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35–958 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 110–436 

VEHICLE SAFETY FOR CHILDREN 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, 

INSURANCE, AND AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 28, 2007 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MARGARET L. CUMMISKY, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

LILA HARPER HELMS, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director 

MARGARET SPRING, Democratic General Counsel 

LISA J. SUTHERLAND, Republican Staff Director 

CHRISTINE D. KURTH, Republican Deputy Staff Director 

KENNETH R. NAHIGIAN, Republican Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, INSURANCE, AND 

AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas, Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire, 

Ranking 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on February 28, 2007 ....................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Carper .................................................................................. 6 

Statement of Senator Klobuchar ............................................................................ 49 

Statement of Senator Pryor .................................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Sununu ................................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES

Campbell, Hon. W. Packy, Former Representative from New Hampshire ......... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

Claybrook, Hon. Joan, President, Public Citizen; Former Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration .................................................. 19 

Prepared statement with attachments ........................................................... 21 

Gulbransen, Dr. Greg, Pediatrician, Syosset, New York ...................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

McCurdy, Hon. Dave, President/CEO, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers; 

accompanied by Robert Strassburger, Vice President, Safety and Harmonization ..................................................................................................................... 38 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 40 

Medford, Ronald, Senior Associate Administrator for Vehicle Safety, National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration ............................................................. 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

APPENDIX

Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, Inc. (AIAM), prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 69 

Fennell, Janette E., President, KIDS AND CARS, prepared statement ............. 84 

Greenberg, Sally, Senior Product Safety Counsel, Consumers Union of U.S., 

Inc., prepared statement ..................................................................................... 71 

(1) 

VEHICLE SAFETY FOR CHILDREN 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, INSURANCE, AND

AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark Pryor, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you all for being here today. It is my 

pleasure to welcome you to our Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and 

Automotive Safety Subcommittee hearing on vehicle safety for children. This is our first meeting of the year, and I want to thank my 

colleague, the Ranking Member, Senator John Sununu, who does 

a fantastic job on this issue and many others. We look forward to 

having a productive couple of years. We anticipate some of our colleagues will come and go today, because there are a lot of committee hearings going on right now, but I just wanted to say good 

morning, thank everyone for being here to talk about auto safety 

for children. 

We have jurisdiction over a wide range of issues that are important to the daily lives of consumers, and Senator Sununu and I 

have already discussed some other hearings that we’ll have in the 

future. Some of those relate to children, some of those relate just 

to the general public, but I’m very pleased that we’re taking this 

first hearing, at Senator Sununu’s request, to talk about the subject matter today. 

In 2005, 1,451 children ages 14 and younger died as passengers 

in motor vehicle crashes, and approximately 203,000 were injured 

in the United States. That’s an average of four deaths and 556 injuries each day. We both feel that we need to work to reduce those 

numbers. And I know that Senator Sununu has shown a great commitment to this issue and, as I said, many others. I have two children myself and I feel the compulsion to try to make our vehicles 

and our roads safer for our children. 

I also want to thank the witnesses for being here this morning, 

providing testimony, for working with the Subcommittee staff on a 

variety of topics, in terms of scheduling and statements, et cetera. 

Today, we’ll have five witnesses. They’ll discuss a variety of topics and issues related to auto safety for children, including the 

2 

Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2007 that was 

introduced yesterday by Senator Clinton and Senator Sununu. And 

I hope that today’s discussion will begin that process of dialogue 

that we’re famous for, sometimes infamous for, here in the U.S. 

Senate. I hope that it definitely leads to more safety for our children and our other auto passengers. 

With that, I’d like to hear from Senator Sununu. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you very much, Senator Pryor. I certainly appreciate the fact that you’ve made the commitment to 

make this our first hearing of the year. As you indicated, Senator 

Clinton and I introduced legislation yesterday that would address, 

in particular, non-traffic fatalities. Over 1,000 children in the last 

5 years have been killed in non-traffic accidents, and thousands 

more have been injured. And it’s not just children, but, of course, 

when it happens to the youngest among us, I think anyone, whether you’re a parent or not, can’t help but feel the enormity of the 

loss. 

Representative Peter King has introduced legislation on the 

House side, and I certainly want to thank him for his great leadership on this issue. As well, Packy Campbell will be joining our 

panel today, a good friend of mine from New Hampshire who has 

dealt very personally with the impact that non-traffic auto fatalities can have on a family. This has been a long process, especially 

for a lot of the advocates and the coalition of partners that have 

worked on this legislation. We introduced legislation at the end of 

the 1st session in 2005, but obviously weren’t able to see it completed on the floor, and this hearing, I think, is an important and 

early beginning to the process in the new session of the 110th Congress. 

You spoke about the impact accidents have. We’re talking about 

thousands of lives, thousands of families. And anytime we talk 

about regulation, whether it’s with auto safety or any other area, 

we have to be mindful of the cost. But the important thing, I think, 

in the construction of the legislation that we’ve introduced is that— 

in two of the key areas, making automatic windows safer, and ensuring that cars can’t inadvertently be put into gear without the 

knowledge of the driver—the costs to implement these improvements are less than $10 on a car. And that is really significant, 

that existing technologies are there to make a huge difference in 

this area. 

And regarding the visibility behind a vehicle, where someone 

may unknowingly back over or back into a child, the technology exists that can certainly prevent tragic accidents. There’s no question 

it’s more than $10 a car to implement today. But there are different options and opportunities to both improve that technology 

and to bring down its cost. 

Equally important, we are mindful that changes and improvements in auto safety don’t happen overnight. The auto industry has 

implemented significant improvements in past years, ranging from 

antilock brakes to side airbags. And this is done because it makes 

good business sense, because it makes good safety sense, because 

3 

it makes a difference in the lives of the consumers that drive those 

vehicles. Things don’t necessarily happen overnight, but I feel—and 

I think the supporters of this legislation feel—there are improvements that can, and need, to be made. We provide a window for 

NHTSA to develop new rules in these areas, and then to implement those rules over a 3-year window. And I think that is realistic, it’s doable, it’s achievable, and ultimately it will have a huge 

impact on both the fatalities and the injuries that we see in these 

three key areas. 

Our bill doesn’t mandate any particular approach to dealing with 

brake-shift interlock or window safety or rear visibility. We don’t 

tell the auto manufacturers how to do it. We don’t tell NHTSA how 

to develop the standard. But we simply say that standards in these 

areas are essential, because they will have a material benefit for 

consumers. So, this is the beginning of the process, this session. I 

want to certainly thank all of those that have been involved in the 

KIDS AND CARS coalition for the advocacy work that they’ve 

done, and the work that they’ve done in helping to gather information. One of the things we realized early on was that we don’t have 

good collection of data in this area. And NHTSA, represented by 

Mr. Medford today, I think is making strides in improving the process for data collection. So, we’ve already had a good impact in that 

area. 

I look forward to the testimony of all of our panelists today. I 

hope this Subcommittee and the full Commerce Committee can 

move the legislation as one of its first orders of business this year. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Now, typically what we will do is, we’ll allow government officials 

to testify on a separate panel, but, by agreement with Senator 

Sununu and also with the permission of Ron Medford, who’s going 

to be our first witness, we’d like to consolidate the panels today. 

So, let me introduce the panelists. Y’all come on up, grab a seat, 

all the panelists, and, as y’all are taking your seats, I’ll introduce 

you. I’ll recognize Mr. Medford first. 

Mr. Medford is the Senior Associate Administrator of Vehicle 

Safety of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 

NHTSA. He’ll be talking about NHTSA’s effort to enhance automobile safety for children, and he’ll give us a progress report on 

some of the studies under SAFETEA–LU. 

And we’ll also hear stories from two parents whose children were 

tragically killed in separate non-traffic automobile accidents. Mr. 

Packy Campbell, whose son, Ian, was the victim of a runaway car, 

and also Dr. Greg Gulbransen, who accidentally backed over and 

killed his 2-year-old son, Cameron. I appreciate you all being here 

and your willingness to testify. 

Also, we’ll have Joan Claybrook, the President of Public Citizen. 

She brings a wealth of experience and insight into the area of automobile safety. She was the NHTSA Administrator during the 

Carter Administration and has remained active in this area ever 

since. She’ll talk about a variety of auto safety issues. 

And, finally, we’ll have Mr. David McCurdy, on behalf of the 

automobile industry. He’s the President of the Alliance for Automobile Manufacturers, and he’ll talk about some of the advances 

4 

made in child safety standards by the industry. He will provide an 

update on safety measures taken by the industry. 

So, with that, what I would like to do is acknowledge Mr. Ron 

Medford and ask him to make his opening statement. 

We’re going to do 5 minutes on the opening statement. I’d love 

for y’all to watch the time. And then we’ll have a series of questions after that. 

Mr. Medford? 

STATEMENT OF RONALD MEDFORD, SENIOR ASSOCIATE 

ADMINISTRATOR FOR VEHICLE SAFETY, NATIONAL 

HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. MEDFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Sununu. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee this 

morning to discuss the important issue of improving vehicle safety 

for children. I regret that Administrator Nason could not appear 

before you because of a prior commitment to testify at a House 

hearing this morning. 

I ask that my written statement be submitted for the record. 

While every highway-related death is a tragedy, the loss of a 

child is particularly devastating. Administrator Nason, the mother 

of two young daughters herself, has made protecting children one 

of her top priorities. Earlier this month, NHTSA hosted a public 

meeting to discuss ways to increase the use of Lower Anchorages 

and Tethers for Children, or a system known as LATCH. LATCH 

is a system of anchorages built into newer vehicles that is designed 

to make it easier to install child seats. This meeting came about 

as a result of a new survey conducted by NHTSA which found that 

40 percent of parents with LATCH-equipped vehicles still rely on 

seatbelts to secure their child seats. The survey also found that 

many parents are unaware of either the existence or the importance of LATCH. As a result of this public meeting, NHTSA is now 

working with vehicle and car seat manufacturers, consumer advocates, and others to develop a national education campaign to better inform parents on proper child seat installation. Installing a 

child seat should not be a daunting task for parents, and NHTSA 

is committed to making LATCH better known and easier to use. 

Regarding back-over crashes, last November NHTSA released a 

comprehensive study on this problem. As a part of the study, 

NHTSA tested camera-based systems currently available, to evaluate their performance and effectiveness in mitigating back-over 

crashes. Our study found that, while rear-facing cameras helped 

drivers better see pedestrians in the back of the vehicle, the presence of fog, rain, or glare, can significantly reduce their effectiveness. We also found that cameras were not effective at night. And, 

finally, our research showed that, even if the camera can clearly 

discern the object, preventing the crash is still dependent on the 

driver observing the video display and reacting quickly enough. Although our studies show that cameras have limitations in preventing crashes, NHTSA believes this technology holds great promise. And, accordingly, we are continuing our research this year on 

examining the human-factors issues related to camera effectiveness. 

5 

Regarding the entrapment hazard posed by power windows, the 

Senators may recall that in 2004 NHTSA finalized a regulation 

mandating all vehicles sold beginning October 1, 2008, have recessed window switches to prevent their inadvertent activation. 

Last year, NHTSA added to this rule, pursuant to a mandate in 

SAFETEA–LU, requiring that power-window switches have to be 

pulled up or out to work. We were pleased to complete this mandate nearly a year ahead of the deadline set by Congress. We believe that, once in effect, these new rules will significantly help reduce the likelihood of these incidents. 

Mr. Chairman, it is the worst fear of every parent to lose a child. 

The good news is that child safety in vehicles has come a long way. 

In 1975, the fatality rate for children 5 years old and younger was 

4.5 per 100,000 children. Today, the fatality rate for children under 

5 is 2.27, a record low. However, moreover, current statistics show 

that children 9 years of age and younger had the least amount of 

fatalities among any age group. These improvements in child safety 

are attributable to a combination of innovative safety features on 

the vehicle, widespread use of child safety seats, and enhanced 

drunk-driving enforcement. NHTSA is committed to making additional safety improvements to further protect children. Of all of the 

lifesaving work NHTSA does, I consider this our most important 

duty. 

Thank you for your consideration and for this Committee’s ongoing effort to improve highway safety. I’d be glad to answer any 

questions that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Medford follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RONALD MEDFORD, SENIOR ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR

FOR VEHICLE SAFETY, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Chairman, my name is Ron Medford, and I am the Senior Associate Administrator for Vehicle Safety at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 

(NHTSA). I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this Subcommittee to discuss the important issue of improving vehicle safety for children. I regret that 

NHTSA Administrator Nicole R. Nason could not appear before you because of a 

prior commitment to testify at a House subcommittee hearing. 

The mission of NHTSA is to reduce fatalities and injuries on our Nation’s roads. 

In 2005, the last year for which complete data are available, there were 43,443 highway-related fatalities and 2.7 million injuries. Vehicle crashes are the leading cause 

of death for the age group of 4 to 34. 

While every highway-related death is a tragedy, the loss of a child is particularly 

devastating. 

Administrator Nason, the mother of two young daughters herself, has made protecting children one of her top priorities. Earlier this month, Administrator Nason 

hosted a public meeting with industry leaders and consumer advocates to discuss 

ways to increase the use of Lower Anchorages and Tethers for Children, or the 

LATCH system. LATCH is a system of anchorages built into newer vehicles that 

is specifically designed to make it easier to properly install child seats. This meeting 

came about as a result of a new survey conducted by NHTSA which found that 40 

percent of parents with LATCH-equipped vehicles still rely on seat belts to secure 

their child seat. The survey also found that many parents are unaware of either the 

existence or the importance of the LATCH system. 

As a result of this meeting, NHTSA is working with vehicle and car seat manufacturers, child seat installation instructors, and consumer advocates to develop a national education campaign to better inform parents on proper child seat installation. 

Installing a child safety seat should not be a daunting task for parents, and NHTSA 

is committed to making LATCH better known and easier to use. 

Additionally, NHTSA is currently working to revise its ease-of-use ratings for 

child seats. We believe this new rating system will serve as a strong incentive for 

child seat manufacturers to make proper installation of car seats easier for parents. 

6 

Another area of concern that NHTSA is active in addressing is back-over crashes. 

Last November, NHTSA released a comprehensive study on this problem. This 

study estimated that back-over crashes cause at least 183 fatalities and up to 7,419 

injuries annually. Thankfully the majority of these injuries are relatively minor, 

meaning that the victims are treated in the emergency room and released. 

As part of this study, NHTSA tested several systems currently available to evaluate their performance and potential effectiveness in mitigating back-over crashes. 

Our tests found that the performance of ultrasonic and radar parking aids in detecting children behind the vehicle was typically poor. 

Our study also looked at camera-based systems and found that they provide drivers with the ability to see pedestrians in the majority of rear blind spot zones. However, we found that rain, fog or glare from the sun can significantly reduce the camera’s ability to show drivers a clear view of an object in back of the vehicle. The 

cameras are also not effective at night. Finally, our research showed that even if 

the camera can clearly discern the object, preventing the crash is still dependent 

on the driver observing the video display and reacting quickly enough. 

Although our study showed that cameras have limitations in preventing back-over 

crashes, NHTSA believes this technology holds promise. Accordingly, we are continuing our research in this area. 

Regarding the entrapment hazard posed by power windows, the Subcommittee 

may recall that in April 2004, NHTSA finalized a rule mandating that all vehicles 

sold in MY 2008 have recessed window switches to prevent their inadvertent activation. Last year, NHTSA added to this rule pursuant to a mandate in SAFETEA– 

LU requiring that power window switches not only be recessed, but have to be 

pulled ‘‘up or out’’ to work. We were pleased to be able to meet this mandate nearly 

a year ahead of the deadline set by Congress. Although a child fatality due to a 

power window is an extremely rare occurrence (approximately one to two children 

a year on average) we believe that once in effect, these rules will significantly reduce the likelihood of these incidents. 

Mr. Chairman, it is the worst fear of every parent to lose a child. The good news 

is child safety has come a long way. A generation ago it was not uncommon for children of all ages to be sitting anywhere in the car, completely unrestrained. Through 

our educational efforts, and the passage of Anton’s Law and other similar legislation, now 98 percent of children under 1 year old are buckled up. 

More important, these changes in law presaged a change in society toward child 

safety in vehicles. Apart from being illegal in all 50 states, most parents now would 

never consider not buckling up their child. This focus on child safety by parents is 

paying dividends, as NHTSA data shows that children 9 years of age and younger 

have the least amount of fatalities among any age group. 

NHTSA is committed to making additional safety improvements to further protect 

children. Of all the lifesaving work NHTSA does, I consider this our most important 

duty. 

Thank you for your consideration, and for this Subcommittee’s ongoing effort to 

improve highway safety. I would be pleased to answer any questions. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Medford. 

We’ve been joined by Senator Tom Carper, of Delaware. And he’s 

decided not to give an opening statement, right? 

Senator CARPER. Could I just make one really, really short statement? 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. CARPER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding the hearing and for letting me step in for a little while. I have three hearings going on at the same time, so I’m not going to burden you for 

long with my presence. 

I’m delighted to see my old colleague—not ‘‘old’’—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER.—but my colleague of longstanding, Dave 

McCurdy. For those of you who follow baseball, I think today may 

be the first day of spring training. 

[Laughter.] 

7 

Senator CARPER. And Dave McCurdy and I used to play on the 

Congressional baseball team, and a couple of years, I remember, 

when I was nominated for Most Valuable Player by the Republicans—I’m a Democrat. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. Tom Ridge was the outfielder for the Republicans for a while. A couple of years, I think we’ve picked him as 

our Most Valuable Player. This guy can handle himself well behind 

the witness stand, and he is also pretty good with a baseball. Real 

good with a bat. But it’s great to see you. 

And thank you all for being here and testifying with us this 

morning. 

Thank you, David. Welcome. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Senator. And thank you for joining 

us. 

Our next witness is Packy Campbell, former State Representative for the State of New Hampshire. 

STATEMENT OF HON. W. PACKY CAMPBELL, FORMER 

REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Good morning. A little nervous this morning. It’s 

my first time in front of the—what I call the ‘‘real Congress.’’ I’ve 

been in front of the Senate in New Hampshire a whole bunch of 

times in the panels, so—— 

It’s an honor to be here with the Members of this Committee, 

and it’s an honor to be one of the advocates, but also a politician 

who realizes that sometimes it takes an act of Congress to save 

lives. And it’s going to take an act of Congress to save more lives. 

My story, of losing my young son, and literally having my child 

die in my arms, is tragic. It’s heart-wrenching. It can keep you 

awake nights. I’m not here to pull at your heartstrings, although 

this is an emotional issue for me and all of the family advocates. 

I’m here to tell you that this is a good commonsense measure. As 

a Republican in the New Hampshire House in the ‘‘Live Free or 

Die’’ State, I’ve never voted for a helmet bill or a mandatory seatbelt bill. What are we talking about? And sometimes, the safety advocates have to tap me and say, ‘‘Remember, safety is a good 

thing.’’ 

I know safety is a good thing, and I know this is a good bill, because it’s reasonable, it’s cost-effective. You know, my story relates 

to a brake-shift interlock or a brake transmission, which they call 

BTSI, or ‘‘Betsy’’ is the word I’m supposed to learn. But no matter 

what the issue is, whether it’s power windows or rear visibility 

standards, as a parent and as a compassionate Congress, as human 

beings, sometimes we need to regulate. This is one of those times. 

The industry and NHTSA has been excellent. I came down and 

met with NHTSA and had over 12 people in the room, with the 

help of Congressman Bass. We had a great meeting. Out of that 

meeting came real, productive measures. Those measures were the 

first step in the right direction of this thing. I realize there are 

things that happen in SAFETEA–LU. It was SAFETEA–LU that 

motivated me to come here, because, quite frankly, as a parent, I 

was angry, because I said, ‘‘It’s not enough.’’ But then, as a legislator, I calmed down and said, ‘‘It’s a step in the right direction. 

8 

We’re moving the ball forward.’’ This bill is good legislation. I hope 

that all the Committee members will join Senator Sununu and 

Senator Clinton and cosponsor this bill. I think it would be a great 

statement, politically, that we need to care about our children, and 

we need to protect our children. 

I obviously failed in reading my statement here. But it’s just 

sometimes something you’ve got to speak from the heart. I hope 

that this Committee and this Senate will do an act of Congress to 

save other parents and to save lives. I know there are other measures that could have happened, or should have happened. The bottom line is, my son’s death wasn’t counted, it hasn’t been counted, 

that—the rules that NHTSA can make up, they can’t make with 

those statistics. Those statistics have not been gathered to a degree 

that allowed them to do rulemaking. Those statistics need to be 

gathered. This bill, unfortunately, needs to hammer that point 

home so that NHTSA, who is willing to do their job, who’s trying 

to do their job, will have clear direction that this data needs to be 

tracked so that we have a reason—a justified reason—I mean, they 

do a cost-benefit analysis, as morbid as that is, with these safety 

features. Since we don’t have the data, we can’t do that analysis. 

That’s why we need an act of Congress to say, ‘‘These are important safety features, and we should enact them.’’ 

I thank you very much, and—I lost track of time, but I think my 

5 minutes is up. And I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Campbell follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. W. PACKY CAMPBELL, FORMER REPRESENTATIVE

FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and 

Automotive Safety Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, 

and Transportation, for the opportunity to provide this testimony on the need for 

improved efforts to protect children from vehicle-related injury. 

My name is Packy Campbell. I live in the small town of Farmington, New Hampshire with my lovely wife Brenda, and our children Ryan, Sarah, Adam and our infant child Sean. Also in that town is the grave of my son Ian Joseph, who tragically 

died at our house on April 14, 2004 just shy of his second birthday. 

I am a politician by choice, an advocate by circumstance. I served two terms in 

the New Hampshire House of Representatives. It was during my first term in the 

House that my son Ian was killed in a non-traffic non-crash incident in our driveway. Ian was killed when his then 4 year old brother was able to knock my company’s F–350 pickup truck out of park without either turning the vehicle on or 

touching the brakes, a feat believed to be impossible due to the fact that the vehicle 

was equipped with brake transmission shift interlock (BTSI). When purchasing that 

vehicle I intentionally sought to buy one with safety features that would keep myself, family and others safe. 

However, although equipped with some safety features, my 4 year old son Adam 

was able to put the truck key in the ignition and, without starting the vehicle or 

touching the brakes, shift the truck out of park and into either neutral or reverse. 

That nearly 8,000 pound truck then rolled in our driveway and crushed Adam’s best 

buddy, our toddler son Ian, who died in my arms on the front porch of our home. 

I have become aware of that our family’s tragic accident is not all that unusual. 

On April 12, 2005 Milan Richard Hedmark died in a startlingly similar situation. 

It was this revelation that motivated me on my current course of action to seek legislation, as I realize my responsibility now is to protect children and families from 

experiencing this type of tragedy. 

Our accident involved a vehicle equipped with brake shift interlock. What is brake 

shift interlock? It is a mechanical or electrical design in a vehicle steering column 

that prevents a car from coming out of park unless the brake petal is depressed. 

Virtually every car made has these features. However some cars are designed so 

that the safety feature only works in four out of five key positions. 

9 

Since the accident occurred I have worked with NHTSA, with the automobile industry, and with advocacy groups like KIDS AND CARS, to make known the risks 

to children posed by cars that do not contain simple, cost effective safety measures 

proposed in the Act, and to mandate such features in all vehicles sold in the U.S. 

by 2010. In my discussions with NHTSA even some of their representatives were 

shocked to learn of what Mr. Keith Brewer at NHTSA called a ‘‘sweet spot’’ where 

a BTSI equipped car can be put into neutral without touching the brake. 

Through the combined efforts of those groups, and others, a voluntary agreement 

(NHTSA–2006–25669–2; ‘‘Reducing the Risk of Inadvertent Automatic Transmission 

Shift Selector Movement and Unintended Vehicle Movement; a Commitment for 

Continued Action by Leading Automakers’’) was reached to promote public consciousness of the fact that brake transmission shift interlock (BTSI) is not foolproof 

right now, by disclosing which vehicles do or do not have BTSI safety features to 

prevent inadvertent roll-away accidents, and to work to make sure that all vehicles 

sold in the U.S. by 2010 are fully protected against roll-away incidents such as the 

one that took the life of my son Ian, and hundreds of other children. 

When first presented with the agreement, I was hesitant to support it, as I 

thought that the Cameron Gulbransen 2005 bill should have been passed to mandate both disclosure and changes to vehicle design standards. I was convinced to 

support the voluntary agreement, however, by the promises of design changes by 

2010 and immediate disclosure by the industry and NHTSA of vehicles that complied, and with a personal commitment to me by key members of NHTSA to produce 

a list of vehicles that DID NOT comply. At the time, I thought that doing something 

now to save some lives in 2010 was autos worth supporting the voluntary agreement. I wanted a list of non-compliant auto’s so that it could be provided as part 

of the law enacted by the New Hampshire Legislature and signed by Governor 

Lynch to mandate the disclosure of all vehicles that did not have complete brake 

shift interlock features. 

With all due respect, in regards to the agreement I quote Ronald Reagan who said 

‘‘trust, but verify.’’ If there is a commitment on the part of industry what is wrong 

with holding industry accountable for that commitment. 

On a more personal level, my 9 year old son said to me regarding this proposed 

law that ‘‘people are more likely to break their promises than they are to break the 

rules.’’ 

When the list of compliant vehicles was released by NHTSA and industry in September, I contacted NHTSA for two reasons. The first was that the F–250 was on 

the list but did NOT comply with BTSI. Some 6 weeks later, Ford amended their 

list to delete the F–250. This was presumably only done as a result of my contacting 

NHTSA about the problem with Ford’s list. The second was that I wanted to see 

what I was promised, namely what I call the ‘‘non-compliant list.’’ The response I 

received was that there is no such list, and that I would need to figure it out on 

my own. I therefore joined Janette Fennell of KIDS AND CARS in writing to 

NHTSA on October 2, 2006 requesting that NHTSA publish such a list, just as it 

publishes the list of compliant cars. 

On February 16th, just 9 short days ago, NHTSA finally produced the list. Upon 

being advised of the newly created list this past weekend, it only took me a minute 

to confirm that the voluntary agreement is still insufficient. Specifically, the same 

F–250, and the F–350 that killed my son, are not on either list. Every vehicle manufactured and/or sold in the U.S. is supposed to be on the list, and I found two that 

are not in just about a minute, approximately the time it took my 4 year old son 

to run into daddy’s truck only slightly ahead of my wife and I and get the vehicle 

to roll-over his baby brother. I will not be surprised to find that other vehicles are, 

for whatever reasons, omitted from the list; for example, I am told that the Chevy 

SSR and Saab 9.2 are on neither list. 

Regardless of why these errors, and perhaps others, were made, the point is that 

this voluntary system is just not an adequate way for this Nation to take reasonable 

steps to protect our children. When industry and the marketplace are unable to 

come to grips with a problem, it is sometimes necessary for the government to step 

in and mandate such reasonable steps to promote the public safety. 

These examples show that without an act of Congress industry and NHTSA will 

be unlikely to provide the type of information promised. 

Additionally, that agreement only deals with one of the issues addressed in the 

Gulbransen bill, namely the brake transmission shift interlock. It does not deal with 

auto reverse power windows, nor with rear visibility standards, both of which have 

caused death and injury, both of which are easily avoidable and equally deserving 

of action by Congress. 

As a parent who is a member of a group of parents who are forced to deal with 

the loss of their child, the principal is simple: safety features are not luxury items, 

10 

nor should the be optional equipment. Further, the absence of safety features is not 

something that should be hidden from consumers. It is not the fault of parents that 

accidents, otherwise preventable, happen. Great parents suffer great tragedies. The 

only way to ensure that fatalities will not happen is to design them out. This proposed Act will design out, with reasonable affects to the cost structure on the industry, defect’s that costs the lives of children. 

PLEASE UNDERSTAND THAT MY SON IAN WOULD BE ALIVE IF HE AND 

HIS BROTHER HAD JUMPED INTO THE OTHER VEHICLE IN MY DRIVEWAY 

AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. That vehicle, a 2002 GMC Envoy, was 

equipped with BTSI in all key positions, making the roll-away accident impossible 

for a 4-year old to cause. The fact that I purchased both of those cars with the expectation that they would behave in the same way shows why we need Congress 

to act on this bill. 

Finally, the agreement does nothing to require industry or NHTSA to compile statistical data of non-traffic, non-crash situations involving bodily injury or death. It 

will take an act of Congress to change the reporting requirements of law enforcement across the company. NHTSA did a 2004 study of death certificates my sons 

death certificate was not reported in a way that it was calculated in that study. It 

will take an act of Congress to make relevant statistics a possibility. 

When my little son Ian died in the little town of Farmington in the little State 

of New Hampshire in April 2004, his death was not tracked, recorded or counted 

by any governmental agency in this country. His death, and hundreds of other 

deaths in such non-traffic non-crash situations, should not go un-noticed. They 

should be heard by this Congress, and NHTSA, and industry, as a call, or more appropriately a cry, to take reasonable steps to avoid such needless deaths and injuries in the future. 

NHTSA may suggest to this Congress that it is working on these issues through 

rulemaking. In fact, prior to offering the voluntary agreement NHTSA offered to put 

the issue in rulemaking, and asked me to petition for such a rule. I declined that 

request. 

Although NHTSA has the authority to make rules with the force of law when circumstances warrant, rulemaking requires NHTSA to perform a cost-benefit analysis 

on any proposal to require a safety feature. However, without any accurate data on 

non-traffic non-crash related deaths, such an analysis is impossible. 

More importantly, it is a morally reprehensible analysis to do in the first place. 

One child’s death is enough when it can be so reasonably avoided by the common 

sense, reasonable and affordable safety measures proposed by this Act. Congressional action circumvents this morbid ‘‘cost-benefit’’ analysis. Congressional action 

is needed now. 

It is only by enacting this law that the Federal Government will begin to collect 

data on such incidents, and will force the industry to implement reasonable measures to avoid the deaths of hundreds of children in the future. It is my hope, and 

my prayer, that my little Ian’s death does not go unnoticed by this Congress, but 

that instead you hear his cry, and the cry of his family and hundreds of family’s 

across this great Nation, and enact the Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety 

Act of 2007. 

I thank you for the opportunity to speak and submit testimony to you on behalf 

of my son Ian, his brothers and sister, my wife Brenda, and on behalf of the hundreds of other families who look to this Committee and this Congress to learn from 

our tragedy and do the best you can to prevent such needless deaths in the future. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Our next witness is Dr. Greg Gulbransen. 

Doctor? 

STATEMENT OF DR. GREG GULBRANSEN, PEDIATRICIAN, 

SYOSSET, NEW YORK 

Dr. GULBRANSEN. Mr. Chairman, good morning. 

I’m Dr. Greg Gulbransen. I’d like to start by saying thank you 

for taking on this challenge. 

I wish to thank you and Members of the Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and Automobile Safety Subcommittee for inviting me to 

appear before you today to testify on the important issue of child 

safety as it relates to the vehicles that we drive. 

11 

I’m here today to speak to you as a dad, a pediatrician, a board 

member of KIDS AND CARS, and a concerned citizen in an attempt to make vehicles safer for the American family. My wife, 

Leslie, and I, along with hundreds of other families, are determined 

to prevent our tragedy from happening again and again to so many 

other families. 

On October 19, 2002, a preventable, but unthinkable, tragedy 

struck our family. It was 9:30 p.m., and I stepped out to move my 

SUV into the driveway. Inside my home were my—the babysitter, 

Leslie, my wife, and my two young sons, or so I thought. It was 

a habit of mine to back the SUV into the driveway in the evening, 

because in the morning the streets are congested with children 

playing and people walking their dogs. Cameron was not in the 

driveway when I got into my SUV. While driving in reverse, I remember looking over my shoulder and using the rearview and both 

side mirrors, and backing slowly into my parking space. I thought 

I was driving a safe vehicle and doing the right thing, until I suddenly felt the front wheel go over a bump. I had no idea what I 

had run over. I knew I couldn’t have hit the curb, and it was too 

early for the newspaper. Out of concern, I jumped out, and there 

in the headlights was my 2-year-old son, Cameron, in his baby-blue 

pajamas, holding his blanket, face up, dying of massive, profuse 

head injuries. I knew immediately it was too late, but I did everything I could to save my dying son. 

I can’t begin to describe the sickening shock and devastation. 

How could this have happened? I looked where I was driving, but 

yet I never saw him. I never had a chance of seeing Cameron, because he was too small—too small for the large blindspots that are 

built into the design of our vehicles. While SUVs, minivans, and 

pickup trucks have become more popular, they pose a greater danger for our children. These vehicles have huge blind zones that 

have led to tragedies for many families, because drivers simply 

cannot see who or what is behind them when they are driving. 

