UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4087

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

GABRIEL ELIJAH MARTIN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, 

District Judge. (1:11-cr-00048-CCE-2)

Submitted: November 6, 2012 Decided: November 9, 2012

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael E. Archenbronn, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL E. ARCHENBRONN, 

Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael A. 

DeFranco, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Gabriel Elijah Martin pled guilty pursuant to a plea 

agreement to two counts of brandishing a firearm during and in 

relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). After the court granted the 

Government’s motion pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

Manual (“USSG”) § 5K1.1, p.s. (2011), and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) 

(2006), Martin was sentenced to 63 months’ and 225 months’ 

imprisonment, to run consecutively. On appeal, counsel has 

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal 

but questioning whether the district court committed procedural 

error by failing to consider the factors in USSG § 5K1.1(a) when 

determining whether to depart more than the sentence reduction 

requested by the Government. Martin was advised of his right to 

file a pro se supplemental brief, but he did not do so. We 

affirm.

We review Martin’s sentence for reasonableness under a 

deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). A sentence is procedurally 

reasonable if, among other requirements, the court considers the 

factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). See Gall, 552 U.S. at 

49-51. However, “in determining the extent of a departure below 

a statutory minimum a district court should look [solely] to the 
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substantial assistance factors listed in [USSG] § 5K1.1(a) . . . 

and other factors related to that assistance.” United States v. 

Hood, 556 F.3d 226, 234 n.2 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal citation 

omitted); see also United States v. A.B., 529 F.3d 1275, 1285 

(10th Cir. 2008) (holding that district court did not have 

authority to depart any further below statutory minimum after 

granting § 3553(e) motion and could not consider § 3553(a) 

factors); United States v. Williams, 474 F.3d 1130, 1130-31 (8th 

Cir. 2007) (holding that district court may look only to 

§ 3553(e) in going below statutory minimum and not to factors 

listed in § 3553(a)).

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the 

district court did not err in its determination of whether to 

depart more than the reduction requested by the Government. The 

court considered the parties’ arguments based on factors 

relevant to substantial assistance. See USSG § 5K1.1(a), p.s. 

(providing non-exhaustive list of substantial assistance 

factors). The court then determined that the Government’s 

recommendation was appropriate “given the nature of the 

cooperation and the procedural situation that existed when 

[Martin] came forward.” (E.R. 230);* see USSG § 5K1.1(a)(1), 

 * “E.R.” refers to the electronic record filed in this 

court.
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(3). The court then correctly noted that, under Hood, it did 

not have the authority to consider Martin’s family and personal 

history as that information did not relate to Martin’s 

substantial assistance. While the court did mention the

§ 3553(a) factors, it already had determined the extent of the 

downward departure based on substantial assistance factors 

alone, and the additional explanation served only to provide a 

basis for the sentence in the event that the court had

misinterpreted Hood, which it did not. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Martin, in writing, of the right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Martin requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Martin. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED