U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

i 

25–872 2018

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–50] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES HEARING 

ON

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE FISCAL 

YEAR 2018 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 

SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

HEARING HELD 

MAY 25, 2017 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama, Vice Chair 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

A. DONALD MCEACHIN, Virginia 

BRUCE JOHNSON, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

JODI BRIGNOLA, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................... 3 

Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Bunch, Lt Gen Arnold W., Jr., USAF, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, U.S. Air Force; Lt Gen Jerry 

D. Harris, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force; and Maj Gen Scott A. Vander Hamm, USAF, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Air Force ................................. 4

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Bunch, Lt Gen Arnold W., Jr., joint with Lt Gen Jerry D. Harris and 

Maj Gen Scott A. Vander Hamm ................................................................. 29 

Wittman, Hon. Robert J. .................................................................................. 27 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Courtney ..................................................................................................... 53 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 57 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE FISCAL YEAR 2018 

BUDGET REQUEST FOR SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION 

FORCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, May 25, 2017. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 8:02 a.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J. Wittman 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. WITTMAN. We will call to order the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces. 

And I want to thank all of the witnesses for joining us today. 

And thank you, for the members joining us for an early morning 

start. 

So today the subcommittee convenes to receive testimony on the 

fiscal year 2018 Air Force budget request regarding bomber, tanker, and airlift acquisition programs. The distinguished panel of Air 

Force leaders testifying before us today are: Lieutenant General 

Arnold W. Bunch, Jr., U.S. Air Force Military Deputy, Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; Lieutenant 

General Jerry D. Harris, United States Air Force Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements; and Major General 

Scott A. Vander Hamm, United States Air Force Assistant Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Operations. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being with us today. 

The fiscal year 2018 budget request for projection forces continues to modernize and recapitalize critical Air Force weapon systems. I am pleased to see significantly increased investment in the 

B–21 long-range strike bomber and steady investment in procuring 

KC–46A tankers. The budget also continues to take solid steps to 

modernize the legacy Guard and Reserve C–130H tactical airlift 

fleet and recapitalize the high-visibility Presidential aircraft. 

That said, I continue to be concerned about the ability of our 

military to properly provide for our Nation’s defense given the damage that sequestration may have had on our fiscal year 2018 budget deliberations. Throughout the year in this past year in testimony 

to Congress, the Air Force senior leadership indicated the Air Force 

is one of the busiest, smallest, oldest, and least ready fleets in our 

history. It is my firm conviction, in light of the higher-end threats 

posed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, that we provide 
2 

the Air Force the resources it needs to fully support and, if possible, accelerate critical recapitalization programs. 

With regard to bombers, I fully support the critical B–21 bomber 

program and am pleased to see that we are moving forward on this 

new platform, which is needed for projecting power over long distances and into denied environments. I look forward to assessing 

in better detail the classified portion of the B–21 program to ensure 

progress on design and to assess proposed risk mitigation strategies. 

With regard to tankers, I am concerned that the KC–46A program continues to suffer delays. Even after overcoming initial setbacks, it is now facing a highly compressed test and certification 

schedule that has almost zero room for error. I look forward to 

hearing your thoughts on this program and whether or not the first 

18 aircraft will be delivered in time to meet the adjusted October 

2018 contract deadline. 

With regard to recapitalizing the Presidential aircraft, I want to 

ensure that the President has the capability to carry out the requirements of the office and that the American people, whose taxes 

fund these aircraft, do not have to pay one dime more than necessary. 

Lastly, I am concerned that this budget fails to provide the necessary resources to procure needed avionics upgrades. These upgrades will ensure that the entire fleet of tankers, airlifters, and 

bombers are able to operate safely in compliance with the FAA 

[Federal Aviation Administration]-mandated next-gen [generation] 

air traffic management standards by January 1, 2020. The civilian 

aviation sector is rapidly moving towards compliance, and I am 

concerned that our military aircraft could be shut out of airspace 

they need for transit and training. 

While I am pleased that the Air Force’s fiscal year 2018 budget 

request makes up some lost ground over last year, I am concerned 

that the proposed budget directs the Air Force to make false 

choices between capability, capacity, and safety, when the undeniable reality is that our military needs all of the above. I firmly believe that what this subcommittee and the rest of Congress does 

about national defense and military readiness will be a defining 

issue. 

We need a strong Air Force equipped with the most capable aircraft that enable our men and women to carry out their missions 

effectively and safely. To do this we need leadership in national security. We need an unambiguous declaration that our national security is our preeminent responsibility. 

Once again, I want to thank our witnesses for participating in 

our hearing this afternoon, and I look forward to discussing these 

important topics. 

Obviously my clock is different than yours. The hearing is this 

morning. 

With that, I turn to my good friend and colleague, the ranking 

member of the subcommittee, Joe Courtney. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 27.] 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CONNECTICUT, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this hearing on the 2018 Air Force budget request for the 

projection forces programs within our jurisdiction. 

And thank you, to all the witnesses, again for being here today. 

The tankers, bombers, and airlift programs that fall under the 

projection forces side of our panel’s oversight serve as the backbone 

of our Nation’s ability to bring and sustain the power that preserves our Nation’s interests around the world. As we know all too 

well, however, these important aircraft all share the common 

enemy of age. 

The tankers and bombers in service today are largely legacy aircraft. These aircraft in most cases are much older than the airmen 

and women who fly and service them. 

That is why it will be critical that we ensure that the 2018 budget properly invests in the refueling, mobility, maritime patrol, and 

long-range strike programs under our purview. Among other 

things, the budget continues to reflect the high strategic priority 

placed on two critical recapitalization programs: the KC–46A Pegasus tanker and the B–21 long-range strike bomber. Both of these 

programs are vital to ensuring that our Nation can continue to support operations around the world and respond when needed. 

Another continued area of concern for me and this subcommittee 

is the modernization of our C–130H fleet. Back home in Connecticut the Flying Yankees of the 103rd Airlift Wing have largely 

completed their transition to the new C–130H flying mission. Half 

of their aircraft recently deployed overseas on their first combat 

mission, which was a capstone to years of effort to stand the unit 

up stemming from the 2005 BRAC [base realignment and closure]. 

As we all well know, the C–130H fleet is an aging one in need 

of modernization. This panel led the efforts in the 2015 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] to unlock the avionics modernization program needed to upgrade these aircraft with the assistance, 

again, of some of the witnesses here this morning, to meet international airspace restrictions by 2020. 

A second phase of the program is focused on additional cockpit 

and technology upgrades. We have heard testimony about the 

progress made on both of these increments of the avionics modernization program and would appreciate any updates on how the 

2018 budget supports these efforts. 

