Office of Inspector General

U.S. General Services Administration

Review of GSA’s Revised 

Plan for the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation 

Headquarters 

Consolidation Project

August 27, 2018
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Introduction

On February 12, 2018, the General Services Administration (GSA) presented a revised plan for

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) headquarters consolidation project to the Senate 

Committee on Environment and Public Works (Senate EPW Committee). The plan 

recommended razing the FBI’s existing headquarters facility, the J. Edgar Hoover (JEH) building 

on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, D.C., and constructing a new headquarters facility on 

that site. This was a change from GSA’s previous approach of seeking a campus facility for the 

FBI at a suburban location in the Washington, D.C., region. 

The GSA Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated this review on March 12, 2018, in response 

to a request from the Ranking Member of the House Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform’s Subcommittee on Government Operations. Our objective was to review GSA's 

decision-making process for the revised FBI headquarters project plan, including an analysis of 

whether the revised plan properly accounts for the full costs and security requirements of the 

project.1 In the course of the review, we also encountered an issue concerning testimony GSA 

Administrator Emily Murphy provided on April 17, 2018, to the House Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government in response to questions 

regarding White House involvement in decision-making regarding the project. We included that 

issue in our review. 

To conduct this review, we held 20 interviews, including with Murphy, GSA Acting General 

Counsel Jack St. John, GSA Public Buildings Service (PBS) Commissioner Daniel Mathews, and 

the Unit Chief of the FBI’s Headquarters Program Management Office; reviewed over 50,000

GSA documents and emails concerning the FBI headquarters consolidation project; and 

reviewed congressional testimony of GSA and FBI officials in 2017 and 2018 concerning the 

decision to rebuild the facility at the JEH site. 

Early in the review the OIG learned that during the course of GSA’s decision-making on the 

revised FBI headquarters plan, Murphy met with the President on January 24, 2018, about the 

project. When we asked about the meeting, some GSA witnesses refused to answer any 

questions about this and other relevant White House meetings, and some of those said they 

were told or believed the information was subject to executive privilege. We sought to 

determine whether GSA took the position that executive privilege precluded sharing 

information with the OIG, which is part of GSA and within the Executive Branch. Ultimately, 

GSA’s Acting General Counsel informed us that he received direction from White House 

Counsel’s Office regarding the matter. He told us that pursuant to those directions, GSA 

employees were authorized to disclose to the OIG the existence of the White House meetings, 

discuss who attended, and discuss any high level agreements that resulted from the meetings;

 1 The OIG has been monitoring GSA’s efforts related to the FBI headquarters consolidation since August 2013. On 

March 30, 2017, we issued Audit of PBS’s Planning and Funding for Exchange Projects (Report Number 

A160024/P/R/R17004). The FBI headquarters consolidation exchange project was one of the projects that we 

reviewed in this audit. We reported that PBS had not fully factored risk into its planning for exchange projects and 

as a result, cancelled or chose not to pursue several exchange projects.
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but not to disclose any statements made by the President. We describe the information we 

received about the meetings in this report. 

The revised plan for the FBI headquarters project presented to the Senate EPW Committee 

contains a cost comparison showing that the plan to raze and rebuild at the JEH site would be 

less costly than the cancelled FBI exchange procurement. However, we found that GSA did not 

include all of the costs in its analysis, and that the JEH demolish and rebuild plan would actually 

be more costly. We also found that GSA and the FBI intend to construct a Level V secure facility, 

but until the FBI finalizes a program of requirements it is not clear how this will be achieved. 

Finally, we found that Murphy’s congressional testimony was incomplete and may have left the 

misleading impression that she had no discussions with White House officials in the decisionmaking process about the project.

This report first describes background information regarding the FBI headquarters 

consolidation project and GSA’s decision-making process for the revised project plan. It then 

assesses whether the revised plan GSA provided to the Senate EPW Committee properly 

accounts for the full costs of the JEH rebuild and the security requirements for the project. 

Finally, the report describes our concerns regarding Murphy’s testimony before the House 

Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government on April 17, 2018.

GSA provided written comments to our draft report in a response dated August 10, 2018. GSA’s 

comments are included in their entirety in Appendix A. We also received comments from 

Administrator Murphy on the draft report. Because those comments were made in her 

individual capacity, we have not appended them to the report. In addition, we made excerpts 

of the report available to FBI officials for their review and comment. 

We considered all of the comments we received and have addressed those relating to factual 

accuracy where appropriate in the body of this report. None of the resulting revisions affected 

our report conclusions. We respond to certain additional comments made by GSA and 

Administrator Murphy in Appendix B. 

Factual Background

Need for New FBI Headquarters

The FBI has occupied the JEH building since construction was completed in 1974. Since then, 

the FBI’s operations and duties have evolved. In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, 

the FBI expanded its mission to include greater national security responsibilities, including 

counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber security. To accommodate its expanded 

mission, the FBI identified a need for a new headquarters facility in its 2005 Asset Management 

Plan. 

In the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations bill, Congress directed the U.S. Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) to review the security concerns of the JEH building and associated offsite 

locations. In a report issued in November 2011, GAO found that actions were needed to 

address issues with the condition of the FBI headquarters. In response to that review, then FBI 

Associate Deputy Director Kevin Perkins noted: “[A] new consolidated FBI Headquarters facility 
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is urgently needed, and we view this as one of our highest priorities for the foreseeable future.” 

In a March 2013 hearing of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 

Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management,

entitled “Proposal for a New Consolidated FBI Headquarters Building,” Perkins referenced the 

November 2011 GAO report and stated:

The FBI has implemented some countermeasures at the JEH building to 

improve the security of the facility, but those efforts are not a substitution 

for relocating FBI Headquarters employees to a location that affords the 

ability to provide true security in accordance with ISC [Interagency Security 

Committee] standards.

In assessing the concerns raised about the JEH building, GSA and the FBI recognized an 

opportunity to consolidate FBI personnel at JEH and other locations throughout the D.C.

metropolitan area into one modern facility. GSA expected the new headquarters facility 

would save close to a million square feet in rentable space, eliminate the need for FBI 

leased space in the National Capital Region, and provide updated workplace solutions 

tailored to meet the FBI’s needs. 

GSA Plans Exchange of the JEH Building for a New Headquarters Campus 

In December 2012, GSA announced its intent to find a new headquarters facility for the FBI. 

GSA’s plan was to partner with a developer that would design and construct a consolidated 

headquarters facility in exchange for title to the JEH building and its land. In January 2013, GSA 

issued a Request for Information to garner reaction from members of the development 

community, local and state jurisdictions, and other interested parties regarding feasibility, 

issues, and considerations related to a potential exchange project structure.

In November 2013, the Request for Information was followed by a Request for Expressions of 

Interest for sites within the National Capital Region to be used for the development of a new 

FBI headquarters. GSA identified three sites where a new campus headquarters could be built: 

(1) Springfield, Virginia; (2) Greenbelt, Maryland; and (3) Landover, Maryland.

On December 19, 2014, GSA issued its Phase I Request for Proposals (RFP) for the government 

to select a short list of no more than five offerors to compete in the Phase II RFP. On October 

13, 2015, GSA identified a short list of offerors to proceed to Phase II of the RFP. On January 22, 

2016, GSA issued the Phase II RFP to these qualified offerors.

In the Fiscal Year 2017 budget request, GSA and the FBI requested a combined $1.405 billion to 

finance the headquarters project. GSA estimated that the $1.405 billion request, combined with 

the value of JEH and approximately $390 million in prior year appropriations, would be enough 

to fund the project. While the RFP allowed GSA to award the exchange agreement without full 

funding, GSA maintained that making the award without full upfront funding would put the 

project at risk. 

