Th e thr e e sp e c ia l is su e s w e re a s f oll ow s: 1 (continued...) 

## IN THE COUR T OF CRIMINA L APPEALS

OF TEX AS
N o. A P - 74, 466

G R EG O R Y R U SSEA U , A ppe l l ant

v . THE S TA TE OF TE X AS O N D I R E C T A P P E A L I N C A U SE N O . 114- 0750- 02 F ROM THE 1 1 4 TH J UDI CI AL DI S TR I CT COURT

S M I TH CO UNTY

H OL C OM B , J. , de l i ve r e d t he opi ni on o f t he C our t , i n w hi c h K ELL ER , P .J ., M E YE RS , P RI CE , W OMACK , H ER V EY , and C OCHR AN , J J ., jo in e d . J OHNS ON , J. , j oi ne d e xce pt as t o i s s ue num be r s e ve nt e e n, i n w h i ch s he c onc ur r e d. K EASLE R , J. , c onc ur r e d.

I n October

2002, a Smit h County

jury , afte r hea

ring evidenc e, found a

ppellant g uilty

of the capital murder of James Sy vertson. See Tex. Pen. Code § 19.03(a) (2). That same jury , afte r hea ring addition al evidence, a

nswere d three statutory

specia l issues in such a wa y that the trial cour

t was 1RUSS EAU -- 2

(...continued) 1 (1 ) “I s th e re a

pr ob a bil ity that th e de fe nd ant, Gr e g or y Rus se a u, wo uld c omm it c r i m i n a l a c t s o f

v i o l e n c e t h a tw o u l d

c o n s t i tu t e a

c o n t i nu i n g t h r e a tt o s o c i e t y ?” (2) “ Did the def

endant, Gr eg ory

Russeau, ac tually cause the death of the dec ease d or did not actua lly

cause the death of the dec ease d but intended to kill the decea sed o r an o t h e r o r an t i c i p a t e d

t h a ta h u m anl i f

e w o u l d b e t a k e n ?” (3) “ Takinginto consideration all of the evidenc e, including the circ umstances of the o f f e n s e , th e d e f

e n d an t’ s c h ar a c te r

an d b a c k g r o u n d , an d

th e p e r s o n a l m o r al culpability

of the de fenda

nt, is there suf

fi cient mi tigating c ircumstance or c ir c ums tanc es to warr ant t hat a se nte nc e of

lif e imp ri so nme nt r a the r t

ha n a de a th sentenc e be imposed? ” All refe renc es to article s are to those in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure

. 2 Appellant’s issues a

re numbe red 1 throug h12, 16, 16A, and 17 throug h 19. Fr om our 3 rea ding of

appellant’ s brief, it appe ars that he orig inally planned to have issues that were numbe re d 1 3, 14 , a

nd 15 bu t th a t he ult imate ly de c ide d n ot t o a sse rt

tho se iss ue s. require d to assess appe llant’s punishment at death. See Art. 37.071, § 2(b), ( e) & (g ). I n J une 2005, 2

we a ffirme d the trial cour t’s judgme nt a s it r elated to a ppellant’s conviction, reve rsed it as it related to his punishment, and remanded the case to the t rial court for a new punishment hea ring

. Russeau

v . S tat e , 171 S.W .3d 871, 887 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). I n Apri l 2 0 0 7 , t h e t ri al cour t held a new punishment hearingbefor e a ne w Smith C ounty jury . At th e co n cl u s i o n of that hea ring , the trial court, a cting in acc ordanc e with t h e j u ry ’s answe rs to the three specia l issues, ag ain assesse d ap p el l an t ’s p u n i s h m en t at d ea t h

. No w, o n d i re ct ap p ea l fr o m t h at s ec o n d p u n i s h m e n t h e ar i n g, appellant br ings se ventee n issues, which we have r ear rang ed to fa cilitate a more order ly discussion. 3 We w ill a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt. I n is su e s numb e rs on e and tw o, a pp e lla nt a rgue s th at “ [t]he e vid e nc e br ou g ht fo rt h at tr ia l, wh ile po ssi bly

su ff ic ie nt t o s ho w that [he ] may be g uil ty of burg la ry or the ft , [w a s] in su ff

ic ie nt, either le g ally

or fa ctually , to pr ove that [he] is guilty of capital murder.” Appellant ar g ues fur therRUSS EAU -- 3

