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*********************************************** 
IN RE LILLYANNE D. ET AL.*

(AC 45124)

(AC 45156)

Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Clark, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent parents filed separate appeals with this court from the

judgment of the trial court terminating their parental rights with respect

to their minor child, R, who had been in foster care since his discharge

from a hospital after his birth. The Department of Children and Families

became involved with the respondents when the respondent mother

threatened to harm their daughter, L. The mother had a previous history

with the department in connection with incidents involving her older

children. After L had been adjudicated neglected and committed to the

custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families,

the respondents’ second child, R, was born, and the petitioner filed a

motion for an order of temporary custody and a neglect petition on the

basis of predictive neglect. That same day, the court granted the order

of temporary custody and ordered specific steps with which the respondents were required to comply. R thereafter was adjudicated neglected

and committed to the custody of the petitioner. The trial court found

that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify R with the

respondents but that the respondents were unwilling or unable to benefit

from the services the department offered. The court found that the

mother had resisted the department’s efforts to address the key issues

underlying her history of threats or acts of violence against R and her

other children and that the father had demonstrated an inability to

accurately evaluate the risk she posed to R. The court thus concluded,

inter alia, that, pursuant to statute (§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i)), the respondents had failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as

would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, they could

assume responsible positions in R’s life. Held:

1. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claim that the trial court

committed harmful error when it admitted into evidence under the

residual exception to the hearsay rule certain summary reports by a

department service provider that it relied on to terminate her parental

rights: this court, without deciding whether the summaries constituted

inadmissible hearsay, concluded that the admission of the summaries

was harmless, as the information in them was cumulative of that contained in the department’s social study and the report of a courtappointed psychologist, both of which had been admitted into evidence

without objection; moreover, despite the mother’s claim that the court

relied on the summaries to bolster and credit the conclusions in the

psychologist’s report, the court was entitled to rely on the report to

support its findings, as it was within the court’s sole province to assess

the reliability and trustworthiness of the psychologist’s conclusions and

the weight to accord to his report; furthermore, even if the court had

sustained the mother’s objection to the summaries, she could not demonstrate that the outcome of the trial would have been different, as the

record was replete with references to the challenged information, and

she failed to articulate any manner in which the information in the

summaries was materially different from that contained in the department’s social study and the psychologist’s report.

2. The respondent father could not prevail on his claims that the trial court

made erroneous evidentiary findings in terminating his parental rights

as to R:

a. The trial court reasonably determined that the cumulative effect of

the evidence was sufficient to justify its conclusion that the respondent

father was unable or unwilling to benefit from the department’s efforts

to reunify him with R: the court did not rely on outdated information

in making its determination, as the father claimed, but limited its analysis

to events that preceded the filing of the termination petition, as required

by the applicable rule of practice (§ 35a-7 (a)); moreover, the record

adequately supported the court’s conclusion that, in the event of reunifi-
cation, the respondent mother would be R’s primary caregiver when the

father was at work, as the respondents were unified in their intentions

to parent R as a couple; furthermore, the record reflected that the father,

who declined to pursue reunification on his own, was defensive about

and overprotective of the mother and appeared to minimize the threat

of harm she posed to R, as the mother resisted efforts to address the

issues that led to R’s removal from her care, rebuffed recommendations

for treatment to address her past trauma and refused to take accountability for the events at issue.

b. The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion

that the respondent father had failed to achieve the requisite degree

of personal rehabilitation so as to encourage the belief that, within a

reasonable time, he could assume a responsible position in R’s life:

contrary to the father’s claim, the court’s consideration of evidence that

predated the filing of the petition to terminate his parental rights was

proper under § 35a-7 (a), the father failed to point to any specific postpetition evidence the court declined to consider that was probative of his

rehabilitation, and the postpetition evidence that the respondents did

introduce did not offer any additional perspective that was determinative

of the issue of the father’s rehabilitation; moreover, the father’s contention that, with proper support services in place, he could assume a

responsible position in R’s life was unavailing, as there was no indication

that he sought the department’s help in obtaining additional support

services or that he intended to rely on support services if reunification

were to be granted, even though he was apprised of the department’s

concerns with respect to the respondents’ intention to have the respondent mother care for R when he was at work; furthermore, regardless

of the father’s progress toward addressing the factors that led to R’s

commitment, and given his failure to appreciate the risk that the mother

posed to the children’s safety and his commitment to parent R with

her, the court, in making its determination, was entitled to rely on his

continued involvement with the mother, whom the court also determined

had failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation.

c. The trial court’s determination that it was in R’s best interest to

terminate the respondent father’s parental rights was factually supported

by the court’s findings and conclusions with respect to the factors set

forth in § 17a-112 (k): the court found that the department had timely

made referrals to address the respondents’ needs and reasonable efforts

to reunify them with R but that, despite having made significant progress

toward improving his marital relationship and complying with nearly

every one of the specific steps, the father remained unable to appropriately assess the threat that the mother posed to R; moreover, although

the court weighed the evidence that was more favorable to the father,

it found that R had bonded with his foster family, with whom he had

spent his entire life, and noted that R could not afford to wait for the

respondents to make the necessary adjustments to ensure his safety and

well-being.

Argued May 18—officially released September 1, 2022**

Procedural History

Petitions by the Commissioner of Children and Families to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with

respect to their minor children, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of Windham, Juvenile Matters at Willimantic, and tried to the court, Chaplin,

J.; judgments granting the petitions, from which the

respondents filed separate appeals with this court;

thereafter, the respondents withdrew their appeals in

part. Affirmed.

Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appellant in Docket No. AC 45124 (respondent mother).

David B. Rozwaski, assigned counsel, for the appellant in Docket No. AC 45156 (respondent father).

Michael J. Besso, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, Claire Kindall, solicitor general, and Evan O’Roark, Jennifer C. Leavitt and Nisa Kahn, assistant attorneys general, for the appellee (petitioner in both

appeals).

Kelly L. Babbitt, for the minor child in both appeals.
Opinion

CLARK, J. In these two appeals, the respondent

mother, Chrystal P., and the respondent father, William

D., appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered

in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children

and Families, terminating their parental rights as to

their minor child, Richard D.1

In Docket No. AC 45124,

the respondent mother claims that the trial court

improperly admitted into evidence two documents

under the residual exception to the rule against hearsay.

In Docket No. AC 45156, the respondent father claims

that the court improperly concluded that (1) the Department of Children and Families (department) had made

reasonable efforts to reunify him with Richard or, alternatively, that he was unwilling and unable to benefit

from those reunification efforts, (2) he had failed to

achieve the requisite degree of rehabilitation required

by General Statutes § 17a-112 (j), and (3) it would be

in Richard’s best interest to terminate his parental

rights. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.2

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to both appeals. The department became involved

with the respondents in June, 2017, when the respondent mother threatened to harm the respondents’

daughter, Lillyanne D., who, at that time, was less than

one year old.3

In July, 2017, the department received

another referral after the respondent father called 911

to report that the respondent mother had threatened

to harm Lillyanne4 and had held Lillyanne tightly across

her chest, causing her to cry, during an argument

between the respondents. In both instances, the respondent mother had threatened harm to Lillyanne as retribution against the respondent father. As a result of the

July, 2017 incident, criminal charges were filed against

the respondent mother, and the criminal court issued

a full protective order, which prohibited her from having any contact with the respondent father and Lillyanne.5 Lillyanne remained in the care of the respondent

father, who signed a safety plan with the department

in which he agreed to abide by the protective order

and to prohibit the respondent mother from having any

unsupervised visits with Lillyanne in the event that the

protective order was modified.

