has to demonstrate to the new team what we can bring to the 

table. I’m incredibly proud—even though I come from the operational side, I’m incredibly proud of the analysts at CIA. That’s 

really our face with policymakers, including the Congress. They do 

an incredible job on the President’s Daily Brief each day. They do 

an incredible job on the expert briefings they provide to inform the 

important decisions our policymakers must consider. 

As I mentioned, there isn’t a week that doesn’t go by that I am 

not the subject of a request to have an analyst by name come over 

and talk about some of the big issues. Our North Korea team has 

a superb reputation. Our China team is running all over this town, 

they’re so busy providing briefings. We are all about bringing the 

most sophisticated, objective, all-source analysis we can to make 

sure that the President and his team have the best intelligence 

that we can deliver. It’s hugely important—— 

[Interruption.] 

Chairman BURR. Capitol Police, please remove her. 

Senator BLUNT. So let’s go back. As a leader of the team, I appreciate that. I appreciate your respect for the team. Let’s be sure we 

talk specifically about you. You’re in the room. There is a fact that 

either hasn’t appropriately been looked at or considered or appreciated in your view. What do you do at that moment? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, thank you. I’ve already worked with this 

President and his team for 15 months. I think I have a great reputation with them. I’m at the table with Secretary Mattis and General Dunford and Secretary Mnuchin. I’m at many of the principals 

meetings. I back up the former Director in the Oval Office, where 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

32 

I’m part of Director Coats’ team. Sometimes Sue Gordon is with 

me. 

I think we’re bringing a very high-quality product. As a senior 

intelligence officer, someone who spent a lot of time overseas in 

some of these places, the President does turn to me for my view 

on certain countries and certain experiences. I give him my best 

advice. But I always separate my view, as someone who’s been out 

in the field, from the view of our analysts, because we’re really 

there to deliver the objective all-source analysis that they write to 

support the President. 

Senator BLUNT. So you would see yourself as the master of the 

facts, to be sure the President knows all the facts the President 

needs to know? 

Ms. HASPEL. I think that’s incredibly important, Senator. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you. 

Thank you Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you Senator. 

Senator King. 

Senator KING. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

First, I’ve been to some of those garden spots with the committee 

and I have the greatest admiration and respect for what you and 

your colleagues have done over the years and do now. That’s one 

of the great responses I have when I come back from one of those 

trips, that the stations are, the people in those places are brave 

and loyal and patriotic Americans. 

A quick yes or no question, not having to do with what we’ve 

been talking about. In January of 2017, the IC issued a joint report 

on the Russia involvement in the 2016 elections. Do you agree with 

the findings of that report? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I do. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

We’ve talked a bit about the statement in Mr. Rizzo’s book that 

you had previously run the interrogation program. I understand he 

has changed his view on that. Your career timeline: 2001 to 2003, 

Deputy Group Chief, Counterterrorism Center; 2003 to 2004, Senior Level Supervisor, Counterterrorism Center; 2004 to 2005, Deputy Chief, National Resources Division. In any of those jobs, were 

you in a supervisory or management capacity in connection with 

the rendition and interrogation program? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, we’ll be able to go over—and I know you 

have some of this information. But we’ll be able to go over any of 

my classified assignments in this afternoon session and I can talk 

about that. 

Just to be clear, Mr. Rizzo didn’t change his view; he was wrong 

and he issued a correction. 

Senator KING. Who’s deciding what’s classified and what isn’t in 

terms of what’s released to this committee? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, we are following the existing guidelines. 

There are very—— 

Senator KING. Who’s deciding? 

Ms. HASPEL. We are following the existing guide—— 

Senator KING. Who’s ‘‘we’’? 

Ms. HASPEL. Well, I have chosen to follow the guidelines that 

exist for the RDI—— 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

33 

Senator KING. So you are making the classification decisions 

about what material should be released to this committee? 

Ms. HASPEL. I am electing not to make an exception for myself, 

but I am adhering to existing RDI guidelines. If I may just—— 

Senator KING. That’s fine. I just wanted to understand that. 

With regard to the cable, Mr. Rodriguez said that he asked you to 

ask two questions of the lawyers the day before the drafting of the 

cable. One was: Was it legal to destroy the tapes? Second, did he 

have the authority? Did you mention to those lawyers the intention 

to issue a cable that would destroy the tapes when you asked those 

two questions or were those the only questions you asked? 

Ms. HASPEL. No, Senator, I explained that Mr. Rodriguez wanted 

to get resolution on this issue and that he was planning to have 

a conversation with the Director about it and he needed to have revalidation of those two points. 

Senator KING. And you drafted the cable, is that correct? 

Ms. HASPEL. Yes at his request. 

Senator KING. Isn’t it common practice in the CIA when a cable, 

particularly of this importance, is drafted that it be copied to various parts of the legal establishment within the CIA? And was that 

done in this case? Was that cable copied to Mr. Rizzo or other lawyers within the Agency? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, there was—there was robust coordination 

with the lawyers at CIA on this issue—— 

Senator KING. Were they copied on the cable? 

Ms. HASPEL. Mr. Rodriguez chose not to copy the lawyers on the 

cable because he took the decision on his own authority and he 

wanted to take responsibility for it. He’s been very clear and up 

front about that. 

Senator KING. And you were aware, because you drafted the 

cable, that the lawyers weren’t copied on the cable? 

Ms. HASPEL. But I knew that the lawyers had been consulted in 

a meeting and consulted over many times over three years. 

Senator KING. In May 2005, Mr. Rizzo reports, ‘‘I told Jose and 

his chief of staff.’’ That was you, is that correct? ‘‘I can’t recall if 

I talked to them separately or together. They were crestfallen because they were now on notice that the DNI, two successive White 

House counsels, and the Vice President’s top lawyer had weighed 

in strongly against destroying the tapes.’’ 

Do you recall that conversation? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I don’t recall that specific conversation. 

However, I was aware that there were some objections and that is 

why that Jose was going to go back to the Director. 

Senator KING. With all respect, those aren’t ‘‘some objections.’’ 

Those are very straightforward prohibitions by your superiors to 

not destroy the tapes, were they not? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator I don’t recall that specific conversation. 

Senator KING. But you do know—Mr. Morell in the report which 

has been released says something similar. He said: ‘‘The record is 

clear that Mr. Rodriguez,’’ and I presume you, ‘‘was aware that two 

White House counsels, the counsel to the Vice President, the DNI, 

the DCIA, and the HPSCI ranking member had either expressed 

opposition or reservation about the destruction of tapes.’’ 

Did you know that at the time you drafted that cable? 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

34 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I don’t believe I knew that entire list, but 

I knew there were some objections, and that is why we were going 

back to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Senator KING. Final question. Was it a matter of coincidence that 

this decision was made to destroy the tapes in the same week that 

two major stories appeared in American newspapers, the Levin 

Amendment was being considered, and the McCain Amendment 

was on the floor of the U.S. Senate? Was it a mere coincidence that 

that was after three years of delay, the decision was taken to destroy the tapes? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I don’t believe in the Directorate of Operations front office we were aware of legislation. The lawyers may 

have been aware. I do not believe we were aware. 

Senator KING. There’s a broader question, not legislation. I’m 

talking about stories in the newspapers. There was a great deal of 

public interest just that week in the whole interrogation question. 

Were you aware of that when you made this decision? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I do not recall being aware of that. 

Chairman BURR. The Senator’s time expired. 

The Chair would note at this time, since there has been a reference to declassification, I just want to draw a distinction that the 

Durham investigation done by the Department of Justice is not in 

the purview of the Central Intelligence Agency. Any decision to declassify or keep classified is a Department of Justice decision and 

I just wanted to separate that from the discussions about Ms. 

Haspel’s background at the Agency. 

With that, the Chair recognizes Senator Lankford. 

Senator LANKFORD. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Ms. Haspel, thank you for your over three decades of work for 

our Nation. The lack of recognition that you’ve had for three decades from our Nation because you’ve served in a way that no one 

has seen. So this is an opportunity we get to be able to say ‘‘thank 

you’’ to you for a lot of years of a lot of service, being able to protect 

our Nation. 

It’s also pretty remarkable, in some of the dialogue today, as I 

go through the very long list of people that have recommended you 

and that are both Republican and Democrat; and to be able to see 

the reports that have been by the Inspectors General about you, 

about previous DOJ about you, that have cleared you of any concerns and that have reaffirmed you. And whether it is President 

Obama’s Director of the CIA John Brennan, or whether it was Jim 

Clapper, Director of National Intelligence for President Obama, 

Henry Kissinger, John McLaughlin, Mike Morrell, Mike Mukasey, 

John Negroponte, Leon Panetta, George Tenet—the list goes on 

and on of people that have looked at your record and that have examined it and said you’d be a qualified leader for that. That speaks 

well of your history and of your leadership and we appreciate that 

very much. 

Let me ask you a little bit about some ongoing threats that are 

coming at us we haven’t had much time to talk about today. Let’s 

talk about the very serious counter-narcotics threat that’s coming 

at us and some of the changing situations that’s happening in our 

hemisphere dealing with drug trafficking organizations, international drug trafficking in particular. What do you sense is a role 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

35 

that CIA should have in the ongoing work to be able to do counternarcotics work in our hemisphere? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, thank you very much for that question, 

and you’ve been a big supporter of CIA’s counter-narcotics work. 

But, when I returned from my overseas posting in early 2017, I 

was, frankly, shocked at what I saw was happening in our country, 

particularly in places like my home State of Kentucky, where 

there’s a real crisis. I think the number is 63,000 Americans we 

lost last year. We’re losing 115 Americans a day. 

That seems to me to be an extraordinary crisis for our country. 

I would like to talk about this, if we could, some this afternoon. 

But, as you know, CIA does have a fairly modest program to try 

and stop the flow of drugs from coming across our southern border: 

heroin, cocaine and fentanyl. We work very closely in Central 

America and Latin America to try and stop that flow. 

I’ve been talking to our team at CIA Headquarters about this for 

several months. I’ve asked them to come up with some options to 

grow that program. We have extraordinary support for that program on this committee. But I think, in light of the fact that we’re 

losing 115 Americans a day, that we’re losing almost a generation 

in some places, that we have to do more. CIA is not the primary 

agency, but we can do a lot. But it has to be a whole of government 

effort. 

Senator LANKFORD. All right, so flip on that into the cyber activities and some of the cyber threats we have. Some of the cyber 

threats are changing internationally. There were criminal gangs in 

other countries that were trying to steal credit cards, steal information and to be able to sell that out there. 

Now there are some governments that are using the criminal 

gangs in their own country and have become this strange hybrid 

that’s out there between a criminal gang sometimes and a government entity at other times. And we are very dependent on trying 

to be able to identify where these threats are coming from and who 

those threats are coming from. 

What is needed with CIA and what do you anticipate would be 

the need to be able to help our Nation be able to determine what 

the threats are and where they’re coming from? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, you’re quite right that it’s a growing threat 

and it’s another area where you have to have a whole of government effort; and it’s a very murky world, as you point out. But 

China, Russia, Iran and North Korea have very aggressive offensive cyber programs, both to steal secrets, but also in some cases 

to earn illicit money. 

CIA can probably make the biggest contribution in collection 

about these other countries’ activities and various groups activities, 

so that we can inform the U.S. government agencies that have to 

mount our defense. Everyone in the U.S. government has been 

struggling, as all western governments are, on what is the most effective way to organize yourself for cyber defense. We’re still working on that, but CIA has a big role. It’s another area that I’d like 

to amplify on a bit this afternoon if I have the opportunity. 

Senator LANKFORD. I will look forward to that. 

I yield back. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Manchin. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

36 

Senator MANCHIN. Ms. Haspel, I want to thank you first of all 

for your service to our country; and also I thank you for your efforts on drugs. We are ground zero in West Virginia and we appreciate—we need everybody in this fight because it is a war and we 

must win it. 

Let me ask the first. What were your thoughts and greatest concerns for the United States of America after the 9/11 attack? 

Ms. HASPEL. I think for probably every American it was all so 

surreal. But what I was very worried about—and we weren’t wrong 

about this—is that other attacks were being planned. So I think everyone in the U.S. government, probably across the board, but certainly in the intelligence community and FBI, we all felt that we 

had let the American people down somehow. We didn’t know these 

attacks were coming. And it was very important to identify who 

headed, who was behind these attacks and stop future attacks. 

Senator MANCHIN. I think back on that day and I remember it 

very vividly as if it was just happening this morning. But I remember that the only thing I cared about—first of all, my first thought, 

was anybody in my family harmed that day? Next, anyone that I 

might have known or related to or thought about or had acquaintances with? Next of all, my final thought was, were any other 

Americans harmed? That’s all I cared about. What was this doing? 

I thought about the history of Pearl Harbor. How did we react 

as a Nation after Pearl Harbor? I remember the cruel and unusual 

internment of Japanese-Americans, and we’ve never gone down 

that road again, and our thought process would have been there. 

But let me go another step further. After 9/11, had any laws or 

rules for procedure changed because of the attacks, those attacks? 

Did we change any procedures after that? You’re saying you would 

never do it now. You said you would say no to the President, because that’s not where we’re going, that’s not where you want the 

CIA to be. Were those changed after that? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I’m not sure I understand exactly. But CIA 

does not do interrogations. We historically have not done interrogations and we don’t do interrogations today. 

Senator MANCHIN. Let me go this direction. Are there any other 

tapes that would reveal agents’ identities that have been destroyed 

and is that the standard procedure? Or are there any tapes of interrogation that haven’t been destroyed of your knowledge? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, probably, I don’t know. I don’t know if 

there are any other tapes. I don’t believe there are any other tapes 

associated with the particular interrogation activity that was on 

the 92 tapes, but I simply don’t know if there are any other video 

tapes of any other activity. 

Senator MANCHIN. And then we’ll go into this. Explain why you 

feel so strongly today that CIA should not be in the interrogation 

business? And would it have anything to do with basically the 

makeup of the CIA with the appointments, your appointment now 

for that, versus the code of conduct for the military? Is there a difference of why you think that the CIA should not be in that business and why it should be done in the military? 

Ms. HASPEL. That’s a great question. CIA historically has not 

done interrogations. We don’t have interrogators, so we just don’t 

have any expertise. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

37 

Senator MANCHIN. Most of the questions that have been directed 

to you have been because of that. 

Ms. HASPEL. Yes, that’s right. 

And DOD of course does do battlefield interrogations, and that 

is why we have the Army Field Manual. We have very clear legal 

and policy guidance for those DOD interrogations, which I support. 

And then of course the FBI has its own authorities for interviewing 

terrorist suspects. And then, as we mentioned, we have the Highvalue Interrogation Group and CIA is part of that. We support that 

with substantive expertise about a particular group or an individual, but we don’t conduct interrogations. 

Senator MANCHIN. And I know you stated strongly that’s why 

you would feel very compelled to tell the President, no, this is not 

something we do and it’s not our line of work. 

Ms. HASPEL. I just think there are other U.S. government entities that are suited to holding detainees, and that isn’t CIA. 

Senator MANCHIN. Let me say this about the CIA, being on this 

committee for one year and on Armed Services for six years prior 

to that. When I speak to the West Virginia citizens today, I brag 

about what you all do in the clandestine services and the people 

they provide to serve for our country to keep us safe. I have never, 

ever seen the quality of people at that level to make the sacrifices 

they make. And to make sure that they understand the importance 

and how successful and how good they are is that, for a country 

that has a target on its back the way the United States has had 

since 9/11 and probably will for long time, to be as safe as we have 

in the most troubled world, in the most dangerous world, with the 

terrorist mentality, I want to thank you on behalf of every West 

Virginian in this country for the job you all do. 

Ms. HASPEL. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Cotton. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you, Ms. Haspel for your many decades 

of service to our country and for taking on this new role, despite 

the accusations, entirely false, you know that you would face from 

some of my colleagues in the Senate and from the media, some of 

these protesters we’ve seen here today. I’m very grateful to you, as 

I know that all the men and women of the CIA are grateful. 

I have to clear up some of the things that have been said here 

before. Senator Warner said that he worried about the message we 

would be sending if we confirmed you to the Director of CIA. Well, 

let’s look at that from the other direction. What message would we 

be sending if we didn’t confirm you to the CIA to the men and 

women of the CIA, to the GS–15s who may be asked to take on a 

controversial position that a future administration with new lawyers might not like? 

And for that matter, what message does overwhelming Democratic opposition to your nomination send? In fact, if you had been 

nominated by President Obama or if Hillary Clinton had won and 

nominated you to be the CIA Director, how many votes do you 

think you would have gotten to be confirmed as the CIA Director? 

[Pause.] 

You don’t have to answer. 

[Laughter.] 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

38 

I also have to take exception to what Senator Warner said when 

he called an opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel that was signed 

off by the Attorney General of the United States as a ‘‘Get Out of 

Jail Free’’ card. Do you believe, acting under the legal approval of 

the Attorney General, that you or any other CIA officer should 

have gone to jail and you needed a ‘‘Get Out of Jail Free’’ card? You 

can answer that one, please. 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, CIA follows the law. 

Senator COTTON. Exactly what I thought. 

Let’s turn to the circumstances of what the Counterterrorism 

Center was doing the days you were there. I think Senator Collins 

asked an excellent sequence of questions that got at many of these 

points. I just want to tie a bow on some of them. These programs 

were, to the best of your understanding, approved by the Commander in Chief, legally approved by the Attorney General, and 

supported by the Director of the CIA, who I point out at the time 

was the former Democratic staff director of this committee; is that 

correct? 

Ms. HASPEL. That’s correct, Senator. 

Senator COTTON. You said that you were not a senior manager 

when those programs were created, is that correct? 

Ms. HASPEL. That’s correct. 

Senator COTTON. Was John Brennan a member of the Senior Intelligence Service and the Deputy Executive Director, at the time 

a senior manager in your opinion? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I believe Mr. Brennan was the Deputy 

EXDIR of the Agency at that time. 

Senator COTTON. And you’d consider that a senior manager position at the CIA? 

Ms. HASPEL. I believe it’s the number four position. 

Senator COTTON. For John Brennan, who was confirmed to be 

the CIA Director by the following members of this committee: Senator Warner, Senator Feinstein, Senator Heinrich, Senator Collins, 

Senator King, Senator Burr, Senator Manchin, Senator Wyden, and 

Senator Rubio. 

Let’s turn to the question about the tapes that were destroyed in 

2005. Did any lawyer at any time in any organization of the Federal Government say that there was a legal prohibition to destroy 

those tapes? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, they did not. They were very consistent 

that there was no legal requirement to preserve the tapes, because 

of the written record. 

Senator COTTON. And it’s your testimony that there is a written 

record that fully documents whatever may or may not have happened? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, yes. And there were two reviews done of 

the written record, by the Office of General Counsel and Office of 

the Inspector General. 

Senator COTTON. In other words, the CIA has a record no different from the Federal court system, which keeps transcripts and 

allows sketch drawings, but does not allow video recordings in a 

Federal courtroom, is that correct? 

Ms. HASPEL. That’s correct, Senator. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

39 

Senator COTTON. You were the chief of staff to Mr. Rodriguez 

when this happened, correct? 

Ms. HASPEL. Yes. 

Senator COTTON. And at his direction, you drafted a cable that 

he later sent. 

Ms. HASPEL. That’s correct. 

Senator COTTON. Michael Morell, who supported Hillary Clinton 

in the last election, cleared you of any wrongdoing in drafting that 

cable? 

Ms. HASPEL. He did. 

Senator COTTON. As did an investigation by the Office of Special 

Counsel and the Office of the Inspector General? 

Ms. HASPEL. That investigation was closed without charges for 

Mr. Rodriguez or anyone. 

Senator COTTON. Would holding you responsible for drafting a 

cable at your boss’ direction make any more sense than holding a 

Senate speechwriter responsible for the boring speeches Senators 

give on the Senate floor? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I’ll defer to you. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator COTTON. I would submit that it does not. 

Finally, there’s a lot of talk about policy guidance and that there 

was some awareness by Mr. Rodriguez that higher officials in the 

government who were political appointees had qualms or expressed 

reservations. I would say that’s another way for which politicians 

don’t want to take responsibilities when they are placed in certain 

positions, whether they are elected or appointed, and give the answers that they are responsible for giving yes or no and take the 

chips to fall where they may. 

Chairman BURR. The Senator’s time has expired. 

Senator Harris. 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. 

So let’s just be clear. This hearing is not about the incredible importance of the service and sacrifice of the men and women of the 

CIA. That’s not what this hearing is about. This hearing is not 

about the importance of the Agency’s mission, both of which I 

wholeheartedly support. 

This hearing is about your suitability to be the Director of the 

CIA. And in our responsibility to participate in choosing who will 

be the next Director of the CIA, the mission that we have now includes understanding that who we choose will be a signal to the 

men and women of the Agency, to the American people, and to our 

neighbors around the world about our values as Americans on critical issues that range from our adherence to a rule of law, to what 

we prioritize in terms of professional accountability and what we 

prioritize in terms of our moral authority as Americans and as a 

country. 

So one question I’ve not heard you answer is: Do you believe that 

the previous interrogation techniques were immoral? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I believe that CIA officers, to whom you referred—— 

Senator HARRIS. It’s a yes or no answer. Do you believe the previous interrogation techniques were immoral? I’m not asking do 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

40 

you believe they were legal. I’m asking do you believe they were 

immoral? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I believe that CIA—— 

Senator HARRIS. It’s a yes or no. 

Ms. HASPEL [continuing]. Did extraordinary work to prevent another attack on this country, given the legal tools that we were authorized to use. 

Senator HARRIS. Please answer yes or no. Do you believe in hindsight that those techniques were immoral? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, what I believe sitting here today is that I 

support the higher moral standard we have decided to hold ourselves to. 

Senator HARRIS. Can you please answer the question? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I think I’ve answered the question. 

Senator HARRIS. No, you’ve not. Do you believe the previous techniques—now armed with hindsight, do you believe they were immoral, yes or no? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I believe that we should hold ourselves to 

the moral standard outlined in the Army Field Manual. 

Senator HARRIS. Okay, so I understand that—you have not answered the question, but I’m going to move on. So I understand 

that you, from previous answers, are serving as the authority over 

whether or not CIA information concerning you will be classified or 

not. Given an obvious appearance of conflict, will you agree to 

recuse yourself from the responsibility and the authority to make 

decisions about whether or not that information will be classified 

or not? Will you agree to recuse yourself of that responsibility and 

authority, yes or no? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I am following the guidelines that exist at 

CIA, and there is another declassification authority. It’s called the 

IRO. I have not interfered—— 

Senator HARRIS. Ms. Haspel, do you believe that you have the 

authority to recuse yourself? 

Ms. HASPEL. I’ll take that for the record. I may have the authority to recuse myself. 

Senator HARRIS. Assuming you do—— 

Ms. HASPEL. I’m not a lawyer. I’m not sure about that. 

Senator HARRIS. Assuming you do—and I believe you do—will 

you agree to recuse yourself from the responsibility and the authority of making decisions about what CIA information about you and 

your record will be classified or declassified? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, if I had agreed with the proposals that 

have come up to—because people thought it would be advantageous 

to me, I think I would’ve been abdicating my responsibility to follow the rules that everyone at CIA follows. 

Senator HARRIS. Okay. And you also in this hearing have a responsibility to answer the questions that are being asked of you. 

I’m going to ask you a different question. Would you agree that, 

given this appearance of conflict or potential conflict around the 

classification or declassification of these documents, that—would 

you agree that Director Coats instead should have the responsibility for declassification decisions regarding your background? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I think one important thing is that this 

committee plays a unique role to review the classified record, and 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

41 

we have sent over every piece of paper we can lay our hands on 

about my classified record; all of my evaluations over a 33-year career. And I hope every Senator has had the opportunity to look at 

that classified material. 

Senator HARRIS. Indeed I have. 

Ms. HASPEL. But there are—— 

Senator HARRIS. I have another question for you then, because 

I only have a few minutes left. I only have few seconds left. The 

President has asserted that torture works. Do you agree with that 

statement? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I don’t believe that torture works. I believe 

that in the CIA’s program—and I’m not attributing this to enhanced interrogation techniques—I believe, as many people, Directors who have sat in this chair before me, that valuable information was obtained from senior Al-Qaeda operatives that allowed us 

to defend this country and prevent another attack. 

Senator HARRIS. Is that a yes? 

Ms. HASPEL. No, it’s not a yes. We got valuable information from 

debriefing of Al-Qaeda detainees, and I don’t think it’s knowable 

whether interrogation techniques played a role in that. 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Chairman BURR. The Senator’s time has expired. 

Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. Ms. Haspel, I note that one prominent national 

security expert has said that if President Obama had nominated 

you to be Director of the CIA it would be an easy decision to support your nomination. So it strikes me that you’re being treated 

much differently than Director Brennan was, which Senator Cotton 

noted he was voted out of this committee by a vote of 12 to 3 and 

confirmed by a vote of 63 to 44 to be CIA Director. 

So it strikes me—and this is not a question for you; this is an 

observation by me—that you and this President are being held to 

a double standard, and I think that’s regrettable. 

I also remember that President Obama in 2009, when he declassified the Office of Legal Counsel memos that are been referred to 

here, promised the men and women of the CIA that, quote, ‘‘We 

will protect all who acted reasonably and relied upon legal advice 

from the Department of Justice that their actions were lawful. 

They need to be fully confident that, as they defend the Nation, I 

will defend them.’’ And I think this committee and this Senate 

should remember those words by President Obama and apply those 

when considering your confirmation. 

Senator Feinstein was kind enough about a year ago to send me 

a book by Peter Bergen called Manhunt. It’s a ten-year history of 

the search for Osama bin Laden. Where as I was thumbing 

through it recently I was reminded that post-9/11 President Bush 

was concerned about reports that he had received that Osama bin 

Laden and Al-Qaeda were meeting with Pakistani officials connected with their nuclear program, to gain access to a nuclear device that they might then use for a follow-on attack against cities 

like Washington, D.C. 

Without divulging classified information, can you confirm that 

there were concerns about follow-on attacks using nuclear devices, 

biological weapons, other weapons of mass destruction that 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

42 

might’ve killed more innocent Americans, as happened on 9/11? 

Was that the environment in which you and the country were operating at the time? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, there were very grave concerns on that 

front. And indeed, Al-Qaeda had those kinds of programs, efforts 

to acquire crude, dirty bombs, efforts to develop—they had a program, a biological weapons program. I remember the operative who 

was in charge of that. There was very deep concern about potential 

contacts—and we continue to monitor this very closely today—between extremists and Pakistani nuclear scientists. 

Senator CORNYN. So here we sit, years following the terrible 

events of 9/11, feeling very safe and secure thanks to the incredible 

work being done by the intelligence community, including the good 

men and women at the CIA, as well as the men and women who 

serve in the United States military. We’re feeling very safe and secure and the memories of that terrible event are very distant. 

But it strikes me that, in addition to the double standard that 

I believe you and this President are being held to compared to Director Brennan and President Obama’s Administration, that people 

have simply forgotten. And that’s dangerous, to have forgotten the 

circumstances under which they were operating at the time and 

doing their dead level best to protect the country from a follow-on 

attack. 

I just want to note in closing that recently I had a chance to 

travel to a garden spot with the Chairman and visit with some of 

those unnamed patriots who served—— 

Ms. HASPEL. Thank you for doing that. 

Senator CORNYN [continuing]. In the CIA, and I was struck by 

talking to one gentleman. He was talking about his girlfriend that 

he no longer had. And I said—— 

Ms. HASPEL. It’s a common story. 

Senator CORNYN. I said: This this must be incredibly difficult on 

marriages and on relationships and on families. Would you just 

take just a second to comment about the sacrifices that intelligence 

officers, rank and file employees of the CIA, make when it comes 

to those sorts of relationships? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, thank you. You know, maybe I could start 

by saying I talked about how CIA’s boots were the first on the 

ground in Afghanistan. We suffered the first U.S. casualty. But 

maybe it’s important for the American people to know that CIA officers are still out there in Afghanistan. Our officers are out there 

fighting extremists, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 

We have 125 stars on our memorial wall, now. Many of those— 

it’s shocking how many stars we’ve added. I believe we added seven 

starts to our wall last year. 

Perhaps I could cite one personal example of an officer who 

worked for me. She was the most extraordinary woman. She was 

our number one Al-Qaeda expert. I worked with her in the 

Counterterrorism Center. She was having her third baby in those 

days following 9/11. But we needed her because she had such deep 

expertise. She later worked for me on terrorism issues in a foreign 

capital. 

And then she went to Afghanistan. And she and six colleagues 

were murdered by a suicide bomber who penetrated our base. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

43 

These are very real sacrifices. These are my friends and colleagues. All of us at CIA have a commitment and an honor-bound 

obligation to uphold the memory of those officers, mothers who’ve 

left their children to go to the field and sometimes have given their 

all in service of this country. 

Chairman BURR. I thank Senator Cornyn. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Ms. Haspel. You’ve been working with the Administration now for 15 months. You’ve had the opportunity to brief the 

President. Have you ever been alone with the President? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I’m usually there with Senator Coats, a 

brilliant analyst who delivers the actual analytic briefing, and usually the National Security Advisor, the Vice President. 

Senator REED. There have been allegations, Mr. Comey one, that 

while he was alone the President asked for a personal pledge of 

loyalty. If you were ever approached by the President and asked for 

a personal pledge of loyalty, what would you respond? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, my only loyalty is to the American people 

and the Constitution of the United States. I am honor-bound and 

will work very hard to deliver to this President and his Administration the best performance and intelligence CIA can deliver. 

Senator REED. And if you were approached in such a way and 

such a demand was made of you, would you inform this committee 

and the Congress that you had been so approached? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I’ve worked very closely with this President. I don’t believe that such circumstance would ever occur. CIA 

has been treated with enormous respect and our expertise is valued 

for what we bring to the table. 

Senator REED. If it occurred, would you inform the committee? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, it’s a hypothetical. I don’t think it’s going 

to occur. I’m very confident about that. 

Senator REED. It does not seem to be a hypothetical. People have 

alleged that that has happened already. 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I don’t know anything about that conversation. 

Senator REED. Now, Senator Harris was asking you about the 

morality of the enhanced interrogation techniques, the 

waterboarding. At the time that you were involved in it, in fact 

fairly directly, you expressed no moral concerns. In fact, you have 

suggested that it was good tradecraft and that it contributed to information that was developed. 

If one of your operations officers was captured and subject to 

waterboarding today or tomorrow or the next day—— 

[Interruption.] 

Chairman BURR. The Senator will suspend. 

The Capitol Police will remove. 

If there are any other further disruptions, I will ask the Capitol 

Police to remove all individuals. 

The Senator can continue. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

If one of your operators were captured, subjected to 

waterboarding and enhanced interrogation techniques, which you I 

believe supervised, would you consider that to be moral, since perLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

44 

haps the other entity did not have legal restrictions, and good 

tradecraft, as you appeared to do when you were involved in it previously? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I don’t believe the terrorists follow any 

guidelines or civilized norms or the law. CIA follows the law. 

Senator REED. Excuse me, madam. You seem to be saying that 

you were not following civilized norms and the law or anything else 

when you were conducting those self-said activities, if that’s the 

analogy you’re going to draw. 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I’m sorry? Can you—— 

Senator REED. It’s very simple. You have an operations officer 

who is captured. He is being waterboarded. I’ve asked you very 

simply, would you determine that to be immoral and something 

that should never be done, condoned in any way, shape or form? 

Your response seems to be that civilized nations don’t do it, but uncivilized nations do it or uncivilized groups do it. 

Senator COTTON. The United States—— 

Senator REED. But a civilized nation was doing it until it was 

outlawed by this Congress. 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I would never, obviously, support inhumane treatment of any CIA officers. We’ve lost CIA officers over 

the years to terrorists. I just gave an example. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed personally killed a Wall Street Journal correspondent and 

filmed that. 

I don’t think there’s any comparison between CIA officers serving 

their country, adhering to U.S. law, and terrorists who by their 

very definition are not following anybody’s law. 

Senator REED. Finally, in the Morell report, which you’ve somewhat acknowledged, there was opposition to the destruction of the 

tapes by two White House counsels, the counsel to the Vice President, the DNI, the DCIA and a member of the Congress. And yet, 

those tapes were destroyed. Do you consider that to be insubordinate actions without the Director, in this case, Mr. Goss, being notified? 

Ms. HASPEL. Senator, I think that consultation with the Director 

was essential, and a lesson coming out of that is the importance 

of making sure all the stakeholders have agreed to include Congressional oversight. There is also a leadership lesson: Don’t let 

real security issues go unaddressed. 

Senator REED. So the action was insubordinate and you would 

not countenance anyone in your organization doing something like 

that? 

Ms. HASPEL. I expect my officers to bring those difficult issues 

to me and I think I have a reputation for not just leaving them in 

the inbox. I will say this: Mr. Rodriguez has taken full accountability for his decision, which he thought he was operating under 

his own authority. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. The Senator’s time has expired. 

We’ve come to the conclusion of the open session. And I would 

duly note for the members, it’s my understanding that we’re going 

to have two recorded votes starting at 12:00. My intention is to 

start the closed hearing immediately after the second vote. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

45 

The Vice Chairman and I would like to make some closing statements. 

I do want to take the opportunity, Ms. Haspel, since two individuals have been mentioned and they will be the subject of conversation in a closed session, but for the American people’s purpose, 

would you share for them who Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is and 

Nashiri? 

Ms. HASPEL. Chairman, thank you. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 

was the architect and mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. His nephew, 

Ramzi Yousef, was behind the 1993 attack on the World Trade 

Center and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed financed that operation. He 

also was behind the infamous Bojinka plot in the Philippines. Tragically, he was the individual who personally killed a Wall Street 

Journal American correspondent and filmed that heinous act. He 

also after 9/11 carried out an attack on a synagogue in Tunisia, 

and he had other attacks planned. We were able to warn allies 

about a planned attack, for example, on Heathrow Airport. 

Mr. Nashiri was the emir of the attack in 2000 on the USS 

COLE, in which we lost 17 sailors. He also was behind the attack 

on a French ship, the LIMBURG, and he was the Al-Qaeda Chief 

of Operations in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. 

Chairman BURR. I thank you for that. I think it’s important to 

put into context, when individuals are mentioned, what their role 

was in terrorism and why they were the focus of not only the Agency, but law enforcement. 

With that, I’d like to recognize the Vice Chairman for any closing 

statements he’d like to make. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I want to submit for the record, to refresh my colleagues’ memories, the testimony of then-nominee John Brennan, 

who quite explicitly repudiated the EIT techniques and programs, 

who stated that he expressed his personal objections and some of 

his views to Agency colleagues, which I think was a relevant piece 

of information when we considered Mr. Brennan’s testimony for 

those of us who decided to vote in favor of him. 

Senator COTTON. And that would be the same—— 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Excuse me, sir. Excuse me, sir. 

Senator COTTON. And that would be the same Mr. Brennan who 

supports her nomination. 

Chairman BURR. The Senator will suspend. 

