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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

 

LOIS JEAN BRENNAN, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 

 v. 

 

 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 

 

 Defendant. 

CASE NO. 4:15-cv-01176-MWB-GBC 

 

(JUDGE BRANN) 

(MAGISTRATE JUDGE COHN) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL 

Docs. 1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Introduction 

The above-captioned action is one seeking review of a decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant”) denying the application of Lois 

Jean Brennan (“Plaintiff”) for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and 

supplemental security income (“SSI”) under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§§401-433, 1382-1383 (the “Act”) and Social Security Regulations, 20 C.F.R. 

§§404.1501 et seq., §§416.901 et. seq.1 (the “Regulations”). Plaintiff’s only 

argument on appeal is that the ALJ should have adopted her treating psychiatrist’s 

medical opinion into the residual functional capacity. (Pl. Brief). 

 1

 Part 404 governs DIB, Part 416 governs SSI. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107 

(2000). Like Sims, these regulations “are, as relevant here, not materially different” 

and the Court “will therefore omit references to the latter regulations.” Id.

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The ALJ “must...adopt” any medical opinion entitled to controlling weight. 

SSR 96-5p. The Regulations afford special deference to treating sources (“treating 

source rule”).2

 The ALJ must assign controlling weight to any well-supported 

treating source medical opinion unless the ALJ identifies substantial inconsistent 

evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(2). The Third Circuit consistently holds that 

lay reinterpretation of medical evidence is not substantial evidence to decline to 

adopt a treating source medical opinion. Burns v. Colvin, No. 1:14–CV–1925, 

2016 WL 147269 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2016) (internal citations omitted). The Third 

Circuit has also held that a medical opinion from a non-treating, non-examining 

source who did not review a complete record was “not substantial.” Morales v. 

Apfel, 225 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Brownawell v. Comm'r Of Soc. Sec., 

554 F.3d 352 (3d Cir. 2008). In contrast, in Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 

2011), the Third Circuit affirmed where there were two non-treating opinions, one 

from a source who reviewed the entire record. Id. 

 2

 The Court notes that, on September 9, 2016, the SSA proposed to eliminate the 

treating source rule and stop providing special deference to treating sources. See

Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 81 FR 62560-

01 ("we would consider the persuasiveness of medical opinions and prior 

administrative medical findings from all medical sources equally using the factors 

discussed below. We would not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, 

including controlling weight, to any prior administrative medical finding or 

medical opinion, including from an individual's own healthcare providers"). This 

proposed revision is contained in a Notice of Proposed Rule Making and the 

comment period has not yet closed, so it is unclear whether the SSA will adopt this 

change. 

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This case law is consistent with SSR 96-6p, which provides that an ALJ may 

only credit a non-treating, non-examining source over a treating source in 

“appropriate circumstances,” such as when the non-treating, non-examining source 

was able to review a “complete case record...which provides more detailed and 

comprehensive information than what was available to the individual's treating 

source.” Id. This is only one example of “appropriate circumstances,” but the 

phrase should be construed as requiring a similarly compelling reason. See Ali v. 

Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 223, 128 S. Ct. 831, 838, 169 L. Ed. 2d 680 

(2008) (“the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to 

the one with specific enumeration”). SSR 96-6p is consistent with SSR 96-2p, 

which provides that “in cases at the administrative law judge (ALJ) or Appeals 

Council (AC) level, the ALJ or the AC may need to consult a medical expert to 

gain more insight into what the clinical signs and laboratory findings signify in 

order to decide whether a medical opinion is well-supported or whether it is not 

inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record.” Id. Morales, 

Brown, and SSR 96-6p are all consistent with the prohibition on lay 

reinterpretation of evidence, because a source who reviews a complete record 

obviates the need for the ALJ to reinterpret medical evidence. 

Here, the non-examining, non-treating source did not technically review a 

complete record. Doc. 9. However, the non-examining source reviewed almost all 

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of the record, the subsequent medical records contained no new objective findings 

or diagnoses, and the ALJ properly evaluated the credibility of Plaintiff’s 

subjective claims and the other non-medical evidence. Doc. 9. The non-examining, 

non-treating source did not mischaracterize the record or make other errors. Doc. 9. 

Consistent with Brown, the non-examining, non-treating source provides 

substantial inconsistent evidence to assign less than controlling weight to the 

treating source medical opinion. 

Addressing the controlling weight provision does not end the inquiry. Even 

when not assigned controlling weight, treating source medical opinions are entitled 

to deference and the ALJ must provide “good reasons” to assign greater weight to 

a non-treating opinion. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(2). Here, the ALJ provided good 

reasons. In addition to citing the non-treating source opinion, the ALJ properly 

concluded that the treatment record contradicted the treating source. The treating 

source opined that Plaintiff's symptoms included suicidal ideation, difficulty 

concentrating or thinking, hallucinations, delusions, or paranoid thinking. (Tr. 411-

13). At each visit, Plaintiff reported that her delusions, hallucinations, disorganized 

behaviors, disorganized thinking, and paranoia had all "resolved." (Tr. 391, 464-

83). She denied suicidal ideation at every visit. (Tr. 391, 464-83). At every visit, 

mental status examinations indicated normal attention and concentration. (Tr. 391, 

464-83). The treating source opined that Plaintiff had "a persistent irrational fear 

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of a specific object, activity, or situation which results in a compelling desire to 

avoid the dreaded object, activity, or situation" and "recurrent obsessions or 

compulsions which are a source of marked distress," and "recurrent and intrusive 

recollections of a traumatic experience which are a source of marked distress." (Tr. 

414). However, at every visit, Plaintiff "denie[d] and [did] not demonstrate any 

symptoms of... obsessive/compulsive behaviors." (Tr. 392, 464-83). These 

observations did not require the ALJ to interpret raw medical data or draw 

inappropriate inferences. 

