IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

FARRAH KELLY, 

Plaintiff 

v. 

JOSHUA BELL, JUSTIN SNYDER, 

and CITY OF WILLIAMSPORT, 

Defendants 

and 

CHRISTOPHER SALISBURY and 

CITY OF WILLIAMSPORT, 

Consolidated Defendants 

No. 4:22cv1940 

(Judge Munley) 

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............................................ ...................... ........................................ .. MEMORANDUM 

Before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Christopher 

Salisbury and City of Williamsport in this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 ("Section 1983"). 

Background 

On April 5, 2022, the Williamsport Bureau of Police obtained a warrant to 

search Plaintiff Farrah Kelly's vehicle. 1 (Doc. 35, Campi. ,r 8). Defendant 

Salisbury signed the warrant application as the affiant. (kl Ex. A, ECF p. 13). 

1 These brief background facts are derived from plaintiff's amended complaint and the exhibits 

attached thereto. At this stage of the proceedings, the court must accept all factual allegations 

in the amended complaint as true. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 

2008). The court makes no determination, however, as to the ultimate veracity of these 

assertions. 

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Per the application, the Williamsport police were investigating an incident 

involving two other individuals, identified as Beyah and Durrant, which occurred 

on April 3, 2022. 2 (kl) Salisbury indicated that Beyah operated Kelly's vehicle in 

relation to the incident. (kl) The police department sought evidence "consistent 

with evidence on scene," specifically 9mm firearms, ammunition, and certain 

clothing worn by the other individuals. (kl) After Judge Butts from the Lycoming 

County Court of Common Pleas authorized the search warrant, the Williamsport 

police department seized Kelly's vehicle. (kl 1l 8 & Ex. A). 

The next day, April 6, 2022, Kelly contacted the police department. (~ 1l 

14 ). She spoke to Defendant Joshua Bell. (kl) Kelly met with an unknown 

officer at the police station that same day. (kl ,I 15). Kelly provided the officer 

with keys to the vehicle. (~) The police then searched Kelly's car pursuant to 

the warrant on April 7, 2022 at 8:00 AM. (kl ,I 35). No items were found , and no 

property was seized as the result of the search. (~ ,I 36). 

Kelly then encountered difficulties recovering her vehicle. She called the 

police department frequently, leaving messages for Defendant Salisbury, 

Defendant Bell, and Defendant Justin Snyder, Williamsport's police chief. (kl 1l 

16). She also contacted the mayor's office. (kl) 

2 The search warrant application references an affidavit of probable cause. (Doc. 35, Ex. A). 

The affidavit of probable cause is not attached to the search warrant application as filed with 

the complaint. 

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After the Kelly spoke to an individual at the mayor's office, Defendant Bell 

contacted the plaintiff. (.!.9.: ,r 18). Defendant Bell, however, refused to provide 

information to Kelly about her vehicle and stated that he was getting additional 

search warrants. (.!.9.: ,r 19). Although Defendant Bell made that statement to the 

plaintiff, Defendant Salisbury, the investigating officer, did not apply for any 

further warrants. (.!.9.: ,r 21 ). 

Kelly continued to leave messages for Defendant Bell and Defendant 

Snyder regarding the return of her vehicle. (.!.9.: ,r 22). She called the mayor's 

office a second time. (.!.9.: ,r 23). She called the Lycoming County District 

Attorney's office. (.!.9.: ,r 24 ). When her repeated calls went unanswered, she 

sought the assistance of counsel. (.!.9.: ,r 25). 

On May 9, 2022, counsel sent correspondence to Chief Snyder at the 

police administration office by hand delivery. (.!.9.: ,r 26). Counsel advised that, if 

the police did not return Kelly's vehicle by May 11 , 2022, a motion would be filed 

in state court for its return. (kt, Ex. B, ECF p. 15). No one from police 

administration contacted Kelly or Kelly's counsel. (.!.9.: ,r 27). Kelly's counsel filed 

the motion, and the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas scheduled a 

hearing for June 6, 2022. (.!.9.: ,r,r 28-30; see also Ex. C, ECF pp. 17-20). But, 

four days before the hearing, on June 2, 2022, Kelly's vehicle was returned 

without explanation. (.!.9.: ,r 31 ). To date, Kelly has not been compensated for the 

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time her vehicle stayed in police control after the expiration of the search warrant. 

