alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

OSIEL GRAJALES-VELASQUEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 22-179

Agency No.

A213-082-606

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 27, 2023**

Pasadena, California

Before: N.R. SMITH, LEE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Osiel Grajales-Velasquez, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (BIA) dismissal of his appeal of an 

Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his applications for cancellation of removal

and withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We 

dismiss in part and deny in part.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not 

precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUN 29 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 22-179

1. We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s determination that 

Grajales-Velasquez is ineligible for cancellation of removal. Although GrajalesVelasquez frames his argument in due process terms, suggesting that the agency’s 

weighing of the relevant evidence violated his due process rights, his argument 

boils down to a challenge to the merits of the agency’s determination that his 

removal would not cause his U.S.-citizen children exceptional and extremely 

unusual hardship. This court lacks jurisdiction to review that factual 

determination, see Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614, 1627 (2022)—even when a 

challenge to that determination is “recast” as a due process argument, see VilchizSoto v. Holder, 688 F.3d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 2012).

2. The BIA did not err in its determination that Grajales-Velasquez is 

ineligible for withholding of removal because there is no nexus between the 

persecution he fears and a protected ground. See Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 

1136, 1142 n.2 (9th Cir. 2021). Grajales-Velasquez did not provide any evidence 

to support the conclusion that cartel members harmed him or his relatives because 

of their family relationship. Moreover, any errors in the IJ’s analysis of GrajalesVelasquez’s withholding claim are harmless, given the BIA’s de novo review of 

that claim. See Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 

2015). And even if the BIA incorrectly applied the “one central reason” asylum

standard for evaluating nexus rather than the “a reason” withholding standard, see 

Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 358 (9th Cir. 2017), this error is 

harmless because the BIA properly determined that there was no nexus at all 
3 22-179

between the harm Grajales-Velasquez fears and his family membership,see Singh 

v. Barr, 935 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2019).1

PETITION DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.

1 Grajales-Velasquez forfeited any asylum or Convention Against Torture claims

by failing to raise them in his opening brief. See Perez-Camacho v. Garland, 54 

F.4th 597, 602 n.2 (9th Cir. 2022).
* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular

cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes

needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal

profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-40556

Conference Calendar

__________________

KEVIN C. MARBLES,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JIMMY ALFORD, Warden; ROBERT J.

PARKER, Warden; STEPHEN HAM, CO III;

BILLY HART, CO III; RANDY GRANT, CO

III; DOMINICO ODIAKA, CO III,

 Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:95-CV-35

- - - - - - - - - -

August 23, 1995

Before KING, JOLLY, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Kevin C. Marbles appeals from the district court's dismissal

without prejudice of his civil rights action for failure to

prosecute. A district court may sua sponte dismiss an action for

failure to prosecute or to comply with a court order. McCullough

v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988). Such a

dismissal is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. 
No. 95-40556

-2-

The two-year statute of limitations has not yet run on

Marbles' claims. See Henson-El v. Rogers, 923 F.2d 51, 52 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1235 (1991); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.

Code Ann. § 16.003 (West 1995). Because the dismissal by the

district court was without prejudice and no statute of

limitations bars the refiling of Marbles' claim, Marbles has not

suffered prejudicial harm resulting from the dismissal. See

McCullough, 835 F.2d at 1127. The district court thus did not

abuse its discretion by dismissing Marbles' complaint without

prejudice. 

AFFIRMED.
II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2151 

To authorize full funding of payments for eligible federally connected children 

under title VIII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 

1965 by fiscal year 2011. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

DECEMBER 20, 2005 

Mr. DURBIN (for himself and Mr. OBAMA) introduced the following bill; which 

was read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, 

Labor, and Pensions 

A BILL 

To authorize full funding of payments for eligible federally 

connected children under title VIII of the Elementary 

and Secondary Education Act of 1965 by fiscal year 

2011. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Fair Share for Military 