The Court reviews the ALJ’s decision under the deferential substantial 

evidence standard. Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003). 

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ decision unless no “reasonable mind might 

accept [the relevant evidence] as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal 

citations omitted). “Stated differently, this standard is met if there is sufficient 

evidence ‘to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict.’” Id. 

(quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 

L.Ed. 456 (1951)). Here, the Court would not direct a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s appeal be denied, 

the decision of the Commissioner be affirmed, and the case closed. 

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II. Procedural Background 

On August 20, 2012, Plaintiff applied for DIB. (Tr. 103-06). On November 

1, 2012, the Bureau of Disability Determination (“state agency”) denied Plaintiff’s 

application (Tr. 67-77), and Plaintiff requested a hearing. (Tr. 84-85). On January 

7, 2014, an ALJ held a hearing at which Plaintiff—who was represented by an 

attorney—and a vocational expert (“VE”) appeared and testified. (Tr. 31-66). On 

February 21, 2014, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits. (Tr. 

10-30). Plaintiff requested review with the Appeals Council (Tr. 8-9), which the 

Appeals Council denied on March 18, 2015, affirming the decision of the ALJ as 

the “final decision” of the Commissioner. (Tr. 2-7). See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 

103, 107 (2000). 

On June 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed the above-captioned action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g) to appeal the decision of the Commissioner. (Doc. 1). On August 

18, 2015, the Commissioner filed an answer and administrative transcript of 

proceedings. (Docs. 8, 9). On October 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed a brief in support of 

the appeal (“Pl. Brief”). (Doc. 10). On October 23, 2015, Defendant filed a brief in 

response (“Def. Brief”). (Doc. 11). On November 6, 2015, Plaintiff filed a brief in 

reply. (“Pl. Reply”). (Doc. 12). On January 12, 2016, the Court referred this case to 

the undersigned Magistrate Judge. The matter is now ripe for review. 

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III. Standard of Review and Sequential Evaluation Process 

To receive benefits under the Act, a claimant must establish an “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act requires 

that a claimant for disability benefits show that: 

He is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering 

his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of 

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, 

regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which 

he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether 

he would be hired if he applied for work. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). 

The ALJ uses a five-step evaluation process to determine if a person is 

eligible for disability benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The ALJ must 

sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful 

activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the 

claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed impairment from 20 C.F.R. Part 

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“Listing”); (4) whether the claimant’s impairment 

prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5) whether the 

claimant’s impairment prevents the claimant from doing any other work. See 20 

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C.F.R. §§ 404.1520. Before step four in this process, the ALJ must also determine 

Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e). 

The disability determination involves shifting burdens of proof. The 

claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. If the claimant 

satisfies this burden, then the Commissioner must show at step five that jobs exist 

in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 

1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). The ultimate burden of proving disability under the Act 

lies with the claimant. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a). 

When reviewing the denial of disability benefits, the Court must determine 

whether substantial evidence supports the denial. Johnson v. Commissioner of 

Social Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence is a deferential 

standard of review. See Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004). 

Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, 

but rather ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.’” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) 

(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial 

evidence is “less than a preponderance” and “more than a mere scintilla.” Jesurum 

v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) 

(citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “Stated differently, this 

standard is met if there is sufficient evidence ‘to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a 

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refusal to direct a verdict.’” Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003) 

(quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 

L.Ed. 456 (1951)). 

IV. Relevant Facts in the Record 

A. Background 

The administrative record in this case is 517 pages long. Doc. 9. Plaintiff 

was born in 1955 and was classified by the Regulations as a person of advanced 

age through February 21, 2014, the date of the ALJ decision. (Tr. 13-26); 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1563. Plaintiff has at least a high school education and past relevant 

work as a nursing home housekeeper. (Tr. 25). Plaintiff established medically 

determinable, severe impairments of diverticulitis, a history of venous 

insufficiency, hypertension, hyperthyroidism, major depressive disorder and 

anxiety disorder. The ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform simple work with 

only occasional interaction with the public, which would allow her to perform her 

past relevant work. (Tr. 25). The VE also testified that if Plaintiff was further 

limited to occasional interaction with supervisors and coworkers, Plaintiff could 

also perform her past relevant work. (Tr. 56). Plaintiff’s appeal addresses only her 

mental impairments. (Pl. Brief). 

B. Non-Treating Source Medical Opinion 

On September 26, 2012, , non-treating, non-examining source Dr. Galdieri 

reviewed Plaintiff’s file and authored an opinion. (Tr. 67-71). Dr. Galdieri opined 

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that she had no more than moderate mental limitations. (Tr. 67-71). Dr. Galidieri 

cited two treatment records, from July 9, 2012 with psychiatrist Dr. Boriosi, and 

August 31, 2012, with new treating psychiatrist Dr. Matthew Berger, M.D., that 

indicated Plaintiff was "improved," had no symptoms of ADHD, exhibited only 

depression on examination, and Plaintiff's report that she could perform activities 

like caring for her personal hygiene, riding as a passenger in a car, travel alone, do 

chores, shop, and socialize. (Tr. 70, 391, 401). Dr. Berger's August 31, 2012 

treatment note also indicates that Plaintiff reported crying, delusions, 

hallucinations, disorganized behaviors, disorganized thinking, and paranoia had all 

"resolved." (Tr. 391). Aside from depression, mental status examinations was 

normal, with cooperative attitude, normal speech, coherent and logical thought 

processes, intact memory, normal attention and concentration, and intact insight 

and judgment. (Tr. 391). 

