1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EDMUND ROBACZEWSKI, : Case No. 4:14-CV-01686

:

Plaintiff, : (Judge Brann)

:

v. :

:

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, :

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF :

SOCIAL SECURITY :

:

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

August 18, 2015

Plaintiff, Edmund Robaczewski (“Robaczewski ”) has filed this action 

seeking review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying his claim for Social Security Disability Insurance 

Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). ECF No. 1. 

Disability benefits are paid to an individual if that individual is disabled and 

“insured,” that is, the individual has worked long enough and paid social security 

taxes. The last date that a claimant meets the requirement of being insured is 

I. Introduction

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commonly referred to as the “date last insured.” Robaczewski met the insured 

status requirements through December 31, 2013. Tr. 15.1

 

Robaczewski is 45 years old, has a 9th grade education with a GED , and is 

able to read, write, speak, and understand the English language. Tr. 53, 67-68, 

175. Robaczewski’s most recent past relevant work was as a truck driver which is 

considered medium duty, semi-skilled. Tr. 22, 68. Robaczewski stopped working 

on July 1, 2010 when he was terminated and alleges disability as of November 1, 

2010 due to arthritis, hip/back pain, anxiety, depression, and alcohol abuse. Tr. 53, 

138, 142, 174.

II. Statement of Relevant Facts

A. Robaczewski’s Mental Impairments

In an initial reception screening for State Correctional Institution- Camp 

Hill, Robaczewski informed staff that he had previously been diagnosed with 

depression and bipolar disorder. Tr. 225. Robaczewski reported that he had twice 

attempted to commit suicide as a result of depression. Id. In a subsequent 

psychiatric evaluation, Robaczewski was diagnosed with severe and recurrent 

major depressive disorder, alcohol and marijuana dependence. Tr. 248-49, 225. 

He stated that he had been treated for Bipolar Disorder for the last 15 years. Tr. 1 References to “Tr. ” are to pages of the administrative record filed by the Defendant as part of 

the Defendant’s Answer.

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249. Robaczewski also reported that he was in a psychiatric hospital six times and

had one serious suicide attempt in 1993 when he shot himself in the face. Id. 

On February 9, 2011, Robaczewski was taken to the emergency room after 

he expressed suicidal ideation to a police officer. Tr. 277. The officer reported 

that Robaczewski had informed him that he had overdosed on cyclobenzaprime

tablets and intended to hurt himself. Tr. 276-78. Nurses were unable to obtain a 

complete history because Robaczewski refused to answer questions and responded 

with “none of your fuckin business.” Tr. 279. He was aggressive, verbally 

abusive and placed in 4 point leather restraints after making multiple verbal threats 

to injure staff and himself. Id. Nurses also noted that Robaczewski appeared to be 

"acutely" intoxicated. Tr. 280, 283. 

After his condition was deemed to be stable, Robaczewski was transferred to 

First Hospital Wyoming Valley for long term care. Tr. 254, 283. At the time of 

admission, Robaczewski denied any suicide attempt and his chief complaint was 

taking a muscle relaxant to relieve back ache caused by chopping ice. Tr. 254. A 

mental status examination showed that Robaczewski was alert with no overt 

evidence of psychotic features, aggressive or assaultive manners. Id. He admitted 

to smoking half a pack to one pack of cigarettes daily, drinking six to eight cans of 

beer per day and smoking marijuana occasionally. Id. He was discharged one

week later and was diagnosed with major depression, recurrent type and alcohol 

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abuse. Tr. 252. His prognosis was described as “fair to good with treatment” 

because Robaczewski was willing to continue medication and follow up with 

Community Counseling Services. Tr. 253. 

In April 2011, Robaczewski sought help from the emergency room, 

complaining of shortness of breath. Tr. 262-68. A mental status examination 

revealed that he was fully oriented with a normal affect. Tr. 263. Robaczewski 

was uncooperative and insisted on leaving the "AMA" and stated “get this shit out 

of me”. Tr. 264. When pressed to stay by his companion, Robaczewski stated 

“it’s my decision, I will see Dr. Wolanin on Monday.” Id. 

In July 2011, Robaczewski was evaluated by Vincent A. Drapiewski, M.D., 

for his physical complaints. Tr. 290-301. Robaczewski admitted that the drank 

one case of beer per week and smoked one pack of cigarettes per day. Tr. 291. Dr. 

Drapiewski's neurological assessment revealed that Robaczewski had a normal 

affect and did not appear to be depressed. Id. Dr. Drapiewski noted that 

Robaczewski had a history of bipolar disorder and depression. Tr. 292. 

Nevertheless, Dr. Drapiewski opined that Robaczewski could perform work at the 

light level of exertion with environmental restrictions. Tr. 296-97.

In September 2011, Robaczewski had a psychological consultative 

examination with Frank James Vita Ph.D. Tr. 306-09. Robaczewski reported that 

he had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and depression, and claimed that he 

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had Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (“OCD.”) Tr. 307. He reported drinking a 

12 pack of beer per day. Id. His mental status examination revealed that 

Robaczewski’s mood was anxious. Tr. 308. His thought process was generally 

logical and coherent and there were no overt indications of delusional thinking. Id. 

Robaczewski’s demeanor during the interview was cooperative and gave no 

indication of hostile or violent behavior. Id. 

Dr. Vita diagnosed Robaczewski with bipolar disorder, most recent episode 

mixed and alcohol dependence. Tr. 308. He assigned Robaczewski with a Global 

Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) of 51-60.2

Dr. Vita also completed a medical source statement indicating that 

Robaczewski had “moderate” restrictions in understanding, remembering, and 

carrying out short, simple instructions, but “marked” or “extreme” limitations in all 

 Id. Dr. Vita also diagnosed 

Robaczewski as having severe occupational problems, economic problems, and 

problems related to the social environment. Id. Dr. Vita opined that Robaczewski 

would likely benefit from weekly outpatient drug and alcohol counseling to 

address his symptoms as well as psychiatric medication evaluation/management. 

Id. He also recommended that Robaczewski attend Alcoholics Anonymous 

meetings. Id.

 2 A GAF score between 51-60 indicates moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in social, 

occupational or school functioning. The American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic & 

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 32 ( 4th ed. 2000)

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other areas of mental work functioning. Tr. 304. Dr. Vita opined that 

Robaczewski would have marked limitations in interacting appropriately with the 

public, coworkers and in responding appropriately to work pressures and to 

changes in the routine work setting. Id. Dr. Vita also indicated that Robaczewski 

would have extreme limitations when interacting with supervisors. Id.

When asked if his opinion would change if Robaczewski was totally 

abstinent from alcohol and or substance abuse, Dr. Vita indicated that 

Robaczewski “would likely be more able to exhibit competent behaviors in all 

contexts.” Tr. 305. He also opined that Robaczewski’s alcohol and substance 

abuse affected his judgment and ability to carry out tasks. Id. 

On September 27, 2011, James Vizza, Psy. D., a state agency consultant 

completed a residual functional capacity "RFC" assessment based on 

Robaczewski’s medical records. Tr. 83-98. He opined that Robaczewski had 

"moderate" limitations in activities of daily living, social functioning, and 

concentration, persistence, and pace. Tr. 91. Dr. Vizza also opined that when not 

using alcohol, Robaczewski, “is able to maintain socially appropriate behavior ...” 

Tr. 95. Dr. Vizza stated that Robaczewski could function in production oriented 

jobs requiring little independent decision making and sustain an ordinary routine 

without special supervision. Tr. 95. Dr. Vizza explained that he gave the opinion 

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of Dr. Vita’s appropriate weight, but that some of the opinions in the report were 

an overestimate of Robaczewski’s functional restrictions. Tr. 96. 

