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PRESERVING PROGRESS: TRANSITIONING

AUTHORITY AND IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGIC

FRAMEWORK IN IRAQ, PART 1

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 1, 2011

Serial No. 112–29

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ms. Patricia M. Haslach, Iraq Transition Coordinator, U.S. Department of 

State ...................................................................................................................... 5

Colin Kahl, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Middle East, U.S. 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 7

Mr. Christopher Crowley, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Middle East Bureau, U.S. Agency for International Development ......................... 9

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Ms. Patricia M. Haslach, Colin Kahl, Ph.D., and Mr. Christopher Crowley: 

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 11

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 28

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 29

(1)

PRESERVING PROGRESS: TRANSITIONING AUTHORITY AND IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK IN IRAQ, PART 1

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 1, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

AND SOUTH ASIA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. CHABOT. Good afternoon, the Subcommittee on the Middle 

East and South Asia will come to order. 

I want to warn folks that we are probably going to be interrupted 

by votes here in a relatively short period of time, at which time we 

will probably be over there for 1⁄2 hour to perhaps 40 minutes. But 

we will come back as quickly as we can. Other members will be 

coming in, so that they can avoid my opening statement probably, 

but they will get here. 

I want to welcome all of my colleagues to this hearing of the subcommittee. This hearing was called to assess the Obama administration’s Iraq policy as we approach the official transition from Department of Defense to the Department of State lead. 

June 1 will mark approximately 6 months until all U.S. troops—

combat or otherwise—are scheduled to leave Iraq. As of January 1, 

2012, it will fall to the State Department to oversee Iraq’s continued progress in the implementation of the goals outlined in the 

Strategic Framework Agreement. 

Having just returned from Iraq a little over a week ago, I appreciate how critical the work our military and our State Department 

does as we continue to carry out the mission there. In conjunction 

with the Iraqi partners on the ground, they have helped set Iraq 

on the course to become a stable, secure, and democratic country 

that respects human rights. But as we look with favor upon these 

hard-won gains, we must remember that we are not there yet. 

Earlier today Baghdad suffered both a car bomb and a roadside 

bomb, wounding 16 people so far. Iraq’s recent progress is, regrettably, as precarious as it is positive. It is far too easy to look at 

where we are today and forget where we were just several years 

ago. And although the administration’s plan to transition the mission is well intentioned, I am concerned that it is neither well 

timed nor, unfortunately, well reasoned in a number of areas. 

2

Our brave men and women in uniform have fought tirelessly for 

over 8 years to get us to where we are today. Thousands of lives 

have been lost. Billions of dollars have been spent. The worst possible outcome for us today would be to withdraw before Iraq is 

ready to stand on its own. And there is reason to question Iraq’s 

readiness. 

In January 2011, U.S. forces-Iraqi reported to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction that,

‘‘The U.S. faces the choice of making additional investments to 

fill essential gaps in Iraqi security forces, capabilities, or accept 

the risk that they will fall short of being able to fully secure 

Iraq from internal and external threats by the time U.S. forces 

department, in accordance with the security agreement.’’

Echoing those concerns, Lieutenant General Babakir Zebari, 

General Chief of Staff of the Iraqi army, acknowledged that the 

Iraqi army still depends on U.S. forces for the protection of its airspace and borders. 

In 2010, as the U.S. was ending its combat mission, Zebari stated 

that ‘‘If I were asked about the withdrawal, I would say to politicians, ‘The U.S. Army must stay until the Iraqi army is fully ready 

in 2020.’ ’’

At its core, the discussion about transition breaks down to two 

critical questions. Does the State Department have the capability 

to succeed? And, if not, should the U.S. military remain in Iraq in 

some meaningful capacity to help consolidate gains? Many in both 

the U.S. and the Iraqi Government doubt that the Iraqi security 

forces will be prepared to defend the Iraqi state from internal and 

external threats by December 2011, just the end of this year. 

And although it may be politically expedient, both in the U.S. 

and in Iraq, to seek withdrawal by that date, it may not be sound 

strategy. It is an undeniable fact that our military forces continue 

to play a vital role on the ground in Iraq. By continuing to serve 

as the guarantor of Iraq’s security and stability, we allow its democratic institutions to grow and to mature. 

And while there are many conflicts that draw our attention, 

America and this Congress must remain dedicated to achieving 

success in Iraq. It is in America’s interest, and it is in Iraq’s interest, to see a democratic Iraq prosper and flourish. That is our strategic objective, and we should do everything in our power to ensure 

it happens, including, if need be, by extending our military presence on the ground. 

More and more, Iraqi political and military figures have come out 

in support of extending the deadline to withdraw. But as the check 

comes, no one wants to be left paying the bill. The domestic political cost in Iraq of asking the U.S. to stay has left Iraq’s leadership 

pointing fingers and passing bucks, and I saw that firsthand when 

I was in Iraq just last week. 

This cannot be where it ends. Responsible leadership, whether in 

the U.S. or in Iraq, cannot sacrifice hard-earned strategic achievements for short-term political gains. We—Iraqis and Americans—

must not allow that to happen. 

This hearing is meant to be an opportunity for members to ask 

the administration what it seeks to achieve in Iraq and how it 

3

plans to achieve it. However, our goal today should not simply be 

to judge up or down the plans presented before us. It should be to 

find that policy which will get us to where we need to go. 

The United States has spent nearly a decade securing and helping to build the foundation of a prosperous and democratic Iraq. A 

premature withdrawal risks squandering those gains. It would be 

a failure of colossal proportions to seize defeat from the jaws of victory, and yet that is precisely what I fear may come to pass. 

And I will now yield to the gentleman from New York, the distinguished gentleman, Mr. Ackerman, former chair and now the ranking members of the committee, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the chairman. Today’s hearing is, indeed, a very important one. At a hearing on this same subject last 

November, I suggested that most Americans and most Members of 

Congress think that we are basically done in Iraq. Our combat 

troops have left Iraq last year, and the rest of our 50,000 troops 

are coming home at the end of this year. 

As a political matter, Iraq is yesterday’s problem and yesterday’s 

news. The only problem with this view is that it is completely at 

odds with both reality in Iraq and the administration’s plans for it. 

As this committee heard last year from Assistant Secretary of 

State Jeffrey Feldman, American assistance is intended to ‘‘help 

Iraq meet its needs, stand up its economy, and cement its democratic system over the next 5 to 7 years.’’ I will repeat what he 

said—5 to 7 years. 