Along these lines, Congress has invested substantial resources 

into other C–130H modernization initiatives, such as upgraded engines and propellers. It is my understanding that funding provided 

in 2016 and 2017 is currently on hold pending the results of operational testing being conducted right now. Given the strong interest that we have in ensuring that the C–130H remains relevant 

into the future, I would appreciate an update on this testing and 

the way ahead. 

Finally, over the last year Congress has made meaningful and bipartisan progress in limiting the impact of sequestration and Budget Control Act. While mitigating the across-the-board cuts in 2016 

and 2017 with the 2-year budget deal was important, the fact re-
4 

mains that our Air Force, like the military at large, remains handcuffed by sequestration in 2018 and beyond because that 2-year 

deal obviously has expired. 

World events will continue to further demonstrate just how important it is for all of us on this committee and colleagues on both 

sides of our aisle to come together to make the compromises needed 

to protect our security and support the needs of our Nation. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and our colleagues 

on the subcommittee, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 

Major General Vander Hamm, Lieutenant General Bunch, Lieutenant General Harris, I understand that you all are going to be 

providing a single combined statement so I will turn it over to you 

for presentation of that statement. 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN ARNOLD W. BUNCH, JR., USAF, MILITARY DEPUTY, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, U.S. AIR FORCE; LT GEN 

JERRY D. HARRIS, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR 

STRATEGIC PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR FORCE; 

AND MAJ GEN SCOTT A. VANDER HAMM, USAF, ASSISTANT 

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General BUNCH. Thank you, Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Courtney, and other distinguished members of this subcommittee, for the opportunity to appear before you today. We appreciate your service and the support this subcommittee provides 

the United States Air Force, our airmen, and their families. 

You have already introduced who we are at here. My colleagues 

and I previous to this jointly prepared and submitted a written 

statement, and I ask that that be entered into the record, sir. 

Mr. WITTMAN. So moved. 

General BUNCH. We will not go through that statement. However, I will provide the brief opening remarks on behalf of the 

group. 

For the past 70 years, from the evolution of the jet aircraft to the 

advent of the ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile], satelliteguided bombs, remotely piloted aircraft, and many other accomplishments, your Air Force has been breaking barriers as a member of the finest joint warfighting team on the planet. 

For the last 27 of those 70 years we have been in continuous 

combat. During this period we employed airpower in ways never 

envisioned and delivered unparalleled support to combatant commanders, sister services, allies, and coalition partners. 

While providing this unmatched operational capability, budget 

realities have taken a toll on our ability to provide for the future 

joint force. These many years of combat have taught us much— 

most importantly that the demand for airpower has grown in every 

mission, in every domain, and in every location. 

The world has watched your Air Force operate and the world has 

adapted. Our adversaries have adapted their capabilities to strike 

at areas we depend on to execute our missions, adapted their defenses to reduce our ability to employ our forces, and adopted many 

of our tactics and techniques, all of which reduce our ability to employ forces. 
5 

Today we face a world of ever-improving adversaries, increasing 

threats, and a persistent war against violent extremism. This 

changing environment of increasing demands and commitments, 

along with a limited pool of resources to address issues and the 

threat of Budget Control Act and sequestration, makes our mission 

of providing unmatched Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global 

Power ever more challenging. 

The result of these changes is a marked decrease in our technological advantage on the battlefield. Where I once as a research 

laboratory commander would have said that we had a decided advantage across all fronts, today, if asked, I will refrain that we lead 

in some technological areas—we retain our lead in some technological areas; however, in other areas potential adversaries are nipping at our heels or are shoulder to shoulder with us. 

To address the shrinking technology gap we must continue to invest in S&T [science and technology] and modernize our forces to 

ensure our most valued treasure, America’s sons and daughters, 

have a decisive advantage when we send them into harm’s way. We 

do not want to fight a fair fight. 

The fiscal year 2018 budget we submitted is the best balance of 

our readiness and modernization we could achieve within the fiscal 

constraints we face. We take this balanced approach seriously as 

we must be ready for today while simultaneously preparing for tomorrow’s challenges. 

The budget request you received continues our emphasis on recovering readiness, filling critical gaps, and improving lethality. 

The budget invests heavily in our airmen, our most valuable resource; readiness; nuclear deterrence operations; space and cyber 

capabilities; combat air forces; and infrastructure. It supports the 

end strength growth we need to start to address combatant commanders’ requirements while also focusing on pilot production. 

We continue to maintain and modernize the nuclear enterprise 

while also prioritizing the resiliency, future capabilities, and modernization of space capabilities to operate in increasingly contested 

domains. 

The budget also supports research, development, and fielding of 

game-changing technologies. As a department, we had to make 

tough choices in balancing capability, capacity, and readiness while 

focusing on modernizing the weapon systems. These decisions were 

not made easily or taken lightly, highlighting that unfulfilled requirements still remain. 

As you are aware, the budgetary needs of the Air Force exceed 

projected top-line funding, as demand for our Air Force capabilities 

currently far exceeds our supply. Uncertainty looms over the department as sequestration and Budget Control Act [BCA] caps return with this next year’s budget. 

Budget stability remains vital, and relief of BCA limits is necessary for the Air Force to realize its long-term strategy and meet 

today’s and tomorrow’s demands. If the law does not change or we 

get relief, it would lead to a repeat of the negative consequences 

of sequestration seen in fiscal year 2013. We request your engagement and assistance to ensure that we do not go down that path. 

General Harris, General Vander Hamm, and I look forward to 

answering questions from the committee this morning. Again, 
6 

thank you for your continued support of the greatest Air Force on 

the planet. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Bunch, General Harris, 

and General Vander Hamm can be found in the Appendix on page 

29.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Lieutenant General Bunch, thank you for your 

opening statement. 

We will now go to Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Mr. Chairman, I will yield to the members on my 

side who were earlier than I was. They deserve it. 

Mr. WITTMAN. No problem. And we will go to Mr. Garamendi. 

The gentleman yields to the lady from Guam, Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I thank my colleague for being such a gentleman. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, to our witnesses, 

for being here today. 

As you know, I am a strong supporter of modernizing our bomber 

force, which is a key component to both deterrence and engaging 

in current conflicts. And I am committed to ensuring that funding 

for the new long-range strike, the B–21 Raider, stays on track and 

that we continue to make critical investments in our high-demand, 

low-volume fleet. Long-range strike is a key component of national 

strategy, and B–21 will ensure that capability is present in the future. 

Last Sunday, gentlemen, we saw North Korea launch its second 

missile test in a week. It is clear that our deterrent capabilities are 

as important as ever as we continue to see threats proliferate 

across the globe. 

