U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

i 

25–870 2018

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–48] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES HEARING 

ON

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL 

YEAR 2018 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 

SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

HEARING HELD 

MAY 24, 2017 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama, Vice Chair 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

A. DONALD MCEACHIN, Virginia 

DAVE SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

JODI BRIGNOLA, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................... 2 

Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Stiller, Allison, Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Research, Development, and Acquisition; accompanied by LtGen Robert 

S. Walsh, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, and VADM William K. Lescher, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval 

Operations for Integration of Resources and Capabilities ................................ 5

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Stiller, Allison, joint with LtGen Robert S. Walsh and VADM William 

K. Lescher ...................................................................................................... 39 

Wittman, Hon. Robert J. .................................................................................. 37 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Force Structure Assessment Executive Summary ......................................... 67 

February 9, 2017, Accelerated Fleet Plan ...................................................... 71 

‘‘The Future Navy,’’ Admiral Richardson May 17, 2017, memo ................... 86 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 97 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL YEAR 2018 BUDGET 

REQUEST FOR SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 24, 2017. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:08 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J. Wittman 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. WITTMAN. I will call to order the Subcommittee on Seapower 

and Projection Forces of the Committee on Armed Services. And 

today, we meet to discuss the Department of Navy’s fiscal year 

2018 budget request. 

Appearing before us today to discuss the important topic are 

three esteemed Navy witnesses. First, we have Ms. Allison Stiller, 

performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research 

Development and Acquisition. 

We also have Vice Admiral William K. Lescher, Deputy Chief of 

Naval Operations for Integration of Resources and Capabilities; 

and Lieutenant General Robert S. Walsh, Deputy Commandant of 

Combat Development and Integration. 

And I want to thank all of you for your service, and just as important, thank you for appearing before this subcommittee on the 

fiscal year 2018 budget request. 

Last week, the Chief of Naval Operations [CNO], Admiral Richardson, laid out a bold vision for the Navy. He indicated, ‘‘Both 

China and Russia are able to compete on a global scale, in all domains, and at competitive speed.’’ In response to this increased 

global pressure, he stated, ‘‘The future fleet must be timely—we 

need this more powerful fleet in the 2020s, not the 2040s.’’ Without 

any reservation, I believe that the CNO is correct. Unfortunately, 

the fiscal year 2018 budget request does not support the vision of 

the CNO, nor of this subcommittee. 

While I do not object with the budget’s emphasis on current readiness, I believe that there is a high degree of naivete in the area 

of ship construction. We must start now, not in 2019. Some believe 

that ship construction is like a spigot that can be turned off and 

on. I believe that there are those in defense budgeting that advocate for such an approach. 

In ship construction, though, we know one thing for certain: Ship 

construction is a long game and requires steady funding to achieve 
2 

steady progress. Unfortunately, I do not see steady progress towards fulfilling the goal of attaining a 355-ship Navy. The budget 

request of only 8 ships does little to build towards a 355-ship Navy. 

We have hot production lines ready to add more work, but the call 

to duty has not been sounded. It is time to get serious and match 

our peer competitors with aggressive ship construction initiatives. 

As to the specific concerns with the Navy request, building 1 aircraft carrier every 5 years will never allow us to reach 12 aircraft 

carriers; building 2 attack submarines a year will result in a submarine reduction in force by 20 percent in 10 years; and building 

only 1 LCS [littoral combat ship] will result in massive layoffs at 

both Marinette and Mobile in the States of Wisconsin and Alabama. These are not acceptable outcomes. 

As the Marine Corps, I am pleased that this committee has supported—as to the Marine Corps, excuse me, I am pleased that this 

committee supported the authorization of two more San Antonio- class amphibious ships in the last 2 years. However, I hold some 

concerns in respect to conducting amphibious operations in a contested environment. As our adversaries become more capable, our 

Marine Corps may need a bold new vision to accomplish future 

missions. 

And I know, in speaking with General Walsh, that they are well 

on track to do that and looking at all the opportunities that are out 

there, using every platform at their avail, but it is our duty to 

make sure that we find ways to make sure we enable and allow 

for those visions to be accomplished. 

This vision may require a change to our legacy forces. Expansion 

of aviation projection, longer range connectors, and a lighter amphibious capability are all desired attributes of a more capable expeditionary force structure. Unfortunately, I see little of this in the 

budget request to change our current trajectory. 

I am reminded of the words of John F. Kennedy himself, a proud 

Navy officer, when he said that history has taught us that control 

of the seas means security. Control of the seas can mean peace. 

Control of the seas can mean victory. The United States must control the seas if it is to protect your security. Ladies and gentlemen, 

it is time that our Nation wake up and seize control of the seas. 

I would now like to turn to our ranking member, Joe Courtney, 

for any remarks that he may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CONNECTICUT, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And again, I want to thank the three distinguished witnesses 

that are here today to discuss the fiscal year 2018 budget request 

for the Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps. 

Before we get into the substance of the hearing, I think it is important to remember the context in which we are considering the 

budget request submitted yesterday. In December of last year, the 

Navy, under President Obama and Secretary Mabus, released an 

updated Force Structure Assessment [FSA] that laid out a require-
3 

ment for increasing the fleet from 308 ships to 355. Among other 

factors, the FSA noted that increased operations, lengthened deployments, and changing conditions around the globe necessitated 

this boost. 

Then, in the early days of the Trump administration, the Navy 

submitted an Accelerated Fleet Plan that, in the words of Acting 

Navy Secretary Sean Stackley, stated: It offers a first step towards 

a framework to develop the strategic guidance and identify the investments needed to reinvigorate our naval forces. That plan identified 29 additional ships that the Navy found could be accelerated 

in support of the larger fleet identified in the FSA. 

And just last week, the Chief of Naval Operations, John Richardson, released a white paper noting the urgent need to boost the 

fleet as quickly as possible. As he concludes in the paper, time is 

of the essence. I agree and, like many of my colleagues on this 

panel, I have eagerly awaited more details on how the Trump administration would move forward on the highly bipartisan push for 

a larger and more capable Navy fleet. 

Unfortunately, the shipbuilding budget released yesterday reflects none of these inputs. Instead, it requests funding for only 8 

ships and submarines, the same level as planned by the former 

Obama administration plan prior to the December FSA, lower than 

the 11 ships that we just voted on in the 2017 Omnibus Appropriations Act that we passed out of Congress just this last month on 

a bipartisan basis, and lower than the 12 ships that the Navy identified in its Accelerated Fleet Plan for 2018. 

In other words, the Trump administration has proposed a 300- 

ship budget for a 355-ship plan. This proposal really begs the question, what is the administration waiting for? The table was set for 

this administration to take the work that had been done for years 

during the prior administration to hit the ground running towards 

a larger fleet. 

While I understand the Defense Department is planning a wider 

review of its defense strategy that will guide future investments, 

I can think of no element of the Department that has as solid a 

foundation to start from than shipbuilding. A year lost in shipbuilding can never be regained, and, unfortunately, that is what 

this budget proposes. 

Shipbuilding, as the chairman stated, is a long game that relies 

on certainty in the Navy’s plans and intentions. Nothing in this 

budget, however, provides any clarity on where this administration 

intends to go with the buildup of the fleet. There is no 30-year 

shipbuilding plan that was submitted yesterday. And there was no 

FYDP, there was no Future Years Defense Plan, that defense officials so far have just simply named as a placeholder. 

Congress, industry, and the American people are left guessing as 

to the way ahead. For some shipyards, this could be a make-orbreak issue for them, and we need to tread carefully to ensure that 

we have a well-rounded industrial base in the future. 

We have a lot of hard work ahead in the next few weeks to craft 

our 2018 defense authorization bill and an extremely truncated 

timeline. I hope that we will use the modest shipbuilding request 

submitted to us yesterday as a floor and not as a ceiling as we look 
4 

for ways to further support the Navy’s fleet expansion and the industrial base that we will need to support it. 

That is not to say that there are not elements in this budget that 

I strongly support. One area of welcome progress is in our undersea forces. In addition to fully funding two attack submarines in 

2018, as planned in the 2014 multiyear contract, the budget supports a long-sought priority of mine, which is the restoration of a 

second attack sub in 2021, making sure that the two-a-year build 

rate will be all the way through the next block contract, Block V 

contract. That means we can expect at least 10 submarines in that 

next block, while we look for additional opportunities to increase 

that rate where the capacity exists to meet the increased fleet requirements of the FSA. 

In addition to supporting continued development and early production on the Columbia-class SSBN [ballistic missile submarine], 

the budget reflects the Navy’s use of key authorities that we provided through the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund. I note that 

nearly $100 million is allocated in this budget for continuous production of missile tubes and advanced construction activities in the 

first Columbia-class boomer, the SSBN–826. 

As we well know, which is we are the committee that drafted and 

created the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, the authorities 

in the NSBDF have been projected to save hundreds of millions of 

dollars if fully utilized. And I look forward to hearing more from 

the Navy about how they intend to use those authorities in 2018 

and beyond. 

I also strongly support the increased focus on restoring readiness 

and operational availability of our fleet through expanding funding 

for the ship depot maintenance. This is a topic that Chairman 

Wittman and I recently publicly discussed in a forum together and 

one that is absolutely critical to ensuring that we can fully utilize 

the fleet we have today as we build towards the future. 

It appears that the budget intends to leverage capacity in the 

private yards to support maintenance priorities as well as focus investment in our shipyard capacity and infrastructure. The backlog 

in ship availabilities is immense, and we clearly need to do more 

to address this problem in 2018 and beyond. 

