IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 

SCOTT ALLEN RENNINGER, 

 Petitioner, 

 v. 

WARDEN GREENE, 

 Respondent. 

 No. 4:24-CV-01425 

 (Chief Judge Brann) 

 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

JANUARY 8, 2025 

 Petitioner Scott Allen Renninger filed the instant pro se petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 while confined at the Federal 

Correctional Institution (FCI) Allenwood Low, in White Deer, Pennsylvania. He 

asserts, among other claims, that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) failed to 

properly calculate his earned time credits under the First Step Act (FSA).1

 For the 

following reasons, the Court must dismiss Renninger’s Section 2241 petition.

I. BACKGROUND

When Renninger initially filed his Section 2241 petition, he was incarcerated 

at FCI Allenwood Low.2

 He has since been released to home confinement.3

1

 Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). 

2

 See Doc. 1 at 1. 

3

 See Doc. 11. Although never explicitly stated, it appears from his notice of change of address 

that Renninger has been released to home confinement. See id. He also implies in his traverse 

that he is in home confinement. See Doc. 10 at 1. 

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In his initial Section 2241 petition filed in August 2024, Renninger 

contended that BOP officials miscalculated his FSA time credits and concomitant 

release date. Specifically, he maintains that he should have been credited for an 

additional 62 days of FSA programming from the date of his sentencing on 

October 20, 2022, to his arrival at FCI Allenwood Low on December 22, 2022.4

 

Renninger then filed a supplemental memorandum on September 10, 2024, 

which contained two additional claims: (1) the BOP “abused its discretion” by 

applying a “greatest severity Public Safety Factor” to him and by misclassifying 

his crime of conviction as a “crime of violence”; and (2) the BOP failed to comply 

with the express terms of his Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement regarding placement 

in the minimum security satellite camp at FCI Lewisburg rather than FCI 

Allenwood Low.5

Following Renninger’s release to home confinement in October 2024, it 

appeared that most, if not all, of his Section 2241 challenges had become moot. 

The Court thus ordered Renninger to show cause as to why his Section 2241 

petition should not be dismissed as moot due to his release to home confinement.6

 

Renninger timely responded, asserting that his initial FSA time credit 

dispute was not moot because a ruling in his favor could hasten his ultimate release 

4

 See Doc. 1 at 2, 7; Doc. 1-2. 

5

 See generally Doc. 8. 

6

 Doc. 12. 

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date.7 He further asserted that he is still asking the Court to “direct the BOP to 

modify his inmate record to reflect that” he was not convicted of a “crime of 

violence,” one of the two claims contained in his supplemental memorandum.8

 

These two remaining habeas claims are fully briefed and ripe for disposition. 

II. DISCUSSION

 Respondent asserts that Renninger’s FSA credit calculation claim must be 

dismissed because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Respondent 

additionally contends that Renninger’s claims either fail on the merits or are not 

cognizable. The Court agrees that Renninger failed to exhaust his FSA time credit 

claim and that his classification claim is not cognizable on habeas review. Thus, 

his Section 2241 petition must be dismissed. 

A. Administrative Exhaustion 

Although there is no explicit statutory exhaustion requirement for Section 

2241 habeas petitions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has 

consistently held that exhaustion applies to such claims.9

 Exhaustion allows the 

relevant agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise, conserves 

7

 Doc. 13 at 1. 

8

 Id.

9

 See Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 

819 F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 1986); Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 

1996)). 

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judicial resources, and provides agencies the opportunity to “correct their own 

errors” thereby fostering “administrative autonomy.”10 

The BOP has a specific internal system through which federal prisoners can 

request review of nearly any aspect of their imprisonment.11 That process begins 

with an informal request to staff and progresses to formal review by the warden, 

appeal with the Regional Director, and—ultimately—final appeal to the General 

Counsel.12 In challenges to disciplinary proceedings before a DHO, the normal 

administrative process is modified slightly, and only requires an inmate to appeal 

the DHO’s decision to the Regional Director and then to final review with the 

General Counsel.13

Exhaustion is the rule in most cases, and failure to exhaust will generally 

preclude federal habeas review.14 Only in rare circumstances is exhaustion of 

administrative remedies not required. For example, exhaustion is unnecessary if 

the issue presented is one that involves only statutory construction.15 Exhaustion is 

likewise excused when it would be futile.16 “In order to invoke the futility 

10 Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761-62 (citations omitted). 

11 See generally 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-.19. 

12 See id. §§ 542.13-.15. 

13 See id. §§ 542.14(d)(2), 542.15. 

14 See Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761-62. 

15 See Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433-34 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 

F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981)). 

16 Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 516 n.7 (1982); see Cottillion v. United Refining Co., 781 F.3d 

47, 54 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming, in ERISA context, futility exception to exhaustion 

requirement). 

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exception to exhaustion, a party must ‘provide a clear and positive showing’ of 

futility before the District Court.”17

Renninger concedes that he did not exhaust his FSA credit calculation 

claim.18 With respect to that claim, he appealed to the Regional Director but did 

not submit a final appeal to the General Counsel.19 Renninger does not provide 

any basis to establish cause and prejudice to excuse his failure to complete the final 

step in the administrative remedy process.20

Renninger instead maintains that “exhaustion would be futile,” asserting that 

the BOP will not “break with its own internal policy” without being forced to do so 

by the court.21 Such a general and conclusory argument, however, does not 

establish a “clear and positive showing of futility” to circumvent exhaustion. 

Renninger should have, and indeed was required to, press his FSA credit 

calculation claim through final review with the General Counsel.22 He did not, and 

17 Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting D’Amico v. CBS Corp., 297 

F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2002)). 

