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PRESERVING PROGRESS IN IRAQ, PART III:

IRAQ’S POLICE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 30, 2011

Serial No. 112–87

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ms. Brooke Darby, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement, U.S. Department of State .................................................... 6

Mr. Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Inspector General, Office of the Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction, accompanied by Mr. Glenn D. Furbish, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction ................................................................................ 24

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Ms. Brooke Darby: Prepared statement ................................................................ 8

Mr. Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.: Prepared statement .................................................... 26

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 44

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 45

(1)

PRESERVING PROGRESS IN IRAQ, PART III: 

IRAQ’S POLICE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

AND SOUTH ASIA, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. CHABOT. The subcommittee will come to order. Good afternoon. I want to welcome my colleagues to this hearing of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. 

Before addressing the topic of today’s hearing, I would like to say 

a few words about President Obama’s recent announcement of a 

full withdrawal from Iraq by the end of 2011. For over 8 years, 

U.S. servicemen and women have labored in Iraq and sacrificed beyond our comprehension to achieve real, tangible gains. The mere 

fact that we today are discussing how to help Iraq improve the effectiveness of its police force is a testament to that fact. 

Despite this, Iraq remains in a precarious position. It is painfully 

clear that although the Iraqi army has progressed remarkably from 

where it once was, Iraq is not yet prepared to defend itself from 

the threat posed by its nefarious neighbors: Iran and Syria. It is 

with this concern in mind that the U.S. and Iraq endeavored to negotiate an agreement which would maintain a small U.S. troop 

presence into 2012. 

Public reports indicate that General Lloyd Austin, Commanding 

General of U.S. forces in Iraq, requested and recommended approximately 20,000 U.S. troops remain in Iraq. Unfortunately, 

these negotiations failed due to in my opinion mismanagement by 

this White House. Amazingly, the White House is now trying to 

tout the breakdown and lack of agreement as a success inasmuch 

as it has met a promise President Obama made as a candidate. 

This blatant politicization calls into question the White House’s 

entire effort to secure a troop extension. Fulfilling a campaign 

promise at the expense of American national security interests is, 

at best, strategic neglect and, at worst, downright irresponsible. 

And the White House tacitly admits this in negotiating an extension in the first place. 

I fear, however, that our objective is no longer to ensure that 

Iraq is stable but merely to withdraw our forces by the end of this 

year in order to meet a political timeline. Saying that Iraq is ‘‘seVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:29 Jan 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\113011\71400 HFA PsN: SHIRL
2

cure, stable, and self-reliant,’’ as Deputy National Security Advisor 

Denis McDonough recently did, does not make it so. 

And to borrow a quote from then-Senator Clinton, it requires 

‘‘the willing suspension of disbelief’’ to believe that withdrawing our 

forces from Iraq at a time when Iranian agents seek to harm at 

every turn our country and its allies advances our strategic interests. 

Although I understand that Iraq is a sovereign country, I believe 

there is much more we could have done to secure a reasonable 

troop presence beyond the end of this year. Accordingly, I would 

like to again echo Senator Lieberman’s call to reopen negotiations 

with the Iraqis. It would be a failure of colossal proportions to 

withdraw our forces before Iraq is ready to stand on its own. 

Today’s hearing is being called to evaluate the Department of 

State’s Iraq Police Development Program, the PDP, which has regrettably been plagued by mismanagement and poor planning since 

its inception. 

A recent audit by the Office of the Special Inspector General for 

Iraq Reconstruction, SIGIR, raises a number of serious questions 

about the efficacy of this program. SIGIR’s audit paints a picture 

of a program which has been formulated without a clear understanding of or attention to the actual needs of the Iraqi Ministry 

of the Interior, MOI. 

In a dooming interview conducted by SIGIR officials, Iraq’s Senior Deputy Minister of the Interior Adnan Al-Asadi rhetorically 

asked ‘‘What tangible benefit will Iraqis see from this police training program? With most of its money spent on lodging, security, 

and support, all the MOI gets is a little expertise, and that is if 

the program materializes. It has yet to start.’’

More to the point, he suggested that the U.S. ‘‘take the program 

money and the overhead money and use it for something that can 

benefit the people of the United States because there will be very 

little benefit to the MOI from the $1 billion.’’

Although I appreciate Mr. Asadi’s sensitivity to the current fiscal 

climate, his statement makes very clear that the PDP as it exists 

today will not meet Iraq’s needs and has little, if any, Iraqi buyin. 

And although our witness here today may testify that the Iraqi 

MOI does, in fact, appreciate the value of the currently formulated 

PDP, the Government of Iraq has yet to sign a written agreement 

committing to the program or offer a single dollar to contribute to 

it. 

I am also deeply concerned by the reports of obstruction and noncooperation on the part of the Department of State during SIGIR’s 

audit. This is extremely distressing. And, to echo the sentiments of 

several of my colleagues in the other body which they recently expressed in a letter to Secretary of State Clinton, the Department 

of State is legally obliged to cooperate with SIGIR in the execution 

of its mission; jurisdictional games are unacceptable. 

Although I have many concerns about the nature of the current 

PDP, I do not believe that a permutation of it is unimportant. The 

intent of this hearing is not to foreclose the idea. It is not the idea, 

but the implementation that worries me. Helping Iraq build an effective police capability is of paramount importance. The devil, as 

3

they say, is in the details. And it is my hope that with proper planning, the U.S. can help Iraq develop a capable and accountable police force that serves its people’s needs. 

And I would now yield to the gentleman from New York, the distinguished ranking member of the committee, Mr. Ackerman, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the chairman very much. Thank you for 

calling this very important oversight hearing. 

I would like to welcome Brooke Darby, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, representing the State Department. And I am particularly pleased today that we are going to be hearing from Stuart 

Bowen, the Special Inspector General for Iraqi, who, with a team 

of true professionals, has been doing a tremendous job protecting 

the U.S. taxpayers’ interests. 

Our topic today is the Police Development Program, which Mr. 

Bowen and his team have been warning is heading for trouble for 

many, many months now. He has testified before other bodies in 

Congress. He has released written quarterly reports as well as specific audits. And the message is the same. The program for which 

Department of State officially took responsibility on October 1st is 

nearly a textbook case of why government procurement, in this 

case foreign assistance, doesn’t buy what we think we are paying 

for, what we want, and why more money will make the problem 

worse. 

Failed procurement is not a problem unique to the State Department. And when it comes to frittering away millions, Foggy Bottom 

is a rank amateur compared to the Department of Defense. 

As our colleagues on the Armed Services Committee have 

learned, the best projects with the most desirable purposes can go 

horribly, horribly off track. And the hardest thing it seems that any 

bureaucracy can do is pull the plug on a failed initiative. 

How do we know the Police Development Program is going off 

track? Very simple things demonstrate a strong likelihood of waste 

and mismanagement. Number one, does the Government of Iraq, 

whose personnel we intend to train, support the program? Interviews with senior Iraqi officials by the Special Inspector General 

show utter disdain for the program. When the Iraqis suggest that 

we take our money and do things, instead, that are good for the 

United States, I think that might be a clue. 

Subsequent diplomatic intervention by the State Department 

with the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior may have changed their officially stated views, but I, for one, take the Iraqis’ initial unfeigned 

contempt to be a more reliable indicator than their post-coaching 

enthusiasm. 

So if the Iraqis are ambivalent, is the PDP program at least correctly structured to fill gaps in capabilities that have been clearly 

identified and assessed? The answer again is no. Despite being in 

development for years, as of today, the program’s objectives remain 

a mushy bowl of vague platitudes. 

There is no comprehensive and detailed plan for execution. There 

is no current assessment of Iraqi police force capability. And, perhaps more tellingly, there are no outcome-based metrics. This is a 

flashing red warning light. 

4

Surely the bureau within the State Department that will be ad- ministering this $887 million program is aware of these deficiencies 

and is moving swiftly to address them based on their long history 

of successful contract administration and robust management capabilities. Right? Well, not exactly. 

The particular bureau at State that has inherited this mess from 

the Department of Defense is the Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement, known as INL. INL until 9/11 was informally known as the Drugs and Thugs Bureau, focusing chiefly on 

fighting drug trafficking and working to close the space available 

to international crime. 

Suddenly, with the advent of the war on terror, INL was asked 

to administer hundreds of millions of dollars in contracts in two active theatres of war. Its performance has been subject to many audits and quarterly reviews by the Special Inspectors General for 

Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Pre-9/11, INL had no history with massive acquisition, large contract administration, or long-term program management on a large 

scale. It lacked trained personnel, management capacity, and was, 

frankly, overwhelmed. INL personnel have tried hard, but the results have often been poor. 

Audit activity by the Special Inspector General on the PDP 

shows that the Bureau again is unprepared for the very large task 

they have been asked to handle. The warning klaxon is blaring. 