During its investigation, the department learned that

the respondent mother had a history with the department dating to 1997, when her eldest child, Margaret

T., was removed from her care following a domestic

dispute with Margaret’s father, James T. During that

incident, the respondent mother reportedly had

attacked James with a pen and picked up Margaret,

who was five weeks old, by one arm and dangled her

in the air twice, stating: ‘‘Look what I can do.’’6 The

department’s files also indicated that the respondent

mother had subsequently been involved with Michael

T., with whom she had two children. In 2015, the depart-
ment had received a referral alleging that the respondent mother and Michael had been arrested after getting

into a domestic dispute that was witnessed by their

children.7 When interviewed during the department’s

investigation into the allegations concerning Lillyanne,

Michael indicated that the respondent mother had a

history of attempting or threatening to harm one of

their children when they were in a relationship.8

On October 2, 2017, the criminal protective order was

vacated, and the respondent mother moved back into

the respondents’ home shortly thereafter. On October

5, 2017, the department learned that the respondent

mother was residing in the home and attempted to

create a safety plan with the respondents. The respondents declined to implement a safety plan and were

informed by the department that the respondent mother’s presence in the home placed Lillyanne at risk of

removal from their care. The next day, the petitioner

filed a motion for an order of temporary custody and

a neglect petition on behalf of Lillyanne. The court

granted the ex parte order of temporary custody and

ordered specific steps for the respondents to take to

facilitate their reunification with Lillyanne. The order

of temporary custody was sustained by agreement of

the parties on October 10, 2017. Lillyanne was adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody

of the petitioner on July 9, 2018.

In June, 2019, the respondents’ second child together,

Richard, was born. On June 7, 2019, the petitioner filed a

motion for an order of temporary custody and a neglect

petition as to Richard on the basis of predictive neglect.

That same day, the court granted the order of temporary

custody, ordered specific steps with which the respondents were required to comply, and scheduled a contested hearing. Richard was adjudicated neglected and

committed to the care and custody of the petitioner on

June 21, 2019. On October 8, 2019, the petitioner filed

termination of parental rights petitions as to both Lillyanne and Richard, which alleged that the respondents

had failed to rehabilitate pursuant to § 17a-112 (j).9 The

termination of parental rights trial was held on July 12,

13, 15 and 16, 2021.

In a memorandum of decision dated September 17,

2021, the court granted the termination petitions. In the

adjudicatory phase of the proceedings, it initially found,

by clear and convincing evidence, that the children had

been adjudicated neglected in prior proceedings, that

the department had made reasonable efforts to locate

and reunify the children with the respondents, and that

the respondents remained unwilling or unable to benefit

from the services the department offered. The court

further found that the respondents had failed to achieve

an appropriate degree of personal rehabilitation as

would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable

time, considering the age and needs of the children,
they could assume responsible positions in the children’s lives. The court’s conclusion that the respondents had failed to rehabilitate was predicated on its

finding that the respondent mother had resisted efforts

to address the key issues underlying her history of

threats or acts of violence against her children and had

minimized the nature of the events that led to Lillyanne’s

removal from her care. With respect to the respondent

father, the court found that the respondents were unified in their intentions to parent as a couple and that

the respondent father had demonstrated an inability

to accurately evaluate the risk the respondent mother

poses to the children.

In the dispositional phase of the proceedings, the

court made findings as to each of the criteria set forth

in § 17a-112 (k) and concluded that the termination of

the respondents’ parental rights would be in the best

interests of Lillyanne and Richard. Accordingly, the

court appointed the petitioner as the statutory parent

of the children. These appeals followed. Additional facts

will be set forth as necessary.

I

AC 45124

The respondent mother claims that the court improperly admitted into evidence two documents under the

residual exception to the rule against hearsay and that

the admission of those documents constituted harmful

error because the court could not have reached the

decision to terminate her parental rights as to Richard in

the absence of the information contained within those

documents. Without deciding whether the challenged

documents fall within any of the exceptions to the rule

against hearsay, we conclude that the admission of the

documents, even if improper, was harmless.10

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to the disposition of the respondent mother’s claim.11 At the termination trial, the petitioner

offered testimony from two witnesses and presented

ten exhibits, all of which the court admitted into evidence in full. Relevant to this appeal, the court admitted

a social study and an addendum to the social study

(addendum), which were authored by Jennifer L.

Andrews, a department social worker assigned to the

respondents’ case, who testified at trial. Both the social

study, dated September 10, 2019, and the addendum,

dated June 24, 2021, were admitted into evidence without objection.

The social study outlines, among other things, the

observations and assessments of United Services, Inc.

(USI), staff members, who worked with the respondents

in 2018 when they participated in two reunification

programs, Therapeutic Family Time and Reunification

and Therapeutic Family Time (reunification program(s)).12 Following each reunification program that
the respondents participated in, USI staff members

authored a summary report (summaries), both of which

are the subjects of the respondent mother’s claim on

appeal.

In the social study, Andrews noted that the USI staff

members had reported the following concerns with

respect to the respondent mother: her inappropriate

tone in regard to her interactions with Lillyanne; her

poor reception of feedback and suggestions made by

staff members; a continued lack of insight into the circumstances that led to Lillyanne’s removal from her

care; and her statements indicating that, after the

department was no longer involved with the family, she

would parent her children in the manner she saw fit.

It was also noted that the USI staff members had concluded that the respondent mother was unwilling to

implement the parenting strategies taught during the

reunification programs and did not recommend reunification between the respondent mother and Lillyanne.

The petitioner also offered the testimony of and a

report prepared by David M. Mantell, a clinical and

forensic psychologist, who had been appointed by the

court to evaluate the respondents and provide recommendations with respect to reunification. Although

counsel for both respondents initially objected to the

introduction of Mantell’s report, those objections were

later withdrawn, and the court admitted his report in

full. In evaluating the respondents, Mantell reviewed

the records of and spoke with other service providers

who had worked with the respondents since the June,

2017 incident concerning Lillyanne that led to the initial

referral to the department. In his report, Mantell thoroughly described the contents of both of the challenged

summaries, often citing the observations and conclusions of the USI staff members verbatim. Additionally,

he indicated that he did not recommend reunification

as of the date of his report, June 1, 2019.

The petitioner did not call the USI staff members

who had authored or approved the summaries as witnesses at trial but, instead, sought to admit the summaries into evidence during Andrews’ direct examination.

Counsel for the respondent mother objected on the

ground that the summaries constituted inadmissible

hearsay. The petitioner responded that the summaries

fell within the business records exception to the rule

against hearsay. See Conn. Code Evid. § 8-4. The court

concluded that the petitioner had not established a

proper foundation to satisfy the business records exception but that the summaries were nonetheless admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule

and admitted them in full.

