IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LARRY L. WATTS, :

 :

 Plaintiff : 

 :

 v. : CIVIL NO. 4:17-CV-00778

 :

MANSFIELD UNIVERSITY OF : (Judge Brann) 

PENNSYLVANIA OF THE STATE :

SYSTEM OF HIGHER EDUCATION, :

CHUCK COLBY, JAMES PARKER, :

DIA CARLETON, and :

ALAN GOLDEN, :

 : 

 Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

July 2, 2015

Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff Larry L. Watts’ Motion for an 

Extension of Time to Serve Defendants, (ECF No. 31), as well as Defendants Alan 

Golden’s and James Parker’s (collectively the “Moving Defendants”) Motion to 

Dismiss for Insufficient Service. (ECF No. 24). Briefing has concluded and these

motions are now ripe for disposition. For the following reasons, Moving 

Defendants’ Motion is denied, while Mr. Watts’ Motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 23, 2014 Mr. Watts filed a complaint alleging civil rights 

violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as under the Age Discrimination 

in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Pennsylvania Human 

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Relations Act. (ECF No. 1). Mr. Watts named Mansfield University of the State 

System of Higher Education (“Mansfield University”) as the defendant; Mansfield 

University filed an answer to the complaint on June 23, 2014. (ECF No. 6). On 

October 9, 2014, Mr. Watts amended the complaint to add four individual 

defendants, including Mr. Parker and Mr. Golden. (ECF No. 14).

Mr. Watts avers that he attempted to effectuate service on the new 

defendants by mailing the Amended Complaint, Summons, Notice of Suit, and 

Waiver of Service to their last known addresses at Mansfield University. (ECF 

No. 32). Unbeknownst to Mr. Watts, Moving Defendants were no longer 

employed by Mansfield University, and therefore were not served. Mr. Watts

asserts that none of the mailings were returned to him as undeliverable. Id. 

On November 14, 2014, Mansfield University submitted a response to Mr. 

Watts’ first set of interrogatories. (ECF No. 31, Ex. 1). Interrogatory number 

three requested the contact information for “each person who had knowledge of the 

facts of this matter or who may be called to testify at the trial of this matter.” Id. at 

2. Neither Mr. Parker’s nor Mr. Golden’s information was provided. Id. at 2-3. 

Thereafter, defendants Dia Carleton and Chuck Colby waived service of the 

Amended Complaint and on December 12, 2014, Mansfield University, Ms. 

Carleton, and Mr. Colby filed an answer to the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 

18). 

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On February 6, 2015, the deadline to serve defendants with the Amended 

Complaint passed without Mr. Watts having properly served Moving Defendants. 

Similarly, the deadline to file an answer or reply to a requested waiver of service 

passed without any action from Moving Defendants. Mr. Watts apparently made 

no further effort to serve Moving Defendants prior to the deadline, nor did he move 

for an extension of time to effectuate service. Mr. Parker was eventually served 

with the Amended Complaint on April 14, 2015, while Mr. Golden was served on 

April 15, 2015. (ECF Nos. 19, 20). 

II. DISCUSSION

When examining a motion for an extension of time to perfect service, the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed district courts to 

follow a two-step process. Petrucelli v. Bohringer & Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 

1305 (3d Cir. 1995). First, the court “should determine whether good cause exists 

for an extension of time. If good cause is present, the district court must extend 

time for service and the inquiry is ended.” Id. If, however, good cause does not 

exist, “the court may in its discretion decide whether to dismiss the case without 

prejudice or extend time for service.” Id.

A. Good Cause

The Third Circuit has “equated ‘good cause’ with the concept of ‘excusable 

neglect’ . . . which requires ‘a demonstration of good faith on the part of the party 

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seeking an enlargement and some reasonable basis for noncompliance within the 

time specified in the rules.’” MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Teleconcepts, 

Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995). Thus, “the primary focus [in such an 

inquiry] is on the plaintiff's reasons for not complying with the time limit in the 

first place.” Id. Courts will also examine the “prejudice to the defendant by lack 

of timely service” and “whether plaintiff moved for an enlargement of time to 

serve.” Id. (citing United States v. Nuttall, 122 F.R.D. 163, 166–67 (D. Del.