The best indicator for any failed government acquisition, whether 

foreign aid or procurement of a new fighter-bomber, is incessant 

changes in program and funding requirements. As mentioned, the 

Police Development Program is already moving ahead without a 

strong buy-in from the Government of Iraq or a clear and well-defined plan of action, or clear measures of success. Not surprisingly, 

the funding levels, personnel requirements, and spending plans for 

the PDP have all been in flux from year to year. We should now 

be evacuating this building. 

There is, of course, one more major sign of impending failure. As 

the last of our troops leave Iraq next month, yes, next month, as 

the President promised and as our Nation deserves, the interest of 

the United States Congress in Iraq is going drop like a tree in an 

empty forest. Not only will it plummet to Earth, it will do so without anyone even being aware it happened. A roughly $900 million 

program without clear objectives, intended for a partner we will 

have forgotten, with requirements that change yearly and no genuine partner country buy-in, is no place I would be willing to put 

my money or that of my constituents. 

Let’s not wait for Mr. Bowen’s next cringe-inducing audit. Let’s 

pull the plug right now. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

At this time if any of the members would like to make a 1-

minute opening statement, we would be happy to call them in the 

order that they arrived. Mr. Marino, that would put you next if you 

would like to say anything. Okay. Mr. Higgins? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes just briefly, Mr. Chairman. I, too, am very disturbed by what I read here. Given the amount of American investment in Iraq already. Since 2003, we have committed $8 billion, $8 

billion to training Iraqi police, almost $1 billion more for 2012. 

5

The fact of the matter is when the surge was undertaken, it was 

designed to tamp down violence to give some breathing room for 

the Iraqis, Sunni, Shia, the Kurds to do political reconciliation and 

deal with all of those other existential issues, to keep that society 

from evolving. 

Those issues still aren’t resolved. And until those issues are resolved, you can’t begin to think about developing a police force that 

people are going to recognize as legitimate. 

In northern Ireland when we do peace between the Catholics and 

the Protestants, political reconciliation preceded the issue of policing. And so it was political reconciliation and a commitment to proceed. Then the all-important issue of policing was dealt with. 

This is very disturbing and I don’t think a good investment of 

U.S. tax dollars. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized 

for 1 minute. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. This whole episode in American history is a 

very disturbing thing to look at. And I think when people look 

back, they are going to wonder why the hell did we ever go into 

Iraq and there will be no question, even in our minds, they, whether or not the money that was expended and the lives and the blood 

that we have expended there was worth it. It was not. 

And whatever we are spending now should be terminated. And 

as soon as we can get those troops out, the better. When you find 

yourself in a bad situation, you don’t try to mess around and make 

it a little bit less bad. You just step over and try to get into a good 

situation somewhere else where you can accomplish things. 

We have had some heroic efforts on the part of the people to 

make it work. And I think that, especially—we have Stuart Bowen, 

who has tried as Inspector General to make sure that the amount 

of proliferation and abuse of the American tax dollars was kept to 

a minimum. And he did his best. Our military forces did their best. 

But it was an undoable job that we were trying to do for an ungrateful people. And if they don’t have the gratitude for what we 

have done for them, we shouldn’t spend a day more on a penny 

more on their behalf. 

Thank you. Who cares about whether their police are good or 

not? Let them determine whether their police are good or not. And 

let them spend the money and make the commitment to do that 

themselves. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Turner, is recognized if he 

would like to make a statement. If not, okay. We will go ahead and 

get to the witness, then. 

Our witness today is Ms. Brooke Darby. Ms. Darby became a 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, INL, U.S. State Department in March 2011. 

Throughout her career in INL, she has been responsible for developing and managing peacekeeping and criminal justice capacitybuilding programs in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Africa, and most 

6

recently Iraq. Before joining the State Department, Ms. Darby 

served on the National Security Council staff. 

She graduated with honors from Mount Holyoke College, a B.A.; 

and Georgetown University Law Center, a J.D. 

And we welcome you here, Ms. Darby. And, as you know, our 

witnesses receive 5 minutes, as do the members of the panel here 

in questioning the witnesses. 

I would note that our clock system apparently is down, at least 

at your location there. So you won’t have a light system to look at. 

So I will tap my gavel here when you have 1 minute to go and then 

a little bit louder or we have an electric shocking system if you 

would like. We won’t utilize that. But I will do it a little bit louder. 

And if you could wrap up at that point, that would be good. 

And so you are recognized for 5 minutes. Thank you for being 

here this afternoon. 

Ms. DARBY. Thank you very much. 

STATEMENT OF MS. BROOKE DARBY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. DARBY. Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Ackerman, and 

distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

today to discuss the Department of State’s Police Development Program in Iraq. With your permission, I will summarize the prepared 

remarks which have been submitted for the record. 

The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, which I help to lead, assumed the responsibility for police development in Iraq as of October 1st, 2011. Our program, known as 

the Police Development Program, or PDP, builds on the U.S. military’s efforts with the Government of Iraq over the last 7 years. 

The military’s program utilized hundreds of police advisors to 

generate a police force from scratch and train it for 

counterinsurgency operations. Our much smaller cadre of senior police advisors work with Interior Ministry officials and police to help 

Iraq adopt its law enforcement institutions to deal effectively with 

today’s complex threats, to develop structures and systems that operate with respect for the rule of law, and to establish systems and 

processes that promote and protect gender equality and human 

rights. 

The Department of State launched the PDP on October 1st, 2011 

and currently has 105 U.S. advisors leading the mentoring and advising mission in Iraq. Our advisors constitute the most senior and 

experienced team ever deployed by the United States Government 

with an average of 23 years of police service and extensive international policing experience. Each assesses Iraqi police strengths 

and challenges and works with their Iraqi counterparts on a peerto-peer basis to develop appropriate solutions. 

Since October 1st, PDP senior police advisors have held hundreds of meetings with Iraqi counterparts. At this early stage, most 

mentoring and advising needs pertain to management tasks required to run a police department, such as strategic planning, recruitment, logistics, and managing criminal investigations. The 

Iraqis have also expressed a keen interest in gender and human 

rights, for which we have a dedicated advisory team. 

7

We are developing a rigorous program oversight plan to continuously assess our progress. In this vein, we appreciate the audit report released by the SIGIR on October 31st, 2011. I am pleased to 

say that we already are implementing the three recommendations 

SIGIR recommended for action. 

To touch on the SIGIR recommendations briefly, first, we agree 

that we need a baseline assessment of Iraqi capabilities against 

which to measure progress. Our updated planning called for our 

senior police advisors to conduct that assessment. 

Since October 1st, they have done just that. And we are compiling the results now. We will use the results to ensure that our 

performance metrics are clear and realistic for each program element. 

Second, we will continue to adjust our police assistance program 

as planned based on real-time developments on the ground. A dedicated INL monitoring and evaluation staff will measure progress. 

And every 6 months, we will do a comprehensive program review 

to assess progress and to identify the need for course corrections. 

We will be able to keep this subcommittee informed as those developments and review processes occur. 

And, lastly, we fully agree that Iraqi buy-in and ownership of 

this program is critical to its success. We at INL have the unique 

mission of trying to put ourselves out of business by offering programs that build sustainable capacities. 

This program grew out of the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement that this subcommittee knows a great deal about. 

Iraqi officials then defined law enforcement needs and priorities. 

Our two governments continue to share the costs involved in police 

development in Iraq. 

Our program will not pay for infrastructure, equipment, or operational support for Iraqi police. The Government of Iraq will fund 

these costs directly along with all personnel costs for Government 

of Iraq employees. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, we recognize the 

complexity and importance of this mission. And we and the Iraqi 

Government have committed to bilateral cooperation to help realize 

our common security goals. 

Just today in Iraq, Vice President Biden and Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki chaired a session of the U.S.-Iraqi Higher Coordinating 

Committee, which recommenced our partnership. The United 

States is making good on this commitment by implementing the 

Police Development Program hand in hand with the Ministry of Interior. 

Security issues remain a challenge in Iraq. However, the threat 

that would result from our failure to follow through on the investment the U.S. has already made and for which American servicemen and women, diplomats, and others have sacrificed their lives 

is even greater. 

Iraq requires continued international support to remain on its 

path toward modern, professional, community-oriented police capable of responding to the difficult security conditions present in Iraq 

today. We absolutely expect that our mentoring and advising support for the Iraqi police service will enable Iraq’s civilian police to 

8

secure communities more quickly and allow democratic principles 

of government under the rule of law to take hold. 

We appreciate your continued support. And I am pleased to answer your questions today and in the future. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Darby follows:]


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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much for your testimony. And now 

the members will have 5 minutes. And I recognize myself for 5 

minutes for that purpose. 

The comments by Iraq’s senior Deputy Minister of Interior, 

which I referenced in my opening remarks are I think you would 

agree very distressing. Governing, even more so today given the 

current fiscal climate, is about choosing. 

And when viewed in the context of the extraordinary cost to this 

program, I am concerned that the currently formulated PDP will 

not meet Iraqi needs to a degree that justifies the expenditures. 

The current plans, for example, involve an extremely expensive 

air wing, for which INL may not even be a priority user. According 

to the SIGIR audit of the $200 million DoS requested for Fiscal 

Year 2011 fourth quarter, ‘‘Only about 12 percent of the funds are 

targeted to higher trained and deployed police advisers and managers. The remaining 88 percent are for life admission support for 

the advisers and staff, security for sites and transportation, and operation and maintenance of the helicopter air wing.’’

Would it not be a better use of taxpayer money to retune the 

plans to allow for more trainers in the field at any given time? 

And, additionally, how is INL working with the Iraqi MOI to better 

tailor the program to meet its needs? 

Ms. DARBY. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Let me start by addressing the issue of Deputy Principal Minister of Interior Al-Asadi’s comments with respect to the PDP. I 

cannot speak for Minister Al-Asadi. 

Based on the comments I have seen attributed to him, I would 

say that he is frustrated by the high cost involved in the security 

and logistics and support for this program. And, frankly, I share 

that frustration. I wish we didn’t have to spend so much of our program dollars in supporting the security and welfare of our people. 

But if we are going to make the commitment to deploy our people 

to Iraq, we have a similar commitment to ensure their safety and 

their well-being. And at the moment, that is a very expensive endeavor. 

And I think as a result of our continued engagement with Iraqi 

police, the Ministry of Interior and improving their capabilities, we 

hope to get to a point where they are in a better position to provide 

that security or system providing that security for us and costs will 

go down. But I can’t project how quickly that will happen. 

I can tell you that I was out in Iraq about 2 weeks ago. And I 

met with Deputy Minister Al-Asadi. And we discussed his comments. And he affirmed it to me that he very much supports the 

PDP. He welcomes the advice and guidance that it is going to provide. 

He subsequently said the same thing to our police advisers at 

their headquarters in Baghdad, reemphasizing that Iraq needs the 

support of our advisers to guide and mentor what is a fairly young 

Iraqi police force, to professionalize it, to modernize it. 

And his comments, frankly, echo the comments that our advisers 

are hearing. Our advisers have already begun to deploy and engage 

with their Iraqi counterparts. And the reception that they have received is very welcoming, very receptive. And in many cases we 

have even had Iraqi counterparts visit our advisers at our facilities. 

14

I think that is a strong indication of the support that they have 

and the value that they see in the assistance that we were providing. 

Mr. CHABOT. He didn’t deny the comments, did he? He didn’t 

deny the comments? He made the——

Ms. DARBY. He didn’t directly deny the comments. 

Mr. CHABOT. All right. SIGIR’s PDP audit made three explicit 

recommendations, namely the completion of an adequate current 

assessment of the Iraqi police forces, and more comprehensive and 

detailed program plan, and a written agreement with the Government of Iraq ensuring its financial participation in agreement with 

the program’s scope. 

Has DoS followed through on these recommendations? And, if 

not, can we expect DoS to do so and when? 

Ms. DARBY. Yes, sir. We are following through on those recommendations. And I would just like to say at the outset that we 

very much appreciate the insights and observations and recommendations of the audit community: SIGIR, GAO, our own Office of Inspector General. We take those comments very seriously. 

And we already have begun to implement the three recommendations that SIGIR has identified. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you. 

I think my time has expired or there’s some weirdness happening 

with the clock here. I am going to go ahead and recognize the ranking member, then, for his 5 minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I am just a little bit dismayed with this whole 

thing. We are going to screw this up again, aren’t we? 

Ms. DARBY. Sir, I take my responsibility for U.S. taxpayer dollars 

very, very seriously. I also take our mission in Iraq very seriously. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Have we been getting our money’s worth lately? 

Ms. DARBY. Sir, this program is only 2 months in execution. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I mean in the——

Ms. DARBY. We have been monitoring it very closely to ensure 

that we do get results. And we have put in place a number of accountability measures to make sure that this program is carefully 

monitored and observed. 

We have an Assistant Chief of Mission in Iraq, Ambassador 

Michele Sison, a two-time ambassador, who oversees the Iraq police 

program. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Well, when will they be ready to stand up without us? 

Ms. DARBY. I wish I could answer that question. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Then why are we spending money if we don’t 

have the answer? You know, this is turning into what happens 

after a bar mitzvah or a Jewish wedding. It is called a Jewish goodbye. Everybody keeps saying goodbye, but nobody leaves. 

I am told there was this song during World War I called ‘‘We’re 

Here Because We’re Here,’’ and the words were, ‘‘We’re here because we’re here because we’re here because we’re here. We’re here 

because we’re here.’’ I think it just went on. There were no other 

words. 

I mean, there has to be a time when we’re no longer going to be there. And I don’t know if $100 billion, if $900 million, if $800 

zillion makes that time come faster, or sooner, or what you get for 

15

more money being there. So if we don’t know how long it is going 

to take, I am going to stop paying the tuition when my kid’s in his 

19th year at college. 

Give me some hope. Make up a year. 

Ms. DARBY. Sir, I have been engaged in international police development for about 15 years. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. 15 years. That is good. At $900 million a year? 

Ms. DARBY. The situation we face in Iraq is that for 25 years, for 

a generation, police in Iraq were instruments of repression. Respect 

for human rights, professionalism in discipline, gender rights had 

no place in policing in Iraq. Iraq needs our help to modernize and 

become a respected, effective police force. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. And in your opening statement, you said they 

have shown an interest in that. 

Ms. DARBY. They have, indeed, sir. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. What does that mean, ‘‘They have shown an interest in that’’? 

Ms. DARBY. They are seeking out our help in developing plans to 

implement that in Iraq. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Can we send them a book? 

Ms. DARBY. No. We actually have our advisers working right now 

at the Ministry of Interior’s request on a strategic plan on human 

rights and gender issues and how to incorporate those into the 

Iraqi Government’s administration. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is this a human rights and gender issue project, 

rather than the national security interest of the United States, to 

have them stand up to protect the world against whatever? 

Ms. DARBY. That is also an element of the program, sir, but I 

think that having an Iraqi citizenry that goes to the police to resolve their disputes and has confidence that those police will act in 

a professional, respectful way that respects their human rights,——

Mr. ACKERMAN. What is Iraq——

Ms. DARBY [continuing]. Even if they don’t turn to militias 

groups——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Okay. If that is what this is supposed to be, that 

is pretty admirable if we are flush. In the list of 190 countries in 

the world, where does Iraq stand in that human rights and gender 

issue? Are they in the middle? Are they in the bottom quarter? Are 

they in the top 10 percent of the best? 

Ms. DARBY. I am in no position to offer that ranking. I don’t 

have——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Why are we doing human rights and gender 

issues in Iraq and not Botswana? 

Ms. DARBY. Iraq, and stability in Iraq and security in Iraq is 

very much in the U.S. national security interest. It is important to 

us to have a stable and secure partner in the region. It is important to us to have a partner on combating the types of complex 

threats we face as a——

Mr. ACKERMAN. How important is it in terms of dollars? Let’s as- sume the rate is constant and it is $900 million a year. 

Ms. DARBY. Sir, we have already made an investment. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. $1 billion bucks a year for how many years? 

Ms. DARBY. We have already made an investment of billions of 

dollars to date. 

16

Mr. ACKERMAN. ‘‘We’re here because we’re here because we’re 

here because we’re here.’ We have already done it. So we are doing 

it again. 

Ms. DARBY. Our program is very different from the U.S. military’s program. The U.S. military had to focus primarily on generating a police force from the ground up. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is it possible this will take us 8 years? 

Ms. DARBY. I am not prepared to put a time limit on it. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. 4 years? 

Ms. DARBY. But, sir, I will say that we will be reporting on 

progress. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. We are spending taxpayers’ dollars here at a 

rate of $900 million a year if it remains constant. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired, but you can answer the question if you can answer the question. 

Ms. DARBY. Yes. We will be assessing the progress. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I know when my time has expired. 

Ms. DARBY. We will be assessing the progress that we and the 

Iraqis are making toward mutually agreed objectives and goals 

every 6 months. We will have a dedicated monitoring and evaluation staff who will be assessing it on a more regular basis. 

We look forward to reporting to the committee, the subcommittee 

on what we have found as a result of these reviews and what it 

means for the program going forward. And we look forward to that 

dialogue with you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. I apologize for subjecting you to my 

singing. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s apology is accepted. 

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Marino, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, sir. 

Good afternoon, and thank you for being here. Ms. Darby, your 

credentials are impeccable, and your work experience is beyond reproach. And I commend you. I don’t know if you drew the short 

straw for coming in here and someone else just didn’t want to do 

this, but my hat is off to you. 

I am going to get very serious, right to the point. And you correct 

me if I am wrong. There are billions and billions of dollars missing 

in Iraq that the Iraqi Government cannot account for. Whether 

those funds are a mixture of U.S. and Iraqi or simply U.S. or Iraqi 

remains to be seen because we are not getting an answer. Maliki 

just doesn’t want to answer questions, takes a position that he is 

offended when we ask questions like this. 

I understand that this government, the Iraqi Government, implemented legislation that gave absolute immunity to the government 

officials for the loss of this money, knowing that it was stolen by 

someone or a group of individuals. They actually granted themselves immunity from criminal prosecution and civil prosecution for 

accounting for this money. And I understand that one particular individual made it quite clear that he actually walked away with $9 

million. 

How can we continue to fund a government that works under 

that premise where they are granting their own corrupt governVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:29 Jan 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\113011\71400 HFA PsN: SHIRL
17

ment officials immunity from prosecution from stealing, perhaps 

from the United States and certainly from the Iraqi people? Can 

you give me some insight on that, please? 

Ms. DARBY. Congressman, I am sorry that that falls outside the 

gambit for which my bureau is responsible, which is police development and justice assistance. I do know we also work on some of the 

anti-corruption programs, and I can tell you that there have been 

a few positive developments. 

I think there is still a way to go, certainly, in addressing corruption issues in Iraq, and we have been working with institutions 

that are designed to assist in that. But there was a positive step 

recently in that the Parliament enacted legislation that now prevents ministers from preventing the prosecution and investigation 

of their personnel for corruption. So I think we look at corruption 

in Iraq in incremental steps. 

And with respect to missing dollars, I am afraid I can’t answer 

that question directly, but——

Mr. MARINO. Well, I am not asking you to directly answer the 

missing dollars, where it is at. I mean, the government won’t respond to it. So, you know, how would we know that? 

But I was a prosecutor for 19 years at the state and Federal levels. I have a basic fundamental problem with trusting an entity or 

someone that I know is a crook and a thief and really has very little interest on appearance about what happens to the people of 

that country. 

I would hope that the State Department also has that concern 

and also keeps that fact that we are not getting information from 

them, and there has been literally billions of dollars stolen and unaccounted for in the back of your mind when dealing with these 

people. 

I thank you for your response. 

Ms. DARBY. Could I just respond to that briefly? 

Mr. MARINO. Please go ahead. 

Ms. DARBY. Thank you very much for your comments. 

I would just like to emphasize that none of the money that is associated with the Police Development Program goes to the Government of Iraq. 

Mr. MARINO. I understand that. 

Ms. DARBY. Thank you. 

Mr. MARINO. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman yields back his time. 

Let’s see—the gentleman from New York, Mr. Higgins, I believe 

is next. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Police Development Program under the State Department is 

not more than 2 months old. Does this include a current status as 

to what shape the Iraqi police apparatus is in today? I mean, 

where are we at? And what is the baseline here? 

Ms. DARBY. Our advisers right now—we began deploying our advisers this summer. And one of the first tasks we assigned to them 

was conducting a baseline assessment of Iraqi capabilities, which 

we view as essential to refining the objectives we have for this program and the performance metrics that we establish for this program and against which we will measure and evaluate progress. 

18

This was an issue that was discussed in the SIGIR report as one 

of the recommendations of the SIGIR report. I came into this job 

in May, and I certainly wish that we had had an assessment that 

was completed before we launched the PDP. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Right. 

Ms. DARBY. There was an effort. We did issue a grant to an outside entity to conduct such a baseline assessment. And for a variety 

of reasons, they were unable to do so. By the time that became apparent, we already had our——

Mr. HIGGINS. Claiming back my time, why weren’t they able to 

do so? I mean, that is pretty important here. 

Ms. DARBY. I am sorry? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Why weren’t they able to do what they were asked 

to do? 

Ms. DARBY. I think it largely had to do with the difficulty of moving around in Iraq and the length of time it took to get appointments with the Iraqi. 

Mr. HIGGINS. So lack of cooperation? 

Ms. DARBY. I think it was also some logistical and security issues 

that made it hard for them to get around. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. I mean, what is the sense of things? I mean, 

is it a country that has a police force that is, you know, functioning 

in certain places, like Baghdad, not in Ramadi? I mean, you know, 

what is the anecdotal assessment of the strength of the Iraqi police 

force today? 

Ms. DARBY. I will be able to answer that question a lot better in 

about a month’s time, when we have completed our full review of 

the assessments that our advisers have done. But I would say in 

general that there is a sense that in terms of very basic police 

skills, the U.S. military has done an excellent job in working with 

the Iraqis over the course of the last 7 years to generate a police 

force from scratch and attain a basic level of capability. 

Mr. HIGGINS. What is that basic level of capability? 

Ms. DARBY. They can basically police. They can provide presence 

on the streets. They can take complaints. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Do they have the confidence of the people on the 

streets? 

Ms. DARBY. I think it is a very mixed bag, and I think that is 

why we are working as part of this program to build. That is actually one of the major subject areas of the program, is to build relationships between the Iraqi police and the community they serve 

and also to develop accountability mechanisms within the Iraqi police. And this is an area where they acknowledge that they need 

help. 

They need a code of conduct for their police. They need a discipline system that works. They need to be able to demonstrate to 

the Iraqi people that they have taken action against police officers 

who have not performed their jobs and who have, you know, committed crimes or committed human rights abuses. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes, but those things are pretty fundamental, 

whether you are policing in Baghdad or Buffalo. 

Ms. DARBY. Absolutely. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Others have touched on this as well. You know, 

since 2003, we have spent $8 billion training the Iraqi police, apVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:29 Jan 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\113011\71400 HFA PsN: SHIRL
19

proximately $1 billion a year. The Inspector General’s review indicates that about 12 percent of that was spent for actually training 

police and 88 percent for overhead costs, including paying for security contractors. You know, we have spent $63 billion in reconstructing Iraq. We 

are scheduled to leave there at the end of the year. The past performance doesn’t inspire great confidence in the ability of anybody 

in changing fundamentally the situation in Iraq. 

Give me some words of encouragement as to what has changed 

on the ground. You know, I think that is very important here. 

Ms. DARBY. I think we are entering a new day. I think what the 

U.S. military was able to do with Iraq was some of the basics. But 

the basics are not enough to sustain an effective, respected, professional police force. They need a lot of advanced and specialized 

training. They need systems and structures that will enable them 

to be a sustainable force, everything from disciplinary systems to 

be able to handle their logistics, to be able to handle their budgeting, making sure that their forces in the field have——

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes. 

Ms. DARBY [continuing]. The equipment that they need to be basically responsible. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes. Let me just claim back because I think I am 

out of time. But I just wanted a final comment. All of this would 

be comforting and perhaps even confidence-inspiring if there hadn’t 

been a past. But there is an immediate past that demonstrates pervasive corruption, a lack of confidence, a lack of discipline, a lack 

of a willingness to provide appropriate oversight to ensure that 

U.S. taxpayer dollars are being spent in an appropriate manner. 

So, I mean, again, you have been sent over here, and you are in 

a tough spot. I understand that. But this is a very steep hill to 

climb given the past performance here. And everything, you know, 

associated with Iraq, be it its reconstruction, its political reconciliation, all those existential issues that are fundamentally important 

to an evolving, functioning society are lacking. 

And, you know, it doesn’t give us a sense that, you know, there 

is a lot of opportunity here to see something dramatically different 

other than what we have already experienced. And what we have 

already experienced isn’t good. It is not bad. It is awful. It is awful. 

So I will yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from California, who is also the chair of the Oversight and Investigations Committee of Foreign Affairs Committee, 

Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

And I have learned a lot today about Jewish weddings that I 

didn’t know before. And it seems to me that Jewish weddings are 

much more fun than the Baptist weddings that I have been to, 

where they didn’t drink and they didn’t dance, and it was just getting rid of the kids, you know? So thank you for my friend, Mr. 

Ackerman. 

Mr. Ackerman and I weren’t always on good terms. I argued the 

case for supporting President Bush in his efforts in Iraq with Mr. 

Ackerman numerous times, and I was wrong. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. This has been a waste of our lives and our money. 

20

Just the very program we are talking about, this isn’t the first 

$900 million that we have spent on trying to help them build their 

police. In fact, the Department of Defense has been spending 

money and trying to help them build their police since 2003. If my 

figures are correct, we have spent about $7 billion by the Department of Defense, and they apparently have failed, perhaps for the 

same reasons that this program will fail, if you end up spending 

12 percent on the actual training and 88 percent of the money that 

is being allocated is actually going to provide for the people who 

are supposed to do the training, you know, so that they can get 

along in that country. 

Let me just say that I have in my life gone through several major 

upheavals such as this. And I got a very close look during the Vietnam War, and I was dismayed at that time. I remember going 

home from Hawaii—I was not in the military there. I was doing 

a part of a political operation in Vietnam, but I learned enough to 

know that we were going to lose. I mean, I just could see it. 

