Israel’s Cognitive War

by Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Shlomo Brom

Wars among states are becoming a rare

phenomenon all over the world in general and in the

Middle East in particular. In the case of Israel, the

common engagement in violent conflicts is no longer

with other states, but rather with non-state or hybrid

actors1 in an asymmetrical war. The objective of such

military encounters is not to achieve a classical

military victory that will cause the surrender of the

enemy or encourage the enemy to adopt a peaceful

settlement that will annul the causes of the conflict.

On one hand, the non-state adversaries, who are

weaker militarily, do not intend to achieve a classical

military victory. Instead, they pursue their political

goals through terror and guerilla warfare that target

civilians with the purpose of using the people directly

or indirectly to influence Israel’s policy makers. 

On the other hand, Israel’s non-state adversaries,

who are ideologically motivated and in many cases

guided by radical Islamic ideologies, will not

surrender, and when they are defeated in direct

military encounters, they melt away and find refuge

in the supportive population. This allows them to shift

to more clandestine terror activities and organize as

a potent military force. Therefore, the purpose of the

Israeli military campaign—in addition to minimizing

damage to its civilian population and armed forces

and curbing their adversaries’ capabilities to cause

future damage—is to influence the non-state actors’

perceptions and policies in a way that will make them

limit their violent actions against Israel and eventually

consider more peaceful ways to achieve their political

goals. In the last two decades, Israel was actually

quite successful in achieving these objectives. There were substantial periods of

practical cease fire between Israel and its bitterest non-state enemies, and there are

indications that some of them are considering less violent ways of engaging Israel. 

Gray Research Center, 2040 Broadway Street, Quantico, VA 22134 • 703.432.5260 • www.usmcu.edu/mes

Middle East Studies

at the Marine Corps University

MES Insights • Volume 9, Issue 1 February 2018

MES Notes

This issue of Insights carries an

abrigded version of guest lectures

Brig. Gen. (Ret) Shlomo Brom

presented on information operations

and the information environment for

the faculty, students, and staff at the

Marine Corps University in January

2018.

Information about MES events and

publications is available on the MES

website at: www.usmcu.edu/mes, or

you can contact Adam Seitz at (703)

432-5260 or adam.seitz@usmcu.edu.

Also in this Issue

“MES Hosts Visitng Israeli

Scholar”........................................Pg. 4

MES at MCU Disclaimer

The opinions and conclusions

expressed herein are those of the

individual author and do not

necessarily represent the views of

either the Marine Corps University

or any other governmental agency.

Any references to this newsletter

should include the foregoing

statement.

1 A hybrid actor is a non-state actor that has some attributes of a state, e.g., state-like military capabilities

and control over territories.
Both sides in these conflicts are interested in

shaping the perceptions not only of their adversaries

but also of those in their domestic and regional

environments and beyond, acknowledging that these

perceptions will affect the attitudes of the different

societies, policy makers, and political groups in these

environments. At the end of an encounter, the

general perception of which side was victorious and

which was defeated is sometimes more important

than the actual military results of the campaign.

Modern military thought recognizes that the

objective of military operations is not only to inflict

direct material damage on the other party but also to

shape the adversary’s thinking in a way that will serve

one’s campaign goals. Complementing the kinetic

effects with information operations is also not new;

this strategy has been used since Biblical times. What

has changed in recent decades is the scope and

means of such operations, first because of the

evolution of the classical traditional media from print

to radio and then to television, and then because of

the information revolution that has allowed

individuals to serve also as media channels by using

YouTube, chats, and other social media tools to

communicate to a global audience. 

Consequently, Israel is developing a theory,

doctrine, and practice of cognitive war, a form of

warfare that combines kinetic operations aimed at

influencing the other side’s thinking with information

dominance and information operations aimed at

achieving realistic limited objectives in an asymmetric,

limited conflict. The most important soft power

elements in cognitive warfare are economic steps

aimed at decreasing the pressure for use of violence

and diminishing the supportive constituency of the

adversary.

Israel’s engagement with the Gaza Strip can

serve as a good example of Israel’s engagement in

cognitive war. The Gaza Strip is ruled and tightly

controlled by the Hamas Movement, which is a

classical hybrid actor. It is a violent political movement

using terror and guerilla warfare in the fight against

Israel, but it also serves as the government of the

Gaza Strip. It operates against the Israeli population

from Gaza population centers, enjoying their

coverage for disguise and protection.

