1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JEANNIE JACKSON : (Judge Brann)

:

Plaintiff, : No. 4:12-cv-01719

:

v. :

:

HOOPES TURF FARM :

:

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

April 7, 2015

Pending before this Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 25) 

filed by Defendant Hoopes Turf Farm. The motion seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

claims for hostile environment sexual harassment and gender discrimination, Title 

VII retaliation, and discrimination under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act 

(hereinafter, the “PHRA”).1 The matter has been fully briefed and is now ripe for 

disposition. In accordance with the following reasoning, Defendant’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part. With respect to 

Plaintiff’s claims for hostile environment sexual harassment and gender 

discrimination, Defendant’s motion is denied. With respect to Plaintiff’s claim 

under the PHRA, to the extent it is based on those issues, Defendant’s motion is 

denied. However, Defendant’s motion is granted with respect to Plaintiff’s claim 

 

1 Defendant does mention Plaintiff’s claim for gender discrimination in its motion; however, as will be addressed, 

Defendant does not make any argument in favor of dismissal of that claim.

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for retaliation under Title VII, and that claim is dismissed. Consequently, to the 

extent Plaintiff’s PHRA claim is based on her claim of retaliation, that count is 

similarly dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jeannie Jackson has brought this action alleging hostile 

environment sexual harassment, gender discrimination and unlawful retaliation for 

protected conduct under Title VII. She also alleges violations of the PHRA. Many 

of the facts underlying these claims are disputed, and the parties particularly 

disagree on the interpretation of those facts; the Court will therefore give credence 

to the evidence favoring the Plaintiff, as the nonmovant, as long as that evidence is 

properly supported, and will acknowledge Defendant’s version of the facts when 

relevant to the instant motion. See infra, Section II. 

For all times relevant to this case, Plaintiff was employed as a driver by 

Defendant Hoopes Turf Farm, a trucking company. Def.’s Statement of Facts ¶ 1, 

June 23, 2014, ECF No. 27 (hereinafter “Def.’s SOF”). The instant action relates 

to a series of sexually harassing actions taken towards Plaintiff on the part of her 

employer’s owner, Preston Hoopes. The timeline of the alleged conduct is not

entirely clear to the Court; however, the relevant conduct generally occurred 

between December 2009, when the harassment began, and January 2011, when 

Plaintiff was terminated from her employment at Hoopes Turf Farm. 

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As one of the only female employees at Hoopes Turf Farm, Plaintiff alleges 

that she first began to feel uncomfortable during the Christmas party held by the 

company in December 2009. Pl.’s Counter Statement of Facts ¶ 21, July 31, 2014, 

ECF No. 32 (hereinafter “Pl.’s Counter SOF”); Pl.’s Statement of Facts ¶ 6, July 

31, 2014, ECF No. 31 (hereinafter “Pl.’s SOF”). At that party, Plaintiff was 

outside smoking with several other people when Mr. Hoopes asked everyone to 

come inside for a speech. Def.’s SOF ¶ 8. Plaintiff alleges that while he was 

talking to the group he was staring at her crotch. Id at ¶ 9. 

Sometime thereafter2, Plaintiff needed help fairly late in the evening in 

getting a king pin released from her truck so she contacted Mr. Hoopes and asked 

for his assistance. Id at ¶ 10. When he arrived, but before exiting his vehicle, Mr. 

Hoopes made two “wolf calls,” which made Plaintiff uncomfortable. Id at ¶ 11. A 

third incident occurred after an unspecified amount of time, in which Mr. Hoopes 

asked Plaintiff if she would stay the night at his house when her car would not 

start.3Id at ¶ 13. There is a dispute of fact as to whether Mr. Hoopes’ wife was 

home at the time he asked Plaintiff to stay the night and as to whether Mr. Hoopes 

 

2 At the time of her deposition, Plaintiff could not recall an exact timeline for many of the incidents of sexual 

harassment that she alleges. The Court therefore assumes, without any evidence to the contrary, that the events 

occurred chronologically in the order in which they are stated in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and addressed by 

the parties in their briefings.

3 As this Court understands the situation, Hoopes Turf Farm is located near or adjacent to Mr. Hoopes’ private 

residence.