On September 21, 2011, Robaczewski then sought treatment with Kenneth 

H. Tomczyk, D.O., of Mountain Top Family Practice. Tr. 332. He reported that 

he was “very depressed and occasionally had suicidal ideations.” Id. Dr. Tomczyk 

diagnosed him with depressive disorder and prescribed Remeron. Tr. 333. A 

week later, Robaczewski returned for a follow up visit with Dr. Tomczyk. Tr. 322. 

Robaczewski reported drinking fifteen to twenty-five bottles of beer per day. Id. 

He also reported having “shakes and sweats” if he did not have a beer. Id. 

Robaczewski indicated that his mood had improved and he had an appointment 

with a counselor. Id. Dr. Tomczyk diagnosed chronic alcohol dependence for 

which he prescribed Naltrexone and Librium. Tr. 324. 

At his next visit on October 13, 2011, with Dr. Tomczyk, Robaczewski 

indicated that he was still drinking twelve beers per day, was yet to start taking 

Naltrexone or Librium, and did not make an appointment with counseling services. 

Tr. 316. Dr. Tomczyk’s chronic alcohol diagnosis remained unchanged and he 

advised Robaczewski to start the medication as directed. Id. Robaczewski 

returned to Dr. Tomczyk in November 2011, where he reported that he had 

decreased his alcohol intake. Tr. 384-85. He was advised to continue with 

Naltrexone and prescribed Risperdal for his mood disorder. Tr. 385. In December 

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2011, Robaczewski returned for a follow up visit, and there he reported that he was 

back to drinking ten to twelve beers per day and stopped taking the Naltrexone 

because it was making him sick. Tr. 396. Robaczewski also admitted that he had 

not been attending counseling. Id. He was advised to continue with his 

medications and attend counseling. Tr. 398.

Robaczewski returned to Dr. Tomczyk in January 2012 where he indicated 

that he didn’t want counseling services from Northeast Counseling Services. Tr. 

405. He also reported that he had decreased his alcohol intake to two glasses of 

vodka per day. Id. In March, Robaczewski reported to Dr. Tomczyk that he was 

drinking up to five glasses of vodka per day and ran out of Naltrexone. Id. 

Robaczewski returned the following month and stated that he had not had a drink 

in 2 days but had previously been drinking eight glasses of vodka per day for the 

past 2 weeks. Tr. 460. 

In August 2012, Robaczewski sought to establish primary care with Sergey 

Turchin, M.D. in Florida.3

 3 Robaczewski testified at the hearing that he was recently married and moved to Florida with his 

wife. When asked if he wanted his case transferred to Florida, he indicated that even though he 

was now a Floridian, he wanted his case to remain in Pennsylvania.

 Tr. 576. Robaczewski reported that he was drinking 

six to twelve beers and smoking one pack of cigarettes per day. Tr. 577. Dr. 

Turchin recommended a referral to psychiatry for Robaczewski’s bipolar disorder 

and counseled decreased alcohol use. Tr. 577, 579. 

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Robaczewski sought treatment at Coastal Mental Health Center with 

Christian Crissom, M.D. in February 2013. Tr. 605-16. The initial biopsychosocial assessment indicated that Robaczewski had a current GAF score of 

60 and that Robaczewski was “very bright”. Tr. 615. Shortly thereafter, 

Robaczewski underwent a psychiatric evaluation. Tr. 605-07. He was found to be 

calm, cooperative with a labile mood and affect. Tr. 606. Robaczewski reported 

that he had not been on any medication for almost eight months. Tr. 605. Dr. 

Crissom noted that Robaczewski’s attention, concentration, memory, abstraction, 

insight, judgment, intellectual function, and impulse control were fair. Tr. 607. He 

diagnosed Robaczewski with bipolar disorder and post traumatic stress disorder. 

Id. Dr. Crissom assigned a GAF of 52. Tr. 615. 

B. Vocational Expert Testimony

At the hearing, Ms. Terry, an impartial vocational expert ("VE"), was called 

to give testimony. Tr. 67. The ALJ asked Ms. Terry to assume a hypothetical 

individual who was able to work at the light exertional level4

 4 Light Work is defined by the regulations of the Social Security Administration as work “with 

frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted 

may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or 

when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. 

