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i 

64–511 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–181] 

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S 

EFFICIENCY INITIATIVE 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2010 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

CHARLES K. DJOU, Hawaii 

PAUL ARCANGELI, Staff Director 

ANDREW HUNTER, Professional Staff Member 

ROGER ZAKHEIM, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, September 29, 2010, The Department of Defense’s Efficiency 

Initiative ............................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, September 29, 2010 ............................................................................ 47 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2010 

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S EFFICIENCY INITIATIVE 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Armed Services ............................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Carter, Hon. Ashton, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics, U.S. Department of Defense ....................................................... 6 

Cartwright, Gen. James E., USMC, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, U.S. Department of Defense ..................................................................... 9 

Lynn, Hon. William J., III, Deputy Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department 

of Defense ............................................................................................................. 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Carter, Hon. Ashton ......................................................................................... 71 

Cartwright, Gen. James E. .............................................................................. 76 

Connolly, Hon. Gerald E., a Representative from Virginia ........................... 81 

Lynn, Hon. William J., III ............................................................................... 55 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 53 

Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. 51 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Joint Forces Command Transition Planning Team Nondisclosure Agreement Form ..................................................................................................... 85 

Legal Analysis by the Department of Defense’s Office of General Counsel 

of the Applicability of Section 2687 of Title 10, United States Code, 

to the Disestablishment of JFCOM, NII, and BTA .................................... 89 

Letter from Linda T. Johnson, Mayor of Suffolk, Virginia, to Hon. Ike 

Skelton Regarding Disestablishment of USJFCOM, Dated September 

24, 2010 .......................................................................................................... 96 

Memorandum by Hon. Ashton Carter on Better Buying Power: Mandate 

for Restoring Affordability and Productivity in Defense Spending, 

Dated June 28, 2010 ..................................................................................... 105 
Page

IV 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD—Continued 

Memorandum by Hon. Ashton Carter on Better Buying Power: Guidance 

for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending, 

Dated September 14, 2010 ........................................................................... 111 

Memorandum by Hon. William J. Lynn III Regarding the Policy for 

Communication with Industry, Dated June 21, 2010 ................................ 129 

Memorandum by Robert Rangel, The Special Assistant to the Secretary 

of Defense, Regarding the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Disestablishment Working Group, Dated September 1, 2010 ................................. 132 

Statement for the Record of Stan Soloway, President and CEO, Professional Services Council ................................................................................. 134 

Written Testimony of Hon. Robert F. McDonnell, Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Regarding Defense Department Budget Initiatives ................................................................................................................ 144 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bishop ......................................................................................................... 179 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 180 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 171 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 170 

Mrs. McMorris Rodgers .................................................................................... 180 

Mr. Skelton ....................................................................................................... 163 

Mr. Thornberry ................................................................................................. 168 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 180 
(1) 

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S EFFICIENCY 

INITIATIVE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 29, 2010. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. Welcome to the House Armed 

Services Committee hearing on the Department of Defense’s efficiency initiative. We have with us three distinguished witnesses: 

Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn, III, the Department’s chief management officer; Dr. Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and 

General James E. Cartwright, United States Marine Corps, the 

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

The topic of the hearing discussed is one of the most important 

we will consider this year, and will be particularly important next 

year, when the committee reviews the President’s budget request 

for fiscal year 2012. The topic is the Department’s effort to wring 

billions of dollars of efficiency out of its operations. 

Let me begin and end this hearing with one clear overriding message. I think I speak for the overwhelming majority of our committee, regardless of party, when I tell you I do not support cutting 

the defense budget at this time. The national security challenges 

this Nation faces around the world dictate that we maintain the recent growth of our ground forces, the Army and Marine Corps, we 

modernize our Air Force, and that we grow our Navy. To do this, 

we must continue to grow the base defense budget for some time 

to come. 

I think I also speak for the committee by saying that we all want 

to eliminate waste within the Department wherever and whenever 

we find it, and I commend the Secretary of Defense and his able 

support team, well represented here today, for making hard choices 

that have too often been avoided. 

Now, as you all know, this committee hasn’t agreed on every decision made, nor should we, but we do respect the leadership being 

demonstrated by the Department of Defense. The Department’s efficiency initiative is the most comprehensive effort of its kind in almost 20 years. Across the board, the committee stands ready to 

hear the Department’s case. In the area of acquisition reform, we 
2 

believe the Department’s initiatives are very much aligned with the 

policies this committee has advocated for years, and which were recently clearly expressed in the report of our Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform. In other areas, we look forward to better understanding what the Department is proposing and what savings will 

be achieved. 

When it comes to jointness, insourcing, and information technology, this committee has longstanding interests and concerns 

that may not align as clearly with the Department’s proposals. As 

long as I have served in Congress, this system has worked one 

way: the administration proposes, and the Congress disposes. This 

year and next will be no different. 

So gentlemen, your task today is to persuade us that the initiative is not part of an agenda to cut the Defense budget, and that 

it is consistent with this committee’s longstanding priorities in a 

number of critical areas. 

I turn to my friend, my colleague, the gentleman from California, 

Buck McKeon. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ McKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Lynn, Secretary Carter, General Cartwright, good morning and welcome to 

each of you. We have been looking forward to your testimony on 

the Department’s efficiencies initiative for some time. I hope that 

you will be able to provide members of this committee with detailed 

information regarding the Secretary’s proposed measures and to 

allay the concerns that many of us share. As elected officials, Members of Congress have a responsibility to ensure that U.S. taxpayer 

dollars are not wasted on inefficient, wasteful, or redundant programs. 

I agree with Secretary Gates we must scrutinize Defense programs to ensure that we are generating the most bang for the 

buck, and that we must concentrate our limited resources on the 

highest-priority programs. 

Furthermore, I view it as the responsibility of the Armed Services Committee to exercise the same discipline on an annual basis 

through our Defense Authorization Act to shift funds from poorly 

performing programs to higher national security priorities and 

promising technologies for the future, such as missile defense and 

means to counter anti-access threats. 

But as with most things, the devil is in the details. Unfortunately, although we have requested more information, both verbally and in writing, the Department has failed to fully respond. 

My first concern is where we find $20 billion a year in cuts in the 

midst of two wars, without also cutting back on required weapons 

and services needed to meet the threats of today and tomorrow. 

Secretary Lynn, you have already announced that at least a third 

of the savings will come from within the force structure and modernization accounts, the same accounts the Secretary is attempting 

to grow. We have seen that setting arbitrary targets for cost sav-
3 

ings, as appears to have happened with insourcing, can frequently 

not yield the expected results. How do we avoid those pitfalls here? 

Second, I am extremely concerned that no matter what the intentions of the Secretary may be, the Administration and some in Congress will not allow the Secretary to keep the savings. 

This summer, the White House supported a teacher bailout bill 

that was funded in part with defense dollars. Once these savings 

from this efficiencies initiative are identified, what is to stop them 

from taking this money also? 

We are already seeing impacts of this summer’s cuts. For example, some of those funds were intended to rectify an overdraft in 

the Navy’s military pay accounts. Once those funds were taken, the 

Navy was forced to take the money from aircraft procurement accounts. What is the result? It is going to take longer to buy the external fuel tanks our Super Hornets and Growlers need and to upgrade training simulators. Even worse, it will cost the taxpayers 

more money to buy those fuel tanks because we won’t be able to 

take advantage of a negotiated bulk buy. So much for efficiency. 

Secretary Gates appears to share my concern. In August, he stated, and I quote, ‘‘My greatest fear is that in economic tough times 

that people will see the Defense budget as the place to solve the 

Nation’s deficit problems to find money for other parts of the government. I think that would be disastrous in the world environment we see today, and what we are likely to see in the years to 

come,’’ end quote. 

Third, with respect to acquisition reforms, most of these appear 

to be consistent with congressional direction. I would like to learn 

more about the Department’s plans to set cost targets for new 

weapon systems. Congress supports analytical tradeoffs between 

required capabilities, time to the warfighter, and costs. However, 

our requirements must be determined by the future threat environment, not simply by our budgets. 

The Department will have to convince members of this committee that these efforts will not weaken our Nation’s defense. To 

that end, we must fully understand the rationale behind each decision and potential impact of every cut. Case in point: Who within 

the Department of Defense will be responsible for ensuring our 

commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq have the correct number and 

mix of military forces if the Department eliminates the Joint 

Forces Command? 

Thank you for your willingness to provide this committee with 

the information we require to conduct thorough oversight and support the Secretary’s efforts to grow our investment accounts. 

I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 53.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Secretary Lynn, you are 

on. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. LYNN III, DEPUTY 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary LYNN. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to appear before you and present testimony and discuss the De-
4 

partment’s efficiency efforts. What I would like to do, if it is acceptable, Mr. Chairman, is enter my complete statement into the 

record, and summarize it briefly for you. 

The CHAIRMAN. You may, without objection. 

Secretary LYNN. During a speech in May of this year at the Eisenhower Library, Secretary Gates outlined how in order to maintain and modernize America’s key military capabilities at a time of 

war and fiscal pressure, the Defense Department would need to 

fundamentally change the way it does business. The reason is this: 

to sustain the current military force structure, which we must do 

given the security challenges the country faces, requires the equivalent of real budget growth of 2 to 3 percent. The overall Defense 

budget, however, is projected to rise in real terms by about 1 percent, and the Department cannot and should not ask Congress or 

the American taxpayers for more increases unless and until we 

have done everything possible to make the dollars we already have 

count for more. 

Bridging the gap requires culling the Department’s massive overhead costs and structure, the ‘‘tail,’’ and directing them to our 

fighting forces and modernization accounts, the ‘‘tooth.’’ This is not 

an effort to reduce the defense budget. This is about shifting resources and priorities within the existing top line. That requires reducing the Department’s overhead costs by targeting unnecessary 

excess and duplication in the Defense enterprise. 

This effort, moreover, is not just about the budget, it is also 

about operational agility. We need to ensure that the Department 

is operating as efficiently and effectively as possible. The Secretary 

has directed us to take a hard look at how the Department is organized, staffed, and operated, how we can flatten and streamline the 

organization, how we can reduce executive or flag officer billets and 

the staff apparatus that supports them, how we can shed overlapping commands and organizations, and how we can reduce the role 

and number of contractors. 

Since the Secretary’s speech in May, DOD [Department of Defense] has embarked on a four-track approach toward a more effective, efficient, and cost-conscious way of doing business. I will briefly touch on our activities in Tracks 1 through 3, and then spend 

a little bit more time on Track 4. 

On Track 1, the Secretary directed that the military services find 

more than $100 billion in overhead savings over the next 5 years. 

The services, however, will be able to keep any of the savings they 

generate to invest in higher-priority warfighting and modernization 

needs. This effort is underway now, and we have already begun to 

review the services’ submissions. The fiscal 2012 budget will reflect 

the results when it is submitted to Congress in February. 

On Track 2, the Department is seeking ideas, suggestions, and 

proposals regarding efficiencies from outside normal channels. We 

have solicited input from experts, from think tanks, from industry, 

and from the Department’s external boards. We have also established a DOD suggestion program to solicit our employees’ ideas. 

The Department is willing to consider any reasonable suggestion to 

reduce our overhead. 

With regard to Track 3, the Department is conducting a broad 

review of how it is organized and operated in order to inform the 
5 

President’s 2012 budget submission. This Track 3 review focuses on 

affecting long-term systemic improvements in several key areas of 

DOD operations. Dr. Carter will address those in more detail in his 

opening statement. 

With regard to Track 4, which was announced on August 9th, we 

are addressing several specific areas where the Department can 

take action now to reduce inefficiencies and overhead. These steps 

are intended to jump-start the reform process ahead of and separate from the normal programming and budgeting cycle. 

In particular, they represent the Secretary’s lead effort to reduce 

headquarters and support bureaucracies, military and civilian 

alike, that have swelled to cumbersome proportions, grown overreliant on contractors, and become accustomed to operating with 

little consideration of costs. Though all of these efforts will result 

in measurable savings, an equally important purpose is to instill a 

culture of cost-consciousness and restraint in the Department, a 

culture that sets priorities, makes real tradeoffs, and separates unrestrained appetites from genuine requirements. 

There are eight major initiatives that reduce support contractors, 

headquarters personnel, senior executives, and flag and general officers. They also include efforts to reduce boards and commissions 

and to eliminate redundant intelligence organizations. 

Finally, Track 4 involves several organizational 

disestablishments. The last decade has seen a growth of new offices 

and organizations, including two new combatant commands and 

five new Defense agencies. The Secretary concluded that the Joint 

Forces Command, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks 

and Information Integration, the Joint Staff’s J–6 Directorate, and 

the Defense Business Transformation Agency no longer effectively 

satisfy the purposes for which they were created. Some missions 

and tasks that each perform remain vital, but can be managed effectively elsewhere. Other functions that each perform are either 

already performed elsewhere or are no longer relevant for the operation of the Department. 

We are mindful that the recommended actions will have economic consequences for displaced employees, their families, and 

their communities. The Department is committed to work with the 

affected communities, and will devote significant attention to the 

challenges employees face during this time of transition. We have 

asked Dr. Clifford Stanley, the Under Secretary for Personnel and 

Readiness, to take direct responsibility for this aspect of the Department’s planning in order to ensure we take the steps necessary 

to help impacted employees with appropriate assistance and support. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I understand that some of these reforms may be controversial and unwelcome to some people both inside and outside the Department. No doubt many of these changes 

will be stressful, indeed wrenching for the organizations and employees affected. But I would ask the members of this committee 

and the Congress as a whole to consider this reform agenda in 

terms of our responsibilities as leaders to set priorities and move 

resources from where they are needed least to where they belong: 

America’s fighting forces, the investment in future capabilities to 

support those forces, and most importantly, the needs of our men 
6 

and women in uniform. This is what Secretary Gates and President 

Obama are proposing, and we urge your strong support. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this initiative, and I 

welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Lynn can be found in the 

Appendix on page 55.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Before I call on Secretary 

Carter, I ask unanimous consent that Representative Connolly sit 

with us at our hearing and ask questions after all members of the 

committee have had their chance to ask questions. And I ask the 

same of Mr. Scott, Bobby Scott, from the great Commonwealth of 

Virginia, for the same. So I ask unanimous consent for both Mr. 

Connolly and Mr. Scott. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

Secretary Carter. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON CARTER, UNDER SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

McKeon, distinguished members of the committee. I also thank you 

for the opportunity to join Deputy Secretary Lynn, General Cartwright today to discuss Secretary Gates’ efficiency initiative, and in 

particular one piece of it for which I have responsibility. 

As part of his broad initiative to improve the American taxpayers’ return on our investment in national defense, Secretary 

Gates and Deputy Secretary Lynn tasked me to improve the Department’s buying power in the way we acquire critical goods and 

services. Specifically, the portion of the budget that I am addressing is that $400 billion of the $700 billion which is contracted out 

for goods and services. The other $300 billion, just to remind you, 

we spend within the walls, so to speak, of the Department of Defense on the uniformed and civilian employees, their salaries, their 

benefits, and so forth, and the buildings and installations within 

which we work. That is $300 of the $700 billion. The other $400 

billion is spent outside the walls, so to speak, of the institution on 

contracted goods and services, that $400 billion in turn about 

equally divided between the procurement of goods and the procurement of services. 

We estimate that by targeting efficiencies in both of these areas 

we can make a significant contribution towards achieving the $100 

billion redirection of defense budget dollars from unproductive to 

productive purposes sought by Secretary Gates and Deputy Secretary Lynn over the next 5 years, a significant contribution. 

The Department can only meet this goal, however, if we fundamentally change the way we do business. To put it bluntly, we 

cannot support our troops with the capabilities they need unless we 

do so. Our challenge is to sustain a military at war, take care of 

our troops and their families, and invest in new capabilities, all in 

an era when Defense budgets will not be growing as rapidly as 

they were in the years following 9/11; 

Last year we identified savings in the Defense budget by canceling unneeded programs, programs that weren’t performing, that 

we had enough of, or whose time had passed. We will still need to 
7 

do that, but now we must find savings within programs and activities we do need and do want. 

The Department must achieve what economists call productivity 

growth. We must learn, as the way I have put it, to do more without more. Productivity growth you see in the commercial economy 

when you go and you buy a computer this year and it is a little 

bit better than last year’s and maybe even a little bit cheaper, and 

yet we are too often in the position of coming to you every year 

with exactly the same product and explaining to you why it costs 

more this year than it did last year. We would like to see some of 

that productivity growth that we see elsewhere in the economy 

within the defense economy. 

On June 28th, I laid out a mandate to the defense acquisition 

workforce and the defense industry describing how the Department 

could try to achieve better buying power. On September 14th, after 

months of work with the Department’s senior acquisition professionals, industry leaders, and outside experts, I issued specific 

guidance on how to implement that mandate. 

I would like to submit, Mr. Chairman, both the June 28th mandate and the September 14th guidance, and the charts which accompany them, for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

pages 105 and 111.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Secretary CARTER. We are now in implementation mode, taking 

each of the 23 principal items in that plan and putting them into 

practice, the very same teams that compiled them. 

The September 14th guidance contains 23 principal actions to 

improve efficiency organized in five major areas, and I would like 

to just highlight a few of the actions we are taking in each of these 

areas and give some illustrative examples. 

Mr. Chairman, to address the point you raised in your opening 

statement, I think you will see that many of the specific actions we 

are taking are not only consistent with, but some were inspired by 

the work of the subcommittee of this committee that deals with acquisition reform. So I think you will find a lot of consistency there. 

First, as we begin new programs like the Ohio-class SSBN(X) 

[ballistic missile submarine] replacement, the joint family of systems for long-range strike, the Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle, and 

even a new Presidential helicopter, we will be establishing affordability requirements that have the same force as high-priority performance requirements like speed, firepower, or bit rate. And Congressman McKeon, to your point, the objective is to have the design 

trades to which you referred be those which identify the key design 

parameters, and then be able to plot how the cost of the system 

varies as those parameters are varied, not in order to have less 

military capability but to understand where we can change the design in the direction of affordability without in fact compromising 

important military capability. That is the purpose of doing those 

design trades, and that is a discipline we need to have and we 

haven’t had enough of. 

We will also insist that our acquisition professionals and suppliers plan according to what programs should cost, not according 

to self-fulfilling historical estimates of what they will cost, as if 
8 

nothing can be changed in how we do business. We are already 

using this method to drive down costs in the Joint Strike Fighter 

program, the Department’s largest, and the backbone of tactical air 

power for the U.S. and many other countries. 

Second, to incentivize productivity and innovation in industry, 

we will strengthen the connection between profit and performance 

in our business practices. Among other things, we are exploring 

ways, through contracting and financing vehicles and a pilot superior supplier incentive program, to reward contractors who control 

their costs and demonstrate exemplary performance. 

Third, we will remove obstacles to effective competition. Last 

year the Pentagon awarded $55 billion in contracts that were supposed to be competitive but for which only one bid was received, 

usually from an incumbent. Yet simple changes in how we structure evaluations and work with industry have been shown to reduce by 50 percent the incidence of single bids by incumbents. 

Additionally, we will promote real competition for competition is 

the single most powerful tool available to the Department to drive 

productivity. We must stop deluding ourselves with the idea that 

directed buys from two designated suppliers represents real competition. We are already cutting down on directed buys with the 

Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship, where we have set in place real competition that will save more than a billion dollars in the next 5 

years alone, with additional savings expected over the life of the 

LCS program. Competition is not always available, but the evidence is clear that the government is not availing itself of all possible competitive situations. 

Fourth, and this is an area where I think we especially owe a 

debt to the Subcommittee on Acquisition Reform because of its 

focus on this question, we will more aggressively manage the over 

$200 billion we spend annually on services, such as information 

technology and knowledge-based services, facilities upkeep, weapons system maintenance, and transportation. When most people 

think of the defense budget they think of ships and planes, but 

more than 50 percent of our contract spending, as I noted earlier, 

is for services. Believe it or not, our practices for buying such services are even less effective than for buying weapons systems. 

Fifth, we are taking steps to reduce unproductive processes and 

bureaucracy by reducing the number of OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]-level reviews to those necessary to support major 

investment decisions or to uncover and respond to significant program execution issues, eliminating low-value-added statutory processes, and reducing the volume and cost of both internal and congressional reports as appropriate. 

Changing our business practices will take time and require the 

continued close involvement of our industry partners. We also need 

your support, which is essential to the success of this endeavor. We 

have every reason to believe that the efficiencies we seek can be 

realized. 

First, we have established reasonable reduction targets. 

Second, we are focused on specific savings of the kind that I described. 
9 

Third, it is reasonable to assume that after an era of double-digit 

budget growth there is fat that has crept in and that we can find 

savings. 

And finally, President Obama, Secretary Gates, Deputy Secretary 

Lynn, you on this committee, both Houses, in fact, of Congress, in 

legislation both last year and this year, have shown that you expect 

it and the American taxpayers expect it. The alternative, also 

worth considering, is unacceptable. Broken or canceled programs 

rather than managed programs, budget turbulence, uncertainty for 

industry, erosion of taxpayer confidence in the care with which we 

spend their money on national defense, and of course especially lost 

capability for the warfighter in a dangerous world. So we not only 

can succeed, but we must. 

I thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Carter can be found in the 

Appendix on page 71.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. General Cartwright, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC, VICE 

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

General CARTWRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative 

McKeon, distinguished members of the committee, and thank you 

for the opportunity to discuss the Department of Defense efficiency 

initiatives. 

A few points of context. We remain a Nation at war, and that 

is not lost on us. Troops are deployed around the world, many engaged in combat. We are committed to ensuring these troops are 

properly supported. 

Second, DOD is a bureaucracy that has not fully adapted its 

processes and constructs to the information age, as Dr. Carter just 

described. We must be able to adapt with increased speed in order 

to ensure we remain competitive. In an era of rapidly evolving 

threats, our success depends on our ability to adapt quickly. 

Third, DOD is cognizant of the Nation’s financial situation. We 

do not expect budgets to grow at the rate they grew over the last 

decade. When developing grand strategy, it is the first duty of the 

strategist to appreciate the financial position of his or her nation. 

We demonstrated this appreciation during last year’s weapons systems portfolio changes and earlier this year in the process to release our strategic reviews. 

The Secretary’s efficiency initiatives are aimed at seeking the 

same effect in our organizations. These initiatives are not a cut, 

but rather a shift of resources from overhead to the warfighter, increasing the tooth-to-tail ratio. 

Regarding the disestablishment of Joint Forces Command, 

JFCOM has helped to accomplish the primary goal for which it was 

established, to drive jointness throughout the military. We must 

continue along the positive vectors regarding joint activities as directed in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. We must also improve 

initiatives to strengthen efforts in the interagency and combined 

arenas. It is our goal to reduce unintended redundancies and 

layering, to more clearly align operational responsibilities with 

service, train, and equip functions in order to reduce inefficiencies 
10 

as forces are presented to combatant commands. At all the 

COCOMs [combatant commands] we must consolidate functions 

where appropriate, and where functions are retained, move toward 

a construct of combined joint interagency task force organizations 

and centers. The combined interagency aspects are a critical component in establishing baseline capacity and surge expectations of 

the force. As the cyber domain continues to grow in importance, the 

Department will look to ensure lines of authority and responsibility 

are clear and adaptable. We intend to focus cyber operations in 

Cyber Command. We will align policy and oversight activities in a 

strengthened DOD Chief Information Officer. 