On orig inal submissi on, we c onsidered a nd overr uled two points of err or in which 4 appellant c halleng ed the leg al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the e vidence to support his conviction. Ru sse au v . S

tate , 171 S.W .3d 871, 877-78 (Te x .Crim.App. 2005). that “ther e [was] not even a s cintilla of evidence to prove that [ he] kill ed the victim or that the killing

occur red to fa cilitate t he taking of any proper ty , or t hat t he int ent t o take the property occur red be fore or conte mporane ously

with the killing.” The State a rg ues in response that “appe llant may not assert

an er ror . . . f rom the guilt-innocenc e phase of t he trial when he is appea ling f rom a re trial of . . . the punishment phase.” As we no te d p re vio us ly , in June 20 05 we a ff ir me d the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt a s it re late d to appellant’ s convicti on, reve rsed the tr ial court’s judg ment as it relate d to his punishm ent, and 4

rema nded the c ase to the tria l court for a new punishment hearing

. Ru sse au v . S tate , 171 S.W .3d at 887. On re mand, the trial c ourt’s jurisdiction was statutorily limit ed to punishment issues. Lopez

v . S tat e , 18 S.W .3d 637, 640 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000)

. After rema nd, appellant’ s rig ht to appeal wa s limit ed to issues that arose during rema nd. That being the case , appellant’ s issues numbers one a nd two, which challeng e the sufficie ncy of t he evide nce to support his convic tion, present nothing for

our re view. We over

rule issues number s one and two. I n issue number s evente en, appe llant argues that the e vidence adduce d at the sec ond punis hme nt h e ari ngwa s le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the jur y ’s affi rm ati ve ans we r t o th e fi rs t specia l issue, which conc erne d his future da ng erousne ss. Appellant ar g ues in particula r that: (1) “The re [was] no evidence that [he] was on drug s [at t h e t i m e of the murder], that the robbe ry had been pla nned in adva

nce, or that the killing of Mr . Sy vertson wa s particular ly

b rut al.” ( 2) “The re [was] no evidenc e that he attempted to r esist a rre st or harm the [arr esting ] officers [or eve n] elude [th e m]

. ” ( 3 ) “ A ll o f [h is ] p r io r c r im e s w e r e c r im e s a g a in s t p r o p e rty , n o t c r im e s o f v io le n c e . ” (4)RUSS EAU -- 4

The State’s w itnesses included two Ty ler police office rs, a L ong view police of fice r, an 5 FB Ispecia l ag ent, a f

orensic D NA spec ialist, two forensic f inge rprint spec ialists, ten present and former g uards at the Smit h County J ail, twenty

prese nt and forme r g uards in the Te x as prison sy stem, two psy chiatrists, a psy cholog ist, and a for mer Da llas County

medical e x aminer. The State ’s e xhibi ts c on sis te d mo stl y of of fi c ia l r e c or ds fr om v ari ou s Smi th C ounty c ourt s. Ap pe lla nt’ s lo ne wi tne ss w a s a

Ty le r p oli c e of

fi c e r, wh os e te sti mony

wa s p re se nte d in 6 an ef fort to ca st doubt upon appellant’s g uilt of Sy vertson’s murde r. The State’s psy chiatric evidenc e wa s deser ving of littl e we ight be cause it lacked “ a scie ntific basis.” (5) “ Appellant’s disciplinary rec ord in prison show[ed] a decre ase [over time] in the number and

sever ity of disciplinary

actions take n ag ainst him.” At the se c on d punis hme nt h e ari ng , th e State pr e se nte d 6 2 w itn e sse s and nume ro us e xhibi ts, 5

and a pp e lla nt p re se nte d o ne wi tne ss. Th e State ’s e vid e nc e wa s to the fo llo wi ng e ff e c t: (1 ) O n Apr il 6 4, 1987 , w h e na

p p e ll an t w a s s e v e n te e ny e ar s o ld , h e c o mm itte d th e f e lo n y o f f e n s e o f a tt e mpted burg lary of a building. (2) On Fe bruar y 11, 1988, appellant committed the felony offe nse of bur g lary of a ha bitation. (3) On May

