alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 184 (Tuesday, September 23, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 49668]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-25246]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
[I.D. 091697A]


Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council; Public Meetings

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of public meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council will convene a 
public meeting of the Socioeconomic Assessment Panel (SEP).

DATES: A joint meeting of the SEP Reef Fish Subgroup and the Reef Fish 
Stock Assessment Panel will be held beginning at 8:30 a.m. on 
Wednesday, October 8 and will conclude by 5:00 p.m. on Thursday, 
October 9, 1997. On Friday, October 10, the entire SEP will hold their 
meeting.

ADDRESSES: The meeting will be held at NMFS Southeast Fisheries Science 
Center, 75 Virginia Beach Drive, Miami, FL.
    Council address: Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, 3018 
U.S. Highway 301 North, Suite 1000, Tampa, FL 33619.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Antonio B. Lamberte, Economist; 
telephone: 813-228-2815.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The SEP members will meet to review 
available social and economic data on red snapper and gag and to 
determine the social and economic implications of the levels of 
acceptable biological catches (ABC) recommended by the Council's Reef 
Fish Stock Assessment Panel (RFSAP). The SEP may recommend to the 
Council total allowable catches (TAC) for the 1998 fishing year. 
Specific TAC recommendations for gag will depend on whether an ABC 
range is recommended by the RFSAP.
    Although other issues not contained in this agenda may come before 
the Panel for discussion, in accordance with the Magnuson-Stevens 
Fishery Conservation Act, those issues may not be the subject of formal 
Panel action during this meeting. Panel action will be restricted to 
those issues specifically identified in the agenda listed in this 
notice.
    A copy of the agenda can be obtained by contacting the Gulf Council 
(see ADDRESSES).

Special Accommodations

    This meeting is physically accessible to people with disabilities. 
Requests for sign language interpretation or other auxiliary aids 
should be directed to Anne Alford at the Council (see ADDRESSES) by 
October 1, 1997.

    Dated: September 17, 1997.
Bruce C. Morehead,
Acting Director, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, National Marine 
Fisheries Service.
[FR Doc. 97-25246 Filed 9-22-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-22-F
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2098 

To amend the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program 

Act of 2000 to clarify the eligibility of certain employees of the Department of Energy under that Act. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

DECEMBER 14, 2005 

Ms. MURKOWSKI (for herself, Mr. AKAKA, and Mr. BINGAMAN) introduced the 

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 

Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

A BILL 

To amend the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 to clarify the eligibility 

of certain employees of the Department of Energy under 

that Act. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. DEFINITION OF MEMBER OF THE SPECIAL EX4 POSURE COHORT. 

5 Section 3621(14) of the Energy Employees Occupa6 tional Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 (42 

7 U.S.C. 7384l(14)) is amended by adding at the end the 

8 following: 
2 

•S 2098 IS

1 ‘‘(D) The employee— 

2 ‘‘(i) was so employed by the Depart3 ment of Energy, or a contractor or subcon4 tractor of that Department, before 1986 

5 on— 

6 ‘‘(I) Enewetak Atoll; 

7 ‘‘(II) Bikini Atoll; 

8 ‘‘(III) Rongelap Atoll; or 

9 ‘‘(IV) Utrik Atoll; 

10 ‘‘(ii) was exposed to ionizing radiation 

11 in the performance of a duty of the em12 ployee; and 

13 ‘‘(iii) during the time the employee 

14 was so employed, was a citizen of the 

15 Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.’’. 

Æ
#### Richard Melvin WRIGHT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-449.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District.

Sept. 9, 1969.

Appeal dismissed.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2083 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2083

       To prohibit the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security 
 (Transportation Security Administration) from removing any item from 
   the current list of items prohibited from being carried aboard a 
                          passenger aircraft.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           December 12, 2005

  Mrs. Clinton (for herself and Mr. Schumer) introduced the following 
 bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, 
                      Science, and Transportation

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
       To prohibit the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security 
 (Transportation Security Administration) from removing any item from 
   the current list of items prohibited from being carried aboard a 
                          passenger aircraft.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROHIBITED ITEMS LIST.