In early 2017, GSA received developer proposals, which included proposed values for JEH. GSA 

did not deem the proposals fair and reasonable. GSA found that the proposals fell far short of 
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the value assumptions that GSA had used when drafting the 2017 budget request. In May 2017, 

Congress appropriated $523 million for the FBI headquarters project, which was $882 million 

below the GSA and FBI request. GSA had not included any funding for the FBI headquarters 

consolidation in its Fiscal Year 2018 budget request, given its expectation that the Fiscal Year 

2017 budget request would be fully funded. 

GSA Cancels JEH Exchange and Develops a New Headquarters Plan

On July 11, 2017, GSA cancelled the FBI exchange procurement, citing a lack of funding as a 

main reason for the cancellation. The Senate EPW Committee held a hearing, “FBI 

Headquarters Consolidation Project – What Happened and What’s Next,” on August 2, 2017. 

The Senate EPW Committee directed then-Acting PBS Commissioner Michael Gelber to provide 

a new plan for the FBI’s headquarters needs within 120 days.

On August 2, 2017, Christopher Wray was sworn in as the Director of the FBI. On August 3, 

2017, Mathews was sworn in as the PBS Commissioner. 

Following the August 2, 2017, Senate EPW Committee hearing, GSA and the FBI met regularly to 

discuss multiple acquisition strategies. Options considered included traditional construction, 

phased construction, and public-private partnership lease construction with a discounted 

purchase option or a ground lease-leaseback.2 GSA focused on a financing strategy. GSA 

officials told us they believed that public-private partnership options could be used to finance 

the project in the absence of a multi-billion dollar upfront appropriation.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is responsible for applying the budget 

scorekeeping guidelines (scoring rules) for federal real property transactions set forth in OMB 

Circular A-11. OMB uses the criteria in OMB Circular A-11 to determine whether a federal real 

property transaction scores as a capital lease or an operating lease. If the project scores as a 

capital lease, Congress must appropriate the full cost of the project, plus interest upfront, for 

the project to proceed. If the project scores as an operating lease, Congress need only 

appropriate the annual cost of lease payments, plus interest. 

GSA’s interpretation of the scoring rules allowed for a public-private partnership in the form of 

a ground lease-leaseback to score as an operating lease. GSA advanced its interpretation of 

OMB Circular A-11 as a matter of policy. As the November 30, 2017, due date for the plan to 

the Senate EPW Committee approached, the FBI headquarters project intersected with GSA’s 

policy efforts. GSA officials viewed the FBI headquarters project as a mechanism to apply its 

broader interpretation of OMB Circular A-11. This interpretation of the scoring rules also 

presented a viable acquisition strategy for the FBI headquarters, according to GSA officials. 

While GSA explored financing options, the FBI evaluated its program of requirements. In a 

November 6, 2017, conference call with GSA and local government officials, GSA communicated 

 2 In a ground lease-leaseback, the government leases federally-owned land to a private entity, which would then 

construct a facility and lease the building back to the government. OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation, 

Submission, and Execution of the Budget, governs the budgetary treatment of ground lease-leasebacks.
5

that the FBI’s program of requirements was unchanged from the exchange procurement.3 In 

late November, the FBI informed GSA that it was developing a plan that reduced the cost and 

the scope of the project. A chronology created contemporaneously by GSA’s Project Executive

reflects that in early December 2017, the FBI advised GSA that the FBI planned to reduce its 

headquarters’ personnel requirement by approximately 2,000 people by relocating them 

nationwide.

After reviewing a draft of this report, GSA commented that in a November 17, 2017, meeting 

between Mathews and an FBI Assistant Deputy Director, “[I]t became clear to GSA that the FBI 

was seriously considering the Pennsylvania Avenue site, at the direction of FBI’s senior 

leadership.”4 In her separate comments on the draft report Murphy asserted that the FBI made 

the decision to stay at the JEH site well before Murphy met with the President. Many of the 

GSA witnesses we interviewed told us that the FBI under Wray’s leadership decided against a 

suburban campus and in favor of remaining at the JEH site with reduced personnel 

requirements. Director Wray confirmed to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Commerce, 

Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Subcommittee that constructing a new building at the 

JEH site would allow the FBI to reside at the location that the FBI needed while providing the 

necessary security.5

It is not clear from the information GSA provided us precisely when GSA became aware of the 

FBI’s interest in staying at the JEH site. As we describe below, GSA did not focus on the JEH site

in its decision-making process until late December 2017 or early January 2018.

December 20, 2017, White House Meeting

On December 1, 2017, GSA received a 60-day extension from the Senate EPW Committee to 

provide the new plan for the FBI headquarters needs. The new deadline for the revised plan 

was January 29, 2018. 

Murphy was sworn in as GSA Administrator on December 12, 2017. On December 14, 2017, 

after meeting with the FBI, Mathews emailed Murphy stating, “There are several things coming 

out of this meeting we need to discuss. WH has been talking to FBI too.”

On December 20, 2017, Murphy met with White House Chief of Staff John Kelly and OMB 

Director Mick Mulvaney in response to a request from Kelly for an update on the FBI 

headquarters project. Mathews also attended the meeting.

Murphy told us that she and Mathews went to the meeting prepared to discuss campus options 

for the project. She said that when they began discussing the campus option, Kelly and 

 3 In a November 6, 2017, email recapping the conference call, the GSA Project Executive stated, “I reiterated that 

these were informal discussions to accommodate the FBI’s internal briefings and that at this time the FBI program 

and requirements remain unchanged from the previous procurement. I also indicated that GSA is not currently 

looking for new sites.”

4 See Appendix A, page A-2. 

5 Review of the FY2019 Budget Request for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, May 16, 2018.
6

Mulvaney informed them that the FBI may no longer be seeking a consolidated campus.

Murphy said that Kelly and Mulvaney told her that the FBI was concerned about the location of 

the headquarters. She said they also may have mentioned that the FBI was looking to stay in 

Washington, D.C. According to Murphy, Kelly suggested that GSA touch base with the FBI to get 

everyone on the same page. Murphy stated that Kelly and Mulvaney indicated that the goal 

was to make the FBI happy and that the FBI should be driving the requirement. Murphy noted 

that funding was a challenge to the project. Murphy also recollected that Kelly or Mulvaney 

may have mentioned that the President would want an update on the project. 

Discussions Between GSA and the FBI About Keeping FBI Headquarters at the JEH Site

On December 20, 2017, Mathews sent an email to his FBI counterpart on the project and 

suggested a telephone conversation between Murphy and Wray. On December 21, 2017, 

Mathews received and passed to Murphy a slide presentation from the FBI regarding

renovation options for the JEH building. On December 22, 2017, Murphy received a call from 

Wray. According to Murphy, Wray informed her in that call of the FBI’s interest in remaining at 

the existing site.

On January 4, 2018, GSA and FBI officials met at the JEH building to discuss options for the FBI 

headquarters. According to then-GSA Associate Administrator and Acting Chief of Staff P. 

Brennan Hart III, the meeting was attended by himself, Murphy, Mathews, Wray, then-FBI 

Associate Deputy Director David Bowdich, and the Unit Chief of the FBI’s Headquarters Program 

Management Office. In his interview, Hart characterized this meeting as the first time that GSA 

officials met with Wray regarding the project. 

Hart informed us that during the January 4, 2018, meeting, GSA and FBI officials discussed plans 

to renovate the JEH building versus demolishing it and rebuilding on the same site. Murphy told 

us that at this meeting, FBI staff advised GSA that its headcount requirements had changed and 

the FBI believed it could stay at its current location and renovate JEH. According to Murphy, the 

FBI had hired a contractor to develop plans to renovate JEH which accounted for the reduced 

headquarters personnel count. The FBI presented the renovation plans to GSA. These plans 

recommended renovating one quarter of the building at a time while FBI personnel remained 

operating in the sections that were not undergoing renovation. Murphy told us the GSA team 

was surprised by this decision. Murphy said that up to this point, all discussions she was aware 

of had focused on a campus scenario for the FBI headquarters. She said that JEH was not GSA’s 

preferred site and that a lot of work had gone into the campus concept.

