UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

The War in the Pacific 

CAMPAIGN 

IN THE MARIAN AS 

by 

Philip .A. Crowl 

--

CENn ,R OF MIL/TAllY HfSTOfl)' 

UNJ71::D S7i l71,S ARMY 

WAS/-J1NGTON, D. C. , 1993 





Foreword

In the capture of the southern Marianas, including the recapture of Guam,

during the summer of 1944, Army ground and air forces played an important,

though subordinate, role to that of the Navy and its Marine Corps. Marine

personnel constituted the bulk of the combat troops employed. The objective of

this campaign was "to secure control of sea communications through the

Central Pacific by isolating and neutralizing the Carolines and by the establishment of sea and air bases for operations against Japanese sea routes and

long-range air attacks against the Japanese home land." Its success would provide steppingstones from which the Americans could threaten further attack

westward toward the Philippines, Formosa, and Japan itself, and would gain

bases from which the Army Air Forces' new very long range bombers, the

B-29's, could strike at Japan's heartland. Recognizing and accepting the challenge, the Japanese Navy suffered heavy and irreplaceable losses in the

accompanying Battle of the Philippine Sea; and the islands after capture became

the base for all the massive air attacks on Japan, beginning in November 1944.

In the operations described in the present volume, landings against strong

opposition demonstrated the soundness of the amphibious doctrine and techniques evolved out of hard experience in preceding Pacific operations. Bitter

inland fighting followed the landings, with Army and Marine Corps divisions

engaged side by side. The author's account and corresponding Marine Corps

histories of these operations provide ample opportunity to study the differences

in the fighting techniques of the two services. Dr. Crowl also deals frankly with

one of the best-known controversies of World War II, that of Smith versus

Smith, but concludes that it was the exception to generally excellent interservice

co-operation.

With team effort among the military services the order of the day, this record

of the Army's experience in working with the Navy and the Marine Corps

should be particularly valuable both now and in the future.

Washington, D.C. 16 March 1959

WARREN H. HOOVER

Colonel, U.S.A.

Acting Chief of Military History

vii
The Author

Philip A. Crowl, who has an M.A. from the State University of Iowa and a

Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University, taught History at the Johns Hopkins

University and at Princeton. Commissioned in the Navy in World War II, he

became a lieutenant (senior grade) and commanding officer of an LCI gunboat

that was in action at Leyte Gulf, Lingayen Gulf, and Okinawa. From 1949

through 1956, Dr. Crowl was a historian with the Office, Chief of Military

History. He was awarded the James V. Forrestal Fellowship for 1953-54 to

study command relationships in amphibious warfare in World War II. Since

1957 he has been in Department of State Intelligence. Dr. Crowl is author of

Maryland During and After the Revolution (1943) and coauthor of The U.S.

Marines and Amphibious War (1951) and Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls

(1955).

viii
Preface

This volume is a companion piece to Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls

by Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love, also published in the Pacific subseries

of the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Together, the two

volumes cover the beginning and climax (although not the conclusion) of the

Central Pacific phase of the war against Japan, with special emphasis, of

course, on the U.S. Army's contribution to the victories won in that area.1

Specifically, Campaign in the Marianas treats of the capture of Saipan, Tinian,

and Guam in the southern Marianas; the strategic and tactical plans leading

thereto; supporting operations by naval and air units; and the final development

and exploitation of these islands as bases for furtherance of American joint

operations against the Japanese homeland.

The word joint cannot be overemphasized in connection with any consideration of U.S. operations in the Central Pacific. It was predominantly a U.S.

Navy theater under the command of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. The main

burden of the amphibious and ground fighting in the Marianas, as in the

Gilberts and Marshalls, fell on the shoulders of the U.S. Marine Corps, whose

troops far outnumbered those of the U.S. Army. The author recognizes this and

recognizes also that, by concentrating on the activities of the Army, this volume

in a sense presents a distorted picture. The distortion is deliberate. The book

represents, by definition, one segment of the history of the U.S. Army in World

War II. Excellent official and semiofficial histories of U.S. Navy and U.S.

Marine Corps operations in the Marianas have already been published. The

present narrative of Army activities should add in some measure to what has

already been written about the campaign. The reader may also gain additional

insight into the nature of joint operations and interservice co-ordination.

Because the number of Army troops participating in the Marianas Campaign

was comparatively small, it has been possible to devote more attention here to

small unit actions than in the volumes of the series that deal with the movements of great armies and corps over large continental land masses. In much

of this narrative the spotlight centers on the infantry company. Ideally, as

much attention should have been devoted to equivalent artillery units, especially

since Army artillery played a major role in the Marianas Campaign. Unfortunately, the records kept by artillery units during the campaign were—to

understate the matter—terse. Unfortunately also, Army field historians who

1

 The conclusion of this phase of the war is covered in Roy E. Appleman, James M.

Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John T. Stevens, Okinawa: The Last Battle, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1948).

ix
accompanied the troops and who were to supplement and correct the official

records by conducting on-the-spot interviews, mostly neglected the artillery in

favor of the more mobile infantry.

No really adequate acknowledgment can be made to the many kind and

industrious people who helped to bring this book to completion. On substantive

matters of strategy and tactics, Dr. Louis Morton, Chief of the Pacific Section,

Office of the Chief of Military History, during the preparation of this volume,

was a tireless and able critic. On questions of literary style, Dr. Kent Roberts

Greenfield, formerly Chief Historian, Department of the Army, was the same.

The final editing of the manuscript was performed by Miss Mary Ann Bacon,

whose eye for detail is remarkable. None of them is responsible for any errors

of fact and interpretation or gaucheries of style I may have persisted in despite

their stern warnings. To all I am very grateful.

I owe a special debt of gratitude to Mr, Wsevolod Aglaimoff whose services

went far above and beyond the call of his duties as Deputy Chief Historian for

Cartography. His maps speak for themselves. What is not so apparent is his

meticulous scrutiny of the written narrative presented here and his expert advice on all matters tactical—advice based on almost a half-century's intensive

study of military tactics.

Maj. Gen. A. C. Smith, formerly Chief of Military History, Col. George G.

O'Connor, formerly Chief of War Histories Division, and the military members

of their staffs were liberal in their technical assistance and made it possible for

me to have access to the classified source material upon which this volume is

based. Mr. Thomas Wilds is responsible for unearthing, in some cases translating,

and in most cases interpreting the widely scattered and often obscure Japanese

source material upon which is based the account of enemy plans, defensive

preparations, and combat activity. Miss Margaret Plumb began and Mr. Stanley

L. Falk completed a highly useful study of the Guam phase of the campaign.

Mr. Falk's excellent draft narrative of the operations of the 77th Infantry

Division on Guam forms the basis for the account of that division's actions

presented here. Loretto Carroll Stevens was copy editor for the volume and

Norma Heacock Sherris was responsible for the selection of photographs. The

Index was compiled by Nicholas J. Anthony. Mr. Israel Wice, Chief Archivist,

General Reference Branch, and his staff and Miss Lois Aldrich of the World

War II Records Division, NARS, were unfailingly patient and courteous. The

debt to officers of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps who read and criticized

various portions of the manuscript or corresponded with the author is acknowledged in the Bibliographical Note appended to the volume.

Since so much of this volume deals with Marine Corps operations, I have

been particularly dependent on the co-operation of members of the Historical

Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Special thanks are

due to the late Lt. Col. Frank O. Hough, USMCR, Lt. Col. Harry Edwards,

USMC, Lt. Col. Carl W. Hoffman, USMC, and Maj. O. R. Lodge, USMC.

Washington, D.C.

16 March 1959

PHILIP A. CROWL

x
Contents

PART ONE

Introduction

Chapter Page

I. BACKGROUND OF STRATEGY .......... . 1

Prewar Origins of the Central Pacific Concept ..... . 2

War in the Pacific: First Year .......... . 4

Revival of the Central Pacific Concept ....... . 6

General MacArthur's Strategy .......... . 9

Enter the Army Air Forces ........... . 11

Cairo Conference ............... . 1 2

Scheduling Operations ............. . 1 3

Acceleration of Operations ........... . 14

Washington Planning Conferences: February–March 1944 . . 15

I I. TH E MARIANAS ................ . 2 1

I n History ................. . 2 1

The Japanese Invasion of Guam ......... . 22

Description of the Islands ............ . 24

PART TWO

Saipan

III. PLANNING THE INVASION ........... . 3 3

Organization and Composition of the Attack Force ... . 33

Tactical Planning ............... . 3 9

Training an d Rehearsals ............ . 4 5

Loading an d Embarkation ............ . 4 7

The Prospects Ahead: Intelligence of the Enemy .... . 50

xi
Chapter Page

I V. THE ENEMY ................. . 5 3

Prewar Japanese Activities in the Marianas ...... . 53

From Pearl Harbor to Invasion .......... . 55

Japanese Doctrine for Island Defense ........ . 62

Enemy Troop Strength and Dispositions on Saipan ... . 64

Japanese Expectations ............. . 6 9

V . INVASION .................. . 7 1

Softening the Target: Pre-D-Day Bombardment .... . 71

D-Day Bombardment and Ship-to-Shore Movement ... . 78

Breakdown of the Landing Plan .......... . 85

Expanding the Beachhead ............ . 87

Summary of the Situation at Nightfall ....... . 93

VI. CAPTURE OF ASLITO AIRFIELD ......... . 95

Counterattack: Night of 15–16 June ........ . 95

Consolidating the Beachhead: 16 June ....... . 96

Night of 16–17 June .............. . 98

Change o f Plans ............... . 9 8

First Landings of the 27th Infantry Division ..... . 99

D Plus 3: 17 June .............. . 101

D Plus 3: 18 June .............. . 111

T h e Japanese Situation ............. . 11 6

VII. SUPPORTING ARMS AND OPERATIONS ...... . 119

Battle of the Philippine Sea ........... . 119

Logistics .................. . 12 3

Postlanding Naval Gunfire Support ........ . 129

Close Air Support .............. . 13 1

Artillery .................. . 13 3

VIII. THE CAPTURE OF NAFUTAN POINT ....... . 137

Action of 19 June .............. . 138

Action of 20 June .............. . 141

Action of 21 June .............. . 144

Change of Plan: Relief of the 165th Infantry on Nafutan

Point ................. . 14 8

Action of 22 June .............. . 150

Stalemate on Nafutan: 23–24 June ......... . 151

Nafutan Secured: 25–28 June .......... . 155

xii
Chapter Page

IX. THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN — I ...... . 163

Preparations for the Drive to the North ....... . 163

2 2 June: Th e Jump-off ............. . 16 7

23 June: Into Death Valley ........... . 170

The First Night in Death Valley ......... . 179

23 June: Marines on the Flanks .......... . 180

24 June: Action of the 27th Division ........ . 181

24 June: Action on the Flanks .......... . 187

X. SMITH VERSUS SMITH ............. . 19 1

Relief of Major General Ralph C. Smith ...... . 191

Interservice Controversy ............ . 19 2

Conclusions ................. . 19 7

XI. THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN — II ...... . 203

2 5 June .................. . 20 3

The Plight of the Japanese ........... . 211

2 6 June .................. . 21 3

2 7 June .................. . 21 6

Japanese Reactions .............. . 22 1

2 8 June .................. . 22 1

2 9 June .................. . 22 7

3 0 June .................. . 23 0

Central Saipan: Sum-up. ............ . 23 2

XII. THE CAPTURE OF NORTHERN SAIPAN ...... . 235

Drive t o Tanapag ............... . 23 5

Change o f Direction .............. . 24 4

5 July ................... . 24 4

6 July ................... . 24 7

7 July ................... . 25 6

Final Victory ................ . 26 2

PART THREE

Tinian

XIII. AMERICAN AND JAPANESE PLANS ........ . 269

Plan for the Invasion ............. . 271

T h e Enemy ................. . 27 8

xiii
Chapter Page

XIV. INVASION AN D CAPTURE ............ . 28 5

Preliminary Bombardment ............ . 28 5

T h e Landings ................ . 28 8

Japanese Counterattack: 24–25 July ........ . 293

Capture o f Northern Tinian ........... . 29 4

Drive to the South .............. . 296

Tinian Secured ................ . 30 1

PART FOUR

Guam

X V. PLANS AND PREPARATIONS ........... . 30 7

T h e Island ................. . 30 7

Plans fo r th e Invasion ............. . 30 9

Change o f Plans ............... . 31 4

77th Infantry Division Training and Preparation .... . 315

Loading an d Embarkation ............ . 31 8

Preliminary Bombardment ............ . 32 0

Intelligence o f th e Enemy ............ . 32 6

XVI. TH E ENEMY .................. . 32 9

Troops and Troop Dispositions .......... . 329

Supporting Weapons .............. . 33 3

Fortifications ................ . 33 4

Japanese Situation on the Eve of Battle ....... . 335

XVII. THE FIGHT FOR THE BEACHHEAD ........ . 339

W-Day Preliminary Bombardment ......... . 33 9

From Ship to Shore .............. . 342

T h e Northern Beaches ............. . 34 3

T h e Southern Beaches ............. . 34 4

Landing the 305th Infantry ........... . 345

Japanese Counterattack ............. . 34 7

Consolidating the Southern Beachhead: 22–24 July . . . . 348

Landing th e Reserves .............. . 35 4

Consolidating the Northern Beachhead: 22–24 July ... . 356

Initial Supply Over the Beaches .......... . 357

xiv
Chapter Page

XVIII. THE ASSAULT COMPLETED: 25–30 JULY ...... . 361

Preparations for the Assault on Orote: 25 July ..... . 362

The Fight in the North: 25 July ......... . 363

Japanese Counterattack: 25–26 July ........ . 364

The Capture of Orote ............. . 367

The Capture of Fonte and the Force Beachhead Line ... 371

Reconnaissance of Southern Guam ......... . 374

XIX. PURSUIT TO THE NORTH ........... . 377

T h e Japanese Withdrawal ............ . 37 7

Drive to the O–2 Line: 31 July–1 August ....... . 378

Supply Problems ............... . 38 3

To Barrigada and the O–3 Line: 2–4 August ..... . 386

77th Division: 3 August ............ . 398

77th Division: 4 August ............ . 402

T h e Marines: 2– 4 August ............ . 40 7

X X . GUAM SECURED ............... . 40 9

77th Division: 5–6 August ............ . 409

3d Marine Division: 5–6 August .......... . 417

Capture of Mount Santa Rosa: 7–8 August ...... . 417

The Marines: 7–8 August ............ . 434

The End on Guam .............. . 436

PART FIVE

Conclusion

XXI. FRUITS OF VICTORY ............. . 441

Appendix

A. Tactical Units of Northern Troops and Landing Force on Saipan . . 449

B. Pacific Ocean Area Unit of Fire for Ground Weapons ..... . 452

C. Japanese Order of Battle on Saipan .......... . 453

D. Troop List of the 77th Infantry Division for the Guam Operation . . 455

E. Order of Battle of III Amphibious Corps (less 77th Infantry

Division) fo r th e Guam Operation .......... . 45 6

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ............... . 45 9

LIST O F ABBREVIATIONS ............... . 46 5

GLOSSARY OF CODE NAMES .............. . 470

BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS ............ . 47 1

INDEX ....................... . 47 5

xv
Tables

No. Page

1. Estimated Strength of the Japanese Garrison on Tinian ..... . 279

2 . Artillery o n Guam .................. . 33 3

Charts

1. Task Organization for Major Commands for Attack on Saipan

a n d Tinian ................... . 3 4

2. Task Organization for Major Commands for Attack on Guam ... . 310

Maps

1. Pacific Ocean Areas, 15 June 1944 ............ . 5

2 . Southern Marianas .................. . 2 5

3. Japanese Defense Sectors on Saipan ............ . 66

4. D-Day on Saipan, 15 June 1944 ............. . 82

5. Advance 16–18 June ................. . 107

6 . Advance 19–22 June ................. . 16 2

7. Into Death Valley, 23–24 June 1944 ........... . 171

8. 27th Division, 25 June 1944 .............. . 202

9. 27th Division, 26–27 June 1944 ............. . 219

10. 27th Division, 28–30 June 1944 ............. . 223

11. Drive to Tanapag, 1–4 July 1944 ............. . 236

12. 105th Infantry, Morning, 6 July 1944 ........... . 249

13. 105th Infantry, Afternoon, 6 July 1944 ........... . 255

14. Last Days of Battle on Saipan, 7–9 July 1944 ........ . 262

15. Japanese Defense Sectors on Tinian ............ . 281

16. Capture of Tinian, 24 July–1 August 1944 ......... . 290

17. Disposition of Japanese Troops on Guam, July 1944 ...... . 330

18. Landings on Guam, 21 July 1944 ............ . 338

19. Capture of Orote Peninsula, 25–29 July 1944 ........ . 367

20. Securing the Force Beachhead Line, 26–29 July 1944 ...... . 372

21. Reconnaissance of Southern Guam, 28 July–2 August 1944 .... . 375

22. Drive to O–2 Line, 31 July–1 August 1944 ......... . 379

23. Approach to Barrigada, 2 August 1944 ........... . 389

24. Advance to O–3 Line, 2–4 August 1944 .......... . 399

25. Advance to O–4 Line, 5–6 August 1944 .......... . 410

26. Advance 7–8 August and Capture of Mt. Santa Rosa ..... . 420

xvi
Maps I–VII Are in Accompanying Map Envelope

I. Saipan Island

II. 27th Division, 16–22 June 1944

III. Advance 5–6 July

IV. Tinian Island

V. Island of Guam

VI. Northern Beachhead, 21–25 July 1944

VII. Southern Beachhead, 21–25 July 1944

Illustrations

Page

Top Naval Commanders in the Marianas Campaign ....... . 36

Vice Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner ............. . 3 7

L t. Gen. Holland M. Smith ................ . 3 8

Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith ................ . 3 9

Destruction a t Charan Kanoa ............... . 7 5

Dummy Searchlight Platform on East Coast of Saipan ...... . 77

Japanese Type 96 25-mm. Machine Cannon .......... . 78

Amphibian Tractors in Line Abreast Formation ........ . 81

Congestion on 2d Marine Division Beach ........... . 84

Early Wave on the Beach ................ . 88

Marines Digging Foxholes ................ . 9 0

D-Day Command Post ................. . 9 1

Narrow-Gauge Railroad Near Charan Kanoa ......... . 10 2

Soldiers Watch Destruction of a Pillbox ........... . 103

Reinforcements Moving Inland .............. . 10 4

105th Infantrymen Wading in From the Reef ......... . 108

Aslito Field Becomes Conroy Field ............. . 11 3

Examining a n Enemy Gu n ................ . 11 5

Shore Parties Unloading Supplies on Blue Beach 1 ....... . 125

Caterpillar Tractor Pulling Ammunition Pallets From an LCM ... . 126

Pontoon Causeway and Barge in Charan Kanoa Harbor ..... . 127

North Central Saipan ................. . 13 4

Seaward Cliff Line, Nafutan Peninsula ........... . 13 8

27th Division Troops at Cliff Edge, Nafutan Peninsula ... . . . . . 140

Infantryman at the Base of Cliff, Nafutan Peninsula ....... . 141

Infantryman Milking a n Island Goat ............ . 14 5

Skirmish Line .................... . 15 6

Americans Rescuing Baby From Nafutan Cave ......... . 15 8

Hill 50 0 ....................... . 16 4

Marines on the Crest of Hill 500 ............. . 165

xvii
Page

Japanese Type 93 13.2-mm. Machine Gun .......... . 166

Japanese Field o f Fire .................. . 16 7

Mt. Tapotchau Dominating Death Valley .......... . 174

Tree Line in Death Valley ................ . 175

Driven t o Concealment ................. . 17 6

Marines Emerging From Purple Heart Ridge Complex ...... . 180

Tank-Infantry Co-operation ............... . 18 5

I n Hell's Pocket Area ................. . 18 9

Inland o f Garapan Harbor ................ . 19 0

Maj. Gen. Sanderford Jarman ............... . 19 3

Lt. Gen. Holland M. Smith ............... . 194

Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr. ............. . 195

Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith ................ . 197

Lower End of Death Valley ............... . 208

Bazooka Team Preparing to Fire ............. . 214

Maj. Gen. George W. Griner ............... . 225

Truck-Mounted Rocket Launchers Firing ........... . 22 9

Marines Dash Through Blazing Garapan ........... . 239

Infantrymen Observe Hill 76 7 .............. . 24 0

Troops Searching Out the Enemy ............. . 243

Harakiri Gulch ................... . 24 6

Waiting To Move Up ................. . 25 2

Marines Examining Destroyed Enemy Tank .......... . 260

Flame Thrower Blasting Paradise Valley Cave ......... . 263

Coastal Area, Northwest Tinian .............. . 27 0

Marianas Leaders Confer a t Tinian ............. . 273

L V T With Ramp ................... . 27 6

155-mm. Gun Firing at Tinian From Saipan .......... . 287

Invasion Craft .................... . 29 2

4th Marines Wading Toward White Beach 1 ......... . 293

Ushi Point Airfield .................. . 29 6

Open Terrain of Central Tinian .............. . 297

155-mm. Howitzer Emplacement on Tinian .......... . 298

Cliff Line at Tip of Orote Peninsula ............ . 308

Orote Peninsula ................... . 30 9

Maj. Gen. Roy S. Geiger ................ . 311

Japanese Beach Obstacles at Guam ............. . 336

Japanese Open-Trench Beach Defenses at Agat ........ . 337

First Wave of Landing Craft Heads for Agat Beaches ...... . 340

Asan's Green and Blue Beaches .............. . 341

3 d Marine Division Beachhead .............. . 34 3

Circling Landing Craft ................. . 34 6

4th Marines Moves Inland Toward Mt. Alifan ......... . 350

Assembly Area of 305th Infantry on 22 July .......... . 351

xviii
Page

Smouldering Japanese Tanks ............... . 35 3

Maj. Gen. Andrew D. Bruce ............... . 354

Pontoon Barge With Crane ............... . 358

Troops i n Bivouac ................... . 36 2

Japanese Airfield, the Prime Objective on Orote Peninsula ..... . 366

Marine Corps Officers ................. . 37 0

Antitank Crew .................... . 37 3

Men of Company B, 305th RCT ............. . 381

Forward Observers of the 77th Division ........... . 383

Artillery Column Moving Inland ............. . 38 5

M t . Santa Rosa ................... . 41 8

Burning U.S. Medium Tanks ............... . 42 6

Lt. Gen. Alexander A. Vandegrift ............. . 435

LST's, LCI's, Small Boats ................ . 44.2

Harmon Field, Guam .................. . 44 4

Photographs are from Department of Defense files with the following exceptions: photographs on pages 37 and 38 from the personal files of Col. Robert C.

Richardson, III; the photograph on page 418 from the Bishop Museum, Oahu,

Hawaii; and that on page 444, by J. R. Eyerman-Life, (c) 1950 Time Inc.

xix
The U.S. Army Center of Military History

The Center of Military History prepares and publishes histories as required by the U.S. Army. It coordinates Army historical matters, including

historical properties, and supervises the Army museum system. It also

maintains liaison with public and private agencies and individuals to stimulate interest and study in the field of military history. The Center is located

at 1099 1.4th Street, N.W., Washington, B.C. 20005-3402.
PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

Background of Strategy

On 15 June 1944 American forces invaded the island of Saipan thus piercing

the first hole in the inner line of island

fortifications that the Japanese had laboriously constructed in order to defend their

homeland, their empire, and their recent

conquests in the western Pacific and in

Asia. Saipan is 1,270 nautical miles from

Tokyo, 1,430 from Manila, 1,640 from

Shanghai, and 3,350 from Honolulu. Located in the southern portion of the Marianas chain, it was the most heavily fortified

of that group of islands and was considered by the Japanese to be a keystone in

the defensive system for the homeland.

After twenty-four days of strenuous battle and much bloodletting on the part of

both victor and vanquished, Saipan was

conquered. On 1 August the little island

of Tinian, just a few miles to the south,

fell to U.S. forces, and in the same month

Guam, the southernmost of the Marianas

chain, was recaptured from the Japanese,

who had wrested it from the Americans

during the first days of the war.

Speaking of the fall of Saipan, Fleet Admiral Osami Nagano, Supreme Naval Advisor to the Emperor, could only remark,

"Hell is on us."1 Premier Hideki Tojo

publicly announced, "Japan has come to

face an unprecedentedly great national

crisis." The following month Tojo resigned

in disgrace along with his entire war cabinet. His resignation marked a major turning point in the war. Up to that time the

military clique, led and symbolized by

Tojo, had been in secure control of the

machinery of government and had dictated

Imperial policy without any effective restraints. Thereafter, an opposition party

with strong inclinations toward terminating the war made gradual but steady inroads into the councils of state, until at

last it was able to persuade the Emperor

to surrender. The loss of Saipan and the

overthrow of Tojo gave this peace party its

first opportunity.2

The spark that set off this interesting

train of events was a directive issued by

the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 March

1944.3 This body—consisting of Admiral

William D. Leahy, President Franklin D.

Roosevelt's chief of staff; Admiral Ernest

J. King, Chief of Naval Operations and

Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; General

George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S.

Army; and General Henry H. Arnold,

1

 United States Strategic Bombing Survey

(USSBS) (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, 2 vols. (Washington, 1946) (hereafter cited as USSBS, Interrogations), II, 356.

2

 USSBS (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division,

The Campaigns of the Pacific War (Washington,

1946) (hereafter cited as USSBS Campaigns), p.

220; USSBS, Chairman's Office, Japan's Struggle

to End the War (Washington, 1946) pp. 2-3;

Robert J. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender

(Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press,

1945), pp. 26-29, et passim. 3

 Msg, JCS to MacArthur and Nimitz, 5171

and 989, 13 Mar 44, CM-OUT 5137.
2 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Commanding General, U.S. Army Air

Forces—was responsible, under the President and in conjunction with its British

counterpart, for the strategic direction of

World War II. On 12 March it ordered

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander

in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific

Ocean Areas, to occupy the southern

Marianas beginning 15 June next. The objective as stated was "to secure control of

sea communications through the Central

Pacific by isolating and neutralizing the

Carolines and by the establishment of sea

and air bases for operations against Japanese sea routes and long range air attacks

against the Japanese home land."

The 12 March directive was the product

of a slow if not always steady growth,

emerging only after a long and sometimes

bitter conflict of strategic ideas, military

interests, and personalities. A leading issue

of this conflict was what can best be called

the "Central Pacific concept" of American

strategy in a war against Japan.

Prewar Origins of the

Central Pacific Concept

Shortly after the termination of World

War I, when Japan's pretensions in the

western Pacific and the Far East were becoming steadily more apparent, American

strategic planners set to work to examine

possible ways and means of defeating the

Japanese Empire in the event of war between the two nations. From these deliberations emerged a series of plans, dating

from 1924 through 1938, entitled the

ORANGE plans.4 The product of joint

Army-Navy effort, these were issued by

the Joint Army and Navy Board, the predecessor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Although the several plans varied in detail, certain assumptions remained fairly

constant. The basic concept of the war

against Japan, as expressed by the Joint

Board in 1929, was that it would be "primarily naval in character throughout, unless large Army forces are employed in

major land operations in the Western Pacific, directed toward the isolation and exhaustion of Japan, through control of her

vital sea communications and through aggressive operations against her armed

forces and her economic life." 5 To conduct such a war, the U.S. Fleet must first

move west from Hawaii and establish an

advanced naval base in the Philippines,

preferably at Manila Bay if it could be

held. Such an advance would be either a

direct movement or a step-by-step process

involving seizure and occupation of key

Japanese Mandated Islands in the Marshalls and Carolines, depending upon the

nature and extent of the enemy resistance.

From a naval base in the Philippines, it

was presumed that Japanese trade routes

through the South China Sea could be cut

and Japan's economic life throttled. American forces might also move north to establish still more bases in the Ryukyus and

other islands neighboring Japan, from

which American naval control could be

exercised over Japanese home waters and

American aircraft could harass the homeland itself.

4

 JB 325, Ser. 228, 15 Aug 24, sub: Joint Army

and Navy Basic War Plan, ORANGE; Ser. 280, 14

Jun 38-11 Jan 29; Ser. 546, 9 May 35; Ser. 570,

19 May 36; Ser. 618, 28 Feb 38. For further discussion of prewar strategic plans, see Louis

Morton, Strategy and Command: Turning the

Tide, 1941-1943, a forthcoming volume in the

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

series. 5

 JB 325, Ser. 280, 14 Jun 28-11 Jan 29, sub:

Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, ORANGE

—Estimate of the Situation, p. 39.
BACKGROUND OF STRATEGY 3

The plans assumed it would be essential

to establish subsidiary U.S. bases in the

Japanese Mandates, especially in the Marshalls, for the purpose of protecting the

line of communications between the Philippines and the continental United States.

It was generally agreed that bases in the

Marshalls, and probably in the Carolines,

would have to be occupied by U.S. forces

either in offensive operations in advance of

a fleet approach to the Philippines or as a

defensive measure to protect the line of

communications of American forces operating in the western Pacific. The Marianas

figured only incidentally in the scheme,

since they lay north of the main route of

advance from Hawaii to the Philippines.

Thus first emerged the Central Pacific

concept of strategy.

The ORANGE plans were based on the

assumption that the United States alone

would be engaged in a war with Japan.

With the outbreak of war in Europe in

1939, and with the gradual strengthening

of bonds between the United States and

the anti-Axis nations, especially Great Britain, this assumption no longer held. It became necessary to agree to some combined

strategic measures in anticipation of the

day when the United States might actively enter the war against the Axis.

As a consequence, British and American

military staff representatives met in Washington in early 1941 to discuss possible

strategy should the United States become

a belligerent.6 In their final report, ABC1,7

 the representatives agreed first that

"should the United States be compelled to

resort to war," both nations would consider the Atlantic and European area to be

"the decisive theater," since Germany was

the predominant member of the Axis Powers. Thus was enunciated the doctrine of

"beat Germany first" that prevailed until

the surrender of Germany on 8 May 1945.

Until the Germans were defeated, Allied

strategy in the Far East would be primarily defensive. American and British forces

would defend Hong Kong, the Philippines, and the Netherlands Indies and hold

Malaya, Singapore, and Java against Japanese attack. Within this defensive pattern,

the U.S. Navy was assigned the specific

offensive mission of capturing positions in

the Marshalls and preparing to establish

control over the entire Caroline and Marshall Islands area.8

 Thus was restated the

main principle of the ORANGE plans: hold

the Philippines, if possible, and gain control over the islands and waters of the

Central Pacific west of Hawaii.

In April 1941 the U.S. Joint Board set

about bringing its own plans up to date in

the light of these American-British Conversations. The new strategic plan, entitled

RAINBOW 5, merely restated the decisions

of ABC-1 and assigned more specific tasks

to the U.S. forces. Germany was to be

beaten first; the Philippines were to be

held as long as possible; the U.S. Fleet was

to prepare to capture positions in the Marshalls and the Carolines.9

 Thus, once

6

 ABC-1, 27 Mar 41, in Pearl Harbor Attack:

Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (Washington, 1946) (hereafter cited as Pearl Harbor Hearings), Part 15, pp. 1487-1550. 7

 ABC stands for American-British Conversations.

8

 Pearl Harbor Hearings, Part 15, pp. 1511-12,

1516, 1518-19. 9

 Ibid., Part 18, pp. 2885, 2889-90, 2894, 2919,

2916. RAINBOW 5 was approved by the Secretaries of War and Navy, and although never formally approved by the President, it was in fact

the war plan that went into effect on 7 December

1941.
4 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

again, the role of the Central Pacific in

the forthcoming war against Japan was

affirmed.

War in the Pacific: First Year

The rapid succession of Japanese victories after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor

made it impossible for the United States

and her allies to put into immediate execution any of the prewar plans. Guam fell

to the invaders, followed by Hong Kong,

Singapore, Manila, and the Philippine Islands. In short order the United States

and Great Britain were stripped of all the

usable advanced bases they once possessed,

The Netherlands Indies, Malaya, and

Burma were overrun and the Bismarck

Archipelago-New Guinea-Solomons area

was invaded. By May of 1942 the Japanese

were well ensconced in a far-flung system

of mutually supporting bases including the

Kurils, the Marianas, the Marshalls, the

Carolines, the Palaus, and Rabaul (in

New Britain), with outposts in the Gilberts, the Solomons, and New Guinea.

Flushed with victory, the Japanese high

command decided to ride its good fortune

to the limit and push on to Port Moresby,

New Guinea—the very threshold of Australia; to New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa,

astride the sea lanes between Australia

and the United States; and to Midway

and the western Aleutians. The first plan

was frustrated by the Allied naval victory

in the Coral Sea in early May 1942, while

the second died aborning. The Japanese

gained a tenuous foothold in the Aleutians,

but in attempting to seize Midway they

suffered their first decisive defeat of the

war at the hands of the U.S. Pacific Fleet

in the great naval and air battle of 3-4

June 1942.10 The time had come for Allied counteraction.

The United States, which had assumed

major responsibility for the war in the Pacific, had laid the groundwork for future

offensive operations against the enemy. On

30 March 1942 the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

with the approval of President Roosevelt,

organized the Pacific theater into two

commands—the Southwest Pacific Area

(SWPA) and the Pacific Ocean Areas

(POA). The former fell to the command

of General Douglas MacArthur, with

headquarters in Australia, and included

Australia, New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomons, the Netherlands

Indies (except Sumatra), the Philippines,

and adjacent waters.11 The Pacific Ocean

Areas was to be commanded by Admiral

Nimitz, whose headquarters was at Pearl

Harbor and who was concurrently Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. This

theater included virtually the entire remainder of the Pacific Ocean. Within its

boundaries lay the Hawaiian Islands, Midway, Wake, the Gilberts, the Marshalls,

the Carolines, the Palaus, the Marianas,

the Bonins, the Ryukyus, Formosa (Taiwan), and the Japanese home islands.12

Because of the immensity of the theater, it

was subdivided into three areas, North,

Central, and South Pacific. Nimitz directly commanded the first two, but as10

 See Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United

States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol.

IV, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions,

May 1942-August 1942 (Boston, Little, Brown

and Company, 1949), 11

 Memo, Marshall and King for President, 30

Mar 42, no sub, with two inclosures, Directive to

CINCPOA and Directive to the Supreme Commander, SWPA, ABC 323.31 POA (1-29-45),

1-B.

12

 Excluded from POA were the waters off the

west coast of South America.
BACKGROUND OF STRATEGY 5

MAP 1

signed the third to a subordinate commander who from October 1942 to June

1944 was Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr.13

The first task facing MacArthur and

Nimitz after the Japanese fleet had been

turned back at Midway was to render more

secure the line of communications between

the United States and Australia. On 2

July 1942 the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered

their Pacific commanders to advance

through the Solomons and New Guinea

and seize the Japanese stronghold of Rabaul. On 1 August 1942 the area under

MacArthur's control was reduced slightly

by moving his eastward boundary line

from 160°E to 159°E from the equator

southward. This in effect took the lower

Solomon Islands including Tulagi, Guadalcanal, Florida, the Russells, Malaita, and

13

 Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, USN, and

Lieutenant Commander J. Bryan, III, USNR,

Admiral Halsey's Story (New York and London,

Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company,

Inc., 1947).
6 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

San Cristobal out of MacArthur's jurisdiction. (Map 1) There followed the

lengthy and exhausting Guadalcanal and

Papua Campaigns. By January of 1943

the line of communications was safe,

even though Rabaul remained in enemy

hands.14

The Japanese were at last on the defensive; the losses at Pearl Harbor were

more than replaced by the naval repair

and construction program. Allied military

planners could now direct their attention

to devising ways and means of taking up

the offensive, and it is not surprising that

their thoughts turned once again to the

prewar plans for the Pacific.

Revival of the Central Pacific Concept

The Casablanca Conference

In January 1943 President Roosevelt

and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff met

with Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill

and the British Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca, French Morocco. There, the American and British Chiefs, known collectively

as the Combined Chiefs of Staff, mapped

out as best they could the main lines of

global strategy for the coming year.15 In

the midst of prolonged and sometimes

acrimonious discussion concerning forthcoming operations in Europe and the

Mediterranean, proposed offensives in Burma, and aid to China, Admiral King

stepped forth to assume the role that he

was to fill for the next two years—that of

the leading advocate of a greater effort in

the Pacific and more specifically of a Central Pacific thrust against the Japanese.

King addressed himself primarily to the

problem of where to go after Rabaul was

captured—an operation that was optimistically assumed to be already well advanced with the campaigns in Guadalcanal and Papua drawing to a successful

close. He adhered to the concept of the

ORANGE plans and urged that the first

main Allied objective in the Pacific be the

Philippines, since they lay athwart the

line of communications between Japan

and the oil-rich East Indies and since their

occupation by Allied forces would permit

that line to be cut. The best route to this

objective, he claimed, lay through the

Central Pacific. Such a drive would involve "establishing a base in the northwestern Marshalls and then proceeding to

Truk and the Marianas." "The Marianas"

he added, "are the key of the situation be14

 See John Miller, jr., Guadalcanal: The First

Offensive (Washington, 1949), and Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua (Washington, 1957), both

in UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II series; Samuel Eliot Morison, History of

United States Naval Operations in World War

II, Vol. IV, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine

Actions, and Vol. V, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942-February 1943 (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1949); Maj. John L.

Zimmerman, USMCR, The Guadalcanal Campaign, Historical Division, Division of Public Information, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

(Washington, 1949); Wesley Frank Craven and

James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in

World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944 (hereafter cited as Craven and Cate, AAF IV) (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1950).

15

 For excellent discussions of the Casablanca

Conference, sec Lt. Grace P. Hayes, USN, The

War Against Japan, Part I, Ch. X, MS, JCS

Hist Sec; John Miller, jr., "The Casablanca Conference and Pacific Strategy," Military Affairs,

XIII (Winter, 1949); Fleet Admiral Ernest J.

King and Walter M. Whitehill, Fleet Admiral

King, A Naval Record (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1952), Ch. XXXIII; Maurice

Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959).
BACKGROUND OF STRATEGY 7

cause of their location on the Japanese

line of communication."16

An important addition was thus introduced into the ORANGE concept of the

war in the Pacific. The Marianas, which

had received little attention from the Joint

Board in its prewar plans, now emerged

as a major objective in the mind of Admiral King. The other participants at the

Casablanca meeting were too concerned

about more immediate problems to pay

much attention to King's remarks about

the Marianas, but the conferees did endorse planning for a drive through the

Central Pacific in 1943.

On 17 January the U.S. Joint Staff

Planners, a subcommittee of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, presented a fourfold program for the forthcoming year's operations

in the Pacific: (1) seizure of the Solomons, of eastern New Guinea as far as Lae

and Salamaua, and of the New BritainNew Ireland area; (2) seizure of Kiska

and Agattu in the Aleutians; (3) after the

fall of Rabaul, seizure and occupation of

the Gilberts, the Marshalls, and the Carolines through Truk, and extension of the

occupation of New Guinea to the border

of Netherlands New Guinea; and (4) operations in Burma designed to keep China

in the war and increase the employment

of China-based aircraft against Japanese

shipping.17

Most of this program was acceptable to

the Combined Chiefs, although they stipulated that the advance in the Central Pacific should not be allowed to prejudice

the recapture of Burma. The final agreement at Casablanca authorized plans to

be made for a campaign in the Aleutians,

an advance northwest from Samoa along

the Solomons-New Britain-New IrelandNew Guinea axis to protect the line

of communications between the United

States and Australia, diversionary attacks

against the Malay Barrier, and a Central

Pacific advance west against the TrukGuam line.18

TRIDENT Conference

In May of 1943 the President and

the Prime Minister with their Combined

Chiefs of Staff convened again, this time

in Washington at the TRIDENT Conference.19

 Most of the discussion again centered around questions concerning the

Mediterranean theater and Burma and

China, but during the course of the meeting, the Combined Chiefs reaffirmed their

determination to get on with the war in

the Central Pacific.20

On 14 May the American representatives circulated to the Combined Chiefs a

paper drawn up by the various subcommittees of the Joint Chiefs, entitled Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan.21

 This

paper was more of an estimate than a plan,

16

 Min, 56th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43. 17

 CCS 153 (Rev.), 17 Jan 43, title: Situation

To Be Created in Eastern Theater (Pacific and

Burma) in 1943.

18

 CCS 170/2, 23 Jan 43, title: Final Rpt to

President and Prime Minister Summarizing Decisions by CCS in Casablanca Conf. 19

 For a more detailed discussion of the TRIDENT conference, see Philip A. Crowl and Edmund

G. Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR

II (Washington, 1955), pp. 12-17; Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944;

Hayes, The War Against Japan, Sec. IV, Part II,

Ch. XIII. 20

 See Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), pp. 327-33. 21

 CCS 220, 14 May 43; Min, 86th mtg JCS,

20 May 43; JSSC 40/2, 3 Apr 43; JPS 67/4, 28
8 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

but it did articulate more clearly than before the main strategic principles endorsed

by the highest U.S. planners for the war

in the Pacific in 1943-44. It was assumed

that to bring about the unconditional surrender of Japan it would first be necessary

for the Allies to secure a foothold in China

in order to make best use of the enormous

Chinese manpower and to provide air

bases from which to bomb the Japanese

mainland. China could be entered by three

routes: through Burma, through the Strait

of Malacca and the South China Sea to

Hong Kong from the west, and across the

Pacific through the Celebes Sea to Hong

Kong from the east. The British, with

American and Chinese aid, should be held

responsible for operations along the first

two routes. The United States would assume major responsibility for the third.

Next came the question of how American forces could best get to the Celebes

Sea and Hong Kong from positions held

by the United States. The American planners proposed a two-pronged drive by U.S.

forces, one westward from Hawaii through

the Central Pacific, the other west and

north along the Solomons-Bismarck-New

Guinea line in General MacArthur's

Southwest Pacific Area. The two thrusts

were to merge in the Philippines-South

China Sea area and join in the descent

upon Hong Kong. In determining priorities as between the two drives, it was declared that the main effort in the westward advance should be made through

the Central Pacific and a subsidiary role

assigned to the South and Southwest

Pacific.

Once again Admiral King took the floor

to press the argument in favor of the Central Pacific drive and more particularly to

champion his favorite project, the invasion

of the Marianas. For years, he said, officers

at the Naval War College in Newport had

been studying the problem of supporting

or recovering the Philippines as the sine

qua non of defeating Japan. Their conclusions all pointed to the route straight

through the Pacific from the Hawaiian Islands as the best approach. The Marianas,

he insisted, were the key to the western Pacific. A major offensive there, he

claimed, would seriously jeopardize Japanese lines of communications, most probably force the Japanese Fleet into a decisive

naval engagement, and provide bases from

which to bomb the Japanese home islands.22

In its final session at TRIDENT the Combined Chiefs of Staff, although not committing themselves on the question of the

Marianas, agreed to American recommendations for a two-pronged attack across

the Pacific. Specifically, they listed the

following strategic objectives in the Pacific

for 1943-44:

1. Conducting air operations in and

from China,

2. Ejection of the Japanese from the

Aleutians,

3. Seizure of the Marshall and the Caroline Islands,

4. Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese-held

New Guinea, and

Apr 43; JCS 287/1, 8 May 43. All these bear the

title Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan or a

similar one. The subordinate committees of the

JCS included the Joint War Plans Committee

(JWPC), the Joint Strategic Survey Committee

(JSSC), and the Joint Staff Planners (JPS). For

more detailed discussion of the paper Strategic

Plan for the Defeat of Japan, see Crowl and Love,

Gilberts and Marshalls, pp. 12-17.

22

 Min, 92d mtg CCS, 21 May 43; King and

Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, pp. 437-38, 444.
BACKGROUND OF STRATEGY 9

5. Intensification of operations against

enemy lines of communication.

Two months later the Joint Chiefs of

Staff decided to modify the plans for

launching the Central Pacific drive. A direct assault on the Marshalls from Hawaii,

they reasoned, would require more shipping and troops than were immediately

available in the Central Pacific and might

necessitate draining General MacArthur's

Southwest Pacific Area of some of its resources. Also, it would be well to have

better aerial photographs of the Marshalls

before attempting the dangerous amphibious assault on these Japanese strongholds

about which almost nothing was known.

Air bases from which photographic missions could be flown should therefore be

built close to the Marshalls. Largely for

these reasons the Joint Chiefs, on 20 July,

ordered Nimitz to capture Tarawa, in the

Gilberts, and Nauru as a preliminary to

going into the Marshalls themselves. The

target date selected was 15 November

1943.23

In August the Combined Chiefs, meeting at Quebec for the QUADRANT Conference, accepted the revision as well as a

schedule of operations proposed by the

American representatives for the period

after the capture of the Marshalls. For the

Central Pacific this included the capture

of Ponape, Woleai, and Truk in the Carolines, the development of Truk as a major

fleet base, and the seizure of Yap and the

Palaus. At Admiral King's suggestion, an

invasion of the Marianas was included in

this program as a possible alternative to

the Palaus or as a concurrent operation.24

A few days after this decision was made

Admiral Nimitz suggested one further

change in the plan for initiating the Central Pacific drive. He proposed substituting Makin in the Gilberts for Nauru

because Makin could more easily be assaulted and because it was closer to the

Marshalls. The proposal was accepted,

and Nimitz was authorized to seize Tarawa, Makin, and Apamama in the Gilberts.25

 On 20 November 1943 simultaneous amphibious landings were launched

against Makin and Tarawa by elements

of the 27th Infantry Division and the 2d

Marine Division, respectively. Within four

days both atolls were captured, following

which Apamama was occupied.26 The

Central Pacific drive was under way.

General MacArthur's Strategy

Meanwhile, halfway around the world

at his headquarters in Brisbane, General

MacArthur was developing strategic plans

that were not always consonant with the

ideas prevailing among high echelon plan23

 Min, 97th mtg JCS, 30 Jul 43; JCS 386/2,

30 Jul 43, title: Strategy in the Pacific; Rad, JCS

to CINCPAC, 20 Jul 43, CM-IN 14465. See also

Crowl and Love, Gilberts and Marshalls, pp. 18-

25.

24

 JCS 446, 5 Aug 43, title: Specific Opns in

the Pacific and Far East, 1943-44; Min, 101st

mtg JCS, 7 Aug 43; CCS 301/3, 27 Aug 43,

title: Specific Opns in the Pacific and Far East;

CCS 319/5, 24 Aug 43, title: Final Rpt to President and Prime Minister. 25

 Msg, Nimitz to JCS, 260439, 26 Sep 43;

Memo, Roberts for Handy, 37 Sep 43, Sub: Substitution of Makin for Nauru in Operation GALVANIC, ABC 394 Pacific (28 Jun 43); Memo,

U.S. CofS for COMINCH, 37 Sep 43, same sub;

OPD Exec 2, Item 1b. 26

 See Crowl and Love, Gilberts and Marshalls;

Historical Division, War Department, The Capture of Makin, AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION (Washington, 1946) ; Captain James R.

Stockman, USMC, The Battle for Tarawa, Historical Division, Division of Public Information,

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (Washington,

1947).
10 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

ners in Washington. MacArthur, having

left the Philippines in early 1942, was determined to return as quickly and with as

strong a force as possible. He was also

determined that the major role in this

undertaking should be assigned to the

forces under his command and that the

main approach to the Philippines should

be made through his own Southwest Pacific theater.

In early 1943 MacArthur's immediate

concern was with current operations leading up to the eventual capture of Rabaul.27

 At the same time, his staff was

preparing a long-range plan (RENO I) for

a return to the Philippines. As first set

forth in February 1943, this plan called

for the progressive seizure in New Guinea

of Hansa Bay, Hollandia, Geelvink Bay,

and the Vogelkop Peninsula. With the

north coast of New Guinea under control,

Southwest Pacific forces would then advance north to Halmahera or to the Celebes before the final jump into the southern Philippines.28

This schedule of operations expressed

perfectly MacArthur's fundamental strategic ideas. The Philippines could best be

approached by a series of amphibious

jumps along the entire northern coast of

New Guinea, each so distanced as to permit full cover by land-based aviation. A

similar move into Halmahera or to the

Celebes would bring him to the threshold

of the Philippines. Then, with his eastern

flank secured by previous capture of the

Palaus and his western flank possibly protected by the occupation of islands in the

Arafura Sea, he would be fully prepared

to make good his promise to return.

Preoccupied as he was with his own

theater, MacArthur could only view with

alarm the growing pressure for an advance

through the Central Pacific. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs

of Staff notwithstanding, he strongly opposed an invasion of the Marshall Islands.

Even after the Combined Chiefs had approved and authorized the Marshalls operation, he radioed General Marshall:

From a broad strategic viewpoint I am

convinced that the best course of offensive

action in the Pacific is a movement from Australia through New Guinea to Mindanao. This movement can be supported by land

based aircraft which is utterly essential and

will immediately cut the enemy lines from

Japan to his conquered territory to the southward. By contrast a movement through the

mandated islands will be a series of amphibious attacks with the support of carrier based

aircraft against objectives defended by Naval

units and ground troops supported by land

based aviation. Midway stands as an example of the hazards of such operations. More- over no vital strategic objective is reached

until the series of amphibious frontal attacks

succeed in reaching Mindanao. The factors

upon which the old Orange plan were based

have been greatly altered by the hostile con- quest of Malaya and the Netherlands East

Indies and by the availability of Australia as a base . . . . 29

This protest may have helped persuade

the Joint Chiefs to postpone the Marshalls

operation until the Gilberts were taken,30

but it did nothing to sway the majority of

Washington planners from their determination to attack through the Central Pa27 cific. Two months later, in August at the See John Miller, jr., CARTWHEEL: The

Reduction of Rabaul, UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959). 28

 See Robert Ross Smith, The Approach to

the Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), pp. 3-4.

29

 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, C3303, 20 Jun

43, CM-IN 13149. 30

 See Crowl and Love, Gilberts and Marshalls,

pp. 18-21.
BACKGROUND OF STRATEGY 11

Quebec meeting of the Combined Chiefs

of Staff (QUADRANT), it was decided,

against General MacArthur's previous advice, to bypass Rabaul,31

 These decisions

on the part of higher authority did nothing

to dissuade the Southwest Pacific commander from continuing his opposition to

an extension of the Central Pacific drive.

Specifically, he was strongly set against an

invasion of the Marianas.32

Enter the Army Air Forces

In the autumn of 1943 a new factor

entered into the strategic picture of the

war against Japan—a factor that was to

have an important bearing on the decision

to invade the Marianas. The Army Air

Forces announced the imminent appearance of a very long range bomber—the

B-29.

An experimental model of the plane was

first flown in September 1942, but it took

about another year to iron out the "bugs"

and make arrangements for quantity production. From the point of view of strategic bombing, the outstanding characteristic of this four-engine plane was that with

a bomb load of four tons it had an estimated range of approximately 3,500 miles.

In effect, once the B-29 was produced in

sufficient quantity, mass bombing raids

could be conducted from friendly air bases

against enemy targets located as much as

1,750 miles away, although for optimum

efficiency and safety a 1,500-mile radius

was usually used as a basis for calculation.33

As 1943 drew to a close, it became apparent that the B-29's would not be off

the production line in sufficient number

in time to play a significant role in the

preinvasion bombardment of Europe, and

that in any case the B-17's and B-24's

already assigned to the European theater

were adequate for the job there.34 The

question then arose as to how the B-29's

could best be employed against Japan. To

which of the various theaters of operations

in the Pacific and Far East should the

bulk of the bombers be assigned? Three

possibilities suggested themselves: Australia, China, and the Marianas.

From the Southwest Pacific came urgent representations by Lt. Gen. George

C. Kenney of the Fifth Air Force that first

priority in the allocation of the new bombers be assigned to his command. He argued that the best way of using the B-29's

against Japan was to knock out the pe31

 JCS 446; Min, 101st mtg JCS; CCS 301/3;

and CCS 319/5. All cited n. 24. MacArthur's opposition to bypassing Rabaul was strongly put in

a radio to Marshall, C4183, 23 Jul 43, CM-IN

16149. 32

 General MacArthur reiterated his opposition

to the invasion of the Marianas as late as 1955.

He stated, "The 'Central Pacific Concept' . . .

lost its validity when it was abandoned in favor

of a 'Europe First' policy as the Japanese actually struck the Philippines. That was the time which

presented the golden opportunity, both in strategy

and logic, for a Central Pacific drive by our combined fleets aimed at engaging and destroying

Japan's naval power on the Pacific ... . Having

missed this initial opportunity, the belated Central Pacific drive toward the Marianas in July

[sic] 1944 could at best produce local tactical

successes without bringing to bear any decisive

influence upon the course of the war." Ltr, MacArthur to Maj Gen A. C. Smith, Chief of Mil

Hist, Dept of the Army, 7 Jan 55, OCMH.

33

 For an excellent treatment of the development of the B-29, see Wesley Frank Craven and

James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in

World War II, Vol. V, The Pacific: Matterhorn

to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945 (hereafter cited as Craven and Cate, AAF V) (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1953),

Ch. I. 34

 H. H. Arnold, General of the Air Force,

Global Mission (New York, Harper & Brothers,

1949), p. 477.
12 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

troleum industry in the Netherlands Indies

from bases in Australia. In Washington,

however, the Air Forces chief, General

Arnold, and his staff had other ideas, and

Kenney's suggestion was rejected.35

At the Quebec conference of August

1943 General Arnold presented to the

Combined Chiefs his "Air Plan for the

Defeat of Japan."36 Arnold estimated that

by October 1944 ten B-29 groups of

twenty-eight planes each might be available for employment against Japan. It was

assumed that by that time no Pacific island within fifteen hundred miles of the

Japanese main island of Honshu would

have been captured. Therefore he proposed to build a chain of airfields north

and south of Changsha in China, all of

which would be within the required range

of most of Japan's war industries. Since

the Air Forces high command refused to

believe either that a port on the east coast

of China could be captured in time to

supply these operations or that the Burma

Road could be opened, it concluded that

logistical support of any airfield built in

China must come from India, flown over

the Hump in B-24's.37

Air Forces planners were none too

happy about basing their new bombers in

China, partly because of the logistical difficulties involved and partly because they

were skeptical of the ability of the Chinese

to hold the fields against the Japanese.38

Hence, after the conclusion of the Quebec

conference, they urged that the Marianas

be seized and that D Day for the operation be advanced to mid-1944 by neutralizing and bypassing intervening Pacific islands.39

 The Air Forces planners argued

strongly that "plans for the acceleration

of the defeat of Japan would place emphasis upon the seizure of the Marianas

at the earliest possible date, with the establishment of heavy bomber bases as the

primary mission."40 The Marianas, it

will be recalled, were about 1,270 miles

from Tokyo, well within the estimated optimum 1,500-mile cruising radius of the

B-29's.

Cairo Conference

At last Admiral King had a powerful

ally in his persistent campaign for an invasion of the Marianas. At the meeting of

the President and Prime Minister with the

Combined Chiefs in Cairo in December

1943 (SEXTANT), the joint Navy-Air

Forces efforts bore fruit. Among the operations submitted to and approved by

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister

Churchill was the "seizure of Guam and

the Japanese Marianas," tentatively set for

1 October 1944.

This operation was to follow the capture

of important objectives in the Marshalls

in January, Ponape in the Carolines in

May, and Truk in July. Meanwhile, General MacArthur was scheduled to seize

Kavieng on New Ireland, Manus Island

in the Admiralties, and Hansa Bay on the

northeast coast of New Guinea, and then

35

 Craven and Cate, AAF V, pp. 12, 316;

George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports, A

Personal History of the Pacific War (New York,

Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949), pp. 378, 419, 426. 36

 CCS 323, 20 Aug 43, title: Air Plan for

the Defeat of Japan. 37

 Craven and Cate, AAF V, pp. 17-18. 38

 Arnold, Global Mission, p. 477.

39

 Craven and Cate, AAF V, p. 19. 40

 JPS 288, 4 Oct 43, sub: Plans for Defeat of

Japan Within 12 Months After Defeat of Germany, CCS 381, Japan (8-25-42), Sec. 7.
BACKGROUND OF STRATEGY 13

move on to the tip of Vogelkop Peninsula

by August 1944.41

The Combined Chiefs chose this occasion to again endorse the Central Pacific

route as part of a two-pronged drive to

Japan. In presenting their "Overall Plan

for the Defeat of Japan," they stated that

their ultimate aim was "to obtain objectives from which we can conduct intensive

air bombardment and establish a sea and

air blockade against Japan, and from

which to invade Japan proper if this

should prove necessary." This would necessitate one advance along the New

Guinea - Netherlands Indies - Philippines

axis and another through the Central Pacific in time for a major assault in the

area of Formosa-Luzon-China by the

spring of 1945. The two lines of advance

were to be "mutually supporting," but

should there be conflicts, "due weight

should be accorded to the fact that operations in the Central Pacific promise at this

time a more rapid advance toward Japan

and her vital lines of communication; the

earlier acquisition of strategic air bases

closer to the Japanese homeland; and, of

greatest importance, are more likely to

precipitate a decisive engagement with the

Japanese Fleet."42 Here in a capsule was

the rationale of the Central Pacific concept of strategy.

Scheduling Operations

Upon receiving word of these latest decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff,

Admiral Nimitz set about preparing a

schedule for forthcoming operations in the

Central Pacific. A preliminary draft of his

campaign plan, GRANITE, was finished by

27 December. It tentatively outlined operations as follows:43

Capture of

Kwajalein

Kavieng

(and air attack

on Truk)

Manus

Eniwetok

Mortlock (Nomoi Is.)

Truk

Saipan, Tinian,

and Guam

Date

31 January 1944

20 March 1944

20 April 1944

1 May 1944

1 July 1944

15 August 1944

15 November 1944

On 13 January, Nimitz issued another

GRANITE plan revising his original somewhat.44

 Operations to seize Mortlock Island and Truk were scheduled for 1 August. The possibility of bypassing Truk

was considered, and it was suggested that

if Truk could be bypassed, the Palaus

should be invaded by Central Pacific

forces on 1 August. The Marianas could

then be invaded by 1 November since capture of the Palaus, it was assumed, would

be a less costly and time-consuming venture than assaulting the Japanese stronghold on Truk. In any case, both the

original plan and the revision looked to

the Marianas as the culmination of the

1944 campaign.

A curious turn of events in Pacific

planning now took place. In order better

to co-ordinate future operations in the two

Pacific theaters, a meeting of representatives of the Southwest Pacific and the Pacific Ocean Areas was convened at Pearl

41

 CCS 397 (Rev.), 3 Dec 43, title: Specific

Opns for Defeat of Japan. 42

 CCS 417, 3 Dec 43, title: Overall Plan for

Defeat of Japan.

43

 CINCPOA Campaign Plan GRANITE, 27 Dec

43.

44

 CINCPOA Campaign Plan GRANITE, 13 Jan

44.
14 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Harbor in the last days of January 1944.

Present, among others, were Admiral Nimitz, and from his staff, Rear Adm. Charles

H. McMorris, Rear Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, and Vice Adm. John H. Towers,

Commander, Air Force Pacific. From the

Southwest Pacific came Maj. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur's chief of

staff; General Kenney, Commander, Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area;

and Vice Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, Commander, Allied Naval Forces, Southwest

Pacific Area.45

Admiral Nimitz presented his revised

GRANITE plan for the consideration of the

conferees. Immediately, and from all sides,

objections were voiced to the proposal to

invade the Marianas. General Sutherland

advocated pooling all available resources

in the Pacific and concentrating upon

operations in MacArthur's theater. "If

Central Pacific will move against Palau as

the next operation after the Marshalls,"

he argued, "and make available to Southwest Pacific Area the amphibious force

now contemplated for Truk, we can take

all of New Guinea, the Kai and Tanimbars, and Halmahera in time to join you

in amphibious movement to Mindanao

this year." General Kenney spoke of

bombing Japan by B-29's based on the

Marianas as "just a stunt." Admiral Kinkaid remarked that "any talk of the Marianas for a base leaves me entirely cold."46

Even Nimitz' own staff members

showed themselves to be less than enthusiastic over the Marianas, although Nimitz

himself favored the project. Admiral McMorris doubted if long-range bombing

from the Marianas would cause the capitulation of Japan. Admiral Sherman admitted that operations in the Marianas

would be extremely costly and that when

captured the harbors would be of limited

usefulness to the Navy.

When word of these proceedings reached

Admiral King, he read them "with indignant dismay." In a stern message to Nimitz he pointed out, "The idea of rolling up

the Japanese along the New Guinea coast,

through Halmahera and Mindanao, and

up through the Philippines to Luzon, as

our major strategic concept, to the exclusion of clearing our Central Pacific line

of communications to the Philippines, is

to me absurd. Further, it is not in accordance with the decisions of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff." Assuming correctly that Nimitz

agreed with his own strategic ideas, he

continued, "I'm afraid . . . that you have

not . . . maintained these views sufficiently positively vis-a-vis the officers from the

South and Southwest Pacific,"47 Admiral

King was not one to stand idly by while

theater staffs undermined his favorite and

long-nourished war plan almost at the

very moment of its fruition.

Acceleration of Operations

On 31 January Central Pacific forces

attacked Kwajalein Atoll in the central

Marshalls and, after a four-day fight by

the 7th Infantry Division and the 4th

Marine Division, secured the objective. At

the same time, Majuro in the eastern Mar45

 Min, Pacific Conf, 27-28 Jan 44, OPD

334.8, Case 125; Memo, Col William L. Ritchie

for Handy, 4 Feb 44, sub: Brief of Pacific Conf,

Held at Pearl Harbor 27-28 Jan 44, same file;

Hayes, The War Against Japan, Sec. IV, Part II,

Ch. XXI, pp. 6-8; Kenney, General Kenney Reports, pp. 347-49. 46

 Min, Pacific Conf, and Memo, Ritchie for

Handy, cited n. 45.

47

 Memo, King for Nimitz, Ser. 00409, 8 Feb

44, COMINCH file.
BACKGROUND OF STRATEGY 15

shalls was occupied without a battle.48

The conquest of these important positions

had been relatively easy, and the reserve

troops intended for the operation had not

been committed. Nimitz could thus speed

up his plan for moving into the western

Marshalls, and accordingly he launched,

on order, an amphibious assault against

Eniwetok on 17 February, two months

ahead of schedule. At the same time he

delivered a carrier strike against Truk.49

Eniwetok fell in six days before the combined assault of the 22d Marines and the

106th Regimental Combat Team of the

27th Infantry Division. On 17-18 February (Tokyo time) Rear Adm. Marc A.

Mitscher's Fast Carrier Force struck the

once mighty Japanese bastion at Truk,

destroying at least seventy planes on the

ground and in the air and about 200,000

tons of merchant shipping in the harbor.50

The defenses of Truk were so weak as to

lend strong support to the idea that it

might be bypassed altogether.

Shortly after the successful conclusion

of these operations in the Central Pacific,

General MacArthur found opportunity to

step up his own schedule. The most recently approved plans called for the Southwest Pacific Area commander to conduct

simultaneous invasions of Kavieng on New

Ireland and Manus in the Admiralties on

1 April.51 Then, on 23 February, an incident took place that persuaded MacArthur that he could safely accelerate at

least part of this plan. Planes from the

Southwest Pacific flying over the Admiralties on that date reported no evidence of

the enemy. The general decided to act at

once. He dispatched elements of the 1st

Cavalry Division to Los Negros to conduct

a reconnaissance in force and, when initial resistance was discovered to be light,

sent the rest of the division in to capture

the entire Admiralties group.52

Washington Planning Conferences

February-March 1944

In the light of these events, the time had

obviously come for the Washington planners to reconsider their schedule of operations for both Pacific theaters for the rest

of 1944.

Most planners by this time agreed that

the primary objective for the next phase

of the war against Japan was to establish

a lodgment somewhere in the "strategic

triangle" represented by Luzon, Formosa,

and the neighboring China coast. From

there it was believed that communications

between the Japanese homeland and the

Netherlands Indies could be completely

cut off, bases for the very long range

bombers could be set up within effective

range of the enemy's industrial centers,

and forward bases could be established for

the ultimate invasion of Japan, if that

operation should prove necessary.

48

 See Crowl and Love, Gilberts and Marshalls, pp. 302-04; Lt. Col. Robert D. Heinl, Jr.,

USMC, and Lt. Col. John A. Crown, USMC,

The Marshalls: Increasing the Tempo, Historical

Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine

Corps (Washington, 1954). 49

 Rad, CINCPOA to COMINCH, 022212, 2

Feb 44, CM-IN 1855; Min, 143d mtg JCS, 3 Feb

43; Rad, CINCPOA to COMINCH, 150749/2,

15 Feb 44, CM-IN 10592. 50

 See Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United

States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol.

VII, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942

-April 1944 (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1951), Ch. XVIII.

51

 Msg, JCS to CINCSWPA, 23150/Z, Jan

44, CM-IN 15765, and to CINCPOA, 231515/Z,

Jan 44, CM-IN 15699. 52

 See Miller, CARTWHEEL: The Reduction

of Rabaul.
16 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Beyond this point agreement ceased.

The arguments that ensued were many

and various, but they can be resolved into

two main issues. First, which was the better

route of approach to the strategic triangle,

the Central Pacific route through the

mandated islands or the Southwest Pacific

route along the coast of New Guinea to

Mindanao? Second, which of the two

theaters would be given priority in the

allocation of resources, especially those

troops, ships, and aircraft that had until

now been assigned to the South Pacific, a

command that had practically completed

its mission and was about to become a rear

area?

Early in February Admiral Sherman

from Nimitz' staff and General Sutherland, MacArthur's chief of staff, appeared

in Washington to represent their respective commanders in the discussions that

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their subordinate committees were to hold, Sutherland argued that RENO and GRANITE

plans were "relatively weak and slow of

progress." As a substitution, he proposed

"an advance along the general axis, New

Guinea-Mindanao, with combined forces."

Truk, he believed, could be bypassed and,

with "the capture of Truk thus obviated,

amphibious forces can be combined for an

advance along the northern coast of New

Guinea." This, he claimed, would enable

United States forces to enter Mindanao as

early as 1 December 1944. For such a

drive, naval forces could be based at

Manus Island. He did not propose to limit

the freedom of action of the Pacific Fleet.

Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur

could operate by co-operation. But, he

added, the "Southwest Pacific Area needs

certain naval forces for direct support of

its operations. It is General MacArthur's

hope that Admiral Halsey will be assigned

as Commander, Allied Naval Forces, because of his ability, rank, prestige, and experience."53

From General MacArthur himself came

representations of the same nature. To

General Marshall he radioed:

There are now large forces available in the

Pacific which with the accretions scheduled

for the current year would permit the execution of an offensive which would place us in

the Philippines in December if the forces were employed in effective combination.

However, under the plan of campaign that

has been prepared in Washington, the forces

will be employed in two weak thrusts which

can not attain the major strategic objective

until several months later . . . . 54

In the same message MacArthur insisted that the forces of the South Pacific

should remain under his command. These

forces, he argued, had been engaged in

operations within his own theater since

their advance from Guadalcanal. He could

not continue to operate effectively without them. "I must state," he added, "that

any reduction in the forces presently engaged in the Southwest Pacific by actual

withdrawal of forces of any category

would be incomprehensible."55

At the same meeting of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff addressed by General Sutherland,

Admiral Sherman attempted to explain

Nimitz' Plan GRANITE. The plan, he

pointed out, differed from that proposed

by General MacArthur in that it "envisages occupation of Luzon at the same time

that an attack is made in the south

[Mindanao] and is predicated upon the

occupation of Eniwetok about 1 May, the

53

 Min, 145th mtg JCS, 8 Feb 44. 54

 Msg, MacArthur to CofS, C1217, 2 Feb 44,

CM-IN 1443. 55 Ibid.
BACKGROUND OF STRATEGY 17

Carolines about 1 August, and the Marianas, or such other point as might be selected as the next objective, by the end of

the year."56

MacArthur's chief antagonist in this

strategic debate was neither Sherman nor

Nimitz, but, as usual, Admiral King. King

vigorously opposed handing MacArthur

the naval forces of the South Pacific. MacArthur already had the Seventh Fleet under his command, King argued. The South

Pacific forces were operating in a separate

area and were "primarily concerned in

such circumstances with the probability of

enemy forces from the Pacific Ocean Areas

threatening the operations of both the

South and Southwest Pacific." King could

see no sound reason for placing them under MacArthur.57

 He called attention to

the decision of the Combined Chiefs of

Staff at Cairo (SEXTANT) that the advance in the Pacific should be along two

axes and that in case of conflicts between

the two, "due weight should be accorded

to the fact that operations in the Central

Pacific promise at this time a more rapid

advance toward Japan and her vital line

of communications."58 "General MacArthur," said King, "has apparently not accepted this decision and desires a commitment to an advance along a single axis. I

do not think that this is a propitious time

to change our agreed strategy."59

At this point in the argument, General

Marshall suggested that, in the light of

developments since the Cairo conference,

the time had come for the Joint Chiefs to

issue a new directive to both Pacific commanders. Specifically, Marshall recommended that the Joint Strategic Survey

Committee, which consisted of Vice Adm.

Russell Willson (Navy), Lt. Gen. Stanley

D. Embick (Army), and Maj. Gen. Muir

S. Fairchild (Army Air Forces), be directed to study the matter anew and report its

views as to what geographic objectives

should be seized, the order of their seizure,

and what axis of advance appeared to offer

the best chance for victory in the Pacific.60

Admiral King immediately concurred.61

To the disappointment of the advocates

of the Southwest Pacific concept of strategy, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee

came forth with a statement clearly favoring King's and Nimitz' strategic plan.62

The committee, repeating its earlier convictions, stated that the Joint Chiefs of

Staff "should resolve the present situation

as between these two plans by deciding

and directing that the primary effort

against Japan will be made through the

Central Pacific, with operations in the

Southwest Pacific cooperating with and

supporting that effort." The primary objective, said the committee, was the

Formosa-Luzon-China triangle, and that

objective "would seem to be more effectively supported by the Central Pacific

concept than by the concept of the Southwest Pacific. The former leads most directly and most promptly to the vital Formosa,

Luzon, China coast area. The latter after

reaching Mindanao will require further ex56

 Min, 145th mtg JCS, 8 Feb 44. 57

 Memo, King for CofS, 8 Feb 44, sub:

CINCSWPAC Despatch C121702 Feb 44, OPD

381, Case 301. 58

 CCS 417, cited n. 42. 59

 Memo cited n. 57.

60

 Memo, CofS for King, 10 Feb 44, OPD 381,

Case 301. 61

 Memo, King for Marshall, 11 Feb 44, sub:

1944 Opns in Pacific Theater, OPD 381, Case 301. 62

 Apparently this report was written mostly by

Admiral Willson. General Embick, the Army representative, however, was in general accord.

Memo, Gen T. T. Handy, no addressee, 19 Feb

44, OPD 381, Case 301.
18 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

tensive operations before reaching that

vital area."63

The Joint Strategic Survey Committee

report not only disappointed the representatives of the Southwest Pacific but also

failed to satisfy General Marshall, He did

not feel that the committee had sufficiently explored the problem of allotting resources between the two theaters or the

question of how best to employ the great

Allied superiority in land-based air.64 He

wanted other subcommittees of the Joint

Chiefs, specifically the Joint Staff Planners

and the Joint Logistics Committee, to

study the matter further.65 In reply to

these proposals, Admiral King, while

agreeing in principle that further longrange studies would be beneficial, expressed his fear that any more delays in

committee might kill the momentum of the

drive now under way in the Pacific.66

With Admiral King pressing for immediate action either in the direction of Truk

or straight for the Marianas or the Palaus,

General MacArthur on 5 March came

forward with a proposal to accelerate

operations in his own theater. He advised

the Joint Chiefs of Staff to omit the Hansa

Bay operation scheduled for about 22

April and to move instead to Hollandia,

some three hundred miles up the coast of

New Guinea. To accomplish this, he proposed to use not only the forces of the

South and Southwest Pacific Areas but

also Central Pacific aircraft carriers and

other shipping tentatively earmarked to

support the Kavieng-Manus operation.67

These suggestions were in keeping with

General MacArthur's latest RENO plan,

which reached Washington within a few

days. It proposed a four-phase program:

first, a continued advance along the north

coast of New Guinea through Hollandia

to Geelvink Bay; second, establishment of

air bases in the Arafura Sea area for strategic bombing in the Netherlands Indies

and to support subsequent operations into

the Vogelkop and Halmahera; third, seizure of the western tip of the Vogelkop and

Halmahera; and fourth, occupation of

Mindanao, southernmost of the Philippines, and the establishment of bases there

for an attack upon the Formosa-LuzonChina coast area.68

Admiral Nimitz, who had meanwhile

been summoned to Washington, was quick

to note that these proposals, if accepted,

would have the effect of slowing up operations in his own theater. To the Joint

Chiefs he argued that a retention by MacArthur of forces from the Central Pacific

after the capture of Kavieng and Manus

would result in "stopping the Central Pacific Campaign, losing its momentum, deferring movement into the MARIANAS

until the approach of the typhoon season,

and by allowing the enemy additional time

to strengthen his defenses in the CAROLINES and MARIANAS would jeopardize our ability to reach the LUZON63

 JCS 713, 16 Feb 44, title: Strategy in the

Pacific. 64

 Memo, CofS for Leahy and King, 24 Feb

44, OPD 381, Case 301. 65

 Memo, Marshall for COMINCH and CNO,

1 Mar 44, sub: Your Memo of 24 Feb on Proposed Directive to CINCPOA and Memo of 27

Feb on JCS 713, OPD 381, Case 297. 66

 Memo, King for CofS, 1 Mar 44, OPD 381,

Case 297.

67

 Msg, MacArthur to JCS, C2473, 5 Mar 44,

CM-IN 3318. 68

 RENO IV, Outline Plan for Operations of

the Southwest Pacific Area to Include the Reoccupation of the Southern Philippines, 6 Mar 44,

CNO (WPD) file, Env 68, Case 184, NR&H.
BACKGROUND OF STRATEGY 19

FORMOSA-CHINA area in early 1945

as now planned."69

On the affirmative side, Nimitz suggested two alternative schedules for the

remainder of 1944. The first contemplated

an invasion of Truk on 15 June, the

southern Marianas on 1 September, and

the Palaus on 15 November. The second

proposed bypassing Truk and going into

the southern Marianas on 15 June, Woleai

on 15 July, Yap on 1 September, and the

Palaus on 1 November. On reconsideration, Nimitz decided that, if the second

schedule were accepted, the capture of

Yap could be deferred until the Palaus

had been taken and that a fleet harbor

could be established in Ulithi. This would

advance the target date for the Palaus to

1 October.70

In the end, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted neither MacArthur's nor Nimitz'

schedules in toto. Nor did they accept

without change the final conclusion of the

Joint Strategic Survey Committee that to

seize the desired objective in the FormosaLuzon-China coast area, "a fundamental

strategic prerequisite is our control of the

Marianas, Carolines, Palau [Pacific]

Ocean area."71 At the insistence of General Marshall, Mindanao was added to the

vital intermediate objectives that United

States forces must capture before proceeding on to the strategic triangle.72

Thus the directive that the Joint Chiefs

of Staff issued to General MacArthur and

Admiral Nimitz on 12 March represented

in a sense a compromise between the Central Pacific and the Southwest Pacific concepts of strategy. It declared "that the

most feasible approach to the FormosaLuzon-China area is by way of Marianas

-Carolines-Palau-Mindanao area, and

that the control of the Marianas-Carolines

-Palau area is essential to the projection

of our forces into the former area, and

their subsequent effective employment

therefrom." Specifically, the Joint Chiefs

ordered:

1. Cancellation of the Kavieng operation and the complete isolation of the

Rabaul-Kavieng area with the minimum

commitment of forces.

2. Early completion of the occupation

of Manus and its development as an air

and fleet base.

3. Occupation of Hollandia by MacArthur, target date 15 April 1944.

4. Establishment of control of the Marianas-Carolines-Palau area by Nimitz'

forces by neutralizing Truk; by occupying

the southern Marianas, target date 15

June 1944; and by occupying the Palaus,

target date 15 September 1944.

5. Occupation of Mindanao by MacArthur's forces supported by the Pacific

fleet, target date 15 November 1944.

6. Occupation of Formosa, target date

15 February 1945, or occupation of Luzon

if necessary, target date 15 February

1945.73

With this directive in hand, Admiral

Nimitz and his subordinates could at last

69

 Memo, CINCPAC, no addressee, 7 Mar 44,

sub: Sequence and Timing of Opns, Central Pacific Campaign, with JCS Info Memo 200, same

date, CCS 381 POA (6-10-43), Sec. 2. 70

 Memo, Nimitz for King, 8 Mar 44, sub:

Sequence and Timing of Opns, Central Pacific

Campaign, CCS 381 POA (6-10-43), Sec. 2. 71

 JCS 713/3, 11 Mar 44, sub: Future Opns in

the Pacific. 72

 Marshall's penciled notes on Draft Directive

[JCS to MacArthur and Nimitz, 12 Mar 44],

OPD 381, Case 301.

73

 Msg, JCS to MacArthur and Richardson for

Nimitz, 13 Mar 44, CM-OUT 5137.
20 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

prepare their tactical plans in detail. The

southern Marianas would be assaulted and

the target date was to be 15 June. The

largest amphibious operation yet to be

undertaken in the Pacific was about to

get under way.
The Marianas

In History

The islands thus chosen as the next

point of American amphibious assault in

the Central Pacific had had a long and

not altogether happy experience as minor

pawns in the international rivalries of

great powers. Magellan discovered them in

1521 in the course of his famous first voyage around the world. Struck by the sailing powers of the native boats and by the

similarity of their rigging to that of the

small craft that abounded in his own Mediterranean, the navigator labeled his discoveries, "Islas de los Velas Latinas" (Islands

of the Lateen Sails). Other members of

the expedition were more impressed by

the natives' pilfering habits and accordingly called them "Islas de los Ladrones" (Islands of the Thieves), a name that remained in popular usage well into the

twentieth century, even though it had long

since been officially abandoned. Late in

the seventeenth century the islands were

officially renamed "Las Marianas" in

honor of Maria Anna of Austria, wife of

Philip IV and Queen of Spain, who took

a personal interest in converting their inhabitants to the Church of Rome.1

The original native population of the

Marianas, the Chamorros, were a hardy

race, probably of Polynesian origin, but

not hardy enough to withstand the encroachments of western civilization as represented by Spanish traders and missionaries. In spite of mass baptisms by the latter, native resentment toward the rigid

rule of the priesthood increased until finally, in the 1960's, armed revolution broke

out in the islands. The result was inevitable; the Spaniards with their superior

weapons and organization overcame the

rebels, killed large numbers and forced

most of the remainder to flee. The center

of the trouble was on Guam, and from

there many of the remaining Chamorros

fled to the northern Marianas, where they

were relentlessly pursued and persecuted.

Others finally escaped south to the Carolines to become intermingled with the

Kanaka population of those islands.

Spanish control, which had become progressively weaker during the nineteenth

century, was finally severed completely in

1898-99. Imperial Germany was the first

of the Western Powers to challenge Span1

 Historical data presented here are derived

from the following sources: R. W. Robson, comp.,

The Pacific Islands Year Book, 1942 (Sydney,

Australia, Pacific Publications, Limited, 1942);

R. W. Robson, comp., The Pacific Islands Handbook, 1944 (New York, The Macmillan Company,

1946); Laura Thompson, Guam and Its People

(Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press,

1947); OCNO Div of Naval Intel, ONI 99 Strategic Study of Guam, 1 Feb 44 (hereafter cited as

ONI 99).
22 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

ish hegemony in Micronesia.2 In August

1885 the Germans hoisted their flag over

Yap in the western Carolines and laid

claim to much of the surrounding territory. After violent Spanish protest, the

dispute was submitted to papal arbitration

and Spain's sovereign rights were confirmed, although Germany obtained important commercial concessions at the

same time. Negotiations for transfer between the two countries continued in the

1890's, and in 1899 Spain ceded all of

her possessions in the Carolines, the Marshalls, and the Marianas to the German

Empire for the sum of about $4,000,000.

Meanwhile, a small American naval expeditionary force had seized Apra Harbor

on Guam, and at the termination of the

Spanish-American war that island was

ceded to the United States.

Another radical change in the disposition of the entire Central Pacific area occurred as the result of World War I.

Japan, having emerged successfully from

her recent war against Russia and being

anxious to expand her commercial and

military influence throughout the Orient

and its adjacent waters, was quick to seize

the opportunity of a European war to

realize her own imperialist ambitions. As

one of the Allied Powers, Japan contributed her share to the ultimate downfall of

the German Empire by seizing the Carolines, the Marshalls, the Palaus, and the

Marianas (except, of course, Guam) in

the first year of the war. Then, under the

Treaty of Versailles, all former German

possessions north of the equator were mandated to Japan, although they theoretically

still remained under League of Nations

authority. During the 1920's and 1930's

the Japanese proceeded vigorously to colonize these new holdings and to exploit

their economic resources for the benefit of

Japanese economy. After 1935, when Japan withdrew from the League of Nations,

no further effort was made to give even

lip service to the idea that the islands

were mandated territories. They became,

to all intents and purposes, outright possessions.3

Meanwhile, the United States had occupied Guam and had converted it into a

minor naval base. By an executive order

of President William McKinley dated 23

December 1898, the island was placed under control of the Navy Department, a

naval officer was commissioned as governor

of Guam, and the same officer was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy as

commandant of the naval station, which

encompassed the entire island. Progress in

constructing a naval base of respectable

proportions was slow and halting. In 1939

the Hepburn Board reported to Congress

that the area should and could be developed into a major naval base, but the necessary appropriations failed to pass.

The Japanese Invasion of Guam

At the time of the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan, the

American garrison on Guam consisted of

153 marines and 271 U.S. Navy personnel, supported by a force of 308 Guamanians. The garrison had no artillery or

fixed defenses and, in addition to its small

arms, possessed only a few .30-caliber and

.50-caliber machine guns. The local naval

surface force consisted of three small pa- 2

 Micronesia is the name applied to the islands

of the western Pacific Ocean including the Marianas, the Carolines, the Marshalls, and the Gilberts. 3

 See Ch. IV, below.
THE MARIANAS 23

trol craft and an old oiler. One of the

patrol craft, the USS Penguin, mounted

two 3-inch antiaircraft guns and the oiler

boasted two .50-caliber antiaircraft machine guns.4

Japanese designs against this tiny force

and the outpost that it garrisoned began

to materialize well before the attack on

Pearl Harbor. As early as the middle of

October 1941, the 18th Air Unit, a small

force of reconnaissance seaplanes based in

the Marianas, began conducting a reconnaissance, of Guam and during the following November flew frequent secret photo

reconnaissance missions over the island at

altitudes of 3,000 meters or higher. 5 At

the same time, small Japanese vessels began

patrolling the waters around the island,

mostly at night, and in early December

succeeded in landing several native Guamanians friendly to their cause.

Japanese plans for an amphibious invasion of Guam were complete by 8 November. On that date Maj. Gen. Tomitara

Hori, who commanded the South Seas

Detachment, a unit of about 5,500 Army

troops, received his orders. He was to assemble his forces in the Bonins in November and wait there until definite word of

the first Japanese air attack against the

United States had been received. Then,

naval air units based on Saipan were to

fly to Guam and attack U.S. ships and installations. Meanwhile, Army troop transports with a naval escort were to proceed

from the Bonins to Guam, where landing

operations would commence in the early

morning of 10 December. In addition to

the Army troops assigned, the Navy was

to contribute a special landing force of

about 400 men drawn from the 5th Defense Force stationed on Saipan.6

The planes assigned to softening up the

target came, to about twenty in number,

including the 18th Air Unit, which had

been busy on reconnaissance missions over

the island since October. At 0525 on 8 December word came to the airmen waiting

on Saipan that the Greater East Asia War

had begun. The message read, "Begin attack on Guam immediately."7

 The shooting war in the Marianas had started. It

would not formally end for another two

years and nine months.

Within three hours of receiving this

command, Japanese planes bore down on

Guam and bombed the American oiler

Barnes in the harbor. Next they turned

their attention to the patrol boat Penguin,

which was attempting to escape to the

open sea, and finally they dumped their

remaining bombs over shore targets. Penguin was sunk and Barnes damaged to

4

 Capt G. J. McMillin, USN, to CNO, 11 Sep

45, sub: Surrender at Guam to the Japanese;

ONI 99, p. 2; JICPOA Bull 52-44, 15 Apr 44,

Guam, p. 6; Historical Division, War Department, Guam: Operations of the 77th Division (21

July-10 August 1944), AMERICAN FORCES

IN ACTION (Washington, 1946) (hereafter cited

as AFAS, Guam) p. 17; Samuel Eliot Morison,

History of United States Naval Operations in

World War II, Vol. III, The Rising Sun in the

Pacific, 1931-April 1943 (Boston, Little, Brown

and Company, 1948), pp. 32-34, 184-86. 5

 18th Air Unit Combat. Rpt, G Opn, WDC

161418; Land Forces, Vol. 2, NA 11665, WDC

161013. Both these documents art: now located in

the National Archives, Washington. WDC numbers are the Washington Document Center accession numbers; NA numbers are the National

Archives accession numbers.

6

 Japanese Studies in World War II, 55, Operations in the Central Pacific, pp. 1-6, copy in

OCMH; CINCPAC-CINCPOA, 12060, Handwritten Account of the Civil and Military Situation on Guam from the Japanese Occupation

Unit February 1944, dated November 1943 and

January 1944, GHQ FEC, G-2 Hist Sec, Doc. 56871. 7

 18th Air Unit Combat Rpt, G Opn, WDC

161418.
24 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

the extent that she had to be abandoned.

A second flight appeared over the island

at 1330 the same afternoon, the planes

concentrating their attack on the still unsunk Barnes and the cable and wireless

stations ashore.

The following day, Japanese aircraft

again made morning and afternoon raids.

Two bombs struck the Marine barracks,

and many other hits were scored. The

Japanese airmen reported that fire from

the ground was very light and that they

had spotted no artillery emplacements and

no mines in any of the harbors or bays—

only a machine gun position in the northern suburbs of Agana. (See Map V.)

While Guam burned under the bombs

of its attackers during the first two days

of the war, the troop-laden assault vessels

and their escorts were on the way down

from the north. At 0900 on 4 December,

the main elements of the convoy, carrying

the 5,500 Army troops, moved out of

Hahajima and headed toward Rota,

where they were joined by the ships carrying the small naval detachment from Saipan. From Rota the force advanced in

separate groups to Guam, where all arrived during the first hour of 10 December. Landing operations commenced at

0230. The main force of the Army troops

landed on the west coast between Facpi

Point and Merizo, intending to drive

northward along the coast to Agat. This

plan miscarried when it was discovered

that there was no adequate road from

the beachhead to Agat, and the troops

had to re-embark and land again at Facpi

Point. The maneuver proved superfluous

since by the time the new landing was

completed the American garrison had already surrendered to the smaller naval unit.

The naval detachment landed about

two miles north of Agana. As it advanced

toward the city, it flushed the machine

gun emplacement, reported by planes the

night before, about one kilometer from the

city itself. The main body of the U.S. marines had taken positions at the Marine

rifle range on Orote Peninsula, and only

about eighty Guamanians and a few

Americans were in Agana when the Japanese arrived. These few put up a stiff

fight and twice at Agana Plaza drove the

invaders back with rifle and machine gun

fire before finally being overcome. After

the skirmish on the plaza, the Japanese

went on to occupy the naval hospital and

the wireless station, and the naval repair

station at Piti. Finally, at 0545, the island

governor, Capt. C. J. McMillin, USN,

realized that resistance was useless and

commenced negotiations for surrender.

Soon after, the American ensign was run

down from Government House and replaced by the Imperial flag of Japan. The

Japanese had completed the occupation of

the Marianas chain.8

Description of the Islands

The Marianas are a chain of volcanic

islands running in an approximately north

-south direction from 20° 32' N, 144°

54' E to 13° 15' N, 144° 43' E. From

Farallon de Pajaros In the north to Guam

in the south, the chain numbers fifteen

islands in all. Guam has an area of over

200 square miles hut about two thirds of

the chain is little more than mountainous

rocks and of practically no military value.

8

 McMillin, Surrender at Guam to the Japanese; Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 184-

86.

26 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

The four largest islands and those having

the chief military utility are all in the

southern half of the chain. These, from

north to south, are Saipan, Tinian, Rota,

and Guam. (Map 2) Of these, Rota was

eliminated by the U.S. planners as a feasible target because of the inaccessibility of

most of its coast line, its inadequate harbor facilities, and its general inferiority to

the other three islands as a naval and air

base for future operations against Japan.

Saipan, Tinian, and Guam lay directly

athwart or on the near flank of the advance of Central Pacific forces from their

westernmost base at Eniwetok to almost

any part of Japanese-held territory that

might become the object of future amphibious operations—the Philippines, Formosa, the Volcano Islands, the Ryukyus, and

Japan proper. Saipan lies about a thousand nautical miles west of Eniwetok and

over 3,200 miles from Pearl Harbor. Northwest, Tokyo is only about 1,260 miles distant, and Manila Bay is 1,500 miles almost

due west. Tinian is just three miles south

of Saipan; Guam, approximately another

hundred miles in a southerly direction.

The main geographic factors that planners of the operation had to take into consideration were climate, the location of

beaches and the approaches thereto, topography of the terrain inland from the

beaches, the nature of the vegetation as it

would affect military operations, harbor

facilities, the location and size of towns

and cities, and the location of roads, railroads, and other transportation facilities,

The necessary information was gleaned

from a variety of sources—prewar surveys

and hydrographic charts, aerial and submarine reconnaissance missions executed

during the war, and enemy documents

captured in earlier operations.

The first aerial photographs of Saipan

and Tinian were taken on 22 and 23 February 1944 by planes flown from Marc

Mitscher's fast carrier force (Task Force

58). At that time, a total of twenty-five

sorties at various heights and angles was

flown, but because of cloud formations

only a partial coverage of the islands was

obtained.9 These were supplemented by

full photographic coverage provided by a

flight of five Navy PB4Y's, escorted by

Army bombers, that took off from Eniwetok on 18 April for a round trip of more

than two thousand miles and thirteen

hours in the air, A second mission flown by

a similar group of planes on 25 April also

photographed Guam.10 Guam was covered again on 7 May by six Navy photographic "Liberators," and the northern

islands as well as Guam were rephotographed on 29 May.11

In addition, the submarine USS Greenling made a series of sorties around all

three islands between 2 and 29 April and

obtained excellent photographs, which

were made available to the expeditionary

troops. The submarine's photographs were

chiefly remarkable for their accuracy of

detail on the beach approaches.12

Between 15 January and 10 May, Joint

Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas

(JICPOA), issued a total of eight infor9

 Hq Expeditionary Troops, Task Force 56 Report on FORAGER (hereafter cited as TF 56 Rpt

FORAGER), Incl D, G-2 Rpt on FORAGER, p. 2;

App. C, pp. 1-2. 10

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in PDA—Apr

44, pars. 37-39. 11

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA—May

44, pars. 49-50; TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl D, p. 2,

All of these Navy photographic missions were escorted by Army B-24's of the Seventh Air Force

flown out of the Marshalls. Craven and Cate,

AAF IV, pp. 684-87. 12

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA—May

44, pars. 49-50.
THE MARIANAS 27

mation bulletins covering the proposed island targets,13

 In addition, the Office of

Naval Intelligence (ONI) made available

a monograph on the geography of the Palaus and the Marianas that had been prepared in the spring of 1942.14

 More detailed was another ONI bulletin on Guam

that was an exhaustive, although somewhat obsolete, study based chiefly on a

monograph completed by Marine Corps

Schools in Quantico as early as 1937 and

the notes and personal recollections of a

naval officer, Comdr. R. F. Armknecht

(CEC) (USN), who had left the island

only a month before the Japanese captured

it.15 Other materials, including diagrams

of tides, sunlight and moonlight tables, and

captured Japanese charts, completed the

list of information on the Marianas upon

which plans for the landings had to be

based.16

Some of this proved to be inaccurate in

detail. The number of enemy installations

and the size and disposition of troops were

generally underestimated. Many terrain

features were erroneously depicted in the

maps made on the basis of photographic

intelligence. On the whole, however, a

fairly good general understanding of the

nature of the targets could be gleaned

from the various sources.

Climatic conditions vary little as between the sister islands of Saipan and

Tinian in the north and Guam in the

south. The year can be conveniently divided into two seasons: the dry or winter

monsoon season from November through

March, and the wet or summer monsoon

season from April through October. During most of the dry period the prevailing

wind is from north and east with an average velocity of ten to fifteen knots. By

June the wind usually shifts from east to

south and by August and September the

southwestern monsoon frequently occurs.

Thus, if landings on the western beaches

were to be considered, it was clear that

they should be made before August in order to be certain of a lee shore.

Average cloud cover is nearly 70 percent

for most of the year, which added to the

problem of achieving adequate aerial observation and aerial reconnaissance. Generally, however, weather conditions offered

no serious obstacle to military operations.

The climate is mild and healthful. Mean

temperature on Saipan varies between a

January maximum and minimum of 81°

F. and 72° F., respectively, and June values of 85° F. and 75° F. Guam, being a

hundred miles closer to the equator, is

somewhat warmer and more humid but

not enough so to make any significant difference. The summer months constitute

the rainy season, during which the total

precipitation is from 80 to 86 inches. Most

rain falls in the form of showers, lasting

from only a few minutes to two hours, but

there are occasional steady, light rains.

August is the wettest month—an additional reason for concluding any proposed

military operations before the end of July.

Typhoons occur in the area, but not with

as much regularity or intensity as elsewhere in the Pacific. This is a region of

typhoon genesis and storms are usually not

13

 JICPOA Bull 7-44, Mariana Islands, 15 Jan

44; Bull 29-44, Weather Survey for Carolines

and Marianas, 36 Feb 44; Bull 31-44, Carolines

and Marianas, Part I, Tides and Currents, Part II,

Daylight and Dark, 4 Mar 44; Bull 34-44, Saipan, Tinian, and Rota, 10 Mar 44; Bull 52-44,

Guam (2 vols.), 15 Apr 44; Bull 66-44, Saipan

(Target Survey), 10 May 44; Bull 67-44, Tinian

(Target Survey), 10 May 44; Bull 73-44, Saipan,

Tinian, and Rota, 10 May 44. 14

 ONI 29, Palau, Mariana Islands, 11 May 42. 15

 ONI 99, p. vii. 16

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl D, App. B.
28 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

fully developed. About once every two

years disturbances of the typhoon type hit

the islands or pass near enough to cause

violent winds and heavy rainfall, but even

so the storm diameter is generally comparatively small.17

None of the three islands offered ideal

beach conditions for landing assault

troops. On Saipan the land on the western

side slopes rather gently up from the shore

line, but the beaches themselves could be

reached only with difficulty because of

fringing and barrier reefs that extend for

most of the island's length. (See Map I.)

A small gap existed in the reef just off the

town of Charan Kanoa and a dredged

channel led into Tanapag Harbor, but for

most of the area the coral barrier presented a serious impediment to the landing of

troops boated in small craft. The north

end and east side of the island have deep

water close inshore and are free of reefs

except for a fringing one around Magicienne Bay on the east coast. However,

the beaches were generally narrow and the

shores steep, thus making landing operations and movement inshore extremely

hazardous. The same conditions prevailed

for the most part on the southern end.

Harborage facilities ranged from poor to

mediocre. Tanapag Harbor, the principal

anchorage area, was the only one that provided even partial protection from all

winds, and against heavy seas from the

west the reef barrier on the seaward side

offered little real safety to ships at anchor

within. Vessels could anchor off Garapan

and find some shelter from easterly winds

and sea, but it was no more than an open

roadstead, and landing and unloading

would be impossible during strong westerly winds. The only shelter against northerly and westerly winds was at Magicienne

Bay on the southeast coast. However, the

bay was deep and open to winds and seas

from the southeast.18

Tinian was even better equipped topographically to resist an amphibious landing. The main obstacle to invasion was an

almost unbroken barrier of abrupt cliffs

close to the water line and ranging from

a few feet to over a hundred feet in height.

Although the cliffs were not unscalable,

especially along the northern and western

shores, there was very little landing space

at the water's edge for small craft, and the

flow of supplies inland from such narrow

beaches would be seriously handicapped.

The cliffs were broken at various spots in

the neighborhood of Tinian Harbor and

again on the northwest coast and along

the northeastern shore line, but none of

these locations offered ideal landing conditions.19

 (See Map III.)

Guam, like the other islands of the Marianas, presented to would-be invaders the

combined hazards of reefs and shore-line

cliffs. The northern half of the island was

virtually inaccessible to amphibious troops

because of the reef, the surf, and the sheer

cliffs rising from the beaches. Although

there were some possible landing points on

the southeast and southern coasts, the most

practicable beaches were south of Orote

Peninsula and north of the naval station

at Piti, both on the southwest coast. These

were obstructed by barrier reefs and, in

the north, by low-level cliffs, but were at

least negotiable by amphibian craft and 17

 JICPOA Bull 59-44, Detailed Weather—

Guam, pp. 1-3; Detailed Weather—Saipan and

Tinian, pp. 1-3; Comdr Fifth Fleet Opn Plan

Central 10-44, 12 May 44, App. I, Weather

Summary.

18

 JICPOA Bull 73-44, pp. 6, 11; Bull 34-44,

p. 44; Bull 7-44, pp. 53-56. 19

 JICPOA Bull 7-44, PP. 43-49; Bull 34-44,

p. 34; Bull 73-44, P. 20.
THE MARIANAS 29

vehicles. The only good harbor was at Port

Apra, north of Orote Peninsula. The port

was protected by the peninsula proper, by

Cabras Island on the north, and by a

breakwater extending from the island, and

was considered safe from wind and sea

from almost any direction except during

the typhoon season.20

Although terrain features inland from

the shore line on each of the islands were

in some ways unique, the similarities were

more marked than the differences. The

most distinct characteristics of all the Marianas, at least to seasoned troops, were

to be their novelty and variety. Heretofore,

practically all operations of American

forces in the Pacific had been confined to

tropical jungle or to coral atolls where

maneuver was limited either by the denseness of the vegetation or by the smallness

of the area to be seized. Now American

troops were to find themselves maneuvering over moderately large land masses with

highly varied topography and vegetation.

They would have to fight their way

through mangrove swamps and fields of

lashing sword grass and sugar cane;

through fairly sizable towns where the

enemy might have to be routed by houseto-house fighting; and, finally and worst of

all, up and down precipitous volcanic

mountains pocked with caves and creased

with endless ridges, escarpments, and other

natural concealments that the enemy could

be expected to exploit to the fullest.

The dominating physical feature of Saipan is Mount Tapotchau, which rises to

an elevation of 1,554 feet near the center

of the island.21 Between this summit and

Mount Marpi, located at the north end of

the island and having an elevation of 832

feet, there is a ridge over seven miles long

with peaks ranging between 720 and 934

feet. To the west of this ridge there is a

fairly level coastal area in the region of

Tanapag Harbor, but to the east the slope

ends abruptly in steep coastal cliffs. South

and southeast of Tapotchau, the backbone

ridge slopes off into the plateau forming

Kagman Peninsula on the eastern and the

southern third of the island. In the southern area Mount Kagman, on the east, and

Mount Nafutan, on the southern peninsula

of the same name, form conspicuous headlands. Approximately 70 percent of the

island's 85 square miles was under sugar

cultivation at the time of the invasion.

Cane can present a serious obstacle to

troops, impeding movement by foot, limiting fields of fire, and offering excellent

concealment for the defenders. Another

obstacle to attacking troops, especially

from west coast beaches, was an extensive

marsh that was inland from the town of

Charan Kanoa and centered on freshwater Lake Susupe. Saipan is better than

fourteen miles along its north-south axis

and about six miles across at its widest

point.22

Tinian is somewhat smaller, being about

10.5 miles in length and 5.5 miles in width

at its widest point. Its terrain is also considerably less difficult for military operations than is that of its sister island. It is

basically a broad elevated limestone plateau, the highest point of which is Mount

Lasso (564 feet) in the north-central part.

Most of the southern end of the island

is of rolling hills and flatlands except for

the southernmost tip, which is marked by

precipitous cliffs and ravines. At the time 20

 JICPOA Bull 7-44, pp. 9-12; Bull 52-44,

pp. 44-51. 21

 Unless otherwise stated, the elevations in the

text of this volume are in feet.

22

 JICPOA Bull 7-44, pp. 53-54; Bull 73-44,

p. 6.
30 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

of the invasion about 90 percent was in

sugar cane and the remainder, along the

rocky slopes between the broad terraces

and along the coasts, was covered with

dense vegetation.23

Guam, the largest of the Marianas, is

32 miles long and from 4 to 8 miles wide,

with a total surface of over 200 square

miles. The northern half is a large coral

limestone plateau sloping upward from

the lowlands in the middle of the island

between the town of Agana on the west

coast and Port Pago on the east. It is

broken in the south by Mount Barrigada

and in the east-central section by Mount

Santa Rosa, which rises to an elevation of

870 feet. The southern half of the island

is characterized by broken mountain country. Inland from Apra Harbor on the west

coast below Agana lie the mountain peaks

of Chachao, Alutom, and Tenjo, all above

a thousand feet in elevation. South of these

peaks and opposite Agat Bay, the ridge

slopes down to a 400-foot saddle and then

rises again at the southern end of the island to elevations of over 1,200 feet. On

the westward side the range slopes steeply

to low foothills and narrow belts of lowlands. On the east the slopes are more

gradual, ending in a plateau about 400

feet high stretching to the coastal highlands, which rise in steep bluffs from a

narrow coastal flat. Five streams pierce

the plateau in their eastward course. The

highlands of the southern half of Guam

are largely volcanic rock except for Orote

Peninsula and Cabras Island on the west

coast and the east coastal regions, all of

which consist of coral limestone. Most of

southern Guam, volcanic in origin, was

covered with breast-high sword grass,

and sparse scrub growth. In the coral

limestone regions were found weeds, trailing vines, and tropical vegetation thick

enough to make even roads impassible if

not cleared continuously. In addition to

these undesirable features, the coastal

areas abounded in marshes and lowlands

that were usually cultivated as rice paddies and that were either deep in mud or

covered with cogon grass and weeds reaching heights of fifteen to twenty feet. In

short, Guam even more than the other

islands of the Marianas contained a superabundance of terrain difficulties to harass

and impede the progress of attacking

troops.24

23

 JICPOA Bull 73-44, p. 20.

24

 JICPOA Bull 7-44, pp. 8-10; AFAS, Guam,

pp. 14-15.
PART TWO

SAIPAN

Planning the Invasion

Organization and Composition

of the Attack Force

For the Marianas, as in the case of all

operations in the Pacific outside of General

MacArthur's jurisdiction, Admiral Nimitz

retained over-all command of the campaign. Under him in the chain of command

was Vice Adm. Raymond A. Spruance,

commander of the Fifth Fleet, and under

him Vice Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner,

who was to command the Joint Expeditionary Force (Task Force 51), was

charged with the actual job of taking the

islands. Turner wore a second hat. Until

15 July 1944, he was also in command of

the Northern Attack Force (Task Force

52), which was made up of all the amphibious elements assigned to the attack on

Saipan and Tinian, and which was one of

the two component parts of Task Force 51.

Its equivalent for Guam was designated

Southern Attack Force (Task Force 53)

and was commanded by Rear Adm. Richard L. Conolly. Vice Adm. Marc A.

Mitscher's Fast Carrier Task Force (Task

Force 58) and Vice Adm. Charles A. Lockwood's Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet

(Task Force 17), were assigned supporting

missions according to their appropriate

capacities. The former operated as part of

the Fifth Fleet and the latter directly under

Admiral Nimitz. (Chart 1)

Tactical command of all troops ashore

for the Marianas operation devolved upon

Lt. Gen. Holland M. Smith, USMC. General Smith was perhaps as well grounded

in the fundamentals of amphibious techniques as any general officer in either the

Army or the Marine Corps at that time.

In 1941 and 1942 he had supervised the

training of the 1st Infantry Division and

the 1st Marine Division in basic landing

problems on the U.S. east coast. At that

time amphibious warfare was still something of a novelty, and United States

forces were generally innocent of the fundamentals of launching an assault of seaborne troops against a hostile shore.

For at least two decades before the

outbreak of World War II, it is true, the

Marine Corps had slowly been piecing together a workable body of amphibious

doctrine, and after 1934, in conjunction

with the U.S. Navy, it had conducted

yearly landing exercises, chiefly on the island of Culebra, Puerto Rico. These had

been valuable, indeed indispensable, experiments. They were in no small measure

responsible for the ability of American

troops to invade the beaches of Africa,

Europe, and countless Pacific islands.

Not until after the fall of France did the

United States commence to prepare in

earnest for large-scale amphibious landings.

In February of 1941 General Smith and

PLANNING THE INVASION 35

his staff planned and oversaw a joint

Army-Marine Corps practice landing in the

Culebra area. In June of the same year

the first full two-division landing exercise

was conducted at New River, North Carolina, under their supervision. Another was

held on a somewhat smaller scale off Lynn

Haven Roads, Virginia, in January of

1942, Two months later, General Smith

was ordered to duty as Commander, Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet, an amphibious training command, and later

in the year he served in much the same

capacity as Commanding General, Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet. In September 1943 he and his staff left San Diego

for the Central Pacific, where Smith was

to be commander of the V Amphibious

Corps.1 As such, he commanded the expeditionary troops that captured Tarawa

and Makin in the Gilbert Islands and

Kwajalein and Eniwetok in the Marshalls.2

Now his task was even greater.

Holland Smith's designation for this

operation was Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops (Task Force 56). He

was directly responsible to Admiral Turner

until the amphibious phase was completed.

Like Turner, he was to play a dual role.

As Commander, Northern Troops and

Landing Force (Task Group 56.1), he personally exercised tactical control of all

troops ashore during the capture of Saipan. He was relieved on 12 July 1944 from

this command (but not from command

of Expeditionary Troops) by Maj. Gen.

Harry Schmidt, USMC, who thereafter

performed the same role during the seizure

of Tinian. Their counterpart on Guam was

Maj. Gen. Roy S. Geiger, USMC, the commanding general of III Amphibious Corps

and of Southern Troops and Landing Force

(Task Group 56.2). Although in this capacity Geiger and Smith held parallel commands, the former was subordinate to the

latter as Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops.3

The command relationships among General Smith, his naval superiors, and his

Marine and Army subordinates, although

resembling in complexity the hierarchy of

saints, can be reduced to fairly simple

terms. In effect Admiral Spruance enjoyed,

by delegation from Admiral Nimitz, supreme command of the operation. He retained operational command throughout

and upon him devolved the responsibility

of determining when the capture and occupation phase of each island had been

completed. Tactical command during the

amphibious phases of the operation was

placed in the hands of Admiral Turner,

who exercised it directly at Saipan and

through Rear Adm. Harry W. Hill on Tinian and Admiral Conolly on Guam.

The completion of the amphibious phase

was determined in each instance by the

landing force commander—whenever he

decided that the situation warranted it, he

was to establish his command ashore.

Thereafter, all tactical decisions regarding

the disposition of troops would be made

by him. On Saipan the landing force commander was Holland Smith, on Tinian

Harry Schmidt, and on Guam Roy S. Geiger. On all three islands, however, "overall

1

 Holland M. Smith, "The Development of

Amphibious Tactics in the U.S. Navy," U.S.

Marine Corps Gazette (October, 1946), pp. 45-

48, 53-55; Holland M. Smith, Coral and Brass

(New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), Chs.

IV, V, VI. Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl,

The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1951), Chs.

II, III. 2

 See Crowl and Love. Gilberts and Marshalls. 3

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, pp. 7-8.
36 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

TOP NAVAL COMMANDERS IN THE MARIANAS CAMPAIGN. From the left: Vice

Adm. Raymond A. Spruance, commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet; Fleet Admiral

Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy;

and Admiral Chester A. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and

Pacific Ocean Areas.

troop command" was retained by General Smith as Commander, Expeditionary

Troops.4

There were 105,859 assault troops assigned to capture the three islands; 66,779

were allocated to Saipan and Tinian and

the remaining 39,080 to Guam. The bulk

of the force was made up of two reinforced

Army divisions, three reinforced Marine

divisions, and a provisional Marine brigade consisting of two regimental combat

teams.5

The landing on Saipan was to be made

by the ad and 4th Marine Divisions, with

the 27th Infantry Division in reserve,6 All

three of these organizations had seen previous action in the Pacific. The 2d Marine

Division was activated in San Diego on 1

February 1941. One regiment (2d Marines) took part in the initial attack on

Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942, and the

remaining two entered that campaign in

4

 Ibid., Incl A, Opn Plan 3-44, Annex I,

Change 1, 5 May 44. 5

 Commander Joint Expeditionary Force, Marianas (Task Force 51), Report of Amphibious Operations for the Capture of the Marianas Islands

(FORAGER Operation), 25 Aug 44 (hereafter cited

as TF 51 Opn Rpt Marianas), p. 6. 6

 See Appendix A, below, for breakdown of

troops assigned to Northern Troops and Landing

Force.
PLANNING THE INVASION 37

November and January, The division had

also fought the bloody battle of Tarawa,

losing over 3,000 casualties there.7 An independent Marine unit, the 1st Battalion,

29th Marines, which was formed in the

spring of 1944 around cadres of 2d Marine

Division veterans of Guadalcanal and Tarawa, was attached to the 2d Division for

the Saipan operation.8 In the Marianas,

the division was commanded by Maj. Gen.

Thomas E. Watson, USMC, who had previously led the Marine and Army regimental combat teams that captured Eniwetok

in the Marshalls.

The 4th Marine Division was not formally activated until 16 August 1943, but it

was by no means totally unseasoned. In

early February 1944 it had captured Roi

and Namur Islands in Kwajalein Atoll

while troops of the 7th Infantry Division

were taking nearby Kwajalein Island in the

central Marshalls.9 The 4th was to be commanded at Saipan by General Schmidt,

who had been the division's commander

since it was first formed. When General

Schmidt relieved Holland Smith of command of the Northern Troops and Landing

Force after Saipan was officially declared

secure, he in turn was succeeded in command of the 4th Marine Division by Maj.

Gen. Clifton B. Cates, a veteran of Guadalcanal and an alumnus of the 1st Marine

Division.10

The 27th Infantry Division was a National Guard unit of New York State when

it was called into federal service in October 1940. Its three regiments, the 105th,

106th, and 165th, had had their headquarters at Troy, Albany, and New York City,

respectively.11 It was the first combat division to leave the United States for Pacific

duty and by the war's end had spent a

longer time overseas than any National

Guard division in the United States Army.

In March 1942 advance echelons arrived

in Hawaii and for the next year and a half

the division served as base defense force,

first for the outer islands and then on

Oahu after the 25th Division was sent to

VICE ADM. RICHMOND KELLY TURNER

7

 Richard W. Johnston, Follow Me!: The Story

of the Second Marine Division in World War II

(New York, Random House, 1948), pp. 7-156. 8

 Bevan G. Cass, ed., History of the Sixth

Marine Division (Washington, 1948), p. 11.

9

 Carl W. Proehl, ed., The Fourth Marine Division in World War II (Washington, 1946), pp.

16-33; Crowl and Love, Gilberts and Marshalls,

pp. 304-08. 10

 Proehl, Fourth Marine Division, pp. 2-4. 11

 When the division was triangularized in 1942

its fourth regiment, the 108th Infantry, was transferred to the 40th Division. Edmund G. Love,

The 27th Infantry Division in World War II

(Washington, Infantry Journal Press, 1949), pp.

1-2.
38 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

LT. GEN. HOLLAND M. SMITH

Guadalcanal. In November 1943 the 165th

Infantry, reinforced by the 3d Battalion,

105th Infantry plus organic artillery, engineer, and service units, invaded and

captured Makin simultaneously with the

2d Marine Division's assault on Tarawa.

Three months later two battalions (1st and

3d) of the 106th Infantry, plus an independent Marine regiment,12

 took Eniwetok

Atoll. Thus, of the entire 27th Division

only the 1st and 2d Battalions, 105th Infantry, and 2d Battalion, 106th, which secured Majuro Atoll without battle, were

unseasoned in atoll warfare.13

Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith joined the

27th Division as commanding general in

November 1942. His previous wartime

duty had been with the Military Intelligence Division (G-2) of the War Department General Staff and with the

76th Infantry Division at Fort George G.

Meade.14 His primary job for the next

year was to supervise training of the division for forthcoming operations. His own

initiation into Pacific warfare came at

Makin, where he exercised tactical command over the reinforced 165th Infantry

Regiment.

Aside from the three reinforced infantry

divisions, the largest single unit attached

to Northern Troops and Landing Force for

the Marianas operation was the XXIV

Corps Artillery (Army). The organization

was formally activated on 25 March 1944

and consisted of two battalions each of

155-mm. howitzers and 155-mm. guns.

The nucleus of this new organization consisted of coastal artillery and field artillery

battalions orginally assigned to the defense

of Oahu. One battalion (145th) had participated in the Kwajalein Island landing,

but the rest were new to combat.15 For the

Marianas Campaign the corps artillery was

commanded by Brig. Gen. Arthur M.

Harper, a field artilleryman since 1920.

Between the commencement of the war

and his assignment to XXIV Corps, he

had served as artillery officer of I Corps,

of the 30th Infantry Division, and as commanding general of III Corps Artillery. 12 16 The 22d Marines. This unit later was incorporated into the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade,

which fought on Guam. The brigade was subsequently expanded to the 6th Marine Division,

which saw action on Okinawa. 13

 Love, The 27th Infantry Division, pp. 18-

111; Hq 27th Inf Div, Hist of 27th Inf Div From

Induction, 15 Oct 40, to Date, 20 Mar 45, pp.

1-3.

14

 General Officers, Service Biographies, DRB

AGO, Misc 201. 15

 XXIV Corps Arty Final Rpt on FORAGER

Opn, Phases I and III, S-3 Rpt, pp. 1-2. 16

 General Officers, Service Biographies, DRB

AGO, Misc 201.
PLANNING THE INVASION 39

MAJ. GEN. RALPH C. SMITH

Tactical Planning

Headquarters, V Amphibious Corps,

was first alerted to its forthcoming responsibilities in the Marianas on 15 January

1944, when it received Admiral Nimitz'

Campaign Plan GRANITE setting forth the

concept and outlining a tentative schedule

of operations for the Central Pacific area

for the year 1944.17 Operation FORAGER,

involving the seizure, occupation, and defense of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, was

included as the final phase of this program.

The first two months of 1944 witnessed

an unexpected speed-up in Pacific operations. By 17 February, as already noted,

Kwajalein Atoll had been seized, a successful landing had been made on Eniwetok, and, most important, a fast carrier

strike against Truk had revealed the alleged impregnability of that once-powerful

base to be a myth,

On 13 March, therefore, Nimitz assigned

highest priority to the Marianas operation.

A week later he issued his Joint Staff Study

for FORAGER to all major commanders as a

guide for advanced planning. The study

indicated that V Amphibious Corps, including the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions,

would be mounted in the Hawaiian area

for the initial assault on the beaches of

Saipan with the 27th Infantry Division in

reserve. The III Amphibious Corps, consisting of the 3d Marine Division and the

1st Provisional Marine Brigade, was to be

mounted in the Guadalcanal area for an

invasion of Guam. The 77th Infantry Division was to be alerted in the Hawaiian

area for possible movement to the Marianas twenty days after the initial landing

on Saipan. The probable target day (D

Day) for Saipan was set as 15 June. The

date for the invasion of Guam (W Day)

was tentatively established as 18 June.18

On 12 April General Holland Smith divided his V Amphibious Corps staff into

two separate components. One, initially

known as the Red Staff, later functioned

as Northern Troops and Landing Force

(Task Group 56.1) for the capture of Saipan and Tinian. The other portion, first

known as Blue Staff, later served as

Headquarters Expeditionary Troops (Task

Force 56).19 General Smith's two staffs

were heavily augmented by U.S. Army per17

 See above, p. 13. Planning for the Guam and

Tinian phase of FORAGER, although undertaken

concurrently with that for Saipan, is discussed in

detail in Chapters XIII and XV.

18

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl C, G-3 Rpt, pp.

1-2; Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Areas,

FORAGER Joint Staff Study. 19

 Headquarters Northern Troops and Landing

Force Report, Marianas, Phase I (Saipan) (hereafter cited as NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I), Incl

E, G-3 Rpt, p. 1.
40 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

sonnel. On the Northern Troops and Landing Force Staff, the assistant chiefs of

staff for both intelligence (G-2) and supply (G-4) were Army officers—Lt. Col.

Thomas R. Yancey and Lt. Col. Joseph C.

Anderson.

There were disadvantages to this cellular fission, however unavoidable it may

have been. First, there was a decided shortage of trained personnel, especially of special staff sections, officer assistants and

trained clerks, draftsmen, and stenographers; and second, a shortage of headquarters and corps troops already existed in V

Amphibious Corps.20 "In effect," as one

commentator put it, "you have here an

army and a corps trying to operate with

a staff too small for a corps,"

 21

All echelons prepared their plans simultaneously, and the normal time sequence

of planning from highest echelon down,

with each subordinate basing his own plan

on that of his immediate superior, was seldom achieved. For example, Headquarters

Expeditionary Troops (Task Force 56)

Operation Plan 3-44 was issued on 26

April, whereas the next higher echelon, Admiral Turner's Headquarters Northern Attack Force (Task Force 52) did not issue

its plan until 21 May.22 Again, it was not

until 12 May that Admiral Spruance, who

was superior to both Turner and Smith,

came out with his operation plan for the

Fifth Fleet.23

Northern Troops and Landing Force

Headquarters Operation Plan 3-44 of 1

May summarized all previous plans from

higher echelons and governed the tactical

order of all troops in the proposed landings

on Saipan.24 The 4th Marine Division (reinforced) was to land on Blue and Yellow

Beaches, extending from the town of

Charan Kanoa south almost to Agingan

Point. Its first objective was to be a line

inland from the beaches about 2,000 yards

at the north and tapering down to the

water's edge at the southern end. Then,

on order, the division was to advance rapidly and seize Aslito airfield and the surrounding terrain. (Map I.)

The 2d Marine Division was to land simultaneously to the north of Charan Kanoa

on Green and Red Beaches, seize the first

commanding ground inland, and then advance rapidly and capture Mount Tapotchau and Mount Tipo Pale and the adjacent ground. The XXIV Corps Artillery

was to land on order on beaches to be

designated and to execute missions as assigned.

North of the 2d Marine Division's

beaches, in the vicinity of Tanapag Harbor, a naval force consisting of transport

divisions carrying reserve regiments from

the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions would

conduct a diversionary demonstration to

last from a half hour before sunrise to an

hour after the main landing.

Finally, the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines,

was detached from its parent organization

to perform a separate mission. Originally,

the battalion was to land from destroyer

transports (APD's) on Magicienne Bay on

the southeast side of the island the night

before the main landing on the west coast.

20

 Ibid., p. 2. 21

 C&GS School, Ft. Leavenworth, Kans., Second Command Class, Recent Operations, FORAGER

(Marianas), Annex C, p. 2. 22

 Northern Attack Force (TF 52) Attack Order

A11-44, 21 May 44. As Commander, Expeditionary Forces (TF 51), Turner issued his Operation

Plan A10-44 on 6 May 1944. 23

 Comdr Fifth Fleet Opn Plan Central 10-44,

12 May 44; TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl B, G-5

Rpt, p. 5. 24

 NTLF Opn Plan 3-44 (FORAGER), 1 May 44.
PLANNING THE INVASION 41

It would then move rapidly inland, attempt to seize Mount Tapotchau before

daylight and hold on until relieved by the

main elements of the 2d Marine Division,

Later, on 7 May, this order was changed,

and the battalion was to be prepared to

land on Magicienne Bay or perhaps other

beaches after the main landing had been

effected and then move west and north to

attack enemy positions from the rear.25

Eventually, the whole scheme was canceled as impractical and involving excessive

risks.

The final decision was in all probability

the soundest one. To have committed a

single battalion armed with nothing heavier than 60-mm. mortars against the formidable defenses the Japanese had set up

around Magicienne Bay would in all likelihood have proved disastrous. As events

turned out, it took the entire 2d Marine

Division ten days to reach Mount Tapotchau's summit.26

At headquarters of the 27th Division the

problem of planning for landings on Saipan

was seriously complicated because there

was no certainty as to how the division

would be employed. It was the corps reserve and might be committed on Saipan

only in part or piecemeal, might be reserved for later action on Tinian and

Guam, or might not be used at all. In

short, there were a large number and wide

variety of possibilities, and operations officers had to plan accordingly. Hence,

Ralph Smith's G-3 (operations) section

found it necessary to prepare a total of

twenty-one complete plans for tactical employment of the division. A few of these

were discarded as higher headquarters

made progress in outlining the details of

their own plans. By the time the troops

sailed from Hawaii it appeared that, if used

on Saipan at all, the division would probably be employed in one of three ways and,

accordingly, three preferred plans were devised. The first contemplated a landing of

two regiments (105th and 165th) on

beaches at Magicienne Bay and a rapid advance northwest across the island to capture the seaplane base at Flores Point, The

second envisaged a landing by the same

two regiments on the beaches north of

Charan Kanoa, on the left of the 2d Marine Division, followed by a northward

thrust to Garapan Village. If either of

these were executed, the third regiment

(106th Infantry) would act as floating reserve. Plan number three called for the two

assault regiments to go ashore at Tanapag

Harbor and prepare to move southward to

join forces with the 2d Marine Division. In

this case, the 106th Regimental Combat

Team (RCT) was to seize Maniagassa Island off Tanapag and support the main

assault.27 A final plan was made only after

the division had sailed from Hawaii. On

its arrival at Kwajalein the 106th Infantry

was attached to the Southern Landing

Force and ordered to prepare plans for a

landing on Guam.28

In actual fact, all of the plans had to be

abandoned early in the battle for Saipan.

Although it cannot be said that all the

laborious preparations by the 27th Division were entirely wasted, it is true that

25

 Ibid., Change 1, 7 May 44. 26

 These conclusions are based on a concurrence

of opinion of several planning and intelligence

officers in the 2d Marine Division and the V

Amphibious Corps. See Major Carl W. Hoffman,

USMC, Saipan: The Beginning of the End, Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

(Washington, 1950), p. 28.

27

 Hq 27th Inf Div Opn Plans I, II, III. 28

 Hq 106th Inf FORAGER Opn Rpt, p. 2.
42 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

neither the division nor the corps headquarters had on hand a detailed plan that

exactly fitted the situation as it had developed by the time the division was

committed.

Preliminary naval and aerial bombardment of the Marianas was planned along

lines by then well established in the Central

Pacific theater. Landings at Tarawa and

in the Marshalls left little doubt of the

necessity for heavy preliminary pounding

of the beaches from both the air and the

sea if excessive American casualties were

to be avoided.29

For Saipan, an impressive armada of

ships and planes was allocated to do the

job. A total of fifty-five ships was originally scheduled to deliver fire against the

main island: 7 fast battleships from Marc

Mitscher's fast carrier force, 4 old battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 15

destroyers, and 24 LCI gunboats (LCI

(G)'s). Simultaneously with this bombardment, the smaller island of Tinian was to

be subjected to similar fire from an

additional 33 ships, including 3 old battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 7

destroyers, and 24 LCI(G)'s. 3 0

Two days before the scheduled landing,

fast battleships and destroyers of Task

Force 58 were to bombard Saipan and

Tinian, destroy aircraft, put airfields out

of commission, destroy coast defense and

antiaircraft batteries, burn off cane fields

in the landing area, deliver antipersonnel

fire, and, finally, cover mine-sweeping operations off the western shore line. Next day,

old battleships and smaller fire support

ships of Turner's Task Force 52 were

scheduled to deliver counterbattery fire,

area bombardment, and interdiction fire,

commencing at daybreak and continuing

throughout the day. Their primary mission

was to destroy as many coast defense guns,

antiaircraft batteries, artillery weapons,

and other enemy defenses and personnel

as possible. Ships were directed to remain

well beyond the range of enemy shore batteries on that day, which meant in effect

that their fire would be delivered at ranges

in excess of 10,000 yards.31 They were

instructed to pay particular attention to

gun positions at Magicienne Bay and to

the beach defenses and installations on the

selected landing beaches on the west coast.

Also, they were to cover mine-sweeping operations and beach reconnaissance by the

underwater demolition teams, whose job

it was to inspect the beaches and approaches thereto for mines, underwater

obstacles, and explosives. Simultaneously,

ships of Admiral Conolly's Task Force 53

were to work over neighboring Tinian in

much the same manner, although these

vessels were to conserve most (80 percent)

of their ammunition allowance for preassault bombardment of Guam.32

For D Day (15 June) on Saipan the

schedule of fires was to be stepped up

sharply, with particular attention to be

paid to the landing beaches. Counterbattery fire was to commence at dawn and to

cover known and suspected positions of

enemy coast defense guns and antiaircraft,

dual-purpose, and field artillery batteries

both on Saipan and on Tinian. Ships were

to be in position to bombard beach defenses and possible flanking positions, with

close-range fire to commence at the low29

 See Crowl and Love, Gilberts and Marshalls. 30

 NTLF Opn Plan 3-44 (FORAGER), 1 May

44, Annex Charlie, pp. 1-2.

31

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Rpt on Naval Gunfire

Support, p. 10. 32

 Ibid., pp. 2-4; TF 52 Attack Order A11-44,

21 May 44, Annex C, pp. 3-9.
PLANNING THE INVASION 43

water line and extend 400 yards inland.

Area bombardment of secondary defenses

such as supply installations, barracks, and

bivouac areas was to be continued, as was

supporting bombardment of Tinian by

Task Force 53. Shortly before the scheduled landing hour (H Hour) on Saipan,

close supporting fires were to be delivered

against the Charan Kanoa beaches and in

the Tanapag Harbor area, the latter being

in support of the demonstration landing

and therefore on a smaller scale. All naval

gunfire, except for counterbattery fire

necessary to the protection of ships and

landing craft, was to cease for a half hour

(between H minus 90 and H minus 60)

to permit a low-altitude aerial strike on the

beaches, and then resume for the hour before the landing. For the hour remaining

before the troops were scheduled to touch

shore, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers

were directed to move in to close range and

bombard the selected landing beaches and

adjacent installations.33

Then, just before the scheduled landing

hour, when the assault troops were assembled in the leading waves of amphibian

tractors, twenty-four LCI gunboats, equipped with rockets and 20-mm. and 40-mm.

guns, were to move slowly forward toward

the beach in line-abreast formation, just

ahead of the first wave of amphibian

tanks. As the LCI's reached the line where

the heavier fire support ships lay to, they

were directed to open fire on the beach

areas with their 40-mm. guns. Those off

the northern beaches (Green and Red)

were to stop dead in the water at this line,

let the leading waves pass through them,

and continue to fire as long as safety to

the landing craft permitted. No rockets

were to be fired by the northern group of

gun boats since the reef in this area would

keep them out of effective range of the

beach (1,100 yards). At the southern

beaches (Blue and Yellow), LCI(G)'s

were ordered to proceed at a distance two

hundred yards ahead of the first landing

craft until they reached a line 1,000 yards

off the beach, then fire their rockets and

40-mm. guns as long as safety allowed.34

Just as impressive as the plans for preparatory naval fire were those for prelanding aerial bombardment. Mitscher's Task

Force 58 had made its first strike against

the islands of Guam, Rota, Tinian, and

Saipan on 23 February,35 and thereafter

on the occasions when aerial reconnaissance

missions were flown across the islands36

some bombs were released, although with

dubious results. According to the original

plans, however, not until two days before

the scheduled landing on Saipan would a

heavy and prolonged aerial bombardment

of that island and Tinian be undertaken.

The fast carriers of Mitscher's force, working in conjunction with escort carriers under command of Admiral Turner, would

undertake this task.37 One D minus 2 (13

June) planes from the fast carrier force

were to make fighter sweeps on airfields on

both Saipan and Tinian to destroy enemy

aircraft. On the same day thirty-three

planes would deliver counterbattery fire

against guns firing on the mine sweepers.

Combat air patrol and antisubmarine

patrol missions were to be flown simultaneously. The next day a more intensive pro33

 CTF 52 Attack Order A11-44, App. 6A to

Annex C.

34

 Ibid., App. 6A to Annex C, p. 2; App. 5 to

Annex J, p. 14. 35

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Feb 44. 36

 See below, pp. 50-51. 37

 CTF 51 Opn Plan A10-44, Annex F; CTF

56 Opn Plan 3-44, Incl A to TF 56 Rpt FORAGER,

Annex D; CTF 56.1 Opn Plan 3-44, Annex D.
44 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

gram of destruction was to be undertaken.

Inland coast defense and dual-purpose and

antiaircraft guns were to be bombed

heavily. Cane fields not already burned

were to be fired. Other priority targets

were inland defense installations and structures, the buildings around Aslito airfield,

and communications and transportation

facilities on the west coast of Saipan including small craft, radio stations, observation towers, railroad and road junctions,

and vehicles. The same day six smoke

planes were to provide protection for underwater demolition teams operating close

offshore, if necessary. Also, vertical photographs were to be made of all beaches from

Tanapag Harbor to Agingan Point.

On 15 June, in addition to continuing

most of the above duties, a heavy half-hour

aerial attack on both islands was to be

carried out and to be terminated only one

hour before the scheduled landings. During this period naval gunfire was to be

lifted so that planes could fly in low for

precision bombing and rocketing of enemy

installations. A total of 60 fighters, 51 dive

bombers, and 54 torpedo bombers were to

take part in this final preliminary saturation attack. Thereafter, until the carriers

were withdrawn, the carrier-based planes

would act as aerial observers for land-based

artillery, make photographic sorties, lay

smoke on request, and provide deep and

close support for the troops ashore.

For the critical movement of assault

troops from ship to shore the plans followed, with some variation, the pattern

used so successfully in the Marshalls operation.38

 Astern of the LCI gunboats,

amphibian tanks (LVT(A)'s) would constitute the bulk of the leading wave. They

mounted either 75-mm. howitzers or 37-

mm. guns plus machine guns, and their

first job was to lead the waves of assault

amphibian tractors (LVT's) from the reef's

edge to the shore line. The LVT(A)'s

Would provide the only close fire support

for the assault troops during the critical

few minutes between the time that naval

gunfire and aerial bombardment were compelled to lift and the time that the

infantrymen actually hit the beach's edge.

Moreover, for the Saipan landing the mission of the amphibian tanks was not to

cease at the shore line. On the 4th Marine

Division beaches, the tanks of the 708th

Amphibian Tank Battalion (Army) were

to push inland approximately 1,500 yards

to the first objective line and set up a

perimeter defense closely supported by infantry in the amphibian tractors.39

 To the

northward, in the 2d Marine Division's

zone of action, the 2d Armored Amphibian

Battalion (Marine) was ordered to move

four companies of its amphibian tanks inland only about three hundred yards to

the tractor control line and there cover the

debarkation of assault troops from its

LVT(A)'s. Thereafter, most of the amphibian tanks were to remain under cover

and engage targets as far inland as 1,500

yards, but only on call from the infantry.40

Thus, LVT(A)'s were scheduled to proceed beyond the beaches' edge and to act,

to all intents and purposes, as land tanks

until such time as heavier tanks could be

brought ashore. This was an innovation in

amphibious techniques and one that, as

38

 See Crowl and Love, Gilberts and Marshalls,

pp. 172-82.

39

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl H, LVT

Rpt, Rpt of 708th Armd Amph Tank Bn, 5 Jul

44, p. 3. 40

 Ibid., Incl G, Rpt of 2d Armd Amph Bn, 1

Jul 44, p. 1.
PLANNING THE INVASION 45

events developed, proved to be of dubious

merit.41

Training and Rehearsals

With the conclusion of the Marshalls operation, it became apparent that the future

promised a shift in the Central Pacific Area

from atoll warfare to operations on larger

land areas that were both mountainous

and jungle-covered. Hence, even before the

official warning orders came down from

corps headquarters, all three divisions assigned to Northern Troops and Landing

Force had commenced training their troops

to meet the particular conditions that the

forthcoming campaign would impose.

The 27th Division, stationed on Oahu,

made an early study of the methods of

burning sugar cane and the movement of

foot troops through freshly burned fields.

Groups from all of the infantry regiments

conducted exercises in methods of burning

fields, cutting passage through them, and

the movement of large and small numbers

of troops through standing arid freshly

burned cane.

The division also concentrated heavily on

training its men in combined tank-infantry

operations. All infantry companies engaged

in field exercises involving the use of tanks

in direct support, a particularly important

exercise for the Army division since its tank

battalions were not organic but were specifically attached to the infantry for the

Marianas operation. Other specialized

training included intense education in amphibious communications procedures. The

295th Joint Assault Signal Company

(JASCO) was attached to the division sufficiently far in advance to allow for

thorough familiarization of the infantry

battalions with the functions and abilities

of the various JASCO teams.

All units were instructed in the proper

organization and plan of fires for a night

perimeter defense, A period of five weeks

was devoted to the study and practice of

methods of loading 105-mm. howitzers in

amphibian trucks (DUKW's). Combat engineers were instructed in the use of flame

throwers and demolitions for the reduction

of fortified positions. The 27th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop conducted rubber boat

training with emphasis on beach reconnaissance, hydrographic studies, and night

landings.42

The 2d Marine Division boasted excellent training facilities in the vicinity of its

"Camp Tarawa" on the main island of

Hawaii. It too held special exercises in

the techniques of fighting through sugar

cane. Also, the jungle and mountainous

terrain on Hawaii approximated the type

that the division would meet on Saipan and

was ideal for the simulation of realistic

combat conditions.43

The 4th Marine Division fared less well.

Its camp site on Maui was new, its living

and training facilities were incomplete.

Hence, camp construction and training

had to be carried out simultaneously—a

situation that, though common enough in

the Pacific, was never desirable. Nevertheless, by instituting emergency measures for

the acquisition of suitable land and

through co-operation with the Navy and

Army authorities, "a fairly satisfactory

schedule of individual, unit and combined

training was completed," according to the

division's commanding officer.44

41

 See below, pp. 85-87.

42

 27th Inf Div Rpt FORAGER, G-3 Combat Rpt,

pp. 1-5. 43

 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, p. 1. 44

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, p. 6.
46 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

The chief training problem facing XXIV

Corps Artillery was that of converting two

coast artillery battalions into field artillery

battalions. The XXIV Corps Artillery was

not activated as a unit until the end of

March 1944. At that time the 225th Field

Artillery Group was alerted to take part in

the Marianas operation and relieved of its

defensive mission on Oahu. Two of its field

artillery battalions were detached, and the

32d Coast Artillery Battalion and 2d Battalion, 55th Coast Artillery, were attached.

As finally organized, the XXIV Corps Artillery was made up of one 155-mm.

howitzer group of two battalions and one

155-mm. gun group of two battalions

drawn from available field artillery personnel and supplemented by coast artillery

personnel. Because of its infancy as an organization and the lack of combat experience of most of its personnel, adequate

training for the unit was urgent.

Coast artillery officers were immediately

given an intensive education in basic field

artillery methods, and a similar program

for enlisted personnel followed. Demonstrations held by field artillery batteries and

battalions were followed by four field exercises per week. On 1 May two batteries of

the 53d Field Artillery Battalion were

loaded on an LST and taken to Maui to

experiment with methods of loading 155-

mm. guns and to obtain training in unloading across sandy beaches. Experiments

were also conducted in loading the 155's on

the smaller LCT's (landing craft, tank).

Because of the shortness of time and its

relative lack of basic training, XXIV Corps

Artillery did not participate in the final

grand rehearsal. Instead, the two-month

intensive training period culminated in a

corps artillery field exercise held during the

rehearsal period.45

On 14 May ships carrying the two Marine divisions with their full loads of

equipment rendezvoused in the area of

Maalca Bay, Hawaii, for final rehearsals

before shoving off to Saipan. LVT's and

other amphibious craft were launched; the

assault battalions practiced ship-to-shore

movements; shore party team personnel

and beach parties were landed with their

communications equipment; artillery was

beached and dragged ashore. On 16 and 17

May each of the divisions made a coordinated landing on the island of Maui

and battle conditions were simulated as far

as was practicable. However, in view of

the fact that the island was populated, ship

and aerial bombardment had to be "constructive" only. Moreover, the landing

beaches were separated and maneuver area

ashore was extremely limited, preventing

rehearsal of co-ordinated movements inland

and any extensive deployment of troops

once they had reached the shore line. As

an exercise in ship-to-shore movement the

rehearsal was useful, but it failed to give

the troops an adequate foretaste of the

problems involved in consolidating a beachhead once they had landed.46

Finally, on 19 May, a simulated landing

was made jointly by the two Marine divisions on the nearby island of Kahoolawe.

This time troops approached the shore under actual cover of naval and aerial fire.

On reaching a line 300 yards from the

beaches they turned back, but in every

other respect the exercise was a full-dress

45

 XXIV Corps Arty Final Rpt on FORAGER

Opn, Phases I and III, S-3 Rpt, pp. 1-3. 46

 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, Sec.

III, pp. 1-2; 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan,

Incl A, pp. 7-8.
PLANNING THE INVASION 47

rehearsal of the plans for the forthcoming

landing on Saipan, with units, positions,

intervals, distances, and other details as

prescribed in the operation plans. This was

followed immediately by a second exercise

in which air and naval gunfire did not take

part. Then troops were re-embarked in the

vessels in which they were scheduled to sail

overseas and returned to their respective

rehabilitation areas.47

The only incident that had marred lastminute training was the loss of three deckloaded LCT's over the sides of the LST's

that were carrying them to the rehearsals.

This resulted in twenty-nine casualties to

the 2d Marine Division. Moreover, two of

these LCT's had been specially equipped

with 4.2-inch mortars. Plans called for their

employment on Saipan as support ships to

supplement the rocket-firing LCI's in the

last minutes between the lifting of heavy

ships' fire and the landing of troops. Their

loss during rehearsals prevented the equipment from being tested until a later operation and deprived the assault troops of that

much additional naval support.48

From 18 to 24 May the 27th Division

(minus its artillery), fully loaded on three

transport divisions, conducted similar rehearsals. The exercise emphasized the technique of debarking and landing a large

number of troops with a limited number

of boats, a situation thought likely to occur

if reserve troops had to be landed at all on

Saipan. Ship-to-Shore communication was

established although, as in the case of the

two Marine divisions, no supplies were unloaded since all ships had already been assault loaded for the actual landing.49

Loading and Embarkation

The task of carrying three reinforced divisions and almost seven thousand corps

and garrison troops with all their supplies

and equipment over a distance of 3,200

miles from Hawaii to Saipan was the heaviest yet imposed upon the Navy in the

Pacific war. To accomplish it, Admiral

Nimitz assembled a flotilla of no naval

transport vessels of all varieties—37 troop

transports (APA's and AP's), 11 cargo

ships (AKA's and AK's), 5 LSD's (landing ships, dock), 47 LST's, and 10

APD's.50

In addition, a whole division of Liberty

ships had to be organized to transport the

106th Regimental Combat Team because

of the scarcity of Navy troop transports in

the area.51

All together, a total of 74,986.6 measurement tons of cargo representing 7,845,194

cubic feet was loaded. By comparison, during the invasion of Kwajalein in January

1944, only 49,283 tons were carried in the

assault shipping.52 Nimitz' operation plan

provided that assault and garrison forces

should be allowed 32 days of Class I supplies (rations), 20 days of Class II (organizational and individual equipment), 20

days of Class III (fuels and lubricants),

20 days of Class IV (miscellaneous), and

47 Ibid. 48

 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, Sec.

III, p. 1; United States Army Forces Central Pacific Area (USAFICPA), Participation in the

Marianas Operation, Jun-Sep 44, Vol. I, p. 58.

49

 27th Inf Div Rpt FORAGER, G-3 Combat Rpt,

p. 5.

50

 Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, Amphibious

Operations, Invasion of the Marianas, June to

August 1944 (Washington, 1944) (COMINCH

P-007), V-1. 51

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl G, TQM Rpt, p. 7. 52

 COMINCH P-007, V-4; TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl G, TQM Rpt, p. 3.
48 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

7 (CINCPOA) units of fire for ground

weapons and 10 for antiaircraft weapons.53

Staging areas for the three divisions were

widely separated and not all were conveniently located. Ships assigned to the 2d

Marine Division loaded at Hilo on the main

island of Hawaii, those of the 4th Marine

Division at Kahului, Maui, and those of

the 27th Division at Oahu. The ports of

Kahului and Hilo were ill suited to loading

the two Marine divisions efficiently. The

piers at each could berth only four ships

alongside the dock at one time. There were

not enough dock cranes, stevedore equipment, and warehouses. There were no dock

lighting facilities, and it was difficult for

LST's to beach properly.54 Also, Hilo was

some sixty miles away from the 2d Marine

Division's Camp Tarawa, which complicated the problem of loading both troops

and equipment.55

Standard combat unit loading procedures were followed as a rule, but shipping

shortages sometimes made this impossible.56

 This was especially true of supplies

and equipment belonging to V Amphibious

Corps troops, XXIV Corps Artillery, and

garrison troops. The last available AP in

the Pacific (USS G. F. Elliott), two AK's

(USS Hercules and USS Jupiter), and two

LST's were assigned to lift these units, but

the shipping space was inadequate. Excess

personnel (approximately 4,000) were distributed among the transports carrying the

two Marine divisions. As a result most of

these units, especially the XXIV Corps

Artillery, were separated from their cargo.

In other words these particular units were

"convoy unit loaded"—which was highly

undesirable from the point of view of tactical disposition.57

Even after parceling out more than half

of its attached troops to the ships carrying

the Marine divisions, V Amphibious Corps

still did not have enough room aboard its

own vessels. It was impossible to combat

load its cargo. To have tried to vertically

load each of the twenty-five units carrying cargo on the corps ships would have

meant leaving from 25 to 35 percent of the

cargo behind. The upshot was that a top

priority was assigned to corps artillery

and the corps signal battalion, and the remainder of the units' equipment was

stowed wherever it could be fitted in.58

As early as 1 May 1944, Holland Smith's

headquarters had ordered 25 to 50 percent

of all supplies and two to five units of fire

to be palletized.59 The object was to per- 53

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opn Plan 3-44, Annex

C; TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Annex E, G-4 Rpt, pp.

4-5; for CINCPOA units of fire, see Appendix B,

below. 54

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Annex G, TQM Rpt,

PP. 13-16. 55

 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, Sec.

II, p. 1. 56

 Combat unit loading is defined as the method

"in which certain units, selected because of their

probable employment to meet tactical situations

immediately upon landing, are completely loaded

in a single transport with at least their essential

combat equipment, transportation, and supplies

available for immediate debarkation with the

troops." (Office of Naval Operations, Division of

Fleet Training, Landing Operations Doctrine

United States Navy, 1938 (FTP 167), p. 211.)

This means, in effect, that materials most urgently

needed will be stowed near the top of ships' holds

and immediately under hatch covers. Lower priority supplies will be stowed lower in the holds and

away from the hatch covers where they cannot be

unloaded without first removing everything between. 57

 Convoy unit loading is defined as the method

in which "the troops with their equipment and

supplies are loaded in transports of the same convoy, but not necessarily in the same vessel." FTP

167, p. 211. 58

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl G, TQM Rpt, pp.

6-7.

59

 V Phib Corps Order 3-44, 1 May 44, par.

(g). Pallets are wooden, sledlike structures to

which supplies can be lashed.
PLANNING THE INVASION 49

mit rapid transfer from the beach to inland

dumps by using tractors to drag the pallets instead of resorting to the older method

of trucking loose supplies inland employing manpower to load the trucks. From

the outset, the two Marine divisions were

lukewarm toward the project, and in the

end loaded only a few pallets. The 27th

Infantry Division, however, had had several months' experience in handling palletized

cargo and was enthusiastic about this

technique for loading and unloading supplies.60

 The division not only complied

with corps orders, but went beyond it and

palletized between 80 and 90 percent of

all supplies.61

One reason for the Marine divisions'

failure to follow suit was inexperienced

labor and a shortage of equipment. The 4th

Marine Division reported that it could

procure only enough material to palletize

10 to 15 percent of all supplies and that

the job was done so poorly that some pallets broke down during handling.62

 In the

end, the division decided that palletization

of supplies at least for the initial stages of

the assault was not worth the trouble. The

marines argued that palletized supplies

took up too much space aboard ship, were

difficult to transfer from one type of landing craft to another, and required too

much extra equipment. Furthermore, it

was contended that pallets were not practical where dumps were located more than

500 yards inland and where reefs were

encountered.63

Neither corps headquarters nor the 27th

Division agreed. Holland Smith's transport

quartermaster maintained that the "reasons for palletization overbalance the negative effects," and cited as the primary

benefits the rapid unloading of landing

craft at the beaches and the release of large

working parties formerly engaged in transferring cargo from landing craft to

trucks.64 The 27th Division headquarters

was so enthusiastic about the process that

it diverted from training one and sometimes

two companies of infantry in addition to a

platoon of engineers for a period of six

weeks just to palletize supplies.65

Amphibian tanks and tractors, the allimportant vehicles of assault, were as usual

transported aboard LST's. Each LST carried seventeen LVT's, loaded in two rows of

eight with the odd one secured on the

ramp. By loading LVT's in this manner,

about fifteen feet of clear space remained

on the after portion of the LST tank deck,

and emergency supplies were "preloaded"

thereon. In addition to the amphibian vehicles, each LST carried more than 300

marines from Hawaii to Eniwetok. There,

they received fifty to seventy-five more

from transports to fill the complement of

the assault waves. A serious LST shortage

almost occurred when six were destroyed

by fire at Pearl Harbor on 21 May. However, LST's originally assigned to the garrison force were used as substitutes, and

loading and embarking was only delayed

twenty-four hours.66

One impediment to well-planned and

well-co-ordinated combat loading was that 60

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl G, TQM Rpt, p.

15.

61

 27th Inf Div Rpt FORAGER, G-4 Rpt, Supply

Phase of FORAGER Opn, Incl 3, p. 1. 62

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex D,

Supply and Evacuation, p. 6. 63

 Ibid., Annex E, p. 23.

64

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Annex G, TQM Rpt,

p. 33. 65

 27th Inf Div Rpt FORAGER, G-4 Rpt, Supply

Phase of FORAGER Opn, p. 3. 66

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl G, TQM Rpt, pp.

10, 17.
50 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

troop transport quartermasters too often

received insufficient or inaccurate information on the characteristics of the ships

assigned to them. Precise data on the

location, size, and shape of ships' holds,

the number and location of hatches and

winches and other equipment, plus myriad

other details concerning ship structure are

essential to proper combat loading. This

was not always forthcoming. New ships arrived at the very last moment, and there

was little or no time available to obtain

correct ships' characteristics.67 For two

AP's (USS Storm King and USS John

Land) assigned to the 4th Marine Division,

no characteristics were obtainable before

actual loading. The division's supply section had been instructed to assume that

these vessels' characteristics were similar to

those of another AP, USS LaSalle. Upon

arrival of the ships, it was discovered there

was no such resemblance, that the new

ships were not entirely suitable for combat

loading, and that the winchmen were inexperienced and too few in number to cope

with the problems at hand. Hence, many

valuable items of equipment, especially

twenty-five 21⁄2-ton cargo trucks, had to be

left behind.68

In spite of these and kindred difficulties,

the three divisions met Admiral Turner's

loading schedule. By 14 May both the Marine divisions were aboard their transports

and ready to depart for rehearsals, completely loaded except for a few last-minute

items. By 18 May the 27th Division was

also set to go.69

After a brief period of rehabilitation

following rehearsals, all units of Northern

Troops and Landing Force once again

boarded their ships and prepared to set sail

for the final ordeal. The slower LST's carrying assault elements of the two Marine

divisions sortied from Pearl Harbor on 25

May. On 29 and 30 May two groups of

naval transports followed. All ships carrying the assault troops rendezvoused at

Eniwetok, where last-minute intelligence

data was disseminated and additional

troops assigned to the initial landing waves

were transferred from transports to LST's.

By 11 June the last of the attack transports

had weighed anchor in Eniwetok lagoon

and the mighty convoy, split into four

separate groups, was steaming westward

through hostile waters toward still more

hostile shores.70 Well to the rear came

the transport and tractor (LST) groups

carrying the reserve troops, the 27th Infantry Division. These had sailed from

Pearl Harbor between 25 May and 1 June

and had rendezvoused at Kwajalein. There,

the 106th Regimental Combat Team was

informed that it would undoubtedly be detached to the Southern Attack Force for

the invasion of Guam. Otherwise, the voyage for all units was uneventful.71

The Prospects Ahead:

Intelligence of the Enemy

While still at anchor in Eniwetok, the

intelligence section of Headquarters, Expeditionary Troops (Task Force 56), received a final batch of aerial photographs

67

 Ibid., Incl G, TQM Rpt, p. 17. 68

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex D,

p. 3.

69

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl G, TQM Rpt, p.

16, and Incl JJ; 37th Inf Div Rpt FORAGER, G-3

Rpt, p. 5.

70

 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, Sec.

IV, pp. 1-2; 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan,

p. 13. 71

 27th Inf Div Rpt FORAGER, G-3 Rpt, p. 6;

27th Inf Div Arty Rpt FORAGER, p. 6.
PLANNING THE INVASION 51

of Saipan and the southern Marianas.

These had been made on 28 May for Saipan and on 29 May and 7 June for Guam.

They were disseminated to the two Marine

divisions before their departure from Eniwetok on 11 June, although the initial

assault elements aboard the LST's had left

before the new information could reach

them. Hence, the leading waves of troops

would make their landings on the basis of

information of the enemy situation as derived from photographic sorties flown on 18

April.72

A final G-2 "Summary of the Enemy

Situation" was prepared by Holland

Smith's intelligence section on 13 June and

represents the last-minute estimate of enemy potentialities in the Marianas before the

actual landing.73 This document predicted

that the Japanese had on Saipan alone

from 15,000 to 17,600 troops, with an

additional 10,150 to 10,750 on nearby Tinian. Of the total, 9,100 to 11,000 were

thought to be ground combat troops located

on Saipan, The rest of the garrison, it was

believed, was made up of air base personnel, maintenance and construction personnel (including Koreans), and a home

guard. This represented a considerable

increase over an estimate made a month

earlier (9 May), which put the total number of enemy troops on Saipan at 9,000 to

10,000 and on Tinian at 7,500 to 8,500.74

Saipan had three airfields in varying

stages of preparedness. Aslito Naval Air

Station in the south was 3,600 feet in

length and believed to be fully operational;

an emergency landing strip 3,280 feet in

length had been sited in the area of Charan

Kanoa; and at Marpi Point a large airfield

(4,300 feet) was still under construction

and was considered to be nonoperational.

In addition, a major seaplane base at

Flores Point in Tanapag Harbor was

thought to be fully operational.

The latest estimate of air strength on Saipan before the carriers' strikes was a total

of 152 aircraft. However, on 11 and 12

June 140 aircraft were destroyed on Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, and since no aerial

opposition was encountered at Saipan on

13 June, Japanese aerial resistance from

Saipan was thought unlikely.75

The newest photographs of Saipan revealed several significant increases in the

number of gun installations since 18 April,

when the last photographic sortie had been

flown. The most notable of these were an

increase of 32 percent in the number of

heavy antiaircraft guns, 28 percent in medium antiaircraft guns, and 37 percent in

machine guns.76

The following table indicates the number and

type of enemy installations estimated to be emplaced on Saipan as of 29 May 1944:

Blockhouses . .................. ........ ............... ..1

Possible blockhouses...................... .......... . 1

Coast defense guns ........................... .......13

Possible coast defense guns.......... ........ 2

Dual-mount dual-purpose guns................ 5

Single-mount dual-purpose guns.... . .....11

Single-mount heavy AA................. ..... .49

Possible single-mount heavy AA .... ....... .9

Single-mount heavy AA emplacements ....... 5

Single-mount medium AA ........... ........ .134

Possible single-mount medium AA ................ 8

Single-mount medium AA emplacements...... .1

Covered artillery emplacements.............. .... . 3

Pillboxes.... ......... ..... ............................... 37

Possible pillboxes ... .......................................... 4

Machine guns (20-mm. or under) AA ......264

Possible machine guns (20-mm. or

under) AA ..................................................6

Machine gun emplacements ........................... 4

Empty emplacements............................... ... 23 72

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl D, G-2 Rpt, p. 2. 73

 Ibid., Annex F, pp. 1-15. 74

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, G-2 Rpt, App.

A, G-2 V Phib Corps Special Study of Enemy

Strength in the Southern Marianas, 9 May 44.

75

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl D, G-2 Rpt, Annex

F, p. 1. 76

 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
52 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Radar ............................... ................................2

Possible radar.....................................................1

Searchlights .............. .....................................31

Unidentified installations............. ................... 4

According to intelligence estimates, the

preferred landing beaches off Charan

Kanoa were defended by a well-developed

system of trenches, tank traps, pillboxes,

and machine guns. It was assumed that infantry elements on the island would be assigned chiefly to the defense of this area.

The absence of extensive field fortifications

and the presence of heavy-caliber weapons

between Garapan and Flores Point suggested to intelligence officers that the defense of that area would be primarily the

responsibility of artillery and antiaircraft

elements of whatever guard forces, special

landing forces, and antiaircraft units that

were stationed on the island. Intelligence

officers also believed that the machine guns

around Aslito field, at the southern end of

Charan Kanoa strip, and on the eastern

end of Marpi Point would probably be

manned by similar elements and by air base

defense antiaircraft personnel.

Intelligence also led the officers to believe

that the enemy probably had a tank detachment or at least an amphibious tank

unit on Saipan. This, plus other factors,

suggested that the Japanese contemplated

a strong defense at the shore line combined

with a mobile defense in the area behind

the preferred landing beaches.77

The last assumption was essentially correct, even if some of the detailed estimates

as to the number of enemy troops and installations proved to be well under the

mark. At any rate, nothing in the lastminute intelligence surveys indicated that

a basic change in the preferred landing

plans was necessary. The die was cast. Under mild skies and through gently rolling

seas the advance groups of troop-laden

ships moved in slow procession toward the

battleground.