These technologies will continue—I’m sorry—these tragedies will 

continue, if something isn’t done. 

I learned, later, that there are technologies, like cameras and 

sensor systems, that would have warned me that my son was behind my vehicle. As a pediatrician who advocates for children’s 

safety, and as a father who has lost a child, I can’t stress enough 

how important it is to get these lifesaving technologies into vehicles. 

While the Government is responding for collecting accident data 

and recognizing safety issues affecting our daily lives, at the 

present time the Government hasn’t even set up a database to collect information about non-traffic injuries. Yes, my son was also not 

a statistic. No one ever even counted his death. It was an unevent. 

Without data collection, how can we expect the Government and 

the automobile industry to appreciate the need to make the necessary safety improvements in our vehicles? I find it curious that 

it’s taken the efforts of a nonprofit agency, such as KIDS AND 

CARS, to bring this issue to the public attention. If not for their 

work—if not for their efforts to inform the public about these dangers, I’m certain we would not have—we would not be here today, 

12 

trying to work together to solve this grave public health and safety 

issue. 

Yes, the ultimate responsibility for operating a vehicle lies with 

the driver. I feel that pain every single day. However, the automobile industry is responsible for designing safe vehicles, and the 

Government has both the duty and the obligation to protect children in and around motor vehicles by setting reasonable safety 

standards. 

The truth is that when drivers are backing their vehicles, they 

are forced to put blinders on that prevent them from seeing large 

areas behind their vehicle. Parents know the driver should not be 

required to bear the burden for this problem alone, especially when 

motor vehicles come equipped with large blind zones as standard 

equipment, blind zones that cannot be eliminated by mirrors and 

cannot be made safe by educational messages alone. Only technology that provides drivers with visibility behind the vehicle can 

shine a light into the blind zone and ensure that our children are 

protected. 

I’m not talking about futuristic, pie-in-the-sky developments that 

are years away. I’m talking about stuff that already exists, that’s 

already being offered as either standard or optional equipment on 

many current production vehicle models. Until the Government 

acts to provide that technology in every vehicle, drivers will have 

little chance of preventing back-over crashes, and our children will 

remain at risk even near their own homes. That’s why the Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2007 is so important. 

While my son’s name is on the bill, it’s not about him at all. It’s 

about every single child that’s ever been backed over, inadvertently 

left in a vehicle, or accidently trapped in a power window. This legislation honors all of them, and shows how much we are trying to 

make vehicles safer for the American family. 

For some reason, there’s a little confusion. The press seems to 

think that all we want to do is advocate that cameras are on the 

rear of all these vehicles. It’s not that. We want safety performance 

standards for rearward visibility. 

So, thank you for your time and giving me the honor to crusade 

here today for safety of children. I thank you for the past support 

for this legislation and your efforts to get it enacted last year before Congress adjourned. I hope that passage of this legislation will 

be of—a priority of the Subcommittee, and I want to help in any 

way I can. I think this is my fifth time down here, and I’ll continue 

to keep coming down. 

I’m happy to answer any questions you have. I also have included attachments to the testimony to illustrate the enormous 

blind zones behind some vehicles, a fact sheet on the major provisions in the legislation, and information about the growing number 

of child deaths. 

Please remember the motto from KIDS AND CARS, ‘‘Be sure you 

can see before you turn the key.’’ 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gulbransen follows:] 

13 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. GREG GULBRANSEN, PEDIATRICIAN, SYOSSET, NEW

YORK

Mr. Chairman, good morning. I am Dr. Greg Gulbransen and would like to start 

by saying thank you for taking on this challenge. I wish to thank you and the members of the Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and Automotive Safety Subcommittee for 

inviting me to appear before you today to testify on the important issue of child 

safety as it relates to the vehicles we drive. I am here today speaking to you as dad, 

a Pediatrician, a board member of KIDS AND CARS, and a concerned citizen in an 

attempt to make vehicles safer for the American family. My wife Leslie and I, along 

with hundreds of other families are determined to prevent our tragedy from happening again and again to so many other families. 

On October 19, 2002 a preventable but unthinkable tragedy struck our family. It 

was 9:30 p.m. and I stepped outside to move my SUV into the driveway. Inside my 

home were the babysitter, Leslie, and my two young sons; or so I thought. It was 

a habit of mine to back the SUV into the driveway in the evening because in the 

morning the streets were congested with children playing and people walking their 

dogs. Cameron was not in the driveway when I got into my SUV. While driving in 

reverse I remember looking over my shoulder and using the rear view and both side 

mirrors and backing slowly into my parking space. I thought I was driving a safe 

vehicle and was doing the right thing until I suddenly felt the front wheel go over 

a bump. I had no idea what I had run over. I knew I couldn’t have hit the curb. 

Out of concern I jumped out and there in the headlights was my 2-year-old son, 

Cameron, in his baby blue pajamas holding his blanket, face up, bleeding profusely 

from a massive head injury. I knew immediately it was too late but I did everything 

I could to save my dying son. 

I can’t begin to describe the sickening shock and devastation. How could this have 

happened? I looked where I was driving but yet I never saw him! I never had a 

chance of seeing Cameron because he was too small. Too small for the large blind 

zones that are built into the design of our vehicles. 

While SUVs, minivans and pickup trucks have become more popular they pose a 

greater danger for our children. These vehicles have huge blind zones that have led 

to tragedies for many families because drivers simply cannot see who or what is behind us when we drive. These tragedies will continue if something isn’t done. I 

learned later that there are technologies, like cameras and sensor systems that 

would have warned me that my son was behind my vehicle. As a pediatrician who 

advocates for children’s safety and as a father who has lost a child, I can’t stress 

enough how important it is to get these life-saving technologies into all vehicles. 

While the government is responsible for collecting accident data and recognizing 

safety issues affecting our daily lives, at the present time the government hasn’t 

even set up a database to collect information about non-traffic injuries. Without 

data collection how can we expect the government and the automobile industry to 

appreciate the need to make the necessary safety improvements in our vehicles? I 

find it curious that it has taken the efforts of a nonprofit agency, KIDS AND CARS, 

to bring this issue to public attention. If not for their efforts to inform the public 

about these dangers, I’m certain we would not be here today trying to work together 

to solve this grave public health and safety issue. Yes, the ultimate responsibility 

for operating a vehicle lies with the driver. I feel the pain of that every day. However, the automobile industry is responsible for designing safe vehicles, and the government has both the duty and the obligation to protect children in and around 

motor vehicles by setting reasonable standards for safety. The truth is that when 

drivers are backing their vehicles they are forced to put blinders on that prevent 

them from seeing large areas behind their vehicle. Parents and other drivers should 

not be required to bear the burden for this problem alone, especially when motor 

vehicles come equipped with large blind zones as standard equipment. Blind zones 

that cannot be eliminated by mirrors and cannot be made safe by educational messages alone. Only technology that provides drivers with visibility behind their vehicle can shine a light into the blind zone and ensure that our children are protected. 

I am not talking about futuristic, pie-in-the-sky developments that are years 

away, I am talking about existing technology that is already offered either as standard or optional equipment on many current production vehicle models. Until government acts to provide that technology in every vehicle, drivers will have little chance 

of preventing back-over crashes, and our children will remain at risk even near 

their own homes. 

That’s why the Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2007 is so important. While Cameron’s name is on the bill, let’s remember this isn’t just about 

Cameron. This bill is about every single child that has been backed over, inadvertently left in a vehicle or accidentally trapped in a power window. This legislation 

14 

honors all of them and shows how much we are trying to make vehicles safer for 

the American family. 

Thank you for your time and giving me the honor to crusade here today for the 

safety of children. I thank you for your past support for this legislation and your 

efforts to get it enacted last year before Congress adjourned. I hope that passage 

of the legislation will be a priority of the Subcommittee and I want to help in any 

way I can. This is my fifth trip to Capitol Hill to urge passage and I will come as 

often as you like to see this important bill enacted. 

I am happy to answer any question you have. I also have included attachments 

to my testimony that illustrate the enormous blind zones behind some vehicles, a 

fact sheet on the major provisions in the legislation and information about the growing number of child deaths and injuries. 

Please remember the motto from KIDS AND CARS when you get behind the 

wheel of your vehicle today, ‘‘Be sure you can see before you turn the key.’’ 

THE CAMERON GULBRANSEN KIDS AND CARS SAFETY ACT OF 2007 FACT SHEET

At least four young children are killed in a non-traffic automobile incident every 

week. The age of victims in these cases is usually less than 5-years-old. These tragedies are truly heart-wrenching—but also preventable. This bill addresses the leading causes of these needless deaths and injuries by directing the Secretary of Transportation to issue safety standards and take other action to reduce the incidence of 

child injury and death inside or outside of parked passenger motor vehicles. 

The Need To Protect Children In and Around Vehicles 

Since 2001, over 1,000 children have died in non-traffic incidents and this statistic 

has been steadily rising. Preliminary data indicate 219 documented fatalities in 

2006. The government currently does not collect data about non-traffic incidents, so 

we know that the real fatality numbers are much higher. (data provided by Kids 

and Cars, www.KidsAndCars.org.) 

A 2002 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) study (July 2000–June 

2001) reported that over 9,160 children are treated in hospital emergency rooms due 

to non-traffic incidents. 

The Bill 

The Cameron Gulbransen KIDS AND CARS Safety Act of 2007 directs the Secretary of Transportation to issue safety standards to decrease the incidence of child 

injury and death. The Act: 

• Establishes reasonable rulemaking deadlines regarding child safety, applicable 

to all passenger motor vehicles, in three ways: 

—Ensures that power windows and panels automatically reverse direction 

when they detect an obstruction to prevent children from being trapped, injured or killed. 

—Requires a rearward visibility performance standard that will provide drivers with a means of detecting the presence of a person behind the vehicle 

in order to prevent backing incidents involving death and injury, especially 

to small children and disabled people. 

—Requires the vehicle service brake to be depressed whenever the vehicle is 

taken out of park in order to prevent incidents resulting from children disengaging the gear shift and causing vehicles to roll away. 

• Establishes a child safety information program, administered by the Secretary 

of Transportation. This will involve collecting non-traffic incident data, informing parents about these hazards to children and ways to mitigate them, as well 

as making this information available to the public through the Internet and 

other means. 

Support 

Senators John E. Sununu (R–NH) and Hillary Rodham Clinton (D–NY) are the 

prime senate sponsors; the House of Representatives companion bill is sponsored by 

Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky (D–IL) and Congressman Peter King (R–NY) 

Groups supporting the bill include: KIDS AND CARS, Consumers Union, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, the American Academy of Pediatrics, Public Citizen, Kids in Danger, Trauma Foundation, The Zoie Foundation, Adrianna’s Rule 

Foundation, Veronica’s Eyes Foundation, Craig’s Crusade and more. 

15 


gulb1.eps
16 


gulb2.eps
17 


gulb3.eps
18 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Ms. Joan Claybrook, Public Citizen. 


gulb4.eps
19 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOAN CLAYBROOK, PRESIDENT, PUBLIC 

CITIZEN; FORMER ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL HIGHWAY 

TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I’d like to acknowledge the role of this Committee in passage of the SAFETEA–LU bill for which we are very appreciative. 

It’s a wonderful piece of legislation, and it’s made a huge difference 

already in safety. 

Second, I’d like to acknowledge the work that was done on the 

TREAD Act, although some of you weren’t here then. This committee did pass the TREAD Act in 2000, and it also has made important improvements in the activities of the National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration. 

Third, I’d just like to direct the Senators to some of the families 

that are in the first rows here who have come to Capitol Hill to 

lobby for the legislation, and to thank Senator Sununu for your cosponsorship of this important bill. 

Mr. Chairman, I have divided my statement into three parts: the 

importance of protecting children inside cars, the importance of 

protecting children outside of vehicles, and school bus safety. And 

because there’s so much to say, I’m going to have to urge that you 

pay attention to the testimony as its whole, but I’m just going to 

mention a few items in it. 

First, I do want to support the enactment of the Cameron 

Gulbransen legislation. It’s really an important piece of legislation, 

and it needs to be passed. 

But the question of what the Committee is going to do in terms 

of its decisions in the legislative process beyond that legislation, I 

think, need to be addressed in terms of the number of deaths to 

children in the different types of crashes that occur. 

And it’s amazing, I just got this data yesterday from NHTSA— 

late yesterday—and so, I don’t have it included in my testimony, 

but I do have—it’s being distributed today—a sheet that pictures 

a car that describes the different crash sources/modes, and where 

these deaths and injuries occur. The data are for 2005. In frontalcrash impacts—these are 0- to 8-year-old children who are—there 

are 241 deaths in frontal-impact crashes. There are 257 deaths of 

children in rollover crashes. There are 61 deaths in rear-impact 

crashes. There are 200 deaths in side-impact crashes. There are 

339 deaths of child pedestrians. And there are 226 deaths that 

would be prevented were the Gulbransen law to pass. 

So, there you have the importance of that bill spelled out by the 

statistics and the data. Incredibly, incredibly important. And it’s no 

less important than front-, rear-, rollover, or side-impact crashes 

that occur. 

Now, the other interesting piece of information that I got from 

NHTSA late yesterday was the relationship between the deaths of 

children and the deaths of adults in those modes of crashes. And— 

in terms of percentages, because the numbers are quite different— 

but if you compare the 0- to 8-year-old children in these modes of 

crashes to adults age 13 and above, they’re 33 percent for rollovers, 

where children are killed; and 34 percent for adults. Same thing. 

For frontal, you have 31 percent for the 0- to 8-year-old, and 38 

percent for adults, so it’s very close. For the side, it’s 26 percent 

20 

and 22 percent—26 for children, 22 for adults. And in the rear, 

there’s a bigger difference, 8 percent and 3 percent. 

Now, what does that say to us, in terms of what’s needed? Well, 

first—cars are not made for children. They’re just not made for 

children. Motor vehicles are made for adults. And so, the items 

that are addressed in our testimonies jointly today are ones that 

say, ‘‘These are the most important areas where there are simple 

remedies.’’ Most of them are incredibly inexpensive, like the brakeshift interlock, which is voluntarily offered by the auto industry, 

but only 80 percent of the vehicles comply with it today, and less 

used to when this voluntary deal was first agreed to in the 1990s. 

It costs a couple of dollars, and it means that no kid can shift that 

gearshift out of park and into neutral, and let the car roll away, 

because they can’t reach the brake. And so, the brake-shift interlock requires you to put your foot on the brake before you can shift. 

And I will say that when I was 5 years old, I did that in my parents car, and, as a result, I almost died, because the car almost 

rolled over a cliff. And if some woman hadn’t seen it happen and 

stopped it, I would be dead, at 5 years old. So, this is a really important, but small, item. 

But if you look at the back-over, which is where the largest number of deaths are occurring, and which is really unnecessary, I 

want to say two things. One is that in 1980 I issued a conspicuity 

standard, a standard which measures what a person inside the vehicle can see all around, 360°. And that standard took 10 years to 

develop, and it was never implemented. NHTSA never implemented it. And, as a result, we have vehicles that are designed so 

that—and Consumer’s Union has documented this—so you cannot 

see children for many, many feet, particularly if you’re short. And 

many women who drive these SUVs are short. You cannot see your 

children. And even if you’re taller, you can’t. So, there’s got to be 

something done. And what this bill has in it is a safety performance standard. It’s not a requirement for any particular technology. 

It’s a safety performance standard. So, I think that this bill is wellwarranted. 

In terms of power windows, when I was at NHTSA in the 1960s, 

we started working on power windows. They were just coming into 

vehicles and—in a widespread way. And no one knew what to do. 

Well, now we have the methods for raising and lowering the window changed. The auto reverse in Europe costs $10 to $12 a window. If you ask any parent would they spend $10 to $12 per window to protect their kids from being strangled or their arms or 

hands being cut off, you wouldn’t find a parent in this nation that 

wouldn’t pay that amount of money. And when you think about the 

cost of fancy radios and all the rest of it that are put in cars that 

cost much more, then you know that these are cheap, very cheap, 

by comparison. 

And when the industry does something in mass production, the 

costs go way down. They always complain about it, and then they 

give you the optional equipment price, but when they put it in 

mass production, the price goes down. 

There are several other things that I mention in my testimony. 

I’ll just briefly say that child restraints are only tested for frontal 

crashes, they’re not tested for side, rear, or rollover crashes. They 

21 

should be. The rear seatbacks often fall down on children, because 

they’re not built in a strong enough way, and the standard for vehicle seats is 35 years old. And we tell people to put their kids in 

the back seat, and, when we do, the seat can go back and harm 

them. When NHTSA did crash tests for the rear-impact tests that 

they were going to raise to 50 miles an hour, almost every seat 

back fell backward. Now, who doesn’t go 50 miles an hour down the 

highway, right? You may not crash at 50 miles an hour, but it 

could be at 40 in the rear. NHTSA did nothing to issue a new 

standard to require that seat backs don’t fall back. And yet, we tell 

all people to put their kids in the back seat. If that seat back falls 

backward, what happens is, the front seat passenger goes zooming 

backward, because your belt doesn’t hold you in a rearward crash, 

and you become a quadriplegic or paraplegic, and you crush your 

child. Terrible. And that data is generally not collected. 

So, I urge you to pass this bill. I urge you to look at these other 

issues. They’re very minor costs, most of them. The seat-back cost 

couldn’t be $15 or $20 to fix per car. And I urge you to consider 

all of these issues, because they’re really critically important, and 

children deserve it. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Claybrook follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOAN CLAYBROOK, PRESIDENT, PUBLIC CITIZEN; 

FORMER ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and 

Automotive Safety Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, 

and Transportation, for the opportunity to provide this testimony on the need for 

improved efforts to protect children from vehicle-related injury. I am Joan 

Claybrook, the president of Public Citizen, a national non-profit public interest organization with over 150,000 members nationwide. We represent the interests of consumers and ordinary citizens through lobbying, litigation, regulatory oversight, research, and public education. 

Child safety issues first gained the spotlight in the 1990s, with the discovery that 

auto manufacturers were installing cut-rate airbags that were killing children. I had 

alerted manufacturers in 1980 of research pointing to the need to consider designs 

and technologies such as top-mounted, vertically deploying airbags, dual inflation, 

technical folds, and tethers in order to reduce risks to children and small-statured 

adults, but most automakers failed to follow through on this information. Although 

automakers had known for a dozen years that the child/airbag relationship was delicate, they neither warned the public against placing children in the front seats nor 

designed airbags to protect children. Instead, they exploited the discretion granted 

them by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) broad performance standard and abused it. It took Congressional action to force NHTSA to 

require the automakers to accommodate children in airbag design. This story, unfortunately, is paradigmatic of the child safety issue. 

Motor vehicle crashes are the leading cause of death for children ages 3 to 14 in 

the United States. 1 NHTSA reports that in 2005, 1,946 children were killed and 

234,000 children were injured in motor vehicle crashes. 2 That means that each day 

an average of 5 children are dying in motor vehicle crashes while another 640 are 

injured. 3 Moreover, children are also at serious risk in and around motor vehicles 

in non-traffic related incidents, and these data are completely missing from state 

and Federal safety databases. In the absence of government data collection, KIDS 

AND CARS, a national nonprofit safety organization, maintains a database of child 

fatalities from motor vehicle events other than crashes on the Nation’s roadways. 

These non-traffic motor vehicle related events—which include children being backed 

over by vehicles, being inadvertently left in hot vehicles, being strangled by power 

windows, and setting cars in motion when left unattended in a vehicle—killed at 

least 226 children in 2005 alone. 4 (We suspect these numbers could be even higher, 

because NHTSA does not currently collect non-traffic death and injury data; KIDS 

AND CARS is the only source for these data.) 

22 

What is even more tragic about these bleak statistics is that many of these deaths 

and serious injuries could have been prevented. When I refer to preventability, let 

me be clear that I am not blaming parents; instead, I am referring to the failures 

of industry to design motor vehicles for children and of our Federal Government to 

use the resources at its disposal to gather data and set standards to protect children 

from needless harm. I am sure that we will undoubtedly hear today about the need 

to educate parents, or that many of the deaths and injuries we will discuss today 

are attributable to parental neglect. I caution you to reject these arguments, for 

they are simply the child safety equivalent of the ‘‘nut behind the wheel’’ argument 

that industry raised for years in order to avoid accepting responsibility for its design 

failures. We know that children must be driven to school, the doctor, and so on; we 

know as well that parents do not have fifteen arms or eyes in the backs of their 

heads, and that children can get into enormous danger in a split second. Vehicles 

must be designed with some recognition of these simple facts of life, and NHTSA 

must ensure that they are. As NHTSA and manufacturers continue their pattern 

of neglect, then we must turn to Congress to make sure children are protected. 

I. Child Safety Is Undermined by Unnecessary Information Gaps 

A core issue for child safety is how little information is available to guide policymakers and help the public hold NHTSA and the motor vehicle industry accountable. One problem is that information which NHTSA has at its disposal is not readily accessible to the public. For example, a researcher interested in learning the 

number of children killed in rear-impact crashes or side-impact crashes in a given 

year cannot find this information through the public interface for NHTSA’s Fatality 

Analysis Reporting System (FARS). NHTSA can and will generate reports from that 

data, but only upon request. 

NHTSA’s data gathering systems have focused on injuries and deaths from crashes on the Nation’s roadways and have never tracked the deaths and injuries related 

to motor vehicles in non-traffic incidents. The invisibility of non-traffic incidents in 

NHTSA data has resulted in decades of neglect of several kinds of alarming yet preventable child deaths and injuries, such as back-overs in driveways and strangulations in power windows of parked vehicles. Thanks to the enterprising work of KIDS 

AND CARS, we know much more about the gravity of these risks to children. 

NHTSA is only now taking the initial steps to begin gathering this kind of data systematically, thanks to Congress’s decision in 2005’s Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA–LU) to require 

NHTSA to do so. 

Meanwhile, the agency is undermining our ability to know about potential defects 

in child safety seats. Outraged by the revelation that NHTSA had known of the 

Ford-Firestone deaths but failed to act, Congress demanded in the Transportation 

Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act of 2000 that 

NHTSA create an early warning system—a database to alert the public of trends 

suggesting a potential safety defect. NHTSA has created that system, but it has 

inexplicably opted in its implementing rule to keep most of that data secret from 

the public. (In fact, when NHTSA created the database and starting gathering information from manufacturers in 2003, it kept all such data secret, pending the outcome of litigation challenging the agency’s first rule to exempt the data from public 

disclosure. After NHTSA lost in court, it returned to the drawing board and proposed a rule that would keeps most of this data secret. Meanwhile, at present none 

of this data is yet available to the public.) 5

In addition to monitoring NHTSA’s efforts to implement the data gathering requirements of SAFETEA–LU, I encourage Congress to hold the agency’s feet to the 

fire on its decision to keep the TREAD Act’s early warning data (including data on 

child safety) a dark secret. I also call on Congress to require the agency to close 

the information gap by compiling the latest safety data on children and other vulnerable populations (such as seniors and pregnant women) in readily available periodic reports. 

II. Children Are Unnecessarily at Risk From Insufficient Motor Vehicle 

Safety Standards 

It is no easy task to try to catalogue all the vehicle-related harms that children 

face. Of course, there are all the risks that are specific to children, such as unsafe 

booster seats, inadequate child restraints, and vehicle back-overs. There are also all 

the risks that adults face—frontal, rear, side-impact, and rollover crashes—which 

may be magnified for children. I want to focus on a few of the most urgent risks, 

and I believe it would be useful to group them in three categories: risks children 

face inside the vehicle, those they face outside the vehicle, and those they face when 

they are entrusted to school buses. 

23 

A. Protecting Children Inside the Vehicle 

Children face a range of harms while they are inside the vehicle—as passengers 

in cars on the road, and as occupants (often active occupants) in cars that have been 

parked. I want to focus on a few core issues that are most in need of oversight and 

legislative action. 

1. The Child Safety Gap in Motor Vehicle Safety Standards 

Federal motor vehicle safety standards protect all of us, including children, every 

day. The increase in the number of passenger vehicles and drivers since 1966 is substantial, yet both the number of deaths and the death rate have declined dramatically in the last 40 years. NHTSA’s motor vehicle safety standards have played a 

large role in achieving these savings. Nonetheless, there are significant gaps in existing and developing safety standards: just as manufacturers fail to design vehicles 

to protect children, NHTSA is not doing enough to develop safety standards that 

will adequately address the particular needs of children. 

Side impact crashes. Perhaps the most important example is side-impact crash 

protection. The current side-impact crash protection standard (FMVSS No. 214) does 

not address rear occupants. NHTSA proposed in 2004 to amend the side-impact 

standard to include demanding new tests for front seat occupants, essentially requiring the use of upper and lower interior side-impact air bags. The proposed rule’s 

requirements for rear seat occupants, however, are far less demanding and can be 

met with foam padding instead of dynamic side-impact airbags, which offer greater 

protection. What does this inadequate proposal mean for children? Simple: parents 

are instructed to place children in the rear seats, precisely where the current and 

proposed side-impact standards fail to offer sufficient protection. 6 Moreover, the 

proposed rule endangers children under 12 who are in the front seat of a vehicle, 

because side-impact airbags for front seat occupants that comply with the proposed 

rule still allow children to be ejected from the vehicle. In short, NHTSA’s new proposal offers no protection for children whether they ride in the front or back seat. 7

Meeting the needs of children in side-impact crashes should be a higher priority, 

given that side-impact collisions account for 42 percent of vehicle-related child fatalities for rear-seated children ages 0–8. 8

Rollover crashes. The safety gap for children also means that weak standards will 

be doubly weak for children. A significant portion of vehicle-related child fatalities— 

around 30 percent of child deaths from motor vehicle crashes—is attributable to rollover crashes. 9 Unfortunately, NHTSA has proposed a standard for roof strength in 

rollover crashes that will not adequately protect anyone, much less children. Among 

its problems: it maintains the static platen test, which fails to accurately replicate 

the damage and forces a vehicle is subjected to during a rollover crash, and its inadequacy will not mitigate the deaths and injuries specifically attributable to the cascading effects of a weak roof, which include the creation of ejection portals when 

the window glazing fails, belt failure, door retention failure, and injury from the violent intrusion of the roof itself. I look forward to this particular issue being addressed in more detail in the months to come, as this Committee conducts oversight 

of the Administration’s implementation of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 

Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA–LU), which requires 

NHTSA to issue roof crush and ejection mitigation standards. 

Seat backs. Unmet needs for adult safety protection can put children at particular 

risk. One case in point is the need for stronger seat backs. In a rear-impact crash, 

the vehicle’s front seats can collapse rearward. The result is not just back injury, 

paraplegia, and quadriplegia for the front-seat occupant: the rearward collapse of 

the back of the front seat injures any occupants behind it, in the rear seat. All too 

often, the rear seat occupants injured or killed in cases of seatback collapse are the 

vehicle owners’ own children. NHTSA does currently have a seat strength standard, 

but it remains so pathetically inadequate that some believe vehicle seats are held 

to a weaker standard than lawn chairs. Manufacturers are well aware of the dangers of seat back failures in crashes, 10 and NHTSA is likewise aware 11—although 

it nonetheless aborted its proposal in 2000 to remedy the problem. 12 Congress must 

insist that NHTSA make necessary updates to this important rule. 

2. Child Restraints 

The revolution that was supposed to fill, or at least bridge, this safety gap for the 

youngest children was the widespread use of child restraints and booster seats. 

Child restraints have definitely had a positive effect on child safety, even when they 

are misused. Nonetheless, there is much more NHTSA can do to improve child safety by focusing its safety and consumer information programs on child restraints. 

24 

The Need for Safety Standards 

Under FMVSS 213, the only test child safety restraints must pass is a standard 

for 30 mile per hour frontal-impact crashes. Children are at risk in all crashes, not 

just frontal-impact crashes. For example, side-impact collisions account for 42 percent of child fatalities for rear-seated children ages 0–8, 13 and on average 32 percent of children killed in motor vehicle crashes die in rollovers. 14 Federal motor vehicle safety standards are designed to ensure that our motor vehicles meet a very 

basic level of safety and are capable of protecting occupants from common crashes 

and other safety concerns. Is it unreasonable to expect these standards to require 

basic protections for children, the most precious cargo our vehicles will ever carry, 

in common vehicle crashes? 

In 2000, Congress instructed NHTSA in section 14 of the TREAD Act to initiate 

a rulemaking on side-impact crash test standards for child restraints, which was 

supposed to be completed 2 years later. After considering the issuance of such a rule 

NHTSA decided that more research was necessary and then promptly abandoned 

the rulemaking it was explicitly required to complete. Congress never authorized 

NHTSA to abandon this rulemaking. Congress must ensure that NHTSA does not 

continue to stall on this important issue but instead pushes forward with research 

and the timely issuance of a much needed standard. 

In addition to failing to issue safety standards for child restraints in even the 

most basic of vehicle crashes, NHTSA also fails to guarantee that child restraints 

are safe and appropriate for the upper age/size range recommended to use them. 

FMVSS 213, the only standard applicable to child restraints, which includes booster 

seats used by older children, is severely limited because it tests safety seats only 

for children weighing up to 65 pounds, even though booster seats are recommended 

for children up to 80 pounds. 15

Finally, it is essential for NHTSA to issue standards for child restraints for the 

crash types discussed above, while including a full range of representative child test 

dummies, including the 10-year-old child test dummy for children up to 80 pounds 

which the agency has developed but not included in performance standards. Currently, the one standard test required for child restraints only requires child restraints to perform adequately in frontal crash tests at 30 miles per hour. This is 

dangerously inadequate. NHTSA must also test child safety seats in side-impact, 

rear-impact, and rollover crashes in order to guarantee that children are properly 

protected. 

The Need for Built-In Restraints 

Properly installed child restraints can reduce the chance of a fatality in a vehicle 

crash by 71 percent for infants and by 54 percent for children 1–4 years old. 16 A 

recent NHTSA study that evaluated the effectiveness of a new standardized installation method, however, found that many parents still improperly install child restraints in vehicles. 17 Child car seats are the only consumer product mandated by 

law that requires a 32-hour training course to learn how to install correctly. 

In 2002, a new safety technology known as LATCH (Lower Anchors and Tethers 

for Children) became mandatory in new vehicles. NHTSA mandated these new child 

restraint attachment standards in order to end confusion about installation methods 

and to help parents safely install restraints for their children. In December 2006, 

however, NHTSA released a final report on the study it conducted to evaluate the 

LATCH system. The results show that the system is so confusing that many parents 

and caregivers are not properly using the system, and the need for education about 

the system is great. 18

To NHTSA’s credit, the agency has acknowledged that there is a widespread problem with poor child restraint installation, and it has promised to work to eliminate 

this confusion so that all children can be properly restrained in vehicles. 19 Working 

to educate people about proper installation methods, however, does not go far 

enough to address the many installation difficulties and confusion surrounding child 

restraint systems. Only with built-in child restraint systems can parents avoid the 

problem of mis-installation. 

Built-in child restraint systems, also known as integrated child restraints, when 

combined with 5-point harness systems are the most effective way to safely restrain 

children in motor vehicles. Currently, integrated child restraints can accommodate 

children other than infants over the age of one. Their mandatory installation in all 

new vehicles would eliminate widespread restraint mis-installation problems for forward-facing seats, ensuring that children over the age of one are properly restrained 

in motor vehicle crashes. 

Furthermore, integrated child restraints would ensure easy notification if a safety 

defect is discovered. Currently, child seat purchasers must register themselves for 

notice in case of a recall, in contrast to the automatic registration that takes place 

25 

when a vehicle is purchased. Built-in restraints eliminate the need for self-registration, which can reduce parents’ likelihood of receiving timely recall notification. 

Finally, integrated restraints would instantly make it possible that child safety 

seats could be included in all the safety standards for which the vehicle is tested. 

The Need for Consumer Information 

In the absence of any requirement for integrated child restraints, NHTSA should 

at a minimum provide consumers more information about the child restraints on the 

market. The New Car Assessment Program (NCAP), which NHTSA launched under 

my watch in 1978, provides consumers information about vehicle performance under 

conditions which are more stringent than those used for safety standards. NCAP 

has been quite successful in creating market incentives for manufacturers to improve safety. Additionally, NCAP’s most important success has been in educating 

consumers about the safety of available vehicles, empowering consumers to make 

educated choices about the vehicles they choose to purchase for themselves and 

their families. 

