1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVNIA 

EDWARD H. SATERSTAD, : Civil No.: 4:13-CV-00847 

 : 

Petitioner, : 

 v. : (Judge Brann) 

 : 

TREVOR WINGARD, : 

 : 

 Respondent : (Magistrate Judge Schwab) 

MEMORANDUM 

March 7, 2016 

 Before the Court for disposition is Petitioner Edward H. Saterstad’s petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons that 

follow, this petition is denied and dismissed. 

I. BACKGROUND/ PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On September 11, 2003, a Dauphin County jury convicted Petitioner, Edward 

H. Saterstad, hereinafter “Petitioner,” of attempted luring of a child into a motor 

vehicle, attempted kidnapping, and stalking. 1

Judge Richard A. Lewis sentenced 

Petitioner to a total term of imprisonment of two to ten years.2

 At trial, Petitioner 

                                                            

1

 Report and Recommendation 27 

2

 Id.

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was represented by Joshua Lock, Esquire.3 Following trial, Petitioner was 

represented by Courtney Kishel, Esquire, who filed a post-sentence motion which 

Judge Lewis subsequently denied.4

 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed 

Petitioner’s judgment of sentence and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied 

Petitioner’s petition for allowance of appeal.5

 

Saterstad then filed a “Motion to Correct Factual Errors in the Sexual 

Offenders Assessment Board Assessment” (PCRA I). Judge Lewis denied PCRA I 

“without the appointment of counsel, on the ground that the court no longer had 

jurisdiction to correct the report.” 6

 While the appeal of PCRA I was pending, 

Petitioner filed a pro se “Petition for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief and Request 

for Discovery” (PCRA II).7

 Judge Lewis appointed Jeffrey Engle, Esquire to 

represent Petitioner, but subsequently allowed Attorney Engle to withdraw based 

on his assertions that the PCRA II was untimely and that the grounds therein 

lacked merit.8

 

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania consolidated Petitioner’s PCRA I and 

PCRA II.9

 The Superior Court reversed the order denying the PCRA I petition 

                                                            

3

 Id. 

4

 Id. 

5

 Id. at 28 

6

 Id. at 28-29 

7

 Id. at 29 

8

 Id. 

9

 Id. at 30

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because counsel was not appointed for Petitioner.10 With regard to PCRA II, the 

Superior Court determined that Judge Lewis improperly permitted Attorney Engle 

to withdraw without appointing other counsel due to Attorney Engle’s erroneous 

conclusion that the petition was untimely and his failure to independently review 

the record to determine whether any meritorious issues existed.11 

Petitioner subsequently retained Norris E. Gelman, Esquire, to represent him.12

The Superior Court reversed and remanded the two PCRA petitions to allow 

Attorney Gelman to file an amended PCRA petition.13 More than a year later, 

Petitioner filed another PCRA petition (PCRA III) with the assistance of Attorney 

Gelman.14 Judge Lewis issued an order dismissing each of Petitioner’s PCRA 

claims that had been filed since the remand from the Superior Court.15 Judge Lewis 

also granted Attorney Gelman’s request to withdraw due to conflicts of interest and 

strained relations with Saterstad.16 

On a second appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Petitioner requested 

the appointment of new counsel; that request was denied.17 Petitioner failed to file 

                                                            

10 Id. 

11 Id. 

12 Id., See also Edward H. SATERSTAD, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Norris E. GELMAN, 

Defendant/Appellee, 2014 WL 4179170 

13 Id. 

14 Id. 

15 Id. at 33 

16 Id. 

17 Id. 

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a timely brief, and his appeal was dismissed.18 Petitioner’s subsequent petitions for 

allowance of appeal and reargument/reconsideration were denied by the Supreme 

Court of Pennsylvania on February 4, 2013 and March 12, 2013, respectively.19

On April 4, 2013, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 with this Court. On November 25, 2015, Magistrate Judge 

Susan H. Schwab, to whom the petition is jointly assigned, issued a report and 

recommendation recommending that the petition be denied. Petitioner filed timely 

objections to the report and recommendation, which are now ripe for disposition. 