77

 Ibid., p. 7.
CHAPTER IV

The Enemy

Prewar Japanese Activities

in the Marianas

At the termination of World War I Japan, as one of the Allied powers, was

awarded a Class C mandate over all of the

islands and atolls north of the equator that

had formerly been in the possession of the

German Empire. These included the Marshalls, the Carolines, the Palaus, and the

Marianas except for Guam. Under the

terms of Article 22 of the Covenant of the

League of Nations, Japan agreed to refrain

from "the establishment of fortifications or

military and naval bases" in her newly acquired territories. Eleven years later Japan

gave the required two years notice of her

intention to withdraw from the League and

did so officially on 27 March 1935.1

Whether or not the Japanese made any

active effort to fortify or garrison the mandates before 1933 remains in doubt, although their policy of excluding foreign

visitors from these scattered islands inevitably raised suspicions in the minds of

interested westerners as to what was going

on behind the silken curtain. In any event

after her withdrawal from the League and

before the outbreak of hostilities it is certain

that Japan embarked on a program of military construction in the area. This was

done in spite of the fact that Japan's secession from the League was a unilateral act

and in international law did not relieve her

of accepted obligations under the League

Covenant.2

From 1934 to 15 November 1940, the

Japanese Government is known to have

appropriated at least 14,456,800 yen

($3,939,478) for construction in the Marianas alone.3

 For the year beginning 15 No1

 Denys P. Myers, Handbook of the League of

Nations (Boston and New York, World Peace

Foundation, 1935), p. 378; International Military

Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), International Prosecution Section (IPS) Doc. 6527, p. 13.

The proceedings of the IMTFE and attached

documents are filed in the Law Library, Office of

the Judge Advocate General, Department of the

Navy.

2

 IMTFE Proceedings, pp. 39, 43, 205-16, 408-

15; Earl S. Pomeroy, Pacific Outpost: American

Strategy in Guam and Micronesia (Stanford,

Calif., Stanford University Press, 1951).

It should be noted that Japan was under no

obligation to the United States not to fortify the

mandated islands. The United States was not a

signatory to the League Covenant. By the Five

Power Treaty signed at Washington in 1922,

Japan agreed with the United States and Great

Britain to maintain the status quo in regard to

fortifications and naval bases in certain of her

island possessions, but the Pacific mandates were

not included in the agreement. See Harold and

Margaret Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea

Power (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press,

1940), Chs. X, XIII, and App. B. 3

 For this chapter, dollar value of the yen has

been obtained by averaging the dollar value of the

yen for the years 1934-40. Figures for all conversions from yen to dollars have been taken from

Japan Statistical Yearbook: 1949 (Nihon Statistical Association, 1949), p. 612.
54 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

vember 1940, a minimum of 121,189,666

yen ($28,406,858) was appropriated for

construction in the Marianas, Carolines,

and Marshalls, of which 15,605,885 yen

($3,658,019) was allocated to the Marianas. Of the total of over thirty million

yen ($7,032,000) spent in the Marianas,

about 60 percent was assigned to Saipan,

25 percent to Tinian, and 15 percent to

Pagan. About 40 percent of the Saipan

appropriation was for air installations, the

remainder being allocated to fortifications,

barracks, storage buildings, offices, water

supply facilities, ammunition storage facilities, and communications stations. Practically all of the money allocated to Tinian

and Pagan was earmarked for airfield

construction.4

In 1934 work began on Aslito airfield,

located near the southern end of Saipan,

Aslito was the principal Japanese air base

in the Marianas, and its capture and development was to be the main objective of

the American forces that invaded the

Marianas in 1944. In addition to Aslito, a

seaplane base in Tanapag Harbor, Saipan,

was completed in 1935. Five years later

nearby Tinian could boast an airfield costing about 7.5 million yen ($1,758,000).

Although various Japanese spokesmen

after the close of World War II pretended

that these airfields and other building activities in the mandates were undertaken for

peaceful purposes, the pretense was a flimsy

one. A close examination of appropriations

made by the Japanese Government for construction in the Marianas in 1940 and 1941

clearly indicates that Japan had launched

an active program of military fortification

of the mandates well before the actual outbreak of hostilities. In November of 1940

a sizable appropriation was made for the

construction of "lighthouses" throughout

the mandated islands. Each "lighthouse"

came equipped with barracks, ammunition

storage facilities, a command post, and a

lookout station. Actually, of course, these

were naval lookout stations.

On Saipan, construction was fairly extensive. Twelve "lighthouses" were constructed at a cost of 1,333,333 yen

($312,533). In February 1941, 100,000

yen ($23,440) was set aside to build four

gun positions of reinforced concrete, to be

completed by the end of July. During 1941

almost 700,000 yen ($164,080) was devoted to the construction of the Saipan

branch of the 4th Fleet Naval Stores Department, including ammunition storage

sheds with a floor area of 800 square

meters. Also during 1941, almost 800,000

yen ($187,520) was earmarked for construction of communications facilities, including receiving and sending stations,

radio direction finders, and barracks for

the personnel to man them. In September

1941, 1,500,000 yen ($351,600) was

devoted to building military barracks,

baths and latrines, kitchens, infirmaries,

storehouses, workshops, torpedo storage

sheds, garages, and air raid shelters. The

order authorizing this expenditure specifically stated that these structures were

intended for the use of a base force and a

defense force, both of which under Japanese naval organization were acknowledged

combat units.5

4

 Unless otherwise noted, the sources of information on Japan's prewar fortifications in the mandates are: Special Forces, Early Series, Vols. 9

and 10, in U.S. National Archives, World War II

Seized Enemy Records, Record Group 242, NA

12226 and NA 12255, WDC 160867 and WDC

161009.

5

 For similar details on Japanese prewar military preparations in the Marshalls, see Crowl and

Love, Gilberts and Marshalls, Chapter IV.
THE ENEMY 55

There is other evidence to prove that in

the year or two before Pearl Harbor Japan

was making active preparations to use the

mandates, including the Marianas, as military and naval bases, contrary to the terms

of the League Covenant.

On 15 November 1939 the 4th Fleet of

the Imperial Japanese Navy was organized

and placed in charge of garrisons and fortifications in the mandates.6

 This fleet,

which was primarily a base defense unit

rather than the more orthodox type of

naval combat unit, established its headquarters at Truk. For administrative and

defense purposes, the mandates were divided into four sectors—East Carolines,

West Carolines, Marshalls, and Marianas,

with sector headquarters at Truk, the

Palaus, Kwajalein, and Saipan, respectively. Each sector was controlled by a base

force subordinate to the 4th Fleet, and each

base force commanded subordinate shore

and surface units within its own sector.

Shortly after the creation of the 4th

Fleet, the 5th Special Base Force was activated in Japan and assigned the duty of

preparing for the fortification and defense

of the Marianas. Attached to it were the

5th Communications Unit and the 5th Defense Force, the latter unit comprising the

bulk of the combat personnel located in

this area before the outbreak of war with

the United States. These troops arrived in

the Marianas in December of 1940. Not

long afterward their strength was augmented by a detachment each of the 4th Fleet

Naval Stores Department and the 4th Naval Air Depot, both located on Saipan.7

The mission of the 5th Special Base

Force from December 1940 to 31 May

1941 was to defend its assigned areas and

speed up preparations for combat in the

event of a war. The subordinate 5th Defense Force engaged in construction of gun

positions, road building, harbor improvement, and sundry other duties aimed at

enhancing the security of Saipan. During

the succeeding period, from 1 June through

30 November, an additional mission was

assigned to the 5th Special Base Force—

that of "planning and preparation for the

Guam invasion operation." No additional

evidence need be adduced to show that

well before the Pearl Harbor attack, Japan

had committed herself unequivocally to a

policy of fortifying the Marianas for offensive as well as defensive purposes.

From Pearl Harbor to Invasion

For the first two years after the Pearl

Harbor attack, the fighting war between

Japan and the United States remained far

from the shores of Saipan and her sister

islands except, of course, for the Japanese

invasion of Guam. The Marianas during

this period served the Japanese chiefly as

supply and staging bases for troops, ships,

and planes engaged in battle well to the

east and south, and the strength of combat

naval shore units in the area remained low.

The 5th Special Base Force on Saipan

ranged from a low of 919 military troops

and 220 civilians in May 1943 to a total of

1,437 men in February of the following

year. The 54th Naval Guard Force on

Guam had 302 men in September 1942,

and in early 1944 received an additional

425 recruits. In September 1943 the Yoko- 6

 USSBS (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division,

The Reduction of Truk (Washington, 1947), p. 2. 7

 Base Forces and Defense Forces, Early Series,

Vols. 9 and 10, NA 12245 and NA 12229, WDC

106869 and WDC 160867; Special Forces, Early

Series, Vols. 9 and 10, NA 12226 and NA 12255,

WDC 160867 and WDC 161009.
56 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

suka 1st Special Naval Landing Force,

numbering about 1,500 men, arrived on

Saipan, but in the following January was

reduced by about a third when detachments

were sent to the Rabaul area.8

Considering the magnitude of the Empire's troop commitments elsewhere, the

garrison assigned to the Marianas can be

considered no more than a token force.9

This is not at all surprising. The Marianas

were a rear area. Simple military logic dictated that the Japanese concentrate their

efforts in the Rabaul-New Guinea area to

the south and build up the defenses of the

Gilberts and Marshalls to the east. There

was not enough money, manpower, or matériel to build strong fortifications and defenses on every one of Japan's myriad

island possessions, and those farther away

from the direct line of American advance

had to suffer neglect. Not until the Marshall Islands finally fell to the Americans

did the position of the Marianas become

dangerous enough to justify urgent measures in their defense.

Reinforcement of the Marianas

By February 1944 the Marianas garrisons could predict that their time had

come. Tarawa and Makin in the Gilberts

had been captured by U.S. forces in

November 1943. Kwajalein Atoll in the

Marshalls fell in early February 1944, and

Eniwetok, less than a thousand nautical

miles from Saipan, in mid-February.10

Also in mid-February, Admiral Mitscher's

Fast Carrier Task Force (Task Force 58)

executed a two-day raid against Truk, thus

opening the way to the complete neutralization of that formidable bastion.11

 Following the Truk raid, Mitscher moved on

to the Marianas and on 22-23 February

administered to those islands their baptism

of fire.12 The rear area had obviously become a forward area.

As the first step in recognition of the

approaching threat to the Marianas, Carolines, and Palaus, the Japanese high command reorganized the command structure

in the Central Pacific. For the first two

years of the war, the 4th Fleet had commanded all Japanese garrisons in the

mandates and was itself directly responsible

to the Combined Fleet. By March of 1944

the 4th Fleet had lost effective control of

its remaining garrisons in the Marshalls

and had been further weakened by Mitscher's February raids on Truk and the

Marianas, On 10 March 1944 a new headquarters was placed between the Combined

Fleet and the 4th Fleet and given control

of all Navy and Army forces in the

mandates and in the Bonin Islands to the

north. This was the Central Pacific Area

Fleet, commanded by Vice Adm. Chuichi

Nagumo, who had led the attack on Pearl

Harbor. Thereafter, 4th Fleet control was

confined to naval garrisons in Truk and the

8

 JICPOA Trans 4071, Monthly Personnel Totals for Units Under the Jurisdiction of the 4th

Fleet, September 1942-July 1943; CINCPACCINCPOA Trans 11601, 5th Special Base Force

(Saipan), Situation Rpt, dated 12 Feb 44;

CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 12060, account of

the civil and military situation on Guam from the

Japanese occupation until February 1944; Tabular Records of Special Landing Forces, NA 11651,

WDC 161406. 9

 For example, in January of 1944 the number

of Japanese Army personnel in the Marshalls, on

Wake, and on Kusaic numbered 13,721. This does

not include the numerous naval personnel stationed

in the same area whose exact numerical strength

is not known. See Crowl and Love, Gilberts and

Marshalls, p. 210.

10

 Crowl and Love, Gilberts and Marshalls. 11

 Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls,

Ch. XVIII. 12

 See below, p. 71.
THE ENEMY 57

eastern Carolines, though it was theoretically exercised over the lost garrisons in

the Marshalls. Naval garrisons in the

Marianas, Bonins, and western Carolines

(Palau Sector) fell under the direct control of the Central Pacific Area Fleet. Also,

this new headquarters, in theory at least,

commanded all Army forces in the mandates and the Bonins, commanding through

Headquarters, 31st Army, In fact, Army

troops remained practically independent of

the naval command, and to all intents and

purposes 31st Army had exclusive tactical

and administrative control over all Army

personnel in the area. Speaking of the

Central Pacific Area Fleet headquarters, a

Japanese naval commander captured on

Saipan said, "It is a purely administrative

command and has no tactical significance. ... in actual fact it never got

beyond the stage of paper organization."13

Failure to establish clear-cut command

relationships between the Army and Navy

was characteristic of Japanese military organization in the Central Pacific, In the

Marianas, as elsewhere, it had serious consequences. From the very beginning there

was friction between Army and Navy from

the highest headquarters to the lowest

ranks. In early March, about the time the

Central Pacific Area Fleet was officially

placed in over-all command, a furious administrative squabble arose between that

headquarters and the 31st Army, the latter

objecting to being subordinate to the Navy.

The final decision, reached on 15 March,

took the form of a compromise between

the two headquarters. It was agreed that

the command of each separate island was

to rest with the senior Army or Navy officer present. It was also agreed orally between the Commander in Chief, Central

Pacific Area Fleet, and the Commanding

General, 31st Army, that neither would

assume complete responsibility, thus apparently leaving the area without a supreme command.14

The failure to carry out the principle of

a unified command was to prove seriously

detrimental to the efficiency of future

Japanese operations in the Central Pacific.

The resultant confusion was further compounded because of the high degree of

mutual interdependence that necessarily

existed between Army and Navy units. For

example, all of the air strength in the Central Pacific was naval, under command of

the Central Pacific Area Fleet. However,

many of the air installations were serviced

by Army units. Similarly, although the

Army was only partially dependent on the

Navy for surface transport, Army convoys

had to be escorted by Navy ships.15

More significant than the administrative

changes reorganizing the structure of command in the Central Pacific was the rapid

acceleration of troop movements into the

area following the fall of the Marshalls and

the strike against Truk. By May 1944 the

Japanese had five divisions, six independent

brigades, and five independent regiments

in the 31st Army area, supported by innumerable smaller units ranging in size

13

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, G-2 Rpt, p.

98, The organization of the Central Pacific Area

Fleet is shown in Central Pacific Area Fleet Orders, NA 11810, WDC 150941.

14

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 12058, Excerpts

Taken From a Staff Diary of the 31st Army

Headquarters, 25 February-31 March 1944, in

CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans, Vol. 3, pp. 99-148. 15

 Japanese Studios in World War II, 72, History of the Army Section, Imperial General

Headquarters, 1941-1945, pp. 94-95, OCMH;

CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 10145, 31st Army

Staff, table showing passengers and cargo of the

Natsu 2 Convoy, dated 18 Mar 44, in CINCPACCINCPOA Trans, Vol. 3, pp. 79-98.
58 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

from tank and antiaircraft artillery regiments down to independent machine cannon companies. About one third of the

Army personnel in the Central Pacific was

concentrated in the Marianas, including

two divisions, two independent brigades,

and two independent regiments.16 The two

divisions sent to the Marianas were the

29th and the 43d. The 29th was transferred from Manchuria to Saipan in February, later moving to Guam. The 43d,

organized in June 1943, moved from Japan

to Saipan in late May 1944.17

In addition, the Japanese organized sundry independent Army units for service in

the Central Pacific Area. Units of battalion

size and smaller were detached from their

parent divisions and reorganized into eight

expeditionary units, three of which were

sent to the Marianas. The 1st Expeditionary Unit, consisting of four infantry battalions and two artillery battalions, was

allocated to Saipan; the 5th Expeditionary

Unit, of two infantry battalions and one

artillery battalion, was moved to Pagan;

and the 6th Expeditionary Unit, made up

of six infantry battalions and two artillery

battalions, was sent to Guam.18

In May, after most of the expeditionary

units had reached their destinations, Army

Section, Imperial General Headquarters,

ordered a reorganization of the expeditionary units into independent mixed brigades

and independent mixed regiments. In the

Marianas the 1st Expeditionary Unit (Saipan) became the 47th Independent Mixed

Brigade, the 5th Expeditionary Unit (Pagan) became the 9th Independent Mixed

Regiment, and the 6th Expeditionary Unit

(Guam) was divided into the 48th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 10th Independent Mixed Regiment.19

The Navy, too, began to increase its

strength in the Marianas shortly after the

fall of the Marshalls. The 55th and 65th

Naval Guard Forces were established on

Saipan and Tinian, respectively, and several antiaircraft artillery units were also

dispatched to the area. A large variety of

small administrative offices were established

to handle the greatly increased volume of

supplies and troop movements, and labor

units for construction work and loading

and unloading ships were added to the garrisons. Finally, air strength was poured into

the Marianas during the period as local

airfields were developed and war came

closer, so that many naval airmen and

maintenance men swelled the number of

naval air personnel in the islands.

This accelerated movement of troops into

the Marianas was not allowed to go uncontested by the ever-advancing American

forces. From the very beginning of the Japanese attempt to reinforce the islands,

submarines of the U.S. Pacific Fleet began

to take their toll. American submariners

played an important role in the capture of

the Marianas; in fact it can be said that

the American campaign actually began in

February with the first submarine attacks

on Japanese troop convoys bound for

Saipan.

The first of the major Japanese troop

movements involved the transfer of the

29th Division, which left Ujina, Japan, 16

 Japanese Studies in World War II, 55, Operations in the Central Pacific, pp. 17-19, 36-38,

OCMH. 17

 MID WD, Order of Battle of the Japanese

Armed Forces, 1 March 1945, pp. 99-100; Japanese Studies in World War II, 72, pp. 92-93. 18

 Japanese Studies in World War II, 55, p. 17.

19

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 16035, chart indicating change in organization of old units

(undated), rev. trans by Hq NTLF in the field, 23

Jul 44.
THE ENEMY 59

on 26 February aboard three troop transports. Late in the afternoon of the 29th

the convoy was attacked by American submarines. One transport (Sakito Maru),

laden with 3,080 troops was torpedoed and

sunk. Only 1,688 were rescued. The survivors (members of the 18th Infantry Regiment ) landed on Saipan with almost no

equipment. According to one report, "All

their weapons were lost except seven rifles,

one grenade thrower, two light machine

guns and 150 bayonets."20

The next large convoy to sail for the

Marianas left Yokohama on 12 March and

carried the 1st, 5th, and 6th Expeditionary

Units. The convoy was attacked by American submarines and, although no Army

troops were lost, a naval transport (Kokuyo Maru) carrying 1,029 reinforcements

for the 54th Naval Guard Force on Guam

was torpedoed and sunk.21

In April two more convoys left Japan

for the Marianas, and although the first

was attacked by submarines and two of its

ships sunk, all troops were rescued and put

ashore safely on Saipan.22 The last two

convoys to reach the Marianas, however,

arrived with the units seriously depleted

and without their equipment. The first of

these departed Yokohama on 5 May and

reached Saipan on the 14th. None of the

troops carried aboard were originally intended for the Marianas, but when two of

the transports were torpedoed the survivors

were landed on Saipan. Fifteen hundred

of these, members of the 9th Expeditionary

Unit bound for Yap, remained on Saipan

until the American invasion. About six

hundred were reorganized as a battalion of

the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade, but

the rest remained on Saipan as ill-equipped

stragglers. Other survivors of the same illfated convoy belonged to the 15th Infantry

Regiment, destined for the Palaus. They

formed another straggler group on Saipan,

where the American invasion caught

them still awaiting transportation to the

Palaus.23

The last major troop movement to the

Marianas, and certainly one of the most

significant, was the transfer of the 43d Division from Japan to Saipan. Arriving only

a few weeks before the American invasion,

the division was to play a leading role in

the defense of the island, and its commander, Lt. Gen. Yoshitsugu Saito, would

assume effective control of the Saipan

defenses. For transportation purposes the

division was divided into two echelons, the

first of which made its way safely through

to Saipan sometime in May. The second

was not so fortunate. On 30 May a convoy

of seven transports carrying more than

7,000 troops of the 43d Division sailed

from Tateyama and headed south. It was

subjected to almost continous submarine

attack, and within three days five of the

seven transports were sunk. The two remaining vessels picked up the survivors and

20

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 12058. 21

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Trans 10145, pp. 79-

98; CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 12058, pp. 34-

36; CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 9767, Situation

Rpt, 4th Special Shipping Engineer Company

(Saipan), dated Apr 44. 22

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 10931, a file of

orders and tables showing troop movements and

locations of units in the Central Pacific Area. The

Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee, Japanese

Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During

World War II By All Causes (Washington, 1947)

(hereafter cited as JANAC, Japanese Shipping

Losses).

2 3

 CINCPAC-CINCPO A Trans 10931;

CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 9485, Army Section

Order 982 (1 Apr 44); CINCPAC-CINCPOA

Trans 10959, Extracts From an Account of the

Sinking of the Hiyori Maru; CINCPACCINCPOA Trans 9883, File of Shipping Orders,

Shipping Operation Order 283 (7 Apr 44).
60 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

steamed the rest of the way to Saipan.24

About 80 percent of the troops of this

convoy were saved and landed on Saipan,

but they arrived as hapless survivors without weapons or equipment. The 118th Infantry Regiment lost about 850 men, and

the survivors had virtually no resemblance

to the organized fighting team that had

left Japan. So little time was left before

the American invasion that the regiment

could not be reorganized and re-equipped

sufficiently to raise its combat efficiency

much above nil.25

All together, from January to early

June 1944, the Japanese dispatched about

45,000 Army troops to the Marianas. Of

these about 40,000 were allotted to Saipan,

Guam, and Tinian; the remainder to Pagan

and Rota. At least 12,000 of these troops

were aboard torpedoed vessels, and about

3,600 died as a result of the sinkings. While

many of the survivors were successfully reorganized, rehabilitated, and re-equipped,

about half, perhaps four or five thousand,

became stragglers on Saipan, equipped and

armed only with their resolution to die for

the Emperor. Thus, well before the initial

American strikes against Saipan from surface ships and aircraft, U.S. submarines

had seriously disrupted Japan's major effort to reinforce the Marianas against the

imminent threat of invasion.

Military Construction in 1944

Along with their hasty and not altogether successful effort to enlarge the

garrisons of the Marianas, the Japanese

in early 1944 undertook an ambitious

program of building up the islands' fortifications and defenses. First priority was assigned to airfield construction. At the beginning of the war Saipan had an airfield

(Aslito) and a seaplane base and Tinian

had an airfield. All three appear to have

been operational. The situation remained

unchanged as late as mid-1943, when the

Imperial Navy commenced a new program

of airfield construction in the Marianas

and Carolines, planning to increase the operational airfields from one to two on Saipan and from one to three on Tinian. In

addition, the program called for two new

fields on Guam, and one each on Pagan

and Rota, where none had existed before.

By February 1944 Aslito airfield was being

enlarged, and two more fields on Saipan

were under construction. The Saipan seaplane base, constructed in 1935, was in full

operation. On Tinian, the Ushi Point field

was in operation, and another field was

under construction. On Guam, Sumay airfield was almost completed, and three other

fields and a seaplane base were under way

or in the planning stage.26

In March plans were developed for an

even more rapid build-up of airfield facilities. Combined Fleet and Central Pacific

Area Fleet each issued orders outlining an

ambitious policy of airfield construction.

The Combined Fleet order provided that

three independent complexes of bases were

to be rapidly completed in the MarianasTruk area and in the Palau-Yap area.27

The Central Pacific Area Fleet order de24

 USSBS, Interrogations I, 212; CINCPACCINCPOA Trans 10931, p. 40. 25

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 10931, p. 40.

26

 JICPOA Trans 5577, 11th Air Fleet Secret

Bull 37, data tables for surface craft assigned or

attached to the 11th Air Fleet; Japanese Studies

in World War II, 60, The AGO Operation, 1944,

p. 11, OCMH; CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans

10092, Advance Expeditionary Unit, 13th Division, intelligence record dated 29 February 1944. 27

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 9497, Combined

Fleet Secret Order 20 (19 Mar 44), Construction

of Air Bases in the Central Pacific Area.
THE ENEMY 61

fined construction policy as: "To build

rapidly a large number of bases so as to

make possible the immediate development

of great aerial strength." In the Marianas,

the bases were first to be built on a

rough and ready basis and then gradually

brought to a finished state as conditions

permitted. Each field was to be integrated

into the land defenses; machine gun positions for plane-mounted guns were to be

built near plane shelters, and air force personnel were to be organized for ground

combat.28

These plans were intended to result in

fourteen airfields and two seaplane bases:

Saipan, three airfields and a seaplane base;

Tinian, four airfields; Guam, four airfields

and a seaplane base; Pagan, two airfields;

Rota, one airfield. Each airfield was to be

capable of handling forty-eight planes, except for the Marpi Point field on Saipan,

which would handle twenty-four, and the

Charan Kanoa strip, also on Saipan, which

was for emergency use only. The entire network of bases would be sufficient for six

hundred planes of various types.29

Although the Combined Fleet order specified that normal air facilities were to be

completed by April, the estimate proved

much too optimistic. When the American

landing forces came upon the scene in

June, much of the construction was still

unfinished. On Saipan, Aslito airfield was,

of course, operational, as was the Charan

Kanoa emergency airstrip, but the Marpi

Point field was still unfinished and nonoperational. Guam had two operational

strips and two still unfinished. Tinian, the

air center of the Marianas, had three fields

finished and one to go. Rota and Pagan

each boasted a surfaced runway. All together, of the fourteen fields planned,

nine had been completed and were capable

of handling at the most a total of four

hundred planes rather than the originally

planned six hundred.30

While the Imperial Navy was hurriedly

attempting to build up air strength in the

Marianas, 31st Army was making similar

plans for ground fortifications. The precis

of the 31st Army defense plan gives a general outline of the Army fortification program:

While deploying the troops the defensive

constructions must be strengthened and general preparations for the annihilation of the

enemy landing on the beaches must be completed, including the protection of our air

bases. The field positions must be completed

within one month after the arrival of troops

and within three months the positions must

be strengthened by constructing permanent

fortifications in the most important points.31

The hope that this schedule could reach

completion before the American landings,

if ever seriously held, proved a vain one.

The 43d Division did not arrive on Saipan

until early June, a matter of days before

the invasion. The 7th and 16th Independent Engineer Regiments, which were responsible for most of the "permanent

fortifications," arrived in April, only two

months before the invasion. The job, even

under ideal conditions, would have been

difficult, and conditions were far from

ideal. Troops arrived in a haphazard fashion, often depicted in number and missing 28

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 9498, Central

Pacific Area Force Secret Order 2 (21 Mar 44),

Construction of Air Bases in the Marianas and

Carolines. 29

 Ibid.; CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 9692,

Central Pacific Area Fleet Secret Order 30-8 (20

Apr 44), New Nomenclature for Air Bases.

30

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, G-2 Rpt, App. F, pp.

1-4.

31

 Japanese Studies in World War II, 55, pp.

19-20.
62 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

their arms and equipment. Moreover,

American submarine warfare accounted for

the loss of more than mere manpower. Essential building matériel went to the bottom of the sea along with the men. A

report, dated 31 May, from the chief of

staff of the 31st Army gives a clear survey

of the difficulties facing the Japanese in

their hurried effort to construct adequate

fortifications on Saipan and the other islands in the Marianas:

We cannot strengthen the fortifications appreciably now unless we can get materials

suitable for permanent construction. Specifically, unless the units are supplied with

cement, steel reinforcements for cement,

barbed wire, lumber, etc., which cannot be

obtained in these islands, no matter how

many soldiers there are they can do nothing

in regard to fortifications but sit around with

their arms folded, and the situation is

unbearable.

I would like this matter of supply of construction materials dealt with immediately.32

Japanese Doctrine for Island Defense

The failure on the part of the Japanese

to meet their time schedule in reinforcing

the Marianas' physical defenses had an important effect on the tactical doctrine to

which they adhered throughout the campaign. It was one of the factors that

compelled them to rely more heavily on

beach defenses than would logically have

been called for by the size and physiographic features of these particular islands.

In the Gilberts and Marshalls, Japanese

defensive doctrine stressed defense at the

beaches. At Tarawa, Makin, Kwajalein,

and Eniwetok the fortifications were concentrated on a thin line along the shores

with little defense in depth.33 By concentrating the majority of their positions on

the beaches proper, and with the aid of

fringing coral reefs and offshore obstacles,

the Japanese hoped to annihilate the Americans before they could gain a foothold

ashore. If the U.S. troops did succeed in

establishing a beachhead, doctrine called

for a counterattack to push them back into

the sea.

This doctrine of island defense was based

to a great extent on purely geographical

and terrain considerations. The Gilberts

and Marshalls are composed of widely scattered coral atolls, each in turn composed

of many small islets. Although the Japanese

usually selected the larger of the islets for

their bases, these still had very little area

and were generally elongated in shape. Defense in depth was impractical not only

because there was little depth to defend

but also because what little there was usually contained an airstrip that had to be

left free of obstacles if it was to land and

dispatch planes. Moreover, the flat terrain

of the atolls provided no natural features

such as hills and caves that could be exploited to set up an adequate defense in

depth.

The Marianas are much different. They

are volcanic islands, not coral atolls. They

are generally much larger in size, have considerable elevation, and the terrain is rugged and mountainous, providing favorable

opportunities for defense in depth. Yet, in

spite of this the Japanese continued to

place great emphasis on defending the

shore lines of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam 32

 Report on the Defenses of the Various Islands, from CofS 31st Army to CofS Central Pacific Area Fleet, Trans 116 of Japanese Document

by Hq NTLF, 11 Jul 44, copy in archives of Hist.

Br G-3, Hq U.S. Marine Corps.

33

 See Crowl and Love, Gilberts and Marshalls,

Chs. IV, XIII.
THE ENEMY 63

to the consequent neglect of fortifications

and gun positions in the interior.

The continued reliance on beach defenses is illustrated in the defense plan for

Saipan drawn up by the 1st Expeditionary

Unit:

Tactical Command Doctrine

A. Objective

It is expected that the enemy will be de- stroyed on the beaches through a policy of

tactical command based on aggressiveness,

determination, and initiative. . . .

When the enemy elements are attempting

to land: The main fire-power will be directed

at the enemy landing forces prior to their

arrival on the beach. Taking advantage of

the confusion, the enemy will be rapidly destroyed by counter attacks, mounted from all

sectors wherever the opportunity presents

itself.

Should the enemy succeed in gaining a

foothold on the beach, intense fire will be

concentrated and determined counter-attacks

launched with the aid of reserves and tanks.

Although the advantages of surprise will be

lost, the enemy landing forces can be dealt

with by further attacks after night fall.34

Later in the war and under conditions

similar to those obtaining in the Marianas,

the Japanese abandoned or modified their

earlier doctrine and concentrated heavily

on defenses in depth. When the U.S. Marines landed on Iwo Jima, they found a

well-prepared network of defenses in depth

as well as fortifications commanding the

shore line.35 At Okinawa the landing

beaches on the west coast were left practically undefended, and the main Japanese

forces had retired before the invasion to the

southern part of the island, where they

holed in along the Shuri line with its elaborate system of caves and underground

installations.36

Why, then, did the Japanese as late as

June 1944 cling to the older concept, which

though valid enough for atoll warfare was

clearly not so suitable for the type of fighting that would inevitably develop in the

mountainous terrain of the Marianas? The

failure to adjust tactical doctrine to changing conditions of terrain can probably be

attributed in part to the highly aggressive

spirit of the Japanese military mind. Generally, the Japanese preferred to sally forth

sword in hand against the enemy rather

than bide their time in prepared positions.

As noted in the U.S. Army handbook on

the subject of Japanese tactics:

No matter what the situation, a Japanese

commander's first reaction to it is to act aggressively to maintain the traditions of his

army. . . . Even when the Japanese commander assumes the defensive, he will, so far

as possible, carry out that defense by using

the most aggressive tactics that the situation

permits.37

In the case of the Marianas, there was an

even more compelling consideration that

forced the Japanese to rely most heavily on

their beach defenses. There was simply not

enough time to complete the fortification

program. The 31st Army program for defense had made provision for falling back

upon prepared "strategic inland positions"

34

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 8946, 1st Expeditionary Unit Defense Plan for Saipan Island,

dated 10 May 44. 35

 Isely and Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, Ch. X.; Lt. Col. Whitman S.

Bartley, USMC, Iwo Jima: Amphibious Epic,

Historical Branch, (G-3 Division, Headquarters

U.S. Marine Corps (Washington, 1954), pp. 5-18.

36

 Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell

A. Gugeler, and John Stevens, Okinawa: The Last

Battle, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1948). 37

 TM-E 30-480, Handbook on Japanese Military Forces, Ch. VII, Japanese Tactics, 1 Jun

45, p. 2.
64 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

in the event that an enemy landing force

was not thrust back into the sea. That plan

reads, in part:

First priority in construction will be given

to improvised positions designed to frustrate

enemy landings on the beaches . . . and to

temporary protective measures designed to

minimize our losses in personnel and materials. Later, these constructions will be rapidly

supplemented and strengthened by extending

the positions in depth, converting actually

the island into an invulnerable fortress.38

The speed-up of the U.S. invasion plans,

coupled with the loss of valuable building

materials to the U.S. submarines, made the

fulfillment of the second part of this plan

impossible.

In line with the doctrine of defense at

the beaches, the 31st Army planned to

cover all segments of the shore line "where

the enemy could land without difficulty"

with independent strongpoints several hundred meters or one kilometer apart. Each

strongpoint would be manned by an infantry company or a heavy weapons platoon. Patterns of fire were to be arranged

so that each strongpoint could provide

flanking fire on its neighbors' fronts, and

areas not otherwise provided for were to

be covered by machine guns and mortars.39

 In this manner, whole companies

would be deployed along the beaches.

Behind the coastal positions, at a distance depending on terrain, was to be

constructed a second line that would cover

any partial collapse of the coastal positions

and serve as a starting point for counterattacks by reserve units. The second line

was to be organized on the same principle

as the coastal positions. The 31st Army

plan emphasized the construction of dummy positions between strongpoints and between the coastal positions and the second

line. These positions were to deceive the

enemy and divert his fire. They were to be

especially thick on those stretches of the

shore line where enemy landings were less

likely because of natural obstacles, and

where only small forces or lookouts might

be stationed.

Since the artillery was to fire antiboat

missions, many pieces were to be emplaced

in the coastal positions and the second

lines, as well as farther to the rear. Antiaircraft artillery was to be located in positions where it could lend support to

ground actions as well as fulfill its primary

function. Finally, the plan made rather

vague provision for final strongpoints to

the rear of the second lines, providing that

"if time allows the rear positions . . .

must be strongly built and also completely

equipped for the counter-attack."40 Actually, time did not allow the Japanese to

provide for such positions.

Enemy Troop Strength and

Dispositions on Saipan

Command of all Army troops in the

Marianas rested with the 31st Army under

Lt. Gen. Hideyoshi Obata, who had headquarters on Saipan.41

 When the American

forces landed on 15 June, Obata was in

the Palau Islands and consequently exercised no tactical command during the

campaign. His headquarters on Saipan,

consisting of about 1,100 officers and men,

was largely administrative in function and

had little tactical significance. The largest

single Army unit on the island at the time

38

 Japanese Studies in World War II, 55, p. 25. 39

 Ibid., pp. 26-32.

40

 Ibid., p. 29. 41

 See below, App. C, Japanese Order of Battle

on Saipan.
THE ENEMY 65

of the landing was the 43d Division, commanded by General Saito. It was Saito who

actually exercised tactical command until

his death a few days before the close of the

battle. The division consisted of three infantry regiments, the 118th, 135th, and

136th, plus a signal company, a transport

company, an ordnance company, a field

hospital, and an "intendance duty unit"

responsible for quartermaster and finance

functions. All together, the division numbered about 12,939 officers and men.42

Next in size among Army units was the

47th Independent Mixed Brigade, commanded by Col. Yoshiro Oka. The brigade

had four organic battalions, but one, the

315th, was on Pagan. The three others,

the 316th, 317th, and 318th Independent

Infantry Battalions, were on Saipan. An

engineer unit and an artillery unit, the latter consisting of one battery of eight field

guns and two batteries of seven howitzers

each, also belonged to the brigade. Total

strength of the brigade on Saipan at the

time of the landing was about 2,600.

To this nucleus was attached a host of

smaller units including many that had originally been destined for other islands but

had been stranded on Saipan as a result

of shipping damage inflicted by American

submarines. The most important of these

were the 3d Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment consisting of two battalions,

each with twelve 75-mm. mountain guns;

the 16th Shipping Engineers Regiment; the

7th Independent Engineer Regiment; the

9th Tank Regiment with thirty-six medium arid twelve light tanks; and the

25th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment. Total

strength of Japanese Army troops on Saipan on the eve of the American invasion

was about 25,469.

To this number must be added about

6,160 naval personnel. Among the naval

units present on the island were the Headquarters, Central Pacific Area Fleet, under

Admiral Nagumo and the Headquarters,

5th Base Force, under Rear Adm. Takahisa

Tsujimura. The latter unit had been in

command of the Marianas since before

Pearl Harbor, but with the arrival of Army

troops in 1944 it assumed a less important

role in the defense of Saipan, though it

continued to command naval shore forces

and surface units within the Marianas. The

largest single element of the naval forces

was the 55th Naval Guard Force, about

2,000 officers and men, which was chiefly

responsible for manning coast defense guns.

The only other large naval unit was the

Yokosuka 1st Special Naval Landing Force,

consisting mainly of a headquarters, three

rifle companies, a machine gun platoon,

and a gun section.

For purposes of ground defense, Saipan

was divided into four parts. (Map 3) The

first was the Northern Sector, that portion

of the island north of a line beginning at

Flores Point on the west coast and extending to the east coast in a southeasterly direction. The most important troop unit

located here was the 135th Infantry Regiment, less one battalion.

The second division was the Navy Sector, which was bounded on the north by

the Northern Sector, on the west by the

shore line from Flores Point to a point just

below Garapan, thence on the south by a

line to a point just southwest of Mount

Tapotchau's summit, and on the east by

a line from this point up the axis of the

island to the center of the Northern Sector's

boundary. The 5th Base Force controlled

42

 Sources for this data on the Japanese Order

of Battle are given in Appendix C.

THE ENEMY 67

the Navy Sector, but the beach defenses

were actually manned by a battalion of the

136th Infantry Regiment.

The Central Sector lay directly south of

the Navy Sector. Its shore line extended

from a point below Garapan to Afetna

Point. Inland, to the east, it was bounded

by an extension of the Navy Sector's boundary down the central axis of the island to

a point directly east of Afetna Point. Here

the boundary turned west to Afetna, enclosing the sector from the south. Responsibility for the defense of the Central Sector

rested with the commanding officer of the

136th Infantry Regiment. His regiment

was reduced to the 2d Battalion reinforced by one company of the 3d, since the

1st Battalion was assigned to the Navy

Sector and the remaining two companies of

the 3d Battalion were in 43d Division

reserve.

The fourth defense area was the Southern Sector, whose shore line extended

along the west coast from Afetna Point,

around the entire south coast, and up the

east coast beyond Kagman Peninsula to

the boundary line of the Northern Sector.

This sector, commanded by the commanding officer of the 47th Independent Mixed

Brigade, encompassed about half of the island, and probably contained the same

proportion of the island's troops. Here were

concentrated all the reserve troops as well

as the forty-eight tanks, the main artillery

batteries, and the antiaircraft units clustered around Aslito airfield.43

Within each of these sectors, the disposition of troops was generally in accordance

with the doctrine of concentrating on defeating the enemy at the shore line. For

example, a 136th Infantry Regiment operations order dated 25 May makes the following disposition of the regiment's forces

in the Central Sector, which included most

of the shore line upon which the 2d Marine

Division was to make its landing:44

Front Line (Beaches)

4th Company

5th Company

6th Company (less 1/3)

8th Company (less 1/3)

2d Infantry Gun Company

Sector Reserves

1/3 6th Company

1/3 8th Company

The commitment to beach defense of such

a large portion of troops of the 136th Regiment with the consequent neglect of reserve

power was entirely consistent with prevailing Japanese tactical doctrine.

Reserves for the island were located in

the area just north of Magicienne Bay and

included two companies of the 3d Battalion, 136th Infantry Regiment, with two

companies of the 3d Battalion, 9th Independent Mixed Brigade, attached. The

16th Shipping Engineers Regiment (less

detachments) and the main body of the

43

 Map, Sectors for Units Defending Saipan, reproduced from overlay attached to captured

Japanese Northern Marianas Group Operations

Order A-4, reproduced in NTLF Rpt Marianas,

Phase I, G-2 Rpt, pp. 8-9; 136th Infantry Regiment Operation Order 12, 0800, 25 May, copy in

Field Diary, 2d Artillery Battery, 136th Infantry

Regiment, 1-31 May 1944 (NA 21961). The diversion of the 1st Battalion, 136th Regiment, to

the Navy Sector, a last-minute change that does

not appear in American sources, is indicated by a

136th Infantry Regiment Order, 2000, 29 May 44,

signed by the regimental commander, Col. Yukimatsu Ogawa, and found in Field Diary, 1st

Infantr y Gun Company, 136th Infantry Regiment,

1-31 May 1944, entry for 29 May (NA 22386). 44

 136th Infantry Regiment Operation Order 7,

1300, 25 May 44, Field Diary, 2d Artillery Battery,

136th Infantry Regiment, 1-31 May 44 (NA

21961).
68 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

9th Tank Regiment were also in this area.

In case of landings in the GarapanTanapag sector, the tanks were to assemble

in the mountains two miles east of Garapan

and there prepare to counterattack. If

landings took place in the Magicienne Bay

or Charan Kanoa area, the tanks were to

assemble about one-half mile north of Aslito

airfield's west end and prepare for operations against either area, or both.45

Most of the Army mobile artillery, organized as the 3d Independent Mountain

Artillery Regiment and the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade Artillery Unit, was

located along the ridge overlooking the

Charan Kanoa beaches to the north and

south of Mount Fina Susu. From these

positions the guns were to fire missions on

the east and west coasts. Japanese artillery

preparations on Saipan were careful and

elaborate, preliminary sightings having

been made on important points such as

breaks in the reefs. However, these preliminary sightings seem to have been conducted independently by separate pieces of

batteries, and no common survey control

was established. As a result, the Japanese

were unable to mass fires by tying in batteries or battalions, and the Japanese

artillery dissipated itself in local un-coordinated missions.46

 Another defect in

Japanese artillery on Saipan arose from the

lack of prime movers. All of the field artillery was mobile, but there were neither

horses nor trucks on the island and the

pieces therefore had to be moved by hand,

if at all.

In addition to the Army's mobile artillery, Saipan could boast an elaborate

system of naval coast defense and dualpurpose batteries. The Japanese Navy's

scheme of artillery fire was intended to

cover almost every square inch of both Saipan and neighboring Tinian, large sweeps

of the adjacent sea, and nearly all of the

air overhead. According to the Navy's plan,

coast defense guns (12, 14, and 15-cm's.)

were to be lined up along the west coast

of Saipan from Agingan Point to Tanapag

in a series of seven batteries covering the

entire approach from the west with interlocking sectors of fire. A second concentration of Navy coast defense guns, in five

batteries, was to be emplaced on Nafutan

Point and the shores of Magicienne Bay,

covering the sea approaches to Saipan from

the south and southeast. A battery of 4-

cm. guns on Marpi Point emplaced to fire

to the north would complete the picture.

Two batteries of 12-cm. dual-purpose guns

were to cover the Aslito airfield; two more

of the same size were to cover the center of

island; an 8-cm. battery, the Tanapag

area; and a battery of 12-cm's., Marpi

Point.47 Not all of these emplacements were

completed at the time of the American

landings, but most of the Navy's coast and

aerial defense program was in working order by mid-June of 1944.

Army antiaircraft batteries on Saipan

were spread from Mutcho Point to Aslito

airfield, mostly along the ridges and hills

overlooking the west beaches. The air over

the entire southern portion of the island

was covered by the guns of the 25th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment's 1st, 2d, and

6th Batteries, The central portion of Saipan was covered by the 43d Independent

45

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, G-2 Rpt, pp.

8, 76. 46

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 9604, Battle

Plan of Artillery Unit of the 1st Expeditionary

Unit.

47

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 12252, Disposition of Navy Dual-Purpose and Coastal Defense

Batteries on Saipan and Tinian, dated 15 May 44.

Reprinted in CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans, Vol. 8,

P. 9.
THE ENEMY 69

Antiaircraft Company and the 45th Field

Machine Cannon Company.48 In general,

however, a shortage of ammunition handicapped the antiaircraft artillery. Maximum

allowance for antiaircraft weapons on Saipan was three units of fire, but in fact the

25th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment and

its two attached companies probably did

not have as much as one unit of fire (4,800

rounds) on hand. Antiaircraft ammunition

was in short supply not only in the Marianas but in all other 31st Army areas as

well.49

Japanese Expectations

Immediately after the February strike

against Truk by Marc Mitscher's fast

carrier task force, the Japanese reached a

state of near panic in their apprehensions

of an imminent American attack against

the Marianas. Preparations for moving the

31st Army headquarters to the Marianas

had already begun when U.S. forces

seized the Marshalls and Eniwetok, and the

headquarters staff was scheduled to leave

Tokyo for Saipan when Mitscher's followup strike on the Marianas took the Japanese by surprise. This strike occurred on

22-23 February, and on the following day

General Tojo himself suddenly ordered the

staff to depart at once. On 3 March 31st

Army issued an emergency plan for the defense of the archipelago, which at that time

was virtually defenseless. On 4 March civil

government was abolished on Guam, and

shortly afterward martial law was established throughout the islands. In early

March the Japanese actually feared an

invasion of the Marianas by the end of the

month, as indicated by the following excerpt from the 31st Army staff diary: "The

central command was very much concerned over the enemy attacks. After the

enemy striking force hit the Marianas Sector on the 22d and 23d of February,

thereby revealing our lack of defenses, they

were afraid of an enemy invasion in

March."

 50

 The sinking of Sakito Maru,

which was carrying the 18th Infantry Regiment to Saipan, only increased the alarm.

For a while 31st Army headquarters

planned to divert the 8th Expeditionary

Unit, bound for Truk, to the Marianas,

but this plan was not carried through. By

late March the apprehension over an immediate invasion had somewhat abated,

and Army troops were being used to build

airfields.51

Then at the end of March Mitscher

raided the Palaus, and on 22 April MacArthur captured Hollandia in Netherlands

New Guinea. The Japanese pulse once

again beat faster. The Japanese Navy and

Army high command differed somewhat in

their estimates of the situation. The raid

on the Palaus, the capture of Hollandia,

and, finally, the operations around Biak in

May led the naval high command to anticipate that the next American attack would

come in the Palaus or Carolines rather than

as far north as the Marianas.52 On 3 May

Admiral Soeumu Toyoda assumed command of the Combined Fleet and received

a directive from Imperial GHQ outlining 48

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 12251, order for

change in location of Army antiaircraft batteries

on Saipan, dated 10 May 44. 49

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 9698, 31st Army

table showing immediate supply of ammunition

necessary for antiaircraft guns and antiaircraft

machine cannon.

50

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 12058, Excerpts

Taken From a Staff Diary of the 31st Army Headquarters, 25 February-31 March 1944, p. 32. 51

 Ibid., pp. 5, 14-17, 32, 45. 52

 USSBS, Campaigns, pp. 3-9, 204-15.
70 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

the A Operation (also known as the A-GO

Operation), which called for the surface

striking force and land-based air units to

be prepared for a decisive engagement with

the U.S. fleet by the end of May, presumably in the Palau-Carolines area.

Army officers in Imperial GHQ at the

same time seem to have taken more seriously the possibility of an early invasion of the

Marianas. On the assumption that the main

objective would be the Philippines, they

concluded that the Americans might advance along the north coast of New Guinea

or into the Carolines and Marianas. It was

also estimated that "there is a great possibility that both of the operations will be

commenced simultaneously."

 53

Whatever may have been their belief in

regard to an ultimate invasion of the Marianas, it is clear that the Japanese did not

expect a full-scale attack against Saipan

by mid-June. As late as 8 June, 31st Army

headquarters issued an order for the transfer of troops from Saipan to other islands

in the archipelago, which, had it been carried out, would have reduced the Saipan

garrison by 2,500 men.54 An even more

striking indication that the Japanese were

caught off guard by the rapidity of the

American approach comes from an order

issued by Admiral Nagumo on 14 June,

the day before the first American troops

hit the beaches on Saipan, that reads, in

part, "It is a certainty that he [the

enemy] will land in the Marianas Group

either this month or next."55

The conclusion, then, is inescapable that

the Japanese were simply not prepared for

the American landings on Saipan when

they came. In the short time intervening

between the American capture of the Marshalls and the invasion of Saipan, the

Japanese found it physically impossible

with the means at hand to build up the

defenses of the Marianas to a point where

they might successfully resist a landing by

U.S. forces. In their race against time the

Japanese were further handicapped by the

deadly efficiency of American submarines,

which by now had extended the radius of

their operations well to the west of the

Marianas perimeter. Finally, U.S. forces

achieved a measure of surprise by attacking

Saipan before they were expected, thus

adding the element of shock to the already

preponderant strength they were able to

bring to bear against this vital point in

Japan's inner defensive perimeter.

Prepared or not, the Japanese forces on

Saipan were by no means feeble. The more

than 30,000 troops on the island were

backed by forty-eight tanks and an elaborate, if incomplete, network of artillery

positions and reinforced by their determination to die if necessary for the Emperor.

They could be expected to put up a fierce

battle. 53

 Japanese Studies in World War II, 72, p. 123. 54

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 9645, 31st Army

Operation Order 369-72 (Jun 44, Saipan).

55

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, G-2 Rpt, 12

Aug 44, p. 5.
CHAPTER V

Invasion

Softening the Target:

Pre-D-Day Bombardment

On 6 June, while the convoys carrying

the attack troops headed westward for

their staging bases in the Marshalls, Marc

Mitscher's Task Force 58 weighed anchor

and slipped out of Majuro for waters east

of the Marianas. For this operation Admiral

Mitscher had gathered together a total of

seven carriers, eight light carriers, seven

fast battleships, three heavy cruisers, ten

light cruisers, and fifty-two destroyers.1

Their missions were to prevent Japanese

aircraft from interfering with the capture

of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam; to protect

the expeditionary force and the troops

ashore from attack by enemy surface vessels; and, commencing on D minus 3 (12

June), to destroy aircraft and air facilities

in the Marianas. Finally, on 13 June when

it was presumed that Japanese aircraft operating from fields in the Marianas would

be eliminated, Task Force 58 was directed

to destroy all other types of Japanese defenses both by aerial bombardment and by

ships' fire from its supporting vessels.2

This was to be the culmination of an

accelerated program of aerial neutralization

of the Marianas. Mitscher's fast carriers

had raided the islands on 22-23 February,

and a few bombs had been dropped in

April on both Saipan and Guam by B-24's

of the Seventh Air Force escorting Navy

photographic planes over those islands.3

For almost three months Army heavy

bombers and Navy and Marine Corps

fighters and dive bombers had steadily

pounded Truk, the western Carolines, the

Palaus, and Marcus and Wake Islands.

After the destructive carrier strike against

Truk on 17 February, primary responsibility for neutralizing that base as well as sister islands in the Carolines fell to planes of

the Seventh Air Force, stationed in the

Marshalls, and the Thirteenth Air Force,

based at Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville Island, and later (early May) in the

Admiralties. The neutralization plan had

called for almost daily attacks, since Japanese runways could otherwise have been

quickly repaired to accommodate replacement planes flown down through the chain

of mandated islands. As the target day for

Saipan approached, B-24 raids against

Truk were stepped up sharply and other

possible danger points in the Carolines

were hit proportionately.4 Meanwhile, late

in May Mitscher's Task Group 58.6 had

conducted a successful raid on Marcus and

Wake Islands to eliminate the possibility of

1

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA—Jun 44,

Annex A, p. 28. 2

 Ibid., p. 22.

3

 See Craven and Cate, AAF IV, pp. 684-87. 4

 Ibid., pp. 677-88.
72 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

intervention from that direction in the

forthcoming Marianas operation.5 Thus,

with all possible routes of enemy aerial interception from the south, east, and northeast successfully interdicted, Task Force 58

was assured a relatively free hand to deal

with Japanese airpower based on the Marianas themselves.

The original plan for the preinvasion

bombing of the Marianas called for the first

Task Force 58 carrier strike to be launched

at dawn of 12 June, three days before the

scheduled landing. Because of unexpectedly good weather conditions en route, the

escorting destroyers were fueled more

rapidly than had been anticipated, and the

entire force arrived at points within fighter

range of its targets earlier than planned.

This bit of good fortune induced Admiral

Mitscher to request permission to launch

his first fighter sweep on the afternoon of

11 June rather than wait until the following morning. His main reason was that all

previous carrier attacks by Task Force 58

had been launched at dawn and that an

alteration in the pattern would surprise

the enemy and be that much more effective. Admiral Spruance approved, and at

1300 on the 11th the first planes took off

from the carriers, which at that time were

approximately 192 miles northeast of

Guam and 225 miles southeast of Saipan

and Tinian, The results were altogether

gratifying. Of the 225 planes launched in

this initial fighter sweep, only twelve were

lost. By contrast, the enemy suffered heavily. Estimates as to Japanese aircraft put

out of operation either through destruction

or serious damage ran from 147 to 215. 6

Ashore on Saipan a Japanese soldier,

member of the 9th Tank Regiment, wrote

of the strike in his diary:

At a little after 1300, I was awakened by

the air raid alarm and immediately led all

men into the trench. Scores of enemy Grumman fighters began strafing and bombing

Aslito airfield and Garapan. For about two

hours, the enemy planes ran amuck and finally left leisurely amidst the unparallelledly

inaccurate antiaircraft fire. All we could do

was watch helplessly. At night we went, to

extinguish the mountain fires which had been

caused by gun fire. They were finally brought

completely under control.7

In spite of the magnitude of the attack,

the Japanese command on Saipan apparently did not realize on the 11th that this

was the prologue to a full-size invasion. At

1600 on that date 43d Division headquarters ordered the construction of a new road

between the Marpi Point and Aslito airfields. The north-south highway already in

use ran along the west coast adjacent to

the ocean shore, and General Saito felt that

in "the event of a battle occurring at the

shore, there would be a great danger of

the direction of the battle being hindered

by an immediate interruption of communications."8

 The new road was to be

inland from the coast line and follow the

comparatively well-concealed foot of the

mountains. Nothing could illustrate more

graphically the Japanese failure to grasp

5

 Lt. (j.g.) A. O. Van Wyen and Lt. (j.g.) W.

G. Land, Office, DCNO, Naval Air Operations in

the Marianas: 11-20 June 1944, pp. B-10–B-17,

copy in Records and Research Sec, Hist Br G-3,

Hq USMC.

6

 Ibid., pp. D-1–D-4, D-6; Comdr Fifth Fleet

to COMINCH, Initial Rpt on Opn to Capture

the Marianas, 13 Jul 44. 7

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 10238, Extracts

From the Diary of Matsuya Tokuzo, 9th Tank

Regiment. 8

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 9378, 43d Division Operation Orders, pp. 27, 28, 29 (Saipan,

Jun 44).
INVASION 73

the fact that the 11 June bombing was not

merely another hit-and-run strike but the

beginning of an invasion. If it had suspected an immediate invasion, the Army

command on Saipan would not have

diverted to a long-range project when men

and matériel that could and should have

been devoted to emergency fortifications.

Though there was a wide discrepancy

in the estimates of damage inflicted on the

Japanese during the attack of 11 June,

there was no doubt that the enemy's power

of aerial resistance in the Marianas had

been considerably reduced. At no time

thereafter were Japanese land-based aircraft more than a minor nuisance to

American operations. According to Admiral

Nimitz, "Control of the air had been

effected by the original fighter sweep on

11 June."9

For the next three days (12-14 June)

all four of Mitscher's task groups flew

scheduled strikes over Saipan, Tinian,

Guam, Rota, and Pagan with the object

of continuing the destruction of enemy

aircraft, rendering airfields at least temporarily useless, destroying coastal defense

and antiaircraft batteries, and burning

cane fields south of Mutcho Point on Saipan to prepare for forthcoming troop landings. In addition, last-minute photographic

missions were flown over all three of the

larger islands. During this period another

fifty planes were reported destroyed with

an additional sixty-six put out of operation.

The task groups were less successful in

bombing enemy airfields. Few runways on

these or any other outlying bases were surfaced with concrete, macadam, or steel

strip since the comparatively light weight

of Japanese aircraft made such expenditure

of time and material unnecessary, and it

proved almost impossible to render the

earthen airfields permanently unserviceable

by moderate bombing attacks.10

The effectiveness of preliminary aerial

bombardment of coastal defense and antiaircraft artillery is difficult to assess. Pilots

reported direct hits on gun positions on all

three islands, but the accuracy of these

reports could not be precisely measured.

The mere fact that enemy guns remained

silent after a strike was no indication that

they had been destroyed or even seriously

damaged since the Japanese might have

been holding their fire in order to save ammunition or avoid detection. Indeed, one

dive bomber squadron leader after a run

on Tinian admitted, "The odds of a dive

bomber hitting a target the size of a gun

are astronomical even under ideal conditions." He concluded that, on the basis of

photographs and observations, shrapnel

and blast resulting from the bombing

caused the chief damage to enemy installations, knocking out the control posts and

damaging some of the guns.11

On 12 June Admiral Mitscher's carrier

pilots came into an unexpected windfall

in the form of two Japanese convoys trying

to escape the area. One of these, composed

of about twenty vessels and located about

125 miles west of Pagan on a northerly

course, was immediately bombed and

strafed heavily.12 Nine merchant ships,

with a total tonnage of almost 30,000 tons,

along with their escort vessels including

one large torpedo boat, three submarine

chasers, and a converted net tender, were

9

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA—Jun 44, Annex A, p. 30.

10

 Van Wyen and Land, Naval Air Operations

in the Marianas, pp. C-2–C-5. 11

 Ibid., p. C-5. 12

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA—Jun

44, pp. 30-31.
74 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

sunk.13 On the same day, other carrier

planes hit two cargo vessels just off the

northwest coast of Saipan, sinking one and

damaging the other so badly that it had

to be beached. Still another was sunk while

being repaired in Tanapag Harbor.14 On

13 June a convoy fleeing south of the west

coast of Guam was struck by planes of

Rear Adm. Joseph G. Clark's Task Group

58.1. One high-speed transport was definitely sunk and other shipping was reported set on fire.15

Also on 13 June, while the carrier planes

continued their bombing and strafing missions against the islands, the fast battleships

and certain designated destroyers were

detached from escort and screening duties

and assigned the mission of initiating naval

shore bombardment of Saipan and Tinian

and covering mine-sweeping operations.

Seven fast battleships and eleven destroyers

were detached and formed into a separate

bombardment group under command of

Vice Adm. William A. Lee, Jr. From 1040

until about 1725 they pounded the west

coast of Saipan and Tinian. Meanwhile,

ten fast mine sweepers probed the waters

off the west coast of Saipan from distances

of about six to two miles offshore. They

found no moored contact or acoustics

mines and received no fire from the beach.

That night the battleships withdrew, but

five destroyers remained in the area to deliver harassing fire. 1 6

The results of the first day's naval gunfire were doubtful. At the close of the day's

bombardment, headquarters of the 31st

Army reported that although the city

streets in Garapan and Charan Kanoa had

been almost destroyed, personnel losses had

been relatively slight.17 In spite of naval reports of considerable damage done

to shore installations, General Holland

Smith's naval gunfire officers remained

skeptical. In their opinion, the effectiveness

of the firing by these ships of Mitscher's

task force had been limited because of

severe handicaps. With one exception, the

fast battleships had received no continuous

training in shore bombardment as had most

of the old battleships. This type of firing,

which required slow, patient adjustments

on specific targets, was quite different from

that normally experienced in surface engagements and called for specialized training. Also, air spotters off the fast battleships had neither experience nor training

in locating ground targets. Finally, because

none of the ships was allowed to move

closer than 10,000 yards (five nautical

13

 JANAC, Japanese Shipping Losses, pp. 12,

60-61. Naval pilots mistook this torpedo boat, the

Otori, for a destroyer and so reported it. (Van

Wyen and Land, Naval Air Operations in the

Marianas, p. C-27.) The error is understandable

since the Otori, though less than half the size of a

destroyer, resembled it somewhat in silhouette.

Otherwise, American damage claims for this action

erred on the side of modesty. Postwar studies indicated a total of fourteen ships sunk, whereas

the official American Navy claim came only to

ten. Van Wyen and Land, Naval Operations in

the Marianas, p. C-27; JANAC, Japanese Shipping Losses, pp. 12, 60. 14

 JANAC, Japanese Shipping Losses, pp. 60-

61; Japanese Studies in World War II, 97, A-GO

Operations Log, pp. 13-14, OCMH. The Joint

Army-Navy Assessment Committee claimed that

one of these, the Keiyo Maru, was sunk. Japanese

sources examined since the war indicate that it

was only badly damaged and was subsequently

beached on Saipan. 15

 JANAC, Japanese Shipping Losses, p. 12;

Van Wyen and Land, Naval Air Operations in the

Marianas, p. C-13; CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns

in POA—Jun 44, Annex A, p. 31.

16

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA—Jun

44, Annex A, pp. 34-35, and Table XII, App. 1. 17

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item 9983-85, translation of captured Japanese document, SONAE

Staff Msg 1011.
INVASION 75

DESTRUCTION AT CHARAN KANOA

miles) from the shore for fear of mines,

accurate fire against anything but large

buildings and other such obvious targets

was virtually impossible.18

Nevertheless, to the Japanese on the island the bombardment of the 13th, and

especially that of the naval vessels, was a

terrifying experience. One soldier described

it thus:

At 0500 there was a fierce enemy air attack. I have at last come to the place where I

will die. I am pleased to think that I will die

calmly in true samurai style. Naval gunfire

supported this attack which was too terrible

for words. I feel now like a full-fledged warrior. Towards evening the firing died down

but at night naval gunfire continued as

before. About 1700 communications with battalion headquarters were cut off. 1 9

Another eyewitness, a Japanese naval

officer, noted: "The shells began to fall

closer and closer to the airfield. It was

frightful. The workers were all rather depressed."

 20

 The same officer reported that

shortly after the naval shelling started he

ordered his lookouts, his fire-fighting unit,

and his workers to withdraw to caves in

the hills. He himself remained behind with

a junior officer and a "superior petty officer." "On the veranda of the destroyed

18

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl G, Sec. 2, Rpt on

Naval Gunfire Support, p. 10; NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl I, Sec. 3, Naval Gunfire Rpt,

p. 5.

19

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Tram 10051, Extracts

From the Diary of an Unidentified Japanese

Soldier. 20

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Translations and Interrogations, Vol. 29, Trans B-1938, Diary of a

Naval Officer, June-July 1944.
76 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

workers' quarters," he notes, "we who had

stayed behind bolstered our spirits with five

bottles of beer."21

Early on the morning of 14 June, Rear

Adm. Jesse B. Oldendorf arrived off the

coast of Saipan with the two bombardment

groups that would carry the main burden of naval gunfire support both before

and during the seizure of the island. This

force consisted of seven old battleships,

eleven cruisers, twenty-six destroyers, and

a few destroyer transports and fast mine

sweepers.22 The battleships had all been

commissioned between 1915 and 1921.23

Four of them, California, Pennsylvania,

Maryland, and Tennessee, were survivors

of the attack on Pearl Harbor.24 All had

undergone the rigorous training program

for shore bombardment set up by V Amphibious Corps at Kahoolawe Island in the

Hawaiian Islands.

These ships were able to move into closer

range than had the fast battleships in the

previous day's bombardment. Mine sweepers had reported the area to the seaward of

two miles from the shore line free of mines

and were steadily moving in closer to the

reef line. Better results were reported from

this day's activities, and many installations

were believed to have been directly hit, in

spite of the facts that the time allowed for

deliberate pinpoint fire was too short and

that air spotters again revealed their lack

of training in distinguishing important land

targets.

There is evidence that this preinvasion

bombardment was especially effective against prepared gun positions of antiaircraft units, which were for the most part

fixed. Two prisoners of war taken on 29

June reported that their antiaircraft unit,

the 1st Battery, 25th AAA Regiment, had

been annihilated before D Day in the

Magicienne Bay area.25 The Japanese naval

officer quoted above noted in his diary,

"Practically all our antiaircraft gun and

machine gun positions were destroyed by

bombing and shelling on the 13th, 14th,

and 15th."26

In other respects, however, the American

preliminary bombardment was far from

perfect. A Japanese artillery instructor, assigned to Saipan as an observer, managed

to radio the following report on the effects

of the shelling:

Beach positions withstood four days of

bombardment. Those observation posts and

gun emplacements that were protected by

splinter-proof shelters were able to withstand

the bombardment. Dummy positions proved

very effective. During bombardment, both

day and night, movement to alternate positions was very difficult. Communication

lines were cut frequently, and the need for

repairs and messengers was great.27

During this naval bombardment of the

14th, two of the supporting ships were hit

by fire from the shore. The destroyer

Braine, while bombarding Tinian, took a

4.7-inch shell that caused three deaths and

21

 The consumption of five bottles of beer by

three men is not as harmless as it would appear at

first glance. Japanese beer is stronger than the

standard Western brew and normally comes in

bottles holding a little more than a quart. Also,

Japanese are notoriously poor drinkers, with consumption and sobriety levels far below Western

standards. This particular naval officer may have

been an exception, for, as noted below, he resorted

to stronger stuff on D Day. 22

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA—Jun

44, Annex A, Table IV, App. 1. 23

 Jane's Fighting Ships, 1944-45 (New York,

The Macmillan Company, 1947), pp. 438-46. 24

 Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 106-

08, 111-13, 117-19.

25

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, G-2 Rpt, 12

Aug 44, p. 86. 26

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans B-1938. 27

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 15282, Tactical

Lessons Learned on Saipan, by Captain Shimamura, Combined Fleet, Aug 44.
INVASION 77

DUMMY SEARCHLIGHT PLATFORM ON EAST COAST OF SAIPAN. False positions

such as this effectively diverted some air and sea bombardment from genuine defense positions.

numerous injuries. The battleship California was struck by a small caliber artillery shell; one man was killed, nine were

wounded, and the ship's fire control system was damaged.28

Also on the 14th, three naval underwater

demolition teams reconnoitered the landing

beaches of Saipan as well as other parts of

the shore line. Each team consisted of about

sixteen officers and eighty men, all naval

personnel except for one Army and one

Marine liaison officer per team. The men

were dispatched from destroyer transports

in small boats to the edge of the reef

whence they swam close into the shore line

in full daylight under the protection of

ships' fire. No obstacles were reported and

hence no demolition work was necessary.

The teams performed their work under

considerable fire from the beach, but even

so only two men were killed and fifteen

wounded—a low figure considering the inherent danger of the operation and the fact

that promised air support failed to materialize and ships' fire was generally too far

inland to provide much protection.29

One result of the underwater demolition

activities was to alert the Japanese on Sai- 28

 TF 51 Opn Rpt Marianas, Incl A, p. 5; CO

USS California, Rev Rpt of Participation in Saipan Opns, 7 Jul 44, p. 9. 29

 TF 51 Opn Rpt Marianas, Incl G, pp. 2-3.
78 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

JAPANESE TYPE 96 25-MM. MACHINE CANNON. U.S. marines repaired this damaged

twin-mount weapon fitted with speed ring sights and promptly put it to use against

the enemy.

pan as to the probable place and time of

the forthcoming landing. At 0800 a 31st

Army message stated: "The enemy at about

0730 was making reconnaissance of reef

with small boats. It is judged that the enemy will land here." Later in the day

another message from the same headquarters reported:

Since early this morning the enemy small

vessels have been planting markers and

searching for tank passages on the reef. Because as far as one can see there are no transports, the landing will have to be after

tonight or dawn tomorrow. The enemy

bombardment is being carried out on coastal

areas in anticipation of a landing.30

D-Day Bombardment and

Ship-to-Shore Movement

On the night of 14-15 June most of the

support ships retired, leaving a handful to

continue harassing fire along the coast line.

Meanwhile the Western Landing Group,

commanded by Admiral Hill and consisting mostly of transports and LST's carrying the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions, was

slowly approaching the island from the

east. As dark fell the marines could observe

fires burning ashore and the glow of star

30

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 9983-85, 31st

Army Msg File, Msgs 1012, 1015.
INVASION 79

shells fired by the naval ships left in the

area. Shortly after 0500 the gigantic convoy moved into the transport area off the

west coast of Saipan. In the early dawn,

Mount Tapotchau lay silhouetted in the

east. Streaks of fire from the armada of

naval support ships colored the sky and the

shore was blurred in a haze of smoke and

dust. As the light improved, the town of

Charan Kanoa became visible. To the

north lay Garapan, the capital city. In its

harbor, called Tanapag, lay several Japanese ships, beached, half-sunken, and

smoking.

Naval bombardment commenced about

0530. Heavy close support ships were ordered not to approach closer than 1,500

yards from the reef. Destroyers were permitted to move in as far as 1,000 yards.

Two old battleships, two cruisers, and

seven destroyers were assigned the duty of

last-minute preparation of the landing

beaches themselves.31

 At dawn these ships

took station and shortly thereafter the two

battleships commenced main battery fire at

the beach defenses; less than an hour later

the two cruisers opened up with their 12-

inch guns.

In spite of the apparent intensity of this

barrage, the Japanese high command was

not overly impressed—at least not officially.

From 31st Army headquarters came the

report: "They did not carry out large scale

shelling and bombing against the positions

on the landing beach just prior to landing.

When they came to the landing, even

though we received fierce bombing and

shelling, our basic positions were completely sound."

 32

But to other less exalted defenders of the

island, the shelling appeared more formidable. One member of the 9th Tank Regiment observed fairly effective results from

the shelling of the Magicienne Bay area.

A naval supply warehouse was hit,

causing a considerable number of casualties, and a nearby ammunition dump was

set off. "There was no way," he reported,

"of coping with the explosions. We could

do nothing but wait for them to stop."

 33

Somewhere in the same vicinity, the Japanese naval officer mentioned above took

to the bottle again to calm his nerves

against the shock of the shelling, "I quietly

opened the quart I brought along," he

noted in his diary, "and took my first

'shot' from it. There is something undescribable about a shot of liquor during a

bombardment."

 34

At 0545 the word was passed throughout

the American task forces that H Hour, the

moment at which the first troops were supposed to land, would be 0830, as scheduled.

Guns and winches were manned; boats

were lowered into the water from the

transports.

Shortly after 0700 the thirty-four LST's

carrying the Marine assault battalions

moved into position and dropped anchor

about half a mile off the line of departure.

The line, the starting point from which the

assault landing craft would take off, was

located 4,250 yards offshore. Bow doors

swung open; ramps lowered, and hundreds

of amphibian tractors and amphibian tanks

crawled into the water and commenced to

circle. In all, 719 of these craft would be

employed in the operation.

Astern of the assault landing ships lay

twelve other LST's carrying light artillery, 31

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA—Jun

44, Plate XV, App. A. 32

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 9983-85, 31st

Army Msg File, Msg 1027.

33

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 10238. 34

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans B-1938.
80 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

most of which would be landed in

DUKW's. Still further seaward of each

division's beach lay two dock landing

ships embarked with heavier landing craft

(LCM's) that would take ashore the

tanks and heavy artillery as soon as enough

beachhead had been secured by the infantry.35

 About 18,000 yards offshore the

larger troop transports swung at anchor.

Aboard were reserve troops, headquarters

troops, shore party teams, heavy artillery,

trucks, tractors, bulldozers, and sundry

equipment and supplies.

Meanwhile, north of the main transport

area, marines of the 2d Regimental Combat

Team (2d Marine Division) and the 1st

Battalion, 29th Marines, were conducting

a diversionary demonstration off the town

of Garapan. Boats were lowered, troops

embarked, standard waves were formed

and went in as far as 5,000 yards off the

beach. There they circled for ten minutes

without receiving any fire and then returned to their mother ships.

Off the main landing beaches, all ships'

fire ceased at 0700 to allow a thirty-minute

Strike by carrier planes. Fifty fighters, 51

scout bombers, and 54 torpedo bombers

conducted an area bombing attack along

the beaches with the primary aim of demoralizing the enemy rather than knocking

out particular installations. As soon as this

strike lifted, the naval ships assigned to

close support took up the course once

again and continued to hit the beaches

with heavy guns until the first wave of

troops was only 1,000 yards from the

shore line and with 5-inch guns until the

troops had progressed to within 300

yards.36

The line of departure was marked by

four naval patrol craft (PC's), each anchored and flying flags designating the

number and color of the beaches opposite

them. At 0750, H Hour was postponed to

0840 because of a delay in launching the

amphibian tractors. Small control craft escorted the leading waves toward the line

of departure. A few minutes after 0800 the

control craft hoisted their Wave-1 flags

and twenty-four LCI gunboats crossed the

line of departure, firing their automatic

weapons as they went. About five minutes

later wave flags were run down from the

signal yardarms of the anchored patrol

craft and the first wave of amphibian tanks

and tractors crossed the line of departure.

Following waves—three for the northern

beaches and four for the southern—were

spaced at intervals of from two to eight

minutes. The run into the beach would

take a few minutes less than half an hour

at maximum LVT(A) speed of 4.5 knots.

About 1,600 yards from shore the gunboats

on the northern beaches stopped engines

and lay to just short of the reef but kept

up their fire as the first wave passed

through them. On the southern beaches,

where the reef was closer to the shore, the

LCI(G)'s moved in to 400 yards and let

loose salvos of 4.5-inch rockets in a lastminute saturation of the beach. As the leading troops came within 300 yards of the

shore, all naval gunfire ceased except in

the area around Afetna Point, which lay

between the two divisions' beaches. A last35

 LCM—landing craft mechanized—a shallow

draft vessel, fifty feet long, equipped with a bow

ramp and primarily designed to carry a tank or

motor vehicles directly onto the beach.

36

 This account of D-Day preliminary bombardment is taken from the following sources:

CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA—Jun 44,

Annex A, pp. 41-47; TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl

G, Sec. 2, pp. 40-41; 2d Marine Div SAR

FORAGER, Phase I, Sec. V.
INVASION 81

AMPHIBIAN TRACTORS IN LINE ABREAST FORMATION churn toward Saipan's

beaches.

minute strafing attack by seventy-two

carrier-based planes commenced when the

leading waves were 800 yards from the

shore line, continued until the first troops

were within 100 yards of the beaches, then

shifted to 100 yards inland until the first

landings were made.

The formation of the assault waves differed between the two Marine divisions.

North of Afetna Point, the 2d Marine

Division was landing with four battalion

landing teams abreast. From north to south

(left to right) the 6th Marines headed for

Red Beaches 2 and 3; the 8th Marines for

Green Beaches 1 and 2, immediately in

front of the Charan Kanoa airstrip. South

of Afetna Point, the 4th Marine Division

proceeded toward Blue and Yellow Beaches

with the 23d Regimental Combat Team on

the left and the 25th on the right.

(Map 4)

In the 2d Marine Division's zone the

first wave consisted of eight separated lines

of six amphibian tractors, each in lineabreast formation. Between each line of six

LVT's was echeloned one platoon of amphibian tanks (LVT(A) (4)'s) mounting

75-mm. howitzers. The succeeding three

waves consisted of LVT's alone in lineabreast. The amphtracks (LVT's) were

crewed by the Marine's 2d Amphibian

Tractor Battalion and the Army's 715th

Amphibian Tractor Battalion. The amphibian tanks, seventy in number, belonged to

the Marine's 2d Armored Amphibian Battalion.37

The 4th Marine Division's landing plan

differed. The first wave consisted exclusively of sixty-eight amphibian tanks, formed

abreast and manned by the Army's 708th

Amphibian Tank Battalion. Most of these

were old style LVT(A)(1)'s with only a

37-mm. gun on the bow, but sixteen of

them were LVT(A)(4)'s carrying 75-mm.

howitzers. Astern in four successive waves

37

 Army and Marine Corps nomenclature for

these vehicles differed. In the Marine Corps they

were designated "armored amphibians"; in the

Army, "amphibian tanks." The latter usage will be

followed in this volume. LVT's were sometimes

called amtracs or amphtracks.
82 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

MAP 4

came the assault troops boated in amphibian tractors of the Marine 10th Amphibian

Tractor Battalion (less Company A, plus

Company C, 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion) and the Army 773d Amphibian

Tractor Battalion.38
INVASION 83

From the line of departure to the reef

the first waves moved in good order and

met only moderate enemy gunfire. Once

across the reef, however, the picture

changed. All along the line the Japanese

opened up with automatic weapons, antiboat guns, and artillery and mortar barrages against the first wave. These increased in intensity as the second, third,

and fourth waves climbed over the reef.

In the 2d Marine Division's zone, three

amphibian tanks and four tractors were

knocked out of action between the reef

and the beach.39 Surf in the area ran as

high as twelve to fifteen feet, too high for

amphtracks to operate with any great degree of safety. Nevertheless, only two capsized as a result of the swells. About 98

percent of all the tractors got ashore safely.

Once across the reef, the wave formation in the 2d Division area broke down

completely. Because of their superior speed,

many of the tractors commenced to overtake their supporting amphibian tanks and

to compress them from echelon almost into

column formation. Some tractors crossed

in front of the tanks thus masking their

fire.40

Even more serious, the Navy guide boat

led the leading waves off course. This has

been variously attributed to compass error,

a strong drift of current to the northward,

and the fact that extremely heavy fire was

coming at the boats on the right flank from

the area around Afetna Point. Whatever

the reason, the entire right flank of the

leading waves veered to the left, thus causing a northerly shift along the entire line

and considerable crowding in the center.

The 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, which was

scheduled to land on Green Beach 2, went

ashore instead on Green 1, where it became

badly intermixed with the 3d Battalion of

the same regiment. The two assault battalions of the 6th Marines landed about 400

yards north of their assigned beaches, Red

2 and 3.41

The first assault waves of the 8th Marines landed on the Green Beaches at

approximately 0843; the last were being

landed by 0900. On the Red Beaches the

first assault wave landed at 0840, the last

at 0908.

To the south, in the area of the 4th

Marine Division, the ship-to-shore movement was proceeding somewhat more

smoothly. Here, the sixty-eight amphibian

tanks of the Army's 708th Amphibian

Tank Battalion constituted the entire first

wave. All commenced to fire 75-mm. howitzers or 37-mm. guns about 400 yards from

the shore after mounting the reef. From

each beach came answering fire of all types

including mortar, small arms, and artillery.

Japanese artillery markers—small flags on

bamboo sticks that were apparently a part

38

 This account of the organization of the Shipto-Shore movement is derived from the following

sources: TF 51 Opn Rpt Marianas, Incl C, pp.

2-3. COMINCH P-007, Ch. IV, p. 6, Diagrammatic Chart Showing Organization of Boat Waves,

Saipan. NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl E,

G-3 Rpt, pp. 13-14. Ibid., Incl H, LVT Rpt, with the following inclosures: Incl A, Rpt of 2d

Amph Trac Bn, pp. 5-7; Incl B, Rpt of 5th Amph

Trac Bn, pp. 2-3; Incl C, Rpt of 10th Amph Trac

Bn, pp. 1, 4; Incl E, Rpt of 715th Amph Trac Bn,

pp. 1-3; Incl F, Rpt of 773d Amph Trac Bn, p.

5; Incl G, Rpt of 2d Armd Amph Tk Bn, pp.

1-2; and Incl H, Rpt of 708th Amph Tk Bn, pp.

1-2. 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, Part

I, Sec. V, p. 1. 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan,

Annex C, pp. 1-9. 39

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl H, LVT

Rpt; Incl A, Rpt of 2d Amph Trac Bn, p. 7; Incl

E, Rpt of 715th Amph Trac Bn, p. 3; Incl G, Rpt

of 2d Armd Amph Bn, p. 1.

40

 Ibid., Annex G, Rpt of 2d Armd Amph Bn,

p. 1.

41 Hoffman, Saipan, p. 50.
84 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

CONGESTION ON 2D MARINE DIVISION BEACH, the result of the right-flank

battalion landing north of its assigned area. Note disabled LVT(A)(4) at

upper right.

of the enemy's prearranged fire plan and

for unknown reasons had not been removed

by underwater demolition teams on the

previous day—were scattered along the

reef. Of the sixty-eight tanks in the first

wave all but three arrived safely. One

burned, one was swamped on the reef, and

one received a direct hit from an antitank

weapon firing from the shore at about

twenty-five yards range.42

Astern of the tanks came the amphibian

tractors of the Marine 10th Amphibian

Tractor Battalion and the Army 773d

Amphibian Tractor Battalion in four

waves, spaced from two to six minutes apart. Of the 196 troop-carrying tractors,

only two failed to land their cargo; one

was hit by a shell on the reef and the other

42

 1st Lt. Russell A. Gugeler, FA, 1st I and H

Sv, Army Amphibian Tractor and Tank Battalions in the Battle of Saipan, 15 June-9 July 1944,

20 Jan 45, pp. 6-7, MS in OCMH. These figures

differ from those given in the official action report

of the 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion, which

states that two of its tanks were overturned and

three lost due to maintenance difficulties. The

report mentions no direct hits. (NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl H to Incl Y, p. 1). The former

figures are accepted as more accurate because the

author of that account gives a detailed description

of the LVT(A) casualties in the battalion as well

as the names and actions of the personnel involved.
INVASION 85

developed mechanical difficulties. Between

0843 and 0907 all of the leading waves

with about 8,000 marines embarked were

ashore.43

Breakdown of the Landing Plan

From the outset, two factors marred the

smooth execution of the landing plan. The

first was the wide gap that had developed

between the right battalion (2d Battalion,

8th Marines) of the 2d Marine Division

and the left battalion (3d Battalion, 23d

Marines) of the 4th Marine Division. The

landing plan had provided for a gap between the two divisions. Troops were not

to land on Afetna Point itself because of

the reasonable fear that the enemy would

have placed his heaviest concentration of

artillery there to guard the only channel

through the reef to the pier at Charan

Kanoa.44 However, the distance between

the two divisions was more than double

that envisaged because the 2d Battalion,

8th Marines, landed north of its assigned

beach. Almost three days would elapse before firm contact between the divisions was

established.

Perhaps more serious was the breakdown

of the scheme to employ amphibian tanks

and tractors to carry the assault inland

from the water's edge. The basic plan for

the landing on Saipan prescribed a blitz

assault, continuous from shipboard inland

to the first high ground. In the 2d Marine

Division's zone of action the four companies of amphibian tanks were to proceed

inland about three hundred yards to the

tractor control line, cover the debarkation

of the assault troops from their tractors,

and support their advance to the first objective line, which lay about 1,500 yards

inland.45 Tractors of the first wave were to

accompany the LVT(A)'s to the tractor

control line and there debark their troops.

The succeeding three waves were supposed

to discharge their troops on the beach.46

In the zone of the 4th Marine Division,

the initial wave—amphibian tanks—was

to lead the next two waves—tractors—all

the way to the first objective line, which

was located on the first high ground a mile

inland. There, the tanks would deploy

and support the troops as they debarked

and moved forward. The fourth and fifth

waves were to be discharged at the beach

and mop-up areas bypassed by the leading

waves.47

None of these plans succeeded completely, and for the most part the scheme of

employing amphibian tanks as land tanks

and amphibian tractors as overland troopcarrying vehicles must be marked off as a

failure. The LVT(A)'s had neither the

armor nor the armament to withstand the

terrible pounding from enemy artillery and

supporting weapons that could be expected

during this phase of the assault. Moreover,

43

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl H, LVT

Rpt; Incl C, Rpt of 10th Amph Trac Bn, p. 4;

Incl F, Rpt of 773d Amph Trac Bn, p. 5. 44

 Information from Maj. Carl Hoffman,

USMC, who commanded the right flank company

(Company G) of the 8th Marines, to the author,

30 March 1950.

45

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl H, LVT

Rpt; Incl G, Rpt of 2d Armd Amph Bn, p. 1.

The tractor control line should not be confused

with the transfer control line, which was on the

seaward side of the reef and marked the point at

which troops and supplies would be transferred

from small craft (LCVP's) to amphibian tractors. 46

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl B, Rpt of

5th Amph Trac Bn, p. 5. 47

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex H,

23d RCT Rpt, p. 29; Annex J, 25th RCT Rpt,

p. 3.
86 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

the LVT(A)'s were underpowered and

were stopped by sand, trenches, holes,

trees, and other minor obstacles, most of

which a land tank could have negotiated

with ease.48 Once the tractors were out of

the water, their hulls were exposed and

they became easy targets for enemy fire,

which their armor was too light to resist.

On shore they were clumsy and slow. It

proved far healthier for troops to extricate

themselves from these death traps as fast

as possible and find shelter in whatever

natural protection the terrain and the vegetation offered.

On the 2d Marine Division's beaches the

situation rapidly became chaotic. Trees,

trenches, and shell holes stopped some of

the tanks of the 2d Armored Amphibian

Battalion before they could even cross the

beach. Between the beach and the tractor

control line, twenty-eight LVT(A)'s, more

than one-third the total number, were disabled. Only a few points of ingress from

the beach inland could be discovered, and

while the amphibian tanks were maneuvering up and down trying to locate the points

they became almost hopelessly intermixed

with the tractors of the first and succeeding waves. Up to the tractor control line

infantry troops were able to maintain close

contact with the tanks, but the eighteen

LVT(A)'s that went beyond that point got

little infantry support. Tanks fired indiscriminately among troops and tractors and

in general merely added to the confusion

instead of aiding the battalions they were

supposed to support.49

Congestion was particularly bad in the

area of Green Beach 1, where the two battalions of the 8th Marines were trying to

land at the same time because the right

flank of the first wave had veered to the

left. These troops were all embarked in the

amphibian tractors of the 715th Amphibian

Tractor Battalion. Directly ahead of them

was a heavily wooded bank constituting an

almost impassable barrier for tanks and

tractors alike. The marines forthwith abandoned their tractors and took cover behind

the embankment. Within five minutes after

the first wave touched shore, the second

wave arrived and landed a little to its right.

By the time the third and fourth waves had

landed, the men on foot were being

squeezed between the tractors to their rear

and the Japanese to the front. All together,

only two tractors were able to get beyond

the beach, one making its way as far as

the radio tower 700 yards inland. Two

days later, the driver wandered back to the

beach but was too shell-shocked to be able

to remember how he had got that far or

what had happened when he got there.50

On the southern beaches, the 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion fared a little better.

Of the sixty-eight tanks in the first wave,

about half reached Fina Susu ridge by ten

o'clock.51 Contrary to expectations, progress through the town of Charan Kanoa

was fairly easy, and by 0915 thirteen tanks

of Company B, assigned to this sector, had

arrived at the objective. South of them

the going was more difficult. The tanks

48

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl H, LVT

Rpt; Incl G, Rpt of 2d Armd Amph Trac Bn, pp. 8-9; Incl H, Rpt of 708th Amph Tk Bn, pp.

6-7.

49

 Ibid., Incl G, Rpt of 2d Armd Amph Trac

Bn, pp. 1-2; 6th RCT 2d Marine Div SAR,

Phase I, FORAGER, Incl A, p. 1.

50

 Gugeler, Army Amph Trac and Tk Bns at

Saipan, p. 22. 51

 Ibid., p. 10. Gugeler states that thirty-three

tanks reached the O-1 line, most of them by

1000. According to the action report of the battalion itself, forty tanks were on the O-1 line by

1000. NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl H, LVT

Rpt; Incl H, Rpt of 708th Amph Tk Bn, p. 3.
INVASION 87

that landed below Charan Kanoa had to

fight swampy ground, tank trenches, heavy

artillery, a burning gas dump, and a steep

railroad embankment before attaining the

ridge. Nineteen made it. Those on the extreme right had the most difficulty. Swinging south, three tanks reached the tip of

Agingan Point about a thousand yards

south of the lowest landing beach. They

braved it out against fairly heavy Japanese

mortar and artillery fire, but when American naval shells commenced to drop in the

area they discreetly withdrew.52 Agingan

Point would have to wait another day

for capture.

Meanwhile, back on the beaches most

of the troops were deserting their amphibian tractors for the dubious safety of

traveling on foot and belly. The 23d Marines, which landed in and just south of

Charan Kanoa, made fair progress inland.

Fifteen LVT's of the second wave were able

to carry their troops through the town itself and on to the ridge behind. On the

beach immediately below, thirty-three tractors got as far as a railroad embankment about 400 yards inland before the

infantry commanders ordered their troops

to debark.53

On the southern (Yellow) beaches,

where the fighting was fiercest, no such

progress was made. One company of the

773d Amphibian Tractor Battalion got as

far as a railroad spur about 700 yards inland, but the rest unloaded their troops as

rapidly as possible and shoved off back to

the transfer line beyond the reef. In spite of

the hasty withdrawal of most of the first

group of LVT's, the shore line soon was

thick with tractors as succeeding waves telescoped onto the beach. It was small

wonder. After a full hour's fighting the 1st

Battalion, 25th Marines, had succeeded in

pushing just twelve yards in from the

beach, and the 2d Battalion's progress was

only a little better.54 The tractor plan

failed most signally here. The infantryman

was on his own.

Expanding the Beachead

Action of the 2d Marine Division

On the Red Beaches to the north, the

two assault battalions of the 6th Marines

met fierce enemy fire immediately upon

landing. The failure of most of the amphibian tanks and tractors to proceed any considerable distance inland and the rain of

enemy shells caused unexpected congestion

and confusion on the beaches.55 The command posts of both battalions received

direct hits that seriously injured battalion

commanders and most of their staffs. The

regimental commander, Col. James P.

Risely, USMC, came ashore at 1000 and

established his command post practically

at the water's edge. Forty minutes later the

regimental reserve (1st Battalion, 6th Marines) commenced to land and prepare to

support the assault elements.

By 1105 the front line had advanced only

400 yards inland. The 3d Battalion, on the

right, was suffering especially heavy casual52

 Gugeler, Army Amph Trac and Tk Bns at

Saipan, pp. 10-11. 53

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl H, LVT

Rpt; Incl C, Rpt of 10th Amph Trac Bn, p. 4.

54

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex J,

25th RCT Rpt, p. 3. 55

 The following account of D-Day activity in

the 2d Marine Division's zone of action is derived

from: 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER,

Sec. V, pp. 1-5; 6th RCT 2d Marine Div SAR,

Phase I, FORAGER, Incl A, pp. 1-2; 1st Bn 20th

Marine SAR Saipan, Incl A, p. 1; Hoffman,

Saipan, pp. 31-35.
88 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

EARLY WAVE ON THE BEACH, protected by embankment. Black rods in foreground

are portable radio antennas. Note disabled amtracks.

ties, and the 1st Battalion was therefore

ordered to pass through the 3d. Weak

points began to appear all along the line.

More serious, a dangerous gap developed

between the right flank of the 6th Marines

and the left flank of the 8th Marines when

the 6th Marines landed some 400 yards

north of its assigned beaches. In spite of

the fact that Companies K and L of the

6th Regiment were ordered to establish

physical contact, a gap of 300 yards still

existed, although covered by fire.

Around noon the 6th Regiment's casualties had mounted to an estimated 35 percent. An hour later three Japanese tanks

counterattacked in the area in front of the

command post. Two of the tanks were

knocked out by bazookas before penetrating the front line, but the third managed

to push through to within seventy-five

yards of the command post before being

disabled by a bazooka rocket fired from the

post itself. During the morning and early

afternoon the regiment had no supporting

weapons ashore other than those carried as

organizational—bazookas, antitank grenades, and 37-mm. guns. Meanwhile, however, some tanks had commenced to land.

Shortly after 0900 a pilot tank was

disembarked at the reef's edge to explore

the best passage through the reef. By 1020

it had searched out a path to Green Beach
INVASION 89

1, although it was under heavy fire all the

way. Once on the beach, enemy fire forced

the crew to abandon the tank, but a reef

route was marked and by 1300 the first of

the 2d Division's tanks had landed on

Green 1 and moved northward to support

the 6th Marines. By midafternoon those

tanks assigned to the 8th Marines had

successfully landed and were in operation.

Southward, on the Green Beaches, the

chief problems facing the 8th Marines were

confusion and congestion. The right flank

battalion (the 2d) had landed from 700 to

1,000 yards north of its assigned beaches.

As a result, the two assault battalions of

the 8th Marines and part of one battalion

of the 6th Marines all found themselves in

the same beach area. To add to the confusion, the commanders of the two assault

battalions of the 8th Marines were both

wounded early in the action and had to

be evacuated. The 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, had the most difficult job—to attack

south along the beach toward Afetna Point.

The object was not only to remove the

menace of antiboat weapons located in

that area but also to secure the single reef

channel off Charan Kanoa and permit the

early entry of tank-carrying landing craft,

which could not negotiate the reef itself.

According to their prescribed scheme of

maneuver, one company (Company G)

moved south along the beach and the other

two (E and F) fanned out to the southeast. Company G was heavily armed with

shotguns in addition to its normal weapons.

These short-range guns with wide dispersion patterns were allotted to Company G

chiefly as insurance against its firing into

the lines of the 4th Marine Division toward

which it was advancing. Progress was slow

—the beach itself was thickly covered with

pillboxes, and enemy riflemen situated east

of the Charan Kanoa airstrip made the

most of the flat, open terrain to harass the

company's left flank as it inched southward. At 0950 the 1st Battalion, in regimental reserve, was ordered to land.

Company B was attached to the 2d Battalion to support Company G's attack

toward Afetna Point. Companies A and C

were committed between the 2d and 3d

Battalions.

Later in the afternoon, the 1st Battalion,

29th Marines, was landed and also attached to the 8th Marines on the Green

Beaches. Because of a shortage of amphibian tractors, the battalion was unable to

boat up properly and hence landed in

considerable disorder. Company B, 29th

Marines, was ordered to proceed at once

to fill a gap between Companies E and G

of the 8th Marines. However, its knowledge

of the terrain was inaccurate and it was

furnished no guides, so the company ended

up about 600 yards north of its assigned

position. The gap between the two right

companies of the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, still remained unfilled, and Company

A, 29th Marines, was ordered at 1730 to

take that position. The approach of darkness and a heavy barrage of enemy

artillery pinned these troops down before

they could arrive at their destination.56

Meanwhile, the 2d Marines, which had

participated in the demonstration off Tanapag, was beginning to come ashore on Red

Beach 2. By 1800 the 3d Battalion had

landed and was attached to the 6th Marines, taking station before nightfall on the

division left flank. By nightfall one company from the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines,

56

 1st Bn 29th Marines SAR Saipan, Incl A,

p. 1.
90 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

MARINES DIGGING FOXHOLES, checking weapons, and keeping a steady watch.

in addition to the regimental commander

and the advance echelon of his command

post, was also ashore. The rest of the regiment was ordered to return to the area of

the control vessel on the line of departure

and remained boated throughout the night,

to be landed by midmorning of the following day.57

By noon of D Day Red Beach 3 was

sufficiently clear to permit shore parties to

land. The first team came ashore at 1300,

and supplies began to flow over the two

central beaches. Two more shore parties

landed before the end of the day. Late in

the day the two 75-mm. pack howitzer battalions of the 10th Marines were ashore

and in position to support the infantry.

The 1st Battalion landed by 1403 and

supported the 6th Marines; the 2d Battalion was ashore at 1730 and in position

to support the 8th Marines. Before dark

the 2d Marine Division's commander, General Watson, had established his command

post on Red Beach 2. By this time the

division was digging in for the night and

consolidating its positions against counterattack. Amphibian tanks and tractors

had set up a defensive net against possible counteramphibious attacks from the

sea. Division casualties were estimated to

amount to 1,575—238 killed, 1,022

wounded, and 315 missing in action.58

57

 2d Marines 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I,

FORAGER, p. 2.

58

 3d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, Sec.

V, p. 5.
INVASION 91

D-DAY COMMAND POST, a captured Japanese gun position in the Red Beach area.

Action of the 4th Marine Division

South of Afetna Point, the 4th Marine

Division was having it own share of problems.59

 To be sure, opposition in the town

of Charan Kanoa was comparatively light.

Japanese riflemen sniped away as troops

and tractors moved through the rubble of

the town, but they caused small damage.

The 3d Battalion, 23d Marines, reached the

first objective line with phenomenal speed.

On its right flank, however, the 2d Battalion of the same regiment was not so

lucky. Troops debarked from their tractors

unevenly and there was no semblance of

a continuous line. Fighting degenerated

into a series of small unit actions, and not

until midafternoon was tactical control regained by the battalion commander. The

farther south, the worse the situation

became. After a full hour, the 25th Marines

had penetrated only twelve yards in from

the beach. From its right flank the 1st

Battalion caught the heaviest load of fire

from pillboxes and mortars on Agingan

Point. Amphibian tanks, bombs, and naval

shells were unable to abate this nuisance

for the remainder of the day, and at nightfall the 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, had

to dig in with its right flank exposed.

59

 This account of operations in the 4th Marine

Division's zone is derived from the following

sources: 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, pp.

13-15; Annex C, Opns, pp. 9-13; Annex H, 23d

RCT Rpt, pp. 30-35; Annex I, 24th RCT Rpt,

p. 18; Annex J, 25th RCT Rpt, pp. 3-4; Annex

K, Rpt of 4th Tk Bn, p. 3; Hoffman, Saipan, pp.

134-53.
92 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Tanks of the 4th Marine Division began

to come ashore about two hours after the

initial landing. Their progress from ship to

shore was seriously impeded since the channel off Afetna Point was still interdicted

by enemy fire, thus making it necessary in

most cases for tanks to debark from landing craft at the reef and attempt to

negotiate the lagoon under their own

power. Mounting seas during the afternoon

increased the hazards of the trip. Of the

sixty tanks of the 4th Tank Battalion,

twenty-one failed to reach the 4th Marine

Division's beaches. One sank with the

LCM on which it was boarded, another

settled into a pothole off the reef, others

were unable to locate landing craft to take

them ashore or had their wiring systems

fouled en route. Finally, six medium tanks

were misdirected to Green Beach 2, a 2d

Division beach. Of these, five were immobilized in deep water inside the lagoon and

the sixth was appropriated by the 2d

Division and failed to reach its parent organization until several days later. The

only decisive tank action on the southern

beaches occurred on the extreme right

flank. There, the 1st Platoon of Company

A helped to break up a counterattack that,

if successful, would have driven the 1st

Battalion, 25th Marines, back into the

sea.60

In the matter of artillery, the 4th Marine

Division was more fortunate than the 2d

Division. Whereas the latter got only two

battalions of 75-mm. pack howitzers ashore

on D Day, the entire 14th Regiment, consisting of two 75-mm. pack howitzer

battalions and three 105-mm. howitzer

battalions, was landed by 1630 to support the 4th Marine Division.61

 Shortly

thereafter the reserve regiment, the 24th

Marines, landed and proceeded to an area

about 800 yards south of Charan Kanoa.62

At 1930 General Schmidt, commander

of the 4th Division, came ashore. His command post was a series of foxholes about

fifty yards from the beach and very poorly

protected from enemy light artillery, which

was firing from the high ground about

1,500 yards away. General Schmidt later

recalled, "Needless to say the command

post during that time did not function very

well. It was the hottest spot I was in

during the war, not even excepting Iwo

Jima."63

By the time the division commander had

landed, the division's left flank had been

pulled back to conform to the configuration of the remainder of the line. The 2d

and 3d Battalions, 23d Marines, were both

ordered to withdraw to positions roughly

800 yards west of the first objective line

on the reverse slope of Fina Susu ridge.

The movement was executed under cover

of darkness—a difficult operation but one

carried out successfully and without alerting the enemy. After the withdrawal was

completed, the 1st Battalion relieved the

3d, and the latter assembled in what was

60

 This account of 4th Marine Division tank

action on D Day is derived from: 4th Marine Div

Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex K, Rpt of 4th Tk Bn,

pp. 2-3; Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 143-48.

61

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, p. 14. At

the time of the Marianas Campaign, the Marine

Corps artillery regiment was ordinarily composed

of only four battalions, two of 75-mm. pack howitzers and two of 105-mm. howitzers. At Saipan, V

Amphibious Corps attached an extra 105-mm.

battalion to the 4th Marine Division and a 155-

mm. howitzer battalion to the 2d Division. 62

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex I,

24th RCT Rpt, p. 18. 63

 Comments by General Schmidt on draft copy

of this volume, OCMH.
INVASION 93

euphemistically called a "rear area" to

protect the left flank.64

Summary of the Situation at Nightfall

By darkness of the first day it could be

concluded that the landing was a success,

even though only about two thirds of the

area within the first objective line was

under the marines' control. In spite of the

failure of the initial plan to carry some of

the assault waves 1,500 yards inland

aboard amphibian tractors, the troops

had established a beachhead approximately

10,000 yards in length and over 1,000

yards in depth in most places. Two divisions were ashore with almost all their

reserves. Seven battalions of artillery had

landed, as had most of the two tank battalions. Both division command posts were

ashore by the time the troops had dug in

for the night. The most serious weaknesses

in the Marine position were on its flanks.

Afetna Point, between the two divisions,

was still in enemy hands. So was Agingan

Point on the right flank, and the 6th Marines' hold on the extreme left was

precarious.

As for the Japanese, they had exacted

a heavy toll—how heavy cannot be accurately stated because of the inadequacy of

casualty figures for D Day. The American

landings had been made against what the

enemy considered his strongest point and

at a time when his garrison there was four

battalions overstrength. He had registered

the landing area, using flags on the reef

for registration markers, and as successive

waves landed artillery and mortar fire increased in intensity. The Japanese had

massed at least sixteen 105-mm. howitzers

and thirty 75-mm. field pieces on the first

high ground and the reverse slope thereof

about 1.5 miles southeast of Charan

Kanoa. Directly east of the airstrip they

had emplaced a 150-mm. howitzer battery

of four weapons with a similar battery

south of it. All of these weapons were well

sited, and they were responsible for a tremendous amount of fire on the landing

beaches.65

Although the enemy realized that the

diversionary maneuver off Tanapag was a

ruse, he did retain one infantry regiment

(the 135th) in that area instead of committing it, as was intended, to the south

of Garapan. At no time on D Day did the

Japanese employ infantry in any great

strength. They relied almost entirely on

artillery, heavy weapons, and scattered

tank attacks.

In the opinion of Holland Smith's operations officer, the "most critical stage of

the battle for Saipan was the fight for the

beachhead: for the security of the landing

beaches, for sufficient area into which

troops and heavy equipment could be

brought, and for the ability to render

logistical support to those forces once

landed."

 66

 This, to be sure, could be said

of any amphibious landing where strong

opposition is encountered. On Saipan, it

was six days before the beachhead could

be considered completely secured, but it

was the first day's action that was crucial.

The most critical stage of "the most critical

stage" was past.

64

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex H,

23d RCT Rpt, p. 34.

65

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl D, G-2 Rpt, pp. 12-13. 66

 Ibid., G-3 Rpt, p. 5.

CHAPTER VI

Capture of Aslito Airfield

Counterattack

Night of 15-16 June

Nightfall brought little hope of respite

to the battle-weary marines on Saipan

as they dug in on their narrow strip of

beachhead with the Philippine Sea at

their backs and a vengeful and still potent

enemy lurking in the dark ahead. All had

been alerted to the strong possibility of

a night counterattack. Few doubted that

it would come—the only questions being

where, when, and in what force.

In fact, by midafternoon of the 15th the

Japanese high command on Saipan had

already issued orders to drive the Americans back into the sea before daylight next

day. To Tokyo, 31st Army radioed optimistically, "The Army this evening will

make a night attack with all its forces and

expects to annihilate the enemy at one

swoop."1 To the troops, the order went

out, "Each unit will consolidate strategically important points and will carry out

counterattacks with reserve forces and

tanks against the enemy landing units and

will demolish the enemy during the night

at the water's edge."2

First to feel the effects of these measures

was the 6th Marines, 2d Division, which

held the left flank of the beachhead.3

About 2000, a large force of Japanese infantry, supported by tanks, bore down

from the north along the coastal road.4

With flags flying, swords waving, and a

bugle sounding the Japanese fell upon the

marines' outposts. Unhappily, the 2d Marine Division had been able to land none

of its 105-mm. howitzer battalions during

the day so the regiment under attack had

only one battalion of 75-mm. pack howitzers to support it. However, naval star

shells fired from American destroyers lying

close off the coast silhouetted the attackers

as they approached, and the first attack

was stopped by the withering fire of machine guns and rifles, assisted by naval

5-inch guns.

A second, though smaller counterattack

developed in the same area around 0300

on the 16th. It, too, failed to penetrate the

marines' lines. Finally, just before daylight

another organized force of infantry and

tanks rolled down the road from Garapan.

Again, the Japanese were repulsed, this

time with the help of five American me1

 SONAE 1030, CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item

9983, p. 5. 2

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl D, G-2

Rpt, p. 9.

3

 The account of the night's action in the 2d

Marine Division zone is taken from: 2d Marine

Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, Sec. VI, p. 1; 6th

Marines SAR Saipan, pp. 3-4; Hoffman, Saipan,

pp. 71-72. 4

 The exact timing of the beginning of the main

counterthrust is not precisely known since the reports vary. The time stated here is derived from

the 6th Marines SAR Saipan, page 3.
96 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

dium tanks. By dawn the full measure of

the enemy's failure was revealed. About

700 Japanese lay dead just to the north of

the 6th Marines flank.

In the zone of the 4th Marine Division,

enemy countermeasures on the night of

15-16 June were less well organized and

less powerful. Also, the 4th Division had

all three of its 105-mm. howitzer battalions

ashore by nightfall and was in a better

position to resist.5 On the southern beaches,

small groups of enemy soldiers, one

shielded by a spearhead of civilians, hit

once at 0330 and again an hour later. Both

thrusts failed, with much of the credit for

the successful defense going to a battalion

of 105-mm. howitzers.

The most vulnerable spot in the 4th Marine Division's zone of action, of course,

lay on the exposed left flank, where the

23d Marines had not yet tied in with the

2d Division to the north. All through the

night Japanese artillery fire swept the

beaches in this area from one end to the

other. From dusk to dawn small groups of

the enemy managed to filter through frontline units only to be wiped out in the rear

areas by either infantry or shore party

personnel. Among the latter were the 311th

Port Company and the 539th Port Company. These were attached to the 4th

Marine Division and were the first Army

units to be put ashore on Saipan. Finally,

at 0530, about 200 Japanese launched an

organized attack. Through the gap it came,

apparently aimed at the pier at Charan

Kanoa. It too was stopped. Only a

few individual enemy soldiers reached the

beaches, where they were disposed of by

members of the shore parties.

One important factor that contributed

to the marines' success in warding off

these early morning counterattacks was the

bright illumination provided by the Navy.

The battleship California, assisted by two

destroyers, cruised off the west coast of

Saipan all night firing star shells to light

up danger spots from which surprise attacks might be launched. That they were

highly successful was later confirmed by

31st Army headquarters itself, "The enemy

is under cover of warships nearby the

coast; as soon as the night attack units go

forward, the enemy points out targets by

using the large star shells which practically

turn night into day. Thus the maneuvering

of units is extremely difficult."

 6

In spite of precarious holds on both the

extreme flanks and the gap in the middle

between the two divisions, the marines

therefore succeeded in maintaining their

positions and thwarting all major efforts to

drive them back into the sea. Those few

Japanese who managed to infiltrate behind

the lines were wiped out without causing

any considerable damage. The enemy plan

of maneuver had relied in the main on repelling the American assault troops at the

beach by counterattacks with artillery and

tanks in support. As dawn broke on the

morning of 16th June, the miscarriage of

the Japanese first basic defense plan was

more than evident.

Consolidating the Beachhead

16 June

Daylight brought to the grateful marines

hugging the beaches a respite at least from

5

 The account of the night's action in the 4th

Marine Division zone is taken from: 4th Marine

Div Opns Rpt Saipan, p. 16; 23d Marines SAR

Saipan, p. 35; 25th Marines Final Rpt Saipan

Opn, pp. 16-17; Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 73-74. 6

 31st Army Msg File, Msg 1038.
CAPTURE OF ASLITO AIRFIELD 97

the fearful dread of night counterattacks

and infiltration. But immediate and pressing duties lay ahead. No more than a half

of the designated beachhead (west of the

O-1 line) was under their control. (See

Map 4.) Afetna Point had not been secured, which meant that a gap of about

800 yards lay between the two divisions.

The tip of Agingan Point, the southwest

extremity of the island, still remained in

enemy hands. Finally, an unknown number of Japanese could be presumed to be

still lurking behind the lines, ready to ambush the unwary and harass the attacking

troops from the rear.

On the left (north) flank, the 6th Marines held fast and consolidated the positions won the day before. South of the 6th,

the 8th Marines made rapid progress in its

zone of action. Afetna Point offered little

resistance, and the few Japanese left there

after the previous night's counterattack

were quickly mopped up. By 0950 the right

flank company of the 2d Marine Division

had reached Charan Kanoa pier and

about two hours later established contact

with the left flank of the 4th Marine

Division.7

The heaviest fighting of the day took

place in the zone of the 4th Marine Division, especially on its right flank. Orders

called for the capture of all ground lying

west of the O-1 line along Fina Susu ridge

by nightfall, but the assault was held up

until 1230 while lines were rearranged. On

the division right, the 25th Marines encountered considerable opposition from

machine guns, mountain guns, and the

antiaircraft weapons guarding the western

approaches to Aslito field. By the end of

the day's fighting the 25th had overrun

Agingan Point and accounted for five machine guns, two mountain guns, and approximately sixty Japanese combatants.

Meanwhile, the left and center regiments,

the 23d and 24th, moved abreast of the

25th Marines and by 1730, when the fighting was called off, the lines of the 4th Marine Division rested generally along the

Fina Susu ridge line.8

On the same day, to the north of the

main area of fighting, additional elements

of infantry and artillery were being landed

on the beaches controlled by the 2d Marine

Division. By 1000 of the 16th those men of

the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, that had not

come ashore on D Day were landed and

took positions on the division left.9 Around

1600 the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, which

had originally been scheduled to invade

Magicienne Bay,10 was landed, minus its

heavy weapons, on the 2d Marine Division's beaches. The heavy weapons were

subsequently dropped by parachute from

carrier torpedo planes, but because the

planes flew at a low altitude the equipment

was almost completely destroyed.11

At the same time that the remaining infantry elements of the 2d Marine Division

were being dispatched shoreward, the two

105-mm. battalions of the 10th Marines

were also going into position in the area.12

About 1600 the 4th Battalion landed just

north of Afetna Point and set up its batteries to support the 8th Marines, while an

7

 8th Marines SAR FORAGER, 20 Jul 44, pp. 1-2;

6th Marines SAR Saipan, 18 Jul 44, pp. 4-5;

Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 79-80.

8

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex H,

23d RCT Rpt, pp. 35-36; Annex I, 24th RCT

Rpt, p. 18; Annex J, 25th RCT Rpt, p. 17; Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 81-83. 9

 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, p. 2. 10

 See above, pp. 40-41. 11

 Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 80-81. 12

 The two 75-mm. pack howitzer battalions had

landed on D Day.
98 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

hour later the 3d Battalion came ashore

on Red Beach 3 behind the 6th Marines.13

At 1515 on the 16th, General Harper,

USA, commanding the XXIV Corps Artillery, left the flagship Cambria and an hour

later arrived on Blue Beach 2 just south

of Charan Kanoa. There, he set up his

command post about a hundred yards inland from the southern edge of Blue Beach

2, and before dark advance parties of the

149th and 420th Field Artillery Groups,

the 225th and 531st Field Artillery Battalions, and elements of his staff reported

to him there. No corps artillery equipment

came ashore on 16 June, and the advance

elements spent an uneasy night dug-in

in a partially destroyed enemy gasoline

dump.14

Night of 16-17 June

General Saito's failure to "drive the

enemy back into the sea" the first night

after the landing did not discourage him

from making a second try. During the

afternoon of the 16th he ordered the 136th

Infantry Regiment and the 9th Tank Regiment to launch a co-ordinated attack at

1700 toward the radio station that now

lay behind the lines of the 6th Marines.

Another, through un-co-ordinated, attack

was to be carried out by the Yokosuka

Special Naval Landing Force from the direction of Garapan.15

The scheduled hour came and passed,

but the units assigned to the task were

apparently too disorganized to carry it out

on time. Meanwhile, the marines were able

to prepare their night positions undisturbed except by artillery and mortar fire.

About 0330 the Japanese struck—

chiefly against the 6th Marines. No less

than thirty-seven Japanese tanks were involved, and perhaps a thousand infantrymen. They approached the American

lines through a ravine that cut westward

through the mountains toward the radio

station. The tanks came in groups of four

and five, each with a few riflemen aboard.

Each group of riflemen carried at least one

light machine gun. When they came within range, they were met by a furious barrage of fire from the marines' artillery,

machine guns, mortars, bazookas, and rifles.

Within an hour, a good percentage of the

tanks had been either destroyed or incapacitated. Although the escorting infantrymen

kept up the fight until about 0700, their

efforts were fruitless. By the end of the

battle the Japanese had lost at least

twenty-four and possibly more of their

tanks and an uncounted number of infantrymen. Saito's second counterattack was

a total failure.

Change of Plans

The initial plan for the capture of the

Marianas had set 18 June as the tentative

date (W Day) for the landing on Guam,

which was to constitute Phase II of the

FORAGER operation. On the night of 15

June, after it appeared that the marines

could hold their narrow beachhead on Saipan, Admiral Spruance confirmed this

date, and preparations were set under way

for an immediate invasion of Guam. But

before daybreak of the 16th, Spruance received new information that caused him to

reverse his own decision.

13

 10th Marines SAR, 22 Jul 44, pp. 2-3. 14

 XXIV Corps Arty Final Rpt on FORAGER

Opn, Phases I and III, S-3 Rpt, p. 5. 15

 The account of this attack is from: NTLF

Rpt Marianas, Phase I, G-2 Rpt, pp. 77-78, 85;

31st Army Msg File, Msg 1039; 6th Marines SAR

Saipan, p. 4; Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 86-91.
CAPTURE OF ASLITO AIRFIELD 99

At 1900 on the evening of 15 June, the

U.S. submarine Flying Fish sighted a Japanese task force of battleships, cruisers,

destroyers, and aircraft carriers making its

way eastward through San Bernardino

Strait in the central Philippines. Four

hours later another submarine, Seahorse,

reported another enemy task force about

two hundred miles east of Leyte Gulf

steaming in a northwesterly direction.16 It

was clear that the Japanese Fleet was preparing to do battle and that the U.S. Fifth

Fleet would be called upon to take the

necessary countermeasures.

The next morning Admiral Spruance, in

the light of these developments, postponed

indefinitely the date for the invasion of

Guam and joined Admiral Turner aboard

Rocky Mount off the coast of Saipan. Together, Turner and Spruance decided

that unloading should continue at Saipan

through 17 June, that as many transports

as possible would be retired during the

night and that only those urgently required

would be returned to the transport area

on the morning of the 18th. The old battleships, cruisers, and destroyers of the

Saipan bombardment group would cover

Saipan from the westward, and Admiral

Conolly's force would be withdrawn well

to the eastward out of any presumable

danger from enemy naval attack. Certain

cruiser and destroyer units heretofore attached to Admiral Turner's Joint Expeditionary Force were to be detached and

directed to join Admiral Mitscher, who

would carry the brunt of the attack against

the approaching enemy fleet. Patrol planes

based in the Marshalls were to be dispatched forthwith and would prepare to

make night radar searches as far as 600

miles west of Saipan. Finally, Admiral

Mitscher was ordered to discontinue all

support aircraft operations over Saipan

and restrict his carrier air operations on 17

June to searches and morning and afternoon neutralization strikes on Guam and

Rota. Thus were begun the preparations

for the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

First Landings of the

27th Infantry Division

The imminence of a full-scale naval battle also demanded an immediate decision

regarding the disposition of the troops of

the 27th Division, which had been assigned

to corps reserve. The division had sailed

from Oahu in three separate transport divisions under command of Rear Adm.

William H. P. Blandy and was scheduled

to reach Saipan the day after the main

landings. On 15 June, while still en route

to the objective, the 106th Regimental

Combat Team (RCT) was detached from

the division and ordered to join Admiral

Conolly's Southern Attack Force as the

reserve force for the Guam invasion, which

at that time was still scheduled to take

place on 18 June. Shortly before noon of

the 16th, when the ships carrying the other

two regiments were still about thirty miles

from Saipan, General Ralph Smith, aboard

the transport Fremont, was notified by radio that the division, less the 106th RCT,

was to land as soon as practicable over the

beaches held by the 4th Marine Division.

The general himself was ordered to report

to Cambria, flagship of Admiral Hill and

headquarters of Brig. Gen. Graves B. Ers16

 Comdr Fifth Fleet, Initial Rpt on Opn to

Capture the Marianas, 13 Jul 44, p. 3.
100 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

kine, USMC, chief of staff to Holland

Smith.17

Aboard Cambria, General Ralph Smith

received his orders to land his division

artillery as soon as possible to support the

4th Marine Division. The 165th Regiment

was to land immediately and move to the

right flank of the 4th Marine Division, to

which it would be attached. The 105th

Regiment would follow. The 106th was to

remain afloat as reserve for the Southern

Landing Force for the Guam operation,

which by now had been postponed indefinitely. As soon as the 105th Regiment and

other elements of the division were ashore

they were to unite with the 165th and

relieve the 4th Marine Division on the

right zone, which included Aslito airfield.

General Ralph Smith returned to his

own flagship about 1930, where the assistant division commander, Brig. Gen. Ogden J. Ross, and the 165th Regiment

commander, Col, Gerard W. Kelley, were

anxiously awaiting him. Kelley had already

instructed his executive officer, Lt. Col.

Joseph T. Hart, to land the regimental

combat team over Blue Beach 1 immediately south of the Charan Kanoa pier. Ross

and Kelley were then ordered to go ashore,

establish contact with the 4th Marine Division, and to make whatever arrangements

were practicable during the night.

The two officers, accompanied by a

small advance group, left Fremont about

2100. The coxswain of their small boat lost

his way, and, after much fumbling in the

dark and many futile inquiries among

other landing craft in the area, the party

finally located a guide boat to steer them

through the channel to Blue Beach 2, where

they waded ashore about 0130. (Map II.)

In spite of the darkness and confusion

on the beach, they succeeded in locating

the command post of the 23d Marines

about 300 yards south of the point where

they had landed. General Ross raised 4th

Marine Division headquarters by telephone

and was informed that the 165th Regiment

was expected to move to the right flank of

the line and jump off at 0730. By this time

it was 0330 and the Army troops were

scattered along the beach over a three-mile

area. General Ross and Colonel Kelley immediately set forth to locate the command

post of the 4th Marine Division. There,

Kelley was ordered by the division chief of

staff to pass through the lines held by the

3d Battalion, 24th Marines, and relieve on

his left elements of the 25th Marines.

Jump-off hour for the attack toward Aslito

field was confirmed as being 0730.

Meanwhile, Colonel Kelley had established telephone contact with his executive

officer, who reported that the 1st and

2d Battalions of the 165th Infantry had

landed.18 After getting his orders, Kelley

joined the two battalions and moved them

south along the road running down the

beach from Charan Kanoa. Just before

dawn they took positions along the railroad

embankment paralleling and east of the

coastal highway and about 1,000 yards behind the line of departure. As the first

17

 The account of the landing of the 165th Regiment is derived from: Ralph C. Smith to CG

USAF Central Pacific Area, Preliminary Rpt on

Opns of 27th Div at Saipan, 15-24 Jun 44 (11

Jul 44), Annex I, Notes on Opns of 27th Div at

Saipan (hereafter cited as Ralph Smith, Notes,

Saipan), pp. 1-2; Brig Gen Ogden J. Ross, Summary of Opns by 27th Div, 16 Jun-10 Jul (13 Jul

44), pp. 1-2; 165th RCT Rpt of Saipan Action,

14 Jul 44, pp. 1-2.

18

 The 3d Battalion, 165th RCT, remained

afloat during the night. Part of the landing team

stayed aboard ship because of the scarcity of landing craft; the remainder spent the night aboard

landing craft, unable to locate the Charan Kanoa

channel. 3d Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 16 Jun 44.
CAPTURE OF ASLITO AIRFIELD 101

glimpses of light appeared in the eastern

sky before them, they prepared to jump

off in support of the 4th Marine Division.

During these same early morning hours,

three of the 27th Division's four artillery

battalions were also moving toward shore.

The 105th Field Artillery Battalion landed

at Blue Bleach 1 at 0515 and by 1055 was

in position and ready to fire in support of

the 165th Regiment. The other two field

artillery battalions (the 106th and the

249th) came ashore somewhat later but

were registered and ready to fire by about

the same time. The fourth battalion, the

104th Field Artillery Battalion, remained

afloat and detached from division artillery.19

D Plus 2: 17 June

165th Infantry

The immediate objective assigned to the

165th Infantry, which was attached to the

4th Marine Division, was Aslito airfield

and as much of the surrounding area as

could be secured in a day's fighting. Before

that could be accomplished, the regiment

would have to take the small village that

lay on the boundary line between its two

battalions, pass through a series of densely

planted cane fields, and seize the ridge that

ran in a southwesterly direction along

most of the regimental front and that commanded the western approaches to the airfield. The ridge at its highest points was

about 180 feet. The distance between the

line of departure and the westernmost

point of the airfield along the regiment's

line of advance was roughly 1,500 yards.

Colonel Kelley placed his 1st Battalion

on the right, his 2d on the left. Maj. James

H. Mahoney, commanding the 1st Battalion, disposed B Company on the left, and

A Company on the right just inshore of the

southern coast of the island. Lt. Col. John

F. McDonough put his E Company on the

right and G Company on the left, tying in

with the 25th Marines.20

The 1st Battalion crossed the line of departure at 0735, the 2d about fifteen

minutes later.21 Company A, on the right,

immediately ran into a fire fight. Three

Japanese pillboxes located just inland from

the beach opened fire on the advancing

troops and were not eliminated until an

amphibian tank had been called in to assist

and engineers were brought up to place

shaped charges and scorch out the enemy

inside with flame throwers.

Along the rest of the regimental line the

troops ran into no difficulty until they approached the small settlement that lay on

the boundary line between the two battalions. As B Company tried to skirt south

of the village, it came under simultaneous

fire from the direction of the village itself

and from the ridge to the eastward, 1st Lt.

Jose Gil, B Company's commander, called

for an air strike at 0955, but five minutes

later canceled the request in favor of artillery fire from the 14th Marines.22

For the next two hours the whole line

was more or less immobilized. It had become apparent that the ridge line in front

was strongly held by the enemy. The ridge

itself was covered by sparse undergrowth

and the approaches to it were all across

open cane fields. The cane offered some

19

 27th Inf Div Arty Rpt FORAGER Opn, p. 7.

20

 Unless otherwise noted, this account of the

action of the 165th Infantry is derived from: 27th

Inf Div G-3 Jnl; 165th RCT Rpt of Action Saipan, pp. 2-3; 165th RCT Jnl; 1st Bn 165th RCT

Jnl; 2d Bn 165th RCT Jnl; Edmund G. Love,

The Battle for Saipan, pp. 43-83, MS in OCMH. 21

 165th RCT Jnl, 17 Jun 44, Msg 13. 22

 1st Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 17 Jun 44, Msgs 23,

25.
102 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

NARROW-GAUGE RAILROAD NEAR CHARAN KANOA, Infantrymen of the 1st and 2d

Battalions wait for the jump-off signal, 17 June.

cover from enemy observation as long as

the terrain was level, but entrenched as

they were on the hill above these fields, the

Japanese could follow every movement

made by the Americans approaching below

them.23

By noon Colonel Kelley had more troops

available. The 3d Battalion, part of which

had remained aboard its transport while

the other part spent the night offshore in

small boats, was finally landed and assembled during the morning.24

 Company I was

ordered to report to the 1st Battalion commander to act as reserve in place of C

Company, which was now to be committed to the support of Company B.

At 1150 the 1st Battalion moved off

again in the attack with A Company on

the right, B on the left, and C to the rear

of B. At 1230 the 2d Battalion jumped off

following a fifteen-minute artillery preparation.25

 Immediately, the 1st Battalion

came under a concentration of mortar and

machine gun fire from the high hill that

marked the southern extremity of the ridge

line. For the next hour and fifteen minutes

this position was pounded by the field

pieces of the 105th and 249th Field

Artillery Battalions as well as by naval gunfire. At 1414 the attack was resumed.26

23

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 52-53. 24

 3d Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 17 Jun 44.

25

 1st Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 17 Jun 44, Msg 32;

2d Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 16 Jun 44, Msg 39. 26

 1st Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 17 Jun 44, Msgs 39,

41, 46, 52, 53, 54, 55.
CAPTURE OF ASLITO AIRFIELD 103

SOLDIERS WATCH DESTRUCTION OF A PILLBOX, the last of three that had

slowed their advance toward Aslito airfield on 17 June.

By 1535 Company A had gained the

crest after losing three men killed and four

wounded.27 About an hour later it was

joined by two platoons of B Company, but

the third platoon got involved in a fire fight

in the cane fields below and failed to reach

the summit during the rest of the day.28

Meanwhile, a gap had developed between Companies B and E, and the 1st

Battalion commander ordered Capt. Paul

Ryan to pull his C Company around to the

left of B. Ryan was ordered to make a reconnaissance to determine whether he

could move to the right behind A Company and up the ridge by the same route

it had taken. Once on the ridge, it was

supposed that he could move his company

directly to the left and take position on the

left of Company B. Ryan made the crest

with about half of his second platoon, but

the rest of his company failed to reach the

objective.29

While Company A and most of Company

B on top of the hill were digging in and

Company C was attempting to reinforce

them by various routes, the Japanese again

struck. Starting about 1725, the enemy

managed to work his way between B

Company and the 2d Battalion and commenced to pound the hill with mortars and

27 dual-purpose guns from the southern tip Ibid., Msg 66. 28

 Ibid., Msg 73; Love, Battle for Saipan, pp.

63-66. 29

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 72-74.
104 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

REINFORCEMENTS MOVING INLAND. Men of the 3d Battalion, 165th Infantry,

landed on 17 June and proceeded directly to assigned areas.

of the airfield.30 After about half an hour

of this, both Lieutenant Gil and Capt.

Laurence J. O'Brien, commander of Company A, decided to move off the hill.31

Captain O'Brien moved over to his extreme left and ordered his platoons to

withdraw by leapfrogging. The 3d Platoon

was to pull back behind the 2d while the

latter covered, and then the 2d was to pull

back below the ridge while the 1st covered.

The 1st Platoon eventually withdrew down

the hill while O'Brien himself covered its

movement. The company commander was

the last man down over the cliff.

Meanwhile, Captain Ryan, commanding

Company C, decided to move off to the

left to reinforce B Company and hold at

least part of the hill if possible. His attitude

was reflected by one of his men, Pfc. Cleve

E. Senor: "I fought all day for this ridge,"

Senor is reported to have said, "and by

God I'll help hold it." Both Senor and

Captain Ryan were killed in the attempt,

and the C Company platoon joined Company A in its withdrawal to the beach.32

Captain O'Brien led most of the withdrawing battalion back along the southern

beach for a distance of about 1,400 yards,

then cut inland where he met guides from

battalion headquarters. Shortly after 2000

he reached the command post with elements of all three companies and dug in

for the night practically at the line of

departure from which the companies had

attacked in the morning. Except for scattered elements that remained dug in along

the approaches to the ridge, progress in

the 1st Battalion's zone of action had been

30

 1st Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 17 Jun 44, Msg 79. 31

 Ibid., Msgs 80, 81. 32

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 75-77.
CAPTURE OF ASLITO AIRFIELD 105

nil.33 Casualties for the day's fighting in

the battalion were reported as 9 killed and

21 wounded.34

The 2d Battalion had been more successful. After the 1230 jump-off, E Company,

on the battalion right, was immediately hit

by an enemy artillery barrage that killed

three men and wounded four others. Except for the 1st Platoon, the whole company retired to the extreme west edge

of the village that lay on the battalion

boundary line and for the next hour

reorganized its scattered elements and evacuated its wounded. The 1st Platoon, however, instead of withdrawing when the

artillery barrage hit, rushed forward in an

effort to take concealment in the heavy

cane at the foot of the ridge line. From

there it began to move on to the ridge itself, but after the leading squad was cut

off by Japanese fire, the rest of the platoon

halted.

Capt. Bernard E. Ryan, the company

commander, had been with the forward

elements of the 1st Platoon when his company was hit and was already in the cane

field making a reconnaissance forward.35

With two of his men, he made his way

through the cane and up to the top of the

ridge. For thirty minutes they waited in

vain for the rest of the platoon to come

up, and when it finally appeared that they

were isolated, Ryan decided to conduct a

reconnaissance. For three hours this officer

and his two men wandered around the

hilltop observing the enemy from a distance

sometimes of only thirty yards. He ordered

one of his men, S. Sgt. Laurence I. Kemp,

to carry the information gained back to the

company executive officer. Kemp, equally

fearful of friendly and enemy fire along the

return route, solved his dilemma by tying

a white hankerchief to the barrel of his

rifle, executing a right shoulder arms, and

marching safely down the hill in full view

of both the enemy and his own troops.

Upon receiving Kemp's information

the battalion commander immediately requested reinforcements. Colonel Kelley released F Company, which was then moved

into the line to the left of E. Both companies jumped off at 1610 behind a screen

of heavy mortar, small arms, and automatic weapons fire.36

 Within thirty minutes they reached the ridge line about two

hundred yards west of Aslito field and

began to dig in.37

On the extreme left of the battalion

front, Capt. Paul J. Chasmar's G Company

met with little difficulty. By 1416, less than

two hours after the jump-off, the company had reached the ridge line and

commenced to dig in.38 Chasmar sent two

patrols onto the airfield. They investigated

the installations along the west side of the

field and up to the south edge of the

stretch without running into opposition.

About 1530 temporary contact was established on the left with the 25th Marines,

which had by this time penetrated into

the building area north of the airfield

proper.39

Thus, by the end of 17 June the 2d

Battalion had succeeded in pushing about 33

 Ibid., p. 79. 34

 27th Inf Div G-1 Periodic Rpt 1. 35

 Ryan was the brother of Capt. Paul Ryan, C

Company commander, who was killed later in the

afternoon while trying to hold a portion of this

same ridge. Because of Paul Ryan's death, men

of the 27th unofficially named the position Ryan's

Ridge.

36

 2d Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 17 Jun 44, Msg 51. 37

 Ibid., Msg 53; Love, Battle for Saipan, pp.

57-60. 38

 2d Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 17 Jun 44, Msg 46. 39

 Love, Battle for Saipan, p. 60; Hoffman,

Saipan, p. 95.
106 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

1,300 yards from the line of departure, was

firmly dug in just two hundred yards short

of Aslito airfield, and was in a good position to attack the field the following

morning. In the day's fighting the battalion had lost six killed and thirty-six

wounded.40 It failed to attack the airfield

on the 17th only because of regimental

orders to the contrary. Colonel Kelley decided that in view of the difficulty encountered by his 1st Battalion on the right

flank, it would be unwise for the 2d Battalion to push forward any farther. From

its positions on top of the ridge line

commanding Aslito, the 2d Battalion "had

an excellent field of fire against any possible counterattack," so the regimental

commander ordered it to hold there for

the night and to resume the attack against

the airfield the next day.41

4th Marine Division

To the left of Colonel Kelley's regiment

the 25th Marines jumped off at approximately the same time in columns of battalions. Against light resistance the regiment

pushed rapidly ahead to its O-2 line.

Because of the marines' more rapid progress, a gap developed between them and

the 2d Battalion, 165th Regiment, that was

filled by two companies of marines. By

midafternoon the companies had searched

the building area north of the airfield

proper and sent patrols onto the field itself.

When Colonel Kelley's determination not

to attack the airfield until the 18th became

known to the 25th Marines, its 3d Battalion

was shifted to the north side of the airfield,

facing south, and as it dug in for the night

there was no contact between the marines

and the Army unit.42

In the center of the 4th Marine Division's line, progress was more difficult. The

24th Marines jumped off on time about

0730, In spite of continuous fire from

antiaircraft guns located east of the airfield, the right flank battalion reached the

foot of the ridge line quickly and by noon

commenced the ascent. By 1630 the battalion commander reported that his men

were digging in on the O-2 line. In the

center and to the left enemy resistance was

even stronger, and after reaching the approaches to the ridge by late afternoon, the

marines withdrew a full 600 yards before

digging in for the night.43

To the 23d Marines on the division's left

flank fell the hardest fighting in the 4th

Marine Division zone for the 17th. On the

right, the 2d Battalion made fairly rapid

progress against light opposition, but on

the left, the 1st Battalion was not so

fortunate. Having once cleared Fina Susu

ridge, the marines started to advance

across the open ground to the eastward but

were quickly pinned down by heavy mortar

and enfilade machine gun fire from their

left front. After retiring to the ridge line

to reorganize, the battalion pushed off

again at 1500 after a ten-minute artillery

fire. Again the attack was stopped. Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion on the right had

been pushing steadily forward .and contact

was lost between the two battalions. Even

more serious was the 600-yard gap on the

left between the 23d Marines and the right

flank of the 2d Marine Division. From this

40

 27th Inf Div G-1 Periodic Rpt 1. 41

 165th RCT Rpt of Action Saipan, p. 3.

42

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex J,

25th RCT Rpt, p. 4; Hoffman, Saipan, p. 95. 43

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex I,

24th RCT Rpt, pp. 18-19; Hoffman, Saipan, pp.

95-96.
CAPTURE OF ASLITO AIRFIELD 107

MAP 5

area came most of the enemy fire, and the

failure of the two Marine divisions to close

this gap early in the day seriously endangered the flanks of both.

As night approached it became apparent

that, with the advance of the 2d Battalion
108 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

105TH INFANTRYMEN WADING IN FROM THE REEF on 17 June.

and the delay of the 1st, the right flank

was extended and the left retarded so that

it was impossible to close the gap with the

units then on line. Consequently, the 3d

Battalion, 23d Marines, was ordered to tie

in the flanks of the two. Later, the 3d

Battalion, 24th Marines, was attached to

the 23d Regiment and under cover of darkness was moved into position to relieve the

3d Battalion, 23d Marines, tie in, and defend the gap between the two leading

battalions. But between the two Marine

divisions as they dug in for the night, the

wide gap in the area around Lake Susupe

still remained unclosed.44

2d Marine Division

In the zone of the 2d Marine Division,

the day's plan called for an attack by the

2d and 6th Regimental Combat Teams to

the northeast, while the 8th Marines, on

the division right, was to drive due east

toward the O-1 line.45 (Map 5) The

jump-off hour was originally scheduled for

0730 but was subsequently changed by

General Holland Smith's headquarters to

0930. Word of the change, however, failed

to reach division headquarters in time, so

the troops crossed the line of departure according to the original schedule, following

a 90-minute intensive preparation by aerial

bombardment, naval gunfire, and artillery

shelling.

On the extreme right, the marines of the

2d Division met with the same problems

that were besetting the left flank of the

4th Division, and more besides. The 1st

Battalion, 29th Marines, attached to the

8th Marines, had first to slosh its way

44

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex H,

23d RCT Rpt, pp. 36-37; Hoffman, Saipan, p. 96.

45

 The following account of action in the 2d

Marine Division zone is from: 2d Marine Div

SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, Sec. VI, p. 4; Hoffman,

Saipan, pp. 92-93.
CAPTURE OF ASLITO AIRFIELD 109

through the sniper-infested swamp that

ran about 1,000 yards north of Lake

Susupe.46 Directly east of the swamp was

a coconut grove from which periodically

came enemy mortar fire, described in the

division action report as "bothersome."

Northeast of the coconut grove was a

high hill on which the Japanese were

entrenched in caves, and beyond this on a

sharp nose was a series of heavily manned

positions.

Throughout the day the 1st Battalion,

29th Marines, was unable to seize the

coconut grove and in fighting for it the

battalion commander, Lt. Col. Guy F.

Tannyhill, was wounded and had to be

evacuated. By late afternoon the battalion,

with the help of four tanks of the 2d Marine Tank Battalion, succeeded in taking

the hill to the north of the grove where

it dug in for the night. Meanwhile, the

other two assault battalions of the 8th Marines had reached their objective line with

little difficulty and were tied in for the

night with the 6th Marines on their left.

The 6th Marines had jumped off on

schedule at 0730 and soon after 0900 had

reached its objective line, encountering

little resistance on the way. Further progress was held up because of the danger of

overextending its lines as a result of the

relatively slow progress of the 8th Marines

on the right.

The 2d Marines, on the division left,

regulating its advance by that of the regiment to its right, moved forward at 0945

in a column of battalions. By 1020 the

leading battalion had advanced four hundred yards against light resistance. By 1800

the regiment had reached its objective line,

which was coincident with the Force

Beachhead Line47 in its zone and lay only

a thousand yards from the southern outskirts of the town of Garapan.

Landing Reinforcements

At 0605 on the 17th, Col. Leonard A.

Bishop received orders to land his 105th

Regimental Combat Team as soon as boats

were available.48 By 0845 the 1st Battalion was loaded and headed for the

beach; the other two followed during the

morning.49 However, because of low tide

and the heavy congestion in and around

the Charan Kanoa channel, the troops had

to be landed piecemeal. Not until late

afternoon were all of the infantrymen

ashore. That evening the 2d Battalion was

attached to the 4th Marine Division as reserve, and the 1st Battalion was attached

to the 165th Infantry and moved to an

assembly area just west of Aslito field.

Also, the 27th Division Reconnaissance

Troop landed and commenced to establish

an observation post area running from

Agingan Point about 1,500 yards along the

southern shore. The rest of the 105th Regiment remained in bivouac in the area of

Yellow Beach 3 during the night.50

The slowness with which the 105th Regiment was landed brought one later embarrassment to that unit. In view of the

bottleneck at the Charan Kanoa channel,

orders were issued shortly after noon to

stop unloading equipment through the

channel until the congestion had been

46

 The swampy ground around Lake Susupe was

much more extensive than it had appeared on the

map used by U.S. planners. See map of Saipan

Island reproduced from captured Japanese maps

by ACofS G-2 NTLF, 26 Jun 44.

47

 The Force Beachhead Line is the line that

fixes the inshore limits of a beachhead. 48

 105th RCT Jnl, 17 Jun 44, Msg 4. 49

 Ibid., passim. 50

 Ibid., Msgs 60, 61, 67; 105th RCT Opn Rpt

FORAGER, pp. 4-5.
110 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

cleared up.51 This caught most of the

regiment's organizational equipment still

aboard the transport Cavalier. That night

Cavalier, along with most of the other

transports, retired eastward after an air raid

warning. Meanwhile, the Japanese fleet

was reported to be moving toward Saipan.

In the light of these circumstances, Cavalier was ordered to stay out of the danger

zone and did not return until 25 June to

continue unloading.52 As General Ralph

Smith later testified:

The 105th Infantry was thus placed under

great handicap in operating as a regimental

unit. It had very little communication equipment or personnel ashore, either radio or telephone. It had almost no staff facilities or

blackout shelter such as regimental headquarters is compelled to use if orders arrive

after dark.53

North of the 27th Division's beaches

other important elements were coming

ashore on the 17th. General Holland Smith

left Rocky Mount in midafternoon and at

1530 set up the Northern Troops and

Landing Force command post at Charan

Kanoa. General Harper, corps artillery

commander, moved his command post to a

point about 200 yards inland from Yellow

Beach 2, and advance parties of the 532d

Field Artillery Battalion got ashore.54

Night of 17-18 June

Compared to the first night on Saipan,

that of the 17th was quiet for the American troops in their foxholes. Only in the

zone of the 2d Marine Division did the

Japanese exert themselves. Around midnight, they attempted to breach the Marine lines near the boundary between the

6th and 8th Regiments. About fifteen or

twenty Japanese overran two machine

guns, but the attack was shortly stopped.

For a brief time the enemy penetration

destroyed contact between the two regiments, but the gap was quickly filled and

the lines were restored.55

A more serious enemy threat occurred

on the morning of the 18th in the form of

an attempted counteramphibious landing.

A month before the American landings,

31st Army had established a force consisting of the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, to

be held in readiness for amphibious attacks

on either Saipan or Tinian in the event the

Americans were able to establish a beachhead.56

 About 0430 on the 18th this group

sortied from Tanapag Harbor in thirty-five

small boats to put the plan into effect. The

Japanese failed. LCI gunboats intercepted

the boats and, with the help of Marine

artillery, destroyed most of the landing

party and turned back the rest.57

This uninterrupted series of reverses sustained by the Japanese on Saipan merely

reinforced their determination to hold the

island at all costs. On the 17th the chief

of the Army General Staff in Tokyo attempted to bolster the spirits of the defenders in a message to 31st Army headquarters: "Because the fate of the Japanese

Empire depends on the result of your operation, inspire the spirit of the officers and

men and to the very end continue to

destroy the enemy gallantly and persistent- 51

 27th Inf Div G-4 Jnl, 17 Jun 44. 52

 USS Cavalier, Action Rpt Saipan-Tinian, 28

Aug 44, p. 3. 53

 Ralph Smith, Notes, Saipan, p. 3. 54

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, p. 12; XXIV

Corps Arty Final Rpt on FORAGER Opn, Phases I

and III, S-3 Rpt, pp. 5-6.

55

 Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 99-100. 56

 JICPOA Trans 8905, SONAE Operation Order 44 (14 May 44) 31st Army Order. 57

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl D, G-2

Rpt, p. 14.
CAPTURE OF ASLITO AIRFIELD

ly; thus alleviate the anxiety of our

Emperor."

To which the Chief of Staff, 31st Army,

responded: "Have received your honorable

Imperial words and we are grateful for

boundless magnanimity of the Imperial

favor. By becoming the bulwark of the Pacific with 10,000 deaths we hope to requite

the Imperial favor."58

D Plus 3: 18 June

27th Division

General Holland Smith's orders for 18

June called for all three divisions under his

command to seize the O-3 line within their

respective zones of action. For the 4th Marine Division and the 27th Division this

meant that the end of the day should see

them resting on the eastern coast of Saipan

from a point opposite Mount Nafutan up

the shore line about 5,000 yards in a northerly direction to a point about one third

up Magicienne Bay. From there the objective line for the 4th Marine Division

bent back in a northwesterly direction to

correspond with the advance of the 2d Marine Division, which was not intended to

cover so much territory. The boundary between the 4th Marine Division and the

27th Infantry Division ran eastward to

Magicienne Bay, skirting Aslito field to the

north. Army troops were to capture the

field itself.59 (See Map II.)

For action on the 18th, the 27th Division

had under its command only the 165th

Regiment and the 1st and 3d Battalions of

the 105th. The 2d Battalion, 105th Regiment, remained in corps reserve in an area

to the rear of the 4th Marine Division, and

the 106th Infantry was still at sea. In spite

of the fact that as early as 0758 the Marine

division had notified General Ralph Smith

that control of the 165th Regimental Combat Team was passing to Col. Kelley,60

 the

regimental commander remained uncertain

as to his own exact status. He later reported:

I was unable to determine (by telephone

conversation with Hq 4th Marine Div)

whether I was still attached to the 4th Marine Division or had passed to the command

of CG 27th Div. . . . Shortly after this, Major General Ralph Smith visited my CP and

advised me that I should receive notice of

my release from the Marines and reversion to

the 27th Division. I did receive notice from

the 27th Division but never received such

orders from 4th Marine Division Headquarters.61

This confusion, however, though indicative of poor liaison, was to have no

significant effect on the action of the units

involved.

Jump-off hour for the two Marine divisions was to be 1000; for the Army

division it was 1200.62 The Immediate

concern of Colonel Kelley, however, was to

recapture the ridge southwest of Aslito

that his 1st Battalion had given up the

previous day. Accordingly, at 0605, he ordered Maj. Dennis D. Claire to move the

3d Battalion into the line on the right in

order to launch a co-ordinated attack with

the 1st Battalion at 0730.63 The 165th Infantry jumped off on schedule after a

half-hour naval and artillery preparation

along the whole front. The 1st and 3d Battalions with four tanks preceding them

stormed up the ridges while the 2d Bat58

 31st Army Msg File, Msgs 115 and 1046. 59

 NTLF Opn Order 6-44, 17 Jun 44.

60

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 18 Jun 44, Msg 16. 61

 165th RCT Rpt Saipan, p. 3. 62

 NTLF Opn Order 6-44. 63

 3d Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 18 Jun 44, Msg 3.
112 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

talion on the edge of the airfield held its

lines until the other units on its right came

abreast, A few minutes after 1000 the

ridge that had caused so much trouble the

preceding day was secured against very

light opposition and with negligible casualties to the assaulting units.64

Meanwhile, at 0800, Colonel Kelley authorized his 2d Battalion to cross Aslito

airfield.65 Beginning about 0900, Captain

Chasmar, commanding G Company, ordered his men across the airfield along the

north side. Capt. Francis P. Leonard, in

command of F Company, followed suit

shortly after, although he kept his company echeloned to the right rear in order to

keep physical contact with E Company,

which in turn was in contact with the 1st

Battalion. Chasmar reported that he had

crossed the airfield at 1000. Sixteen minutes later, Aslito was announced as secured.66

 That afternoon when General

Ralph Smith arrived at the regimental

command post the airfield was officially renamed Conroy Field in honor of Col.

Gardiner J. Conroy, former regimental

commander of the 165th, who had been

killed at Makin.67 Later, it was renamed

Iseley (sic) Field in honor of a naval aviator, Comdr. Robert H. Isely, who had

been shot down over Saipan.68

Up until 1000 the troops that had overrun the airstrip had met no opposition.

Only one Japanese was discovered on the

whole installation, and he was found hiding

between the double doors of the control

tower. All of the Aslito garrison still alive

had retired to Nafutan peninsula.69

Upon reaching the eastern end of the

airstrip, Captain Chasmar stopped to build

up his line because he had been having

considerable trouble during the morning

trying to cover his frontage. He had tried

unsuccessfully to make contact with the

marines on the left who were now veering

off to the northeast and in his move across

the airport had temporarily lost contact on

the right with F Company. At the same

time, F Company was itself developing

large gaps between platoons. By 1100 the

whole 2d Battalion advance was stopped

while the battalion commander waited for

his companies to close up. For the next

two hours the forward line remained stationary along the eastern boundary of the

airfield. Unfortunately, the terrain in

which G and F Companies had taken up

positions was overlooked by the high

ground of Nafutan ridge, and the men

had hardly begun to dig in when they

came under fire from dual-purpose guns

located in that sector. The fire lasted for

about two hours until friendly artillery was

brought to bear on the Japanese positions,

which were temporarily silenced.70

With the airfield secure in the hands of

the 2d Battalion, 165th Regiment, and the

ridge west and southwest of it occupied

by the 1st and 3d Battalions, General

Ralph Smith rearranged his units to launch

the main attack at noon as ordered. Into

his right flank he ordered the 1st and

3d Battalions, 105th Regimental Combat

Team, which had landed the day before

and so far had seen no action on Saipan.

On the extreme right the 3d Battalion,

64

 165th RCT Jnl, 18 Jun 44, Msgs 45, 54. 65

 Ibid., Msg 16. 66

 Ibid., Msg 56; Love, Battle for Saipan, pp.

86-87. 67

 165th RCT Jnl, 18 Jun 44, Msg 76. See

Crowl and Love, Gilberts and Marshalls, pp. 96-97. 68

 Hoffman, Saipan, p. 104n.

69

 Love, Battle for Saipan, p. 87. 70

 2d Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 18 Jun 44; Love,

Battle for Saipan, pp. 87-88.
CAPTURE OF ASLITO AIRFIELD 113

ASLITO FIELD BECOMES CONROY FIELD. General Ralph Smith (left) congratulating Col. Gerard W. Kelley at ceremonies renaming the airfield following its capture. Brig. Gen. Ogden Ross, at right, looks on.

105th, completed the relief of the 3d Battalion, 165th, at 1245, three quarters of an

hour late.71 The 3d Battalion, 165th, then

went into reserve. About the same time,

the 1st Battalion, 105th, relieved the 1st

Battalion, 165th. The latter was then

shifted to the left flank of the division line

to close the gap between the 4th Marine

Division and the 2d Battalion, 165th,

which was occupying the airfield.72 From

right to left, then, the new division line

consisted of Companies L, I, C, and A,

105th Infantry, and Companies F, G, B,

and C, 165th Infantry, with the remaining

infantry companies in reserve in their respective battalion zones.

As the afternoon wore on it developed

that, as on the previous day, progress on

the extreme right of the division front was

the slowest, and again the chief obstacle

was terrain. In the area inland from the

southern coast the ground was a series of

jagged coral pinnacles that jutted up from

the water's edge to a height of about 90

feet. Between these peaks were a heavy undergrowth of vines, densely planted small

trees, and high grass. Against these odds,

but luckily not against the added encum71

 3d Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 18 Jun 44, Msgs 34,

35.

72

 1st Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 18 Jun 44, Msgs 41,

43, 44, 45, 57.
114 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

brance of Japanese opposition, Company

L on the extreme right advanced a mere

200 yards from the line of departure by

nightfall, and I Company's progress was

only a little better.73 The situation on the

left of the 105th Regimental line was somewhat more promising. In spite of artillery

fire from Nafutan Point, Lt. Col. William

J. O'Brien, 1st Battalion commander, succeeded by 1400 in pushing forward to a

line running southwest from the southeast

corner of the airfield.74

While the 105th Regiment was having

more than a little difficulty getting started

on the division right flank, the 165th on the

left was faring better. By 1700 the entire

regimental line had almost reached Magicienne Bay, having met only light opposition. The original intention had been to

proceed on to the water's edge, but the

heavy undergrowth and coral outcroppings

persuaded the regimental commander to

pull back to the high ground west of the

shore line for the night. About 1700 the

commanding officer of the 3d Battalion,

25th Marines, who was on the right flank

of the 4th Marine Division line, reported

the imminence of a Japanese counterattack

between the 24th and 25th Marines. In

view of the necessity of the latter's pulling

north to pour in reinforcements against

this threat, the lines of the 165th were

shifted left about 600 yards to establish

contact with the marines for the night.75

4th Marine Division

North of the 27th Division zone, the 4th

Marine Division attacked toward the east

coast with three regiments abreast: the

25th Marines on the right, 24th Marines in

the center, and 23d Marines on the left.76

The right half of the objective line for this

day's action was to be on the coast of

Magicienne Bay, and from there it bent

back to the northwest to meet the more

slowly progressing 2d Marine Division.

The 25th Marines jumped off on schedule at 1000. Opposition was light, and by

1330 the regiment had reached the beaches

on Magicienne Bay well in advance of the

165th Infantry on its right. The occupation

of these beaches on the east coast completed

the initial drive of the division across Saipan. The island now, at this point at least,

was cut in two. One battalion of the 25th

Regiment was left behind to mop up the

southern extremity of a heavily defended

cliff line that had been bypassed by the

24th Marines on its left.

The latter regiment had had a little difficulty organizing its lines before the jumpoff and consequently was delayed forty-five

minutes in the attack. Nevertheless, in the

face of "moderate to heavy" machine gun

and rifle fire, it had succeeded by 1400 in

pushing forward to a point only 300 yards

west of Magicienne Bay. Then, about 1615,

two Japanese tanks suddenly appeared in

the zone of the 2d Battalion, causing considerable anxiety and about fifteen American casualties before they were chased

away by bazookas and artillery. By nightfall the elements of the 24th on the right

had reached the O-3 line, part of which

rested on the coast, and the unit was well

tied in with the regiments on its right and

left.

73

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 89-90. 74

 105th RCT Jnl, 18 Jun 44, Msg 35. 75

 165th RCT Jnl, 18 Jun 44, Msgs 93, 99, 100,

109.

76

 This account of 18 June action of the 4th

Marine Division is derived from: 23d RCT Rpt,

PP. 37-38; 24th RCT Rpt, p. 19; 25th RCT Rpt,

pp. 4-5; Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 102-04.
CAPTURE OF ASLITO AIRFIELD 115

EXAMINING AN ENEMY GUN, This Japanese Type 10 120-mm. gun was one of

several captured when Aslito airfield was overrun.

As was the case of the 165th Infantry,

the 23d Marines on the extreme left of the

4th Division line had to capture its line

of departure before the scheduled jump-off

hour. At 0730 the 3d Battalion, 24th Marines (attached to the 23d), passed

through the 1st Battalion, 23d, with orders

to seize the line of departure before the

main attack, which was scheduled for

0900. The battalion never made it—not

that day at least. Intense mortar and enfilade machine gun fire from the left flank

stopped the men after an advance of about

200 yards. On the right the 2d Battalion,

23d, made about the same gain before it

too was pinned down. At 1300 the attack

was resumed and after fierce fighting

against stubborn Japanese resistance the

troops advanced about 300 yards. By 1715

the regiment had established a line some

400 yards east of Lake Susupe. Progress

on the left flank of the 4th Marine Division

had been far less than anticipated. It was

becoming apparent that the main line of

Japanese resistance would be in the area

north and east of Lake Susupe and not in

the southern sector of the island.

2d Marine Division

The left flank of the corps line remained

almost stationary during the 18th. As the
116 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

2d Marine Division's commander explained

it, "At this stage, the frontage occupied by

the Division was such that its lines could

not be further lengthened without dangerously thinning and overextending them."77

The strong pocket of resistance encountered by the 4th Division near the division

boundary line formed a hostile salient into

the beachhead and forced both divisions

to maintain abnormally long lines in the

sector. The inability of the 4th Division to

make substantial progress on its left flank

in turn prevented the 2d Division from

risking further extension of its own lines.

Only the 8th Marines saw significant

fighting on the 18th. The enemy-infested

coconut grove on the regiment's right that

had proved so bothersome the previous day

was assaulted and captured. Here, a large

number of Japanese dead were found. Before the 18th the enemy had systematically

removed its dead before the advance of the

attacking forces, but by now, with the

American beachhead firmly established and

Aslito airfield overrun, Japanese commanders on Saipan had more urgent matters

on their minds.78

The Japanese Situation

By the night of 18 June, the Japanese

high command in Tokyo as well as its subordinates on Saipan were at last compelled

to confess that the situation was critical.

The island had been cut in two and the

southern part, including the main airfield,

was for all practical purposes in American

hands. True, remnants of Japanese units,

including most of the Aslito garrison, were

still holed up on Nafutan peninsula and

along the southern shore west of it, but

they were cut off from the main body of

troops and incapable of anything more serious than harassing attacks against the

American lines. (See Map 5.)