Finally, so much of what we do in the 2018 budget will depend 

on how we address the Sword of Damocles that is hanging over the 

entire process: the Budget Control Act caps, and the threat of sequestration. Much has been said about lifting the defense sequester 

at the expense of non-defense spending, such as STEM [science, 

technology, engineering, and mathematics] education and job training funding outside of the Pentagon. I can think of no worse approach for the overall security and well-being of our Nation. 

We cannot expect to embark on the buildup of our ships, aircraft, 

or other advanced technologies if we are at the same time gutting 

education, workforce development, skills training, and other efforts 

at closing the job-skill mismatch that is rampant in defense manufacturing all across the country. The only way we are going to extract ourselves from our current budget quagmire is through a balanced approach that ensures that we meet all the needs of our Nation. 

I yield back. 
5 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. Thanks for those opening statement words. And it is good to know that I think we are 

both on the same page about what the course is ahead. 

So with that, Ms. Stiller, I will go to you for the opening statement that I know that you will present for both the Navy and Marine Corps. 

STATEMENT OF ALLISON STILLER, PERFORMING THE DUTIES 

OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH, 

DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION; ACCOMPANIED BY 

LTGEN ROBERT S. WALSH, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT 

FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, AND 

VADM WILLIAM K. LESCHER, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL 

OPERATIONS FOR INTEGRATION OF RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES 

Ms. STILLER. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Courtney, 

distinguished members of the subcommittee—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Ms. Stiller, if you can either pull the mike closer 

to you or turn it on. 

Ms. STILLER. Well, I turned it on. I will talk loud. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. We have got to make sure we have it on 

the microphone. 

Ms. STILLER. Okay. I will start this way. 

Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Courtney, distinguished 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to address the Department of the Navy’s acquisition programs. I am joined this afternoon by Lieutenant General Bob Walsh, Deputy Commandant for Combat Development 

and Integration; and Vice Admiral Bill Lescher, Deputy Chief of 

Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources. 

I request that our written statement be included in the record. 

Mr. WITTMAN. So ordered. 

Ms. STILLER. On behalf of our Navy and Marine Corps, we want 

to thank this subcommittee for your strong support and the fiscal 

year 2017 defense authorization and appropriations bills. Not only 

has Congress supported our request, but the committee increased 

funding for many of our critical programs. We are committed to 

making good on that investment and to do so in the most fiscally 

responsible manner possible, to provide the ships, aircraft, vehicles, 

and weapons that are needed for our men and women in uniform 

to be successful. 

We have continued to leverage every tool available to drive down 

cost. We have tightened requirements, maximized competition, capitalized on multiyear and block-buy procurements, explored crossprogram efficiencies, and attacked our cost of doing business so 

that more of our resources can be dedicated to warfighting capability. 

Global activities over the last year have made it clear that security challenges are intensifying at an increasingly rapid pace. To 

remain competitive, it is imperative that we continuously adapt to 

the emerging security environment and to do so with a sense of urgency. This requires us to work closely with Congress to return 

budget stability and predictability to the Department, which necessitates increasing defense caps under the Budget Control Act. 
6 

Our 2018 President’s budget [PB] submission is governed by 

SECDEF’s [Secretary of Defense’s] priorities to improve warfighting readiness by addressing pressing programmatic shortfalls that 

have accrued from 15 years of wartime operational tempo. The 

budget maintains the operational effectiveness of our current force 

while also building a bridge to growing the future force, starting 

in 2019. Over the past year, 11 ships were delivered and an additional 12 ships were christened. One of the ships delivered this 

year was DDG 1000 [guided missile destroyer], USS Zumwalt, a 

truly transformational platform. And today, CVN–78, Gerald R. 

Ford, our newest aircraft carrier, is at sea on her acceptance trials. 

On the aviation side, over this last year we delivered over 130 

manned aircraft and 120 unmanned aircraft. Of note, our P–8A 

successfully completed flight testing with a capability that will revolutionize air-based antisubmarine warfare. And we designated our 

carrier-based unmanned tanker as an accelerated acquisition program. 

On the Marine Corps side, the Amphibious Combat Vehicle Program began delivery of vehicles this spring, with a total of 32 vehicles expected to be delivered by the end of the year. And last 

month, we conducted a ship-to-shore maneuver exercise, which 

demonstrated new technologies that could shape future amphibious 

operations. 

I would like to briefly discuss a couple of items posed by our 

budget request. First, we have requested multiyear procurement 

authority for the fiscal year 2018 to fiscal year 2022 DDG–51 

Flight III buy. We have a handshake agreement with Huntington 

Ingalls to introduce the Flight III capability on their fiscal year 

2017 ship. 

We are also requesting multiyear procurement authority for the 

fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year 2023 Virginia class, which will introduce the Virginia payload capability. 

Second, we have made a couple of adjustments to our 5-year 

shipbuilding plan. We added a Virginia-class submarine in fiscal 

year 2021, and we have deferred the start of the Frigate Program 

from fiscal year 2019 to fiscal year 2020 while we revisit the ship’s 

requirements. 

Our small surface combatant requirement remains at 52 ships, 

and we desire to transition to the frigate as soon as possible. However, the administration recognizes the criticality of our industrial 

base and supports funding a second LCS in fiscal year 2018. We 

note that our shipbuilding plan beyond fiscal year 2018 may be adjusted in our PB–19 submission as a result of the defense strategic 

review that we will complete later this summer, consistent with 

SECDEF’s fiscal year 2019 priority to grow a larger and more lethal force. 

In summary, the Navy’s 2018 budget is focused on improving the 

wholeness of our current forces. We greatly appreciate the subcommittee’s strong and consistent support of your sailors and marines. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today, and we look forward to answering your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Ms. Stiller, General Walsh, and 

Admiral Lescher can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 
7 

Mr. WITTMAN. Ms. Stiller, thank you. Vice Admiral Lescher, 

Lieutenant General Walsh, thank you so much for joining us today. 

I wanted to begin. I am going to just ask a single question and 

I want to go to the ranking member and our other members, because we have a long list of members that want to ask questions. 

So, Lieutenant General Walsh, I want to get your perspective on 

where the Marine Corps is today. If we look at and hear the assessment of where the Marine Corps is, we look at the force today, and 

it is a heavier force and a less expeditionary force than it was 20 

years ago. 

And I think in the contested environment that we face, some of 

the things that the Marine Corps has to do is to look at the weight 

of amphibious forces, looking at the capability of connectors, making sure we are optimizing that capability, making sure too that in 

all instances we can project power as a highly maneuverable force 

in a contested environment. I think that those are things that we 

absolutely have to do today. 

And I just want to get your perspective on what changes are 

being made to expand our amphibious connectors and how we are 

going to be able to project power and what capabilities we will have 

in a contested environment. And how is the Marine Corps leveraging what I believe for the Marine Corps is a renaissance in aviation 

capabilities in amphibious operations? 

General WALSH. Thank you, Chairman, for that question and the 

opportunity to talk to you here today and all the support the committee has done, particularly around LPD–28 and 29 [amphibious 

transport dock ships] and that support. 

Great question. And I think, you know, as we look at where we 

have been, we have been focused really for the last 15, 16 years 

on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. So this renaissance, you 

know, as you call it, in aviation, aviation has been moving out, and 

one of the things that the Commandant has us focused on is developing a fifth-generation Marine Corps. And as we look at that fifthgeneration Marine Corps, there are pieces and places inside the 

Marine Corps we are developing that fifth-generation capability. 

Last year, we conducted really about an 18-month force structure 

assessment of the entire Marine Corps and looked at where we 

have gaps and seams, where we are not set up for the future battlefield. As we look at the threats in the future—and the threat 

drives our concepts and drives our capabilities—the threat we are 

seeing is not just focused on ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant], it is not just focused on Taliban, it is focused on peer adversaries and how are we going to operate in that environment. 

As we looked at that force, the desire to lighten up, as you talk 

about, on our amphibious force was driven by a lot of the IED [improvised explosive device] threats that we have seen on the ground 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. So it is easy to say that we need to lighten up. We can’t look like the Army. We are not the Army. We come 

from the sea; we have to be a light expedition force if we are deployed. But at the same time, when we get ashore, if it is a contested environment, we are going to have to be able to slug it out 

and be able to operate against peer adversaries. We do that in a 

lot of ways as a lighter force with maneuver. 
8 

So aviation, as you talk about, brings us a lot of maneuver capability. But yet, when we maneuver and those marines go into close 

contact, they are going to have to be able to fight it out and, hopefully, in a maneuver warfare fashion where we are not going tank 

on tank against large enemy formations. That is not who we are; 

we are not the Army. 

So we are looking at exactly what you are talking about. We 

have done a number of experiments and assessments of how do we 

lighten up. One of the things the Commandant had us do last year 

was to purchase 144 utility vehicles that can fit inside—MRZRs we 

are calling them—that fit inside the MV–22 that are expanding our 

range to be able to go longer distances. 

While we did that, just at this advanced naval technology experiment that we just did, we were looking at how we can lighten that 

particular capability in an electric capability, that lightens that 

load to be able to go further, bringing a network-on-the-move capability. 

So as we deploy the force and we start to distribute more, we 

have got to be able to bring the fires with them and the C2 [command and control] capability, so those distributed forces that can 

operate in a lighter way have those capabilities to bear. 