Despite NCAP’s importance to consumers and the program’s success at motivating 

manufacturers to strive for higher safety ratings, NHTSA has failed to include child 

restraint systems in its NCAP testing. The only evaluation rating NHTSA conducts 

on child restraint systems for consumers is an ease-of-use rating. Although important for consumers, the ease-of-use rating should not be NHTSA’s top rating priority 

for child restraints when the safety of these restraint systems is left unevaluated. 

NHTSA’s failure to test child restraints through the NCAP program leaves parents 

and caregivers at a great loss and children at great risk. Parents and caregivers are 

denied information necessary to make safe and educated decisions about the restraint systems they choose, and a valuable opportunity is squandered to encourage 

manufacturers to build safer restraint systems. (Of course, with built-in child restraints, the child systems would be tested every time the vehicle itself is put 

through its paces.) NHTSA should inform consumers about child restraint performance in frontal, side, rear, and rollover crashes. 

Europe and Japan administer programs similar to NCAP in order to inform consumers about the safety of available vehicles. 20 In both of these programs, child restraints are tested, and consumers are provided with a safety rating system that 

informs them of the different products’ safety performance levels. 21 In Europe, child 

restraints are tested and rated in both frontal and side-impact crashes, and in 

Japan child restraints are tested and rated in frontal-impact tests. 22 Although it 

would be ideal for these programs to test and rate child restraint performances in 

a greater variety of crash scenarios, these programs are still admirably providing 

people with an important and necessary service. If Europe and Japan can provide 

their citizens with this valuable safety information, the United States can do so as 

well. 

3. Power Windows and Strangulation 

Child safety is not a static issue: as motor vehicle technology develops and 

evolves, potential safety hazards themselves evolve. Power windows are a case in 

point: as this technology has added convenience, it has also added risk. Power windows pose a serious threat to children who, time and again, are killed or injured 

when they are trapped in a power window as it rises. 

Congress moved forward to force NHTSA to address one factor of this risk. In the 

Safe, Accountable, Flexible and Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for 

Users (SAFETEA–LU), Congress required all power window switches in motor vehicles to have safer pull-up designs rather than the dangerous rocker or toggle switch 

designs. The risk from rocker and toggle switches was that children would unintentionally engage the window by pushing on the switch and then kill or injure themselves from the rising window. 

These new switches, however, will not completely eliminate the risk of a child 

being injured or killed by a power window. Even with safer designs for window 

switches, children are still at risk if someone begins to close a power window without realizing that the child’s head or other body part is in the way of the rising window. A child has been killed by a power window every month for the last 3 months: 

one in Canada this month, one in New Mexico last month, and one in Detroit in 

December. The Detroit incident is particularly noteworthy because the vehicle involved was a Pontiac Vibe, which has the safer power window switches. (In fact, 

protecting children from being trapped in power windows could also protect adults 

in some cases—such as, for example, the Illinois paramedic who was injured when 

his arm was trapped in the window of a vehicle attempting to drive around an ambulance.) 23

26 

One solution to prevent these tragic injuries and deaths is to require automatic 

reversal technology in power windows when the window meets an obstruction. Automatic reversal technology would ensure that power windows would reverse direction 

whenever they detect a trapped object. This simple, lifesaving technology is already 

widely available throughout Europe, and it is even included as a feature in many 

of the same vehicle models that do not include this feature in the United States. 

Currently pending in the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Cameron 

Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2007 would address this need with a requirement for a performance standard that could be met by auto-reverse technologies. 

4. Brake-Transmission Shift Interlock 

Another danger children face in motor vehicles is the risk of shifting a parked vehicle into gear and causing it to roll away and crash. Since 1998, over 100 children 

have died in vehicle roll-away incidents, though this statistic is likely an 

undercount. 24

A proven way to prevent roll-away incidents is with Brake-Transmission Shift 

Interlock (BTSI), a basic safety feature for automatic transmission vehicles that requires the brake pedal to be depressed before the driver can shift out of park. Since 

most children cannot reach the brake pedal, BTSI prevents them from putting the 

vehicle into gear, thus preventing the vehicle from rolling and crashing. NHTSA has 

recommended since 1980 that manufacturers include BTSI in all vehicles, yet to 

date only about 80 percent of new vehicles include this necessary safety feature. 25

Additionally, many of the vehicles that do include BTSI do not include BTSI 

versions that work in all ignition key positions. 

Since the 1980s, auto manufacturers have opposed mandatory BTSI standards 

and have attempted to avoid them by proffering voluntary standards. Voluntary 

standards rarely work and are often just a tactical delay employed by manufacturers to avoid regulations. Automakers’ repeated failure to include BTSI in all vehicles 

is another example that voluntary standards are unreliable, subject to manufacturer 

caprice, set without a public process, and not subject to compliance requirements. 

The Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2007 would require that 

BTSI be included in the vehicle safety standards for all light vehicles and in all ignition key positions. 

B. Protecting Children Outside the Vehicle 

Children also face serious vehicle-related hazards outside the vehicle. We are familiar, of course, with back-over deaths, which occur when a parent is backing out 

a driveway and cannot see a child who has appeared in the path of the car. Children 

are also, like all of us, exposed to potential danger as pedestrians. Further action 

is needed to protect children from these risks. 

1. Improving the Driver’s Ability To See Children in the Path of the Vehicle 

Drivers must be able to view the environment in which they are operating their 

vehicles. It is a simple premise, one that takes on a tragic dimension when children 

are hurt or killed simply because the driver could not see them. 

Among the dangers vehicles pose to child pedestrians are back-over incidents. 

Backovers occur when a motor vehicle backs up and hits or rolls over a child. These 

terrible tragedies occur because drivers can’t see the children behind their vehicles. 

Many light trucks and SUVs have blind zones behind the vehicles that can be startlingly large: in fact, the latest Consumers Union analysis shows that the worst offender is the 2006 Jeep Commander Limited, which has a blind zone of 44 feet for 

a driver who is 5 feet 8 inches tall, or 69 feet for a driver 5 feet one inch tall. 26

Dozens of children could fit in such a large blind zone and be hidden from the driver’s view. 

Because of NHTSA’s historical failure to assess these risks, we have relied on 

other sources to reveal the magnitude of the problem. KIDS AND CARS has found 

evidence pointing to 100 children killed in back-overs each year, and the Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention report 7,500 children treated in hospital emergency rooms between 2001 and 2003 for back-overs. 27 NHTSA has subsequently 

confirmed the gravity of this risk in a November 2006 report (which was mandated 

by SAFETEA–LU) on technology designed to prevent back-over incidents from occurring. NHTSA concluded that, every year, thousands of children are injured and 

at least 183 people die in back-overs. The study also found that camera-based detection systems were much more effective than sensor-based systems at helping drivers 

detect child pedestrians behind their vehicles. 28

Children are also at risk precisely where everyone assumes they must be most 

visible: in front of vehicles. Especially with the rise in popularity of large SUVs, 

27 

drivers cannot see the area immediately in front of them, which puts small children 

in intersections and driveways at increased risk. 

Children are like the canary in the coal mine, their heightened risk alerting us 

to a problem that affects all of us: the need for standards to secure drivers’ ability 

to see the environment in which vehicles are operated. When I was the administrator of NHTSA, I supervised the completion of a decade-long effort to develop a 

conspicuity standard. I issued this standard in 1980, but it was revoked before it 

could take effect. NHTSA has not relaunched the rulemaking in the 20 years since. 

The Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2007 would require a performance standard for rearward visibility to help end the tragedy of back-overs. In 

addition to a rearward visibility standard, however, Congress should require 

NHTSA to issue a general conspicuity standard. Clearly, the importance of driver 

visibility has been recognized for sometime, and the issuance of a new standard is 

long overdue. 

2. Improving Protection for Child Pedestrians 

In 2005, 339 child pedestrians were killed, and an estimated 16,000 child pedestrians were injured. 29 In addition to visibility standards, NHTSA also needs to address the design of motor vehicles, which through proper engineering can minimize 

the injuries inflicted on pedestrians hit by a moving motor vehicle. 

In Japan and Europe, motor vehicles are routinely tested and rated for their performance in crashes with pedestrians. Vehicles receive stars based on their ability 

to inflict the least amount of possible injury on a pedestrian. These ratings, which 

are a part of Europe and Japan’s New Car Assessment Programs (NCAP), help to 

encourage auto manufacturers to invest in design and technology innovations for pedestrian safety. Additionally, the European Union has also issued a pedestrian safety directive, in which European, Japanese, and Korean (but not, notably, U.S.) auto 

manufacturers have agreed to voluntarily improve pedestrian protections in their 

vehicles. 

Although a voluntary agreement is inadequate to address the importance of pedestrian safety (and European safety groups, accordingly, are advocating mandatory 

pedestrian safety standards), the European Union is still taking greater steps to address the importance of pedestrian safety than the United States. Pedestrian protection is not rocket science: numerous technologies already exist which auto manufacturers could incorporate into new vehicles, such as sensor systems that detect pedestrians and automatically reduce vehicle speeds and vehicle hoods that give way, 

thereby reducing impact forces, when they collide with pedestrians. I challenge Congress to follow the lead of the rest of the world by taking a far more aggressive 

stand against the dangers vehicles pose to pedestrians. Congress should instruct 

NHTSA to issue safety standards to protect all pedestrians, including children. 

C. Protecting Children on School Buses 

We have NHTSA safety standards to thank for the nationwide implementation of 

safety features that school buses have enjoyed for so long it is difficult to remember 

a time without them. Among the important safety features are the stop sign arm 

that extends out when the bus is loading or unloading children and improvements 

to fuel tanks. The statistics bear out these benefits: according to NHTSA, between 

the years of 1990 to 2000, an estimated 26,000 school buses crashed each year, with 

only 10 children dying and 9,500 children being injured each year. 30

The leading safety feature on school buses for several decades has been 

compartmentalization: the design of the seats as compartments that contain children in a crash. Historically, compartmentalization has served as an effective safety 

measure in frontal school bus crashes; however, in other crash modes, children have 

been left unprotected and unrestrained. For compartmentalization, seats are positioned close together so that in frontal crashes children impact into deformable 

seatbacks that absorb the impact force. In other crash modes, such as side-impacts 

and rollovers, compartmentalization is ineffective and children can be thrown 

around the bus and hit their heads on unpadded structures. In crashes of this nature, specially designed restraints can be effectively used to protect children, but no 

Federal standard exists to require restraints in school buses. 

Currently, states have been left to themselves to develop laws for school buses, 

with no guidance from the Federal Government. The only Federal standards regulating school bus crashworthiness require occupant protection only in frontal crashes, and even for frontal crashes the standards do not require dynamic testing with 

child dummies. 

In the absence of Federal guidance, the states are embarking upon their own policy plans, with the result that we are on the brink of seeing a confusing mish-mash 

of different laws in all of the states, rather than one uniform law that provides comVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:35 Jul 18, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\35958.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
28 

prehensive safety for all child passengers. At this point there are five states with 

school bus seat belt laws, including Florida, where most safety advocates fear that 

the law will cause more harm than good. Restraints cannot simply be retrofitted 

into existing bus designs. 

State policymakers have requested guidance from NHTSA on developing these 

laws, but NHTSA has declined to offer any assistance, claiming that 3 years (minimum) of research and development are necessary before any recommendations can 

be made. The Federal Government’s failure to address this issue is unacceptable. 

The only way to ensure that children are safe in school buses is to pass comprehensive Federal standards that will protect children in all crash modes and require appropriately designed restraint systems in all school buses. With states left 

to themselves to develop these regulations on a state by state basis, the country will 

be left with an inconsistent hodgepodge of school bus restraint systems, which would 

hinder and confuse school bus safety developments. 

III. Congress Must Improve NHTSA’s Capacity To Protect Children 

I want to conclude by reiterating the very important role NHTSA has played and 

should be playing in improving safety for children, and for us all, in and around 

motor vehicles. I have advocated for motor vehicle safety improvements for 40 years, 

from the very birth of NHTSA to today. We cannot ever forget how far we have 

come from the time that people were routinely impaled by steering columns and air 

bags were an achievable but nonetheless neglected safety technology. After 40 years 

of being caught in a tug of war between industry interests and its statutory mission, 

NHTSA still has much to do to protect the public, especially children. Unfortunately, this important agency has been pulled away from its mission and stuck in 

a morass of analyses, reviews, and indifference for far too long. 

If Congress expects that this hearing, or the Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars 

Safety Act of 2007, will result in a renewed dedication to child safety, then it will 

have to take additional steps to improve NHTSA’s capacity to meet these compelling 

needs. Throughout my testimony, I have already identified many specific steps that 

are needed to address particular issues for children. What I want to address now 

is the bigger picture: what Congress can do to ensure that any of the specific remedies discussed so far will actually result in improved protections for children. 

Most important, of course, is that NHTSA needs funds for testing and analysis 

of child dummies and the development of performance tests for needed safety standards. Moreover, as we have found repeatedly over the years, NHTSA also needs specific mandates and clear deadlines in order to make issuance of new or improved 

standards a real priority. I would like to conclude by discussing a factor that Congress will need to address but which often goes unmentioned: the need to shield the 

agency from the political interventions of the Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs (OIRA) in the White House Office of Management and Budget. 

Although Congress delegates authority to act directly to the Department of Transportation, which acts through NHTSA to meets its safety obligations, the White 

House has for over 20 years asserted the right to interfere with that delegation and 

impose its political priorities in the rulemaking process. Through Exec. Order No. 

12,866, the successor to Exec. Order No. 12,291, the White House arrogates to itself 

the power to weaken or eliminate proposed motor vehicle safety standards, power 

it executes by requiring the agency to submit its draft regulations to OIRA. 

OIRA has long stood in the way of improved motor vehicle safety. For example, 

OIRA ordered NHTSA to weaken its proposed rule for tire pressure monitoring systems—the telltales that alert drivers whenever their tires are dangerously underinflated. Although Congress required NHTSA to mandate a TPMS that alerts drivers whenever a tire is under-inflated, OIRA intervened to force the agency to 

produce a weak rule that would fail to alert drivers whenever all four tires were 

underinflated or if two tires diagonal from each other were under-inflated. OIRA’s 

interference has resulted in unnecessary harm to the Nation’s motoring public and 

litigation that is still being waged to force the agency to do what Congress told it 

to do. 

I fear that, even if the Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2007 

were passed, and even if Congress were to require NHTSA to address the other 

issues I have identified, children will still be in unnecessary danger because of the 

political machinations of OIRA. The White House signaled its hostility to any further improvements in safety standards by nominating Susan Dudley, an anti-regulatory extremist from the industry-funded Mercatus Center, to head OIRA. Dudley 

has been no friend to motor vehicle safety; in fact, she opposed advanced air bag 

standards, based incredibly on the argument that if consumers truly valued air bag 

protections they would have already compelled recalcitrant auto makers to install 

them. 31 Dudley’s history of regulatory comments and other public pronouncements 

29 

has led me and others in the public interest community to conclude that she would, 

as OIRA administrator, demand the impossible of agencies, standing in their way 

until they prove a case for regulating that Dudley will ensure cannot be proven. 

Although the Senate wisely declined to allow Dudley’s nomination to leave committee in the 109th Congress, the White House decided to renominate her in the 

110th—and to put her in office through the backdoor, while her nomination is officially pending, as an appointed ‘‘senior advisor.’’ The Bush Administration then 

moved to give her even more power by releasing, on January 18, Exec. Order No. 

13,422 and the Final Bulletin on Good Guidance Practices. These proclamations, 

combined, give OIRA the power to review not just regulations but also ‘‘guidance,’’ 

an amorphous category of agency information that apparently includes any ‘‘pronouncement about the conditions under which [an agency] believes a particular substance or product is unsafe.’’ 32 The new order and bulletin give Dudley a powerful 

new ax she can use to chop this Congress off at the knees. 33 Whatever this Congress decides to do for the important issues of the day—global warming, fuel economy, and, yes, child safety—Dudley will be able to undo. 

Conclusion 

Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for this opportunity today to testify 

on these critical needs of children for improved motor vehicle safety. I am eager to 

address your questions. 

ENDNOTES 1 National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration, 2005 Traffic Safety Facts: 

Children available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/TSF2005/ 

2005TSF/810l623/810623.htm. 2 Id. 

3 Id. 

4See KIDS AND CARS, National Data Base of Non-Traffic Incidents, available at 

http://www.kidsandcars.org/ . 5Public Citizen’s comments on the latest rulemaking to keep the data secret outline the legislative, rulemaking, and litigation history of this disastrous plan. See 

http://www.citizen.org/documents/EarlyWarningCBIComments.pdf. 6 Consider other deficiencies regarding back seats: we lack reminder telltales 

alerting drivers when backseat passengers are unbelted, and we have no reminder 

systems to alert parents that a child has been left in the backseat of a parked vehicle, where the child could overheat and die. 7Meanwhile, although it is beyond the scope of child safety issues, it is also worth 

noting that the 2004 proposal came out before Congress required, in 2005’s 

SAFETEA–LU, that NHTSA upgrade the side-impact standard for occupants in all 

seating positions. The proposed rule clearly does not meet that test. 8 Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, Researchers Release New Findings on Protecting Children in Side Impact Crashes, Press Release, Sept. 13, 2005. 9From 1993 to 1998, 31.8 percent of children who died in motor vehicle crashes 

died in rollovers. See F.P. Rivera, P. Cummings & C. Mock, Injuries and Death to 

Children in Rollover Motor Vehicle Crashes in the United States, 9 Injury Prevention 

76 (2003). 10 Internal GM documents obtained by CBS News reveal that General Motors 

(GM) knew of the dangers of weak seats in 1966. See CBS, ‘‘Collapsing Car Seats,’’ 

Nov. 19, 2002. Also, in a recent court case, a former Chrysler manager responsible 

for minivan safety issues testified that his investigation team determined that 

Chrysler seat backs needed to be redesigned. Chrysler, however, did not redesign 

the seats and disbanded the investigation team. Experts at the trial also testified 

that minivan seats collapsed in nearly every rear-impact crash test that Chrysler 

conducted. In the case, the jury ultimately awarded $105.5 million to the parents 

of an infant who died when the seat back collapsed and a family friend was thrown 

backward into the child. See R. Robin McDonald, $105 Mil. Verdict Returned Over 

Minivan Seats, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 2, 2004. 11 NHTSA has long acknowledged the need to improve Federal seating system requirements. Over 30 years ago, NHTSA proposed a rulemaking that would address 

seating system safety and consolidate FMVSS No. 202 ‘‘head restraints’’ and No. 207 

‘‘seating systems.’’ Most recently, in a 2000 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), 

NHTSA stated that in crash tests the agency conducted ‘‘the values of head and 

neck injury criteria... were much higher than acceptable thresholds. Direct contact of the head of the dummy with the interior of the vehicle compartment, which 

occurred when the front seat rotated backward excessively due to the high impact, 

contributed to these high values.’’ 65 Fed. Reg. 67,702. Additionally, fuel integrity 

crash tests revealed significant seat back failures that caused the front seat occuVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:35 Jul 18, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\35958.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
30 

pants to become projectiles into the rear seat. However, to this day, the agency has 

not updated Federal safety standards to adequately protect occupants from seat 

back failure. 12 NHTSA spokesman Rae Tyson stated that ‘‘the seatback rulemaking was terminated for the simple reason that we believe it may be wiser to approach the seat 

as part of an integrated unit rather than treat it as a separate part.’’ Jeff Plungis, 

$106 Million Judgment Against Chrysler and New Safety Studies Intensify the Debate Over Federal Standards, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 19. 2004. This is what NHTSA 

proposed to do in 1974. It appears that the agency has dragged its feet hardly an 

inch in three decades. 13See Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, supra note 8. 14See Rivera et al., supra note 9. 15For more information about children in this vulnerable category, see Public Citizen, The Forgotten Child: The Failure of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers to Protect 4- 

to 8-Year-Olds in Crashes (April 2002). 16 National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration, 2005 Traffic Safety Facts: 

Children available at <http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/ 

TSF2005/2005TSF/810l623/810623.htm>. 17Lawrence E. Decina, Kathy H. Lococo, and Charlene T. Doyle, Child Restraint 

Use Survey: LATCH Use and Misuse, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, December 2006. 18 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, LATCH Child Safety Seat System Confusing Says NHTSA Study, News Release, December 12, 2006. 19 Nation’s Top Highway Safety Official Calls on Manufacturers, Retailers and 

Consumer Groups to Make Child Safety Seats Easier to Install, NHSTA news release. 20 Vehicle Safety Opportunities Exist to Enhance NHTSA’s New Car Assessment 

Program, Government Accountability Office, April 2005. 21 Japan NCAP: http://www.nasva.go.jp/mamoru/english/2006/child/ 

howto.html; European NCAP: http://www.euroncap.com/content/safetylratings/ 

ratings.php?id1=6. 22 Id. 23See EMS Network, Woman Assaults Paramedic With Car—Illinois, Dec. 5, 2006, 

available at <http://www.emsnetwork.org/artman/publish/articlel24279.shtml>. 24 Automakers Agree to Add Break-to-Shift Interlocks The Safety Record September/October 2006, Volume 3 issue 5. 25 Id. 26See Attachment 1. 27See id. 28 NHTSA’s report is not, despite this positive conclusion, the last word on backover issues. See Attachment 3 for safety groups’ response to NHTSA’s inexplicable 

conclusions that back-over avoidance technologies, such as cameras, are somehow 

other than cost-effective. 29 NHTSA Traffic Safety Fact Sheet 2005 Child Safety. 30School Bus Restraint Study National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 

2000 PowerPoint presentation. 31See Public Citizen & OMB Watch, The Cost Is Too High: How Susan Dudley 

Threatens Public Protections (Sept. 2006), available at <http://www.citizen.org/documents/dudleyreport.pdf>. 32OMB, Final Bulletin on Good Guidance Practices, available at <http:// 

www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-07.pdf>, at 10. 33More information is included in Attachment 2. 

ATTACHMENT 1—CONSUMERS UNION RELEASE ON BLIND ZONES

Consumer Reports Releases New Vehicle Blind Zone Data, Listing 2006 Jeep 

Commander Limited as Worst Overall 

CR cautions: the area behind your vehicle can be a danger zone for youngsters. 

YONKERS, NY—Consumer Reports’ latest examination of vehicle blind zones— 

the area behind a car or truck that’s hidden from the driver’s view—shows that the 

2006 Jeep Commander Limited ranks as the worst vehicle overall. 

Consumer Reports measured the blind zone behind the Commander at 44 feet for 

a driver who is five feet, eight inches tall and a stunning 69 feet for a shorter driver 

(five feet, one inch tall) with all three rows of seats raised. The Commander’s blind 

zone is considerably larger than that for other mid-sized and large sport-utility vehicles (SUVs). 

31 

Until now, the vehicle with the worst blind zone in Consumer Reports’ tests was 

the 2002 Chevrolet Avalanche 1500, a pickup truck, which had a blind zone of 29 

feet for a five-foot, eight-inch driver and 51 feet for a five-foot, one-inch driver. But 

the redesigned, 2007 Chevrolet Avalanche LT has no blind zone when equipped with 

the optional rearview camera. Without the camera, the vehicle had a 31-foot blind 

zone for a five-foot, eight-inch driver and 50 feet for a short driver. The Commander 

also offers an optional rearview camera, which CR’s test vehicle lacked. This camera 

can significantly reduce or eliminate the blind zone. 

To help consumers understand how large some blind zones are, Consumer Reports 

has been measuring the blind zones on vehicles that it tests and rates since 2003. 

CR’s database now covers about 200 vehicles from model years 2002 through 2007. 

To measure the blind zones, a 28-inch traffic cone was positioned behind the vehicle 

at the point where the driver could just see the top. This cone simulates the height 

of a small child. 

‘‘Consumer Reports findings illustrate that the danger of vehicle blind zones correlates with the use of large SUVs, minivans and pickups trucks as common family 

vehicles. Consumers must be cognizant of this danger—and the value of rearview 

cameras—when going out to purchase a new vehicle,’’ said Don Mays, Senior Director for Product Safety and Consumer Science at Consumer Reports. 

KIDS AND CARS, the safety group, estimates that more than 100 children were 

killed by vehicles whose drivers simply could not see them in the blind zone behind 

the vehicle. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, 

nearly 7,500 children were treated in United States emergency rooms between 2001 

and 2003 for back-over injuries. Many of these incidents could have been prevented 

if drivers had a way to see or detect what is behind them while backing up. Every 

vehicle has blind zones. Side and rearview mirrors are insufficient to combat them. 

Consumer Reports tests show that, in general, the longer and higher the vehicle, the 

bigger the blind zone is likely to be. 

There are no Federal Government requirements for back-up warning sensors or 

rearview cameras on any passenger vehicle sold in the United States. 

‘‘Unfortunately, the few vehicles that now come with this technology are higherend models, and most devices are available as an extra-cost option—often requiring 

the purchase of other equipment like an expensive navigation system,’’ said Sally 

Greenberg, Senior Product Safety Counsel for Consumers Union in Washington, 

D.C. ‘‘We believe that back-up technologies, such as rearview cameras are essential, 

and should be a requirement by Federal law. Their cost is small compared to the 

cost of a child’s life. And once this technology becomes standard equipment in vehicles, systems will become more economical for manufacturers to produce.’’ 

‘‘Without these devices, parents and families will continue to suffer the terrible 

tragedy of accidentally backing over a child,’’ Greenberg said. ‘‘That is why it is critical that Congress pass the Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of 

2005—to require a rearward visibility standard that will provide drivers with a 

means of detecting a child behind the vehicle.’’ 

Consumers who wish to improve the safety of their current vehicle can add an 

aftermarket rearview camera. Consumer Reports tests have shown that most work 

well. Such cameras typically cost several hundred dollars and are best installed by 

a professional. 

To learn more about the vehicle blind zones, and see measurements for models 

tested by Consumer Reports, visit www.ConsumerReports.org. 

Consumer Reports is one of the most trusted sources for information and advice 

on consumer products and services. It conducts the most comprehensive auto-test 

program of any U.S. publication or website; the magazine’s auto experts have decades of experience in driving, testing, and reporting on cars. To subscribe to Consumer Reports, call 1–800–234–1645. Information and articles from the magazine 

can be accessed online at www.ConsumerReports.org. 

CONSUMER REPORTS Tested Best & Worst Rear Blind Zones 

Vehicle Class Driver 

Height Best Worst Average 

Small Sedans 5′ 8′′ 2006 Subaru Impreza 2.5i 

(6′) 

2003 Suzuki Aerio GS 

(23′) 

12′ 

5′ 1′′ 2006 Subaru Impreza 2.5i 

(11′) 

2003 Suzuki Aerio GS 

(49′) 

24′ 

Mid-sized Sedans 5′ 8′′ 2006 Hyundai Sonata GLS 

(9′ ) 

2005 Cadillac STS ( 21′) 13′ 

32 

CONSUMER REPORTS Tested Best & Worst Rear Blind Zones—Continued 

Vehicle Class Driver 

Height Best Worst Average 

2004 Ford Taurus SES 

(21′) 

2005 Mitsubishi Galant 

GTS (21′) 

5′ 1′′ 2004 Acura TSX (12′) 2006 Mercury Milan (35′) 22′ 

Large Sedans 5′ 8′′ 2003 Lexus LS430 (9′) 2004 Audi A8L (20′) 12′ 

5′ 1′′ 2003 Lexus LS430 (16′) 2006 Cadillac DTS (30′) 22′ 

Wagons & 

Hatchbacks 

5′ 8′′ 2004 Chevrolet Aveo LS 

(5′) 

2005 Chevrolet Malibu LS 

Maxx (17′) 

10′ 

5′ 1′′ 2004 Chevrolet Aveo LS 

(10′) 

2005 Chevrolet Malibu LS 

Maxx (23′) 

16′ 

Small SUVs—Four 

Door 

5′ 8′′ 2006 Subaru Forester 2.5X 

(9′) 

2003 Honda Element EX 

(18′) 

13′ 

2006 Toyota RAV4 Base 

(18′) 

5′ 1′′ 2006 Subaru Forester 2.5X 

(12′) 

2003 Honda Element EX 

(35′) 

21′ 

Midsized SUVs 5′ 8′′ 2004 Volkswagen Touareg 

(11′) 

2006 Jeep Commander 

Ltd. (44′) 

18′ 

5′ 1′′ 2005 Nissan Pathfinder 

LE (18′) 

2006 Jeep Commander 

Ltd. (69′) 

29′ 

Large SUVs 5′ 8′′ 2002 Toyota Sequoia Ltd. 

(14′) 

2004 Dodge Durango Ltd. 

(19′) 

17′ 

5′ 1′′ 2004 Dodge Durango Ltd. 

(24′) 

2007 Chevrolet Tahoe (38′) 27′ 

2004 Nissan Armada LE 

(24′) 

Minivans 5′ 8′′ 2005 Dodge Grand Caravan SXT (12′) 2005 Saturn Relay FWD 

(19′) 

15′ 

5′ 1′′ 2004 Ford Freestar SEL 

(16′) 

2005 Toyota Sienna XLE 

(28′) 

26′ 

Pickups 5′ 8′′ 2005 Nissan Frontier LE 

(16′) 

2004 Ford F–150 XLT 

(34′) 

23′ 

5′ 1′′ 2005 Dodge Dakota SLT 

(24′) 

2007 Chevrolet Avalanche 

(50′) 

35′ 

Coupes 5′ 8′′ 2003 Hyundai Tiburon GT 

(10′) 

2005 Chevrolet Cobalt SS 

(23′) 

15′ 

5′ 1′′ 2004 Mazda RX–8 (19′) 2005 Chevrolet Cobalt SS 

(32′) 

23′ 

2006 Honda Civic Si (19′) 

In this chart Consumer Reports identifies the length, in feet, of the blind zone for each listed vehicle. The 

distance noted is how far behind the vehicle a 28-inch traffic cone had to be before the person, sitting in the 

driver’s seat, could see the cone’s top by looking through the rear window. Distances are provided for vehicles 

that are currently sold with no major changes from the vehicle CR tested. This chart does not include tests 

performed on vehicles using rear view camera systems, either standard or optional. 

ATTACHMENT 2—INFORMATION ON NEW EXECUTIVE ORDER AND GUIDANCE BULLETIN—LATEST WHITE HOUSE POWER GRAB PUTS PUBLIC AT RISK—PROBLEMS OF

THE JAN. 2007 EXECUTIVE ORDER AND BULLETIN ON GUIDANCE (JANUARY 2007) 

The White House released a double whammy attack on the public interest on Jan. 

18, 2007: (1) a new executive order increasing burdens on the regulatory process, 

and (2) a final bulletin creating new burdens on agencies ability to inform the public. Together, this double whammy is an enormous challenge to the ability of the 

Federal Government to protect and inform the public. 

33 

Market Failure... and New Excuses for Failing the Public 

The White House already demanded, under Exec. Order No. 12,866 (1993), that 

agencies state the reason for a new regulation in an economic impact assessment. 

The new Bush executive order now changes the language, putting the spotlight on 

‘‘market failure’’ as the chief rationale—and adding that the purpose of the justification is ‘‘to enable assessment of whether any new regulation is warranted.’’ 

Exec. Order No. 12,866 Revised Text 

Each agency shall identify Each agency shall identify in writing 

the problem that it intends to address (including, where applicable, the failures of private 

markets or public institutions that warrant 

new agency action) 

the specific market failure (such as 

externalities, market power, lack of information) or other specific problem that it intends to address (including, where applicable, the failures of public institutions) that 

warrant new agency action, 

as well as assess the significance of that problem. as well as assess the significance of that problem, 

to enable assessment of whether any new regulation is warranted. 

Market failure is an economics term describing situations in which private markets, left to themselves, fail to bring about results that the public needs. This order, 

however, will be enforced by Susan Dudley, the radical extremist that the White 

House is setting up for a recess appointment to become the administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the White House Office of Management and Budget. Based on an evaluation of Dudley’s record in a report released 

last year, Public Citizen has concluded that, in her hands, the market failure provision will become a barrier to the protections that the public needs. 

Deputy Dudleys in Every Agency 

Although Congress delegates power directly to the agencies themselves, thereby 

diffusing authority throughout the Executive Branch and preventing any single office from becoming all-powerful, the White House has claimed yet more power to 

control agencies and distort regulatory policy with political goals. The new executive 

order commands every agency to designate a Presidential appointee to serve as the 

‘‘Regulatory Policy Officer.’’ Agencies will not be allowed to add new regulatory initiatives to their annual plans without the approval of the new officer. 

