[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 181 (Thursday, September 18, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 49046-49047]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-24962]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration


Notice of Safety Advisory

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.

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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 97-2 addressing safety 
practices to reduce the risk of casualties from runaway locomotives, 
cars, and trains caused by a failure to properly secure unattended 
rolling equipment left on sidings or other tracks.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dennis Yachechak, Operating Practices 
Specialist, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh 
Street, S.W., RRS-11, Mail Stop 25, Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 
202-632-3370), or Nancy L. Goldman, Trial Attorney, FRA, Office of 
Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., RCC-12, Mail Stop 10, 
Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-632-3167).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A fatal head-on collision between a Union 
Pacific Railroad Company (UP) freight train and an unattended, runaway 
UP locomotive consist near Fort Worth, Texas, on August 20, 1997, has 
caused FRA to focus on the effectiveness of certain railroad procedures 
for protection of people and property from hazards caused by failure to 
properly secure locomotives, cars, and other rolling equipment left 
unattended on sidings or other tracks.
    FRA and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) are 
investigating the accident. In addition, FRA inspection teams are on 
UP's property to conduct safety assurance reviews on all aspects of the 
issue. The facts and findings developed in the investigations will be 
published when the individual investigations are complete.
    In the meantime, FRA's preliminary findings indicate that the UP 
crew applied the hand brake on the lead locomotive of the locomotive 
consist and then applied the independent air brake. The crew then 
released the independent brake to verify that the hand brake would 
hold, which it appeared to do. The crew then reapplied the independent 
brake. Three of the four locomotives in the locomotive consist were 
already shut down. The remaining locomotive was then shut down and the 
crew left the locomotive consist unattended. Sometime later, however, 
it is believed that the air brakes eventually leaked off and that the 
single hand brake did not, by itself, sufficiently secure the 
locomotive consist, enabling it to roll out of the siding eastward and 
onto the main track where it collided head-on with a UP freight train.

Securement Procedures

    The Federal power brake regulations at 49 CFR 232.13(f) require 
that, ``The automatic air brake must not be depended upon to hold a 
locomotive, cars or train, when standing on a grade, whether locomotive 
is attached or detached from cars or train. When required, a sufficient 
number of hand brakes must be applied to hold train, before air brakes 
are released. When ready to start, hand brakes must not be released 
until it is known that the air brake system is properly charged.''
    Based upon FRA's review of the Fort Worth incident, and its 
awareness of other incidents involving improper securement of rolling 
equipment, it appears evident that further guidance regarding 
securement procedures may be of assistance to our nation's railroads. 
This advisory may be especially beneficial to those railroads that may 
not be aware of current practices in the industry regarding securement 
of rolling equipment. Accordingly, FRA believes that the following 
recommended procedures for the proper securement of unattended rolling 
equipment can be taken to reduce the likelihood of future accidents, 
which each railroad can then adapt to meet its own individual 
circumstances.

Recommended Action

    FRA believes that the likelihood of further accidents, such as the 
one that occurred on the UP on August 20, 1997, would be greatly 
reduced by the inclusion of certain additional measures into railroads' 
procedures for securement of unattended locomotives, cars, and trains 
left on sidings or other tracks. Therefore, FRA recommends that each 
railroad adopt and implement its own procedures incorporating the 
following actions, or equally effective measures, with respect to a 
locomotive, car, or train that is left unattended:
    1. Consistent with the railroad's rules and procedures, place each 
locomotive, car, or train on a track that is protected by a permanent 
derail or apply a portable derail, if available.
    2. On cars: (a) Apply the appropriate number of handbrakes; to 
assist

[[Page 49047]]

crewmembers in this regard, railroads should develop and implement a 
process or procedure, such as a matrix, that would provide specific 
guidance in determining the appropriate number of hand brakes to apply, 
considering grade, tonnage, and other local conditions prevalent at the 
time of securement, for example, high winds or extreme cold; (b) where 
appropriate, remove slack from the train, or as commonly referred to in 
the industry, ``bunch the slack'; and (c) detach any locomotives from 
the cars to allow an emergency brake application.
    3. On locomotives, fully apply all hand brakes on all unattended 
locomotives in the consist. If the grade exceeds one percent, or 
whenever it is otherwise required by railroad rules, in addition, chock 
or chain the front and back of at least one pair of wheels in the 
locomotive consist. Railroads should develop and implement procedures 
that would then verify that the hand brakes will hold the locomotive 
consist. Further, railroad instructions should address: (a) The 
throttle position; (b) status of the reverse lever; (c) position of the 
generator field switch; (d) status of the independent brakes; (e) 
position of the isolation switch; and (f) position of the automatic 
brake valve. The above procedures should also take into account winter 
weather conditions as they relate to throttle position and reverser 
handle.
    FRA may modify Safety Advisory 97-2, issue additional safety 
advisories, or take other appropriate necessary action to ensure the 
highest level of safety on the Nation's railroads.

    Issued in Washington, DC on September 15, 1997
Edward R. English,
Director, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance.
[FR Doc. 97-24962 Filed 9-17-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P