IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs July 21, 2015

KENNETH RAY GRIFFIN v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Washington County

No. 26850 R. Jerry Beck, Judge

No. E2015-00239-CCA-R3-PC – Filed August 27, 2015

The pro se Petitioner, Kenneth Ray Griffin, appeals the Washington County Criminal 

Court’s denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the 

Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking discretionary 

review of the dismissal of his motion, this court is without jurisdiction in this case. 

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROGER A. PAGE

and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JJ., joined.

Kenneth Ray Griffin, Henning, Tennessee, pro se.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Nicholas W. Spangler, Assistant 

Attorney General; and Tony Clark, District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of 

Tennessee.

OPINION

In 1997, the Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and especially 

aggravated robbery and sentenced to life without parole plus twenty-three years. On 

direct appeal, this court affirmed his convictions and sentences. See State v. Kenneth R. 

Griffin, No. E1998-00037-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 944010, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 

6, 2000), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 20, 2001).

On June 4, 2001, the Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction 

relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily 

dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to provide verification under oath. 

This court reversed the post-conviction court’s order and remanded the case to give the 
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pro se Petitioner the opportunity to amend his petition. See Kenneth R. Griffin v. State, 

No. E2001-01932-CCA-R3-PC, 2002 WL 236697, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 19, 

2002).

Thereafter, the Petitioner filed an amended petition with the assistance of counsel, 

and the post-conviction court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing. This court 

affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief on March 5, 2014. Kenneth R. Griffin v. 

State, No. E2013-00617-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 885998 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 

2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 29, 2014).

On October 24, 2014, the Petitioner filed his first pro se motion to reopen his 

petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the 

motion on November 5, 2014, finding that the Petitioner “state[d] no reasons as to why 

his post-conviction should be re-opened.” See T. C. A. § 40-30-117 (2014) (providing 

statutory grounds for reopening a post-conviction petition). 

The Petitioner subsequently filed another pro se motion to reopen his petition for 

post-conviction relief on December 18, 2014, alleging that post-conviction counsel

omitted certain issues from the initial evidentiary hearing. On January 16, 2015, the postconviction court again entered an order summarily dismissing the Petitioner’s second 

motion. Specifically, the court found that “[t]he issues which the pro-se [P]etitioner says 

were left unresolved were addressed in the original post-conviction hearing.” The court 

also noted that the Petitioner could not use the Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1995 to 

attack post-conviction counsel and that the Petitioner failed to comply with statutory 

criteria to reopen his petition. 

On February 6, 2015, the Petitioner filed a pro se notice of appeal in the

Washington County Criminal Court.

ANALYSIS

The Petitioner appears to argue that he received ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. The State responds that the appeal should be dismissed because the 

Petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirements outlined in Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 40-30-117(c). Alternatively, the State argues that the post-conviction 

court properly denied the motion because the Petitioner failed to state a statutory basis for

reopening post-conviction proceedings. We agree that this appeal should be dismissed.

A petitioner has no appeal as of right from the post-conviction court’s denial of a

motion to reopen a post-conviction proceeding. See Charles W. Elsea, Jr. v. State, No. 

E2012-01661-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 1279178, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2013), 
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perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 10, 2013) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Timothy Roberson v. 

State, No. W2007-00230-CCA-R3-PC, 2007 WL 3286681, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 

7, 2007); Miko T. Burl v. State, No. W2005-01640-CCA-R3-PC, 2006 WL 3371395, at 

*1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 17, 2006)). Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-117(c), 

which governs appeals from the denial of a motion to reopen a post-conviction 

proceeding, provides:

If the motion is denied, the petitioner shall have thirty (30) days to file an 

application in the court of criminal appeals seeking permission to appeal. 

The application shall be accompanied by copies of all the documents filed 

by both parties in the trial court and the order denying the motion. 

T.C.A. § 40-30-117(c); see Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 10(B) (“A petitioner whose motion to 

reopen is denied shall have thirty (30) days to seek permission to appeal by filing an 

application, accompanied by the order denying the motion, in the Court of Criminal 

Appeals.”). The Tennessee Supreme Court has summarized the requirements of the 

statute, stating that it “outlines four requirements of an appeal from a motion to reopen to 

be considered: (1) the timeliness of filing, (2) the place of filing, (3) the application to be 

filed, and (4) the attachments to the application.” Graham v. State, 90 S.W.3d 687, 689 

(Tenn. 2002). In order for a pleading entitled “Notice of Appeal” to be treated as an 

application for permission to appeal, the pleading “must include the date and judgment 

from which the petitioner seeks review, the issue which the petitioner seeks to raise, and 

the reasons why the appellate court should grant review.” Id. at 691 (citing as examples 

Tenn. R. App. P. 9(d), 10(c), and 11(b)).

Here, the Petitioner’s notice of appeal cannot be treated as an application for 

permission to appeal the denial of a motion to reopen. Although the notice complies with 

the requirements that an application be filed within thirty days and that it state the date 

and judgment from which it seeks review, it does not comply with any other criteria. The 

Petitioner filed the notice in the Washington County Criminal Court instead of this court 

as required under section 40-30-117(c). Additionally, the notice did not state the issues 

for review or the reasons why the Petitioner deserved relief. Nor did the Petitioner attach 

the required documents to his notice. We therefore conclude that the Petitioner failed to 

properly seek review of the post-conviction court’s denial of the motion to reopen, and 

we lack jurisdiction to review the appeal.

CONCLUSION

Upon review, we conclude that the Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory 

requirements for seeking discretionary review of the denial of his motion to reopen his 
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post-conviction petition. Because we do not have jurisdiction to review this appeal on

the merits, it is dismissed.

_________________________________ 

CAMILLE R. McMULLEN, JUDGE