II

The Russian Way of War

Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

Dr. Lester W. Grau Charles K. Bartles

Foreign Military Studies Office

2016
III

The views expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not 

reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the US 

government.

Images acquired from Vitaly Kuzmin <http://www.vitalykuzmin.net/> 

and the Russian Ministry of Defense <http://mil.ru/> are licensed under a 

Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License <https://

creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode>. Images acquired from

U.S. Department of Defense sources are not copyrighted, and are in the

public domain. All non-attributed graphics are the creations and/or

translations of the authors.

Hyperlinks are included throughout this study for academic sufficiency. The 

appearance of hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the U.S. Army 

of this site or the information, products, or services contained therein. Users 

should exercise caution in accessing hyperlinks.

Cover Design: CW2 Hommy Rosado

TG2 

 v1.2 (22 August 2017)
IV
V

Lester W. Grau is a senior analyst and the Research Director for the Foreign Military Studies 

Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. A Vietnam War infantryman, graduate of the U.S. Army 

Defense Language Institute (Russian) and the U.S. Army’s Institute for Advanced Russian and 

Eastern European Studies, he retired from the US Army in 1992 at the grade of Lieutenant 

Colonel. His military education included the Infantry Officers Basic and Advanced Courses, 

the United States Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Air Force War 

College. His Baccalaureate and Masters degrees are in International Relations. His doctorate 

is in Military History. He served a combat tour in Vietnam, four European tours, a Korean 

tour and a posting in Moscow. He has traveled to the Soviet Union and Russia over forty 

times. He has also been a frequent visitor to the Asian subcontinent, especially Pakistan and 

Afghanistan. He was a CENTCOM Fellow.

Dr. Grau has published over 200 articles and studies on tactical, operational and geopolitical 

subjects. His book, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, 

was published in 1996. The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the SovietAfghan War, co-authored with Ali Jalali, was published in 1998. The Soviet-Afghan War: How a 

Superpower Fought and Lost was published in 2001. The Red Army’s Do-It-Yourself, Nazi-Bashing 

Guerrilla Warfare Manual and Passing It On: Fighting the Pushtun on Afghanistan’s Frontier

were published in 2011. Operation Anaconda: America’s First Major Battle In Afghanistan 

and Mountain Warfare And Other Lofty Problems: Foreign Ideas On High-Altitude Combat, 

co-authored with Charles K. Bartles, were also published in 2011. Fangs of the Lone Wolf: 

Chechen Tactics in the Russian-Chechen Wars 1994-2009, co-authored with Dodge Billingsley, 

was published in 2012. Afghanistan: Preparing for the Bolshevik Incursion into Afghanistan and 

Attack on India, which is a translation of General Snesarev’s 1921 classic work, was published 

in 2014. From Fabric Wings to Supersonic Fighters and Drones: A History of Military Aviation on 

Both Sides of the North-West Frontier, with Brian Cloughley and Andrew Roe, was published in 

2015.

Charles K. Bartles is a junior analyst and Russian linguist at the Foreign Military Studies 

Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His specific research areas include Russian and Central 

Asian military force structure, modernization, tactics, officer and enlisted professional 

development, and security assistance programs. Chuck is also a Major, imagery, and space 

operations officer (FA40) in the Army Reserve at the Joint Functional Component Command 

for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD). He has deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, and 

has served as a security assistance officer at embassies in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and 

Kazakhstan. Chuck has a BA in Russian from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, an MA in 

Russian and Eastern European Studies from the University of Kansas, a certificate in Geospatial 

Information Systems from the University of Missouri-Kansas City, and certificates in Database 

Administration and Computer Programming from Johnson County Community College.
VI

ABOUT THE FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES OFFICE

The mission of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command G2’s 

Foreign Military Studies Office is to research and present understudied 

and unconsidered foreign perspectives in order to better understand the 

Operational Environment. FMSO was founded during the Cold War as the Soviet 

Army Studies Office (SASO) and charged with doing open source research and 

academic outreach to bring a better understanding between the armies of the 

two superpowers. The name and scope of the Office changed and broadened 

over time, but research in the source language, has remained a cornerstone of 

the FMSO methodology. While FMSO’s motto and work continues to represent 

“How they think they think,” FMSO does not produce official U.S. Army threat 

doctrine. In this regard, this book is a study of the ground forces of a major 

Eurasian power from its own sources.