So I think we are going after that problem, because the number 

of ships we have is limited. I think we are on a fairly good plan 

on the amphib side. As you talked about, we have got hot lines. 

So, moving forward, we have got good ships, but we have got to 

be good partners with the Navy, that we have got to keep an expeditionary mindset that we have walked away from a little bit in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. So the focus is on how do we lighten up, but 

at the same time when we are buying smaller vehicles in a footmobile Marine Corps, how do we bring that firepower to bear as 

we go forward. No question about it that our aviation capability 

brings us a lot of that. 

Expanding the connectors, we are looking at that very hard. One 

of the things we are looking at with Office of Naval Research that 

we have got a project going on right now is to increase the speed 

of our current amphibious combat vehicle capability. That is the 

number one line of effort. 

The second line of effort is to look at other connectors that could 

help us in that way, things like sleds that we could put the amphibious combat vehicles on, move them ashore from further distances and faster, along with different connectors that can help us 

along those lines, such as joint high-speed vessel, those kind of different connector capabilities where we can bring more and faster. 

And the third line of effort that we have looked at is looking at 

that problem and how do we get ship to shore in a different way. 

With the technologies that are out there, and just this last experiment that Ms. Stiller mentioned out of Camp Pendleton. 

We had more than 50 different dynamic capabilities that we experimented with that came from across industry and across the 

naval warfare centers that brought in new capabilities that are 

going to allow us to be able to sense the battle space, see where 

the enemy is, where it is not, be able to deceive the enemy, understand that battle space a lot better, and be able to maneuver more 

quickly ashore. 
9 

So I think we are getting after this problem pretty hard and I 

think, if anything, we probably owe some more discussion to this 

in detail with you in follow-on discussions. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Lieutenant General Walsh. 

We now go to Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Stiller, thank you 

for noting in your testimony that the budget calls for sort of filling 

in that 2021 dip in the Virginia-class production and making sure 

that the Block V will be at least two a year. 

You know, even since January, again, we have had combatant 

commanders testifying before Armed Services, such as Admiral 

Harris, again, raising the flag about the need for, you know, addressing the dip, the larger dip in submarine fleet in the 2020s. 

And Secretary Stackley, in terms of his Accelerated Fleet Plan, had 

actually suggested a build rate of three subs a year in 2022 and 

2023, which are, again, part of that Block V timespan. 

So I guess the question I would ask you is, would you consider, 

you know, the 10 subs outlined in the Block V to be a starting 

point in your talks about the next contract, and would your proposal for additional submarines to be added beyond the 2-a-year 

rate should the capacity in industry and budget resources become 

available; and is there anything we can to in our subcommittee in 

terms of authorities to enable that? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. In the past, we have had the ability in a 

multiyear contract to also ask for option pricing for additional ships 

that may not get the full benefit of a multiyear, but obviously benefit from having the multiyear pricing. 

So we can add that flexibility if we see as we build our fiscal year 

2019 budget that additional submarines are going to be added in 

the later years. As you noted, the fiscal year 2022 and 2023 are the 

years we are not building a Columbia. So those are years that 

when we looked at the future fleet plan we identified as that would 

be an opportunity to get to the three a year. 

We also need to make sure that we are working closely with industry, both Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls, to make sure 

that we understand all of the facilities and manpower required to 

get to that. 

But yes, sir, we have the tools in our toolkit to add option pricing 

on multiyears, which, as we can see, as I pointed out, that one’s 

a fiscal year 2019 to 2023, so we do have a little bit of time as the 

budget starts to crystallize and we see where we are going to be 

from a top-line perspective and whether we can get there. 

And if it looks like we are going to be able to and it makes sense, 

we can have a dialogue with the committee to increase the number 

in the multiyear as well. That is an option. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. You also talked about the use of continuous production authority on missile tube components for the 

Columbia class, and also some funding for advanced construction 

funds on the first submarine, which, again, were authorities that 

this subcommittee created in the National Sea-Based Deterrence 

Fund. Again, there are a couple other authorities that we had, you 

know, inserted into that portion of the law. 
10 

And last year was the first year, as you know, that money started flowing through the fund. So it is not just an accounting device. 

I mean, it is actually a functioning program now. 

And I was just sort of wondering whether, again, you could sort 

of elaborate in terms of the Department’s intentions in terms of 

utilizing those authorities we gave? 

Ms. STILLER. We absolutely intend to utilize the continuous production of missile tube authority as well as the advanced construction. And we continue to look at what other authorities we might 

need, and we would come back to the committee if we feel like we 

need additional authorities. 

This year we don’t see that, but we have put into place—as you 

know, we have been looking across the submarine programs, both 

Virginia and Columbia, to see were there synergies there. We have 

expanded that now to also include looking at the aircraft carriers. 

So we are looking at our nuclear force to see are there opportunities. We haven’t completed all that work yet, and so we may be 

coming back in a subsequent year, seeing that we might find other 

authorities that would also cross into the aircraft carrier as well. 

Hopefully—well, presumably. I am not going to come back without 

a business case that is compelling that would drive cost down 

across the platforms. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Right. Like shopping at Costco. 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COURTNEY. One last question, which is in your testimony, 

you stated that the Navy is supporting the Coast Guard’s efforts 

to responsibly and affordably recapitalize the heavy polar icebreaker fleet and that the Coast Guard expects delivery of the first 

icebreaker as early as 2023. 

The President actually was in my district just last week at the 

Coast Guard Academy and threw his support behind the recapitalization of the icebreaker fleet. I don’t, however, see any funding in 

the Navy’s budget for this effort, and the Coast Guard budget 

seems to allocate only $19 million for the program, which it is my 

understanding is far lower than the levels needed to continue towards advanced procurement and long lead efforts on the first icebreaker. 

Can you elaborate on how the Navy is working with the Coast 

Guard to move this program forward, and what can we do in our 

2018 bill to support the icebreaker program? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. We have signed two memorandum of 

agreements, one with the Coast Guard and the Navy and one at 

the Navy/Department of Homeland Security level. We have put together an integrated team, integrated program team to run the 

program with the Coast Guard. We sit on their review boards as 

the design is going through. 

And as they have been finalizing requirements and having that 

debate on cost versus requirements, we are right there at the table 

trying to provide good suggestions, what we have learned lessons 

in the past. So it has been an excellent exchange. We have Navy 

folks that are on the team permanently. And then I sit on an oversight board with the Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard. So it 

is a very good working relationship. 
11 

As for funding, funding is not included in the Navy’s budget, because it is the Coast Guard’s mission, by law, to provide icebreaking capability. There is money in their budget, I am not exactly sure of the amount, but that is to continue these studies that 

are ongoing. There is $150 million that the Congress appropriated 

last year of shipbuilding construction Navy [SCN] money that is 

available; and as they get into detail design, that money can be 

used for detail design. 

We can’t use SCN money for R&D [research and development] 

type of activities. But the Navy doesn’t intend to program for the 

icebreaker. As you know, we have challenges and areas where we 

want to grow the fleet, and it is more appropriately funded in the 

Coast Guard budget. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. We will now go to Mr. 

Byrne. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Stiller, thank you for 

being here today, and I appreciate your announcement in your 

opening remarks that the administration is changing its request on 

the LCS program from one to two. I would like to follow up on that 

if you don’t mind. 

We all read with great interest the CNO’s white paper that highlights that we need to take advantage of our hot production lines, 

and you know as well as I do how hot the production lines are on 

LCS. 

Earlier this month, we heard from Admiral Neagley that the optimal number for the LCS is three. Now, as far as cost and schedule efficiency, that seems to work pretty well. And we are still 

working towards 52 small surface combatants, including the transition to the frigate, and a 350-ship fleet. Why not continue to leverage this production capacity by going to three? 

Ms. STILLER. Well, yes, sir. And the way we are looking at how 

we get from the LCS to the frigate while looking at the industrial 

base, while three is the most efficient, I am looking at it more 

across the fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018. So if you have got 

three ships that were appropriated in 2017 and the two and the 

eight that we are talking about to be discussed, obviously, until the 

2018 budget is passed, that is five to go across the two. 

Within the yards right now, there are 13 ships that are in phases 

of construction. And we would certainly work with both shipyards 

to figure out what is the optimal build strategy during this time 

where we are trying to transition, but keep the industrial base 

there. 

So I agree with you. We are not at their most efficient level, but 

we are also greater than minimum sustaining rate. And so we will 

work with the yards to make sure that we are mitigating impacts 

to the industrial base as we move forward. 

Mr. BYRNE. I know I don’t have to tell you this, but this is a 

highly trained, highly skilled workforce, and they have been working together long enough now to where they have gotten efficiencies down and costs down, which is music to our ears up here. 

We want to try to take advantage of that, and I know you and I 

have talked about this before. This is not a spigot. When we turn 

even part of that spigot off, all these highly trained people that can 
12 

get jobs in this economy literally all over the country, they are 

gone. 

And trying to rebuild that technical capability at the level we are 

going to need to build it back to meet your 52-ship requirement is 

going to be difficult and I think is going to draw out your timeline, 

and I am pretty sure it is going to increase the expense of the ships 

in the future. So I know you already know that. I just want to 

make sure you and I have communicated about that. 

I want to go to the timing for the transition to the frigate. Now, 

we went through this. Three years ago, we went through this study 

that the Navy had from the Small Surface Combatant Task Force, 

and they called for the transition to the frigate in 2019. Now, obviously, if we can go ahead and transition to 2019, that makes the 

job of trying to make sure that we have got these hot lines still hot 

enough and being able to do what we want to do a lot easier. Have 

we amended that study to change it from 2019 to 2020? 