The Israeli campaign against Hamas in the Gaza

Strip has four target audiences: Hamas, the

Palestinian public in the Gaza Strip, the Israeli public,

and the regional and international community. Israel

uses threats of retaliation to deter Hamas from

attacking. The message to Hamas is that, if it attacks

Gray Research Center, 2040 Broadway Street, Quantico, VA 22134 • 703.432.5260 • www.usmcu.edu/mes

MES Notes (Cont.)

20 December 2017

Adam Seitz published “The TribalMilitary-Commercial Complex and

Challenges to Security Sector Reform

in Yemen” in Addressing Security

Sector Reform in Yemen, edited by

Marie-Christine Heinze (CARPO).

4 January - 5 February 2018 

Amin Tarzi taught the Marine Corps

University (MCU) Command and Staff

College (CSC) elective “The State of

Israel in Context, 1948-2018”.

5 January 2018

Amin Tarzi presented a lecture on

Iranian Maritime Capabilites to the MCU

Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS).

16 January 2018

Amin Tarzi co-taught a class entitled

“Isreal’s Security and the Balance of

Power in the Middle East” at the Marine

Corps War College (MCWAR).

24 January 2018

Amin Tarzi presented a lecture on Iran

to the Senior Enlisted Professional

Military Education (SEPME) course.

31 January - 1 February 2018

Adam Seitz presented lectures on

Yemen at MCWAR.

5 February 2018

MES hosted General Robert Magnus

(USMC, Ret) as a guest lecturer for Dr.

Tarzi’s CSC elective “The State of Israel

in Context, 1948-2018”.

20 February 2018

Amin Tarzi taught a class entitled

“Islamic State - Present and Future

Challenges” at MCWAR.

21 February 2018

MES hosted Dr. Steven Cook, Council

on Foreign Relations, for a lecture

entitled “Sinai, Sisi, and Extremism:

Local and Regional Dynamics,” as part

of the MES AY18 Lecture Series.

26 February 2018

Adam Seitz presented a lecture entitled

“The Houthi Rebellion and The Yemen

Quagmire” at the Daniel Morgan

Graduate School, Washington DC.
Gray Research Center, 2040 Broadway Street, Quantico, VA 22134 • 703.432.5260 • www.usmcu.edu/mes

Israel, it will fail in causing any real damage and will pay a very high price. On the other

hand, if Hamas stops its attacks, Israel would accept Hamas’ de-facto rule of the Gaza

Strip and help provide necessary services to the population by allowing flow of goods,

electricity supply, and water as well as medical assistance, enabling normal life for Gazan

citizens. That message is communicated using information operations, to include public

statements made by senior political and security personalities and messages delivered

by third parties. These statements are reinforced by kinetic means such as missile and

rocket defense, destruction of tunnels that Hamas has built to penetrate Israel, and

retaliation for every attack coming from Gaza. 

Influencing public opinion in the Gaza Strip is considered an indirect way of shaping

policy makers’ decisions. In this case, Israel is influencing public opinion by directly

accessing the Palestinian inhabitants of Gaza through telephone calls (based on an

accurate list of all phone numbers in the Strip), internet chats, and social networks to

deliver a clear and consistent message: Hamas is making your life miserable when it

allows attacks on Israel, and Israel is willing to make your life better if the attacks stop. 

These kinds of cognitive operations are also needed to prevent the adversary’s

cognitive war against Israel from being successful, and, therefore, it is also necessary to

address the Israeli public. The message to the Israelis is that the state and the armed

forces are doing all they can and are going to extremes to ensure Israelis’ security and

prevent interference in their lives; however, it is impossible to guarantee 100% security.

That message is delivered through kinetic operations (e.g., successful interceptions of

rockets by rocket defense systems, destruction of offensive tunnels around Israel’s

border, and punishing retaliatory attacks) and through statements made by political and

military leaders, government spokesmen, and the media.