Tom Wilhelm

Director

Foreign Military Studies Office
VII

FORWARD

In 1984, Lieutenant General William Richardson, the commander of the U.S. 

Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), authorized the creation of 

an office modeled after the British Army’s Soviet Studies Research Center (SSRC) 

in order to provide unclassified material from primarily Russian sources for U.S. 

Army training and education. The Soviet Army Studies Office (SASO) opened at 

Fort Leavenworth in 1986 and was staffed with civilian academics and U.S. Army 

foreign area officers who were proficient in Russian, understood Russian and 

Soviet histories and military institutions, and had traveled, studied or lived in 

the Soviet Union. I was assigned to SASO at its inception and was privileged to 

serve as its director from 1989 to 1993, during which the office was transformed 

and expanded into the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO). During that 

period, FMSO produced most of the U.S. Army unclassified studies related to the 

Ground Forces in Russia and the Soviet Union on training, tactics, and military 

thought.

In particular, I was part of FMSO’s development of the study entitled The Soviet 

Conduct of War: An Assessment of Soviet Military Capabilities (1982-1987), 

which became an enduring document as the end of the Cold War shifted the U.S. 

military’s focus elsewhere. Now, more than a quarter of a century later, FMSO 

has produced a new appreciation of the Russian Federation’s military under the 

rubric The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of 

the Russian Ground Forces. This new study combines the seasoned insight of 

FMSO’s long-time Russia hand, Dr. Les Grau, with the exceptional skills and talent 

of Mr. Chuck Bartles (a younger hand) in an ambitious book that is designed to 

mitigate the decades-long gap in comprehensive unclassified understanding 

regarding how the Russian army organizes and trains to fight. In short, while 

acknowledging the fact that the new Russian Army is not the old Soviet Army, 

this study recognizes the many traditions, customs, and practices of the past 

that shape the present and will likely inform the future. Rather than embracing 

an antagonistic or adversarial point of view, this work attempts to understand an 

important military organization in an important global region.

David M. Glantz

Colonel, USA (Retired)