On appeal, the respondent mother claims that the

trial court improperly admitted the summaries under

the residual exception to the hearsay rule and that the

court’s reliance on the observations and conclusions
of the USI staff members described within the summaries to terminate her parental rights demonstrates that

the court’s error was prejudicial. Specifically, the

respondent mother argues that the court’s factual findings and conclusion that she had failed to achieve an

appropriate degree of rehabilitation substantially were

based on the following information contained within

the summaries: the respondent mother’s continued lack

of insight into the circumstances that led to Lillyanne’s

removal from her care; her persistent remarks that she

would parent her children as she deemed appropriate;

her resistance to implement the parenting strategies

taught during the reunification programs; the USI staff

members’ lack of confidence with regard to the respondent mother’s ability to keep Lillyanne safe from harm;

and the respondent mother’s unwillingness to modify

her parenting strategies. With respect to the court’s

conclusion that termination of her parental rights was

in the children’s best interests, the respondent mother

argues that the court improperly relied on the summaries to find that she had failed to appreciate the gravity

of her threats of violence toward her children and that,

despite the efforts of the USI staff members, the respondent mother remained steadfast in her determination

to raise her children ‘‘ ‘as she sees fit.’ ’’

Notwithstanding the respondent mother’s argument,

the record discloses that all of the foregoing contested

information was restated in Mantell’s report and the

department’s social study—either in substance or

quoted nearly word for word from the summaries—both

of which were admitted into evidence as full exhibits

without objection. The social study, for example, outlines the concerns of the USI staff members that the

respondent mother now alleges on appeal were improperly admitted into evidence through the summaries and

relied on by the court to terminate her parental rights.

Mantell’s report likewise comprehensively details that

same information. Moreover, the court could have predicated its findings and conclusions on other evidence

presented at trial. Andrews, for example, testified that

Jessica Janczyk, a licensed counselor with whom the

respondent mother had engaged with for counseling

services, also assessed the respondent mother as lacking an understanding regarding the seriousness of the

incident that led to the department’s involvement and

resistant to implementing recommendations made by

service providers.

When challenging a court’s evidentiary ruling, a party

‘‘must show that the court abused its discretion in

admitting the challenged evidence and that any

improper admission caused [the party] substantial prejudice or injustice.’’ In re Tayler F., 111 Conn. App. 28,

36, 958 A.2d 170 (2008), aff’d, 296 Conn. 524, 995 A.2d

611 (2010). In order to demonstrate that she was

harmed, the respondent mother must establish that, but

for the evidentiary error, the outcome of the trial likely
would have been different. See, e.g., In re Alizabeth L.-

T., 213 Conn. App. 541, 602, 278 A.3d 547 (2022). This

she cannot do. Even if we were to conclude that the

court improperly admitted the summaries into evidence

under the residual exception to the hearsay rule, the

information contained therein was available elsewhere

in the record. The respondent mother fails to articulate

any manner in which the information within the allegedly inadmissible summaries that the trial court relied

on to terminate her parental rights was materially different from the information that was provided through the

department’s social study and Mantell’s report. Thus,

the contested information was entirely cumulative. ‘‘It

is well recognized that any error in the admission of

evidence does not require reversal of the resulting judgment if the improperly admitted evidence is merely

cumulative of other validly admitted [evidence].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Anna B., 50 Conn.

App. 298, 305–306, 717 A.2d 289 (1998); see also Duncan

v. Mill Management Co. of Greenwich, Inc., 308 Conn.

1, 23, 60 A.3d 222 (2013) (‘‘[i]n determining whether

evidence is merely cumulative, we consider the nature

of the evidence and whether any other evidence was

admitted that was probative of the same issue as the

evidence in controversy’’).

Additionally, although the respondent mother acknowledges that the court relied on additional evidence, such

as Mantell’s report, to terminate her parental rights, she

argues that the court’s admission of the summaries was

nevertheless harmful because the court relied on the

improperly admitted hearsay evidence, i.e., the summaries, to bolster and credit Mantell’s conclusions and his

recommendation against reunification. This argument

misses the mark. Insofar as the respondent mother is

challenging the reliability and trustworthiness of Mantell’s conclusions, it is well established that the weight

accorded to evidence presented at trial is within the

sole province of the fact finder. See In re Leo L., 191

Conn. App. 134, 142, 214 A.3d 430 (2019) (‘‘it is the

trial court’s role to weigh the evidence presented and

determine relative credibility when it sits as a fact

finder’’). Because Mantell’s report was admitted as a

full exhibit, without objection, the court was entitled

to rely on it to support its findings. See In re Leilah

W., 166 Conn. App. 48, 71, 141 A.3d 1000 (2016). More

importantly, as we have explained, even if the court

had sustained the respondent mother’s objection to the

summaries, the record is replete with references to the

information she now challenges on appeal.

We conclude that, because the evidence contained

within the summaries was merely cumulative of other

validly admitted evidence contained in Mantell’s report

and the department’s social study, and the respondent

mother has failed to establish that the result of the trial

would have been different had the summaries not been

admitted into evidence, their admission was harmless.
II

AC 45156

The respondent father claims that the trial court erroneously found that (1) the department had made reasonable efforts toward reunification and that he was unwilling or unable to benefit from the department’s

reunification efforts,13 (2) he had failed to achieve a

degree of rehabilitation sufficient to encourage the

belief that, within a reasonable time, he could assume

a responsible position in Richard’s life, and (3) termination of his parental rights was in Richard’s best interest.

We address each of these claims in turn.

Initially, we briefly set forth the relevant legal principles that govern termination of parental rights proceedings. Pursuant to § 17a-112 (j), ‘‘[t]he Superior Court,

upon notice and hearing . . . may grant a petition [to

terminate parental rights] . . . if it finds by clear and

convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate

the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in

accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-111b,

unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent

is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification

efforts . . . (2) termination is in the best interest of

the child, and (3) . . . (B) the child (i) has been found

by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have

been neglected, abused or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent of such child has been

provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return

of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129

and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a

reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the

child, such parent could assume a responsible position

in the life of the child . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re Ryder M., 211 Conn. App. 793, 807,

274 A.3d 218, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 931, 276 A.3d

433 (2022).

‘‘[A] hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights

consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the

dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the

trial court must determine whether one or more of the

. . . grounds for termination of parental rights set forth

in § 17a-112 [(j) (3)] exists by clear and convincing

evidence. . . . If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then it proceeds to

the dispositional phase. During the dispositional phase,

the trial court must determine whether termination is

in the best interests of the child. . . . The best interest

determination also must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Ja’La L., 201 Conn. App. 586,

595, 243 A.3d 358 (2020), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 909, 244

A.3d 148 (2021). ‘‘Because a respondent’s fundamental
right to parent his or her child is at stake, [t]he statutory

criteria must be strictly complied with before termination can be accomplished and adoption proceedings

begun.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Egypt

E., 327 Conn. 506, 527, 175 A.3d 21, cert. denied sub

nom. Morsy E. v. Commissioner, Dept. of Children &

Families, U.S. , 139 S. Ct. 88, 202 L. Ed. 2d

27 (2018).

The following additional facts provide the necessary

context for our discussion of the respondent father’s

claims.14 The respondent mother experienced a turbulent childhood and has a history of untreated mental

health issues. As a result of the incidents precipitating

Lillyanne’s removal from the respondents’ care, the

department made referrals for individual counseling

and a substance abuse evaluation to assist the respondent mother in addressing her mental health concerns.

In August, 2017, the respondent mother engaged in

treatment with Janczyk, who diagnosed the respondent

mother with an anxiety based disorder. During the

nearly two years that the respondent mother met with

Janczyk, the respondent mother continued to insist that

she never posed a threat to Lillyanne and refused to

acknowledge the concerning nature of her actions that

led to the department’s involvement in this case. Additionally, the respondent mother continually rejected

Janczyk’s recommendation to engage in trauma focused

therapy because the respondent mother believed that

her childhood trauma was not impacting her and that

trauma focused therapy was therefore unnecessary.