II. DISCUSSION 

 Upon designation, a magistrate judge may “conduct hearings, including 

evidentiary hearings, and ... submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of 

fact and recommendations.”20 Once filed, this Report and Recommendation is 

disseminated to the parties in the case who then have the opportunity to file written 

objections.21 When objections are timely filed, the district court must conduct a de 

novo review of those portions of the report to which objections are made.22. 

Although the standard of review for objections is de novo, the extent of review lies 

                                                            

18 Id. 

19 Id. at 34

20 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B) 21 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)

22 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1); Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011)

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within the discretion of the district court, and the court may otherwise rely on the 

recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper.23 

 For portions of the report and recommendation to which no objection is 

made, the court should, as a matter of good practice, “satisfy itself that there is no 

clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.”24

Regardless of whether timely objections are made by a party, the district court may 

accept, not accept, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations 

made by the magistrate judge.25

 I have reviewed those portions of the report to which no objections were 

made, and am satisfied that the report and recommendation has no clear error in its 

face. I have also conducted a de novo review of those portions of the report to 

which an objection was made, and have concluded that the report and 

recommendation of the magistrate judge will be adopted in full. The Clerk will be 

directed to enter judgment in favor of the Respondents and against the Petitioner 

and close the case file. 

                                                            

23 Rieder v. Apfel, 115 F. Supp.2d 496, 499 (M.D.Pa. 2000) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 

U.S. 667, 676 (1980)

24 Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), advisory committee notes; see also Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Intern., 

Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 469 (M.D.Pa.2010)(citing Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878 (3d 

Cir. 1987) (explaining that judges should give some review to every report and recommendation) 25 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Local Rule 72.31

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 The Petitioner’s objections to the Report and Recommendation are discussed 

below. 

A. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT 

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania dismissed Petitioner’s appeal for failure to 

file a brief. Petitioner declined to raise a claim addressing this issue on direct 

appeal, and therefore the claim is procedurally defaulted. Generally, when a claim 

is procedurally defaulted, a federal court may not grant habeas corpus relief for the 

claim. However, federal review is not barred by procedural default if the 

procedural rule upon which the state court relied is neither both “independent” nor 

“adequate.” 

To be independent, the operation of the state procedural rule must not require 

the application of federal constitutional law. Petitioner does not contest that the 

dismissal of his Superior Court appeal was premised upon an independent state 

rule. Petitioner asserts, however, that the state rule relied upon was not adequate on 

the basis that “[a] review of Pennsylvania appellate procedure does not reveal any 

rule requiring dismissal of an appeal for failure to file a brief.”26 This Court adopts 

Magistrate Judge Schwab’s reasoning on this matter in full and concludes that 

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure 2101 and 2188 are “firmly established 

and regularly followed state rules” which explicitly state that failure to file a brief 

                                                            

26 Petitioner’s brief p. 47

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may result in a dismissal of the claim. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has 

acknowledged that there is an administrative practice by the Superior Court of 

Pennsylvania to “dismiss[] appeals if the appellant’s brief has not been filed after a 

substantial delay.”27

 That said, Petitioner asserts that even if his claim is procedurally defaulted, 

it is not barred from federal habeas review. An established exception to procedural 

default doctrine provides that defaulted claims may be reviewed if the Petitioner 

can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice. Petitioner asserts that 

he has established cause by demonstrating that his rights under Pennsylvania 

Criminal Procedural Rule 904(c) and (F)(2) have been violated. 

However, after counsel withdrew from the initial PCRA filings, Petitioner 

appealed and the Superior Court concluded that counsel should have been 

appointed. The Superior Court remanded and provided counsel to Petitioner. 

Petitioner retained counsel throughout his second round of PCRA filings, after 

which the PCRA court notified Petitioner of its intention to dismiss his petitions. 

Petitioner then filed a notice of appeal pro se after his PCRA counsel was granted 

permission to withdraw. Petitioner asserts that this withdrawal violated his right to 

counsel under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 904 (C) and (F)(2). Rule 

                                                            

27 Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1162 (Pa. 2003)

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904(C) explicitly states, however, that “the judge shall appoint counsel to represent 

the defendant on the defendant’s first petition for post-conviction collateral relief.” 