Finally, we must align cyber requirements and cyber acquisition 

to maximize support to the operational activities. Given the expanding role and criticality of information and the networks that 

hold and transmit that information, we need to manage DOD systems in the cyber domain as we do any other operational system. 

To ensure our success, IT [information technology] systems must 

have the proper architecture and capability to ensure adaptability 

and innovation. 

Further, our architecture should enable collaboration throughout 

the joint interagency coalition and commercial partnerships that 

we engage in. The free flow of information among these players is 

integral to our strategies. The Department’s information systems 

must extend to the tactical edge and must work when others do 

not. 

I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Cartwright can be found in 

the Appendix on page 76.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you very much. I have spent a 

great deal of time and effort over a period of years pursuing 

jointness. I was in on the ground floor in 1982, an effort that was 

begun by Richard White of Texas. I introduced legislation in 1983. 

My first bill abolished the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is when I 

found that none of them had a sense of humor. But the House 

passed, on three different occasions, legislation to create jointness, 

and in 1986, with a new chairman in the Senate, Barry Goldwater, 

and the able assistance and leadership of Bill Nichols of our committee, a bill was passed into law called Goldwater-Nichols, which 

created, in fact, jointness. 

Now, it took some time for the joint culture to come about, but 

it did. The services saluted and did well, and I to this day wish to 

compliment all those, present and past, who helped create the 

jointness based upon the law that we passed known as GoldwaterNichols. 

So that leads me to my first question, Secretary Lynn, if I may. 

The Joint Forces Command is a subject of elimination. If that 

comes to pass, who within the Department will have as its central 

mission the job to advocate and develop and disseminate joint operating concepts, doctrine, and training? Would we be throwing away 

all of the efforts that began with Goldwater-Nichols should that 

happen? I am very concerned about where that will go, how much 

thought has gone into that, and will our military be better off as 

a result? 
11 

But answer the first question, Secretary Lynn. Who assumes 

that duty? 

Secretary LYNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We, too, recognize 

the importance of jointness in our training, in our doctrine, and in 

our operations, and appreciate the role you played in the 1980s, 

and Goldwater-Nichols, and the subsequent events. And as you indicated, those efforts have been successful in changing the whole 

culture of the Department. The COCOMs operate very differently 

than they did during the first Gulf War, when jointness was not 

adequate. The services operate very differently than they did in the 

1970s and the 1980s in the actions that led to the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. We do think that since the Department is in a different place that it is possible to eliminate the Joint Forces Command, to eliminate this four-star, billion-dollar headquarters, but 

retain the culture of jointness. 

You ask where the leadership will come from. The leadership will 

come from the Joint Staff, the leadership will now come from the 

services and the COCOMs themselves because of the efforts of 

Goldwater-Nichols, because of the work of the Joint Forces Command. The joint doctrine, training, and operations will continue to 

be a strong part of the Department. 

The CHAIRMAN. Where does it go again? 

Secretary LYNN. As I said, the leadership, in terms of training 

and doctrine, much of it will come from the Joint Chiefs and the 

Joint Staff. But the place that we are in is fundamentally different 

than the one that we were in the 1970s and 1980s and into the 

1990s. We have a much stronger joint culture inside the military 

departments and the military services themselves, and the combatant commands inherently operate jointly and have a joint ethos as 

part of how they operate. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Our committee has asked for a range 

of information on how the Department reached the decision to disestablish the Joint Forces Command. Thus far we have not received the information. Mr. Secretary, when will the information be 

forthcoming? 

Secretary LYNN. Mr. Chairman, we have provided I think briefings to the staff, we have provided an extensive—— 

The CHAIRMAN. No, no, I am not talking about briefings, I am 

not talking about information, sheets of paper. 

Secretary LYNN. Pieces of paper. We have provided, I think, an 

extensive legal opinion on the relevance of the BRAC [base realignment and closure] legislation, we have provided the task force 

memos, and will continue to answer the committee’s questions and 

provide the documentation and the material that the committee 

needs. As the task force moves into the implementation phase, 

there will be much more material available for the committee. 

The CHAIRMAN. Have you provided everything for which we have 

asked? 

Secretary LYNN. I am not sure the committee would agree with 

that. We have been trying to be as responsive to the committee’s 

questions as possible, and we are going to continue to do so. If 

there is specific pieces of information that you think we need, I am 

happy to follow up—that you need, I am happy to follow up for the 

record. 
12 

The CHAIRMAN. For the record, I would like to receive the copy 

of the memorandum for Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 

Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; Subject: Joint 

Forces Command Disestablishment Working Group. I would like to 

have a copy of that piece of information, please. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 132.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I alluded in my 

opening statement, it is critical that the Department provide this 

committee with as much information as possible about its plans to 

improve efficiencies, where cuts will come from, where reinvestment will occur, and the impact of each of those changes in terms 

of current and future operations. This is no more true than in the 

case of the proposed closure of U.S. Joint Forces Command. The 

standup or closure of a combatant command deserves close scrutiny. It represents a major organizational and functional shift within the Department, and a significant change for the workforce. 

To that end, on August 10th, during a briefing to HASC staff and 

Members’ staff by Secretary Hale and other senior leaders, several 

documents were requested regarding the closure of JFCOM [Joint 

Forces Command]. By the end of the month, no such information 

had been provided. 

Now, the chairman just asked about some of that. I want to be 

even a little more specific. On August 31st, I, along with two of my 

ranking members, Representative Randy Forbes and Representative Rob Wittman, sent a letter to Secretary Gates requesting the 

same information. Nearly a month later, just yesterday we finally 

received a reply. 

I want to thank Secretary Gates for responding, and to thank 

you for any role that you may have played in providing additional 

information. However, not only was the response extremely tardy, 

but it was incomplete. My colleagues and I requested the DOD 

General Counsel’s legal counsel about the applicability of the 

BRAC law, a copy of the recommendation and analysis provided by 

senior staff to the Secretary of Defense regarding the closure of 

U.S. JFCOM, any business case analysis conducted relating to this 

initiative, finally, terms of reference provided to the task force 

charged with implementing closure of U.S. JFCOM. 

Now, we received the General Counsel’s legal opinion and the 

terms of reference for the task force, but not the senior staff’s analysis, nor any business case analysis. 

Secretary Lynn, will the Department immediately provide the 

committee with the requested materials? 

Secretary LYNN. Mr. McKeon, let me address the business case 

issue because it has come up repeatedly. The decision to disestablish or to recommend disestablishment of the Joint Forces Command was not based on a business case; it was based on a military 

rationale. It was based on a review of the Unified Command Plan 

and what the central purposes of the Joint Forces Command were, 

the provision of forces, joint training and doctrine, joint experimentation. After 30 meetings on those subjects with his senior military 

leaders and his senior civilian advisers, the Secretary concluded 
13 

that those missions no longer justified a four-star, billion-dollar 

command, and he so recommended to the President. 

So it was a military rationale that caused the Secretary to recommend the disestablishment of the Joint Forces Command, not a 

business case. 

Mr. MCKEON. So nothing regarding any business was involved in 

the decision? 

Secretary LYNN. The Secretary looked at the growth of the Joint 

Forces Command. It tripled over the last decade, with no fundamental change in its mission. So that caused him to look at that 

military rationale, and we are now engaged in a review center by 

center, function by function as to which centers and which functions need to be retained and where they would be retained. In 

that review, the results of which we will provide to the committee 

of course, we are looking at the business case—— 

Mr. MCKEON. May I ask when? 

Secretary LYNN. As we develop the courses of action and the recommendations. It will be over the course of the fall. 

Mr. MCKEON. I think probably one of the problems the committee, or at least myself as a member of the committee are having, is the things we have asked for are late in coming or incomplete in coming, and we can’t seem to get an answer as to when 

we will get those things that we have asked for. And then you tell 

us that you have made decisions, you are moving forward like we 

have no say whatsoever or no way to deal with this. And it leaves 

us somewhat frustrated. I think you can see from both the chairman and myself the questions we have. I am not saying that we 

are against this. It is just that we haven’t seen the rationale or the 

total—we don’t understand totally the why and the wherefor. And 

we still have questions about that. And when I asked when or if 

you will immediately give us this information, what is the response? You started talking about that it is not a business decision, 

it was a military decision. Okay. So you made no business analysis. 

Is that what I am understanding? 

Secretary LYNN. No. What I am saying is that there was a military rationale. I tried in my testimony to summarize that rationale. 

We will try and provide you—I understand you want more material 

on that. We will try and provide that. 

Mr. MCKEON. I understand that you made—— 

Secretary LYNN. I am trying to say that on the issues of the 

budgets and how much savings there will be, which is I think what 

you mean by a business case, that is being developed now. We 

think we will be able to save a substantial part of that billion dollars. We have not developed all of the recommendations that lead 

to the savings. We have developed the rationale that caused the 

Secretary to recommend disestablishment. The second phase is 

then to review which pieces stay, which pieces go, and what the net 

result in terms of savings are. When you are saying business case, 

I think that is what you want. I am saying that is underway right 

now, and we will provide it to the committee. 

Mr. MCKEON. Okay. So what you said is you made no business 

decision. You think that as time goes on you will look for savings, 

and that is probably what we are talking about when we ask for 

business information on it. 
14 

Secretary LYNN. I am trying, I guess, to understand that is 

where you are going. 

Mr. MCKEON. I am not too articulate. 

Secretary LYNN. You are very articulate, I think. 

Mr. MCKEON. But some of the things we are asking, let me go 

back then to—well, eventually I guess we will get something about 

the business analysis. But what about the military rationale document? Could we get that? 

Secretary LYNN. Well, we think we have answered that question 

in the testimony, in the briefings, in the material we have provided, in the legal opinion. But I will go back to the Department 

and see if there is more material or a fuller explanation that we 

can provide if the committee thinks it requires it. 

Mr. MCKEON. This committee, Mr. Secretary, is the most supportive of the military in Congress, the members of this committee, 

and we are not trying to be obstructionists. We are supportive of 

what you are trying to do. We just need to understand more fully 

where you are coming from. There was a lot of rationale to set up 

JFCOM, and now you are saying there is a lot of rationale to eliminate it. The chairman asked who is going to take over that responsibility of jointness. And you said, well, we are in a different place 

now and I guess we don’t need it anymore. We just need to understand that more completely. 

Let me ask another question. I share the Secretary’s concern that 

the growth in the Department’s top line is insufficient to address 

the future capabilities required by the military. One percent real 

growth in the defense budget over the next 5 years is a net cut for 

investment and procurement accounts. This is not just my view. 

The independent, bipartisan QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] 

panel appointed by Congress recognized this fact. The co-chairman 

of that independent panel, Bill Perry, the Secretary of Defense 

under President Clinton, and Steve Hadley, the National Security 

Adviser under President George W. Bush, echoed the concerns of 

many on the committee. Their report rightly states that our Nation 

cannot afford business as usual, and warns of a potential train 

wreck coming in the areas of personnel, acquisition, and force 

structure. Significantly, the report offers a realistic view of the 

global security environment: that maintaining and growing our alliances will place an increased demand on American hard power and 

require an increase in our military’s force structure. With that in 

mind, I am fully supportive of efforts to identify unnecessary overhead or low-priority programs if we can translate that savings into 

force structure and modernization accounts. But we cannot be 

naive. 

Secretary Lynn, what specific commitments, if any, have you or 

the Secretary received from the administration that they will not 

attempt to harvest this savings for non-defense spending, and that 

they will oppose any attempt by the Congress to do so? And secondly, should you be successful in reinvesting $100 billion over the 

next 5 years into force structure and modernization accounts, how 

much more funding will be required to see sustained growth of 2 

to 3 percent in these accounts? How do you propose to achieve this 

growth? 
15 

Secretary LYNN. Well, answering the last question first, Mr. McKeon, the $100 billion number comes from what we think it 

takes to get from the 1 percent top line growth to a 2 to 3 percent 

growth in the accounts that you are focused on, the force structure 

and the modernization accounts. That is how that calculation was 

done. 

We have the support of the administration for the budget plan 

that we have presented of 1 percent real growth, and we have been 

trying to get the support of Congress. Of course we haven’t heard 

the final bell on that yet. 

I guess I would come back, Mr. McKeon, the challenge here is 

that everyone supports our effort in general, supports reform in 

general, but has problems with each of the particular recommendations, such as the Joint Forces Command, to eliminate redundancy, 

to take out layering, to take out headquarters. I understand these 

are tough decisions, but if we don’t make these tough decisions we 

will not get that $100 billion. 

Mr. MCKEON. Well, you haven’t given us any savings yet for 

JFCOM. You said you haven’t done a business analysis yet to come 

up with any savings. That was a military decision. So to count that 

in the 100 billion is probably not—— 

Secretary LYNN. Well, fair enough. Before we submit the budget 

in fiscal 2012, there will be savings coming from this initiative. 

Mr. MCKEON. Okay. We are hoping there will be. We haven’t 

seen that analysis yet. We are just assuming at this point that 

there will be some savings generated. 

Secretary LYNN. And it is a fair question to get that analysis before you judge it. 

Mr. MCKEON. And that is what we asked for back in the letter, 

and that is what we would still like to see. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, you don’t know how much 

you would save in efficiency by elimination of that command? 

Secretary LYNN. We don’t have the net number yet. We know it 

costs about a billion dollars to operate that command every year, 

and we know we are going to eliminate portions of that, the headquarters and some of the other functions, and that will save some 

money. And we will provide that analysis, I think what Mr. 

McKeon called the business case analysis, as we proceed this fall. 

The CHAIRMAN. As I see it, Mr. Secretary, somebody is going to 

have to ride the shotgun on jointness. I think that is a given. The 

services could very well resort to stovepipe activities without that 

joint doctrine being enforced one way or the other. That really worries me. 

Secretary LYNN. I understand. Let me ask General Cartwright to 

comment on that, if I may. 

The CHAIRMAN. By the way, Goldwater-Nichols almost didn’t include your job, General Cartwright, but we got it. 

General CARTWRIGHT. I am sincerely appreciative. 

Congressman, you know, as we looked at this activity, I tend to 

be much aligned, and we have had many conversations over the 

years about jointness and the incentives that drive us to joint, and 

we were clearly in need of getting more horsepower behind building 

in jointness to our force when we moved to the construct of Joint 
16 

Forces Command. That was clear, and it was clear particularly in 

the areas of essential training, the essential task lists that we work 

with, which we call military essential task lists. These are the 

things that the units use to train their people and certify their people in their functionality. But they were doing it to service METLs 

[military essential task lists] rather than to joint. 

So one of the first tasks that we had to have when we stood up 

Joint Forces Command is we had to have sufficient horsepower in 

the command, authority aligned and able to say this is what we 

want you to do. And to develop those joint operating concepts, 

which we worked so hard on for the latter part of the 1990s, along 

with the essential task lists necessary to certify a unit joint. 

About 3 years ago, we started to transition the responsibility to 

certify those units to the services, because those training activities, 

the essential task lists had been developed, and the concepts, and 

the services were in fact demonstrating both through their infrastructure, the training ranges, the capabilities, that they could in 

fact do this and would do this and saw the value in it. That was 

the heart of why we needed Joint Forces Command, why we needed 

that four-star to actually be there to drive this. 

I am not saying joint and the journey to joint is done, but the 

hard work that we put into building those training regimens, building those training ranges, building the distributed modeling and 

simulation that bring these forces together and allow us to do our 

work has by and large been accomplished. The question is how do 

we sustain it? And I agree with you, who is responsible? Who gets 

up every morning worried about is this force going to stay joint? 

We are working our way through several courses of action that 

are associated with that. It is going to have to be somebody. Somebody has to be accountable for that activity. We are working on 

that. We have several options that we are going to develop, and we 

will provide the committee with the results and with those choices 

and with the analysis that we perform. But at the end of the day, 

I am where you are: somebody has to get up every morning believing they are in charge of this. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is an excellent answer. However, there 

should have been an answer in place before announcing to disband 

this particular command, don’t you think, General? You announce 

you are going to get rid of it and then we will find a replacement. 

Come on. 

General CARTWRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, we understand and we believe that when we looked at it as the Joint Chiefs and made our 

recommendation to the Secretary that we could in fact draw down 

from a four-star command to some other organizational construct. 

However, in the development of what we are doing, in the business 

case and all of the other elements of this activity, when we look 

at the full range of courses of action, status quo is an option. It is 

an option that we will fully investigate as to whether or not it is 

the option or it is not. But we are also looking at a full range from 

status quo to breaking down into agencies, other commands, assumption by other commands, divestiture completely. That full 

range is going to be considered as we develop this case and present 

our options to the Secretary. I do not feel because the Secretary set 
17 

an objective of eliminating Joint Forces Command that that option 

is removed from us in consideration. 

Now, quite frankly, we believe that we will be able to in fact reduce below a four-star command this activity, but it is still on the 

table. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank you for that. I hope you will keep 

in mind that the services by nature will go back to the stovepipe 

doctrines of the past, and there needs to be a joint activity to make 

this a continued success of jointness. 

Mr. Ortiz. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Lynn, Secretary Carter, General Cartwright, I know 

that you have huge responsibilities and serious obligations, but, as 

I said before, in the same boat, so do we. 

You know—and I think that the Joint Forces Command—correct 

me if I am wrong—came about because of the lessons learned during the first Persian Gulf. And the reason that at least this Member is a little leery is that we established a base in Ingleside, 

Texas, because of the lessons learned during the Persian Gulf, 

which was mine warfare. That base has since been closed, has been 

moved someplace else at a huge cost because where they moved did 

not have the infrastructure. This is why sometimes we are leery as 

to what is going on, all these studies. And, you know, when we 

want to buy something and we know that we need it, the longer 

that we wait, the more that it is going to cost. 

But, you know, Secretary Gates has stated that there will be a 

10 percent reduction in service contracts for each of the next 3 

years. And my question is, 10 percent of what? What exactly—is 

everything being considered for the cuts? 

Historically, since I have been here, civilian personnel freezes 

have led to increased contracting out by huge numbers. What 

mechanism is being put into place to ensure that contractors will 

not simply be substituted for civilians? And I believe in contracting 

out when it makes sense, but, in many instances, it doesn’t make 

sense. 

And I would like to hear what your overarching plan is, to include operational energy as part of your broader review of efficiencies, and also to hear what steps DOD is taking now to get cutting-edge technologies to the theater to change the culture and to 

reduce our demand for fuel. 

I know I have given you three questions, but—anyone that would 

like to tackle these questions. 

Secretary LYNN. I am going to ask Dr. Carter to address your 

operational energy question. There is quite a lot we are doing, and 

it is within his office. But before I do that, let me answer your 

question on consultants. 

I think Secretary Gates had exactly the same perspective that 

you had, that often when we freeze civilian personnel, as has happened in the past, it just causes growth in what we call service 

support contracts. And what I mean by that is basically contracts 

which provide staff augmentation to government workers. I am not 

meaning people who do depot maintenance or do functional responsibilities related to warfighting. These are staff augmentees. 
18 

And they have grown in the last 10 years by about a factor of 

three. Secretary Gates thinks that growth was largely uncontrolled, 

in some cases perhaps unintended; at least, it wasn’t centrally directed. The reductions that he is directing, the 10 percent per year, 

is intended to rein that back in to try and get some more sense of 

balance between government workers and service support contractors. 

We certainly need both. We cannot operate without contractors. 

But we do think that we have gotten out of balance over the last 

10 years. And so we are working to restore that balance as we go 

forward and as we look to reduce overhead in the Department. 

Let me ask Secretary Carter to address the energy question. 

Secretary CARTER. Thank you. Very important question. And I 

am delighted to say that, finally, our director of operational energy, 

Sharon Burke, was confirmed a few months ago. So she is in the 

seat now—a very important role. 

And I will give you a few examples of the kind of problems that 

she is looking at. A few weeks ago, I was at Bagram Air Base at 

the fuel depot, where fuel trucks come in, and we basically buy at 

the gate. We are paying $4.28 a gallon—not bad—at the gate of 

Bagram Air Base for fuel, much of which is trucked in through 

Central Asia through mountain passes and so forth. A great example of a logistics effort to decrease the cost of operational energy— 

that is, energy at the operational end. 

Down in the Kandahar area, we are doing installation of tentage 

there so you are not air conditioning a tent, which anybody could 

realize is an inefficient way to do business. 

So we have learned a lot about operational energy, and Ms. 

Burke is really pushing that forward. 

May I also take the opportunity—Congressman Ortiz, you talked 

about getting cutting-edge technology to the theater. If you read 

my directive to the acquisition workforce that I indicated—that I 

issued a couple weeks ago and indicated I would put in the record, 

it says that achieving these efficiencies described in this memorandum is your second-highest priority. Your first-highest priority 

is to support the ongoing wars. That is my charge to the acquisition 

workforce. 

And you see this in the MRAPs [mine resistant ambush protected vehicle], in ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], and everything else we are trying to do, make sure that 

people realize it is not just about buying tomorrow’s weapon system 

that is efficiently and effectively high-end, but also about supporting conflict that is ongoing. 

I just wanted to make that point because I feel very strongly 

about it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Parkinson noted that, as the British Navy became smaller 

and smaller, the Admiralty, their equivalent of our Pentagon, grew 

larger and larger. He also noted that an organization consumes energy with internal communication. And the larger the bureaucracy 

grows, the more of its energies are consumed with internal communications. And he noted that, at some point, a different point for 
19 

different types of organizations, they become so large that essentially all of their energies are consumed with internal communication and nothing gets done outside. 

Our Defense Establishment has not escaped these inherent characteristics of bureaucracies, and so it is very important that we 

take a look. And thank you for doing that. 

The question is, is the current suggestion of doing away with the 

Joint Forces Command—which—problem might be solved by other 

means, by the way, that we might need to discuss—is it possible 

that this suggested cure might be worse than the disease? 

Because his district is so impacted by this, I would like to yield 

the balance of my time to Mr. Randy Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. I thank my friend from Maryland. 

And, General Cartwright, I thank you for being here, but I am 

not going to ask you any questions for two reasons. The first one 

is because we have basically seen what this Administration does to 

people in uniform who disagree with them. 

But, secondly, Secretary Lynn wasn’t completely forthcoming 

when he said that the Department was soliciting ideas from people 

about all of these issues, because what wasn’t disclosed is you had 

put a gag order or a nondisclosure agreement on the people doing 

this in the Joint Forces Command, where anybody that disagrees 

with you can’t even talk to Members of Congress or couldn’t be 

here today to talk about these issues. 

And, Mr. Secretary, I ask you this question this morning: Who 

do you serve? Who do you work for? 

Secretary CARTER. Sir, the President and the American people, 

through him. 

Mr. FORBES. If that is the case, then you had made the comment 

that President Obama and Secretary Gates were supportive of 

these reforms. Is it your testimony today that President Obama has 

signed off on the reform proposal to shut down the Joint Forces 

Command? 

Secretary LYNN. No, sir. As we discussed yesterday morning, the 

Secretary made that recommendation—— 

Mr. FORBES. So then you misspoke when you said that the President and Secretary Gates—this is Secretary Gates’s proposal. 

And the second thing I would ask you is this: You said to the 

ranking member that it was fair, a fair question, to get the analysis before you judge it. If that is the case, did the Secretary get 

the analysis? And if he got the analysis, why in the world won’t 

you give it to this committee to look at it? 

And let me just go back and say this. Look, this should be a debate, as my friend from Maryland said, about whether we should 

shut down the Joint Forces Command, other efficiencies, but we 

can’t have that debate because you have just refused to give us the 

information. 

Some of us may disagree. My friend from South Carolina, my 

friend from Texas, my friend from Florida, they all might disagree 

and think it should be shut down or not. But we can’t have that 

debate because you have refused to give us a scintilla of evidence. 

You know, the Pentagon has woven a tapestry of silence that is 

deafening to the sounds of liberty itself. The end doesn’t justify the 

means. 
20 

Let’s just look at some of the facts. You have had 11 years of testimony out in the public, of written analysis that we could look at 

for joint forces and jointness and the Joint Forces Command, and 

you have had 90 days of backroom meetings—and they have all 

been backroom. And when you talk about meetings, it could be just 

two people talking with each other. And you talk about these 30 

meetings. But you have refused to give us one bit of the evidence. 

And when you come in here, you are blending apples and oranges. You say there is no business case, yet it was the Business 

Board recommendation that we all first heard about this closure. 

So the Business Board is making military policy, not business decisions. 

And then on the first briefings that you came in, you said you 

didn’t know what the cost-savings were. Shouldn’t you have at 

least looked at those cost-savings before you made the analysis? We 

all know from BRAC that sometimes you guys come in here and 

tell us all this money we are going to save from shutting down facilities and it ends up costing us more money rather than saving 

money. 

And you say it is a philosophical decision, but it is not a philosophical decision to the folks who are losing their homes right now 

in Virginia to the $250 million deal that didn’t close last week because of your decision, to the restaurants and businesses that are 

shutting up because you didn’t make that decision. 

And my time is out. Mr. Chairman, I will look forward to asking 

some more questions when I get my own time. 

Secretary LYNN. Mr. Chairman, I need to respond to a couple of 

those points. 

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. 

Secretary LYNN. First, Mr. Forbes, the recommendation the Secretary made—and you correctly described it as a recommendation 

to the President. He has had extensive discussions with the President about that recommendation and all the recommendations he 

has made. But with regard to the disestablishment of the Joint 

Forces Command, the President has not yet made a decision. 

The Secretary’s recommendation was not based on the Defense 

Business Board. The Defense Business Board is an independent 

and parallel activity that came to the same conclusion. But the Secretary’s decision, his recommendation was based on his consultation primarily with his military advisors. These were not meetings 

with one or two people in the room. These were meetings with the 

Chairman, with the Vice Chairman, with the chiefs, with senior civilian advisors, with the commanders, both incoming and outgoing, 

of the Joint Forces Command. 

With regard to the rationale, this is a two-part exercise. The rationale to recommend disestablishment was based not on the economics but on the military rationale. And I won’t—I have gone into 

that in some detail. I won’t repeat it. But I know you will have another chance for questions, and we can do that then. 

The savings—there is a billion dollars. I am sure we will save a 

substantial part of that billion dollars, and that will be the business case. And we will provide that to the committee when we have 

it. We have provided to the committee the military rationale for the 

recommendation for closure. 
21 

As a bottom-line point, Mr. Forbes, I fully understand this is a 

very, very tough decision. It is particularly tough for the area 

around Norfolk. We are going to work very hard to work with those 

people to help that adjustment. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Lynn, you have not done that. If you are going 

to work hard with them, you could have at least taken their calls 

from the Governor, you could have at least given them some information. And you still stonewall us today. But I will ask my questions in just a couple of minutes. 

Secretary LYNN. I met with the Governor, as well as yourself, 

yesterday morning and will continue to do that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor, please. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I am going to 

yield my time to Mr. Nye and claim his time when it is his turn. 

Mr. NYE. Thank you, Mr. Taylor, for yielding. 

Thank you, Chairman, for holding this set of hearings. 

Secretary Lynn, you said that this was a military decision, not 

a business case decision, and that this is essentially a military, not 

a civilian, decision. I disagree. I just want to say, I agree with my 

colleague, Congressman Forbes, and with Senator Webb, who yesterday said, essentially, this, at the end, boils down to a civilian decision, because it is going to be made by the President on a recommendation by the Secretary. 

But, just talking about the military side of things, I want to read 

quickly a quote from the former commander at JFCOM, Admiral 

Hal Gehman, who said, ‘‘I disagree with the Secretary of Defense’s 

message that jointness in military operations has been achieved 

and the job is done.’’ He goes on to say, ‘‘Gates’s decision to close 

JFCOM is abandoning a decades-long effort initiated and supported by multiple Secretaries of Defense and Chairmans of the 

Joint Chief of Staff to ensure maximum effectiveness of our Armed 

Forces.’’ 

Aside from hearing from General Cartwright yesterday morning 

at a meeting we had and in testimony today, this is the only other 

military expert that we have been able to have access to to hear 

his thoughts on the issue. So I think it is fair, at the very minimum, to say that there is some disagreement or different points 

of view on the military side here. 

Now, we understand, at some point, we have to come to a decision on what to do on this issue. I accept that. But I do want to 

say, I strongly share Chairman Skelton and Ranking Member 

McKeon’s skepticism in the secretive nature of the discussions that 

have gone on in the Defense Department on this issue, particularly 

on something that has the kind of impact that potentially disestablishing a four-star command could have. 

And I have to tell you, I get the feeling that the Department 

doesn’t seem to believe that there is a role for Congress in this decisionmaking, given the fact that the recommendation has already 

been announced. 

I will concede the point that you—today I think we are moving 

forward, actually—have said you agree that an analysis needs to 

be done. And when I say analysis, I am talking about what disestablishing the command or what any other route that we might 

end up taking would cost, how much it would save, what the spe-
22 

cific effects would be on our military, and how we would ensure to 

carry out those important functions that even the Secretary has 

said he knows JFCOM does. He said there are some important 

functions there that need to be carried out. 

What I am concerned about is the fact that the Secretary has 

made the recommendation before the analysis is done that even 

you have said today is an important part of the decisionmaking 

process on where to go here. 

What I want to ask you is if you will commit to including us, not 

just as a committee—but the Virginia delegation and the Governor 

has made many requests to sit down with the Secretary of Defense 

face to face—if you will make a commitment to arrange that meeting, to allow us to have the input in this analysis process that you 

have described before implementation would proceed with this proposal. 

Secretary LYNN. Thank you, Mr. Nye. 

As we discussed yesterday morning directly with the Governor 

and yourself and some other members of the delegation, we will, 

indeed, ensure that the Governor and elected members of the Virginia delegation have an opportunity to meet with the Secretary 

sometime this fall before final decisions are made on implementation. And we will solicit your views and open a—make sure we 

have a channel that the information that you think needs to be before the Department before we made that decision indeed is before 

the Department. 

Mr. NYE. Well, I appreciate you saying that, and I appreciate 

your recognition that we should have a role in the process. I have 

to say, I am unhappy with the performance of the Department to 

date in terms of involving us in that discussion. I will say, I am 

happy to note now that you have offered to include us more rigorously in the analytics before any decision is implemented, and I 

thank you for that. 

I just want to close by saying—and reminding the other members 

of this committee—and I think you have had an opportunity so far 

to get a little bit of a flavor of, kind of, where this committee is 

on the decisionmaking process here—reminding the other members 

of the committee that the proposed closure of Joint Forces Command represents, based on a number that we have been given by 

the Department previously, only one-quarter of 1 percent of the 

Secretary’s plan to realign $100 billion in defense priorities. 

And, as we provide oversight over the Secretary’s plan, we will 

demand strategic cost-benefit analysis of those decisions. Because 

it is our job to provide oversight over the DOD, and it is also our 

job to our constituents back home to ensure that a large DOD 

brush doesn’t sweep away thousands of jobs in our district without 

proper justification and without rationale. 

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Let me say, Mr. Secretary, that I am deeply concerned that the 

years of creating the joint culture and the enforcement thereof 

could go down the river and be lost. And, as long as I am chairman, 

I am going to do my best to make sure that that culture stays and 

that it is enforced. 
23 

It has come at too much effort, not just by Congress, but by so 

many outstanding leaders who wear the uniform. They made it 

happen. And I don’t want to see that slip away. And if I have any 

message for you, Mr. Secretary, I hope you understand that. 

Secretary LYNN. I do understand it and share the objective, Mr. 

Chairman. As we discussed, we are not sure the Joint Forces Command is the right conduit going forward, but appreciate there may 

be differences about that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Forbes, your regular time. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I would like to request unanimous approval to submit 

to the record a statement by the Governor of Virginia, a statement 

by the city of Suffolk, Virginia, and also questions that we have requested that be asked by the Department. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

pages 144 and 96.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, I also have enormous respect for 

you. And one of the things that frightens me about Secretary 

Lynn’s testimony today is he specifically says he didn’t believe 

there was any risk of reverting back to the pre-Goldwater-Nichols 

Act of jointness. I think there is a huge risk. 

You might not be concerned about all of the cost to the Commonwealth of Virginia. I don’t expect Members here to be concerned. 

But we should be concerned about this: The number-one news story 

on the day this was announced in the communist Chinese press 

was the closure of the Joint Forces Command and how it was going 

to help them because their number-one weakness when they are 

working with the Russians has always been jointness. 

Secondly, it is coming to a theater near you. If they can do this 

process here and not have any kind of openness and not include 

anybody, they will do it anywhere across the country. 

The third thing is we have just sent a message out to all of our 

partners across America: You better be careful when you deal with 

the Department of Defense, because don’t count on them being 

open and having a process. If they just decide they are going to 

close something, they will make that decision and get the analysis 

later. 

And I wanted to go back to what I was talking about, Mr. Secretary, with this cloud of lack of transparency, that you guys have 

pulled down the drapes in the Pentagon. Last year—and I understand why, because we haven’t really, as a committee, held you accountable to that. 

Last year, you issued a gag order that prohibited any of the individuals at the Department of Defense from even talking to Members of Congress about the ramifications of some of your cuts. We 

had hearings that were cancelled because people couldn’t come here 

and testify. And what did we do about it? This committee did nothing. 

When you refused—the requirement you had by law to give us 

a shipbuilding plan so we would know what you were doing with 

building ships, and we asked you in every way we could and you 

just refused to do it, what did we do about it? We didn’t do anything. 
24 

When you were required by law to give us an aviation plan and 

you just refused to do it and we asked you and asked you and 

asked you and you just failed, we didn’t do anything about it. 

You have had 11 years of testimony, analysis supporting Joint 

Forces Command. You make 90 days of backroom meetings, and 

you come in here and give us conclusions but no analysis, what are 

we going to do about that? Not a scintilla of evidence. 

You wouldn’t respond to Members of Congress, both the Senate 

and as Republicans and Democrats. My friend, Congressman Scott, 

has been right with us on asking this. He has had the same kind 

of problems that we have had. 

The Governor of Virginia, you met with him yesterday. You went 

7 weeks and wouldn’t even return his telephone calls to just sit 

down and say, ‘‘What are you doing, and how are you doing it?’’ 

Yesterday, at the so-called meeting that you had with us, you 

wouldn’t let the press come in. We asked you to let the press come 

in. You took our telephones away, any recording devices. And there 

wasn’t any classified information or anything that had executive 

privileges, but you just don’t want the public to know some of this 

information. 

You have issued a gag order to the personnel in Joint Forces 

Command, refusing to let them talk if they have a counteropinion 

to yours. And one of the questions I would have for you today is, 

will you give us a copy, will you give the chairman and the ranking 

member a copy of that order that you made them sign, that nondisclosure agreement, today? 

You know, at some point in time, Mr. Chairman, enough is 

enough. We need the analysis, and we need the effects. I think this 

is the time. 

And, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, we so respect 

both of you, but today we will be sending you a letter that is going 

to be signed by Democrats and Republicans, and not just people 

from Virginia, requesting that we have backed up, we have drawn 

a line in the sand, we have said, ‘‘Please give us this information’’; 

you have refused. We have backed up again and drawn a line in 

the sand, and you have just refused. We have backed up again and 

drawn a line in the sand, and you have refused. 

And, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, we are going to request that, if they keep pushing us against this wall, that this committee issue a subpoena to them, requiring this information be 

given to us, because I think it is right for the American people. 

And, Mr. Lynn, I will just close by saying this: You may work 

for the President, you might work for the Secretary of Defense, but 

you do work for the American people. They are the ones that pay 

your bills. They are the ones that send their sons and daughters 

to fight our wars. And they have a right to know this information. 

And we ought to be able to give them this analysis and put it on 

the table, because, as the chairman said, we can’t afford to go back. 

And we need, as part of Congress, not to have to come with our 

hat in our hand, pleading for you to give us crumbs of information. 

We ought to be able to come to you and you give us the analysis 

and the information so that we can do the due diligence—we have 

to have an oversight function to protect the greatest military the 

world has ever known. 
25 

And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Secretary, do you want to respond to anything 

Mr. Forbes had to say? 

Secretary LYNN. Just a couple of things. Thank you, Mr. Snyder. 

One, I think, Mr. Forbes, the one thing we are agreed on, I do 

work for the American people. That is what I said in response to 

your answer, and I hope you weren’t implying that I said something else. 

Just on a couple of the factual points, we have provided the committee with the shipbuilding plan; we have provided the committee 

with an aviation plan. I know you would have—the committee 

would have liked it in the first month or 2 of the administration. 

We didn’t have people confirmed. We provided it when we built it. 

There was no plan when you requested it. We built it over the 

course of the first year, and we have provided it now to the committee. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Chairman, because I always like to hear what 

Mr. Critz has to say, I would like to yield the balance of my time 

to Mr. Critz. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, Dr. Snyder. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, obviously, I had some questions that I was going to 

ask, but, after listening to Mr. Forbes’s testimony—you know, I go 

back to the briefing that we received that says the DOD indicates 

that, though some analysis was done leading up to the decision to 

eliminate the command, the detailed plan for doing so will be developed over the upcoming year. 

And it is frustrating, because if we are working together and 

good decisions are being made, certainly we are going to agree on 

them. But I think I can understand the frustration is that, if we 

are not included in any of these decisions but we are the authorizing committee, it sort of gets a little dicey as to what do we support, what don’t we support, are we working together for the American people. 

But quickly, my question would be, you know, going back to 

1993, when President Clinton and Vice President Gore came in, 

they reinvented government, and a lot of civilian Pentagon employees were eliminated over that time, and most of that was sucked 

up into contractors. But, during that time, the O&M [operation and 

maintenance] budget stayed pretty consistent with the ECI [employment cost index], with inflation. It has been those last 10 

years, though, that it has been pretty extensive, how it has grown. 

So my question to you is, when you are looking at this shrinking 

of the Defense Department, are we shrinking on O&M, are we 

shrinking on procurement? What is, sort of, the split on how that 

is going to be addressed? 

Secretary LYNN. The focus of the Secretary’s initiative is on what 

he has described as overhead. Now, much of the overhead is in the 

O&M account, but not all of it. And so we have asked the services 

and all the defense agencies to put forward proposals to develop 

$100 billion in overhead cuts and to shift those resources into the 
26 

warfighting accounts. That will probably lead to some restraint in 

the growth of the O&M accounts, but how much I couldn’t tell you 

right now. 

Mr. CRITZ. So there is really no general idea that 90 percent of 

it is coming out of O&M and 10 percent is coming out of procurement. There is really no idea. 

Secretary LYNN. The focus is on overhead. We are going to evaluate the specific proposals, and then it will fall where it does in the 

budget. 

Mr. CRITZ. Okay. So when you are looking forward and you are 

looking to cut your budget, where does the Future Combat System 

fall in this debate? 

Secretary LYNN. Well, the Future Combat System is an Army 

modernization system for its fleet of vehicles. The Secretary restructured that last year, feeling that it was not focused sufficiently 

on the lessons that we had learned coming out of combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly with respect to IEDs [improvised 

explosive devices]. And that is now being restructured. 

The lead element of that is a Ground Combat Vehicle, which will 

probably be the first element out of the restructured program. And 

Mr. Carter could go into more detail on that, if you would like. 

Mr. CRITZ. Well, I am—we just saw that the future combat—or 

the Ground Combat Vehicle, there is going to be a rebidding. So 

is that part of the savings that we are looking for going forward, 

or what is the plan here? 

Secretary CARTER. With respect to the Ground Combat Vehicle, 

which is one of the elements of what used to be Future Combat 

Systems, the RFP [request for proposals] that the Army issued several months ago we have pulled back because it did not contain the 

right acquisition strategy. 

I think the intersection of GCV—I am sorry, Ground Combat Vehicle—and the efficiencies initiative lies in the area that I described earlier, particularly the affordability-as-a-requirement idea. 

So, as we look at the Ground Combat Vehicle, just like the Navy 

has done with SSBN(X), as the Army looks at the Ground Combat 

Vehicle, we are looking at each element of the design, all the drivers of the design—internal power, the number of troops that the 

vehicle can carry, the hardness of the vehicle, gunnery, and so 

forth—and looking at the way in which each of those requirements 

drives cost, and making sure that we are making the right tradeoff—that is, at the point at which we are getting a diminishing return of military capability for continuing investment, that we cap 

the requirement at that point. 

Doing that for each of the design parameters on the vehicle and 

thereby getting a well-rounded overall design so that the vehicle 

that we put out an RFP [request for proposals] for, for the technology development phase, which is our next step, is one that the 

Army is actually going to be able to afford when it comes time to 

buy it. Seven years to first production vehicle, then a period of production. You can look out at the Army budget at that time and say, 

what else are they going to be doing? They are going to be doing 

light vehicles, heavy vehicles, in addition to this armored vehicle. 

They have other investments to make. And we want to make sure 
27 

that we are building a vehicle that is, in fact, affordable, while also 

having the military capability they want. 

The savings on that will be—you can think of in two categories. 

One is that it may be that the resulting design is one that allows 

us to spend less over the next 5 years than we had originally 

planned. In which case, that is a savings that can be part of the 

$100 billion. But I think, for that particular project, the body of the 

savings will be in the out-years, when it comes time to design a— 

or to procure a vehicle that is better designed for affordability than 

would have been the case if we had followed the RFP 4 months 

ago. 

Mr. TAYLOR. [Presiding.] The chair recognizes the gentleman 

from Texas, Mr. Conaway, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning. 

I am going to talk about something besides Joint Forces Command. My antenna went up when I heard, I guess on August 9th, 

that Secretary Gates’s scheme was to cut overhead—and back office 

those kinds of things—in order to adjust these numbers, and specifically mentioned the Business Transformation Agency and NII 

[networks and information integration], as well, as being redundant, inefficient, inexplicably worthless, and on the chopping block 

for this $100 billion nut. 

A couple of questions. Did you come up with $100 billion as a 

goal, or did you build a case from the bottom up, saying, ‘‘Here are 

these things,’’ and you just got to the $100 billion? 

How does eliminating all of that back office, particularly BTA 

[the Business Transformation Agency] and others—have you look 

me in the eye with a straight face and tell me you are just as committed to getting auditable financial management systems in place 

and audited financial statements for the Department of Defense as 

you were before this happened? Because it looks like you have 

taken the team that was on the field to do that and said they 

weren’t going to get there. 

So my question is that—the issue is, one, do you think telling the 

American people—the confidence to the taxpayers you mentioned 

earlier, Mr. Lynn, is helped or hurt by the Department of Defense 

having audited financial statements? In other words, is the Department better able to look them in the eye and say, ‘‘Your money is 

being spent the way we think it is supposed to be spent’’? Or, ‘‘Just 

trust us’’? You know, ‘‘We don’t need audits. We are the single-largest entity on the face of the Earth, from a spending standpoint, and 

audits are not needed. You can just trust us that we will spend this 

money.’’ 

So how do you defend the law that none of you will be here when 

it happens, that it is, you know, 2017, that is required for the Department of Defense to be audited—none of you guys will be here, 

and so we won’t be able to hold your feet to the fire or have any 

kind of a penalty for you because you didn’t get there. And so the 

passive-aggressive, you know, ‘‘Yeah, we are going to get there; 

yeah, we are going to get there; but it is going to be somebody 

else’s job’’ is frustrating to me. 

And then to have you say, ‘‘Well, we really don’t need the BTA, 

we don’t need a focus on getting the financial statements au-
28 

dited’’—can you help me understand how you are still going to keep 

it as a top priority for the Department to get audited financial 

statements and, at the same time, not commit resources to getting 

that done? 

Secretary LYNN. There are a couple of questions embedded there. Let me—if I could just take the first one, you asked where the $100 

billion came from. We have discussed that with Mr. McKeon. It 

was a calculation of, what does it take to get our warfighting accounts to 2 to 3 percent real growth—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, I would ask you to give me that math because I am not following it. But go ahead. 

Secretary LYNN. Okay. I am happy for the record to provide you 

how the math—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. That is fine. 

Secretary LYNN. That is—we can provide you the calculation, but that is where the $100 billion came from. It wasn’t a totaling of 

proposals. It was a target based on what we thought we needed to 

get warfighting accounts to 2 or 3 percent, which is what history 

tells you need to continue upgrades, continue supporting training 

and personnel. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

Secretary LYNN. The bulk of your question, though, was on audited financial statements. 

Mr. CONAWAY. And sustainable systems. 

Secretary LYNN. And sustainable—well, that is where I was 

going, actually. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

Secretary LYNN. The most important piece is not an audit, in my 

mind. The most important piece is the management information 

systems that the audit just provides a test of. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Right. 

Secretary LYNN. And we are committed to that. It is, as I am 

sure you well understand, given your background, it is somewhat 

different than it is in the private sector. The goal here is not providing information to investors. The goal is ensuring the taxpayers’ 

money is well spent, that the stewardship is there. 

For that reason, we have focused our initial efforts on upgrading 

management information systems that have to do with budgetary 

resources. That is the—we are trying to focus on the most important information because, as you indicated, this is a mammoth job, 

and so we want to start with the most important piece. And we are 

continuing to do that. The Comptroller, who has the—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Mr. Hale and I have had this conversation. The 

focus on the data you use, and you are—it is not getting there. You 

are not getting there. So—but go ahead. 

Secretary LYNN. Well, that—if we are not getting there, we probably ought to have a discussion, because that is indeed what we are 

trying, and I am sure that is what Mr. Hale told you. And as you 

indicated, Mr. Hale has the lead for this. This is the Comptroller’s 

lead. The Business Transformation Agency plays a contributory 

role, in terms of some of the business systems. 

It was the Secretary’s conclusion not that it would hinder audited financial statements, is that the BTA became an added layer 

when Congress added the position of Deputy Chief Management 
29 

Officer, to which the BTA reports, that there was no longer a need 

for a senior official—the DCMO is an Under Secretary-level official—and a defense agency. 

So we are going to fold the responsibilities underneath the 

DCMO [Deputy Chief Management Officer] directly, and we think 

we are going to get some overhead savings by combining the senior 

official with the defense agency. And that was the conclusion. It 

was not a rolling back of our commitment to audited financial 

statements. 

Mr. TAYLOR. All right. The chair recognizes the gentleman from 

New Jersey, Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for your testimony. 

I think what Secretary Gates has to say is characteristically necessary and correct. And I want to be a supporter of his in his efforts to bring some rationality to this exploding budget. So I appreciate the work you are doing on his behalf, and I appreciate his position. 