In January, 2018, the respondents began a twelve

week reunification program with USI. The USI staff

members reported that the respondent mother lacked

insight into the reason for Lillyanne’s removal from

her care and was difficult to engage with during the

program, resistant to implementing new parenting strategies, and unaware of developmentally appropriate

expectations. It was recommended that the respondent

mother continue to engage in individual therapy to

address her past trauma.

In March, 2018, the respondent mother participated

in a neuropsychological evaluation with Sarah E. Bullard, a clinical neuropsychologist. In a report dated June

9, 2018, Bullard opined that the respondent mother’s

test results indicated a deficit in executive function and

impaired intellectual abilities. The respondent mother

was assessed as having unreliable problem solving skills

and a processing impairment, which could cause her

to become overwhelmed, frustrated, and unable to manage stressful situations. Additionally, Bullard noted that

the respondent mother was reluctant to admit to shortcomings and presented as detached and unemotional

at times.

In June, 2018, the respondents participated in another

twelve week reunification program with USI staff mem-
bers, who reported that the respondent mother

remained obstinate in her resistance to implementing

new parenting strategies and continued to ‘‘lack insight

into the circumstances that led to [Lillyanne’s] removal.’’

Although the USI staff members felt confident about

the respondent father’s parenting abilities and observed

that he shared a strong bond with Lillyanne, they

expressed concern that his work schedule would leave

the respondent mother as the primary caregiver. They

additionally noted that they were not confident with

respect to the respondent mother’s ability to recognize

and meet Lillyanne’s needs or to keep Lillyanne safe,

and recommended that the respondent mother continue

to engage in therapy to address her past trauma.

The respondents also engaged in couples counseling

with Richard Hisman, a clinical counselor, for approximately six months beginning in September, 2018, to

address intimate partner violence concerns and communication issues. Hisman opined that the respondents

had made significant progress in developing effective

communication skills during the course of their counseling sessions.

In May, 2019, the respondents participated in a courtordered psychological evaluation with Mantell. In addition to reviewing the USI summaries, Bullard’s report,

and other records related to the respondents’ case, Mantell interviewed the respondents, spoke with service

providers who had worked with them, conducted psychological evaluations of both respondents, and

observed a parent-child visit between the respondents

and Lillyanne. With respect to the respondent mother,

Mantell opined that she presented as a ‘‘very weak and

often unreliable personal historian who is denying her

own responsibilities for the loss of custody of [Lillyanne].’’ He noted that she was reluctant to address and

was in avoidance of ‘‘major issues of personal violence

and threat[s] that have been a part of her life since

childhood’’ and that ‘‘[t]hreatening to harm a child is a

rare protection issue . . . [that] cannot be considered

resolved by not talking about it and by rejecting

accountability for its occurrence.’’ Accordingly, Mantell

concluded that the respondent mother needed further

focused treatment to address her past ‘‘exposures to

family violence, both physical and verbal, as well as

her thoughts about violence and her use of violent

threats with at least [two] marital partners and with at

least [two] children.’’ With respect to the respondent

father, Mantell noted that the respondent father ‘‘speaks

for his wife in multiple settings in ways that are considered overprotective and defensive’’ and that the respondent father had stated that he was not at all concerned

with the respondent mother being home alone with a

toddler and a newborn. Additionally, Mantell reported

that he had spoken with Kimberly Applewhite, who

provided individual counseling to the respondent father

for about one and one-half years after Lillyanne was
placed in the custody of the petitioner. When asked

about her understanding of the respondent father’s

views regarding the respondent mother’s judgment,

Applewhite informed Mantell that the respondent father

appeared comfortable with the respondent mother’s

being alone with Lillyanne while he was at work. Mantell consequently did not recommend reunification as

of the date of his report, June 1, 2019, because ‘‘[t]here

are too many issues in this case involving parent-andchild violence and threat[s] of violence which remain

unresolved.’’

In support of the termination of parental rights petitions, the petitioner filed with the court the September

10, 2019 social study authored by Andrews, which was

admitted into evidence at trial.15 Relevant to this appeal,

Andrews reported that the department previously had

discussed with the respondent father its concerns

regarding the respondent mother and that reunification

would be appropriate as to him if he pursued reunification on his own. The respondent father told the department that he would not pursue reunification without

the respondent mother, however. Notwithstanding the

department’s repeated concerns that the respondent

mother would be the primary caregiver for the children

while the respondent father was at work, the respondent father did not suggest an alternative caregiving

plan until the department informed him that it did not

recommend reunification.16 Andrews also noted that the

respondent father continually minimized the respondent mother’s statements and behaviors that led to the

department’s involvement in this case.

A

We first consider the respondent father’s claim that

the trial court improperly found that he was unable or

unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.

‘‘As part of a termination of parental rights proceeding, § 17a-112 (j) (1) requires the department to prove

by clear and convincing evidence that it has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the

child with the parent, unless the court finds in this

proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to

benefit from reunification efforts . . . . Accordingly,

the department must prove either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification

efforts.’’17 (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 552, 979 A.2d

469 (2009).

‘‘[I]n determining whether the department has made

reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and a child or

whether there is sufficient evidence that a parent is

unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts,

the court is required in the adjudicatory phase to make

its assessment on the basis of events preceding the date
on which the termination petition was filed. . . . This

court has consistently held that the court, [w]hen making its reasonable efforts determination . . . is limited

to considering only those facts preceding the filing of

the termination petition or the most recent amendment

to the petition . . . . Practice Book § 35a-7 (a) codifies

this procedural rule by providing: In the adjudicatory

phase, the judicial authority is limited to evidence of

events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest

amendment, except where the judicial authority must

consider subsequent events as part of its determination

as to the existence of a ground for termination of parental rights.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Cameron W., 194

Conn. App. 633, 660–61, 221 A.3d 885 (2019), cert.

denied, 334 Conn. 918, 222 A.3d 103 (2020).

Finally, in reviewing whether a trial court properly

determined that a parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from the department’s reunification efforts, ‘‘the trial

court’s subordinate factual findings are reviewable only

for clear error, [but] the court’s ultimate conclusion

that a ground for termination of parental rights has

been proven presents a question of evidentiary sufficiency. . . . That conclusion is drawn from both the

court’s factual findings and its weighing of the facts

in considering whether the statutory ground has been

satisfied. . . . On review, we must determine whether

the trial court could have reasonably concluded, upon

the facts established and the reasonable inferences

drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to justify its [ultimate conclusion].

. . . When applying this standard, we construe the evidence in a manner most favorable to sustaining the

judgment of the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re Xavier H., 201 Conn. App. 81, 87, 240

A.3d 1087, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 981, 241 A.3d 705

(2020), and cert. denied, 335 Conn. 982, 241 A.3d 705

(2020).

In the present appeals, the court found that the

department had made reasonable efforts to locate the

respondents and to reunify them with the children. It

noted that, since Lillyanne entered into the petitioner’s

custody in 2017, the petitioner had maintained contact

with the respondents and offered each respondent

appropriate services to facilitate reunification in accordance with the court-ordered specific steps,18 which,

among other things, required the respondent father to

engage in parenting and individual counseling and to

make progress toward ensuring Richard’s safety and

well-being.