5 Children in Public Schools Act’’. 
2 

•S 2151 IS

1 SEC. 2. PAYMENTS FOR ELIGIBLE FEDERALLY CONNECTED 

2 CHILDREN UNDER TITLE VIII OF THE ELE3 MENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 

4 OF 1965. 

5 Section 8014(b) of the Elementary and Secondary 

6 Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7714(b)) is amended 

7 to read as follows: 

8 ‘‘(b) BASIC PAYMENTS; PAYMENTS FOR HEAVILY IM9 PACTED LOCAL EDUCATIONAL AGENCIES.—For the pur10 pose of making payments under section 8003(b), there are 

11 authorized to be appropriated— 

12 ‘‘(1) for fiscal year 2007, such sums as may be 

13 necessary to pay to each local educational agency for 

14 such fiscal year 70.4 percent of the full amount com15 puted for such agency for such fiscal year under 

16 paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 8003(b); 

17 ‘‘(2) for fiscal year 2008, such sums as may be 

18 necessary to pay to each local educational agency for 

19 such fiscal year 77.8 percent of the full amount com20 puted for such agency for such fiscal year under 

21 paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 8003(b); 

22 ‘‘(3) for fiscal year 2009, such sums as may be 

23 necessary to pay to each local educational agency for 

24 such fiscal year 85.2 percent of the full amount com25 puted for such agency for such fiscal year under 

26 paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 8003(b); 
3 

•S 2151 IS

1 ‘‘(4) for fiscal year 2010, such sums as may be 

2 necessary to pay to each local educational agency for 

3 such fiscal year 92.6 percent of the full amount com4 puted for such agency for such fiscal year under 

5 paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 8003(b); and 

6 ‘‘(5) for fiscal year 2011, such sums as may be 

7 necessary to pay to each local educational agency for 

8 such fiscal year the full amount computed for such 

9 agency for such fiscal year under paragraphs (1) 

10 and (2) of section 8003(b).’’. 

Æ
## Record of conversation

Mondoil Enterprises International, LLC operates as a subsidiary of RAK Petroleum Holdings, an Olso

listed oil and gas investment company. It is a CFR part 91 operator managed by Jet Aviation Flight
Services which is a subsidiary of General Dynamics Corporation

. On September 18, 2015 I, Michael E. Filippell, sen t an email to Mr. Bill Thomas, Jet Aviation Flight Services, Inc. Director of Operations
, in which I outlined the requirements for petitioning for an exemption to an SFAR, ci ting 14 CFR 11.63 and
14 CFR 11.81. I explained the importance of discussing why granting the exemption would not adversely affect safety, or how it would provide a level of safety at least equivalent to that provided by SFAR 77
and the method by which yo u will obtain current threat information and integrate that information into all phases of your proposed operation. While every question is important, these can be pivotal in helping us choose an appropriate course of action. Mr

. Thomas responded on the s ame day and stated
he would make some amendments removing the September 21 date, change the security information provided, and submit the petition.
CBI REPLACEMENT PAGE

EPA-HQ-OW-2014-0598

DCN: SGE00724.A17









THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN REMOVED BECAUSE IT 

CONTAINS CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION 

(CBI) PER 40 CFR PART 2, SUBPART B.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 4, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-40192

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOE ZAVALA,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

(4:02-CR-73-7)

Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Joe Zavala contends that the evidence was insufficient to

support his conviction for conspiracy to distribute 100 kilograms

or more of marijuana. Zavala moved for acquittal at the close of

the Government’s case but not at the close of all of the evidence.

Therefore, his claim is reviewed only to determine whether there

was a manifest miscarriage of justice warranting a reversal.

United States v. McCarty, 36 F.3d 1349, 1358 (5th Cir. 1994); see

also United States v. Dean, 59 F.3d 1479, 1489 (5th Cir. 1995),
2

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1064 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 979

F.2d 1024, 1029 (5th Cir. 1992). Zavala does not satisfy this

narrow standard.

AFFIRMED
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Jimmy Earl MAY.

No. 60481.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Aug. 19, 1977.