Putting Industry Costs Above the Public Interest 

The new order requires agencies to develop annual plans for upcoming 

rulemakings that identify ‘‘the combined aggregate costs and benefits of all regulations planned for that calendar year to assist with the identification of priorities.’’ 

This new requirement will make cost/benefit analysis the central factor in setting 

priorities for needed protections of the public interest. These cost/benefit analyses 

are notoriously biased against regulation, especially long-term goals such as preventing global warming or cancers that manifest years after exposure to toxic substances. 

From Guidance to Darkness 

The executive order and the new bulletin on guidance work together to create a 

new bureaucratic bottleneck that would slow down agencies’ ability to give the public information it needs. 

Guidance 

agency policy other than a rulemaking which sets forth: 

• a policy on a statutory issue 

• a policy on a regulatory issue 

• a policy on a technical issue 

• an interpretation of a statutory issue 

• an interpretation of a regulatory issue 

Significant Guidance 

guidance which: 

• leads to an annual effect of $100 million or more or materially and adversely affects the economy 

• creates inconsistencies with another agency’s activities 

34 

• materially alters budgetary impact of grants, entitlements, etc. 

• raises novel legal or policy issues 

• implicates the President’s priorities 

The bulletin requires significant guidance to be approved by a senior-level agency 

official, and the executive order adds another layer of review by the White House 

itself. By requiring White House approval of important guidance, the White House 

will insert its political agenda and pro-business bias into every level of agency policy, so that our Federal Government will handcuff itself instead of the companies 

that violate the law and put the public in danger. 

The bulletin also requires the agencies to create a webpage listing all significant 

guidance and creating a public challenge process, for industry to demand changes 

to the policy statements, interpretations, and so on that it opposes. 

So Much for the New Congress 

The upshot of this whole executive order is that the White House is already working to undermine not just agencies but also the new Congress’ ability to protect the 

public. Whatever gains might come to consumers and other public interest sectors 

in the 110th Congress are already vulnerable to being rendered meaningless by the 

powers the White House is giving itself. 

ATTACHMENT 3—SAFETY GROUPS’ RESPONSE TO NHTSA BACKOVER REPORT—RE- VIEW AND RESPONSE OF SAFETY GROUPS TO NHTSA’S VEHICLE BACKOVER AVOID- ANCE TECHNOLOGY STUDY, REPORT TO CONGRESS—AGENCY’S CONCLUSIONS CON- TRADICT STUDY FACTS

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) Study, Vehicle 

Backover Avoidance Technology Study, Report to Congress (Nov. 2006), reaches a 

number of negative conclusions about the state of back-over detection technology, 

even though the Study itself contains many positive factual findings—findings that 

support both the need to adopt this technology and the readiness of the technology 

for use in motor vehicles. This review and response evaluates the major conclusions 

reached by NHTSA and shows why those conclusions are not backed up by the facts 

in the Study. 

Scope of the Safety Problem 

The Study admits that estimates of almost 200 people killed and thousands injured each year in back-over crashes is too low, NHTSA does not yet collect data on 

this issue. 

The Study uses available sources of data to estimate that each year at least 183 

people are killed and between 6,700 and 7,400 are injured, at least 1,000 seriously 

enough to need hospitalization, in back-over crashes. The Study estimate is based 

on samples taken in a single year and on older data (1998) that does not capture 

the full effect of the sales of larger vehicles over the past decade. The Study acknowledges that in light of current data limitations the reported deaths and injuries 

are only a rough estimate. Yet, NHTSA dismisses the data collected by KIDS AND 

CARS which has documented news reports of back-over incidents indicating that the 

annual death toll of children continues to rise. 

Due to limitations of available data on back-over crashes, NHTSA asserts that it 

‘‘is unable to conclude... that there is an increasing trend in back-over crashes.’’ 

This does not mean, however, that back-over crashes are not on the rise. NHTSA 

does not have annual data on back-over and other non-traffic deaths and injuries, 

and only began to consider how to collect such data in response to a mandate from 

Congress in SAFETEA–LU (2005). The Study admits that ‘‘there are no accurate 

trend data specifically for the non-traffic incidents’’ in Federal databases, and also 

acknowledges that ‘‘the extent and nature of back-over crashes are difficult to determine because many crashes are not reported in currently available crash databases.’’ Without comparative data, collected over a number of years, no conclusive 

determination can be made about whether there is an increasing trend in back-over 

crashes. 

The Study confirms that young children are at greatest risk. Yet, NHTSA has not 

developed plans to use technology currently available in many high-end vehicle 

makes and models to protect these children. 

The Study confirms the KIDS AND CARS data showing that children under 5 

years old, especially toddlers up to age 2, are the highest risk group. Despite information dating back to 1971 that children are at risk in back-over crashes, NHTSA 

relies on general education messages that are not part of an overall strategy to preVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:35 Jul 18, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\35958.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
35 

vent back-over crashes. Moreover, NHTSA has not included this issue as part of its 

crash avoidance program or its advanced vehicle safety technology (AVST) initiative. 

The Study also confirms that many, if not most, back-over crashes involve parents 

or neighbors, people who are highly motivated to avoid injuring their children. Yet, 

NHTSA mistakenly concludes that technology is not currently an appropriate remedy. 

The Study points out that people in their 20s and 30s have a greater exposure 

as drivers in back-over crashes because they are parents of young children and are 

involved in more backing situations when young children are present. The Study 

also cites data from Utah indicating that 48 percent of back-over incidents involve 

a family member and another 24 percent involve a neighbor. These drivers can be 

expected to be highly motivated to avoid such incidents, probably have greater 

awareness of nearby children and many may already heed some or all of the existing educational messages intended for their benefit. Such drivers are also highly 

motivated to use back-over prevention technology properly. 

Feasibility of Backover Prevention Technology 

The Study finds existing back-over prevention technology can detect children and 

other objects in the rear blind zone. Yet, as child deaths continue to mount NHTSA 

dithers and concludes much more research is needed. 

The Study found that camera systems provide drivers with a clear image of most 

of the rear blind zone behind their vehicle and that these systems ‘‘have the potential of providing a good field of view of the objects including pedestrians behind the 

vehicles.’’ Also ‘‘[t]he rearview camera systems examined had the ability to display 

pedestrians or obstacles behind the vehicle clearly in daylight and indoor lighted 

conditions.’’ The Study found these facts even though it reviewed only a limited 

number of so-called ‘‘parking aids’’ and did not evaluate technology specifically designed for use as a back-over prevention system. 

Even though the Study finds that rearview camera systems allow drivers to see 

pedestrians in ‘‘the majority of the rear blind zone areas[,]’’ NHTSA concludes that 

more research is necessary because current sensor and video/camera systems do not 

always provide a view of obstacles in the entire rear blind zone. However, drivers 

without any back-over avoidance technology have absolutely no warning that pedestrians are in the rear blind zone. Backover prevention technology would at least provide drivers with an opportunity to avoid backing collisions. 

NHTSA is actively engaged in developing and promoting other, similar radar- and 

sensor-based crash avoidance technologies, such as advanced cruise control which is 

already in the market, lane departure warning systems which are now being field 

tested and used in some commercial vehicles, as well as intersection collision warning systems. Despite this active effort to use the same type of technology to provide 

driver warnings in other crash modes, NHTSA is highly negative about the use of 

back-over prevention systems despite the fact that a version of that technology is 

already standard equipment in many vehicle lines and is already being used by 

drivers for that purpose. 

Detection Technology Testing 

The Study finds that existing rear visibility technology provides drivers with a 

view of rear blind zones that prevents back-over crashes even when children move 

into the vehicle path. Yet, NHTSA surprisingly concludes that these technologies are 

not effective. 

The Study cites research to show that some rear object detection systems were 

successful in detecting and preventing impact with rear objects most of the time. 

Sixty five percent of drivers avoided unexpected obstacles that appeared suddenly 

during backing when relying on a combination of existing technologies. Another 

study showed ‘‘Rear video cameras [are] effective in 23 percent of rear backing maneuvers when [an] ‘‘unexpected’’ obstacle is placed 2–3 feet behind the vehicle.’’ 

Thus, nearly one-fourth and possibly as many as two-thirds of incidents, including 

those in which a child runs immediately behind the vehicle while it is backing, may 

be prevented by existing back-over prevention technology. This would represent a 

vast safety improvement and could save as many as 46 (23 percent) or 123 (65 percent) lives annually based on NHTSA’s rough estimate of 183 deaths each year (an 

estimate that may understate the problem). 

The Study documents that in 2006 there were already 36 vehicle makes and 100 

model lines offering some form of back-over ‘‘parking aid’’ technology as standard 

equipment. The use and installation of such technology is clearly feasible as backover detection technology. Many drivers are already using ‘‘parking aids’’ for this 

36 

purpose. The widespread proliferation and use of these systems to improve rearview 

visibility appears to have a high level of driver acceptance. The Study cites survey 

results of drivers who own ‘‘parking aid’’ equipped vehicles. The majority of drivers 

found the systems to be helpful in parking, at least 85 percent felt the systems are 

effective or very effective in giving warnings, and 80 percent thought that the system would lower their risk of being in a backing crash. Overall, it appears these 

drivers know how to properly use the technology. 

The Study also mentions that the effectiveness of back-over prevention systems, 

especially cameras, could be diminished as a result of practical problems caused by 

weather conditions such as snow, rain, fog and glare from the sun. However, this 

is largely a red herring. Based on a review of cases in NHTSA’s databases the Study 

finds that ‘‘[t]he weather did not appear to be a major factor in these back-overs, 

as the weather was classified as ‘normal’ in the majority of crashes. . . .’’ 

The Study also combines two research and testing issues. The first is whether the 

technology itself can perform the function required, that is, provide the driver with 

visual notice of obstacles in the rear blind zone. Statements in the Study support 

a conclusion that current camera-based or combination video-sensor systems do provide drivers with a view of obstacles in the rear blind zone. As the Study admits, 

the existing technology is capable of detecting objects in the blind zone behind the 

vehicle and warning the driver. 

The second issue is whether the technology will be properly used by drivers, i.e., 

the human factors issue common to all technological applications. While both issues 

are related to the overall effectiveness of the system, the human factors issue goes 

beyond the evaluation of whether the technology itself can perform the task required. Human factors evaluation is highly dependent on the complexity of the system, clear user instructions, the amount of time permitted to become familiar with 

the system, and repeated use. In this respect, use of a back-over avoidance system 

is analogous to use of the required vehicle rearview mirror system, including the 

need to properly arrange and pay frequent attention to the inside as well as both 

the driver and passenger outside rearview mirrors. The same type of attention and 

appropriate response is required for back-over prevention technology. 

Rearward Visibility Standard: 

The Study documents the need for a rearview visibility performance standard. Yet, 

NHTSA defers and delays while children are at risk. 

Large rear blind zones exist that threaten everyone—children, seniors, the disabled, and all pedestrians—despite a Federal safety standard for rearview mirrors, 

intended to reduce the number of deaths and injuries that occur when the driver 

does not have a clear view to the rear of the vehicle. The Study acknowledges that 

‘‘[a]lmost all vehicles have rear blind zones that could obscure the driver’s visibility 

of small children.’’ This confirms research conducted by Consumers Union showing 

the size of the average blind zone behind different types of vehicles. The Study also 

documents that current back-over technologies are, to varying degrees, effective in 

providing drivers with a view of the rear blind zone. Still, NHTSA presents no plans 

to conduct rulemaking on a rearward visibility performance standard to limit the 

size of the vehicle blind zone and enhance the ability of drivers to see behind their 

vehicle. Furthermore, there is no stated timeline for agency action to develop specifications for the performance of the technology to prevent back-over crashes and no 

intention to make the specifications mandatory. 

Backover Crash Education: 

The Study finds that current back-over awareness and educational efforts are not 

scientifically sound countermeasures that have proven effective. NHTSA concludes 

that such educational efforts have value but available technology does not. 

The Study finds that current back-over prevention programs ‘‘have been designed 

based on specific back-over incidents rather than on a data-driven, research-based 

back-over strategy.’’ Despite the disconnect in logic, NHTSA promotes these types 

of education and awareness efforts even though the agency states that none of the 

programs have an evaluation component to establish their effectiveness as a countermeasure. NHTSA concludes that such efforts may make drivers sensitive to the 

problem and provide common sense safety tips. At the same time, NHTSA disapproves of requiring the use of available technology that has shown positive results 

in tests and already is in wide use, as part of a comprehensive approach to backover prevention. 

The educational programs reviewed in the Study, as well as in NHTSA’s ‘‘Safety 

Tips for Parents’’ found on their website in Preventing Backovers in America’s Driveways, call for checking the area around the vehicle before backing the vehicle. The 

37 

Study, however, relies on research testing of rearview back-over prevention technology that uses ‘‘surprise’’ or ‘‘unexpected’’ obstacles that are introduced after backing has begun or near the end of a backing maneuver. Merely education and awareness programs that rely on checking around the vehicle before backing begins cannot address such dynamic situations. Backover prevention technology systems that 

detect people and objects in the vehicle blind zone are needed to allow drivers to 

continuously check behind their vehicle during backing. 

The educational messages also caution parents to ‘‘know where your children are 

and have them stay in your full view and well away from your vehicle’’ and to listen 

for children who may have dashed behind your vehicle suddenly’’ while you are 

backing up (‘‘Safety Tips for Parents’’). 

First, parents are highly motivated to protect their children and may be already 

aware of these educational safety tips. Second, some of these safety tips may actually divert the driver’s attention from the driving task during backing by constantly 

trying to keep children in full view with conventional mirrors or turning your head. 

Third, reliance on your sense of hearing (auditory cues) to detect children who have 

moved into the vehicle path during backing is not only unreliable but can be masked 

by other interfering sounds. This safety tip ignores the fact that children often assume that they can be seen and may make no sound to attract attention. Although 

these safety tips may be good advice for drivers with no other means of detecting 

children and objects in the vehicle blind zone when backing, they are an inadequate 

substitute when far more direct and effective detection and warning technology systems are available. 

Education and awareness are not an adequate substitute for lifesaving technology 

to prevent back-over deaths and injuries. Legislation is necessary to direct NHTSA 

to advance a comprehensive strategy that couples reasonable information with backover detection technology to assist drivers. 

Cost-Effectiveness Analysis: 

The Study states that, at present, meaningful estimates of safety benefits and costeffectiveness cannot be calculated. In contradiction NHTSA offers up an unsupported 

conclusion that back-over systems will have low effectiveness and do not appear to 

be particularly cost-effective. 

The Study clearly asserts that data on which to base accurate benefit/cost assessments of back-over detection technology is not available. Therefore, no conclusions 

can be drawn. Nevertheless, the Study attempts to analyze the cost-effectiveness of 

existing ‘‘parking aids’’ as a surrogate for back-over prevention systems. The analysis, however, is based on a series of assumptions that are not supported by data 

or evidence, including assumptions about incremental system cost, the cost of system repairs due to damage, crash speed distribution and human reaction using the 

system. No data was collected or presented to support any of these assumptions. 

The Study also failed to include any estimate of savings from reduced damages 

and costs avoided as a result of rear-end collisions prevented by the ‘‘parking aids.’’ 

The failure to include any such savings was based on the unsupported reasoning 

that ‘‘parking aids only mitigate the cost of the smaller number of minor backing 

crashes which tend to have smaller total costs.’’ However, no data was collected 

from drivers using ‘‘parking aids’’ to determine the accuracy of this conclusion. 

Finally, this analysis also assumes that there are no safety benefits, that is, potential deaths and injuries that would be prevented, because the agency believes 

that ‘‘parking aids’’ are not intended to function as back-over prevention systems 

and, therefore, would not provide such benefits. In actuality, reports indicate that 

drivers with ‘‘parking aid’’ systems are in fact using the systems for back-over prevention purposes as well as to avoid damages from low-speed backing crashes. Thus, 

NHTSA uses its analysis of ‘‘parking aids’’ to eliminate the inclusion of safety benefits and to conclude that none of the currently installed rear object detection systems are cost-effective. 

As a result, the Study casts a pall over the cost-effectiveness of back-over detection systems even though it readily admits that without studying a true back-over 

crash detection technology system ‘‘meaningful estimates of death and injury benefits and cost effectiveness cannot be calculated.’’ 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

David McCurdy? 

38 

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVE MCCURDY, PRESIDENT/CEO, ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS; ACCOMPANIED 

BY 

ROBERT STRASSBURGER, VICE PRESIDENT, SAFETY AND 

HARMONIZATION 

Mr. MCCURDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Senator Sununu, and other Senators—Senator Carper—thanks for the 

comments, earlier. 

I am President and CEO of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers. The Alliance represents the BMW group, DaimlerChrysler, 

Ford Motor Company, General Motors, Mitsubishi, Porsche, Toyota, 

and Volkswagen, close to 85 percent of the manufacturers. Now, I 

will tell you, unlike some of my colleagues here, I’ve only been in 

this job 3 weeks. So—— 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MCCURDY. But I come to—so, this is somewhat of a baptism—but I come to the industry from the tech community, having 

been the CEO of the Electronic Industries Alliance and then previously served with my colleagues. But I first want to commend, actually, the advocates and the parents who are pushing this. And 

we all, I think, have heartfelt sympathy and concern, and can’t 

imagine the horrific images and memories that they have to deal 

with on a daily basis. My wife, by the way, is a child psychiatrist, 

and I would tell you, children are a top priority for us, as well. 

Mr. Chairman, in your office you have a little plaque that says, 

‘‘Arkansas comes first.’’ Well, Mr. Chairman, for automakers, ‘‘Safety comes first.’’ And it’s seen as a public health challenge. Our industry invests more in research and development than any other 

industry, including pharmaceuticals and computers. And I encourage the Chairman and the Ranking Member, plus staff—and, as a 

matter of fact, I extended an invitation to Representative Campbell 

this morning, to visit one of the test and safety facilities. I did it 

yesterday, flew to Detroit to a 4,000-acre facility with 5,000 employees there dedicated to testing and safety. I saw crash tests. 

They didn’t set them up for me. They have two a day. There’s a 

regular ongoing process. Got to test drive for—to see electronic stability control, antilock brake systems. I saw demo on backup technology. I looked at this almost—incredible army of test dummies 

that they now have, each of them costing well over 100-and-someodd-thousand dollars per piece, saw the deployment of side airbags, 

some of these new technologies. And so, I would encourage you to 

actually visit. We could arrange that. 

Despite some of the common perception and—I think the recent 

record proves that safety developments often happen faster through 

market-based initiatives rather than just legislative mandates. Our 

companies’ intense competitiveness has already accelerated safety 

feature introductions to speeds faster than would be developed 

through regulation. And I want to point to one thing that Senator 

Sununu, as an engineer, knows: data, data, data. And I think it’s 

really critical. And actually, the parts of the bill, the Gulbransen 

bill, we support wholeheartedly, and that is collection of much of 

this information and data, because I don’t think you can get 

enough. 

39 

Recent technologies, like side airbags and stability control, have 

been introduced ahead of Federal legislation or a legislative mandate. As I stated, safety is our highest priority. Ours is a high-tech 

industry, using cutting-edge safety technology to put people first. 

In 2005, automakers invested $40 billion in research and development, roughly $2,400 for every car and light truck sold in the 

United States that year. The challenge is that the development 

costs may total up to a billion dollars for a new product—I’m not 

talking about some of these—but it may take 3 to 5 years to bring 

a product to market. Automakers lead legislative and regulatory 

initiatives with the invention, development, and implementation of 

advanced technologies focused upon safety improvements, including 

dual-stage frontal airbags. History of airbags—let me tell you, I 

saw the introduction, and see the difference between a dual-stage; 

de-powering of airbags, which were serious reasons for injuries in 

the past; side-impact airbags; safety-belt pre-tensioners—didn’t 

know exactly what that was—saw it in action yesterday in a crash 

test; load-limiting retractors; side-curtain airbags; advanced lighting; adaptive speed control; lane-departure warnings; brake-assist 

systems; and much more. And those were not—and most of these 

are voluntary, implemented by the manufacturers. These items 

were not mandated. Antilock brakes, stability control, side airbags 

for head and chest protection, side curtains, pre-crash occupant positioning, which is a very important thing—pre-crash occupant positioning, especially with children—lane-departure warnings, radar 

use for collision avoidance. Seatbelts and restraint systems, by the 

way, as you see the statistics, 43,434 people killed in the United 

States, fatalities in automobiles, a huge portion of those, because 

the occupant was unrestrained, didn’t use seatbelts. 

We’ve supported the 10-year Air Bag and Seatbelt Safety Campaign. We’ve seen progress in the States. We believe there should 

be more. The Alliance is also actively participating in blue-ribbon 

panels, and working in conjunction with NHTSA. The LATCH provision that Mr. Medford mentioned, helped standardize the way 

children restraints attach to vehicles, is an important step from 

that. I actually saw demonstrations on that, as a matter of fact, 

yesterday. 

Last summer, alliance members joined others in developing and 

implementing brake-transmission shift interlock systems, in response to some of the concerns of this Committee, that work in all 

key positions. There is real progress there, and we will continue to 

make progress. 

In the end, Mr. Chairman, I would just say that market-driven 

innovation, combined with comprehensive and current data, are 

necessary to make insightful and sound public-policy decisions. And 

with regard to the bill, the thing, I think, that’s important—and 

the Senator mentioned it in his opening statement—that they’re 

not trying to prejudge the rulemaking by picking the technology. 

That was a very important statement, and one that opens up, I 

think an, opportunity for manufacturers to work with this Committee and the authors of this bill to—and NHTSA—to make sure 

that we achieve an objective that I think we share. 

Mr. Chairman, I could go into detail, but, perhaps in questions, 

with regard to S. 1948 that was introduced yesterday, I think the 

40 

Committee would be interested to know the manufacturers’ position with regard to that bill, and I’ll be glad to go into it in detail, 

but my time has run out, so I will stop at that point. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McCurdy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVE MCCURDY, PRESIDENT/CEO, THE ALLIANCE OF

AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS; ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT STRASSBURGER, VICE

PRESIDENT, SAFETY AND HARMONIZATION

Thank you Mr. Chairman. My name is Dave McCurdy and I am President and 

CEO of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers. Within Alliance membership, 

safety is our highest priority. Ours is a high-tech industry that uses cutting-edge 

safety technology to put people first. In fact, automakers invest more in research 

and development than any other industry, including pharmaceuticals and computers, according to the National Science Foundation. In 2005 alone, automakers invested $40 billion, roughly $2,400 for every car and light truck sold in the U.S. that 

year. The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (Alliance) is a trade association of 

nine car and light truck manufacturers including BMW Group, DaimlerChrysler, 

Ford Motor Company, General Motors, Mazda, Mitsubishi Motors, Porsche, Toyota 

and Volkswagen. 

Industry, Consumers and Motor Vehicle Safety 

Automakers lead legislative and regulatory initiatives with the invention, development and implementation of advanced technologies focused upon safety improvements. Consider for example the installation of: dual stage frontal air bags, sideimpact air bags, safety belt pretensioners, load limiting retractors, side curtain air 

bags (for side-impact and some with roll over capacity), advanced lighting, adaptive 

speed control, lane departure warnings, brake assist systems, adjustable torso belts 

for small passengers, child security door locks, automatic door locks, electronic stability control systems, battery isolation in severe collisions, automatic post collision 

notification to emergency responders, engineered structures for car to truck collisions and other crash modes. All of these technologies are voluntarily installed by 

manufacturers on their own initiative. 

The automobile industry engineers, manufacturers, and markets the most complex consumer product that is offered for sale in the global economy. It is a product 

of great utility, essential to the day-to-day flow of people, goods and services in developed and developing economies and a key contributor to economic growth. Motor 

vehicle manufacturers’ institutional successes are contingent upon the desire of individual consumers to purchase the products our manufacturers offer for sale. In making their independent purchase decisions, consumers balance many considerations, 

style, color, fuel economy, performance, reputation, safety, technology content, interior noise levels, accommodation for passengers, cargo, pets and all those things we 

transport frequently or rarely. 

The industry is brutally competitive with little margin for error. A new product 

program may consume as much as $1B in development, take 3 to 5 years to bring 

a product to market and in a strong economy, may sometimes actually have a 

chance to earn a positive return on investment. Globally and here in the U.S., manufacturing capacity significantly exceeds market demand. This condition makes for 

great consumer choice, value and competative/lower product prices. We have seen 

the effects of global and local excess capacity in our market here in the U.S. reflected by real lower prices for vehicles that are increasing equipped with more performance and technology content. Much of that additional performance and technology content is safety related. Consumers expect more safety performance and 

technology content and manufacturers respond to those customer needs and demands. 

Before addressing specific performance conditions and technology installations, it 

is important to understand the industry’s approach to motor vehicle safety. There 

are several principles to which the industry adheres and it’s important to explain 

these precepts. 

First, we consider motor vehicle safety to be a public health challenge. Collisions 

result in a human toll and in direct economic loss. This is why we work to improve 

safety. In every respect, it is in the interest of the industry and society to reduce 

these losses. 

Second, as with any public health challenge, it is essential to base policy and improvement initiatives on good scientific understandings of the priorities, cause and 

pathology of specific concerns. It is also important to use good science in identifying 

and prioritizing specific opportunities for improvement. To do so, good solid data 

41 

about the human victim and injury morphology, the environment in which collision 

events occur (roadways), and the vehicle are necessary. Therefore, we support the 

collection and analysis of collision data and the prioritization of collision problems 

by measures of harm (numbers of fatalities, serious injuries, total economic cost, lost 

days of productivity, etc.). Ideally, with a good understanding of collision related injury patterns, problem areas can be identified, prioritized and addressed in sequential order to ensure the maximum safety return and to facilitate continued improvement. 

Third, there are many public institutions with an interest in improving motor vehicle safety; think of this effort as injury control. Auto makers have an interest in 

injury control as do many public institutions and classes of individuals: drivers, 

other roadway users, law enforcement agencies, municipal and state governments 

responsible for roadway safety, medical practitioners, first responders, legislative 

bodies, government regulators, and various nongovernmental organizations. All of 

these institutions and groups are partners in injury control and our common interests are to improve motor vehicle safety. 

Fourth, safety resources should be expended so as to maximize the safety return 

and injury reduction consequent to the expenditures. 

Alliance Members Are Aggressively Pursuing Safety Advancements, 

Collectively and Individually 

Advancing motor vehicle safety remains a significant public health challenge—one 

that automakers are addressing daily, both individually and collectively. Alliance 

members make huge investments in safer vehicle design and technology. Most of the 

new, significant safety features currently available on motor vehicles—antilock 

brakes, stability control, side airbags for head and chest protection, side curtains, 

pre-crash occupant positioning, lane departure warnings, radar use for collision 

avoidance—in the U.S. were implemented voluntarily by manufacturers, not as a result of any regulatory mandate. While the industry is engaged in high-tech research 

and implementation of new safety technologies, it continues to add safety features 

voluntarily, even such mundane features as right-hand side mirrors for passenger 

cars, obstacle detection devices for sliding doors and automatic liftgates, automatic 

lights on with wiper use, etc. Those who claim that vehicle safety will not be advanced in the absence of regulatory requirements are living in the past and are not 

paying attention to today’s marketplace. 

The Alliance also has engaged in collective activities, not only of its member companies, but also with other vehicle manufacturers and interested safety partners. A 

number of these initiatives are intended to enhance child safety directly or indirectly. However, it is important to state here: Auto manufacturers, as well as all 

other safety advocates, implore parents and caregivers to NEVER leave children unattended either in or around automobiles and NEVER leave the key in the ignition. 

Vehicle Safety for Children—Traffic Related 

According to Federal Government statistics, in 2005 there were a total of 43,443 

traffic fatalities in the United States. The 14 and younger age group accounted for 

4 percent (1,946) of these traffic fatalities. The majority of young children riding in 

motor vehicles in the United States are restrained by some type of child safety seat 

or seat belt, with 98 percent of infants and 89 percent of children ages 1 to 3 so 

restrained in 2006. Children between the ages of 4 and 7 are also restrained at 

somewhat lower rates than younger children, with 78 percent of these children restrained by a safety seat or seat belt in 2006. Most children now ride in the rear 

seat of vehicles. In 2006, 93 percent of infants, 94 percent of children ages 1 to 3, 

and 91 percent of children ages 4 to 7 rode in the rear seat. National fatality data 

show, however, that of the more than 400 tweens—children 8 to 12 years old—killed 

in crashes each year, nearly 50 percent are unrestrained and one-third were riding 

in the front seat. In 2004, a Partners for Child Passenger Safety (PCPS) study found 

that 35 percent of 9 to 12 year-olds were riding in the front seat, compared to only 

7 percent of 4 to 8 year-olds. Research shows that children are 40 percent more likely to be injured in a front seat than if they had been seated in back. Finally, child 

restraint use continues to be lower when the driver was unbelted than for belted 

drivers. National fatality data show when adult drivers are not restrained 91 percent of 8 to 15 year-old fatals are unrestrained. However, when adult drivers are 

restrained, 48 percent of 8 to 15 year-old fatals are restrained. 

Research has shown that lap/shoulder belts, when used, reduce the risk of fatal 

injury to front seat occupants (age 5 and older) of passenger cars by 45 percent. For 

light-truck occupants, safety belts reduce the overall risk of fatal injury by 60 percent. But in light truck rollover crashes, seat belts reduce the risk of being killed 

by 80 percent. Research on the effectiveness of child safety seats has found them 

42 

to reduce fatal injury by 71 percent for infants (less than 1 year old) and by 54 percent for toddlers (1–4 years old) in passenger cars. For infants and toddlers in light 

trucks, the corresponding reductions are 58 percent and 59 percent, respectively. 

Alliance members’ support of the Air Bag and Seat Belt Safety Campaign conducted over the last decade has worked to get children in back seats properly restrained in a restraint appropriate for their age and size. Moreover, the Campaign 

has been very successful in increasing seat belt usage—20 percentage points in the 

last 10 years. Further still, the Campaign has been successful in securing the adoption of primary enforcement seat belt laws. States with primary enforcement laws 

have average safety belt usage rates approximately 11 percentage points higher 

than states having secondary enforcement laws. NHTSA estimates that a single percentage point increase in safety belt use nationwide would result in an estimated 

280 lives saved per year. In 1996, 11 states had primary enforcement laws covering 

38 percent of the population. As of 2006, 25 states and the District of Columbia have 

primary enforcement laws covering 65 percent of the population. When an adult restraint is used, it is far more likely that children riding with that adult are restrained as well. 

Alliance members were also active participants in two Blue Ribbon Panels on 

child passenger safety. The Automotive Coalition for Traffic Safety (ACTS), at the 

request of the U.S. Department of Transportation, served as the facilitator for both 

Panels. The first endeavor was the Blue Ribbon Panel on Child Restraint and Vehicle Compatibility. This panel was announced in February 1995 and recommendations were released that May. One key recommendation resulted in the new LATCH 

(Lower Anchors and Tethers for CHildren) system created to help standardize the 

way child restraints are attached to vehicles without using a seat belt. All child restraints and most new vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2002 were 

required by NHTSA to include hardware components designed to simplify child seat 

installation and to reduce the incidence of misuse and incorrect installation of child 

safety seats. A study released by NHTSA in December 2006 concluded that LATCH, 

‘‘appear(s) to be helping to reduce insecure installation of child safety seats.’’ The 

study further concluded that people who have experience with LATCH appear to 

prefer its use over the conventional method using the vehicle seat belt. Finally, the 

study concluded that the primary reason that people do not use LATCH is that they 

don’t know about it or because LATCH was not available in some center-rear seats. 

The Alliance has committed to work with NHTSA to resolve these and other questions about LATCH. 

The second panel, the Blue Ribbon Panel on Protecting Our Older Child Passengers was announced in November 1998. Panel members focused recommendations on getting 4 to 16 year-olds into the correct restraint systems and seating positions for their age and size. 

Please see http://www.actsinc.org/blueribbon.cfm for more information about 

both of these Panels. 

To address the large number of tweens who are needlessly at risk when riding 

in motor vehicles because they are not always wearing seat belts and many sit in 

front seats, the Alliance turned to ACTS. According to research released by ACTS, 

parents have more influence on tween behavior than many people realize. Tweens 

are well aware of safety messages, including the benefits of buckling up and dangers 

associated with sitting in front of a deploying air bag. However, safety awareness 

alone has limited influence on how tweens ride in vehicles because other factors 

may be more important to them. Even though tweens are becoming more independent, they still need parental guidance to ensure their safety in cars. 