13, 1988, appellant c ommitt ed fe lony theft. (4) On May

16, 1988, appellant c ommitt ed the f elony offe nse of bur g lary

of a ha bitation. (5) On May

17, 1988, appellant committed the felony offe nse of burg lary of a ha bitation. (6) On May

23, 1988, appellant c ommitt ed the fe lony offe nse of bur g lary

of a ha bitation. (7) On June 27, 1988, appellant c ommitt ed the f elony offe nse of e ngaging in org anized criminal ac tivity . (8) On Ma y 6, 1997, appellant c ommitt ed misdemeanor the ft. (9) O n Dec ember 12, 1997, appellant c ommitt ed the f elony offe n s e of possession of a c ontrolled substance . (10) On Septe mber 14, 2000, a ppellant committed the misdemeanor of

fense of burg lary of a vehicle. (11) On May 30, 2001, appellant c ommitt ed ca pital

mur de r b y burg lari zing 75 -y e ar- old Jame s Sy ve rt so n’ s aut o re pa ir sh op in Tyle r an d the n k ill inghim by crushing his skull with a blunt instrument. (12) At the t ime he killed Sy vertson, appe llant wasRUSS EAU -- 5

a chr onic abuse r of “ cra ck” c ocaine . (13) While incar cer at ed i n t h e Smith C ounty J ail and in the Texas prison sy stem at various times in the 1990' s and 2000' s, app e ll a nt c o mmitt ed numer ous serious infrac tions of the rules of c onduct. I n a dd iti on

to t he fo re g oin g , th e State pr e se nte d th e te sti mony of tw o p sy c hiatr ist s ( Dr s. Ty nus McNee l and Edwa

rd Gripon) and one psycholog ist (Dr. Sue Stone). All three te stified that the eva luation of a c riminal defe ndant’s future da ng erousne ss was within their profe ssional training and expertise. All three also testified that, in lig ht of appellant’ s criminal and pr ison recor ds and the extreme nature of the instant offe nse, their pr ofessional opin i on was that he would probably be a future da ng er. Th e State ha d th e burd e n of pr ov ing be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t th a t th e ans we r t o th e fi rs t specia l issu e wa s “y es.” A rt. 37.071, § 2(c) . I n other wor ds, the State had the bur den of pr oving be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t th a t th e re is a

pr ob a bil ity tha t a pp e lla nt, if a llo we d to liv e , w ou ld c omm it cri mi n a l a c ts o f v io le n c e , s o a s to c o n s ti tute a c o n ti nu in g thr e a t to p e o p le an d p r o p e rty
. Ladd v. Sta te , 3 S.W .3d 547, 557 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). As an appe llate cour t review ing the leg al

su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e to s up po rt

the jur y ’s a ff ir mativ e ans we r t o th e fi rs t sp e c ia l is su e , w e mus t consider a ll of the rec ord evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the State and dete rmine whe ther, based on that evidence and re as o n able infe renc es there from, any rational jury

could have found bey ond a re asonable doubt t h at the cor rec t answer

to the first specia l issue was “y es.” Id . at 558. I f, given all of t he evidence, a rational jury

would have ne cessa

rily enter tained a r easona

ble doubt as to the corr ect answe r to the first specia l issue, we must re form the trial court’s judgme nt to r efle ct a sente nce of

imprisonment for life. Ar t. 44.251(a). Ap ply ingthe se pr inc ipl e s to the ins tant c a se, we con clud e that th e e vid e nc e wa s le g a llyRUSS EAU -- 6

sufficie nt to support the jury ’s af firmative a

nswer to the f

irst special issue. On this rec ord, a rational jury could have conclude d bey ond a re asonable doubt that appellant e xh ib it ed a da

ng erous a berr ation of c ha ra c te r, that he wa s a c hr on ic and inc re a sin g ly da ng e ro us vio lator

of our s tate ’s c ri min a l la

ws , and th a t if h e w e r e a ll o w e d to li v e , th e r e is a p r o b a b il it y th a t h e w o u ld c o mm it c r im ina l acts of vio le nc e in t

he futur e , s o a s to c on sti tut e a c on tin uin g thr e a t to pe op le and

