IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

JAMEY McKEE, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

B. SALAMAN, et al., 

 Defendants. 

 No. 4:22-CV-01240 

 (Chief Judge Brann) 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

DECEMBER 20, 2024 

 Plaintiff Jamey McKee is a serial pro se litigant who was previously 

incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution, Rockview (SCI Rockview), 

located in Bellefonte, Pennsylvania.1

 He filed the instant pro se Section 19832

action claiming constitutional violations by numerous SCI Rockview officials. 

Presently pending is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Because McKee has not responded to Defendants’ 

Rule 56 motion and thus has failed to carry his burden on his remaining Section 

1983 claims, the Court will grant Defendants’ unopposed motion for summary 

judgment. 

1

 McKee is currently incarcerated at SCI Somerset. See Doc. 70. 

2

 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional 

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves 

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ. 

v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002). 

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND3

McKee initiated this pro se Section 1983 action in August 2022.4

 In his 

lengthy second amended complaint—the operative pleading in this action—he 

primarily alleged a campaign of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment by 

SCI Rockview officials for filing a report under the Prison Rape Elimination Act 

(PREA) in May 2022, in which he alleged that his Unit Manager—defendant M. 

Knapp—had sexually assaulted him.5

 He also claimed that multiple prison 

officials had failed to protect him in violation of the Eighth Amendment, exposed 

him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement (also in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment), and infringed his Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural 

due process rights.6

 

In total, McKee asserted 18 counts and named nine different prison officials, 

including Superintendent Bobbi Jo Salamon, Deputy Superintendent Michael 

3

 Local Rule of Court 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment be supported “by a 

separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to 

which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” LOCAL RULE OF COURT

56.1. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of 

material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving party’s statement 

and identifying genuine issues to be tried. Id. Defendants properly filed their statement of 

material facts, (Doc. 100), but McKee failed to respond to that statement. Accordingly, the 

Court will deem admitted the facts in Defendants’ Rule 56.1 statement. See LOCAL RULE OF 

COURT 56.1. 

4

 See generally Doc. 49. 

5

 See Doc. 64 at 2. 

6

 Id. at 3. 

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Rowe, BMU Unit Manager Michael Knapp, Hearing Examiner Christian Collins, 

and Corrections Officers Willis Holden, John Hayles, Dylan Steberger, Richard 

Burns, and Nathan Anna.7

Defendants moved for partial dismissal of McKee’s second amended 

complaint.8

 Because that pleading was so dense, the Court first broke down 

McKee’s various Section 1983 claims by category, i.e., First Amendment 

retaliation (Counts 5-12), Eighth Amendment failure to protect (Counts 1-4), 

Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement (Counts 13-14), Fourteenth 

Amendment substantive due process (Counts 15-16), and Fourteenth Amendment 

procedural due process (Counts 17-18), and provided a brief synopsis of each of 

the 18 claims.9

 

After an exhaustive sufficiency analysis, the Court permitted several 

retaliation and failure-to-protect claims to proceed.10 Specifically, the following 

claims survived Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny: (1) retaliation against Holden for issuing 

misconduct #601647 (Count 5); (2) retaliation against Rowe by demoting McKee’s 

BMU phase one day after McKee filed the PREA report (Count 6); (3) retaliation 

against Knapp for relocating McKee to a “recovery/hard” cell with harsh 

7

 Id.

8

 Doc. 58. 

9

 See Doc. 64 at 5-6. 

10 See id. at 7-23; Doc. 65 ¶¶ 1-2. 

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conditions of confinement (Count 7); (4) retaliation against Hayles for permitting 

another inmate to assault McKee with urine and spit (Count 8); (5) retaliation 

against Anna for issuing an allegedly false misconduct #601665 (Count 9); (6) 

retaliation against Salamon for refusing to allow McKee to file additional prison 

grievances (Count 11); (7) failure to protect against Steberger and Hayles for 

permitting assault by another inmate on June 2, 2022 (Count 1); and (8) failure to 

protect against Salamon and Knapp for permitting assault by another inmate on 

August 1, 2022 (Counts 3 and 4).11 All other claims were dismissed, including 

McKee’s official capacity claims, and further leave to amend was denied.12 

 Defendants now move for summary judgment on McKee’s remaining 

Section 1983 claims.13 McKee has failed to respond to Defendants’ Rule 56 

motion in any way. McKee, who is a frequent litigant in this Court, is well aware 

of the Local Rules of Court and specifically the requirements of Local Rule 7.6, 

which generally requires a brief in opposition if a party opposes a motion.14 The 

deadline for a Rule 56 response has passed. McKee has neither filed a response 

nor sought an extension of time to do so. Defendants’ unopposed motion for 

summary judgment is therefore ripe for disposition. 