A little unsolicited advice. As you have heard from Mr. Nye’s concerns, Mr. Forbes’s concerns, you will hear from Mr. Scott, anytime 

we make some kind of reduction or change in this budget, it is very 

difficult to do. You are living that every day. I think it is especially 

important to do so in a way that is procedurally defensible in every 

respect. 

The concern that I would express, having heard from my colleagues about this, about the Joint Forces Command is, you know, 

a decision announced August 9th, given the cycle of when Congress 

considers appropriations bills, when it considers authorization bills, 

is unfortunate. 

I think when you are going to make decisions like this, you 

should follow either of two tracks: You should either do it in the 

budget presentation so the normal process can work its course. Or 

you should call for another BRAC, and, imperfect as that process 

is, I think it has gained some credibility. 

So the hard decisions that you have ahead of you I think will become more achievable if you follow some sort of regular order. 

The second thing I want to chime in on is what my friend from 

Texas, Mr. Conaway, just said. The legislation he and I worked on 

together that the committee unanimously approved, the floor nearly unanimously approved, which hopefully will be enacted as part 

of the authorization bill, does place great emphasis on these financial audits. And I think that you will gain credibility with the public and with the Congress when these audits are done. I think it 

will permit us to discover areas where we can, in fact, achieve efficiency without risking in any way, shape, or form the security of 

the country. 

I wanted to ask you your opinion on the following question. Any 

of the three of you would be fine. 

The waste—the major weapons systems bill the President signed 

in May of 2009 was predicated on the premise that—or, the GAO 

[Government Accountability Office] report that we had overspent 

by nearly $300 billion, and I think it was 17 major weapons systems. 
30 

What do you think a plausible goal is in terms of reducing outlays in future major weapons systems? In other words, if we could 

unscramble the egg, from the GAO report, in theory it would have 

saved about $300 billion. What do you think we will gain, in terms 

of avoiding cost overruns, if we properly implement the WASTE 

TKO (Weapons Acquisition System Reform Through Enhancing 

Technical Knowledge and Oversight) law the President signed in 

2009? 

Secretary LYNN. It is hard—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Would the gentleman yield, sir? 

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Just hold up, and you are going to get your remaining time. 

They have just announced a motion to—a vote on a motion to adjourn. I am going to—it is the chair’s intention to continue the 

hearing. So those of you who need to go make that vote, do so, but 

we are going to continue the hearing. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Andrews. We will give you back that 

half a minute or so. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Of course, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary LYNN. It is hard to set a target other than that we 

should bring in the programs on cost and on budget. I don’t know— 

you hate to set a target that I am going to fail by so much. 

I think, under Dr. Carter’s leadership and with the committee’s 

legislative assistance, I think we have put in place things that are 

going to allow us to do that. We are putting far more contracts 

under fixed-price incentive terms rather than cost-plus terms, 

which give a convergence of the incentives of both the contractor 

and the government now to bring it in at the price that was originally quoted because we are now sharing the risk if we go over. 

Dr. Carter has introduced things that are making schedule a key 

performance parameter, because, indeed, it is loss of schedule that 

is one of the most common causes for cost overruns. So we want 

schedule, not just performance, to be important. 

We are trying to—I am happy, Dr. Carter, if you would like to 

expand on those. 

We are trying to put in place the things that will bring that GAO 

number down. The target is to bring it to no cost overruns. I understand—I am not naive—that is a very ambitious goal, but that is 

the goal. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Dr. Carter, would you like to comment? 

Secretary CARTER. Just to echo what the Deputy Secretary said, 

it is an edifice we build brick by brick. I will give you a few examples of recent bricks. 

The Joint Strike Fighter program, which we had to tell you last 

fall was an aircraft that—in 2002 we had told you it would be $50 

million per aircraft in 2002 dollars. And our current estimate, 

which was a credible estimate, a so-called will-cost estimate, was 

$92 million per aircraft. 

And I think Secretary Gates, Deputy Secretary Lynn, and I look 

at that number and say, no, we are not going to pay that, we 

shouldn’t have—let’s see what we can do to get that number down. 

We are working with the performers of the work to do that. We are 

making some progress in that regard. 
31 

And just in that regard, as a result of that progress, I think the 

services have been able to reallocate from money they thought they 

might have to spend on Joint Strike Fighter over the next 5 years 

some $580 million, which is a contribution to that $100 billion. 

Another example—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, it is a good start, yeah. 

Secretary CARTER. Another example: the F/A–18 multiyear, on a 

$6 billion contract, now about $5.3 billion because you allowed us 

to procure those aircraft on a multiyear basis; $600 million over the 

FYDP [Future Years Defense Program] that will not have to be 

spent and can be reallocated from that. 

Essentially, the overhead at the plants that make the F/A–18 as 

a consequence of them not being able to plan on a multiyear basis, 

that overhead can be plowed into warfighting accounts—just exactly the principle that Secretary Lynn has been talking about, and 

Secretary Gates—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for joining us. 

I want to jump right in, since my time is limited, and talk about 

the decisionmaking between the recommendation to close Joint 

Forces Command. 

First of all, I think there is a tremendous lack of transparency 

there. It took us over 7 weeks to get a response back from the Secretary. Ranking Member Forbes, Ranking Member McKeon, and 

myself requested that. And when we got the letter back, it just restated the initial decision and had in there a justification as to why 

this didn’t fall under BRAC. And I noticed using the term ‘‘disestablish’’ JFCOM, rather than ‘‘close’’ JFCOM. I noted a parsing of 

terms. 

It seems like, to me, that as we look at this process, first of all, 

we were told, ‘‘Well, this is an efficiency effort. We are going to be 

looking at this to look at where we can obtain efficiencies.’’ But we 

are told that there was no efficiency analysis or cost analysis about 

closing JFCOM; that is yet to come. 

And then we were said, ‘‘Well, really, it wasn’t a business decision. It was really a military decision.’’ So when we asked, ‘‘Well, 

tell us the strategic analysis behind that,’’ we were told, ‘‘Well, we 

are in the process of doing that. We have some operational documents out there that talk about how jointness is going to be continued, but, strategically, we haven’t figured out who is going to do 

this job, how it is going to be done. So none of those details have 

been put together.’’ 

And then we said, ‘‘Well, let us understand a little bit, then, 

about the process.’’ And you said, ‘‘Well, we had over 30 meetings.’’ 

And we said, ‘‘Well, it would be nice to know what happened in 

those 30 meetings.’’ It is amazing to me how 30 meetings can take 

place at the Pentagon, there isn’t a single note, there isn’t a single 

proceedings anywhere about those meetings that you can divulge 

to us. Boy, I tell you, I would love to know a little bit more about 

how those meetings take place there and how you can have no proceedings there, nothing that we can get our hands on to understand what goes on there. 
32 

So you can understand why we are a little bit frustrated by the 

lack of transparency, the lack of understanding about a decision of 

this magnitude and, as the chairman so rightfully pointed out, the 

effort that went into providing a framework for jointness and a decision of this magnitude without the transparency, without this 

body understanding—and, Secretary Lynn, you lectured us on the 

responsibilities of a leader. 

I would say that your responsibility as a leader is to provide that 

information so that we, as a Congress, can do our duty and our 

duty to the people that have elected us to make sure we understand the decisions, understand the implications to this Nation of 

those decisions. So I appreciate that lecture. I would say that the 

responsibility cuts both ways and that the Pentagon also has a responsibility back to the Congress, to divulge back to us clearly how 

that decision was made, what the underlying information is there. 

And my question boils down to this. It seems like this process is 

wrought with inconsistencies, is wrought with lack of information 

being disclosed to us. Even at one point, when a meeting was had, 

Christine Fox said that this was a philosophical decision. So we are 

going from it is an efficiency effort; no, it is a military decision; no, 

it is a philosophical decision, without any transparency to understand exactly what is going on. 

And my question is this: I want to know historically about how 

these decisions are made. Can you tell me other instances where 

decisions are made of this magnitude where you do the analysis 

afterwards, where you do a post-decision analysis instead of a predecision analysis? Can you tell me when that focus has been, in the 

past, on saying we will do the analysis after we make a decision 

or after we make a recommendation? 

Secretary LYNN. Mr. Wittman, I appreciate the fact that you and 

other members of the delegation feel that we should have gotten 

you more information, we should have gotten it to you faster. As 

I discussed with Congressman Nye, going forward—we met with 

the Governor yesterday morning, with yourself and some of the 

other Members. We will ensure, as I discussed, that the Governor 

and those same Members get the opportunity to meet directly with 

the Secretary. We will seek your input—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, that is not the 

question I asked. The question I asked was, can you tell me when 

in the past decisions have been made like this, with the lack of 

analysis prior to the decision and without that being able to be divulged? 

Secretary LYNN. I was addressing some of the preamble that you 

had before that, but let me jump to your question. 

The Secretary made his decision with enormous input from the 

military and the civilian advisors that he had. As we have had discussed, his reasoning here was on: What is the military purpose for 

this command, and is it still valid today? 

The conclusion he came to, based on the advice he received, was: 

No, the purpose had been served in some cases, could be accomplished by other organizations in other cases, and was duplicative 

in cases such as force provisioning, and the Joint Forces Command 

wasn’t needed in that role. 
33 

For those reasons—and he received a lot of input to that decision 

from his advisors in the meetings that you correctly summarized— 

he made his decision. 

As we have discussed with other members of the committee, once 

he has made that decision, the question then is, how much of the 

billion dollars would be saved? And that is a decision by what 

would be retained and what would not. We are not going to eliminate every component of the Joint Forces Command, nor are we 

going to keep every component. We are going to go through a thorough analysis, which we will share with you, as I discussed with 

Congressman Nye, as to what needs to be kept and what needs to 

go. At the end of that process, we will have the complete case that 

you desire. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The gentlewoman from California is recognized, 

Mrs. Davis, 5 minutes. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate your all being here. This is difficult, very difficult. 

And I certainly understand the concerns of my colleagues. 

I wanted to shift for a second in the more personnel-health-care 

arena, because we are talking about jointness on the one hand. 

And in the House defense authorization, there is a provision that 

would create a permissive authority to establish a unified medical 

command. 

Given that the Center for Naval Analyses predicts that such a 

move would save approximately $294 million a year, we actually 

were surprised that the Department opposed strongly that section 

of the bill. And it is also true, of course, that there haven’t—I don’t 

think any of the politically appointed positions have been filled 

within Health Affairs. 

So I am just wondering what objection to the unified medical 

command you have and that you have encountered. You know, 

what is the, I think, considerable pushback to reject the House proposal that we think would save significant savings? 

Secretary LYNN. This is—as the congresswoman knows, this is a 

long-running debate over a command versus an agency and how we 

treat our health care. 

I actually think that we ought to have, as the Secretary has indicated, a completely open mind. That second track I indicated was 

outside input. I think we should consider all possibilities as we look 

at overhead savings. Although we have had questions about it in 

the past, I would assert to you that we should take a look. In the 

new fiscal circumstances we face, we should look anew at that proposal. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Is there any sense—can you give us any idea what 

kind of management structure, in fact, you might be thinking about 

that would be quite different from what we have today? 

Secretary LYNN. We don’t have—I don’t have any proposals to 

discuss in terms of changing the military—the medical management structure for the Department, at this point. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. I think a lot of issues have been raised about 

other commands or other installations that might be—you might be 

thinking about closing. Is there anything else that you might share 

with us of other commands, at this point? 
34 

Secretary LYNN. I mean, I think the Secretary has said as part 

of his direction to the services that, if they think there needs to be 

changes in installations, they should suggest that in their submissions. But we have not gotten to the point that we would request 

a BRAC. That would be just input. So what we are—we are not to 

a point of looking at closing bases or installations, at this point. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Thank you. 

Let me just turn, then, to an important personnel issue that affects the men and women across our country and, certainly, across 

the globe. And recognizing the strides that have been made in 

MWR [morale welfare and recreation] and, certainly, in family support assistance programs and Military OneSource, as we are looking to efficiencies, what would you say—how would you articulate 

the efficiencies in family policy that are being envisioned right 

now? And how are these efficiency studies going to impact our policies as it relates to the men and women and their families that are 

serving today? 

Secretary LYNN. I think the Secretary would be interested in any 

proposals where we could deliver the same services to our military 

families in a more efficient way. I do not think he would look favorably on proposals that would reduce the support to families, at this 

point. It is not quite part of the direct warfighting, but I think the 

Secretary believes it is equally important. 

And that would not be, I think, the avenue that the Secretary 

is looking to go down. He is more interested in the things, frankly, 

we have been discussing: delayering, eliminating headquarters, reducing bureaucracy. I think in terms of benefits for military families, that is not the direction he is looking to, in terms of making 

shifts in resources. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Uh-huh. I appreciate that because, as you know, we 

really are in unchartered territories, as our men and women return. And I don’t think we really have quite got our heads around 

what that is going to mean. I appreciate it. 

And very, very quickly, I mean, people have raised the issues of 

insourcing, outsourcing. And I think one of the things that I am 

hearing out in the San Diego community is a concern from businesses that a number of their positions and their people, highly 

qualified people—they use the word ‘‘poaching,’’ that the military 

is essentially, you know, finding them—it is not that hard to find 

them—and bringing them in. And they think that, you know, this 

could create an imbalance down the road. 

I just want to express that to you, that that is being heard. And 

I wonder if you have any comment. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Coffman. 

Secretary LYNN. I guess not. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Oh, 10 seconds. 

Secretary LYNN. We do hear reports from the field. We need to 

follow up and make sure that all the steps that are taken are appropriate and that the government isn’t doing anything inappropriate in seeking the goals of getting more expertise into the government. That is certainly not the objective of the insourcing program. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The gentleman from Colorado. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
35 

Mr. Lynn, Secretary Carter, and General Cartwright, thank you 

so much for your service to our country and your testimony today. 

I certainly respect the comments of Congressman Randy Forbes 

from Virginia in terms of the process and that maybe it wasn’t the 

best process that you used in arriving at your conclusion. 

But I want to say this, as somebody who has served in both the 

United States Army and the United States Marine Corps and 

served in both the first Gulf war and the Iraq war, and that the 

15 intervening years between 1990 and 2005, between my service 

in the first Gulf war and the Iraq war, there has just been a quantum leap in terms of jointness in our military. And I think that it 

is something that today is ingrained in our military culture. So I 

think that you are right to evaluate whether or not we still need 

the Joint Forces Command in light of the extraordinary changes 

and progress that our military has made. 

Let me go to a couple of other issues. First of all, on the 

insourcing/outsourcing issue, it seems that Republican Administrations want to outsource and Democrat Administrations want to 

insource. And let me just say that maybe there is a compromise between the two, and that is effectively managing contracts. And I 

am not sure that we are doing that right now. And I think we need 

to do a better job, before we make a decision about insourcing, in 

effectively managing the contracts that we have. 

And just a couple more quick issues, and then I would love your 

response. 

I think that one area that we could actually derive a savings and 

increase the effectiveness in our military—and it is not, certainly, 

a subject of our discussions yet today—is the fact that I think that 

our personnel system in terms of promotion is too rapid. And I 

think that our members of our military are not getting enough experience in their respective time and grades. And I think that we 

would improve our warfighting skills and save in the operating 

budget if we would, in fact, slow this promotion process down. 

And, with that, I would refer to—defer to any of you for comments. 

Secretary LYNN. On the issue of managing service contracts, we 

in fact agree with you, and a significant part of Secretary Carter’s 

initiative earlier this month was improvements in that regard. Let 

me ask him to describe those for you. 

Secretary CARTER. There are a number of those that have to do 

with improving our tradecraft, getting a better deal, better value 

for the $200 billion we spend on services. But specifically to the 

insourcing question raised twice, a couple points. First, yes, it has 

gone back and forth from time to time. I think the important thing 

to bear in mind is one size doesn’t fit all. Some things it is beneficial to outsource. Mowing the lawn at the base. Why should the 

base commander have to figure out how to get the lawn mowed? 

There are people who do that for a living, and it is much more efficient to do that. 

When it comes to contracting officers, pricers, systems engineers 

and a systems command, you really want to have in the government people who have those skills. And what lay behind the Secretary of Defense’s insourcing initiative for the acquisition workforce, which is ongoing and which he has indicated is not being cur-
36 

tailed because of the efficiencies initiative, was less to save money, 

though on average it can be the case that a government employee 

fully loaded costs less than a contractor, the point was to get within our walls and on our side of the table the talent that we need 

responsibly to spend $400 billion in contracting goods and services 

that we do every year. 

So are we poaching? I mean we do go to the open market and 

ask people to come and join the ranks of government. They come 

from some other job. I am delighted when they do come. I will tell 

you I talk to these people. And what we have on our side when we 

recruit is the mission. We don’t have money, we don’t pay a lot, our 

buildings aren’t steel and glass, you know, they are wood and mold, 

and so forth, but we have the mission, and that is, particularly for 

young people—what really gets them hooked is the idea that they 

are going to be contributing to national security. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Let me just interrupt one point. But you also have 

a personnel system that rewards mediocrity in the sense that it 

takes an act of God to fire somebody, and that definitely needs to 

be reformed. Go ahead. 

Secretary CARTER. I agree with you, and that in fact is something that Secretary Gates emphasizes all the time, and another 

thing that we are trying to address in the course of the workforce 

initiative. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, 5 

minutes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to thank 

the witnesses for their testimony today. 

Dr. Carter, in your testimony I think you sort of framed the fact 

that just setting aside all these percentage numbers, increase, decrease, I mean the fact is we still have to deal with the challenge 

of the alternative of broken or canceled programs or ones that 

work. And I think really that really should be the outcome that we 

are all trying to together achieve. And in the short time that I have 

been here, seeing the Presidential helicopter and the Zumwalt destroyer program just sort of collapse under their own weight, you 

know, that is not a rhetorical point that you were making in your 

testimony. 

The program that we have been keeping an eye on over the last 

year or so is the SSBN program, which as you point out, has been 

endorsed by the QDR, Nuclear Posture Review, and was included 

in the 30-year shipbuilding program, but there is no question that 

the price tag which the Navy was, you know, assuming was one 

that was going to potentially challenge the surface ships of our 

Navy. And again, it appears from your testimony that already just 

within the last few months, I mean there has been some progress 

made in terms of that milestone A cost reduction. 

You know, I guess the question is, you know, that reduction has 

nothing to do with the fact that this administration is still committed to moving forward with SSBN, which I appreciate if you 

could address that point, and secondly, that the capability that has 

been identified in terms of that program and our national security 

need for a sea-based deterrent also is not being compromised. It is 

really about trying to, again, not end up with another Zumwalt 

program that 10 years, 20 years down the road, is going to be 
37 

unsustainable and really affect our ability to defend ourselves as 

a Nation. So I was wondering if you could address that point. 

Secretary CARTER. I think that is accurate. It is more a question 

of how than whether. On the other hand, if you don’t get the how 

right you can get the whether wrong, if you are following me. And 

the helicopter is an example of that. So we don’t want to get ourselves in a situation with SSBN(X) where we design a submarine 

that we know we won’t be able to afford. And the Navy has done, 

I think, an excellent job in the last several months of going through 

all the design drivers for SSBN(X) and looking at where the change 

in one of the design features or one of the requirements that drives 

the design features can be changed in such a way that the cost of 

the submarine is reduced without sacrificing in any way essential 

military capabilities. And this kind of disciplined systems engineering job really does work. They have managed to reduce the estimated cost of that submarine by 16 percent already. And it is very 

plausible that they will get down to the 27 percent, which is the 

target. And if you consider that this is a project that is going to 

cost hundreds of billions of dollars over the next 20 years, if you 

are talking 16 percent, $27 billion in costs you won’t have to pay, 

that is a significant engineering achievement. And it will bring the 

submarine in at a price that the country will afford. It won’t be one 

of these programs that collapses of its own weight. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And the timing of that milestone, given the fact 

that the design work is really just sort of commencing at this point, 

I mean really is consistent with all the acquisition reform models 

that this committee endorsed, which is to not get ourselves into a 

position of design-build at the same time and wasting money. And 

again, I think what you have described is something that fits well 

within the schedule that your budget is embarking on. And as you 

said, long term that is going to create some relief for the Defense 

budget without sacrificing any of our country’s deterrence, which 

again is something that is I think—again, has been embraced by 

this administration. I mean again, there is no compromise that is 

being made as far as this initiative regarding those goals which 

were set forth in the NPR [Nuclear Posture Review] and the QDR. 

I just wanted to at least underscore and emphasize that. 

Secretary CARTER. Absolutely, it is consistent both with the NPR 

and QDR, and very much with the intent of the work of this committee in the area of acquisition reform, particularly at the beginning of the program lifecycle. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Bishop, 5 minutes. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, this is an 

important issue, which is why many of us are staying here a little 

bit longer. I want to go into another area of weeds, if I could, for 

just a moment. 

First of all, General Cartwright, thank you for being in Utah recently. The wife of my Legislative Director thanks you very much 

for her purse. And we will just leave that issue right there. 

Mr. Carter, if I can talk to you, though, specifically about it, I 

have been appreciative in the past of your understanding of industrial base issues, especially as we talked about solid rocket motors, 

when other agencies outside of the Department of Defense and the 
38 

White House were clueless about the entire issue. I want to address, because I am concerned, especially when we are talking 

about a $100 billion cut when recapitalization is yet to be completed, concerned about another industrial base, and this one is 

small turbine engines. The weapon of choice that we have is basically the cruise missile, Tomahawk, Tactical Tomahawk airlaunched cruise missile. We have those because the industrial base 

produces them at a low cost with a very high-efficiency small turbine engine. Yet one of the proposals to cut the Tomahawk procurement and to zero out R&D [research and development] on the supersonic cruise missile definitely puts that private sector in danger 

of maintaining that industrial base and losing the expertise we 

have to keep those programs functional. 

So the three questions I do have specifically for you, is the small 

defense turbofan industrial base something that your office has 

specifically identified as a defense industrial base concern? 

Secondly, what can we expect to see from your office or DOD in 

the way of specific actions to address an industrial base concern if 

it indeed has been identified as such? And finally, with Russia and 

India announcing sometime back they are jointly fielding a supersonic cruise missile, is it wise for this administration to pull back 

R&D at this particular time? And is that, once again, something 

that was a specific point of discussion in making your decisions on 

zeroing out the R&D on the supersonic cruise missile as well as 

cutbacks in procurement of Tomahawk? 

Secretary CARTER. Thank you, Congressman. I think I can answer all three of those questions. Certainly to the first question 

emphatically, yes, I am aware of the issue that the end of 

TACTOM [Tactical Tomahawk] production occasions. We have specifically identified it as an industrial base issue. And I should say 

industrial base issues are, as you noted, very important. Deputy 

Secretary Lynn has identified that as an area of great importance 

to the Department and expects us to pay attention to it, and we 

are. I don’t know the actions that will come out of that review yet. 

Mr. BISHOP. Secretary Carter, let me in the interests of time just 

direct you here. If you could write what the actions will be, submit 

it to us later on, that would be fine. 

Secretary CARTER. Will do. 

Mr. BISHOP. If, though, you could answer the question on the 

Russian and Indian activity, was that a part of the consideration? 

Did you discuss that before making this decision? 

Secretary CARTER. Yes. Not those specific programs, but the global situation and the other—and the investments that we will need 

to make in stand-off weapons. We know we will need to make investments in stand-off weapons. They are being considered as part 

of the long-range strike family of systems work that is going on. 

