Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 181 / Thursday, September 18, 1997 / Notices 49047

crewmembers in this regard, railroads

should develop and implement a

process or procedure, such as a matrix,

that would provide specific guidance in

determining the appropriate number of

hand brakes to apply, considering grade,

tonnage, and other local conditions

prevalent at the time of securement, for

example, high winds or extreme cold;

(b) where appropriate, remove slack

from the train, or as commonly referred

to in the industry, ‘‘bunch the slack’;

and (c) detach any locomotives from the

cars to allow an emergency brake

application.

3. On locomotives, fully apply all

hand brakes on all unattended

locomotives in the consist. If the grade

exceeds one percent, or whenever it is

otherwise required by railroad rules, in

addition, chock or chain the front and

back of at least one pair of wheels in the

locomotive consist. Railroads should

develop and implement procedures that

would then verify that the hand brakes

will hold the locomotive consist.

Further, railroad instructions should

address: (a) The throttle position; (b)

status of the reverse lever; (c) position

of the generator field switch; (d) status

of the independent brakes; (e) position

of the isolation switch; and (f) position

of the automatic brake valve. The above

procedures should also take into

account winter weather conditions as

they relate to throttle position and

reverser handle.

FRA may modify Safety Advisory 97–

2, issue additional safety advisories, or

take other appropriate necessary action

to ensure the highest level of safety on

the Nation’s railroads.

Issued in Washington, DC on September

15, 1997

Edward R. English,

Director, Office of Safety Assurance and

Compliance.

[FR Doc. 97–24962 Filed 9–17–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

Notice of Safety Advisory

AGENCY: Federal Railroad

Administration (FRA), Department of

Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.

SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety

Advisory 97–3 addressing safety

practices to reduce the risk of accidents

arising from the authorization of train

movements past stop indications of

absolute signals.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Dennis Yachechak, Operating Practices

Specialist, Office of Safety Assurance

and Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh

Street, SW., RRS–11, Mail Stop 25,

Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202–

632–3370), or Nancy L. Goldman, Trial

Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA,

400 Seventh Street, SW., RCC–12, Mail

Stop 10, Washington, DC 20590

(telephone 202–632–3167).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A fatal

head-on collision between a Union

Pacific Railroad Company (UP) freight

train and an unattended, runaway UP

locomotive consist near Fort Worth,

Texas, on August 20, 1997, has caused

FRA to focus on railroad operating rules

and procedures pertaining to protection

against conflicting train movements

when train dispatchers and control

operators authorize movements past a

stop indication of an absolute signal.

FRA and the National Transportation

Safety Board (NTSB) are investigating

the accident. FRA has also initiated an

in-depth and comprehensive analysis of

train dispatcher procedures employed

by UP. FRA inspection teams are on

UP’s property to conduct safety

assurance reviews on all aspects of the

issue. The facts and findings developed

in the investigations will be published

when the individual investigations are

complete.

The collision occurred in single track,

centralized traffic control (CTC)

territory. Preliminary FRA findings

indicate that an unoccupied UP

locomotive consist unintentionally

rolled out of a controlled siding

eastward onto a main track. A UP

dispatcher noticed on his computer

screen that the siding switch was out of

correspondence, and that the main track

segment beyond the switch was

occupied. At least three times, the

dispatcher radioed the runaway light

locomotive consist, in an attempt to

contact a crewmember. Not getting a

response, the dispatcher then contacted

a signal maintainer. Meanwhile, a UP

control operator at Fort Worth,

authorized a westbound freight train to

pass a stop indication of an absolute

signal at the west end of Centennial

Yard in Fort Worth, and proceed onto

the main track at restricted speed.

Subsequently, the runaway light

locomotive consist struck the

westbound freight train at a speed of

approximately 60 miles per hour. The

UP engineer and engineer pilot were

killed, and the UP conductor was

seriously injured.

Operating Practices

FRA rules require each railroad to

periodically instruct its employees on

the meaning and application of the

railroad’s operating rules (49 CFR

217.11), and also require each railroad

to periodically conduct operational tests

and inspections to determine the extent

of compliance with its code of operating

rules, timetables, and timetable special

instructions (49 CFR 217.9).

UP train dispatcher rule 20.6 pertains

to movements in adjoining territories

and requires that, ‘‘Train dispatchers

must not issue track warrants, track

bulletins, or instructions or take any

action that may affect safe train

operation on another train dispatcher’s

territory unless the dispatchers reach an

understanding.’’ Rule 9.12.1 of the

General Code of Operating Rules

pertains to CTC Territory and requires

that, ‘‘At a signal displaying a Stop

indication, if no conflicting movement

is evident, the train will be governed as

follows: Before authorizing the train to

proceed, the control operator must

know that the route is properly lined

and no conflicting movement is

occupying or authorized to enter the

track between that signal and the next

absolute signal governing movement or

the end of CTC where applicable.’’

Initial findings of the FRA

investigation of the collision indicate, in

part, that the train dispatcher and

control operator did not communicate

with each other as to the cause of the

stop indication on the absolute signal at

the west end of Centennial Yard. It

appears that the train dispatcher did not

contact the control operator of the

adjoining territory and inform him of

the track occupancy. Likewise, it

appears that the control operator did not

verify the cause of the stop indication

by determining whether a conflicting

movement was occupying the track

segment between that signal and the

next absolute signal governing

movement, before authorizing the

westbound train to pass the stop

indication.

Recommended Action

FRA believes that the likelihood of

further accidents, such as the one that

occurred on the UP on August 20, 1997,

would be greatly reduced by the

inclusion of certain additional measures

into the railroads’ operating procedures.

Therefore, FRA recommends that:

1. As soon as possible, but preferably

within seven calendar days of the date

of publication of this Safety Advisory in

the Federal Register, each railroad

should:

(a) Ensure that a railroad operating

supervisor personally contacts each

train dispatcher and control operator

responsible for controlling train
49048 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 181 / Thursday, September 18, 1997 / Notices

movements, and in a face-to-face

meeting:

(i) Informs them of the circumstances

surrounding the UP accident described

above;

(ii) Reemphasizes the importance of

complying with existing operating rules

and procedures pertaining to the

authorization of train or engine

movements past a stop indication; and

(iii) Reemphasizes rules and

procedures that ensure that train

dispatchers and control operators,

dispatchers and other dispatchers, or

control operators and other control

operators are communicating with each

other and with enough specificity to

prevent conflicting movements. FRA

recommends that such one-time face-toface meetings be held in addition to the

periodic instruction required by 49 CFR

217.11.

(b) Review train dispatcher and

control operator procedures in order to

determine if any gaps exist, particularly

as they relate to necessary

communication with adjoining

territories.

(c) Revise operating rules and train

dispatcher procedures as needed to

assure that gaps do not exist.

2. As part of the tests and inspections

required by 49 C.F.R. 217.9, each

railroad should conduct operational

tests and inspections to ensure

compliance with operating rules and

train dispatcher/control operator

procedures pertaining to authorization

to pass a stop indication and dispatcher/

control operator communication.

FRA may modify Safety Advisory 97–

3, issue additional safety advisories, or

take other appropriate necessary action

to ensure the highest level of safety on

the Nation’s railroads.

Issued in Washington, DC, on September

15, 1997.

Edward R. English,

Director, Office of Safety Assurance and

Compliance.

[FR Doc. 97–24967 Filed 9–17–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P