We also saw the importance of that deterrent capability last 

year, when all three bomber variants were deployed to Andersen 

Air Force Base on Guam—the first time they had been deployed together in the Pacific. 

I have a question for General Vander Hamm. As best you can in 

an unclassified setting, could you comment on how a system like 

the B–21 will improve the deterrent posture of our forces, particularly as it relates to the Pacific theater? 

General VANDER HAMM. Ma’am, thank you for the opportunity to 

be here and testify. 

And first I would like to say thank you to each of you for the support that you give to our airmen total force and their civilians that 

live in your districts. Those that are serving downrange, it goes a 

long way to know that their families are being taken care of, so 

thanks for your support. 

To your question on the B–21 and its relevance to deterrence in 

the future, having myself flown all three bombers and had the 

chance to command all three bombers, the deterrent capability of 

long-range strike, which gives the most flexible arm of our deterrent triad, you know, the subs [submarines] for survivability, for 

responsiveness in the ICBMs, but that flexibility you get in the 

bomber force allows you to lift and shift capabilities around the 

world. 

Currently you have a continuous bomber presence in the Pacific 

AOR [area of responsibility] and on the island that you represent. 

That presence sends a message—not only a deterrent message, but 
7 

it sends an assurance message that our umbrella extends to our 

partners in the region. 

The commitment to the B–21 is a commitment to the long-range 

viability of that capability for now into the future. And as Air Force 

Global Strike Command works on its roadmap of the bomber force 

into the future, the B–21 is the big part of that, which is why we 

say we are looking for at least 100. 

So as they work through the exact number of bombers that we 

need, the lion’s share of that will be the B–21 Raider. And its ability to message not only conventionally but with a nuclear deterrent 

sends a message into the mind of our adversary that today may not 

be the day that I want to mess with the United States. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, General. I guess this 

question would go to you, too. 

Now the Air Force leadership has indicated the intent to keep 

the B–52 in the inventory beyond 2050. It has also acknowledged 

that new engines would provide a 95 percent reduction in engine 

maintenance, virtually eliminating engine overhauls and reducing 

fuel consumption by 30 percent. 

Does the Air Force have a plan to re-engine the B–52 to take advantage of benefits that would afford in terms of future cost avoidance and operational benefits? 

General BUNCH. So, ma’am, I will take that one—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. I am sorry. 

General BUNCH [continuing]. If you don’t mind. 

So we are—do realize that the engines we have on the B–52 are 

not going to last through the life of the program. We are either 

going to have to do a service life extension program or we will have 

to procure new engines. 

We are looking at all of those options right now. We have some 

money in the 2018 budget to do some of those initial analyses and 

look at all those alternatives. 

And you are correct, ma’am, it is not just fuel savings; it is tanker savings, it is operational implications, it is manpower savings by 

not having to use as many maintainers on the flight line to be able 

to maintain those older engines, as well as what you talked about 

with the time it stays on the wing and the operational viability. 

Another factor that we will weigh into this are the diminishing 

manufacturing sources and the obsolescence that we face on many 

of the components that reside on the B–52 engine, such as constant 

speed drives and generators, and that we need to assess all of those 

to ensure that we have the growth potential for any power demands and we can maintain the mission capability rate. 

The Air Force is actively engaged in that. I got an update on it 

just last week on where we are at in the progress, and we are discussing with all the appropriate—and looking at all the alternatives for how we could or would fund that. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, General. And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you so much, Ms. Bordallo. 

We will now go to Mrs. Hartzler. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is good to see 

all of you. Appreciate all that you do for our Air Force, and espe-
8 

cially good to see General Vander Hamm, who was commander of 

Whiteman Air Force Base when I was first elected. 

So I appreciate your long support for the Air Force and appreciate my co-chair of the Long-Range Strike Caucus, Madeleine— 

Madam Bordallo, and her questions about B–21. I kind of want to 

follow up on that. 

A very important program, and as your witness testimony states, 

the Air Force remains committed to a fleet size of 100 B–21s, but 

I have heard different numbers from other people feeling like we 

need even more; and certainly, you know, even a range of some are 

advocating for up to 150. And as we have seen what happened certainly with the B–2 years ago, I have concerns that we are, you 

know, not going to end up with the amount that we truly need. 

So given the significant shortfall that we have in the bomber inventory and—do you believe that 100 is adequate? And should we 

be shooting for 150, or what is your perspective on that number? 

General BUNCH. What we have briefed thus far is that we need 

at least 100, so we are not ruling out the fact that as we do more 

analysis we may need more. What we have looked at so far based 

on our extensive analysis looking at the campaign plans and looking at all the plans that are out there, we need at least 100 to be 

able to meet all those demands as well as meet the training requirements that we have. 

Those are all items that we will continue as we move forward, 

ma’am, to look at. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. I will be watching that very closely, and 

happy to work with you to try to keep that number as high as we 

need. We need to provide what we need and not just what we can 

afford. 

And along with that, if we fund the B–21 at less than $2 billion 

in fiscal year 2018, how would the development phase be impacted 

and would there be significant delays to the overall program? 

General BUNCH. So, ma’am, we remain fully committed to the 

program. It is one of our top three priorities and we have fully 

funded it, in accordance with the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act passed by the Congress, to the service cost position that 

was established by the independent cost estimate. 

So we remain and we are committed to putting in the money we 

need to execute the program. We need all the dollars that we have 

asked for to go into the program to stay on track so that we can 

deliver this vital capability that our Nation needs and continue to 

execute the program on the schedule that we are on. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Right. We look forward to that being filled in 

mid-2020s, so that will be here before we know it and we have 

gotta keep this—keep moving. 

I wanted to switch to the C–130. I think Ranking Member Courtney mentioned that, as well. Of course, Missouri has Rosecrans and 

we also have C–130s there. And they visited with me a couple 

times about the avionics. 

And I know you are planning to upgrade the cockpit avionics and 

displays of the older Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve C– 

130H aircraft, but there is concern among commercial vendors that 

the Air Force will overly rely on solutions that favor military speci-
9 

fications at the expense of commercial off-the-shelf solutions that 

are already proven successful in the civilian world of aviation. 

So how would you address this concern while ensuring that the 

Air Force is running a process that encourages and does not limit 

competition? 

General BUNCH. So, ma’am, I will answer it in two phases. 

I think everyone understands that our focus for the C–130 fleet 

is making sure we are focused on safety, and then compliance, and 

then modernization. Those are the three main, and then a limited 

recapitalization in certain areas. Those are really our four-pronged 

approach for how I want to address this. 

The compliance is the AMP Inc-1 [Avionics Modernization Program Increment-1]. That is to meet the FAA mandates. We have 

fully funded that. 