    The Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation 
Security Administration) shall not modify the list of items prohibited 
from being carried aboard a passenger aircraft operated by an air 
carrier or foreign air carrier in air transportation or intrastate air 
transportation set forth in section 1540 of title 49, Code of Federal 
Regulations, so as to permit any item contained on the list as of 
December 1, 2005, to be carried aboard a passenger aircraft.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                          16,387
<SECURITIES>                                    21,658
<RECEIVABLES>                                   15,670
<ALLOWANCES>                                     7,782
<INVENTORY>                                      1,134
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                52,057
<PP&E>                                           8,439
<DEPRECIATION>                                   3,809
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  69,329
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           10,798
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        53,271
<OTHER-SE>                                       5,260
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    69,329
<SALES>                                         43,693
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                48,262
<CGS>                                           14,841
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   16,899
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                35,916
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 9,551
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,913)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (1,238)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,675)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,675)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.15)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.15)
        

</TABLE>
Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

January 13, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

127515 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

CHRISTOPHER D. BENTFIELD, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 127515 

 COA: 248795 

Oakland CC: 2002-039613-NO 

BRANDON’S LANDING BOAT BAR, DAVID

WATTS, INC., and DAVID WATTS, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

_________________________________________/ 

On December 14, 2005, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave 

to appeal the August 31, 2004 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, 

the application is again considered. MCR 7.302(G)(1). In lieu of granting leave to 

appeal, we REVERSE Part III of the Court of Appeals opinion and REINSTATE the 

Oakland Circuit Court’s order denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. For the 

reasons stated in the partially dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, the trial judge 

did not abuse her discretion when she denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. 

CAVANAGH, J., would deny leave to appeal. 

MARKMAN, J., dissents and states as follows: 

I would deny leave to appeal. In denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, 

the trial court held that plaintiff “merely present[ed] the same issues ruled upon 

previously by this Court . . . .” This statement was an error because plaintiff argued for 

the first time in his motion for reconsideration that defendant was liable under MCL 

554.139. The dissent in the Court of Appeals, upon which the majority relies, asserted 

that “‘[w]e find no abuse of discretion in denying a motion resting on a legal theory and 

facts which could have been pled or argued prior to the trial court’s original order.’” 

Bentfield v Brandon’s Landing Boat Bar, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of 

Appeals, issued August 31, 2004 (Docket No. 248795) (Meter, J., concurring in part and 

dissenting in part), quoting Charbeneau v Wayne Co Gen Hosp, 158 Mich App 730, 733 

(1987). However, it also would not necessarily have been an abuse of discretion to have 
 _________________________________________ 

 

2 

considered a motion for reconsideration resting upon a new legal theory. See MCR 

2.119(F)(3). The trial court simply failed to recognize that plaintiff was raising a new 

legal theory and, as a result, failed to exercise its discretion to consider (or not consider) 

plaintiff’s argument. The trial court’s failure to exercise its discretion was itself an abuse 

of discretion. 

KELLY, J., joins the statement of MARKMAN, J. 

t0110 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

January 13, 2006 

Clerk
Page 1 of 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

 

KATHLEEN DRU MEYERS, 

 Plaintiff, 

 

 v. 

 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 

 Defendant. 

CASE NO. 4:14-cv-000548-GBC 

 

(MAGISTRATE JUDGE COHN) 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

APPEAL, VACATING THE DECISION OF 

THE COMMISSIONER, AND REMANDING 

FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 

Docs. 1, 6, 7, 8, 9 

In accordance with the accompanying memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 

THAT: 

1. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of Kathleen Dru Meyers and against 

the Commissioner as set forth in the following paragraph. 

2. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Kathleen Dru Meyers 

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income is vacated and the case remanded 

to the Commissioner of Social Security to: 

2.1 Conduct a new administrative hearing, appropriately evaluate the medical evidence, 

and appropriately assess Plaintiff’s limitations. 

