1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,

v. Case No. 1: 21
- CR
- 708
- RCL
- 1
LEO CHRISTOPHER KELLY , Defendant

.

MEMORANDUM OPINION Defendant Leo Christopher Kelly was convicted after a jury trial of seven counts stemming from his conduc t during the Capitol Riot on January 6, 2021. D efens e counsel for Mr. Kelly spoke to members of the jury panel afte r it was discharged . One member of the jury panel made statements that Mr. Kelly believes show the juror lied during voir dire and was biased against Mr. Kelly. Mr . Kelly thereafter moved for a new trial and judgment of acquittal under Federal Rules of Criminal Pro cedure 33 and 29, respectively. The government opposed. Upon consideration of Mr. Kelly ’ s m otion for n ew t rial and j udgment of a cquitt al , Def. ’ s Mot

. , ECF No. 118, the government ’ s opposition, Go v ’ t Opp ’ n, ECF No. 122, t he applicable law, and the whole record, the Court DENIES the motion

. I. BACK GROUND A. Proced ural History On May 9, 202 3, the jury unanimously found Mr. Kelly guilty of all se ven counts charged in t he indictment : (1) obstruction of an official proceeding , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512( c)( 2); (2) entering and remaining in a restricted building or grounds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1); (3 ) disorderly and disruptive c onduct in a restricted building or grounds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(2); (4) entering and remaining on the floor of Congress, in violation of
40 U.S.C. § 510 4 (e) (2)(A); (5) entering and rema ining in certain rooms in the Cap itol Building,2 40 U.S. C. § 510 4 (e) (2)(C); (6) disorderly conduct in a Capitol Bu ilding, 40 U.S.C. § 510 4 (e) (2)(D); and (7) parading, demonstrating, or p icketing in a Capitol Building, 40 U.S.C. § 510 4 (e) (2)(G)

. Indictment, ECF No. 27 ; Minute Entry (May 9 , 2023)

. On July 13, 20 2 3, M r. Kelly moved under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 33 and 29 for a new trial and judgment of acquittal. Def. ’ s Mot. The motion raised two argument s : (1) Mr. Kelly is entitled to a new trial un der Rule 33 because a juror was inherently biased and f ailed to disclose that bias during the Cou rt ’ s voir dire examination ; and (2 ) Mr. Ke lly is entitled to acquittal on all counts under Rule 29 because no re asonable juror could find the elements of the statute s at issue pr oven bey ond a reasonable doubt. See Def. ’ s Mot ; Gov ’ t Opp ’ n
. In connection with the first claim , Mr. Kelly argued that juror 1437 ( “ the J uror ” ) lied to the Court during voir dire

. The government opposed Mr. Kelly ’ s mo tion and disputed its characterization o f the Juror ’ s
statements

. Go v ’ t O pp ’ n . Mr . Kelly did not file a reply . T he motion is now ripe for review.
B. Voir Dire
T he Court conduc ted voir dire over the course of two days commencing on May 1, 2023

. Minute Entries (May 1

– 2, 2023). During voir dire , the Court questioned the prospective j urors about their ability to serve fairly and impartially

. See May 1, 2023 Tr

. Transcript ( “ Tr. ” ) a t 5

. The
Court also asked them about their connections to the United States Capitol. Id. at 13

– 14. 1 The Juror was among thos e interviewed by the Court on May 1

. Id. at 37

– 44

. The Court engaged the
Juror in the following colloquy : THE COURT: You live or work near the Capitol? JUROR: I live about a mile from the Capitol. THE COURT: Where do you live? JUROR: Mount Vernon Square, Mount Vernon right north of us.