Notwithstanding its finding that the department had

satisfied its obligations under § 17a-112 (j) (1), the trial

court also concluded that the respondent father was

unable or unwilling to benefit from the department’s

efforts to reunify him with Richard. In so concluding,
the court observed that the respondent mother had

‘‘resisted all efforts to address the central issue of parent-child threats of violence and parent-child violence.

She has repeatedly refused to engage in treatment necessary for her to make progress regarding her parentchild violence issues and, thereby, demonstrated her

inability and/or unwillingness to benefit from the petitioner’s efforts to reunify the respondent parents with

Lillyanne and Richard. [The] respondent parents are

unified in their positions in this matter and plan to

parent as a unit, with [the] respondent mother serving

as the primary caretaker. [The] respondent father has

demonstrated a continued inability to properly evaluate

the threat of harm [the] respondent mother poses to the

children while her parent-child violence issues remain

unaddressed and untreated and, thereby, demonstrated

his inability and/or unwillingness to benefit from the

petitioner’s efforts to reunify the respondent parents

with Lillyanne and Richard.’’

The respondent father raises two primary arguments

in support of his claim that the trial court improperly

found that he was unwilling or unable to benefit from

reunification services. First, he asserts that the court’s

findings are premised on outdated information and

failed to account for the respondents’ continuing progress and engagement with services after the petitioner

filed the termination of parental rights petitions. Second, he argues that the court’s determination that he

was unable or unwilling to benefit from the department’s efforts to reunify him with Richard is predicated

on its erroneous finding that the respondent mother

would be the primary caregiver for the children while

he is at work. We are not persuaded.

We first consider the respondent father’s assertion

that the court relied on outdated information to reach

its conclusion that he was unwilling or unable to benefit

from reunification services. In support of this claim,

the respondent father argues that the court’s findings

were based entirely on information predating the filing

of the termination petitions in October, 2019, and that

the court failed to consider the observations and testimony of service providers who worked with the respondents after the filing of the petitions. The respondent

father’s contention that the court improperly had relied

on reports and information predating the petition to

terminate his parental rights, however, directly contravenes our rules of practice, which provide that trial

courts are, generally, ‘‘limited to evidence of events

preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment’’ during the adjudicatory phase of termination proceedings. Practice Book § 35a-7 (a); see also In re Cameron W., supra, 194 Conn. App. 660. Consequently, we

conclude that this argument fails.

Having concluded that the court properly limited its

analysis to events preceding the filing of the termination
petitions, we next review the court’s subordinate factual findings and consider whether clear and convincing

evidence supports the trial court’s ultimate conclusion

that the respondent father was unwilling or unable to

benefit from the department’s reasonable efforts

toward reunification.

Initially, we note that the respondent father does not

challenge the court’s finding that he and the respondent

mother were unified in their intentions to parent the

children together. Nor does the respondent father challenge the court’s findings with respect to the respondent

mother’s resistance to addressing her history of parentchild violence and threats prior to the filing of the termination petitions. Rather, he contends that the court’s

conclusion that he was unwilling or unable to benefit

from the department’s efforts toward reunification is

based on a finding that lacks evidentiary support,

namely, that the respondent mother would be the primary caregiver for the children when he was at work.

The court’s finding that the respondent mother would

serve as the primary caregiver, however, is adequately

supported by the record, which indicates that the USI

staff members expressed concerns that the children

would be left in her care while the respondent father

was at work. In the department’s social study, Andrews

also noted that the respondent father’s work schedule

would result in the respondent mother’s assuming the

primary caregiving role in the event that the respondents were reunified with the children.19 Although the

department repeatedly raised concerns about this plan,

the respondent father did not suggest an alternative

care plan until the department indicated that it would

not recommend reunification. Additionally, multiple

service providers had observed that the respondent

father appeared comfortable with the respondent mother’s remaining home alone with the children. Thus, contrary to the respondent father’s claim, the court’s finding that the respondent mother would be the primary

caregiver for the children is not clearly erroneous.

The record establishes that, as of the date of the

petition to terminate her parental rights, the respondent

mother continued to resist efforts to address the key

issues that had led to the children’s removal from the

respondents’ care. The respondent mother rebuffed recommendations to engage in treatment to address her

past trauma and refused to take accountability for the

events that led to the department’s involvement in this

case. As a result, multiple service providers lacked confidence in the respondent mother’s ability to recognize

the children’s needs or to keep them safe from harm.

The record also reflects that the respondent father presented as defensive about and overprotective of the

respondent mother and appeared to minimize the threat

of harm she poses to the children. Additionally,

although the department had expressed that reunification would be appropriate as to the respondent father
alone, he declined to pursue reunification on his own

and remained steadfastly committed to coparenting the

children with the respondent mother. On the basis of

the foregoing, the trial court reasonably determined

that the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient

to justify its ultimate conclusion that the respondent

father was unable or unwilling to benefit from the

department’s efforts to reunify him with Richard.

B

The respondent father also challenges the court’s

finding that he had failed to achieve a sufficient degree

of rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i).

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that this claim

is unavailing.

‘‘Failure of a parent to achieve sufficient personal

rehabilitation is one of six statutory grounds on which

a court may terminate parental rights pursuant to § 17a112. [See General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i).] That

ground exists when a parent of a child whom the court

has found to be neglected fails to achieve such a degree

of rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that

within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs

of the child, the parent could assume a responsible

position in the life of that child.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Leilah W., supra, 166 Conn.

App. 67.

‘‘Personal rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a-112 (j) (3)

(B) (i)] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or

her former constructive and useful role as a parent.

. . . The statute does not require [a parent] to prove

precisely when [he] will be able to assume a responsible

position in [his] child’s life. Nor does it require [him]

to prove that [he] will be able to assume full responsibility for [his] child, unaided by available support systems.

. . . Rather, [§ 17a-112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent’s] rehabilitative status as it relates to

the needs of the particular child, and further, that such

rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable

time. . . . [The statute] requires the court to find, by

clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [the parent] has achieved, if any, falls short of

that which would reasonably encourage a belief that

at some future date [he or she] can assume a responsible

position in [his or her] child’s life.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Lilyana P., 169 Conn. App. 708,

717–18, 152 A.3d 99 (2016), cert. denied, 324 Conn. 916,

153 A.3d 1290 (2017). ‘‘[I]n assessing rehabilitation, the

critical issue is not whether the parent has improved

[his or her] ability to manage [his or her] own life, but

rather whether [he or she] has gained the ability to care

for the particular needs of the child at issue.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) In re Phoenix A., 202 Conn.

App. 827, 845, 246 A.3d 1096, cert. denied, 336 Conn.

932, 248 A.3d 1 (2021).
With respect to a claim that a trial court improperly

concluded that a parent failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation, we review the court’s subordinate factual

findings for clear error. See, e.g., In re Anaishaly C.,

190 Conn. App. 667, 681, 213 A.3d 12 (2019). The court’s

determination that a parent has failed to rehabilitate,

however, is subject to the evidentiary sufficiency standard of review. Id.; see also part II A of this opinion.

Finally, we note that ‘‘the mere existence in the record

of evidence that would support a different conclusion,

without more, is not sufficient to undermine the finding

of the trial court. Our focus in conducting a review for

evidentiary sufficiency is not on the question of whether

there exists support for a different finding—the proper

inquiry is whether there is enough evidence in the

record to support the finding that the trial court made.’’

