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Plaintiff currently resides at 215 N. Hyde Park Avenue,

Scranton, Pennsylvania. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RANDY GREENFIELD, :

:

Plaintiff : No. 4:CV-05-0217

:

vs. : (Complaint Filed 02/02/05)

:

: (Judge Muir)

COUNTY OF LACKAWANNA, et al., :

:

Defendants :

ORDER

July 27, 2006

I. Background 

This counseled civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 was filed on February 2, 2005, on behalf of Randy

Greenfield, an inmate formerly confined at the Lackawanna County

Prison, Scranton, Pennsylvania.1 The named defendants are

Lackawanna County and Lackawanna County Prison. 

In his complaint, Greenfield claims that defendants violated

his Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when

they failed to protect him from an assault by another prisoner

and then failed to provide adequate medical treatment. (Doc.

No. 1, complaint). Presently before the Court is defendants’

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Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim is analyzed under

the Eighth Amendment. See Faulcon v. City of Philadelphia, 18

F.Supp.2d 537, 540 (1998). Even assuming that it could also

be considered under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment the test is the same. Id. 

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motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 8). The motion is fully

briefed and is ripe for disposition. In his brief in

opposition, plaintiff surrenders his claim for inadequate

medical care. (See Doc. No. 17, p. 5). Thus, the only issue

for summary judgment is defendants' alleged failure to protect

plaintiff from assault by another inmate, in violation of the

Eighth Amendment.2 For the reasons that follow, the defendants’

motion for summary judgment will be granted.

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) requires the court to

render summary judgment " . . . forthwith if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P.

56(c). "[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of

some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat

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an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the

requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact."

Anderson vs. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)

(emphasis in original). 

A disputed fact is "material" if proof of its existence or

nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under

applicable substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Gray vs.

York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An

issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner vs. Local 514, United

Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 927 F.2d 1283,

1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).

When determining whether there is a genuine issue of

material fact, the court must view the facts and all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore vs. Tartler,

986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement vs. Consolidated Rail

Corporation, 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White vs.

Westinghouse Electric Company, 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988).

In order to avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party

may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her

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pleadings. When the party seeking summary judgment satisfies

its burden under Rule 56(c) of identifying evidence which

demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,

the nonmoving party is required by Rule 56(e) to go beyond the

pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to

interrogatories or the like in order to demonstrate specific

material facts which give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex

Corporation vs. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The party

opposing the motion "must do more than simply show that there is

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita

Electric Industrial Co. vs. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586

(1986). When Rule 56(e) shifts the burden of production to the

nonmoving party, that party must produce evidence to show the

existence of every element essential to its case which it bears

the burden of proving at trial, for "a complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323. See Harter vs. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d

Cir. 1992). 

III. Statement of Facts

From the pleadings, declarations and exhibits submitted

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therewith, the following facts can be ascertained as undisputed.

On March 23, 2004, inmate, Kenneth Michaels was committed

to the custody of the Lackawanna County Prison. (Doc. No. 19,

pp. 17 & 18, Recommitment). He was imprisoned on charges of

simple assault, aggravated assault, recklessly endangering

another, retail theft, possession with intent to use drug

paraphernalia, resisting arrest and driving under the influence

with a suspended license. Id. 

By Order dated June 28, 2004, plaintiff was committed to the

custody of the Lackawanna County Prison as a parole violator.

(Doc. No. 10, Ex. A-5, Order). Plaintiff and inmate Michaels

were both housed on DC cell block. (Doc. No. 10, Ex. D.

Deposition of Randy Greenfield at p. 11). 

On August 10, 2004, plaintiff and another inmate were

working out on DC Block. Id. at p. 14. Inmate Michaels asked

plaintiff for a match. Id. at p. 16. Plaintiff told Michaels

that he would get one for him when he was done working out. Id.

Michaels then proceeded to go into plaintiff's cell and “ripping

apart [plaintiff's] whole bed and basically just rummaging

through all of [plaintiff's] stuff, to get a match stick.” Id.

Plaintiff told him to “stop going through [his] stuff” and that

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he would get the match for him. Id. Michaels then told

plaintiff that if he didn't like it, he could “go down to his

cell to fight him.” Id. at p. 17. Plaintiff “told him no.”

Id. Plaintiff then went “back to [his] corner” to make his bed

“when [Michaels] came from behind and started hitting [him]” and

“before [he] knew it [he] was on the ground spun around” and

“knocked out basically.” Id. at pp. 16, 17. Plaintiff had been

struck in the jaw by inmate Michaels. Id. Immediately after the

incident inmate Michaels was placed in segregation in the Delta

Unit. (Doc. No. 10, Ex. C-1). 