(~ ,r 41 ). The state trial court denied Kelly's attempt to recoup attorneys' fees 

and costs through the motion for return of property. (~, Ex. C). 

Kelly initially filed a Section 1983 action against Defendants Bell, Snyder, 

and the City of Williamsport in December 2022. The Honorable Chief Judge 

Matthew W. Brann denied a previous motion to dismiss filed by those 

defendants. Kelly v. Bell, No. 4:22-CV-01940, 2023 WL 3161643 (M. D. Pa. Apr. 

28, 2023). During discovery, Kelly learned that the police department has 

adopted, in practice, "a policy of complete deference to the officer who has 

seized a car pursuant to a warrant and permits the officer in his sole discretion to 

make all decisions related to retention and return of the car to its owner." (~ ,I 

33). Defendant Salisbury oversaw the investigation. (~ ,r,r 8, 20, 34 & Ex. A). 

Per Kelly, Defendant Salisbury "independently decided, in accordance with the 

established practice of the Defendant City of Williamsport, that he would continue 

to deprive [her] of the possession of her car, simply because in his sole judgment 

he was not done with the car." (~ ,I 38). 

Kelly filed a second action against Defendant Salisbury and the City of 

Williamsport in April 2024. Her complaint asserts three claims against these 

defendants as follows: Count I, a Section 1983 claim against Defendant 

Salisbury for violation of her Fifth Amendment rights; Count II, a municipal liability 

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claim against the City of Williamsport premised upon its lack of policies and/or 

training resulting in the practice of allowing investigating officers sole discretion to 

keep possession of a vehicle after a search warrant has been executed and has 

expired; and Count 111 , a Section 1983 claim against the City of Williamsport 

seeking just compensation for the temporary taking of her property as provided 

by the Fifth Amendment. 

On June 11 , 2024, Defendant Salisbury and Defendant City of Williamsport 

filed the instant motion to dismiss.

3 (Doc. 28). Having been fully briefed, this 

matter is ripe for disposition. 

Jurisdiction 

Based on the alleged violations of Section 1983, this court has jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . ('The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 

of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States."). 

Legal Standard 

Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b )(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

3 By order dated June 13, 2024, the court granted defendants' unopposed motion to 

consolidate the two related lawsuits. (Doc. 27). 

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granted. The court tests the sufficiency of the complaint's allegations when 

considering a Rule 12(b )(6) motion. 

To survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must provide "a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Doe v. 

Princeton Univ. , 30 F.4th 335, 341--42 (3d Cir. 2022)(quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 

8(a)(2)). That means, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. 

~ . 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when factual content is pied that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 

the misconduct alleged. ~ (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). ''Threadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action , supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice."~ (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts accept all 

factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the 

complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 

( citations omitted). 

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Analysis 

Defendants move to dismiss each cause of action. Defendant Salisbury 

argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the Section 1983 claim raised 

against him. The City of Williamsport asserts that the complaint fails to state 

sufficient facts to proceed with a municipal liability claim. The city also argues 

that plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim for violation of her Fifth 

Amendment rights from the two-month period she was deprived of her vehicle. 

The court will address these issues in turn . 

1. Qualified Immunity 

Defendant Salisbury asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity in this 

action. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials 

performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages "insofar as their 

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 

which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 

800, 818 (1982). The doctrine "protects 'all but the plainly incompetent or those 

who knowingly violate the law. '" Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quoting 

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). 