In the face of unrelenting pressure from

their attackers, the Japanese on the 18th

began withdrawing to a defense line extending across the island in a southeasterly

direction from a point just below Garapan

via the south slopes of Mount Tapotchau

to Magicienne Bay. To be more exact, the

new "line of security" drawn up by 31st

Army headquarters on the night of the

18th was to run from below Garapan east

to White Cliff, then south to Hill 230

(meters) and southeast through Hill 286

(meters) to a point on Magicienne

Bay about a mile west of the village of

Laulau.79

The line roughly paralleled the O-4, or

fourth phase line of the American attackers, and was the first of two last-ditch defense lines scratched across the island in a

vain attempt to stabilize the battle during

the retreat to the north. If the Americans

could be brought to a standstill, the Japanese hoped to prolong the battle and

eventually win out with the aid of rein77

 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, Sec.

VI, p. 6. 78

 Hoffman, Saipan, p. 103.

79

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item 9983-85, p. 10,

31st Army CofS, Msg 1060. The map of Saipan

prepared before the operation by American troops,

on which the maps in this volume are essentially

based, is by necessity not very accurate—particularly from the point of view of terrain configuration and spot elevation data.

The troops also used a captured Japanese map

of the island. The heights on this map, which is

more accurate as to relief features, are in meters.

Elevations in meters derived from the Japanese

map are shown on the maps of this volume in

parentheses.
CAPTURE OF ASLITO AIRFIELD 117

forcements. To Tokyo, 31st Army headquarters radioed its plans:

Situation evening of 18 June:

The Army is consolidating its battle lines

and has decided to prepare for a showdown

fight. It is concentrating the [43d Division]

in the area E of Tapotchau. The remaining

units [two infantry battalions of the 135th

Inf, about one composite battalion, and one

naval unit], are concentrating in the area E

of Garapan. This is the beginning of our

showdown fight.80

In reply, Imperial General Headquarters

ordered Maj. Gen. Keiji Iketa to hold on

to the beaches still in his possession, wait

for reinforcements over those beaches, and

"hinder the establishment of enemy airfields."81

 Iketa reported that he would

carry out these orders, that Aslito airfield

would be neutralized by infiltration patrols "because our artillery is destroyed,"

and that the Banaderu (Marpi Point) airfield would be repaired and defended "to

the last." "We vow," he concluded, "that

we will live up to expectations."82 Stabilize the battle, keep beaches open for

reinforcements, recover and preserve the

use of the Marpi Point airfield, and deny

to the Americans the use of Aslito—these

four objectives were now the cornerstones

of Japanese tactics on Saipan.

And from the Emperor himself came

words of solemn warning and ominous

prescience: "Although the front line officers are fighting splendidly, if Saipan is

lost, air raids on Tokyo will take place

often, therefore you absolutely must hold

Saipan."83

Five months later American B-29 bombers taking off from Saipan for Tokyo would

confirm the Emperor's worst fears.

80

 31st Army Msg File, Msg 1050. 81

 Ibid., Msg 150.

82

 Ibid., Msg 1054. 83

 Ibid., Msg 152.

CHAPTER VII

Supporting Arms and Operations

Battle of the Philippine Sea

While the marines and soldiers of the

V Amphibious Corps were still pushing

toward the east coast of Saipan, Admiral

Spruance received news that was to prove

even more significant than that of the capture of Aslito field. Beginning on 15 June,

American submarines patrolling the waters

east of the Philippine Islands sent in a series of reports on enemy ship movements

that seemed to indicate strongly that the

Japanese were massing a fleet and were

sending it to the rescue of the beleaguered

defenders of Saipan.

Spruance, like all other high-ranking

U.S. naval commanders in the Pacific, had

hoped that an invasion of the Marianas

would bring the enemy fleet out fighting.

That hope now seemed likely to be fulfilled.

The Japanese Navy, like the American,

had long been imbued with Alfred Thayer

Mahan's doctrine that the sine qua non

of victory in naval warfare is the destruction of the enemy fleet. In their own national history, the Japanese had only to

look back as far as 1905 for historical

warrant for this assumption. In that year,

Admiral Heigachiro Togo had met and almost annihilated the Russian Fleet at the

Battle of Tsushima, thus paving the way to

Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War

and a long-coveted place in the international sun.

In the early stages of World War II the

Japanese sought to put this doctrine to

test, but always fell short of complete

success. In spite of the tremendous damage

done to it at Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Fleet

survived and recovered with remarkable

rapidity. Important sea battles were won

by the Japanese in the Solomons, but none

of them were conclusive. At Midway the

tables were turned when U.S. carrier

planes repelled an attempted invasion and

administered a sound drubbing to the Japanese naval forces supporting it.

By late 1943 the high command of the

Imperial Navy felt that conditions were

ripe for a decisive fleet engagement. Twice

in the autumn of that year Admiral

Mineichi Koga, Commander in Chief,

Combined Fleet, sallied forth from Truk in

an effort to engage the U.S. Central Pacific Fleet. Both times he failed to discover

his adversary. In the end he retired to Truk

and allowed most of his carrier air strength

to be diverted to the Rabaul area, where

two thirds of it was lost.1 In the spring of

1944, as American forces threatened to

1

 Thomas Wilds, "The Admiral Who Lost His

Fleet," United States Naval Institute Proceedings,

Vol. 77, No. 11, Whole No. 585 (November,

1951) pp. 1175-81; Crowl and Love, Gilberts

and Marshalls, Ch. IV; Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, Ch. IX.
120 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

press farther into western Pacific waters,

the Japanese prepared another plan, Operation A-GO, in the hope of forcing a major

fleet engagement.

On 3 May 1944 Admiral Toyoda, Koga's

successor as Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, issued the general order for

Operation A-GO. It was assumed that the

next major thrust of the U.S. Fleet would

be into waters around the Palaus, in the

western Carolines, and that there it could

be met and bested by the Japanese.

Thought was given to the possibility that

the Americans might move first against the

Marianas rather than Palaus, but the consensus among high Japanese naval circles

favored the latter alternative. Probably

wishful thinking entered the picture here,

for it was obviously to the advantage of

the Japanese to concentrate their naval

forces in the more southerly waters. The

1st Mobile Fleet, commanded by Admiral

Jisaburo Ozawa, was soon to be moved to

Tawi Tawi in the Sulu Archipelago, and

it was to this force that major responsibility

for carrying out Operation A-GO was assigned. The Japanese were already suffering a shortage of both fuel and tankers,

and should Ozawa extend the range of his

operations as far north as the Marianas he

would take considerable logistical risks.2

Before A-GO could be executed, an

American thrust in another quarter caused

Toyoda to change his plans. On 27 May

General MacArthur's forces invaded the

island of Biak in the Geelvink Bay area of

New Guinea and placed the Japanese admiral in a dilemma. If Biak were lost to

the invaders, the success of A-GO could

easily be jeopardized by American aircraft

based on that island. On the other hand,

to reinforce Biak would entail at least a

temporary dispersion of forces, and of

course the first principle upon which AGO was based was that of concentration

of force. Faced with this choice, the Japanese decided to accept the risks of

dispersion and to dispatch some of their

ships and planes to the Biak area in an

effort to drive the Americans off. This decision was reflected in a new plan of

operations known as KON.3

Three times within eleven days Japanese

naval forces sailed forth for Biak with troop

reinforcements. The first of the expeditions

turned back on 3 June, having lost the

element of surprise on being sighted by

American submarines and planes. The second was struck by B-25's and suffered one

destroyer sunk and three others damaged

before the entire task force was chased

away by American warships. The third,

which included the superbattleships Yamato and Musashi, the light cruiser Noshiro,

and six destroyers, all detached from the

1st Mobile Fleet, was abruptly called off

on 12 June when Admiral Toyoda received

definite word that Admiral Spruance's

forces were attacking the Marianas.

Thus, the American soldiers on Biak

were saved from further naval harassment

by the timely appearance of Central Pacific

forces off the Marianas. By the same token,

the invasion of Biak by Southwest Pacific

forces was to prove a boon to Admiral

2

 Information on Operation A-GO is derived

from: Japanese Studies in World War II, 60 and

97; USSBS, Campaigns, pp. 213-72; USSBS, Interrogations, II, 316.

3

 Information concerning KON and its effects

is derived from: Smith, Approach to the Philippines, Ch. XV; Samuel Eliot Morison, History of

United States Naval Operations in World War II,

Vol. VIII, New Guinea and the Marianas, March

1944-August 1944 (Boston, Little, Brown and

Company, 1953), pp. 119-33.
SUPPORTING ARMS AND OPERATIONS 121

Spruance, Japanese plans for A-GO relied

heavily on the support of naval land-based

planes of the 1st Air Fleet stationed in the

Marianas, Carolines, and Palaus, but one

third to one half of all these planes were

sent to Sorong and other bases in western

New Guinea in response to the invasion of

Biak. There, large numbers of pilots fell

prey to malaria, and most of the aircraft

were lost either to U.S. action or to bad

weather. By the time the U.S. Fifth Fleet

showed up to meet the challenge of A-GO,

the land-based aircraft available to Toyoda

had been sizably reduced in number.

On 11 June the Japanese admiral received word of Mitscher's carrier strike

against Saipan and immediately suspended

the KON operation, ordering the task

force bound for Biak to join forces with

the main body of Ozawa's 1st Mobile Fleet.

Ozawa himself sortied from Tawi Tawi two

days later, and on the morning of the 15th

Operation A-GO was activated. Contrary

to earlier Japanese expectations, the Americans had chosen to attack the Marianas

rather than the western Carolines. Hence

the scene of the impending "decisive fleet

engagement" could only lie somewhere in

the Philippine Sea—that vast stretch of

ocean between the Philippines and the

Marianas.4

On the evening of 15 June Ozawa's fleet

had completed its progress from Tawi Tawi

up the Visayan Sea and through San Bernadino Strait into the Philippine Sea. On

the next afternoon it was joined by the

KON force that had been diverted from

Biak. Both fleets were sighted by American

submarines, and it was apparent that the

Japanese were heading in a northeasterly

direction toward the Marianas.

All together, Ozawa had mustered 5 carriers, 4 light carriers, 5 battleships, 11

heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 28 destroyers, and 430 carrier-based combat aircraft.

He was outnumbered by the Americans in

every respect except in heavy cruisers.

Spruance had at his disposal 7 carriers, 8

light carriers, 7 battleships, 8 heavy cruisers, 13 light cruisers, 69 destroyers, and

891 carrier-based planes.5 The mammoth

American fleet was divided into four carrier task groups under Admiral Mitscher,

Commander, Task Force 58. Mitscher was

in tactical command, but his major tactical

decisions had to be approved by Spruance

as Commander, Fifth Fleet.

By the morning of 18 June all four

American carrier groups had rendezvoused

and were steaming in a southwesterly direction toward the approaching enemy.

Spruance had ordered: "Action against the

enemy must be pushed vigorously by all

hands to ensure complete destruction of his

fleet," but had added the precautionary

note, "Task Force 58 must cover Saipan

and our forces engaged in that operation."6

 That night Admiral Mitscher

learned the full meaning of this qualification when his superior ordered him to

change course to the east and maintain it

4

 The following account of the Battle of

the Philippine Sea is derived from CINCPACCINCPOA Opns in POA—Jun 44, Annex A, Part

VII; Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas,

Chs. XIV-XVI.

The Philippine Sea was so named as the result

of a recommendation made by Admiral Nimitz

in 1944, at the time of operations against the

Marianas. The name was officially approved by

the U.S. Board on Geographic Names in March

1945. The Philippine Sea applies to that area

limited on the north by Japan, on the east by the

Bonins and the Marianas, on the south by the

Carolines, and on the west by the Philippines,

Formosa, and the Ryukyu Islands.

5

 Figures are from Morison, New Guinea and

the Marianas, p. 233. 6

 Ibid., pp. 243, 250.
122 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

until daylight. Mitscher protested but was

overruled. Admiral Spruance was fearful

that Ozawa might attempt an end run under cover of darkness and put the Japanese

fleet between him and Saipan. The Fifth

Fleet commander was unwilling to jeopardize the landing operations even if it meant

a delay in closing with the enemy fleet.

Actually, no such end run was contemplated by the Japanese commander, but

Spruance had no way of knowing that at

the time.

On the morning of the 19th, after the

American carriers had turned west again,

Ozawa's planes, which were lighter and less

well armed and therefore capable of greater

range than their American rivals, delivered

the first blow. In four separate raids lasting

for almost five hours Japanese planes

roared over the horizon in a futile effort to

knock out Mitscher's mighty fleet. Out of

all the American surface vessels present,

only one was hit—the battleship South Dakota, which lost 27 men killed and 23

wounded, but was not seriously damaged.

For the rest, the raids were broken up and

the raiders destroyed or turned back by

the combined might of American ships' fire

and planes, chiefly the latter. Later that

afternoon American strikes on Guam and

Rota, which had been ordered for the

morning, were resumed. By evening the

"Great Marianas Turkey Shoot" was over

with disastrous results to the Japanese. Out

of 430 carrier planes, Ozawa lost 330.

Some went down under the fire of American ships and planes; others were destroyed on Guam and Rota; and still

others were counted as operational casualties. Against this, only twenty-four American planes were shot down and six lost

operationally. The same day, two Japanese

carriers, Shokaku and Taiho (Admiral

Ozawa's flagship) were sunk by American

submarines operating well to the south of

Mitscher's fleet.

That night Ozawa changed course to the

northwest hoping to put distance between

himself and the American fleet and to allow himself opportunity to refuel. Mitscher

held to a westerly course in the belief that

it would bring him across the track of his

enemy. However, he could not send out

night air patrols because none of his carrier

aircraft were equipped with search radar,7

and not until late the following afternoon

was aerial contact finally made with the

Japanese fleet, which was now heading in

the general direction of Okinawa. Mitscher

immediately launched a twilight air attack

that succeeded in destroying about 65 of

Ozawa's remaining 100 aircraft, sinking

the carrier Hiyo, hitting another carrier

and a battleship, and damaging two fleet

oilers to the extent that they had to be

scuttled. American plane losses came to 100,

mostly incurred through crashes when the

returning planes tried to land on their carriers after dark. Personnel casualties were

not so heavy, coming to only 49.

Thus ended the Battle of the Philippine

Sea. Mitscher would have detached his

battleships, cruisers, and destroyers to pursue and destroy the fleeing enemy, but

Spruance refused to break up the fleet. It

would have made no difference anyway

since Ozawa was by now too far away to

be overhauled.

Despite the escape of six carriers and

their escorts, the Imperial Navy had suffered a severe blow—one from which it

never recovered. In the opinion of Samuel

Eliot Morison, the Battle of the Philippine

7

 Ltr, Admiral Spruance to Maj Gen A. C. Smith, 28 Feb 55, OCMH.
SUPPORTING ARMS AND OPERATIONS 123

Sea "decided the Marianas campaign by

giving the United States Navy command

of the surrounding waters and air. Thus,

the Japanese land forces on Saipan, Tinian,

and Guam were doomed, no matter how

bravely and doggedly they fought."8

There can be no doubt of the decisive

influence of the sea battle on the ultimate

outcome of the land campaigns in the Marianas. On the other hand, the immediate

effects were not altogether beneficial from

the point of view of the troops fighting

ashore on Saipan. On first getting word of

the approach of the Japanese Fleet, Admiral Spruance had detached from Admiral

Turner's attack force five heavy cruisers,

three light cruisers, and twenty-one destroyers to supplement Task Force 58.9

This left Turner without adequate fire support for his transport shipping, which was

still in the process of unloading at Saipan.

Consequently, most of the transports retired well to the eastward of Saipan on the

night of 17 June and remained away from

the Saipan area until the Battle of the Philippine Sea was over.10

 The withdrawal of

these transports naturally interrupted unloading and imposed additional strains on

the already overburdened logistical program on Saipan.

Logistics

No aspect of an amphibious landing

against a hostile shore presents more complex problems than that of transporting

supplies from ship to shore and allocating

them at the proper time and place and in

the proper amounts to the troops that need

them. Similarly, no phase of an amphibious

operation is so likely to become disorganized and even disorderly. Ordinarily, the

assault landing craft and vehicles move

from ship to shore in scheduled wave formations and in a fairly methodical fashion.

Once ashore the troops deploy and eventually move inland according to prearranged

plan. Supplies, on the other hand, cannot

move off the beach under their own power.

More often than not they are dumped at

the water's edge in a haphazard fashion

by landing craft whose naval crews are primarily interested in putting out to sea

again. The supplies stay at the shore line

until shore parties can segregate them in

some order on the beaches or until mechanical transportation comes ashore to haul

them in to inland dumps. To the casual

observer at least, the pile up and congestion

of supplies at the shore line during the first

phase of a normal amphibious assault presents a picture of total chaos.

To be sure, in a well-conducted amphibious operation the chaos is often more apparent than real, but even under the best

conditions the problem of ship-to-shore

supply is a complicated one and not easy

of solution. At Saipan it was further complicated by local circumstances, which

were formidable, although not unique. On

the first day unloading was hampered by

heavy artillery and mortar fire on the

beaches that did not cease altogether until

three days later. Hydrographic conditions

were unfavorable to a steady movement of

supplies and equipment in to the beaches.

The uncertain naval situation made it

necessary for the transports to retire to seaward each of the first three nights. Finally,

for the next five days and nights most of

the transports stayed at sea awaiting the

8

 Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, p.

318.

9

 Ibid., p. 242. 10

 TF 52 Opns Rpt Marianas, Incl A, pp. 6-7.
124 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

outcome of the Battle of the Philippine

Sea.11

Enemy harassment of the beaches and

the unfavorable hydrographic conditions

offshore were of course felt most seriously

by the two Marine divisions during the first

two days of the operation. Sporadically,

enemy fire caused all unloading work to be

suspended as shore parties took cover. The

beaches on the flanks of the landing area

were completely inaccessible to boats of

any kind. LST's and LCT's could ground

on the abutting reef, but supplies from that

point to shore had either to be manhandled or transferred to LVT's and

DUKW's. Some landing craft could reach

shore at the interior beaches by way of the

narrow channel off Charan Kanoa, but at

low tide its use was restricted to those of

the most shallow draft, and at all times it

was congested because both assault divisions were using it.12

Inevitably, too, along the six thousand

yards of beach there was some mix-up of

supplies in spite of the elaborate organization to supervise the unloading of the

transports and the movement of supplies

to the troop units to which they were allocated. In accordance with standard amphibious doctrine, this task was shared by

naval beach parties and ground force shore

parties. The beach parties supervised the

unloading of the transports and the progress of landing craft and vehicles to the

shore line. Also, they marked channels and

controlled traffic in the lagoon. In command of these operations was a force master who had under him two transport

group beachmasters, one for each Marine

division, each of whom in turn commanded

two transport division beachmasters, one

for each assault regiment. All of these naval

officers were landed as soon as satisfactory

lateral communications had been established, and each was provided with a

communication team of one officer, five

radiomen, and five signalmen.13

Paired with the naval beachmasters and

working in close co-ordination with them

were the Marine and Army shore party

commanders whose job it was to control

traffic on the beaches themselves, receive

the supplies as they were landed, and distribute them to the appropriate troop

units. Each Marine division was authorized a shore party of 98 officers and 2,781

enlisted men. The 2d Marine Division

based its shore party organization on the

pioneer battalion of its engineer regiment.

Nine teams were organized under three

shore party group headquarters. The organization of the 4th Marine Division's

shore party differed somewhat in that two

shore party groups were set up, each with

three teams. These were drawn from personnel of the 121st Naval Construction

Battalion as well as from the pioneer battalion of the division engineering regiment.14

 Each of the three Army regiments

had its own shore party battalion—the

152d Engineers for the 165th Infantry, the

34th Engineers for the 105th, and the

1341st Engineers of the 1165th Engineer

Group for the 106th Infantry.15

Notwithstanding this system of interlocking and parallel controls, the first two

days of the operation frequently saw supplies of the 2d Marine Division being

11

 COMINCH P-007, Ch. 5, p. 7. 12

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex D,

pp. 8-9; 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER,

Part II, p. 32.

13

 TF 51 Opns Rpt Marianas, Incl C, pp. 5-6. 14

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl J, Engr

and Shore Party Rpt, p. 2. 15

 27th Inf Div G-4 Rpt, pp. 12, 17.
SUPPORTING ARMS AND OPERATIONS 125

SHORE PARTIES UNLOADING SUPPLIES ON BLUE BEACH 1

dumped on the beaches of the 4th Division

and vice versa. When the 27th Division

began to land the situation rapidly deteriorated. On the night of 16 June the 165th

Infantry commenced to come ashore over

Blue Beach 1 in the zone of the 4th Marine

Division. Next day the 105th Infantry

followed. Few, if any, preliminary plans

had been made by higher headquarters to

cover the details of landing the reserve division, and the division itself, in its initial

planning, had made no provision for a

landing in this particular area.16 Hence,

the process of getting the troops and supplies ashore inevitably became a makeshift

proposition. Col. Charles Ferris, Division

G-4, set up an on-the-spot system of controls, but was unable to persuade either

the Navy beachmaster or the senior shore

party commander at corps headquarters to

agree to routing cargo to any single beach

or to order the transports' boats to report

to a single control craft in the channel so

that an accurate record could be kept of

items discharged. The result was that the

27th Division's supplies were landed over

several beaches, and the Army troops had

to scramble and forage to get what they

needed.17

On 18 June all ships carrying troops and

supplies of the 27th Division retired eastward of the island to await the outcome

of the Battle of the Philippine Sea. To add

to the division's difficulties, the 152d Engineers, which had been assigned as the

shore party for the 165th Infantry, was

detached and assigned to corps, leaving

only the 34th Engineers to perform shore

party functions for the two Army regiments that landed. By the morning of the

19th the supply situation within the division had become critical. True, there was

16

 See above, p. 41. 17

 27th Inf Div G-4 Rpt, p. 17.
126 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

CATERPILLAR TRACTOR PULLING AMMUNITION PALLETS FROM AN LCM

enough food and water on hand for

immediate needs, but only by dint of borrowing K rations from Marine dumps and

capturing the water cisterns on Aslito field.

The quantities of Class II, III, and IV

(organization equipment, fuel and lubricants, miscellaneous equipment) supplies

on hand were almost negligible. Small arms

ammunition would last four days, but

there were only about 600 rounds of 155-

mm. ammunition available for each battalion and 1,200 rounds per battalion of

105-mm. ammunition, most of the latter

borrowed from the Marines. Of the division's vehicles, there were on shore only

three 2-1/2-ton cargo trucks, twentythree 3/4-ton weapon carriers, and fortynine DUKW's. Not until 20 June did the

ships carrying the troops of the 106th

Regiment return to Saipan, and not until

the 27th were the division's supplies and

equipment fully unloaded.18

The 27th Division was not alone in

suffering an interruption to the flow of its

supplies and equipment because of the

Battle of the Philippine Sea. The hasty

withdrawal of the naval transports on the

18th made an orderly discharge of any cargo over the proper beaches impossible.

Priorities were assigned to rations, ammunition, and fuels, and other items had to

be neglected. Moreover, in order to dispatch the cargo ships with all possible

speed out of the danger area, it was necessary to permit them to unload over the

beach that was the handiest. Thus, it was

18

 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
SUPPORTING ARMS AND OPERATIONS 127

PONTOON CAUSEWAY AND BARGE IN CHARAN KANOA HARBOR

impossible to prevent a division's supplies from being scattered among all the

dumps.19 The only advantage enjoyed by

the two Marine divisions in this respect lay

in the three full days they had had to

unload their cargo before the general exodus of naval shipping, but this was at least

partly offset by the fact that for most of

the time their landing beaches were under

fire.

Meanwhile, during the period when most

of the transports were cruising east of Saipan, shore parties were furiously at work

improving the beach approaches and eliminating obstacles to a more rapid delivery

of supplies across the reef. Twelve ponton

sections had been hauled to Saipan lashed

to the sides of LST's, and others came

later, side-carried by ships of the first garrison echelon. By 18 June naval Seabees

had floated three of these and commenced

construction of a causeway pier off Charan

Kanoa, which was increased in length as

fast as additional sections could be obtained from LST's on their return from

retirement to sea.20 Next day the 34th Engineer Battalion opened up Yellow Beach

3 just north of Agingan Point by blowing

two channels through the reef to permit

small boats to discharge on the shore during high tide. The battalion also rigged up

a crane on an overhanging point off the

beach to enable it to unload matériel di19

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl F, G-4

Rpt, Part II, p. 5; Incl J, p. 5. 20

 COMINCH P-007, Ch. 5, p. 15.
128 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

rectly from landing craft into trucks

waiting on a level above the beach itself. On

21 June the 1341st Engineer Battalion removed all the mines from White Beach 1

below Agingan Point and prepared access

roads from the beach. Naval underwater

demolition teams searched for antiboat

mines and blew landing slips in the offshore reef for LST's and LCT's.21

One factor that eased the 27th Division's

unloading problems was that a large percentage of its supplies had been palletized

before embarkation from Oahu. Unlike the

two Marine divisions, which were skeptical

of the process, the 27th Division had responded enthusiastically to General Holland Smith's administrative order that 25

to 50 percent of all supplies and two to five

units of fire be palletized. In fact, the Army

division had palletized almost 90 percent of

all its supplies and had reason to be grateful for its own forehandedness.22

 Securing

the matériel to wooden pallets permitted

a more rapid unloading of landing craft at

the beaches, released working parties that

otherwise would have been engaged in the

arduous labor of transferring cargo from

landing craft into trucks, and reduced the

number of men at the landing beaches in

positions exposed to enemy fire. In the

opinion of Holland Smith, "These advantages were clearly manifest at Saipan when

palletized supplies of the 27th Division

were handled as against unpalletized

supplies of the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions."23

Not all of the logistical difficulties that

beset the fighting troops were due to unloading difficulties. Some shortages can be

traced back to the point of embarkation

and are attributable to insufficient shipping. This was particularly true in the case

of motor transportation. There was simply

not enough space aboard the transports

assigned to the operation to stow all of the

vehicles of the three infantry divisions and

of the XXIV Corps Artillery. General

Smith's headquarters cut the table of organization and equipment allowances, and

his own allowances were reduced again because of inadequate shipping space. In the

end, out of all motor transport vehicles allowed by corps, only 94 percent of the

ambulances, 83 percent of the trucks, 71

percent of the trailers, and 75 percent of

the tractors could be embarked from

Oahu.24 Although these cuts were distributed more or less equally among all the

units involved, the 27th Division suffered

somewhat less than the others, being able

to carry with it 86 percent of its trucks,

99 percent of its trailers, and 99 percent of

its tractors.25 However, this advantage was

more than offset when, after arrival on

Saipan, corps headquarters commandeered

thirty-three of the Army division's 2-1/2-

ton trucks and refused to return them even

as late as 6 July.26

As a partial compensation for the shortages in standard types of motor transportation, a substantial number of DUKW's

was provided for the Saipan operationmore than had hitherto been used in the

Central Pacific. All together, 185 of these

21

 27th Inf Div G-4 Rpt, p. 19; NTLF Rpt

Marianas, Phase I, Incl J, p. 5. 22

 See above, pp. 48-49. 23

 Quoted in COMINCH P-007, Ch. 5. p 11.

24

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl F, G-4;

Incl A, Annex A, p. 1. 25

 Ibid. The following table gives the distribution of motor transportation among the three

divisions:

Division

2d Marine.......... .

4th Marine......... .

27th Infantry. ...... .

Trucks

437

558

624

Trailers

222

201

196

Tractor.

16

40

122

26

 27th Inf Div G-4 Rpt, pp. 20-23.
SUPPORTING ARMS AND OPERATIONS 129

vehicles were embarked. Each infantry division had a DUKW company attached, as

did XXIV Corps Artillery.27 The DUKW's

initial function was to land the artillery.

This had entailed some modification both

of the DUKW's bodies and of the 105-mm.

howitzer wheels. After the landing phase,

the amphibian trucks were used continually throughout the campaign, chiefly for

hauling ammunition from shipboard or

supply dumps to artillery emplacements

and as prime movers for 105-mm. howitzers. In the opinion of General Holland

Smith's G-4 officer, Colonel Anderson,

GSC, "the DUKW was the outstanding

single type of equipment employed in this

operation."28

Later, as the fight in the central and

northern part of Saipan progressed, one

other serious supply shortage manifested

itself. The heavy demand for artillery support and close-in infantry support by 81-

mm. and 60-mm. mortars created an unexpected drain on the mortar ammunition

supply. Previous experience in the Central

Pacific had seemed to indicate that a total

of seven units of fire would be sufficient

for Saipan, but this proved to be too low

an estimate, and on the basis of experience

in the Marianas ten units was recommended for future operations.20

 The initial

fault in not loading enough ammunition

aboard the assault ships was compounded

by the fact that resupply ships were frequently not vertically loaded, thus making

it difficult for the troops to get their ammunition ashore when they needed it. Also,

the first ammunition resupply ship was late

in arriving in the area, and many of

these vessels withdrew at night because of

threatened air attacks, thus making a

build-up of reserves impossible.30

The extent to which these shortages and

delays, avoidable and unavoidable, affected

the course of the battle on Saipan cannot

definitely be determined. The shortages

and delays were real enough, but the fact

that they were reported in such detail by

supply officers and others might be taken

to be as much in evidence of the wealth of

matériel to which Americans in combat

were accustomed as of any real privation

suffered on Saipan. The records show no

single instance wherein any infantry or artillery unit had to cease fire for want of

ammunition or became completely immobilized for lack of transportation. On the

other hand, it can be assumed that any

defects in a supply system automatically

impede the progress of ground troops. It is

highly probable that had more supplies

been on hand and had they reached the

front lines in a more expeditious fashion,

the combat troops would have been able

to move against the enemy with greater

force and speed.

Postlanding Naval Gunfire Support

On Saipan, as elsewhere in the island

warfare typical of the Pacific, one of the

most effective weapons in support of the

infantry proved to be ships' fire. Naval vessels ranging in size from LCI gunboats to

old battleships, and mounting guns of calibers from 20-mm. to 14 inches, cruised the

27

 1st Amphibian Truck Company for the 2d

Marine Division; 2d Amphibian Truck Company

for the 4th Marine Division; Provisional DUKW

Company (from Quartermaster Company) for the

27th Division; 477th Amphibian Truck Company

for XXIV Corps Artillery. 28

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl F; Incl

B, p. 1. 29

 For the Pacific Ocean Areas unit of fire, see

Appendix B.

30

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl F, Part

II, p. 7.
130 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

coasts of the island prepared at all times

to support the troops on call, lay down

preparatory fire, illuminate the night with

star shells, and perform a host of other

duties. True, the configuration and terrain

of Saipan imposed some natural limitations

on the fullest exploitation of this support.

Naval guns have a flat trajectory and the

mountains and hills of the volcanic island

often masked fire from the sea. Also, the

reefs fringing many parts of the island kept

the larger vessels from approaching within

optimum range for direct fire at some targets. On the other hand, many of the

enemy's guns and installations were emplaced in defilade in valleys that ran

perpendicular to the shore line on the east

and west coasts, and against these naval

gunfire could be particularly effective.

The caves along the shore line offered ideal

hiding places for enemy troops and were

also ideal targets for ships firing from the

sea, especially for the vessels of more shallow draft.31

In general, two types of controls were

set up to permit the co-ordination between

troops and ships so necessary to efficient

operations of this sort.32 For close support

missions it was customary each day to assign a certain number of vessels to each

infantry battalion in the assault—usually

two or three destroyers. During the entire

course of the operation 2 old battleships,

2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, and 39

destroyers delivered call fires at various

times. Attached to each battalion was a

shore fire control party consisting of naval

and ground force personnel furnished by

the 1st, 2d, and 295th Joint Assault Signal

Companies, which were attached, respectively, to the 4th Marine Division, the 2d

Marine Division, and the 27th Infantry Division. These parties were in direct radio

communication with their supporting ships

and from their positions on shore would

request fire missions and spot the results.

This system of control was generally employed for two types of missions. First were

the close support missions fired sometimes

within fifty yards of friendly troops. Destroyers' five-inch guns were usually used

for this purpose, and the bulk of all fiveinch ammunition (139,691 rounds) was

consumed in this fashion. How effective it

was is doubtful. Admiral Turner's final

opinion was, "Field Artillery is much better

qualified for this type of fire by reason of

its greater accuracy and smaller burst

patterns."33 The second type of mission

usually controlled by shore fire control parties was night illumination. Star shells

were fired on request of the infantrymen

to prevent infiltration, to help stop counterattacks, and to keep enemy activity to

their immediate front under surveillance.

Unfortunately, there were not enough of

these projectiles on hand to satisfy the

wants of the troops, and after the first

night a quota of six per hour per ship had

to be imposed except during emergencies.

Except for these two types of missions,

request for all other sorts of ships' fire on

ground targets originated from the naval

gunfire officer of the Northern Troops and

Landing Force. His headquarters was set

up ashore near those of the corps air officer

and the corps artillery officer and the three

worked in close co-ordination so as to avoid

duplication of effort and waste of ammunition. 31

 TF 52 Opns Rpt Marianas, Incl F, p. 13. 32

 This account of naval gunfire is derived

chiefly from NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl

I, Sec. 3, and TF 52 Opns Rpt Marianas, Incl F. 33

 TF 54 Opns Rpt Marianas, Incl F, p. 13.
SUPPORTING ARMS AND OPERATIONS 131

Under the naval gunfire officer's supervision, all deep support fire missions were

arranged, including preparation fires, deliberate and methodical destruction fires,

counterbattery, harassing, and interdiction

fires, and fires on targets of opportunity.

Since these missions were not controlled by

shore fire control parties, it was considered

necessary to fix definite safety limits and

to specify safe lines of fire. Preparation fires

were not brought closer than 1,500 yards

from the nearest friendly troops. Deliberate

and moderate destruction fires, fires on targets of opportunity, and counterbattery,

harassing, and interdiction fires were usually confined to areas 2,500 yards from the

front line. On the whole these various

missions were executed far more effectively

than were close support fires, and it was in

this field that naval gunfire won its laurels

at Saipan. Other chores ably performed by

the support ships were the guarding of

Saipan against amphibious reinforcements

from Tinian, neutralization of the airfields

at Marpi Point and Ushi Point, Tinian,

and destruction of enemy cave positions

along the seacoast that were inaccessible

to anything but the 40-mm. fire of LCI

gunboats.

The testimony of prisoners of war captured on Saipan leaves no doubt of the

impression made on the Japanese by American naval gunfire. Maj. Takashi Hiragushi, 43d Division intelligence officer,34

testified, "the most feared of . . . [American] weapons was the naval shelling

which managed to reach the obscure

mountain caves where . . . CP's were located."35

 A captured Japanese lieutenant

declared that the greatest single factor in

the American success was naval gunfire.

When asked how he distinguished between

naval gunfire and land-based artillery, he

laughed and said that it was not difficult

when one was on the receiving end. Everyone in the hills "holed up" and waited when

a man-of-war started to fire.36 Other Japanese prisoners of war, when interrogated

on the matter, were in almost unanimous

agreement. Perhaps the highest testimonial

of the efficacy of this particular weapon

came from General Saito himself when he

wrote on 27 June, "If there just were no

naval gunfire, we feel with determination

that we could fight it out with the enemy

in a decisive battle."

 37

Close Air Support

Once the assault troops had landed on

Saipan and established their beachhead,

the role of aircraft for the remainder of the

operation was twofold. First, and most important, it was to keep the battlefield isolated from the inroads of enemy air and

surface craft. Second, it was to support the

advance of the ground troops in somewhat

the same manner as naval gunfire and artillery.

After the Battle of the Philippine Sea no

serious threat of enemy air intervention remained, and except for occasional nuisance

raids the troops on Saipan could enjoy

virtual immunity from that quarter. Thereafter, the planes of Mitscher's Task Force

58 were employed on occasional troop

support missions, while Admiral Turner's

escort carriers provided the aircraft for

combat air patrols and antisubmarine

patrols.38 Once Aslito airfield was captured 34

 He was mistakenly identified as Maj, Kiyoshi

Yoshida, 31st Army intelligence officer. 35

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl I, Sec. 3,

p. 19.

36

 Ibid., p. 20. 37

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item 9983-85, p. 35. 38

 TF 51 Opns Rpt Marianas, Incl I, p. 4.
132 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

and put into operation, these duties were

shared by P-47's of the 19th and 73d

Fighter Squadrons, Seventh Air Force.39

Whether in deep support or close support, the planes assigned to assist the

ground forces flew three types of missions

—bombing, rocketing, and strafing. Of

these, the first was the least effective in

knocking out comparatively small targets

such as gun installations. After the initial

softening up of the landing beaches, bombing missions were ordinarily employed

against enemy troop concentrations, supply

dumps, and buildings. The first extensive

use of aircraft rockets in the Central Pacific

was on Saipan. The rockets proved to be the

most valuable weapon for support aircraft,

in spite of the fact that there was insufficient training in its use and that no delay

fuzes were available. The most common

technique for close support missions was

strafing, which was not only effective

against the enemy but safer for friendly

troops.40

Troop requests for close air support

were radioed by air liaison parties attached

to each regiment and battalion. The requests were filtered through division and

corps headquarters, each of which had the

opportunity of rejecting them before final

decision was made by the Commander,

Support Aircraft, Capt. Richard F. Whitehead, USN, who was aboard Admiral

Turner's flagship. Once a strike was ordered, it would be controlled either by

Captain Whitehead himself, by the support

aircraft commander on Holland Smith's

stall, by the air co-ordinator (who was a

group or squadron leader from one of the

participating carriers and was on station

over the island at all times during daylight

hours), or by the flight leader assigned to

the particular mission.

Air liaison parties on the ground had no

direct radio communication with the planes

and were therefore unable to coach the pilots into their targets. Targets were designated in a variety of ways. Sometimes the

infantry marked them with white phosphorus mortar shells. At others, planes

flew dummy runs and waited to execute

their missions until battalion air liaison parties notified the Commander, Support

Aircraft, who in turn notified the flight

leader if the runs were made on the correct

area. Fluorescent panels were used to mark

the front lines of the troops.41

The highly centralized system of close air

support control used at Saipan had the

advantage of reducing to a minimum the

danger of duplication of missions and of

planes bombing and strafing within friendly lines. On the other hand, it was time

consuming to a degree that was highly

unsatisfactory to the troops. The time lag

between requests for and execution of an

air strike was sometimes more than an

hour and seldom less than a half hour.42

One reason for the delay was the difficulty of co-ordinating air with the other

supporting arms. No single co-ordinating

agency had been established before the invasion of Saipan. This created no especially

difficult problem when it came to coordinating air and naval gunfire, since by

mutual agreement naval gunfire was lifted

in certain areas when requested by the

Commander, Support Aircraft, and air attacks were stopped on the request of firing

ships. On the other hand, the co-ordination

39

 AAF Hist Div, Army Air Forces in the Marianas Campaign, pp. 15-36, MS, OCMH. 40

 TF 51 Opns Rpt Marianas, Incl I, p. 11.

41

 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 42

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Incl H,

pp. 97-103.
SUPPORTING ARMS AND OPERATIONS 133

of air and artillery presented a more

difficult problem because of the higher ordinates of artillery pieces, their rapid rate of

fire, and the lack of central control for

the four separate artillery units.43 For these

and other reasons, close air support was

the least satisfactory of the three supporting arms.

Artillery

Artillery support was of course provided by the three divisions' organic pieces,

as well as by the twenty-four 155-mm.

guns and twenty-four 155-mm. howitzers

of XXIV Corps Artillery, which was commanded by General Harper. Corps artillery

commenced to land and go into position on

18 June, and by 22 June all four battalions

were ashore and firing.44 The two 155-mm.

howitzer battalions and one of the gun battalions were emplaced 1,500 to 2,000 yards

south of Charan Kanoa on the low, flat,

plain adjacent to Yellow Beaches, while the

other gun battalion was emplaced on the

higher ground just southwest of Aslito airfield. Initially, all battalions faced north

on Saipan except for Battery B, 531st

Field Artillery Battalion, which was positioned to fire on Tinian.45

 On 27 June the

front lines had advanced to an extent calling for a forward displacement of the heavy

battalions of the corps, and by the 28th

all had been displaced to positions northeast

of Magicienne Bay. On 7 July the 225th

Field Artillery Battalion displaced again,

this time to the northeastern edge of Kagman Peninsula. In addition to supporting

the troops on Saipan, XXIV Corps Artillery had the job of guarding the back door

to Tinian. Observation posts overlooking

the southern island were manned twentyfour hours a day, and various harassing

and destructive missions were fired on Tinian airfields and other targets on that island

throughout the Saipan operation.46

For the most part corps artillery was assigned the job of delivering deep support

fires for the advancing troops, and a minimum safety band of 1,500 yards in front

of the infantry was established. The division's batteries engaged in night harassing

fires, preparation fires in advance of the

daily infantry jump-offs, fires on targets of

opportunity, and call fires at the request

of the troops.47 On several occasions division artillery fired rolling barrages. Close

liaison was maintained between corps and

each division artillery headquarters by

liaison officers numbering as many as three

per division. A similar system was maintained by the divisions themselves. Each

light artillery battalion had a command

liaison officer with its supported infantry

regiment, and usually the Marine and

Army artillery units exchanged liaison officers to co-ordinate fires near division

boundaries. Primary means of communication was by wire, although this was not

altogether satisfactory because the large

number of tracked vehicles used on Saipan

made maintenance of wire lines difficult. As

a substitute, all corps liaison officers were

provided with truck-mounted radios.48

43

 TF 51 Opns Rpt Marianas, p. 10. 44

 XXIV Corps Arty Final Rpt on FORAGER

Opn, Phases I and III, S-3 Rpt, p. 6. 45

 Hq Central Pacific Base Comd, Target Saipan: A Story of XXIV Corps Artillery, p. 6.

46

 XXIV Corps Arty Final Rpt on FORAGER

Opn, Phases I and III, S-3 Rpt, pp. 7-8. See

below, Ch. XIII. 47

 Ibid., passim; 27th Inf Div Arty Rpt FORAGER Opn, Sec. II. 48

 XXIV Corps Arty Final Rpt on FORAGER

Opn, S-3 Rpt, p. 16; 27th Inf Div Arty Rpt

FORAGER Opn, Annex A, p. 4.
134 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

NORTH CENTRAL SAIPAN from the crest of Mt. Tapotchau to the northern tip of

the island. Northern end of Death Valley is visible at right center.

All together, the four artillery units were

to fire about 291,500 rounds before the

end of the battle for Saipan. Of these,

37,730 can be attributed to the corps artillery.49

 In spite of this considerable

volume of fire, there were certain limiting

factors to the optimum employment of artillery. Chief among these was terrain.

After the major portion of southern Saipan

had been secured and the main American

attack reoriented to the north, General

Holland Smith disposed almost all of his

field artillery to support the northward

thrust. True, one battery of 155-mm. guns

(later increased to three) was pointed to

the south against Tinian, but all the remaining pieces were ordered to direct

their fire against the Mount TapotchauDeath Valley-Kagman Peninsula line and

beyond.

The terrain in this central part of Saipan

presented several problems to the gunners.

XXIV Corps Artillery was assigned the

49

 The estimate is derived from Hoffman, Saipan, p. 250; corps figures are from XXIV Corps

Arty Final Rpt on FORAGER Opn, S-3 Rpt, p. 8.
SUPPORTING ARMS AND OPERATIONS 135

general mission of deep support, which

meant that most of its targets were located

in the northern half of the island. Since

Mount Tapotchau lay athwart the line of

sight between ground observers and these

targets, corps artillerymen had to rely entirely on air spotters. Six L-4 liaison planes

were assigned for this purpose, and by the

end of the operation each of the pilots and

his accompanying air observer had put in

approximately a hundred hours in the air

over enemy territory.50

A more serious problem faced the artillerymen of the three divisions whose

mission was to fire in close support of the

advancing troops. In the center of the island, just east of Mount Tapotchau, lay

Death Valley, which ran north and south

along the axis of the attack. Since most of

the enemy's guns and mortars in this area

were sighted into the valley from the hills

and cliffs on either side, they could not

easily be reached by American artillery firing from the south. This was one reason

for the slow progress made by infantrymen

up the center corridor of the island. Furthermore, since the troops on the right and

left pushed on more rapidly than those in

the center, the front line became more and

more bent back in the middle. The unevenness of the line made the adjustment

of artillery fire all the more difficult.

Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that

Saipan was far from an artilleryman's paradisc, the main body of Holland Smith's

troops during the attack to the north did

at least have continuous artillery support.

Not so those troops of the 27th Division

that were left to clean out the Japanese

who were holed up on Nafutan Point, the

southeastern tip of the island. Except for

tanks, naval gunfire, and, later, antiaircraft

guns, the infantrymen assigned to this mission would have to depend entirely on their

own weapons.

50

 Hq Central Pacific Base Command, Target

Saipan, p. 6.

CHAPTER VIII

The Capture of Nafutan Point

By the end of 18 June the 4th Marine

Division had penetrated to Magicienne Bay

and cut the island of Saipan in two. General Holland Smith's plans for the next

phase of the operation called for a change

of direction of the main attack from east

to north across the breadth of the island.

Specifically, this meant that the 2d Marine

Division would hold and consolidate its

positions on the extreme left flank south of

Garapan and would constitute the pivot of

a wheeling movement. The outer end of

the wheel's spoke would be the right flank

of the 4th Marine Division resting on Magicienne Bay. When the turn had been

completed the two divisions would be

abreast and ready to launch their northerly

drive against the main enemy defense line,

which now stretched across the island in a

southeasterly direction from the outskirts

of Garapan to Magicienne Bay.

Meanwhile, Nafutan Point and the approaches to it along the south coast of Saipan remained occupied by Japanese troops

that had to be cleared out before Aslito

field could be considered entirely safe from

counterattack and infiltration.

Nafutan Point is a short peninsula—a

southward extension of the east coast of

Saipan. Dominating most of the peninsula

is a high cragged ridge running in a north

-south direction not far inland from the

east coast. This is Mount Nafutan, whose

highest point is about 407 feet. Its

northern and western faces are almost

sheer cliffs. About 400 yards west of the

northern part of Nafutan mountain lies a

ridge about 300 feet in height. Although the

lowlands in the western portion of the

peninsula and in the valley between Mount

Nafutan and Ridge 300 were mostly under

cultivation, the hilly and mountainous

areas in the east were generally covered

with thick underbrush. (See Map II.)

Compressed into this area by the advance of the American troops was a motley

crowd of Japanese military personnel mixed

with civilians. All together, the military

contingent numbered about 1,050. Included were survivors of the 317th Independent Infantry Battalion, 47th Independent Mixed Brigade; naval personnel who

had manned the coastal defense guns

located near the southern tip of the peninsula; antiaircraft and service troops that

had been swept out of Aslito field; and

probably stragglers from many other units.

The men were under no single command,

at least in the strict sense of that word,

but the highest ranking officer seems to

have been a Captain Sasaki, who commanded the 317th Independent Infantry

Battalion.

1

The job of disposing of these people and

securing Nafutan Point was initially assigned to the two regiments of the 27th

1

 See below, p. 159.
138 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

SEAWARD CLIFF LINE, NAFUTAN PENINSULA

Infantry Division that were ashore by the

18th of June. Holland Smith's headquarters assumed that the task could be completed in a short time, and that it would be

little more than a mopping-up operation.

The assumption proved to be optimistic in

the extreme. Not until 27 June was the

southeastern extremity of Saipan completely cleared of the recalcitrant, if disorganized, enemy troops holed up in that

vicinity.

Action of 19 June

directe Holland thd Smith' e 27ths Infantr orders fo y Divisio r the 19t n toh

"complete missions assigned" in the previous day's order, which meant in effect

that the division was to push to the east

coast of Saipan along its entire front including all of Nafutan Point. Jump-off

hour was set by division orders at 0730.2

In position along the front line from right

to left (south to north) were the 3d and

1st Battalions, 105th Infantry, and the 2d

and 1st Battalions, 165th. The latter regiment had on the preceding day almost

reached Magicienne Bay, but the line of

the 105th bent back sharply to the westward to a position on Saipan's south coast

only 700 yards east of Cape Obiam,

On the extreme right, the 3d Battalion,

105th Regiment, met no opposition to

speak of. During the day not an enemy

shot was fired except for a few random

rounds of artillery that were lobbed into

the battalion's area from Nafutan Point.

Nevertheless, the rugged terrain along the

southern coast made progress difficult, and

2

 NTLF Opn Order 7-44, 19 Jun 44; 27th Inf

Div G-3 Jnl, 19 Jun 44, Msg 5.
THE CAPTURE OF NAFUTAN POINT 139

by nightfall the battalion had advanced

only about 1,800 yards in its zone.3

To its left and well ahead, the 1st Battalion, 105th, jumped off at 0730, as

scheduled, with Company A on the right,

B on the left. After three hours of unopposed progress, the battalion came up

against the first of the series of ridges that

flank Mount Nafutan to the northwest. In

spite of considerable enemy small arms and

automatic weapons fire, both companies

reached the top of the ridge without

trouble, but as they went over the crest to

a stretch of level ground with clear fields

of fire they were pinned down by heavy fire

from five separate pillboxes to their immediate front. The pillboxes were located

near the boundary line between the two

advance companies, and the company commanders drew their units into a semicircle

around the area and poured fire into it.

After an hour and a half of futile effort

to place shaped charges against the pillboxes, both companies pulled back to a

line below the ridge out of range of enemy

fire.4

On being informed of the situation, regiment ordered the 1st Battalion to re-form,

move to the left, and try to outflank the

enemy by an attack from the north,

rather than by a frontal assault. As a

prelude to the attack, naval planes were to

deliver a fifteen-minute air strike, which

was to be followed by a half hour's concentrated division artillery fire.5

Promptly at 1610 the battalion jumped

off and almost immediately ran into

trouble. B Company, on the left, had to

climb the ridge some distance back from

the enemy positions in order to execute

the flanking movement. Once on top, it

was to attack south. However, in getting

onto the ridge, the men were held up by

an exploding artillery dump and had to

take a circuitous route. No sooner had they

reached the top of the ridge than the Japanese opened fire with dual-purpose guns.

By this time it was 1730, well on toward

darkness.

Company A, meanwhile, had not been

able even to get into position to attack. Before it could swing into line on the right

flank of Company B, it too came under

fire from the enemy positions and the

men jumped for cover. One soldier (Pvt.

Thomas C. Baker) succeeded in knocking

out one of the enemy's pillboxes with a

bazooka, but even so the company made

no substantial progress. Shortly after 1800,

Colonel O'Brien halted the attack, and the

whole battalion retired to the line of departure for the night. There, Company C replaced Company B.6

To the north, the 165th Infantry was

faring somewhat better. The previous

evening the regiment had stopped short of

the shore line, and its first task was to

complete its penetration to the sea. Ahead

was a steep slope that ran down to a line

of cliffs at the water's edge, there to drop

fifty to sixty yards straight down to the

ocean. The slope was a coral formation

studded with sharp rocks and pocketed

with holes, deep canyons, crevasses, and

caves. The whole area was heavily overgrown with a tangle of vines, small trees,

and bushes. The only feasible means of approach to the shore line was by way of a

series of parallel paths running eastward

through the undergrowth.7 3

 Love, Battle for Saipan, p. 108; 105th RCT

Jnl, 19 Jun 44, Msg 62. 4

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 101-06. 5

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 19 Jun 44, Msg 48.

6

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 107-08. 7

 Ibid., pp. 96-97.
140 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

27TH DIVISION TROOPS AT CLIFF EDGE, NAFUTAN PENINSULA

The regiment jumped off on schedule at

0730 with the 2d Battalion on the right

(south), 1st on the left (north).8 Only A

Company on the extreme left had any serious trouble. An advance platoon ran into

a Japanese machine gun position and was

fired upon from ambush and held up for

over two hours. By 1300 lead elements of

both battalions had picked their way cautiously to the ocean's edge.9

 The only apparent enemy opposition remaining in the

area was in a small pocket along the

boundary line between the Army regiment

and the 4th Marine Division, During the

afternoon anneals were sent out over a

public address system in an attempt to persuade this isolated remnant of enemy troops

to surrender, but the action met with no

success. Before the troops dug in for the

night, the 1st Battalion, on the left, was

relieved by the 3d, which had been in reserve during the day.10

At the close of operations on the 19th,

two battalions of the 165th Infantry were

drawn up in defensive positions along the

southern coast of Magicienne Bay. The 1st

and 2d Battalions had completed the process of cutting off the enemy on Nafutan

Point from the rest of the island. However,

the leftward swing of the 1st Battalion,

8

 1st Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 19 Jun 44, Msg 7. 9

 165th RCT Jnl, 19 Jun 44, Msg 63.

10

 1st Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 19 Jun 44, Msgs 23,

47, 64.
THE CAPTURE OF NAFUTAN POINT 141

INFANTRYMAN AT THE BASE OF CLIFF, NAFUTAN PENINSULA

105th Infantry, and the slow advance of

the 3d Battalion, 105th, along the southern

shore, had resulted in a large gap in the

middle of that regiment's line. In order to

fill the gap and protect Aslito airfield,

Colonel Kelley ordered the 1st Battalion,

165th, to move back to the airfield and dig

in.11

Along the 27th Division front the night

was quiet except for two widely separated

actions. On the south coast, a group of

twenty to thirty civilians stumbled into the

perimeter of Company L, 105th Infantry,

and were all killed. In the Magicienne Bay

area, about an hour after dark, some twenty Japanese launched a counterattack

against the right flank of B Company,

165th Infantry, but the attack was broken

up within half an hour.12

Action of 20 June

The morning of 20 June brought about

a change in the 27th Division's plans and

a reorientation of the attack against Nafutan Point. General Ralph Smith, after reviewing the difficulties encountered the

preceding day by the 1st Battalion, 105th

Infantry, in its attempt to assault Nafutan

Ridge frontally from the west, decided that

the direction of the attack should be

changed from eastward to southward. He

11

 Ibid., Msg 62. 12

 Love, Battle for Saipan, p. 110.
142 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

attached the 1st Battalion, 105th, to the

165th Infantry and then at 0800 called a

conference of the unit commanders most

concerned with the new plan of attack. In

attendance, besides General Smith, were

his operations officer, Lt. Col. Frederic H.

Sheldon; Colonel Kelley, commanding officer of the 165th Infantry; and the three

battalion commanders of that regiment, as

well as Colonel O'Brien who commanded

the 1st Battalion, 105th.13

As a result of the conference, General

Smith issued his Field Message No. 1,

which called for a co-ordinated attack by

the 165th Infantry, with the 1st Battalion,

105th, attached, southward along the main

axis of Nafutan Point, to commence at

1000. The day's objective was a line drawn

across the peninsula about halfway between the line of departure and the

southern tip.14 The 3d Battalion, 105th,

in the meanwhile would continue to advance eastward along the southern coast

until it could close lines with the rest of

the division in a tightening noose around

Nafutan.15

For the main attack down the peninsula,

the line-up of units from right to left (west

to east) was: Companies C and A of the

105th Infantry and Companies I, K, F,

and G of the 165th. The terrain to the

front of the three battalions varied. Immediately ahead of the right flank of the

1st Battalion, 105th, the ground was fairly

smooth with no serious obstacles. On its

left the land sloped upward abruptly to

a cane-covered plain in Company I's zone.

Between the two levels, at the line of departure, a short ramplike piece of ground

served as an approach to the higher plain

from the west, but as one proceeded

farther southward the ramp became progressively steeper and finally developed into

sheer cliff. Originally, A Company was deployed across this ramp from top to bottom

with Company C tied in on the flat land

to its right. As the advance progressed it

would be necessary for Company A to keep

edging more and more to the right until

eventually it would end up on the level

ground at the foot of the ridge. This necessarily would make effective contact with

Company I on the left impossible. Thus it

was that the action of the 1st Battalion,

105th, was to all intents and purposes independent of that of the 165th on its left.

Immediately in front of K and F Companies, 165th Infantry, there was nothing

but open cane field sloping gently down to

the bay on the left. Ahead of Company G,

however, was a rubble of coral topped with

the thick undergrowth that lined Magicienne Bay. Approximately 800 yards

ahead of the line of departure the ground

in front of the 165th sloped upward to a

hill. On the left of the 3d Battalion zone

the incline was gradual, but on the right

of the 2d Battalion the slope gave way to

an abrupt cliff—the face of Mount Nafutan itself.16

Although the original jump-off hour had

been set at 1000, General Smith found it

necessary to postpone it to 1115 and later

to 1200 in order to permit the 1st Battalion, 165th, to relieve the other two battalions, which were still in position along

Magicienne Bay north of the line of departure.17

 At 1145 division artillery laid

down a concentrated fire along the whole

front, particularly along the hill that

13

 165th RCT Jnl, 20 Jun 44, Msgs 3, 6, 13, 14;

165th RCT Rpt of Action Saipan, p. 5. 14

 165th RCT Jnl, 20 Jun 44, Msg 14. Also, see

attached overlay in 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl. 15

 105th RCT Jnl, 20 Jun 44, Msg 12.

16

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 114-15. 17

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Jun 44, Msgs 9, 17.
THE CAPTURE OF NAFUTAN POINT 143

crossed the 165th's line of advance. Then

Company C, 88th Chemical Battalion,

which had been brought up to lend general

support to the attack, fired its 4.2-inch

chemical mortars and set up a smoke

screen. Six tanks from the 766th Tank

Battalion supported the 3d Battalion,

165th, in the center of the regimental line.

Promptly at 1200 the troops jumped off.18

On the right of the regimental line the

1st Battalion, 105th Infantry, almost immediately came under machine gun fire

from its left front and flank, while the right

flank received some fire from a heavy flattrajectory weapon. The whole line stopped,

and C Company on the right dug in.

Colonel O'Brien, the battalion commander,

came up in an effort to locate the source

of enemy fire and finally determined that

it came from a small group of buildings

almost on the battalion boundary line.

Company A immediately put automatic

weapons fire into this whole area. This

seemed to stop the fire, and Colonel

O'Brien went out to make a reconnaissance. He had moved over into the buildings when snipers began opening up on

him from various houses, O'Brien immediately ordered all the buildings burned

down. For the next hour the battalion was

held up while the settlement was burned

to the ground, tanks, self-propelled mounts,

antitank guns, and flame throwers joining

in the arson.

Upon completion of this task, the 1st

Battalion, 105th, pushed forward again

and for the rest of the afternoon ran into

no trouble except occasional small arms

fire. Contact with Company I on the left

was lost during the burning of the settlement and was not regained for the rest of

the afternoon, chiefly because of the gradually rising ridge that now separated the

two battalions. When the 1st Battalion dug

in at nightfall, it had advanced about 500

yards.19

In the zone of the 3d Battalion, 165th

Infantry, Company I, led by three tanks,

fell under enemy fire almost immediately

and remained stationary for about an hour

and a half. Its tanks proved to be more of

a hindrance than a help since they drew

enemy artillery fire into the area of advance

but could not be controlled by the infantry

because of radio failure. On the left, Companies K and F were faring considerably

better, and at 1405 Company K reported

that it was 400 yards ahead of I Company

and out of contact.20 Meanwhile, on the extreme left of the regimental line G Company was stopped by a nest of Japanese

hidden in the underbrush near the ocean

shore and made no further advance. With

both flanks of the line retarded, the two

battalion commanders ordered their reserve Companies, E and L, to take positions on the extreme left and right,

respectively. These moves were completed

about 1630, and the regiment prepared to

continue the advance.21

Heavy mortar fire was laid down, and

both battalions jumped off in a continuance of the attack. On the regimental

right progress was slow since the entire 3d

Battalion had to contend with the heavy

undergrowth and was moving up hill. On

the left, E Company commenced to receive

considerable fire from the hills north of

18

 165th RCT Jnl, 20 Jun 44, Msgs 45, 47, 48,

50, 51; 105th RCT Jnl, 20 Jun 44, Msg 23; Roy

E. Appleman, Army Tanks in the Battle for Saipan, p. 18, MS in OCMH.

19

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 124-26. 20

 3d Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 20 Jun 44, Msg 38. 21

 2d Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 20 Jun 44, Msg 28; 3d

Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 20 Jun 44, Msg 49.
144 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Mount Nafutan and was pinned down. By

1730 no further progress seemed possible

before nightfall, and all units were ordered

to dig in for the night. Company E withdrew about a hundred yards before doing

so.22 Casualties had been relatively light,

the 105th suffering only one man killed

and five wounded; the 165th, six killed,

twenty-one wounded, and one missing in

action.23

Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, which was still under control of its

parent regiment, had been pushing eastward along the southern shore. Little

infantry opposition was encountered by

either of the two assault companies, although they did receive scattered artillery

fire at different times during the day. By

nightfall the battalion had reached a point

only a hundred yards short of tying in with

the attack coming down Nafutan peninsula

from the north. The division line, therefore, presented an almost solid front that

hemmed the southern defenders of the

island into an ever-tightening pocket.24

During 20 June the 106th Infantry Regiment landed on Saipan and was assigned

as corps reserve.25 As soon as the regiment

was ashore the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, was released to the control of the 27th

Division, and General Ralph Smith immediately ordered it to assemble in division

reserve at the southwest corner of Aslito

airfield.26

Along the division's front line that night

there was little activity except in the center

in the zone of the 3d Battalion, 165th Infantry. Shortly before 2200 enemy guns

began opening up not more than 150 yards

to the direct front. The fire was point

blank and was aimed at both the 3d Battalion zone and the area held by the 1st

Battalion, 105th Infantry. In the zone of

the former, the Japanese guns overshot

their mark and no damage was done, but

during the barrage some rounds fell on A

Company, 105th, killing one man and

wounding three.27

Action of 21 June

Plans for 21 June called for a continuance of the attack to the south on Nafutan

Ridge. At a conference held at the 27th

Division command post at 2200 on 20

June, the plan was reaffirmed, but with

some changes. At Colonel Kelley's request,

General Ralph Smith ordered the fresh 2d

Battalion, 105th Infantry, to relieve the 2d

Battalion, 165th, on the left of the line as

early as possible the next morning. The attack was to jump off at 0930 after a

thirty-minute artillery preparation. Upon

reaching the first phase line, where the

3d Battalion, 165th Infantry, was to be

pinched out, control of the attack southward was to be assumed by Colonel Bishop

of the 105th Infantry. Field Order Number

45, 27th Infantry Division, which contained these plans, was issued at 0615, 21

June.28 By 0900 the 2d Battalion, 105th,

had relieved the 2d Battalion, 165th, on

the left of the line.29 As the action opened,

then, on the morning of 21 June, the 27th

Division units on the line from right to

left (west to east) were: Companies L,

22 I, C, and A, 105th Infantry; Companies

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 122-24. 23

 27th Inf Div G-1 Periodic Rpt 4. 24

 Love, Battle for Saipan, p. 126. 25

 106th RCT Jnl, 20 Jun 44, Msg 11. 26

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Jun 44, Msg 42.

27

 Love, Battle for Saipan, p. 128. 28

 27th Inf Div FO 45, 21 Jun 44. 29

 165th RCT Jnl, 21 Jun 44, Msg 21.
THE CAPTURE OF NAFUTAN POINT 145

INFANTRYMAN MILKING AN ISLAND GOAT in Nafutan area, 20 June.

L, and K, 165th; and Companies G and

F, 105th.

On the extreme right, the 3d Battalion

of the 105th, still pushing its way eastward

along the southern coast of Saipan, met

serious enemy opposition for the first time.

Shortly before noon the right platoon of

Company I, operating along the seashore,

crossed the face of a cave in the ridge and

a Japanese machine gun opened up, placing enfilade fire all along the platoon line.

The advance stopped at once. On request of

the company commander, division dispatched a platoon of tanks from those that

had come ashore with the 106th infantry.

In the meantime, Lt. Col. Edward T. Bradt,

battalion commander, sent forward a selfpropelled mount from the Cannon Company. The vehicle sprayed the area with

fire but failed to get close enough to the

cave to deliver direct fire into its mouth.

Shortly after 1500 the tanks arrived and

immediately knocked out the position with

their machine guns and 37-mm's. The battalion line then remained stationary while

a loud speaker was sent forward from division headquarters in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the remaining Japanese

troops and/or civilians to come out of the

cave. Shortly before 1700 the battalion line

pushed forward to a point about 600 yards

from the morning line of departure and

dug in for the night. Contact with the 1st

Battalion, 105th, on the left had been lost

during the day's movement, and a

small gap remained between the two battalions.30

30

 Love, Battle for Saipan, p. 154.
146 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

In the zone of the 1st Battalion, 105th,

Company A on the battalion left lost

ground even before the drive got under

way. At daylight, when it became evident

from the sound of firing on its left that the

enemy had entrenched himself firmly to

the front, Capt. Louis F. Ackerman ordered his men to move back about a

hundred yards to a less exposed position.

A further backward movement to adjust

its lines to those of the unit on its left

brought Company A a full 200 yards behind the positions where it had dug in the

night before.

After jumping off at 0930, the 1st Battalion, 105th, moved forward slowly without opposition. The advance was delayed

to permit cane fields to be burned to the

company's front, and even two hours after

the jump-off Company A had not yet

reached the place where it had bivouacked

the night before. Finally, at 1255, when

Company A had advanced about a hundred yards ahead of the line where it had

spent the previous night, it was hit by a

heavy mortar concentration coupled with

sweeping small arms and automatic weapons fire. This caught the advancing troops

in open terrain without cover. Ackerman

immediately radioed battalion headquarters for tanks and ordered his men back

into the foxholes of the night before.

On the right of the battalion line, Company C had guided its advance on Ackerman's company. Most of the men in this

part of the line had better protection than

did A Company, so when the mortar barrage hit, 1st Lt. Bernard A. Tougow, in

command of C, kept his men on the line.

Within a few minutes after A pulled back,

Colonel O'Brien, battalion commander,

arrived at the C Company command post

with three tanks, which immediately went

to work to break up a small Japanese

counterattack. The tanks then moved over

to the left to meet Captain Ackerman, who

had put in the request for their assistance.

O'Brien organized a co-ordinated attack

along the whole front of his battalion and

supported it by the tanks, which he placed

in front of Company A. Shortly before

1500 the assault moved off after a brief

artillery preparation. The tanks, which

were buttoned up, moved out ahead of the

line of infantrymen for a few minutes, then

veered to the left and finally reversed their

course and headed back toward the American line firing as they came. Colonel

O'Brien's frantic efforts to contact the

tankers by radio failed, and he finally ran

out in the midst of this fire to meet them.

Crawling up on the turret of the first tank

he met, he banged on it with his pistol

butt. The tank then contacted the other

two by radio and the firing stopped

momentarily. O'Brien turned the vehicles

around and then took up a position atop

the lead tank's turret and ordered the advance to proceed.

The whole battalion jumped off in a

rapid push that carried it across the open

ground. Throughout the movement most

of the men advanced at a dogtrot behind

the tanks, keeping up a steady fire to the

front. O'Brien continued to ride the tank

turret of the lead tank, giving directions

to the men inside with his pistol butt and

waving the infantrymen forward. During

the advance A Company lost two men

killed and three wounded. Company C on

the right suffered no casualties.31

In the center of the division line, Companies L and K of the 165th Infantry

jumped off on schedule at 0930. They had

31

 Ibid., pp. 147-50; 105th RCT Jnl, 21 Jun 44,

Msgs 19, 21, 27.
THE CAPTURE OF NAFUTAN POINT 147

made some progress by 1255, when they

were held up by a heavy concentration of

mortar fire, most of which landed in the L

Company area. Within the space of a few

minutes one man was killed and eleven

were seriously wounded; then the barrage

ceased as abruptly as it had begun. By that

time all of the 3d Battalion was badly disorganized and made no further advance

during the afternoon. This left L Company

of the 165th some 500 yards to the left rear

of Company A, which had advanced rapidly during the afternoon with the aid of the

tanks under Colonel O'Brien's personal

direction.

To fill the gap, O'Brien ordered in the

1st Platoon of his reserve Company B. The

platoon leader sent out a patrol that reported that a number of Japanese had

taken up position with a machine gun at

the crest of the ridge between the two battalions and that the only way firm contact

could be established was by knocking out

the position. O'Brien then ordered the platoon to face the ridge, deploy, and assault

it frontally from the west. After a short

mortar concentration the platoon attacked

at 1615, but was immediately pinned down

by enemy fire that killed two men and

wounded three others. Shortly afterward,

O'Brien received an urgent radio message

indicating that Company L was being

fired on from the direction of the 1st Platoon, Company B, The assault on the west

face of the ridge was promptly called off

and the gap along the battalion line remained unclosed for the night.32

The most serious difficulties of the day's

fighting for Nafutan came on the extreme

left of the division line. Here, the unblooded 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, was

inserted in the line with Company G on

its right and Company F on its left close to

the ocean shore, while the reserve company

took position north of the front line along

the eastern coast.

The terrain to the immediate front was

extremely difficult. The most prominent

feature was the nose of Mount Nafutan, a

sheer cliff splitting the battalion front like

the bow of a ship. The cliff was not more

than thirty feet high, but the approach to

it was up a steep slope through the stubble

of a cane field that offered no cover.

The battalion jumped off on schedule at

0930. On the right, Company G was

immediately hit by enemy small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire. One source of

the fire was soon found to be a machine

gun located on the top of the cliff. Capt.

Frank Olander, company commander, ordered one squad to assault the cliff itself,

but the men had no sooner reached the

top of the cliff than they were recalled because of their precarious and isolated

situation. A second squad was sent to the

top, but the underbrush was so thick that

the men failed to spot the critical machine

gun. Another platoon that had meanwhile

attempted to infiltrate around to the right

of the nose of Mount Nafutan was soon

pinned down by the enemy fire from the

top. The squad on top of the cliff was then

called back, and the company commander

made his way to the battalion command

post to request more aid.

Lt. Col. Leslie M. Jensen, the battalion

commander, immediately ordered two selfpropelled mounts from the 165th Infantry

Cannon Company (the 105th Cannon

Company was not yet ashore) to carry rations and water to the isolated men around

the base of the cliff. He then called division

artillery for help but was advised that a 32

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 145-46, 151-52.
148 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

concentration on the nose of the ridge or

near any part of Jensen's front line was

inadvisable because of the advanced positions of the rest of the American line.

Eventually, however, it was agreed that

one battery of 105-mm. howitzers could be

sent forward to fire point-blank against the

cliff. Olander was instructed to withdraw

his men under cover of this fire. The decision was reached at 1535, and Battery

B, 104th Field Artillery Battalion, was ordered to the front lines at once.33

For the next hour, under Olander's instructions, Company G attempted no further movement. Then, under cover of the

artillery barrage the entire company drew

back to positions to the rear of that morning's line of departure.34

On the extreme left, close to the ocean

shore, Capt. Earl White, commanding

Company F, 105th Infantry, sent his 2d

Platoon south through the scrub fringing

the shore line with instructions to search

for a route that would lead them onto

Mount Nafutan from the rear. At 1700,

after an afternoon of extremely difficult

work through the coral and underbrush,

the platoon finally gained the top of Mount

Nafutan. During this period, White had

kept mortar fire on the Japanese positions

on top of the ridge that were holding back

the rest of his company. Sometime during

the afternoon the Japanese appear to have

picked up their guns and moved out. When

the 2d Platoon arrived on top of the ridge

at 1700 the men found it unoccupied, but

within a few minutes of the arrival of the

platoon the company commander ordered

it to return to its starting point. Upon the

return of the platoon, White ordered Company F to pull back behind the line of departure where there was better cover and

where Company G had already dug in.35

Thus, by the close of the fighting on 21

June, troops of the 27th Division had made

insignificant progress on either flank of its

attack down Nafutan Point, but had

made a slight dent in the center.30 The intermediate objective line about halfway

down the peninsula from the original line

of departure of 20 June was still from five

hundred to a thousand yards away. The

nose of Mount Nafutan, which had been

reached by elements of Companies F and

G, 105th Infantry, had been relinquished

and the mountain itself still had to be

scaled before the southeastern tip of the

island could be secured. Casualties for the

day's fighting on Nafutan came to seven

killed and fifty-seven wounded in action.37

Change of Plan: Relief of the

165th Infantry on Nafutan Point

By 21 June the two Marine divisions

had completed their pivoting movement to

the north, and General Holland Smith prepared to launch a full-scale attack against

the Japanese main line of resistance in that

area. To do so, he would need the bulk of

the 27th Division as corps reserve and, accordingly, he decided to reduce the number

of troops committed to Nafutan Point and

to remove most of the men to the reserve

area behind the Marine front lines to the

north. His opinion that these troops would

no longer be needed on Nafutan was reinforced by a report from 27th Division

33

 165th RCT Jnl, 21 Jun 44, Msg 121. 34

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 137-45.

35

 Ibid., pp. 136-37. 36

 See attached Hq 27th Inf Div Situation

Overlay to Accompany G-3 Periodic Rpt 4, Saipan, 1/20,000, 211600 Jun 44. 37

 27th Inf Div G-1 Periodic Rpt 5.
THE CAPTURE OF NAFUTAN POINT 149

headquarters stating that the only enemy

left in that area consisted of 300 to 500

service personnel from the remnants of

naval air units originally stationed on Aslito, plus a larger number of civilians.38

Hence, on 21 June Holland Smith issued

his operations Order Number 9-44, which

was received at 27th Division Headquarters at 1215 that day.39

 The 27th Infantry

Division (less one infantry battalion and

one light tank platoon) was to assemble

northwest of Aslito airfield in corps reserve.

Division artillery was to pass to control of

the XXIV Corps Artillery. One infantry

battalion (undesignated) of the division

was ordered to remain in the garrison area,

that is, Nafutan peninsula. "It will mop

up remaining enemy detachments, maintain anti-sniper patrols . . . and protect

installations within its zone of action with

particular attention to ASLITO Airfield."

The slow progress that his division had

made on the afternoon of the 21st, however, convinced General Ralph Smith that

more than a single battalion would be

necessary to clean up the point. Accordingly, at 1435, his headquarters notified Col.

Robert Hogaboom, USMC, G-3 of Northern Troops and Landing Force, that at

least two battalions would be needed for

the next day's operations in that area.40

At 1700 General Ralph Smith called General Holland Smith and recommended that

all of the 105th Regimental Combat Team

be left in the Nafutan Point area. General

Holland Smith agreed to this but stipulated

that only two of the 105th's battalions be

used there. The other would be held in

reserve ready for use elsewhere if necessary.41

This modification of Operations Order

Number 9-44 was contained in a mail

brief issued by General Holland Smith that

arrived at 27th Infantry Division headquarters at 0830 on 22 June. In the words of

the message, "1 RCT will continue mission

in Garrison Area [Nafutan] of cleaning

up remaining resistance & patrolling

area."42 The order did not designate specifically which regimental combat team was

intended, although the previous day's conversation had clearly indicated that the

105th was to be used for the mission.

At 2000, 21 June, after his conversation

with General Holland Smith but before receiving the mail brief modifying the latter's

original orders, General Ralph Smith issued his Field Order Number 45-A, which

contained the following instruction to the

105th Infantry:

RCT 105 will hold present front line facing

NAFUTAN PT, with two Battalions on the

line and one Battalion in Regimental Reserve. It will relieve elements of RCT 165

now on the present front line by 0630 22

June. The Battalion in reserve will not be

committed to action without authority from

the Division Commander. Reorganization of

the present front line to be effected not later

than 1100 22 June and offensive operations

against the enemy continued. Reserve Battalion will maintain anti-sniper patrols in the

vicinity of ASLITO AIRFIELD.43

The wording of this paragraph and the

fact that it was issued at all to the 105th

Infantry by 27th Division's commanding

general was soon to become a major bone

of contention between Generals Holland

38

 27th Inf Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 5, 21 Jun 44. 39

 NTLF Opn Order 9-44, 21 Jun 44; 27th

Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 21 Jun 44, Msg 34. 40

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 21 Jun 44, Msg 43.

41

 Ibid., Entry 65. 42

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 22 Jun 44, Msg 14. 43

 27th Inf Div G-3 Rpt, Battle for Saipan, FO

45, Able, 2000, 21 Jun 44. Author's italics.
150 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Smith and Ralph Smith and was one of the

alleged reasons for the latter's being subsequently relieved of his command.

Action of 22 June

22 June was spent reorganizing the front

lines facing Nafutan Point.44 On the right

General Ralph Smith ordered the 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, to hold its line and

spread out to the left to relieve the 1st

Battalion of the same regiment, which was

to revert to corps reserve. On the left, the

2d Battalion, 105th, was to hold its line

facing Mount Nafutan and move to the

right to relieve the 3d Battalion, 165th Infantry. On the right, the 3d Battalion accomplished its assigned relief mission, but

on the left the 2d Battalion ran into

trouble.

During the preceding night it had become evident that the Japanese were

preparing positions on the nose of Mount

Nafutan, and Captain Olander, G Company commander, requested permission to

pull his men back to less exposed positions.

Permission was granted, but before the

move could be executed the enemy on

Mount Nafutan opened fire with machine

guns, small arms, and mortars, killing seven

men and wounding twenty-one.

Companies G and F immediately pulled

back a considerable distance to the rear

for reorganization, leaving E Company to

prevent any breakthrough. Company G,

which had been badly hit on the 21st as well

as on the morning of the 22d, took more

than two hours to reorganize. By 0946 Captain Olander was ready to move again, but

by this time his company had four officers

and only seventy-two enlisted men, less than

half of its original strength. With these few

soldiers he was expected to take over a zone

then held by a full battalion. The reorganization had taken place some 400 yards

behind the position of the night before and

the men now marched another 600 yards

to the original line of departure from which

the attack had jumped off on 20 June.

From this point the company commander

moved his men up to relieve the 3d Battalion, 165th, at 1025.45

 Because his company was understrength, Olander had to

place his men some twenty yards apart in

the skirmish line.

The 2d Battalion, 105th, spent the rest

of the afternoon reorganizing its line, and

made no further advance. By nightfall, in

fact, there was a net loss of ground on the

2d Battalion front.

Meanwhile, about 1515 General Ralph

Smith visited headquarters of Northern

Troops and Landing Force to consult with

the corps commander about plans for the

immediate future. General Holland Smith

expressed his concern regarding the slowness of the advance on Nafutan Point. He

said that "he did not wish to be unreasonable but that Colonel Bishop [Commanding Officer, 105th Infantry] must not be

permitted to delay. If he couldn't do it, to

send somebody who could."46 In response,

General Ralph Smith "pointed out difficult

terrain and Jap positions in caves and said

44

 The following narrative of the Nafutan Point

action from 22 to 28 June is derived mostly from

information gained by Capt. Edmund G. Love and

set forth in his manuscript, Battle for Saipan.

During most of this period only one battalion

was engaged at Nafutan, the 2d Battalion, 105th

Infantry. All of the records of the battalion were

destroyed by fire on 7 July, and the records of

higher echelons contain very little detailed information concerning activity in the area. See

Love, Battle for Saipan, p. 162ff.

45

 3d Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 22 Jun 44, Msg 14. 46

 Ralph Smith, Notes, Saipan, p. 9.
THE CAPTURE OF NAFUTAN POINT 151

rapid advance was impracticable if undue

losses were to be avoided and if Japs were

to be really cleaned out. [He] said that

continuing pressure would be applied and

that [he] thought the point could be

cleaned in a couple of days more."47

Shortly after this meeting, General

Ralph Smith went to see General Erskine,

Holland Smith's chief of staff. General Erskine apprised him of the corps plan to

pass the 27th Division between the two

Marine divisions on the northern front. As

to Nafutan Point, Erskine expressed his belief that one battalion could finish up the

job there.48

As a result of these afternoon conferences, General Ralph Smith returned to

the division command post and drew up

Field Order Number 46, which was issued

at 2100. In part, the order read: "2d Battalion, 105th Infantry (1 Platoon Light

Tanks attached) [will] continue operations to mop-up remaining enemy detachments in NAFUTAN POINT area. On

completion of this mission, [it will] revert

to Corps control as Corps Reserve."49

An hour later Holland Smith issued

Operations Order Number 10-44, which

was received at 27th Division command

post at 2330.50 In reference to Nafutan

Point this order read: "2d Battalion, 105th

Infantry (with one light tank platoon attached) [will] continue operations at

daylight to mop up remaining enemy

detachments in NAFUTAN POINT area.

Upon completion this mission [it will] revert to Corps control as Corps reserve."

Although there was no serious discrepancy between these two sets of orders,

General Holland Smith was becoming

alarmed over the fact that the battalion

on Nafutan Point was getting orders from

two different sources. Next day he warned

General Ralph Smith: "2d Battalion, 105th

by my operations order 10-44 not under

your tactical control and should not be included in your tactical orders. Please take

steps to rectify."

 51

Later in the operation, in requesting the

relief of General Ralph Smith, General

Holland Smith alleged that Field Order 46

"contravened the NT and LF order by issuing tactical orders to the 2d Battalion,

105th Infantry, to continue operations to

mop up enemy resistance in NAFUTAN

POINT area. The 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, by NT and LF Order No. 10-44,

had been removed from the tactical control

of the 27th Infantry Division,"

 52

Stalemate on Nafutan

23-24 June

As a result of these new orders the job

of finishing off Nafutan peninsula was left

to a single rifle battalion supported by one

platoon of six light tanks. The battalion

was to have no assistance from artillery except for whatever fire support might be

provided by naval ships operating in the

area. The front line currently held by the

American troops ran along the northern

base of the peninsula for a distance of

roughly 2,500 yards. The terrain was

mountainous, full of cliffs, crevices, and

caves. Yet, it must be added that, because

of the shape of the peninsula, any continuous forward advance of the attacking

47 Ibid.

48

 Ibid., p. 11. 49

 27th Inf Div FO 46, 2100, 22 Jun 44, in 27th

Inf Div G-3 Rpt. 50

 NTLF Opn Order 10-44, 2200, 22 Jun 44;

27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 22 Jun 44, Entry 78.

51

 NTLF G-3 Jnl, 23 Jun 44, Msg 231411. 52

 CG Expeditionary Troops to CO TF 51, 24

Jun 44, Buckner Board Rpt, p. 2 and Exhibit D.
152 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

troops would automatically reduce the

length of the front and thereby shorten the

line. In effect, the troops were moving

down an inverted isosceles triangle from

base to apex. An advance of a thousand

yards along the axis of the attack would

reduce the front from approximately 2,500

yards to approximately 1,000 yards.

Nevertheless, General Ralph Smith was

sufficiently alarmed at the wide dispersion

of the troops left along the front line on

Nafutan to warn General Holland Smith

of the possible consequences. "I want to

draw your attention," he wrote on 23

June, "that it is within the enemy's capabilities at NAFUTAN Point to infiltrate

small bodies of men through our lines at

night and execute considerable damage to

the planes and supplies at Conroy [that is,

Aslito or Isely] field." He added that the

Seabees and Air Forces troops working on

the field should be alerted and would have

to provide their own local security against

enemy groups that might infiltrate through

the lines of the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry.53

General Holland Smith had withdrawn

the bulk of the troops previously committed to Nafutan because they were more

urgently needed in the north and because

his intelligence reports indicated that the

number of Japanese remaining on the point

was small and probably ill-equipped. Two

days earlier the intelligence sections of both

the 27th Division and the 105th Infantry

had estimated that only from three to five

hundred enemy service personnel remained

bottled up in that area, and no revision of

that estimate had been made since.54 Actually, as later events were to prove, the

number was much larger, but as of the 23d

no responsible authority had issued any report to indicate that this was so.

The change in orders now necessitated

another shuffling of the line. Lt. Col. Leslie

Jensen, commanding officer of the 2d Battalion, 105th, ordered E Company to

march to the right and relieve the 3d Battalion, 105th. Company G was shifted to

the right so that part of the company was

below the 300-foot ridge line west of

Mount Nafutan and part was on the north

slope of the ridge. This reorganization was

completed at 1230, and the company was

ordered to attack at 1400. Company F,

which on the morning of 23 June was still

in position before the nose of Mount Nafutan, was ready to attack at 0800, but, before the attack could be launched, was

withdrawn and reorganized. Colonel Jensen then waited until he saw how far his

other two companies would stretch before

ordering F back into the line. Thus, in spite

of Holland Smith's orders to "continue

operations at daylight," the 2d Battalion

spent the entire morning trying to readjust

its lines to stretch clear across Nafutan

Point. When this readjustment was completed, the three companies were in position

in a broken line with Company E on the

right, G in the center, and F on the left.55

On the right (west) flank, one platoon

of Company E managed to push through

the coral fringing the beach for a distance

of about 300 yards without any opposition.

However, at the day's end this advance

platoon was pulled back to its starting

position because Capt. Clinton F. Smith,

the company commander, had not been 53

 Ralph Smith to CG NTLF, 23 Jun 44, Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit VVV. 54

 105th Inf FO 30, 1200, 21 Jun 44; 27th Inf

Div G-2 Periodic Rpts 5, 6, 7.

55

 Unless otherwise noted, the account of the

actions of the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, is derived from Love, Battle for Saipan, pages 175-98.
THE CAPTURE OF NAFUTAN POINT 153

able to establish contact with G Company

on his left and was fearful of infiltration.

Meanwhile Company G moved up to the

top of Ridge 300. There it came under fire

from at least four machine gun positions to

its left (east). Captain Olander ordered

his men not to return fire for fear of endangering the men of F Company, who

were presumably operating in the general

area from which the enemy was firing.

Efforts to bring up the three light tanks

attached to the unit failed because of the

precipitous coral terrain, and finally the

company commander ordered his men to

withdraw to the bivouac area of the night

before.

In the zone of Company F, the 2d Platoon reached the top of Mount Nafutan by

skirting it to the left through the brush

just inland of the east coast and coming

up to it from the rear. The men met no

opposition en route. The 1st Platoon was

ordered to move up the valley between

Ridge 300 and Mount Nafutan. For about

an hour it proceeded without any opposition, but suddenly the whole column came

under fire from a machine gun on the right

in the direction of Ridge 300. Three tanks

were called up and for better than half an

hour these vehicles sprayed the hills on

both sides of the valley. Nevertheless, at

1700 Captain White, the company commander, called the platoon back out of the

valley and ordered it to dig in along the

morning's line of departure. Meanwhile,

the 3d Platoon had moved along the inside,

east of Ridge 300, with no opposition until

about 1500. There it halted and waited for

the rest of the company to move abreast.

When this failed to happen, it too withdrew to dig in for the night with the rest

of F Company.

Thus at the close of the day the 2d Battalion, except for one platoon atop Mount

Nafutan, had withdrawn to approximately

the same positions it had occupied at the

beginning of the day's advance. The battalion was dug in in four widely separated

perimeters with no contact between them.

The perimeter of E Company on the right

was about 1,000 yards from that of G in

the center; G, in turn, was about 800 yards

from the Company F positions, while one

platoon of F was in an inaccessible position

another 800 yards to the left front.

As before, General Holland Smith's orders for 24 June called for the 2d Battalion,

105th Infantry, to "continue operations at

daylight to mop up remaining enemy detachments in NAFUTAN POINT area."56

However, not until 0800 did the battalion

actually commence moving. The interim

was spent trying to readjust the overextended lines of the battalion and trying to

establish at least a semblance of contact

between the various units.

On the extreme right flank, two platoons of Company E, against almost no

opposition, reflushed the area they had

traversed the day before and by nightfall

reached a point about 100 yards beyond

that previously gained. The 3d Platoon of

this company, on the left, ran into more

difficulty. During the early part of the

morning the unit had moved to the left

and re-established contact with G Company. By 1000, without running into any

Japanese, it had reached the point of its

furthest advance of the day before. Shortly

thereafter the leading squad was hit by

heavy small arms and machine gun fire

from its left rear and was forced to take

cover in a group of small houses. Mean56

 NTLF Opn Order 11-44, 23 Jun 44.
154 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

while, the other two squads to the rear

laid mortars on the suspected source of

enemy fire, but failed to knock it out. Then,

about 1500, a force of from fifty to

seventy-five Japanese rose up out of the

ground and launched a counterattack

through the gap that had developed between E and G Companies. With this, all

further progress ceased, and shortly after

dark the entire platoon moved back to the

company perimeter of the night before.

G Company in the center was late in

moving out. Captain Olander waited until

Company E on his right had made contact

and until F on his left had been reorganized. He then further delayed his jump-off

until the arrival of the three light tanks he

had requested. Moving off about 1130

Company G quickly recovered the ground

it had taken the previous day, and then it

again ran into machine gun fire. A tank

was brought forward, succeeded in locating

one of the enemy guns, and in a few minutes silenced it with 37-mm. fire. Shortly

after this the Japanese counterattack on

the right developed, and although G Company was not hit, it remained stationary

for two hours.

At approximately 1630 Olander once

again ordered his company to advance.

Four enemy machine gun positions in the

immediate front were taken out by tank

guns. The reduction of these positions put

the company ahead of the units on the

right and left, and Captain Olander swung

his men to the left in an attempt to take

out a group of machine guns that were

holding back the advance of Company F.

This move was effected in spite of approaching darkness, and within a few

minutes after making the turn G Company

surprised a pocket of about fifty Japanese

and wiped them out within ten minutes.

In the ensuing darkness, however, all

organization within the company broke

down. Olander lost contact with his platoon leaders, and the latter pulled their

men back to the bivouac area of the night

before.

The action of Company F on the left was

in general a repetition of that of the previous day. The 2d Platoon, which had

spent the night on Mount Nafutan, was

ordered to build up a skirmish line and

comb the nose of the ridge until the 1st

Platoon could move up on its right. However the latter unit, while en route to the

top of Mount Nafutan, ran into scattered

rifle fire and stopped in its tracks. Meanwhile, on the company's right, the 3d Platoon was held up by a Japanese machine

gun. A self-propelled mount from the

105th Cannon Company knocked this position out, but retired before disposing

of a second machine gun, which had

wounded one of its crew. The platoon

leader then sent out a squad to get the

weapon, but a third gun opened up and

pinned the squad down. By this time night

was approaching and, as no further progress seemed likely, Captain White ordered

his entire company including the platoon

on top of Mount Nafutan to withdraw to

the G Company perimeter of the night

before.

At nightfall then, the 2d Battalion,

105th Infantry, occupied positions m practically the same area in which it had dug

in the previous night, except that the

platoon atop Mount Nafutan had been

recalled. At 1818 control of the battalion

had passed to the Army Garrison Force.57

57

 Memo, Col Geoffrey M. O'Connell for Gen

Richardson, 12 Jul 44, sub: Opns of 2d Bn, 105th

Inf, Saipan, on Nafutan Point, Buckner Board

Rpt, Exhibit WW.
THE CAPTURE OF NAFUTAN POINT 155

Since Maj. Gen. Sanderford Jarman, USA,

the island commander, had taken command of the 27th Division during the

day, command of the forces on Nafutan

Point passed to the control of Col. Geoffrey

M. O'Connell, General Jarman's chief of

staff.

Nafutan Secured

25-28 June

Colonel O'Connell's first step to expedite the capture of Nafutan was to assign

two batteries of 90-mm. antiaircraft guns

and four 40-mm. guns to support the advancing infantry. The 90-mm. guns were to

fire from their fixed positions on Aslito

field, and the 40-mm.'s were ordered to

move into forward positions in direct support. Because of the mountainous terrain

and the impossibility of bringing direct fire

against most of the Japanese positions, the

90-mm. guns were ordered to fire air bursts

into the tree tops, approximately twelve

feet above ground level. In the opinion of

Colonel O'Connell, "The high muzzle velocity of these weapons, their rapid rate of

fire and the flexibility obtainable by raising

and lowering the height of burst made

them particularly effective for support in

this type of terrain."

 58

 The 40-mm.'s were

used for direct fire and were to prove remarkably accurate in hitting cave entrances

as small as four or five feet in diameter

from an average range of 2,000 yards.59

O'Connell's plan for the infantry differed

somewhat from that previously employed.

Company E was ordered to leave its 3d

Platoon in the area adjacent to the peninsula's west coast at the point where the

company had bivouacked the two preceding days. The other two platoons were to

move to the left, establish firm physical

contact with G Company, build up a

skirmish line, and move south along the

west slope of Ridge 300. Company G was

to form a line on E Company's left flank

and advance in co-ordination with that

unit. F Company was to deploy two platoons across the mouth of the valley between Ridge 300 and Mount Nafutan,

while the third platoon moved along the

east slope of the ridge in co-ordination

with the other two companies.60

By 1030 of 25 June, the 1st and 2d

Platoons of E Company had swung left

and established contact with Company G.

About 1130, after an advance of nearly

150 yards, the leading squad of the 1st

Platoon on the right ran into a fusillade of

fire and was pinned down. Tanks were

called up but became entangled in the

undergrowth and rocks and could be of no

assistance. At 1600 the company commander ordered both platoons to retire about

forty yards behind their farthest point of

advance and tie in with Company G and

spend the night.

Company G had little or no opposition

during the day, but its advance was slow

because it was held up by the halting

forward movement of the units on both

flanks and because the tanks had extreme

difficulty in maneuvering over the terrain.

About noon the company reached the gun

position it had knocked out during the late

afternoon of the preceding day, and after a

heavy fire by antiaircraft guns, moved on

through it. The position contained four 58

 O'Connell, Opns in Nafutan Point Area, Saipan, 2 Jul 44, Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit XX,

p. 3. 59

 Ibid.; see also, Memo cited n. 57.

60

 The following account, unless otherwise

noted, is derived from Love, Battle for Saipan

pp. 199-215.
156 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

SKIRMISH LINE on west slope of Ridge 300. Note man with bazooka at extreme

right.

heavy machine guns and two 50-mm.

mortars. The company advanced another

twenty-five yards but was then held up

because of the dense growth of scrub

brush. Captain Olander worked his tanks

into position and for two hours sprayed

this area with machine gun fire and canister. Just as he was about to continue the

advance, the tanks notified him that it was

1600 and they were about to withdraw.

This notice plus the fact that Company E

was making no further progress induced

Olander to pull his men back to the demolished enemy strongpoint and dig in

there for the night.

Meanwhile, Company F was undergoing

a repetition of the trouble it had encountered the day before. Shortly after jumping

off, the 3d Platoon on the right discovered

that the Japanese had mined the only

available tank route and engineers were

called up to abate the nuisance. Two tanks

were then called up and succeeded in

destroying two machine guns that lay

athwart the line of advance. Immediately,

another gun opened up. A squad went

forward to take out this position but was

pinned down by machine gun fire and a

shower of grenades. Further tank action

was delayed when radio communications

between the tanks and infantry gave out,

and not until 1500 was the platoon leader

able to direct his tanks into the area of resistance. Finally, the two tanks succeeded

in bringing their guns to bear against the

position, and shortly after 1500 the whole

platoon pushed forward and into the Japanese line. Here they found six heavy machine guns, several mortars, a wrecked

dual-purpose gun, and all types of grenades

and ammunition, together with the dead

bodies of over a hundred Japanese. The

platoon dug in for the night. The other two

platoons of Company F had remained
THE CAPTURE OF NAFUTAN POINT 157

stationary during the day guarding the

northern approach to the valley between

Mount Nafutan and Ridge 300.

June 25 marked the climax of the campaign for the capture of Nafutan Point.

During the day the 2d Battalion knocked

out and overran the main defensive line of

Japanese positions on top of Ridge 300.

These positions controlled the approach to

the point, and it was from Ridge 300 that

the advance of the whole line had been

held up since 22 June.

Plans for 26 June were the same as on

the previous day except that the 1st and

2d Platoons of Company F were to leave

the northern mouth of the valley and take

position on the left flank of the battalion

line. At 0645 concentrated mortar fire

was directed along the whole front, and at

0750 both batteries of 90-mm. antiaircraft

guns fired a ten-minute concentration.

Promptly at 0800 all three companies

jumped off.

On the right, Company E moved slowly

forward, fighting the terrain and the underbrush. By 1400, when it was some fifty

yards ahead of its farthest point of advance

of the previous day, a machine gun opened

up directly in front of the 2d Platoon. A

self-propelled mount came forward but

could not bring its gun to bear against the

enemy position. Finally, the enemy gun

was taken out by a BAR belonging to

Company G, whose right flank was moving along an elevation to the left of E

Company and was therefore in a better

position to fire on the enemy in front of

the latter unit. That company resumed its

advance and for the next 200 yards met no

opposition. At 1600 Captain Smith was notified that the other two companies were

pulling back to approximately the same

positions they had held the night before,

so he did likewise.

Company G made more rapid progress.

After cleaning out the position to the front

of E Company, Captain Olander's men

pressed ahead. At 1600 their tanks left to

return to their maintenance pool for the

night, but the company commander elected to go on without them. Within half

an hour his men had arrived at the southern edge of Ridge 300.

It was on the left flank in the zone of

Company F that the greatest progress was

registered on the 26th. With three platoons

abreast, and without benefit of tank support, the company pushed steadily forward

without meeting any enemy fire. By 1700

it had reached the southern end of Mount

Nafutan, a thousand yards from the tip of

the peninsula. There, the men began to receive small arms fire and came to a halt.

At 1830 F and E Companies withdrew all

the way back to the area in which G had

spent the previous night. This withdrawal

was made because both company commanders felt that their positions on the top of

the high rocky points of Mount Nafutan

and Ridge 300 were too exposed to provide

satisfactory spots to dig in and establish

perimeters.

The battalion dug in in four perimeters

on the night of 26 June. The three rifle

companies, less E Company's 3d Platoon

but reinforced by elements of H Company,

dug in on Ridge 300. The 3d Platoon of

E Company still occupied the old bivouac

area near the west coast of the peninsula.

The whole area between the 2d Battalion

positions on Ridge 300 and the sea to the

east was unoccupied by American troops

and serious gaps appeared on the right of

the line.
Americans Rescuing Baby From Nafutan Cave
THE CAPTURE OF NAFUTAN POINT 159

Shortly after midnight of 26 June, a body

of Japanese estimated at 500 sneaked

through the 2d Battalion's outposts. Their

destination was Hill 500, formerly the site

of headquarters of the 47th Independent

Mixed Brigade, but now occupied by the

25th Marines in Northern Troops and

Landing Force reserve. One small force hit

the rear command post of the 2d Battalion,

105th Infantry, and in the darkness was

driven off with a loss of twenty-seven dead

in return for four Americans killed and

twenty wounded.61 Otherwise the infiltration was undetected.

This desperate Japanese move was led by

Captain Sasaki, commanding officer of the

317th Independent Infantry Battalion,

47th Independent Mixed Brigade. The

troops composing the force consisted of

those remnants of his own command that

had escaped to Nafutan plus scattered

Army and Navy men from other units,

including the service and antiaircraft

troops formerly stationed on Aslito.

Sasaki's order read in part:

26 June 1944

1. The enemy situation is the same as you

have been informed.

2. The Battalion will carry out an attack

at midnight tonight. After causing confusion

at the airfield, we will advance to Brigade

Headquarters in the Field.

3. . . . Units will assemble at 1930 in

areas to be designated separately. You must

carry out the attack from the designated

places.

4. Casualties will remain in their present

positions and defend Nafutan Mount. Those

who cannot participate in combat must commit suicide.

5. We will carry the maximum of weapons

and supplies.

6. The pass word for tonight will be

"Shichi Sei Hokoku" [Seven lives for one's

country].62

The word "battalion" as applied here is a

courtesy title only. The force was a conglomerate mixture of all kinds of troops, of

which the remnants of Sasaki's battalion

formed only the nucleus.

About 0230 Sasaki's force hit Aslito field

and splattered the area with machine gun

and small arms fire before moving on

toward Hill 500, where it apparently expected to find the command post of the

47th Independent Mixed Brigade. Arriving

at its destination around 0530, one part of

the force found instead that the hill was

occupied by the 25th Marines, who instantly gave battle with small arms and

hand grenades.

Simultaneously, another group of Japanese fell upon the 14th Marine Artillery

Regiment in positions between Hill 500 and

Aslito. Here another hot fight ensued, the

Marine artillerymen killing 143 Japanese

at the cost to themselves of 33 killed and

wounded.63 Still another segment hit the

command post of the 104th Field Artillery

Battalion, where 15 to 20 of them were

killed. The 25th Marines mopped up the

remaining stragglers the next morning,

and with that Sasaki's breakthrough was

finished.64

On the morning of 27 June all three

companies of the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, formed a skirmish line and swept to

the end of the peninsula with no trouble.

Not a live Japanese was encountered, and

at 1840 Nafutan Point was declared secure.65

 Two hundred dead Japanese, mostly soldiers, were found in five of the caves

61

 Ibid., p. 216.

62

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl D, G-2

Rpt, p. 34. 63

 Ibid; TF 51 Opn Rpt Marianas, Incl A, p. 10. 64

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl D, G-2

Rpt, p. 34; TF 51 Opn Rpt Marianas, Incl A, p.

10; 27th Inf Div G-2 Jnl, 28 Jun 44, Msg 19. 65

 27th Inf Div G-2 Jnl, 27 Jun 44, Msg 64.
160 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

on Mount Nafutan, and later another 350

dead enemy soldiers were counted in the

area of the operation of the 2d Battalion,

105th Infantry.66 These figures, plus the estimated 500 that had participated in the

breakthrough, bring the total estimate of

enemy combat personnel in the area to

about 1,050, considerably above the original estimate of 300 to 500 that had been

agreed upon by the 105th Infantry, the

27th Infantry Division, and Northern

Troops and Landing Force.

Also captured on Nafutan Point on 28

June were four 6-inch guns of British

manufacture and three 14-cm. guns manufactured in 1925 at the Yokosuka Naval

Arsenal. All were in the vicinity of the radar station on the point but had not yet

been emplaced. One of the 14-cm. guns

was slightly damaged; one 6-inch gun was

badly damaged, two were slightly damaged, and one was almost intact.67

Nafutan Point had taken a long time to

capture, probably longer than was necessary. General Holland Smith and his staff

were bitterly disappointed, not to say outraged, by the slow progress made by the

2d Battalion, 105th Infantry. They complained frequently about "1000 Americans

being held up by a handful of Japs."68

The number of enemy troops isolated on

Nafutan Point was actually considerably

more than a handful, and probably totaled

about 1,050. Also, the effective strength of

the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, as of 27

June, was down to 556 officers and men

according to Colonel O'Connell, USA, who

commanded the unit during the last stage

of the capture of Nafutan.69

In addition, the terrain that the American soldiers faced was far from suitable for

rapid assault. As described in the battalion

report, "The terrain consisted of steep

ridges, deep gulches with cliffs, ground

broken with coral pinnacles, and thick

jungle type underbrush which impeded

progress and made observation impossible."70

 Also, for the first three days of

the assault, the battalion had no artillery

support, and after that only the 40-mm.

and the 90-mm. antiaircraft guns that

Colonel O'Connell brought down when he

took over command, plus naval gunfire

from three destroyers.

The low estimate of the number of Japanese troops in the area that was entertained by corps headquarters was derived

from an intelligence report emanating from

the 27th Division itself. As of 21 June, the

division had estimated the number of remaining Japanese on Nafutan to be between two and three hundred.71

 Since no

change in this figure had been made, General Holland Smith's staff had some reason

to assume that only a "handful" remained.

Also, the bare figure of 1,050 enemy troops

cited above offers no real picture of the

combat efficiency of the Japanese left on

the peninsula. These were, it must be remembered, stragglers who had made a

disorderly retreat before the onslaught of

the American push across Aslito field. They

were disorganized, short of supplies, and

in some cases unarmed.

Against these people, the American drive 66

 O'Connell, Opns in Nafutan Point Area, Saipan, 2 Jul 44, Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit XX,

pp. 2-3. 67

 Ibid. 68

 O'Connell Rpt, Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit

WW; Testimony of Maj Norvel H. Moore, USA,

Exhibit BBB.

69

 Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit WW. 70

 2d Bn 105th Inf Narrative of Events, Saipan,

p. 3. 71

 27th Inf Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 5, 21 Jun 44.
THE CAPTURE OF NAFUTAN POINT 161

was halting and slow. There was some

justification for Holland Smith's lack of

confidence in the leadership of the regiment, and later of the battalion, committed

to cleaning up Nafutan. The attack of the

infantry companies was frequently un-coordinated; units repeatedly withdrew from

advanced positions to their previous nights'

bivouacs; they repeatedly yielded ground

they had gained. Whatever the extenuating circumstances, these facts could not

fail to raise doubts about the aggressiveness

and combat efficiency of the unit assigned

to the mission.

CHAPTER IX

The Fight for Central Saipan—I

Preparations for the Drive

to the North

While elements of the 27th Division were

slowly inching their way down Nafutan

Point, the two Marine divisions prepared

to launch the drive against the main line of

Japanese defenses, which stretched across

the waist of the island from just below

Garapan to the northwest corner of Magicienne Bay.1

 (Map 6) The 2d Marine Division in the north had little more to do

than consolidate the lines it already held,

send out patrols, and mop up small isolated pockets of enemy troops still lurking

within its sector. The 4th Marine Division,

before it could be in a position to attack,

would have to reorient the direction of its

drive from east to north and then push

forward (northward) about a thousand

yards to tie its left flank in with the right

flank of the 2d Division. When this was

accomplished the two Marine divisions

would be drawn up abreast on what was

designated the O-4 line, which ran roughly

parallel and a little to the south of the

Japanese main line of defense.2

During the period in which the 4th Marine Division was pivoting to the left, the

only serious fighting occurred around Hill

500, on 20 June. This 500-foot eminence

just west of the village of Tsutsuuran had

once been the site of the command post of

Colonel Oka, commander of the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade, who had since

left it for a safer location to the northward.

Hill 500 fell within the zone of the 25th

Marines, which attacked it in column of

battalions.

Following an advance preparation of

rockets, artillery, heavy weapons, and mortars, the lead battalion moved forward

about 1030 under cover of smoke. By noon

it had seized the hill, and it spent the rest

of the day mopping up the network of

caves that ran through the area. All together, the marines suffered forty-nine

casualties and accounted for forty-four

enemy dead. The hill had been well organized for defense but not strongly manned.3

That same day the 8th Marines, which

constituted the 2d Marine Division's right

(south) flank, made a forward advance

against no opposition to tie in with the left

flank of the 4th Division. There was little

other activity in the 2d Division's zone of

action.4 By nightfall of the 20th the marines rested securely on the designated

O-4 line ready to jump off on order for

the big drive northward. They spent June

1

 See above, pp. 116-17. 2

 See NTLF Opn Order 8-44, 19 Jun 44, Annex

A, and Japanese Situation Map, 19 Jun 44, Incl

to Ch. VI.

3

 25th RCT 4th Marine Div Rpt, p. 5; Hoffman, Saipan, p. 115. 4

 Hoffman, Saipan, p. 114.
164 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

HILL 500. Marines in foreground await signal to advance on the hill.

21st resting and sending out patrols. Men

of the 4th Division moved as far as 1,500

yards to their front without meeting any

organized enemy resistance.5

Landing the 106th Infantry

Before leaving Hawaii, the 106th Infantry Regiment had been assigned as reserve

for the 27th Division with the probable

mission of landing on Saipan. On arrival

at Kwajalein, Col. Russell G. Ayers, the

regimental commander, was informed that

his unit would be attached to the Southern

Landing Force, destined for Guam. The

regiment was to land in the rear of the 1st

Provisional Marine Brigade and to capture

Orote Peninsula on that island.6 On 16

June, however, because of the imminent

engagement with the approaching Japanese

fleet, Admiral Spruance indefinitely postponed the landing on Guam,7

 and on the

18th the transports carrying the 106th Infantry were detached from Admiral Conolly's Southern Attack Force and ordered to

Saipan.8

On the evening of the 18th General Holland Smith requested that the 106th be

landed "in order to maintain the continuity

of the offensive," but Admiral Turner was

reluctant to comply because to do so

would inevitably delay the Guam attack

until another reserve force for that landing

could be brought up from the Hawaiian

area. Nevertheless, Smith continued to

press his case, and at last Turner con5

 Ibid., p. 120. 6

 106th (Reinf) RCT Narrative Rpt, FORAGER

Opn, 29 May-14 Aug 44, pp. 1-2.

7

 See above, p. 121. 8

 106th RCT Rpt FORAGER, p. 2. The other landing troops originally assigned to Guam were

subsequently returned to Eniwetok. TF 53 Rpt of

Amph Opns for Capture of Guam, 10 Aug 44,

pp. 5-6.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—I 165

MARINES ON THE CREST OF HII.L 500 mop up network of caves.

curred and ordered the 106th Infantry to

commence landing early on the morning of

20 June.9

The regiment landed on order and except for its attached artillery was assigned

to Northern Troops and Landing Force

reserve. Next day Colonel Ayers directed

all of his units to initiate reconnaissance

in the zones of action of both Marine divisions. In conducting this reconnaissance,

one group from the Antitank Company was

ambushed and suffered four casualties, the

first to occur in the regiment.

The rest of the day the 1st Battalion

patrolled Susupe swamp with the mission

of clearing Japanese stragglers from the vicinity of corps headquarters and a nearby

Marine hospital. For this purpose the

battalion was attached to the 2d Marine

Division under whose control it remained

until the morning of 23 June. During this

period the battalion killed eighteen Japanese in the swamp and took two prisoners

of war.10

Japanese Situation on the Eve

of the Northern Attack

While the marines pivoted on the 2d Marine Division's left flank below Garapan,

the Japanese too were pivoting on almost

the same point. By the 19th they were in

position along a new "line of security" that

ran from below Garapan, east to White

Cliff, south to Hill 230, and then southeast

through Hill 286 to Magicienne Bay.11

General Saito disposed his troops in new

sectors divided by Mount Tapotchau. On

the extreme right (west) of the Japanese

flank the town of Garapan was occupied

9

 Comdr Amph Forces, Ser. 000156, 4 Sep 44,

Incl A; 106th RCT Rpt FORAGER, p. 2.

10

 106th RCT Jnl FORAGER, p. 4. 11

 See above, p. 116.
166 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

JAPANESE TYPE 93 13.2-MM. MACHINE

GUN. This dual-purpose gun was captured at Saipan.

by naval units, chiefly the Yokosuka 1st

Special Naval Landing Force. To their left,

the 135th Infantry held the area between

Garapan and the west slopes of Mount

Tapotchau. The 118th Infantry, a straggler unit, was to hold the area southeast

of Tapotchau and be prepared to check

enemy landings from Magicienne Bay. Kagman Peninsula was to be held by those

remnants of the 47th Independent Mixed

Brigade that had not already been destroyed or isolated on Nafutan Point. The

9th Expeditionary Unit, another straggler

force, was placed under command of the

47th Independent Mixed Brigade and assigned to defend the shore north of Kagman Peninsula. In general reserve was the

136th Infantry, which had been ordered to

assemble at Chacha at sunset on the 19th.

The 9th Tank Regiment had a dual

mission—to co-operate with the 118th Regiment, and to check any advances along

the coast or against the beaches of Magicienne Bay.12

Even this late in the campaign, the

Japanese expected either a landing on

Magicienne Bay or a tank attack up the

bay coast. Their fear of American tanks

was especially acute, as a report from 31st

Army headquarters attests: "The changes

in the battle up until today have been the

results of naval gunfire and bombing but

from now on the main thing will be to

gain unfailing victory in antitank warfare.

Our army has new ideas concerning this

point and we hope this is not a miscalculation."13

The stubborn determination of the Japanese to continue their resistance is all the

more remarkable in view of their losses to

date. As of 19 June approximately three

and a half of the 43d Division's original

eight battalions had been destroyed. Only

one of five artillery battalions remained.

The 47th Independent Mixed Brigade had

been all but eliminated as an organized

fighting unit. Two and a half battalions of

infantry belonging to other units were

destroyed, only one composite battalion

remaining. Sixty percent of the 9th Tank

Regiment was destroyed, as were most of

the 7th and 11th Independent Engineers.14

On the eve of the American attack to the

north the personnel losses of Japanese line

units were reported to be not lower than

50 percent.15

In terms of artillery and tanks, the Japanese were just as badly off and as hope12

 Japanese Studies in World War II, 55, map

facing p. 79. 13

 31st Army Msg File, Msg 1059; CINCPACCINCPOA Trans 9983-85. 14

 31st Army Msg File, Msg 1060. 15

 Ibid., Msg 1071.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—I 167

JAPANESE FIELD OF FIRE from Mt. Tapotchau.

lessly outnumbered. All that remained to

them on 20 June after six days of fighting

were eleven 75-mm. field pieces, twentyseven tanks, three operational antiaircraft

guns, and nine machine cannon.16

But though the Japanese on Saipan were

weak in manpower and short of weapons

and equipment, they lacked nothing of the

traditional spirit that had driven and was

to drive so many of their countrymen to

glorious if futile death on the battlefield.

On the eve of the battle one tanker doubtless spoke for most of his compatriots when

he inscribed in his diary:

The fierce attacks of the enemy only increase our hostility. Every man is waiting for

the assault with all weapons for close quarters fighting in readiness. We are waiting

with 'Molotov cocktails' and hand grenades

ready for the word to rush forward recklessly

into the enemy ranks with our swords in

hands. The only thing that worries me is

what will happen to Japan after we die.17

22 June: The Jump-off

General Holland Smith's orders for 22 16

 Corrected figures are derived from 31st Army June called for an attack to the north by

Msg File, Msgs 1060, 1064, 1068. These figures do

not include the equipment in the hands of straggler elements on Nafutan Point.

17

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 10238, extracts

from the diary of Matsuya Tokuzo.
168 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

the two Marine divisions in line abreast,

the 2d Division on the left, the 4th on the

right. The jump-off hour was to be 0600,

the objective line (O-5) to run through

Laulau village on Kagman Peninsula on

the right, Mount Tapotchau in the center,

and a point on the west coast of the island

about 1,000 yards south of Garapan on

the left.18

In view of the fact that this northward

push would automatically extend the lines

of the two Marine divisions, especially as

the 4th Division was required to spread

eastward on Kagman Peninsula, the corps

commander alerted the 27th Division to

the fact that it might soon be committed

to the northern line. The Army division,

which was then in corps reserve, was ordered to reconnoiter routes to both of the

Marine divisions' zones of action. 27th Division Artillery was passed to the control

of General Harper's XXIV Corps Artillery

to deliver close and deep support missions

in advance of the marines. All together, the

troops on the northern line would have

eighteen battalions of artillery to support

their drive on the morning of 22 June.19

On the right of the 4th Marine Division

zone in the area inland from Magicienne

Bay, the 24th Marines jumped off on

schedule, made rapid progress against light

opposition, and by 1330 reached an intermediate objective line that had been established by the division commander about

2,000 yards in front of its line of departure.20

To its left, the, 25th Marines found the

going more difficult. The regiment jumped

off on schedule in column of battalions,

and within half an hour the lead battalion

was attacked by a force of Japanese troops

accompanied by a tank. Ninety of the

enemy were killed and the tank was destroyed. For the rest of the morning the

regiment encountered light resistance, but

just south of the intermediate objective line

received severe machine gun fire, a situation that was aggravated by an exploding

Japanese ammunition dump. This slowed

progress so that by the day's end the 25th

Marines were still short of the day's objective, although the regiment had made an

advance of about 2,000 yards.21

Meanwhile, the 23d Marines, which had

been in division reserve, was committed

between the two assault regiments shortly

after noon. Fighting against light enemy

resistance but over stubborn terrain, the

23d Regiment, too, fell just short of reaching the day's objective by the time it dug

in for the night.22

The 2d Marine Division had the more

difficult task of gaining the approaches to

Mount Tapotchau and of pushing to the

top of Mount Tipo Pale, General Watson,

the division commander, placed all three of

his regiments in line abreast, the 8th, 6th,

and 2d Marines from right to left. As the

official Marine Corps historian described

the scene, "Looking to the north of the

6th and 8th Marines' lines, a nightmare of

sheer cliffs and precipitous hills could be

observed, separated in crisscross fashion by

deep gashes . . . . Dense foliage which

cloaked the region often limited visibility

to a few feet."

 23

Both assault battalions of the 8th Marines made fair progress against little 18

 NTLF Opn Order 9-44, 21 Jun 44. 19

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl E, G-3

Periodic Rpt 8. 20

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex I,

24th RCT Rpt, p. 20,

21

 Ibid., Annex J, p. 6; Hoffman, Saipan, p. 127. 22

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex H.

23d RCT Rpt, p. 40. 23

 Hoffman, Saipan, p. 128.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—I 169

opposition during the morning even

though their axis of attack was cut by deep

ravines, cliffs, and transverse ridges. As

they neared the top of the first ridge line,

they lost contact, and about noon the reserve battalion had to be committed in the

center. An hour later forward movement

stopped as mortar fire began to fall heavily

all along the line. Enemy machine guns located on a hill to the right in the zone of

the 25th Marines commenced to lay enfilade fire along the right flank of the 8th

Marines. The summit of Mount Tapotchau

still lay about 1,200 yards (as the crow

flies) ahead, but no further progress could

be made that day, and the regiment dug in

for the night.24

In the center the 6th Marines was initially held back by the slow progress of the

division's right flank. Shortly after noon

the advance toward Tipo Pale got under

way, only to come up against several

pockets of Japanese machine guns, which

stopped the lead elements on the slopes of

the mountain. After a futile attempt to get

at these positions by a flanking movement,

the marines bypassed them altogether, and

by 1400 the lead battalion had pushed to

the top of Tipo Pale.25

The advance to the top of Tipo Pale

marked the farthest and most significant

progress in the zone of the 2d Marine Division. This eminence was about 1,000 feet

in height and lay about 1,200 yards southwest of Tapotchau's summit.26

 Its capture

was essential to cover any approach to the

western slope of Tapotchau.

No forward movement was made on the

extreme left of the 2d Division's zone. The

2d Marine Regimental Combat Team occupied the O-5 line south of Garapan for

several days, and since the whole forward

maneuver of the two divisions pivoted on

this regiment it was forced to remain stationary until the other regiments pulled

abreast.27

Meanwhile, preparations were proceeding apace to move the 27th Infantry Division into the main line of attack. On the

evening of 21 June General Holland Smith

had ordered the division to conduct reconnaissance to the north over the road net

that led to the 2d and 4th Marine Division

areas.28 By late afternoon of the 22d all

three battalions of the 165th Infantry had

completed the reconnaissance as ordered

by Colonel Kelley.29 That evening Colonel

Ayers took the commanders of the 2d and

3d Battalions, 106th Infantry, with him on

a road reconnaissance and before dark had

reached a point where his regiment would

leave the road system and move cross country in the direction of the front held by

the 4th Marine Division.30

About 1600 that afternoon General

Ralph Smith visited the headquarters of

General Erskine, chief of staff to General

Holland Smith, where he first received

definite information that his division would

be fed into the Marine front line the following day. The plan was for the Army division to relieve the left flank elements of the

4th Marine Division so as to permit that

24

 8th Marines 2d Marine Div SAR FORAGER,

p. 4. 25

 6th Marines 2d Marine Div SAR FORAGER,

p. 7. 26

 See Map of Saipan reproduced from captured

Japanese map by ACofS G-2 NTLF, 26 Jun 44.

27

 2d Marines 2d Marine Div SAR FORAGER,

p. 4.

28

 NTLF Opn Order 9-44, 21 Jun 44. 29

 165th RCT Jnl, 22 Jun 44, Msg 15; 2d Bn

165th RCT Jnl, 22 Jun 44, Msg 7; 3d Bn 165th

RCT Jnl, 22 Jun 44, Msg 19. 30

 Testimony of Col Ayers, Buckner Board Rpt,

Exhibit CCC, p. 2.
170 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

unit to move eastward to cover Kagman

Peninsula. This would put the 27th Division in the center of a three division front

and at the entrance to the valley that lay

between Mount Tapotchau and its hill

system on the left (west) and a series of

hills and ridges on the right (east) that

ran north from Magicienne Bay.31 Jumpoff hour for the next morning was set at

1000.

As soon as this decision was reached,

General Ralph Smith called Brig. Gen.

Redmond F. Kernan, Jr., and ordered the

division artillery to begin reconnaissance

for positions from which to support the division attack next morning. Smith then left

for his own command post where he met

with Colonels Kelley and Ayers, commanders of the two regiments that would

go into action next day. General Smith assigned Ayers' 106th Infantry to the left of

the division line and Kelley's 165th to the

right. Zones of approach to the line of

departure were assigned to each of the

regimental commanders, who in turn were

to work out their routes of approach within their zones.

Ayers and Kelley returned to their own

command posts shortly after 1800 and

began briefing their battalion commanders.32

 In the 106th Regiment the 3d Battalion, under Lt. Col. Harold I. Mizony,

was designated the assault battalion. It

was to be followed in column by the 2d,

under Maj. Almerin C. O'Hara, and the

1st, under Lt. Col. Winslow Cornett.33

Colonel Kelley designated his 2d Battalion, under Lt. Col. John F. McDonough, as the lead battalion during the

approach. The 2d was to be followed by

the 1st, under Major Mahoney, and the

3d, under Major Claire. Upon relieving the

marines, the 165th was to take up the line

with its 2d Battalion on the left and its

1st on the right.34

Orders from division headquarters confirming these decisions were issued at

2100. 3 5 The line of departure for the two

Army regiments was to be the "line held

by the 4th Marine Division within the

[27th] Division zone of action," Two and

a half hours later General Holland Smith's

headquarters issued substantially the same

order.36 In this case, the line of departure

was designated as the "front lines at King

Hour [1000]," which was essentially no

different from that specified by Ralph

Smith.

23 June: Into Death Valley

Promptly at 0530, just as day was breaking, both regiments began to move toward

the front lines.37 (Map 7) In the 106th

Infantry zone Colonel Mizony's 3d Battalion led off with Company L in the lead,

followed by K, then battalion headquarters, and finally I Company.38

 Colonel

McDonough's 2d Battalion, 165th, took the

lead in that regiment. About 0620 the head

of McDonough's column cut into Mizony's

column just behind L Company, thus

splitting the 3d Battalion, 106th Infantry,

31

 Information concerning this conference and

General Ralph Smith's actions on 22 June is derived from Ralph Smith, Notes, Buckner Board

Rpt, Exhibit M, pp. 10-13. 32

 106th RCT Jul, 22 Jun 44, p. 32. 33

 106th Inf FO 8, 0100, 23 Jun 44.

34

 Col Kelley, Rpt of Action Saipan Island,

165th Inf, 16-27 Jun 44, Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit N, p. 6. 35

 27th Inf Div FO 46, 222100, Jun 44. 36

 NTLF Opn Order 10-44, 22 Jun 44. 37

 3d Bn 106th RCT Jul, 23 Jun 44, p. 8; 1st

Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 23 Jun 44, Msg 2. 38

 2d Bn 106th RCT Jnl, 23 Jun 44, p. 8.

172 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

at that point.39 The two regimental commanders conferred but nothing could be

done to unscramble the units until they

reached a clearing that would permit the

165th to move eastward and the 106th to

proceed north toward its assigned zone of

action. At this point of divergence an officer

control station was set up to sort out the

vehicles and units of the two regiments and

direct each to its proper destination. All

together, this delayed Companies K and I,

106th Infantry, upwards of an hour,

though Company K was due to move into

the assault at the line of departure at 1000.

Company L, 106th, on the other hand, was

ahead of the traffic jam and was able to

push on unhindered.40

The two assault battalions of the 165th

Infantry relieved the 24th Marines at 1000

on schedule.41 Company L, 106th Infantry, completed the relief in its zone at 0930.

Only Company K of the 106th was late,

but its tardiness was to hold up the entire

division attack. Not until 1055, or almost

an hour after the scheduled jump-off time,

was Company K in line, and not until then

could the 3d Battalion jump off in the

attack.42

When the men of the 106th Infantry got

into the line, they were surprised to discover that some of the marines whom they

were to relieve had fallen back two or three

hundred yards from positions held the day

before.43 Company K of the 25th Marines

had pulled back to its right rear on the

previous evening to tie in the night defense.44

 This caused some consternation at

106th headquarters because the regimental

commander was under the mistaken impression that the line of departure for the

morning's attack was the forward line of

the previous day's advance as indicated on

his overlay, rather than the "front lines at

King Hour" as stated in the operation order. Actually, of course, this withdrawal

on the part of the Marine company eased

Colonel Ayers' immediate problem by reducing the distance his already tardy

troops would have to cover before reaching

the line of departure. It did, however,

create a gap between the 106th and the

165th on his right that would have to be

covered before the two units could move

forward abreast.

The positions the 27th Division was ordered to assault had, since 19 June, been

held by the 118th Infantry Regiment,

which as of that date was made responsible

for the entire Japanese line of defense from

the east slope of Mount Tapotchau to

Magicienne Bay.45 The Japanese regiment

had been torpedoed en route from Japan

to Saipan less than three weeks earlier and

had arrived on the island minus about 850

of its troops and almost completely stripped of its weapons and equipment.46

Total troop strength of the regiment on its

arrival on Saipan was estimated to be

about 2,600.47 The Japanese command

had had neither time nor opportunity to

re-equip the survivors and reorganize them

into a first-class fighting unit. The degree

of attrition suffered by the regiment since

39

 Ibid. This movement to the line of departure

is described in Colonel Kelley, Rpt of Action Saipan, Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit N, and Ayers

Testimony, Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit CCC. 40

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jul, 23 Jun 44, Msg 34. 41

 1st Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 23 Jun 44, Msg 4; 2d

Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 23 Jun 44, Msg 3. 42

 106th RCT Jnl, 23 Jun 44, Msgs 110, 118. 43

 Ayers Testimony, Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit

CCC, p. 3.

44

 Hoffman, Saipan, p. 134. 45

 See above, pp. 116-17. 46

 See above, p. 60. 47

 See App. A.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—I 173

the American invasion is unknown but it

cannot have escaped damage from the

terrible pounding from air, sea, and land to

which the island had been subjected since

12 June.

Before the 27th Division was committed,

the 136th Infantry Regiment, 43d Division,

which had previously been in reserve

around Chacha village was ordered to

move out to Hill 286 (meters), Hill 343

(meters), "and the hills E[ast] of there."48

Hill 286 was in the zone of action of the

2d Marine Division, but Hill 343, the

"hills East," and the valley in between were

directly athwart the line of advance of the

27th Infantry Division.

Initially, the 136th had been one of the

Saipan garrison's best fighting forces, being

at full strength and fully equipped at the

time of the landing. However, the regiment

had taken a frightful beating in the first

days of the invasion. Manning the Central

Sector facing Red and Green Beaches, it

had borne the brunt of some of the hardest

fighting on Saipan. Although not literally

decimated, its combat strength had been

severely weakened. Two men of the regiment who had been captured on 25 June

testified that its 2d Battalion had been depleted approximately 67 percent on the

first day of the landing, that the remnants

of the 2d and 3d Battalions were combined

as a single battalion, and that the total

strength of the regiment was less than

1,000.49

But whatever losses in manpower and

equipment the Japanese in this sector may

have suffered, they still had one enormous

advantage. That was terrain.

The soldiers of the 27th Division were

soon to dub the area "Death Valley."50

The "valley" is really a terracelike depression on the eastern slope of the sprawling

mountain mass that fills most of central

Saipan and culminates in the towering

peak of Mount Tapotchau. The floor of

the valley, less than 1,000 yards in width,

is dominated along its entire length by the

rugged slopes of Mount Tapotchau on the

west and a series of hills, the highest about

150 feet above the valley floor, on the east.

This eastern hill system was to be called

"Purple Heart Ridge" by the soldiers who

fought there. Death Valley, then, was a

sort of trough into which the men of the

27th Division were to advance. The valley

itself was almost devoid of cover except

for a line of trees near the southern end

and for three or four small groups of farm

buildings surrounded by trees. The cliff on

the left was for the most part bare, but

above the cliff was wooded ground. The

hills on the right were tree-covered. A narrow road—little more than a cowpath—

ran up the valley a short distance then

branched off, the left branch skirting the

cliffs of Mount Tapotchau, the right heading toward the north face of Hill Able and

then cutting to the east.

Obviously, this terrain was ideally suited

for defense against any attack through the

valley, and the Japanese made the most of

48

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 10531, excerpts

from a notebook of field orders, 14 Jun to Jul 44. 49

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Annex D, G-2

Rpt, p. 83.

50

 This description of Death Valley is derived

from: Brig Gen Ogden J. Ross, Summary of Opns

by 27th Inf Div, 13 Jul 44, Buckner Board Rpt,

Exhibit RR, p. 4; Col Albert K. Stebbins, Jr.,

Narrative Account of Opns of 27th Inf, 14 Jul 44,

Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit TT, p. 3; Sworn

Statement of General Ralph Smith, Buckner

Board Rpt, Exhibit AAA, p. 4; Love, The 27th

Infantry Division in World War II, pp. 238-29.
174 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

MT. TAPOTCHAU DOMINATING DEATH VALLEY, where 27th Division troops fought

from 28 through 30 June.

it. In the words of Col. Albert K. Stebbins,

Jr., 27th Division chief of staff:

The cliffs and hillsides were pocketed with

small caves and large caves. The wooded

area was rough, filled with boulders, and excellent for defensive operations. Bands of fire

were laid by the enemy thru the underbrush

and in such manner as to make it most difficult to discover their locations: Wellplaced, hostile guns fired only when lines

passed and striking our forces in the rear

disrupted the attack.51

The Japanese had at their disposal all

kinds of automatic weapons, light and

heavy mortars, and some 75-mm. mountain

guns. These were well concealed, usually

in caves whose mouths were covered with

brush. Troops approaching through the

valley could get at the positions only by

direct shots from tanks or self-propelled

guns. It was impossible to reach them with

artillery, at least during the initial stages

of the attack, because the axis of the

caves was at right angles to the line of fire

of the artillery.

"Cannon to right of them, Cannon to

left of them." Not so much cannon perhaps, but enough other fire to make this

seem to the men caught in the middle a

true replica of Tennyson's "Valley of

Death."

51

 Stebbins, Account of 27th Inf Opns, Buckner

Board Rpt, Exhibit TT, p. 3.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—I 175

TREE LINE IN DEATH VALLEY, where elements of the 2d Battalion, 165th, were

pinned down on 23 June.

The units of the 27th Division lined up

from right to left (east to west) as follows:

165-C: 1st Lt. Edward L. Cloyd, Jr.

165-A: Capt. Laurence J. O'Brien

165-G: Capt, Paul J. Chasmar

165-F: Capt. Francis P. Leonard

106-K: Capt. William T. Heminway

106-L: Capt. Charles N. Hallden

The regimental boundary line coincided

with the road that ran through Death

Valley.

On the division right the first obstacle

to be overcome by the 1st Battalion, 165th,

was Hill Love, lying roughly on the border

line between Companies A and C. This

eminence rose about 700 feet above sea

level, was tree-covered, and was infested

with Japanese. A patrol from A Company

met heavy machine gun and rifle fire that

killed the patrol leader and wounded one

other man. It was then decided that the

two companies would circle the hill and

meet at its northern base. Company C on

the right jumped off at 1015 and by 1400

had succeeded in working its way around

the hill to the northern face. Here, the men

were pinned down by heavy fire to their

front and made no further advance. During

the course of the afternoon the company suffered three men killed and fourteen wounded. A platoon of tanks from

the 762d Provisional Tank Battalion was

brought forward in an effort to reduce the
176 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

DRIVEN TO CONCEALMENT BY THE INTENSITY OF ENEMY FIRE in Death Valley

on 23 June, 27th Division soldiers worked their way into a small wooded area.

enemy positions. One of these, commanded

by 1st Lt. Louis W. Fleck, was set on fire

with a "Molotov Cocktail." All the tankers

but one were killed as they emerged from

the turret.52 The men of Company C who

witnessed the incident were helpless to

avert it because by now marines had

pushed ahead directly into their line of fire

and the battalion commander had ordered

them not to fire.

Meanwhile, Company A had also

reached the northern face of Hill Love. It

too could make no further progress. At

1630 the tanks withdrew for the night and

the two companies dug in. Company B

was brought in and completed the encirclement of the promontory by digging in on

the south face.53

The 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry, also

had considerable trouble during the afternoon. After reaching the tree line that lay

about 300 yards to their front, both of McDonough's companies remained stationary

for two hours, waiting for Company K,

106th Infantry, to work its way up on the

left. General Ralph Smith finally ordered

McDonough to advance without regard to

52

 Appleman, Army Tanks in the Battle for

Saipan, pp. 34-37.

53

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 240, 245; Kelley

Testimony, Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit PP, pp.

2-3.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—I 177

what was going on in the 106th area and

instructed Colonel Kelley to commit his reserve if necessary.54

 Regiment therefore

ordered an attack for 1315.55 Company K

was brought up and ordered to deploy one

platoon on the regimental left to maintain

contact with K Company of the 106th and

the other on the right to maintain contact

with the 1st Battalion, 165th.56

As soon as McDonough's battalion

moved out from the line of trees it was

greeted by a hail of small arms, machine

gun, and heavy weapons fire from the cliff

line on its left. A similar concentration of

fire from Purple Heart Ridge on the right

soon followed and the advance platoons of

Company F were badly hit in the cross fire.

Under cover of a smoke screen laid down

by the chemical battalion, the men eventually pulled back to the tree line from which

they had started. Company G, witnessing

the results of F Company's advance also

withdrew to the tree line and remained

there for the rest of the day.57

In the zone of the 106th Infantry on the

division left the action can be characterized as two separate battles since K and

L Companies had no physical contact during most of the day. Company K on the

right pushed off at 1055. Shortly thereafter

the leading scout of the advance platoon

was struck by machine gun fire. The rest

of the company hit the ground and was

immediately subjected to mortar fire. The

company commander, Captain Heminway,

ordered his men to move forward by infiltration. This movement began about

1300, and by 1500 the company had

worked its way into a small wooded area

that provided some cover against the enemy weapons. There it waited for L Company on its left to come up, and since the

latter unit did not pull abreast until 1615

both decided to dig in there for the

night.58

Company L had arrived on the line in

sufficient time to push the attack at 1000

but had been held up by K Company's

tardiness in relieving the marines in its

zone. On Captain Hallden's left was the

cliff of Mount Tapotchau and on his right

a series of ravines. About 400 yards ahead,

the cliff line receded to form a little cove

in the mountain wall that the soldiers

dubbed "Hell's Pocket." In the midst of

this cove was a lone rock that rose a hundred feet and was covered with ivy. Caves

in the rock and in the cliff walls that surrounded it provided ideal spots for Japanese machine guns.59

Company L advanced about fifty yards

from its line of departure, and Japanese

mortar fire began to fall in the area. Hallden pushed his men on, moving along the

base of the cliff, which formed the west wall

of Hell's Pocket. As the troops probed

deeper into the pocket an enemy mortar

shell set off a Japanese ammunition dump

and the flying debris kept the men pinned

down for over an hour. Self-propelled

mounts were brought forward in an effort

to knock out the cave positions of the

Japanese but the vehicles were too exposed

to fire from above to accomplish much.

Finally, a platoon of medium tanks came in

to support the infantry.60

By this time the gap between K and L

Companies had grown wider so Hallden

54

 165th RCT Jnl, 23 Jun 44, Msg 29. 55

 Ibid., Msg 13. 56

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 23 Jun 44, Msg 89. 57

 Love, Battle for Saipan pp. 237-53.

58

 Ibid., pp. 253-55. 59 Love, The 27th Infantry Division in World

World War II, p. 231. 60

 106th RCT Jnl FORAGER, 23 Jun 44, Msg 193.
178 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

shifted to the right rear out of Hell's

Pocket and by 1530 had re-established

contact with Company K on the valley

floor where both companies dug in for the

night. Company I, which had been in reserve most of the afternoon, was brought

up and dug in on the rear of this position.61

 Progress for the day in the zone of

the 106th was about 100 yards.

Throughout the day the 106th Regiment

experienced considerable difficulty in maintaining contact with the 2d Marine Division on its left. The corps order had

stipulated that the burden of contact was

from right to left.62 Responsibility for

contact therefore rested with L Company,

106th, but the marines were moving along

the top of the cliff at whose base the Army

troops were located, and physical contact

was impossible. As Company L moved to

the right to tie in with Company K, even

visual contact was lost. At 1703 division

headquarters ordered Colonel Ayers to gain

contact with the marines on his left "with

sufficient force to maintain it,"63 and

half an hour later Ayers ordered the 2d

Battalion, 106th, to cover the gap.64 On

the theory that it would be easier to maintain contact between two companies of the

Army division than between Marine and

Army units, Company F was ordered to

move to the top of the cliff and tie in with

the marines while G Company moved forward to positions below the cliff and

established contact on the left of L Company. This move was not completed until

1910, and both companies had to build up

a defensive line under cover of darkness.65

Later that night, Company F's 1st Platoon,

which was hugging the cliff overlooking the

edge of Hell's Pocket, was attacked by a

party of about fifteen Japanese who made

their way through the perimeter before

being discovered. In the intense hand-tohand fight that ensued, bayonets, grenades,

knives, and fists came into play. The Japanese killed two men of the platoon and

wounded two others before being destroyed

or routed.66

Progress in the zone of the 27th Division

on 23 June had been disappointing, especially in the area assigned to the 106th

Infantry. During the afternoon General

Holland Smith expressed his alarm over the

situation in a conversation with General

Jarman, the island commander and the

senior Army officer on Saipan. In General

Jarman's words:

General Smith, CG of the V Phib Corps,

called me to his quarters and indicated that

he was very much concerned about the situation which he was presented with in regard to the 27th Div. He outlined to me the

many things that had happened with respect

to the failure of the 27th Div to advance.

He indicated that this division had suffered

scarcely no [sic] casualties and in his opinion he didn't think they would fight. . . . He

stated that if it was not an Army division

and there would be a great cry set up more

or less of a political nature, he would immediately relieve the division commander

and assign someone else.67

Next morning, General Holland Smith

registered his displeasure in a stern dispatch to General Ralph Smith himself:

COMMANDING GENERAL IS HIGHLY DISPLEASED WITH THE FAILURE OF THE 27TH

DIVISION ON JUNE TWENTY THIRD TO LAUNCH

ITS ATTACK AS ORDERED AT KING HOUR AND

THE LACK OF OFFENSIVE ACTION DISPLAYED

BY THE DIVISION IN ITS FAILURE TO ADVANCE

61

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 255-58. 62

 NTLF Opn Order 10-44, 22 Jun 44. 63

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 23 Jun 44, Msg 126. 64

 Ibid., Msg 134. 65

 2d Bn 106th RCT Jnl, 23 Jun 44, Msg 85;

106th RCT Jnl, 23 Jun 44, Msg 201; Hoffman,

Saipan, p. 137.

66

 Love, Battle for Saipan, p. 262. 67

 Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit J.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—I 179

AND SEIZE OBJECTIVE O-5 WHEN OPPOSED ONLY BY SMALL ARMS AND MORTAR

FIRE X THE FAILURE OF THE 27th TO ADVANCE IN ITS ZONE OF ACTION RESULTED IN

THE HALTING OF ATTACKS BY THE 4TH AND

2D MARINE DIVISIONS ON THE FLANKS OF

THE 27TH IN ORDER TO PREVENT DANGEROUS

EXPOSURE OF THEIR INTERIOR FLANKS X

IT IS DIRECTED THAT IMMEDIATE STEPS BE

TAKEN TO CAUSE THE 27TH DIVISION TO ADVANCE AND SEIZE OBJECTIVES AS ORDERED

X.68

There can be no doubt of the truth of

General Holland Smith's charges that the

27th Division had been late in the jumpoff, that its advance had been slow, and that

it had held up progress of the two Marine

divisions on its flanks. It is apparent, however, that he underestimated the stubbornness of the Japanese defenses in the area

by dismissing the opposition in the zone

of the 27th Division as being "only by

small arms and mortar fire."

When subsequently queried on this

point, Colonel Ayers, commanding officer

of the 106th Infantry, was of the firm belief that if he had tried to advance rapidly

across the open ground in front of him

his regiment "would have disappeared."

 69

General Ralph Smith agreed. He later testified that, after visiting the front lines

shortly after noon, he was "satisfied that

Col. Ayers was making every effort possible

to advance in the valley, and considered

that any further pushing of troops in that

zone would only lead to increased casualties, without accomplishing adequate results."70

On the other hand, General Jarman

testified that in his conversations with

General Ralph Smith on the afternoon of

23 June the division commander had been

far from satisfied with the conduct of his

troops. In General Jarman's words:

I talked to General Smith and explained

the situation as I saw it and that I felt from

reports from the Corps Commander that his

division was not carrying its full share. He

immediately replied that such was true; that

he was in no way satisfied with what his

regimental commanders had done during the

day and that he had been with them and

had pointed out to them the situation. He

further indicated to me that he was going to

be present tomorrow, 24 June with his division when it made its jump-off and he

would personally see to it that the division went forward ... . He appreciated the situation and thanked me for coming to see

him and stated that if he didn't take his

division forward tomorrow he should be relieved.71

The First Night in Death Valley

At 1925, just as darkness fell, the Japanese launched a six-tank attack down the

road that ran the length of Death Valley and marked the boundary between

Mizony's and McDonough's positions.72

Not until the column had almost reached

the American outposts was it discovered,

and by then the lead tank was too close to

be fired upon from either side of the road

without endangering the men on the other.

The other five tanks, however, were taken

under fire by both battalions with every

weapon available. Bazookas, antitank guns,

grenade launchers, and artillery went into

action, and all five tanks were knocked out.

The lead tank proceeded on through the

lines and circled back, firing constantly.

One shell landed in a Japanese ammuni68 tion dump located in the midst of the 3d Ibid., Exhibit G. 69

 Ibid., Ayers Testimony, Exhibit CCC, p. 5. 70

 Ibid., Ralph Smith, Sworn Statement, Exhibit

AAA, p. 5.

71

 Ibid., Exhibit J. 72

 106th RCT Jnl, 23 Jun 44, Msg 202.
180 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

MARINES EMERGING FROM PURPLE HEART RIDGE COMPLEX

Battalion, 106th's, lines and set it afire.

The tank then turned east and was finally

knocked out in the zone of the 23d

Marines.73

Meanwhile, the ammunition dump in

the middle of the 3d Battalion, 106th, was

going off in all directions. Simultaneously,

the Japanese on Mount Tapotchau began

to throw mortar shells and machine gun

fire into the area. Company L suffered

sixteen men wounded within the space of

an hour. The position of the entire 3d Battalion was now untenable, 1st Lt. George

T. Johnson of I Company ordered his men

to disperse as soon as the dump started to

explode. He later assembled them across

the road to the rear of the 165th line and

dug in there for the rest of the night. The

other two infantry companies withdrew

about 100 yards behind the conflagration,

thus canceling altogether the small gain

made by the battalion during the day's

action.74

23 June: Marines on the Flanks

On the right of the 27th Division, the

4th Marine Division attacked with two

regiments abreast, 24th on the right and

23d on the left. The 24th Marines pushed

73

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 364-65. 74 Ibid., pp. 266-67.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—I 181

rapidly ahead along the shore of Magicienne Bay and by midafternoon had

reached the O-5 line at one point just east

of the village of Laulau.75 On the left the

23d Marines made somewhat slower progress, partly because its advance was held

back by the 165th Infantry. Within a short

time after the jump-off, one battalion

seized the top of Hill 600, which though

lightly manned by the enemy was admirably suited for defense and took thirty

minutes of close fighting to capture. There,

the battalion was ordered to hold, pending

the advance of the Army troops on the left,

but since the 1st Battalion, 165th, was held

up, the marines spent the rest of the afternoon in a stationary position, firing and

pitching grenades at the Japanese who still

occupied in force the northern face of the

hill.76 That night a group of enemy tanks

launched an attack against Hill 600 but

was repulsed with the loss of three of its

five vehicles.77

On the other side of Death Valley, the

8th Marines jumped off on schedule except

on the right flank, which was held up by

the late arrival of the 106th Infantry. To

fill the gap between these units, the reserve

battalion was ordered into position to protect the right flank and the three battalions

in the assault moved forward. By midafternoon the right battalion seized the cliff that

dominated the only feasible route to the

top of Mount Tapotchau. On the regimental left, the marines ran into a nest

of about thirty Japanese riflemen and six

heavy machine guns, which held up their

progress for the rest of the day.

Soon after the 6th Marines in the center

of the 2d Division's line launched its attack, the right flank battalion was pinched

out by the reduced frontage. On the left,

the regiment made no advance during the

day because it was already so far forward

that any further move would have caused

too much of a contact strain. The same

was true of the 2d Marines on the division

left flank. Not until the center of the corps

line made more significant progress would

it be safe for the elements on the left to

move ahead.78

24 June: Action of the 27th Division

General Holland Smith's order for June

24th called for a continuation of the attack with three divisions abreast in the

same order as before, commencing at 0800.

Corps artillery was assigned to general support and ordered to reinforce the fires of

divisional artillery.79 In the zone of the

27th Division, its own organic artillery

would fire a ten-minute preparation before

the jump-off and thereafter support the

attack on call.80

165th Infantry Attack Against

Purple Heart Ridge

At 0705 corps reminded 27th Division

that the slope on the right side of Purple

Heart Ridge was in the zone of action of

the 165th Infantry, which would capture

it with the help of fire from the 4th Marine

Division on its right.81 This meant in effect that the 106th Infantry alone would

75

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex I,

24th RCT Rpt, p. 20. 76

 Ibid., Annex H, 23d RCT Rpt, pp. 40-42;

Hoffman, Saipan, p. 136. 77

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex H,

23d RCT Rpt, p. 41; Hoffman, Saipan, p. 140.

78

 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, Sec.

VI, pp. 10-11; Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 137-39. 79

 NTLF Opn Order 11-44, 2100 33 Jun 44. 80

 27th Inf Div FO 47, 232100, Jun 44, 27th Inf

Div G-3 Jnl, Incl. 81

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 24 Jun 44, Msg 8.
182 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

be responsible for the frontal attack up

Death Valley. Simultaneously, the 2d Battalion, 165th, would attack along the crest

of Purple Heart Ridge itself and the 1st

Battalion, 165th, would move up on the

right (east) of the ridge.

Purple Heart Ridge was in reality a

series of hills connected by a ridge line

running in a northerly direction. From

south to north these hills were designated

Queen, Love, George-How, Xray-Yoke,

Oboe, King, and Able.82 Hill Queen had

already been overrun by the 4th Marine

Division in its advance eastward toward

Kagman Peninsula. Hill Love had been

surrounded by the 1st Battalion, 165th Infantry, which had dug in the night before

around its base.83

There were obvious tactical advantages

to an early capture of this ridge line or

any considerable part of it. It overlooked

Death Valley from the east just as the

higher cliffs around Mount Tapotchau did

from the west. The commanders were becoming aware that any movement north

through the valley could be easily interdicted by fire from the elevations on either

side. If the lower of the two walls of the

corridor—Purple Heart Ridge—could be

seized, then fire could be brought directly

to bear against the caves that dotted the

west cliffs from which such effective fire

was being trained on the troops trying to

advance through the valley below.

At 0800 the two assault battalions of the

165th Infantry jumped off on schedule84

in the same order they were in at the end

of the previous day's fighting: On the front

line from right to left were Cloyd's Company C, O'Brien's Company A, Chasmar's

Company G, and Leonard's Company F.

In reserve for the 1st Battalion was Gil's

B Company; for the 2d Battalion, Ryan's

E Company. The regimental plan called

for Company C on the right flank to

swing well to the right and then northeast

into the zone of the 23d Marines. There it

would wait until the rest of the battalion

came abreast. Company B was to come up

from behind Hill Love on A Company's

left, execute a turning movement, and then

attack eastward across A's front in order

to enfilade the enemy positions to the north

of Hill Love.85

Within a little more than an hour after

the jump-off, Company C had moved to

the right and gained physical contact with

the marines.86 Lieutenant Cloyd stopped

his advance on the northern nose of Hill

600 to await the approach of the rest of

the battalion on his left. He made no further progress that day.87

On the battalion left, Companies A and

B ran into immediate trouble. As A pushed

off from Hill Love toward the same positions that had caused so much trouble the

day before, it came under heavy fire from

small arms and machine guns. Company B

then moved up to the left and, as planned,

82

 According to standard usage in the Central

Pacific, the maps used in the Marianas were overlaid with a grid. Each large square of the grid

measured 1000 by 1000 yards and was given a

numerical designation. These were in turn subdivided into twenty-five smaller squares of 200

square yards, each given a letter designation according to the phonetic alphabet then in use.

Thus, Hill Love derived its name from the fact

that it was located in small square "L" of large

square "175." The squares, both large and small,

were called "target areas." 83

 See above, p. 176.

84

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 24 Jun 44, Msg 16. 85

 Love, Battle for Saipan, p. 277. 86

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 24 Jun 44, Msg 22. 87

 Unless otherwise indicated, the following account of the actions of the 165th Infantry is derived from Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 276-87,

310-15.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—I 183

tried to execute a turning movement to the

right across A Company's front. Company

B, too, met a fusillade of fire and finally

withdrew after losing twelve wounded, two

mortally. It was only 0930, but the 1st Battalion attempted no further movement

until midafternoon.

Colonel Kelley then decided to commit

his 3d Battalion to the right of the line.

The 3d was to move to the right, following

the same route used by Company C and,

upon reaching the latter's positions on the

left flank of the Marine lines, pass through

and launch an attack that would carry it

to the top of Hill King, almost at the

northern edge of Purple Heart Ridge.

While this was taking place, B Company

was to circle the pocket of resistance north

of Hill Love and build up a line facing the

pocket from the north. Thereafter, the 1st

Battalion was to mop up this area of resistance and retire into regimental reserve.

The change of plans was agreed upon at

0904, and orders were accordingly issued

at 1015.88 The 3d Battalion completed its

move by 1335, and by that time Company

B had encircled the pocket and was facing

south ready to attack.

Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry, moved off on schedule in an effort

to take the ridge by a direct assault from

the southwest. The night before, the battalion had occupied positions about three

hundred yards to the north and west of

Hill Love. G Company moved off with

Company F following, echeloned to the left

rear. By 1000 the lead platoon had reached

the southern face of Hill Xray-Yoke, about

the midpoint of the ridge. Here the men

found a steep gulch directly across the

path of advance. In order to get up on the

hill itself, they would have to climb down

the near cliff, cross the bottom of the canyon, and scale the cliff on the other side.

As the first platoon attempted this feat of

acrobatics it came under rifle fire from the

hill ahead and was stopped in its tracks.

Company G made no further progress that

day.

F Company to the left rear had also run

into trouble. As it came abreast of G, Company F spread out to the left where the

gully in front of Hill Xray-Yoke was not

quite so precipitous. Here the terrain was

friendlier, but the enemy was not, and

heavy mortar and machine gun fire kept

the bulk of the company pinned down for

two hours. Around 1130 Captain Leonard

sent a patrol out to his left toward a small

house located on the floor of Death Valley.

His purpose was to protect his flank from

a possible attack from that direction. Of

the twenty men dispatched on this mission

six were wounded and one was killed by

machine gun fire before the patrol was

withdrawn. F Company, too, now held its

lines for the remainder of the day. At

nightfall the whole battalion dug in just

below the gulch. The clay's action represented an advance of about 150 yards.

While the stalemate was developing on

the left flank of the regimental line, stubborn resistance continued on the extreme

right. The 3d Battalion had swung right

behind the ridge and passed through Company C at 1335.89

 Shortly after 1600 Capt.

Howard Betts, who commanded Company

K, made a frontal assault in column of

platoons up Hill Xray-Yoke from the east.

The lead platoon reached the tree line well

up the hill without much trouble, but just

88

 1st Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 24 Jun 44, Msg 13;

3d Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 24 Jun 44, Msg 10. 89 3d Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 24 Jun 44.
184 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

as it started into the undergrowth, Japanese machine guns opened fire from the

left front, traversing the length of Betts'

line and wounding two men. The platoon

took to earth and was pinned there by a

continuous grazing fire for almost two

hours. Betts immediately swung his second

platoon into line on the right, but after

about fifty yards further advance up the

hill, it too ran into machine gun fire and

was stopped. By this time darkness was

coming on, and Company K was pulled

down the hill to tie in with I Company for

the night. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion's

effort to mop up the pocket of resistance

north of Hill Love had failed, and that

unit, with the exception of Company C,

dug in around the same positions it had

occupied the night before.

106th Infantry: Into Death

Valley Again

The units, from right to left, on the front

line facing the mouth of Death Valley on

the morning of 24 June were: Company K,

106th Infantry, Captain Heminway; Company L, 106th Infantry, Captain Hallden;

and Company G, 106th Infantry, Capt.

David B. Tarrant. Company F of the 106th

was still on top of the cliff, and, since its

movement was geared to that of the 2d

Marine Division, its actions must be considered as separate from those of the rest

of the 106th Regiment.

The 3d Battalion jumped off on time,

but immediately encountered such heavy

mortar fire that many of the men fell back

to the line of departure and in some cases

behind it.90 By 0945 the front-line troops

had advanced from 50 to 100 yards into

the valley, but there was no sign of any

abatement of enemy fire, especially from

the cliffs of Tapotchau. Division headquarters was severely disappointed, and at 1012

General Ralph Smith radioed Colonel

Ayers: "Advance of 50 yards in 1-1/2

hours is most unsatisfactory. Start moving

at once."91

In response to this pressure, Company

K, supported by a platoon of medium

tanks of Company B, 762d Tank Battalion,

immediately pushed forward into the valley. Captain Heminway had two platoons

abreast, the 1st on the right, the 3d on the

left. He left the 2d Platoon at the entrance

to the valley to deliver covering fire to his

front. He also set up his machine guns on

the high ground beside the valley road and

had some support from M Company's

heavy weapons. Heminway's men advanced

in a long, thin skirmish line, moving rapidly

toward the center of the valley. They had

pushed forward fifty yards without event

when the entire cliff on the left of the valley seemed to open up. The company broke

into a run toward a fold in the ground that

offered some cover. Here the company

commander stopped to reorganize his line.

Just as he got up to wave his men forward

again he was shot in the head and killed.

This paralyzed the entire line until 1st Lt,

Jefferson Noakes, the company executive

officer, could come forward and take command.92

Meanwhile, the platoon of tanks attached to Company K had been roaming

around the floor of the valley trying to

silence the Japanese fire from the cliff. One

of the tanks, commanded by the platoon

leader, 2d Lt. Richard Hitchner, received

90

 106th RCT Jnl, 24 Jun 44, Msg 230.

91

 Ibid., Msg 243. 92

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 294-95.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—I 185

TANK-INFANTRY CO-OPERATION. Medium tank leading men of Company K, 106th

Infantry, into Death Valley on 24 June.

two hits from enemy shells, was knocked

out, and had to be abandoned.93 Around

1100 another tank was hit, and the whole

platoon withdrew.