1 The Court asked four questions regardin g the United States Capitol : (1) “ [d] o any of you live or work at or near the U.S. Capitol? ” ; (2) “ [ does ] anyone you are clo se to live or work at or near the U.S. Capitol? ” ; (3) “ were you at or near the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021? ” ; (4) “ did any of you watch the events at the U .S. Capitol on January 6, 2021 on live TV at that time? ” T r. at 13

– 14

.3 THE COURT: Okay. And you watched this live on TV that day? JUROR : Yeah, I was watching the news that morning and working from home and watched it as it all unfolded. THE COURT: And you did say you thought you could put that aside and decide this case ju st on the evidence you saw here at the trial, is that right? JUROR : Yes, I have served on a jury before, so I have

-- you know, aware of how to, like, think about the law and think about the evidence and would like to think I could do that here too. THE COURT: Okay. Any reason you couldn't be a fair and impartial juror if you were chosen to serve here? JUROR: No. THE COURT: Tell me how much you followed the investigation here. Did you watch the TV cov erage? JUROR: I would say I would follow it just lik e a normal person reading news articles and major updates about it obviously. THE COURT: Like in the Post or

– JUROR: Yeah, yeah. I mean, I wasn't one of those people that was watching all the hearings. I was, like, reading news articles about them after wards. And, you know, in D.C. it's hard to avoid. And yeah, I was i nterested in it, so

... THE COURT: Okay. Tell me your impression, if you can, of that day and what you have followed that has led you to wha t kind of impression? JUROR: I mean, it was a pret ty major event. I wasn't happy that it was happening, both in my ci ty and also that people were breaking into the Capitol and there seemed to be violence going on, and obviously people died on both sides of it. So, you know, I'm glad that these cases are g oing to trial because I think that's important. But yeah, I general ly don't think it was a good thing. You know, I am very supportive of protesters. I am very supportive of activism and people's right to pr otest. I think there's always like a line you have to be

-- you can't cross. And so was that line crossed on January 6? Probably I guess that's what the Court is trying to determine, so... THE COURT: Any reason you couldn't follow the law and decide whethe r this defendant really crossed that line under t he instructions I give to this jury? JUROR: Yeah. THE COURT: That 's what you would have to do here is decide what the facts are here in this case, whether this defendant really crossed the line of the instru ctions I would give the jury. Do you think you could do that fairly? JUROR: Yeah. I mean, I think that's what the purpose of these trials is, for each individual defendant to plead

-- you know, for the government to give their case and defendants to give their case, and for us as the jury to determine that. And that's, you know, why I do think I could be an impartial juror, because on my last jury, I was really impressed with everybody and how thoughtful our jury was at examining the evidence

– THE COU RT: That ’ s what

– JUROR:

-- and th ink about the law and how to apply it even if we didn't particularly agree with the circumstances. So that would be my hope , is that

– THE COURT: What is the last case you were on? JUROR: It was 2019. It was a drug case here in D.C.4 THE COURT: I have found my juries conten tious too. Now I will ask you the hardest question. If you are sitt ing over there in his s eat, would you want somebody like you on your jury in this kind of case where you have some views? JUROR: Yeah, I think so, because like I said, I respect the court systems and I respect the rule of law. I almost went to law school. I didn't end up going, but, you know, I think what we have in this country is really important. And I have even said to friends, like my friends who always talk about how to get out of jur y duty, I tell them, like, I don't think you should try to get out of it. T HE COURT: R ight. JUROR: Like, I have fri ends that have had very bad jury experiences, and I have always said that I was really impressed with my jury, and if I ever was a defendant , hopefully I will never be, that I would want to have the type of jury I had. So yeah. THE COURT: I'm glad to hea r that. Was that in this court or across the street? JUROR: It was in this building. I think it was across the room

-- across the hallway in t hat courtroom, so... THE COURT: Any follow

- up by counsel? (The fo llowing was heard sidebar.) DEFENSE COUN SEL : Your Honor, I'm not sure you asked her about question No. 8, which is arrested, convicted, or charged with a crime. And I see that that is cros sed on the list. And I would like to know whether or not they reach ed a verdict in her case and whether or n ot it was civil or criminal. And she made a statement that she said that the government and the defendant each have to give a case. And I want to ma ke sure that she understands the defendant does not have to give a case and whether or not she would hold th at against the defendant if he did not do a case. A SSISTANT U.S . ATTORNEY : Your Honor, I don't have any additional follow

- up, and I don't disagree with Ms. West's proposed questions. (The following was heard in op en court.) THE COURT: I think there's another question I didn't ask you about. You, a member of your family or friends arrested for or charged with a crime or victim or witness to a crime? JUROR: I have an extended family member that was charged with a cr ime, but that was a cousin, so I don't k now if that counts as immediate or close. But otherwise, no one else that's close. THE COURT: What was that one ? JUROR : My cousin, ten years ago, wa s charged