(Emphasis omitted.) In re Jayce O., 323 Conn. 690, 716,

150 A.3d 640 (2016).

In determining that the respondent father had failed

to rehabilitate sufficiently, the court set forth the following relevant findings in its memorandum of decision,

emphasizing that the ‘‘primary issues in this matter are

the threat of physical harm that the respondent mother

poses to the children and the respondent father’s ability

to accurately assess the threat of harm that the respondent mother poses to the children.’’ Although the court

acknowledged that the respondent father had made a

concerted effort to comply with many of the courtordered specific steps to address the department’s main

concerns, it noted that compliance with specific steps

does not necessarily demonstrate that a parent has

achieved sufficient rehabilitation. See In re Brian P.,

195 Conn. App. 558, 569, 226 A.3d 159 (‘‘[The] completion or noncompletion [of the specific steps] . . . does

not guarantee any outcome . . . . Accordingly, successful completion of expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat a department claim that

the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 335

Conn. 907, 226 A.3d 151 (2020). Thus, notwithstanding

the respondents’ progress in certain respects, the court

underscored that its main concern was not the number

of steps the respondents had complied with but, rather,

that the ‘‘respondent parents have failed to comply in

a substantive manner with the specific steps that raise

the most concern.’’

With respect to the respondent mother, the court

found that she ‘‘has a history of untreated mental health

issues’’ and noted that she initially became acquainted

with the petitioner nearly twenty years prior to the

present case. The court then summarized the observations of the various service providers who had worked

with the respondent mother to assist her in rehabilitating. Specifically, the court highlighted the observations

of the USI staff members, Mantell, and Janczyk concern-
ing the respondent mother’s resistance to engaging in

treatment to address her history of family violence, her

reluctance to modify her parenting strategies, and her

lack of accountability for the events that had precipitated the department’s involvement in this case. For

those reasons, among others, the court found that the

respondent mother had demonstrated a ‘‘consistent

resistance to address her pattern of parental violence

toward her own children, to address the impact of her

past trauma on the threat she poses to the children,

and to take accountability for her attitudes, behaviors

and actions that led to Lillyanne’s removal from her

care.’’ The court further found that the ‘‘respondent

mother’s refusal to discuss her behaviors and the cause

thereof is the single most important issue in this case

and the foremost barrier to her deriving any rehabilitative benefit from the services provided by the petitioner.’’ As a result of its findings, the court determined

that the respondent mother had failed to rehabilitate,

noting that it agreed with Mantell’s assessment that

‘‘[t]here are too many issues in this case involving parent-and-child violence and threat[s] of violence which

remain unresolved.’’

With respect to the respondent father, the court

remarked that his barriers to reunification with the

children, although fewer, were nonetheless ‘‘highly disconcerting.’’ The court noted that the respondent father

had been observed to be ‘‘sensible, attentive, [and] reasonable’’ during Mantell’s evaluation, and someone who

appears to understand appropriate parenting techniques and demonstrated compassion and patience for

both Lillyanne and the respondent mother. The court

also found that the respondent father had been

described as ‘‘enmeshed’’ with the respondent mother

and was overprotective and defensive of her, which

impeded her progress in holding herself accountable

for her actions and addressing the issues that underlie

her behaviors. Consequently, the court found that the

respondent father enabled the respondent mother and

‘‘consistently demonstrated a blind spot for appropriately assessing the risk that the respondent mother

poses to the children’s welfare and safety.’’ The court

also found that the parents consistently had presented

as united in their intentions to parent the children

together, with the respondent mother assuming the primary caregiving role should reunification be granted.

On the basis of the respondent mother’s unwillingness

to address her unresolved mental health issues and the

respondent father’s unwavering commitment to coparent with the respondent mother, the court concluded

that the respondent father had failed to achieve an

appropriate degree of rehabilitation sufficient to

encourage the belief that he could assume a responsible

role in the children’s lives within a reasonable time.

In challenging the court’s determination that he had

failed to rehabilitate, the respondent father again argues
that the court improperly relied on outdated information that preceded the filing of the termination petitions

to support its findings and failed to consider evidence

of rehabilitation that occurred subsequent to the filing

of the petitions. This contention lacks merit. First, as

noted, Practice Book § 35a-7 (a) makes clear that, ‘‘[i]n

the adjudicatory phase, the judicial authority is limited

to evidence of events preceding the filing of the petition

or the latest amendment, except where the judicial

authority must consider subsequent events as part of

its determination as to the existence of a ground for

termination of parental rights.’’ (Emphasis added.)

Thus, it was appropriate and proper for the court to

consider the evidence before it that predated the filing

of the petition.

With respect to postpetition evidence, our courts

have held that a ‘‘court may rely on events occurring

after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate

parental rights when considering the issue of whether

the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that

the parent may resume a useful role in the child’s life

within a reasonable time.’’ (Emphasis added.) In re

Keyashia C., 120 Conn. App. 452, 457 n.12, 991 A.2d

1113, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 909, 995 A.2d 637 (2010).

In this case, however, the respondent father has failed

to point to any specific postpetition evidence that was

probative of his rehabilitation that the court declined

to consider. And, upon our independent review of the

record, we have found none.

There is no dispute that the respondent parents introduced some postpetition evidence, including, among

other things, a competence based parenting assessment

of the respondent mother completed by Kathleen M.

Brown, dated April 30, 2020, and a psychotherapy intake

note regarding the respondent mother, which was completed by Nicole M. Hayes, a licensed professional counselor. The court considered this evidence in the context

of the dispositional phase of the termination proceedings. This postpetition evidence, however, did not offer

any additional perspective determinative of the issue

of the respondent father’s rehabilitation. Specifically,

this evidence did not demonstrate that the respondent

mother no longer posed a threat to the children or that

the respondent father intended to parent the children

without her.20

The respondent father also argues that the evidence

is insufficient to support the court’s conclusion that he

had failed to rehabilitate because the record demonstrates that he is willing and capable of benefiting from

continued efforts toward reunification and that he could

assume a responsible position in Richard’s life, within a

reasonable time, with proper support services in place.

There is no indication in the record, however, that the

respondent father sought the department’s help in

obtaining additional support services. Nor is there any
evidence that the respondent father intended to rely on

support services if reunification were to be granted,

even though the respondent father was apprised of the

department’s concerns with respect to, inter alia, the

respondents’ intention to have the respondent mother

care for the children while the respondent father was

at work. See In re Gabriel C., supra, 196 Conn. App.

358 (‘‘[t]he purpose of the social study is to put parents

on notice of allegations that need to be explained or

denied’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). To the

extent the respondent father is maintaining that he

should have been afforded more time to rehabilitate,

‘‘we recently have noted that such an argument is inconsistent with our Supreme Court’s repeated recognition

of the importance of permanency in children’s lives.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Phoenix A.,

supra, 202 Conn. App. 847 n.4.

