F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

N AOK O O HNO , a

n in div idu a l, Plaintif f-Appellee ,

v.
Y UK O Y AS UMA , a

n in div idu a l; S A I N T S O F G L OR Y C H U RCH , a California c orporation,

De fe nd an ts- Ap pe lla nts

. No. 11-55081

D.C. No. 2:10-cv-06400- O D W

- P JW

OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he Ce ntra l D istri c t of

Ca lif or nia Otis D. Wright, District J udg e, Presiding Argued and Submitted May 9, 20 12 —Pa sa de na , Ca lif or nia Filed July 2, 2013
Be fore : Harr

y Preg erson, Susan P. Gra

ber,
and Mars ha S. B e rzo n, Cir c uit

Judg e s. Opinion by

J udg e B erzonO HNO V

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2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es n o part of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s * b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y *

Diversity/California’s Unif ormF oreign-Country M oney Judgme nts Recognition Act The panel aff

irmed the district cour

t’s judgme nt in favor of plaintiff a

war d i n g her, pur suant to California’s Unif orm F or e ign- Countr

y Mo ney Judgme nts Re c ognit ion

Ac t, C a l. Civ. P roc. Co d e §§ 1713–1724, monetar y relief order ed by the cour ts of J apan.
Plainti f f s u e d Yuk o Y a s uma

an d th e Sa ints o f

G lory Chur c h( c o ll e c ti v e ly , “ th e Chur c h ” ) in Ja p an , a ll e g in gthat they had tortiously

i n du ced her to transf

er ne arly all of her assets t o the Church. The J apane se cour ts awar ded plaintiff a $1.2 mi llion tort judgme nt. Plaintiff sought e nforc ement of the judg ment in the United States Di strict Court for the Central District of Califor nia. The Churc h asser t ed that the dis tr ic t c ourt

wa s b oth

c on sti tut ion a lly

andstatut or ily requ ir e d to r e f u s e r e c o gn it io no f

th e Ja p an e s e ju d g ment beca use (1) the judg ment burdene dfre e exerc ise of re ligion in violation of the R elig ion Clauses; and (2) the judg ment was not entitled to recognition or enforc ement under the Uniform A c t , b e c a

u s e i tw a s “ r e p u g n antt o th e p u b l i c p o l i c y” e mbo die d in

the Re lig ion

Cla us e s. The pa nel held: first, the dist ri ct cour t’s enfor ceme nt of thi s f or e ign- c ountr

y mon e y jud g me nt d id n ot c on sti tut e domestic state ac tion trigge ri ngconstitutional scrutiny ; and,
se c on d, ne ith e r t

he jud g me nt a

t is su e in t

his pa rt ic ula r c a seO HNO V

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no r t he c a us e of a c tio n on whi c h it

wa s b a se d w a s so repugnant to public policy as to qua lify for non- enfor ceme nt under the Uniform Ac t.

CO UN SEL
Steven J . Renick (a

rgued), Eug ene J

. Eg an, Paul H anna, a nd L a d e ll H u le t Muh le s te in , M ann in g & K a s s E ll r o d , Ra mi r e z, Tr e ste r, L os An g e le s, Ca lif or nia , f or De fe nd ants -A

pp e lla nts

. Robert W. C ohen (a

rgued) a nd Mariko Ta enaka , L aw Of fice s of Robert W . Cohen, L os Ang eles, California , for PlaintiffAppellee

.

OP IN ION
BERZ ON, Circuit J udg e:
Our c ase involves novel issues conce rningthe enfor ceme nt of fore ign- coun try money judgme nts that
asser tedly implicate the def

endant’ s fre edom of re ligion. Na o k o Ohno sued Yuko Y asuma a nd the Saints of Glory Church (c ollectively , “the Churc h”) in J apan, a lleg ing that they had tortiously i n du ced he r to transfe r nea rly all of her assets t o the Church. The J apane se cour ts awar ded Ohno a $1 .2 mil lio n to rt

jud g me nt.
Th e Chu rc h c onte nd s that th e jud g me nt i mpo se s li a bil ity for its relig ious te achings, in violation of its constituti onalO HNO V

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4

A l t ho ug h t he C hu rch ra i ses b o t h free sp ee ch an d f ree ex erc i se c l aim s, 1 t he s peech at i s s ue was ei t her r el i gi ous i n c ont ent or, al l ege dl y , mo t i vat ed b y re ligio u s b e liefs. W h ile “p riv a te re ligio u s s p e e c h

. . . i s a s fully p ro te c te d un d e r th e F re e S p e e c h C la u se a s se c u la r p riv a te e x p re ssio n
. . . [it ] rec eive s pr ef

er ent i altre a tm e n t un d e r th e F re e E x e rc ise C la u se .” C a p ito l S q u a re R e v ie w & A d v iso ry B d . v. P in e tte , 515 U

. S. 753, 760, 767 ( 1995)

. B ec au s e t h e r i g h t t o r el i g i ou s f r ee dom a f

f or ds a h i g h er de g r ee of p rotect i o n t han wo ul d t he Free S p eech C l ause i n thi s case, we anal y ze t he Chu r ch ’ s cl ai ms un der t h e Fr ee E x er ci s e Cl au s e of t h e U

. S. Cons t i t u t i on and co rr espo nd i ng pro vi si o ns o f t he C al ifo rni a C o nst i t ut i o n, A rt i cl e I, S ec t i o n 4 , no t sep ara t ely un d er the free sp ee ch p ro visi o ns.

T h e te r m s “ re c o g n iti o n ” a n d “e n fo rc e m e n t” a re d istinc t. See 2 R est at em ent (T hi rd) of Fo rei gn R el at i o ns L aw § 4 8 1 cm t

. b (1 9 8 7 ). R eco gni t i o n of a judgm ent i s a p rereq ui si t e t o i t s enf o rcem ent

. I n r ecogn i zi ng a j udgment , a c our t ac kn owl edges t hat a mat t er has been
co ncl usi vel y ad

judicat ed and t hat t he judgm ent m ay have p recl usi ve ef f ect

. I n e nf

orci ng a j udgment , a c our t “ us es i t s coer ci ve po wer s t o order t h e r el i ef g r an t ed by t h e f

or ei gn c o ur t

. ” O f

f i ce of t h e Chi ef

Coun s el f

or In te rn a tio n a l C o m m e rc e , U .S . D e p ’t o f C o m m e rc e , Rec ogni t i on and E n f o rcem en t of F o re ig n M o n e

y J u d g m e n ts h t t p: / / www. ose c. do c. gov/ ogc/ occi c/ r ef mj. ht m (l as t vi s i t ed M ay 29, 201 3). As t he di s t i nct i on bet ween t he t w o co nc ep t s i s no t p erti ne nt f o r t he p urp o ses o f

t his op i nio n, we use t he t erm s reco gn i t i o n and enf o rcem ent i nt erchangeab l y t o de no t e t he di s t r i ct cour t ’ s deci s i on t o e nt er j udgment i n f avor of O hn o, awa r di ng he r t he m o net ary rel i ef

ord ered by t he co urt s o f Jap an.

T h ro u g h o ut t hi s o p i ni o n, we ref er t o t he Free E xerci se Claus e o f t he 3 U

. S. Cons t i t u t i on a n d t h e cor r es pon di n g pr ot ec t i on s of r el i g i ou s f

r ee dom in th e C a lif

o rn ia C o n stitutio n a s “th e R e ligio n C la u se s.” right to free exe rcise of

relig ion. The Churc h makes two

1 principal a

rgu ments on appea l: (1) that the district cour t’s recognition and enforc ement o f th e Ja p an e s e j u d g m e nt is 2 unconstitutional as a direc t violation, by the cour t, of the F ree Ex erc ise Clause in the U.S . Constitution and the par allel provisions of the C alifornia Consti tution, U.S. Const. amend. I ; Cal. Const . art. I , § 4; and (2) that the J apane se judg ment 3O HNO V

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is not entitled to r ecognition or enfor ceme n tu n der Ca lif or nia ’s Un if

or m F or e ign- Countr

y Mo ne y Judgme nts Reco gn it io nA c t, Ca l. Ci v
. Pr o c
. Co d e § § 1 7 1 3

– 1724 (“ Un if or m A c t” ), be c a

us e it is “ repu gna

nt t o th e pu

bli c po lic y” e mbo die d in

the Re lig ion

Cla us e s. We hold, first, that the district court’s re cognition and enfor ceme nt of the Japanese mone y judgme nt does not constitute “state a ction” trig g eringdirec t const i tutional scrutiny and, sec ond, that neither the J apane se judgme nt nor the cause of action on which it wa s based rises to the level of repugnance to the public policy of California or

of the United S t ates that would just ify

a re fusal to enf

orce the judg ment under the Uniform Ac t. Accor dingly , we a ffirm the district court’s judgment in Ohno’s favor.

I. BACKGROUND
A. F acts and P roce dural Hi story
O hn o , a c i t i z e no f J ap an , s u e d

th e C hur c hi nT o kyo District Court. She rec eived a favor able judgment, upheld on appea l to Tokyo’s High Court. Ohno then initiated an ac tion for r ecognition and enforc eme n t o f the judgment in the Un i t edStates District Court for the Centra l District of California, a s Yasuma is a r esident of L os Ang eles a nd the Saints of Glory

Church (“ Saints of Glory”) is a r eg istered California re ligious cor

poration.
i. The Japan ese Litigation The followingfac ts are summarized from the finding s of the To kyo tria l court , a s se t f or th i n it s ju dgme nt o f Augus t 28, 2009:O HNO V

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I n t he Japane s e l aws ui t , O hn o di d not cont es t t he vol un t ar i nes s or s eek 4 resti t ut i on of

t hes e r out i ne t i t hes

. She ch al l eng ed onl y t he s ubs t ant i al t rans f ers of m o ney t hat s he m ad e t o the C h u rch b et ween Ja nuary and M a rc h 2 0 0 2 , re fer re d to in this o p inio n a s “th e T ra n sfe rs .” Ohno joi ne d Sa int s o f Gl or y in 1 99 4 whil e wo rk ingin L on do n. Thre e ye ars late r, Ohno be ga n r e gula rl y participating in pra

yer me eting s, bible study , and wor ship at a bra nch of Saints of Glory i nTokyo. Part of the Churc h’s progr am in Tokyo was play ing f or worshipe rs there tape rec ording s of sermons g iven eve ry Sunday in California by Sa int s o f G lor

y ’s pr inc ipa l pa sto r, Ya suma
. Ohno lis te ne d to the tapes while attendingchurc h in Tokyo. Saints of Glory prea ched obe dience to J esus Christ a nd to Yasuma. Membe rs wer e re quired to tithe one-tenth of their incomes, which O hno did. 4
Ohno wa s o be die nt to Ya suma ’s a dv ic e and te a c hin g s in various ar eas of

her life . For

example, when Ohno learne d that her f ather was ter

minally ill, Yasuma “stated some thing
ne g ativ e a

bo ut [Ohn o] go ing to s e e he r f athe r, ” so Ohno did not return home to se e him befor e he die d and did not attend his funera l. L ater , afte r Ohno infor med Yasuma

that she had lost her job, the Church convinced Ohno to live with another “chur ch member in the same situation,” in what we infer f rom the re cord w as a Churc h-owne d or Church- aff iliated residenc e in Tokyo. Also, after Yasuma r epeatedly

made neg ative stateme nts about medications, Ohno cease d taking the anti-de pressa

nts and tranquilizers she had bee n presc ribed when she was diagnosed with depre ssion y ear s ea rlier. At Yasuma’ s instruction, O hno purcha sed Saints of Glory videos
an d b o o k s , wh i c h s h e b e g an w at c h i n g an d r e a d i n gr e p e at e d l y. Finally , the Church told Ohno not t o purcha se her ownO HNO V

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O hn o d i d no t co ntest o r see k re st i t uti o n o f t he se d o na t i o ns. 5 apar tment when she tr i ed t o do so, and admonished he r for
ne g oti atin ga

re du c tio n in

he r r e nt.
F oll ow inga ll the se e ve nts , a nd wh ile su ff

e ri ngfr om b oth depre ssion and g ener al ataxia (a la ck of muscle coordination du e to dama g e to the ne rv ou s sy ste m) , Ohno “ be c ame obsessed with a se nse of guilt that she had not o beyed Jesus Christ .”Af

te r Y a suma e nc oura g e d Ohn o to make “ g ivi ng s” in late 2001, Ohno g ave Yasuma and another churc h minist er eac h 800,000 Yen. Then, on J anuar y 2, 2002, Yasuma “ took 5
sever al hours to talk to [Ohno] , in a talk re fer red to a s ‘“Warning s” [or “R ep ri mands”], pressuringher to tithe’” (a lte ratio n in

or ig ina l) . A ft e r t

he ta lk, Ohno fe lt “ ov e rc ome with terror

and compe lled to tithe.” Over t h e s pan of two months, Ohno closed her s avings ac count and tra nsfer red 68,678,424 Yen to Saints of Glory , virtual l y all of Ohno’s assets at that time. A year afte r these tr ansfe rs (“ the Tra n s fer s”), Ohno w as told she would be “drive n out” of Saints of Glory beca use she

“ h a d n o tb e e no b e d i e ntt o J e s u s C hr i s t

. ” T h e f o l l o w i n gM ay, the Church order ed her to le ave the apar tment where she wa s living. On the advice of her psychiatrist, Ohno then r esumed takingmedications for

her depression. She also be g an participating in re ligious ser vices at a diffe rent c hurch.
Ohno eve ntually

came to believe that she had bee n de fr a ud e d b y the Churc h. She fi le d a

c omp la int

in 2 00 7 in Tokyo District Court, assertin g t o rt and unjust enric hment cl a im s a g a in s t Y a s uma , Sa ints o f G lo r y , an d tw o other individual defenda

nts not parties to the prese nt enforc ement acti o n
. The dispute ce ntere d on the circ umstances in whichO HNO V

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8
Ohno ha d tr ans fe rr e d th e ap pr oximate ly $5 00 ,0 00 to S a int s of Glory betwee n J anuar

y and March 2 0 02, leavingher essentially

destitute. Ohno contende d that the Transf ers took place as a r esult of the Church’ s “fr audulent and thr eate ning statements” to her

while she wa s in a vulnera ble mental and phy sical state. The Church argued that the c o n t ested Transf ers wer e faith-ba sed donations, and that Ohno s ought return of the money

beca use s h e n o longe r believe d in the Churc h’ s te a c hin g s. The litigation in J apan lasted over two year s and involved several heari ng s, va

ri ou s f ili ng s, and

a fu ll m e ri ts tri a l, i n wh ic h Y a suma

and Sa int s o f G lor

y a pp e are d thro ugh c ouns e l. Th e To kyo D istri c t Co ur

t’ s ju dgme nt h e ld Ya suma and Sa int s of Glory liable under J apane se C ivil Code article s 709, 719, and 7 1 5, for illeg ally

inducingOhno to tithe “in such a w ay as to incite anxiety

and ca use terr or to the Plaintiff who was alre ady in [ a] state of depr ession and wa s suffe ringfrom g ener al ataxia.” The Tokyo trial court c oncluded that Ohno’ s decision to g ive the Tra nsfer s “under

such psycholog ical condition” could not be sa id to have been m ade of her own fre e will, and aw arde d damag es, including r estitution of the 68,678, 424 Yen Ohno ha d g iven to Saints of Glory in the disputed Transf

ers; 3,000,000 Ye n for pa in and suffe ring ; and 7,200,000 Yen f

or attorney ’s fe es. The total a war d was 78,878,424 Yen ( $843,235.66).
As t o the grounds for the judgme nt, article 709 of the Japa ne se Civ il Co de , entit le d “D ama g e s in To rt s, ” pr ov ide s: “A pe rson who has intentional l y or neg lige ntly

infring e[d]
any ri ght o f o the rs , o r l e g a lly pr ote c te d inte re st o f o the rs , sh a ll b e lia

ble to c omp e ns ate any dama g e s r e su lti ngin conseque nce.” Minp ô [ C i v
. C.] art. 709. Ar ticle 719 pr ov ide s f

or joi nt a nd se ve ra l li a

bil ity of joi nt t ort fea so rs ,O HNO V

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Minp ô [C iv. C.] art. 719, and article 715 pr ovides for a n e mpl oye r’ s li a

bil ity fo r t he tor tio us a c tio ns of

its e mpl oye e s, Minp ô [C iv. C.] art. 715. The J apanese trial c ourt did not specify prec isely which right or leg ally protec ted intere st the Church infring ed; it sta ted only that the solicitation of d o nations from Ohno wa s illega l beca use it exceede d “the scope of what is socially

appropriate.”
De fe n d an t s ap p ea l edth e j u d gm en tt o t h e T o kyo Hi gh Court , whic h a ff

ir me d the low e r c ourt

de c isi on on a ll c ounts and dis mis se d th e a

pp e a l.
ii. The En forcem ent Ac tion in F ederal Court Ohno next brought an international diversity action in the United States District Court fo r t h e Centra l District of California, see king e nforc ement of the J apane se judg ment ag ainst Yasuma a

nd Saints of Glory

under Califor

nia’s Un i f o r mA c t , C a l

. C i v
. P r o c
. C o d e § § 1 7 1 3

– 1 7 2 4

. In opposition t o Ohno’s motion for summary judgme nt, the Church argued that the Religion Cl auses bar re cover y in tort for the conseque nces of protec ted religious spee ch, including threats of di vine re tribution, and prohibit a court fr om judging the va lid ity

of the Churc h’ s r e lig iou s te a c hin g s. Th e Japa ne se ju dgment , th e Churc h a

rgue d, wa s in c on sis te nt w iththe se pr inc ipl e s. Th e Churc h f ur the r as se rt e d th at th e Japa ne se jud g me nt i s n ot e nt it le d to re c ognit ion , b oth be c a us e it i s “repugnant” to public policy embodi ed in the Relig ion Clauses and because it “wa s obtained through proce dures not
c o mp at i b l e w i th th e r e qu i r e m e nt s o f d u e p r o c e s s o f l aw
. ” In the alter native, the Churc h reque sted that the mot i on for summary judgme nt be continued to permit additional dis c ov e ry re latin gto t

he Japa ne se pr oc e e din g s.O HNO V

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10

T h e di s t r i ct c ou r t a l s o hel d that t h e Ja pan es e j u dg men t w as n ot 6 in c o m p a tib le w ith d u e p ro c e ss o f l a w , b u t t h e C h u rc h ha s a b a n d o n e d it s d u e p ro c e ss a rg u m e n ts o n a p p e a l.