18 See Doc. 10 at 1-2. 

19 See Docs. 1-9 through 1-15; Doc. 9-2 at 3 ¶ 12. 

20 It is unclear whether Renninger exhausted his “crime of violence” administrative classification 

claim. Respondent implies that this claim was exhausted. See Doc. 9 at 5 n.1. However, the 

declaration of Case Management Coordinator Bruce Beaver implies that only Renninger’s 

Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP) eligibility claim was exhausted. See Doc. 9-2 at 3 

¶ 12 (averring that the only administrative remedy Renninger exhausted through final review 

with the General Counsel or “Central Office” was his claim regarding RDAP eligibility, a 

claim Renninger has explicitly acknowledged he did not raise in his Section 2241 petition and 

which he is not pursuing as a habeas claim, see Doc. 10 at 1). 

21 Doc. 10 at 1-2. 

22 Renninger’s attachments to his initial Section 2241 petition establish that he received his 

response from the Regional Director in February 2024, (see Doc. 1-15), giving him ample time 

to submit his final appeal to the General Counsel before filing the instant habeas petition. 

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thus procedurally defaulted this claim.23 Moreover, under Renninger’s reasoning, 

virtually no claim would need to be appealed to intermediate review with the 

Regional Director or to final review with the General Counsel if either the warden 

or the Regional Director, respectively, relied on BOP policy in their administrative 

remedy denials. Such a broad interpretation of “futility” would eviscerate the 

BOP’s carefully crafted multi-stage administrative remedy process. 

Additionally, FSA time credit calculations are well within the purview of the 

BOP, which is best situated to address (and potentially correct) these issues in the 

first instance. Renninger’s failure to exhaust his time credit calculation claim thus 

deprives this Court of a properly developed record for review.24 Accordingly, this 

claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.25

 

23 See Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761-62; see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (explaining 

that administrative exhaustion requires “proper exhaustion of administrative remedies, which 

‘means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency 

addresses the issues on the merits)’” (citation omitted)). 

24 See Donnelly v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 10-cv-3105, 2012 WL 2357511, at *4-5 (D. Minn. 

May 30, 2012) (noting that one of the primary purposes of exhaustion is to develop the relevant 

factual and legal issues, as “[t]he administrative remedies process hones the factual record, and 

brings clarity to the legal issues presented in the case,” and concluding that the purported 

challenge to a BOP policy “should have been fine-tuned and vetted before being brought into 

federal court”), report & recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 2357490 (D. Minn. June 20, 

2012). 

25 See Moscato, 98 F.3d at 762; Ryan v. United States, 415 F. App’x 345, 347 (3d Cir. 2011) 

(nonprecedential) (“As [Petitioner] readily acknowledges that he failed to exhaust available 

administrative grievance processes, the District Court was correct to dismiss his petition.” 

(citing Moscato, 98 F.3d at 760)). 

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B. “Crime of Violence” Classification Challenge 

The Court will assume that Renninger administratively exhausted his 

supplemental challenge to the BOP’s “crime of violence” classification. That 

claim, however, is not cognizable on federal habeas review. 

Section 2241 authorizes a federal court to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a 

prisoner who “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of 

the United States.”26 A habeas corpus petition is appropriate when the petitioner 

“is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the 

relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a 

speedier release from that imprisonment.”27 Habeas jurisdiction also lies for 

certain challenges regarding the execution of a prisoner’s sentence.28 However, as 

the Supreme Court of the United States has explained, habeas corpus is not the 

appropriate procedural vehicle where the relief sought would “neither terminat[e] 

custody, accelerat[e] the future date of release from custody, nor reduc[e] the level 

of custody.”29 

26 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

27 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 

28 See Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005); Cardona v. Bledsoe, 

681 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining that claims regarding execution of sentence are 

cognizable on habeas review when the “BOP’s conduct [is] somehow inconsistent with a 

command or recommendation in the sentencing judgment”). 

29 Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 534 (2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Wilkinson v. 

Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 86 (2005)). 

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 Renninger has not explained or established how the BOP’s internal, 

administrative classification of his offense of conviction as a “crime of violence” 

affects the fact or duration of his confinement or the execution of his current 

sentence.30 Renninger further admits that he “does not envision any scenario that 

would bring him back to prison[.]”31 

In his show-cause response, he alleges—without argument or legal 

support—that the BOP’s classification “has a direct bearing on [his] Second 

Amendment rights[.]”32 Even assuming for the sake of argument that this 

proposition is accurate, Renninger has not demonstrated how such an ancillary 

consequence would render his claim cognizable in a Section 2241 petition, as it 

does not affect the fact, duration, or execution of his federal sentence. 

Consequently, there is no habeas jurisdiction for the current iteration of 

Renninger’s “crime of violence” classification challenge. 

30 It appears, from attachments to his supplemental memorandum, that the BOP’s classification—

or alleged misclassification—of Renninger’s offense of conviction as a crime of violence 

affected his potential for early release under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) following successful 

completion of RDAP. See Doc. 8-2. This specific claim, however, has not been pressed in the 

instant Section 2241 petition and Renninger plainly asserts that he is “no longer seeking the 

one-year sentence reduction [he] was entitled to for finishing RDAP.” Doc. 10 at 1. Renninger 

has failed to establish how the BOP’s classification of his offense of conviction otherwise 

affects the duration or execution of his sentence beyond RDAP eligibility and Section 3621(e). 

31 Doc. 8 at 4. 

32 Doc. 13 at 1. 

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court must dismiss Renninger’s petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. An appropriate Order follows. 

 BY THE COURT: 

s/ Matthew W. Brann 

 Matthew W. Brann 

 Chief United States District Judge 

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