To do all of this assisting and stand upping and cementing, the 

U.S. mission in Iraq will be spending billions of dollars, operating 

five major diplomatic facilities, and employing as many as 13,000 

people who will be operating a fleet of military vehicles and helicopters, and maybe engage in such diplomatic operations as 

‘‘counter, rocket, artillery, and mortar notification, and neutralization response.’’

At that same hearing, Deputy Assistant Secretary Kahl warned 

that ‘‘We are now at a point where the strategic dividends of our 

sacrifice are within reach, as long as we take the proper steps to 

consolidate them.’’ Meaning what? He said, ‘‘The long-term strategic partnership with Iraq, based on our mutual interest and mutual respect.’’

Secretary Feldman emphasized essentially the same point, noting that ‘‘The strategic importance of this moment cannot be overemphasized.’’ I thought then that we had a major problem. I am 

now convinced that we have a total disconnect. 

While the administration is planning for an Iraq that is going to 

be continuing its recovery and reconstruction with the aid of a 

multi-billion dollar American presence, the public and Congress 

aren’t just moving swiftly to the exits on this, they have actually 

left the building. 

If there is one lesson the Obama administration can’t seem to 

learn is it has to be—that nothing explains itself, and nothing sells 

itself. If the administration thought last year that it was vital to 

our national security interest to spend billions of dollars over the 

next 5 to 7 years to establish a strategic partnership with Iraq, 

then a vastly more robust effort to sell this policy to the Congress 

and the American people was necessary. 

4

With all due respect to our distinguished witnesses—and they 

are, indeed, distinguished—this panel at this time will simply not 

be enough. 

Personally, I would prefer that we do not repeat our dismal performance in Afghanistan, where after driving out the Soviets, and 

then driving out the Taliban, we, as a nation, abandoned our prior 

allies to their fates. It was short-sighted and produced exactly the 

bad results that were anticipated at that time. 

Now it looks like we are going to make the very same mistake 

in Iraq. All the blood, all the treasure, and all the national trauma, 

and where are we? We are on our way, at the very moment when 

a smaller, smarter investment would finally give us some hope of 

salvaging some foreign policy benefit, from the horribly misbegotten war in Iraq, but the administration is going to have to sell a 

lot of members on an outgoing effort that those members do not 

want, and they don’t believe we need, and that they have been 

counting the days until it finished. 

The collision of our expectations and the administration’s policy 

is not going to be pretty. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I would 

yield back my time. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. 

I think the two votes have started on the floor, although I didn’t 

hear bells go off. But we can probably get through the introductions at least before we go over for votes. Two votes? Two ballots, 

okay. 

And we will begin with the Ambassador, Ambassador Patricia M. 

Haslach. I have been told it rhymes with a very popular insurance 

company commercial, but I am not going to do my imitation, but 

that is the correct pronunciation? Excellent. And she currently 

serves as the State Department’s coordinator for Iraq transition in 

the Office of the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources. 

In this capacity, she is responsible for coordinating all State Department-Washington aspects of the U.S. transition from military 

to civilian operations in Iraq, working closely with our Ambassador 

to Iraq, James Jeffrey, whom we spent considerable time with 

when we were there, the U.S. military, and other U.S. Government 

departments and agencies. 

Ambassador Haslach has previously served as deputy coordinator 

for diplomacy for the U.S. Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative, assistant chief of mission for assistance transition at the U.S. 

Embassy-Baghdad, director of the Office of Afghanistan, Ambassador to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, APEC, the 

U.S. Ambassador to the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 

Ambassador Haslach received her M.A. in International Affairs 

from Columbia University, and her B.A. from Gonzaga University, 

and we appreciate you being here this afternoon. 

And I will introduce the other two witnesses. Secondly—I have 

been informed that we actually have 5 minutes to go on the vote, 

in which case we will save the introduction of the next two witnesses until we come back. 

So we are in recess here briefly, and we will be back as soon as 

the votes are over. We are in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. CHABOT. The committee will be back in order. 

5

I am going to go on with the introductions now. I think next we 

had Dr. Colin Kahl, who currently serves as the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for the Middle East. Dr. Kahl is on a 3-year 

public service leave from Georgetown University, where is a professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. 

Prior to joining the Defense Department, he was a senior fellow 

at the Center for a New American Security, and served as coordinator for the Obama campaign’s Iraq Policy Expert Group. In 2005/

2006, he was a Council on Foreign Relations fellow, working at the 

Department of Defense on counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and 

stability operations. 

He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, and his B.A. in Political Science from the University of Michigan. 

And we welcome both of you here. 

And last, but not least, is Christopher D. Crowley, who currently 

serves as the Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Middle 

East, from 2007 to 2010. Prior to this assignment, he was USAID 

mission director in Iraq. A career minister in the Senior Foreign 

Service, Mr. Crowley joined USAID in 1971 as an assistant area 

development advisor in Vietnam. He has since served as director 

of USAID’s regional mission for Central Asia, director of the program office in USAID-India, and deputy mission director in Egypt. 

In 1994, following the Oslo Accords, Mr. Crowley became the first 

mission director for the West Bank and Gaza. Mr. Crowley holds 

a bachelor of science degree in Physical Sciences from The Ohio 

State University, a master’s degree in International Relations from 

the University of Pennsylvania, and a master’s degree in public administration from The John F. Kennedy School of Government at 

Harvard University. 

And we welcome all three of you here this afternoon. And, as you 

know, we operate under the 5-minute rule, so if you could keep 

your remarks to that time. There is a lighting device on the table 

that will warn you. When the red light comes on, that is—your 

time has concluded. And then, we will ask questions for the same 

period of time. 

And without further ado, we will, again, welcome you, Ms. 

Haslach. 

STATEMENT OF MS. PATRICIA M. HASLACH, IRAQ TRANSITION 

COORDINATOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador HASLACH. Thank you, Chairman Chabot, Representative Ackerman, and distinguished committee members. 

Thank you for holding this hearing and inviting me to appear before you today to discuss the issues facing Iraq, and the challenges 

associated with the United States’ transition from a military-led to 

a civilian-led presence. 

I would like to take this time to submit our joint written testimony for the record. 