I was 19 years old. You see gore and you see incompetence and 

you see corruption, all put in the same package, and it does affect 

an idealism of a 19-year-old. I will tell you that much. 

And I hate to think what these young men and women that we 

have been sending over to Iraq are going to think when they come 

home and all the ones who know who they have lost. And for what? 

For a country that is run by a man who despises us: Mr. Maliki. 

People have no gratitude whatsoever for the bloodshed and the 

treasure that we have given them and provided them. 

And, again, I am not sure that we could succeed in Vietnam or 

Iraq. You had better choose your fights. I think hopefully we will 

learn we have got to choose our fights in the future so that we are 

not wasting people’s lives. 

And, like I say, it has not been because we haven’t had dedicated 

people. I mean, you know, Stuart Bowen has been in my office so 

many times trying to make sure that I know what was going on 

and the hard work that they have done. And he has had convictions and saved the taxpayers money. 

But, you know, you can’t do what is the undoable, and that is 

trying to run somebody else’s country for them, when they have 

such dramatic differences in culture and in desires. 

This police training program, that what you say—and, by the 

way, again, that figure of 12 percent training, that is not just for 

police training. I would like to suggest to my friends on the other 

side of the aisle who are much more open to the idea of benevolent 

and foreign aid to try to help others almost all the aid programs 

come down to that, come down to 12 percent going to what you 

really want it to go to. And 88 percent is going to make sure that 

the people there have drivers, great cars, wonderful accommodations. And, even with the NGOs, you will find them living in very 

fine houses and out in their SUVs and being taken care of like royalty in that country. 

We need to make sure that we pick where we are going to be 

participating and helping. And we obviously have not learned our 

lesson yet in Iraq because you are asking us to spend another $900 

million. And I hope that someone is listening because I wasn’t lisVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:29 Jan 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\113011\71400 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tening when I debated Mr. Ackerman years ago, and I should have 

been, on this. 

So I won’t ask you to comment on that, but I just thought I 

would throw that in. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Will Mr. Ackerman have an opportunity to comment? [Laughter.] 

I thank the gentleman for his remarks. The gentleman’s time has 

expired. 

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to congratulate my friend from California. It is a rare 

moment here in Capitol Hill that somebody says, ‘‘I should have 

been listening. I wish I had. And hat’s off to’’ somebody else. I 

think that is to your credit, Mr. Rohrabacher, that you are willing 

to do that. And I thank you as a colleague. I wish more of us had 

the capacity to do that around here. 

Madam Deputy Assistant Secretary, welcome. Is it your testimony here today that the State Department is fully committed to 

transparency and accountability with respect to any and all programs it has any oversight or responsibility for in Iraq? 

Ms. DARBY. We take our responsibility for accountability and cooperation with all of the audit entities, with Congress very, very seriously. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, ma’am. That was not my question. Is it your 

testimony that you are fully committed to transparency and accountability with respect to those responsibilities? 

Ms. DARBY. We are absolutely committed to accountability. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Full transparency, full accountability? 

Ms. DARBY. I am not sure how you define that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I guess I am not sure why you avoid the 

word. That was my question, and you have ducked it three times. 

Are we or are we not? Is the State Department fully committed to 

transparency, full transparency and accountability, to the taxpayers of the United States and the people we are trying to serve 

in Iraq or not? 

Ms. DARBY. We absolutely are accountable to the taxpayers, to 

our Congress, and to all of the oversight bodies who are looking 

into how we are spending our dollars, whether our programs are 

achieving success. We are absolutely——

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. I will sort of kind of take that as a commitment. 

Are you familiar with the August correspondence between the 

legal adviser to the Department of State and the IG’s office, SIGIR? 

Ms. DARBY. I am. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You have reviewed the actual letters? 

Ms. DARBY. I have. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Now, is it in your view consistent with that commitment, full commitment? It looks, frankly, to a layman, like myself, that, frankly, that the State Department is splitting hairs to 

avoid producing documents to SIGIR using the bureaucratic turf 

argument that this goes beyond your scope and, therefore, you are 

on our platform and we are not going to cooperate when you do 

22

that, as opposed to let’s see how we can work out a cooperative arrangement to make sure you have everything you need to get at 

the truth? 

So given your commitment here today to full accountability and 

transparency, I would like you to respond to the observation that 

this correspondence doesn’t look that way. It actually looks like the 

State Department is, you know, stonewalling. 

Ms. DARBY. Congressman, thank you for that comment. I will say 

that, you know, as I have said already, we very much value the 

oversight bodies and the advice and guidance and recommendations that they provide to us and service to the American taxpayer 

and to the Congress. 

The issue of coordination of requests from our oversight bodies; 

in particular, SIGIR, is not handled by my office. So I am not in 

the best position to comment on overall issues of jurisdiction and 

coordination. As you noted, our legal adviser’s office is very much 

involved in that. 

I do know, however, that there has been a series of meetings and 

dialogues between the Department and with SIGIR, in particular, 

to find ways to improve cooperation and coordination, including the 

appointment of a single point of contact. and the Deputy Chief Financial Officer, I believe, is the individual. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I have to reclaim my time, because, as you know, 

we have limits on time. But I appreciate your response. And I certainly appreciate the fact that, look, there are going to be turf 

issues. There are going to be differences of opinion. And I certainly 

welcome and I am sure SIGIR does as well your reiteration of the 

assurance that you are looking for ways to actually cooperate because this correspondence looks like a lawyer who is looking for 

ways not to cooperate and justify it legally. And I just mentioned 

that to you because it is not a reassuring set of correspondence, as 

far as I am concerned. 

I want to ask you. The senior Deputy Minister of Interior, Adnan 

al-Asadi, referred to the PDP program and said it was a hopeless 

waste of money. Why would the Deputy Minister of Interior of a 

country we are trying to help say such a thing? And are those sentiments the State Department has heard from other senior officials 

of the Iraqi Government? 

Ms. DARBY. I can’t speak to what may have led Principal Deputy 

Interior Minister Al-Asadi to make those remarks. As I indicated 

before, I did ask him about those remarks when I was in Iraq 

about 2 weeks ago. And he reiterated Iraq’s need for and interest 

in PDP and, in particular, the advising and mentoring that we are 

providing to Iraqi police. And he reiterated that point. He made a 

special trip over to our headquarters of our police program in 

Baghdad to reiterate that point to our advisers personally. And he 

indicated he had reviewed their CDs. 

And I think that the interaction that our advisers have had with 

their senior Iraqi counterparts speaks volumes and the positive response they have received and the real desire and quest for more 

help, guidance, and assistance speaks well to the prospects for success for this program. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. If the chairman would allow a very simple, direct 

follow-up? 

23

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman is recognized for 1 additional 

minute. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair so much for his graciousness. 

So is it your testimony that you believe the PDP is, in fact, an 

efficacious program, it is working? 

Mr. CHABOT. Sir, we are 2 months into the program. I am optimistic about its chances for success. And we have built in accountability and review measures so that we will be able to constantly 

monitor and assess whether we are having an impact, make corrections if we need to, and have an ongoing dialogue with the Congress about what success we are achieving and where we are not 

achieving it and the direction we see going forward. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Turner, is recognized for 5 

minutes. And following the gentleman from New York’s questions, 

we will move to the second panel. The gentleman is recognized. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

How has your day been going so far, Ms. Darby? 

Ms. DARBY. Just great. 

Mr. TURNER. Good. I am delighted. Maybe these will be easy 

ones. 

In January, we will be leaving a lot of civilians there: Advisers, 

NGOs, et cetera. Are there any strings or contingencies built into 

these plans to protect our citizens from some of the eventualities 

that we are sure will be coming up? They will be attacked. They 

will be in self-defense. We will be seeking immunity. There will be 

kidnappings, et cetera, et cetera. Is this in the thinking and something we should perhaps put there if it isn’t? 

Ms. DARBY. Sir, I can only speak to the Police Development Program, not to all of our citizens in Iraq. And I think probably diplomatic security is in the best position to answer the details of your 

questions, but I will say that we obviously take the security of the 

personnel that we deploy to Iraq very, very seriously. 

We are working very closely with a regional security officer, who 

is the lead for our Diplomatic Security Bureau, in the Country of 

Iraq to constantly monitor and assess the way that we operate the 

program to promote the greatest security for our personnel. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman yields back his time. 

We want to thank you very much, Ms. Darby, for your time here 

this afternoon. And we are going to move on to our second panel 

now. Thank you. 

Ms. DARBY. Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. CHABOT. As the two members of the second panel approach, 

I will go ahead and introduce them. First we have Stuart W. 

Bowen, Jr. Mr. Bowen was appointed Inspector General for the coalition, provisional authority, in January 2004 and has served as the 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction since October 

2004. 