We have recently awarded a contract to get that program started, and we are committed to getting all that done on the 130H fleet 

so that we meet the 2020 mandates. That is in our budget; that is 

what we are driving to, and we are committed to that. 

We are using and looking at using commercial solutions in that, 

as well. That was part of the market research we did before we 

went on contract to make sure that we were not overly driving a 

solution that drove military things and capitalize on what commerciality we can. 

We are continuing to go through the work on AMP Inc-2. We 

have delayed some of the initial steps as we get the acquisition 

started, but we did that because we had a robust dialogue with the 

industry so that we could understand what commerciality we could 

apply to the program and not change the end date. So our goal 

was: save money, drive the commerciality, and still meet the end 

date that we have committed to you and is in our budget that we 

are going to do. 

So we are very focused on driving the solution. There will be 

areas that we have already researched where the military specifications can be met by commercial applications. There may be areas 

that we won’t be able to do that, but we are actively researching 

that to ensure that we are taking as much of the benefit from 

commerciality as we can. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. That is great. Thank you very much. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Hartzler. 

We will now go to Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Generals, thank you 

so very much for your service. 

And, as you probably know, I represent both Travis and Beale. 

Those Air Force bases have almost all that you do except the C– 

130s. They also have some other platforms. Thank you for the support that you have given to both bases. The Beale now has the KC– 

135s unit will be there. 

Of the many investments that you have been making, the C–5M 

recently traveled from Travis to Japan without stopping in Alaska, 

saving some 14 hours and a whole lot of fuel and time. Well done, 

gentlemen. I suspect that the continued upgrade and the availability of the C–5Ms will play out all across the world in similar fashion. 
10 

There are, however, some ongoing questions out there, so let’s get 

to them. 

The KC–46. I don’t think we have had an updated status report, 

although I know it is on all of our minds. 

General Bunch. 

General BUNCH. So, sir, that is a great question and I thank you 

for the opportunity to talk about it. 

We are—still remain committed to the KC–46 program. We got 

all of the money and we have got everything lined in. We continue 

to team with Boeing. 

We are making steady but slower progress than we had anticipated. We are running into areas of—where we are being delayed 

through our airworthiness certification through the FAA process 

and delays in our test program. 

We are at this time going through a schedule risk assessment 

with Boeing as a joint effort. Ms. Costello and I will get an update 

on that next week and then we will be coming forward to let everyone know exactly where that is at. 

Right now Boeing remains committed to the RAA [required assets available] date that we set last year that we were going to. 

Our assessment right now shows that we are a little bit behind 

that schedule and that we continue to work with Boeing to try to 

pull that back. 

Boeing remains a very good partner in that they are applying resources and trying to do what they can to make that schedule. We 

continue to support their efforts by making sure we provide all the 

resources we need to execute that program, but right now there 

have been delays in the testing and we are monitoring that, and 

as soon as we get the schedule risk assessment we will come back 

and give everyone an update on where we are at on the program. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. If appropriate, can you describe what the specific delays are? 

General BUNCH. So, sir, we are not executing the test program 

in the—at the pace that we had anticipated, and as we modify 

the—one of the things for getting FAA certification, as components 

are modified they have to be reviewed and approved by that process through the FAA. That has not gone at the pace that we would 

expect, and if you don’t get that done then some of your testing 

that you would want to do are blocked—the test points you would 

want to do are blocked, so those are all aspects of what we are balancing out right now to try and get the program on track. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Some of us on this committee also are on the 

Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee and the FAA is a 

problem there. Is the FAA part of this problem? 

General BUNCH. We are partnering with the FAA, sir, and we 

have been partnering with the FAA on this program for an extensive period of time. We continue our dialogue and communication 

with them. I am not in a position that I would say that the FAA 

is a problem. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I note the look on your colleagues’ faces. 

General BUNCH. No sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. We will let it go at that. 

All right. The buyback of the C–5As—I understand that there 

will be a couple of—or maybe more than a couple of the C–5As that 
11 

are off the line that will be bought back in this budget. Is that correct? 

General HARRIS. Yes, sir, if I may address that. When we look 

at what the C–5 is capable of we have 12 C–5Ms in BAI [backupaircraft inventory]. We put eight of them there in the 2015 budget 

that we were hoping to bring back. 

And basically these are airplanes that have been flying, they are 

just not manned appropriately in the units’ ops and maintenance 

to take care of them. So we are going to buy back two a year for 

4 years if we are able to have a predictable budget to get the fleet 

back to a higher quality. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And just a final quick question: The large aircraft countermeasure program, is it online? The troops in my area 

always want to make sure that they have the best protection possible. 

General BUNCH. Okay, sir, you are asking about LAIRCM [Large 

Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures]. I apologize. I often use the— 

I hate to do it, but I will use the acronym. But my understanding 

is the programs that we are working on with the LAIRCM program, I have not gotten any updates that we are running behind 

any of the schedules we have committed to the warfighter. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. Yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi. 

We will now go to Mr. Byrne. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I want to go back to the KC–46A because I still have 

some questions. I didn’t hear a date specific, and it may be that 

you don’t have a date specific, but could you tell us if you do have 

a date specific? And if so, what is it? 

General BUNCH. Sir, I would be—sir, I would not want to give 

you a date till I get the schedule risk assessment that we are working with Boeing and we have that dialogue. But then again, in 

light of how we have done all of our communication on the KC–46, 

I think we have been very transparent with all the committees on 

that program. As soon as we get that worked out we will come forward and we will brief everyone on where we are at. 

Mr. BYRNE. I expected that was going to be your answer, that 

you are just not in a position to give it to us yet—— 

General BUNCH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BYRNE [continuing]. But I wanted to make sure we confirmed that today. And you are going to give that to us next week? 

General BUNCH. Sir, I wouldn’t say I am going to give it to you 

next week. What I would say is Ms.—I said next week—Ms. 

Costello and I will get a update the week of the—first week of— 

full week of June, and then once we get that update and we round 

it up to make sure that our senior leaders know what we are doing, 

we will make sure that we come over and explain to everyone 

where we are at. 

Mr. BYRNE. As I recall, the award of this contract for Boeing, 

there was a competition and it was originally awarded to Airbus 

USA and then there was a challenge to that and there was a rebidding of it and Boeing came in with basically a—this is a new design. This plane didn’t exist. 
12 

General BUNCH. Sir, I would say it is different—it is a variant 

off of their 767 line that they already had up and running is how 

I would couch it. It is a tanker, but it—a lot of the components are 

similar to what they were doing on their commercial 767 line. 