At this juncture 3d Battalion called the

company headquarters and announced that

a smoke screen would be laid down and

that under its cover the men of Company

K were to withdraw from their exposed

positions. Some of the men did withdraw

under the smoke, but one platoon failed

to get the word and remained holed up

until two tanks that had been supporting

L Company went over and covered its

withdrawal.94

Meanwhile, Company I, under Lieutenant Johnson, had been ordered into the line

between the other two companies of the

3d Battalion. Reporting at 1015,95 Johnson was told to move two platoons out

into the valley in column, swing left until

he made contact with L Company's right

flank, and then deploy his men to the right

to close the gap that existed between Companies L and K. Immediately upon entering the pass into the valley, both platoons

were subjected to brutal fire from the cliffs

on the left and stayed pinned down for

better than two hours. The men lay on an

open slope without any means of protection, unable even to lift their heads to

fire back. Seven were killed and thirteen

wounded. A little before 1200, as the men

still lay out on the open ground, three Japanese tanks came down the valley road

from the north firing in all directions. Just

93 as they were about to overrun the area Appleman, Army Tanks in the Battle for Saipan, pp. 44-46. 94

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 296-98. 95

 106th RCT Jnl, 24 Jun 44, Msg 245.
186 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

occupied by Company I, all three were

knocked out by antitank guns from both

sides of the valley.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Johnson was

frantically trying to get at the source of

the enemy fire that was proving so deadly

to his unit. He had the antitank guns of

battalion headquarters open up on the face

of the western cliff with canister and set

up all of M Company's heavy machine

guns to deliver covering fire in that direction. His 3d Platoon, which was just at the

entrance to the valley, took up positions

and delivered supporting small arms fire all

along the face of Mount Tapotchau. Johnson himself took his company headquarters

and moved along the edge of the trees to

the left in an effort to get at the Japanese

position in front of Company L. As this

group moved to the left through the undergrowth, it too was pinned down by mortar fire and discovered the woods to be

full of enemy riflemen between the valley

road and L Company's right flank. Johnson was wounded.

It was at this point that the battalion

commander ordered K and I Companies

to withdraw under cover of smoke. In the

latter unit's zone, the screen was neither

effective nor of long enough duration, and

only a handful of Johnson's men could get

out. Finally, about 1225, Colonel Mizony

brought every weapon he had to bear on

the Japanese positions along the cliff and

in Hell's Pocket. Under cover of this fire

the remainder of Company I was able to

crawl and scramble back to the cover of

the trees.96 Casualties in the 3d Battalion,

106th, alone, for the day had amounted to

14 killed and 109 wounded.97

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, had been ordered up to relieve the

3d Battalion. The relief was accomplished

at 1515.98 Upon assuming its position in

the line the 1st Battalion was ordered to

dig in for the night since it was considered

too late in the day to launch further attacks into the valley.99

While the 3d Battalion had been enengaged in trying to push out into the valley, Company G, on the left flank, had

advanced no more than two hundred yards

during the day. The unit had not itself encountered much enemy fire, but when

Company L ran into so much trouble during the morning, Captain Tarrant held his

line firm rather than push out ahead of the

unit on his right.100

The attempt of the 106th Infantry to

push up Death Valley by frontal assault

had failed again. In the words of Colonel

Ayers, "We were thrown right back on to

the original line of departure."

 101

Once again corps headquarters ordered

the 27th Division to renew the attack into

the valley next morning with the "main

effort on the left."102 General Ralph

Smith, however, now decided that any

further headlong rush up the valley would

only result in increased casualties, and

ordered his division to make the main effort

on the right.103 Beginning on the morning

of the 25th, the 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, would take up positions along the

entrance to the valley and contain the

Japanese there while the 165th Infantry

96

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 301-04. 97

 106th RCT Jnl, 24 Jun 44, Msg 308.

98

 Ibid., Msgs 261, 285. 99

 Love, Battle for Saipan, p. 304. 100 Ibid. 101

 Ayers Testimony, Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit CCC, p. 6. 102

 NTLF Opn Order 12-44, 1800, 24 Jun 44. 103

 27th Inf Div FO 48, 141800 Jun 44, 27th

Inf Div G-3 Jnl, Incl.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—I 187

and the other two battalions of the 106th

would circle around the east (right) flank

and come out into the valley at its northern

end to the rear of the Japanese positions.

This, it was hoped, would put the Army

division abreast of the two Marine divisions, and the encircled Japanese in

Death Valley could then be mopped up at

leisure.104

There is no evidence that this discrepancy between corps and division orders

was ever noted at the time. In any case,

before he could put this plan into execution, General Ralph Smith was relieved of

his command, and it was left to his successor, General Jarman, to solve the

problem of Death Valley.105

24 June: Action on the Flanks

On the right of the corps line, the 4th

Marine Division was ordered to press eastward across Kagman Peninsula and secure

that area before reorienting its drive

toward the north of the island. The division jumped off on schedule at 0800, the

24th Marines on the right, the 23d on the

left. The 24th Regiment moved out rapidly

along the coast to Kagman Peninsula

against "moderate" resistance. By the end

of the day the 24th Marines had advanced

about 1,200 yards.

On its left the 23d Marines was initially

held up by a pocket of resistance on the

slopes of Hill 600 that marked the boundary line between the Marine division and

the Army division. About noon the Marine

regiment detoured the pocket and commenced to swing around the are toward

Kagman Peninsula, pivoting on the 24th

Marines on its right. As the 23d Regiment

accelerated its swing, the gap between it

and the 165th Infantry increased and

toward late afternoon amounted to from

800 to 1,000 yards. By 1630 Chacha village was overrun and the advance halted

for the night since the gap on the left

precluded any further progress. The 1st

Battalion, 23d Marines, in division reserve,

was ordered to occupy Hill 600 and assist

its parent regiment in patrolling the gap.

Opposition in the 4th Division's zone on

the 24th was characterized as "moderate"

and "light," although total casualties came

to 380, including killed, wounded, and

missing in action.106

To the west (left) of Death Valley the

2d Marine Division was drawn up abreast,

from right to left, 8th Marines (with the

1st Battalion, 29th Marines, attached), 6th

Marines, and 2d Marines. On the right

flank the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, was

struggling along the cliff overlooking Death

Valley. The ground was "a tangle of tree

ferns and aerial tree-roots overgrown with

a matting of vines. This formation led up

to a ridge, access to which required an

almost vertical climb."107 By nightfall

the battalion had succeeded in climbing

the ridge, which connected with and was

within machine gun range of the summit

of Mount Tapotchau. The battalion's advance for the day was about 800 yards.108

During this movement of the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, Company F of the

106th Infantry was virtually an integral

104

 Ralph Smith, Notes, Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit M, p. 15. 105

 See below p. 203.

106

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, pp. 24-

23; NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl C, G-1

Rpt, App. 1, Casualty Rpt; Hoffman, Saipan, pp.

145-46. 107

 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, Sec.

VI, p. 12. 108

 Ibid., p. 13.
188 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

part of the Marine battalion and had been

ordered by its own battalion headquarters

to gear its movements to those of the

marines.109 About 1230, F Company came

to a halt when the marines on its left engaged in a fire fight. The company's right

flank rested along the edge of the cliff overlooking Death Valley just opposite the

north rim of Hell's Pocket. The terrain to

the right consisted of a down-sloping nose

of ground that broke off abruptly in the

cliffs that scaled down the valley. Capt.

Roderick V. Le Mieux, the company commander, ordered a patrol to probe down

this nose and Investigate the source of enemy rifle fire coming from that direction.

The patrol soon flushed a covey of Japanese and a full-scale fire fight developed.

The patrol leader, finding himself outnumbered, returned for more men. With the

larger group he again went down the nose

and succeeded in driving the enemy back

down the hill.110

Meanwhile, Captain Le Mieux had

moved ahead a short distance and observed

a Japanese artillery piece in a cave in the

side of the cliff about 500 yards to his

front. The Japanese were playing a hide

and seek game with the piece, running it

out of the cliff to fire at the line of trees

along the south edge of the valley below,

then quickly dragging it back under cover.

Le Mieux observed about a hundred of

the enemy in the vicinity of this position as

well as a large ammunition dump. He ordered up heavy weapons from Company H,

which succeeded in catching the gun out

of the cave and destroying it. In addition

they blew up the ammunition dump, killing

about thirty Japanese. Shortly thereafter

an enemy patrol was discovered advancing

toward the heavy weapons outpost. Rifle

fire and grenades quickly dispersed the

Japanese, but not before Captain Le

Mieux received a serious fragmentation

wound and had to be replaced by 1st Lt.

Herbert N. Slate, the company executive

officer. A few minutes later the company

was ordered to pull back to the left and

to tighten up the lines before digging in

for the night.

In the center, the 8th Marines advanced

with no particular difficulty, maintaining

contact with units on both of its flanks.

The battalion on the regimental left, on

the other hand, after advancing a short

distance, encountered heavy enemy resistance in an area honeycombed with caves

and irregular coral limestone formations

covered with trees and undergrowth. This

was the same pocket that had retarded the

battalion on the previous day. Contact

with the 6th Marines on the left was temporarily broken. Shortly after noon the

pocket was cleaned out and contact was

restored with the regiment on the left. The

advance continued until late afternoon and

by the time the 8th Marines dug in for the

night it had registered a day's gain of about

700 yards.111

The advance of the 6th Marines in the

division center was not so rapid, especially

on the right flank where it faced cliffs and

thickly wooded ravines and encountered

strong enemy positions in natural cave

formations. By evening the regiment had

progressed from about 900 yards on the

left to 500 to 600 yards on the right. The

regimental lines had become too extended 109

 2d Bn 106th RCT Jnl, 24 Jun 44, Msg 96. 110

 This account of F Company's activities is derived from Love, Battle for Saipan, pages 306-08.

111

 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, Sec.

VI, p. 12; Hoffman, Saipan, p. 143.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—I 189

IN HELL'S POCKET AREA

for safety, and an additional company was

committed to the line.112

On the division left the 2d Marines

jumped off at 0800. On its right, progress

was slow against heavy fire from a hill, just

southeast of Garapan, that the marines did

not occupy until 1500. Shortly thereafter

the Japanese counterattacked the hill,

which from their side (north) was virtually

a cliff. Firing with muzzles depressed

against the enemy below, the marines easily

repulsed the attack and dug in for the

night along the ridge overlooking "Radio

Road," which ran at right angles to the

line of advance. Meanwhile, the battalion

on the left had quickly advanced 500 yards

along the beach into the southern outskirts

of Garapan itself. Around 1625, as these

men were preparing their defenses along

the flatlands bordering the sea, seven enemy tanks unaccompanied by infantrymen

suddenly moved out from Garapan against

them. Marine tanks and 75-mm. halftracks were rushed in and quickly broke

up the attack, destroying six of the Japanese vehicles and routing the seventh. The

2d Marines had now reached the O-6 line

and would again have to hold up until

the units on its right came abreast. Casualties for the entire 2d Division on the

24th amounted to 31 killed, 165 wounded,

and one missing in action.113

112

 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, Sec.

VI, p. 13. 113

 Ibid.; Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 141-42.
190 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

INLAND OF GARAPAN HARBOR from hill position southeast of the town, 24 June.

After two days of fighting on a three

divisional front, the attack of Holland

Smith's corps against the center of the Japanese main line of resistance had stalled.

On the right, the 4th Marine Division had

overrun most of Kagman Peninsula, an

area that presented no particular terrain

problems but that still contained plenty of

live Japanese, judging from the casualties

suffered there by the marines. On the left,

the 2d Marine Division had fought its way

into the outskirts of Garapan and up the

craggy approaches to Mount Tapotchau,

although it would take another day to

reach the summit of the mountain. In the

corps center, the 165th Infantry on the

27th Division's right had captured Hill

Love, but had made no further advance

along the hill system called Purple Heart

Ridge. Progress of the 106th Infantry into

Death Valley had been negligible. Thus, in

the center—the 27th Division zone—the

corps line bent back as much as 1,500

yards. Total reported casualties in the 4th

Marine Division for the two days were 812;

for the 2d Marine Division, 333; for the

27th Infantry Division, 277.114

114

 27th Infantry Division casualty figures are

from 27th Inf Div G-1 Periodic Rpts; 2d Marine

Division casualty figures are from 2d Marine Div

SAR Phase I, FORAGER, Sec. VI; 4th Marine Division casualty figures are from NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl C, G-1 Rpt.
CHAPTER X

Smith Versus Smith

Relief of Major General

Ralph C. Smith

By 24 June General Holland Smith had

made up his mind that the "all-round poor

performance" of the 27th Division could

only be remedied by a drastic shake-up in

its command structure.1 Accordingly, he

decided to ask for the relief of General

Ralph Smith.

He first visited Admiral Turner, who

agreed with him, and together the two officers boarded the flagship Indianapolis to

consult with Admiral Spruance. As a result of this discussion, Admiral Spruance

"authorized and directed" that General

Ralph Smith be relieved by General Jarman, the island commander. It was understood that Jarman would take over only

until such time as another general officer

could be dispatched from Hawaii to command the division. In Spruance's words,

"No other action appeared adequate to

accomplish the purpose."2

The bill of particulars presented by General Holland Smith against General

Ralph Smith broke down into two general

charges: (1) that on two separate occasions the Army commander had issued

orders to units not under his command and

had contravened orders of the corps commander; and (2) that on the morning of

23 June the 27th Division had been late

in launching its attack and had thereafter

retarded the progress of the Marine divisions on the flanks.3

On the first point, the corps commander

charged that the "27th Infantry Division

Field Order No. 454 contravened the

NTLF Operation Order Number 9-44 by

ordering the 105th Infantry to hold its

present positions, although the 105th Infantry had been removed from the tactical

control of the Division Commander," and

that the 27th Division "Field Order No. 46

again contravened the NTLF order by issuing tactical orders to the 2d Battalion,

105th Infantry to continue operations to

mop up enemy resistance in NAFUTAN

POINT Area," although that battalion "by

NTLF Operation Order No. 10-44 had

been removed from the tactical control of

the 27th Infantry Division."5

On the second point, it was alleged that

on the morning of 23 June, the "27th Infantry Division was from 77 minutes to two

hours late in launching its attack, although

the major elements of this division did not

1

 The words are General Holland Smith's, See

Smith, Coral and Brass, p. 171. 2

 Ltr, Comdr Fifth Fleet to CINCPAC- CINCPOA, 29 Jun 44, Ser. 00025, Buckner Board

Rpt, Exhibit C.

3

 Ltr, CTF 56 to CTF 51, 24 Jun 44, Ser.

00055-3, Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit D. 4

 He meant Field Order Number 45-A. 5

 Ltr, CTF 56 to CTF 51, 24 Jun 44, Ser.

00055-3, Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit D.
192 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

have to move more than about three miles

to execute the order."6 In a report to Admiral Turner written three days later, General Holland Smith revised this figure

downward to "55 minutes to two hours"

and added that the "lack of coordination

in the attack" resulting from the 27th Division's late arrival and "the slow advance

of the Division against small arms and

mortar fire uncovered the flanks of the 4th

and 2d Marine Divisions to such extent that

it was necessary to slow down and eventually halt these units and thereby retard

otherwise favorable offensive operations

which were in progress."7

Interservice Controversy

It is doubtful whether the relief of General Ralph Smith brought about any

marked change one way or the other in the

"aggressiveness" of the 27th Division about

which General Holland Smith was so concerned.8

 There is no doubt, however, that

it precipitated an interservice controversy

of alarming proportions—a controversy

that seriously jeopardized harmonious relations at all levels among the Army and

the Navy and the Marine Corps in the

Pacific.

The first signs of strain appeared naturally enough on Saipan itself, where

soldiers and marines still had to fight

shoulder to shoulder for more than two

weeks to secure the island. Army officers

were quick to resent the slur on their

service implied by the relief of General

Ralph Smith, and by the end of the battle

relationships between top Army officers

and Holland Smith's staff had reached the

breaking point. Various Army officers who

had contact of one sort or another with

that staff reported that the Marine officers

at headquarters made little effort to disguise their feeling that the 27th Division

was an inferior organization. In the opinion

of one of the Army officers, "the Commanding General and Staff of the NTLF

held the units of the 27th Division in little

esteem, actually a position bordering on

scorn."9

The reaction on the part of the ranking

Army officers present on Saipan was a determination never to serve under General

Holland Smith again if they could help it.

Gen. Ralph Smith urged Lt. Gen. Robert

C. Richardson that "no Army combat

troops should ever again be permitted to

serve under the command of Marine Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith." 1 0

General Kernan, who commanded the 27th

Division Artillery, agreed.11 Maj. Gen.

George W. Griner, who took over command of the Army division on 26 June,

quarreled so bitterly with the corps commander that he came away from Saipan

with the "firm conviction that he [Holland Smith] is so prejudiced against the

6

 Ibid.

7

 Ltr, CG NTLF to CTF 51, 27 Jun 44, Ser.

00063-3, with Incl A, Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit E. 8

 See below, Chs. XI, XIII.

9

 Ltr, Maj Stephen J. McCormick, SC, to CG

Army Garrison Force, Saipan, 2 Sep 44, sub: Reflections on 27th Inf Div, in Hq AFMIDPAC,

Correspondence Incident to Relief of Maj Gen

Ralph C, Smith, 27th Division (hereafter cited

as AFMIDPAC Corresp, Ralph Smith) bound

photostatic copy in OCMH. See also Brig Gen

Edgar B. Colladay, USA, Memo for Island Comdr

Saipan, 5 Sep 44; Lt Col P. B. Stiness, GSC,

Memo for CG Army Garrison Force, APO 244, 4

Sep 44, both in corresp cited above. 10

 Maj Gen Ralph C. Smith, Recommendation

to CG USAFICPA, 28 Aug 44, in AFMIDPAC

Corresp, Ralph Smith. 11

 Ltr, Kernan to Richardson, 16 Aug 44, in

AFMIDPAC Corresp, Ralph Smith.
SMITH VERSUS SMITH 193

MAJ. GEN. SANDERFORD JARMAN, talking with Admiral Spruance, June 1944.

Army that no Army Division serving under

his command alongside of Marine Divisions

can expect that their deeds will receive fair

and honest evaluation."12

When, less than a week after the conclusion of organized hostilities on Saipan,

the island was visited by General Richardson, the commanding general of all Army

forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas, the dispute waxed even hotter. While on the island, Richardson reviewed the Army troops

and presented decorations—all without the

previous knowledge or consent of Holland

Smith.13 The corps commander was quick

to resent these actions, which he considered

to be a breach of military etiquette and an

unwarranted infringement on his own authority. On his part, General Richardson

is reported to have said angrily to the Marine general, "I want you to know you can

not push the Army around the way you

have been doing."

 14

 At this juncture Admirals Spruance and Turner jumped into

the fight and complained strongly to

Admiral Nimitz of the irregularity of

Richardson's actions on Saipan, and especially his berating of Holland Smith.15

General Richardson's visit to Saipan was

in fact incident to a more general inquiry

into the relief of Ralph Smith, which

Richardson had called at his headquarters

back on Oahu. On 4 July, five days before

the conclusion of the battle for Saipan,

Richardson had appointed a board of inquiry to examine the facts involved.16

The board was headed by Lt. Gen. Simon

B. Buckner, Jr., and consisted, in addition

to the chairman, of four Army officers,

Maj. Gen. John R. Hodge, Brig. Gen.

Henry B. Holmes, Jr., Brig. Gen. Roy E.

Blount, and Lt. Col. Charles A. Selby. It

convened first on 7 July and continued until the 26th, hearing the testimony of Army

officers and examining those official reports

from Army files that were available to it.17

After examining all the available evidence—which was admitted to be limited

12

 Ltr, Griner to CG USAFPOA, 11 Oct 44, in

AFMIDPAC Corresp, Ralph Smith. 13

 One account of this visit is given by General

Holland Smith in Coral and Brass, pages 176-78. 14

 CG Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Rpt of Visit

of Lt Gen Robert C. Richardson, Jr., 18 Jul 44,

filed in RS Hist Br G-3, Hq USMC. 15

 Ltr, Comdr V Phib Force to CINCPAC, 16

Jul 44, with COMCENPAC 1st Ind, 18 Jul 44,

sub: Rpt of Unwarranted Assumption of Comd

Authority by Gen Richardson, filed in RS Hist

Br G-3, Hq USMC.

16

 Rad, Richardson to WDCSA, 4 Jul 44, in

AFMIDPAC Corresp, Ralph Smith. 17

 Buckner Board Rpt, Ralph Smith Personal

File.
194 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

LT. GEN. HOLLAND M. SMITH

because only personnel and records of the

U.S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area,

could be examined—the "Buckner Board"

arrived at four conclusions:

1. that General Holland Smith had full

authority to relieve General Ralph Smith;

2. that the orders effecting the change of

command were properly issued;

3. that General Holland Smith "was not

fully informed regarding conditions in the

zone of the 27th Infantry Division," when

he asked for the relief of General Ralph

Smith; and

4. that the relief of General Ralph Smith

"was not justified by the facts."18

In reaching these conclusions, the Buckner Board reasoned that the situation facing

the 27th Division at the entrance to Death

Valley was far more serious than General

Holland Smith had imagined. "The bulk

of the 27th Division," the board reported,

"was opposed by the enemy's main defensive position on a difficult piece of terrain,

naturally adapted to defense, artificially

strengthened, well manned and heavily

covered by fire," General Holland Smith,

it concluded, "was not aware of the

strength of this position and expected the

27th Division to overrun it rapidly . . . .

The delay incident to this situation was

mistaken by Lt. Gen. Holland M. Smith

as an indication that the 27th Division was

lacking in aggressiveness and that its commander was inefficient . . . ."19

 Furthermore, the board argued, there was no

evidence that General Ralph Smith attempted to "contravene" orders during the

clean-up on Nafutan Point,

These findings, coming as they did from

an all-Army board of inquiry by no means

ended the controversy. Holland Smith

wrote to Admiral Nimitz to the effect that

the Buckner Board's conclusions were unwarranted, and added, "I was and am convinced that the 27th Division was not

accomplishing even the combat results to

be expected from an organization which

had had adequate opportunity for training,"20

 Admiral Turner, resenting the

board's implied criticism that he had been

overzealous in "pressing Lt. Gen. Holland

M. Smith ... to expedite the conquest

of Saipan so as to free the fleet for another

operation,"

 21

 also demurred from the findings of the board. He at no time had

brought pressure to bear on Holland

18

 Ibid., p. 10.

19

 Ibid., p. 3. 20

 CG Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to CINCPAC

29 Aug 44, Proceedings of the Buckner Board, RS

Hist Br G-3, Hq USMC. 21

 Buckner Board Rpt, p. 3.
SMITH VERSUS SMITH 195

LT. GEN. ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, JR.

Smith, he asserted, and he was confident

that no part of the Marine general's action

against Ralph Smith "was based on

either personal or service prejudice or

jealousy."22

When the detailed report of the proceedings of the Buckner Board reached Washington, General Marshall's chief advisers

tended to take a "plague on both your

houses" attitude. Maj. Gen. Thomas T.

Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff, advised

Marshall that Holland Smith had some

cause for complaining of the 27th Division's lack of aggressiveness in the attack

into Death Valley; that "Holland Smith's

fitness for this command is open to question" because of his deep-seated prejudice

against the Army; and that "bad blood

had developed between the Marines and

the Army on Saipan" to such a degree that

it endangered future operations in the theater. "In my opinion," he concluded, "it

would be desireable that both Smiths be

ordered out of the Pacific Ocean Area.

While I do not believe we should make

definite recommendation to the Navy for

the relief of Holland Smith, I think that

positive action should be taken to get Ralph

Smith out of the area. His presence undoubtedly tends to aggravate a bad situation between the Services."23

Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy

Chief of Staff, was of much the same mind

as General Handy. After examining the

Buckner Board Report, he concluded that

the staff work of Holland Smith's V Amphibious Corps was below acceptable

standards; that there was reasonably good

tactical direction on the part of Ralph

Smith; and that Ralph Smith failed to exact the performance expected from a welltrained division, as evidenced by poor

leadership on the part of some regimental

and battalion commanders, undue hesitancy to bypass snipers "with a tendency to

alibi because of lack of reserves to mop

up," poor march discipline, and lack of

reconnaisance.24

On 22 November General Marshall expressed to Admiral King his deep concern

over the fact that "relationships between

22

 Comdr V Phib Force to CINCPAC, 18 Aug

44, RS Hist Br G-3, Hq USMC. 23

 Memo, Handy for CofS, 16 Aug 44, atchd to

Buckner Board Rpt, This recommendation was

acted upon favorably. Ralph Smith was relieved

of his command of the 98th Infantry Division,

which was on garrison duty in the Hawaiian Islands. He was later transferred to the European

Theater of Operations. Holland Smith, while relieved of his command of V Amphibious Corps,

was elevated to the command of the newly organized Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

24

 Memo, McNarney for Handy, 19 Aug 44.

atchd to Buckner Board Rpt.
196 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

the Marines and the Army forces on Saipan had deteriorated beyond mere healthy

rivalry. To avert future controversies of the

same sort, General Marshall suggested that

he and Admiral King send identical telegrams to Richardson and Nimitz adjuring

them "to take suitable steps to promptly

eradicate any tendency toward . . . disharmony among the components of our

forces." Marshall also suggested that both

commanders should conduct an immediate

investigation into the Saipan affair with

an eye to preventing the recurrence of any

such imbroglio in the future.2 5 To this Admiral King replied that in his mind the

findings of the Buckner Board were unilateral and suspect, and that the record

improperly included intemperate attacks

on the personal character and professional

competence of General Holland Smith. He

could not concur in any further investigations in which General Richardson was to

be a party because he felt that that officer

had already done enough damage by his

"investigational activities during his visit to

Saipan" and by convening the Buckner

Board.26 There the matter was dropped as

far as official action was concerned.

The American public, however, was not

to be permitted any early respite from the

heated journalistic dispute that followed

Ralph Smith's relief. First among the newspapers to air the matter was the Hearst

press. Various affiliates of that syndicate

pointed editorially to two lessons from the

battle for Saipan. First, it was claimed that

Marine Corps casualties were excessive, especially in contrast to those in MacArthur's

theater. Second, divided command was a

mistake. The Hearst papers' conclusion

was that "the supreme command in the

Pacific should, of course, be logically and

efficiently entrusted to General Douglas

MacArthur."

 27

Another powerful syndicate, the Henry

Luce publications, took the other side.

Time and Life magazines both carried articles favoring Holland Smith's side of the

controversy, the former concluding, "when

field commanders hesitate to remove subordinates for fear of interservice contention,

battles and lives will be needlessly lost."28

More than four years after the event, the

issue was reopened publicly when General

Holland Smith published part of his wartime memoirs in the Saturday Evening

Post,

29 He was answered by Capt. Edmund G. Love, the official historian of the

27th Infantry Division, in a rebuttal that

was printed in part in the Saturday Evening Post, and in full in the Infantry

Journal.

30 The capstone of this particular

literary controversy was inserted when

General Holland Smith published his memoirs in book form in 1949, and Captain

Love in the same year came out with the

25

 Memo, Marshall for King, 22 Nov 44,

WDCSA 000.7 and draft of proposed telegram to

Richardson from Marshall (a similar telegram to

be sent by King to Nimitz). 26

 Memo, COMINCH for Marshall, 23 Nov 44,

sub: Article in Time Magazine, 12 Sep 44,

WDCSA 000.7.

27

 San Francisco Examiner, July 6, 1944, p. 5.

See also New York Journal American, July 17-18,

1944. 28

 Time, September 18, 1944, pp. 26-27. See

also Life, August 28, 1944, pp. 33-42. 29

 General Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch,

"Howlin' Mad's Own Story," a book condensation

in three parts, Saturday Evening Post, November

6, 13, 20, 1948. 30

 Edmund G. Love, Official Historian of the

27th Division, "The Army Says Holland Smith Is

Wrong," Saturday Evening Post, November 13,

1948, pp. 33, 85; Edmund G. Love, "Smith versus

Smith," Infantry Journal, LXIII (November,

1948), 3-13.
SMITH VERSUS SMITH 197

MAJ. GEN. RALPH C. SMITH

official history of the 27th Division in

World War II.31

Conclusions

To resolve the controversy of Smith

versus Smith conclusively and to the satisfaction of all is probably impossible. But a

dispassionate re-examination of the salient

facts of the case as presented in the foregoing chapters may serve at least to clarify

the issue and to point to some satisfactory

conclusions.

The first charge against Ralph Smith

dealt with his alleged usurpation of authority and contravention of orders in handling

the troops of the 27th Division that were

left to finish the capture of Nafutan

Point. In order to examine this charge it

will be necessary first to recapitulate some

of the events that took place on 21 and 22

June.

It will be remembered that on the morning of 21 June Holland Smith issued

Operations Order Number 9-44, which directed that the bulk of the 27th Infantry

Division be removed from the front lines

on Nafutan peninsula and be assembled

northwest of Aslito field in corps reserve.

In Paragraph 3(d) of this operations order, one infantry battalion (undesignated)

of the division was ordered to remain on

Nafutan peninsula, where it would "mop

up remaining enemy detachments, maintain anti-sniper patrols . . . and protect

installations within its zone of action

with particular attention to ASLITO Airfield." 3 2

After an afternoon in which his troops

made little progress on Nafutan, Ralph

Smith called Holland Smith and persuaded

him that at least two battalions would be

needed to mop up the enemy in that area.

Accordingly, the corps commander modified his initial order in a mail brief that

arrived at 27th Division headquarters at

0830 on 22 June. This message read, "1

RCT will continue mission in Garrison

Area [Nafutan] of cleaning up remaining resistance and patrolling area . . . ,"33

Like the initial order, this mail brief did

not specifically designate the unit intended

for the mission, although it was understood

from previous conversations that the 105th

infantry would be given the job.

At 2000, 21 June, after his conversation

with General Holland Smith but before receiving the mail brief modifying Operations

Order Number 9-44, General Ralph Smith

31

 Smith, Coral and Brass; Love, The 27th Infantry Division in World War II. 32

 NTLF Opn Order 9-44, 21 Jun 44; 27th Inf

Div G-3 Jnl, 21 Jun 44, Msg 34. 33

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 22 Jun 44, Msg 14.
198 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

issued his Field Order Number 45-A. This

order, insofar as it applied to the 105th

Infantry, read:

RCT 105 will hold present front line facing NAFUTAN POINT, with two Battalions

on the line and one Battalion in Regimental

Reserve. It will relieve elements of RCT 165

now on the present front line by 0630 22

June. The Battalion in reserve will not be

committed to action without authority from

the Division Commander. Reorganization of

the present front line to be effected not later

than 1100 22 June and offensive operations

against the enemy continued. Reserve Battalion will maintain anti-sniper patrols in vicinity of ASLITO AIRFIELD.34

In asking for the relief of Ralph Smith,

Holland Smith claimed that in issuing this

field order, the 27th Division commander

had committed two offenses simultaneously. He had usurped authority of his

immediate superior by issuing formal orders to a unit no longer under his control,

and he had contravened his superior's

orders by instructing that unit to "hold"

rather than to fight offensively. Holland

Smith argued that his corps Operation

Order Number 9-44, as modified by the

mail brief, placed the entire 27th Division

in reserve status and removed the 105th

Infantry from tactical control of the 27th

Infantry Division. Hence, Ralph Smith

had no right at all to issue orders to

the 105th. Furthermore, Holland Smith

claimed, his own order directed the 105th

Infantry "to conduct offensive operations

to mop up enemy units in the NAFUTAN

POINT area."35 Ralph Smith's Field Order Number 45-A, on the other hand, instructed the 105th Infantry "to hold its

present positions" rather than to conduct

offensive operations. This, according to

Holland Smith, was a clear contravention

of orders.

Both Army and Marine Corps regulations concerning the composition of combat

orders tend to support Holland Smith's

argument on the question of where control

of the 105th Infantry lay on the night of

21 June. Furthermore, they account in

part for his own conviction that tactical

control over the 105th had been clearly

removed from the 27th Division and had

been placed under his own headquarters

by his Field Order Number 9-44. These

regulations state that Paragraph 3 of a

field order "assigns definite missions to each

of the several elements of the [issuing]

command charged with execution of the

tactical details for carrying out the decision

of the commander or the assigned mission."36

 Since the "one Infantry Battalion, 27th Infantry Division (to be designated)," was assigned a specific mission in

Paragraph 3(d) of Holland Smith's Field

Order Number 9-44 and since the entire

105th Infantry was shortly thereafter

substituted for this one battalion, it seemed

clear to members of Holland Smith's staff

that the unit would execute its mop-up

task as an immediate subordinate of Holland Smith's headquarters.37

General Ralph Smith, on the other hand,

was just as clear in his mind that the unit

left on Nafutan was still under his own

command. Speaking of his telephone conversation with General Holland Smith, he

34 later recollected, "Nothing was mentioned 27th Inf Div G-3 Rpt, Battle for Saipan,

Field Directive 45, Able, 2000, 21 Jun 44. Italics

are the author's. Where the order used abbreviations, the words have been spelled out. 35

 Ltr, CTF 56 to CTF 51, 24 Jun 44, Buckner

Board Rpt, App. D.

36

 War Dept FM 101-5, 19 Aug 40, p. 43, This

manual was in effect in 1944 and governed both

Army and Marine Corps procedures. 37

 Hoffman, Saipan, p. 122n.
SMITH VERSUS SMITH 199

in his conversation about having the regiment [105th] operate under NTLF control,"38

 He continued that, in his opinion,

his Field Order Number 45-A was neither

a usurpation nor a contravention of orders.

No written confirmation of the mission to

be assigned to the 105th Infantry arrived

until 0830, 22 June, much too late to have

permitted issuing any instructions for that

day's operation. The 105th Infantry was to

take over with two battalions a front line

covered the previous day by four battalions. "It seemed elementary military

common-sense to have these two battalions

first take over the front from the units

being relieved." Hence, in the absence of

any further orders from higher headquarters, at 2000 on the night of the 21st

Ralph Smith had ordered the 105th to

"hold present front line," relieve elements

of the 165th Infantry, and jump off not

later than 1100 the following morning.

"The 105th Infantry was thus directed to

resume offensive operations as soon as the

lines were adjusted, thus to carry out the

plan recommended by me and approved by

General Holland Smith."39

Two facts stand out in support of General Ralph Smith's contention. In the first

place, Corps Order Number 9-44 did not

specifically and expressly detach the 105th

Infantry from the 27th Division and attach

it to corps. Secondly, neither Corps Order Number 9-44 nor the subsequent

mail brief mentioned the regiment by

name, nor is there any record that either

was sent to the command post of that regiment. Presumably, had General Ralph

Smith not issued his Field Order Number

45-A, the 105th Infantry would have been

without orders for 22 June.40

On the afternoon of 22 June, General

Holland Smith decided that a single battalion would be sufficient to clean up Nafutan Point. His chief of staff, General

Erskine, personally communicated this decision to General Ralph Smith. That evening, the 27th Division commander drew up

his Field Order Number 46, which he issued at 2100. In part, the order read: "2d

Battalion, 105th Infantry (1 Platoon Light

Tanks attached) [will] continue operations to mop-up remaining enemy detachments in NAFUTAN POINT area. On

completion of this mission, [it will] revert

to Corps control as Corps Reserve."41

Just one hour later, Holland Smith issued his Operations Order Number 10-44,

which was not received at 27th Division

headquarters until 2330.42 This order read

in part: "2d Battalion 105th Infantry

(with one light tank platoon attached)

[will] continue operations at daylight to

mop up remaining enemy detachments in

NAFUTAN POINT area. Upon completion this mission [it will] revert to Corps

control as Corps reserve."

In requesting the relief of Ralph Smith,

Holland Smith alleged that the Army general's Field Order Number 46 contravened

Corps Order Number 10-44 "by issuing

tactical orders to the 2d Battalion, 105th

Infantry, to continue operations to mop up

enemy resistance in NAFUTAN POINT

area. The 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry,

by NT and LF Order No. 10-44, had been

38

 Ralph Smith, Notes, Saipan, Buckner Board

Rpt, Exhibit M, p. 7. 39

 Ibid.

40

 The 105th RCT Journal for 21 and 22 June

1944 contains no record of the receipt of Corps

Order Number 9-44. 41

 27th Inf Div FO 46, 2100, 22 Jun 44, in 27th

Inf Div G-3 Rpt, Battle for Saipan. 42

 NTLF Opn Order 10-44, 2200, 22 Jun 44;

27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 22 Jun 44, Entry 78.
200 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

removed from the tactical control of the

27th Infantry Division."43

Actually, of course, the only difference

between Ralph Smith's Field Order

Number 46 and Holland Smith's Order

Number 10-44 in respect to the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, is that the latter

included the words "at daylight" and the

former omitted them. Otherwise, they are

identical in all essential points. Later, Ralph

Smith testified that in his conversations

with General Holland Smith up to date

no mention had been made of any question

of control of the 105th Infantry nor had

he been given any indication that that unit

was no longer under direct control of the

27th Division.44 His belief that the 2d Battalion, 105th, was still under his tactical

control was reinforced by the wording of

Corps Order Number 10-44 itself. The

fact that the order stipulated that "upon

completion this mission" the battalion was

to "revert to Corps control as Corps reserve" would seem to indicate strongly that

until its mission was completed, the unit

was not under corps control but still under

the division.

The fact is that the orders from Holland

Smith's headquarters were never clear as

to where command authority over the

troops on Nafutan Point did lie. Ralph

Smith had to issue some orders, or none

would have reached the front-line troops

in time. There was no important difference

between the commands that he issued and

those that later came down from corps

headquarters. There is no indication that

any "contravention" of orders was intended or effected. At best, this charge appears to have been a rather flimsy legal

peg upon which to hang a justification for

Ralph Smith's relief.

The second charge was more serious. It

concerned the tardiness of the 27th Division in jumping off into Death Valley on

the morning of 23 June, the alleged poor

co-ordination of the division in the attack,

and its slow advance against "small arms

and mortar fire," which slowed down the

whole corps attack. Connected with this

charge was Holland Smith's opinion, as

later expressed, that the Army division was

guilty of "all-round poor performance."45

Here was undoubtedly the core of Holland

Smith's complaint against the 27th Infantry Division and its commander, and it is

on these allegations that the case between

him and Ralph Smith must be decided.

The details of the fighting at the entrance to Death Valley on 23 and 24 June

have already been presented.46 Out of

this complex of events, several conclusions

emerge. On the one hand, it appears clear

that Holland Smith and his staff underestimated both the formidability of the terrain and extent of enemy opposition that

faced the 27th Division in Death Valley

on the days in question.

The terrain facing the 27th Division was

most difficult. Two parallel ridges on the

division flanks dominated its zone of action,

and flanking fire from well-concealed enemy positions on the slopes interdicted the

valley between the ridges. Before the division could accomplish its mission the enemy

occupying these dominant terrain features

had to be eliminated.

43

 CG Expeditionary Troops to CO TF 51, 24

Jun 44, Buckner Board Rpt, Annex D, p. 2. 44

 Ralph Smith, Notes, p. 11, Buckner Board

Rpt, Exhibit M.

45

 CG NTLF to CTF 51, 27 Jun 44, Buckner

Board Rpt, Incl B; Smith, Coral and Brass, p.

171.

46

 See above, Ch. IX.
SMITH VERSUS SMITH 201

The conditions obtaining in the left part

of the division zone precluded the possibility of maneuver, and an attack along the

east slopes of Mount Tapotchau would

have to be a frontal assault. Because of

extremely rugged terrain, flanking enemy

fire from Purple Heart Ridge, and the

difficulty of co-ordination with the Marines

on the left, any such frontal attack would

necessarily be costly.

In the right part of the division zone the

terrain was less rugged, and, more important, there was a possibility of a flanking

maneuver east of Purple Heart Ridge. This

was clearly the more promising area for

the main attack by the Army division. Yet

even as late as the evening of 24 June after

two days of heavy and generally fruitless

fighting on the part of the 27th Division,

corps headquarters still ordered the main

effort to continue on the left.47

On the other hand, there is no doubt

that the 106th Infantry Regiment of the

27th Division was late in jumping off in

the attack on the morning of 23 June—

even though not so late as Holland Smith

charged. On the 23d and again on the

24th, the Army troops attacking Death

Valley were slow and faltering in their advance. According to the testimony of General Jarman, who took over the division

from Ralph Smith, the unit leaders of the

106th Infantry were hesitant and apparently confused. Although the Army troops

in Death Valley sustained fairly heavy

casualties, the two Marine divisions on the

flanks suffered greater ones. Yet the marines made considerable advances while the

165th Infantry registered only small gains

—the 106th Infantry almost none at all.

No matter what the extenuating circumstances were and there were several—the

conclusion seems inescapable that Holland

Smith had good reason to be disappointed

with the performance of the 27th Infantry

Division on the two days in question.

Whether the action he took to remedy the

situation was a wise one, however, remains

doubtful. Certainly the relief of Ralph

Smith appears to have done nothing to

speed the capture of Death Valley. Six

more days of bitter fighting remained before that object was to be achieved. 47

 See above, p. 186.

CHAPTER XI

The Fight for Central Saipan—II

With General Ralph Smith's relief effected, General Jarman received orders to

take over command of the 27th Division.

He reported to division headquarters in the

middle of the afternoon of 24 June and discovered that General Ralph Smith was at

the front inspecting troops. Late that afternoon General Smith returned to the

command post and remained there in consultation with General Jarman until about

0100 the next morning. The plan agreed

upon for 25 June was essentially the one

General Smith had already devised. Rather

than continue the frontal assault on Death

Valley with all three battalions of the 106th

Infantry, it was decided that one battalion

would be left at the mouth of the valley to

contain the Japanese while the other two

would circle to the right (eastward), then

turn northwest and establish contact with

the 2d Marine Division north of the Japanese positions that had held up the 27th

Division's advance through the valley.1

Early on the morning of the 25th, while

the two generals were still together, General Smith received his orders to report not

later than 0530 that day for air transportation back to Pearl Harbor.2

25 June

General Jarman issued his orders for the

25th soon after his long conversation with

General Ralph Smith. He directed the

165th Infantry to continue its advance and

seize the O-5 line in its zone, including all

of Purple Heart Ridge. Jump-off hour was

to be 0730. One battalion was to mop up

the Japanese on Hill Xray-Yoke and in the

gulch to the south of it while the other

two were to move up the ridge itself. Starting at 0600 the 1st and 3d Battalions,

106th Infantry, were to move by covered

route in the rear of the 165th, then advance to the northwest, cross the northern

entrance of the valley, and establish contact with the 2d Marine Division, The 2d

Battalion, 106th, was ordered to remain in

its current position at the southern end of

Death Valley, conduct mop-up operations,

and "assist in containing and eliminating

enemy positions" within the valley. Division artillery was to fire a fifteen-minute

preparation.3 XXIV Corps Artillery would

be in general support and was ordered to

place the mass of its fires in the zone of

the 27th Division.4 (Map 8) 1

 Jarman, Memo for Record, 24 Jun 44, Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit J; Ralph Smith Notes,

Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit M, p. 16. 2

 CG NTLF to Ralph Smith, 25 Jun 44, Ser.

2445, Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit O.

3

 27th Inf Div FO 46, 242100 Jun 44, Incl to

27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl. 4

 NTLF Opn Order 12-44, 24 Jun 44.
204 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Attack on Purple Heart Ridge

Early on the morning of the 25th,

Colonel Kelley issued orders to his three

battalions to move northeast up Purple

Heart Ridge. The 2d Battalion, 165th, was

to attack Hill Xray-Yoke frontally from its

position at the foot of the hill and then

move on to Hills Oboe and King beyond.

The 3d Battalion was to move up on the

right of the 2d Battalion so that the two

could jump off together at 0730. The 1st

Battalion was to mop up all enemy resistance behind the two assault battalions and

follow them northward.5 Had these orders

been carried out and had the 1st Battalion,

106th, succeeded in tying in with the right

flank of the 165th as planned, the assault

on Purple Heart Ridge would have been

conducted as a co-ordinated movement

with three battalions abreast and one in

support. As it turned out, the fighting

degenerated into separate and un-coordinated actions by each of the four

battalions involved.

The 1st Battalion, 165th, moved off on

schedule from the base of Hill Love and

after a short fire fight cleared the last vestige of the enemy from the area to the

north. The battalion combed the area in

its immediate zone without incident and

then retired to its bivouac area of the two

previous nights without taking any further

part in the day's attack on Purple Heart

Ridge.6

The immediate task of the 2d Battalion,

165th, was to take Hill Xray-Yoke, which

Company K had unsuccessfully attacked

the previous day. Company F had bivouacked the night before southwest of the

gulch below the hill. Instead of attempting

another frontal attack from that direction,

Captain Leonard conducted a wide detour

and came upon Hill Xray-Yoke from a

southeasterly direction. Company G, after investigating the gulch itself, moved

directly up the face of the hill from the

south.7 Company F arrived at the eastern

foot of Hill Xray-Yoke about 09308 and

commenced to move up the slope in column

of platoons, led by 1st Lt. Ford Martin,

Captain Leonard, meanwhile, had joined

the battalion commander, Colonel McDonough, who was conducting a separate

reconnaissance for the purpose of locating

a site to establish an observation post.

McDonough was desperately trying to

close the gap between his own troops and

the Marine line to the northeast. Just two

hundred yards to the east he could observe

a road so congested with American troops

and vehicles that it reminded him of Times

Square on New Year's Eve. "It was a machine gunner's dream," he later recalled,

"but not one shot was being fired at it

from the ridge to my front and this ridge

showed no signs of life."9

As McDonough's party reached the top

of the hill, just before the main body of

the company was approaching it, a machine gun opened up and felled the entire

group.10 McDonough was wounded, as

were Captain Leonard, Lieutenant Martin,

and five enlisted men of F Company, 1st

Lt. Henry W, Morrow, also of F Company,

was killed.11 Captain Leonard later died

5

 165th RCT Jnl, 25 Jun 44, Msgs 1, 2. 6

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 321-22.

7

 Unless otherwise noted, this account of the

action of the 2d Battalion, 165th, is derived from

Love, Battle for Saipan, pages 323-30. 8

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 25 Jun 44, Msg 38. 9

 Comment USNG, McDonough, Incl to Ltr,

Brig Gen Gerard W. Kelley, to General A. C.

Smith, n.d., OCMH. 10

 2d Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 25 Jun 44, Msg 9. 11

 165th RCT Jnl, 25 Jun 44, Msgs 51, 62.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—II 205

of his wounds, and McDonough had to be

replaced as battalion commander by Maj.

Gregory Brusseau. Company F was so

stripped of its officer personnel that later

in the day 1st Lt. Joseph Trummel had to

be transferred from G Company to take

over command.12

Enemy mortars joined the machine gun,

first to pin down and then to scatter the

troops of Company F as they approached

the summit of the hill. In the absence of

any officers on the spot, 1st Sgt. Edward

Heikens took command of the company,

collected the men, built a firm line, and

reorganized the company front about halfway up the hill. There the men remained

until late afternoon, when they were ordered down the hill to dig in for the

night.13

Meanwhile, Company G had reached the

top of Hill Xray-Yoke from the south and

was pushing out along the ridge that ran

north from it. As it reached the point where

McDonough and his party had been hit,

firing broke out all along the front and

Captain Chasmar halted his advance. The

new battalion commander, Major Brusseau, ordered Chasmar to hold fast and

then requested tanks and self-propelled

mounts.14 However, the approach to the

position was too precipitous and rocky to

permit the vehicles to be brought forward,

and when F Company withdrew Company

G also pulled back down the hill and dug

in with battalion for the night.

Somewhat to the east and north of Hill

Xray-Yoke lay another elevation, a sort of

tongue jutting eastward from the main line

of Purple Heart Ridge. This was labeled

Hill Victor and lay within the zone of the

3d Battalion, 165th Infantry.15 Before

jump-off hour on the 25th, Captain Belts

of Company K had sent patrols along the

west side of the promontory only to have

them pinned down by fire from the top.

Therefore he decided to move around the

east side of the hill in an effort to take it

from the north. Accordingly, K Company

moved out at 0730 in column of platoons,

2d Platoon in the lead. Immediately, the

whole line came under heavy rifle and machine gun fire from the top of Hill Victor

and from caves in the sides of the cliffs.

The company was pinned down, as was I

Company on its right, and no further effort

was made to reach the top of the hill.

By midmorning it had become apparent

that the 3d Battalion, 165th, was not making any progress toward reaching the top

of Purple Heart Ridge. Colonel Kelley

therefore decided to leave that job to the

2d Battalion and to send the 3d off to the

right to establish contact with the 4th Marine Division north of Chacha. The idea

was for the 3d Battalion to extend the right

flank of the 106th Infantry, which was

supposed to be moving north through the

valley east of Purple Heart Ridge in order

12

 Ibid., Msg 78. 13

 As a commentary on the difficulties of terrain

appreciation in this area of Saipan, it might be

noted that throughout the action described above,

battalion, regiment, and division headquarters

were under the mistaken belief that the attack was

being conducted not against Hill Xray-Yoke, but

against Hill Able some 600 yards to the north (see

27th Inf Div G-3 Jul, Msgs 27, 28, 67). This mistake derived from the erroneous reports of Captain Chasmar of G Company, who believed himself

to be well north of where he actually was. It was

his report that he had reached the top of Hill

Able that partly induced McDonough and his

party to go exploring around Hill Xray-Yoke for

an observation post. See Love, Battle for Saipan,

pp. 379-80.

14

 2d Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 25 Jun 44, Msg 10. 15

 Unless otherwise noted, the account of the

action of the 3d Battalion, 165th, is derived from

Love, Battle for Saipan, pages 330-36.
206 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

to seal off the Japanese in Death Valley

from the north.

At 1445 the 3d Battalion, 165th, moved

off toward the north.16 The advance was

rapid, since there was no opposition. Within a short time the battalion had established contact with the marines along a

line northwest of Chacha, and by nightfall

was digging in on the left flank of the 4th

Marine Division.17 To the rear, forming a

perimeter, was the 1st Battalion, 106th,

which had been attached to the 165th in

the morning.

While the 165th Infantry was making

unsuccessful efforts to work its way to the

top of Purple Heart Ridge, the 1st and 3d

Battalions of the 106th had moved off from

the lower end of Death Valley in the

circling movement that was intended eventually to bring them into contact with the

2d Marine Division north of the main

pocket of Japanese resistance. The plan,

which had been conceived by General

Ralph Smith and concurred in by General

Jarman and Colonel Ayers, was for the two

battalions to move up the valley to the east

of Purple Heart Ridge behind the 165th

Infantry, then cut northwest along the

road that ran north of Hill Able and establish a new line across the northern

opening of Death Valley. Instead of carrying out this plan, which would have involved cutting across open country, the

two battalion commanders, with the approval of Colonel Ayers, chose to stick to

the roads. The reason given was that the

inside route was too rough to permit the

passage of vehicles and heavy weapons.

The decision resulted in the troops of the

two battalions moving in a wide circle eastward onto Kagman Plain into the zone of

action of the 4th Marine Division.18

Colonel Ayers had ordered the 1st Battalion to make this move at 0600, but the

troops were delayed for an hour and fifty

minutes while the 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, extended its lines eastward in order

to cover the position formerly held by the

1st Battalion and seal off the whole lower

end of Death Valley. At 0750 the 1st Battalion, commanded by Colonel Cornett,

moved off, followed ten minutes later by

the 3d Battalion under Colonel Mizony.19

When Colonel Cornett reached the point

where he was supposed to turn off the road

he was following and cut overland into the

valley east of Purple Heart Ridge, guides

from the 165th Infantry informed him that

the valley route would be impassable to

vehicles and that heavy fighting was going

on in the area through which his battalion

was supposed to pass.20 Cornett then decided to continue eastward along the road

until it crossed a road (called S Road) that

ran northwest past Hill Able into Death

Valley. He then intended to follow S Road

to his assigned positions.

Pursuing this course, the 1st Battalion

reached the road junction, turned left, and

had proceeded up S Road for about 400

yards when its lead vehicles drew fire.

There, about 1130, Cornett built up a

skirmish line 200 yards on either side of

the road, with A Company on the right

and B on the left.21 Immediately upon

16

 3d Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 25 Jun 44, Msg 43. 17

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 25 Jun 44, Msgs 71,

81.

18

 Jarman, Memo for Record, 24 Jun 44, Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit J; Gen Ross, Summary of

Opns by 27th Inf Div, Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit RR, p. 4. 19

 106th RCT Jnl, 25 Jun 44, p. 57. 20

 Love, Battle for Saipan, p. 337. Unless otherwise noted, account of the action of the 2d and

3d Battalions, 106th Infantry, is derived from

Love, Battle for Saipan, pages 337-45. 21

 106th RCT Jnl, 25 Jun 44, Msg 348.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—II 207

jumping off from this position, the battalion began to receive heavy fire from small

arms, automatic weapons, and mortars situated in the hills to its front. Within

twenty minutes Company A on the right

had succeeded in reaching this high

ground, although at the cost of twenty-one

casualties, including the company commander, 1st Lt. Robert C. McCoy, who

was wounded. On reaching the high

ground, Company A remained immobile for

the next two hours, waiting for B Company

on its left to come up. By 1410 Company

B pulled abreast, and the battalion occupied a line across S Road about 400 yards

from where it had jumped off shortly before noon.22

 No further progress was made

during the day. The enemy, from his positions in the defiles of Purple Heart Ridge,

was able to cover the whole area with continuous machine gun and mortar fire.

Finally, at 1615, Colonel Ayers ordered

Colonel Cornett to withdraw his troops to

the road junction from which they had

begun their movement northwest toward

Death Valley.23 This was accomplished by

1840, and the 1st Battalion bivouacked at

the junction for the night. The 3d Battalion, 106th, meanwhile, had made no

progress during the day beyond the same

road junction. It had arrived there in the

wake of the 3d Battalion, 165th, by 1155

and reported that it was being held up by

congestion caused by the 23d Marines.24

Thereafter, it made no move and finally,

late in the afternoon, pulled back to the

point from which it had started in the

morning at the south end of Death

Valley.25

That night General Jarman, highly displeased with the failure of the 106th Infantry to comply with its orders to skirt the

eastern slope of Purple Heart Ridge or to

make any significant progress along the

wider route that it had taken, asked

Colonel Ayers for an explanation. In the

division commander's words, "He [Ayers]

had no excuse and could offer no explanation of anything he did during the day.

He stated he felt sure he could get his

regiment in hand and forward the next

morning (26 June). I told him he had one

more chance and if he did not handle his

regiment I would relieve him."26

Attack up Death Valley

The part of General Jarman's plan that

had called for an encirclement of Death

Valley by skirting Purple Heart Ridge to

the east had failed. Collaterally, on 25

June the 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, was

to execute a holding attack across the

mouth of the valley, contain the enemy

there, and apply whatever pressure was

feasible from that direction. General Jarman hoped to make better use of his artillery than had been previously possible,

and early in the morning ordered the

commanding officer of Battery A, 106th

Field Artillery, to conduct a reconnaissance

along the southern end of Purple Heart

Ridge with a view to moving one battery of

155-mm. howitzers to positions from which

they could fire directly into the cliffs that

walled the valley on the left.27

By 0800 the 2d Battalion had taken its

position across the lower end of the valley

and by 0830 was ready to move off with 22

 Ibid., Msg 366. 23

 Ibid., p. 65, and Msg 400. 24

 Ibid., Msg 350, 25

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 25 Jun 44, Msg 77.

26

 Jarman, Memo for Record, 24 Jun 44, Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit J. 27

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 25 Jun 44, Msg 24.
208 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

LOWER END OF DEATH VALLEY, 25 June. Elements of 106th Infantry are waiting

for signal to attack.

Company E on the right, G on the left.

(Company F was still on top of the cliff,

tied in with the 2d Marine Division.) Because of the breadth of the front, all three

rifle platoons of each company had to be

committed to the line.28

Though the men moved forward cautiously, the constant fire from the cliffs on

the left precluded any real progress during

the morning. General Jarman now, for the

first time since the beginning of the attack

on Death Valley, decided to bring direct

artillery fire to bear against the cliffs on

the left. At 1400 he ordered the 106th

Field Artillery Battalion to move two batteries of artillery into position to fire pointblank at the cliff line just north of Hell's

Pocket. The artillery battalion commander

was directed to co-ordinate his fire with

the movement of the 2d Battalion, 106th,

and to deliver at least a half hour's preparation before the infantry jumped off again

in the assault. General Jarman also attached one platoon of medium tanks from

Company B of the 762d Tank Battalion to

the infantry. He ordered Major O'Hara,

commanding officer of the 2d Battalion,

106th, to launch his afternoon attack up

the right side of Death Valley along Purple

Heart Ridge using Companies E and G,

drive all the way up the corridor, and establish contact with Company F, 106th,

on the left and with the 165th Infantry on

28

 2d Bn 106th RCT Jnl, 25 Jun 44, Msg 27.

Unless otherwise noted, the account of this action

of 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, is derived from

Love, Battle for Saipan, pages 347-66.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—II 209

the right. The time of attack was set for

1600.29 This drive, if successful, would bypass and seal up the remaining enemy in

Hell's Pocket and the left side of Death

Valley and would bring the 27th Division

abreast of the Marine divisions on either

side.

At 1630 the attack jumped off following the artillery preparation, which was

deemed "very satisfactory."30 Further artillery fire had to be called off because of

complaints from the marines on Mount

Tapotchau that fragments were falling

within their lines.31 The medium tanks

moved into the valley ahead of the infantry but were out of contact with the troops

for the rest of the afternoon and operated

independently, firing at will against targets

of opportunity.32

Capt. David Waterson's E Company

took the lead and was followed on its right

rear by Company G, which was commanded by Captain Tarrant.33

 The 3d

Platoon of Company G was held in reserve

at the battalion command post to prevent

any possible attempt on the part of the

enemy to break out of the valley to the

south. Once again heavy fire from both

sides of the valley greeted the men. The

3d Platoon of Company E managed to

reach the battalion's intermediate objective

—a line of trees running across the valley

about 800 yards from the line of departure

—but was quickly forced to withdraw to

the cover of another tree line about 200

yards to the rear. The 2d Platoon, Company E, after being scattered by enemy

fire, retreated all the way back to the line

of departure, while the 1st Platoon never

left it.

Initially, Company G met with more success. Most of the men of this unit reached

the tree line, which was the intermediate

objective, and Captain Tarrant started to

organize his defense, but a barrage from

the side of Mount Tapotchau persuaded

him to pull back into a gully about twentyfive yards to his rear. Tarrant tried to attract the attention of the tank platoon that

was moving through the valley but neither

smoke pots nor flares succeeded in bringing

aid from the tanks. In the gathering dusk

G Company, too, moved back to the first

tree line where the 3d Platoon of Company

E had taken cover. There, under cover of

night, the men commenced to dig in, but

at midnight the two company commanders

conferred and decided to pull back to the

line of departure. Their wounded were uncared for, their ammunition, water, and

rations were low, and they were out of radio contact with battalion.

The march back was full of horrors.

Flares lighted the valley about every five

minutes, silhouetting the retreating troops

and occasionally revealing foxholes full of

Japanese—who luckily did not fire. Many

of the wounded fainted and had to be carried by their comrades; some of them died

en route. Finally, about 0300, both companies straggled into tree line at the south

edge of the valley that had marked their

line of departure of the morning before.34

Once again the attempt to force Death

Valley from the south had failed.

29

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 25 Jun 44, Msg 69; 2d

Bn 106th RCT Jnl, 25 Jun 44, Msg 161. 30

 27th Div Arty Unit Rpt 9, 25 Jun 44, Incl to

27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 25 Jun 44. 31

 106th RCT Jnl, 25 Jun 44, Msg 394. 32

 Appleman, Army Tanks in the Battle for Saipan, pp. 47-48. 33

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 25 Jun 44, Msg 84.

34

 This account is derived from Love, Battle for

Saipan, pages 353-65.
210 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Kagman Peninsula Secured

In the zone of the 4th Marine Division

the major accomplishment of the day was

the final occupation of the whole of Kagman Peninsula. This served not only to reduce the corps front by about 3,000 yards,

but also to clear the way for the construction of an auxiliary airfield on Kagman

Plain.

The division jump-off, which was scheduled at 0730, was from forty minutes to

an hour late, but thereafter the advance

was rapid. The 24th Marines on the right

met little or no enemy resistance and by

1015 had secured Kagman Hill on the

southeastern extremity of the peninsula.

The rest of the day was spent patrolling

the area and investigating caves along the

coast. On the left, the 23d Marines ran

into occasional sniper fire and was harassed by an enemy field piece located on

Purple Heart Ridge but nevertheless managed to reach the O-6 line on the east

coast by 1533. Thus Kagman Peninsula

was completely blanketed and sealed off,

and the 4th Marine Division for the first

time in four days was permitted to relax.35

Seizure of Mount Tapotchau

Honors for the capture of the summit of

Tapotchau, the highest point of the island,

were shared by the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, and the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines.36

 The 2d Battalion, 8th Marines,

pushed off at 0730 and advanced rapidly

against little resistance along the cliff line

overlooking Death Valley until it found itself, three hours later, at the base of a

sheer 50-foot cliff, just beyond which was

the peak of the mountain itself. Patrols

scaled the cliff, worked their way almost to

the crest of the mountain, and returned

shortly after noon with the information

that the small plateau that constituted the

summit of Tapotchau was unoccupied. On

receiving this information, the 1st Battalion

of the 29th Marines, on the left, gradually

worked its way to the right along the route

that had been followed by the patrols and

by late afternoon had established itself on

the mountain top. During the operation

enemy fire was not severe, but that night

a force of Japanese counterattacked and

had to be repulsed. Eighteen enemy dead

were counted the next morning. During

this period Company F, 106th Infantry,

moved forward with the 2d Battalion, 8th

Marines, guarding its right rear flank.

On the western slopes of Tapotchau the

other two battalions of the 8th Marines

made little progress against the multitude

of machine gun nests in the network of

crevices and ravines that crisscrossed that

side of the mountain. The heaviest fighting

occurred on the right flank of the 6th Marines, where for the third successive day

the attack was held up by the Japanese

strongpoint north of Mount Tipo Pale,

On the left of the 6th Marines' zone the

lines had been extended as far as was feasible, and no further advance was possible

until the difficulty on the right had been

cleared up. On the western coast and on

the high ground overlooking Garapan the

2d Marines, too, remained immobile, waiting for the elements on its right to come

abreast.

35

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex H,

23d RCT Rpt, pp. 41-42; Annex I, 24th RCT

Rpt, p. 21. 36

 The following account of the actions of the

2d Marine Division is derived from: 2d Marine

Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, Sec. VI, p. 14; and

Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 151-55.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—II 211

In terms of yardage gained the 2d Marine Division had made little progress on

25 June, but the capture of Tapotchau's

peak yielded it control of Saipan's key terrain feature. In the words of the official

Marine Corps historian, "From this point

forward, the Marines would look down on

the Japanese, who heretofore had enjoyed

the advantages of superior ground observation. In addition the Marines could now

fight downhill for a while. The change

would be appreciated."37

The Plight of the Japanese

By the end of 25 June it was obvious

to the Japanese high command on Saipan

that the situation was desperate almost

(but not quite) to the point of hopelessness. A telegram from 31st Army headquarters to the 29th Division on Guam

stated that the ten-day battle had reduced

the strength of the line forces to the following approximate levels:38

Unit

118th Infantry Regiment

135th Infantry Regiment (exclusive

of the 1st Battalion, which was

on Tinian)

136th Infantry Regiment

47th Independent Mixed Brigade

7th Independent Engineers

3d Independent Mountain Artillery

Regiment

9th Tank Regiment

Approximate

Strength

300

350

300

100

70

(no weapons

in firing

condition)

3 tanks

In addition to the losses, the message

added, "reserve units (companies and platoons), hospital units, equipment, maintenance and supply units, etc. are either

completely wiped out or reduced to the

point where no fighting strength can be

expected of them,"

With the failure of the defense effort

along the line south of Tapotchau the Japanese, in spite of occasional lapses of wishful thinking, realized full well that the

island could not be held. In a lengthy telegram, probably of 25 June, 31st Army

headquarters said as much and analyzed

some of the reasons for its failure:

The fight on Saipan as things stand now

is progressing one-sidedly since, along with

the tremendous power of his barrages, the

enemy holds control of sea and air. In daytime even the deployment of units is very

difficult, and at night the enemy can make

out our movements with ease by using illumination shells. Moreover, our communications

are becoming disrupted, and liaison is becoming increasingly difficult. Due to our

serious lack of weapons and equipment, activity and control is hindered considerably.

Moreover, we are menaced by brazenly lowflying planes, and the enemy blasts at us

from all sides with fierce naval and artillery

cross-fire. As a result even if we remove units

from the front lines and send them to the

rear their fighting strength is cut down every

day. Also the enemy attacks with fierce concentration of bombs and artillery. Step by

step he comes toward us and concentrates

his fire on us as we withdraw, so that wherever we go we're quickly surrounded by

fire.39

Continuing, the message noted two difficulties peculiar to the Saipan campaign.

The first was the confusion caused by the

presence on the island of so many straggler units, the waifs cast up by American

submarine attacks. The second was the

ever-growing shortage of water. There had

been little enough at the beginning of the

campaign, and the American bombardment had closed many of the sources of

supply.

The prospect was dim: "The attack of

the enemy proceeds ceaselessly day and 37

 Hoffman, Saipan, p. 153. 38

 31st Army Msg File, Msg 1102. 39 Ibid., Msg 1101.

THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—II 213

night and as they advance with the aid of

terrific bombardments it becomes apparent

that the northern part of the island for

the above mentioned reasons of (1) water,

(2) food, (3) supply, and (4) terrain, cannot be held with our skeleton strength of

520."

Yet in spite of the admitted futility of

resistance, resistance continued. Surrender,

the only practical thing to do in such a

situation by Western standards, was out of

the question for the Japanese. The order of

the day read, ". . . the positions are to be

defended to the bitter end, and unless he

has other orders every soldier must stand

his ground."40

Grasping at straws, General Saito on 24

June had ordered an infantry company

from Tinian to conduct a landing operation on the coast of Saipan, east of

Chacha.41 On the night of 25 June eleven

barges departed Sunharon (Tinian) harbor

for Saipan. The destroyer Bancroft intercepted and dispersed them. One of the

barges was reported sunk; the rest scurried

back to Tinian Town. Still later, in the

early morning hours of 26 June, several

troop-laden barges came out of Tanapag

Harbor, destination unknown. Two LCI

(G)'s on patrol opened fire, sank one of

the barges, and damaged another.42 Thus

ended Saito's immediate prospects of aid

from counterlandings.

26 June

Action of the 27th Division

With the failure of the 106th Infantry

to accomplish its mission on the 25th, General Jarman proposed a new scheme of

maneuver for that regiment on the 26th.

His plan called for the 3d Battalion to push

along the inside (western) slope of Purple

Heart Ridge, build up a line there, and, if

possible, push on to the regimental objective line at the north end of Death Valley.

The 2d Battalion, after reorganizing, was

to follow the 3d, then swing left across the

valley and move on to the regimental objective. The 1st Battalion would be in regimental reserve. Later (at 0920) Colonel

Ayers ordered the 1st Battalion to move

out on the left of the valley and clean out

Hell's Pocket, which was still infested with

Japanese.43 At the same time the 2d Battalion, 165th, was to continue the attack

against Purple Heart Ridge from the

southeast.44 (Map 9)

The 3d Battalion, 106th, jumped off at

0600 in column of companies with Company L in the lead, followed by I, M, and

K.45 By 1020 the leading elements of

Company L had reached the top of Hill

Oboe without encountering significant resistance and had started down into the

saddle between Oboe and Hill King to the

north.46 Company I followed immediately

behind. As Company L advanced toward

Hill King a machine gun opened up, and

the heavy weapons company was called

up to train its mortars and machine guns

on the suspected source of fire. At 1245,

under cover of this protection, Company

L moved forward, but within ten minutes

the lead platoon had six men killed and

seventeen wounded.47 The advance halted,

40

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl D, G-2

Rpt, p. 104. 41

 31st Army Msg File, Msg 1093. 42

 TF 51 Opn Rpt Marianas, Incl A, p. 9.

43

 106th RCT Jnl, 26 Jun 44, p. 70; 106th Inf

Narrative Rpt FORAGER, p. 9. 44

 Unless otherwise noted, the account of the

actions of the 27th Division on 26 June is derived

from Love, Battle for Saipan, pages 375-96. 45

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 26 Jun 44, Msg 6. 46

 3d Bn 106th RCT Jnl, 26 Jun 44, Msg 16. 47

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 26 Jun 44, Msg 44.
214 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

BAZOOKA TEAM PREPARING TO FIRE a 2.36-inch rocket launcher during moppingup operations along the ridge line.

then the company was withdrawn. By the

time Captain Hallden had worked his way

back to Hill Oboe and reorganized his

company, it was in a highly demoralized

condition. The 1st Platoon was down to

twelve men, as was the 2d Platoon, which

had been hard hit during the explosion of

the enemy ammunition dump on 23 June.

Company I was sent in to relieve Company

L, It enjoyed no more success than its predecessor and retired to Hill Oboe to dig in

with the battalion for the night.

The 2d Battalion, 106th, had stayed behind the 3d during the day and made no

effort to work its way out into the valley.

It dug in on Hill Xray-Yoke for the night.

While the 106th Infantry was moving

along the inside of Purple Heart Ridge, the

2d Battalion, 165th, had begun to mop up

on the outside (east) of the ridge line.

Major Brusseau had ordered Company G

to fan out and clean up Hills Xray-Yoke,

Oboe, and Victor. Upon completion of this

mission Company G was to move on north

to Hill Able. Meanwhile, Company E was

to push patrols to the base of Hill Victor

and then proceed up S Road to the point

where it cut into Death Valley.48

The 1st Platoon, Company G, took over

Hill Xray-Yoke without opposition. By

0840 Captain Chasmar's 3d Platoon was

atop Hill Victor without much trouble, but

thereafter the Japanese began to show

some fight. The enemy had taken refuge

48

 Love, Battle for Saipan, p. 379.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—II 215

in ledges and caves just below the crest of

the hill and from there commenced lobbing hand grenades up into the line of the

Americans on top. Some thought was

given to getting at these positions by tying

charges onto ropes and letting them swing

down into the protected strongpoints, but

rather than attempt this device, Chasmar

withdrew the lead platoon to the ground

below and called up self-propelled mounts

(M7's) to fire into the ledges where the

enemy was entrenched. The M7's failed to

accomplish the mission and had to retreat

when the Japanese began dropping mortar

shells on them. Three tanks were then

brought forward, but to no avail. As a last

resort Captain Chasmar sent up some M8

self-propelled mounts. These vehicles were

equipped with 75-mm. rather than 105-

mm. howitzers and had smaller openings at

the top, thus offering better protection to

the gunners from fire from above. For half

an hour the M8's plugged away at the sides

of the cliffs, forcing many of the enemy

into the open where they could be picked

off by riflemen.

At 1500 the 3d Platoon ventured to the

top of the hill again, followed an hour later

by the 2d Platoon. Machine gun fire from

the west along the main line of Purple

Heart Ridge held down their advance however, and since darkness was approaching

they were recalled down the hill to dig in

for the night.49

Meanwhile, E Company had worked its

way under scattered fire up S Road, along

the route taken the day before by the 1st

Battalion, 106th Infantry. It had reached

the point of the previous day's farthest advance and had begun to dig in when the

Japanese on the hills to the left opened

with machine guns and mortars. Inasmuch as the company was in an isolated

position almost a thousand yards from the

rest of the battalion, the new commander,

1st Lt. John J. Raleigh, took his men back

to join the rest of the battalion for the

night.50

Purple Heart Ridge was beginning to

crack under the combined assault of the

2d Battalion, 165th, and the 3d Battalion,

106th Infantry. Meanwhile, on the other

side of Death Valley, Colonel Cornett's 1st

Battalion, 106th, was vainly trying to clear

out Hell's Pocket. The battalion moved off

at 1245 following a thirty-minute preparation by the Cannon Company but was

quickly pinned down by fire from the

pocket.51 Company C alone lost three men

killed, and twenty-two wounded including

Capt. Robert T. Bates, the company commander, who was replaced by 1st Lt. Andrew B. Campbell, Within the next hour

the 104th Field Artillery put 360 rounds

of 105-mm. howitzer fire into the pocket.

It was to no avail. The battalion still encountered heavy fire from the walls of the

pocket and from the high rock in the

center, so Cornett retired his men to the

line of departure where they dug in for the

night.52

Sometime after ten o'clock on the morning of 26 June General Kernan, division

artillery commander, in company with

Colonel Sheldon, the operations officer,

made a trip up to the southern edge of

Death Valley. There they found that the

2d Battalion had made no advance out of

the assembly area, where it was mingled

with the rear elements of the 3d Battalion,

49

 Ibid., pp. 388-91.

50

 Ibid., p. 392. 51

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 26 Jun 44, Msgs 39,

51, 53.

52

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 393-94.
216 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

They reported that "the battalions were

standing still and there was no reason why

they should not move forward." The 106th

Infantry, they concluded, was in a demoralized state. On the basis of this report,

which confirmed his previous dissatisfaction with this regiment's conduct, General

Jarman relieved Colonel Ayers of his command and assigned Colonel Stebbins, the

division chief of staff, as commander.53

Action of the Marines

Having completed its occupation of

Kagman Peninsula, the 4th Marine Division was ordered on the 26th to mop up

the area, outpost the coast line of Magicienne Bay, and then assemble in the

vicinity of the beaches along the northern

coast of the bay in corps reserve. The marines encountered no enemy opposition

except from small groups of snipers in the

vicinity of Chacha and in the caves along

the coast, although Japanese artillery occasionally opened up from the unsecured

portions of Purple Heart Ridge. Before the

division could properly assemble in corps

reserve plans were changed, and it was ordered to take over the right of the line

again next morning.54

In the zone of the 2d Marine Division

the most important event of the day was

the bypassing of the pocket north of Mount

Tipo Pale by the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines. One company passed to the right,

another to the left, while the third was left

behind to reduce the pocket.

The 8th Marines registered only small

gains in the Mount Tapotchau area. In the

regimental center the 3d Battalion, 8th

Marines, and the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, moved forward slowly through nightmarish terrain, receiving heavy mortar and

machine gun fire as they went. The 2d

Battalion, 8th Marines, and Company F,

106th Infantry, remained stationary on the

right flank, holding back to deny enemy

approaches from that direction. No great

yardage was gained in this area, but the

positions on the heights of Tapotchau were

consolidated and the regimental line was

straightened out. On the division left the

2d Marines again remained immobile except for patrols, who reported that there

was no Japanese activity to the immediate

front.55

27 June

Death Valley Broached

The first permanent inroads into Death

Valley were made on 27 June. Up to that

date the only significant progress in the

zone of the 27th Division had been in the

hills that made up the lower part of Purple

Heart Ridge. Death Valley itself had defied

capture; the Japanese from their commanding positions in the cliffs on the left

and the northern part of Purple Heart

Ridge on the right were able to interdict

any movement along the floor of the valley

itself.

General Jarman's plan for 27 June called

for a reorientation of the direction of the

attack. For this purpose he had four battalions under his control—all of the 106th

Infantry plus the 2d Battalion, 165th,

which had been detached from its parent

regiment the night before when the 165th 53

 Jarman, Memo for Record, 24 Jun 44, Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit J; 27th Inf Div Special

Order 118, 36 Jun 44, Incl to 27th Inf Div G-3

Jnl.

54

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, p. 27.

55

 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, Sec.

VI, p. 15.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—II 217

Regiment was attached to the 4th Marine

Division.56 The 2d Battalion, 165th, was

ordered to continue mopping-up operations against Purple Heart Ridge, working

from the eastern slopes. Meanwhile, the 3d

Battalion, 106th, was to move north along

the ridge until it reached Hill King, then

pivot left and attack west across the valley

toward Mount Tapotchau. Once a corridor had been driven across the valley, the

battalion was to pivot again, this time to

the right, and move off toward the northern end of the valley. Before this drive was

completed the 2d Battalion, 106th, was to

take positions on the right flank of the 3d.

In the meantime the 1st Battalion, 106th,

in an independent movement, would

renew its attempt to clean out Hell's

Pocket.57

The 3d Battalion, 106th, jumped off for

Hill King at 0620, with Company I on the

right, K on the left.58 Almost immediately

machine gun fire opened up, killing one

man and wounding seven, and the battalion was ordered back to Hill Oboe,

which had been the line of departure.

Division then ordered twenty-five-minute

artillery preparation, to commence at 1020,

but the position of the American troops on

Purple Heart Ridge was so hard to ascertain that the artillerymen held fire for more

than half an hour.59

Following the artillery preparation,

which was completed by 1120, the attack

moved off again with Company L on the

left in place of Company K, whose strength

was now down to about that of one platoon. This time there was no opposition.

The battalion moved up Hill King through

a litter of enemy dead, and not a shot

was fired. As Company I moved over the

crest of the hill and down its northern

slope, it surprised a large party of Japanese

hiding among the rocks and grass. After a

brief exchange of rifle fire and hand grenades, the Americans withdrew to the reverse slope and mortar fire was requested.

This lasted only a few minutes, after which

the attackers were able to push down the

north slope of the hill without trouble.

With Hill King secured, the 3d Battalion, 106th Infantry, could now push off

to the west across Death Valley according

to plan. The attack jumped off at 1150,

Company L on the left and I on the

right.60 The terrain to the battalion front

was a steep slope down into the valley

proper. The descent would be made

through thick, high tufts of grass for most

of the way, and then through cane fields

into a low ridge line that cut across the

valley at that juncture. Directly to the battalion front, about a thousand yards away,

were the cliffs of Mount Tapotchau.

Immediately upon reaching the floor of

the valley, the men of the 3d Battalion began to receive machine gun and mortar

fire from Hill Able behind them and from

the cliff sides of Tapotchau to their front.

Among others wounded was 1st Lt. Robert

M. Smith, who had taken command of

Company I only that morning. This left

the company without officers except for

one platoon commander, whose unit had

become separated from the rest of the

56

 27th Inf Div Fid Msg 1(a), 26 Jun 44, Incl

to 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl. 57

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 400-401, 403,

428.

58

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 27 Jun 44, Msg 24.

Unless otherwise noted, the account of the action

of the 3d Battalion, 106th Infantry, is derived

from Love, Battle for Saipan, pages 401-03,

406-15. 59

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 27 Jun 44, Msgs 33,

39. 60

 106th RCT Jnl, 27 Jun 44, Msg 545.
218 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

company. In the hiatus thus created, Captain Hallden of Company L incorporated

the scattered remnants of I Company with

his own unit and took command of both.

Meanwhile, Company K had been ordered into the line on L Company's left,

with the mission of securing the tree line

that ran across the valley at this point and

of establishing physical contact with Company F, 106th Infantry, which was still on

the cliff top just below the summit of

Mount Tapotchau. No sooner was Company K abreast of L Company than it, too,

came under heavy fire that by now was

general throughout the valley floor.

Nevertheless, the 3d Battalion succeeded

in cutting across the valley and was sending out patrols to establish contact with

Company F on the cliff in front by 1545.61

By this time all three companies were badly

in need of ammunition. They had no supplies of water or rations, and parts of each

company had been cut off from the main

body of the battalion. Colonel Mizony

placed Captain Hallden in charge of the

remnants of all three companies and dispatched a platoon of light tanks, not only

to lay fire on both sides of the valley but

to supply the infantry with rations, water,

and ammunition.62 The tanks accomplished their mission before dark, and the

3d Battalion dug in along the low ridge

line that traversed Death Valley west of

Hill Able. There it was joined by the 2d

Battalion, which had come up behind, and

the two battalions prepared to attack to

the north the next morning.

Meanwhile at 1120, following a delayed

artillery preparation, Company G, 165th

Infantry, pushed up the eastern slope of

Hill King, which 3d Battalion, 106th Infantry, was attacking from the other

side.63 Within three hours G Company

had reached the summit of the hill and was

driving down its forward slope toward Hill

Able to the north. Hill Able was more an

outsized rock than a hill. The south face

toward which Captain Chasmar's company

was moving was a sheer cliff about fifty

feet high, crosscut by a series of ledges. The

right (east) face of the hill was steeplyterraced and the west side was another

sheer cliff. The top was a rounded knob

covered with dense undergrowth and was

heavily defended, judging from the intense

fire that began to pour down on the heads

of the advancing troops.

About 1600, before it reached the foot

of the hill, Company G was attacked by a

party of Japanese moving down through

the corridor between Hills King and Able.

The enemy movement was undetected until the Japanese were within a few yards

of Chasmar's positions. A severe hand-tohand fight ensued, resulting in seven

American casualties and thirty-five enemy

killed. By this time it was too late to

warrant a continuation of the attack

against Hill Able, and G Company moved

back to Hill King to dig in with the battalion for the night. Before the men could

prepare their foxholes, however, a heavy

barrage of mortar and machine gun fire

fell on the area, killing five and wounding

nineteen. Among the latter was Major

Brusseau, the 2d Battalion commander,

61

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 27 Jun 44, Msg 71. 62

 Appleman, Army Tanks in the Battle for Saipan, pp. 51-53.

63

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 27 Jun 44, Msg 39;

Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 419-27. Unless otherwise noted, this account of the actions of the 2d

Battalion, 165th Infantry, is derived from the latter source.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—II 219

who later died of his wounds. He was

replaced by Capt. James A. Dooley,64 who

was in turn later relieved by Major Claire.

Claire's command of the 3d Battalion,

165th, was taken over by his executive officer, Maj. Martin Foery. At the conclusion

of the fire G Company, 165th Infantry,

withdrew past Hill Oboe and back to Hill

Xray-Yoke for the night, where it was

joined by Company E. The latter had

spent the day unsuccessfully trying to

move up S Road to the point where it

entered Death Valley, Scattered rifle fire,

coupled with heavy mortar and machine

gun fire from a hill that commanded the

road, had thwarted the effort to break into

Death Valley by this route.

During the afternoon General Jarman

had still been skeptical of the staying power

of the 106th Infantry and had instructed

the executive officer of that regiment to get

word to all units that "they" must hold and

under no case fall back."65 Now, with the

drive across Death Valley successfully completed, Jarman was relieved and gratified.

To the commanders of the 2d and 3d Battalions he dispatched the message: "Congratulations on a day's work well done.

I have the utmost confidence in our

continued success in a vigorous push

against the remaining enemy. Keep up the

good work." 6 6

In the meantime, the 1st Battalion,

106th Infantry, was taking the first effective step of the campaign toward mopping

up Hell's Pocket at the southwest end of

the valley. To accomplish this mission,

Colonel Cornett planned to use Company

C to contain the Japanese at the mouth of

the pocket while the other two rifle companies climbed the cliff to the left in order

to approach the enemy's positions from

above and the rear.67

Company A took the lead in the enveloping movement, slowly groped its way to the

top of the cliff, and commenced circling the

rim around Hell's Pocket. Soon the lead

platoon stumbled upon a deep crater, almost fifty yards wide, that turned out to be

a nest of live and very active Japanese.

Grenades and rifle fire failed to silence the

position. Mortars were then dragged up

the cliff to accomplish the job, after which

the infantrymen moved on through and

past the crater. Twenty dead Japanese

were found in the area, as well as two machine guns and three fully operative American Browning automatic rifles.68

 Company B, meanwhile, was held up behind A

Company until the latter had cleaned out

the crater. During this wait the battalion

executive officer, Maj. John Nichols, who

was in charge of the cliff-top operation,

came forward and relieved 1st Lt. Frank J.

Pryor of command of the company replacing him with 1st Lt. Charles Warge. The

new company commander immediately began to deploy his unit to the left, and by

the time the crater was cleaned out he was

abreast of Company A, Both companies

then formed a skirmish line and moved

forward another hundred yards north

along the edge of the pocket without flushing any more Japanese. There, Major

Nichols ordered the advance halted and

both companies pulled 500 yards to the

left of the cliff line where they dug in for

the night.

64

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 27 Jun 44, Msg 107. 65

 Ibid., Msg 87.

66 106th RCT Opns Rpt FORAGER, p. 11.

67

 Ibid. Unless otherwise noted, the account of

the action of 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, is derived from Love, Battle for Saipan, pages 428-34. 68

 106th RCT Opns Rpt FORAGER, p. 11.
220 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Action on the Flanks

On the right flank of the three-division

front, the 4th Marine Division was ordered

to continue northward and seize all of the

O-6 line within its zone.69 For this operation the division had under its control a

total of nine battalions—the 23d and 24th

Marines and the 165th Infantry (less 2d

Battalion) with the 1st Battalion, 105th

Infantry, attached.

On the right, the 23d Marines made

rapid progress against only occasional

small arms fire from the villages of Hashigoru and Donnay and by 1640 had

reached its objective. The advance would

have been even more rapid but for dense

underbrush and the ragged cliff line along

the coast that called for cautious movement and thorough investigation.70

On the left of the 23d Marines, the

165th Infantry jumped off at 0730 on

schedule with the 3d Battalion on the

right, in direct contact with the left flank

of the 23d Marines, and the 1st Battalion,

105th Infantry, on the left, followed about

600 yards to the rear by the 1st Battalion,

165th.71 The advance was rapid, especially

on the right flank where the 3d Battalion,

165th, met little resistance. Toward late

afternoon the 1st Battalion, 105th, encountered some heavy enemy fire from positions

along the road that ran west of the village

of Hashigoru. Colonel Kelley ordered the

battalion commander to bypass the positions, which he did.

Meanwhile the 1st Battalion, 165th,

which was moving up on the left rear flank

of the regimental line, had lost all contact

with the 2d Battalion, 165th, which was

still held up among the hills of Purple

Heart Ridge. On Colonel Kelley's recommendation the 3d Battalion, 24th Marines,

was brought up and committed to fill the

gap. Action in the regimental zone was

broken off about 1700, and all three battalions of the 165th Infantry dug in for

the night in positions that bent back on

the left to retain contact with the 106th

Infantry.

The 2d Marine Division's advance on the

27th was much slower than that of its sister division because of continued terrain

difficulties around Tapotchau and heavy

Japanese resistance in the center. During the morning the marines completed the

occupation of the entire main crest of

Mount Tapotchau and started down its

northern slope.72 In the division center

the lines had been tightened sufficiently by

noon to permit one badly battered battalion of the 6th Marines to be pinched out

and retired to reserve status. Later that

afternoon the battalion on the 6th Marines'

right ran into heavy resistance from the

ridge line north of Tipo Pale and was

stopped in its tracks, causing the remainder

of the regiment to hold back too, although

the opposition on the regimental left had

been comparatively light. On the extreme

left flank the 2d Marines was again compelled to stand still on the outskirts of Garapan until the rest of the division pulled

abreast. It spent the day consolidating its

positions and sending out patrols.

69

 NTLF Opn Order 14-44, 26 Jun 44. 70

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex H,

23d Marines Rpt, p. 44, 71

 165th RCT Jnl, 27 Jun 44, Msg 29; 165th

RCT Rpt of Action Saipan, p. 6. Unless otherwise

noted, this account of the action of the 165th

Infantry is derived from the latter source.

72

 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, Sec.

VI, p. 16; Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 171-73.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—II 221

Japanese Reactions

June 27th marked another turning point

for the Japanese in their stubborn, futile

battle to save Saipan from the invaders.

On that day General Saito established a

final line of resistance where a last stand

would be made. This was the third such

battle line to be laid down. The first had

been the shore line; the second, the midisland defense line; and now a third was to

be held across the island from Tanapag on

the west coast, through Hill 221 (meters)

and Tarahoho to the east coast, cutting

across the base of the island's northern tip.

(See Map I.)

The withdrawal was to be gradual.

What remained of the mid-island defense

line would be held until the new line could

be established. This policy of conducting

a delaying action until a new line could be

built up was explained by 31st Army headquarters to Tokyo: "The Defense Force,

along with the firmest possible defense of

its present defense line and its activities

toward annihilation of the enemy, is at

present setting up with a line between

Tanapag-Hill 221-Tarahoho as the final

line of resistance."73

General Saito still clung to the small

hope that a renewed Japanese air attack

might alter the situation and save Saipan

and the Marianas for the Empire. In a

telegram to the assistant chief of staff in

Tokyo, to the Minister of War, and to the

29th Division on Guam, he painted a

gloomy picture of the future of Japanese

forces on Saipan, but closed with a hopeful

reference to the Marpi Point airfield,

which was still in his hands:

The pressing need of the moment is that

the mistake be not made of allowing this

important experience in the defense of Saipan to be put to no practical end, and, the

soldiers here be robbed of the fruits of victory

after having fought so bravely. . . . Especi- ally, the Banadero [Marpi Point] airport

has not been completed, but in case the necessity arises, it can be used, and the Saipan

defense forces trust that they can hold out

until the first 10 days of the month [July],

awaiting its completion.74

In another message to Guam, the Japanese general made a more specific plea for

air reinforcements to be sent to Tinian:

The attacking force of the enemy has the

appearance of becoming less intense from

now on. Even though the Banadero airport

has not yet been completed, we are endeavoring to finish it, so that it may be an air base

in the Marianas which we can use. However,

for the present it is an impossibility.

Because the enemy planes which have appeared in the air are only carrier borne

bombers and recco planes, the situation is

such that our large fighter formations could

seize good opportunity for daylight sinking

of enemy destroyers, etc. However as the fate of the Empire will be

decided in this one section, we trust that you

will decide to send fighters to Tinian.75

28 June

Action of the 27th Division

The key to the battle in the zone of the

27th Division on 28 June was the fight for

Hill Able, the northernmost promontory of

Purple Heart Ridge, and the failure of the

2d Battalion, 165th Infantry, to capture

this hill brought progress through Death

Valley to a standstill once more. After the

heavy pounding that had been taken by G

Company on the preceding night, the

whole battalion had pulled back from Hill

King, past Hill Oboe, and had dug in atop

73

 31st Army Msg File, Msg 1120.

74

 Ibid., Msg 1121. 75

 Ibid., Msg 1122.
222 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Hill Xray-Yoke in almost the same place

where it had spent the previous two nights.

On learning of this, General Jarman expressly ordered, "No [future] withdrawal

will be made for the night for the purpose

of consolidation."76

Major Claire had been transferred the

night before from the 3d Battalion, 165th,

to take over command of the 2d Battalion

after Major Brusseau had been mortally

wounded. Claire's plan for the 28th called

for G Company again to make the assault

along the ridge. F Company was to circle

the low ground on the east side and come

up between Hills King and Able. Company

E was to be maintained as battalion reserve.77

 (Map 10)

Company G jumped off promptly at

0630 and pushed rapidly over Hill Oboe.

On reaching Hill King the men discovered

that the enemy had either reoccupied the

hill during the night or had remained well

concealed from the American troops who

had "captured" it the previous day. At any

rate, the Japanese suddenly came to life

with machine guns and rifles and the advance of Company G was stopped. Around

noon, self-propelled mounts were brought

forward and after an hour's fire from these

vehicles enemy fire ceased. Company G

moved forward again and encountered no

trouble until the men went over the crest

of the hill. There, the whole line was

greeted by a shower of grenades and machine gun fire from the east slope, which

had not been touched by the self-propelled

mounts.

For half an hour there was a furious fire

fight, but the Americans did not advance.

At 1330 Captain Chasmar called battalion

headquarters to report his casualties,

which numbered about twenty.78 He was

ordered to pull back to Hill Oboe until

mortar fire could be brought to bear upon

the enemy line. At Oboe he stopped to reorganize, but enemy mortar shells falling

into his lines caused complete confusion.

Major Claire ordered one platoon of Company E to move up and take over Hill

Oboe. Company G was withdrawn to Hill

Xray-Yoke, where it dug in in the bivouac

area of the night before. There it was

joined by Company F, which had met with

no more success in trying to assault Hill

King from the east.

The setback suffered by the 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry, on the 28th was to

govern, retard, and finally frustrate the effort of the 2d and 3d Battalions of the

106th to break out of Death Valley, So long

as the Japanese held Hill Able they could

interdict the entire northern half of the

valley and pour devastating fire on any

troop movements through the area.

The attack order of the two battalions

of the 106th Infantry called for them to

jump off at 0630 on 28 June, following a

fifteen-minute artillery preparation, and to

capture the O-6 line, which lay about

3,000 yards to the north.79 Between them

and their objective lay a series of low ridge

lines, the first one of which crossed the valley about 400 yards to their front.

The advance moved off on schedule with

the 2d Battalion on the right and the 3d on

the left, and by 0930 the men had reached

76

 27th Inf Div FO 51, 27 Jun 44, Incl to 27th

Inf Div G-3 Jul, 27 Jun 44. 77

 Unless otherwise noted, the account of the

action of the 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry, is derived from Love, Battle for Saipan, pages 456-63.

78

 2d Bn 165th RCT Jnl, 28 Jun 44, Msg 30. 79

 27th Inf Div FO 51, 27 Jun 44, and 106th

Inf FO 10, 27 Jun 44, Incls to 27th Inf Div G-3

Jnl, 28 Jun 44.

224 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

the first ridge line.80 There they were ordered to dig in to await supplies that were

to be brought forward in self-propelled

mounts. Almost as soon as the vehicles appeared and began to unload, the enemy,

who had been more or less quiescent for

over an hour, opened up from Hill Able

with intense fire. The self-propelled mounts

promptly dropped their supplies and scurried for cover,81

 and the infantry commanders had to send out carrying parties

to pick up the supplies. The men who went

back to recover the hastily jettisoned supplies were caught in heavy enemy mortar

fire that was being directed at the Cannon

Company vehicles. Within the space of a

few minutes seven men were killed and

twenty-two wounded, mostly from Companies I and K. Among those killed was

2d Lt. Robert J. Bonner, commander of

Company I. He was the fourth commander

to have led that unit in three days and

his death left only one officer, 2d Lt.

Spencer M. Pitts, in the company. The 3d

Battalion was now virtually decimated. A

count of heads revealed that there were

only a hundred riflemen left in it as of

1010.82

Following this debacle, Company F,

106th Infantry, which previously had

been ordered from Mount Tapotchau to

join its parent regiment after serving for

five days with the 2d Marine Division,

moved down into the valley and took up

positions in a small group of trees just

behind Company E.83 There the men

were soon joined by remnants from Companies I and K as well as by the headquarters of both the 2d and 3d Battalions,

which by 1315 had displaced forward.

Suddenly, two Japanese tanks moved

into view over the brow of a small hill just

200 yards north of the crowded grove. The

lead tank opened up on the trees with machine guns and its 40-mm. turret gun. Enemy fire continued for ten minutes before

a single American shot was fired in return.

Casualties were frightful. In the 2d and 3d

Battalions of the 106th Infantry, twelve

were killed or mortally wounded, and

sixty-one others were wounded. Among

those killed were Colonel Mizony, commander of the 3d Battalion, 1st Lt.

John T. McGregor, commanding officer

of Company M, and Captain Tarrant of

G Company. As the suddenness and intensity of the tank attack seemed to indicate

a more general one, Major O'Hara, the

senior officer present, ordered both battalions to dig in immediately. During the next

hour a strong defensive position was constructed on the ridge, and artillery fire was

directed on the whole area to the front.

All plans for further forward movement

during the day were abandoned, and the

two battalions remained where they were

for the night.

While this stalemate was developing in

Death Valley proper, the 1st Battalion,

106th Infantry, was completing its task,

started the day before, of eliminating enemy resistance in Hell's Pocket. Instead of

holding at the south end of the area on the

28th, Company C moved straight across

the mouth of the pocket, while Companies

A and B mopped up along the cliffs above.

Company A, which was given the job of

skirting the cliff edge on the rim of the

pocket, encountered the most difficulty.

80

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 28 Jun 44, Msg 22.

Unless otherwise noted, this account of the actions

of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 106th Infantry, is

derived from Love, Battle for Saipan, pages

440-56. 81

 106th RCT Jnl, 28 Jun 44, Msg 621. In this

message the supply vehicles are misnamed "tanks." 82

 106th RCT Jnl, 28 Jun 44, Msg 609. 83

 Ibid., p. 99.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—II 225

MAJ. GEN. GEORGE W. GRINER, who

assumed command of the 27th Infantry

Division on Saipan, 28 Jun 1944.

Enemy mortar and rifle fire harassed the

men throughout the morning, causing several casualties. Major Nichols, the battalion

executive officer, was mortally wounded.

By midafternoon the Japanese guns that

were molesting the area were cleared out

with the aid of heavy machine guns and

mortars. Meanwhile, Company C managed

by late afternoon to push all the way across

the pocket and move up the left edge of

the valley before being called back to the

southern entrance of the valley to bivouac

with the rest of the battalion. By nightfall

there were still a few Japanese soldiers

holed up in Hell's Pocket, but all organized resistance there had finally been eliminated.

At 1030 on 28 June, command of the

27th Infantry Division passed from General Jarman to General Griner, who had

formerly commanded the 98th Infantry Division in Hawaii.84

 He had received his

orders as soon as word of General Ralph

Smith's relief had reached the headquarters of General Richardson, Commanding

General, United States Army Forces in the

Central Pacific Area. General Jarman had

taken over command of the division only

on an interim basis since he had other

previously assigned duties as island commander.

Among the problems facing General

Griner was the disposition of the 3d Battalion, 106th Infantry, which in its present

state could not be expected to continue on

the front line. Accordingly, early in the

evening of 28 June General Griner ordered

the 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, to relieve the 3d and establish contact with the

2d Marine Division on the left.85 The 3d

Battalion, 105th Infantry, which had seen

no action since its withdrawal from Nafutan Point was ordered into the right of the

division line with the responsibility of

seizing Hill Able. The 2d Battalion, 165th

Infantry, which for the past three days had

been attached to the 106th Infantry, was

now attached to the 105th to assist it.86

With these shifts in the line ordered, the

new division commander prepared to complete the capture of Death Valley and

Purple Heart Ridge.

Action on the Flanks

In view of the success of the 4th Marine

Division in overrunning Kagman Peninsula

and in securing most of the O-6 line in its

84

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 28 Jun 44, Msg 32. 85

 106th RCT Jnl, 28 Jun 44, p. 106.

86

 27th Inf Div FO 52, 28 Jun 44, Incl to 27th

Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 28 Jun 44.
226 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

zone of action, Holland Smith—on the

28th—ordered it to "hold present positions

until further orders" and to assist the advance of the 27th Infantry Division by

supporting fires from the east.87 The 24th

Marines and the 165th Infantry (less 2d

Battalion), which was still attached to it,

were ordered to establish one battalion

apiece on the division boundary and support the 27th Division in its movement

along Purple Heart Ridge and Death

Valley.

On the extreme right, the 23d Marines

held its positions on the O-6 line and continued to mop up the rear area and the

caves that studded the coast line.88 The

24th Marines remained in division reserve

except for the 3d Battalion, which maintained its position on the boundary line

between the 165th Infantry and the 27th

Division. Late in the afternoon the 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, was brought up to

fill the gap that still existed between the

two divisions, but was unable to establish

contact with the 27th Division on the left

before dark.89

The only significant advance in the Kagman Peninsula area on the 28th was in

the zone of the 165th Infantry. There the

3d Battalion, which was in position along

the regimental boundary on the left flank

of the 23d Marines, jumped off at 0630

and within an hour had progressed to the

O-6 line, about 440 yards forward. From

there it moved west toward Hill 700, a

dominating terrain feature on the division

boundary.90 While consolidating positions

in that area, Capt. Joseph P. Stampher,

commander of Company L, was wounded

and was replaced by 1st Lt. George R.

Weigand.91

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry, was following to the left rear of the

3d Battalion, 165th. Moving along the tortuous mountain trails that lay in its zone,

the battalion cleaned out the area that

marked the boundary between the 4th Marine Division and the 27th Infantry Division.92

Earlier in the morning Colonel Kelley,

commanding officer of the 165th Infantry,

was struck by a fragment of a mortar shell

and had to be evacuated. The regiment

was turned over to Colonel Hart, its former

executive officer, who commanded it for

the rest of the operation.93

In the 2d Marine Division's zone, the

movement toward the O-6 line was again

slowed down by the broken terrain and by

the Japanese, who were exploiting it to

the utmost. In the zone of the 8th Marines

on the division right the day's objective

was a series of four small hills, nicknamed

"the Pimples," across the front.94 On the

regimental right, the marines advanced

with relatively little difficulty around the

east cliffs of Mount Tapotchau before redeploying on the northern slope. About

1300 they came to a steep ravine that

could be traversed only by a slow descent

down a narrow crevice leading to the bottom. This took the remainder of the day.

On the higher ground to the immediate

87

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, p. 28. 88

 Ibid., Annex H, 23d Marines Rpt, p. 44. 89

 Ibid., Annex I, 34th Marines Rpt, p. 22. 90

 165th RCT Jnl, 28 Jun 44, Msgs 8, 22; 4th

Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, p. 128; 165th

RCT Rpt of Action Saipan, p. 9.

91

 165th RCT Jnl, 28 Jun 44, Msg 41. 92

 Ibid., Msgs 33, 40; 165th RCT Unit Rpt 11,

28 Jun 44. 93

 165th RCT Rpt of Action Saipan, p. 10. 94

 This account of the action of the 2d Marine

Division is derived from: 2d Marine Div SAR,

Phase I, FORAGER, Sec. VI, pp. 15-16; Hoffman,

Saipan, pp. 174-75.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—II 227

left, the marines made more rapid progress

against moderate resistance and succeeded

in pushing ahead of the units on either

flank. Two battalions of the 8th Marines

were held up throughout the day by mortar and heavy machine gun fire and at

1600, when the fighting was called off,

were still short of the Pimples.

In the division center, the 6th Marines

continued to slug away at the low ridge line

north of Tipo Pale against heavy enemy

opposition. Medium tanks and light flame

throwers were brought forward in an effort

to dislodge the Japanese, but it proved to

be an infantry-engineer task since the tanks

could not depress their weapons sufficiently

to reach the fortified positions that lay between the regiment and the hills to the

front. At the day's end the advance

amounted only to 150 to 200 yards, although one company finally succeeded in

wiping out the bypassed enemy pocket that

had been occupying Tipo Pale for the past

four days.

South of Garapan the 2d Marines again

held in place, fearing a forward movement

would force them to break contact with

the units on its right. Close air support by

American planes accounted for the only

casualties on the 28th suffered by the marines in this area. In one air strike against

Garapan, three misdirected rockets fell

within the lines of the 1st Battalion, 2d

Marines, causing twenty-seven casualties.

29 June

Action of the 27th Division

June 29th was a day of mixed blessings

for the 27th Infantry Division. On the one

hand, it was the first day since the beginning of the assault into Death Valley that

the Army troops were able to make sufficient inroads to establish contact with the

marines on at least one of their flanks. On

the other hand, at the day's end, the tally

showed another failure to seize Hill Able.

With the 3d Battalion, 106th Infantry,

almost depleted, General Griner had decided to replace it with the 1st Battalion,

106th, which had heretofore been occupied

with the task of cleaning out Hell's Pocket.

Company C of the 1st Battalion was to

guard the mouth of the pocket, but the

rest of the battalion was ordered into the

left of the division line with the specific

admonition, "It is of utmost importance

that you gain contact with the 8th Marines today before dark."95

The 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, was

already in position in the center of the line

across Death Valley at the beginning of

the day's fighting. The 3d Battalion, 105th

Infantry, was ordered into the right to

complete the cordon that, it was hoped,

would squeeze the remaining life out of the

enemy in the valley. To the right rear the

2d Battalion, 165th, now attached to the

105th Infantry, was ordered to finish capturing Purple Heart Ridge by overrunning

Hill Able.

The two advance battalions of the 106th

Infantry jumped off on schedule but were

at first held up by fire from what appeared

to be dug-in tanks and machine guns located along S Road north of Hill Able.96

The 2d Battalion requested artillery fire

but was denied it because the area in

question was too close to the boundary line

of the 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry, the

95

 106th RCT Jnl, 29 Jun 44, Msg 679; 27th

Inf Div FO 52, 28 Jun 44, Incl to 27th Inf Div

G-3 Jnl, 28 Jun 44. 96

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 29 Jun 44, Msgs 17,

27, 28, 34.
228 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

battalion that was supposed to be working

up Hill Able from the south.97

To add to the delay, friendly artillery

fire began to fall on the front lines of the

3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, and it had

to reorganize before it could jump off.98

Finally, Company K got lost and was involved in an extracurricular fire fight before reaching the right flank of the front

line in Death Valley to which it was assigned.99

Company K had moved out of the

battalion assembly area around 0700 and

had skirted the inside (west) slope of

Purple Heart Ridge until it reached Hill

King. There, one of the guides furnished

by the 106th Infantry informed Capt.

Alexander C. Bouchard, the company commander, that Hill King was cleared and

offered an easy route to the battalion line of

departure. Unfortunately, Hill King had

been lost to the enemy two days before

and had not been recovered. As K Company began to climb to the top it came

under severe enemy rifle fire, which was

soon followed by an American artillery

barrage designed to clear the hill of Japanese troops in advance of the attack of

Company E, 165th Infantry, which was

coming up from a different direction.

Nineteen of Bouchard's men were immediately wounded, and the rest scattered.

Company E then assaulted the hill and,

with some help from K Company, cleared

the remaining Japanese, most of them hidden in foxholes.100

 This eliminated Hill

King as a source of trouble, but Company

K had to stop and reorganize before advancing to its line of departure. Not until

about 1300 was it able to take position on

the right of Company I and close the line

across Death Valley.101

Finally, about 1400, all three battalions

—the 1st and 2d of the 106th, and the 3d

of the 105th—jumped off in line abreast

toward the northern end of Death Valley.102

 Within less than twenty minutes the

106th Infantry had advanced 400 yards;

the 105th was only a little behind. By 1445

another 300 yards had been gained. By the

end of the day the 106th had scored a total

gain of 900-1,000 yards, while the 3d Battalion, 105th, had moved ahead about 600

yards.103 By 1530 the men of 1st Battalion,

106th, had visual contact with the 2d Marine Division on the northern slopes of

Mount Tapotchau on their left.104

At last the long-broken link was restored.

At last General Holland Smith, corps

commander, could find good words to say

for the 27th Division. Viewing its progress

through Death Valley on the 29th from

the vantage point of Mount Tapotchau, he

"expressly complimented" the division's

performance to General Griner, its new

commander.105

No such good fortune attended the efforts of the 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry,

on the division right flank. After recapturing Hill King, Company E moved off at

1335 toward Hill Able.106 A shower of

hand grenades greeted the men who tried

to scale the steep southern slope. Com97

 106th RCT Jnl, 29 Jun 44, Msg 700. 98

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 29 Jun 44, Msgs 12,

13; 105th RCT Jnl, 29 Jun 44, Msg 2. 99

 105th RCT Jnl, 29 Jun 44, Msgs 5, 6. 100

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 473-74.

101

 105th RCT Jnl, 29 Jun 44, Msgs 13, 14;

105th RCT S-3 Dispatch Summary, 29 Jun 44,

Incl to 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 29 Jun 44. 102

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 29 Jun 44, Msg 50;

105th RCT Jnl, 29 Jun 44, Msg 1410. 103

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 29 Jun 44, Msg 50;

106th RCT Jnl, 29 Jun 44, Msgs 729, 733; 27th

Inf Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 13. 104

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 29 Jun 44, Msg 59. 105

 27th Inf Div Fld Msg 2, 29 Jun 44, Incl to

27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 29 Jun 44. 106

 105th RCT Jnl, 1335, 29 Jun 44.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—II 229

TRUCK-MOUNTED ROCKET LAUNCHERS FIRING at hills north of 8th Marines

position on 29 June.

pany E withdrew. Meanwhile, Company

F on the right was making slow progress in

a move to come up Hill Able from the east.

Continuous mortar fire from the hill

impeded its movement, and one shell

wounded Lieutenant Trummel, the company commander. By late afternoon the

company had worked its way into a position just east of Hill Able, but by that

time the hour was too late to warrant an

attack.107

Action on the Flanks

The 4th Marine Division again spent the

day patrolling and consolidating its positions while waiting for the 27th Infantry

to reach the O-6 line and establish contact

on its left flank.108 The 23d Marines sent

out patrols as far as 1,200 yards to the

front, capturing small groups of unarmed

Japanese.109 To the left rear of the division zone, elements of the 24th Marines

received fairly heavy machine gun and

mortar fire from enemy groups that had

apparently filtered in to escape the pressure

of the 27th Division.110 The 3d Battalion,

165th Infantry, continued to improve its

positions by consolidating on Hill 700 on

the left flank of the division zone and on

107

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 480-85.

108

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, p. 29. 109

 Ibid., Annex H, 23d Marines Rpt, p. 44. 110

 Ibid., Annex I, 24th Marines Rpt, p. 22.
230 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Charan Danshii ridge to the north. In so

doing, the battalion fell under considerable artillery and mortar fire from enemy

positions on its left front in the zone of

the 27th Division. Around 1400 the fire

reached such intensity that the battalion

withdrew from Charan Danshii and dug in

for the night on Hill 700.111 Colonel Hart

informed the Marine division headquarters

that in order to hold Hill 700 he would

have to move the 3d Battalion about 300

yards to the west, leaving about the same

distance between his troops and the 23d

Marines. To fill this gap, some eighty men

of the 1st Battalion, 165th, were sent into

the front lines, their own previous positions

being taken over by elements of the 3d

Battalion, 24th Marines.112

On the corps left the 2d Marine Division

again made slow progress against rugged

terrain and determined enemy resistance.

On the division right the 8th Marines

struggled through dense jungle until about

noon, when it was Stopped by heavy fire

from the Pimples to the north. Two wellplaced rocket concentrations were put on

these hills with excellent coverage of the

area, but before the regiment could move

forward sufficiently to undertake its assault it was too late to justify an attack,

and the hills remained uncaptured for another day.113

In the center, a readjustment of the

lines of the 6th Marines took so long that

the attack did not jump off until about

noon and made little progress during the

rest of the day. Once again, too, the 2d

Marines below Garapan were forced to

wait for the rest of the division to come

into line. Their day was not spent in idleness, however. A group of Japanese of

about platoon size had dug in on a small

hill some 500 yards ahead of the Marine

lines in such a manner as to defy extermination by artillery or mortars. In order to

entice the enemy out of his underground

caves and passageways, the 2d Marines

simulated an infantry attack on the morning of 29 June. Following a heavy artillery

preparation, the marines opened with small

arms and machine guns as though preparing for an assault, then ceased their machine gun fire but continued with small

arms to heighten the illusion of an infantry attack. At this the Japanese emerged

to man their machine guns and automatic weapons, whereupon they were immediately wiped out by American artillery

and mortars. Thus, the way was cleared

for a relatively easy entry into Garapan

once the 2d Division's lines had been sufficiently straightened to justify the movement,

30 June

Death Valley: Capture

and Breakthrough

The last day of June witnessed the end

of the long and bitter struggle of the 27th

Division to capture Death Valley and

Purple Heart Ridge, As General Schmidt,

USMC, later testified, "No one had any

tougher job to do."114 General Griner's

orders for the day read that operations to

reduce Hill Able would "be concluded" by

the 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry.115 The

111

 165th RCT Unit Rpt 12, 29 Jun 44; 165th

RCT Jnl, 29 Jun 44, Msgs 37, 39. 112

 165th RCT Jnl, 29 Jun 44, Msgs 28, 29. 113

 This account of the action of the 2d Marine

Division is from: 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I,

FORAGER, Sec. VI, p. 18; Hoffman, Saipan, pp.

182-83.

114

 Ltr, Gen Schmidt, USMC (Ret.), to Gen A.

C. Smith, 10 Jan 55 (Incl), OCMH. 115

 27th Inf Div Fld Msg 2, 29 Jun 44, Incl to

27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—II 231

orders were complied with. Jumping off at

0715, the battalion launched its attack,

with Company F assaulting the hill from

the east (right), G from the west. Company E remained back on Hill King to

lend fire support.116 Opposition was light

and by 0940 the hill was reported secured. For the rest of the day the battalion

dug in and consolidated its positions.117

Meanwhile, the troops in the valley below sustained the momentum of the

previous day. Since Colonel Bradt's 3d

Battalion, 105th Infantry, had lagged behind the 106th on the 29th, the main effort

was to be in his zone, on the right of the

division line.

Bradt's battalion, accompanied by nine

tanks, jumped off promptly at 0715 following a fifteen-minute artillery preparation.118

 After about two hours of fairly

easy going the battalion came under fire

from Hill Uncle-Victor, located about

1,400 yards north of Hill Able. "It appears," reported Bradt, "to be another

Hill Able."119 Colonel Stebbins then proposed to place an artillery barrage in the

area, but could not safely do so until the

tanks that were operating at the foot of

the hill withdrew, so the attack on the

division right came to a temporary standstill. Around noon the artillery preparation

was completed, and Colonel Bradt's troops

moved up onto the troublesome hill and

declared it secured.120

Meanwhile, at two points on the division

boundary contact was at last established

between the 27th Infantry Division and

the 4th Marine Division. Soon after 1000

a patrol sent out from the 3d Battalion,

105th, made contact with a party of marines at a point about 600 yards northeast

of Hill Able.121 Two hours later a platoon

of the 27th Reconnaissance Troop that had

in the morning been fed into the right of

the division line for that express purpose,

established contact with the 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, just northeast of Hill

Able.122 At long last the 4th Marine Division was in a position to move forward

without fear of exposure on its left flank.

In the center of the 27th Division's line,

106th's 2d Battalion made fairly steady

progress throughout the day against light

opposition, but on the left its 1st Battalion

discovered to its sorrow that the cliffs of

Mount Tapotchau were still not entirely

cleared of the enemy. Mortar and machine

gun fire sporadically harassed the battalion as it tried to keep pace with the rest

of the division in its move to and through

the northern end of Death Valley.

Late in the afternoon, 2d Lt. Ralph W.

Hill of the 1st Platoon, Company B, located at least one of the positions in the

cliffs that had been causing the battalion

so much trouble. Taking two enlisted

men with him, and against the advice of

his company commander, he reconnoitered

the cliff line and discovered a machine gun

position on a tiny ledge about thirty feet

up the side of the cliff. The party was soon

detected by the Japanese. Hill was shot

and then all three Americans were

wounded by the explosion of a hand grenade. The two enlisted men retreated but

came back later to find their platoon

leader, undaunted by his serious wounds,

still firing at the enemy position, which was

forthwith silenced. Whether this action

was decisive or not is unknown, but by the

116

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 30 Jun 44, Msgs 7, 15. 117

 Ibid., Msgs 21, 24. 118

 Ibid., Msg 7. 119

 Ibid., Msg 17. 120

 Ibid., Msg 46.

121

 Ibid., Msg 41. 122

 Ibid., Msg 54.
232 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

next morning the cliff was clear of Japanese, and it was assumed that they had

come down from the caves and withdrawn

to the north during the night.123

All together, the advance of the 27th Division's line on 30 June was about 400

yards.124 By the day's end, physical contact had been established on both the right

and the left with the two Marine divisions.125

 Death Valley had been left behind.

Action on the Flanks

Once more the 4th Marine Division on

Kagman Peninsula spent the day resting,

patrolling, and consolidating its lines. Along

the coast the 23d Marines pushed its patrols as deep as 800 yards north of the

O-6 line but, aside from capturing a few

civilians, made no contact with the enemy.

With the advance of the 27th Division, the

1st Battalion, 24th Marines, which was the

southernmost Marine unit disposed along

the division boundary line, was pinched

out. Throughout the day little enemy artillery and mortar fire was received, although small arms fire from pockets of resistance located in the 27th Division's zone

continued to cause some casualties.126

On the left of the 27th Division, the 2d

Marine Division continued its slow progress through the wooded hills and ravines

north of Tapotchau. The 2d Battalion, 8th

Marines, captured one of the Pimples, and

a medium tank platoon from the Army's

762d Tank Battalion came up in the late

afternoon to lay fire on the remaining hills

similarly nicknamed. In the division center,

the 6th Marines gained little ground but

was able to straighten its lines, while on

the left the 2d Marines again waited on

the outskirts of Garapan for the rest of

the corps line to come abreast.127

Central Saipan: Sum-up

With the closing of the gaps on either

side of the 27th Division's line, the battle

for central Saipan can be said to have

come to a successful end. The cost had

been high and the progress painfully slow.

Total American casualties came to an estimated 3,987.128

 Of these, the 4th Marine

Division suffered 1,506; the 2d Marine Division, 1,016; the 27th Infantry Division,

1,465. The Army division was especially

hard hit among its line officers. The 165th

Infantry lost its commander, Colonel

Kelley, who was wounded in action.

Colonel McDonough, commander of the

2d Battalion, 165th, was wounded and

evacuated; his successor, Major Brusseau

was wounded and later died; and Colonel

Mizony of the 3d Battalion, 106th, was

killed in action. In addition, a total of

twenty-two company commanders of the

165th and 106th Regiments were either

killed or wounded in action during the

period.

123

 This action is described in Love, Battle For

Saipan, pages 606-08. 124

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 30 Jun 44, Msg 94;

Love, Battle for Saipan, p. 600. 125

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 30 Jun 44, Msgs 32,

41, 54. 126

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, pp. 29-30.

127

 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, pp.

19-20; Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 183-84. 128

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl C, G-1

Rpt, App. 1; 27th Inf Div G-1 Periodic Rpts 7

through 14. Casualty figures for the 27th Division

are derived from the second source cited, since

NTLF figures for the Army division are obviously

incomplete. In computing 27th Division casualties

for central Saipan for the period 23-26 June, the

figures for the 105th Infantry have been deducted

from the total division casualties, since that regiment was either in reserve or fighting on Nafutan

Point during the period.
THE FIGHT FOR CENTRAL SAIPAN—II 233

In the center of the corps line, it had

taken the 27th Division eight days to advance 3,000 yards. In the same time the

2d Marine Division had advanced 2,600

yards on its right and 1,500 yards on its

left where any further forward movement

was unfeasible until the rest of the line

came abreast. Only on the corps right, in

the zone of the 4th Marine Division, had

the troops advanced rapidly. By the close of

30 June this division, with its Army attachments, had pushed about 4,400 yards

east to the tip of Kagman Peninsula and

about 5,000 yards northwest from its original line of departure of June 23d. Undoubtedly, it would have gone farther had

it not been held back by the relatively slow

advance in the center of the corps line.

This bald account of the yardage gained

is by no means a true measure either of the

difficulties of the fighting or of the results

achieved. Unlike the 4th Marine Division,

the other two divisions faced extremely difficult terrain, which the Japanese, in spite

of their dwindling strength, exploited to

the utmost. The main drive of the 27th

was up the long axis of a valley flanked

on both sides by fortified hills, cliffs, and

mountains. That of the 2d Marine Division

was across the largest and most precipitous

mountain mass on the island. Against any

but a completely prostrated enemy, the assault could only have been slow and

painstaking.

Whatever the cost of the drive, the results were decisive. Mount Tipo Pale and

Mount Tapotchau were captured; Death

Valley, Purple Heart Ridge, and Kagman

Peninsula occupied. The main line of resistance set up by the Japanese after

their withdrawal from the beachhead was

broached and overrun.

CHAPTER XII

The Capture of Northern Saipan

Drive to Tanapag

1-2 July

With Death Valley cleared, Holland

Smith was at last in a position to push his

forces rapidly ahead and seal off the Japanese remaining in the northern neck of

Saipan. On 1 July he established the next

corps objective at a line (O-7) that cut

across the base of this neck in an arc, at

a distance from about 1,000 yards on the

right to 6,000 yards on the left from the

respective flanks of the corps front. Between line O-7 and the corps front, as of

1 July, lay the hill mass (Hills 221 and

112 meters)1 on which the Japanese had

chosen to anchor their last defensive position across the island. The attack was to

be made with the three divisions abreast in

the same order as before, the main effort

again to be in the center, in the zone of the

27th Division.2 (Map 11)

In the earlier phases of the fighting on

Saipan, General Holland Smith had noted

a tendency on the part of his infantry commanders to neglect the abundant artillery

support available to them, and to rely too

heavily on their own weapons. Too frequently, he believed, the front-line troops

had failed to call for massed artillery fires

before jumping off in attack. Moreover,

even when artillery concentrations had

been properly called for, they were often

not followed promptly by tanks and infantry, and thus the whole effect of the artillery preparation was wasted.3

 To correct

this situation the corps commander specifically ordered:

Massed artillery fires will be employed to

support infantry attacks whenever practic- able. Infantry will closely follow artillery

concentrations and attack ruthlessly when

the artillery lifts. Absence of tanks is no ex- cuse for failure of infantry to press home the

attack.4

Even before the order calling for a quick

thrust to Tanapag had been issued, the

corps line had been pushed forward and

straightened in preparation for the drive.

In the center the 27th Division, on 1 July,

registered a gain of about 400 yards on

the right and 600 on the left against moderate opposition.5

 On the right, the 4th

Marine Division maintained its positions

and sent patrols as far out as 1,500 yards

in front of its line without establishing contact with the enemy.6

 It was clear that the

1

 American troops called Hill 221 "Radar Hill."

On the American map, Hill 112 was located just

southeast of Tarahoho. 2

 NTLF Opn Order 19-44, 1 Jul 44.

3

 NTLF Dispatch 011806 to 2d Marine Div, 4th

Marine Div, 27th Inf Div, Incl to 27th Inf Div

G-3 Jnl. 4

 NTLF Opn Order 19-44, 1 Jul 44. 5

 27th Inf Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 15, 1 Jul 44. 6

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex H,

23d RCT Rpt, p. 45; Ibid., Annex I, 24th RCT

Rpt, p. 62.


238 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Japanese were retreating to the north.

Early on 1 July members of the 27th Division had seen a small body of Japanese

lugging ammunition up one of the roads

that led out of Death Valley. All morning

long, a 4th Marine Division observation

post atop Hill 700 reported, the Japanese

had been retreating in groups of three or

four, carrying their packs and equipment

with them.7

While these events were taking place on

the right and in the center of the line, the

2d Marine Division gained more yardage

than on any other day since the landing.

The strong line of resistance through

Mount Tapotchau had been smashed. Over

terrain that was far better suited to the

employment of tanks than the cliffs and

defiles of Tapotchau, the 8th Marines advanced 800 yards. On its left, the 6th Marines kept pace in spite of having to overcome several pockets of heavy resistance,

and on the extreme left the 2d Marines

continued to patrol south of Garapan in

preparation for the long-awaited push into

the city itself, which was scheduled for 2

July.8

On 2 July, the 4th Marine Division,

which had spent most of its time during the past days resting and patrolling,

plunged ahead for about 1,500 yards in its

zone. Resistance was so light that the assault battalion of the 24th Marines suffered

only one man wounded during the day.9

On the 4th Division's immediate left, the

3d Battalion, 165th Infantry, which had

now been returned to the control of its

parent division, maintained the same pace.

By 1400 Major Foery's men had pushed

ahead about 1,700 yards,10 leaving behind

at about the same distance to their left

rear the 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry. This

unit was held back by intense rifle and

machine gun fire, leaving a deep re-entrant

between the 3d Battalion, 165th, on its

right and the 106th Infantry on its left.

The latter had succeeded in advancing

about 1,000 yards after clearing out five

enemy tanks emplaced as pillboxes. To

close the gap, General Griner late in the

afternoon ordered the 1st Battalion, 105th

Infantry, which had been in regimental reserve, to make a wide end run around the

regiment's left flank, bypass the enemy

strongpoint that was holding up the 3d

Battalion, 105th, and establish contact

with the left flank of the 3d Battalion,

165th.11 This the 1st Battalion did by

1800.12

In the zone of the 2d Marine Division,

the two regiments on the right made good

progress (800-1,200 yards) during the day

in spite of rough terrain and the fact that

the 8th Marines was temporarily disorganized when friendly artillery fire fell into

its lines causing forty-five casualties. On

the division left flank the 2d Marines, after

its prolonged wait before Garapan, was at

last ordered to enter the city. As it did so,

the devastating effect of the many days of

artillery bombardment and naval shelling

was revealed on all sides. Garapan was

little more than a mass of rubble, and

though there was some hostile rifle fire, the

7 2d Marines quickly occupied the center of NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl D, G-2

Rpt, pp. 43-44. 8

 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, Sec.

VI, pp. 20-21. 9

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex H,

23d RCT Rpt, p. 45; Ibid., Annex I, 24th RCT

Rpt, p. 22; Hoffman, Saipan, p. 193.

10

 165th RCT Jnl, 2 Jul 44, Msg 58. 11

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 2 Jul 44, Msg 62. 12

 105th RCT Opns Rpt FORAGER, p. 8; 106th

RCT Opns Rpt FORAGER, p. 18; 27th Inf Div G-3

Periodic Rpt 16, 2 Jul 44.
THE CAPTURE OF NORTHERN SAIPAN 239

MARINES DASH THROUGH BLAZING GARAPAN, 2 July.

the town with the help of tanks and armored amphibians. To the immediate

east the Japanese, entrenched on a hill

overlooking the city, caused considerable

trouble, but by nightfall enemy resistance

had subsided, and the regiment dug in

about 700 yards from its morning line of

departure.13

Under the mounting pressure of the

American attack, the Japanese on the night

of 2 July once more fell back to new positions. Six days earlier General Saito had

decided to make his last stand along a line

running from north of Garapan through

Radar Hill and Hill 112 (meters) on to

the coast.14 Now those troops able to do

so were to retire to the new line. It was

high time. Many of them had been so

pressed for provisions that they were eating

field grass and tree bark.15

3-4 July

The axis of the drive to Tanapag Harbor

now took a more northwesterly direction,

with the main effort still in the center in

the zone of the 27th Division. The Japanese were retreating rapidly and in a piecemeal manner. Saito's plans for an orderly

withdrawal to the north were obviously

13

 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, Sec.

VI, p. 22; Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 186-87.

14

 Japanese Studies in World War II, 55. 15 Ibid.
240 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

INFANTRYMEN OBSERVE HILL 767 before approaching. Note abandoned Japanese

37-mm. gun in foreground.

breaking down in the face of the gathering

momentum of the attacking troops.

On the morning of 3 July the attack on

the right got off to a slow start as a result

of confusion shared by the 4th Marine Division and the 1st Battalion, 165th, as to

the intentions of each. The Army unit was

prepared to jump off on schedule at 0800,

but held back because an air strike in front

of the Marine division's lines prohibited

forward movement. After the strike the

soldiers continued to hold, waiting for the

marines to go forward. The latter made no

move on the false assumption that the 1st

Battalion, 165th, was waiting for the unit

on its left to come abreast. This misunderstanding continued until 1100, when the

Marine division and the Army battalion

jumped off together.16

The 4th Marine Division attacked in

columns of battalions, with the 3d Battalion, 23d Marines, 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, and 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, in

the assault from right to left. After a few

hours of fairly unimpeded movement, the

battalion on the right was pinned down by

heavy machine gun, mortar, and rifle fire

from well-concealed positions in caves and

wooded recesses on Hill 721 and on a nose

16

 165th RCT Record of Opns FORAGER, Sec.

IV, S-3 Rpt, p. 7; 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 3 Jul

44, Msgs 11123, 11127; Hoffman, Saipan, p. 202.
THE CAPTURE OF NORTHERN SAIPAN 241

abutting south from it that the marines

were later to dub "Fourth of July Hill."

Several attempts were made to penetrate

the position by both frontal assault and

envelopment, but each time the troops were

so badly shot up that they were forced

to retire. The approaches were heavily

mined, and neither tanks nor self-propelled

mounts could come in close. Finally, at

1715, after three hours of continuous

fighting, the battalion pulled back 300

yards to safe positions and let the artillery

take over. All night long howitzers of the

14th Marines pounded the strongpoint and

kept it neutralized.17

Daylight of 4 July revealed that the Japanese had either withdrawn during the

night or been eliminated by the intense artillery fire, and by 1135 both Fourth of

July Hill and Hill 721 were in American

hands. Within another hour a battalion of

the 23d Marines had moved 800 yards to

the northeast and had taken Hill 767 without opposition.18

 Meanwhile, the other

two regiments of the 4th Marine Division

had kept abreast. The 25th tied in with

the 23d around Hill 767 on the night of 4

July, by which time most of the 24th Marines had been relieved by the 165th Infantry. 1 9

In the zone of the 27th Division, the 3d

Battalion of the 165th kept abreast of the

marines on 3 July without meeting more

than sporadic fire from the Japanese.20 To

its left the 1st Battalion, 105th, moved

even faster against negligible opposition

and by 1410 reached its objective for the

day—the high ground 2,000 yards east of

Tanapag Harbor overlooking the plains of

Tanapag.21

The 106th Infantry on the division left

jumped off on schedule and also reached

the high ground north of Tanapag by late

afternoon. Earlier in the morning the 1st

Battalion had found a pocket of Japanese

close to the division boundary line, but

these men were quickly silenced by tanks

and self-propelled mounts. Thereafter opposition was light. Meanwhile, to the rear

of the front line the 3d Battalion was mopping up a bypassed enemy position in the

cliffs north of Tapotchau. While one company of the 8th Marines tried to get at

the Japanese-infested caves from above,

Company K, 106th, contained the enemy

from the plain below. After this maneuver

failed to produce results, artillery was called

upon to lay down a concentration. This too

accomplished nothing, and at nightfall the

strongpoint was still in enemy hands.22

In the early morning hours of 4 July a

large group of Japanese, trying to escape

to the north to join General Saito, stumbled

into the command post of the 165th Infantry. After a brisk fire fight, twentyseven of the enemy were killed including

a number of officers, one of whom proved

to be Colonel Ogawa, commanding officer

of the 136th Infantry Regiment.23

On his body Ogawa carried Saito's withdrawal order of 2 July. Ogawa himself had

ordered the remnants of his own regiment,

now bypassed by the Americans, to com- 17

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex H, mence their withdrawal at 2200 on the

23d RCT Rpt, pp. 45-46. 18

 Ibid., p. 46. 19

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex I,

24th RCT Rpt, p. 23; Ibid., Annex J, 25th RCT

Rpt, pp. 7-8; Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 203-06. 20

 165th RCT Record of Opns FORAGER, Sec.

IV, S-3 Rpt, p. 7.

21

 105th RCT Opns Rpt FORAGER, pp. 8-9. 22

 106th RCT Opns Rpt FORAGER, Sec. I, pp.

18-19. 23

 165th RCT Record of Opns FORAGER, Sec.

IV, G-3 Rpt, p. 7; NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase

I, Incl D, G-2 Rpt, p. 49.
242 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

night of the 3d. When he was killed,

Ogawa was bound for his new command

post, which he hoped to locate on a cliff

about 500 meters east of Hill 221. 2 4

Ogawa was not merely in command of a

decimated regiment, but of the entire Japanese left and thus one of the few key men

remaining among the Japanese defenders.

His death was a heavy blow to the already

stunned and reeling enemy, but the circumstances of his death indicate that an even

greater misfortune had befallen the Japanese. It is more than likely that many if

not most of the units under Ogawa's

command behind the American lines never

reached their assigned positions to the

north. Thus the Japanese left flank, toward

which the main drive of the American

forces was now oriented, lay weakened, exposed, and almost leaderless.

The Fourth of July was to see the culmination of the 27th Division's thrust to

Tanapag Plain. On the right the 1st Battalion, 165th, jumped off at 0730 on

schedule and, meeting almost no opposition, quickly pushed forward to the last

low ridge line overlooking the Flores Point

seaplane base. A heavy downpour, the first

daylight rainfall of any severity since the

landing on Saipan, mired the tanks, but

it made little difference since there were no

targets at which they could fire. The rest

of the regiment failed to keep pace so, from

1030 until midafternoon when new orders

were issued changing the direction of the

attack, the men of the 1st Battalion rested

atop the ridge and took pot shots at the

Japanese milling in the coastal valley below.25

In the center of the division line, the 1st

Battalion, 105th, made rapid progress to a

position just beyond the same ridge line,

where it found a strongpoint manned by

about three hundred enemy soldiers, with

some machine guns. A called artillery barrage scattered the Japanese, and by 1600

most of the battalion had succeeded in

reaching the beach.26 On the left, the two

assault battalions of the 106th had an easier time in spite of the heavy undergrowth

through which they had to push. By 1430

they made their way into the Flores Point

seaplane base, where they were joined in

mopping-up operations by the 8th Marines,

To their rear the 3d Battalion, 106th, spent

most of the day finishing off the troublesome caves that had occupied it on the 3d.

First, flame thrower teams went forward

to destroy the ring of enemy machine gun

positions that had been protecting the

largest cave. Next, a public address system

was brought up and interpreters broadcast

pleas to the main body of Japanese to surrender. When this failed, the infantry resumed the attack and reduced the position.

It yielded one wounded Japanese and fifty

dead plus an unknown number sealed up

in the smaller caves adjacent to the main

position. It was the last Japanese strongpoint remaining on the slopes below Tapotchau.27

In the zone of the 2d Marine Division,

by nightfall of 3 July the 6th Marines was

still held up on the ridge line about 1,000

24

 In Japanese terrain designation, this was Hill

205 (meters). NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl

D, G-2 Rpt, map, pp. 50-51; CINCPACCINCPOA Trans 10531, excerpts from a notebook

of field orders, 14 Jun-3 Jul.

25

 165th RCT Record of Opns FORAGER, Sec.

IV, G-3 Rpt, p. 7; Love, Battle for Saipan pp.

670-72, 680. 26

 105th RCT Opns Rpt FORAGER, p. 9; 27th

Inf Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 18. 27

 106th RCT Opns Rpt FORAGER, p. 20.
THE CAPTURE OF NORTHERN SAIPAN 243

TROOPS SEARCHING OUT THE ENEMY in the Tapotchau cliff area on 4 July.

yards from the ocean shore, but the 2d

Marines had finished mopping up Garapan

and had pocketed the small enemy garrison

remaining on the tip of Mutcho Point.

Next day, both regiments reached the shore

line.28

During most of the day the Japanese,

under relentless pressure from the attackers, had been retreating steadily toward

Saito's last headquarters, the rallying point

for the final desperate counterattack that

would come two days later. The Japanese

commander had set up his command post

in the valley running south from the village

of Makunsha—appropriately enough labeled "Paradise Valley" by the Americans

and "Hell Valley" by the Japanese.29 A

captured Japanese officer was later to describe in moving terms the miserable situation in which Saito and his staff found

themselves:

This area is generally called the Valley of

Hell and we felt that this was an unpleasant

hint and suggestion concerning our future.

The intelligence which managed to reach

me at this last place was all depressing.

On 4 July, an enemy unit appeared on the

other side of the valley and fired at us with

heavy automatic weapons. At that time I felt

we were entirely surrounded and had lost all

hope.

28

 2d Marine Div SAR, Phase I, FORAGER, Sec.

VI, p. 23; Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 198-207.

29

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl D, G-2

Rpt, pp. 51-52.
244 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

General Saito was feeling very poorly be- cause for several days he had neither eaten

nor slept well and was overstrained. He was

wearing a long beard and was a pitiful sight.

That morning that very valley received intense bombardment (I don't know whether

it was naval gunfire or pursuing fire from

artillery, but it was the second most intense

bombardment I had been in). It was so fierce

that I thought maybe the cave where the

headquarters was would be buried. At this

time the staff and Lt. Gen Saito received

shrapnel wounds.

I felt that the final hour was drawing

near.30

Change of Direction

As it became apparent that the drive to

Tanapag Harbor could be successfully concluded on the 4th, General Holland Smith

prepared plans for the last phase of the

Saipan campaign. The direction of the

drive would change to the northeast—

toward Marpi Point and the remaining

Japanese airfield, which bore the same

name. Most of the 2d Marine Division,

which had by now been pinched out, was

assigned to corps reserve. The final assault

was to be conducted with the 4th Marine

Division on the right, 27th Infantry Division on the left. To allow time for the

necessary shifts, jump-off hour was set at

noon, 5 July.31 General Griner was ordered to relieve the two left battalions of

the 4th Marine Division. The division

boundary line would now cut down the

northern end of the island slightly west of

the middle. Griner decided to commit the

165th Infantry on the right, the 105th on

the left, the 106th going into reserve.32

Late in the afternoon he ordered the 2d

and 3d Battalions, 165th, to relieve the

marines in that portion of the line now assigned to the Army division. In effecting

this relief, contact with the 1st Battalion,

165th, on the regimental left was lost,

so Griner ordered Colonel Bradt's 3d Battalion, 105th, to fill the gap. Unfortunately, Bradt's orders were garbled in transmission and he moved to the left rather

than to the right of the 1st Battalion,

165th. By this time night had fallen, and

before the error could be rectified almost

a hundred Japanese were able to infiltrate

through the gap and harass the front-line

troops throughout the night. The attacks

were sporadic, however, and by morning

the gap had been filled, and the enemy repulsed or destroyed.33

 (Map III.)

5 July

4th Marine Division

On the right half of the corps line, General Schmidt placed the 25th Marines on

the right and the 24th on the left, and ordered the 23d to clean up the area between

the designated line of departure and the

division's night positions before the division jumped off. The division launched its

drive about 1330, an hour and a half late.

The delay was largely because the 25th

Marines, after being relieved by Army units

in midmorning, had to move laterally about

2,500 yards to take position on the right of

the line. Once they jumped off, the marines drove forward against very little resistance and by 1630 reached their objec30

 Ibid., App. G, pp. 2-3.

31

 NTLF Opn Order 22-44, 4 Jul 44. 32

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 4 Jul 44, Msg 46.

33

 165th RCT Record of Opns FORAGER, p. 9;

Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 693-703.
THE CAPTURE OF NORTHERN SAIPAN 245

tive for the day, the O-8a line, which was

about 1,200 yards from the line of

departure.34

The rapid and almost uncontested progress was indicative of the total collapse of

General Saito's plans for establishing a final

defense line across the entire northern neck

of Saipan. The 4th Marine Division had

overrun the whole left flank of the proposed line. The 136th Infantry Regiment

should have contested this ground, but

whatever remained of that unit was scattered and isolated behind the American

lines, mostly in the area around Radar

Hill.35 With the collapse of the enemy left,

all that remained under Saito's control was

the Navy sector and a thin slice of the

135th Infantry's area. These were in the

zone of the 27th Division. Even there, the

defense was disorganized and confused.

Japanese officers captured on the 5th revealed that their "front line units were

mixed up, the communications were badly

disorganized, . . . there was little or no organized resistance at the present time, no

organized supply plan and very little artillery, if any, remaining."36

 Yet to the

Japanese military mind, disorganization,

lack of supplies, and lack of communications was no excuse for an abatement of

effort. What the enemy lacked in the ordinary sinews of war he made up in determination. As the 27th Division began to

probe into Saito's last shattered defense

line, the degree of that determination was

made manifest.

27th Division

The newly designated line of departure

for the 27th Division ran east from the

beach just north of the village of Tanapag

to a point just south of Hill 767. Facing

this line from right to left were the 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry, 3d Battalion, 165th,

3d Battalion, 105th, and 2d Battalion,

105th. The terrain over which the division

was to move was of two kinds. On the left

in the zone of action of the 105th Infantry, the ground was a low, slightly rolling,

coastal plain. The most important landmark on the plain was a large coconut

grove about 600 yards east of Tanapag village. The main coastal road ran along the

beach and was paralleled by a small cane

railroad. Just above Tanapag, at Road

Junction 2, the coastal road was joined by

a cross-island highway. Just to the east of

the coconut grove, the highway made a

U-shaped turn and from the north leg of

the U, at Road Junction 64, another,

smaller, road branched off, wound in a

southeasterly direction through a canyon

fifty to sixty feet deep, and came out into

the hills below Hill 721, one of the two

high points on the ridge that rose up from

the plain in the center of the island.

The canyon, winding uncertainly between

steep, cave-studded cliffs on either side,

was soon to be called "Harakiri Gulch" by

the men of the 27th. The floor of the

gulch, never more than fifty yards wide,

was covered with sparse undergrowth dotted with trees. In length, it ran about 400

yards.37 Lying athwart the main line of

advance, the canyon was an ideal defensive

position. From the west mouth of the

gulch, running all way to the sea, was a

34

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex I,

24th RCT Rpt, p. 63; Ibid., Annex J, 25th RCT

Rpt, p. 8. 35

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl D, G-2

Rpt, pp. 53-55, 93. 36

 Ibid., p. 54. 37

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 715-16.
246 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

HARAKIRI GULCH, 27th Division soldiers patrolling road following capture of

this strongpoint on 7 July.

deep dry gully that also provided ideal

cover for enemy movement.38

K Company of the 165th Infantry drew

first blood in the two-day fight for Harakiri Gulch. Soon after the jump-off, an advance patrol climbed down the south face

of the canyon but received such inhospitable treatment from the Japanese below

that the men climbed right back up again,

dragging their wounded with them. Shortly

thereafter two tanks started down into the

gulch via the road to the west. Within a

few minutes both were disabled by Japanese who darted out from the ditches and

placed mines on them. Three more tanks

from the same platoon appeared over the

edge of the precipice in an attempt to rescue those below. After an hour and a half

of maneuvering and firing, one of the

stricken vehicles was recovered; the other

had to be abandoned.39 For the rest of the

afternoon Company K made repeated stabs

into the gulch, but each failed. Selfpropelled mounts were sent down the road

38 to search the caves on the north side with Historical Division, War Department, AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION, Small Unit Ac- tions (Washington, 1946) (hereafter cited as

AFAS, Small Unit Actions), p. 74, map on p. 99.

39

 Appleman, Army Tanks in the Battle for Saipan, pp. 76-80.
THE CAPTURE OF NORTHERN SAIPAN 247

point-blank fire from their 75-mm. and

105-mm. howitzers, but the infantrymen

who followed found the going still too

rough, and Captain Betts withdrew the

company from the gulch and called for artillery. Along the southern rim the entire

3d Battalion, 165th, dug in for the night,

tying in on the right with the 2d Battalion,

165th, which had seen no significant action

during the day.40

On the left of the 3d Battalion, 165th,

Company L of the 105th was stopped in its

tracks by fire from the opposite side of

Harakiri Gulch and made no effort to force

an entry into the canyon. To its left Company K, 105th, tried to work its way into

the coconut grove, but fire from the uplands on the right interdicted the area,

mortally wounding Captain Bouchard. The

new company commander, 1st Lt. Roger

P. Peyre, then withdrew south of the

grove. The 2d Battalion, 105th, had spent

the day working its way slowly along the

shore line and the coastal plain north of

Tanapag. It had mopped up a series of

small pillboxes, most of them abandoned,

and had discovered a live mine field directly

in the path of its advance. By the end of

the day it had not quite reached its scheduled line of departure, although the men

had moved almost 800 yards through

ground not previously reconnoitered.41

6 July

4th Marine Division

Holland Smith's orders for 6 July called

for the 27th Division to jump off at 0700

in an effort to bring its line abreast of the

marines on the right by 0900. Assuming

this would be accomplished on time, the

4th Marine Division was to launch its attack at 0900, and the two divisions would

continue to move abreast in a northeasterly direction toward the tip of the island, sweeping the remaining Japanese

before them.42 An hour or two after the

27th Division had jumped off it became

apparent to the corps commander that it

was going to be impossible for it to keep

pace with the marines. Consequently, at

0900 General Smith changed his plans and

assigned new missions. The 27th Division

was to reorient the direction of its attack

from northeast to north, thus assuming

responsibility for about 2,600 yards of

coastal strip from just above Tanapag to

just above Makunsha, as well as for the

first high ground immediately inland from

the beaches, Harakiri Gulch, and Paradise

Valley. The entire remainder of the island

northeast of this sector was to be taken

over by the 4th Marine Division. Once the

right flank of the Army division reached its

objective on the west coast just above

Makunsha, it would be pinched out.43

To take over his newly expanded front,

General Schmidt put all three of his Marine regiments into the line—25th, 24th,

and 23d Marines from right to left. Accompanied by thirteen tanks, the 25th

Marines made fairly rapid progress north

along the east coast of the island, mopping

up isolated Japanese troops and civilians

in the many caves and cliffs that bordered

the ocean. In this work the 25th was assisted by naval vessels, whose flat trajectory fire was ideally suited to the coastal

targets. By midafternoon Mount Petosu40

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 717-23. 41

 Ibid., pp. 728-35.

42

 NTLF Opn Order 23-44, 5 Jul 44. 43

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl E, G-3

Rpt, G-3 Periodic Rpt 22.
248 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

kara was occupied, and the two assault

battalions dug in for the night on either

side of that elevation. Just before dark a

group of from seven to eight hundred

civilians came into the lines of the 25th and

surrendered. Meanwhile, to the rear, the

reserve battalion in mopping up a bypassed hill flushed a sizable covey of

Japanese soldiers and killed sixty-one in a

brief but lively fire fight.44

In the division center, the 24th Marines

registered a day's gain of 1,400 to 1,800

yards against sporadic resistance.45

On the left, the 23d Marines encountered considerably more difficulty. Having

been in reserve in the morning when it received its orders, the unit had to march

some 4,300 yards before reaching its line

of departure. Jumping off at 1415, it soon

came upon the cliff line that rimmed Paradise Valley on the east. Here, the regiment

came under enemy fire from caves well

concealed by dense underbrush. As the marines pushed down the slopes into the valley, hidden enemy machine guns and knee

mortars opened up from the rear. With

only an hour of daylight remaining, the

regimental commander decided it was impossible to continue the attack, and at 1730

pulled his men back to establish defensive

positions for the night on the high ground.

There, the 23d Marines tied in with portions of the 27th Division but was entirely

out of contact with the 24th Marines on

the right.46

The Battle for Tanapag Plain

On the morning of 6 July the 27th Infantry Division was still on the near side of

Harakiri Gulch and still short of its line of

departure on the plain north of Tanapag

village. On the line from right to left were

Major Claire's 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry, Major Mahoney's 1st Battalion,

165th,47 Colonel Bradt's 3d Battalion,

105th, and Maj. Edward McCarthy's 2d

Battalion, 105th. The plan for the day, as

revised by General Smith's order of 0900,

called for the 2d Battalion, 165th, to push

toward the coast above Makunsha by way

of Paradise Valley. On its left the 1st Battalion, 165th, and the 3d Battalion, 105th,

were to rout the enemy still entrenched in

Harakiri Gulch and then proceed northward. Finally, to the 2d Battalion, 105th,

was given the job of pushing up the

coastal plain to a point just south of

Makunsha.48

On the right the division made no progress in the effort to push through Paradise

Valley. Capt. William J. Smith, commanding Company F, 165th Infantry, tried to

force his way into the valley by the trail

that ran along its floor, but the hail of fire

that greeted this effort discouraged him

and he withdrew his men. After a futile

effort to rout the enemy with tanks and

44

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex J,

25th RCT Rpt, p. 9; Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 220-21. 45

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex I,

24th RCT Rpt, p. 24; Hoffman, Saipan, p. 219. 46

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex H,

23d RCT Rpt, p. 47; Hoffman, Saipan, pp.

218-19.

47

 This unit had taken over the positions occupied on the 5th by the 3d Battalion, 165th

Infantry. 48

 The account of action of the 27th Infantry

Division on 6 July, unless otherwise noted, is derived from Love, Battle for Saipan, pages 738-

838, and AFAS, Small Unit Actions, pages 69-

118. These accounts were written largely from

interviews conducted shortly after the action by

Captain Love, the historian assigned to the division. The official records are sparse to the point of

being almost useless. This is particularly true of

the records of the 105th Infantry, most of which

were destroyed by fire.
THE CAPTURE OF NORTHERN SAIPAN 249

MAP 12

self-propelled mounts, the whole battalion

fell back to the western base of Hill 767

and dug in for the night.

The attack on Harakiri Gulch met with

no more success. Jumping off about noon

the 1st Battalion, 165th Infantry, attempted, as had the 3d Battalion the day

before, to assault the canyon frontally,

moving perpendicularly to its axis. In the

course of this effort the men of Company

A witnessed an incident that was to give

the name to the area. Following an intense

ten-minute mortar preparation, the company proceeded slowly into the valley and

was greeted by a series of explosions that

forced the lead platoon to duck for cover.

When the fireworks had abated about fifteen minutes later, the men investigated a

group of straw shacks located on the sides

of the gulch in the path of their advance.

In each of these they found groups of three

or four Japanese soldiers who had committed suicide by pressing hand grenades

to their abdomens. All together, about

sixty of the enemy were discovered to have

ended their lives in this fashion. Nevertheless, fire from the gulch below continued

intermittently throughout the afternoon,

and by evening Major Mahoney's battalion

abandoned all thought of further advance

and dug in again on the rim overlooking

the gorge.

On the western flank of the gulch, the

3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, was equally
250 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

unsuccessful. (Map 12) In this area, most

of the burden of combat fell on Capt,

Robert J. Spaulding's Company L. During

the morning Spaulding made two separate

attempts to get across the gulch. He ordered his 1st Platoon, on the right, to crawl

down into a small tributary draw that

branched off from the main gulch in a

southwesterly direction. The platoon was

to work down the draw to its mouth and

there set up machine guns that could cover

enemy positions on the floor of the gulch

and fire into the caves on the opposite side.

Under cover of this support, Spaulding

proposed to send his 2d Platoon over the

near walls of the canyon, across the floor

of the gulch, and up the opposite side. He

also had at his disposal a skeleton platoon

of four light tanks that he intended to send

up the gulch along the trail that entered

it from the east.

Company L moved off to the attack at

0700. The 1st Platoon crawled up over the

ridge and down into the tributary ravine

without drawing fire. Moving stealthily in

single file along this narrow corridor, the

platoon escaped detection and reached the

corridor's mouth. There, the men set up

two light machine guns and began firing

at the caves in the face of the opposite wall,

only to be greeted by return fire from the

disabled American tank that had been left

in the gulch the day before and was now

in the hands of the Japanese. Meanwhile,

the four light tanks had arrived, and

Spaulding ordered them to work up the

trail that ran through the middle of the,

gulch. An infantryman, Pfc. James R.

Boyles, volunteered to accompany the buttoned up lead tank to guide it, but he was

soon killed and thereafter no direct communication could be maintained between

tanks and infantrymen. To add to the confusion, three enemy soldiers then jumped

out of the bushes and clapped a magnetic

mine onto the side of the third tank in line,

disabling it. Eventually the crew from

the crippled tank was evacuated, and the

tank platoon commander, 2d Lt. Gino

Ganio, was able at last to get well up into

the gulch and spray the walls on the north

side. Nevertheless, by this time (noon)

Company L had withdrawn again to the

rim of the gorge, and no further effort to

breach the canyon was made on the 6th.

Meanwhile, Company K, 105th Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Peyre, was

having its own troubles in the area of the

coconut grove in the valley below and to

the west of the mouth of Harakiri Gulch.

Jumping off on schedule at 0700, Peyre's

men moved along a deep gully that circled

the south edge of the grove, making use

of the cover and concealment it offered.

Once they emerged from the ditch, however, they were taken under fire by Japanese machine guns located near the center

of the grove, and the whole company was

pinned down. At this juncture a platoon of

five light tanks commanded by 1st Lt.

Willis K. Dorey hove into view and within

ten minutes cleared the way for the infantrymen to move into the grove. For

about an hour the men of Company K

worked their way among the stock piles of

enemy supplies that abounded in the area

and by 0815 reached the north edge of the

grove, facing the open ground beyond the

cross-island road.

Once his troops arrived at this objective,

Lieutenant Peyre ordered Dorey's tanks to

move along the road until they reached positions from which they could put effective

fire on the cliffs to the right front. So long

as the tanks were firing the infantrymen

were able to move about the grove at will,
THE CAPTURE OF NORTHERN SAIPAN 251

but whenever the tankers ceased fire the

Japanese in the cliffs opened up again. Unfortunately too, at this point, tank-infantry

communications failed, and Peyre could

neither reach Dorey by radio nor attract

his attention with hand signals. Consequently the tank commander merely kept

patrolling the road, laying down a blanket

of fire on the cliffs, until about 1000 when

the tanks ran out of ammunition and had

to retire.

Peyre dug in as well as he was able to

await the tankers' return. A hundred yards

ahead of him in the open terrain north of

the grove was a small knoll on which were

located three enemy machine gun positions.

To interdict these as well as the remaining

guns on the cliffs to his right, Company

K's commander brought his own machine

guns to the north edge of the grove and

prepared to launch an attack against the

knoll.

When the tanks returned at 1030, Lieutenants Peyre and Dorey conferred and

laid their plans. The right platoon of

Company K would move ahead to capture

the knoll under cover of fire from the left

platoon. Dorey, with his tanks, would

again proceed up the cross-island road, take

the trail that led into Harakiri Gulch, and

neutralize the enemy fire in the cliffs.

The lead platoon jumped off about 1045

and was immediately met by a deadly hail

of small arms and machine gun fire that

forced the men to take to the earth.

Lieutenant Peyre, seeing his right platoon

stalled, ordered his left platoon to try for

the rise. Just as these men were venturing

out of the coconut grove, the Japanese

counterattacked down the cliffs and along

the paths that led to a gully just behind

the rise of ground that was the American

objective. Total chaos ensued as a result

of a tremendous explosion that sent bodies

and limbs of the leading Japanese into the

air in all directions. Apparently, one of the

enemy had stepped on the horn of an embedded sea mine, thus setting off a series

of mines scattered over the area. Whatever

the cause of the explosion, it created havoc

among the Japanese and abruptly stopped

the counterattack. In the American lines

the results were not so serious, and although a few men were wounded by flying

debris, the effect of the concussion was

short-lived.

Meanwhile, orders had come down for

Company G, 105th Infantry, to relieve

Company K in the coconut grove. After

receiving General Smith's orders indicating

that the 27th Division would change the

direction of its attack from northeast to

north toward the coast line, General Griner

had decided to shift the emphasis of his

division attack from the left to the right of

his line. Hence, to bolster the efforts

of the 3d Battalion, 105th, against Harakiri

Gulch, he ordered Company G to relieve

Company K so that the latter could move

out of the coastal plain and into the reserve

area behind its parent unit. For the rest of

the afternoon the area along the coast

would be assigned entirely to the 1st and

2d Battalions, 105th Infantry.

It was the second of these battalions,

commanded by Major McCarthy, that had

been responsible for the area immediately

abutting the seacoast during the morning.

