This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. No. 34,693 4 MARC BARRAZA, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Christina P. Argyres, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 Steven H. Johnston, Assistant Attorney General 11 Albuquerque, NM 12 for Appellee 13 Mark A. Keller Law Office 14 Terri Keller 15 Albuquerque, NM 16 for Appellant 17 MEMORANDUM OPINION 18 VARGAS, Judge. 192 {1} This appeal requires us to consider th e enforceability of a plea agreement based 1 on Defendant’s admission to and successful completion of a drug court program when 2 Defendant was terminated from the program. Italso asks us to consider whether the 3 district court judge erred in refusing to recuse herself after she signed the order 4 terminating Defendant from the program. Findi ng no error in the district court judge’s 5 denial of Defendant’s motion to enforce the plea agreement and recusal motion, we 6 affirm. 7 I. BACKGROUND 8 {2} Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded no contest to one count of 9 aggravated battery against a household memb er resulting in great bodily harm and one 10 count of aggravated battery against a hous ehold member with a deadly weapon, both 11 in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30- 3-16 (2008). The plea agreement contained 12 a conditional sentencing agreement requiri ng Defendant to submit to a drug court 13 screening. If he was accepted to the drug court program and successfully completed 14 it, the State agreed to a suspended senten ce with two years of supervised probation. 15 If Defendant submitted to the screening but was “den ied acceptance into the program 16 for any reason except his willingness to take part in it,” he must “request a status 17 hearing on these matters within thirty days of his rejection” from the drug court 18 program. If Defendant failed to submit to th e screening, did not successfully complete 193 the drug court program, was rejected becausehe was unwilling to participate, or was 1 rejected for another reason but did not reque st a status conference within thirty days 2 of his rejection, his sentence was subject to an habitual enhancement on each charge 3 and consecutive sentences, exposing him to a minimum of two years incarceration. 4 The district court postponed sentencing pending the outcome of Defendant’s drug 5 court screening and continue d Defendant’s conditions of release, which prohibited 6 Defendant, from among other things, committing any new crimes. 7 {3} One month later, Defendant was again charged with domestic violence against 8 the same household member as a result of a new incident (the August charge), in 9 violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-12 (1995). The State filed an emergency 10 motion to review conditions of release. In its motion, the State requested that the court 11 order that Defendant have no contact withthe victim household member. The State 12 also asserted that the new charge constitute d a violation of his conditions of release 13 “because one of . . . Defendant’s conditions of release is to not commit any new 14 crimes.” The State argued that the district court “may also need to consider whether 15 this new alleged incident ne gates the sentencing agreemen t in the plea and disposition 16 agreement[.]” 17 {4} The district court held a hearing on the motion. At the hearing, the parties 18 focused on the dates and nature of Defendant’s contact with the victim. The State 194 argued that “the plea agreement clearly states that any new violations of the law would 1 negate [the] agreement, and picking up a new charge . . . is violation of the law.” The 2 State acknowledged that nothing in Defendant’s conditions of release prohibited him 3 from having contact with the victim, but ar gued that the additional charge constituted 4 a violation of his conditions of release. De fense counsel responded that, as of the date 5 of the hearing, Defendant was still invol ved in the drug court program and had not 6 been found guilty of the August charge. A drug court officer testified that Defendant 7 had been doing well in the program, but that if he had additional conditions of release, 8 he would have to follow them. She stated, “We can keep him in [d]rug [c]ourt, but he 9 cannot violate.” The State requested that De fendant be sentenced to incarceration for 10 a period of time. The district court re manded Defendant into custody, and set 11 sentencing for October 2014. 12 {5} Several days after remandi ng Defendant into custody, the district court issued 13 an order finding that “Defendant has been UNSUCCESSFULLY terminated from the 14 [d]rug [c]ourt [p]rogram[,]” after havi ng received notice from drug court personnel 15 of Defendant’s termination from the progr am. The district court again postponed 16 Defendant’s sentencing pending resolution of the August charge. At trial, a jury 17 acquitted Defendant of the August charge. Following his ac quittal, Defendant filed a 18 motion to enforce the plea agreement. In his motion, Defendant argued that he was not 195 rejected from the drug court program, that the district court had actually terminated 1 him upon learning of the August charge; and, termination and rej ection have different 2 meanings in the context of drug court involvement. Defendant argued that, because 3 he was not rejected from the program, he re mained entitled to the benefits of the plea 4 agreement. 