Editor, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies
VIII

Table of Contents

Personnel System 2

DOSAAF 6

Conscripts 6

Contract NCOs 8

Officers 9

The Russian General Staff System 10

The General Staff Personnel System: How Russia Does “Joint” 11

The Reserve System 14

Pay in the Russian Army 16

Ethics in the Russian Armed Forces 18

Rank Structure of the Russian Armed Forces 19

Women in the Military 22

Conclusion 23

Structure and Echelonment 24

What Kind of Military Action Does Russia Need to Prepare for? 25

What Constitutes the Russian Military? 25

The 2008 “New Look” Reforms 27

Military District System Reform 28

The Role of the Army Group 30

Transition to the Brigade Structure 31

Reintroduction of the Division? 33

Building Blocks of the Russian Brigade 34

The Role of the Battalion Tactical Group 37

The Battalion Tactical Group in Relation to Mission Command 38

The Battalion Tactical Group in Relation to Operational Art 39

Elements of Offensive and Defensive Combat 41

Military Decision Making Process 51

The Defense 60

Defensive Theory 61

Squad in the Defense 65

Platoon in the Defense 68

Company in the Defense 76

Battalion in the Defense 84

Brigade in the Defense 91
IX

The Offense 102

Offensive Theory 103

Squad in the Offense 110

Platoon in the Offense 113

Company in the Offense 119

Battalion in the Offense 123

Brigade in the Offense 138

Tactical Maneuver 146

The March 147

Meeting Battle (Engagement) 154

Flanking Detachment 161

Relief in Place 168

Breaking Contact and Withdrawal 174

Fighting in an Encirclement and Breakout 180

Maneuver Defense 190

Soviet/Russian Tactical Nuclear Planning and Future War 201

Branches of Arms 208

Motorized Rifle Troops 209

Tank Troops 223

Artillery Troops 232

Air Defense Troops 266

Specialty Branches 272

Reconnaissance, Spetsnaz, and SOF 273

Signal Troops 285

Electronic Warfare Troops 289

Engineer Troops 301

NBC Defense Troops 316

Material Technical Support Troops 322

Other Tactical Considerations 358

Airborne (VDV) 359

Coastal Defense Troops 362

Military Police 366

Arms Procurement Process 368

UAV Development 371

Robotics in the Russian Armed Forces 378

Cold Weather and Arctic Combat 380

Close Air Support 384

Russian Military Symbology 390
X

Charts & Illustrations

Personnel System 2

Conscript and Contract Serviceman Ranks 20

Officer Ranks 21

Structure and Echelonment 24

The Assessed Chain of Command for Combat Operations 26

Structure of the Russian Ministry of Defense 27

Russian Operational Strategic Commands 28

Ground Forces Peacetime Command and Control Structure 28

Russian Ground Forces Dispositions 29

Proposed Baseline Army Group Structure 30

Motorized Rifle Brigade Structure (variant) 31

Approximate Unit Manpower 32

Russian Graphic Symbols Depicting Subunits 34

Combat Missions for a Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Offense 40

Russian Classifications of Fire Theory 47

Russian Strike Classification Theory 50

Artillery Nomogram Formula (example) 52

Artillery Nomogram (example) 53

Steps of the U.S. Army’s Military Decision Making Process 54

Approximation of the Russian Military Decision Making Process 55

Correlation of Operational Planning Time 57

The Defense 60

Composition of Dismounted Squad (variant) 65

Aspects of Fire for a Motorized Rifle Squad 66

Motorized Rifle Squad Range Card 67

Positions for a Motorized Rifle Platoon in the Defense 68

Motorized Rifle Platoon in the Defense 69

Motorized Rifle Platoon in the Defense 70

Combat Formation of a Motorized Rifle Platoon in the Defense (with two echelons) 71

Combat Formation of a Motorized Rifle Platoon in the Defense (with one echelon) 71

Combat Formation of a Motorized Rifle Platoon in the Defense (refused right flank) 71

Scheme of Fire for a Platoon in the Defense 73

Combat Formation of a Motorized Rifle Company in the Defense (in the first echelon) 77

Positions for a Motorized Rifle Company in the Battalion Defense 78

Motorized Rifle Company in the Defense (in the second echelon) 79

System of Fires for a Motorized Rifle Company 81

Motorized Rifle Company in the Defense 83

Positions for a Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Brigade Defense 86

Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Defense 87

Motorized Rifle Brigade in the Defense 93

Relative Positions of a Motorized Rifle Brigade in the Defense 95
XI

The Offense 102

Fundamentals for Subunits Conducting an Offensive 104

Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Offense 105

Deployment Lines for Subunits in an Attack From The March 106

The Combat Formation of a Motorized Rifle Squad on Foot 110

Squad Formation for Overcoming Mine Obstacle (maneuver group) 111

Squad Formation for Overcoming Mine Obstacle (fire group) 111

Deployment of the Motorized Rifle Squad from Behind a Vehicle (variant) 112

Combat Formation of a Motorized Rifle Squad in the Offense (variant) 113

Combat Formation and Missions of a Motorized Rifle Platoon in the Offensive 114

Combat Formation of a Motorized Rifle Platoon in the Offense (dismounted) 115

Dismount and Deployment of a Motorized Rifle Platoon (variant) 116

Combat Formation of a Motorized Rifle Platoon in the Offense (mounted) 117

Combat Formation for a Motorized Rifle Platoon Breaching a Minefield 118

Composition of a Motorized Rifle Company in the Offensive 119

Combat Formation of a Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Offense 123

Composition of a Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Offensive 124

