UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BRIAN and VICKY BANEY, :

Plaintiffs : CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14-CV-2393

(JUDGE MANNION)

v. :

JAMES R. FICK, M.D., et al., :

:

Defendants

 MEMORANDUM

Pending before the court are the defendants’ motions to dismiss the

sole federal count of the plaintiffs’ complaint, (Doc. 62, Doc. 64, Doc. 67, Doc.

75), on the grounds that plaintiffs failed to plausibly plead sufficient factual

matter to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Based upon the

court’s review of the relevant documents, the court will GRANT the

defendants’ motions and DISMISS, with prejudice, plaintiffs’ federal claim. It

will also decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remainder of

the complaint, dismissing it, without prejudice, to re-filing in the appropriate

Pennsylvania State Court.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

By way of relevant background, the plaintiffs, Brian and Vicky Baney,

husband and wife, filed the instant action, (Doc. 1), on July 9, 2014, in the

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under the

Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C.

§1395dd, et seq., as well as Pennsylvania state law, including, professional

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medical malpractice claims. It is alleged that this court has subject matter

jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ federal claims based on 28 U.S.C. §1331, and that

the court can exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ pendent state claims under

28 U.S.C. §1367. The defendants are: James R. Pick, M.D.; James E. Frieje,

M.D.; John R. Van Kirk, M.D.; David C. Sterner, MD; Cara M. Albarano,

CRNA; John Does 1-10; Jane Does 1-10; ABC Corporations 1-10; Mount

Nittany Medical Center Health Services, Inc., d/b/a Mount Nittany Physician

Group; Centre Community Health Services, Inc., d/b/a Mount Nittany

Physician Group; Mount Nittany Medical Center; Mount Nittany Surgical

Center; The Milton S. Hershey Medical Center, d/b/a Penn State Hershey

Medical Group; Penn State Hershey Health System, Inc.; Penn State Hershey

Bone and Joint Institute; and Penn State Hershey Neuroscience Institute. On

November 14, 2014, plaintiffs’ case was transferred to this court since venue

was clearly lacking in the Eastern District. (Doc. 58).

Subsequently, defendants filed motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ federal

claim with prejudice pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(b)(1), and they seek the court to decline its exercise of supplemental

jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims. (Doc. 62, 64, 67, 75).

The defendants filed their briefs in support. (Docs. 63, 65, 68, 77). Plaintiffs

filed their briefs in opposition, essentially relying on their prior opposition brief

filed in the Eastern District which is attached to their present briefs. (Docs. 37,

71, 72, 76). On January 28, 2014, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their

complaint to add Geisinger Clinic as a party defendant with a proposed

amended complaint attached asserting a new vicarious liability negligence

claim against this additional defendant. (Doc. 74). On February 13, 2015, The

defendants filed their brief in opposition. (Doc. 81). As such, defendants'

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motions to dismiss are ripe for disposition.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

 

Plaintiffs allege that Brian Baney was injured as “a result of [inpatient]

medical care provided to [him] from 7/19/2012 through 7/26/2012 at Mount

Nittany Medical Center in State College, Centre County, Pennsylvania”

(“Mount Nittany”). Plaintiffs aver that “[d]uring a[n] [elective cervical spine]

neurosurgical procedure on 7/19/2012[,] Mr. Baney suffered serious and

catastrophic injury to his esophagus [i.e., a perforation] which was not

properly managed/stabilized during his inpatient stay at Mount Nittany Medical

Center resulting in devastating permanent injuries.” (Doc. 63-1). Plaintiffs

allege that after Mr. Baney’s esophagus was perforated during the surgery,

“the medical team managing his care was negligent in treating him for his

esophageal injury while at Mount Nittany, including that the defendants should

have arranged for his transport immediately following the injury to a tertiary

care facility where cardiothoracic surgeons were available.” (Doc. 37, at 2-3).