5 {6} Defendant also filed a moti on requesting that the district court judge in the case 6 recuse herself. Defendant asserted that the judge was influenced by representations 7 made by the State and recitations given by the victim that were irrelevant to an 8 interpretation of the contractual language contained in the plea agreement. Defendant 9 also contended that the report of his termination from the drug court program and 10 subsequent order noting that he was “UNSUCCESSFULLY terminated,” which was 11 signed by the district court judge, was improper. As support for this assertion, 12 Defendant pointed to e-mail messages from a drug court officer, in which the officer 13 stated that she had spoken to the judge and informed the judge that Defendant was 14 “clearly not appropriate” for the program, that he was “at too high of a risk to 15 violently reoffend,” and that he would not be allowed back into the program. 16 {7} The district court held a hearing on the motions to recuse and to enforce the 17 plea in February 2015. In response to Defe ndant’s request for recusal, the district 18 court clarified that although the judge had signed the order terminating Defendant 196 from the drug court program, she was coveri ng for another judge at the time, and it 1 was drug court officials who made the decision to terminate. Further, the district court 2 judge explained that she harbored no ill- will towards Defendant, she was involved 3 with the program only to cover for another judge on staffing matters, and that she had 4 approached the drug court officials toascertain whether Defendant could be 5 reconsidered for the program . There was also testimony fro m a drug court officer that 6 the district court judge had nothing to do with the deci sion that Defendant was “not 7 an appropriate candidate” for the drug court program. According to the officer, the 8 district court judge’s only involvement in Defendant’s termination was her signing the 9 order of termination. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to recuse. 10 {8} The district court next turned to Defendant’s motion to enforce the plea 11 agreement. Defendant again submitted to the court that “termination” and “rejection,” 12 considered in the context of the drug court program, had different meanings, and that 13 because he had been acquitted of the August charge, there had been no violation of the 14 law. The district court declined the parties’ invitation to argue over semantics by 15 stating that, while rejected and terminatedcould have different meanings, rejected 16 “also means to discard unsatisfactorily” and that seems to be just what had happened 17 to Defendant. The district court postpone d addressing sentencing matters until it had 18 reviewed a transcript of the change of pl ea hearing, intending to review just what 197 Defendant could have understood as far as any distinction between the term “reject” 1 versus “terminate.” 2 {9} At sentencing, and in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, the State 3 filed a supplemental information the day of the hearing, seeking to enhance 4 Defendant’s sentence pursuant to NMSA1978, Section 31-18-17(D) (2003). The 5 district court considered Defendant’s understanding of the plea agreement at the time 6 he entered his no contest plea. The distri ct court opined that the term “rejection” 7 meant never being allowed into the program , while “termination” meant being thrown 8 out of or not allowed to continue the program. The court summarized its position by 9 stating that Defendant “was accepted into[d]rug [c]ourt, he did not successfully 10 complete [d]rug [c]ourt, and by the terms of [the plea] agreement that he entered into 11 on that date, we would come back here for sentencing.” After receiving clarification 12 from the drug court officer that Defendantwas terminated from the program because 13 of his continued criminal behavior and Adderall addiction, the district court moved 14 on to sentencing. The State asked that Defe ndant be sentenced to eight years. The 15 district court sentenced Defendant to eight years, two of which were suspended, plus 16 an eight-month credit for time served. Defendant appealed. 17 II. DISCUSSION 188 {10} On appeal, Defendant asserts error in th e denial of his motion to enforce the 1 plea agreement and the denial of his moti on for recusal. Regardi ng the denial of his 2 motion to enforce the plea agreement, De fendant makes three assertions. First, 3 Defendant insists that the language of the plea agreement gave rise to a reasonable 4 understanding that without committing a violation of any kind, hewould be kept in 5 the drug court program. Second, Defendant ar gues that, because he did not violate any 6 conditions of the plea agreement, the drug court, or the district court, his termination 7 from drug court was improper. Finally, Defendant contends that his termination from 8 the drug court program violated his due process rights. 