They may well result in other kinds of new stand-off weapons programs. And it is for that reason, it is to protect that option that 

the industrial base is so important. So that if we do choose that 

option again in the future, we will have the industrial capability 

to produce the engines. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. I appreciate your concern for that base. 

Too many people have the naive idea these bases can be just 

turned on and off like a spigot. 
39 

Congressman Taylor, thank you for allowing me to get that question, and I yield back. 

Mr. TAYLOR. General, we recently had a classified briefing on the 

roller situation in Afghanistan, and the need to deploy them in a 

more expedient manner. One of the things that came to light, and 

I am trying to stay within the confines of the classified nature of 

that, was that the SPARKS II [self-protection adaptive roller kit 

system II] roller is made overseas, and that the date for all of them 

being delivered is several months off. One of the things that is delaying the arrival of all of them is that in the purchase of this we 

did not get the technical data package. I would hope that one of 

the revisions that your organization is looking into making is that 

any time our Nation pays to develop a weapon, that as a part of 

that contract that we will own the technical data package for that 

product, and that if we feel like a supplier is taking too long to deliver that product then we, as a Nation, will have the right to take 

that technical data package to another supplier if need be in order 

to get that program delivered in a more timely manner. 

I don’t think as a citizen, any citizen of this country wants to see 

a single soldier, sailor, airman, or marine lose their life or limb 

needlessly because we are waiting on someone who has the exclusive rights to that information to take too long to deliver it. 

I would welcome any of the Secretaries’ or the General’s thoughts 

on that, but most of all, I want to hear your reassurance that going 

forward that any time we are spending the Nation’s money to develop a product that we are going to own the technical data package to that product that we paid to have delivered. 

Secretary Carter. 

Secretary CARTER. If I may, I am very aware of the SPARKS roller issue. They are being destroyed at a rate larger than we had anticipated. 

Mr. TAYLOR. And for the sake of the public, the good news is 

when the roller is destroyed the vehicle behind it is not. 

Secretary CARTER. That is exactly right. 

Mr. TAYLOR. But the bad news is then we have to get another 

roller to theater in a hurry. 

Secretary CARTER. That is exactly right. And I agree with you 

about technical data package. You and I have discussed that in the 

context of the Littoral Combat Ship competition. And I will just 

note that in the spirit of amen to what you said, that in the document that I issued 2 weeks ago, that of the 23 items in that, one 

is specifically to improve the way that we acquire technical data 

packages. We need to learn what our rights are in that regard and 

also how to value them so that we can carry out the transaction, 

appropriate transaction with industry. So I agree with you completely. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. With that, the chair recognizes the gentleman 

from Virginia, Mr. Nye, 5 minutes. 

Mr. NYE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you yielding 

time to me earlier. I just wanted to follow up with a couple of 

thoughts and questions. 

Secretary Lynn, you heard from a number of members of the 

committee today the notion that this process is hard, the process 

of finding savings to reallocate within the Defense Department is 
40 

a challenging one, but that having the committee involved and 

using the regular 2012 budgeting process is probably the best route 

to do that. 

Now, what I wanted to ask you was, and I know that the Secretary has said most of the decisionmaking he intends to be done 

during that process, and I think you have backed that up today. 

I am curious to know if you can give us, shed any light on why Secretary Gates decided August 9th was the right time to sort of 

preannounce a certain segment of those decisionmaking and not 

to—noting the fact that we have had some discussion about the 

fact that an analysis of Joint Forces Command, for example, of how 

this could and would be done and what the options would end up 

being has yet to be done, why August 9th? Why not wait and just 

do this as part of the regular process? 

Secretary LYNN. I think Secretary Gates felt a strong need to 

jump-start the process to establish that this was going to be an aggressive process, that this was going to be a process that he was 

going to be involved in personally, and that he wanted to start by 

establishing what he has called a culture of savings. And in particular, he focused on the areas of headquarters, of staffing, general 

officers, senior executives, redundancy, extra layers. And he wanted to take steps that were really more management steps that he 

could take immediately to try and establish the path ahead so that 

as we go forward with the budget the rest of the building would 

follow on and be equally aggressive. 

Mr. NYE. Okay. Well, again, I just want to encourage you in the 

strongest possible terms to do this process within the regular established order. I think you will find that your ability to work with 

the Congress on it will be greatly enhanced if we have an opportunity to be part of that process. I want to say and again recognize 

that you have said today you intend to include us in that analysis 

process before any decisions are implemented. Thank you for that. 

I also want to know that General Cartwright has said today that 

during that analysis at this point all options are still on the table, 

and essentially the status quo is one possible option for the outcome of that analysis. One possible option. We may reach another 

conclusion. But that is still on the table as a possible outcome. And 

I appreciate the fact that we will be allowed to be involved in the 

analysis and the process going forward. 

But one last thing I want to make in terms of comments, and I 

want to follow up on something that Mr. Wittman asked about, he 

asked you have you or can you give us an example of when a decision was made without an analysis, which we agree needs to be 

done, you know, sort of the cart before the horse idea? I can tell 

you I can think of one. And that has to do with the recommendation to build a fifth U.S. carrier homeport in Mayport without the 

analysis done to support that decision. 

Now, I say this just to say, and for the record, given the fact that 

we are going through a difficult decisionmaking process of how to 

save money, cut down on overhead and reallocate it within the Defense Department, I will be very surprised and dismayed if during 

this 2012 budget process that we have coming up the Defense Department again, having stated that we have got to find savings in 

overhead, especially things that are redundant and duplicative, 
41 

asks for money to build a billion-dollar port facility in Mayport that 

is by its very nature duplicative and redundant. 

I don’t need an answer from you. I just wanted to state that for 

the record. Again, this is a tough process. I recognize that you all 

have very difficult work to do here, and so do we, and I appreciate 

the fact that you have recognized that today. To be honest with 

you, I think that recognition was late in coming, but I am happy 

to note that you have agreed that we should be part of that process 

going forward. I look forward to working with you in taking a very 

good business case, if you want to use that word, military look, but 

an analysis of the best decisionmaking that we can make going forward on the contractor issue, on Joint Forces Command, and all 

the other efficiency questions that we have to solve together. Again, 

I thank you for being here. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. MCKEON. Will the gentleman yield? You have a few seconds 

left. 

Mr. NYE. Yes, I do. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Eighteen to be exact. 

Mr. MCKEON. I just want to clarify what the gentleman has indicated in his statement and in his earlier statement, to reiterate or 

to confirm. What I hear him saying is that you have committed to 

involve the Congress in the decision to disband or to eliminate 

JFCOM. Or are you agreeing that you have already made the decision, you will make the decision, the Secretary will make the decision, the President will make the decision, and then you will include us in how you carry out that decision? 

Secretary LYNN. The Secretary has made his recommendation to 

the President on disestablishing Joint Forces Command. The President has not yet made his decision. And I have committed here 

with Congressman Nye and others that as we move forward on the 

implementation of that decision, should the President affirm it, we 

will work with the committee and the Congress in making those 

implementation decisions. 

Mr. MCKEON. Okay. It just sounds like I hear you saying maybe 

he misunderstood or maybe he thought that you were going to involve the Congress in the decisionmaking. But rather that is already done and it is just now the implementation. 

Secretary LYNN. I think I would end up saying again what I just 

said. 

Mr. MCKEON. All right. And I want to make sure that you like 

that answer. Thank you. 

Mr. TAYLOR. For the benefit of the committee, they have just 

called a vote on the adjournment resolution. So it is the chair’s intention to keep this going for another 10 minutes. That will be followed by two 5-minute votes. That will make the hearing approximately 2 hours and 45 minutes. 

So having said that, in the 10 minutes that remain, the chair intends to recognize Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being 

here today. Secretary Lynn, I share the concerns of Congressman 

Forbes. Thus far, your testimony is that the Joint Forces Command 

decision was made as a result of several ad hoc discussions among 

senior DOD officials. I know these officials have reviewed some doc-
42 

uments that outline their military rationale for the decision. Knowing that there has been documentation considered, I request those 

documents, print and electronic, used as a basis for the military decisions to be provided to the committee. 

Additionally, my question is to Secretary Carter. The National 

Guard and Reserve forces have been instrumental in the global war 

on terrorism, and I know firsthand of how successful and capable 

our Guard and Reserve are. I served in both for 31 years, and I 

have four sons currently serving in the military, three in the National Guard. However, Guard and Reserves still faces shortages of 

proper equipment for training and for use in theater. 

How are the proposed acquisition reforms going to affect the 

Guard and Reserve? 

Secretary CARTER. The piece of the efficiency initiative that I was 

describing will affect the procurement of equipment irrespective of 

the ultimate customer, but I think the burden of your question 

about equipage of the Guard and Reserve in the future would be 

better answered by General Cartwright than by me. 

Mr. WILSON. General. Thank you. 

General CARTWRIGHT. As we work through these efficiency activities, the intent is to get to a better ratio of what we are calling 

tooth to tail, but to get those forces that are standing in order to 

go support either the global war on terrorism or any other activities that may be identified either on the Federal side or on the 

State side. The question is can we afford, through these efficiencies, to get sufficient equipment to outfit everybody with the 

best capabilities that we have? Or are we going do that in some 

other way? In other words, are there going to be shortages that we 

are going to have to manage? And if so, how we manage them? The 

idea here is to generate the resources so that we don’t have those 

shortages. 

Mr. WILSON. Great. And you personally, I want to thank the Marine Corps. I represent Parris Island, Marine Corps Air Station, 

Beaufort Naval Hospital. I am very proud of the Marines. 

At this time, I yield the balance of my time to Congressman 

Forbes of Virginia. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. Mr. Secretary, would you 

agree to provide to the chairman and the ranking member a copy 

of the nondisclosure agreement that you have required people at 

Joint Forces Command to sign? 

Secretary LYNN. I am not directly familiar with those nondisclosure agreements. 

Mr. FORBES. If there is one, would you—— 

Secretary LYNN. But I will explore whether there is one, and I 

will report my findings to the chairman and ranking member. 

Mr. FORBES. And if there is one, will you give them a copy? 

Secretary LYNN. Yes. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 85.] 

Mr. FORBES. Can you tell us, is it your testimony today that you 

provided to this committee all of the written analysis that was 

given to the Secretary of Defense to make his decision to close the 

Joint Forces Command? 

Secretary LYNN. We have provided the committee—— 
43 

Mr. FORBES. Just need to know yes or no, all the written information. If you have, yes. If you haven’t, no. 

Secretary LYNN. We have provided the committee the analysis, 

the rationale—— 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, I don’t have much time. I am just 

asking have you provided all the written analysis that was given 

to the Secretary of Defense to this committee? If you haven’t, it is 

okay. I just need to know. 

Secretary LYNN. I am going to have to—you are going to have to 

let me answer. We have provided the committee a body of material 

that supports what the Secretary—— 

Mr. FORBES. That is not my question, Mr. Secretary. In all due 

respect, I am asking have you provided this committee with all of 

the written analysis that was provided to the Secretary of Defense 

to make the decision to close the Joint Forces Command? Yes or 

no? It is pretty simple. 

Secretary LYNN. We have provided the committee with the material that supports the decision that the Secretary made. 

Mr. FORBES. I am asking if you provided the written material 

that was given to the Secretary, all the material that was given to 

the Secretary for the Secretary to make his decision. 

Secretary LYNN. I have answered the question. 

Mr. FORBES. No, you haven’t. You said you provided analysis, but 

that could have been back-filled analysis. I am asking have we gotten all the written documentation that was provided to the Secretary? 

Secretary LYNN. The Secretary has provided you the material 

that—— 

Mr. FORBES. That he thinks we should have? 

Secretary LYNN [continuing]. That supports his decision. I will go 

back and see if there is more material that we can provide you. 

Mr. FORBES. So what you are saying is you don’t know, as you 

are sitting there, whether there was more written information 

given to him or not? 

Secretary LYNN. I am saying that I will explore as to whether 

there is more material that we can provide you to try and help you 

with this decision. 

Mr. FORBES. Do you know if there was any more written material, Mr. Secretary, as you are sitting there testifying? 

Secretary LYNN. I am sorry, I didn’t hear you. 

Mr. FORBES. I am saying do you know whether there was more 

written material given to the Secretary than was provided to this 

amendment? 

Secretary LYNN. I am saying that we will provide you—we provided you with a body of materials. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, my time is out. You are not going to 

answer the question, so I would like to have him provide us with 

the information, and I yield back. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman. The gentlewoman 

from Guam, Ms. Bordallo, 5 minutes. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Lynn, it is 

good to see you again, Secretary Carter and General Cartwright. 

Let me divert slightly from the topic of today’s hearing and bring 

up concerns about the military buildup in Guam, and they cer-
44 

tainly are issues of cost efficiencies if we get the buildup done 

right. 

The Record of Decision was signed by Assistant Secretary of the 

Navy Jackie Pfannenstiel, and while the ROD [Record of Decision] 

delays the final decision on the location of a firing range, it states 

a preference to acquire land on the east side of the island, on a 

bluff above the Pagat historical and cultural site. I remain extremely skeptical that such a land acquisition deal can be struck 

with the Government of Guam. 

So with that in mind, can you outline what steps the Department 

is taking in regards to meet Marine Corps training requirements? 

Has the Department considered Tinian Island or some of the DOD 

land on Guam that could be used? 

And again I want to repeat I am skeptical that a deal can be 

struck, and I would not feel it prudent for the Department to spend 

billions of dollars without a deal secured for the training range. 

So can you please comment, and can I get your commitment to 

more seriously explore alternatives for the Marine Corps firing 

range? 

Secretary Lynn. 

Secretary LYNN. Congresswoman Bordallo, thank you for the 

question. I appreciate the question. As you know, I recently visited 

Guam and saw for myself the plans and the issues that we face. 

The training range is a critical issue. I agree with you. To have 

the Marines move to Guam and to maintain the levels of training 

that we would expect out of a Marine unit, we do need to find some 

resolution of this issue. I think you correctly described it, Pagat, 

that location in Pagat is the preferred location. That was after analyzing government land and some other options. Tinian is off island, probably appropriate for some training, but not close enough 

for the small arms training we are talking about here. We are 

much more interested in a training range on Guam. 

We are continuing—I understand the cultural concerns in the 

Chamorro site that is there. We are continuing to work those 

issues. And we are hoping that we can find a resolution that allows 

the Marines to conduct their training on Guam without compromising the cultural site. And we are going to continue to work with 

you on that, and I agree it is a critical issue for going forward. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and I do want to get 

it on record to state that you are seriously looking at alternatives. 

I have another question. General Cartwright, I guess I am following up on Congressman Wilson’s questions. The recommendations put forth are a good start on some of these to maximize efficiencies. But as I reviewed the recommendations, I am perplexed 

as to why the Department has not tackled personnel costs. And 

what further frustrates me is that I don’t see anywhere where the 

National Guard plays a role in the solutions. This is a frustration 

of mine with regards to the buildup in Guam and now here. The 

Guard has demonstrated that it can recruit and retain quality soldiers and airmen at a significant savings over the active duty personnel. 

So can I get a commitment to more adequately review this potential efficiency? 
45 

General CARTWRIGHT. I think your reference here is more frequent use of the Guard in lieu of the active force—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. That is correct. 

General CARTWRIGHT [continuing]. And ensuring that they are 

well equipped as they go forward, and well trained and afforded 

the opportunities to be well equipped. 

Ms. BORDALLO. And there will be savings. 

General CARTWRIGHT. The Guard in itself would generate savings. This effort will generate savings to equip the Guard and continue to keep the Guard trained at the levels that we have become 

accustomed to, which is substantially higher than anything we 

have experienced in the past. So our commitment here is to generate this savings so that we can plow it back into that tooth, 

which we consider the Guard to be. How much we get here, and 

then our work with the Congress will determine the amount of 

money that is available to do that. 

I acknowledge the fact that there are savings that we reap from 

utilizing the Guard that we don’t necessarily receive utilizing active forces, but there are trades that we make there in that area 

also operationally. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentlewoman. The chair now 

recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, for—if you could 

keep it very brief, Mr. Scott, we have only 3 minutes remaining on 

the vote across the street. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to get a couple things quickly on the record. Secretary Lynn, 

in the QDR there was no recommendation to close JFCOM. Is that 

right? 

Secretary LYNN. That is correct. It didn’t address command 

issues. 

Mr. SCOTT. And there was no recommendation to close JFCOM. 

And during the last BRAC, JFCOM was mentioned but the decision was made not to close JFCOM. Is that right? 

Secretary LYNN. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. And it was mentioned in BRAC, which suggests that 

BRAC has jurisdiction, which is an interesting little thing. In reference to your answer to my colleague from Virginia, Mr. Forbes, 

you said you have given information that supports the decision. 

That invites the inquiry whether there are documents that did not 

support the decision that are floating around. Are such documents—do such documents exist? 

Secretary LYNN. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. SCOTT. No document exists that gave an evaluation that suggested that maybe it shouldn’t be closed? There was no written debate about this? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Scott? I hate do this to you, but we are at the 

2-minute mark. Could I ask you to please submit the remainder of 

your questions for the record? 

Mr. SCOTT. If I could just get a quick answer to that, and thank 

you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to just get in a 

couple of questions. 

Mr. TAYLOR. If you would, the gentleman is going to submit the 

remainder of his questions for the record. 
46 

Secretary LYNN. Fine. 

Mr. TAYLOR. General Cartwright, Chairman Skelton also has 

some questions for you for the record. With that, I do want to 

thank all three of you gentlemen for being here. 

The meeting stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:37 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2010 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2010 

(51) 

Statement of Chairman Ike Skelton 

The Department of Defense’s Efficiency Initiative 

September 29, 2010 

Welcome everyone to the House Armed Services Committee’s 

hearing on the Department of Defense’s Efficiency Initiative. We 

have with us three distinguished witnesses: Deputy Secretary of 

Defense William J. Lynn, III, the Department’s Chief Management 

Officer; Dr. Ashton Carter, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and General James E. Cartwright, USMC, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

The topic they are here to discuss is one of the most important 

we will consider this year. And it will be particularly important 

next year when the committee reviews the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2012. That topic is the Department’s effort to 

wring billions of dollars of efficiencies out of its operations. 

I want to begin and end this hearing with one clear overriding 

message. I think I speak for the overwhelming majority on this 

committee, regardless of party, when I tell you that I do not support cutting the defense budget at this time. The national security 

challenges this Nation faces around the world dictate that we 

maintain the recent growth in our ground forces, the Army and the 

Marine Corps; that we modernize our Air Force; and that we grow 

our Navy. To do this, we must continue to grow the base defense 

budget for some time to come. 

I think I can also speak for the committee in saying that we all 

want to eliminate waste within the Department wherever and 

whenever we find it. I commend the Secretary of Defense and his 

able support team, well represented here today, for making hard 

choices that have too often been avoided in the past. As you all 

know, this committee hasn’t agreed with every decision made, nor 

should we, but we do respect the leadership being demonstrated at 

the Department of Defense. 

The Department’s efficiency initiative is the most comprehensive 

effort of its kind in almost 20 years. Across the board, this committee stands ready to hear the Department’s case. In the area of 

acquisition reform, we believe the Department’s initiatives are very 

much aligned with policies the committee has advocated for years 

and which were recently clearly expressed in the report of our 

Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform. In other areas, we look forward to better understanding what the Department is proposing 

and what savings will be achieved. When it comes to jointness, 

insourcing, and information technology, this committee has longstanding interests and concerns that may not align as clearly with 

the Department’s proposals. 
52 

As long as I have served in Congress, the system has worked one 

way: the Administration proposes, and the Congress disposes. This 

year and next will be no different. So gentlemen, your task today 

is to persuade us that this initiative is not part of an agenda to 

cut the defense budget, and that it is consistent with this committee’s longstanding priorities in a number of critical areas. 
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Statement of Ranking Member Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

The Department of Defense’s Efficiency Initiative 

September 29, 2010 

Secretary Lynn, Secretary Carter, and General Cartwright, good 

morning and welcome. We have been looking forward to your testimony on the Department’s efficiencies initiative for some time. I 

hope that you will be able to provide members of this Committee 

with detailed information regarding the Secretary’s proposed measures and to allay the concerns that many of us share. 

As elected officials, Members of Congress have a responsibility to 

ensure U.S. taxpayer dollars are not wasted on inefficient, wasteful 

or redundant programs. I agree with Secretary Gates that we must 

scrutinize defense programs to ensure we are generating the most 

bang for the buck and that we must concentrate our limited resources on the highest-priority programs. Furthermore, I view it as 

the responsibility of the Armed Services Committee to exercise the 

same discipline on an annual basis, through our defense authorization act, to shift funds from poorly performing programs to higher 

national security priorities and promising technologies for the future, such as missile defense and means to counter anti-access 

threats. 

But, as with most things, the devil is in the details. Unfortunately, although we have requested more information, both verbally and in writing, the Department has failed to fully respond. 

My first concern is where we find $20 billion a year in cuts—in the 

midst of two wars—without also cutting back on required weapons 

and services needed to meet the threats of today and tomorrow. 

Secretary Lynn, you’ve already announced that at least a third of 

the savings will come from within the force structure and modernization accounts—the same accounts the Secretary is attempting to grow. We have seen that setting arbitrary targets for cost 

savings, as appears to have happened with insourcing, can frequently not yield the expected results. How do we avoid those pitfalls here? 

Second, I am extremely concerned that no matter what the intentions of the Secretary may be, the Administration and some in Congress will not allow the Secretary to keep the savings. This summer, the White House supported a teacher bailout bill that was 

funded in part with defense dollars. Once these savings from this 

efficiencies initiative are identified, what’s to stop them from taking this money, too? 

We’re already seeing impacts of this summer’s cuts. For example, 

some of those funds were intended to rectify an overdraft in the 

Navy’s military pay accounts. Once those funds were taken, the 

Navy was forced to take the money from aircraft procurement accounts. What’s the result? It’s going to take longer to buy the external fuel tanks our Super Hornets and Growlers need and to upgrade training simulators. Even worse—it will cost the taxpayers 

more money to buy those fuel tanks because we won’t be able to 

take advantage of a negotiated bulk buy. So much for efficiency. 

Secretary Gates appears to share my concern. In August he stated, ‘‘ . . . my greatest fear is that in economic tough times that peo-
54 

ple will see the defense budget as the place to solve the nation’s 

deficit problems, to find money for other parts of the government. 

I think that would be disastrous in the world environment we see 

today and what we’re likely to see in the years to come.’’ 

Third, with respect to acquisition reforms, most of these appear 

to be consistent with Congressional direction. I would like to learn 

more about the Department’s plans to set cost targets for new 

weapon systems. Congress supports analytical trade-offs between 

required capabilities, time to the warfighter, and cost. However, 

our requirements must be determined by the future threat environment, not simply by our budgets. 

The Department will have to convince members of this committee that these efforts will not weaken our nation’s defense. To 

that end, we must fully understand the rationale behind each decision and potential impact of every cut. Case in point—who within 

the Department of Defense will be responsible for ensuring our 

commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq have the correct number and 

mix of military forces, if the Department eliminates the Joint 

Forces Command? 