Senator COTTON. We need the full record on the record. 

Chairman BURR. No, the Senator will suspend. 

Senator COTTON. John Brennan supports her nomination. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me also say this. I know this is something that is a different 

experience for you. You have led your life serving our country in 

the shadows. But should you be confirmed in this position, you 

have a whole different set of responsibilities that, candidly, I understand that perhaps nothing in your career has fully prepared 

you for. 

You have to not only earn our trust, where we have more exposure to your records and classified information, but you have to 

earn the trust of other members who are not on this panel, and 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

46 

folks in the House who won’t even consider this. You also I think 

have to earn the trust of the American public. 

So three brief points I want to make. I appreciate the fact and 

the support you have from the Agency’s workforce and the fact that 

this, your confirmation, will be the first time in 54 years an operations officer would be confirmed to be Director. 

And I also understand what are normal procedures on declassification. But I think it troubles some of my colleagues when we 

do get stories that float from the press that point out some remarkable parts of your career—your interactions with Mother Teresa, 

the fact that you were shot at by foreign operatives—and there 

does appear to be information put forward by the Agency that 

helps you. And all—I think many of us—and I’ve reviewed most of 

your record. I think there’s many extraordinary things in your 

record. But the willingness to lean forward on that declassification—not for our benefit on this committee, we get that. But for 

other members and for the public? I’d hope you reconsider some of 

your decisions made there. 

I also appreciate very much in my line of questioning on the fact 

that you believe at this point that the RDI program is not consistent with American values. I wish you would have said that 

more clearly and more directly. 

And finally, the question that if you were asked by this President 

to take an action that you believed was immoral, regardless of the 

status of a legal opinion, we finally got to the point that you said 

you would not follow that. You gave me an even stronger answer 

in private. I just feel that as you try to gain our trust and other 

Senators’, for that matter the public’s trust, you realize this is a 

totally different kind of role than you had any time in your career. 

And having clarity on these issues and having clarity on what your 

appointment will represent, and what values you’ll bring to this 

critically important job, at this moment in time, is extraordinarily 

important. 

My hope and prayer will be that as we consider this nomination, 

the more you can bring us that clarity, for those of us who want 

to give you that fair consideration that you deserve and, candidly, 

the extraordinary service you provided our Nation, is so important. 

So we can make the right judgment, so that we can know the character of the individual who will take on again one of the most important jobs in our country’s protection, and particularly at this 

moment in time. 

So I thank you for your testimony. I would like to see more. I 

regret some of my colleagues’ comments in terms of 

mischaracterization, but that’s part of the process and welcome to 

it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. I thank the Vice Chairman. 

Senator WYDEN. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. I would ask unanimous consent to enter into 

the record two documents provided by Senator Feinstein in opposition to the nomination, one from myself, a statement of support 

from Attorney General Michael Mukasey. I would expand my unanimous consent to include any documents that are for or against the 

nomination; and I would ask unanimous consent that every memLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

47 

ber be given the opportunity for additional follow-on questions, and 

those QFRs would need to be in by the close of business tomorrow. 

Senator WYDEN. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Yes? 

Senator WYDEN. Very quickly, following up on that point you 

made, and I support that, I did have several additional questions 

for the public record, and if I could at least make clear, I think it’s 

important to have those before we vote in the committee, those answers to the additional questions, and I just wanted to convey that, 

and I hope we can get consent for that, too. 

Chairman BURR. Duly noted. 

Senator CORNYN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask you a question, briefly? 

Chairman BURR. Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. I think there’s been some comment made about 

committee members not getting responsive information, but I noticed declassified materials have been provided in a public setting. 

It is true, isn’t it, that classified materials will be made available 

to members in a classified setting? 

Chairman BURR. Everything that I think has been requested is 

available to members, not to all staff. And any inquiry into those 

documents will be made available in the closed setting, and I stand 

to be here as long as we need be tonight for every Senator to ask 

the full breadth of questions that they have. 

With that, Gina, I’d like to thank you for your testimony today. 

Ms. HASPEL. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. And I look forward to continuing the conversation in the closed setting. 

Before we adjourn the open session, though, I want to add a few 

closing remarks. As you know, I’m a strong supporter of your nomination to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I can 

think of few, if any, individuals as qualified to lead the Agency as 

you are, particularly at this challenging time. You may in fact be 

the most qualified nominee ever nominated for this role. You’ve 

been a leader in the field and at headquarters. You have the respect of the workforce, of your peers, of Republicans, of Democrats, 

of military officers, and of civilian security leaders. You have the 

courage to speak truth to power and you’ve demonstrated that 

courage time and time again. You’re intimately familiar with the 

threats facing our Nation. Where others can discuss world events, 

you’ve lived them. 

For you, there’s no learning curve. You have a vision for the 

Agency and its future. It’s obviously informed by your career, your 

past experiences. But you bring a clear-eyed understanding of the 

Agency’s mission going forward, and I think you have reemphasized that today. 

I support your nomination for all of these reasons. But I’m also 

mindful of the historic nature of your nomination and what it 

means for those first-tour case officers and junior analysts that will 

join the Agency this year and in years to come. I know you don’t 

like to talk about it, so I will. 

Outside the Agency workforce, not many Americans get an opportunity to walk the halls of the Old Headquarters Building. 

Those who do, though, including the members and staff of this 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

48 

committee frequently enter the OHB, climb the stairs and turn 

down that hallway. As they do, they enter a series of portraits depicting former Directors of OSS, Central Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency. We see them every day, as does the workforce. Some of those directors were loved, some were controversial, 

and some little understood the Agency they were asked to lead. 

Some made disastrous decisions out of hubris or inexperience, or 

both. But one thing is common: All of the portraits are men. 

Many want to make your nomination about one small piece of 

Agency’s past. Most of us, though, are looking towards the Agency’s 

future. I think it’s important to remember Director Brennan’s—to 

put in context Director Brennan’s not only time there and his testimony, but the fact is that you’re being criticized for not speaking 

up when you were there, and nor did he. I want to make sure that 

we don’t hold you to a different standard for any reason. Avril 

Haines and Meroe Park and others who have served or are currently serving have cracked the glass ceiling at the Agency. You’re 

poised to break it. 

It may be impossible to measure the importance of that breakthrough, but I know that your confirmation will send a signal to 

the current workforce and the workforce of the future that a lifetime of commitment to the Agency and its mission can still and will 

be rewarded. 

I want to thank you for your willingness to go through this 

treacherous process. I’m not sure if I was in your position that I 

would expose myself to it, but I thank you for your willingness to 

lead. I thank you for your willingness to serve. 

This hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

(49) 

Supplemental Material 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

50 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 5 here 30119.005

SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

INTELLIGENCE 

~DSTATESSENATE 

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY 

PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES 
51 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 6 here 30119.006

SELECT COMMITf.EE ON.INTELUGENCE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY 

PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES 

PART A -BIOGRAPBICALINFOIMATION 

1. FUILNAMB: GiaaCheriHaspel 

O'l'HBR.NAMBS USED: Gina Cheri Walker 

2. DATBAND PLACE OF BIRTH: October 1,1956, Ashland, Kenbleky 

ClT.IZENSHIP: United Stares of America 

3. MARlTAL STATUS: Single 

4.· SPOUSB'SNAMB: N/A 

S. SPOUSB'SMAIDBNNAMEIF.APPLICABLB: N/A 

6. NAMES AND AGBS OF CHILDREN: N/A 

1. EDUCATION SINCBIRGH SCHOOL: 

lNS'lTI'QTION DAIBSATI'BNDED DI!GREBRBCBM!P DATBOFDOORBB. 

Univasity ofKenbleky 

University ofLouisville 

NOJ:theasrem Universicy 

George Washiugton Uni~ 

Aug 1974-May 1977 

Aug 1977 -May 1978 

Jan 1982-May 1982 

Jan 1986-May 1986 

B.S. withbonors May 1978 

Pamlegal Cett:i&ale May 1982 

None-

(Accept.ed PCS Assignment) 

8. BMPLOYMBNTRBCORD (LIST ALL POSITIONS HELD SINCE COLI.BGB, INCLUDING 

MILITARY SBRVICB. INDICATBNAMBOFBMPLOYBR, POSlTION, T.lTLB ORDBSCRJPTION, 

LOCATION, AND DATBS OFBMPLOYMENT.) 

JWP!.OXER POSITIQNII'fi'LE LOCATION JlATBS. 

CIA Various positions McLean, VA Jan 1985 - pll!ISeD~ 

(Deputy Dh:ector since Feb 2017) 

Tidewater Legal Paralegal Norfolk, VA Sep 1983 -Dec 1984 

Aid Society 

S.B. Mass. Legal ProjectDirecl.oriParalegal 

Asst. Corp 

Brockton, MA May 1982-Aug 1983 
52 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 7 here 30119.007

EMPLOYER POS1Tl0Nl1TI'Ll! LQCATION DAIJ3S. 

US Aimy Pducalion MOS Library Coonlinatnr FortDeveDS, MA Ian 1980-Oct 1981 

Center 

Mount Wachnseu Assistant Tntor Gardner,MA Nov 1979-Ian 1980 

College 

Worcester County Teller Worcester, MA Inn 1979-0ct 1979 

National Bank 

F'ust:Vugiaia.Bank Teller AJexandrla, VA Dec 1978-Apr1979 

9. OOVBRNMBNT EXPBRIBNCB (INDICATBBXPBRIENCB lN ORASSOCIATIONWllH FEDBRAL, 

STATE, ORIDCALGOVERNMENTS,INCLUDING ADVISORY, CONSULTATIVE, HONORARY, OR 

OTHBR.PART-TJMB SBR.VICB OR POSITION. DO NOTRBPBATINFORMATION ALRBADY 

PROVIDED IN QUESTION 8): 

See Question 4#8. 

10. INDICATE ANY SPECIALIZBD INTilLLIOENCB OR NATIONAL SBCUR1TY EXPBRTISB YOU HAVE 

ACQUIRBD HAVING SERVED IN Tim POSITIONS DF3CRIBED IN QUESTIONS 8 AND/OR 9 •• 

I am the cmrent Deputy Director of the· CIA and have served in various positions at the CIA since 1985. As the 

Deputy Director, I assist the Director in managing intelligeace collection, aualysia, covert acti011, 

counterintelligence, and liaison relationships with foreign semces. I have served in numerous U.S. and overseas 

assignmenll, 118 well118 having saved 118 Cbief of Station multiple times. I have held 'IBrious leadenbip 

positions throughout the National CJandeatine Senicc (now Directorate of Operations) to include the Deputy 

Director for the National Clandestine Service. 

11. HONORS AND AWARDS {PROVIDE INFORMATION ON SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS, 

HONORARYDBGRBES,MIL1TARYDECORATIONS, CIVILIAN SBR.VICBClTATIONS, OR ANY 

OTHBR.SPBCTALRBCOGNITIONFOR OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE ORACHIBVBMBNT): 

Inte!ligence Medal of Merit- 2014 

Presidential Rank Award- 2013 

Donovan Awanl- 2007 

George H.W. Bnsh Awmd for Excellence in Countel1emlriam -1999 

12. ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS (UST MEMBERSHIPS IN AND OFFICBS HBLD WITHIN THE 

LASTTENYBARS IN ANY PROFESSIONAL, CIVIC. FRATERNAL, BUSINESS, SCHOLARLY, 

CULTURAL, CHARITABLE, OROTHBR. SJMILAR ORGAN)ZATIONS): . 

Nooe. 
53 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 8 here 30119.008

13. PUBUSHBD WRITINGS AND SPBBCHBS (LIST Tim 'lTl'I..ES, PUBLISHERS, BLOOS AND 

PUBUCATIONDATBS OF ANY BOOKS, ARTICLES, REPORTS, OR onmRPUBUSHED 

MATRR1ALS YOUHAVBAUTHORBD. ALSO LIST ANY PUBUC SPilBCHBS ORRBMARKS YOU 

HAVBMADB WlTHINTimLASTTENYBARSFOR WHICHTHERBISA 'J.'BXT, TRANSCRJPI', OR 

VIDEO.) JFASKED, WliL YOUPROVIDBACOPYOFEACHRBQUESTBDPUBUCATION, TEXT, 

TRANSCRIPI', OR VIDEO? 

None. 

PARTB -OUAL1FIC4TION8 

14. QUALJFICATIONS (DESCRIBE WHYYOUBBUEVBYOU ARB QU.ALJFIED TO SBRVBAS Tim 

DJRECI'OR OF Tim CENTRAL JNTilLLIGENCB AGENCY): 

The skills and experience I bave acquired during my lhree decade& at the CIA bave provided me an -neat 

foumlalion thai: I will leverage if I am confirmed as Dlrectnr of the CmdrallDbilligmlce Agency. I bave a 

dellliled wtderstanding of the Agency's mission as WISH as the risb our oftkers lake to collect critical human 

and technical intelligence to inform our nalion's policymakers against lhll wide may ofinlelligence prinrities. 

I bave experience, both at Headquatbml and oveneas, directing opcrationa against bard targets such as China, 

Iran, North Korea and Russia, as well as experience in the QQIIlllel'tlll1'0 anma. Further, as Deput,y Dlrectnr 

of lhe CIA. I help oversee and direct CIA's activities lncludlng kllllplng Coagn!ss fnlly and c111te11dy informed 

of lhe Agency's activities. · 

PART C ·POLITICAL AND FOREJGNAFFHJATIONS 

15. POUI'ICALACTIVlTIBS (LIST ANY MEMBERSHIPS OR OFFICES HBID IN OR FINANCIAL 

CONTRIBUTIONS ORSBRVICESRBNDBREDTO,ANY POUTICALPARTY, BLECTION 

COMMrn'EE, POUTICALACTION COMMITl'BB, ORINDIVIDUALCANDIDATEDURINGTim 

LAST TEN YEARS): 

None. 

16. CANDIDACYFORPUBUC OFFICE (FURNISH DETAILS OF ANY CANDIDACYFORI!LBCTIVB 

PUBUC OFFICE): 

None. 

17. FORmaN APFlLIATIONS 

(N0'11!: QUESTIONS 17A AND BARB NOT LIMl.TED TO RELATIONSHIPS RBQUlRING 

REGISTRATION UNDER. Tim FOREIGN AGENTS RllGlSTRATION ACT. QUBSTIONS 17A, B, AND C 

DO NOT CAILFORAPOSITlVBRBSPONSBJFTimRBPRBSBNTATION OR TRANSACTION WAS 

AUTHORJZED BY Tim UNITBDSTATBS GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTIONwrrHYOUR OR YOUR 

SPOUSJ3'S EMPLOYMENT lN GOVBRNMBNT SERVICE.) 

A. HAVB YOU OR YOUR SPOUSBBVBRREPRBSENTBD lN ANY CAPACITY (B.O.l!MPLOYEB, 

A'ITORNBY, ORPOUTICAl.JBUSINBSS CONSULTANT), wrrHOR wriliOUl' COMPENSATION, A 

FORBlGN GOVERNMBNTORANENTITYCONTROLLBDBY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? JF SO, 

PLBASBFUIJ..Y DESCRIBE SUCHRBLATIONSlDP. 

No. 
54 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 9 here 30119.009

B. HAVBANYOFYOtlR.ORYOtlR.SPOUSB'SASSOCIATBSRBPRESENTBD,lNANYCAPAClTY, 

WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION,AFORBIGNGOVERNMENT OR ANBN'ITI'Y CONTROILBD 

BY AFORBIGNOOVBRNMHNT? IF SO,PLBASBFUU.YDBSCRIBRSUCHRBLATIONSHIP. 

No. 

C. DURJNGTHBPASTTBNYBARS, HAVBYOU OR YOtlR.SPOUSBRECBIVED ANY 

COMPENSATION FROM, ORBBENINVOLVED IN ANY FINANCIAL OR BUSINESS TRANSACI'IONS 

WlTH,AFOREIGN GOVBRNMBNT ORANYEN'lTl'YCONTROll.EDBY A FOREIGN 

GOVBR.NMENT? IF SO, PLBASBPROVIDBDBTAB..S. 

No. 

D. HAVB YOU OR YOORSPOUSBBVERRBGISTERED UNDBR THBFORBIGN AGBNTS 

REGISTRATION Acr? IF SO, PLBASBPROVIDBDBTAB..S. 

No. 

18. DBSCRIBR ANY LOBBYING AC'IIVII'YDURJNG THBPAST TEN YEARS. OTHER THAN lN AN 

OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT CAPAaiY,lNWHICHYOU OR YOOR SPOUSB HAVBBNGAGBDFOR 

THB PURPOSE OPDJRBCTI..Y OR INDIRECI'LY JNFLUBNCJNG THB PASSAOB,DEFBAT, OR 

MODIFICATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION, OR FOR THBPURPOSB OF AFF.BCI'INGTHB 

ADMlNISTRATION AND EXBCUTIONOFFBDERALLAW ORPUBUCPOUCY. 

None. 

PARTD- FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AN)) CONFLiq.' OF INTEREST 

19. DBSCRlBBANYBMPLOY.MENT,BUSlNBSSRELATIONSHIP,FINANClAL TRANSACIION, 

lNVBSTMBNT, ASSOCIATION, OR ACI'IVlTY (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LlMITBD TO, DBALINGS 

WITHTHBFBDBRAL GOVBIINMBNT ONYOOROWNBEHALFORONBBHALF OF A CLIENT), 

WHICH COtJll> CREAT.B. OR APPEAR TO CRBAT.B. A CONFUcr OF JNTBREST INTHB POSITION 

TOWHICHYO'UHAVB BBENNOMINATBD. 

None. 

~· DO YOUINTHNDTO SBVERALLBUSINESS CONNBCI'IONS WITHYOtlR.PRllSBNTBMPLOYERS, 

FIRMS, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES AND/OR PARTNERSHIPS, OR OTHBR ORGANIZATIONS lNTHB 

BVBNTTIIATYOUARECONFlRMBDBYTHBSBNA~? IFNOT,PLBASBBXPLAIN. 

I am employed by the CIA as the Deputy Di=tor. I bave no other' business connections. 

21. DBSCRIBR THBFINANCIALARRANGBMENTS YOU HAVBMADBORPLANTOMAKB, IF YOU 

ARECONFIRMBD,IN CONNBCTIONWII'HSBVERANCBFROMYOtlR. CORRBNT POSmON. 

PLBASB INCLUDE SBVBRANCB PAY, PENSION RIGHTS, STOClC OPTIONS, DBPBRRBD INCOME 

ARRANGEMENTS, AND ANY AND ALLCOMPBNSATIONTIIATWB.L ORMIOHTBERECBIVBD 

INTHB FtlTVRB AS A RESULT OF YOOR CURRENTBUSlNBSS OR PROFESSIONAL 

RELATIONSHIPS. 

See Queation #20 above. 
55 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 10 here 30119.010

22. DO YOUHA VB ANY PLANS, COMMITMENTS, ORAGRBBMBNTS TOPURSUB OUTSIDE 

EMPLOYMENT, WlTH OR WlTHOUTCOMPENSATION, DURING YOUR SERVICE WlTHTBE 

GOVBRNMBNT'l JF SO, PU!ASB PROVIDBDBTAlLS •. 

No. 

23. AS F.ARAS CANBBFORBSBBN, STATBYOURPLANS AFTBRCOMPLBTING GOVERNMBNT 

SERVICE. PLEASE SPBCJF.ICALLYDESCRlBB ANY AGRBBMBNTS OR UNDBRSTANDINGS, 

WRITrBN OR UNWRITTBN, CONCBRNINGBMPLOYMENT AFTBRLBAVING GOVBRNMBNT 

SERVICE. IN PARTICULAR. DESCRlBB ANY A.GREBMB!fl'S, UNDERSTANDINGS, OR OPTIONS 

TO RETURN TO YOURCURRBNTPOSITION. 

I have no iiJllllediate plans, agreements or undetstandings regarding pnllt-govenunent service, written or 

otherwise. 

24. JFYOU ARBPRBSBN'ILYIN GOVERNMENT SERVI~ DURINGTBEPASTFIVB YEARS OF SUCH 

SERVICB, HAVE YOURBCBIVED FROMAPBRSON OUTSIDE OFGOVBRNMBNT AN OFFBROR 

EXPRESSION OFINTBRBSTTO BMPLOYYOURSERVICBS AFTER YOULBAVB GOVBRNMENT 

SERVICE? JF YES, PLBASB PROVIDB DBTAJLS. 

No. 

25. IS YOUR SPOUSBBMPLOn>D? JFYES ANDTBENATURBOFTHIS EMPLOYMENT IS RELATED 

IN ANYWAY TO THE POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARB SBBKlNGCONPIRMATION,PLBASB 

INDICATB YOURSPOUSB'SBMPLOYBR, THE POSITION, AND TBELBNG'IH OFTIMBTBE 

POSITION HAS BBBNHBLD. JFYOURSPOUSB'SBMPLOYMENTIS NOTRELATBDTOTBE 

POSITION TO WHICHYOUHAVBBBBNNOMINATBD, PLBASBSO STATE. 

Not applicable. 

26. USTBBLOW ALL CORPORATIONS, P.ARTNBRSHIPS, FOUNDATIONS, TRUSTS, OR OTIJBl( 

ENlTl'JES TOWARD WHICH YOU OR YOURSPOUSBHAVBFIDUaAR.YOBUGATIONS ORIN 

WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVBHBID DIRBCIORSHIPS OROTHl!RPOSITIONS OF TRUST 

DUlUNGTHBPASTFIVB YEARS. 

None. 

2:1. UST ALLGJFTSEXCEBDING$100INVALUSRBCBIVBDDURINGTHBPASTFIVBYEARSBY 

YOU, YOUR SPOUSE, OR YOURDBPBNDENTS. (NOTB: GJFl'S RBCB1VED FROM RELATIVES 

AND GJFl'S GIVEN TOYOURSPOUSB ORDBPBNDENT NBBI> NOTBBINCLUDBD UNLBSS THE 

GJFTWAS GIVBNWlTHYOUR.KNOWLBDGB ANDACQUIBSCBNCBAND YOU HAD REASON TO 

BBLIBVE THB GJFTWAS GIVBNBECAUSB OF YOUR OFFICIAL POSITION.) 

CIA Officers Memorial Foundation DiDner-Apri12017 (estimated value $1000) 

CIA Officers Memorial Foundation DiDner-April2013 (estimated value $1000) 

I have ~ m:o.ived gifts from foreip aovemments iu the pcrl'onrtaace of my ofticial duties. I bandlod 

those gifts in accordance with ClA regulations. 
56 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 11 here 30119.011

28. IJST ALL SBCURITIBS, REAL PROPERTY, PARTNBRSHIP JNTBRESTS, OR. OTHBR.INVESTMBNTS 

OR.RECBIV ABLES WITH A CURRENT MARKBTVALl:JB (OR., JP MAR.Km' VALUE IS NOT 

ASCBR.TAINABU!,BST.IMATBD CURRENT FAIR. V ALlJB) IN EXCESS OF $1,000. (NOI'B: THB 

INFORMATION PR.OVIDBD IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE A OFTHB DISQ.OSUREFOR.MS OPTHB 

OFFICE OPOOVERNMBNTm:HICSMAYBRJNCORPORATBD BYRBFERENCB.PR.OVIDBDTHAT 

CURRENTVALUATIONSAR.RUSBD.) 

Please see my submialld OGR Fonn 278e for compt= infOI'IDidion. 

29. IJST ALL LOANS OR. OTHBR.INDRB'l'EDNESS (INCLUDING ANY CONTINGENT I.IABli..lTISS) 1N 

EXCESS OF $10,000. HXCLUDBAMOR.TOAGB ON YOUR. PBR.SONAL R.I3SIDBNCB UNLESS ITIS 

RENTIIDOUT, AND LOANS SECURED BY AUTOMOBJLBS, HOUSBHOID FURNITURE, OR. 

APPLTANCBS. (NOI'B: THBJNFORMATIONPROVIDBD INR.RSPONSB TO SCHBDULB C OPTHB 

DISCLOSURE FORM OFTHBOFFICBOP OOVERNMBNTETIUCS MAYBBINCORPORATBD BY 

REmRRNCB, PR.OVIDBD THAT CONTINGENT UAB1LlTJES AR.R ALSO JNCLUDBD.} 

Please see my submitted OOB Fonn 27lle. 

30. AR.R YOU OR. YOUR.SPOUSBNOWJNDBFAULTON ANYLOAN,DBBT, OR. OTHER. FINANCIAL 

OBUGATION? HAVBYOUOR.YOUR.SPOUSBBBBNJNDBFAULTONANYLOAN,DBBT,OR. 

OTHBR.FINANCIALOBUOATION 1N THBPASTTBNYEARS? HAVB YOU OR. YOUR.SPOUSB 

BVBR.BBBNRBFUSBD CRBDITOR.HADALOAN APPUCATIONDBNJBD? JPTHBANSWBR. TO 

ANY OFTHBSB QUESTIONS IS YBS, PLEASE PROVIDB DB!' .AILS. 

No. 

31. lJST THB SPBCIFIC SOUR.CBS AND AMOUNTS OF ALL INCOME R.BCBlVBD DURING THB LAST 

FIVE 'YEAR.S,JNCLUDING ALL SALARIES, FBBS, DIVlDBNDS,lNTBRBST, GJFI'S, RBNTS, 

R.OYAI..'I'IBS, PATENTS, HONORARIA, AND OTHER. I'03MS BXCBEDJNO $200. (COPJES OF U.S. 

INCOME TAX RBTURNS FOR. THESE YEARS MAY BB SUBS'lTIUll!D HBRE, Btrr THBIR. 

SUBMISSION IS NOTR.BQUJRBD.) 

INFORMATION REDACTED 
57 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 12 here 30119.012

INFORMATION REDACTED 

32. JF ASKED, W1LL YOU PROVJDB Tim COMMlTI'f!EWl'IHCOPIBS OF YOUR. Am> ¥OUR SPQYSB'S 

FBDERALINCOMBTAXRBTURNS FOR TIIBPASTTBRBBYBARS? 

Yes. 

33. LtST AIL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU ,'\m} ¥OUR llPQtJSii FILBANNUALINCOMB TAX 

RBTURNS. 

The Uuiled States and the Commonwealth ofVqinia; also filed in the District of Columbia in 2013-2014. 

34. HAVBYOUR.FBDERALORSTATBTAXREI'URNSBBENTHBSUBJECTOFANAUDIT, 

INVESTIOA'IION, OR INQUIRY AT ANY T1MB? JF SO, PLEASB PROVJDBDBTAILS, INCLUDING 

TIIBRBSULTOF ANY SUCH PROCBBDINO. 

No. 

3S. JFYOU ARB AN ATTORNEY, ACCOUNTANT, OR OTBEilPROFBSSIONAL, PLBASBLtST AIL 

CL1BNTS AND CUSTOMERS WHOMYOUBlLLBDMORB THAN$200 WORTH OF SERVICES 

DURINOTIIBPASTFIVB 'YEARS. ALSO, LIST AILJURISDicriONS IN WHICH YOU ARB 

UCBNSED TO PRACTICE. 

Not applicable. 

36. DOYOUINlllND TOPLACB YOURFJNANCIALHOI.DINOS ANDTHOSB OPYOURSPOUSBAND 

DBPENDBNTMBMBBRS OFYOURIMMBDJATBHOUSBHOID IN ABUNDTRUST? JFYES, 

PLEASE FURNISHDBTAILS. JFNO,DBSCRIBB onmRARRANOBMBNTS FOR AVOIDING ANY 

POTf!N'llAL CONFUCfS OF INTEREST. 

Given my cuaent financial assels, I do not require a blind lnl8t in order to avoid actual or potential OODflicts of 

intemst. 

r/. JF APPLICABLB,USTTIIBLASTTBRBB YEARS OF ANNUAL FJNANCIALDISCLOSURBRBPOR:I'S 

YOUHAVBBBBNREQUIRBD TO FILB WITHYOURAOBNCY,DBPAR'l'MBNT, OR BRANCH OF 

GOVERNMBNT. JF ASKED, W1LL YOUPROVJDBACOPY OFTHBSBRBPORTS? 

OOBFonn278 for calendar years 2015,2016 and 2017. Yes, if asked I will provide a copy of these lqlOrtS. 
58 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 13 here 30119.013

PARTE-ETWCAI..MATTERS 

38. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ADISCIPLJNARY PROCEEDING OR ClTBD FORA 

BREACH OF ETHICS OR UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BY, OR BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A 

COMPLAINT TO, ANY COURT, ADMINISTRATIV.BAGENCY, PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION, 

DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE, OR Ol'HBR.PROFESSIONAL GROUP? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. 

3!1. HAVE YOU EVERBBEN INVESTIGATED, HELD, ARRESTED, OR CHARGED BY ANY FEDERAL, 

STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY FOR VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL 

STATE, COUNTY, ORMUNICIPALLAW,REGULATION, OR ORDINANCE, OTHBR THAN A .MINOR 

TRAFFIC OFFENSE, ORNAMBD ASADEF.BNDANTOROTHBRWISEIN ANY INDICTMENT OR 

INFORMATION RELATING TO SUCH VIOLATION? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS. 

In JIID.1IBI'Y 2008, 1hen Attorney General Michael Mukasey appoinmd Asslslant Unl1ed States Allomey John 

Durbam to investigate the desttuctioD of videotapes by CIA per!i01111el A team of prosecutors and FBI agents 

led by Mr. Durham condueted an exbaustive investlgatkm, to include investlgatillg my oolllllwt in the matter. 

On 9 November 2010, Mr. Durham BDDOunced tbathe would not pursue crimiDBl charges :fur the destruction of 

the videotapes. On 15 September 2011, thenDCIA David Pelracus direoted DDCIA Michael Morell to 

conduct a disciplinary IeView of the same matter. In his final report issued on 20 December 201 1, Mr. Morell 

concluded that I acted approprialely and did not violate any Agency n:gulatioml. 

40. HAVEYOUBVERBEENCONVICTEDOFORENTBREDAPLEAOFGUILTYORNOLO 

CONTENDERE TO ANY CRI.MINAL VIOLATION OTHBR THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE? IF 

SO, PROVIDE DETAILS. 

No. 

41. AREYOUPRESENTLYORHAVEYOUEVERBEENAPARTYININTERESTINANY 

AD.MlNISTRATlVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CIVIL LITIGATION? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE 

DETAILS. 

No. 

42. HAVE YOU BEENINTERVIEWBD OR ASKED TO SUPPLY ANY INPORMATION AS A WlTNESS OR 

OTHERWISE IN CONNECTION WITH ANY CONGRESSIONALINVESTIGATION,FBDERAL, OR 

STATE AGENCY PROCEEDING, GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION, OR CRI.MlNAL OR CIVIL 

LITIGATION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS. 

In Salim v. Mitchell (Matter No. CV-1S-li286-JLQ/16-MC-0036-JLQ (B.D. Wash)), I was subpoenaed by the 

plaiolifJ's to provide deposition testimony; the govemment objected end the oourt denied the plaintiff's motion 

to compel. Accordingly, I provided no testimony in that matter. 

Slmilarly, in a sepanrte matter on which 1 can provide greeter detail in classified chanoels, defense counsel 

requested my voluntary testimony; the relevant court has not IUlcd that my testimony is required. 
59 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 14 here 30119.014

43. HAS ANYBUSINBSS OF WHICH YOU ARBOR. WERBAN OF.FICBR, DIRBCl'OR, OR. PARTNER 

Bm!N A PARTY TO ANY ADMINISTRATIVBAGBNCY PR.OCBBDING OR. CRIMINAL OR CIVIL 

ImGATIONRBLBVANTTO THEPOSmONTO WBICHYOUHAVEBBBNNOMINATBD? lF SO, 

PROVIDEDETAJLS. (WITHRESPBCTTOABUSINBSS OF WHICH YOU ARBOR WERBAN 

OFFJ.CBR. YOU NEBDONLY CONSJDERPROCBBDlNGS AND ImGATIONTIIAT OCCURRBD 

WHIUl YOU WERE AN OFFICER OFTIIATBUSINBSS:} 

No, not applicable. 

44. HAVE YOUEVBRBBBNTHESUBJBCT OFANYINSPBCTORGBNBRALINVBSTIGATION? lF SO, 

PROVIDBDBI'AJLS. 

In addition to the xesponse in Question #39, I am awan~lhat CIA's Office ofinspector General conduell:d 

muldple invesliplions relaled to CIA's colllllelflmOrism actl:vities. To my knowledga. thete are no allll&Biioos 

that I had engaged in aay misconduct. Apart from a single interview with the Office ofiuspector General 

regarding a detainee, wbich I can provide more detail about in classified chamlels, I have not been inleniewed 

by the Office of Inspector General on these Jllllllem. Fm1hennote, I have never been rec:ommcnded fur or 

.received any disciplinary aclion, Jetter of reprimand or other adverse consequences in connection with auy of 

these invesligalioes. 

PARTF- SECURITYINFQBMATION 

45. HAVE YOUEVBRBBBNDENlBDANY SBCORITY CLBARANCBORACCBSS TO CLASSIPIBD 

INFORMATION FOR ANY REASON? IF 'YES, PLBASB EXPLAIN IN DETAIL. 

No. 

46. HAVE YOUBBBNRBQUIRBDTOTAKBAPOLYGRAPHEXAMINATIONFORANY SBCURII'Y 

CLBARANCB OR ACCBSS TO CLASSIPIBD INFORMATION? IF 'YES, PLBASB EXPLAIN. 

Yes. I have laken 'full..scope' polygraph elUIIIlinations associated with my omployment at CIA. 

47. HAVE YOUEVBRREFUSBDTO SUBMIT TO A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION? lF YES, PLBASB 

EXPLAIN. 

No. 

PART G • APDrTIQNA£ INFORMATION 

48. DESCRIBE IN YOUR OWN WORDS THBCONCBPT OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF U.S. 

INTELLIGENCE ACTIV.ITIBS. IN PARTICULAR, CHARACl'ERIZB WHAT YOU BBLIEVE TO BE 

THEOBUGATIONS OPTHBDJRBCTOR OFTHB CBNTRALINTELLIGmiCBAGENCY ANDTHB 

INTELLIGENCBCOMMJ.'ITBBS OF THE CONGRESSRESPBCTIVBLYINTHEOVBRSIGHT 

PROCBSS. 

Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amendeil requires the Director of the CIA to keep the 

congressional intelligence committees "fully aud cummtly" informed of the Agency's activities. Members of 

COIIgnlss are RllpOIISible to the Ameripau people fur ensuring that inlellipnce activities are caaied out 

cfiiclcutly, cfl.'ectively, and legally. As both a C8I'CCI' intelligcm:c officer, and ~American citizen, I am a 
60 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 15 here 30119.015

strong believer in the imporlance of Congressional oversight. CIA CIIIUIOt be an effi:clive agency without the 

people's trust and we cannot hope to eam that trust without the IICCOlllltability that comes with oversight. I am 

fully committed to ensuring that Congress have a clear and unobsll:ucted ~of CIA's miMion and 

operations. 