9 {11} Defendant repeatedly contends that hewas acquitted of the August charge and 10 that, therefore, there was no violation of law to support the district court’s refusal to 11 enforce the plea agreement. Becau se we conclude that the district court’s refusal to 12 enforce the agreement was ba sed on Defendant’s failure to complete the drug court 13 program, we need not address his acquittal of the August charge. 14 A. Standard of Review 15 {12} The terms of a plea agreement “must beinterpreted, unders tood, and approved 16 by the [district] court.” State v. Mares , 1994-NMSC-123, ¶ 12, 119 N.M. 48, 888 P.2d 17 930. Appellate courts reviewthe unambiguous terms of a plea agreement “according 18 to what [a d]efendant reasonably understood when he entered the plea.” State v. 199 Miller , 2013-NMSC-048, ¶ 9, 314 P.3d 655 (internal quotation marks and citation 1 omitted). We have said that “[a] plea agreement is a unique form of contract whose 2 terms must be interpreted, understood, and approved by the district court.” State v. 3 Gomez , 2011-NMCA-120, ¶ 9, 267 P.3d 831. Thus , if the language in the written 4 agreement is ambiguous, it is the district c ourt’s task to resolve that ambiguity with 5 the parties. Id. If the court resolved the ambiguity , the agreement can no longer be said 6 to be ambiguous as to that point. Id. On the other hand, if the district court failed to 7 resolve the ambiguity and there is no pres entation of extrinsic evidence that would 8 resolve it, then we “may rely on the rule s of construction, construing any ambiguity 9 in favor of the defendant. U nder such circumstances, we re view the terms of the plea 10 agreement de novo.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 11 1. Defendant Did Not Successfully Co mplete the Drug Court Program 12 {13} The plea agreement in this case sets forth that if Defendant “gets accepted and 13 successfully completes drug court,” the State agrees to a suspended sentence and two 14 years of supervised probation for Defe ndant. If Defendant attempts to become 15 involved in the program, but is unable to do so because he “is denied acceptance into 16 the program for any reason except his willingne ss to take part init,” he was entitled 17 to “request a status hearing on these matters within thirty (30) days of his rejection 18 from [d]rug [c]ourt” and may still be eligib le to reap the benefits of the plea 1910 agreement. The plea ag reement states, however, that “there will be no agreements on 1 the underlying sentence” if Defendant “ does not successfully complete drug court or 2 is rejected because he is not willing to take part in the program at the screening, or he 3 is rejected for another reason but does not request a status conference within thirty 4 (30) days of his rejection from drug court[ .]” (Emphasis added.) As written, there is 5 no ambiguity as to the circumstances that subject Defendant to a minimum of two 6 years, and a maximum of ei ght years, incarceration. 7 {14} Defendant argued to the district court th at termination and rejection are not the 8 same in the context of drug court. On appeal, Defendant contends that because the 9 drug court terminated him after originally accepting him and then reconsidering its 10 original decision, that termination “should have been considered a ‘rejection’ beyond 11 Defendant’s control and Defe ndant should have been allo wed to enter into another 12 program as contemplated by . . . the langua ge of the plea.” The sentencing agreement 13 is silent as to what would happen in th e event Defendant was rejected from the drug 14 court program and requested a status conference hearing within th irty days. The plea 15 agreement contains no language that give s Defendant the rightto enter another 16 program; and, even if it did, Defendant failed to request a hearing within thirty days, 17 as required by the agreement. Thus, even if Defendant’s interpretation of the plea 1811 agreement is correct, he failed to comply with the requirements that would trigger 1 those rights under the plea agreement. 2 {15} The plea agreement states that ther e are no agreements on the underlying 3 sentence if Defendant “does not successfullycomplete drug court[.]” The State made 4 it clear during the change of plea hearing that , “if [Defendant] gets into [d]rug [c]ourt 5 but does not complete it, then . . . th e State will impose habitual offender on each 6 charge and [Defendant] will be subject toa minimum of two years and maximum of 7 eight years of incarceration.” Indeed, the district court pointed out the clarity of the 8 plea agreement’s language during the sentencing hearing in March: 9 I’m not getting into an argument whether rejection versus termination is 10 part of this agreement. . . . So I’mnot going to get into this back-and11 forth again, rejection versus termin ation versus nonaccepted versus being 12 thrown out. He was accepted into [d]rug [c]ourt, he did not successfully 13 complete [d]rug [c]ourt, and by the terms of this agreement that he 14 entered into on that date, wewould come back here for 15 sentencing. . . . [T]here was no indication that [Defendant] did not 16 understand what would happen if he did not successfully complete [d]rug 17 [c]ourt. 18 The language of the plea agreement is both clear and unambiguous; if Defendant, for 19 any reason, failed to complete the progr am, he would lose the benefit of the 20 sentencing agreement. Defendant did not co mplete the drug court program. Therefore, 21 under the terms of the plea agreement, hewas not entitled to enforcement of the 2212 sentencing agreement in the pl ea agreement. It was not erro r for the district court to 1 deny Defendant’s motion to enforce the terms of the plea agreement. 