In re: Jimmy Earl May applying for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

Writ granted. Bail reduced to $50,000.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2101 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2101

                    For the relief of Charles Nyaga.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           December 14, 2005

 Mr. Chambliss introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
                    For the relief of Charles Nyaga.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any 
order, for the purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
U.S.C. 1101 et seq.), Charles Nyaga shall be deemed to have been 
lawfully admitted to, and remained in, the United States, and shall be 
eligible for issuance of an immigrant visa or for adjustment of status 
under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1255).
    (b) Application and Payment of Fees.--Subsection (a) shall apply 
only if the application for issuance of an immigrant visa or the 
application for adjustment of status is filed with appropriate fees 
within 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act.
    (c) Reduction of Immigrant Visa Numbers.--Upon the granting of an 
immigrant visa to Charles Nyaga, the Secretary of State shall instruct 
the proper officer to reduce by 1, during the current or subsequent 
fiscal year, the total number of immigrant visas that are made 
available to natives of the country of the alien's birth under section 
202(e) or 203(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1152(e), 1153(a)), as applicable.
                                 <all>
```
#### James Patrick ROBINSON and John Brent Menier, Plaintiffs, v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS et al., Defendants-Third-Party Plaintiffs-Third-Party Defendants-Appellants.

No. 6219.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

Dec. 20, 1977.

*468Taylor & Trosclair by Earl B. Taylor, Opelousas, for plaintiff-appellant.

Lewis & Lewis by James T. Guglielmo, Opelousas, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Doran, Jr., Baton Rouge, McBride & Brewster by Norman P. Foret, Lafayette, for defendant-appellee.

Before CULPEPPER, GUIDRY and FORET, JJ.

GUIDRY, Judge.

The above numbered and entitled matter was consolidated for trial in the district court with *Ferguson*v. *Dixie Auto Insurance Co. et al.,*353 So.2d 468 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1977) and *Bergeron, Ind., et al. v. Louisiana Department of Highways et al.,*353 So.2d 469 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1977). These cases remain consolidated on appeal and we decide all of these cases today. The facts and law are common to all three cases.

These consolidated cases arise out of an intersectional collision between a Ford and a Volkswagen which claimed the lives of the three occupants of the Volkswagen and caused physical injury to Marc Bergeron, a guest passenger in the Ford automobile. Dixie Auto Insurance Co. and Early American Insurance Co., the insurers of the negligent driver of the Ford settled the three wrongful death claims which were filed in these suits and now, as assignees of these claims, seek contribution from the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Highways.

The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the Department of Highways was guilty of negligence in allowing grass and weeds to obscure the intersection.

The trial judge found no negligence on the part of the Department of Highways concluding that, although there was a minimal obscurement of vision as to the lower part of vehicles traveling on the favored highway as a driver approached the intersection on the unfavored road, when the driver on the unfavored street reached the stop sign he was afforded almost unlimited vision down the main highway. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Judy Bergeron, driver of the Ford automobile, in failing to obey a stop sign and overhanging flasher signal and recklessly driving her vehicle directly in the path of oncoming traffic. We affirm these conclusions of the trial court finding a reasonable factual basis in the record to support same. *Canter v. Koehring,*283 So.2d 716 (La.1973). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed at appellants’ costs.

AFFIRMED.
**Exhibit      32.2**

**CERTIFICATION**

|   | (1) | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d),                as                applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and |
|--------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company                at the dates and for the periods indicated. |
|--------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:October                24, 2008  | /s/                Bennet P. Tchaikovsky                                                                                              |   |
|--------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                       | Bennet                P. TchaikovskyChief                Financial Officer(Principal                Financial and Accounting Officer) |   |

----
#### John BRINKLEY and Vincenta Brinkley, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 76-1913.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Dec. 6, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 16, 1978.

Preddy, Kutner & Hardy and Joel Ka-plan, Miami, for appellant.