To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the 

ability to do substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that 

he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of 

fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967.

who would be limited 

to occasional climbing of stairs, and no ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Tr. 68. The 

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individual was also to avoid concentrated exposure to extreme temperatures, 

wetness, humidity, fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor ventilation; and hazards 

such as moving machinery and unprotected heights. Id. The individual was 

limited to simple routine tasks in a low stress environment defined as occasional 

decision making and occasional changes in the work setting. Id. The individual 

would also need to have occasional interaction with the public as well as 

coworkers and supervisors. Id. 

Under this hypothetical, Ms. Terry testified that the individual would not be 

able to perform Robaczewski’s past relevant work. Tr. 68. However, the 

individual would be able to perform three jobs that exist in significant numbers in 

the national economy: cafeteria attendant, hand garment trimmer and light products 

packer. Id. The ALJ limited this hypothetical individual to requiring only two 

hours of standing and walking throughout the work day and to lifting and carrying 

within a sedentary exertion. Tr. 69-70. Ms. Terry reduced the number of available 

jobs for a light products packer by fifty percent, eliminated the cafeteria attendant 

position entirely to account for the two hour standing and walking option mandated 

by the ALJ. Tr. 70. The hand garment trimmer position numbers remained 

unchanged. Id. Ms. Terry also identified an additional position, a retail marker, 

that this hypothetical individual could perform under the two hours sitting and 

walking restriction. Id. With the lifting and carrying within a sedentary exertion

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limitation, Ms. Terry opined that the hypothetical individual could work as a 

telephone order clerk, a lamp shade assembler, or a clerical assistant. Tr. 70. 

C. The ALJ’s Decision

At step one, the ALJ found that the Robaczewski was not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since November 1, 2010. Tr. 15. At step two, the ALJ 

found that Robaczewski had the following severe impairments: depressive 

disorder/major depressive disorder, chronic alcohol dependence, chronic 

obstructive pulmonary disease with emphysema, tracheal stenosis, bipolar disorder, 

attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive 

disorder. Id. 

At step three, the ALJ found that Robaczewski did not have an impairment 

or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one 

of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 

§§404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526) Tr. 15. Robaczewski's mental 

impairments were considered under the criteria of Listings 12.04, 12.06, 12.08, and 

12.09 in which the ALJ concluded the mental impairments did not cause at least 

two "marked" limitations or one "marked" limitation and repeated episodes of 

decompensation. Tr. 17. 

At step four, the ALJ determined that Robaczewski had the RFC to perform 

light work as defined in 20 CFR §404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except Robaczewski

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was limited to occasional climbing of stairs but he must never climb ladders, ropes, 

or scaffolds. Tr. 18. Robaczewski was to avoid temperature extremes of cold/heat, 

wetness, humidity, fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poor ventilation, and hazards such 

as moving machinery and unprotected heights. Tr. 18. Robaczewski was limited 

to simple routine tasks performed in low stress environment defined as involving 

no more than occasional decision making and occasional changes in the work 

setting. The ALJ also found that Robaczewski was limited to occasional 

interaction with the public, coworkers, and supervisors.

At step five, the ALJ based her decision on the VE's testimony that an 

individual of the same age, education, work experience, and RFC could perform 

the representative occupation of cafeteria attendant, light products packer, and a 

hand garment trimmer. Finally based upon the testimony of the VE, and a 

hypothetical question that the ALJ posed to her, the ALJ concluded that there were 

jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Robaczewski 

could perform. Tr. 22. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Robaczewski was not 

disabled within the meaning of the Act. Tr. 23. 