C. Medical Records, Function Reports, and Testimony 

Dr. Galdieri accurately characterized the evidence submitted prior to the 

opinion. Prior to Dr. Berger's August 31, 2012 treatment note, Plaintiff had 

reported worsening anxiety to her primary care provider in July of 2012, and was 

hospitalized in August of 2012 for psychiatric impairments. (Tr. 273-93, 315). In 

August of 2012, she was placed on a combination of three medications that she 

would take through the remainder of the relevant period: Geodon, Prozac, and 

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Xanax. (Tr. 273-93, 316). By August 29, 2012, less than four months after her 

alleged onset date, she reported to her primary care physician that she was "less 

anxious." (Tr. 320). 

On September 4, 2012, Plaintiff submitted a Function Report in support of 

her claim for benefits and reported intense changes in emotions, schizophrenia 

symptoms, difficulty concentrating, social isolation, panic attacks, problems with 

memory, difficulty understanding instructions, an inability to finish tasks, and 

problems handling stress or changes in routine. (158-70). Plaintiff's sister, son, and 

friend submitted letters containing similar reports. (Tr. 184-88). 

The records submitted after Dr. Galdieri and Dr. Potera authored their 

opinions contain treating source medical opinions from Dr. Berger and from Dr. 

Haley supporting Plaintiff's claim for benefits, updated treatment records from Dr. 

Berger and Dr. Haley, and medical records from Marian Community Hospital. 

(Tr. 411-517). The Marian Community Hospital Records consist of laboratory and 

radiology reports that generally indicate normal physical findings. (Tr. 491-517). 

Dr. Haley's updated records indicated that a cardiologist opined that Plaintiff 

needed only a "low dose" beta blocker and did not need invasive cardiac testing. 

(Tr. 449). In September of 2012, Plaintiff had hand tremors with sustenation but 

denied neurological and musculoskeletal symptoms. (Tr. 418-19). In February of 

2013, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Haley that she had applied for disability "due to 

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mental issues," and Dr. Haley agreed that she was "unable to work." (Tr. 421). 

Plaintiff denied neurological or musculoskeletal symptoms and Dr. Haley did not 

examine her extremities. (Tr. 421). In May of 2013, Plaintiff denied neurological 

or musculoskeletal symptom, examination of the extremities was normal, and there 

were no tremors with sustenation. (Tr. 426-27). On October 14, 2013, Plaintiff 

denied neurological and musculoskeletal symptoms. (Tr. 428). Providers noted that 

a PIXI bone density scan "was 1.5" (Tr. 428). Plaintiff does not identify where the 

PIXI scan is located in the record, and an earlier DEXA bone density scan, from 

June of 2012, had been normal. (Tr. 348). On October 31, 2013, Plaintiff reported 

"bilateral carpal tunnel" for the first time, and the same day, and Dr. Haley opined 

that it was "debilitating" and she was "totally disabled" as a result. (Tr. 432-33). 

Dr. Berger's updated records contain treatment notes from September, 

October, and November of 2012, and January, May, August, and November of 

2013. (Tr. 464-83). At each visit, Plaintiff reported that her crying, delusions, 

hallucinations, disorganized behaviors, disorganized thinking, and paranoia had all 

"resolved." (Tr. 464-83). Aside from occasional depression or anxiety, mental 

status examinations were normal, with cooperative attitude, normal speech, 

coherent and logical thought processes, intact memory, normal attention and 

concentration, and intact insight and judgment. (Tr 464-83). In October and 

November of 2012 and January of 2013, Plaintiff exhibited no depression or 

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anxiety. (Tr. 464-83). Plaintiff's GAF ranged from 50-58. (Tr 464-83). Plaintiff 

denied symptoms of bipolar disorder and medication sides effects at each visit. (Tr. 

464-83). Plaintiff treated with Klonopin, Prozac, and Geodon at each visit, at the 

same dose aside from an increase in Prozac in October of 2012. (Tr. 464-83). At 

every visit, Plaintiff "denie[d] and [did] not demonstrate any symptoms 

of...obsessive/compulsive behaviors." (Tr. 392, 464-83). 

On January 4, 2014, Plaintiff testified in support of her claim for benefits 

that she continued experiencing panic attacks, auditory hallucinations, problems 

concentrating, and rambling and incoherent speech. (Tr. 31-50). 

D. Treating Source Medical Opinions 

In February of 2013, Dr. Berger opined that Plaintiff's symptoms, allegedly 

including suicidal ideation, difficulty concentrating or thinking, hallucinations, 

delusions, or paranoid thinking, would cause marked limitations in social function, 

concentration, and episodes of decompensation. (Tr. 411-13). Dr. Berger did not 

sign this opinion. (Tr. 414, 417). In November of 2013, Dr. Berger submitted a 

signed medical opinion. (Tr. 417). Dr. Berger opined that Plaintiff had "generalized 

persistent anxiety" characterized by motor tension and apprehensive expectation 

with "a persistent irrational fear of a specific object, activity, or situation which 

results in a compelling desire to avoid the dreaded object, activity, or situation," 

"recurrent severe panic attacks manifested by a sudden unpredictable onset of 

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intense apprehension, fear, terror and sense of impending doom occurring on the 

average of at least once per week," "recurrent obsessions or compulsions which 

are a source of marked distress," and "recurrent and intrusive recollections of a 

traumatic experience which are a source of marked distress." (Tr. 414). 

In October of 2013, Dr. Haley opined that Plaintiff could sit, stand, or walk 

for eight hours out of an eight-hour workday, but bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome 

"constantly" interfered with her ability to concentrate and caused hand numbness 

and weakness. (Tr. 435). Dr. Haley opined that Plaintiff's hand symptoms would 

require additional unscheduled breaks during the workday and would preclude 

grasping, fine manipulations, pushing, and pulling. (Tr. 436-37). Dr. Haley opined 

that Plaintiff could not lift more than five pounds occasionally. (Tr. 436). On 

December 19, 2013, Dr. Haley opined that Plaintiff could not sit, stand, or walk for 

more than four hours in an eight-hour workday, could lift only less than ten pounds 

occasionally, would have to walk around every ten minutes for at least ten minutes, 

could not perform any postural activities or activities with her upper extremities, 

and would be absent more than four days per month. (Tr. 487) Dr. Haley cited 

Plaintiff's "longstanding, progressive psychological and physical disabilities," her 

palsy, "psychological and medical/physical disability," and "history and physical." 