1988)).

The particular facts of this case lead the Court to conclude that good cause 

for an extension of time does not exist. First, the reasons for Mr. Watts’ failure to 

timely serve Moving Defendants do not demonstrate reasonable efforts on his part. 

Although Mr. Watts attempted to serve the two defendants at their last known 

place of work – Mansfield University – and the mailings were not returned as 

undeliverable, this effort was not adequate in light of the facts that subsequently 

emerged. 

Counsel entered an appearance on behalf of defendants Mansfield 

University, Ms. Carleton, and Mr. Colby, but did not enter an appearance for 

Moving Defendants. (ECF No. 17). An answer to the Amended Complaint was 

filed by Mansfield University, Ms. Carleton, and Mr. Colby, but no answer was 

filed by Moving Defendants, even after the deadline to file an answer expired. 

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(ECF No. 18). These facts would have given sufficient notice to a diligent plaintiff 

that the defendants may not have been properly served.

Second, Mr. Watts did not file for an extension of time to effectuate service 

until June 12, 2015, 126 days after the expiration of the time to serve the 

defendants. (ECF No. 31). Although as discussed infra, the Court does not 

believe any significant prejudice would result to the defendants in this case by 

granting an extension, this lack of prejudice does not outweigh the other two 

factors. As two of the three factors weigh against a finding of good cause, the 

Court concludes that good cause is not present.

B. Exercise of Discretion

In examining whether to exercise discretion in granting an extension of time 

to serve defendants, courts examine, inter alia: whether the defendant would suffer 

prejudice, whether “the applicable statute of limitations would bar the refiled 

action, or [whether] the defendant is evading service or conceals a defect in 

attempted service.” Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1305-06 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) 

advisory committee's note (1993)). 

An examination of these factors leads to the conclusion that an exercise of

discretion to allow an extension of time is appropriate. First, the Court finds that 

the defendants would suffer minimal, if any, prejudice. Although Moving 

Defendants assert that they would be prejudiced since litigation has been “ongoing 

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for over a year[,]” this assertion is misleading. (ECF No. 35, p. 5). Moving 

Defendants are utilizing the same attorney as the other three defendants; this 

attorney has represented Mansfield University since the inception of litigation. 

Therefore, no new attorney will need to play catch-up in this case. 

Second, the statute of limitations has expired on all of Mr. Watts’ claims 

against both Mr. Parker and Mr. Golden. See (ECF No. 35, pp. 6-7). Contrary to 

Moving Defendant’s protestations otherwise, this factor cuts significantly against 

denying Mr. Watts’ motion. In that vein, the Third Circuit has stated that the 

expiration of an applicable statute of limitations is a reason to grant an extension, 

not deny one. See, Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1306 (holding that a district court should

“consider whether the running of the statute of limitations would warrant granting

an extension of time”) (emphasis added). 

Although Mr. Parker and Mr. Golden took no steps to evade service, this 

factor does not outweigh the remainder of the Court’s analysis. Moving 

Defendants would not be prejudiced by the Court’s decision to grant Mr. Watts’ 

Motion while, in contrast, Mr. Watts would suffer extreme prejudice should the 

Court deny his Motion. In balancing these equities, it is appropriate to exercise 

discretion and permit Mr. Watts a reasonable period of time to perfect service on 

Mr. Parker and Mr. Golden.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for an Extension of Time to 

Serve Defendants (ECF No. 31) is granted. Because the Court is granting 

Plaintiff’s Motion, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Insufficient Service is 

denied as moot.

BY THE COURT

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

United States District Judge

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