According to Mathews, GSA communicated its concern to the FBI that if the FBI headquarters 

stayed at its existing site, it would be difficult to obtain congressional support for full upfront 

funding for the project. Mathews told us that, if the cost savings between a suburban campus 

site and the existing site were similar, Wray’s preference was to remain at the JEH building. If 

the campus scenario offered significant savings, Mathews stated, Wray was not opposed to a 

suburban campus site. 

One suggestion briefly discussed at the meeting was a plan to utilize a smaller site for FBI senior 

leadership in Washington, D.C., and a larger campus for FBI personnel. However, Hart told us 
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that Wray wanted the FBI headquarters’ personnel in one location. Murphy also told us that 

Wray stated that proximity to the Department of Justice (DOJ) was important to the FBI. 

Mathews stated that, by the conclusion of the January 4, 2018, meeting, he had not been able 

to persuade Wray to leave the JEH site in favor of the campus scenario. 

Discussions Between GSA and the FBI About Renovation Versus Demolishing and Rebuilding

After the January 4, 2018, meeting, GSA and the FBI worked to develop options for the FBI to 

remain at the existing site. As GSA officials evaluated a renovation of the JEH building, they

developed serious reservations. GSA officials raised concerns regarding cost, constructability, 

security, and impact on operations. For example, GSA officials noted that the deteriorating 

structure of the JEH building would make it problematic to harden the building. Mathews said 

that it would be “extremely difficult” to renovate while JEH was occupied. The PBS Office of 

Design and Construction advised him to disagree with a renovation, as it was a “bad idea.” 

Mathews also noted that if a renovation required swing space (temporary office space during 

construction), it would be faster, cheaper, and more secure to demolish and rebuild. 

Given the risks associated with renovation and the FBI’s expressed desire to remain at the JEH 

site, GSA’s efforts pivoted to developing a plan to demolish and rebuild at the JEH site. Murphy 

said she thought that PBS had identified the demolish-rebuild option at an earlier point in time, 

but had dismissed the idea then due to the FBI’s personnel requirements. With the decrease in 

personnel requirements for JEH, Murphy said that demolish and rebuild was a viable option. 

Murphy told us that sometime between January 4, 2018, and January 24, 2018, she discussed

the demolish-rebuild option with Wray in a telephone call. Murphy said that Wray “liked the 

plan,” but had some reservations. Murphy stated that she and Wray discussed concerns related 

to ensuring that the numbers were accurate and determining where to relocate FBI personnel. 

Murphy noted that Wray was particularly concerned that if the FBI left JEH, it would not be able 

to return after the rebuild was complete. 

Murphy told us that as of January 23, 2018, GSA’s recommendation was to demolish and 

rebuild at the JEH site with a ground lease-leaseback to finance the project. The FBI, according 

to Murphy, was developing an estimate for renovation. At that point in time, no decisions had 

been made regarding funding. 

White House Meetings on January 24, 2018

GSA emails and photographs reflect that Murphy, Wray, and others met with the President 

regarding the FBI headquarters project on January 24, 2018. 

When we asked Murphy for information about the meeting, her private counsel stated Murphy 

was not authorized to discuss specific communications with the President. However, she was
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authorized to disclose the existence of White House meetings, attendees at the meetings, the 

topics of meetings with the President, and the outcomes of the meetings with the President.6

Murphy told us that she attended two meetings about the FBI project at the White House on 

January 24, 2018. The first meeting occurred in Kelly’s office, and immediately preceded the 

second meeting. The second meeting was in the Oval Office with the President. 

Meeting in Kelly’s office. Murphy said that she attended the first meeting with Kelly, Mulvaney, 

Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, and Wray. Murphy told us that Mulvaney requested

the meeting to ensure that everyone was on the same page prior to the meeting with the 

President. 

Murphy said that during this meeting, Wray reiterated his concern that if the FBI left the JEH

building, it would not be able to return to the JEH site after the rebuild was completed. Murphy 

said that Rosenstein stated that close proximity between DOJ and the FBI headquarters was 

important to DOJ. Due to the unique security and operational requirements of the FBI 

headquarters, Murphy and Mulvaney provided assurances that the FBI would return to the site 

because the building would be designed and constructed to meet the FBI’s specific 

requirements. Murphy stated that upon receiving this assurance, Wray agreed to the demolishrebuild plan at the existing site. 

According to Murphy, all involved in the meeting acknowledged the challenges to a demolishrebuild plan. The challenges identified were obtaining authorization for the funding level and

scope of the project, and securing appropriations for the project. Murphy recalled saying that 

White House assistance with the funding issues would be appreciated. Mulvaney indicated that 

all of the agencies needed to work together to secure funding and authorization. Murphy 

stated that she did not recall discussing a ground lease-leaseback option at that meeting.

Oval Office Meeting. Immediately following the meeting in Kelly’s office, Murphy met with the 

President in the Oval Office along with Kelly, Mulvaney, Rosenstein, and Wray. The purpose of 

the meeting was to provide an update to the President regarding the FBI headquarters project. 

According to Murphy, Mulvaney was the first person in the meeting to state that the plan was 

to demolish and rebuild the FBI headquarters at the JEH site. Murphy told us that the 

renovation option was not raised at the Oval Office meeting with the President.

Murphy described the conversation in the meeting as “back and forth” with “free flow

discussion.” Murphy told us that she, Wray, and Mulvaney explained how they collaborated to 

reach a decision to demolish and rebuild the FBI headquarters. They also discussed swing space, 

authorization, and appropriation challenges.

 6 During Murphy’s interview, her counsel also stated that the White House Counsel’s Office had advised GSA’s 

Acting General Counsel that the presidential communications privilege was being asserted. After reviewing a draft 

of this report, GSA commented that this was incorrect and that the White House had not asserted executive 

privilege. Rather, “[t]he White House informed the Administrator, through the Acting General Counsel, that she 

was not authorized to disclose the content of presidential communications from those meetings. A formal 

assertion of executive privilege, therefore, was not necessary to justify or explain the Administrator’s refusal to 

disclose those communications.” Appendix A, page A-8.
9

Murphy said she presented the ground lease-leaseback as the best funding option because it

was more cost effective than incremental funding. She said she also explained that the ground 

lease-leaseback was less cost effective than full upfront funding, but that GSA did not think that 

the project could secure full upfront funding. 

Murphy told us that there was a general consensus in the room that the government should 

own the building. Murphy said that she distinguished a ground lease-leaseback option from a 

lease purchase option. She said she explained that the government would own the building at 

the end of the term of the lease under the ground lease-leaseback option. Under a lease 

purchase option, Murphy explained that the government would have the option of purchasing 

the building at the end of the term of the lease. 

According to Murphy, the discussion included the challenges facing the project, such as

potential resistance from local congressional delegations. There was a consensus to collaborate 

to find the funds, develop a legislative strategy, and locate swing space. Murphy told us that 

Wray was excited about the project; however, he had lingering concerns that the FBI would 

remain in the swing space, rather than return to the new building. Murphy told us that Wray 

was interested in making this happen as fast as possible and was grateful to be working 

together. Murphy said that Mulvaney agreed to work closely with GSA and the FBI on this 

project. 

