1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

THOMAS TUCKER, and : Case No. 4:16-cv-0071

LALONIE1TUCKER, as husband :

and wife, :

: Judge Brann

Plaintiffs, :

:

v. :

 :

CODY HORN, and :

COLBURN TRANSPORTATION, :

 :

Defendants, and Third :

Party Plaintiffs :

 :

:

v. :

 :

MOSS TRUCK REPAIR, LLC :

a/k/a MTR MOSS TRUCK REPAIR2, :

 :

Third Party Defendants. :

 :

MEMORANDUM

September 7, 2016

 

1 Plaintiffs’ filed an amended complaint on February 3, 2016. The amended complaint corrected

the spelling of Plaintiff, Lalonie Tucker’s first name from Lilonie to Lalonie. The clerk will be 

directed to update the docket caption accordingly. 

2 Third Party Defendant, Moss Truck Repair, LLC a/k/a MTR Moss Truck Repair is listed on the 

docket caption three times – twice as a third party defendant and once as a third party plaintiff. It 

should be listed in the caption only once as a third party defendant. The clerk will be directed to 

update the docket caption accordingly. 

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I. BACKGROUND

On January 14, 2016, Plaintiff spouses Thomas and Lalonie Tucker filed a 

complaint3against Defendants Cody Horn, a tractor-trailer driver, and his 

employer, Colburn Transportation. Plaintiffs amended their complaint on February 

3, 2016,

4

and Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint on March 8, 

2016.5 

The matter is fully briefed, and the parties have come to several stipulations as 

to the amended complaint and the motion. Specifically, the parties have stipulated 

that all claims of independent negligence against Colburn Transportation are 

dismissed without prejudice, such that if Cody Horn is found liable for negligence, 

then Colburn Transportation will be vicariously liable for said negligence.6 As a 

result of this stipulation, the motion to dismiss was partially withdrawn by 

Defendants.7 Accordingly, the only remaining issue for the Court’s disposition 

today is whether to dismiss the demand for punitive damages. 

 

3 ECF No. 1.

4 ECF No. 6. 

5 ECF No. 7. In addition, the Defendants filed a third-party complaint against Moss Truck 

Repair, LLC a/k/a MTR Moss Truck Repair on March 10, 2016, ECF No. 8. However, the thirdparty defendant has no involvement with the instant motion to dismiss. 

6 ECF No. 12. 

7 ECF Nos. 13 and 14. 

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This Court has consistently held that it is premature to dismiss demands 

punitive damages prior to discovery;

8

the motion to dismiss will therefore be 

denied. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may file a motion 

to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Such a 

motion “tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading” and “streamlines litigation by 

dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding.”9“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a 

court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.”10 This is true of 

any claim, “without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or 

on a close but ultimately unavailing one.”11

Beginning in 2007, the Supreme Court of the United States initiated what some 

scholars have termed the Roberts Court’s “civil procedure revival” by significantly 

tightening the standard that district courts must apply to 12(b)(6) motions.12 In two 

landmark decisions, Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

the Roberts Court “changed . . . the pleading landscape” by “signal[ing] to lower-

 

8

See, e.g., Cobb v. Nye, 2014 WL 7067578 (M.D. Pa. December 12, 2014) (Brann, J.). 

9

 In re Hydrogen Peroxide Litigation, 552 F.3d 305, 316 n.15 (3d Cir. 2008) (Scirica, C.J.) 

(quoting Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, 

J.)). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1989).

10

 Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326 (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69, 73 (1984)).

11

 Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

12

 Howard M. Wasserman, THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIVAL, 31 Rev. 

Litig. 313 (2012).

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court judges that the stricter approach some had been taking was appropriate under 

the Federal Rules.”13 More specifically, the Court in these two decisions “retired” 

the lenient “no-set-of-facts test” set forth in Conley v. Gibson and replaced it with a 

more exacting “plausibility” standard.14

Accordingly, after Twombly and Iqbal, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.’”15 “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”16 “Although the 

plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a 

pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.”17 Moreover, “[a]sking for plausible grounds . . . calls for enough facts 

to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of 

[wrongdoing].”18

The plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the 

 

13

 550 U.S. 544 (2007); 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Wasserman, supra at 319–20.

14

 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 670 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)) (“[a]cknowledging that 

Twombly retired the Conley no-set-of-facts test”).

15

 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

16

 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

17

 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., No. 14-3792, 2016 WL 106159, at *3 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 2016) 

(Jordan, J.) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

18

 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

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reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”19 No matter 

the context, however, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent 

with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and 

plausibility of entitlement to relief.’”20

When disposing of a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept as true all factual 

allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences from the facts alleged in the 

light most favorable to [the plaintiff].”21 However, “the tenet that a court must 

accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to 

legal conclusions.”22 “After Iqbal, it is clear that conclusory or ‘bare-bones’ 

allegations will no longer survive a motion to dismiss.”23 “Threadbare recitals of 

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice.”24

As a matter of procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 

Circuit has instructed that:

Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a 

court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three 

steps. First, it must tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must 

 

19

 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

20

 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotations omitted)).