We have significant national interests in Iraq that require the 

continuation of strong U.S. support to ensure that we do not lose 

the fragile progress that has been achieved through tremendous 

sacrifice. We face a critical moment that will determine whether we 

achieve our goal of a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq. 

6

We must recognize that the ripples of Iraq’s success also extend 

beyond Iraq and the United States. Iraq is poised to become a political and economic leader in the Middle East region. As the Middle 

East faces steep challenges and an unknown future, Iraq must take 

center stage as a beacon of democracy and an anchor of U.S. support for the region. 

Countries in the region and around the world look to our efforts 

in Iraq to assess the sincerity with which we approach the Arab 

world, and the people of the Middle East and North Africa look to 

Iraq as an example of what is possible in the region—a democracy 

whose government is elected by the people and whose purpose is 

to serve the people. 

The transition that we are executing in Iraq is vital to our national interest. To pursue and strengthen these interests, we must 

strengthen our long-term partnership with the Government of Iraq 

and the Iraqi people. The Strategic Framework Agreement—an 

agreement signed between the United States and Iraq—serves as 

the framework and road map in building these bilateral ties. 

In the Government of Iraq, we have found determined partners 

who are committed to the shared vision. Prime Minister Maliki and 

other Iraqi leaders consider the agreement to be the foundation of 

U.S. and Iraqi relations. With the strong support from the Iraqis, 

we look forward to building a long-term partnership that will 

strengthen Iraq, secure the national interests of both countries, 

and provide stability to the region. 

The time is right for this transition. The security situation, while 

still a concern, continues to improve, providing an opening through 

which the people of Iraq can focus not on fear of violence, but on 

the prospects of rebuilding a strong economy and forming a government that is more efficient, less corrupt, and committed to improving the nation. The people of Iraq are eager to build a strong Iraq, 

and we must be there to support them. 

What the State Department and our partners around the interagency are trying to accomplish with this transition is at the forefront of diplomacy. Its success will not only determine the fate of 

an emerging friend and ally, but will shape the future of U.S. engagements in the Middle East and in conflict and post-conflict 

areas around the world. 

This transition is one of the most important international endeavors that the United States is undertaking, and its success or 

failure will have global implications. We cannot fail. 

We will do this always mindful of the costs it requires the American people to bear. The United States has sacrificed much to reach 

this critical moment. Now is not the time to hesitate or to change 

course. We are in mid-stride and must maintain our determination 

and momentum to secure our footing and our direction. 

The transition that we are implementing now began years ago, 

and it is critical that we follow through. The strategy that we will 

continue to pursue is the best balance between what is necessary 

to achieve our interests and what we can honestly call upon the 

American people to support. 

It is because of the tremendous sacrifice that Americans have 

made in Iraq that we must continue our critical missions there. 

And through the historic Strategic Framework Agreement made beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:19 Jul 05, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\060111\66779 HFA PsN: SHIRL
7

tween the United States and Iraq, we find that our two countries, 

who for years clashed as adversaries, now share a common goal—

a sovereign and prosperous Iraq that is a strong ally of the United 

States, and is committed to and capable of ensuring security, providing services, and addressing the will of the Iraqi people. Now is 

the time to work together to achieve that goal. 

In closing, I would like to thank Dr. Kahl and Mr. Crowley and 

their staffs, Ambassador Jeffrey and his Embassy, General Austin 

and his troops, and the many offices and bureaus throughout the 

Department of State, and other U.S. departments and agencies, 

that are involved in this transition. 

Planning and implementing this transition has required the tireless efforts of our top men and women, many of them risking their 

lives to ensure that everything we have been fighting and working 

for over the last decade is not lost. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you today. 

I would be happy to answer any questions the committee may 

have. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Ambassador. 

Dr. Kahl, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF COLIN KAHL, PH.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. KAHL. Thank you. Chairman Chabot, Representative Ackerman, and distinguished committee members, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the issues and challenges associated with the United States transition from a militaryto a civilian-led effort in Iraq. 

Ambassador Haslach has discussed the overall U.S. policy with 

regard to transition, so I will focus on the security situation in 

Iraq, which is enabling our responsible drawdown, and then say a 

few words about our support—of the support from the Defense Department providing to the State Department to help set them up 

for success. 

I know members have concerns about the readiness of the Iraqi 

Government to provide security in Iraq as U.S. forces draw down 

between now and December 2011 in compliance with the U.S.-Iraq 

security agreement. Indeed, terrorist and militia attacks continue 

to pose a threat. 

In mid-May, for example, an attack consisting of three coordinated car bombs in Kirkuk targeted Iraqi policemen and killed over 

two dozen people. And, on May 22, al-Qaeda in Iraq conducted a 

series of coordinated attacks in Baghdad that left 14 dead and dozens wounded. 

Iraq still faces dangerous and determined enemies, but it is important to emphasize that these enemies do not have the support 

of the Iraqi people, and these attacks have not sparked a return 

to widespread insurgency or communal civil war. Moreover, despite 

these recent attacks, the underlying security situation remains 

strong, with attack levels remaining near their lowest levels of the 

entire war for the last 2 years. 

This is particularly remarkable considering that the Iraqi security forces have assumed primary responsibility for security for the 

8

entire country, and our U.S. force numbers have declined from 

roughly 144,000 when the Obama administration came into office 

in January 2009 to roughly 47,000 today. 

Since January 1, 2009, the Iraqi security forces have been in the 

lead on security operations—a role that they have more capably 

embraced with each passing month. On September 1st of last year, 

we made the transition from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation 

New Dawn and drew down to below 50,000 U.S. troops, fulfilling 

President Obama’s commitment to end the combat mission in Iraq 

and further cementing the Iraqis’ lead security role. 

While the United States continues to provides vital support to 

the Iraqi security forces, including training, equipping, mentoring, 

advising, and providing certain critical technical enablers, we need 

to be clear that the Iraqis are very much in charge, and they simply no longer need such large numbers of U.S. forces to help them 

keep the violence in check. 

The Iraqi security forces have also remained professional, despite 

the prolonged period of uncertainty associated with Iraq’s government formation negotiations. Indeed, it remains unclear when the 

Iraqis will name a minister of defense or minister of interior. General Austin and Ambassador Jeffrey continue to engage Prime Minister Maliki and other Iraqi leaders to emphasize the importance 

of reaching finality on this issue. 