Ms. STILLER. Sir, I am going to start this, then I am going to 

defer to Admiral Lescher to talk to you a little bit more about the 

requirements. 

Mr. BYRNE. Sure. 

Ms. STILLER. But as we have been going through our fleet, as we 

are watching what is happening around the world, yes, we did have 

a frigate plan to start in 2019. The requirements community said 

no, they want to take another look at that, especially in the local 

air defense area. 

And I will turn it over to Admiral Lescher here in a minute. And 

so while they are combing through their deliberations, we, again, 

will look at making sure that we are keeping that LCS line and 

the industrial base there so that we can get to the frigate in fiscal 

year 2020. But I will defer to Admiral Lescher on the requirements. 

Mr. BYRNE. Before you do that, Admiral, you have not amended 

the plan itself? 

Ms. STILLER. I am sorry, sir. We have moved the frigate start to 

fiscal year 2020 in this budget. 

Mr. BYRNE. But the plan that was put forward in 2014 has not 

been formally amended? 

Ms. STILLER. We are in the process right now of looking at—the 

requirements community is in the process right now of relooking at 

requirements, based on the threat today. 

Mr. BYRNE. I am sorry, Admiral. 

Admiral LESCHER. No, sir, absolutely. So, very briefly, the requirements evaluation team for the frigate is working very hard 

right now to take a look at the use of the frigate in distributed 

maritime operations, the distributed lethality concept which will be 

a slightly different requirement set for that ship. 

So, as Allison indicated—— 

Mr. BYRNE. That is the missile capability? 

Admiral LESCHER. It is a combination of an aviation warfare capability, increased survivability, and looking at electronic warfare. 

Concurrent with that, the OTH [over-the-horizon] missile is 

something that is part of our cruise missile strategy as well, to 

bring that on. But that team is working to really present their rec-
13 

ommendations in the building end of this month and start briefing 

that up to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary. 

Mr. BYRNE. Let me register one other concern that I have, and 

I know this is not something that is set in stone, but there is a figure out there for the cost cap for the frigate at $1.2 billion for a 

ship that we are making now for about $500 million. Now, it is 

going to cost more when you go up, we get that. 

I am a little concerned that we are—and I know this can change. 

I understand you may want to talk about lowering that cap. I am 

a little afraid that we have got it so high that, A, we are really just 

building another destroyer; and B, this is something we won’t be 

able to afford because we get it so high that we have designed a 

program that we are going to come in here and my colleagues are 

going to say, we can’t do that. 

Admiral LESCHER. Yes, sir, I think you are absolutely right. And 

CNO, in fact, testified this morning before the SAC–D [Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense] similarly that that figure is 

too high. He believes that. So I think you are absolutely right in 

terms of what is really a placeholder figure in the fiscal year 2020 

column right now, and that cost has to come down. 

Mr. BYRNE. I want to thank both of you. I look forward to working with you. I know there is a lot of work left for you to do, and 

we want to be working with you as you go through this, but I certainly appreciate your opening statement and the addition of another LCS. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Byrne. We are going to now go to 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all for 

being here today. 

As you know, the budget submission contained no fiscal year 

2018 funding for the Expeditionary Sea Base, ESB, Program, despite the fact that the Navy identified that requirement to double 

the force from three to six ships. 

So could you help us understand a little bit better about what 

was driving that, the budget or a change in strategy? 

Admiral LESCHER. I will take a stab at that, ma’am. So you are 

absolutely right in terms of the 2016 Force Structure Assessment 

called for the increased requirement that you highlighted. What 

you see in terms of the fiscal year 2018 budget and the eight ships 

that are in there is entirely consistent with the broader direction 

that the entire Department of Defense has been directed to execute, which is for fiscal year 2017 really getting after those critical 

readiness efforts; fiscal year 2018, building on the readiness and 

addressing pressing shortfalls; and then fiscal year 2019 is the 

grow capacity, grow to a larger, more capable, more lethal Navy. 

And so that is essentially the construct, SECDEF Mattis’ threephase campaign plan to get at the broader capacity, the greater capacity that you outlined. 

Mrs. DAVIS. There are some current overriding concerns about 

that, though. And I am just wondering about the budget in general 

and what was presented and what your greatest concerns are. 

Where does this one go, I guess, along with some other ones? 
14 

Admiral LESCHER. Ma’am, again, that is a great question. I think 

we have to work collectively with the committee and the Navy and 

broadly to articulate the case, to make the case for the higher defense caps that are going to enable that vision. To grow to the larger, more capable, more lethal Navy clearly is not executable at the 

PB 2018 funding levels, at the fiscal year 2018 funding levels. So 

collectively working to get those defense caps raised is fundamental 

to getting there. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Anybody else want to comment on that? Would you 

like to comment, Deputy Stiller? 

Ms. STILLER. I agree with Admiral Lescher. I mean, as he said, 

the fiscal year 2018 budget was really looking at getting our current fleet whole. And as we go into fiscal year 2019 budget, we are 

going to be looking at growing the force. But we are going to be 

faced with—we are going to need to understand how we are going 

to do that, and looking forward to the defense caps to be raised. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

General WALSH. I guess just to add, Congresswoman, as we get 

that ship out there, I think right now, I think a lot of us are looking at, we had the MLP [mobile landing platform], the ESB out 

there—or the ESD [expeditionary transport dock]. 

Once we start to see the ESB get out there, I think we will start 

getting our hands on that ship and start to see what we are going 

to be able to use it for as an afloat staging base and how we may 

use it different. 

I know the Commandant is very interested in getting the next 

one into the Mediterranean. And so once I think we start using it 

out in the fleet in the operating forces, we will start getting much 

more comfortable in how we are going to be able to operate with 

that ship. 

Admiral LESCHER. If I could add onto that very briefly, before 

coming to the Pentagon this time, I was a 5th Fleet Expeditionary 

Strike Group commander. And the USS Ponce, the interim afloat 

forward staging base, was one of my ships. And what the ESB and 

the afloat forward staging base brings to that theatre more broadly 

is really critical. I mean, those will be very important ships, as reflected in the Force Structure Assessment you saw that grew the 

requirement in recognition of what they bring to the fight. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay, thank you very much. 

If I could just speak a little bit about the unmanned vessels and 

what you are predicting, what kind of requirements should we be 

looking at, and do you plan to incorporate them into the fleet architecture? 

Admiral LESCHER. I will take a stab at starting with that. You 

know, across the unmanned activity, more broadly, air and vessels, 

but specifically to the vessels, absolutely. This is something that 

you will hear our leadership, the Secretary of the Navy and the 

CNO speak very urgently about, about the need to bring this capability in. 

So particularly in the unmanned underwater vehicles, you are familiar, there is a family from small to extra large that are executing a set of missions that are key to enabling the power of our 

submarines more broadly. 
15 

So we feel a real sense of urgency to get after that. And we could 

talk perhaps about some of the missions in a closed forum that are 

particularly compelling. But we feel a sense to both enable and increase the projection, the power projection, of the manned systems. 

We need to learn about the integration of manned and unmanned. 

We feel a sense of urgency to get after that. 

And I would say more broadly on the aviation side, when we talk 

about MQ–25, it also has a compelling reason to arrest the fatigue 

life consumption of our Hornets doing that mission. So broadly 

across all of those unmanned type systems. 

And to your specific questions, in terms of the future fleet architecture and CONOPS [concept of operations], absolutely. It will be 

leveraging unmanned and artificial intelligence. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Davis. 

We will now go to Mr. Gallagher. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

your opening statement. If there is a better argument for the need 

to move aggressively to 355 ships, I have yet to hear it. And I really appreciate you articulating it. 

I also appreciate, Ms. Stiller, your announcement that you support two LCSs this year. I think that is a move in the right direction. I remain concerned, however, I echo Mr. Byrne’s concerns that 

two ships will have devastating impacts on the shipyards. We went 

back and forth with the Navy on this a couple weeks ago, and they 

seemed to suggest that three was the minimum required to maintain a hot production line. 

And so just so I have it clear, you are not disagreeing with the 

Navy’s assessment that three is the minimum? 

Ms. STILLER. Three is the most efficient to execute within the 

yards. There is a minimum sustaining rate, which I believe we are 

well above, but we are somewhere between minimum sustaining 

and most efficient. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. You talked about—— 

Ms. STILLER. Five across the 2 years. I am sorry. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. No, thank you. You talked about mitigating the 

impact if you went from three to two. What would that be, what 

sort of mitigation? 

Ms. STILLER. What we need to look at across both yards is how 

are they executing, where are they on their delivery schedules, and 

how do we more efficiently smooth production. So, for example, if 

it is helpful for them for a delivery date that we have on a current 

contract to extend that so that they can more succinctly level-load 

the workforce in the yard, we are more than happy to have those 

discussions. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. I mean, both yards, as you know, have been optimized for two ships on a 6-month production rate. So I worry 

when we get into mitigation in production rates that really what 

we are admitting is that—I mean, if 2 of our yards, 2 of the 7 are 

having difficulties, I don’t see any way we can get to 355 ships and 

thereby satisfy the Commander-in-Chief’s intent. 

And kind of in line with what the chairman laid out, echoing the 

CNO’s white paper on the need to get there in 10 years, not 20 

years or 30 years, does the Navy have a plan as part of the ongoing 
16 

review? I know we are talking in 30-year terms, but is anyone 

thinking about how we get there in 8 years or 10 years? 