Surveys showed when parents take control, tweens tend to sit in the back. Twothirds of tweens sit in a back seat when parents make the decision, compared to 

only half of tweens who independently decide where to sit. When tweens in two pilot 

sites were asked what might encourage them to sit in a back seat, most said being 

told by a parent or the vehicle’s driver. This was especially true for those tweens 

who were less likely to buckle up. To reach out to tweens, their parents and others 

who influence their behavior—to increase the number of tweens who are properly 

restrained in back seats—ACTS established a new interactive website, http:// 

www.tweensafety.org. 

In 2005, a total of 414, or 21 percent, of the fatalities among children age 14 and 

younger occurred in crashes involving alcohol. Another 48 children age 14 and 

younger who were killed in traffic crashes in 2005 were pedestrians or pedalcyclists 

who were struck by drinking drivers (BAC of 0.01 g/dL or higher). The Alliance’s 

support of MADD’s Campaign to Eliminate Drunk Driving—described below—is 

aimed at ending drunk driving in the United States and the associated fatalities 

and injuries including those involving children. 

43 

Vehicle Safety for Children—NonTraffic Related 

Turning to the issues that were before this Committee in the 109th Congress as 

presented in S. 1948, ‘‘The Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2005,’’ 

the Alliance supports the establishment of a data collection system for non-traffic, 

non-crash events involving motor vehicles. Good solid data about the human victim, 

injury morphology, the environment in which events occur, and the vehicle are a 

necessary first step to identifying possible interventions that might be effective. 

However, before determining whether action by this Committee on this point is 

needed, please consider that Congress has already acted on this issue with the provisions of Sections 2012 and 10305 of Pub. L. 109–59 (119 Stat. 1539 and 1941 

(2005)) that was enacted as part of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA–LU). 

Similarly, the Alliance supports the establishment of a consumer information program to provide information about hazards to children in non-traffic, non-crash incident situations. However, implementation of such a provision(s) could and should 

be timelier that the 18 months proposed in S. 1978. The Alliance believes 90 days 

following enactment may be possible. Such a directive could, for example, complement SAFE KIDS Worldwide’s ‘‘Spot the Tot’’ program designed to prevent injury 

to children in non-crash events. The program is a nationwide expansion of the successful program of the same name created by SAFE KIDS Utah. It is designed to 

raise parents’ awareness of the risk of vehicle back-overs in driveways and parking 

lots by providing a few simple tips for adults and kids to make sure the area around 

the vehicle is safe before driving away. 

With regard to the mandated rulemakings on vehicle technology, we offer the following. 

The 109th Congress specifically addressed power window switches in motor vehicles. Power window safety has been addressed by Congress previously. Section 

10308 of SAFETEA–LU directed: 

‘‘The Secretary [of Transportation] shall upgrade Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 

Standard 118 to require that power windows in motor vehicles not in excess of 

10,000 pounds have switches that raise the window only when the switch is 

pulled up or out. The Secretary shall issue a final rule implementing this section by April 1, 2007.’’ 

In April 2006, NHTSA implemented the changes to FMVSS No. 118 that were required by SAFETEA–LU. See 71 Fed. Reg. 18673, April 12, 2006. (‘‘The agency is 

amending... the standard to require that any actuation device for closing a 

power-operated window must operate by pulling away from the surface in the vehicle on which the device is mounted [i.e., ‘‘pull-to-close’’ switches]. This provision implements the mandate of section 10308 of SAFETEA–LU.’’) 

NHTSA’s April 2006 final rule also responded to petitions for reconsideration received in response to the agency’s September 2004 power window final rule. Whether the installation of automatic reversal systems for power windows and panels 

should be mandated was evaluated by NHTSA in response to separate petitions for 

rulemaking submitted to the agency seeking such a mandate. NHTSA denied these 

petitions to include an automatic reversal requirement under FMVSS No. 118 in 

part because the petitioners did not provid any new data regarding the incidence 

of fatalities and injuries for inadvertent or intentional actuation of power window 

switches. NHTSA concluded that their most recent amendments to the standard 

‘‘. . . will prevent the types of power-window incidents that have been documented.’’ The agency further rejected some hypothetical scenarios offered by petitioners by stating, ‘‘. . . there is not any documentation that any such cases have 

actually occurred. Even so, the risk of unintentional switch operation . . . is already addressed by the safer switch requirement of the final rule . . . we do not 

believe that the speculative arguments in the Advocates, et al., petition about magnitude of risk justify their request for the agency to require automatic reversal systems, absent data demonstrating a safety problem. It is not feasible to eliminate all 

potentially conceivable risks through regulation.’’ (emphasis added). 

Regarding rearward visibility, again Congress has addressed the issue of backover incidents by requiring several studies on the magnitude of the problem and the 

potential effectiveness of different technologies to address the problem. A report on 

one such study was released by NHTSA in November 2006. That study concluded 

that back-over crashes involving all vehicle types, ‘‘are estimated to cause at least 

183 fatalities annually... [and] between 6,700 and 7,419 injuries per year . . .’’ 

The report also described the results of tests conducted by NHTSA involving several 

systems currently available as original equipment on vehicles and aftermarket products to evaluate their performance and potential effectiveness. The report concluded 

that, ‘‘the performance of sensor-based (ultrasonic and radar) parking aids in detectVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:35 Jul 18, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\35958.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
44 

ing child pedestrians behind the vehicle was typically poor, sporadic and limited in 

range.’’ The testing by NHTSA did find that camera based systems, ‘‘may have the 

greatest potential to provide drivers with reliable assistance in identifying people 

in the path of the vehicle when backing.’’ However, NHTSA cautions, ‘‘readers of 

this report about relying on the results of our testing or other published test results 

to promote such systems as an effective means to address the back-over crash risk.’’ 

The agency cited numerous reasons for this caution, including the need to better understand the environmental factors (e.g., rain, fog, or other inclement weather, or 

sun glare) that limit the effectiveness of cameras and the limits of driver performance using such systems. The report observed that: ‘‘Even if cameras allow the driver to identify an object in the back of a vehicle, the driver must look at the display 

and have the capability to identify an object or person in the path when backing 

up, and to react and brake quickly enough to prevent the incident. The speed being 

traveled, the level of driver attention and reaction time all play significant roles in 

estimating the systems’ effectiveness.’’ Therefore, the Alliance believes that a mandate to require technology that may or may not be effective in addressing a problem 

whose exact nature is not objectively known would be premature. 

Finally a mandate to require brake transmission shift interlocks (BTSI) to work 

in all ignition key positions is simply not needed. A BTSI requires the operator of 

the vehicle to be positioned in the driver’s seat and to depress the service brake 

pedal in order to shift the automatic transmission control out of the ‘‘Park’’ position. 

Virtually all automatic transmission-equipped cars and light trucks have a BTSI, 

but not all of them work in all ignition key positions. In August 2006, Alliance members, and others, completed development of and immediately began implementing 

an initiative to further reduce the incidents of shift selector movement in vehicles 

equipped with automatic transmissions in circumstances where an unsupervised 

and unattended child has gained access to both a vehicle and its ignition keys by 

requiring that the vehicle’s service brake be depressed, in all key positions, before 

the transmission can be shifted out of ‘‘Park’’. Approximately 80 percent of 2006 

model year cars and light trucks are already equipped with an all-key-position BTSI 

and all new vehicles will have it no later than September 1, 2010. More information 

about this agreement can be found at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov under ‘‘Agreement 

on Brake Transmission Shift Interlock’’ or by entering docket number ‘‘25669’’ in the 

search box found at http://dms.dot.gov/search/searchFormSimple.cfm. 

Other Alliance initiatives are providing real-world safety benefits to the public, including children. These are described below. 

In December 2003, auto manufacturers committed to a plan developed by an 

international group of safety experts for enhancing the crash compatibility of passenger cars and light trucks. The plan established new performance criteria for further enhancing occupant protection in front and side crashes between cars and light 

trucks. It also defined research programs to investigate future test procedures and 

performance criteria. The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) facilitated 

the development of this plan with the sponsorship of the Alliance. 

By September 2009, 100 percent of each participating manufacturer’s applicable 

vehicles will be designed to these criteria. However, participating auto manufacturers began implementing the front-to-front and front-to-side performance criteria immediately upon industry’s agreement. Manufacturers’ recent progress in implementing this commitment is described below. 

Approximate Percentage of Production Designed in Accordance w/Performance Criteria 

Crash Mode Production 

Year 2005 

Production 

Year 2006 

Front-to-Front Criteria 62% 75% 

Front-to-Side Criteria 33% 53% 

The frontal component of the commitment established criteria to further reduce 

the potential for vehicle override and under-ride in serious front-to-front crashes between cars and light trucks by requiring sufficient overlap between the primary energy-absorbing structures (PEAS) of the two vehicle types. This may be achieved by 

‘‘geometric matching’’ or alignment of these structures or by providing additional 

structure in light trucks (called secondary energy absorbing structures (SEAS)) for 

this purpose. In November 2005, new test procedures were added by safety experts 

to measure the performance of the SEAS. An updated version of the December 2003 

compatibility commitment, reflecting this change, was submitted to NHTSA on May 

10, 2006. 

45 

In 2006, IIHS completed an analysis of the safety benefits of the front-to-front 

compatibility agreement. 

In front-to-front crashes involving light trucks into passenger cars, IIHS found 

that the passenger car driver was 16 percent less likely to be killed if struck by a 

sport utility vehicle (SUV) with a front-end design that met the compatibility performance criteria. Similarly, the passenger car driver was 20 percent less likely to 

be killed if struck by a pickup truck with a front-end design that met the compatibility performance criteria. The overall reduction in passenger car driver deaths in 

front-to-front crashes involving both SUVs and pickup trucks was 19 percent. 

In front-to-side crashes involving light trucks into passenger cars, IIHS found that 

the passenger car driver was 30 percent less likely to be killed if struck by a sport 

utility vehicle (SUV) with a front-end design that met the front-to-front compatibility performance criteria. The passenger car driver was 10 percent less likely to 

be killed if struck by a pickup truck with a front-end design that met the front-tofront compatibility performance criteria. The overall reduction in passenger car driver deaths in front-to-side crashes involving both SUVs and pickup trucks was 19 

percent. 

The front-to-side crash component of the commitment established performance criteria that further enhances head protection for people riding in passenger vehicles 

that are struck in the side. Manufacturers have voluntarily agreed to engineer their 

vehicles using two test options: (1) the Federal Government’s (NHTSA) optional 

side-into-pole test (see FMVSS 201), or (2) the Insurance Institute for Highway 

Safety (IIHS) test for consumer information, using a moving deformable barrier with 

front-end geometry to simulate an SUV or pickup. Use of the NHTSA pole test option will sunset in 2009, and all manufacturers will then have to use the IIHS test. 

In 2006 the IIHS updated its estimate of the real-world benefits of side airbags 

in reducing struck vehicle driver fatalities. The results show that side airbags that 

protect people’s heads are reducing driver deaths in cars struck on the driver side 

by an estimated 37 percent. Airbags that protect the chest and abdomen but not 

the head are reducing deaths by 26 percent. The results also show an estimated 52 

percent reduction in fatality rates for drivers of SUVs equipped with side airbags 

with head protection. These real-world findings corroborate the good crash test performance of these devices in crashes simulating an SUV striking the driver side of 

a vehicle and suggest that the manufacturer’s voluntary front-side commitment will 

lead to significant reductions in struck vehicle driver fatality rates. 

To learn more about the Crash Compatibility initiative, please see http:// 

www.autoalliance.org/safety/ or visit http://dms.dot.gov/search/ 

searchFormSimple.cfm and enter docket number ‘‘14623’’ in the search box. 

Another voluntary initiative led to the establishment of test procedures and performance criteria to assure that in the event an occupant is out-of-position at the 

time of deployment of a side air bag, the risk of serious injury is limited to 5 percent. In response to concerns about potential injury risk to out-of-position (OOP) 

women and children from deploying side airbags, the Alliance, the Association of 

International Automobile Manufacturers (AIAM), the Automotive Occupant Restraints Council (AORC), and IIHS used a joint working group to develop test procedures with injury criteria and limits to ensure that the risk of injury to OOP occupants from deploying side airbags would be very limited. The initiative produced 

recommended procedures for evaluating occupant injury risk from deploying side air 

bags that were finalized in August 2000 and updated in September 2003. Currently, 

90 percent of Alliance member company side airbags have been designed in accordance with the recommended procedures. More importantly, the field performance of 

side air bags remains positive. For more information, please visit http:// 

twg.iihs.org/ or visit http://dms.dot.gov/search/searchFormSimple.cfm and enter 

docket number ‘‘5098’’ in the search box. 

In July 2006, Canada’s Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities 

(The Honourable Lawrence Cannon) announced the signing of three memoranda of 

understanding (MOUs) with vehicle manufacturers. Each of the agreements will advance the safety by: 

• updating the side-impact protection requirements to better protect children who 

sit next to an air bag; 

• improving compatibility between vehicles of different sizes to reduce the severity of occupant injury in side and frontal collisions; and 

• promoting the use of new technologies in the design and manufacture of vehicles to ensure optimal seatbelt fit for front seat passengers. 

Each of these MOUs are based on voluntary agreements first initiated and developed by the Alliance. In announcing these agreements, Transport Canada stated 

46 

that, ‘‘The department continues to modernize its system of regulatory governance 

by making smarter regulations through innovative consultation mechanisms and 

processes, harmonized initiatives and voluntary agreements with the transportation 

industry.’’ 

These efforts to develop voluntary standards to enhance motor vehicle safety, 

when combined with an industry commitment to design vehicles in accordance with 

them, is a model for responsible industry action. These programs are proven to be 

a very effective way to bring significant safety improvements into the fleet faster 

than has been historically possible through regulation. The voluntary standards 

process also has the flexibility to produce rapid modifications should the need arise. 

The Alliance has also developed a set of principles to address the safety aspects 

of driver interactions—often called ‘‘driver distraction’’—with new in-vehicle 

telematics systems. The Alliance’s Driver Focus—Telematics Guidelines relate to the 

design, use, and installation of invehicle information and communications systems. 

The Guidelines contain 24 principles to enhance the safety of driver interaction with 

telematics systems. Each principle includes verification procedures and performance 

criteria for the safe operation of advanced in-vehicle information and communications systems intended for use by the driver while the vehicle is in motion. The 

Guidelines were first issued in draft form in 2002 and continue to be updated as 

research, field data, and technology become available. Alliance members are voluntarily using the Guidelines to minimize driver distraction and collaborate with 

NHTSA on efforts to further enhance efficiency using in-car systems. Transport 

Canada is also in negotiations with automakers to establish a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which would set out the general terms and conditions with regard to limiting driver distraction from in-vehicle telematics devices pursuant to the 

Alliance Guidelines. Finally, the United Nations Inland Transport Committee has 

accepted these Guidelines and has presented them to its World Forum for the Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (WP.29), the internationally-recognized governmental body that helps set the future direction of global motor vehicle safety activities. For more information, please visit http://www.autoalliance.org/safety/. 

Alliance members are also individually pursuing initiatives to enhance motor vehicle safety. One such initiative that has received widespread support is the installation of vehicle-based technologies to encourage safety belt usage. Preliminary research on one system deployed in the United States by one Alliance member found 

a statistically significant 5 percentage point increase in safety belt use for drivers 

of vehicles equipped with that system compared with drivers of unequipped vehicles. 

NHTSA estimates that a single percentage point increase in safety belt use nationwide would result in an estimated 280 lives saved per year. Beginning in model year 

2004, all members of the Alliance began deploying various vehicle-based technologies to increase safety belt use. Eighty-five percent of model year 2006 cars and 

light trucks were equipped with safety belt reminder systems. 

Significant Progress Has Been Made to Reduce Fatalities and Injuries 

From Motor Vehicle Crashes, but Challenges Remain 

Over the past 25 years, significant progress has been made in reducing the traffic 

fatality rate. In 1981, the number of fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled 

stood at 3.17. By 2005, this rate had been driven down by 54 percent to 1.45 fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled. The level of competitiveness among automakers has helped to accelerate the introduction of safety features in the absence 

of regulation, aiding in the progress made. In fact, all of the most recent technologies like side airbags and stability control have been introduced ahead of Federal regulation or legislative mandate. 

Safety is an area in which manufacturers compete and seek competitive advantage. Manufacturers leverage their safety performance and equipment in efforts to 

distinguish their products from competitors. Manufacturers continue to make innovative safety features available to consumers across their entire product line. For 

example, side airbags with head protection were available on 84 percent of model 

year cars and light trucks. Two-thirds of these air bags were side curtains and onequarter were rollover-activated devices. Another example: electronic stability control 

was available on 63 percent of model year 2006 cars and light trucks. These two 

breakthrough technologies, as well as the others mentioned and the growing use of 

electronics and radar to take advantage of the time prior to a crash to either eliminate it or reduce its severity through automatic braking, demonstrate the commitment of manufacturers to improving safety. 

Despite the progress made, however, data show that 43,443 people lost their lives 

on U.S. highways in 2005 and almost 2.7 million were injured. Tragically, 55 percent of vehicle occupants killed in crashes were not restrained by safety belts or 

47 

1 ‘‘Highway Safety—Research Continues on a Variety of Factors That Contribute to Motor Vehicle Crashes.’’ U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO–03–436, March 2003. 

child safety seats. Alcohol was a factor in 39 percent of all fatalities. This is unacceptable. As a Nation, we simply must do better. 

As the General Accounting Office reaffirmed, vehicle factors contribute less often 

to crashes and their subsequent injuries than do human or roadway environmental 

factors. 1 We will never fully realize the potential benefits of vehicle safety technologies until all vehicle occupants are properly restrained and all impaired drivers 

are off the road. 

Increased Safety Belt Usage and Preventing Impaired Driving Are Needed 

Today To Prevent Needless Fatalities and Injuries 

The single most effective way to reduce traffic fatalities and serious injuries in 

the short-term is to increase the proper use of safety belts and child safety seats. 

Alliance members have a long and proud record of working to increase safety belt 

usage. Over the past two decades, efforts, nearly totally funded by automakers, have 

lead to a 44 percentage point increase in safety belt usage; from 37 percent in 1986 

to 81 percent in 2006, resulting in an estimated 12,000 additional lives saved annually. 

However, we are still working to make that number higher, and with good reason. 

Safety experts say an additional 3,000 lives a year could be saved if the safety belt 

usage rate increased to 92 percent. Belt use in 5 states and one jurisdiction (CA, 

HI, MI, OR, WA, and PR) currently exceed 92 percent confirming that high belt 

usage is possible. The proper use of safety belts and child safety seats is the single 

most effective way to reduce traffic fatalities and serious injuries. 

The significant increase in belt use over the years is largely due to high visibility 

enforcement mobilizations. Last May, the most successful mobilization ever was conducted with more than 10,000 law enforcement agencies providing stepped up enforcement and close to $31 million in state and national paid advertising to augment 

the enforcement effort. Funding for the enforcement ads, both national and state, 

comes from funds earmarked by Congress for this purpose. These mobilizations have 

consistently achieved dramatic increases in safety belt use. We believe that it is important for Congress to continue to provide funding for these law enforcement mobilizations and the paid ads informing the public about them. 

Primary enforcement safety belt use laws are significantly correlated with higher 

safety belt usage levels. States with primary enforcement laws have average safety 

belt usage rates approximately 11 percentage points higher than states having secondary enforcement laws. Currently, only 25 states and the District of Columbia 

have primary safety belt laws. Efforts to enact primary enforcement laws are now 

being enhanced by the Section 406 incentive grants Congress provided in 

SAFETEA–LU for states passing primary enforcement laws or achieving high belt 

use rates. Primary enforcement bills have been introduced in at least a dozen states 

this year and the Alliance is actively working to secure their enactment. 

Impaired driving is also a significant highway safety problem. While substantial 

progress in reducing impaired driving has been made in the last quarter century, 

more must be done to prevent these needless tragedies. Just one-half of 1 percent 

of the trips taken annually in the United States by personal motor vehicles are 

made by alcohol-impaired drivers. Yet, these trips result in nearly 40 percent of all 

motor vehicle fatalities occurring in the United States each year. 

In November 2006, the Alliance joined with the U.S. Department of Transportation, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), the Governors Highway 

Safety Association, The Century Council, the Distilled Spirits Council of the United 

States (DISCUS), and the International Association of Chiefs of Police, to support 

MADD’s Campaign to Eliminate Drunk Driving. There is no single solution that will 

eliminate drunk driving. Drunk driving remains a behavioral challenge, a law enforcement challenge and a challenge requiring innovative new approaches, including 

exploring new technologies. Recognizing this, the Campaign has initiated a bold new 

4-point plan intended to end drunk driving in the United States. The plan is leading 

the Nation toward the goal of eliminating drunk driving through: 

1. Intensive high-visibility law enforcement, including twice-yearly crackdowns 

and frequent enforcement efforts that include sobriety checkpoints and saturation patrols in all 50 states. 

2. Full implementation of current alcohol ignition interlock technologies, including efforts to require alcohol ignition interlock devices for all convicted drunk 

drivers. A key part of this effort is working with judges, prosecutors and state 

driver’s license officials to stop repeat offenders. 

48 

2Section 30122 of Title 49, United States Code, forbids a manufacturer, dealer, or motor vehicle repair business from ‘‘making inoperative’’ anything that is installed in a motor vehicle to 

comply with a Federal motor vehicle safety standard. 

3. Exploration of advanced vehicle technologies through the establishment of a 

Blue Ribbon Panel of international safety experts to assess the feasibility of, the 

potential benefits of, and the public policy challenges associated with a range 

of advanced technologies that might help prevent drunk driving. These technologies must be moderately priced, absolutely reliable, and unobtrusive to the 

sober driver. This element of the Campaign is being led by the Alliance. 

4. Mobilization of grassroots support, led by MADD and its 400+ affiliates, to 

make the elimination of drunk driving a reality. MADD is uniting drunk driving 

victims, families, community leaders, and policymakers in the fight to eliminate 

drunk driving. 

Comprehensive and Current Data Are Necessary To Make Insightful and 

Sound Public Policy Decisions 

Sound science provides the foundation on which we build true progress. Data collection is critical to assessing a promising idea’s expected real-world benefits. Our 

extensive research starts with knowledge of human behavior and how people act— 

and react—in autos. 

The Alliance sponsors a significant amount of safety research that is shared with 

the safety community. The Alliance is sponsoring a program to collect-real world 

crash data on the performance of de-powered and advanced air bags at three sites 

around the U.S. (Dade County, Florida; Dallas County, Texas; and Chilton, Coosa, 

St. Clair, Talledega, and Shelby Counties in Alabama). This program adds valuable 

information about air bag performance to the extensive crash data already being collected by NHTSA through NASS. The Alliance project observes all the NASS data 

collection protocols so that the Alliance funded cases can be compared with, and 

evaluated consistently with, other cases in the NASS dataset. For more information, 

please visit http://groups.iihs.org/brp/. 

In December 2006, NHTSA issued a technical report, titled An Evaluation of the 

1998–1999 Redesign of Frontal Air Bags. The Alliance estimates that approximately 

25 percent of the crash investigations considered as part of this evaluation were 

cases investigated by the Alliance. The report finds that, compared to first-generation air bags, redesigned air bags reduced fatalities to infants and children by 83 

percent and to out-of-position drivers by 70 percent in low-to-25 moderate speed 

crashes. Yet they entirely preserved the overall life-saving benefits of first-generation air bags for belted drivers and for passengers age 13 and up. 

Consistent with need for more real-world data, some Alliance members have voluntarily installed Event Data Recorders (EDRs) that provide improved data to assist 

safety researchers, auto engineers, government researchers and trauma doctors in 

their work. EDRs can improve our collective understanding of crash events and lead 

to improvements in vehicle safety systems. Recording certain data elements in the 

moments just prior to and during a crash can contribute to the breadth and reliability of the crash data already gathered by state and Federal governments and 

widely used by public and private entities to study and improve transportation safety. NHTSA and NTSB have noted the important safety benefits of EDRs and 

NHTSA has recently issued a regulation federally mandating performance and disclosure requirements for voluntarily installed EDRs. NHTSA’s regulation, acknowledging the importance of consistent EDR requirements and encouraging the continued voluntary installation of EDRs by automakers, preempts conflicting state and 

local requirements and any requirement that would affect EDR performance, design, 

or operation, including ‘‘On/Off Switches’’. 

Mandated EDR ‘‘On/Off Switches,’’ which were considered and dismissed by 

NHTSA as technically unfeasible, have, nonetheless, been proposed in a recent 

House bill. As certain parties fail to acknowledge, the EDR’s in today’s vehicles are 

typically integrated into the air bag control module. They are not stand-alone devices that can be deactivated without disabling the airbag system. Disabling the 

EDR would also be prohibited by Federal law. Federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS) No. 208 requires that ‘‘[a]n occupant protection system that deploys 

in the event of a crash shall have a monitoring system with a readiness indicator.’’ 

(49 CFR Part 208, S4.5.2). These monitoring systems are integrated with EDR functions. And, it would also violate Federal law to install a switch that would disable 

the airbag system. 2

49 

The Potential Benefits of Vehicle Safety Technologies Can Not Be Fully 

Realized Until Vehicle Occupants Are Properly Restrained and 

Impaired Drivers Are Off the Road 

Motor vehicle safety is a shared responsibility among government, consumers and 

vehicle manufacturers. Auto manufacturers are more committed than ever to developing advanced safety technologies to reduce fatalities and injuries resulting from 

motor vehicle crashes. But as a nation, we will never fully realize the potential benefits of vehicle safety technologies until occupants are properly restrained and impaired drivers are off the road. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

I want to thank all the panelists for your opening statements. 

And I have two very quick motions. First is that all the written 

testimony and exhibits offered by the witnesses be made part of the 

record. 

Is there any objection? 

[No response.] 

Senator PRYOR. If not, so ordered. 

Senator PRYOR. And, second, that Senator Stevens, from Alaska, 

will be added as an original cosponsor to the Clinton-Sununu bill 

that we’ve been talking about today. 

Is there any objection to that? 

[No response.] 

Senator PRYOR. If not, then so ordered. 

We’ve been joined by Senator Klobuchar, of Minnesota, who, by 

the way, thinks that we’re all wimpy here in Washington when our 

kids don’t have school when there’s 3 inches of snow on the ground. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. That would be correct. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator PRYOR. But, Senator, we normally allow Senators to 

make an opening statement of a couple of minutes. If you’d like to, 

feel free. 

STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I’m 

very pleased to be on this subcommittee. My background involves 

work as a prosecutor, and I’ve dealt with public safety issues before, and I wanted to be on this committee for that reason. 

I thank you also for holding this important hearing. I know, from 

my own experience with car safety for kids—my daughter is now 

11, but I had many difficult situations with car seats. I thought I’d 

have them installed right, and then I would turn and she would 

be halfway over in the car seat. And I think it just shows—and I 

had tried my best and pulled those seatbelts as tight as I could, 

and then trained and done everything—that clearly there is more 

work to be done. I also remember going on vacation and trying to 

get, when she was a little older, one of those booster seats from a 

car rental place, and they only had ones for little kids, and we had 

to go to Target and buy one. I have found it to be a confusing area, 

and I think it’s something that is ripe for making sure that we do 

everything that we can to protect kids in cars, because I appreciated the work that’s been done with education efforts with seatbelts, Mr. McCurdy, but the issue for these kids is, they’re just relying on adults to take care of them, and manufacturers to take 

50 

care of them, and they don’t have as much say in what’s happening. 

And I’ve read the statistics about how a child dies in this country 

almost every other year from a non-traffic accident. They’re backed 

over, strangled by—or every other day—they’re backed over, strangled by a power window, killed when a car is accidentally shifted 

into gear. And the CDC has found that more than 9,000 children 

were treated in a single year in hospital emergency rooms for nontraffic-related issues with cars. And, most of the time, a parent or 

other family member is involved, and clearly they didn’t intend to 

do this, but we need to put every safety measure we have in place, 

so this doesn’t happen. 

Senator Clinton and Senator Sununu’s bill calls upon the Secretary of Transportation to craft and implement some of those tools 

to create new rules that regulate rearward visibility, power-window 

performance, and shifting from park to drive. And I fully support 

this bill and look forward to asking some questions. 

Thank you. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Senator. 

Mr. Medford, let me start the questions by asking you one. In 

2000, under the TREAD Act, Congress directed NHTSA to initiate 

a rulemaking to consider whether to require more comprehensive 

safety tests for child restraints in side-impact and rear-impact 

crashes. But, ultimately, the agency concluded that there were too 

many uncertainties to issue a proposed rule. What uncertainties 

are out there? 

Mr. MEDFORD. Thank you, Senator. The uncertainties that were 

considered at the time that rule was issued in an ANPR, advanced 

notice of proposed rulemaking, in 2002, as the agency began to look 

at it, and got comments from the public, there was no performance 

standard. Remember, child seats are actually tested on a simulator 

or a sled, not in a vehicle, per se. So, there are some challenges in 

developing a test for a sled, which generally uses a frontal crash 

simulation. So, there was test method development that hadn’t 

been worked out. Then there were no side-impact dummies that 

could actually measure the injuries sustained to children effectively. And then, there was a lack of injury criteria for those dummies. So, the agency—it was the time before I was there—but the 

agency withdrew that and continued to do research. And just in the 

past few months we’ve continued to do research, and—as have 

most other parts of the world—looking at an effective standard for 

side-impact for children. And we think we’re close, and expect, this 

year, to have a test method and at least one 3-year-old dummy that 

we can use to begin to consider rulemaking in this area. But it has 

been a technical challenge, and that was why it was withdrawn at 

the time. 

Senator PRYOR. So, in other words, it sounds like you’re in the 

process of coming up with a new test that you feel would provide 

you the data that would be helpful. 

Mr. MEDFORD. Yes, sir. We don’t have the final test results, and 

we haven’t finished the research, but we will finish it this year and 

make a decision this year. 

51 

Senator PRYOR. Great. At this point, I’m going to turn it over to 

my colleague Senator Sununu, because it’s his bill that we’re talking about today. And then we’ll turn it over to Senator Klobuchar. 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you very much. 

Mr. McCurdy, you spoke a little bit, generally, about improvements that have been made in safety over the last 10–15 years, 

and Ms. Claybrook used the phrase—and I think we understood 

what she meant when she used it—that cars aren’t designed for 

kids. In other words, we’re adults, we buy the cars, we drive the 

cars, we’re concerned about safety, generally speaking, but, historically, all the design criteria haven’t focused on 5-year-olds—or 10- 

year-olds, for that matter. But the LATCH system was mentioned 

in some of the earlier testimonies. That’s obviously focused on children. Could you expand a little bit on systems that either have 

been implemented, or that you believe the industry is close to implementing, that are focused on child safety? 

Mr. MCCURDY. Well, thank you, Senator. As we mentioned, the 

BTSI voluntary work that this alliance led and—in conjunction on 

the brake-transmissions interlock, I think is an important step. I 

saw, yesterday, as a matter of fact—and, again, that’s why I want 

to encourage you all to take advantage of this—you know, side airbags that, when you look at some of the test results—and I 

watched a number—not only the live ones, but some previous 

ones—a lot of the injuries would not have been protected—or prevented from existing technologies, because young—adults average, 

you know, the size of—that they replicate with dummies, and children often become flying objects within vehicles if it’s a rollover or 

something. That’s why both the head protection airbags development, I think, is critical. The LATCH system a children were 

young, there wasn’t such thing, but—you know, it may be a little 

cumbersome, quite frankly, and I think they’re working to try to 

find out how to make that more usable. But it is a serious restraint. 

We’re actually working—and I think the manufacturers are coordinating—with the car seat manufacturers, that are separate 

from the auto manufacturers. And I think that’s an area that probably needs to have some focus to see if there are—is some compatibility there, and some standards, and so that they can work together to ensure that they are secured there. 

The dual-stage airbags and the de-powering of airbags for young 

children, I think, was particularly designed to protect them, because we saw, in the first iteration of airbags, that—such explosive 

force—that small adults and children were often injured severely 

and fatally because of that. They actually had to go back and get 

some real changes, I believe, so that they could go through a process of de-powering. So, again, the unintended consequences of a 

well-intended, you know, objective, but we actually had to go back 

through the rulemaking process and change that in order to see 

that it was amended and workable to actually save lives. So, there 

are a number of those kinds of developments. Again, I—this is my 

third week, so I probably don’t have the complete compendium, but 

I can—I will gladly find more specifics and provide those to you 

and to the Committee. 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you. 