49. BXPLAIN YOUR UNDBRSTANDJNGOFTHBRBSPONSJBILITIBS OFTHBDIRBCTOROFTHB 

CBNT.RAL INTBLLIGBNCB AGENCY. 

CIA's mission is to enhance lllltional security through the colleclion and analysis of foreign inldligence and 

COilllll:rintelligence. Our mission inc;ludes providing overall din:elion for the collel:tion of nalional inldligence 

through human sources. and performing other funclions related to intelligence affilcling the lllltional security as 

the President may direct, inc;luding covert action. The Dilector leads the Agency in each of these endeavors, 

and provides both groond truth and sttategic advantsge to policymaiWs and the inle.tagency. At the same time, 

the Dinlctor must cnslln'llbet CIA persoDIICI have the proper budget, SlrUCtm:e, and authorities 10 carry out the 

mission assigned to it through sts1ute and by the Presideot. 
61 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 16 here 30119.016

AFFIRMATION 

I, I GINA HASPEL DOSWBARTHATTHBANSWBRSIHAVE 

PROVIDED TO THIS QUBSTIONNAIRE ARRAQ::URATEAND COMPLBTE. 

SIGNATURE OF GINA HASPEL 

SIGNATURE OF NOTARY 

JESSICA L. FERGUSON 

NOTARY PUBUC 

REG. ,7189162 

GOMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES OCT: 31. 2020 
62 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 17 here 30119.017

TO THE CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITI'EE ON INTELLIGENCE: 

In connection with my nomination to be the Director of the Central 

Intelligence Agency, I hereby express my willingness tO respond to requests to 

appear and tes~ before any duly ~nstituted committee of the Senate. 

Signature SIGNATURE OF GINA HASPEL 

Date 
63 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 18 here 30119.018

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#1) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) According to a CIA press release, you were transferred to the CIA's 

Counterterrorism Center (CTC) on September 11, 2001, and you didn't let up for three 

years." Please provide the titles you held at CTC and the time periods during which you 

held them. 

Response: 

(U) I served in CTC in the following positions: 

• 2001 - 2003: Deputy Group Chief, CTC; and 

• 2003 - 2004: Senior-level Supervisor, CTC. 

(U) On September 11, 2001, I was transitioning between Agency assignments. When I 

learned of the attacks in New York, Pennsylvania, and at the Pentagon, I walked into 

CTC and volunteered to help with CIA's response to the attacks. I was assigned as 

Deputy Group Chief in CTC from 2001 to 2003, when I became a senior-level 

supervisor. I remained in CTC until June 2004. I will provide additional details about my 

assignments in classified channels. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
64 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 19 here 30119.019

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#2) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) According to the CIA press release, you served as Chief of Staff to the Deputy 

Director for Operations (DDO). The Morell report concerning interrogation videotapes 

confirms that you held that position at the time of the destruction of the videotapes, in 

November 2005. Please provide the full time period during which you held the position 

of Chief of Staff to the DDO. 

Response: 

(U) I served as Chief of Staff to the DDO from 2005 to 2008. I have provided a more 

detailed description of my assignments in classified channels. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
65 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 20 here 30119.020

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#3) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) Executive Order 13526 {Section 1.4) states that: "Information shall not be 

considered for classification unless its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be 

expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security" and 

pertains to one or more of eight specific categories of information. 

a. Please identify and/or describe the "damage to the national security" that 

would be caused by the confirmation or denial of any association between an 

individual in the top leadership of the CIA (who is not under cover) and 

previously declassified programs and operations. 

b. Please identify which of the eight specific categories would apply to such 

confirmation or denial. 

Response: 

{U) Classification decisions must take into account all the relevant facts. As a general 

matter, we do not associate individual officers, regardless of whether they are under 

cover, with particular operations because it would likely subject them to some level of 

risk. On 28 January 2015, pursuant to Executive Order 13526, CIA issued updated 

classification guidance for information about CIA's former Rendition, Detention, and 

Interrogation (RDI) Program. Although a large amount of information about the former 

RDI Program has already been publicly acknowledged, CIA still protects information 

regarding CIA personnel involved in the RDI Program as well as information about the 

operation and location of any overseas detention facilities. This includes the name of 

any country in which the detention facility was located. 

(U) One of the primary reasons for retaining this classification level is for the safety and 

security of all of our officers. Such official acknowledgment of these officers would 

significantly, and unnecessarily, jeopardize the safety of these officers, their families, 

and their associates. There have been death threats and security incidents involving 

officers who have been alleged to have worked in the former RDI Program. In addition, 

there are public websites that have shown a pattern and practice of identifying CIA 

officers with the intended purpose of exposing their identities and impairing CIA's 

intelligence activities. Some of these websites aggregate and assemble other publicly 

available information to identify and post names of family members, phone numbers, 

hobbies, and photos and commercial imagery of homes for the intended purpose of 

UNCLASSIFIED 
66 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 21 here 30119.021

UNCLASSIFIED 

facilitating the identification and location of individuals associated with the CIA and CIA 

personnel. If the CIA were unable or unwilling to protect personnel's affiliation with the 

CIA and activities, not only would this benefit our nation's adversaries, future personnel 

may be less willing to accept dangerous job assignments, thereby significantly impairing 

the CIA's ability to conduct its clandestine intelligence mission. 

{U) Which of the eight EO 13526 categories of information might apply in a given case 

would depend on the specific details of the declassified facts of the program or 

operation. Executive Order 13526 §1.4 categories include: {c) intelligence activities, 

intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology; {d) foreign relations or foreign activities 

of the United States, including confidential sources; {e) scientific, technological, or 

economic matters relating to the national security; and {g) vulnerabilities or capabilities 

of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services related to 

national security. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
67 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 22 here 30119.022

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#4) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) Do you agree that there is a public interest in the disclosure of information related to 

the background of a nominee to be CIA Director, particularly if it involves information 

that has already been declassified? 

Response: 

(U) Yes, I do agree, and CIA remains committed to transparency with the full Senate on 

my professional history. CIA has made public information about my background, and we 

are working toward sharing additional information with the public to the greatest extent 

possible consistent with our responsibility to protect information, the disclosure of which 

reasonably could be expected to cause damage to national security. 

(U) Where material is still classified or protected from disclosure under statutory 

authorities, we will work with the Committee to provide access to the full Senate in 

appropriate classified forums. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
68 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 23 here 30119.023

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#5) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) Have any CIA officers discussed classified information with members of the press, 

either confirming or denying such information, in the context of your nomination? If so, 

please elaborate. 

Response: 

(U) I am unaware of CIA officers revealing classified information to the press in the 

context of my nomination. Members of the press who contact CIA occasionally appear 

to be in possession of classified information, and the Office of Public Affairs, adhering to 

classification rules, responds to those queries. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
69 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 24 here 30119.024

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#6) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) Executive Order 13526 (December 29, 2009) provides that: "In no case shall 

information be classified, continue to be maintained as classified, or fail to be 

declassified in order to: (1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; 

(2) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; (3) restrain 

competition; or (4) prevent or delay the release of information that does not require 

protection in the interest of national security." Executive Order 13292 (March 25, 2003) 

and Executive Order 12958 (April17, 1995) prohibited classification based on the same 

factors. Do you support these prohibitions? 

Response: 

(U) Yes. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
70 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 25 here 30119.025

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#7) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) If you or another CIA officer were to say something that was factually inaccurate in 

public, would you correct the public record? 

Response: 

(U) If I were aware that I or another CIA officer had said something in public that I 

learned was factually inaccurate, I would attempt to correct the public record to the 

extent possible consistent with my legal duty to protect classified information and 

intelligence sources and methods. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
71 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 26 here 30119.026

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#8) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May 2018 

(U) In his June 27, 2013, letter to Committee leadership, then-Director Brennan wrote 

that "we agree with a number of the Study's conclusions." Among them were that the 

CIA: 

• "Allowed a conflict of interest to exist wherein the contractors who helped design 

and employ the enhanced interrogation techniques were also involved in 

assessing the fitness of detainees to be subjected to such techniques and the 

effectiveness of those same techniques; 

• "Detained some individuals under a flawed interpretation of the authorities 

granted to CIA, and; 

• "Fell short when it came to holding individuals accountable for poor performance 

and management failures." 

(U) Do you agree with these conclusions? 

Response: 

(U) As those conclusions suggest-and the Committee's report found-the CIA was not 

prepared to conduct a detention and interrogation program. I believe that the same 

holds true today. If confirmed as Director, I would not permit the CIA to restart such a 

program. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
72 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 27 here 30119.027

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#9) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May 2018 

(U) Prior to ridding itself of its only copy of the Committee's Study of the CIA's Detention 

and Interrogation Program, did the CIA conduct an analysis of whether the Study was a 

federal record under the Federal Records Act, independent of whether it constituted a 

congressional record under the Freedom of Information Act? If so, please provide that 

analysis. 

Response: 

(U) The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the full 

Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program is a congressional 

document and not an Agency record subject to the Freedom of Information Act. See 

American Civil Liberlies Union v. CIA, 823 F.3d 655 (D.C. Cir. 2016), cerl. denied, 137 

S. Ct. 1837 (2017). On the basis of that holding, the CIA returned the congressional 

document to the Committee upon the Chairman's request. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
73 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 28 here 30119.028

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#10) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) The Morell report referenced your "efforts to press for and facilitate a resolution of 

the matter." Please elaborate on those efforts, beginning from when you first became 

aware of the existence of the tapes. 

Response: 

(U) I first became aware of the tapes in 2002. When I served as the Chief of Staff to the 

Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) from 2005 to 2008, I pressed for and facilitated 

efforts to resolve an outstanding question on the disposition of detainee interrogation 

videotapes recorded in 2002. My role included setting up consultation with legal staff at 

the Agency and others at CIA to try to identify a resolution of the security issues from aiQa'ida posed by the tapes. It also included arranging meetings for the DDO with 

personnel whose images were on the tapes and were concerned for their personal 

safety. In discussions with lawyers within the Office of General Counsel, I was informed 

that there were no legal prohibitions to destroying the tapes; but I was notified in 

January 2005 of an outstanding objection from the White House, although I had not 

recalled that until a document refreshed my recollection. At the DDO's direction, I 

drafted a cable to destroy the tapes for the DDO's release, but I did so with the 

understanding that he would use the draft cable to raise this issue with then-Director 

Porter Goss to find a resolution of this matter. When I subsequently saw that the DDO 

had sent the cable to the field, I asked whether he had raised this matter with Director 

Goss. He told me that he had not talked to Director Goss and had sent out the cable 

based on his understanding of his authority as head of the clandestine service. 

(U) Over the years, this issue was thoroughly investigated. In his final report on this 

matter issued on 20 December 2011, then-Deputy Director Michael Morell found no 

fault in my performance and concluded that I acted appropriately. 

(U) I will provide additional information in a classified addendum. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
74 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 29 here 30119.029

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#11) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

{U) The Morell report states that "Ms. Haspel [REDACTED] claims that she believed -

incorrectly, as it turned out- that Mr. Rodriguez was going to obtain approval from then 

Director Goss before releasing the cable and that she took action after the release of 

the cable to ascertain from Mr. Rodriguez whether he had obtained that approval." Are 

there any contemporaneous documentary records supporting those claims? If so, 

please provide them to the Committee. 

Response: 

{U) Contemporaneous records relating to my role were reviewed by Department of 

Justice Special Prosecutor John Durham, and by then-Deputy Director Michael Morell. I 

understand that a copy of Deputy Director Morell's review has been made available to 

the Committee and to the public. The Department of Justice closed their investigation, 

and Deputy Director Morell found no fault in my actions. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
75 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 30 here 30119.030

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#12) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) During his confirmation process for DCIA, Director Pompeo wrote that "If confirmed, 

I will consult with experts at the Agency and at other organizations in the U.S. 

government on whether the Army Field Manual uniform application is an impediment to 

gathering vital intelligence to protect the country or whether any rewrite of the Army 

Field Manual is needed." Are you aware of any such consultation and, if so, what 

lessons were derived from it? 

Response: 

(U) I am not aware of any discussions within the CIA about Army Field Manual 2-22.3 

being an impediment to gathering vital intelligence, nor am I aware of any requests to 

rewrite the Field Manual. I understand that Section 1 045 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 requires the Secretary of Defense to undertake a 

review of the Field Manual every three years, in consultation with the Attorney General 

and Director of National Intelligence. I would refer you to the Secretary of Defense for 

any questions regarding the status of such a review. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
76 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 31 here 30119.031

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#13) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) In August 2016, the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG) released its first 

assessment of interrogation best practices. Have you read this report? If so, what 

lessons have you taken from it? 

Response: 

(U) Yes, I reviewed the HIG report and agree with many of its findings about the team 

effort involved and various debriefing strategies that must be tailored to the individual 

case. I would particularly note the importance of having patient, trained interrogators 

and subject matter experts involved. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
77 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 32 here 30119.032

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#14) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) Will you commit to supporting the deployments of the High Value Detainee 

Interrogation Group (HIG) to interrogate High Value Detainees? 

Response: 

(U) Yes, CIA is supportive of the HIG's efforts to interrogate key terrorists and 

extremists. We continue to coordinate and support deployments, including asking our 

Chiefs of Stations to do their best to accommodate HIG deployments wherever possible 

and sending substantive experts to support these deployments. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
78 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 33 here 30119.033

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#15) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) Do you believe that any of the CIA's former enhanced interrogation techniques are 

consistent with the Detainee Treatment Act? 

Response: 

(U) I understand that attorneys from the Department of Justice and the CIA's Office of 

General Counsel reviewed the enhanced interrogation techniques, and determined that 

they were legal under the laws in effect at the time. CIA personnel involved with the 

detention and interrogation program relied on that legal guidance, and adhered to it in 

good faith. On those few occasions where personnel did not adhere to that guidance, 

they were referred to the Office of Inspector General and Department of Justice, as 

appropriate. 

(U) Today, the law is clear. Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2016 provides that any individual "in the custody or under the effective 

control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government" may 

only be interrogated using the techniques listed in the Army Field Manual 2-22.3. I fully 

support the law, and if confirmed as Director, I would not support the use of enhanced 

interrogation techniques by the US Government, nor any technique not listed as 

permissible in the Army Field Manual. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
79 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 34 here 30119.034

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#16) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) Do you believe that any of the CIA's former enhanced interrogation techniques are 

consistent with the U.S. statutory prohibition on torture? 

Response: 

(U) Please see my answer to Question 15. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
80 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 35 here 30119.035

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#17) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) Do you believe that any of the CIA's former enhanced interrogation techniques are 

consistent with the War Crimes Act? 

Response: 

(U) Please see my answer to Question 15. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
81 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 36 here 30119.036

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#18) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) Do you believe that any of the CIA's former enhanced interrogation techniques are 

consistent with U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture, Common Article 

3 of the Geneva Convention and other U.S. treaty obligations? 

Response: 

(U) Please see my answer to Question 15. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
82 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 37 here 30119.037

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#19) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May 2018 

(U) The CIA General Counsel has agreed that CIA officers should not participate in 

interrogations of detainees in liaison custody when those officers witness, know or 

otherwise suspect the detainee has been tortured or mistreated. Do you also agree? 

Response: 

(U) Yes, I agree with the view of CIA's current General Counsel and former General 

Counsel Caroline Krass that CIA officers should not participate in any interrogation 

when they witness, know or otherwise suspect a detainee has been tortured or 

mistreated, as their participation could, depending upon the circumstances, result in 

violations of law or administrative restrictions. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
83 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 38 here 30119.038

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#20) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) The statutory prohibition on interrogations not consistent with the Army Field Manual 

apply to any individual "in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, 

employee, or other agent of the United States Government; or detained within a facility 

owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States, in any 

armed conflict." 

a. Please describe the factors that would indicate whether a detainee was in the 

"effective control" of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States 

Government. 

b. Please describe how you would define whether a detainee is "detained within a 

facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United 

States." 

Response: 

(U) The interpretation of the statutory standards would be based on the particular facts 

and would be made in consultation with the relevant agency's General Counsel. The 

focus of the analysis would be the common meaning of the statutory terms. Relevant 

factors might include whether the United States controls access to the detention 

facilities in question, owns the land on which the facilities are located, manages the 

operations of the facilities, controls the disposition of detainees, and/or has the authority 

to discipline or fire the personnel running the facilities. 

(U) Executive Order 13491 prohibits the CIA from operating any detention facilities 

(other than facilities used only to hold people on a short-term, transitory basis). 

UNCLASSIFIED 
84 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 39 here 30119.039

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#21) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) The United States recognizes its obligation, under the Convention Against Torture, 

not to "expel, return ('refouler') or extradite a person to another state where there are 

substantial grounds for believing that he [or she} would be in danger of being subjected 

to torture." 

a. Are you aware of any instances in which this has occurred? 

b. To what extent should written "diplomatic assurances" be required for 

extraditions and renditions? 

c. Should such assurances be accepted from countries with established records of 

committing torture? 

Response: 

(U) The United States takes seriously its obligations under the Convention Against 

Torture. In addition, section 2242(a) of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act 

of 1998 states that it is the policy of the United States "not to expel, extradite, or 

otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are 

substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to 

torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States." 

There are rigorous procedures in place to ensure adherence to these obligations, 

including a formal Intelligence Community Policy on Transfers (described in the answer 

to Question 49 below). I am not aware of any instances in which we have failed to follow 

these procedures. 

(U) The application of the legal standards to particular situations would be fact-specific. 

Diplomatic assurances have been a significant tool for ensuring that detainees are 

treated humanely and may be an important factor in determining whether the legal 

standards are met. The reliability of any assurances would be assessed on a case-bycase basis in light of all the relevant factors at the time, including the practices of the 

country providing the assurances as well as that country's record of complying with 

similar assurances provided to the United States and other countries. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
85 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 40 here 30119.040

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#22) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) In an August 6, 2015, letter, then-Director Brennan wrote that "[w]hile we neither 

condone nor participate in activities that violate human rights standards, we do maintain 

cooperative liaison relationships with a variety of intelligence and security services 

around the world, some of whose constituent entities have engaged in human rights 

abuses." If a liaison service were to use CIA-provided resources to engage in human 

rights abuses, with CIA's knowledge, would the CIA bear any legal responsibility? 

Response: 

(U) Former Director Brennan's letter addressed situations where we may maintain a 

liaison relationship with a foreign intelligence or security service where some elements 

of those services may have engaged in human rights abuses. That is different from the 

question posed about the misuse of CIA resources, with CIA's knowledge, to engage in 

human rights abuses. In the latter situation, the CIA's legal culpability, if any, would tum 

on the specific facts. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
86 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 41 here 30119.041

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#23) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) Director Brennan's August 6, 2015, letter stated that "[w]hen we choose to continue 

a liaison relationship despite allegations of human rights abuses by individuals 

associated with a liaison service, CIA policy requires that we take several steps to 

inform our U.S. Government partners and to mitigate the risk offuture human rights 

abuses. First, we advise the local Chief of Mission of CIA's concerns and seek the 

Chief of Mission's input on whether to continue the liaison relationship." 

(U) During his confirmation process, Director Pompeo was asked what role the Bureau 

of Intelligence and Research (INR) and other components of the U.S. Department of 

State should play in considering the policy implications of CIA liaison relationships 

despite allegations of human rights abuses. Director Pompeo responded that chiefs of 

mission are informed and that, "[o]n a select basis, and if appropriate, CIA may also 

inform other U.S. Government partners of any human rights issues that could affect the 

equities of the other U.S. Government partner." 

(U) Does the CIA inform INR or other elements of the Department of State when it 

considers a liaison relationship despite allegations of human rights abuses? 

Response: 

(U) CIA coordinates country-specific issues locally with the Chief of Mission. Prior to 

entering into a liaison relationship with a service against which there are allegations of 

human rights abuses, the CIA Station Chief discusses the case with the Chief of 

Mission and obtains Chief of Mission support for such action. If a Chief of Mission does 

not approve, the Chief of Station may acquiesce in the disapproval by the Chief of 

Mission or refer it to our Headquarters for resolution. If allegations surface after the 

establishment of a relationship, the Chief of Station informs the Chief of Mission and 

obtains his or her concurrence to continue the relationship. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
87 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 42 here 30119.042

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#24) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) The CIA's Response to the Committee's Study of the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program included a recommendation to broaden the scope of 

accountability reviews "to address any systemic issues revealed by the case, and to 

expand the scope of the review as warranted to include officers responsible for those 

systemic problems." During his confirmation, Director Pompeo was asked whether he 

would implement this recommendation. He responded that "I understand that the CIA 

has made improvements in this area, which, if confirmed, I will implement. As Director, I 

will continue to look for ways to improve." While you have served as Deputy Director, 

how has the CIA implemented this recommendation? How would you implement it if 

confirmed as director? 

Response: 

(U) The Agency has made numerous improvements in this area as a result of the 

concerns identified in the study. Since I became Deputy Director, there has not been a 

reason to convene an Accountability Board. If confirmed as Director, I would use the 

improved process that we implemented as a result of the study. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
88 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 43 here 30119.043

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#25) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May 2018 

(U) What would your response be if the President or the White House instructed you to 

withhold information from the full Committee? 

Response: 

(U) The law requires the President, the Director of National Intelligence, and the 

Director of the CIA to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently 

informed of all intelligence activities, to the extent consistent with due regard for the 

protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive 

intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters. Throughout 

my 30 years of experience at the CIA, I have repeatedly seen the importance and value 

of keeping the congressional intelligence activities fully and currently informed to the 

fullest extent possible under the law. If confirmed, I would ensure that the CIA continues 

to fulfill all of its responsibilities in this regard. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
89 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 44 here 30119.044

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#26) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May 2018 

(U) The Committee relies on its staff for assessments of the policy, budgetary and legal 

implications of intelligence activities. Will you commit to ensuring that all staff, including 

member designees, are read into all CIA programs? 

Response: 

(U) If confirmed, I would ensure that Committee staff, including member designees, are 

read into CIA programs consistent with Title V of the National Security Act of 194 7, 

amended. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
90 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 45 here 30119.045

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#27) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) What is your view of the "Gang of Eighf' provision? Are there any circumstances in 

which it can be used for other than time-sensitive tactical matters? Can it be used to 

limit briefings on activities other than covert action and, if so, what would be the 

statutory basis for such limitations? Are there any circumstances in which it can be 

used to conceal from the full Committee ongoing programs or significant legal analyses 

related to intelligence activities? 

Response: 

(U) I understand that the "Gang of Eight" provision allows the President to limit access 

to covert action information to the chairman and ranking minority members of the 

congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of 

Representatives, and the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate. Such provision 

can only be utilized when the President determines that "it is essential to limit access" in 

order to "meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States." 

By its terms, there is no requirement that the "Gang of Eight" provision be limited to 

time-sensitive tactical matters. 

(U) There is a statutory basis for limited notifications in rare cases involving particularly 

sensitive non-covert action matters. Sections 502 and 51 0 of the National Security Act 

of 1947, as amended, require the CIA to keep the congressional intelligence 

committees fully and currently informed "to the extent consistent with due regard for the 

protection from unauthorized disclosures of classified information relating to sensitive 

intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters." It would not 

be proper to use those provisions to withhold from the full Committee intelligence 

information related to ongoing programs or significant legal analyses unless the limited 

access was done for the protection of classified information related to sensitive 

intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
91 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 46 here 30119.046

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#28) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) The Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair 

(November 1987) found that: ''The NSC staff was created to give the President policy 

advice on major national security and foreign policy issues. Here, however, it was used 

to gather intelligence and conduct covert operations. This departure from its proper 

functions contributed to policy failures." Do you agree with the dangers of intelligence 

collection and covert operations conducted by the White House? How, as CIA Director, 

would you seek to ensure that intelligence activities are conducted by the Intelligence 

Community and notified to Congress? 

Response: 

(U) Yes, I agree with the dangers of intelligence collection and covert operations 

conducted by the White House. There is a clear demarcation of responsibilities, with the 

NSC responsible for providing support to the President for review of, guidance for, and 

direction to intelligence activities and the CIA and other elements of the intelligence 

Community responsible for conducting intelligence activities. Since the Iran-Contra era, 

across multiple administrations, I am unaware of a situation where the NSC tried to 

conduct intelligence collection or covert action operations. We have regular and 

frequent coordination meetings with the NSC and other elements of the Intelligence 

Community. If confirmed, I would ensure that the CIA continues to fulfill all of its 

responsibilities to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently 

informed to the fullest extent possible under the law. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
92 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 47 here 30119.047

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#29) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May 2018 

(U) 22 U.S.C. 3927 states that "Under the direction of the President, the chief of mission 

to a foreign country ... shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and 

supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country ... • Absent 

direct intervention from the President, is the CIA obligated to cease intelligence 

activities (including, but not limited to liaison relationships) that do not have the approval 

of the chief of mission? 

Response: 

(U) Intelligence activities that do not have the approval of the Chief of Mission but 

remain supported by the Chief of Station are referred back to CIA and the Department 

of State for resolution. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
93 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 48 here 30119.048

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#30) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) 22 U.S.C. 3927 requires that chiefs of mission "shall be kept fully and currently 

informed with respect to all activities and operations of the Government within that 

country," including the activities and operations of the CIA. As described in the 

Executive Summary of the Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program, in two countries, U.S. ambassadors were informed of plans to establish CIA 

detention sites in the countries where they were serving only after the CIA had already 

entered into agreements with the countries to host the detention sites. Did the failure to 

inform chiefs of mission prior to entering into agreements with the host countries violate 

22 u.s.c. 3927? 

Response: 

(U) Under the direction of the President, it is vital for Chiefs of Mission to be kept fully 

and currently informed of intelligence activities and operations undertaken in their 

countries of accreditation. Communications between the CIA's Chief of Station and the 

Chief of Mission should be sufficiently timely and detailed to inform the Chief of Mission 

of intelligence activities and operations. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
94 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 49 here 30119.049

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#31) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) In two other countries where negotiations on hosting new CIA detention facilities 

were taking place, the CIA told local government officials not to inform the U.S. 

ambassadors. Did the CIA's direction to local government officials not to inform the 

U.S. chiefs of mission violate 22 U.S.C. 3927? 

Response: 

(U) As I noted in the preceding response, under the direction of the President, it is vital 

for Chiefs of Mission to be kept fully and currently informed of intelligence activities and 

operations undertaken in their countries of accreditation. Communications between the 

CIA's Chief of Station and the Chief of Mission should be sufficiently timely and detailed 

to inform the Chief of Mission of intelligence activities and operations. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
95 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 50 here 30119.050

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#32) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May 2018 

(U) During his confirmation process, Assistant Attorney General for National Security 

John Demers was asked about the prohibition on reverse targeting in Section 702 of 

FISA. He responded: 

"As I understand it, determining whether a particular known U.S. person has 

been reverse targeted through the targeting of a Section 702 target necessitates 

a fact specific inquiry that would involve consideration of a variety of factors. For 

example, as the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board noted in its 2014 

report, if a Section 702 tasking resulted in substantial reporting by the 

Intelligence Community regarding a U.S. person, but little reporting about the 

Section 702 target, that might be an indication that reverse targeting may have 

occurred." 

(U) Please describe any CIA guidelines that require review of CIA's post-collection 

actions, including reporting and querying, that would inform the fact specific inquiry into 

whether reverse targeting has occurred. How does this review inform the CIA's own 

nominations of Section 702 targets? 

Response: 

(U) Section 702 of FISA prohibits "reverse targeting" -intentionally targeting a person 

reasonably believed to be outside the United States if the real purpose of such 

acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be inside the 

United States (sec. 702(b)(2)). The Department of Justice reviews all targeting 

nominations for compliance with all statutory requirements, including the prohibition on 

reverse targeting. 

(U) CIA handles information obtained through Section 702 collection in strict conformity 

with Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court-approved procedures. CIA's handling and 

use of that information is subject to constant internal oversight by CIA's FISA Program 

Office, Office of General Counsel, and Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties. 

(U) CIA's Section 702 program is, in addition, subject to extensive external oversight by 

the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Congress, the Department of Justice, and 

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). This includes a joint 

Department of Justice/ODNI audit of CIA's Section 702 program every 60 days, 

UNCLASSIFIED 
96 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 51 here 30119.051

UNCLASSIFIED 

entailing review of all CIA nominations approved for targeting under Section 702; CIA's 

use of US person identifiers to query the content of raw Section 702-acquired data; and 

CIA's retention and dissemination of Section 702-acquired communications that contain 

US person information. Bi-monthly reports documenting the results of each such review 

are submitted to Congress. Any compliance incidents discovered in the course of the 

Department of Justice and ODNI's oversight are reported to the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Court and to Congress in semiannual reports. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
97 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 52 here 30119.052

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#33) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May 2018 

(U) "Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Activities: Procedures Approved by the 

Attorney General Pursuant to Executive Order 12333" is currently posted on line. Do 

you commit to continuing to post these procedures and to making public any 

modifications, superseding policies and procedures, or significant interpretations? 

Response: 

(U) Yes, subject only to my duty to protect classified information and intelligence 

sources and methods. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
98 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 53 here 30119.053

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#34) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May 2018 

(U) The CIA's PPD-28 Section 4 policies and procedures are publicly available. Will 

you ensure that the CIA continues to post these procedures as well as any 

modifications, superseding policies and procedures, or significant interpretations? 

Response: 

(U) Yes, subject only to my duty to protect classified information and intelligence 

sources and methods. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
99 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 54 here 30119.054

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#35) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) What do you see as the possible costs to bilateral relationships, including bilateral 

intelligence relationships, to eliminating or modifying PPD-28? 

Response: 

(U) PPD-28 underlies the US commitment to the EU/US Privacy Shield. This 

administration reviewed PPD-28 last year and decided to retain it. If PPD-28 were 

substantially modified or eliminated, our European partners might re-evaluate their 

commitment to the Privacy Shield that support trans-Atlantic commercial data flows. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
100 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 55 here 30119.055

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#36) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) NSA Director Nakasone has stated that, absent consent of the U.S. person or 

certain emergency situations, U.S. person queries of communications collected under 

Executive Order 12333 "normally must be approved by the Attorney General on a caseby-case basis after a finding of probable cause." Does the same requirement apply to 

the CIA? Please describe any exceptions to a requirement for a probable cause finding 

and Attorney General approval for U.S. person queries. 

Response: 

(U) CIA's Attorney General Guidelines, which were approved by former CIA Director 

John Brennan and Attorney General Loretta Lynch in January 2017, govern any CIA 

collection, retention, or dissemination of information concerning US persons. The 

Attorney General Guidelines require that any proposed "special collection" activity, 

including electronic surveillance to acquire communications, directed at a US person 

outside the United States, requires the General Counsel's concurrence and approval by 

the Director of the CIA (or an official the Director has designated), the Attorney General 

and, when the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act applies to the collection activity, the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (sec. 4.4.2). The Attorney General Guidelines 

require any official approving the use of such a special collection technique directed at a 

US person outside the United States to "document in writing that, under existing facts 

and circumstances, the official has determined that there is probable cause to believe 

that the person or entity at whom the special collection technique is directed is an 

agency of a foreign power, or an officer or employee of a foreign power, and that the 

information sought is significant foreign intelligence or counterintelligence" (sec. 4.2.2). 

(U) The Attorney General Guidelines state that "[q]ueries of CIA information 

repositories are not considered collection; rather, those queries examine previously 

collected information and do not require any additional approval" beyond the approvals 

for its collection noted above (sec. 4.1 ). When such queries are of unevaluated 

information and are designed to retrieve information concerning a US person, they must 

be "reasonably designed to retrieve information related to a duly authorized activity of 

the CIA'' and require a statement that explains the purpose of the query (sec. 6.2.3). 

The Attorney General Guidelines also require that an auditable record be maintained, 

recording access, queries made, and justifications for queries that were designed to 

retrieve information concerning US persons (sec. 6.2.2.1 ). 

UNCLASSIFIED 
101 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 56 here 30119.056

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) NSA operates under its own authorities and procedures, and I must defer to NSA 

with reference to their requirements. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
102 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 57 here 30119.057

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U} Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#37) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) What rules apply to the CIA's receipt, use and dissemination of communications 

collected by a foreign source or liaison partner that is known to include U.S. person 

communications? 

Response: 

(U} The CIA's collection, use, retention, and dissemination of communications collected 

by a foreign source or liaison partner that are known to include US person 

communications are governed by the CIA's Attorney General Guidelines implementing 

Executive Order 12333, which were updated and signed by Attorney General Lynch and 

Director Brennan in January 2017 and are available on the CIA's website. In this regard, 

the CIA's Attorney General Guidelines implement the requirements of Section 309 of 

the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 ("Procedures for the Retention of 

Incidentally Acquired Communications"). 

UNCLASSIFIED 
103 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 58 here 30119.058

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#38) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) The 22 May 2013 Direct Action Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) was released to 

the public. Do you support transparency with regard to any modifications to these 

policies? 

Response: 

(U) As a general rule, I do support being as transparent as possible. I believe that this 

must be balanced against the negative impact of revealing to our enemies key elements 

of our tradecraft that would enable them to take measures to evade counterterrorist 

operations and thus continue to threaten the United States and allies and interests 

abroad. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
104 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 59 here 30119.059

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#39) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) Please describe your view of the legal and policy implications of targeting or 

otherwise knowingly killing a U.S. person in a U.S. Government lethal operation. What 

additional public transparency do you believe would be warranted in that situation? 

Response: 

(U) Although being a US citizen does not immunize members of an enemy force from 

attack, a decision to use lethal force against a US citizen is one of the most serious the 

US Government could face. When deciding whether to use lethal force against a US 

citizen, the US Government would need to take that person's constitutional rights into 

account. The Department of Justice has set forth a detailed and authoritative framework 

for the constitutional analysis in public documents and speeches. Continued 

transparency on these issues is important. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
105 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 60 here 30119.060

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#40) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May 2018 

(U) On December 2, 2015, now-President Donald Trump stated the following: "The 

other thing with the terrorists is you have to take out their families, when you get these 

terrorists, you have to take out their families. They care about their lives, don't kid 

yourself. When they say they don't care about their lives, you have to take out their 

families." Do you agree that this would be a violation of U.S. and international law? 

Response: 

(U) During my more than 30 years at the CIA, to my knowledge, no US official has 

proposed-much less acted upon-intentionally targeting innocent family members of 

terrorists. I can assure you that, if confirmed as Director of the CIA, I would not condone 

any such activity by the US Government regardless of its legality under domestic and 

international law. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
106 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 61 here 30119.061

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#41) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) Please give a time line of your positions at CIA from 2001 to 2008, and describe in 

detail your responsibilities, participation, supervision, and approval relevant to the 

rendition, detention and interrogation program in each position. 