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alluded to that fact in his invitation to Plaintiff. Id at ¶ 14; Pl.’s SOF ¶ 14.4 When 

Plaintiff choose not to stay the night, Mr. Hoopes lent her his wife’s car to drive. 

Def.’s SOF ¶ 15. 

On March 26, 2010, Mr. Hoopes called Plaintiff and asked her to polish a 

semi-truck used in the business which she agreed to do. Id at ¶ 16. While she was 

polishing the truck, Mr. Hoopes began to help her and talked to her about 

inappropriate topics. Id at ¶ 17. Specifically, Mr. Hoopes talked about sex with his 

wife before they got married, as well as catching his father in the bathroom at their 

house with his wife’s mother. Id. Mr. Hoopes, however, denies making any 

inappropriate comments to Plaintiff while she was polishing the truck. Pl.’s 

Counter SOF ¶ 26.

Less than a month later, on April 11, 2010, Mr. Hoopes insisted that Plaintiff 

ride in the front with him on the way back from a job because “he did not want to 

look at Parsell’s ugly mug.” Def.’s SOF ¶ 18; Pl.’s SOF ¶ 18.5 Finally, at another 

point in time, as Mr. Hoopes was demonstrating to Plaintiff how to use a new 

 

4

In the depositions of Mr. and Mrs. Hoopes, both recalled Mrs. Hoopes being home on that evening because they 

had an argument when Mr. Hoopes allowed Plaintiff to use his wife’s car. Plaintiff stated in her deposition that she 

was unaware as to whether Mrs. Hoopes was home at all. She was not directly asked if Mr. Hoopes had informed 

her that his wife was not at home.

5 The Court is somewhat confused by this allegation. It appears from Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts that it arises 

from Plaintiff’s allegation that she and Mr. Hoopes did have sex sometime between when she polished his truck and 

when he requested that she sit in the front with him, and that during that encounter Plaintiff was intoxicated. 

However, Plaintiff has not explained how the allegation of a sexual relationship changes the nature and meaning of 

Mr. Hoopes’ action in insisting Plaintiff sit up front with him. Similarly, the Court is not aware of the timing or 

circumstances of this alleged sexual relationship because the parties have included very little such information 

within their briefings and statements of facts. Moreover, Mr. Hoopes disputes that there was ever any sexual 

relationship between him and Plaintiff.

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dump truck, his crotch touched her left hand, which was resting upon her left knee, 

and after that Plaintiff moved her hand away. Def.’s SOF ¶ 19.

Sometime in mid-July 2010, Plaintiff complained several times to Mr. 

Hoopes that she was uncomfortable with the way he was acting towards her. Id at ¶ 

20; Pl.’s SOF ¶ 20. Because Hoopes Turf Farm did not have a human resources 

department during the time in which Plaintiff was employed by the company, she 

had no recourse but to go directly to Mr. Hoopes with her complaints. Pl.’s 

Counter SOF ¶ 13-15. After that, Plaintiff testified that things both at work and 

between her and Mr. Hoopes changed “majorly.” Id at ¶ 21. She alleges that she 

was treated unfavorably at work in a variety of ways. Specifically, she claims that 

there were several instances when she would get called into work even though she 

had taken personal time, and that she would request time off but never hear back 

about that request. Pl.’s SOF ¶ 25; Def.’s SOF ¶ 28. Moreover, she alleges that 

jobs were cancelled without notice to her, so that she would necessarily drive into 

work before being informed that the job was cancelled and she would not be paid 

for that time. Def.’s SOF ¶ 28-29. 

Plaintiff alleges several other retaliatory actions taken in response to her 

complaint regarding Mr. Hoopes’ sexually harassing behavior. For one, Plaintiff’s 

transmission broke in August 2010 and she had to wait four hours for the garage 

person to pick her up; however, she was not paid for that four hours of waiting 

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time. Id at ¶ 26; Pl.’s SOF ¶ 26. Additionally, there was one incident in which 

Plaintiff spoke with Robin Vetter, Defendant’s dispatcher, about getting a hotel 

room when she was on a job like two other drivers were able to do, but after 

alleging that she had to discuss it with Mr. Hoopes, Ms. Vetter never got back to 

Plaintiff on that issue. Def.’s SOF ¶ 27.

