UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

HARRY E. HAMILTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

NICOLE BROMLEY, et al.,

Defendants

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14-CV-02248

(BRANN, J.)

(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is a civil action filed by pro se litigant, Harry E. Hamilton, appearing in forma 

pauperis.

1 For the reasons provided herein, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 

1), be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and the above-captioned case be closed.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Harry E. Hamilton, proceeding pro se, filed the instant civil rights action on 

November 24, 2014, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against Nicole Bromley of the 

Centre County Office of Children and Youth Services, Judge Bradley Lunsford, the 

Director/Owner/Operator of Youth Haven, and John Doe Defendants. (Doc. 1). In his

complaint, Hamilton alleges that the above-named Defendants violated his constitutional rights 

under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as under the Child Abuse 

Prevention and Treatment Act, the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, and the 

Runaway and Homeless Youth Act, by placing his minor child into shelter care during the 

pendency of a child abuse investigation involving the child’s mother, rather than allow Plaintiff 

 

1 Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 

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custody of his minor child. (Doc. 1, at 3). He alleges that the Defendants failed to ensure that 

the shelter was a suitable environment for his minor child, as his minor child was subjected to 

“psychological and emotional abuse . . . by having [to] change clothing in front of incompletely 

covered windows, [and] causing [him] to endure inappropriate jokes and taunts,” as well as 

required to share a living space with other residents “who made inappropriate statements” to 

him, and assigned daily responsibilities such as chores. (Doc. 1, at 4). He additionally alleges 

that the shelter refused to allow contact between Plaintiff and his minor child during the child’s 

stay at the youth shelter. 

The Court deferred screening this complaint for six months in light of Plaintiff’s 

representations to the Court that he was in the process of retaining counsel to represent him in 

the instant matter. However, Plaintiff was unable to obtain counsel in the timeline provided by 

the Court. On May 5, 2015, the Court conducted a telephone conference with the parties to 

determine the status of the instant action. (Doc. 21). It was revealed at that time that Plaintiff 

had obtained physical custody of his minor child pursuant to an ongoing child-custody dispute. 

Having heard from the parties at the teleconference, the Court entered a Show Cause Order on 

May 8, 2015, directing both parties to submit, on or before June 5, 2015, an affidavit, 

declaration, or other documentation addressing why the case should not be dismissed on 

abstention or mootness grounds. (Doc. 23). On June 4, 2015, and June 5, 2015, the Defendants 

responded to the Show Cause Order. 

I. SECTION 1915(E)(2) STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is statutorily required to review the complaint 

of a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis prior to service of process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

In performing this mandatory screening function, a district court applies the same standard 

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applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir.1999).

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to 

dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted the evolving standards 

governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. 

Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of 

Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently with the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), pleading 

standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more 

heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the 

possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable 

inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). A court 

“need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions’ when deciding a motion to 

dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a

court need not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated 

Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). In order 

to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which 

“requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). When 

ruling on a motion to dismiss, a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon 

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which relief can be granted, and should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are 

no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face 

of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and 

matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 

U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Additionally, while a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” 

must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. 

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972), “[p]ro se attorneys . . . typically cannot claim the special 

consideration which the courts customarily grant to pro se parties.”Allegrino v. Conway E & S, 

Inc., No. 09–1507, 2010 WL 2035658, at *2 (W.D.Pa. May 18, 2010) (internal quotations 

omitted); see also Heller v. Emanuel, No. 07–1393, 2007 WL 1491081, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 21, 

2007). The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure 

to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment 

would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

II. CLAIMS BROUGHT BY PLAINTIFF ON BEHALF OF HIS MINOR CHILD

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, includes numerous allegations within his complaint that 

appear to seek vindication of his minor child’s constitutional rights. Indeed, but for an

allegation that Plaintiff was deprived of emergency custody of and contact with his minor child 

at the direction of the court throughout the duration of the minor’s stay at a youth shelter 

pending the conclusion of an investigation into an incident of alleged child abuse involving the 

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minor child’s mother, the complaint primarily sets forth specific factual allegations regarding 

injury that the Plaintiff’s minor son allegedly endured while residing at the youth shelter.

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief on behalf of his minor child, Plaintiff, appearing 

pro se, is not permitted to represent other parties, including his minor children or other family 

members, in federal litigation. See Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882–83 (3d Cir. 