As described above, pursuant to guidance from the White House Counsel’s Office, Murphy did 

not provide the OIG with information concerning any specific communications or direction from 

the President at the meeting. However, Murphy stated that at the end of the meeting, she 

understood that they were moving forward with the demolish-rebuild project at the JEH site, 

funded through a ground lease-leaseback. She also told us that immediately following the 

meeting, she communicated that understanding to GSA personnel involved in the project. 

GSA emails, including emails from Mathews and Hart, reflect that GSA and FBI personnel who 

were involved with the project, but not in attendance at the meeting, also understood that the 

meeting had resulted in a decision or direction to move forward at the JEH site using a ground 

lease-leaseback funding mechanism.7 Mathews told us he was not at liberty to talk about the 

meeting because it was a decision involving the White House. We asked Hart to explain 

references to the President’s “direction” or “instruction” used in his emails. Hart told us he 

understood the “direction” was simply to execute the plan the FBI and GSA had recommended. 

Discussions Between GSA and OMB Regarding Funding

Shortly after the January 24, 2018, White House meeting, OMB personnel raised objections to 

the ground lease-leaseback funding option due to scoring rules. GSA leadership endeavored to 

 7 For example, a January 27, 2018, email from Hart to Mathews states: “Ideally I think it would first recap the oval 

meeting with what POTUS directed everyone to do then ask Emily (GSA) to execute POTUS’s orders.” In addition, a 

January, 28, 2018, email from Mathews to the Assistant Director of the FBI Finance Division states: “Though I don’t 

see us conceding these two key points, GL LB [ground lease-leaseback] can be classified as an operating lease and 

demolish rebuild, as they are necessary to deliver the project the president wants on the timetable he wants it 

done.” 
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resolve the scoring concerns with OMB. However, according to Murphy, OMB ultimately 

determined that the ground lease-leaseback was not a viable option. 

GSA continued negotiations with OMB on how to fund the project. On February 12, 2018, as 

part of the Fiscal Year 2018 budget negotiations, the Administration provided Congress with a 

list of additional items that Congress could consider funding in the budget. The list included 

$2.175 billion for the FBI headquarters project. According to GSA officials, OMB indicated to 

GSA that the FBI project would be funded as part of this budget “add-back.” However, the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, signed into law on March 23, 2018, did not include 

funding for the project. 

Throughout the negotiations with GSA, OMB presented another option for funding the project 

– the proposed Federal Capital Revolving Fund. The $10 billion fund would be structured to 

allow federal agencies to meet large, upfront dollar obligations needed for large scale real 

property projects. However, the Federal Capital Revolving Fund has not yet been implemented 

and there is uncertainty as to whether Congress will approve it.

GSA and the FBI Submit Revised FBI Headquarters Plan

On February 12, 2018, GSA and the FBI provided the FBI Headquarters Revised NationallyFocused Consolidation Plan (Revised FBI Headquarters Plan) to the Senate EPW Committee. The 

document outlined the Administration’s plan to seek $2.175 billion to fund the demolition and 

construction of a new facility at the JEH site. The plan identified the next step as GSA submitting 

a prospectus to Congress. In the months since GSA and the FBI submitted this plan, Congress 

has questioned the agencies about it.

On February 15, 2018, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Government 

Operations Subcommittee held a hearing, “General Services Administration – Checking in with

the Government’s Acquisition and Property Manager.” At that hearing, committee members 

sought information regarding the reasons for rejection of the campus plan in favor of the

demolish-rebuild plan. 

Similarly, on February 28, 2018, the Senate EPW Committee held its “Hearing on Oversight: FBI 

Headquarters Consolidation Project.” At the hearing, committee members expressed bipartisan 

concern about the revised plan. In response to a question regarding whether he was aware of 

conversations with the President about the project, Mathews indicated that he was not in a 

position to answer that question. Mathews was also asked whether he had any conversations 

or communications with the President or any senior White House staff about the project. 

Mathews answered that he had not spoken with the President, but later clarified that he had 

spoken with senior White House officials. 

On April 17, 2018, Murphy testified before the House Appropriations Committee, 

Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government regarding GSA’s Fiscal Year 2019 

budget. She was questioned about White House involvement in the FBI headquarters project 

and did not disclose the White House meetings. 
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White House Meeting: June 15, 2018 

On June 15, 2018, Murphy attended a meeting with the President at the White House to discuss 

the FBI headquarters project. Kelly; Rosenstein; Wray; Russ Vought, Deputy Director of OMB;

Donald McGahn, White House Counsel; and Marc Short, White House Director of Legislative 

Affairs and Assistant to the President also attended the meeting. Murphy said the invitees 

discussed ongoing congressional pressure for a campus project and the funding challenges.

Issues

Project Cost Analysis

GSA and the FBI submitted the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan to the Senate EPW Committee on 

February 12, 2018. The Revised FBI Headquarters Plan estimated total costs of $3.328 billion to

raze the JEH building and build a new headquarters on the site (JEH rebuild). The JEH rebuild is 

expected to house 8,300 personnel. According to the plan, taking into account previously 

appropriated funding, GSA and the FBI will require an additional $2.175 billion to move forward 

with the JEH rebuild. 

The Revised FBI Headquarters Plan contrasts the cost of the JEH rebuild with the cost of the 

cancelled full consolidation exchange procurement (JEH exchange). Though the Revised FBI 

Headquarters Plan estimated the JEH exchange to have a higher cost of $3.565 billion, the JEH 

exchange was to be a larger facility and house more people. Figure 1 is an excerpt from the 

Revised FBI Headquarters Plan that compares the cost of the previously cancelled JEH exchange

(referred to as “full consolidation” in Figure 1) to the newly recommended JEH rebuild strategy.

According to Figure 1, given the previously appropriated funding, GSA and the FBI would have 

required $2.412 billion in additional funding to move forward with the JEH exchange.

Figure 1 – Excerpt from GSA and the FBI’s Revised FBI Headquarters Plan
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The Revised FBI Headquarters Plan does not include the full costs of the JEH rebuild. The 

Revised FBI Headquarters Plan does not accurately portray the costs and shortfall comparison 

between the previously cancelled JEH exchange and the JEH rebuild. The plan shows that the 

JEH rebuild would cost less and require less additional funding than the JEH exchange. 

However, we determined that the JEH rebuild will have a higher project cost and require more 

additional funding than the JEH exchange would have. We recreated the Revised FBI 

Headquarters Plan’s Funding Gap Analysis for a more transparent cost comparison (see Figure 

2). We discuss our recalculations in the subheadings below.

Figure 2 – OIG Recalculated Funding Gap Analysis

JEH Exchange JEH Rebuild

Total cost (from Revised FBI Headquarters Plan’s Funding 

Gap Analysis)

$3.565 billion $3.328 billion

Add: Non-JEH construction cost - $0.459 billion

Add: Personnel relocation cost (2,306 people) - $0.057 billion 8

Total OIG Recalculated Cost $3.565 billion $3.844 billion

Less: Prior appropriations and DOJ Working Capital Fund 

(from Revised FBI Headquarters Plan’s Funding Gap Analysis)

($1.153 billion) ($1.153 billion)

Less: JEH exchange value (market rate)9 REDACTED -

Total OIG Recalculated Shortfall REDACTED $2.232 - $2.691 billion 10

After reviewing a draft of this report, GSA asserted that that our analysis in Figure 2 creates a 

misleading impression that a true comparison can be made between the JEH rebuild and the 

cancelled JEH exchange. However, GSA itself purported to compare the costs of those two 

scenarios in its Revised FBI Headquarters Plan’s Funding Gap Analysis (see Figure 1). As we 

describe further below, GSA’s purported comparison omits significant relevant items.