F or mer R ul e 5 6( f

) of t h e F e de r a l Ru l e s of

Ci v i l Pr oc e du r e be c a me 7 R ul e 5 6 (d) und er t he 2 0 1 0 A m end m ent s t o the Fed eral R ul es. B ecause t he d i st ri ct co urt de ci si o n, t he C hurch’ s b ri ef s t o t hi s co urt , and t he rel evant
cas e l aw i n t hi s ci r cui t al l r ef er t o t he f

orme r R ul e 56(f

) , t hi s opi ni on as well s o ref

ers t o t he rul e current l y co d i f i ed as R ul e 5 6 (d). The district c ourt grante d summary judgme nt in favor of Ohno and

e nte re d ju dgme nt j ointly and se ve ra lly

a g a ins t Yasuma a nd Saints of Glory , holding the J apane se judg ment n o tr e p u gn antt o th e R e l i g i o nC l a u s e s. It also denied the 6 Chur c h ’ s r e qu e s t f

o r a c o nti nu an c e un d e r F e d e r a l Ru le of Civil Procedur e 56(f

), citing the failure to identify with any 7 specific ity

the fa cts soug ht thr ough additional discovery and why the evidenc e to be ob t ai ned would pre clude summary judgme nt. This tim ely

appea l followed. On appe al, the Church c ontends that the district court wa s bo th c on sti tut ion a lly

a nd statut or ily

re qu ir e d to re fu se rec ognition of the J apane se judgm en t beca use the judgment burdens f ree exercise of relig ion in violation of the Religion Clauses. As to the constitutional issue, the Church maintains that enfor ceme nt in the United States of a f o reign-country jud g me nt t

hat w ou ld b e vio lativ e of the Re lig ion C lau se s if issued by a domestic court is itself an exercise of state powe r, direc tly subject to constitutional c onstraints. Statutorily , the Church argues that a fore ign- country judgme nt that impinges
on Am e ri c an c on sti tut ion a l ri ghts is n e c e ssa ri ly repu gna nt t o public policy , makingits recognition under Cali fornia’s Uniform Ac t an abuse of discre tion.O HNO V

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A s o f J une 2 0 1 3 , ninet een st at es have enacted t he 2 0 0 5 vers i o n of t he 8 U ni f orm Act , or s om e v er s i on t her eof , an d an a dd i t i onal t hr ee s t at es h a v e intro d u c e d b ill s p ro p o sin g it s e n a c tm e n t. S ee F o reig n -C o u n t ry M on ey Judg m ents R ecogn i t i on A ct , U n i f or m La w Commi s s i on , T he N at i onal C onf

er enc e of C om mi s s i oner s on U ni f orm St at e La w s, h ttp :// u n ifo rm la w s. o rg/ A ct

. aspx? t i t l e= Fo rei gn- C o unt ry M o ney J u d g m e n ts R eco gni t i o n A ct (l ast vi si t ed M ay 2 5 , 20 1 3 ). T h e earl i er vers i o n of t he B. The Unif

ormFo reign-Coun try M oney Judgme nts Rec ognition Act
In internatio nal diversity case s such as this one,

“ e nf or c e a bil ity of jud g me nts of c ourt s of oth e r c ountrie s is g ener all y governe d by

the law of

the state in which enfor ceme nt is sought.” Y ah oo ! In c . v . La LigueCont re le Racisme e t L’Antisemitisme , 4 3 3 F.3d 1199, 1212 ( 9th Cir. 2006) (e n banc) (per

curiam) (“ Y

ahoo! II ”) (plurality

opinion) ( ci t i n g Bank of Montreal v . Kough , 6 1 2 F

. 2 d 4 6 7 , 4 6 9–70 (9 th C ir . 1 98 0) ); see also id. at 1239–41 (F isher, J.,
concur ringin part and dis s entingin part). In California, the Uniform Ac t regulates enf orce ment of the Japanese damag es awa rd at iss ue her e. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1713–1724. The pre sent California f oreign judgme nt enforc ement s t atut e w as en ac t edi n2 0 0 7 t o re p l ac e th e U n i fo rmFo re i gn Money J udg ments Recognition Act, former ly codi fied at California Civil Procedure Code section s 1713–1713.8, and app lies to all recognition and enforc ement ac tions
c o mm e n c e d

o no r a f te r Janu ar y 1 , 2 0 0 8. See § 1724(a) ; see also Manco Contracting Co. (W .W .L.) v. Be

zdikian , 45 Cal.4th 192, 204 (2008). California’ s Act was modele d on the 20 05 Un if

or m F or e ign- Countr

y Mo ne y Judgme nts Recognition Act, 13 U.L .A. pt. I I , at 18–38 ( S up p
. 2011), draf ted by the National Confe renc e of Comm i s sioners on Un if or m State L aws
. See M

an co Contracting Co. , 4 5 Ca l. 8O HNO V

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12

U ni f o rm A ct , ap p roved i n 1 9 6 2 , was ad o p t ed by t wenty

- ni ne st at es pl us the D istric t o f C o lu m b ia a n d the V irg in I sla n d s. See Ced r i c C. Chao & C h ristine S . N e u h o ff

, E n fo rc e m e n t a n dR eco g n i t io n o f F o re ig n J

u d g m e n ts i n Uni t ed St at es C ou r ts : A P r act i calP ers pect i ve , 29 Pepp. L. Rev

. 147, 1 5 0 (20 0 1 ). T he st at e l aw versi o ns o f t he U ni f

o rm A ct do not vary s ubs t ant i al l y f

r om s t at e t o s t at e. T he mo r e s i gn i f i can t di s t i nct i on l i es bet ween t hos e s t at es t hat hav e a do pt ed s om e v er s i on of t he U ni f orm Act
a n d t h os e t h a t f

ol l ow a c om mo n l a w s t a n da r d s t e mmi n g f r om t h e S u pr e me C o urt ’ s d eci si o n i n H i l t on v

. G u yot , 1 5 9 U .S . 1 1 3 (1 8 9 5 ). See Cha o & N eu h of f , 29 Pepp. L. Rev

. a t 148.

S e c tio n 1 7 1 6 (b ) p ro v id e s in fu ll: 9

A cour t of

t hi s s t at e s hal l not r ecogn i ze a fo re ign -co u n try ju d g m e n t i f an y o f t h e fo llo w ing a p p ly: ( 1) T he j udgment was r ender ed un der a j udi ci al s y s t em t hat does not p r ovi de i mp ar t i al t r i bunal s or procedur es com pat i bl e wi t h t he r equi r ement s of due proces s of l aw. ( 2) T h e f or ei g n cou r t di d n ot h av e per s on al j u r i s di ct i on o ver t he d ef

end ant

. (3) T he f

o rei gn co urt d i d no t have juri sdi ct i o n ove r t he subject m at t er.
C al

. C i v. P roc. Co d e § 17 1 6 (b). 4th at 198 (desc ribingthe bac kground and p urpose of the Uniform Ac t); Lyustiger v. Lysustiger ( In re M arriage of Ly us tige r) , 177 Cal. App. 4th 1367, 1369–70 (200 9) (re countingthe history

of the Ac t in California).
California’s Uniform Act p ro v ides that the cour ts of California “ shall re co gnize a fore ign- country judgme nt” for
mon e y dam a g e s th at is fi na l, c on c lus ive , a nd e nf or c e a ble wher e re ndere d, except if one or m o re of the mandator

y grounds for non-re cognition enume rate d in § 1716(b), or dis c re tio na

ry gro un ds fo r n on -r e c ognit ion e nume ra te d in § 17 16 (c ), a

pp lie s. § 1 7 1 6 (a ). The only exception at issue 9O HNO V

. Y AS UMA 13

Sect i on 1 71 6(c) provi des t hat a c our t i s “ not r equi r ed t o re cogni ze a f o rei gn- co unt ry [mo ney] judgm ent i f ” a n y o f

t he f o l l o wi ng ni ne d i scr et i o nary ground s f o r no n- reco gni t i o n exi st s: (1) l ack o f noti ce t o t he def en dan t ; ( 2) f

r au d; ( 3) r epu g n an cy of t h e f or ei g n j u dg men t or ca u s e of act i o n t o pu b lic po l i cy; (4) confl i ct wi t h ano t her f i nal and co ncl usi ve judgm ent ; (5) co nt rari ness t o an agreem ent b et ween t he p art i es r egard i ng t h e r es ol u t i on of

di s pu t es ; ( 6) i n con v en i en ce of t h e f or ei g n forum ; ( 7) d o ub t s ab o ut t he i nt egri t y o f t he rende ri ng co urt ; (8) i nco m p at i b i l i t y o f t he judgm ent wi t h t he requir em ent s o f due pro cess of l aw; and (9) a r eco very un der def

amat i on l aw t hat provi des l es s prot ect i on f or f r eedom of

s peech
an d t he p ress than i s p ro vid ed un d er t he U .S. an d C ali f o rnia C o nsti t uti o ns. I d. in t his a pp e a l is § 17 16 (c )( 3) , whic h p ro vid e s th at a c ourt is “not re quired to rec ognize a fore ign- country judgme nt if . . . [t ]he j u d gm en tor the c ause of action or c laim for re lief on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of [California] or of the United States.” § 1716( c)( 3).
Under the Uniform Act, the party seekingenfor ceme nt of a for eign judgment bear s the initial burden of e stablishing that the judg ment falls within the scope of the Act. § 1715(c)

. The parties here do not dispute that the J apane s e j u d gm ent c on fo rm s to the thr e sh old re qu ir e me nts fo r r e c ognitio n: i t grants re cover

y of a sum of money , as required by § 1715(a) (1); it is final, conclusive and enfor cea ble in J apan, under § 1715(a) (2); and it is not a judg ment for taxes, a fine
or oth e r p e na lty , o r a

jud g me nt i n c onne c tio n w ithdo mes tic relations, barre d from re cognition under § 1715(b).
Once cover ag e under the Uniform Ac t is established, the pr e sumpt ion

in f avo r o f e nf

or c e me nt a

ppli es, and

the pa rt y resistingrec ognition of a fore ign- country judgme nt “has the burden of establishing that a ground for nonr ecognition st ated in su bd ivi sio n [§ 17 16 ](b ) or (c ) e xists .” § 1 71 6( d) ; se eals oO HNO V

. Y AS UMA

14

T he onl y N i nt h Ci r cui t ca s e t hat i nv ol ved s om ewh at s i mi l ar i s s ues 10
c o n c e rn e d a d e c la ra to ry j u d g m e n t ac tio n se e k ing to b a r e n fo rc e m e n t o f a French i nj un ct i on

— not a money j udgment

— r equi r i ng an Am er i can co m p any, Y aho o ! , t o res t ri ct French users’ a c cess t o cert ai n onli ne m a te ria l o n the b a sis o f i ts c o n te n t. Ya h o o ! I I , 43 3 F. 3d 11 99

. T he di s t r i ct
co urt had he l d t ha t en f o rce m en t o f

the o rd er w o uld vio l ate the F i rst A m e n d m e n t. Yah oo ! , I nc. v. La Li gu e Co nt r e Le R a cis m e e t L ’ An t i s e mi t i s me , 169 F. Su pp. 2d 1181, 1 1 92–93 ( N

. D

. Cal

. 2001) (“ Ya h o o ! I

” ), rev’d en banc on ot hergr ounds , 43 3 F

. 3 d 11 9 9 (9t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) (p e r c u ria m ). U n like h e re , h o w e v e r, n o a ttem p t ha d b e e n m a d e to
e n fo rc e the F re n c h ju d g m e n t i n the U n ited S ta te s. O n a p p e a l, a m a jo rity of t h e en ba n c pan el a g r ee d t h at t h e ca s e s h ou l d be di s mi s s ed, f or l ac k of
r i pen es s or l ac k of

pe r s on al j u r i s di ct i on , a n d s o di d n ot r ea ch t h e mer i t s of
an y co nsti t uti o na l o r rep ug na nc y qu esti o ns. Ya h o o ! I I , 433 F. 3d a t 1224. Uniform F oreign-Country Money J udg ments Recognition Act, 13 U.L .A. pt. I I , at 19 (Supp . 2011) (Pre fatory Note). T h e r ep u gn an cy

gro un d fo r n o n -r ec o gn i t i o no f f o re i gn judgme nts is theref

ore a n aff irmative def

ense. See§ 1716(d). This statutorily

specified b u rden a

pplies equally

wher e, as here , the ground of r epugnancy is an asser

ted violat i on of fede ral c onstitut ional norms. See, e .g. , Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder, Inc ., 489 F.3d 474, 477–78 ( 2d Cir. 2007). Thus, the Church ha s the burde n of establishingthe grounds it h a s r a ise d f

or no n- re c ognit ion

of the jud g me nt.
II. DI SCU SSIO N
Th is c a se pr e se nts qu e sti on s o f f ir st i mpr e ssi on

in t his circ uit, relatingto the enfor cemen t o f a f oreign-country mon e y jud g me nt c ha lle ng e d o n const itutio na l gro un ds

. 10 Specifica lly , we must consider the constitutional impl ications of e nf or c ingsu c h a

jud g me nt i f t

he Re lig ion

Cla us e s w ou ld ba r a c ourt in t he Un ite d St ate s f

ro m re nd e ri ngthe same judgme nt in the first instance. Also at i s s u e i s whether a fore ign- country

money judgme nt that might be inconsistentO HNO V

. Y AS UMA 15

U nd er t he U ni f

o rm A ct , § 1 7 1 6 (c), a c o urt that de t erm i nes a f o rei gn- 11
c o u n try m o n e y ju d g m e n t o r th e c a u se o f a c tio n o n w h ic h the ju d g m e n t i s b ased t o be repugnant t o pub l i c p o l i cy i s “not requi red” t o recognize t he judgm ent , but— i m p l i ed l y

— m ay d o s o a t it s d i scr et i o n. C o nvers el y , if t he Jap anese judgm ent i s no t r e p u g n a nt t o pub l i c p o l i cy, t hen, ba rr i ng any o t he r gro un d f

o r no n-rec o gn i t i o n, t he d i st ric t c o urt wa s r equi r ed to
e n fo rc e it

.
T h e f r ee s pee ch pr ov i s i on s i n Ar t i cl e I of t h e Cal i f

or n i a Cons t i t u t i on 12 d o n o t a lw a ys tur n o n sta te a c tio n
. See Ral phs G r oce r

y Co. v

. Uni t ed Food & C o m m e rc ia l W

o rk e rs U n io n L o c a l 8 , 55 Cal

. 4t h 1083, 1093–94 with the Fe dera l Constitution or a state c onstitut ion if issued by a dom es t ic cour

t is repugnant to public policy and the re fo re c an b e de nie d en fo rc e me nt und e r the Un if or m A c t. 11
As we e x plain b el o w, we do not r eac h the question of wh e the r a

do me sti c tor

t ju dgme nt p ara lle l to the Japa ne se judgme nt would have been unconstitutional under the Religion Clauses had Ohno’s sui t been br ought here . Instead,
we c onclude: first, that e nforc ement o f this foreign-country mon e y jud g me nt b y

a do me sti c c ourt

do es no t c on sti tut e domestic st at e action trigg eringconstitutional scrutiny ; and, second, that neither the judgment at issue i n t h is particular
c a se no r t

he c a us e of a c tio n o n whic h it

is b a se d is so repugnant to public policy as t o qualify for non- enfor ceme nt un de r t he Un if or m A c t.
A. Constitutional Ch allenge
The Churc h’s direc t constituti onal cha lleng e turns on whether the district court’s e nforc ement of the damag es awa rd iss ue d b y

a fo re ign s ov e re ign amou

nte d t o dome sti c g overnme ntal action subj ect to the constraints of the Relig ion Cla us e s. 12O HNO V

. Y AS UMA

16

(2 0 1 2 ); Fa s h i o n Va l l e

y M a l l, L L C v

. NL RB , 42 Cal

. 4t h 850, 858, 870 (2 0 0 7 ); R o b i n s v. P ru n ey a rdS h o p p i n g C t r. , 2 3 C al

. 3 d 8 9 9 , 91 0 (19 7 9 ),
a f f ’d , 4 4 7 U .S. 7 4 (1 9 8 0 ). L i ke t he F i rst A m en d m en t F ree E xe rcise C l ause, how ever, t he f ree exerci se cl ause i n A rt i cl e I, s ect i o n 4 o f t he C al i f orn i a Co ns t i t ut i on p ro t ect s ag ai ns t onl y gove r nment al ac t i on t hat b u rd e n s re ligio u s fre e d o m
. See C at ho l i c C ha r i t i es o f S acr am ent o, I

nc. v. S u p erio r C o u rt , 3 2 C a l. 4 th 5 2 7 , 5 6 1 (2 0 0 4 ); Ver non v

. Ci t y of Los A ng el es , 27 F.3d 13 8 5 , 13 9 2

– 9 3 (9t h C i r. 19 9 4 ). O ur d i scus si o n t heref o re appl i es t o bot h t h e Fe der al a n d St at e Cons t i t u t i on s
. W e con cent rat e on f ed eral s t at e act i o n prece d en t s b ut do s o wi t h t he und ers t and i ng t hat t he
s ame s t at e a ct i on pri nci pl es appl y un de r the C al i f orn i a Co ns t i t ut i on as w e ll. A s w e c o n c lud e tha t t h e re w a s n o s ta te a c tio n su b je c t t o co nst i t ut i o nal s c ru ti ny , we need not d eci d e whet her t he C al i f o rni a and f ed era l f ree ex erc i se c l au ses are o t he rw i se c o t erm i no us. Rec ognizing and enforcing a for eign-country money jud g me nt i s d ist inc t f

ro m rendering that judgme nt in the fi rs t instance. The district court, in g iving e ffe ct to the judg ment issued in Japan, has not participate d in the action the Churc h claims is unconstituti onal—namely , judgingthe truth or falsity of the Churc h’s re ligious teac hings or imposing liability for the c onsequenc es of r elig ious ex pression. In the absenc e of suc h participation, we conc lude the district cour t’s rec ognition and e nforc ement of the J apane se dama g es aw ard in this ca se does not tr ansfor m the underlying f

oreign court’s rulinginto domestic “state ac tion” subject to constitutional
s c r ut i ny.
i. State Ac tion “[M] ost rights sec ured by the C o n s tituti on are protec ted only ag ainst infring ement by g ov ern m ents ,” so that “the conduct a lleg edly

causingthe deprivation of a fe dera l rig ht [must] be fa irly

attributable to the State.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. , 457 U.S. 922, 936–37 (1 9 82) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). I f the a ction challeng ed here is notO HNO V