Thank you for your willingness to provide this Committee with 

the information we require to conduct thorough oversight and support the Secretary’s efforts to grow our investment accounts. 
55 

TESTIMONY OF 

William J. Lynn, III 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Before the U.S. House of Representatives 

Armed Services Committee 

September 29, 2010 
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2010 

(163) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON 

Mr. SKELTON. Deputy Secretary Lynn, the DOD General Counsel legal opinion is 

based on the concept that there will be enough United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) workload reduced that the number of civilian employees realigned 

will fall below thresholds for coverage under the Base Realignment and Closure 

statute. What JFCOM functions was the DOD General Counsel’s office told were 

being eliminated in formulating this legal opinion? If the General Counsel was not 

provided with a list of workload reductions, what assumptions or factual elements 

were provided in obtaining the legal opinion? 

Secretary LYNN. The DOD General Counsel was told that the Secretary was proposing the disestablishment of JFCOM and was asked to analyze the extent to 

which the requirements of Section 2687 of Title 10, United States Code might apply 

to that action. No specificity regarding the functions or number of personnel positions to be eliminated was provided, just a general statement that the Department 

anticipated eliminating a significant number of functions and personnel positions. 

The Office of the General Counsel therefore did a location-by-location analysis, examining the full range of possible actions to accomplish the disestablishment. The 

attached paper explains the extent to which any such action would, or would not, 

trigger the requirements of Section 2687. The paper does not assume or depend 

upon any specifics regarding what functions or what number of personnel positions 

would be eliminated; rather it simply explains the legal effect of the full range of 

possibilities. 

Mr. SKELTON. Deputy Secretary Lynn, by law, the department must manage its 

civilian workforce by workload and funding, rather than use arbitrary constraints. 

How is the freeze consistent with the law? Why won’t the freeze lead to reductions 

in civilian employees without any workload analysis? 

Secretary LYNN. 10 U.S.C. § 129 does not prohibit managing our civilian workforce 

by any particular accounting convention, such as man years, end strength, or full 

time equivalent (FTEs) targets, provided that those conventions are based on workload or funding. In his efficiencies roll-out speech on August 9, 2010, Secretary 

Gates stated that for the past two years Department leadership has been working 

on reforming the way the Pentagon does business. He referenced the fact that sustaining the current force structure and making needed investments in modernization will require annual real growth of 2 to 3 percent, which is 1 to 2 percent above 

current top-line budge projections. He also referenced the fact that in May 2010, he 

‘‘called on the Pentagon to take a hard, unsparing look at how the department is 

staffed, organized, and operated.’’ The conclusion from that study was that the headquarters and support bureaucracies had grown cumbersome and top-heavy, overreliant on contractors, and accustomed to operating with little consideration to cost. 

Further, as he outlined his four-track approach he made it clear that it will be incorporated in the FY 2012 budget request. 

We are now in the midst of a careful evaluation of the roles and functions of our 

component organizations that considers the most effective allocation human capital—government and contract personnel alike. Our problem is that our entire workforce has grown too large and we must take steps to control this growth. The Department is not conducting a civilian hiring freeze. Rather, we are halting the 

growth of our workforce and reducing our reliance on service support contractors 

through targeted reductions. 

Mr. SKELTON. Deputy Secretary Lynn, in announcing the efficiency initiative, the 

Secretary has focused on examining opportunities to reform many of the Department’s business operations, such as contracting, acquisition, and human capital. The 

FY08 NDAA established the Deputy Secretary of Defense as DOD’s Chief Management Officer (CMO), established a Deputy CMO (DCMO) to assist the CMO, and 

designated the service Under Secretaries as CMO for their departments. 

What is your role, as the CMO, in the efficiency initiative? What specific responsibilities have been given to the CMO and how are these being carried out? 

Secretary LYNN. As CMO, I review all recommendations from the Efficiencies 

Task Force as part of the Secretary’s leadership and decisionmaking team. 
164 

The Secretary’s call to cut overhead costs and transfer those savings to force 

structure and modernization is effectively accomplished through the four tracks detailed in his initiative announcement to include: 

1) Finding $100 billion in savings over the next five years that can be reallocated 

to priority warfighting and modernization needs. 

2) Seeking suggestions from industry, advisory boards and DOD employees on 

new ideas to achieve efficiencies. 

3) Reviewing how the Department is organized and operated to identify necessary 

changes to how we do business. 

4) Implementing 23 initiatives on defense acquisition and contracting, such as reduction of funding for support contractors by 10 percent a year for the next three 

years. 

These tracks are being implemented across the Department. For example, the 

Secretary issued guidance to each of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies with specific savings targets that are to be met as part of the budget preparation process for the FY 2012 President’s budget; conducted the Innovation for New 

Value, Efficiency and Savings Tomorrow (INVEST) contest, which solicited cost-cutting ideas from our workforce; and made the decision to close the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 

Information Integration and the Business Transformation Agency (BTA). Disestablishment plans for those organizations are under development. 

Mr. SKELTON. How will the task force being led by the Secretary’s chief of staff 

interrelate with the CMO, DCMO and military department CMOs? 

Secretary LYNN. The Secretary’s Chief of Staff chairs the Department’s Efficiencies Task Force, with support from established study groups. These groups are 

tasked with managing the four tracks detailed by the Secretary in his efficiency initiative announcement. As CMO, I review all recommendations from the Efficiencies 

Task Force as part of the Secretary’s leadership and decisionmaking team. The Secretary’s Chief of Staff is working with the DCMO on the closure of BTA and the 

INVEST contest. 

Mr. SKELTON. What is the role of the Deputy CMO and military department 

CMOs with respect to the efficiency initiative? What specific responsibilities have 

been given to the CMO and how are these being carried out? 

Secretary LYNN. The DCMO is working with the Department’s senior leadership 

to ensure BTA critical skill sets and functions are retained, but functional overlaps 

are eliminated. Second, the DCMO is administering the Department’s INVEST contest. This contest solicited DOD military and civilian employees’ creative ideas to 

save money, avoid cost, reduce cycle time, increase agility and use resources more 

effectively. The contest ran from August 9, 2010 through September 24, 2010, and 

15,890 ideas were submitted. The Department is currently evaluating these ideas. 

Military Department CMOs have broad responsibility for implementing the Secretary’s efficiency initiative within their respective organizations and achieving the 

Secretary’s goal for each Military Department in shifting $28.3 billion in overhead 

costs to force structure and future modernization. 

The Army CMO was designated as the single oversight lead for all Army efforts 

in meeting objectives across the four tracks detailed in the Secretary’s announcement. In this role, the Army CMO has: delineated specific roles and responsibilities 

of Army leadership for 14 specific efficiency tasks; established guidance to ensure 

synchronization and integration of Army-wide initiatives affecting adjustments to 

the FY 2012–2016 Program Objectives Memorandum (POM); and expanded Army 

initiatives to a longer-term effort incorporating a holistic review of major Army Enterprise programs, capability portfolio reviews and processes to garner efficiencies 

in the out-years (Program Review 2013–2017). The Army CMO also directed establishment of a process to identify, assess and implement future DOD and Army efficiency initiatives that leverages the Army integrated management processes against 

specific metrics and efficiency targets. 

The Department of the Navy (DON) CMO is tasked with tracking and coordinating across the Navy, Marine Corps and Secretariat, all efficiency-related pursuits 

with the specific goal of institutionalizing an enterprise-wide culture of efficiency. 

The DON CMO is responsible for establishing and chairing a Department of the 

Navy Efficiency Implementation and Monitoring Program and leads an efficiency 

working group within DON to increase awareness of efficiency tasks, coordinate specific issues across multiple stakeholders, and by doing so, avoid duplication of effort. 

The DON CMO is also leveraging the Department of the Navy Business Transformation Council to incorporate the efficiency initiative into the DON’s overall business transformation program. 
165 

The Air Force CMO is the lead in working with DOD’s Efficiency Task Force, and 

is tasked, together with the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, with providing final efficiency recommendations to the Secretary of the Air Force. The Air Force CMO is 

aggressively working to reduce overhead and realign savings to warfighting needs; 

seek proposals from the entire Air Force; assist in the conduct of front end assessments to inform the FY 2012 budget request; and to assist in reducing excess duplication across the entire DOD Enterprise. To meet the Secretary of the Air Force’s 

direction to find $28.3B in efficiencies across the Future Years Defense Program, the 

Air Force CMO and Vice Chief of Staff, as co-chairs of the Air Force Council, are 

utilizing the Air Force Corporate Structure to ensure top-level leadership and focus 

on our efforts in improving warfighting capability while shedding non-value added 

work and improving efficiency. In this effort, the Air Force CMO is responsible for 

ensuring efficiency priorities and objectives are integrated into Air Force business 

transformation and other related strategic plans, as well as Air Force’s performance 

management processes. 

Mr. SKELTON. If not the CMO, who in the Department is accountable for making 

sure that the initiative is fully implemented? 

Secretary LYNN. The Secretary of Defense and the Department’s entire senior 

leadership team are working together to implement and assume accountability for 

this initiative. 

Mr. SKELTON. Dr. Carter, does the Department have the human capital, the numbers and the expertise, to truly implement the reforms in Dr. Carter’s September 

14 guidance? In particular, does the Department have the expertise to conduct 

should cost and will cost management of programs? 

Secretary CARTER. The Department has program management, cost and engineering capabilities within the existing acquisition workforce that are critical to executing programs and facilitating affordability decisions. However, the Department 

recognizes that the size and composition of this existing workforce must be expanded to be able to apply these core capabilities to meet the more detailed affordability analysis needs of all acquisition programs and to more fully enhance those 

capabilities in support of Major Defense Acquisition Programs. 

The Department is committed to using disciplined program management practices, revitalizing cost-related capabilities, and reversing a decade-long decline in 

the organic workforce. To get best value for taxpayers, DOD will enhance the costestimating and pricing capability to improve program estimates and ensure we price 

contracts appropriately. As reported in our April 2010 report to Congress ‘‘The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Strategy FY10,’’ to improve quality, the 

Department is expanding and improving training programs in this area. We have 

created a separate cost-estimating career path within the Business career field, and 

now require 7 instead of 4 years of experience to achieve Level III certification. Currently, the Department has more than 900 cost-estimating positions in the DOD acquisition workforce supporting a diverse set of technical and program activities. The 

cost analysis capability at the program office level is supported and guided by existing cost analysis organizations within each Component acquisition product division 

and organizations at the Component headquarters level that provide independent 

cost analyses to support Component Acquisition Executive decisions. In the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation organization provides an additional level of capability to provide estimates to inform Department-level decisions on acquisition programs and their affordability. 

In terms of Engineering-related capabilities within the acquisition workforce, the 

Department currently has 38,000 positions in the ‘‘Systems Planning Research Development Engineering—SPRDE’’ technical workforce. The SPRDE workforce represents the Department’s core capabilities for executing the range of engineering 

trade-off studies including life cycle cost modeling in all phases of the acquisition 

process. These trade study and modeling activities are critical to making informed 

choices that impact system affordability. As part of the Organization and Capability 

Assessment efforts mandated by Public Law 111–23 (Weapons Systems Acquisition 

Reform Act of 2009), the Department is currently working with the Military Departments and Agencies to assess the current capability of the workforce members providing engineering-related expertise. The Department possesses the capabilities 

needed at the present time by using government personnel with augmentation from 

systems engineering-focused Federally Funded Research and Development Centers 

(FFRDCs) and contractor personnel. The transition to an indigenous organization of 

government technical personnel is in progress and is anticipated to take several 

years. 

The Department has been working closely with the Military Departments on several Major Defense Acquisition Programs with good results from carefully thinking 

through requirements, business strategies, cost estimates and engineering trade- 
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offs. As Secretary Gates has said, ‘‘There is no silver bullet’’ for changing how the 

Department conducts business, and it will take time to fully implement these ideas 

across the Department and inculcate these practices in all acquisition programs. 

Mr. SKELTON. Dr. Carter, the acquisition workforce is a critical element in the 

management of acquisition—and the IMPROVE Act makes a number of recommendations related to the acquisition workforce. Under your efficiency initiative, 

the acquisition workforce is deemed a critical area (and exempted from the billet 

freeze). Beyond just increasing hiring for acquisition positions, what internal actions 

is the Department taking to hire and train individuals for the acquisition workforce? 

How will you ensure that the military services don’t include parts of the acquisition 

workforce in their ‘‘overhead’’ reductions undertaken in track (1)? 

Secretary CARTER. In addition to improving hiring practices and increasing the 

size of the acquisition workforce, the Department is creating more focused acquisition career paths, strengthening certification requirements, investing in leadership 

development, assessing workforce competencies and implementing strategies to address identified gaps, increasing acquisition training capacity, and providing new 

and improved training at all levels. Components are actively using the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund for a full spectrum of quality-enhancing 

workforce initiatives authorized by 10 U.S.C. 1705. 

DOD efforts to strengthen the acquisition workforce in size and quality are key 

to successful implementation of our acquisition reform efforts to improve our buying 

methods and our buying power. The President’s FY 2011 budget request provides 

for continuing the Secretary of Defense initiative to grow the acquisition workforce 

by 20,000 positions by 2015. Significant progress in hiring and growth continues and 

is being closely monitored by the defense acquisition workforce steering board, 

which is chaired by Dr. Carter, and is composed of senior acquisition component and 

functional leaders. 

Mr. SKELTON. Dr. Carter, when you state that the Department is cutting 10% of 

service support contracts, can you please clarify what this means? Ten percent of 

what, and what is the basis for choosing ten percent? What analysis is the Department using to determine which service support contracts will be eliminated? How 

will you know you’ve cut the ‘‘right’’ contracts? 

Secretary CARTER. The Department is focused on reducing its growing reliance on 

support contractors that perform routine, staff support functions. These targeted 

services are a subset of the Department’s Knowledge Based Services portfolio and 

align within Advisory and Assistance Services (A&AS). 

Examples of targeted support contractors include: 

• Contractors that come into a headquarters building (e.g. the Pentagon) each day 

and have a desk, phone number, and computer account; and 

• Contractors that perform duties such as writing memoranda or preparing routine briefings. 

Examples of support contractors not targeted include: 

• Contractors that orchestrate range control and monitoring at training ranges; 

• Contractors that provide highly specialized technical assistance for weapons 

systems; and 

• Contractors that provide IT support or maintain landscaping. 

In accordance with Section 807 of the FY 08 National Defense Authorization Act, 

DOD submits an annual inventory of services contracts to Congress. We admit that 

this inventory is not sufficiently exact for the intended purposes of this 10% reduction. In order to implement these reductions accurately and effectively, the Department must first establish a more complete accounting of the targeted support contractors. A DOD-wide survey of these support contracts is in progress. This survey 

data will not only assist the Department in reducing such support by 10% annually 

during the next three years, it will provide the necessary data and management 

tools to better manage this contractor support into the future. 

Mr. SKELTON. Dr. Carter, what is the plan going forward for involving defense industry in the implementation of the reforms spelled out in Dr. Carter’s September 

14 guidance? 

Secretary CARTER. Many of the initiatives in the September 14 Memorandum to 

Acquisition Professionals emphasize the Department’s own business practices— 

things that we can do directly to provide better value to warfighters and taxpayers. 

We developed that list of initiatives through intensive internal effort, looking hard 

at data and lessons learned from experience, but we also drew extensively on the 

best ideas submitted by industry. We expect the Efficiency Initiative to continue to 

benefit from communication and cooperation with industry. We also understand that 

some of our recommendations will affect (1) our interactions with industry and (2) 
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industry’s business practices. We specifically want to reward industry for actions 

that increase efficiency and provide real value-added initiatives for the Department. 

To make sure industry understands the Initiative’s goals and the detailed implementation steps, the Department’s leadership is holding a series of meetings with 

CEOs and industry leaders. That process began immediately after we published the 

September 14 memorandum. On September 16, we held a public event for industry 

at which we explained the initiative and answered questions, and we committed to 

meet individually with defense industry leaders to hear their suggestions and their 

concerns. We have carried out that promise. Additionally, my Principal Deputy, the 

Service Acquisition Executives, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Industrial Policy, 

and other Department executives have held a similar series of meetings. Our goal 

is to maintain an open line of communication that will smooth implementation. We 

want to give industry leaders as clear a signal as possible about our plans, and we 

want to give companies as much opportunity and incentive as possible to adapt to 

the new acquisition environment. 

We also hope to work with industry to stimulate new thinking that will lead to 

follow-on steps to improve the Department’s efficiency still further. The September 

14 memorandum also calls for the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Industrial Policy 

to involve industry further in implementing the reforms. Industrial Policy will solicit 

input from the industrial base to discover how DOD requirements of questionable 

utility and inefficient DOD practices cause industry to adopt practices that increase 

non-value-added costs. This input will build on the earlier set of industry suggestions and will solicit specific, credible, and convincing data on the non-value-added 

practices and the costs that they impose. The Department will then hold a public 

meeting at which industry experts can comment on the best of the suggestions, ensuring that those suggestions are broadly relevant to industry. This process will 

lead to follow-on reform proposals as part of the next phase of Efficiency Initiative 

implementation. 

Mr. SKELTON. Dr. Carter, what exactly is the intent of your new policy on independent research and development? 

Secretary CARTER. The intent is to reinvigorate industry’s independent research 

and development (IR&D) and protect the defense technology base. We are reviewing 

how we can work with industry to identify and eliminate impediments to innovation, provide better feedback to industry partners on their IR&D investments, and 

better define the Department’s needs to our industry partners. Open communication 

between industry and the Department should guide industry’s prioritization of 

IR&D. Results from initial inquiries reveal that the communication between industry and DOD on specific IR&D investments is not as strong as it could be as a result 

of changes made during the 1990s to the law governing IR&D processes. I intend 

to take action to improve communication between industry and government to better align the purpose of IR&D to actual practice. 

Mr. SKELTON. General Cartwright, my understanding is that pursuant to section 

162 of title 10, United States Code, all forces under the jurisdiction of a military 

department must be assigned to either a unified command or a specified command 

that reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. Is this also the Department’s understanding of this law? Given that today this requirement has been satisfied by 

the fact that all forces in the continental United States are assigned to United 

States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), what options are being considered to 

achieve this requirement once JFCOM is disestablished? 

Section 162 of title 10, United States Code reads as follows: 

§ 162. Combatant commands: assigned forces; chain of command 

(a) Assignment of forces. 

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Secretaries of the military departments shall assign all forces under their jurisdiction to unified and 

specified combatant commands or to the United States element of the 

North American Aerospace Defense Command to perform missions assigned to those commands. Such assignments shall be made as directed 

by the Secretary of Defense, including direction as to the command to 

which forces are to be assigned. The Secretary of Defense shall ensure 

that such assignments are consistent with the force structure prescribed 

by the President for each combatant command. 

(2) Except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, forces to be assigned by the Secretaries of the military departments to the combatant 

commands or to the United States element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command under paragraph (1) do not include forces assigned to carry out functions of the Secretary of a military department 

listed in sections 3013(b), 5013(b), and 8013(b) of this title [10 USCS 
168 

§§ 3013(b), 5013(b), and 8013(b)] or forces assigned to multinational 

peacekeeping organizations. 

(3) A force assigned to a combatant command or to the United States element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command under this 

section may be transferred from the command to which it is assigned 

only— 

(A) by authority of the Secretary of Defense; and 

(B) under procedures prescribed by the Secretary and approved by the 

President. 

(4) Except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all forces operating within the geographic area assigned to a unified combatant command shall be assigned to, and under the command of, the commander 

of that command. The preceding sentence applies to forces assigned to a 

specified combatant command only as prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. 

(b) Chain of command. Unless otherwise directed by the President, the chain of 

command to a unified or specified combatant command runs— 

(1) from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and 

(2) from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command. 

General CARTWRIGHT. Section 162 of title 10, United States Code, provides that 

the Secretaries of the military departments shall assign all forces under their jurisdiction to the combatant commands or to the U.S. element of the North American 

Aerospace Defense Command, as directed by the Secretary of Defense, except for 

those forces assigned to carry out the functions of the Secretary of a military department listed in sections 3013, 5013, and 8013 of title 10 or forces assigned to multinational peacekeeping organizations. The Department of Defense is considering how 

best to effect the reassignment of those forces currently assigned to United States 

Joint Forces Command if the President disestablishes that Command. 

Mr. SKELTON. General Cartwright, in the past, Congress has found it necessary 

to compel the Department to more aggressively pursue jointness, most notably in 

the Goldwater-Nichols Act. If United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is 

eliminated, who within the Department will have as their central mission the job 

to advocate, develop, and disseminate joint operating concepts, doctrine, and training? Without a central advocate for jointness, and considering that the CJCS and 

VCJCS already have full time jobs, how can the Congress be assured that the Department won’t default to service-centric approaches? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Since Goldwater-Nichols passed in 1986, the Department of 

Defense, including Services and Combatant Commands, has diligently pursued 

jointness. The U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) was established to standardize 

training, develop doctrine, deliver Joint capabilities, and improve jointness in operations and warfighting. JFCOM has been successful in helping define, establish and 

compel a Joint culture throughout the U.S. Military. 

The Secretary’s recommendation that the President approve the disestablishment 

of U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is based on a review of the missions assigned to JFCOM in the Unified Command Plan and the determination that these 

missions can now be accomplished effectively and more efficiently elsewhere within 

the Department. 

Fundamentally, the principal purpose for the creation of JFCOM in 1999—to force 

a reluctant service-centric military culture to embrace joint operations and doctrine—has largely been achieved. Jointness is a cultural and behavioral principle 

that is evolutionary and not easily measured; however, there is little debate that 

today the United States military has doctrinally, operationally and culturally embraced jointness as a matter of practice and necessity. The on-going assessment of 

JFCOM’s functions will identify those functions which should be sustained, and will 

recommend the appropriate level and location of leadership. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Deputy Secretary Lynn, in your statement you said, ‘‘The department is seeking ideas, suggestions and proposals regarding efficiencies from outside normal channels. We have solicited input from experts, from think tanks, from 

industry and from the department’s external boards . . . The department is willing 

to consider any reasonable suggestion to reduce our overhead.’’ Military mail has 

long been identified as a non-core function of the Defense Department and is resource-intensive. A 2005 Defense Business Board (DBB) report strongly rec-
169 

ommended outsourcing military mail. Major identifiable cost factors for military 

mail include Second Destination Transportation costs, air and surface transportation costs, air terminal facilities and personnel costs, APO/FPO facilities and personnel costs, Official Mail Center facilities and personnel, and unit mail clerks. Potential savings of outsourcing military mail are estimated in the hundreds of millions per year. Have you and/or will you consider outsourcing military mail as a reasonable suggestion to reduce overhead? If you have not, why not? 

Secretary LYNN. Not only has the Department considered outsourcing mail functions, we have progressively outsourced military mail services. After the 2005 Defense Business Board (DBB) report and a 2007 OSD directive to outsource mail 

services, the Military Departments outsourced positions at APOs/FPOs, mail terminal facilities and official mail centers that resulted in an estimated annual savings to DOD of approximately $60 million from FY 2005 to FY 2009. Military and 

DOD civilian postal personnel are still required to: perform postal jobs that are inherently governmental; serve as on-site postmasters at APOs/FPOs in accordance 

with United States Postal Service (USPS) policy; serve as contracting officer technical representatives; provide postal support for theater-opening contingency operations; provide direct support for rapid, episodic deployments; and provide support 

at forward operating bases and other dangerous, austere locations. 