11 See Doc. 64 at 7-21. 

12 See id. at 7-24. 

13 Doc. 91. 

14 See, e.g., Doc. 2-3 (providing excerpts of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rules of 

Court, including Local Rules 7.6, 7.8, and 56.1). 

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

“One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate 

and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.”15 Summary judgment is 

appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”16 Material 

facts are those “that could alter the outcome” of the litigation, and “disputes are 

‘genuine’ if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the 

position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.”17 

At the Rule 56 stage, the Court’s function is not to “weigh the evidence and 

determine the truth of the matter” but rather “to determine whether there is a 

genuine issue for trial.”18 The Court must view the facts and evidence presented 

“in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and must “draw all 

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.”19 This evidence, however, must be 

adequate—as a matter of law—to sustain a judgment in favor of the nonmoving 

party on the claim or claims at issue.20 A “scintilla of evidence” supporting the 

nonmovant’s position is insufficient; “there must be evidence on which the jury 

15 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). 

16 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 

17 EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Clark v. Modern 

Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993)). 

18 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). 

19 Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014). 

20 Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250-57; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 

U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986). 

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could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].”21 Succinctly stated, summary 

judgment is “put up or shut up time” for the nonmoving party.22 

III. DISCUSSION 

 Defendants contend that McKee is unable to satisfy his Rule 56 burden 

because he cannot adduce any competent evidence to establish a genuine issue of 

material fact as to his Section 1983 claims. Defendants also assert that McKee 

failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court agrees with Defendants and 

finds that McKee has failed to carry his Rule 56 burden, so judgment must be 

entered in Defendants’ favor on the remaining constitutional claims. 

A. Failure to Oppose Rule 56 Motion

First, McKee has failed to carry his burden at summary judgment because he 

has not opposed Defendants’ Rule 56 motion in any way. McKee has not 

identified any record evidence that would rebut Defendants’ contention (and 

supporting evidence) that they took no action that would violate McKee’s 

constitutional rights. McKee has not, for example, pointed to a declaration or 

affidavit, witness statements, documentary support, or any other evidence that 

could sustain a verdict in his favor. In fact, McKee has not even responded to 

21 Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 

U.S. at 252) (alteration in original). 

22 Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Berkeley Inv. Grp. 

v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006)). 

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Defendants’ Rule 56 motion, meaning that—pursuant to Local Rule 7.6—the 

motion is deemed unopposed.23 

At summary judgment, “the non-moving party must oppose the motion and, 

in doing so, may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings but, 

instead, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 

Bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or suspicions will not suffice.”24 

Moreover, “[t]he court need consider only the cited materials” when ruling on a 

motion for summary judgment.25 No materials have been provided or cited by 

McKee in opposition to Defendants’ Rule 56 motion. Thus, because McKee has 

failed to establish that there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial, the Court 

must grant Defendants’ unopposed motion for summary judgment. 

B. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies 

A second reason summary judgment must be granted in Defendants’ favor is 

that McKee failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to his remaining claims. 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA)26 requires prisoners to exhaust 

available administrative remedies before suing prison officials for alleged 

23 See LOCAL RULE OF COURT 7.6 (stating that failure to file a brief in opposition to a motion, 

including one for summary judgment, results in said motion being deemed “unopposed”). 

24 Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2018) (emphasis added) 

(alteration omitted) (quoting D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268-69 (3d Cir. 

2014)). 

25 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3). 

26 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et seq. 

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constitutional violations.27 Proper exhaustion is mandatory, even if the inmate is 

seeking relief—like monetary damages—that cannot be granted by the 

administrative system.28 The exhaustion process a prisoner must follow is 

governed by the contours of the prison grievance system in effect where the inmate 

is incarcerated.29 

Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections (DOC) employs a three-step 

grievance process that must be completed to properly exhaust administrative 

remedies in most cases.30 If informal resolution attempts do not solve the problem, 

the first step is to file a written grievance (using form DC-804, Part 1) with the 

Facility Grievance Coordinator within 15 working days after “the event upon 

which the claim is based.”31 An adverse decision by the grievance coordinator 

must be appealed to the Facility Manager within 15 working days of the initialreview response or rejection.32 Finally, an adverse decision by the Facility 

Manager must be appealed to “Final Review” with the Secretary’s Office of 

27 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639, 642 (2016) (explaining that only 

“available” remedies must be exhausted). 

28 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006). 

29 Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007); see also Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91. 

