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The Honorable Carol E. Jackson, United States District Judge

for the Eastern District of Missouri.

___________

No. 94-3665

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Larry Brown, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: September 12, 1995

 Filed: January 30, 1996 ___________

Before FAGG, Circuit Judge, and FLOYD R. GIBSON and HENLEY, Senior

Circuit Judges.

___________

HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

Larry Brown appeals from a 57-month sentence imposed by the

district court1 following his guilty plea to possession of an

incendiary device, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. We affirm. 

During a meeting between Brown, a union business agent, and

Keith Milton, a union member, regarding Milton's dissatisfaction

with the union's handling of a grievance, the two came to blows.

The union suspended Brown after Milton filed a complaint against

him. A few days later, on August 13, 1993, Brown sought the

assistance of Martin Dames, an acquaintance who was also an FBI

undercover informant, in injuring Milton and his property. On

August 17, Brown introduced Dames to Donald Vaughn, who was on
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parole for murder.

On August 26, the trio met and Vaughn suggested putting a

wired spark plug in the gas tank of Milton's car, which would cause

the car to explode when it was started, a feat Vaughn said he had

successfully performed in the past. During the course of several

meetings, Brown and Vaughn discussed various ways of harming Milton

and his property. They also made several attempts to locate Milton

and his house. In September, Department of Labor agents questioned

Brown as to whether he was stalking Milton and told him he would be

a suspect if Milton were hurt. Brown told Dames about this

conversation and said he had to be careful. In May 1994, Brown was

charged with conspiracy to possess an incendiary device. 

The presentence report (PSR) calculated a total offense level

of 23, a criminal history category of I, and a Guidelines range of

46 to 57 months. Brown filed objections to the PSR, contending,

inter alia, that he was entitled to a three-level reduction under

U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)(2) because he had not completed the acts

necessary for the successful completion of the substantive offense.

In relevant part, Section 2X1.1(b)(2) provides for a three-level

reduction in conspiracy cases, "unless the defendant or a coconspirator completed all the acts the conspirators believed

necessary on their part for the successful completion of the

substantive offense."

At sentencing, Brown again claimed he was entitled to the

reduction, attempting to characterize the substantive offense as

arson or murder. Terry Coff, an FBI agent who investigated the

case, testified that the conspirators had met seven times and

during these meetings the plans regarding harming Milton "changed

a few times," but at the last meeting Brown insisted that "we're

still going to burn his house and blow up his car."

The court overruled Brown's objection. The court stated that
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the focus of the guideline was on the substantive offense and what

a defendant thought was necessary on his part for successful

completion of the offense. The court indicated that had the

substantive offense been arson or murder, as Brown had suggested,

a reduction might have been warranted. However, the court found

that the substantive offense was possession of an incendiary device

and that by hiring somebody "who could do the job" Brown did "what

he thought was necessary to successfully complete the act." 

On appeal, Brown first suggests that the district court erred

as a matter of law in applying 2X1.1(b)(2) by failing to

distinguish between the conspiracy and the substantive offense.

See United States v. Rothman, 914 F.2d 708, 710-11 (5th Cir. 1990)

("offense" in § 2X1.1(b)(2) refers to "underlying offense and not

the conspiracy"). However, he reluctantly admits that the court

did distinguish between the conspiracy and the substantive offense.

In fact, as the government points out, the district court was

careful to note that the substantive offense was possession of an

incendiary device, and not arson or murder, as Brown had suggested.

See United States v. Westerman, 973 F.2d 1422, 1428 (8th Cir. 1992)

(court erred in applying 2X1.1(b)(2) by treating arson rather than

mail fraud as substantive offense).

In the alternative, Brown argues that, as a matter of fact,

the denial of the reduction was clearly erroneous because the

conspirators did not possess the incendiary device. The government

responds that a reduction was not warranted because a spark plug

and wire were easily obtainable and, as the district court found,

by hiring Vaughn who "could do the job," Brown did all he believed

was necessary for completion of the offense. We agree. As the

government notes, whether a reduction under Section 2X1.1 is

warranted is a fact-specific inquiry, and courts have upheld the

denial of a reduction even though a defendant had not reached the

"last step" before completion of the substantive offense. For

example, in an analogous situation, in United States v. Barton, 32
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F.3d 61, 64 (4th Cir. 1994), a defendant pleaded guilty to

attempted money laundering. Section 2X1.1(b)(1) provides a threelevel reduction for an attempt, "unless the defendant completes all

the acts [he] believed necessary for successful completion of the

substantive offense." The court rejected the defendant's argument

that a reduction was warranted because his money laundering

"schemes were patently ridiculous . . . not one of [them] could

ever have led to the successful completion of a money laundering

transaction." Id. "Despite [the defendant's] protestations of

naivete and ineptitude," the court upheld the denial of the

reduction because defendant had accepted a suitcase containing

money, which was "the first step or initiation of his planned

delivery of what he believed was drug money to his associate[,]" 

who had given assurances that she could launder money. Id. 

Brown also argues that the district court erred in restricting

his cross-examination of Coff and thereby prevented him from

proving that he had abandoned the spark plug conspiracy and had

moved on to other conspiracies. We find no error. In fact, the

court allowed cross-examination about the various plans to harm

Milton, but noted the discussion of other plans was irrelevant to

the conspiracy to which Brown had pleaded guilty - possession of an

incendiary device. Moreover, we note that after Brown's crossexamination, on redirect, Coff stated that even though other plans

had been discussed at the last meeting Brown still insisted on

"burn[ing] [Milton's] house and blow[ing] up his car." 

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
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A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.