[Cite as State v. Nixon, 2023-Ohio-3457.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

STATE OF OHIO

Appellee

v.

CHARLES NIXON

Appellant

C.A. No. 30403

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT

ENTERED IN THE

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO

CASE No. CR 21 11 4166

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: September 27, 2023

FLAGG LANZINGER, Judge.

{¶1} Charles Nixon appeals from the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common 

Pleas, denying his motion to suppress. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.

I.

{¶2} A grand jury indicted Mr. Nixon on charges for improperly handling a firearm in a 

motor vehicle (with a forfeiture specification) and failure to comply with an order or signal of a 

police officer. The charges stemmed from a traffic stop wherein officers from the Akron Police 

Department (“APD”) arrested Mr. Nixon and located a loaded firearm under the driver’s seat of 

the vehicle Mr. Nixon was driving. 

{¶3} Mr. Nixon pleaded not guilty and moved to suppress the evidence obtained during 

the traffic stop. In his motion to suppress, Mr. Nixon argued that the officers lacked reasonable 

suspicion to initiate a traffic stop and that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. The 

matter proceeded to a suppression hearing wherein the following testimony was adduced. 
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{¶4} According to the testimony of one of the arresting officers, he and his partner 

observed a vehicle with heavily tinted windows fail to use a turn signal while executing a turn. 

The officer testified that the officers attempted to initiate a traffic stop by activating the police 

cruiser’s sirens and overhead lights. When the vehicle came to a stop at a stop sign, the officer 

exited the police cruiser and started to walk toward the vehicle. According to the officer, the driver 

of the vehicle then yelled out of the driver’s side window that he was not going to stop. The driver 

then pulled away from the stop sign and continued to drive through a residential neighborhood at 

a relatively low rate of speed. The officer quickly returned to the police cruiser and the officers 

followed the vehicle for about thirty seconds until the vehicle pulled into a driveway. The officers 

then exited the police cruiser, approached the vehicle, and arrested the driver: Mr. Nixon. 

{¶5} The officers confirmed through their in-cruiser LEADS data terminal and through 

a radio call to the LEADS operator that Mr. Nixon was not the owner of the vehicle, and that Mr. 

Nixon had a suspended driver’s license. After the officers arrested Mr. Nixon and secured him in 

the back seat of the police cruiser, the officers conducted a tow inventory search of the vehicle 

pursuant to the APD’s “Vehicle Impoundment and Inventory Procedure” policy (“Inventory 

Policy”). The trial court admitted the Inventory Policy as an exhibit during the suppression hearing. 

The Inventory Policy provides, in relevant part, that officers should tow a vehicle if the driver has 

a suspended driver’s license. The Inventory Policy also provides that the officers must conduct an 

inventory for all impounded vehicles and complete a “Tow Report[.]” 

{¶6} The officer testified that the officers conducted the inventory search in compliance 

with the APD’s Inventory Policy. During the course of the search, the officers located a loaded 

firearm under the driver’s seat of the vehicle. The officer acknowledged that the firearm was not 

subsequently noted on the Tow Report but testified that it was documented in three places: the 
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police report, the supplemental report, and the evidence report. The officer testified that this 

documentation satisfied the APD’s policies. The officer also acknowledged that they did not call 

for a tow truck until after the search occurred. He testified, however, that there is no specific 

timeframe regarding when officers are required to call for a tow truck.

{¶7} Mr. Nixon testified on his own behalf. According to him, he continued driving the 

vehicle after the police attempted to conduct the initial traffic stop because he wanted to stop in a 

well-lit location, which was his driveway a few blocks away. Mr. Nixon also testified that his 

driver’s license was not suspended at the time of the incident. 