. Y AS UMA 17

so attributable, then ther e is no “state action” and no violation of the Re lig ion

Cla us e s.
For eign g overnme nts, like the g overnme nt of J apan, a re not bound by

the U.S. or California Constitutions. “ [ O] ur n o t i o n s o f du e pr o ce s s , ” fo r ex amp l e, d o n o tap p l y “t o fo re i gn court proc eeding s ag ainst America n citizens who have committed foreign crimes outsi de the United States.” United States v. Ge cas , 120 F.3d 141 9 , 1 4 3 0 (11th Cir. 1997) (e n b an c) (c i t i n g Neely v . Henk el , 1 80 U. S. 1 09 , 1 23 (1 90 1) ); see also United States v. Ant , 8 8 2 F. 2 d1389, 1395 n.8 (9th Cir. 19 89 ) (“ ‘N e ith e r the F ourt h n or the F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nts ar e d i re ct eda tM ex i cano ff i ci al s
. . . . ’” ) ( qu o t i n g Brulay v. United States , 3 83 F .2 d 3 45 , 3 48 (9t h Cir. 19 67 )) ; United States v. Pete rson , 8 12 F .2 d 4 86 , 4 90 (9 th C ir . 1 98 7) ; United Sta te s v . R os e , 5 70 F .2 d 1 35 8, 13 61 –6 2 ( 9th Cir . 1 97 8) ; Flynn
v . S hu ltz , 7 4 8 F

. 2 d

1 1 8 6 , 1 1 9 7 ( 7 thC i r
. 1 9 8 4 ) ( “ O b v i o u s l y, the Mexican g overnme nt is not bound by the require ments of
our Constitution e ven when prosec uting a United S t ates citizen . . . .”). In particula r, “[i] t is, of course , a c omm on pla c e that th e [F ir st Ame ndme nt] is a gua ra nte e on ly
a g a ins t a br idgme nt b y

g ov e rnme nt, federal or s tate. ” Hudgens v . NLRB , 4 24 U. S

. 50 7, 51 3 ( 19 76 ) ( e mph a sis added)

. As for eign -c ountr

y c ourt or de rs , li ke do me sti c c ontr a c ts betwee n private pa

rties, ar e not, without more, subject to the constraints of our

constitutional law, neither the la ws of Japan
no r t he de c isi on s o f i ts c ourt s consti tut e do me sti c “ state a c tio n” fo r t

he purp os e s o f a con sti tut ion a l c la im i n th is country

. The succ ess of the Churc h’s direc t constituti onal
argume nts the re fo re de pe nd s upo n sho wi ng that, thr ou gh it s e nfo rcem e nt b y

a do me sti c c ourt , th e jud g me nt i ssu e d inO HNO V

. Y AS UMA

18 Japa n b e c ome s a c tio n o f t

he g ov e rnme nt, and

so su bje c t to c o n s t i tut i o n a l s c r

ut i ny.
Dec isions of a domestic court in the United States do
c o n s t i tut e g o v e r

nm e nt a l a c t i o n
. S t at e a c t i o n “ r e f e r s to exertions of state power in all forms ,” Shelley v . Kraemer , 33 4 U .S. 1, 20 (1 94 8) (e mph a sis a dd e d) , s o th at “ [s]tate action, for

purposes of the [ Constitution] , may emanate from ruling s of administrative and r egulat o ry agenc ies as we ll as from leg islative or judicial action ,” Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Ir v is , 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) (emphasis added) . Thus, “the action of sta t e courts and of judicial offic ers in their of ficial
c a pa c iti e s [ha s lo ngbe e n] r e g ard e d a s a c tio n of the State within the meaning of the Four teenth Amendme nt,” Shelley , 33 4 U .S. at 14 , a

nd so , to o, ha s th e a c tio n o f f e de ra l c ourt s, see Gathright v. City of Portl and, 4 39 F .3 d 5 73 , 5 76 n. 2 ( 9th Cir . 2 00 6) ; cf. Hurd v. H

odge , 334 U.S. 24, 31–36 (1948).
So the re is n o d ou

bt t hat th e dis tr ic t cour

t’ s d e c isi on

in this case applying California’s Uniform Act—leg islation that is i tse lf the re su lt o f g ov e rnme nta l a c tio n— c on sti tut e s st ate a c tio n f or purp os e s o f co ns tit

uti on a l sc rutiny . B ut t

hat tr uis m does not resolve our

question, which is: Should t he substance of the un de rl yingJapa

ne se mon e tary

dama g e s judgment,
re su lti ngfr om a laws uit in Japa n be tw e e n two pr ivate pa

rt ie s, be asc ribed to the district cour t’s enfor ce m ent of the jud g me nt un de r t

he Un if or m A c t and

so su bje c te d to constituti o n al s crutiny ? “Prec isely when . . . judicial involvement i n private litig ation assumes constitutional dimensions is a problem that has per plexed court s and scholars for deca des.” Da hl v . A k in , 630 F .2 d 2 77 , 2 80 (5 th Cir . 1 98 0) . G ive n th e pa ra lle lis m, f

or c on st it uti on a l st ate action purpose s, betwee n p rivate dome stic action and the
a c tio ns of

fo re ign g ov ernme nts , e sse nti a lly the sameO HNO V

. Y AS UMA 19

p er p l ex i t i es ar i s e w i t hre gar d t o th e e n fo rc em en to f f

o re i gn jud g me nts re su lti ngfr om l iti g atio n a br oa d. We t

he re fo re re ly
on bo th c onte xts in

our a na ly sis

.

a.
We b e g in o ur ana ly sis wi th g e ne ra l st ate a c tio n p re c e pts : A t b o tt o m, th e s tate a c ti o n r e qu ir e me nt s e r v e s to “av o id [] imp os ing on

the State , it s a g e nc ie s o r o ff ic ia ls, re sp on sib ili ty for c onduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.” Lugar , 457 U.S. at 936 . Consist ent with this approac h,

“ c on sti tut ion a l st and ard s are inv ok e d o nly wh e n it c an be sa id that th e State is re

sp on sib lefor the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Blum v. Y aretsky , 4 5 7 U. S. 991, 1004 (1982). Lugar , a ca se c on c e rn ing a pr ivate c re dit or ’s us e of state courts to ef

fec tuate a pr ejudgment attach m en t , set forth a broadly applicable two-prongframework f or analy zing when g overnme ntal involvement in private action is itself sufficie nt in char acte r and impac t that the g overnme n t fa irly can be viewed a s responsible for the har m of which the pla intiff complains. 457 U.S. at 937–42. The f irst prongasks whethe r the claimed c onstitut ional depriva tion resul t ed from “the exercise of some right or privil eg e cr eate d by the State or by
a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a p er s o nfor whom the State is r esponsible.” Id. at 937. The se cond prong deter mines whether

the par ty charg ed with the de p rivation could be de scribed in a ll fairness a s a state a ctor. Id. Do me sti c jud ic ia l e nf

or c e me nt o f t

he Japa ne se judgme nt i n this case satisfies neither pr ongof the Lugar framework. As to the first prong , th e Church doe s not challeng e the constituti o n al ity

of the Unifor

m Act, fa cially

or as a pplied.O HNO V

. Y AS UMA

20
Instead, it cha lleng es the c onstitut ionality of the Japanese tort judgme nt Ohno seeks to e nforc e under the Uniform Ac t. As the so ur c e of

the a lle g e d c on sti tut ion a l ha rm is thu s Jap ane se tor t la w, c reat ed b y

and e nf or c e d thro ugh Jap ane se g overnme ntal entities, the claimed c onstitut ional deprivation
c ann o t b e tr a c e d

to a r igh t, p r iv il e g e , o r

r u le o f conduct impos ed by

a do me sti c g ov e rnme nta l e nti ty or ind ivi du a l. See id. The Church disagree s, relying on Paul v. W atchtower Bible &Tract Society of New Y ork, Inc

. , 8 19 F .2 d 8 75 (9 th Cir. 1987). Paul held that the application of Washington tort law t o e sta

bl is h dama g e s li a

bil ity fo r a c tio ns take n in fu rt he ra nc e of re lig iou s bel ie fs c on sti tut e s an exe rc ise of state power , subject to constitutional scrutiny

. Id. at 880–81. The Church’s r eliance on Paul is mispl ace d.

F ir st, the dis tr ic t c ourt

he re did not app ly

tor t la w; it
a pp lie d Ca lif

or nia ’s Un if or m A c t, a nd did no t r e -t ry the fa c ts of the case or re- assess the Church’s liability for any i n j u ry alleg ed. Second, e ven if it could be s ai d t hat the district
c ourt ’s re c ognit ion

of the Japa

ne se dama g e s aw ard

is tanta mou nt t o d ir e c tly imp os inglia bil ity in t he fi rs t instance—a

proposition that we do not endorse—the tort law applied in this case is the la w of J apan, not of C alifornia. A s s u ch , t he c on te nt of

the la w i s n ot a ttributa ble to a do me sti c state ac tor, and so its application to the Church’s c halleng ed conduct ( all of which was conduct that took place in J apan or wa s sp e c if

ic a lly dir e c te d at O hn o in

Japa n) is no t an e xer c ise of do me sti c state po we r. Th e same log ic a pp lie s to pr ivate tort suits i nitiated in the Unit ed S tates: A tort ac tion between pr ivate pa

rt ie s d oe s n ot i nv olv e state a c ti on sim ply be c a us e the c ourt in whic h th e c a se is p ur su e d is an o rg an o f t he state or fe dera l gove rnment. Rather , a private t ort ac tion init iatedO HNO V

. Y AS UMA 21

in the United States may involve g overnme ntal action subjec t to constituti onal constraints whe re it is domestic substantive law that allows re cover y
. S e e Ne w Yor

k Ti mes Co. v. Sullivan , 376 U.S. 254, 277–78 (1964).
Paul applied an a

naly sis s i m i lar to that in Ne w York Times , explaining that it was bec ause tort liabi l i t y stemmed fr om sta tesu bs tan tiv elaw that it s imp os iti on c on sti tut e d s tate act i o n trig g eringconstitutional scrutiny

. Paul , 819 F.2d at 880. Ex pounding in Paul , we c larified that reg ardle ss of the form an Americ an state’s tort law take s—“whe ther statutory or common l aw”—it relies on the power of state g overnme nt to regulate conduc t. Id. (c i t i n g New Y ork Times , 376 U.S. at 265). It is for that reason—a nd not simpl y

beca use of judicial inv olv e me nt—

that “ the a

pp lic atio n o f [d ome sti c ] tor t law t o activities of a c hurch or

its adhere nts in t h ei r fur

thera nce of their re ligious belief

is an exercise of

state power.” Id. Simi larly , Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. he ldthat a state court’s a pplication of the common law doctrine of promissory estoppel to enfor ce a

newspa per’ s confide ntiality

agree ment was subjec t to constitut ional scrutiny , as an “application of state rules of

law.” 501 U .S. 663, 668 (1991).

In short, only the tort law of J apan, a nd not the law of a

ny state or the fe de ra l g ov e rnme nt, underl ay the Japa

ne se jud g me nt. Th e fi rs t Lugar p r o n gth e r e f

o r e d o e s n o ta

p p l y.
Ev en i f enforce ment of the Japanese judgme nt satisfied the first prongof the Lugar fra mework, it would fail the second. Her e, “the party charg ed with the deprivation” is not “a pe rson who may

fairly be said to be a

state a ctor,” where

“ state a c tor ” me ans a

n a c tor forwh om a

do me sti c g overnme ntal entity

is in some sense re sponsible. Lugar , 457 U.S. at 937. Although the J apane se cour ts are org ans of theO HNO V

. Y AS UMA

22

T hese t wo t est s l argel y s ub sume t he st at e c o m p u l si o n and 13 go vernm ent al nexus t est s, be cause t hey ad d res s t he d egre e t o whi ch t he
s t at e i s i n t er t wi n ed wi t h t h e pr i v at e ac t or or a ct i on
. T h e s t at e compu l s i on t es t requi r es a s howi ng t hat “ t he s t at e h as ‘ exe r ci s ed coer ci ve po wer or has p rovided s uch si gni f

i cant enco uragem ent , ei t her o vert o r covert , t hat t he [p riv a te a c to r’s] c h o ic e m u st in la w b e d e e m e d to b e tha t o f t h e S ta te .’” John s on v. Kn ow l es , 1 1 3 F .3 d 1 1 1 4 , 1 1 1 9 (9 th C ir . 1 9 9 7 ) (a lter a tio n in
o ri gi nal ) ( q uo t i ng Yaret s ky , 4 57 U

. S. at 1 00 4). “U nder t he gover nment al
ne xu s t est, a p rivate p arty ac t s und er c o l o r o f s ta te law i f ‘ t he re is a suf f i ci ent l y cl o se nexus be t ween t he Stat e and t he chal l enged act i o n of t he
r egu l at ed en t i t y s o t hat t he act i on of t he l at t er may be f ai r l y t r eat ed as t hat of t he St at e i t s el f

. ’ ” L o p ez v

. D ep ’t o

f H ea l t h S erv s. , 93 9 F. 2d 881, 883 (9th C i r. 1 9 9 1 ) (per curi am ) ( q uo t i ng Jac ks on v

. M et r o. Edi s on Co. , 419 U .S . 3 4 5 , 3 5 1 (1 9 7 4 )) . F o r sim p licity, we re fer o n ly t o the “p u b lic f unct i o n” and “

joint act i o n” t est s, but i nt end t hereb y t o i nco rpo rat e al l f o ur t es t s
. Ac c o r d i n g l y , o u r c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Oh n o i s n o t a s t a t e ac t or f or cons t i t ut i onal pur po s es en com pas s es al l f our s t at e act i on t es t s ar t i cul at ed b y the S u p re m e C o u rt. State of Japa n, the y are no t org ans of

the fe de ra l or

Ca lif or nia g overnme nt. And whil e t h e J apane se cour ts surely perf orm a pu bli c fu nc tio n in Japa n, the y we re no t com pel led to
c on c lud e a s th e y

did by Am e ri c an la

w, or a ide d in the ir decision by

the par ticip ation of an America

n g overnme ntal
a c t o r o r e nt i ty.
Nor c an Ohno, in bring ing a n enfor cement suit under Ca lifornia’s Unif

orm Act, be likened to a state actor . “‘The Supreme Court h as articulated four te sts for deter mining whether a [non -g ov e rnme nta l pe rs on ’s ] ac tio ns amou nt t o state ac tion: (1) the public func tion test; (2) th e joint action test; (3) the state c ompulsion t est ; an d (4) the g overnme ntal nexus t est.’” Tsao v. Desert Palace , Inc. , 698 F.3d 1128, 1 1 4 0 (9 thC i r. 2 0 1 2 ) ( qu o t i n g Franklin v. Fox , 312 F.3d 423, 44 4–45 (9 th C ir . 2 00 2) ). Mo st r e le va nt h e re are the “ pu

bli c fu nc tio n” and

“ joi nt a c tio n” te sts : Th e fo rm e r t re ats p ri vate 13O HNO V

. Y AS UMA 23

a c tor s a s st ate a c tor s whe n th e y pe rform a ta sk

or e xer c ise power s traditionally

rese rved to the g overnme nt. See, e .g. , Jack son v. Me tro. Edis o n Co. , 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974); Terry v. Adam s , 3 45 U. S. 4 61 , 469– 70 (1 95 3) ; Marsh v. Alabama , 326 U.S. 501, 507–08 (1946). The latter foc uses on

“ ‘whe the r s tate of

fi c ials and

pr ivate pa

rt ie s h ave a c te d in
conce rt in eff

ecting a par

ticular de privation of constitutional rights.’” Tsao , 6 9 8 F. 3 d at1 1 4 0 (qu o t i n g Fran k lin , 312 F.3d
at 44 5)

. “ Joint

a c tio n” e xists wh e re the g ov e rnme nt a ff ir ms, au th o ri z es , en co ura ges , o r f ac i l i t at es un co n s t itutional conduct through its invol vement with a private par ty , see, e .g. , Lugar , 45 7 U .S. at 94 1; Flagg Bros. v. Brooks , 436 U.S

. 1 4 9, 157, 164–65 (1978); Sniadach v. Fam ily Fin. Corp. of Bay View , 39 5 U .S. 33 7 ( 19 69 ); Shelley , 334 U.S. 1, or o t h erwi se has “so fa r i n s i n uated itself into a position of interde pendenc e with [ the non-g overnme ntal party] that it must be r ecognized as a joi n t p articipant in the challeng ed ac tivity ,” Tsao , 698 F.3d at 1140 (internal quotation mar ks omitt ed).
Ohno’s use of

California’s Uniform Act a s a li tiga nt does
no t ma ke he r a state a c tor

thr ou gh the p ub lic fu

nc tio n te st. Although the court a ssuredly perf orms a pu b lic purpose, a private individual see king a re m ed y from a c ourt is seeking g a in fo r him or he rs e lf

, a pure ly pr ivate act . “[M]er e ly
resor ting to the c ourts and being o nthe winningside of a lawsui t d o es notmake a

party a co- conspirator

. . . with the judge .” Dennis v. Spark

s , 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980).
Nor does Ohno’s invocation of the Unifor m Act conve rt the under lying Japane se judg ment into the joint action of Ohno and the State of California or the district court. Ag ain, although California’s Uniform Act c reat es the leg al framework that may entitle the holder of a qualifying f oreigncountry money judgme nt to rec o gn i tion and enfor ceme nt ofO HNO V