21

 Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008) (Nygaard, J.).

22

 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations omitted).

23

 Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (Nygaard, J.).

24

 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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plead to state a claim. Second, it should identify allegations that, 

because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the 

assumption of truth. Finally, [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual 

allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then 

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to 

relief.25

III. DISCUSSION

Taking the facts alleged in the amended complaint as true, as I am 

compelled to do in considering a motion to dismiss, the story that unfolds is as 

follows: 

Plaintiff Thomas Tucker, hereinafter “Mr. Tucker,” is a tractor-trailer driver 

who resides in Northumberland, Pennsylvania, with his wife, Plaintiff Lalonie 

Tucker, hereinafter, collectively, “the Tuckers.” At approximately 8:13 p.m. on 

March 10, 2014, Mr. Tucker was driving a tractor-trailer west on Interstate-80 in 

Nescopeck Township, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. Defendant Cody Horn, 

hereinafter “Horn,” was operating a tractor-trailer in the course and scope of his 

employment with Defendant Colburn Transportation, hereinafter “Colburn.” Horn

was driving in the east bound lane of Interstate-80, when a tire came loose from his 

tractor-trailer and rolled across the center median into Mr. Tucker’s lane of travel. 

Mr. Tucker’s truck collided with the tire, travelled down an embankment and 

 

25

 Connelly, 2016 WL 106159, at *4 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

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rolled onto its side. As a result of the accident, Mr. Tucker suffered multiple left 

rib fractures, left flank contusion, and multiple abrasions. 

The Tuckers assert claims of negligence against Horn, for which, if proven,

Colburn will be vicariously liable. The Tuckers also assert a loss of consortium 

claim. 

The instant motion is to dismiss concerns a demand for punitive damages. In 

the amended complaint, the Tuckers allege both outrageousness and recklessness, 

two of the elements that support a claim for punitive damages.

Defendants argue that all demands for punitive damages must be dismissed 

because Plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence to support these particular

claims. Rather, Defendants contend, the Tuckers only plead facts supporting a 

claim for negligence. The Tuckers respond that they have alleged actions on the 

part of Defendants which constitute both outrageous and reckless conduct. 

Under Pennsylvania law, punitive damages are only available to compensate 

“for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his 

reckless indifference to the rights of others.”26 Fundamentally, punitive damages 

are penal in nature; the objective is to punish a tortfeasor for his outrageous 

conduct and to deter him from similar conduct in the future.27 Accordingly, a 

 

26 Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 770 (Pa. 2005) (citing Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 747 

(Pa. 1984)). 

27 See id.; see also SHV Coal, Inc. v. Continental Grain Co., 587 A.2d 702, 704 (Pa. 1991). 

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punitive damages claim must be supported by sufficient evidence to establish: (1) 

that the defendant had a subjective appreciation of the risk of harm to which the 

plaintiff was exposed; and (2) that he acted or failed to act in conscious disregard 

of that risk.28

“Although ordinary negligence will not support an award of punitive 

damages, ‘punitive damages are appropriate for torts sounding in negligence when 

the conduct goes beyond mere negligence and into the realm of behavior which is 

willful, malicious, or so careless as to indicate wanton disregard for the rights of 

the parties injured.’”29 In making this determination, the state of mind of the actor 

is a vital consideration.30 Moreover, there is no general proscription against 

pursuing damages in connection with a claim of negligent supervision, if the facts 

so warrant.31

Here, the Tuckers have pled that the Defendants acted in an outrageous and 

reckless manner, and that they acted without due regard for the safety of Mr. 

Tucker. These allegations, if proven, may support a claim for punitive damages, 

even though Plaintiffs’ amended complaint sounds primarily in negligence. 

Discovery is necessary to make the determination of whether Defendants’ actions 

 

28 See Feld, 485 A.2d at 1097-98.

29 Young v. Westfall, No. 4:06-CV-2325, 2007 WL 675182, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Mar. 1, 2007) 

(McClure, J.) (citing Hutchison, 870 A.2d at 770). 

30 Id. 

31 See Hutchison, 870 A.2d at 773.

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were merely negligent or whether they were outrageous and reckless. 

Consequently, dismissal at this juncture in the litigation is premature. 

Unsurprisingly, other district courts in this Circuit have come to similar 

conclusions on this issue.32 

Because Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages rests on allegations of 

outrageous and reckless conduct, and it would be premature to dismiss the demand 

prior to discovery, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the punitive damages demand in 

Plaintiffs’ amended complaint will be denied. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) will 

be denied. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

United States District Judge

 

32 See Young, 2007 WL 675182 at *2-3 (denying motion to dismiss punitive damages in 

negligence accident involving a tractor-trailer); see also Ferranti v. Martin, No. 3:06cv1694, 

2007 WL 111272, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Jan. 19, 2007) (Munley, J.) (finding, in a claim relating to a 

tractor-trailer accident, that the plaintiff had pled sufficient allegations to require discovery).

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