Rule 904 does not require a judge to appoint counsel to a defendant on a second 

or subsequent petition unless an evidentiary hearing is required as provided in 

Pennsylvania Criminal Procedural Rule 908. Under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 

“[a]n indigent offender is entitled to appointed counsel only when an evidentiary 

hearing is required and the offender satisfies the trial court that the offender is 

indigent and is unable to otherwise procure counsel. Otherwise, an offender is not 

entitled to appointed counsel with respect to a second or subsequent PCRA 

petition.”28 An evidentiary hearing is required under Rule 908 “when the petition 

for post-conviction relief or the Commonwealth's answer, if any, raises material 

issues of fact. Petitioner was only entitled to counsel at this point to the extent that 

he “satisfie[d] the trial court” that he was indigent and unable to otherwise procure 

counsel. Petitioner does not assert that he was unable to otherwise procure counsel, 

likely because Petitioner was in fact able to procure counsel when he personally 

retained Attorney Gelman after concluding that his court-appointed counsel was 

inadequate.29 

                                                            

28 West's Pa. Prac., Law of Probation & Parole § 18:4 (3d ed.) 29 See Edward H. SATERSTAD, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Norris E. GELMAN, Defendant/Appellee.,

2014 WL 4179170 (Pa.Super.), 7

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For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner cannot show cause due to counsel’s 

withdrawal after the PCRA court dismissed Petitioner’s second petition. 

B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

1. Victim’s Criminal History 

Petitioner also asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 

when he failed to discover the victim’s criminal history. The standard of review for 

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is set forth in Strickland v. Washington. 

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner must show that: 

(1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense.30 To establish deficient performance, Petitioner must prove 

that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness.”31 Under this objective standard, there is a “strong presumption 

that counsel’s representation was reasonable.”32 To overcome this presumption, 

Petitioner must show that Attorney Lock, Petitioner’s counsel at trial, “failed to act 

reasonably considering all the circumstances.”33

Attorney Lock did not fail to act reasonably “considering all the 

circumstances” when he did not investigate and discover the victim’s criminal 

                                                            

30Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)    31 Id. at 688 

32 Id. at 689 

33 Id. at 688

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history. As discussed by Magistrate Judge Schwab, the victim was a juvenile at the 

time of trial, and juvenile records are generally sealed. The victim’s record was 

not, in fact, publicly available until 2007, four years after the trial took place. 

Despite clearly acknowledging this fact, Petitioner does not assert or suggest any 

means by which Attorney Lock could have discovered the retail theft conviction. 

Because Attorney Lock could not access the victim’s juvenile records and because 

there is no other suggested means by which he might have discovered the retail 

theft conviction, Attorney Lock did not “fail[] to act reasonably considering all the 

circumstances” and the strong presumption of reasonableness has not been 

overcome. Petitioner does not therefore meet the first prong of the Strickland test. 

Because Petitioner has not proven that Attorney Lock’s performance was deficient, 

he cannot meet the second prong of the Strickland test, which would require him to 

prove that Attorney Lock’s deficient performance was prejudicial to his defense. 

The Court will next address Petitioner’s assertion that the prosecution 

violated its due process obligations under Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose 

the victim’s criminal history, and that the PCRA court’s ruling on the Brady claim 

is contrary to or an unreasonable application of Brady. Magistrate Judge Schwab 

did not consider the Brady claim, finding that the habeas corpus petition framed 

the claim as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This Court agrees with 

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Magistrate Judge Schwab’s conclusion that, if the claim had been framed as a 

Brady claim, it would have been procedurally defaulted. 

Further, even if the claim were not procedurally defaulted, disclosure of the 

victim’s retail theft conviction was not required under Brady. The Brady Court 

held that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 

request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 

punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution.”34 Evidence is 

‘material,’ and therefore must be disclosed under Brady, “if there is a reasonable 

probability that, if the evidence had been disclosed, result of the proceeding would 

have been different.”35 

Petitioner objects that, because the victim’s testimony regarding the actual 

solicitation by Petitioner was not corroborated, the victim’s retail theft conviction 

was an “essential part of his credibility-based defense.”36 However, the jury could 

consider the fact that no other individual corroborated the events of the solicitation 

when weighing the evidence. Additionally, although the victim’s grandmother, 

Sharon Edwards, was not present at the time of the solicitation, the victim’s 

account of the solicitation was corroborated by Ms. Edwards’ testimony regarding 

                                                            

34 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1197, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963) 

35 Wilson v. Beard, 589 F.3d 651, 665 (3d Cir. 2009) 

36 Petitioners brief p. 45

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what the victim disclosed to her about the solicitation. For these reasons, it is not 

reasonably probable that if the jury had knowledge of the victim’s retail 

conviction, such knowledge would have led them to a different outcome. 