In July 2009, the USPS completed contracts for deregulated, international com- mercial air movement of mail resulting in a $34 million transportation savings for 

DOD during the first year. On September 29, members of the Office of Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness and the Military Postal 

Service Agency briefed the DBB on these and other outsourcing and efficiency efforts made throughout the mail enterprise since their report in 2005. In accordance 

with DOD policy, the Department continues to civilianize and outsource mail functions, streamline the mail transportation network, and consolidate/align mail facilities to reduce operating costs and return personnel to warfighting functions. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Dr. Carter, in your statement you said, ‘‘The Pentagon awarded $55 billion in contracts that were supposed to be competitive, but for which only one 

bid was received, usually from an incumbent.’’ Recently the Air Force issued presolicitation notices seeking input from private industry for technical solutions for a 

proposed counterinsurgency, ISR, and light attack aircraft. The requirements outlined were overly proscriptive in technical details rather than capability. As a result, 

an innovative crop-dusting company in Olney, Texas, which has developed the AT802U for counterinsurgency, ISR, and light attack purposed for the U.S. military, 

was unable to even bid. It appears that the Department wrote the requirements 

with an incumbent and their preferred solution model in mind. How do you plan 

to address technical requirements written so narrowly as to exclude innovative, nontraditional, and relatively unknown entrants to the defense industrial base? How do 

you plan to avoid developing requirements that may inadvertently endorse an incumbent’s preferred solution? 

Secretary CARTER. Competition is the cornerstone of the acquisition process and 

its benefits are well understood. To that end, we make every effort to avoid overly 

prescriptive technical specifications that hamper competition. In accordance with 

the requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, contracting activities are to 

employ market research before developing requirements documents for an acquisition and before soliciting offers to determine what sources are available to meet the 

agency’s requirements. Market research is also used to identify the capabilities of 

small businesses and new entrants into the marketplace. Contracting offices also 

use draft Request for Proposals and industry days to obtain industry feedback on 

the technical requirements and other aspects of solicitations. All of this is in support 

of ensuring maximum competition for our requirements. 

The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) in his September 14, 2010 memorandum ‘‘Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining 

Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending’’ underscored the importance of competition and removing barriers to competition that often result in only 

one offer. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. General Cartwright, in your statement you said, ‘‘At all the 

COCOMs, we must consolidate functions where appropriate and where functions are 

retained, move toward a construct of combined joint interagency task force organizations and centers.’’ Because strategic communication is an inherently interagency 

problem and because the need for addressing strategic communication considerations are required both in the development and execution of policy, would you consider establishing mission-focused Joint or Combined Joint Interagency Task Forces 

for strategic communication within the combatant commands for U.S. missions in 

Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere to be of value? If not, what would you recommend 

to organizationally better address the strategic communication issue? What road-
170 

blocks to establishing such organizations do you foresee? Does the Department have 

the authority to establish such organizations under existing authority or is legislative change required to overcome these roadblocks? 

General CARTWRIGHT. There is substantial consensus within the Department that 

strategic communication (SC) is a process by which we integrate and coordinate, 

rather than a collection of capabilities and activities. The process is an enabling 

function that guides and informs our decisions. Conceptualizing SC as a process allows the Department to focus on ensuring effective coordination among components, 

and to identify needed supporting capabilities, rather than designing and resourcing 

new structures and organizations. The SC process supports appropriate coordinating 

mechanisms at the combatant command level. But, rather than establishing new 

structures and organizations, SC leverages existing interagency organizations and 

capabilities to minimize bureaucratic layers and competition for limited resources. 

As referenced in the 2009 Report to the President on a National Framework for 

Strategic Communication and DOD’s Fiscal Year 2009 Report on Strategic Communication to congressional defense committees, in response to Section 1055(b) of the 

Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009, interagency task 

forces and coordinating bodies needed to address SC considerations currently exist. 

The Combined Joint Interagency Coordination Group (C/JIACG), established at each 

geographic combatant command, coordinates with the United States Government civilian agencies to conduct operational planning. Though the name of the organization has changed with the addition of coalition partners, it has worked and is working today in the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters. The C/JIACG can be leveraged to 

serve as a resource for military planners seeking information and input from communication practitioners in theater or at the national level. Furthermore, the DOD 

Global Engagement Strategy Coordination Committee (GESCC) is the Department’s 

central body for facilitating the SC integrating process. GESCC representatives participate in the National Security Council’s regular interagency policy committee 

meetings on SC and global engagement and also work closely with the Department 

of State’s Global Strategic Engagement Center. Accordingly, the Department sees no 

need to establish new task forces or coordinating bodies as they either currently 

exist for the purpose of fulfilling interagency SC considerations or, as in the case 

of the C/JIACG, can be leveraged to support operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

elsewhere. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Dr. Carter, what is the status of the acquisition program developing an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) detector that replicates the smelling 

sense of a canine? 

Secretary CARTER. This question references DARPA’s basic research program, 

RealNose. The RealNose goal is to model, design, and develop a novel sensor inspired by the canine’s olfactory system to include: air/odor intake, a detector layer 

(which includes olfactory receptors), a signal transduction methodology, and a signal 

processing/pattern recognition methodology for the accurate detection and identification of known and unknown chemicals and mixtures of chemicals (i.e. explosives, 

chemical and biological weapons). The key to the program concept is simulating the 

entire mammalian olfactory system (from air intake to pattern recognition) to demonstrate canine-comparable specificity, distance and detection thresholds. 

The program is currently working in Phase 1A. Performers in Phase 1 developed 

breadboard device system-level designs but were unable to demonstrate the ability 

to detect five individual chemical odors (out of ten potential) at the canine level of 

detection for each molecule, and at a probability of detection greater than or equal 

to 80 percent. Stabilization of olfactory receptor proteins for use in a device became 

a significant challenge that all three performers were unable to overcome in Phase 

1. Therefore, the goal of Phase 1A is to optimize the sequence of olfactory receptors 

to augment stability, allowing for consistent and reliable detection of odorants at 

room temperature for greater than 48 hours. At the end of this phase, the PM will 

assess whether the program is ready to proceed to Phase II. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Dr. Carter, how much has been spent on this initiative? 

Secretary CARTER. $22.6 million from FY 2008 to FY 2010. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Dr. Carter, what cost-benefit analysis has gone into determining 

the efficiency of this initiative vice procuring more canines, personnel, and associated equipment? 

Secretary CARTER. For IEDs, there is not an applicable cost/benefit analysis in 

using canines. Canines are a great detector but only for TNT/DNT, not for homemade explosives or IEDs utilizing other materials. Operators must carry multiple 
171 

detectors to detect explosives and chemicals. They must also use an alternate labbased sensor(s) to identify threats. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Dr. Carter, is this initiative in-line with your guidance on gaining efficiencies through the acquisition reform? If yes, how? 

Secretary CARTER. As part of the overall DARPA S&T portfolio, all approved programs are reviewed for efficiency opportunities. RealNose will assess the level and 

utility of the contractor support on the program and the technical direction/approach 

as part of this review. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. General Cartwright, does the military have adequate satellite 

communication capabilities to meet theater requirements concerning intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR)? 

General CARTWRIGHT. We have adequate satellite communication capabilities to 

meet current theater ISR requirements. We are procuring additional capacity and 

capability to meet the forecast demand. The Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) Communications constellation recently deployed its third satellite over western Africa, 

and we expect the fourth and fifth WGS spacecraft to be launched before the end 

of 2012. This will increase the amount of capacity available to our ISR assets, as 

well as other users. At the same time, we are working to ensure that all of our reconnaissance platforms are properly equipped with terminals that will allow them 

to use the new WGS network. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. General Cartwright, do you see an increased requirement for satellite communications to be used as a capability for protecting troops on the battlefield? What is being done to ensure this capability is being developed to meet the 

dynamic conditions of current and future overseas contingency operations? 

General CARTWRIGHT. The need for battlefield communications over the next ten 

to fifteen years will continue to increase, and satellites will remain a mainstay of 

the capability mix we’ll deploy to support our troops in the field. As contingencies 

erupt around the globe, we will need to rapidly surge communications capabilities 

into a theater, then be able to reposition that capability rapidly to meet needs that 

may emerge in other theaters. 

Satellite systems require significant lead time—often as long as a decade—to design, build, test, and finally launch. Their lengthy build schedules, coupled with 

complications arising from the repositioning of geosynchronous spacecraft, are often 

incompatible with the need to surge capabilities in and out of theater. For these reasons, we will look to commercial SATCOM leasing and a deployable aerial communications layer to augment the military space communications backbone. A recommended capability mix is part of the outcome of an expected Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) the Department plans to conduct on space communications during fiscal year 2011. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. General Cartwright, I am told there are issues with the services 

communicating with each other on the battlefield due to use of different communications platforms by the Services. What is being done to bridge this capability gap, 

garner efficiencies, and ensure a joint effort? 

General CARTWRIGHT. The Department has improved the ability for Joint forces 

to communicate by investing in common equipment with interoperable technologies. 

However, we have not yet achieved wideband tactical connectivity that enables full 

implementation of situational awareness/information sharing at the tactical edge. 

Additionally, Joint forces continue to rely on Service-specific communications equipment and work-around tactics, techniques, and procedures to maintain communications with other Joint and coalition forces. 

Although we are able to communicate, challenges still remain and greater efficiency can be realized. The Department is addressing these and other issues 

through initiatives such as the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS), the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Program, and 

the Global Information Grid (GIG) 2.0 construct. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. 1. Is the Department intending to terminate the Acquisition and 

Cross-Servicing Agreement with NATO SACT? If so, what are the implications from 

a diplomatic perspective and the implications from a warfighting perspective? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. The Acquisition 

and Cross Service Agreement (ACSA) with NATO SACT will remain intact and be 

executed under Joint Staff oversight. The Department currently has no plans to terminate the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement with NATO SAC-T. 

Mr. FORBES. 2. Who will manage the Foreign Liaison/Exchange Officer agreements that are in place with 19 nations? 
172 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. The new Joint 

Staff Deputy Director J7, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, will manage the FLO/ 

Exchange Officer agreements with the 20 countries we currently have agreements 

with. The intent is for remaining elements of former JFCOM training, doctrine, lessons learned, and concept development entities to maintain those relationships as 

part of the Joint Staff. 

Mr. FORBES. 3. Does the Department of Defense view the National Security Strategy as an important document that should, in a broad sense, drive our nation’s national defense structure? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. The Department of 

Defense views the National Security Strategy as a vital document that articulates 

the Commander-in-Chief’s national security priorities and guidance. The National 

Security Staff and the Department of Defense worked to ensure close coordination 

between the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense 

Review (QDR). The 2010 QDR report is consistent with President Obama’s vision 

on defense issues, including: reforming acquisition; taking care of our military personnel and families; strengthening international relationships in the face of common 

challenges; and rebalancing our forces to succeed in today’s conflicts while preparing 

for the threats of tomorrow. 

Mr. FORBES. 4. What is your plan to ensure that our allies have access to joint 

interoperability doctrine without a combatant command to lead them? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. Part of the JFCOM 

Disestablishment Plan includes the creation of a Joint Staff-led organization focusing on Joint and Coalition Warfighting, located in Hampton Roads, to ensure doctrine and training interoperability with allies and coalition partners remain current. 

A key aspect in developing this plan has been to ensure the close relationship with 

NATO ACT is maintained. As such, General Abrial, Supreme Allied Commander 

Transformation (NATO), has been an integral part in the development of the new 

‘‘to be’’ organizations and kept informed on our progress. In this new construct, his 

staff will interact on a day-to-day basis with the DDJ7 JCW in Suffolk, VA. Additionally, General Abrial will now interact with the CJCS and VCJCS on issues involving ACT/US interests. 

Mr. FORBES. 5. Why has the Department abandoned a strategy-based military 

construct and instead elected to try and protect our national interests with a weaker 

and wholly illogical budget-based military? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. The Department 

has not abandoned a strategy-based defense construct. Through the Quadrennial 

Defense Review and related strategic initiatives, the Department has undertaken a 

thorough assessment of ongoing operations and emerging challenges. As demonstrated in the FY 2010–2012 budgets, the Department is continually improving 

the balance of efforts and resources among current conflicts, preparing for future 

contingencies, and preserving existing advantages. 

Mr. FORBES. 6. Article 5 of the NATO charter states that: 

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe 

ar North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 

of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked 

by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all 

measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security 

Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has 

taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and 

security. 

On September 11th, 2001, NATO offered, for the first time, assistance to the 

United States. Why is the Department recklessly abandoning this partnership? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. The Department of 

Defense is not abandoning the NATO Alliance. The Department has led the way in 

creating a 50-nation NATO coalition with over 40,000 troops from allied and partner 

countries united in Afghanistan, so that terrorists who threaten us all have no safe 

haven and so that the Afghan people can forge a more hopeful future. At the 2010 

NATO Summit in Lisbon, President Obama reaffirmed our Article 5 commitment: 

that an attack on one is an attack on all. To ensure this commitment has meaning, 

the Department of Defense, is leading the development of a missile defense capability for NATO territory, the phased adaptive approach, to defend against the growing threat from ballistic missiles. This new approach to European missile defense 

will be the United States’s contribution to this effort and a foundation for greater 
173 

collaboration that will protect all of our allies in Europe as well as the United 

States. We are also leading efforts to improve NATO’s flexibility, efficiency, and effectiveness to better prepare it to counter other new challenges in an uncertain future. For example, the Department has led efforts to reform NATO structures and 

processes to better position the Alliance to handle emerging challenges such as malicious cyber activities and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. (This 

NATO effort is analogous to the Department’s plans to streamline the U.S. military 

combatant command structure.) Finally, building on our experience with NATO in 

Afghanistan, the Department will continue to support building the NATO partnership beyond the Euro-Atlantic area that will help make the Alliance a pillar of global security. 

A key aspect in developing this plan has been to ensure the close relationship 

with NATO ACT is maintained. As such, General Abrial, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (NATO), has been an integral part in the development of 

the new ‘‘to be’’ organizations and kept informed on our progress. In this new construct, his staff will interact on a day-to-day basis with the DDJ7 JCW in Suffolk, 

VA. Additionally, General Abrial will now interact with the CJCS and VCJCS on 

issues involving ACT/US interests. 

Mr. FORBES. 7. Does the Department now find the research conducted under the 

Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADA) with IBM, Northrop 

Grumman and Old Dominion University not worthy of continuation? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. Like all parts of 

JFCOM, the Cooperative Research and Development Agreements are being reviewed 

and those judged effective and valuable will be retained and re-aligned under another appropriate DOD organization. 

Mr. FORBES. 8. What is your cost estimate of the termination of the non-indefinite 

requirement contracts? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. As of 8 Feb 2011, 

JFCOM does not anticipate incurring any contract termination costs. 

Mr. FORBES. 9. If you don’t have an estimate, how can the Department in good 

conscience recommend the closure of a combatant command authorized under 10 US 

Code 161 without first determining not just what the indefinite contract cost may 

be, but the whole cost? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. See response to #8 

above. 

Mr. FORBES. 10. What is your estimate for the closure of the Suffolk and L’Enfant 

facilities with regards to termination of the leases and disposal of the buildings and 

material? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. The Suffolk facility 

lease costs were programmed into the FY12 budget submission. The L’Enfant lease 

will expire without renewal in FY11. FY12 will be a transition year during which 

most facility moves and renovations will occur. First order estimate of move/renovation/closure costs for Hampton Roads is $25M, and for L’Enfant is $50K. These estimates will be refined during a series of Rehearsals of Concept during the second 

and third quarter of FY11. These costs should be considered in the context of overall 

savings. 

Mr. FORBES. 11. If no estimate exists, how can the Department in good conscience 

recommend the closure of a combatant command authorized under 10 US Code 161 

without first determining not just what the indefinite contract cost may be, but the 

whole cost? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. See response to 

question #10. 

Mr. FORBES. 12. Does the Department possess a complete listing of all applicable 

Memorandums of Agreement and Understanding to ensure that we do not inadvertently violate an agreement opening up the government to some level of liability? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. JFCOM continues 

to compile a comprehensive list of applicable instructions and agreements across all 

functional areas which must be addressed during the disestablishment. JFCOM has 

begun coordination on these instructions and agreements. JFCOM has not encountered nor does it expect to encounter any violations or difficulties in resolving. 

Mr. FORBES. 13. If there exists no complete list, how can the Department close 

a combatant command without full knowledge of the agreements that may be in 

place and may expose the Department to liability if not properly terminated? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. See response to 

question #12. 

Mr. FORBES. 14. How is the Department planning to deal with the high number 

of displaced federal workers? What is the Department planning to do to properly 

care for those employees who have relied upon employment at JFCOM and now, to 
174 

their detriment, are having their livelihood taken from them with little or no notice? 

What is the Department going to do beyond RIF procedures? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. DOD is utilizing its 

portfolio of outplacement transition programs and tools to mitigate any negative impact on affected employees. The Department has and will continue to identify employment opportunities within DOD through our Priority Placement Program and 

outside of DOD through the Office of Personnel Management’s Interagency Career 

Transition Assistance Plan (ICTAP) and Reemployed Priority List (RPL). 

Additionally, the Department is working directly with the impacted organizations 

to provide transition assistance. This type of assistance includes resume writing; 

workshops on transition benefits and entitlements; referral to job assistance centers; 

and instructions on how to apply for other federal jobs outside DOD. The Department may choose to use workforce shaping tools such as Voluntary Early Retirement Authority (VERA) and Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay (VSIP) as part of 

the transition process. 

Mr. FORBES. 15. Deputy Secretary William J. Lynn stated that the Department 

spent ‘‘considerable time reviewing the input of his [Secretary Gates] most senior 

advisors, including the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Staff, myself, and 

others.’’ Why has the Department steadfastly refused to provide this input and analysis that was developed for and relied upon by the Secretary to make his decision 

despite repeated requests by multiple members of the Virginia Delegation? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. The Department 

has and continues to provide information to the VA Delegation. Secretary Gates met 

with Governor McDonnell and the Virginia Congressional Delegation in order to 

provide information and receive direct input and suggestions before making final decisions on the implementation plan for the disestablishment of JFCOM. Additionally, the Department has met with Members of the Virginia Congressional Delegation, including the Governor of Virginia, and provided information both in the form 

of briefings and documents. Finally, General Odierno, JFCOM Commander, and his 

senior staff have been consistently engaged with Governor McDonnell and the Virginia Congressional Delegation in an effort to effectively communicate JFCOM disestablishment plans and be responsive to additional requests for information. 

Mr. FORBES. 16. Please provide the actual (not a summary) of the Department’s 

legal opinion with regards to the applicability of Title X, 2687 Base Closure and Realignments on the JFCOM closure decision. 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. As previously provided on 24 Sep 2010, attached is the Department’s legal analysis of the applicability of Section 2687 of title 10, United States Code. (See page 89 in the Appendix.) 

Mr. FORBES. 17. Numerous documents and statements from DOD have indicated 

that a plan for disestablishment of JFCOM, including a determination of the functions that should continue to exist, should be eliminated, or should be moved, is 

being developed over the next several weeks. How does DOD justify making a decision to close JFCOM before first carrying out such an assessment? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. As discussed in responding to previous questions, the decision to recommend the disestablishment of 

JFCOM was based on improving operational effectiveness. JFCOM today is a redundant layer in our processes for training joint forces and providing them to the other 

combatant commanders to use operationally. A review of the missions assigned to 

JFCOM in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) showed that JFCOM functions could 

be carried out by other organizations within the Department. Determining precisely 

which functions will go where does not affect the fundamental rationale for the decision. Since the Secretary’s decision, the JFCOM Transition Planning Team has systematically reviewed all JFCOM functions and identified those functions that should 

be retained and transitioned elsewhere in the Department (in whole or part), and 

as well as those that could be eliminated as an efficiency. 

Mr. FORBES. 18. What studies on cost savings has DOD conducted concerning the 

JFCOM closure and contractor reduction? Please provide details. 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. The cost-savings, 

which are significant, were identified in the detailed JFCOM transition planning. 

Specifically, the original JFCOM resource request for FY11 included $988M in funding, 1,545 military personnel, 1,612 government civilians, and 2,565 Full-time 

Equivalent (FTE) contractors. The transition plan calls for retaining $536M in funding, 1,131 military personnel, 1,487 government civilians, and 580 FTE contractors 

for FY 11. These resources will be re-directed to the organizations gaining the 

former JFCOM functions selected for reassignment. 

The decision to disestablish JFCOM was also based on improving military effectiveness by making the force generation and force provider process more streamlined by removing layers that are redundant or no longer necessary. 
175 

Mr. FORBES. 19. What studies on workload impacts has DOD conducted (e.g., 

what are impacts on JCS of force provider function shift)? Provide details. 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. JFCOM will prepare a detailed implementation plan in coordination with the Joint Staff that addresses workload impacts. The Department plans for transition of selected personnel, as appropriate, to accompany the shift of functions from JFCOM to other 

organizations. Specifically, of the 5,722 total personnel initially assigned in FY11 to 

JFCOM, 3,198 will be reassigned to the organizations gaining former JFCOM functions. The majority of these reassigned personnel (more than 1,600) will be assigned 

to the Joint Staff. The remainder of retained personnel will be assigned across various other joint organizations. Of the 3,891 JFCOM personnel originally assigned to 

the Hampton Roads area, approximately 1,900 will remain there after transition is 

completed. 

Mr. FORBES. 20. Has DOD contacted contractors and civilians to determine their 

intent to move locations if their functions are moved? What impact on moving functions, and the servicemembers who receive JFCOM training and operations support, 

could result from the loss of these personnel from the workforce? What process was 

used to identify JFCOM for closure and what factors were considered in proposing 

the JFCOM closure? Why was it not done within the QDR completed this spring, 

or as part of a BRAC realignment? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. No JFCOM support 

contractors or civil servants have been contacted to determine their intent to relocate or not relocate. As the contracts for relocated functions are modified or new 

support instruments negotiated, the contract company will determine how to position their employee assets to perform the task. JFCOM recently hosted a meeting 

with industry representatives to keep them informed of pending changes. Additionally, JFCOM is coordinating with agencies from the Commonwealth of Virginia as 

the Governor’s office establishes a Workforce Transition Center to support JFCOM’s 

disestablishment. There is no major anticipated impact to operations support if civil 

servants or contractors do not desire to relocate. 

The Secretary took an unsparing look at the Department to find ways to increase 

the Department’s effectiveness especially given the likelihood of increased budgetary 

pressure. The QDR and BRAC realignment were not explicitly designed for this purpose. As referenced in previous answers, the decision to recommend the disestablishment of JFCOM was indeed based on improving operational effectiveness. JFCOM 

today is a redundant layer in our processes for training joint forces and providing 

them to the other combatant commanders to use operationally. A review of the missions assigned to JFCOM in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) showed that JFCOM 

functions could be carried out by other organizations within the Department. 

Mr. FORBES. 21. What specific legal authority exists for such strategic closures 

outside of BRAC? Jointness and joint interoperability give the U.S. military a great 

strategic advantage. How will such important characteristics of the modern military 

be met if JFCOM closes? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. As specified in Section 113(a) of title 10, United States Code, the Secretary of Defense ‘‘ . . . is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. Subject to the direction of the President and to [title 10, United States Code] 

and section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401), he has authority, 

direction, and control over the Department of Defense.’’ In this capacity the Secretary of Defense is responsible for ensuring that the Department of Defense operates efficiently and effectively in the performance of its missions. Closures and realignments are often necessary to achieve efficient and effective operations. The Secretary of Defense has the authority to close and realign military installations outside of the BRAC process provided that action does not trigger the thresholds established in section 2687, or the action is only undertaken after the Department satisfies the procedures set forth in that provision. 