Beyond our continuing efforts to build the Iraqi security forces 

and draw down our forces, the Department of Defense and other 

agencies and offices have also undertaken unprecedented levels of 

coordination and planning for the transition in Iraq. DoD has an 

excellent working relationship with the State Department, and we 

are working together at all levels to achieve a successful transition. 

As one would expect with a transition of this scope and complexity, challenges exist, but rest assured that DoD is doing everything it can to help the State Department achieve success. To facilitate the whole of government coordination, in November of last 

year DoD embedded a staff officer within the transition team in 

State to serve as a liaison and work day-to-day issues. 

DoD and State have also established an ad hoc senior executive 

steering group for coordination and synchronization. This group is 

co-chaired at the deputy assistant secretary level and meets biweekly to review status and progress of the eight subordinate functional areas—supply chain, equipment, contracting, medical, facilities and construction, information technology, security, and aviation. 

Additionally, to expeditiously respond to requests for equipment, 

a combined Office of Secretary of Defense/Joint Staff equipping 

board was established in early January 2011. The process consists 

of working-level representatives from all the services, joint staff, 

and OSD, which feeds recommendations for sourcing of equipment 

to the General Officer/Flag Officer Board, chaired by the Joint 

Staff, JFOR, for approval. 

Currently, in Iraq, a State and DoD team has been established 

in each of the remaining locations to address practical solutions to 

issues resulting from the downsizing of the site footprint. The transition of these sites is not a turn-key operation, and each presents 

unique challenges. 

9

For example, each team needs to establish new perimeters and 

move T-walls, resite and move containerized housing units, reroute 

utilities, and, where needed, undertake general site preparation. 

DoD will also provide State a number of specific functions on a reimbursable basis. For example, Bobcat 4 will be retained to provide 

general base operation and life support. 

In conclusion, I want to emphasize that our continued engagement with Iraq remains vital. We are now at the point where the 

strategic dividends of our tremendous sacrifices and huge investments in Iraq are within reach, as long as we take the proper steps 

to consolidate them. A long-term strategic partnership with Iraq, 

based on mutual interest and mutual respect, continues to present 

many advantages to the United States. 

Recent turmoil in the broader Middle East highlights the importance of active U.S. engagement and shoring up our relations with 

our key regional partners. DoD strongly believes we must remain 

focused on Iraq in order to advance our broader regional objectives 

of peace, prosperity, and security. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Crowley, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. CHRISTOPHER CROWLEY, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST 

BUREAU, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you. Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member 

Ackerman, honorable members of the committee, thank you for 

holding this hearing and inviting me to appear before you today to 

discuss the U.S. Agency for International Development’s role in the 

transition from a military-led to a civilian-led presence. 

USAID has played a major role in the U.S. Government’s civilian 

response to Iraqi economic and social needs since 2003, and will 

continue to do so. The situation in Iraq has dramatically improved 

over the past few years, but Iraq is still very much a post-conflict 

developing country facing considerable development, human resource, and fiscal challenges. 

The reduction in violence has created the breathing room for 

Iraqis to begin building their democracy, restoring public institutions, and creating conditions for private sector-led growth. But 

continued support is required to further nurture Iraq’s fledgling democracy and improve its ability to manage its own wealth. 

USAID has been supporting overall USG efforts in Iraq since 

2003. The primary objective then was to restore essential infrastructure and services. Beginning in 2007, USAID shifted much of 

its resources to a stabilization program, to complement the military 

and civilian surge which began at that time. This program focused 

on community stabilization and administering quick response funds 

to the joint civilian-military provincial reconstruction teams. 

USAID support is currently aligned with the Strategic Framework Agreement, which outlines the political, economic, and security cooperation between the United States and Iraq. The agreement focuses on sustainable development programs in several sectors and is characterized by increasing levels of host country ownership of the costs of these programs. 

10

Mr. Chairman, the key challenge ahead for the Iraqi Government 

will be in security, essential services, economic growth, and 

strengthening of institutions of democratic governance. Now is the 

time for Iraq to transition from the legacy of war and insurgency 

to one of economic opportunity and good governance. 

USAID’s democracy and governance programs will continue to 

strengthen the capabilities of Iraqi governance at the national, provincial, and local levels. And this includes Iraq’s gradual transition 

toward a more decentralized model of decisionmaking and control 

of resources. 

USAID will help Iraq expand its economic growth in non-oil sectors, such as agriculture, financial sector development, and small 

and medium enterprise. USAID will also support the health sector 

in Iraq by focusing on strengthening Iraqi primary health care. 

We will continue to assist ethnic and religious minorities and internally displaced persons. We will also support the education sector in Iraq. 

USAID is a strong and growing network of working relationships 

with key leaders in the public and private sectors throughout Iraq. 

Community action groups, provincial counsels, farmer cooperatives, 

all of whom have been partners or who have been trained in our 

programs, continue to work to improve the lives of their families 

and communities. 

USAID has been able to adapt to changing conditions in Iraq, 

and fully expects to be able to adapt to circumstances as the military withdraws. We will continue our programs through our implementing partners, both American and Iraqi. This has been a major 

strength of our programs, both in terms of our ability to engage 

more directly with our beneficiaries, and as a way to project our 

presence more widely into the country. In this way, we are better 

able to monitor and evaluate the impact of our programs. 

Mr. Chairman, along with the Government of Iraq, partners in 

the donor community, and the broader U.S. mission to Iraq, USAID 

will continue the engagement and commitment necessary to build 

on the gains that have already been achieved. USAID will be assisting the Iraqis on further developing their own abilities and resources to ensure a sovereign, stable, and self-reliance Iraq. 

In closing, I would like to thank Ambassador Jeffrey, Ambassador Haslach, and their staffs, General Austin and his troops, and 

the many offices and bureaus throughout the Department of State, 

and other U.S. departments and agencies, that are involved in this 

transition. All have provided tremendous support to USAID and its 

mission. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today, 

and I will be happy to answer any questions the committee may 

have and look forward to working with you and your congressional 

colleagues. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Haslach, Mr. Kahl, and 

Mr. Crowley follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Crowley. And we want to thank all 

three of the witnesses for their testimony here this afternoon. 

And now the members here will have 5 minutes, and I will recognize myself for that purpose now, to ask questions. 

The administration has developed so-called minimum essential 

capabilities—MEC—benchmarks, which refer to an end state in 

which ‘‘Iraqi security ministries, institutions, and forces can provide internal security and possess maximum foundational capabilities to defend against external threats.’’