2 B. Violation of Defendant’s Right to Due Process 3 {16} Defendant argues that becau se he did not violate any condition in the plea 4 agreement, any condition of the drug court, or any condition of the district court, that 5 his termination from the drug court progr am violated his due process rights. 6 Defendant states that “[i]t is a denial of due process to allow . . . Defendant to be 7 accepted into the [drug c]ourt [p]rogram but then later after acceptance and while 8 Defendant is in compliance w ith all conditions, for [d]rug [c]ourt to reconsider their 9 original decision and terminate him[.]” 10 {17} In support of his claim that defendants have a due process right to contest 11 termination from a court program, Defendant cites State v. Lucero , 2007-NMCA-127, 12 142 N.M. 620, 168 P.3d 750. The defendant in Lucero twice violated a no contact 13 order and was terminated from a domestic violence intervention program. He asserted 14 on appeal that due process entitled him to a hearing akin to a probation revocation 15 hearing before termination from the progr am. We held that notice and hearing 16 procedures required in probation revocation proceedings do not necessarily apply to 17 a termination from a voluntary, post-adjudication program offered prior to sentencing, 18 but we did not analyze whether due proce ss protections applied to someone in the 1913 defendant’s position because the defendant had not preserved the issue for appellate 1 review. Id. ¶ 26. 2 {18} Despite his reliance on Lucero , it does not support Defe ndant’s assertion that 3 “[a] defendant has a due pro cess right to contest his termination from the [drug court] 4 program,” which includes a hearing similar to that of a probation revocation hearing. 5 We agree with Defendant that probation revo cation hearings are intended to afford a 6 defendant “minimum due process rights to en sure that [the defendant] is heard and 7 that the facts underlying the alleged probation violation are evaluated.” State v. Leon , 8 2013-NMCA-011, ¶ 17, 292 P.3d 493 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 9 As we noted, but did not decide in Lucero , the notice and hearing requirements prior 10 to probation revocation may not apply to termination from a voluntary post11 adjudication program, such as drug c ourt. 2007-NMCA-127, ¶¶ 21, 26. However, 12 even if they did, those requirements were satisfied in this case. Prior to sentencing, 13 Defendant had two separate hearings at which he had the opportunity to introduce 14 evidence and testimony setting out his version of events leading up to his termination. 15 He had an opportunity to provide the districtcourt with details of his compliance with 16 the program up to that point, as well as the suitability of his participation in the 17 program. He had an opportunity to litigate th e propriety of his termination from the 18 program before a determination was made by the metropolitan court on the August 1914 charge. The record indicates that an offi cer from the drug court program was present 1 and testified at each of Defendant’s hearings, allowing Defendant to confront the 2 witnesses against him. See Lucero , 2007-NMCA-127, ¶¶ 24-25. 3 {19} At the hearing on Defendant’s motion to enforce the plea and to recuse the 4 judge, the drug court supervisor appeared and advised the district court that Defendant 5 had been terminated from drug court for three reasons: (1) he had not had recent 6 substance abuse issues; (2) he had an Adderall addiction, which the drug court could 7 not monitor; and (3) he picked up a new charge and exhibited violent behavior against 8 the same victim. For these reasons, the drug court concluded th at Defendant was not 9 an appropriate candidate for the program. Defense counsel took the opportunity given 10 by the district court to question the drug court supervisor. Additionally, during a 11 hearing on August 21, 2014—before De fendant was terminated from the 12 program—the victim gave a statement in ope n court about the events resulting in the 13 August charge with the State, defense counsel, and Defendant present. Defense 14 counsel did not make any argument in respons e to the victim’s statements, nor did she 15 pose any questions for the victim to answer. 16 {20} We therefore disagree with Defendant’s assertion that he was denied due 17 process on his drug court termin ation. The district court considered the testimony and 18 evidence offered by both Defendant and the State in three separate hearings—one 1915 prior to termination and tw o following termination, but prior to sentencing—before 1 rejecting Defendant’s motion to enfo rce the plea agreement and sentencing 2 Defendant. We conclude thatDefendant was afforded ample opportunity to be heard 3 and to challenge the evidence against him. Moreover, Defendant did not request any 4 additional process during any heari ngs before the district court, see id. ¶¶ 23, 26, and 5 failed to avail himself of his right to request a status hearing within thirty days of 6 being terminated from the drug court program where, Defendant contends, he “should 7 have been allowed to enter into another program as contemplated by the parties[.]” 