Mr. BYRNE. Do we have U.S. aircraft that are being refueled by 

some of our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies 

using the Airbus tanker? 

General VANDER HAMM. Probably—if you look at the Australians, 

the Australians have an Airbus tanker. 

Mr. BYRNE. So are—— 

General BUNCH. So, sir, let me—I will take that for the record 

to make sure that I give you an accurate answer. I know that there 

are other aircraft that we have gone through some certifications 

with and we have partnered as the U.S. government, because of 

our expertise in the area of air refueling, we have actually utilized 

some of our test personnel with expertise in those areas to go help 

countries get certified to do missions to support our efforts around 

the world. 

But I do not have a specific answer that I would feel comfortable 

giving you until I go do some research, but we will take that for 

the record to get you an accurate answer. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you. And I didn’t expect you to be able to give 

me a direct answer on that if you didn’t have actual information, 

but I would love to know that. 

General BUNCH. We will give you that information, sir. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. BYRNE. That is all I have. I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Byrne. 

We will now go to Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, to all 

of you. 

I wish that we could take these subjects in isolation and other 

branches of our service in isolation, but we can’t. Like those of us 

who are on Strategic Forces [Subcommittee] at 10 o’clock this 

morning will begin Fiscal Year 2018 Priorities of the Nuclear 

Forces and Atomic Energy Defense Activities, which is, according 

to your testimony, you—Air Force basically operates two-thirds of 

the triad. And, of course this all relates back to that wonderful 

thing called the triad. 

So I guess my question is this: If you are going to assist us in 

understanding your relevance and your importance and your continued need for the support in the fiscal year 2018 to operate twothirds of the triad—and as you know, there has always been a discussion as to whether or not the triad is very relevant in the upcoming challenges that we have. Some have said that when you 

have China, Russia, and North Korea as your major—as our major 

threats in the area of nuclear that each one of those components 

does not necessarily fit the triad. The triad is an, I guess, agreedto reaction to the Cold War and it was the answer to Russia. 

So having said that—and you are in Seapower; that is the committee we are in. And of course you have the issue of the nuclear 

submarines that we are dealing with, as well. 
13 

Explain to me as best as you can why the priority should be as 

you have stated, which is, as you represent two-thirds of the triad, 

that we should be 100 percent behind supporting like 100 B–21 

bombers versus maybe another 2 Columbia-class subs. And it is because it—we don’t have an unlimited supply of money, so we have 

got to—we are the ones who are going to end up balancing this. 

And my problem is if we talk to you all in isolation you all make 

great arguments. However, that is not the way the world exists. 

So explain to me why we should support what you want even at 

the cost of other platforms. 

Who wants to take that? 

General HARRIS. Ma’am, I would be happy to start with that. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. 

General HARRIS. Because it is a long journey that you have asked 

to—for us to go down this road. I think all of the services support 

all three legs of the triad. Each one brings a different piece. 

As we talked about, the subs that you support through the 

Seapower are that force that is hard to get to while the oceans are 

still opaque. 

Our bomber force brings to us a flexibility and our ability to message, and that is very important in a deterrent role. But as you 

know, we also use those bombers in our conventional effort, so that 

is one of the few legs that gets multiple use on a regular basis that 

lives in both camps or is dual-role. 

And then our—the throw weight, the big firepower is our landbased ICBMs, so that will be our GBSD [ground-based strategic deterrence] effort. And that is our least expensive, although it seems 

to get the worst press when it comes to if we go to a dyad wouldn’t 

it just be bombers and submarines. And I would think that would 

be an awful choice for us to make as a Nation. 

We need each one of these because, as you said, the threat is different from China than North Korea, than Russia, and each one of 

these has a strength against those different threats. We do need all 

three. 

Ms. HANABUSA. I understand that. My question, though, is we 

have a limited amount of money and we have to make the decision, 

so what is your best pitch that if it were down to whatever monies 

we have and we are not going to do everything, why is it that the 

Air Force component—primarily the big-ticket item is B–21s—why 

is that the best way for us to go if we have to choose among two? 

General BUNCH. So, ma’am, I will jump in, and I want to remind 

everybody we are going through a Nuclear Posture Review [NPR] 

so I don’t want to get in front of our Secretary of Defense. I need 

to allow him the flexibility to listen to all aspects and go review 

this to make sure we come back. 

So what I will tell you about the B–21 is it—that makes it of 

value to us as the United States Air Force—and I would actually 

say we provide more than two-thirds of the triad when you consider the national command, control, communication network that 

we control about 75 percent of for the United States. So I would 

actually say we carry more weight than the two-thirds, but that 

is—who is counting? 
14 

But on the B–21, it provides an unmatched flexibility to be able 

to reach out and touch anyone in the message. You can recall the 

bombers. You can send a message with a deterrent. 

So there is an unbelievable amount of messaging that can be 

done with that platform. You can do both the conventional and the 

nuclear mission once we get it certified for the nuke mission, which 

will occur 2 years after IOC [initial operational capability]. 

So that is the reason for the B–21: that flexibility, the ability to 

recall, the ability to reach out and touch anyone. That is what that 

platform brings. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Hanabusa. 

We will now go to Mr. Gallagher. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being with us here today. It is always a—budget time is always a good time to review the kind of force we want 

to buy. 

I would like to follow up on that as well as the line of questioning that Mrs. Hartzler posed earlier about the B–21, which I 

think is especially important given our experience in buying the B– 

2, where we kept cutting planned procurement numbers until we 

ended up with what I believe to be a wildly insufficient number of 

exorbitantly priced aircraft. 

And in recent years I have seen highly varying accounts of how 

many B–21s we actually need to buy, with at one point the Air 

Force listing a range of 80 to 100. That is a variance of 20 percent, 

which seems rather large given the bomber’s importance to the 

force of the future. And as I understand that and as you have said 

today, we have settled on this 100 number, correct? 

General BUNCH. At least 100. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. At least 100—— 

General BUNCH. Want to make sure I am real clear there: at 

least 100. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Okay, well to that point, I mean, how did you— 

can you just give us sort of the logic, the strategic logic that allowed you to arrive at the 100 or the at-least-100 number? 

General BUNCH. So we base ‘‘at least 100’’ on analysis that we 

have done of all the ops [operations] plans and we looked at all of 

what we want the aircraft to do as well as the mission set that we 

would need for the training. So it is not just 100 to go do missions; 

it is at least 100 to do all the training, to do the depot maintenance. 

So it is not just a number that we would immediately employ. 

So there are a lot of components that lead into that, but we based 

that off looking at our ops plans, doing analysis, running scenarios, 

and coming up with a number that we believe. 