In its June 2010 report to Congress on Iraq, the Department of 

Defense assessed that only the Iraqi navy is presently on course to 

fully achieve its MEC goals prior to December 2011, and Iraq will 

not be able to independently secure its airspace before that date. 

Overall, the Department of Defense has reported that the potential 

for the Iraqi security forces to meet and maintain performance at 


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16

minimum benchmark levels ‘‘continues to be reliant on U.S. support.’’

In March 2011, CENTCOM Commander, General James Mattis, 

said in Senate testimony that ‘‘There are going to be loose ends unless the Iraqis ask to stay and work on these—ask us to stay and 

work on these issues. And those loose ends would be difficult for 

them to overcome on their own.’’

And, Dr. Kahl, you mentioned one example of recent violent occurrence, and it happened to be the one—we were in Baghdad the 

first—this was the third time that I was in Iraq. I was there before—after the fall of Saddam but before we caught him. That was 

about 2003. I was back in around 2007, toward the end of the 

surge, and then most recently, as I say, about 1–2 weeks ago. 

And the day we were in Baghdad was the day that the occurrence happened up in Kirkuk, and we met with people who had—

the general whose staff had been—were some of the victims. And, 

of course, that is evidence of the ongoing threats to this country. 

With that being the case, and everything we know at this point, 

how realistic is it for us to be able, under the existing plan, to pull 

that many troops out and basically transition from Department of 

Defense to State? Is the State Department up for that task? Is 

there any precedent for anything on this scale? And, you know, 

what do you think the committee should know about that? 

Mr. KAHL. You know, it is our assessment that the Iraqi security 

forces will be—have pretty good capabilities in terms of internal defense. We have spent billions of dollars and many years building 

up a very capable counterinsurgency force, as well as a capable 

counterterrorism force. 

In terms of internal defense, I think we see a few gaps that are 

likely to exist beyond 2011. They will have some challenges in intelligence. They will have some challenges in logistics. The bigger 

gaps, as you mentioned, Chairman, is the gap on external defense. 

Maritime they will be in pretty good shape. 

As you mentioned, they are going to have significant challenges 

as it relates to what we call air sovereignty or air defense, and that 

is going to be true for a number of years. And then, they are also 

going to have some challenges as it relates to combined arms—that 

is, the ability to use their forces for conventional combat, to defend 

their borders against conventional adversaries. 

It is important to note that, even in the absence of a continued 

troop presence, there will be ways for us to continue to get after 

these challenges, both through the Office of Security Cooperation 

Iraq, which will facilitate our security assistance and security cooperation programs, and through the State Department’s police development program. so we will be able to continue to get after 

these. 

Anything beyond the Office of Security Cooperation would require, under the terms of the security agreement, for the Iraqis to 

ask. And, as you know from your recent visit, they haven’t yet 

asked. But the administration has been clear that, were they to 

ask, that we would be happy to start that conversation with them. 

Mr. CHABOT. Let me get to a second question, if I can. And I am 

going to address this to you, if I can, Madam Ambassador. And 

then, if you want to follow up on anything there, you can. 

17

I understand that the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction has initiated an audit of the police development program, 

and has requested an entrance conference to begin the audit. They 

have been told that the Department has informally taken the position that SIGIR does not have authority to audit this program, 

even though it is funded by the International Narcotics Control and 

Law Enforcement Fund, which fund SIGIR has authority over 

under Public Law 108.106, as amended. 

My view is that SIGIR has done important work on police training, which is clearly part of Iraq’s reconstruction, and we will need 

to continue to look at this program going forward. And I also, further, think it is inappropriate for the Department to try to block 

SIGIR’s access to information on how preparations to carry out a 

prospective appropriation of more than a billion dollars are proceeding. 

Please let me know what you plan to do to facilitate SIGIR’s ability to continue to do its work. 

Ambassador HASLACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have 

sought to be consistently forthcoming with our responses to all of 

the various requests for documents and information during the 

planning effort, including those from SIGIR. In fact, I worked very 

closely with SIGIR’s employees when I was in Iraq. 

We appreciate the efforts undertaken by SIGIR to perform audits 

and investigations of reconstruction activities in Iraq, and have 

provided them with requested materials that we feel fall under its 

mandate. As the Department engages in the significant transition 

from a military- to civilian-led mission in our Iraq, our assistance 

is also transitioning from largely reconstruction-based to technical 

assistance and capacity-building. 

We do not read the responsibilities assigned to SIGIR in its 

founding statute as extending to the State Department’s operations 

in support of our diplomatic platform in Iraq. Those audit responsibilities fall, we feel, within the purview of other oversight and 

audit entities such as the Government Accounting Office, the survey and investigation staff of the House Appropriations Committee, 

the Department of State Office of Inspector General, and the Commission on Wartime Contracting. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. And just me conclude with a quick 

statement, that we have spent billions of dollars over there, and 

auditing those dollars and making sure that that is being spent appropriately and not wasted or ripped off by some entity is critical. 

So we would ask your cooperation in continuing that. 

Thank you very much. 

And I will now yield to the ranking member from New York, Mr. 

Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much. Thank you all for your 

testimony. Is there somebody in the administration that is in 

charge of selling this to the American people? 

Ambassador HASLACH. Well, in my building, it is the Secretary 

of State. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I mean, somebody specifically who has the responsibility of explaining to the American people why we are doing 

this, that the American people think we have already done. 

18

Mr. KAHL. You know, the only thing that I would add, I mean, 

both our Secretaries are heavily involved. It is a top priority for 

both Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton. And, of course, Vice 

President Biden was tasked by President Obama right off the bat 

to lead our Government’s efforts. But in terms of a government 

spokesperson, I mean, I guess that is in the eye of the beholder. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. What you are both indicating is that there is 

none. And I am suggesting that there is a key problem here, because the American people thought they bought this, used it, and 

finished with it, and they are done with it and don’t have to make 

any further investments. 

And it seems to be not the case, and it—these kinds of things are 

going to be very, very difficult to do in the ensuing months, if not 

years, given all the givens, both realities and the political terms 

that we have to come to and deal with. And that is not necessarily 

a good thing. 