As day broke McCarthy had Companies E

and F drawn up in a tight perimeter

around Road Junction 2. Directly ahead

athwart his line of advance, was the mine

field, discovered the day before, that ran

from the coastal road to the railroad and

that was about 250 yards in depth. It consisted of about 150 Japanese general pur-
252 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

WAITING TO MOVE UP north of the coconut grove on 3 July,

pose bombs set in the ground in four rows,

noses up. Only about a hundred had been

fuzed.49 Immediately beyond the mine

field was the gully that ran down to the

sea from the western mouth of Harakiri

Gulch. To the right (east) of McCarthy's

bivouac area was a wide expanse of open,

slightly rolling ground, which was covered

by small arms and automatic weapons fire

from the cliffs still farther to the east.

The 2d Battalion's commander decided

to move his men along the narrow strip

of beach between the road and the lagoon

in order to avoid the mine field. To eliminate the series of pillboxes strung along the

shore in this area, he called for a rolling

artillery barrage in advance of the infantry.

Company F was to take the lead, to be

followed by E Company, which would fan

out to the right once the far edge of the

mine field was passed.

Promptly at 0700 Company F jumped

off and within a few minutes had reached

the northern limit of the mine field. At this

point it received a heavy burst of machine

gun and small arms fire from its direct

front. McCarthy at once tried to put in a

call for tanks and self-propelled mounts,

but discovered that his radio communications were out; he then sent a runner to

order up the vehicles. This involved a trip

all the way back to Tanapag. 49

 27th Inf Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 20, 6 Jul 44.
THE CAPTURE OF NORTHERN SAIPAN 253

Meanwhile, the men of Company E had

managed to crawl to the right along the

north edge of the mine field and to deploy

in a three-platoon front along a line running east of the coastal road. About 0900

Major McCarthy decided to withdraw

Company F from its cramped positions between the road and the beach and send it

around to the right of Company E to close

the gap between the 2d and 3d Battalions.

This move took about an hour. Also, Company A of the 102d Engineer Combat

Battalion was brought forward to deactivate the mine field.

At 1000 five medium tanks commanded

by 1st Lt. Dudley A. Williams of the 762d

Tank Battalion put in their appearance at

Road Junction 2. Rather than send them

down the road, which he believed was almost certainly mined, McCarthy ordered

them to proceed single file along the railroad track to the right. The lead tank unfortunately snarled its tread in the steel

rails and became immobilized. While an

effort was being made to clear a path

through the mine field so that the second

tank could be worked around the first, the

enemy opened fire, scoring direct hits on

both tanks. Lieutenant Williams hooked

cables to the two vehicles and hauled them

loose of the tracks and clear of the area

before any more damage was done.

By this time it was apparent that the

chief source of enemy fire came from the

gully in front of the mine field, and Coinany E sent out a squad to rush the gully

and knock out the machine gun position

that seemed to be causing most of the

trouble. The squad leader got as far as the

gully and located the position in question,

but was wounded and had to withdraw

before he could eliminate it.

By midafternoon the entire 2d Battalion,

105th Infantry, appeared to have bogged

down. Companies E and F were facing the

gully just north of the mine field and Company G was still at the north edge of the

coconut grove. Anxious to get on with the

day's business, General Griner at 1520 ordered the regimental commander, Colonel

Bishop, to commit his reserve, the 1st

Battalion, 105th, commanded by Colonel

O'Brien. Bishop objected to committing his

reserves at such a late hour and argued

that an attack would not give sufficient

time before dark for the front-line troops to

prepare a proper perimeter defense.50 His

objection was overruled. On Griner's orders, O'Brien's unit was to be inserted on

the right flank of the 2d Battalion, 105th,

and from that point was to drive north to

Makunsha village on the shore before

nightfall.51

Even before this move could be executed, relief to the men immediately in

front of the enemy-infested gully came

from a different quarter. About 1530

Lieutenant Dorey, after refueling and resupplying, arrived on the scene with two

other tanks in addition to his own. Observing that the infantry was apparently completely immobilized, he drove straight into

the troublesome gully pushing the enemy

before him and slaughtering them with

canister and machine guns. For half an

hour he kept this up, killing about 150

Japanese in the gully and literally paving

with dead bodies the way for a renewed

advance of the 2d Battalion. In the course

of this action, Japanese soldiers, armed

with magnetic mines, attacked one of the

50

 Ltr, Bishop to Gen A. C. Smith, 25 Feb 55,

OCMH. 51

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 6 Jul 44, Msg 36.
254 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

light tanks and it lost its track. In spite

of his valiant efforts, Dorey was unable to

rescue either the damaged tank or its

crew.52

Meanwhile, back at the regimental command post, Colonel Bishop was outlining

his plans for the final move up the coast to

Makunsha. As directed by the division

commander, O'Brien's 1st Battalion was to

move into line between the other two battalions of the 105th. To make room for this

maneuver, Company F was to move back

around the rear of Company E to the left

of the regimental line where it would again

take up a position between the railroad

track and the beach. Company G, commanded by Captain Olander and still in

the coconut grove, was to be attached to

the 3d Battalion and swing on its right

flank across the western mouth of Harakiri

Gulch in order to bottle up the enemy

there. Such a movement would presumably protect the rear of the 1st Battalion,

and the next morning the rest of the 3d

Battalion could mop up the enemy isolated in the gulch.

Pursuant to these instructions, Colonel

O'Brien brought his battalion into line,

with Company B on the right, A on the

left, and C echeloned to the right rear. His

apprehension over the role assigned to his

men was apparent to Captain Ackerman,

A Company commander, who later testified: "Obie was nervous and restless, as

usual. He drew a picture for us and told

Dick [Capt. Richard F. Ryan, of Company B] and I that no matter what else

happened, we were to keep going. 'Its the

old end run all over again. Whenever they

got a job nobody else can do, we have to do

it. Sooner or later we're going to get caught

and this may be it.'"53

The 1st Battalion was in line by approximately 1645, following F Company's shift

to the division left flank along the beach.

Between that time and 1715 both battalions resupplied and organized their lines.

At 1715 the 105th Infantry moved off in

a co-ordinated attack.54 (Map 13)

On the left of the line, the 2d Battalion

had little difficulty moving ahead in the

wake of the devastation caused by Lieutenant Dorey's tanks. Although Company F

delayed slightly to investigate a series of

Japanese pillboxes along the beach, by

1800 the whole battalion had advanced

about 600 yards. At that point it built up

its perimeter for the night. O'Brien's battalion ran into more trouble. On reaching

the gully, Company A encountered a nest

of fifteen to twenty Japanese. Some were

wounded and some were still trying to hide

from Dorey's tank fire by hugging the

walls of the trench on the near side. Ackerman's men waded in with bayonets and

knives and after a 20-minute hand-to-hand

fight, cleaned out the pocket. Once across

the gully, Company A rushed headlong

some 500 yards in spite of increasingly

heavy machine gun fire from the cliffs to

the right. This fire was falling even more

heavily on Company B and succeeded,

among other things, in killing the company

commander, Captain Ryan, who was replaced by 1st Lt. Hugh P. King. Meanwhile, on the battalion right rear, Company C was faced with the same machine

guns emplaced on the knoll north of the

coconut grove that had previously stopped

both K Company, 165th, and G Company,

105th. For the rest of the day and even

52

 Appleman, Army Tanks in the Battle for Saipan, pp. 91-92.

53

 Quoted in Love, Battle for Saipan, p. 810. 54

 105th RCT Jnl, 6 Jul 44, p. 72.
THE CAPTURE OF NORTHERN SAIPAN 255

MAP 13

after dark, Company C battled to take

out these positions. Not until a selfpropelled mount was finally brought in to

wipe them out was the entire company able

to rejoin the rest of the battalion in its

night perimeter.

Meanwhile, immediately to the right

Captain Olander of Company G, 105th,

was trying to carry out his mission of sealing up the western mouth of Harakiri

Gulch. Working its way along the road that

led into the gulch the lead platoon, just

before dark, stumbled onto a nest of Japanese. A brisk hand-to-hand fight ensued,

with inconclusive results, and, in view of

the lateness of the hour, the company commander ordered all of his men to pull back

west along the road to the point from

which they had started. There Captain

Olander called Colonel Bradt, to whose
256 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

battalion he was now attached, and admitted his inability to build up a line across

the mouth of the gulch. He was given permission to dig in on the high ground overlooking Road Junction 64, from which

point he hoped to be able to interdict

movement from the gulch with machine

gun fire.

By nightfall then, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 105th (less Company G), were

digging in in positions about 900 yards

northeast of Road Junction 2. On the left,

Companies E and F bivouacked in a tight

perimeter between the road and the railroad. The narrow corridor between the

road and the beach was outposted by two

men armed with carbines and with express

orders to report any signs of enemy movement along the beach. Inside the perimeter

were stationed the mortars of both rifle

companies as well as the mortars and machine guns of the heavy weapons company.

In placing his heavy weapons and machine

guns, Major McCarthy assumed that before nightfall the 1st Battalion would have

reached its objective north of his perimeter. Hence, without neglecting the northern approaches to his position altogether,

he concentrated his defenses on the eastern

side.

Meanwhile, Colonel O'Brien's 1st Battalion had come abreast. Rather than push

on to the beach ahead of the 2d Battalion

as originally planned, O'Brien, after consultation with McCarthy, decided to tie in

for the night to the right of the 2d Battalion. His perimeter was drawn up in the

shape of an arc whose terminal points

rested on the railroad just east of the right

side of the 2d Battalion's perimeter. This

arrangement meant that two whole platoons of the 2d Battalion were now inside the final perimeter. More important,

O'Brien's perimeter screened one of the 2d

Battalion's antitank guns as well as all of

Company H's heavy machine guns, which

had been emplaced so as to protect the

eastern leg of McCarthy's original perimeter. Thus, by hedging in the 2d Battalion

from the east, O'Brien in effect subtracted

from the combined fire power of the twobattalion perimeter.

Even more significant was the fact that

between the 1st Battalion, 105th, and

Company G, 105th (attached to the 3d

Battalion), lay a gap of about 500

yards. However, the ground was open and

O'Brien took the precaution of placing all

of his antitank guns in such a position as

to bear directly on the gap. By the time all

these arrangements were completed it was

well after dark. The morning, it was hoped,

would bring the 105th Infantry to its objective line at the shore and an end to its

labors.

7 July

Banzai Attack

About an hour after dark, an American

soldier patrolling the road in the vicinity

of the command post of the 3d Battalion,

105th Infantry, came upon a lone, armed,

Japanese lying asleep. He forthwith took

him prisoner and sent him back to headquarters for interrogation. The Japanese

proved to be a "leading seaman" of the

55th Guard Force, and his testimony, reluctantly given, was sufficient cause for

deep alarm. An all-out attack by the entire

remaining Japanese force on the island, he

said, had been ordered for the night of 6-7

July. Word was immediately sent out to

all major units of the division as well as to
THE CAPTURE OF NORTHERN SAIPAN 257

Holland Smith's headquarters to prepare

for the worst.55

In the front line below Makunsha,

Colonel O'Brien and Major McCarthy

went into conference on receiving this information. Both were worried about the

gap that extended some 500 yards southeastward to the night positions of Company

G, 105th Infantry. O'Brien called the regimental command past and asked for reinforcements to fill the gap but was told

that none were available. Colonel Jensen,

the regimental executive, in turn called for

help from division headquarters. He too

received a negative answer. The two battalion commanders would have to make

out with what they had on hand.56

The Japanese counterattack that was

now mounting had in fact been ordered

early on the morning of the 6th. At 0600

General Saito had issued his final proclamation:

MESSAGE TO OFFICERS AND MEN

DEFENDING SAIPAN

I am addressing the officers and men of the

Imperial Army on Saipan.

For more than twenty days since the American Devils attacked, the officers, men, and

civilian employees of the Imperial Army and

Navy on this island have fought well and

bravely. Everywhere they have demonstrated

the honor and glory of the Imperial Forces.

I expected that every man would do his duty.

Heaven has not given us an opportunity.

We have not been able to utilize fully the

terrain. We have fought in unison up to the

present time but now we have no materials

with which to fight and our artillery for attack has been completely destroyed. Our

comrades have fallen one after another. Despite the bitterness of defeat, we pledge,

"Seven lives to repay our country."

The barbarous attack of the enemy is being

continued. Even though the enemy has occupied only a corner of Saipan, we are dying

without avail under the violent shelling and

bombing. Whether we attack or whether we

stay where we are, there is only death. However, in death there is life. We must utilize

this opportunity to exalt true Japanese manhood. I will advance with those who remain

to deliver still another blow to the American

Devils, and leave my bones on Saipan as a

bulwark of the Pacific.

As it says in the "SENJINKUM" [Battle

Ethics], "I will never suffer the disgrace of

being taken alive," and "I will offer up the

courage of my soul and calmly rejoice in living by the eternal principle."

Here I pray with you for the eternal life

of the Emperor and the welfare of the country and I advance to seek out the enemy.

Follow me!57

Actually, General Saito was too feeble

and sick to lead the charge in person.

Shortly after issuing his final order he committed suicide. A captured Japanese officer

who was with the general almost until the

end described what probably took place:

"Cleaning off a spot on the rock himself,

Saito sat down. Facing the misty EAST

saying 'TENNO HEIKA! BANZAI! [Long

live the Emperor] . . . he drew his own

blood first with his own sword and then

his adjutant shot him in the head with a

pistol."

 58

The exact number of Japanese to participate in the attack is unknown. A count

taken later On the authorization of General

Griner revealed 4,311 enemy dead in the

area covered by the attackers, although undoubtedly some of these had been killed

by naval gunfire or artillery before the banzai charge got under way.59

 A captured in55

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 6 Jul 44, Msg 57;

27th Inf Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 21, 7 Jul 44.

56

 Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 858-59.

57

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl D, G-2

Rpt, pp. 57-58. 58

 Ibid., App. G, p. 3. 59

 Buckner Bd Rpt, Exhibit FFF, Ltr, CG 27th

Inf Div to CG NTLF, 16 Jul 44.
258 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

telligence officer of the 43d Division at first

estimated that the total Japanese force

came to no more than 1,500, hut later revised this upward to 3,000.60

 Another

prisoner of war, a Korean laborer, also gave

3,000 as the approximate number,61 and

this is probably as acceptable an estimate

as any.62

The truth is that even the Japanese commanders themselves had no very clear picture of the number of men left under them.

The attacking force was drawn from

almost every conceivable unit on the island,

forming a composite group of stragglers.

Specific identifications made among Japanese dead included the 118th, 135th, and

136th Infantry Regiments, 43d Division

headquarters and 43d Field Hospital, 3d

Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment,

16th Shipping Engineer Regiment, and

sundry naval units including combat,

maintenance, and labor personnel. Many

of the Japanese were poorly armed with

rusty rifles and some merely carried poles

to which crude knives and bayonets were

attached.63

Poorly armed or not, the impact of this

horde was overwhelming. In the words of

Major McCarthy, one of the few officers

to survive it, "It was like the movie stampede staged in the old wild west movies.

We were the cameraman. These Japs just

kept coming and coming and didn't stop.

It didn't make any difference if you shot

one, five more would take his place. We

would be in the foxholes looking up, as I

said, just like those cameramen used to be.

The Japs ran right over us."

 64

About 0400 on 7 July the main body

of the desperate attackers started south

from Makunsha between the shore line and

the base of the cliffs bordering Tanapag

plain. Although there is no evidence that

the movement was organized, the mounting flood sluiced out along three principal

channels. The main group charged down

the railroad track, hitting the American

perimeter below Makunsha; another attacked positions of the 3d Battalion, 105th,

at Harakiri Gulch; the attackers facing the

gap between these two American positions

continued through unopposed.65

Shortly before 0500 the full force of the

attack struck the perimeter of the 1st

and 2d Battalions, 105th Infantry, and in

twenty-five minutes of fierce close-quarter

fighting the American positions were overrun. During the first moments of impact

Colonel O'Brien again made himself conspicuous by his fortitude. With a pistol in

each hand he joined battle with the

60

 Ibid., Annex H, p. 7; Hq FEC, Mil Hist Sec

Special Staff, to Chief of Mil Hist, 5 Jun 52, Incl,

Comments by Maj. Takashi Hiragushi. Major Hiragushi, was taken prisoner after the counterattack

of 7 July. For reasons unknown he assumed the

name of Maj. Kiyoshi Yoshida, the 31st Army

intelligence officer, who had been killed in action.

The NTLF G-2 Report refers to this officer as

Yoshida. His true identity was not revealed until

after the war. 61

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl D, G-2

Rpt, p. 96. 62

 General Holland Smith's final estimate lay

between 1,500 and 3,000 (Smith, Coral and Brass,

p. 195). General Griner believed the number was

not less than 3,000 and probably more (CG 27th

Inf Div to CG NTLF, 16 Jul 44, Buckner Board

Rpt, Exhibit FFF). A special board, appointed

by Admiral Spruance to survey the circumstances

surrounding the counterattack, estimated the

number of enemy involved to lie between 2,500

and 3,000 (Comdr Fifth Fleet, Rpt of Japanese

Counterattack at. Saipan on 7 Jul 44, 19 Jul 44).

63

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl D, G-2

Rpt, pp. 59-60. 64

 Quoted in Love, Battle for Saipan, pp.

870-71. 65

 Unless otherwise noted, the account of the

banzai charge is derived from Love, Battle for

Saipan, pages 871-92.
THE CAPTURE OF NORTHERN SAIPAN 259

deluge, firing until his magazines were

empty. Then, though seriously wounded,

he manned a .50-caliber machine gun and

kept firing until killed.66 With him went a

good percentage of the officers and men of

both battalions.

The tide rolled on, and before it stumbled most of the survivors of the perimeter.

Among those left behind was Sgt. Thomas

A. Baker of Company A. Although severely

wounded, he refused to let himself be carried back with the retreat. Preferring certain death to further risking the lives of his

comrades he demanded to be left, armed

only with a loaded pistol. When his body

was later discovered the gun was empty

and around him lay eight dead Japanese.67

Meanwhile, the left flank of the enemy

had swiftly penetrated the gap. One group

of Japanese spread out to attack the 3d

Battalion, 105th, but from their dominating positions on the high ground above

Harakiri Gulch the men of the 3d Battalion were, able to repulse the attack and

hold their positions intact.68 Another group

hit the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines (Artillery), which had set up its guns the day

before about 500 yards southwest of Tanapag village. Only one of the batteries (H)

was in a position to fire and it succeeded,

among other things, in knocking out a Japanese tank before the men were forced to

retreat pell-mell, leaving the breechblocks

and firing locks in their howitzers. The marines of Battery I, after expending all of

their small arms ammunition, removed the

firing locks from their howitzers and fell

back south along the railroad track to the

positions of Battery G, where the two units

held fast until relieved that afternoon by

the 106th Infantry.69

Meanwhile, the 27th Division artillery

was pouring as many shells into the enemy

as could safely be done without endangering the retreating American troops. Between 0515 and 0615 the three light battalions expended a total of 2,666 rounds in

the zone of action of the 105th Infantry.

This represented an average of more than

forty rounds a minute.70

By the time the men of the two advanced

battalions had retreated as far as the

northern edge of Tanapag village, they ran

into the van of the left prong of the Japanese force, which had come through the

gap, past the positions of the 10th Marines,

and then gone on to the command post of

the 105th Infantry, where the attack was

finally stopped. At this point, two officers,

Captain White of Company F and Lieutenant King of Company B, rallied the retreating men and brought some organization out of the confusion. They were able

to persuade most of the troops to take

cover in Tanapag village. While directing

this diversion, King was killed. Meanwhile

Major McCarthy, the 2d Battalion commander, had come up, and with the help

of other surviving officers and noncommissioned officers he was able to organize

a perimeter within Tanapag village by

about 0800, three hours after the initial

attack had been made.71

66

 For this and other notable demonstrations

of bravery on Saipan, O'Brien was posthumously

awarded the Medal of Honor (WDGO 35, 9 May

1945). 67

 For this action, Baker was posthumously

awarded the Medal of Honor (WDGO 35, 9 May

1945). 68

 105th RCT Opns Rpt FORAGER, p. 10.

69

 Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 224-25.

70

 27th Inf Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 21, 7 Jul 44,

p. 2. 71

 This account is derived from Love, Battle for

Saipan, pages 876-932.
260 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

MARINES EXAMINING DESTROYED ENEMY TANK, which was knocked out by a

battery from the 10th Marines during the Japanese banzai attack.

For the next four hours the beleaguered

men fought a bitter house-to-house battle

with the Japanese that had surrounded

and were infiltrating the village. The

Americans were out of communication

with the command posts to the rear, short

of ammunition and water, and had no

means of evacuating or properly caring for

their wounded. Shortly after 1100 McCarthy tried to lead a small force back to

the regimental command post to bring up

help for the wounded. Just as he got under way, his group was hit by two concentrations of American artillery and those

men who were able to do so stampeded into

the water and swam for the reefs. Some of

these returned to establish another small

perimeter below Tanapag, where they remained out of touch with the main body of

their regiment's troops in the village itself

and the command post, which was still farther to the rear.

Finally, shortly after noon, the first sign

of relief appeared in the form of a platoon

of medium tanks that rolled down the road

from the direction of the command post.

The vehicles fired indiscriminately at areas

that might be presumed to contain enemy

troops, but because there were no communications between the tanks and the infantry

there could be no co-ordinated effort to

route the enemy or rescue the surrounded

troops. Finally, McCarthy was able to get

to the lead tank, and climbing in himself,

lead a group of about thirty-five of his men

back down the road, reaching the regimental command post by about 1500.

Under his persuasion a convoy of trucks

and DUKW's, loaded with medical supplies and ammunition, was dispatched
THE CAPTURE OF NORTHERN SAIPAN 261

toward Tanapag village. Some of the vehicles were knocked out en route, but three

got through and returned fully loaded with

wounded. Still later, a group of LVT's of

the 773d Amphibian Tractor Battalion was

sent by water to rescue some of the men

still fighting on the beach or stranded on

the reefs. Others had already swum out

and had been picked up by naval landing

craft to be carried to destroyers waiting

outside the reef. About 2200 the last survivor left the perimeters in Tanapag village

and below. All together, out of the 1st and

2d Battalions, 105th Infantry (less Company G), 406 officers and men were

killed and 512 wounded.72

American Countermeasures

Back at 27th Division and corps headquarters, word of the Japanese banzai

charge was gradually filtering through. In

response to the news, General Griner at

0920 ordered Colonel Stebbins to commit his 106th Regiment into the line

and attack northeast astride the railroad

track.73 About the same time corps attached the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, to

the 27th Division, and at 1050 the battalion was ordered to mop up an enemy force,

reported to be 100 strong, in the Tanapag

area.74 At 1100 Griner requested that

some Marine tanks be released to the division from corps control, but this was refused.75

 According to the 27th Division

commander, "headquarters did not accept

my version of the importance of the action

then in progress."76 However, not long

afterward, Holland Smith did order the

two Marine divisions to release 1,000

rounds of 105-mm. howitzer ammunition

to the Army division, which by now was

running short.77

By 1000 Colonel Stebbins had the 106th

Infantry in line with the 1st Battalion on

the left and the 2d Battalion on the right

of the railroad track.78 They moved forward slowly. The 1st Battalion met little

opposition, but O'Hara's men on the right

encountered a considerable number of Japanese still alive and firing.79

 By 1540 Company F had recaptured two of the Marine

batteries, the first one with the help of some

of the Marine artillerymen who had remained in the vicinity after being driven

off their guns.80 A short while later the

1st Battalion reported that it had recaptured the abandoned guns of Battery H of

the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines.81 By 1600

the 106th Infantry was still 200 to 300

yards short of positions of the 105th Infantry, which it was supposed to relieve.

Colonel Stebbins nevertheless decided to

dig in where he was, although against the

advice of one of his battalion commanders.

Stebbins was concerned lest there be too

many bypassed enemy to his rear.82 This

left the division commander with no alternative but to evacuate the remainder of his

isolated troops by water.

Meanwhile, on the division right the

165th Infantry was touched only lightly by

72

 For this day's action, the 105th Infantry (less

3d Battalion and Company G) was awarded the

Distinguished Unit Citation (Department of the

Army, GO 49, 14 July 1948). 73

 106th RCT Jnl, 7 Jul 44, Msg 1072. 74

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Jul 44, Msgs 28, 37. 75

 Ibid., Msg 39.

76

 George W. Griner, Certificate, 12 Jul 44,

Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit ZZ. 77

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Jul 44, Msg 46.

78

 Ibid., Msg 32.

79

 106th RCT Opns Rpt FORAGER, p. 23. 80

 106th RCT Jnl, 7 Jul 44, Msgs 1089, 1107. 81

 Ibid., Msg 1108. 82

 George W. Griner, Certificate, 12 Jul 44,

Buckner Board Rpt, Exhibit ZZ.
262 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

MAP 14

the overflow from the charge that had all

but overwhelmed the 105th. By 0930 the

attached 3d Battalion, 106th, had finally

reached the floor of Harakiri Gulch and

was mopping up the Japanese still hidden

in the caves and ditches. Occasionally,

random riflemen who were apparently part

of the main enemy counterattack wandered

into the area to delay operations, but no

serious opposition remained. Shortly after

noon, the 1st Battalion, 165th, to the right,

was able to advance through the draw at

the upper end of the gulch and move into

the plateau to the north overlooking the

plain. It stopped there for the night and

made plans to descend the cliffs the next

day.83

Final Victory

In spite of the fact that by nightfall of

7 July the 27th Division had recovered

some of the lost ground in the area of the

83

 165th RCT Jnl, 7 Jul 44, Msgs 14, 15, 46;

Love, Battle for Saipan, pp. 936-37.
THE CAPTURE OF NORTHERN SAIPAN 263

FLAME THROWER BLASTING PARADISE VALLEY CAVE, an effective method of

flushing Japanese.

counterattack and had at last cleaned out

Harakiri Gulch, General Holland Smith

decided to relieve most of the Army units

from the line. The 2d Marine Division

(less detachments)84 was ordered to pass

through the 27th Division and "mop up

and destroy enemy elements" remaining in

its zone of action. Attached to the Marine

division would be the 165th Infantry, as

well as the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines,

which was now to be released from the

control of the Army division. Upon being

passed through, the 27th was ordered into

corps reserve.85 (Map 14)

"Mop-up" was the proper word for the

activities of most of the 2d Marine Division

for the next two days. Along the beach

the 6th Marines had an easy time after its

jump-off at 1130. In the words of the official report, "Initially, the attack was field

day for our troops and slaughter for the

Japs." Later in the afternoon, however, the

regiment came up against a small pocket

of resistance, just southwest of the coconut

grove, containing about a hundred Japa84

 The detachments were the 2d Marines; 1st

Battalion, 29th Marines; and Company A, 2d

Tank Battalion.

85

 NTLF Opn Order, 7 Jul 44, NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl A.
264 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

nese who had taken refuge in the bed of a

small stream that ran down to the sea.

Flame throwers, tanks, and self-propelled

mounts were brought up to wipe out the

enemy, but at nightfall the pocket still remained. By 1830 all units of the regiment

had reached the beach, and the next day

was spent mopping up and eliminating all

enemy in the area.86

In the hills and ravines just east of the

coastal plain, the 8th Marines spent most

of 8 and 9 July in demolition work, since

the remnants of enemy consisted of disorganized groups holed up in caves. Every

cave had to be investigated, and the few

Japanese remaining alive were destroyed or

driven out with hand grenades, flame

throwers, and TNT charges.87

On the division right, the 165th Infantry met similar scattered opposition and

dealt with it in much the same way. Delaying its assault on the 8th until the

marines could come abreast, the 165th

jumped off from its positions north of

Harakiri Gulch at 1130. By midafternoon

Company I had forced its way through

Paradise Valley, where General Saito had

established his final headquarters and from

which the banzai order had been issued.

Apparently not all of Saito's men had

joined in the charge, for the caves in the

cliffs' sides still harbored enough Japanese

to offer stiff resistance to progress through

the valley. By 1245 of 9 July forward elements of the regiment reached their destination on the shore, while Company K

stayed behind to finish mopping up the

caves of Paradise Valley.88

The morning of the 8th found the 4th

Marine Division poised and ready for its

final drive to Saipan's northern tip. On

the left, the 23d Marines were on the

high ground overlooking Karaberra Pass,

through which the regiment would have to

advance in order to seize its assigned portion of the shore line north of Makunsha.

Following an intense preparation by rockets and tank fire, and assisted by LCI gunboats lying off Makunsha, the 23d Marines

forced its way through the pass and by

1205 had rushed across the coastal flats to

the sea.89 On its right, the 23d and 24th

Marines kept abreast and secured their assigned zones by about 1530, while the 25th

Marines, on the east flank, advanced its

lines about 600 yards against no opposition. That night the 1st Battalion, 2d

Marines, suffered a series of minor counterattacks that were troublesome in the extreme but that failed to make a dent in

the division line. On the 9th, with three

regiments abreast (the 23d Marines was

pinched out), the 4th Marine Division

completed the final lap in a fast sprint to

Marpi Point.90 At 1615, 9 July 1944, Admiral Turner announced Saipan to be

"secured."

 91

All that remained was to ferret out the

few remaining enemy troops from their

scattered hiding places in the caves and

gulleys and ravines that littered the northern part of the island. Initially, this task

was assigned to the two Marine divisions,

with the 165th Infantry still attached to

the 4th. These men still had to witness a

few horrendous sights before they were

through with Saipan. In spite of continu86

 6th RCT SAR FORAGER, pp. 15-16. 87

 8th RCT SAR FORAGER, p. 9. 88

 165th RCT Record of Opns FORAGER, p. 9.

89

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Annex H

23d RCT Rpt, p. 48; Hoffman, Saipan, p. 238. 90

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Saipan, Sec. VI,

pp. 36-37; Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 239-42. 91

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl E, G-3

Rpt, G-3 Periodic Rpt 25.
THE CAPTURE OF NORTHERN SAIPAN 265

ous American efforts to induce both

military and civilian survivors to give

themselves up, the traditional Japanese

code of death before surrender prevailed

in most cases. Shortly after the declaration

that the island was secured, hundreds of

civilians leapt from the cliffs of Marpi

Point to the knifelike rocks below. At times

the waters below the point were so thick

with the floating bodies of men, women,

and children that naval small craft were

unable to steer a course without running

over them.92

On the 9th many Japanese soldiers swam

out to the reefs of Tanapag Harbor and

defied capture. 1st Lt. Kenneth J. Hensley,

USMC, commanding officer of Company

G, 6th Marines, was ordered out with a

small flotilla of amphibian tractors to capture or destroy these die-hards. A few surrendered, but most refused to give up.

From one reef, to which fifty to sixty Japanese were clinging, machine guns opened

up on the approaching LVT's, The Americans returned fire and the force was annihilated. On another reef a Japanese

officer was seen beheading his little band of

enlisted men with his sword before he

himself was shot down by his would-be

captors.93

For the remainder of their brief stay on

Saipan, the marines spent most of their

days investigating the caves and wooded

sections along the north shore. On 13 July

the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, occupied

tiny Maniagassa Island in Tanapag Harbor

in a miniature amphibious landing complete with naval gunfire, artillery, and

aerial bombardment. They found twentynine Japanese soldiers on the island, but

encountered no serious opposition.94 This

action brought to an end Marine activities

on Saipan. The 2d and 4th Divisions both

withdrew to prepare for the assault on

nearby Tinian. The Army took over the

job of clearing out the last remnants of the

enemy. From 31 July through 6 August,

the 27th Division conducted a gradual

sweeping operation with two regiments

abreast from just north of Mount Tapotchau to Marpi Point, thus concluding the

organized mop-up.95 Starting the middle of

August and ending in October, the division

embarked in stages for the much welcomed

trip to the New Hebrides for rehabilitation.96

The toll of American killed and wounded

was high. Of the 71,034 officers and men

that made up Holland Smith's Northern

Troops and Landing Force,97 it is estimated that 3,674 Army and 10,437 Marine Corps personnel were killed, wounded,

or missing in action.98 This total of 14,111

represents about 20 percent of the combat

troops committed, or roughly the same

percentage of casualties suffered at Tarawa

and Peleliu, both of bloody renown."

In exchange, almost the entire Japanese

92

 For eyewitness accounts of this episode, see

Robert. Sherrod, On To Westward: War in the

Central Pacific (New York, Duell, Sloan and

Pearce, Inc., 1945). 93

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl D, G-2

Rpt, App. K.

94

 6th RCT SAR FORAGER, p. 17. 95

 27th Inf Div G-3 Rpt, G-3 Periodic Rpts

45-50. 96

 27th Inf Div, Hist of 27th Inf Div, 20 Mar

45, p. 4. 97

 Figure is from TF 51 Opns Rpt Marianas,

p. 6.

98

 Army casualty figures are derived from 27th

Inf Div G-1 Periodic Rpt, 6 Aug 44, Annex B,

and XXIV Corps Final Rpt, S-1 Rpt. Marine

Corps figures were compiled by Machine Records

Sec, Hq USMC, and published in Hoffman, Saipan, pp. 268-69. 99

 Smith, Approach to the Philippines, pp. 472-

577; Stockman, The Battle for Tarawa, p. 67.
266 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

garrison of about 30,000 men was wiped

out. Far more important, the inner defense

line of the Japanese Empire had been

cracked, and American forces were at last

within bombing range of the enemy homeland.
PART THREE

TINIAN

CHAPTER XIII

American and Japanese Plans

Writing after the war, Admiral Spruance

expressed the opinion, "The Tinian operation was probably the most brilliantly

conceived and executed amphibious operation in World War II." 1

 To General

Holland Smith's mind, "Tinian was the

perfect amphibious operation in the Pacific

war."

 2 Historians have by and large—

endorsed these sentiments.3

Much of this praise is well deserved, although a close examination of the facts reveals that these, like most superlatives, are

somewhat misleading. The invasion of

Tinian, like other military operations, was

not entirely without flaw. Various deficiences can be charged to both plan and

execution. Yet, as an exercise in amphibious skill it must be given a superior rating,

and as a demonstration of ingenuity it

stands as second to no other landing operation in the Pacific war.

Situated only about 3-5 miles off the

southern coast of Saipan, Tinian is the

smaller of the two islands. (Map IV.) From

Ushi Point in the north to Lalo Point in

the south, it measures about 12.5 miles,

and in width it never extends much more

than 5 miles.4 In one respect its terrain is

not as formidable for would-be attackers

than that of Saipan—it is far less mountainous. In the northern part of the island

Mount Lasso rises to 564 feet, or only a

little more than a third of the height of

Tapotchau. Another hill mass of almost the

same height dominates the southern tip of

the island and terminates in heavily fissured cliffs that drop steeply into the sea.

Most of the rest of the island is an undulating plain, which in the summer of 1944

was planted in neat checkerboard fields of

sugar cane.

It was indeed the relative flatness of

Tinian's terrain that made it such a desirable objective— -that and the fact that its

proximity to Saipan made its retention by

the Japanese militarily inadmissible. Tinian's sweeping plains and gentle slopes

offered better sites for bomber fields than

its more mountainous sister island, and of

course one of the main objectives of the

Marianas operation was to obtain sites for

air bases for very long range bombers. To

a limited extent, the Japanese had already

realized this possibility and near Ushi Point

had constructed an airfield that boasted a

runway almost a thousand feet longer than

Aslito's. In addition, smaller fields were located just south of the Ushi Point field and

at Gurguan Point, and another was under

1

 Quoted in Maj. Carl W. Hoffman, USMC,

The Seizure of Tinian, Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (Washington, 1951)

(hereafter cited as Hoffman, Tinian), p. III. 2

 Smith, Coral and Brass, p. 201. 3

 See Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, p. 352; Morison, New Guinea and

the Marianas, p. 351; Hoffman, Tinian, passim. 4

 JICPOA Bull 73-74, 10 May 44, p. 20ff.
270 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

COASTAL AREA, NORTHWEST TINIAN, showing White Beach areas, checkerboard

terrain inland, and Ushi Point airfield in background.

construction just northeast of Tinian

Town.5

But if the island was well suited by nature for the construction of airfields, its

natural features were also well disposed to

obstruct a landing from the sea. Tinian is

really a plateau jutting up from the surrounding ocean, and most of its coast line

consists of cliffs rising sharply out of the

water. Only in four places is this solid cliff

line interrupted. Inland of Sunharon Bay,

in the area of Tinian Town on the southwest coast, the land runs gradually to the

sea, offering a fairly wide expanse of beach

protected by the usual reef line. South of

Asiga Point on the east coast there is an

indenture in the cliff wall that forms a

small approachable beach about 125 yards

in length. The northwest coast line offers

other possible routes of ingress through the

cliffs over two tiny beaches about 60 and

150 yards in length, respectively.6

The peculiar features of the coast line

placed American planners in a dilemma.

The beaches off Tinian Town were obviously the best suited for a landing operation, but by the same token they were the

best fortified and defended. The other

beaches, which were little more than dents

in the cliff line, were obviously not desirable sites for an amphibious assault of

corps dimensions. The risks of troops and

supplies being congested to the point of immobility as they tried to pour through

these narrow bottlenecks were considerable

and alarming. For these reasons, which

were just as apparent to the Japanese as

to the Americans, defenses on the smaller 5

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase III, Incl D, G-2

Rpt, p. 32. 6 Ibid., Annex A.
AMERICAN AND JAPANESE PLANS 271

beaches were less formidable than those

elsewhere.

In the end, the American planners

seized the second rather than the first horn

of their dilemma, chose the narrow beaches

on the northwest coast, and accepted the

risks that troops, equipment, and supplies

might pile up in hopeless confusion at the

water's edge. Having made the choice, the

planners were compelled to devise special

means of overcoming the accepted risks.

This involved working out novel techniques

that were radical modifications of standard

amphibious doctrine as it had been evolved

during the war in the Pacific. Paradoxically then the invasion of Tinian was a

"perfect amphibious operation" largely because it was atypical rather than typical—

because of its numerous departures from,

rather than its strict adherence to, accepted amphibious doctrine.

Plan for the Invasion

From the very outset of the planning for

the seizure of the southern Marianas, Tinian had been considered one of the three

main targets of the operation. Holland

Smith's Northern Troops and Landing

Force was ordered to "land, seize, occupy

and defend SAIPAN Island, and then

. . . be prepared for further operations to

seize, occupy and defend TINIAN Island."

 7 Consequently, planning for the

Tinian phase commenced at the same time

as that for the capture of Saipan and was

continuous until the very day of the landing on Saipan. By the time Admiral

Turner's task force set sail from Pearl Harbor, maps, photographs, and charts of

Tinian had been distributed and tentative

arrangements had been made for loading

and for resupply shipping. While at sea,

Holland Smith's staff had more leisure than

earlier to concern itself with this phase of

the operation, and by the time the ships

reached Eniwetok a draft plan was ready

for the commanding general. In devising

this plan, the staff gave due consideration

to the relative merits of the various landing

beaches and recommended that a landing

be made on northern Tinian in order to

make full use of artillery emplaced on

southern Saipan.8

While the fighting for Saipan was in

process, the Americans were afforded ideal

opportunities for scrutinizing the island to

the south from every angle. Beginning on

20 June, when artillery first bombarded

Tinian from southern Saipan,9 observation

planes flew daily over northern Tinian.

Frequent photo reconnaissance missions

were flown, and many valuable documents

throwing light on Tinian's defenses were

captured on Saipan.10 Opportunities for

gathering intelligence were almost without

limit, and it is doubtful if any single enemy island was better reconnoitered during

the Pacific war.

With Saipan secured and the preparations for the next landing in mid-passage,

a change in command within the Northern

Troops and Landing Force was ordered.

On 12 July General Holland Smith was

relieved and ordered to take command of

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, a newly created headquarters for all Marine Corps

combat units in the theater. The new commanding general of Northern Troops and

Landing Force was General Schmidt, who

7

 NTLF Opn Plan 30-44, 10 May 44, in

NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl A.

8

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase III, p. 2. 9

 XXIV Corps Arty Final Rpt on FORAGER

Opn, S-3 Rpt, p. 6. 10

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase III, p. 3.
272 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

was in turn relieved of his command of the

4th Marine Division by General Cates.11

Concurrently, a shift in the naval command structure took place. Admiral Hill,

who had served as Admiral Turner's second in command, took over a reconstituted

Northern Attack Force (Task Force 52)

and thus became responsible, under the

Commander, Joint Expeditionary Force

(Admiral Turner as Commander, Task

Force 51), for the capture of Tinian.12

As planning for Tinian went into high

gear, it was becoming increasingly apparent to all hands that the original concept

of landing the assault troops somewhere

in the northern part of the island was

sound. Members of the staff of the 4th Marine Division, notably Lt. Col, Evans F.

Carlson, the division's planning officer, had

already decided that an amphibious landing in this area was desirable. Working

independently of the Marines, Admiral Hill

had arrived at the same conclusion.13 All

agreed that the Tinian Town area was too

well defended to justify an amphibious assault there and that the advantages of

heavy artillery support for landings on the

northern beaches were too considerable to

ignore.

All, that is, but one. Admiral Turner

was still not convinced. In his mind, the

Tinian Town beaches offered important

advantages that should not be lightly dismissed. From the point of view of gradient

and inland approaches, the Tinian Town

beaches were even more favorable to the

attacker than those used on Saipan and

certainly far better than Tinian's other

beaches. Also, Sunharon Bay offered an excellent protected harbor for small craft and

good facilities for unloading supplies, once

the beachhead was secured. On the other

hand, the beaches in the northern half of

the island, argued the admiral, were too

narrow to permit a rapid landing of a force

of two divisions with full supplies and

equipment, and if the weather took a turn

for the worse the shore-to-shore movement

of supplies in small craft from Saipan

might be seriously endangered. In addition,

an advance down the full length of the

island would take too much time, and the

troops would soon outrun their artillery

support based on Saipan—an especially

dangerous prospect should weather conditions forbid shifting the heavy artillery

pieces from Saipan to Tinian.14

In the light of these objections and out

of ordinary considerations of military caution, General Schmidt ordered a physical

reconnaissance of the northern beaches.

The task fell to the Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, V Amphibious Corps,

commanded by Capt. James L. Jones,

USMCR, and naval Underwater Demolition Teams 5 and 7, commanded by Lt.

Comdr. Draper L. Kauffman, USN, and

Lt. Richard F. Burke, USN, respectively.

Their job was to reconnoiter Yellow Beach

1 on the eastern coast below Asiga Point

and White Beaches 1 and 2 on the northwestern coast. Under cover of darkness the

three groups were to be carried part way

to their destinations by the high-speed

transports Gilmer and Stringham. Then,

launched in rubber landing boats (LCR's),

they would be paddled to distances about

500 yards offshore and swim in the rest of

the way. The men were charged with the

responsibility of investigating and securing 11

 Ibid., p. 4; Smith, Coral and Brass, p. 201. 12

 TF 51 Opn Rpt Marianas, p. 2. 13

 Hoffman, Tinian, pp. 20, 161.

14

 Ltr, Turner to Comdt USMC, 21 Dec 50,

quoted in Hoffman, Tinian, p. 21.
AMERICAN AND JAPANESE PLANS 273

MARIANAS LEADERS CONFER AT TINIAN. Left to right: Rear Adm, Harry Hill,

Maj. Gen. Harry A. Schmidt, Admiral Spruance, General Holland Smith, Admiral

Turner, Maj. Gen. Thomas E. Watson, and Maj. Gen. Clifton B. Cates.

accurate information concerning the height

of surf, the height and nature of the reef

shelf, depth of water, location and nature

of mines and underwater obstacles, the

slope of the bottom off the beaches, the

height and nature of cliffs flanking and

behind the beaches, exits for vehicles,

and the nature of vegetation behind the

beaches. The naval personnel would

conduct the hydrographic reconnaissance

while members of the Marine amphibious

reconnaissance group were to reconnoiter

the beaches themselves and the terrain

inland.15

After dark on 10 July, but well before

moonrise, Gilmer and Stringham got under

way from Magicienne Bay on the east coast

of Saipan to take their respective stations

off of Yellow Beach 1 and White Beaches

1 and 2. As the rubber boats approached

Yellow Beach 1, the men heard sharp reports and thought they were being fired on,

but went about their business anyway.

Two of the men swam along the cliffs south

of the beach and discovered them to be

20 to 25 feet high and unscalable by infantry without ladders or nets. One Marine

officer, 2d Lt. Donald Neff, left two of his

men at the highwater mark and worked

his way along inland for some thirty yards

to investigate the possibilities for vehicle

exits. Japanese sentries were apparently

patrolling the entire area, but the suspected rifle shots proved to be exploding

caps being used by construction workers

15

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase III, Incl L,

Amph Rcn Bn Rpt, Annex A, pp. 1-2.
274 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

nearby. In any case, all hands got back to

their ships without being detected.16

Meanwhile, on the other side of the island, the reconnaissance of White Beaches

1 and 2 hit a snag. As the rubber boats

cast off they were set rapidly to the north

by a strong current that they had not been

compensated for. Hence the swimmers assigned to White Beach 2, the southernmost

of the two, ended up on White 1, while

the second group destined for the latter

beach were set ashore about 800 yards to

the north. This left White 2 unreconnoitered, and next night another group of

swimmers had to return to finish the job.17

The information gathered during the

two nights fully justified the valiant labor

expended. Yellow Beach 1 was clearly unsuitable for an amphibious landing. In addition to its natural disadvantages, the

beach was strung with strong double-apron

wire, and large, floating, contact mines

were found anchored about a foot underwater off the reef.18

 On the other side of

the island no man-made obstacles were reported on White Beaches 1 and 2. Although White Beach 1 to the north was

only sixty yards in length, the bluffs that

flanked it for about 150 yards on either

side were only from six to ten feet in height

and offered enough small breaks to permit

men to proceed inland in single file without

the need of cargo nets or scaling ladders.

From the reef to the shore line the water

depth was never more than four feet and

the gradient was slight. Of the hundred

and fifty yards of White Beach 2, only the

central seventy yards were approachable by

amphibian vehicles, the flanks of the beach

being guarded by coral barriers jutting out

from the reef. Nevertheless, the barriers offered no obstacle to infantrymen, who

could scramble over them and wade the

rest of the way in. At two hours before

high tide the water inside the reef was nowhere more than four feet in depth.19

 In

short, although the White Beaches were far

from ideal for landing purposes, they were

better than Yellow Beach 1, and except for

their narrowness offered no known natural

or man-made obstacles.

With this information in hand, Admiral

Turner's objections to a landing on the

northwest coast, however strong they may

once have been, were overcome. At a

meeting held aboard his flagship on 12

July, General Schmidt made a forceful

presentation of the case for the White

Beaches. An amphibious assault against the

strong enemy defenses in the Tinian Town

area would be too costly; artillery could

be more profitably employed against the

northern beaches; Ushi Point airfield

would be more quickly seized and made

ready; tactical surprise could be obtained;

the operation could more easily be conducted as a shore-to-shore movement from

Saipan; and, finally, most of the supplies

could be preloaded on Saipan and moved

on amphibian tractors and trucks directly

to inland dumps on Tinian. Admiral Hill

concurred, and Admirals Turner and

Spruance gave their consent to a landing

on White Beaches 1 and 2.20

The next day, 13 July, General Schmidt

issued the operation plan that was to govern the invasion of Tinian.21

 General

Cates' 4th Marine Division was assigned

the task of conducting the amphibious as16

 Ibid., Annex A; Annex E. 17 Ibid., Annex B. 1 8 Ibid., Annex E .

19

 Ibid., Annexes D and E. 20

 Hoffman, Tinian, pp. 23-24. 21

 NTLF Opn Plan 30-44, 13 Jul 44, NTLF

Rpt Marianas, Phase III, Incl A.
AMERICAN AND JAPANESE PLANS 275

sault over White Beaches 1 and 2 on JIG

Day, which was later established as 24

July. On landing, the division was to make

its main effort toward Mount Lasso and,

before reorganizing, seize the Force Beachhead Line, which included Faibus San Hilo

Point, Mount Lasso, and Asiga Point.

Once this area was captured, it was presumed that the beachhead would be safe

from ground-observed enemy artillery fire.

To accomplish the division's mission General Cates ordered the 24th Marines to

land in column of battalions on White

Beach 1 on the left, the 25th Marines with

two battalions abreast on White Beach 2.

The 23d Marines would remain in division

reserve.22

The assault troops would be carried

ashore in the customary fashion in amphibian tractors discharged fully loaded

from LST's. Of the 415 tractors assigned

to carry troops, 225 were supplied by

Army units—the 715th, 773d, and 534th

Amphibian Tractor Battalions. The remainder were Marine LVT's from the 2d,

5th, and 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalions. Because of the narrowness of the landing beaches, only one company of amphibian tanks could be employed in the assault,

Company D, 2d Armored Amphibian

Tractor Battalion (Marine). The battalion

was ordered to precede the first wave of

troops, fire on the beaches after naval gunfire was lifted, and move to the flanks

before reaching land. The 708th Armored

Amphibian Tank Battalion (Army) was

ordered to stand by off the beaches and

be prepared to land and support the infantry ashore.23

As before, command of the entire operation was vested in Admiral Turner as

Commander, Joint Expeditionary Force

(Task Force 51), under Admiral Spruance; General Holland Smith, who still

retained his position of Commander, Expeditionary Troops, continued in over-all

command of troops ashore. In fact, however, both of these officers had sailed

aboard Rocky Mount on 20 July to be on

hand for the Guam landings, which took

place the next day, and did not return to

the Saipan-Tinian area until the 25th.24

During the landing then, Admiral Hill, as

Commander, Northern Attack Force (Task

Force 52), commanded all naval craft and

supporting forces, while General Schmidt

commanded the landing forces.25 Even

after Admiral Turner returned, Admiral

Hill retained the responsibility "for offensive and defensive surface and air action"

in the area and for all practical purposes

Schmidt remained in tactical control of the

troops.26

Because most of the heavy artillery

pieces could more profitably be employed

from emplacements on Saipan, the 4th Marine Division would carry only 75-mm.

pack howitzers in the initial assault. In addition to its own two battalions (1st

and 2d Battalions, 14th Marines), it was

loaned the two light battalions of the 2d

Marine Division (1st and 2d Battalions,

10th Marines). These battalions would be

carried ashore in Marine DUKW's. Additional fire power was afforded the division

by attaching the 2d Division's tank battalion. Army troops (1341st Engineer

22

 4th Marine Div Opn Order 34-44. 23

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase III, Incl H,

LVT Rpt, pp. 1-3.

24

 TF 51 Opn Rpt Marianas, Incl A, pp.

17-19. 25

 NTLF Opn Plan 30-44, Annex I. 26

 TF 51 Opn Rpt Marianas, Incl A, pp.

17-19.
276 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

LVT WITH RAMP

Battalion) would make up part of the assault division's shore party, the remainder

being provided by the 2d Battalion, 20th

Marines.27

To the rest of General Watson's 2d Marine Division was assigned the role of

landing in the rear of the assault division

once the latter had cleared an initial beachhead and moved inland. Before this, the

division was to conduct a demonstration

landing off Tinian Town for the purpose of

diverting Japanese attention from the

main assault to the north.28

The 27th Infantry Division, less the

105th Infantry and less its organic artillery, was to remain in corps reserve and

"be prepared to embark in landing craft

on 4 hours notice and land on order . . .

on Tinian."

One of the main justifications for the

final decision to land over the unlikely

beaches on the northwestern shore of the

island was the feasibility of full exploitation of artillery firing from Saipan. Consequently, all of the field pieces in the area

except for the four battalions of 75-mm.

pack howitzers were turned over to XXIV

Corps Artillery during the preliminary and

landing phase. General Harper arranged

his thirteen battalions, totaling 156 guns

and howitzers, into three groupments, all

emplaced on southern Saipan. Groupment

A, commanded by Col. Raphael Griffin,

USMC, consisted of five 105-mm. battalions, two each from the Marine divisions

and one from V Amphibious Corps. It was

to reinforce the fires of the 75-mm. pack

howitzers and be ready to move to Tinian

27

 NTLF Opn Plan 30-44, 13 Jul 44. 28

 This scheme was not part of the original

operation plan, but was devised shortly before

the assault took place.
AMERICAN AND JAPANESE PLANS 277

on order. Groupment B, under the 27th

Division's artillery commander, General

Kernan, was made up of all of that division's organic artillery except the 106th

Field Artillery Battalion. It was to reinforce

the fires of Groupment A and also to be

ready to displace to Tinian. Groupment C,

commanded by General Harper himself,

contained all the howitzers and guns of

XXIV Corps Artillery plus the 106th Field

Artillery Battalion. It was to support the

attack with counterbattery, neutralization,

and harassing fire before the day of the

landing, deliver a half-hour preparation on

the landing beaches immediately before the

scheduled touchdown, and execute longrange counterbattery, harassing, and interdiction fire.29

In addition to the artillery, the, troops

would of course have the support of

carrier-borne aircraft, aircraft based on

Aslito field, and naval gunfire. Although

all three supporting arms were to be cmployed against targets everywhere on Tinian, primary responsibility for the northern

half was allocated to artillery while naval

gunfire and air took over the southern half.

The task of co-ordinating the three was

vested in a XXIV Corps Artillery representative at General Schmidt's headquarters.30

The most unique feature of the plan for

Tinian was its logistical provisions. Because

only slightly more than 200 yards of beach

were available, it was essential that precautions be taken to avoid congestion. Hence,

a supply plan was developed that allowed

all supplies to cross the beach on wheels or

tracks and move directly to division dumps

without rehandling. This entailed devising

a double shuttle system in which loaded

trucks and Athey trailers traveled back and

forth between the base supply dumps on

Saipan and division supply dumps on Tinian, and all amphibian vehicles carrying

supplies between ship and shore moved directly to division dumps. The objective was

to avoid any manhandling of supplies on

the beaches themselves. The solution represented a marked departure from standard

amphibious practice and was made possible, of course, by the proximity of Tinian

to the supply center on Saipan.31

The plan called for preloading thirty-two

LST's and two LSD's at Saipan with topdeck loads of all necessary supplies except

fuel. Ten LST's were allotted to each Marine division, eight to general reserve, and

four primarily to 75-mm. artillery. All amphibian tractors and trucks available, both

Army and Marine Corps, were initially assigned to the 4th Marine Division, but after

the assault was over were to be distributed

between the two divisions. The supplies

were loaded on the LST's in slings, and

the ships carried crawler cranes on their

top decks so that the slings could drop supplies into DUKW's and LVT's coming

alongside. To carry out the shuttle system,

the plan called for preloading eighty-eight

cargo trucks and twenty-five Athey trailers on Saipan to be taken to Tinian aboard

LCT's and LCM's. A special provision for

fuel supply was made. Seven ponton barges

loaded with drums of captured Japanese

gasoline and matching lubricants were to

be towed to positions off the landing

beaches to act as floating supply and fueling points for LVT's and DUKW's. Other

fuels for initially refueling the trucks were

29

 NTLF Opn Plan 30-44, Annex F. 30 Ibid., Annexes C, D, F.

31

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase III, Incl F,

G-4 Rpt, p. 1.
278 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

placed on barges that were to be spotted

off the beaches.32

One other innovation introduced in the

Tinian campaign was a special portable

LVT bow ramp. Ten amphibian tractors

were equipped with this device so as to

provide a means for extending the narrow

beach area. The ramps were so constructed

that an LVT could drive up to a cliff

flanking the beaches, place the ramp in

position along the ledge, then back down

leaving the ramp to act as a sort of causeway by which other vehicles could get to

shore.33

Finally, precautions were taken to supply the troops in case of unexpected bad

weather after the landing. Plans were

made to drop about 30 tons of supplies by

parachute and to deliver 100 tons by air

daily to Ushi Point airfield as soon as it

had been captured.34

The Enemy

As already observed, the opportunities

for gaining detailed intelligence of Tinian's

defenses were superior to those enjoyed by

American forces in most Pacific operations.

Proof of this superiority lies in the accuracy

with which General Schmidt's staff was

able to estimate Japanese strength and dispositions. As of 13 July they predicted, on

the basis of captured documents, photo reconnaissance, and other intelligence data,

that the strength of the Tinian garrison

came to 8,350, plus possible home guard

units. The main part of this force was believed to consist of the 50th Infantry Regiment (reinforced)—about 4,000 men—

and the 56th Keibitai (Naval Guard

Force)—about 1,100 men—plus sundry air

defense, base force, and construction personnel. The Army troops were believed to

be disposed in three sectors, northern,

western, and southern, which included respectively the Ushi Point—Asiga Bay retion, the west coast north of Gurguan

Point including White Beaches 1 and 2,

and the southern part of the island including Tinian Town. The northern and southern sectors were thought to be defended by

at least one infantry battalion each, but

the western sector where White Beaches 1

and 2 were located had, it was estimated,

only one company with one antitank

squad. It was predicted that in each of

these sectors the Japanese would first try

to repulse the landing at the water's edge

and would shift two thirds of each defense

force from the areas not under attack to

the beaches where the actual landings were

taking place. A reserve force of one battalion was believed to be located near

Mount Lasso, and it too was expected to

move to the specific area under amphibious

attack. One artillery battalion was thought

to be located in the Tinian Harbor area,

one battery near Asiga Bay. These estimates, except those pertaining to artillery

strength, were remarkably accurate.

The defense of Tinian was in the charge

of Col. Takashi Ogata, commanding officer, 50th Infantry Regiment, which represented the bulk of the Japanese Army

forces on the island. Other important units

were the 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry; the

Tank Company, 18th Infantry; the 56th

Naval Guard Force; and two naval antiaircraft defense units. All together, Ogata

had four Army infantry battalions, none of

which were straggler units, plus additional

32

 Ibid., p. 2. 33

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase III, Incl H,

LVT Rpt, p. 3. 34

 TF 52 Rpt Tinian, pp. 1-3.
AMERICAN AND JAPANESE PLANS 279

TABLE 1—ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF THE JAPANESE GARRISON ON TINIAN

—Unknown.

a The strength figures for the three infantry regiments given here are somewhat lower than those estimated by NTLF, chiefly because

the latter included attached artillery units in its infantry strength estimates. The figure 576 is the actual strength of the 2d Battalion, 50th

Infantry, as of February 1944 (Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 50th Infantry Regiment, War Diary, February 1944, NA 27434). lt is assumed that

the other regiments were approximately the same.

b Estimated on the basis of unit records for May 1944 of Headquarters, 1st and 3d Companies, and Infantry Gun Company (NA 22237,

27394, 27393).

c Shikamura Tai War Diary, 29 April to 23 July 1944 (NA 22831).

Source: These strength figures are derived from NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase III, Incl A, G-2 Rpt, pp. 24-30 and TF 56 Rpt FORAGER,

Annex A, G-2 Rpt, p. 57.

infantry in the 56th Naval Guard Force

and other naval units. For artillery, the

Japanese commander had his regimental

artillery battalion, the coast artillery

manned by part of the 56th Naval Guard

Force, and two naval antiaircraft defense

units. The 18th Infantry Tank Company

had nine tanks, which constituted the entire armored strength present. Total personnel strength, as indicated in Table 1,

came to a little more than eight thousand

officers and men, Army and Navy.
280 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

As foreseen by General Schmidt's intelligence section, the Japanese Army plan for

the defense of Tinian provided for the disposition of forces in three sectors. (Map

15) The northern sector force guarding

Ushi Point, Asiga Bay, and part of Masalog

Point was the responsibility of the 2d Battalion, 50th Infantry, and a platoon of

engineers; the western sector, containing

Mount Lasso and the northwest coast, was

guarded only by the 3d Company, 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry, and an antitank

squad. Regimental reserve in the southern

sector consisted of the 1st Battalion, 50th

Infantry, less the 3d Company and less one

antitank squad and was located about

3,000 yards southeast of Faibus San Hilo

Point. The 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry, was designated "mobile counterattack

force," and was in effect another reserve.

Ogata's armored strength came to only

nine tanks of the Tank Company, 18th Infantry, which was located on the northeast

side of Marpo Well with orders to advance

either to Tinian Town or Asiga Bay, wherever the landings came. In addition, this

company had two vehicles rarely found

among Japanese forces, amphibious trucks

similar to the American DUKW.35

Japanese naval personnel on the island

were under the command of Capt. Goichi

Oya, who reported to Colonel Ogata.

There was another, more senior, naval officer present on the island, but he held no

position in the chain of command and had

nothing to do with the defense of Tinian.

This was Vice Adm. Kakuji Kakuta, Commander in Chief, 1st Air Fleet, who was

responsible only to Admiral Nagumo of the

Central Pacific Area Fleet. After the loss of

most of his planes in the Battle of the

Philippine Sea, Kakuta made several efforts

to escape Tinian by submarine. Each time

he failed, and in the end he apparently

committed suicide.36

Captain Oya appears to have made some

effort to integrate his command with that

of the Army. The 56th Naval Guard Force

was charged with the defense of the air

bases, defense of harbor installations and

ships in the harbor, and destruction of enemy attack forces. The force was divided

into two parts. One was to man the coastal

defense guns and antiaircraft weapons and

the other, called the Coastal Security

Force, was to maintain small coastal patrol

boats and lay beach mines. No matter what

the intentions of either commander, however, it would seem that there was little

real co-ordination or even co-operation between Army and Navy forces. There may

have been serious interservice friction.37

This is at least suggested in the captured

diary of one Army noncommissioned officer, who wrote:

15 June: The Naval aviators are robbers.

There aren't any planes. When they ran off

to the mountains, they stole Army provisions,

robbed people of their fruits and took cars.

25 June: Sailors have stolen our provisions. They took food off to the mountains.

We must bear with such until the day of decisive battle. . . .

6 July: Did Vice-Admiral Kakuta when

he heard that the enemy had entered our

area go to sleep with joy?38

35

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase III, Incl A,

G-2 Rpt, pp. 8-9.

36

 Ibid., p. 21; 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Tinian, G-2 Rpt, Special Intel Rpt 4. 37

 4th Marine Div, Representative Translations

Made on Tinian, Record and Research Sec, Hist

Br, G-3 Hq USMC, Sec. I, Sec. IX, p. 3. 38

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 11405, excerpts from the diary of a noncommissioned

officer, a member of the Medical Administrative

Unit, Mountain Artillery Battalion, 50th Infantry Regiment.

282 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Responsibility for coastal defense was divided about equally between Army and

Navy. Because of the small number of

beaches over which hostile troops could

possibly land, the problem was somewhat

simplified. Consequently, even with the

rather limited means at hand, it was possible for the Japanese to distribute their

fixed gun positions so as to place a fairly

heavy guard around the only feasible approaches to the shore. The Tinian Town

area boasted three British-made 6-inch

coastal defense guns, two 75-mm. mountain guns,39

 and six 25-mm. twin-mount

antiaircraft and antitank automatic cannons. Just up the coast from Tinian Town

in the area of Gurguan Point were three

120-mm. naval dual-purpose guns and nine

25-mm. twin mounts that guarded the

northern approaches to Sunharon Bay as

well as the Gurguan Point airfield. The

northwest coast from Ushi Point to Faibus

San Hilo Point, including the area of White

Beaches 1 and 2, was quite well fortified,

especially considering that the Japanese

had no real expectations of hostile amphibious landings in that area. All together, this stretch of coast line contained

three 140-mm. coastal defense guns, two

75-mm. mountain guns, two 7.7-mm.

heavy machine guns in pillboxes, one 37-

mm. covered antitank gun, two 13-mm.

antiaircraft and antitank machine guns,

two 76.2-mm. dual-purpose guns, and

three 120-mm. naval and dual-purpose

guns. In addition, in the hills behind and

within range of this shore line were two

47-mm. antitank guns, one 37-mm. antitank gun, and five 75-mm. mountain

guns. Guarding Ushi Point airfield were

six 13-mm. antiaircraft and antitank guns,

fifteen 25-mm. twin mounts, four 20-mm.

antiaircraft automatic cannons, and six

75-mm. antiaircraft guns. On the northeast coast, between Ushi Point and Masalog Point, were seven 140-mm. coastal defense guns, three 76.2-mm. dual-purpose

guns, one 37-m . antitank gun, and

twenty-three pillboxes containing machine

guns of unknown caliber. Except for the

coastal defense guns, all of these weapons

were concentrated in the area of Yellow

Beach 1, south of Asiga Point. Finally, inland from Marpo Point on the southeast

coast there were four 120-mm. dualpurpose guns.40

The most surprising feature of the distribution of fixed positions is the relatively

heavy concentration of guns within range

of White Beaches 1 and 2. In spite of the

fact that General Ogata assigned a low priority to the infantry defenses in that region, it is quite apparent that the Japanese were by no means entirely neglectful

of the area. The figures cited here of course

give no indication of the damage wrought

on these positions by naval gunfire, field

artillery, and aerial bombardment before

the landing. But had American intelligence

estimates of Japanese artillery dispositions

been as accurate as they were in other respects, the plan for an amphibious landing

over the White Beaches might not have

been undertaken so optimistically.

More accurate knowledge of Japanese

mining activities off of White Beaches 1

and 2 might also have given the American

39

 The JICPOA report cited below, note 45,

lists these as 75-mm. M94 mountain howitzers.

This must be an error because the Japanese had

no 75-mm. howitzers and their Model 94 field

piece was a 75-mm. mountain (pack) gun, (War

Dept Technical Manual E 30-480, 15 Sep 44,

Handbook on Japanese. Military Forces, p. 220.)

40

 JICPOA Study of Japanese Fixed Gun Positions, 24 Jul-5 Aug; Hoffman, Tinian, p. 15.
AMERICAN AND JAPANESE PLANS 283

planners pause. The reports of the amphibious reconnaissance and underwater demolition groups to the contrary, the Japanese

had set up a mine defense of sorts along

the northwest coast. Off White Beach 1

they had laid a dozen horned mines, though

by the time of the landing these had deteriorated to the point of impotence. White

Beach 2 was mined in depth. Hemispherical mines were placed in two lines offshore, conical yardstick, and box mines

covered the exits from the beach. All together, more than a hundred horned mines

were laid in the area. In addition, there

were many antipersonnel mines and booby

traps concealed in cases of beer, watches,

and souvenir items scattered inland. On

the other side of the island, Yellow Beach

1 was protected by twenty-three horned

mines and by double-apron barbed wire.

In the Tinian Town area a strip about

thirty-five yards wide from the pier north

along the water's edge to the sugar mill was

completely mined. The beach south of the

pier was laid with hemispherical mines that

had steel rods lashed across the horns. Behind these were conical mines placed in

natural lanes of approach from the shore

line.

Until the very eve of the landing, the

Japanese worked furiously to improve their

beach defenses, especially in the Tinian

Town and Asiga Bay areas. Even the

gathering rain of American shells and

bombs failed to stop them entirely, for

when the pressure became too great they

worked at night and holed up during the

day.41

Ogata was well aware that an invasion

of Tinian was inevitable, and in one respect

he was more fortunate than Saito.42 Unlike

the commanding general of Saipan, he had

no stragglers to deal with, and his Army

troops were well trained, well equipped,

and well integrated under a unified command. He had had his regiment since

August of 1940. For almost four years

before moving to Tinian the unit had been

stationed in Manchuria, and, under the

semifield conditions obtaining there, Ogata

was able to develop a high degree of homogeneity and esprit.43

Ogata's plan of defense conformed to

standard Japanese doctrine at this stage

in the war. The enemy was to be destroyed

at the water's edge if possible and, if not,

was to be harried out of his beachhead by

a counterattack on the night following the

landing. "But," read the order, "in the

eventuality we have been unable to expel

the enemy . . . we will gradually fall back

on our prepared positions in the southern

part of the island and defend them to the

last man."

 44

Whichever of the three possible beach

areas was hit by the Americans, the bulk

of the Japanese forces in the two other

sectors was to rush to the point of attack

and close arms with the invader. Tinian

Town and Asiga Bay were strongly favored

as the probable landing beaches, the northwest coast being relegated to third place

in Ogata's list of priorities.45 Thus, when

the Americans chose this unlikely lane of

approach, they achieved complete tactical

surprise—a rare accomplishment in the

Central Pacific theater of war.

41

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 11962, excerpts from the diary of Kaneko Tokutaro, noncommissioned officer at Hq, 2d Bn, 50th Inf

Regt; Shikamura Tai War Diary, 29 Apr to 23

Jul, NA 22831.

42

 4th Marine Div Representative Trans. 43

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase III, Incl A,

G-2 Rpt, p. 25. 44

 Ibid., p. 9. 45

 4th Marine Div Representative Trans.

CHAPTER XIV

Invasion and Capture

Preliminary Bombardment

Field Artillery

The decision to land the assault infantry

troops across beaches on northwestern Tinian had stemmed in part from a desire to

make optimum use of artillery based on

Saipan. In many Pacific landings such as

those at Tarawa, Saipan, and Iwo Jima it

had not been, or was not to be, practicable

to seize neighboring islands for the purpose

of establishing bases for field artillery

before the principal landing operations.

Hence reliance had to be put entirely on

naval gunfire and aircraft for whatever

preliminary bombardment was laid down.

In these operations some part, and probably a considerable part, of the casualties

incurred by the infantry during the amphibious assault phase must be attributed

to the limitations inherent in naval and

aerial bombardment. The invasion of Tinian, on the other hand, offered an ideal

opportunity to supplement these arms with

field artillery. Tinian was, in fact, favored

with a more prolonged preliminary artillery

bombardment than any other island in the

Central Pacific to be assaulted by American troops.

As early as 20 June, Battery B of the

531st Field Artillery Battalion was ordered

to emplace its 155-mm. guns to fire on

Tinian, Lateral observation posts were

established on southern Saipan and counterbattery and destructive fires commenced

forthwith. Four days later the battalion's

other two batteries, relieved of their duties

of supporting the troops on Saipan,

turned around and began firing to the

south. On 8 July, the day before Saipan

was declared secured, the other three battalions of XXIV Corps Artillery were ordered either to turn around in their present

positions on southern Saipan or to displace

to the area of Agingan Point and commence firing on Tinian.1

 Meanwhile, observation planes made daily flights over

Tinian to register fires and to accumulate

intelligence data for future use. Observation posts had been established on Agingan

Point, Obiam Point, and Nafutan Point.

All together, from 20 June through 9 July,

while the troops were engaged in capturing

Saipan, XXIV Corps Artillery fired a total

of 331 missions—7,571 rounds—on Tinian, or roughly a fifth of the total it expended on Saipan.2

With Saipan officially secured on 9 July,

even greater attention could be directed

toward the island to the south. Corps artillery increased the tempo of its bombard1

 The field artillery battalions were the 225th

(155-mm. howitzers), the 145th (105-mm. howitzers), and the 532d (155-mm. guns). 2

 XXIV Corps Arty Final Rpt on FORAGER Opn,

Phases I and III, S-2 Rpt, p. 8; Ibid., S-3 Rpt,

pp. 7-8.
286 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

ment. By 15 July all four battalions of the

27th Division artillery had displaced to new

positions to fire on Tinian,3 as had also

the two Marine divisions' howitzers (except for the two 75-mm. pack howitzer

battalions of each)4 and the 5th Battalion,

V Amphibious Corps Artillery. This represented a total of 156 pieces—two 155-mm.

gun battalions, three 155-mm. howitzer

battalions, and eight 105-mm. howitzer

battalions.5 Corps artillery had at its disposal nine organic planes plus the additional observation planes of the units attached. Air activity became so heavy at

Isely Field that a new airstrip for the exclusive use of observation planes had to be

constructed somewhat to the westward.

Except for a brief period on 16-17 July,

when ammunition ran low, artillery maintained a steady round-the-clock schedule of

fire totaling 1,509 missions or 24,536

rounds. In addition to counterbattery and

harassing and general area bombardment,

the artillery attempted to burn off cane

fields with white phosphorus shells, but

without much success because of the

heavy rains that immediately preceded the

landing.

For the most part, XXIV Corps Artillery

confined its efforts to the area north of

the line between Gurguan Point and Masalog Point, while aircraft restricted their

efforts to the southern half of the island.

Naval ships were assigned any targets on

Tinian deemed unsuitable to either of the

other two arms. Co-ordination of the three

supporting arms was assigned to the corps

artillery representative attached to General

Schmidt's staff. In one instance, an artillery air observer discovered three 140-mm.

coastal defense guns on Masalog Point

that were within easy firing range of White

Beaches 1 and 2, but were masked from

field artillery. The battleship Colorado was

called in and, with its main batteries adjusted by an airborne artillery observer,

succeeded in neutralizing or destroying

the enemy weapons. Because the spotting

plane was not in direct radio contact with

the ship, it was necessary for the plane to

submit its spotting data to the artillery post

by radio, whence they were relayed by telephone to General Schmidt's headquarters,

and in turn by radio on another frequency

to the firing ship. In spite of this somewhat complicated system of communications, the time lag was so slight as to be

insignificant.6

Naval and Air Bombardment

Naval guns had harrassed Tinian intermittently since 11 June when Admiral

Mitscher's Fast Carrier Force first made its

appearance in the adjacent waters. For

about a week after Saipan was secured, the

job was left almost entirely to field artillery

except for night fires delivered on Tinian

Town by small naval craft. Then, starting

on 15 July, naval gunfire was resumed. Admiral Hill's plan called for daily destructive

fire by destroyers on specific targets that

were not suitable to air or artillery, gradual

intensification of daytime fire by employment of additional destroyers and cruisers,

and a continuation of night harassing missions. Commencing on the 16th, seven destroyers began to deliver destructive fire

3

 27th Inf Div Arty Rpt FORAGER Opn, p. 25. 4

 Each Marine division had two 105-mm. howitzer battalions and two 75-mm. pack howitzer

battalions. 5

 XXIV Corps Arty Final Rpt on FORAGER Opn,

Phases I and III, S-3 Rpt, p. 9.

6

 Ibid.; TF 52 Rpt Tinian, 24 Aug 44, Incl A,

p. 61.
INVASION AND CAPTURE 287

155-MM. GUN FIRING AT TINIAN FROM SAIPAN during night bombardment of

the island to the south.

against targets designated by corps artillery. On the evening of the 17th, additional destroyers commenced harassing fire

against the Japanese who were known to

be working feverishly at night to install

beach defenses in the Asiga Bay area. On

the 20th the cruiser Louisville was added

to the armada, and two days later another

cruiser, New Orleans, was sent into the

line, as were two LCI gunboats whose job

it was to pour 40-mm. fire into the many

caves that pocked the cliffs along the shore

line.7

Starting at 0600 on 23 July, the day before the landing, Admiral Hill stepped up

his preparatory fire with a total of three

old battleships, two heavy cruisers, three

light cruisers, and sixteen destroyers, distributed in such a way that the island of

Tinian would be shelled from every point

on the compass. The Navy made no effort

to concentrate on White Beaches 1 and 2

—in fact, the ships assigned to that area

were fewer in number than in most of the

other five sectors into which the waters off

the island were subdivided. Deception was

given even greater consideration than destruction, and the naval gunfire plan can

have given the Japanese no indication as

to where the amphibious assault would

take place. At 1500 all ships ceased fire for 7

 TF 52 Rpt Tinian, Incl A, pp. 58-59.
288 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

an hour to permit aircraft to drop napalm

bombs on the wooded area inland of Faibus San Hilo Point, and at 1720 naval fire

was again discontinued for an air strike

with napalm against the White Beaches

area. During the night of 23-24 July destroyers and cruisers kept important road

junctions between Faibus San Hilo and

Gurguan Points interdicted, while the destroyer Norman Scott delivered harassing

fire to cover Asiga Bay and all important

road junctions on the east side of the island. Another destroyer, Waller, covered

a last-minute underwater reconnaissance of

White Beaches 1 and 2 by Underwater

Demolition Team 5, which unsuccessfully

attempted to detonate some recently discovered mines. Throughout the day and

thereafter during the operation, in order to

minimize interference between air and

naval gunfire, all ships were directed to

deliver their fire from ranges of a maximum ordinate of less than 1,000 feet when

possible and to exceed that maximum only

after notification by Admiral Hill.8

For air support on Tinian, Comdr.

Lloyd B. Osborne, USN, who was Admiral

Hill's Commander, Northern Support Aircraft, had 358 fighters, bombers, and torpedo planes under his control, mostly Army

and Navy. Tinian, like Saipan, had of

course felt the might of Marc Mitscher's

carrier force early in June, and from then

on was subject to an increasing tempo of

bombing from naval planes of Turner's

and Hill's escort carriers and from Army

P-47's from Isely Field. Starting on 22

June, P-47's of the 318th Fighter Group

kept the airfields at Ushi and Gurguan

Point and the new strip just east of Tinian

Town under constant strafing and bombing attacks. Tinian Town itself was reduced

to rubble.9

On 22 July, just two days before the

invasion, two P-47's dropped on Tinian

the first napalm bombs used in the Pacific

war. These were fire bombs consisting of

jettisonable aircraft fuel tanks filled with

a mixture of napalm gel and gasoline.

Shortly before the scheduled landing on

Tinian, Lt, Comdr. Louis W. Mang,

USNR, recently arrived from the United

States, easily persuaded Admiral Hill of the

efficacy of these new bombs, and, since

napalm was in short supply, an order for

8,500 pounds was immediately dispatched

to Pearl Harbor. Meanwhile, diesel oil was

sometimes used as a less efficient substitute.

The new fire bombs were found to be especially effective in burning cane fields

and underbrush. During the late afternoon

of 23 July thirty were dropped immediately

inland and on the flanks of White Beaches

1 and 2 to burn off underbrush cover and

destroy enemy personnel that might be located in open trenches and dugouts. In

both respects the bombs were successful

and their continued employment in the Pacific war was assured.10

The Landings

At daybreak on 24 July a motley flotilla

of ships and landing craft carrying the 2d

and 4th Marine Divisions got under way

from Tanapag Harbor for the short trip to

Tinian. All together, it included 8 transports, 37 LST's, 2 LSD's, 31 LCI's, 20

LCT's, 92 LCM's, 100 LCVP's, 533

8

 Ibid., pp. 62-63.

9

 This account of preliminary air activities is

derived from TF 52 Rpt Tinian, Incl A, p. 26,

and AAF Hist Div Army Air Forces in the Marianas Campaign, MS, OCMH. 10

 TF 52 Rpt Tinian, Incl A, pp. 93-96.
INVASION AND CAPTURE 289

LVT's, and 140 DUKW's. All of the

LST's were assigned to the 4th Marine Division, whose assault troops were nested in

their amphibian tractors waiting for the

moment when the bow doors would open

and their vehicles would crawl out into the

water and approach their line of departure. Four of the LST's carried DUKW's,

aboard which had been loaded four battalions of 75-mm. pack howitzers. Tanks

were stowed in LCT's and LCM's, some

to be carried to their destination in the

wells of LSD's, others to get there under

their own power. The eight transports carried the two regimental combat teams of

the 2d Marine Division scheduled to make

a diversionary feint at Tinian Town before

landing in the rear of the assault troops.

The division's other regiment would have

to stand by on Saipan until ten of the

LST's bound for White Beaches 1 and 2

had unloaded and returned to pick it

up.11 (Map 16)

On past the White Beaches to Sunharon

Bay steamed the Demonstration Group—

the transports carrying the two 2d Marine

Division RCT's accompanied by their escorts.12

 The Japanese expected a landing

at Tinian Town, and Admiral Hill intended

to prolong that expectation as far as possible. Into the water went landing craft

lowered from their mother transports;

down the cargo nets climbed the marines

of the 2d Division, to all appearances

bound for the beach.

Ashore, the Japanese reacted immediately and furiously. Flashes from their

guns, followed by tremendous geysers of

water, kept the marines crouching low beneath the gunwales of their boats as they

approached the 2,000-yard line, which

marked the inshore limits of their fake attack. Nothing but water and a few shell

fragments hit the troops, but the escorting

ships were not so lucky. The three Britishmade 6-inch coastal defense guns located

south of Tinian Town struck the battleship

Colorado and the destroyer Norman Scott,

scoring twenty-two hits on the former and

six on the latter. In this short action the

Navy lost 62 killed and 245 wounded before the shore battery could be silenced.13

By 1015 the boats and men had been

recovered and the Demonstration Group

stood up the coast toward White Beaches.

The feint had been altogether successful.

From Colonel Ogata to Tokyo went the

message that more than a hundred landing

barges had been repulsed in an attempt to

get ashore at Tinian Town.14 The 56th

Naval Guard Force stuck to its guns that

guarded Sunharon Bay, and no part of the

3d Battalion, 50th Infantry Regiment,

abandoned the southern sector to meet the

amphibious landing in the north.15 One

Japanese infantryman probably reflected

the thoughts and hopes of all when he

wrote in his diary, "24 July: Today the

enemy began to land on the beach at Tinian. 3 companies were sent out. Our platoon moved into position. . . . Up to

0900 artillery fire was fierce in the direction of Port Tinian but it became quiet

11

 Ibid., p. 6; NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase III,

Incl H, LVT Rpt, pp. 1-3. 12

 Unless otherwise noted, the account of the

diversionary feint against Tinian Town is derived

from TF 52 Rpt Tinian, pp. 30-32; Hoffman,

Tinian, pp. 43-45; Morison, New Guinea and

the Marianas, pp. 361-62.

13

 The battery was actually destroyed four days

later by the battleship Tennessee. Morison, New

Guinea and the Marianas, p. 362. 14

 Japanese Studies in World War II, 55, pp.

51-52. 15

 2d Marine Div Rpt Tinian, D-2 Rpt 76;

NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl A, G-2 Rpt,

p. 41.

INVASION AND CAPTURE 291

after the enemy warships left. Maybe the

enemy is retreating."

 16

Meanwhile, the northwest coast of Tinian which had heretofore been treated with

a studied impartiality, began to receive the

full force of the attackers' armament. At

0600 one battery of 155-mm. howitzers on

Saipan commenced laying down a smoke

screen on Mount Lasso to last for two and

a half hours. Forty-five minutes later all of

General Harper's guns and howitzers burst

forth in a massed fire. For fifteen minutes

artillery pounded known installations on

northern Tinian, likely enemy assembly

areas, and avenues of approaches to the

beaches. Then, on signal, artillery lifted its

fires to the woods and bluffs above the

shore from which the Japanese might observe the approach of the assault craft and

vehicles.17

The chorus of destruction was swelled

by Admiral Hill's support ships offshore.

Starting at 0530, Tennessee, California,

and Louisville opened up on White

Beaches 1 and 2 with their main batteries, while Birmingham and Montpelier

together bracketed Mount Lasso from opposite sides of the island. Freshly arrived

from Guam, Admiral Spruance's flagship

Indianapolis took over responsibility for

Faibus San Hilo Point, which overlooked

the landing beaches from the south. From

0625 until 0640 all ships' fire ceased in order to allow an air strike against the

beaches, and more particularly against the

recently discovered mines off White Beach

2, which neither underwater demolition

swimmers, nor mine sweepers, nor ships'

guns had been able to detonate. Thirty

minutes before the scheduled landing time,

artillery fire from Saipan shifted to the

landing beaches. Throughout this period,

one battery of 155-mm. howitzers fired a

continuous barrage of smoke shells at

Mount Lasso to prevent enemy observation

of the landing beaches. Then came the final

crescendo of naval bombardment with destroyers abandoning their screening duties

to add their five-inch shells to the general

destruction.

The first wave was to touch down at

0730, but because of a slight delay in forming the landing waves, Admiral Hill ordered a ten-minute postponement. The

formation of landing craft and vehicles followed the pattern by now familiar in the

Central Pacific. First in line abreast went

the LCI gunboats, six toward White Beach

1, nine toward White Beach 2. Astern

came a wave of amphibian tanks, followed

in turn by the troop-carrying amphibian

tractors. Those bound for the northern

landing beach were crewed by marines of

the 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion; the

Army's 773d Amphibian Tractor Battalion

carried the assault troops to the southern

beach. As the gunboats approached shallow water, they turned to port and starboard and took the flanks of the landing

area under fire; at 300 yards the amphibian tanks turned toward the flanks and the

first waves of amphibian tractors churned

through the water to touch shore on White

Beach 1 at 0742, on White Beach 2 at

0750.18

By comparison with most assault landings in the Central Pacific, the initial in16

 4th Marine Div Representative Trans, Sec.

VII, Diary of Takayoshi Yamazaki.

17

 XXIV Corps Arty Final Rpt on FORAGER

Opn, Phases I and III, S-3 Rpt, p. 11.

18

 TF 52 Rpt Tinian, pp. 33, 65; XXIV Corps

Arty Final Rpt on FORAGER Opn, Phases I and

III, S-3 Rpt, p. 11.
292 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

INVASION CRAFT make an easy landing on Tinian's White Beaches.

vasion of Tinian was easy.19 Within forty

minutes after the touch down, the entire

assault battalion of the 24th Marines was

ashore on White Beach 1, and after a brief

fire fight moved rapidly to the first objective line. On White Beach 2, to the south,

the 25th Marines faced somewhat heavier

odds in the form of scattered land mines

and two Japanese pillboxes undestroyed by

the preliminary bombardment. Two LVT's

were blown up by the mines. As the first

wave of marines rushed inland it bypassed

the pillboxes, which were subsequently reduced without difficulty. Following the

landing of the two assault regiments, tanks

and half-tracks moved in on schedule, and

in spite of the difficulties involved in landing over the narrow, cliff-flanked beaches,

none of the vehicles was lost. By midafternoon DUKW's had succeeded in landing

all four of the pack howitzer battalions assigned to the 4th Marine Division, and by

late afternoon the reserve regiment (23d

Marines), after some delay caused by communications failure, was ashore and in position in its assembly area on the right

(south) flank of the beachhead. The two

shore parties (1341st Engineer Battalion

(Army) on White Beach 1 and the 2d Battalion, 20th Marines, on White Beach 2)

had landed all their men and equipment

by 1400. Two of the ten special portable

LVT ramps were launched late in the

afternoon. One capsized when the amphibian tractor struck a coral head, but the

other was in proper position before nightfall. Six of the eight remaining ramps were

installed the next day, the other two having

been swamped in the process.

19

 The account of JIG Day on Tinian is derived from the following sources: 4th Marine Div

Opns Rpt Tinian, pp. 16-20, 23-24; Hoffman,

Tinian, pp. 48-58.
INVASION AND CAPTURE 293

4TH MARINES WADING TOWARD WHITE BEACH 1 keep their weapons dry.

By nightfall of the 24th the 4th Marine Division had established a beachhead about 2,900 yards in width and

almost a mile deep in the center.20 Casualties for the day had been light—15 killed

and 225 wounded.21 Barbed wire was

strung along the entire length of the division front, machine guns were emplaced

to provide interlocking bands of fire, and

pack howitzers were registered to cover the

main road from Ushi Point airfield and

other likely routes of enemy approach.

Amphibian vehicles preloaded with ammunition had made their direct deliveries from

ships lying offshore to the front-line troops

as scheduled, and the latter were well supplied with reserve stocks of shells, mortars,

and bullets. Every precaution was taken

against the expected traditional first-night

enemy counterattack. When it came, the

marines were ready for it.

Japanese Counterattack

24-25 July

Having failed to stem the tide of the

American assault over the beaches, Colonel

Ogata now had to put into execution the

second phase of his defensive plan—an

organized counterattack during the first

night after the landing. Whether the Japanese commander was in direct communication with any of his troops other than

those assigned to the Tinian Town area is

uncertain, but his battalion commanders

were well enough indoctrinated to launch

the drive on their own initiative. Still under

the illusion that the main amphibious assault would eventually be directed against

Tinian Town, Ogata kept the 3d Battalion,

20

 Hoffman, Tinian, Map 8, p. 3.

2 1

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Tinian, p. 24.
294 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

50th Regiment, in position. The 2d Battalion, to which had been assigned the

northeast sector guarding Asiga Bay, also

stayed out of the fight, as did the main

body of the 56th Naval Guard Force

manning the coastal defense guns along

southern Tinian. Thus the brunt of the

counterattack fell to Ogata's mobile reserve

battalion (the 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry Regiment), the 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry, and sundry naval units stationed in

the northern part of the island.22

The attack, when it came, consisted

of three separate and seemingly un-coordinated thrusts against the American

front—one along the western shore against

the marines' left, one in the, center at the

boundary between the 25th and 24th Marines, and a third against the 23d Marines

on the American right flank. The first commenced about 0200 and was undertaken

exclusively by naval personnel coming

down from the north. It lasted almost five

hours, but the Japanese failed to penetrate

the marines lines at any point and lost an

estimated 476 men in the effort.23

In the center, Japanese infantrymen

struck about 0230. Between the two Marine regiments they discovered a weak spot

in the line through which a large body of

Japanese poured and then branched out in

two directions. One of the enemy groups

turned west toward the rear areas of the

25th Marines where it was eliminated after

a brief fire fight. The other headed straight

for the beach where it was eventually

stopped by Marine artillerymen and elements of the 2d Marine Division that had

landed only a few hours earlier. The next

morning almost 500 dead Japanese were

counted in this area.

The third attack was from the south and

was preceded by five or six tanks, over half

of the entire Japanese tank strength on the

island. All the tanks were destroyed before

they penetrated the lines of the 23d Marines, against which the attack was directed. The infantrymen following the

tanks had no better luck. In the eerie light

furnished by naval star shells, the marines

quickly disposed of this last group, estimated to number over 270 enemy soldiers.

On the morning of the 25th a total of

1,241 Japanese dead was counted, about

700 identified as members of the two

infantry regiments. Later interrogation of

six prisoners of war revealed that by the

morning of the 25th the 1st Battalion, 50th

Infantry, had been virtually destroyed as a

result of the fighting incident to the landing and the counterattack.24

 Another prisoner of war testified that the 1st Battalion,

135th Infantry, Ogata's mobile reserve,

had been "practically annihilated."

 25

 In

the light of this evidence, General Cates'

final conclusion seems irrefutable—in the

early morning hours of 25 July, the 4th

Marine Division "broke the Japs back in

the battle for Tinian."

 26

Capture of Northern Tinian

During the next eight days, until the

island was finally declared secured on 1

August, the fighting on Tinian resolved it22

 The account of the counterattack is derived

from 4th Marine Div D-2 Periodic Rpt 72, and

Hoffman, Tinian, pp. 62-68. 23

 This and subsequent figures for Japanese

casualties are taken from dead counts made on

the morning of 25 July. Since some of the Japanese may have been killed by preliminary naval,

air, and artillery fire, the estimates are probably

exaggerated.

24

 4th Marine Div Representative Trans, Note

574, Sec. IX. 25

 4th Marine Div D-2 Periodic Rpt 73, 26

Jul 44. 26

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Tinian, p. 25.
INVASION AND CAPTURE 295

self into three phases. First, it was necessary to push across to the eastern coast

and seal off the entire northern third of

the island, including such vital points as

Mount Maga, Mount Lasso, and the Ushi

Point airfield. Once this was accomplished,

both Marine divisions could wheel to the

south and proceed at a more rapid pace

down Tinian's long axis until they reached

the foot of the plateau that dominated the

island's southern tip. Finally came the twoday battle for the plateau and the cliffs of

Marpo Point that brought the operation to

a close.

On 25 July the 4th Marine Division,

against only sporadic resistance, spent the

day expanding the beachhead in all directions. On the right, the 23d Marines

covered about half the distance from White

Beach 2 to Faibus San Hilo Point, meeting

very few Japanese as they went. In the

center, the 25th and 24th Regiments made

comparable advances in an easterly and

southeasterly direction, the 25th capturing Mount Maga, which lay athwart the

division's approaches to Mount Lasso, the

highest point of the island. Army P-47's

flying from Isely Field, as well as artillery

based on Saipan, supported the action. On

the left, the 8th Marines (attached to the

4th Marine Division), assisted by tanks

and by armored amphibians firing from the

water, inched its way through the coral

cliffs that lined the west coast north of

White Beach 1. Meanwhile, most of the

remainder of the 2d Marine Division had

come ashore and by midafternoon General

Watson had set up his command post inland of White Beach 2.27

Marine casualties for the day were low,

and enemy opposition, although occasionally fierce, was spotty. Nevertheless, those

marines who did make contact with the

enemy developed a healthy respect for the

caliber of the Tinian garrison. The Japanese here were reported "to be better

troops than those encountered on Saipan,

with much better marksmanship."

 28

The fact is that immediately after the

failure of his night counterattack, Colonel

Ogata decided to disengage his forces and

establish a new defense line running from

Gurguan Point to the radio station inland

from the center of Asiga Bay. The brief

flurry of artillery fire that the 25th Marines

had encountered during their approach to

Mount Maga had merely been a delaying

action. The bulk of the Japanese troops

remaining in northern Tinian were withdrawing to the new line south of Mount

Lasso.29

On JIG plus 2 (26 July) General

Schmidt ordered the 4th Division, now on

the right, to continue the attack in a

southerly direction and the 2d Division to

drive straight toward the east coast.30 In

the 4th Division zone, the 23d Marines

pushed down the coast another 2,500 yards

to a point well below Faibus San Hilo

Point, while the 25th Marines occupied

Mount Lasso, which had been entirely

evacuated by the Japanese the day before.31

 At Mount Lasso the 25th Marines

reported evidence of "a careful, wellplanned withdrawal, removing dead and

destroying documents. Abandoned posi27

 This account is derived from 4th Marine

Div Opns Rpt Tinian, pp. 25-26; 2d Marine

Div Rpt Tinian, p. 2; Hoffman, Tinian, pp.

69-77.

28

 4th Marine Div D-2 Rpt 72. See also 2d

Marine Div D-2 Periodic Rpt 74. 29

 Japanese Studies in World War II, 55, p. 52. 30

 NTLF Opn Order 32-44. 31

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Tinian, pp. 26-27.
296 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

USHI POINT AIRFIELD, in the northern portion of Tinian. This field was a

major objective of the Tinian operation.

tions had been well dug-in and carefully

planned."

 32

On the corps left, meanwhile, the 8th

Marines took over Ushi Point airfield,

and its sister regiments sped on to the east

coast and prepared to swing south.33

Thus, in three days, the major tactical objectives of the Tinian invasion had been

achieved: Ogata's major counterattack

had been beaten off with a consequent loss

to him of about one fourth of his force;

Ushi Point airfield had been taken and was

already in the process of being made operational for American planes; Mount Lasso,

the commanding position of the island had

been occupied. In the words of the official

Marine Corps historian, "Seldom was the

victor of any of the Central Pacific conquests so unmistakably identified so early

in the fight."

 34

Drive to the South

From 27 through 30 July both Marine

divisions made rapid advances toward the

plateau that dominated the southern tip

of the island. Enemy resistance on the 27th

and 28th was almost nonexistent, but it

gradually stiffened as the Americans approached the Japanese last main defensive

line. During the 27th and 28th General

Schmidt employed what has been called an

"elbowing" technique. That is, on the first

day of the attack southward, he held back

the 4th Division on the right while the 2d

Division surged forward; the second day

32 the roles were exchanged. The ostensible 4th Marine Div D-2 Rpt 73, Annex, D-2

Material for Dispatch Summary 271700. 33

 2d Marine Div Rpt Tinian, pp. 2-3. 34

 Hoffman, Tinian, p. 76.
INVASION AND CAPTURE 297

OPEN TERRAIN OF CENTRAL TINIAN, which permitted rapid advance toward

the hill mass that dominates the southern tip of the island.

purpose of this tactic was to permit his

artillery to concentrate first in support of

one division, then of the other.35

On the 29th this technique was abandoned, and both divisions were ordered to

advance as rapidly within their respective

zones as conditions permitted.36 On the

right, the 4th Division on the 30th assaulted a series of well-camouflaged cave

positions on the west coast and after reducing them pushed on in and through Tinian

Town. Land mine fields on the town's outskirts and along the beaches of Sunharon

Bay slowed the advance a little, but the

town itself had been reduced to rubble by

naval gunfire and aerial bombardment and

had been evacuated.37 On the left,

the 2d Division faced a tougher proposition

as it came abreast the Masalog hill mass,

but by nightfall of the 30th the area was

overrun, and the Japanese were in retreat

to the south.38

Apparently Colonel Ogata had relinquished his mid-island line of defense almost as soon as it had been established,

and on the night of the 29th he moved his

command post to a shrine in a cliff near

Marpo Point. Seeing his delaying actions

crumble before the advancing Americans,

he ordered all Army and Navy forces to

assemble on the southern tip of the island

to defend the ridge line there.39

On their part, the Americans in four

days had pushed their lines ahead about

35

 Ibid., p. 86. 36

 NTLF Opn Orders 35, 36. 37

 4th Marine Div D-2 Periodic Rpt 77; Hoffman, Tinian, pp. 96-97.

38

 2d Marine Div Rpt Tinian, pp. 3-4; Hoffman, Tinian, pp. 98-100. 39

 4th Marine Div Representative Trans, Sec.

IX, p. 5.
298 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

155-MM. HOWITZER EMPLACEMENT ON TINIAN

10,000 yards on the left and 4,000 on the

right.40 Coming so soon after the prolonged

deadlocks of the Saipan battle, this seemed

indeed like a sprint. As General Cates expressed it, the marines were "heading for

the barn."

 41

One of the reasons for this rapid movement was the gently undulating terrain of

central Tinian, which permitted tanks to

be used with far greater effectiveness than

had been the case on Saipan. To each regiment was assigned one reinforced medium

tank company (eighteen tanks), a platoon

of four flame thrower tanks, and two light

tanks. Each of the tank companies stayed

with its parent regiment throughout the

operation, which of course facilitated tankinfantry co-ordination. Also, one infantry

regiment of each division was at all times

in reserve, thus giving its assigned tank

unit an opportunity to repair its vehicles. In addition, communications between tanks and infantry were markedly

improved over those on Saipan.42

Tinian's terrain also offered more favorable opportunities for the employment of

artillery than had Saipan's. Initially, all artillery in support of the 4th Marine Division was based on Saipan except for four

battalions of 75-mm. pack howitzers from

the 14th and 10th Marine Artillery Regiments. On 26 July the 3d Battalion,

14th Marines (105-mm. howitzers), came

ashore, followed the next day by the 105-

mm. howitzers of the 4th Artillery Battalion, V Amphibious Corps (attached to the

4th Marine Division), and the two 105-

mm. howitzer battalions of the 10th Marines.43

 On 28 July the 419th Field

Artillery Group of the XXIV Corps Artillery (155-mm. howitzers) displaced from

40

 See Hoffman, Tinian, Map 10, p. 87. 41

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Tinian, p. 29.

42

 Ibid., Annex C, Opns Rpt, p. 19; Ibid., Annex K, 4th Tank Bn Rpt. 43

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Tinian, Annex F,

14th Marines Rpt, pp. 4-6; 2d Marine Div SAR,

Phase III, FORAGER, Annex, 10th Marines Rpt,

pp. 1-3.
INVASION AND CAPTURE 299

Saipan to positions on Tinian, as did one

battery of the 106th Field Artillery Battalion (also 155-mm. howitzers). The

other two batteries of this battalion were

forced to return to their Saipan positions

since they were unable to land over the

White Beaches because of wrecked ponton

causeways there. The XXIV Corps Artillery's 420th Field Artillery Group remained on Saipan throughout, its 155-mm.

guns having sufficient range to hit any part

of the southern island.44

Corps artillery alone fired 1,404 missions,

totaling 46,309 rounds, during the assault

and capture of Tinian.45 Added to this, of

course, was the Marine divisions' organic artillery, which fired approximately

142,000 additional rounds.46 As one Japanese prisoner testified, "You couldn't

drop a stick without bringing down artillery."

 47

Close air support on Tinian was provided by Army P-47's flying from Isely

Field, as well as Navy carrier-based planes.

As the two Marine divisions started their

drive south from the Mount Lasso line,

Army and Navy aircraft alternated in providing air cover in advance of the troops,

averaging 175 sorties daily. Admiral Hill's

support aircraft commander, Commander

Osborne, had the final responsibility for

approving and directing all air strikes requested by the Marines on the front line.

Under him was the Commander, Support

Aircraft Ashore, who was stationed on Isely

Field with authority to exercise direct control over the P-47's. Final responsibility

for co-ordinating air, artillery, and naval

bombardment resided with a representative

from XXIV Corps Artillery at General

Schmidt's headquarters.48

Only in rare instances were supporting

aircraft directly coached into their targets

by air liaison parties attached to the infantry. The Navy command was fearful of

turning over control of supporting aircraft

to the ground troops for a variety of reasons. Neither the air liaison parties nor the

pilots were deemed sufficiently trained in

the niceties of air-ground co-ordination to

risk it. Air-ground communications were

uncertain chiefly because of unsatisfactory

and insufficient radio equipment. Finally,

the danger of decentralizing control of air

strikes over such a small target as Tinian

was considerable. Once the drive to the

south was under way, the marines had on

the front lines at all times at least twelve

battalions, each with its own air liaison

party. The lines themselves were often irregular and of course the front narrowed

as the troops approached the southern tip

of the island. Under these conditions, to

have allowed each battalion to control its

own called strikes would have seriously endangered the units on the flanks, and the

risk was considered unacceptable.49

On Tinian, as on Saipan, the time lag

between requests for and execution of air

strikes was a cause for dissatisfaction

among the ground troop commanders.

Even when the planes were on station

above the target, half an hour was usually

required to complete an air strike, and

when the planes had to be flown from their

mother carriers or from Isely Field, an

hour's delay was more common. One air

liaison party had to wait a full nineteen

44

 XXIV Corps Arty Final Rpt on FORAGER

Opn, Phases I and III, S-3 Rpt, p. 12. 45

 Ibid.

46

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase III, Incl F,

G-4 Rpt, and Incl D. 47

 4th Marine Div Representative Trails.

48

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER Tinian, Incl I; NTLF

Opn Plan 3-44, Annexes C, D, F. 49

 Hoffman, Tinian, p. 128.
300 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

hours to get its request honored, but that

was exceptional.50 Nevertheless, General

Cates and General Watson were both of

the opinion that the execution of air strikes

was several cuts above what it had been on

Saipan—largely because the pilots had

been better briefed, were more familiar

with the terrain, and were gaining experience.51

Naval fire support during the battle for

Tinian was also considered to be an improvement over that for Saipan, again because of greater experience on the part of

ships' companies and because of more

favorable terrain. Preparation fires were

commonly delivered on request of division

commanders before the morning jump-off

to supplement the field artillery, and

counterbattery interdiction and destructive

fires were delivered daily on call.52 In the

opinion of Lt. Col, E. G. Van Orman,

USMC, who was Holland Smith's naval

gunfire officer, "In the occupation of Tinian call fire procedure was carried out

much more satisfactorily than at either

Saipan or Guam because of experience

gained by all hands at Saipan and exchanged and clarified in meetings of all

personnel both afloat and ashore prior to

J-Day."

 53

Perhaps the most unusual features of the

battle for Tinian were the techniques that

were improvised for getting supplies over

the narrow beaches to the front-line troops

both during the initial amphibious phase

and later. Responsibility for preparing the

beaches themselves and for controlling traffic over them fell to the Army's 1341st

Engineer Battalion and the 2d Battalion,

20th Marines (the Engineer regiment of

the 4th Marine Division). The former was

assigned to White Beach 1, the latter to

White Beach 2. Both were landed on JIG

Day, at first operating under control of the

4th Marine Division and later (26 July)

coming under the direct command of General Schmidt's shore party officer, Col.

Cyril W. Martyr, USMC.54 Also on the

26th the 2d Battalion, 18th Marines (organic to the 2d Marine Division), came

ashore to assist at White Beach 2, to work

in the division dumps, and later to help

unload aircraft at Ushi Point airfield.55

To facilitate unloading on the White

Beaches, two ponton causeways were assembled on Saipan and on the afternoon

of 24 July were towed to Tinian. There

they were put to excellent use until the

night of 29 July, when the tail of a typhoon

that had been building up in the Philippine

Sea hit Tinian with full force. The storm

broached one of the artificial piers and

broke the other in two.56

It was during this typhoon that the

DUKW's once again demonstrated their

outstanding versatility and durability. About half of the 140 amphibian trucks

used on Tinian were crewed by Army personnel of the 477th Amphibian Truck

Company and the 27th Division Provisional

Amphibian Truck Company, the rest were

crewed by marines of the 1st and 2d Marine Amphibian Truck Companies. As the

seas mounted on the afternoon of 29 July,

50

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Tinian, Annex

E, Special Comments and Recommendations. 51

 2d Marine Div Rpt Tinian, p. 18; 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Tinian, Annex C, p. 12. 52

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER Tinian, Incl I, Naval

Gunfire Rpt. 53

 Ibid., p. 138.

54

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Tinian, Annex G,

20th Marines Rpt, pp. 1-4; NTLF Rpt Marianas,

Phase III, Annex J (2) , Engineer and Shore

Party Rpt, p. 1. 55

 2d Bn 18th Marines Rpt, p. 1. 56

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER Tinian, Incl J, Engineer and Shore Party Rpt, p. 2.
INVASION AND CAPTURE 301

broaching one LST and washing a landing

craft control boat up on the beach, it developed that of all the small craft and vehicles present, only the DUKW's were seaworthy enough to operate in the heavy

swells, and for the duration of the storm

they were solely responsible for overwater

supply.57

As General Schmidt's supply officer remarked, the DUKW's at Tinian "performed an astounding feat of supply."

 58

Equipped with A-frames, they carried most

of the artillery pieces from LST's directly

to firing positions ashore.59 They were

solely responsible for averting a serious fuel

shortage when the typhoon struck, since

they were the only means at hand for getting through the surf to fuel barges anchored off the northwest coast of Tinian.

Not only did they prove more seaworthy

than their sister amphibian vehicle, the

LVT, but over Tinian's fairly well

developed road system they delivered supplies more quickly to the troops as they

approached the southern end of the island

and also, of course, wrought much less

damage to the roads than did the tracked

vehicles.60

The DUKW's and LVT's bore the main

burden of shuttling supplies and equipment

of all kinds from the vessels lying off the

beaches straight to inland dumps, or even

to the men on the front lines as they

pushed farther southward. It was this direct and rapid system of supply, which

eliminated manhandling supplies on the

beaches, that struck most observers as the

outstanding feature of the Tinian battle.

In the words of General Schmidt's supply

officer:

This operation was in many ways a re- markable demonstration of the fact that preconceived notions and amphibious doctrine can be altered radically on the spot. In

effect, a reinforced corps was landed over

less than 200 yards of beach and over a difficult reef, and was supplied throughout nine

days of heavy combat without handling so much as one pound of supplies in the usual

shore party manner. Everything rolled in on

wheels. When a violent sea made impossible

the landing of trucks, the DUKW's took over

all supply, supplemented to a minor degree

by incoming air evacuation planes bringing

in rations. The troops never lacked what they

required at the time it was required.61

Tinian Secured

Nightfall of 30 July found the two Marine divisions drawn up on a line just north

of the hill mass that dominated the southern tip of Tinian. South of them was about

a mile of flat land that terminated in an

abrupt wooded escarpment rising to a plateau. Here Colonel Ogata had elected to

make his last desperate stand. The area

consisted mostly of an oblong mountain

mass about 5,000 yards long and 2,000

wide running generally in a northeastsouthwest direction. This high ground was

something like a huge mesa with the steep

ridges and cliffs of its shoulders supporting

the comparatively gentle slopes along the

57

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase III, Incl F,

G-4 Rpt, Sec. B, pp. 2-3. To supplement this

delivery, transport planes from Saipan flew rations to the front-line troops on Tinian. 58

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase III, G-4 Rpt,

Sec. B, pp. 2-3. 59

 This particular use of the specially adapted DUKW's had been introduced by the 7th Infantry Division at the invasion of Kwajalein. See

Crowl and Love, Gilberts and Marshalls, p. 227. 60

 Hoffman, Tinian, p. 136.

61

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase III, Incl F,

Supply Rpt, p. 4. This statement contains two

minor inaccuracies. The beaches were somewhat

more than 200 yards in width, and the vehicles

that carried supplies inland were tracked as well

as wheeled.
302 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

top. Of the two long sides, one faced the

flat land around Tinian Town, the other

met the sea on the east coast. The entire

southern tip sloped steeply to the water.

Colonel Ogata's defense line was drawn on

the forward (northwestern) slopes of the

hill mass.

On the morning of 31 July the marines

attacked as before with two divisions

abreast, the 4th on the right, 2d on the

left. Before the jump-off, two battleships

(Tennessee and California) and three

cruisers (Louisville, Montpelier, and Birmingham) fired about 615 tons of shells

into the area, and Army bombers dropped

about 69 tons of explosives.62

On the right the 24th Marines, supported by tanks and armored amphibians,

made slow but steady progress against

stiffening resistance along the coast line

south of Tinian Town, and by the end of

the day had advanced about 2,500

yards.63 The 23d Marines on the division

left faced greater obstacles as it came up

against the cliff line that marked the northwestern face of the plateau. With the help

of supporting tanks, the regiment knocked

out a 47-mm. antitank gun in the path of

its progress and at day's end dug in at the

foot of the cliff, though one company

reached the top and spent the night

there.64

On the left, the 2d Marine Division attacked with three regiments abreast. The

two left regiments, 2d and 6th Marines,

moved forward to the base of the cliff

against only light rifle and machine gun

fire, but the 8th Marines was not let off

so easy. In its zone lay the precipitous

double-hairpin road that offered the most

feasible route to the top of the plateau,

and to get even partial command of this

artery took a day of heavy fighting and

arduous climbing. By late afternoon one

company had reached the top of the cliff,

followed after dark by most of the two assault battalions of the 8th Marines, but, as

night fell, there was a gap of 600 yards on

the right and one of 350 yards on the left

of the Marine battalions atop the cliff. The

time and the situation were ripe for a Japanese counterattack, and it came as expected.65

Colonel Ogata personally led the

counterattack, which was directed mainly

against the 8th Marines atop the cliff. According to one Japanese prisoner of war,

Ogata was killed during the charge by

American machine guns and was last seen

hanging dead over the Marines' barbed

wire.66 About 2300 the Japanese first

struck elements of the 8th Marines but

were repulsed. Three hours later a force

of some 150 of the enemy suddenly rushed

the hairpin road up which the marines had

been trying to carry ammunition and other

supplies. There, the Japanese set up a roadblock, burned two ambulance jeeps, and

threatened to cut off the two American

battalions on top of the plateau. An hour

later a platoon of the enemy moved up the

road and attacked from the rear. In a short

but furious fire fight they were driven back

and their roadblock was eliminated. For

the next three hours, 75-mm. half-tracks,

mortars, and field artillery kept the enemy

at bay, but at 0515 came the final banzai

62

 TF 52 Rpt Tinian, pp. 79-80, 132. 63

 Hoffman, Tinian, Map 11, p. 103. 64

 4th Marine Div Opns Rpt Tinian, pp. 30-31;

Hoffman, Tinian, pp. 102-07.

65

 2d Marine Div Rpt Tinian, pp. 5-6; Hoffman, Tinian, pp. 107-10. 66

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase III, Incl D,

G-2 Rpt, pp. 18, 20, 21. A Japanese study of

the operation prepared after the war, on the other

hand, has Ogata still alive and leading another

counterattack as late as 3 August. Japanese

Studies in World War II, No. 55, p. 53.
INVASION AND CAPTURE 303

charge. For a full half hour the attackers

charged the Marine lines, but at no point

did they penetrate. Daybreak revealed over

a hundred enemy dead in an area only

about 70 yards square. Later interrogation

of prisoners indicated that the entire counterattacking force had numbered between

six and eight hundred.67

With the failure of this last counterattack, organized Japanese resistance quickly

came to an end. By late afternoon on 1

August both Marine divisions had reached

the southern edge of the cliff line, and at

1855 General Schmidt declared the island

secured.68 Mopping up, to be sure, was a

long and often bloody process.69 Not until

1 January 1945 were the remnants of the

enemy force considered sufficiently disposed of to permit the mop-up troops, the

8th Marines, to be transferred to Saipan.

In the three months after Tinian was

turned over to the island commander, Maj.

Gen. James L. Underhill, USMC, a total

of 542 Japanese were reported killed.70

All together, the capture of Tinian had

cost the invading ground forces a total of

328 killed and 1,571 wounded in action,

almost all of them Marine Corps personnel.71

 In exchange, the Japanese sacrificed

their entire garrison of more than eight

thousand men, most of them killed. More

significant than this death toll was the fact

that the U.S. forces had succeeded in

wresting from the enemy one of the best

airfield sites in the Central Pacific. Ushi

Point airfield and Gurguan Point airfield,

enlarged and expanded, became vital bases

for the XXI Bomber Command, which in

the spring and summer of 1945 would unleash its very long range bombers against

the Japanese homeland with such devastating effect. Significantly, it was from Ushi

Point airfield that the B-29 Enola Gay,

took off on 6 August 1945 to drop the first

atomic bomb on the city of Hiroshima.72

Tinian was largely a Marine Corps show.

A Marine headquarters made the tactical

plans and Marine infantrymen carried the

main burden of attacking and overrunning

the island. Nevertheless, the Army's role

was by no means negligible. In the ship-toshore movement, over half of the amphibian tractors were provided by the Army

and crewed by soldiers. Half of the amphibian trucks that landed the artillery and

later, during the typhoon, played such an

important role in supplying the troops,

were Army-manned. An Army engineer

battalion acted as shore party for one of the

landing beaches. Army artillery played a

decisive part in the preliminary bombardment and in supporting the marines after

they had landed. Finally, Army P-47's flew

continuous close support missions in front

of the Marine infantry. Since so much of

the success of the operation depended upon

artillery based on Saipan, on the efficient

work of the amphibian vehicles, on the organization of the supply system at the

beaches, and on close air support, it can

be concluded that the Army's share in the

reduction of Tinian was far out of proportion to the number of its personnel actually

committed to the operation.

67

 Hoffman, Tinian, pp. 109-13.

68

 NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase III, p. 15.

69

 Pfc. Robert L. Wilson of the 2d Battalion,

6th Marines, was posthumously awarded the

Medal of Honor for covering with his own body

a live hand grenade on 3 August, two days after

Tinian had been declared secured. For a similar

feat performed on 30 July, Pvt. Joseph W. Ozbourn, 1st Battalion, 23d Marines, was given the

same award. Hoffman, Tinian, pp. 98, 117. 70

 Hoffman, Tinian, p. 121. 71

 Ibid., App. III, p. 150. 72

 Craven and Cate, AAF V, pp. 715-17.

PART FOUR

GUAM

CHAPTER XV

Plans and Preparations

The Island

To the invaders of Guam, southernmost

of the Marianas chain, the physiography of

the island presented essentially the same

problems and challenges that had already

been encountered at Saipan—those for

Guam were just on a larger scale. Located

a little more than a hundred miles south of

Saipan, Guam is more than twice its size,

measuring 228 square miles in area. From

Ritidian Point in the north to the southern

coast line, the distance is about thirty-four

miles; the width of the island varies from

five to nine miles.1 (Map V.)

Guam, like Saipan, is surrounded by

coral reefs ranging in width from 25 to 700

yards. Even the lowest of these is covered

at high tide by only about two feet of water

—a condition that of course made the employment of amphibian tractors mandatory

in the projected ship-to-shore movement.

Around the entire northern half of the island from Fadian Point on the east coast

to Tumon Bay on the west, sheer cliffs rising to 600 feet ruled that area out for

landing. In the southern part of the island

the shore line cliffs are somewhat less forbidding, but even so in many places, such

as at the tip of Orote Peninsula on the

west coast, they are still too precipitous to

permit rapid movement inland by any large

numbers of men approaching from the sea.

The southern and southeast coasts, exposed

as they are to the prevailing easterly winds,

are pounded too heavily by surf to permit

easy landing operations. This leaves about

fifteen miles of coast line feasible for an

amphibious assault, all on the west coast,

north and south of Orote Peninsula. At

various places in this region, the reef is

low enough and the sandy beaches are both

wide and deep enough to permit invading

troops to get ashore and establish a foothold

before assaulting the mountainous terrain

inland.

Although nowhere does Guam's mountain range reach the heights of Mount Tapotchau on Saipan, it still presents obstacles of no mean proportions. The northern

part consists almost entirely of a coral limestone plateau broken by three elevations,

Mount Barrigada (674 feet), Mount Santa

Rosa (870 feet), and Mount Machanao

(610 feet). The central part, the waist of

the island between Agana Bay and Pago

Bay, is mostly lowland draining into the

Agana River through a wide swamp of the

same name. Just south of the waist the land

begins to rise again toward the mountain

range that runs to the southern tip of the

island. Dominating the northern part of this

range are Mount Chachao, Mount Alutom,

1

 This account of the physical features of Guam

is derived from ONI 99, and Military Intelligence

Service, War Department (MIS WD), Survey of

Guam, 1943.
308 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

CLIFF LINE AT TIP OF OROTE PENINSULA

and Mount Tenjo, all inland from Apra

Harbor and all attaining more than a

thousand feet. East of Agat Bay below

Orote Peninsula lies Mount Alifan (869

feet); south of it and inland from Facpi

Point is Mount Lamlam, the highest point

on the island (1,334 feet).2

Though Guam's mountain mass is not so

high as Saipan's, its vegetation is lusher,

heavier, and thicker. A degree and a half of

latitude in this area of the world makes a

difference, and Guam is considerably more

tropical than the northern island. At the

time of the invasion the northern section

of Guam was heavily covered with tropical

forests, weeds, trailing vines, lianas, air

plants, and underbrush—all combining to

make foot passage almost impossible except through man-made jungle trails. The

mountain tops themselves were mostly barren volcanic rock covered only with sparse

growths of sword grass and scrub. The

southern plateau was covered mostly with

sword, cogon, and bunch grass and scrub

forest, except between Mount Alifan and

Mount Lamlam, where timber grew in

fairly large stands.

To facilitate passage over and through

this rough and forbidding country there

were, in the summer of 1944, about a hundred miles of hard-surface road, linked together by single-lane unsurfaced roads and

a network of narrow jungle trails cut

through the bush. The main road ran from

the town of Agat along the west coast to

Agana, then northeast to Finegayan, where

it split into two parallel branches, each

terminating near Mount Machanao near

the northern tip of the island. Another

branch of the same road ran northeast to

the village of Yigo, where it dwindled into

a narrow unsurfaced road that continued

on almost to Pati Point, on the northeast2

 Heights of land are derived from Army Map

Service, Map, Island of Guam, Scale 1:62,500,

Washington, 1944.
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 309

OROTE PENINSULA

ern coast. Also from Agana to Pago Bay on

the east coast stretched a main artery that

continued south and west along the coast

line to Umatac. Umatac and Agat on the

west coast were connected only by a dirt

road.

Except for the surfaced highways, the

roads and trails were normally all but impassable during the rainy season, which

lasted from July to November. During this

summer monsoon period, 20 to 25 days out

of each month were rainy. Mean temperature was about 87° Fahrenheit and average humidity about 90 percent—factors

that would increase the discomfort of combat troops, whether American or Japanese.

Plans for the Invasion

Guam was initially included in the list

of American targets for 1944 by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff directive of 12 March 1944

that ordered Admiral Nimitz to prepare to

seize and occupy the southern Marianas.

Like the islands to the north, it offered

sites for B-29 bases and, in addition, Apra

Harbor was the best ship anchorage in the

entire archipelago, having excellent possibilities for development into a small forward naval base. Then too, Guam, like the

Philippines, had been an American possession; its native population was presumed

loyal to the United States, and its liberation deemed a moral obligation.

Little more than a week had passed since

the 12 March directive when Admiral

Nimitz issued a preliminary order (dated

20 March) for the seizure of the southern

Marianas, including Guam. Saipan and

Tinian were assigned to the V Amphibious

Corps. To the III Amphibious Corps,

commanded by General Geiger, USMC,

went the job of recapturing Guam.3 Gen3

 Actually at this date the unit was named I

Marine Amphibious Corps (I MAC), but on 15

April its designation was changed to III Amphibious Corps. To avoid confusion the latter title

is used throughout this volume.

PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 311

MAJ. GEN, ROY S. GEIGER

eral Geiger was to have under his command the 3d Marine Division; the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, consisting of the

4th and 22d Marine Regiments, reinforced;

III Amphibious Corps Artillery; and the

9th and 14th Marine Defense Battalions.

The 27th Infantry Division was constituted

Expeditionary Troops Reserve for the entire force of the two corps. The 77th Infantry Division, commanded by Maj, Gen.

Andrew D. Bruce—still in the United

States but scheduled shortly to move to

Hawaii—was designated Area Reserve.

Twenty days after Saipan was assaulted,

the 77th was alerted for movement into the

Marianas.4

Command relationships between the top

commanders for the Guam phase (Phase

III) of the Marianas operation were to be

in every way similar to those that were obtained for Saipan and Tinian. Under Admiral Nimitz, Admiral Spruance as Commander, Fifth Fleet, was in over-all command. Under him came Admiral Turner,

Commander, Joint Expeditionary Force

(Task Force 51), and General Holland

Smith, Commander, Expeditionary Troops

(Task Force 56), whose respective powers

and responsibilities on this echelon of command have already been described.5

 The

Joint Expeditionary Force was in turn divided into two groups. The first, called

Northern Attack Force (Task Force 52),

also under Admiral Turner, was directed

to land and support the assault troops on

Saipan and Tinian. The second, designated

Southern Attack Force, commanded by

Admiral Conolly, USN, was given the same

task for Guam. In like manner, General

Holland Smith's Expeditionary Troops was

split into two parts: Northern Troops and

Landing Force (Task Group 56.1) consisting mainly of the V Amphibious Corps plus

the XXIV Corps Artillery and commanded

also by General Smith was allocated to Saipan and Tinian; Southern Troops and

Landing Force (Task Group 56.2), made

up mostly of the III Amphibious Corps,

commanded by General Geiger, was destined for Guam. The command relationships between General Geiger and Admiral

Conolly were essentially the same as those

that obtained between General Smith as

Commander, Northern Troops and Landing Force, and Admiral Turner as Commander, Northern Attack Force.6

 Thus,

during the ship-to-shore movement, Con4

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl B, G-5 Rpt, pp.

1-5.

5

 See above, p. 33.

6

 TF 56 Opn Plan 2-44, 11 Apr 44; Opn Plan

3-44, 26 Apr 44; III Phib Corps Opn Plan 1-44,

11 May 44, Annex King.
312 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

olly was to command the landing force

through Geiger. Once Geiger determined

that the status of the landing operation

permitted, he was to assume command of

the troops on shore and report that fact to

the task force commander. (Chart 2)

Planning for the invasion of Guam was

somewhat complicated by the vast distances that lay between the headquarters

of the various commanders concerned.

General Geiger's III Amphibious Corps

headquarters was located at Guadalcanal;

General Holland Smith's Expeditionary

Troops staff was at Pearl Harbor, as

were Admirals Spruance, Turner, and Conolly and their staffs. The 77th Division was

still in the United States during the period

when the initial plans for the landing were

being worked out.

On 29 March, General Geiger flew to

Pearl Harbor, where for better than a

week he conferred with General Smith and

Admirals Turner and Conolly and their respective staffs. A week after Geiger's departure from Pearl Harbor, Admiral Conolly flew to Guadalcanal, where the two

commanders completed their planning and

ironed out some of the many complicated

problems involving naval-ground force coordination in the forthcoming landing.7

The upshot of these various conferences

was the promulgation of one preferred and

two alternate landing plans for Guam. The

preferred plan called for simultaneous landings on the west coast by the 3d Marine

Division between Adelup Point and Tatgua

River and by the 1st Provisional Marine

Brigade between the town of Agat and

Bangi Point. The landing day (designated

W Day) was tentatively set as 18 June,

three days after D Day for Saipan.8

To support the troops, Admiral Conolly

split his Southern Attack Force into two

groups, Northern and Southern Attack

Groups. The former, commanded by Conolly himself, was, under the preferred

landing plan, to support the 3d Marine

Division; the later, to be commanded by

Rear Adm. Lawrence F. Reifsnider, USN,

would perform the same function for the

1st Provisional Brigade. The provisions for

naval gunfire support during and after the

landing closely paralleled those established

for the Saipan operation. Before W Day,

ships and aircraft of Admiral Conolly's

Task Force 53 were to co-ordinate their

bombardments with scheduled strikes by

aircraft from Admiral Mitscher's Task

Force 58. On W minus 2 and W minus 1,

Task Force 53 was charged with responsibility for close-range support of underwater

demolition teams and for destruction of

coastal defense guns and antiaircraft and

field artillery batteries on the landing

beaches and of areas immediately inland.

During the evenings ships of Task Force

53 were to provide harassing fires and some

time during this period were to conduct a

diversionary bombardment on the east

coast of Guam.9

On W Day itself the first priority for

the fire support ships would be counterbattery fire, beginning at dawn, on known

and suspected enemy positions. Secondary

attention would be paid to local defenses

by close-range fire. Third priority would be

given to interdiction fire against any roads

7

 III Phib Corps Rpt Guam Opn, 3 Sep 44,

pp. 1-2.

8

 III Phib Corps Opn Plan 1-44, 11 May 44;

Opn Plan 3-44, 30 May 44; Opn Plan 4-44, 9

Jun 44.

9

 III Phib Corps Opn Plan 1-44, Annex C,

Naval Gunfire Support Plan.
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 313

leading to the landing beaches. Shortly before H Hour naval gunfire was to shift to

close support fire on the flanks of the landing beaches. When the leading tractor

waves were 1,200 yards from shore, cruisers

were to lift their main batteries to the inland areas with an accelerated rate of fire

to neutralize mobile batteries and mortars.

Five-inch gunfire was to be maintained

along the beaches while naval aircraft

strafed and bombed the same area. When

the leading assault wave of LVT(A)'s was

500 yards from shore, the 5-inch batteries

were to shift fire to the near flanks of the

beaches. One novel safety factor was introduced into the plans for Guam that had

not been prescribed for the other landings

in the Marianas. During the period when

air and naval bombardment was to be conducted simultaneously, ships were ordered

to restrict their fire to a maximum range

of 8,000 yards, which meant in effect a

maximum shell ordinate of about 1,200

feet. At the same time pilots were instructed to fly no lower than 1,500 feet.10

After H Hour, ships were to continue

scheduled fires until ordered to stop. Call

fires, it was planned, would be available as

soon as communication with the shore fire

control parties on the beaches was set up,

and fire support ships were then to be prepared to deliver harassing fire, interdiction

fire, star shell and searchlight illumination,

and white phosphorus projectile fire on

call.11

Admiral Conolly, as Commander, Northern Attack Group, was to control the naval

fire in support of the 3d Marine Division's

landing over the Asan beaches, while Admiral Reifsnider was to control bombardment of the brigade's beaches in the Agat

area. Control of aircraft over both sets of

beaches was to be exercised by Admiral

Conolly alone through his Commander,

Support Aircraft, stationed aboard the task

force flagship, the AGC Appalachian. This

officer was assigned control of combat air

patrols, antisubmarine patrols, close air

support of troops, and a variety of special

missions. He would control not only the

planes flown from the carriers attached to

Task Force 53 but also planes flown from

the fast carriers of Task Force 58 from the

time of their arrival over the combat area

until their departure for recovery by their

parent ships.12

Before the arrival of Appalachian in the

Guam area, an Advance Commander, Support Aircraft, embarked on the cruiser

Honolulu, would discharge these functions.

A standby Commander, Support Aircraft,

embarked in Admiral Reifsnider's flagship

George Clymer, was assigned the temporary

additional duty of Commander, Landing

Force Support Aircraft. He was to assume

this role under the command of General

Geiger after the latter had established his

command post ashore. The plan provided

that when the Landing Force Support Aircraft commander was ready to take control

of aircraft (land-based and carrier-based)

in direct support of the troops, he was to

advise Admiral Conolly and thereafter, under Conolly, would assume control of all

support aircraft over Guam. Requests for

carrier-based and distant land-based aircraft were to be sent by the Commander,

Landing Force Support Aircraft, to Admiral Conolly, who would effect the arrangements for getting the planes on station and notify the Commander, Landing 10

 TF 53 Opn Plan A162-44, 17 May 44,

Annex D, Vol. I, pp. 1-15. 11

 Ibid.

12

 III Phib Corps Opn Plan 1-44, Annex D,

Air Support Plan.
314 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Force Support Aircraft, of their estimated

time of arrival at the rendezvous point.13

This procedure would automatically give

the landing force commander (General

Geiger), through his air representative,

more direct control over the aircraft employed in the support of his troops than

was the case at Saipan and Tinian. There

the Commander, Attack Force Support

Aircraft, afloat, had kept close rein on all

troop support missions flown from carriers.

To avoid conflict between air support

strikes and field artillery fire, Commander,

Support Aircraft, or Commander, Landing

Force Support Aircraft, was to request a

cessation of fire from the commanding general of III Amphibious Corps Artillery for

the duration of the air strike. Further coordination was to be secured through air

observers, artillery spotters, and through

the air co-ordinator. The function of the

latter was to direct scheduled air strikes

from the air and to report developments

of the ground situation. Marine air observers were to keep General Geiger informed on the ground situation, while

artillery spotters would direct Marine artillery fire.

Preliminary air strikes on Guam were to

begin on D Day at Saipan and last until

W Day minus 1 under direction of the Advance Commander, Support Aircraft. On

W Day itself a major air strike was scheduled to last for half an hour, from H Hour

minus 90 minutes to H Hour minus 60 minutes. During this period forty-six fighters

and ninety-six dive bombers were to bomb

and strafe gun positions and beach installations in the two landing areas and surrounding territory.14

Change of Plans

Following intensive amphibious training

and rehearsals in the Guadalcanal area,15

the various Marine units of the III

Amphibious Corps set sail aboard the

transports and LST's of Task Force 53 and

arrived at the staging area at Kwajalein

Atoll on 8 June. After a brief period allowed for fueling, watering, and provisioning, the convoy put to sea again and by

15 June had arrived at its designated assembly area over a hundred miles to the

east of Saipan. There it waited for ten days,

cruising idly through the open seas, while

higher authorities debated the feasibility of

an early landing on Guam.

Originally, W Day for the assault had

been tentatively set as 18 June, but events

on Saipan and in the adjacent waters made

a postponement mandatory. As already indicated, the 27th Infantry Division, at

first designated as reserve for the Saipan

and Guam phases of the Marianas invasion, had to be committed in its entirety to

Saipan, Furthermore, the Japanese Mobile

Fleet had been sighted steaming toward

the Marianas with the apparent intention

of giving battle, and it was obvious folly to

send the slow-moving troop transports and

LST's of Task Force 53 into the waters

west of Guam. Hence, Admiral Spruance

canceled W Day and ordered Conolly's

task force to remain out of danger well to

the east of Saipan.

By 25 June the situation ashore on Saipan had improved sufficiently to warrant

releasing the III Amphibious Corps from

its duties as floating reserve for the V

13

 Ibid.

14

 Ibid., App. 1.

15

 See Major O. R. Lodge, USMC, The Recapture of Guam, Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (Washington, 1954) (hereafter cited as Lodge, Guam),

pp. 26-28.
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 315

Corps. Accordingly, the ships carrying the

3d Marine Division sailed back to Eniwetok

where they were followed five days later

by the rest of the vessels carrying the 1st

Provisional Marine Brigade.16 By early

July, with the Saipan battle over two weeks

old, thought could at last be given to deciding on a firm date for the landing on

Guam. As a result of conferences among

Admirals Turner, Hill, and Conolly and

Generals Holland Smith and Geiger, 25

July was recommended. These commanders

deemed an earlier attack on Guam inadvisable because, as Admiral Spruance expressed it to Admiral Nimitz, "The character of enemy resistance being encountered in Saipan and the increase over the

original estimates of enemy strength in

Guam" made the presence of the entire

77th Infantry Division necessary.17

Admiral Nimitz was anxious to schedule

the assault for 15 July, by which time it

was presumed that at least one regimental

combat team of the 77th Division could

be dispatched to the scene of operations.

Nevertheless, he deferred to the judgment

of the officers present in the combat area

and agreed to delay W Day until the whole

of the Army division had arrived at Eniwetok. On 6 July Admiral Spruance was

advised that the last two regimental combat teams of the 77th Division to leave

Hawaii could reach Eniwetok by 18 July,

four days earlier than expected. Consequently, W Day was advanced to 21 July.

The 305th Infantry of the 77th Division

was constituted reserve for the 1st Provisional Brigade and ordered to land on the

Agat beaches sometime after the brigade

had gone ashore. The rest of the division

was designated corps reserve and was ordered to prepare to land "about William

plus 2 Day on designated Beaches between

Agat Village and Facpi Point"—also in

the brigade zone.18

77th Infantry Division

Training and Preparation

For the 77th Infantry Division, the invasion of Guam was to be the first chapter

of a distinguished combat record in the

Pacific war. Activated in March 1942, the

unit spent its first two years in the United

States undergoing training in basic infantry warfare and in various specialties such

as desert warfare at Camp Hyder, Arizona,

mountain warfare in West Virginia, and

amphibious warfare in the Chesapeake Bay

area. In May 1943 General Bruce assumed

command of the division. A veteran of

World War I, General Bruce was a graduate of the Infantry School, the Field Artillery School, the Command and General Staff School, the Army War College,

and the Naval War College. Before he assumed command of the 77th Division he

completed a tour of duty in the Operations

and Training Division of the War Department General Staff and commanded the

Tank Destroyer Center at Camp Hood.19

By March 1944 the division was located

at Oahu, and for the next three months it

was put through an intensive indoctrination in the techniques of warfare peculiar

to the Pacific area under the direction of

General Richardson's United States Army

16

 TF 53 Opn Rpt Guam, 10 Aug 44, pp. 5-6. 17

 Comdr Fifth Fleet, Final Rpt on Opn to

Capture the Marianas, p. 5.

18

 III Phib Corps Opn Plan 1-44, Addendum,

10 Jul 44. 19

 Ours To Hold It High, The History of the

77th Infantry Division in World War II By Men

Who Were There (Washington: Infantry Journal

Press, 1947), pp. 1-40.
316 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Forces in the Central Pacific Area (USAFICPA). Infantrymen were trained as flame

thrower and demolition men so as to avoid

the necessity of relying exclusively on engineers to perform these functions in combat. Officers and noncommissioned officers

took a forward-observers course to reduce

dependence on artillery personnel. The

706th Tank Battalion trained with the infantry regiments in mutual close-in support, combined maneuver problems, and

landing operations. The entire division

spent six days at the Unit Jungle Training

Center on Oahu. Amphibious training for

the infantrymen consisted of net-climbing,

embarkation, and debarkation from mockup ships, transfer of personnel and equipment from LCVP's to LVT's at sea, and

landing on beaches in wave formation. Artillery units conducted test landings from

LST's and practiced landing operations in

DUKW's and LVT's with battalion landing

teams. Experiments in loading and landing

155-mm. guns from LCM's, LST's, and

LCT's were made. The 77th Division Reconnaissance Troop held four days of

practice with destroyer escorts, and part

of the 292d JASCO trained with Navy

aircraft at Maui. The JASCO's shore fire

patrol party conducted destroyer firing exercises at the naval gunnery range on Kahoolawe Island. The only important feature

missing from the program was the customary last-minute ship-to-shore rehearsal,

which had to be foregone because of the

lack of time. For most of the period the

XXIV Corps, to which the division had

initially been assigned, assisted in the

training. Not until 22 June, almost on the

eve of its departure from Oahu, was the

division released to the V Amphibious

Corps, the Marine Corps' administrative

and training command in the Hawaiian

area.20

At the time the division set sail from

Hawaii in the first week of July, it was

still a matter of doubt as to how and where

it would be employed on Guam. Not until

the middle of the month when the troop

transports had reached Eniwetok was General Bruce fully apprised of the intentions

of his superiors in regard to his unit. This

meant that there was very little time before

the target date to complete plans and to

disseminate them to subordinate units. An

additional handicap was the fact that not

until they arrived at Guam itself were the

commanding general and his staff able to

establish personal contact with higher, adjacent, and supporting units.21

Despite these difficulties, by 15 July

General Bruce was able to promulgate

three plans (one preferred and two alternates) for the division's commitment. The

plan already devised by III Amphibious

Corps had contemplated the seizure of a

Force Beachhead Line to extend from

Adelup Point along the Mount AlutomMount Tenjo-Mount Alifan ridge line to

Facpi Point. According to the corps' preferred plan, the 3d Marine Division would

land between Adelup Point and the mouth

of the Tatgua River and move south to

the Apra Harbor area while the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, with the 305th

Regimental Combat Team of the 77th Division attached, would land between the

town Agat and Bangi Point and then wheel

north to the base of Orote Peninsula.

20

 USAFICPA Participation Rpt Marianas,

Vol. I, pp. 24, 68, 171, 172, 266, 276, 289-93;

Vol. II, pp. 315, 337. See Appendix D for order

of battle of the 77th Infantry Division for the

Guam operation. 21

 77th Inf Div Opn Rpt FORAGER, 21 Jul-16

Aug 44, p. 17.
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 317

Gearing his own plans to this schedule

of operations, General Bruce directed the

2d Battalion, 305th, with a platoon of the

706th Tank Battalion, to assemble at the

line of departure two hours after H Hour

and be ready to land on order of the 1st

Provisional Marine Brigade. The other two

battalions of the 305th were free of specific

instructions except to be ready to debark

and land, also on brigade order. As corps

reserve, the 306th and 307th Regiments

would land on corps order over the same

beaches as the brigade, move to assembly

areas, and be prepared to relieve the brigade of the duty of defending the final

beachhead line.22

The two alternate plans prepared for the

Army division's commitment were both

based on the assumption that the Marines'

preferred plan would be put in effect. One

of these contemplated a landing by the

306th and 307th Infantry Regiments near

Adelup Point, whence they would move

southwest to assembly areas and be prepared to attack either south toward Mount

Tenjo or southeast toward Pago Bay. The

second called for landings by the same two

regiments on the northwestern coast between Uruno and Ritidian Points, from

which positions they would move southwest

in order to secure from the rear a beachhead at Tumon Bay.23

This second plan was particularly dear

to General Bruce's heart.24 He wanted the

two regiments of the 77th Division that

were in corps reserve (the 306th and

307th) to land at dawn or just before

dawn near the northwest tip of Guam

about four days after the initial amphibious assault. They would then drive rapidly

south and capture a beachhead at Tumon Bay from the rear. They would land

without heavy equipment, but once the

Tumon Bay beaches were secured necessary supplies and equipment and possibly

other infantry elements could be landed

there. The concept of the plan, as Bruce

expressed it, was "for the 77th Division to

become a hammer striking forwards and

eventually on the anvil, i.e., the Force

Beach Line. Should the enemy divert sufficient forces to halt this Division for any

appreciable length of time it should be

possible for the 77th Division to become

the anvil and the forces occupying the FBL

to become the hammer."

 25

Immediately upon his arrival at Eniwetok on 11 July, General Bruce, with characteristic enthusiasm, pressed this scheme

on the Marine commanders present. None

of them warmed to the proposal, and Maj.

Gen. Alien H. Turnage told him he had

better drop the idea. The Marines were

reluctant to divert the corps reserve to a

secondary landing for fear it might be

needed to support the assault troops at

the main beachheads. Undaunted by this

22

 77th Inf Div Opn Plan I, 15 Jul 44, 77th

Inf Div Initial Opn Plans and Adm Orders

Guam, Jun-Jul 44. 23

 77th Inf Div Opn Plan II and III, 15, Jul

44, 77th Inf Div Initial Opn Plans and Adm

Orders Guam, Jun-Jul 44. 24

 Throughout his entire World War II service

as commanding general of the 77th Division, General Bruce was an enthusiastic supporter of the

concept of the "amphibious end run," that is, of

secondary amphibious landings to the rear of the

main Force Beachhead Line. During the Leyte

operation he succeeded in getting the idea accepted

with the result that the 77th Division made a

highly successful landing at Ormoc. At Okinawa

he tried to persuade his immediate superiors to

let his division make a similar landing on the

southern coast of the island to the rear of the

Japanese main line of resistance, but the plan was

rejected. 25

 Hq 77th Inf Div, Alternate Opn Plan Employment 77th Div in Corps Reserve, 14 Jul 44.
318 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

cold reception, Bruce sent a despatch outlining his plan to General Geiger, who had

already sailed for the Marianas aboard Admiral Conolly's flagship, Appalachian. The

corps commander rejected the plan on the

grounds that it was then too late to make

any radical changes.26

Loading and Embarkation

77th Division

In the Hawaiian area where the 77th

Division loaded and embarked for the

Guam operation, its logistical needs were

handled by the supply section of General

Richardson's headquarters and its subordinate agencies and by Commander, Service

Force Pacific, a naval organization, Holland Smith's staff determined the amounts

of each class of supplies to be landed

initially and supervised or at least checked

the tentative loading plans. In the early

phases of the logistical planning, it was not

considered necessary to provide initial combat supplies to the division because the

earlier operation plans did not call for its

commitment within thirty-five days of the

Marine assault landings.27 Once the division was designated area reserve and then,

in mid-June, alerted for movement to the

Marianas, supply activities were naturally

accelerated.

General Bruce's first supply order was

issued on 24 June and specified the levels

of initial supply for each class:

Class I

Rations

Type B

10-in-1 pack

Type C

Type K

Type D

Assault candy ration

Rations accessory pack

10 days

10 days

7 days

3 days

2 days

2 per man

20 days

Water

In 5-gallon containers and 55-gallon drums, 2

gallons per man per day for 5 days; 1 water

point unit for each RCT; 2 water distillation

units for each engineer combat battalion.

Class II

20 days maintenance of clothing, equipment,

and general supplies, bulk clothing and individual

equipment carried by RCT's to be equally distributed in all ships and landed early.

Class III

Fuels and lubricants 20 days

Class IV

Chemical Warfare

Engineer

Ordnance

Quartermaster

Medical

Signal

20 days

20 days

20 days

20 days

30 days

20 days

Class V

Antiaircraft weapons

All other weapons

10 CINCPOA U/F

7 CINCPOA U/F2 8

Like the 27th Division before it went to

Saipan, and unlike any of the Marine

divisions destined for the Marianas, the

77th complied enthusiastically with General

Holland Smith's directive that between 25

and 50 percent of all supplies be palle26

 Ltr, Lt Gen Andrew D. Bruce, USA (Rct),

to Gen A. C. Smith, 11 Feb 55, with Incl 2 (copy

of FORAGER Notes kept by General Bruce), OCMH. 27

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl E, G-4 Rpt, p. 8.

28

 77th Inf Div Administrative Order 1, 24

Jun 44, pp. 1-3. Later the number of days supply

of 10-in-1 pack rations was changed to 20. Maj.

Gen. Andrew D. Bruce, "Administration, Supply,

and Evacuation of the 77th Infantry Division on

Guam," Military Review, XXIV (December,

1944), 3. For the composition of CINCPOA units

of fire, see Appendix B.
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 319

tized.29 All together, the division built

about five thousand pallets, but about a

thousand of these were dismantled before

being loaded aboard ship because they

would not fit into available spaces in the

holds or because they were too difficult to

handle in holds where fingerlifts were not

available.30 In contrast, the marines bound

for Guam palletized none of their supplies,

partly because they lacked the building materials and equipment to handle them and

partly because they were still skeptical as

to whether pallets could be satisfactorily

hauled ashore over a coral reef.31

To lift the more than 18,000 troops and

the 21,428 tons of supplies and equipment

of the 77th Division from Hawaii to Eniwetok and then on to Guam, the Navy

provided seven attack transports, four

transports, three AKA's, two AK's, and

three LST's. The LST's carried 612 troops

and the 53 DUKW's allotted to the division. The DUKW's were the only amphibian vehicles allowed the 77th; no LVT's

were taken along since the division was not

scheduled to go into the beach in assault.32

Loading the vessels was complicated by

the fact that the 77th Division had less

than two weeks' advance notice as to how

many ships would be made available to it

and what their characteristics would be.

Loading plans therefore had to be sketchy

and tentative, since they could not be made

final until approved by the commanding

officer of each ship. The vessels themselves

did not arrive at Oahu until forty-eight

hours before the date set to begin loading.

To troops who were about to embark on

their first amphibious operation, the delay

of course was maddening. One battalion

commander later recalled that his transport

quartermaster, the troop officer in charge

of loading, "worried for 5 straight days

without sleep, as did most of his assistants."

 33

 The 305th Regimental Combat

Team was the first of the regiments to be

loaded, and it left Honolulu on 1 July.

Embarkation was hasty, troops and cargo

were loaded simultaneously, and much confusion resulted. The other two regiments

had to await the return of transports that

had been involved in the first phase of the

Marianas operation at Saipan. They did

not leave Hawaii until 8 July.34

The Marines

The Marine units embarking for the

Guam operation had one distinct advantage over the 77th Division in that their

assigned shipping was present in their

mounting area, the Solomon Islands, well

in advance of the embarkation date. Admiral Conolly and his staff arrived at

Guadalcanal on 15 April for a stay of

nearly a month of preliminary planning

with the III Amphibious Corps, The naval

forces assigned to Task Force 53 were

largely from Admiral Halsey's South Pacific Area and had engaged in the Hollandia operation before putting in to bases in

the Solomons on 10 May. Before their return for attachment to Conolly's task force,

arrangements had been made to station

29

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl G, Transport QM

Rpt, p. 15. 30

 77th Inf Div Adm Order 1, 24 Jun 44;

Bruce, "Administration, Supply, and Evacuation

. . .," Military Review, XXIV, 6. 31

 III Phib Corps Rpt Guam, Incl A, Supply

Rpt.

32

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl G, Transport QM

Rpt, pp. 515, 517, Incl BB.

33

 Ltr, Col James E. Landrum, Jr., to Gen A. C.

Smith, 27 Apr 55, and Incl, OCMH. 34

 Ibid., p. 20; 77th Inf Div Opn Rpt FORAGER,

305th RCT Rpt, p. 12.
320 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

them at Guadalcanal, Efate, Espiritu Santo,

and Hathorn Sound so as to avoid overcrowding Guadalcanal and Tulagi.35

Because of the presence of the ships in

the immediate area of the points of embarkation, there was ample time for the

transport division commanders and ship

captains to check thoroughly the loading

plans of the various units. Such difficulty

as was encountered centered primarily

around the loading and embarkation of the

1st Provisional Marine Brigade, which had

only recently been formed and had not had

as much time to prepare detailed plans as

had the 3d Marine Division.36

More important was the fact that early

in May the naval lift allotted to the assault

units was unexpectedly ordered to carry

more than five hundred troops of Maj.

Gen. Henry L. Larsen's Island Command

Headquarters Group, which was destined

for garrison duties on Guam after it was

secured. This raised additional demands on

the already limited shipping space, and the

result was that the marines had to leave a

good number of their organic vehicles behind when they sailed from the Solomons,

Their supply of amphibian vehicles, however, was not curtailed. The 358 LVT's of

the 3d and 4th Amphibian Tractor Battalions were assigned respectively to the 3d

Marine Division and the 1st Provisional

Marine Brigade. Their job, after delivering

the assault troops ashore, was to transship

cargo and personnel from landing craft over

the reef and thence to shore. In addition

to these vehicles, the marines were supplied with a hundred DUKW's.37

Preliminary Bombardment

Naval Gunfire

No matter what the immediate inconvenience to American forces caused by Admiral Spruance's postponement of the

scheduled landing day on Guam, the longrun consequences of that decision were fortunate. The postponement of W Day from

18 June to 21 July made possible a more

prolonged preliminary air and sea bombardment against Guam than against any

other island in the Pacific during the war.

The marines of the III Amphibious Corps

who had chafed and fretted at being confined to their ships in the sweltering lagoon

of Eniwetok later had good reason to be

thankful for their enforced inactivity.

The first American naval shells to hit

Guam were fired from ships of a small task

group from Task Force 53 on 16 June, the

day after the landing on Saipan. For an

hour and three quarters, the cruiser Honolulu, the battleships Pennsylvania and

Idaho, and several destroyers, all supported

by planes from accompanying aircraft carriers, bombarded the west coast of the island. The damage done appears to have

been negligible, but the raid did alert the

Japanese as to the probable American

choice of landing beaches in the forthcoming invasion.38

The enemy ashore mistook the shelling

for the usual last-minute preliminary to an

assault landing, and one Army lieutenant

wrote in his diary:

For the first time I saw the enemy fleet and

was under its gunfire. I regret very much that

we are powerless to do anything but to look

35

 TF 53 Opn Rpt Guam, pp. 1-2. 36

 III Phib Corps Rpt Guam, Incl A, Supply

Rpt, pp. 1-3. 37

 Lodge, Guam, pp. 21-22. See Appendix E

for Order of Battle of III Amphibious Corps (less

77th Division).

38

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Jul

44, p. 29; Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, p. 377.
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 321

at the enemy which came in barely 10,000

meters away. They shelled us steadily for two

hours. Our positions were hit fourteen times.

Fortunately none was injured. . . . We think

that at last the enemy will land tonight, and

so we will observe strict alert all night. We

were issued hand grenades and are now waiting for the enemy to come.39

By next morning, of course, the American ships had disappeared over the horizon,

much to the disappointment of the lieutenant, and probably of most of his comrades. Impatiently, he wrote, "If the enemy is coming, let him come. The spirit to

fight to the death is high. We are anxiously

waiting but nothing unusual has happened

so far as dawn breaks."

 40

The next surface ship strike against

Guam occurred on 27 June when a

small detachment of cruisers and destroyers

(Task Unit 58.4.5) from Admiral Mitscher's carrier fleet made a quick run into

the waters off Guam and Rota, sank a

small harbor tug and two barges in Apra

Harbor, and set fire to some oil storage

tanks ashore. Three days later Destroyer

Division 46 shelled the airfields on Orote

Peninsula.41

Then, on 8 July, began the greatest

single naval bombardment program of the

war—greatest at least in terms of time expended. For thirteen days the Japanese garrison on Guam was treated to the most

spectacular display of shore bombardment

that the U.S. Navy had yet produced.

First to arrive were four heavy cruisers,

twelve destroyers, and two escort carriers

of Task Group 53.18 commanded by Rear

Adm. C. Turner Joy. The group's primary

mission was to destroy coastal defense and

heavy antiaircraft guns. Secondary targets

were warehouses, command posts, communications facilities, and troop concentrations. Co-ordinating with the planes from

two task groups of Task Force 58 that arrived in the area about the same time, the

cruisers and destroyers were responsible for

one half of the island while the planes

bombarded the remainder. At noon each

day the two exchanged areas of responsibility. Meanwhile, planes from the two escort

carriers flew combat air and antisubmarine

patrol. At night each warship delivered

harassing fire against the island. On 12

July the battleships New Mexico, Idaho,

and Pennsylvania arrived to add their bit

to the fireworks. Two days later Admiral

Conolly himself put in his appearance

aboard the AGC Appalachian and thereafter personally took charge of coordinating all naval and air bombardment.

The same day, the battleship Colorado

joined the bombardment force, as did

California and Tennessee on the 19th. By

the time the marines arrived to invade the

island, a total of six battleships and nine

cruisers with their escorting destroyers

were saturating Guam with naval shells of

all varieties. For this period of thirteen days

(exclusive of W Day itself) naval ammunition expenditures against shore targets

totaled 836 rounds of 16-inch, 5,422 of

14-inch, 3,862 of 8-inch, 2,430 of 6-inch,

and 16,214 of 5-inch shells.42

At the invasion of Roi-Namur Admiral

Conolly had earned the sobriquet "Closein Conolly" for his insistence that warships 39

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 10634, extracts from the diary of 2d Lt Imanishi, Rai 3211

To (38th Inf Regt, 29th Div) (hereafter cited as

Imanishi Diary). 40

 Ibid. 41

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Jul

44, p. 29.

42

 TF 53 Opn Rpt Guam, Incl E, Intel Rpt,

p. 5; TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl G, Naval Gunfire

Support Rpt, p. 71; CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns

in POA, Jul 44, p. 29.
322 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

cruise close to shore when firing at land

targets.43 At Guam, he reaffirmed his right

to the title, but more important was the

systematic procedure he introduced for coordinating naval gunfire and aerial bombardment and checking the results of each.

A target board of six officers, representing

the air, gunnery, and intelligence sections

of the staff, was set up to assign primary

missions for air strikes and naval gunfire

and assess the damages daily before designating the next day's targets. Aerial photographs were taken each morning and on

the basis of these damage was assessed and

new targets were assigned. In these operations, the admiral's staff was aided by the

presence aboard Appalachian of General

Geiger who, as commanding general of the

landing force, naturally had the greatest

personal concern about the accuracy both

of the bombardment and of the damage reports submitted afterward.44

During the later stages of the preliminary bombardment, one additional duty was

imposed on the ships present—that of supporting naval underwater demolition teams.

All together, three teams were made available for the Guam landings. The procedure

was one that had by now become standardized in the Pacific. Swimmers disembarked from their mother APD into

LCPR's that took them close to the reef

before putting them in the water to swim

in the rest of the way to inspect the reef

itself. In the meantime, four LCI gunboats

lay to just off the reef and fired their 40-

mm. and 20-mm. guns over the heads of

the swimmers. On each flank of the

LCI(G)'s was a destroyer firing five-inch

shells farther inland, while the APD followed astern of the line of gunboats, also

firing. After the small boats had picked up

their swimmers, the covering ships continued their fire on the beaches in an effort

to interdict the area where the enemy was

attempting to make repairs.

On 14 July Underwater Demolition

Team 3, aboard the APD Dickerson, arrived in the area and for three days conducted reconnaissance of the chosen landing beaches and other segments of the western coast line. On 17 July Underwater

Demolition Teams 4 and 6 put in their appearance. Actual demolition work began

that evening. The obstacles discovered on

the Agat beaches were chiefly palm log

cribs filled with coral and connected by

wire cable. On the Asan beaches wire cages

filled with cemented coral were spaced

about every five feet. Only occasional strips

of barbed wire were found, and no underwater mines. All together, 640 obstacles

were blown-up off Asan and about 300 off

Agat by hand-placed demolitions.45 Some

of these, at least, had been constructed as

recently as 3 July, by which time the Japanese had been tipped off as to the probable landing beaches to be used by the

invaders.46

Aerial Bombardment

In preparing the way for the amphibious

assault on Guam, four main duties fell to

the air arms of the Army and Navy. They

were to neutralize Truk and the other islands in the Caroline group from which

43 the Japanese might be expected to send See Crowl and Love, Gilberts and Marshalls,

Ch. XVIII. 44

 TF 53 Opn Rpt Guam, Incl B, Naval Gunfire Support Rpt; Lodge, Guam, p. 34; Morison,

New Guinea and the Marianas, pp. 380-81.