-- I don't actually know what the charge was, but it was, like, kind of like petty c rime stuff. It was up in Boston. But he was convicted and went to jail for a few years. THE COURT: What was the crime? JUROR: He was involved

-- I don't know wha t the actual crime was. He was involved with people who were

-- I t hink there was something to do with parking meters and maybe parking meters being broken into and being stolen. And he was caught up with someone else, and they got in a fight with people, and because he had a record, I think they kind of threw the book at him, so... TH E COURT: From what you know, and I know you may not know all the facts, was he fairly treated by the criminal justice system? JUROR: I guess. I mean, I don't have a lot of o pinion

-- I wasn't like super close with him back then. We are clos er now. But I know he's very much like, I never want to go back and5 I want to live my life straight. And I'm like, great, we are going to support you in every way we can. THE COURT: In the case when you were on the jury, did the jury reach a verdict? JUR OR: Uh

- huh. THE COURT: Was that civil or criminal? JUROR: Criminal. THE COURT: It was a drug case? JUROR: Drug case, yeah. THE COURT: And in the

-- I missed what the other point was. L e t me ask you. Oh, I know what it was. I think you said something a bout you understand the defendant doesn't have to put on a case at all because the burden is on the government to prove everything? JUROR: Uh

- huh. THE COURT: So the defendant d oesn't have to testify, doesn't have to call any witnesses or do anything. The total effort has to be by the government. The defendant doesn't have the burden to even testify or call a witness or do anything. Do you understand the government has the burden of proof

– JUROR: Yes. THE COURT:

-- and the burden of producing evidence? You don't have any problem with that? JUROR: No. In my last case, the defendant didn't testify, and that wasn't an issue in how we came to our conclusi on. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. JUROR: Thank you. THE COURT: You can step down. (Prospectiv e juror exited the courtroom.) THE COURT: Any challenge for cause? ASSIS TAN T U.S. ATTORNEY : None on behalf of the government. THE COURT: She will be in t he group. We will go to 18. Id.
B esides the follow

- up questions prof f er ed by defense counsel during the sidebar, which encompassed the Juror ’ s prior jury service , understanding of the burdens of proof in criminal case s , and criminal history, neither Mr. Kelly nor the government asked the C ourt to ask the Juror any other questions

. I d. Defense counsel did not as k the Court to inquire into the Juror ’ s employment history or whether the Juror had ever worked at the United States Capitol. Id. And n either Mr. Kelly nor the government challenged the J uror for cause. Id. at 44.6 C. P ost
- Trial Conversation w ith Members of the Jury Panel
D efense counsel apparently spoke with members of the jury panel in the hallways of the courthouse shortly after they rendered their verdict and were dismissed. Def. ’ s Mo t . at 1. According to defense cou nsel, the Juror agreed to speak with her

. Id. Defense counsel alleges that the Juror told her, in the presence of “ at least 7 other jurors, ” that the J uror “ used to work at the [Capitol] as an intern, and once you ’ r e in, yo u ’ re in. Even I couldn ’ t go on the floor. ” Id. The Juror also allegedly stated , “ this is our city . We live here. We know what went on. ” Id. The government was not present for this ex change. Gov ’ t Opp ’ n at 4. For the purposes of this motion, the Court wi ll assume that defense counsel had permission
to speak to members of the jury panel and that the Juror in fact made the statements ascribed to her by defense counsel. 2
II. LEGAL STANDARD S Mr. Kelly has filed a motion asking the Court to grant him a new trial p urs uant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33

. He also request s a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29.
A. Fe deral Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 Rule 33 authori zes a court to vacate a judgment and grant a new trial “ if the interest of justice so requires. ” Fed . R. Crim. P. 33(a). A defendant “is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one, for there are no perfect trials.” McDonough Power Eq uipment, Inc. v. Greenwood , 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984) (quotations and citations omitted). “ [G]ranting a new trial moti on is warranted