This seems to be—Iraq seems to have been a marriage of convenience, and everybody seems to agree that there should be some 

kind of a divorce. But when? And everybody thought we were waiting for the final papers to come through, and now we seem to have 

some remorse about that. And maybe we are sticking around for 

the sake of the children, and now they are all saying we should 

leave, although they really mean we should stay, but we ain’t staying unless they ask us, and it seems like a mess. 

And I don’t know how you explain that to the civilian population 

that is going to be asked to pay for child support. 

All right. I guess I will move on to something else. Is there any 

war in this region, in the entire region, that we can afford to ever 

finally leave? 

Mr. KAHL. You know, I don’t want to speak outside the lane of—

you know, my particular portfolio stretches from Egypt up through 

Iraq and around down to Yemen. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Right. Can we afford to leave Egypt? Can we afford to leave Libya? Can we afford to leave anywhere? 

Mr. KAHL. I think that we have profound national interest in this 

part of the world, countering weapons of mass destruction, countering violent extremism, energy security, the safety and security 

of Israel and our other strategic partners. So I think we are heavily 

invested in this part of the world. We have a sizeable presence in 

this part of the world. We are likely to remain postured at a pretty 

high level, even as we drawn down from Iraq. 

So I don’t know whether the question is ‘‘ever,’’ but we are——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Draw down means 5 to 7 years and billions of 

dollars. You start multiplying that across a region where everything is 5 to 7 years, that is going to shift the 5 to 7 years by the 

time we get to 6 years, and it is going to cost more billions of dollars. 

I am not advocating leaving this place yet, you know, but I just 

want to know, because of the lack of an answer to my first question, if there is nobody in charge of selling it, nobody is going to 

buy it. 

Mr. KAHL. Well, you know, I would say that we have made a consistent case, as the administration—the President did so again last 

week when he gave his big Middle East speech—of emphasizing 

19

the importance of the long-term strategic partnership with Iraq, 

and that it is especially important in light of all the events with 

the Arab Spring. 

So we have—I mean, Iraq has been so important to our national 

interest for 20 years that we have either been at war against Iraq 

or in Iraq for 20 years. So, clearly, we have made an investment. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. What about a financial partnership? You are 

talking about billions of dollars in supporting a partner that is 

richer than we are in many ways. Well, not really, but they seem 

to have some bucks. And they are going into financial partnerships 

with other people, which means they are cheating on us. 

Ambassador HASLACH. Well, Representative Ackerman, we have 

no intention of leaving Iraq. I think it was pretty clear in our opening statements—all three of us—and, in fact, we have asked for assistance——

Mr. ACKERMAN. The American people think we have left. They 

think we have made the political decision that we—here is the 

problem. You have no intention of leaving, and everybody else in 

the country, except those who are really finely tuned, which is a 

very limited audience, thinks we have already done that. And I 

would suggest that is a disaster of a short—an intermediate-term 

problem, because it ain’t going to be just Iraq that is on the plate 

in this situation. 

And somebody in the administration really has to start thinking 

about that long term. Even if long term only means 5 to 7 years, 

how do you sell a billion dollar program to people who think that 

they are done with the payments? 

Ambassador HASLACH. Representative Ackerman, if I may, Deputy Secretary Nides will be chairing a roundtable discussion on Friday with approximately 30 presidents and CEOs of major U.S. companies to talk about the challenges and the opportunities of investing in Iraq. He will also be meeting—having a number of press 

interviews, along with Ambassador Jeffrey, to be making the case 

that Iraq is worth all of the effort and worth the long-term commitment that we have made. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Those people might have a financial incentive to 

invest in Iraq, because it might be good for their 30 or whatever 

companies. But the American people don’t necessarily own that 

portfolio and aren’t going to see it that way, if I could put on my 

public relations hat and try to understand where the American 

people are going to be coming from. 

And I will just say it again—if you ain’t got no one to sell it, you 

ain’t got no one going to buy it. I taught English better than that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. 

And the gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome. 

I wonder if you could comment—well, first of all, I should ask, 

what is your understanding of how much CERP funding there is 

in this fiscal year? For Iraq and/or for Afghanistan. 

Mr. KAHL. I can’t speak to Afghanistan, Congressman, because it is not in my portfolio. I believe we have requested $25 million 

for FY12. 

20

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Crowley, are you familiar with the CERP 

program? 

Mr. CROWLEY. Yes, sir, I am. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Is it your understanding it is well in excess of a 

billion dollars? 

Mr. CROWLEY. Not in Iraq at the present time it isn’t. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Not in Iraq. I am just talking about CERP. 

Mr. CROWLEY. No. I am not sure what the overall dimensions of 

it are. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You don’t know what the number is. 

Mr. CROWLEY. No, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. If it were that order of magnitude, what are the 

conditions on programming of that money? I mean, you work for 

AID. AID has all kinds of constraints and regulations and legal requirements. What are the comparable constraints on the use of and 

reporting of and auditing of CERP funds? 

Mr. CROWLEY. Well, I know how CERP funds were used in Iraq 

during the period I was there. And, by and large, they were used 

by the military units and the provincial reconstruction teams to 

deal with rapid response capabilities to various economic and other 

issues on the ground. These are more short-term programs to respond to local situations. 

USAID works in a longer term——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Crowley, I am quite familiar with how 

USAID works. But would it not be of concern to you—it certainly 

is to me—that I agree with your—that was the original intent. But 

when you have that kind of intent, that is a relatively modest 

amount of money. 

When you get to very significant sums of money, would it not—

I am asking you to put on your professional hat, not your public 

policy hat—as a professional, would it not concern you that now we 

have a different management challenge when the magnitude isn’t 

$25 million, its a billion plus. 

Next door to Afghanistan—I know it is not your portfolio—but 

would that be of concern to you as a professional at AID? 

Mr. CROWLEY. Yes, sir, it would. And I would be building in all 

kinds of safeguards and overlapping mechanisms in order to make 

sure that that money is spent appropriately. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I would, too. 

Mr. Kahl, is it of any concern at all—I know it is not your portfolio, as you have pointed out—but at the Pentagon, any concern? 

Ever pick up anything by the water fountain? 

Mr. KAHL. Congressman, I just am not going to speak to Afghanistan. It is not in my portfolio. But I would be happy to take your 

question. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am asking you to speak about whether you 

have a concern, on behalf of the taxpayers of the United States, 

that we have a program—irrespective of where it is—that has now 

ballooned in terms of value? It is not a $25 million program, and 

there are only two countries we are really talking about here. 