52 

Mr. Medford, you spoke little bit about the testing or review of 

some of the camera systems that are available now on many vehicles, some as standards equipment on cars that are sold today, 

some as optional equipment. But as I think you’re well aware, the 

legislation doesn’t require cameras, it doesn’t require any specific 

piece of equipment. It simply calls for NHTSA to establish a rulemaking to create a visibility standard so that we have good definition of how big a blind spot is, or should be, or how much visibility 

we have on the rear of the vehicle. 

Have you tested other systems, devices, or technology for improving visibility around a car? What types of approaches have you 

looked at to date? 

Mr. MEDFORD. Yes, Senator, we have tested, and included in the 

report in November, the available technology that we are aware of. 

And, at that time, it was sensor technology, which was both 

ultrasonics and radar-based systems that were often included in 

vehicles today, more-expensive vehicles, for parking aids, as you’re 

backing slowly into a parking spot. It would—it’s really intended 

by the manufacturers to provide an aid for you in backing into 

those spots. We looked and examined those, and, quite frankly, 

found there are many dead zones, and we don’t believe they’re reliable for this purpose, and wouldn’t recommend them for protecting 

children, identifying them, because of the blind spots. 

We also looked at a couple of different mirror systems, one actually used by Toyota, in the rear pillar portion, which is a mirror 

system that allows you to look from your rearview mirror to the 

pillar mirror, and then, that provides some view of the back area, 

some of the blind spot—and found that the images were so distorted that they were not helpful for people. We also looked at an 

after-market mirror that would actually be placed on the rear window, and you’d look—you’d actually turn your head and look 

through that, and also found that to be distorted. 

And when we looked at the camera systems, we did find these 

are systems with good cameras that basically reveal almost the entire area behind the vehicle. And so, they have that capability of 

providing good views behind the vehicle. What we did also say in 

that report, as you probably know, sir, was that until we understand how effectively people will actually use those systems—because it—an average backing speed is about 3 miles an hour, and, 

as you go in reverse, there’s a little bit of a delay, and the camera 

comes on, you look—if you look quickly in there, and you recognize 

there’s something there, and you detect it, you should stop, and you 

put on your brake, everything works perfectly—when you’re backing at 3 miles an hour, within a little over 2 seconds you’ve actually traveled almost 10 feet. So, these systems are relying completely on human behavior, as they currently exist. And what— 

we’re not saying, at the moment, that that’s not good. What we’re 

saying is, we’d like to understand how effective human behavior is 

with the systems that exist. And we’re studying that this year in 

our laboratories. 

Senator SUNUNU. What about the collection of non-traffic data? 

I mean—— 

Mr. MEDFORD. Right. We’re—— 

53 

Senator SUNUNU.—obviously, to any person who has experienced, 

or knows someone who has experienced one of these accidents, I’m 

sure it comes as a surprise that we haven’t collected good information on non-traffic injuries or fatalities. What are we doing to improve that now? And—— 

Mr. MEDFORD. We—— 

Senator SUNUNU.—what should we be doing? 

Mr. MEDFORD. We are aggressively expanding our data systems. 

There was a requirement in SAFETEA–LU that the agency develop 

a surveillance system and publish, every 2 years, data, to the Congress and to the public, about non-traffic injuries. We have a series 

of pilot studies going on now to make sure that—we’re actually trying to identify systems that are going to be effective in identifying 

these non-traffic injuries. NHTSA’s data systems that were originally put in play really were never intended for—to collect data on 

these systems. The census data that we do for fatal crashes—the 

FARS, Fatal Accident Reporting System—has a census of every 

death that occurs in a vehicle. Some of that data actually captures 

non-traffic injuries, and we’re trying to do all we can to ensure that 

we’re capturing those cases. We’re also expanding our state data 

systems to include police action reports that include non-traffic injuries, which were typically excluded from our collection system, to 

see how valuable they are. We’ve entered into a program with the 

Consumer Products Safety Commission that has an all-trauma 

data system, which collects from—daily—from hospital emergency 

rooms around the country, all incidents that are treated, regardless 

of whether or not they involve vehicles or any other consumer products, to see what value they have. We’ve initiated a special crash 

investigation initiative on back-over crashes, where we do detailed 

investigations to try to understand exactly how the—what the circumstances are for the back-over crashes, something we’re very 

concerned about. So, those are the initiatives. And we’ll have—be 

revealing the results of those pilot studies this year, as the analysis 

gets completed. 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you. I have one final question, and I appreciate Chairman Pryor being very lenient with my time. Collection of data, I think, is absolutely essential, and I think that’s one 

of several areas where, I think, there’s very strong consensus on 

the value of the provisions in this bill. One of the things that we 

require to be collected, and, even more importantly, disclosed, are 

vehicles that do and do not have the brake-shift interlock safety 

feature that we’ve discussed here. 

Representative Campbell, after your son’s death, I’m curious to 

know, How were you able to determine whether your car had this 

or, in this case, didn’t have this feature? Was the information available? And what did you do to finally get the answer to your questions? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. The information was not available. And when my 

accident—my tragedy happened, I had no idea that this was possible. And, no, the information wasn’t available. I then contacted 

NHTSA, honestly, about—almost a year after my son’s death, because I thought either my car was broken or I was a bad parent, 

because I let my child die. And I realized that great parents suffer 

great tragedies, and that I’m not a bad parent, that the only way 

54 

to prevent these types of accidents is to design them out. Because 

whether it was me or some of the unfortunate families that are 

here today, statistically, if you don’t design out these very hidden— 

very hidden safety problems, we will not start saving lives. 

I went down to Washington, contacted your office, and your staff. 

I had a great meeting with NHTSA. I remember it really well because it was—December 8th was my birthday—and there were 

about 12 people from NHTSA there. And that’s when I began to 

understand that this was actually a design feature, that 80 percent 

of the cars didn’t have it. You know, we talked a little bit about 

the voluntary agreement. I—you know, and the data in that says 

that they’ll give me a list of vehicles that will have it. We actually 

didn’t get a list of vehicles that didn’t have it until just recently. 

And it took writing a letter and putting it on the docket to say, 

‘‘Hey, we need this information.’’ 

I went so far as to pass a bill in New Hampshire and say, ‘‘Hey, 

we need to disclose—the automobile dealers need to tell people that 

BTSI doesn’t work in every key position,’’ because I haven’t met a 

person who hasn’t said to me, ‘‘In a million years, I never thought 

that would happen.’’ Even the people at NHTSA said, I quote, the 

term ‘‘sweet spot,’’ from Keith Brewer—I don’t know his job there— 

but he—one of the first people I met with at NHTSA—and was surprised that his 2001 Ford didn’t work in every key position. And 

that’s when I realized that this is a big, big problem, and a big, 

big tragedy that—look, I’m not mad at the industry, I’m not mad 

at NHTSA. I’m trying to be forgiving and understanding. I wouldn’t 

want to tell people, ‘‘Here’s some of the dangerous things about my 

product,’’ when I’m selling it. But we have an obligation, as Congress, as leaders, to say, ‘‘I’m sorry. You must tell consumers.’’ 

There was no disclosure in the owner’s manual, there was no information from dealers. 

When Michael Harrington asked the big three, ‘‘Hey, can I have 

this list?’’ they said, ‘‘No.’’ That was back in November of 2005. 

When I got a list, it was, ‘‘Yes, we have that in all our cars.’’ Untrue statement. You have it in four out of five key positions. So, 

when I ask you, ‘‘Does your car have BTSI?’’ and you say, ‘‘Oh, yes, 

it does,’’ I expect that means it has it in every key position, not 

four out of five. And we were left with a situation where it was— 

and I—this is in my written testimony, and I hope you’ll read it— 

but it’s important to restate it—my children beat me out the door 

by about a minute. My excited little 4-year-old and his younger 

brother, 2 years old, ran out and got in the car, and they were able 

to roll it in a matter of seconds. If they had gotten in the other vehicle in my driveway, a 2002 Envoy that had BTSI in every key 

position, which was the normal car that we normally use for our 

family, my son would be alive, because that type of accident was 

impossible in a car that had BTSI in every key position. Because 

they got in my Ford F–350, four-door, that accident was designed 

in to happen on purpose. And I could go into what I’ve discovered 

and why it happened, but I hope that’s—all that stuff will come to 

light when we have this process, this process of getting legislation. 

You will see, there is no alternative. 

I appreciate the voluntary agreement, but it wasn’t until this 

Committee hearing that we got the follow-up information of what 

55 

happened. I appreciate the industry, and I quote, ‘‘a shared responsibility of manufacturers, consumers, and government.’’ This is a 

big step. But when we get into all the nitty-gritty of that issue, 

you’ll find that it correlates the same way of not enough disclosure, 

not enough people understanding what a blind zone is, or people 

not realizing their windows don’t go back down. They think that 

they do. I mean, this is a—this is a problem. 

So, I thank this Committee, and I thank everyone who’s supporting this bill. 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you very much. 

Senator PRYOR. Senator Klobuchar? 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Campbell, for being here, and sharing this, 

and trying to take your grief to help other parents and other families. 

I had some questions, for you, Administrator Medford, and they 

relate to the back-over avoidance and the recent NHTSA study that 

found that it wasn’t cost-effective. And then you said, just now, 

that the cameras might work, but that we’re not sure if people 

would use it practically. Many consumer groups have conducted 

their own studies that have challenged the results of that initial 

NHTSA study, and I just wondered how you responded to those 

challenges. 

Mr. MEDFORD. I just got, this morning, a copy from Consumer’s 

Union, one of the responses to their studies so, I must apologize, 

I haven’t read the responses. But we don’t know whether the systems are cost-effective or not. We’ve not made a determination. 

What we have said is, this is how much they cost. We think they 

provide a very good field of view in back of the vehicle. We’re positive about that. We just don’t know how effectively consumers will 

use them, in terms of doing the steps that they must do, in the limited time that they have, at the speed for which they back, to actually prevent the tragedy. We are very serious and very interested 

in solving this problem. We grieve terribly at the deaths of these 

children. We share that concern. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. All right, thank you. 

Mr. MCCURDY. Senator? 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Mr. McCurdy? 

Mr. MCCURDY. Senator, could I respond? Yes, if—thank you. Yesterday, I met with Dr. Green, who has been conducting some of 

these human-factor studies on back-ups with these different systems, including video. And I would implore and ask that, perhaps 

in later hearings or independently, we can get a copy of some of 

those tests and actually show you the video of individuals who 

were put in those situations, to test their reaction time to obstacles 

or objects that appeared in the back. And I will also tell you, kind 

of personally and anecdotally, I happen to have three different vehicles, I have three different types of sensors right now. One is a 

camera, one is a more sophisticated kind of combination of radar, 

and one is the traditional sound-based. None of them work perfectly, and each have flaws. My wife told me—she would kick me, 

but, after 35 years, I guess I can get by on this one—she has the 

car that has the camera in the back—or that has the rear view— 

and it was new, and so she started focusing, kind of, on that, in 

56 

the back-up mode, was at the grocery store and was pulling back, 

but was so focused on the camera, forgot to look to the right, and 

another car was coming from an angle—you know, typically you’re 

supposed to look both directions, and—but got so focused on the 

camera, forgot that, and backed into the side of that car. So, 

there’s—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. But why would they be putting them in 

models, then, though, if they’re—— 

Mr. MCCURDY. No, because—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR.—perceived to be ineffective—I’m just—— 

Mr. MCCURDY. No, they’re not—they are effective for certain 

things. They’re not effective for every conceivable situation. And 

what—the technology, I think, that NHTSA and others are going 

to have to look at is, there are other blind spots, there are other 

areas, there are 360s. Some of these incidents would not have been 

prevented by having a backup camera. And if they’re front wheels, 

you have other kinds of potential risks. But, you know, I tell you, 

from the industry standpoint, because—actually, safety sells. If you 

look at the J.D. Power listing, nine of the ten top criteria are safety 

features that people want. I think surround-sound kind of snuck in 

there somewhere, but the rest of them were all safety features. 

But, again, they’re not a panacea. That’s why we do say it’s shared 

responsibility. We accept responsibility. It’s shared. But you also 

have to have the educational awareness and, again, information, 

and probably some training. I’m a passionate advocate of technology, but, I will tell you technology does not solve all problems. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. You know, and I understand, now, that the 

manufacturers have agreed with—Mr. Campbell’s tragedy here— 

that they will agree, voluntarily, to equip all the new vehicles with 

the all-key-position BTSI, which is great. But what I’m wondering 

about is, with this agreement in place, what objection would there 

be to have a mandatory rule? 

Mr. MCCURDY. I’ve already told the Senator that if the goal posts 

are not moved, that we will—I think we have a lot of room to work 

together on this bill. I come as an honest broker. I am new to this 

position. But I would tell you, in the—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. I’m new to mine, too. 

Mr. MCCURDY. Pardon? 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. I’m new to mine, too. 

Mr. MCCURDY. Yes. And—but having worked on both sides of 

this daises, or these dais, on Capitol Hill, I would tell you that, to 

the extent that—where there are reasonable and actionable items, 

we’re going to work with them, and we think there areas that we 

can continue to support—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. OK. 

Mr. MCCURDY.—and will actively support. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Good. 

Mr. MCCURDY. It’s not a perfect bill, but, again, we will work to 

try to see that this goes through the process. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. OK. And thank you. 

Administrator Medford, the issue I was raising earlier, in my 

opening comments about the car seats, and you talked about the 

fact that the LATCH system is designed to make it easier to properly install seats. But I think something like 40 percent of parents 

57 

are still using seatbelts instead of the LATCH system. You’ve also 

said before that NHTSA is working with vehicle and car seat manufacturers, child-seat installation instructors, and consumer advocates to develop a better education campaign. I wondered if you’ve 

explored the idea of an actual built-in child-restraint system or 

other steps that we can take beyond education to make sure that 

kids are properly restrained when riding in cars? 

Mr. MEDFORD. We have. As a part of that February 8th meeting 

that I mentioned in my testimony, Senator, we also are looking at 

changing the LATCH regulation to see if there are ways to make 

it easier and actually changing the ease-of-use ratings that we’re 

currently giving to car seat manufacturers. We have a system 

where we actually give star ratings, or grades, to car seat manufacturers about how easy it is to install their seats. We’re going to revise that system this year. We think we’re giving too high of grades 

for current seats. So, we’re taking a number of steps to make it 

easier. 

I think, in 1995, we had a survey that showed that 89 percent 

of the car seats that were installed in cars were incorrectly installed. Today, we’re—we’ve reduced that number to about 39 percent, but there’s still a lot of work to be done. Car seats are, by 

far, the most important piece of safety device for children in a vehicle, but it has to be properly installed, and they have to be in the 

right seat. But if those two things are done, they provide tremendous safety benefit to kids. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Can I comment on that? 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Ms. Claybrook? 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. First of all, integrated seats are those that 

would actually be built into the vehicle, and—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. You mean, so I wouldn’t have to do all 

the—— 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. So, you wouldn’t have—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR.—seatbelt? 

Ms. CLAYBROOK.—to buy an extra seat, so you wouldn’t have to 

worry about which LATCH you had in, or seatbelt you were using, 

so that when the car is tested for adult crash tests, it would also 

be tested—you could put a child dummy in the child seat and test 

it at the same time, so it would reduce the cost of testing. If there 

was a defect recall, you’d have the name of the owner of the vehicle, you do not often have the name of the owner of the child restraint, because it is sold separately. And so, you would have a seat 

that fits, that’s tested with that vehicle, and the parents can know 

and rely on that. And there are systems that have been designed 

that are built in, so that when you buy that car, you have it. And 

if you don’t have children, but you still carry children because 

you’re an aunt or an uncle or a grandparent, you have that seat, 

as well, so you don’t have to go buy a separate seat yourself. And 

there have been systems that have been designed for 1- to 10-yearolds. And Volvo has done some, Chrysler did at some point. So the 

industry has not really addressed this issue—although it’s been 

talking about it since the 1970s—because it hasn’t been required 

to do so. It’s a perfect example of how cars are not built for children. 

58 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. One last question before—Mr. McCurdy, 

you want to respond to that? 

Mr. MCCURDY. The information I have received on that—we actually asked those questions yesterday when we were looking at 

the car seats, and, I will tell you, that LATCH system is hard— 

was not an easy one to hook up. And, again, I think that’s where 

we have to work with the car seat manufacturers. I’m not trying 

to dispute Ms. Claybrook’s claim, but reports that I’ve actually 

heard is that parents have not been pleased with some of those 

built-in systems, that they are not as convenient and not as uniformly accepted. So, again, consumers ultimately make the decision 

which vehicle, which—and I don’t think government is in a position 

to design those features in. And I think we need to have the data 

and work with those manufacturers to understand that. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. OK. I’ll be honest. I just can’t believe, in 

this day and age that there isn’t some easier way to design this 

system. And I don’t believe that, you know, anyone wants to hurt 

children. I just think that we need to make this more of a priority, 

because this is, again, based on my own experience, and we all 

bring our own experiences to the Senate, but it seemed to me that 

there must be an easier way to make these seats so that they’re 

in the cars, yourself instead of having to pull all these belts and 

trying to do it yourself, and then you’re not strong enough, and 

then they fall over on the side. 

Thank you. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Let me follow-up, if I may. Ms. Claybrook, when I asked my first 

question earlier to Mr. Medford about the TREAD Act and the comprehensive safety test with child restraints, et cetera, you communicated that they were working on something. I’d like to hear your 

comments. I should have asked for your comments, as well. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, the TREAD Act said, in 2000, that, within 2 years, 

they had to issue a child-safety standard that protected children in 

side-impact crashes. And in 2002, before that deadline occurred, 

the agency issued a notice, which said that they just couldn’t do it. 

They were going to issue an advance notice, and then they were 

going to work on it. But they never really had a all-points call for 

help on this, they didn’t have a public hearing on it, they had a 

notice, but that’s it. They didn’t inform the Committee. And it’s 

now been 7 years since that—almost 7 years since that law was 

passed, and it’s just, to me, an example of how this issue is not a 

priority. 

Now, there is a safety standard for side-impact protection that 

Dr. Runge issued in a proposed form in 2004, for adults, that because of the way that it’s written—at least the proposal was written—would require side-head airbags for adults. But in that sideimpact standard, it doesn’t have them in the rear seat, which is 

where we have children, including older children, 12-year-old children, for example; and in the front seat design for the side-head 

airbags, it says that children under 12 would submarine and could 

be ejected from the vehicle, the way they’ve got the proposed rule 

written. So, there are two side-impact issues here, and I think that 

the agency definitely ought to put a priority on them. I don’t know 

59 

1 Committee Report on S. 3005, The Traffic Safety Act of 1966, June 23, 1966, at 271, 273, 

274. 

how much money they’ve spent. I haven’t had a chance to analyze 

their budget for this and whether they’ve put as much money as 

they should have into it. 

But clearly, the integrated seat is really, to me, the answer to 

this issue, because a lot of parents don’t realize that, in a side-impact crash—it’s one of the worst crashes you can have for a child, 

because the child is thrown sideways in a side-impact crash. They 

have very small bones in their backbone, and so, they are very 

often likely to be quadriplegic and paraplegic as a result, and, if 

they’re put in seatbelts, which some children at those ages are, 

then they’re really in deep trouble. 

So, I’m not telling Mr. McCurdy how to design his integrated 

seats. That’s the genius of the auto industry. And I defer to the genius of the auto industry. But what happens is that when you have 

a standard that is required in performance terms, the industry 

stops lobbying against it, and they start settling down and letting 

the engineers do their work. That’s the real issue here. And on the 

voluntary standards, by the way, on the brake interlock, I don’t understand why it shouldn’t just be required, because a voluntary 

standard means the public is excluded from any participation in 

the rulemaking process, there’s no enforcement, the agency has no 

responsibility to do anything, and the companies can change their 

mind. And they’ve changed their minds all sorts of times, and the 

whole issue of a voluntary standard is, ‘‘Don’t regulate—don’t require us to do it now. We’ll take care of it.’’ And then, if they don’t 

do it later, well, there’s no legislation pending at that moment, so 

nothing happens. And no one knows they’ve stopped complying. I’ll 

submit to the Committee a list of when the industry has promised 

to do something voluntarily, which is an avoidance-maneuver device, as opposed to a real sincere interest in putting them in. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

AUTOMAKERS: SAFETY JUST ANOTHER ‘‘OPTION’’ 

The Industry’s False Promises to Voluntarily Improve Vehicle Compatibility and Side Impact Safety 

Voluntary ‘‘Standards’’ Are Not Standards 

Voluntary safety ‘‘standards’’ do not work, and the historical path of automakers’ 

voluntary efforts is paved with broken promises. In fact, Congress rejected them almost three decades ago when it passed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act in 1966. As the Senate Committee Report stated: 

The promotion of motor vehicle safety through voluntary standards has largely 

failed. The unconditional imposition of mandatory standards at the earliest 

practicable date is the only course commensurate with the highway death and 

injury toll. 1

Not only were the 1966 Congressional legislators right, but voluntary ‘‘standards’’ 

violate core principles of democratic accountability and transparency: 

• Involve no mechanisms for accountability: If the voluntary proposal proves dangerously deficient, automakers shirk liability because there is no recourse for 

injured consumers, nor for the government to initiate a defect investigation or 

compel the industry to perform a recall; 

• Involve closed, secret processes and meetings: The public, which is at risk, is 

shut out of the development of the proposal, which instead is designed in secret 

by industry working groups who are not subject to oversight, compliance with 

60 

2 Incantalupo, Tom. ‘‘A Drive For Safer Autos Advocates Press For Action As U.S. Weighs 

Costs, Benefits.’’ Newsday Long Island, NY) May 14, 2003. 3 Rechtin, Mark. ‘‘Toyota Concept Truck hints at next Tundra.’’ Automotive News January 4, 

2004. <http://www.autonews.cominews.cms?newsId=7421&bt=fistT1>. 

statutory requirements, responsibility for explaining the basis for their decisions, or judicial review of their decisions; 

• Lack transparency: The public has no means to secure an independent evaluation of the quality of the industry’s voluntary tests or standards. The public receives no verification that a particular vehicle actually complies with the industry’s voluntary tests, as they do with government standards that are subject to 

public compliance testing and enforcement, and there is no vehicle sticker at the 

point-of-sale to indicate that a standard is met; 

• Lack a baseline for safety: High-income purchasers, who can afford safety extras 

may be protected, but low-income purchasers remain vulnerable to cost-based 

decisions by manufacturers; and 

• Produce weak and non-binding results: Proposals are invariably weak because 

they represent the lowest common denominator among companies looking out 

for their own costs and product plans, and there is no obligation to install technology in compliance with the group standard, meaning that companies can 

change their minds at will and decide to withdraw any protection offered by the 

voluntary ‘‘standard.’’ 

History of Broken Promises 

When it comes to voluntary agreements, automakers have reneged or retreated 

on promises for decades. From General Motors’ promises in 1970 to voluntarily put 

air bags in all its vehicles by the mid-1970s (GM installed just 10,000 in model year 

1974 and 1975 vehicles, and then discontinued the program), to Ford, 

DaimlerChrysler and GM’s recent recanting of their widely publicized 2001 promises 

to voluntarily improve the fuel economy of their light trucks by 25 percent (withdrawn after the threat of Congressional action on fuel economy receded), ‘‘voluntary’’ 

is often just another name for the manufacturers’ tactical maneuvers and delay. 

The industry’s approach to interior vehicle head protection illustrates how, for 

automakers, safety is optional. In 1970s, General Motors began to improve head protection in its vehicles with such technologies as air gap head protection padding installed in critical interior roof areas. However, by the 1980s GM had discontinued 

designing in such protections in most of its vehicles, preferring to focus on more 

marketable performance characteristics, such as horsepower and acceleration. 

In 2003, as part of a supposed effort to improve vehicle compatibility, automakers 

announced a voluntary plan to test and install side air bags in most new vehicles. 

The plan, however, does not make any specific commitment to redesigning vehicles 

to improve side-impact safety. Moreover, there is no requirement that all vehicles 

become compliant with the plan, and no outside body will verify vehicle compliance. 

In fact, even the safety tests developed for the side air bags are voluntary and unbinding. The plan—developed in closed, secret deliberations—involves no procedural 

or judicial oversight, provides no mechanisms for accountability, and offers no baseline for safety. 

Just the year before, General Motors, in cost-cutting measures, made side-air 

bags—as well as anti-lock breaks—optional equipment in a number of models where 

they had been standard. 2

Industry’s Refusal To Improve Safety of ‘‘Cash Cows’’ 

Why should the industry be trusted on safety when auto manufacturers have 

unblinkly faced the carnage inflicted on other motorists from light trucks’ high 

bumpers and menacing front grilles, building ever-more heavy and terrible SUVs 

over time and continuing to market them militaristically, such as with ads calling 

the Lincoln Navigator an ‘‘urban assault vehicle.’’ In fact, General Motors’ new 

Hummer is a direct adaptation of a military vehicle. The chief designer of the upcoming 2006 Toyota Tundra brags that his aggressive design reflects ‘‘the power of 

the fist.’’ 3

In 1998, the auto industry promised the NHTSA Administrator Dr. Ricardo Martinez that it would make modifications to achieve safer designs, mainly by adjusting 

vehicle suspension, but the industry refused to provide any details of their plans. 

Consequently, the promise rang hollow as vehicles continued to be designed large 

and aggressive, and the resulting highway carnage continued. 

In December 2003, auto manufacturers announced a voluntary initiative to address incompatibility and aggressivity. The plan, which would be phased in on most 

61 

vehicles by September 2009, would phase in side air bags and lower bumpers of 

SUVs or add a barrier to prevent them from riding over cars. 

Yet the Alliance makes no specific commitments to redesign vehicles to protect 

consumers, despite the fact that it has known for decades that pickup trucks act 

as battering rams in crashes, and that that the height and stiffness of SUVs makes 

them major killers on the highway. Moreover, there is no requirement that all vehicles become compliant with the plan, and no outside body will verify vehicle compliance. A voluntary ‘‘standards’’ program is a particularly inapt solution where, as here, 

thousands of lives are at stake, the manufacturers have long been on notice of the 

serious safety hazards in these vehicles, and the externalities of their marketingdriven decisions to produce ever-more aggressive and deadly vehicles are imposing 

needless suffering and costs on all of us. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. I’m not saying, in this case, they’re not sincerely 

interested. I’m not saying you haven’t done a great job, Mr. McCurdy, in designing these systems. I applaud you for that. Thank you. 

But let’s just make sure that everyone knows that they’re in every 

vehicle. That’s all. We just want to make sure they’re in every vehicle. 

So, I—the other point that I’d—if I could take one or more minutes—— 

Senator PRYOR. Sure. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK.—on the child restraints, which is that the 

NCAP, the New Car Assessment Program, which tests cars at approximately 5 miles an hour above the standard, the only NCAP 

program, New Car Assessment Program, for child restraints is 

whether the restraints fit. They don’t test it at a higher speed than 

the standard. So, they don’t have a front, rear, rollover, side, or any 

kind of vehicle test under the New Car Assessment Program. Now, 

there’s a hearing next week at NHTSA which—at which this will 

be raised, but I just wanted the Committee to realize that, again 

and again, the children are treated as second-class citizens in both 

the NHTSA rulemaking and in the auto industry decisionmaking. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Mr. Medford, let me also say, after the hearing, I’ll look closer 

at that report that we’ve been talking about regarding the rear-facing cameras. We actually have a vehicle that has one, and one of 

the things I believe you said earlier is, the effectiveness at night 

is in question. I find that to be opposite, because when you put the 

car in reverse, the reverse lights, which are white, come up, and 

they illuminate the back side. But, again, I’ll look at your findings 

there. And you also mentioned that a lot of this depends on the 

user, the consumer, the person who’s driving. And that’s exactly 

right. But you could make the same argument about rearview mirrors. If they don’t use those properly, and if they don’t, you know, 

pay close enough attention, there’s no point in having a rearview 

mirror. So, I’ll look at that, and we’ll follow up with that separately. 

Dr. Gulbransen—— 

Dr. GULBRANSEN. Yes. 

Senator PRYOR.—I’m sorry I butchered your name earlier. I really—— 

Dr. GULBRANSEN. No, I—— 

Senator PRYOR.—did not intend to do that. Let me ask, just on 

a personal note, Was—the tragedy that you faced—was that on private property? 

62 

Dr. GULBRANSEN. Yes, it was. I lived in a townhouse at the time, 

and it was in the driveway. 

Senator PRYOR. And do you know if that was reported in—— 

Dr. GULBRANSEN. Well, I filled out a police report, but it didn’t 

become a statistic—— 

Senator PRYOR. It did not. 

Dr. GULBRANSEN.—from what I was told. 

Senator PRYOR. That was my question. 

Dr. GULBRANSEN. That’s what I—— 

Senator PRYOR. Did not become—— 

Dr. GULBRANSEN.—was told. 

Senator PRYOR.—a statistic. 

Dr. GULBRANSEN. Right. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. And so, when we were talking about statistics earlier—— 

Dr. GULBRANSEN. Wasn’t in there. 

Senator PRYOR.—you would agree that we need a better—— 

Dr. GULBRANSEN. Right. 

Senator PRYOR.—statistical collection—— 

Dr. GULBRANSEN. In order to make changes, you have to learn 

from information. You’ve got to collect the information. 

I just wanted to make one comment. I know I’m just a—— 

Senator PRYOR. Sure. 

Dr. GULBRANSEN.—study of one, or ‘‘an’’ of one, and I’m just, you 

know, sort of a grassroots general pediatrician. And I wouldn’t 

want to be in the position of Mr. McCurdy, of going back to the 

automobile industry, or Mr. Medford, who’s got to design these 

studies, which are very difficult to design, I can imagine. As a pediatrician who reads a lot of research, a lot of stuff is very flawed 

when you’re reading it, and I can only imagine how difficult this 

is going to be for him to design the stuff. But just sort of like in 

a grassroots level, having been an operator of a vehicle for many 

years without a camera, and then with a camera, I can tell you, 

it definitely makes a difference. It’s not going to save everybody, 

but it’s definitely going to make a difference. It’s remarkable how 

now I don’t want to drive a vehicle without a camera, because I use 

it as, you know, an additional device. Yes, you’ve got to look everywhere, plus now the camera. But it’s really helpful. I’m actually 

afraid to go in reverse if the car doesn’t have a camera. And in my 

practice, I think the patients are afraid to tell me they don’t have 

cameras. They park down the block or something. But most of 

them will come in now, and they say, ‘‘You know, I got a camera. 

Now I wouldn’t go’’—the comment is always the same, ‘‘I can’t 

drive without one.’’ And it’s not perfect, but certainly it’s going to 

be helpful. I mean, I used to be a kindergarten teacher, believe it 

or not, and there are actually—I’d call your—to your attention to 

this one handout here. Sixty-two children behind this one vehicle. 

It’s a well-known, very popular American-made SUV. And there’s 

actually three classrooms worth of children behind that vehicle 

that can’t be seen by somebody who’s driving in reverse. So, you 

know, that’s—it’s just scary. 

So, I can only tell you, from someone who actually lived through 

the trauma, drove without a camera, drove with a camera, it definitely makes a difference. I can only imagine, if I had to, sort of, 

63 

look forward, that the best technology would probably envision— 

probably involve audio and visual at the same time, because some 

people don’t hear as well, some people don’t—or may not look— 

they may not look, because they’re looking somewhere else. So, it’s 

going to have to be a combination. But that’s only my speculation. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Mr. McCurdy, let me follow up with a question earlier, and that 

is about the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers’ voluntary 

agreement on the brake-transmission shift interlock. That’s a voluntary agreement that your companies have entered into. Was 

there anything that prompted that? 

Mr. MCCURDY. Well, I—I’ll have to ask the staff, because it was 

before my time. It may have been awareness on this particular incident. I don’t recall. If I could ask Rob? 

Senator PRYOR. Sure. 

Mr. MCCURDY. He’s our—— 

Senator PRYOR. Yes. 

Mr. MCCURDY.—safety expert. 

Mr. STRASSBURGER. Yes, it was Mr. Campbell—Representative 

Campbell, working with Congressman Bass, coming to us, asking 

us to look at the issue and take it on. And we did. 

Senator PRYOR. Great. And could you identify yourself, for the 

record, please? 

Mr. STRASSBURGER. Rob Strassburger, with the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

And, Mr. McCurdy, this agreement that you’ve entered into, does 

it require all of your association’s vehicles to have that device? 

Mr. MCCURDY. All have agreed to participate in that, yes. 

Senator PRYOR. Does that mean every single vehicle will have it? 