Response: 

(U) As I noted in my response to Senator Wyden, on September 11, 2001, I had just 

returned to Washington from an overseas assignment. While checking in to 

Headquarters as part of the transition process, I learned of the attacks in New York, 

Pennsylvania, and at the Pentagon, I walked into the CIA's Counterterrorism Center 

(CTC) and volunteered to help with CIA's response to the attacks. I was assigned as 

Deputy Group Chief in CTC from 2001 to 2003, when I became a senior-level 

supervisor. I remained in CTC until 2004. 

(U) In 2004, 1 was assigned as the Deputy Chief of National Resources Division, where 

my duties were not directly related to CTC. 

(U) In 2005, I became Chief of Staff to Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) Jose 

Rodriguez. As DDO, Mr. Rodriguez was responsible for the CIA's clandestine service 

operations, to include those within CTC. My responsibility as Mr. Rodriguez's Chief of 

Staff included facilitating discussions, communications, and decisions between the DDO 

and his subordinates, other offices within CIA, and Agency leadership. As a 

consequence, I was involved in discussions related to CTC matters. However, I had no 

independent operational authority. 

(U) I will provide additional information in a classified addendum. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
107 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 62 here 30119.062

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#42) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) If you had direct observation or read descriptions of the use of "enhanced 

interrogation techniques," did any of the detainees in the CIA detention and 

interrogation program experience severe pain or suffering, or prolonged physical or 

mental harm as a result of their treatment in CIA custody? 

Response: 

(U) I understand that the Department of Justice determined that the "enhanced 

interrogation techniques" would be lawful under the laws in effect at the time if applied in 

accordance with the approved guidelines. However, the CIA referred several instances 

of alleged violations of the approved procedures to the CIA Office of Inspector General 

and the Department of Justice for investigation. 

(U) Under current law (the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016), the 

United States Government may not use any interrogation technique that is not approved 

under the Army Field Manual 2-22.3. I fully support this change, and if confirmed as 

Director, I would not allow CIA to engage in the use of enhanced interrogation 

techniques again. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
108 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 63 here 30119.063

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#43) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) Were you in a position of authority to stop, or prevent the future employment of, 

"enhanced interrogation techniques" that were approved for use at the time by executive 

branch officials? Please explain your answer. 

Response: 

(U) I will provide details of my career in a classified channel. However, throughout my 

Agency career, I have conducted myself honorably and in full compliance with the law. 

When placed in positions of leadership, I have ensured that CIA operations have been 

conducted professionally and in accordance with legal guidance. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
109 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 64 here 30119.064

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#44) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) What is your assessment today of the effectiveness of "enhanced interrogation 

techniques" and their impact on the United States' moral standing in the world? 

Response: 

(U) I realize that there are strong disagreements on the effectiveness of CIA's detention 

and interrogation program. In my view, a view shared by all nine former Directors and 

Acting Directors, the CIA was able to collect valuable intelligence that contributed to the 

prevention of further terrorist attacks. That said, it is impossible to know whether the CIA 

could have obtained the same information in another way. 

(U) I have read the Executive Summary of this Committee's report on the program, and 

I agree with the report's finding that the CIA was neither equipped nor prepared to 

conduct a detention or interrogation program. I also understand that the intelligence 

collected came with costs. There is little question that CIA's participation in the program 

harmed not only the officers who participated but also caused damage to our 

relationships with our foreign partners. 

(U) That is why, if confirmed as Director, I would not permit CIA to restart such a 

detention and interrogation program. Nor will I support the US Government using 

enhanced interrogation techniques again. Current law prohibits their use, and 1 support 

that law. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
110 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 65 here 30119.065

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#45) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) Were you aware of the means by which the CIA deprived detainees of sleep during 

the interrogation program-including shackling, nudity, and the use of diapers for 

prolonged periods? Did you ever intervene to limit the length of time a detainee was 

subject to sleep deprivation? 

Response: 

(U) I understand that the Department of Justice determined that the "enhanced 

interrogation techniques" would be lawful under the laws in effect at the time if applied in 

accordance with the approved guidelines. However, the CIA referred several instances 

of alleged violations of the approved procedures to the CIA Office of Inspector General 

and the Department of Justice for investigation. 

(U) Today, the law is clear, and such techniques are prohibited. Under the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, the United States Government may not 

use any interrogation technique that is not approved under the Army Field Manual 2-

22.3. I fully support this change, and if confirmed as Director, I would not allow CIA to 

engage in the use of enhanced interrogation techniques again. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
111 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 66 here 30119.066

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#46) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May 2018 

(U) Were you ever interviewed by the CIA Inspector General or law enforcement in 

connection with the CIA's rendition, detention and interrogation program? Please 

describe and provide any materials from those interviews in your possession. 

Response: 

(U) In January 2008, then-Attorney General Michael Mukasey appointed Assistant 

United States Attorney John Durham to investigate the destruction of videotapes by CIA 

personnel. A team of prosecutors and FBI agents led by Mr. Durham conducted an 

exhaustive investigation, to include investigating my conduct in the matter. On 

November 9, 2010, Mr. Durham announced that he would not pursue criminal charges 

for the destruction of the videotapes. On September 15, 2011, then-DCIA David 

Petraeus directed then-DDCIA Michael Morell to conduct a disciplinary review of the 

same matter. In his final report issued on December 20, 2011, Mr. Morell concluded that 

I acted appropriately and did not violate any Agency regulations. He found no fault with 

my actions. 

(U) Separately, I am aware that CIA's Office of Inspector General conducted multiple 

investigations related to CIA's counterterrorism activities. To the best of my recollection, 

in addition to inquiries related to the destruction of the tapes, I have been interviewed 

only on two other matters related to CIA's counterterrorism activities; the first pertains to 

a detainee and the second was a matter where the Office of Inspector General initiated 

interviews that were never concluded. I will provide further detail on these matters in 

classified channels. I have never been recommended for or received any disciplinary 

action, letter of reprimand or other adverse consequence in connection with any of 

these investigations. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
112 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 67 here 30119.067

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

Question: 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#47) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) Do you know why James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen sought to depose you, in 

particular, as part of their defense against the civil lawsuit brought by their victims? 

Response: 

(U) I was subpoenaed by defendants Mitchell and Jessen to provide deposition 

testimony. However, the government objected and the court denied the plaintiffs 

motion to compel. Accordingly, I never testified in the case, and am therefore unaware 

of what questions they intended to ask me. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
113 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 68 here 30119.068

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#48) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) In your view, did the CIA ever render or detain suspects who were innocent, or 

conduct renditions based on insufficient evidence? 

Response: 

(U) I understand that the CIA's Office of the Inspector General conducted a review of 

the rendition of Khalid ai-Masri and determined that CIA did not meet the standard for 

rendition under the September 1?11', 2001 Memorandum of Notification (MON). 

Additionally, OIG identified other cases where a Counterterrorism Center lawyer applied 

"similar, inaccurate legal text as used in the cable approving the ai-Masri rendition." 

UNCLASSIFIED 
114 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 69 here 30119.069

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#49) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) How do you understand the laws limiting detainee transfers by the CIA to have 

changed since your time at the Counterterrorism Center? 

Response: 

(U) Among other things, there is now a formal Intelligence Community Policy on 

Transfers. The policy requires the CIA and other elements of the Intelligence 

Community to have certain standards in place, including provisions for the secure and 

humane treatment of transferees, an express statement that under no circumstances 

may an Intelligence Community element transfer any person to a foreign state or entity 

where it is more likely than not that the person will be tortured, and a requirement that 

the Intelligence Community element will take appropriate steps to investigate any 

credible allegations that a transferred person has been subjected to torture by a foreign 

state or entity. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
115 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 70 here 30119.070

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#50) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) Did you advocate for the destruction of the videotapes, as John Rizzo appears to 

allege in his memoir? 

Response: 

(U) I first became aware of the tapes in 2002. When I served as the Chief of Staff to the 

Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) from 2005 to 2008, I pressed for and facilitated 

efforts to try to resolve an outstanding question on the disposition of detainee 

interrogation videotapes recorded in 2002. I did not appear on the videotapes nor did I 

make the decision to destroy them. That decision was made by the former DDO who 

has publicly taken responsibility for his decision. My role included setting up 

consultation with legal staff at the Agency and others at CIA to try to identify a resolution 

of the security issues from ai-Qa'ida posed by the tapes. It also included arranging 

meetings for the DDO with personnel whose images were on the tapes and were 

concerned for their personal safety. In discussions with lawyers within the Office of 

General Counsel, I was informed that there were no legal prohibitions to destroying the 

tapes; but I was notified in January 2005 of an outstanding objection from the White 

House, although I had not recalled that until a document refreshed my recollection. At 

the DDO's direction, I drafted a cable to destroy the tapes for the DDO's release, but I 

did so with the understanding that he would use the draft cable to raise this issue with 

then-Director Porter Goss to find a resolution of this matter. When I subsequently saw 

that the DDO had sent the cable to the field, I asked whether he had raised this matter 

with Director Goss. He told me that he had not talked to Director Goss and had sent out 

the cable based on his understanding of his authority as head of the clandestine 

service. 

(U) Over the years, this issue was thoroughly investigated. In his final report on this 

matter issued on 20 December 2011, then-Deputy Director Michael Morell found no 

fault in my performance and concluded that I acted appropriately. 

(U) I will provide additional information in a classified addendum. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
116 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 71 here 30119.071

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#51) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) At the time of the tapes' destruction, were you aware of the request from 

Representative Jane Harman that the videos be preserved? Were you aware of CIA 

attorneys' concerns that congressional investigators or a congressionally authorized 

commission might seek access to them? Were you aware of the White House Counsel's 

and Director of National Intelligence's instructions that they not be destroyed? 

Response: 

(U) To the best of my recollection, at the time of the destruction of the videotapes, I was 

aware of concerns raised in several quarters about destroying the tapes, but I was told 

that there were no legal prohibitions to destroying the tapes. Ultimately, the decision to 

destroy the tapes was made by the former Deputy Director for Operations. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
117 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 72 here 30119.072

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#52) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) Did you support Rodriguez's decision to order destruction of the tapes at the time he 

gave the order? If not, did you object, or attempt to dissuade him from destroying the 

evidence? 

Response: 

(U) When I served as the Chief of Staff to the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) 

from 2005 to 2008, I pressed for and facilitated efforts to resolve an outstanding 

question on the disposition of detainee interrogation videotapes recorded in 2002. It was 

my understanding that the DDO was to raise the issue with Director Goss and reach a 

resolution of the matter before he approved the destruction of the tapes. Only after the 

DDO released the cable did I learn that the DDO had approved the destruction of the 

tapes without seeking final approval from Director Goss. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
118 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 73 here 30119.073

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#53) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May 2018 

(U) How would you respond to evidence that an allied intelligence service, which is 

funded by the United States or participates in joint detention or capture operations with 

the United States, was using techniques similar to those the CIA conducted after 

September 11, 2001? 

Response: 

(U) CIA officers should not and may not participate in detainee debriefings where 

interrogation techniques are used that are inconsistent with US law. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
119 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 74 here 30119.074

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#54) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) What steps would you take as CIA Director to ensure that all persons working for or 

contracted to the CIA comply with domestic and intemationallegal obligations? 

Response: 

(U) I take our commitment to following the law very seriously. Our nation was founded 

on fundamental principles of justice and the rule of law. This distinguishes the United 

States from many of our adversaries. Consequently, the CIA must comply with all 

applicable legal obligations. The CIA currently provides briefings and online training to 

persons working for or contracted to CIA on their various legal obligations and CIA 

authorities. Such training is frequently tailored to the specific programs and locations 

where they serve CIA. I will ensure that CIA continues to do so and provide additional 

training where necessary. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
120 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 75 here 30119.075

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#55) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) The director of the CIA has original classification authority for CIA information. 

Would a personal involvement in the rendition, detention and interrogation program 

create a conflict of interest with regard to the exercise of classification and 

declassification authority about that program? Does it create the appearance of a 

conflict of interest? 

Response: 

(U) I am committed to ensuring the proper classification of national security 

information. I do not believe that my exercise of Original Classification Authority (OCA) 

to classify or declassify information on programs in which I participated would cause any 

actual conflict of interest. The standards in E.O. 13526 that govern OCA decisions are 

clear: an OCA must determine that the unauthorized disclosure of the information 

reasonably could be expected to result in damage to national security, and if there is 

significant doubt about the need to classify, it shall not be classified. I appreciate, 

however, that there may be instances where my decision to classify or declassify 

information on matters in which I participated could result in appearance concerns, and I 

will work with the CIA General Counsel and the Senior Agency Official for Classification 

on issues that raise such concerns to ensure that my actions are appropriate and in full 

compliance with the applicable standards. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
121 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 76 here 30119.076

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#56) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) Have you read the 2014 report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 

the CIA detention and interrogation program? Do you support declassifying the full 

report, and would you do so if confirmed? 

Response: 

(U) I have read the Executive Summary of the Committee's report, and agreed with its 

conclusion that the CIA was not prepared to run a detention and interrogation program. I 

believe that the same holds true today, and therefore if confirmed as Director, I would 

not permit the CIA to restart a detention and interrogation program. 

(U) Should a request from the Committee to declassify the document be made during 

my tenure, the Executive Branch would need to examine the full document carefully to 

determine what sources, methods, ongoing operations, and liaison relationships might 

be imperiled through further release. Based on the length of the document and CIA's 

experience with declassifying the Executive Summary, that would be a significant 

undertaking. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
122 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 77 here 30119.077

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

{U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein {#57) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) The ongoing classification of information regarding the defendants' torture in CIA 

custody, and classified allegations of intrusions into defense attorney's communications 

with their clients, are a continuing source of delay in the Guantanamo military 

commissions. The CIA, including the director as Original Classification Authority, plays a 

major role in determining what information can be shared with the defense counsel or 

declassified. Would you be willing to declassify relevant information so that these cases 

can finally move forward? 

Response: 

(U) As the pending prosecutions at US Naval Station Guantanamo Bay proceed toward 

trial, CIA has provided the Office of the Chief Prosecutor for the Military Commissions 

access to a significant volume of information related to CIA's former Detention and 

Interrogation Program as well as other CIA information requested by the Office of the 

Chief Prosecutor. This information, in tum, is made available by the prosecutors to 

defense counsel as appropriate under the rules of those proceedings. If confirmed, I 

would ensure that the CIA continues to provide appropriate assistance to the Chief 

Prosecutor, while also protecting intelligence sources and methods. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
123 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 78 here 30119.078

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#58) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May 2018 

(U) If confirmed as CIA Director, would you ensure that any statements made by 

detainees while they were in CIA custody are not used as evidence in any proceedings 

against them or against others? 

Response: 

(U) I understand that courts and other tribunals have rules in place governing when 

statements may be used as evidence in their proceedings. It would not be appropriate 

to substitute my judgment for the rules that govern those proceedings. If confirmed, I 

would continue CIA's praCtice of supporting those proceedings and the appropriate 

prosecuting authorities while deferring to those authorities on matters regarding the 

admissibility of evidence. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
124 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 79 here 30119.079

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Angus King (#59) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) Were you aware that legislation had been introduced in the U.S. Congress to review 

detainee issues when you drafted the cable authorizing the destruction of detainee 

interrogation videotapes on November 8, 2005? Please describe all conversations you 

had regarding congressional oversight of this matter prior to the destruction of the 

videotapes. 

Response: 

(U) To the best of my recollection, I was not aware of this proposed legislation and I do 

not recall any discussions pertaining to congressional oversight of detainee videotapes 

prior to the destruction in November 2005. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
125 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 80 here 30119.080

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Angus King (#60) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) In its June 2013 response to the Committee's study of the detention and 

interrogation program, the CIA agreed that "the Agency made serious missteps in the 

management and operation of the program in its early days. • Do you accept any 

personal responsibility for CIA's admitted failures in its management and operation of 

the detention and interrogation program? 

Response: 

(U) I was a mid-level GS-15 officer on 9/11. Although I played no role in the 

establishment or design of CIA's Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program, I take 

responsibility for all of my actions throughout my career, to include my time in the 

Counterterrorism Center. Having lived through that tumultuous time, I have learned 

some valuable lessons to include the fact that the Agency was not prepared to conduct 

a detention and interrogation program. I accept personal responsibility for ensuring the 

CIA does not undertake an activity that is inconsistent with our mission, expertise, 

values, or the law. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
126 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 81 here 30119.081

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Angus King (#61) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) During his tenure as Director of Central Intelligence, Robert Gates said "Managers 

must create an environment in which analysts feel comfortable airing substantive 

differences." Do you agree with this statement? As Director of the CIA, what steps 

would you take to promote analytic independence and objectivity? Do you believe that 

CIA Directors have an affirmative obligation to accurately represent intelligence 

information? 

Response: 

(U) I agree that managers must create an environment that fosters open dialogue about 

substantive differences, and it would be my responsibility if confirmed as Director of the 

CIA to ensure CIA is accurately and objectively presenting intelligence information to 

our partners and customers. Ensuring the objectivity of CIA's analytic product is 

foundational to the work that we do and is deeply engrained across CIA. The credibility 

of CIA analysis-and by extension, the CIA's credibility as a whole-rests on our ability 

to produce timely, accurate, and objective all-source analysis that is free from bias or 

advocacy for any policy or operational goal. 

(U) As DCIA, I would look to reinforce several of the significant steps we have taken 

during the last year to bolster our ability to produce objective analysis. These include 

increasing leadership engagement on objectivity issues, clarifying the roles and 

responsibilities of all of our officers-both analysts and collectors-in the production of 

objective analysis, and expanding the resources available to any officer who has an 

objectivity issue to raise. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
127 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 82 here 30119.082

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Pre-Confirmation Hearing Questions Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Angus King (#62) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

5 May2018 

(U) In response to the 9/11 attacks, Congress created the position of the Director of 

National Intelligence (DNI) to serve as the head of the intelligence community and 

establish an integrated framework to promote a more effective intelligence apparatus for 

our country. A successful DNI makes the intelligence community more efficient, more 

collaborative, and advances seamless information sharing across our intelligence 

agencies. In your view, what is the proper role of the DNI? What part should the DNI 

play with respect to management of the CIA? As Director of the CIA, how would you 

work with the DNI to advance intelligence integration? 

Response: 

(U) The DNI has a number of significant responsibilities as outlined in the National 

Security Act, EO 12333, and other policies. In its role overseeing the Intelligence 

Community (IC) and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program, 

the DNI has the ability to lead integration across the IC by improving information sharing 

and promoting a strategic, unified direction. The Office of the DNI, like CIA, seeks to 

provide policymakers with insightful, timely, accurate, and integrated intelligence to 

inform policymakers' decisions and protect the United States. Throughout my career, I 

have seen how essential collaboration among the various IC agencies is for producing 

timely and accurate intelligence to policymakers. 

{U) The statute makes clear our respective roles and responsibilities. As the Deputy 

Director of CIA and in previous roles as Chief of Station, I have always maintained a 

strong relationship with the DNI. I have worked closely with DNI Coats and Principal 

Deputy DNI Gordon on IC-wide policies and initiatives, as well as on providing updates 

on CIA activities, and I look forward to continuing this collaborative dialogue, if 

confirmed. Furthermore, in my last assignment as Chief of Station and DNI 

Representative in the capital of a major US ally, I maintained a tight working relationship 

with senior DNIIeadership. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
128 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 83 here 30119.083

Tim DIRECTOR 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505 

The Honorable Richard Burr, Chainnan 

Select Committee on Intelligence 

United States Senate 

211 Hart Senate Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

Dear Chainnan Burr: 

14 May 2018 

Thank you for the Committee's letter dated 10 May 2018. As you requested, I have 

completed the Committee's unclassified post-hearing questions, which are enclosed. My 

responses to the Committee's classified post-hearing questions are being submitted under 

separate cover. 

An original of this letter is being sent to Vice Chainnan Warner. 

Enclosure 

Gina C. Haspel 

Acting Director 
129 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 84 here 30119.084

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Mark Warner (#1-2) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) With the benefit of nearly 20 years of hindsight, and from your perspective as the 

nominee to be Director of the CIA, do you believe the Agency's use of "enhanced 

interrogation techniques• was consistent with American values? Do you believe the 

rendition, detention and interrogation program was a mistake? 

(U) What will you do when faced with an order that, while technically legal, is contrary to 

your sense of moral values? If the President orders you to carry out some morally 

questionable program, for example, but OLC writes an opinion noting the legality of the 

morally questionable actions, what will you do? 

Response: 

(U) As Director, I would refuse to undertake any proposed activity that is contrary to my 

moral and ethical values. As I was able to describe in detail during the classified 

session, in my role as Deputy and now Acting Director, every operation l review must 

not only meet those high standards, the activity must also be consistent with CIA's 

mission, expertise, and the law. I do not and would not hesitate to reject a proposal that 

fails to meet this threshold. The American people have placed a great deal of trust In 

CIA, and we work to earn that trust every day. 

(U} Over the last 17 years, the Agency and I have learned the hard lessons since 9111. 

While I won't condemn those that made these hard calls, and I have noted the valuable 

Intelligence collected, the program ultimately did damage to our officers and our 

standing in the world. With the benefit of hindsight and my experience as a senior 

Agency leader, the enhanced interrogation program is not one the CIA should have 

undertaken. The United States must be an example to the rest of the world, and I 

support that. 

(U) As I stated to the Committee, it was a mistake not to brief the entire committee at 

the beginning. Both the Committee and the Agency shared the goal of obtaining the 

critical intelligence needed to thwart another attack. CIA needs to have consensus from 

members of the oversight committees who make decisions on behalf of the American 

people as their elected representatives on activities that can't be made public. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
130 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 85 here 30119.085

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Mark Warner (#3) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

(U) You state in your written responses to the Committee's pre-hearing questions that 

the CIA OIG identified cases-in addition to Khaled ai·Masri-in which "similar, 

Inaccurate legal text was used in the cable approving the ai-Masri rendition" were used 

to justify the capture and detention of individuals. Do you believe you have responsibility 

for any of these flawed decisions? What steps did you take to ensure that another 

innocent individual would not be wrongfully rendered? 

Response: 

(U) I take full responsibility for all of my actions. Throughout my career, I have sought to 

ensure that CIA operations have been conducted professionally and In accordance with 

appropriate legal guidance. Even so, I have learned hard lessons through my 

experience in the Counterterrorism Center. One of those lessons is the need to foster a 

culture of questioning in the workforce In which junior officers feel comfortable 

challenging the process to make sure CIA's activities adhere to the highest standards. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
131 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 86 here 30119.086

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Mark Warner (#4) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) Do you pledge to fully cooperate with the ongoing Russia investigations, both the 

committee's and that of Special Counsel Mueller? 

Response: 

(U) Yes. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
132 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 87 here 30119.087

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Mark Warner (#5) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

(U) Do you agree with the IC's Assessment from January 2017 that Russia intelfered in 

the 2016 election? 

Response: 

(U) Yes, I agree with the conclusions of the 20171ntelligence Community Assessment. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
133 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 88 here 30119.088

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Mark Wamer (#6) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) We are in an increasingly precarious situation with Iran. Based on intelligence seen 

to date, do you believe that I ran continues to abide by Its responsibilities under the 

JCPOA? 

Response: 

(U) Iran has continued to substantially meet the JCPOA commitments that the US 

Intelligence Community judges extend the amount of time Iran would need to produce 

enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about a year. Iran 

has observed JCPOA limits on its centrifuges and amounts of low-enriched uranium. 

Iran has not pursued the original design of Its heavy water research reactor and has not 

produced or tested fuel for the original heavy water research reactor-a key component 

of which it previously disabled by filling it with concrete as part of its JCPOA 

commitments. 

(U) The JCPOA addresses Iran's nuclear program; it does not address Iran's ballistic 

missile program or its regional activities. 

(U) Iran's desire to equip Hlzballah with guided rockets, its support to the Huthis in 

Yemen, and its attempt to launch missiles into the United Arab Emirates and Saudi 

Arabia-those are all recent and aggressive moves, some of which threaten Israeli 

security. It also has surged fighters and moved materiel to Lebanon and Syria to attack 

Israel. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
134 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 89 here 30119.089

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Mark Warner (#7) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) How will you guard against the politlcization of intelligence? 

Response: 

(U) The credibility of CIA analysis-and by extension, the CIA's credibility as a wholerests on our ability to produce timely, accurate, and objective all-source analysis that is 

free from bias or advocacy for any policy or operational goal. Ensuring the objectivity of 

CIA's analytic product Is foundational to the work that we do and is deeply engralned 

across the Agency. 

(U) As DCIA, I would seek to reinforce several of the significant steps we have taken 

during the last year to bolster our ability to produce objective analysis. These include 

increasing CIA leadership engagement on objectivity issues, clarifying the roles and 

responsibilities of all of our officers-both analysts and collectors-in the production of 

objective analysis, and expanding the resources available to any officer who has an 

objectivity issue to raise. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
135 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 90 here 30119.090

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCJA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Mark Warner (#8) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

(U) Does the CIA have an affirmative obligation to speak out when intelligence 

assessments are being deliberately misrepresented by political actors? What is your 

responsibility to Congress and to the American people to correct the record? Will you 

commit to publicly correcting the record when you believe the IC has been 

misrepresented by political actors? 

Response: 

(U) As I stated at my confirmation hearing, it is a key part of CIA's mission to provide the 

most sophisticated, objective, all-source analysis to appropriately cleared policymakers, 

and operational actors, throughout the US Government. We do so without regard to 

political agendas. Our analytic tradecraft and standards are specifically designed to 

minimize the introduction of bias or advocacy into our products. Consistent with the 

protection of sources and methods, I commit to ensuring our analytic assessments are 

not misrepresented to the American people. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
136 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 91 here 30119.091

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Mark Warner (#9) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence . 

14 May2018 

(U) Do you believe it is necessary for the Director of CIA to "speak truth to power" -to 

tell the president the unvarnished truth, and the full best assessments of the CIA, even if 

these truths are unwelcome? Can you provide examples of having done this in your 

career? 

Response: 

(U) I believe it is critically important for the CIA as an organization, and most especially 

the Director of the CIA indMdually, to "speak truth to power" even if these truths are 

unwelcome. I have spent my life speaking truth to power. I have had frank discussions 

with allies and adversaries. I have delivered unwanted news to CIA Directors, Cabinet 

Secretaries, and the President. I have provided a more specific example in a classified 

addendum. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
137 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 92 here 30119.092

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Mark Warner (#10) 

Senate Select Committee on lnteiHgence 

14 May2018 

(U} Section 1. 7 of EO 13256 states that "in no case shall information be classified 

continue to be maintained as classified, or fail to be declassified in order to ••. conceal 

violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error" or "prevent embarrassment to a 

person, organization, or agency." Do you agree with those prohibitions? Do you the 

think the CIA has complied with these prohibitions, and other prohibitions against 

lobbying, during the course of your nomination. 

Response: 

(U) I agree with those prohibitions and believe the CIA has complied. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
138 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 93 here 30119.093

i.JNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Martin Heinrich (#11) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) As you may know, six senators sent a letter on May 9, 2018, to Attorney General 

Sessions requesting greater transparency with regard to the 'Durham report,' the 

investigation report written by U.S. Attorney and former special prosecutor John 

Durham regarding the destruction of videotapes by the CIA. The letter specifically 

requests the Justice Department to permit all senators to review that report, since its 

review has been restricted to Committee members and Senate leadership. 

a. You are now familiar with some aspects of the report. Given that the CIA has 

already made publicly available the Morell report exonerating your actions with 

regard to the videotapes' destruction, would you agree that before they case a 

vote for or against your nomination, all U.S. senators should have an opportunity 

to review the Durham report? 

b. My colleague Senator Wyden also asked you in the hearing whether you have 

any objection to the public release of the Durham report. Do you? 

Response: 

(U) The "Durham report" Is a Department of Justice document, and I therefore defer to 

DOJ to determine what access to this internal DOJ document may be appropriate. I 

have never read the report myself. I am aware that the Durham Investigation closed with 

no charges filed. Over the years, this issue was thoroughly investigated. In the final 

report on the matter issued on December 20, 2011, then-Deputy Director Michael Morell 

found no fault in my performance and concluded that I had acted appropriately. 

i.JNCLASSIFIED 
139 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 94 here 30119.094

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Martin Heinrich (#12) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

(U) Have you read the "key findings" and summary of the internal CIA review of the RDI 

program referred to now as the "Panetta Review?" If not, will you commit to doing so? 

Response: 

(U) I have not read the documents referenced in your question, which I understand 

refers to a series of draft documents prepared by CIA regarding the former RDI 

program. During my confirmation hearing, I discussed many of the important lessons 

learned from the program. I remain committed to ensuring that the Agency learns from 

and implements the lessons associated with CIA's experience with that program, and I 

will commit to review those documents. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
140 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 95 here 30119.095

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Martin Heinrich (#13-14) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) You testified that only one detainee appears on the videotapes that were destroyed. 

Please see this document from FOIA litigation referencing two detainees, one who 

appeared in 90 videotapes, and another who appeared in two: 

https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/torturefoia/released/030609/videotape inventory. 

oQ!. Please correct your testimony accordingly. 

(U) Were there in fact two detainees who appeared on the videotapes? 

Response: 

(U) My understanding, which is consistent with the record (available to the Committee in 

a classified forum), is that there were 92 videotapes, two of which were labeled 

"detainee 2." The OGC attorney who reviewed those tapes in 2002 found that "there 

are no viewable videotapes of the interrogation of the second detainee." Therefore, 

when the tapes were destroyed in 2005, there was only one detainee depicted. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
141 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 96 here 30119.096

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#15) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) Would you follow a direct presidential order to waterboard a detainee? Please 

answer yes or no. 

Response: 

(U) No. Today, the law is clear, and such techniques are prohibited. Under the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, the United States Government may not 

use any interrogation technique that is not approved under the Army Field Manual 2-

22.3. I fully support this change, and if confirmed as Director, I would not allow CIA to 

engage in the use of enhanced interrogation techniques again. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
142 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 97 here 30119.097

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#16) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) Do you believe in hindsight that the Enhanced Interrogation Techniques were 

immoral? Please answer yes or no. 

Response: 

(U) Please see the responses to Questions #1 and #2. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
143 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 98 here 30119.098

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#17) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) Will you recuse yourself from having any role in adjudicating declassification of your 

background in furtherance of your nomination? Please answer yes or no. 

Response: 

(U) Please see my response to Question #18. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
144 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 99 here 30119.099

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#18) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

(U) Do you agree that Director Coats should have the responsibility for declassification 

decisions regarding your background? Please answer yes or no. 

Response: 

(U) As noted in the May 14th letter to Senators Feinstein, Wyden, Heinrich, and Harris 

the ODNI, " ..• concurs with the CIA's finding that much of the information associated with 

Ms. Haspel's career properly remains classified in accordance with established 

classification authorities, as its disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause harm 

to US national security.• CIA has made public information about my background and 

has attempted to share additional information with the public to the greatest extent 

possible consistent with our responsibility to protect information the disclosure of which 

reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. The Agency 

has adhered to existing classification guidelines, in accordance with the requirements of 

Executive Order 13526, and will continue to do so. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
145 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 100 here 30119.100

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#19) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May 2018 

(U) Has President Trump asked you to pledge loyalty to him? Please answer yes or no. 

Response: 

(U) No. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
146 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 101 here 30119.101

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#20) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May 2018 

(U} Did you oversee the "enhanced" interrogation of Abd ai~Nashiri, which included the 

use of the waterboarcl? Yes or No? 

Response: 

(U) Please see the classified addendum for information about my classified 

assignments. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
147 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 102 here 30119.102

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#21) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

{U) Did you order or oversee the waterboarding of any detainee? Yes or No? How 

many times? 

Response: 

(U) Please see the classified addendum for information about my classified 

assignments. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
148 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 103 here 30119.103

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee ~ina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#22) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) Did you ever receive any instructions on the use of these "enhanced" Interrogation 

techniques? 

Response: 

(U) Please see the classified addendum for Information about my classified 

assignments. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
149 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 104 here 30119.104

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#23) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) Did you understand the rendition, detention, and Interrogation program to be lawful? 

What was the basis for this opinion? 

Response: 

(U) I understood that the Department of Justice reviewed the program and determined it 

was legal under the law of the time. CIA personnel involved with the detention and 

interrogation program relied on that legal opinion, and adhered to it in good faith under 

the guidance of CIA's Office of General Counsel. 

(U) Today, the law is clear. Under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2016, the United States Government may not use any interrogation technique that 

is not approved under the Army Field Manual 2-22.3. I fully support this change, and if 

confirmed as Director, I would not allow CIA to engage in the use of enhanced 

interrogation techniques again. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
150 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 105 here 30119.105

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#24) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

(U) Aside from the legality of the program, did you have personal reservations regarding 

any aspects of the rendition, detention, and interrogation program at the time? If so, did 

you ever express these reservations to peers or superiors? 

Response: 

(U) Please see the classified addendum. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
151 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 106 here 30119.106

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#25) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

{U) Were you responsible for supervising or managing James Mitchell and Bruce 

Jessen, who devised the CIA's "enhanced" interrogation techniques, as they 

interrogated ai-Nashlri? 

Response: 

(U) Please see the classified addendum for information about my classified 

assignments. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
152 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 107 here 30119.107

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#26) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

{U) Did you ever converse with them prior to or after the interrogation? 

Response: 

{U) Please see the classified addendum response to Question #25. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
153 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 108 here 30119.108

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#27) 

Senate Select Commit:IBe on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) Did you ever question their qualifications? 

Response: 

(U) Please see the classified addendum response to Question #25. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
154 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 109 here 30119.109

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#28) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) In your response to the Committee's questions, you stated that you served as a 

"Senior-level Supervisor" in the Counterterrorism Center from 2003 to 2004. 

a. Did this position Include responsibility, supervision or approval relevant to the 

rendition, detention, and Interrogation program? Yes or No? 

b. Were you aware of the conditions of capture and confinement of different CIA 

detainees during that tlmeframe? 

c. Did you believe the conditions of confinement for the CIA detainees during that 

timeframe were humane? 

d. Were you aware of the specific methods of interrogation being used? 

Response: 

(U) Please see the classified addendum for information about my classified 

assignments. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
155 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 110 here 30119.110

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#29) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) In your responses to the Committee's questions, you stated that you served as 

Chief of Staff to the Deputy Director for Operations from 2005 to 2008. Did this position 

include responsibility, supervision or approval of any aspect of the rendition, detention, 

and interrogation program? Yes or No? 

Response: 

(U) My responsibility as Mr. Rodriguez's Chief of Staff included facilitating discussions, 

communications, and decisions between the DDO and his subordinates, other offices 

within CIA, and Agency leadership. As a consequence, I attended discussions related to 

CTC matters. However, I had no independent operational authority, and in this position 

did not hold a supervisory role related to RDI. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
156 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 111 here 30119.111

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#30) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

(U) You state in your written responses to the Committee that some innocent individuals 

- in addition to Khalid ai-Masri -were captured, rendered, and held, under cables that 

used "inaccurate legal text"- essentially illegally. The Agency has publicly taken 

responsibility for at least one wrongful death during this period. 

a. Do you personally take any responsibility for any of those flawed decisions? 