The Department has identified JFCOM functions that are essential to ensure 

Joint and Coalition interoperability is maintained and sufficient resources are in 

place to adapt to an evolving threat environment. Those retained, essential functions will remain but will align under the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, or the 

Military Departments as appropriate. Some functions may remain in their present 

physical location. 

Mr. FORBES. 22. The modeling and simulation work done at JFCOM is a critical 

low-cost test and evaluation function. How can it be done if JFCOM closes? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. Like all parts of 

JFCOM, the modeling and simulation work has been reviewed and those elements 

judged effective and valuable are being retained and re-aligned under another appropriate DOD organization. In particular, modeling and simulation capabilities are 
176 

being retained in two areas: as part of the support to Joint Training and as part 

of the Joint Concept Development and experimentation process. These capabilities 

will continue to be housed in the Hampton Roads region but will be re-aligned 

under the Joint Staff J7 directorate. 

Mr. FORBES. 23. Did OSD review the process and decision made by the OSD 

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross Service Group during the 2005 

BRAC process that resulted in the recommendation that JFCOM continue to exist 

and should in fact purchase its leased facilities? How does DOD reconcile the recommendation to close JFCOM with the 2005 BRAC recommendation? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. These two decisions 

addressed different questions. BRAC was focused on facilities and the efficient use 

of these; the Secretary’s recommendation to disestablish JFCOM was driven by a 

review of command organizations and the desire to improve operational effectiveness of those organizations. 

The analysis undertaken by the Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross 

Service Group during the 2005 BRAC process focused only on whether existing 

Headquarters activities were appropriately located and whether the facilities in 

which they were located met their mission requirements. The Headquarters and 

Support Activities Joint Cross Service Group did not examine those organizations 

on a functional basis to determine if those organizations should continue to exist. 

Mr. FORBES. 24. Various personnel at JFCOM have been directed to sign nondisclosure agreements relating to the review and closure process. Why does the Department not take a transparent review and decisionmaking process in this action? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. JFCOM transition 

planning personnel initially complied with local information handling instructions 

designed to prevent initial pre-decisional and wide-ranging discussions from giving 

rise to premature and inaccurate rumors and misunderstandings. 

Mr. FORBES. 25. The Secretary indicated that he authorized the services to consider additional closures, and Mr. Hale recently indicated that no ‘‘more’’ closures 

would be announced until at least February. Is DOD currently considering additional base or function closures or realignments that would affect Virginia? If so, 

what are the metrics and process being used in that review? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. As part of our ongoing effort to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Department, DOD will 

consider all options in how we perform our missions. There are currently no firm 

recommendations regarding any future disestablishments or realignments. 

Mr. FORBES. 26. If the Secretary and the military departments are considering additional closures and realignments, does DOD believe that another round of the 

BRAC process is necessary? Have specific locations outside of Hampton Roads been 

identified to host any JFCOM mission that will remain intact after the proposed disestablishment of JFCOM? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. The Department of 

Defense is not currently seeking authority to undertake another round of closures 

and realignments under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as 

amended. The Secretary of Defense has asked the Secretaries of the Military Departments to examine their organizations for efficiencies. If the Secretaries of the 

Military Departments identify any actions that could involve the closure or realignment of a military installation, those actions will only be undertaken in accordance 

with law. 

The vast majority of retained Hampton Roads located functions will remain in 

Hampton Roads. The intent for retained, re-assigned elements of JFCOM that are 

located outside the Hampton Roads area is for them to remain in their current locations. This includes: Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) in Dahlgren, VA; Joint 

Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) in Ft Belvoir, VA and Spokane, WA; Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) in Tampa, FL; Joint Fires Interoperability 

and Integration Team (JFIIT) at Eglin AFB, FL; and the NATO School in 

Oberammergau, GE. 

Mr. FORBES. 27. Has DOD considered moving a new mission to backfill the sudden loss of this Command in the Hampton Roads region? For example, has DOD 

considered moving AFRICOM or other functions to the region? Which locations are 

being considered to host AFRICOM? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. The Department 

considered a range of options. That said, the Hampton Roads region will be included 

in any future evaluation of options to relocate AFRICOM’s headquarters. 

Mr. FORBES. 28. What specific JFCOM functions will remain in Suffolk and Norfolk? What are the estimated civilian, uniformed, and contract job positions at each 

location? Are these personnel assigned to specific billets at each location? 
177 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. Specific functional 

reconfiguration is on-going and will be codified in a detailed Implementation Plan. 

In general, essential joint force providing, joint training, doctrine and concept development, lessons-learned, command and control integration as well as key Combat 

Command support enablers are planned to remain in Hampton Roads. Approximately 1,300 military, civilian and contractor positions remain in Suffolk and 500 

remain in Norfolk. Personnel alignment to retained positions will continue over the 

next 6–12 months. 

Mr. FORBES. 29. What is the DOD plan for use of leased space in Suffolk? Will 

the leases be terminated and what are the termination fees? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. The Department is 

pursuing both alternative occupants for the vacated spaces as well as potential transition from lease arrangements to Department ownership of one or more of the Suffolk properties. Lease costs programmed into the budget through FY12 allow the 

Department ample opportunity to develop those alternatives and avoid lease termination fees. 

Mr. FORBES. 30. If similar functions to JFCOM exist within the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff and other organizations, did DOD consider consolidation of those functions to 

JFCOM, rather than disestablishment? Should alternatives, such as expanding or 

strengthening the JFCOM function, have been considered instead of selecting the 

JFCOM closure option? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. The decision to recommend the disestablishment of JFCOM was based on several factors including improving operational effectiveness by eliminating a redundant layer in our command 

and control processes for training joint forces and providing them to the other combatant commanders to use operationally. 

Mr. FORBES. 31. For those activities that DOD determines should continue to 

exist, what process will DOD use to determine whether they should remain in place 

or move elsewhere? Was there consideration given to simply reducing the number 

of contractors and eliminating the duplication of missions versus eliminating the entire command? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. The intent for the 

vast majority of retained, re-assigned elements of JFCOM that are located in Hampton Roads is for them to remain in Hampton Roads. Due to the significant investment in supporting technologies and workforce, further analysis led to the recommendation for those retained functions to remain in the Hampton Roads area. 

The intent for retained, re-assigned elements of JFCOM that are located outside 

Hampton Roads is for them to remain in their current locations due to the same 

business case analysis rationale. 

The decision to recommend the disestablishment of JFCOM was based on several 

factors including improving operational effectiveness by eliminating a redundant 

layer in our command and control processes for training joint forces and providing 

them to the other combatant commanders to use operationally. 

Mr. FORBES. 32. Has DOD calculated the extreme economic costs to Virginia of 

the contractor reduction; and what is the estimate? Where are the displaced contractor functions going to be performed? Will the JFCOM closure make the region 

eligible for base closure assistance, including OEA grants, from the federal government? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. DOD has not calculated costs to local areas of any of the efficiency initiatives, including the disestablishment of JFCOM. 

While all sectors of the JFCOM workforce are being scaled back, the mission functions that are retained in Virginia will continue to be performed by the remaining 

military, civil servants, and contractors or some combination of these workforce 

groups. 

In January 2011, the Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) approved a $472,180 

award to provide economic adjustment assistance to the Commonwealth of Virginia 

in response to the disestablishment of JFCOM. (Please note: OEA’s program of assistance to Virginia for the disestablishment of JFCOM is ‘‘economic adjustment assistance,’’ not ‘‘base closure assistance’’ as the question indicates.) 

Mr. FORBES. 33. Will the JFCOM closure result in an increase of personnel in the 

National Capital Region? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. We do not anticipate JFCOM disestablishment will have a discernable impact on the National Capital Region workforce numbers. 

Mr. FORBES. 34. What costs, and savings, are associated with the use of defense 

contractor personnel at JFCOM? What costs, and savings, are associated with the 

use of defense contractor personnel in the National Capital Region? How will DOD 
178 

decide which defense contractors and contracts to cut or eliminate in order to 

achieve the announced reduction? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. DOD does not inventory contractor personnel or expenditures by geographical region. Contractor/contracts that support those missions/functions that are redundant will be eliminated. 

Those that support unique and critical missions/functions will be retained. JFCOM’s FY11 estimated ‘‘historical’’ contract cost is $550M in active contract instruments and funds obligated, subject to reduction as a result of functions ending 

and transferring and the associated ending or scaling of supporting contract instruments. 

Mr. FORBES. 35. What studies has DOD conducted on both the short- and longterm real cost savings by reducing the use of defense contractors? Please include 

any existing examples where reducing the use of defense contractors—either by 

using uniformed personnel or by insourcing—has actually reduced costs to DOD. If 

the Department is looking for efficiencies, why was the decision made to cut the government contracting services sector rather than finding efficiencies through the 

streamlining of administrative operations? 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. The DOD, Congress, and GAO have observed a significant increase in the Department’s spending 

for contracted services, as evidenced by the doubling of the dollars DOD has budgeted/obligated for contracted services, to approximately $250B in FY10. While the 

reduction in contracted spending as a result of in-sourcing was $900M in FY10, the 

net growth in contracted services from FY09 to FY10 was still more than $5 billion. 

While in-sourcing decisions may result in savings, in half of all decisions to insource a contracted service to date, cost has not been the deciding factor. While at 

the organizational level, DOD components are finding that they can generate savings or efficiencies through in-sourcing certain types of previously contracted services or functions, these savings are generally not visible at a macro level and materialize in the form of resource realignment at the field/command level to other priorities or requirements. 

As part of improving the way DOD conducts business, DOD is ensuring adequate 

in-house capability and capacity to perform inherently governmental functions, 

closely associated with inherently governmental functions, and other critical work 

(including increased acquisition capabilities and contract oversight and other critical 

acquisition functions that will help mitigate risk, build internal capacity, and help 

meet readiness needs). 

While in-sourcing these critical or necessary services may not always generate direct savings, the overall benefits to the taxpayer are realized through: Æ improved oversight of contracted service performance; Æ maximizing use of competitive processes for contracted services; Æ improved tradecraft in services acquisition 

Æ implementing more efficient and timely acquisition processes; 

Æ reducing fraud, waste, and abuse; 

Æ improved performance of critical cost-saving acquisition functions to include 

systems engineering, contracting, cost estimating, test; 

Æ contract pricing. 

A major tenet of the Secretary’s Efficiencies Initiative is to streamline administrative operations. Sometimes this means eliminating associated support that has been 

obtained by contract. OSD (including the defense agencies and field activities) and 

the Combatant Commands conducted a functional review and identified low-priority 

functions for potential elimination as well as other opportunities to lower operating 

costs and improve performance and agility. In addition, the Department reduced 

funding for administrative support services that have previously been obtained by 

contract. The Department recognizes that the private sector is, and will continue to 

be, a vital source of expertise, innovation, and support to the Department. 

Mr. FORBES. 36. Upon what basis or analysis was the decision made to reduce the 

use of defense contractors by a total of 30% over the next three (3) years? Please 

provide a copy of any analysis conducted by DOD that forms the basis of this action. 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. The reduction is in 

the use of a specific subset of contractors—service support contractors. These are 

contracted personnel that perform staff and administrative functions. 

The goal of the Secretary’s Efficiencies Initiative is to protect current and future 

operational capability by streamlining overhead functions and shifting those savings 

toward investments in capabilities. The functions performed by service support contractors typically fall into the category of overhead and therefore should either be 

eliminated or performed by existing government personnel. 

Mr. FORBES. 37. What universe of service will the reduction affect? Will it be an 

across-the-board? If not, which categories of service will be targeted? 
179 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. The reduction is in 

the use of a specific subset of contractors—service support contractors. These are 

contracted personnel that perform staff and administrative functions. 

As the result of a Department-wide survey that concluded in October 2010, the 

Department determined that about $4B was spent on service support contracts. This 

is roughly 3 percent of the value of all service contracts. We used this baseline to 

calculate the 10 percent annual reductions. 

Mr. FORBES. 38. Will the reduction in the use of defense contractors be spread 

equally throughout the country or will any such reduction be confined to a specific 

region, such as the National Capital Region of Northern Virginia, which appears to 

be hit extremely hard by this decision. 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. The reduction applies to all DOD world-wide components and its magnitude will be a function of each 

component’s existing use of service support contract personnel. 

Mr. FORBES. 39. Please provide a list, by position, of every individual involved in 

any capacity in the JFCOM decision and disestablishment that have been required 

to sign a non-disclosure agreement. 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. The non-disclosure 

agreement was originally signed by 15 members of the JFCOM Disestablishment 

Transition Planning Team, who did not make final decisions affecting the disestablishment of JFCOM or the realignment of its functions or workforce. 

Mr. FORBES. 40. Describe in detail in the internal and external actions being 

taken to disestablish JFCOM. 

Secretary LYNN, Secretary CARTER, and General CARTWRIGHT. A detailed implementation plan has been developed to disestablish US Joint Force Command along 

both functional and organizational lines. The cornerstones of this plan include: 

1) Transfer streamlined, relevant joint functions to appropriate DOD entities; 

2) Revert forces currently assigned to JFCOM back to their appropriate Service; 

3) Eliminate unnecessary or redundant functions; 

Additional focus is being placed on ensuring the Department sustains the momentum and gains in Jointness it has worked so hard to achieve since the passage of 

the Goldwater-Nichols Act, while causing no harm to critical interaction with NATO 

and other multi-national partners. 

General Odierno, JFCOM Commander, and his senior staff are consistently engaged with Governor McDonnell and the Virginia Congressional Delegation in an 

effort to effectively communicate JFCOM disestablishment plans and be responsive 

to requests for information. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP 

Mr. BISHOP. Dr. Carter, I have been informed recently that cuts and reductions 

in cruise missile procurement and R&D programs may force private industry to disband its design teams with this highly specialized expertise. Is the small defense 

turbo fan engine industrial base something that your office has specifically identified as a defense industrial base concern? 

Secretary CARTER. Yes, the Department has specifically identified the small turbo 

fan industry as an industrial base issue. My Industrial Policy office has been actively engaged with this issue over the last 6 months and is seeking alternative 

strategies. 

Mr. BISHOP. Dr. Carter, what can we expect to see out of your office and the DOD 

in the way of specific actions in the near future to address the small turbine engine 

industrial base concern? 

Secretary CARTER. The Military Services are exploring new next generation weapons programs that will use small turbo fan engine technologies. To ensure these 

technologies are available, the Department is actively considering the realities of the 

small turbo fan industry viability on these new program timelines. DOD is investigating ways to bridge these industrial capabilities until they are required. 

Mr. BISHOP. Dr. Carter, with Russia and India having announced last year that 

they have jointly fielded a supersonic cruise missile, is it wise for this Administration to pull back any further R&D funding for a supersonic variant? 

Secretary CARTER. As the Department plans its next generation systems, DOD 

needs to perform the appropriate analysis to determine which capabilities and associated propulsion technologies will be required to meet our future national security 

requirements and establish the investment plans to develop and mature those technologies. 
180 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. McMORRIS RODGERS 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. I, like many of my colleagues, applaud the Department 

of Defense’s proactive approach to reduce unneeded bureaucracy, rein in wasteful 

spending, and I concur with Chairman Skelton and Ranking Member McKeon that 

now is not the time to cut the defense budget. 

However, in light of Secretary Gates’s announced plans to eliminate the U.S. Joint 

Forces Command, I am concerned the critical mission of the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, a subordinate command of the U.S. Joint Forces command, may be adversely affected if reshuffled or reassigned to a different outpost. 

Spokane, Washington, has served as the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency home 

since its 1999 inception, to the end, what are the DOD’s plans with regard to the 

Joint Personnel Recovery Agency? Does the DOD efficiency initiative result in closing the ‘‘White Bluff’’ Joint Personnel Recovery Agency facility located in Spokane, 

Washington? 

Secretary LYNN. A review of all U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) functions 

is ongoing. For functions that will be retained, several courses of action are being 

analyzed with respect to their future organizational alignment, location and resources. The disposition of the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency will be determined 

as the JFCOM disestablishment plan is completed. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Mr. CONAWAY. Secretary Lynn, you indicated in your testimony that the elimination of the Business Transformation Agency would not negatively impact the Department’s ability to improve its business processes and prepare for financial audits, 

and that the savings from the elimination of BTA would only be in the form of duplicative staff and overhead functions. As we look to ensure that there is no degradation of these important functional capabilities currently provided by BTA, 

please identify what, if any, specific non-overhead BTA functions/personnel will be 

eliminated as part of the shutdown. For each of these positions, please identify how 

they are duplicative in nature and no longer necessary. 

Secretary LYNN. BTA’s mission is to guide transformation of business operations 

throughout the Department and to deliver Enterprise-level capabilities aligned to 

warfighter needs. This mission remains valid. However, with the establishment of 

the position of the DCMO as an Under Secretary of Defense-level official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, duplication was created. It was determined the benefits provided by BTA could be more effectively realized through its disestablishment and incorporation of appropriate functionality into the Office of the DCMO. 

While a number of potential courses of action are under consideration, and all aspects of the organization, including programs, are under review, elimination of the 

BTA will meet the Secretary’s guidance to eliminate redundancy and reduce cost. 

Efficiency will be found through elimination of overhead functions that, while necessary in a Defense Agency regardless of size, can more cost-effectively be provided 

to the DCMO through existing support organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, organizations that currently exist within the Office 

of the DCMO and BTA, that perform similar or complementary functions will be 

combined and streamlined. This consolidation will enable more agile management 

of Departmental business transformation functions and the ability to more effectively carry out the mission. Other functions, that were part of BTA, but not directly 

related to its mission, may transfer to other organizations within the Department 

or be eliminated entirely. 

We are still in the process of determining exactly which BTA functions/personnel 

will be eliminated and which will be transferred. We expect to have more information on the details of the BTA disestablishment by January. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Mr. WITTMAN. Deputy Secretary Lynn, what quantitative and qualitative analysis, 

and what data, underlie the decision to eliminate JFCOM? Please provide the cost/ 

benefit assessments and projected savings with regard to keeping or eliminating 

JFCOM and its functions and responsibilities. 

Secretary LYNN. The decision to disestablish JFCOM was based on improving 

operational effectiveness: JFCOM today is a redundant layer in our processes for 

training joint forces and providing them to the other combatant commanders to use 

operationally. The Secretary considered a detailed breakdown of JFCOM’s UCP missions and how they are executed within DOD including interactions between 
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JFCOM and other commands. His examination of the range of functions carried out 

by JFCOM concluded that many are duplicative; some are obsolete or of questionable value; and others can be carried out just as effectively by other existing DOD 

organizations. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Deputy Secretary Lynn, who will insure the progress made to date 

will continue in Joint training, doctrine, capabilities, and operations, particularly 

with regard to assessing Joint lessons learned and adapting Joint doctrine, developing integrated joint capability solutions, and preparing the Joint force for future 

threats? Will these remain command responsibilities or become staff functions of the 

Chairman, the Services, the COCOM’s or some other entity? 

Secretary LYNN. Since Goldwater-Nichols passed in 1986, the Department of Defense, including Services and Combatant Commands, has diligently pursued 

jointness. The U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) was established to standardize 

training, develop doctrine, deliver Joint capabilities and improve jointness in operations and warfighting. JFCOM has been successful in helping define, establish and 

compel a Joint culture throughout the U.S. Military. 

The Secretary’s recommendation that the President approve the disestablishment 

of U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is based on a review of the missions assigned to JFCOM in the Unified Command Plan and the determination that these 

missions can be accomplished effectively and more efficiently, elsewhere within the 

Department. 

Fundamentally, the principal purpose for the creation of JFCOM in 1999—to force 

a reluctant service-centric military culture to embrace joint operations and doctrine—has largely been achieved. Jointness is a cultural and behavioral principle 

that is evolutionary and not easily measured; however, there is little debate that 

today the United States military has doctrinally, operationally and culturally embraced jointness as a matter of practice and necessity. The on-going assessment of 

JFCOM’s functions will identify those functions which need to endure, and will recommend the appropriate location of former JFCOM functions and responsibilities as 

well as the appropriate level of leadership to ensure our joint capabilities are sustained and improved upon to meet current and future threats. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Deputy Secretary Lynn, Allied Command Transformation (ACT) 

and NATO have built strong ties to JFCOM in areas of training, capability development, experimentation, and coalition forces integration. How will this progress be 

sustained and which U.S. commander and staff will assume counterpart responsibilities to ACT’s NATO Four-Star commander? 

Secretary LYNN. We will sustain interagency and coalition relationships. On September 7, NATO Secretary General stated that ACT will remain in Norfolk, VA 

even if JFCOM is disestablished. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Deputy Secretary Lynn, in the transfer of JFCOM functions to 

Washington or elsewhere, was the cost of labor, living, and operations factored into 

the analysis particularly in comparison to Hampton Roads? For those functions retained and either transferred or retained in place, what cost savings factored into 

the estimates of cost savings from JFCOM closure? 

Secretary LYNN. The Secretary did not recommend disestablishing JFCOM to save 

money. His decision was based on improving operational effectiveness. JFCOM 

today is a redundant layer in our processes for training joint forces and providing 

them to the other combatant commanders to use operationally. We are still working 

on a detailed implementation plan. Cost savings estimates will not be available 

until a more detailed implementation plan is completed. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Deputy Secretary Lynn, with the announced intent to reduce the 

growth of Pentagon overhead (support staffs, senior positions, staffing layers), how 

do you foresee organizing and supervising JFCOM functions that revert to the Joint 

Staff without significant increase in staff size and space requirements? What statutory authorities will you be requesting to increase the size of the Joint Staff? 

Secretary LYNN. A review of the functions performed by U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), in support of its Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigned missions, 

concluded that several functions are needlessly duplicative, while others are obsolete 

or of questionable value. It was also determined that the functions still required to 

meet UCP missions can be accomplished effectively and more efficiently elsewhere 

within the Department. 

These latter functions will be transferred either to the CJCS or to a Combatant 

Commander or Service Chief. To accomplish these transfers, there will be a determination of what resources will be required by the receiving organization to perform 

the functions into the future. A final decision on the location of these functions and 

associated manpower has not yet been made. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Deputy Secretary Lynn, are there statutes that prevent the CJCS 

from executing certain functions currently being done by JFCOM in support of the 
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COCOMs? Which commander will be assigned the missions specifically assigned to 

JFCOM in the Unified Command Plan IAW the provisions of Goldwater-Nichols? 

Secretary LYNN. Chapter 5 of title 10, United States Code, addresses the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and in particular addresses the functions of the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. A key limitation on assigning functions to the Chairman is 

that he may not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any 

of the armed forces (10 U.S.C. 152(c)). In addition, the Chairman may neither organize nor use the Joint Staff, which is under the authority, direction and control of 

the Chairman, as an overall Armed Forces General Staff nor may the Joint Staff 

exercise any executive authority (10 U.S.C. 155(e)). The Department of Defense is 

considering how best to address the missions currently assigned to United States 

Joint Forces Command by the President in the Unified Command Plan, if the President disestablishes that Command. 

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