Areas, Positions and Lines for an Attack From Positions in Direct Contact 125

Combat Formation and Missions of Subunits in the Attack (mounted and dismounted) 127

Motorized Rifle Battalion Assembly Area 131

Fundamentals for Conducting an Offensive by Combined Arms Subunits 133

Inserting Additional Armor for an Attack in Direct Contact 135

Transitioning to the Attack from a Position in Direct Contact with the Enemy 137

Motorized Rifle Brigade in the Offense 139

Motorized Rifle Brigade in the Offense 145

Tactical Maneuver 146

Battalion Tactical Group on the March (variant) 148

Rear Service Support for a Tank Battalion on the March 149

Transportation of Troops by Rail 150

The Combined Movement of Troops 151

A Rough March 153

Company Meeting Battle 154

Battalion Meeting Battle 155

Meeting Engagement 158

Flanking Detachment 163

Theory of the Withdrawal 176

Withdrawal in Practice 177

Withdrawal of a Motorized Rifle Battalion 179

Fighting in an Encirclement 185

Breaking Out of an Encirclement 187

Artillery Planning for the Security Zone 193

Disposition of Forces in the Security Zone 195

Combat Formation of a Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Maneuver Defense 197

Early Tactical Nuclear Employment 202

Tactical Nuclear in Support of a Battalion in the Offense (1984) 203

Tactical Nuclear Strike on the Reserve (1988) 205

Motorized Rifle Battalion Attacking in One Echelon 206

Motorized Rifle Battalion Attacking in Two Echelons 206
XII

Branches of Arms 208

Motorized Rifle Battalion (on BTRs) 210

Motorized Rifle Battalion (on BMPs) 211

Small Arms Characteristics 214

Portable ATGM Characteristics 218

BMP and BTR Characteristics 219

“Epoch” Universal Module 221

Barrel-Launched ATGM Characteristics 222

Tank Characteristics 223

Tank Battalion 224

T-14 “Armata” Characteristics 225

Tank Gun Characteristics 226

Tank Characteristics Comparison 227

Self-Propelled Artillery Characteristics 232

Towed Artillery Characteristics 233

Self-Propelled Howitzer Battalion 234

MLRS Battalion 236

Antitank Battalion 237

Mortar Characteristics 238

Russian Artillery Classifications 240

Artillery Fire Method: Fire concentration 244

Artillery Fire Method: Fire against an individual target 244

Artillery Fire Method: Standing barrage fire 245

Artillery Fire Method: A deep standing barrage 246

Artillery Fire Method: A double moving barrage 246

Artillery Fire Method: Moving barrage 247

Artillery Fire Method: Successive concentrations of fire 248

Artillery Fire Method: Offensive rolling barrage 249

Artillery Fire Method: Massed fire 250

Fire Control Battery 255

Artillery Fire Plan for the Defense 259

MLRS Characteristics 262

Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion 266

Anti-Aircraft Missile-Artillery Battalion 267

The Brigade’s Organic Air Defense Units 269
XIII

Specialty Branches 272

Signal Battalion 288

Electronic Warfare Company 290

Russian Concept of the Aspects of Electronic Warfare 291

Actions of an Electronic Warfare Maneuver Group in Support of the Offense 299

Engineer Battalion 302

Engineer Fortifications in the Brigade Defense 307

River Bend and Crossing Sites 310

Engineer Support of a Counterattack 315

NBC Defense Company 317

Rocket Propelled Flamethrower Characteristics 318

Logistic Battalion (old system) 323

Maintenance Battalion (old system) 323

Material-Technical Support System Comparison 325

Comprehensive Support 328

Combat Support 328

Moral Psychological Support 329

Rear Support 329

Technical Support 329

Ammunition Distribution for a Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Defense 330