Yes or No? 

b. What steps did you take to ensure that another innocent individual would not 

be wrongfully killed or captured under your watch? 

Response: 

(U) Please see the response to Question #3. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
157 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 112 here 30119.112

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Dianne Feinstein (#31) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) Several key U.S. national security partners have been extremely critical of the 

rendition, detention, and interrogation program and, as a result, have limited intelligence 

cooperation in the past. 

a. Do you think your Involvement in the rendition, detention, and interrogation 

program will affect your ability to engage with these partners? If so, how do you 

intend to address that? 

b. How would you explain your past involvement in the rendition, detention, and 

interrogation program to these allies? 

c. What, if any, assurances should the United States provide to key national 

security partners regarding future activities like those pursued as part of the 

rendition, detention, and interrogation program? 

d. Do you believe you will be able to credibly give these assurances? 

Response: 

(U) CIA has learned some tough lessons, especially when asked to tackle missions that 

fall outside our expertise, but we have used those experiences to improve our activities 

going forward. For me, there is no truer example of implementing lessons learned than 

what I took away from CIA's detention and interrogation program. Despite CIA's 

tremendous contribution to preventing future attacks, there is little question that CIA's 

participation in this program harmed not only the officers who participated but also 

caused damage to our relationships with our foreign partners. 

(U) When serving as Chief of Station to a major ally, and as Deputy and now Acting 

Director, I have found tremendous support from our foreign partners. In my current 

capacity, and indeed for the last 10 years, I have worked very closely with our European 

and other partners. I have had discussions with many of our foreign partners, and they 

are well aware that I will not accept any attempt to have CIA undertake an activity that is 

contrary to our mission, values, or the law. This clear position will only enhance my 

ability to implement my vision to leverage partnerships in new ways against the hardest 

targets. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
158 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 113 here 30119.113

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#32) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) Please provide any opinions, guidance or reasoning of the General Counsel and/or 

Senior Agency Official for Classification with regard to your decisions related to the 

classification of matters associated with your nomination. 

Response: 

(U) All classification decisions are guided by Executive Order 13526, the CIA Act of 

1949, as amended, and the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. In addition, CIA 

issued updated classification guidance for information about CIA's former detention and 

interrogation program on January 28, 2015. The CIA's Director of Congressional Affairs 

detailed the CIA's approach to classification of matters associated with my nomination 

in letters to Senators Feinstein, Heinrich, and Wyden dated April 24, 2018. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
159 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 114 here 30119.114

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#33) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) How do you square the CIA's sanctioning of public acknowledgements that certain 

individuals were associated with the [RDI] program with your testimony that you are 

bound by existing guidelines to conceal any association you may have had with the 

program? 

Response: 

(U) Although a large amount of Information about the former RDI program has already 

been publicly acknowledged, CIA still protects Information regarding CIA personnel 

involved in the RDI program for the safety and security of our officers. While I agree that 

the confirmation process for a nominee to be the Director of the CIA requires 

transparency with the American public, I cannot make an exception for myself that could 

jeopardize the safety and security of our officers or disclose classified sources and 

methods. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
160 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 115 here 30119.115

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#34) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May 2018 

(U) Do the "existing RDI guidelines" to which you referred prevent the public release of 

any opinion about the program expressed by a CIA officer, regardless of whether that 

officer was associated with the program at the time he or she provided that opinion? 

Response: 

(U) Please see the classified addendum. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
161 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 116 here 30119.116

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

{U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden {#35) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

{U) In discussing the destruction of the interrogation videotapes, you testified that: •Mr. 

Rodriguez chose not to copy the lawyers on the cable because he took the decision on 

his own authority and he wanted to take responsibility for it" Did your draft of the cable 

exclude the lawyers, or did It Include the lawyers only to have Mr. Rodriguez remove 

them? 

Response: 

{U) In discussions with lawyers within the Office of General Counsel, I was informed that 

there were no legal prohibitions to destroying the tapes. At the DDO's direction, I drafted 

a cable with instruction to destroy the tapes for the DDO's release, but I did so with the 

understanding that he would use the draft cable to raise this issue with then-CIA 

Director Porter Goss to find a resolution of this matter. The DDO chose not to add the 

lawyers because he took the decision on his own authority. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
162 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 117 here 30119.117

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#36) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) You testified that you were at your desk and could see your computer screen, "so it 

was shortly after Mr. Rodriguez ••. had released the cable• that you became aware that 

the cable was released. In your responses to written questions, you wrote that "[w]hen I 

subsequently saw that the DDO had sent the cable to the field, I asked whether he had 

raised this matter with Director Goss." How long after the cable was sent did you have 

this conversation? 

Response: 

(U) Shortly after I realized Mr. Rodriguez had released the cable, I got up from my desk 

to discuss it with him. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
163 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 118 here 30119.118

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#37) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) You testified that the tapes were destroyed because of "security risks to CIA officers 

who were depicted on the tapes." Your testimony includes six other references to "other 

officers.• To what extent were contractors, as opposed to CIA officers, depicted on the 

videotapes? 

Response: 

(U) In this context, "CIA officers• meant CIA personnel, including employees and 

contractors. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
164 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 119 here 30119.119

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#38) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) Did you ever take any action, or have management responsibility for any action, that 

was inconsistent with the law? If so, please elaborate. 

Response: 

(U) I have always strived to adhere to the legal guidance I have been provided, and I 

believe that my actions throughout my career have been lawful. In each of my 

leadership positions, I have ensured, and will continue to ensure, that all relevant work 

is reviewed by CIA lawyers. I place the heaviest weight on the views of CIA lawyers. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
165 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 120 here 30119.120

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#39) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May201B 

(U) During the hearing, you were asked about the statement in John Rizzo's book that 

you had "previously run the interrogation program.• You responded: "I would never even 

served in that department nor was I the head of it." Please specify which department 

you were referring to. 

Response: 

(U) Please see the classified addendum. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
166 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 121 here 30119.121

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#40) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

(U) You testified that you were "not even read into the interrogation program until it had 

been up and running for a year.• Abu Zubaydah was rendered to DETENTION SITE 

GREEN in late March 2002. He was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques in August 2002. Please provide more precise information about when you 

consider the program to have been "up and running,• and when you were read into It: 

Response: 

(U) I was referring to the Presidenfs signing of a Memorandum of Notification on 

September 17, 2001, which authorized the CIA to undertake operations designed to 

capture and detain persons who posed a continuing, serious threat of violence or death 

to US persons and interests who were planning terrorist activities. 

(U) i was read into the more restricted detention and interrogation program in October 

2002. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
167 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 122 here 30119.122

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U} Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#41} 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May 2018 

(U) As Chief of Staff at the Directorate of Operations, what role did you play did you or 

the Directorate have in preparing, reviewing, or coordinating on information provided to 

the congressional intelligence committees related to the RDI program, Including 

testimony and responses to questions? Did you play any such role at the CTC? 

Response: 

(U) As Chief of Staff to the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO), one of my primary 

responsibilities was to ensure DO seniors were supported with briefing material, readahead information, talking points (including remari<s to the DO wori<force), and 

additional background material for meetings, conferences, briefings, and testimony to 

Congress. During my time in CTC, I participated in some non-RDI related congressional 

briefings. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
168 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 123 here 30119.123

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#42) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) During the hearing, you were asked whether, between 2005 and 2007, as the CIA 

was capturing fewer detainees and waterboarding was no longer approved, you ever 

called for the program to be continued or expanded. Please provide an answer to that 

question. 

Response: 

(U) It is advantageous for the United States Government to be able to question, in 

person, terrorists for intelligence on current threats and plots. As a mid-level officer, I 

believed that capturing and detaining ai-Qa'lda terrorists provided significant Intelligence 

and helped prevent future attacks. CIA continues to play a crucial role in that process. 

(U) CIA no longer has a detention and interrogation program; other elements of the 

USG-specifically, DoD and FBI-handle the detention and interrogation of detainees 

while CIA provides its subject matter expertise. I support this division of responsibilities 

and I do not support the Agency resuming a detention and interrogation program. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
169 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 124 here 30119.124

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#43) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

(U) In its 2013 response to the Committee's Study of the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program, the CIA acknowledged that the Agency "fell short when it came 

to holding individuals accountable for poor performance and management failures?" Do 

you agree? 

Response: 

(U) Yes. I believe that, looking forward, the Agency should ensure that accountability 

exercises do not focus just on the officers directly involved in the specific failure or 

misconduct, but also look more broadly at management responsibility and more 

consistently at systemic issues. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
170 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 125 here 30119.125

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#44} 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) In responses to a written question, you wrote: 

"I understand that the CIA's Office of the Inspector General conducted a review 

of the rendition of Khalid ai-Masri and determined that CIA did not meet the standard for 

rendition under the September 17fh, 2001 Memorandum of Notification (MON). 

Additionally, OIG identified other cases where a Counterterrorism Center lawyer applied 

'similar inaccurate legal text as used in a cable approving the ai-Masri rendition.'" 

In its 2013 response to the Committee Study, the CIA concluded that, in the aiMasri case, "those with broader responsibility for the program" were not held 

accountable for "any management shortcomings that contributed to the outcome. • The 

CIA further stated: "we concede that it is difficult in hindsight to understand how the 

Agency could make such a mistake, take too long to correct it, determine that a flawed 

legal interpretation contributed, and in the end only hold accountable three CTC 

attorneys, two of whom received only an oral admonition." 

Do you agree that there should have been accountability for management 

shortcomings in the ai-Masri case? 

Response: 

(U) I believe that, looking forward, the Agency should ensure that accountability 

exercises do not focus just on the officers directly Involved in the specific failure or 

misconduct, but also look more broadly at management responsibility and more 

consistently at systemic issues. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
171 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 126 here 30119.126

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#45) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May 2018 

(U) In its 2013 response to the Committee Study, the CIA acknowledged that it "allowed 

a conflict of interest to exist wherein the contractors who helped design and employ the 

enhanced interrogation techniques also were involved in assessing the fitness of 

detainees to be subjected to such techniques and the effectiveness of those 

techniques." 

a Do you agree that the CIA allowed such a conflict of interest? 

b. If yes, do you believe anyone at the CIA should have been held accountable 

for allowing that to happen? 

Response: 

(U) Yes, I support the 2013 CIA response to the Committee Study. In addition, please 

see the response to Question #43. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
172 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 127 here 30119.127

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#46) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) The CIA's 2013 response to the Committee Study states that "the propriety of the 

wide-ranging nature of the psychologists' roles - particularly their involvement In (1} 

performing interrogations, (2) assessing the detainees' psychological fitness, and (3) 

assessing the techniques' effectiVeness - raised concerns and prompted considerable 

discussion and deliberation within CIA." Did you ever raise any of these concerns? 

Response: 

(U) As I stated at the hearing, CIA officers were told that interrogation experts had 

designed the program and that it had been legally cleared at the highest levels of the 

US Government. There was no independent interrogation expertise at CIA then and 

there is none now. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
173 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 128 here 30119.128

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#47) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) Would you ever allow CIA contractors to participate in or conduct briefings or 

interrogations of detainees? 

a. If yes, please describe the situations in which you believe that would be 

appropriate. 

b. If yes, would those contractors be limited to techniques authorized by the Army 

Field Manual? 

Response: 

(U) As noted above, CIA does not conduct interrogations, debriefings of detainees in the 

custody of other agencies or entities are an important part of intelligence collection. 

Contractors make valuable contributions to these debriefings, consistent with applicable 

law and policy. For example, contractors may supply a particular expertise, such as a 

language skill, that is otherwise not readily available. Contractors performing debriefings 

must be overseen by a US Government employee. While the CIA does not conduct 

interrogations, any USG personnel-to Include a contractor working for the CIA-would 

be subject to the Army Field Manual. 

(U) Please see the classified addendum. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
174 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 129 here 30119.129

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Ron Wyden (#48-49) 

Senate Select Committee on intelligence 

14May2018 

(U) On July 18, 2014, the CIA Inspector General issued a Report of Investigation on 

Agency Access to SSCI Shared Drive on RDINet. Among the IG's findings was that 

agency employees "improperly accessed SSCI Majority staff shared drives on the 

RDINet." 

a. Do you agree that the CIA's access to the SSCI Majority staff shared drives 

was improper? 

b. Do you believe anyone should have been held accountable for those 

accesses? 

(U) The IG further found that: "The Agency filed a crimes report with the DOJ, reporting 

that SSCI staff members may have improperly accessed Agency information on the 

RDINet The OIG investigation determined that the factual basis for referral was 

unfounded and the author of the letter had been provided Inaccurate Information on 

which the letter was based." 

a. Do you agree that the factual basis for the referral was unfounded and based 

on inaccurate information? 

b. Do you believe that CIA personnel filing crimes reports with the DOJ have an 

Independent responsibility to ascertain whether the reports are factually 

accurate? 

c. Do you believe anyone should have been held accountable for the 

inaccurate and baseless crimes report? 

d. What is your view of the propriety of the CIA filing crimes reports on 

congressional members or staff? 

Response: 

(U) I have no firsthand knowledge of this matter, I do not know all of the underlying 

facts, and I have not reviewed all relevant materials. I therefore cannot offer an 

UNCLASSIFIED 
175 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 130 here 30119.130

UNCLASSIFIED 

independent judgment about the issues raised. I understand that CIA convened an 

Accountability Board to review the issues identified by the Inspector General. I 

understand further that the Board, which was chaired by former Senator Evan Bayh, 

concluded that no disciplinary action was warranted on the facts presented. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
176 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 131 here 30119.131

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (#50) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May 2018 

(U) In your career, have you ever felt pressured to revise intelligence assessments to 

meet a particular political or policy goal? If yes, how did you respond? 

Response: 

(U) Not that I recall. I am incredibly proud of the analysts at CIA and the sterling 

reputation they have in the Intelligence Community for providing all source analysis to 

the policymal<ers. We have a long-established commitment to preserving the integrity 

and objectivity of our analysis. There is also an independent ombudsman that provides 

for a private, safe, and absolutely confidential channel for officers to raise concerns that 

an analytic assessment has been politicized. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
177 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 132 here 30119.132

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (#51) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

(U) If confirmed, will you commit to stand firm, in the face of any political pressure, to 

defend the CIA's assessments-especially if those assessments do not support current 

or planned policies? 

Response: 

(U) Yes. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
178 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 133 here 30119.133

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (1t52) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May 2018 

(U) If confirmed, do you commit to notify this Committee immediately if you ever receive 

political pressure to alter intelligence assessments? 

Response: 

(U) I commit to resist any such pressure, should it ever exist, and commit that CIA will 

continue to meet its obligations to its congressional oversight committees, including our 

legal obligation to keep the committees currently and fully informed of all significant 

intelligence activities. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
179 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 134 here 30119.134

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (#53) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) If confirmed, will you commit to hiring a workforce that reflects the diversity of the 

American people across race, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, physical 

ability and religion? 

Response: 

(U) Yes, and I believe CIA must work harder to achieve a more diverse workforce. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
180 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 135 here 30119.135

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U} Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCI,I). Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (#54} 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U} There are potential national security benefits to having a diverse CIA workforce that 

can more easily operate overseas. If confirmed, how do you plan to promote recruiting 

for diverse candidates at CIA? 

Response: 

(U) The benefits of diversity, both in terms of talent acquisition and the larger CIA 

mission, are critical. I have long been a supporter of CIA having a robust diversity 

recruiting program that provides a broad-based approach to outreach with a strong 

focus on languages and ethnic diversity. In addition to the benefits of having a diverse 

workforce, our global mission demands it. CIA's recruitment program pursues diversity 

in hiring through a variety of methods including public advertising, direct community 

outreach, college campus events, and student programs, to name a few. If confirmed, I 

will continue to support all of CIA's diversity efforts and explore ways to improve the 

Agency's performance in this area. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
181 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 136 here 30119.136

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (#55) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) If confirmed, how do you plan to improve diversity, of all kinds, at CIA in senior level 

management positions? 

Response: 

(U) Through the course of my career, I have always worked to do my part to build a 

diverse and inclusive workforce at CIA, including promoting and encouraging fellow 

officers, ensuring a fair process on personnel decisions, and formally leading 

mentorship programs. I am proud to say I am a champion for diversity but I recognize 

more must be done, and as DCIA I will be committed to making additional 

advancements. 

(U) In 2014, the then-DCIA commissioned the "Diversity in Leadership Study (DLS)," 

chaired by Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., which examined the factors that limit diversity in CIA's 

senior leadership. The study identified seven recommendations and a five-year effort 

with an eye toward building a more diverse leadership cadre and fostering an inclusive 

culture at CIA. If confirmed, I plan to continue emphasizing the critical need for diversity, 

particularly in the leadership ranks, and intend to place specific focus on the underlying 

DLS initiatives necessary to achieve the goals identified by the study. Additionally, I will 

continue leveraging the senior officer performance review process and mandatory 

Diversity and Inclusion training for all senior officers as instruments to further 

Inclusiveness and diversity at CIA. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
182 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 137 here 30119.137

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (#56) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

(U) If confirmed, how do you plan to be an advocate for the CIA's LGBTQ community? 

Response: 

(U) I have been, and will continue to be, a supporter and ally for CIA's LGBTQ 

community. CIA is a diverse multi-cultural workplace, and its 15 Agency Resource 

Groups (ARG) highlight that diversity. It is essential that Agency leadership is attuned to 

the broadest cross-section of views on these issues. One of the 15 ARGs Includes the 

Agency Network of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Officers and Allies 

(ANGLE). Workforce diversity at CIA is, and will continue to be, a focus area for me if 

confirmed. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
183 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 138 here 30119.138

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (#57) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) If confirmed, will you commit to protecting the rights of LGBTQ employees to equal 

professional opportunities and benefits? 

Response: 

(U) Yes, I will. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
184 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 139 here 30119.139

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (#58) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) Do you believe that the American people deserve to know as much as possible 

about the nominee to be CIA director, including that person's professional history and 

judgment? 

Response: 

(U) Yes. Some Information must remain classified for the safety and security of our 

officers and foreign partners and for the protection of sources and methods. Classified 

Information about my record, including past assignments, Is available for review by all 

members of the US Senate. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
185 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 140 here 30119.140

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (#59) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) Prior to a vote on your nomination, will you commit to declassifying, with appropriate 

redactions for protecting sources and methods, all information about any involvement 

that you may have had in the CIA's Rendition, Detention and Interrogation program? 

Response: 

(U) Although a large amount of information about the former RDI Program has already 

been publicly acknowledged, CIA still protects information regarding CIA personnel 

involved in the RDI Program for the safety and security of our officers. Congress has 

recognized the need to protect from disclosure the functions, names, and official titles of 

persons employed by the Agency. Any classified information about my record, including 

past assignments, Is available for review by all members of the US Senate. I do not 

wish to make any exception for myself that could have the effect of jeopardizing the 

safety and security of our officers or of disclosing sensitive intelligence sources and 

methods or giving terrorist groups a basis upon which to target CIA individuals. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
186 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 141 here 30119.141

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (#60) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

(U) Have you ever, in any way, advocated for sharing less information with Congress 

related to the CIA's Rendition, Detention and Interrogation program? 

Response: 

(U) Not that I recall, and it would be contrary to my strong belief in the importance of 

congressional oversight. As I stated in my prehearing Question #25, throughout my 30 

years of experience at CIA, I have repeatedly seen the importance and value of keeping 

the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all significant 

intelligence activities. If confirmed, I will ensure that the CIA continues to fulfill all of its 

responsibilities in this regard. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
187 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 142 here 30119.142

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U} Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (#61) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

(U} The President, then a candidate, asserted that, ''we should go much stronger than 

waterboarding.• If you received such an order, as CIA Director, would you comply? 

Response: 

(U) No. Today the law is clear, and such techniques are prohibited. Under the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, the United States Government may not 

use any interrogation technique that is not approved under the Army Field Manual 2-

22.3 I fully support this change, and if confirmed as Director, I would not allow CIA to 

engage in the use of enhanced interrogation techniques again. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
188 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 143 here 30119.143

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (#62) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

(U) The President, then a candidate, asserted that, regarding waterboarding suspected 

terrorists, "if it doesn't work, they deserve it anyway, for what they're doing." Do you 

agree with that statement? 

Response: 

(U) I do not support use of enhanced interrogation techniques for· any purpose. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
189 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 144 here 30119.144

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (#63) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) If confirmed, do you commit to make countering Russian influence operations, 

particularly those targeting U.S. elections, a priority at CIA? 

Response: 

(U) Yes, I do. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
190 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 145 here 30119.145

Question: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (#64) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

(U) You have stated that you concur with the 20171ntelligence Community assessment 

regarding Russia's Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections. If confirmed as CIA 

Director, how do you plan to convey the seriousness of the threat from Russia to the 

President? 

Response: 

(U) It is the CIA's role to provide policymakers with timely, high-quality assessments of 

the serious and ongoing threat from Russia. Election interference is just one example of 

the growing threat the United States faces from Russia (as well as from other state and 

non-state actors). I noted during my testimony that it is important to have a whole-ofgovernment approach to combatting this persistent problem. While CIA is an important 

player in this discussion, effectively understanding and countering the Russian threat 

requires coordination and cooperation throughout the federal government. I believe my 

long experience working against the Russian target has uniquely prepared me to 

understand and respond effectively to the serious threat posed by Russia. 

UNCLASSIFIED 
191 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 146 here 30119.146

Question: 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to . 

DCIA.Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Angus King (#1) 

Senate Select Com!'littee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

(U) During the course of your time at CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC), what role · 

did you play In CTC's management and operation of its detention and interrogation 

program? Please provide any records In th~ CIA's possession-that describe your role 

and duties at CTC with respeCt to managing or operating this program (such as any 

organizational charts, job descriptions, or the equivalent, should they exist). Further, if a 

classified response is required, please provide a justlfjcatlo~ for why the Agency has 

chosen not to declassify this Information. 

Response: 

(U) In regard to the role I played in CTC's management, please see the classified 

addendum to Question· #28. In regard to the request for an explanation of why this 

response is classified, please see my responses to Question #59 and the classified 

addendum to Question #34. 
192 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 147 here 30119.147

Question: 

• (U) Questions for the Record Submitted to . 

DCIA"Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Angus King (#2) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May201B 

(U) In his book, Mr. Rodriguez states that he sent the cable authorizing the destruction 

of the videotapes on November 8 and that tha tapes were destroyed the next day on 

November 9. Did you inform the Director of the CIA, legal staff at the Agency, officials in 

the Offlca of the Director of National lntelllgenca, or any other officials that the cable had 

been sent? If you did not, why? Please describe all conversations, calls, emails, or other 

communications you had regarding the destruction of the videotapes from the moment 

you learned thet Mr. Rodriguez had sent the cable to the moment you learned the 

videotapes were destroyed. Further, if a classified response is required, please provide 

a justification for why the Agency has chosen not to declassify this information. 

ResJ1onse: 

(U) At the Deputy Director for Operation's (DOO) direction, I drafted the cable te destroy 

the tapes, but I did so with the understanding that he would use the draft cable to raise 

this Issue with the DCIA. Shortly after I saw ttie cable was released, I discussed the 

cable with the"DDO. I also forwarded the cable to the officer responsible for running the 

program. During my conversation with the DOO, I asked him whether he had consulted 

with the DCIA and he told me that he had not and that he had decided to release the 

cable by his own authority. Mr. Rodriguez took full responsibility for this decision. 
193 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 148 here 30119.148

Question: 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Jack Reed (#7) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) To the best of your knowledge, did the approved "enhanced interrogation 

techniques" employed by the. CIA ever include: 

a. (U) Th~ats ofharm to the detainee's family?. 

b. (Ur Suggesting to detalne~s that they would never leave CIA custody alive? 

c. (U) Stripping detainees for the purpose of humiliating them? 

d. (U) Intentionally creating unsanitary conditions II) detainee's cells? 

Response: 

(U) The responsibinty of Agency officers was to earry out detention and interrogation 

activities in strict adherence to the guidelines and legal opinions in place. Any Agency 

officer who acted contrary to the legal and/or policy rules that governed the program 

were referred to the CIA Office of Inspector General for their actions. Additionally, the 

CIA referred certain cases to the Department of Justice for criminal investigations. 
194 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 149 here 30119.149

Question: 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Jack Reed' (~B) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) Did you ever authorize CIA or contractor personnel to conduct unsupervised 

interrogations using harsh physical interrogation techniques that were not a part of 

CIA's formal "enhanced interrogation" program (I.e. that had not been approved by the 

DOJ or authorized by CIA HQS)? Are you aware of any such incidents, whether or not 

authorized by you? 

Response: 

(U) No, I did not. With respect to my knowledge of any such incidents, please see my 

response to Question #7. 
195 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 150 here 30119.150

Question: 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Jack Reed (#12) . 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) Did you participate In any comprehensive analysis or assessment of the 

effectiveness of the aenhanced interrogation techniques" employed by the CIA, or any 

analysis of the effectiveness of such techniques as were employed on detainees in your 

charge? If so, what did you conclude? If not. why not? 

Response: 

(U) No. There are, to this day, strong disagreements on the effectiVeness of CIA's 

detention and interrogation program. In my view, which is shared by my predecessors, 

CIA gained valuable intelligence that helped thwart planned attacks, capture terrorists, 

and ultimately save lives. What is impossible to know is whether CIA could have 

obtained the same information without using enhanced interrogation techniques. 
196 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 151 here 30119.151

Question: 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Jack Reed (#13) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

(U) Are you aware of any commuplcatlons, during the period of 2002-2007, between the 

Office of the Vice President, the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel, and/or the 

senior management of the CIA conceming the legality, effectiveness, or 

appropriateness of "enhanced interrogation techniques" or the other forms of abuse 

treatment cited above? 

Response: 

(U) I was generally aware of a broad and ongoing Interagency discussion of the en: 

program, including the legal and policy guidance surrounding the program •. 
197 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 152 here 30119.152

Question: 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 1 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by ~nator Jack Reed (#14) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) Are you aware of any communications outside the ordinary chain of reporting 

between the Office of the Vlce President and the CIA personnel or 090traotors 

performing .such techniques?. 

Response: 

(U) Ns. 
198 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 153 here 30119.153

Question: 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

OCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Jack Reed (#15) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

(U) In 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence conc:luded that from 2002-

2007, CIA made false representations to the DeP8rtment·of Justice Office of Legal 

Counsel COOC!itming: (1) the conditions of confinement of detainees held by CIA, (2) the 

appl~tion of CIA's enhanced interrogation· techniques, (3} the physical effects of the 

techniques on detainees, and (4) the effectiveness of the techniques? When did you 

personally become aware of those representations? When did you become aware that 

the legal conclusions reached by Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel were 

dependent upon these false-representations, and that the Department had warned CIA 

that those conclusi~ns may not be valid under different factual circumstances? 

Response: 

(U) Please see response to Question #13. 
199 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 154 here 30119.154

Question: 

(U) Questions for the. Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspell:!y Senator J~ck Reed {#18) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence · 

14May2018 

(U) Have you ever participated in any discussions.at CIA about how to evade or stymie 

congressional oversight or Whl\e House management. either with respect specifically to 

the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation (RDI).program or any other matter? When 

did you become aware of CIA's Intrusion into congressional investigative materials and 

records?· 

Response: 

(U) I am a strong believer in the Importance of oversight. As I stated In my prehearing 

Question #25, throughout my 30 years of experience at CIA, I have repeatedly seen the 

importance and value of keeping the congressional intelligence committees fully and 

currently informed to the fullest extent possible under the law. If confirmed, I will ensure 

that the CIA continues to fulfill all of Its responsibilities in this regard. 
200 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 155 here 30119.155

Question: 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gi~a Haspel by Senator Jack Reed (#20) 

Sen!de Select Committee on Intelligence 

14 May2018 

(U) Were you interviewed by the CIA's Office of Inspector General about your 

involvement in the RDI program? If so, did you provide OIG with complete and ~ccurate 

information about the operation and management of the program? 

Response: 

(U) Please see my answer to prehearlng Question #46. 
201 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 156 here 30119.156

Question: 

. (U) Questions for the Rec.ord Submitted to 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Jack Reed (#21) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

(U) Have you ever participated in, or were you ever aware of, discussions at CIA about 

the release of classified information concerning the RDI program to members of the · 

media in order to counter public criticism, shape p1,1blic opinion, or influence 

congressional action? 

Response: 

(U) I did not participate, nor was I aware of CIA discussion, to .release classified 

inform~tion to the media. 
202 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 157 here 30119.157

Question: 

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted ~o 

DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Jack Reed (#22) 

Senate Selec:t Committee on Intellige-nce 

14May2018 

(U) Have you ever been cited as an onnamed source in a media repart? 

Response: 

(U) No. 
203 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 158 here 30119.158

Ou,estlon: 

{U) Questions for the Record Submitted to 

DCIA Nomi~~ Gina Haspel by S~nator Jack Reed (#23) 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

14May2018 

(U) Did you ever have conversations with Vice President Cheney or his Chief of Staff 

David Addington about enhanced interrogation techniques or conditions at CIA 

detention facilities? 

Response: 

(U) No. 
204 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 159 here 30119.159

SECRE'i'//NOFOR!i 

1HE DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

CENTRAL~UGENCEAGENCY 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505 

20 December 2011 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency 

SUBJECT: (S//MF) Disciplinary Review Related to 

Destruction of Interrogation Tapes 

REFERENCE: 15 September 2011 D/CIA Memorandum 

"Disciplinary Review" 

1. !S//NF) In the referenced memorandum, you directed me 

to undertake a disciplinary review of NCS officers relating to 

their conduct in the events surrounding the CIA's 9 November 

2005 destruction of detainee interrogation videotapes. You 

directed that I take the disciplinary actions I deemed 

appropriate and that I report my decision to you. This 

memorandum is that report. 

In my review, I focused on the performance of 

~uuLiuiuc,~, now retired, and his then Chief of 

who is currently serving as Chief ji(llliil I focused on these two individuals because the 

record assembled by Special Prosecutor John Durham--

and my discussions with the OGC attorneys who assisted me in my 

review--indicated that Mr. Rodriguez and Ms. Haspellll were the 

NCS officers directly involved in the decision to destroy the 

tapes. 

• I considered including a review of the 

by the NCS officer who was then 

Division. It was a phone call from him to 

that prompted • Station on 8 November to send to 

HQS the cable requesting permission to destroy the tapes 

to which Mr. Rodriguez responded affirmatively that same 

day. That phone call preempted an email with the same 

SBCRB'I:'//UOFORN 
205 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 160 here 30119.160

SECH'fffNePORN 

SUBJECT: (Cf/UP) Disciplinary Review Related to Destruction of 

Interrogation Tapes 

message to -Station that OGC attorneys were 

preparing. I concluded, however, that the then c/11 

reflecting D/NCS' sense of urgency on this issue, was 

simply trying t~te the process. Most important, 

the cable fromiiiiiiiiStation requesting approval to 

destroy the tapes was neither a necessary nor dispositive 

step in the decision to destroy the tapes. Hence, I 

decided not to review, for disciplinary actions, then 

C~'s role in the matter. 

• Neither did I review the actions of those officers in 

........ Station who actually destroyed the tapes, as they were following a direct order from the D/NCS. 

3 . (9//li'P) In carrying out your directive, I reviewed a 

subset of the documents gathered by the Special Prosecutor that 

was prepared for me by the OGC, along with other relevant 

documents, including draft book chapters-describing the events 

surrounding the tapes destruction by Mr. Rodriguez and by former 

Acting General Counsel John Rizzo, as well as the relevant 

portion of the draft SSCI report on renditions, detentions, and 

interrogations. In addition, I interviewed ~r. Rodriguez and 

Ms. Haspelllll I also discussed the case with several senior 

officials--General Counsel Stephen Preston and members of his 

staff, and my Chief of Staff,. While these 

discussions were useful in ref~n~ng my thinking, I want to note 

that the decisions outlined below are entirely my own. 

4. (S//NP) I have found no fault with the performance of 

Ms. Haspe~. I have concluded that she acted appropriately in 

her role as Mr. Rodriguez's Chief of Staff, including in her 

efforts to press for and facilitate a resolution of the matter, 

as well as in her drafting of the cable that authorized the 

destruction of the tapes. She drafted the cable on the direct 

orders of Mr. Rodriguez; she did not release that cable. It was 

not her decision to destroy the tapes; it was Mr. Rodriguez's. 

In addition, Ms. Haspel claims that she believed--

incorrectly, as it turned out--that Mr. Rodriguez was going to 

obtain approval from then Director Goss before releasing the 

cable and that she took action after the release qf the cable to 

2 

Si!lCRi3'i'/ /UOPO~l 
206 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 161 here 30119.161

SECRB'!//HOPeRN 

SUBJECT: "te//NPl Disciplinary Review Related to Destruction of 

Interrogation Tapes 

ascertain from Mr. Rodriguez whether he had obtained that 

approval. Although there is no •good soldier• defense in the 

case of an act that violates the .law or Agency regulations, the 

Special Prosecutor evidently found no prosecutable offense, nor 

did I find a violation of Agency regulations. 

5. (81/i!W) I have found fault with the performance of 

Mr. Rodriguez, and I have decided to issue to him a letter of 

reprimand.to remain in his official personnel file for·two 

years. ·But I have also decided that the letter. of reprimand 

will not carry any sanctions against Mr. Rodriguez. These two 

decisions reflect the following reasoning. 

• Mr. Rodriguez .served the Agency with distinction for 

highly motivated, innovative, and productive, and commend 

him for his operational creativity, managerial skill, and 

political and bureaucratic savvy; Mr. Rodriguez also 

held a succession of increasingly responsible and · ~ headquarters assignments, including Chief of 

IIIIIIIIIIITask Force, Deputy Director of the 

Counternarcotics Center, Chief of the Latin America 

Division, Chief of the Counterterrorism Center in the 

years following 9/11, and ultimately the Deputy Director 

of Operations and founding Director of the National 

Clandestine Service. He is the recipient of multiple awards, including the National Intelligence Distinguished 

which 

Director Goss in May 2006, and the same award from 

Director Hayden in October 2007 as Mr. Rodriguez was 

stepping down as D/NCS. In August 2007, Mr. Rodriguez 

was acclaimed in a public ceremony by then HPSCI Chairman 

Sylvester Reyes as an "American hero.n 

3 
207 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 162 here 30119.162

SUBJECT: (C//MPt Disciplinary Review Related to Destruction of 

Interrogation Tapes 

• Mr. Rodriguez's decision to destroy the tapes was not 

motivated by any personal gain or interest. His decision 

was motivated by what he believed to be the best 

interests of•the CIA and its officers, particularly the 

latter. He has repeatedly said that he was told--which 

he was--that the written record fully and accurately 

recorded the events depicted on the tapes and that he was 

deeply concerned that the tapes would ultimately leak--or 

·be officially released--and expose the affiliation of the 

Agency officers shown in the tapes, thereby putting their 

livelihood and personal security at risk. He also says 

that he was concerned that publication of the tapes would 

damage the domestic and international standing ·of the 

CIA, perhaps ~ignificantly degrading 6ur operational 

capabilities. J'i:e says that the worldwide reaction to the 

leak of photos of the actions of US military personnel.at 

Iraq's Abu Ghuraib prison in April 2004 cemented his view 

that the tapes· represented a threat to his officers and 

the Agency. His focus on what he believed to be the best 

for the CIA and its officers, rather than ·on what was 

best for him, reflects values thatwe·try to instill in 

all Agency officers. 