Thus, plaintiffs state that the “gist of the EMTALA claim is that Brain Baney

was not ‘stabilized’ or transferred as required by EMTALA for persons

suffering from an ‘emergency condition.’” (Doc. 37, at 2-3). Plaintiffs indicate

that Mr. Baney was not transported from Mount Nittany to Hershey Medical

Center until July 26, 2012. Plaintiffs admit that all of the conduct alleged to

have been in violation of the EMTALA occurred at Mount Nittany. (Doc. 74,

1The facts alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint must be accepted as true in

considering defendants’ motions to dismiss. See Dieffenbach v. Dept. of

Revenue, 490 Fed.Appx. 433, 435 (3d Cir. 2012); Evancho v. Evans, 423

F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005). The court notes that it focuses its discussion of

the facts to those pertaining to plaintiffs’ federal claim under EMTALA.

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at 4). 

In Count XV of their original complaint, plaintiffs raise their only federal

claim under the EMTALA against one defendant, Mount Nittany Medical

Center, ¶’s 113-119. (Doc. 63-1). In their EMTALA claim, plaintiffs allege as

follows:

113. The above and foregoing paragraphs are incorporated by

reference hereat (sic) as if set forth at length in their entirety.

114. The "Medical Screening" requirement of EMTALA applies if

any individual "comes to the emergency department”, but the

"Necessary Stabilizing Treatment for Emergency Medical

Conditions" requirement applies if any individual "comes to a

hospital" and the hospital determines that the individual has an

emergency medical condition. [42 U.S.C. 1395dd(a) and 42 USC

1395dd(b)J.]

115. It was determined as of 7/19/2012 that Brian Baney was

suffering from an "emergency medical condition" as evidenced by

his subsequent, care treatment, records, and diagnostic test

results, his remaining in the intensive care unit, and his transfer

to a specialized tertiary care facility.

116. It was again determined and/or reinforced on 7/23/2012,

when it was confirmed by barium swallow study that contents

were leaking from a tear in Brian Baney's esophagus into his

mediastinum, that he was suffering from an "emergency medical

condition" as evidenced by his subsequent, care treatment

records, and diagnostic test results, his remaining in the intensive

care unit, and his transfer to a specialized tertiary care facility.

117. On 7/19/2012 and 7/23/2012, during which times Brian

Baney was an admitted patient at Mount Nittany Medical Center

and was suffering from an emergency medical condition, to wit,

an esophageal laceration causing various contents to leak into his

mediastinum, that put his life and health in jeopardy, placed him

at risk for a serious impairment of a body function, placed him at

risk for the serious dysfunction of a body organ.

118. The defendant physicians and/or the employees, agents,

staff, nurses, or other medical providers who cared for Brian

Baney during his admission at Mount Nittany Medical Center,

specifically on 7/19/2012 and 7/22/2012 failed to stabilize Brian

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Baney and/or to transfer him to another hospital for further

appropriate treatment which conduct, actions and/or omissions

violated EMTALA.

119. As a result of the foregoing violations of EMTALA by Mount

Nittany Medical Center, and/orits employees, servants, workmen,

agents and/or ostensible agents, Plaintiffs (sic) the losses and

damages set forth above in detail.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The defendants’ motions to dismiss are brought, in part, pursuant to the

provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Defendants argue that under Rule

12(b)(6), Count XV, raising a claim under EMTALA, should be dismissed for

failure to state a cognizable claim. This rule provides for the dismissal of a

complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no

claim has been stated, Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir.

2005), and dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting all of the facts alleged

in the complaint as true, the plaintiff has failed to plead “enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (abrogating “no set of facts”

language found in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The facts

alleged must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. This requirement “calls for

enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence of” necessary elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Id.

Furthermore, in order to satisfy federal pleading requirements, the plaintiff

must “provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief,” which “requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231

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(3d Cir. 2008) (brackets and quotations marks omitted) (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the

complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. See Sands v.