In an action under 42 U.S.C. §405(g) to review the Commissioner’s decision 

denying a plaintiff’s claim for disability benefits, the district court must uphold the 

findings of the Commissioner so long as those findings are supported by 

III. Discussion

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substantial evidence. Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable 

amount of evidence, but ‘rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 

565 (1988), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 

(1938). Substantial evidence has been described as more than a mere scintilla of 

evidence but less than a preponderance. Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d 

Cir. 1988). In an adequately developed factual record substantial evidence may be 

"something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two 

inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative 

agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence." Consolo v. Fed. 

Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). 

Substantial evidence exists only "in relationship to all the other evidence in 

the record," Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706 (3d Cir. 1981), and "must take into 

account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight." Universal Camera 

Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not 

substantial evidence if the Commissioner ignores countervailing evidence or fails 

to resolve a conflict created by the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 

1064 (3d Cir. 1993). The Commissioner must indicate which evidence was 

accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for rejecting certain 

evidence. Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2008). 

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Therefore, a court reviewing the decision of the Commissioner must scrutinize the 

record as a whole. Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981).

The Commissioner utilizes a five-step process in evaluating disability 

insurance benefits claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 91-92 (3d Cir. 2007). This process requires the Commissioner 

to consider, in sequence, whether a claimant (1) is engaging in substantial gainful 

activity, (2) has an impairment that is severe or a combination of impairments that 

is severe, (3) has an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

equals the requirements of a listed impairment, (4) has the residual functional 

capacity to return to his or her past work and (5) if not, whether he or she can 

perform other work in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The 

initial burden to prove disability and inability to engage in past relevant work rests 

on the claimant; if the claimant meets this burden, the burden then shifts to the 

Commissioner to show that a job or jobs exist in the national economy that a 

person with the claimant’s abilities, age, education, and work experience can 

perform. Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.

A. Step Three of the Sequential Evaluation Process

Robaczewski first argues that the ALJ erred at step three in finding that his 

severe mental impairment of depression and bipolar disorder did not meet or equal 

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one of the Listings. Additionally, Robaczewski argues that the ALJ erred by 

failing to discuss the medical equivalence of the listing.

1. The ALJ Properly Determined that Robaczewski did not have an 

Impairment that meets a Listed Impairment

At step 3, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant's impairment 

matches or is equivalent to one of the listed impairments. Burnett v. Comm'r of 

Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000) . The listings described impairments 

that prevent an adult, regardless of age, education, or work experience, from 

performing any gainful activity. Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 85 (3d Cir. 2000). 

"If the impairment is equivalent to a listed impairment, then the claimant is per se 

disabled and no further analysis is necessary." Burnett, 220 F. 3d at 119. The 

ALJ has the burden to identify the relevant listed impairment that compares with 

the claimant's impairment and must “fully develop the record, explain his findings 

at step 3 and include an analysis of whether and why [the claimant's] ... 

impairments ... are or are not equivalent in severity to one of the listed 

impairments.” Burnett 220 F.3d at 120, n.2. In general, the required level of 

severity for these disorders may be established when the criteria for both parts A 

and B of the listing are satisfied.5

 5 The part A criteria are medical findings that substantiate the presence of the mental disorder; 

the part B criteria are functional limitations resulting from the impairment that are incompatible 

with the ability to do any gainful work. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(A).

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 To satisfy the paragraph B criteria, the claimant must result in at least two 

of the following: (1) marked restriction of activities of daily living; (2) marked 

difficulties in maintaining social functioning; (3) marked difficulties in maintaining 

concentration, persistence, or pace; or (4) repeated episodes of decompensation, 

each of extended duration. 20 C.F.R. part 404 Subpart P, App. 1. “A ‘marked’ 

restriction or difficulty is one that is more than moderate but less than extreme and 

that ‘interfere[s] seriously with [the] ability to function independently, 

appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis.’ Cunningham v. Comm'r of 

Soc. Sec., 507 F. App'x 111, 116 (citing 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1, § 

12.00(C)). Here, as required, the ALJ properly identified the relevant Listings and 

determined that Robaczewski failed to meet the “B” criteria of the identified 

Listings.