• Mr. Rodriguez never denied making the decision to destroy 

the tapes nor did he ever attempt to cover up his 

decision in any way. On the contrary, from day one, 

Mr. Rodriguez has admitted that he made the decision and 

he has been consistent in his explanation of why he made 

that decision. In doing so, he has· demonstrated candor, 

another trait on which we place high value. 

• The leadership of the Agency failed Mr. Rodriguez. It 

failed him when he was D/CTC and it failed him when he was DDO and D/NCS. Beyond the Acting General Counsel 

discussing the issue with White House Counsel, there is 

rio record of any effort on the part of the Agency 

leadership to engage White House policymakers. The 

Director should have taken this issue to the White House 

and requested that it be addressed as a policy issue .. 

Because no effort was undertaken by CIA leadership to 

4 
208 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 163 here 30119.163

SUBJECT: (e//MP) Disciplinary Review Related to Destruction of 

Interrogation Tapes 

tackle the issue at the policy level, Mr. Rodriguez was 

left believing, rightly or wrongly, that he had no other 

choice but to act on his own authority. 

• Mr. Rodriguez in the days leading up to the destruction 

was told by senior agency attorneys that there was no 

legal constraint to destroying the tapes and that, as 

D/NCS, he had the authority to order their destruction. 

Accounts differ over whether he was reminded at that time 

of the White House Counsel's direction that the DNI and 

Attorney General be briefed prior to destruction, or the 

fact that others in his chain of command had expressed 

opposition to or reservations about destruction. What is 

clear, however, is that Mr. Rodriguez believed his 

actions were legally permissible and that, under CIA 

regulations, he had the authority to issue the order to 

destroy the tapes. 

• Neither the leadership of the Agency nor the White House 

took any action against Mr. Rodriguez at the time of the 

tapes destruction, even though they had the same facts 

that I currently possess. This appears to have been a conscious decision on the part of Director Goes. 

According to a by the then Deputy 

Executive Director of the meeting with 

Director Goes during Mr. Rodriguez reported the 

destruction and conveyed his willingness to take the heat 

for it, the Director joked that he would be the one to 

take the heat but added that he agreed with the decision. 

Also, there is no record that, for its part, the White 

House, despite the White House Counsel'.s reported anger 

when she heard the news, asked· for a review, an 

investigation, or an accountability decision. I conclude 

from this inaction that Mr. Rodriguez's superiors in the 

Agency and at the White House did not see his action as insubordination or even a significant error in judgment. 

o Having concluded that, I must note that this is a 

source of concern in making the accountability 

decision I have made. I do not kriow qf another case 

5 
209 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 164 here 30119.164

SI1leR.BW//NOF9RN 

SUBJECT: (C//HPl Disciplinary Review Related to Destruction of 

Interrogation Tapes 

in which, without new information, an Agency leader 

or Accountability Board has overturned an earlier 

accountability decision, particularly one made by a 

Director. 

• .Accountability is critical, but it should also be swift. 

Mr. Rodriguez's action occurred six years ago. I find it 

deeply unfair to our employees to undertake 

accountability reviews and make accountability decisions 

so far after the fact. Although some of that delay was 

caused by the more than three years it took the Special 

Prosecutor to come to the evident conclusion that 

Mr. Rodriguez did not commit a prosecutable offense, this 

does not, in mY view, lessen the unfairness to the 

employee of the lack of a timely accountability review. 

• Mr. Rodriguez has already paid a significant price for 

the decision. He was investigated by a Special 

Prosecutor, he had to retain counsel, and he says he 

found it· difficult to find post-retirement employment 

with a legal cloud hanging over nis head. I find this 

latter point compelling, as I beiieve that a fo~r D/NCS 

and C/CTC would have secured a prominent corporate 

position immediately upon retirement, which in 

Mr. Rodriguez's case did not happen until almost a year 

after he entered the Transition Program. 

• Taken together, all of the above would argue for a 

decision on my part of no finding of fault. And that is 

what I would have decided, save one additional and 

critical factor: The record is clear that Mr. Rodriguez 

was aware that two White House Counsels, the counsel to 

the Vice President, the DNI, the DCIA, and the HPSCI 

ranking member had either expressed opposition to or 

reservations about the destruction of the tapes. No 

organization, particularly the CIA, can function 

effectively if its employees believe that they can ignore 

the direction and/or the intent of senior Agency, IC, or 

White House officials because they thi~ their view is 

the right one--even if it is. 

6 
210 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 165 here 30119.165

SUBJECT: (€{/!W) Disciplinary Review Related to Destruction of 

Interrogation Tapes 

• What Mr. Rodriguez should have done is take his 

entreaties frequently and increasingly forcefully to the 

Director rather than focus so heavily on the Acting 

General Counsel. As this was clearly a matter of deep 

conviction and conscience for Mr. Rodriguez, had he 

failed to persuade the Director to work the issue at the 

White House, he should have--after informing the Director 

of his intent to do so--taken his case to the DNI and, 

failing that, to the White House himself. 

• Ultimately, it is my firm belief in the need for an 

effectively functioning chain of.command that has caused 

me to find fault in Mr. Rodriguez's decision to destroy 

the tapes and for me to give him a letter of reprimand. 

My purpose in doing so is to confirm the principal that 

no one--whatever their rank or their belief in the 

righteousness of their position~:can disregard the views 

of those above them. Having said that, I believe the 

factors that I have cited above are mitigating ones--and 

significantly so--and this is why I have opted not to 

attach sanctions to the letter of reprimand. 

6. !8/fNF) There is one more issue I want to address, 

giveh its importance, and that is CIA's failure to inform 

Congress of the destruction of the tapes. This is a serious 

issue: Notifiqation should have occurred within days of.the 

destruction, even though the leadership of the oversight 

committees had been told in early 2003 of CIA's intent to 

destroy the tapes. I do not hold Mr. Rodriguez accountable for 

this failure, as .it was ultimately the responsibility of the 

Director. According to Mr. Rizzo's draft chapter, Director Goss 

made clear that he intended to notify the leadership of the 

7 
211 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 166 here 30119.166

SUBJECT: (E!/INP) Disciplinary Review Related to Destruction of 

Interrogation Tapes 

oversight committees in private without staff present. 

Mr. Rodriguez is not responsible for the fact that Congress was 

not informed about the tapes destruction after 

the fact. 

Michael J. Morell 

8 

SEE!RB'!'/ /N'6P9RN 
212 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 167 here 30119.167

Former CIA Officers Endorse Haspel 

Gina Haspel is the first CIA career Clandestine Service officer to be nominated as 

Director since Richard Helms in the 1960s and William Colby in the 1970s. Ms. Haspel, 

currently the Acting Director of the CIA, has been endorsed by a host of former national 

security senior officials drawn from the ranks of the Intelligence Community, the 

Department of Defense, and the State Department. When someone rises through the 

bureaucracy, it is important to take their measure from those who have served closely 

with them-their peers. 

The undersigned represent an array of former Agency officers who have served 

with Gina either in the foreign field or in CIA Headquarters. Some of us have known her 

for over 30 years since she was a first-tour operations officer. Others worked closely 

with her after she reached mid-level management ranks and then later as one of the 

most accomplished Senior Intelligence Service leaders the Agency has produced. In her, 

we saw the image of what we want a peer and leader to be: someone who offers 

professional respect, a person who commits to the highest standards of conduct and 

ethical behavior, and a bold but pragmatic decision-maker who places the interests of 

our nation above personal advancement or petty politics. 

While Gina has spent most of her career on the operations side of the intelligence 

business, the officials who strongly support her nomination come from all disciplines, to 

include analysis, administration, and technology. Hers is a corporate, whole-of -Agency, 

whole-of-government approach designed to work productively within the national 

security community to keep our nation safe. 

We urge swift Senate approval of her nomination to be the next Director of the 

Central Intelligence Agency. 
213 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 168 here 30119.168

Heidi August, former Chief of Station 

Mike Baker, former Operations Officer 

Stephanie Usry Bellistri, former Directorate of Operations senior officer 

Bob Benedetti, former Chief of Station 

Vaughn Bishop, former Directorate of Intelligence senior manager and Chief of Station 

Alex Bolling, former Chief of Station 

Andrea Rattler Bramson, former Directorate of Science and Technology senior manager 

Patty Brandmaier, former Senior Executive Officer 

Timothy Buch, former Directorate of Intelligence senior officer and component chief 

Christy Jobe Carter, former Reports Officer 

Jim Costana, former Senior Intelligence Service officer 

Jack Devine, former Acting Deputy Director of Operations 

Paula Doyle, former Chief of Station and Associate Deputy Director of Operations 

Technology 

John Driscoll, former Operations Officer 

Bob Eatinger, former attorney, Office of General Counsel 

Shaun Fitzpatrick, former intelligence officer 

Carol Rollie Flynn, former Chief of Station 

Melvin Gamble, former Chief of Station and Directorate of Operations component chief 

Christopher T. Griffin, former Directorate of Operations senior officer 

Mark T. Gygi, former Chief of Station 

Gerald Hamilton, former Chief of Station and Directorate of Operations component 

chief 

Beth Hitchings, former Deputy Chief Financial Officer 

Daniel Hoffman, former senior clandestine service officer 

Paul Hollingsworth, former Directorate of Operations senior officer and Senior Director 

for Intelligence Programs, National Security Council 

Monelle Holshey, former Directorate of Operations reports officer 

Robert Hultslander, former Chief of Station 
214 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 169 here 30119.169

Terry Hussey, former Directorate of Operations senior officer 

Leslie Ireland, former Assistant Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis for the Treasury 

Department 

Susana Isaacson, former Chief of Leadership Development, Directorate of Operations 

Justin J. Jackson, former Deputy Director/National Clandestine Service 

Kenneth Kaiser, former Directorate of Operations component chief 

Elinor Kelly, former Senior Intelligence Service officer 

James E. Kirkman, former Chief, Protective Programs 

Paul Kolbe, former Chief of Station and Directorate of Operations component chief 

Frank Knott, former Chief of Station and Directorate of Operations component chief 

William Lofgren, former Directorate of Operations component chief 

Jason Matthews, former Chief of Station 

Suzanne Matthews, former Directorate of Operations officer 

Mary Rose McCaffrey, former Director of Security 

Patricia McGuckin Stuart, former Chief of Station 

Carmen A. Medina, former Deputy Director for Intelligence 

Carmen Middleton, former Directorate of Intelligence senior officer and Deputy 

Executive Director 

Carla Gayle Milor, former Directorate of Operations senior officer 

James Micsan, former Chief of Station and Directorate of Operations component chief 

Michael Morgan, former Directorate of Operations senior officer and Assistant Deputy 

Director of National Intelligence 

Gerald A. O'Shea, former Chief of Station 

William R. Piekney, former Chief of Station and Directorate of Operations component 

chief 

Richard E. Pound, former Chief of Station and Directorate of Operations component 

chief 

Pamela Purcilly, former President's Daily Briefer and Associate Deputy Director for 

Intelligence 

William Richardson, former Deputy Director of the Office of South Asian Analysis 

Keith E. Riggin, former Chief of Station 
215 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 170 here 30119.170

David Rolph, former Chief of Station 

Norman Roule, former Directorate of Operations component chief and National 

Intelligence Manager for Iran 

Thomas A. Ruth II, former Chief of Station 

James F. Sartain, former Chief of Station 

Dawn Scalici, former Directorate of Intelligence senior officer 

Joe Schmank, former Senior Intelligence Service Center Director 

John Sears, former Senior Intelligence Service officer 

Charlie Seidel, former Chief of Station 

Rodney G. Smith, former Directorate of Operations component chief 

Mark S. Sparkman, former Chief of Station 

Sue Waldman Steinke, former analyst 

Susan R. Symington, former Directorate of Operations component chief 

Sara B. Thibault, former Directorate of Operations component chief 

Jeanne Tisinger, former Deputy Director for Support 

Thomas Twetten, former Deputy Director for Operations 

Robert Wallace, former Director, Office of Technical Service 

DeNeige Watson, former President's Daily Briefer 

Harry Wetherbee, former Directorate of Operations senior operations officer 

James Wilcox, former Directorate of Science and Technology senior officer 

Meredith Woodruff, former center chief 

Paul Zalucky, former Directorate of Operations senior officer 
216 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 171 here 30119.171

The Honorable Richard Burr 

Chairman, 

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

211 Hart Senate Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

April9,2018 

Dear Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Warner: 

The Honorable Mark Warner 

Vice Chairman, 

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

As national security leaders who have helped safeguard America against global threats and challenges over 

many decades, we write to express our strong support for the nomination of Gina Haspel to serve as Director of 

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 

Ms. Haspel's qualifications to become CIA Director match or exceed those of most candidates put forward in 

the Agency's 70-year history. She has spent more than 30 years of her life quietly serving America and the CIA, 

routinely stepping up to handle some of the most demanding assignments around the globe. Ms. Haspel is a 

proven leader who inspires others and has what it takes to make tough calls in times of crisis. She is a true 

intelligence professional who brings care, integrity and a commitment to the rule of law to her work every day. 

She will speak truth to power, offering unbiased intelligence to policymakers no matter how difficult the 

situation. 

Throughout her distinguished career, Ms. Haspel has received numerous honors, including the Intelligence 

Medal of Merit, the George H.W. Bush Award for Excellence in Counterterrorism, the Donovan Award and a 

Presidential Rank Award, the highest award in the federal service. 

Those who have served alongside Ms. Haspel have only the utmost praise and respect for her. She has broad 

support from the CIA workforce. Within the U.S. national security community and among our allies around the 

globe, admiration for her is unsurpassed. It is truly telling that a broad spectrum of national security leaders 

from both Republican and Democratic administrations has voiced unequivocal support for her nomination. 

Given the nature of CIA's mission, most of her achievements cannot be shared publicly. But we can tell you she 

has made vital contributions to the strength and security of our country and has dedicated her life to serving her 

fellow Americans. In considering her nomination, the Senate, and through them the public, will gain a deeper 

understanding of the many attributes that Ms. Haspel would bring to the job of CIA Director. Any fair 

examination of those qualities will reveal that she would be an outstanding choice for that position. 
217 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 172 here 30119.172

The threats to America today are grave and numerous, but the U.S. Senate can help protect our country by 

swiftly confirming Gina Haspel. She has the integrity, experience and determination it takes to safeguard our 

nation and lead the men and women of the CIA. 

Sincerely, 

Charles E. Allen, 

Former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection 

Frank Archibald, 

Former Director, CIA National Clandestine Service 

Matthew Barzun, 

Former US Ambassador to the United Kingdom and to Sweden 

Jeremy Bash, 

Former Chief of Staff to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 

John Bennett, 

Former Director, CIA National Clandestine Service 

Ambassador Cofer Black, 

Former Director, CIA Counterterrorist Center and State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism 

John 0. Brennan, 

Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 

V. Sue Bromley, 

Former Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency 

Vice Admiral Albert M. Calland ill, USN, Ret., 

Former Deputy Director Central Intelligence Agency 

Saxby Chambliss, 

Former United States Senator and Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

James R. Clapper, Jr., 

Former Director ofNational Intelligence 

David Cohen, 

Former Deputy Commissioner New York Police Department (Intelligence) and former CIA Deputy Director for 

Intelligence 

2 
218 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 173 here 30119.173

David S. Cohen, 

Former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and former Under Secretary of the Treasury for 

Terrorism and Financial Intelligence 

Ambassador Henry A. Crumpton, 

Former CIA officer and Coordinator for Counterterrorism 

Porter J. Goss, 

Former Director of Central Intelligence and former Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on 

Intelligence 

Mary Margaret Graham, 

Former Deputy Director ofNational Intelligence for Collection and CIA Associate Deputy Director of 

Operations for Counterintelligence 

Avril Haines, 

Former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and former Deputy National Security Advisor 

General Michael V. Hayden, USAF (Ret.), 

Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency 

Stephen R. Kappes, 

Former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 

BobKerrey, 

Former United States Senator and Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

Henry A. Kissinger, 

Former Secretary of State 

A.B. Krongard, 

Former Executive Director, of the Central Intelligence Agency 

Robert S. Litt, 

Former General Counsel, Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

Mike McConnell, 

Former Director of National Intelligence 

John E. McLanghlin, 

Former Acting Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 

Admiral William H. McRaven, USN, (Ret.), 

Former Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command 

Fran Moore, 

Former Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency 

Michael J. Morell, 

Former Acting Director and Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 

3 
219 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 174 here 30119.174

John H. Moseman, 

Former Chief of Staff to the Director of Central Intelligence 

Michael B. Mukasey, 

Former Attorney General 

Lieutenant General John F. Mulholland, USA (Ret.), 

Former Associate Director of Military Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency 

Ambassador John Negroponte, 

Former Director ofNational Intelligence 

Stephanie O'Sullivan, 

Former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence 

Leon Panetta, 

Former Secretary of Defense and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 

MeroePark, 

Former Executive Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 

James L. Pavitt, 

Former Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency 

Stephen W. Preston, 

Former General Counsel of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency 

John A. Rizzo, 

Former Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency 

Jose A. Rodriguez, Jr., 

Former Director, CIA National Clandestine Service 

Mike Rogers, 

Former Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

George P. Shultz 

Former Secretary of State 

Jeffrey H. Smith, 

Former General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency 

Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN (Ret.) 

Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander 

Michael Sulick, 

Former Director, CIA National Clandestine Service 

4 
220 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 175 here 30119.175

Louis B. Susman, 

Former United States Ambassador to tbe United Kingdom and Norther Ireland 

George J. Teuet, 

Former Director of Central Intelligence 

Frances Fragos Townsend, 

Former Counterterrorism and Homeland Advisor to President George W. Bush 

Michael G. Vickers, 

Former Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

GregVogle, 

Former Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency 

Cindy Webb, 

Former CIA Associate Deputy Director for Counterintelligence 

Judge William H. Webster, 

Former Director of Central Intelligence and Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Pete Wilson 

Former U.S. Senator, former member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and 

former member of the Defense Policy Board (advisory to the Secretary of Defense) 

Douglas H. Wise, 

Former Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency 

5 
221 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 176 here 30119.176

May 09,2018 

Dear Senator: 

We write as former ambassadors of the United States to register our serious concern over Gina 

Haspel's nomination to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 

As career and non-career senior diplomats, we experienced no higher honor than to have 

represented the American people and their interests and values to foreign governments abroad. 

We did so while recognizing that foreign audiences-governments and their citizens, friends and 

foes-rightly look to the senior-most representatives of our government to embody what our 

nation holds dear. It is for this reason that we cannot support Ms. Haspel's nomination, given 

credible information in the public domain. 

There remains much we do not know about the specific roles and responsibilities Ms. Haspel 

held in relation to the CIA's rendition, detention, and interrogation program generally, and the 

use of so-called "enhanced interrogation" specifically. Mindful of this, we support calls made by 

various members of Congress for the CIA to declassify additional information regarding her 

relationship to the program, commensurate with the need to protect legitimate intelligence 

sources and methods, so that the American people have a meaningful and accurate understanding 

of the role that Ms. Haspel played. 

What we do know, based on credible, and as yet uncontested reporting, leaves us of the view that 

she should be disqualified from holding cabinet rank. This includes that, in 2002, she oversaw a 

secret detention facility in Thailand in which at least one detainee was repeatedly subjected to 

waterboarding, and that she later strongly advocated for and helped implement a decision to 

destroy video tapes of torture sessions, including ones she oversaw. 

We have no reason to question Ms. Haspel's credentials as both a leader and an experienced 

intelligence professional. Yet she is also emblematic of choices made by certain American 

officials in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001 that dispensed with our ideals and 

international commitments to the ultimate detriment of our national security. 

America's power in the world is defined in part by the strength of our military, the size of our 

economy, the prestige of our universities, and the quality of our entrepreneurs. But our influence, 

and thus our security, is also advanced by the principles and values set forth in our Declaration of 

Independence, Constitution, and laws and treaties, as well as our adherence to the rule oflaw, to 

democratic norms and institutions, and to our willingness to stand up for men and women living 

under repression. 

We have little doubt what lesson governments that rely on torture and other forms of 

mistreatment to maintain their grip on power will draw from Ms. Haspel's confirmation. 

Whether or not she uses the opportunity of her confirmation hearing to reject torture-which we 

hope she will do-the point will remain that her record of involvement in torture was judged 

worthy of and compatible with holding the CIA's highest office. The message inherent in this 

decision will be understood by authoritarian leaders around the world. They will welcome it, as it 

1 
222 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 177 here 30119.177

will allow them to proclaim, however cynically, that their behavior is no different from ours. Her 

confirmation will thus undercut the work of countless diplomats, military service members, and 

intelligence professionals who continue to engage with their foreign counterparts on why the 

United States believes that torture and other forms of abuse are not only morally wrong, but 

strategically shortsighted and legally impermissible. In an era in which the rule of law is under 

considerable strain around the world, this is a cost we can ill afford. 

For all these reasons, we urge you to scrutinize Ms. Haspel's record with the utmost care. If that 

record demonstrates that Ms. Haspel played a role in torture or other forms of detainee abuse, or 

the destruction of evidence relating to such activities, we urge you to reject her nomination. 

Sincerely, 

Thomas Pickering 

Career Ambassador, Former Under 

Secretary of State for Political Affairs and 

former Ambassador to Russia, India, the 

United Nations, Israel, El Salvador, Nigeria, 

and Jordan 

James R. Jones 

Former Ambassador to Mexico and former 

Member of the U.S. House of 

Representatives 

Daniel Baer 

Former Ambassador to the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 

Rob Barber 

Former Ambassador to Iceland 

Leslie Bassett 

Former Ambassador to Paraguay 

Donald S. Beyer, Jr. 

Former Ambassador to Switzerland and the 

Principality of Liechtenstein; Member of the 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Jack R. Binns 

Former Ambassador to Honduras 

Clyde Bishop 

Former Ambassador to the Republic of the 

Marshall Islands 

James K. Bishop 

Former Ambassador to Niger, Liberia, and 

Somalia 

Robert. 0. Blake, Jr. 

Former Assistant Secretary of State for 

South and Central Asian Affairs and former 

Ambassador to Indonesia and Sri Lanka and 

Maldives 

Barbara Bodine 

Former Ambassador to Yemen 

Avis Bohlen 

Former Assistant Secretary of State for 

Arms Control and former Ambassador to 

Bulgaria 

Aurelia E. Brazeal 

Former Ambassador to the Federated States 

of Micronesia, Kenya, and Ethiopia 

James (Wally) Brewster Jr. 

Former Ambassador to the Dominican 

Republic 

SueK.Brown 

Former Ambassador to Montenegro 

Edward Brynn 

Former Ambassador to Burkina Faso and 

Ghana 

2 
223 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 178 here 30119.178

John Campbell 

Fonner Ambassador to Nigeria and Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of State for Human 

Resources 

Carey Cavanaugh 

Fonner Ambassador and Special Negotiator 

for Eurasian Conflicts 

Luis CdeBaca 

Fonner Ambassador-at-Large to Monitor 

and Combat Trafficking in Persons 

James F. Collins 

Fonner Ambasador to the Russian 

Federation 

Elinor G. Constable 

Fonner Ambassador to Kenya 

Edwin G. Corr 

Fonner Ambassador to Peru, Bolivia, and El 

Salvador and former Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State for International Narcotics 

Matters 

Ruth A. Davis 

Fonner Director General of the Foreign 

Service, Director of the Foreign Service 

Institute, and Ambassador to Benin 

Robert Dillon 

Fonner Ambassador to Lebanon 

Shaun Donnelly 

Fonner Ambassador to Sri Lanka and 

Maldives 

David Dunford 

Fonner Ambassador to Oman 

Harriet L. Elam-Thomas 

Fonner Ambassador to Senegal 

Nancy Ely-Raphel 

Fonner Ambassador to Slovenia 

Gregory W. Engle 

Fonner Ambassador to Togo 

Robert W. "Bill" Farrand 

Fonner Ambassador to Papua New Guinea 

and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in 

the Bureau of Human Rights and 

Humanitarian Affairs 

Gerald M. Feierstein 

Fonner Ambassador to Yemen 

Robert S. Ford 

Fonner Ambassador to Algeria and Syria 

Chas W. Freeman, Jr. 

Fonner Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and 

former Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

International Security Affairs 

James I. Gadsden 

Fonner Ambassador to Iceland and former 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for European 

Affairs 

Rufus Gifford 

Fonner Ambassador to Denmark 

David N. Greenlee 

Fonner Ambassador to Bolivia and 

Paraguay 

Michael Guest 

Fonner Ambassador to Romania 

Keith Harper 

Fonner Ambassador and Permanent 

Representative to the United Nations Human 

Rights Council 

Douglas A. Hartwick 

Fonner Ambassador to Laos and Assistant 

US Trade Representative 

3 
224 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 179 here 30119.179

Samuel D. Heins 

Former Ambassador to the Kingdom of 

Norway 

Carla A. Hills 

Former Secretary of Housing and Urban 

Development and former U.S. Trade 

Representative with title of ambassador 

Heather Hodges 

Former Ambassador to Moldova and 

Ecuador 

Henry Allen Holmes 

Former Ambassador to Portugal 

Thomas C. Hubbard 

Former Ambassador to the Republic of 

Korea and the Republic of the Philippines 

Arthur H. Hughes 

Former Ambassador to Yemen and Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of State for Near East 

Affairs 

Edmund Hull 

Former Ambassador to Yemen 

Robert E. Hunter 

Former Ambassador to NATO 

Bonnie Jenkins 

Former Coordinator for Threat Reduction 

Programs with title of ambassador 

Dennis Jett 

Former Ambassador to Peru and 

Mozambique 

Linda Jewell 

Former Ambassador to Ecuador 

L. Craig Johnstone 

Former Ambassador to Algeria 

Deborah K. Jones 

Former Ambassador to Kuwait and Libya 

Richard H. Jones 

Former Ambassador to Lebanon, Israel, 

Kuwait, and Kazakhstan 

Ian Kelly 

Former Ambassador to the OSCE and 

Georgia 

David T. Killion 

Former Ambassador to UNESCO 

Jimmy Kolker 

Former Ambassador to Uganda and Burkina 

Paso 

John Kornblum 

Former Ambassador to the Federal Republic 

of Germany 

Mark P. Lagon 

Former Ambassador-at-Large to Monitor 

and Combat Trafficking in Persons 

Suzan LeVine 

Former Ambassador to the Swiss 

Confederation and the Principality of 

Liechtenstein 

Carmen Lomellin 

Former Permanent Representative to the 

Organization of American States (OAS) 

FrankE. Loy 

Former Under Secretary of State for Global 

Affairs and former Director of the Bureau of 

Population, Refugees, and Migration, with 

the personal rank of ambassador 

Princeton N. Lyman 

Former Assistant Secretary of State for 

International Organization Affairs and 

former Ambassador to Nigeria and South 

Africa 

4 
225 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 180 here 30119.180

Jack F. Matlock, Jr. 

Former Ambassador to the USSR and 

Czechoslovakia 

Nancy McEldowney 

Former Ambassador to Bulgaria and 

Director of the Foreign Service Institute 

James D. McGee 

Former Ambassador to Swaziland, 

Madagascar, the Comoros Islands, and 

Zimbabwe 

Donald F. McHenry 

Former Permanent Representative to the 

United Nations 

William B. Milam 

Former Ambassador to Pakistan and 

Bangladesh 

Richard Miles 

Former Ambassador to Georgia, Bulgaria, 

and Azerbaijan 

Day Mount 

Former Ambassador to Iceland 

Thomas Niles 

Former Ambassador to Canada, the 

European Union, and Greece 

Robert M. Orr 

Former Ambassador to the Asian 

Development Bank 

TedOsius 

Former Ambassador to Vietnam 

Maurice S. Parker 

Former Ambassador to Swaziland 

June Carter Perry 

Former Ambassador to Lesotho and Sierra 

Leone 

Robert C. Perry 

Former Ambassador to the Central African 

Republic 

Pete Peterson 

Former Ambassador to Vietnam and Former 

Member of the U.S. House of 

Representatives 

John R. Phillips 

Former Ambassador to Italy 

Nicholas Platt 

Former Ambassador to Pakistan, 

Philippines, and Zambia 

Michael C. Polt 

Former Ambassador to the Republic of 

Estonia, Serbia, and Montenegro 

Laurence Pope 

Former Ambassador to Chad and Associate 

Coordinator for Counter-terrorism 

Samantha Power 

Former U.S. Permanent Representative to 

the United Nations 

Jon R. Purnell 

Former Ambassador to Uzbekistan 

Stephen J. Rapp 

Former Ambassador-at-Large for War 

Crimes Issues 

Charles Ray 

Former Ambassador to Zimbabwe and 

Cambodia 

Arlene Render 

Former Ambassador to Ivory Coast, Zambia, 

and Gambia 

5 
226 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 181 here 30119.181

Peter F. Romero 

Former Assistant Secretary of State for 

Western Hemisphere Affairs and 

Ambassador to Ecuador 

Edward M. Rowell 

Former Ambassador to Bolivia, 

Luxembourg, and Portugal, and Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 

Consular Affairs 

Stapleton Roy 

Career Ambassador, Former Assistant 

Secretary of State for Intelligence and 

Research and former Ambassador to 

Singapore, China, and Indonesia 

Nancy Rubin 

Former Ambassador to the United Nations 

Commission on Human Rights 

William A. Rugh 

Former Ambassador to Yemen and the 

United Arab Emirates 

David Saperstein 

Former Ambassador at Large for 

International Religious Freedom 

Teresita Schaffer 

Former Ambassador to Sri Lanka and 

Maldives 

David Scheffer 

Former Ambassador-at-Large for War 

Crimes Issues 

Theodore Sedgwick 

Former Ambassador to Slovakia 

John Shattuck 

Former Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and 

former Ambassador to the Czech Republic 

Sally Shelton-Colby 

Former Ambassador to Barbados, Grenada, 

and Dominica and Minister to St Lucia, and 

Special Representative to Antigua, St. 

Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, and St. Vincent 

Harry Shlaudeman 

Former Ambassador to Venezuela, Peru, 

Argentina, Brazil, and Nicaragua and former 

Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs 

Alan Solomont 

Former Ambassador to Spain and Andorra 

Joan E. Spero 

Former Ambassador to the United Nations 

for Economic and Social Affairs 

Ronald I. Spiers 

Former Ambassador to Pakistan, Turkey, 

and the Bahamas 

Sylvia Stanfield 

Former Ambassador to Brunei Darussalam 

Kathleen Stephens 

Former Ambassador to the Republic of 

Korea 

Strobe Talbott 

Former Deputy Secretary of State and 

former Ambassador-at-Large on the New 

Independent States 

Clyde D. Taylor 

Former Ambassador to Paraguay 

Patrick N. Theros 

Former Ambassador to Qatar 

Alexander Vershbow 

Former Ambassador to NATO, Russia, and 

South Korea and former Deputy Secretary 

General ofNATO 

6 
227 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 182 here 30119.182

Kirk Wagar 

Ambassador to Singapore 

EdwardS. Walker, Jr. 

Former Assistant Secretary of State for Near 

Eastern Affairs and Ambassador to Israel, 

Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates 

Alexander F. Watson 

Former Assistant Secretary of State for 

Western Hemisphere Affairs, Ambassador 

to Pern, and Deputy Permanent 

Representative to the United Nations 

Melissa Wells 

Former Ambassador to Guinea Bissau and 

Cape Verde, Mozambique, Zaire, and 

Estonia 

Allan Wendt 

Former Senior Representative for Strategic 

Technology Policy and former Ambassador 

to Slovenia 

Barry B. White 

Former Ambassador to the Kingdom of 

Norway 

Philip C. Wilcox, Jr. 

Former Ambassador-at-Large for 

Counterterrorism 

Kenneth Y alowitz 

Former Ambassador to Belarus and Georgia 

John M. Yates 

Former Ambassador to Cape Verde, Benin, 

Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea and 

Special Representative for Somalia 

7 
228 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 183 here 30119.183

April23, 2018 

Dear Senator: 

As retired general and flag officers of the United States military, we write to express our profound 

concern about the nomination of Gina Haspel to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA). We urge you to examine closely the full extent of Ms. Haspel's involvement in the rendition, 

detention, and interrogation program and, should you fmd that she played any role in carrying out, 

supervising, or directing the torture or abuse of people in U.S. custody, or the destruction of 

evidence relating to these activities, we urge you to reject her nomination. 

We are deeply troubled by the prospect of someone who appears to have been intimately involved 

in torture being elevated to one of the most important positions of leadership in the intelligence 

community. While the public record concerning Ms. Haspel is incomplete, there are multiple 

uncontested reports that she ran a CIA "black site" prison, at which at least one detainee, Abd alRahim al-Nashiri, was repeatedly tortured, including by waterboarding. In addition, former CIA 

general counsel John Rizzo has stated that for some period of time a person we now know to be Ms. 

Haspel oversaw the CIA's entire interrogation program-a program that was rife with 

mismanagement and abuse. 

We understand that some well-respected former senior government intelligence officials have 

spoken highly of Ms. Haspel's experience and long record of service to the Agency. However, we 

do not accept efforts to excuse her actions relating to torture and other unlawful abuse of detainees 

by offering that she was "just following orders," or that shock from the 9/11 terrorist attacks should 

excuse illegal and unethical conduct. We did not accept the 'just following orders" justification 

after World War II, and we should not accept it now. Waterboarding and other forms of torture or 

cruel and inhuman treatment are-and always have been-clearly unlawful. Individuals in the 

service of our country, even at the lowest levels, have a duty to refuse to carry out such actions. 

Moreover, Ms. Haspel appears to have been involved in inappropriate actions that went beyond 

what was authorized by Congress or senior officials in the executive branch. Public reports suggest 

that cases of detainee abuse she supervised or otherwise had an operational role in involved conduct 

even more abusive than what the discredited legal memos supported. In addition to her role in 

overseeing and implementing torture, Ms. Haspel also appears to have strongly advocated for and 

played a key role in carrying out an order to destroy 92 videotapes of individuals in U.S. custody 

being subjected to torture. She did so despite federal court orders requiring preservation of all 

records pertaining to detainee abuse, and over the objections of congressional leaders, the Director 

of National Intelligence, Director of Central Intelligence, two successive White House counsels, 

Department of Justice officials, and the vice president's top lawyer. This disregard for lawful 

checks on the CIA's power is troubling. 