McCormick, 502 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider

“undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attaches as an exhibit

to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached]

documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d

1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged

in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not

physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the

court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to

dismiss. See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250,

1261 (3d Cir. 1994).

Generally, the court should grant leave to amend a complaint before

dismissing it as merely deficient. See, e.g., Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote

Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007); Grayson v.

Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213

F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000). However, “[d]ismissal without leave to

amend is justified only on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or

futility.” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).

 Defendants’ motions also facially challenge this court’s subject matter

jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure based

on federal question jurisdiction. The plaintiffs assert that there is federal

question jurisdiction since they bring one claim under federal law, namely,

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EMTALA. “Dismissal under a facial challenge is proper ‘only when the claim

clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining

jurisdiction or ... is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’” Byrne v. Cleveland

Clinic, 684 F.Supp.2d 641, 648-49 (E.D.Pa. 2010) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc.,

926 F.2d at 1408–09) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773,

90 L.Ed. 939 (1946)). “In this circumstance, the court must accept all

well-pleaded allegations in plaintiff's complaint as true, and must view them

in the light most favorable to the non-movant.” Id. at 649 (citing In re Kaiser

Group Int'l Inc., 399 F.3d 558, 561 (3d Cir. 2005)). Additionally, “a party

asserting that the court has jurisdiction always bears the burden of showing

that the case is properly before the court.” Id. (citing Packard v. Provident

Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1045 (3d Cir.1993); McNutt v. General Motors

Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936)).

As such, “the Court must accept the allegations of the [] Complaint as true,

and consider whether [plaintiffs' federal] claim[] “clearly appear[s] to be

immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where

[the claim] is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” Byrne v. Cleveland Clinic, 684

F.Supp.2d at 650 (citing Bell, 327 U.S. at 682–83, 66 S.Ct. 773). 

IV. DISCUSSION

The EMTALA “forbids hospitals from refusing to treat individuals with

emergency conditions, a practice often referred to as ‘patient dumping.’”

Torretti v. Main Line Hospitals, Inc., 580 F.3d 168, 169 (3d Cir. 2009).

“EMTALA[] ... is not a federal malpractice statute.” Id. at 170. Also, the

EMTALA was not “intended to create a federal malpractice statute or cover

cases of hospital negligence.” Id. at 178.

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In Torretti, 580 F.3d at 172-73, the Third Circuit explained the

background of EMTALA as follows:

EMTALA requires hospitals to give certain types of medical care

to individuals presented for emergency treatment: (a) appropriate

medical screening, (b) stabilization of known emergency medical

conditions and labor, and (c) restrictions on transfer of

unstabilized individuals to outside hospital facilities. 42 U.S.C.

§1395dd(a)-(c) FN7; see Urban v. King, 43 F.3d 523, 525 (10th

Cir.1994) (stating that a hospital has two primary obligations

under EMTALA: (1) if an individual arrives at an emergency room,

the hospital must provide appropriate medical screening to

determine whether an emergency medical condition exists; and

(2) if the hospital determines an individual has an emergency

medical condition that has not been stabilized, it may not transfer

the patient unless certain conditions are met).

FN7. The statute states in pertinent part:

(a) Medical screening requirement

In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency

department, if any individual (whether or not eligible for

benefits under this subchapter) comes to the

emergency department and a request is made on the

individual's behalf for examination or treatment for a

medical condition, the hospital must provide for an

appropriate medical screening examination within the

capability of the hospital's emergency department,

including ancillary services routinely available to the

emergency department, to determine whether or not an

emergency medical condition (within the meaning of

subsection (e)(1) of this section) exists.

(b) Necessary stabilizing treatment for emergency

medical conditions and labor

(1) In general[:] If any individual ... comes to a hospital

and the hospital determines that the individual has an

emergency medical condition, the hospital must provide

either-

(A) within the staff and facilities available at the

hospital, for such further medical examination and such

treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical

condition, or

(B) for transfer of the individual to another medical

facility in accordance with subsection (c) of this section.