. Y AS UMA

24 that judgme nt in the courts, the Unifor m A ct is not the sour ce of the subst an t i ve leg al rights underlying the judgme nt enfor ced.
To be sure , the district court’s e nforc ement orde r f a c il it ate s O hn o ’ s e f

f o rts to r e c o v e r in th e Un it e d St ates the sum of money

awa rded by the J apane se cour

t. But the district court, through its implementation o f the proc edure s established by

the Uniform Act , cannot be said to provide “significant assistance ” to the underlying acts that the Churc h
c onte nd s c on sti tut e d th e c ore vio latio n o f i ts F ir st Amendment rights—namely , judicial scrutiny of the c ontent of its relig ious b el i ef

s and imposition of liabili ty for the conseque nces of

its religious e x p ression. California la w requires a c o urtt o re co gn i z e afi n a l , co n cl u s i v e f o re i gn monetary awa rd that is enfor cea

ble wher e re ndere d, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1716(a) , without inquiry into the merits of the
un de rl yingjud g me nt, on c e the c ourt de te rm ine s th at th e re is no ground for

nonrec ognition under § 17 1 6 (b) or (c) of the Uniform Act. The court’s mandatory indiffer ence t o the underlying me rits of the judg ment Ohno is seekingto enforc e ref utes any char acte rization by the Church o f O h n o’s enfor ceme nt effor

t as a joint ac t i on with California or the fede ral judiciar

y as t o the aspe cts of the Japanese judgme nt a lle g e d to c omp ro mis e the Churc h’ s r e lig iou s f re e do m.
No ta b l y , th e c a s e s i n wh i c h th e S u p r e m e C o urt h a s h e ld that private us e of

state -c re ate d p ro c e dure s amou nts to state action have , by

and larg e, conc erne d due proc ess cha lleng es to t he state pr oc e dure s the mse lve s or the ir a pp lic atio n. Th os e case s have not a ddresse d constitutional challeng es t o the underlying c auses of

action that prompted the nong overnme ntal party ’s re course to the state enf orce ment proce dures. See, e .g. , Tulsa Prof’l Co l lection Serv s., Inc. v

.O HNO V

. Y AS UMA 25

In Edm on son v

. Le es vi l l e Concr et e Co. , 50 0 U

. S. 61 4 (19 9 1 ), t he 14 C our t ca me cl ose r t han i n t he r un o f c ase s t o i mp ut i ng t he s ubs t anc e b eh i n d a pr i v at e par t y ’ s u s e of a s t at e pr oce du r e— t h at of pe r em p t o ry c h a llen g e s to strik e p ro sp e c tive ju ro rs fro m a ve n ire

— to the sta te it s e lf. B u t un like sta tuto ry sc h e m e s su c h a s the U n ifo rm A c t, w h ic h e x ist t o ser ve p ri vat e p u rp o ses , t he ent i re ende avo r at i ss ue i n Edm ons on s er ves g o ve r nm ent alpu r pos es

— n ame l y , c on du ct i n g a c i v i l t r i al

. T h rough p e re m p to ry c h a llen g e s, th e s ta te e sse n tially d e le g a te s to p riv a te p a rtie s in
a c ivil trial p a rt o f t h e p u b li c fun c tio n o f sele c ting a ju ry. See i d. at 621–24. Pope , 4 85 U. S. 4 78 (1 98 8) ; Lugar , 4 57 U. S. 9 22 ; Sniadach , 395 U.S. 337. F o r

e xamp le , in S

n iadach , the petitioner 14 challeng ed the pr ocee dings by which her

wag es we re g arni shed , a

rguin gthat th e y

vio late d d

ue pr oc e ss. 39 5 U .S. at 339–40. She did not contend that the underl y ing contra ctual debt could not ultimately be judicially en fo rce d be c a us e the re wa s so me a sp e c t of the c ontr a c t th at, i f
ma nd a te d by the g ov e rn m e n t , w o u l d c o n s t i t ute unconstitutio n al state ac tion. Id. Her e, in contra st, the Church’s challeng e is not to the proce dures use d to enforc e the under lying Japane se judg ment in f eder al court but to the substanti v e r igh ts an d

d e f e n s e s th at g av e r is e to that judgme nt—whi ch , for pr esent purpose s, is analog ous to a private c ontrac t or debt, bec ause n o tattributable to any do me sti c state a c tio n o r s tate a c tor s.
As to a fi na l jo int

a c tio n c on sid e ratio n, it c ann ot be sa id that the fede ral or California g overnme nt in an y m eaningf

ul
wa y a c c e p t s b e n e f

i t s d e r i v e df

r o m t h e a l l e g e dly unconstitutional actions. See F lorer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuy im, N.A ., 63 9 F .3 d 9 16 , 9 26 (9 th Cir . 2 01 1) . At mo st, the Un ite d St ate s ma

y g a in s ome dip lo mat ic be ne fi t whe n it
re co gn i z es fo re i gn -c o untry j u d gm en t s , m an i fe s t edth r o u gh inc r e a s e d r e c i p r o c i ty

i nth e tr e atm e nto f

U

. S

. j u d g m e ntsO HNO V

. Y AS UMA

26
abroa d. But this b en efit is, once a g ain, independe nt of the
c onte nt o f the jud g me nts re c ognize d and so c ann ot b e sa id t o in c o r p o r ate th e a ll e g e d ly

un c o n s ti tuti o n a l a c ts un d e r lying the m.
In sum, neither the Unif

orm Act nor the district court’s
c ha lle ng e d e nf

or c e me nt a

t O hn o’ s b e hestof

the Japa ne se money judgme nt meets the standar ds for state a ctio n , under th e c o ntro l l i n g Lugar f r ame w o r k , w it h r e g ar d to the substance of

the J apane se judicial dec ision. Both the Act a nd the c ourt ’s involve me nt i n im ple me nti ngit a

re a ssu re dly g overnme ntal actions. B ut the purposely limit ed n at ure of that invo lve me nt u

nd e rm ine s th e attributio n to do me sti c g overnme ntal actor s of re sponsibili ty for the Japane se cour

t’s de te rm inatio n th at th e Churc h c omm itt e d a to rt by un fa ir ly i n d u c i n gO hn o t o tr an s f

e r a l l o f h e r m o n e y t o S a i nt s o f

G l o r y, and so is l ia ble to h e r f

or dama g e s.
b.
Consideration of the seminal civil ri gh t s case, Shelley v

. Kraemer , 33 4 U. S. 1, do e s no t a lte r our mod e of ana ly sis under the g ener ally

applicable Lugar fr ame wo rk or le a d u s to conclude otherwise. S h e lle y established that judicial enfor ceme nt of a leg al right or obl igation whose source is not domes t i c gover

nmental ac tion can constitute state ac tion trig g eringconstitutional scrutiny

. See id. at2 0

. S p e c i f i c a l l y, Shelley he ld t

hat a state c ourt ’s e nf

or c e me nt of

ra c ia lly
re stric tiv e ho us ingc ov e na nts e nte re d into b e tw e e n p ri vate land owner s amounts to state action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id

. The Court vi ewe d the interposition of judicial coer cive powe r to en forc e ra cially discriminatory private a gree ments as g ov ern m ental discrimination on the basis of ra ce. Id. at 20 –2 1; se eals o Barrows v. Jack son , 346O HNO V

. Y AS UMA 27

Look i n g f

or pr ec ede n t s a ppl y i ng S h ell ey in the c o n te x t o f d o m e stic 15 enf o rcem ent of f

o reign judgm ent s y i el d s f ew hel p f ul aut ho ri t i es. T he Yahoo! dis t ri ct co urt , rel y i ng on Sh el l ey ’ s r eas oni ng , r ef us ed t o enf

orce a fo re ign ju d g m e n t o n F irst A m e n d m e n t g ro u n d s, h o ld ing th a t d o m e stic ju d ic ia l en fo rc e m e n t o f a fo re ign ju d g m e n t co n stitute s sta te a c tio n w ith
re g a rd to the u n d e rlying fo re ign o rd e r, fo r c o n stitutio n a l p u rp o se s. Yahoo! I , 1 6 9 F . S u p p . 2 d a t 1 1 8 9 , rev’d on ot hergr ounds , Ya h o o ! I I , 433 F. 3d 1 1 9 9

. Ya h o o ! I

co ncerned a French i nj unct i on tha t i m p o se d vie w p o intb a se d r e stric tio n s o n s p e e c h . A s w e d isc u ss la te r, s ee P a rts II .A .i. c , II.B .ii , t he st at e act i o n co nsi d erat i o ns wi t h res p ect t o enf o rcem ent of a f

o rei gn i nj un cti o n di f

f er f r om t hos e t hat ar i s e wi t h r es pect t o enf orce ment of

an o rd e r to p a y a su m o f m o n e y.
O n a pp eal , we di s mi s s ed t he Ya h o o ! I cas e f or l ack of

p ersonal juri sdi ct i o n and ri p eness , wi t ho ut m ent i o ni ng Sh el l ey o r i t s reasoni ng. Yahoo! II, 4 3 3 F

. 3 d a t 12 0 1

. T o t he ext ent t hat t he o p i ni o ns d i scus sed t he
m eri t s o f t he Fir st A m end m ent que st i o n, a m ajo ri t y of t he judges o n t he
en b anc p anel ass um ed t hat t he co nst i t ut i o nal i t y of enf o rci ng t he
c h a llen g e d fo re ign ju d g m e n t wo u ld d e p e n d o n w h e the r c o m p lian c e w ith t he French co urt ’ s o rde r w o ul d res t ri ct Y aho o ! ’ s d i ss em i nat i o n of, and
user s’ a ccess t o , s p eech i n t h e Un i t ed S t a t es. S e e id

. a t 1 2 2 0

– 2 2 (p lur a lit y o p inion); id

. a t 1234–35, 1244–45 ( Fi s h er , J

. , c on cu r r i n g i n pa r t and d i ss ent i ng i n pa rt ).

O t her court s ad d res si ng si m i l ar i ss ues have hel d , wi t ho ut dis cuss i ng st at e act i o n dir ect l y or o t herwi se exp l ai ni ng t hei r co ncl usi o n, t hat where a f orei gn j udgment f

ai l s t o com po r t wi t h dom es t i c c ons t i t ut i onal
re q u ire m e n ts, “the re fus a l t o re c o g n iz e the ju d g m e n t sho u ld b e , an d itis deemed t o be, ‘ cons t i t ut i onal l y mandat ory
. ’ ” B achc han v

. I ndi a Abr oad U.S. 249, 254, 258 ( 1 9 5 3 ) (applying the same state a ction pr in c ip le to a c o urt’ s aw ar d o f d ama g e s f o r v io lati o n o f a discriminatory

private c ontrac t).

B ut Shelley

h as not bee n interpre ted as mea ning that domestic judicial enfor ceme nt of anymonetary obliga tion
nece ssarily

transfor ms the circ umstances that g ave rise to that ob lig ation in to s tate a c tio n f or c on sti tut ion a l pu

rp os e s. 15O HNO V

. Y AS UMA

28

P ub l ’ ns I

nc. , 5 8 5 N .Y .S .2 d 6 6 1 , 6 6 2 (N .Y . S u p . C t. 1 9 9 2 ); see a lso Vi ewf i nd er , 489 F.3d at 480 ( hol di ng “ un enf orce abl e” j udgment s t hat “i m p i nge o n F i rs t A m end m ent ri ght s”) (quo t i ng Bachc han , 585 N

. Y

. S. 2d at 662, an d Yahoo! I , 16 9 F. Sup p
. 2d at 1 1 8 9

– 9 0 ). A l t ho ugh t ho se r ul i ngs m ay ass um e t hat judici al enf o rcem ent t rans f

o rms t he und erl y i ng fo re i gn judgm ent i nt o one ad o p t ed by and at t ri b ut ab l e t o the d o m est i c co urt , t he
o p i ni o ns d o not i d ent i f y t he b asi s f

o r any such unar t i cul at ed ass um p t i o n.
See , e

. g. , G o l d en G a t ew ay C t r. v. G o l d en G a t ew ay Te n a n ts A ss ’n , 26 16 C al. 4 t h 1 0 1 3 , 1 0 3 3

– 3 5 (2 0 0 1 ) (up ho l d i ng an i nju nc t i o n e nfo rcing a lease pr ov i s i on proh i bi t i n g t en an t s f r om di s t r i bu t i n g u n s ol i ci t ed n ew s pape r s on t h e g r ou n d t h at “

j u di ci al e n f

or ce men t of i n

j u n ct i v e r el i ef

doe s n ot , by i t s el f , cons t i t ut e s t at e a ct i on f or pur po s es of

Cal i f orn i a’ s f r ee s p eec h
c la u se ” ); St at e v. Noah , 103 W as h. Ap p. 29, 48– 50 ( 20 00 ) ( j udi ci al
e n fo rc e m e n t o f a v o lun ta ry se ttl e m e n t ag re e m e n t p ro h ib iti n g p u b lic I n s tead, Shelley ’ s att

r ib uti o no f

s tate a c ti o nto ju d ic ia l enfor ceme nt has g eneral l y b een c onfined to the c ontextof d i s c r i m i n at i o n c l a i m s un d e r th e E qu a l P r o t e c t i o n C l a u s e
. In th e conte x t of First Ame ndment challeng es to speec hre stric tiv e pr ov isi on s in

pr ivate a gre e me nts or

c ontrac ts, d o m es tic judicial enfor ceme nt of terms that could not be
enac ted by the g overnme nt has not ordinarily been c onsidered state ac tion. See, e .g. , Democ ratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm ., 673 F.3d 192, 204–05 ( 3d Cir. 2012) (“ The Supreme Court has de clined to find state a ction wher e the c ourt action in question is a far cry from the c ourt enfor ceme nt in Shelley

. . . . Court e nf orcemen t of a

pr ivate agree ment to limit a party ’s abili ty to speak or a ssociate doe s not nece ssarily violate the F irst Amendment.”) , cert. de nied, 133 S. Ct . 931 ( 2013). Va rious state court decisions “e nforc e restric tions on speech a

rising f rom domestic contract s that
c ou ld n ot h ave be e n e na c te d into l aw due to t he F ir st Amendment.” Ma

rk D. Rosen, Exporting the Constituti on , 53 Emory

L .J . 171, 174, 192–94 & nn.98–111 ( 2004) (compilingcase s). 16O HNO V

. Y AS UMA 29

cri t i ci sm o f

certain typ e o f

psy cho l o gi cal t herap y was not s t at e act i o n); Li nn Val l ey Lak es Pr op. O wners Ass ’n v. Br ockway , 250 K an
. 169, 1 7 2

– 7 3 (19 9 2 ) (judi ci al enf o rcem ent o f a res t ri ct i ve co venant b arri ng t he p o st i ng of si gns was not st at e act io n ); cf. Co mpu Ser ve I nc. v. Cyb er Pr om ot i ons , I

nc
. , 96 2 F. Sup p
. 1 0 1 5 , 1 0 2 6 (S. D

. O hi o 1 9 9 7 ) (“ [T ]he mere judici al enf

o rcem ent o f

. . . t res p ass laws [of

ge neral a p p l i cat i o n] by t he p riv a te o w n e r o f p ro p e rty d o e s n o t alo n e re n d e r [ the o w n e r] a sta te
a c to r.” ); Com m onweal t h v. H ood , 38 9 M ass
. 58 1 , 58 7

– 8 9 (19 8 3 ) ( ho l d i ng t h at j u di ci al e n f

or ce men t of

t r es pas s s t at u t e of

g en er al a ppl i ca t i on i s n ot sta te a c tio n ); bu ts ee W . H illB a p tist C h u rc h v . A b b a te , 261 N

. E. 2d 196, 2 0 0

– 0 1 (O hi o 19 6 9 ) ( judici al enf

o rcem ent of res t ri ct i ve co v e n ant excl ud i ng houses of

wo rs hi p co nst i t ut es s t at e act i o n). Simi larly , in the context of judicial confirmation of arbitra l awar ds, loosely analog ous to rec ognition of for eigncountry money judgme nts, the Eleventh C ircuit has held that “mer e conf

irmation of a private arbitration a war d by a district court is insu ff

icient state a ction to trigg er the application of the Due Process Clause.” Davis v. Prude ntial Secs., Inc. , 59 F.3d 1186, 1192 (11th Cir. 1995). Other courts agree
. United Sta te s v . A me ric an So cie ty

of C om po se rs, Au tho rs & Pu bli sh e rs , 708 F. Supp. 95 ( S .D.N.Y. 1989) , for e x ample, held that a court’s “mer e approva l .