Therefore, the victim’s retail theft conviction was not material for purposes of 

requiring disclosure under Brady. 

2. Victim’s School Records 

Trial counsel’s failure to review the victim’s school records also did not 

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Under Strickland it cannot be 

determined that counsel’s failure to review the victim’s school records constituted 

a failure to act reasonably considering all of the circumstances. As stated by 

Magistrate Judge Schwab, the record presents no evidence that the in camera

review conducted by Judge Lewis to determine whether the school records 

contained any exculpatory evidence did not, in fact, occur. Magistrate Judge 

Schwab also noted that the record did not contain any indication that a review of 

the victim’s school records would have led to a finding of exculpatory material. 

Even if the in camera review did not take place, Attorney Lock’s failure to 

investigate the victim’s school records does not overcome the strong presumption 

of reasonableness on the part of trial counsel because there is no indication that the 

victim’s school records would have revealed exculpatory information. 

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Although Petitioner cites Williams for the proposition that counsel has a “duty 

to investigate” proof that would diminish the victim’s credibility, Williams is not 

binding upon this Court and is distinguishable from this case. In Williams, trial 

counsel breached the “duty to investigate” when it failed to “review [] the 

discovery materials provided by the state.”37. Unlike the attorney in Williams, 

Attorney Lock did not wholly disregard his duties as counsel by failing to prepare 

for trial, failing to investigate the facts of his client’s case and neglecting to review 

the discovery materials provided to him. Instead, it is simply not clear whether an 

evidentiary hearing, not known to likely reveal exculpatory information, occurred. 

Petitioner also cites Bond v. Beard for the proposition that school records are a 

“trove of information.” However, Bond refers specifically to the American Bar 

Association’s Guideline for Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death 

Penalty Cases, and is not relevant here.38

I conclude that Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim 

because he does not assert any “factual allegations to be proven.” The decision to 

grant an applicant’s request for an evidentiary hearing is in the discretion of the 

district court; this discretion is “not unconstrained.”39 In making this determination, 

the district court must consider “whether such a hearing could enable an applicant 

                                                            

37 See Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 1995) 

38 See Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2008), as amended (Oct. 17, 2008) 39 Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 392-93 (3d Cir. 2010)

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to prove the petition’s factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant 

to federal habeas relief.”40 Here, Petitioner asserts no factual allegations that would 

entitle him to federal habeas relief and therefore he is not entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing. Petitioner cites Barkell v. Crouse, also not binding on this Court, for its 

holding that a habeas corpus petitioner was “entitled to an evidentiary hearing to 

determine if counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate a minor victim’s 

school and counseling records.”41 Be that as it may, Barkell is distinguishable from 

Petitioner’s case because the petitioner in Barkell could point to specific testimony 

that would have been offered at the evidentiary hearing.42

3. Impeachment of Victim with Prior Inconsistent Statements 

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner must 

show that: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense.43 To prove prejudice under the second prong 

of Strickland, Petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

                                                            

40 Id.

41 Barkell v. Crouse, 468 F.3d 684, 693 (10th Cir. 2006) 

42 Id. 43 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)

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different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.”44

Petitioner cannot show that there is a reasonable probability that the result of 

the proceeding would have been different if counsel had impeached the victim with 

her prior inconsistent statements regarding the exact number of dates over which 

the events occurred. Petitioner asserts in his objections that, because Attorney Lock 

failed to impeach the victim with her prior inconsistent statements, the jury was 

left with an impression of consistency. 

Magistrate Judge Schwab notes that Attorney Lock impeached one statement 

by the victim, and that the victim’s testimony “showed that she was unclear about 

the precise sequence of events.” Additionally, Judge Lewis stated that the victim 

was “obviously confused as to the exact days and times that the[] numerous 

incidents occurred.” For these reasons, Judge Lewis found that Petitioner was not 

prejudiced by Attorney Lock’s failure to impeach the victim with prior inconsistent 

statements. 