Material Technical Support Brigade (variant) 332

Material Technical Support Battalion (new system) 333

Support Platoon (for a Motorized Rifle Battalion) 334

Field Fueling Systems 341

MTO Brigade on the March 342

MTO- Pushed from Higher Echelons 344

MTO- Pulled from Higher Echelons 344

MTO- Pushed and Pulled from Higher Echelons 345

MTO- Pushed, Bypassing Intermediate Echelons 345

MTO Brigade Subunits in the Defense 347

MTO Brigade Subunits in the Offense 349

Russian Logistic Vehicle Families 350

Logistic Vehicle Characteristics 351

Other Tactical Considerations 358

Airborne Dispositions 360

Naval Infantry Dispositions 363

Area Denial Capabilities 365

Artillery Spotting Methods for UAVs 375

Controlled Turret Module Workstation 379

Russian Military Symbology 390
XIV

Introduction

Russia’s 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, activity in Eastern Ukraine, saber rattling 

regarding the Baltics, deployment to Syria, and more assertive behavior along its borders 

have piqued interest in the Russian Armed Forces.1 This increased interest has caused much 

speculation about their structure, capabilities, and future development. Interestingly, this 

speculation has created many different, and often contradictory, narratives about these 

issues. At any given time, assessments of the Russian Armed Forces vary between the idea of 

an incompetent and corrupt conscript army manning decrepit Soviet equipment and relying 

solely on brute force, to the idea of an elite military filled with Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

who were the “polite people” or “little green men” seen on the streets in Crimea. This book will 

attempt to split the difference between these radically different ideas by shedding some light 

on what exactly the Russian Ground Forces consist of, how they are structured, how they fight, 

and how they are modernizing. 

Russia’s actions in this regard are a continuation of past Russian and Soviet policies of 

achieving national objectives in the context of the current operational environment and 

forecasting of future war. The Russian General staff envisions less large-scale warfare; 

the increased use of networked command-and-control systems, robotics, and precision 

weaponry; greater importance placed on interagency cooperation; more operations in 

urban terrain; a melding of offense and defense; and a general decrease in the differences 

between military activities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Along with these 

considerations of the future, the General Staff also takes into consideration Russia’s unique 

geography, history, political and economic systems, social attitudes, weapons procurement 

practices, and general threat perception, altogether providing a detailed picture of what 

Russia’s military looks like today and will look like in the future.

In terms of organization of this book we have chosen not to align it according to the 

warfighting functions (Movement and Maneuver, Fires, Intelligence, Sustainment, Command 

and Control, Protection), but have opted for a more systemic approach. In our view, there are 

substantial differences between the Russian and U.S. ways of warfare and how the warfighting 

functions are related. For this reason, we believe any analysis of this system should begin first 

by describing the Russian system and then proceed to an analysis of how the warfighting 

functions work within the system. We have also chosen to discuss Russian force structure, 

tactics, and modernization in one document, as we believe these issues are inextricably 

linked: there can be no understanding of any one of these issues without understanding all 

the others. Finally, the word “Soviet” appears frequently in this book. This is because the 

Russian system today is based on what they have preserved, modified, and improved from 

their former Soviet system, and that source information still best applies where indicated in 

this book.

1

 For the purposes of this book, the term “Armed Forces” will refer specifically to the Ministry of Defense, while 

the term “military” will refer to all of Russia’s militarized intelligence and security services, including the Ministry 

of Defense.
XV

We have elected to structure this book from the bottom, up. At the base of every army is 

its people, and so we start our discussion with the Russian personnel system. Chapter One 

(Personnel System) includes a description of the recruiting, training, and paying of the three 

personnel types found in the Russian military: the officer, contract NCO (warrant officer), and 

conscript. Although most discussions mention only the negative aspects (hazing, corruption, 

etc.) of the personnel system, we will also identify some advantages, namely specialization. 

Chapter Two (Structure and Echelonment) introduces the reader to the Russian system of 

militarized intelligence and security services and explains their differing roles, with a focus 

on the military forces of the Ministry of Defense. This chapter also introduces the 2008 “New 

Look” reforms, which, along with an influx of funding, have arguably been responsible for 

recent military successes. The chapter concludes with the description of Russia’s primary 

means of force projection, it’s Ground Forces, including how they are structured in tactical 

situations.

