UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4836

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee, 

 v. 

DARREN LEON PRINGLE, 

 Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge. 

(4:08-cr-00058-TLW-3) 

Submitted: August 20, 2009 Decided: September 1, 2009 

Before MICHAEL, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Ray Coit Yarborough, Jr., LAW OFFICE OF RAY COIT YARBOROUGH, 

JR., Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Rose Mary 

Sheppard Parham, Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, 

South Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Darren Leon Pringle pled guilty to conspiracy to 

distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). The district court sentenced Pringle to 

60 months’ imprisonment, the statutory mandatory minimum 

sentence under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) (2006). 

Pringle’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that in his view, there 

are no meritorious issues for appeal. Counsel, however, asks 

this Court to review the validity of Pringle’s guilty plea and 

the reasonableness of his sentence. Pringle has filed a pro se 

supplemental brief in which he argues that his guilty plea was 

the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, and a letter in 

which he states that he wishes to contest the quantity of drugs 

charged. The Government has not filed a brief. 

 Under Rule 11(b)(1), the district court must address 

the defendant in open court and inform him of the following: the 

nature of the charge; any mandatory minimum sentence and the 

maximum possible sentence; the applicability of the Sentencing 

Guidelines; the court’s obligation to impose a special 

assessment; the defendant’s right to an attorney; his right to 

plead not guilty and be tried by a jury with the assistance of 

counsel; his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses; his 

right against self-incrimination; and his right to testify, 

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present evidence, and compel the attendance of witnesses. The 

defendant also must be told that a guilty plea waives any 

further trial and that his answers at the proceeding may be used 

against him in a prosecution for perjury. Under Rule 11(b)(2), 

the court must address the defendant to determine that the plea 

is voluntary. The court must require disclosure of any plea 

agreement under Rule 11(c)(2) and determine a factual basis for 

the plea under Rule 11(b)(3). The record reflects that the plea 

colloquy was conducted in substantial compliance with Rule 11, 

and that Pringle’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. 

 Our review of the record also indicates that Pringle’s 

sentence, the statutory mandatory minimum, is reasonable. 

 A counseled guilty plea waives all antecedent 

nonjurisdictional defects not logically inconsistent with the 

establishment of guilt, unless the petitioner can show that his 

plea was not voluntary and intelligent because the advice of 

counsel “was not within the range of competence demanded of 

attorneys in criminal cases.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 

258, 266-67 (1973) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 

Pringle’s knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives his objection 

to the amount of drugs with which he was charged in the 

indictment. 

 Finally, this Court may address on direct appeal a 

claim that counsel was ineffective only if the ineffectiveness 

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appears conclusively on the face of the record. United 

States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006). There 

is no evidence on the face of the record that Pringle’s counsel 

was ineffective. 

 Accordingly, Pringle’s assertion that he did not 

receive effective assistance of counsel is not cognizable in 

this direct appeal; instead, it must be presented in a timely 

motion for post-conviction relief. 

 Pringle’s pro se challenge to the drug quantity with 

which he was charged is likewise without merit. 

 In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Pringle, in writing, of the right 

to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Pringle requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Pringle. 

 We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED