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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DOUGLAS BRYAN, JR. and : Case No. 4:15-CV-214

JOAN BRYAN (H/W), :

:

Plaintiffs, : (Judge Brann)

:

v. :

:

KINGS EXPRESS, INC., :

:

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

July 27, 2015

I. BACKGROUND:

The instant action arises from a commercial trucking-related accident that 

took place on Interstate 80 in Scott Township, Columbia County, Pennsylvania, 

shortly before Exit 236B, on July 24, 2014 at 12:00 p.m. Plaintiffs Douglas Bryan 

Jr. (“Mr. Bryan”) and his wife, Joan Bryan, filed this complaint on January 19, 

2015 against Defendant Kings Express, Inc. (“Kings Express”). ECF No. 1.

Plaintiffs complaint is brought on two counts. Count I is a claim of 

negligence against Defendant through the actions of their deceased employee, 

Lonnie Huffman. Count II is a claim for loss of consortium for Joan Bryan.

On March 2, 2015, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal 

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Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 10. Defendant argues that 

Plaintiffs’ complaint has “no factual predicate for the notion that King [sic]

Express could be deemed to have conducted itself in a reckless manner, and the 

‘recklessness’ should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6).” ECF No. 10 at 6.

On March 16, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant’s 

Motion for Dismissal. ECF No. 13. Plaintiffs claim again that Mr. Huffman 

suffered from sleep apnea and that Defendant was aware of his impaired ability to 

safely operate a tractor trailer. They also reiterate that they are bringing this claim 

against Defendant “alleging negligence and recklessness on the part of Mr. 

Huffman.” ECF No. 13 at 2.

For the reasons addressed, and discussed below, the Court will grant 

Defendant’s Motion for Dismissal in part and deny it in part. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must view all allegations stated in the complaint as 

true and construe all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Hishon v. 

King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 81 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1984); Kost 

v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). However, “the tenet that a court 

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must accept as true all of the [factual] allegations contained in the complaint is 

inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 

1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (internal citations omitted). In ruling on such a 

motion, the Court primarily considers the allegations of the pleading, but is not 

required to consider legal conclusions alleged in the complaint. Kost, 1 F.3d at 

183. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. At the motion to 

dismiss stage, the Court considers whether Plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to 

support the allegations in the complaint. Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 482 

(3d Cir. 2000). 

A complaint should only be dismissed if, accepting as true all of the

allegations in the complaint, Plaintiff has not pled enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). “Determining whether a complaint 

states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 663-664. 

“In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we must be mindful that federal 

courts require notice pleading, as opposed to the heightened standard of fact 

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pleading.” Hellmann v. Kercher, 07-CV-1373, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54882 at *4, 

2008 WL 1969311 (W.D. Pa. May 5, 2008) (Lancaster, J.). Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8 "'requires only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what 

the ... claim is and the grounds on which it rests,'" Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964 

(citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957)). 

However, even under this lower notice pleading standard, a plaintiff must do more 

than recite the elements of a cause of action, and then make a blanket assertion of 

an entitlement to relief under it. Hellmann, supra. Instead, a plaintiff must make a 

factual showing of his entitlement to relief by alleging sufficient facts that, when 

taken as true, suggest the required elements of a particular legal theory. Twombly, 

127 S.Ct. at 1965. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer 

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - - but it 

has not “shown” - - “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, supra (citing Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(a)). 

The failure-to-state-a-claim standard of Rule 12(b)(6) “streamlines litigation 

by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 

U.S. 319, 326-27, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). A court may dismiss 

a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) where there is a “dispositive issue of law.” Id. at 326. 

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If it is beyond a doubt that the non-moving party can prove no set of facts in 

support of its allegations, then a claim must be dismissed “without regard to 

whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately 

unavailing one.” Id. at 327

III. DISCUSSION

A. Allegations in the Complaint

Accepting as true all of the allegations in the complaint, the facts are as 

follows. As delineated above, Mr. Bryan was driving his United Parcel Service 

(“UPS”) tractor trailer on Interstate 80 in Scott Township, Columbia County, 

Pennsylvania, near Exit 236B, on July 24, 2014 at approximately 12:00 p.m. ECF 

No. 1 at ¶7.

Traffic on Interstate 80 slowed due to construction and Mr. Bryan brought 

his tractor trailer to a stop behind another tractor trailer. Id. at ¶12. At that time, 

Lonnie Huffman, driving a tractor trailer owned by Kings Express, rear-ended Mr. 

Bryan’s tractor trailer. Id. at ¶13. The force of the impact caused Mr. Bryan’s 

tractor trailer to collide with the rear of the tractor trailer in front of it. Id. at ¶14. 

Mr. Huffman was killed in the accident, while Mr. Bryan suffered “severe 

traumatic injuries.” Id. at ¶15-16.

Plaintiffs allege that at the time of the incident, “Mr. Huffman suffered from 

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a medical condition or conditions, including sleep apnea that impaired his ability to 

safely operate a tractor trailer.” Id. at ¶17. Further, Plaintiffs allege “Kings Express 

was aware of, or should have been aware of Mr. Huffman’s medical conditions that 

impaired his ability to safely operate a tractor trailer.” Id. at ¶18. Moreover, 

Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Huffman, and through him the Defendant, was guilty of 

“negligence, carelessness, and recklessness.” Id. at ¶21.