(Tr. 486-87). 

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V. Plaintiff Allegations of Error 

A. Mental Health Treating Source Medical Opinion 

1. Plaintiff Allegations 

In this appeal, Plaintiff challenges only the weight assigned to the opinions 

of Dr. Berger, her treating psychiatrist. (Pl. Brief). Plaintiff cites her July 2012 

report of anxiety to Dr. Haley and Dr. Berger's initial report, during her 

hospitalization, of loosening associations, delusions, hallucinations, paranoia, and 

impaired attention. (Pl. Brief at 5-7). Plaintiff notes that she continued reporting 

subjective symptoms to Dr. Berger through the relevant period, but does not 

acknowledge that she never again reported loosening of associations, delusions, 

hallucinations, paranoia or other psychotic symptoms. (Pl. Brief at 7-8). Plaintiff 

also cites Plaintiff's sister's report. (Pl. Brief at 8). 

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in finding her activities of daily living 

contradicted Dr. Berger's opinions. (Pl. Reply at 1-3). The Court agrees. However, 

“whether the error is harmless depends on whether the other reasons cited by the 

ALJ...provide substantial evidence for her decision.” Brumbaugh v. Colvin, 3:14–

CV–888, 2014 WL 5325346, at *16 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 20, 2014). Here, the ALJ also 

relied on Dr. Galdieri's opinion, noted that Dr. Galdieri's opinion was more 

consistent with her "treatment history," elsewhere described as "conservative," and 

cited normal findings on mental status examination. (Tr. 22-24). 

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Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in failing to write down how he 

considered Dr. Berger's specialization. (Pl. Brief at 9). First, Plaintiff asserts that 

Dr. Berger should be credited because he is a specialist in mental health, but does 

not acknowledge that Dr. Galdieri is also a specialist in mental health. (Pl. Brief at 

8-9). Second, “there is a distinction between what an adjudicator must consider and 

what the adjudicator must explain in the disability determination or decision.” SSR 

06-3p; see also Phillips v. Barnhart, 91 Fed.Appx. 775, 780 (3d Cir. 2004) (“the 

ALJ's mere failure to cite specific evidence does not establish that the ALJ failed to 

consider it”) (quoting Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir.1998)); Francis v. 

Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 414 Fed.Appx. 802, 804-05 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Although 

the regulations instruct an ALJ to consider these factors, they expressly require 

only that the ALJ's decision include “good reasons ... for the weight ... give[n] [to 

the] treating source's opinion”—not an exhaustive factor-by-factor 

analysis...Procedurally, the regulations require no more.”) (internal citations 

omitted). 

If explanation allows meaningful judicial review, it suffices. See Christ the 

King Manor, Inc. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 305 

(3d Cir. 2013) (Court may “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the 

agency's path may reasonably be discerned”); Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 

505 (3d Cir. 2004) (ALJ is not required to “use particular language or adhere to a 

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particular format in conducting his analysis” and instead must only “ensure that 

there is sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings to permit 

meaningful review.”); Hur v. Comm’r Soc Sec., 94 F. App’x130, 133(3d Cir. 2004) 

(“There is no requirement that the ALJ discuss in its opinion every tidbit of 

evidence included in the record”). 

 Plaintiff asserts that the Regulations provide that the ALJ "will" give the 

treating source greater weight if the treating physician "has reasonable knowledge" 

of the claimant's impairments. (Pl. Reply at 4). As discussed below, this is not the 

correct standard. An ALJ may assign greater weight to a non-treating source in any 

appropriate circumstance; the weight assigned to a treating source is not 

determined by the single factor of "reasonable knowledge" identified by the 

Plaintiff. See SSR 96-6p. 

Plaintiff notes that Dr. Galdieri did not review "the entire record." (Pl. Brief 

at 10) (Pl. Reply at 4). However, Dr. Galdieri reviewed the functional equivalent of 

a complete record. Subsequent mental health records contained no new findings, 

diagnoses, or subjective reports of symptom exacerbation. The only difference 

between Dr. Berger's August 31, 2012 treatment record and subsequent treatment 

records were the higher GAF scores in subsequent records. (Tr. 392, 464-83). 

There were no new diagnoses or objective findings on mental status examination. 

(Tr. 392, 464-83). Plaintiff's medications remained the same, at the same dosage, 

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aside from an increase in Prozac in October of 2012. (Tr. 392, 463-84). Relying on 

Dr. Potera's opinion did not require the ALJ to reinterpret medical evidence. 

The ALJ was also not required to draw inferences from medical data in order 

to find that Dr. Berger's treatment record contradicted his opinion. Dr. Berger 

opined that Plaintiff's symptoms included suicidal ideation, difficulty concentrating 

or thinking, hallucinations, delusions, or paranoid thinking. (Tr. 411-13).At each 

visit, Plaintiff reported that her delusions, hallucinations, disorganized behaviors, 

disorganized thinking, and paranoia had all "resolved." (Tr. 391, 464-83). She 

denied suicidal ideation at every visit. (Tr. 391, 464-83). At every visit, mental 

status examinations indicated normal attention and concentration. (Tr. 391, 464-

83). Dr. Berger opined that Plaintiff had "a persistent irrational fear of a specific 

object, activity, or situation which results in a compelling desire to avoid the 

dreaded object, activity, or situation" and "recurrent obsessions or compulsions 

which are a source of marked distress," and "recurrent and intrusive recollections 

of a traumatic experience which are a source of marked distress." (Tr. 414). 

However, at every visit, Plaintiff "denie[d] and [did] not demonstrate any 

symptoms of... obsessive/compulsive behaviors." (Tr. 392, 464-83). 