30 See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 292 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002); COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEP’T 

OF CORR., INMATE GRIEVANCE SYS., Policy No. DC-ADM 804 (May 1, 2015) (hereinafter 

“DC-ADM 804”). 

31 DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(3)-(5), (8). 

32 Id. § 2(A)(1). 

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Inmate Grievances and Appeals (SOIGA), and again must be submitted within 15 

working days of the date of the Facility Manager’s decision.33

The DOC has specific requirements for grievances submitted by inmates. 

Those requirements include, among other conditions, that the grievance “be legible 

[and] understandable”; “include a statement of the facts relevant to the claim” as 

well as “the date, approximate time, and location of the event(s) that gave rise to 

the grievance”; that the prisoner “identify individuals directly involved in the 

event(s)”; and that the grievance include “the specific relief sought,” including 

“compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court.”34

The undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that McKee failed to exhaust 

administrative remedies. McKee filed approximately 25 grievances during May 

2022, many of which complained about “retaliation.”35 Those grievances were 

either withdrawn, procedurally rejected, or denied on the merits.36 None of them, 

however, were appealed to first-level review with the Facility Manager or to final 

review with the SOIGA.37 McKee has not proffered any evidence that he 

exhausted his remaining Section 1983 claims in this case or that administrative 

remedies were made unavailable. McKee’s claims are thus procedurally defaulted 

33 Id. § 2(B)(1). 

34 Id. § 1(A)(11). 

35 See Doc. 100-28. 

36 See id.

37 See id.

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and, without any excuse for this default, judgment must be granted in Defendants’ 

favor for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

C. Merits of Claims 

A final reason that summary judgment must be granted in Defendants’ favor 

is that, upon consideration of the Rule 56 record, there is no evidence that would 

sustain a verdict in McKee’s favor on his remaining Section 1983 claims. 

1. First Amendment Retaliation 

Although a prisoner’s constitutional rights are necessarily circumscribed, an 

inmate still retains First Amendment protections when they are “not inconsistent” 

with prisoner status or with the “legitimate penological objectives of the 

corrections system.”38 To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff 

must show that (1) “he was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct,” (2) he 

suffered an “adverse action” by prison officials sufficient to deter a person of 

ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights, and (3) the 

plaintiff’s protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the prison 

officials’ decision to take the adverse action.39

38 Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 

775, 781 (3d Cir. 2010)). 

39 Id. (quoting Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001)); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 

523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333). 

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 There are a variety of ways to establish causation for a First Amendment 

retaliation claim. One method is to show “unusually suggestive” timing between 

the protected conduct and the adverse action.40 When a plaintiff relies solely on 

circumstantial evidence of temporal proximity, the time between the protected 

conduct and the adverse action is often measured in days rather than weeks or 

months.41 However, there is no “bright line rule limiting the length of time that 

may pass between a plaintiff’s protected speech and an actionable retaliatory act by 

a defendant.”42 Another approach is to demonstrate “a pattern of antagonism 

coupled with timing.”43 Finally, causation can be inferred “from the evidence 

gleaned from the record as a whole.”44 Logically, a plaintiff asserting retaliation 

“will have to show . . . that the decision maker had knowledge of the protected 

activity[.]”45

If a prisoner-plaintiff can establish a prima facie retaliation case, the burden 

shifts to the defendant or defendants to show that “they would have made the same 

40 See Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007). 

41 See Conard v. Pa. State Police, 902 F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 2018). 

42 Id. 43 DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d at 267. 

44 Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 424 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 

206 F.3d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 2000)). 

45 Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 351 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 

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decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate 

penological interest.”46 This is often referred to as the “same decision defense.”47

McKee’s retaliation claims fall short for two reasons. First, he has failed to 

proffer evidence to support his prima facie retaliation cases. Although his 

allegations were sufficient to rebut Defendants’ motion to dismiss, they are 

insufficient at the Rule 56 stage. As noted above, at summary judgment, “the nonmoving party must oppose the motion and, in doing so, may not rest upon the mere 

allegations or denials of his pleadings but, instead, must set forth specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Bare assertions, conclusory 

allegations, or suspicions will not suffice.”48

Second, Defendants have put forth undisputed evidence that most of the 

alleged retaliatory actions were taken for legitimate penological reasons, thus 

satisfying the “same decision” defense. For example, as to McKee’s claim that 

Rowe retaliatorily demoted his BMU phase (Count 6), the record shows that 

McKee’s BMU phase was reduced from phase 3 to phase 4 due to McKee’s refusal 

to participate in BMU programming and his negative, argumentative behavior.49 

In Count 5, McKee alleged that Holden retaliatorily issued him a false misconduct, 

46 Watson, 834 F.3d at 422 (quoting Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334). 

47 Id.

48 Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 288-89; El v. SEPTA, 479 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The nonmoving party cannot rest on mere pleadings or allegations; rather it must point to actual 

evidence in the record on which a jury could decide an issue of fact its way.”). 