As the taxpayers’ watchdog in Iraq, Mr. Bowen oversees more than $63 billion in U.S. funds, including the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, the Iraq Security Forces Fund, the Economic SupVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:29 Jan 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\113011\71400 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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port Fund, international narcotics control and law enforcement 

funding, and the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. Mr. 

Bowen’s public service career includes service to President George 

W. Bush as Deputy Assistant to the President, Deputy Staff Secretary, Special Assistant to the President, and Associate Counsel. 

He holds a B.A. from the University of the South and a J.D. from 

St. Mary’s Law School. 

And we welcome you here this afternoon, Mr. Bowen. Is Mr. 

Bowen here? Oh, okay. 

And then our other panel member is Glenn D. Furbish. Mr. 

Glenn Furbish is the Senior Audit Manager in the Office of the 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Mr. Furbish has 

served as a senior audit manager with the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction since May 2005. 

Prior to this, Mr. Furbish spent 28 years with the U.S. Government Accountability Office as a senior program analyst for defense 

issues. And before that, Mr. Furbish spent 6 years in the U.S. 

Army as an infantry officer and a helicopter pilot. 

He holds a B.S. from George Mason University in accounting. 

We want to thank you especially for your service to our country 

there, Mr. Furbish. 

And, Mr. Bowen, while you were gone, I said a whole lot of nice 

things about you. So if you are prepared, Mr. Bowen, we can go 

ahead and begin with you first. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. STUART W. BOWEN, JR., INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR 

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION, ACCOMPANIED BY MR. GLENN D. 

FURBISH, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITS, 

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ 

RECONSTRUCTION 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Ackerman, members of the committee. 

I am honored to be joined by Glenn Furbish, my Assistant Inspector General for Audit, who has served me faithfully for years, 

both here and in Iraq. 

And on a personal point, I am also especially blessed that my 

mother is here this morning, too, in the audience. 

Mr. CHABOT. Excellent. 

Mr. BOWEN. So welcome her. 

Today’s hearing addresses a crucial issue, as the previous panel 

and questions identify. And that is, what is the proper expenditure 

of another $1 billion in Iraq? And what will it accomplish? And 

that was the core purpose of our audit, which we began last April, 

struggled to execute through the spring and early summer, forcing 

me eventually to do something very unusual, send an obstruction 

letter to Secretary Clinton about the stonewalling that occurred in 

the course of the audit. 

That had the effect of breaking the logjam and getting us enough 

information to produce the audit that we issued on October 24th. 

It addresses, really, more than $1 billion in potential expenditures 

because the Congress has already approved and appropriated over 

700 million. State has in its possession now between 200 and 300 

25

million and has a pending request for 887 million. Do the math. 

That is more like $1.2 billion. 

The program just began about a month ago. And it is impossible 

to ascertain the nature of the progress thus far given its young 

state. 

But I did visit with Ambassador Sison when I was in Iraq on my 

31st trip 2 weeks ago. And she indicated to me that they embraced 

our recommendations from our audits. And we are implementing 

the assessment, as required. 

And I met with Deputy Secretary Burns 2 days ago. And he, 

similarly, embraced both what we have had to say and the need 

to address the weaknesses. 

The latest audit is just the latest in a series of audits we have 

been doing on police training since 2007. And they have echoed 

similar problems: Weak management controls, weak oversight. 

And, indeed, our audit of a year ago on this issue recommended 

that an assessment be done of the police forces in preparation for 

transition. It wasn’t done. That, curiously, also echoed a recommendation from a joint planning team from 2 years ago that 

went to Iraq and said, ‘‘Well, we have got to get a baseline.’’ It obviously, as we know, wasn’t done. 

All the things that we found in our audit were that there wasn’t 

a sufficiently comprehensive and detailed plan on what the state 

intended to accomplish through the PDP; that there wasn’t sufficient transparency in the budgeting; that the amount of funds that 

had been requested were probably more than what is now a scaleback program down from 192 trainers to 115 today; and that, as 

we have talked about, as the panel has discussed, Iraqi support 

was limited or even questionable. 

We made three recommendations: Do the assessment again, develop a comprehensive plan that has metrics and milestones that 

demonstrate what is going to be accomplished, what goals are 

there;—the committee has already addressed that—and that we obtain, the State Department obtain, written assurances pursuant to 

existing regulations adopted by the Congress from Iraq on their 

contributions, certainly at least to that program money. 

Currently, as we have heard, there are about 100 advisers on the 

ground over there. And they have got 200 to 300 million in the 

bank. They estimate the expense for the program is 500 million. 

You do the math. Eight hundred eighty-seven million may not be 

necessary for next year as you look at it. 

But, as was also mentioned by the committee, this is a 5-year 

program. It is envisioned to carry on perhaps at, what, $800 million to $1 billion a year for 5 years. So we are not talking about 

one. We are talking about potentially $5 billion. 

Iraqi buy-in remains an issue. They haven’t provided their contribution commitment. When I met with Deputy Minister Al-Asadi 

2 weeks ago and asked him, you know, ‘‘Have you withdrawn from 

your comments that you made to us a month ago?’’ he said, ‘‘Well, 

they are still on my Web site. They are still posted.’’ And he didn’t 

indicate to me that he would step back, although he said, ‘‘We welcome the support.’’

And so, with that, you know, I think it is deserving of careful 

scrutiny. I think the committee is demonstrating that today. 

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And, with that, I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bowen follows:]


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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Bowen. 

And I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes. I had some very 

probing questions, was really going to put you on the spot here this 

afternoon. But since you brought your mother, I can get a little 

more genteel. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. All kidding aside, we just want to get the appropriate responses out there. 

First of all, SIGIR documented in its PDP audit what it believes 

constitutes continued obstructions to the execution of SIGIR’s statutory authority to conduct oversight on the part of DoS. To what 

do you attribute this resistance? 

In the correspondence between DoS and SIGIR, DoS expounded 

a view that resources and programs which are shared by both the 

PDP and Embassy Baghdad do not fall under SIGIR’s jurisdictions. 

Do you face some more objections in other audits? Could you address that? 

Mr. BOWEN. No, we haven’t faced similar objections other than 

in one prior instance with the State Department regarding an 

audit we wanted to carry out of Triple Canopy, a major defense security contractor in country. And we withdrew our audit 31⁄2 years 

ago because the State Department IG announced an audit that was 

virtually identical. So there was a rational basis for us not pursuing it. 

The State Department IG is not auditing the Police Development 

Program. And the single biggest largest program in the United 

States is funding next year in Iraq. And, thus, it is crucial for the 

Congress to know the truth. 

Mr. CHABOT. Well, SIGIR on numerous occasions cites plans and 

documents which were not provided. Do you believe these documents exist and were not provided because of jurisdictional disagreements or, alternatively, do you think that the level of information SIGIR received is reflective of the state of planning which 

actually exists or existed in the INL? And have there been any further developments since the audit was completed? 

Mr. BOWEN. Some of those documents did exist. Yet, I think also 

some were developed in the face of our requests. Indeed, as we 

asked for plans and a comprehensive plan about what did the PDP 

constitute, we received a PowerPoint slide presentation of about 23 

slides. 

Later, further supplementation was more detailed, but it appeared it had been developed subsequent to our request. On the 

other hand, we never got the Fiscal Year 2011 spend plan, which 

certainly existed. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Mr. Bowen, in your testimony, you observed that ‘‘In August 

2010, INL received $450 million for start-up costs and $200 million 

for Fiscal Year 2011 fourth quarter operating costs.’’

According to a spend plan, INL expected to use most of these 

funds to upgrade hub and aviation facilities and purchase rotary 

wing aircraft. However, INL has suspended plans to operate dedicated aircraft for the PDP. 

If not for INL, what do you believe the money was spent for? 

34

Mr. BOWEN. Well, I believe part of the purposes of the air wing, 

the State Department’s air wing in Iraq was for the movement of 

the senior officials and others around the country on missions and 

for DV visits as well. 

As you pointed out, that particular aspect of the program was 

suspended, which raises a question about the 887 million request 

since it embraces the airway. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you. 

As you note in your testimony,

‘‘A cardinal rule for successful international development 

programs is that the host government must be fully engaged 

in and supportive of program planning and execution. As 

SIGIR has found from 7 years of oversight work in Iraq, programs must be geared to indigenous priorities, capacities, and 

needs. 

‘‘Senior officials from Iraq’s Ministry of Interior told SIGIR 

this fall that they are ready and willing to work with INL on 

the PDP, but they also noted that the program’s merits are impossible to assess as of yet, that they were not sufficiently consulted on the program’s scope, and that they are withholding 

judgment until they see what benefits come from it. 

‘‘In an October meeting with my deputy, Senior Deputy Minister of Interior Adnan al-Asadi, said, ‘What tangible benefit is 

there to my ministry of 650,000 people who are in the midst 

of massive security challenges on the streets of Iraq? Very little.’ ’’

What is your prognosis for Iraqi support, financial or otherwise, 

for the PDP? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, I think they are not turning their back on $1 

billion. They don’t shoot gift horses, do they? They are willing to 

accept the $62 billion later. The Iraqis have not said no to any U.S. 

dollar sent to Iraq to date. And they are not saying no to these. 