pr op e rt y . We ov e rr

ule issue number seve nteen. I n issue number th re e, appellant a rg ues that the trial c ourt violated the Crue l and Unusual Pun ish me nts Cla

us e of the Ei g hth Am end men t and the Du e Pr oc e ss C la

us e of the F ourt e e nth Amendment whe n it failed to define fo r t h e jury the term “ probability ” as use d in the first specia l i s s u e . A p p e l l an tar g u e s t h a t , i n c o m m o n u s a g e , t h e t e r m “ p r o b a b i l i t y” c anm e an“ an y p o s s i b i l i t y”

and that, b e c a

us e the tr ia l c ourt

fa ile d to de fi ne th e ter m, “a ju ro r w ou ld h a ve be e n c omp e lle d to

ans we r t he fi rs t sp e c ia l is su e ‘y e s’ if [he wa s] con vin c e d that the re wa s e ve n th e re mot e st p ro ba bil ity of future violence by

appellant.” The trial c ourt did not err in fa iling to define the term “proba bility ” as used in the first specia l i s s u e. T h e t er m i s n o ts t at u t o ri l y d ef i n ed , an d we p re s u m e t h at j u ro rs gi v e i ti t s u s u al m ea n i n g. Re nte ria v . S

tate , 206 S.W .3d 689, 706 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). We overrule issue number thre e. I n issue number four , appellant a rg ues that the trial c ourt violated t h e C ru el and Unusua l Punishm ents Clause of the E ighth Ame ndment and the Due Process and Equal P rotec tion Cl auses of the F ourtee nth Amendment wh en it failed to define for the jur y the phra se “c riminal acts of vio le nc e ” a s u se d in

the fi rs t sp e c ia l is su e . M or e sp e c if ic a lly , a pp e lla nt a rgue s: “‘Crimin al ac t s of violence ’ could be interpre ted as fa lling at e very point along the s cale from dee ds of g rotesque sa vag ery to the slightest assa

ult [ or eve n of fe ns e s th a t da

ma g e on ly

pr op e rt y ]. So lon g a s a

de fend ant caus e d s ome bo dil yRUSS EAU -- 7

injury , o r ev en s i mply

phy sical pain, he is guilty of assa ult. I f the func tion of the death pe nalt y [ s t at ute] is t o provide a principled distinction betwee n those who deser ve death and those who do not, a n instruction that w ould e x clude a person who might commit a minor assa ultive offense , but is very unlikely to commit a gr ave a ct of violence , is c alled for. Ag g ravating circ umstances (of which this is one) may not apply to ever y person c onvicted of murder and those ag g ravating circ umstances may no t be un c on sti tut ion a lly va g ue .” (C itati on s omitte d; p are nth e tic a l mate ri a l in orig inal.) The phra se “c riminal acts of viole n ce , ” as u s ed in the first spec ial issue, is not unconstitutionally

vague and ne ed not be define d for the jury

. Sa lda no v . S tate , 232 S.W .3d 77, 91 (T e x.Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Dr ue ry v . S tate , 225 S.W .3d 491, 509 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007. “I n addition, the Supreme Court of the United States has conclude d that the submissi on of [t he first] special issue,

even without the definition[] in que stion, is sufficie nt to constitutionally gu i d e t h e jury ’s deter mination.” Dr ue ry

v . S tate , 225 S.W .3d at 509. See J urek v . Texas , 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976). We overrule issue number four

. I n is su e numbe r f

ive , a pp e lla nt a rgue s that th e tr ial co ur

t, whe n it ins tr uc te d th e jur

y in

a c c or da nc e wi th A rt ic le 37 .0 71 , § 2( d) (1 ), vio late d th e Pe a c e a ble As se mbl y

Cla us e of the F ir st Amendment, the Crue l and Unusual Pu n i shments Clause of the Eig hth Amendment, and the D ue Process Clause of

the Four teenth Amendme nt beca

use it failed t o d ef

i n e for the jury the term “militates.” Appe llant ar g u e s th a t, c o n s is te nt w ith the na

med constitutional provisions, the trial court

was re quired “ to define the word ‘militates’ so as to pr eclude consideration of the defe ndant’s ag e,

ra c e , s e x, natio na l or ig in, re lig ion , po lit ic a l vi e ws or se xua l or ie ntatio n a s a

fa c tor su pp or tin g a de a th

se nte nc e .” Ap pe lla

nt ar g ue s fur

the r that “[t]he jur or s w e re le ft wi tho ut guid anc e a s to ho w t o a pp ly this critical word and conse quently may have g iven weig ht to factors w hich should have be en excluded.”RUSS EAU -- 8