. . of the use of arbitration did no t c r e ate any

s tate a c ti o n ” le s t “ a ll ar

b it r ati o n s
. . . be subject to due proc ess l i m i t ati ons through the simple act of appea ling the arbitrator s’ decisions to the court sy stem.” Id. at 97. And the California Court of Appea l has made c lear that “the limited s t ate involvement of conver ting the [arbitration] aw ar d i nto a judg ment . . . [does] not eng ender the same due proce ss incidents require d wi t h re s pect to an awa rd orig inally

assessed a

nd imposed by

a cou rt .” RifkindO HNO V

. Y AS UMA

30

I n c iti n g th e se c a se s, w e d o no t m e a n to a d o p t o r sa n c tio n a n y o f t h e ir 17 sp e c ifi c ho ld ing s. In ste a d , th e y a re illus tra tive o f t h e p rin c ip le tha t Sh el l ey h as n ot bee n un der s t ood as appl y i n g ge n er al l y t o j u di ci al e n f or ce men t of
no n-go ve rnm en t al agre em en t s o r d ec i si o ns. &Sterling, Inc. v. R ifkind , 28 Cal. App. 4 t h 1282, 1292 (1994). 17
Courts’ reluc tance , since Shelley , to expand that case’ s ho l d i n g t o o f

ar b e yo n d i t s o r i g i n a l c o nt e xt s t e m s f r om a c on c e rn fo r pr e se rv inga

sp he re fo r p ri vate a c tio n a nd pr ivate actor s, not subject to the constitutional const ra i n ts designe d to p ro tect our p op ula c e fr om governm ental control and
ov e rr e a c hin g . “ [I ]f, fo r c on sti tut ion a l pu rp os e s, e ve ry

pr ivate right wer e transformed into gover nmental ac tion by

the mere fa c t of c ourt e nf or c e me nt o f i t, the dis tin c tio n be tw e e n p ri vate and g overnme ntal action would be obliter ated.” Edwards v. Ha bib , 3 9 7 F

. 2 d

6 8 7 , 6 9 1 ( D

. C

. C i r
. 1 9 6 8 )

. S i m i l ar l y, ex t en d i n g Sh el l ey ’s holding to judicial e nforc ement of fore ign- country

money judgme nts wo u l d eff

ectively require fo re ign g ov e rnme nts de siringAm e ri c an r e c ognit ion of the ir jud ic ia l r uli ng s to a pp ly the su bs tanti ve pr ov isi on s o f t

he U. S. Constitution in their courts whene ver the re is a defe ndant wh o c ou ld b e su e d f

or e nf or c e me nt i n th e Unite d St ate s, reg ardle ss of wher e the c onduct subject to adjudication
occur red or who the litiga

nts are. Such wholesale imposit ion of a ll a sp e c ts o f o ur Con sti tut ion a br oa d is inc on sis te nt w ith the pr inc ipl e s o f c omi ty and re sp e c t f

or so ve re ignty un de rl yingthe re c ognit ion of fo re ign ju dgme nts

. For all these re asons, the distri ct cour t’s enfor ceme nt of the J apane se judg ment does not rende r the subst antive law
a pp li ed by the Japa ne se c ourt , o r t

he jud g me nt i t r e a c he d in applying that law, domestic state a ction direc t ly constraine dO HNO V

. Y AS UMA 31

b y th e C a l i f

o r n i a o r U

. S

. C o n s t i tut i o n s
. C o n s e qu e nt l y, contra ry to the Church’s c ontentio n , n o n-re cognition of the j u d g m e ntc ann o tb e c o n s t i tut i o n a l l y m an d at o r y.

c.
In so ho ldi ng , we do no t su g g e st that “ all that matte rs ” in the state action inquiry is whether an Americ an entity “is the orig in of the leg al right” enf orce d in a domestic cour

t. Rosen, 53 Emory

L .J . at 207. For

example, there may

be circ umstances in which the nature of the enf orce ment action
re qu ir e s th e c ourt to take su c h an a c tiv e ro le in, or to e xer c ise sustained supervision of, the underlying le g al dec ision or the
re su lti nga llo c atio n o f right s that it be c ome s a

pp ro pr iate to vie w the c ourt ’s a c tiv iti e s as go ve rnme nta l a c tio ns wi th rega rd t o the substance of the unde rlying de cision or of the resultingorder

. Su c h m ay w e l l b e th e c a s e , f o r e xamp l e , w i th r e g ard

to the e nf or c e me nt i n a

do me sti c c ourt

of so me (o r a ll) inj un c tio ns iss ue d by

fo re ign c ountrie s. Inju

nc tio ns dir e c tly compel or f

orbid a pa

rty ’s ac tions, and thus may be see n as placingthe domestic court’s imprimatur behind the substance of the for eign court’s or der to that e x tent. Also, enfor ceme nt of injunctions impli es the a uthority to exercise conte mpt and mod if ic atio n p ow e rs a ft e r t

he inj un c tio n is su e s; the e xer c ise of such a uthority may entang le the enf

orcingco urt in the
me ri ts o f t

he un de rl yingdis pute. Wh e the r o r n ot t he se aspec ts of injunctive relief could result in a determination that
en fo rc em en t b y a do m es t i c co urt o f a part i c u l arfo re i gn inj un c tio n c on sti tut e s st ate a c tio n for c on sti tut ion a l pu

rp os e s, those same c onsiderations are not pr esent wher e, as here , the enf o rce ment is of an orde r to pay over a pre- deter

mined amount of money . In the latt er i n stance , the conne ctionO HNO V

. Y AS UMA

32

T h e J a p a n e se c o u rt’s fi n d ing s ind ic a te tha t t h e C h u rc h inte n tio n a lly 18 di r ec t ed i t s a l l eg edl y r el i g i ou s s pee ch t o O h n o i n J apa n
. T h e cou r t f ou n d, f or e xampl e, t hat “ [ o]n Jan uar y 2, 200 2,

. . . Y as uma t o o k se ve ra lh o u rs t o t al k t o O hno [o n J a n u a r y 2 , 2 0 0 2 ], . . . p re ssu rin g he r to ti the ,” (em p hasi s ad d ed ) and t hat t hi s t al k ul t i m at el y l ed O hno t o m ake t he betwee n the nar

row domestic c ourt order an d t he asse rted violation by

the fore ign court of substantive rights prote cted by our C on sti tut ion

is s imp ly too atte nu ate d, wi tho ut mor e , to attribute re sponsibili t y for the merits of the under lying judgme nt to a domesti c st ate actor. And, standing a lone, the order —to pay mon ey t o someone—doe s not mandate a
c on sti tut ion a lly

pr ote c te d a c t.
ii. App lica ti on o f theF ir stAm e ndm e ntto th e Church’s Condu ct
Be c a u s e th e Chur c h ’ s c o n s ti tuti o n a l c la im f a il s at the
s tate ac tion stage , we ne ed not dec ide direc tly whether the First Amendment’s protec tions actually do rea ch the
a sse rt e dly re lig iou s e xpre ssi on

at issu e in the Japa

ne se su it. As thr e e jud g e s n ote d in Y ahoo! II , “ [t]he ex te nt o f F ir st Am e ndme nt p ro te c tio n o f s pe e c h a c c e ss ible so le ly by tho se o u t s i d e the United States is a difficult and, to some degree , unres o lved issue” a

nd “the e x tent—indeed the ve ry e xiste nc e —o f s uc h a

n e xtrate rrito ri a l right un de r t he F ir st Am e ndme nt [t o p ub lis h s pe e c h in vio latio n o f fo re ign la

w] is
uncer tain.” 433 F.3d at 1217, 1221 (plurality opinion). Nor has any co urt yet dec ided whethe r the F irst Amendment’s Fr ee E x erc ise Clause applies to relig ious ex pression initiated domestically

but directe d to a fore ign a udience

. Ohno was in Japan at all rel evant times, and the Church communicated with her the re. Absent demonstrated impact 18O HNO V

. Y AS UMA 33

co ntested t ran sf

ers to S aints o f

G l o ry. T he f

i nd i ng s also sho w t ha t a s a general m at t er, t he C hurch sent reco rdings o f each of Y asuma ’ s ser m o ns to J a p a n , to b e p la ye d to its m e m b e rs the re
. T h e C h u rc h d o e s n o t d isp u te t hat t he eve nt s at i s s ue “ occur r ed chi ef l y i n Japan. ” A l t houg h i t i s not cl ear w h e the r Y a su m a c a m e to J a p a n o r w h e the r, ins te a d , t h e C h u rc h se n t a
co p y of h er s pee ch t o Ja pan , we do n ot s ee wh y i t mat t er s wh i ch i s t he
cas e.

T h a t t h e j u dg me n t a t i s s u e h e r e i s a n a w a r d o f mo n e t a r y da ma ges 1 9 rat her t han an i njunct i o n, as i n Yahoo! , co ul d b ear o n o ur anal y si s o f t he
su b st ant i ve co nst i t ut i o nal i ss ue as wel l as o n t he st at e act i o n i nq uiry. W hi l e t he i m p o si t i o n of l i ab i l i t y i n t he f o rm o f da m ages can have t he
e ff e c t o f ch ill ing p ro te c te d c o n d u c t, tha t effe c t i s m u c h le ss d ire c t tha n is t he e f f ect of us i ng t he coer ci ve po wer of a dom es t i c c our t t o ens ur e t hat
a def en dan t c ompl i es w i t h t h e t er ms of a n i n j u n ct i on , c ompel l i n g or fo rb id d ing p a rtic u la r c o n d u c t. of the Japanese judgme nt on conduct in the United States, the only con stitut ional question we fa ce w ould “involve a determi n at ion whetherthe Fir st Amendment has extraterritorial application”—a deter mination this C ourt declined to make in Y

ahoo! II , 433 F.3d at 1217–18, 1 222 (p lur a lity op ini on ); see also id. at 1234–35, 1244–45 (F isher, J ., concur ringin part and dissentingin part), and which w e likewise d ecline to make here

. Havingconclude d that the 19 enfor ceme nt of the judg ment does not amount to state ac tion,
we re se rv e for ano the r d ay the ta sk of tr a c ingthe F ir st Am e ndme nt’ s r e a c h b e yon d o ur bo rd e rs
. Our a naly sis does not, however , fore close other , nonconstitutional ba rs to enforc ement of a fore ign- country money judgme nt, such as repugnancy to public policy . As we discuss next , there can be sound policy ju s t ifications for ref using to re cognize fore ign- country money judgme nts that the Consti tution would forbid a domestic cour t from rende ringin the first instance.O HNO V

. Y AS UMA

34
B. Statutory Challenge: Re pugn ancy to P ubl ic P olicy
In addition to its constitutional argument, t h e C hurch
c o nt e n d s th at th e Ja

p an e s e j u d g m e nt i s n o t e nt i t l e d to
rec ognition and enforc ement under California’s Uniform Act beca use it is “ repugnant to the public policy” embodied in the Religion Clauses of t h e Feder al and State Constitutions . A fore ign judgment t h at would be unconstitutional if rende red in this country nece ssarily qualifies as repugnant, the Church maintains, m ak i ngits recognition an abuse of disc retion
un de r C a lif

or nia ’s Un if

or m A c t.
The Ac t permits—but does not require—courts to deny
rec ognition to fo re i gn monetary awa rds if either

“[t] he judgment or the cause of ac tion or claim for relief on which the judg ment is based is repugnant to the p ublic policy of California or of

the United States.” § 1716(c) (3) (empha ses added) . Ac co rding ly , we e x amine whe ther e ither the J apane se law on which the judgment rests o r the judg ment issued meets the string ent standar d for r ep u gnancy under California law

. i. The Stand ard of Review
W e f i rs tad dre s s th e p ro p e r s t an d ar d fo r r ev i ew i n g a district court’s decision whether to refuse rec ognition of a fore ign- country

money judgme nt under California ’s Uniform Ac t or sim ila r s tate statut e s o n gro un ds of repu gna nc y to p u b l i c p o l i cy. T h e o n l y

ca s e o f th i s co urtad dre s s i n g a so me wh at si mil ar i ssu e is Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim ( In re Hashim) , 213 F.3d 1169 (9 t h Cir. 2000). Ha sh im treated
a bankruptc y court’s deter mination that an Eng lish award of costs and fe es wa s “re pugn ant t o Americ an jurisprude nce” and thus unenfor cea

ble under

Ar izona common lawO HNO V

. Y AS UMA 35

O the r c irc u its re v ie w ing re c o g n iti o n o f f o re ign ju d g m e n ts un d e r sta te 20
s t at u t es s i mi l ar t o Cal i f or n i a’ s h av e appl i ed a n a bu s e of di s cr et i on s t an dar d. Se e, e

. g. , B an qu e Li ba na i s e P ou r Le C om m er ce v. Kh r ei ch , 915 F.2d 10 0 0 , 1 0 0 4

– 0 6 (5t h C i r. 19 9 0 ) ( revi ewing f o r abuse of d i scr et i o n a d i st ri ct co urt de ci si o n whet her t o ap p l y a no n- m and at o ry ground of no nre c o g n iti o n un d e r T e x a s’s U n ifo rm A c t); I ng ers ol lM i l l i ng M ach. C o. v. G r an ger , 833 F. 2d 680, 688 ( 7t h Ci r
. 1 9 8 7 ) (re v i ew i n g f or a bu s e of di s cr et i on t he di s t r i ct cour t ’ s r ef us al t o den y r ecogn i t i on on publ i c pol i cy g ro u n d s u n d e r Illino is’s U n ifo rm A c t, b u t ev a lua ting the d e fen d a n t’s p rin c ip a l l e g a l ar g u m e n ts d e no v o “fo r th e sa k e o f co m p le te n e ss” ); c f. Rem i ngt on Rand Cor

p.
- D el

. v. Bus

. Sy s

. I

nc
. , 830 F. 2d 1260, 1266 ( 3d C i r. 19 8 7 ) ( ci t i ng II T

C o rp . v. L a m (In re C o lo . C o rp .) , 531 F. 2d 463, 469 ( 10 t h Ci r
. 197 6) ( r evi ewi ng f or abus e of di s cr et i on t he ext ens i on or deni al
o f co m ity)). E v e n if

w e w e re to a p p ly a d e fer e n tial sta n d a rd o f re v ie w , a di s t r i ct cour t “ abus es i t s di s cr et i on whe n i t com mi t s an er r or of l aw. ” AE
ex rel. H ern a n d ez v

. C n t y. o f T u l a re , 66 6 F

. 3 d 6 3 1 , 63 6 (9t h C i r. 20 1 2 ). S o the a n a lysis w o u ld b e the sa m e a s the o n e w e c o n d u c t. principles of comity , as a leg al conclusion, subject to de novo revie w. Id. at 1172. 20
Absent a de monstrated ground for non-re cognition, enfor ceme nt of a qualifying fore ign- country money judgme nt i s mandatory

under Califor

nia’s Unifor

m Act. § 1716(a ). Her e, the district cour

t’s decision to rec ognize and enfor ce the Japa nese c ourt ’s jud g me nt, ov e r t he Churc h’ s o bje c tio ns , hinge d on a pre liminary deter mi n at i on that neither the judgme nt n o r th e un d e r ly in g c a u s e o f a c ti o n was fundame ntally

incompatible wit h, and ther efor e repugnant to, the Re li gio n Cl a

us e s. B e c a

us e that de te rm inatio n w a s a c o n c lu s io n o f la

w , w e, as in Ha sh im , examine de novo the district court’s leg al eva lu at i o n
. Given that the Churc h has
asser ted no other ground for

non-re cognition on appeal, if the dis tr ic t c ourt cor

re c tly de te rm ine d th at ne ith e r t he Japa ne se jud g me nt n or

the un de rl ying

c a us e of a c tio n is repu gn ant t oO HNO V

. Y AS UMA

36

T h e r ev i s ed U n i f

or m For ei g n - Coun t r y M on ey Ju dg men t A ct of 2005, 21
on w h i ch t h e Cal i f

or n i a s t at u t e i s ba s ed, r et ai ned “t h e s t r i n g en t t es t f or f i nd i ng a pub l i c p o l i cy vi o l at i o n ap p l i ed by court s i nt erpret i ng t he [ prev i ous ve r s i on o f

t he] Act

. ” U ni f

orm Forei gn - C ount r y M oney Ju dg men t s R ecog n i t i on Act , 13 U

. L. A. pt

. I I , § 4, c mt

. 8, a t 28 ( Su pp. 20 11 )

. Accordi ng t o t hat t es t , t he comm ent ar y t o t he mo del U ni f orm Act
ex pl ai n s , “ [ p] u bl i c pol i cy i s v i ol at ed on l y i f r ec og n i t i on or e n f

or ce men t of t he f o rei gn co unt ry jud gm ent wo ul d t end cl earl y t o i njure p ub l i c heal t h, t he publ i c moral s , or t he publ i c c onf i dence i n t he a d m i ni s t r at i on of l aw, public policy , then re cognition of the dam age s awa rd wa s statutorily require d.
ii. The Stand ard for Repugn ance
California courts have set a high bar f or re pugnancy

under the Uniform Ac t. T h e s tandar d, rooted in the public policy exception to the comity

doctrine at common law, see Hilton v. Guy ot , 159 U.S. 113, 205–06, 227–28 (1895), mea sures not sim ply wh e the r t

he fo re ign judgme nt o r c a us e of a c tio n is
c ontr ary to o ur p ub lic po lic y , b ut whe the r e ith e r i s “so of fe ns iv e to our p ub lic po lic y a s to be ‘p re

jud ic ia l to
re c ognize d s tand ard s o f m or a lity and to the g e ne ra l inte re sts of the c itiz ens.’” Java O il Ltd. v. Sullivan , 168 Ca l. Ap p. 4th 1 1 7 8 , 1 1 8 9

– 9 2 (2 0 0 8 ) ( emp h as i s ad d ed ) ( qu o t i n g W ong v. Tenneco, I

nc. , 39 Cal. 3d 126, 135–36 (1985)). T hus, “eve n wh e re it i s a gre e d th at a fo re ign law of fe nd s pub lic po lic y , it
m ay s till be applied in a limited contextwher e the potential harm is minimal.” W

ong , 39 Cal. 3d at 1 3 6

. Put another way , the public policy

exception codified at § 1716(c) (3) doe s not apply unless a for eign-country judgme n t or the lawon wh ic h it is b a se d is “ so anta g on ist ic to C a lif or nia [or fe de ra l] public p o l i cy

interests as to pre clude the e x tension of comity .” Crockford’s Club Ltd. v. Si–Ahmed, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1402, 1406 (1988) ( internal quotation marks omitted). 21O HNO V

. Y AS UMA 37

or w oul d under mi ne t hat s ens e of s ecu r i t y f

or i ndi vi dual r i gh t s , wh et her
o f p e rs o n a l l ib e rty o r o f p riv a te p ro p e rty, w h ic h a n y c iti z e n o u g h t to fee l.” I d

. (in te rn a l q u o ta tio n m a rk s o m itt e d ); see a lso Res t at eme n t ( T h i r d) of Fo rei gn R el at i o ns La w o f t he U ni t ed Stat es § 4 8 2 cm t . f (19 8 7 ); R est at em ent (Seco nd ) of C o nf l i ct of La ws § 1 1 7 (19 7 1 ).