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....

(c) Restricting transfers until individual stabilized

(1) Rule[:] If an individual at a hospital has an

emergency medical condition which has not been

stabilized (within the meaning of subsection (e)(3)(B) of

this section), the hospital may not transfer the

individual unless .... [considerations not applicable to

this case.]

See also Byrne v. Cleveland Clinic, 684 F.Supp.2d 641, 650 (E.D.Pa. 2010).

Thus, “EMTALA requires hospitals to provide medical screening and

stabilizing treatment to individuals seeking emergency care in a

nondiscriminatory manner. Torretti, 580 F.3d at 173. Also, EMTALA is not

limited to the indigent and uninsured. Id.

Moreover, the court in Torretti, 580 F.3d at 173-74, stated:

Under EMTALA, ... , any individual who suffers personal harm as

a direct result of a hospital's violation of the statute may bring a

private civil action for damages. 42 U.S.C. §1395dd(d). While an

EMTALA action usually will be brought in conjunction with a state

statutory claim or common-law medical malpractice or negligence

action arising out of the same events, it does not create a federal

cause of action for malpractice. See, e.g., Summers v. Baptist

Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1137 (8th Cir. 1996); Brooks

v. Md. Gen. Hosp., Inc., 996 F.2d 708, 710, 713 (4th Cir. 1993)

(stating that EMTALA “does not create liability for malpractice

based upon breach of national or community standard of care”).

Liability is determined independently of whether any deficiencies

in the screening or treatment provided by the hospital may be

actionable as negligence or malpractice, see Summers, 91 F.3d

at 1137, as the statute was aimed at disparate patient treatment.

Viewing plaintiffs’ above quoted allegations in Count XV, in the light most

favorable to plaintiffs, they have not plead a cognizable claim under EMTALA.

Based on Torretti, the court finds that Mr. Baney does not “fit within EMTALA’s

scope-a patient antidumping statute.” 580 F.3d at 175. There is no allegation

that the elective inpatient spinal procedure Mr. Baney was scheduled to have

on July 19, 2012, was to treat an emergent condition or that he presented as

an emergency when he appeared for his pre-scheduled appointment. Rather,

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Mr. Baney was being given an elective inpatient surgical procedure at a

scheduled appointment at Mount Nittany Medical Center and during this

procedure a complication occurred, allegedly caused by negligence, when he

experienced an esophageal laceration. As such, Mr. Baney was already a

patient of Mount Nittany Medical Center at the time of his emergency medical

condition and he simply cannot be considered as going to Mount Nittany

Medical Center for purposes of EMTALA. Mr. Baney alleges that while he was

already a patient, Mount Nittany failed to timely transfer him to the proper

facility to care for his “emergency” condition which arose during his surgery.

The EMTALA does not apply under the facts of this case. Torretti, 580 F.3d at

174-75. Even if Mr. Barney suffered from a serious medical condition that was

at risk to become emergent when he presented at Mount Nittany, the EMTALA

did not cover him under the alleged facts in the complaint. As the Torretti Court

pointed out, “Congress passed EMTALA to curb the problem of patient

dumping by creating a statutory duty for hospitals to examine and treat

individuals who come to them for emergency care. 42 U.S.C. §1395dd.” Id. at

177.