Mahoney, Hadlow & Adams and Paul C. Huck and Sharon L. Wolfe, Miami, for ap-pellee.

Before HAVERFIELD, NATHAN and KEHOE, JJ.

NATHAN, Judge.

This appeal questions the correctness of a summary final judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company, in a personal injury action stemming from an accident in which the telephone booth owned by the defendant, and occupied by the plaintiff, John Brinkley, located in a shopping center parking lot, was struck by an automobile. The automobile was owned by a third party, and the driver was allegedly drunk at the time of the accident.

We have examined the record on appeal, and have concluded that there are genuine issues of material fact in this case which are triable by jury, including foreseeability; the negligence of Southern Bell; and whether the actions of the driver of the automobile constituted an independent intervening cause. See *Wills v. Sears, Roebuck & Company,*351 So.2d 29 (Fla.1977); *Vining*v. *Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc.,*354 So.2d 54 (Fla.1977). Defendant not having been entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the summary final judgment is, therefore,

Reversed.
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 184 (Tuesday, September 23, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Page 49674]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-25249]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board, Monticello 
Site

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of open meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act (Public Law 92-463, 86 Stat. 770) notice is hereby given of the 
following Advisory Board Committee Meeting: Environmental Management 
Site-Specific Advisory Board, Monticello Site.
    Date and Time: Tuesday, October 21, 1997--6:00 p.m.-8:00 p.m.
    Address: San Juan County Courthouse, 2nd Floor Conference Room, 117 
South Main, Monticello, Utah 84535.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Audrey Berry, Public Affairs 
Specialist, Department of Energy Grand Junction Projects Office, P.O. 
Box 2567, Grand Junction, CO, 81502 (970) 248-7727.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Purpose of the Board

    The purpose of the Board is to advise DOE and its regulators in the 
areas of environmental restoration, waste management, and related 
activities.

Tentative Agenda

    Update on Operable Unit I project; reports from subcommittees on 
local training and hiring, health and safety, and future land use.

Public Participation

    The meeting is open to the public. Written statements may be filed 
with the Committee either before or after the meeting. Individuals who 
wish to make oral statements pertaining to agenda items should contact 
Audrey Berry's office at the address or telephone number listed above. 
Requests must be received 5 days prior to the meeting and reasonable 
provision will be made to include the presentation in the agenda. The 
Designated Federal Official is empowered to conduct the meeting in a 
fashion that will facilitate the orderly conduct of business. Each 
individual wishing to make public comment will be provided a maximum of 
5 minutes to present their comments.

Minutes

    The minutes of this meeting will be available for public review and 
copying at the Freedom of Information Public Reading Room, 1E-190, 
Forrestal Building, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585 
between 9:00 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday-Friday, except Federal holidays. 
Minutes will also be available by writing to Audrey Berry, Department 
of Energy Grand Junction Projects Office, P.O. Box 2567, Grand 
Junction, CO 81502, or by calling her at (303) 248-7727.

    Issued at Washington, DC on September 18, 1997.
Rachel M. Samuel,
Deputy Advisory Committee Management Officer.
[FR Doc. 97-25249 Filed 9-22-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 95-40556 Conference Calendar

__________________
KEVIN C. MARBLES, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus JIMMY ALFORD, Warden; ROBERT J. PARKER, Warden; STEPHEN HAM, CO III; BILLY HART, CO III; RANDY GRANT, CO III; DOMINICO ODIAKA, CO III, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:95-CV-35

- - - - - - - - - - August 23, 1995 Before KING, JOLLY, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Kevin C. Marbles appeals from the district court's dismissal without prejudice of his civil rights action for failure to prosecute. A district court may sua sponte dismiss an action for failure to prosecute or to comply with a court order. McCullough v. Lynaugh , 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988). Such a dismissal is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.No. 95-40556 -2- The two-year statute of limitations has not yet run on Marbles' claims. See Henson-El v. Rogers , 923 F.2d 51, 52 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 501 U.S. 1235 (1991); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003 (West 1995). Because the dismissal by the district court was without prejudice and no statute of limitations bars the refiling of Marbles' claim, Marbles has not suffered prejudicial harm resulting from the dismissal. See McCullough , 835 F.2d at 1127. The district court thus did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Marbles' complaint without prejudice.
AFFIRMED.