So we believe it has been scrutinized by a lot of the department 

and we are comfortable that that is a minimum number that we 

need to be able to execute the Nation’s missions that it has given 

us. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. So short of a change in those missions, we 

should consider 100 the floor for the—— 

General BUNCH. That is what we believe, sir. 
15 

Mr. GALLAGHER. But then you have these alternative studies, 

like the AFA [Air Force Association] study led by retired Lieutenant General Mike Moeller, which concluded that the Air Force 

needed substantially more than 100. And his analysis was driven 

by a historical examination of past air campaigns in scenarios involving North Korea, Iran, and Russia. 

And in an unclassified report he found that we would need 

roughly 60 bombers for a North Korea scenario and 103 bombers 

for an Iran scenario. Moreover, he found a conflict with Russia 

could call for as many as 258 bombers, if I am getting that correct. 

And given that a two-war standard has traditionally been a critical measurement of our status as a superpower, it seems to me 

that the right number of bombers should be north of 160 in order 

to factor in Korea and Iran contingencies. And certainly Lieutenant 

General Moeller agrees and calls for as many as 200 B–21s. 

So, I mean, I guess how would you respond to those outside analyses that sort of project far above the 100 floor? 

General HARRIS. Well, thank you. If I may add onto General 

Bunch’s question then, sir, those numbers aren’t incorrect. When 

we look at some of these efforts that are put out there, we do agree 

that probably 165 bombers is what we need to have, so there are 

numbers that support that depending on the scenarios. 

But in addition to the NPR that is ongoing, we also have a National Military Strategy. It is an internal look that the OSD [Office 

of the Secretary of Defense] is doing through the Secretary of Defense, and we don’t want to get in front of that. 

So our approach to it is it is an early decision. We know we are 

going to need at least 100; we will possibly need more than that. 

But as was brought up earlier, these aren’t inexpensive weapon 

systems across—— 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Sure. 

General HARRIS [continuing]. This entire effort, so we don’t want 

to throw down a number that may change in several months. So 

we would rather sit back, say 100 min [minimum] at this point—— 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Sure. 

General HARRIS [continuing]. And then move on and so—until we 

get guidance from the Secretary. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. So your next decision point is you are going to 

wait for the National Military Strategy, analyze that, and come up 

with an updated requirement? 

General HARRIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Okay. And sort of to take a turn in a different 

direction, I have never been on Air Force One and so this question 

is probably the closest I will ever get, particularly if you follow my 

Twitter feed in recent days. The Air Force One plans on recapitalizing with two—and the chairman mentioned this—two 747–200 

Presidential aircraft, which will be over 30 years old by the time 

they are replaced in the mid-2020s, and we are moving towards the 

two 747–800 aircraft. The estimated cost, I believe, is $3.5 billion. 

So just kind of following up on what the chairman mentioned, I 

mean, how can we assure the American people, at a time when 

there is a lot of scrutiny around the President’s travel, that these 

tax dollars are being properly used to provide what—the office of 
16 

the President what is required, but at the lowest possible cost to 

the taxpayer? 

General BUNCH. So, sir, I will answer that one. So it is important 

and we need to make sure that we can provide a platform that the 

President can execute the duties of his office regardless of the situation that we find our Nation in. That is one that we need to remember as we look at what that platform is going to provide and 

what that platform is going to do. 

We do understand the need to control cost. We understand that. 

That is an undertaking that we are going after. Right now we have a $172 million contract with Boeing on risk 

reduction. Part of that risk reduction is looking at the cost capability analysis and doing trades with what we can and can’t do and 

letting us be smart buyers. 

The other thing that we have done is we have worked with the 

White House Military Office and the Air Force and we have now 

agreed on a set of requirements that we plan to hold firm, which 

is one of the reasons we have been able to keep the costs under 

control on the KC–46. So we will continue to hold firm with those 

requirements that we have now agreed to and established as the 

min needed to execute that mission. 

We have two other contract actions we are doing right now. One 

of those will be the procurement of the two aircraft. The next one 

we will do to get to a preliminary design review as quickly as possible. 

And then what we will do is use all of our acquisition authorities 

to get the max [maximum], and I would ask for max flexibility as 

we use those acquisition authorities so that we can go get a contract to get this done and meet the IOC. 

We plan on being substantive participants in some of the source 

selections that Boeing will do. That will be the prime; they will do 

some of the subcomponents; they will be doing the competition for 

those, but we will be substantive participants in that. And we realize we have to efficiently and effectively acquire these systems because it is American taxpayer dollars that we are worried about. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, gentlemen. Appreciate you being 

with us here today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gallagher. 

And we will now go to Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, to the tardy member 

here. 

And again, thank you for the great testimony and great questions from my colleagues on the panel, particularly Mrs. Hartzler, 

you know, covered the C–130 issues nicely, which I did intend to 

focus on. 

So really only have one question, which is on the B–52 modernization. Again, obviously this is a big piece of your planning in 

the future, and it has been a multiyear process that you have been 

involved in. 

And that is why when the budget came over it actually reduced by roughly $60 million the modernization efforts that have been 

built into the prior administration’s—the Obama administration’s 

funding for B–52 modernization. I was just wondering if you could 

explain, you know, that alteration. 
17 

General BUNCH. I do not have any of my program managers on 

the acquisition side coming to me right now and telling me they 

can’t execute the programs that we have got laid in for the bombers. So without knowing exactly—with—I mean, if you look at what 

we are doing, we are doing the 1760 weapons bay upgrade; we are 

doing—finishing up the CONECT [Combat Network Communications Technology] program to give it more modern displays and to 

be able to connect and have it beyond-line-of-sight; we are starting 

the radar modernization effort; we are doing our investigations into 

the re-engining. 

We have got a whole lot of programs that are going on right now 

to modernize and keep that platform viable and flyable and able to 

meet the demands of tomorrow. My take on that would be that all 

we have done is change it for the fact of life of where we are at 

in the programs. 

I am not aware of any program that we have stopped or any program that I have hindered by the ability that we have put in for 

the budget. 

Mr. COURTNEY. So again, that number that—the new number is 

adequate? 

General BUNCH. That is my belief, sir. And I will go back and 

do an investigation, and if it is different than that I will personally 

get back to you and your staff and let you know that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 53.] 

Mr. COURTNEY. Great. Thank you. Yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 

Lieutenant General Harris and Bunch, I wanted to talk a little 

more about the Presidential aircraft program. The President’s 

budget request for fiscal year 2018 has a dollar amount of $434 

million that are requested. The request reported last year was $625 

million, so it was a $191 million reduction. 

