alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Darcie Langer EDSON, as mother, next friend, and natural guardian of Jay C. Langer, Damon L. Langer, and Jesse J. Langer, all minors, and James M. Brickley, as Administrator of the Estate of Raymond Langer, deceased, Appellants, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee.

No. 68-530.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District.

Nov. 12, 1969.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 17, 1969.

Kiernan & Reams, St. Petersburg, for appellants.

*397Fowler, White, Collins, Gillen, Humkey & Trenam, St. Petersburg, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Bass v. Allstate Insurance Company, 291 F.Supp. 604 (U.S.Dist.Ct., N.D.Fla.1968); Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Whittington, 98 So.2d 382 (2nd D.C.A.Fla.1957), and Mutual Life Insurance Co. of N. Y. v. Denton, 93 Fla. 276, 112 So. S3 (1927).

HOBSON, C. J., and LILES, J., concur.

McNULTY, J., dissents.
<PAGE>

                                                                 Exhibit 10.79.2
                                                                 ---------------

DATE:   March 15, 2001

TO:     Paul Rosinack

FR:     Kenneth M. Cohen

RE:     Increased Retention Plan Cash Bonus Opportunity

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

As you know, under the Company's retention plan you have been entitled to
receive a cash retention bonus if the Company or its animal health business is
sold and you remain employed by the company at the time of the sale.

At its February 14, 2001 meeting, the Board of Directors decided to increase
your potential cash bonus benefit from the retention plan by doubling the amount
you would receive, including a doubling of the minimum payment from 50% to 100%.
This recognizes your contributions to date, the value you are expected to create
for the shareholders in continuing to work toward a sale, and the diminution in
the expected value of the stock option component of the retention plan.

Whether or not you have a written employment agreement, please note that (except
to the extent expressly provided in a written employment agreement) the Company
and you each retain the right to unilaterally terminate the employment
relationship at any time, for any reason or for no reason; neither the original
retention plan nor this augmentation of it changes that.
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 10.64
                                                                   -------------

                                   Amendment 1


RF Monolithics, Inc. ("Company") and Tai-Saw Technology Co., Ltd. ("Contractor")
agree that the Agreement between Company and Contractor entitled Manufacturing
Agreement and dated October 12, 2001 (the Agreement) is hereby amended effective
October 13, 2001 as follows:

Schedule A, A1; Wafer Foundry Products is deleted and replaced with the attached
Schedule A (Amended), A1: Wafer Foundry Products.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Amendment to be executed by
their duly authorized representative this 13th day of October, 2001.



RF MONOLITHICS, INC.                            TAI-SAW TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.

 /s/ David T. Somerville                         /s/ Chih-Hsyong Wu
------------------------------------            --------------------------------
             (Authorized Signature)                       (Authorized Signature)

Name  David T. Somerville                       Name Chih-Hsyong Wu
      ------------------------------                 ---------------------------
             (Type or Print)                              (Type or Print)

Title VP-QA & Corporate Development             Title General Manager
      ------------------------------                  --------------------------
             (Type or Print)                              (Type or Print)


                (Remainder of this page deliberately left blank)









                      Amendment 1 (Dated October 13, 2001)
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2064 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

122 South Bill Street in Francesville, Indiana, as the Malcolm Melville 

‘‘Mac’’ Lawrence Post Office. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

NOVEMBER 18, 2005 

Mr. LUGAR (for himself and Mr. BAYH) introduced the following bill; which 

was read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 122 South Bill Street in Francesville, Indiana, 

as the Malcolm Melville ‘‘Mac’’ Lawrence Post Office. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. MALCOLM MELVILLE ‘‘MAC’’ LAWRENCE POST 

4 OFFICE. 

5 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

6 Postal Service located at 122 South Bill Street in 

7 Francesville, Indiana, shall be known and designated as 

8 the ‘‘Malcolm Melville ‘Mac’ Lawrence Post Office’’. 
2 

•S 2064 IS

1 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg2 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

3 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

4 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Malcolm Melville 

5 ‘Mac’ Lawrence Post Office’’. 