45

 TF 53 Opn Rpt Guam, p. 10; CINCPACCINCPOA Opns in POA, Jul 44, pp. 31-42. 46

 Imanishi Diary.
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 323

their own aerial strength into the southern

Marianas, prevent intervention by Japanese carrier-borne planes, photograph the

island, and soften the target itself with an

accelerated program of aerial bombing and

strafing.

Starting in mid-March and continuing

even after Guam had been secured, Army

Air Forces bombers of the Seventh, Thirteenth, and, later, Fifth Air Forces conducted a series of devastating raids against

the Carolines, chiefly Truk and Woleai. On

one occasion, during the last two days of

April, they were joined by Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58, which dropped 748

tons of bombs on Truk while retiring from

the Hollandia invasion. The major credit

for keeping the Carolines neutralized, however, fell to the Army Air Forces. By the

time of the invasion of the southern Marianas, the island of Truk, once the leading

Japanese bastion in the Central Pacific, had

been rendered virtually useless.47 A like

fate had befallen the great Japanese Mobile Fleet at the hands of Task Force 58

during the Battle of the Philippine Sea. By

20 June it was clear that the invaders of

Guam need have no fear of serious Japanese threats from the air.

To Task Force 59, commanded by Maj.

Gen. Willis H. Hale, AUS, fell the chief responsibility for aerial photographic reconnaissance of the Marianas, Seventh Air

Force and shore-based Navy bombers, both

under General Hale's command, maintained armed reconnaissance over all the

southern Marianas for more than two

months before the first landings on Saipan.

The first mission over Guam was carried

out on 6 May by ten Army B-24's escorting six Navy PB4Y's. Five of the planes

were shot down over the target by enemy

fighters; six others were damaged. Again

on 24 May, 29 May, and 6 June flights of

B-24's and PB4Y's made the trip over

Guam, taking photographs and dropping

token loads of bombs on targets of opportunity.48

 Of the 6 June raid, a Lieutenant

Imanishi wrote despairingly, "There were

9 B-24's,49 but not one of our planes

went up to meet them. We felt disheartened. Just how desirous our air force

is of fighting is open to doubt."

 50

Desirous of fighting or not, the Japanese

pilots stationed on Guam were soon to lose

the means of doing so. Shortly after the

photographic flight on 6 June, Admiral

Mitscher's fleet showed up to begin its

methodical destruction of enemy aircraft

and air facilities. In the belief that the island would be invaded on 18 June, Commander, Task Force 58, first unleashed his

mighty armada of fighters and bombers

against Guam and nearby Rota on 11-12

June. In the ensuing air battle, a total of

150 Japanese planes was reported destroyed in the air or on the ground. For the

next four days, one or more of Mitscher's

task groups carried out strikes against aircraft facilities, runways, coastal guns, and

antiaircraft positions on Guam and Rota.51

Against this overwhelming naval airpower, the Japanese were almost helpless.

Wrote Lieutenant Imanishi, "It is especially pitiful that we cannot control the air.

We can only clench our fists with anger and

47

 See above, pp. 71-72; Craven and Cate, AAF

IV, pp. 676-90; USSBS, The Reduction of

Truk.

48

 Army Air Forces in the Marianas Campaign, Operation FORAGER, Mar-Aug 44, pp.

7-10, MS in OCMH. 49

 Actually there were seven B-24's and four

PB4Y's, 50

 Imanishi Diary. 51

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Jun

44, pp. 69-93.
324 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

watch,"

 52

 At the same time, a Japanese

private noted that he and his companions

were unable to leave their shelters and help

repair the damage because of the bombings.53

 Another enlisted man complained,

"The number of enemy planes was said to

be more than 500 today, while not one of

our planes took to the air. I felt a bitter

resentment at the manner in which the enemy stressed his air power,"

 54

Yet there was still some fight left in the

Japanese air contingent on Guam, for on

the evening of 15 June a few planes took

off from Orote field to launch a low-level

torpedo attack against the American carriers offshore. As a result, two of Mitscher's

task groups next day concentrated heavily

on Guam to prevent a repetition of the

previous evening's attacks.55 During the

two-day Battle of the Philippine Sea, the

fields of Guam again received the attention

of Mitscher's fliers. Japanese land-based

planes still undamaged by previous raids,

as well as carrier planes that had flown in

from Ozawa's fleet, constituted a threat on

Mitscher's flank and rear that could not be

overlooked. On the morning of 19 June, before the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot had

even gotten well under way, two separate

air battles were fought over Guam, both

ending in victory for the Americans. Even

during the course of the main battle itself, which was fought well out to sea, Mitscher kept one contingent of fighters and

bombers over Guam to interdict the airfields and prevent any remaining planes

from taking off to join Ozawa's carrier

planes. All together, about fifty Guambased planes were destroyed on the 19th

alone, and the fields themselves were at

least temporarily put out of business.56

That night, when about fifteen Japanese

carrier bombers attempted to make emergency landings there, they found the fields

too torn up to do so and, being out of

fuel, had to crash.57

The raids of 19 June all but delivered

the coup de grâce to Japanese airpower

on Guam. Occasionally, in the weeks that

followed, a few Japanese planes flew into

Orote from Yap and other islands in the

Carolines, but they posed no real threat.

On 4 July one of Mitscher's task groups

(Task Group 58.3) returned to conduct

a daylight raid over the island, and from

6 through 17 July two other carrier

groups (Task Groups 58.1 and 58.2) alternated daily in strikes over Guam and Rota.

Primary targets were coastal and antiaircraft guns, supply dumps, airfield installations, and the towns of Asan, Piti, and

Agat. These strikes were co-ordinated with

those of the escort carrier planes and the

naval bombardment ships of Admiral Conolly's Task Force 53.58

 On the last three

days before the landing, the Japanese on

Guam witnessed the full weight of American naval airpower in a mounting crescendo of aerial fury. On 18 July planes

from the two task forces flew 662 bombing

sorties and 311 strafing attacks, on the 19th

the number increased to 874 and 392, and

on the day before the landings to 1,430

and 614. The total tonnage of bombs,

52

 Imanishi Diary. 53

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 10996, extracts from the diary of Leading Pvt Murano,

Koko (2d Bn, 10th IMR). 54

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 10802, extracts from the diary of Cpl Susuki, Tai (Yoshikawa Unit). 55

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Jun 44, Annex A, pp. 81-98.

56

 Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas,

pp. 257-63, 274-77.

57

 Imanishi Diary.

58

 See above, pp. 320-21.
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 325

depth charges, and rockets dropped and

launched during these three days came to

1,131.59

Assessment of Damage

As night closed in on 20 July, it seemed

impossible to those aboard the flagship

Appalachian that the Japanese on Guam

could put up anything but token resistance

to the troops that would go in the next day

in amphibious assault. Maj. William M.

Gilliam, USMC, who was Geiger's naval

gunfire officer, reported, "When the morning of the landing arrived, it was known

that the assault troops would meet little

resistance."

 60

 Admiral Conolly's staff believed, "Not one fixed gun was left in

commission on the west coast that was of

greater size than a machine gun."

 61

These conclusions were to prove somewhat extravagant, as the marines next day

discovered to their sorrow. Testimony given

after the war by Lt. Col. Hideyuki Takeda,

IJA, who was a staff member of the 29th

Division, provides a corrective to the American reports on which these optimistic conclusions were based.

Conventional construction, Takeda reported, consisting of buildings reinforced

on an emergency basis, was completely

destroyed when it received direct hits.

Field positions that were hit by shells were

completely destroyed, and of those on or

near the landing beaches, over 50 percent

were demolished. Half-permanent positions

in which the hard agent cascajo (a type

of coral) was used and that were reinforced

with concrete about 50-cm. thick remained

in good condition except in cases of direct

hits. Those that were hit by shells were

more than 50 percent destroyed. Permanent positions with concrete over one meter

thick remained in perfect condition even

after receiving direct hits. All open naval

gun emplacements were completely destroyed before the landings. Of those naval

guns emplaced in caves, about half remained operational at the time of the

landings, but they were soon put out of

commission by counterbattery fire that

closed up the cave mouths where they were

located. Antiaircraft artillery on the island

sustained damage from naval gunfire only

once, and so long as Japanese antiaircraft

ammunition lasted the Japanese were reasonably safe from American planes. Harbor

installations received almost no damage,

water pipes received only one direct hit,

and power installations were all located in

caves and so escaped damage. Most military boats were sunk. Naval gunfire had

no effect against construction in the valleys

or in the jungle and had very little effect

against the interior parts of the island over

two and a half miles from the shore line.

American airpower, reported Colonel

Takeda, succeeded in knocking out the airfields on Guam but posed little threat to

defense positions because there was little

bombing of Japanese gun emplacements

from the air. By far the most important

effect of aerial bombing and strafing was

the extreme limitation it placed on Japanese ground movement during daylight

hours. However, neither naval guns nor

aircraft succeeded in causing any serious

interruption in communications on Guam.

Takeda could not remember a single case

where telephone lines were cut because of

naval gunfire. As of 21 July, Headquarters,

59

 TF 53 Opn Rpt Guam, Incl C, App. 5.

60

 III Phib Corps Rpt Guam, Incl G, Naval

Gunfire Support, p. 3. 61

 TF 53 Opn Rpt Guam, Incl B, Naval Gunfire Support, p. 11.
326 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

29th Division, in command of the defense

of Guam, possessed perfect wire and wireless communications with the 18th Infantry Regiment, the 38th Infantry Regiment, the force on Orote Peninsula, forces

south of Pago on the east coast, and forces

at Tarague on the north tip of the island.

Perfect field telephone communication with

the 48th Independent Mixed Brigade was

maintained. Headquarters also had uninterrupted wireless communication with

Rota, as well as with Imperial General

Headquarters in Tokyo.62

In spite of the limited effectiveness

of American preliminary bombardment,

Takeda's testimony does indicate that it

produced certain substantial results. Many

of the buildings that were destroyed by direct hits, such as hospitals, warehouses,

and office buildings in the towns of Piti,

Agana, and Agat, housed military personnel and equipment. Takeda's own appreciation of the important role played by

American air and sea power in reducing

the defenses of Guam emerges through the

crude but clear translation of the closing

words of his postbattle report:

Among the battle colored by the holy

blood of the dead I can find out the only

lesson: The powerful air and sea powers

make ground forces to defend island unnecessary. That is, the defence of island depending merely upon the isolated and helpless

ground forces cannot be existed in the world.

If the defence depending only upon the

ground forces succeeded it would only be

clue to the fact that the island was neutralized, troops on it would hardly exist and they

could perform their duty to defend the island because the enemy did not land on it.63

Intelligence of the Enemy

Considering the fact that Guam had

been a U.S. possession for more than forty

years, American intelligence of the island's

road system and terrain was remarkably

incomplete. The War Department in June

1943 had prepared and published a general survey of the island, and in February

1944 the Office of Naval Intelligence circulated a voluminous bulletin containing all

kinds of information about hydrographic

conditions, ground contours, road systems,

weather, and the native population.64

Neither of these studies was any further up

to date than 10 December 1941, the date

of the Japanese occupation, nor could the

information supplied by American servicemen and native Guamanians who had lived

on the island before the occupation give

the planners any idea of Japanese defense

installations or dispositions. General Geiger

asked permission to send in small patrols

by submarine to contact natives and "see

behind the curtain," but the request was

turned down. Hence, for up-to-date data

on the activities and progress of the Japanese garrison, reliance had to be placed entirely upon photographic reconnaissance,

chiefly aerial.65

Not until 25 April, after Conolly's staff

had arrived on Guadalcanal, were photographs received, and the first ones were

badly obscured by cloud cover. Later,

aerial photographs were only fair, but were

supplemented by excellent obliques of the

coast line taken by the submarine USS

62

 Lt Col Hideyuki Takeda, IJA, Outline of

Japanese Defense Plan and Battle of Guam Island, translated by Major Sato, IJA, Incl to Ltr,

Col W. S. Coleman to Comdt USMC, 4 Oct 46;

Lt Col Hideyuki Takeda, Ltr to Brig Gen J.

C. McQueen, USMC, Dir Marine Corps Hist, 20

Feb 52, translated by Thomas G. Wilds, OCMH

(both in Records Sec Hist Br G-3, Hq USMC).

63

 Takeda, Outline of Japanese Defense Plan. 64

 MIS WD, Survey of Guam ONI 99. 65

 III Phib Corps Rpt Guam, Intel, p. 3.
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 327

Greenling. Maps of the interior, prepared

from prewar sources and revised on the

basis of these aerial photographs, were

fairly good as to scale and azimuth, but

only occasionally did they portray ground

contours accurately. Changes made by

the Japanese in the road system were not

indicated on the maps provided the troops;

in fact, in the north of the island map

locations of the roads were as much as

1,500 yards off from their true positions.

Trails were not shown at all.66

With the capture of Saipan, a good

number of Japanese documents were made

available to the planners for Guam and

afforded them for the first time some idea

of the enemy situation. On the basis of

these documents and of interrogations of

prisoners of war, the intelligence section

of III Amphibious Corps estimated that

Guam was garrisoned by a total of 17,673

Army troops and 9,945 to 10,945 Navy,

Air, and construction personnel. Although

these figures proved to be considerably in

excess of actual enemy strength, Geiger's

staff correctly predicted that the bulk of

the Army troops on the island was composed of the 29th Division under Lt. Gen.

Takeshi Takashima and the 11th Infantry

Regiment under Maj. Gen. Kiyoshi Shigematsu.67

 The principal naval unit on the

island was thought to be the 54th Naval

Guard Force, and it was believed that

about 2,185 naval air personnel were stationed there as well.68

It was assumed, on the basis of these

documents and interrogations, that the Japanese would concentrate their defenses

around Tumon Bay, Agana, and Agat, all

on the west coast. Only two battalions

were thought to be garrisoned on the south

and southeast coasts. American troops

about to invade Guam were warned to expect a large amount of mobile artillery and

a determination on the part of the Japanese to exploit the mountainous terrain,

which provided excellent observation. The

enemy was thought to be holding back

(from the beach defense) a mobile reserve

of at least one battalion plus supporting

weapons in the Agana area. A smaller reserve of about reinforced company strength

was believed to be located somewhere inland of Agat.

"It seems evident," concluded Geiger's

intelligence section, "that both we and the

Japanese have been thinking along the

same lines, that is, the beaches we find best

for landings are those the Japs find most

dangerous to them and have fortified the

most."

 69

 The conclusion was fully warranted.

66

 Ibid., p. 1; TF 53 Opn Rpt Guam, 10 Aug

44, Incl E, p. 2. 67

 The 11th Infantry Regiment, somewhat expanded, had actually been renamed the 48th Independent Mixed Brigade.

68

 III Phib Corps Opn Plan 1-44, Supplement 4 to Annex B, 9 Jul 44. 69

 Ibid., p. 5.

CHAPTER XVI

The Enemy

The Japanese defense of Guam was

much less effective than that of Saipan.

Not only did the Japanese have fewer men,

less artillery, and fewer tanks than their

compatriots on Saipan but they also had

a much larger area of land to defend.

Nevertheless, they had ideal terrain for the

defense and a sufficient force to prevent a

rapid or easy conquest of the island.

Guam's defense was commanded initially

by General Takashima, Commanding General, 29th Division and Southern Marianas

Army Group. In the middle of June General Obata, Commanding General, 31st

Army, reached Guam with his two senior

staff officers. He had been in the Palaus,

probably because the Japanese expected

the next American thrust to be in that

area. Once it became apparent that the

blow would come farther north, he had

hastened to the Marianas, too late, however, to reach his headquarters on Saipan.

Instead, he landed on Guam to linger in

forced inactivity while the garrison on Saipan went down to defeat. His presence on

Guam had very little influence on Japanese

tactics there until the death of General Takashima on 28 July, after which Obata assumed direct command.1

Troops and Troop Dispositions

In mid-July, on the eve of the American

invasion of Guam, the Japanese defenders

numbered about 18,500 men. The early

preponderance in air and naval strength

that the Americans were able to establish

in the area resulted in the loss to the Guam

garrison of about 900 much needed men,

including the 1st Battalion, 10th Independent Brigade. These troops had been temporarily stationed on Rota and on 8 June

had been ordered to return to their parent

commands on Guam. By the time the move

could be organized, however, the 38-mile

stretch of water between the two islands

was under close American surveillance,

and the transfer was never made.

All together, the American invaders

faced an understrength garrison composed

of eleven Army infantry battalions, two

and two-thirds Army artillery battalions,

three tank companies, two Army antiaircraft companies, Army engineers, service

troops, and so forth, together with various

Navy units, the most important of which

were the 54th Naval Guard Force and the

60th Antiaircraft Defense Unit.2

In early June these forces were spread

all over the island as a precaution against

1

 Japanese Studies in World War II, 55; TF

56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl D, G-2 Rpt.

2

 See Appendix F for complete Japanese order

of battle.

THE ENEMY 331

an invasion from any direction. Guam was

divided into four sectors for purposes of

defense. In the Agana sector were stationed

the four battalions of the 48th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 3d Battalion,

38th Infantry; in the area around Agat

were the 1st and 2d Battalions, 38th Infantry; on the south coast in the Inarajan

sector were two battalions of the 10th Independent Mixed Brigade; and in the

northern sector, with headquarters at

Finaguayac, was the 2d Battalion, 18th

Infantry.3

By July this picture had radically

changed. The American naval shelling of

Agat on 16 June had tipped off the Japanese as to the probable place of the forthcoming landings, and the postponement of

W Day gave them ample opportunity to

reorganize their defenses. By mid-July almost the entire garrison had been moved

to the west coast between Agat and Tumon Bay. (Map 17)

At the time of the American amphibious

assault, Headquarters, 29th Division, and

most of the division's service troops were

located at Fonte, as was the headquarters

of the 48th Independent Mixed Brigade.

General Shigematsu, Commanding General, 48th Independent Mixed Brigade,

commanded the Agana sector, which

stretched along the west shore from Piti

to Tumon Bay and included the great majority of the Japanese forces on the island.

For purposes of shore defense, the Agana

sector was divided into three, perhaps four,

beach defense areas. From northeast to

southwest, the first of these was at Tumon

Bay, where the 322d Independent Infantry

Battalion was located. The 321st Independent Infantry Battalion defended the area

around Agana Bay, and the 320th Independent Infantry Battalion manned the

defenses between Adelup Point and Asan

Point, where the 3d Marine Division was

to land. In the Piti area was the 18th Infantry Regiment, less the 1st Battalion,

which was on Saipan. The unit was considerably understrength since some of its

personnel and much of its equipment had

been lost when one of its ships en route

from Japan had been sunk by an American submarine. The 18th Regiment also

had partial responsibility for Asan Point in

case the Americans should land there.

The 10th Independent Mixed Regiment,

less its 1st Battalion and 9th Company,

was in the Fonte-Ordot area. The 319th

Independent Infantry Battalion was inland,

east of Agana, in reserve. Two of the three

tank units on the island were also in reserve, poised to strike the beachhead with

the infantry. These were the 29th Division

Tank Unit at Ordot and the 2d Company,

9th Tank Regiment, at Sinajana. Also in

general reserve was the Otori Unit, composed chiefly of naval air personnel reorganized into a jerry-built unit for ground

combat. Most of the Army artillery, including the 48th Independent Mixed Brigade Artillery Unit, formerly the 3d Battalion, 11th Mountain Artillery Regiment,

was disposed throughout the Agana sector.

The two batteries of the 10th Independent

Mixed Regiment Artillery Unit had been

removed from regimental control and

placed directly under the 48th Independent Mixed Brigade. Certain guns of these

batteries were located just inland of Tumon Bay, but the majority were in the

vicinity of Agana. The 38th Infantry's Artillery Battalion was broken up, one battery attached to each infantry battalion, so

3

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl D, G-2 Rpt, p. 47.

The locations of the 3d Battalion, 18th Infantry,

and of the several naval units were unknown.
332 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

that the 3d Battery, attached to the 3d

Battalion, was also in the Agana sector

force.

The Agat sector was commanded by Col.

Tsunetaro Suenaga, commanding officer of

the 38th Infantry Regiment, whose command post was on Mount Alifan. The

1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, covered the

beaches in the Agat area, and the 2d Battalion of the same regiment occupied the

base of Orote Peninsula. To the rear of the

Agat beaches, the 1st Company, 9th Tank

Regiment, was in readiness to counterattack in case of a landing. Also in reserve

for the Agat beaches was the 9th Company, 10th Independent Mixed Regiment.

Orote Peninsula was garrisoned by the

main body of the 54th Naval Guard Force;

the 755th Air Unit, reorganized for ground

combat; and the two batteries of the 52d

Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, which was

charged with antiaircraft defense of Orote

airfield. Since this unit's guns, which were

75-mm. antiaircraft, could be depressed as

low as minus seven degrees, they were in

effect dual purpose and could be used to

supplement the conventional field artillery

and antiboat weapons.4

Other units, such as service, engineer,

and construction units, were scattered

throughout the island, some on the west

coast, and some inland as far as Santa

Rosa. None of these, however, had any

significant combat value. Nor could the

Japanese arm the civilian population, most

of which appears to have remained at least

passively loyal to the United States. As of

10 January 1944, the native Guamanians

numbered about 24,000.5 Slightly over a

hundred were of mixed American and

Chamorro parentage and had been jailed

as soon as the Japanese occupied the island. The rest of the population suffered

some organized maltreatment and abuse in

the early days of Japanese rule, but this

appears to have gradually tapered off.

However, rigid food rationing, forced labor,

confiscation of property without compensation, exclusion from business enterprises,

and a score of lesser deprivations and

humiliations kept the native population

sullen and restive during the period of Japanese occupation. In June 1943 all ablebodied men between the ages of fourteen

and sixty were forced to work for the occupation army, and women were ordered

to replace the men in the fields. After the

American air raid of 11 June, large numbers of natives fled to the hills. Many were

rounded up by Japanese military police

and placed in camps near Asinan, Manengon, and Talofofo. The Guamanians were

clearly poor raw material for collaborationism, and there is no evidence that the

Japanese made any successful attempt to

reconstruct them to that end.6

Japanese military doctrine for the defense of Guam was essentially the same as

that for Saipan. Emphasis was placed on

meeting and annihilating the enemy at the

4

 Sources from which the locations of the Japanese units on Guam were derived are as follows:

TF 53 Rpt FORAGER, Incl D, G-2 Rpt; Japanese

Studies in World War II, 55; Ltr, Takeda to McQueen, USMC; III Phib Corps Rpt Guam, Incl

D, G-2 Rpt; CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 10194,

Opn Orders of Guam Garrison Units, 15-16 Jul

44; 77th Inf Div G-2 Jnl File, Guam Opn; POW

Interrogation Rpts made by III Phib Corps, Hq

3d Marine Div, SLF (TG 56.2), and Intel Sec

21st Marines, in Records Sec Hist Branch G-3,

Hq USMC.

5

 III Phib Corps Rpt Guam, Incl D, G-2 Rpt

10.

6

 Sources for the description of the lot of Guam's

civilians under Japanese rule are William Hipple's report in Newsweek, August 21, 1944, p. 35,

and Thompson, Guam and Its People, p. 160.
THE ENEMY 333

TABLE 2—ARTILLERY ON GUAM

Source: III Phib Corps Rpt Guam, Incl D, G-2 Rpt; Ltr, Takeda to McQueen, 4 Oct 46. The first column represents the Japanese pieces

captured or destroyed before 10 August, the date Guam was officially declared secured. Colonel Takeda's estimate was made in October 1946,

more than two years after the battle. Of the two estimates, the first is undoubtedly the more accurate.

beaches. If that failed, an organized counterattack was to be delivered against the

beachhead soon after the landing. Finally,

if the invaders succeeded in establishing

and holding their beachhead line, the Japanese would retire to the hills and fight on

from there.

Thus General Shigematsu, in command

of the Agana sector garrison unit, which

contained the majority of troops on the island, declared on 15 July, "It has been

decided that the enemy is going to launch

an attack in force at dawn in the region

of the Agana sector. When he lands, the

Division will be quick to seize the opportunity to attack him in this sector with a

powerful force and crush him at the

beaches. . . . The Garrison Unit will await

its initial opportunity and will completely

destroy the enemy landing force upon

the beaches."

 7 If the infantry units at

the shore line failed in their mission, the

10th Independent Mixed Regiment, two

battalions of the 18th Infantry, and the

3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, were ordered

to carry out the second phase of the plan

—a counterattack in force against the

American beachhead in this area.

Supporting Weapons

Artillery on Guam, including coast defense, field artillery, and antiaircraft and

antitank weapons, was manned by both

Army and Navy personnel. As indicated

above, the bulk of the field artillery pieces

in July were situated to command the

western shore line from Tumon Bay to

Agat. Table 2 gives two estimates of the

number and type of these weapons. Just

how many were still operational at the time

of the American landings is not known, and

even a comparison of these figures with 7

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 10194. the assessment of damage wrought by the
334 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

preliminary bombardment cited above will

provide only a hazy idea of Japanese artillery strength on 21 July.

Japanese tank strength was considerably

lower than it was believed to be by American intelligence staffs, both before and

after the battle. Although the Americans

claim to have destroyed or captured fiftynine enemy tanks by 11 August, actually

there were no more than thirty-eight present at any time, and possibly even fewer.8

The 1st Company, 9th Tank Regiment,

which was located in the Agat-Orote area,

had from twelve to fifteen light tanks. The

2d Company of the same regiment and the

29th Division Tank Unit, both situated so

as to support the defense of the Asan

beaches, had a total of from twenty-one to

twenty-three tanks, of which at least ten

were mediums,

Fortifications

The main fortified area ran along the

west coast from Tumon Bay to Facpi

Point and included, of course, Orote Peninsula. Other fortified beaches, on the

south and east coasts from Merizo to Pago

Bay, had been abandoned before W Day,

their defenders having moved to the north.

Outside the main fortified area, the airfields were provided local defense by antiaircraft and dual-purpose guns.

The most notable and certainly the

most effective fortifications on the island

were constructed across the neck of Orote

Peninsula, which contained a fairly elaborate system of trenches and foxholes

arranged in depth, together with large

numbers of pillboxes and heavy-caliber

weapons. Outside of Orote, the prepared

defenses were generally hastily constructed

and often incomplete. The typical beach

defense was arranged, from the seaward

side, in four parallel lines: first were obstacles and mines on the fringing reef offshore; second came beach obstacles and

tank traps; third were trenches, machine

gun positions, pillboxes, heavy weapons, artillery, and coast defense guns on the

beaches or immediately inland; and, finally,

came the machine guns, heavy weapons,

and artillery emplaced on the high ground

inland.

Insufficient advantage was taken of the

high ground, and except on Orote little

provision was made for defense in depth.

Even as late as the five-week period of preinvasion bombardment, the Japanese continued to work frantically on improving

offshore obstacles and beach defenses, to

the neglect of positions in the rear.9

During the first two years of the war,

the Japanese had slighted the military development of the Marianas in favor of more

forward areas, and almost nothing was

done to fortify Guam until early 1944. The

beaches had to be protected first, and

Guam's large size and numerous possible

landing points meant that proportionately

greater effort had to be expended at the

shore line before work could be commenced on defenses in depth. The time,

effort, and materials expended on the south

and southeast shores was ultimately wasted

when these positions were abandoned. After the assault on Saipan, Guam was entirely cut off from its sources of materiel,

8

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl D, G-2 Rpt, p.

65; 3d Marine Div Interrogation Rpt 396, Capt

Sato, Hideo (CO 24th Tk Co, 29th Div Tk Unit),

Records Sec Hist Br G-3, Hq USMC; CINCPACCINCPOA Trans 9304, 9th Tk Rgt Order of

Battle. 9

 Ltr, Takeda to McQueen, 4 Oct 46.
THE ENEMY 335

and the five-week period of bombardment

not only destroyed many of the existing

fortifications but also severely hampered

efforts on the part of the Japanese to continue construction.10

As has been already mentioned, the

Japanese relied heavily on coral-filled palm

cribs and wire cages to interrupt and impede the approach of landing craft to and

over the offshore reef.11 In addition to

these, which were all blown up by American underwater demolition teams, a series

of antiboat mines of about forty to fifty

pounds was placed along the reef or between the obstacles. The beaches themselves were strung with barbed wire and

in some places aerial bombs were embedded

in the sand just inland of the wire. Antitank obstacles also were installed on the

beaches by lashing coconut logs across

trees or setting them vertically in the

ground.

The Agat beach defenses were typical of

the others. Here was an almost continuous

line of open trenches about two feet wide

and three and a half feet deep. Running

parallel to the shore line approximately

fifty feet inland of the high-water mark,

these trenches were supplemented by an

occasional rifle or machine gun pit about

eight feet to their front and by shelters to

their rear. Distributed along the beach between Agat and Bangi Point were about

twenty-five pillboxes. A strong concrete

blockhouse on Gaan Point held two 75-

mm. mountain guns, one 37-mm. gun, and

positions for machine guns and riflemen.

Two concrete emplacements of 40-mm.

guns were located between Gaan Point and

Agat only about five feet inland of the

high-water mark.12

Pillboxes here were constructed of palm

logs, sandbags, reinforced concrete, earth,

and coral rocks, the majority being simple

structures of palm logs covered with earth.

They averaged about eight feet square and

three feet high, with roofs two feet thick

in the center and one foot at the edge.

Usually, they had two firing ports about

twelve by four inches in size, which allowed

only a fairly narrow traverse. The reinforced concrete types were either square or

octagonal and located chiefly along the

roads. About eight feet across and two to

three feet high, their walls were about six

inches thick. There were a few masonry

pillboxes of coral rocks with walls a foot

thick. All the pillboxes on the beaches

were mutually supporting against attack

from the seaward side, but not against attack from the flanks or rear.

Japanese Situation on the Eve of Battle

The effects of American preliminary

bombardment on Japanese defenses has already been described in as much detail as

surviving records permit. The devastation

was great and widespread, if not as effective as the invaders at first believed. Moreover, the accelerating tempo of naval shelling and aerial bombing and strafing made

it almost impossible for the Japanese to repair the damage or to engage in new

construction.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, the

defenders bent every effort to shore up

their crumbling defenses to the last minute

10 before the invasion. But most of the labor, TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl D, G-2 Rpt,

pp. 61-63. 11

 See above, p. 322. 12 MIS WD Mil Rpt 25, Jan 45, p. 31.
336 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

JAPANESE BEACH OBSTACLES AT GUAM were numerous along the northern landing

beaches.

at least along the beaches, had to be performed at night when darkness and the

physical exhaustion of the troops slowed

progress to a snail's pace. The dilemma

was inescapable, as is attested by one Japanese Army lieutenant who complained,

"Our positions have been almost completed but they have not been done as we

had hoped . . . great effort was put into

the construction but we still have been unable to complete the cover. We are in a

terrible fix."

 13

The weeks of American bombardment,

the prolonged uncertainty, the anxious

waiting from day to day while explosions

rent the air but no American soldier came

into view to be shot at or stabbed with

bayonet—all these factors took their psychological toll even on the martial-minded

Japanese. They suffered greatly in seishin

—a word that means not so much "morale" as "psychological well-being." After

several days of successive attacks, "scattered outbreaks of serious loss of spirit"

occurred. After another week the spirit of

some of the men deteriorated so badly that

they "could not perform their duties in a

positive manner."

 14

This cumulative physical and psychological exhaustion would show up in the days

of battle to come. The troops on Guam

tended to become more easily disorganized

than had their compatriots on Saipan and

Tinian. They turned more readily from organized combat to futile and suicidal individual displays of fanaticism.15

13

 Imanishi Diary; see also CINCPAC -

CINCPOA Trans 10802, extracts from the diary

of Cpl Suzuki, Tai; CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans

10410, diary of an unidentified soldier.

14

 The quotations are from Ltr, Takeda to McQueen, 20 Feb 52. 15

 III Phib Corps Rpt Guam, Incl D, G-2

Rpt 7.
THE ENEMY 337

JAPANESE OPEN-TRENCH BEACH DEFENSES AT AGAT, where the 1st Provisional

Brigade units landed.

But if their seishin was ebbing, the Japanese on Guam remained high in shiki—

meaning morale in the sense of a willingness to die in combat.16

 This spirit is

reflected, with the usual rhetorical flourishes, in the diary of one enlisted man: "I

will not lose my courage, but now is the

time to prepare to die! If one desires to

live, hope for death. Be prepared to die!

With this conviction one can never lose

. . . . Look upon us! We have shortened

our expectancy of 70 years of life to 25 in

order to fight. What an honor it is to be

born in this day and age."

 17

Against this kind of determination, the

task facing the marines and soldiers of the

III Amphibious Corps would by no means

be light.

16

 Ltr, Takeda to McQueen, 24 Jan 52.

17

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Trans 10802.

CHAPTER XVII

The Fight for the Beachhead

As evening of 20 July closed in, Admiral

Conolly and those around him who were responsible for the invasion of Guam looked

forward with high optimism to the success

of their enterprise. Reports indicated that

"all known major defensive installations

in position to interfere with the transports

approach and the landing have been destroyed and the assault beaches cleared of

obstructions and searched for mines with

negative results."

 1 The weather forecast

for 21 July was excellent. Conolly confirmed W Day as 21 July and H Hour as

0830. To his entire task force he promised, "conditions are most favorable for a

successful landing."

Ashore, the Japanese command was not

to be outmatched, at least in outward show

of confidence. To the men of the 48th Independent Mixed Brigade, General Shigematsu announced encouragingly: "The

enemy, overconfident because of his successful landing on Saipan, is planning a

reckless and insufficiently prepared landing

on Guam. We have an excellent opportunity to annihilate him upon the beaches. We

are dedicated to the task of destroying this

enemy, and are confident that we shall

comply with the Imperial wish."

 2

W-Day Preliminary Bombardment

The morning of 21 July dawned bright

and clear as predicted. The wind was light,

the sea calm. At 0530 came the first order

to commence fire and for almost three

hours the din and smoke of incessant naval

salvos filled the air over the transport areas

and shot up great geysers of dirt and debris

ashore. From their flagships Appalachian

and George Clymer, Admirals Conolly and

Reifsnider directed the bombardment of

the Asan and Agat beaches, respectively.

(Map 18) Ships' fire was slow and deliberate, concentrating on the landing beaches

themselves, their flanks, and the areas immediately inland. On this day alone the

fire support ships would expend a total of

342 rounds of 16-inch shells, 1,152 rounds

of 14-inch, 1,332 rounds of 8-inch, 2,430

rounds of 6-inch, 13,130 rounds of 5-inch,

and 9,000 4.5-inch rockets.3

Twenty minutes after the opening of this

tremendous naval bombardment, the first

planes appeared overhead to provide cover

against possible enemy air or submarine attack. At 0615 a roving patrol of twelve

fighters, nine bombers, and five torpedo

planes from the carrier Wasp made the

day's first strike—against tiny Cabras Island lying just off the right flank of the 3d

1

 TF 53 Rpt Guam, Incl A, Opns Chronology,

p. 11. 2

 III Phib Corps Rpt Guam, Incl D, G-2 Rpt 1.

3

 TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl G, Naval Gun

Fire Rpt, p. 71.
340 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

FIRST WAVE OF LANDING CRAFT HEADS FOR AGAT BEACHES. Smoke is from preinvasion naval shelling and air bombardment.

Marine Division's zone of attack. These

and all other planes from Mitscher's Task

Force 58, as well as those flown from the

escort carriers of Task Force 53, were under the control of Conolly's Commander,

Support Aircraft, aboard Appalachian.

Also on station was an airborne air coordinator to direct scheduled air strikes

and such other attacks as might later be

ordered by the Commander, Support Aircraft.4

From 0715 to 0815 planes from Mitscher's fleet bombed and strafed the fourteen miles of coast line from Agana to

Bangi Point. During this period of simultaneous attack from air and sea, naval guns

were restricted to a maximum range of

8,000 yards to insure that the ordinate of

their shells would be no higher than 1,200

feet. Pilots were instructed to pull out of

their runs before reaching as low as 1,500

feet—a precaution taken to save American planes from being struck by friendly

naval fire while at the same time rendering

unnecessary the usual cessation of naval

4

 TF 53 Rpt Guam, Incl A, p. 26; Ibid., Incl

C, p. 13.
THE FIGHT FOR THE BEACHHEAD 341

ASAN'S GREEN AND BLUE BEACHES stretch from Asan town (left center) to Asan

Point (lower right).

fire during the aerial strikes. Throughout

this hour of bombardment, 312 of Mitscher's planes pounded the northern and

southern landing beaches and their flanks

with a total of 124 tons of bombs.5

Over each of the two sets of beaches

flew a naval observation plane equipped

with parachute flares, which were released

when the troop-laden landing vehicles were

1,200 yards (8 minutes) from the shore

—a signal to the support ships to step up

their fire. Immediately, the support ships

commenced a last mighty bombardment of

the beaches and maintained it until the

troops were reported to be only 300 yards

from the shore. Then all naval fire was

shifted inland, to continue even after the

first of the marines had touched land. The

parachute flares were also the signal for a

special H Hour strike by aircraft from

Task Force 53. A flight of forty-four

fighters strafed the two landing beaches

until the first troops were almost ashore,

then shifted their attack 1,500 to 2,500

yards inland. This strike was followed by a

flight of twenty-four, whose task was to 5

 TF 53 Rpt Guam, Incl C, p. 13.
342 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

keep the enemy down until the first wave

of marines could cross the open beaches

and gain cover.6

From Ship to Shore

In the midst of all this fire and smoke,

the ships carrying the assault troops arrived

on schedule and took station in the transport areas off the landing beaches. Amphibian tanks and amphibian tractors

laden with marines eased their way into

the water through the open bow doors

of the LST's, transports lowered their

LCVP's over the sides, and the LSD's let

down their tail gates to permit their tankcarrying LCM's to become waterborne.

The pattern of the ship-to-shore movement was essentially the same for the

northern and southern beaches—a pattern,

in fact, that had been standardized in the

Pacific since the invasion of the Marshalls.

Ahead of the first waves of landing vehicles

bound for each set of beaches went a line

of nine LCI(G)'s firing 4.5-inch rockets

and 40-mm. and 20-mm. guns as they came

within range of the shore line. Then came

a wave of amphibian tanks firing 37-mm.

and 75-mm. guns to escort the marines

over the reef and onto the beaches. Close

astern were the successive waves of

amphibian tractors carrying the assault

troops, followed at intervals by LCM's embarking tanks. Reserve troops were loaded

in LCVP's that would have to stand by at

the edge of the reef until the first waves

of tractors had debarked their troops and

could return to take more men in from the

reef.7

Off the northern beaches the LCI(G)'s

crossed the line of departure at 0806 and

commenced firing their rockets when they

were about 1,000 yards off the shore line.

At 0819 the first wave of troop-carrying

LVT's reached a line approximately

1,200 yards offshore. Parachute flares were

dropped from the observation plane overhead, and three minutes later the last

flurry of intense close naval fire on the

beaches began. The tempo of firing of the

5-inch guns increased from five to ten

rounds per minute. About 300 yards from

the shore the LCI(G)'s ceased their salvos

of rockets, moved to the flanks, and, along

with the destroyers, kept these areas under

fire. By then mortar and artillery fire from

shore was falling among the approaching

tractors. In spite of the pounding they had

been receiving from ships and aircraft, the

Japanese were able to bring their pieces

to bear on the assault waves and destroy

nine of the 3d Marine Division's amphibian

tractors.8 Nevertheless, the waves of vehicles rolled on, and at 0828 the first

LVT(A) touched down, two minutes

ahead of schedule.9

Off Agat, fire from the shore was even

heavier. There, the Japanese greeted the

invaders with a hail of small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire for the duration

of their approach to the shore. In addition,

several 70-mm. guns in well-placed concrete blockhouses enfiladed the beaches and

fired at the LVT's as they crossed the reef.

On Gaan Point, near the middle of the

landing area, a 75-mm. field piece and a

37-mm. gun opened fire as did a 75-mm.

field piece on Yona Island to the right.

One LCI(G) was hit and thirteen am6

 Ibid., p. 14.

7

 The formation of the landing waves is given

in SLF TG 56.2 Opn Plan 1-44, 11 May 44,

Annex G, Charts 11 and 12.

8

 3d Marine Div War Diary, Jul 44, p. 6.

9

 TF 53 Rpt Guam, Incl A, pp. 27-30.
THE FIGHT FOR THE BEACHHEAD 343

3D MARINE DIVISION BEACHHEAD. All types of invasion craft in background;

first-aid station in foreground.

phibian tractors were knocked out.10 Still

the landing formation held, and the troops

got ashore on schedule.11 In the zone of

the 4th Marine Regiment (and there alone

along the entire corps landing zone) the

amphibian tractors had been ordered to

move a thousand yards inland before disembarking their troops. As on Saipan, this

scheme failed, and here as elsewhere during

the assault on Guam, the leading waves of

troops dismounted from their LVT's close

to the shore line.12

The Northern Beaches

The 3d Marine Division plan called for

a landing of the assault elements of all

three regiments over about 2,500 yards of

beach between Asan Point and Adelup

Point. From right to left, the 9th Marines

was to go ashore on Blue Beach, the 21st

Marines on Green Beach, and the 3d Ma10

 TG 53.2 Rpt Guam, Incl D, p. 2. 11

 1st Provisional Marine Brig Opn Rpt and

SAR Jnl, p. 10.

12

 1st Provisional Marine Brig War Diary, 1

Jul-10 Aug 44, p. 4.
344 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

rines on Red Beaches 1 and 2. On hitting

shore, the division was to capture the cliffs

and high ground immediately inland and

prepare for further operations to the east

and southeast. The 9th Marines was to

seize the low ridge facing its beach, protect

the division right flank, and be prepared to

move along the coast to take Piti Navy

Yard and Cabras Island if so ordered. In

the center, the 21st Marines was to capture

the cliff line to its front. On the left the

3d Marines was ordered to secure Adelup

Point, Chonito Cliff, and the high ground

southeast of the cliff.13 (Map VI.)

On the right, the 9th Marines, commanded by Col, Edward A. Craig, moved

ahead steadily against fairly heavy machine

gun and rifle fire and by the end of the

day had secured a beachhead about 1,500

yards in depth.14 In the center, Col. Arthur H. Butler's 21st Marines found the

opposition only moderate, but the terrain

"almost impossible." Ahead lay low cliffs

of bare rock mounting to a plateau covered

with scrub growth and tangled vines. Intense heat and a shortage of water added

to the day's ordeal, but in spite of the

natural obstacles as well as enemy mortar

and rifle fire, two battalions had made their

way to the top of the cliff and tied in

with the 9th Marines on the right by nightfall.

It was on the division left that the day's

most intense and arduous fighting occurred. Northeast of Red Beach 1 was

Chonito Cliff, containing a complex system

of cave defenses and offering the enemy a

perfect opportunity to pour mortar and artillery fire on the low ground below. Inland

of Red Beach 2 lay Bundschu Ridge,15 offering the same sort of obstacles. By noon,

Chonito Cliff was cleared, but two separate

and costly attacks on the ridge to the south

failed to make any significant headway,

and by nightfall the right flank of Col, W.

Carvel Hall's 3d Marines was still out of

contact with the 21st Marines in the division center.

The day's casualties on the northern

beachhead came to 105 killed, 536

wounded, and 56 missing in action. The

cost was more than had been anticipated,

yet the results, if far from decisive, were

at least hopeful. The beaches themselves

were secured, as was Chonito Cliff on

the left flank. By late afternoon General Turnage, the division commander, was

ashore, and his command post was in operation; division artillery was in position

and in the process of registering; division

engineers had cut a road to supply the

21st Marines and were at work removing

land mines and demolishing cave positions.

The Southern Beaches

According to the operation plan of the

1st Provisional Marine Brigade, the two

Marine regimental combat teams would

land in assault, and Col. Vincent J. Tanzola's 305th Regimental Combat Team of

the 77th Infantry Division would be in reserve. The 4th Marines on the right was

to go over White Beaches 1 and 2 north

of Bangi Point, establish a beachhead, and

protect the brigade right flank. On the left,

the 22d Marines was to land on Yellow

13

 3d Marine Div Opn Plan 2-44, 13 May 44. 14

 This account of 3d Marine Division's operations is derived from: 3d Marine Div SAR FORAGER Opn, 19 Aug 44, p. 1; Ibid., Incl L, 3d

Marines SAR, p. 1; Ibid., Incl M, 9th Marines

SAR, p. 1; Ibid., Incl M, 21st Marines SAR, p.

1; Lodge, Guam, pp. 38-47.

15

 So named after Capt. Geary R. Bundschu,

Commander, Company A, 3d Marines, who later

lost his life there.
THE FIGHT FOR THE BEACHHEAD 345

Beaches 1 and 2, occupy the town of Agat,

and then drive north to seal off Orote Peninsula at its base. The 305th Infantry,

when committed to action on brigade order, would pass through the lines of the

4th Marines and protect the right sector

of the beachhead.16 (Map VII.)

The terrain facing the brigade was far

more favorable for the attack than that

facing the 3d Marine Division to the north.

Low hills and open ground characterized

most of the area immediately inland of the

landing beaches. In spite of numerous pillboxes still alive with Japanese, both of the

assault regiments moved forward rapidly.

By early afternoon, the 4th Marines had

cleared Bangi Point and Hill 40 just inland

and had set up a roadblock supported by

five tanks on Harmon Road, which ran

east out of Agat. The 22d Marines captured Agat, which had been mostly reduced to rubble by naval and air bombardment but still contained its share of

defenders hiding in the debris. Moving out

from Agat, the regiment began to receive

artillery fire from the hills beyond and suffered some casualties, as well, from a misplaced American air attack. It was also

handicapped by the fact that a communications failure kept the reserve battalion

(the 3d) afloat until too late to participate

in the day's fighting.17

Despite these difficulties, by the close of

the first day's fighting the brigade had established a beachhead ranging in depth approximately 1,300 to 2,300 yards at the cost

of only about 350 casualties. Brig. Gen.

Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., came ashore before noon and his command post southeast

of Gaan Point was in operation by 1350.

Defenses were organized in depth against

the expected Japanese night counterattack.

Artillery was ashore and registered.

Landing the 305th Infantry

The operation plan for the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade had designated the

305th Regimental Combat Team as brigade reserve, to be used at General Shepherd's discretion. Accordingly, the brigade

commander had ordered one battalion

team (later designated the 2d, commanded

by Lt. Col. Robert D. Adair) to be boated

and ready at the line of departure by 1030

of the 21st. The other two battalion landing teams would follow the 2d ashore when

and as needed.18

Actually, the first element of the 77th

Division to go ashore was a liaison party

of four from the 242d Engineer Combat

Battalion, which was attached to the 305th

Infantry. Two officers and two enlisted

men landed shortly after 0830 on White

Beach 1, which they proceeded to reconnoiter. The second group, the first organized element of the division to come ashore,

was the reconnaissance party of the 305th

Field Artillery Battalion. At 0830 this

group was boated in two DUKW's at the

line of departure, where it remained for

several hours. Finally, the vehicles were ordered ashore, and by midafternoon the reconnaissance party had established itself on

White Beach 2.19

16

 1st Provisional Marine Brig Opn Plan 7-44,

11 Jul 44. 17

 1st Provisional Marine Brig War Diary, p.

4; 22d Marines SAR, p. 3; Lodge, Guam, pp.

47-56.

18

 1st Provisional Marine Brig Opn Plan 7-44,

11 Jul 44. 19

 305th Fld Arty Bn, Action Against the Enemy, Guam, 21 Jul 44, p. 1; 242d Engr Combat

Bn Hist, p. 1, in 77th Inf Div Opns Rpt Guam,

21 Jul-10 Aug 44.
346 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

CIRCLING LANDING CRAFT. The 2d Battalion of the 305th Infantry waited three

and a half hours for the signal to go in to the reef.

Meanwhile, the infantrymen of Colonel

Adair's 2d Battalion were climbing down

cargo nets from their transports into the

bobbing landing craft that were to carry

them to the edge of the reef. By 1030 all

boats were in position near the line of departure waiting for the signal to go in. For

three and a half hours they circled impatiently. At last, at 1405, came the message

to proceed to the beach and assemble in an

area 300 yards inland from Gaan Point.20

Unfortunately, no amphibian tractors

were on hand to transport Adair's men

over the reef and on to the shore line, and

of course their LCVP's were too deepdrafted to negotiate either the reef or the

shallow waters inland of it. Over the sides

of their boats the men climbed, and waded

the rest of the way in water at least waist

deep. Some lucky few were able to pick

up rides in Marine LVT's on the landward side of the reef, but most stumbled

in over the rough coral bottom, cutting

their shoes en route and occasionally falling into deep pot holes. Luckily, no enemy

fire impeded their progress, and except for

the dousing they got and the exhaustion

they suffered the troops of the 2d Battalion,

305th, completed their ship-to-shore movement without injury.21

The remaining two battalions of the

305th Infantry encountered even greater

difficulties in getting ashore. At 1530

Colonel Tanzola received the message (a

20

 1st Provisional Marine Brig War Diary, Jul

44, p. 4; 305th RCT AAR, 18 Jun-9 Aug 44,

p. 1.

21

 S. Sgt. James M. Burns, Narrative of the

Guam Campaign, Notes, 21 Jul 44 (hereafter

cited as Burns Notes), MS, OCMH. Sergeant

Burns headed the historical team attached to the

77th Infantry Division on Guam. See also, AFAS,

Guam, pp. 33-34. (This account was prepared in

large part from the notes and interviews made by

Sergeant Burns.)
THE FIGHT FOR THE BEACHHEAD 347

full hour after it had been dispatched) to

land the rest of his regiment immediately.

With only enough landing craft available to

embark one battalion, he ordered Lt, Col.

James E. Landrum, Jr., to boat his 1st

Battalion and head for the reef. However,

naval officers in charge of boat traffic had

not been apprised of these orders and refused to permit the landing craft to proceed beyond the line of departure. Finally,

at 1730, General Shepherd settled the matter by ordering the regimental commander

to land his combat team at once. Again

no amphibian tractors were available and

again the troops had to make their way

through the water on foot. This time conditions were even more adverse. The tide

was full, forcing some of the men to swim

part of the way, and night was approaching. It was no easy task in view of the fact

that the average infantryman was loaded

down with a steel helmet and liner, gas

mask, life belt, rifle, bayonet, grenade

launcher, light pack, two bandoleers of ammunition, a bag full of rifle grenades hung

from his neck, another pouch of hand

grenades strapped to his thighs, a two-foot

long pair of wire cutters tied to his pack,

two canteens of water, a first aid pack, and

a machete hanging from his cartridge

belt. Nevertheless, the troops reached the

beach safely after nightfall, although they

were scattered and several hundred yards

south of Gaan Point, where they were

supposed to touch down. Colonel Landrum

gathered the better part of his men together and led them to their designated

assembly areas inland. The rest had to

spend the night on the beach, since after

2130 Marine military police stopped all

movement.22

The 3d Battalion, 305th, commanded by

Lt. Col. Edward Chalgren, Jr., took even

longer to get to shore. Before the landing

craft assigned to the 1st Battalion had returned to the transport area, the report

came in that an enemy submarine had

been spotted in the area, and all the ships

of Transport Division 38 put to sea—including Alpine, aboard which Chalgren's

unit was embarked. Not until 2120 did the

ship return, and it was 0330 of the 22d

before the bulk of the battalion completed

the complicated transfer from ship to landing craft to shore. To expedite the ship-toshore movement of his battalion, Chalgren

borrowed five LVT's from the Marines.

One of these acted as control boat while

the other four ferried the troops across the

reef in driblets. Even so, some elements

failed to reach the beach until 0600, and

not for another hour was the unit fully

reorganized. Meanwhile, Colonel Tanzola

and his staff had debarked and reached the

reef line, where they, too, found no transportation waiting them. The regimental

commander came upon an abandoned rubber raft, commandeered it, and paddled his

way to shore while the rest of his staff

waded and swam in.23

Japanese Counterattack

The American troops that dug in along

their beachhead perimeters on the night of

21-22 July were well aware that the odds

favored an organized enemy counterattack,

probably in the early morning hours. Jap22

 Burns Notes, 21 Jul 44; 305th RCT AAR, 18

Jun-9 Aug 44, p. 1; 305th RCT Jnl Record Book,

1 Jul-8 Sep 44, 21 Jul 44; 1st Provisional Marine

Brig Opns Jnl, 21 Jul 44, in 1st Provisional Marine Brig Opns and SAR; AFAS Guam, pp. 34-

36; Ltr, Col Landrum to Gen A. C. Smith, 27

Apr 55, Incl, OCMH. 23

 Burns Notes, 21 Jul 44; Lodge, Guam, pp.

57-58.
348 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

anese defensive doctrine prescribed such

countermeasures and at both Saipan and

Tinian the island commanders had rigidly

adhered to doctrine. All along the line the

troops were alerted to prepare for the expected attack and took such measures as

the terrain and their own dispositions permitted. When the counterthrust did materialize, it was surprisingly feeble, at least

in comparison with those that the enemy

had launched against the invaders of Saipan and Tinian.

In the zone of the 3d Marine Division,

whose hold on the beachhead was the most

precarious, no critical threat to the Marine

lines occurred. Mortar and artillery fire

falling on the beaches put a temporary end

to unloading about 0230, and enemy patrols probed the front lines throughout the

night, but that was all.24

Farther south, the Japanese undertook

more serious measures. Against the Agat

beaches, Colonel Suenaga of the 38th Infantry Regiment himself led a force consisting of at least two infantry battalions

supported by tanks. The brunt of the attack, which started about 0100, fell in

the zone of the 4th Marines. In two successive waves, the enemy struck the Marine perimeters around Hill 40 and succeeded in penetrating as far as the pack

howitzer positions on the beaches before

being destroyed or beaten off. Another

force, led by four tanks followed by guns

mounted on trucks, came down Harmon

Road in an apparent attempt to re-establish

positions in the town of Agat. Fortunately, the marines had set up a roadblock,

and a platoon of Sherman tanks with the

help of a single bazooka quickly disposed

of the Japanese armor, after which the

enemy infantrymen retreated. About the

same time, another group of Japanese hit

the 1st Battalion's lines south of the road,

and again succeeded in penetrating the defenders' lines as far to the rear as the artillery positions. Fighting was so fierce in

this area that one platoon of Company A

was reduced to four men.25

It was here, too, that the soldiers of the

305th Infantry got their first taste of closein combat on Guam. One finger of the

Japanese penetration reached the hastily

established lines of Companies A and B,

and in the fighting that ensued seven

Americans were killed and ten wounded in

exchange for about twenty Japanese.26

On their part, the Japanese lost at least

268 men and 6 tanks during the counterattack.27

 Among those killed was Colonel

Suenaga who, after being wounded in the

thigh by mortar fire, continued to lead the

attack until he received a fatal bullet in the

chest. Suenaga's death deprived the Japanese defenders on Orote Peninsula of their

commander. Command of the sector passed

to Comdr. Asaichi Tamai, IJN, of the 263d

Air Unit, who took over not only the Navy

forces stationed on Orote but also the 2d

Battalion, 38th Infantry, guarding the base

of the peninsula.28

Consolidating the Southern Beachhead

22-24 July

General Shepherd's plan for 22 July contemplated an expansion of the beachhead

in three directions—north, east, and south.

24

 Lodge, Guam, p. 59.

25

 Ibid., pp. 54-55. 26

 Burns Notes, 21 Jul 44. 27

 III Phib Corps Rpt Guam, Incl D, G-2 Rpt

2. Major Lodge estimates the number of Japanese

killed to be closer to 600. Lodge, Guam, p. 55. 28

 Ltr, Takeda to McQueen, 20 Feb 52. See

also Takeda Rpt, 4 Oct 44; Japanese Studies in

World War II, 55.
THE FIGHT FOR THE BEACHHEAD 349

On the right (south), the 4th Marines was

ordered to seize Mount Alifan and then

push south along the ridge line toward

Mount Taene. The 22d Marines was to

head in a northeasterly direction and capture an intermediate objective line that ran

about 4,000 yards east of Pelagi Rock. The

305th Infantry (less 2d Battalion) was ordered to pass through the left battalion of

the 4th Marines and attack toward Maanot

Pass, a cut through the mountains over

which Harmon Road ran from Agat to the

east. The 2d Battalion, 305th, and 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, were to be in brigade

reserve.29

At the outset of the attack the 4th Marines ran into heavy enfilade fire from the

reverse slopes of Alifan's foothills. Once

this was neutralized and the marines could

approach the mountain itself, the chief deterrent to rapid progress was the terrain.

Approaches to the crest were snarled with

pandanus roots and led to vertical cliffs

covered with thick scrub growth. Enemy

resistance, however, was only nominal, and

one patrol was able to reach Alifan's summit, where it discovered no evidence of

Japanese activity. The patrol then returned

to the foot of the cliffs and joined the rest

of the regiment.30

In the brigade center the 305th Infantry was slow in jumping off because of the

many delays incurred in getting ashore the

night before. Neither the 1st nor the 3d

Battalion had been able to get fully organized until about 0700; the regimental

command post was not in a position to

direct the attack until an hour later; the

305th Field Artillery was even longer in

getting set to go into action. By 1000, however, all was in order and the regiment,

with the 1st Battalion on the right, the

3d Battalion on the left, passed through

the left flank of the 4th Marines and

launched its attack to capture the high

ground over which Harmon Road passed

to the east.31

During the morning the 305th encountered little resistance, and by 1252 the

3d Battalion was already on the line that

had been set as the day's objective.32 That

afternoon Chalgren's men pushed ahead

still farther but before night were pulled

back to their 1300 positions in order to tie

in with the 1st Battalion, which had made

slower progress because of the dense underbrush that covered the hills over which

it had had to advance. When the regiment

dug in, its two forward battalions had firm

contact, but a deep gully prevented physical contact with the 22d Marines on the

left.33

On the brigade left, the 22d Marines

pushed off at 0845, ahead of the other two

regiments. Until late afternoon, it encountered only moderate resistance. The hill

northeast of Agat that had held up the

1st Battalion the day before was easily

mounted as tanks cleared the way to the

next high ground. When the marines on

the left reached the Ayuja River they were

temporarily halted when it was discovered

that the Agat road bridge across the river

had been destroyed. The men were reluctant to ford the river without their supporting tanks, and the tanks could not cross because the river banks were too steep. In

29

 1st Provisional Marine Brig Opns and SAR,

War Diary, p. 5; 305th RCT AAR Guam, p. 2. 30

 Lodge, Guam, p. 66.

31

 305th RCT AAR, p. 2; 305th RCT Jnl Record Book 1 Jul-8 Sep 44, 22 Jul, Msgs 65, 66. 32

 305th RCT Jnl Record Book, 22 Jul, Msgs

71(c), 75. 33

 305th RCT AAR, p. 2; Burns Notes, 3/305,

22 Jul 44.
350 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

4TH MARINES MOVES INLAND TOWARD MT. ALIFAN

the absence of engineers, amphibian tanks

were called up to replace the tanks until

provision could be made to get the latter

across.

This substitution of armored amphibians

for tanks was contrary to prevailing Marine Corps doctrine. Experience at Saipan

had shown that amphibian tractors, armored or otherwise, were extremely vulnerable to enemy fire when out of the water.34

Hence, that afternoon General Shepherd

sent clear orders to all the units under his

command that the amphibians should not

be used inland except where absolutely

necessary.35

In any event, the troops made their way

across Ayuja River, some of them reaching

a point beyond the Old Agat Road before

they were ordered back to the road itself

to tie in for the night with the rest of the

22d Regiment. Later, the 22d Marine Tank

Company, after twenty-four hours of labor,

constructed a causeway across the river to

enable its vehicles to cross over.

By nightfall the brigade, with the 305th

Infantry attached, was drawn up along a

line extending from the shore near Pelagi

Rock, along the high ground northeast of

Harmon Road, through Mount Alifan,

southwest along the ridge line toward

Mount Taene, then west to the sea at

Magpo Point. The 4th Marines held this

line from its coastal anchor at Magpo

Point to Mount Alifan; the 305th Infantry held the area along the foothills northeast of Mount Alifan to a point about

1,200 yards from the Old Agat Road; and

the 22d Marines held the area north and

northeast of Agat. Approximately 3,000

34

 See above, Ch. V. 35

 1st Provisional Marine Brig Opns and SAR,

Jnl, 22 Jul 44, Msg 62.
THE FIGHT FOR THE BEACHHEAD 351

ASSEMBLY AREA OF 305TH INFANTRY ON 22 JULY

yards of the Force Beachhead Line in

the brigade's zone was now in American

hands.

It was clear by now that nothing was

likely to impede the complete and rapid occupation of the southern beachhead, and,

accordingly, General Geiger announced the

second objective for the brigade—the capture of Orote Peninsula. Once the Force

Beachhead Line had been fully occupied,

the brigade was to be relieved by two regiments of the 77th Infantry Division, which

would take over defense of the line from

Inalas to Magpo Point. This task was to

fall to the 305th Infantry, already ashore,

and to Col. Aubrey D. Smith's 306th Regimental Combat Team, which was still

afloat. The 305th would be released from

brigade control, and both regiments were

to be under direct command of General

Bruce. The 307th was ordered to remain

afloat in corps reserve and be prepared to

land anywhere on order.36

The night of 22-23 July in brigade

zone was one of relative quiet, disturbed

only occasionally by Japanese patrols,

whose efforts to infiltrate through the lines

were uniformly unsuccessful. The next

morning, and throughout the 23d, the 4th

Marines on the right (south) made no

further effort to advance, but consolidated

its positions and prepared to be relieved by

the 306th Infantry. That these men were

able to go about their preparations undisturbed was partly due to the fact that

36

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 22 Jul 44, Msg 1830,

CG III Phib Corps to CG 77th Inf Div and CG

1st Provisional Marine Brig,
352 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

naval guns and aircraft sealed off most of

the possible routes of enemy counterattack.

Early in the morning of the 23d observers

had spotted a large Japanese troop movement headed from Mount Lamlam toward

Facpi Point. The call went out immediately for naval and air assistance, and in

response the cruiser Honolulu, aided by

carrier planes, dispersed the Japanese.37

For the other two regiments, the push

toward the Force Beachhead Line was considerably facilitated by the landing of field

and antiaircraft artillery. By the morning

of 22 July, Brig. Gen. Pedro A. del Valle,

USMC, had two thirds of the 155-mm.

guns and howitzers of III Amphibious

Corps Artillery ashore, and the 9th Marine

Defense Battalion had succeeded in placing two dozen 40-mm. and 20-mm. guns

and a dozen .50-caliber machine guns

along the beach between Agat and Bangi

Point.38 Late the same afternoon, Brig.

Gen. Isaac Spalding, Commanding General, 77th Division Artillery, set up his

command post inland of Gaan Point. By

then the remainder of the 305th Field Artillery Battalion was ashore, as were two

other artillery battalions, the 304th and

902d. The 305th was ordered to continue

to support the 305th Infantry; the 304th

Field Artillery Battalion was assigned to

close support of the 306th Infantry when

it should get ashore; and the 902d was

given the mission of general support for

the division. The 304th and 902d Battalions were also ordered to be prepared to

support the brigade in its forthcoming attack on Orote Peninsula.39

Meanwhile, on the 23d the 305th Infantry had made rapid progress, hampered

only by occasional enemy patrols. By 1130

the 3d Battalion, on the left, had reached

the O-2 line; the 1st was pushing from the

Harmon Road along the ridge northeast of

the Maanot Pass toward the O-2 line on

the right of the 3d. The 2d Battalion

moved to Maanot Pass to block the path

of possible Japanese approach from the

east along the Harmon Road. By early afternoon, as the 305th Infantry was digging

in for the night in a deep salient along the

O-2 line and the Force Beachhead Line,

all of the high ground overlooking Orote

Peninsula from the southeast was in American hands.40

To the left, the 22d Marines moved more

slowly in its northward thrust toward the

base of Orote Peninsula. Little resistance

was encountered on 23 July until midafternoon, but then, as the regiment attempted

to swing across the narrow neck leading

out onto the peninsula, the Japanese suddenly came to life. The southern approaches to the peninsula were guarded by

marshy rice paddies interspersed with

small hills that the Japanese had organized into a system of mutually supporting strongpoints. Moreover, the zone of

the 22d Marines approach was exposed to

artillery and mortar fire from both Orote

Peninsula on the west and Mount Tenjo

to the northeast. The Japanese had not

failed to make full use of these commanding positions. In spite of heavy concentration laid down by corps and division

artillery, assisted by the big guns of the

battleship Pennsylvania, the marines could

do nothing to dislodge the enemy. After a 37

 Lodge, Guam, p. 66. 38

 Ibid.

39

 77th Inf Div Opns Rpt Guam, p. 3; 77th

Inf Div Arty, Daily Summary of Events, 23 Jul

44, p. 4.

40

 305th RCT AAR, p. 2; 305th RCT Jnl,

22 Jul 44, Msgs 93, 96, 102, 104b, 109.
THE FIGHT FOR THE BEACHHEAD 353

SMOULDERING JAPANESE TANKS knocked out on Agat-Sumay Road by U.S.

medium tanks.

wasted, exasperating afternoon sloshing

through the rice paddies, the regiment finally drew back a full 400 yards from its

most advanced positions and dug in just

south of the Old Agat Road.41

General Shepherd's plan for action on

the 24th contemplated a two-pronged

movement, the object of which was to envelope the rice paddy area and establish a

firm line across the narrow neck of Orote

Peninsula. All three battalions of the 22d

Marines were to be committed to the attack. On the right, the 2d Battalion was to

jump off from its night positions south of

the Old Agat Road, skirt to the right of

the marshland, and push north to the town

of Atantano, just inland of Apra Harbor.

On the left, the other two battalions were

to drive north up the coast along the AgatSumay Road in columns of battalions.

Once the rear battalion had reached a

point on the Agat-Sumay Road about 600

yards from its line of departure, it was to

fan out to the right and then head north

toward the south shore of Apra Harbor.

The lead battalion would continue in a

northeasterly direction along the AgatSumay Road. If this plan succeeded, nightfall would find the regiment drawn up

across the neck of Orote Peninsula from

the seacoast to Apra Harbor, with all three

battalions abreast. Enemy defenses in the

rice paddy area would be enveloped and

presumably destroyed or neutralized. To

relieve the 22d Marines of the necessity of

lengthening its already thinning lines, the

305th Infantry was ordered to shift left

41

 1st Provisional Marine Brig Opns and SAR,

War Diary, 23 Jul 44, p. 7; Ibid., Jnl, 23 Jul

44, Msgs 62, 63b; Lodge, Guam, p. 67.
354 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

MAJ. GEN. ANDREW D. BRUCE discussing operational plans with Col. Douglas McNair.

as far as Old Agat Road, which was to be

the new regimental boundary line.42

After delaying an hour to permit a

longer preliminary naval bombardment,

the regiment jumped off as ordered at

1000, 24 July. The battalion on the right,

was counterattacked almost immediately

and had to fall back to its previous night's

positions south of the Old Agat Road. By

early afternoon, however, it regained the

initiative and was quickly able to reach its

objective at Atantano, where it established

visual contact with the 305th Infantry on

its right. The other two battalions found

the going slower as they felt their way up

the Agat-Sumay Road. The road was

thickly mined with aerial bombs and subject to heavy enemy artillery fire from

Pelagi Rock and Orote Peninsula. Five

Japanese tanks appeared and contested the

passage but were quickly disposed of by

the heavier Shermans that were spearheading the drive. As planned, on reaching the

point on the road where the ground to the

right permitted a decent foothold, the rear

battalion fanned out in that direction.

Without too much difficulty it overran the

strongpoints that had held up the regiment

on the 23d, but as evening approached and

the battalion was compelled to dig in, it

was still some 400 yards short of its objective on the south shore of Apra Harbor.

Meanwhile, on the left, the lead battalion

had succeeded in reaching its objective on

the west coast of the narrow neck of

Orote.43

Thus by the end of 24 July, General Shepherd's major objectives had been

achieved. The Force Beachhead Line had

been captured and was now manned

mostly by units of the 77th Division. Orote

was sealed off and the time was at hand

to launch the drive to capture this vital

peninsula that pointed fingerlike into the

ocean between the two landing beaches and

would constitute a danger to each so long

as it remained in enemy hands.

Landing the Reserves

General Geiger's plan to commit the major portion of the 1st Provisional Marine 42

 1st Provisional Marine Brig Opns and SAR,

War Diary, p. 8; 1st Provisional Marine Brig Opn

Order 15. (See Lodge, Guam, Maps 14, 15.)

43

 1st Provisional Marine Brig Opns and SAR,

War Diary, p. 8; Lodge, Guam, pp. 68-69.
THE FIGHT FOR THE BEACHHEAD 355

Brigade to the assault on Orote required

that the 77th Division take over the duty

of manning the Force Beachhead Line until the peninsula could be secured. Accordingly, he ordered the 305th Infantry to

occupy the northern part of the line and

the 306th to land and relieve the 4th Marines on the southern part.

Late in the afternoon of 22 July, Colonel

Smith, commanding officer of the 306th,

had come ashore with Col, Douglas C. McNair, 77th Division chief of staff, to reconnoiter the landing beaches and assembly

areas. Next day the whole regiment made

the damp journey from ship to shore. As in

the case of the Army troops that had preceded them, the men had to wade in from

the reef line carrying all their equipment.

The 77th Division as a reserve unit had

been assigned no LVT's and its DUKW's

had to be reserved for cargo and light artillery. Division headquarters had tried to

land the troops at low tide, but overloaded

communications and other difficulties in

procuring landing craft delayed the shipto-shore movement until the tide was

flooding. Vehicles had to be dragged by

bulldozer from the reef to the beach, and

most of them drowned out. Almost all of

the radio sets, even those waterproofed,

were ruined, and one tank disappeared altogether in a large shell hole.

As a result of the delays incident to this

slow procedure, only the 3d Battalion,

commanded by Lt. Col. Gordon T. Kimbrell, was ashore in time to make its way

into the line that afternoon. This battalion, with Companies A and C attached,

relieved the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, in

its positions between Mount Alifan and

Mount Taene where, after repulsing a

small enemy attack, the Army battalion established its perimeters for the night. The

other two battalions of the 306th stayed in

their assembly areas.44

On the morning of 24 July Lt. Col.

Charles F. Greene's 2d Battalion, 306th Infantry, completed the relief of the 4th Marines on the northern part of its line and

established contact with the 305th Infantry on the left. Throughout the day

Greene's men cleaned out Japanese caves

and dugouts in their area. No organized

enemy appeared to contest their positions.45

General Bruce therefore requested permission to land two battalions of the 307th

Infantry so that he could push the Force

Beachhead Line still farther east and as

far south as Facpi Point. General Geiger

denied the request because he considered

a further expansion unnecessary and also

because he was loath at this time to part

with all but one battalion of his corps reserve.46

 Nevertheless, he conceded that the

307th should at least be landed in the area

of the southern beachhead, although it

was retained under the III Amphibious

Corps command. Starting on the morning

of 24 July, Col. Stephen S. Hamilton's

regiment commenced the uncomfortable

trek from its transports to the beach—

made even more arduous this time by an

untimely storm at sea. By midafternoon,

General Bruce himself was ashore at his

command post and ready to take over direction of his two regiments on the line.47

44

 306th RCT Opn Rpt Guam, p. 3; 306th

RCT Jnl, 23 Jul-10 Aug 44, 23 Jul 44, Msgs 2,

4, 6; AFAS, Guam, p. 39; Ltr, Lt Gen A. D.

Bruce, USA (Ret.), to Gen A. C. Smith, 11 Feb

55, Incl 1, OCMH. 45

 306th RCT Jnl, 24 Jul 44, Msgs 8, 12, 14, 15, 16; 306th RCT Opn Rpt Guam, p. 2. 46

 III Phib Corps Rpt Guam, Opns Rpt, p. 3. 47

 77th Inf Div Opns Rpt Guam, p. 5; 307th

RCT Jnl, 24 Jul 44, Msg, 1030.
356 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Thus by the end of 24 July, after four

days of fighting, the 1st Provisional Marine

Brigade, with an assist from the 77th Infantry Division, had captured almost all

the ground between the landing beaches

and the Force Beachhead Line and had

cut off from retreat and reinforcement the

Japanese garrison on Orote Peninsula. The

305th and 306th Regimental Combat

Teams had taken over all of the line except

that section across the neck of Orote Peninsula, where the marines were poised to

launch the next major assault. All of del

Valle's III Amphibious Corps Artillery was

ashore, and most of the 77th Division Artillery was in position to support the advance. Beach defenses from Agat to Gaan

Point were manned by the 9th Marine Defense Battalion, and from Gaan Point south

to Bangi Point by the 7th Antiaircraft

Artillery (Automatic Weapons) Battalion

of the 77th Division. Firmly in American

hands was a large irregular slice of Guam

running from Magpo Point northeast to

Mount Taene, north to Mount Alifan, and

again northeast to Inalas, where it bent

back northwestward to Atantano and then

southwest across the neck of Orote Peninsula. Casualties up to the night of

24 July were 188 killed in action, 728

wounded, and 87 missing in the brigade;

24 killed in action, 63 wounded, and 1

missing in the Army division.48 This was

a substantial price to pay, but the figures

were not out of proportion when compared

to those for most Central Pacific campaigns. Nor were the losses nearly so great

as those being suffered at the same time

by the 3d Marine Division in its bitter fight

for the northern beachhead.

Consolidating the Northern Beachhead

22-24 July

Speaking of the terrain that faced the

3d and 21st Regiments of the 3d Marine Division just inland of their landing

beaches, Lt, Gen. Alexander A. Vandegrift,

commandant of the Marine Corps, later remarked that it was "some of the most

rugged country I have ever seen."

 49

 Coming as it did from a veteran of Guadalcanal, this description conveys some idea of

the nature of the problem facing the marines immediately upon their landing in

this zone. Bundschu Ridge and Chonito

Cliff were little more than a hundred feet

in height, but rose precipitately from the

narrow coastal plain beneath.50 Dense

and tangled underbrush covered the approaches to the ridge, and the whole area

was striated with deep ravines and gulleys that made contact between the attacking units extremely difficult to maintain

and at the same time offered ideal routes

for Japanese infiltration. (See Map VI.)

On 22 July, while the 21st Marines reorganized, the 3d Marines, on the left, assaulted Bundschu Ridge behind a heavy

concentration of artillery and heavy weapons, supplemented by the 20-mm. and 40-

mm. guns of the 14th Marine Defense

Battalion. A few men reached the top, but

only to return to their parent unit before

the day's close. By this time Colonel Hall's

3d Marines was a badly battered regiment.

In two days fighting he had lost 615 men,

and some of his companies were down to

30 or 40 men.51 On the next day he decided to pit his 1st and 2d Battalions, deci48

 Lodge, Guam, p. 70; 77th Inf Div G-1 Jnl,

24 Jul 44.

49

 3d Marine Div SAR, p. 4. 50

 See USAFICPA, Map, Island of Guam,

Apra Harbor, Rev., Apr. 44. 51

 3d Marine Div SAR, p. 2.
THE FIGHT FOR THE BEACHHEAD 357

mated as they were, against the ridge. To

General Turnage he sent the message, "I

am going to try and advance up that mess

in front of me. What I really need is a

battalion whereas I have only 160 men to

use on that 500 yard slope."

 52

 To his great

surprise, when his men finally hacked their

way to the top on the morning of the 23d,

most of the Japanese had evacuated.

Still it was impossible to push on immediately. The cliffs were studded with

machine guns that had to be mopped up,

and contact had yet to be gained with the

21st Marines on the right. That regiment

had made little progress during the day in

the face of heavy opposition from enemy

pillboxes. Colonel Hall asked for reinforcements from the 77th Division, whose 307th

Regiment was still afloat, but General

Geiger was unwilling to release his corps

reserve.53

On the morning of 24 July, two battalions of the 21st Marines attacked up the

ravine that lay between the 21st and the

3d Marines to the left. From the cliffs on

either side came murderous machine gun

fire. On top of this, American naval pilots,

called in to make an air strike, were forced

to drop their bombs so close to the attacking line that seventeen marines were killed

or wounded.54 That afternoon, two companies of the 3d Marines coming up from

the left were able at last to establish contact between the two regiments.

At the close of 24 July the left and center regiments of the 3d Marine Division

had, by dint of great effort and many casualties, succeeded at last in establishing a

foothold on the first ridge line inland from

the sea. Yet, though this victory was by no

means a Pyrrhic one, neither could it be

considered decisive. Ahead still lay a series

of formidable ridges, running roughly parallel to the sea, each one higher than the

one before, and all culminating in the midisland mountain mass, which in this area

was dominated by Mount Chachao, Mount

Alutom, and Mount Tenjo.

Meanwhile, on the division right, the

picture was not so discouraging. On 22

July the 9th Marines moved southwest

along the ocean shore against light resistance and occupied Piti Navy Yard. Late

the same afternoon a minor amphibious

assault of battalion size was sent against

Cabras Island. The landing was unopposed

and uneventful except that one LVT hit

a land mine. The next day the occupation

of the island was completed. On the 24th

the regiment sent out a patrol south along

the Piti-Sumay Road in an attempt to establish contact with the brigade. Covered

by amphibian tanks as they moved along

the coastal road, the men eventually came

under heavy machine gun fire from the inland cliffs, and this, coupled with the fact

that they were approaching the edge of the

pattern of American fire being directed

against Orote, persuaded them to return.

Contact between the division and the brigade would have to await another day.55

Initial Supply Over the Beaches

If the 3d Marine Division suffered more

severely than the 1st Provisional Marine

Brigade from enemy fire and nightmarish

terrain, it did enjoy one advantage over

the troops to the south—the movement of

supplies from ship to shore during the early

52 days of the assault was more expeditious. Quoted in Lodge, Guam, p. 62. 53

 III Phib Corps Rpt Guam, Opns Rpt, p. 2. 54

 21st Marines SAR, p. 3.

55

 Lodge, Guam, pp. 62-63.
358 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

PONTOON BARGE WITH CRANE is a fueling station. Alligator is refueling from a

barge inside the reef.

Off the Asan beaches, the lagoon between the shore line and the reef's edge was

for the most part dry at low tide and

trucks were able to drive to the edge and

take on supplies directly from cargo boats

and lighters. Off the Agat beaches, however, the abutting reef and the lagoon bottom were underwater at all times, and

consequently all cargo had to be restaged

to amphibious vehicles several hundred

yards offshore. To add to the difficulty, the

fringe of the reef was not pronounced, and

therefore it was impossible to position

cranes on the coral outcroppings as was

done at Asan. As a substitute measure, the

cranes at Agat were mounted on pontoon

barges moored along the line where the

shallow water began. Using this system, it

was possible for the cargo boats to load

LVT's at the rate of 25 tons an hour and

DUKW's at the rate of 40 tons an hour.56

Another device employed to expedite unloading over the southern beaches was the

construction of improvised pontoons made

by lashing together two life rafts covered

by a platform. Each attack transport of the

Southern Transport Group was ordered to

provide one of these "barges," each of

which had a capacity slightly in excess of

one ton. LCVP's could lower their ramps

over the floating platforms and transfer

their supplies. The rafts could then be

floated over the reef and in to shore.57

Notwithstanding these emergency measures, the brigade on 21-22 July suffered

from a scarcity of supplies, especially ammunition. The main reason, aside from

56

 TF 53.2 Rpt Guam, Incl F, pp. 2, 6. 57

 Ibid., Incl B, p. 12.
THE FIGHT FOR THE BEACHHEAD 359

the hydrographic difficulties described,

was the shortage of amphibian vehicles.

Thirteen of Shepherd's LVT's had been

knocked out by enemy gunfire during the

ship-to-shore movement, and eleven more

had been lost later on W Day. The poor

roads ashore made it necessary to use a

portion of the amphibian tractors to transport supplies directly to the front lines instead of just to the shore line as planned,

thus reducing still further the number of

amphibian vehicles available for ship-toshore supply. The DUKW's, of course,

took over part of the burden, but many of

these during the first two days were occupied with the job of landing artillery

pieces and could not be diverted to carrying cargo. Also, some of the DUKW's got

mired in the silt that bordered the shore

line and others had their tires punctured

on sharp coral heads.58

Ashore, the movement of supplies inland

was further impeded by the congestion resulting because of the narrow dispersal

areas, especially on White Beach 1. For the

first two days infantrymen, artillery pieces

and their crews, and the members of an

LVT repair pool all crowded together in

this restricted area, causing confusion and

delay.

Admiral Conolly was quick to take cognizance of the shortages suffered by the

brigade and ordered his transports to continue unloading throughout the night of

21-22 July and on until midnight of the

22d.59 Thereafter, ships ceased loading

from 2400 to 0530. In order to get supplies

and equipment into the hands of the troops

that needed them, the admiral was willing

to keep his transports at anchor and partially lighted even at the risk of exposing

them to enemy air and submarine attacks

at night. Partly as a result of these measures, and in spite of the numerous obstacles

involved, an average of about 5,000 tons a

day was unloaded over the northern and

southern beaches during the first eight days

of the invasion.60

58 Ibid., passim.

59

 This order also applied to the transport off

the 3d Marine Division's beaches. 60

 COMINCH P-009, V, 15-16; TF 56 Rpt

FORAGER, Incl G, Transport QM Rpt, p. 26.

CHAPTER XVIII

The Assault Completed

25-30 July

Late on the afternoon of 24 July, General Geiger issued his orders for the next

day's action—orders that contemplated a

completion of the assault phase of the invasion of Guam. Commencing at 0700, 25

July, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade

was to press the attack against Orote Peninsula while the 77th Infantry Division

(less the 307th Regimental Combat Team,

in corps reserve) held the Force Beachhead

Line in the southern zone. In the north,

the 3d Marine Division was to resume the

offensive and seize the high ground overlooking the Mount Tenjo road. Efforts

were also to be made to link the two

beachheads by establishing firm contact

between the Marine brigade or the Army

division and the 3d Marine Division.1

On the receipt of this order, General

Shepherd of the Marine brigade asked for

a day's postponement. His troops, he submitted, were greatly fatigued by four days

and nights of steady fighting. Moreover,

his 4th Regimental Combat Team had not

been fully relieved by Army elements until

midafternoon on 24 July and needed more

time to move north and get into position

to launch the attack on Orote. In view

of these representations, General Geiger

agreed to delay the assault on the peninsula until 0700 on 26 July.2

Meanwhile, the 22d Marines (less 2d

Battalion) was directed to capture all unseized ground between Agat Bay and Apra

Harbor across the narrowest portion of the

peninsula's neck. The 4th Marines was

to remain in its current bivouac area and

prepare to relieve its sister regiment on

order.3

While the marines were thus preparing

for the final drive against Orote, General Bruce ordered the 77th Division to

straighten and improve its defensive lines

and take precautions to disperse and camouflage its gun positions. The two infantry

regiments on the line (305th and 306th)

were to mop up within their defense sectors

and carry out security patrols beyond their

front lines. On 26 and 27 July, two battalions of the 306th Infantry pushed in a

southeasterly direction beyond the Force

Beachhead line. Advancing against neligible opposition, they reached Maanot Pass

-Mount Lamlam road south of Road

Junction 370 and dug in about 1,500 yards

from their line of departure. The 305th In1

 III Phib Corps Opn Plan 6-44, 24 Jul 44;

77th Inf Div FO 2, 0800, 25 Jul 44, in 306th

RCT Jnl, 33 Jul-10 Aug 44.

2

 1st Prov Marine Brig Opns and SAR, War

Diary, pp. 8-9. 3

 Ibid.
362 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

TROOPS IN BIVOUAC. 305th near the reservoir at Maanot Ridge.

fantry extended its right flank and tied in

with the new position of 306th. Two of the

Army field artillery battalions (304th and

305th) would continue to support the two

Army infantry regiments on the line, but

the other two (306th and 902d) were

placed in general support and ordered to

start moving toward the base of Orote

Peninsula and prepare to fire in advance

of the marines next day.4

Preparations for the Assault on Orote

25 July

Jumping off at 0800 behind a fifteenminute air and artillery attack, the 22d Marines got an early foretaste of the rigors

that still lay ahead before the Japanese

garrison on Orote could be subdued. (See

Map VII.) From Neye Island and from

the airfield near the end of the peninsula,

artillery rained down on the column of the

1st Battalion as it tried to make its way

along the coast of Agat Bay to Dadi Beach,

while to the north the 3d Battalion ran into

a hive of concrete pillboxes supported by

well-camouflaged machine gun nests. Enemy tanks appeared at intervals throughout the day to obstruct the attack. By

noon the 1st Battalion, 22d, was so depleted that it had to be replaced by the

1st Battalion, 4th Marines. Nevertheless,

by nightfall the Americans' front line had

been pushed ahead to extend across the

narrow neck from Dadi Beach to a point

4

 77th Inf Div FO 2, 0800, 25 Jul 44, in

306th RCT Jnl, 23 Jul-10 Aug 44.
THE ASSAULT COMPLETED: 25-30 JULY 363

just east of the thick mangrove swamp that

lay inland of Apra Harbor.5

On the 24th the 307th Infantry landed

near Agat. The two other Army regiments

on the line consolidated their positions and

tied in together by nightfall in the vicinity

of the reservoir on Maanot Ridge. Little

enemy opposition was encountered, except

for some light mortar fire that fell into the

ranks of the 2d Battalion, 305th, in the

early evening. Contact with the 22d Marines was established during the afternoon,

and later Company F of the 307th Infantry was attached to the 305th for the purpose of maintaining contact with the

brigade on the left.6 Meanwhile, an outpost

of the 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, made

contact with a patrol from the 9th Marines

at the bridge that crossed the Big Gautali

River. Thus for the first time in six days of

fighting a link, although a feeble one, was

forged between the northern and southern

beachheads.7

The Fight in the North

25 July

In the zone of the 3d Marine Division,

the prospect on the morning of 25 July

was still the same. The 9th Marines on

the right faced little opposition and fairly

easy terrain; the other two regiments were

up against the enemy's only remaining organized defense line (except for Orote Peninsula), which was drawn up along the

hellish approaches to the Chachao-Alutom

-Tenjo mountain system. In view of the

punishment suffered during the preceding

days by the 3d Marines, one battalion of

the 9th Marines was attached to the 3d

Marines early in the morning. (See Map

VI.)

During the day the 9th Marines on the

right, with the support of the antiaircraft batteries emplaced on Cabras Island,

pushed up the coast line of Apra Harbor

as far as the high ground overlooking the

Aguada River, This advance so lengthened

the division's lines that during the afternoon General Turnage ordered the 9th

Marines to pull back about 1,500 yards to

the north of the Laguas River. The movement was completed by noon of the next

day. In the division center, the 21st Marines jumped off in the direction of Mount

Tenjo, but the way was barred by heavy

enemy artillery, machine guns, and mortars

well emplaced on the reverse slopes of the

ridge that crossed the marines' line of advance. By nightfall the regiment was still

short of the Mount Tenjo road. On the

left, the 3d Marines, fighting against moderate opposition, captured a stretch of the

Mount Tenjo road in the morning. Ahead

of them lay Fonte Plateau. Tanks were

requested but were slow in arriving, so Lt.

Col. Robert E. Cushman, commanding the

2d Battalion, 9th Marines, which was attached to the 3d Marines, decided to take

advantage of the few remaining hours of

daylight and advance without them. As

night closed in, this one battalion had succeeded in gaining a foothold on the slopes

leading up to Fonte, By that time the division lines had been stretched more than

9,000 yards. The regiments and battalions

had almost no reserves to call on, and even

division had only one depleted battalion in

5

 1st Provisional Marine Brig Opns and SAR,

War Diary, 25 Jul 44, p. 9.

6

 305th RCT AAR, p. 2; 306th RCT Opn

Rpt, p. 2; 307th RCT Hist Records, Summary of

Events, p. 1. 7

 2d Bn 22d Marines Jnl, 21 Jul-21 Aug 44,

25 Jul 44.
364 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

reserve.8 Should the enemy choose this

time and place for an organized counterattack, the situation for the marines could

hardly have been worse. Unfortunately,

the Japanese did so choose.

Japanese Counterattack

25-26 July

In fact, General Takashima had been

planning and preparing for a full-scale

counterattack for several days. Units that

had remained in the Agana and Tumon

Bay areas even after the American landings

were withdrawn to the line facing the 3d

Marine Division. Commander Tamai on

Orote Peninsula was notified to launch an

offensive in co-ordination with the main

attack in the north.9 Detailed orders with

accompanying maps and overlays were issued to subordinate commanders. Takashima set up his command post in a cave

about 325 yards west of Fonte. In preparation for the attack, General Shigematsu,

commanding officer of the 48th Independent Mixed Brigade, moved his command

posts to Mangan Quarry, about 540 yards

west of Fonte, and Col. Hiko-Shiro

Ohashi assembled the 2d and 3d Battalions

of his 18th Infantry Regiment in the hill

area south of Agana.10

According to the plan issued by General

Takashima, the 48th Independent Mixed

Brigade would attack on the right against

the 3d Marines, who were drawn up before the Fonte Plateau. Simultaneously,

the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 18th

Infantry Regiment (from right to left)

would come down from the hills and attack

toward Asan Point and the mouth of the

Nidual River in the sector held by the 21st

Marines. On the Japanese left, another

unit, probably part of the 10th Independent Mixed Regiment, was to push down

the valley of the Tatgua River against

the 9th Marines. At the same time the force

on Orote Peninsula was to launch a drive

to the east in co-ordination with the main

attack.11

On the marines' left the attack first fell

on the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, which

had succeeded the day before in establishing only the most precarious of footholds

on the western slopes of Fonte. Seven times

during the night of 25-26 July the Japanese rolled down from the plateau and

seven times they were repulsed. By morning the battle here was over, but not before

Colonel Cushman's battalion had suffered

over 50 percent casualties. In exchange,

approximately 950 of the enemy were

killed in this single segment of the front.12

In the center of the line, Maj. Chusha

Maruyama's 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry

Regiment, struck the lines of the 21st Marines in mass and penetrated as far to the

rear as the battalion command post and

the perimeters of the mortar sections.

There, those Japanese that had survived

the first onslaught were eventually eliminated with the help of engineers, cooks,

clerks, communicators, and any other miscellaneous troops the regiment could throw

into the fight. 8

 3d Marine Div SAR, Incl L, pp. 2-3; Ibid.,

Incl M, p. 2; Ibid., Incl O, pp. 3-4; Lodge,

Guam, pp. 74-76. 9

 In spite of the heavy American bombardment, Takashima still had good communications

with the isolated garrison on Orote. 10

 Ltr, Takeda to McQueen, 20 Feb 52; Japanese Studies in World War II, 55, pp. 48-49.

11

 3d Marine Div D-2 Periodic Rpt, 26 Jul

44, Incl, Map found on body of Maj Chusha

Maruyama, CO 2d Bn, 18th Inf. 12

 3d Marine Div SAR, Incl L, pp. 2-3; Lodge,

Guam, pp. 81-82.
THE ASSAULT COMPLETED: 25-30 JULY 365

About the same time Maj. Setsuo Yukioka's 3d Battalion, 18th Regiment, also

hit the 21st Marines, locating and fully exploiting an 800-yard gap that lay between

that regiment and the 9th Marines to its

right. Here, in the high ground overlooking

the Nidual River, the Japanese set up machine gun emplacements that could rake

the flanks of both of the Marine regiments

with deadly accuracy. Part of the attack

through the gap got as far as the division hospital area. Doctors, corpsmen,

and pajama-clad patients set up a makeshift line around the hospital tents and

held fast until reinforcements arrived in

the morning to put the remaining Japanese

to rout. Meanwhile, the division artillery

regiment (12th Marines) was busily engaged in hand-to-hand combat with

numerous small suicide squads that had

infiltrated the rear on 25 July and had

timed their attacks with that of the main

offensive. All morning the artillerymen beat

off these desperate Japanese, some of whom

had packs of TNT strapped to their

backs, others of whom were loaded with

magnetic mines. Around noon, when the

fighting had let up, some fifty or sixty dead

Japanese were located in the area of the

12th Marines alone. Not until early afternoon were the Japanese machine gun

positions that had been emplaced in the

gap between the two Marine regiments

finally overrun. By that time the attack

had spent itself, and the few surviving

Japanese were fleeing into the hills.13

Meanwhile, on Orote Peninsula, Commander Tamai, according to order, had

launched his attack against the 22d Marines. Starting about 2230 a horde of

drink-crazed Japanese, mostly naval personnel, armed with anything from rifles to

ball bats, swarmed through the mangrove

swamps to fall upon the lines of the 22d

Marines. Artillery pieces of corps, brigade,

and the 77th Division almost immediately

commenced fire and kept up at a rapid rate

for the next two hours. Pack howitzers

were dragged to within thirty-five yards of

the infantry front lines to fire point blank

at the onrushing enemy. "Arms and legs,"

reported one observer, "flew like snowflakes."

 14

 The marines here, and in the

zone of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines,

which was guarding the regimental boundary, fought off those Japanese that had

escaped the barrage of heavy shells with

rifle, hand grenade, and bayonet. The

American lines held, and by daylight it was

apparent that the attack had failed. Not

as well organized as Takashima's counteroffensive against the 3d Marine Division,

and more nearly similar to the traditional

and suicidal Japanese banzai charge, Tamai's counterattack suffered besides from

the fact that the marines in this zone were

in better position to resist and were

backed by the major part of American artillery on the island.15

All together on both fronts, the Japanese

lost an estimated 3,500 men in the night

counterattack of 25-26 July. In the north,

three whole battalions were virtually annihilated. Up to 95 percent of all commissioned officers in the sector defense forces

were killed, according to later Japanese

testimony. Among these was General Shigematsu, who lost his life on the 26th while

futilely trying to rally his decimated brigade around Fonte Plateau. Also numbered

among the dead were Colonel Ohashi,

13

 3d Marine Div SAR, Incl L, pp. 2-3; Ibid.,

Incl O, pp. 4-5; Lodge, Guam, pp. 78-88.

14 Quoted in Lodge, Guam, p. 78. 15

 1st Provisional Marine Brig Jnl, 26 Jul 44;

Lodge, Guam, p. 78.
366 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

JAPANESE AIRFIELD, THE PRIME OBJECTIVE ON OROTE PENINSULA

commanding officer of the 18th Infantry

Regiment; Lt. Col. Ichiro Kataoka, commanding officer of the 10th Independent

Mixed Regiment; and Majors Maruyama

and Yukioka, commanders of the 2d and

3d Battalions, 18th Infantry. Over 90 percent of all Japanese weapons were estimated to have been destroyed or captured.

Radio communications between units on

the island, which had remained surprisingly good in spite of the heavy American bombardment, were almost completely

knocked out.16

On their part, the marines had suffered

heavily too, especially the 3d Marine Division. Between 25 and 27 July, the division reported 166 killed in action, 645

wounded in action, and 34 missing in action, mostly as a result of the Japanese

counterattack.17

At his command post back of Fonte,

General Takashima stayed in ignorance of

the outcome of the attack until morning

of the 26th. After dawn survivors of the

holocaust gradually straggled back to

headquarters, and the full story of the

failure was pieced together before noon.

On the basis of these reports, the island

commander decided that all hope of expelling the Americans from Guam was lost.

The only recourse left to him, as an officer

in the Imperial Japanese Army and a man

16

 Ltr, Takeda to McQueen, 20 Feb 52; Japanese Studies in World War II, 55, pp. 48-49;

III Phib Corps G-2 Rpts 7 and 8; Intel Sec

21st Marines, POW Interrogations 5 and 8. 17

 3d Marine Div D-3 Periodic Rpts 5-7.
THE ASSAULT COMPLETED: 25-30 JULY 367

MAP 19

of honor, was to retire with his remaining

troops into the interior of the island and

inflict as many losses on the Americans as

possible until he himself should go down

in the inevitable defeat.18

The Capture of Orote

Notwithstanding the counterattack of

the previous night, the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade was prepared on the

morning of 26 July to jump off on time in

the attack on Orote Peninsula. Behind it

was the greatest array of artillery pieces

yet mustered for any single attack since

the beginning of the operation on Guam.

Three battalions of General Spalding's

77th Division Artillery were in position and

ready to fire along with four Marine battalions from III Amphibious Corps and the

3d Marine Division. Lt. Col. Leo B. Burkett's 902d Field Artillery Battalion first

opened fire at 0645 in deep support of the

Marine infantrymen and all together dur- 18

 Ltr, Takeda to McQueen, 20 Feb 52. ing this preparation phase fired a thousand
368 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

rounds. From 0800 to 0830, the 305th

and 306th Field Artillery Battalions, commanded respectively by Lt. Col. Edward

B. Leever and Lt. Col. Jackson B. Serfas,

joined in the fire. Some batteries fired as

many as two rounds a minute per gun. On

General Bruce's order, all Army artillery

pieces were to direct their fire at least

1,000 yards in front of the advancing marines. Closer support bombardment was

delivered by Marine artillery as well as by

naval planes and by the 90-mm. guns of

the 14th Marine Defense Battalion based

on Cabras Island.19 (Map 19)

Jump-off hour for the brigade was 0700,

with the 22d Marines on the right, 4th

Marines on the left. Enemy artillery fire delayed the 22d Marines for an hour, but

the 4th Marines got under way on time

and made rapid progress against light resistance. In fact, progress on the left was

so rapid that the regiment's right flank

soon became exposed. In view of this, Lt.

Col. Alan Shapley, commander of the 4th,

requested permission to shift to the right

and take over part of the 22d Marines

zone. The brigade commander agreed, and

shortly before noon the regimental boundary was laid down at the Agat-Sumay

road. On the right, Col. Merlin F. Schneider's 22d Marines found the going harder.

Not only was the unit blanketed by heavy

enemy mortar fire but, because most of its

front line was blocked by the wide mangrove swamp lying inland of Apra Harbor,

all forward movement had to be confined

to a narrow corridor along the AgatSumay road. By nightfall the regiment's

left flank had reached Road Junction 15

and tied in with the 4th Marines. The rest

of the line was bent back to the east of the

mangrove swamp.20

The next morning the attack jumped off

at 0715, Once again progress on the right

was delayed because the 22d Marines were

compelled to channelize all troops and supplies along the road inland of the mangrove

swamp. This narrow corridor had been

mined with aerial bombs and was covered

by automatic weapons located in wellcamouflaged pillboxes. By midafternoon,

Colonel Schneider's men had worked their

way through the bottleneck, but only to

come up against a series of pillboxes and

dugouts on the ridge east of the old prewar

U.S. Marine barracks. Late in the afternoon marines on the front lines were rewarded with signs that Japanese organized

resistance was beginning to crumple. The

first harbinger of the breakdown of enemy

organization occurred when a lone Japanese officer rushed out and attacked an

American tank with his sword. Shortly afterward, another officer, waving a huge

battle flag, marched his men up the peninsular road straight into American fire and

to certain annihilation. Then, about two

hours before dark, after an intensive bombardment by American artillery and naval

guns and aircraft, the Japanese in front of

the 22d Marines broke and ran—a rare

occurrence in the Pacific war. This proved

to be the turning point in the battle for

Orote Peninsula. Although it was too late

in the day for the marines to capitalize

fully on this retreat, the 22d Regiment was

able before dark to push forward and set

up a line within 300 yards of the old 19

 77th Inf Div Arty Rpt Guam, 26 Jul 44,

Msg 23; 77th Inf Div Opns Rpt Guam, Rpt Hq

77th Div Arty, p. 26; 305th Fld Arty Bn Rpt,

p. 2; 306th Fld Arty Bn Rpt, p. 6; 902d Fld

Arty Bn Rpt, p. 2.

20

 1st Provisional Marine Brig Opns and SAR,

War Diary, p. 10; Lodge, Guam, pp. 88-89.
THE ASSAULT COMPLETED: 25-30 JULY 369

Marine barracks. The 4th Marines on the

left had made somewhat slower progress

during the day, and a gap existed between

the two regiments when they dug in for the

night. Fortunately, the Japanese were in no

position to exploit the gap.21

On 28 July the 22d Marines swept

through the barracks ground and on to the

outskirts of the village of Sumay. There,

they were halted for the night while demolition teams searched the rubble-littered

streets for mines that the Japanese had laid

in great numbers. On the left, Colonel

Shapley's regiment was forced to make

its way more slowly through dense scrub

growth that concealed several coconut log

pillboxes. Marine tanks were called in, but

could make little headway because the

heavy underbrush restricted observation

and frequently made it impossible to fire

without endangering friendly troops.

In the face of this difficulty General

Shepherd, early in the afternoon, put in

a call to 77th Division headquarters for

Army medium tanks to reinforce those of

the brigade. The request could not be

honored in full since only the light tanks

of Lt. Col. Charles W. Stokes' 706th Tank

Battalion had landed. Five of these from

Company D were immediately organized

into a platoon under 2d Lt. Charles J.

Fuchs and dispatched to General Shepherd, who routed them to the 4th Marines

sector to support an attack ordered for

1600. There, they were joined by two

Shermans from Headquarters Company,

706th Tank Battalion, which had since

come ashore. Two more platoons of Marine mediums were meanwhile shifted from

the zone of the 22d Marines to join the

scheduled tank-infantry attack on the brigade left.

Promptly at 1600 Colonel Shapley

launched the assault along his whole regimental front. All up and down the line

the tanks moved forward cautiously, followed at short distances by the Marine infantrymen. In their zone, the seven Army

tanks covered about three hundred yards of

front, often firing at ranges of ten to fifteen

yards at the reinforced log pillboxes that

barred their path. The light tanks of Company D alone expended about 10,000

rounds of .30-caliber ammunition, 100

rounds of high explosive, and 20 rounds of

canister. They were credited with the destruction of four pillboxes, numerous dugouts, and about 250 Japanese.22

Before this massed Army-Marine armored attack Japanese defenses collapsed,

and the infantrymen rushed on and set up

their night positions just short of the airfield. One of the strongest enemy defensive

lines on the peninsula had been established

there to protect Orote field. After the battle, some 250 pillboxes and emplacements

were counted in the area taken by the 4th

Marines and their supporting tanks.23

29 July saw the end of the battle for

Orote, except for minor mopping-up activities. Once again tremendous Army and

Marine artillery fire, supplemented by

naval gunfire, pounded the tip of the peninsula in preparation for the infantry assault. Again the seven Army tanks, this

time assisted by six M10 tank destroyers

as well as the brigade's own mediums, led

21

 1st Provisional Marine Brig Opns and SAR,

War Diary, pp. 11-12; III Phib Corps G-2 Rpt

7; Lodge, Guam, pp. 90-91.

22

 706th Tk Bn Opns Rpt Guam, pp. 3-4; 1st

Provisional Marine Brig Opns and SAR, War

Diary, p. 12; AFAS, Guam, pp. 44-45. 23

 Lodge, Guam, p. 93.
370 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

MARINE CORPS OFFICERS with plaque taken from the wreckage of the old Marine Corps barracks on Guam. From left: Lt. Col. Alan Shapley, Brig. Gen.

Lemuel C. Shepherd, Col. Merlin F. Schneider, and General Holland Smith.

the assault. By 1400 Orote airfield had

been overrun with little opposition, and

an hour later the 4th Marines took over

the entire brigade zone, the 22d Marines

mopping up Sumay and the cliffs bordering Apra Harbor. The platoon of Army

tanks, accompanied by Marine infantry,

was dispatched to the tip of the peninsula.

On discovering only two live Japanese in

the area, they reported back and were released to their parent division.24

Orote was now, to all intents and purposes, secured. An estimated 2,500 Japanese had been killed in the process. In

exchange, the American attackers had lost

115 killed in action, 721 wounded, and

38 missing.25

On the afternoon of the 29th, with appropriate ceremony, the American flag was

raised over the skeleton remains of the old

Marine barracks. "Under our flag," said

General Shepherd, "this island again stands

ready to fulfill its destiny as an American

fortress in the Pacific."

 26

 Before the general's words could be fully realized, however, the marines and soldiers of the III

24

 1st Provisional Marine Brig Opns and SAR,

War Diary, pp. 12-13; 706th Tk Bn Opns Rpt

Guam, pp. 3-4.

25

 1st Provisional Marine Brig Jnl, 30 Jul 44. 26

 Quoted in Lodge, Guam, p. 95.
THE ASSAULT COMPLETED: 25-30 JULY 371

Amphibious Corps would have more than

a week of fighting ahead.

The Capture of Fonte and the

Force Beachhead Line

Whipped though they were and in retreat after their full-scale counterattack,

the Japanese in the north were still capable

of putting up a strong rear-guard defense

while the main body of Takashima's troops

prepared to retire into the interior. In

their favor, of course, was the fact that

that they still maintained possession of the

high ridge from Fonte south through

Mount Alutom, Mount Chachao, and

Mount Tenjo. Fonte Plateau, in particular,

was the site of an enemy strongpoint that

Takashima refused to yield without a battle. Here, in a hollow depression atop

the plateau, lined on all sides with caveemplaced machine gun positions, the Japanese chose to make the advance of the

3d Marines as costly as possible. The 2d

Battalion, 3d Marines, and the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, would spend three bitter

days of fighting before the left flank of the

corps Force Beachhead Line could be secured. (Map 20)

On the morning of 27 July the attack

was first delayed when shells and bombs

delivered by American air and artillery fell

behind the Marine front lines. Then a force

of about 150 Japanese came out of the hills

and launched a banzai charge. Once these

men were disposed of, the two battalions

moved out and by late afternoon reached

their day's objective—the power line that

stretched across the forward slopes of the

plateau. By the following evening the two

battalions had pushed up to the rim of

the plateau and on the 29th cleaned out

most of the remaining enemy positions in

the depression on top.27

Sometime on the previous day American

machine gun fire had killed General Takashima just as he was about to evacuate to

the rear. This left only one Japanese general officer alive on Guam—General

Obata, Commanding General, 31st Army,

who had only recently arrived from the

Palaus and who, up to this time, had

exercised no control over the island's defenses. To him fell the hopeless task of reorganizing the remaining Japanese forces

defending Guam's interior against the invaders.28

During these three days (27-29 July)

the 21st Marines in the division center had

kept abreast of the units struggling on

Fonte, while on the right the 9th Marines

had been assigned the task of capturing

Mount Alutom and Mount Chachao. On

28 July Maj. John Lovell's 3d Battalion,

307th Infantry, which on the 26th had

moved north along the Old Agat Road to

the vicinity of Piti and was then attached

to 3d Marine Division, reversed its course

and attacked south on the 9th Marines'

right, over the same ground it had covered

two days before. As the marines pushed

their way up the slopes leading to the

mountain peaks, they soon spotted elements

of the 77th Division atop Mount Tenjo to

the south. Meanwhile, General Geiger had

moved the boundary between the Marine

and Army divisions north so that it ran

along a trail leading east from the Old

Agat Road through Agafan to the junction

of the road between Mount Tenjo and

27

 3d Marine Div SAR, Incl L, 3d Marines

Rpt, pp. 3-4; Lodge, Guam, pp. 96-102; Lt. Col.

Robert E. Cushman, "The Fight at Fonte," Marine Corps Gazette (April, 1947). 28

 Ltr, Takeda to McQueen, 20 Feb 52.

THE ASSAULT COMPLETED: 25-30 JULY 373

ANTITANK CREW of 305th RCT on

coastal ridge overlooking Harmon

Road.

Mount Chachao. This shift of the original

boundary line between the 3d Marine Division and the 77th Infantry Division so as

to include Mount Tenjo in the latter's zone

had been suggested by General Bruce. He

wanted to get his troops on the high

ground so that they could work along the

ridges rather than push ahead along a line

abreast and get trapped in the ravines.

Also, to prevent the piecemeal commitment

of his division and to preserve its integrity,

he wanted to be given the job of capturing Mount Tenjo. The boundary change

meant in effect that the 3d Marine Division's right flank would orient its movement to the south while the 77th Division

pushed north to establish firm contact

along the Force Beachhead Line.29

On the 28th the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, supported by heavy artillery and

tank fire, fought its way to the top of

Mount Chachao and annihilated an infantry company that had been left behind in

the general Japanese withdrawal. At the

same time the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines,

and the 3d Battalion, 307th Infantry,

moved south against light opposition and

by 1745 were in contact along the new division boundary with those soldiers of the

77th Division that had meanwhile been

moving northwest of Mount Tenjo.30

The men who were sighted on Mount

Tenjo on the morning of 28 July were

members of Company A, 305th Infantry.

General Bruce ordered the 305th Infantry

to send a company to reconnoiter the approaches to Mount Tenjo. If Japanese were

not encountered in great number, Lt. Col.

Charles F. Learner's 2d Battalion, 307th

Infantry, was to occupy the mountain,

while Colonel Landrum's 1st Battalion,

305th, was to take and hold the high

ground from Cotal south to Inalas. Once

Tenjo was in American hands, Colonel

Chalgren's 3d Battalion, 305th, was to send

out patrols to the north and establish contact with the right flank of the 3d Marine

Division.31

At 0500 on 28 July, Company A, 305th

Infantry, moved out of its assembly area

toward Mount Tenjo. The men encountered no resistance on the way except for

occasional sniping, and reached the summit

29

 3d Marine Div SAR, Incl M, 9th Marines

Rpt, pp. 2-3; III Phib Corps G-3 Periodic Rpt,

1800, 27 Jul-1800, 28 Jul, overlay; Ltr, Bruce to

Gen A. C. Smith, 11 Feb 55, OCMH. 30

 3d Marine Div SAR, Incl M, 9th Marines

Rpt, pp. 2-3; 307th RCT Hist Records, Summary, pp. 1-2.

31

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 27 Jul 44, Msg 28;

AFAS, Guam, pp. 47-48.
374 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

at 0815, There they remained until midafternoon, when they were relieved by

Learner's battalion. While it was waiting,

Company A suffered a mishap of a sort

that was occurring with alarming frequency on Guam. American planes came

up out of the sea and bombed and strafed

their own infantrymen. Only the quick

thinking of Pfc. Benno Levi, who rushed

out from cover under fire to spread identification panels, saved the unit from possible disaster.32

With the 2d Battalion, 307th Infantry,

in firm possession of Mount Tenjo, Chalgren's 3d Battalion, 305th, according to

plan pushed north to establish contact

with the southward moving soldiers attached to the 9th Marines. At last, after

eight days of fighting, the northern and

southern beachheads were firmly joined.

Reconnaissance of Southern Guam

With the repulsion of Takashima's big

counterattack and the launching of the

drive on Orote Peninsula on 26 July, General Geiger could safely predict a rapid

push to the Force Beachhead Line and the

termination of the first phase of the battle

for Guam. Before initiating the second

phase, it was necessary for him to have reliable information as to where on the island

the remaining Japanese had withdrawn. All

indications pointed to northern Guam as

their most likely destination. It was clearly

the most logical course for the Japanese

command to have taken. Southern Guam

was a mass of jungle and mountain, serviced only by roads and trails not wide

enough or hard enough to permit the passage of large numbers of troops and vehicles.

It was known that before the American

invasion few troops had been stationed in

the southern area. From captured documents and interrogations of prisoners of

war, it appeared almost certain that the

enemy troops were moving north toward

Mount Barrigada.

Nevertheless, before the corps commander could finally decide to commit his

forces to a northern drive, simple military

caution demanded a reconnaissance of the

southern section. The reports obtained

through aerial reconnaissance were inconclusive since the island's dense jungle made

camouflage and concealment of enemy positions and troop movements too easy.

Ground reconnaissance was the only alternative. (Map 21)

The task fell to the 77th Infantry

Division, which had already been conducting limited reconnaissance. General Bruce

had prepared an extensive patrolling plan

for covering the southern half of Guam,

but it first had to be cleared through corps

in order to prevent interference from

friendly air, naval, and artillery bombardment. Once the clearance was received

Bruce assigned the mission to the 77th

Reconnaissance Troop, which for the past

few days had been guarding Maanot Reservoir. Five patrols, each consisting of five

men and each accompanied by a native

guide, were ordered to leave from Road

Junction 370 early on the morning of 28

July and to penetrate inland south and east

up to seven miles. Patrols Able and Baker

were to proceed directly east to the coast

and return. The other three, Patrols Charlie, Dog, and Easy, would move directly

south along the ridge below Alifan, Charlie

toward Mount Lamlam, Easy to Umatac,

and Dog along the coast below Facpi

Point. Within the limits of these general 32 305th RCT AAR, p. 2; AFAS, Guam, p. 49.

376 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

orders, each patrol was to exercise discretion about its own movements. Each was to

report by radio every two to three hours

and call for artillery support if needed.33

Pushing off on order early on the morning of 28 July, Patrol Able got less than

half way to Ylig Bay when two of its

members as well as the native guide came

down with fever and had to return. Consequently, Patrol Baker took over responsibility for the entire area from Ylig Bay to

Talofofo Bay. As Patrol Baker started out

toward Talofofo, the men sighted a few

Japanese, but stayed out of their way and

went on to spend the night in a cave overlooking the eastern coast. The next morning they moved north along the coast for

about four and a half miles to Ylig Bay,

where they were greeted by Chamorros

who informed them that the Japanese had

all moved north except for groups of less

than platoon size that were still roaming

around the southern jungles. With this information, Patrol Baker returned to headquarters.

Meanwhile, Patrols Charlie and Dog

reached the slopes of Mount Lamlan, but

turned back on receiving rifle fire. Patrol

Easy went on to Umatac on the west coast

below Facpi Point, found little evidence of

enemy activity, and came back on up by

the coastal road. Later, on 30 July, two

other patrols from the reconnaissance troop

(Fox and George) were sent out to reconnoiter Pago Bay and the southeast tip of

the island. Both reported negative results.

The reports brought back by the patrols

confirmed General Geiger's assumptions:

no organized enemy resistance could be expected in southern Guam, the main body of

the Japanese had retreated to the north,

and it was in this direction that the

next American attack would have to be

launched.

33

 The account of the reconnaissance of southern Guam is derived from the following sources:

77th Reconnaissance Troop AAR Guam, pp. 1-2;

AFAS, Guam, pp. 57-63; Lt Col F. C. Bridgewater, "Reconnaissance on Guam," The Cavalry

Journal (May-June, 1945), pp. 46-48.
CHAPTER XIX

Pursuit to the North

The Japanese Withdrawal

When news reached General Takashima

of the disastrous defeat suffered by his

troops in the counterattack of 25-26 July,

he ordered the survivors to withdraw from

the Fonte area and to establish a new defensive line farther north. As an intermediate step the troops were to assembly around

Ordot, then they were to move north and

establish positions along a line between

Dededo and Barrigada. While this shift was

taking place, a rear-guard force was to be

left in the vicinity of Ordot to fight a delaying action until the new defensive line

could be established.1 (See Map V.)

Takashima was killed shortly after he issued this order. However, his successor,

General Obata, had been kept fully informed of the tactical situation and had no

particular trouble taking over. Obata established his headquarters at Ordot on 28

July and remained there for about a day

supervising the transfer of troops and

equipment to the defensive line.2 During

that time he had under his immediate

command in the Ordot area approximately

1,000 Army infantry troops, 800 Navy

shore combat troops, and 2,500 others, including the 29th Division Tank Unit, and

the 48th Independent Mixed Brigade artillery unit, which had six guns.3

 Just

how many other Japanese were scattered

through the rest of the island at the time

it is impossible to determine.

By the 30th, organized Japanese movement to the north had begun in earnest,

and General Obata established his headquarters to the north of the new line at a

three-pronged road junction northwest of

Mount Barrigada. That same day he reaffirmed his intention to be guided by

Takashima's defensive plan. Along the

newly prepared line he deployed his troops

in two sectors. A right sector unit was

located in the vicinity of Dededo, and a

left sector unit was placed on the southwest slopes of Mount Barrigada. In case

these new dispositions failed to stop the attackers—and Obata must have been aware

of the hopelessness of his situation—a final

defense line was to be drawn up just below

Ipapao. If this too should succumb, Obata

designated Mount Santa Rosa as the site

of a last stand. A day later he moved his

headquarters again, this time to Mount

Mataguac, and on 1 August he set up a

hastily organized unit to defend Mount

Santa Rosa and its environs. This bobtailed

organization, called the Mount Santa Rosa

Garrison Force, was composed entirely of

1

 Japanese Studies in World War II, 35, p. 49. 2

 Ltr, Takeda to McQueen, 20 Feb 52. 3

 Japanese Studies in World War II, 55, p. 49.
378 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

naval units, including laborers.4 The entire force was organized into four and a

half companies. Three of these were placed

under command of a Captain Otori and

ordered to defend Mount Mataguac, site

of Obata's new command post. The remainder, composed of one company of infantry and two machine gun squads, was

assigned to Mount Santa Rosa, where it

would construct dummy positions "to fool

U.S. troops."

 5

Obviously, the intention of the Japanese

commander on Guam was to make the inevitable American victory as expensive as

possible. His compatriots on Saipan had

succeeded in doing this by orderly withdrawals to the northward where two separate and fairly well-organized lines were

drawn across the breadth of the island.

Obata apparently hoped to accomplish

somewhat the same result, but his problem

was more difficult and the means at his disposal less promising. Guam was considerably wider than Saipan and there were

fewer men left to defend it. The American

troops were hot in pursuit and no delays

such as had held up the 27th Infantry Division in Death Valley were to give the

31st Army commander on Guam an opportunity to reorganize. To add to his troubles,

Obata was constantly being harassed by

American naval and aerial bombardment.

As postwar Japanese testimony indicates:

"The enemy air force seeking our units

during the daylight hours in the forest,

bombed and strafed even a single soldier.

During the night, the enemy naval units

attempting to cut our communications

were shelling our position from all points

of the perimeter of the island, thus impeding our operation activities to a great

extent."

 6

Drive to the O-2 Line

31 July-1 August

General Geiger was fully aware of the

route of the Japanese retreat and geared

his plans accordingly. Late on the afternoon of 30 July, he ordered the 3d Marine

Division and 77th Infantry Division to

commence the pursuit on the morning of

the 31st.7 The corps commander planned

to swing his line across Guam, pivoting on

its left flank until he had occupied the

waist of the island, and then push north,

(Map 22) For this he would use both the

3d and the 77th (initially less the 306th

Infantry) Divisions. General Geiger established two objective lines, the first (O-1)

ran from the shore just east of Agana along

the Agana-Pago Bay road to the town of

Famja, where the road curved southeast

along the high ground south of the Pago

River. The second line (O-2) began at a

point on the western shore little more than

4

 It consisted of the 263d Air Unit, the 521st

Naval Air Unit with attached personnel, the

217th and 218th Construction Units, the 5th Field

Hospital, the 5th Construction Unit, a weather

observation unit, an air depot unit, an air ordnance unit, and the 30th Labor Unit.

5

 Ltr. Takeda to McQueen, 20 Feb 52; Japanese Studies in World War II, 55, p. 49; POW

Interrogation 47, Interrogation of Leading Seaman Shirakawa Yukio, in TF 56.2 Interrogation

Rpts; III Phib Corps Rpt Guam, Incl D, G-2

Rpt 12, 311801K-011800 K and Rpt 18, 061801K

-071800K.

6

 Japanese Studies in World War II, 55, p. 50. 7

 The word pursuit as used here does not

imply that the enemy was completely disorganized

and routed. Nor does it imply that the attacking

troops could move rapidly against few obstacles.

General Bruce has suggested that a more accurately descriptive phrase to cover this phase of

the battle for Guam would be "pursuit by direct pressure." Ltr, Bruce to Gen A. C. Smith,

11 Feb 55, Incl 1, OCMH.
PURSUIT TO THE NORTH 379

MAP 22

a mile beyond the O-1 line and ran inland

through Road Junction 218, reaching the

east coast about a mile west of Fadian

Point. The drive was scheduled to begin

at 0630, 31 July, with the 3d Marine Division on the left as the hub of the turning

maneuver. The 3d Division had but two to

five miles to cover from its line of departure, while the 77th Division would

have to advance nearly ten miles from the

Tenjo-Alifan ridge. In force reserve was

the 22d Marines (less 3d Battalion), while

the 1st Provisional Brigade (less force reserve but initially plus the 306th Infantry) would hold the Force Beachhead Line,

protect the corps right, and continue patrols throughout southern Guam.8

In compliance with this plan, General

Bruce directed the 77th Division to move

off in column of regiments, with its initial

8

 III Phib Corps Opn Order 7-44, 30 Jul 44,

in III Phib Corps Rpt Guam, Opns Orders.
380 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

objective the O-1 line along the high

ground south of the Pago River. First to

move out would be the 307th Infantry,

with 3d Battalion of the 305th Infantry,

a reinforced company of the 706th Tank

Battalion, and other supporting units attached. Behind the 307th would come the

305th Infantry, less its 3d Battalion, but

otherwise similarly reinforced. The 307th

Infantry would move east about two thirds

of the distance from the Force Beachhead

Line to the east coast and then turn north.

The 305th Infantry, behind it, would cover

the division south flank and turn northeast

so as to go into position abreast and east of

the 307th Infantry. Thus the division

would present a two-regiment front facing

north, 305th Infantry on the right, 307th

on the left. When the 306th Infantry was

relieved from its attachment to brigade, it

would follow the division advance. The

105-mm. howitzers of the 902d Field Artillery would give direct support to the 307th

Infantry, while the rest of the division artillery would be in general support. The

boundary between the 77th Division and

the 3d Marine Division roughly paralleled

the Sigua River to the point where it

joined the Pago River, and from there the

boundary continued generally northeast.9

The Army Advance

On the morning of 31 July the 77th Division moved out on schedule. The 1st

Battalion, 307th Infantry, led the advance,

followed by the 3d Battalion, and, finally,

by the 2d in reserve. Echeloned to the right

was the attached 3d Battalion, 305th Infantry. Encountering no enemy opposition,

the advance moved fairly well. Only the

roughness of the terrain and the weight of

their loads slowed the troops. Men slid

down the steep slopes of ravines and

gorges, struggled through tangled undergrowth where it was next to impossible to

see other units, and sweated it out in the

humid heat. By noon the 305th Infantry,

relieved on the final beachhead line by the

4th Marines, had joined the advance, and

the 3d Battalion, 305th Infantry, had rejoined its parent regiment.

So far enemy resistance had been nonexistent, for the handful of Japanese

flushed out of their holes were more concerned with saving themselves than with

killing Americans. Shortly before noon,

General Bruce pushed up his schedule and

ordered the two attack regiments to occupy

the O-1 line by that night.10

During the afternoon the 77th Division

troops moved ahead, still encountering

little resistance. The 307th Infantry occupied its section of the O-1 line during the

early afternoon, while the 3d Battalion,

305th Infantry, followed by the 1st

Battalion, drove farther east toward its

assigned objective along that line. As afternoon passed into the dusk of early evening,

Capt. Lee P. Cothran's Company I, leading

the 305th Infantry's advance, reached the

high ground overlooking Pago Bay. Earlier

in the day, a patrol from the 77th Reconnaissance Troop had reported that there

were no enemy forces in the vicinity. The

men of I Company pushed rapidly d

9

 77th Inf Div FO 4, 30 Jul 44, in 77th Inf

Div Guam Opn, Overlays.

10

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 31 Jul 44, Msgs 1-

36; 77th Inf Div G-2 Rpt 8, 31 Jul 44, in 77th

Inf Div G-2 Jnl File (Guam), 30 Jul-2 Aug 44;

Guam, Opns of the 77th Inf Div, pp. 95-98, MS

in OCMH; 77th Inf Div G-3 Rpt, p. 4, in 77th

Inf Div Rpt of Opns for the Capture of Guam.
PURSUIT TO THE NORTH 381

MEN OF COMPANY B, 305th RCT, moving out from the high ground along the FBL.

the trail toward the town of Yona, about

1,500 yards southwest of the mouth of the

Pago River, where the company commander sought secure positions for the

night. As the lead scouts neared the town,

they saw two Japanese run across the trail.

The enemy soldiers disappeared into the

thick vegetation that bordered the trail just

as a squad of the 2d Platoon opened fire.

Small arms fire from Yona answered.

Forming a skirmish line, Company I began moving into the town. The Japanese

were surprised. Some returned the fire, but

others, in varying stages of undress, fled

from the village. Those that remained apparently acted as a rear guard to cover the

retreat of their comrades, for the Japanese

firing at I Company made little or no attempt to move from their huts and dugouts. Soon K Company joined the fight

and, thus reinforced, I Company moved

into and through Yona, ending the brief

struggle. Of an estimated 50 to 100 Japanese in the village, five were killed and

the rest made good their escape. Shortly

thereafter the 1st Battalion joined the 3rd

Battalion in the area, and the 305th Infantry dug in for the night along its sector

of the O-1 line.11

It had been a hard, hot, agonizing

march. Luckily only a handful of Japanese

had shown up to oppose the advance.

There was another compensation. At the

town on Asinan, on the south bank of the

11

 Guam, 77th Div (MS), pp. 98-103; 77th

Inf Div G-3 Rpt 8, 1 Aug 44; 77th Inf Div

G-2 Rpts 8 and 9, 31 Jul and 1 Aug 44, in 77th

Inf Div G-2 Jnl File (Guam), 30 Jul-2 Aug 44.
382 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Pago River about a mile from its mouth,

troops of the 307th Infantry discovered a

concentration camp in which the Japanese

had assembled some 2,000 Chamorros. Although the enemy had left the area, the

natives were apparently still too frightened

to depart, and greeted the men of Company L, first into the area, as liberators.

The scene was a moving one, as sick,

hungry, but joyful Chamorros exhibited

tiny and hitherto hidden American flags.

While the troops pressed rations and cigarettes on them, the natives told of their

oppression under the enemy and of their

constant faith that the Americans would

return. "We long time wait for you to

come," said one.12

The 77th Division advance had been so

rapid on 31 July that less than two hours

after noon of that day General Bruce ordered the 305th and 307th Infantry Regiments to occupy the O-2 line on 1 August.

With the 305th on the right, the two regiments would move out at 0700.13

 The

decision to press on with all speed to the

O-2 line was based not only on the lack

of enemy resistance and the necessity of

putting pressure on the enemy before he

could reorganize, but on the need to secure

a supply route. The Army troops had left

the Force Beachhead Line with only small

loads of rations in order to lighten their

burdens over the rough terrain ahead.

Building a supply route behind the advance or landing supplies at Pago Bay

proved unfeasible, and it was obvious that

the 77th Division would have to be supplied over the main road from Agana to

Pago Bay. The Marine advance into Agana

on 31 July placed half of this road in

American hands, but not until the O-2

line was seized would the rest of it be secured. If the 77th Division wanted food, it

would have to occupy the O-2 line and

its half of the cross-island road. "Capture

that road," said General Bruce to the

307th Infantry's Colonel Hamilton, "and

we'll bring up your breakfast."

 14

With some minor exceptions, 1 August

was a repetition of 31 July. The 77th Division's advance was unopposed. Hungry

and thirsty now, and somewhat more

weary, the men nevertheless made good

progress. By noon a portion of the AganaPago Bay road had been seized by the

307th Infantry, and soon the promised

breakfast was on the way. Meanwhile, some

of the troops appeased their hunger

with captured Japanese canned salmon

and candy. To satisfy their thirst, the

men dropped halazone tablets into the

unpleasant-tasting creek water. Others,

more enterprising, mixed Tom Collinses

from captured sake, K ration lemon powder, and sugar.

By evening the 77th Division was safely

deployed along the O-2 line. On the right

was the 305th Infantry with its 2d Battalion on the right, 3d on the left, and 1st

in reserve. Just west of the point where

Price Road—the northern branch of the

Agana-Pago Bay road—crossed the O-2

line, began the zone of responsibility of the

307th Infantry. That regiment also had

two battalions on the line, the 3d on the

right, the 1st on the left; its 2d was in

reserve. So far, the advance to the north

had been easy.15

12

 Quoted in Guam, 77th Div (MS), p. 104. 13

 77th Inf Div FO 5, 31 Jul 44, in 77th Inf

Div Guam Opn, Overlays.

14

 Quoted in Guam, 77th Div (MS), p. 114. 15

 Ibid., pp. 114-18; AFAS, Guam, Map, p.

76.
PURSUIT TO THE NORTH 383

FORWARD OBSERVERS OF THE 77TH DIVISION check progress of troops near

the Pago River.

The 3d Marine Division Zone

The same was true for the marines. On

31 July Turnage's men jumped off at 0630,

9th Marines on the right, 21st in the center, and 3d on the left. The 9th pushed

through Ordot, eliminating the small enemy detachment that had been left there

to guard supplies and equipment. That

afternoon two Japanese tanks showed up

to give battle but were quickly disposed of,

and by midafternoon Colonel Craig's unit

had dug in on the O-1 line. Craig's only

real problem was one that was to occur

with increasing frequency as marines and

soldiers pressed further into the jungle—

the matter of contact. The 9th Marines

was in physical contact with the Army

division on the day's objective line on its

right, but not with the 21st Marines on its

left. Finally, before nightfall, patrols from

the two Marine regiments met about 300

yards to the left of the 9th Marines boundary, and Craig sent Company C to plug

the gap.16

Meanwhile, the 21st Marines had

reached the corps objective line as had the

3d Marines on the left. In the course of

the day's advance the 3d had overrun

Agana, capital city of Guam, and seized

control of the western end of the AganaPago Bay road. All together, the Marine

division had pushed forward more than

5,000 yards. On 1 August a comparable

advance was made against neligible opposition, and the division halted just short of

Tiyan airfield, the 21st Marines, which

had been in the center, being pinched

out.17

Supply Problems

The chief problem facing Geiger's troops

at this point was supply. The Army and

Marine Corps divisions had both moved so

rapidly on the last day of July and the first

of August that supply dumps were left far

in the rear—as much as sixteen miles in

the case of the 77th Division.

The problem in the Army's zone had

been foreseen and steps were taken in an

attempt to solve it. General Bruce proposed

to construct a main supply route from the

Agat area across the island. From Agat, a

main road ran inland, connecting with

trails that lead southeast to the coast. The

western terminus of the new supply route

that Army planners envisaged would be on

this road about 1,000 yards southeast of

Agat. From this point the new route would

16

 3rd Marine Div G-3 Jnl, 31 Jul 44; Lodge,

Guam, pp. 124-25. 17

 3d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 1 Aug 44; Lodge,

Guam, pp. 125-27.
384 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

run generally along the high ground to

the south of the Pago River in an easterly direction to Yona and Pago Bay.

From there, it was planned, the supply

route would turn north to follow the advance of the division up the island.

Soon after the 77th Division landed,

Companies A and C, 302d Engineer Combat Battalion, began working on the new

road. Like the infantrymen, the engineers

found nature on Guam to be their worst

enemy. The soft clay of central Guam

proved an insufficient foundation for the

road, and torrential rains and heavy traffic

combined to make it a quagmire. Because

of the consistency of the ground and the

need for speed, once the move out of the

beachhead area was begun the engineers

could not follow good road-building practice. It was impossible to build roads on a

higher level than the surrounding ground,

since the soft clay would not support such

a route. Instead, after culverts of coconut

logs or oil drums had been emplaced, a

two-lane road was bulldozed out, excess

dirt being pushed to either side. This

road was actually below the surrounding

ground, and water drained onto rather

than off of it. As heavy traffic rutted the

road, the bulldozers pushed off the mud

until a firm base was reached farther

down.18 "Such a road," commented the

S-3 of the 302d, "is soon lost." With no

other equipment than that organic to a

division Engineer battalion, with the need

for speed, and with men and equipment of

the unit hard-pressed to complete other

tasks within their mission, the 302d Engineers had its troubles.

The rapid advance of the 77th Division

on 31 July made it obvious to General

Bruce, "that we could not hope to supply

the division over this route."

 19

 Late that

afternoon the 302d Engineers was ordered

to abandon its attempt to construct a main

supply route across the island. By this time

the engineers had built about three and a

third miles of road, and their labors had

brought them to the southern slopes of

Mount Tenjo. Remaining unfinished were

nearly six miles of planned road.

The decision to abandon work on the

project meant that the 77th Division had

to rely on the main Agana-Pago Bay road,

which was captured on 1 August, Since

this road would also serve the 3d Marine

Division and corps artillery, indeed had

been doing so since the capture of its

western half the day before, the strain on

it as the main supply route would be tremendous. The road had once been good. It

was hard surfaced and two lane, but the

rigors of the weather and poor maintenance

had considerably reduced its efficiency, and

in the summer of 1944 it was a "tortuous

route" requiring constant maintenance.20

The steady stream moving along this

overloaded supply artery threatened to

burst it but, by constant day and night

movement of every vehicle the weary supply people could lay their hands on, the

situation was kept fluid. In the absence

of Japanese air and artillery opposition

night movement could be carried out with

lights on—a tremendous advantage. By

dint of hard work and detailed planning,

aided not a little by Japanese inability to

18

 302d Engr Combat Bn (Guam), S-3 Opn

Rpt, p. 2. Unless otherwise indicated, this section

is based on: the above report, pp. 1-3; Bruce,

"Administration, Supply, and Evacuation of the

77th Infantry Division on Guam," Military Review, XXIV, 8; Guam, 77th Div (MS), pp.

106-08; AFAS, Guam, Map, p. 72.

19

 Bruce, "Administration, Supply. . . ," p. 8.

20 Ibid.
PURSUIT TO THE NORTH 385

ARTILLERY COLUMN MOVING INLAND from Agat beachhead over rutted supply

road. Construction and maintenance difficulties prevented extension of this road as

far as Pago Bay,

interfere, the Agana-Pago Bay road was

made to serve as a main supply route for

the whole III Amphibious Corps. "The

books would say it can't be done," wrote

General Bruce, "but on Guam it was done

—it had to be."

 21

The Marine 3d Division was in a slightly

more advantageous position as far as supply was concerned because its supply

dumps were closer to its own front lines

and because the coastal road through

Agana was within its zone of action. Nevertheless, traffic along the route was extremely congested and, furthermore, the

road had been littered with Japanese aerial

bombs and single-horned mines. To improve the situation, the 25th Naval Construction Battalion and the 19th Marines

(the Engineer regiment of the 3d Marine

Division) concentrated all their efforts on

improving existing roads and trails and removing the mines. However, the progress

of supplies to the front lines was by no

means satisfactory, and on 2 August General Geiger requested that a harbor reconnaissance be made of Agana Bay on the

west coast and Pago Bay on the east coast,

If these could be opened to boat traffic,

some of the heavy load on Guam's poor

and inadequate road system might be reduced.22

21

 Ibid.

22

 III Phib Corps G-3 Jnl, 2 Aug 44; Lodge,

Guam, pp. 127-29.
386 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

To Barrigada and the O-3 Line

2-4 August

On the evening of 1 August General

Geiger informed the forces under his command that the enemy, by all indications,

had fallen back to the vicinity of the town

of Yigo, in the eastern half of Guam,

roughly eight miles northeast of the O-2

line. The two divisions were to make all

possible speed to regain contact with the

Japanese, while Task Force 53 was to

work over enemy concentrations in the

north with naval gunfire. Geiger's hope

was that he could close with the Japanese

in northern Guam before they could construct effective defenses there. Each division made ready for its mission. Meanwhile,

corps artillery shifted to take targets farther north under fire, and a force of two

battleships, five cruisers, ten destroyers,

and four LCI(G)'s cruised off Guam's

northern coasts to carry out their part of

the attack.23 Since the advance was in the

nature of a pursuit, no artillery preparation

was to precede it. Since the Japanese were

withdrawing northward, corps artillery and

naval gunfire support were concentrated on

northern targets and neither of the infantry divisions planned a preassault bombardment.24

 Later that night General

Geiger issued additional orders, directing

the ground attack to begin at 0630, 2 August, with the initial objective a phase line

(O-3) crossing the island about four miles

northeast of the O-2 line.25

77th Division: 2 August

In compliance with these orders, General

Bruce directed the light tanks of the 706th

Tank Battalion to open the advance with

a reconnaissance to the O–3 line. The infantry attack elements of the 77th Division

—the 305th and 307th Infantry Regiments—were not to move out until 0700.26

The first major objective of the 77th Division drive was the village of Barrigada, in

a large clearing about two miles northeast

of the center of the divisional position on

the O-2 line. The town was important to

General Bruce for two reasons. First, about

a hundred yards northwest of Road Junction 306, in the center of the town, was a

reservoir and pump capable of supplying

the thirsty troops with 20,000 gallons of

water daily. Up to now streams and creeks

had been the main source of water, but

there were few watercourses in the northern part of Guam into which the division

was moving. Moreover, water points established by the engineers near the beaches

were too far away from the front lines for

rapid delivery, a situation made worse by

the fact that all supplies were carried along

the overworked Agana-Pago Bay road.

Weapons and ammunition had first priority on this artery, and with two divisions

as well as corps troops being supplied along

it there was not much room to bring up

large quantities of water. On the morning

of 2 August, for instance, the 305th Infantry put in an urgent plea for water.

"We haven't had any since yesterday," it

reported.27 The capture of the Barrigada 23

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 1 Aug 44, Msg 88;

Lodge, Guam, p. 127 and fn. 33. 24

 For 3d Marine Division plans for the advance,

see 3d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 1 Aug 44, Msg 110. 25

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 1 Aug 44, Msg 97;

III Phib Corps G-3 Jnl, 1 Aug 44, Msg 2000;

77th Inf Div G-3 Rpt 10, 3 Aug 44, Overlay.

26

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 1 Aug 44, Msgs 93,

102.

27

 77th Inf Div G-4 Jnl, 2 Aug 44, Msg 1. It

was not until nearly 1500 that a water point

could be moved forward to take care of the 305th

Infantry's requirements. Ibid., Msg 5; Guam,

77th Div (MS), pp. 122-23.
PURSUIT TO THE NORTH 387

reservoir would solve the problem. Furthermore, even before they reached Barrigada,

the troops would be in control of the entire

length of Price Road, the northern branch

of the Agana-Pago Bay road, and thus obtain an additional route over which supplies might be carried to the front-line

troops. Seizure of Road Junction 306

would give the 77th Division a link from

Price Road to Barrigada, and a direct route

from Agana to Barrigada.

The capture of Barrigada was assigned

to the 307th Infantry, on the left of the

division line. Maintaining contact on its left

with the 3d Marine Division, the regiment

was to push through the town and continue generally northeast for a little over

a mile to seize Mount Barrigada—a junglecovered mountain, 674 feet in height. With

its 3d Battalion on the right, its 1st on the

left, and its 2d in reserve, the regiment was

to advance in a series of three phase lines

to Mount Barrigada. The first of the lines,

the so-called C line, would place the as yet

uncaptured portion of Price Road in 77th

Division hands and, if the marines on the

left did their share, breakfast for the 307th

could be brought up along Price Road as

soon as it was captured. From the C line,

with full stomachs, the 307th Infantry

would advance on order, the 3d Battalion,

on the right, passing through the center of

Barrigada, with the 1st Battalion moving

up to the west of the town.28

The 305th Infantry, to the right of the

307th, would attack northeast at the same

time. Responsible for the area between the

307th Infantry and the east coast of Guam,

the 305th planned to strike with its 2d

Battalion on the right, its 1st in reserve,

and its 3d Battalion on the left, in contact

with the 307th. The 305th Infantry would

advance east of Barrigada and Mount Barrigada, and thus would not, if the plan

were followed, be engaged in the fight for

the town itself.29

Promptly at 0630 on a August about a

dozen light tanks of D Company (reinforced), 706th Tank Battalion, moved out

from the 77th Division lines and advanced

in column northwest along Price Road.

On the alert for 2,000 Japanese reported

north of Barrigada, they turned east at the

point where the road from Barrigada met

Price Road. No sooner had the tanks made

this turn, a little over a mile west of Road

Junction 306, than they were fired on by

a small group of enemy soldiers. After

putting machine gun fire on the enemy and

on likely areas of concealment, the reconnaissance force turned and drove back to

the division line with their report of contact. It was 0730.30

At 0800 the light tanks moved out again

on a second reconnaissance. To supplement the armor, General Bruce requested

an aerial reconnaissance of the area around

Barrigada and northward. The tanks

moved rapidly ahead, in close radio contact

with the division advance command post,

and pushed along the same route they had

taken on their first reconnaissance. About

0845 they brushed aside an estimated

twenty-five Japanese defending a roadblock 28

 A request by the 307th Infantry that it

be allowed to stop once Price Road was secured

in order to receive the expected food had been

approved by General Bruce. 307th RCT Summary

of Events, p. 3, and Overlay Showing Scheme of

Maneuver for 2 Aug, in Opn Overlays, both in

307th RCT Guam Opn, FORAGER Rpt.

29

 AFAS, Guam, p. 77; 305th RCT S-3 Jnl

File, 2 Aug 44, Entry 321 (map showing 3d

Battalion routes of advance for 2 August). 30

 706th Tk Bn Opn Rpt Guam, pp. 5-6;

AFAS, Guam, pp. 79-80. See also 77th Inf Div

G-2 Jnl File (Guam), 2 Aug 44, Msgs 14, 17-24.
388 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

at Road Junction 306 and, following orders, by 0900 had turned to continue north

on the road to Finegayan. Two thousand

yards up the road the tankers found their

way blocked by three Japanese trucks.

The tankers knocked out the trucks, killing about thirty-five enemy soldiers, then

moved back to Barrigada and turned east

to investigate matters in that direction.

Despite enemy mines and a Japanese pillbox that proved to be undefended, the

tanks advanced a few hundred yards with

no resistance. When one tank got hung up

on a stump, however, the whole column

was halted on the narrow road. At this

point the enemy put in an appearance in

force. About 1045 some 150 Japanese attacked the tanks with hand grenades and

20-mm. and machine gun fire. The tanks

returned the fire with a vengeance and

managed to drive off their attackers without any American casualties. They then returned to their own lines.31

While the tanks had been making their

reconnaissance, the attack echelons of the

77th Division moved out. At 0700 the

305th Infantry, on the right, and the 307th

Infantry, on the left, crossed the line of

departure and began the general advance.

From right to left were the 2d and 3d

Battalions, 305th Infantry, and the 3d and

1st Battalions, 307th Infantry. Moving forward against little or nor resistance, the

men reached C line, securing Price Road,

by 0830. Supplies were moved in quickly

and 10-in-1 rations issued to the hungry

troops of the 307th. While the 307th Infantry was eating and reorganizing, General Bruce sent word to the 305th Infantry to hold and reorganize on the C line,

abreast of the 307th. Both regiments

would resume the attack at 1030.32

The plan of attack for 2 August had not

called for the 305th Infantry to a halt on

the C line. Consequently, sometime between 0930 and 1000 when that regiment

received General Bruce's order to halt

along C line,33 the 305th had already sent

a reinforced company of the 3d Battalion

beyond. Company I, reinforced by the

heavy machine guns and mortars of M

Company, was advancing in front of the

battalion and by about 0930 the point of

the company had just reached the edge of

a clearing in a small draw about 300 yards

southeast of Barrigada. (Map 23) Reconnoitering the area, the lead squad of the

2d Platoon came under enemy small arms

fire from the direction of the town and

took some casualties before it could fall

back on the rest of its platoon and form

a skirmish line. Soon the 1st Platoon had

joined the 2d and a fire fight began between the Americans and what appeared

to be a small group of Japanese with a

machine gun. The Japanese were well concealed in the thick foliage at the edge of

the draw, and attempts to flank the position were halted by effective fire from the

same or another enemy machine gun.

Company M's machine guns and mortars

joined the struggle, but the enemy troops

were so well hidden and their fire discipline

was so perfect that the American fire had

little effect. Moreover, a few enemy riflemen managed to infiltrate the M Company

31

 77th Inf Div G-2 Jnl File (Guam), 2 Aug

44, Msgs 5, 25-35, 44-49; 77th Inf Div G-2 Rpt

10, 2 Aug 44; 706th Tk Bn Opn Rpt Guam,

p. 6. See also AFAS, Guam, p. 81.

32

 307th RCT Summary of Events, p. 3, in

307th RCT Rpt Guam; 305th RCT Rpt Guam,

p. 3; 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl Advance CP, 2 Aug

44, Msgs 3-10. 33

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl Advance CP, 2 Aug

44, Msg 10; 305th RCT S-3 Jnl File, 2 Aug 44,

Msg 322.

390 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

positions. By 1030 the Americans estimated

that a company of Japanese, well equipped

with automatic weapons, was dug in in

good positions to command the clearing.

The presence of these enemy troops, possibly some of the same soldiers who in a

few minutes would ambush the tank patrol,

was ample proof that the Japanese controlled the road east of Barrigada and were

therefore free to bring in reinforcements

along that route. At the time, the men of

the 3d Battalion, 305th Infantry, were in

no position to challenge effectively the enemy control there.34

Meanwhile, at 1030 the 307th Infantry

and the remainder of the 305th began their

advance in accordance with Bruce's orders.

On the right, where the Japanese positions

had already been discovered, the 305th Infantry built up a line on I Company. On

the left, however, the advance of the 307th

Infantry had not uncovered the main enemy positions by 1030. It was here, on the

left of the 77th Division, that the major

action of 2 August was to occur.35

The formation of the 307th Infantry

was, from right to left, Companies K, L,

A, and, in contact with the marines, C.

Each battalion kept a rifle company in reserve, and the 2d Battalion was in regimental reserve. The direction of the attack

was northeast, aimed at Mount Barrigada,

which meant that the 3d Battalion would

push through the town of Barrigada while

the 1st Battalion would move past it on

the west, in position, if necessary, to flank

any Japanese in the town.36

As the regimental attack got under way,

a number of enemy riflemen opened fire on

Company A. The resulting delay in the

company advance was in large measure to

abort the attack of the 307th Infantry on

2 August.

By the time A Company had driven the

Japanese off before it, the rest of the line

had advanced beyond it. Drawn slightly to

its right by the enemy, and further confused by its poor maps, Company A took

up its advance in the wrong direction. Instead of following its assigned azimuth of

45°, the company veered to the right and

followed generally along the road linking

Price Road and Barrigada, or on an azimuth of nearly 80°. A wide gap between

C Company, on the division left, and A

Company, which in turn was now moving

into the 3d Battalion zone, resulted. Once

contact between these units was lost, it was

extremely difficult to regain, not only because of the dense undergrowth but also

because the 1st Battalion's radio batteries

had become so weak that its radios were

ineffective beyond a range of two hundred

yards.

As the troops approached Barrigada,

Company A pushed in on the left of Company L, which in turn crowded K Company over against the 305th Infantry zone.

The axis of the 3d Battalion attack was

thus shifted away from Barrigada and

toward the area south of the town. Company A was moving toward Barrigada, but

the three companies were crowded into the

center and right half of the 3d Battalion

area, in a line not wide enough for two

34

 AFAS, Guam, pp. 81-84; 3d Bn 305th RCT

Unit Rpt, 2 Aug 44 (with overlay), in 305th

RCT S-3 Jnl File 4-11 Aug 44, Entry 419; Ltr,

Col Edward Chalgren, Jr., CO 3d Bn 305th

Inf, to Hq USMC, 23 Jan 53 (comments on Guam

MS), in Hist Br, USMC. 35

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl Advance CP, 2 Aug

44, Msg 14; AFAS, Guam, p. 90.

36

 AFAS, Guam, p. 130. See also, 307th RCT

S-1/S-4 Jnl, 2 Aug 44, Entry at 0955, in 307th

RCT Rpt Guam.
PURSUIT TO THE NORTH 391

companies, much less for three. Moreover,

on the left of A Company was a gap of

1,000 yards between that unit and C Company, which was still advancing to the

northwest of Barrigada.

By about 1130 Company A reached the

edge of the clearing just west of Barrigada

and almost immediately was taken under

heavy small arms fire by Japanese troops

in the town. Deploying on a north-south

line near a temple in the southwest corner

of the clearing, about 225 yards west of

Road Junction 306, the men of A Company began to extend to their right only

to run into members of L Company, also

moving into the clearing. By the time the

Americans could get into line they were

squeezed into an abbreviated front. Company A could only bring one platoon to

bear on the enemy and, while Company L

could place its entire force in action, K

Company had almost been driven into the

305th Infantry's zone and was facing that

portion of the enemy opposing the 305th,

rather than the Japanese in front of the

307th Infantry. Thus the Americans attacking the western half of the Japanese

position, like those attacking to the east,

were unable to force their way forward

into the enemy line,

By about noon, most of the 1st Battalion

reserve—a large portion of B Company—

had been committed to regain contact

with C Company, northwest of Barrigada.

The 2d Platoon, B Company, was ordered

to drive north around Barrigada, on the

left of A Company, and capture a twostory green house with a concrete base that

was located less than 200 yards north of

Barrigada on the east side of the Barrigada

-Finegayan road. From here the platoon

would be in a good position to put fire

on the enemy flank.

The 2d Platoon, B Company, moved

across a large, open, grassy field on the

left of Company A. Advancing by short

rushes in groups of two or three men, the

troops reached Finegayan road without incident. Since they had not been fired upon

and all appeared quiet to their front and

flank, the men began to cross the road. As

the first small group reached the other

side, however, an enemy machine gun in

the woods east of the green house took the

platoon under fire. The men of the 2d Platoon threw themselves into the ditches on

either side of the road and sent back a request for a section of machine guns, which

was moved up under heavy fire.

It was now nearly 1400. About this

time, the weapons of Companies A and L

scored a hit and set afire a grass shack on

the road east of Barrigada near the point

where the light tanks had been ambushed

that morning. An enemy medium tank inside was forced to leave in a hurry, and,

with three Japanese on top, drove west

along the road toward the 307th Infantry's line. Raking the American position

with cannon and machine gun fire, the

tank moved up the road in the face of machine gun, BAR, and rifle fire. The three

passengers were quickly knocked off, but

the tank was still undamaged when it

reached Road Junction 306 and turned

north to confront the men of the 2d Platoon, B Company.

Caught in the open, some of the Americans dashed forward to the house, while

the others pressed themselves helplessly

against the bottom of the ditch. The tank

threw a burst of machine gun fire at the

prostrate men, killing one and wounding

two, but then turned back to the road

junction. Here it turned west again and

moved along the Agana road toward Com-
392 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

pany A, 307th Infantry. A machine gunner

emplaced in the temple opened fire on the

tank, which retaliated by plunging into the

side of the building, shifting gears, and

forcing its way out the other side. The

tracks missed the American gunner by a

close margin, but the roof of the temple

caved in and pinned him to the ground.

The tank, meanwhile, undamaged but

with a piece of thatched roof partially obscuring its vision slit, continued on and

into the American lines.

Rifles, machine guns, BAR's, and grenades were powerless against the tank. The

three bazookas in the A Company line—

the only weapons that might have stopped

it—were of no avail since two failed to go

off and the gunner of the third was so

excited that he failed to pull the safety

until it was too late. For a moment the

tank got hung up on a coconut log, but

even then it remained impervious to American bullets and continued to fire wildly.

In another moment it was free again and

swept on down the road through a battalion command post and aid station and,

about 1415, on through the command post

of the 307th Infantry.

So far luck had been with the Japanese

tank on its impromptu dash. It had succeeded in raising havoc on the 307th Infantry lines, forcing the men to fall back

in search of better cover. Wounded men

and scattered equipment marked its trail.

What happened to it next is difficult to establish firmly. The tank left the 307th Infantry sector around 1430 and apparently

moved west into the 3d Marines' sector,

since a lone Japanese tank was destroyed

there late in the afternoon by two American mediums.

Since the tank dash was not part of a

planned Japanese attack, but rather an extemporaneous move on the part of the

driver, the enemy forces made no attempt

to follow up their advantage. However,

those men of the 2d Platoon, B Company,

who had sought shelter in the green house

were exposed to the same enemy fire that

had opposed the platoon advance across

the road. From a pillbox and from other

emplacements in the woods, the Japanese

sent machine gun and automatic weapons

fire through the thin walls of the house.

The men were helpless, and a runner made

his perilous way back to company headquarters and received permission for the

exposed platoon to withdraw.

It was agreed that Company A would

cover the withdrawal, but before the 2d

Platoon, Company B, could begin to fall

back, American artillery fire began to drop

around the house. The battalion commander tried desperately to have the shelling stopped, the men in the house who

could still move made a dash for safety,

and most of A Company also fell back to

escape the artillery fire. Enough men

stayed, however, to cover the withdrawal

of the 2d Platoon, B Company, and the

evacuation of the wounded.

It was by then 1500. With the exception

of C Company, which had reached a point

north and west of Barrigada, the men of

the 307th Infantry had been stopped short

of their day's objective. The gap in the line

was still open and should the Japanese

choose to take advantage of it they might

inflict heavy damage. Accordingly, Lt.

Col. Thomas B. Manuel, who had replaced Colonel Hamilton as regimental

commander when the latter was evacuated

for illness, asked General Bruce for permission to commit the reserve 2d Battalion

(less one company) of the 307th Infantry.

This was granted immediately, and Bruce
PURSUIT TO THE NORTH 393

ordered the 306th Infantry, the division reserve, to send one battalion forward to a

position of readiness should it too be

needed.37

Probably General Bruce would have sent

more forces into the 307th Infantry area,

even had they not been requested. The

heavy jungle growth retarding and confusing the advance of C Company had resulted in a loss of contact between Army

and Marine troops in the early afternoon.

General Turnage was forced to commit a

portion of his reserves in an attempt to regain contact. Indeed, shortly after 1400

General Geiger had radioed a terse message

to General Bruce: "You are holding up advance of 3d Mar Div," he said. "Make

every effort to advance your left flank to

maintain contact."

 38

 General Bruce replied with a brief description of his

difficulties in the 307th Infantry sector. "I

do not," he said, "expect to capture Mt.

Barrigada today." He would consolidate

for the night on a line just north of Barrigada village and attack again the next

morning.39 To his own troops, after approving use of the 307th Infantry's reserve,

Bruce sent orders to complete the capture

of Barrigada, tie in with the marines, and

hold for the night.40

Bruce's realization that he could not take

Mount Barrigada on 2 August was not

based on consideration of the situation on

his left alone, since his advance on the

right had been equally frustrated. By 1330

Company K, 305th Infantry, reinforced

with five light tanks of Company D, 706th

Tank Battalion, moved out in attack. It

had taken the 305th Infantry until that

time to strengthen I Company's position on

the left and deploy in the thick woods.

Company K and the tanks moved from behind Company I and up and parallel to

it. To reach the enemy positions, it was

necessary to cross a slight draw, all fairly

open ground. The attackers adopted a formation in which the tanks took the lead,

each with a small group of infantrymen for

close-in protection, while two platoons of

infantry moved in the rear of the armor.