8 Defendant provides us with no statutory or common law authority that imposes an 9 additional obligation upon the State or the di strict court to afford Defendant yet 10 another hearing to address his termination from the drug court program. State v. Vigil11 Giron , 2014-NMCA-069, ¶ 60, 327 P. 3d 1129 (stating the rule that appellate courts 12 will not consider an issue if no authority is cited in support of the issue and that, when 13 given no cited authority, we a ssume no such authority exists). We therefore conclude 14 that Defendant’s due process rights were not violated wh en he was terminated from 15 the drug court program. He was given more than one hearing between his termination 16 and his sentencing, and he did not avail himself of another hearing. 17 C. Recusal 1816 {21} We now turn to Defendant’s argument th at the district court judge should have 1 recused herself from the case. We review the district court’s decision on a motion to 2 recuse for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ruiz , 2007-NMCA-014, ¶ 13, 141 N.M. 53, 3 150 P.3d 1003. A judge must exercise his or her judicial function “[e]xcept in those 4 cases where a judge’s impartiality might be reasonably questioned[.]” State v. 5 Cherryhomes , 1992-NMCA-111, ¶ 21, 114 N.M. 495, 840 P.2d 1261 (internal 6 quotation marks and citation omitte d). “In order to require recu sal, bias must be of a 7 personal nature against the party seeking recusal. Personal bias cannot be inferred 8 from an adverse ruling or th e enforcement of the rules of criminal procedure.” State 9 v. Hernandez , 1993-NMSC-007, ¶ 44, 115 N.M. 6, 846 P.2d 312 (citation omitted). 10 Such bias must “stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the 11 merits on some basis other than what the j udge learned from his participation in the 12 case.” Ruiz , 2007-NMCA-014, ¶ 15 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 13 Rule 5-106(H) NMRA prohibits judges fro m sitting on a case where their impartiality 14 may reasonably be questione d under the Constitution of Ne w Mexico or the Code of 15 Judicial Conduct. The Code of Judicial C onduct requires a judge to disqualify himself 16 or herself where the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Rule 21- 17 211(A) NMRA; see also Rule 21-100 NMRA (stating that a judge shall “promote the 1817 independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and shall avoid impropriety 1 and the appearance of impropriety”); Rule 21-102 NMRA (same). 2 {22} Defendant asserts that our Supreme Court’s reliance in Miller , 2013-NMSC3 048, ¶ 29, on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Santobello v. New York , 4 404 U.S. 257 (1971), supports the proposition th at a case remanded for enforcement 5 of plea terms requires a different sentencing judge. We disagree. In Santobello , the 6 United States Supreme Court remanded a case b ack to a state court to decide whether 7 it was more appropriate to award specifi c performance of the plea agreement through 8 a new sentencing judge or to allow the de fendant to withdraw his plea altogether. Id. 9 at 262-63. The Court took time to emphasize, however, that it meant “in no sense to 10 question the fairness of the sentencing judge.” Id. at 263. We are therefore 11 unpersuaded by Defendant ’s suggestion that Miller , which does not address recusal 12 or judicial bias at all, but deals withinterpretation of a plea agreement’s terms, 13 requires recusal of the original sentenci ng judge where a defendant requests specific 14 performance of a plea agreement. 15 {23} Defendant also suggests that, because th e district court judge signed the order 16 terminating Defendant from drug court, sh e “had discussions with [d]rug [c]ourt 17 outside the presence of Defendant” that mandate recusal. Weremain unpersuaded. 18 During the February hearing, the district court judge explained away any appearance 1918 of impropriety through her own explanations and the testimony of a drug court officer. 1 The district court judge acknowledged making inquiries as to whether Defendant 2 could continue in the program and also made it abundantly clear that her involvement 3 with drug court was temporary and administ rative. The drug court officer confirmed 4 that the drug court had terminated Defe ndant from the program. Defendant does not 5 point to any extrajudicial source that so mehow altered the district court judge’s 6 decision in this case. Ruiz , 2007-NMCA-014, ¶ 15. Seeing no abuse of discretion in 7 the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to recuse the district court judge, we 8 affirm. 9 III. CONCLUSION 10 {24} The district court properly denied Defendant’s request to enforce the sentencing 11 agreement contained therein. Further, th e district court judge did not abuse her 12 discretion when she denied Defendant’s moti on to recuse herself. We therefore affirm 13 the district court. 14
{25} IT IS SO ORDERED. 15

16 JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge 17 WE CONCUR: 1819 1 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge 2

3 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 4