Æ
Dolan Chemical Laboratory

4001 Bixby Road

Groveport, OH 43125

T: 614-836-4221, Audinet 210-4221

F: 614-836-4168, Audinet 210-4168

http://aepenv/labs

Water Analysis

Location: Mountaineer Plant Report Date: 5/14/2012

Form REP-703

Rev. 0, 4/2012

Sample Number: 122116-001 Date Collected: 05/09/2012 08:40 Date Received: 5/9/2012

 Trip Blank

Parameter Result Units RL MDL Analysis By Analysis Date/Time Method

Data 

Qual

Mercury, Hg < 0.2 ng/L U 0.5 0.2 TLT 05/11/2012 EPA 1631E

Sample Number: 122116-002 Date Collected: 05/09/2012 08:40 Date Received: 5/9/2012

 Field Blank

Parameter Result Units RL MDL Analysis By Analysis Date/Time Method

Data 

Qual

Mercury, Hg < 0.2 ng/L U 0.5 0.2 TLT 05/11/2012 EPA 1631E

Sample Number: 122116-003 Date Collected: 05/09/2012 08:40 Date Received: 5/9/2012

Plant Outfall #001 

Parameter Result Units RL MDL Analysis By Analysis Date/Time Method

Data 

Qual

Mercury, Hg 4.6 ng/L 2 1 TLT EPA 1631E

Sample associated with QC outside acceptable limits (CCB=0.514ppt; acceptable limit: CCB<0.5ppt).

05/11/2012

Sample Number: 122116-004 Date Collected: 05/09/2012 08:40 Date Received: 5/9/2012

CPS Effluent 

Parameter Result Units RL MDL Analysis By Analysis Date/Time Method

Data 

Qual

Mercury, Hg 148 ng/L 10 4 TLT EPA 1631E

Sample associated with QC outside acceptable limits (CCB=0.514ppt; acceptable limit: CCB<0.5ppt).

05/11/2012

Sample Number: 122116-005 Date Collected: 05/09/2012 08:40 Date Received: 5/9/2012

Bioreactor Effluent 

Parameter Result Units RL MDL Analysis By Analysis Date/Time Method

Data 

Qual

Mercury, Hg 14.3 ng/L 5 2 TLT EPA 1631E

Sample associated with QC outside acceptable limits (CCB=0.514ppt; acceptable limit: CCB<0.5ppt).

05/11/2012

Mountaineer Plant, 122116 Page 1 of 2
THIS TEST REPORT RELATES ONLY TO THE ITEMS TESTED AND SHALL NOT BE REPRODUCED EXCEPT IN FULL WITHOUT WRITTEN 

APPROVAL OF THE LABORATORY. ALL TEST RESULTS MEET ALL OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACCREDITING AUTHORITY, 

UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.

U: Analyte was analyzed and not detected at or above adjusted Method Detection Limit

J: Analyte was positively identified, though the quantitation was below Reporting Limit.

Trisha Tucker, Chemist III

Email tltucker@aep.com Tel. 614-836-4184

Fax 614-836-4168 Audinet 210-4184

Mountaineer Plant, 122116 Page 2 of 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

YONGSHENG CHEN, : Case No. 4:15-CV-1136

:

Plaintiff, : (Judge Brann)

:

v. :

:

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE :

UNIVERSITY, :

:

Defendant. :

ORDER

October 5, 2016

AND NOW, in accordance with the Memorandum of this same date, IT IS 

HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED THAT Defendant’s Motion for a 

Protective Order Regarding the Deposition of Bruce Miller (ECF No. 43) is 

DENIED. Plaintiff’s deposition of Bruce Miller is limited, however, to the 

following topics: (1) Mr. Miller’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s work on a Volvo grant 

project and (2) Mr. Miller’s knowledge of any reduction in Plaintiff’s salary based 

on the denial of tenure. 

BY THE COURT:

 s/ Matthew W. Brann 

Matthew W. Brann

 United States District Judge

Case 4:15-cv-01136-MWB Document 51 Filed 10/05/16 Page 1 of 1
II 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2802 

To amend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to remove 

a prohibition on the use of funds relating to the provision of a dangerous 

weapon or training in the use of a dangerous weapon. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 14, 2023 

Mr. PAUL (for himself, Mr. SCOTT of Florida, Mr. LEE, Mr. SCHMITT, Mr. 

BRAUN, Mr. VANCE, and Mrs. BLACKBURN) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

A BILL 

To amend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 

of 1965 to remove a prohibition on the use of funds 

relating to the provision of a dangerous weapon or training in the use of a dangerous weapon. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Educating Responsible 

5 Future Hunters Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•S 2802 IS

1 SEC. 2. AMENDMENT ON ESEA FUNDING. 

2 Section 8526 of the Elementary and Secondary Edu3 cation Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7906) is amended— 

4 (1) in paragraph (5), by adding ‘‘or’’ after the 

5 semicolon; 

6 (2) in paragraph (6), by striking ‘‘; or’’ and in7 serting a period; and 

8 (3) by striking paragraph (7). 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11**  **- 6025** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

– Appellee ,

v.
JOSEPH ROGER PEARSON , Defendant

– Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Spartanburg

. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior District Judge. ( 7:08

- cr - 00818

- HMH

- 1 )

Submitted : February 28, 2011 Decided: March 9, 2011

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and KING and DIAZ , Circuit Judges.