I n Al ma nz a , we he ld that unobjected- to char g e er ror r equire s reve rsal only if the 7 de fe nd ant s uf

fe re d e g re g iou s h arm . The re cord r efle cts that the trial cour t, in a c c o rdanc e with Article 37.071, § 2(d)( 1), instructed the jur y a s f oll ow s:

“ I n d e lib e ratin g on

Spe c ia l I ssu e No . 1 and

Spe c ia l I ssu e No . 2 su

bmi tte d in

thi s ch ar ge, t h e j u ry

s h al l co n s i d er al l ev i d en ce ad m i t t ed at t h e gui l to r i n n o ce n ce s t age and the punishment stag e of this trial, including evidence o f t h e defenda nt’s backg round or c hara cter

or the c ircumstance s of t he off ense that mili tates for

or mitigates a g ainst the impositi on of the de ath pena lty .” Appellant’s a

rg ument has no merit. First, the tria l court did not err in failing to define the term “militates.” The term i s n o t s t atutorily define d, and we presume that jurors g ive it its usual meaning

. Fu lle r v . S

tate , 2 53 S.W. 3d

22 0, 23 4- 23 5 ( Te x.Cr im. Ap p. 20 08 ); Ma rti ne z v . S tate , 924 S.W

. 2 d 6 9 3 , 6 9 8 ( T e x. Cr im

. A p p . 1 9 9 6 )

. Se c o n d , a p p e ll an t d id n o t a s k th e tr ia l c o u rt f o r the

“ lim iti ngde fi nit ion ” of

“ mil itate s” th at he no w c la ims is c on sti tut ion a lly re qu ir e d, and

no thi ngin the re cord sug g ests that he suff er ed an y h ar m, let alone eg reg ious harm, from the la ck of suc h a limit ing de finition. See Al ma nz a v . S

tate , 6 8 6 S. W. 2 d

1 5 7 , 171 (Tex.C r im

. A p p . 1 9 8 4 )

. We 7

overr ule issue number f

ive. I n issue number six, appellant argues that t he trial c ourt violated the Crue l and Unusual Pun ish me nts Cla

us e of the Ei g hth A men dm ent and the Du e Pr oc e ss C la

us e of the F ourt e e nth Am e ndme nt w he n it fa ile d to de fi ne fo r t he jur y the ph ra se “ c on tin

uin g thr e a t to so c ie ty ” a s u se d in the first spec ial issue. Appellant arg ues t hat “[ t] he trial c ourt’s fa ilure to define ‘continuing threat to society ’ fa i l ed t o provide suff icient g uidance to the jury so as to preve nt an ar

bitrary and capr icious infliction of the death penalty .” The trial court did not err in f ailing to de fine the phrase “continuing threat to soc iety ,”RUSS EAU -- 9

See discussion of issue number five , su pra . 8 beca use the jury

is presumed to under stand the phra se without further instruction. Dr ue ry

v . S tate , 22 5 S. W.3 d at 5 09 ; Lad

d v . S tate , 3 S.W. 3d

a t 57 2- 57 3. An d, a s w e no te d p re vio us ly , th e Sup re me Court of the Un ite d State s ha s c on c lud e d th a t th e fi rs t sp e c ia l is su e , e ve n w ith ou t th e de fi nit ion in question, adequately

g uides the jury ’s deter

mination. Jurek

v. Texas , 4 28 U. S. at 2 75 . We ov e rr ule is s u e n u mb e r

s ix. I n issue number seven, appellant argues that the trial c ourt, when it instructed the jury on the first two specia l issues in acc ordanc e with A rticle 37.071, § 2(d)( 1), violated the Cruel a nd Unusual 8 Pun ish me nts Cla

us e of the Ei g hth Am end men t and the Du e Pr oc e ss C la

us e of the F ourt e e nth Am e ndme nt be c a

us e it fa ile d “ to ins tr

uc t the jur

y so a s to lim it the sc op e of mil itatin g e vid e nc e in favor of death to that which a juror mig ht reg ard a s increa sing a def en d an t ’s m oral blamewor