The two-part test to determine whether government officials should receive 

qualified immunity is well settled. Montemuro v. Jim Thorpe Area Sch. Dist., 99 

F.4th 639, 642 (3d Cir. 2024) (citing Anglemeyer v. Ammons, 92 F.4th 184, 188 

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(3d Cir. 2024 )). Under the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, a court 

must decide whether the facts that plaintiff has alleged make out a violation of a 

constitutional right. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)(citation 

omitted). Under the second prong, "the court must decide whether the right at 

issue was 'clearly established' at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct." kl 

(citation omitted). To be clearly established, "[t]he contours of the right must be 

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 

violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). In 

considering qualified immunity, the court may address the prongs of this test in 

any order. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242. The defendant bears the burden of 

establishing that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Burns v. PA Dep't of Corr., 

642 F .3d 163, 176 (3d Cir. 2011 )( citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819). 

Judge Brann previously addressed this issue when Defendants Bell and 

Snyder asserted qualified immunity in the prior motion to dismiss. Kelly, 2023 

WL 3161643, at *4, n. 54. Per the earlier decision arising from the same set of 

operative alleged facts, Judge Brann concluded that the officers' alleged actions 

"violated Kelly's rights secured by the Fifth Amendment and that the unlawfulness 

of their conduct was clearly established at the time it occurred." kl (citing Frein v. 

Pennsylvania State Police, 47 F.4th 247, 251 - 53 (3d Cir. 2022)). He rejected the 

argument that Bell and Snyder are entitled to qualified immunity. kl 

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At this juncture, the court will not address Defendant Salisbury's qualified 

immunity. The officers subject to Judge Brann's earlier ruling, Defendants Bell 

and Snyder, are alleged to be a police captain and the chief of police, 

respectively. Defendant Salisbury, the investigating officer and search warrant 

affiant, was presumably under the command of Bell and Snyder. Defendants 

Bell and Salisbury were already deposed following disposition of the earlier 

motion to dismiss, and their counsel lodged no objection to the deposition of 

Defendant Snyder during a discovery dispute contemporaneous to the filing of 

the new action. (Doc. 22, Defs. Mot. for Prot. Order ,m 3, 6-7). Defendants also 

indicate that discovery is complete and that they intend to file a motion for 

summary judgment once their motion to dismiss is resolved and the pleadings 

are closed. (Docs. 31 , 33). 

Under the law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to 

dismissal before the commencement of discovery unless the plaintiff's allegations 

state a claim for violation of clearly established law. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 

511 , 526 (1985)(citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817). Put more simply, "liberal 

discovery rules are at odds with the doctrine of qualified immunity[.]" Graber v. 

Dales, 511 F. Supp. 3d 594, 599 (E.D. Pa. 2021 ). "And qualified immunity may 

be implicitly denied when a government official otherwise entitled to immunity is 

nonetheless subjected to 'the burdens of such pretrial matters as discovery.'" 

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Oliver v. Roquet, 858 F.3d 180, 188 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 

516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996)). 

Here, under some peculiar procedural circumstances, Defendant Salisbury 

has already been subjected to pretrial discovery burdens. On a motion to 

dismiss, the evidence obtained from that discovery is not in full view. For 

example, the complaint contains Defendant Salisbury's search warrant 

application, but it does not contain his affidavit of probable cause to support that 

application. (See Doc. 35, Ex. A). The limited details in that warrant application 

suggest that Kelly's vehicle was involved in some type of incident in Williamsport 

where 9mm firearms were discharged. (l9..:) Details into the investigation of that 

incident are crucial in evaluating the prongs of the qualified immunity test. See 

United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 376 (3d Cir. 1999)(citations 

omitted)("lt is well settled that the government is permitted to seize evidence for 

use in investigation and trial, but that such property must be returned once 

criminal proceedings have concluded, unless it is contraband or subject to 

forfeiture."). The court will thus preserve the issue and defer ruling on Defendant 

Salisbury's qualified immunity arguments until the time of summary judgment. 

2. Kelly's Claims Against the City of Williamsport 

Kelly asserts two claims against the City of Williamsport. Count II 

advances a Section 1983 claim premised upon Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of 

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City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) for the city's alleged violation of her 

Fifth Amendment rights. While Count Ill also asserts a violation of Section 1983, 

Kelly alleges that the city directly violated the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause 

by temporarily taking her vehicle for public use without paying her for it. 

a. Kelly's Monell Claim 

Count 11 of Kelly's complaint asserts a Monell claim against the City of 

Williamsport. A local government may not be sued under Section 1983 for an 

injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. 