2 Defense counsel asserts that the Court , acting ex parte , granted her permission to speak to jurors ex parte

. See Def. ’ s Mot. at 1. U nder Local Criminal Rule 24.2, after the ju ry has been discharged, “ no party or attorney shal l speak with a juror concerning the case exce pt when permitted by the C ourt for good cause shown in writing. ” L C vR 24.2(b). So, defens e counsel has put the Court in the posture of having violated i ts own rules. T he Court is troubled b y defense counsel ’ s claim that she received permission . Over the last ten years, this Court has never granted permission to counsel to speak with a ju ry that rendered a verdict. Although defense counsel “ asked permission of the Court ’ s law clerk an d courtroom dep uty [t o sp eak t o the jury] , ” and asserts that “ [ p]ermission was granted, ” defense counsel does not state by whom. Def. ’ s Mot. at 1

. In any event, the Court ’ s concern s do not affect the outcome of this motion

. Mr. Kelly is not entitled to a new trial

.7 only in those limited circumstances where ‘a serious miscarriage of justice may have occurr ed

. ’ ” United States v. Wheeler , 753 F.3d 200, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ( quoting United States v. Rogers , 918 F.2d 207, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1990) )

. A motion fo r n ew trial is “ committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge

. ” United States v. Reese , 561 F.2d 894, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ; see also United
States v. Stone , 61 3 F. Supp. 3d 1, 27 (D.D.C. 2020)

. The d ecision is subject to reversal “ only for abuse of dis cretion or misapplication of the law. ” R eeves , 561 F.2d at 898. This is because t rials
courts are “ obviously

. . . the tribunal best qualified to weigh the relevant factors

. ” United States v. Williams , 822 F.2d 1174, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

. Trial courts ’ fa ctual determinations are given

“ great weight. ” United States v. White , 116 F.3d 903, 929

– 30 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curium) ( quoting Hobson v. Wilson , 737 F.2d 1, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied , 470 U.S. 1084 (1985) )

. Mr. Kelly seeks a new trial under Ru le 33 based on alleged juror misconduct during voir dire

. See Def. ’ s Mot

. A defendant seeking a new trial based on a juror ’s statements during voir dire must demonstrate both that the jur or “ failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire ” and “ that a correct response would have provided a val id basis for a challenge for caus e. ” McDonough , 464 U.S. at 556. Additionally, a new trial is proper only if the juror ’s falsehood at
voir dir e “demonstrated actual bias.” United States v. North , 910 F.2d 84 3, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ( per curiam ) ; see also United States v. Brown , 26 F.3d 1124, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ; United States

v. Boney , 97 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2000). A Rule 33 motion on grounds other than newly discovered evidence ordinarily must be file d “ within 14 days after the ver dic t or finding of guilty. ” Fed. R. Cr im. P. 33( b)(2). Mr. Kelly ’ s Rule 33 motion was filed before the deadline set by the Court and therefore is time ly

. See ECF
N o. 111 ; Def. ’ s Mot.8 B. Federal Rule of Cri minal Procedure 29 Rule 29 requires a “ court on the defendant ’ s motion to enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a convicti on. ” F ed. R. Crim. P. 2 9 ( a )

. A defendant seeking a judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evide nce must show that no

“ rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ” United States v. W illiam s , 836 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The Court “ must view the evidence in the light most favorable t o the government, drawing no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, and gi ving full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, w eigh the evidence and draw justifiable inferences of fact. ” Id. T h is standard is “ highly deferential ” to the jury v erdict. Id.
A Rule 29 motion may be filed or “ rene w [ed] . . . within 14 days after a guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury, whichever is later. ” F ed. R. Crim. P. 29( c )(1). The jury was discharged on May 9, 2023, the same day it rendered its verdict. Minute Entry (May 9, 2023).
Here , the motion is untimely because it was filed sixty

- five days after the guilty verdict. See Def. ’ s Mot. The Court granted Mr. Kelly ’ s mot io n to extend the tim e for filing a motion for new trial until July 15, 2023. ECF No