We devoted our lives to the defense of our country. We know that fidelity to our most cherished 

ideals as a nation is the foundation of our security. The torture and cruel treatment of prisoners 

PAGE 1 OF4 
229 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 184 here 30119.184

undermines our national security by increasing tbe risks to our troops, hindering cooperation with 

allies, alienating populations whose support the United States needs in tbe struggle against 

terrorism, and providing a propaganda tool for extremists who wish to do us harm. It would send a 

terrible signal to confirm as the next Director oftbe CIA someone who was so intimately involved 

in tbis dark chapter of our nation's history. 

Given the serious allegations made against Ms. Haspel, we urge you to insist on full 

declassification, witb appropriate redactions to protect sensitive national security information, of all 

information regarding her role in tbe rendition, detention, and interrogation program. If tbe record 

shows that Ms. Haspel played any role in carrying out, supervising, or directing any form of torture 

or detainee abuse, or tbe destruction of evidence relating to these activities, we urge you to reject 

her nomination. 

Sincerely, 

General John R. "Jack" Dailey, USMC (Ret.) 

General Ronald H. Griffith, USA (Ret.) 

General Walter Kross, USAF (Ret.) 

General David M. Maddox, USA (Ret.) 

General Hogb H. Shelton, USA (Ret.) 

Vice Admiral Richard H. Carmona, USPHS (Ret.) 

Lieutenant General Michael D. Dubie, USAF (Ret.) 

Lieutenant General Robert G. Gard, Jr., USA (Ret.) 

Vice Admiral Kevin P. Green, USN (Ret.) 

Vice Admiral Lee F. Goon, USN (Ret.) 

Lieutenant General Arlen D. Jameson, USAF (Ret.) 

Lieutenant General Oaudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.) 

Lieutenant General Dennis McCarthy, USMC (Ret.) 

Lieutenant General Charles Otstott, USA (Ret.) 

Lieutenant General Norman R. Seip, USAF (Ret.) 

Lieutenant General Keith J. Stalder, USMC (Ret.) 

Lieutenant General Mitchell H. Stevenson, USA (Ret.) 

General Howell M. Estes III, USAF (Ret.) 

General Richard D. Hearney, USMC (Ret.) 

General Charles C. Krolak, USMC (Ret.) 

General Thomas A. Schwartz, USA (Ret.) 

Lieutenant General Steven L. Arnold, USA (Ret.) 

Lieutenant General John J. Cusick, USA (Ret.) 

Lieutanant General Benjamin C. Freakley, USA (Ret,) 

Lieutenant General Walter E. Gaskin, USMC (Ret.) 

Lieutenant General Wallace C. Gregson, USMC (Ret.) 

Vice Admiral Michael D. Haskins, USN (Ret.) 

Lieutenant General Richard L. Kelly, USMC (Ret.) 

Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lauteobacber, Jr, USN (Ret.) 

Lieutenant General Michael D. McGinty, USAF (Ret.) 

Lieutenant General Garry L. Parks, USMC (Ret.) 

Lieutenant General Harry E. Soyster, USA (Ret.) 

Lientenaot General Martin R. Steele, USMC (Ret.) 

Vice Admiral Edward M. Straw, USN (Ret.) 

PAGE20F4 
230 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 185 here 30119.185

Lieutenant General Willie J. Williams, USMC (Ret.) 

Rear Admiral Michael C. Bachmann, USN (Ret) 

Rear Admiral David M. Boone, USN (Ret.) 

Major General Michael W. Davidson, USA (Ret) 

Major General Eugene Fox, USA (Ret) 

Rear Admiral Don Guter, JAGC, USN (Ret.) 

Rear Admiral Janice M. Hamby, USN (Ret.) 

Major General Albert C. Harvey, USMCR (Ret.) 

Rear Admiral John D. Hutson, JAGC, USN (Ret) 

Major General Steven J. Lepper, USAF (Ret.) 

Rear Admiral Archer M. Macy, Jr., USN (Ret) 

Major General Randy E. Manner, ARNG (Ret.) 

Major General J. Michael Myatt USMC (Ret.) 

Major General WDiiam L. Nash, USA (Ret) 

Major General Eric T. Olson, USA (Ret.) 

Major General Gale Pollock, USA (Ret.) 

Rear Admiral Stephen W. Rochon, USCG (Ret.) 

Major General Orlo K. Steele, USMC (Ret) 

Major General Michael W. Symanski, USAR (Ret.) 

Major General William D. Razz Waff, USA (Ret) 

Major General John J. Weide, USAF (Ret.) 

Major General Margaret Woodward, USAF (Ret) 

Brigadier General Bruce A. Adams, USA (Ret.) 

Brigadier General David M. Brahms, USMC (Ret.) 

Brigadier General Stephen A. Cheney, USMC (Ret) 

Brigadier General Thomas V. Draude, USMC (Ret) 

Brigadier General Evelyn P. Foote, USA (Ret) 

Major General Joseph T. Anderson, USMC (Ret.) 

Major General Donna Barbisch, USA (Ret) 

Rear Admiral Paul E. Busick, USCG (Ret) 

Major General Paul D. Eaton, USA (Ret.) 

Major General Wilton Scott Gorske, USA (Ret) 

Major General Irving Halter, USAF (Ret.) 

Major General Marcelite Harris, USAF (Ret) 

Major General Sanford E. Holman, USA (Ret) 

Major General Michael R. Lehnert, USMC (Ret) 

Rear Admiral Steven W. Maas, USN (Ret.) 

Major General Albert J. Madora, USA (Ret) 

Rear Admiral Donald K. Muchow, USN (Ret.) 

Major General Roger A. Nadeau, USA (Ret.) 

Rear Admiral David R. Oliver, Jr., USN (Ret) 

Major General Earl G. Peck, USAF (Ret) 

Rear Admiral Markham K. Rich, USN (Ret.) 

Major General Thomas J. Romig, USA (Ret.) 

Rear Admiral Timothy S. Sullivan, USCG (Ret) 

Major General Antonio M. Tagnba, USA (Ret.) 

Rear Admiral James M. Walley, Jr., USNR (Ret) 

Major General Richard 0. Wightman, Jr., USA (Ret) 

Major General David T. Zabecki, USA (Ret) 

Rear Admiral James A. "Jamie" Barnett, USN (Ret.) 

Rear Admiral Michael J. Browne, USN (Ret) 

Brigadier General John W. Douglass, USAF (Ret) 

Brigadier General Robert J. Felderman, USA (Ret) 

Brigadier General Gerald E. Galloway, USA (Ret.) 

PAGE30F4 
231 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 186 here 30119.186

Rear Admiral F. Stephen Glass, USN (Ret) 

Rear Admiral Dean H. Hines, USN (Ret.) 

Rear Admiral Grady L. Jackson, USN (Ret.) 

Brigadier General Carloes E. Martinez, USAF (Ret) 

Brigadier General LeifH. Hendrickson, USMC (Ret.) 

Brigadier General David R. Irvine, USA (Ret) 

Brigadier General John H. Johns, USA (Ret.) 

Brigadier General Jenenne P. Nelson, USAF (Ret.) 

Brigadier General Richard O'Meara, USA (Ret.) Rear Admiral Harold L. Robinson, USN (Ret) 

Brigadier General Edward F. Rodriguez, Jr., USAFR (Ret.) Brigadier General Murray G. Sagsveen, USA (Ret.) 

Brigadier General Earl Simms, USA (Ret) 

Brigadier General Burdett K. Thompson, USA (Ret) 

Brigadier General Terrence P. Woods, USAF (Ret.) 

Brigadier General Scott E. Wuesthoff, USAF (Ret.) 

Brigadier General Frederick A. Zehrer III, USAF (Ret) 

Brigadier General Paul Gregory Smith, USA (Ret.) 

Brigadier General George H. Walls, USMC (Ret.) 

Brigadier General Daniel P. Woodward, USAF (Ret.) 

Brigadier General Stephen N. Xenakis, USA (Ret) 

PAGE40F4 
232 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 187 here 30119.187

1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 

Washington, DC 20009 

Tel: 202-612-4321 

Fax: 202-612-4333; 202-478-2988 

II.,UU!IlU:UTJVIIHUtTOIIl 

Mlcl!oloAI__.,,lk! .. ropm•nti'l!ldG/obalhlltiatlws 

llld>oluOiwu,Medlll 

CtwckLw«ttt.Opon>lian> 

llrunoSiqm;lllp!t<t.ll<lwxJcy 

EmmoOo!y,Cammumcoti<m•Dirt«tw 

lllno~l'olfct!p!ltl,(i~n<ra/(aun••l 

lo,....-.,log<~landP,HqD/n<!<!r 

bJVlSJ<II lilll PI!CIIIA• DJIU:TOI!Il 

lmiA<IIm.,Asla 

lll<l>le~lllfty,UnitedSIM!< 

Mlon!Sopll,ll(rl«J 

JooiiMipollllnnco,Ameri<m 

s...bl.ui>WIIitloii,Middl~f.,./aMNorlitA{tiro 

llu!lhiMIUo.......,,furo~amiC..,Ir!IIA<IG 

$~0J>Itllbuhn1p.Oi<<Jbl8tyR/gl>l> 

l'ot*f~.fmug<!"n<le:; 

Zl""'lloff,O.Rik•"'<l!lght; 

llktiii!IIO!cbr,lntv""rfanO!ftl~ 

IIRFH!t<k,Rtl{ug.~e>'l<'/gllts 

...... dGa!J-n,81J>iJ>O»OIIdHUm<m/li;J)>I$ 

Uu!kn!!llol!l,Wom""''Rigi>I:J; 

--."""' illellfilll.ohmoo.H£alrhamiHiP1rtm/lighU 

~O..H•o.,Enrir<>IJmemaMJiumanRfgh!s 

GfMOIIhili,l~G<Ij\BI>=ai,CJ>CI~m./1G 

AgYOCIUIIIU<:TOU 

Mori•t.t.rnoC..Ineii.Br<llfl 

)l:olll'II'Wiot,Un/mJN<Jtfuo;,<'kn..,. 

MoonoblllGaquiy,SOIJ/hA>Io 

Nnkla.J...,o...,d,Fronce 

l.othltekbr,Eur<>pmnUnion 

s..M-..,.,Wnsllingron.OC 

Dni4Mt$>11atn,Uoiw/Kieyllcm 

'NelmllMidoolold,G"""""'' 

IO!IIIItO'IIiUU'OIJ 

H._~r......y.ca(Mir 

MlcloaeiAodi,VI<.,..(il<lfrandlre<•S<•rer 

Ol<IMaloumoU!, V/<e·C~air 

Amylll<I,VIa-Chair 

AmyT---.VIce-CM/r 

Cot~ei!IIIZ•nn.t!Om,Vfa-Ch<Jir 

Ito-~-... .......... 

J<>rp(atal\fto 

....,.,_ 

-~00 

~-GJIIU>.t·l.urie 

P .. IGt.,. _Ctillln~ 

.... 

Klmbe;lyMort$&11Er!lot110!1 

Al.ldoMift .... 

)l:ooR.Pio!t 

tlellltlmor 

51HIIt.yhutllubln 

M!llula<lcrll<llii•S..."*'-

I•o-to•to.S.....·Sdlmbor 

Slolr!oystloillboltJ 

IINnSirn,...,. 

/t)feJibSI<nynakl 

Dom!IS!ol!lht 

Siflst.,..Nle!Hn 

o.n.-.w.,... 

Mokelo'foltno 

M•rieW.olluot 

March 23, 2018 

The Honorable Mitch McConnell 

Senate Majority leader, US Senate 

The Honorable Chuck Schumer 

Senate Minority leader, US Senate 

The Honorable Richard Burr 

Chairman, US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

The Honorable Mark Warner 

Vice Chairman, US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

Re: Nomination of Gina Haspel to be CIA Director 

HRW.org 

Dear Majority leader McConnell, Minority leader Schumer, Chairman Burr, 

and Vice Chairman Warner: 

We write on behalf of Human Rights Watch to express our opposition to the 

impending nomination of Gina Haspel to be Central Intelligence Agency 

director. 

President Donald Trump's decision to nominate as CIA director someone 

closely involved in the torture of detainees under the CIA's Rendition, 

Detention, and Interrogation (RDI) program,' and the destruction of related 

evidence, demonstrates contempt for the prohibition against torture under 

US and international law. It sends a message to the American people and 

the world that acting without regard for rights protections and the rule of 

law will be rewarded • 

Much of Haspel's role in the RDI program is not publicly known because the 

government has classified extensive information related to that program. 

Information on her role should be declassified and released publicly prior to 

her hearing so that both senators and the American public have a clear and 

full understanding of her record. However, what is already known should 

disqualify her from this critical cabinet-level position. 

1 Human Rights Watch, No More Excuses: A Roadmap to Justice for OA Torture, December 2015, 

httos:!/www.hrw.org/report/2015/12/01/no~more~excuses/roadmap~iustice-cia-torture. 

~ • l!lltUT • lfiWII • RLBSE1S • CHICMO· Cllll¥A • SOMA • J(JHAIOGIIUilC • 1C1!V • 111M1tAM. • lDIIDOII • LOSAIIGBB • 110SC0W • 1W1011 

IIW101K • IWtiS • SMIMIICISCO • IAoPAULO • SEeM · SIUCOIIIYAI.I.Ef • SI'OCKitOlM • 5YD11EY • 10ilYO . 10ilOin'O • WAS1111Cn011 • zDiaCH 
233 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 188 here 30119.188

Ran CIA "Black Site," Oversaw Torture 

Haspel is credibly reported to have run a CIA "black site" in Thailand from late October 

2002 until late December 2002 where at least two detainees, Abu Zubaydah, and Abd alRahim al-Nashiri, were held.' 

Though Haspel appears to have physically arrived at the Thai site toward the end of Abu 

Zubaydah's most aggressive interrogation period, she would have known or should have 

learned that Abu Zubaydah had been subject to extensive torture and ill-treatment. This 

included being stripped naked, hit, slammed into walls, shackled into extremely painful 

stress positions, subjected to extreme cold, and waterboarded 83 times-on at least one 

occasion to the point of near death.' 

Within weeks of her arrival, Haspel supervised the interrogation of al-Nashiri, a new 

detainee brought to the site. Interrogators used many of the same unlawful techniques 

used on Abu Zubaydah, includingwaterboarding.4 

Role in Other Aspects of the RDI Program 

By the end of December 2002, Haspel reportedly returned to the CIA Counterterrorism 

Center outside Washington as an operations officer. 5 No public record exists of the role she 

played in the RDI program between then and the time that she became chief of staff to Jose 

Rodriguez, who headed the CIA's National Clandestine Service from 2004 or 2005 until 

2007.6 But credible, public accounts suggest that during this time she played a leading, 

supervisory role. 

In his book, former CIA General Counsel John Rizzo describes Haspel as having "run the 

[CIA] interrogation program."7 Glenn Carle, a former undercover CIA operative involved in 

2 Adam Goldman, "Gina Haspel, Trump's Choice for C.I.A., Played Role in Torture Program," New York Times, 

March 13, 2018, https://www.nvtimes.com/2018/03/13/us/politics/gina-haspel-cia-director-nominee-trumptorture-waterboarding.html?smid=tw-share (accessed March 18, 2018). 3 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and 

Interrogation Program," Executive Summary, December 13, 2012, 

https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/ cache/files/7/c/7c85429a-ec38-4bb5-968f289799bf6d0e/D87288C34A609FF736F9459ABCF83210.sscistudy1.pdf (accessed March 18, 2018)(hereinafter 

"Senate Summary"), pp. 31-47. 4 Senate Summary, p. 67. 5 Goldman, New York Times, March 13, 2018. 6 Jose Rodriguez, "A CIA veteran on what 'Zero Dark Thirty' gets wrong about the bin laden Manhunt:' 

Washington Post, January 3, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-cia-veteran-on-what-zero-darkthirtv-gets-wrong-about-the-bin-laden-manhunt/2013/01/03/4a76f1b8-52cc-1le2-a613-

ec8d394535c6 story.html?utm term=.e33121c5e84a (accessed March 19, 2018). 7 John Rizzo, A Company Mon, Scribner: New York 2014, p. 14. 
234 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 189 here 30119.189

interrogating a detainee in CIA custody described her as "one of the architects, designers, 

implementers and one of the top two managers of the [CIA interrogation program]."" 

In addition to using so-called "enhanced interrogation techniques,'' the CIA also held 

detainees in long-term incommunicado detention in unsanitary conditions, forced 

detainees to be naked or wear diapers, and deprived them of food, and fed at least five 

detainees through their rectums. 9 The agency also unlawfully rendered numerous men to 

various countries, many of whom were then tortured by US partner forces.'0 

Haspel should publicly explain which aspects of the CIA program she was involved in 

during this time, if any, and her role. The CIA has admitted to a number of "management 

failures" during the time that she was in charge of the Thailand CIA "black cite."" This 

included a failure to discipline for detainee abuse. The agency also admitted to inflating 

the value of intelligence gathered from detainees to continue justifying the program.12 

Destruction of Videotapes 

In 2005 Haspel was involved in destroying 96 videotapes of some of the most violent 

images of CIA torture, mostly depicting the torture of Abu Zubaydah.'3 During one 

waterboarding session likely recorded, a CIA cable describes Abu Zubaydah having 

become "completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth."'4 

8 Natasha Bertrand, "A Controversial Record of Torture, but Maybe Not a Deal-Breaker for Democrats," The 

Atlantic, March 13, 2018, https:ljwww.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/03/democrats-may-look-past-a-cianominees-record-on-torture/555554/ (accessed March 19, 2018). 9 See generally, Senate Summary. See also: Human Rights Watch, No More Excuses: A Roodmap to Justice for CIA 

Torture. 

10 See Human Rights Watch, Delivered Into Enemy Hands: US-Led Renditions to Gaddafi's Libya, September 5, 

2012, https://www.hrw.org/repart/2012/09/05/delivered-enemy-hands/us-led-abuse-and-rendition-opponentsgaddafis-libya: See also, Globalization of Torture Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI), "Globalizing Torture: CIA 

Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition," February 2013, 

http://www.opensocietvfoundations.org/sites/default!fileslglobalizing-torture-20120205.pdf (accessed March 

20, 2018). 11 See U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Comments on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's Study of the 

Central Intelligence Agency's Former Detention and Interrogation Program," June 27, 2013, 

https:Uwww.cia.gov/librarv/reports/CIAs June2013 Response to the SSCI Study on the Former Detention a 

nd Interrogation Program.pdf (accessed March 22, 2018). 12 Ali Watkins, "CIA Strikes Back At Senate: Torture Program Was Poorly Run, But It Worked," The Huffington Post, 

December 9, 2014, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/09/cia-torture-program n 6272220.html 

(accessed March 22, 2018). 

"The exact number of tapes destroyed varies by source. In his book, "A Company Man, former CIA General 

Counsel John Rizzo who has a first-hand account of the episode, says there were 100 hours of recordings on 96 

tapes. See Rizzo, A Company Man, p. 7. Many media reports say 92 tapes were destroyed. See e.g., Adam 

Goldman and Matt Apuzzo, "lawyers left Off Memo to Destroy CIA Terror Tapes," Associated Press, July 26, 

2010, http:ljwww.nbcnews.com/id/38416094/ns/us news-securitv/t/lawvers-left-memo-destroy-cia-terrortapes/#.WguUY6jwY2x (accessed March 20, 2-018). 14 Annabelle Timsit, "What Happened at the Thailand 'Black Site' Run by Trump's CIA Pick," The Atlantic, March 

14, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international!archive/2018/03/gina-haspel-black-site-torturecia/555539/?utm source=poltw (accessed March 22, 2018). 
235 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 190 here 30119.190

John McPhearson, a CIA lawyer who reviewed the tapes, said they showed Abu Zubaydah, 

"crying" and "gagging" and that they were "very unpleasant to look at.'"5 

In November 2005, Haspel drafted the order to destroy the tapes and Rodriguez signed it 

though Rizzo had instructed Rodriguez not to do so without his and further White House 

approval. 16 According to Rizzo, Rodriguez and Haspel were "the staunchest advocates 

inside the [CIA] for destroying the tapes,'"7 and Rodriguez said in his book that destroying 

the tapes was something that he and Haspel had been trying to do for a long time. 18 

Conclusion 

The US Senate is charged with scrupulously examining the administration's nominee for 

CIA director. Given her record, confirming Haspel would not only erode US respect for the 

prohibition on torture and other HI-treatment but would undermine US commitments to 

human rights at home and abroad. For these reasons, we urge you to oppose her 

nomination. 

Sincerely, 

~.c..Jc\t.-. 

Nicole Austin-Hillery 

Executive Director, US Program 

Human Rights Watch 

4.:::~ Washington Director 

Human Rights Watch 

15 Rizzo, A Company Man, p. 8. 16 1bid,. pp. 16-17. 17 1bid., A Company Man, p. 14. 18 Jose Rodriguez, Hard Measures: Haw Aggressive CIA Actions After 9/11 Saved American Lives, Threshold 

Editions: New York, 2012, p. 193. 
236 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 191 here 30119.191

March 20, 2018 

Dear Senator: 

The 

CENTER for 

VICTIMS of 

TORTURE 

We write to urge you to oppose Gina Haspel's nomination to be director of the Central Intelligence 

Agency. Ms. Haspel played a significant, operational role in a program that tortured people. Elevating her 

to one of the highest and most powerful positions in government--especially when we have a President 

who has openly advocated for torture-would be a dangerous and damaging act. 

Former CIA general counsel John Rizzo describes Ms. Haspel as having "previously run" the CIA's 

"interrogation" program. This is a program in which men were stripped naked, diapered, and shackled to 

the ceiling; brutally beaten; waterboarded to the point of near-death; and stuffed for hours in boxes the 

size of small dog crates (among a host of other sadistic abuses). Mr. Rizzo has also said that Ms. Haspel 

was one of "the staunchest advocates inside the building" for destroying videotaped evidence of these 

torture sessions. Indeed, the centrality of her role in the tapes' eventual destruction has not been disputed. 

There is an ongoing public discussion about the more granular details of Ms. Haspel's involvement in 

CIA torture because much of that information remains classified. Several senators have demanded the 

information's public release, and we applaud them for it; too much about the United States' use of torture 

has been secret for too long. But even to ask the kinds of questions on which such declassification will 

shed light--e.g., for which detainees' vicious torture was Ms. Haspel in a position of responsibility onsite, versus off-site?-is to make clear that she does not deserve a promotion to a Cabinet-level position. 

CVT has been providing care to torture survivors for more than 30 years. Every day, our clinicians sit 

across from people who have survived unspeakable brutality. We know all too well that torturers 

intimately dismantle their victims' identity and humanity, intentionally breaking both their bodies and 

minds. That is precisely what the program Gina Haspel helped run (and then tried to cover up) did. 

Confirming her would not just sanction those atrocities, it would reward them. 

Ms. Haspel's supporters have said that she knows the CIA's inner workings, is well regarded by her 

colleagues there, and is a skilled intelligence officer. That may all be true. But when making your 

confrrmation decision, we hope you will agree that there can be no counterbalance to deep complicity in 

torture. 

We urge you to reject Gina Haspel's nomination for CIA director. 

Sincerely, 

Curt Goering 

Executive Director 

Scott Roehm 

Director of the Washington Office 

1015 15th St NW, Suite 600 • Washington, D.C. 20005 • 202.822.0188 • cvt@cvt.org • www.cvt.org 
237 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 192 here 30119.192

'"+A National Council of Churches .,. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN THE USA 

May7, 2018 

The Honorable Richard Burr, Chair 

The Honorable Mark Warner, Vice Chair 

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

cc: All U.S. Senators 

Dear Senator, 

I write to you to ask you to oppose the nomination of Gina Haspel to be CIA Director. Her role 

in the CIA's torture program disqualifies her from leading the agency. The NCC is a founding 

member of the National Religious Campaign Against Torture and has long been on record in 

opposition to the use of torture. 

Not only are we deeply troubled by Ms. Haspel involvement in the CIA's torture program, we are 

concerned with the lack of transparency displayed by the agency as evidenced by its 

unwillingness to share adequate information regarding Ms. Haspel's involvement in the 

destruction of CIA videotapes documenting the agency's use of torture. 

What little we do know about Ms. Haspel's record excludes her, in our judgment, from being CIA 

Director. We know that Ms. Haspel supervised the torture of Abd ai-Rahim ai-Nashiri at the CIA 

black site in Thailand. While we don't know the full list of techniques used on Mr. ai-Nashiri 

while she supervised his interrogation, we do know that he was waterboarded multiple times 

and likely faced other forms of torture. Before considering her nomination, the Senate 

Intelligence Committee should ensure that the full record of Ms. Haspel's role supervising 

torture is made public. 

One declassified memo, written by Deputy CIA Director Michael Morrel, is purported to 

exonerate her for her role in the destruction of the tapes. The memo also suggests that the 

CIA's leadership "failed" Haspel and her then-boss Jose Rodriguez, because "beyond the Acting 

General Counsel discussing the issue with White House Counsel" (who told the agency not to 

destroy the tapes), "there is no record of any effort on the part of the Agency leadership to 

engage White House policymakers." This memo suggests that despite the CIA General 

Counsel, the White House Counsel, and at least one Member of Congress weighing in against 

destroying the tapes, Ms. Haspel and her boss Mr. Rodriguez were nevertheless right to do so. 

110 Maryland Avenue NE, Suite 108, Washington, DC 20002-5605 

(202) 544-2350 www.nationalcouncilofchurches.us 
238 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 193 here 30119.193

According to the Morell memo, Mr. Rodriguez believed that destroying the tapes was justified. 

He said that "the publication of the tapes would damage the domestic and international standing 

of the CIA. • He also stated that "the worldwide reaction to the leak of the photos of the actions of 

US military personnel at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison· "cemented his view that the tapes 

represented a threat to his officers and the Agency." 

By confirming Gina Haspel, someone who is known to the world as having supervised torture, to 

a Cabinet-level position, the U.S. Senate will do exactly what Mr. Rodriguez feared- it will 

damage the domestic and international standing of the CIA, the Senate, and indeed our country 

itself. Confirming Haspel will be widely understood as a message that the U.S. accepts torture 

and it will be used by tyrants and dictators to justify both torture and a legion of other human 

rights abuses. 

The National Council of Churches has for years called for the whole record of torture in the 

post-9/11 period to be made fully known. Ms. Haspel's nomination signals a return to the 

darkest, most immoral policies our nation has supported. I pray that you and your colleagues 

will consider the deep cost of promoting someone who supervised torture to be CIA Director and 

will ultimately choose to oppose this nomination. 

Sincerely, 

President and General Secretary 

National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA 
239 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 194 here 30119.194

May 7. 2018 

NC Stop Torture Now 

P.O. Box 12707, Raleigh, NC 27605 

Dear Chairman Burr and Ranking Member Warner. 

Some 70 years ago, the U.S. acted for justice as a member of the Allied forces that tried and 

sentenced World War II criminals. How far we have come, in the wrong direction, to now be 

considering the confirmation of Gina Haspel. who by rights herself should be charged with war 

crimes. as Director of the CIA. As is well known. Haspel oversaw a CIA black site during the 

Bush-era torture program, and was instrumental in the destruction of videotapes that would have 

served as evidence of torture. 

North Carolina Stop Torture Now is a statewide organization. working since 2005 for investigation 

of and accountability for the participation ofNC airports in the CIA's rendition, detention, and 

interrogation (RDI) program begun soon after 9/11. Several airports, in particular that of Johnston 

County. which hosts the CIA front company Aero Contractors. Ltd., launched at least 80 flights to 

kidnap "suspects" - some detained due to mistaken identity or faulty intelligence - and deliver them 

to CIA black sites or to countries known to torture. These men were tortured in horrible ways. and 

still struggle with serious physical and psychological sequelae of their ordeals. 

Gina Haspel is deeply implicated in these atrocities. For example, she was Chief of Base at the 

CIA's Thai black site while Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri was kept naked and shackled there, 

threatened with sodomy and the arrest and rape of his family. and repeatedly waterboarded. In 

addition, Ms. Haspel and her boss at the time. Jose Rodriguez, were apparently the staunchest 

advocates for destroying the CIA's videotapes of those Thai torture sessions. 

We will continue to provide public education on the illegality and ineffectiveness of torture. and on 

North Carolina's role, and will continue to urge local, state, and federal officials to seek 

accountability. We are deeply disturbed that Ms. Haspel's elevation to the directorship of the CIA 

would constitute an endorsement of torture. It would invalidate the suffering of countless survivors. 

not only of U.S. torture but of torture by other countries. which would perceive the U.S. as offering 

a green light for their own dehumanizing policies. 

On behalf of North Carolina Stop Torture Now. we urge you to support full transparency on Ms. 

Haspel's role in the torture program. and to oppose her nomination to direct the CIA. 

Sincerely, 

Q__).{JvL_ 

Joa«alsh~ 

Durham, NC 

~~Jb.- Christina Cowger - tf 

Raleigh. NC 
240 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 195 here 30119.195

~T'ruah the rabbinic caU for human rights 

T'ruah: The Rabbinic Call for Human Rights 

266 West 37th Street, Suite 803 

New York, NY 10018 

May 8, 2018 

The Honorable Richard Burr, Chair 

The Honorable Mark Warner, Vice Chair 

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

cc: All U.S. Senators 

Dear Senator, 

We write on behalf of close to 2,000 rabbis and cantors across the United States to urge you to 

oppose Gina Haspel's nomination for CIA Director. Given Ms. Haspel's role in the CIA's nowdefunct torture program, a vote to confirm her is incompatible with any kind of meaningful 

commitment to the prohibition on torture and so-called "enhanced interrogation." Her oversight 

of a CIA black site is an extreme moral offense that overrides any other qualifications she might 

have to serve as the head of the CIA. 

As Jews, we believe that every human being is created in God's image. This assertion applies to 

all people, friend or enemy. The shame and humiliation caused by torture degrade the divine 

spark inherent in each of us. Furthermore, the Torah commands not to inflict punishments that 

degrade the perpetrator. How much more so must dignity be respected in interrogations, where 

guilt has not been established and where torture neither effectively produces accurate intelligence 

nor keeps us safer. 

But torture is more than just ineffective. It is also deeply immoral. Torture violates the very basic 

human dignity of the suspects, even if they tum out to be guilty. As the Talmud teaches, "When 

a human being suffers, what does God say? My head is too heavy for me, my arm is too heavy 

for me. Thus God suffers over the blood of the wicked, how much more so over the blood of the 

righteous." (Mishnah Sanhedrin 6:5) 

The rabbis and cantors ofT'ruah represent the moral voice of the Jewish community. In 2005, 

T'ruah was one of the first Jewish organization to condemn American use of torture in the 

ongoing War on Terror. We are founding members of the interfaith National Religious 

Campaign Against Torture. 

We hope that the United States will never again return to the dark days of state-sponsored 
241 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 196 here 30119.196

torture. We must not appoint officials who fail to respect the power of international prohibitions 

against torture and the Geneva Conventions. 

We urge you to support America's moral standing and reject the nomination of Gina Haspel as 

CIA Director. 

Sincerely, 

Rabbi Jill Jacobs 

Executive Director, T'ruah 

Rabbi Rachel Kahn-Troster 

Deputy Director, T'ruah 

Rabbi Michael Cohen Rabbi Amy Eilberg Rabbi Zev-Hayyim Feyer 

Manchester Center, VT Los Altos, CA Pomona,CA 

Rabbi Howie Schneider Rabbi Suzanne Singer Rabbi Manachem Creditor 

Aptos, CA Riverside, CA Berkeley, CA 

Rabbi Judith Seid Rabbi Samuel Broude Rabbi Meredith Cahn 

Pleasanton, CA Oakland,CA Petaluma, CA 

Rabbi Sheldon Lewis Rabbi Sarah Weissman Rabbi Diane Elliot 

Palo Alto, CA Redwood City, CA El Sobrante, CA 

Cantor Devorah Felder-Levy Rabbi Robin Podolsky Rabbi Shoshanah Devorah 

Lose Gatos, CA Los Angeles, CA Ukiah,CA 

Rabbi Andrew Straus Cantor Rise Wallach Rabbi Keara Stein 

Thousand Oaks, CA Oakland,CA Pasadena, CA 

Rabbi Laura Geller Rabbi Ephraim Pelcovits Rabbi Joshua Levine Grater 

Los Angeles, CA Los Angeles, CA Pasadena, CA 

Rabbi Corey Helfand Rabbi Aryeh Cohen Rabbi Paula Marcus 

Foster City, CA Los Angeles, CA Aptos, CA 

2 
242 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 197 here 30119.197

Rabbi Burt Jacobson Rabbi Marc Soloway Rabbi Eliot Baskin 

El Sobrante, CA Boulder, CO Greenwood, CO 

Rabbi David Zucker Rabbi Deborah Bronstein Rabbi A. Nadya Gross 

Aurora, CO Boulder, CO Erie, CO 

Rabbi Deborah Cantor Rabbi Stanley Kessler Rabbi Murray Levine 

Bloomfield, CT West Hartford, CT New Haven, CT 

Rabbi James Ponet Rabbi Penina Alexander Rabbi Aaron Potek 

New Haven, CT Washington D.C. Washington D.C. 