Another incident occurred when Plaintiff asked Mr. Hoopes for a letter of 

recommendation because she wished to change jobs due to the way she was being 

treated at work. Id at ¶ 30; Pl.’s SOF ¶ 30. Mr. Hoopes told her that he would not 

write her a letter of recommendation because he did not do that, but that she could 

have a prospective employer call him. Def.’s SOF ¶ 31. She also alleges retaliation 

in that Mr. Hoopes had called out five trucks to work a job but did not call out 

Plaintiff to do that job. Id ¶ 32. At yet another time, Mr. Hoopes asked Plaintiff to 

drive a roller truck in Coudersport, but the location he had given her was incorrect 

and she was required to contact Mr. Hoopes to determine the correct location of the 

job. Id at ¶ 33. There was also an incident in which the pump on Plaintiff’s

assigned truck kept freezing. When she requested to switch out the truck so that 

the pump could thaw in the garage, Mr. Hoopes responded that she should keep her 

truck running and that she should not call him back if it was not something 

important. Id at 34-35.

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Finally, there is also at issue in this case the existence of several voicemails 

left for Plaintiff by Mr. Hoopes in which he calls her “beauty” and “sleeping 

beauty,” and tells her that she is playing “hard to get” and that “nobody can touch 

ya.” Pl.’s Counter SOF ¶ 1-5. The Court is unsure chronologically when these 

voicemails were left on Plaintiff’s phone, whether before she complained to Mr. 

Hoopes of his conduct towards her, or after.

On January 10, 2011, Plaintiff was terminated from her position with 

Hoopes Turf Farm. Def.’s SOF ¶ 39. Her termination took place the day after an 

incident in which the brakes on Plaintiff’s assigned truck caught fire. Id at ¶ 36. 

When she called Mr. Hoopes to tell him about it, he told her that she must have had 

the spike brake on, although she responded that she never used the spike break. Id. 

Several reasons were given for her termination, in addition to the incident just 

described. For one, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff ran a new truck into a ditch 

and thereby incurred significant costs of repair, although Plaintiff denies having 

done this. Id at ¶42; Pl.’s SOF ¶ 42. As another reason, Defendant contends that 

Plaintiff ran her truck into a building and bent the ladder; however, Plaintiff denies 

this and claims that she merely tapped an exhaust fan with her truck ladder. Def.’s 

SOF ¶ 43; Pl.’s SOF ¶ 43. Finally, Defendants asserts that Plaintiff damaged a tool 

box on a company truck when she was making a turn and hit an abutment placed 

there by another company, although Plaintiff claims that this accident was not her 

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fault. Def.’s SOF ¶ 44; Pl.’s SOF ¶ 44. Defendant alleges that all of these 

accidents necessitated repairs in the total amount of $1794.84; however as stated 

Plaintiff denies being responsible for these repairs. Def.’s SOF ¶ 45; Pl.’s SOF ¶ 

45.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” where it “might affect 

the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” where “the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury,” giving credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant and 

making all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor, “could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party.” Id.

The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a “genuine issue” is on the 

party moving for summary judgment. In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 237 (3d Cir. 

2003) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986) (Brennan, J., 

dissenting)). The moving party may satisfy this burden by either (i) submitting 

affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s 

claim; or (ii) demonstrating to the Court that the nonmoving party’s evidence is 

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insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case. Id. at 

331. 

Where the moving party’s motion is properly supported, the nonmoving 

party, to avoid summary judgment in his opponent’s favor, must answer by setting 

forth “genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact 

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson, 477 

U.S. at 250. For movants and nonmovants alike, the assertion “that a fact cannot 

be or is genuinely disputed must” be supported by “materials in the record” that go 

beyond mere allegations, or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish 

the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot 

produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–50. 

“When opposing summary judgment, the non-movant may not rest upon 

mere allegations, but rather must ‘identify those facts of record which would 

contradict the facts identified by the movant.’” Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J. v. 

Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2003). Furthermore, “[i]f a 

party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address 

another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . 

consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).

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In deciding the merits of a party’s motion for summary judgment, the 

Court’s role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but 

to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. 

Credibility determinations are the province of the factfinder, not the district court. 