Four tanks and their accompanying infantry moved across the draw without opposition. As soon as the fifth tank exposed

itself, however, it became a target for machine gun and cannon fire. This had no

effect on the tank, but the ricochets off its

sides hit the infantrymen around it. The

riflemen threw themselves into the dirt,

and the lead tanks tried to return the fire,

but the Japanese were so well concealed

that the tankers could discover no targets

and had to fire blind.

With their accompanying infantry

pinned down, the tanks did not dare to advance farther toward the Japanese positions and shortly thereafter pulled back to

less exposed positions. The men of K Company, hugging the ground in the slight

cover of the draw, were unable to move in

37

 This description of the action of the 307th

Infantry is based mainly on: Guam, 77th Div

(MS), pp. 131-39; AFAS, Guam, pp. 84-90,

and Map, p. 82. Also see 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl

and G-3 Jnl Advance CP, 2 Aug 44; 307th

RCT S-2/S-3 and S-1/S-4 Jnls, 2 Aug 44;

77th Inf Div G-2 Rpts 10 and 11, 2 and 3 Aug

44, in 77th Inf Div G-2 Jnl File; 706th Tk Bn

Rpt Guam, p. 6; 77th Inf Div Arty Rpt Guam,

pp. 8-9; Lodge, Guam, p. 129; Ltr, Col Joseph

B. Coolidge to Gen A. C. Smith, 6 Apr 55,

OCMH. 38

 III Phib Corps G-3 Jnl, 1410, 2 Aug 44;

Lodge, Guam, p. 128. See also 3d Marine Div

Opn Summary as of 1800, 2 Aug 44, Msg 87, in

3d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 2 Aug 44. 39

 III Phib Corps G-3 Jnl, 1447, 2 Aug 44. 40 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 2 Aug 44, Msg 9.
394 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

any direction. There was no indication that

the Japanese positions had in any way been

reduced, and the Americans still had no

precise idea of their location. The tankinfantry attack had gained nothing.

One more attempt was made to knock

out these enemy positions with armor.

Carrying as a guide an officer of Company

I, 2d Lt. Edward C. Harper, who had already crawled forward on his belly to

reconnoiter the enemy line, one light tank

moved to within five yards of the presumed

Japanese position and opened fire with its

machine guns. The enemy fire proved to be

more effective, however, and Japanese machine gun or possibly 20-mm. bullets hit

the tank's trailing idler and drive shaft and

put a hole in its armor plating. Unable to

move forward, the tank backed, only to

have one of its tracks drop off. Thus ended

this attempt. Covered by two medium

tanks of Company C, 706th Tank Battalion, which had just come up, the tankers

jumped out of their vehicle and ran back

to safety. The mediums then destroyed the

abandoned light tank.

The Japanese position was still intact,

and the 3d Battalion, 305th Infantry, did

not yet have a clear idea of the enemy

dispositions. Accordingly, the riflemen

still out in the draw were ordered to fall

back, and artillery fire was requested. The

men in the draw made their way out by

a circuitous route, not without casualties,

but the 3d Battalion was denied artillery

support on the grounds that shelling might

hit 307th Infantry elements on the left.

There was one last chance. Four medium

tanks of C Company, 706th Tank Battalion, with Lieutenant Harper again acting

as a guide, moved out abreast. Advancing

on the enemy position, they fired 75-mm.

shells at the Japanese. The fire destroyed

some of the enemy's camouflage that had

hidden a tank, which the mediums quickly

knocked out. Under protection of the tanks

several American wounded who had previously been trapped were evacuated, but

by this time it was almost dark, and any

hope of following up the attack vanished.

Moreover, A and B Companies, which had

been moving up during the afternoon to

join the 3d Battalion attack, had been so

delayed by scattered enemy fire that they

were not yet ready to begin an attack,

even if one had been possible. It was fully

dark before the two companies were in

position between the 3d and 2d Battalions.

The 305th Infantry thus had little success on 2 August. Only on the extreme

right, in the 2d Battalion sector, had its

advance been unopposed, though the 2d

Battalion had not ventured forward of the

line held by the 3d, lest contact between

the units be broken.41

On the left of the 77th Division, the

307th Infantry was to make one more attempt before dark. Shortly after 1500 the

2d Battalion (less F Company) began to

move up to fill the gap in the 307th line.

Within an hour or an hour and a half, with

Company E advancing to make contact

with C Company and Company G pushing toward Barrigada, contact was established along the line. The gap still was not

completely filled since the line curved inward, leaving a salient that might still be

occupied by enemy troops.

41

 Guam, 77th Div (MS), pp. 139-44; AFAS,

Guam, Map 18, p. 91; Ltr, Chalgren to USMC,

23 Jan 53; 706th Tk Bn Opn Rpt Guam, p. 6;

3d Bn 305th RCT Unit Rpt, 2 Aug 44, in 305th

RCT S-3 Jnl File, 4-11 Aug 44, Msg 419; 305th

RCT, Overlay Showing Situation as of 0900, 3

Aug 44, Entry 359, in 305th RCT S-3 Jnl File,

28 Jul-3 Aug 44.
PURSUIT TO THE NORTH 395

Late in the afternoon the regimental

commander planned to send a small force

of tanks and Company G to evacuate

wounded from the green house area. The

plan called for an enveloping attack. The

2d Platoon was to follow four light tanks of

D Company, 706th Tank Battalion, along

the Agana-Barrigada road to Road Junction 306 and then, turning north, to approach the house from the south. At the

same time the 1st Platoon would move east

parallel to the 2d Platoon advance and 200

or 300 yards north of it, to hit the Finegayan road north of the house. The two

platoons would thus move around the

edges of the open field across which B

Company had made its unsuccessful attack

a few hours earlier.

Unfortunately for the success of the

plan, the officers concerned were not sufficiently briefed. Consequently, when the

tanks moved through the 1st Battalion and

along the Agana-Barrigada road, the 2d

Platoon was not behind them. Instead the

platoon leader, following what he believed

to be his orders, had begun to move his

men across the open field, a move that the

planners had specifically meant to avoid.

When the 2d Platoon was halfway across

the field and still somewhat protected from

enemy fire to the east, a runner reached it

with the correct orders but it was too late

for the infantrymen in the field to move

back and catch up with the tanks which

had by then almost reached Road Junction

306. Accordingly, the platoon leader decided to continue his advance across the

field in an attempt to arrive at the green

house simultaneously with the tanks. Moreover, should the tanks be held up at the

road junction, he believed his men would

be in position to break up any resistance

in front of the tank advance.

The platoon leader's plan worked. The

2d Platoon reached the green house just

as the tanks arrived. Heavy Japanese fire

was coming from the woods, but although

the infantry had no way of communicating

with the tank crews to designate targets,

fire from the tanks greatly reduced the

volume of enemy fire. The 2d Platoon soon

formed a line just east of the house, and

the tanks began evacuating wounded.

Meanwhile, the 1st Platoon, G Company, had moved across the northern edge

of the field. Before the 1st Platoon was

across the field, the tanks at the house began to fall back with the wounded they had

gone to rescue. The volume of American

fire was thus noticeably lessened, and from

the woods to the north Japanese riflemen

and machine gunners, who had remained

quiet all day, opened fire on the flank of

the two American rifle platoons. Another

machine gunner east of the house also began shooting, and the two platoons were

caught in a cross fire.

As the men of G Company's 1st and 2d

Platoons fell back or vainly searched for

cover, the heavy Japanese fire began to

take its toll among the exposed Americans.

One of the men managed to get back to

company headquarters with a call for help,

and the 3d Platoon was sent forward to

assist. It pushed across the field and into

Barrigada village. Leaving a squad at Road

Junction 306, the rest of the men advanced north on the Finegayan road pouring a heavy volume of rifle, BAR, and machine gun fire at the enemy. Machine guns

and mortars from H Company moved up

and joined the fight, and soon two tanks

were back to lend their heavier fire.

The rescue force did not know where the

1st Platoon was, and so had concentrated

on getting to the 2d Platoon, which was
396 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

around the green house. Moreover, fearing

to hit the 1st Platoon, the force had concentrated its fire to the east, rather than

to the north. This sufficed to cover the

evacuation of the wounded men of the 2d

Platoon, In the gathering dusk, and with

their men now low on ammunition, the

leaders of the 2d and 3d Platoons withdrew

their units, although not without sustaining a few more casualties.

The 1st Platoon, to the north, was still

pinned down and still suffering casualties.

The rescue force, this time with three tanks

and led by the regimental commander, now

moved out to the aid of the beleaguered

men who were scattered across the northern half of the field, most of them casualties. Covered by heavy fire from the

tanks, the rescuers began evacuating the

wounded. The 1st Platoon had suffered

twenty-six casualties, most of them killed,

including the commander, 1st Lt. James

T. Whitney. As darkness closed in, the last

men of G Company returned to their line

of departure and dug in for the night.42

With the coming of night, the 77th Division had yet to take Barrigada village.

The American line ran roughly from southeast to northwest, with the woods just

north-northwest of Barrigada forming an

enemy salient. The Japanese positions had

been barely dented, although by dark

American attacks had developed the enemy

defenses fairly well. At least the Americans

knew where the Japanese were, which had

not been the ease twelve hours earlier. To

acquire this information had cost a total

of 102 casualties: 6 killed, 18 wounded,

and one missing in the 305th Infantry, and

22 killed and 55 wounded in the 307th Infantry.43

 The two regiments claimed a

total of 105 Japanese killed, almost all by

the 305th Infantry. Contact with the 3d

Marine Division was at best tenuous, for

while a platoon of C Company, 307th Infantry, was with the marines, it was

out of contact with the rest of its own

company.44

On the evening of 2 August the Japanese

still controlled most of Barrigada village

and the roads leading north (to Finegayan) and east. The 77th Division G-2

section made a cautious estimate that the

enemy resistance might indicate that the

Americans had struck forward positions

of a Japanese line defending northern

Guam.45 On lower echelons, the troops

were restless in their foxholes, mindful of

the great banzai attack on Saipan that

had overrun and ripped up American lines

on that island.46

The night passed without incident, but

General Bruce's plan of action for 3 August

was a more cautious one than that of the

previous day. This time the 77th Division

commander called for an artillery preparation on the enemy before him. Division artillery—supported by a battalion of 155's

from corps artillery—would begin firing at

0630. At 0700, as the big guns shifted their

fire to targets farther north and northeast,

the 305th and 307th Infantry Regiments

would renew their attack. General Bruce

hoped to push on to Mount Barrigada

and the O–3 line, if necessary bypassing

and containing resistance at the town of

42

 Guam, 77th Div (MS), pp. 146-55; AFAS,

Guam, pp. 93-99; 307th RCT S-1/S-4 Jnl, 2

Aug 44.

43

 77th Div G-1 Daily Consolidated Rpt of

Casualties, Guam, 2 Aug 44. 44

 Guam, 77th Div (MS), p. 141; 3d Marine

Div D-3 Jnl, 2 Aug 44, Msg 78. 45

 77th Inf Div G-2 Rpt 11, 3 Aug 44. 46

 AFAS, Guam, p. 101.
PURSUIT TO THE NORTH 397

Barrigada itself in order to reach his objective.47

There was to be no change in regimental

boundaries, but the battalions were regrouped.48

 On the right of the division

line, southeast of Barrigada, the 305th Infantry would continue its push to the

northeast. Its 2d Battalion maintained its

position on the right while on the left the

1st Battalion replaced the 3d, which had

done the bulk of the regiment's fighting on

2 August.49 On the division left, the 307th

Infantry was to drive northeast through

Barrigada. Its 3d Battalion remained tied

in with the 305th Infantry. The 1st Battalion, however, was so spread out that the

2d Battalion, part of which had already

seen action on 2 August, replaced it as the

left flank unit of the 77th Division. This

replacement was actually carried out in

the late afternoon and night of 2-3 August

at the direction of Brig. Gen. Edwin H.

Randle, assistant division commander, present at the regimental command post during

the afternoon.50

In planning the advance for 3 August,

General Bruce gave some attention to the

problem of contact between units. On 2

August the main body of his troops had

been out of contact with the 3d Marine Division, and the drive northeast through the

thick jungles of Guam promised to make

lateral liaison progressively more difficult.

While Bruce was well aware of this problem and gave it due consideration, he did

not feel that it was the primary issue. The

Army general subscribed to the theory

that, in jungle fighting, close contact between units, though desirable, should not

be insisted upon to the sacrifice of rapidity

of advance and destruction of the enemy.

Under such conditions, according to this

theory, it is often preferable to push ahead

quickly over whatever trails and roads

there are through the jungle and maintain

lateral contact only by patrols and connecting files or only where favorable terrain

permits.

Bruce had served in Panama in 1933

and while there had developed a set of

principles governing jungle warfare, some

of which were later incorporated into the

Army manual on the subject and all of

which he impressed on the 77th Division

during training. As he himself later expressed it, "The Japanese were skillful in

penetrating 'lines' and attacking flanks and

rear. I pointed out that it was far better to

get through the jungle regardless of flanks

until they [the attacking troops] arrived at

a trail or road where liaison and contact

could be established with adjacent units.

I emphasized the lack of vision in woods or

jungle precluded the ordinary concept of

fighting in the open. In brief, my idea

. . . was to push boldly forward and then

take up a strong all around defense at

night."

 51

Bruce's thoughts were made clear on the

morning of 3 August when he submitted

his plan for the day's action to the III

Amphibious Corps. "I intend to push hard

with my right unit past [Mount Bar47

 77th Inf Div Rpt, pp. 4-5; 77th Inf Div

G-3 Jnl File, 3 Aug 44, Entry 6; 307th RCT

Rpt, p. 3; 307th RCT S-1/S-4 Jnl, Entries at

0618, 0626, 0627, 3 Aug 44; 77th Inf Div Arty

Rpt Guam, p. 9; Overlay, 77th Inf Div Arty,

Preparation Fires 3 Aug 44, in 77th Inf Div Arty

S-3 Jnl File, 3 Aug 44; III Phib Corps Arty Rpt,

p. 7.

48

 AFAS, Guam, p. 101. 49

 305th RCT Rpt, p. 3; 3d Bn 305th RCT

Rpt, p. 3. 50

 307th RCT S-1/S-4 Jnl, 1605, 2 Aug- 0543, 3 Aug 44, passim. 51

 Ltr, Bruce to Gen A. C. Smith, 11 Feb. 55.
398 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

rigada] without regard to contact. I suggest 3d Div unit on my left push up past

mountain. This may cause a gap which I

will fill with my reserve. Otherwise progress will be slow because of the difficult terrain." 52

 Almost immediately corps

headquarters approved this method of

attack, and Bruce was ordered to "keep

pushing to hit main enemy body. Do not

hold up for small pockets which can be

mopped up later."

 53

 By this time the 77th

Division attack was already well under

way.

77th Division: 3 August

At 0700 on the morning of the 3d, as

77th Division Artillery shifted to forward

targets, the two infantry regiments began

to move slowly forward. The 307th Infantry, advancing with Company A, 706th

Tank Battalion, in support, reported that

the artillery preparation had inflicted numerous casualties on a platoon-sized enemy

patrol that had approached the American

positions. However, the advance of the 2d

Battalion, on the left, was slowed by short

artillery rounds that disrupted communications and killed some men in the command post area and wounded others,

including the battalion commander, Colonel Learner, who was replaced by Maj.

Thomas R. Mackin, battalion executive

officer.

The division advance was slow but, initially, steady, for most of the Japanese

defending Barrigada had pulled back during the night or under the morning's

artillery fire. Only scattered resistance met

the Americans as they moved forward, and

in the 305th zone on the right the troops

had more trouble with the difficult, heavily

wooded terrain than they did with the

scattered enemy. On the division left

the 2d Battalion, 307th Infantry, pushed

through Barrigada clearing it with relative

ease but was halted by automatic weapons

fire north of the town shortly after 0900.

The 3d Battalion was generally astride and

east of the Barrigada-Finegayan road, 200

or more yards from Barrigada and in contact with the 305th Infantry. (Map 24)

The seizure of the village of Barrigada,

anticlimatic after the frustrating struggle

of the previous day, put the important

Barrigada reservoir in American hands on

3 August. Working rapidly, the 302d Engineers established a water point and had

it in operation by 1430 to assure a ready

supply for the thirsty troops.

Meanwhile the 3d Battalion, 307th Infantry, supported by the tanks of Company

A, 706th Tank Battalion, had pushed farther northeast through the Japanese defenses. The advance was extremely slow,

however, because the thick, almost trackless jungle made for hard going. Moreover,

at 1130 the battalion commander, Major

Lovell, had to be evacuated because of

sunstroke and was replaced by his executive officer, Maj. Joseph Hanna. By now

the regimental commanding officer and

each of the battalion commanding officers

had been evacuated because of wounds or

illness. On the left (southwest) of the 3d

Battalion, the 2d Battalion was still moving

extremely slowly, but its right had reached

Finegayan road at Road Junction 410,

about 1,000 yards from Barrigada. At

noon the entire 307th Infantry halted to

reorganize for another attack in the afternoon. The 305th Infantry, meanwhile, was

east-southeast of Barrigada, pushing very

52

 III Phib Corps G-3 Jnl, 0815, 3 Aug 44. 53

 Ibid., 0830, 3 Aug 44.

400 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

slowly northeast through the dense and

virtually uncharted jungle.54

It had become apparent that the bulk of

the enemy resistance was north to northeast of Barrigada in front of the 3d Battalion, 307th Infantry, exactly where General Bruce had expected it. Bruce's original

plan had been to continue the push on his

right with the 305th Infantry, regardless of

how much the 307th might be held up.

With conditions now anything but favorable for such a maneuver, the division

commander changed his plan to take advantage of the success at Barrigada village.

All four division artillery battalions would

support an attack by the 307th Infantry

with a five-minute concentration and a

rolling barrage. The shelling would start

at 1330, at the rate of a round per gun

per minute. At 1335 it would lift 100 yards

and an additional 100 yards every two

minutes thereafter, maintaining the same

rate of fire. As the artillery fire climbed

Mount Barrigada, the infantry would follow close behind to seize the height.55

On the heels of the artillery fire, the

307th Infantry attacked. Two platoons of

tanks spearheaded the advance, breaking

a trail through the thick jungle as the

troops moved against scattered resistance

on the lower slopes of Mount Barrigada.

As the men pushed forward resistance lessened, and by 1500 the 3d Battalion was on

the summit, 2,400 yards northeast of the

town of Barrigada. A 400-yard gap lay between K and I Companies, but the regiment had ample time to reorganize and

close the gap before nightfall.

Echeloned to the left rear (southwest)

of the 3d Battalion was the 2d Battalion.

The 2d Battalion's advance had been held

up somewhat because it had to resupply

itself with water. Company E, for instance,

had received no issue of water for at least

twenty-four hours. Another reason for the

delay was the denseness of the vegetation.

The failure of the 2d Battalion to keep up

with the 3d had left a gap between the

two units and, on the left, the 2d Battalion

was out of contact with the 3d Marine Division. In addition to falling behind, Mackin's men had moved somewhat to the

right in an attempt to maintain contact

with the 3d Battalion. Responsibility for

the loss of contact between Army and Marine troops did not lie entirely with the 2d

Battalion, 307th Infantry, however. General Bruce's plan and Geiger's approval of

it had been passed on to the 3d Marine

Division that morning.56 General Turnage

immediately ordered the 9th Marines, on

the right of his division line, "to break contact with the 77th and push ahead as

rapidly as possible."

 57

 Thus as early as

0845 on 3 August, contact between Marine and Army units was as good as lost.

54

 77th Inf Div Rpt, p. 5; 77th Inf Div G-3

Rpt 11, 4 Aug 44; 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 3 Aug

44; 77th Inf Div Arty S-3 Jnl, 3 Aug 44; 307th

RCT Rpt, p. 3; 77th Inf Div Arty Rpt Guam, p.

9; 307th RCT S-1/S-4 and S-2/S-3 Jnls, 3

Aug 44; 706th Tk Bn Opn Rpt Guam, p. 6;

AFAS, Guam, p. 102; 305th RCT, Overlay Showing Situation as of 0900, 3 Aug 44, in 305th RCT

S-3 Jnl File, 3 Aug 44, Entry 361. 55

 307th RCT Opn Rpt Guam, p. 3; 77th

Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 3 Aug 44, Entry 43.

56

 3d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 3 Aug 44, Msg 17.

Unless otherwise indicated, this account of the

77th Division attack on the afternoon of 3 August is based on the following: 77th Inf Div Rpt,

p. 5; 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 3 Aug 44; 77th Inf

Div G-3 Rpt 11, 4 Aug 44; 307th RCT Rpt

Guam, p. 3; 307th RCT S-1/S-4 and S-2/S-3

Jnls, 3 Aug 44; AFAS, Guam, pp. 103-04; 706th

Tk Bn Opn Rpt Guam, pp. 6-7. 57

 3d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 3 Aug 44, Msg

18. III Amphibious Corps was notified of this

order. III Phib Corps G-3 Jnl, 0925, 3 Aug.
PURSUIT TO THE NORTH 401

During the day the 2d Battalion, 307th

Infantry, made numerous attempts to regain contact with the 3d Battalion as well

as with the Marine division—all unsuccessful. By 1230 General Turnage was worried

enough about the gap between Marine and

Army troops to rescind his earlier order to

the 9th Marines and halt the advance on

the right.58 Meanwhile, the 307th Infantry

continued its efforts to regain contact with

the 3d Marines and late in the afternoon

a platoon of medium tanks with men of the

2d Battalion riding on their decks moved

north along the Finegayan road toward the

Marine lines. However, Japanese mines and

an enemy roadblock less than 1,000 yards

beyond Road Junction 410 frustrated the

attempt, and the 9th Marines began to

protest that Army fire on this roadblock

was falling within their positions.59 Thus at

nightfall gaps still remained between the

two battalions of the 307th Infantry and

between the 307th and the 9th Marines.

To fill the latter and protect his right flank,

General Turnage released a battalion of

the 21st Marines from reserve to the 9th

Marines.60

While the 307th Infantry was advancing

on 3 August with varied success, the 305th

Infantry, to its southeast, had continued

to push slowly across the thickly overgrown

terrain. By this time the tropical rain forest

had grown so thick that the only way the

men could make any progress at all was by

reversing the guns on their medium tanks

and tank destroyers and using the vehicles

as trail blazers.61 Struggling through the

luxuriant vegetation, the regiment soon

found roads dwindling to trails and trails

disappearing altogether. Small pockets of

enemy resistance in the heavy jungle involved the Americans in a number of minor

engagements, with companies or smaller

units fighting independent actions. The

regimental right did not extend all the way

down to the water's edge, but rather held

along the top of a bluff, which paralleled

the coast about 1,000 yards inland. An attached platoon of the 77th Reconnaissance

Troop patrolled the slope of the bluff.62

By the end of the day the 305th Infantry

was southeast of Mount Barrigada, almost

on line with the 307th Infantry on its left.

The regiments were in contact with each

other.

For most of the 77th Division, the day's

advance had netted disappointingly short

gains of from 2,000 to 2,500 yards, the

2d Battalion, 307th Infantry, having advanced less than 1,500 yards. The reserve

306th Infantry was in position 1,500 yards

south of Barrigada. It had not been used

to fill the gap between Army and Marine

units, though General Bruce had indicated

that morning that he might so employ the

unit, because the gap was at most 800

yards wide and Bruce felt that it could be

closed once the enemy roadblock on the

Finegayan road was broken. The 3d

Marine Division, meanwhile, had pushed

rapidly ahead, held back only on its right

flank in order to keep in contact with the

77th Division. Casualties in the two Army

regiments attacking on 3 August were four

killed and twenty wounded in the 305th

Infantry and eight killed and thirty-three 58

 3d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 3 Aug 44, Msg

69.

59

 307th RCT S-1/S-4 Jnl, 1730, 1732, 3

Aug 44. 60

 3d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 3 Aug 44, Msgs

66, 69.

61

 Ltr, Landrum to Gen A. C. Smith, 27 Apr

55, Incl, OCMH. 62

 77th Inf Div Rcn Troop Rpt, p. 2.
402 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

wounded in the 307th. A total of 161 enemy dead was claimed by the two units.63

Disappointed with the speed of the 77th

Division advance on 3 August, General

Bruce issued his orders for the next day's

operations. He hoped on 4 August to secure Mount Barrigada and pull his troops

up to the O-3 line. The attack was to continue at 0700. The only change in the assault formation was in the 307th Infantry

sector where the 1st Battalion would push

through the 2d to replace it on the regimental left. The 3d Battalion would hold

in position until the 1st was abreast of it.

The 306th Infantry was to maintain contact with the 305th, follow behind that

regiment mopping up the area, and be prepared to turn north toward Mount Santa

Rosa once Mount Barrigada had been

passed, pinching out the 307th Infantry

and replacing it on the line.64

77th Division: 4 August

The 77th Division attack got under way

on 4 August after a night that saw

American lines raided by small groups of

Japanese, despite harassing fire placed on

enemy-held road junctions by division and

corps artillery. Actually, the infantry attack was taken up only by the 305th Regiment, for the 307th Infantry spent the

morning reorganizing its assault formation

and attempting to regain contact with the

marines.

Shortly after 0600 the 1st Battalion,

307th Infantry, began to move through the

2d in order to relieve that unit on the

regimental left. Less than three quarters of

an hour later, a platoon of the 1st Battalion, with a single tank of Company A,

706th Tank Battalion, in support, set off

along the Finegayan road to reduce the

Japanese roadblock between Army and

Marine positions. The 3d Battalion held

firm but sent patrols over the northern part

of Mount Barrigada. By 0700, when the

305th Infantry began its attack, the 307th

had already made a good beginning in its

own sector.

The attempts to gain contact and to pull

the 307th Infantry lines abreast of the 3d

Marine Division—both part and parcel of

the same general scheme to align and tie

in the entire corps front—met both tragedy

and failure. By about 0800, little more

than an hour after the tank-led patrol had

set out for Marine positions, it was halted

by the same Japanese roadblock that had

stopped similar attempts the previous afternoon and evening. The roadblock was well

covered by machine guns, and the 2d Battalion commander requested artillery fire

to knock out the Japanese position. The request was turned down, and instead Major

Mackin was ordered to use tanks to break

through the roadblock. A few minutes later

a platoon of tanks set off up the road leading an infantry patrol. Shortly after 1030

the tank-infantry force succeeded in smashing the Japanese position as well as a second roadblock a little farther along the

road. Just before 1100 the American patrol

came upon a third block. Taking no

chances, the men in the tanks opened fire

immediately, but with unfortunate results. The roadblock was not manned by

enemy troops, but rather by Americans of

Company G, 9th Marines, who had established the block in accordance with 3d Division orders to protect the right flank of

63

 77th Inf Div G-1 Daily Consolidated Rpt

of Casualties, Guam, 3 Aug 44. 64

 77th Inf Div Rpt, p. 5; 307th RCT Rpt

Guam, p. 3; 77th Inf Div Arty G-3 Jnl, 3-4

Aug 44, Msg 16.
PURSUIT TO THE NORTH 403

the Marine division. The 3d Marine Division had been warned of the approach of

the Army patrol and was expecting it; the

Army troops, on the other hand, had

been told that red smoke grenades would

be used as a signal to indicate friendly positions, although Company G, 9th Marines,

was apparently unaware of this signal. The

marines, recognizing the Army troops, did

not fire; the soldiers, not seeing any signal,

did. Seven marines were wounded before

the Marine company commander, Capt

Francis L. Fagan, stopped the action by

running down the trail to the Army troops

and waving his helmet. Only through this

mishap was contact between the two divisions at last re-established.65

Even so, it was tenuous and short-lived.

The main body of the 9th Marines had

picked up the advance again at 0700 that

morning and by now was well ahead of

the point of contact; there was thus no

tie-in of the front lines of Army and Marine units. The 1st Battalion, 307th Infantry, had passed through the 2d by about

0900 and continued to move forward unopposed. Heavy undergrowth, however,

blocked the way as the battalion moved

very slowly up the western slopes of Mount

Barrigada. At 1230 the 1st Battalion was

still slightly to the left and rear of the 3d,

and not yet in contact with it. On the regimental left contact with the marines was

again lost as the assault troops of both

services pushed on past the roadblock on

Finegayan road. General Geiger therefore

ordered the 3d Marine Division to halt its

advance until the 77th Division could

straighten its lines and close the gap. He

so informed General Bruce, who in turn

passed the word on to the 307th Infantry.

Shortly after 1245 the 1st Battalion was

abreast of the 3d, and the 307th was ready

to take up the attack.66

Even before receiving General Geiger's

prodding message, General Bruce ordered

the regiment to drive forward to a trail,

roughly paralleling and just short of the

O–3 line, which ran generally east out of

Finegayan. The division commander suggested that the advance be made in one

or two columns per battalion for the drive

through the jungle, with the regiment reorganizing along the trail, where it would

dig in for the night. A Marine patrol would

make contact with the 1st Battalion on the

regimental left at a point on the trail about

1,100 yards southeast of Finegayan.67

About 1300, as the 307th Infantry prepared to attack, the regiment was a little

more than 1,000 yards short of its objective line. With hopes that this attack would

be successful, General Geiger directed the

3d Marine Division to continue on to the

O-3 line if the left of the 77th Division

moved up. It was the hope of the III Amphibious Corps commander to tie down his

entire front along the O-3 line that

night.68

65

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 4 Aug 44; 77th Inf

Div G-3 Rpt 12, 5 Aug 44; Guam, 77th Div

(MS), p. 170; 77th Inf Div Rpt, p. 5; 307th

RCT S-1/S-4 and S-2/S-3 Jnls, 4 Aug 44;

77th Inf Div Arty G-3—3 Jnl, 4 Aug 44, Entry 21;

Lodge, Guam, pp. 136, 141; 3d Marine Div D-3

Jnl, Entries 17, 21, 59; 706th Tk Bn Opn Rpt,

Guam, p. 7.

66

 III Phib Corps G-3 Jnl, 4 Aug 44, Entries

of 1222, 1225, 1229; 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 4

Aug 44, Entries 35, 44; 307th RCT S-1/S-4

and S-2/S-3 Jnls, 4 Aug 44, passim; 307th

RCT Rpt, p. 4; 3d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 4 Aug

44, Entries 5, 21, 26, 59; 77th Inf Div Artys G-3—3

Jnl Worksheet, 3-4 Aug 44, Entry 17. 67

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 4 Aug 44, Msg 39;

307th RCT S-2/S-3 Jnl, 1250 and 1252, 4 Aug

44; 307th RCT Rpt, p. 4.

68

 III Amph Corps G-3 Jnl, 1330, 1340, 4

Aug 44; 3d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, Msg 29, 4 Aug

44; 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 4 Aug 44, Msg 47.
404 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

During the afternoon the 307th Infantry moved slowly toward its objective.

Crossing the line of departure sometime between 1300 and 1400, the regiment moved

in columns through the thick jungle

against scattered, light opposition. Contact

between the two battalions was maintained

mostly by radio, although occasional openings in the heavy undergrowth permitted

visual contact from time to time. Shortly

after 1600, men of the 3d Battalion hit the

trail that General Bruce had designated as

their objective, and within an hour or so

the entire battalion was on it. The 1st

Battalion, to the left, was a little slower in

coming up, the jungle in its sector being

extremely heavy. Medium tanks of the 1st

Platoon, C Company, 706th Tank Battalion, strained their engines to knock down

trees and break trails through the thick

vegetation. By 1800 at the latest, however,

the 1st Battalion appears to have been in

position,

As usual, there was the question of contact with the marines on the left, and as

usual there was no contact. Both the 9th

Marines and the 1st Battalion, 307th Infantry, sent patrols along the trail, the marines pushing southeast from and the

soldiers northwest toward Finegayan. The

jungle was thick and enemy elements engaging the American patrols prevented free

movement. As dusk settled on the battlefield, the soldiers and marines, in radio

contact with each other, decided to postpone further attempts to make physical

contact until the next morning.

Though not in contact with the marines, the 307th Infantry had gained its objective, the trail just below the O-3 line.

About 1800 the 3d Battalion was a little

too far to the right of the 1st Battalion and

out of contact with it, except by radio. By

dark, however, the 3d Battalion had extended to its left and made contact with

the 1st Battalion.69

On the right of the 77th Division, meanwhile, the 305th Infantry moved up to and,

indeed, beyond the O–3 line in its zone.

Unhampered by problems of contact or of

straightening its line, the regiment was opposed only by the difficult terrain and

scattered enemy resistance. Attacking at

0700 on the heels of a five-minute artillery

preparation, the 305th Infantry made its

main effort on the left with its 1st Battalion advancing on a narrow front. On the

right, the 2d Battalion moved over a wider

area, and patrols covered the 1,000-yard

slope of the bluff between the regimental

right and the sea. The mission of the 305th

Infantry was to seize a strong position on

its left on the O–3 line and push on toward

the O–4 line so as to allow the 306th Infantry to slip across the front of the 307th

Infantry on the left of the division line.

Moving slowly through the thick jungle

with tanks and bulldozers clearing the

way, Colonel Tanzola's regiment advanced

in a column of companies within each

battalion. Resistance during the morning

was negligible, the biggest problem was to

find the way through the jungle. Maps

were completely useless when it came to

showing trails and roads, and the paths

that the Americans followed twisted and

turned, branched and forked, stopped

dead and started up again with amazing

frequency and inconsistency. Perhaps as

much time was taken in choosing a route

as in following it, and when the men had

69

 307th RCT Rpt, p. 4; 307th RCT S-1/S4 and S-2/S-3 Jnls, 4 Aug 44; Guam, 77th Div

(MS), p. 169; 706th Tk Bn Opn Rpt Guam,

p. 7; 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 4 Aug 44; 3d Marine

Div D-3 Jnl, 4 Aug 44, Entries 44, 52, 54.
PURSUIT TO THE NORTH 405

to push cross country more tanks with

dozer blades and more bulldozers had to

be called on. Moreover, frequent patrolling

on cross trails was necessary in order to

maintain contact between nearby units.

Not much progress had been made by

noon, and by 1300 the regiment had

barely pulled abreast of Mount Barrigada's

summit.

Shortly thereafter tanks and infantry

leading the 1st Battalion advance were

halted by dense undergrowth at a bend

in the trail they were following. While

stopped, one of the men of the point suddenly spotted a small party of Japanese and

opened fire. The men in front formed a

skirmish line to fight off the enemy at

ranges so close that the Japanese, well concealed in the thick woods, could easily

reach them with grenades. While the advance squads were so engaged, the remainder of the lead company, Company C,

with tanks to beat a path through the

undergrowth, circled the enemy position,

and fell upon it from the rear. Thus outmaneuvered, the Japanese left some of their

weapons and many supplies and hastily retreated. They had been cooking when the

Americans surprised them, and when the

1st Battalion moved into the area the food

was still warm. The 1st Battalion then

picked up the advance again.

During this action the 2d Battalion on

the regimental right had continued to push

ahead almost unopposed and by 1600 was

just short of the O–3 line. As the advance

continued, Adair's men shifted more and

more to the left because that was where

the emphasis of the 305th Infantry attack

lay and because the terrain and vegetation

forced them that way. By late afternoon

the 2d Battalion had moved in front of the

1st to cross the O-3 line. When, about

1800, the two battalions dug in for the

evening, the 1st was on the O–3 line on

the regimental left and tied in with the

307th Infantry, and the 2d Battalion was

about 1,250 yards ahead—one third of

the way to the O-4 line. The reserve 3d

Battalion was on the southeast slopes of

Mount Barrigada, perhaps a mile behind

the 1st. Patrols covered the area from the

regimental right flank to the sea.70

By the night of 4 August the 77th Division had reached the O–3 line and, on

the right of the 305th Infantry, had pushed

a battalion well forward of the line. The

306th Infantry, under Lt. Col. Aubrey D.

Smith, remained in reserve just below Barrigada, conducting reconnaissance and laying plans for its move the next morning to

replace the 307th Infantry on the division

left.71 Casualties in the two attacking regiments on 4 August were, for the 305th

Infantry, four killed and thirteen wounded,

and for the 307th Infantry, nine killed,

seventeen wounded, and one missing. The

305th Infantry claimed fifty-nine enemy

killed, and the 307th Infantry claimed

none at all.

The advance of the 77th Division from

the O-2 to the O-3 line had taken three

days and had cost about two hundred casualties, of which slightly more than fifty

were fatal. It had been an advance against

two enemies, the Japanese and the jungle,

and it would be difficult to say which of

the two had been the more effective in

70

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 4 Aug 44; 77th Inf

Div Arty G-3—3 Jnl, 3-4 Aug 44, Entries 34, 53,

57, 79, and 4-5 Aug 44, Entry 8, and Jnl Worksheet, 4-5 Aug, Entry 2; 305th RCT G-3—3 Jnl

File (KC or AG), 5 Aug 44, Entry 378 (overlay

showing position as of 0800, 5 Aug); 77th Inf

Div G-3 Rpt 12, 5 Aug 44; AFAS, Guam, pp.

105-06; 77th Inf Div Rpt, p. 5; Ltr, Landrum to

Gen A. C. Smith, 27 Apr 55, Incl, OCMH. 71

 306th RCT Unit Rpt 13, 5 Aug 44.
406 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

slowing the American drive. On the first

day the Japanese themselves were the more

successful in frustrating the 77th Division

attack, although the jungle terrain contributed to the mix-up on the American left.

On the following two days it was definitely the thick, heavy undergrowth that

thwarted progress. In places the jungle was

almost trackless; the few existing trails led

nowhere and only served to confuse the

troops. The Japanese proved only slightly

more than a nuisance, their main achievement being to prevent soldiers and marines

from regaining contact with each other,

and here of course the almost impenetrable

jungle must be given almost equal credit.

The denseness of the Guamanian vegetation, inadequate maps, and aerial photographs obscured by cloud cover, all

combined to make the location of individual units a nightmare. Unit commanders

rarely knew exactly where they were, and

the reports they sent back to higher echelons could not be relied on. This not only

hampered attempts to maintain contact

between units, but sometimes also resulted

in American artillery fire falling on friendly

troops. Consequently, even when Japanese

shelling hit 77th Division positions the men

often refused to believe it was not American fire. General Bruce had to remind

his troops that the enemy had heavycaliber weapons and that the Japanese

frequently masked the sound of their own

artillery by firing at the same time that the

American guns were fired. He warned the

infantry regiments to "stop accusing our

own artillery of firing on [our] own troops

until the 'facts are known.' " 72

To add to the disagreeableness of the

heavy jungle and of the chance of friendly

shells hitting them, the men of the 77th

Division were faced with other discomforts.

This was the rainy season on Guam. Intermittent drizzles, or heavy, drenching

showers, fell regularly. When it was not

raining, the blazing heat of the tropical

sun in the steaming, insect-infested jungle

bathed the men in their own perspiration.

At night lower temperatures and foxholes

filled with water chilled the same troops

who had sweated during the day. Flics and

mosquitoes tormented them with pestiferous malevolence. One veteran of the campaign later recalled there were "billions of

flies—dead Japanese and animals all over

—with inevitable results, something new

on Guam." Even the frogs, which normally kept Guam's fly population under

control, couldn't cope with the stepped up

proliferation caused by such wholesale

human death and decay.73

 All of nature

seemed to combine to make life more difficult for the tired soldiers. As they moved

north the sticky red mud, which smeared

uniforms, equipment, and hands and faces

with a thick dirty coating, gave way to

hard coral and limestone five inches below the surface and made foxhole digging

a major excavation problem. "The hike

was tough," commented one American after a particularly trying day, "the heat

terrific, the insects maddening and the

digging backbreaking." To add to his

troubles he was soon taken under fire by

an enemy rifleman who had infiltrated the

American lines after dark.74 There were

72

 77th Div G-3 Jnl File, 4 Aug 44, Msg 16.

This general discussion of difficulties in the advance to the O-3 line is based on AFAS, Guam,

pp. 102-03.

73

 Ltr, Landrum to Gen A. C. Smith, 27 Apr

55, Incl, OCMH. 74

 Narrative of Pvt Connelly, Co E, 305th Inf,

quoted in Guam, 77th Div (MS), p. 175.
PURSUIT TO THE NORTH 407

few pleasures in the life of an infantryman

on Guam.

The Marines: 2-4, August

Nightfall of 2 August saw the 3d Marine

Division in full possession of Tiyan field

but more rapid progress, which might have

been expected in view of the negligible

character of enemy resistance, was frustrated by the jungle and by the difficulties

of establishing contact with the Army

troops on the right. On 3 August the 9th

Marines on the right of the two-regiment

front flushed a covey of Japanese, estimated

to be about platoon size, near Road Junction 177, southwest of Finegayan village.

Within half an hour the stronghold was

overrun by tanks and infantrymen and 105

dead Japanese were counted. By 1300,

after a second brief encounter with a

smaller number of the enemy, the road

junction was secured, and the marines prepared to spend the night in Finegayan.

Any further advance was considered impracticable because firm contact with the

Army troops still had not been established.75

On 4 August the 21st Marines was fed

into the middle of the division line, making

it again a three-regiment front with the

9th Marines on the right, 3d on the left.

To fill the ever widening gap along the division boundary, General Turnage ordered

the 3d Battalion, 21st Marines, and 2d

Battalion, 9th Marines, to move over and

protect his right flank. In pursuance of

these orders, the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines,

established a roadblock on the Finegayan

-Barrigada road, and it was this position

that was fired on by the patrol sent out

by the 77th Division.76

Later in the afternoon, when it appeared

that the problem of contact was still unresolved, General Turnage ordered the

21st Marines to take over the zone of the

1st Battalion, 9th Marines, and halt about

a thousand yards short of the O-3 line.

The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, drew up

before a roadblock along the FinegayanBarrigada road, which the Japanese were

still defending with antitank guns, 75-mm.

guns, machine guns, and rifles. Meanwhile,

on the division left the 3d Marines had

made good progress against light resistance

and had reached the O-3 line from Naton

Beach inland to a point north of Dededo.77

During the day, for the fifth time since

their arrival on Guam, American troops

were molested by their own planes. This

time two B-25's opened up on the command post of the 3d Battalion, 21st Marines, and strafed other marines along the

Finegayan-Barrigada road.78

While the two divisions in the attack had

been moving through the jungle against

what was left of the main line of enemy

resistance, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade had been assigned the duty of patrolling southern Guam to flush the scattered

remnants of enemy soldiers lurking there

in the bush. All together, three companies

were employed, A of the 22d Marines and

A and F of the 4th Marines.

Late on the afternoon of 3 August, General Shepherd was ordered to move the entire brigade (less the 1st Battalion, 22d

Marines, the 9th Defense Battalion, and

75

 3d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 2-3 Aug 44;

Lodge, Guam, pp. 128-29, 137-40.

76

 See above, pp. 402-03; 2d Bn 9th Marines

SAR, Guam, p. 6. 77

 3d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 4 Aug 44; Lodge,

Guam, pp. 140-41. 78

 3d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 4 Aug 44.
408 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

the 7th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic

Weapons Battalion) to the vicinity of Toto,

where it would act as force reserve and

prepare to support the final push to

the north. The excluded units would be

formed into a separate task force with the

mission of protecting Geiger's southern

flank and, with the help of Guamanian volunteers, would continue the job of capturing or eliminating Japanese stragglers still

in the southern part of the island.79

As the marines and soldiers of the III

Amphibious Corps prepared to launch

their final drive to the northern tip of the

island, General Obata was engaged in a

withdrawal to his final defense line. The

Dededo-Barrigada line had crumbled before the American attack—in fact it docs

not appear that the Japanese had had time

to set up anything resembling an organized

defensive line there at all. From his new

headquarters atop Mount Mataguac, to

which he had retreated as early as 31 July,

the Commanding General, 31st Army,

now summoned his last feeble strength to

pit itself against the American juggernaut

as it moved inexorably toward Mount

Santa Rosa, Mataguac, and Yigo.80

79

 1st Provisional Marine Brig War Diary, 1

Jul-10 Aug 44, pp. 16-18.

80

 Japanese Language Study 55, Opns in

CENPAC. See map in original Japanese version.
CHAPTER XX

Guam Secured

By the evening of 4 August, General

Geiger had concluded that the Japanese

in northern Guam were falling back on

Mount Santa Rosa, which is east of Yigo

and a good six and a half miles northeast

of Mount Barrigada. To deny the enemy

enough time to complete his defenses in

this area, Commander, III Amphibious

Corps, directed his forces to chase and

close with the Japanese as rapidly as possible.1

77th Division: 5-6 August

The 77th Division plan for 5 August

called for the 306th Infantry to replace the

307th on the division left and the 305th

Infantry to continue its push to the northeast, sending at least one battalion to the

O-4 line, which crossed the island about

a mile south of Yigo. The 307th Infantry

was to complete the advance to positions

assigned the day before and then go into

division reserve until its men were sufficiently rested. (Map 25)

2

On the division right, Colonel Tanzola's

305th Infantry floundered ahead through

the heavy jungle, the individual units having little or nor idea of their actual positions. The only means the troops had of

obtaining their approximate positions was

by shooting flares and, by prearrangement,

having their supporting artillery triangulate on the flares. Then the artillerymen

would plot the position of the flares on

their maps and radio the information to

the infantry. The lost and weary soldiers

moved slowly through the dense jungle,

following thin, winding trails or hacking

their way through the thick vegetation.

Only an occasional Japanese was encountered, and the jungle as usual proved the

great obstacle to the advance. The two

forward battalions, 2d Battalion in front

of the 1st by more than 1,000 yards,

moved in column through the undergrowth

and quickly lost themselves in the vegetation. Unable to see more than a short

distance around them, each unit was unaware of its location and could not orient

itself on the relatively flat terrain nor find

its position on the inadequate maps available. Even regimental headquarters was

apparently ignorant of the location of subordinate units, nor could artillery spotter

planes locate the troops. Late in the morning the 2d Battalion was reported to have

reached G line, an advance of about 1,100

yards, and by the middle of the afternoon

the battalion thought it had reached the

O—4 line, about 2,000 yards farther ahead.

The 1st Battalion was thought to be 1,000

or 2,000 yards behind the ad. The positions

1

 III Phib Corps Rpt Guam, p. 7; 77th Inf

Div G-3 Jnl File, 5 Aug 44, Msg 2 (C-3 III

Phib Corps to CG 3d Marine Div et al.). 2

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 4 Aug 44, Msgs 68, 69.

GUAM SECURED 411

were no more than guesses. Indeed, the

2d Battalion began cutting a trail to the

coast on a 90° azimuth in an attempt to

make an exact determination of its position.

At nightfall the map location of the two

battalions was still in doubt. They were

somewhere east-northeast of the F line,

with the 2d Battalion apparently still in

the lead. Regimental headquarters and

the 3d Battalion were apparently somewhere along the eastern portion of either

the O-3 line or the F line.

Heavy rainfall during the late afternoon

and evening of 5 August increased the discomfort of the troops. The downpour

stopped around midnight, but the night

was still dark and overcast. Shortly before

0200, men of Company A, holding the

northern portion of the 1st Battalion perimeter, heard the noise of approaching

tanks and infantry, American tanks were

reportedly in the neighborhood, and the

troops assumed that the force they heard

was a friendly one moving back from the

ad Battalion. The men in their foxholes

kept careful watch, however, and as the

full moon came from behind a cloud the

Americans saw revealed in its light two

Japanese tanks and an estimated platoon

of enemy infantry setting up machine guns.

Company A opened fire at once and

silenced the Japanese infantry, but the two

tanks drove against the line of the perimeter. One cut to the right off the trail, the

other to the left, then both drove into the

perimeter away from the trail which the

1st Battalion was astraddle. Firing their

weapons as they came, the Japanese tanks

broke through the defenders and pushed

through the perimeter. Once inside, one of

the vehicles stopped and threw a stream

of fire around the area while the other

drove farther on. A platoon of American

tanks from C Company, 706th Tank Battalion, attached to the 1st Battalion, could

not fire for fear of hitting the American

infantry.

The enemy infantry outside the battalion

perimeter had been killed or drive off, but

inside the perimeter the Japanese tanks

continued to raise havoc. The tank that

circled inside the area probably did the

most damage as men struggled to escape

from its path or threw ineffective small

arms fire at its steel sides. Bazooka men

were so excited that they neglected to pull

the safety pins in their ammunition. Soon

the two tanks rejoined and doubled back

to the north again through A Company's

perimeter. As they left the area a last defiant rifle shot killed a Japanese soldier who

had ridden one of the tanks through the

entire action.

Behind them the tanks left a trail of

ruin. Equipment was smashed or bulletriddled; one or two jeeps were badly

crushed, and the area was a shambles. All

six enlisted men in an artillery observation

party were either killed or wounded and

the officer observer was injured. Casualties

in the 1st Battalion, mainly in Company

A, were heavy. A total of forty-six men

were wounded, of whom thirty-three had

to be evacuated; fifteen were killed.

The Japanese tanks escaped unscathed, although the losses among the enemy infantry, caught in the first burst of A

Company's fire, were probably high.

On the next morning (6 August) the

305th Infantry continued in its attempt to

reach the O-4 line. Its 3d Battalion was

kept in force reserve in accordance with

corps and division plans for pushing the

pursuit to the northeast, but the remaining

two battalions were able to drive for the
412 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

O-4 line. Neither the 1st nor the 2d Battalion knew its exact position.

The 2d Battalion had found and was

following a tiny path near the coast that

led into "impenetrable jungle" so thick

that "a man cannot even step off a

trail without cutting."3 To avoid following

this path, the battalion attempted to work

to the northwest, and General Bruce

gave his permission for the unit to move out

of the regimental zone and into the area of

the 306th Infantry, if this proved necessary. As the battalion advanced along a

narrow trail in a thin column of companies, the lead scout suddenly came face

to face with an enemy soldier. The American sent back a warning to the rest of the

column, while simultaneously the Japanese

shouted the alert to his own unit, the same

tank-infantry force that had the night before attacked the 1st Battalion, 305th Infantry, with such success.

The chance meeting started a fierce fire

fight. The initial advantage was with the

Japanese, for the two enemy tanks were

in hull defilade, their 57-mm. cannon and

machine guns covering the trail, while the

American infantrymen were strung out

along the narrow trail in an exposed position. The advantage was ably exploited

by the enemy. His machine gun fire raked

the trail while shells burst in the trees and

sent punishing fragments into the column

of American troops. Company E, the lead

unit, hastily deployed on both sides of the

trail, but the same rise in ground that gave

hull defilade to the enemy armor prevented

the Americans from locating the Japanese

riflemen supporting the two tanks.

The intense enemy fire brought down

a number of Americans. Medics attempted

to move forward to aid the wounded, and

the supporting platoon of mediums of

Company C, 706th Tank Battalion, advanced up the trail to hit the enemy. The

lead American tank halted, and riflemen

formed a skirmish line on either side of it.

Heavy machine guns of H Company were

brought up next to the tank, but sweeping

Japanese fire put these guns out of action

before they could fire more than a few

bursts. The enemy fire, especially the tree

bursts from which there seemed no defense and no protection, soon began to

drive the riflemen back from around the

tank. The driver of the Sherman, fearing

to be left alone, reversed his course and

in so doing almost precipitated a panic in

the entire American line. However, the

battalion executive officer, Capt. Charles

T. Hillman, with the aid of a sergeant

from H Company, began to rally the

troops. Both men were wounded, Hillman

fatally, but by their efforts troops of the

2d Battalion were able to form a line just

a few yards behind the first American

position.

To the American rear, meanwhile, other

soldiers were attempting to put the 81-mm.

mortars into operation. Tree bursts and

continued enemy machine gun fire made

this dangerous and difficult, and the heavy

jungle overhead made it equally dangerous

to attempt to fire the mortars. One piece

finally got into action, however, and began

lobbing a steady barrage of shells at the

Japanese position.

Once the mortar was in action the enemy was finished. Japanese fire began to

slacken and then suddenly ceased. Squads

of American infantry that had moved out

on flanking maneuvers on either side of

3

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 6 Aug, Msg 10; Ltr,

Landrum to Gen A. C. Smith, 27 Apr 55, Incl,

OCMH.
GUAM SECURED 413

the trail closed in on the enemy position

without opposition. They found the two

Japanese tanks deserted and three dead

Japanese.

Most of the Japanese riflemen of this

particular tank-infantry team had apparently been killed during the fight with the

1st Battalion the night before. The tanks

and few remaining infantrymen would

seem to have been attempting to regain

their own lines when they encountered the

2d Battalion. Outnumbered, and eventually outgunned, the Japanese had rendered

a good account of themselves in the short

battle. Casualties on the American side

were not as heavy as might have been expected, for only four Americans were

killed, but at least fourteen, possibly as

many as thirty, were wounded.

Other than this fight, the daylight hours

of 6 August witnessed no serious engagements in the 305th Infantry area. A few

scattered Japanese were encountered but,

as on the previous day, the main enemy

force was still the jungle to the north. Both

battalions continued to have difficulty

threading their way through the heavy vegetation, and both were still unsure of their

exact positions. The 1st Battalion, which

did not have to retrace its steps, appears to

have done less wandering and to have

moved rapidly forward northeast in the left

half of the regimental zone. Shortly after

noon, advance elements were on the O-4

line and in contact with men of the 3d

Battalion, 306th Infantry, on the left.

By midafternoon the entire 1st Battalion,

305th Infantry, was on the objective line.

The 2d Battalion was also moving forward

with a clearer knowledge of its location and

by dusk, at the latest, it too was on the

O-4 line. Its wanderings had brought it to

the right of the regimental sector, and it

dug in on the right (southeast) of the 1st

Battalion.

While the 1st and 2d Battalions had

been advancing to the O-4 line on 6

August, regimental headquarters and the

3d Battalion, in force reserve, had moved

to positions on the F line. An attached platoon of the 77th Reconnaissance Troop

continued to patrol the open right flank

of the 305th Infantry down to the sea. It

discovered evidence of enemy patrols in the

area, and in a brief encounter with a small

Japanese force in midafternoon killed one

soldier. One of the enemy patrols that

eluded the American patrol, or perhaps

some Japanese stragglers from elsewhere in

the jungled 305th Infantry area, got as far

as the regimental command post before two

were killed and the others driven off.

On 5 and 6 August the 305th Infantry

had thrashed its way through the heavy

Guam jungle, across poorly mapped and

unfamiliar terrain, and against sporadic,

but on two occasions punishing, Japanese

resistance, to positions along the O-4 line.

The regiment suffered nearly a hundred

men wounded on the two days, and about

twenty-five killed. The regiment estimated

that it had killed about a hundred Japanese and had knocked out the two enemy

tanks that had invaded the regimental zone

of action.4

4

 This account of the advance of the 305th

Infantry on 5-6 August is based on: 77th Inf

Div G-3 Jnl, 5-6 Aug 44; 77th Inf Div Rpt, pp.

5-6; 77th Inf Div G-2 Rpts 14-15, 6-7 Aug 44;

77th Inf Div G-3 Rpts 13-14, 6-7 Aug 44; 77th

Inf Div G-2 Jnl File, 6-7 Aug 44, passim; 305th

RCT Jnl File, 4-11 Aug 44 (AG), Msgs 378,

392, 402, 429, 432; 305th RCT Rpt, p. 3; 77th

Inf Div Arty S-3 Jnl and Jnl Worksheets, 4-6

Aug 44, passim; 706th Tk Bn Opn Rpt Guam,

p. 9; 77th Inf Div Arty Rpt, p. 10; AFAS, Guam,

pp. 111-16; Burns Intervs of 2d Bn and Co H,

305th RCT, pp. 371, 414; 77th Rcn Trp Rpt,

p. 2.
414 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

To the left, the movement of the 306th

Infantry around the right flank and in

front of the 307th Infantry was impeded

more by the thick vegetation and poor

trails and the lack of decent maps than

by the Japanese opposition. The maneuver

would have been arduous under any circumstances, because of the complicated

trail net that involved several 90° turns. It

was so difficult to keep track of the units

within the regiment that a division artillery

liaison plane was called on to spot infantry

positions.

Colonel Smith's regiment began its move

at 0630 on 5 August in a column of battalions, the 1st in the lead, followed by the

3d. It advanced generally unopposed along

a trail from the Barrigada area past the

east side of Mount Barrigada. By noon the

1st Battalion, 306th Infantry, had reached

the trail running east from Finegayan that

had marked the 307th Infantry's objective

line the previous day. Moving eastward

along the trail, the men reached another

trail that led north to a juncture with the

coral road that ran from Finegayan eastnortheast to Yigo. As the 1st Battalion turned north toward the Finegayan

-Yigo road shortly after noon, it began to

run into a few scattered enemy riflemen.

Lt. Col. Joseph A. Remus' men advanced

north along the trail against increasing

Japanese opposition, and by the time they

reached the Yigo road shortly after 1400

the resistance had become quite strong.

The enemy consisted for the most part

of individual riflemen and machine gun positions. The Japanese astride the road itself

were driven off without too much difficulty, but these or other enemy soldiers

filtered through the jungle and struck the

flank of Company A, which was leading

the battalion advance. The assault, while

thrust home with vigor, was not made in

great force, and the Americans were able

to drive off the enemy as tanks came up

to help complete the job. The entire action

along the Yigo road took more than two

hours before the enemy was finally destroyed or driven off. Company A had

been supported by the battalion's 81-mm.

mortars and by a platoon of B Company,

706th Tank Battalion, as well as by the

artillery. It had killed nearly a score of

Japanese while the company itself had

lost one man killed and seven wounded.

It was about 1630 before the 1st Battalion could pick up the advance again. Unable to find Road Junction 363, forward

elements pushed west a few hundred yards

beyond where their map showed the junction to be and then fell back to night

positions at a point about where the battalion had first hit Yigo road. The 3d

Battalion, meanwhile, had turned east according to plan when it reached the Yigo

road in midafternoon. Encountering scattered light resistance, Colonel Kimbrell's

troops were able to move only a few

hundred yards east along the road and

northeast into the jungle before halting for

the night.

The day's advance was not sufficient

for the 306th Infantry to make contact

with the marines, who were still about

1,000 yards to the west of the 1st Battalion. That night, during a heavy rainfall,

the Japanese made several attempts to infiltrate the perimeter, but all were beaten

back.5

5

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 5 Aug 44; 306th

RCT S-3 Jnl, 5 Aug 44; 77th Inf Div Arty S-3

Jnl, 4-5 Aug 44.; 77th Inf Div G-3 Rpt 13, 6

Aug 44; 306th RCT Rpt 14, 6 Aug 44; 306th

RCT Opns Rpt, Guam, p. 3; 77th Inf Div G-2

Rpt 14, 6 Aug 44; 306th Inf FO 3, 4 Aug 44,

Entry 58 in 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl File, 4 Aug

44; AFAS, Guam.
GUAM SECURED 415

Shortly after 0700 on 6 August the

306th Infantry, according to orders,

pushed off again. The 1st Battalion started

west on the Finegayan-Yigo road in search

of Road Junction 363 and the trail north.

The battalion moved slowly, apparently

against light opposition. With the aid of

an artillery spotter plane it was able to

locate the road junction, which it reached

shortly after 0900. The trail to the north

led through heavy jungle and was evidently

not very wide or clear. The battalion

turned north to follow it, sending a patrol

of company size farther west along the

Finegayan-Yigo road in an attempt to

make contact with a Marine patrol pushing

east along the road. Slowly northward the

soldiers pushed, cutting through the thick

vegetation that bordered and overgrew the

trail. By about 0930 they had encountered

a Japanese force about 150 to 200 yards

north of Road Junction 363. Company B,

leading the advance, engaged the enemy,

taking a few casualties. Tanks and supporting weapons were then brought up to

drive the rest of the Japanese off.

Continuing in the same direction, Remus' battalion encountered little or no enemy opposition, but by about 1330, when

the troops were still roughly half a mile

from the division boundary, the trail gave

out. From here on the men had to cut

their way through the heavy jungle, packing coral limestone down so that vehicles

could follow the advance. By 1700 the battalion had reached the division boundary

on G line. When the men dug in for the

night their perimeter was but 300 yards

from that of the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, and contact, either visual or by

patrol, had been established.

Meanwhile, the company of the 1st Battalion that had continued to push west

along the Finegayan-Yigo road had moved

easily against little or no resistance during

the morning. By about 1100 the Army patrol had met a similar Marine patrol that

had pushed east from Marine lines, thus

establishing contact about 400 yards west

of Road Junction 363.

While the 1st Battalion was pushing

north and west, the 3d Battalion drove

east along the Finegayan-Yigo road. Kimbrell's men had moved about 1,000 yards

up the road from their morning position

on G line when, shortly after 0800, the

lead scout of I Company noticed the muzzle

of an enemy 47-mm. gun in the bushes

ahead of him. The infantry column halted

and deployed as quietly as possible while a

platoon of Shermans of B Company,

706th Tank Battalion, moved up. The

enemy position was well camouflaged and

the lead American tank discovered it was

facing a Japanese medium tank at about

the same time that the enemy vehicle

opened fire. The first round flattened a

bogie wheel on the American tank, but

answering fire from the 75-mm. gun on the

Sherman was much more effective. Three

rounds set the Japanese tank aflame, and

the Sherman's machine guns and a quick

rush by the American infantry took care

of the enemy soldiers around the Japanese

tank. Nearly a score of Japanese were

killed with no American losses.

With the enemy ambush thus effectively

demolished, the 3d Battalion picked up the

advance again. By about 1000 it had

reached Road Junction 385, just 400 yards

from the O-4 line, and within half an hour

the men had crossed the objective line and

were reported by an air observer to be only

about 1,200 yards from Yigo itself. Since

an advance up Yigo road by only the 3d

Battalion, 306th Infantry, would have ex-
416 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

posed the unit to flank attack and disturbed division plans for the next day, the

battalion was called back to the O-4 line.

Darkness found the 3d Battalion dug in in

its assigned position and in contact with the

305th Infantry to its right (southeast).

Thus, on 6 August, the 306th Infantry

completed its mission by gaining the O-4

line and establishing contact with the marines. Moreover, Yigo road was now open

as far as the O-4 line. Casualties in the

regiment on the 6th were two killed and

fourteen wounded, mostly in the 1st Battalion. One additional casualty occurred in

midafternoon when Col. Douglas McNair,

chief of staff of the 77th Division, was

fatally wounded by an enemy rifleman

while reconnoitering for a new division

command post about 600 yards east of

Road Junction 363. McNair had gone

forward accompanied by an officer from

the Reconnaissance Troop armed with a

carbine, a sergeant armed with a BAR, and

an escort of two light tanks. The party

suddenly came upon a small shack almost

concealed in the brush and the men

thought they detected movement inside.

"Spray it, Sergeant," said the Colonel, and

the sergeant peppered the shack. But one

shot was fired in retaliation and it caught

McNair in the chest. He died almost instantly. One of the tanks then rushed forward and demolished the shack and

burned it. In the ruins were the bodies of

three Japanese soldiers.6

Meanwhile, on 5 August, the 307th Infantry had rested and reorganized. The

regiment moved forward only a few hundred yards, and so did not reach the O-3

line. Patrols from the 1st Battalion established contact with the marines at the

division boundary on the trail east of

Finegayan that had been the regimental

objective on 4 August. However, this point

of contact was still 2,100 yards behind the

3d Division's right flank, which hung in

the air.7

The next morning, as planned, the men

of the 307th pushed off again to the rear

of the 306th, with the intention of giving

General Bruce a three-regiment front before nightfall. Moving slowly in a column

of battalions, 3d leading with 1st close behind it and 2d bringing up the rear, the

307th Infantry followed the same route

that the 306th had taken. The rain of

the previous night had left the trail

muddy and the men sank ankle-deep into

the ooze. The jungle continued to hamper

off-trail movement. These two factors, combined with the fact that the 307th Infantry had to wait until all elements of the

306th had passed it, made the going slow.

By noon of the 6th the 307th Infantry

had reached the trail junction that gave

access to the trail leading north to Yigo

road. Shortly thereafter, with all 306th

Infantry elements passed, Colonel Manuel's

regiment continued its advance, going

6

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 6 Aug 44; 306th RCT

Jnl, 6 Aug 44; 306th RCT Unit Rpt 15, 7 Aug

44; 306th RCT Opns Rpt, pp. 3-4; AFAS,

Guam, pp. 109-11; 77th Inf Div G-2 Rpt 14, 6

Aug 44; 706th Tk Bn Rpt, p. 8; Bums Combat

Interv of 1st Bn, 306th Inf, p. 535; 3d Marine Div

D-3 Jnl, 6 Aug 44, Msgs 30, 33, 66, 67; 77th

Inf Div Arty S-3 Jnl, 5-6 Aug 44, Entry 55. The

account of the details of Colonel McNair's death

is given in Ltr, Brig Gen Isaac Spalding to Gen

A. G. Smith, n.d., incl, OCMH. McNair's death

came but two weeks after his father, Lt. Gen.

Lesley J. McNair was accidentally killed by

friendly bombers in France. 7

 307th RCT Rpt, p. 4; 3d Marine Div D-3

Jnl, 5 Aug 44; 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 5 Aug 44;

77th Inf Div G-3 Rpt 13, 6 Aug 44; Overlay

Showing Summary of Outstanding Events and

Areas Secured by 307th Infantry, in 307th RCT

Rpt.
GUAM SECURED 417

north to Yigo road and then turning east

to follow the 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry,

along this main route. By midafternoon the

lead battalion of the 307th Infantry—the

3d—had reached the O-4 line and had

tied in with 306th Infantry troops already

there. The other units followed, and by

nightfall the 3d Battalion, 307th Infantry,

was on the O-4 line between the 306th

and 305th Infantry Regiments, with the

2d Battalion and regimental headquarters on the Yigo road 800 yards to the rear

and the 1st Battalion on the road another

800 yards farther back.8 The 77th Division now had three regiments on the line.

In conformance with plans already issued

for the continuation of the attack, General

Bruce could throw his entire division (less

3d Battalion, 305th Infantry, which was in

force reserve) into the assault.

3d Marine Division

5-6 August

Meanwhile, on the corps left, the 3d

Marine Division, attacking on a three-regiment front, was groping its way through

jungle just about as thick as that slowing

the progress of the Army troops. On the

division left and center the 3d and 21st

Marines met no organized resistance on 5

August, but on the right the 9th Marines

fought hard to clear the remaining Japanese out of the Finegayan area and open

Road Junction 177 to permit supplies to

move north toward forward dumps at

Dededo.

On the 6th the same general pattern was

repeated. The two regiments on the west

gained as much as 5,000 yards against only

nominal opposition. The 9th Marines,

pushing north from Finegayan, succeeded

in keeping abreast of the rest of the division, though it continued to meet scattered

resistance and had to dispose of 700 Japanese defenders in the Finegayan area in

the process.9

During this movement General Turnage

approached the ever worrisome problem of

unit contact in much the same manner as

had General Bruce. In view of the tremendous difficulties involved in maintaining

continuous physical contact in the nightmarish jungles of northern Guam, Turnage

ordered his regimental commanders to

advance in column along the trails. Patrols

were to fan out 200 yards on either side

of the trails to wipe out enemy troops that

might possibly be lurking in the underbrush, but physical contact was to be

established only at indicated points where

lateral roads or cleared spaces made it

feasible.10

Capture of Mount Santa Rosa

7-8 August

By the close of 6 August the final defensive line that General Obata had tried

to set up across northern Guam had been

pierced and overrun in so many places that

it constituted no line at all. Only isolated

pockets of Japanese remained to contest

the American advance, and these were

without adequate weapons, out of touch

with higher headquarters, and often virtually leaderless. The Japanese, like their

attackers, were harassed and obstructed by

the jungle that surrounded them. As 8

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 6 Aug 44, Msgs 7, 9,

34, 35, 54, 91; 77th Inf Div Rpt, pp. 5-6; 307th

RCT Rpt, p. 4; 3d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 6 Aug

44, Msg 26.

9

 3d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 5-6 Aug 44;

Lodge, Guam, pp. 141-45. 10

 3d Marine Div Opns Order 16, 6 Aug 44.
418 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

MT. SANTA ROSA, taken by the 307th

Infantry on 8 August.

Colonel Takeda later reported, "They were

obliged to fight in the jungle where it was

very hard to cooperate and communicate

with each other. Therefore they could not

fight satisfactorily to show their whole

strength. And as the American armoured

troops drove along the highways and trails

in jungle to cut off the front line into several pockets, our troops were forced to be

isolated."11 So much for the supposed inherent superiority of the Japanese in jungle

warfare.

With less than one third of Guam

still remaining in Japanese hands, General

Geiger issued orders to complete the destruction of the enemy on the island. These

orders—ready since the morning of 5 August, but not made effective until the

afternoon of the 6th—called for an all-out

attack on the morning of 7 August. Geiger

planned to put almost his entire force into

the final assault, holding out only one battalion from each division as force reserve.

The 77th Division would make the main

effort, seizing Mount Santa Rosa and the

northeastern portion of the island. On its

left and supporting it, the 3d Marine Division would drive northeast to the sea.

Finally, on the far left would come the 1st

Marine Provisional Brigade, protecting the

3d Division flank and securing the northernmost tip of the island by patrols. The

corps commander stressed the necessity for

maintaining contact between units, since

the Japanese might well mount a last

desperate counterattack to spring the

crushing American trap. With the Army

troops making the main offensive effort,

General Geiger for the first time directed

that responsibility for maintaining contact

would be from left to right—the 1st Brigade would be responsible for maintaining

contact with the 3d Division, and the 3d

Division would be charged with keeping

touch with the 77th. Warships and aircraft—P-47's and B-26's from Saipan—

had been softening up Mount Santa Rosa

for several days, and the bombardment, reinforced by corps and division artillery fire,

would continue on the day of the attack.

The corps assault plan was to go into effect

at 0730, 7 August.12

The corps plan of attack did not reach

General Bruce until the late afternoon of

5 August, but in anticipation the 77th Di11

 Lt Col H. Takeda, Outline of Japanese Defense Plan, 4 Oct 46.

12

 CG SLF to CG 2d Marine Div et al. (III

Phib Corps Opn Plan 8-44), 050714 and 061324,

Aug 44, both in III Phib Corps Opn Orders;

AFAS, Guam, pp. 117-18.
GUAM SECURED 419

vision staff had already worked out a

scheme of assault to be put into action once

the O-4 line was secured.13 Distributed

and explained to subordinate units shortly

before noon of the 5th, the division plan

fitted in well with the over-all corps

scheme.14 (Map 26)

General Bruce's plan of attack—including modifications worked out up to the

morning of 7 August—called for a wheeling maneuver on the part of his division,

three regiments in line pivoting on their

right. The object of the attack was Mount

Santa Rosa, a height of nearly 900 feet, in

front of the 77th Division. When the wheeling maneuver was completed, Bruce's

regiments would have surrounded the

mountain on three sides—south, west,

and north—pinning the Japanese defenders

against the sea.

On the left of the division attack was

the 306th Infantry with an attached company of Shermans of the 706th Tank Battalion. The 306th was to advance along

the division's left boundary until it had

passed Mount Santa Rosa and then swing

east to seize an objective area north of the

mountain from the town of Lulog seaward

to Anao on the coast. Patrols from this

regiment would push northeast above the

main body to the coast farther north.

Since the 306th Infantry had to cover far

more ground than either of the other two

regiments, it would advance without regard to contact in order to accomplish its

mission. On the right of the 306th was the

307th Infantry. For its action in the fairly

open, rolling terrain around Yigo, the regiment had a company of medium tanks attached and the 706th Tank Battalion (less

two companies) in support. The 307th

would continue to attack up the Finegayan

-Yigo road to capture Yigo and then swing

east and northeast to block the western

side of Mount Santa Rosa. In order to hold

these gains and prevent any enemy escape,

the 307th was authorized to commit all

three of its battalions without maintaining

a reserve. On the division right the 305th

Infantry (less 3d Battalion in force reserve) had only a short distance to cover

in its move to seal the southern approaches

to Mount Santa Rosa and support the

307th Infantry. In spite of this advantage

the regiment was handicapped by having

only two of its battalions in the assault

and also in having no tanks attached.

The line of departure for the 77th Division was from 400 yards to a mile in front

of the 306th and 307th Infantry positions

on the O-4 line, with the shortest distance

between the two lines on the left, in front

of the 306th. The 305th Infantry, with

only a small area to cover, would attack

from the O-4 line. The 306th and 307th

Regiments would begin the advance to the

line of departure at 0730; the 305th would

remain in position until ordered forward.

The 1st Battalion, 306th Infantry, would

start for the line of departure half an hour

early, at 0700. This battalion had not

reached the O-4 line on 6 August, but had

halted on the G line, a good 2,000 yards

from the O-4 line. The extra half hour was

apparently to enable the 1st Battalion to

move abreast of the 3d.

H Hour, the time of the general division

attack from the line of departure, was set

tentatively by General Bruce at approxi13

 III Phib Corps G-3 Jnl, 5 Aug 44, Entry

098; 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 5 Aug 44, Entry 60.

The 3d Marine Division received the order at the

same time. 3d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 5 Aug 44,

Addendum to Jnl, Entry 2A. 14

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 5 Aug 44, Entry 31;

77th Inf Div Overlay Showing Tentative Future

Opns, 5 Aug 44, in 77th Inf Div Overlays.

GUAM SECURED 421

mately 1200. The 77th Division assault was

to be supported by a tremendously heavy

air, artillery, and naval gunfire preparation. For an hour, beginning at 0900, P47's and B-26's would bomb and strafe

Mount Santa Rosa. Twenty minutes before

H Hour division artillery reinforced by

corps artillery would begin a barrage lasting until the attack began. All four battalions of division artillery were to fire a

round per gun per minute, all concentrations to fall in the zone of action of the

306th and 307th Infantry Regiments. At

the same time that the artillery preparation

began, a one-hour naval bombardment of

the Mount Santa Rosa area would start,

with the warships firing from south to

north and moving their fire beyond the

area immediately in front of the infantry

by H Hour. After H Hour division artillery, supported by the corps weapons, was

available on call. The immense air, artillery,

and naval gunfire preparation, it was

hoped, would leave the Japanese defending

the Mount Santa Rosa area too weakened

or dazed to put up more than a feeble resistance against the 77th Division attack.15

The turning maneuver planned for the

77th Division was a difficult one to carry

out. Its execution was made even harder

by a misunderstanding on the part of

Bruce's staff as to the precise location of

the boundary between the Army and Marine divisions. Tentative division plans

worked out before the receipt of General

Geiger's orders used the operational boundaries between the 3d and 77th Divisions

prescribed by corps on 2 August. The

boundary then established ran along a road

that branched off to the northeast from

the main Finegayan-Yigo road at Liguan,

passed Mount Mataguac, and ended at the

junction with Yigo-Chaguian road about

2,000 yards north of the mountain. Since

corps had not projected the boundary beyond the end of Liguan road, the 77th

Division staff on its own initiative extended

the boundary line to the northeast—from

the road junction cross-country to Salisbury and thence along the Salisbury-Piti

Point Road to the coast.16 Unless corps

called for a change in operational boundaries, this line would stand. Unfortunately for those concerned, a boundary

change is precisely what was directed by

General Geiger.

The new operational boundary established by corps on 5 August was, beyond

the town of Salisbury, exactly as 77th Division planners had assumed: along the

road running from that town to the coast.

While the Army was responsible for the

road, it was to be used jointly by soldiers

and marines. In an apparent effort to

make as much of this road as possible available to the 3d Division, however, General

Geiger shifted the interdivisional boundary

below Salisbury eastward to a line that ran

from a crossroads southwest of Mount

Mataguac to a point on Yigo-Salisbury

road midway between the two towns, and

from there along the road to Salisbury.

Thus a large diamond-shaped area, about

two miles long, between Mount Mataguac

15

 77th Inf Div Overlay Showing Tentative

Future Opns, 5 Aug 44, 77th Inf Div Opns Overlay for 7 Aug, dated 6 Aug 44, and 77th Inf Div

FO 6, 061900 Aug 44, all in 77th Inf Div Overlays; 77th Inf Div Rpt, p. 6; CG 77th Inf Div,

Notes on Plans for 7 Aug, Entry 63 in 77th Inf

Div G-3 Jnl File, 6 Aug 44; 77th Inf Div G-3

Jnl, Entries 61, 85, and 86 on 6 Aug, and 2 on

7 Aug 44.

16

 CG SLF to 3d Marine Div et al., 020935

Aug 44, in III Phib Corps Opns Orders; 77th

Inf Div Overlay Showing Tentative Future Opns,

5 Aug 44, in 77th Inf Div Overlays.
422 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

and Salisbury was transferred from the

77th Division to the 3d Marine Division.

That a new boundary had been drawn

was made explicit in the III Amphibious

Corps order that the 77th Division received on the afternoon of 5 August.

"Boundary," read the order, "between

77th and 3d Mar Div changes . . . ," and

then proceeded to describe the new boundary. The boundary was described again

further on in the order when a reference

was made to use of the Salisbury road.

While no overlay accompanied the order,

the map co-ordinates, repeated twice, and

the use of the word "change" made it quite

clear that a new boundary had been established.17

Nevertheless, when the 77th Division

field order and final overlay for the 7 August attack were drawn up on the afternoon of the 6th, the original boundary line

was incorporated in both the order and the

overlay.18 The zone of action of the 306th

Infantry, making its sweep around Mount

Santa Rosa on the division left, was therefore partially within the 3d Marine Division's operational area.

Promptly at 0700 on 7 August the 1st

Battalion, 306th Infantry, began advancing

along the Liguan trail toward the line of

departure. At 0730 the 3d Battalion, on

its right, began to advance cross-country,

the 2d Battalion remaining in its reserve

position.19 In the 307th zone, in the center

of the division, that regiment's 3d Battalion led the way along the Yigo road on

schedule, with the 1st and 2d Battalions

prepared to follow.20 The two battalions of

the 305th Infantry on the O-4 line stood

by in position.21

By 0900 or a few minutes thereafter, just

as American aircraft began pummeling

Mount Santa Rosa, the 1st Battalion, 306th

Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 307th, had

reached the line of departure. The 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry, advancing overland

between them, did not reach the line until

1000.22 The 305th Infantry, meanwhile,

had asked and received permission at 0905

to begin moving its 2d Battalion forward

from the O-4 line. Ten minutes later, with

a bulldozer cutting the way through the

thick jungle, the 2d Battalion moved out

to start the regimental advance.23

The first resistance of the day was encountered by the 3d Battalion, 307th Infantry, as it moved up Yigo road just before it reached the line of departure. As

the battalion began fanning out to occupy

a line about 800 to 1 ,000 yards below Yigo,

it received enemy rifle and machine gun

fire from concealed positions in the woods

ahead. About 0840 the first Japanese fire

struck Capt. William B. Cooper's Company

I, which was leading the advance. In the

face of the enemy fire, it was almost 0930

before I Company could deploy along the

line and begin to advance against the Japanese positions. The other companies had

bunched up on the road, making it dif17

 CG SLF to CG 3d Marine Div et al. (III

Phib Corps Opns Plan 8-44), 050714 Aug 44, in

III Phib Corps Opns Orders. 18

 77th Inf Div FO 6, 061900 Aug 44, and 77th

Inf Div Opns Overlay for 7 Aug, dated 6 Aug

44, both in 77th Inf Div Overlays. 19

 306th RCT Jnl, 7 Aug 44, Entry 2; 306th

RCT Unit Rpt 16, 8 Aug 44.

20

 307th RCT S-1/S-4 and S-2/S-3 Jnls,

7 Aug 44, passim; see also 307th Inf FO 6 and

Annex to FO G (overlays showing scheme of

maneuver), in 30701 RCT Rpt. 21

 305th RCT Jnl File, 7 Aug 44, Msg 4.30. 22

 306th RCT Jnl, 7 Aug 44, Entries 8 and 11;

307th RCT S-2/S-3 Jnl, entry at 0912, and

S-1/S-4 Jnl, entry at 0910; 77th Inf Div Rpt,

p. 6.

23

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Aug 44, Entry 31.
GUAM SECURED 423

ficult for the entire battalion to deploy and

for the attached tanks of Company A,

706th Tank Battalion, to move forward.

Nevertheless, once I Company had formed,

it began to push back the enemy. By

shortly after 1000 some of the Japanese

had been killed and the rest were falling

back. The Americans had suffered eleven

casualties, but the 2d Battalion was on the

line and ready to push off.24

With all his attack battalions on the line

of departure and the other units moving

forward behind them, General Bruce was

able to set H Hour definitely at 1200. Division units and corps headquarters were

notified accordingly.25

The artillery preparation began promptly

at 1138—General Bruce had advanced the

time by two minutes26—with the three

105-mm. howitzer battalions of division artillery opening fire on targets in front of

the 306th and 307th Infantry Regiments.

At 1148 the shelling stopped for two minutes and then at 1150 all four battalions

of division artillery and the three 155-mm.

battalions of corps artillery delivered a

heavy ten-minute preparation.27 To add to

the weight of metal falling on enemy

positions on the forward slope and atop

Mount Santa Rosa, naval gunfire support

vessels were also sending their big shells

crashing inland. Meanwhile, the infantry

and tanks made ready to attack.

The major opposition to the day's advance of the 77th Division was to come in

the center of the 307th Infantry zone of

operations. Here, a tank-infantry assault

had been planned to take advantage of the

relatively open terrain around Yigo. The

706th Tank Battalion (less Companies A

and B) was to spearhead this assault as

soon as the artillery fire lifted at 1200. At

that time the light tanks of Company D

were to push up the Yigo road as fast as

possible and enter the town with C Company's mediums right behind them. The

infantry was to act in close support of the

armor, with the medium tanks of Company

A, attached to the 307th, providing general

support. Once Yigo was seized, the two

companies of the 706th Tank Battalion

were to occupy the high ground eastnortheast of the town, thus opening the

way for the 307th Infantry to swing

against the western slopes of Mount Santa

Rosa.28

Co-ordination between the 706th Tank

Battalion and the 307th Infantry was something less than satisfactory. While the plan

for the use of the tanks had been worked

out late on 6 August, it was then too early

to set the time of H Hour. At 0700 on 7

August the tank battalion (less A and B

Companies) began moving from its assembly area to positions behind the 307th

Infantry, prepared to move into the line

as soon as H Hour was announced. At

1040 General Bruce sent word to the 706th

that H Hour would be at noon, but the

message never reached Colonel Stokes, the

tank commander. Not until 1145 did

Stokes get word to report to the 307th

Infantry command post and not until his

arrival, nearly ten minutes later, did he

24

 307th RCT S-2/S-3 and S-1/S-4 Jnls,

passim.; AFAS, Guam, pp. 120-21; 77th Inf Div

G-2 Rpt 15, 7 Aug 44, in 77th Inf Div G-2 Jnl

File, 7-10 Aug 44. There is no breakdown on

American casualties; Japanese casualties are unknown. 25

 III Phib Corps G-3 Jnl, 7 Aug 44, msg in

at 1010; 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Aug 44, Entry

17.

26

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Aug 44, Entry 26. 27

 77th Inf Div Arty S-3 Rpt 14, for period

6-7 Aug 44, in 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl File, 9 Aug

44, Msg 42; III Phib Corps Arty SAR, p. 9. 28 AFAS, Guam, p. 121.
424 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

learn the attack was scheduled to commence at 1200.29

With only a few minutes to go before

H Hour, the two companies of tanks

scheduled to spearhead the attack were still

some distance behind the line of departure.

At 1155 Stokes radioed Company D, which

was to have led the drive, to move up and

carry out the plan of action.30 Meanwhile,

the officers of the 3d Battalion, 307th Infantry, poised on the line of departure to

follow the tanks, had been growing anxious

about the failure of the armor to appear.

The battalion commander had orders to

follow closely on the heels of the artillery.

At 1156 the barrage was falling at a good

distance from the line of departure and the

infantry commander informed the regimental command post that he was about

to move out. Without the tanks, then, at

H Hour minus 3 minutes the 3d Battalion

crossed the line of departure and began

advancing on Yigo.31

As the light tanks of Company D pushed

hastily forward on Yigo road, they found

their way blocked by the confusion of men

and vehicles before them. Unable to move

through the thick jungle on either side of

the road, the tanks had to make their way

between soldiers, vehicles, and the company

of medium tanks attached to the 307th Infantry. It was thus 1207 before D Company reached the rear of the 3d Battalion,

and nearly 1220 before the tanks could

pass through the leading infantry and begin to fan out in the more open terrain. The

advance by this time had covered about

250 yards from the line of departure without resistance. However, less than 500

yards from the edge of Yigo, the Americans

began to meet rifle fire from enemy troops

driven south from the town by the volume

of the preattack artillery preparation.32

Japanese small arms fire increased in intensity as the light tanks of D Company

echeloned to the right, and the mediums of

C Company moved up along the road

behind them. The light tanks overran or

pushed by several dugouts and pillboxes,

leaving them for the infantry to clean out.

Just short of the southern edge of Yigo,

D Company swept across a slight rise of

ground east of the road and began to receive fire of a heavier caliber from enemy

positions concealed in the woods along and

west of the road. It was apparent that the

Japanese here had weapons too heavy for

the light tanks, and a call went back for

the mediums. Just as Company C reached

the area, the Japanese succeeded in stopping the light tank farthest to the left. A

few minutes later a second light tank was

knocked out.

The enemy troops were well concealed in

the woods to the left, and it was not until

its mediums began to receive fire that C

Company could determine the location

of the Japanese positions. The mediums

swung to put fire on the Japanese before

following D Company on toward Yigo, but

two of C Company's tanks were also

knocked out by enemy fire. As the two

companies of the 706th began to push into

the shell-flattened town, the 3d Battalion,

307th Infantry, attacked the Japanese positions along and west of the road. The infantrymen advanced cautiously into the

woods, using rifles, machine guns, and

29

 Burns, Interv with Col Stokes, p. 193; 77th

Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Aug 44, Msg 18. 30

 Burns, Interv with Stokes, p. 193. 31

 307th RCT S-2/S-3 and S-1/S-4 Jnls, 7 Aug 44, msgs in 1112-1206, passim; 77th Inf

Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Aug 44, Entry 35.

32

 307th RCT S-1/S-4 Jnl, 7 Aug 44, msgs in

at 1207, 1222; 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Aug 44,

Entries 35, 41; AFAS, Guam, p. 122.
GUAM SECURED 425

grenades. It was slow work, and at 1330

the troops still had not cleaned out the

area. The tanks, with their mission to push

through Yigo, had reorganized and were

entering the town in force. The attached

medium tanks of the 307th were still back

with the rest of the regiment, and the task

of destroying the enemy defenses was left

to Major Lovell's battalion.

Suddenly, unexpected assistance appeared from the west. The 3d Battalion,

306th Infantry, advancing on the west

flank of the 307th had heard the firing

below Yigo, and Colonel Kimbrell, battalion commander, had taken a platoon of

K Company to investigate. The Japanese

had neglected to protect their rear and

the K Company platoon caught them

completely unawares, killing those enemy

troops that had not been disposed of by

the 3d Battalion, 307th. Other elements of

K Company, 306th Infantry, struck enemy

positions in the woods farther north, and

the entire area south of Yigo was soon

cleared.

The Japanese position had been a strong

one, built around two light tanks with a

37-mm. or 47-mm. antitank gun between

them. In addition, the enemy had been

equipped with two 20-mm. antitank rifles

and six light and two heavy machine guns.

No report on Japanese casualties is available, but undoubtedly they were heavy.

There were probably a score of casualties

in the 3d Battalion,33 while the 706th

Tank Battalion reported two killed, ten

wounded, and one man missing.

By 1408 the leading elements of the 3d

Battalion, 307th Infantry, were at the

southern edge of Yigo, while the two companies of the 706th Tank Battalion had

reached Road Junction 415, some 250

yards farther up the road at the northern

edge of Yigo. A quarter of an hour later

the tanks reported Yigo clear of Japanese,

and the 307th Infantry commander ordered

his 3d Battalion to press through the town.

By 1450 Yigo was secured, the 3d Battalion

had reached Road Junction 415, and the

two tank companies had moved unopposed

up to the high ground east-northeast of

the village.

Now that enemy resistance had been

broken, Lovell's 3d Battalion, 307th, moved

east along the road from Road Junction

415, the men advancing about 1,000 yards

during the late afternoon. The 1st Battalion, ordered up a few hours earlier, also

moved through Yigo and followed the 3d,

The 2d Battalion moved to Yigo, where

Major Mackin, battalion commander, set

up his command post. In the village were

found fifteen abandoned Japanese trucks

and other mobile equipment, as well as

several ammunition and food dumps, showing that the site had recently been a major part of the Japanese defense scheme.

No Japanese resistance was encountered

during the afternoon. However, the 3d

Battalion was mistakenly strafed by American planes in midafternoon though, fortunately for the infantrymen, no one was

hurt. Nightfall found the 307th Infantry

in control of Yigo and a large area to the

northeast, east, and southeast.34

33

 This figure is obtained by subtracting the

number of casualties suffered in the. morning from

the total casualties for the regiment on 7 August,

No breakdown can be made.

34

 307th RCT S-1/S-4 and S-2/S-3 Jnls,

7 Aug 44; 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Aug 44; 77th

Inf Div Rpt, p. 6; 307th RCT Rpt, p. 4; AFAS,

Guam, pp. 122-25; 77th Inf Div G-3 Rpts 15,

16, 7, 8 Aug 44; 77th Inf Div G-2 Jnl File, 7-10

Aug 44; Msgs, 706th Tk Bn to G-2, and Bomb

Disposal Squad to G-2, Nos. 15 and 30, 8 Aug

44, in 77th Inf Div G-2 Jnl File, 7-10 Aug 44;

706th Tk Bn Rpt, p. 9.
426 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

BURNING U.S. MEDIUM TANKS disabled by enemy fire along the road to Yigo.

While the 307th Infantry fought its way

through Yigo on the afternoon of 7 August,

the regiments on its flanks were also advancing, although with much less difficulty.

The 306th Infantry, to the left, crossed the

line of departure on time at noon. With

the 3d Battalion on the right, 1st on the

left, the regiment advanced against scattered light resistance. Well over a hundred

Japanese were claimed killed, while only

three Americans were wounded. In its

rapid movement up the Yigo road, the 3d

Battalion employed a type of tank-infantry

tactics peculiarly adapted to the jungles of

Guam. To the lead company of infantrymen was assigned a tank platoon. One

tank moved through the brush on one side

of the jungle trail, a second on the other

side, and the remainder followed along the

trail about a hundred yards to the rear.

The object of this unorthodox formation

was to permit the tanks to support each

other, protect the lead tanks from mines

located on the trail, and widen the trail

for the infantrymen who would follow.

With each vehicle went four infantrymen

on foot to serve as guides, spotters, and

protectors. In this manner, the 3d Battalion pushed on through Yigo and then

northeast about 900 yards along the Salisbury road. There, it dug in for the night.35

The 1st Battalion advanced along the

Liguan road to the crossroads southwest of

35306th RCT Rpt, p. 4; 306th RCT Unit

Jnl, 7 Aug 44; 77th Inf Div G-2 Rpts 15, 16,

7, 8 Aug 44, in 77th Inf Div G-2 Jnl File, 7-10

Aug 44; 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Aug 44, passim;

AFAS, Guam, p. 110.
GUAM SECURED 427

Mount Mataguac where the new corps

boundary left the trail. Although General

Bruce had ordered the 306th Infantry to

advance some 600 yards farther up the

Liguan trail, the 1st Battalion during the

afternoon ran into resistance from about

forty Japanese with two machine guns

just below the crossroads. With the help

of the attached Company B, 706th Tank

Battalion, the battalion eliminated the opposition but did not advance much farther.

Had the 1st Battalion continued, it would

have entered what was actually Marine territory under the new boundaries. This

might have caused difficulties, since the 9th

Marines had moved past the crossroads

along and east of the Liguan trail, in an

area that the 77th Division still thought

to be within the Army zone of operations.

However, since the 1st Battalion, 306th Infantry, had not yet advanced beyond the

point of the boundary change, there had

been no trouble so far.36

On the division right the 305th Infantry

(less the 3d Battalion) also advanced unopposed. With bulldozers blazing a trail

through the thick jungle, the 2d Battalion

covered 1800 yards during the day and by

nightfall was digging in about a mile northwest of Lumuna Point. The 1st Battalion, meanwhile, remained with regimental headquarters on the O-4 line,

preparing to pick up the advance on 8

August.

No opposition impeded the movement of

the 2d Battalion, 305th Infantry, on 7

August. The only untoward incident of the

day occurred around 1500 when American

aircraft hitting Mount Santa Rosa mistakenly dropped a bomb on F Company,

causing some casualties. Presumably, these

were the same planes that strafed the 3d

Battalion, 307th Infantry, about the same

time.37

The night of 7-8 August found the 77th

Division dug in in positions from which it

could launch a final attack on Mount

Santa Rosa the next day. Despite the day's

successes, there was some apprehension

among the Americans as to possible Japanese moves during the night. As early as

noon on 7 August, General Bruce had requested permission to move the 3d Battalion, 305th Infantry, then in corps reserve, to Road Junction 415 at Yigo in

midafternoon in order to get set for any

enemy counterattack. A counterblow at

Yigo, either down the Salisbury road or

from Mount Santa Rosa, would almost

certainly be initially aimed at this important junction. Bruce's request was denied,

but that night General Geiger informed

subordinate units that he was expecting a

counterattack in force and that the 3d Bat36

 The 77th Division reported to corps that the

advance here had actually carried to the point

where Bruce had ordered it, that is, 600 yards

beyond the crossroads, but the overwhelming

weight of evidence indicates that this report was

incorrect, 306th RCT Unit Jnl, 7 Aug 44; 77th

Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Aug 44, passim; 77th Inf

Div G-2 Rpts 15, 16, 7, 8 Aug 44, in 77th Inf

Div G-2 Jnl File, 7-10 Aug 44; 3d Marine Div

D-3 Jnl, 7 Aug 44, passim; 306th RCT Rpt, p.

4; 706th Tk Bn Rpt, p. 9,

37

 Regimental casualties for the day, half a

dozen killed and more than a score wounded, presumably were taken for the most part by the 3d

Battalion, which, in corps reserve, was engaged

in flushing out the area around the division

command post where Colonel McNair had been

hit on 6 August. In this mission the battalion encountered and engaged Japanese estimated to

be a company in strength, 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl,

7 Aug 44, Entries 33, 71; 305th RCT Rpt, p. 3,

and attached bn rpts; 77th Inf Div G-2 Rpts 15,

16, 7, 8 Aug 44, in 77th Inf Div G-2 Jnl File,

7-10 Aug 44; 305th RCT Overlay Showing Situation as of 1400, 7 Aug 44, and Overlay Showing Situation as of 0800, 8 Aug 44, Entries 437

and 443, in 305th RCT Jnl File, 4-11 Aug 44.
428 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

talion, 305th Infantry, and the Marine

battalion in reserve with it were on call.38

Fortunately for the Americans, the Japanese mounted no major attacks during the

night. Possibly the speed of the American

advance during the day, combined with

the heavy artillery bombardment that continued as harassing fire during the night,

prevented a major enemy counterblow.

Whatever the reason, the Japanese made

only a few local counterattacks and attempts to infiltrate during the night.39

The first of these came shortly before 1920

when a small group of the enemy took advantage of the rapidly gathering dusk between sunset and moonrise to attempt to

infiltrate the 1st Battalion, 307th Infantry,

east of Yigo. Alert infantrymen spotted the

Japanese, however, and nine of the enemy were killed trying to penetrate the

position.40

At 0230 corps sent another warning of a

possible major Japanese counterattack to

the 77th Division.41 Within an hour the

biggest enemy attack of the night struck

the 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry. In the

exposed position on the Salisbury road

north of Yigo, these men had already been

the target of two small enemy probing attacks. The first had been beaten off about

the time of the attack on the 1st Battalion,

307th Infantry; the second had come

around midnight and, in the bright moonlight, had been repulsed. The final attack

against the 3d Battalion began between

0300 and 0330.

This time, the enemy force consisted of

three medium tanks and riflemen estimated

to be of platoon strength. First came the

Japanese tanks, firing their machine guns

and cannon into the battalion perimeter.

The defenders were safe in their slit

trenches from the flat-trajectory machine

gun fire, but the high-explosive cannon

shells burst in the trees above, raining

fragments down on the Americans. Attempts to knock out the tanks with bazookas and flame throwers were aborted

by fire from the accompanying Japanese

infantry. Two machine gunners finally got

the first tank by waiting until it was almost

upon them and then closing in with their

light machine gun to fire into the tank

through an aperture. They burnt out the

barrel of their gun, but they also killed all

the Japanese in the tank. A rifle grenade

knocked out a second tank. This apparently discouraged the occupants of the

third tank, since they drove their vehicle off

with one of the other tanks in tow. The enemy infantry, deprived of their support,

quickly followed. The 3d Battalion, 306th

Infantry, had killed eighteen Japanese

while itself sustaining losses of six killed

and more than a dozen wounded. The

enemy attack, the largest of the night, had

failed to penetrate the American position

guarding the northern approach to Yigo.42

38

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Aug 44, Entries 37,

48, 77; III Phib Corps G-3 Jnl, 1215, 7 Aug 44.

The 77th Division G-2 felt that if the enemy

chose to assume the offensive, his attack would

come in the manner described above. 77th Inf

Div G-2 Rpt 15, 7 Aug 44, in 77th Inf Div G-2

Jnl File, 7-10 Aug 44. See also 77th Inf Div Rpt,

p. 6.

39

 77th Inf Div Rpt, p. 6; 77th Inf Div G-3

Rpt 16, 9 Aug 44. 40

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Aug 44, Entry 78. 41

 77th Inf Div G-2 Jnl File, 7-10 Aug 44,

Entry 52 on 7 Aug.

42

 306th RCT S-3 Jnl File, 8 Aug 44, Entry

3; 306th RCT Unit Rpt 17, 9 Aug 44; 77th Inf

Div G-3 Jnl, 8 Aug 44, Entry 6; 77th Inf Div

G-2 Rpt 16, 8 Aug, and Entry 3 on 8 Aug, both

in 77th Inf Div G-2 Jnl File, 7-10 Aug 44;

AFAS, Guam, pp. 126-27.
GUAM SECURED 429

While the Army and Marine troops were

forging ahead on 7 August, General Geiger

issued orders directing that the pursuit of

the enemy be continued at 0730 on 8

August.43 Later, he added, "Admiral Nimitz arrives 10 August. Push Japs off Guam

before then."

 44

The 77th Division plan for 8 August

called for a continuation of the drive begun

on the 7th. The 306th Infantry would complete its envelopment of the northern flank

of Mount Santa Rosa with its 1st and 3d

Battalions while the 2d Battalion followed

with the command post. In the center of

the division line, the 307th Infantry would

attack with the 1st and 3d Battalions

abreast to seize Mount Santa Rosa; the 2d

Battalion was to be prepared to execute

an enveloping attack up the southern

slopes to bring the assault to a successful

conclusion. Finally, the 305th Infantry

(less 3d Battalion in corps reserve) would

continue to close in on Mount Santa Rosa

and seal it off from the south. There was

no plan for a division artillery preparation,

although all battalions were available for

call fire. As directed by corps, the infantry

would attack at 0730.45

General Bruce's force opened the assault

on schedule. In the zones of operations of

the 305th and 307th Infantry Regiments,

the attack proceeded rapidly and with little

or no difficulty. The 305th Infantry, on the

division right, encountered only slight opposition in its short advance to the regimental objective area. The 2d Battalion

pushed forward about 1,000 yards to secure the left (northwest) half of the

objective area, while the 1st Battalion followed the 2d for a while and then, in the

early afternoon, swung east to secure the

rest of the objective zone. The 3d Battalion, still in corps reserve, moved forward

to set up defensive positions behind the

307th Infantry at Yigo and the important

Road Junction 415. Casualties in the

305th Infantry were five killed and six

wounded, while the regiment claimed to

have killed twenty-five of the enemy.

Like the 305th Infantry, the 307th in

the center of the division experienced little

difficulty in its drive on 8 August. By H

Hour the 1st Battalion had pulled abreast

and to the right of the 3d, approximately

1,000 yards east of Road Junction 415.

Although the forward displacement of artillery battalions and some confusion as to

unit locations prevented a brief artillery

preparation requested by the regiment, the

two battalions stepped off on schedule unopposed. About 0800, when potential opposition was revealed by a captured

document indicating an enemy gun position before the 1st Battalion, artillery fire

was quickly brought to bear on the target.

By about 0830, when General Bruce arrived for a check at the 307th command

post, the attack was well under way. Bruce

himself went forward to look over the

situation and immediately ordered the regimental commander to throw his 2d

Battalion into the planned envelopment

from the south. Moreover, to exploit the

situation further, he directed that the attached company of medium tanks (Company A), as well as all other supporting

43

 III Phib Corps Opn Order 9-44, 7 Aug 44,

in III Phib Corps Opns Orders. 44

 III Phib Corps G-3 Jnl, 7 Aug 44, Entry

0148. 45

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 7 Aug 44, Entries 63

and 66; AFAS, Guam, p. 127; 307th RCT S-1/

S-4 Jnl, 1803, 7 Aug 44; 307th RCT FO 7, 7

Aug 44, Overlay Showing Scheme of Maneuver

for 8 Aug; 306th RCT Jnl File, 7 Aug 44, Entry

30; 306th RCT, Overlay For Future Contemplated Action, in 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl File, 6

Aug 44, Entry 96; 77th Inf Div Rpt, p. 7,
430 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

regimental units, be used in the attack.

When the 2d Battalion went into action,

the regiment made quick arrangements

with the 305th Infantry to prevent a collision between the 2d Battalion, 307th, and

the left battalion of the 305th, since the

trail that the 2d Battalion was to follow

led through the objective area of the 305th

Infantry.

With the 307th Infantry attack well

under way, twenty minutes after the

2d Battalion had been committed, General

Bruce enlarged the regimental mission. The

regiment was not only to carry out its

earlier mission of seizing Mount Santa

Rosa but was also to push on from that

height to the sea beyond. Within an hour

Bruce also directed all available tanks of

the 706th Tank Battalion (less Companies

B and C) to join the company of mediums

already with the 307th Infantry. By pushing through as fast as possible, the division

might well end the fight in short order.

By 1050 the three battalions of the 307th

Infantry were on a north-south line about

2,000 yards east of the Yigo area, having

covered approximately 1,000 yards from

the morning's line of departure. Each battalion was astride a trail leading up the

western slopes of Mount Santa Rosa, 3d

Battalion on the left (north), 1st in the

middle, and 2d on the right. So far Japanese opposition had been negligible, but a

prisoner captured by the 1st Battalion—

the first taken in over a week by the division—revealed strong potential resistance

ahead. Talking freely, the captured Japanese stated that there were 3,000 of his

compatriots in caves on Mount Santa

Rosa. If this information were correct, the

307th Infantry might be in for a tough

fight. Accordingly, the regimental commander, with the immediate approval of

General Bruce who was impatient for the

307th to seize Mount Santa Rosa, ordered

a new maneuver to wipe out any Japanese

left on that height. The 2d Battalion was

to continue with its planned envelopment

from the south while the 1st and 3d Battalions were to follow a trail to the northeast until they were due north of Mount

Santa Rosa and then attack south to hit

the enemy from the north. The result

would be a double envelopment that, it

was hoped, would crush the enemy between its two wings.

The elaborate preparations proved unnecessary, for if 3,000 Japanese had ever

been on Mount Santa Rosa they were no

longer there. It is little wonder. Since 3

August, Admiral Conolly's fire support

ships had been bombarding the mountain

day and night. Seventh Air Force P-47's

and B-25's, flying down regularly from

Isely Field on Saipan, had intensified the

destruction. The infantry and tank advance in the 307th Infantry sector was

almost completely unopposed. By 1240 the

northern half of Mount Santa Rosa was in

American hands, and as the regiment

moved to secure the rest of the mountain

the 1st Battalion continued to push on to

the sea. Shortly before 1400, with the entire height under regimental control, the

command post of the 307th Infantry began

displacing forward to the summit of Santa

Rosa. By 1440 the 1st Battalion commander reported he had reached the cliffs

along the sea and could look down into the

water. Regimental patrols were ranging

over the entire Santa Rosa area. As night

fell the regiment was still mopping up

small isolated groups of the enemy, patrolling, and digging in. It had not encountered any large force of Japanese. The

day's action had cost the 307th Infan-
GUAM SECURED 431

try only one man killed and a dozen

wounded; less than fifty Japanese were

claimed killed.46

The relatively easy time enjoyed by the

305th and 307th Infantry Regiments on 8

August was shared in part by the 306th

Infantry, but the latter regiment had difficulties arising out of miscalculation as to

the location of the division boundary on its

left and a failure to observe the regimental

boundary on the right. Colonel Smith's

regiment jumped off on time from the positions it had secured the night before: 3d

Battalion on the right, on the Salisbury

road about 900 yards above Yigo; 1st Battalion on the left, in the vicinity of the crossroads southwest of Mount Mataguac

marking the point where the boundary

change began. The 2d Battalion, near

the regimental command post on the

Finegayan-Yigo road about a mile below

Yigo, was prepared to follow and join the

action when necessary. The regimental advance would also be supported by Company B, 706th Tank Battalion, which at

that time was still attached.

The two lead battalions of the 306th

moved forward unopposed, the 3d advancing along the Salisbury road and the 1st

continuing along the Liguan road from the

crossroads. The advance of the 1st Battalion

led it into the Marine zone, and the fact

that the 9th Marines had cleared this area

on the previous day probably accounted

for the lack of resistance to the Army battalion. By 0910 the 1st Battalion had

advanced about 1,000 yards up the trail,

and had been in contact with the marines

since 0840. To the east the 3d Battalion

had made a similar gain, while the 2d Battalion jumped off in column at 0900 to

follow the 3d.

By about 0930 the 3d Battalion was well

into its turning movement, cutting a trail

east from the Salisbury road at a point

about 2,400 yards above Road Junction

415. At the same time, the 1st Battalion

apparently was either beginning its turn

to the east to follow the 3d or was preparing to begin its turn. It was encountering

slight opposition.

About 0955, however, General Bruce,

then at the 307th Infantry command post

and eager to exploit that regiment's gains,

ordered a change in the mission of the

306th Infantry. One battalion was to

drive all the way east to the coast, instead

of halting on the north side of Mount

Santa Rosa; another battalion was to push

northeast on the Salisbury road all the way

to Pati Point at the far northeast corner

of Guam; the remaining battalion would

set up a roadblock on the Salisbury road,

midway between Salisbury and Yigo where

another trail came down from Chaguian

to the northwest. Thus the 3d Battalion

would continue its drive east; the 1st Battalion, instead of following, would advance

on Pati Point; and the 2d Battalion roadblock at the junction of the Chaguian trail

and the Salisbury road would protect the

rear of the other two battalions.

In its movement to the east, the 3d Battalion and supporting tanks met no opposition. The path they were cutting, however,

led the battalion southeast rather than east.

A slight southeast movement was necessary,

46

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 8 Aug 44; 77th Inf

Div Rpt, p. 7; 307th RCT Rpt, p. 5; 307th RCT

S-1/S-4 and S-2/S-3 Jnl Files, 8 Aug 44;

77th Inf Div Arty Rpt, p. 11; 77th Inf Div Arty

S-3 Jnl, 7-8 Aug 44, passim; 77th Inf Div Arty

S-3 Rpt 15, period 7-8 Aug 44, in 77th Inf

Div G-3 Jnl File, 10 Aug 44; 77th Inf Div G-2

Rpts 16-17, 8-9 Aug 44, in 77th Inf Div G-3

Jnl File, 7-10 Aug 44; Msg, 307th RCT to

G-2, No. 23 on 8 Aug, in same jnl; 706th Tk

Bn Rpt, p. 10; AFAS, Guam, pp. 117-18.
432 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

but the troops went too far and, before

they realized it, were in the 307th Infantry

zone of operations. By 1110 the battalion

found itself on a trail on the northwest

slope of Mount Santa Rosa, nearly 1,000

yards south of the regimental boundary

and blocking the planned route of advance

of the 3d Battalion, 307th Infantry, to the

northern flank of the mountain.

The trail that the 3d Battalion, 306th

Infantry, now blocked led northeast

toward the Lulog area. If the battalion

could follow this trail with the same speed

as the day's earlier advance, it would soon

reach its objective and be out of the way

of the 307th Infantry. However, about

this time the 3d Battalion's leading elements began to encounter light, scattered,

enemy opposition, which slowed the advance. Most of the Japanese had little desire to fight. Still stunned by the terrific

artillery, air, and naval bombardment,

many of them simply huddled in caves or

huts and waited to be killed. A few offered

desultory resistance; some committed suicide. When enemy strongpoints were encountered, however, well co-ordinated

infantry-tank teams, with flame throwers

and pole charges, quickly dealt with the

resistance.

The advance of the 3d Battalion, 306th

Infantry, was still not fast enough to suit

either the 307th Infantry or General Bruce.

Meanwhile, the men of the 3d Battalion,

306th, were not too happy when tanks

with the 307th accidentally began firing in

their direction. This fire was stopped, but

the 306th infantrymen were ordered to

move out of the area, or at least off the

main trail, as soon as possible. By early

afternoon the 3d Battalion had either left

the trail or advanced far enough to permit

the 307th Infantry to secure its operational area unhindered. Indeed, midafternoon found the 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry, in full possession of the Lulog area and

with strong patrols between that point and

the sea. By nightfall the entire Lulog-Anao

Point area was in the hands of Kimbrell's

men.

While the 3d Battalion, 306th Infantry,

struggled to keep out of the way of the

307th Infantry, Colonel Smith's other two

battalions of the 306th were having difficulties of their own. West of the Salisbury

road, the 1st Battalion was moving crosscountry unopposed in a general northeasterly direction in what it believed was 77th

Division territory. Its aim was apparently

to regain the Salisbury road and then

follow the road in the direction of Pati

Point. About 1030, however, the battalion reported that Marine units on the

Chaguian trail—who were actually in

what the marines correctly believed to be

their own zone—were blocking the Army

advance. Moreover, the marines on the

Chaguian trail, and along another trail

leading from the Chaguian trail northeast

toward Salisbury that the soldiers apparently had themselves hoped to follow,

claimed that they were going to Pati Point.

Reporting this to corps, General Bruce said

he had no objection to following the marines on up, but he asked that the 3d Marine Division troops clear rapidly so that

the soldiers could continue their mission.

This was agreeable to corps headquarters.

The marines were directed to move forward rapidly, and the Army troops were

ordered to follow.

Shortly after 1100 General Bruce decided that if the marines were going to

Pati Point in force there was no need of

sending more than a small group of Army

troops in that direction. By now he had
GUAM SECURED 433

received the report that 3,000 Japanese

might still be on Mount Santa Rosa, and

in his desire to insure the success of the

307th Infantry's drive he made another

change in the orders for the 306th. Instead

of setting up a roadblock on the Salisbury

road, the 2d Battalion, 306th Infantry, was

to follow the 3d Battalion in its advance

east, prepared to support the latter or, if

necessary, to move to the aid of the 307th

Infantry. The 1st Battalion, meanwhile,

would send only one company up the Salisbury road, and that solely to maintain

contact with the marines. The rest of the

1st Battalion was to join the regimental

command post group, which had moved

up with the 2d Battalion, apparently to be

used as the regimental commander saw fit.

The 1st and 2d Battalions, 306th Infantry, moved to carry out their new assignments. Shortly after noon lead elements of

the 2d Battalion moving up the Salisbury

road reached the turn-off point where the

3d Battalion had begun cutting its trail to

the east that morning. A few minutes later

the 1st Battalion (less one company) began

moving back toward the regimental command post, just below the junction of the

Chaguian trail and the Salisbury road.

Beginning about 1215 and continuing

for approximately two hours, troops of the

306th Infantry in the confused area along

the Salisbury road found themselves under

fire from a quarter they least expected.

About 1215, 2d Battalion elements making

the turn to the east began receiving rifle

and machine gun fire that they thought

might have been from Marine weapons.

Half an hour later Company F, bringing

up the rear of the battalion, was engaged

at the junction of the Chaguian trail and

Salisbury road by a force that the soldiers

were convinced was composed of marines.

Notified of this, the 3d Marine Division

replied that it had no troops in that immediate area but that the firing might have

been done by some Japanese troops left

over from a scrap the marines had had

there that morning. By the time this information was relayed back to F Company,

however, the fire fight had stopped as

mysteriously as it had begun. No sooner

was this over than pack howitzer fire began

to fall on the regimental command post

below the road junction. This time there

was no mistake; fragments taken from the

wounds of one soldier proved conclusively

to be from a Marine weapon. Again, not

long after this shelling had been stopped,

an Army motor column moving up the

Salisbury road came under machine gun

fire, which the soldiers again blamed on

the marines.

The climax of the confusion came about

1400, when a battalion of the 9th Marines

began moving east off the Salisbury road

on the trail that the 3d Battalion, 306th

Infantry, had cut that morning. Earlier,

Marine and Army units had conflicting

overlays to show that each was in its own

zone of operations, but this time there was

no doubt that the Marine battalion was in

the Army zone. The Marine commander,

however, in the apparent belief that he

was still on the Salisbury road, stated that

he had permission to be where he was and

refused to withdraw. Finally, the 306th Infantry commander was able to persuade

a Marine staff officer of the error and the

Marine commander reluctantly agreed to

turn his battalion around and march it

back.

By about 1500 everything appeared to

have been straightened out. The shooting

had stopped; there were no Army troops

in the Marine area; there were no Marine
434 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

troops in the Army area. The 1st Battalion

(less the company charged with maintaining contact with the marines) and the regimental command post group had moved

east on the heels of the 2d Battalion, which

was now advancing against extremely light

and scattered resistance behind the 3d Battalion. Completion of the regimental mission was relatively easy, and at 1715 the

306th Infantry reported itself dug in across

the northern face of Mount Santa Rosa.

The 3d Battalion had reached the sea at

Anao Point; the 2d Battalion was tied in to

its west; the regimental command post was

at Lulog; and the 1st Battalion was along

the trail west of the command post. The

day's action had cost the regiment 11 men

killed and 24 wounded, while 172 Japanese

were claimed killed.47

As if the confusion between American

units during the daylight hours of 8 August had not been enough, just at sunset

the 1st Battalion, 306th Infantry, west of

Lulog, and the 3d Battalion, 307th Infantry, to the south on Mount Santa Rosa,

were involved in another tragic incident.

About 1830 both battalions began receiving mortar fire. This was either Japanese

fire or, more probably, fire from American

weapons being zeroed in for the perimeter

defense that night. Unfortunately, the fire

hitting the 306th Infantry troops came

from the south, where the 3d Battalion,

307th Infantry, was digging in, while the

shells that landed in the 307th area came

from the north, where 306th Infantry

troops were preparing their defenses. Both

battalions reported a counterattack and

opened fire with small arms in the direction

of the presumed assault, which only served

to increase the illusion of a counterattack.

Tanks of the 306th Infantry began shooting, and both battalions called down artillery fire.

Fortunately for those involved, the confusion was short lived. Within the space of

a few minutes it became apparent that the

troops were exchanging shots with their fellow Americans, and all firing was halted.

The 902d Field Artillery Battalion had

fired a brief barrage and both infantry battalions had done considerable firing on

their own. The result was at least ten casualties in the 3d Battalion, 307th Infantry,

and a smaller number of casualties in the

1st Battalion and regimental command

post of the 306th Infantry.48

The Marines: 7-8 August

On the morning of 7 August, General

Geiger for the first time had all three of

his units deployed abreast for the attack.

The 1st Provisional Brigade, which had

spent the past days resting and patrolling

southern Guam, was now fed into the line

to the left of the 3d Marine Division and

made responsible for securing the northwest coast of the island including Mount

Machanao and Ritidian Point. The mission

47

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 8 Aug 44; 306th RCT

Unit Jnl File, 8 Aug; 306th RCT Unit Rpt 17, 9

Aug 44; 306th RCT Rpt, p. 4; Burns interviews

with 1st and 3d Bns, 306th RCT (none available

for 2d Bn), pp. 506, 537-38, 564, 566-68, 572- 73; 77th Inf Div G-2 Jnl File, 8 Aug 44, passim;

706th Tk Bn Rpt, p. 10; 77th Inf Div Arty

Jnl, 7-8 Aug, passim; III Phib Corps G-3 Jnl,

8 Aug 44, passim; 3d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 8

Aug, Entry 29; 307th RCT S-1/S-4 and S2/S-3 Jnls, 1155, 8 Aug 44.

48

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 8 Aug 44, Entries

75-77, 81, 83, and 9 Aug, Entry 3; 306th RCT

Unit Rpt 18, 10 Aug 44; 77th Inf Div Arty S3 Jnl, 8-9 Aug 44, Entries 4-6, 10, and journal

worksheet entry at 1917 (from 304th Fld Arty);

77th Inf Div G-2 Jnl File, 7-10 Aug 44, Entry

49, 8 Aug 44.
GUAM SECURED 435

LT. GEN. ALEXANDER A. VANDEGRIFT being greeted at Orote airfield by (from

the left) Maj. Gen. Henry L. Larsen, General Geiger, and General Holland Smith

on 10 August.

of the 3d Marine Division, in the center of

the corps attack, was to continue to push

to the north and northeast until it reached

the sea in the vicinity of Tarague Point.

The 7th of August was a relatively quiet

day for both Marine units. The 3d Division

came across a few antitank guns guarding

a roadblock in the neighborhood of Road

Junction 390 but quickly reduced it without casualties. By 1530 elements of the division reached the O-5 line along the trail

that ran southeast from Road Junction 460

to the Yigo-Salisbury road. There, the entire division dug in for the night after a

day's advance of about 6,000 yards. On

the left, the brigade's 4th Regiment kept

pace and succeeded in occupying a line

running due west of Road Junction 460.

Pausing there, General Shepherd late in the

afternoon brought in the 22d Marines to

take over the western (left) half of the

brigade line.49

The next day the chief obstacle facing

the Marines was again jungle rather than

Japanese. The only reported fighting in

the zone of the 3d Division was around

a roadblock manned by nineteen enemy

49

 3d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 7 Aug 44; 1st Provisional Marine Brig, War Diary, 1 Jul-10 Aug

44, p. 19; Lodge, Guam, pp. 149-50.
436 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

soldiers. These were quickly eliminated.

Nightfall found the division on a line north

of Salisbury about a mile and a half from

the sea. At the same time the 22d Marines

forged ahead up the west coast in the wake

of a series of well-placed aerial bombing attacks. By midafternoon marines of the 22d

Regiment reached Ritidian Point, the

northernmost point of Guam.50

The End on Guam

By nightfall of 8 August the end of fighting on Guam was virtually at hand. The

gains of the 77th Division around Mount

Santa Rosa, the advance of the 3d Marine

Division to within a mile and a half of the

sea, the occupation by the 1st Provisional

Marine Brigade of the entire northwest

coast of the island to Ritidian Point—all

spelled the doom of the remaining Japanese. That night even Radio Tokyo conceded that nine tenths of Guam had fallen

to American troops.51

The capture of Mount Santa Rosa by

the 77th Division marked the end of organized resistance on Guam, for this was

the last Japanese stronghold on the island,

and the enemy now had no important rallying spot. Only a little more than 500

Japanese dead were discovered on Santa

Rosa, far less than the number of enemy

troops there at the beginning of the attack,

and far less than General Bruce had expected to encounter. Apparently the extremely heavy preassault bombardment

forced most of the defenders to flee the

area. The Japanese were denied their last

major defensive area on Guam and were

driven north into the jungle in a completely

disorganized state.

On the evening of 8 August General

Geiger ordered the pursuit to continue at

0730 the following morning.52 Accordingly, on 9 August, the 77th Division

moved out on schedule to complete its mission. The 306th Infantry patrols sent

northward to the sea to flush the area between Lulog and the north coast encountered only scattered and light resistance.

The 307th Infantry on Mount Santa Rosa

patrolled vigorously between that height

and the seacoast to the east. The 305th

Infantry (less 3d Battalion) moved to an

assembly area south of Barrigada. Nowhere

in the division zone on 9 August was

any organized resistance encountered. The

same held true for the 10th.53

To the west, marines of the 3d Division

and 1st Provisional Brigade encountered

only a little more difficulty. During the

early morning hours of 9 August, the 2d

Battalion, 3d Marines, came under attack

by five enemy tanks accompanied by infantrymen. The marines withdrew into the

jungle without suffering any casualties and

by daylight the enemy force had disappeared. That day the 3d Marines gained

another 1,500 yards, which put it roughly

about the same distance from the sea. At

the same time, the 9th Marines completed

its particular assignment by reaching Pati

Point. On the corps left, the brigade extended its control southeast from Ritidian

Point as far as Mergagan Point.54

50

 3d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 8 Aug 44; 1st

Provisional Marine Brig, War Diary, I Jul-10 Aug

44, p. 20; Lodge, Guam, pp. 153-55. 51

 III Phib Corps G-2 Periodic Rpt 19.

52

 III Phib Corps Opn Ord 10-44. 53

 77th Inf Div Rpt, p. 7; 77th Inf Div G-3

Jnl, 9-10 Aug 44; 77th Inf Div G-3 Rpts 17,

18, 19, 11 Aug 44, 54

 3d Marine Div SAR, p. 5; 1st Provisional

Marine Brig, War Diary, 1 Jul-10 Aug, p. 21;

Lodge, Guam, pp. 154-57.
GUAM SECURED 437

The next day, 10 August, with only a

small pocket between Mergagan Point and

Pati Point left to be occupied, General

Geiger at 1131 announced that organized

resistance on Guam had ended.55 The announcement was timed to correspond with

the arrival on Guam of Admirals Nimitz

and Spruance and Marine Generals Holland Smith and Vandegrift aboard Spruance's flagship Indianapolis.

The official conclusion of the campaign

did not mean it was actually over, for

soldiers and marines were to spend many

dreary weeks before they finally cleaned

out the enemy-infested jungles and mountains of Guam. Even though all signs

of Japanese organized resistance were

crushed, General Obata killed (on 11

August), and the island overrun, there still

remained unaccounted for a large number

of Japanese who had fled into the jungles

in small groups and continued to harass

the American garrison, even until after the

end of the war. Two officers, who were

eventually captured, Colonel Takeda and

Major Sato, vainly attempted to organize

these survivors, but they remained for the

most part isolated stragglers. Almost all

were too preoccupied with the eternal

search for food to think of fighting, and

their weapons and ammunition were saved

for hunting until they rusted for want of

lubricating oil. American patrols killed a

few every day; others succumbed at last

to the siren song of American psychological

warfare and gave themselves up.56

Eventually, the entire Japanese garrison

on Guam, numbering about 18,500, was

killed or captured. In exchange, American

casualties as of 10 August 1944 came to

7,800, of whom 2,124 were killed in action

or died of wounds. Of this total, the Army

accounted for 839, the Navy for 245, while

the remaining 6,716 were marines.57

55

 77th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 10 Aug 44, Entry 31.

56

 Lt Col H. Takeda, Outline of Japanese

Defense Plan, 4 Oct 46. 57

 Lodge, Guam, App. III, pp. 178-80.

PART FIVE

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER XXI

Fruits of Victory

The Allied decision to invade and capture the three major islands of the southern

Marianas was made with three main objectives in mind. First, it was hoped that

the enemy fleet or a sizable part of it might

be flushed and decisively defeated. Second,

the islands of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam

were considered desirable as forward naval

bases, even though they were not favored

with first-rate harbors. But most important, the southern Marianas were ideally

located for use as bases from which the

newly developed very long range bombers

could bombard the Japanese homeland.

The islands were, as the wartime phrasemakers put it, "anchored aircraft carriers"

from which the aerial war against Japan

could be pressed with hitherto unequaled

intensity.

The first of these objectives was of

course achieved with Spruance's victory

over Vice Adm. Jisaburo Ozawa's Mobile

Fleet in the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

Although a large part of the Japanese Fleet

escaped destruction because of Spruance's

determination not to leave the landing

force at Saipan unprotected, the battle was

nevertheless a decisive victory for the Americans. Sustaining only minor losses, the

U.S. Fifth Fleet and its supporting submarines sank three carriers and two fleet

tankers and damaged two carriers, a battleship, three cruisers, and a tanker. Equally

if not more important were the tremendous

losses of planes and trained aircraft personnel suffered by the enemy. All together,

476 Japanese planes were destroyed in the

Battle of the Philippine Sea, and the total

number of aviators lost was about 445.1

In the words of Professor Samuel Eliot

Morison, "The Battle of the Philippine Sea

contributed as much to victory as if

Ozawa's fleet had been destroyed; for

without its air arm the fleet was crippled,

and the six carriers that survived were useful only as decoys . . . ."2

 Fleet Admiral

King was of the same opinion. Commenting on the affair long after the war, he

wrote:

Spruance accomplished more lasting results than he or anyone else realized at the

time, for the great loss of Japanese naval aircraft in the Battle of the Philippine Sea

crippled Japanese naval aviation for the remainder of the war. Planes could be replaced, but pilots could not, and, as was

discovered later in the year at the Battle for

Leyte Gulf, the Japanese no longer had the

trained and seasoned aviators that were

necessary for successful operations against

our fleet.3

The second objective of the campaign—

to provide secondary naval facilities for the

1

 Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, p.

321.

2

 Ibid., p. 318. 3

 King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, p.

559.
442 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

LST's, LCI's, SMALL BOATS, and other vessels at Tanapag Harbor carried much of

the shipping required by the stepped-up tempo of action in the Pacific in May 1945.

fleet—began to be realized shortly after the

islands were secured. At the time of their

capture, none of the southern Marianas

possessed adequate sites for fleet anchorages, and, in fact, the only truly protected

anchorage in the entire area was Apra Harbor at Guam. Nevertheless, on both Saipan

and Tinian it did prove feasible to set up

various other naval facilities important to

the further prosecution of the war in the

central Pacific. On Saipan, a naval seaplane base was constructed at Tanapag

Harbor, small-boat and LVT repair units

were established, and the pier at Garapan

was enlarged to permit its employment as

a major ammunition dock. Farther inland,

naval construction battalions built a large

tank farm to house aviation gasoline and

diesel and fuel oil, a naval supply depot,

sundry administration buildings, several

hospitals, fleet recreation areas, and an ammunition depot. On Tinian, an airfield was

constructed for the use of naval patrol

planes, and a tank farm similar to that on

Saipan was built. In addition, two railways

were set up for use in landing craft repair,

and Tinian Harbor was dredged and supplied with docking facilities for eight Liberty ships.4

Guam, with its relatively large land mass

and protected harbor, was to be the scene

of more ambitious base development proj4

 Department of the Navy, Bureau of Yards

and Docks, Building the Navy's Bases in World

War II: History of the Bureau of Yards and

Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps, 1940-1946,

2 vols. (Washington, 1947), II, Ch. 28.
FRUITS OF VICTORY 443

ects. On 9 August, the day before the

official announcement that the island was

"secured," Admiral Nimitz made known

his plans to use Guam as a base for the

Pacific Fleet and as forward headquarters

for his Pacific Ocean Areas command.5 As

a result, Apra Harbor was dredged and

given the additional protection of a lengthy

breakwater. An extensive tank farm was

erected, several major supply depots were

established, and hospitals and administration buildings were constructed. Early in

1945 Nimitz' forward headquarters was

set up on the island, and by the end of the

war the naval base at Guam was capable

of supporting a third of the U.S. Pacific

Fleet.6

The major construction effort on all

three islands was of course devoted to laying out airfields and other facilities for the

very long range bombers, the Army Air

Forces' B-29's. In the minds of many U.S.

strategic planners this had been, after all,

the compelling reason for launching the

Marianas Campaign. The first B-29 airdrome to be completed was Isely Field on

Saipan.7 Work started on 24 June 1944

and by mid-December Saipan boasted two

B-29 runways plus storage space for sixty

spare bombers at nearby Kobler Field.

The first of the very heavy bombers arrived on the island on 12 October, and on

24 November B-29's flew the first mission

against Tokyo.8

On Tinian, two fields were developed.

The first, North Field, on the site of the

old Japanese airdrome near Marpi Point,

was ready for use by February 1945, and

the second, West Field, just above Tinian

Town, became operational the next month.

On Guam, North and Northwest Fields, located inland of Ritidian and Pati Points,

respectively, were put into operation between January and June of 1945, and the

first mission from Guam to Japan was

launched in late February. In addition on

Guam, Harmon Field above Agana was

commissioned for use as headquarters of

the XXI Bomber Command.

Starting on 24 November 1944 and continuing through early August of 1945

when the atomic bombs were dropped on

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the home islands

of Japan were subjected to a mounting

crescendo of B-29 raids, all flying out of

the five airfields in the Marianas. Japan's

industrial plants were flattened, her shipping was mined and sunk, and her cities

were laid waste.

Without attempting to allocate responsibility for the ultimate defeat of Japan

among the various agencies, services, and

weapons that contributed to that end, it is

more than clear that the Marianas-based

B-29's played a major role. Certainly, that

was the opinion of many responsible Japanese leaders. Prince Fumimaro Konoye

later reported, "Fundamentally, the thing

that brought about the determination to

5

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Ser. 000650, 11 Aug 44.

44.

6

 Bureau of Yards and Docks, Building the

Navy's Bases in World War II, II, Ch. 28; The

War Reports of General of the Army George C.

Marshall, Chief of Staff, General of the Army

H. H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air

Forces, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of

Naval Operations (Philadelphia & New York, J.

B, Lippincott Company, 1947), p. 685. 7

 For reasons unknown, the XXI Bomber Command changed the original spelling to Isley, although the field derived its name from Comdr

Robert H. Isely, USN, a navy pilot who had been

killed during the assault on Saipan. (See Craven

and Cate, AAF V, p. 515.)

8

 Information on the construction of B-29

bases in the Marianas is derived from Craven and

Cate, AAF V, pp. 512-25, and Bureau of Yards

and Docks, Building the Navy's Bases in World

War II, II, Ch. 28.
Harmon Field, Guam, where headquarterss of the XXI Bomber Command opened,

16 December 1944.
FRUITS OF VICTORY 445

make peace was the prolonged bombing by

the B-29's." According to Premier Kantaro Suzuki: "It seemed . . . unavoidable

that in the long run Japan would be almost destroyed by air attack so that merely

on the basis of the B-29's alone I was convinced that Japan should sue for peace."9

Even before the bombs began to drop,

many Japanese were aware that the loss of

the Marianas, and especially of Saipan,

was a crucial, if not the decisive, turning

point in the war. The most immediate repercussion was the fall of Premier Tojo and

his entire cabinet. Japanese leaders were

aware of the tremendous potentialities of

the B-29 (although not of the atomic

bomb), and they fully realized that with

the loss of the Marianas those potentialities

could be quickly brought to bear against

Japan. Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni,

Commander in Chief of Home Defense

Headquarters, later stated:

The war was lost when the Marianas were

taken away from Japan and when we heard

the B-29s were coming out . . . . We had

nothing in Japan that we could use against

such a weapon. From the point of view of

the Home Defense Command, we felt that

the war was lost and said so. If the B-29s

could come over Japan, there was nothing

that could be done.10

Postwar testimony in the same vein was

volunteered by such high ranking officers

as Fleet Admiral Nagano, Chief of the

Naval General Staff and Supreme Naval

Advisor to the Emperor; Vice Adm.

Shigeru Fududome, who had served as

Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet, Commander, Second Air Fleet, and Commander, 10th Area Fleet; Vice Adm.

Shigeyoshi Miwa, Commander in Chief,

Sixth (Submarine) Fleet; and Capt. Mitsuo Fuchida, Air Staff Officer to the

Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet.11

The Japanese high command had realized from the beginning the strategic importance of the Marianas in the Empire's

defensive system. It was for that reason

that the high command ordered the Combined Fleet to intercept or frustrate the

landing on Saipan. The thorough defeats

that Japan suffered during the Marianas

campaign on the sea, on land, and in the

air proved irreparable.

To be sure, other battles remained to be

fought before the Japanese could finally

be induced to surrender. General MacArthur's return to the Philippines would

cut Japan's vital line of communications

to the Netherlands Indies and secure important naval and air bases. The U.S.

Navy's victory in the Battle of Leyte Gulf

would reduce to virtual impotence the

remnant of the Japanese Fleet that was

left afloat after the Battle of the Philippine

Sea. The capture of Iwo Jima by Admiral

Nimitz' forces would greatly facilitate the

bombing of the home islands from bases

in the Marianas. And, finally, the successful invasion of Okinawa would bring

American forces to the very doorstep of

Japan.

Out of the long sequence of campaigns

and battles that took place in the Pacific

between 7 December 1941 and 15 August

1945, it is of course impossible to isolate

any single one as "decisive" in bringing

about the defeat of Japan. But certainly,

by any reasonable standard of judgment,

the campaign in the Marianas must be 9

 AC/AS Mission Accomplished: Interrogations of Japanese Industrial, Military, and Civil

Leaders of World War II, Washington 1946, pp.

39-40. 10

 AC/AS Mission Accomplished, p. 18.

11

 USSBS, Interrogations, II, Naval Nos. 80,

115, 72, 99.
446 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

rated high in the order of events that led

to the success of American arms. Admiral

King often spoke of the Marianas as "the

key to the Pacific War."12 Purists might

quarrel with his choice of the definite article, but few would deny that victory in

the Marianas was a key and a very important key to the door that led to the defeat

of the Japanese Empire in World War II.13

In the campaign in the Marianas, the

U.S. Army played an important, although

not the major, role. The Army contributed

two reinforced divisions, a corps of artillery, and sundry other troops, numbering

39,280 officers and men. In addition, the

Seventh Air Force provided three squadrons of P-47 fighters, a detachment of P61 night fighters, and a squadron of

B-25 medium bombers to fly tactical missions in support of the ground troops. By

comparison, the Marine Corps contributed

85,824 officers and men—or three reinforced infantry divisions, a provisional brigade of two regiments, a corps of artillery,

and various other troops.14

Army casualties came to 4,523 killed in

action, dead of wounds, and wounded in

action. Of these, 3,666 were incurred on

Saipan and Tinian, 857 on Guam. Total

Marine Corps casualties came to 19,272

killed in action, dead of wounds, and

wounded in action. Of these 10,437 took

place on Saipan, 1,892 on Tinian, and

6,943 on Guam.15 The ratio of casualties

to total troops employed was roughly 1 to

9 for the Army and 1 to 4.5 for the Marine Corps. The higher proportion of casualties suffered by the Marine Corps can

be explained largely by the fact that the

marines were given the initial task of

assaulting the beaches on all three islands,

were in action for a longer time than

either of the two Army infantry divisions,

and were almost solely responsible for the

fighting on Tinian.

The role of the Navy in the Marianas

campaign was of course fundamental. Admiral Spruance's Fifth Fleet softened up

the targets and kept the battlefields isolated once the troops were ashore. Naval

vessels transported the troops to the islands, supplied them when they got there,

and kept up a continuous program of

naval bombardment against enemy troops

and installations. Naval aircraft provided

the great bulk of aerial support both before and during the land battles.

Without doubt the outstanding feature

of the campaign in the Marianas was the

skillful manner in which the separate services and the component arms of the U.S.

forces were co-ordinated. Perhaps more

than any other type of warfare, amphibious operations require a harmony

of action, a precise meshing of the multitudinous gears that comprise the whole of

the assault machinery. Land, sea, and air

forces must be combined in the proper

quantities at the proper time and place. 12

 King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, p.

557.

13

 See Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender,

passim. 14

 These figures are derived from TF 56 Rpt

FORAGER, Incl A, G-1 Rpt, pp. 3-23; Ibid., Incl

C, G-3 Rpt, pp. 8-9; NTLF (TF 56.1) Rpt

Marianas, Incl C, G-1 Rpt, pp. 3-5. 15

 These figures are to be understood as approximate only. Casualty statistics submitted by

various units are so uneven and at times so contradictory as to render impossible an absolutely

precise statement of the number. The figures

here given are derived from studies, made by the

Marine Corps Historical Branch, G-3, U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, which contain the most

accurate and up-to-date data available. They are

contained in Hoffman, Saipan, App. III, p. 268-

69; Hoffman, Tinian, App. III, p. 150; Lodge,

Guam, App. III, pp. 178-80.
FRUITS OF VICTORY 447

By the summer of 1944, the U.S. Army,

Navy, and Marine Corps had had sufficient experience in joint operations to be

optimistic about the success of future landings in the Pacific. Victory in the Marianas

brought confirmation to the belief that

current amphibious doctrine was sound

and could be employed, with modifications,

against any Japanese-held island or land

mass.

To be sure, all was not perfection. There

were still some "bugs" in the machinery,

some failures of performance. Also, the

Smith versus Smith affair on Saipan was

alarming to those who had hoped for perfect teamwork between the services. Nevertheless, the relief of General Ralph Smith

and the interservice controversy that ensued should not be allowed to obscure the

fact that for the most part co-operation

between the separate U.S. services was

excellent. Had it been otherwise, victory

in the Marianas would have been neither

so rapid nor so complete.

Appendix A

TACTICAL UNITS OF NORTHERN TROOPS AND LANDING FORGE ON SAIPAN

Total Strength—66,779

Unit

Northern Troops and Landing Force Troops

Lt. Gen. Holland M. Smith, USMC (to 12 July 1944)

Headquarters and Service Battalion, V Amphibious Corps (less detachments)

Signal Battalion, V Amphibious Corps (less detachments)

Motor Transport Company, V Amphibious Corps (less detachments)

Headquarters, Provisional Engineer Group, V Amphibious Corps

Headquarters, Provisional LVT Group, V Amphibious Corps

7th Field Depot (less detachments) (reinforced)

Medical Battalion, V Amphibious Corps

31st Field Hospital

2d Provisional Portable Surgical Hospital

3d Provisional Portable Surgical Hospital

Air Warning Squadron 5 (less detachments)

Detachment, 680th Air Warning Company

Detachment, 726th Air Warning Company

Detachment, 763d Air Warning Company

Detachment, Company C, 101st Signal Battalion

Mobile Communication Unit, Central Pacific

Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, V Amphibious Corps (less detachments)

2d Marine Division

Maj. Gen. Thomas E. Watson, USMC

Headquarters Battalion

Tank Battalion

Service Battalion

Motor Transport Battalion

Medical Battalion

2d Marines (less 1 battalion)

6th Marines

8th Marines

10th Marines (artillery)

18th Marines (engineer)

Attached Units

2d Amphibious Tractor Battalion (LVT)

1st Battalion, 29th Marines (reinforced)

1st Amphibious Truck Company

18th Naval Construction Battalion

2d Joint Assault Signal Company (JASCO)

2d 155-mm Artillery Battalion

715th Amphibious Tractor Battalion (LVT(A))

Estimated

Strength

2,296

21,746
450 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Unit

5th Amphibious Tractor Battalion (LVT)

2d Provisional Rocket Detachment

4th Marine Division

Maj. Gen. Harry Schmidt, USMC (to 12 July)

Headquarters Battalion

Tank Battalion

Service Battalion

Motor Transport Battalion

Medical Battalion

23d Marines

24th Marines

25th Marines

14th Marines (artillery)

20th Marines (engineer)

Attached Units

708th Amphibious Tank Battalion (LVT(A)) (Army)

10th Amphibious Tractor Battalion (LVT) (less Company A and plus Company C, 11th

Amphibious Tractor Battalion)

773d Amphibious Tractor Battalion (LVT) (Army)

534th Amphibious Tractor Battalion (LVT) (Army) (less Company A less 1st Platoon)

1st JASCO

121st Naval Construction Battalion

2d Amphibious Truck Company

311th Port Company (Army)

539th Port Company (Army)

4th 105-mm. Artillery Battalion (howitzer) (V Amphibious Corps)

1st Provisional Rocket Detachment

Detachment, Air Warning Squadron 5

Detachment, 7th Field Depot

1st Battalion, 2d Marines (reinforced)

1st Battalion, 2d Marines

Company A, Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, V Amphibious Corps

XXIV Corps Artillery

Brig. Gen. Arthur M. Harper, USA

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery

1st Provisional Gun Group (155-mm. gun, Army)

2d Battalion, 55th Coast Artillery

32d Coast Artillery Gun Battalion

225th Field Artillery Howitzer Group (155-mm. howitzer)

145th Field Artillery Battalion

225th Field Artillery Battalion

477th Amphibious Truck Company

Provisional Antiaircraft Artillery Group

864th Aircraft Warning Antiaircraft Battalion (less detachments)

Battery A, 751st Antiaircraft Battalion

Battery B, 751st Antiaircraft Battalion

27th Infantry Division

Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith, USA

Headquarters, 27th Infantry Division

Headquarters, Special Troops

Estimated

Strength

21,618

1,084

2,682

949

16,404
APPENDIX A 451

Unit Estimated

Strength

Headquarters Company

Military Police Platoon

27th Division Band

27th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop

727th Ordnance Company

27th Quartermaster Company

105th Infantry

106th Infantry

165th Infantry

Headquarters, 27th Division Artillery

104th Field Artillery Battalion

105th Field Artillery Battalion

106th Field Artillery Battalion

249th Field Artillery Battalion

102d Engineer Battalion

102d Medical Battalion

Attached Units

38th Held Hospital

98th Portable Surgical Hospital

295th JASCO

762d Tank Battalion

766th Tank Battalion

1165th Engineer Group headquarters

34th Engineer Battalion

152d Engineer Battalion

1341st Engineer Battalion

94th Bomb Disposal Squad

95th Bomb Disposal Squad

88th Chemical Battalion

604th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company

Detachment, 534th Amphibious Tractor Battalion

Source: TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl C, G-3 Rpt, pp. 8-9; NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, Incl C, G-1 Rpt, pp. 2-5; 4th Marine Div

Opns Rpt Saipan, pp. 3-4.
Appendix B

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA UNIT OF FIRE FOR GROUND WEAPONS

(Rounds Per Unit of Fire)

Weapon

.30-caliber carbine

.30-caliber rifle

.30-caliber BAR

.30-caliber machine gun

.12-gauge shotgun

.45-caliber automatic revolver

.45-caliber submachine gun

.50-caliber machine gun

20-mm. antiaircraft machine gun

27-mm. antitank or tank gun

37-mm. antiaircraft gun

40-mm. antiaircraft gun

57-mm. antitank gun

60-mm. mortar

81-mm. mortar

4.2-inch chemical mortar

75-mm. howitzer field or pack

75-mm. self-propelled tank gun or LVT howitzer

75-mm. gun

3-inch self-propelled or antitank gun

90-mm. self-propelled or antitank gun

105-mm. M3 (short barrel) howitzer

105-mm. field howitzer

105-mm. self-propelled or tank gun howitzer

4.7-inch antiaircraft gun

155-mm. M1 howitzer

155-mm. M1 gun

8-inch howitzer

240-mm. howitzer

75-mm. gun

3-inch antiaircraft mobile

Hand grenade

Rifle antitank grenade launcher

2.36-inch antitank rocket launcher (bazooka)

Total Rounds

45

100

500

1,500

25

14

200

600

540

100

270

270

90

100

100

100

300

150

100

50

125

150

200

100

75

150

100

100

60

300

150

1 per EM

2M9AT grenade

6 rockets

Source: TF 56 Rpt FORAGER, Incl E, G-4 Rpt, Incl A.
Appendix C

JAPANESE ORDER OF BATTLE ON SAIPANa

Army

Unit

Headquarters, 31st Army

43d Division

Headquarters, 43d Division

118th Infantry Regiment

135th infantry Regiment

136th Infantry Regiment

43d Division Signal Company

43d Division Transport Company

43d Division Ordnance Company

43d Division Field Hospital

43d Division Intendance Duty Unit

47th Independent Mixed Brigade

47th Independent Mixed Brigade Headquarters

316th independent infantry Battalion

317th Independent Infantry Battalion

318th Independent Infantry Battalion

47th Independent Mixed Brigade Engineer Unit

47th Independent Mixed Brigade Artillery Unit

Miscellaneous Units

1st Battalion 18th Infantry Regiment

(reorganised and re-equipped stragglers; the main body of

the regiment was on Guam)

3d Battalion 9th Independent Mixed Brigade

(destined for Pagan, the unit was caught on Saipan)

3d Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment

16th Shipping Engineers Regiment (less one company)

7th Independent Engineer Regiment (less one company)

11th Independent Engineer Regiment (straggler unit)

9th Tank Regiment (less two companies)

4th Independent Tank Company (straggler unit; no tanks)

25th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment

43d independent Antiaircraft Company

Commanding Officer

Lt. Gen. Hideyoshi Obata

Lt. Gen. Yoshitsugu Saite

Col. Takeshi Ito

Col. Eisuke Suzuki

Col. Yukimatsu Ogawa

Capt. Yoshimitsu Washizu

Capt. Mitsuo Yamamoto

Capt. Yoshihiro Murase

Lt. Col. Ikko Fukayama

Lt. Hideo Okawa

Col. Yoshiro Oka

Capt. Susumu Eto

Captain Sasaki

Major Nagashima

1st Lieutenant Yoneya

Captain Yamane

Capt. Masao Kubo

Lt. Col. Tsune Nakashima

Maj. Masaichi Tsunekawa

Col. Kukujiro Koganezawa

Col. Takashi Goto

Lt. Col. Jitsunori Niiho

1st. Lt. Kiichi Kimishima

Strength

1,100

268

2,605

3,000b

3,650

223

94

99

500

2,500

227

618

618

618

188

323

600

578c

845

450

600

200

550

118

600

136d

a

Unless otherwise indicated, this order of battle is based on NTLF Rpt Marianas, Phase I, G-2 Rpt, 12 Aug 44, App. J, dated 1 Sep 44. b

NTLF G-2 Report gives 2,200. According to 135th Infantry Regiment War Diary, May 1944 (NA 27445), the total number, as of 31 May

1944, was 3,914, of which approximately 900 were on Tinian. c

This unit is not listed in NTLF G-2 Report. The numerical strength is estimated from the known battalion strength of the 48th Independent Mixed Brigade on Guam. d

NTLF G-2 Report gives the number as 150, 4th Independent Antiaircraft Company War Diary, May 1944 (NA 22761), gives the number

as 136.
454 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Amy

Una

44th Field Machine Cannon Company

14th Independent Mortar Battalion (straggler unit)

17th Independent Mortar Battalion (straggler unit)

20th Independent Mortar Battalion (straggler unit)

115th Airfield Battalion (straggler unit)

23d Field Airfield Construction Unit (straggler unit)

14th Hangar Maintenance Section (straggler unit)

60th Anchorage Headquarters

1st Independent Security Unit

Detachment, 15th Infantry Regiment (straggler unit)

9th Expeditionary Unit

(a straggler unit; part was reorganized as 318th Independent Infantry Battalion, the rest remained stragglers)

150th Infantry Regiment (straggler unit)

264th Independent Motor Transport Company

278th Independent Motor Transport Company

Navy

Central Pacific Area Fleet Headquarters

5th Base Fores Headquarters

(this headquarters was combined with Central Pacific Area Fleet

Headquarters)

55th Naval Guard Force

Yokosuka 1st Special Naval Landing Force

5th Construction Department

5th Communications Unit

41st Naval Guard Force (straggler unit)

Saipan Branch, 4th Fleet Supplies and Accounts Department

1st Branch, Truk Transportation Department

Saipan Harbor Master Department

Saipan Branch, 4th Naval Stores Department

Commanding Officer

1st Lt. Takahiro Hasagawa

Capt, Tatsuo Jinnai

Capt. Hajime Matsunami

Colonel Saito

Col. Keize Hayashida

Capt. Tadaomi Iwama

1st Lt. Shozo Arima

Vice Adm. Chuichi Nagumo

Admiral Takahisa Tsujimura

Capt. Sanji Takashima

Lt. Comdr. Tatsue Karashima

Rear Admiral Tsujimura

Lt. Comdr. Shinasaku Miyazaki

Comdr. Makota Mihara

Comdr. Akiyoshi Mizumoto

Ens. Shoichi Takahashi

Comdr. Akiyoshi Mizumoto

Strength

105e

580

350f

387g

269

392

250h

81i

54i

182i

908

300

120

183j

502

2,000

800

456

369

400

45

100

Total Estimated Strength on Saipan

NTLF G-2 count

Revised count

Army

22,702

25,469

Navy

6,960

6,160k

Total

29,662

31,629

e

NTLF G-2 Report gives the number as 150. 44th Field Machine Gun Cannon Company War Diary, May 1944 (NA 27395), gives the

number as 105. f

NTLF G-2 Report gives the number as 580. CINCPAC-CINCPOA Translation 10931, a file of orders and tables showing troop movements and locations of units in the Central Pacific Area, gives the number as 350. g

This unit is not mentioned in NTLF G-2 Report. The number is derived from CINCPAC-CINCPOA Translation 9696, handwritten

tables showing the approximate number of men receiving supplies in sectors under the 31st Army. h

NTLF G-2 Report gives the number as 139. CINCPAC-CINCPOA Translation 9883, file of shipping headquarters orders March-May

1944, gives the number as 250. i

Not listed in NTLF G-2 Report. This figure is taken from CINCPAC-CINCPOA Translation 9696. j

NTLF G-2 Report gives the number as 120. CINCPAC-CINCPOA Translation 9696 gives the number as 183. k

In the revised count, the number of Navy personnel is reduced because the NTLF G-2 Report mistakenly identified certain Army units

as Navy organizations.
Appendix D

TROOP LIST OF THE 77TH INFANTRY DIVISION FOR THE GUAM OPERATION

Organic Units

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 77th Division

Headquarters Special Troops

Military Police Platoon

77th Division Band

777th Ordnance Company

77th Quartermaster Company

77th Reconnaissance Troop

77th Signal Company

302d Engineer Combat Battalion

302d Medical Battalion

305th Infantry Regiment

306th Infantry Regiment

307th Infantry Regiment

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 77th Division Artillery

304th Field Artillery Battalion

305th Field Artillery Battalion

306th Field Artillery Battalion

902d Field Artillery Battalion

Attached for Guam Operation

292d JASCO

132d Engineer Combat Battalion

233d Engineer Combat Battalion

242d Engineer Combat Battalion

36th Field Hospital

95th Portable Surgical Hospital

706th Tank Battalion

7th Antiaircraft Battalion

404th Ordnance Company

88th Chemical Battalion (Company A)

92d Bomb Disposal Squad

Base Censor Detachments

2218th Pacific Ocean Area Transport Quartermaster Team

Detachment 1st Information and Historical Section

Photo Assignment Units, 3116th Signal Service Battalion

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment

Interrogator, Interpreter, Translator Team

Source: The information on the units comprising the 77th Division at Guam is taken from Ours to Hold it High, pages 431-33, and from

the Order of Battle Branch, War Histories Division, Office of the Chief of Military History.
Appendix E

ORDER OF BATTLE OF III AMPHIBIOUS CORPS (LESS 77TH INFANTRY

DIVISION) FOR THE GUAM OPERATION

Southern Landing Force Troops

Headquarters and Service Battalion, III Amphibious Corps (less detachments)

4th Ammunition Company

III Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion (less detachments)

Detachment, Argus 17

Detachment, Marine Air Warning Squadron 2

Detachment, 246th Aircraft Warning Company

Communications Unit 41

3d Marine Division (reinforced)

3d Marine Division

14th Marine Defense Battalion (less 155-mm. Seacoast Artillery Group, 2 batteries 90-mm. antiaircraft guns,

1 platoon searchlight, detachments, Headquarters and Service Battery)

1st Armored Amphibious Tractor Battalion (less Companies A and B)

3d Amphibious Tractor Battalion (reinforced)

2d Ammunition Company (less 4th Platoon)

III Amphibious Corps Motor Transport Battalion (less Company C—DUKW's)

Detachment, III Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion

2d and 3d War Dog Platoons

3d JASCO

25th Naval Construction Battalion

2d Aviation Engineer Battalion

Detachment, 5th Field Depot

1st Provisional Marine Brigade (reinforced)

1st Provisional Marine Brigade

9th Marine Defense Battalion (less 155-mm. Seacoast Artillery Croup, 90-mm. Antiaircraft Group, detachments, Headquarters and Service Battery)

4th Amphibious Tractor Battalion (reinforced)

2d Ammunition Company, 4th Platoon

1st Armored Amphibious Tractor Battalion, Companies A and B

III Amphibious Corps Motor Transport Bn—DUKW's, Company C

1st War Dog Platoon

53d Naval Construction Battalion

5th Field Depot (less detachments)

III Amphibious Corps Medical Battalion (reinforced)

Corps Artillery

1st 155-mm. Battalion (howitzer)

7th 155-mm. Battalion (gun)

Garrison Force

3d Marine Division (when released by III Amphibious Corps)

14th Marine Defense Battalion (less above detachments)

9th Marine Defense Battalion (less above detachments)
APPENDI

X E 45

7

2d Aviation Engineer Battalion

25th Naval Construction Battalion

53d Naval Construction Battalion

Company B, 2d Special Naval Construction Battalion

Communications Unit 41

Detachment, Argus 17

Detachment, Marine Air Warning Squadron 2

Detachment, 746th Aircraft Warning Company

Army Defense Troops

5th Field Depot

Source: III Phib Corps Opn Plan 1-44, Annex A, pp. 1-2.

Bibliographical Note

The primary sources for this volume are

the official records of the U.S. Army,

Navy, and Marine Corps and the various

strategic planning agencies both American

and Allied. The draft narratives and reports of interviews prepared by Army field

historians during or shortly after the campaign constitute an almost equally important source of information. During the

preparation of the volume, most of the

leading participants in the campaign were

consulted and their letters and comments

on the early drafts of the manuscript have

proved invaluable. The various services

have prepared special studies of the campaign, or particular aspects of it, and these

have been most useful, as have the many

works published since World War II, especially the official Marine Corps histories

and the semiofficial history of naval operations authored by Samuel Eliot Morison.

Finally, Japanese records, both in the

original and in translation, have been exhaustively examined.

Official Records

Strategic Planning

The records relating to strategic planning on the highest Allied and U.S. levels

were maintained by the Combined Chiefs

of Staff (Allied) and U.S. Joint Chiefs of

Staff and its subordinate committees, particularly the Joint War Plans Committee

and the Joint Strategic Survey Committee.

Copies of these records were kept for the

Army by the Strategic Policy Group of the

Operations Division and are identified by

the initials ABC. They are in the custody

of the World War II Records Division,

National Archives and Records Service

(NARS), Other papers on planning for

the Marianas Campaign are to be found

in the OPD central files, also World War

II Records Division, NARS.

U.S. Army

The official U.S. Army records form

the backbone of this study. The three general types most frequently consulted were

operation plans (or field orders), after action reports, and unit journals. The after

action reports include those of the highest theater command, Headquarters, U.S.