1991) (pro se litigant not permitted to represent his minor children); Williams v. United States, 477 

Fed. App’x. 9, 11 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (plaintiff holding power of attorney under state 

law not permitted to represent her father pro se in federal litigation); see also Meeker v. Kercher,

782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986) (“We hold that under Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 

1654, a minor child cannot bring suit through a parent acting as next friend if the parent is not 

represented by an attorney.”); Lawson v. Edwardsburg Public School, 751 F.Supp. 1257, 1258 

(W.D. Mich. 1990) (“While a litigant has the right to act as his or her own counsel, see 28 

U.S.C. § 1654, a non-attorney parent is not permitted to represent the interests of his or her 

minor child.”).

Accordingly, the Court declines to liberally construe Plaintiff’s complaint to assert any 

claims on behalf of the minor child. See Norman v. Greenwood Cnty. Sch. Dist. 52, No. CA 8:13-

421-TMC-JDA, 2013 WL 1281926, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 4, 2013) report and recommendation 

adopted, No. CA 8:13-421-TMC, 2013 WL 1281922 (D.S.C. Mar. 26, 2013) (summarily 

dismissing a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff asserting injuries suffered by minor child and 

advising plaintiff that “if, following summary dismissal of th[e] improperly brought case, 

[p]laintiff still wants to pursue [the minor child’s] alleged constitutional claims, professional 

legal counsel must be obtained to represent the minor child in any such lawsuit”). Thus, this 

Court is left only with claims that Plaintiff brings in his own right.

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III. YOUNGER ABSTENTION

It appears from the complaint and the facts provided by Defendants in response to this 

Court’s Show Cause Order, that Plaintiff seeks to challenge the pending state court proceedings 

regarding his parental rights, particularly with respect to the court’s refusal to allow the minor 

child to reside with the Plaintiff pending resolution of a child abuse investigation involving the 

minor child’s mother. However, this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear such a claim. 

Indeed, to the extent Plaintiff’s complaint challenges the pending state court proceedings 

regarding his parental rights, the Court must abstain from entertaining that challenge under 

Younger v. Harris, 301 U.S. 37 (1971). Under Younger, abstention is proper if: (1) there is an 

ongoing state proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates an important state interest; and (3) the 

state proceeding affords the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims. Dixon v. 

Kuhn, 257 Fed.Appx. 553, 555 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). “The Younger doctrine is based 

on comity and the notion that comity makes it undesirable to permit a party access to a federal 

court when he is currently involved in state proceedings where he can secure an adjudication of 

his constitutional claim.” FOCUS v. Allegheny Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 844 (3d 

Cir. 1996). 

With respect to the first prong, at the time Plaintiff filed the above-captioned matter, 

there was, and continues to be, an ongoing child-custody proceeding in state court. Mikhail v. 

Kahn, 991 F. Supp. 2d 596, 623 (E.D. Pa.) aff'd, 572 F. App'x 68 (3d Cir. 2014)(quoting Stefanov 

v. Ross, No. 12–0472, 2013 WL 3754819, at *5 (M.D. Pa. July 15, 2013) (“It is reasonable to 

conclude that custody proceedings must also be viewed as a whole, rather than as individual, 

[discrete] hearings.”). Indeed, a child custody hearing is scheduled for June 18, 2015. (Doc. 24-

1, at 2). Accordingly, the first prong is clearly met. With respect to the second prong, childCase 4:14-cv-02248-MWB Document 30 Filed 06/15/15 Page 6 of 10
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custody proceedings implicate compelling state interests. Jones v. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, No. 

CIV.A. 03-CV-3610, 2004 WL 1175808, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2004) (citing Judice v. Vail, 430 

U.S. 327 (1977) (holding that states have important interest in the law of domestic relations 

under the second prong of the Younger-abstention test); see also Sheils v. Bucks Cnty. Domestic 

Relations Section, 921 F. Supp. 2d 396, 411 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (“[T]here can be no doubt that child 

support-related proceedings are quintessential ‘domestic relations [proceedings that] are 

traditionally the domain of state courts’ . . . thus implicating important state interests.”). Thus, 

the second prong is met. With respect to the third prong, Plaintiff certainly could raise federal 

constitutional objections in a state court child-custody proceeding. See Mikhail v. Kahn, 991 F. 

Supp. 2d 596, 629 (E.D. Pa.) aff'd, 572 F. App'x 68 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Lui v. Comm'n on 

Adult Entm't Establishments, 369 F.3d 319, 326 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Absent some showing of a 

procedural defect, the presumption is that ‘[s]tate courts are every bit as competent to deal with 

the [plaintiff’s] claims . . . as are the federal courts and this, of course, includes the ability to 

address claims under both the State constitution and the Federal constitution.”). Indeed, 

“[t]here is no bar in custody proceedings to a parent’s raising his federal constitutional rights. In 

fact, Pennsylvania courts have entertained such claims in custody cases.” Mikhail, 991 F. Supp. 