{¶8} After the suppression hearing, the trial court denied Mr. Nixon’s motion to 

suppress. In doing so, the trial court concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion to initiate 

a traffic stop. In support of this conclusion, the trial court cited the fact that the officer testified 

that he and his partner observed the vehicle Mr. Nixon’s was driving turn without signaling, and 

then continued driving after the officers activated their sirens and overhead lights. The trial court 

also concluded that the tow inventory search was permissible and valid because the officers 

conducted it after properly impounding the vehicle and arresting Mr. Nixon. 

{¶9} After the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress, Mr. Nixon pleaded no 

contest. The trial court then found Mr. Nixon guilty of the charged offenses and sentenced him to 

community control. Mr. Nixon now appeals, assigning as error that the trial court erred by denying 

his motion to suppress. 

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANTAPPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
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{¶10} In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Nixon argues that the trial court erred by 

denying his motion to suppress. For the following reasons, this Court disagrees. 

{¶11} A motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. 

Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. “When considering a motion to suppress, the 

trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual 

questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 

366 (1992). Thus, a reviewing court “must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are 

supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id., citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20 

(1982). “Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, 

without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal 

standard.” Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 710 (4th Dist.1997). Accordingly, 

this Court grants deference to the trial court’s findings of fact but conducts a de novo review of 

whether the trial court applied the appropriate legal standard to those facts. State v. Booth, 151 

Ohio App.3d 635, 2003-Ohio-829, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.).

{¶12} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states 

through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Accord Ohio 

Constitution, Article I, Section 14. “Subject to specific exceptions, which the State has the burden 

of establishing, warrantless searches are unreasonable per se under the Fourth Amendment.” State 

v. Atkinson, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 19CA011481, 2020-Ohio-3522, ¶ 13, citing State v. Roberts, 110 

Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, ¶ 98. 

{¶13} As the Ohio Supreme Court has acknowledged, “[t]he inventory-search exception 

is a well-defined exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” State v. BanksHarvey, 152 Ohio St.3d 368, 2018-Ohio-201, ¶ 20, citing Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 
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(1983). “[A] routine inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle is not unreasonable within 

the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when performed pursuant to standard police practice and 

when the evidence does not demonstrate that the procedure involved is merely a pretext for an 

evidentiary search of the impounded vehicle.” Blue Ash v. Kavanagh, 113 Ohio St.3d 67, 2007-

Ohio-1103, ¶ 11, citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 

{¶14} “To determine if an inventory search is valid, the court must first determine whether 

the police lawfully impounded the vehicle. A vehicle can be lawfully impounded when the 

occupant of the vehicle is arrested.” State v. Neal, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25937, 2012-Ohio-2609, 

¶ 7, quoting State v. Robinson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 19905, 2000 WL 1587007, *3 (Oct. 25, 2000). 

Next, a court must determine “whether the impoundment was merely a pretext for an evidentiary 

search of the impounded vehicle.” Kavanagh at ¶ 12. “This Court has rejected a challenge to the 

impoundment of a vehicle when there was no evidence of a pretextual motive and the 

impoundment was conducted pursuant to standard police procedure.” Neal at ¶ 7. As this Court 

has explained:

When a vehicle is lawfully impounded, the validity of the inventory search then 

must be examined. “The justification for inventory searches stems from three 

administrative caretaking functions: (1) protecting an individual’s property while it 

is in police custody; (2) protecting the police from claims of lost, stolen, or 

vandalized property; and (3) protecting the police from danger.” * * * 

“[I]nventories pursuant to standard police procedures are reasonable.” * * * 

Furthermore, a police department need not have a written policy or practice for 

inventorying a vehicle. * * * It is sufficient that some “established routine” exists, 

and the State can produce evidence of it through testimony. 