Affirme d by un published per curiam opinion

.
Joseph Roger Pearson , Appellant Pro Se. William Jacob Watkins, Jr. , OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circui t.2 PER CURIAM: Joseph Roger Pearson appeals the district court’s
order denying his motion for resentencing under the
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 , Pub. L. No. 111

- 220, 124 Stat.
2372 . We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error.
The Fa ir Sentencing Act , which increased the amounts of cocaine base that trigger the statutory minimum sentences at 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 841(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010), is not retroactive and is therefore inapplicable to Pearson’s sentence. See United States
v. Diaz , 627 F. 3d 930, 931 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam);
United States v. Brewer , 624 F.3d 900 , 909 n. 7 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Bell , 624 F.3d 803 , 814 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Gomes , 621 F.3d 1343 , 1346 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) ; United Sta tes v. Carradine , 621 F.3d 57 5, 580 (6th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, we affirm the district court ’s order

. United States v. Pearson , No. 7:08

- cr - 00818

- HMH

- 1 (D.S.C.
Dec. 23, 2010) . We dispense with oral argument because the
fac ts and legal contentions a re adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Cecilia A. MARTENS, Appellant, v. Goldie May BATZLE, Executrix of the Estate of Frank Monahan, f/k/a Andrew Francis Minehan, Deceased, Appellee.

No. 69-594.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

July 30, 1969.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal dismissed.
Case 05-01292-WWB Doc 14 Filed 01/06/06 Entered 01/06/06 14:44:07 Desc Main

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#### GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION v. Bobby Joe GREGORY.

No. 50331.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 31, 1978.

Fair & Mayo, James C. Mayo, Louisville, for appellant.

Crawley & Ford, Michael H. Steele, Kosciusko, for appellee.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Winston County; Clarence E. Morgan, Jr., Judge.

Before ROBERTSON, P. J., LEE and BOWLING, JJ., and J. C. FEDUCCIA, Commissioner.

AFFIRMED.
#### Michael Miles BELSKY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69-575.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Feb. 10, 1970.

*257Mitchell M. Goldman and Nickolas Cap-uano, Miami, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Jesse J. McCrary, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for ap-pellee.

Before PEARSON, C. J., and BARK-DULL and HENDRY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order denying appellant’s motion made pursuant to Rule 1.8S0, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 33 F.S.A., for post conviction relief. The order of denial was entered after the trial judge conducted a full evidentiary hearing.

The appellant was indicted for first degree murder. He was represented by a privately employed attorney, who advised the appellant to plead guilty. The appellant tendered a guilty plea. After an exhaustive examination in open court to determine if the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered, the court accepted the plea and sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment.

 Appellant now urges that his privately employed attorney was incompetent and that therefore he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Although the trial court took evidence on this allegation and determined that it was not true, we think it should be further pointed out that generally a defendant may not attack the competency of his privately retained counsel. See Frizzell v. State, Fla.App.1968, 213 So.2d 293; Everett v. State, Fla.App.1964, 161 So.2d 714. Appellant relies upon United States ex rel. Crosby v. Brierley, 404 F.2d 790 (3rd Cir. 1968), for a contrary holding. The exception made in that case is inapplicable here, since there: (1) the trial court failed to conduct any inquiry into the defendant’s understanding of the nature and consequences of his guilty plea; (2) trial counsel failed at any time to explain to his client the nature of a guilty plea; (3) the defendant’s testimony at trial basically contradicted his guilty plea. None of these circumstances is present in the instant case.

Appellant also urges as a factor on the issue of the adequacy of his representation the suggestion that his lawyer was not qualified to represent him because the lawyer had previously represented another individual when that individual had been questioned by the authorities about the crime of which appellant was convicted. This record reveals that this circumstance was fully explained by counsel to his client and that at the evidentiary hearing on the petition for relief, the appellant admitted knowing of the circumstances prior to accepting the privately employed counsel.

Having reviewed the record in the light of appellant’s contentions in his motion for relief, we hold that the trial court correctly denied the motion.