3. The Clerk of Court shall close this case. 

Dated: March 31, 2015 

s/Gerald B. Cohn 

GERALD B. COHN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 4:14-cv-00548-GBC Document 15 Filed 03/31/15 Page 1 of 1
<PAGE>
                                                                     EXHIBIT 4.1

                      WESTERN UNITED LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY
                PREFERRED STOCK, SERIES A, AUTHORIZING RESOLUTION

                  Resolved, that pursuant to the authority expressly granted and
          vested in the Board of Directors (the "Board") of this Corporation by
          its Articles of Incorporation, as amended, a series of preferred
          stock, Series A of the Corporation be, and hereby is, established
          which will have a par value of $10.00 per share, designated "Preferred
          Stock, Series A" (hereafter called "Series A Preferred Stock"). The
          Series A Preferred Stock shall consist of 5,000,000 shares, which
          number may be increased or decreased by the Board, and shall have
          rights, preferences, qualifications and restrictions as follows:

                  The holders of Series A Preferred Stock shall be entitled to
          receive, when and as declared by the Board, out of the net earnings of
          the corporation available therefore, dividends at such rates and on
          such dates as may be determined by the Board. The dividend rate shall
          be determined at least annually. Dividends payable on the Series A
          Preferred Stock shall have priority to the payment of any dividends on
          common stock, shall not be cumulative and no right shall accrue to any
          holder of shares of the preferred stock by reason of the fact that
          dividends on such shares have not been declared in a prior period.

                  The Series A Preferred Stock may be redeemed in whole or in
          part upon such terms and at such times as shall be determined by the
          Board but the redemption price shall, in no event, be no less than the
          par value of such shares. Shares of Series A Preferred Stock shall not
          be entitled to be converted into any other securities of the
          corporation.


                                       1
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 184 (Tuesday, September 23, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 49677]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-25331]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[Docket No. ES97-44-001]


Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc.; Notice of Filing

September 19, 1997.
    Take notice that on September 18, 1997, Orange and Rockland 
Utilities, Inc. (O&R) filed an amendment to its application for 
authorization to issue securities in the above-captioned docket. The 
only change to the previously-approved application is a request by O&R 
that the authorization become effective October 1, 1997.
    Any person desiring to be heard or to protest said filing should 
file a motion to intervene or protest with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, in 
accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice 
and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 18 CFR 385.214). All such motions or 
protests must be filed on or before September 25, 1997. Protests will 
be considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action 
to be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the 
proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a motion to 
intervene. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission and 
are available for public inspection.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 97-25331 Filed 9-22-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
TYPHOON
                            CAPITAL CONSULTANTS. LLC





VIA AIRBORNE EXPRESS

December 11,2001

Mr. Darryl Reed, President and CEO
Pre-Settlement Funding Corp.
927 S. Walter Reed Drive, Suite 5
Arlington, VA 22204


Dear Mr. Reed,

Due to unforeseen circumstances, Typhoon Capital has lost
the majority of its employees and clients during the course of this year.

As a result, I am in the process of further reducing expenses including
terminating our current office lease.

I regret to inform you that Typhoon Capital will not be able to serve as a
consultant to the company as per the agreement dated March 15, 2001.

Typhoon Capital waives all rights to any cash or equity
compensation owed to it by Pre-Settlement Funding except for fifty-thousand
(50,000) shares of the company's 144 stock issued upon signing of the
agreement.

Typhoon Capital hereby releases Pre-Settlement Funding from all obligations
under the agreement.

Yours sincerely,



Sanjay Sabnani
President
SS/dma

  3120 Ocean Park Soulavard. Suits 3020 Santa Monica California 90405 ' lei
              310.399.*059 fa 310.399.3431 -www.tvpcap.com
Exhibit 23.1

                         Consent of Independent Auditors

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-8 No. 33-98738 and No. 333-39407) pertaining to the Vion
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Amended and Restated Stock Option Plan and in the
Registration Statements (Form S-3 No.333-37941 and No.333-61477) of Vion
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and in the related Prospectus of our report dated February
12, 1999, with respect to the financial statements of Vion Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
included in the Annual Report (Form 10-KSB) for the year ended December 31,
1998.