Plaintiff asserts that the record "consistently" showed flat affect, poor eye 

contact, tremors, anxiety, or depression, but, after Plaintiff's August 2012 

hospitalization, these findings only appeared occasionally, with multiple mental 

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status examinations revealing entirely normal findings. (Pl. Brief at 10). Mental 

status examinations support the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff's mental symptoms 

were not disabling within the meaning of the Act, which requires a twelve-month 

duration. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ was not entitled to rely on the GAF scores. 

However, the ALJ is required to evaluate all medical opinions, and defer to 

medical opinions by treating sources. The Regulations provide a “broad definition” 

of medical opinion. See Wrights v. Colvin, No. 3:13-CV-02516-GBC, 2015 WL 

2344948, at *10 (M.D. Pa. May 14, 2015) (citing 20 C.F.R. §1527(a)(2) (“Medical 

opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable 

medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your 

impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can 

still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.”)). GAF 

scores fall within this definition.3

 GAF scores are more probative of non-disability 

than disability. This is because: 

 3 Schwartz v. Colvin, 3:12-CV-01070, 2014 WL 257846 at *5, n. 15 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 

23, 2014) (“The GAF score allows a clinician to indicate his judgment of a person's 

overall psychological, social and occupational functioning, in order to assess the 

person's mental health illness... A GAF score of 51 to 60 represents moderate 

symptoms or any moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school 

functioning.. A GAF score of 61 to 70 represents some mild symptoms or some 

difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning, but generally functioning 

pretty well with some meaningful interpersonal relationships”) (citing Diagnostic 

and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 3–32 (4th ed.1994). 

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The GAF score allows a clinician to indicate his judgment of a 

person's overall psychological, social and occupational functioning, in 

order to assess the person's mental health illness. A GAF score is set 

within a particular range if either the symptom severity or the level of 

functioning falls within that range. The score is useful in planning 

treatment and predicting outcomes. Id. The GAF rating is the single 

value that best reflects the individual's overall functioning at the time 

of examination. The rating, however, has two components: (1) 

symptom severity and (2) social and occupational functioning. The 

GAF is within a particular range if either the symptom severity or the 

social and occupational level of functioning falls within that range. 

When the individual's symptom severity and functioning level are 

discordant, the GAF rating reflects the worse of the two. 

Schwartz v. Colvin, 3:12-CV-01070, 2014 WL 257846 at *5, n. 15 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 

23, 2014). Thus, a GAF score of 55 indicates that neither the claimant’s functional 

impairment nor symptoms are more than moderate. Id. Here, on all but one 

treatment date after Plaintiff's August 2012 hospitalization, Plaintiff's GAF scores 

were in the "moderate" range, meaning that Plaintiff could not be more than 

moderately impaired in occupational function. Supra. Again, the GAF scores 

support the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff's mental symptoms were not disabling 

within the meaning of the Act, which requires a twelve-month duration. Supra.

Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that no reasonable person would have relied on 

Dr. Galdieri's opinion, who reviewed records containing all of the pertinent 

objective findings and diagnoses, Dr. Galdieri's interpretation of the mental status 

examinations, and her conservative treatment to find that she had no more than 

moderate mental health limitations. The Court would not direct a verdict in 

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Plaintiff's favor if the case were before a jury. As discussed in more detail below, 

the Court does not recommend remand on these grounds. 

2. Controlling Weight 

Dr. Berger was an acceptable medical source. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(a); (Tr. 

486-87). Dr. Berger was also a treating source because Dr. Berger treated Plaintiff 

“a number of times and long enough to have obtained a longitudinal picture of 

[Plaintiff’s] impairment[s].” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Dr. Berger’s statement is 

a medical opinion “on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of [Plaintiff’s] 

impairment(s),” and was not a statement on an issue reserved to the Commissioner. 

20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(2). Thus, the ALJ must assign Dr. Berger’s opinion 

controlling weight if it is well-supported and not inconsistent with other substantial 

evidence. Id. The Court finds that the ALJ developed substantial inconsistent 

evidence, so Dr. Berger’s opinion was not entitled to controlling weight. The Court 

addresses the extent to which Dr. Berger’s opinion was supported in the analysis of 

the 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(1)-(6) factors. 

The Third Circuit has held that a medical opinion from a non-treating, nonexamining source who did not review a complete record was “not substantial.” 

Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2000).4

 In Brownawell v. Comm'r Of Soc. 

 4

 The Social Security Administration abolished the policy of non-acquiescence in 

1990 with the promulgation of 20 C.F.R. §404.985. Id. An ALJ must follow all 

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Sec., 554 F.3d 352 (3d Cir. 2008), the only other precedential decision addressing 

an ALJ who relied on a non-treating, non-examining source who did not review a 

complete record to reject a treating source opinion, the Third Circuit also 

remanded. See Brownawell, 554 F.3d at 352. In contrast, in Brown v. Astrue, 649 

F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2011), the Third Circuit affirmed where there were two nontreating opinions, one from a source who reviewed the entire record. Id. see also 

Kreiser v. Colvin, No. 3:15-CV-1603, 2016 WL 704957, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 

2016) (Noting that expert “reviewed records...through November 2012” and “the 

record does not appear to contain....treatment records which post date [the 

expert’s] opinion”). 

In Diaz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2009), there were 

three non-treating medical opinions and one treating medical opinion, but the 

Court held that the non-treating medical opinions did not provide good enough 

reason to reject the treating source medical opinion because they were 

“perfunctory” and omitted significant objective findings. Id. at 505; see also Boyer 

v. Colvin, No. CV 1:14-CV-730, 2015 WL 6438870, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2015) 

(Non-examining state agency opinion was insufficient to reject treating source 

opinion where state agency physician “mischaracterized the record”). Diaz is 

consistent with SSR 96-6p, which provides that: 

 

precedential Circuit Court decisions if more than 120 days have passed since the 

decision was issued. See 20 C.F.R. §404.985(b). 