The last target audience is the regional and international community. Here the

message is that Hamas is not serving the interests of the Palestinians. Instead, it is using

innocent Palestinians to protect terrorists who attack innocent Israelis, threatening life and

property of both Palestinians and Israelis. Israel cannot allow terrorist attacks against its

citizens and is reacting accordingly, doing the utmost to distinguish between the terrorists

and the innocent civilians and to minimize collateral damage. Once again this message is

delivered through actual actions in the material realm and through verbal messages that

are released via diplomatic channels, public statements, the media, and social networks.

There are two major keys for the successful delivery of Israel’s message. First of all,

the messages to the different audiences should be consistent. In the current open and

transparent world, delivering a message to one audience while delivering a contradictory

message to another is a grave mistake that will backfire. Second, there is a need for

synchronization between actions in the material world and operations in the information

world, namely synchronization between what Israel says and does. When these two

principles are followed, there is a good chance of success in shaping perceptions and

affecting decisions of foes and friends.

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Middle East Studies at Marine Corps University

Dr. Amin Tarzi • Director, MES • amin.tarzi@usmcu.edu

Mr. Adam C. Seitz • Senior Research Associate, MES • adam.seitz@usmcu.edu

MES Hosts Visiting Israeli Scholar

Middle East Studies (MES) hosted retired Israel Defense Forces Brigadier General

Shlomo Brom, currently a senior research associate at the Institute for National Security

Studies in Tel Aviv, from 16 through 19 January 2018. Brig. Gen. Brom’s visit was

sponsored by the Israel Institute. During his four days at the Marine Corps University

(MCU), Brig. Gen. Brom addressed five different educational forums at MCU. He co-taught

the Marine Corps War College’s course, “Israel Security and the Balance of Power in the

Middle East Class,” with Dr. Amin Tarzi and guest lectured for Dr. Tarzi’s Command and

Staff (CSC) elective, “The State of Israel in Context, 1948-2018,” and the CSC elective,

“Modern Political Warfare: Cyber and Information Operations,” speaking on Information

Operations in the Lebanon War. He also led a roundtable discussion with MCU’s

Commanding General and invited guests on “The 2006 Lebanon War–Information

Operations/Information Environment in a War with a Hybrid Adversary” and presented the

lecture, “Israel—Retaining an Island of Stability in Stormy Water” as part of the MES

Academic Year 2018 Lecture Series, “Navigating Geopolitical Competition and Internal

Wars in the Middle East and North Africa.”

As the United States and its allies continue to advance their strategic interests and

develop partnerships to effectively confront the multifaceted challenges posed by

revisionist powers (e.g., Russia), rogue regimes (e.g., Iran), and non-state actors, it is

imperative for policymakers, military planners, and practitioners to understand the

challenges our allies face when confronting these adversaries. Given the Marine Corps’

mission set and ongoing deployments to the region, it makes sense for Marine Corps

University to lead this research agenda and to provide opportunities that enhance

professional military education (PME), both in and beyond the classroom. Hosting a

visiting professor from Israel with strong practical information operations experience in

Israel’s complex security environment provided such an opportunity to inject further

innovation in, and further enhance, the overall PME programs at MCU. 

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Brigadier General (ret.) Shlomo Brom, a senior research associate at the Institute

for National Security Studies, joined the Jaffee Center in 1998 after a long career in the

Israel Defense Forces (IDF). His most senior post in the IDF was director of the Strategic

Planning Division in the Planning Branch of the General Staff. Brig. Gen. (ret.) Brom

participated in peace negotiations with the Palestinians, Jordan, and Syria, and in Middle

Eastern regional security talks during the 1990s. He continued to be involved in Track 2

dialogues on these subjects after his retirement from the IDF. In 2000 he was named

deputy to the National Security Advisor, returning to JCSS at the end of his post. In 2005-

2006, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Brom was a member of the Meridor committee established by the

Minister of Defense to reexamine the security strategy and doctrine of the State of Israel.

His primary areas of research are Israeli-Palestinian relations and national security

doctrine. Brig. Gen. (ret.) Brom authored Israel and South Lebanon: In the Absence of a

Peace Treaty with Syria, and edited The Middle East Military Balance 1999-2000 and The

Middle East Military Balance 2001-2002. He is the editor of In the Aftermath of Operation

Pillar of Defense: The Gaza Strip, November 2012, co-editor (with Meir Elran) of The

Second Lebanon War: Strategic Perspectives and (with Anat Kurz) the Strategic Survey

for Israel series.