Robaczewski, however, contends that the ALJ’s findings with respect to two 

categories in Paragraph B criteria— social functioning and maintaining 

concentration, persistence and pace—are erroneous, and asserts that Robaczewski's 

limitations in these areas are “marked” rather than “moderate.” Robaczewski 

contends that he is highly antagonistic, uncooperative and hostile which is 

indicative of "marked" limitations within social contexts. He cites anecdotal 

observations from an emergency room visits occasioned by his alleged suicide 

attempt. Robaczewski however fails to include that he appeared to be visibly 

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intoxicated and was restrained because he threatened to hurt himself and hospital 

staff. Robaczewski also refers to a second visit to the emergency room where he 

was uncooperative during his medical examination. These incident do little to 

undermine the ALJ's conclusions at step three. The ALJ's assessment of 

Robaczewski's social functioning reflects his condition longitudinally not in 

isolation. Robaczewski has not provided evidence which would undermine the 

ALJ's conclusion that Robaczewski mental impairment does not meet the 

requirements of the listing. While Robaczewski may have been in poor mental 

states during these visits, nothing in the record reflects that these difficulties lasted 

for the required 12 month minimum time frame.

Robaczewski also argues that the ALJ’s reference to his ability to watch 

television and read daily is not sufficient to contradict the definition of marked 

difficulties in concentration, persistence, and pace. Robaczewski however fails to 

point to any objective evidence in the record that contradicts the ALJ’s 

determination. The burden is on the claimant to present medical findings that 

show that his impairment matches or is equal in severity to a listed impairment. 

Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1186 (3d Cir. 1992). This burden is 

particularly high at step three. Robaczewski's argument is insufficient to 

undermine the substantial evidence that support the ALJ’s conclusion.

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2. ALJ failed to discuss medical equivalence of the Listings at Step 3

Next, Robaczewski argues that the ALJ erred by not considering the 

combined effects of his impairments and conducting a proper combination 

analysis. Indeed the extent of the ALJ’s combination analysis was the statement 

that “[t]he claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments 

that meet or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 

CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Tr. 16. While the ALJ adequately 

reviewed each of Robaczewski’s impairments individually, this statement 

regarding Robaczewski’s impairments in combination is overly broad and too 

generalized. See Torres v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 279 F. App’x 149, 152 (3d Cir. 

2008)(holding that ‘[c]onclusory statements, like the one in this case, have been 

found to be ‘beyond meaningful judicial review’” and remanding because the 

‘entire combination analysis consisted of one cursory paragraph.’) 

In this case, the ALJ found eight severe impairments at step two. Tr. 15. 

The ALJ’s blanket statement that the combination of these impairments does not 

medically equal any listed impairments is insufficient. Without a more detailed 

explanation of the reasons and facts underlying the ALJ’s conclusion, the Court 

lacks a reasonable basis upon which to review. Therefore, the Court remands the 

case for a detailed step three analysis that considers whether Robaczewski’s 

impairments in combination are or not equivalent in severity to a listed 

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impairment. On remand the ALJ shall fully develop the record and explain her 

findings at step three, including an analysis of whether and why all of 

Robaczewski’s severe impairments in combination are or are not equivalent in 

severity to one of the listed impairments.

B. The Residual Functional Capacity Assessment.

Robaczewski next argues that the ALJ failed to accord proper weight to Dr. 

Vita’s opinion and to incorporate all of his limitations when determining the RFC. 

1. Evaluation of Opinion Evidence

The ALJ gave limited weight to the opinion of Dr. Vita, reasoning that the 

Dr. Vita’s statements were inconsistent with the longitudinal treatment records and 

with the doctor’s own GAF assessment and the GAF assessment of 60 noted in 

Robaczewski’s most recent psychosocial assessment in February, 2013. Tr. 20. 

The ALJ remarked that at the time of Robaczewski’s examination with Dr. Vita, he 

was drinking heavily and was taking no medication. Tr. 21. Furthermore, the ALJ 

explained that it was reasonable to conclude that with the recent reduction in his 

alcohol consumption, Robaczewski had an even greater RFC than set forth. 