Rather, liability extends when injuries are inflicted by "execution of a 

government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those 

whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy[.]" lit 

The city asserts that Kelly failed to plead sufficient facts to state a Monell 

claim, that is, she failed to identify a municipal policy or custom that was the 

basis of her alleged constitutional deprivation. Kelly counters that she has 

asserted a viable claim premised on a lack of written policies relative to vehicle 

returns after the expiration of a search warrant. (See Doc. 30, Pl. Br. in Opp. at 

12). In that void, per Kelly, the City of Williamsport has adopted a custom or 

practice of deferring to the investigating officer as to the length of time to keep 

the vehicle, even after the search warrant has been executed, regardless of 

whether items have been found. (See Doc. 35, Campi. ,m 47-52). Moreover, 

1 1 

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according to the plaintiff, the City of Williamsport did not train its officers 

regarding any obligation to return a vehicle after a search warrant was executed, 

which caused Kelly's Fifth Amendment rights to be violated. (kt ,r,r 52-53). 

Kelly has thus pied a policy or custom of deference to investigating officers 

and a failure to train officers about citizens' personal property rights in the vehicle 

search and seizure context, which led to a violation of her rights by Defendant 

Salisbury. "Failure to adopt a policy" Monell claims require a showing that the 

injuries were caused by inaction that manifests a deliberate indifference like the 

showing required in the failure-to-train context. See Semerod v. Siko, No. 4:24-

CV-1165, 2024 WL 4374973, at *3 & n. 37 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2024)(Brann, 

J.)(citing Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105-06 (3d Cir. 2019)(additional citations 

omitted). 

"In limited circumstances, a local government's decision not to train certain 

employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens' rights may rise to the 

level of an official government policy for purposes of§ 1983." Connick v. 

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 , 61 (2011 ). To satisfy Section 1983, a municipality's 

failure to train its police officers must amount "to deliberate indifference to the 

rights of persons with whom the police come into contact." City of Canton, Ohio 

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)(footnote omitted). 

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"A plaintiff sufficiently pleads deliberate indifference by showing that '(1) 

municipal policy makers know that employees will confront a particular situation, 

(2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling, 

and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of 

constitutional rights. '" Est. of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d 

Cir. 2019)(brackets omitted)(quoting Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 180 

(3d Cir. 2011 ); Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999)). 

"Establishing municipal liability on a failure to train claim under § 1983 is 

difficult." Reitz v. Cnty. of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1997). A pattern of 

similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to 

demonstrate deliberate indifference. Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (citing Board of 

Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997)). However, " 'in a 

narrow range of circumstances,' a pattern of similar violations might not be 

necessary to show deliberate indifference." kt (quoting Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 

409). "[A] single violation of federal rights, accompanied by a showing that a 

municipality has failed to train its employees to handle recurring situations 

presenting an obvious potential for such a violation, could trigger municipal 

liability." Bryan Cnty. , 520 U.S. at 409 (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 & n. 

10). 

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Kelly does not allege that this is a single incident situation. Rather, she has 

alleged that the City of Williamsport received complaints related to the failure of 

its police department to return vehicles after the expiration of search warrants. 

(No. 4:24cv608, Doc. 1, Compl. ,-m 47). Accordingly, for the purposes of a 

motion to dismiss, plaintiff has made a sufficient allegation regarding a pattern of 

alleged constitutional violations.

4 Defendants' motion to dismiss Count II will thus 

be denied. 

b. Kelly's Takings Clause Claim 

Count Ill of Kelly's complaint asserts a separate cause of action premised 

upon the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. That provision "states that 

'private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.' " 

Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pa., 588 U.S. 180, 184 (2019). 

The parties dispute the legal framework as to how such claims proceed 

against a municipality. Defendants assert that "in order to establish liability under 

the Fifth Amendment against the [c]ity, [p]laintiff would have to establish or set 

forth [what] was required in Monell[.]" (Doc. 29, Defs. Br. in Supp. at 7). Kelly 

counters that liability against the city under the Takings Clause exists 

independently: "Count Ill is not a Monell claim, it is a claim against a local 

4 Kelly has offered no other facts about these complaints other than those related to her own 

case. At summary judgment, Kelly's allegations must be supported by the evidence. 

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government seeking compensation for a 'taking' without just compensation." 

(Doc. 30, Pl. Br. in Opp. at 10). 