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The regulations provide progressively more rigorous tests for 

weighing opinions as the ties between the source of the opinion and 

the individual become weaker. For example, the opinions of 

physicians or psychologists who do not have a treatment relationship 

with the individual are weighed by stricter standards, based to a 

greater degree on medical evidence, qualifications, and explanations 

for the opinions, than are required of treating sources. 

For this reason, the opinions of State agency medical and 

psychological consultants and other program physicians and 

psychologists can be given weight only insofar as they are supported 

by evidence in the case record, considering such factors as the 

supportability of the opinion in the evidence including any evidence 

received at the administrative law judge and Appeals Council levels 

that was not before the State agency, the consistency of the opinion 

with the record as a whole, including other medical opinions, and any 

explanation for the opinion provided by the State agency medical or 

psychological consultant or other program physician or psychologist. 

Id. 

The case law is consistent with SSR 96-6p, which provides that an ALJ may 

only credit a non-treating, non-examining source over a treating source in 

“appropriate circumstances,” such as when the non-treating, non-examining source 

was able to review a “complete case record...which provides more detailed and 

comprehensive information than what was available to the individual's treating 

source.” Id. This may be only an example of “appropriate circumstances,” but the 

phrase should be construed as requiring a similarly compelling reason. See Ali v. 

Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 223, 128 S. Ct. 831, 838, 169 L. Ed. 2d 680 

(2008) (“the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to 

the one with specific enumeration”). 

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The ALJ is bound by SSR 96-6p and SSR 96-2p. See 20 C.F.R. § 

402.35(b)(1) (Social Security Rulings are “binding on all components of the Social 

Security Administration”). Moreover, Auer deference “ordinarily calls for 

deference to an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation.” 

Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166, 183 L. Ed. 2d 

153 (2012) (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 117 S. Ct. 905, 137 L. Ed. 2d 79 

(1997)). SSR 96-6p is the Social Security Administration’s interpretation of 20 

C.F.R. §404.1527(c), so it is entitled to deference by the Courts. 

Morales, Brown, and SSR 96-6p are all consistent with the prohibition on 

lay reinterpretation of evidence, because a source who reviews a complete record 

obviates the need for the ALJ to reinterpret medical evidence. See Burns v. Colvin, 

No. 1:14-CV-1925, 2016 WL 147269, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2016); Tilton v. 

Colvin, No. 1:14-CV-02219-YK-GBC, 2016 WL 1580003, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 

31, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:14-CV-2219, 2016 WL 

1569895 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2016) (citing Frankenfield v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 405, 

408 (3d Cir. 1988); Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26, 29–30 (3d Cir. 1986); Ferguson 

v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37, 36–37 (3d Cir. 1985); Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 

110, 115 (3d Cir. 1983); Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 874 (3d Cir. 1983); 

Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 494 (3d Cir. 1980); Rossi v. Califano, 602 

F.2d 55, 58–59, (3d Cir. 1979); Fowler v. Califano, 596 F.2d 600, 603 (3d Cir. 

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1979); Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 777 (3d Cir. 1978)). These “cases hold 

that, even under the deferential substantial evidence standard of review, lay 

reinterpretation of medical evidence is not inconsistent substantial evidence 

sufficient to reject an uncontradicted treating source medical opinion.” Id. (internal 

quotation omitted); see also Fed.R.Evid. 702, 1972 Advisory Committee Notes 

(“An intelligent evaluation of facts is often difficult or impossible without the 

application of some scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge ...'There is 

no more certain test for determining when experts may be used than the common 

sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine 

intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without 

enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject 

involved in the dispute' ”) (quoting Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand.L.Rev. 414, 

418 (1952)). If a non-examining source is able to review the complete case record, 

the ALJ will not be required to reinterpret the remainder of the record in order to 

reject a treating source opinion. 

Non-medical evidence, like activities of daily living that contradict the 

opinion, may only provide substantial inconsistent evidence in “extremely rare” 

cases. See Standards for Consultative Examinations and Existing Medical 

Evidence, 56 FR 36932-01 at 36936; Torres v. Barnhart, 139 F. App'x 411, 414 

(3d Cir. 2005) (ALJ permissibly rejected treating opinion “in combination with 

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other evidence of record including Claimant's own testimony”); Kays v. Colvin, 

No. 1:13-CV-02468, 2014 WL 7012758, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2014); Marr v. 

Colvin, No. 1:13-cv-2499 (M.D.P.A. April 15, 2015). However, the “non-medical” 

evidence must be truly “inconsistent” with the opinion. Standards for Consultative 

Examinations and Existing Medical Evidence, 56 FR 36932-01 at 36936; see also 

Chunn v. Barnhart, 397 F.3d 667, 672 (8th Cir. 2005) (“the ALJ's decision fails to 

explain how Chunn's activities and behaviors are inconsistent with Dr. Ziolkow's 

characterization of her mental capacity.”). 

The ALJ properly found that Dr. Berger’s opinion was inconsistent with 

other substantial evidence. The non-medical evidence did not contradict Dr. 

Berger’s opinion. However, Dr. Galdieri’s opinion does contradict Dr. Berger’s 

opinion, and this opinion is substantial evidence. Dr. Galdieri opined that she had 

no more than moderate mental limitations. (Tr. 67-71). Dr. Galidieri cited two 

treatment records, from July 9, 2012 with psychiatrist Dr. Boriosi, and August 31, 

2012, with new treating psychiatrist Dr. Matthew Berger, M.D., that indicated 

Plaintiff was "improved," had no symptoms of ADHD, exhibited only depression 

on examination, and Plaintiff's report that she could perform activities like caring 

for her personal hygiene, riding as a passenger in a car, travel alone, do chores, 

shop, and socialize. (Tr. 70, 391, 401). Dr. Berger's August 31, 2012 treatment note 

also indicates that Plaintiff reported crying, delusions, hallucinations, disorganized 

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behaviors, disorganized thinking, and paranoia had all "resolved." (Tr. 391). Aside 

from depression, mental status examinations was normal, with cooperative attitude, 

normal speech, coherent and logical thought processes, intact memory, normal 

attention and concentration, and intact insight and judgment. (Tr. 391). Dr. 