Consequently, she could not accommodate greater functional limitations as 

described by Dr. Vita.

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Robaczewski asserts that the ALJ should not have credited the GAF score 

Dr. Vita assigned to him because as per the Administration's Messages, GAF 

scores are not a reliable rating due to "great variability of training and experience 

levels among clinicians." Social Security Administration, Administrative Message 

AM-13066, Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) Evidence in Disability 

Adjudication (July 22, 2013). Nevertheless as an ALJ is required to consider all of 

the evidence, a GAF score is relevant in making a disability determination. See 

Colon v. Barnhart, 424 F.Supp. 2d 805, 812 (E.D.Pa. 2006) (Although a claimant's 

GAF score does not have a “ ‘direct correlation to the severity requirements,’ ... 

[the GAF score] remains the scale used by mental health professionals to ‘assess 

current treatment needs and provide a prognosis.’ Therefore, the GAF score [is] 

medical evidence ... and must be addressed in making a determination regarding a 

claimant's disability.”) (quoting 65 Fed. Reg. 50764–65)); Dougherty v. Barnhart,

No. Civ.A. 05-5383, 2006 WL 2433792, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug 21, 2006); Brooks v. 

Colvin, No. 3: CV-13-937, 2015 WL 2339117, slip op. (M.D.Pa. May 13, 

2015)(Kosik, J.) Here, not only did the ALJ demonstrate that she weighed the 

importance and seriously considered the GAF score, she gave a reasonable 

explanation for discounting the score. Tr. 17. 

However, this does not mean that the entirety of the ALJ's RFC analysis 

was not at fault. In making a disability determination, an ALJ has a duty to 

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develop the record fully and fairly. See e.g., Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 902 

(3d Cir. 1995); Maniaci v. Apfel, 27 F. Supp. 2d 554, 559 ( E.D. Pa. 1998); see 

also 20 C.F.R. 404. 1512(d)-(f)(2007). Sometimes, this duty requires the ALJ to 

order an additional consultative examination to more fully develop the record. See

20 C.F.R. §404.1519(a)(b)(4)(2007). A consultative examination is “require[d]” 

when “[a] conflict, inconsistency, ambiguity or insufficiency in the evidence must 

be resolved, ... or [t]here is an indication of a change in [the claimant's] condition 

that is likely to affect [his or her] ability to work, but the current severity of [the] 

impairment is not established.” Id. § 404.1519(a)(b)(4)-(5).

Here, the ALJ did not fulfill her duty to fully develop the record and should 

have requested an additional examination to compare with Dr. Vita's evaluation. 

In this instance, the ALJ engaged in pure speculation when she concluded that 

Robaczewski's recent decrease in alcohol consumption affected his functional 

limitations. As the Third Circuit has noted, “[a]n ALJ may not make speculative 

inferences from medical reports or employ her own expertise.” Plummer v. Apfel, 

186 F. 3d 422, 429 ( 3d Cir. 1999). Id. Under these circumstances, the ALJ should 

have ordered an additional consultative examination; such an examination was 

necessary and would have provided a better indication of Robaczewski's current 

mental health and the resulting functional limitation.

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Accordingly, the Court will not address Robaczewski's other substantive 

arguments that the ALJ inappropriately discounted Dr. Vita's report and the RFC 

assessment described therein. In the absence of a record fully and fairly 

developed, the Court must remand the case. 

C. Step 5 of the Sequential Evaluation Process

Because remand is otherwise required for reconsideration of earlier steps in 

the sequential process, further proceedings may well lead to a determination that 

Robaczewski has lesser limitations which were not previously credited and/or 

considered. Therefore, additional VE testimony may be called for and a decision 

on this issue is not required at this time

For the forgoing reasons, the final decision of the Commissioner is 

VACATED and REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this 

Opinion. An appropriate Order will be entered.

IV. Conclusion

BY THE COURT:

Matthew W. Brann

s/Matthew W. Brann 

United States District Judge

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