Ms. STILLER. As was referenced earlier, Mr. Stackley signed out 

the Accelerated Fleet Plan, which, as he talked about it, it helps 

to set the framework for strategic guidance. We expect that to be 

part of the discussion as SECDEF goes through the strategic review and we get through this summer to figure out where we are 

headed. But where you are going to see growth in the force, as Admiral Lescher mentioned, is starting in fiscal year 2019. 

Admiral LESCHER. If I may, sir, add to that. 

The Navy is looking very comprehensively, to your point, about 

how you can really accelerate growing to a larger force. So clearly, 

the initial step is the investments in this budget to improve readiness. To get the ships we have out is one element to that; looking 

at service life extensions as well where that makes sense across either DDGs or SSNs [attack submarines]; also commissioned a 

study to look at whether recommissioning would make sense; and 

then also, of course, looking at new build. 

So that is part of an ongoing comprehensive assessment that 

would be really rolled out as part of the next year’s budget about 

how you get after this in the most aggressive way. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. So when is the soonest we and the American 

people could see a Navy plan for getting to 355 in the 2020s, as 

the CNO says we must? To include what mix of ships go to what 

shipyards and just how we do it? 

Admiral LESCHER. Well again, sir, that is a great question. One, 

of course, key element of such a strategy would be how fiscally informed it was. So it starts with the ability to execute that. To make 

that plan come alive obviously starts with the defense caps as well. 

So I do think that that is part of this ongoing discussion that will 

come this summer, this fall, and certainly be part of the fiscal year 

2019 rollout. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. I just would hope that we talk about strategically what is necessary before we get into fiscally what we need to 

achieve, what we know we must, right? 

And so if we have that clear signal coming from the Pentagon or 

the Navy, it makes it easier for us here to make the argument to 

our colleagues that we need to fully fund what you are asking for. 

Three [hundred] fifty-five, as I remember, is the minimum you 

guys are saying you need to satisfy an ongoing requirement. So the 

sooner we can get there, the better. 

I just would submit if you look at how the Reagan administration 

got there, they were able to do both at the same time. I appreciate 

the crucial investments in readiness, but the fact that we are actually taking a backwards step when it comes to shipbuilding is incredibly troubling. 

And so I just would ask that you work with us on how we do this 

in a more expeditious fashion, and I hope we get to see that plan. 

And as the CNO said, we can do. We believe the defense industrial 

base could produce 14 more small surface combatants in the near 

term and a total of 29 more ships over the next 7 years than under 

current plans. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gallagher. 
17 

We will now go to Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I 

thank our witnesses for being here today. 

While I share some of the concerns that my colleagues are voicing about resource allocation in the fiscal year 2018 Navy budget 

proposal, I am pleased to see an effort to rebuild the readiness. 

And I will first note that I was pleased that the request included 

three MQ–4C Triton systems, which provide a critical maritime 

ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capability at a 

crucial time in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, where I understand an 

early operational deployment to Guam is scheduled for 2018. Admiral Lescher, could you tell us how things are going on the program 

and whether the deployment is currently on track? 

Admiral LESCHER. So, ma’am, I will have to get back to you on 

that specific deployment, but I will tell you the program is to a 

point where it is going to be able to execute it looks like the acquisition profile that you highlighted of three this year and three 

going forward. 

So we are very much looking to bring the MULTI-INT [multi-intelligence] capability of that aircraft online, forecast for an IOC 

[initial operational capability] 2021 timeframe as well. 

So anything else you would add, Allison? 

Ms. BORDALLO. Can I ask you to get back to us when you do have 

some plans about the deployment? 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in subcommittee files.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Okay. And shifting subjects, Assistant Secretary 

Stiller, it is nice to see you again. And could you just go through 

how you see that this budget request adequately addresses the current threats that hold our forces at risk. Are we investing appropriately in long-range standoff weapons? 

Ms. STILLER. Ma’am, I will start off and then I will turn to Admiral Lescher as well. But we do have a strategy for our weapons 

across the board. And we are investing in each of the areas, and 

we look at it in the near term, the mid term, and the far term. We 

have been very careful to make sure that we are putting a balance 

across investing today, investing in the near term, and also investing in the long term, to understand exactly where we need to go. 

I don’t know if you want to add to that. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Admiral. 

Admiral LESCHER. Just a little bit more detail. So, as Allison 

said, in the near term we are really focused on providing options 

to the commander, in terms of how these weapons are launched, 

these long-term weapons, and also their target set. So, for example, 

the Tomahawk, with the request for 100 in this budget, which is 

an increase from the prior budget, obviously, that is ship-/sublaunched for a land attack mission. 

The LRASM [Long Range Anti-Ship Missile], also forecast with 

an early operational capability on the B–1 in fiscal year 2018, and 

an F–18 in fiscal year 2019. So that is an air-launched weapon, 

providing the commander options to go after the maritime target 

set. SM–6, maritime target for cruiser/destroyer-type ships. So 

those would kind of be the set for the near term 2020. 
18 

As we move into the 2020 to 2025 range timeframe, the Tomahawks, as you know, will be coming in for recertification starting 

in fiscal year 2019. As part of that recert, to build some of them 

as maritime strike Tomahawk variants. So from ships and submarines to be able to strike both land and maritime targets will 

be an important flexibility for the commander. 

In the 2020 to 2025 timeframe as well, we are investing in an 

advanced Harpoon for an aviation launch to go after the maritime 

target. And then the OTH missile we talked about earlier, as part 

of the distributed lethality, to look for that to come aboard LCS 

and frigates. 

So a little bit of an outline. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you. One quick question also 

for you, Secretary Stiller. Are you coming up with any kind of final 

plans—I have asked this before at hearings—about putting together a dry dock? We now have the appropriations available in the 

western Asia-Pacific area. Do you have any plans? I understand it 

is in a planning stage, but where are we? 

Ms. STILLER. So, ma’am, I would certainly like to come and sit 

down with your team and talk about what is the best use of the 

$9.5 million that you refer to for depot-level capability. But, as you 

know, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Secretary Stackley, and 

Secretary McGinn asked us to do a business case analysis on having dry-dock capability in Guam as well as a warfighting analysis. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Or any of the other—— 

Ms. STILLER. Right. And as they came through—and we have 

done both of those. And our warfighting assessment tells us that 

in peacetime and in wartime, the repair timeline would be too long 

for that to be of value. But we went ahead and looked at the business case too. 

And the business case, because of the throughput in the dock, it 

just doesn’t make fiscal sense. So I want to figure out the best way 

that we can leverage those dollars. And we are in the early stages 

of coming up with ideas, but it would be worth sitting down with 

your team to figure out. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, I am concerned because of threats. You 

know, we certainly have been threatened in our area. And in this 

case, I certainly think it would be important to come up with some 

kind of a plan. Thank you. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo. 

We will now go to Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Stiller, you were in my office with Secretary Stackley 

and we created the integrated program office, right, for the icebreakers. We now give the Coast Guard—as of my Coast Guard bill 

today, we give them total block-buy authority for all their major acquisitions. They can lead materials. Trying to put them on par with 

the Navy. 

So I guess Mr. Courtney already talked icebreakers. I guess the 

one specific question I have is, do you think it is even possible to 

build three to six heavy icebreakers in the next decade without 

doing block buy? The Navy does block buy on lead ships. And, 
19 

again, the icebreaker, there is ice, the icebreaker hits it, goes down 

on it, backs up, hits it, goes down on it, backs up. I mean, it really 

is not rocket science, but the Coast Guard will make it seem as 

such if the Navy allows them to. 

Ms. STILLER. Sir, I would tell you that block-buy authority has 

certainly helped us in certain acquisitions. We haven’t always gone 

to it on a lead ship, but certainly on follow ships. You just have 

to weigh the risk, to your point. 

So as they come through the requirements, I think as we can 

look at the risk, we can make a really good assessment whether 

block buy makes sense. But certainly, when you are buying a limited quantity like you are talking about, whether it is three, even 

six—if it is six, perhaps you would start the block buy from two to 

six. But if you are talking about three, you just have to look at the 

risk. 

But absolutely, block buy helps with the vendor base, the commitment to the shipyard, all the way around. It is a very helpful 

tool. And it would be very useful for them, I am sure, to be able 

to most efficiently—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Which you are telling them, I would presume. 

Ms. STILLER. Oh, yes. At this stage of the game, what we are 

doing with the Coast Guard is really looking more at the requirements and the tradeoffs to get the specifications right, working 

with industry to get their good ideas as we go in and build a contract design type package so that it can go out for bid. And then 

as we get closer to how are we going to go contract for it, we will 

certainly have those discussions. 

Mr. HUNTER. How do you see at this point the Coast Guard getting the $1 billion to do that without using Navy money? 

Ms. STILLER. Sir, I defer to the Department of Homeland Security and the Coast Guard on that. Like I said, we signed an MOA 

[memorandum of agreement] at the DHS [Department of Homeland 

Security] level just last week, and, really, that squares away how 

we would go about contracting, depending on the color of money. 

But they understand that that is not coming from the Navy budget, 

that it is coming—that they are going to have to address it. 

Mr. HUNTER. The last question is—what is nice about coming in 

late is everybody asks your questions before you do, so I don’t have 

to say anything. But Mrs. Davis, from San Diego, asked about the 

ESBs. But here is my question in general, one thing I don’t understand. 