BWM, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). Although 

the Court may consider any materials in the record, it need only consider those 

materials cited. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Sexual Harassment Hostile Environment

Defendant first argues that Mr. Hoopes’ alleged conduct towards Plaintiff 

was neither severe nor pervasive and therefore she has failed to make out a prima 

facie claim of hostile environment sexual harassment. In that vein, it argues that 

every complained of action by Plaintiff was either interpreted incorrectly by her or 

was not as serious as Plaintiff suggests. Plaintiff all but ignores Defendant’s 

argument and instead focuses on the following steps of the McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting analysis, apparently assuming, with little explanation, that she has 

already set forth a prima facie claim despite Defendant’s argument to the contrary. 

To the extent she does directly counter Defendant’s argument she merely claims, 

without citing any law to support her allegations, that it is not for the Defendant, at 

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this stage in the proceeding, to make sweeping determinations as to whether the 

conduct alleged in this case is sufficiently offensive.

Title VII prohibits discrimination based on an individual’s race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin with respect to his “compensation, terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The Supreme 

Court of the United States has clarified that the phrase “terms, conditions, or 

privileges” “evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of 

disparate treatment of men and women in employment, which includes requiring 

people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment.” Harris v. 

Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. 

Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)). To bring an actionable claim for sexual harassment 

because of an intimidating and offensive work environment, a plaintiff must 

establish that: (1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination because of his 

or her sex; (2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive; (3) the discrimination 

detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally 

affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that position; and (5) the existence of 

respondeat superior. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 

(3d Cir. 1990).

Because Defendant only disputes the existence of the second element, the 

Court will not consider any of the other elements at this juncture. To prove that the 

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harassment was severe or pervasive, the plaintiff must demonstrate that her 

workplace was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult 

that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s 

employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. 

The plaintiff need only prove that the conduct is severe or pervasive, not both. See 

id. “[S]ome harassment may be severe enough to contaminate an environment even 

if not pervasive; other, less objectionable, conduct will contaminate the workplace 

only if it is pervasive.” Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 449 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2006). 

“Therefore, a single incident of severe harassment in the workplace may 

contaminate the work place to such a high degree that it will be considered hostile. 

Where such harassment is not severe, incidents of harassment must occur either in 

concert or with regularity.” Rorrer v. Cleveland Steel Container, 712 F.Supp.2d 

422, 428 (E.D.Pa. 2010). 

Determining whether any given conduct is severe or pervasive is far from an 

exact science. In making this determination, the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Third Circuit has counseled that the court examine all of the relevant 

circumstances surrounding the discriminatory conduct, considering factors such as: 

(1) the frequency; (2) the severity; (3) whether it is physically threatening or 

humiliating as opposed to a mere offensive utterance; (4) whether it unreasonably 

interferes with the employee’s work performance; or (5) the effect on the 

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employee’s psychological well-being. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; see also Arasteh 

v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 146 F.Supp.2d 476, 495 (D.Del. 2001). This 

constitutes a non-exhaustive list, and no single factor is required or dispositive. 

See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.

As a preliminary issue, Defendant’s allegation that Plaintiff was mistaken in 

her interpretation of Mr. Hoopes’ conduct is problematic for the purposes of the

instant motion. The perceptions and interpretations of the parties are all factual 

disputes that are not to be decided by this Court on a motion for summary 

judgment. For instance, Defendant argues that it “is a matter of [Plaintiff’s] 

opinion that Mr. Hoopes stared at her crotch” during the 2009 Christmas party 

because “Mr. Hoopes may have looked down as he spoke for other reasons 

assuming he looked down at all.” Though Defendant claims that Mr. Hoopes was 

not staring at Plaintiff’s crotch, she maintains that he was doing so. This is the 

very essence of a factual dispute, and it is for a factfinder to determine what 

actually happened in that situation.6

 

6 Defendant’s arguments that factual issues do not exist as to all of Plaintiff’s other allegations are similarly flawed. 