Chapters Three (The Offense), Four (The Defense), and Five (Tactical Maneuver) will probably 

be of greatest interest to Army readers. Most recent studies of Russian tactics have focused 

on case studies of Russian operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, but we have taken a 

different approach. Although an examination of past Russian operations is interesting and 

useful for historical reference, we believe the way the Russians conducted operations against 

these adversaries would be much different than the way they would conduct operations 

against an adversary with sophisticated capabilities, such as the U.S. and/or NATO. Perhaps 

General Gerasimov explained this concept best when he stated: “Each war represents 

an isolated case, requiring an understanding of its own particular logic, its own unique 

character.” In other words, there is no “one-size-fits-all” formula for conducting operations or 

understanding the operational environment. While some countries apply various models to 

aid in discerning operation and strategic factors for decision-making, such as Center of Gravity 

analysis, PMESII-PT (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical 

Environment, and Time), Ends, Ways, and Means Analysis, and DIME (Diplomatic, Information, 

Military, Economic), the Russian approach emphasizes dialectical thinking about forecasting, 

trends analysis, correlation of forces and means, and determining forms and methods. They 

are allergic to “one-size-fits-all” models. 
Chapter 1 

Personnel System
Personnel System

3

The Russian Federation has pursued the development of a professional enlisted component 

in the Russian Armed Forces since the early 1990s. The impetus for this stemmed from the 

conscription system inherited from the Soviets. After the Second World War the Soviets 

believed that the future of modem warfare would closely resemble the battles they had 

fought in the last years of the war, albeit with nuclear weapons. These battles would require 

vast numbers of troops organized in divisions, army groups, and fronts to execute high speed 

maneuver warfare to penetrate enemy defenses and then exploit these successes. At this 

time the Soviets believed that the enlisted force that would be required to fight in future 

battles would resemble the enlisted force that fought in the Second World War. In order to 

mass a large army without bankrupting the economy, the Soviets retained their universal 

conscription system. The intent was that all males would receive a basic level of military 

training during their two-year stints and would then be able to return to civilian life. These 

former conscripts would infrequently be called for musters, and would be called en masse in 

the event of a mobilization. This system had an unintended consequence for the strong NCO 

corps that the Soviets had inherited from the Tsarist Army. The two-year conscription model 

for enlisted personnel had no real career path for enlisted personnel who desired to serve 

past their initial conscription length. The strong NCO corps that emerged after the Second 

World War soon disappeared, as these NCOs either left the service or became commissioned 

officers. In the Soviet Armed Forces, officers, not NCOs, became the primary small unit leaders 

and trainers.1

This system began experiencing problems as the Soviet Armed Forces began to modernize 

rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s. Technically advanced equipment requires skilled and well 

trained labor to operate and maintain it. Since two-year conscription terms were considered 

insufficient time to train individuals to perform complex technical tasks, Soviet officers 

performed duties that would normally be performed by NCOs in Western armies. The Soviets 

believed this was an inefficient way of managing manpower, and decided to create “warrant 

officer” positions primarily to maintain and operate advanced equipment. These warrant 

officers, recruited from conscripts who had completed their initial tours, were generally not 

viewed favorably by the officer corps, since the best conscripts who wanted to continue 

their military service were enrolled in military academies. Russian warrant officers relieved 

some of the technical and small unit leadership burdens that were placed on officers, but 

were never well regarded as an institution and had little in common with Western NCOs and 

warrant officers.2

 In addition to technical positions, warrant officers filled positions somewhat 

similar to U.S. first sergeants (albeit with far less authority) and served as platoon leaders for 

maintenance and supply units. The Russian Federation abolished all warrant officer positions 

during the 2008 “New Look” reforms and converted all warrant officers into contract NCOs. 

Warrant officer billets have since been brought back. There has been little reporting about 

1

 Aleksandr Pinchuk, “The University for Sergeants,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 23 November 2012, <http://www.

redstar.ru/index.php/2011-07-25-15-57-07/item/5984-serzhantskie-universitetyi>, accessed 1 May 2016. 