Thus, Mr. Baney’s alleged “emergency condition” was really a

complication of the elective surgical procedure he was undergoing. Even if the

esophageal laceration became a medical emergency during the elective

procedure as plaintiffs allege, there is no allegation that Mr. Baney presented

a medical emergency on July 19, 2012, when he arrived for his procedure or

that he was transferred from Mount Nittany without having been stabilized when

he had an emergency medical condition, i.e., when the laceration occurred as

the procedure was being performed. The court finds plaintiffs’ reading of

EMTALA to be incorrect as applied to the facts of their case and unsupported

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by case law. As the court in Byrne noted, 684 F.Supp.2d at 651 n. 9,

“[s]ubsection (e)(4) of §1395dd defines ‘transfer’ as including the discharge of

a patient from the hospital at the direction of any person employed by the

hospital.” As such, “EMTALA prohibits hospitals from both transferring and

discharging those patients who have been determined to have an ‘emergency

medical condition’ and have not been stabilized.” Id. In the present case,

plaintiffs allege that defendant Mount Nittany violated the EMTALA by failing to

timely transfer Mr. Baney after the laceration occurred, to a more appropriate

facility. Plaintiffs do not allege that Mount Nittany transferred Mr. Baney with “an

emergency medical condition” when he was not stabilized, essentially to

“dump” him on another facility.

The plaintiffs assert a “stabilization” claim and allege that defendant

Mount Nittany violated the EMTALA since its surgeons did not stabilize Mr.

Baney’s emergency condition, i.e. his esophageal laceration, and then failed

to promptly transfer him to an appropriate facility.

2

In Toretti, the court stated

the following requisite elements of a “stabilization” claim under EMTALA, the

plaintiff “(1) had ‘an emergency medical condition; (2) the hospital actually knew

2

There is no dispute that Mount Nittany is a proper party defendant

that can be sued under the EMTALA if a cognizable claim is stated. As the

court in Byrne, 684 F.Supp.2d at 656, stated, “[a] ‘participating hospital’

[which can be sued under the EMTALA] is defined as one that has entered

into a ‘provider agreement’ under 42 U.S.C. §1395cc, which permits

hospitals to seek Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement. See id.

§§1395dd(e)(2),1395cc.” Thus, “[h]ospitals that voluntarily participate in the

Medicare or Medicaid programs and have effective provider agreements

must comply with EMTALA.’” Id. (quoting Torretti, 580 F.3d at 173, n. 8

(internal quotations and citations omitted)).

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of that condition; [and] (3) the patient was not stabilized before being

transferred.’” 580 F.3d at 178 (quoting Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d

872, 883 (4th Cir. 1992)); Byrne, 684 F.Supp.2d at 654. The court in Byrne, 684

F.Supp.2d at 654-55, further explained a stabilization claim and stated:

The term “to stabilize” is specifically defined by EMTALA, and

“means, with respect to an emergency medical condition ... [a

hospital must] provide such medical treatment of the condition as

may be necessary to assure, within reasonable medical probability,

that no material deterioration of the condition is likely to result or

occur during the transfer of the individual from a facility.” 42 U.S.C.

§1395dd(e)(3)(A). Under EMTALA, hospitals can only be held

accountable for failing to stabilize conditions of which they were

actually aware, not those of which they should have been aware.

Torretti, 580 F.3d at 178. The stabilization and transfer provisions

of EMTALA are “triggered only after a hospital ‘determines that [an]

individual has an emergency medical condition.’ ” Gatewood v.

Washington Healthcare Corp., 933F.2d 1037, 1040 (D.C.Cir. 1991)

(citing 42 U.S.C. §1395dd(b)(1), (c)).

Although not explicitly stated in the text of EMTALA, the

caselaw makes it clear that EMTALA mandates stabilization only

in the event of a transfer or discharge, and does not obligate

hospitals to provide stabilization treatment for patients who are not

transferred or discharged. See Fraticelli–Torres v. Hospital

Hermanos, 300 Fed.Appx. 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2008); Bryant v. Adventist

Health System/West., 289 F.3d 1162, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2002);

Harry v. Marchant, 291 F.3d 767, 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2002); Bryan

v. Rectors and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 95 F.3d 349, 352 (4th

Cir. 1996); Smith v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, No. 08–5689,

2009 WL 2487417 , 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71403 (E.D.Pa. Aug.

12, 2009); Marrero, 253 F.Supp.2d at 198; Mazurkiewicz v.