. 111

. However, Mr. Kelly ’ s motion for an extension of time , and the
Court ’ s order , were specific to motions for new trial under Rule 33. ECF No s. 110 and 111. Defense counsel ’ s motion did not request an extension of time to file or renew a motion f or a judgmen t of acquittal under Rule 29, and the Court did not grant one. Id. In any event , the Court will analyze Mr. Kelly ’ s motion for a judg ment of acquittal as though it were timely.
III. D ISCUSSION A. Jur or Misconduct Mr. Kell y ’ s Rule 33 motion for new trial fails because his allegations do not warrant a new trial under the McDono ugh factors as interpreted by the D.C. Circuit in North . Mr. Kelly bears the9 burden of showing that : (1) the Ju ror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire ; (2) a correct respo nse would have provided a val id basis for a challenge for caus e ; and (3) the
Juror ’ s failure to answer honestly demonstrated actual bias. McDonough , 464 U.S. at 556 ; North , 910 F. 2d at 904

. Mr . Kelly fails on each point

. First , there is no evidence the Ju ror lied , withheld, or concealed information in response to
qu estioning. The Court asked the Juror four questions regarding her connection s to the Capitol

. Tr. at 13

– 14

. The Court asked whether she lived or worked at or near the C apitol, whether anyone she was close to lived or worked at or near the Capitol, wheth er she was at or near the Capitol on January 6, and whether she watched the events at the Capitol on January 6 on live television. Id

. The Juror ’ s prior internship at the Capitol is not responsive to any of these question s
. And n othing about the Court ’ s questioning or follow

- up inquiries required the Juror to volunteer that information

. The Juror answered each of the Court ’ s question s directly and tru thfully. The Court knows the Juror answered truth fully because the Court thoroughly interrogated each of the Juror ’ s

answer s
. Id. at 37

– 44

. When the Juror stated that she lived or worked near the Capitol, the Co urt aske d the Juror to identify the e xac t nei ghborhood where she lived. Id. at 37. W hen the Ju r or stat ed that she wat ched the events of January 6 unfold on live television, the Court asked her to clarify the extent to which she had followed media coverage of the Capitol Riot. Id. at 37

– 38

. And w hen
t he Court ask the Juro r to describe her feelings r egarding January 6 , the J uror responded candidly , explaining, “ I wasn ’ t happy that it was happening, both in my city and also that people were breaking into the Capitol and there seemed to be violence going on, and obviously pe ople died on both sides of it [, s ] o, y ou know, I ’ m glad that these cases are going to trial because I think that ’ s impor tant [, b]ut yeah, I generally don ’ t think it was a good thing. ” Id. at 3 8

– 3 9 (emphasis added)

.10 The Court then asked the Juror whether she could “ follow the law and d ecide whether this defendant really crossed that line [of illegality] under the instructions I give to this jury

. ” Id. at 39. The Juror responded by affirming that she would follow the Court ’ s instructions and that she believed she could serve impartially. Id. The Ju ror was not asked whether she was ever an intern, volunteer, or employee at the Capitol

. I d. at 37

– 44 . She was not asked whether s he was familiar with the layout of the Capitol

. I

d. Rather , she was asked about her connection s to the Capitol on J anuary 6 and her feelings about the events of that day

. Id. The Juror described her feeling s to t he Court

. Id. at 3 8

– 3 9

. The Juror explained to the Court ’ s s atisfaction that she understood the proper role of the jury and would decide the case fai rly and impartially

. Id. at 3 9. In other words, t he Juror answered the Court ’ s questions directly and trut hfully. The Juror concealed nothing

. And the Juror ’ s candid answers permitted the Court to gauge her credibility and determine that she would follow t he C ourt ’ s inst r uctions. Because the Juror did not answer a material question on voir dire un truthfully, or deliberately conceal material information , Mr. Kelly ’ s motion fails at the first McDonough f actor. See McDonough , 464 U.S. at 556

. Second , the Juror ’ s statements during voir dire and during the post

- verdict con versation with defense counsel are entirely consistent. According to Mr. Kelly, the Juror told defense counsel that she “ used to work at the [Capitol] as an intern, and once you ’ r e in, you ’ re in [ , e] ven I couldn ’ t go on the floor , ” and further , “ this is our city [, w ] e live here [, w] e know what went on. ” Def

. ’ s Mot. at 1 (emph asis added)

. The Court has already noted that it did not ask the Juror whether she previously worked at the Capitol. Nor di d d efense counsel ask the Court to ask this question. Tr. at 41. So, nothing about the first part of the Juror ’ s post