If you have got hot production, right, and you stop it, you guys, 

you and Secretary Stackley have obviously looked at the cost incurred on stopping a hot line. I don’t understand how we are going 

to take a timeout for fiscal year 2018, do all maintenance and repair, add no new ships, and even stop the ones that we requested 

in the last 6 months? For instance, like the ESB, I don’t understand how that plays out across the shipyards in the country. 

When you stop a hot line then you say, okay, you got to fire all 

the welders, all the pipefitters, all the guys bending steel, and then 
20 

we are going to rehire them back in 12 months. Just explain to me 

how that works. I don’t get it. 

Ms. STILLER. Well, sir, in the case of NASSCO, who is the builder 

of the ESB, they also have—they have work in the yard that is 

Navy and commercial work. So, as you know, we ran a limited competition for the LHA–8, and up to six—or including six oilers. And 

we ran a competition of similar ships. 

Mr. HUNTER. The TAO. 

Ms. STILLER. The TAO. And NASSCO has run the TAO. So they 

have steady production in the yard for the oiler. They also have 

commercial work. The ESB–5, was a fiscal year 2016 appropriated 

ship and authorized—and thank you for that help—but they have 

not yet started construction on that ship. 

So we really have to look at what does the workload look like in 

a yard? It is a little different because they are more of a multiproduct yard. So they have a workforce that has a base of work. 

And so we would have to look at the best timing if we were to go 

ahead and buy additional ESBs that are called out in the FSA. 

Mr. HUNTER. I am out of time in 20 seconds. Tell me nonparochially, across the whole country, when you look at shipyards and 

you are stopping a lot of these builds with no new starts going for 

1 year, what does that do nationally to some of these yards that 

aren’t NASSCO? 

Ms. STILLER. Sir, we do not like to go to zero and then restart. 

That is not where we want to be. And that is why we look at can 

we make sure that we are paying attention to the industrial base. 

Mr. Courtney would be able to tell you that in submarines we 

had a hiatus of 6 years between submarine builds. That was very 

difficult at the end of the Seawolf program to ramping back up into 

the Virginia class. 

So we are very aware of the devastating impacts that can happen 

if you go down, if you go to zero in a yard or near zero. So we look 

very carefully with the yards. We have dialogue with the yards to 

make sure that we are not doing that type of harm. 

We have gotten the minimum sustaining rates in a number of 

yards and on a number of aircraft and weapons programs, and that 

is difficult, because you end up paying more for what you have to 

go buy to equip the warfighter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hunter. 

We will now go to Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Stiller, I understand and I got to see the benefits of the block program. And I 

think we will all agree that the, I guess, one product that is built 

that is on budget and sometimes comes in under budget is like the 

Virginia class. And the Virginia class, it is the method by which 

it is built, but in addition to that it is where we did the block program. 

Having said that, however, Admiral Richardson’s white paper 

says: The Navy must get to work now to both build more ships and 

to think forward, innovate as we go. To remain competitive, we 

must start today and we must improve faster. 

A great philosophy. But my question is, how do you determine 

what, in other words, and where? So all of this is premised on the 
21 

threat, and his paper focuses on Russia and China. Understood. 

But in his paper, he also says China was a land issue and then decided in 2015 or something along those lines that all of a sudden 

they said, well, you know what, we got to be a maritime force. 

And they can switch immediately and do whatever they are going 

to do, which I assume that if we are reacting to that threat that 

we are going to have to reposition ourselves to whatever they decide that they need to do to be a maritime force. So how do we 

make that decision? 

Our problem is we really set our policies by acquisition. What we 

do is we say, okay, let’s go to Virginia-class subs, and if we do a 

block program it is 10. At some point, it may not be the answer, 

though. Of course, I will never admit that or I will never believe 

that. But say something like that happens. How do we anticipate 

that? 

When I was in Congress before, LCSs all of a sudden became the 

bad thing. We weren’t going to build LCSs. I come back to Congress and we are building LCSs again. Yes, there are some modifications. We may call it a frigate, we may do whatever, but we are 

building it again. So how do we plan for that effectively and efficiently and within the costs that we have to always look at to contain and to manage? 

Ms. STILLER. So, ma’am, I would say on most of our programs, 

most of our weapons, our platforms, our shipbuilding platforms, 

they are very adaptable. And so over time we have been able to 

pace the threat. 

And I will give you an example. I will use DDG–51 and then I 

will use Virginia. So on the DDG–51 program, we have got 54 

ships delivered into the Navy. 

Ms. HANABUSA. We were supposed to stop DDG–51. 

Ms. STILLER. We did stop. We did stop. There is an example of 

where we shut the line down and then restarted it, and we are in 

the restart now. But we also are introducing our Air and Missile 

Defense Radar to that ship; in fact, I mentioned that we have a 

handshake today with Ingalls to introduce that on their fiscal year 

2017 ship. 

So going forward in the 2018 multiyear, we are going to introduce that capability, which will give us much more enhanced BMD 

[ballistic missile defense] capability on those ships. 

So we have also done that on Virginia class. As we have seen the 

threat evolve, we have been able to pace the threat, whether it be 

in the combat systems or Virginia payload module, for example. So 

we build platforms that are very adaptable. And so what we need 

to do a better job of with CNO, where I think CNO is going too, 

is the ability to inject those changes more rapidly, get the capability developed and be able to get it out there quicker. 

He and I have co-chaired a couple of accelerated acquisition 

boards. We have designated two programs to be maritime accelerated capability offices, MQ–25 and our LDUUV [Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle], and we also have an RPED 

[rapid prototyping, experimentation, and demonstration] project for 

surface Navy laser weapon program. So he and I are looking at 

how do you tailor and make sure that you can get programs off and 

running to a good start. 
22 

And we also have the ability to prototype, to go test capability, 

fail in some cases, I am sure, but in other cases, we will be able 

to be successful and be able to get stuff to the fleet faster. 

Admiral, I don’t know if you wanted to add. 

Admiral LESCHER. Ma’am, I would just add, the theme that Secretary Stiller has been talking about of increased agility, and to 

your point, to be able to not just be reactive, but to be proactive 

in the way we acquire things, is a key theme that you will hear 

continually from CNO and the Secretary. The sense of urgency to 

be able to just be more agile and developing and fielding fleet. This 

framework of focusing on not just platforms, but the payloads and 

the sensors, and really it is the netted integrated things that we 

are investing in that we see as the real—really the game changers 

for the tactical capability we field. 

Ms. HANABUSA. And I am running out of time, but what I would 

like to have you respond to is in terms of our laws and in terms 

of the way procurement works, what is it that you need, if anything, for that flexibility so that you can change what is there? 

And if you could—I am out of time, but if you could give it to 

me back on the record, because it seems like that is what is missing. In order for us to do it, you have got to be able to be flexible. 

Ms. STILLER. Yes. 

Ms. HANABUSA. And is our structure sufficient in terms of that 

flexibility. 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, ma’am. And I would be happy to give you that. 

One of the first starts was the 2016 NDAA, which pushes stuff to 

the services, so—— 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Ms. Hanabusa, if you would like, we can have the 

question answered now if you would like. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Oh. Is that—oh. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Could you please answer? 

Ms. STILLER. I will, but I can also get you additional—we have 

been working very, very closely with the committee on acquisition 

reform initiatives that would help us to streamline. 

Giving us accelerated acquisition authority has been very helpful 

so we can go and tailor programs, again, like I mentioned CNO and 

I are trying to do, and we want that to become the norm. 

The fiscal year 2016 National Defense—NDAA pushed oversight 

to the services, and that has been—that is very helpful as well for 

programs that are not joint programs, so to give services a little 

more flexibility. 

We have particular legislative proposals that I can get you a listing of things that will help us, but we have been working very 

closely with the committee, and I think we have a lot of good tools 

in our toolkit. We just have to give them some run time now, because we have recently gotten them. 

I don’t know if you had any—— 

General WALSH. If I could jump in on that, Allison. One thing I 

think is the law is really helping us out. It is pushing things down 

much more to the service chiefs, but within our large bureaucracy 

that we have got within DOD [Department of Defense] to work 
23 

through that, now how does that big bureaucracy adjust to the 

flexibility that you are giving us? 

Ms. HANABUSA. That is exactly the problem. 

General WALSH. So as we are getting into the details of that, one 

of the big things that is challenging us is, so where does the money 

come from? Typically in the past where we have taken money is 

out of existing programs, and squeezed those program lines, the 

R&D out of those programs, to try new ideas, new and innovative 

things to kind of move faster. 

So as we now start to take in our programming process and align 

money to that, that is not what we have been used to in the normal 

DOD way of acquisition. So by moving money into that area, do I 

move a little in? Do I try? Is somebody going to take it from me 

if I move it in there? 

You know, up the chain of command, is somebody over on the appropriator side going to take the money if I move it in there to try. 

So I think the key thing that we are starting to see is be very 

specific in the area that we are trying to do innovative ideas, and 

then work very closely with our chain of command all the way up 

to DOD and then over here in Congress, so when we say, hey, we 

are going to put money in here against this capability area, it 

might be mine warfare, it might be ship-to-shore maneuver, and we 

put money in there to do some rapid prototyping to see where we 

get, that that money doesn’t disappear as we put it in there before 

it gets appropriated. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Hanabusa. We will now go to Mr. 

Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I want to follow up on what Ms. Hanabusa was 

working on, but start in a slightly different place. 

We have heard discussion after discussion about a 355-ship 

Navy, and it almost seems to me that that number is driving decisions. And the LCS is where I want to go with this. 