O ur s i st er ci rc u its have ap p l i ed a s i m i l arl y s t ri ct s t and ard t o t he repugna ncy excep t i o n of o t h e r st at es’ f o rei gn judgm ent enf

o rcem ent sta tute s. See Vi ewf

i nd er , 4 8 9 F.3d at 47 9

– 8 0 (“ T he p ub l i c p o l i cy i nq ui ry ra re ly re su lts i n re fus a l t o e n fo rc e a ju d g m e n t un le ss it i s inh e re n tly
v ic io u s, w ic k e d o r im m o ra l, a n d s h o c k ing to the p re v a ili n g m o ra l se n se .” (i nt ernal q uo t at i o n m arks om i t t ed )) ; Ack er m ann v

. Le vi ne , 788 F. 2d 830, 8 4 1 (2d C i r. 1 9 8 6 ) (descri b i ng t he repugna ncy st and ard as “hi g h , and i nf reque nt l y m et , ” ap p l y i ng only i n “ cl ear- cut ” cases where t he judgm ent
or cau s e of act i on on whi ch i t i s bas ed i s cont rary t o “‘ f un dam ent al
no t i o ns o f what i s d ecent and jus t ’ ” (quo t i ng Tahan v

. H odgs on , 662 F. 2d 8 6 2 , 8 6 4 (D .C . C ir. 1 9 8 1 )) ); Sw. Li ve s t ock & Tr uck i ng C o. v. Ram on , 169 F. 3d 317, 321 ( 5t h Ci r
. 1999) ( n ot i n g t h at t h e “ l ev el of c on t r av en t i on of T e x a s la w ” ha s to b e “h igh ” fo r th e c o u r t to d e n y re c o g n iti o n o n p u b lic p o licy g ro u n d s) ; cf

. Andes v

. Vers antCor

p. , 87 8 F.2d 1 4 7 , 1 5 0 (4th C i r. 1 9 8 9 ) (h o ld ing , w itho u t ex p re ssly d isc u ssin g re p u g n a n c y to p u b lic p o licy, t hat a cour t ap pl y i ng M ar y l and’ s U ni f orm Forei gn - M oney Ju dgment s Act woul d not gi ve ef

f ect t o an E ng l i s h r ul e of prec l us i on t hat i s “ s o m uch at od ds w i t h n or ma l Ame r i c a n n ot i on s of l i t i g a t i on t h a t n o A mer i can juri sdi ct i o n wo ul d readil y em b race i t ”). In the context of an Ariz ona enf orce ment action,
c on str uin gc omm on

la w p ri nc ipl e s o f i nte rn atio na l c omi ty simil ar to those on whic h California’s Uniform Act is based, see M anco Contracting Co. , 45 Cal. 4th at 198, we obser ved th at “ f e w ju d g me nts f

a ll in th e c ate g o r

y o f ju d g me nts that need not be rec ognized because they violate the public policy of the for

um,” In reHa sh im , 213 F.3d at 1172 (internal quotation marks omitted). “It h as l ongbeen the law that unless a for eign country ’s judgments are the re sult of outrag eous de p ar tures f

rom our own motions of ‘c iviliz ed ju risprudenc e,’ c omity

should not be ref

used.” Br iti

shO HNO V

. Y AS UMA

38
Midland Airways Ltd. v. Int’l Travel, Inc. , 497 F.2d 869, 871 (9 thC i r. 1 9 7 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Hilton , 159 U.S. at 205). Simpl e inconsistency

betwee n Americ an state or fede ral law and fore ign law, t hen, does not rende r a f oreign judgme nt unenfor cea

ble by rea son of re pugnancy
. See Yahoo! II , 433 F.3d at 1215 (plurality

opinion). Fore ign judgme n t s are not to b e “ tr ie d a fr e sh ” in U.S. c ourt s, a pp lyingdo me sti c concepts. See H

ilton , 1 59 U. S. at 20 2– 03 . “ We ar e no t so provincial a s to say

that ever y solution of a pr oblem is wrong beca use we deal with it otherwise at home.” Lou c k s e xre l. L o u c k s v

. S ta n d a rd O i l C o

. o f N

. Y. , 224 N.Y. 99, 111 (1918) (Cardozo, J .). Applying the se principles, c ourts in other jurisdictions have de c lin e d to e nf

or c e fo re ign- countr

y mon e y jud g me nts on gro un ds of

repu gna nc e to t he pu bli c po li c y

e mbo die d in t h e First Amendment, but only wher e ther e we re star

k differ ence s betwee n fore ign a nd domestic l aw
. In Te lnik off v. Matusev itch , 347 Md. 561 (1997), for example, Maryland’s high court declined to e nforc e an Eng lish lib el j u dg ment under principles of comity beca use Eng lis h d efamation law

“ is t otal ly

dif fe re nt” fr om M ary

land de fa matio n la w “ in virtually ever

y signific ant re spect” and “so c ontrary . . . to the policy of fr eedom of the press underlying Ma ryland law.” Id. at 598–99. A Ne w York tria l court si m i larly ref used
rec ognition of an E n g lish li bel judg ment on the ground that En glish li bel standar ds are “ an tit he tic al to the protec tions aff orded the press by

the U.S

. Constitution,” explaining that the presumptions and burdens of proof under Eng li s h l i bel law ar e the r ever se of those u n d erAmeric an law, r equiring
me dia d e f e n d ant s t o p r o v e th e tr

utho f s p e e c ho f

p u bli c c o n c e r n , r ath e r o b l i g i n gp l a i nt i f

f s t o d e m o n s tr at e f

a l s i ty.O HNO V

. Y AS UMA 39

Fe der al l aw n ow con t r ol s dome s t i c act i o n s s ee k i n g r ec og n i t i on of 22 f o rei gn d ef

am at i o n judgm ent s. In A ugust 2 0 1 0 , C o ngres s ad o p t e d t he SP E E C H Act ( “ Secur i ng t he P r ot ect i on of our E ndur i ng an d E s t abl i s hed Cons t i t u t i on al H er i t ag e Act

. ”) , Pub. L. N o. 111- 223, 124 St at

. 2380 ( 20 10 ) , 28 U

. S. C

. §§ 4 10 1– 41 05 , ef f ect i vel y codi f

y i ng t he approa ch ad o p t ed i n T

e ln ik o ff . T h e A c t w a s p ro m p te d b y a p e rc e ive d inc re a se in t he f req ue nc y of f

o r e ig n li b el jud gm en t s i nc o nsist en t wit h the F i rst A m e n d m e n t, P u b . L . N o . 1 1 1 -2 2 3 , § 2 (5 ), a n d c o n c e rn tha t t h e se su its
w e re “sig n ifi c a n tly c h ill ing A m e ric a n fre e sp e e c h a n d re stric ting b o th domes t i c an d w or l dwi de ac ce s s t o i mpor t an t i n f o rma t i on
. ” S. Rep. N o. 1 1 1 -2 2 4 , a t 2 (2 0 1 0 ); s ee al s o P ub. L. N o. 111

- 22 3, § 2(3)

. T he new l aw makes f orei gn def

amat i on j udgment s un enf orce abl e i n t he U ni t ed St at es u n l es s i t c an be s h own t h at s u ch j u dg men t s s at i s f y t h e protec t i on s of fre e d o m o f sp e e c h a n d p re ss g u a ra n te e d b y b o th th e F irst A m e n d m e n t t o t he U ni t ed S t ates Co ns t i t ut i on an d t he cons t i t ut i on of t he s t at e i n w hi ch the d o m e stic c o u rt is lo c a te d

. See 2 8 U

. S.C

. § 4 1 0 2 (a)( 1 ). N o t ab l y , t he S P E E C H A c t d o e s n o t p e rta in to a ll fo re ign ju d g m e n ts a lleg e d ly inc o n siste n t with a n y p a rt o f t h e F irst A m e n d m e n t b u t fo c u se s u n iq u e ly on def amat i on ac t i ons a nd the “ Fi r s t Am endment r i gh t s of Am er i can a u tho rs a n d p u b lishe rs .” H .R

. R e p
. N o
. 1 1 1 -1 5 4 , at 5 (2 0 0 9 ), re p rin te d in 20 10 U

. S. C

. C

. A

. N

. 81 2, 81 6. Cal i f orn i a’ s U ni f

orm Act cont ai ns a s i mi l ar sp ec i al exc ep t i o n fo r fo reign jud gm en t s rend ere d i n d efam ati o n a cti o ns. See C al

. C i v. P roc. Co d e § 17 1 7 (c). Bachc han v. India Abroad Publ’ns I nc. , 58 5 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (1992) ( emphasis adde d). 22

In Yah o o ! I

, the Northe rn District of Califor nia, in an opinion rever sed on jurisdictional grounds, see Yahoo! II , 433 F.3d 1199, a

pplied simil ar l og ic to that in Te lnik off and Bachc han and bar

re d enfor ceme nt of a F renc h injunction
re qu ir ingthe Inte rn e t c omp any Ya ho o! to b loc k F re nc h u se rs ’ acc ess to Nazi-related website c ontent. S e e Ya h o o ! I

, 1 69 F. Supp. 2d at 1184–85. The “content and viewpoint-ba sed
re gulatio n” of

Inte rn e t sp e e c h, the dis tr ic t c ourt he ld, “ c le arl y would be inconsistent with the Fir st Amendment if mandate d by a cour t in the United States.” Id. at 1192–93.O HNO V

. Y AS UMA

40

T he same d i st i nct i o n m ay b e d rawn be t ween the p res ent case and 23 anot h e r c i r c u i t c ou r t op i n i on , i n v ol v i n g e n f or c e me n t of

a F r e n ch i n t el l ec t u al prope r t y an d copy r i g h t ju dg men t , t ar g et i n g t h e pu bl i ca t i on of p h o to g ra p h s. See Vi ewf i nd er , 4 8 9 F .3 d 4 7 4

. T h e d istric t co u rt h a d he ld t he Fre nch j udgment r epugn ant t o publ i c p ol i cy o n t he gr ounds t hat i t was f und am ent al l y at od d s wi t h pri nci p l es o f f ree exp res si o n pro t ect ed by t he U .S . a n d N e w Y o rk C o n stitutio n s. SarlLou i s F er au d Int ’ lv. V i ewf i nd er I nc. , 4 0 6 F . S u p p . 2 d 2 7 4 , 2 8 5 (S .D .N .Y . 2 0 0 5 ). T h e S e c o n d C irc u it
v ac at ed an d r ema n ded f or a mor e t h or ou g h c ompar i s on of Fr en ch a n d U

. S. copyr i gh t l aw and t he “ f ai r us e” exc ept i on f

or Fi r s t Am endment

- prot ect ed
ac t i v i t y
. 489 F. 3d a t 484. These case s do not sugg est that a looser standard a

pplies when the a sserted r epugnancy arises f rom an inconsistenc y with U.S. constitut ional as opposed to statutory or common law princ iples. There is no California case so holding and no basis in the statutory languag e for such a c onclusion. Rather, the ca ses under score that only judgme nts pr esenting a dire ct and def inite c o n f

li c t w ith fundame ntal Americ an c on sti tut ion a l princ ipl e s w ill be de nie d rec ognit ion be c a us e repu gna nt.
Such direc t conflict is more apt to arise whe re the fore igncountry judgme nt—or the law underl y ing it—does not incidentally

or indirec tly

aff ect c onduct that may

be prote cted in t he Un ite d St ate s, but e xpre ssl y targ e ts s uc h c on du c t. Te lnik off , Bachc han , and Yah o o ! ( I & II ), all conc erne d
c ha lle ng e s to e nf

or c e me nt of

fo re ign- c ountr

y jud g me nts issued on the basis of for eign laws s p ecif ic to speec h or expression—such as libel, defa mation and hate spe ech laws —n ot l aws of

g e ne ra l a pp lic atio n, su ch a s th e Japa ne se t o rtlaws underlying the judgme nt at issue here

. Th e state 23 courts in Te lnik

off and Bachc han , a

nd the dis tr ic t c ourt

in Yah o o ! I , f o un dr e p u gn an c y no t ba se d o n th e wa y that a particula r for eign law was applied to the spec ific fa cts of theO HNO V

. Y AS UMA 41

T hi s co nd i t i o n i s suf

f i ci ent but no t necess ary f o r non- repugna n c y. 2 4 T h e re c o u ld b e fo re ign c a u se s o f ac tio n tha t h a v e no p a ra llel in d o m e stic l aw b ut are not repugnant t o any aspect o f do m est i c l aw ei t her. case , but beca

use of f undamental differe nces in the guiding leg al doctrine applied or the proce dures used in the fo re igncountry court a s compar ed to domestic leg al principles. The courts concluded that the f oreign judgme nts in question were
re pu g na nt t o pu blic po lic y be c a us e the y

wo uld
un qu esti on ab ly

violate the C onstitut ion wer e they issued here with respec t to domestic activity ; those conclusions wer e not fac t-depe ndent. In other wor ds, it wa s not de batable whether the orde rs, if domestically issued and applied, c ould have
s ur v i v e d c o n s t i tut i o n a l s c r

ut i ny.
Th e sit uatio n w ithwh ic h w e are faced her e is q uit e oth e rw ise . A s w ill a

pp e ar, it i s highl y deb ata ble , at le a st, whether tort liability

could be im posed on the Churc h for inducing Ohno’s Transfer s, and the ultimate determination of that question would be high ly fac t-depe ndent. As the J apane se ca

use of a ction and judgment in t h is case a re not antithetical

to t he Re lig ion Cla

us e s, the y are no t r e pu gna

nt t o California or U .S. public policy in the sense r equire d by

the
e xce pti on in C a lif or nia ’s Un if

or m A c t.
iii
. Re pugna nc y o f theJa pane se Ca use of A c ti on a nd Cl a i ms
In evaluating the r epugnancy of a fore ign cause of ac tion,
we c ompare t h e l ega l basis for liability and the plaintiff’ s claims for r elief in the fore ign court with c ompara ble grounds for suit in the United States. I f Americ an law r ecognizes g ener ally para llel cause s of ac tion, the fore ign cause of ac tion
c ann o tb e s a i d

t o b e r e p u gn antt o A m e r i c anp u b l i c p o l i c y. 24O HNO V

. Y AS UMA

42
This assessment does n o t depend on whe ther the stand ar d s f

o r e v a l u at i n ga

c a u s e o f a c t i o no r

th e e l e m e nts re quired to state a

claim ar e identical un d e r d o me s ti c and fore ign la

w. I n s t ead, w e nec essarily focus on the funda me nta ls of the c ause of action underlying the for ei gn judgme nt and def

enses ther eto, “not the diff ere nces i n the bodies of law” or in the way in which reme dies are aff orded. So c ’y of L loyd’

s v . R e inh ar t , 4 0 2 F

. 3 d 9 8 2 , 9 9 5 ( 10th Cir. 20 05 ); see also Soc’y

of Lloyd’s v. Turner , 303 F.3d 325, 332 (5th Cir. 2002). That a

particul ar ca u se of a ction does not
e xist, or that a pa rt ic ula r c la im w ou ld n ot b e c ogni z able, in California doe s not obligate us to refuse enfor ce ment of a jud g me nt, a s lo nga s th e e xiste nc e of the c a us e of a c tio n is not itself r ep ugnant to California public policy

. See Restatement (Thir d) of For eign Relations L aw of the United States § 482 cmt. f (1987); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of L aws § 117 (1971)

. Her e, the Church was held l iable under article 709 of the J apane se C ivil Code, which provides that “[a] person who has intentionally or neglig ently infring e[d] any right of others, or le g a lly pr ote c te d inte re st o f o the rs , s ha ll b e li able t o compensate any

damag es re sulting in conseque nce.” Minp ô [Civ. C.] a

rt . 7 09 (Ja

pa n) . T he re i s n oth ingrepu gna nt t o California public policy

about providinga da m ages r emedy for i n t en tional or neg lige nt injury to others’ rights or protec ted intere st s
. California tort law—a nd Americ an tort law g ener ally

—d o es ex actly

that. See, e .g. , Cal. Civ. C ode § 1714. And, while a pa rty ’s status as a r eli gi ous entity or believer may bear o n cer

tain rele vant inquiries, such a s whether the party may asser t a Relig ion Clause defe nse, that d o e s n o tr e n d e r

th e p arty i mmunefrom liability under tort law. Cf. Viewfi nder , 489 F.3d at 480–81 (explaining that an entity ’s status as a news publication may bear on its assertionO HNO V

. Y AS UMA 43

T he Supre me C our t of C al i f orn i a and C al i f

orn i a C ourts o f

A pp eal 25 ha ve rec o gn i ze d ac t i o ns f o r reli ef und er the e q uit ab l e d o ctri n e o f unj ust
e n ric h m e n t. S e e G h ira rd o v . A n to n io li , 1 4 C al

. 4th 3 9 (19 9 6 ) ( reco gni zi ng a cause of

act i o n f o r unj ust enri chm ent upo n a s ho wi ng t hat t he d ef end ant
r ec ei v ed ben ef

i t t h r ough a not h er ’ s k n own mi s t ak e, f r au d, c oer ci on or o the r to rtio u s c o n d u c t); s ee als o Her na nd ez v. Lop ez , 1 8 0 C a l. A p p . 4 th 9 3 2 , 9 3 8 (20 0 9 ) (“ T he d o ct ri ne ap p l i es where p l ai nt i f f s, whi l e havi ng no enf o rceab l e co nt ract , none t hel ess have co nf erred a b enef

i t on d ef end ant whi ch d ef

end ant ha s kno wi ngl y accep t ed unde r ci rcum st ances t hat m ake it ine q u itab le fo r th e d e fen d a n t t o re ta in t h e b e n e fit w itho u t p a ying fo r its val ue. ”). of a “ fa ir us e ” de fe ns e but do e s n ot ent itl e it t o immun ity f r o ml i a b i l i ty un d e r i nt e l l e c tu a l p r o p e rty l aw s )

. A c c o r d i n g l y, the g e ne ra l ava ila

bil ity of a tor t r e me dy in J a pa n f or a su it
a g a ins t a c hurc h is no t, o n it s f

a c e , repu gn ant t o Ca lif

or nia p u b l i c p o l i c y.
We look nex t at the par

ticular c laims o n wh i ch the tort
c a us e of a c tio n wa s ba se d. Ohno ’s c la ims are ana lo gous to actions for

undue influenc e, fr aud, neg lige nt or intentional infliction of emotional distress, and unjust enrichment under California law

. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1572 (fr aud), 1575 (undu e i nfluenc e); 1714 (liability for willful or ne g lige nt i n j u ry to others). The Churc h maintains that claims of

25 undue influenc e, fr aud, neg lige nt or intention al i nfliction of
e mot ion d istre ss, or

un jus t e nr ic hme nt a

re no t c ogniza

ble in Ca lif or nia if the de fe nd ants’ act ions g ivi ngri se to l ia bil ity
we re fa c ia lly

re lig iou sly

mot ivate d. At the le ve l of g e ne ra lity at which this asser

tion is m ade, it is false

. Am e ri c an court s c a

n r e c ognize tor

t li a bil ity fo r a c ts asser tedly motivated by

relig ion. Th e R el igion Clauses do
no t ba r t or t c la ims a g a ins t a

re lig io us enti ty

or its me mbe rs , so long a s adjudicatingthe ca use of action does not requir e aO HNO V