- verdict statement is inconsistent with her statements during voir dire

. The second part of the Juror ’ s post

- verdict state ment is also cons istent

.11 During voir dire , the Juror expressed that s he was not “ happy that [the events of January 6 were ] happening in . . . my city

. ” Id. at 38 (emphasis added). This is entirely consistent with the Juror ’ s post

- verdict statement that she knew “ what went on ” in “ our city

. ” Def

. ’ s Mot . at 1 (emphasis added)

. That the Juror ’ s voir dire and post

- verdic t statements are consistent demonstrates that nothin g the Juror told the Court about her ability to serve fairly and impartially was false. Third , defense co unsel had the oppor tunity to ask the Juror whether she had ever worked in the Ca pitol but failed to do so

. Tr. at 41. Both parties were given the opportunity to propose questions to the Court before the commencement of voir dire

. The Court has reviewed the parties ’ joint proposed voir dire questions as well as Mr. Kelly ’ s supplement al requests

. ECF Nos. 78

- 1 and 89. Mr. Kelly never proposed asking th e prospective jur ors whether they ha d ever been employed or worked in the Capitol. Id. Moreover, b efore concluding its interview of the Jur or, the Court asked counsel for the government and defense couns el whether they had any follow

- up questions

. Tr. at 41

. Defense counsel had several

. Id. Defense counse l aske d the Court to inquire into whether the Juror had ever been arrested, convicted, or charged with a crime ; whether she had reach ed a verdict in a previous case in which she had served as a juror ; and whether she understood that Mr. Kelly did not have to present a cas e in his defense

. Id. Not ably, defense counsel proffered these follow

- up questions after the Juror had already affirmed that she did not work at or near the
Ca pitol and af ter she had already explained that she wa s not “ happy that [the events of January 6

were ] happening in . . . my city

. ” Id. at 37

– 38, 41. Defense counse l plainly had the opportunity to solicit additional information regarding the Juror ’ s em ployment history and feelings rega rding the events of Janu ary 6 b ut failed to do so

. I d. at 41. The Court surmises that defense counsel did not raise these additional questions becaus e she was otherwise satisfied with the Court ’ s lin e of inquiry . Defense counsel ’ s current protestations are belied by the record

.12 F

ourth , even if the Juror had disclosed their prior internship at the Capitol, the Juror would not have been stricken for cause . In United States v. Maxwell , No. 20

- cr - 330 (AJN), 2022 WL 986298, at * 4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr

. 1, 2022) , the parties l earned after the t rial that a juror failed to disclose during voir dire that they were the victim of sexual abuse . The court denied the defendant ’ s Rule 33 motion, in part because it foun d that re sponses during voir dire disclosing the history of sexual abuse would not have provided a sufficient basis to strike the juror for cause. Id. at *11. The court reached this conclusion because the juror “ repeatedly and credibly affirmed that his personal history o f sexual abuse would not affect his ability to serve as a fair and impa rtial juror. ” Id. Here, it is eviden t that even if the Court had learned of the Juror ’ s prior employment history during voir dire , the Juro r ’ s repeated and credible affirmations that she c ould serve fairly and impartially would ha ve overcome any for cause challenge. Tr. at 3 8

– 3 9

. Indeed, the Juror ’ s
p rior employment history is nothing like the juror ’ s a dmission of victimhood in Maxwell . Although Mr. Kelly cla ims that “ [a]nyone who worked at the Capitol has the life experience of being in the exact same posi tion as everyone present on January 6, 2021 , ” and that therefore, the Juror “ is a victim of the J 6 riot , ” this contention is wholly unsub stantiated and is not supported by the Juror ’ s post

- verdict statements. See Def. ’ s Mot. at 1 , 6. Basic fa miliarity with t he Capitol Riot does not evince bias, let alone bias specifically directed against Mr. Kelly. See United States v.
G ossJankowski , No. 21

- cr - 123 (PLF) , 2023 WL 395985 , at * 6 (D.D.C. Ja n. 25, 2023). There is no evidence that the Juror was a victim of the Cap itol Riot such that she was bias ed , and even if she

were a victim, the Court ’ s careful questioning during voir dire was sufficient to dispel any risk that she would fulfill her role partially and without regard for the Court ’ s legal instructions. See Irvin v. Dowd , 366 U.S. 717, 722