B. Analysis

In their Response to Defendants Motion for Dismissal, Plaintiffs assert that 

their “Complaint adequately sets forth factual averments that can support the 

allegation of recklessness by Defendant.” ECF No. 13 at 4. The Court respectfully 

disagrees. 

In paragraphs 17-18 of their complaint, Plaintiffs provide the following 

facts:

17. Upon information and belief, at the time of the accident Mr. Huffman 

suffered from a medical condition or conditions, including sleep apnea that 

impaired his ability to safely operate a tractor trailer.

18. Upon information and belief, Kings Express was aware of, or should 

have been aware of Mr. Huffman’s medical conditions that impaired his 

ability to safely operate a tractor trailer.

ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs never allege that sleep apnea or other medical conditions 

actually caused Mr. Huffman to crash into Mr. Bryan. In failing to make this direct 

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connection, the Court is being asked to connect those dots itself. 

As noted above, a plaintiff must do more than recite the elements of a cause 

of action, and then make a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief under it. 

Hellmann, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54882 at*4, (Lancaster, J.). Instead, a plaintiff 

must make a factual showing of his entitlement to relief by alleging sufficient facts 

that, when taken as true, suggest the required elements of a particular legal theory. 

Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965.

Plaintiffs further fail to present a well-pleaded complaint with regard to 

Count I’s claim of negligence. Count I, paragraph 21 states:

21. The negligence, carelessness, and recklessness of Mr. Huffman and 

through him, Defendant Kings Express, and the negligence of Kings Express 

directly, consisted of the following:

ECF No. 1. After listing the facts that they believe support those claims, Plaintiffs 

demand compensatory damages against Defendant. However, the Plaintiffs have 

combined several different legal theories into one Count, leading to confusion as to 

what they actually aver.

Pennsylvania tort law provides a variety of relief claims that may be 

applicable to this particular case. However, the instant complaint only hints at 

them. Count I claims negligence, but also lists carelessness and recklessness. 

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Recklessness carries with it a significantly different legal meaning than negligence. 

Negligence is established by proving the following four elements: “(1) a 

duty or obligation recognized by law; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal 

connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual 

damages.” Estate of Swift by Swift v. Northeastern Hosp., 456 Pa.Super. 330, 

690 A.2d 719, 722 (1997). Moreover, in any negligence action, “establishing 

a breach of a legal duty is a condition precedent to a finding of negligence.” 

Id.

Grossman v. Barke, 2005 PA Super 45, ¶ 10, 868 A.2d 561, 566 (2005). However, 

recklessness is defined differently. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania adopted 

section 500 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which defines reckless disregard. 

In doing so, it cited the following:

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500. The comments to this section explain, 

inter alia, that in order to be reckless, conduct

must be unreasonable; but to be reckless it must be something more 

than negligent. It must not only be unreasonable, but it must involve a 

risk of harm to others substantially in excess of that necessary to make 

the conduct negligent. It must involve an easily perceptible danger of 

death or substantial physical harm, and the probability that it will so 

result must be substantially greater than is required for ordinary 

negligence.... [emphasis supplied].

The actor to be reckless must recognize that his conduct involves a 

risk substantially greater in amount than that which is necessary to 

make his conduct negligent. The difference between reckless 

misconduct and conduct involving only such a quantum of risk as is 

necessary to make it negligent is a difference in the degree of the risk, 

but this difference of degree is so marked as to amount substantially to 

a difference in kind.

Moran for & on Behalf of Estate of Moran v. G. & W.H. Corson, Inc., 402 Pa. 

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Super. 101, 114, 586 A.2d 416, 423 (1991).

The question remains then: are Plaintiffs claiming negligence or 

recklessness, or both? If they are making both claims, the claims need to be cited in 

separate counts, and the facts alleged must support each of those counts.

In addition to separating negligence from recklessness, Plaintiffs failed to 

clarify the type of negligence and recklessness they are alleging against Kings 

Express. For example, it appears from the initial complaint at paragraph 21 that 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant was vicariously liable through the actions of their 

employee, Mr. Huffman. ECF No. 1 at ¶21. However, Plaintiffs never specifically 

state a claim for “vicarious liability.” Furthermore, the complaint alleges that 

Defendant knew or should have known about Mr. Huffman’s medical conditions, 

and should not have retained him in their employ. Id. at ¶18. However, Plaintiffs 

never state a claim for “employer liability for negligent hiring or retention of 

employee.” Instead, Plaintiffs’ complaint is vague, leaving much to the speculation 

of Defendant and the Court.

Finally, Plaintiffs’ complaint demands compensatory damages in excess of 

seventy-five thousand dollars. ECF No. 1 at 6. However, it fails to enunciate the 

type of compensatory damages. For example, Plaintiffs might be asking for, inter 

alia, lost wages, or for medical expenses, or both. But without clearly defining 

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those claims, the Court is unable to discern what relief is actually being requested. 

Moreover, given that Plaintiffs use the word ‘recklessness,’ they may also be 

alluding to punitive damages. If so, that must be clearly stated in the complaint.

IV. CONCLUSION 

Defendant’s Motion for Dismissal Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) will be granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs’ complaint 

will be dismissed with leave to amend.

BY THE COURT:

/s Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

United States District Judge

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