Mr. MCCURDY. Yes. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. And I’ve heard some discussion earlier about 

‘‘in key positions,’’ which I’m not 100-percent sure I understand. 

Does that mean—— 

Mr. MCCURDY. I’ve spent a lot of time asking that same question, 

Senator, trying to understand the acronym and make sure that it’s 

there. And I’ve been, again, kind of tutored by my staff that one 

of the reasons there appear to be some differences in the language 

is that actually, believe it or not, the nature of the keys are changing so dramatically. What you and I probably think of as a traditional key, that concept is changing, they’re moving to start buttons 

and they’re going more electronic. So, they wanted to get away 

from just kind of the standard vision of a key, but they are talking 

about it in all positions. 

Senator PRYOR. OK, so they’re talking about it. It’ll work all the 

time, no matter what the key position, or whatever, may be? 

Mr. MCCURDY. That’s my understanding, yes, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. And—— 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Mr. Chairman, could I comment on one question 

you asked—— 

Senator PRYOR. Yes. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK.—very briefly, which is, the auto industry—— 

Senator PRYOR. Microphone, please. 

64 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Sorry. The auto industry has been sued for not 

having it’s break-shift interlock for a number of years. This is not 

something they didn’t know about. I would say it goes back 15 

years. And the foreign industry, in 1995, pretty much agreed to put 

the brake-shift interlock in, and the Detroit manufacturers would 

not. And then, there were 20/20 and 60 Minutes programs—I can’t 

remember which ones—disclosing this. So, there’s been a lot of 

pressure about this issue. It’s not a brand-new issue. I am deeply 

grateful that Representative Campbell and Congressman Bass 

pushed the companies to take it the next step. But it’s not a brandnew issue. I just wanted—— 

Senator PRYOR. Right. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK.—to—for the record. 

Senator PRYOR. I understand that, and I think the Committee 

does, as well. 

But here’s my last question, Mr. McCurdy. On this issue—would 

the manufacturers be opposed to a statutory requirement that this 

be done? And if so, why? 

Mr. MCCURDY. Senator—and I indicated this in personal conversations with Senator Sununu, that if the Senator believes it’s 

essential to memorialize this agreement, then we would be supportive of doing so. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. 

Mr. MCCURDY. Is that clear? I mean, I—— 

Senator PRYOR. Yes. No, I just didn’t know if there was a good 

reason why we shouldn’t do that. But, OK, we’ll continue to work 

with you on that. 

And the last question I had was on the auto-reverse windows. 

We’ve talked a little bit about those today. But, as I understand it, 

the technology exists, they’ve been using these, I guess, in Europe. 

I don’t know if they’re required in Europe. I don’t know their exact 

circumstances. But, as I understand, it’s $10 to maybe $15, on average, a window, something like that. Is this something that your 

alliance would consider doing on a voluntary basis, or, there again, 

is it something that NHTSA thinks should be done by regulation, 

or should we—— 

Mr. MCCURDY. Senator, we’ve worked with NHTSA and—on the 

changing of the nature of the shift on the—and activator—on the 

power windows. Before, it was one that could be accidentally suppressed—or depressed, that, therefore, continued engagement. And 

so, the design changes were to make those that they were suppressed—or leveled out. And then, last year, it was amended again 

to make sure it had to be a lift-up-and-out—— 

Senator PRYOR. Right. 

Mr. MCCURDY.—in order to raise the window. And that’s becoming the standard. That’s where auto manufacturers are going. 

I actually asked a question, trying to understand, too, on the 

auto-reverse situation—some automakers—first of all, it’s not required, to the best of my members’ recollection, in Europe or in 

Japan, even though it’s—I think, Ms. Claybrook’s correct that in 

Japan it appears to be more widely used. In some vehicles—in the 

vehicle I was riding in yesterday, in the express position, it is an 

automatic reverse. But in some situations, believe it or not, you 

don’t want it having auto-reverse, because if someone were trying 

65 

to actually reach into your car, and you didn’t want them to be 

reaching into your car—criminal act or something—they could actually force the window down. So, that’s why the lift-up-and-out— 

so, it’s only in the express position that it would—that it goes 

down. On others, you actually have it where it would—where you 

couldn’t force that down. So, there are some trade-offs there. I’m 

not providing an excuse. I’m just telling you that—just some of the 

technical questions that have been raised. And, again, I think 

we’ll—we’re willing to work with the Senate and the leaders and 

NHTSA to try and find out what is that best approach. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Mr. MCCURDY. And, again, you know—I apologize—this is where 

data really is critical, just really understanding the full impact of 

that. It does sound easy. I don’t think it is as much a cost issue 

as it is some other factors. But, again, we’re open to working with 

the Senate on this. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Now, Senator Sununu, do you have any other questions? 

Senator SUNUNU. Just a follow-up to the question of cost that 

you asked, for Mr. Medford, because I do want to be clear about 

the cost of the—as clear as we can be about the cost of the autoreverse. Ten years ago, I think NHTSA’s estimate was that it 

would be $100 a window to implement. I think their current estimate, or the 2004 estimate, was $8 to $12.50 a window. So, don’t 

you think it’s reasonable to assume, not only can that cost profile 

be beaten today, but that if this is established as a standard feature, we can expect it to be significantly less than that $8 figure? 

Mr. MEDFORD. Certainly, Senator, that—if the volume were to increase, the prices are likely to be reduced. I think the—there are 

two types of auto-reverse systems. NHTSA actually has an optional 

requirement in its window standard that is more severe and stringent than the one that exists in the European standard. And so, 

they think there may be some differences in cost, if you had to comply with that one, versus the other one. And the figures that you 

quoted, that were in the 2004 notice, or before that more stringent 

one than currently exists as an option in our standard today. And 

it would be less for the Europeans, we think. 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you for the clarification. 

Ms. Claybrook? 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Yes, I just wanted to comment that 80 percent 

of all the vehicles in Europe today have the auto-reverse in every 

window. So, I just want the record to be clear on that. 

And, second, for Mr. McCurdy, if we’re going to have data—we 

don’t collect data as well as we should yet—but in 2004 at least 

eight children were strangled by power windows. And I have never 

heard of a complaint yet, either in Europe, or in the United States 

to the few equipped vehicles that are here, where someone said 

that some criminal tried to get into their vehicle and killed them 

because they had auto-reverse. So, if we’re going to rely on data, 

let’s rely on data. And I know we have that. And I’d love to have, 

you know, any further answer to that, that you might have. 

Mr. MCCURDY. Well, I appreciate the gentlelady for the clarification. And, again, for—this is my third week, so I—— 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. I know it is. And I know—— 

66 

Mr. MCCURDY.—I’ve got to—— 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. I know it is. I want to come visit you, so we can 

talk some more. 

Mr. MCCURDY. Yes. No, I—— 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. Right, OK. 

Mr. MCCURDY. We’ve had some previous experience, but it’s been 

a number of years. You know, and this is not meant in any way— 

I asked, probably, a naive question yesterday when I was in Detroit 

at this 4,000-acre facility, where 5,000 people are doing safety and 

testing on automobiles, and been there for decades, and looking at 

people who are so committed to the purpose of safety. And if you 

listen to them, there is a real commitment. And no one is there trying to design things that intentionally cause harm. And I understand that NHTSA—I don’t know what your budget is on testing, 

but I know that you do some in Ohio, and there’s a lot of contract— 

it’s a huge amount—as do other auto manufacturers. And my naive 

question was, Where does Public Citizen do their testing? And I got 

this blank look. And the fact of the matter is, you do not have a 

budget for that. And there’s literally millions of dollars spent on 

this. 

So, I’m offering, again, an invitation for you all, as Members and 

staff and advocates, to actually come and observe and see. And 

some people will never, you know, be totally convinced. Perfect is 

often the enemy of the good. We want to have some good results 

here. We want to work with you on those. And that’s the commitment that I give you. And I can’t speak for everybody. And I appreciate everybody saying, ‘‘Well, thank you for this.’’ It’s not me. It’s 

that—it’s been the work of these manufacturers and literally hundreds of thousands of people that have—making this commitment. 

Ms. CLAYBROOK. You know, Mr. McCurdy raises a point, which 

is, there’s no budget in this bill for NHTSA to do this work. And 

there’s no authorization amount. And Public Citizen, of course, 

does not have a testing budget. Wish we did. We’d love to do that. 

But we rely on the government. And so, one of the things that we 

do do, Mr. McCurdy—and we’d love to do this with you—is, we 

lobby for more money for NHTSA to do its testing work. And I’d 

love to join hands with you and do this together. Thank you. 

Senator SUNUNU. Well, I appreciate that very much. I’m going to 

conclude my time, there. I know you can be counted on to lobby for 

more money for NHTSA—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SUNUNU.—when the authorization period—when we 

come to the authorization period. And when we have those discussions here in this Subcommittee and the full Committee, I think we 

need to take into consideration, and we will take into consideration, everything that we’re asking NHTSA to do, whether it’s 

through SAFETEA–LU or TREAD or this legislation here. 

I want to thank all of the panelists for taking the time to be 

here. This hearing, I think, was very detailed, was—went even a 

little bit longer than I had expected. But that’s a good thing, because that means we at least gave everyone a chance to weigh in 

on the things that they think are of greatest concern to all of us. 

And we—I think everyone here on the Committee and the staff understand, whether they’ve been to facilities at the auto manufacturVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:35 Jul 18, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\35958.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
67 

ers or not, that you’ve got great people working at those companies. 

They’re smart, they’re capable. They have families, they have kids. 

And there are probably more than a few that have dealt with the 

kinds of issues and problems that we’re talking about here. So, I 

think everyone recognizes that, when you’re talking about children 

and families, these issues do cut very close to home—through family, through friends, through stories that you’ve heard, and as 

we’ve heard here today. 

Dr. Gulbransen and Packy Campbell, very grateful for you being 

here, willing to speak on behalf of many, many others, some of 

whom sitting behind you today. No one who hasn’t been as close 

to this as you have can really appreciate the difficulties and the 

courage that it takes for you to share your family’s story. So, we’re 

grateful for that. 

Mr. Medford, we know you’ve got a challenging job, whatever 

level we authorize for you, and we wish you well in your work. 

And, Ms. Claybrook, thank you for being here today, for your advocacy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator PRYOR. Well, I want to thank Senator Sununu for his 

leadership on this issue. It’s very important. 

Thank all the members—all the witnesses on the panel today. 

And I also want to say that the record will remain open for 2 

weeks for Senators to offer written questions, and we’ll work with 

the staff on getting those responses back. 

But, with that, I want to thank you all very much, and the hearing’s adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(69) 

A P P E N D I X 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL AUTOMOBILE

MANUFACTURERS, INC. (AIAM) 

The Association of International Automobile Manufacturers (AIAM) appreciates 

this opportunity to provide its views on vehicle safety for children, the subject of 

a February 28 hearing and of legislation now before the Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation Committee. AIAM is a trade association representing 14 international motor vehicle manufacturers who account for 40 percent of all passenger 

cars and light trucks sold annually in the United States. AIAM members include 

Aston Martin, Ferrari, Honda, Hyundai, Isuzu, Kia, Maserati, Mitsubishi, Nissan, 

Peugeot, Renault, Subaru, Suzuki and Toyota. AIAM also represents original equipment suppliers and other automotive-related trade associations. For more information, visit our website at www.aiam.org. 

The focus of the Subcommittee’s February 28 hearing was Senate bill S. 694, introduced on February 27 by Senators John Sununu and Hillary Clinton. Main elements of the bill are requirements for— 

• A NHTSA rulemaking to mandate that power windows have an automatic reverse feature. 

• A NHTSA rulemaking to establish a rearward visibility performance standard. 

• A NHTSA rulemaking to establish a vehicle roll-away standard. This standard 

would assure that light vehicles having an automatic transmission may not be 

shifted out of the ‘‘Park’’ position unless the service brake pedal is depressed. 

This requirement would apply in all ignition key positions in which the transmission can be shifted out of ‘‘Park.’’ 

• NHTSA to establish a database of injuries and deaths in non-traffic, non-crash 

events involving passenger motor vehicles. 

• NHTSA to establish a consumer information program relating to child safety in 

non-traffic, non-crash incidents. 

AIAM supports the establishment of child safety as a high priority for the Subcommittee, and vehicle manufacturers view it as a high priority for their own research and product development initiatives. We also support NHTSA’s efforts to obtain data on non-crash vehicle-related events. We believe that such data provides 

the necessary, rational starting point and the only appropriate basis for establishing 

program priorities for new safety initiatives to address non-crash events. The alternative of relying upon anecdotal information or intuitive assessments could well 

lead to shifting of NHTSA and manufacturer resources away from initiatives that 

have greater life-saving potential, toward actions with lesser potential benefits. We 

also support, as a necessary corollary to legislative direction for new data collection 

efforts, the provision of adequate budget and staff resources for NHTSA to collect 

and analyze the data. Without such resources and staff, the data collection and 

analysis process could be impaired or delayed. 

We also support the establishment of a consumer information program of the type 

included in the bill, to bring market incentives to bear in promoting child safety. 

Reliance on such market-based approaches (based upon previously developed and reliable data and analysis) can provide safety benefits more quickly than regulatory 

approaches in many instances. Ongoing efforts to educate parents and care-givers 

as to the need to use child restraints and the proper use of those restraints have 

been highly effective. We continue to support efforts to enhance the performance of 

child restraint systems, including efforts to make restraints easier to use. Extension 

of such consumer education programs to include non-crash risks is a reasonable 

step. 

Our specific comments on S. 694 are as follows: 

70 

Section 2(a)—Power Window Safety 

Consistent with direction under the 2005 SAFETEA–LU legislation, NHTSA completed a rulemaking to modify power window operating switch design to require that 

the switches would operate to close a window only if the switch were pulled up. See 

71 Fed. Reg. 18673, April 12, 2006. In responding to petitions for reconsideration 

of that rule, the agency stated that, based on available data, the measures adopted 

by the agency would ‘‘prevent the types of power window incidents that have been 

documented.’’ See 71 Fed. Reg. 18679. The agency went on to state that risk scenarios presented by safety advocacy organizations ‘‘lacked any documentation that 

any such cases have actually occurred.’’ Id. Without any documented evidence that 

a safety problem beyond that addressed by the 2006 NHTSA rule exists, the redirection of agency and manufacturer resources to implement automatic reverse features 

across-the-board cannot be justified. However, as noted above, we support the enhancement of NHTSA’s data collection capability for non-crash incidents, and we 

would be open to reconsidering our opposition to mandating auto-reverse if new data 

were to show a safety need. If Congress deems it necessary to direct further action 

by NHTSA on this matter, we urge that it direct NHTSA to conduct a review of 

the newly acquired non-crash data in 2 years, and pursue further rulemaking if justified based upon that review. 

Section 2(b)—Rearward Visibility Performance Standard 

If Congress mandates improvements in rearward visibility for light vehicles, we 

support a true performance-based approach. For example, a standard could specify 

an area behind a vehicle that must be visible to the driver by some means. In this 

way, manufacturers may implement the most suitable visibility systems, which 

could involve technology that does not yet exist and could well vary among vehicle 

types. However, we have two concerns with the language in S. 694 in this regard. 

First, although the language of the bill on this point is not clear, the section 2(f) 

definition of ‘‘rear blind zone’’ could be interpreted to prevent manufacturers from 

relying on mirrors or enhanced rear window design to achieve compliance. Section 

2(f) appears to require that areas beyond those visible through windows and mirrors 

must be visible, even if such areas are not safety critical. (The existing bill language 

could also be interpreted as excluding mirror and window performance only in establishing phase-in priorities.) In either case, it is not clear why visibility provided 

by windows and mirrors should automatically be excluded from consideration. Second, NHTSA’s November 2006 report on rear visibility technology identifies significant shortcomings in existing systems. It would be a mistake to mandate the implementation of new technology until there is a reasonable basis to conclude that the 

technology will perform well. Therefore, we urge Congress to allow NHTSA to extend the time for completing rulemaking and mandating compliance, based on the 

availability of effectively performing rear visibility systems. 

Section 2(d)—Preventing Vehicles From Rolling Away 

S. 694 establishes the same ‘‘brake-transmission shift interlock (BTSI)’’ performance criteria, with the same September 1, 2010, effective date as the industry Voluntary Agreement to implement BTSI that was submitted to NHTSA on August 7, 

2006. The bill would require manufacturers to report and NHTSA to publish the 

identification of vehicle models that do not comply with the BTSI criteria; the voluntary agreement includes a comparable commitment to publish this information. 

The industry estimated that 80 percent of model year 2006 light vehicles complied 

with BTSI criteria, and 98 percent of model year 2009 light vehicles are projected 

to comply. 

All light vehicles produced by AIAM member companies already comply. Although 

we would not oppose a requirement for BTSI, we do not see a substantive safety 

benefit that would result from enactment of section 2(d). We note that requiring a 

NHTSA rulemaking as in section 2(d) would, to some degree, divert agency resources away from activities that would presumably have a greater safety benefit. 

Section 2(e)—Database on Injuries and Deaths in Non-Traffic, Non-Crash 

Events 

The provisions of S. 694 regarding the establishment of a NHTSA database of 

non-crash events are somewhat more detailed than the comparable provisions in 

section 2012 and 10305 of SAFETEA–LU, but we doubt that these minor differences 

would lead to any substantive changes in the data system that NHTSA develops. 

As stated previously, we support the development of this database. A more effective 

step that Congress could take, however, would be to include in the bill an authorization of appropriations in an amount NHTSA projects to be necessary to implement 

71 

1 Consumer Reports  is published by Consumers Union, an expert, independent nonprofit organization whose mission is to work for a fair, just, and safe marketplace for all consumers and 

to empower consumers to protect themselves. To achieve this mission, we test, inform, and protect. To maintain our independence and impartiality, Consumers Union accepts no outside advertising and no free test samples, and has no agenda other than the interests of consumers. 

Consumers Union supports itself through the sale of our information products and services, individual contributions, and a few noncommercial grants. 2With the enactment of SAFETEA in 2005, NHTSA is now required to collect these data. Section 255 of that law directs the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to 

establish a method for collection of ‘‘non-traffic non-crash data’’ on ‘‘back-overs, power window 

incidents, hyperthermia, fires and other related incidents.’’ 

the database, and to support inclusion of the necessary funding in the Fiscal Year 

2008 budget for the agency. 

Section 3—Child Safety Information Program 

We support the child safety information program described in section 3. We also 

support NHTSA’s ongoing effort to make the LATCH system for child restraints 

more effective and easy to use, and the provision of consumer information to encourage proper use of child restraint systems. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SALLY GREENBERG, SENIOR PRODUCT SAFETY COUNSEL, 

CONSUMERS UNION OF U.S., INC. 

Introduction 

Consumers Union (CU), 1 nonprofit publisher of Consumer Reports (CR), welcomes 

the opportunity to submit comments to members of the Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and Automotive Safety. CU has been 

testing cars and reporting our findings to readers since the organization’s founding 

in 1936. CU regularly testifies before Congress on issues ranging from automotive 

safety to health care to telecommunications and financial privacy. 

The topic for discussion this morning, vehicle safety for children, is a top legislative priority for Consumers Union. This Senate Commerce Committee has a proud 

history of enacting legislation that has provided critical protections for children and 

adults riding in passenger vehicles. It is not an exaggeration to say that had this 

Committee not acted on seat belts, air bags, child car seats, roof crush, rollover and 

many other auto safety issues, many thousands of people would either not be alive 

today or would have suffered grievous injury. 

This hearing provides us with a welcome opportunity to share with Members of 

this Subcommittee concerns about the unfinished business of keeping children safe 

in and around cars. Our testimony focuses on four key areas of interest for us both 

in terms of our testing and our public policy work: blind zones, LATCH car-seat installation system, power window switches, and brake-shift interlock. 

The Problem of Backing Over Children 

Every year, thousands of children are hurt or die because a driver backing up 

couldn’t see them. Consumers Union has studied the problem and has found that 

all vehicles today have blind zones that prevent drivers from being able to see what 

is behind them. We also learned that some vehicles have far larger blind zones than 

others. 

Several years ago, Consumer Reports began measuring blind zones for every car 

and truck we test at our Auto Test Division in Connecticut. (see CR’s Best and 

Worst Blind zone chart in the Appendix) We put a 28′′ cone behind the vehicle that 

approximates the size of a 1–2 year-old child and asked a 5′8′′ male driver and a 

5′1′′ female driver to use their rear view and side mirrors to attempt to see what 

is behind them as they back up. The results of our testing have been startling. 

While all vehicles have blind zones that are dangerous, some vehicles have blind 

areas as large as 69 feet, a sure recipe for disaster if a child is in back of that car 

or truck. Back-overs are not ‘‘freak’’ accidents—they happen all too often and most 

important, are completely preventable. 

Currently, there are three sources of data on backing-over incidents that provide 

insights into the dimensions of this problem: 2

• According to a 2005 report from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

(CDC), 7,475 children were treated in hospital emergency rooms after being 

struck or rolled over by a vehicle moving in reverse during the 2001–2003 period. 

72 

3KIDS AND CARS is a nonprofit safety organization based in Kansas whose founder and 

president, Janette Fennell, has maintained a database of statistics on back-over and other nontraffic incidents since 1999. The government has never gathered these data. Non-traffic, noncrash incidents occur when a car is either parked or backing up or moving forward slowly and 

not driving on the roadways or thoroughfares. KIDS AND CARS data indicate that back-over 

incidents have grown each year as the popularity of longer, higher vehicles like SUVs, pickup 

trucks and to a lesser extent, minivans has grown. (NHTSA disputes that the numbers are 

growing, while acknowledging it doesn’t have good data to prove or disprove that assertion. Vehicle Backover Avoidance Technology Study, p. 13.) 4 NHTSA’s report notes the agency’s problem in sizing-up the dimensions of the problem: ‘‘The 

magnitude of the back-over problem has been estimated based on available data. Much of the 

difficulty in determining an exact count of back-over crashes is due to the fact that NHTSA 

databases mainly cover traffic crashes, which excludes back-over crashes that occur outside of 

the traffic-way (e.g., on private property). In response to Sections 2012 and 10305 of SAFETEA– 

LU, NHTSA is currently in the process of exploring alternate ways of developing a system to 

improve the collection of non-traffic vehicle-related incidents. Information on the development 

is contained in the section on ‘Plans to improve data collection in the United States’ of this report.’’ Page 13, NHTSA Backover Study. 

• KIDS AND CARS 3 own data—which is the only database that currently tracks 

non-traffic incidents—shows at least 550 fatal back-over incidents occurred from 

2000–2007, primarily involving children under the age of 5. Most of these incidents took place in residential driveways or parking lots. An injury or death occurred in 99 percent of cases documented in the database. Over 60 percent of 

backing-up incidents involved a larger size vehicle, (truck, van, SUV). Tragically, in over 70 percent of these incidents, a parent or close relative was behind the wheel. 

• NHTSA’s recent report, ‘‘Vehicle Backover Avoidance Technology Study,’’ [hereinafter Backover Report] released in November 2006, used 1998 death certificate data to estimate that there were 183 fatalities per year from back-over incidents, and between 6,700 and 7,419 injuries. 4

Young children are impulsive and unpredictable and they have little understanding of danger. They do not recognize boundaries such as property lines, sidewalks, driveways or parking spaces. Toddlers have established independent mobility 

between the ages of 12–23 months, and because of their relatively small size, they 

are often not easily visible to caregivers. Their concept of personal safety is also 

minimal. Back-overs are often the predictable consequence of a child following a 

parent into the driveway without the parent’s knowledge. That is the story parents 

tell us time again—they did not know the child had followed them out of the house. 

The tragic consequences of a parent or caregiver not seeing a child and backing 

over that child are enormous. Dr. Greg Gulbransen, a pediatrician, is here today to 

describe from personal experience the tragic result of his inability to see his little 

son Cameron as Dr. Gulbransen backed his car into his own driveway. 

CU is committed not only to educating parents to the dangers of blind zones 

through our publication, Consumer Reports, but to working for the enactment of legislation that will require that all cars to meet a rearward visibility standard. CU 

believes that if technology exists to prevent these terrible incidents and the cost is 

reasonable, such technology should be standard equipment for all vehicles. This is 

the provision in the Kids and Cars Safety Act (S. 1948, 109th Congress) pertaining 

to back-over prevention: 

(b) REARWARD VISIBILITY—Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment 

of this Act, the Secretary shall issue regulations, applicable to all passenger 

motor vehicles, requiring a rearward visibility performance standard that will 

provide drivers with a means for detecting the presence of a person or object 

behind the vehicle in order to prevent backing incidents involving death and injury especially to small children and disabled persons. 

Does the technology exist? Yes, technology exists to allow drivers to see behind 

them as they back up and has been used for years. The legislation we are supporting, the Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2007, doesn’t require 

a particular technology—it simply calls for a rearward visibility performance standard which the automakers can meet using any technology that satisfies the standard. 

Consumer Reports has tested both rear bumper sensors that beep when they detect an object in the vehicle path and rearview cameras. CR found cameras to be 

the most effective for preventing a collision with an object or person behind the vehicle. Automakers are experimenting with new technologies all the time, including 

sensor systems that will actually park the car. 

73 

Is the cost reasonable? NHTSA estimates the cost of cameras, the most effective 

technology in current use for seeing what is behind the vehicle, to be approximately 

$325. If the vehicle already has a monitor for a navigation system, or other purpose, 

the cost is substantially lower. Put that cost into perspective. A car DVD system 

costs $1,295–$2,097, a moon or sun roof costs $700–$1,595, seat warmers cost $645– 

$895. These are all options that many auto buyers are actively seek out when buying a new car. Surely the cost of this technology is worth the price if it saves a 

child’s life. 

Back-overs can happen in any vehicle because all vehicles have blind zones—the 

area behind a vehicle you can’t see from the driver’s seat. The danger tends to increase with larger vehicles. As CU’s Auto Test Site Director David Champion has 

noted the longer and higher the vehicle, the more difficult it is to see a child or 

something on the ground behind. 

Consumer Reports also advises our readers that ‘‘it’s always best to look carefully 

behind the vehicle before you get in and again before you put the car in gear and 

back up. Remember to back up slowly, and pay attention to your mirrors.’’ 

Consumers Union joins with other safety groups—including KIDS AND CARS, 

Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, Public Citizen, US PIRG, the American 

Academy of Pediatrics, in urging Senators to support legislation to require a rearward visibility standard in all vehicles. That measure is included in a bill that is 

co-sponsored by Senators Hillary Clinton and John Sununu, S. 1948 in last year’s 

Congress and will be introduced on February 27, 2007 during the 110th Congress. 

We also endorse KIDS AND CARS’ recommendations to keep children safe as 

well. 

These recommendations include: 

• Walk around and behind a vehicle prior to moving it. 

• Know where your kids are. Make children move away from your vehicle to a 

place where they are in full view before moving the car and know that another 

adult is properly supervising children before moving your vehicle. 

• Teach children that ‘‘parked’’ vehicles might move. Let them know that they can 

see the vehicle; but the driver might not be able to see them. 

• Consider installing cross view mirrors, audible collision detectors, rearview 

video camera and/or some type of back-up detection device. 

• Measure the size of your blind zone (area) behind the vehicles you drive. A 5′1′′ 

driver in a pickup truck can have a rear blind spot of 7 feet wide by 50 feet 

long. 

• Be aware that steep inclines and large SUV’s, vans and trucks add to the difficulty of seeing behind a vehicle. 

• Hold children’s hand when leaving the vehicle. 

• Teach your children to never play in, around or behind a vehicle. 

• Keep toys and other sports equipment off the driveway. 

• Never leave children alone in or around cars; not even for a minute. 

• Keep vehicles locked at all times; even in the garage or driveway. 

• Keys should never be left within reach of children. 

• Always make sure all child passengers have left the car after it is parked. 

• Be especially careful about keeping children safe in and around cars during 

busy times, schedule changes and periods of crisis or holidays. 

LATCH Car Seat Installation System 

Consumers Union has long been concerned about the safety of child passengers 

in cars. We know that when families with children are in the market for a car, child 

safety is one of their top priorities. We also know that parents and caregivers have 

struggled for years to install car seats securely enough to ensure that their children 

will be safe in the event of a crash. For many parents, getting a secure fit remains 

a challenge. 

Lower Anchors and Tethers for Children (LATCH), an installation system created 

to help standardize the way child restraints are attached to vehicles without using 

a seat belt, has been in operation since the NHTSA-promulgated regulation (Federal 

Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 225) became fully effective on September 1, 2002. All 

child restraints and most new vehicles manufactured as of that date were required 

to include hardware components designed to simplify child safety seat installation 

and to reduce the continuing high incidence of misuse and incorrect installation of 

child safety seats. 

74 

CR also noted in the article attached herein that ‘‘The [LATCH] system doesn’t 

work equally well in all vehicles. In many cars, the new attachment points are obscured or difficult to reach, so it’s not easy to use them even with some of the newest child seats. In other models, the LATCH anchors are positioned too far out from 

the vehicle’s seat, making it difficult to secure the child seat tightly against the rear 

seat’s back cushion. Try your child seat in the vehicle before you buy.’’ 

In 2005 NHTSA conducted a survey to collect information about the types of restraint systems being used to keep children safe while riding in passenger vehicles. 

In particular, NHTSA was interested in whether drivers with were using LATCH 

to secure their child safety seats to the vehicle, and if so, were these seats properly 

installed. This is what they found, which we thought was quite instructive: 

• 55 percent of child safety seats, located in a seating position equipped with an 

upper anchor were attached to the vehicle using an upper tether. 45 percent of 

parents and caregivers, however, are still not using the upper tethers. 

• 13 percent of the time child safety seat was placed in a seat position in the vehicle not equipped with lower anchors—the seat belt was used to secure the 

child safety seat to the vehicle—of course, since we’re all taught to put kids in 

the middle seat. 

• Among the 87 percent who do place the child safety seat at a position equipped 

with lower anchors, 60 percent use the lower attachments to secure the child 

safety seat to the vehicle. 

• 81 percent of upper tether users and 74 percent of lower attachments users said 

upper tether and/or lower attachments were easy to use. 

• 75 percent preferred lower attachments over seat belts of those with experience 

using both lower attachments and seat belts. 

• 61 percent of upper tether non-users and 55 percent of lower attachments nonusers cited their lack of knowledge—not knowing what they were, that they 

were available in the vehicle, the importance of using them, or how to properly 

use them—as the reason for not using them. 

On February 8, 2007, NHTSA held a meeting to give the public an opportunity 

to discuss their experiences using LATCH. Consumers Union tests over 80 vehicles 

each year. We ask our engineers to fit car seats—infant, toddler and booster seats— 

into a wide variety of cars and light trucks, using both the LATCH system and seatbelts and comparing the ease of use and other factors between cars and car seats. 

We report the results to our readers, raising concerns about LATCH systems that 

are particularly difficult to use or belts that could be better designed. Consumers 

Union’s Jennifer Stockburger, an automotive engineer and mother of young children, made a presentation at the February meeting in Washington, D.C., and that 

Power Point presentation is attached. 

75 


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76 

LATCH EFFECTIVENESS

CU’s concerns about the ease of use and operation of LATCH is discussed below 

in the August 2005 issue of CR, accompanied by photos: 

The Reality of Latch 

CHEVROLET AVALANCHE—Where do you put the child seat while securing the 

tether? The Avalanche illustrates the potential challenge in securing a low tether 

anchor. 

Unfortunately, there are factors that can make installation of LATCH-equipped 

seats difficult or, in some cases, impossible. 

Typically, the safest spot to install a child seat is in the center position of the rear 

seat. That positions the child farthest from danger in an impact. Unfortunately, 

most vehicles don’t equip their vehicles with lower anchors in the center seats. 

Chrysler Group and General Motors are good at providing three sets of attachments 

in their larger vehicles, and Ford owner’s manuals often allow for child seats to be 

positioned in the middle using the inner anchors from the left and right side 

LATCH anchors. 


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77 

Access to the lower anchors varies from vehicle to vehicle; the best anchors allow 

the seat to quickly click or be hooked into place, while others make it awkward to 

attach and/or detach. Some vehicles have very firm seat cushions, making it difficult 

to fit your hand in to find and access the anchor. Other vehicles have soft cushions, 

but the anchor is recessed so far back that it’s difficult to reach. Optimally located 

lower anchors provide enough space for an adult hand to easily access them. 

Getting to the top tethers can also be a difficult and frustrating process. Many 

vehicles have well-positioned anchors that are readily accessible; parents can simply 

run the top tether under the head restraint and clip it into the top tether anchor. 