Ms. Hanabusa said it started, it stopped, it started up again. And 

the information that we have currently available is that it doesn’t 

work for what it was designed for or developed for, but yet we are 

going to continue to build them. And since it doesn’t work, we are 

going to go build a frigate. And now we don’t know what the frigate 

is going to be used for. 

We had a discussion, Admiral, a moment ago, it is going to be 

electronic warfare or maybe missiles or maybe whatever. And I am 

trying to figure out, what are we doing here? Are we simply trying 

to build ships to meet a target number or are we trying to build 

ships—or are we building ships for specific purposes? 

The discussion a moment ago about flexibility, I assume that was 

flexibility that the ship might be used for this or that and different 

elements added to it. Presumably that is what the LCS was supposed to do, but it doesn’t seem to do that, because it can easily 

be sunk, and doesn’t work close to shore because it can easily be 

sunk. 

I don’t get it. I really don’t understand. I understand why we 

want to keep the shipyards busy. A very cogent argument, Ms. 

Stiller, that you put together on that account, as did Mr. Byrne, 

who—and Mr. Gallagher. I guess it is the appropriate time for me 
24 

to raise the issue, since they are both gone. But I don’t get it. I 

don’t understand here what it is. And we are talking about, you 

know, half a billion dollars a copy or more. 

So help me. Help me. What is it that we are trying to accomplish 

here with these particular ships? 

Admiral LESCHER. So I will start by observing that the fleet has 

a very high demand for these ships, which is so—it is contrary to 

the notion that they are not working. They are—in fact, Admiral 

Rowden, the surface forces commander, said, ‘‘Hey, I need these 

ships out here and I need more of them.’’ 

In terms of the specific missions in particular that the littoral 

combat ship will be executing, one of the key ones is mine countermeasures. So our current mine countermeasure ships, the MCM– 

1 Avengers, are running out of service life, and they will be retired 

in the late 2019s, early 2020s, and so that mission will be executed 

by LCS. It also has surface warfare and ASW [antisubmarine] warfare mission packages as well that it will execute. 

I would say one of the more compelling ways to think about 

LCS—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Excuse me for a moment for interrupting. 

Admiral LESCHER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. The director of operational testing and evaluation says that the mine countermeasure and the antisurface warfare mission packages has not demonstrated—don’t work, has not 

demonstrated effective capability. 

Admiral LESCHER. Right. And so there is—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So what—could you just tell me? 

Admiral LESCHER. They are in development—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Are you telling me they do or they don’t? 

Admiral LESCHER. Well, like any sophisticated technology, and 

what is compelling about this technology as well is it takes the 

man out of the minefield, right? So we are talking unmanned technology with a forecast initial capability of that MCM mission package of 2021. So there is absolutely work to be done to mature that, 

to get that functional. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. But these things are not survivable in the area 

for which they were intended to operate. 

Admiral LESCHER. Well, so as the commander who is going to use 

them will take a look at—he will design his operation and design 

his campaign so they are survivable, right? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. In other words, not putting them where they 

were intended to operate. 

Admiral LESCHER. Well, I think they will operate as intended, 

but what they also do is if—absent these ships, we would be putting, you know, a $1.5 billion DDGs to do some of these missions 

that are not suitable for those ships. 

So these ships are designed specifically to replace the MCM 

ships, to replace the PC [patrol coastal] ships, to do that mission 

in an environment in which—in which they were designed to do. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. But not survivable. I—— 

Ms. STILLER. Sir—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Is that the case? Am I—— 

Ms. STILLER. Sir, there are—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. We hear—I hear over and over—— 
25 

Ms. STILLER. There are different components to survivability, 

and that when the requirements for these ships were laid out, they 

are incredibly fast, so they can get in and out of an area, and that 

will—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. They don’t go very far. 

Ms. STILLER. Well, sir, they can go far. I mean, there is—there 

is the iron triangle of—but I understand what you are saying, but 

they were designed to a certain level of survivability. 

That has been enhanced over the time in the program. And, 

again, these ships were designed to be—have mission modules that 

would switch in and switch out, as Admiral Lescher was describing, and so they really are single mission ships. And as Secretary 

of Defense Hagel and Secretary of Defense Carter and Secretary of 

Defense Mattis have said, we want to get to a frigate that is a 

multimission that will have the SUW [surface warfare] and the 

ASW capability inherent in the ship. 

So there is absolutely a mission for these ships. As Admiral 

Lescher said, for the LCSs, they are in demand today and they are 

in construction today. And there is a demand for the frigate going 

forward, with a total inventory of 52. And so we are trying to figure 

out what the right balance between the LCS and the frigate should 

be. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And you are not yet complete with that analysis? 

Ms. STILLER. Well, as we were intending to go to the frigate in 

2019, we would have had a total of 28 LCSs. In order for the industrial base, there will be additional ones, they will be employed. We 

are looking at backfitting capability that we are intending for the 

frigate onto existing LCS and be able to do that in forward fit as 

well. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I have many more questions. I am out of time. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi. 

Vice Admiral Lescher, just as a follow-up, in the shock trial testing for LCS, give us a perspective there about its survivability 

based on its testing standards? 

Admiral LESCHER. Sir, I think I will ask Secretary Stiller to 

speak to this as well, but it performed well, is the bottom line 

there. 

So do you have any more—— 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. Both variants went through shock trials 

this past year, and they both performed very well. And DOT&E 

[Director, Operational Test and Evaluation] was part of that analysis, so they were with us on the ship. They were tested to the survivability levels that they were designed to, and they passed. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. Very good. Thank you. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 

witnesses for appearing today. 

So when it comes to transitioning technology, I believe that we 

have to be prepared in advance to facilitate smooth transition from 

the lab into the joint battle space. We can’t let the perfect be the 

enemy of the good. So in that line of thinking, we can’t let our desire to get to 100 percent deter us from fielding a 95 percent solu-
26 

tion. And if we delay funding transition pieces, then we risk technologies falling into the ‘‘valley of death.’’ 

And I understand that the Navy has decided not to fund the 

transition railgun this fiscal year despite multi-shot with inspection tests having recently occurred and a true multi-shot test likely 

to take place soon. 

So I want to know, what is the potential impact to railgun development without this transition money? 

Admiral LESCHER. Sir, so the status of railgun is there is continued S&T [science and technology] funding, as I think you just highlighted, in this budget forward, and that really just reflects the 

technology maturity of it right now. So going to the $6.4 [million] funding that you were talking 

about for demonstration and validation and then operationally realistic environment, our assessment is that technology is just not 

ready for that stage yet. So we are continuing to fund it, looking 

for the repeated—you know, ten rounds per minute type capability 

out of that weapon and the barrel life as well, continuing to fund 

that to keep the overall momentum going. 

We are also refocusing fundings into the hypervelocity projectile 

and accelerating that for use in the 5-inch powder guns so that we 

can integrate it with the combat systems. So in that specific program, the current profile simply reflects its execution and the maturity of that technology right now as we continue to try and develop it and take it forward. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So at what point in its development would the 

Navy find railgun viable in order to consider transition? 

Ms. STILLER. Sir, I think, as you mentioned, we have a multishot event coming up later this summer. That will help us to look 

at it and see where we want to go as part of the 2019 budget, but 

that gives us additional information that helps us to retire some of 

the risk. 

Admiral LESCHER. Yeah. I think for fiscal year 2019 is when we 

are forecasting a full-scale prototype demonstration. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. And as we look forward, what platforms 

does the Navy see as viable for railgun? 

Admiral LESCHER. So I am not sure that analysis has been done 

yet or has been settled yet. I will take that for the record, sir, and 

get back with you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 97.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. All right. I would appreciate it. I just don’t want 

us to, you know, let the perfect be the enemy of the good. 

And I commend the Navy for being very forward leaning on 

things like directed energy. I know we have got a test weapon on 

the USS Ponce, it is a 30-kilowatt system, and, again, not perfect, 

it is not what we want it to be in terms of a 150-kilowatt system, 

but we are learning as we are going, and it is effective against 

some targets like drones and things like that, so we are learning 

a lot. 

So, again, I commend the Navy for being forward leaning on directed energy; I just don’t want to see us fall behind and lose the 

opportunity to get railgun out there as well if we are waiting for 

perfect. 
27 

Ms. Stiller, our shipyards, and particularly those working on our 

submarine fleet, depend on timely distribution of funds from the 

U.S. Navy in order to successfully procure and construct the various pieces and parts of our fleet so that they can deliver on time 

and under budget. 

The Navy has previously predicted the long lead time material, 

engineering support, and advanced construction activities required 

to capitalize on advanced procurement successes. Has there—or 

will there be coordination with the shipbuilding industry to identify 

what delays on delivery or additional costs may occur if we don’t 

have adequate advance procurement funding? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. We are in constant communication with 

the shipyards. And for our next multiyear on Virginia, we have already identified EOQ [economic order quantity] funding that will 

start in fiscal year 2019 for that multiyear in concert with the shipyard to make sure that we are getting the best deals we can with 

our EOQ funding. And that will go through the entirety of the 

multiyear, but we want to make sure that we have it upfront when 

we need it. 

And I think we have it adequately funded right now in the budget, but we will continue to have that dialogue with the yard and— 

yards, and if they identify other areas where we could benefit from 

EOQ, we are happy to have that discussion. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I think that dialogue is important. Let’s make 

sure that continues. 