In reviewing this conclusion, the question this Court must answer is “not 

whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination under the 

Strickland standard was incorrect but [instead] whether that determination was 

                                                            

44 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694

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unreasonable─ a substantially higher threshold.”45 I conclude that Judge Lewis’s 

denial of Petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims was not 

unreasonable and was also not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established federal law. 

4. Sequestration of Witnesses 

Petitioner asserts that trial counsel, Attorney Lock, was ineffective by failing 

to request that the witnesses be sequestered, allowing the victim’s friend, Arielle 

Moore, to align her testimony with the victim’s. Petitioner objects that there is “at 

least a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been 

different” if Ms. Moore did not have this opportunity to align her testimony. Judge 

Lewis determined that Petitioner was not prejudiced by Attorney Lock’s failure to 

sequester the witnesses because the jury was aware of and could take into 

consideration the fact that witnesses were not sequestered. Judge Lewis reasoned 

that the jury was able to properly weigh Ms. Moore’s credibility. This Court agrees 

with Judge Schwab’s determination that the jury knew that the victim and Ms. 

Moore were friends, that Ms. Moore may have attempted to mold her testimony to 

that of the victim, and that the jury and was able to weigh this fact in their decision. 

The jury saw Ms. Moore appeared confused during her testimony, and at one point 

                                                            

45 Knowles v. Mirazyance, 566 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 

465, 473 (2007)) (internal quotes omitted)

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admit that she had given an answer because she had heard the victim testify to that 

answer. 

The Court concludes that the Petitioner does not meet the second prong of 

Strickland because he cannot show that Attorney Lock’s failure to sequester the 

witnesses created “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”46 Furthermore, 

under the deferential standard of review, Judge Lewis’s finding that Attorney 

Lock’s failure to sequester the witnesses did not constitute ineffective assistance of 

counsel is not unreasonable. 

5. Failure to Call Petitioner’s Wife 

Petitioner objects that testimony from Saterstad’s wife regarding the “red 

van” would have undermined the victim’s credibility, because the victim claimed 

to have seen him driving the red van at a time when Saterstad’s wife claims to have 

driven the red van to Maryland. Petitioner does not meet the second prong of 

Strickland because he cannot show that Attorney Lock’s failure to call Petitioner’s 

wife, Mary Saterstad, created “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”47

Judge Lewis found that Attorney Lock did not provide ineffective assistance when 

                                                            

46 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984) 47 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)

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he failed to call Mary Saterstad as a witness. Judge Schwab interpreted Judge 

Lewis’s reasoning to be that Attorney Lock’s trial strategy─ showing that 

Petitioner had a legitimate purpose for being in the area─ was reasonable and that 

Petitioner was not prejudiced by Attorney Lock’s failure to call Mary Saterstad. 

This Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Schwab’s analysis that, even under 

a de novo standard of review, Attorney Lock was not ineffective by failing to call 

Mary Saterstad. There is not a reasonable probability that if Mary Saterstad had 

testified at trial, the result of the trial would have been different. 

Furthermore, this Court agrees with Judge Lewis’s conclusion that credit 

card receipts showing purchases made in Maryland would have only indicated that 

purchases were made in Maryland and would not necessarily indicate that the red 

van was in Maryland. This Court additionally agrees with Magistrate Judge 

Schwab that, while this evidence would have contradicted the testimony of the 

victim and Ms. Moore as to when they saw Saterstad in the red van, this would 

likely only have supported the inference that the girls were mistaken as to dates; 

the jury was already aware of the fact that the girls seemed confused regarding the 

exact dates of the incidents. Testimony by Mary Saterstad stating that the red van 

was in Maryland would therefore not have created a reasonable probability that the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. 