Its contention that Mr. Hoopes’ invitation to Plaintiff to stay the night does not suggest that he was requesting sexual 

favors in return is countered by Plaintiff’s own interpretation of the event in which she claims that sex was his 

objective. Similarly, this Court is unable to make the determination that Mr. Hoopes rubbed his crotch against 

Plaintiff’s hand inadvertently when she disputes that inadvertence. Finally, Defendant cannot unilaterally 

characterize the voicemails that Mr. Hoopes left for Plaintiff as “in the nature of joking,” and then maintain that 

there is no dispute as to that characterization. In its reply brief, Defendant further argues that these voicemails must 

be understood in context in a way that is not sexually harassing. However, Defendant’s use of the word “probably” 

and his acknowledgement that “[i]t is difficult to properly evaluate the voicemails relied on by Plaintiff without 

knowing Plaintiff’s voicemail greeting” only serve to highlight the existence of factual disputes that the Court is not 

empowered to decide.

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In this case, the Court is unwilling to determine as a matter of law, even at 

this juncture, whether Mr. Hoopes’ conduct towards Plaintiff was severe or 

pervasive because there are too many omitted facts and too many factual disputes 

between the parties. See Rorrer, 712 F.Supp.2d at 429 (“[T]he severity and 

pervasiveness evaluation is particularly unsuited for summary judgment because it 

is ‘quintessentially a question of fact.’”) (quoting O’Shea v. Yellow Tech. Servs., 

Inc., 185 F.3d 1093, 1098 (10th Cir. 1999)). There is no doubt that in many 

instances, particularly where the facts are undisputed, the court is able to determine 

as a matter of law whether certain conduct is severe or pervasive; however, such is 

not true in the instant matter. In this case, the parties dispute virtually every fact 

and every implication of those facts.

7

 Consequently, the Court will deny 

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s hostile environment 

sexual harassment claim, pending a determination by the factfinder as to what 

actually occurred between Plaintiff and Mr. Hoopes.

B. Gender Discrimination

Under Title VII, “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 

employer: (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 

 

7

Importantly, Defendant has brought up an argument in its reply brief that Plaintiff and Mr. Hoopes did have a 

consensual sexual relationship which therefore changes the nature and determination of Plaintiff’s claim of sexual 

harassment. However, this issue is, in and of itself, a factual issue. Though Defendant relies upon Plaintiff’s 

deposition testimony, it is necessary to note that Mr. Hoopes himself disputes the occurrence of this incident and 

denies having had any kind of sexual relationship with Plaintiff. How this fact, if proven, might fit into an analysis 

of Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim is impossible to know pending a determination by the factfinder as to what

version of the story is correct and what, if any, the exact circumstances of that sexual relationship were.

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discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. To establish a prima 

facie case of gender discrimination under Title VII, the plaintiff must demonstrate 

that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; 

(3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the action occurred under 

circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination. See 

Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008). 

It is unclear what argument, if any, Defendant is making in order to dismiss

Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim. In its “Statement of Questions Presented,” 

Defendant states that there is no genuine issue of material fact whereby a 

reasonable jury could find in favor of the Plaintiff on her hostile work environment 

sexual harassment and gender discrimination claims. However, the only argument 

that Defendant makes relates to the severity or pervasiveness of Mr. Hoopes’ 

conduct towards Plaintiff. The Court has already addressed this issue in the 

previous section. Severity or pervasiveness is not, however, a required element of 

a gender discrimination claim. Rather, a gender discrimination claim requires only 

that the plaintiff have suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances 

of intentional discrimination. Consequently, to the extent Defendant does request 

dismissal of Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim, summary judgment will be 

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denied on that claim because Defendant has not argued for dismissal on any 

specific issue or element. 

C. Retaliation Claim

Defendant next contends that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim must fail because 

there was no significant adverse action taken against Plaintiff after she told Mr. 

Hoopes that she felt uncomfortable with the current situation. Specifically, it 

concedes that her termination was an adverse action but argues that all other 

purportedly retaliatory actions taken against her were objectively de minimus. 

Moreover, Defendant argues that the record in the case fails to establish causation 

between Plaintiff’s conversation with Mr. Hoopes and her ultimate termination

after a six month lapse in time. Plaintiff responds that she has made out a prima 

facie case for retaliation under Title VII because she complained to Mr. Hoopes 

about his conduct three times and she was terminated within a reasonable time 

after making these complaints. Furthermore, she argues that circumstantial 

evidence of causation exists in various forms.8

Section 704(a) of Title VII forbids an employer from discriminating against 

an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 

practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 

participated in any manner in an investigation . . . under this subchapter.” 42 

 

8

Plaintiff also argues another element not currently in issue, that is, that Plaintiff’s conversation with Mr. Hoopes 

was protected under Title VII. Because Defendant has not argued this element as a means for dismissal, the Court 

will not address it here.