Finally, you may have to answer this for the record, my time is 

about to run out, but the Navy has made great strides in the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program [SEWIP], and the 

existing fleet has been receiving enhanced electronic warfare and 

surveillance capability. So leveraging these technologies is essential 

to pace the impending full-spectrum threat of tomorrow’s fight. 

How does the fiscal year 2018 budget request advance electronic 

warfare capabilities? And, also, the Marines have also planned to 

grow their electronic warfare [EW] capabilities through aviation 

and ground EW equipment. Will the fiscal year 2018 budget request provide the Marines with adequate funding to make further 

investments in the spectrum realm? 

General WALSH. Thank you, Congressman. I mentioned earlier 

we had gone through a fairly detailed force structure review. One 

of the areas that we focused on very heavily was information warfare, of which electronic warfare is a big piece of that. 

So what we are doing in our Marine Corps Force 2025 is growing 

that structure in electronic warfare. And in the fiscal year 2018 

budget, we have got funding going into both aviation and ground 

programs to increase those capabilities, along with the R&D efforts 

to get more follow-on enhanced capabilities through some of the 

labs that we have. 

Admiral LESCHER. Sir, on the SEWIP question you had, the fiscal 

year 2018 budget has a Block II in full-rate production and Block 

III initial system that is in development. A contract award is forecast for the fourth quarter of this year. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thank you all very much. I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. 
28 

Ms. Stiller, I do want to end with one additional question that 

hadn’t gotten mentioned through the line of questioning, and that 

is concerning the aircraft carrier build. 

As you know, in the Force Structure Assessment, the projection 

was they are to go to 12 aircraft carriers, and I want to get your 

perspective. At the current build rate of 1 carrier every 5 years, is 

it possible to ever get to 12 aircraft carriers, building 1 for every 

5 years, and if not, what would the cadence of construction need 

to be in order for us to get to 12 within the next 30 years? And 

did the budget request include anything in that initiative? 

Ms. STILLER. Sir, we could have gotten to 12 carriers for a brief 

period of time had we—on CV—when CVN–79 was introduced, but 

we changed the delivery schedule on that ship so that we would not 

get above 11. 

So if you stay on 5-year centers, right now we are at 11, you 

would eventually get down to 10. So we have always said where 

you need to be to get to a 12-carrier Navy is about a 3.5-year centers. And we are not there right now. We are on 5-year centers, 

and at this point, the budget doesn’t reflect anything that would 

change that. That will be something as we go through the defense 

strategic review this summer and SECDEF’s priorities for the 2019 

and out budget that we will be looking at. 

Mr. WITTMAN. So if we were to go to 3.5-year cadence in builds, 

we could get to 12 in the next 30 years? 

Ms. STILLER. Oh, yes, sir. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WITTMAN. All right. Very good. I will go to Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I am sorry. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Ladies first. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. Mr. Chairman, I am 

returning here for another question because I want to straighten 

out the record. 

Secretary Stiller, when I asked you about the dry dock, you said 

one of the reasons that they are still discussing it is it is not financially viable. The BCA says that it is twice as expensive to not have 

a dry dock than to have one on Guam, and, of course, this would 

certainly be the case if you had to depend on other U.S. shipyards. 

But I am wondering, would the Navy be going back to relying on 

foreign ship repairs like they did in the old days, taking their MSC 

[Military Sealift Command] ships over to Singapore? So it is my belief, and Navy leadership has stated, and we have this on record, 

that a dry dock is a strategic need in the Western Pacific. And I 

am concerned again, and I want to repeat it, that there is an overreliance, or maybe there is an overreliance on foreign ship repair. 

So I am asking, what is wrong with Buy America? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, ma’am. As you know, MSC ships are not homeported, although—and I know that is a nuance there, but when we 

looked at the BCA, the BCA revealed to us that the usage rate 

would be too low to justify the cost for the dry dock and the infrastructure that came with it. The estimate in that BCA was anywhere from $32 million to $46 million a year to maintain the dock. 

And so that just far outweighed—— 
29 

Ms. BORDALLO. So where would you go for ship repair? 

Ms. STILLER. You can go—you can come back to the U.S. 

Ms. BORDALLO. And that is not expensive? 

Ms. STILLER. There is an expense, but it is not as expensive as 

maintaining a dry dock. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, I think this should be further looked into, 

and, you know, I plan to do this, because—— 

Ms. STILLER. Understand. 

Ms. BORDALLO [continuing]. I just think that if anything should 

erupt in our part of the world, and Guam is in the lap of North 

Korea, so I want to see that we have everything we need, and that 

is a full-scale dry dock on Guam. And the money is there, and so 

I see no reason why we can’t continue to look at this very seriously. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo. I now go to Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one quick question, which is kind of a nagging one that my office certainly hears 

a lot about, from Groton, which is the issue of security clearances. 

Again, as the hiring up is proceeding, we are, I think actually, and 

I think Rob is probably in the same position, you know, the State 

of Virginia and Connecticut, they have been doing a pretty good job 

of, you know, getting training and, you know, workforce skills in 

place, with the help of the Department of Labor. 

But the security clearances, I mean, they have actually reached 

a point where they are segregating parts of the yard, you know, because they are still sort of in limbo waiting for the final final. 

Is this an issue that you are watching, and is there anything 

that you can help us with in terms of reporting back? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. I can tell you that this has been high on 

the Navy’s concern list. And I believe it was last week, he may not 

have signed it yet, so don’t hold me to this, but Mr. Stackley was 

poised to sign a letter to the Defense Security Services folks offering to provide naval reservists to help get at least the—to interim 

secret for the shipyard workers so that they can go and start work. 

Obviously to get to—the clearance level has to go all the way to 

OPM [Office of Personnel Management], but this would at least alleviate the backlog within the Department of Defense. We are looking at this as a one-time thing, but we want—so they can go address it, but we really do understand the impacts of not being able 

to get that workforce employed where we need them. And so we are 

looking at doing this on a one-time exception to be able to go and 

address this backlog. 

Mr. COURTNEY. I am glad I asked the question. And, again, if 

there is—— 

Ms. STILLER. Of course, if you can help us with OPM, that would 

be wonderful. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And we are there, I mean, all in. And to the extent that, again, that, you know, memorandum has been released, 

you know, again, I know my office, and I would imagine others, 

would be very anxious to get a copy of it. 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And lastly, Mr. Chairman, just for the record, I 

just feel like given the discussions that both of us had earlier, I 
30 

would like to enter into the record the executive summary of the 

FSA, the February 9 Accelerated Fleet Plan, and also Admiral 

Richardson’s memo from last week. Again, I think it just helps sort 

of complete the record. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I would agree. So ordered. We will make sure we 

do that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 67.] 

Mr. COURTNEY. And with that, I yield. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 

I do want to, Ms. Stiller, also address one other thing, and that 

is the Ready Reserve Force. In looking at today where the demand 

is in relation to a potential conflict and our ability to sustain logistics surrounding a major war, I believe we are going to be severely 

tested with the current element of our Ready Reserve Force. It is 

antiquated, its ability to conduct extensive logistical efforts, I 

think, is really going to be tested. 

So the question is, is the Navy looking at the Ready Reserve 

Force? Is there anything in the current budget request to look at 

building the Ready Reserve Force with the capability necessary to 

be able to sustain logistical support necessary in a major conflict? 

Ms. STILLER. Sir, this is something that we will be addressing in 

fiscal year 2019, but we have been looking at it, and, in fact, in the 

Navy’s Accelerated Fleet Plan, there is a little section that talks 

about looking at our prepositioning ships and the age of those, and 

that those, while not aged out, are aging, and they could go—and 

I am—it doesn’t say it exactly like this, but that those ships could 

be considered to go into the Ready Reserve to relieve those ships 

that are very old, because what we don’t want to do is build brandnew ships and then put them in the Ready Reserve. That doesn’t 

make sense. 

So you would recapitalize potentially the Maritime Prepositioning Ships. And we want to look, because we want to be very 

thoughtful about it, we want to look at something like a common 

hull form or a family of common hulls that would provide that capability, that would provide synergy on the—and logistics support 

and other stuff. So we are looking at it. TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command] is also interested, as I know you have 

heard—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. 

Ms. STILLER [continuing]. On bringing ships from the Maritime 

Security Program, buying them and bringing them into the Ready 

Reserve. There is probably a mixture of all of that that has to be 

looked at. 

And, again, we intend to be looking at that in 2019, so I think 

you will start to see that discussion happen starting in 2019. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yeah. I think that is critical. And we would like 

to continue the discussion with you and see a concrete proposal for 

2019. I think we have to do more than just look at it at that particular point. 

Hopefully what we look at over the next year, then we can work 

with you and have a concrete proposal in 2019 for the Ready Reserve Force, because my concern in talking with General McDew 

and others is that our capacity there and ability to sustain in a 
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major conflict is really being stretched to the point where I think 

it becomes strategically problematic. 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. We will work with you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you so much. 

Any other questions from the subcommittee? If not, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:37 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MAY 24, 2017 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Admiral LESCHER. Studies and preliminary assessments on the feasibility to integrate Electro-Magnetic Rail Gun (EMRG) on US Navy vessels include DDG 51 Flt 

IIA, DDG 51 Flt III, CG, Littoral Combat Ship, LPD 17 and DDG 1000. The US 

Navy continues to assess options that would further reduce the size, weight, power, 

and cooling, as well as the cost of critical EMRG sub-systems to better inform the 

evaluation of ship classes that could serve as platforms for future EMRG. This data 

will be included as part of the Analysis of Alternatives for the Future Surface Combatant. [See page 26.] 

Æ