On August 11, 2004, inmate Michaels was issued Misconduct

Report No. 0804428, for assault. (Doc. No. 10, Ex. C-1). The

misconduct specifically stated that:

Inmate Greenfield reported that he had fallen while

doing push-ups and struck his jaw. He was sent to

Mercy Hosp. for treatment and surgery for a broken jaw.

It was learned from a C.I. that Greenfield had been

struck by I/M Michaels following a brief argument over

a mattress. Michaels was placed in Delta w/o incident.

Id. Inmate Michaels' disciplinary hearing was held on August

17, 2004. (Doc. No. 10, Ex. C-5). Michaels pled guilty to the

misconduct, stating the following: 

I was sleeping. I was the block runner. Officer

Pallott (sic) called me to get a mattress for a new

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inmate. Greenfield had 2 mattresses. I asked him for

1 of the 2. Outside the cell it was ok. In the cell

his story changed. He started getting loud &

aggressive. He came at me & I defended myself. I

swung and hit him. He took the wires off his jaw

himself. He had a broken jaw when he came. I'm here 6

mos. w/o incident. He's been here 1 month with injury.

Id. As a result of Michaels' altercation with Greenfield, he

was sentenced to forty-five (45) days disciplinary confinement.

Id. Prior to his altercation with Greenfield, inmate Michaels

was not subject to any other disciplinary action while confined

at the Lackawanna County Prison. (Doc. No. 10, Ex. C-6). 

IV Discussion

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against the infliction

of cruel and unusual punishment has been interpreted to impose

upon prison officials a duty to take reasonable measures “‘to

protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other

prisoners.’” Hamilton vs. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir.

1997) (quoting Farmer vs. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)).

Although, “[i]t is not . . . every injury suffered by one

prisoner at the hands of another that translates into

constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for a

victim’s safety,” “[b]eing violently assaulted in prison is

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simply not ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for

their offenses against society.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834

(quoting Rhodes vs. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1981)). A

plaintiff, however, must prove more than that he had a fight

with another inmate, see Beard vs. Lockhart, 716 F.2d 544, 545

(8th Cir. 1983), and mere negligent conduct that leads to

serious injury of a prisoner by a prisoner does not expose a

prison official to liability under § 1983. Davidson vs. Cannon,

474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986). To succeed, a prisoner must show

that: (1) he was incarcerated under conditions posing a

substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant was “aware

of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists”; (3) the defendant

actually drew this inference; and (4) the defendant deliberately

disregarded the apparent risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-37.

In determining whether a defendant was deliberately

indifferent, the court must “focus [on] what a defendant’s

mental attitude actually was (or is), rather than what it should

have been (or should be).” Hamilton vs. Leavy, 117 F.3d at 747.

It is not an objective test for deliberate indifference; rather,

the court must look to what the prison official actually knew,

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rather than what a reasonable official in his position should

have known. “A prison official’s knowledge of a substantial risk

is a question of fact and can, of course, be proved by

circumstantial evidence.” Id. In other words, it may be

concluded that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from

the very fact that the risk was obvious. The Farmer Court

explained in hypothetical terms the type of circumstantial

evidence sufficient for a finding of actual knowledge on the

part of a prison official:

[I]f an Eighth Amendment plaintiff presents

evidence showing that a substantial risk of

inmate attacks was ‘longstanding, pervasive,

well-documented, or expressly noted by prison

officials in the past,’ and the circumstances

suggest that the defendant-official being

sued had been exposed to information

concerning the risk and thus ‘must have

known’ about it, then such evidence could be

sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find

that the defendant-official had actual

knowledge of the risk.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43.

Thus, in order to survive defendants’ summary judgment

motion, Greenfield was obligated to produce sufficient evidence

to support the inference that defendants ”’knowingly and

unreasonably disregarded an objectively intolerable risk of

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harm.’” Beers-Capitol vs. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 132 (3d Cir.

2001). It is not enough to assert that a defendant should have

recognized the risk; the evidence must be sufficient to support

the inference that “the defendant must have recognized the

excessive risk and ignored it.” Id. at 138. 