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U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under 

Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she was engaged in protected 

activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action subsequent to or 

contemporaneously with such activity; and (3) there is a causal link between the 

protected activity and the adverse activity. See Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 

F.3d, 913, 920 (3d Cir. 1997). 

“The scope of the anti-retaliation provision, unlike the substantive provision, 

is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of 

employment.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006). 

Consequently, “a plaintiff claiming retaliation under Title VII must show that a 

reasonable employee would have found the alleged retaliatory actions ‘materially 

adverse’ in that they well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making 

or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 

331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). “In evaluating whether actions are 

materially adverse, we must remain mindful that ‘it is important to separate 

significant from trivial harms’ because ‘[a]n employee’s decision to report 

discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or 

minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees 

experience.’” Id at 346 (citing Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68).

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To establish causation, the third element of a prima facie case, the plaintiff 

must demonstrate a connection between her opposition to the unlawful 

discrimination and an action that might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from 

making a similar charge of discrimination. See id at 342. “The ultimate question in 

any retaliation case is an intent to retaliate vel non.” Jensen, 435 F.3d at 449 n.2. It 

is only once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of retaliation involving 

these three elements that the McDonnell Douglas framework operates to shift the 

burden back to the Defendant. Because this Court holds, as a matter of law, that 

Plaintiff did not meet her burden of proving a prima facie case, the Court need not 

delve into that analysis.

In this case, Plaintiff claims that after she confronted Mr. Hoopes regarding

his sexual harassment, he began to discriminate against her in various ways, 

ultimately leading to her termination from the company. Specifically, she alleges 

that: (1) she was not paid for four hours of waiting time when her truck broke 

down; (2) Defendant several times cancelled her shift without telling her so that 

she had already driven into work; (3) she was sometimes not notified when she 

was granted time off; (4) she did not receive a hotel room like two other drivers on 

one trip; (5) she asked for, but was not given, a letter of recommendation from Mr. 

Hoopes; (6) she was assigned a truck on one trip with a pump that kept freezing 

and Mr. Hoopes did not assist her in getting a new truck; and (7) she learned at one 

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point that five trucks were working at a site and she had not been called in to work

that job. Finally, (8) she alleges that on her last day of work she was assigned a 

truck with heater problems and the breaks on the truck caught fire, an incident for 

which she was terminated. 

With the exception of Plaintiff’s eventual termination, none of the other 

incidents cited above are materially adverse actions. Rather, all of these minor 

employment issues are no more than trivial harms, if even that. Many of them do 

not appear harmful but are rather everyday issues that an employee must deal with 

in the ordinary course of her employment. See Riley v. Delaware River and Bay 

Authority, 661 F.Supp.2d 456, 470 (D.Del. 2009) (“The Burlington court stressed 

that the antiretaliation provision of Title VII does not protect an individual from all 

retaliation, but only from retaliation that produces injury or harm.”); see also 

Burton v. Pennsylvania State Police, 990 F.Supp.2d 478, 510 (M.D.Pa. 2014) 

(Rambo, J.) (finding that several small actions, including a temporary 

reassignment, a threat of termination, a reprimand, and an allegation of a failure to 

fully investigate an internal discrimination claim did not constitute adverse action). 

While it is true that actions which are not materially adverse by themselves can be 

materially adverse when considered together, see Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 

399, 422 n.17 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The cumulative impact of retaliatory acts may 

become actionable even though the actions would be de minimus if considered in 

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isolation.”), in this case, this Court does not believe that any reasonable jury could 

determine that such minor actions, even taken together, could be materially adverse 

actions against the Plaintiffs. Several of the actions cannot even be considered 

adverse at all. 