Construing the evidence in the manner most favorable to sustaining the court’s judgment, as we must, we

conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support

the court’s conclusion that the respondent father had

failed to rehabilitate. Because the court determined that

the respondent mother had failed to achieve a sufficient

degree of rehabilitation and continued to pose a risk

to Richard, it was entitled to rely on those findings and

the respondent father’s continued involvement with the

respondent mother to conclude that the respondent

father also had failed to rehabilitate. As our Supreme

Court has observed, in considering whether a parent

has failed to rehabilitate, trial courts have relied on

evidence that a parent has continued to associate with

a party who poses a danger to a child. See In re Jorden

R., supra, 293 Conn. 562 n.20; see also In re Corey C.,

198 Conn. App. 41, 76, 232 A.3d 1237 (court’s determination that father failed to rehabilitate was not improper

even though court’s conclusion relied, in part, on factual

findings related to risk mother posed to child), cert.

denied, 335 Conn. 930, 236 A.3d 217 (2020); In re Albert

M., 124 Conn. App. 561, 565, 6 A.3d 815 (trial court’s

finding that father failed to rehabilitate was not clearly

erroneous because record supported finding that father

had ‘‘knowledge of the necessity of changing his relationship with the mother,’’ yet failed to appreciate risk

mother posed to child), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 920, 10

A.3d 1050 (2010); In re Ellis V., 120 Conn. App. 523,

531–32, 992 A.2d 362 (2010) (record supported trial

court’s finding that father failed to achieve sufficient

rehabilitation because he remained loyal to child’s

mother and entrusted child to mother’s care while he

was away for work, despite knowledge of mother’s psychological and substance abuse issues).

In the present case, the respondent father was given

an opportunity to pursue reunification on his own, but

he declined to do so. Regardless of the respondent

father’s progress toward addressing the factors that led

to Richard’s commitment, given his failure to appreciate
the risk posed by the respondent mother and his commitment to parent with her as a unit, we cannot find

fault with the trial court’s determination that he had

failed to achieve the requisite personal rehabilitation

so as to encourage the belief that, within a reasonable

time, he could assume a responsible position in Richard’s life.

C

Last, the respondent father claims the court improperly found that termination of his parental rights was

in Richard’s best interest. He contends that the trial

court too narrowly focused on the respondents’ actions

prior to the filing of the termination petitions and failed

to accord appropriate weight to evidence demonstrating that he consistently attended visitation and engaged

in services, in addition to progress made by the respondent mother after the adjudicatory date. We do not

agree that the court’s best interest determination was

clearly erroneous.

‘‘In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts

from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of

the child. . . . It is well settled that we will overturn

the trial court’s decision that the termination of parental

rights is in the best interest of the [child] only if the

court’s findings are clearly erroneous. . . . The best

interests of the child include the child’s interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity

and stability of [his or her] environment. . . . [T]he

trial court must determine whether it is established by

clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of

the [respondent father’s] parental rights is not in the

best interest of the child. In arriving at this decision,

the court is mandated to consider and make written

findings regarding the seven statutory factors delineated in [§ 17a-112 (k)].21 . . . The seven factors serve

simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory

prerequisites that need to be proven before termination

can be ordered. . . . There is no requirement that each

factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.’’

(Footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In

re Brian P., supra, 195 Conn. App. 579.

‘‘[T]he fact that the legislature [had interpolated]

objective guidelines into the open-ended fact-oriented

statutes which govern [parental termination] disputes

. . . should not be construed as a predetermined

weighing of evidence . . . by the legislature. [If] . . .

the record reveals that the trial court’s ultimate conclusions [regarding termination of parental rights] are supported by clear and convincing evidence, we will not

reach an opposite conclusion on the basis of any one

segment of the many factors considered in a termination

proceeding . . . . Indeed . . . [t]he balancing of

interests in a case involving termination of parental

rights is a delicate task and, when supporting evidence
is not lacking, the trial court’s ultimate determination

as to a child’s best interest is entitled to the utmost

deference.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re

Jacob M., 204 Conn. App. 763, 789, 255 A.3d 918, cert.

denied, 337 Conn. 909, 253 A.3d 43 (2021), and cert.

denied sub nom. In re Natasha T., 337 Conn. 909, 253

A.3d 44 (2021).

In the dispositional phase of the termination proceedings, the court made the following relevant findings.

With respect to the criteria set forth in § 17a-112, the

court found that (1) the department had timely made

referrals to address the most important concerns that

had been identified by the petitioner and service providers who had worked with the respondents to facilitate

reunification; (2) the department had made reasonable

efforts to reunify the respondents and the children,

including providing substantial supervised visitation

and multiple referrals for services; (3) the respondent

father had made determined and significant progress

toward improving his marital relationship and complied

with nearly every specific step but, nonetheless,

remained unable to appropriately assess the threat to

the children’s safety and well-being insofar as the

respondent mother is concerned; (4) Richard had

bonded to his foster family and seeks their comfort and

support; (5) Richard was twenty-seven months old and

had been with his foster family since his discharge from

the hospital after his birth; (6) the respondent father

had failed to appreciate that the respondent mother

poses a substantial risk to the children; and (7) there

was no unreasonable conduct or economic circumstances that prevented the respondents from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children.

In addition to the foregoing findings, the court found

that the ‘‘respondent mother’s resistance to meaningfully address the impact of her past trauma on her

parenting history and her continuation of the cycle of

parent-child violence causes serious concern for the

children’s welfare.’’ Notwithstanding that the respondents had made demonstrable strides to address their

intimate partner violence and communication issues,

which the court applauded, the court found that those

efforts had failed to address the primary areas of concern that were noted by the petitioner at the outset of

this case when seeking custody of Lillyanne. On the

basis of all of the evidence presented, the court ultimately found that there was no basis in the record to

conclude that the respondent parents would be willing

to adjust their circumstances such that the court could

form a belief that they could safely and appropriately

parent the children in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, the court concluded that terminating the respondents’ parental rights was in Richard’s best interest.

Importantly, the respondent father does not challenge the accuracy of any of the facts underlying the
court’s findings with respect to the criteria enumerated

in § 17a-112 (k). Instead, in his appellate brief, he

appears to ask this court to reweigh the evidence that

was presented to the trial court so that we might reach

a conclusion that differs from the one reached by the

trial court. That is not our role or function. See, e.g.,

In re Janazia S., 112 Conn. App. 69, 99, 961 A.2d 1036

(2009) (‘‘Our function as an appellate court is to review

and not retry the proceedings of the trial court. . . .

The probative force of conflicting evidence is for the

trier to determine.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). ‘‘[A] trial court’s factual findings are accorded

great deference’’ and will not be disturbed unless those

findings are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., In re Davonta

V., 285 Conn. 483, 488, 940 A.2d 733 (2008).

Although the court discussed at length the evidence

concerning the respondent mother’s failure to address

the root causes underlying her history of threatening

or attempting to harm her children and the respondent

father’s inability to recognize the threat she posed to

Richard’s safety and well-being, it was not improper

for the court to consider evidence relevant to its adjudicatory findings. As this court previously has observed,

even though ‘‘the emphasis shifts from the parent to

the child in the dispositional phase . . . a trial court

is not required to blind itself to any parental deficiencies

that also were considered during the adjudicatory

phase. Our precedents establish that the consideration

of the parent’s circumstances, including the parent’s

degree of rehabilitation, is proper during the dispositional phase.’’ (Citation omitted.) In re Malachi E., 188

Conn. App. 426, 437, 204 A.3d 810 (2019). Additionally,

the trial court’s memorandum of decision makes clear

that it did weigh the evidence that was more favorable

to the respondent father in considering whether termination of his parental rights was in Richard’s best interest. Nevertheless, the court noted that Richard had been

in the care of his foster parents for more than two years

at the time of the termination trial and could not afford

to wait for the respondents to make the necessary

adjustments to ensure his safety and well-being. Aside

from the time he spent in the hospital following his

birth, Richard has spent his entire life residing in the

home of his foster parents, where two of his biological

siblings also were placed. See footnote 9 of this opinion.