First of all, is that something that the Air Force is in agreement 

with? Is it something that the Air Force requested? And can you 

tell me where that 30 percent reduction leaves us in first of all 

making sure we deliver those aircraft on time and making sure, 

too, that we are on track with cost reductions on construction of the 

aircraft? 

So any delays, obviously, that happened there, especially with 

Boeing, can have financial impacts, so I want to kind of get your 

perspective on where we are with that. 

General BUNCH. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question. 

We are fine with the budget that is put in. Its rephased dollars 

align with our acquisition strategy that we are going for and we 

are not anticipating any changes to the dates that we have predicted for when we would deliver. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. And you are still continuing on track 

with cost projections on the aircraft? I know we have had some discussions about mechanisms to use to make sure that we get the 

best price possible but also provide the Air Force some flexibility 

for the Air Force also to be able to get the best price possible. 

General BUNCH. So, sir, we understand the critical nature of 

making sure that we control the cost on this program. We are very 

focused on that. I think you can see the level of attention the Air 
18 

Force put on that by designating one of our most experienced PEOs 

[program executive officers], Major General Duke Richardson, putting him solely in charge of that after his great run of executing 

the KC–46 program and keeping that program on track. So I believe that shows to the committee and everyone our commitment 

to making sure that program is executed properly. 

What we would ask is that we are allowed to work with you if 

we decide on language we want to try to put for how we would 

want to structure what we are limiting ourselves to from a contracting perspective or a cost perspective so that we all understand 

the ramifications of those things, and we are doing it in a collaboration because we need flexibility to use all the acquisition authorities that we have while still understanding that this is a critical 

program to the committee and to the American public that we need 

to make sure we are executing properly. 

Mr. WITTMAN. And we are absolutely committed to that. I had 

a great meeting the other day with Lieutenant General Richardson 

and his efforts to make sure that the cost controls are placed on 

that program and that we have all of the different viewpoints necessary both with Boeing, the Air Force, Congress, and the administration to make sure we get the best price possible for the taxpayers, as I spoke about. 

Lieutenant General Bunch, I wanted to also try to develop a little bit better understanding of the Air Force’s efforts with the Compass Call mission equipment. As you know, you all have appointed 

L3 as the lead systems integrator and empowered them to make 

aircraft procurement decisions in order to re-host the Compass Call 

mission equipment. 

And I wanted to get your perspective on why the Air Force is 

moving in this direction for critical mission components, and if you 

can give me an example about how you have used this mechanism 

using private entities in the past versus it being done within the 

Air Force or at least within a government entity, within the Air 

Force Secretary’s office. Give me your perspective on how the decision making took place there and why you believe that L3 is going 

to be able to perform and make the critical decisions necessary on 

this critical program. 

General BUNCH. So, Chairman Wittman, that is a great question 

and I will let everybody know that it is in the media this morning 

that Boeing did file a protest last week that is now playing out. We 

will let the GAO [Government Accountability Office] work that. 

We, the Air Force, remain committed to the acquisition strategy 

that we have brought forward to address this critical need, so we 

will stay pretty—I won’t go into devil in the details; I won’t go into 

a ton of that. But I will give you an overarching what we were trying to do. 

And last year in the 2016 congressional language we were told 

to go look at—do analysis of alternatives, look at a variety of different options for what we would do for the EC–130H fleet. After 

looking at all those, the most cost-effective and the most efficient 

and the most timely—timely being one of the critical components 

of what we are trying to do—came back with the approach of designating a systems integrator. 
19 

We do not use the ‘‘lead’’ part of that. There are specific acquisition things that are tied to being a lead system integrator. This is 

a systems integrator, sir, just to make sure that I am real clear on 

the words that I am trying to use. 

And we picked that because the L3 has been—played that role 

as the systems integrator as we have modernized these aircraft for 

the last 15 years. They are the ones that are very familiar with the 

mission equipment that is on there. 

That mission equipment is highly classified to be able to execute 

the electronic warfare mission that we asked that platform to do. 

They have all the tooling; they have all the existing knowledge; and 

they have the modeling and all the information to do that work. 

This is a, for the preponderance of this, a non-developmental effort, meaning that we have had a robust and extensive program of 

modernizing the mission equipment to be able to meet the demands 

of the EC–130H mission over the years, and most of that will be 

simply cross-decked over and the—so they have the knowledge, 

having done that work, having installed that mission equipment. 

And then the last item that would be there is the short timeline. 

Our analysis showed that we could do it through this means and 

do it quicker than we could any other way, getting a critical need 

to address something out in the future—a threat that is evolving 

that if we need more details we can go to a different classification 

level and we will be happy to brief anybody on that. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Want to get to the decision-making element here, and it seems like what you are saying is that there is 

some advantage, then, gained by using a private entity like L3, 

based on their experience and outcomes as it relates to decision 

making within this critical realm as to integrating systems on 

this—on the application of Compass Call. Is that correct? 

General BUNCH. There are advantages of that. And what I want 

to make sure, sir, and I apologize I left this part out: We are not 

stepping out of this and just watching the process play out. 

What we are doing is we will thoroughly review their aircraft selection decision to ensure that it was comprehensive, impartial, and 

compliant with all the applicable statutes and regulation. So we 

are not, as I said earlier on the PAR [Presidential Aircraft Recapitalization], we are going to be substantive partners. We will allow 

the system integrator to come in and give us a report of what they 

have done and we will analyze and scrutinize that and ask what 

questions we need to make sure that we are—that it was fair and 

there—it was equitable and we made that decision. 

The other piece that we will do on this is all of the routine things 

that we do in acquisition where we ensure that it is cost compliant, 

fair and reasonable with DCMA [Defense Contract Management 

Agency], DCAA [Defense Contract Audit Agency]. All those things 

will be done in this program, as well. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. You had spoken about L3 being systems integrator, not lead systems integrator. I just want to make 

sure; there seems to be some disagreement there within the Air 

Force. 

On January 31st of this year Lisa Disbrow, who is the acting secretary, wrote a letter to Senator Murray and she stated, ‘‘Extensive 

analysis determined this lead systems integrator approach is the 
20 

most efficient, expedient, and cost-effective means to re-host the 

Compass Call capability into non-developmental commercial derivative aircraft.’’ So it seems that the secretary there is denoting this 

as a lead systems integrator, so I just want to make sure that we 

are straight in how you determine and say that L3 would not be 

the lead systems integrator. 

General BUNCH. So, sir, I will go back. I think I have submitted 

a subsequent letter that said it would be a systems integrator. I 

may not have that exactly right. But what I will do is go back and 

we will work through that to make sure that the position we are 

taking is clear to the committee and what we are trying to do. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Got you. Very good. Yes, I am just looking at your 

letter of 1st of February. You also refer to L3 as a lead systems—— 

General BUNCH. And I misspoke, sir, and I will go back and clarify what we are doing, but it is a systems integrator role is what 

we are asking L3 to do, and I apologize for any confusion. 

Mr. WITTMAN. And I don’t mean to be picking on this, but I do 

think it is critical as far as the role that the government and the 

Air Force is going to take in decision making here. And if you are 

looking at that there is an advantage to L3 as a systems integrator 

versus a lead systems integrator and where the decision making is 

going to take place and what role the Air Force will play or what 

it won’t play I think is really something important for us to understand because this is a very, very critical system that we want to 

make sure gets integrated properly. 

General BUNCH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WITTMAN. And to make sure that we clearly define the Air 

Force’s role and L3’s role I believe is critical. So there does seem 

to be some dichotomy there, so I just want to make sure that we 

are all clear on this. 

General BUNCH. So we will continue the dialogue on that, the 

thought process through that with L3 having been the system integrator for the last 15 years, they are the ones who know what the 

cross-deck requirements would be better than anyone else. That 

was the driver—that and the other factors, the time and all the 

other factors that I—sensitivity of the—of the equipment—mission 

equipment and the mission. Those were the drivers that led to the 

selection of them as the systems integrator. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Well, that is good to know because that was behind my question of what advantage you gain. You talk about them 

having base knowledge; you talk about them having dealt with 

these systems before. The key is, you know, where is the definition 

in role between the Air Force and L3 to make sure we get it right 

so we stay on time, we stay on performance, we make sure that the 

integration of these systems gets done properly. 

General BUNCH. Yes, sir. And we are committed to making sure 

it is. And as I said, we are going to be actively involved and watching that and we will get reports, analyze all those things to make 

sure it works. 

One of the big drivers, as I said, sir—and I apologize for going 

over again—the timing of this is really critical to make sure we 

see—we are ready for the evolving threat, to make sure we can execute the mission. 
21 

Mr. WITTMAN. I couldn’t agree more. I think timing this here is 

critical to make sure there are no hiccups about what—who is 

going to perform certain roles, because when there is we know that 

also elongates timeframes and can complicate things, so that would 

be great. 

If you would follow up with us, too, to redefine what you have 

stated to us today, I think that would be—— 

General BUNCH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WITTMAN [continuing]. Very helpful to us. 

General BUNCH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Are there any other questions from 

committee members for our panelists? 

If not, gentlemen, thank you so much for your leadership. Thank 

you for coming before us today and shining some light on these 

critical issues for the Air Force, and we continue to look forward 

to working with you as we go down these roles and making sure 

that these assets get delivered on time and on budget. 

And with that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 9:00 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MAY 25, 2017 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MAY 25, 2017 

(27) 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MAY 25, 2017 

(53) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY 

General BUNCH. The FY18 President’s Budget adequately supports ongoing B–52 

modernization efforts. FY18 RDT&E and Procurement requests for B–52 decreased 

$52M from FY17 President’s Budget request due to revised program estimates and 

schedule revisions. 

B–52 Modernization assures viability to perform current/future wartime missions 

by sustaining and modernizing the fleet to ensure relevance, lethality and survivability. The FY18 PB request continues B–52 modernization and addresses issues 

required to maintain nuclear and conventional credibility. [See page 17.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MAY 25, 2017 

(57) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. Directed energy offers a deep magazine and an affordable way to 

engage threats. Can you address how the Air Force is working with the other services to ensure synergy is achieved in program development? The Navy has a directed energy system deployed on the USS Ponce, is the Air Force working with the 

Navy to build on their operational findings? Describe the ways the Air Force is potentially fielding directed energy? Are there plans to work this capability into our 

current integrated air defenses? 

General BUNCH. The Air Force has developed a Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) 

Flight Plan to identify activities required across the doctrine, organization, training, 

materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and policy spectrum to transition DEW 

technologies from the Science and Technology (S&T) portfolio to operationally deployed Air Force weapon systems in a deliberate manner to minimize cost and maximize efficacy. 

Signed by the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff in May 

2017, the DEW Flight Plan identifies the revolutionary opportunities provided by 

DEW technologies. The Air Force DEW Flight Plan also charts a course that enables 

the Air Force to explore and exploit the opportunities DEWs offer to accomplish future missions in support of national military objectives. It provides guidance for a 

range of coordinated follow-on activities across the Air Force enterprise, including 

an experimentation campaign focused on operationalizing DEWs. The plan builds a 

transition path from technology development to a fielded weapon system, and provides feedback to the S&T, acquisition, and operational communities on efforts needed to support transition. To ensure directed energy technologies transition from opportunity to full potential, the Air Force must maintain a preeminent posture in the 

development of those technologies while also exploring a variety of new operational 

concepts and strategic military effects that address emerging U.S. military 

vulnerabilities and opportunities. 

One of the principal ways that DEW synergy is maintained across the services 

is the Joint Directed Energy Transition Office, formerly the High Energy Laser 

Joint Technology Office, through its cross service technology efforts, Strategic Planning meeting, and Annual Review meeting. There are also many relevant presentations and sidebars at the various Directed Energy Professional Society meetings. 

The DEW subgroup of the Government-only Weapons Community of Interest is also 

a valuable resource. All of these provide opportunities for both senior officials and 

program managers to discuss matters regarding DEW technologies. 

The Air Force supplied some beam control technology to the Navy laser system 

on the USS Ponce and we will follow their effects and system reliability data. There 

are vast differences in the vulnerability of Service targets, which range from closein rubber boats, drones, artillery, rockets, and missiles, to long range cruise missiles, aircraft, and air-to-air missiles. The Joint Directed Energy Transition Office 

maintains the principal effects data base for the Services. 

The Air Force is looking at several DEW applications with different fielding opportunities. One application is aircraft self-protection using lasers. This is one of our 

more challenging applications, as it requires significant progress in size, weight, 

power need and power on target, especially in modern fighters. Another application 

is airbase defense. The Army has a ground-based integrated Air Defense mission, 

for which the Air Force and Army are working a joint S&T effort in ground-based 

beam control. The Air Force is also looking at airborne directed energy capabilities 

to support this application, especially in remote locations. In addition, as part of the 

execution of the DEW Flight Plan, the Air Force recently issued a Capability Request for Information to assist in determining possible candidate systems for an upcoming FY18 directed energy counter-unmanned aircraft systems experiment. A 

third Air Force application is using high power microwaves to defeat electronic systems. The Air Force demonstrated this capability in 2013 from a cruise missile; the 

Air Force and the Navy now have a joint effort to demonstrate an advanced capability in a more appropriate platform. 

Æ