The JEH value was not factored into the funding needed for the JEH exchange. GSA did not 

account for the value that it would receive for JEH under the JEH exchange. Although GSA 

noted an anticipated $750 million value for the JEH exchange in the Revised FBI Headquarters 

Plan, it ultimately excluded that value in the JEH exchange total shortfall calculation. The 

anticipated JEH value should have been included in order to accurately show the total shortfall 

calculation. Furthermore, GSA should have used a more accurate JEH value, based upon 

proposals that GSA received from developers during the exchange procurement. To be most 

 8 In response to our inquiry, the FBI estimated $57 million for personnel relocation costs. After reviewing excerpts 

of the draft report, the FBI stated that the estimate may range from $20 million to $60 million and will be dictated 

by the number of employees accepting a transfer.

9 Redactions in this report represent either procurement sensitive information or non-Senior Executive Service 

personnel names.

10 According to the Unit Chief of the FBI’s Headquarters Program Management Office, the FBI has received some 

funding for three of the four non-JEH construction projects. Accordingly, we present a range for the total OIG 

recalculated shortfall.
13

conservative in our recalculation, we incorporated the lowest JEH value proposed during the 

exchange procurement, REDACTED (see Figure 2).

The proposed exchange agreement between GSA and the developer under the JEH exchange

supports our conclusion. In the exchange procurement, GSA would not have needed an 

appropriation for the agreed-upon value of JEH. The JEH value would have been designated by 

the developer and accepted by GSA in the exchange agreement. This JEH value would have 

been recognized in the latter years of construction of the new facility. The exchange 

procurement’s Phase II Request for Proposals stated:

As part of this procurement, Offerors are required, among other things, to 

establish the credit they will contribute toward the cost of the consolidated FBI 

Headquarters in exchange for JEH. It is the Government’s intent that this credit 

will be utilized toward the end of construction of the consolidated FBI 

Headquarters facility prior to substantial completion and payment of the 

Developer’s profit or incentives. It is also the Government’s intent to make 

regular progress payments to the Contractor during the construction phase of 

the project up to a defined Government contribution amount, as described and 

set forth in the Contract. [emphasis added]

Therefore, GSA would have known, before construction began, that it would not need to 

request funding for the JEH value under the JEH exchange. Because GSA would not need 

funding equal to the JEH value, it should have factored the JEH value in the JEH exchange total 

shortfall calculation.

The Revised FBI Headquarters Plan does not present per person costs in its cost comparison.

Although the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan estimated the JEH rebuild would be a less costly 

option than the JEH exchange, it does not show that the JEH rebuild would cost more per 

person. The JEH exchange planned to house 10,606 personnel. However, the FBI adjusted the 

headquarters personnel requirement as part of its “nationally-focused consolidation,” under 

which the FBI would move employees out of the National Capital Region and into facilities in 

Huntsville, Alabama; Pocatello, Idaho; Clarksburg, West Virginia; and Quantico, Virginia. Due to 

the plan to relocate employees out of the National Capital Region, the FBI reduced its 

headquarters headcount requirement to 8,300 personnel. A comparison of the total cost of the 

two project plans and the per person costs is displayed in Figure 3 below:

Figure 3 – Comparison of Cost per Person

Project Total Cost

Personnel 

Count Cost/Person

JEH Exchange $3.565 billion 10,606 $336,130

JEH Rebuild $3.328 billion 8,300 $400,964

As shown above, based on GSA’s cost estimates, the cost per person for the JEH Rebuild is 

higher than that of the JEH Exchange. 
14

Relocation and non-JEH construction costs are not included. The Revised FBI Headquarters 

Plan estimate of $3.328 billion for the JEH rebuild is understated because it does not capture 

relocation and non-JEH construction costs. The FBI estimated $516 million for these costs. The 

JEH exchange was planned to accommodate 10,606 personnel, while the JEH rebuild plan seeks

to accommodate 8,300. In order to meaningfully compare the two plans, the Revised FBI 

Headquarters Plan should have accounted for the relocation and construction costs associated 

with housing the 2,306 personnel at other FBI facilities.

The FBI plans to move these 2,306 employees into facilities in Alabama, Idaho, Virginia, and 

West Virginia. However, the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan does not account for costs 

associated with relocating these employees. In response to our inquiry, the FBI estimated $57 

million for employee relocation (see Figure 2).

11

In addition, the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan does not account for costs associated with the 

construction necessary to accommodate the relocated headquarters personnel. FBI personnel 

stated that construction activities in Huntsville, Pocatello, Clarksburg, and Quantico are not 

solely attributable to the relocation of headquarters personnel. Rather, these construction 

activities are associated with the implementation of the FBI’s broader space planning. The FBI 

estimated the construction “cost-share” for the personnel to be relocated under the Revised 

FBI Headquarters Plan as $459 million (see Figure 2). 

We asked the FBI about the four locations where personnel may be relocated and the FBI 

provided the following responses:

• Huntsville, Alabama – The FBI recently secured funding related to the Huntsville site. 

The FBI plans to move approximately 1,800 personnel to Huntsville related to the 

Revised FBI Headquarters Plan. This does not represent all of the expansion that the FBI 

foresees at this site. 

• Pocatello, Idaho – This project has been funded and construction is underway. The FBI 

estimates that Pocatello will accommodate approximately 250-300 personnel related to

the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan.

• Quantico, Virginia – There is no construction currently at this site to accommodate 

individuals relocating related to the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan.

12

 11 After reviewing a draft of this report, GSA stated that it included relocation costs in its Revised FBI 

Headquarters Plan as part of the costs associated with FBI Fit-Out and Swing Space. This is incorrect. The

FBI Fit-Out and Swing Space costs do not include the $57 million associated with relocating 2,306 

personnel to Alabama, Idaho, Virginia, and West Virginia.

12 After reviewing excerpts of the draft report, the FBI commented that Quantico is not expected to see a net 

increase in the number of personnel as a result of the FBI’s revised national headquarters strategy. 
15

• Clarksburg, West Virginia – This project has been funded and construction is imminent. 

The FBI is renovating its cafeteria in order to accommodate approximately 150-200 

personnel related to the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan.

13

After GSA and the FBI submitted the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan, GSA officials discussed

internally and with the FBI whether these costs should have been included in the plan. A 

document internal to GSA suggests these costs should have been included in the Revised FBI 

Headquarters Plan, but that officials unintentionally omitted the information. Further, a GSA 

official involved in the cost estimating agreed with our conclusion that these construction costs 

should have been included in the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan.

As a result of excluding non-JEH renovation costs, the JEH rebuild cost in the Revised FBI 

Headquarters Plan is understated by $516 million.

Swing space cost estimates were appropriately excluded. Swing space, the temporary space 

for FBI personnel during construction, is one major cost item under the JEH rebuild plan that 

would not have existed under the JEH exchange proposal. Under the JEH rebuild plan, GSA will

have to locate and renovate swing space for the FBI while the new headquarters building is 

under construction. Under the JEH exchange proposal, the FBI would have continued to occupy 

the JEH building while the new headquarters facility was constructed, and therefore swing 

space would not have been needed. 

GSA appropriately included design and construction costs associated with the FBI swing space 

in its cost estimate comparison, but did not include the costs the FBI would incur in rent 

payments for the swing space. GSA personnel maintain that the costs associated with the FBI 

remaining in the JEH building and the cost of swing space rent would be roughly equivalent. If 

these costs were equivalent, there would be no need to include swing space rent in the Revised 

FBI Headquarters Plan. We compared the cost of operating and maintaining the current space 

at JEH with a market estimate for swing space rent and agree that the costs would be roughly 

equivalent. 

Facility Security Level Analysis

Executive Order 12977 established the ISC in October 1995. The ISC revised The Risk 

Management Process for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee Standard (ISC 

standard) in November 2016. The ISC standard defines the criteria and processes that those 

responsible for the security of a facility should use to determine its facility security level 

(security level) and provides an integrated, single source of physical security countermeasures 

for all federal facilities.