Nevertheless, there is no dispute that Plaintiff’s termination is an adverse 

action within the meaning of a retaliation claim. However, Plaintiff has failed to 

uphold her burden in proving that her termination was causally related to her 

complaints to Mr. Hoopes. Though Plaintiff does point to “other evidence” which 

could lead a jury to conclude that Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff, none of 

that “other evidence” provides any circumstantial evidence of causation. 

Specifically, Plaintiff points to the fact that: (1) Plaintiff testified that Mr. Hoopes 

had sex with her while she was under the influence of alcohol; (2) she testified that 

things changed after she slept with Mr. Hoopes; and (3) Mr. Hoopes had 

considerable control over Plaintiff’s day-to-day assignments. That Mr. Hoopes 

had sex with Plaintiff at some unspecified point in time before she complained 

about his sexual harassment has no bearing on the causation of her termination

because she is not alleging that sleeping with Mr. Hoopes is the protected conduct 

for which she was then retaliated against; if anything, that event only provides one 

more fact for her sexual harassment claim. 

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Moreover Plaintiff’s perspective that “things changed” after she slept with 

Mr. Hoopes is irrelevant for the same reason; at best, Plaintiff can use this 

evidence to prove that she was retaliated against for sleeping with her boss, which 

is not protected activity under Title VII. Finally, Mr. Hoopes control over her 

assignments is similarly inapplicable to prove causation. In fact, this Court is at a 

loss to understand how this evidence factors into a determination of causation at 

all. 

Plaintiff’s termination occurred six months after she made her complaint, 

and she has pointed to no circumstantial evidence that could lead this Court to 

conclude that a reasonable jury could find in her favor on this element. See Culler 

v. Shinseki, 840 F.Supp.2d 838, 847 (M.D.Pa. 2011) (Mannion, J.) (“[T]he 

protected activity and alleged retaliation must be extremely close in time for such 

proximity to raise an inference of discrimination on its own.”); see also LeBoon v. 

Lancaster Jewish Community Center Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 233 (3d Cir. 2007)

(holding that three months between the occurrence of protected activity and 

subsequent adverse action was not sufficient without additional circumstantial 

evidence to create an implication of retaliatory motive); McCLoud v. United Parcel 

Service, Inc., 543 F.Supp.2d 391, 401 (“In determining whether Plaintiff has met 

the causation element of the prima facie case, we consider all evidence that is 

‘potentially probative of causation.’”) (quoting Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 

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206 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir 2000). Consequently, Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment is granted as to Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim.

D. PHRA

Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims under the PHRA should be 

dismissed for the same reasons it has argued with regard to the claims made under 

Title VII. Plaintiff responds only that because Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment must be denied on the above-referenced grounds, it must be denied on 

Plaintiff’s PHRA claim as well.

The elements of hostile environment sexual harassment and gender

discrimination claims under the PHRA are analogous to those under Title VII. See 

Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Medical, Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 317 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000) 

(“The analysis required for adjudicating Goosby’s claim under PHRA is identical 

to a Title VII inquiry.”). Similarly, the elements of a retaliation claim under the 

PHRA are analogous to those under Title VII. See Hussein v. UPMC Mercy Hosp., 

466 Fed.Appx. 108, 111 (3d Cir. 2012); see 43 Pa.S. § 955(d) (Under the PHRA, it 

is unlawful for an employer “to discriminate in any manner against any individual 

because such individual has opposed any practice forbidden by this act, or because 

such individual has made a charge . . . under this act.”).

Consequently, because this Court has already determined that summary 

judgment is denied as to Plaintiff’s hostile environment sexual harassment and 

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gender discrimination claims, her PHRA claim will similarly survive to the extent 

that it is based on those issues. However, because the Court has also held that 

Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation must be dismissed, her PHRA claim must be 

dismissed to the extent it is based on those issues.

IV. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing reasoning, Defendant’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part. With respect to 

Plaintiff’s claims for hostile environment sexual harassment and gender 

discrimination, Defendant’s motion is denied. With respect to Plaintiff’s claim 

under the PHRA, to the extent it is based on those issues, Defendant’s motion is 

denied. However, Defendant’s motion is granted with respect to Plaintiff’s claim 

for retaliation under Title VII, and that claim is dismissed. Consequently, to the 

extent Plaintiff’s PHRA claim is based on her claim of retaliation, that count is 

similarly dismissed.

BY THE COURT

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

United States District Judge

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