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C. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

 Petitioner claims that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to convict 

him of attempted kidnapping and stalking under the standard set forth by the 

Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). In Jackson, the Court 

held that the relevant question under a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim is 

“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.”48 

Jackson claims “face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they 

are subject to two layers of judicial deference.”49 First, “[a] reviewing court may 

set aside the jury’s verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no 

rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.”50 Second, a federal court 

“may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence 

challenge simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court;” it may 

only overturn such a state court decision if it was “objectively unreasonable.”51

                                                            

48 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979) (italics 

in original) 

49 Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062, 182 L. Ed. 2d 978 (2012) 50  Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. St. 2, 4 (2011) 51 Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. at 2062 (quoting Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010))

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When reviewing a state court sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, a federal court 

must “afford due respect to the role of the jury and the state courts.” 52 

1. Attempted Kidnapping 

Judge Lewis’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the 

attempted kidnapping conviction was not an unreasonable application of Jackson v. 

Virginia, because a rational trier of fact could have found Petitioner guilty of the 

essential elements attempted kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt. A person is 

guilty of criminal attempt “when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does 

any action which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that 

crime. 18 Pa.C.S. §901. The elements of kidnapping are specifically set forth in 18 

Pa.C.S. §2901: 

A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another 

person a substantial distance under the circumstances from the place 

where he is found... with any of the following intentions: 

.... 

(2) To facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter. 

(3) To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another. 

Judge Lewis concluded that the evidence at trial established that Petitioner 

approached the victim, a ten year old girl, “and asked her if she wanted $200 to go 

across the river with him for thirty minutes and ‘fool around.’” He determined that 

this evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction for attempted kidnapping. 

                                                            

52 Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. at 2062

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Judge Lewis reasoned that the circumstances showed Petitioner’s intent to commit 

the act of kidnapping, and that Petitioner took a substantial step towards unlawfully 

removing the victim when he asked her to go across the river. This Court adopts 

Magistrate Judge Schwab’s finding that, given the highly deferential standard that 

must be applied to Judge Lewis’s rulings, those findings were not an unreasonable 

application of Jackson v. Virginia. 

2. Stalking 

Judge Lewis’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the 

stalking conviction was also not an unreasonable application of Jackson v. 

Virginia. A rational trier of fact could have found Petitioner guilty of the essential 

elements of stalking which is committed when a person “engages in a course of 

conduct or repeatedly communicates to another person under circumstances which 

demonstrate or communicate either an intent to place such other person in 

reasonable fear of bodily injury or to cause substantial emotional distress to such 

other person.”53 Judge Lewis determined that the victim “would obviously be 

placed in fear and suffer from substantial emotional distress when [Saterstad], an 

                                                            

53 18 Pa.C.S. §2709.1(a)(2)

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adult male, repeatedly followed her around her neighborhood, including driving 

around her school bus stop and asking her if she wanted to ‘fool around.’”54 

Petitioner contends that the prosecution did not present evidence regarding 

his specific intent to place the victim in fear of bodily injury or to cause her 

substantial emotional distress, and that he had a legitimate business-related reason 

for being in the area. Petitioner argues that “because no evidence was presented 

with regard to Petitioner’s specific intent,” Judge Lewis’s finding “was an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.” The 

prosecution was not, however, required to present direct evidence regarding 

Petitioner’s intent to either place the victim in reasonable fear of bodily injury or to 

cause her substantial emotional distress. 

Instead, “[a]bsent circumstances to the contrary, a person intends the natural 

and probable consequences of his or her act. The law permits the fact finder to 

infer that one intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts, in 

determining whether the evidence supports a conviction.”55 I agree with Magistrate 

Judge Schwab’s conclusion that “it was within the jury’s province to reject 

Petitioner’s testimony regarding the reason for being in the area and conclude that 

Petitioner’s actions would place a child in fear and that he intended the natural 

                                                            

54 Report and Recommendation p. 81

55 4 Summ. Pa. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 5:5 (2d ed.) (internal quotations omitted)

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consequences of his actions.”56 Judge Lewis’s decision was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, Jackson v. Virginia. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons delineated above, Magistrate Judge Schwab’s Report and 

Recommendation is ADOPTED and the Petitioner’s § 2254 petition for habeas 

corpus DISMISSED. A Certificate of Appealability shall not issue. 

An appropriate Order follows. 

 BY THE COURT: 

 /s Matthew W. Brann 

 Matthew W. Brann 

 United States District Judge 

                                                            

56 Report and Recommendation p. 81

Case 4:13-cv-00847-MWB Document 69 Filed 03/07/16 Page 23 of 23