The FBI is responsible for determining security level and related countermeasures. According 

to the ISC standard:

 13 After reviewing excerpts of the draft report, the FBI commented that the renovation will convert a portion of its 

cafeteria into office space in order to accommodate the increase of approximately 150-200 personnel as part of 

the FBI’s national facility strategy which is related to but not dependent on the new FBI headquarters project.
16

The responsibility for making the final [security level] determination rests with 

the tenant(s) who must devise a risk management strategy and, if possible, fund 

the appropriate security countermeasures to mitigate the risk:

For single-tenant facilities owned or leased by the government, a representative 

of the tenant14 agency will make the [security level] determination in 

consultation with the owning or leasing department or agency and the security 

organization responsible for the facility.

The ISC standard also states, “The facility's security organization will conduct a risk assessment 

to identify risk(s)....When a facility has one Federal tenant with [sic] law enforcement or 

security function housed in the facility, this entity should be selected as the security 

organization for the facility.” In its 2011 report, Federal Bureau of Investigation: Actions Needed 

to Document Security Decisions and Address Issues with Condition of Headquarters Buildings, 

GAO noted that, “In cases where the FBI is the sole tenant in the facility, the FBI usually signs a 

waiver stating that the FBI is responsible for conducting its own assessments.”15 Furthermore, 

the ISC standard describes a building tenant’s responsibility to mitigate or accept risk. Building

tenants must fund security measures to reduce risk, or accept the assessed risk and potential 

consequences. Therefore, as the lone tenant for the new FBI headquarters building, it is the 

FBI’s decision to fully mitigate or accept risk.

The FBI and GSA plan for a Level V facility. The ISC standard bases security level on a score of 

five factors:

• Mission Criticality;

• Symbolism;

• Facility Population;

• Facility Size; and 

• Threat to Tenant Agencies. 

The five factors carry equal weight and receive scores on a scale of 1 to 4. A Level IV security 

level results from a score of 18-20 points. A sixth factor, intangibles, is then applied and can 

raise or lower the security level by one level. After applying these criteria, the FBI rated the 

security level needed for the FBI headquarters at a Level V (very high risk). According to the ISC 

standard, “the criteria and decision-making authority for identifying Level V facilities are within 

the purview of the individual agency.”

As of the date of this report, the FBI is drafting the program of requirements for the JEH rebuild. 

Therefore, we cannot verify the security level that the FBI calls for in the program of 

requirements, nor how the FBI and GSA intend to achieve it. However, FBI and GSA officials 

have confirmed their intention that the FBI headquarters will be a Level V facility. 

 14 The representative of the tenant agency approved by the department or agency to make such determinations 

(e.g., the Director of Security might make all determinations to ensure consistency).

15 GAO-12-96, November 2011
17

The program of requirements for the cancelled JEH exchange project, dated January 15, 2016, 

also called for a Level V facility. It stated, “Because of the symbolic nature of the client, the 

client mission, and performance of functions critical to the security of the United States a 

Facility Security Level V designation was selected for this campus.” The FBI has confirmed that

this Level V security level is not site dependent, but based upon the operations of the FBI 

headquarters.

Once the security level is determined, the facility's security organization should conduct a risk

assessment to identify risk(s). The risk assessment should compare the baseline level of 

protection with the risks to the facility. If the risks are in line with the baseline level of 

protection, no customization is needed. If the risks exceed the baseline level of protection, the 

FBI must decide if a higher level of protection can be achieved, if a different location should be 

selected, or if risks will be accepted. Until the FBI completes a program of requirements and risk 

assessment for the project, it will not be able to confirm that the new facility can meet its 

security needs. 

The ISC standard does not include a minimum setback distance requirement. For the FBI’s 

Level V facility, a very high level of protection is required. This very high level of protection is 

associated with a set of baseline countermeasures. The current ISC standards outline 93 

security countermeasures in seven categories:

• Site;

• Structure;

• Facility Entrance;

• Interior;

• Security Systems;

• Security Operations and Administration; and

• Cyber.

The current ISC standard does not explicitly state minimum setback criteria to achieve Level V 

security, but rather uses a more integrated design approach that recommends a combination of 

setback and hardening. This lack of minimum setback is a change from the prior ISC standard, 

and was prompted by the difficulty of obtaining setbacks in urban settings. The current ISC 

standard states:

For future building construction (whether lease-construct or government-owned), this 

Standard shall be applied as part of the requirements definition process. The security 

organization will conduct a project-specific risk assessment during the requirements 

definition phase and recommend countermeasures and design features to be included 

in the design specifications. The FSC will determine whether the identified 

countermeasures will be implemented or risk will be accepted.16 Those 

countermeasures will become part of the facility’s design program requirements to 

 16 FSC refers to Facility Security Committee. In the case of the FBI headquarters, the FSC includes representatives 

from the FBI and GSA. GSA is not a voting member of the FSC.
18

ensure required security measures are fully integrated into the configuration of the site 

and/or building design.

Site security requirements for new construction, particularly setback, must be 

identified before a site is acquired and the construction funding request is 

finalized. This may prevent the selection of a site that lacks necessary features, 

especially sufficient setback, and help reduce the need for more costly 

countermeasures such as blast hardening.

Under the previous program of requirements for the full consolidation, the FBI was relying on 

facility setback as one of its main countermeasures. However, with the lesser setback at the JEH 

site, the FBI will have to integrate alternative countermeasures to achieve the desired level of 

security. 

In response to our questions about the FBI’s plans for security countermeasures for the JEH 

rebuild, an FBI official provided the following response:

The urban location and site configuration will require [sic] new approach to meet 

FBI's operational and security requirements. This will include a varied approach 

including but not limited to increased hardening, greater application of 

perimeter protections, and progressive collapse requirements. It will also include 

re-positioning sensitive operations deeper into the core of the facility, 

operational and administrative changes and security mitigations as we adjust 

planning from a suburban campus to a limited metropolitan property 

location. The blast protection at the JEH will be revised to adjust to the level 

appropriate for being located in a metropolitan location. 

Administrator Murphy’s April 17, 2018, Testimony 

Murphy told us that in advance of the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on 

Financial Services and General Government hearing, she participated in a minimum of four 

preparatory sessions. Murphy said she thought she would be asked at the hearing if the White 

House was involved in the FBI headquarters project. She stated that the participants in the 

preparatory sessions agreed that she should try to answer the substance of the question 

without specifically addressing the White House meetings. If pressed, she would answer that “it 

would be inappropriate to comment on any discussions I had or did not have with the 

President.”

On April 17, 2018, Murphy testified at the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on 

Financial Services and General Government hearing. During the hearing, Murphy was asked 

about the FBI headquarters project by the Subcommittee’s Ranking Member, Representative 

Mike Quigley:

Representative Quigley: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so much for being 

here and again for your service. To your knowledge when did the administration 

make the decision not to build the suburban FBI facility and instead rebuild where 

it is?
19

Murphy: That's – thank you, sir. It's my understanding when – and again I was 

confirmed in December of last year so I want to be clear that I was not involved 

with many parts of the decision but I want – I'm going to try and answer your 

question as fully and as completely as I may – as possible, that last July the – that 

GSA and the FBI working with OMB reevaluated the lease exchange that had 

previously been proposed for building a new FBI headquarters and prioritizing 

the need that there was a new FBI headquarters that was absolutely required.

EPW asked – the Environmental and Public Works Committee – forgive me, 

asked GSA and the FBI to go back and provide them with a report, a plan on the 

alternatives given that it had also been 14 years since the original program 

requirements had been developed.

Murphy was then asked about White House involvement in the FBI headquarters project. 