Rabbi Gilah Langner Rabbi Hannah Goldstein Rabbi Dr. Susan Marks 

Washington D.C. Washington D.C. Sarasota, FL 

Rabbi Louis Rieser Rabbi Cheryl Weiner Rabbi David Weizman 

Boynton Beach, FL Hollywood, FL Clearwater, FL 

Rabbi Moshe Tom Heyn Rabbi Robyn Fisher Cantor Rachelle Nelson 

Miami,FL Miami,FL Palmetto Bay, FL 

Rabbi Jonathan Fisch Rabbi Phyllis Zarren-Zohar Rabbi Sharon Steinberg 

Florida Miami,FL Boca Raton, FL 

Rabbi Mark Kula Rabbi Jonathan Tabachnikoff Rabbi Gayle Pomerantz 

Miami,FL Miami,FL Miami Beach, FL 

Rabbi Rachel Greengrass Rabbi Daniel Marmorstein Rabbi Dr. Rafael Goldstein 

Miami,FL Miami,FL Miami,FL 

Rabbi Joshua Lesser Rabbi Scott Colbert Rabbi Bruce Elder 

Atlanta, GA Atlanta, GA Highland Park, IL 

3 
243 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 198 here 30119.198

Rabbi Suzanne Griffe! Rabbi Danya Ruttenber Cantor David Berger 

Chicago, IL Evanston, IL Chicago, IL 

Rabbi Monica Gomery Rabbi Margaret Frisch Klein Rabbi H D Uriel Smith 

Chicago, IL South Elgin, IL Lexington, KY 

Student Rabbi Joshua Rabbi Barbara Penzner Rabbi Richard Meirowitz Boydston West Roxbury, MA Peabody, MA Louisville, KY 

Rabbi Henry Zoob Rabbi Devorah Jacobson Rabbi Dr. Aryeh Wineman 

Westwood, MA Amherst,MA Northampton, MA 

Rabbi Toba Spitzer Rabbi Matthew Soffer Rabbi Randy Kafka 

Waltham,MA Boston,MA Stoughton, MA 

Rabbi Edward Feld Rabbi Ora Weiss Rabbi Michael Rothbaurn 

Northampton, MA Newton Centre, MA Concord,MA 

Rabbi Andrew Vogel Student Rabbi Laura Bellows Rabbi Katy Allen 

Newton Center, MA Jamaica Plain, MA Wayland, MA 

Rabbi Rachmiel Langer Cantor Elise Barber Rabbi Robin Sparr 

Littleton, MA Springfield, MA Natick,MA 

Rabbi Justin David Rabbi Gerald Serotta Rabbi John Franken 

Northampton, MA Chevy Chase, MD Chevy Chase, MD 

Rabbi Charles Buckholz Rabbi Nina Cardin Rabbi Jeremy Kridel 

Jerusalem Baltimore, MD Elkridge, MD 

Rabbi Sara Adler Rabbi Michael Latz Rabbi Emma Kippley-Ogman 

Ann Arbor, MI Minneapolis, MN St. Paul,MN 

4 
244 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 199 here 30119.199

Rabbi Debra Rappaport Rabbi Joshua Chasan Rabbi Rachel Isaacs 

Minneapolis, MN Portland, ME Waterville, ME 

Rabbi Doug Alpertt Rabbi Scott Shafrin Rabbi Tracy Nathan 

Kansas City, MO St. Louis, MO University City, MO 

Cantor Joshua Finkel Rabbi Jeffrey Stiffman Rabbi Susan Talve 

St. Louis, MO Olivette, MO St. Louis, MO 

Senior Rabbinic Intern Laurie Rabbi Rachel Jurovics Rabbi Geoffrey Claussen Franklin 

Missoula, MT Raleigh,NC Greensboro, NC 

Rabbi Eric Solokon Rabbi Brian Nelson Rabbi Sharon Litwin 

Raleigh,NC Cary, NC Teaneck Township, NJ 

Rabbi Faith Joy Dantowitz Rabbi Ruth Gais Cantor Ilan Mamber 

Millburn, NJ Summit, NJ Frankiln Lakes, NJ 

Rabbi Sally Priesand Rabbi Elliott Tepperman Rabbi Randall mark 

Asbury Park, NJ Montclair, NJ Wayne,NJ 

Rabbi David Greenstein Rabbi Ariann Weitzman Rabbi Benjamin Adler 

Montclair, NJ West Orange, NJ 

Lawrenceville, NJ 

Rabbi Micah Liben Rabbi Kerry Olitzky Rabbi Andrew Gold 

New Mildord, NJ No Brunswick, NJ Las Vegas, NV 

Rabbi Jonah Geffen Cantor Janet Leuchter Rabbi Rachel Goldenberg 

New York, NY New York, NY Forest Hills, NY 

Rabbi Julia Andelman Rabbi Michael Feinberg Rabbi Rachel Esserman 

New York, NY New York, NY Endwell, NY 

5 
245 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 200 here 30119.200

Rabbi Adam Fisher Rabbi Mark Hurvitz Rabbi William Plevan 

Port Jefferson Station, NY New York, NY New York, NY 

Rabbi Regina Sandler- Rabbi Shoshana Hantman Rabbi Howard Handler Phillips Katonah, NY NewYork,NY Brooklyn, NY 

Rabbi Pamela Wax Rabbi Nancy Wiener Rabbi Marc Margolius 

Bronx, NY New York, NY New York, NY 

Rabbi Shai Held Rabbi Jonathan Slater Rabbi Andy Shugerman 

White Plains, NY Hastings on Hudson, NY Brooklyn, NY 

Cantor Suzanne Bernstein Rabbi Barat Ellman Rabbi Sara Zacharia 

Brooklyn, NY Brooklyn, NY New York, NY 

Rabbi Lisa Grant Rabbi Dr. Tzemah Yoreh Rabbi Joseph Selevan 

Brooklyn, NY Baltimore, MD Tonawanda, NY 

Rabbi Bob Gluck Rabbi Drorah Setel Rabbi Shuli Passow 

Albany, NY Rochester, NY New York, NY 

Rabbi Melinda Zalma Rabbi Ellen Lippman Rabbi Eva Sax-Bolder 

New York, NY Brooklyn, NY New York, NY 

Rabbi Rena Blumenthal Rabbi Dr. Arthur Blecher Cantor Abbe Lyons 

New Paltz, NY New York, NY Ithaca, NY 

Rabbi Judith Bardack Cantor Judy Ribnick Rabbi Jonah Strom 

NewYork,NY New York, NY Chappaqua, NY 

Rabbi Jeffrey Roth Rabbi Lina Zerbarini Rabbi Simkha Y. Weintraub 

Olivebridge, NY Lynbrook, NY Brooklyn, NY 

6 
246 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 201 here 30119.201

Rabbi Dr. Daniel Bronstein Rabbi Jo Hirschmann Rabbi Burton Visotzky 

Brooklyn, NY Bronx, NY New York, NY 

Rabbi Guy Austrian Rabbi Aye let S. Cohen Rabbi Sue Oren 

New York, NY New York, NY Brooklyn, NY 

Rabbi Michael Fessler Rabbi Rachel Timoner Rabbi Andrew Pepperstone 

Poughkeepsie, NY Brooklyn, NY DeWitt, NY 

Rabbi Linda Shriner-Cahn Rabbi Lester Bronstein Rabbi Susan Falk 

Bronx, NY White Plains, NY New York, NY 

Cantor Sandy Horowitz Rabbi Jessica Meyer Rabbi Alex Kress 

New York, NY New York, NY Roslyn, NY 

Rabbi Daniel Bogard Rabbi Miriam Terlinchamp Rabbi Jessica Shimberg 

Cincinnati, OH Cincinnati, OH Columbus, OH 

Rabbi George Barnard Rabbi Enid Lader Rabbi Deborah Prinz 

Cincinnati, OH Cleveland, OH Cincinnati, OH 

Rabbi Daniel Isaak Cantor Linda Shivers Rabbi Ruhi Rubenstein 

Portland, OR Portland, OR Eugene, OR 

Rabbi Debra Kolodny Rabbi Benjamin Barnett Rabbi James Lebeau 

Portland, OR Oregon Jerusalem 

Rabbi Douglas Charing Rabbi Sue Levi Elwell Rabbi Margorie Berman 

Leeds Philadelphia, P A Clarks Summit, PA 

Rabbi Linda Holtzman Rabbi Yael Levy Rabbi David Teutsch 

Philadelphia, P A Philadelphia, P A Philadelphia, PA 

7 
247 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 202 here 30119.202

Rabbi Lawrence Troster Rabbi Anna Boswell-Levy Rabbi Mordechai Liebling 

West Chester, PA Yardley, PA Philadelphia, P A 

Rabbi Meryl Crean Rabbi Tamara Cohen Rabbi Robert Tabak 

Upper Gwynedd, PA Philadelphia, P A Melrose Park, P A 

Rabbi Arthur Waskow Rabbi Tsurah August Rabbi Beth Janus 

Philadelphia, P A Philadelphia, P A Philadelphia, PA 

Rabbi Alan LaPayover Cantor Julie Newman Rabbi Elyse W echterman 

Philadelphia, P A Pittsburgh, P A Wyncote, PA 

Rabbi Myriam Klotz Rabbi Alex Weissman Rabbi Dr. Susan Einbinder 

BaJa Cynwyd, PA Providence, R1 Providence, R1 

Rabbi Dr. Arthur Segal Rabbi Michael Tevya Cohen Rabbi Nancy Kasten 

Hilton Head Island, SC Dallas, TX Dallas, TX 

Cantor Sheri Allen Rabbi Rosalind Gold Rabbi Michael Knopf 

Ft. Worth, TX Reston, VA Richmond, VA 

Rabbi Esther Lederman Rabbi Elizabeth Goldstein Cantor Robert Scherr 

Arlington, VA Vienna, VA Alexandria, VA 

Rabbi Elana Zaiman Rabbi Jill Borodin Rabbi Jay Heyman 

Seattle, WA Seattle, WA Seattle, WA 

Rabbi Ellen Dreyfus Rabbi Darby Leigh Cantor Benjie Schiller 

Homewood, IL Concord,MA White Plains, NY 

Rabbi Brian Field Rabbi Aryeh Azriel Cantor Daniel Pincus 

Denver, CO Omaha, NE New York, NY 

8 
248 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 203 here 30119.203

Rabbi Judith Edelstein 

New York, NY 

Rabbi Bonny Grosz 

Herndon, VA 

Rabbi Ariel Stone 

Portland, OR 

Rabbi Lev Meirowitz Nelson 

Brooklyn, NY 

Rabbi Justin Goldstein 

Asheville, NC 

Rabbi David Minkus 

Chicago, IL 

9 

Rabbinical Student Salem 

Pearce 

Brooklyn, NY 

Rabbi Batsheva Meiri 

Asheville, NC 

Rabbi Aryeh Bernstein 

Chicago, IL 
249 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 204 here 30119.204

Just ln ••• 

Corker: Trump asked 

me not to file tariff bill 

BALLOT BOX -3M 105 AGO 

The House farm bill is 

crony capitalism on 

steroids 

OPINION -3M 225 AGO 

WTO advances EU, 

Canada complaints 

against Trump's trade 

moves 

FINANCE- 6M 428 AGO 

San Juan mayor: 

Trump's hurricane 

response was 'historic 

failure' 

ADMINISTRATION- 8M 235 AGO 

RFK grandson says 

Kennedy's fight is at 

stake today 

HOUSE -11M 375 AGO 

ACLU joins immigrant 

groups in lawsuit 

challenging citizenship 

Census question 

COURT BATTLES -14M 21$ AGO 

This is why amnesty is 

wrong 

OPJNION -18M Z1S AGO 

Trump administration 

sparks artistic 

resistance from 

celebrities, cartoonists 

IN THE KNOW -18M 22$ AOO 

VIEW ALL 

Gina Haspel is the wrong choic 

head the CIA 

BY LAURA PmER. OPINION CONTRIBUTOR -03/25/1808:00 AM EDT 

THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CONTRIBUTORS ARE THEIR OWN AND NOTTHEVIEWOFTHE HILL 

2,806 SHARES SHARE TW£ET 

Much concern has been raised, for good reason, about President Trump's 

nomination of Gina Haspel to head the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Haspel allegedly was involved in reckless, illegal torture under the 

agency's "rendition, detention and interrogation" program. 

Since records remain classified, the full extent of Haspel's involvement is 

not clear. The New York Times reports she ran the CIA's first "black site" in 

Thailand when one detainee, Abd ai~Nashiri, was severely tortured there. 

She also appears to have played a key role in pressing for and ultimately 

destroying videotapes of the torture of another detainee, Abu Zubaydah, 

whose detention at the same site began before she arrived. 

One section of a Senate Intelligence Committee summary of a much 

larger classified report describes the CIA's torture of Zubaydah to the 

point of near death: "In at least one waterboarding session, Abu Zubaydah 

'became completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, 

full mouth:" The CiA discussed what to do if Zubaydah died and how to 

make sure no one learned what the CIA did to him. "In light of the planned 

psychological pressure techniques to be implemented, we need to get 

reasonable assurances that [he] will remain in isolation and 

incommunicado for the remainder of his life," a CIA cable read. 

PL 
250 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 205 here 30119.205

View Latest Opinions» 

Related News ,, 

Too bad for the victims: 

Europe still fails to ... 

Republicans beware: 

The 'blue wave' is ... 

Can Trump pardon 

himself? The answer is ... 

How philosopher Jordan 

Peterson will change ... 

The CIA's apparent hopes that Abu Zubaydah's treatment would never see 

the light of day is one likely reason why Jose Rodriguez, head of the CIA 

clandestine service at the time, ordered 92 video tapes of CIA 

interrogations destroyed. Rodriguez claims this was done solely to keep 

CIA agents' identities confidential. 

The government continues to keep classified many facts related to the 

CIA's torture program, making it difficult to attribute to specific officials 

responsibility for incidents of torture or oversight of it. But it is clear that 

Haspel held a senior role at the CIA, and at a "black site," during the 

height of the agency's torture program. 

Glenn Carle, a former undercover CIA operative who was involved in 

interrogating a suspected at Qaeda detainee, described her as "one of the 

architects, designers, implementers and one of the top two managers of 

the [CIA interrogation program]." Former CIA general counsel John Rizzo, 

in his book, "A Company Man," describes Haspel as having "run the [CIA] 

interrogation program.· 

Rizzo also says in his book that Rodriguez and Haspel were "the 

staunchest advocates inside the [CIA] for destroying the tapes." 

Rodriguez, in his book, "Hard Measures," says that Haspel drafted the 

order, which Rodriguez signed even though Rizzo says he had told him 

not to do so without approval. 

If this much is correct- that Haspel was heavily involved in running the 

torture program and destroying evidence of it-this is enough to 

disqualify her from heading the CIA. True, the Justice Department signed 

off on the program, and others in higher positions at the CIA made the 

decisions to carry it out. But the culpability of other senior officials doesn't 

absolve her of responsibility. 

The torture program clearly was inhumane. Many CIA professionals are 

reported to have taken stands against it, reported their concerns, or 

refused to carry out orders. The "enhanced interrogation techniques" 

were just the tip of the iceberg. There also was long-term incommunicado 

detention in unsanitary conditions, unlawful rendition, forced nudity, food 

deprivation and diapering, among other things. 

Haspel should not be confirmed to head the CIA even if she is"!!. 

consummate professional," as some CIA colleagues have described her, or 

"a good deputy director" this past year, as Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) 

said. It's fine to weigh these positives when considering someone for a 

position, but they cannot possibly outweigh the negatives associated with 

a record that includes running a program that was illegal under both U.S. 

and international law. 

Failing to promote her to head the CIA would not be punishment, as some 

have claimed. Despite this huge black mark, she already has ascended to 

great heights within the agency. 

Some U.S. senators such as Rand Paul (R·Ky.), Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and 

Mark Heinrich (0-N.M.), have expressed their opposition to Haspel's 

nomination. Others, such as Feinstein, are reserving judgment but 

demanding more information be made public about Haspel's role in the 

program prior to her confirmation hearing. 

The public has a right to know more about this dark chapter in U.S. history. 

Without declassification, senators cannot ask important questions about 

Haspel's record because her answers would be classified. Among these 
251 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 206 here 30119.206

Just ln ... 

This is why amnesty is 

wrong 

OPINION- 2S AGO 

Trump administration 

sparks artistic 

resistance from 

celebrities. cartoonists 

IN THE KNOW- 3S AGO 

Experts warn massive 

malware network linked 

to Russia is more 

widespread 

CYBERSECURITY- 4M 37S AGO 

New Poor People's 

Campaign has the 

laudable goal of 

questions: Was she responsible for "management failures" that the CIA 

itself has described? Were these failures related to detainee abuse, or 

conditions of detention? Did she discipline officers for their conduct? Did 

she raise concerns about aspects of the program? Did she play a role in 

inflating reports of the intelligence gained from the program, which the 

CIA also has acknowledged? 

Other questions. such as whether she would ever use such techniques 

again and if she believes they were illegaL could be asked in a public 

setting. But even if Haspel disavows torture, it wouldn't come close to 

erasing concerns to a degree that would favor confirmation. Promoting 

someone who made such profound errors in judgment to the senior 

position in an important and powerful agency, at a time when the 

president has himself supported the use of torture, sends the message to 

other U.S. government officials- and to the world -that fundamental 

violations of the law will be rewarded and that impunity in the United 

States is the order of the day. 

Laura Pitter is the senior national security counsel at Human Rights Watch. 

TAOS DIANN£FEINSTEIN DONALDTRUMP RANDPAUL RONWYDEN TORTUREINTHEUNITEDSTAT£5 

INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

GINA HASPEL ENHANC£0 INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES 

SHARE TWEET PI.USQNE 

Giuliani: Kim Jong Un got 'on h 

hands and knees and begged' 1 

summit 

BY JOHN 80WD£N • 06/06/1811:43 AM EDT 

0 SHARES 

©Getty 
252 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 207 here 30119.207

May9,2018 

Chairman Mark Warner 

United States Senate 

Select Committee on Intelligence 

211 Hart State Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

Senator Dianne Feinstein 

United States Senate 

331 Hart Senate Office Building 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

STEVEN A. CASH 

7707 MacArthur Boulevard 

Cabin John, Maryland 20818 

Dear Chairman Warner and Senator Feinstein: 

I am writing to urge you to vote in favor of Deputy Director Gina Haspel's nomination as 

CIA Director. I do so despite what I consider the indisputable findings of the Committee's 

report on enhanced interrogation, and my firm opposition to the use of torture as an instrument of 

intelligence gathering. 

I believe it is critical that we do not expect, or even permit, our intelligence officers to 

substitute their judgment for our elected officials. Ms. Haspel, and others like her, must see 

themselves as following the direction of our elected officials, rather than substituting their 

judgment for those of our elected leaders. 

I realize that this view, on its surface, evokes the specter of Nazi Germany and the socalled Nuremberg defense. But such comparisons are misplaced. We are not Nazi Germany. We 

live in a functioning democracy, and·there is a fundamental difference between following 

Hitler's orders and following the direction of a U.S. President and the Congress. Ironically, the 

idea that CIA officers should disobey directions which on their face are lawful, presents the 

danger of slipping into a system where the security services take on the role of a "check" on 

elected officials. That is a role that has no place in our system.1 

Whether, and if so, under what circumstances, we should use "enhanced interrogation" 

(or, as I believe better described, "torture,") is a hard question, to be answered by the American 

people through their elected officials; not by CIA officers. I believe that rejecting Ms. Haspel 

because she did not substitute her judgment for that of those officials would endanger perhaps 

1 I have attached a short essay on this subject (which has been approved for publication by the 

CIA Publication Review Board and the SSCI) for your review; it has not yet been accepted for 

publication as an Op-Ed. 
253 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 208 here 30119.208

the most successful aspect of our intelligence apparatus: that it works well within our 

democracy. 

I hope you will consider these issues as you make this most consequential decision. 

-2-
254 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 209 here 30119.209

Gina Haspel should be confirmed 

Gina Haspel's nomination to be the next Director of Central Intelligence is being considered by 

the U.S.Senate. The first woman, and the first career intelligence professional since Director 

Casey to lead the CIA, Ms. Haspel promises to be an excellent, apolitical and talented leader. 

She should be confirmed. 

But concerns have been raised that, because of allegations of her involvement in so-called 

"enhanced interrogation," she should be rejected. These concerns are Whether you 

believe that "enhanced interrogation" was legal or immoral, it is 

critical that we do not look to the CIA or its professional these judgments for us. 

Why is this so important? A bit of historical context is 

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the allied vigMIII!IItlr•~le·cutc::d 

array of horrific crimes. The trials, held at Nurenlber.illlft"d,van.ced 

by some of the Nazis that they were "just foll.owin.ll ~ill'gument 

for the city in which the trials were held. That "Nll!'ennbe:rg· 

come, in different contexts, to stand for a 

simply following orders can excuse snc•'!KJiilgJLY 

Why now? Because in 

(and selt;·eXIliminlltio~ 

in the 

of the 

Enhanced 

applied to our examination 

or torture, as practiced by the CIA 

am1•1111'lms issue was high-profile after release 

Sentab:lllfel.ect Committee on Intelligence on 

•• I!JDt:extofMs. Haspel's nomination as the next 

is well respected throughout the Agency. 

in "enhanced interrogation." It remains to be seen 

But, even if true, they should not be disqualifying and 

thjJiorrific crimes during World War II. 

First, the easy, comparison of the CIA's actions with that of Hitler and the Nazis is 

inappropriate. It the evil of the Nazi regime, aind by inviting easy analogy, warps our 

assessment of our own actions. There simply is no appropriate comparison between the two sets 

of events. 

Second, we should abandon the drl!inlatic rhetoric that has surrounded the issue of enhanced 

interrogation since it was first discussed (largely out of the public view), aind in the ensuing 

public discussion. It is foolish for those who defended what the Bush Administration called 

"enhanced interrogations" to characterize opposition or criticism as "soft on terrorism," or 
255 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 210 here 30119.210

treasonous. It is equslly foolish for those who believe that enhanced interrogation is a misleading 

euphemism for torture to equate these polices with that of Nazi Germany. 

Third, we need to add into the debate a reevaluation of the Nuremberg Defense, and, as difficult 

as it is to articulate, accept it as legitimate within bounds -a defense of the Defense. Why is this 

important? Because some type of Nuremberg Defense is, counterintuitively, essential to our 

d~ocracy. How can this be so? 

In any government system such as our representative democracy, the 

elected representatives make policy choices, while government 

democratic decisions, is critical. This is particularly so in the 

intelligence services. It has long been well understood that 

necessary to the continued existence of American dmnoc::rac~:YII 

personnel who can, if they wish, overturn almost 

do not like- it is their deeply engralned forbearance tholro.,u.>~~,. 

our government. This same logic applies to our 

The CIA, by necessity (and as directed in law and capabirrty to act in 

go,'emmeJtlt entity. Despite 

and its own efforts (take a 

w~.rur1cnonsthat are at 

secret with less oversight and less constraint than 

the softening of its image in recent both 

look at the friendly CIA website), it still 

odds with the norms of our society. It 

(secretly effecting the course of history). 

and covert action 

be conducted in secret. 

These necessary chftrac~tCJi•• it inevitably dangerous to our 

capfabilitices of our government that we 

manag:•~1a1ance this tension. It has been tested 

thn ... 11-.··r- have been largely addressed and 

..... wer fully be resolved. 

democracy. It is 

have, with 

over time and 

remedied 

on Intelligence (and its House of Representatives 

on Intelligence), along with Executive Branch 

as well as vigorous press (armed with First 

the framework for this imperfect success. But one major 

tbiJ<i,option and acceptance of a variation on the Nuremberg 

th~~1ghe:st and lowest levels, have nearly uniformly accepted the idea 

directions of elected officials -most importantly, the President, 

they are bound by the Constitution and Law. This acceptance, at the 

field level, is the of ideology (we live in a democracy and "following the orders" of 

elected officials is, in part, what distinguishes the CIA from its historica). adversaries, such as the 

KGB); this ideological acceptance is buttressed by the practical aspects of working in a secret, 

and compartmented, profession- field level officers accept orders not only because they should, 

but because they recognize that they usually do not have enough information to assess whether 

these orders are "good" or "bad." 

-2-
256 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 211 here 30119.211

The fundamental point is that this limited acceptance of the Nuremberg principal is critical to our 

ability to have the CIA and democracy at the same time. CIA officials, and most importantly, 

field officers, should consider rejecting orders as extraordinary and nearly impossible to even 

consider. The CIA, at no level, shoul4 function as a type of court of review for the 

determinations of elected officials, nor should it hold a veto on those decisions. 

Intelligence agencies such as the CIA are a necessary but dangerous tool for our democracy. 

These agencies should be led by intelligence professionals who will follow the direction and 

guidance of our democratically elected leaders and not substitute their · s and preferred 

policies. They can persuade, argue, complain and even resign in pro they cannot serve 

as our conscience. Ms. Haspel should be confirmed. 

-3-
257 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 212 here 30119.212

May7, 2018 

The Honorable Richard Burr 

U.S. Senator 

217 Russell Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable Mark Warner 

U.S. Senator 

703 Hart Senate Office Building 

Washington, DC 20510 

CC: All Members of the U.S. Senate 

RE: Torture and the Nomination of Gina Haspel to be CIA Director 

Dear Senator: 

As national Catholic advocacy organizations, we write to ask you to oppose the nomination of 

Gina Haspel to be CIA Director. While we recognize that Ms. Haspel is an experienced career 

CIA employee; her role overseeing torture in the CIA's black site in Thailand raises serious 

questions and using basic mom! standards for human dignity disqualifies her from leading the 

agency. 

Most of Ms. Haspel's career is classified, leaving the public with little on which to evaluate her 

nomination. Public reports, though, which have not been disputed by the CIA, indicate that she 

supervised the CIA black site in Thailand while Abd ai-Rahim al-Nashiri was tortured through a 

variety of techniques- including waterboarding. CIA records indicate that agency interrogators 

at that site were at times at "the point of tears and choking up" and "likely to elect transfer away 

from the site." There is no indication, however, that Ms. Haspel attempted to stop the use of 

torture at the site - indeed she may have been transferred there to tamp down on concerns the 

interrogators at the site had over the legality of the techniques being used. 

Confirming someone who actively supervised torture to be CIA Director would send a very 

unhealthy, unethical, and anti-rule of law message to the world. Our friends and allies would 

question our opposition to torture, and tyrants and dictators would once again point to us to 

justifY their own use of torture. Those at the CIA, the FBI, and in our military who objected to 

torture would be betrayed as they watched someone who was responsible for torture elevated 

above them. American Catholic pastoral and humanitarian aid workers would be distrusted and 

endangered. It would also be understood as a message of support for torture by our Presidentwho has repeatedly stated his personal interest in restarting the torture program. 

Ms. Haspel's undisputed role supervising torture should be reason enough for Senators to vote 

against her nomination. Additionally, though, the CIA's decision to selectively declassifY no 

more than a handful of pages from her more than three decade career makes it impossible for the 

American people to fairly evaluate someone who has been nominated for a Cabinet-level 
258 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 213 here 30119.213

positiOn. A CIA spokesperson recently told the NYTimes that the agency "is being more robust 

than normal in supporting this nomination." In essence, that means that the agency Ms. Haspel 

now effectively heads, and which has admitted to supporting her nomination, has used its 

authority to prevent the release of almost any information about her role in the torture program, 

let alone the rest of her career. Keeping this information from the American people is an 

inappropriate and undemocratic use of classification authority. 

We ask our Senators to demand that the full record of Ms. Haspel's involvement in torture be 

made public prior to the consideration of her nomination. Further, we pray that you will see her 

role supervising torture as disqualifYing and vote against this nomination. 

Sincerely, 

Conference of Major Superiors of Men 

Franciscan Action Network 

Maryknoll Office of Global Concerns 

National Advocacy Center of the Sisters of the Good Shepherd 

NETWORK Lobby for Catholic Social Justice 

Sisters of Mercy of the Americas Institute Justice Team 

Society of the Sacred Heart, USC Province 

Pax Christi USA 
259 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 214 here 30119.214

Statement from September 11"' Families for Peaceful Tomorrows 

Concerning the Nomination of Gina Haspel as Director of the CIA 

Torture is immoral and illegal. No one who played an operational role in torture, oversaw a "black 

site" where torture was committed, or destroyed evidence of torture rather than promote 

transparency and accountability should hold the office of Director of the CIA. That is why 

September 11th Families for Peaceful Tomorrows opposes Gina Haspel, President Trump's nominee 

for CIA Director, and urges all U.S. Senators to vote NO. 

As 9-11 family members, we know all too well the cost our nation now pays for having violated our 

prohibition against torture. It is the central reason that there has not been, and may never be, 

justice for the victims of the 9-11 terrorist attacks, their families, and America's citizens. 

After six years of Military Commission hearings at Guantanamo Bay, there is still no trial date for 

the five men alleged to have planned the 9-11 attacks. Why? Because these five defendants were 

tortured. Details of cruel and degrading treatment at CIA black sites remain classified for reasons of 

national security, which has led to years of legal arguments. There is now serious question as to 

whether evidence gathered in later interrogations by FBI "clean teams" will be admissible in court. 

The 9-11 hearings could be on a collision course for a mistrial, an outcome no one wants. 

There were good reasons the U.S. ratified the 1984 Convention against Torture and encouraged 

other nations to do so. By universally condemning cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, we 

ensure that lllir military personnel and citizens do not suffer torture. 

We must ask, if the practices that Gina Haspel allegedly supported and protected were carried out 

on an American soldier, would they be described as torture? Further, we know torture does not 

work. Declassified portions of the Senate 'Torture Report' show that interrogations conducted 

without torture produced actionable information, while torture often led victims to fabricate 

information or to tell the interrogators what they wanted to hear. 

Gina Haspel is alleged to have had an operational role in the torture of one al-Qaeda suspect, Abd alRahim al-Nashiri, while at a CIA black site. Such practices have caused irreparable harm to our 

international standing and to the integrity of the Rule of Law in our nation. 

It is time to once and for all put this tragic and immoral chapter of our national history to rest. All 

U.S. elected officials, indeed all American citizens, need to answer for the torture carried out in our 

name. Gina Haspel must answer today as well. Ms. Haspel's role in government gave her the 

opportunity to project a beacon of American jurisprudence. She chose a shadowy path instead, one 

that must not lead to the position of Director of the CIA. 
260 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 215 here 30119.215

March 16, 2018 

Dear Senator, 

We write to express our grave concerns regarding the nomination of Gina Haspel for Director of the 

Central Intelligence Agency {CIA), and to ask that you not advance her nomination until all of the records 

on her past involvement in the CIA torture program are declassified and released to the public. Senators 

should be concerned not only by Ms. Haspel's reported role overseeing the torture of detainees at a 

secret CIA detention site in Thailand, but also by her participation in a deliberate attempt to avoid 

accountability by destroying video evidence of CIA torture. 

Ms. Haspel joined the CIA in 198S, and has held several leadership roles in the agency's clandestine 

operations. She was named Deputy Director of the CIA in 2017, despite the objections of senators who 

urged President Trump to reconsider her nomination in light of her past connection to torture.' Amid 

similar controversy in 2013, Haspel was denied a promotion to lead the CIA's National Clandestine 

Service.' 

We have strong concerns about Ms. Haspel's reported role overseeing the torture of detainees at a 

clandestine detention site in Thailand, and her subsequent role in the destruction of evidence of those 

torture crimes. Detainees at the Thailand "black site" were waterboarded, slammed against walls, 

subjected to enforced sleeplessness, and confined to coffin-shaped boxes, among other criminal 

practices.' Ms. Haspel reportedly was in a supervisory position over the Thailand "black site" during this 

period-including an on-site leadership role when at least one detainee was brutally tortured-and 

knew about, reported on, and was otherwise involved in other cases of torture and detainee abuse. 4 But 

the full extent of her involvement is impossible to confirm because the CIA continues to insist that 

information about the full extent of her role remain classified. Executive Order 13526 prohibits the 

classification of records to "conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error" or "prevent 

embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency," so there is no reason for the torture program, or 

1 See: "Wyden, Heinrich Express Concern on Selection of Gina Haspel to be Deputy Director of the CIA," February 2, 

2017, available at: 

https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-heinrich-express-concern-on-selection-of-gina-haspel 

-to-be-deputy-director-of-the-cia 

' Greg Miller, "CIA selects new head of clandestine service, passing over female officer," Washington Post, May 7, 

2013, available at: 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-selects-new-head-of-clandestine-service-passing-o 

ver-female-officer-tied-to-interrogation-program/2013/05/07/c43e5f94-b727-11e2-92f3-f291801936b8_story.htm 

I 

'Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and 

Interrogation Program," Executive Summary, December 13, 2012, available at: 

https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/7/c/7c85429a-ec38-4bb5-968f-289799bf6d0e/D87288C34A 

6D9FF736F9459ABCF83210.sscistudy1.pdf 

4 Adam Goldman, "Gina Haspel, Trump's Choice for C.I.A., Played Role in Torture Program," New York Times, 

March 13, 2018, available at: 

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/13/us/politics/gina-haspel-cia-director-nominee-trump-torture-waterboardin 

g.html?smid=tw-share 
261 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 216 here 30119.216

Ms. Haspel's role in it, to remain classified. Senators and the American people must be able to read 

these documents in assessing her nomination to be CIA Director.' 

In addition to her role overseeing the use of torture, Ms. Haspel's participation in the destruction of 

videotapes of the torture program, over objections of White House counsel and CIA General Counsel 

among others, is alarming. In November 200S, amid increasing public outrage over revelations of torture 

at the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba detention facility, the CIA destroyed 92 videotapes of interrogations at 

clandestine facilities elsewhere.' While the CIA maintains that the decision to destroy the tapes was 

made by then-Director of the National Clandestine Service Jose Rodriguez, Rodriguez says in his 2013 

book that Haspel drafted the order herself.' Former CIA Acting General Counsel John Rizzo says Haspel 

and Rodriguez were the "staunchest advocates inside the building for destroying the tapes.''8 

Destruction of the tapes appears to constitute a concerted effort to escape embarrassment and legal 

consequences. In 2004, in a Freedom of Information Act suit filed by the ACLU, a judge had ordered the 

government to preserve all records related to abuse of detainees overseas, which clearly applied to the 

videotapes." The incident was also a clear violation of the Federal Records Act, and indicates that Ms. 

Haspel does not believe she has an obligation to follow the law or a court order.10 

The destruction of 

the videotapes even prompted then-Attorney General Michael Mukasey to appoint a prosecutor to 

investigate the destruction. 

The Senate's constitutional obligation to "advise and consent" on any nomination requires that it have 

full access to relevant information on the nominees before it. In Ms. Haspel's case, the precise details of 

her role in the torture program remain classified. All senators should demand that those records be 

declassified and made public-before her nomination moves any further-so that they can actually 

discuss Ms. Haspel's deeply disturbing background in open session, and so that the public can glean a 

more detailed picture of her role in one of the darkest chapters in U.S. history. 

Ms. Haspel was a central figure in the torture program and the destruction of evidence of torture. Based 

on already available records and public reporting, it is clear by her wrongdoing that she demonstrated 

disregard for the rule of law and fundamental human rights. 

Sincerely, 

American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee 

American Civil Liberties Union 

Arab American Institute 

5 See: "Heinrich, Wyden Urge CIA to Declassify Information About Deputy Director Haspel's Background," February 

23, 2017, available at: 

https://www.heinrich.senate.gov/press-releases/heinrich-wyden-urge-cia-to-declassify-information-about-deputydirector-haspels-background 

'Mark Mazetti, "U.S. Says C.I.A. Destroyed 92 Tapes of Interrogations," New York Times, March 2, 2009, available 

at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/washington/03web-intel.html 1 Jose A. Rodriguez Jr., Hard Measures: How Aggressive CIA Actions After 9/11 Saved American Lives, Threshold 

Editions, 2013, pg. 193. 

'John Rizzo, Company Man: 30 Years of Controversy and Crisis in the CIA, Scribner, 2014, pg. 14. 

'See: ACLU v. Department of Defense, available ot: https://www.aclu.org/cases/aclu-v-department-defense 1

° Federal Records Act, 44 U.S.C. Chapter 31. 
262 

Æ 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 217 here 30119.217

Brennan Centerfor Justice 

Campaign for liberty 

Center for Constitutional Rights 

Centerfor Victims of Torture 

Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington 

Defending Rights & Dissent 

Demand Progress Action 

Free Press 

Government Accountability Project 

Government Information Watch 

Herd on the Hill 

Human Rights First 

Human Rights Watch 

Indivisible 

National Religious Campaign Against Torture 

National Security Archive 

No More Guantanamos 

North Carolina Stop Torture Now 

Open the Government 

PEN America 

Physicians for Human Rights 

Project On Government Oversight 

Reprieve 

Restore The Fourth 

Sunlight Foundation 

Win Without War