And does it concern you at all, from a management point of 

view—even in the theoretical realm, let us say, so you comfortable 

in your silo—that it has so little supervision and so little restraints 

21

in a way that would be comparable to how we do constrain the programming of USAID money? 

Mr. KAHL. I think I would disagree with your characterization 

that there is little accountability or little restraint. There is actually a great deal of coordination between DoD, State, and USAID, 

and a great deal of reporting to Congress on all of the projects that 

are built with CERP. SIGIR, an organization we talked about earlier, has done regular assessments of it. 

I can’t speak to the magnitude or the specific projects in Afghanistan, because none of us work on Afghanistan. I would encourage 

you to direct that to our colleagues who do, and we would be happy 

to take that question back. In Iraq, there was $100 million of CERP requested in FY11. We 

actually didn’t spend all of that money, and then, in FY12, we requested $20 million. And this is basically simply to finish off some 

projects in that last bit of calendar year 2011 that includes the first 

part of Fiscal Year 2012. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, for the record, I thank you for the advice. 

I, in fact, already took it, and I did talk to the head of SIGIR. And 

he would not share your confidence, I think, in the CERP program. 

And, as a matter of fact, in Afghanistan, a number of people have 

already been fingered for, frankly, because it is a cash program, 

and the amounts are, relative to USAID amounts, quite substantial, that we actually have some people who, unfortunately, have 

yielded to temptation. And it has to do with the lack of accounting 

and accountability. 

At any rate, I commend it to you. And since you have offered, 

thank you, I will take you up on it. Please do get back to me, and 

this committee, in terms of what constraints are in place and accountability mechanisms are in place in this growing program. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

We will go to a second round. If the gentleman has any more 

questions, we will get to them in just a second. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Oh, all right. What do you think about—no. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. CHABOT. I just have a couple extra myself, and then I will 

get right back to you. 

Just a couple of quick questions. I assume all of the panel members would agree that it is not only in Iraq’s best interest, but also 

in America’s best interest, that we see a democratic—for the most 

part—Iraq prosper and flourish. I am seeing nods of assent by everyone there. 

And how is it in America’s best interest? I mean, I know it is an 

obvious question, but why is it in our best interest, at this point 

and beyond, not taking into consideration the fact that we have 

lost, you know, thousands of our men and women there, which is 

clear, and a lot of treasure has been spent there, or money. 

But how is it in our long-term best interest that Iraq is essentially a successful country in that important and tumultuous part 

of the world? And I see two of you chomping at the bit. 

Ambassador HASLACH. Well, we have a recent example of when 

Iraq was just the opposite of that, so I think it is pretty clear it 

is in our interest that we have a stable and democratic government 

22

in Iraq, especially in that region surrounded by some less stable 

and less democratic governments. So we——

Mr. CHABOT. Yes, I know. That is the obvious. But why is it? 

Why, you know——

Ambassador HASLACH. Well, it is for our own security, but it is 

also for the security of the region. And it also is for the world’s economic benefit and for the potential that Iraq, you know, has to become what it once was before—a middle-income country, a prosperous country, a stable country, a partner of ours, a partner of 

other democracies in the world. I think we have only to gain from 

Iraq being a democracy. Frankly, we have a lot to lose if they were 

to revert back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Dr. Kahl. 

Mr. KAHL. I would agree with all of that. I would add that, you 

know, Iraq historically has been a source of instability and an aggressor state in this part of the world. And I think it is our hope 

that a democratic Iraq will be a more moderate actor that we can 

work with in the Middle East, which is, you know, a region that 

is vital to our interest for all the reasons that we talked about before. 

I would also point out that, given the kind of mosaic of sectarian 

and ethnic communities in Iraq, only a democratic system can hold 

that country together—that is, can lead to the types of political accommodations and mechanisms to combat extremism that will keep 

Iraq stable over the long term. 

I mean, Saddam was able to keep a lid on instability, but Iraq 

wasn’t stable. Iraq was a brutal dictatorship. 

Iraq has gone now through a period of instability following the 

2003 invasion, but it has come out of that and is now on the right 

trajectory. And, as President Obama said, we have an interest in 

continuing that trajectory. And in the context of the Arab Spring, 

it only magnifies all of those arguments. Especially now that we 

are trying to stand up and consolidate democracies in Egypt and 

in Tunisia and encourage reform in other parts of the world, it is 

even more important to get Iraq right. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. And obviously, as I had stated in my opening 

statement, the United States has spent nearly a decade securing 

and helping to build the foundation of a prosperous and democratic 

Iraq. And that it—a premature withdrawal could risk squandering 

those gains, and that would be a failure of colossal proportions. I 

assume all of the members of the panel agree with that statement? 

Ambassador, did you want to——

Ambassador HASLACH. Yes. This goes back to your actual first—

your first question, too. I mean, we are not abandoning Iraq, and 

we have asked for assistance to help to continue to train their police forces. We have asked for assistance to continue to train and 

equip the Iraq security forces, and, in fact, we—in FY12, we have 

asked, under the Foreign Military Financing Program, for a substantial amount of money, which we feel is essential to help Iraq 

defend itself against the external threats that you were asking 

about before. 

So, I mean, our plan is actually to stay there and to help them 

with this. USAID—we have already requested economic support 

funds to help them on the capacity-building side, fragile instituVerDate 0ct 09 2002 17:19 Jul 05, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\060111\66779 HFA PsN: SHIRL
23

tions, years of instability and repression. And so we are not done, 

but we feel that we are well on the way to a much better situation 

there. 

Mr. CHABOT. And I assume that the panel would agree that Iran, 

at least in the least 30 years or so, has been, shall we say, an 

unhelpful actor in that region. And if Iraq falls under their influence, or they are not able to stand up to Iran, that would be very 

unstable and would certainly hurt the U.S. foreign security interests around the world. Is that correct? 

Okay. And I think I am seeing affirmative. Dr. Kahl, did you 

want to say something? 

Mr. KAHL. Yes. I would only say that, you know, a strong Iraq 

is likely to not be a puppet dangling at the end of Iran’s strings. 

Mr. CHABOT. Right. 