Representative Quigley: Was anyone else – at the White House involved with 

briefing you or to your knowledge did the [P]resident or any of the other officials 

at the White House consult with any of these other agencies in the decisionmaking process? 

Murphy: Well, sir, the FBI was the one who came to me and said that there’s –

their requirements had changed, they no longer required a campus for 11,000 

individuals, they were looking at a campus – they only had a requirement for 

about 8,300 individuals and based on that they wanted to put the J. Edgar 

Hoover site back into play. They actually requested that GSA consider renovating 

the building. In my conversations with GSA and then with the FBI we pushed 

back and didn’t believe that was the right answer. We thought that the 

renovation of the building wasn’t going to address setback issues and further 

given that it uses something called post-tensioned cabling to support it wouldthat any hardening we tried to do with the building wouldn’t be successful and 

that would be a long-term project that was – it – put the FBI’s initiative at risk. 

So, GSA then suggested that instead if the requirement was to stay in proximity 

to the Department of Justice and that location worked and it had the 

infrastructure in place that GSA proposed instead taking the opportunity to 

demolish the current FBI headquarters and rebuild on that site something that 

had (ph) the setbacks, that could do the – couldn’t have hardening, that could 

meet the requirements of the FBI for that new reduced headcount.

We asked Murphy why she did not disclose the White House involvement in response to this 

question. Murphy answered that she did not think that was what Representative Quigley was 

asking. Murphy told us that she interpreted the question as asking how the location decision 

was made and who she worked with in making the decision. Murphy told us that her answer 

focused on the substance of the decision regarding the location of the FBI headquarters. 

Murphy told us that she believed her answer was truthful. 

Immediately following her answer quoted above, Representative Quigley asked:
20

Representative Quigley: But again, to your knowledge was the [P]resident or 

anyone at the White House involved in those discussions either with your 

predecessors or people you’re working with now or yourself?

Murphy: Sir, to my knowledge – the direction that we got came from the FBI. 

They – it was the FBI that directed GSA as to what its requirements would be. 

We obviously did, given that it is a substantial budget request, we coordinated 

that request with OMB to make sure that – to provide for funding but the 

requirements were generated by the FBI. 

When asked why she did not disclose White House involvement in response to this second 

question, Murphy told us that she was trying to answer where the “instruction” came from. She 

indicated that the instruction came from the FBI. Murphy also told us that Representative

Quigley’s opening question asked about the decision to build the FBI headquarters at the 

existing site, and that she thought that the follow-on question’s reference to “those 

discussions” referred back to his opening question. As noted above, the opening question 

posed by Representative Quigley was “[t]o your knowledge, when did the administration make 

the decision not to build the suburban FBI facility and instead rebuild where it is?” Murphy said 

that she interpreted both of Representative Quigley’s subsequent questions to relate to this 

question. 

When asked why she did not give the answer that was agreed upon in the preparatory sessions, 

“it would be inappropriate to comment on any discussions she had or did not have with the 

President,” Murphy told us that she thought that response would “derail” the hearings and not 

answer the substance of the question. 

We found that Murphy’s answers to the questions about White House involvement were 

incomplete and may have left the misleading impression that she had no discussions with the 

President or senior White House officials in the decision-making process about the project.

Representative Quigley explicitly asked her whether any White House official briefed her or 

consulted with the other agencies in the decision-making process. She responded by describing 

discussions between the FBI and GSA about the FBI’s desire to reconsider the JEH site and 

whether to renovate the existing building or raze and rebuild. The congressman then asked 

again whether the President or anyone from the White House was involved in “those 

discussions.”

Despite her expectation going into the hearing that she would be asked about White House 

involvement in the project, and despite this second explicit inquiry about discussions with 

White House officials, Murphy again chose not to disclose the three meetings she had had with 

White House officials in advance of GSA’s submission of the revised plan for the project. Nor did 

she state (as she told us she had been prepared to do) that it would be inappropriate for her to 

comment on any discussions she had or did not have with the President. Instead, she described 

discussions between GSA and the FBI and briefly mentioned coordinating funding for the 

project “with OMB.” As a result, her testimony may have left the misleading impression that 

she had no discussions with the President or senior White House officials in the decisionmaking process about the project. 
21

Murphy told us that she understood the questions were about how the decision to locate the 

headquarters at the JEH site was made. Even assuming that was her interpretation of the 

questions, by Murphy’s own account to us, the White House meeting on December 20, 2017,

was an integral part of GSA’s decision-making process on that issue. Murphy told us that at that 

meeting she and Mathews began presenting campus options for the project, but were told by 

Kelly and Mulvaney that the FBI was concerned about the location of the headquarters and may 

no longer be seeking a consolidated campus. She said they also told her that she should touch 

base with the FBI to get everyone on the same page, and that the goal was to make the FBI 

happy and the FBI should drive the requirement. After receiving that direction, Murphy talked

with Wray and learned of his preference to stay at the JEH site with reduced personnel 

requirements. GSA and FBI personnel then began discussing options for staying at the JEH site.

Similarly, Murphy’s account of the January 24, 2018, White House meetings reflect that those 

meetings were also part of how the decision to rebuild, rather than renovate, the FBI 

headquarters at the JEH site was made. 

Murphy told us that she believed her answers to Representative Quigley were truthful. We 

agree that her responses were literally true. However, we found that because she omitted any 

mention in her answers of her discussions with Kelly, Mulvaney, and the President during the 

decision-making process for the Revised FBI Headquarters Plan, her testimony was incomplete 

and may have left the misleading impression that she had no discussions with the President or 

senior White House officials in the decision-making process about the project.

After reviewing a draft of this report, Murphy requested that we remove all discussion of her 

testimony from our report. Murphy asserted that our conclusion is unfounded and unfair 

because the congressman’s questions were “clearly limited” to the decision to maintain the 

location of the FBI headquarters at its present site. We disagree and believe the congressman’s 

questions speak for themselves, as do Murphy’s answers at the hearing. Murphy’s answers 

went well beyond the decision not to build a suburban FBI facility.

In response to the congressman’s first question about whether the President or any other 

White House official consulted with the agencies during the decision-making process, Murphy

described at length the discussions GSA and the FBI had about the decision whether to 

renovate the JEH building or raze and rebuild on the site. Immediately after her description of 

those discussions about renovation versus raze and rebuild, the congressman again asked, “was 

the President or anyone at the White House involved in those discussions either with your 

predecessors or people you’re working with now or yourself?” As described above, Murphy 

herself told us that at the January 24, 2018, meeting with Kelly and Mulvaney, she and 

Mulvaney assured Wray that the FBI could return to the JEH site after a rebuild, which helped 

persuade Wray to support the raze and rebuild scenario rather than the renovation option the 

FBI had been advocating. Under these circumstances, we cannot ignore Murphy’s failure to 

disclose that she had discussed those very issues with the President and others at the White 

House.

In the alternative, Murphy requested that we delete our finding about her testimony and 

replace it with language she requested for inclusion in the report. For the reasons described in 

this section, we cannot do so.
22

Conclusion

Our review found that GSA did not include all of the costs in its Revised FBI Headquarters Plan, 

and that the JEH demolish and rebuild plan would cost more than the cancelled JEH exchange. 