Army Forces in the Central Pacific Area

(USAFICPA); the XXIV Corps Artillery;

and the 27th and 77th Infantry Divisions

and their component regiments and battalions. The unit journals—on the level

of division, regiment, and battalion—with

their minute-by-minute record of combat

actions as reported to and seen by the

various unit commanders, are for the most

part the most reliable and complete of all

official records. Generally speaking, the

lower the unit, the more detailed is the

official journal. Most of these records are

in the custody of World War II Records

Division, NARS, although many administrative files and some unit journals arc in

the Kansas City Records Center, AGO.
460 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Another important source of information

on the operations of the 27th Infantry Division on Saipan and especially the events

leading to the relief of Lt. Gen. Ralph

Smith is the Buckner Report, with its

many annexes (designated exhibits), a

copy of which is located in the World War

II Records Division, NARS. General Ralph

Smith himself submitted to the Commanding General, USAFICPA, a special preliminary report and Brig. Gen. Ogden J. Ross

prepared a special "summary of operations

of the 27th Infantry Division on Saipan."

Both of the latter are located in the World

War II Records Division, NARS.

U.S. Navy

For the U.S. Navy, the same types of

records have been used, except that it has

not been felt necessary to consult ships'

logs, which are the naval equivalent of the

unit journal. Naval action reports1 consulted include those of the Commander in

Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval

Operations; Commander in Chief, U.S.

Pacific Fleet, and Commander in Chief,

Pacific Ocean Areas (monthly from February through August 1944); Commander,

Fifth Fleet; Commander, Joint Expeditionary Force Marianas; Commanders Task

Forces 52 and 53 and their subordinate

commands; and in some few cases individual ships' reports. All World War II

U.S. Navy records arc located in the Classified Operational Records Branch, Naval

History Division, and copies of most of

1

 Army and Navy nomenclature differs here.

The same type of report that is called "after action report" by the Army is called "action report."

by the Navy. The U.S. Marine Corps usually employs the Navy term. Other variations used occasionally are "special action report," "operations

report," and "participation report."

those used in this volume are to be found

in the World War II Records Division,

NARS, or in the Records and Research

Section, Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

U.S. Marine Corps

Marine Corps action reports and daily

journals have been covered in the same

manner as those of the Army, except that

it has not been felt necessary to consult

Marine battalion reports and journals.

Most frequent use has been made of the

reports of Headquarters Expeditionary

Troops (Task Force 56); Northern Troops

and Landing Force (V Amphibious

Corps); Southern Troops and Landing

Force (III Amphibious Corps); 2d Marine

Division; 4th Marine Division; 3d Marine

Division; the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade; and the appropriate regimental

reports and journals. These records are

located in the Records and Research Section, Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

Interviews, Field Histories,

and Letters

Each of the two Army operations

described here was covered by a field

historian and a team of specialists sent by

Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in the

Central Pacific Area, to accompany the

troops during the fighting on Saipan and

Guam. For Saipan the historian was Capt.

Edmund G. Love; for Guam, S. Sgt. James

M. Burns. Each took extensive notes and

made reports of interviews in the field, and

each prepared draft narratives of the operations he covered. These manuscripts are

filed in the Office of the Chief of Military
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 461

History (OCMH), Department of the

Army.

Early drafts of this volume were submitted to a large number of Army, Navy,

and Marine Corps officers who played

significant roles in the campaign. Many of

them, in response, submitted suggestions,

corrections, and additional information, all

of which was invaluable in the preparation

of the book in its final form. They are:2

Col. Leonard A. Bishop, AUS (Ret.); Lt.

Gen. Andrew D. Bruce, USA (Ret.); Admiral Richard L. Conolly, USN (Ret.);

Col, Joseph B. Coolidge, USA; Lt. Gen.

Pedro A. del Valle, USMC (Ret.); General Graves B. Erskine, USMC (Ret.); Brig.

Gen. Charles B. Ferris, USAR; Maj. Gen.

Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC; Maj. Gen

George W. Griner, Jr., USA (Ret.); Vice

Adm. Harry W. Hill, USN (Ret.); General John R. Hodge, USA (Ret.); Lt. Gen.

Robert Hogaboom, USMC; Brig. Gen.

Gerard W. Kelley, USAR; Brig. Gen. Redmond Kernan, Jr., AUS (Ret.); Col.

Gordon T. Kimbrell, USA; the late Fleet

Admiral Ernest J. King, USN; Col. James

E. Landrum, Jr., USA; General of the

Army Douglas MacArthur; Fleet Admiral

Chester W. Nimitz, USN (Ret.); the late

Vice Adm. Lawrence Reifsnider, USN; Lt.

Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, USA; General

Harry Schmidt, USMC (Ret.); General

Lemuel G. Shepherd, Jr., USMC (Ret.);

General Holland M. Smith, USMC (Ret.)

Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding, USA (Ret.) Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN (Ret.);

General Alien H. Turnage, USMC (Ret.);

and Lt. Gen. Thomas E. Watson, USMC

(Ret.).

Special Studies

Among other sources used were several special studies prepared after the

campaign, either under the official auspices

of particular commands or by individuals

attached to the historical sections of the

various services. In the first category are:

Headquarters, Central Pacific Command,

Target Saipan; A Story of XXIV Corps

Artillery; and Army Air Forces Historical

Division, Army Air Forces in the Marianas

Campaign. Copies of both manuscripts are

in OCMH. Individual special studies consulted are Roy E. Appleman, Army Tanks

in the Battle for Saipan, MS in OCMH;

1st Lt. Russell A, Gugeler, FA, Army Amphibian Tractor and Tank Battalions in the

Battle of Saipan, 15 June-9 July 1944, MS

in OCMH; Lt. Grace P. Hayes, USN, The

War Against Japan, MS in JCS Historical

Section; Lt. (j.g.) A. O. Van Wyen and

Lt. (j.g.) W. G. Land, Office DCNO,

Naval Air Operations in the Marianas, 11-

20 June 1944, copy of MS in Records and

Research Section, Historical Branch, G-3,

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

Japanese Records

The major collection of captured Japanese military records, amounting to about

7,000 linear feet, was returned to Japan in

1958. Before they were returned these records were in the custody of the National

Archives and Records Service, Washington,

D.C. Except for a small group of selected

operational records reproduced by the

Navy Department, there are no substantial collections of Japanese military records

now remaining in the United States.

2

 Ranks are those held as of the time of completion of this volume.
462 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

After the war the G-2 Section of General Headquarters, Far East Command

(GHQ, FEC), directed a group of former

Japanese Army and Navy officers to prepare a series of special studies of Japanese

operations, based on their personal recollections and on available official records in

Tokyo. These were translated, edited, and

incorporated into a formal numbered series

of Japanese Studies now on file in the Office, Chief of Military History. Those used

in the preparation of this volume are Study

Number 55 (Operations in the Central

Pacific) and Study Number 75 (History of

the Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters, 1941-1945).

A large collection of translated captured

enemy records is contained in the bulletins

and translations prepared during the war

by Headquarters, Commander in Chief

Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, and

by the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific

Ocean Areas (JICPOA). Complete collections of both are deposited in the Classified

Operational Records Branch, World War

II, Office of Naval History, and the

Records and Research Section, Historical

Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U.S. Marine

Corps. The 4th Marine Division also collected a series of "representative translations made on Tinian," which is deposited

in the same place. Of particular use in

understanding and evaluating Japanese defensive operations on Guam were two letters from Lt. Col. Hideyuki Takeda, IJA,

one addressed to the Commandant, U.S.

Marine Corps, dated 4 October 1946, and

the other to Brig. Gen. J. C. McQueen,

USMC, dated 20 February 1952. Both are

also to be found in the Records and Research Section, Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

Published Works

Appleman, Roy E., James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens.

Okinawa: The Last Battle. UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR

II. Washington, 1948.

Arnold, H. H., General of the Air Force.

Global Mission. New York: Harper &

Brothers, 1949.

Bartley, Lt. Col. Whitman S., USMC.

Iwo Jima; Amphibious Epic. Historical

Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters,

U.S. Marine Corps. Washington, 1954,

Butow, Robert J. Japan's Decision to Surrender. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1954.

Cass, Bevan G. (ed.). History of the Sixth

Marine Division. Washington, 1948.

Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea

Cate (eds.). The Army Air Forces in

World War II, Vol. IV, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to

July 1944. Chicago: The University of

Chicago Press, 1950,

————, Ibid., Vol. V, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August

1945. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953.

Crowl, Philip A., and Edmund G. Love.

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II. Washington, 1955.

Department of the Navy, Bureau of Yards

and Docks. Building the Navy's Bases in

World War II; History of the Bureau

of Yards and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps, 1940-1946. 2 vols. Washington, 1947.

Halsey, Fleet Admiral William F., USN,

and Lieutenant Commander J. Bryan,

III, USNR. Admiral Halsey's Story.

New York and London: Whittlesey
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 463

House, McGraw-Hill Book Company,

Inc., 1947.

Heinl, Lt. Col. Robert D., Jr., USMC, and

Lt. Col. John A. Crown, USMC. The

Marshalls: Increasing the Tempo. Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Washington,

1954. Historical Division, War Department. The

Capture of Makin, 20 November-24 November 1943. AMERICAN FORCES

IN ACTION SERIES. Washington,

1946.

————. Guam: Operations of the 77th

Division (21 July-10 August 1944).

AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION

SERIES. Washington, 1946.

————. Small Unit Actions. AMERICAN

FORCES IN ACTION SERIES. Washington, 1946.

Hoffman, Major Carl W., USMC. Saipan:

The Beginning of the End. Historical

Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine

Corps. Washington, 1950.

————. The Seizure of Tinian. Historical

Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine

Corps. Washington, 1951.

Isely, Jeter A. and Philip A. Crowl. The

U.S. Marines and Amphibious War.

Princeton: Princeton University Press,

1951. Jane's Fighting Ships, 1944-45. New York:

The Macmillan Company, 1947.

Johnston, Richard W. Follow Me!: The

Story of the Second Marine Division in

World War II. New York: Random

House, 1948.

Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee.

Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping

Losses During World War II By All

Causes. Washington, 1947.

Kenney, George C. General Kenney Reports, A Personal History of the Pacific

War, New York: Duell, Sloan and

Pearce, 1949.

King, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. and Walter

M. Whitehill. Fleet Admiral King, A

Naval Record. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1952.

Lodge, Major O. R., USMC. The Recapture of Guam. Historical Branch, G-3

Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine

Corps. Washington, 1954.

Love, Edmund G. The 27th Infantry Division in World War II. Washington:

Infantry Journal Press, 1949.

Miller, John, jr. CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul. UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Washington, 1959.

————. Guadalcanal: The First Offensive. UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II. Washington, 1949.

Milner, Samuel. Victory in Papua.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II. Washington, 1957.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United

States Naval Operations in World War

II, Vol. III, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942. Boston: Little,

Brown and Company, 1948.

————. Ibid., Vol. IV, Coral Sea, Midway

and Submarine Actions, May 1942-

August 1942. Boston: Little, Brown and

Company, 1949.

————. Ibid., Vol. V, The Struggle for

Guadalcanal, August 1942-February

1943. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1949.

————. Ibid., Vol. VII, Aleutians, Gilberts

and Marshalls, June 1942-April 1944.

Boston: Little, Brown and Company,

1951. ————. Ibid., Vol. VIII, New Guinea and

the Marianas, March 1944-August
464 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

1944, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953.

Myers, Denys P. Handbook of the League

of Nations. Boston and New York:

World Peace Foundation, 1935.

Office, Chief of Naval Operations, Division

of Naval Intelligence. ONI 29, Palau,

Mariana Islands. Washington, 11 May

1942.

————. ONI 99, Strategic Study of Guam.

Washington, 1 February 1944.

Ours To Hold It High: The History of the

77th Infantry Division in World War II

By Men Who Were There. Washington:

Infantry Journal Press, 1947.

Pomeroy, Earl S. Pacific Outpost: American Strategy in Guam and Micronesia.

Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University

Press, 1951.

Proehl, Carl W. (ed.). The Fourth Marine

Division in World War II. Washington,

1946.

Robson, R. W. (comp.). The Pacific Islands Year Book, 1942. Sydney, Australia: Pacific Publications, Limited,

1942.

————. The Pacific Islands Handbook,

1944. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946.

Romanus, Charles F., and Riley Sunderland. Stilwell's Mission to China.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II. Washington, 1953.

Sherrod, Robert. On to Westward! War

in the Central Pacific. New York: Duell,

Sloan and Pearce, Inc., 1945.

Smith, Holland M. Coral and Brass. New

York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949.

Smith, Robert Ross. The Approach to the

Philippines. UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II. Washington,

1953. Sprout, Harold and Margaret. Toward a

New Order of Sea Power. Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1940.

Stockman, Captain James R., USMC. The

Battle for Tarawa. Historical Division,

Division of Public Information, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Washington, 1947.

Thompson, Laura. Guam and Its People.

Princeton: Princeton University Press,

1947. United States Strategic Bombing Survey,

Chairman's Office. Japan's Struggle to

End the War. Washington, 1946.

————. (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division.

The Campaigns of the Pacific War.

Washington, 1946.

————. (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division.

Interrogations of Japanese Officials. 2

vols. Washington, 1946.

————. (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division.

The Reduction of Truk. Washington,

1947. The War Reports of General of the Army

George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, General of the Army H. H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces,

Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet

and Chief of Naval Operations. Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott

Company, 1947.

Zimmerman, Maj. John L., USMCR. The

Guadalcanal Campaign. Historical Division, Division of Public Information,

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

Washington, 1949.
List of Abbreviations

AAF

AAR

ABC

Adm

AFAS

AGC

AK

AKA

Amph

AP

APA

APD

App

Armd

Arty

Atchd

BAR

BLT

Bn

Br

Brig

Bull

C-3

CCS

CD

CEC

C&GS

CG

CINCPAC

CINCPOA

CINCSWPA

CM-IN

CM-OUT

CNO

Co

CO

CofS

Comdt

COMINCH

Army Air Forces

After action report

American-British Conversations

Administrative

American Forces in Action Series

General communications vessel

Cargo ship

Cargo ship, attack

Amphibious

Transport

Transport, attack

Transport (high speed)

Appendix

Armored

Artillery

Attached

Browning automatic rifle

Battalion landing team

Battalion

Branch

Brigade

Bulletin

Operations officer or section of a Marine amphibious

corps

Combined Chiefs of Staff

Coastal defense

Civil Engineer Corps

Command and General Staff

Commanding general

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas

Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area

Classified message, incoming

Classified message, outgoing

Chief of Naval Operations

Company

Commanding officer

Chief of Staff

Commandant

Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet
466 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

CP

CTF

D-2

D-3

DCNO

Div

DUKW

Elms

Env

FBL

FEC

Fld

FMF

FO

FTP

Fwd

G-1

G-2

G-3

G-4

G-5

Gen

GSC

H&S

Hist

Hq

I and H Sv

IJA

IJN

IMR

IMTFE

Incl

Inf

Intel

IPS

JANAC

JASCO

JB

JCS

JICPOA

Jnl

JPS

JSSC

JWPC

Command post

Commander Task Force

Intelligence officer or section of a Marine division

Operations officer or section of a Marine division

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations

Division

Amphibian truck, 21⁄2 tons

Elements

Envelope

Force Beachhead Line

Far East Command

Field

Fleet Marine Force

Field order

Fleet Training Publication

Forward

Personnel section of divisional or higher staff

Intelligence section of divisional or higher staff

Operations section of divisional or higher staff

Supply section of divisional or higher staff

As used in this volume, refers to the Marine section of

divisional or higher staff responsible for tactical planning for an assault from its inception to the time of

issue of the final operations plan

General

General Staff Corps

Headquarters and Service

History, historical

Headquarters

Information and Historical Service

Imperial Japanese Army

Imperial Japanese Navy

Independent Mixed Regiment

International Military Tribunal for the Far East

Inclosure

Infantry

Intelligence

International Prosecution Section

Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee

Joint Assault Signal Company

Joint Board

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas

Journal

Joint Staff Planners

Joint Strategic Survey Committee

Joint War Plans Committee
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 467

LCI

LCI (G)

LCM

LCR

LCT

LCVP

LD

LSD

LST

Ltr

LVT

LVT(A)

LVT(A) (1)

LVT(A) (4)

Min

MS

MID

MIS

Msg

Mtg

NA

NARS

NR&H

NTLF

OCMH

OCNO

ONI

OPD

Opn

Pac

PC

Phib

POA

POW

Rad

Rcn

RCT

Regt

Rpt

RS

S-2

S-3

SAR

Landing craft, infantry

Landing craft, infantry, gunboat

Landing craft, mechanized

Landing craft, rubber

Landing craft, tank

Landing craft, vehicle and personnel

Line of departure

Landing ship, dock

Landing ship, tank

Letter

Landing vehicle, tracked

Landing vehicle, tracked, armored

Landing vehicle, tracked, armored (Mark I) ("Water

Buffalo," turret type)

Landing vehicle, tracked, armored (Mark IV)

Minutes

Manuscript

Military Intelligence Division

Military Intelligence Service

Message

Meeting

National Archives

National Archives and Records Service

Naval Records and History

Northern Troops and Landing Force

Office of the Chief of Military History

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Office of Naval Intelligence

Operations Division, War Department General Staff

Operation

Pacific

Patrol craft

Amphibious

Pacific Ocean Areas

Prisoner of war

Radiogram

Reconnaissance

Regimental combat team

Regiment

Report

Records Section

Military intelligence section of a unit not having a

general staff

Operations and training section of a unit not having a

general staff

Special action report

Signal Corps
468 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Sec(.)

Ser.

SLF

SWPA

TF

TG

Tk

TQM

Trac

Trans

U/F

USA

USAF

USAFICPA

USAFMIDPAC

USMC

USMCR

USN

USNG

USNR

USSBS

WD

WDC

WDCSA

WDGO

WPD

Section

Serial

Southern Landing Force

Southwest Pacific Area

Task Force

Task Group

Tank

Transport quartermaster (officer)

Tractor

Translation

Unit of fire

U.S. Army

U.S. Army Forces

U.S. Army Forces in the Central Pacific Area

U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific

U.S. Marine Corps

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

U.S. Navy

U.S. National Guard

U.S. Naval Reserve

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey

War Department

Washington Document Center

War Department Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

War Department General Orders

War Plans Division
Glossary of Code Names

CARTWHEEL

FORAGER

GALVANIC

GRANITE

ORANGE

QUADRANT

RAINBOW

RENO

SEXTANT

TRIDENT

Operation for the seizure of the Solomon Islands—New

Britain—New Ireland area

Operations for the capture of the Mariana Islands

The Gilberts-Makin operation

Nimitz' plan for operations in 1944

Prewar plan of operations in event of war with Japan

First Quebec conference, August 1943

Various plans prepared between 1939 and 1941 to meet

Axis aggression

MacArthur's plans for advancing along north coast of

New Guinea and thence to Mindanao

International conference at Cairo, 22-26 November

and 3-7 December 1943

International conference at Washington, 12-25 May

1943

Basic Military Map Symbols*

Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within

a triangle an observation post, and within a circle a supply

point.

Military Units—Identification

Antiaircraft Artillery

Armored Command

Army Air Forces

Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery

Cavalry, Horse

Cavalry, Mechanized

Chemical Warfare Service

Coast Artillery

Engineers

Infantry

Medical Corps

Ordnance Department

Quartermaster Corps

Signal Corps

Tank Destroyer

Transportation Corps

Veterinary Corps

Airborne units arc designated by combining a gull wing

symbol with the arm or service symbol:

Airborne Artillery

Airborne Infantry

*For complete listing of symbols in use during the World War II period, see

FM 21-30, dated October 1943, from which these arc taken.
472 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Size Symbols

The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or

above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying

arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization:

Squad

Section

Platoon

Company, troop, battery. Air Force flight

Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron

Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT following identifying numeral)

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force

Wing

Division or Command of an Air Force

Corps or Air Force

Army

Group of Armies

EXAMPLES

The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the

unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent

unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below

boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines:

Company A, 137th Infantry

8th Field Artillery Battalion

Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division

Observation Post, 23d Infantry

Command Post, 5th Infantry Division

Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantr y

Weapons

Machine gun

Gun

Gun battery

Howitzer or Mortar

Tank

Self-propelled gun
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War Department

Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945

The Army and Economic Mobilization

The Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground Forces

The Organization of Ground, Combat Troops

The. Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service Forces

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western Hemisphere

The, Framework of Hemisphere Defense

Guarding the United, States and Its Outposts

The War in the Pacific:

The. Fall of the Philippines

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive

Victory in Papua

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls

Campaign in the Marianas

The Approach to (he Philippines

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

Triumph in the Philippines

Okinawa: The Last Battle

Strategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy

Salerno to Cassino

Cassino to the Alps

The European Theater of Operations

Cross-Channel Attack

Breakout and Pursuit

The Lorraine Campaign

The Siegfried Line Campaign

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge

The Last Offensive

The Supreme Command
Logistical Support, of the Armies, Volume I

Logistical Support of the, Armies, Volume, II

The Middle East Theater

The, Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India Theater

Stilwell's Mission to China

Stilwell's Command Problems

Time Runs Out in CBI

The Technical Services

The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War

The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field

The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and, Equipment

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany

The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior

The Medical Department: Medical, Service in the Mediterranean and Minor

Theaters

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War

The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply

The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany

The Signal. Corps: The Emergency

The Signal Corps: The Test

The Signal Corps: The Outcome

The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply

The, Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special Studies

Chronology: 1941-1945

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945

Rearming the French

Three Battles: Arnaville, Alluzzo, and Schmidt

The Women's Army Corps

Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors

Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces

The Employment of Negro Troops

Manhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial Record

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas

The, War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Japan
Index

A operation: 70

ABC. See American-British Conversations.

Accidents, in training: 47

Ackerman, Capt. Louis F.: 146, 254

Adair, Lt. Col. Robert D,: 345-46

Adelup Point: 312, 316-17, 331, 343-44

Admiralty Islands: 12, 13, 15

Advance Commander, Support Aircraft: 313

Aerial photography. See Reconnaissance, aerial,

U.S.

Aerial reconnaissance. See Reconnaissance, aerial,

U.S.

Afetna Point: 67, 80-81, 83, 85, 89, 91-93, 97

Agafan: 371

Agana: 24, 30, 308-09, 326-37, 331-33, 340,

364, 378, 382-83, 385-87, 391, 395, 443

Agana Bay: 307, 331, 385

Agana River: 307

Agat: 24, 308-09, 312-13, 315-16, 322, 324,

326-27, 331-35, 339, 342, 345, 348-50,

352-53, 356, 358, 363, 368, 383. See also

Old Agat Road.

Agat Bay: 30, 308, 361-62

Agattu: 7

AGC's: 99, 110, 275, 313, 318, 321-22, 325,

339-40

Agingan Point: 40, 44, 68, 87, 91, 93, 97, 109,

127-28, 285

A-GO operation: 120-21. See also A operation;

KON operation.

Aguada River: 363

Air, supply by: 12, 278. See also Supply operations.

Air attacks, carrier-based, Japanese: 23-24

Air attacks, carrier-based, U.S.

on Cabras Island: 339-40

on Caroline Islands: 71, 222

co-ordination of: 132-33, 340

on friendly troops: 227, 345, 357, 374, 407,

425, 427 on Guam: 43, 73, 99, 122, 312-14, 320, 322-

25, 339-42, 345, 352, 357, 362, 368, 371,

378 on Japanese shipping: 7, 13, 15

in Kavieng-Manus operation: 18

liaison measures in: 132-33

on Manus Island: 18

on Marcus Island: 71

on Marianas: 56, 69, 446

Air attacks, carrier-based, U.S.—Continued

on Pagan Island: 73

on Palau Islands: 69, 71

plans for: 2, 13

on Rota Island: 43, 73, 99, 122, 323-24

on Saipan: 43-44, 71-74, 80-81, 108, 132,

139

strafing, effectiveness of: 132

target designation in: 132, 134-35

on Tinian: 43-44, 73, 277, 285-88, 291, 299-

300

on Truk: 13, 15, 39, 56, 69, 71, 322

on Wake: 71

Air attacks, land-based, U.S.

Arnold's plan for: 12

from Australia against Netherlands Indies: 12

by B-29's: 11-12, 14

on Biak: 120

on Carolines: 71, 222

from China against Japan: 7-8, 12

effectiveness of: 132

on friendly troops: 227

on Guam: 322-25, 407, 418, 421-22, 425,

427, 430, 432, 436, 446

on Japanese shipping: 7

on Marcus Island: 71

on Marianas: 446

from Marianas against Japan: 8, 12, 14, 443

in Netherlands Indies: 12, 18

on Palau Islands: 71

in P.I. recovery: 10

plans for: 2, 13

on Saipan: 43, 44

strafing, effectiveness of: 132

on Tinian: 277, 285-88, 295, 297, 302

on Truk: 71

on Wake: 71

Air bases. See Airfields, Japanese; Airfields, U.S.;

Seaplane bases.

Air bursts, use of: 155

Air Forces, U.S. See Army Air Forces; Fifth Air

Force; Seventh Air Force; Thirteenth Air

Force.

Air losses, Japanese

on Guam: 51, 323-24

in Philippine Sea battle: 324, 441

on Saipan: 51, 72

on Tinian: 51

at Truk: 15
476 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Air losses, U.S.

on Guam: 323

in Philippine Sea battle: 122

on Saipan: 72

"Air Plan for the Defeat of Japan": 12

Air strength, Japanese, on Saipan: 51

Air support. See Air attacks, carrier-based, U.S.;

Air attacks, land-based, U.S.

Aircraft, Japanese, diversion of: 121

Airfields, Japanese. See also Seaplane bases.

Aslito: 54, 60-61, 67-68, 72

Charan Kanoa: 51, 61, 68

defenses at: 61, 67-68, 282

Flores Point: 41, 51-52, 65, 242

Guam: 60

Mandated Islands: 54-55

Marianas: 54, 60-62

Marpi Point: 51-52, 61

Pagan Island: 61

Rota Island: 61

Saipan: 51, 61

Tinian: 54, 60-61, 269-70

Airfields, U.S.

Arafura Sea area: 10, 18

China: 12

Guam: 334, 443

Manus Island: 16, 19

Marianas: 8, 12, 14, 441, 443, 445

Marshalls: 9

Mindanao: 18

plans for: 2, 13

Tinian: 396, 442-43

AK's: 47-48, 319

AKA's: 47, 319

Aleutian Islands: 4, 7-8

Alpine: 347

Ambushes, Japanese. See also Counterattacks,

Japanese.

on Guam: 390-91, 422, 424

on Saipan: 140, 165

Ambulances, shortages of: 128

American-British Conversations: 3

Ammunition, Japanese, unit-of-fire allotments: 69

Ammunition, U.S., unit-of-fire allotments: 48,

129

Ammunition dump explosions: 168, 177, 179-80,

188, 214

Ammunition expenditures, U.S.

on Guam: 321, 323-24, 339, 367-69

in naval gunfire: 321, 323-24, 339

on Saipan: 130, 134, 259

on Tinian: 285-86, 299, 302

Ammunition shortages

on Guam: 358-59

on Saipan: 218, 260-61

on Tinian: 293

Amphibian Tank Battalion, 708th: 44, 81, 83, 84,

86, 275

Amphibian tanks, definition: 8 in. See also

LVT(A)'s.

Amphibian Tractor Battalions

534th: 275

715th: 81, 86, 275

773d: 82, 84-85, 87, 261, 275, 291

Amphibian tractors. See LVT's.

Amphibian Truck Companies

27th Division: 300

477th: 300

Amphibian trucks. See DUKW's.

Amphibious operations. See also Landing operations.

communications procedures in: 45

doctrine vindicated: 350, 446-47

end-run principle: 317n

Japanese, at Guam: 24

Japanese, at Saipan: 110, 131, 213

logistical aspects: 123-31

Marine Corps doctrine: 33, 350

in P.I.: 10

supply, role in: 123-31

Tinian, as classic: 269, 271

training for: 33-35, 315-16

Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, VMAC:

272

Amphtracks, See LVT's.

Anao Point: 419, 432, 434

Anderson, Lt. Col. Joseph C.: 40, 129

Antiaircraft artillery. See also Guns, Japanese,

dual-purpose; Guns, U.S., dual-purpose.

Japanese, on Saipan: 68-69, 76, 97

U.S., on Guam: 23

U.S., on Saipan: 179

Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, 7th: 356, 408

AP's: 47-48, 50

APA's: 47, 98-100

Apamama, seizure of: 9

APD's: 40, 47, 322

Appalachian: 313, 318, 321-22, 325, 339-40

Apra Harbor: 30, 308-09, 316, 353-54, 361, 363,

368, 370, 442-43

Arafura Sea area: 10, 18

Area bombardment

on Guam: 312, 314, 321-24, 326, 339

on Saipan: 42-44, 80, 91

on Tinian: 42-43, 286-87

Armknecht, Comdr. R. F.: 27

Armored amphibians, definition: 81n. See also

LVT(A)'s.

Army Air Forces. See also Fifth Air Force;

Seventh Air Force; Thirteenth Air Force.

advocates Marianas seizure: 12

aircraft employed in Marianas: 446
INDEX 477

Army Air Forces—Continued

base troops for: 152

role in CENPAC plans: 11-12

Army Garrison Force, Saipan: 154

Arnold, General Henry H.: 1-2, 12

Artillery dispositions, Japanese

Guam: 332-35

Saipan: 16, 135, 166-67

Artillery strength, Japanese

Guam: 334-34

Saipan: 16, 135, 166-67

Artillery strength, U.S., Tinian: 386

Artillery support, Japanese. See also Guns, Japanese; Howitzers, Japanese.

Guam: 343, 344-45, 348, 353, 354, 362-63,

368, 393, 406, 413, 424-25, 428, 433

Saipan: 68, 96, 98, 103, 105-06, 114, 139,

143-44, 174. 188, 310, 216, 225, 230, 233

Tinian: 379, 383, 389

Artillery support, U.S.

air bursts: 155

air spotting for: 134-35

ammunition expenditures. See Ammunition expenditures, U.S.

communications for: 133

control of: 133-35

co-ordination of: 208, 286, 299, 409

failures in: 135

fire on friendly troops: 87, 228, 238, 345, 357,

369, 374, 392, 398, 402-03, 406-07, 425,

432-34

Guam: 345, 349, 352, 356, 363, 365, 367-69,

371, 373, 380, 386, 394, 396, 398, 400, 402,

404, 409, 414, 421, 423-84, 428-29, 432,

436

liaison in: 133

Saipan: 95-98, 100-102, 106, 108, 110-13,

114, 123, 133-35, 139, 142, 144, 146-48,

151, 154-55, 157, 160, 163, 168, 177, 179, 181, 186, 189, 203, 205, 207-09, 215, 217-

18, 222, 224, 227, 230-31, 237-38, 241-42,

244, 346-47, 249, 252, 255, 259, 264

target designation: 135

Tinian: 133, 271-72, 374-77, 285-86, 291,

293, 295, 297-99, 302

Asan Point: 313, 322, 334, 331, 334, 339, 343,

358, 364

Asiga Bay: 278, 280, 283, 287-88, 294-95

Asiga Point: 270, 278, 275, 282

Asinan: 322, 381

Aslito airfield: 40, 44, 51-52, 132-33, 137, 141, 144, 149, 152, 155, 197-98. See also Isely

Field.

capture of: 95-117

Japanese counterattack: 159

Japanese defense: 61, 67-68

Aslito airfield—Continued

Japanese development: 54, 60-61, 67-68, 72

in support of Tinian: 277

Atantano: 353-54, 356

Atomic bomb: 303, 443

Attack cargo ships. See AKA's.

Attack transports. See APA's.

Australia: 4-7, 12

Automatic rifle fire. See Rifle fire, Japanese;

Rifle fire, U.S.

Ayers, Col. Russell G.: 164-65, 169-70, 172,

178-79, 184, 186, 206-07, 213, 216

Ayuja River: 349-50

B-17's: 11

B-24's: 11, 12, 71, 323

B-25's: 120, 407, 430, 446

B-26's: 418, 431

B-29's

availability of, against Japan: 11-12, 14

first base established: 443

Guam as base for: 309

Kenney's plan for use of: 12

Marianas as base for: 443

military characteristics of: 11-12

role of, in defeat of Japan: 14, 117, 443-45

Baker, Sgt. Thomas A.: 259, 259n

Baker, Pvt. Thomas G.: 139

Banadero airfield. See Marpi Point.

Bancroft: 213

Bangi Point: 312, 316, 335, 340, 344-45, 352,

356

Banzai charges. See also Counterattacks, Japanese; Infiltration tactics, Japanese.

Guam: 365, 368, 371

Saipan: 256-61

Tinian: 303-03

Barbed wire

use of, by Japanese: 283, 322, 335

use of, by U.S.: 393

Barges: 277

Barnes: 23-24

Barrigada: 386-408, 414, 436

Bates, Capt. Robert T.: 315

Battle of the Philippine Sea. See Philippine Sea,

naval battle of.

Battleships

California: 76-77, 96, 291, 303, 321

Colorado: 286, 289, 321

Idaho: 320-21

Maryland: 76

New Mexico: 321

Pennsylvania: 76, 320-21, 352

South Dakota: 122

Tennessee: 76, 289n, 291, 302, 321

Bayonet fighting. See also Hand-to-hand fighting.

Guam: 365

Saipan: 178, 254
478 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Bazooka fire support

Guam, 88, 348, 392, 411, 438

Saipan: 98, 114, 179

Beaches

allocation of: 40, 43

Blue Beach, Guam: 343

Blue Beaches, Saipan: 81, 98, 100-101, 125

communications on: 124, 130

defense of, Japanese doctrine: 62-64, 334-35

Green Beach, Guam: 343

Green Beaches, Saipan: 81, 83, 86, 88-89, 92,

173

Red Beaches, Guam: 344

Red Beaches, Saipan: 81, 83, 87, 89-90, 98,

173

supply control on: 123-27

survey of. See Reconnaissance, beach, U.S.

White Beach 1, Saipan: 128

White Beaches, Guam: 344-45, 359

White Beaches, Tinian: 272-75, 278, 282-83,

286-89, 291-92, 295, 299-300

Yellow Beach 1, Tinian: 272-74, 282-83

Yellow Beaches, Guam: 344-45

Yellow Beaches, Saipan: 40, 43, 81, 87, 109-

10, 127, 133

Betts, Capt. Howard: 183-84, 205, 247

Biak: 120-21

Big Gautali River: 363

Birmingham: 291, 302

Bishop, Lt. Col. Leonard A.: 109, 144, 150, 253-

54

Bismarck Archipelago: 4, 8

Blandy, Adm. William H. P.: 99

Blount, Brig, Gen. Roy E.: 193

Blue Beach, Guam: 343

Blue Beaches, Saipan: 81, 98, 100-101, 125

Blue Staff: 39. See also Expeditionary Troops;

Smith, Lt. Gen. Holland M., USMC.

Bomber Command, XXI: 303, 443, 443n

Bombers, heavy. See B-17's; B-24's.

Bombers, medium. See B-26's.

Bombers, Navy. See PB4Y's

Bombers, very long range. See B-29's.

Bonner, 2d Lt. Robert J.: 224

Booby traps: 283

Bomb tonnage expenditures: 325. See also Air

attacks, carrier-based, U.S.; Air attacks,

land-based, U.S.; Ammunition expenditures.

Bonin Islands: 23

Bouchard, Capt. Alexander C.: 228, 247

Boundaries, operational, Japanese: 65-67

Boundaries, operational, U.S.

on Guam: 312, 342-45, 421-22, 427, 431-34

in Micronesia: 22

in Pacific theater: 4-5

in Philippine Sea: 121

Boundaries, operational, U.S.—Continued

in POA: 4-5

in SWPA: 4-5

Boyles, Pfc. James R.: 250

Bradt, Lt. Col. Edward T.: 145, 231, 244, 248,

255-56

Braine: 76-77

British-American prewar conferences: 3

British Chiefs of Staff, at Casablanca: 6

Bruce, Maj. Gen. Andrew D.: 311, 315-18, 351,

355, 361, 368, 373-74, 379-88, 390, 392-

93, 396-404, 406, 412, 417-19, 423, 427, 427n, 429-33, 436. See also Infantry Divisions, 77th.

Brusseau, Maj. Gregory: 205, 214, 218-19, 222,

232

Buckner, Lt. Gen. Simon B., Jr.: 193

Buckner Board: 193-96

Bundschu, Capt. Geary F., USMC: 344n

Bundschu Ridge: 344, 344n, 356

Burke, Lt. Richard F., USN: 272

Burkett, Lt. Col. Leo B.: 367

Burma: 4, 7, 8

Butler, Col. Arthur H., USMC: 344

Cabras Island: 29-30, 339-40, 344, 357, 363.

368

Cairo Conference decisions: 12, 17

California: 76-77, 96, 291, 302, 321

Cambria: 98-100

Camp Hyder: 315

Camp Tarawa: 45, 48

Campbell, 1st Lt. Andrew B.: 215

Canister

Guam: 369

Saipan: 156, 186, 253

Cannon companies. See Artillery support, U.S.;

parent regiment under Infantry regiments.

Cape Obiam: 138

Cargo handling. See Loading and unloading operations.

Cargo requirements. See Shipping, U.S.

Cargo ships. See AK's; AKA's.

Carlson, Lt. Col. Evans F., USMC: 272

Caroline Islands

air attacks on: 71, 222

directive to Nimitz on: 2

as Japanese base for Guam: 324

Japanese seizure of: 4

placed under Nimitz: 19

plans for recovery of: 2-3, 7-9, 12, 17, 19

target date for: 13

Casablanca Conference decisions: 6-7

Casualties, Japanese

Guam, periodic: 348, 365-66, 369-70, 381,

388, 396, 402, 405, 407, 413-17, 426, 428-

29, 431, 434, 436
INDEX 479

Casualties, Japanese—Continued

Guam, total: 437

Philippine Sea, battle of: 441

Saipan: 74, 96, 97, 98, 159-60, 163, 165-66,

168, 173, 188, 210, 218-19, 241-42, 248-

49, 253, 257-58, 258n, 265-66

Tinian, total: 294, 294n, 303

Casualties, U.S.

1st Marine Provisional Brigade: 356, 370, 437

2d Marine Division: 90, 189, 190, 227, 232,

238, 265

3d Marine Division: 344, 356, 364, 366, 403,

437

4th Marine Division: 159, 163, 187, 190, 232,

238, 265

27th Infantry Division: 105-06, 144, 146-48,

150, 159, 165, 175, 176, 178, 180, 183-86,

190, 204-207 , 213, 215, 217-18, 222, 224,

228, 231-32, 232n, 261, 265

77th Infantry Division: 348, 356, 391, 396,

401-02, 405, 411, 413-14, 416, 423, 425,

425n, 426-27, 429-31, 434. 437

Guam, evacuation of: 394-96, 398, 412

Guam, U.S.: 437, 446

Marianas, total: 446

Navy: 289

ratio among services: 446

Saipan, evacuation of: 260

Saipan, U.S.: 232, 265, 446

Tinian, U.S.: 289, 303, 446

Cates, Maj. Gen. Clifton B., USMC: 37, 272,

274, 294, 297, 300

Cavalier: 110

Cavalry Division, 1st: 15

Cavalry Reconnaissance Troops

27th: 45, 109, 231

77th: 316, 374-76, 380, 401, 413, 416

Celebes Island: 8, 10

Central Pacific Area

AAF role in: 11-12

assigned major role: 8

Cairo decisions on: 12, 17

Casablanca decisions on: 7

conflict of strategic ideas: 2-20

drive through, opens: 9

Japanese reinforcement of: 53-58

JCS directive on operations: 16-20

JCS modification: 9

King's views on plans for: 17-18

lines of communication in, attacks on: 13

MacArthur's views on plans for: 9-11, 17

Marshall's views on plans for: 16-18

Nimitz's schedule for: 13

Nimitz's views on plans for: 16-19

operations accelerated in: 39

prewar concept of strategy for: 2-4

priorities for: 16

Central Pacific Area—Continued

revival of concept for: 6-20

submarine operations, U.S., in: 58-60, 70

two-pronged attack plan for: 8-9, 13, 16-17

Washington Conference decisions on: 7-9, 15-

20

Central Saipan, drive on: 163-90, 203-33. See

also Saipan.

Chacha: 166, 173, 187, 205-06, 213, 216

Chaguian: 421, 431-33

Chalgren, Lt. Col. Edward, Jr.: 347

Changsha: 12

Charan Danshii ridge: 230

Charan Kanoa: 29, 40-41, 43, 74, 79, 81, 85-

87, 89, 91-93, 96-98, 100, 124, 127, 133

airfield development: 51, 61, 68

Chasmar, Capt. Paul J.: 105, 112, 175, 182,

205, 205n, 214-15, 218, 222

Chemical Mortar Battalion, 88th: 143, 177

Chemical weapons. See Chemical Mortar Battalion, 88th; White phosphorus, tactical use

of.

Chesapeake Bay, as training area: 315

Chief of Staff, Japanese: 110. See also Imperial

General Headquarters.

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. See Marshall, General George C.

Chiefs of Staff. See Joint Chiefs of Staff.

China: 7-8, 12, 13, 15-19

Chonito Cliff: 344, 356

Churchill, Winston S.: 6, 7, 12

Civil government, Japanese, on Guam: 69

Civilians, Guamanian: 309, 332, 376, 381-82

Civilians, Japanese, in action on Saipan: 96, 137,

141, 232, 247-48, 265

Claire, Maj. Dennis D.: 111, 170, 219, 222, 248

Clark, Rear Adm. Joseph G.: 74

Classes of supply

daily allotments: 47-48, 318

shortages in: 126

Climate

Guam: 309, 339, 406-07, 411, 416

Marianas: 27-28

Saipan: 27

Tinian: 300-301

Close air support. See also Air attacks, carrierbased, U.S.; Air attacks, land-based, U.S.

communications in: 132

Control of: 132-33

effectiveness of: 133

on Guam: 313, 368

liaison in: 132-33

in Marianas: 446

on Saipan: 131-33, 227, 240

on Tinian: 299

Cloyd, 1st Lt. Edward L., Jr.: 175, 182

Coast Artillery Battalion, 32d: 46
480 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Coast Artillery personnel, conversion to Field

Artillery: 46

Coast Artillery Regiment, 55th: 46

Colorado: 286, 289, 321

Combat unit loading, definition of: 48n

Combined Bomber Offensive in Europe: 11

Combined Chiefs of Staff: 3, 6-9, 11, 12, 13

Command structure

conflict in Japanese: 56-57, 280

U.S. for Guam: 309-12

U.S. for Marianas: 33-36

U.S. for Saipan: 33-40

U.S. for Tinian: 275

Commander, Air Force, Pacific. See Towers,

Vice Adm. John H.

Commander, Allied Air Forces, SWPA. See

Kenney, Lt. Gen. George C.

Commander, Allied Naval Forces, SWPA: 16.

See also Kinkaid, Vice Adm. Thomas C.

Commander, Landing Force Support Aircraft:

313-14

Commander, Service Force, Pacific: 318

Commander, Support Aircraft. See Whitehead,

Capt. Richard F.

Commander, Support Aircraft Ashore: 299

Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. See King,

Admiral Ernest J.

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. See Nimitz, Admiral

Chester W.

Communications, Japanese, on Guam: 325-26,

364n, 366, 378, 418

Communications, U.S. See also Joint Assault

Signal Companies.

in air support: 132

in amphibious operations: 45

in artillery support: 133

on Guam: 345, 355, 376, 387, 390, 398, 404,

409 on Saipan: 124, 130, 132-33, 156, 251-52,

260

on Tinian: 286, 292, 298-99

Conolly, Rear Adm. Richard L.: 33, 35, 99, 164,

311-15, 319-22, 324-26, 339-41, 359, 430

Conroy, Col. Gardiner J.: 112

Conroy Field: 112. See also Aslito airfield.

Construction, in Marianas

Japanese, preinvasion: 60-62

U.S., postinvasion: 443

Control, tactical, official doctrine: 198

Control line, definition: 85n, 86

Convoy unit loading, definition: 48n

Cooper, Capt. William B.: 422

Coral Sea, battle of: 4

Cornett, Lt. Col. Winslow: 170, 206-07, 215,

219

Corps

I Marine Amphibious: 309n

III Marine Amphibious, See also Geiger, Lt.

Gen. Roy S., USMC.

on Guam: 309, 309n, 311-12, 314-20,

327, 337, 355, 370-71, 385, 397-98, 408-09, 422, 428, 432, 435-36

in Saipan landing: 39

V Marine Amphibious: 76, 119, 195n, 272,

309, 311, 314-16. See also Smith, Lt. Gen.

Holland M., USMC.

alerted for Marianas: 39

division of, into landing forces: 39-40

and shipping shortages: 48

and troop shortages: 40

XXIV: 316

Corps Artillery

III MAC: 311, 314, 352, 356, 367, 384, 396,

402, 421, 423

XXIV Corps: 46. See also Harper, Brig. Gen.

Arthur M.

final organization of: 46

on Guam: 311

in Marianas: 38, 46

on Saipan: 40, 110, 128-39, 133-34,

149, 168, 181, 203

shipping shortages of: 48

on Tinian: 276-77, 385-86, 291, 298-99

training of: 46

Cotal: 373

Cothran, Capt. Lee P.: 380

Counterattacks, Japanese. See also Infiltration

tactics, Japanese.

at Aslito airfield: 159

Guam: 347-48, 354, 364-67, 388, 391-92, 402, 411, 414, 428

Saipan: 95-96, 98, 103-04, 110, 141, 146,

154, 159, 168, 178, 210, 218, 243, 251, 256-

62, 264

Tinian: 293-94, 302-03

Counterattacks, U.S., on Saipan: 261-66

Counterbattery fire

Guam: 312, 325

Saipan: 42-43

Tinian: 42, 285-86, 300

Counterlandings, Japanese: 110, 131, 213

Craig, Col. Edward A., USMC: 344, 383

Cruisers

Birmingham: 291, 302

Honolulu: 320, 352

Indianapolis: 191, 291, 437

Louisville: 287, 291, 302

Montpelier: 291, 303

New Orleans: 287

Culebra Island: 35

Cushman, Lt. Col. Robert E., USMC: 363
INDEX 481

Dadi Beach: 362

Death Valley, drive on: 134-35, 170-81, 184-

90, 194-95, 200, 203, 206-10, 213-14, 216-

21, 230-32, 238

Dededo: 377, 407-08, 417

Defense doctrine, Japanese: 283, 332-33, 348

Defense systems, Japanese

on Guam: 322, 327

on Iwo Jima: 63

on Okinawa: 63

on Saipan: 51-52

Defense systems, U.S., on Guam: 22

Del Valle, Brig. Gen. Pedro A., USMC: 352,

356

Demolitions. See also Shaped charges; Underwater demolition teams.

on Guam: 316, 344, 369, 432

on Saipan: 127, 143, 264

training in: 45

Destroyer Division 46: 321

Destroyers

Bancroft: 213

Barnes: 23-24

Braine: 76-77

Gilmer: 272-73

Stringham: 272-73

Waller: 288

Dickerson: 322

Diesel oil, in fire bombs: 288

Distances, relative

Guam: 26, 307

Marianas: 26

Pacific: 1, 12, 47

Saipan: 1, 12, 26, 47

Tinian: 26, 269

Division Artillery

3d Marine Division: 367

77th Infantry Division: 352, 356, 367, 398,

400, 402, 421, 423, 429

Donnay: 220

Dooley, Capt. James A.: 219

Dorey, 1st Lt. Willis K.: 250-54

Dummy positions, Japanese concept of: 64

Dutch East Indies. See Netherlands Indies.

DUKW's: 45, 80, 124, 126, 128-29, 260-61,

275, 277, 289, 292, 301, 316, 319, 320, 345,

355, 358-59

Japanese type: 280

versatility of, proved: 300-301

Efate: 320

Embarkation operations. See also Loading and

unloading operations.

for Guam: 318-19

for Saipan: 47-50

Embick, Lt. Gen. Stanley D.: 17

Engineer Battalions

34th: 124-25, 127

Engineer Battalions—Continued

152d: 124-25

1341st: 124, 128, 275-76, 292, 300

Engineer Combat Battalions

102d: 253

242d: 345

302d: 384, 398

Engineer Group, 1165th: 124

Engineer operations. See also Engineer Battalions; Engineer Combat Battalions; Engineer

troops, training of.

Guam: 344, 350, 384-85, 398, 404-05, 422,

427

Saipan: 101, 124, 127-28, 152, 156, 227, 253

Engineer troops, training of: 45

Eniwetok Island

as base for Guam: 315-20

as base for Marianas: 50

as base for Tinian: 271

target date for: 13

U.S. seizure of: 15-16, 39, 56

Enola Gay: 303

Erskine, Brig. Gen. Graves B., USMC: 99-100,

151, 169, 199

Espiritu Santo: 320

Europe, air attacks on: 11

Expeditionary Troops (Task Force 56): 35. See

also Corps, V Marine Amphibious; Northern

Troops and Landing Force; Smith, Lt. Gen.

Holland M., USMC; Southern Troops and

Landing Force.

Holland Smith named commander: 35-36

intelligence estimates by: 50-52

operations plan: 40

orders palletizing: 48-49

rehearsals and training: 45-47

Facpi Point: 24, 308, 315-16, 334, 352, 355, 374,

376

Fadian Point: 307, 379

Fagan, Capt. Francis L., USMC: 403

Faibus San Hilo Point: 275, 280, 282, 288, 291,

295

Fairchild, Maj. Gen. Muir S.: 17

Famja: 378

Far East, defense plans for: 3

Farallon de Pajaros: 24

Fast Carrier Task Force. See Mitscher, Vice Adm.

Marc A.; Task Forces, 58.

Feints. See also Ruses.

Tanapag Harbor: 40

Tinian: 276, 289

Ferris, Col. Charles: 125

Field Artillery, conversion of personnel to CAC:

46

Field Artillery Battalions

53d: 46

104th: 101, 148, 159, 215, 259
482 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Field Artillery Battalions—Continued

105th: 101-02, 259

106th: 101, 207-08, 259, 277, 299

145th: 38, 285n

225th: 98, 133, 285n

249th: 101-02

304th: 352, 363

305th: 345, 349, 352, 363, 368

306th: 362, 368

531st: 98, 133, 285

532d: 110, 285n

902d: 352, 362, 367, 380, 434

Field Artillery Groups

149th: 98

225th: 46

419th: 298

430th: 98, 299

Fifth Air Force: 11-12, 323. See also Kenney,

Lt. Gen. George C.

Fifth Fleet: 33, 99, 121-22, 441, 446. See also

Spruance, Vice Adm. Raymond A.

Fighter aircraft. See P-47's.

Fighter Group, 318th: 288

Fighter Squadrons

19th: 132

73d: 132

Fiji, Japanese designs on: 4

Fina Susu ridge. See Mount Fina Susu.

Finaguayac: 331

Finegayan: 308, 388, 391, 395, 396, 398, 401-

04, 407, 414-17, 419, 421, 431

Fire bombs, diesel oil in: 288

Fire control and direction. See Artillery fire

support, control of; Naval gunfire support,

control and co-ordination of.

Flame throwers

Guam: 316, 428, 432

Saipan: 101, 227, 242, 364

Tinian: 298

Flares, tactical use of: 341-42, 409. See also

Illumination, battlefield.

Fleck, 1st Lt. Louis W.: 176

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific: 195n, 271. See

also Smith, Lt. Gen. Holland M., USMC.

Flores Point seaplane base: 41, 51-52, 54, 65,

242

Flying Fish: 99

Foery, Maj. Martin: 219, 238

Fonte plateau: 331, 363-66, 371-74, 377

FORAGER: 98. See also Guam; Mariana Islands;

Rota Island; Saipan; Tinian.

Force Beachhead Line

definition of: 109

on Guam: 361-76, 379, 383

Formosa: 13, 15-19

Fortification, by Japanese

of Guam: 334-36

Fortification, by Japanese—Continued

of Mandated Islands: 53-58

of Marianas: 61-62, 334

of Saipan: 61-62

of Tinian: 278-83

Fourth of July Hill: 241

Fremont: 99-100

Friendly troops, fire on

by aircraft: 227, 345, 357, 374, 407, 435, 427

by artillery: 87, 328, 338, 345, 357, 369, 374,

392, 398, 402-03, 406-07, 425, 432-34

by naval gunfire: 87

by small arms: 209

by tank fire: 402-03, 407, 432, 434

Fuchida, Capt. Mitsuo: 445

Fuchs, 2d Lt. Charles J.: 369

Fududome, Vice Adm. Shigeru: 445

Fuel depots, postbattle development of: 442-43

Fuel supply: 277-78

Gaan Point: 335, 342, 345-47, 352, 356

Ganio, 2d Lt. Gino: 250

Garapan: 28, 41, 52, 65, 67-68, 74, 79-80, 93,

95, 109, 116, 137, 163, 165-66, 168-69,

189-90, 210, 220, 227, 230, 232, 238-239,

243, 442

Geelvink Bay: 10, 18, 120

Geiger, Lt. Gen. Roy S., USMC: 35, 309-15,

318, 322, 325-27, 351, 354-55, 357, 361,

371, 374, 376, 378, 383, 385-86, 393, 400,

403, 408-09, 418, 421, 427, 429, 434, 436-

37

George Clymer: 313, 339

George F. Elliott: 48

Gil, 1st Lt. Jose: 101, 104, 182

Gilbert Islands: 4, 7, 9, 13, 62

Gilliam, Maj. William M., USMC: 325

Gilmer: 373-73

GRANITE: 13-14, 16-17, 39

Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. See Philippine

Sea, naval battle of.

Green Beach, Guam: 343

Green Beaches, Saipan: 81, 83, 86, 88-89, 92,

173

Greene, Lt. Col. Charles F.: 355

Greenling: 326-27

Grenade attacks, Japanese

Guam: 388, 405

Saipan: 156, 215, 222, 228, 231, 248

Grenade attacks, U.S.

Guam: 365, 392, 435, 428

Saipan: 178-79, 188, 217, 219, 264

Grenades, antitank, U.S.: 88, 159

Grid system of co-ordinates: 182n

Griffin, Col. Raphael, USMC: 376

Griner, Maj. Gen. George W.: 192-93, 225,

227-28, 230, 238, 244, 251, 253-54, 257,

261
INDEX 483

Ground reconnaissance. See Reconnaissance,

ground.

Guadalcanal: 6, 314, 319-30, 326

Guam: 307-437. See also Mariana Islands.

air attacks, Japanese: 23-24, 324

air attacks, U.S.: 43, 73, 99, 122, 312-14,

320, 322-25, 339-42, 345, 352, 357, 362,

368, 371, 378, 407, 418, 421-22, 425, 427,

430, 432, 436, 446

air losses, Japanese: 51, 323-24

air losses, U.S.: 323

airfield development, Japanese: 60

airfield development, U.S.: 334, 443

ambushes, Japanese: 390-91, 415, 422, 424

ammunition expenditures: 321, 323-24, 339,

367-69

ammunition shortages: 358-59

amphibious operations, Japanese: 24

antiaircraft defenses, U.S.: 23

antitank measures, Japanese: 335

area bombardment: 312, 314, 321-24, 326,

339

artillery dispositions, Japanese: 332-35

artillery fire support, Japanese: 342, 344-45,

348, 332, 354, 362-63, 368, 393, 406, 412,

424-25, 428, 433

artillery fire support, U.S.: 345, 349, 352, 356,

362, 365, 367-69, 371, 373, 380, 386, 394,

396, 398, 400, 402. 404, 409, 414, 421, 423, 424, 428-29, 432, 436

assault force strength: 36, 319

assault by Japanese: 24

assault phase: 339-59

as B-29 base: 309, 443

banzai attacks: 365, 368, 371

barbed wire use, Japanese, 322, 335

bayonet fighting U.S.: 365

bazooka fire support, U.S.: 88, 348, 392, 411,

428

beach defenses: 334-35

beaches, consolidation of: 348-54, 356-57

Blue Beach: 343

bomb tonnages expended: 325

Bonins as Japanese base for: 23

boundaries, operational: 312, 342-45, 421-

22, 427, 431-34

canister, U.S.: 369

Carolines as U.S. base for: 324

casualties, Army total: 437, 446

casualties, Japanese, periodic: 348, 365-66,

369-70, 381, 388, 396, 402, 405, 407, 413-

17, 426, 428-29, 431, 434, 436

casualties, Japanese, total: 437

casualties, Marine Corps total: 437, 446

casualties, Navy total: 437

casualties, U.S., periodic: 344, 348, 356, 366,

391, 396, 401-03, 405, 411, 413-14, 416,

Guam—Continued

casualties, U.S., periodic—Continued

423, 425, 425n, 426, 427n, 428-31, 434

casualties, U.S. total: 437

civil government, Japanese: 69

climate: 309, 339, 406-07, 411, 416

close air support: 313, 368

command structure for: 309-12

communications, Japanese: 325-26, 364n, 366,

378, 418

communications, U.S.: 345, 355, 376, 387, 390,

398, 404, 409

consolidation phase: 361-76

counterattacks, Japanese: 347-48, 354, 364-

67, 388, 391-92, 402, 411, 414, 428

counterbattery fire: 312, 325

damage assessment: 325-26, 335

declared secured: 437

defensive measures, Japanese: 322, 327

defensive measures, U.S.: 22

defensive plan, Japanese: 23, 55, 330-33

demolitions: 316, 344, 369, 432

distances, relative: 26, 307

dual-purpose guns, Japanese: 332

embarkation phase for: 318-19

engineer operations: 344, 350, 384-85, 398,

404-05, 422, 427

Eniwetok as U.S. base for: 315-17, 319-30

evacuation of casualties: 394-96, 398, 412

exploitation phase: 377-408

first air mission against Japan from: 443

flame throwers, U.S.: 316, 438, 432

flares, tactical use of: 341-42, 409

Force Beachhead Line: 109, 361-76, 379, 382

fortification of, by Japanese: 334-36

friendly troops, fire on: 345, 357, 369, 374,

392, 398, 402-03, 406-07, 425, 433-34

fuel depot development: 443

garrison strength, Japanese: 55-56, 327, 329,

377, 430, 433, 437

garrison strength, U.S.: 22

Green Beach: 343

grenade attacks, Japanese: 388, 405

grenade attacks, U.S.: 365, 392, 425, 428

Guadalcanal as U.S. base for: 314, 319-20, 326

Hahajima as Japanese base for: 24

hand-to-hand fighting: 364-65

harbor facilities: 29, 309, 385

Hawaii as training area for: 316, 318-19

infiltration tactics, Japanese: 348, 351, 364,

388-90, 402, 414, 428

intelligence estimates: 326-27, 374-76, 396,

430, 433

Isely Field in support of: 430

Japanese admission of loss of: 436

Japanese seizure of: 24

Japanese situations, periodic: 329, 335-37,
484 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Guam—Continued

Japanese situations, periodic—Continued

377, 408, 417-18

JCS directive on: 309

Kwajalein as U.S. base for: 314

landing craft requirements: 319-20

landing craft shortages: 347, 355, 358

liaison measures: 345

loading and unloading operations: 316, 318-20

logistical aspects: 318-19

LVT losses: 342-43

machine gun fire support, Japanese: 64, 76,

156, 342, 344, 357. 362-63, 365, 388, 391- 95, 402, 407, 411-12, 414, 422, 425, 427-28,

433

machine gun fire support, U.S.: 369, 371,

387-88, 391-92, 394-95, 412, 424, 428

map deficiencies: 326-27, 390, 404, 406, 413,

415

military police, U.S.: 347

mine clearance: 344, 369

mines, land, Japanese: 335, 354, 368, 385, 388,

401

morale, Japanese: 336-37, 339, 368, 371, 380,

432

mortar fire support, Japanese: 342, 344, 348,

352, 363, 368

mortar fire support, U.S.: 388, 395, 412, 414

mud, hindrance by: 406, 416

native population: 309

natives, Japanese treatment of: 332, 376,

381-82

naval base, development as: 22, 443

naval complement, U.S.: 22-23, 319, 321

naval gunfire support: 42, 312-13, 320-22,

325, 339-42, 345, 352, 354, 368-69, 378, 386, 413, 421, 423, 430, 432

Navy control of: 22

night actions: 364-65, 384, 411, 428

Nimitz directive on: 309-10

northern section, drive to: 377-437

officer losses, Japanese: 365, 417

officer losses, U.S.: 398

palletization of supplies: 318-19

panel displays: 374

panic, threat of: 412

pillboxes: 335, 342, 345, 357, 362, 368-69,

388, 392, 424

planning phase: 309-20

pole charges, U.S.: 432

population: 309

postwar resistance: 437

prisoners captured by U.S.: 430

psychological warfare: 437

ration shortages, U.S.: 382, 387

reconnaissance, aerial, Japanese: 23

reconnaissance, aerial, U.S.: 26, 51, 322-23,

Guam—Continued

reconnaissance, aerial, U.S.—Continued

326, 374, 387, 406, 409, 414-15

reconnaissance, beach, Japanese: 23

reconnaissance, beach, U.S.: 28, 322, 345, 355

reconnaissance, ground: 374-76, 380, 386-90,

394, 402-05, 407, 413, 415-17, 419, 430,

432, 434. 436

reconnaissance, submarine: 326-27

recovery of: 1, 7, 307-437

Red Beaches: 344

rehearsals and training: 314-18

reinforcements, Japanese: 329

reserves, landing: 354-56

rifle fire, Japanese: 342, 344, 349, 376, 388,

390-92, 395, 398, 407, 412, 414, 422, 424,

428, 433

rifle fire, U.S.: 365, 391-92, 395. 412, 424

road system: 308-09, 327, 383-87, 421-22

roadblocks, Japanese: 387-88, 401-03, 407,

435-36

roadblocks, U.S.: 345, 348, 407, 431

rocket fire support: 325, 342

ruses, Japanese: 378, 406

Saipan in support of: 418, 430

ship-to-shore movement: 342-43

shipping, U.S., attacks on: 23

shipping losses, Japanese: 321, 331

shipping requirements, U.S.: 319-20

shore party organization: 343-47

smoke, tactical use of: 403

snipers, Japanese: 373

Solomons as U.S. base for: 314, 319-20

strongpoints: 432

suicides, Japanese: 368, 432

supply operations: 318-20, 357-59, 382-88, 417

supply tonnages: 319

surrender, U.S.: 24

tactical plans, Japanese: 23, 55, 309-20, 330-

33, 377

tactical plans, U.S.: 164, 309-20, 400-402,

419, 430-31, 433

tank destroyer support: 369-70, 401

tank losses, Japanese: 334, 348, 354, 383, 394,

413, 415, 428

tank losses, U.S.: 355, 392, 424

tank strength, Japanese: 334

tank support, Japanese: 348, 354, 362-63,

383. 391-92, 411-12, 415, 425, 428, 436

tank support, U.S.: 316, 345, 348-50, 354,

357, 369-70, 373, 380, 386-90, 392-96, 398,

400-405, 407, 411-12, 414-16, 418-19,

423-27, 429-32, 434

target date for: 13, 39, 98-100, 312, 314-

15. 320, 339

target designation: 314, 322, 409

terrain, difficulty of: 344-45, 349, 352-53,
INDEX 485

Guam—Continued

terrain, difficulty of—Continued

356, 368-69, 374, 380, 384, 393, 397-401,

403-07, 409, 412-15, 417, 422, 424, 427, 435

topography: 24-26, 28-30, 307-09

training for: 315-18

troop dispositions, Japanese: 329-33

troop list, U.S.: 311

underwater demolition teams: 312, 322, 335

vegetation: 30, 308

water purification: 382

water shortage: 344, 382, 386, 400

water supply: 386-87, 398, 400

weapons available, Japanese: 333-34

White Beaches: 344-45, 359

withdrawal to north, Japanese: 377-78

Yellow Beaches: 344-45

Guns, Japanese

4-cm: 68, 224

6-in.: 160, 282, 289

8-cm: 68

12-cm: 68, 333

12.7-cm: 333

14-cm: 68, 160

15-cm: 68, 333

20-cm: 333, 388

20-mm: 282, 333, 394, 435

25-mm: 282, 333

37-mm: 282, 333, 335, 342, 425

40-mm: 335

47-mm: 282, 302, 415, 425

57-mm: 333, 412

70-mm: 342

75-mm: 93, 97, 167, 282, 332-33, 335, 342, 407

76.2-mm: 282

120-mm: 282

140-mm: 282, 286

dual-purpose: 106, 112, 139, 332

Guns, U.S.

20-mm: 322, 342, 352, 356

37-mm: 44, 81, 83, 88, 145, 154, 342

40-mm: 43, 131, 155, 160, 287, 322, 342, 352,

356

75-mm: 189, 302, 342, 394, 415

90-mm: 155, 157, 160, 368

105-mm: 97

155-mm: 38, 133, 285, 299, 352, 396

dual-purpose: 155, 157, 160

Gurguan Point: 269, 278, 282, 286, 288, 295, 303

Hahajima, as Japanese base for Guam: 24

Hale, Maj. Gen. Willis H.: 323

Hall, Col. W. Carvell, USMC: 344, 356

Hallden, Capt. Charles N.: 175, 177-78, 184,

214, 218

Halmahera: 10, 14, 18

Halsey, Admiral William F.: 5, 16

Hamilton, Col. Stephen S.: 355, 382, 392

Hand-to-hand fighting

Guam: 364-65

Saipan: 178, 218, 254-55, 258

Handy, Maj. Gen. Thomas T.: 195

Hanna, Maj. Joseph: 398

Hansa Bay: 10, 12, 18

Hara-kiri. See Suicides, Japanese.

Harakiri Gulch: 245-59, 262-64

Harbor facilities

Guam: 29, 309, 385

Marianas: 441-42

Saipan: 28, 442

Tinian: 272, 442

Harmon Field: 443

Harmon Road: 345, 348, 349-50, 352

Harper, Brig. Gen, Arthur M.: 38, 98, 110, 133,

276, 291. See also Corps Artillery, XXIV.

Harper, 2d Lt. Edward C.: 394

Hart, Lt. Col. Joseph T.: 100, 226, 230

Hashigoru: 220

Hathorn Sound: 320

Hawaiian Islands

as base for Marianas: 39, 45-46, 48, 316,

318-19

as base for Marshalls: 9

in P.I. line of communication: 3

role in Pacific plans: 2

training area for Marianas: 46-47, 76, 316,

318-19

Hayashi, Lt.: 279

Headquarters ships. See AGC's.

Heavy bombers. See B-24's.

Heavy weapons companies. See parent battalion

under Infantry Battalions.

Heikens, 1st Sgt. Edward: 205

Hell Valley. See Paradise Valley.

Hell's Pocket: 177-78, 186, 188, 208-09, 213,

215, 217, 219, 224, 225, 227

Heminway, Capt. William T: 175, 177, 184

Hensley, 1st Lt. Kenneth J., USMC: 265

Hepburn Board: 22

Hercules: 48

Higashikuni, Naruhiko: 445

Higgins boats. See LCVP's.

High-speed transports. See APD's.

Hill, Rear Adm. Harry W.: 35, 78, 99, 272, 274-

75, 286-89, 291, 299, 315

Hill, 2d Lt. Ralph W.: 231

Hill 40, Guam: 345, 348

Hillman, Capt. Charles T.: 412

Hills, derivation of names: 182n

Hills, Saipan

Able: 173, 182, 205n, 206, 214, 218, 221-22,

224-25, 227-31

George-How: 182

King: 182-83, 204, 213, 217-18, 221-22, 228,

231
486 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Hills, Saipan—Continued

Love: 175, 176, 182-84, 190, 204

Oboe: 182, 204, 213-14, 217, 219, 221-22

Queen: 182

Uncle-Victor: 231

Victor: 205, 214-15

Xray-Yoke: 182-84, 203-05, 205n, 214, 219, 222

112: 237, 239

221: 221, 237, 242

230: 116, 165

286: 116, 165, 173

343: 173

500: 159, 163

600: 181-82, 187

700: 226, 229-30, 238

721: 240-41, 245

767: 241, 245, 249

Hilo staging area: 48

Hiragushi, Maj. Takashi: 131

Hirohito, Emperor of Japan: 11 7

Hiroshima, bombing of: 303, 443

Hiruma, Capt. Masagi: 279

Hitchner, 2d Lt. Richard: 184

Hiyo: 122

Hodge, Maj. Gen. John R.: 193

Hogaboom, Col. Robert, USMC: 149

Hollandia: 10, 18-19, 69

Holmes, Brig. Gen. Henry B., Jr.: 193

Hong Kong: 3, 8

Honolulu: 320, 352

Hori, Maj. Gen. Tomitara: 23

Howitzers, Japanese, 105-mm: 93, 333. See also

Artillery support, Japanese; Guns, Japanese.

Howitzers, U.S. See also Artillery support, U.S.;

Guns, U.S.

75-mm: 81, 83, 90, 92, 95, 97n, 215, 247, 275-

77, 286, 289, 298

105-mm: 45, 95-96, 129, 148, 215, 247, 261,

276, 298, 380, 423

155-mm: 38, 93, 96, 133, 207, 291, 298-99,

352, 423

Hump operations: 12

Idaho: 320-31

Iketa, Maj. Gen. Keiji: 117

Illumination, battlefield: 95-96, 130, 209

Imanishi, Lt.: 323-24

Imperial General Headquarters: 58, 69-70, 117,

326

Inalas: 351, 356, 373

Inarajan: 331

India, air supply to China from: 12

Indianapolis: 191, 291, 437

Infantry Battalions

1st, 105th Regiment: 109, 111-12, 138-46, 150,

220, 226, 238, 241-42, 251, 253-56, 258, 261

2d, 105th Regiment: 109, 111, 144-45, 147-48,

150-61, 191, 198-200, 245, 247-48, 251-61

Infantry Battalions—Continued

3d, 105th Regiment: 109, 111-13, 138, 141-

42, 144-45, 150, 152. 225, 227-28, 231, 238,

244-45, 247-51, 253-54, 256, 258-59

1st, 106th Regiment: 38, 165, 170, 186, 303-

04, 206-07, 213, 215, 217, 219-20, 224-25,

227-28, 231, 241, 261

2d, 106th Regiment: 169-70, 178, 184, 186-

88, 203, 206-10, 213-14, 216-19, 222-24,

227-28, 231, 241, 261

3d, 106th Regiment: 38, 169-70, 172, 175,

177-80, 184-86, 203, 206-07, 213-15, 217-

20, 222-25, 232, 241, 242, 262

1st, 165th Regiment: 100-106, 111-13, 138,

140-41, 170, 175-77, 181-84, 220, 226, 230,

240, 242, 244, 248-49, 262

2d, 165th Regiment: 100-102, 105-06, 111-

13, 138, 140, 142, 144, 170, 175-77, 183-83,

204-05, 213-22, 225-32, 244-48

3d, 165th Regiment: 100n, 102, 111-14, 140,

142-47, 150, 170, 183-85, 204-07, 219-20,

222, 226, 229-30, 238, 241, 244-45, 247,

249, 254, 264

1st, 305th Regiment: 317, 345-49. 373-75,

380, 382, 387, 394, 397, 404-05, 409-T3,

419, 427, 429, 436

2d, 305th Regiment: 317, 345-46, 349, 352,

363, 380, 382, 387-88, 394, 397, 404-13,

419, 422, 427, 429, 436

3d, 305th Regiment: 317, 345-47, 349, 352,

373-74. 380-82, 387-88, 390, 393-94, 397,

405, 411, 413, 417, 437-29

1st, 306th Regiment: 355, 414-16, 419, 433,

426-27, 429, 431-34

2d, 306th Regiment: 355, 422, 429, 431-44

3d, 306th Regiment: 355, 413-17, 419, 422,

425-26, 428-29, 431-34

1st, 307th Regiment: 380-82, 387-88, 390-92,

394, 396-97, 402-04, 416-17, 422, 425-26, 428-30

3d, 307th Regiment: 363, 373-74, 380, 382,

387, 390, 392-95, 397-403, 417, 422-23, 425. 429-30

3d, 307th Regiment: 371, 373, 380, 382, 387-

91, 397-402, 404, 416-17, 422-25, 427, 429-

30, 432, 434

Infantry Companies. See parent battalion under

Infantry Battalions.

Infantry Divisions

1st: 33

7th: 14, 37

25th: 38

27th: 191-201. See also Griner, Maj. Gen,

George W.; Jarman, Maj. Gen. Sanderford;

Smith, Maj. Gen. Ralph C.

at Aslito airfield: 95-117
INDEX 487

Infantry Divisions—Continued

27th—Continued

casualties: 105-06, 144, 146-48, 150, 159,

165, 175-76, 178, 180, 183-86, 190,

204, 207, 213, 215, 217-18, 222, 224,

228, 231-32, 232n, 261, 265

in central Saipan drive: 163-90, 203-33

combat experience of: 38

at Eniwetok: 15

on Guam: 311, 314

at Makin: 9

multiple plans for: 41-42

at Nafutan Point: 137-61, 163

National Guard background of: 37

in New Hebrides: 265

in northern Saipan drive: 237-66

overseas service of: 37-38

in Saipan landing: 36, 39, 41, 99-106,

109-11, 114, 125-26, 128, 130, 135

in southern Saipan drive: 71-117, 137-61

on Tinian: 276-77, 286

training and rehearsals: 45, 47, 49-50

77th, See also Bruce, Maj. Gen. Andrew D.

alerted for Marianas: 39

casualties: 348, 356, 391, 396, 401-02,

405, 411, 413-14, 416, 423, 425, 425n,

426-27, 429-31, 434. 437 on Guam: 311-12, 315-436

training: 315-18

Infantry Regiments

105th: 41, 100, 109-10, 114, 124-25, 138,

144, 147, 149, 152, 154, 160, 191, 198-200, 235, 227-28, 244, 254, 259, 261, 276

106th: 15, 41, 47, 50, 99-100, 111, 124, 126,

144-45, 164-65, 170, 172, 177-78, 181-82,

187, 190, 201, 203, 205, 207, 213-14, 216,

219-20, 225, 227-28, 231-32, 238, 241-42,

244, 259, 261

165th: 38, 41, 100-106, 109, 111, 114-15,

124-25, 139-40, 142, 144, 147, 169-70, 172,

180-82, 186-87, 190, 198-99, 201, 203-04, 206, 208-09, 216-17, 220, 232, 241, 244,

261, 263-65

305th: 315-16, 319, 344-45, 348, 350-56, 361-

63, 373, 380-82, 386-88, 390-91, 393-94, 396-402, 404-05, 409, 411, 413, 416-17, 419,

422, 427, 429-31

306th: 317, 351-52, 355-56, 361-63, 378-80,

393, 401-02, 404-05, 409, 412, 414-23, 426-

27, 429, 431-34, 436

307th: 317, 351, 355, 357, 361, 363, 380,

382, 386-88, 390-94, 396-405, 409, 414,

416-17, 419-26, 429-34, 436

Infantryman, load of: 347

Infiltration tactics, Japanese. See also Banzai

attacks.

Guam: 348, 351, 364, 388-90, 402, 414, 428

Infiltration tactics, Japanese—Continued

Saipan: 96-97, 152, 159, 244

Tinian: 294

Infiltration tactics, U.S., on Saipan: 177

Intelligence estimates, U.S.

on Guam: 326-27, 374-76, 396, 430, 433

on Marianas: 26-27

on Saipan: 50-52, 152, 160

on Tinian: 278-80, 282-83, 295

Interservice co-ordination, U.S.: 446-47

Interservice differences, Japanese: 56-57, 280

Interservice differences, U.S.: 149-51, 178-79,

191-201, 447

Ipapac: 377

Isely Field: 286, 288, 295, 299, 443. See also

Aslito airfield.

first B-29 base: 443

misspelling of name: 112, 443n

in support of Guam: 430

Isely, Comdr. Robert H.: 112, 443n

Island Command, Guam: 320

Isumi, Capt.: 279

Iwo Jima: 63, 445

Japan

agents of, landed on Guam: 23

Aleutians, plans for: 4

bombing of

from China: 7, 8, 12

from Guam: 443

from Marianas: 8, 12, 14, 443

plans for: 2, 7-8, 11-14

role of B-29 in: 443-45

from Tinian: 303

defensive forced on: 4-6

and East Indies lines of communication: 6-7

Fiji, plans for: 4

government, fall of: 445

Guam loss, admission of: 436

JCS plan for defeat of: 7-9

League of Nations, withdrawal from: 53

Marianas, effect of loss on: 443, 445-46

Midway, decisiveness of: 4, 119

militarists, decline of: 1

New Caledonia, plans for: 4

Pacific conquests, extent of: 4

plans for defeat of: 2-4, 7-9

role of Marianas in defeat of: 443

Samoa, plans for: 4

Japanese Army units. See also Imperial General

Headquarters.

Group, Southern Marianas Army: 329

Army, 31st: 57, 61-64, 69-70, 74, 78-79, 95-

96, 110-11, 116-17, 131, 166, 211, 221, 329,

371, 378, 408

Divisions

29th: 58-59, 211, 221, 325-26, 331

43d: 58-59, 61, 65, 67, 72, 117, 166, 173, 258
488 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Japanese Army units—Continued

Brigades

9th Independent Mixed: 58, 67

10th Independent Mixed: 329, 331

47th Independent Mixed: 58-59, 65, 67,

137. 159, 163, 166, 211

48th Independent Mixed: 58, 326, 327n,

331, 339, 364, 377

Regiments

3d Independent Mountain Artillery: 65,

68, 211, 258

7th Independent Engineer: 61, 65, 166, 211

9th Tank: 65, 68, 79, 98, 166, 211, 331-

32, 334

10th Independent Mixed: 58

10th Independent Mixed Infantry: 332-

33, 364, 366

11th Independent Engineer: 166

11th Infantry: 327, 327n

11th Mountain Artillery: 331

15th Infantry: 59

16th Independent Engineer: 61

18th Infantry: 59, 69, 110, 326, 331, 333,

364-66

35th Antiaircraft Artillery: 65, 68-69, 76

38th Infantry: 326, 311, 332-33, 348

50th Infantry: 278, 280, 289, 293-94

118th Infantry: 60, 65, 166, 172, 211, 258

135th Infantry: 65, 93, 117, 166, 211,

245, 258, 278, 294

136th Infantry: 65, 67, 98, 166, 173, 211,

241-42, 245, 258

Battalions

38th Infantry Regiment Artillery: 331-32

52d Antiaircraft Artillery: 332

315th Independent Infantry: 65

316th Independent Infantry: 65

317th Independent Infantry: 65, 137, 159

318th Independent Infantry: 65

319th Independent Infantry: 331

320th Independent Infantry: 33 1

321st Independent Infantry: 331

322d Independent Infantry: 331

Companies

18th Infantry Tank: 278, 280

43d Independent Antiaircraft: 69

45th Field Machine Cannon: 69

264th Independent Motor Transport: 279

miscellaneous units

1st Expeditionary Unit: 58-59, 63

5th Expeditionary Unit: 58-59

6th Expeditionary Unit: 58-59

8th Expeditionary Unit: 69

9th Expeditionary Unit: 59, 166

10th Independent Mixed Regiment Artillery Unit: 331

29th Division Tank Unit: 331, 334, 377

Japanese Army units—Continued

miscellaneous units—Continued

29th Field Hospital Detachment: 279

38th Independent Mixed Brigade Artillery

Unit: 331

47th Independent Mixed Brigade Artillery

Unit: 68

53d Field Hospital: 258

60th Antiaircraft Defense Unit: 329

82d Antiaircraft Defense Unit: 279

83d Antiaircraft Defense Unit: 279

755th Air Unit: 332

Coastal Security Force, Tinian: 280

Home Defense Headquarters: 445

Japanese Mandated Islands: 2-3, 22, 53-58

Japanese naval units

Fleets

Combined: 56, 60-61, 69, 99, 119-20, 445

Central Pacific Area: 56-57, 60-61, 65, 280

1st Air: 121, 279-80

1st Mobile: 120-21, 314, 323, 441

3d Air: 445

4th: 55-57

6th Submarine: 445

10th Area: 445

Forces

Yokosuka 1st Special Naval Landing: 55-

56, 65, 98, 106

5th Base: 65

5th Defense: 23, 55

5th Special Base: 55

54th Naval Guard: 55, 59, 327, 329, 332

55th Naval Guard: 58, 65, 256

56th Naval Guard: 278-80, 289, 294

65th Naval Guard: 58

Mount Santa Rosa Garrison: 377-78

miscellaneous units

4th Fleet Naval Stores Depot: 54-55

4th Naval Air Depot: 55

5th Communications Unit: 55

5th Construction Unit: 378

5th Field Hospital: 378n

16th Shipping Engineers Regiment: 65,

67, 258

18th Air Unit: 23

30th Labor Unit: 378n

217th Construction Unit: 378n

218th Construction Unit: 378n

233d Construction Unit: 279

263d Air Unit: 348, 378n

521st Air Unit: 378n

523d TOKA: 279

Otori Unit: 331

South Seas Detachment: 23

Japanese Navy

diversion of units: 120-21

Leyte Gulf battle, effect on: 445
INDEX 489

Japanese Navy—Continued

plans for engagement of: 13, 119-20, 441

Saipan, force on: 65

shortages in: 120

Japanese situations, periodic

on Guam: 329, 335-37, 377, 408, 417-18

on Saipan: 116-17, 165-67, 211-13, 221

on Tinian: 278-83

Jarman, Maj. Gen. Sanderford: 165, 178-79, 187,

191, 201, 203, 206-08, 213, 216, 219, 222,

225

Java: 3

Jensen, Lt. Col. Leslie M.: 147-48, 152, 257

JIG Day, use of term: 275

John Land: 50

Johnson, 1st Lt. George T.: 180, 185-86

Joint Army and Navy Board: 2, 7, See also Joint

Chiefs of Staff.

Joint Assault Signal Companies

1st: 130

2d: 130

292d: 316

295th: 45. 130

Joint Chiefs of Staff

at Casablanca Conference: 6

directive on Guam: 309

directive on Marianas: 1-2

directive on Nauru: 9

directive on Pacific planning: 16-20

directive on Rabaul: 5

directive on Tarawa: 9

functions of: 1-2

modifies plan for CENPAC: 9

plan for defeat of Japan: 2-4, 7-9

reorganizes Pacific theater: 4-5

postpones Marshalls operation: 10-11

Joint Expeditionary Force: 99. See also Turner,

Vice Adm. Richmond Kelly.

Joint Intelligence Center, POA: 26-27

Joint Logistics Committee: 18

Joint Staff Planners: 7, 39

Joint Strategic Survey Committee: 17-19

Jones, Capt. James L., USMCR: 272

Joy, Rear Adm. C. Turner: 321

Jungle operations

Japanese ability: 418

tactical principles: 397-98, 418, 426

training in: 45

Jupiter: 48

Kagman Hill: 210

Kagman peninsula: 29, 67, 133-34, 166, 168,

170, 182, 187, 190, 210, 216, 225-26, 232-33

Kagman Plain: 206, 210

Kahi, Maj. Katuro: 279

Kahoolawe training area: 46-47, 76, 316

Kahului staging area: 48

Kai: 14

Kakuta, Vice Adm. Kakuji: 279-80

Karaberra Pass: 264

Kataoaka, Lt. Col. Ichiro: 366

Kauffman, Lt. Comdr. Draper L.: 972

Kavieng: 12, 13, 15, 18, 19

Keiyo Maru: 74n

Kelley, Col. Gerard W.: 100-102, 105-06, 111-

12, 141-42, 144, 169-70, 177, 183, 204-05,

220, 226, 232

Kemp, Staff Sgt. Laurence I.: 105

Kenney, Lt. Gen. George C.: 11-12, 14. See also

Fifth Air Force.

Kernan, Brig. Gen. Redmond F., Jr.: 170, 192,

215, 277

Kimbrell, Lt. Col. Gordon T.: 355, 425

King, Admiral Ernest J.: 195-96

advocates acceleration in Pacific: 6

on CENPAC plans: 17-18

on control of SOPAC naval forces: 17

on JCS: I

on Marianas operation: 6-9, 14, 441, 446

supported by AAF: 12

King, 1st Lt. Hugh P.: 254, 259

Kinkaid, Vice Adm. Thomas C.: 14

Kiska: 7

Knee mortars. See Grenade attacks, Japanese.

Kohler Field: 443

Koga, Adm. Mineichi: 119-20

Kokuyo Maru: 59

KON operation: 120-21

Konoye, Fumimaro: 443-44

Kuril Islands, Japanese seizure: 4

Kwajalein: 13, 39, 50, 56, 314

L-4 liaison aircraft: 135

Lae: 7

Laguas River: 363

Lake Susupe: 29, 108-09, 115, 165

Lalo Point: 269

Land mines. See Mines, land, clearance of;

Mines, land, use by Japanese.

Landing craft. See also LCI's, LCI(G)'s; LCM's;

LCPR's; LCR's; LCT's; LCVP's; LSD's;

LST's; LVT's; LVT(A)'s; LVT(A) (1)'s,

LVT(A)(4)'s.

Guam, requirements for: 319-20

shortages in: 100n, 347, 355, 358

Landing operations. See also Amphibious operations; Counterlandings, Japanese.

Guam: 339-59

Saipan: 71-93

Tinian: 288-93

Landing ships. See LSD's; LST's.

Landrum, Lt. Col. James E., Jr.: 347

Larsen, Maj. Gen. Henry L., USMC: 320

LaSalle: 50

Laulau: 116, 168, 181

LCI's: 43, 288
490 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

LCI(G)'s: 42-44, 80, 110, 129, 131, 213, 264,

287, 291, 322, 342, 386

LCM's: 80, 92, 277, 288-89, 316, 342

LCPR's: 328

LCR's: 272-74, 347

training in use: 45

LCT's: 124, 128, 277, 288-89, 316

LCVP's: 85n, 288, 316, 346, 358

League of Nations, Japanese withdrawal from:

33

Leahy, Admiral William D.: 1

Learner, Lt. Col. Charles F.: 373, 398

Lee, Vice Adm. William A., Jr.: 74

Leever, Lt. Col. Edward B.: 368

LeMieux, Capt. Roderick V.: 188

Leonard, Capt. Francis T.: 112, 175, 182-83,

204-05,

Levi, Pfc. Benno: 374

Leyte Gulf: 99

naval battle of: 445

Liaison aircraft: 135

Liaison measures

in air support: 132-33

on Guam: 345

in naval gunfire: 130-31

on Saipan: 111 , 130-33

on Tinian : 299

Liberators, Navy: 26

Liberty ships: 47, 442

Liguan: 421-22, 426-27, 431

Lines of communication, Allied: 8

Lines of communication, Japanese

acceleration of operations against: 9

CENPAC, attacks through: 13

Japan-East. Indies: 6-7

Marianas as threat to: 8

Netherlands Indies-Japan: 15, 445

Lines of communication, U.S.

Australia-United States: 4-7

Hawaii-Philippines: 3

Marianas-Eniwetok: 26

Philippines-United States: 3

Loading and unloading operations

combat unit, definition of: 48n

convoy unit, definition of: 48n

at Guam: 316, 318-20

palletizatio n of supplies: 48-49, 128, 318-19

at Saipan: 47-50, 99, 110, 123-24

slings, use of: 277

at Tinian: 272, 277 , 300

trainin g in : 45-46

Lockwood, Vice Adm. Charles A.: 33

Logistical operations. See also Supply operations.

in amphibious operations: 123-31

China airfields, support of: 12

Guam: 318-19

Saipan: 123-29

Logistical operations Continued

Tinian: 270-71, 277

Los Negros Island: 15

Louisville: 287, 291, 302

Love, Capt. Edmund G,: 150n, 196, 248n

Lovell, Maj. John: 371, 398

LSD's: 47, 80, 277 , 288-89, 342

LST's: 47-50, 78-79, 89, 124, 127-28, 275, 277,

288-89, 301, 314, 316, 319, 342

Lulog: 419, 432, 434, 436

Lumuna Point: 427

Luzon: 13, 15-19. See also Philippine Islands.

LVT's: 43-44. 47, 49, 79-87, 85n, 89-91, 124,

261, 265, 275, 277-89, 291-92, 301, 316,

319-20, 342-43, 346-47, 350, 355, 357-59

losses at Guam: 342-43

repair of: 442

LVT(A)'s: 43-45, 49, 79-80, 82-92, 101, 239,

275, 291, 302, 313, 342, 349-50, 357

LVT(A)(1)'s: 81

LVT(A)(4)'s: 81

Lynn Haven Roads: 35

Maalea Bay, rendezvous area: 46

Maanot Pass: 349, 352, 361, 363

Maanot Reservoir: 374

MacArthur, General Douglas: 196

on CENPAC plans: 9-11, 17

and JCS directive on Rabaul: 5

on Marianas operation: 11

on Marshalls operation: 10-11

New Guinea, plans for recovery: 12

New Guinea-Mindanao plan: 16

and Philippines: 10

on RENO: 16-18

SOPAC naval forces, on control of: 16-17

and SWPA: 4, 10, 15, 18

on Truk seizure: 16

McCarthy, Maj. Edward: 248, 251-53, 256-61

McCormick, Maj. Stephen J.: 192n

McCoy, 1st Lt. Robert C.: 207

McDonough, Lt. Col. John F.: 101, 170, 176,

179, 204-05, 232

McGregor, 1st Lt. John T.: 224

Machine gun fire support, Japanese

Guam: 342, 344, 357, 362-63, 365, 388, 391-

95, 402, 407, 411-12, 414, 422, 425, 427-28,

433

Saipan: 97-98, 102, 106, 114-15, 143, 147,

150, 153, 157, 159, 168-69, 175, 177, 180-

84, 204-05, 207, 210, 213, 215-19, 222, 224,

227 , 229-31, 238, 240, 242, 248, 250-54, 265

Tinian: 302

Machine gun fire support, U.S.

Guam: 369, 371, 387-88, 391-92, 394-95, 412,

424, 428

Saipan: 44, 95, 98, 145, 156, 184, 186, 213,

225, 230, 250-51, 253, 256, 259
INDEX 491

Machine gun fire support, U.S.—Continued

Tinian: 293

Machine guns, Japanese

7.7-mm: 282

13-mm: 282

Machine guns, U.S.

caliber .30: 22

caliber .50: 22-23, 352

Mackin, Maj. Thomas R.: 398, 402, 425

McKinley, William: 22

McMillin, Capt. C. J., USN: 24

McMorris, Rear Adm. Charles H.: 14

McNair, Col. Douglas C.: 355, 416, 427n

McNair, Lt. Gen. Lesley J.: 416n

McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T.: 195

Magellan, Ferdinand: 21

Magicienne Bay: 28, 40-42, 67-68, 79, 97, 111,

114, 116, 133, 137-38, 140-42, 163, 165-66,

168, 170, 172, 181, 216, 273

Magpo Point: 350-51, 356

Mahan, Adm, Alfred Thayer: 119

Mahoney, Maj. James H.: 101, 170, 248-49

Majuro Atoll: 14-15, 71

Makin Atoll: 9, 56

Makunsha: 243, 247-48, 253-54, 257-58, 264

Malacca Strait: 8

Malaya: 3, 4, 7

Manengon: 332

Mang, Lt. Comdr. Louis W., USNR: 288

Mangan Quarry: 364

Maniagassa Island: 41, 265

Manuel, Lt. Col. Thomas B.: 392, 425, 430

Manus Island: 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19

Map deficiencies

on Guam: 326-27, 390, 404, 406, 413, 415

on Saipan: 116

Map grid system: 182n

Marcus Island, air attacks on: 71

Mariana Islands. See also Cabras Island; Guam;

Maniagassa Island; Pagan Island; Rota Island; Saipan; Tinian; Yona Island.

AAF advocates seizure of: 12

AAF aircraft engaged in: 446

air attacks on: 56, 69, 446

air losses, Japanese: 323

aircraft employed, U.S.: 446

airfield development, Japanese: 54, 60-62

airfield development, U.S.: 8, 12, 14, 441, 443,

445

Army's role, assessment of: 446

assault force strength: 36

as B-29 base: 443

as base for bombing Japan: 4, 12, 14, 443

casualties: 446

Churchill approval: 12

climate: 27-28

command structure: 33-36

Mariana Islands—Continued

construction, Japanese: 60-62

construction, postbattle: 443

defense tactics, Japanese: 63-64

distances, relative: 26

effect of loss of, on Japan: 443, 445-46

Eniwetok as U.S. base for: 50

fortification of, by Japanese: 61-62, 334

garrison strength: 55-56

geography: 24-30

harbor facilities: 441-42

Hawaii as U.S. base for: 39, 45-46, 48, 316,

318-19

history of: 21-22

in line of communications: 26

intelligence estimates: 26-27

interservice co-ordination: 446-47

Japanese expectations: 69-70

JCS directive: 1-2

joint operations, example of: 447-48

Joint. Staff study for: 39

key to western Pacific: 7-8

King's views on: 6-9, 14

Kwajalein as U.S. base for: 50, 314

MacArthur's views on: 11

Majuro as U.S. base for: 71

Marine Corps force engaged: 446

martial law, Japanese: 69

naval base development: 441-42

naval construction battalions at: 442

naval gunfire support: 71-78, 446

Navy's role in seizure of: 446

Nimitz as commander: 2, 19, 33, 39

objectives of seizure: 441-43

occupation by Japan: 4, 22-24

palletization of supplies: 48-49

Pearl Harbor conference on: 14

Philippine Sea battle, effect on: 99, 119-23,

441, 445

population: 21

prewar activities in: 53-55

reconnaissance, aerial, U.S.: 26, 43, 71. 73, 323

reconnaissance, beach, U.S.: 28

reconnaissance, submarine, U.S.: 26

reinforcement, Japanese: 53-60

role in Japanese defeat: 443

role in Japanese plans: 55-56, 445

role in U.S. prewar plans: 3

Roosevelt approval: 12

seizure by U.S., events leading to: 1-20

seizure by U.S., objectives: 441-43

shipping losses, Japanese: 73-74

target date for: 13, 19-20

topographical features: 29, 45, 62-63

Marine Amphibian Tractor Battalions

2d: 81, 275, 291

3d: 320
492 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Marine Amphibian Tractor Battalions—Continued

4th: 320

5th: 275

10th: 82, 84-85, 275

nth: 82

Marine Amphibious Truck Companies

1st: 300

2d: 300

Marine Armored Amphibious Tractor Battalion,

2d: 44, 81, 86, 275

Marine Artillery Battalions

1st, 10th Regiment: 90, 275

2d, 10th Regiment: 90, 275

3d, loth Regiment: 98, 259, 261

4th, 10th Regiment: 97

4th, VMAC Artillery: 298

5th, VMAC Artillery: 286

Marine Artillery Regiments

10th: 90, 97, 298

12th: 365

14th: 92, 101, 159, 241, 275, 292, 298

Marine Brigade, 1st Provisional

casualties: 356, 370, 437

on Guam: 38n, 164, 311-12, 315-17, 320, 344-

45, 350-52, 354-58, 361, 367-68, 379, 407-

08, 418, 434, 436

Marine Corps

amphibious doctrine, prewar: 33, 350

forces engaged in Marianas: 446

tactical doctrine: 350

Marine Corps schools: 27

Marine Defense Battalions

9th: 311, 352, 356, 407

14th: 311, 356, 368

Marine divisional artillery organization: 286n

Marine Divisions

1st: 33-35

2d: 191-201

activation: 36

at Aslito: 95-117

casualties: 90, 189-90, 227, 232, 238, 265

in central Saipan drive: 163-90, 203-33

combat experience: 37

at Nafutan Point: 137-61

in northern Saipan drive: 237-66

in Saipan landing: 36, 40-41, 44, 48, 67,

78-81, 83, 85-90, 92-93, 95-97, 106-11,

114-16, 124-25, 128, 130

in southern Saipan drive: 71-117, 137-61

on Tarawa: 9, 37

on Tinian: 275-76, 288-303

training and rehearsals: 45-47, 50

3d

casualties: 344, 356, 364, 366, 403, 437

on Guam: 311-13, 315-16, 320, 331, 339-

40, 343-45, 348, 356, 361, 363-65, 371, 373, 378-79, 383-85, 387, 393, 396-98,

Marine Divisions—Continued

3d—Continued

on Guam—Continued

400-403, 407, 416-18, 421-22, 432-36

4th: 191-201

activated: 37

at Aslito: 95-117

casualties: 159, 163, 187, 190, 232, 238,

265, 293

in central Saipan drive: 163-90, 203-33

combat experience: 37

in Marshalls: 14-15

at Nafutan Point: 137-61

in northern Saipan drive: 237-66

in Saipan landing: 36, 40, 44, 48, 78-79,

81, 83, 85-89, 91-93, 96-101, 105-09,

111, 113-16, 124-25, 128, 130

in southern Saipan drive: 71-117, 137-61

on Tinian: 272, 274-75, 277, 288-303

training and rehearsals: 45-50

6th: 38n

Marine Engineer Regiments

18th: 300

19th: 385

20th: 276, 292, 300

Marine Infantry Battalions

1st, 2d Regiment: 40-41, 97, 227, 364

2d, 2d Regiment: 89-90, 97

3d, 2d Regiment: 89

1st, 3d Regiment: 356-57

2d, 3d Regiment: 356-57. 371, 436

1st, 4th Regiment: 348, 362, 365, 407

2d, 4th Regiment: 349, 407

3d, 4th Regiment: 355

1st, 6th Regiment: 87-88

2d, 6th Regiment: 216, 265

3d, 6th Regiment: 87-88, 361, 363, 365

1st, 8th Regiment: 89, 210

2d, 8th Regiment: 83, 85, 89, 210, 216, 232

3d, 8th Regiment: 83, 89, 210, 216

1st, 9th Regiment: 373, 407

2d, 9th Regiment: 363-64, 371, 402-03, 407, 415

3d, 9th Regiment: 373

3d, 21st Regiment: 407

1st, 22d Regiment: 349, 353-54, 361-62, 379, 407

2d, 22d Regiment: 353-54, 363, 379

3d, 22d Regiment: 345, 353-54, 361-62

1st, 23d Regiment: 92, 106-08, 115, 187

2d, 23d Regiment: 91-92, 106-08, 115

3d, 23d Regiment: 85, 91-93, 108, 240

1st, 34th Regiment: 226, 231-32, 240

2d, 24th Regiment: 114

3d, 24th Regiment: 100, 108, 115, 330, 326,

230

1st, 25th Regiment: 87, 91-92

2d, 25th Regiment: 87

3d, 25th Regiment: 106, 114, 172, 240
INDEX 493

Marine Infantry Battalions—Continued

1st, 29th Regiment: 80, 89, 108-09, 187, 210,

216

Marine Infantry Regiments

ad: 36, 80, 89, 108-09, 168-69, 181, 187, 189,

210, 216, 220, 227, 230, 232, 238, 243, 302

3d: 343-44, 356-57, 363, 371, 383, 392, 401,

407, 417, 436

4th: 311, 343-45, 348-51, 355, 361, 368-70,

380, 435

6th: 81, 83, 87-90, 93, 95-98, 108-10, 168-69,

181, 187-89, 210, 220, 227, 230, 232, 238,

242, 263-64, 302

8th: 81, 83, 86, 88-90, 97, 108-10, 116, 163,

168-69, 181, 187-88, 216, 226-27, 230, 238,

241-43, 364, 295-96, 302-03

9th: 343-44, 357, 363-65, 371, 374, 383, 400- 401, 403-04, 407, 417, 427, 431, 433, 436

21st: 343-44, 356-57, 363-65, 371, 383, 401,

407, 417

22d: 15, 38n, 311, 344-45, 349-50, 352, 362-

63, 365, 368-70, 435-36

23d: 81, 87, 96-97, 100, 106-08, 114-15, 168,

180-82, 187, 207, 210, 220, 226, 229-30, 232,

241, 244, 247-48, 264, 275, 292, 294-95 302

24th: 92, 97, 106, 114, 168, 173, 180-81, 187,

210, 220, 226, 229, 238, 241, 244, 247-48,

264, 275, 292, 294-95, 302

25th: 81, 91, 97, 101, 105-06, 114, 159, 163,

168-69, 241, 244-45, 247-48, 264, 275, 292,

294-95

29th: 37

Marine Tank Battalions

2d: 109, 275

4th: 92

22d: 350

Marpi Point: 51-52, 61, 68, 72, 117, 131, 221,

244, 264-65. See also North Field, Tinian. Marpo Point: 295, 297

Marpo Well: 280, 282

Marshall, General George G.: 1, 10, 16-18,

195-96

Marshall Islands: 2-3, 4, 7-9, 10-11, 12, 13,

14-15, 62

Martial law, Japanese: 69

Martin, 1st Lt. Ford: 204

Martyr, Col. Cyril W., USMC: 300

Maruyama, Maj, Chusha: 364, 366

Maryland: 76

Masalog Point: 280, 282, 286, 297

Maui training area: 45-46

Medal of Honor awards

O'Brien, Lt. Col. William J.: 259n

Ozbourn, Pvt. Joseph W., USMC: 303n

Wilson, Pfc. Robert L., USMC: 303n

Mediterranean, plans for, at Washington Conference: 7

Mergagan Point: 436-37

Merizo: 24, 334

Micronesia, boundaries: 22

Midway, battle of: 4, 119

Military police, U.S.: 347

Mindanao: 14, 16, 18, 19. See also Philippine

Islands.

Mines, land, clearance of

on Guam: 344, 369

on Saipan: 128, 156

on Tinian: 288, 291

Mines, land, Japanese on Guam: 335, 354, 368, 385, 388, 401

on Saipan: 241, 246-47, 250-54

sympathetic detonation: 251

on Tinian: 292, 297

Mines, marine, clearance of

at Saipan: 42-43, 74, 76

at Tinian: 283

Mitscher, Vice Adm. Marc A,: 15, 26, 33, 71-73,

99, 121-22, 131, 286, 288, 312, 321, 323-34,

340-41

Miwa, Vice Adm. Shigeyoshi: 445

Mizony, Lt. Col. Harold I.: 170, 179, 186, 206,

218, 224, 232

Montpelier: 291, 302

Morale, Japanese

on Guam, 336-37, 339, 368, 371, 380, 432

on Saipan: 70, 75, 117, 166-67, 213

on Tinian: 280

Morison, Samuel Eliot: 122, 441

Morrow, 1st Lt. Henry W.: 204

Mortar fire support, Japanese

Guam: 342, 344, 348, 352, 363, 368

Saipan: 91, 98, 102-03, 106, 109, 115, 123,

146-47, 150, 169, 174, 177, 180, 183-84, 186,

200, 205, 207, 215-19, 224-25, 227, 229-33, 240

Mortar fire support, U.S.

Guam: 388, 395, 412, 414

Saipan: 98, 105, 129, 132, 143, 147-48, 157,

163, 213, 217, 219, 222, 225, 230, 249

Tinian: 302

Mortars, U.S.

60-mm: 41, 129

81-mm: 129, 412, 414

4.2-in.: 143

Mortlock Island, target date for: 13

Motor vehicles, shortages of: 126, 128

Mount Alifan: 308, 316, 332, 349-50, 355-56,

374, 379

Mount Alutom: 30, 307, 316, 357, 363, 371

Mount Barrigada: 30, 307, 374, 377, 386-409,

414

Mount Chachao: 30, 307, 357, 363, 371, 373

Mount Fina Susu: 68, 86, 92, 97, 106

Mount Kagman: 29
494 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Mount Lamlam: 308, 352, 361, 374, 376

Mount Lasso: 29, 269, 275, 278, 280, 291, 294,

296, 299

Mount Machanao: 307-08, 434

Mount Maga: 295

Mount Marpi: 29

Mount Mataguac: 377-78, 408, 421, 427, 431

Mount Nafutan: 29, 111, 137, 139, 141-42, 144,

147-48, 150, 152-55, 157

Mount Petosukara: 247-48

Mount Santa Rosa: 30, 307, 332, 377-78, 402,

408-09, 417-37

Mount Taene: 349-50, 355-56

Mount Tapotchau: 29, 40-41, 65, 79, 116, 134-

35, 165-66, 168-70, 172, 177, 180-82, 184,

186-87, 190, 201, 209-11, 216-18, 220, 224,

226, 228, 231-33, 238, 241-42, 265

Mount Tenjo: 30, 308, 316-17, 352, 357, 361,

363, 371, 373-74, 379, 384

Mount Tipo Pale: 40, 168-69, 210, 216, 220,

227, 233

Mount Yigo: 408-09

Mountainous areas, training for: 45

Musashi: 120

Mutcho Point: 68, 73, 243

Nafutan Point: 68, 112, 114, 116, 135, 166, 191,

197-99, 225, 285

capture of: 137-61

strength of opposing forces: 160

terrain features: 160

Nafutan ridge. See Mount Nafutan.

Nagano, Fleet Adm. Osami: 1, 445

Nagasaki, atomic bombing of: 443

Nagumo, Vice Adm. Ghuichi: 56, 65, 70, 280

Napalm bombs, first use: 288

Narazawa, Lt. Masaakira: 279

Naton Beach: 407

Nauru Island, JCS directive on: 9

Naval base development, Japanese

in Bonins: 23

at Hahajima: 24

at Saipan: 23-24, 54

at Truk: 9, 55

Naval base development, U.S.

at Guam: 22, 443

at Manus Island: 16, 19

in Marianas: 441-42

plans for: 2-3

at Truk: 9

at Ulithi: 19

Naval bombardment. See Naval gunfire support.

Naval Construction Battalions: 127, 152,442

25th: 385

121st: 124

Naval gunfire support

ammunition expenditures: 321, 323-24, 339

characteristics: 130

Naval gunfire support—Continued

control and co-ordination of: 74-75, 130-33,

313, 316, 322 on friendly troops: 87

at Guam: 42, 312-13, 320-22, 325, 339-42,

345, 352. 354, 368-69, 378, 386, 418, 421,

423, 430, 432

liaison in: 130-31

in Marianas: 71-78, 446

at Saipan: 42-44, 74-76, 79-80, 87, 91, 95,

102, 108, 111, 129-31, 151, 160, 238, 247

at Tinian: 42-43, 277, 285-88, 291, 297, 300

training in: 74, 76

Naval units, Japanese. See Japanese naval units.

Naval units, U.S. See by name.

Naval War College: 8

Navy, U.S.

Advance Commander, Support Aircraft: 313

allocation of units in SWPA: 16

casualties: 289

Commander, Air Force, Pacific: 14

Commander, Landing Force Support Aircraft:

313-14

Commander, Service Force, Pacific: 318

Commander, Support Aircraft: 313-14, 340

Commander, Support Aircraft Ashore: 299

Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. See King,

Admiral Ernest J.

Guam, control of: 22

Guam, force at: 22-23, 319, 321

plans to engage Japanese fleet: 13, 119-20, 441

role in Marianas seizure: 446

Saipan, force at: 42, 71, 76

Tanapag Harbor, diversion at: 40

Neff, 2d Lt. Donald, USMC: 273

Netherlands Indies

air attacks on, Allied: 12, 18

defense of: 3

Japanese seizure: 4

in line of communications to Japan: 15, 445

recovery plans: 13

New Britain, recovery plans: 7

New Caledonia, in Japanese plans: 4

New Guinea: 16, 120-21

Japanese seizure: 4

recovery plans: 7-8, 10, 12-14

New Ireland: 7, 12, 13, 15

New Mexico: 321

New Orleans: 287

New River training area: 35

Neye Island: 362

Nichols, Maj. John: 219, 225

Nidual River: 364-65

Night fighter aircraft: 446

Night operations

Guam: 364-65, 384, 411, 428

Saipan: 92, 95-96, 98, 104-05, 110, 159, 244,
INDEX 495

Night operations—Continued

Saipan—Continued

256-61

Tinian: 272, 283, 287, 293-94, 302-03

training in: 45

Nimitz, Admiral Chester W.: 73, 193-94, 196,

311, 315, 429, 437, 443, 445

activates POA: 4

advocates Makin for Nauru: 9

on CENPAC plans: 16-19

controls Marianas-Carolines-Palaus: 19

directive on Carolines: 2

directive on GRANITE: 39

directive on Guam: 309-10

directive on Marianas: 2, 39

directive on Nauru: 9

directive on Rabaul: 5

directive on Tarawa: 9

launches Marshalls operation: 14-15

as Marianas over-all commander: 33

at Pearl Harbor conferences: 14

revises GRANITE: 13-14

schedules operations in CENPAC: 13

sets GRANITE target dates: 13

Noakes, Lt. Jefferson: 184

Nomoi Island, target date for: 13

Norman Scott: 288-89

North Field, Guam: 443

North Field, Tinian: 443. See also Marpi Point.

Northern Attack Force. See Hill, Rear Adm.

Harry W.; Turner, Vice Adm. Richmond

Kelly.

Northern Attack Group. See Conolly, Rear. Adm.

Richard L.

Northern Guam, drive to: 377-437

Northern Saipan, drive to: 163-70, 203-33, 237-66

Northern Support Aircraft. See Osborne, Comdr.

Lloyd B.

Northern Tinian, drive to: 294-96

Northern Troops and Landing Force: 35, 39,

130, 149-50, 159-60, 165, 191. See also

Schmidt, Lt. Gen. Harry; Smith, Lt. Gen.

Holland M.

final loading: 50

Holland Smith named commander: 35

issues operations plan: 40

shore command post established: 110

staff, Army personnel on: 40

strength of force: 265

on Tinian: 271

Northwest Field, Guam: 443

Noshiro: 120

Nozaki, Lt. Kenishi: 279

Oahu staging area: 48

Obata, Lt. Gen. Hideyoshi: 64, 329, 371, 377-

78, 408, 417, 437. See also Japanese Army

units, Army, 31st.

Obiam Point: 285

Objectives of Marianas seizure: 441-43

O'Brien, Capt. Laurence J.: 104, 175, 182

O'Brien, Lt. Col. William J.: 114, 139, 142-43,

146-47, 253-59, 259n

O'Connell, Col. Geoffrey M.: 155, 160

Office of Naval Intelligence: 27, 326

Officer losses, Japanese, on Guam: 365, 417

Officer losses, U.S.

on Guam: 398

on Saipan: 232-33

Ogata, Col. Takashi: 278-80, 282-83, 289, 293-

97, 301-02

Ogawa, Col.: 241-42

O'Hara, Maj. Almerin C.: 170, 208, 224, 261

Ohashi, Col. Hiko-Shiro: 364-66

Oka, Col. Yoshiro: 65, 163

Okinawa: 63, 445

Olander, Capt. Frank: 147-48, 150, 153-54,

156-57, 254-56

Old Agat Road: 350, 353-54, 371

Oldendorf, Rear Adm. Jesse B.: 76

ORANGE plans, 1924-38: 2-4, 6-7. See also

RAINBOW 5.

Ordot: 331, 377, 383

Orote Peninsula: 24, 28, 30, 164, 307-08, 316,

321, 324, 326, 332, 334, 345, 348, 351-57,

361-71, 374

Osborne, Comdr. Lloyd B.: 288, 299

Otani, 2d Lt. Moto: 279

Otori: 74n

Otori, Capt.: 378

"Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan": 13

Oya, Capt. Goichi: 279-80

Ozawa, Vice Adm. Jisaburo: 120-22, 324, 441

Ozbourn, Pvt. Joseph W., USMC: 303n

P-47's: 132, 288, 295, 299, 303, 418, 421, 430,

446

P-61's: 446

Pacific Fleet: 4, 16, 443

Pacific Ocean Areas (POA): 4-5, 13-14, 443.

See also Central Pacific Area; Nimitz, Adm.

Chester W.; South Pacific Area; Southwest

Pacific Area.

Pacific theater. See also Central Pacific Area;

South Pacific Area; Southwest Pacific Area.

boundaries reorganized: 4-5

Casablanca decisions on: 6-7

Hawaii, role in plans: 2

Japan forced to defensive: 4-6

Japanese conquests, extent of: 4

and JCS directive: 16-20

King advocates acceleration: 6

and lines of communication: 8

Philippines, role in plans: 2

reorganization: 4-5

strategic objectives: 8-9
496 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Pacific theater—Continued

U.S. Joint Staff Planners role: 7

Pagan Island: 61, 73

Pago Bay: 307, 309, 317, 326, 334, 376, 378,

380, 382-87

Pago River: 378-81, 384

Palau Islands

air attacks on: 69, 71

Japanese seizure: 4

placed under Nimitz: 19

plans for recovery: 9-10, 19

target date for: 13, 19

Palletization of supplies: 48-49, 128, 318-19

Panel displays: 132, 374

Papua, recovery of: 6

Parachute supply operations: 97, 278

Paradise Valley (Hell Valley): 243, 247-48, 264

Pati Point: 308, 431-32, 436-37, 443

Patrol craft, naval: 80

Patrols, tactical. See Reconnaissance, ground.

PB4Y's: 26, 323

PC's: 80

Pearl Harbor: 13-14, 76, 119, 312

Pelagi Rock: 349-50. 354

Penguin: 23

Pennsylvania: 76, 320-21, 352

Peyre, 1st Lt. Roger P.: 247, 250-51

Philippine Islands

air attacks on, U.S.: 10

amphibious operations plan: 10

defense of: 3

Japanese seizure: 4

line of communications with U.S.: 3

MacArthur's views on recovery: 16, 18

reconnaissance, submarine, U.S.: 99, 119, 121

recovery plans: 6, 8, 10, 13, 16

role in Pacific plans: 2

Philippine Sea, naval battle of: 323-24

air losses, Japanese: 324, 441

air losses, U.S.: 122

casualties, Japanese: 441

effect on Marianas: 99, 119-23, 441, 445

strength of forces: 121

Philippine Sea boundaries: 121n

Pillboxes

Guam: 335, 342, 345, 357, 362, 368-69, 388,

392, 424

Saipan: 91, 101, 139, 238, 247, 252, 254

Tinian: 282, 292

Pimples, The: 226-27, 230, 232

Piti Point: 24, 28, 324, 326, 331, 344, 357, 371,

421

Pitis, 2d Lt, Spencer M.: 224

Plans, strategic. See Strategic plans, Japanese;

Strategic plans, U.S.

Plans, tactical. See Tactical plans, Japanese;

Tactical plans, U.S.

Pole charges, on Guam: 432. See also Demolitions.

Ponape: 9, 12

Pontons, use of: 127, 358. See also Engineer operations.

Port Apra: 29

Port Companies

311th: 96

539th: 96

Port Moresby, Japanese seizure: 4

Port Pago: 30

President, U.S. See Roosevelt, Franklin D.

Price Road: 382, 387-88, 390

Prime Minister, British. See Churchill, Winston S.

Priorities for resources: 9, 16

Prisoners captured by U.S.

on Guam: 430

on Saipan: 165

Pryor, 1st Lt. Frank J.: 219

Public address system, use of: 140, 145, 242

Purple Heart Ridge: 173, 177, 181-84, 190, 201,

203-07, 210, 213-33

Psychological warfare: 437

Quebec (QUADRANT) Conference: 9

Rabaul: 4, 5, 6, 11, 19, 119

Radar: 99, 122

Radar Hill: 239, 245

Radio communications. See Communications, U.S.

Radio Road: 189

Radio Tokyo: 436

Railway development, postbattle: 442

RAINBOW 5: 3-4. See also ORANGE plans, 1924-38.

Raleigh, 1st Lt. John J.: 215

Ramps, bow: 278, 292

Randle, Brig. Gen. Edwin H.: 397

Ration shortages, Japanese: 213, 239

Ration shortages, U.S.

on Guam: 382, 387

on Saipan: 126, 218

Reconnaissance, aerial, Japanese, of Guam: 23

Reconnaissance, aerial, U.S.: 9

in Admiralties: 15

at Guam: 26, 51, 322-23, 326, 374, 387, 406,

409, 414-15

in Marianas: 26, 43, 71, 73, 323

in Marshalls: 9

at Saipan: 26, 43-44, 50-52, 99, 131

at Tinian: 26, 271, 278, 285, 286

Reconnaissance, antisubmarine: 131

Reconnaissance, beach, Japanese, at Guam: 23

Reconnaissance, beach, U.S. See also Underwater

demolition teams.

Guam: 28, 322, 345, 355

Marianas: 28

Saipan: 42, 78

Tinian: 28, 270-74, 283, 288
INDEX 497

Reconnaissance, beach, U.S.—Continued

training in: 45

Reconnaissance, ground

Guam: 374-76, 380, 386-90, 394, 402-05, 407,

413, 415-17, 419, 430, 432, 434, 436

Los Negros: 15

Saipan: 105, 147, 165, 169-70, 195, 205, 207,

210, 216, 218, 229, 231-32

Tinian: 133

Reconnaissance, submarine

at Guam: 326-37

in Marianas: 26

in Philippines: 99, 119, 121

at Saipan: 43

Red Beaches, Guam: 344

Red Beaches, Saipan: 81, 83, 87, 89-90, 98, 173

Red Staff: 39. See also Northern Troops and

Landing Force.

Regimental combat teams. See Infantry Regiments; Marine Infantry Regiments.

Reifsnider, Rear Adm. Lawrence F.: 312-13, 339

Reinforcements, Japanese

in CENPAC: 53-58 on Guam: 329

in Marianas: 53-60

on Saipan: 110, 131, 213

Reinforcements, U.S., on Saipan: 97, 109-10

Remus, Lt. Col. Joseph A.: 414

RENO I. See Philippine Islands, recovery plans

Resources, priority for: 9, 16

Rifle fire, Japanese

Guam: 342, 344, 349, 376, 388, 390-92, 395,

398, 407, 412, 414, 422, 424, 428, 433

Saipan: 114, 154, 175, 177, 182-83, 188, 200,

205, 207, 209, 215, 218-20, 222, 225, 228,

230-232, 238, 240, 251-52

Tinian: 302

Rifle fire, U.S.

on friendly troops: 209

Guam: 365, 391-92, 395, 412, 424

Saipan: 95, 98, 157, 186, 188-89, 217, 219, 230-31

Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C., Jr.: 192-93, 196,

225, 315-16, 318

Ridge 300: 137, 153, 155, 157

Risely, Col. James P., USMC: 87

Ritidian Point: 307, 317, 434, 436, 443

Road construction. See Engineer operations.

Road Junctions, Guam

2: 245, 251, 253, 256

15: 368

64: 245, 256

177: 407, 417

218: 378

306: 386-88, 391, 395

363: 414-16

370: 361, 374

Road Junctions, Guam—Continued

385: 415

390: 435

410: 398, 401

415: 425, 427, 429, 431

460: 435

Road systems, Guam: 308-09, 327, 383-87, 421-

22

Roadblocks, Japanese, on Guam: 387-88, 401-03,

407, 435-36

Roadblocks, U.S., on Guam: 345, 348, 407, 431

Rocket launchers. See Bazooka fire support.

Rocket fire support

effectiveness: 132

on Guam: 325, 342

on Saipan: 163, 227, 230, 264

Rockets, 4.5-in.: 43, 44, 80, 88

Rocky Mount: 99, 110, 275

Roi-Namur: 321

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 4, 6, 7, 12

Ross, Brig, Gen. Ogden J.: 100

Rota Island: 24, 321, 326, 329

air attacks on: 43, 73, 99, 122, 323-24

airfield development, Japanese: 61

eliminated as U.S. target: 26

topography: 26

Rubber boats. See LCR's.

Ruses, Japanese: 378, 406

Ruses: 230. See also Feints.

Russo-Japanese War: 119

Ryan, Capt. Bernard E.: 105, 182

Ryan, Capt. Paul: 103-04, 105n

Ryan, Capt, Richard F.: 254

Ryan's Ridge: 105n

Ryukyus, plans for seizure: 2

S Road, Saipan: 206-07, 214-15, 219, 227

Saipan. See also Japanese Mandated Islands;

Mariana Islands.

air attacks on: 43-44, 71-74, 80-81, 108, 132,

139

air losses, Japanese: 51, 72

air losses, U.S.: 72

air strength, Japanese: 51

air supply: 97

airfield development, Japanese: 51, 61

ambushes, Japanese: 140, 165

ammunition expenditures: 130, 134, 259

ammunition shortages: 218, 260-61

amphibious operations, Japanese: 110, 131, 213

antiaircraft defenses, Japanese: 68-69, 76, 97

antiaircraft defenses, U.S.: 179

antitank measures: 179

area bombardment: 42-44, 80, 91

Army Garrison Force: 154

artillery dispositions, Japanese: 16, 135, 166-67

artillery support, Japanese: 68, 96, 98, 103,

105-06, 114, 123, 139, 143-44. 174, 188, 210,
498 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Saipan—Continued

artillery support, Japanese—Continued

216, 225, 230, 232

artillery support, U.S.: 95-98, 100-102, 106,

108, 110-12, 114, 133-35, 139, 142, 144,

146-48, 151, 155-57, 160, 163, 168, 177,

179, 181, 186, 189, 203, 205, 207-09, 215,

217-18, 222, 224, 227, 230-31, 237-38, 241-

42, 244, 246-47, 249, 252, 255, 259, 264

artillery survey, Japanese: 68

assault force organization: 33-38

assault force strength: 36, 265

assault phase: 71-93

B-29 base first established on: 443

banzai attacks: 256-61

bayonet fighting: 178, 254

bazooka fire support: 98, 114, 179

beaches, allocation of: 40, 43

beachhead expansion: 87-93

Blue Beaches: 81, 98, 100-101, 125

boundaries, operational, Japanese: 65-67

canister: 156, 186, 253

casualties, Japanese, periodic: 74, 96-98, 159-

60, 163, 165-66, 168, 173, 188, 210, 218-19,

241-42, 248-49, 253, 257-58, 258n, 265-66

casualties, U.S.

periodic: 76-77, 88, 90, 105-06, 114, 232

total: 232, 265, 446

central area, drive on: 148-49, 163-90, 203-33

civilians in action: 96, 137, 141, 232, 247-48,

265

climate: 27

close air support: 131-33, 227, 240

coastal defenses: 68

command structure, U.S.: 33-40

communications: 124, 130, 132-33, 156, 251-

52, 260

consolidation phase: 95-97

counterattacks, Japanese: 95-96, 98, 103-04.

110, 141, 146, 154, 159, 168, 178, 210, 218,

243, 251, 256-61, 264

counterattacks, U.S.: 261-66

counterbattery fire: 42-43

counterlandings, Japanese: 110, 131, 213

critical stage: 93

Death Valley drive: 134-35, 170-81, 184-90,

194-95, 200, 203, 206-10, 213-14, 216-21,

230-32, 238

declared secure: 264, 285

defenses, Japanese: 51-52

defensive plan, Japanese: 1, 64-70

demolitions, land: 127, 143, 264

distances, relative: 1, 12, 26, 47

dual-purpose guns, Japanese: 106, 112, 139

dual-purpose guns, U.S.: 155, 157, 160

effect of loss on Japan: 1, 266

embarkation for: 47-50

Saipan—Continued

engineer operations: 101, 124, 127-28, 152,

156, 227, 253

evacuation of casualties: 260

exploitation phase: 95-117

first Army units ashore: 96

flame throwers: 101, 227, 242, 264

fortification, Japanese: 61-62

friendly troops, fire on: 209, 227, 238

fuel depot development: 442

fuel supply: 277-78

garrison strength: 51, 55-56, 64-69, 211, 213,

266

Green Beaches: 81, 83, 86, 88-89, 92, 173

grenade attacks, Japanese: 156, 215, 222, 228,

231, 248

grenade attacks, U.S.: 178-79, 188, 217, 219,

264

H-hour designated: 79-80

hand-to-hand fighting: 178, 218, 254-55, 258

harbor facilities: 28, 442

Hell's Pocket: 177-78, 186, 188, 208-09, 213,

215, 217, 219, 224-25, 227

Holland Smith as tactical commander: 33-36

illumination, battlefield: 95-96, 130, 209

infiltration tactics, Japanese: 96, 97, 152, 159,

244

infiltration tactics, U.S.: 177

intelligence estimates: 50-52, 152, 160

interservice differences: 149-51, 178-79, 191-

201, 447

Japanese situations, periodic: 116-17, 165-67,

211-13, 221

landing plan breakdown: 85-87

liaison measures: 111, 130-33

loading and unloading operations: 47-50, 99,

110, 123-24

logistical operations: 123-29

machine gun fire support, Japanese: 97-98,

102, 106, 114-15, 143, 147, 150, 153, 157,

159, 168-69, 175, 177, 180-84, 204-05, 207,

210, 213, 215-19, 222, 224, 227, 229-31, 238,

240, 242, 248, 250-54, 265

machine gun fire support, U.S.: 44, 95, 98, 145,

156, 184, 186, 213, 225, 230, 250-51, 253,

256, 259

map deficiencies: 116

mines, land, clearance of: 128, 156

mines, land and antitank, Japanese use of:

241, 246-47, 250-54

mines, sympathetic detonation: 251

minesweeping operations: 42-43, 74, 76

morale, Japanese: 70, 75, 117, 166-67, 213

mortar fire support, Japanese: 64, 91, 98, 102-

03, 106, 109, 115, 123, 146-47, 150, 156,

169, 174, 177, 180, 183-84, 186, 200, 205,

207, 215-19, 224-25, 227, 229-32, 240
INDEX 499

Saipan—Continued

mortar fire support, U.S.: 98, 105, 129, 132,

143, 147-48, 157, 163, 213, 217, 219, 222,

225, 230, 249

naval base development, Japanese: 23-24, 54

naval force, Japanese: 65

naval force, U.S.: 42, 65, 71, 76

naval gunfire support: 42-44, 74-76, 79-80,

87, 91, 95, 102, 108, 111, 129-31, 151, 160,

238, 247

night actions: 92, 95-96, 98, 104-05, 110, 159,

244, 256-61

northern area, drive to: 163-70, 203-33, 237-

66

officer losses, U.S.: 232-33

palletization of supplies: 128

panel display: 132

parachute, supply by: 97

pikes, Japanese use of: 258

pillboxes: 91, 101, 139, 238, 247, 252, 254

planning phase: 33-52

prisoners captured by U.S.: 165

public address systems, use of: 140, 145, 252

Purple Heart Ridge: 173, 177, 181-84, 190,

301, 203-07, 210, 213-33

radar, use of: 99

ration shortages, U.S.: 126, 218

reconnaissance, aerial, U.S.: 26, 43-44, 50-52,

99, 131

reconnaissance, antisubmarine, U.S.: 131

reconnaissance, beach, U.S.: 42, 78

reconnaissance, ground: 105, 147, 165, 169-70,

195, 205, 207, 210, 216, 218, 229, 231-32

reconnaissance, submarine, U.S.: 43

Red Beaches: 81, 83, 87, 89-90, 98, 173

rehearsals of landings: 45-47

reinforcements, Japanese attempts: 110, 131,

213

reinforcements, U.S.: 97, 109-10

rifle fire, Japanese: 114, 154, 175, 177, 182-83,

188, 200, 205, 207, 209, 215, 218-20, 222,

225, 228, 230-32, 238, 240, 251-52

rifle fire, U.S.: 95, 98, 157, 186, 188-89, 217,

219, 230-31

rocket fire, U.S.: 163, 227, 230, 264

ruses, U.S.: 230

shaped charges, U.S.: 101, 139, 215

ship-to-shore movement: 78-85

shipping requirements: 47

shipyard facilities: 442

shore party organization: 123-29

shotguns, U.S. use of: 89

smoke cover, tactical use of: 44, 143, 163, 177,

185-86, 209

snipers, Japanese: 91, 143, 195, 197, 210, 216

southern area, drive on: 71-117, 137-61

strength, Japanese, periodic: 51, 211, 213, 266

Saipan—Continued

suicides, Japanese: 249, 257

supply operations: 90, 97, 123-29, 213, 224,

260

supply tonnages: 47

in support of Guam: 418, 430

in support of Tinian: 271-83, 285, 288, 291,

295, 299, 303

supporting arms and operations: 119-35

tactical plans, Japanese: 64-70, 210, 211-13,

221

tactical plans, U.S.: 33-52, 98-99, 137, 141-

42, 144, 149, 152, 163, 213, 216-17, 237,

239, 242, 244, 247-48, 251

Tanapag, drive on: 237-66

tank losses, Japanese: 88, 98, 167-68, 179-81,

186, 189, 259

tank losses, U.S.: 84-87, 89, 92, 176, 184-85,

246, 250, 254

tank strength, Japanese: 52, 70, 88

tank support, Japanese: 88, 95-96, 98, 114,

168, 179-81, 185-86, 189, 224, 227, 238-39,

250

tank support, U.S.: 96, 101, 111, 143, 145-46,

151, 153-57, 175-77. 184-85, 189, 205, 208-

09, 215, 218, 227, 231-32, 237, 241-42, 246-

48, 250-54, 260-61, 264

target date for: 13, 39, 42

target destination: 132, 134-35

terrain difficulties: 113, 130, 134-35, 138-39,

142, 168, 173-74, 200-201, 205n, 206, 213,

233, 245-46

topography: 26, 28-29

training of units: 45-47

transport force requirements: 47

troop dispositions, Japanese: 64-69

troop dispositions, U.S.: 165-67, 211

underwater demolition teams: 42, 44, 77, 78,

84, 128

water shortage, U.S.: 211

weapons, Japanese, improvised: 258

White Beach 1: 128

Yellow Beaches: 40, 43, 81, 87, 109-10, 127,

133

Saito, Lt. Gen. Yoshitsugu: 59, 65, 72, 98, 131,

165, 213, 221, 239, 241, 243-45, 257, 264

Sakito Maru: 59, 69

Salamaua: 7

Salisbury: 421-22, 426-28, 431-33, 435-36

Samoa, Japanese designs on: 4

San Bernardino Strait: 99, 121

Sasaki, Capt.: 137, 159

Sato, Maj.: 437

Schmidt, Lt. Gen. Harry, USMC: 35, 37, 92,

230, 244, 247, 271-72, 274-75, 277-78, 280,

286, 295-96, 299-301, 303

Schneider, Col. Merlin F., USMC: 368
500 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Seabees. See Naval construction battalions.

Seaplane bases

at Aslito: 51, 60

at Flores Point: 41, 51-52, 54, 65, 242

on Guam: 61

Seahorse: 99

Selby, Lt. Col. Charles A.: 193

Self-propelled gun mounts: 215. See also Artillery support, U.S.

Senor, Pfc. Cleve E.: 104

Serfas, Lt. Col. Jackson B.: 368

Seventh Air Force: 71, 323, 430, 446

Seventh Fleet: 17

SEXTANT Conference: 12, 17

Shaped charges: 101, 139, 215

Shapley, Lt. Col. Alan, USMC: 368-69

Sheldon, Lt. Col. Frederic H.: 142, 215

Shepherd, Brig. Gen. Lemuel C., Jr., USMC:

345, 347-50, 353-54, 359, 361, 369-70, 407- 08, 435

Sherman, Rear Adm. Forrest P.: 14, 16

Shigematsu, Maj. Gen. Kiyoshi: 327, 331, 333,

339, 364-65

Shikamura, Lt. Katsuo: 279

Shipping, Japanese: 2, 7, 13, 15

Shipping, U.S.

attacks on at Guam: 23

requirements for Guam: 319-20

requirements for Saipan: 47

shortages in: 9, 47, 49

Shipping losses, Japanese

at Guam: 321, 331

in Marianas: 73-74

troop transports: 59-60

Shipyard facilities, Saipan: 442

Ship-to-shore movement. See Amphibious operations; Loading and unloading operations;

Supply operations, U.S.

Shokaku: 122

Shore party organization

Guam: 343-47

Saipan: 123-29

Tinian: 292

Shortages, Japanese

naval units: 120

rations: 213, 239

supply: 213, 239

water: 211

Shortages, U.S.

ambulances: 128

ammunition: 126, 129, 218, 260, 261, 358-59

amphibian tractors: 89

artillery support: 135

classes of supply: 126

landing craft: 100n, 347, 355, 358

motor vehicles: 126, 128

naval auxiliaries: 120

Shortages, U.S.—Continued

rations: 126, 218, 382, 387

shipping: 9, 47, 49

technicians: 40

tractors: 128

trailers: 128

troop transports: 47

trucks, cargo: 50, 128

water: 218, 260, 344, 382, 386, 400

Shotguns, use by U.S.: 89

Signal companies. See Joint Assault Signal Companies.

Sigua River: 380

Sinajana: 331

Singapore: 3-4

Slate, 1st Lt. Herbert N.: 188

Smith, Col. Aubrey D.: 306, 351, 355, 405, 433

Smith, Capt. Clinton F.: 152-53, 157

Smith, Lt. Gen. Holland M,, USMC: 50, 100,

108, 110-11, 128, 134, 137-38, 148-53, 160-

61, 164, 167, 169-70, 181, 190, 226, 237, 244, 247-48, 251, 257, 261, 263, 265, 269,

275, 300, 311-12, 315, 318, 437. See also

Expeditionary Troops; Northern Troops and

Landing Force; Task Forces, 56; Task

Groups, 56.1

compliments 27th Division: 228

"displeasure" dispatch: 178-79

dispute with Ralph Smith: 149-51, 178-79, 191-201, 447

in Gilberts and Marshalls: 35

named CG, Expeditionary Troops: 35-36

named CG, NTLF: 35 named Saipan tactical commander: 33-36

relief from NTLF: 195n, 271

supervises training: 33-35

Smith, Maj. Gen. Ralph C.: 99-100, 110-12,

141-42, 144, 152, 169-70, 176, 184, 186, 187,

206

dispute with Holland Smith: 149-51, 178-79,

191-201, 447

heads 27th Division: 38

relief of: 191-92, 195n, 203, 225, 447

Smith, 1st Lt. Robert M.: 217

Smith-versus-Smith dispute: 149-51, 178-79,

191-201, 447

Smith, Capt. William J.: 248

Smoke, tactical use of

Guam: 403

Saipan: 44, 143, 163, 177, 185-86, 209

Tinian: 291

Snipers, Japanese

Guam: 373

Saipan: 91, 143, 195, 197, 210, 216

Solomon Islands

as U.S. base for Guam: 314, 319, 320

exclusion from SWPA: 5-6
INDEX 501

Solomon Islands—Continued

Japanese seizure: 4

recovery plans: 7-8

Sorong: 121

South Dakota: 122

South Pacific Area

activated under Halsey: 5

assigned subsidiary role: 8

JCS directive on plans: 18-20

naval forces in, control of: 16-17

Southern Attack Force. See Conolly, Rear Adm.

Richard L.

Southern Attack Group. See Reifsnider, Rear

Adm. Lawrence F, Southern Saipan, drive on: 71-117, 137-61

Southern Tinian, drive on: 296-301

Southern Transport Group: 358

Southern Troops and Landing Force: 35, 100,

164. See also Geiger, Lt. Gen, Roy S,

Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). See also MacArthur, General Douglas,

acceleration of schedule: 15

activated under MacArthur: 4

assigned subsidiary role: 8

demands on resources of: 9

dominant role urged for: 10

geographic boundaries: 4-5

JCS directive on plans: 16-20

MacArthur's views on plans: 18

naval forces allocation: 16

at Pearl Harbor conferences: 13-14

priorities for: 16

Solomons excluded: 5-6

Spalding, Brig. Gen. Isaac: 352, 367

Spaulding, Capt. Robert J.: 250

Spruance, Vice Adm. Raymond A: 33, 35, 40,

72, 98-99. 119-23, 164, 191, 193, 269, 274- 75, 291, 311-12, 314-15, 320, 437, 441. See

also Fifth Fleet; Task Forces, 51.

Staging areas, deficiencies at: 48

Stampher, Capt. Joseph P.: 226

Stebbins, Col. Albert K.: 174, 216, 231, 261

Stokes, Lt. Col. Charles W.: 369, 423-24

Storm King: 50

Strafing, effectiveness of: 132

"Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan": 1-20.

See also ORANGE Plans, 1924-38; "Overall

Plan for the Defeat of Japan"; RAINBOW 5.

Strategic plans, Japanese

Aleutian Islands: 4

Coral Sea battles, effect on: 4

Fiji: 4

Guam: 23, 55

Mandated Islands: 2-3

Marianas, role in: 55-56, 69-70, 445

naval, in CENPAC: 119-20

New Caledonia: 4

Strategic plans, Japanese—Continued

Saipan, role in: 1

Samoa: 4

Strategic plans, U.S. See also "Air Plan for the

Defeat of Japan": "Overall Plan for the

Defeat of Japan."

airfield development: 2, 13

Arafura Sea area: 10, 18

Cairo Conference: 12, 17

Carolines: 2-3, 7-9, 12, 17, 19

Casablanca Conference: 6-7

CENPAC: 2-20, 8-9, 119-20

China: 7

for defeat of Japan: 3-4

for engaging Japanese Navy: 13, 119-20, 441

Far East defense: 3

Formosa: 13

GRANITE: 13-14

Japanese shipping destruction: 2

Kai: 14

naval base development: 2-3

Naval War College, role in: 8

Netherlands Indies: 13

New Britain: 7

New Guinea: 7

New Ireland: 7, 12, 15

objectives for Pacific: 8-9

objectives of Marianas seizure: 441-43

ORANGE plans: 2-7

Palaus: 9-10, 19

Pearl Harbor conferences: 13-14, 312

Philippines, role in: 2

Ponape: 9, 12

Quebec Conference: 9

Rabaul, isolation of: 6, 11, 19, 119

RAINBOW 5: 3-4

Ryukyus: 2

Solomons: 7-8

Tanimbar Islands: 14

Washington conferences: 15-20

Woleai: 9, 19, 323

Yap: 9, 19, 324

Strength, Japanese

artillery: 166-67

Guam garrison: 55-56, 327, 329. 377, 430, 433,

437

Marianas garrison: 55-56

on Nafutan Point: 160

naval forces on Saipan: 42, 65, 71, 76

Saipan garrison: 51, 55-56, 64-69, 211, 213,

266

on Tinian: 51, 278-83, 303

Strength, U.S.

Guam assault force: 36, 319

Guam garrison: 22

Marianas assault force: 36

at Nafutan Point: 160
502 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Strength, U.S.—Continued

Saipan assault force: 36, 265

Saipan naval forces: 42, 65, 71, 76

Tinian assault force: 36

Stringham: 272-73

Strongpoints. See also Pillboxes.

on Guam: 432

Japanese concept of: 64

Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet: 33

Submarine operations, U.S.: 58-60, 70

Submarine reconnaissance. See Reconnaissance,

submarine.

Submarines: 26, 43, 119, 121

Flying Fish: 99

Greenling: 326-27

Seahorse: 99

Suenaga, Col. Tsunetaro: 332, 348

Suicides, Japanese

on Guam: 368, 432

on Saipan: 249, 257

on Tinian: 280

Sulu Archipelago: 120

Sumay: 60, 353, 357, 368-70

Sunharon Bay: 213, 270, 272, 282, 289, 297

Supply operations, Japanese, shortages in: 213

Supply operations, U.S.

by air at Saipan: 97

air supply of China: 12

allotments by class: 47-48, 318

ammunition supply: 293

control at beaches: 123-27

on Guam: 318-20, 357-59, 382-88, 417

palletization methods: 48-49, 128, 318-19

by parachute: 97, 278

role in amphibious operations: 123-31

on Saipan: 90, 97, 123-29, 224, 260

shortages in classes: 126

on Tinian: 277-78, 293, 300-301

tonnages for Guam: 319

tonnages for Saipan: 47

Supporting arms and operations: 119-35

Surprise, achievement of: 283, 291-92

Surrender, U.S., of Guam: 34

Sutherland, Maj. Gen. Richard K.: 14, 16

Tactical air support. See Air attacks, carrierbased, U.S.; Air attacks, land-based, U.S.;

Close air support.

Tactical plans, Japanese

Guam: 23, 55, 309-20, 330-33, 377

Marianas: 63-64

Saipan: 64-70, 211-13, 221

Tinian: 274, 278-83, 287, 293-94, 297

Tactical plans, U.S.

Guam: 164, 309-20, 400-402, 419, 430-31, 433

Saipan: 33-52, 98-99, 137, 141-42, 144, 149,

152, 163, 213, 216-17, 237, 239, 242, 244,

247-48, 251

Tactical plans, U.S.—Continued

Tinian: 270-83, 296-97

Tactical principles, Japanese

defense doctrine: 283, 332-33, 348

doctrine for island defense: 62-64, 334-35

doctrine on dummy positions: 64

strongpoint Concept: 64

Tactical principles, U.S.

amphibious end run: 317n

amphibious operations: 33, 350, 446-47

control, doctrine on: 198

control line, definition of: 85n, 86

convoy unit loading, definition: 48n

doctrine, validity of: 198, 317n, 397-98

jungle warfare doctrine: 397-98, 418, 426

Marino Corps doctrine: 33, 350

Taiho: 122

Taiwan. See Formosa.

Takashima, Lt. Gen. Takeshi: 327, 329, 364,

364n, 365-67, 371, 374, 377

Takeda, Lt. Col. Hideyuki: 325-26, 418, 437

Talofofo: 332, 376

Tamai, Comdr. Asaichi: 348, 364-65

Tanaka, Lt. Kichitaro: 279

Tanaka, Lt. Meiki: 279

Tanapag, drive on: 68, 221, 237-66

Tanapag Harbor: 28-29, 41, 43-44, 74, 79, 89,

93, 110, 213, 239, 241, 244, 265, 288

naval diversion at: 40

seaplane base development: 54, 60, 442

Tanapag Plain: 242, 248-56, 258

Tanimbar Islands, seizure plans: 14

Tank Battalions

706th: 316-17, 369, 380, 386-87, 393-95, 398,

402, 404, 411-12, 414-15, 419, 423-25, 427,

429-31

762d: 175-76, 184, 208, 232, 253

766th: 143

Tank destroyer support on Guam: 369-70, 401

Tank fire on friendly troops: 402-03, 407, 432,

434

Tank losses, Japanese

Guam: 334, 348, 354, 383, 394, 413, 415, 428

Saipan: 88, 98, 167-68, 179-81, 186, 189, 259

Tank losses, U.S.

Guam: 355, 392, 424

Saipan: 84-87, 89, 92, 176, 184-85, 246, 250,

254

Tank reconnaissance. See Reconnaissance, ground,

U.S.

Tank strength, Japanese

Guam: 334

Saipan: 52, 70, 88

Tank support, Japanese

Guam: 348, 354, 362-63, 383, 391-92, 411-12,

415, 425, 428, 436

Saipan: 95-96, 98, 114, 168, 179-81, 185-86,
INDEX 503

Tank support, Japanese—Continued

Saipan—Continued

189, 224, 227, 238-39, 250

Tinian: 279-80, 294

Tank support, U.S. See also LVT(A)'s.

Guam: 316, 345, 348-50, 354, 357, 369-70,

373, 380, 386-90, 392-96, 398, 400-405, 407,

411-12, 414-16, 418-19, 423-27, 429-32,

434

Saipan: 96, 101, 111, 143, 145-40, 151, 153-

57, 175-77, 184-85, 189, 205, 208-09, 215,

218, 227, 231-32, 237, 241-42, 246-48, 250-

54, 260-61, 264

Tinian: 275, 292, 295, 298, 302

training in: 45

Tannyhill, Lt. Col. Guy E., USMC: 109

Tanzola, Col. Vincent J.: 344, 346-47

Tarague Point: 326, 435

Tarahoho: 221

Tarawa: 9, 56

Target dates: 19-20

Guam: 13, 39, 98-100, 312, 314-15, 320, 339

Saipan: 13, 39, 42

Tinian: 13, 275

Target designations

in air attacks: 132-35

on Guam: 314, 322, 409

on Saipan: 132, 134-35

on Tinian: 285, 287, 299

Tarrant, Capt. David B,: 184, 186, 209, 224

Task Forces

17: 33

51: 33, 272. See also Spruance, Vice Adm.

Raymond L.; Turner, Vice Adm. Richmond

Kelly.

52: 33, 42, 272. See also Hill, Rear Adm.

Harry W.; Turner, Vice Adm. Richmond

Kelly.

53: 33, 42-43, 50, 386. See also Conolly, Rear

Adm. Richard L.

56. See Smith, Lt. Gen. Holland M., USMC.

58: 26, 33, 42-43, 56, 71-72, 121, 123, 131.

See also Mitscher, Vice Adm. Marc A.

59. See Hale, Maj. Gen. Willis H.

Task Groups

53.18: 321. See also Joy, Rear Adm, C. Turner.

56.1. See Northern Troops and Landing Force;

Schmidt, Lt. Gen. Harry; Smith, Lt. Gen.

Holland M., USMC.

56.2. See Geiger, Lt. Gen. Roy S.; Southern

Troops and Landing Force.

58.1: 74, 324. See also Clark, Rear Adm.

Joseph G.

58.2: 324

58.3: 324

58.6: 71. See also Mitscher, Vice Adm. Marc A.

Task Unit 58.4.5: 321

Tatgua River: 312, 316, 364

Tawi Tawi: 120-21

Technicians, shortages in: 40

Tennessee: 76, 289n, 291, 302, 321

Terrain

Guam: 344-45, 349, 352-53, 350, 368-69, 374,

380, 384, 393, 397-401, 403-07, 409, 412- 15, 417, 422, 424, 427, 435

Nafutan Point: 160

Saipan: 113, 130, 134-35, 138-39, 142, 168,

173-74, 200-201, 205n, 206, 213, 233, 245-46

Thirteenth Air Force: 71, 323

Tinian Harbor: 28, 278

Tinian: See also Mariana Islands,

air attacks on: 43, 44, 73, 277, 285-88, 291,

295, 297, 299-300, 302

air losses, Japanese: 51

air strength, U.S.: 288

airfield development, Japanese: 54, 60-61, 269-

70

airfield development, U.S.: 296, 442-43

ammunition expenditures: 285-86, 299, 302

ammunition supply: 293

amphibious warfare, classic in: 269, 271

area bombardment: 42-43, 286-87

Army's role in: 303

artillery strength, U.S.: 286

artillery support, Japanese: 279, 282, 289

artillery support, U.S.: 133, 271-72, 274-77,

285-86, 291, 293, 295, 297-99, 302

Aslito in support of: 277

assault and consolidation phases: 288-93

assault force Composition: 288-89

assault force strength: 36

banzai charge: 302-03

barbed wire, Japanese use of: 283

barbed wire, U.S. use of: 293

as base for bombing Japan: 303

booby traps, Japanese: 283

casualties, Japanese: 294, 294n

casualties, U.S.: 289, 303, 446

climate: 300-301

close air support: 299

command structure, U.S.: 275

communications, U.S.: 286, 292, 298-99

counterattacks, Japanese: 293-94, 302-03

counterbattery fire: 42, 285-86, 300

declared secured: 303

defensive plans, Japanese: 274, 278-83, 287,

293-94

distances, relative: 26, 269

effect of loss on Japan: 303

Eniwetok as U.S. base for: 271

exploitation phase: 294-303

feint landings, U.S.: 276, 289

flame throwers, U.S.: 298

fortification of: 278-83
504 CAMPAIGN IN THE MARIANAS

Tinian—Continued

garrison composition: 51, 278-83, 303

harbor facilities: 272, 442

infiltration tactics, Japanese: 294

intelligence estimates: 278-80, 282-83, 295

interservice friction, Japanese: 280

Japanese situations, periodic: 278-83

liaison measures: 299

loading and unloading operations: 272, 277,

300

logistical aspects: 270-71, 277

machine gun fire, Japanese: 302

machine gun fire, U.S.: 293

as Marine Corps operation: 303

mines, land, clearance of: 288, 291

mines, land, Japanese use of: 292, 297

mines, marine, Japanese: 283

morale, Japanese: 280

mortar fire support, U.S.: 302

napalm, tactical use: 288

naval gunfire support: 42-43, 277, 285-88,

291, 297, 300

night operations: 272, 283, 287, 293-94, 302-03

northern area, drive on: 294-96

parachute, supply by: 278

pillboxes: 282, 292

planning phase: 270-83, 296-97

railway facilities, postbattle: 442

reconnaissance, air: 26, 271, 278, 285-86

reconnaissance, beach: 28, 270-74, 283, 288

reconnaissance, ground: 133

rifle fire, Japanese: 302

Saipan in support of: 271-83, 285, 288, 291,

295, 299, 303

seizure of: 1, 269-303

shore party organization: 292

smoke, tactical use: 291

southern area, drive on: 296-301

suicides, Japanese: 280

supply operations: 277-78, 293, 300-301

surprise achieved: 283, 291-92

tactical plans, Japanese: 274, 278-83, 287, 293-

94, 297

tactical plans, U.S.: 270-73, 296-97

tank support, Japanese: 279-80, 294

tank support, U.S.: 275, 292, 295, 298, 302

target date for: 13, 275

target designation: 285, 287, 299

topography: 26, 28-30, 269-70, 298, 301-02

troop dispositions, Japanese: 278-82

typhoon, effect of: 300-301

White Beaches: 272-75, 278, 282-83, 286-89,

291-92, 295, 299-300

Yellow Beach: 272-74, 282-83

Tinian Town: 213, 270, 272, 274, 276, 278, 280,

282-83, 286, 288-89, 293, 297, 302, 443

Tiyan: 383, 407

TNT pole charges: 432

Togo, Adm. Heigachiro: 119

Tojo, Gen. Hideki: 1, 69, 445

Tokuzo, Matsuya: 167n

Tokyo, air attacks on: 443

Topography

Gilberts: 62

Guam: 24-26, 28-30, 307-09

Marianas: 29, 45, 62-63

Marshalls: 62

Rota: 26

Saipan: 26, 28-29

Tinian: 26, 28-30, 269-70, 298, 301-02

Toto: 408

Tougow, 1st Lt. Bernard A.: 146

Towers, Vice Adm. John H.: 14

Toyoda, Adm. Soeumu: 69, 120-21

Tractors, shortages in: 128

Trailers, shortages in: 128, 277

Training

accidents in: 47

amphibious: 33-35, 315-16

beach reconnaissance: 45

demolitions: 45

engineer troops: 45

Expeditionary Troops: 45-47

for Guam: 314-18

jungle: 45

loading and unloading operations: 45-46

for mountainous areas: 45

in naval gunfire: 74, 76

night operations: 45

rubber boat: 45

for Saipan: 45-47

tank-infantry operations: 45

Transfer control line, definition of: 85

Transport Division 38: 347

Transports, troop. See Shipping; Troop transports.

TRIDENT Conference: 7-9, 15-20

Troop dispositions, Japanese

Guam: 329-33

Saipan: 64-69

Tinian: 278-82

Troop dispositions, U.S., on Saipan: 165-67,

211

Troop transports: 48, 50. See also Shipping, U.S.

Japanese losses: 59-60

U.S. force: 47, 288-89

Trucks: 277

21⁄2-ton cargo: 50, 126, 128

shortages in: 128

Truk Island

air attacks on: 13, 15, 39, 56, 69, 71, 322

air losses, Japanese: 15

attacks on Japanese shipping: 13, 15

MacArthur's opposition to: 16
INDEX 505

Truk Island—Continued

naval base development: 9, 55

plans for isolating: 7, 9, 13, 14, 19, 71

target date for: 13

Trummel, 1st Lt. Joseph: 205, 229

Tsujimura, Rear Adm. Takahisa: 65

Tsushima Strait, battle of: 119

Tsutsuuran: 163

Tulagi: 320

Tumon Bay: 307, 317, 327, 331, 333-34, 364

Turnage, Maj. Gen. Alien H.: 317, 344, 357,

363, 383. 393. 400-401, 407, 417

Turner, Vice Adm. Richmond Kelly: 33, 35, 40,

99, 123, 130-31, 164-65, 191-95, 264, 271-

72, 274-75, 311-12, 315

Typhoon, on Tinian: 300

Ulithi, as naval base: 19

Umatac: 309, 374, 376

Underbill, Maj. Gen. James L., USMC: 303

Underwater demolition teams

No. 3: 322

No. 4: 322

No. 5: 272, 288

No. 6: 322

No. 7: 272

at Guam: 312, 322, 335

at Saipan: 42, 44, 77-78, 84, 128

Unit Jungle Training Center: 316

Units of fire, Japanese: 69

Units of fire, U.S.: 48, 129

Unloading operations. See Loading and unloading operations.

Uruno Point: 317

United States Army Forces in the Central Pacific

Area. See Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C., Jr.

United States Fleet. See Navy, U.S.

Ushi Point: 60, 131, 269, 274, 278, 280, 282,

288, 293, 295-96, 300, 303

Van Orman, Lt. Col. Ellsworth G., USMC: 300

Vandegrift, Lt. Gen. Alexander A., USMC: 356,

437

Visayan Sea: 121

Vogelkop Peninsula: 10, 13, 18

W Day, use of term: 312

Wake Island, air attacks on: 71

Waller: 288

War Department: 326

Warge, 1st Lt. Charles: 219

Washington conference: 7-9, 15-20

Wasp: 339-40

Water

purification: 382

shortages: 211, 218, 260, 344, 382, 386, 400

supply: 386-87, 398, 400

Waterson, Capt. David: 209

Watson, Maj. Gen, Thomas E., USMC: 37, 90,

168, 276, 295, 300

Weapons carriers, 3/4-ton: 126

Weather conditions. See Climate.

Weigand, 1st Lt. George R.: 226

West Field, Tinian: 443

West Virginia training area: 315

Western Landing Group: 78. See also Hill, Rear

Adm. Harry W.

White, Capt. Earl: 148, 154, 259

White Beach I, Saipan: 128

White Beaches, Guam: 344-45, 359

White Beaches, Tinian: 272-75, 278, 282-83,

286-89, 291-92, 295, 299-300

White Cliff: 165

White phosphorus, tactical use of: 132, 286

Whitehead, Capt. Richard F., USN: 132, 313-

14, 340

Whitney, 1st Lt. James T.: 396

Williams, 1st Lt. Dudley A.: 253

Wilson, Pfc. Robert L., USMC: 303n

Woleai, plans for seizure: 9, 19, 323

Yamato: 120

Yancey, Lt. Col. Thomas R.: 40

Yano, Lt. Ghuichi: 279

Yap, plans for seizure: 9, 19, 324

Yellow Beach, Tinian: 272-74, 282-83

Yellow Beaches, Guam: 344-45

Yellow Beaches, Saipan: 40, 43, 81, 87, 109-10,

127, 133

Yigo: 308, 386, 414-31, 435

Ylig Bay: 376

Yona Island: 342, 381, 384

Yoshida, Maj. Kiyoshi: 131

Yukioka, Maj. Setsuo: 365-66

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1993 333-163