Mr. KAHL. I think that a strong Iraq that has a strategic partnership with us and has relations with all its neighbors, which is 

what all of Iraq’s leaders want, is going to be a—you know, is going 

to want to maintain its sovereignty, independence, and is going to 

be a fiercely nationalistic place. And so I don’t think the Iraqis 

want to be dominated by Iran, which is the most important aspect. 

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection, I will grant myself 1 additional 

minute here to just make one final observation here in the time 

that I have with that 1 minute. And that is that one of the things 

that was a bit disturbing, although not probably something you 

wouldn’t expect, would be the fact that the parliamentarians that 

we met with about whether or not there needed to be U.S. involvement beyond the end of this year, we are unwilling to make that 

commitment, although to a person—every one of them indicated 

yes, but we really can’t say that publicly, because we run for office 

as well. 

And they said that is for Maliki to say, and spokespeople for 

Maliki indicated, well, the parliamentarians, you know, those are 

the folks that you have to go to. So, and it is not unlike what we 

see here in Washington on occasion when some of the big issues—

everybody points a finger at the other—maybe it is the administration. Maybe it is Congress. Maybe it is Democrats or Republicans, 

but this is an important key issue. 

And the politicians in Iraq are going to have to step up to the 

plate as well, because for the United States to pull out by the end 

of this year, and turn over complete—the future of that country before they are ready, could literally, you know, have defeat out of 

the jaws of victory, and that is what we don’t want to see here, for 

the United States or for the Iraqis as well. 

I want to thank the panel. And, at this point, I will yield to the 

gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, if he has any additional 

questions he would like to ask. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I do. I do, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. Kahl, you indicated in my previous round of questioning that 

your understanding of the CERP program in Iraq was that it was 

$25 million? 

Mr. KAHL. For the FY12, the request is for——

Mr. CONNOLLY. For FY12. 

Mr. KAHL. For FY12. And it was $100 million, my understanding, for FY11, which we didn’t spend all of that money. 

24

Mr. CONNOLLY. Perhaps your staff can confirm this, but am I 

reading the SIGIR report right that since 2003 the total amount of 

CERP funding in Iraq was $3.89 billion? 

Mr. KAHL. Sir, I will have to get back to you on the exact number. But we have spent a considerable amount of CERP money in 

Iraq since 2003. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. More than $25 million a year. 

Mr. KAHL. Yes, Congressman. That is why I said $25 million for 

fiscal——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. I understand. I am trying to get at magnitude, Mr. Kahl. And is it your testimony that, if I understood you 

correctly in your answer to my previous question, that you are satisfied or you believe that we can be satisfied that all of the right 

accounting and transparency is in place, just as it is for USAID 

programming? 

Mr. KAHL. What I would say is that, you know, CERP was an 

innovation in Iraq largely to enable our counterinsurgency operations. And that we learned along the way, frankly, and that we 

are better now than we were at the beginning. So it would not surprise me if, going back and looking at how the program was executed at the very beginning, you found a lot more problems with 

how it is executed now. 

I would say that the program is more accountable, that there is 

better coordination, and that that money is better used now than 

was the case in 2004, for example. But are there no challenges? 

Well, every program of this size will have challenges. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. No one has suggested that there were no challenges, Mr. Kahl. The question was whether you felt that there 

were adequate mechanisms of accountability and reporting and 

transparency as there sort of are with USAID programs, such that 

the Pentagon is satisfied. 

Mr. KAHL. I feel that we are in a good place in executing CERP 

programs in Iraq, which is the portfolio that I cover, and I can’t 

speak to Afghanistan. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I understand. You have made that clear; you 

can’t speak about anything outside of your portfolio. However, certainly, since the taxpayer pays for this, it is not an unreasonable 

expectation that we might up here expect that what you learned 

in your portfolio has applicability elsewhere. Would that be a fair 

thing? 

Mr. KAHL. It is absolutely true that the way the program is being 

applied in Afghanistan learned from the lessons in Iraq. But in 

terms of how it is being executed on the ground in Afghanistan, I 

can’t speak to that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. I look forward to having more dialogue 

about this, because I think CERP has grown so big that it presents 

very serious problems in terms of accountability and transparency. 

And I would love to have you submit for the record more detail 

about what the Pentagon learned in this time period. 

As you said, we have improved and evolved. That is great. But 

I want to know what that is, and I also want to know how—what 

its applicability is to other places. Obviously, I have Afghanistan 

in mind, but I won’t burden you with Afghanistan. 

25

Let me ask a totally separate question real quickly. One of the 

things, in talking to reconstruction folks, that they suggest is that 

it is time we have a permanent Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, because we sort of reinvent the wheel every 

time something comes up. And that if we had an office centrally 

located with expertise, knowing the ropes in the SOPs, and so 

forth, and the rolodex of vendors and providers and nonprofits and 

everything else, that that would make us, frankly, a lot more efficient and save taxpayer dollars. 

Any comments on that suggestion or observation? Mr. Crowley. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Well, there is an office in the State Department 

that has the purpose of doing exactly that, and I think Ambassador 

Haslach would be better positioned to comment on it. And USAID 

works closely with that office in situations where these kinds of responses are required. 

We also have our own Office of Transition Initiatives, which is 

itself built around providing responses to these kinds of situations, 

but it works hand in hand with SERS, which is the State Department office that is tasked with that responsibility. So——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I know we are running—would 

you indulge just to allow Ms. Haslach to be able to respond? 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman is recognized for 1 additional 

minute. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chairman. 

Ambassador HASLACH. Mr. Crowley is right. There is an office at 

the State Department that is tasked with exactly what you are 

talking about. And, in fact, under the Quadrennial—the QDDR, the 

Quadrennial Development and Diplomacy Review, in fact, there are 

a number of suggestions on how that office can be strengthened to 

fulfill the role you are recommending. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. Again, if you wanted to get back for the 

record, anything, that would be great. Thank you so much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. 

Would the gentleman from Pennsylvania—we are ready to wrap 

up the hearing. So you are welcome to ask questions, if you have 

some questions, Tom. 

Mr. MARINO. I apologize for being late, and I have no questions. 

Mr. CHABOT. No problem. Okay. Well, thank you very much. 

And if there is no further business to come before the committee, 

we want to thank the panel for their testimony and answering our 

questions here this afternoon. And without objection, all members 

will have 5 minutes—or, excuse me, 5 days to submit questions or 

statements to the record. 

And if there is no further business to come before the committee, 

we are adjourned. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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