We also found that the FBI determined that the security level for the new FBI headquarters is 

Level V. However, the security level and the countermeasures cannot be definitively 

determined until the program of requirements is complete and additional risk assessments are 

completed. As the project progresses, the FBI will further define the specific security needs and 

the requisite countermeasures for the new FBI headquarters. Lastly, we found that

Administrator Murphy’s testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, Financial 

Services and General Government Subcommittee on April 17, 2018, was incomplete and may 

have left the misleading impression that she had no discussions with the President or senior 

White House officials in the decision-making process about the project.
A-1

Appendix A – GSA Comments
A-2

Appendix A – GSA Comments (cont.)
A-3

Appendix A – GSA Comments (cont.)
A-4

Appendix A – GSA Comments (cont.)
A-5

Appendix A – GSA Comments (cont.)
A-6

Appendix A – GSA Comments (cont.)
A-7

Appendix A – GSA Comments (cont.)
A-8

Appendix A – GSA Comments (cont.)
A-9

Appendix A – GSA Comments (cont.)
A-10

Appendix A – GSA Comments (cont.)
B-1

Appendix B – Response to Comments Regarding Role of the 

Office of Inspector General

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) has carefully considered the comments on our draft 

report submitted by GSA. We also considered comments submitted on behalf of Administrator 

Murphy in her individual capacity. We have addressed any comments relating to factual 

accuracy where appropriate in the body of the report. 

This appendix separately responds to certain comments made on behalf of Administrator 

Murphy and the GSA that appear to reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the OIG’s role in 

initiating, staffing, and conducting this review. 

First, Administrator Murphy has expressed the opinion that the OIG’s initiation of this review in 

response to the request of a congressman whose district has an interest in the project indicates 

an improper purpose. This is misguided. Inspectors General regularly receive requests to 

conduct oversight from Members of Congress affiliated with either the majority or the minority 

party, and must regularly decide whether the subject matter of the request supports directing 

OIG resources to answer some, none, or all of the issues raised in the request. In this case, the 

OIG’s decision to open the review reflects the importance of the FBI headquarters project and 

is wholly consistent with our past work in this area; and our definition of the scope of the 

review reflects our independent consideration of significant issues within our jurisdiction to 

address. 

The FBI headquarters project is a longstanding, high-profile, taxpayer-funded, multi-billion 

dollar project that GSA has been spearheading for over a decade and the OIG has been 

monitoring since 2013. In March 2017, the OIG issued its Audit of PBS’s Planning and Funding 

for Exchange Projects. The GSA’s FBI headquarters project, which then anticipated exchanging 

the Hoover building to help finance construction of a new suburban campus, was among the 

exchange projects the OIG reviewed in this audit. The audit found that PBS had not fully 

factored risk into its planning for exchange projects and as a result cancelled or chose not to 

pursue several exchange projects. In July 2017, GSA cancelled the FBI exchange project. 

When GSA subsequently presented its new plan to raze and rebuild the FBI headquarters at the 

Hoover site rather than continue with the suburban campus plan to which GSA had devoted 

years of planning and taxpayer funds, the change drew widespread public attention and 

bipartisan concern expressed at multiple congressional hearings. Under these circumstances, 

the suggestion that it was improper for the OIG to review GSA’s decision-making process and 

the adequacy of its considerations of comparative costs and security is clearly wrong. 

Second, Administrator Murphy suggests that the manner in which we exercised our oversight 

function -- conducting a multi-disciplinary review -- was improper. This argument rests entirely 

on the premise that a multi-disciplinary review is “not traditional,” and therefore is a suspect 

use of OIG authority. This also is clearly wrong. The Inspector General Act authorizes Inspectors 

General to “make such investigations and reports relating to the administration of the 

programs and operations of the applicable establishment as are, in the judgment of the 

Inspector General, necessary or desirable. 5 U.S.C. App. Section 6(a)(2). The Council of 
B-2

Appendix B – Response to Comments Regarding Role of the 

Office of Inspector General (cont.)

Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Quality Standards for Federal Offices of 

Inspector General (August 2012) state: “In addition to audits and investigations...OIGs may 

conduct, supervise, and coordinate inspections, evaluations, and other reviews related to the 

programs and operations of their departments and agencies.” Likewise, the CIGIE Presidential 

Transition Handbook (October 4, 2016) concerning the role of Inspectors General states:

[S]everal IGs have created offices that conduct special reviews, combining the 

multidisciplinary skills of investigators, auditors, evaluators, and lawyers. These 

special reviews are often hybrid reviews, involving potential misconduct by 

agency employees as well as systemic evaluations of an agency program or 

operation. Examples of such special reviews are the Department of Justice OIG’s 

review of the treatment of detainees after the 9/11 attacks and the Peace Corps 

IG’s review of the death of a Peace Corps volunteer in China.

Like others in the IG community, the GSA OIG has frequently used multidisciplinary teams to 

review GSA programs or operations. For example, the GSA OIG’s Management Deficiency 

Report of the 2010 Western Regional Conference was completed by a team of investigators, 

auditors, and lawyers. More recently, a team of inspectors, investigators, and lawyers 

conducted GSA OIG’s Investigation of Whistleblower Reprisal Complaint, which addressed a 

complaint that the former GSA Administrator retaliated against a senior GSA career official for 

making protected disclosures. The use of teams that leverage the skillsets of multiple disciplines 

within an OIG is one of the most effective ways to achieve the highest quality work in matters, 

like this one, that are not solely audits or investigations but contain elements of both. 

Finally, the GSA’s comments on the draft report contend that the OIG personnel conducting this 

review acted improperly in seeking information about White House meetings relevant to our 

review of GSA’s decision-making process. This too is incorrect. As noted in the report, early in 

the review the OIG learned that during the course of GSA’s decision-making on the Revised FBI 

Headquarters Plan, Administrator Murphy met with the President on January 24, 2018, to 

discuss the project. When we sought information about the meeting, however, we initially 

received inconsistent and unhelpful responses to our inquiries from GSA witnesses. 

Some GSA witnesses readily described what they knew of the meeting, while others initially 

refused to discuss it or even acknowledge that a meeting had occurred. When we asked for the 

basis for these initial refusals, some witnesses, including Administrator Murphy, told us they 

could not comment on meetings they had or did not have with senior White House officials. 

Murphy also stated that she was told not to answer by GSA’s Acting General Counsel, who she 

said told her that such answers were subject to executive privilege. 

Contrary to GSA’s suggestion, the OIG made no “agreement” with GSA’s Acting General Counsel 

not to seek information relevant to this review. In fact, we sought to determine whether 

executive privilege was being invoked to preclude sharing of information with the OIG, which is 
B-3

Appendix B – Response to Comments Regarding Role of the 

Office of Inspector General (cont.)

part of GSA and within the Executive Branch. Murphy told us that to her knowledge the 

privilege had not been invoked. GSA’s Acting General Counsel told us that the White House had 

not asserted the privilege, but that the presidential communications privilege was presumed to 

apply absent White House consent to discuss matters covered by the privilege. He refused, 

however, to discuss with us his guidance to GSA witnesses regarding the scope and parameters 

of any presumptive privilege. 

Ultimately, after we continued to press for an explanation of the scope of any presumptive 

privilege GSA was relying upon to limit information provided to the OIG, the Acting General 

Counsel finally told us he had received direction from the White House Counsel’s Office 

regarding White House meetings relevant to this review. He told us that pursuant to those 

directions, GSA employees were authorized to disclose the existence of White House meetings, 

discuss who attended, and discuss any high level agreements that resulted from the meetings; 

but not to disclose any statements made by the President. Murphy then participated in a 

second interview with the OIG, in which she provided us the descriptions of the meetings 

contained in this report, and we were able to conclude the interviews in this review. 

Contrary to the GSA’s suggestion, the OIG team acted professionally and courteously 

throughout its efforts to seek information relevant to this review. Had GSA acted earlier in 

formulating a consistent and clear position regarding the privilege issue, and been more willing 

to discuss the scope and parameters of the privilege with the OIG, we might have avoided any 

awkwardness associated with the need to conduct multiple interviews of some of the witnesses 

to obtain information relevant to this review. 

In sum, the GSA OIG properly initiated, staffed, and performed this review.