The issue, though, is, as the committee has already addressed, 

is this wisely spent? And will it advance a goal that needs to be 

met that mainly the internal security of Iraq. And while Minister 

Al-Asadi is welcoming at this juncture of his support, at first blush, 

when he was first engaged seriously on the topic, he demurred and 

perhaps spoke off the cuff regarding his, at best, curiosity about 

why we were spending so much money on an issue. 

That President Talibani was addressed 4 days ago in a public 

statement. He said, ‘‘Iraq is capable of providing its own internal 

security.’’

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you very much. My time has expired. 

Gentleman from New York, Ranking Member Ackerman, sir, an 

extra 5 minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Do these programs ever work? 

Mr. BOWEN. They work as best as they can. It depends on defining goals. And you raise a——

Mr. ACKERMAN. I can fly as best I can, too. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, Mr. Ackerman, your implicit point is welltaken. We did train 450,000 Iraqis to be police across the country. 

We equipped them. They are better than they were before. But 

what we uncovered in our audit of a year ago, as DoD managed 

35

this program, we discovered that there weren’t sufficient metrics or 

an over-arching strategic plan to judge whether they worked. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. How much did we spend on that? That didn’t 

work. 

Mr. BOWEN. $8 billion. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. $8 billion that didn’t work. So what are the lessons we learned? 

Mr. BOWEN. Be careful with the taxpayers’ money in stabilization 

operations. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Okay. How do we apply that to the new management so they know how to apply it? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, I don’t know the answer to that question, but 

I would say, as we apply it to this, we should better assess what 

the Iraqis’ real needs are, which is why a year ago, we said, ‘‘Do 

an assessment.’’ Then you can target your aid. The aid is preceding 

an assessment or, actually, now coincident with. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Let me ask a question because I am having difficulty getting my arms around this. How do you assess in the near 

term whether you are teaching human rights to people who are 

learning it? How do you evaluate gender rights absent the 20-year 

sky view look at it? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, Mr. Ackerman, I think you have raised a larger question about assessing development. Those are——

Mr. ACKERMAN. It is a dilemma. How do you measure it? 

Mr. BOWEN. I think it is extremely difficult to do, Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. So we don’t know if we are making progress toward it either? 

Mr. BOWEN. I think that is a fair assessment. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. So there is no way to measure it? 

Mr. BOWEN. On those two issues, given the long-term nature of 

such programs, it would be difficult to assess it on a year-to-year 

basis. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. So there is no way to evaluate it. We have no 

oversight over a program that is costing hundreds of millions of 

dollars. And it is not going to be able to be demonstrated, even if 

it is working or not working. 

Mr. BOWEN. With regard to gender and human rights, I think 

that is true. With regard to the 48 other things that they are doing, 

I think it depends on the particular topic they are undertaking. 

For example, one of the programs is, as I was briefed by Ambassador Sison, canine training; in other words, providing them bombsniffing dogs, which also has been going on. The military did do 

that for years already. So there are some ground-level aspects of 

this program as well as higher-level. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. What do we have the best chance of accurately 

measuring, evaluating in all of the goals of the program? 

Mr. BOWEN. I think it is inherently difficult to measure mentoring, but the best, the most measurable aspects of this program 

are those that are subject to more objective analysis, like how 

many canine dogs have you provided and training to trainers who 

can use them in bomb-sniffing situations? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Let’s say the answer is 106. Is that a good result? 

36

Mr. BOWEN. That is why you have to set goals ahead of time. 

And that was one of our criticisms about the program. They didn’t 

set goals. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Are they setting goals now? 

Mr. BOWEN. That is what I have been told. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. How many bomb-sniffing dogs do they need to be 

successful? 

Mr. BOWEN. They haven’t told me that. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. How many women in general do they need to be 

successful? 

Mr. BOWEN. We are going to follow up in the spring with another 

audit to look at the effects and results of the changes made by the 

Department in implementing our recommendations. And I can better answer those questions then. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. They don’t have these metrics in place now? 

Mr. BOWEN. I have been told that they are putting them in. This 

was a core criticism of the audit, the absence of milestones and 

metrics. That was our second finding, really. And they said that 

they are doing that. We haven’t gone back in to review the success 

of implementing those changes yet. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I used to be a school teacher. I knew if a kid got 

between 60 and 65, he was going to get a D and knew what the 

numbers were to give him an F and where I was going to give him 

an A. Do they have such a chart? 

Mr. BOWEN. Not that I am aware of. They didn’t when we did 

the audit. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. So they have not said anything? 

Mr. BOWEN. No metrics, no milestones. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. No metrics, no milestones, no money. That is my 

point of view. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Marino, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Chairman. 

Good afternoon, Mr. Bowen, Mr. Furbish. Thank you for being 

here. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you. 

Mr. MARINO. I believe both of you gentlemen were in the audience when I was questioning the Secretary Darby about missing 

funds. This may not be directly on point, but it goes to the credibility of the prime minister and his government and it goes to accounting for our tax dollars. So perhaps you can help me with 

something. 

I am going to read you something that I found early on. In Octo- ber in a USA Today article, it was reported that there was $217 

million in cash that was stored in a palace that is still unaccounted 

for in Baghdad. There is an additional $1.6 billion that was intended for distribution among the regions in Iraq that is unaccounted for. And that was part of a $2.4 billion deposit to the Baghdad government. 

Also, other information that has come to my attention is that 

one, if not many more, of the government officials have just merely 

walked away with millions of dollars. And the government has introduced past legislation laws saying that any government official 

37

is immune from prosecution for accounting for any of this money. 

No one has been held responsible for it. And is this information accurate? 

Mr. BOWEN. With regard to the amnesty law of 2008 that the 

Council of Representatives passed, yes. Senior government officials 

in Iraq, Iraqi officials told me that that essentially wiped the slate 

clean for fraud committed prior to that date. 

Regarding the development fund for Iraq issues, which you 

raised, we did issue a new audit on that issue, our third that identified and raised new questions, identified some answers but raised 

new questions about the U.S. use of Iraqi dollars. 

And, Glenn, why don’t you address what our next audit is going 

to hit regarding the $217 million and the $2.8 billion? 

Mr. MARINO. Can you do that rather succinctly? I am limited 

here to about 21⁄2 minutes. 

Mr. FURBISH. Very quickly, we are looking right now at how the 

U.S. used that money. That money was used by the Corps of Engineers to carrying out projects in Iraq. And we are looking at their 

records to account for that money. We will be reporting on that 

within the next 2 months. 

Mr. MARINO. Perhaps we should ask the prime minister if he 

wants to keep these programs in effect over there to account for the 

money that has been missing. There is no indication at this point. 

And perhaps you can help me with this rhetorical statement that 

there have been no plans for Iraq to pass back anything that we 

have spent over there. We will never recoup from the lives that we 

lost over there. 

How can we continue to—I will use this term loosely—do business with a government that has proven to be corrupt, has proven 

to have very little concern for their overall population? How can I 

justify to my people in the Tenth Congressional District of north 

central Pennsylvania that we are going to spend billions of dollars 

more in this Iraqi Government and my people are losing their jobs? 

If I hear of one more time of a foreign despot leaving or living 

a life of luxury on billions of dollars of taxpayer money, I want to 

be in charge of the team that goes over there to apprehend them 

and bring them back. 

Mr. BOWEN. Mr. Marino, corruption is and has been a devastating problem in Iraq and has inhibited progress across the 

board on the relief and reconstruction front. More importantly, it 

inhibits progress for the average Iraqi. They are going to have a 

budget next year of over $110 billion. But the corruption issue, you 

know, raises real questions about the proper use of that money. 

Mr. MARINO. But if I might interrupt you, how are you going to 

measure whether we are making any improvements on curtailing 

corruption over there? 

Mr. BOWEN. It is difficult to do because it occurs in the shadow. 

However, let me identify one important step that we have been 

calling for for years and did occur this year. And that was the repeal of an article in their criminal code that allowed any minister 

to absolve any employee from any liability for fraud. That is obvious counter to the basic notions of democracy. They finally did it. 

And so I commend them on it. 

38

But the reality is, is having laws on the books like that failing 

to have a Commission on Integrity that does its job, failing to have 

a judiciary that will convict people for corruption is why Iraq is in 

the bottom five in the world in transparency internationals index. 

Mr. MARINO. Well, at this point I am not convinced to support 

any legislation that would send any more money over to Iraq. And 

I see my time is up, but I thank you gentlemen for the work that 

you have been doing and that you will continue to do. 

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Mr. Marino. 

Mr. MARINO. I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Higgins, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Bowen, you had indicated that you had been in Iraq 33 

times? 