In this case, there is no question that the harm involved,

a broken jaw, was serious. The determinative issue presented in

this case is whether a material issue of fact exists as to

whether the defendants knew or must have known of the risk and

were deliberately indifferent to it. The fact that Greenfield

and Michaels were confined as inmates on the same block, and

that the altercation took place there, does not alone support an

inference of a deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of

serious harm. While the record does reveal that Michaels came to

Lackawanna County Prison with a history of violent convictions,

this is true for the majority of inmates housed in prison, and

alone does not establish that defendants were deliberately

indifferent to an excessive risk to Greenfield's health or

safety. The record is completely devoid of any evidence that,

while at the Lackawanna County Prison, Michaels demonstrated any

problem behavior or cause for concern of which defendants knew

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or were aware. Greenfield never complained to any correctional

officer or any other prison official about Michaels' behavior

prior to the date of the incident with Michaels. There is no

evidence of record that Michaels ever threatened Greenfield, or

any other inmate, prior to the August 10, 2004 altercation. 

To the extent that the plaintiff attempts to posture in his

brief in opposition that defendants' failed to properly classify

Michaels based on his “detailed history of assaultive behavior

in the County of Luzerne,” (Doc. 17, p. 4),it is undisputed that

Michaels criminal convictions were for assaultive behavior.

However, there is no evidence of record that Michaels was the

subject of any disciplinary action while incarcerated at the

Lackawanna County Prison, or any other prison. Nor is there any

evidence of record that Michaels posed a specific threat to

Greenfield. The record establishes, and Greenfield does not

dispute, that Michaels had no separations with respect to

Greenfield or any other inmate at the Lackawanna County Prison.

In fact, Michaels had been entrusted to serve as a block runner.

(Doc. No. 10, Ex. C-3). Thus, there is nothing in the record to

establish that defendants knew or were aware or had any reason

to know or be aware of any substantial risk of serious harm

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posed by Michaels. 

There is also no evidence in the record that the defendants

ever obtained any knowledge or awareness from Greenfield that

Michaels posed any substantial risk to his safety. Greenfield

admits that he had no history of problems with Michaels or any

fear of him. (Doc. 10, Ex. D, p. 21). At no time did Greenfield

ever express any concern about Michaels to any prison official,

either prior to or even during the altercation. Id. In fact,

it was not until defendants learned from a third party that

plaintiff had been involved in an altercation with Michaels.

(See Doc. 10, Ex. C-1). Greenfield admits that he did not

report to prison officials that Michaels assaulted him(Doc. No.

10, Ex. D, p. 19), and initially maintained that he fell and

broke his jaw while working out. Id. 

Thus, the record lacks sufficient evidence to establish that

defendants knew or were aware of and disregarded a substantial

risk to Greenfield's health or safety. There is no evidence in

the record which would create a material issue of fact with

regard to whether defendants had the requisite level of

knowledge or awareness necessary to impose liability under the

Eighth Amendment. There is no evidence from which it could be

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 The United States Supreme Court established in Will v.

Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989), that "a

State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983." Ordinarily,

only actual persons are subject to suit under § 1983. Id. at 71. 

Furthermore, a prison is not a person within the meaning of 

§ 1983. Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973). 

Consequently, the claims against the Lackawanna County Prison are

clearly subject to dismissal. 

Also, the only basis for liability against a local

governmental body, such as Lackawanna County, is an allegation that

an official policy or custom is responsible for a deprivation of

rights protected by the Constitution. Monell v. Department of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Roman v. Jeffes, 904

F.2d 192 (3d Cir. 1990). In Monell, the Supreme Court added that

liability may not be premised on a theory of respondeat superior, rather, only on a claim that the governmental unit itself supported

the alleged constitutional violation.

"Policy is made when a 'decisionmaker possess[ing] final

authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action'

issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict." Andrews v.

City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292,

1299, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)). Custom, on the other hand, can be

proven by showing that a given course of conduct, although not

specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and

permanent as virtually to constitute law. Andrews, 895 F.2d at

1480; see also Fletcher v. O'Donnell, 867 F.2d 791, 793-94 (3d

Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919 (1989) ("Custom may be

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inferred that Michaels posed a risk of harm to Greenfield. Nor

is there evidence of a pervasive, long-standing problem of

assaults by inmate Michaels at the Lackawanna County Prison.

Accordingly, summary judgment is warranted in favor of

defendants.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants

Lackawanna County and Lackawanna County Prison(Doc. No.

8)is GRANTED.3

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established by proof of knowledge and acquiescence."). We are

unable to discern any evidence of a policy, custom or practice of

Lackawanna County which would subject it to liability. 

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2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter

judgment in this case in favor of defendants

and against plaintiff. 

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this

case. 

4. Any appeal taken from this order will be

deemed frivolous, without probable cause, and

not taken in good faith.

s/Malcolm Muir 

MUIR

United States District Judge

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