. Y AS UMA

44

T h e Su pr eme Cour t v ac at ed an d r ema n ded W o l l ers h ei m I f

or 26
re c o n sid e ra tio n o f the p u n iti v e d a m a g e s a w a rd in ligh t o f Paci f i c M ut ual L ife In su ra n c e C o mp a n y v . Ha slip , 4 9 9 U .S . 1 (1 9 9 1 ). S e e W o llers h e im , 4 9 9 U .S . 9 1 4 ( 1 9 9 1 ). O n re m a n d , W o llers h e im II “i nco rpo rat ed i nt act and
u n a lter e d ” the p o rtio n o f W o l l ers h ei m I t hat “d eal t exhaust i vel y wi t h t he to rt [a n d ] fre e d o m o f re ligio n ” issu e s. W o l l ers h ei m II, 6 C al

. Rp t r
. 2d at 534 n

. 1. T h e Cal i f

o rni a Su pr eme Cour t s u bs equ en t l y g r an t ed r ev i ew of W o l l ers h ei m II, s ee 1 0 C al

. R p t r. 2d 18 2 (19 9 2 ), bu t, “fo l l o wi ng t he c ourt to jud g e the va lid ity of re lig iou s b e lie fs or int e rf e re wi th
ecc lesiastical dec isionmaking re g ardingself-g overna nce or employ ment. See, e .g. , Un ite d States v. B all ar d, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1 94 4) ; Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass’n for U nificat i o n of W or ld C hr ist ian ity , 46 Ca l. 3d

10 92 , 1 11 5– 16 (1 98 8) ; El v ig
v. Calvin Presbyterian Church , 375 F.3d 951, 956, 959–62 (9 thC i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Bollard v. Cal. Provinc e of Soc’ y of Jesus , 196 F.3d 940, 945–47 ( 9th Cir. 1999)). The Relig ion Clause protec tions “embrac e[] t wo c on c e pts —f

re e do m to be lie ve and

fr e e do m to a c t. Th e fi rs t is absolute but, in the nature of thing s, the s ec ond cannot be .” Cantwell v. Connecticut , 3 10 U. S

. 29 6, 30 3– 04 (1 94 0) ; see also Stormans, Inc. v . Selec ky , 586 F.3d 1109, 1128 ( 9th Cir. 20 09 ); Molko , 46 C al

. 3 dat 1112. Conduct, including speec h-base d conduct suc h as solicitation, “re mains subject to regulation for the pr otection of socie ty .” Can twe ll , 310 U.S. at 304. So recognizi ng , California c ourts have enter tained cla ims of fraud, undue influence , and intentional infliction of emotional distress brought ag ainst relig ious entities by former members seeking rec overy o f d onations and dama g es for

harm. See, e .g. , Molko , 4 6 C al. 3d 1092; W olle rsh e im v . Churc h o

f Sc ie nto log

yof C al. , 212 Cal. App. 3d 872 (1989) ( “ W

ollersheim I

”), v a c a te d a n d r e m a n d

e d on other grounds , 499 U.S. 914 (1991), amende d by6 Cal. Rptr. 2 d 5 3 2 ( Ct

. Ap p
. 1 9 9 2) (“ W ollersheim II

”). Re lig iou sly 26O HNO V

. Y AS UMA 45

U ni t ed Stat es Sup rem e C o urt ’ s d eci si o n i n TXO P r od uct i o n C orp. v. A l l i a n ce R e so u rc e C o rp
. , 50 9 U. S. 44 3 ( 19 93 ) , t h e Ca l i f or n i a S u pr e me C our t di s mi s s ed i t s pri or g r ant of r evi ew. ” C hu r ch of

Sci ent ol og

y v

. W o llers h e im , 4 2 C a l. A p p . 4 th 6 2 8 , 6 3 7 (1 9 9 6 ). A c c o rd ing ly, W o l l ers h ei m II

a n d Wo l l e rs h e i m I

— t o t he ext ent t he ear l i er opi ni on was i ncor po r at ed i nt o t he l at er one— r emai n g oo d l aw. motivate d

g if ts h av e b e e ns e t a s id e o na s tr o n gs h o w in gof undue influenc e by

relig ious advis o rs over the testamentar y act. See Su nla nd

Ho meFo un d. , In c . v . B ou rq uin ( In reEs tate of Bourquin) , 161 Cal. App. 2d 289, 299–300 (1958).
Wit h respe ct to speec h related to solicitation for a relig ious cause, the re is no c ate go ric al ba

r u nd e r d ome sti c law t o a c la im i n to rt . T he state is “fre e to r e gulate the tim e and mann e r of so lic itatio n g e ne ra lly , in the int e re st o f p ub lic safe ty , peac e, comf

ort or conve nience .” Can twe ll , 3 10 U. S.
at 30 6– 07 . T he pr e se rv atio n o f t his state re gulator

y a uth or ity i s i mp o rt an t , gi v en th at s p ee ch m ay b e th e ve h i c l e thro u gh
wh ic h un d

u e in f lu e n c e is e xe rte d , d e p e n d in g on the c o nte xt and manne r in which it is conveyed. See, e .g. , Dovydenas v. The Bible Speak

s ( In reThe B ibleSp e ak

s) , 869 F.2d 628, 64 5–46 (1st Cir. 1989) (re

jectinga chur ch’s F irst Amendment de fe ns e a g a ins t c la ims tha t it e xer te d und ue inf lue nc e to obtain g ifts beca

use the c ourt’s finding s rested on the churc h’s sec ular stateme nts and ac tions).
There are , to be sure, de finite limit ations on wh at c on sti tut e s und e r C a lif

or nia law a c ogniza ble tort cl a im arisingfrom fa cially

relig iou s conduct: No cause of action will be rec ognized wh er e a plaintiff challeng es the ve rity of
re lig iou s st ate me nts or

be lie fs . “It is se ttl e d th at in qu ir y int o the truth or fa lsity

of re ligious b eli efs is for eclose d by constitutional guara n t ees of relig ious free dom and that theO HNO V

. Y AS UMA

46 courts may

ask only wh et h er the proponent of a particula r relig ion hol ds his beliefs honestly and in g ood faith.” Ha lli na n v . R om an Cat

ho licArc hb ish op of S.F

. ( In reEs tate of Supple) , 2 47 Ca l. A

pp
. 2d 41 0, 41 4 ( 19 66 ) ( re fu sin gto pass on the truth of r eli gi o us statements alleg ed to have
un du ly inf lue nc e d a te stator ’s a c tio ns ). An d th e Cali fornia Court of Appea l has ref

used to enter

tain actions that re quire the cour t to det er m i n e whether

the ac tions of an individual not pa rty to the lawsuit wer e induced by faith or coercive persua sion. Ka tz v. Su

pe rio r Co ur t , 73 Cal. App. 3d 952 (1 97 7) (o ve rt

ur nin g c on se rv ator sh ip o rd e rs gra nte d to pa re nts of me mb e r s o f

th e Un i f i c at i o nC hur c hwh o c l a i m e d th e ir children w ere brainwa shed).
Simi larly , under the Religion Clauses, c lai m s of in t en t i o n al i n fl i ct i o no f e m o t i o n al d i s tre s s aga i n s tchurc h es or other re ligious entities “ba sed mere ly on threat s of divine retribution” will not be allowed to proc eed, Molko , 46 Cal. 3d at 1120, beca

use such threats, like “‘he ll f ire a nd damnation’” prea ching , are protec ted re ligious spee ch and c annot form the basis of a c laim for emotional distre ss, W ollersheim I

, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 892–93. Under California law , suits alleging purely emotional injury

due to s uch re ligious expression are not pe rmitted, g iven that “[i] t is one of the func tions of many
r e li g io n s to ‘ a f

f li c t t h e c o mf o rtable.’” Id. at 892. And California c ourts have de clined to re cognize a cause of ac tion for ne g li g e nt in f

li c ti o n o f e mo ti o n a l d is tr e s s a s a r e s u lt of rel i gi o u s l y motivated conduct be cause “re ligious org anizat ions owe no duty to members or f

ormer me mbers with r espec t to these forms of [emotional] i njury .” Id. at 901.
As noted above, the J apane se law unde r which the Church was sued pe rmits liabili ty for the inf

ri n gement of a

nother’s rights based either

on an intentional or ne g lige nt state ofO HNO V

. Y AS UMA 47

mind. See Minp ô [C iv. C.] art. 709 (J ap an ). To the extent that Ohno’s cla im amounted to one for m er ely neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress as a result of fa cially relig ious
c on du c t, i t ma

y no t ha ve bee n c ogniza

ble un de r C a lif

or nia law. B ut C a lif

or nia c ourt s hav e pr on ounc e d n o b ar t o c la ims for ne g lige nt infliction of e c on om ic inj ur y , an d Ohn o c le arl y as s e rt edp ec un i ary

l o s s es as we l l as p ai nan d s u ff er i n g. Moreove r, the re ason the California Court o f Appeal has g iven for ba

rringrec overy

from re ligious entities for the neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress is not that such liability n ece ssarily

offe nds the Religion Clauses, but rather that r e lig iou s o rg anizatio ns have no duty of car e to a

vo id causing their member s emotional injury

. See W ollersheim I

, 21 2 Ca l. A

pp . 3 d at 90 0– 01 . I f s uc h a duty of care e xists under Japanese law, this differe nce f rom California law

does not denote repugnance to a publ ic policy embodied in the Re lig ion Cla us e s.
Ohno’s cla ims, which relate to economic as well as emotional i n

jury , do not directly

impugn the Churc h’s relig ious beliefs or tea ching s. The Jap anese trial court
re je c te d th e Churc h’ s ar gume nt that th e laws uit wa s a pure ly
re lig iou s d isp ute and

e xpli cit ly

dis avo we d th e no tio n th at it
was scr utiniz ing the Church’s be liefs, statingthat there was n o “n ee dto make a judgment about the re ligious tea ching i t s elf, in orde r to make a

deter mination about the validity of [Ohno’s] claim.” The cour t further rec ognized that solicitation of donations by relig ious entities is l eg al and protec ted from liability

in J apan, so long a s the methods used
are within the sc ope of what is “socially appropriate.” Wher e inducement of

donations incite anxiety , confusion, or te rror , howeve r, such that the donat ion cannot be c onsidered to be based on the individual’s free will, then a tort ca n be
e sta bli sh e d. It w a s w ith in the se pa ra me te rs that th e Japa

ne seO HNO V

. Y AS UMA

48

co urtad j u d i cat ed Oh n o ’s cl ai m s
. Far f ro mb ei n g so diverg ent fr om d ome sti c le g a l princ ipl e s a s t o be repu gna nt t o p ub lic policy , the ca

uses of a ction underlying the J apane se judg ment we r e g e n e r a ll y

s im il ar to , a lt h o u ghp o s s ib ly

b r o a d e r than, those that would be c ognizable under California law.

In other words, had Ohno alleg ed that she ha d been tortiously induced to donate hundreds of thousands of dollars to a chur ch in California, she could h ave sue d the re ligious entity or its office rs her e, too. Whether she would preva il on the pa rt ic ula r f a c ts o f h e r c a se or

wh e the r t

he de fe nd ants could succ essfully raise constitutional de fense s to any of her claims is a separ ate question, which we addre ss ne x t. We are not persuaded that the ca use of a ction underly

ing the J apane se judgme nt is antithetical to Ca lifornia public policy
re g ardingre lig iou s f

re e do m.
iv. Re pugna nc y o f theJa pane se Judg m e nt
W e turn nex t to the repugnancy of the judgment itself. Th e Churc h c onte nd s th at th e jud g me nt is r e pu gna nt t o p ub lic policy beca use it is incompatible with the Relig ion Clauses of the Ca lif or nia and F e de ra l Co ns tit

uti on s in two r e sp e c ts: First, the judgment nece ssarily involved an asse ssment by the court of the validity of the C hurch’ s relig ious teaching s; and, second, the imposit ion of tort liability place d a burden on the Churc h’s ex e rc ise of

its re lig ion

wi tho ut a

c omp e lli ngstate int e re st i n d oin gso . A s w ill a pp e ar, the fi rst c onte nti on is unsupported in t he record. And t he sec ond cannot be grounds for decla ring the judgme nt r epugnant to public policy pr e c ise ly be c a us e it pr e se nts a c los e qu e sti on un de r C a lif

or nia and fe dera l l aw . In this contex t, where a repugnancy deter mination hinges on a d efinit ive findingof conf lictO HNO V

. Y AS UMA 49

betwee n fore ign a

nd d o m es t ic law, the de batability of the
va lid ity of the Churc h’ s le g a l po sit ion is i ts d ownf

a ll.

a. Ohno’s tort suit rests larg ely on fac t-bound deter minations reg ardingthe nature of the a cti o n s t hat g ave rise to her

asser ted injuries. Ohno co n t ends that “the actua l [J apane se] judgment was manifestly and expli citly conce rned with conduct— the coe rcion, the ove rpowe ringof [her] own wi ll, the de pr ivatio n o f m e dic atio ns , th e de str uc tio n o f f

amil y relat i ons, and the targ eted f leec ing of

[her] assets.” The Church, howev er , char acte rizes the J apane se judg ment as imposing liability

for Ohno’ s react i ons to its “protected
re lig iou s sp e e c h a

bo ut t he c on se qu e nc e s o f di so be die nc e to God’s commandme nts.” By its plain langua g e, the J apane se judgme nt does appe ar to attach liability

to the speec h of a r elig ious entity : The illega l act is described as “ inducement” or “solicitation,” based on “ fra

udulent and intimidatin g st ate me nts .” B ut the J apane se trial cour

t neither limi t ed its focus to spee ch that
wa s re l i gi o u s i nn ature n o r r es t edi t s ru l i n g o nfi n d i n gs reg ardingthe content o f an y relig ious speech at issue. The court made finding s relate d to the Church’s c ommunications with Ohno reg ardingher livings ituation, contact with her family , an d medical c are , as we ll as pressure exerted on her to transfe r funds to the Church, any or all of which ma y have been se cular in nature

. And whil e the judgment rec ounts the substance of

som e of the Churc h’s teac hings, the court’s languag e sug g ests that it attributed the ha rms Ohno suffe red
n o t t o the c on te nt of the Churc h’s threats, but to the contex t in wh i ch they

wer e made—that Ohno was isolated f rom her family , not taking me dication f or her depre ssion, andO HNO V

. Y AS UMA

50
suffe ringfrom g en er al ataxia. The judgment states that the Church’s c on du ct i n soliciting money from Ohno, who w as

“ un d e r s u c ha p s yc h o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n , ” “ i n c i t e [ d ] an x i e ty”
and “ c a us e [d] te rr or ,” su c h that th e Tr ans fe rs c ann ot b e sa id to have be en made of Ohno’s f ree will. The rec ord does not
su pp or t an in fe re nc e tha

t the Japa ne se c ourt imp os e d li a

bil ity beca use of the “ specific motivating ideology ,” opini o n , or perspe ctive behind the Churc h’s communication with Ohno, Rosenberge r v. Rec tor &Visitors of Univ. of Va. , 51 5 U.S. 819, 829 (1995), or

a findingreg arding the truth or fa lsity of the Church’ s relig ious beliefs, se eBa lla rd, 322 U.S. at 87–88.
Whil e t h e facts of Ohno’s c ase ma y not be as e greg ious as those in W

o l le rsh e im and Molko , wher e the plaintiffs alleg ed they wer e phy sically coer ced and dece ived as t o t he ide nti ty of the churc h th e y

we re joi nin g , th e dif

fe re nc e is a matte r o f d e gr e e , n o t k in d

. T o b e s ur e , Ca li f o r n ia to rt law wo uld re qu ir e pr oo f o f e le me nts no t found in t he Japa ne se jud g me nt. T h e to rt o f f r a u d un d e r Ca li f

o r n ia law, for example, require s intent to defra ud. See M

olko , 46 Cal. 3d at 11 08 ; Colli ns v. eM

achines, Inc

. , 202 Cal. App. 4th 249, 259 (2011). Similarly , to sustain a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in California, a plaintiff must show i nt e ntt o c a

u s e , o r r e c k l e s s d i s r e g ar d

f o r , e m o t i o n a l i n

j ur y. W olle rsh e im I

, 212 Cal. App

. 3d at 881. And under California law , “undue influence ” consists in “the use, by one in w ho m a c on

fid e nc e is re po se d b yan oth e r, or

who ho lds a r e a l o r a p p a r e n t a u th o r i t

y o v e r h im , of such c onfidenc e or authority for the pu rp os eo f o b t a i n i n g anun fa i r a dv an t age over him” or

“takingan unfa ir adva ntag e of a

no t her’ s we akn e ss o f m ind .” Ca l. Civ

. Cod e § 15 75 (1 ), (2 ) ( e mph a sis added)

.O HNO V

. Y AS UMA 51

Th e Japa ne se tr ia l c ou rt’ s ju dgme nt d oe s n ot c le arl y establish either knowledg e or intent on the par t of Yasuma or Sa int s of Glo ry to “i nc ite anxie ty” or “ c a us e te rr or .” F a c ts i n the re cord suc h as Ya suma’s discoura g ement of the use of
me dic atio n, Ohno ’s re gular atte nd anc e at Chur c h s e rv ic e s, and the Churc h’s over sight of he r living situation pe rmit an inf e re nc e that D e fe nd ants wer e awa re of Ohno ’s vu lne ra

ble mental and phy sical conditi on, and knew or should have known of the likelihood of c ausingher e motional harm or
e xer tin gun du e inf

lue nc e
. B ut the re c or d re fl e c ts n o d isc re te finding s reg ardingth e Church’ s knowledg e of O hno’s depre ssion and atax i a, whether Yasuma he ld a position of confide nce and authority over Ohno, and whe ther the Churc h intended to take a dvantag e of he r.
F or re a so ns we have surv e ye d, ho we ve r, that th e Japa ne se court did not find all t he re quisite elements of the c auses of action for undue influenc e, fr aud, or infliction of e motional distress under Califor

nia law doe s not m ake the judgme nt antithetical

to the basic pre cepts of tor t law in this country , or to constituti onal principles. Enforc ing a defa mation or libel judgme nt absent a f

inding of malice stands in dire ct tension with constituti onal principles, beca use it punishes speec h on the basis of conte nt. In contra st, imposi ngtort liability absent
a fi nd ingof int e nt, fo r ac tio ns that ma y or may no t c on sti tut e pr ote c te d r e lig iou s condu c t, d oe s n ot g ive ri se to t he same sta rk c la shof le g a l princ ipl e s.