Mr. BOWEN. 31. 

Mr. HIGGINS. 31. Dating back to? 

Mr. BOWEN. February 2004. 

Mr. HIGGINS. 2004. Your last trip was? 

Mr. BOWEN. 2 weeks ago. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. The effort starting in 2003 was to commit $8 

billion to train the Iraqi police force some 450,000 Iraqis. Since 

there are no baseline assessments, again I would ask you, as I 

asked the previous witness, anecdotally what is your sense of the 

security system, the internal security system, with respect to Iraq, 

where the holes are? Are there any places like in Baghdad, for example, or Ramadi that provide a good example of a successful result from this financial effort? 

Mr. BOWEN. I think there have been examples of success across 

the country. Anbar Province is much safer than it was 6 years ago. 

Kurdistan, the three northern provinces, are largely very well in 

order. 

Mr. HIGGINS. But they were pretty calm to begin with. 

Mr. BOWEN. You’re right. There are two Iraqs. There is 

Kurdistan and the southern 15. But, really, what you are addressing is the current state of the Iraqi rule of law system as a whole. 

And that embraces corrections, the judiciary, and the police. 

And I think that there continue to be serious problems on all 

fronts, not just police training. The judiciary, over 45 judges have 

been killed in the last 7 years. I met with Judge Medhat during 

my trip. And another judge had just been killed. And he was bemoaning again the lack of weapons cards for his judge’s security 

members. 

And then on the prison front, you know, frankly, we invested a 

lot of money building prisons and we wasted a lot of money. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Sadr City, five million population center of Baghdad. How does the Iraqi Government deal with Sadr City, just stay 

out of there altogether? 

Mr. BOWEN. I think it is a truce of sorts between the Sadrists, 

who control that area, and the rest of Baghdad. And I think that 

is why, frankly, Mr. Maliki’s senior Deputy Minister, Al-Asadi, and 

others are concerned that the primary location for the Police Development Program in Iraq is right on the edge of Sadr City. It is diVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:29 Jan 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\113011\71400 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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rectly next to the Baghdad Police College, another place where we 

wasted a lot of money, across the street from the Minister of Interior and adjacent to Sadr City and, thus, a magnet for indirect fire. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Clearly there is a lack of oversight and transparency. And that problem is seemingly pervasive and growing or 

at least since we have initiated this back in 2003. 

Why is it that the State Department would deliberately make efforts to obstruct efforts to bring greater oversight and transparency? Why is there that adversarial relationship? It would seem 

to me that your efforts would be to benefit the effective use, efficient use of American resources in that region because we all have 

a strategic interest in seeing that region evolve. Why is it that you 

suspect that the State Department is seemingly obstructing those 

efforts? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, it was obstructing. I think we heard today that 

they are supportive, almost fully supportive, of our oversight at 

this stage. And it took an obstruction letter, though, Mr. Higgins, 

as you were pointing to to break that logjam. 

Why? You know, I can’t read into the exact motives, but I think, 

to a certain extent, it was a legalistic argument about jurisdiction. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes. Okay. Just, you know, a final thought on this. 

You know, someone said, I think it was Tom Friedman. He posed 

a question. He said, ‘‘Is Iraq the way it is because Saddam was the 

way he is or is Saddam the way he is because Iraq is the way it 

is?’’

I just think when you look at this long, expensive effort—and I 

don’t just mean financial expense, expense in human capital—in 

the surge experience, again, which was to tamp down the violence, 

to provide a breathing space, within which all of the political factions in Iraq could reconcile their differences and evolve. 

It seems as though, you know the surge succeeded militarily. But 

politically the situation doesn’t seem to evolve. And obviously the 

policing issue, as I mentioned previously, in northern Ireland is 

fundamental to the success of any kind of power-sharing agreement. 

And without meaningful progress over the past 8 years in this 

renewed effort, given this horrible past of wasted money, of great 

expectations and lofty goals but very, very little to show for it, it 

seems as though, you know, a $1 billion expenditure over the next 

5 years moving forward is not a good use of American resources in 

a region that I think we have done everything that we can do in 

order to help them achieve their objectives, whatever they are, be 

they consistent with our objectives or not. 

So I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes and will 

be our final questioner this afternoon. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome both to Mr. Furbish and Mr. Bowen. General 

Bowen, I am sure your mother is proud of your performance today 

and your service to your country. Thirty-one trips to Iraq, that deserves a special status. I, in fact, traveled with you on one of those 

31 trips. And I can vouch for the fact that you get your hands dirty 

in trying to understand what is going on. 

40

Let me pick up where my colleague Mr. Higgins sort of led us, 

which is you said that you issued to the State Department a letter 

of obstruction. Is that right? 

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. How often do letters of obstruction get issued 

from inspector generals? 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, I explored that question after we issued it. 

And my staff tells me that, at least over the last 4 years, ours was 

the only one. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So on relatively unprecedented ground. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. But you heard the first witness in the first panel 

reassure us up and down that she was mostly kind of fully committed to full transparency or transparency and accountability. I 

assume a letter of obstruction would, sadly, contradict such an assertion. 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, Mr. Connolly, it actually worked in this case. 

We received virtually no documents before August 3rd, the date of 

the letter. And afterwards we got enough to do the audit. We didn’t 

get everything we asked for, but vis-a`-vis what we had in June and 

July, it was a world of difference. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. If I understood your answer to Mr. Higgins’ questioning, you attributed this to just turf protection, bureaucratic turf 

protection. 

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, sir. I think that is true. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, you know, taxpayer money is on the line 

here. Did you not sense any commitment from the Department of 

State and its officials to joining you in trying to make sure that we 

were protecting this $1 billion investment of U.S. taxpayer money? 

Mr. BOWEN. I sensed it today. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Today? I heard you respond to my colleague Mr. 

Ackerman in a declarative sentence, ‘‘There are no metrics and no 

milestones with respect to the PDP.’’ Is that correct? 

Mr. BOWEN. There weren’t when we carried out our audit. They 

are remedying that issue now. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. But you don’t know what they are? 

Mr. BOWEN. Not yet. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. It would strike, I think, the average American, if not the average Member of Congress to invest $1 billion in anything absent metrics and milestones is a fool’s herring, whatever 

the intention, however noble the motivation. If you can’t measure 

it, it is not real as far as I am concerned. Is that a view shared 

by you, Mr. Bowen? 

Mr. BOWEN. That is my judgment. I have said that if you don’t 

show the Congress good metrics and good milestones and identify 

what your goals are, it is tough to ask for more money. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. I think most of us would maybe feel we 

shouldn’t, not only more money. We shouldn’t spend a dime, frankly, without some rigorous metrics and milestones that are efficacious, that are meaningful. 

The object here is to train a viable police force that has some respect for law that isn’t corrupt, that can win the confidence of the 

people and, frankly, enter into the space we create when we withdraw. Is that not true? 

41

Mr. BOWEN. I think that is exactly right, Mr. Connolly. And we spent, as I said, $8 billion already. This is a 5-year program with, 

you know, several hundred million, actually $400 million, already 

spent on this part of it. Are we going to spend $2-, $3-, $4 billion 

more to do what when President Talibani said 4 days ago or 5? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. To what did you attribute—you cited in your report, I believe, this quote I read the previous witness from the senior Deputy Minister of Interior Adnan Al-Asadi, who I think referred to the PDP as a hopeless waste of money, your money, 

American money. Is that true? 

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. That was his early October interview 

with my deputy, Ginger Cruz. And I met with him 21⁄2 weeks ago. 

He moderated his tone a little bit, but when I pressed him more 

firmly, he said, ‘‘Well, it is still on’’——

Mr. CONNOLLY. ‘‘Still on my Web site’’? 

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Now, you heard the previous witness attempt, I 

think, to deflect that statement and argue that while our understanding is now that he is on board and he supports the program, 

they are still certainly making the request for the funding of the 

program. And she again I think sort of deflected my question about 

‘‘Well, is that a representative view of senior officials over in Iraq 

or was that sort of an outlier point of view or a rare moment of 

candor?’’

You might want to comment. My time is up. 

Mr. BOWEN. Well, he was the only senior official from the Ministry of Interior to whom I addressed that issue. And the core point 

is he did not step too far away from it in our discussions. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. Did you want to 

follow up? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say thank you 

to you for holding this hearing. I think this hearing has raised really serious questions about this program. And whatever our intentions are, Lord knows we do need a well-trained police force in 

Iraq. 

I don’t leave this hearing with any confidence that the program 

in front of us with $1 billion being planned in expenditures over 

the next several years has the slightest chance of being effective. 

And I think that raises real questions about how we proceed. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. And I would like to thank the members 

of the panel, both up here, for their participation and probing questions this afternoon, the panel, both panels here this afternoon. 

Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks. 

And, if there is no further business to come before the committee, 

we are adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 2:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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