Galdieri accurately characterized the evidence submitted prior to the opinion. Prior 

to Dr. Berger's August 31, 2012 treatment note, Plaintiff had reported worsening 

anxiety to her primary care provider in July of 2012, and was hospitalized in 

August of 2012 for psychiatric impairments. (Tr. 273-93, 315). In August of 2012, 

she was placed on a combination of three medications that she would take through 

the remainder of the relevant period: Geodon, Prozac, and Xanax. (Tr. 273-93, 

316). By August 29, 2012, less than four months after her alleged onset date, she 

reported to her primary care physician that she was "less anxious." (Tr. 320). 

Dr. Galdieri’s opinion is inconsistent with Dr. Berger’s opinion. (Tr. 67-

71).(Tr. 486-87). In this case, Dr. Galdieri’s inability to review the entire record 

did not require the ALJ to engage in impermissible lay interpretation of medical 

evidence. See Gober, 574 F.2d at 777; Frankenfield, 861 F.2d at 408; Doak, 790 

F.2d at 29-30; Ferguson, 765 F.2d at 36-37; Kent, 710 F.2d at 115; Van Horn, 717 

F.2d at 874; Kelly, 625 F.2d at 494; Rossi, 602 F.2d at 58-59; Fowler, 596 F.2d at 

603. Dr. Galdieri reviewed the functional equivalent of a complete record. 

Subsequent mental health records contained no new findings, diagnoses, or 

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subjective reports of symptom exacerbation. The only difference between Dr. 

Berger's August 31, 2012 treatment record and subsequent treatment records were 

the higher GAF scores in subsequent records. (Tr. 392, 464-83). There were no 

new diagnoses or objective findings on mental status examination. (Tr. 392, 464-

83). Plaintiff's medications remained the same, at the same dosage, aside from an 

increase in Prozac in October of 2012. (Tr. 392, 463-84). Unlike Diaz, Dr. 

Galdieri’s opinion was not “perfunctory” and did not omit significant objective 

findings. Diaz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 2009). Dr. 

Galdieri provided sufficient explanation. See SSR 96-6p. 

The common theme from SSR 96-6p, SSR 96-2p, 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c) 

and Brown, Diaz, Brownawell, Morales, Frankenfield, Doak, Ferguson, Kent, Van 

Horn, Kelly, Rossi, Fowler and Gober is a prohibition on an ALJ undertaking lay 

reinterpretation of medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(2); SSR 96-6p; 

SSR 96-5p; SSR 96-2p; Brown, 649 F.3d at 196; Diaz, 577 F.3d at 505; 

Brownawell, 554 F.3d at 352; Morales, 225 F.3d at 317; Gober, 574 F.2d at 777; 

Frankenfield, 861 F.2d at 408; Doak, 790 F.2d at 29-30; Ferguson, 765 F.2d at 36-

37; Kent, 710 F.2d at 115; Van Horn, 717 F.2d at 874; Kelly, 625 F.2d at 494; 

Rossi, 602 F.2d at 58-59; Fowler, 596 F.2d at 603. When a medical source reviews 

essentially all of the medical evidence, the justification for this prohibition 

evaporates. The ALJ has provided a reason as compelling as the example in 96-6p 

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for rejecting the treating source opinion with only a single non-treating, nonexamining medical opinion. See SSR 96-6p; Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 

U.S. 214, 223, 128 S. Ct. 831, 838, 169 L. Ed. 2d 680 (2008) (“when a general 

term follows a specific one, the general term should be understood as a reference to 

subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration”). Substantial evidence supports 

the ALJ’s assignment of less than controlling weight to the treating source opinion. 

3. Factors in 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(1)-(6) 

When the Commissioner does not give a treating “opinion controlling 

weight under paragraph (c)(2) of this section, [the Commissioner] consider[s] all of 

the following factors in deciding the weight we give to any medical opinion.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Specifically, “[w]hen [the Commissioner does] not give the 

treating source's opinion controlling weight, [the Commissioner] appl[ies] the 

factors listed in paragraphs (c)(2)(i) and (c)(2)(ii) of [Section 404.1527], as well as 

the factors in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(6) of [Section 404.1527] in determining 

the weight to give the opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Section 

404.1527(c)(2)(i) provides that, “the longer a treating source has treated you and 

the more times you have been seen by a treating source, the more weight we will 

give to the source's medical opinion.” Id. Section 404.1527(c)(2)(ii) provides that 

“more knowledge a treating source has about your impairment(s) the more weight 

we will give to the source's medical opinion. We will look at the treatment the 

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source has provided and at the kinds and extent of examinations and testing the 

source has performed or ordered from specialists and independent laboratories.” Id.

Section 404.1527(c)(1) provides that, “[g]enerally, [the Commissioner] give[s] 

more weight to the opinion of a source who has examined you than to the opinion 

of a source who has not examined you.” Id. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(3), 

“[t]he more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, 

particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give 

that opinion” and “[t]he better an explanation a source provides for an opinion, the 

more weight we will give that opinion.” Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(4), 

“the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we 

will give to that opinion.” Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(5), more weight 

may be assigned to specialists, and 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(6) allows consideration 

of other factors which “tend to support or contradict the opinion.” Id. 