b.
Even if a

court in the Unit ed S t at es could find the requisite ele ments of Ohno’s tort c laims, the Church maintains, the Religion Clauses would ba r re cover y . But the
rec ord does not show that the C hurch ha s so clearly made outO HNO V

. Y AS UMA

52

A “vali d an d ne utral [s t ate] law o f g e n e r a l a p p l i ca b i l i t y, ” suc h a s a 27 do mest i c t ort j udgment s i mi l ar t o t he Japane s e ju dgment at i s s ue her e, t hat has t he i nci d ent al ef

f ect of b urdening t he f ree exe rc ise o f

rel i gi o n no lo n g e r m u st w ithsta n d the “c o m p e lli n g inte re st” tes t ar ticu la te d in Sh er ber tv. V

er ner , 374 U

. S. 3 98 , 403 ( 19 63 ) , t o s ur vi ve cons t i t ut i onal
sc ru tiny. E mp ’t D iv

. v . S m ith , 4 9 4 U .S . 8 7 2 , 8 7 9 , 8 8 5 (1 9 9 0 ); a cc o rd Chur ch of

Luk um i Babal u Aye , I

nc. v

. Ci t y of H i al eah , 508 U

. S. 520, 531 ( 19 93 )

. “ [ A ] rel i gi ous object or h as no f eder al cons t i t ut i onal r i gh t t o an ex empt i on f

r om a ne u t r al an d va l i d [ s t at e] l aw of g en er al a ppl i ca bi l i t y on the g ro u nd t hat co m p l i ance wit h t hat l aw i s co nt rary t o t he o b ject o r’s
r el i gi ous bel i ef

s
. ” N. C oas tWom en’ s C ar e M ed. G r p. , Inc

. v. San D i ego C n t y. S u p erio r C o u rt , 44 C al

. 4th 1 1 4 5 , 11 5 5 (2 0 0 8 ) ( em p hasi s o m i t t ed ). A s w e e x p la in b e lo w , h o w e v e r, w e p re su m e fo r p u rp o se s o f o u r a n a lysis tha t t h e to rt ju d g m e n t at issu e he re , ha d it b e e n re n d e re d b y a d o m e stic
cour t , woul d hav e t o s ur vi ve s t r i ct scr ut i ny
. “ U nder s t r i ct s cr ut i ny , ‘ a l aw co ul d not b e ap p l i ed i n a m an n e r tha t s ub st ant i al l y burd en[s ] a r el i gi o us b eli ef o r p rac t i ce unless t he st ate sho w [s] t ha t t he l aw rep rese nt[s] t he l ea st restri ct i ve means of

ac hi evi ng a c om pel l i ng i nt er es t

. ’ ” Id

. at 1158 (al t erat i o ns i n ori gi nal ) ( q uo t i ng C at ho l i c C ha r i t i es of Sa cr am ent o, I nc. v. S u p erio r C o u rt , 32 C al

. 4th 5 2 7 , 56 2 (20 0 4 ))

. a via ble F re e Exe rc ise de fe ns e a s to re nd e r t he Japa ne se judgment antithetical to the fundamental principles underlying America

n protec tion of fre edom of re ligion.
To inv ok e the pr ote c tio n o f the Re lig ion Cla us e s a g a ins t a judgment in tor

t, the Church would have to demonstrate that imp os ing lia bil ity in d ama g e s su

bs tanti a lly

burd e ne d it s sin c e re ly he ld r e lig iou s b e lie fs or pr a c tic e s and t h at the state’s justi fi ca tions for that burden did not outweigh any infring ement on the Churc h’s r el igious fr eedom, unde r the
a p p l i c a b l e s t an d ar d

o f s c r ut i ny. See Hernandez v . Comm’r , 27 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (“ The f re e exerc ise inquiry

asks whether g overnme nt has place d a s ub s t anti al burde n on the observation of a centr al re ligious belief or pra ctice a

nd, if so, whether a compe lling g overnm en t al intere st justi fies theO HNO V

. Y AS UMA 53

burden.” ); Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n , 1 2 Ca l. 4 th 1143, 1166–67 (1996).
The thre shold require ment for a defe nse base d on the Re li g io nCl a

u s e s is to s h o wth at o n e s in c e r e ly h o ld s b e lie fs
as relig ious views. Ma lik v . B ro wn , 1 6 F

. 3 d 3 3 0 , 3 33 (9 th Cir. 1994). Courts ty

pically g ive cr edenc e to a ssertions of sin c e re ly he ld r e lig iou s b e lie fs in a bs e nc e of any c ha lle ng e to th ei r s i n cerity

or re ligious motives, and so longas they are not “ so biz arr e, so cle arly nonrelig ious in mot ivation, as not to be entitled to protec tion under the F ree Ex ercise Clause.” Thomas v. Review Bd. ofInd. Emp’t Sec. Div

. , 450 U.S. 707, 71 5– 16 (1 98 1) ; Sh ak

ur v . S c hr iro , 514 F.3d 878, 885 ( 9th Cir. 2008) (takingthe plaintiff’s a ssertion that h i s d i etar y needs
wer e re ligiously

motivated as prima fac ie evidenc e of sincer e re lig iou s b e liefs); Ma lik, 1 6 F .3 d at 33 3 ( g ivi ngc re de nc e to the pla int if

f’ s te sti mony

re g ardin gthe re a so ns fo r h is adoption of a Muslim name in abse nce o f any thing in the
rec ord cha lleng ing the sincerity of his rel i g ious beliefs). Construing the fac ts in the light most fa vorable to the Church,
as we must on review of

summary judgme nt, w e presume that the ir a c tio ns we re ba se d o n s inc e re ly he ld r e lig iou s b e lie fs

. N e xt , th e C hur c h w o u l d h av e t o s h o w th at th e or de r t o pay damag es to Ohn o i mposed a “ substantial or, in other words, leg ally

signific ant,” Sm ith v . F air Em p’ t &Ho us

. Comm’n , 12 Cal. 4th at 1166–67, burden on its exercise of relig ion. “[A] substantial bu rd en must place more than a n inconvenienc e on r eli g ious ex erc ise”; it must have a

“ te nd e nc y to c oe rc e ind ivi du a ls i nto act ingc ontr ary to t he ir relig ious beliefs” or

“exert[] substantial pressure on an adher ent to modify

his behavior a

nd to vio l ate his belief

s.” Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Y uba City v. Cnty. of Sutter , 456O HNO V

. Y AS UMA

54
F.3d 978 , 988 (9th Cir. 2006) (interna l quotation marks omitted).
To be sure , “the bur den of tort damag es is direc t.” Paul , 819 F

. 2 d at 8 8 1

. Wh il e a to rt d ama g e s ju d g me nt d o e s not c ri min a lize the c on du c t f or wh ic h li a

bil ity is i mpo sed , it eff ectively makes the c halleng ed ac tions “unlawful.” Id

. Her e, h o wever, it is questionable whethe r the Churc h could demonstrate that the burde n impo s ed infring es on protec ted re ligious beliefs, not merely on conduct
a c c omp anie d b y su c h b e lie fs

. Em plo y me nt D iv isi on v . S

mi th , 49 4 U .S. 87 2 ( 19 90 ), re

je c te d the no tio n that “ wh e n o the rw ise pr oh ibi ta ble c on du c t is a c c o m

p a n i e d b y r e l i g iou s c onvic tio ns , not onl y t h e convic tions but the conduc t itself must be free from g overnme ntal regulation.” Id

. at 882. Acc ording ly , that the C hurch’ s conduct may have been motivated by relig ious convictions does not s h i el d it from tort liability for injuries
e ng e nd e re d b y

its a c tio ns
. Even if we presume that the Church coul d show the imp os iti on

of tor t li a bil ity to b e a su bs tanti a l bu

rd e n o n it s relig ious ex erc ise, it would s t ill have to surmount a final hurdle: proving that its burden outwe ighe d the g overnme ntal i n t ere st in the regulation of tortious activity . Ag ain, construingthe facts in favor of the Churc h, we pr esume that stric t sc rutiny

wo uld a pp ly and the jud g me nt c ou ld b e up he ld only upon demonstration that enfor ceme nt of tort law ser ves a compe lling state inter est. Paul , 819 F.2d at 882–83 & n.6 (c i t i n g Sherbert v. V

erner , 3 74 U. S. 3 98 , 4 03 (1 96 3) ). Th is presumption is appropriate, as a law of g ener al application that im pli c ate s “ ‘t

he F re e Exe rc ise Cla

us e in c on jun c tio n w ith
o t h er constituti onal protec tions, such as fre edom of spee ch and of the press’” rema ins subject to strict scrutiny

. Sa n J os eO HNO V

. Y AS UMA 55

T he C al i f

o rni a Sup rem e C o urt has exp res sed skepti ci sm ab o ut t he 28
no t i o n t hat a “ hy b ri d cl ai m ” i m p l i cat i ng m o re t han o ne co nst i t ut i o nal ri ght is e n tit le d to he igh te n e d sc ru tiny u n d e r th e F e d e ra l C o n s ti tu tio n
. See N. Coa s tWomen ’ s Car e M e d. Gr p. , I nc. , 4 4 C al

. 4t h a t 1156–57. R egard l ess , f

ed eral l aw do es no t co nt rol C al i f o rni a’ s i nt erpret at i o n of t he St at e Co ns t i t ut i on. T he C al i f orn i a Supreme C our t has not y et det er mi ned wh at s t an dar d s h ou l d a ppl y u n der t h e Cal i f or n i a Cons t i t u t i on t o a v al i d,
neu t r al s t ate l aw of

ge ner al appl i cabi l i t y t hat bur dens r el i gi ous ex er ci s e. S e e id

. at 1158. W h at ev er t h e Cal i f or n i a s t an dar d mi g h t be , i t w ou l d n ot b e stric te r t h a n stric t sc ru tiny. I d. at 11 5 9

– 6 0 (ci t i ng Ca t ho l i c Ch ari t i es of Sacram ent o, I

nc. , 32 Cal

. 4t h at 559, 562)

. For ou r pu r po s e s , w e a s s u me tha t a t o rt ju d g m e n t im p o sin g liab ili ty fo r f a c ia lly re ligio u s c o n d u c t wo u ld
nee d t o s ur vi ve s t r i ct s cr ut i ny under ei t her t he C al i f orn i a or t he Federa l C o nst i t ut i o n, or b o t h. Chr ist ian Col l. v . Ci ty

of M or ga n H ill , 360 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9 thC i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Sm ith , 494 U.S. at 881) . Be cause the Chur c hc o nte n d s th at t

h e im p o s it io no f

to rt l ia b il it y here burd e ns its re lig iou s sp e e c h, thi s c a se might q ua lif y a s a “‘hy brid’” one in an American c ourt, trig g eringstrict scrutiny under f eder al constitu t i o n al law. See id. at 1031 (quoting Miller v. Re ed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1204 ( 9th Cir. 1999)). 28

B ut w e are no t per su a de d that a Ca lif or nia c ourt could not conclude that “the state’s interest in a llowing tort liability ” as a mea ns of protec ting vulner able individuals agai n s t undue influence , abuse of confide nce f or pec uniary

g ain, and f

raud is compelling e nough “to outweigh any burden” imposed on t h e C h u rch’s action. See M olko , 4 6 Ca l. 3 d

at 1 1 1 7 ( c it ing W isconsin v. Y

oder , 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972 )). Nor are we persua ded that a California court would not de em tort law the least re strictive means of pursuingthe s t at e’s c ompelling i n t ere sts. This result is particularly likely g iven that the relig ious ex pression at issue he re w as target ed at Ohno specific ally , rathe r than a more g ener al audienc e. Holding the Church liable in t h is case ma y discourag e it fromO HNO V

. Y AS UMA

56

W e l i kewis e reject t he C hurch’ s argum ent t hat t he d i st rict co urt 29 abu s ed i t s di s cr et i on i n de n y i n g t h e Chu r ch ’ s mot i on f or a c on t i n u an ce f

or t he pur po s e o f

deve l op i ng ev i dence

. T he C hu r ch’ s mo t i on un der f ormer so lic iti ng fu

nd s in the mann e r p ur su e d h e re , f ro m in div idu a ls in a compar ab le psycholog ical or me dical state, or from otherwise e x ertingundue influenc e to obtain donations in the futur e . It do e s n ot, ho we ver, s ub sta nti a lly inh ibi t Y a suma and Saints of Glory

from pra cticing t heir re ligion or dis se min atin gthe ir

te a c hin g s. Construing the f

acts in the Churc h’s favor, Ohno may well have failed to pre vail in a Cali fo rnia c ourt on all her cl aim s. But it is far f

rom “c lear -cut,” A c k

e rm a n n v

. Le vine , 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d C ir. 1986), and so c erta inly debata ble, whether the Relig i on Clauses would bar a n Americ an cour

t from issuing the same j u dg ment had the suit bee n brought he r e
. M o r e o v e r , a s w e c ann o ts ay , o nth e r e c o r d b e f o r e us , that a cour

t in this country co u l dnot have r ender ed the jud g me nt f

or Ohno ha d th e e ve nts occur re d e nti re ly

wi thi n the Un ite d St ate s, the n w e c e rt a inl y c ann ot c on c lud e that a domestic court c ould not have issued the judg ment wher e, as he re , th e c ha lle ng e d c on du c t wa s dir e c te d at an ind ivi du a l in J apan.
In sum, the J apane se awa

rd cannot be said to fall into the
narr ow class of judgme nts that must be ref used enf orce ment beca use repugnant t o public policy . Neither the law a pplied nor the pa rticular judgment issued is “so antag onistic” to the pu bli c po lic y

e mbo die d in the Re lig ion Cla us e s, Crockford’s Club L td. , 2 0 3 C a l

. Ap p
. 3 d at1 4 0 6 , o r

s o “ i nh e re ntl y vicious, wicked or

immoral, and shockingto the preva iling moral sense ,” Viewfinder , 489 F.3d at 479–80, as t o prec lude
rec ognition. 29O HNO V

. Y AS UMA 57

F e d e ra l R u le o f C ivil P ro c e d u re 5 6 (f) w a s e n tire ly l a c k ing in sp e c ifi c ity. A s t he di s t r i ct cour t not ed, gi ven t hat “ [ t he C hu r ch] vi gor ous l y l i t i gat ed t he und erlyi ng p ro ce ed i ng s i n J ap an , a n d ev en ap p ea l ed t he ad ve rse j u dg me n t , ” c ou n s e l s h ou l d h a v e be e n a bl e t o i de n t i f y w i t h g r e a t er p arti cu l arit y wha t t yp e o f ev i d en ce t he y be l i ev ed ex i st ed i n t he Ja p an ese c o u rt re c o rd s tha t co u ld b o lster the ir a rg u m e n ts. “[I ]t is n o t en o u g h to re ly
on v ag u e as s er t i on s t h at di s cov er y w i l l pr odu ce n ee ded, bu t u n s pec i f i ed, f act s
. ” St ear ns Ai r

por tEqui

p. Co. v

. FM C Cor

p. , 1 7 0 F .3 d 5 1 8 , 5 3 5 (5 th C i r. 19 9 9 ) ( i nt ernal quo t at i o n m arks o m i t t ed ). T he evi d ence sought i n a R ul e 5 6 (f

) mo t i o n m ust be m o re t han t he o b ject of m ere s p ecul at i o n. M a rgo l i s v

. Ryan , 1 4 0 F .3 d 8 5 0 , 8 5 4 (9 th C ir. 1 9 9 8 ); see a lso F a m ily H om e & Fi n. Ct r

. , I

nc. v. Fed. H om e Loan M or t g. Cor p. , 525 F. 3d 822, 827 ( 9t h Ci r
. 2008)

. T h e Rul e 56( f ) mot i on w as t h er ef

or e pr oper l y de n i ed. Conclusion
Th e ro ot s of Cali fo rn ia ’s Un if or m A c t and

its pre sumption that fore ign- country money judgme nts are e n f o r c e a b l e l i e i np r i n c i p l e s o f

i nt e r n at i o n a l c o m i ty:
When an a c ti o n is b r o u gh t in a c o urt of this country , by a citiz en of a fore ign c ountry ag ainst o ne of our

own citizens, to recove r a sum of money

adjudg ed by

a cour tof that country to be due f

rom the def

endant to the pla int if f, and the fo re ign ju dgme nt a pp e ars to have be e n r e nd e red

by a c omp e te nt c ourt , hav i n gjurisdiction of the ca use and of

the pa rt ie s, and up on du e alleg atio ns and

pr oo fs , and opportunity

to defe nd ag ainst them, and its procee dings a

re a ccor ding to the c ourse of a civilized jurispruden ce , and ar e stated in a
c le ar a nd fo rm a l r e c or d, the jud g me nt i s p ri ma fac ie evidence , at least, of the truth of the
matte r a dju dg e d; and it s ho uld be he ld
co n cl u s i v e up o nth e m er i t s tri ed i n th e f o re i gnO HNO V

. Y AS UMA

58 court, unless some spe cial ground is shown for impea chingthe judg ment, as by s h o wing that i t w a s a f

f e c te d b y f r a u d o r p r e ju d ic e , or that by the principles of international law, and by th e c o m i ty

o f o ur o wnc o untr

y , i ts h o u ld
no t be g ive n f

ull c re dit and e ff e c t.
Hilton , 159 U.S. at 205–06. The Churc h has not demonstrated a

ny such ground for

non-re cognition here.

En fo rc e me nt, by

the di stric t c ourt , o f t he Japa ne se damag es aw ard did not re nder the i mp o s i tion of tort liability domestic state ac tion, subject to constituti onal
c onstra int s. Thus , th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r d id n ot d ir e c tly violate the Fe dera l or California Constitution. Nor i s t he Japa ne se jud g me nt o r t

he un derlyingc a

us e of a c tio n s o antithetical to the prote ctions af fo rd ed by

the Relig ion Clauses as to per

mit—let alone require—n o n-re cognition
un de r C a lif

or nia ’s Un if

or m A c t by re a so n of r e pu gna

nc y to public policy

. For the fore g oing rea sons, the judgme nt of the dis tr ic t c ourt

is
AF F IRMED.