2d at 629; see also Schmehl v. Wegelin, 927 A.2d 183, 187 (2007) (addressing an equal protection 

challenge); Everett v. Parker, 889 A.2d 578, 580 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (addressing a due process 

challenge); Luminella v. Marcocci, 814 A.2d 711 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (addressing a Fourth 

Amendment claim); Jackson v. Garland, 622 A.2d 969, 971 (1993) (addressing Fourteenth 

Amendment claim). Accordingly, the third requirement is satisfied. 

Finally, this Court must evaluate whether an exception to the Younger doctrine applies 

here. The Third Circuit has established that:

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Even when the[ ] three [Younger] requirements are met, it is inappropriate to 

abstain . . . if the plaintiff establishes that “(1) the state proceedings are being 

undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of harassment or (2) some other 

extraordinary circumstances exist, such as proceedings pursuant to a flagrantly 

unconstitutional statute, such that deference to the state proceeding will present a 

significant and immediate potential for irreparable harm to the federal interests 

asserted.

Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm., 457 

U.S. 423, 435 (1982)). These exceptions have been “narrowly construed.” Loftus v. Township of 

Lawrence Park, 764 F.Supp. 354, 357 (W.D. Pa. 1991). Indeed, other courts have recognized 

that the “Supreme Court has only applied this exception upon a showing that the federal 

plaintiff ‘cannot adequately assert [his] claims because of an unavailable or biased state forum.” 

Pappas v. Twp. of Galloway, 565 F. Supp. 2d 581, 590 (D.N.J. 2008) (citing Safe Haven Sober 

Houses, LLC v. City of Boston, 517 F.Supp.2d 557, 562–63 (D.Mass.2007) (citing Dombrowski v. 

Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)); Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 945 F.Supp. 1071, 1075 (E.D. 

Mich. 1996) (citing Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977)). Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege that 

his custody or child support proceedings were initiated in bad faith or to harass. Moreover, 

Plaintiff has failed to allege the “existence of any extraordinary circumstances which would 

prevent this Court from deferring to the state court proceedings.” Van Tassel v. Lawrence Country 

Domestic Relations Section, No. CIV. A. 09-266, 2009 WL 2588815, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 

2009). Accordingly, this Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and 

declaratory relief on the basis that the Younger doctrine requires abstention.2

 

2 While Defendants argue in their response to this Court’s Show Cause Order, that 

Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot because Plaintiff received 

physical custody of the minor child as of February 2, 2015, (See Doc. 26, at 5; Doc. 26-5, at 1), 

this Court is unable to make such a determination at this time given the nature of state court 

proceedings with respect to child custody matters, and “given the nature of the parental conduct 

that necessitated placement of [the minor child] in the . . . custody of [Youth Haven, as] there is 

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IV. LEAVE TO AMEND

The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure 

to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment 

would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

In this case, it is clear that amendment would be futile with respect to Plaintiff’s claims for 

injunctive and declaratory relief against the above-named Defendants. It is therefore 

recommended that Plaintiff be denied leave to further amend his complaint.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS 

Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that:

1. All claims for injunctive and declaratory relief be DISMISSED, as the Younger

doctrine requires abstention;

2. The Clerk be directed to CLOSE this case. 

BY THE COURT:

Dated: June 15, 2015 s/ Karoline Mehalchick 

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States Magistrate Judge

 

a reasonable possibility that [the minor child] and his parents will once again be faced with the 

restrictions . . . that are the subject of this lawsuit.” Winston by Winston v. Children & Youth Servs. 

of Delaware Cnty., 948 F.2d 1380, 1384 (3d Cir. 1991). Nevertheless, as this child-custody 

dispute is subject to ongoing state proceedings, the Younger doctrine requires this Court to 

recommend dismissal of the action by reason of abstention. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

HARRY E. HAMILTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

NICOLE BROMLEY, et al.,

Defendants

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14-CV-02248

(BRANN, J.)

(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)

NOTICE

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report

and Recommendation dated June 15, 2015. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and 

Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings, 

recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case 

or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a 

copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the 

magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically 

identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to 

which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing 

requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de 

novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings 

or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or 

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the 

magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or 

her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed 

before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of 

that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or 

recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

Dated: June 15, 2015 s/ Karoline Mehalchick 

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States Magistrate Judge

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