The ALJ properly analyzed the factors in 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(1)-(6). In 

this case, 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(1)-(2) support the treating source opinion, 

because these factors provide greater weight to sources who have examined the 

claimant and sources who have treated the claimant. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(6) 

allows the ALJ to consider other factors which “tend to support or contradict the 

opinion,” such as Plaintiff’s conservative treatment. Id. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. 

§404.1527(c)(4), “the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the 

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more weight we will give to that opinion.” Id. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. 

§404.1527(c)(3), “[t]he more a medical source presents relevant evidence to 

support an opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more 

weight we will give that opinion” and “[t]he better an explanation a source 

provides for an opinion, the more weight we will give that opinion.” Id. 

Here, Dr. Berger’s opinion was inconsistent with other record evidence and 

not supported by other record evidence. Dr. Berger's treatment record contradicted 

his opinion. Dr. Berger opined that Plaintiff's symptoms included suicidal ideation, 

difficulty concentrating or thinking, hallucinations, delusions, or paranoid thinking. 

(Tr. 411-13).At each visit, Plaintiff reported that her delusions, hallucinations, 

disorganized behaviors, disorganized thinking, and paranoia had all "resolved." 

(Tr. 391, 464-83). She denied suicidal ideation at every visit. (Tr. 391, 464-83). 

At every visit, mental status examinations indicated normal attention and 

concentration. (Tr. 391, 464-83). Dr. Berger opined that Plaintiff had "a persistent 

irrational fear of a specific object, activity, or situation which results in a 

compelling desire to avoid the dreaded object, activity, or situation" and "recurrent 

obsessions or compulsions which are a source of marked distress," and "recurrent 

and intrusive recollections of a traumatic experience which are a source of marked 

distress." (Tr. 414). However, at every visit, Plaintiff "denie[d] and [did] not 

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demonstrate any symptoms of... obsessive/compulsive behaviors." (Tr. 392, 464-

83). 

The Regulations require the ALJ to “consider” each factor in assigning 

weight to the medical opinions. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c). However, “there is a 

distinction between what an adjudicator must consider and what the adjudicator 

must explain in the disability determination or decision.” SSR 06-3p. See also 

Phillips v. Barnhart, 91 Fed.Appx. 775, 780 (3d Cir. 2004) (“the ALJ's mere 

failure to cite specific evidence does not establish that the ALJ failed to consider 

it”) (quoting Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir.1998)). Thus, an ALJ must 

provide some written explanation for the assignment of weight, but does not need 

to cite each factor considered in the analysis. See Francis v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 414 Fed.Appx. 802, 804-05 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Although the regulations 

instruct an ALJ to consider these factors, they expressly require only that the ALJ's 

decision include “good reasons ... for the weight ... give[n] [to the] treating source's 

opinion”—not an exhaustive factor-by-factor analysis. Here, the ALJ 

acknowledged Dr. Wakham's role as Francis's “treating family osteopath.” In 

assigning no weight to his opinion, the ALJ cited the opinion's inconsistency with 

the objective medical evidence, Francis's conservative treatment and daily 

activities, and the assessments of Francis's other physicians. Procedurally, the 

regulations require no more.”) (internal citations omitted). 

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If explanation allows meaningful judicial review, it suffices. Christ the King 

Manor, Inc. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 305 (3d 

Cir. 2013) (Court may “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's 

path may reasonably be discerned”); Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 

2004) (ALJ is not required to “use particular language or adhere to a particular 

format in conducting his analysis” and instead must only “ensure that there is 

sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings to permit 

meaningful review.”); Hur v. Comm’r Soc Sec., 94 F. App’x130, 133(3d Cir. 2004)

(“There is no requirement that the ALJ discuss in its opinion every tidbit of 

evidence included in the record”). 

Here, as discussed above, the ALJ’s explanation sufficed for meaningful 

review. Supra. The ALJ provided specific explanations supported in the record and 

cited to specific treatment notes that contradicted the opinions. Supra. The Court 

reviews the ALJ’s decision under the deferential substantial evidence standard. 

Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003). Substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ decision unless no “reasonable mind might accept [the relevant 

evidence] as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 

“Stated differently, this standard is met if there is sufficient evidence ‘to justify, if 

the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict.’” Id. (quoting Universal 

Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951)). 

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Here, the Court would not direct a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. Substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s assignment of weight to the medical opinions. 

B. Other Allegations of Error 

Plaintiff does not allege that the ALJ made any errors aside from evaluating 

the medical opinions. (Pl. Brief); Local Rule 84.40.4(b) (“The court will consider 

only those errors specifically identified in the briefs.”). The Court does not 

recommend remand on any other grounds. 

VI. Conclusion 

The Court finds that the ALJ made the required specific findings of fact in 

determining whether Plaintiff met the criteria for disability, and the findings were 

supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Brown, 845 

F.2d at 1213; Johnson, 529 F.3d at 200; Pierce, 487 U.S. at 552; Hartranft, 181 

F.3d at 360; Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427; Jones, 364 F.3d at 503. Substantial 

evidence is a deferential standard of review. See Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 

503 (3d Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable 

amount of evidence, but rather ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 

565 (1988) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 

229 (1938)). “Stated differently, this standard is met if there is sufficient evidence 

‘to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict.’” Id. (quoting 

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Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 

(1951)). Here, a reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as adequate. 

The Court would not direct a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor if the issues were before a 

jury. Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED: 

I. This appeal be DENIED, as the ALJ’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence; and 

II. The Clerk of Court close this case. 

The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3: 

Any party may object to a Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings, 

recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the 

disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within 

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party 

shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the Magistrate Judge 

and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the 

portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to 

which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The 

briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A 

Judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the 

report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which 

objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in 

part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 

The Judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her 

discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record 

developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own 

determination on the basis of that record. The Judge may also receive 

further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the 

Magistrate Judge with instructions. 

Dated: September 14, 2016 s/Gerald B. Cohn 

 GERALD B. COHN 

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 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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