thiness.” Appellant a

rg ues fur ther that “ the j ury instruction as g iven fa iled to prec lude the jurors fr om givingweig ht to factors be y ond appellant’ s own control.” Appellant’s a

rg ument has no m erit. First, the jury , in its deliberations on the first two spec ial issues, was not limit ed to evidenc e “which a juror might re g ard a s increa sing [the] defenda nt’s moral blamewor

thiness.” The jury

could prope rly

consider a

ny of the e vidence submitt ed at tria l that was rele vant to the two spec ial issues. Second, appe llant did not ask t he trial c ourt for the instruction that he now c laims is constit utionally require d, and nothing in the record sugg ests that he suff ere d any harm, let a lone eg reg ious harm, from the la ck of suc h an instruction. See Al ma nz a v . S

tate , 686 S.W .2d at 171. We overr ule issue number se ven. I n issue number eig ht, a

ppellant argues that the trial court violated the Cruel and Un u sual Pun ish me nts Cla

us e of the Ei g hth

Am e ndme nt a

nd the Du e P roce ss Cl ause of the F ourt e e nthRUSS EAU -- 10

Amendment whe n it failed “to instruct the jury that [t he] finding of g uilt in the first phase of the trial did not forec lose consider ation of evide n ce which they believed te nded to re duce the moral blamewor

thiness of the defe ndant.” This a rg ument has no merit. As we note d previously , the trial court, in ac corda

nce w ith Article 37.071, § 2(d) (1), instructe d the jury that, i n i ts deliberations on the first and se cond spec ial issues, it must “conside r all evide nce a dmitted at the g uilt or innocence stag e and the punishment stage of this trial, including e vidence of the defe n d an t ’s b ackgr ound or char acte r or the c ircumstance s of the offe nse that milit ates for or mitigates a g ainst the impositi on of the de a th p e na lty .” I n a dd iti on , th e thi rd sp e c ia l is su e its e lf instr uc te d th e jur

y to “ tak[e ] int o consideration all of the evidenc e, including the circ umstances of the offe nse, the de fenda nt’s char acte r and backg round, and the persona l moral culpability of the de fenda

nt.” Althoug h the instructions g iven to the jury did not trac k the lang uag e of the instruction that appellant now a rg ues is c on sti tut ion a lly

re qu ir e d, the y

ha d mu c h th e same me anin g . We ov e rr ule iss ue numbe r e ig ht. I n issue number nine, a

pp el l ant arg ues that the trial c ourt violated the Crue l and Unusual Punishm ents Clause of the E ighth Ame ndment when it fa iled “to instruct the jury that there is no presumption in favor of

death, e ven if [the jury ] found appellant to be a ‘ future da ng er’ in answer to special issue number one, and that s p ecial issue number [three], reg ardingmitigating circ umstances, is to be take n up and considered independently , without reg ard to the jury ’s finding

on [s p e c i a l ] i s s u e nu mb e r o n e . ” T h i s ar g u m e n t h a s n o m e r i t
. T h e t r i a l c o u rt , i n a c c o r d an c e wi th Article 37.071, § 2(e) (1), instructed the jury that, if it answer ed spec ial issues numbers one a nd two in the aff irmative, then it would proce ed to answer special issue number three either “y es” or “no.” Nothing in our

law re quired the tria l court to furthe r instruct the jury that there was “ no presumption in favor of

death.” We overrule issue number nine.RUSS EAU -- 11

Un de r t he do c tr ine of

“ the law o f t

he c a se ,” if

a de te rm inatio n o f a

qu e sti on of law i s 9 ma de on an a pp e a l to a c ourt of la st r e so rt , th a t de te rm inatio n w ill be he ld t o g ov e rn the c a se throug hout all of its subsequent stag es, including retria l and appe al. Ex parte Grange r , 850 S.W .2d 513, 516 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). I n i s s u e n u m ber te n, appellant a rg ues that the trial c ourt violated the Crue l and Unusual Punishm ents Clause of the E ighth Amendment “whe n it f ailed to instruct the jury

so as to provide

a ve hic le fo r a

jur or to r e tur n a lif e ve rd ic t w here the j ur or

c on c lud e s th a t th e a g g ra

vatin g fa c tor s, althoug h established b y t h e evidence, still are not so severe as to ca ll for death as a punishment.” Appellant ar g ues fur

ther that “ [t ]he [

jury ] charg e in the pre sent ca se [unconstitut ionally ] provided no means for

the jury to assess a life sentenc e if it believe d that t h e ag g ravating f actor of ‘f uture dang erousne ss’ exist ed, but was not so seve re a s to warr ant death.” Th e tr ia l c ourt ’s ins tr

uc tio ns to t

he j ury me t th e re qu ir e me nts of

Ar tic le 37 .0 71 , w hic h, in turn, met the re quirements of the Eig hth Amendment. Se e Mc Fa rla nd v . S tate , 928 S.W .2d 482, 520 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). We overrule issue number ten. I n iss ue numbe r e le ve n, a

pp e lla nt, c iti ngva

ri ou s f e de ra l and

state c on sti tut ion a l pr ov isi on s,

ar g u e s th a t “ [t ]h e tr ia l c o u rt e r r e d w h e nit r e f u s e d to p r e c lu d e th e d e a th

p e n a lt y a s a s e ntencing option or, in the alternative, to q u as h the indictment beca use a g rand jury

had not consider ed and alleg ed in an indictment the facts leg ally essential to appe llant’s conviction and de ath sentenc e.” O n orig inal submissi on, we c onsidered a nd reje cted this argument to th e extent it was based on the fede ral constitut ion, and that holdi ng rema ins the law of the c ase. Ru sse au v . S tate , 171 S.W .3d at 88 5- 88 7. We now re

je c t this ar g ume nt to the e xtent it is b a se d o n o ur state c on sti tut ion , b e c a

us e 9 appellant ha s failed to cite the pag es i n the record where he made the arg ument to the trial court a nd

rec eived a

ruling there on. See Tex. R. App. P roc. 33.1( a) & 38.1(h). It is not our obligation to poreRUSS EAU -- 12

throug h the voluminous re cord to ve rify that appellant prese rved his state c onstitut ional complaint for a ppellate r eview. We ove rrule issue numbe r ele ven. I n is su e numbe r t

we lve , a pp e lla nt a rgue s th a t “ [t]he Te xas d e a th p e na lty statut e is unconstitutional for its failure to provide for mea ningf ul appellate r eview of

the suffic iency

of the

e v id e n c e [t o s u

p p o rt] th e ju

r y ’ s n e g a ti v e an s w e r

to th e th ir d s p e c ia l is s u e , th e mi ti g a ti o n is s u e . ” We considere d and re

jected this argument on orig inal submissi on, and that holding rema ins the law of the ca se. Ru sse au v . S

tate , 171 S.W .3d at 886. We overr ule issue number twe lve. I n is su e s numb ers si x tee n a nd sixte e n- a , a

pp e lla nt a rgue s th a t “ [t]he tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in admitting [psy chiatric ] evidence of [hi s] fu t u re da

ng erousne ss” without first holding a “ Da ub e rt he ari ng ” and

re qu ir ingthe State “ to e sta bli shthe pr e dic a te ” fo r t

he a dmiss ion

of su c h p sy c hiatr ic

e v id e n c e . S

ee Da u b ert

v. Me rrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc

. , 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (discussing

a dmi ssi bil ity

of sci ent if

ic e vid e nc e un de r F e d. R. E vid . 7 02 ); Ke lly v . S tate , 842 S.W .2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992) (discussing admissibili ty of scientific evidenc e under Tex. R. Evi d. 702). He argues fur ther that he “re quested a Da ub e rt h e ar in g ” b u t t

h a t “ th e tr ia l c o u rt r e f

u s e d to h o ld [o n e ], choosing instead to take judicia l notice of prior proce eding s and her

ruling s therein.” At the first p u n i s h m en t hear ing, the trial court a dmitted, over appe llant’s objection, the testimony of Drs. Mc Nee l, Gripon, and Stone on the subjec t of hi s fu t ure da ng erousne ss. Be fore those experts testified, t he trial court held a “ Da ub e rt he ari ng ” to d e te rm ine the a dmi ssi bil ity of the ir testimony under Texas Rule of Evidence 702. We he ld on orig inal submissi on that “the tria l court did not abuse its discr etion in a dmitti ng the expert testimony .” Ru sse au v . S tate , 171 S.W .3d at 884. At the sec ond punishment he aring , from which appellant now appea ls, the State ag ain pre sented the testimony of McNe el, Gripon, and Stone on the subject of a ppellant’s future dang erousne ss. Be foreRUSS EAU -- 13