In Knick, the United States Supreme Court concluded that "a government 

violates the Takings Clause when it takes property without compensation, and 

that a property owner may bring a Fifth Amendment claim under§ 1983 at that 

time." 588 U.S. at 202. In the same paragraph, the majority stated, "Takings 

claims against local governments should be handled the same as other claims 

under the Bill of Rights." ~ These references indicate that Kelly's path forward 

against the City of Williamsport goes through Section 1983 and Monell. 

But the Knick Court also discussed the "self-executing" character of the 

Takings Clause "with respect to compensation," that is, "a property owner has a 

constitutional claim for just compensation at the time of the taking." 588 U.S. at 

192 (citing First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles 

Cnty., Cal. , 482 U.S. 304, 316 (1987)("First English")). Moreover, as stated in 

First English, claims for just compensation are grounded in the Constitution itself. 

482 U.S. at 315 (discussing Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933)). 

Some district courts have read Knick, First English, and Jacobs to mean that a 

Takings Clause claim is not dependent on the Section 1983 cause of action and 

that a plaintiff need not establish the requirements for municipal liability under 

Monell. See Baker v. City of McKinney, Tex, 601 F. Supp. 3d 124, 146 (E. D. Tex. 

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2022), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 84 F.4th 378 (5th Cir. 2023), ~ 

for cert. denied, No. 23-1363, 2024 WL 4874818 (U .S. Nov. 25, 2024). 

Similarly, the petitioners in DeVillier v. Texas asserted that "the justcompensation requirement of the Takings Clause is self-executing and that 

statutory recognition is not necessary for takings claims because they are 

grounded in the Constitution itself." 601 U.S. 285, 291 (2024)(citing First English, 

482 U.S. at 315)(brackets omitted). After the Fifth Circuit disagreed with that 

theory, the Supreme Court granted certiorari "to decide whether a property owner 

may sue for just compensation directly under the Takings Clause." kt at 290. 

The Supreme Court, however, did not answer that question. See Vargo v. 

Casey, No. 20-CV-1109-JDP, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2024 WL 4794692, at *8-*9 

(W.D. Wis. Nov. 14, 2024)(Peterson, J.)(discussing DeVillier, 601 U.S. at 288-

90, 292). Rather, Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, focused on 

whether the petitioners had an already-existing cause of action under state law to 

proceed with their Takings Clause claim. DeVillier, 601 U.S. at 292-93. They 

did. ~ at 293. The state defendant, Texas, also agreed at oral argument that it 

would not oppose the petitioners' request to amend their complaint to assert that 

state law cause of action. kt So, the decision of the Fifth Circuit was vacated, 

and the case was remanded for that state law claim to be asserted. Id. 

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DeVillier, like the Supreme Court's other precedents, "[did] not cleanly 

answer the question [of] whether a plaintiff has a cause of action arising directly 

under the Takings Clause." 19..: at 292-93. But it did make clear that 

"constitutional rights are generally invoked defensively in cases arising under 

other sources of law, or asserted offensively pursuant to an independent cause 

of action designed for that purpose." 19..: at 291 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

Kelly already has an independent cause of action designed to remedy the 

City of Williamsport's alleged violations of her Takings Clause rights, Section 

1983. Indeed, her Takings Clause claim in Count Ill explicitly relies upon Section 

1983 in the heading of that cause of action. 

As for whether a Takings Clause claim under Section 1983 needs to 

comport with Monell and its progeny, the contours of a Section 1983 claim 

against a municipality are well-settled. Absent further guidance from the Third 

Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court, Kelly must set 

forth a plausible municipal liability claim to proceed pursuant to that statute for 

alleged Takings Clause violations. See Knick, 588 U.S. at 202 ("Takings claims 

against local governments should be handled the same as other claims under the 

Bill of Rights."). The court concludes above that she has in Count II. 

Nonetheless, Count Ill is redundant to Count II and will be dismissed as such. 

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Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, defendants' motion to dismiss will be 

granted in part and denied in part. Defendants' motion is granted as to Count Ill. 

Otherwise, the motion is denied with the issue of Defendant Salisbury's qualified 

immunity preserved for summary judgment. 

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