The record indicates that he is flourishing in his placement and shares a strong bond with his foster parents,

who have expressed a commitment to adopt him. He

requires permanency, stability, and a safe environment

to continue to thrive. In light of the court’s factual

findings concerning the respondent mother’s unwillingness to rehabilitate in a substantive manner, the respondent father’s inability to perceive the risk she poses to

the children, and the likelihood that the respondents

will not substantially adjust their circumstances within

the foreseeable future so as to ameliorate these con-
cerns, we conclude that the court’s determination that

it was in Richard’s best interest to terminate the respondent father’s parental rights is not clearly erroneous.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the Appellate Court.

Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)

(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization

Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49; we decline to identify

any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order,

protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or

others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.

** September 1, 2022, the date that this decision was released as a slip

opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1

In both appeals, the attorney for Richard filed a statement pursuant to

Practice Book §§ 67-13 and 79a-6 (c) adopting the brief of the petitioner.

2 The respondents also appealed from the trial court’s judgment terminating their parental rights as to their minor child, Lillyanne D. Prior to oral

argument before this court, the respondents withdrew their claims on appeal

with respect to Lillyanne. Throughout this opinion, we refer to Lillyanne

and Richard individually by name and collectively as the children.

3 The record reflects that the respondent mother made a comment during

an argument that the respondent father had understood to be a veiled threat

against Lillyanne. The respondent mother had stated, in essence, that the

respondent father did not want to get a call someday that something had

happened to Lillyanne.

4 The respondent father reported to the department that the respondent

mother essentially had stated that, if he went to work, she was going to

call him and tell him news that he was not going to like about Lillyanne.

The respondent father understood the respondent mother’s statement to

imply that she was threatening to harm Lillyanne.

5 The respondent mother was charged with disorderly conduct, interfering

with a 911 call, and risk of injury to a child. On October 2, 2017, she pleaded

guilty to interfering with a 911 call and was sentenced to one year of

incarceration, execution suspended, and one year of probation.

6 The department substantiated the allegations of emotional neglect and

physical abuse against the respondent mother, and a maternal relative of

the respondent mother obtained temporary guardianship over Margaret.

Margaret was returned to the respondent mother’s care in 1998.

7 The department filed neglect petitions following this incident based

on substantiated physical and emotional neglect, but the petitions were

withdrawn due to evidentiary insufficiency.

8 Although, due to the department’s investigation protocol, Michael did

not know about the nature of the allegations concerning Lillyanne, he stated

to a department social worker: ‘‘[L]et me guess, she either tried to harm

[Lillyanne] or threatened to harm [Lillyanne] because that is what she did

with me over [one of our children] when we were together.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.)

9 During the pendency of the underlying proceedings, the respondents

had two more children, Daniel D. and James D. Both children were removed

from the respondents’ care on the basis of predictive neglect.

10 On January 5, 2022, the petitioner filed a motion for articulation, seeking

clarification as to whether the trial court also had determined that the

challenged documents were admissible pursuant to the business records

exception to the rule against hearsay. See Conn. Code Evid. § 8-4. The trial

court denied the motion for articulation. On January 21, 2022, the petitioner

filed with this court a motion for review of the trial court’s denial of her

motion for articulation. This court granted the petitioner’s motion for review

but denied the relief requested therein.

On February 3, 2022, the petitioner filed a preliminary statement pursuant

to Practice Book § 63-4 (a) (1), asserting as an alternative ground for

affirming the trial court’s judgment as to the respondent mother that the

documents were admissible under the business records exception. The

respondent mother claims on appeal that the challenged documents do not
satisfy the requirements of § 8-4 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. Our

conclusion that any error in admitting the documents under the residual

exception to the hearsay rule was harmless makes it unnecessary to address

this claim.

11 We note that, because Richard was adjudicated neglected on the basis

of predictive neglect, the factual record concerning Lillyanne is necessarily

relevant to the court’s termination of the respondents’ parental rights as

to Richard.

12 The department contracts with and provides referrals to USI, which

provides reunification and other support services for families involved with

the department.

13 In his appellate brief, the respondent father frames his first claim as

follows: ‘‘The trial court erred in its findings that the respondent father was

unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification services for his children.’’

On the basis of certain arguments presented in his brief and at oral argument

before this court, however, we interpret the respondent father’s claim to

be challenging both the court’s finding that the department made reasonable

efforts toward reunification and its finding that he was unable or unwilling

to benefit from such efforts. Because we conclude that there was sufficient

evidence in the record to support the court’s finding that he was unable to

benefit from reunification services, we need not address whether the court

properly found that the department made reasonable efforts to reunite him

with Richard. See In re Gabriella A., 319 Conn. 775, 777 n.4, 127 A.3d

948 (2015).

14 See footnote 11 of this opinion.

15 As previously noted, the social study was admitted into evidence as a

full exhibit without objection. See part I of this opinion. Although the petitioner must submit a social study to the court for purposes of the dispositional hearing in contested cases; see General Statutes § 45a-717 (e) (1);

Practice Book § 35a-9; the court may rely on the social study in both the

adjudicatory and dispositional phases of a termination of parental rights

proceeding. See In re Anna Lee M., 104 Conn. App. 121, 128, 931 A.2d 949,

cert. denied, 284 Conn. 939, 937 A.2d 696 (2007).

16 The record does not indicate what alternative caregiving plan the respondent father had proposed.

17 The department also may meet its burden concerning reunification

efforts under § 17a-112 (j) (1) based on ‘‘a previous judicial determination

that such efforts were not appropriate.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In re Ryder M., supra, 211 Conn. App. 808.

18 After Richard was born in June, 2019, the court ordered specific steps

that encompassed the same steps that previously had been ordered with

respect to facilitating the respondents’ reunification with Lillyanne.

19 At trial, Andrews testified that this information was gleaned from her

review of the department’s records and that she did not recall personally

having discussed the respondents’ childcare plans with them.

20 For example, the parenting assessment focused on ways in which to

eliminate barriers impacting the respondent mother’s ability to function,

but it did not undertake to diagnose her mental health issues or to contradict

Mantell’s report. With respect to Hayes’ psychotherapy intake note and

assessment, it consisted of only a sixty minute session with the respondent

mother, which included a thirty minute interview that focused on whether

she needed trauma therapy. Other than an interview with the respondent

mother and the administration of two testing instruments, which took place

three days prior to the start of trial, Hayes’ assessment did not take into

consideration other sources of information, such as Mantell’s report, which

concluded that the respondent mother needed further focused treatment to

address her violent threats to her children. Hayes clarified her assessment,

testifying that she was not recommending that the children be returned to

the respondent mother’s care.

21 General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Except in the

case where termination of parental rights is based on consent, in determining

whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall

consider and shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness,

nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the

parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with

the parent; (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made

reasonable efforts to reunite the family . . . (3) the terms of any applicable

court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and

the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations

under such order; (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect
to the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s person and any person

who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least

one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties;

(5) the age of the child; (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such

parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest

of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future . . . and

(7) the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a

meaningful relationship with the child . . . .’’