Doylestown Hospital, 223 F.Supp.2d 661, 665 (E.D.Pa. 2002). “By

mandating treatment only in the context of a patient transfer, the

stabilization requirement addresses Congress' concern regarding

rejection of patients without converting EMTALA into a federal

malpractice statute.” Harry, 291 F.3d at 774 (affirming the district

court's dismissal of a stabilization claim brought on behalf of a

patient who died after waiting for several hours to receive treatment

in an emergency room, but who was never transferred or

discharged from the hospital). Accordingly, although a hospital's

egregious delay in providing screening may provide the basis for an

EMTALA screening claim, it does not provide a basis for an

EMTALA stabilization claim, where the patient was eventually

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treated and stabilized before being discharged or transferred. See

Torres Otero v. Hospital Gen. Menonita, Inc., 115 F.Supp.2d 253,

260 (D.P.R. 2000)(holding that an allegation that the stabilization

treatment provided was incorrect or delayed did not reflect that the

defendant hospital violated its statutory duty to stabilize before

transfer or discharge).

As stated, plaintiffs state the gist of their EMTALA claim is that “the

medical team managing [Mr. Baney’s] care was negligent in treating him for

his esophageal injury while at Mount Nittany, including that the defendants

should have arranged for his transport immediately following the injury to a

tertiary care facility where cardiothoracic surgeons were available.” (Doc. 37,

at 2-3). Mr. Baney was not transferred from Mount Nittany to Hershey Medical

Center until July 26, 2012. There is no allegation that Mount Nittany and its

staff failed to stabilize Mr. Baney before transferring him to another facility.

Rather, plaintiffs aver that Mount Nittany and its staff negligently failed to

timely transfer Mr. Baney to an appropriate facility to stabilize and treat his

esophageal laceration. Plaintiffs in the instant case are improperly relying on

EMTALA to try and create a federal malpractice claim when, in actuality these

allegations can best be described as a garden variety medical malpractice

cause of action.

Thus, plaintiffs have failed to state a cognizable claim under EMTALA,

including a “stabilization” claim. See Byrne, 684 F.Supp.2d at 655-56.

Additionally, based on the above discussion and based on Torretti and Byrne,

the court finds that any amendment to plaintiffs’ “stabilization” claim under the

EMTALA would be futile. See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir.

2004) (“[I]f a complaint is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a District Court must

permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or

futile.”); Smith v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 378 Fed.Appx. 154, 157 (3d Cir.

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2010)(Citing Torretti, 580 E3d at 172). (Doc. 77-1). As discussed, “EMTALA's

requirements are triggered when an ‘individual comes to the emergency

department’ and an individual only does so if that person is not already a

‘patient.’" Smith v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 378 Fed.Appx. at 157 (citing

Torretti, 580 E3d at 175) (internal citation omitted). Mr. Baney was an inpatient

of Mount Nittany at the time his alleged emergency condition occurred and he

alleges that Mount Nittany failed to transfer him to the proper facility to care for

his condition. The EMTALA simply does not apply under the facts of this case.

Id. (citing Torretti, 580 E3d at 174-75). 

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the court will grant defendants’ motions to dismiss, with

prejudice, plaintiffs’ EMTALA claim in their complaint. The plaintiffs’ remedies

for their allegations are reflected in their claims of professional medical

malpractice and negligence and, the proper forum for such claims in this case

is the state court. Since plaintiffs have not stated any cognizable federal claim

under EMTALA, the court, in its discretion, will decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1367(c)(3). See Smith v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 378 Fed.Appx. 154, 158

(3d Cir. 2010) (Doc. 77-1). The plaintiff may re-file the remaining counts in the

appropriate Pennsylvania State Court.

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The court will also dismiss plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint to

add Geisinger Clinic as a new party defendant, without prejudice, to re-filing

in the appropriate state court. (Doc. 74).

s/ Malachy E. Mannion 

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATED: FEBRUARY 23, 2015

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