Never run the tether over a removable or adjustable head restraint because the soft 

material in the head restraint can compress and create slack in the tether strap. 

It is better to remove or raise the restraint and run the tether over the seatback. 

Of all vehicle types, sedans generally have tether anchors that are easiest to 

reach, located on the rear deck behind the seats, typically set inside a small, covered 

recess. Wagons, SUVs, and hatchbacks with good tether anchors have them positioned midway up the back of the seats, sometimes with plastic covers that snap 

in place when they aren’t being used. Ideal setups provide one top tether anchor 

for each seat location, so the straps are anchored straight back without twisting. 

But many wagons and hatchbacks also have less-friendly tether anchor locations. 

Some place the anchors at the base of the seat where it folds. These can be a full 

arm’s-length away, making them already difficult to reach. To access this anchor 

from within the cabin, it may be necessary to tilt the seatback forward—a challenging maneuver if a large child seat is already on the vehicle’s seat. Other models 

place the tether anchors beneath carpet or covers in the cargo floor. 

Hatchbacks and wagons also often have a cargo cover that protects luggage from 

the sun or the prying eyes of thieves. But the space between the cargo cover and 

the seatback is often very narrow, making it impossible to fit the tether strap 

through. The cover must be removed to access and install the tether strap, which 

is just another annoyance to deal with and adds to the potential for parents or caregivers to opt out of a crucial step. 

TOYOTA RAV4—Even SUVs marketed to families can present challenges to 

child-safety-seat installation, especially when attaching the lower tether anchor. Be 

sure to try installing a seat before buying a vehicle. 

CU’s Recommendations for Improving LATCH Usability & Effectiveness: 

• LATCH anchors should be required in center rear seats. 

• Improve top tether access and visibility. 

• Improve lower and upper anchor clearance so they can be reached easily. 

• Ensure that routing for top tethers isn’t impaired by head restraints or other 

vehicle components. 

• Ensure top tethers on the seats are lengthy enough (CR found they were sometimes too short to reach the tether anchor in the vehicle). 

Power Window Hazards 

NHTSA estimated in a 1997 study that 499 people each year visit emergency 

rooms due to power window injuries, almost 1⁄3 of those under the age of 6, another 


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5Feb. 1, 1971, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 118, regulating power windows, was 

adopted by NHTSA setting minimal safety standards. 6The number of power windows has increased dramatically over the past three decades. In 

1973, only 1.9 million new vehicles in North America had power windows. By 1994 that number 

was 68.1 percent for passenger cars and 55.3 percent for light trucks. 7www.consumersunion.org/pub/1205%20Alliance%20rebuttal.pdf. 8 NPR story on the new requirement http://216.35.221.77/templates/story/ 

story.php?storyId=3915926. 9See Petition, Center for Auto Safety, Filed with NHTSA August 19, 2003, page 2. 

www.autosafety.org. 10 Id. 11 Id. 

nearly 1⁄3 between the age of 6 and 15. Since 1971, 5 at least 59 children have been 

strangled to death and thousands more children and adults injured by power windows. 6

When the Senate Commerce Committee enacted SAFETEA–LU in 2005, it included a critically important provision to prevent young children from accidentally 

closing power windows on their necks, causing strangulation. Section 258 of 

SAFETEA–LU 7 called for the elimination of hazardous armrest rocker switches, requiring the safer pull-up or pull-out switches; NHTSA then published rules requiring safer switches on all new passenger vehicles manufactured after October 1, 

2008. 8 We have been pleased to see that Model Year 2007 vehicles, with only a few 

exceptions, now employ the safer switches. There remains some unfinished business, 

however. 

While getting rid of dangerous switches is a big leap forward, and should prevent 

most of the accidental strangulations by children who are leaning on a switch with 

their heads in the window path, nonfatal injuries are still a major safety hazard. 

Injuries inflicted by power windows have a very long history—and power windows 

have enormous force: they will literally slice a cucumber or green pepper in two. 

The injuries that occur when another person inadvertently closes the power window 

on a child’s fingers or hand or arm are often gruesome. 

And yet there is an easy fix for this hazard—auto-reverse or anti-trap technology 

that is commonly used in Europe should also be the standard here. Like garage or 

elevator door sensors that open the door if they detect an obstruction, this technology sends a window down if it meets with an obstacle in its path. Such technology would have saved the many lives of children strangled by power windows or 

are missing fingers or pieces of fingers that were amputated by a power window. 

None of this information will come as a surprise to NHTSA—or the auto industry. 

Consumers Union has copies of hundreds of reports sent over the past 4 decades 

to both the automakers and NHTSA with heartbreaking stories of small children 

with amputated fingers or broken arms and worst of all, strangulations of children 

because another child or adult didn’t realize she or he was in the path of the window. The history of the government’s failure to require safe power window designs— 

and the industry’s failure to address the hazard—when the technology is readily 

available and the cost is modest, is difficult to understand. 

At least 80 percent of the European car market has vehicles with anti-trap windows—they have become custom there. An effective anti-trap voluntary standard 

was adopted by the European parliament and the Council of the European Union 

in February of 2000, 9 Since that time, no power window fatalities have been recorded in any vehicle meeting European standards—and so, though voluntary, nearly every European automakers has adopted this technology. 10

By contrast, only 15–20 percent of U.S. vehicles have this technology. The same 

models of cars equipped with auto-reverse power windows in Europe do not have 

that technology in their U.S. version, even as an option—the Ford Focus is one example. The estimated cost of making all windows ‘‘anti-trap’’ is, according to 

NHTSA, $8–$12 per window for a grand total of less than $50.00 per car. 11

Legislation introduced by Senators Clinton and Sununu, the Cameron Gulbransen 

Kids and Cars Safety Act of 2007 (S. 1948, 109th Congress) addresses the hazard 

by requiring auto-reverse or ‘‘anti-trap’’ technology in all cars by a specific date: 

(a) POWER WINDOW SAFETY—Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation (referred to in this Act as the 

‘Secretary’) shall issue regulations, applicable to all passenger motor vehicles, 

to ensure that power windows and panels automatically reverse direction when 

they detect an obstruction to prevent children from being trapped, injured, or 

killed. 

79 

12 Id. 13Section 255 of SAFETEA, enacted by Congress in 2005, now requires that the government 

begin keeping track of injuries and deaths involving automobiles even if they do not occur on 

public roadways. 14S. 1948, 109th Congress, pertinent section: (c) PREVENTING VEHICLES FROM ROLLING

AWAY—Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall 

issue regulations, applicable to all passenger motor vehicles, requiring the vehicle service brake 

to be engaged in all key positions and while the key is out of the ignition, before starting the 

engine or engaging the transmission in order to prevent accidents resulting from vehicles accidentally or unintentionally rolling away. 15See this site for information on BTSI: 

http://dms.dot.gov/search/searchResultsSimple.cfm?numberValue=25669&searchType=docket. 16The agreement says that ‘‘any vehicle under 10,000 pounds produced for the United States 

market, with an automatic transmission that includes a ‘Park’ position shall have a system that 

requires that the service brake be depressed before the transmission can be shifted out of ‘Park’.’’ 

Previous NHTSA Proposals on Power Windows 

In 1969 the government proposed auto-reverse technology for all power windows— 

the automotive industry unanimously opposed this measure and it was dropped. 12

The resulting standard imposed minimal performance requirements for power operated windows. Again in 1996 NHTSA proposed a rulemaking to remedy the hazards 

from power windows but took no further action. 

We urge Members of this Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and 

Automotive Safety to support the Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act 

of 2007, which will require auto-reverse or anti-trap technology and address once 

and for all the hazards to children and others from power windows. 

Brake Shift Interlock 

Introduction 

Technology to prevent vehicles from inadvertently being put into gear by children 

or anyone else when the vehicle is in the ‘‘Park’’ position is known as Brake-Transmission Shift Interlock or BTSI. It is an essential safety technology that requires 

depressing the brake pedal to move the gear shift out of park. Since children typically cannot reach the brake pedal, if BTSI is in place, they cannot place the car 

into gear by themselves. 

One of the witnesses at today’s hearing, Packy Campbell from New Hampshire, 

lost his 21 month old son Ian when Ian’s brother set his father’s truck into motion 

and Ian was unable to move out of the way when the truck suddenly started rolling 

in reverse. This is not an isolated circumstance. KIDS AND CARS estimates that 

over 100 children have died since 1998 by placing a vehicle into motion. The government does not track these statistics because they typically do not occur on public 

roadways and have not been officially part of the government database. 13

S. 1948, introduced in October of 2005 as the Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars 

Safety Act, included a provision calling for brake shift interlock in all vehicles within 18 months after enactment. 14 The provision is below: 

NHTSA announced on August 17, 2006 that the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers and the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers were entering 

into a voluntary agreement to ensure that all vehicles sold in the U.S. with automatic transmissions will be equipped with ‘‘brake transmission system interlocks’’ 

to prevent children from moving the shift mechanisms out of park. 15 Automakers 

included in this agreement have agreed to comply by September 1, 2010. 16

According to NHTSA, approximately 80 percent of MY 2006 motor vehicles are 

equipped with an automatic transmission control system designed in accordance 

with the requirements of this agreement. More than 98 percent of MY 2009 motor 

vehicles to be produced are forecasted to be equipped with an automatic transmission control system designed in accordance with this agreement. 

While Consumers Union appreciates that automakers embrace the importance of 

having BTSI on all vehicles, CU believes that voluntary agreements are insufficient 

to ensure across-the-board compliance with an important safety standard. Voluntary 

agreements are just that, voluntary, and they don’t bind the whole industry the way 

a mandatory safety standard does. Indeed, a handful of automakers, are not bound 

by the agreement because they are not members of the associations that were signatories to the agreement, though they may well chose to comply. 

Below is the list of automakers that are part of the voluntary agreement. 

Participating Automakers: 

Aston Martin 

BMW Group 

Ford Motor Company 

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Hyundai Motor 

Maserati 

Nissan 

Suzuki 

DaimlerChrysler Corporation 

General Motors 

Isuzu Motors 

Mazda 

Porsche 

Toyota 

Ferrari 

Honda 

Kia Motors 

Mitsubishi Motors 

Subaru 

Volkswagen Group 

The bill introduced on February 27, 2007 codifies the voluntary agreement and 

makes it law, thus bringing all auto manufacturers under the requirement to implement BTSI, but maintaining the same generous timelines for compliance. 

This is the bill’s language on BTSI: 

PREVENTING VEHICLES FROM ROLLING AWAY.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 24 months after the date of the enactment of 

this Act, the Secretary shall issue regulations to require light motor vehicles 

that are equipped with an automatic transmission that includes a ‘‘Park’’ position to have a system that requires the service brake to be de-pressed before 

the transmission can be shifted out of ‘‘Park’’. This system shall function in any 

starting system key position in which the transmission can be shifted out of 

‘‘Park’’. 

(2) APPLICABILITY.—The regulation issued under paragraph (1) shall apply to 

light motor vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2010. 

The following is a list of Model Year 2007 vehicles that are not equipped with 

Brake-Transmission Shift Interlock (BTSI) technology as reported to NHTSA by the 

vehicle manufacturers: 

Audi: A4/S4, A4/S4 Avant, A4/S4 Cabriolet 

BMW: X3, Z4 

Buick: Rendezvous 

Cadillac: CTS 

Chevrolet: Equinox, Express 1500, Express 15-Passenger Van, Silverado Classic 

Ford: E–150, E–350 15-Passenger Van, Freestar, Ranger 

GMC: Savana, Savana 15-Passenger Van, Sierra Classic 

Honda: S2000 

Hummer: H2 

Isuzu: Ascender 7 

Jeep: Liberty, Patriot 

Mazda: B-Series 

Mercury: Monterey 

Pontiac: Torrent 

Saturn: Ion, VUE 

Volkswagen: New Beetle 

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Conclusion 

Consumer advocates working on product safety believe that if a product hazard 

can be fixed for a reasonable cost, it should be done. This is especially true with 

hazards to children. We don’t believe in playing the blame game—blaming parents 

for being careless or not conscientious when a product harms or kill their children 

is counterproductive and cruel. If we had played the blame game with safety caps 

on medicines or poisons, on garage doors or cigarette lighters, all of which have been 

redesigned for a reasonable cost with children’s safety in mind—we would have 

many more children lost to injury or death. 

Whenever we can, we should fix safety hazards for everyone, but especially when 

they put our children at risk. We think this bill—which addresses the hazards of 

back-over, power windows and brake shift interlock, provides Members of Congress 

with a unique opportunity to fix hazards to children at a reasonable cost. 

We urge members of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee to support the Cameron Gulbransen Kids and Cars Safety Act and thank you 

for your time and consideration of these vitally important issues. 

Consumer Reports—October 2003 

DRIVING BLIND

Every year, children are injured and killed because drivers don’t see them while 

backing up. 

According to KIDS AND CARS, a nonprofit group that wants to improve child 

safety around cars, back-over incidents last year killed at least 58 children. 

A contributing factor is that consumers continue to buy larger vehicles—minivans, 

pickups, and sport-utility vehicles—with larger blind spots. A blind spot is the area 

behind a vehicle that the driver can’t see. 

To help drivers back up, carmakers and aftermarket companies offer two types 

of devices for vehicles: sensors and rear cameras. The cameras are marketed as safety devices; the sensors, as parking assists. KIDS AND CARS has called for vehicles 

to come equipped with such systems. Now, sensors are optional in many larger vehicles; cameras are optional in some higher-priced models. 

We tested several aftermarket sensors and cameras that can be installed on any 

vehicle, comparing them with original-equipment versions. 

The bottom line: Your first line of defense against back-over accidents is to get 

out of your car and check behind it just before you back up. 

Rear-mounted video cameras also help prevent back-over accidents because they 

let you see much of the area that’s usually hidden in the blind spot. But they tend 

to be expensive, from $400 to $900, not including the cost of professional installation, which is recommended. 

A plastic fish-eye lens that adheres to a rear window can provide almost as much 

help as a video camera on certain vehicles and costs only about $20. 

The sensor systems in our tests, which cost $130 to $500 not including professional installation costs, worked well for parking but they aren’t sensitive enough 

to be a reliable safety aid. 

************************************************************* 

CR Quick Take 

The best way to prevent so-called back-over accidents is to walk behind your car 

and check for obstructions. 

If you want an extra margin of safety, first try the $20 Rear View Safety Lens, 

which works on vertical rear windows like those in many SUVs and minivans. 

Camera systems provide a clearer picture and will work on any vehicle, but they 

are expensive. 

Rear sensor systems can help you park, but they aren’t reliable safety devices. 

************************************************************* 

The Problem of Rear Blind Spots 

Back-over accidents usually occur when a person, often a child, is hidden in a vehicle’s rear blind spot. The longer the vehicle and the higher the rear window, the 

bigger the blind spot and the more difficult it is to see a child or object on the 

ground behind the vehicle. 

To illustrate that point, we measured the blind-spot area of a sedan, a minivan, 

an SUV, and a pickup truck. We placed a 28-inch-high traffic cone at varying disVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:35 Jul 18, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\35958.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
82 

tances behind the vehicle to measure how far back it would have to be before a driver of average stature (5 feet 8 inches) and one of short stature (5 feet 1 inch) could 

see it. 

We found that a Honda Accord sedan has a blind spot of roughly 12 feet for an 

average-height driver. That is, the driver may not see a small object up to 12 feet 

behind the bumper. The blind spot for a short driver in the Accord is 17 feet. 

The Dodge Grand Caravan minivan has a blind spot of 13 feet for the averageheight driver and 23 feet for the short driver. The Toyota Sequoia SUV is slightly 

worse: 14.5 feet for an average-height driver; 24.5 feet for a short driver. 

By far the biggest blind spot, however, occurred with a Chevrolet Avalanche pickup: 30 feet for an average-sized driver, 51 feet for a short driver. 

Your Choices 

Camera systems. When the vehicle is shifted into reverse, a camera sends a wideangle view of the area behind the vehicle to a monitor near the driver. 

• Best for seeing small children or objects in a vehicle’s blind spot. Camera systems also work as parking aids. 

• But neither model in our tests emits an audible alert when you approach an 

object. These systems are expensive. 

• Details: To use the HitchCAM, your vehicle must have a tow hitch; the camera 

is mounted in the trailer-hitch receiver and broadcasts to a video screen attached to the inside of the windshield. The camera for the Magna Donnelly 

Video Mirror mounts to the rear of your vehicle and sends the image to a small 

flip-down screen below the rear-view mirror. 

Because it looks straight out the back, the HitchCAM shows more area. The Video 

Mirror, which looks downward, displays less area overall—about 4 feet behind the 

rear bumper—but enough to help prevent a back-over accident. This view works better as a parking aid. The Video Mirror also helped us back up to a trailer. (You 

must remove the HitchCAM from the trailer hitch when connecting a trailer.) But 

the Video Mirror was much less effective at night than the HitchCAM. 

With both systems, image clarity and screen size didn’t match those of factoryinstalled cameras in the Acura MDX and the Lexus RX330. But they provide a reasonable image. 

Both systems worked well even when splashed with muddy water. 

Wide-angle lens. The plastic lens sticks to the rear window and allows you to see 

a wide-angle rear view. 

• Best for seeing objects in the blind spot, parking. 

• But the lens works only with vertical rear windows, such as those in many 

SUVs, minivans, and wagons. It may interfere with normal rear visibility. Backseat passengers or cargo may block the view, and the lens is subject to reflections. You must keep it free from smudges. 

The model we tested, the Elite Enterprises Rear View Safety Lens, 

www .rearlens.com, is 6 x 8 inches and made of plastic. Because the lens is small, 

details are hard to see. But the lens significantly reduced the blind spot on most 

vehicles from 15 or more feet to about 2 feet. 

Sensor systems. Using ultrasonic or microwave energy, sensors detect objects within about 6 feet behind the vehicle and alert the driver via a beep and/or a lighted 

display. 

• Best for a parking aid to help drivers avoid dinging fenders and bumpers. Models in our tests detected large stationary objects. For example, they generally 

picked up a 3-inch-wide pole when it was 3 to 4 feet away from the vehicle. 

• But most could not detect objects low to the ground, such as a bicycle or basketball, or a small moving object. 

False signals can also be a problem. They were often caused by dips in the road 

and surface changes. Systems with sensors near the rounded edge of the bumper 

can pick up the sides of a garage and emit a false warning. In time, these ‘‘false 

positives’’ may lull drivers into ignoring the warnings. 

All require professional installation. 

The Rostra model may require cutting and bending the license plate and could 

interfere with the tailgate latch. It might also prevent the license-plate lights from 

illuminating the plate. The Guardian Alert requires a 2-inch receiver tow hitch and 

5-pin trailer wiring socket, but is the only model that didn’t require drilling into the 

vehicle. All aftermarket systems performed about the same as factory-installed sensors. 

83 

************************************************************* 

CR Quick Recommendations 

If you want an aid for parking, any of these products can help. To help prevent 

a back-over accident, however, only the rear-mounted video cameras and Rear View 

Safety Lens are reliable. 

Of the two camera systems we tested, the HitchCAM provides the larger and better-quality video display, but requires a 2-inch receiver tow hitch and 5-pin trailer 

wiring socket for mounting. For half the price, the Donnelly Video Mirror can be 

mounted on any vehicle with a rear hatch. 

Among sensor systems, the Rostra system is the most sensitive. For half the price, 

the ReverseGuard provides good sensitivity but no visual alert. 

************************************************************* 

Ratings—Backup Aids (Availability—Most models at retail stores through 

2003.) 

Cameras—In order of display clarity. 

Brand Price 

($) Clarity of display Screen size (in.) 

HitchCAM HC–001 900 Good 2.75x2 

Magna Donnelly Video Mirror Reverse Aid 22336 400 Fair 2x1.5 

Sensors—In order of sensitivity. 

Brand Price 

($) Sensitivity 

Features 

No. of sensors Audio alert Visual alert 

Rostra Obstacle 

Sensing System 

250–1594 

350 Very Good 2 Yes Yes 

ReverseGuard 

Classic RA10 

200 Good 4 Yes No 

Echomaster EM– 

PV 

130 Fair 2 or 4 Yes Yes 

Guardian Alert 

Hitch Receiver 

500 Poor 1 Yes Yes 

Availability: Most models at retail stores through 2003. 

************************************************************* 

How To Avoid a Backover Accident—What You Can do 

If children play in your driveway, park your car at the end of the driveway close 

to the street. 

Show your children how hard it is to see out the back of your car. Let them see 

you disappear into the blind spot. 

Just before backing up your vehicle, walk behind it to make sure your path is 

clear. Be sure children are not so close as to be able to dart behind you. 

Look in your mirrors before you put the car in reverse to monitor the rear area. 

Look around while backing up, using all mirrors and looking over both shoulders. 

Back up slowly. 

If you have a backup aid, pay attention to its audible or visual warnings but don’t 

rely solely on the aid. 

Consumer Reports—August 2003 

WHICH POWER-WINDOW SWITCHES ARE SAFER? 

At least 25 children have died during the past decade from injuries involving 

power windows in cars, according to KIDS AND CARS, a nonprofit group that 

tracks auto-safety issues involving children. Typically, the child has his or her head 

84 

1 Ralph Nader, May 1968 letter warning about the dangers of power windows. 

out the window of a parked car and accidentally leans on the window switch. The 

glass moves up forcefully, choking the child. 

Two types of switches are inherently riskier than others if they’re mounted horizontally on the door’s armrest: 

Rocker switches move the glass up when you press one end of the switch, down 

when you press the other. 

Toggle switches work when pushed forward or pulled back. 

A third type, the lever switch, is safer because it makes it harder to raise the window accidentally. Lever switches must be pulled up to raise the glass. They generally have not been implicated in fatal injuries, according to KIDS AND CARS. 

Switches of any design mounted vertically or on an upswept armrest are harder to 

activate by accident. 

Lever switches and auto-reverse sensors are common in Europe. But auto-reverse 

is required in the U.S. only in vehicles with auto/one-touch-up windows and remotely controlled windows. (BMW is recalling some vehicles because of problems 

with the autoreverse mechanism.) 

Clarence Ditlow, director of the Center for Auto Safety (and a member of Consumers Union’s board of directors), says, ‘‘If garage doors can have a reversing sensor, power windows should.’’ His organization has petitioned the government for upgraded safety standards. 

In response to a petition by safety groups including Consumers Union, in April 

2006, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) decided to ban 

power window rocker and toggle switches from U.S. manufactured vehicles. Car 

makers will install recessed or lever switches instead. They have until Oct. 1, 2008 

to do so. 

The Big Three automakers say they abide by the safety standards in place wherever their cars are sold. For example, Kristen Kinley, a spokeswoman for Ford 

Motor Co., says its power windows meet and in some cases exceed Federal standards. 

KIDS AND CARS is working with Consumer Union for legislation requiring a national performance standard for power windows. 

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What You Can do 

Never leave children alone in a car or the keys in the car when kids are nearby. 

Pay close attention to the design and location of window switches when shopping 

for a new car. Here’s a basic rundown for the vehicles we’ve reviewed: 

Horizontal rocker switches. Most vehicles from Ford, Lincoln, Mercury, Chevrolet, 

Buick, Cadillac, GMC, Oldsmobile, and Pontiac, and the Saturn Ion. 

Horizontal toggle switches. Some vehicles from Chrysler including the Dodge 

Neon, Stratus, and Intrepid, and Dodge trucks. 

Lever switches, the safer type. Acura, Audi, BMW, Chrysler Pacifica, Honda, 

Hyundai, Infiniti, most Isuzu models, Jaguar, Kia, Lexus, most Mazda models, Mercedes-Benz, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Saturn L and Vue, current Saab models, Subaru, 

Toyota, Volkswagen, and Volvo. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JANETTE E. FENNELL, PRESIDENT, KIDS AND CARS 

Child safety and health is purported to be a top priority in this country. Both the 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (Alliance) have stated that safety is their top priority. Nevertheless, certain common design features and equipment built into motor vehicles 

still place children at risk of serious, even fatal, injuries in and around motor vehicles. 

In many ways, the development of motor vehicle technology has improved safety 

and convenience. However, potential safety hazards have accompanied the development of some technologies. Power windows are a case in point. This technology was 

added as a convenience, but it has also added new hazards. Power windows pose 

a serious threat of death and injury to children when they are trapped by the window as it rises. This danger has been documented for decades, since power windows 

first became popular. 1 Nothing has been done because the deaths and injuries are 

not reported as part of the national traffic safety statistics. In the 110th Congress, 

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2Testimony of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (Alliance testimony), page 4, presented at the hearing on Vehicle Safety for Children, before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and Automotive Safety, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, February 28, 2007. 3 NHTSA press event, Children’s Hospital, Columbus, OH, September 2004. 

4Final Rule, Response to Petitions for Reconsideration, Power-Operated Window, Partition, 

and Roof Panel Systems, 71 FR 18673, 18680 (Apr. 12, 2006). 

we have not only the opportunity but the obligation to finally eradicate power window strangulation as a cause of death and serious injury to children. 

Congress recently forced NHTSA to address one aspect of the risk posed by power 

windows. In the Safe, Accountable, Flexible and Efficient Transportation Equity Act: 

A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA–LU), Congress required all power window systems 

in motor vehicles to have ‘‘pull-up or out’’ switch designs which are safer than the 

rocker or toggle switch designs. Rocker and toggle switches are known to be dangerous because they can be pressed by accident, as when a child unknowingly leans 

an elbow on a rocker switch, inadvertently closing one or all of the power windows. 

‘‘Pull-up’’ or ‘‘pull-out’’ switch designs are not prone to this problem. This change is 

an important safety advance but addresses only a portion of the injury problem. 

Even with safer window switches, passengers are still in danger if someone else 

in the vehicle intentionally closes a power window without realizing that fingers or 

hands are in the way of the rising window. Children continue to be killed and 

maimed by power windows. In December of 2006, a Detroit, MI child was strangled 

to death by a power window. The Detroit incident is particularly noteworthy because the vehicle involved was a Pontiac Vibe, which has the safer power window 

switches. 

To prevent these tragic injuries and deaths auto-reverse technology is needed in 

all power windows. When a power window rises with 40–80 pounds of pressure and 

meets an obstruction, auto-reverse technology would ensure that power windows 

would immediately reverse direction. Eighty percent of vehicles sold in Europe already come equipped with this simple, lifesaving technology. U.S. children deserve 

this same protection. 

In the U.S., auto manufacturers provide ‘‘obstacle detections devices for sliding 

doors and automatic liftgates.’’ 2 The industry protects us from these moving door 

panels; but ignores power windows. What’s the difference? Children are just as likely to be injured by power windows as they are by sliding minivan doors and power 

liftgates. The industry needs to simply provide the same technology they already 

utilize on doors and liftgates to power windows. 

The American public, lawyers and safety advocates understand the danger posed 

by power windows and that there is an available technological solution. Safety advocates have been calling for an improvement in power window safety for decades. 

Yet, NHTSA has denied no less than 5 petitions requesting that auto-reverse technology be added to power windows. NHTSA’s reasons for denying the petitions are 

the supposed lack of data and cost. 

Current cost estimates are between $8–$10 per window. If this technology becomes standard equipment on all vehicles the true cost will range between $5–$7 

per window or possibly lower. Even at current cost estimates, this safety technology 

is far less expensive than many optional convenience and entertainment features 

the manufacturers include in their motor vehicles. 

With regard to the lack of data, there is actually an abundance of information 

about the issue. NHTSA estimates that there could be 499 hospitalizations annually 

(NHTSA Research Note, May 1997); small children are often victims, losing fingers 

and even limbs. Ten year-old data shows we have a problem. 

NHTSA reviewed 1997 and 1998 death certificates and located at least 4 deaths 

for each of those years. NHTSA is aware of the 8 fatalities that occurred in 2004; 3

yet they continue to state that ‘‘based on all available evidence the agency expects, 

on average, at least one child fatality, and at least one serious injury (e.g., amputation, brain damage from near suffocation) per year could be prevented by the requirements of the final rule.’’ 4 This simply is not the case. 

KIDS AND CARS collects data about non-traffic incidents involving children 

under the age of fourteen. Enclosed are two spreadsheets containing information 

KIDS AND CARS has compiled about power incidents where people were injured, 

killed or requested something be done about these ‘‘guillotines on wheels.’’ 

Utilizing methods anyone interested in locating data has at their disposal, we 

compiled the spreadsheets that contain information about children being strangled 

to death by power windows and others injuries such as fingers amputations, broken 

wrists, etc. Though NHTSA and the Alliance continue to deny that power windows 

86 

5 Alliance testimony, op. cit. note 1, page 11. 

6 ‘‘NHTSA is also responsible for motor vehicle safety when there is not a crash or the event 

occurs off the public traffic way. When the agency tries to quantify safety problems associated 

with non-traffic or non-crash situations it often finds that it has little or no data and must rely 

on the data gathering, efforts of others.’’ Data Collection Study: Deaths and Injuries Resulting 

from Certain Non-Traffic and Non-Crash Events, May 2004, page 3. 7 ‘‘NHTSA is responsible for reducing deaths and injuries associated with motor vehicle crashes and non-crashes.’’ Interim Status Report, NHTSA Pilot Study, Non-Traffic Motor Vehicle Safety Issues, July 2001, page 1. 

represent a significant risk to all passengers in vehicles, it was information that had 

been reported to them that we used to compile the Spreadsheet #1. 

Spreadsheet #1 contains information compiled from NHTSA Office of Defect Investigations (ODI) reports, Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQ) reports, letters written to alert or complain about the dangers of power windows to Ford, etc. The list 

contains over 140 incidents where people have taken the time to alert auto makers 

and NHTSA about these dangers and provide information about injuries and deaths. 

We simply took the information NHTSA already has and are reporting it back to 

you in a spreadsheet format. We do not understand why NHTSA has never included 

this information in any of their reports or studies about power windows. Though far 

from comprehensive, (not even the tip of the tip of the iceberg) it does provide information about the dangers of power windows. It is important to note that drivers 

do not have the ability to see young children seated directly behind them before 

raising power windows. They can alert children that windows are being put up; but 

do not have the ability to visually monitor them while driving. 

Spreadsheet #2 contains information compiled by KIDS AND CARS involving children injured or killed by power windows from our database. 

We know there are hundreds if not thousands of power window injuries and 

deaths that have been reported to auto manufacturers but we do not have access 

to their data, nor is it contained in the enclosed spreadsheets. We feel the information provided is compelling enough for Congress to act. But, if the Committee determines more data is needed to act, we suggest that the Subcommittee use its subpoena powers to request the relevant records from all auto manufacturers including 

complaints, injuries, fatalities and lawsuits filed regarding power window injuries 

and deaths. This information is not being supplied, yet the Alliance notes ‘‘that 

auto-reverse was denied because the petitioners did not provide data regarding the 

need.’’ 5 Why are they not providing the data that is available at their finger tips? 

We know that hundreds (most probably thousands) of reports have been made to 

auto makers about these injuries and fatalities. The industry has withheld this information for decades; yet place the burden on nonprofit agencies to inform NHTSA 

and the general public about these dangers. 

The combination of NHTSA’s 1997 power window injury study, our spreadsheets 

and the subpoenaed records of auto makers will finally put to rest the fact that 

auto-reverse is a necessary safety feature. We encourage and trust that you will act 

with the information provided. 

During the last 10 years KIDS AND CARS has advocated for non-traffic motor 

vehicle safety for children. During that time we have tried to persuade NHTSA to 

collect data about non-traffic incidents and bring awareness to the dangers children 

face in and around ‘‘parked’’ vehicles. NHTSA freely states that non-traffic incidents 

are clearly under their purview; 6 7 but they have resisted getting involved except 

when mandated by Congress to act. 

Again, we need Congress to help save the lives of young children from these predictable and preventable situations. We have provided data that for some reason 

has been ignored by the Federal agency in charge of keeping us safe in and around 

our motor vehicles. We know that the costs are minimal; especially in contrast to 

the life of even one child. We know the industry is already using the auto-reverse 

technology on many if not most vehicles in Europe, and in door panels and liftgates 

and on power windows for high-end models in the U.S. Safety should not be a luxury only for those who can afford it. 

To honor the 60+ children who have lost their lives since this problem was first 

brought to the NHTSA’s attention, we implore you to act swiftly and with resolve 

to stop power window deaths and injuries, reverse the history of regulatory delay 

and indifference, and ensure that power windows will no longer kill or seriously injure another innocent child. 

Attachments to this prepared statement have been retained in Committee files. 

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