49 Doc. 100 ¶¶ 3-7. 

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yet that misconduct was issued because McKee possessed contraband (the RHU 

Law Library’s copy of the PREA Policy) in his cell.50 In Count 7, McKee alleged 

that he was retaliatorily transferred to a “hard” cell, but the record reflects that (a) 

the cell change was the result of a plumbing issue and undertaken at McKee’s 

request, and (b) the cell to which McKee was transferred was not a “hard” cell but 

rather a normal BMU cell.51 Count 9 alleged that Anna retaliatorily issued a false 

misconduct for refusing to obey an order, but the Hearing Examiner reviewed 

video footage of the incident and found the misconduct charge substantiated.52 

Finally, in Count 11, McKee asserted that Salamon retaliatorily limited his ability 

to file grievances, but the record establishes that McKee was put on grievance 

restriction for filing numerous frivolous grievances in short succession.53 54

2. Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect 

“Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that 

criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”55 Prison officials, 

50 Id. ¶¶ 42-44. 

51 Id. ¶¶ 21-36. 

52 Id. ¶¶ 84-86. 

53 Id. ¶¶ 88-103. 

54 Count 8—another retaliation claim that survived Defendants’ motion to dismiss—alleged that 

Steberger and Hayles staged an inmate-on-inmate assault on McKee on June 2, 2022. 

However, because there is no merit to this claim, see infra Section III(C)(2), McKee has failed 

to establish an adverse action and thus no “same decision” defense is relevant or necessary. 

55 Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

834 (1994)), abrogated on other grounds as noted by Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311, 319 n.7 (3d 

Cir. 2020). 

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therefore, have “a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other 

prisoners.”56 However, not “every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of 

another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for 

the victim’s safety.”57

To establish an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against a prison 

official, the inmate must prove that “(1) he was incarcerated under conditions 

posing a substantial risk of serious harm, (2) the official was deliberately 

indifferent to that substantial risk to [the prisoner’s] health and safety, and (3) the 

official’s deliberate indifference caused [the prisoner] harm.”58 In this context, 

deliberate indifference is a subjective standard; that is, “the prison officialdefendant must actually have known or been aware of the excessive risk to inmate 

safety.”59 Actual knowledge or awareness of a substantial risk to an inmate’s 

safety can be proven “in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial 

evidence.”60

 McKee’s second amended complaint asserts two incidents of failure to 

protect: first, McKee contends that on June 2, 2022, Steberger and Hayles failed to 

protect him from an assault by another inmate who purportedly threw urine on 

56 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833). 

57 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 

58 Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 367. 

59 Id. (quoting Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001)). 

60 Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). 

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McKee and spit on him; second, McKee avers that on August 1, 2022, Salamon 

and Knapp ignored his warnings about threats made by another inmate, which later 

resulted in that inmate spitting on McKee. With respect to the first incident, the 

Rule 56 record reflects an absence of evidence that McKee was contacted with 

urine or spit from another inmate.61 The record additionally lacks any evidence 

that Steberger or Hayles knew about or staged the alleged inmate-on-inmate 

attack.62 McKee’s failure-to-protect claim in Count 1, therefore, fails to establish 

deliberate indifference, harm, or causation. 

 As to the August 1, 2022 incident, the Rule 56 record is devoid of evidence 

that McKee was spit on by another inmate.63 Rather, the undisputed evidence 

shows that McKee fabricated this assault, as the two inmates were separated by a 

plexiglass barrier and therefore the other BMU prisoner could not have physically 

spit on McKee.64 McKee’s failure-to-protect claims in Counts 3 and 4, therefore, 

fail to establish harm or causation.

In summary, even if the Court were to reach the merits of McKee’s 

remaining Section 1983 claims (despite his failure to oppose the instant Rule 56 

motion and his failure to exhaust administrative remedies), Defendants’ motion for 

61 See Doc. 100 ¶¶ 45-83. 

62 See id.

63 See id. ¶¶ 108-13. 

64 Id. ¶ 112. 

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summary judgment would be granted. That is because there is no record evidence 

of unconstitutional conduct by Defendants. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant Defendants’ unopposed motion 

for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. An 

appropriate Order follows. 

BY THE COURT: 

s/ Matthew W. Brann 

 Matthew W. Brann 

 Chief United States District Judge 

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