they testified at the se cond punishment hea ring , the following transpire d: Def ense Counsel: J udg e, in our last trial, we had a Da ub e rt hear ing. We want to reur g e that Da ub e rt hear ing, and t here ’s not hing to add to it. I g uess the Court ca n take jud ic ia l no tic e of

it. The Court: I ’ve taken judicial notice of all the prior pr ocee dings a nd will as to the ru lin g s w ithre sp e c t to that. O ka y . M a int a in t

he same ru lin g s. Def ense Counsel: Ye s, Your Honor . Thank you. A tri a l c ourt ’s ru lin g a dmi tti nge vid e nc e wi ll no t be re ve rs e d on a pp e a l a bs e nt a c le ar a

bu se of discre tion. Ra mo s v . S tate , 245 S.W .3d 410, 417-418 (Te x .Crim.App. 2008). Under the

c ir c ums tanc e s o f t

his c a se , w e dis c e rn

no c le ar a

buse of di scr eti on on

the pa rt of the tr ia l c ourt

in admitting the expert testimony without holding a se cond Da ub e rt hear ing. When a ppellant, at the

s e c o n d p u n is h me n t h e ar in g , “ r e - u r g e [d ] th [e ] Da ub e rt h ea ri n g” h el d

at t h e f i rs t p u n i s h m en th ea ri n g, he conc eded that “there ’s nothing to a dd to it” and “guessed” that the trial court could take judicial notice of it. The tr ial court then state d that it ha d alre ady taken judicial notice of the ear lier Da ub e rt hear ing a nd would “[m] aintain t he same ruling s” (which we ha d alre ady upheld) with re spect to the adm is s ib il it

y o f th e e xp e rt t e s ti mo n y . A lt h o u g h a p p e ll an t o b

je c te d to th e a dmi s s io no f

th e expert testimony , he did not, as he now claims, reque st a second Da ub e rt he ari ng , a

nd the tr ia l c ourt

c ou ld have r easona

bly conclude d that nothing would be acc omplished by holding one. We overrule issues numbers six teen a

nd six teen- a. I n issue number eig hteen, appellant argues that the trial cour t violated the Cruel and U nusual Pun ish me nts Cla

us e of the Ei g hth

Am e ndme nt a

nd the Du e P roce ss C la

us e of the F ourt e e nth Amendment whe n the trial cour t, in accor dance with Article 37.071, § 2(d)(2) and (f )(2) , “instructed the jury that a u n animous vote was r equire d to answer the first and se cond spec ial issues in theRUSS EAU -- 14

aff ir mati v e an d

to an s w e r

th e th ir d s p e c ia l i s s u e in

th e n e g a ti v e [an d ] th a t at l e a s t t e nju r o r s w ere require d to answer

the first two spec ial issues in the neg ative and the third specia l i s s u e i n the aff irmative.” We c onsidered a nd reje cted this constitutional attack on the “ 10-12 rule” on orig inal submissi on, and that holding rema ins the law of the c ase. Ru sse au v . S tate , 1 7 1 S. W. 3 d

a t 8 8 6

. We

overr ule issue number e ighte en. Finally , in issue number ninetee n, appellant a rg ues t h at “[t] he Te x as ca pital sentencing statute’s fa ilure to inform the jury that a sing le holdout [

juror] on a spec ial issue would result in [an]

a uto ma tic lif

e se nte nc e vio late s th e [Cru e l and Unus ual P un ishme nts Cla us e of the ] Eig hth [Amendment] and [the Due Process Clause of the] Fourtee nth Amendment[] .” We consider ed and reje cted this argument on orig inal submissi on, and that holding remains t he law of t he case. Ib id

. We overrule issue number ninete en. Ha vin g fo un d n o r e ve rs ibl e e rr or , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

DEL I VERED: J UL Y 1, 2009. PUB L I SH