Affirmed.
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ENACTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Valrico Bancorp, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-QB for the period ending September 30, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jerry
L. Ball, Executive Vice President and CFO of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as enacted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

          1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
               or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
               material respects, the financial condition and results of
               operations of the Company.

Jerry L. Ball
EVP / CFO
March 29, 2004
#### Donald Leonard GREENE, Appellant, v. Jean Barbara GREENE, Appellee.

No. 69-770.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 20, 1970.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Lee WOODS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 76-1104.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Feb. 7, 1978.

Rehearing Denied March 21, 1978.

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, Frank B. Kessler and Stuart A. Young, Asst. Public Defenders, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Paul H. Zacks, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

DOWNEY, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of delivery of heroin. Of the five appellate questions presented only one requires a reversal of the judgment and sentence being reviewed.

The appellant here is the same individual involved in the case of *Woods v. State,*Case No. 76-836, Fla.App., 355 So.2d 437, opinion filed February 7, 1978. Oddly enough, the point requiring reversal in this case is the same point upon which we based our reversal in the other *Woods*case, i. e., denial of appellant’s motion to furnish the name and address of the confidential informant. Although the factual situation giving rise to the criminal transaction in the two cases is different, nearly everything said in *Woods v. State,*Case No. 76-836, Fla.App., *supra,*is applicable here.

In this case the State makes a stronger argument that the appellant knew the name and address of the informant and thus cannot complain. We dispose of that contention by noting that the appellant was never sure of the identity of the informant as the State refused to identify him. When appellant tried to depose a person who may have been the informant, the prosecutor, through objection and instructions to the witness not to answer, effectively precluded the deponent from testifying to anything meaningful.1 And so the important busi*440ness of developing appellant’s defense through the help of the confidential informant turned into a charade.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and sentence appealed from upon authority of *Woods v. State,*Case No. 76-836, Fla. App., 355 So.2d 437, opinion filed February 7, 1978 and remand the cause for a new trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

ANSTEAD, J., and SCHWARTZ, ALAN R., Associate Judge, concur.

1

. An enlightening discussion of the duty of the State in furnishing information regarding a confidential informant is contained in *State v. Jones,*247 So.2d 342 (Fla.3rd DCA 1971).
# Air Force awards $143 million energy savings contract at DoD’s largest joint base

/ Published Sept. 28, 2018
TYNDALL AIR FORCE BASE, Fla., *Editor's note: The original story can be viewed on the Air Force Civil Engineer Center website.*
256 La. 73

#### Philip J. CARDINALE, Jr. v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 50523.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 25, 1970.

In re: Philip J. Cardinale, Jr. applying for writ of habeas corpus, certiorari and review.

Writ refused. The showing made does not warrant the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction.
#### METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Joan Andreu CARTER and Robert C. Carter, her husband, Appellees.

No. 68-993.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.

June 17, 1969.

Rehearing Denied July 25, 1969.

Thomas C. Britton, County Atty., and St. Julien P. Rosemond, Asst. County Atty., for appellant.

Thomas A. Horkan, Jr., Miami, for ap-pellees.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, C. J., and HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Burritt v. Harris, Fla. 1965, 172 So.2d 820; Shearer v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla.App.1966, 189 So.2d 501, and Lawley v. Town of Golfview, Fla.App.1965, 174 So.2d 767.
256 La. 78

#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Daniel Alvin LEE, Jr. v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary et al.

No. 50603.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 25, 1970.

In re: Daniel Alvin Lee, Jr., applying for writ of habeas corpus.

The application is denied. The showing made does not warrant the exercise of our original or supervisory jurisdiction.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ERNEST CLARK HICKS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., a foreign 

(non-Washington incorporated) banking 

institution; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORP OF 

WASHINGTON, a Washington corporation; 

DOES, 1-10, 

Defendants.

No. 20-36029 

D.C. No. 2:20-cv-00158-SAB 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Stanley A. Bastian, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 14, 2021**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 21 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 20-36029 

Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Ernest Clark Hicks appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 

action alleging various federal and state law claims regarding a home loan. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) based on claim preclusion. Mpoyo v. 

Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Hicks’s action on the basis of claim 

preclusion because his claims were raised or could have been raised in previous 

actions between the parties that resulted in final adjudications on the merits. See 

id. at 987-88 (elements of federal claim preclusion); Ensley v. Pitcher, 222 P.3d 

99, 104 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (elements of claim preclusion under Washington 

law).

We reject as meritless Hicks’s contention that prior settlement agreements 

reserved the right to litigate the claims at issue in this action.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.