Id. at ¶ 8

{¶15} On appeal, Mr. Nixon has not argued that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion 

to initiate a traffic stop, or that they lacked probable cause to arrest him. Instead, Mr. Nixon argues 

that the tow inventory search was pretextual and, therefore, unreasonable under the Fourth 
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Amendment. In support of his argument, Mr. Nixon points to the fact that the Tow Report did not 

list the firearm, which was required under the APD’s Inventory Policy. Mr. Nixon also points to 

the fact that the officers did not call for a tow truck until after they conducted the search. Mr. Nixon 

further points to the fact that the underlying incident involved him driving for a short period of 

time and parking in his own driveway. Mr. Nixon concludes that there was no legitimate need to 

tow the vehicle, and that the officers’ reliance upon a tow inventory search was a pretext for 

conducting an illegal, warrantless search. 

{¶16} Despite Mr. Nixon’s arguments to the contrary, competent, credible evidence 

supported the trial court’s findings of fact. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, at ¶ 8. Accepting these facts 

as true, this Court concludes that the facts satisfied the applicable legal standard. Id. Here, the 

vehicle was lawfully impounded because the officers arrested Mr. Nixon for failure to comply. See 

Neal, 2012-Ohio-2609, at ¶ 7. Additionally, the officer testified that Mr. Nixon’s license was 

suspended. Thus, under the APD’s Inventory Policy, the officers were permitted to tow the vehicle 

and were required to conduct an inventory search. While the firearm was not listed on the Tow 

Report, the officer testified that it was documented on the police report, the supplemental report, 

and the evidence report. According to the officer, this satisfied the APD’s policies. Additionally, 

the officer testified that there is no specific timeframe regarding when officers are required to call 

for a tow truck.

{¶17} Having reviewed the record, this Court concludes that the trial court did not err 

when it denied Mr. Nixon’s motion to suppress. The inventory search conducted in this case was 

not unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was performed pursuant 

to standard police practice, and the evidence did not demonstrate that the procedure involved was 

merely a pretext for an evidentiary search of the impounded vehicle. See Kavanagh, 2007-Ohio-
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1103, at ¶ 11; Neal, 2012-Ohio-2609, at ¶ 7; Robinson, 2000 WL 1587007, at *3. Mr. Nixon’s sole 

assignment of error is overruled. 

III.

{¶18} Mr. Nixon’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Summit County 

Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellant.

JILL FLAGG LANZINGER

FOR THE COURT

HENSAL, P. J.

CONCURS.
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CARR, J.

DISSENTING.

{¶19} I respectfully dissent as I would conclude that the trial court erred in denying 

Nixon’s motion to suppress because the evidence presented at the suppression hearing indicated 

that the purported need to inventory the vehicle driven by Nixon was merely a pretext in order to 

justify a more invasive probe for contraband. 

{¶20} A suppression challenge to the legitimacy of an inventory search will turn on 

whether there was evidence of a pretextual motive on the part of police and, further, whether the 

impoundment of the vehicle was conducted pursuant to standard police procedure. See State v. 

Neal, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25937, 2012-Ohio-2609, ¶ 7. The officer who testified at the 

suppression hearing indicated that the “administrative side” of the arrest involved conducting an 

inventory search of the vehicle Nixon was driving. The officer suggested that the search was 

conducted pursuant to the Akron Police Department’s Inventory Policy with the aim producing a 

tow report.

{¶21} As noted by the majority, the firearm recovered from the vehicle was never 

included in the tow report. Perhaps more troubling, a review of the body camera footage admitted 

at the suppression hearing suggests that the scope of the search went well beyond merely 

conducting an inventory of the vehicle. Almost immediately after placing Nixon in the cruiser, 

four police officers began searching the vehicle. None of the officers had clipboards or notepads 

to record the items that were subject to the inventory. Before long, a different officer opened the 

trunk of the vehicle and immediately pulled up the carpet to search for items that might be 

concealed. During the course of the search, the officers appeared to disregard items that would 

typically be subject to inventory while they searched for other items. Under these circumstances, 
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I would conclude that the strong evidence of a pretextual motive invalidated the legality of the 

inventory search. 

APPEARANCES:

ANGELA M. KILLE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN R. DIMARTINO, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.