– 23 (1961).13

Fifth , severa l othe r jurors empa neled in this case had stronger connections to the Capitol than the Juror, were not challenged for cause, and a re not challenged here. At least four other empaneled jurors had connections to the Capitol that were disclosed dur ing voir dire . J uror 1895 disclosed that he worked in an office near the House Office Building on January 6 and had friends and clients who worked at the Capitol and were forced to evacuate on January 6. Tr. at 99–100. Juror 330 disclosed that he worked near the Capitol on January 6 and was at work that day. Id. at 193. Juror 2173 disclosed that his sister works for a Congressperson at the Capitol. Id. at 82. Jur or 1753 disclosed that the juror ’ s nephew had worked for the U.S. Capi tol Police since December
2022. Id. at 186–87. No n e of these jurors were challenged f or cause. Id. at 83, 105, 193, 197. Mr. Kelly did challenge j uror 277, who worked as a Sen ate staffer during 2021. Id

. at 202. But the
Court denied that challenge based on its assessment of the juror’ s credibility. Id. at 206. The same reasoning applies here. Even if the Court assumes that the Juror lied dur ing voir dire , the Juror ’ s prior employment history would not have sustaine d a for c ause challenge because she credibly attested that s he w ould s erve f airly and impartially a nd follow the Court’ s legal instructions.
In summary, the Juror did not fail to honestly answer a material question on voir dire

. Full disclosure of the Juror ’ s prior employment history would not have provided a val id basis for a challenge for caus e
. And Mr. Kelly has not shown that omission of the Juror ’ s prior employment history de monstrated actual bia s. M r. Kell y’s motion for new trial under Rule 33 i s denied.
B. S ufficiency of the E v idence Mr. Kell y’ s Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal fails because it i s untimely and because he is unable to show that no “ rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ” W illiam s , 836 F.3d at 6. Mr. Kelly argues there was insufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that Mr. Kelly intended to obstruct a judicial14 proceeding or had know ledge t hat the Capitol Grounds were restricted. Def. ’ s Mot. at 6

– 7. But the government presented ample evidence to support the jury ’ s verdict

. The Court will not recount the entire corpus of evidence admitted at trial. Instead, it will note only that the jury heard evidence that Mr. Kelly had been closely following alleged election fraud ; intended to come to D.C. to “stop the stea l ”; attended former President Trump ’s rally at the Ellipse; to ok photo graphs and videos of fello w rioters; personally observed tear gas, l aw enforcement perimeters , and rioters climbin g scaffolding ; entered the Capitol Building and personally observed violent proper ty destru ction within the B uilding ; breached a poli ce line; and entered the Senate Chamber, clim bed on the dais, and filmed himself stating that he was “send[ing ] a message to all the t yrants, communists, and globalists that this is our nation and not theirs

. ” Gov ’ t
Exs. 104.5, 107 , 108, 109, 306, 307, 313 , 403, 404, 405 , 406, 410, 504, 604.1 , 702, 703 , 704, 900 ; May 5, 2023 Tr. Transcript at 22

– 25, 28

– 29, 32 , 5 2

– 53

. The jury also he ard testimony from M r. Kelly ’ s father

. Mr. Kelly ’ s father acknowledged that the scene around the Capitol was “ shocking. ” May 5, 2023 Tr. Transcript at 223. The elder Mr. Kelly ultimate ly did not advance on the Capitol because of the prevalence of tear gas and the

“ cha os ” of the day ’ s events. Id. The jury was aware , of course, that the younger Mr. Kelly advanced on the Ca pitol despite the circumstan ces that deterred his father

. Th e contrast between the younger Mr. Kelly and his father could not have been lost on the jury. Ultimately, the jury was faced with evidence that Mr. Kelly pushed past lines of police officers, engaged in disruptive conduct on the Senate floor, and made various statements evincing his intent to stop the certification of President Biden as winner of the 2020 presidential election. From this , the jur y could conclu de beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Kelly knowingly intended to obstruct, i mp ede, and interfere with law enforcemen t officers and the orderly conduct of