                                                      Ernst & Young LLP

Stamford, Connecticut
March 30, 1999
#### FLORIDA CITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a Florida Corporation, Appellant, v. BENRUS CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellee.

No. 77-159.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 11, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 15, 1978.

*299Wolf & Schoninger and Samuel Frank Schoninger, Miami, for appellant.

Charles J. Crowder, South Miami, for ap-pellee.

Before HENDRY, J., and HELIO GOMEZ, Associate Judge, and CHARLES CARROLL (Ret.), Associate Judge.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from that portion of a final judgment which denied plaintiff an attorney’s fee in an action brought by plaintiff for damages and injunctive relief wherein the defendant answered and asserted a counterclaim for foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien under the provision of Chapter 713, Florida Statutes (1977).

Upon trial without a jury, the trial court entered the following final judgment:

> “THIS ACTION was tried before the Court and on the evidence presented,

> “IT IS ADJUDGED:

> “1) That Defendant, BENRUS CONSTRUCTION, INC. prevail on the Plaintiff, FLORIDA CITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION’S Complaint and accordingly Plaintiff take nothing by reason of its Complaint, and

> “2) That Plaintiff, FLORIDA CITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION prevail on the Defendants, BENRUS CONSTRUCTION, INC.’s Mechanics Lien Counterclaim and accordingly Defendant take nothing by reason of its said Counterclaim, and

> “3) That the Plaintiff is denied its attorney’s fees as prevailing party and Defendant is denied attorney’s fees and each party stand their respective costs of this litigation.

> “4) That the Lis Pendens filed by each of the parties to this action in this cause and in Case No. 72-25588 in this Court are hereby cancelled and the Clerk of this Court shall duly note the same among the Public Records of Dade County, Florida.”

The sole point on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying plaintiff an attorney’s fee as provided for in Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1977). The statute is as follows:

> “Attorney’s fees. — In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I of this chapter, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney, to be determined by the court, which shall be taxed as part of his costs.”

The plaintiff/appellant was the prevailing party in the mechanic’s lien foreclosure counterclaim, therefore, it was error for the trial court to deny plaintiff an award of attorney’s fees for defending the counterclaim. *Dominguez v. Benach,*277 So.2d 567 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); *H. D. McPherson, Inc. v. Metro Electric of Orlando, Inc.,*253 So.2d 878 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).

Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the final judgment under review that denied plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees; and we remand the cause with directions to enter a proper award to plaintiff for attorney’s fees for the defense of the counterclaim for foreclosure of the mechanic’s lien.

Reversed and remanded.
**Exhibit 31.1**
**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
     I, Anthony W. Thompson, certify that:
     1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of T REIT, Inc.;
     2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain anyuntrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances underwhich such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this quarterly report;
     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements and other financialinformation included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of theregistrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;
     4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as definedin Exchange Act rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:
          a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure thatmaterial information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;
          b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures as of the end of the period covered by this report based onsuch evaluation; and
          c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s mostrecent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is likely tomaterially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial; and
     5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performingthe equivalent function):
          a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internalcontrols which could adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record,process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for theregistrant’s auditors any material weakness in internal controls; and
          b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrols.     /s/ ANTHONY W. THOMPSON    Anthony W. Thompson  *Chief Executive Officer*
Date: November 14, 2003
In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-13-00101-CV

DANNY WAYNE MARTIN, Appellant

V.

AMANDA JOANN PARRIS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 102nd District Court

Red River County, Texas

Trial Court No. CV03126

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Danny Wayne Martin, appellant, has filed a motion seeking to dismiss this appeal. 

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1), the motion is granted. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 42.1(a)(1).

We dismiss the appeal.

Jack Carter

Justice

Date Submitted: December 9, 2013

Date Decided: December 10, 2013