For an excellent description of the professionalism of Russian NCOs in the Second World War, see:

Leonov, V.N., Blood on the Shores: Soviet Naval Commandos in World War II, Annapolis, M.D: Naval Institute Press, 

1993.

2

 Christopher N. Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War, first edition. (Coulsdon, Surrey: 

Jane’s Information Group, 1988), pp. 180-182.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

4

how warrant officer and contract NCO positions differ, but there is likely little difference.3

Russia has maintained a hybrid system of conscription and contract service to the present 

day.4 In this system, officers, not NCOs, are the primary trainers of the platoon. In order to 

prepare these lieutenants, cadets usually attend four- or five-year military academies that 

more closely resemble a combination of the U.S. Military Academy and the officer basic 

course, with a strong emphasis on tactics, then anything practiced in the U.S.5 As soon 

as a new lieutenant graduates from an academy and takes command of his platoon, he is 

expected to immediately begin training and maintaining discipline in his platoon.6

Soviet lieutenants filled the leadership, planning, training, and disciplinary roles of both a 

U.S. platoon leader and platoon sergeant, and so worked very long days. Since the Soviet 

platoon leader ensured small unit discipline and would leave the barracks at night to be with 

his own family, a very brutal system of hazing, known as dedovschina developed among the 

conscripts. This unofficial, but deeply institutionalized practice consisted of senior (second 

year) conscripts hazing the junior (first year) conscripts. These practices often involved theft, 

beatings, and humiliation, which became somewhat infamous and embarrassing to the 

government. Although this practice has become less common in today’s Russian military, it 

still occasionally surfaces in the media.

Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, former Russian President Yeltsin mentioned 

abolishing the conscription system. Conscription was very unpopular due to problems with 

dedovschina, and the popularity was even further lowered due to the effects of the turbulent 

financial situation, which was devastating the Russian Armed Forces. Due to the economic 

situation, little progress was made towards full enlisted professionalization, but Russia did 

start its first “contract NCO” program, which allowed enlisted soldiers to serve with better 

pay and privileges, such as not living in barracks. Russia has maintained a hybrid system of 

conscription and contract service to present day. 

Russia’s military leadership has had mixed feelings about the replacement of conscripts with 

contract NCOs. Some generals have lamented the idea of abolishing the conscription system, 

because they believe such a reform would deprive Russia of a large strategic reserve with at 

least some military training. Other criticisms have involved the description of contract NCOs 

3

 Viktor Sokirko and Denis Telmanov, “Defense Ministry Approved Positions for Warrant Officers,” Izvestiya Online, 

3 July 2013, http://izvestia.ru/news/552986#ixzz2XyXraoZW, accessed 1 May 2016.

“Warrant Officers Will Service Sophisticated Weapon Systems,” Interfax-AVN Online, 8 April 2013. 4

 Yuriy Gavrilov, “Lining Up for the Beret: No End to Those Wishing to Serve in the VDV at the Enlistment Offices,” 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 26 April 2012, <http://www.rg.ru/2012/04/26/shamanov.html>, accessed 1 May 2016. 5 It is not uncommon for a new platoon leader in an airborne unit to join his unit after completing 45 or more 

jumps at the Airborne Military Academy in Ryazan. See Aleksandr Kolotilo, “VDV: The Valor of the Highest 

Order,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 26 December 2012, <http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/siriya/item/6608-vdv-

%E2%80%93-eto-muzhestvo-vyisshego-klassa>, accessed 1 May 2016. 6

 Andrey Bobrun and Oleg Pochinyuk, “To the Level of the Century,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 6 July 2011, <http://

old.redstar.ru/2011/07/06_07/2_01.html>, accessed 1 May 2016. 

Vladimir Sosnitskiy, “Regimental Training: Hot Times,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 12 July 2011, <http://old.redstar.

ru/2011/07/12_07/2_01.html>, accessed 1 May 2016.
Personnel System

5

as “mercenaries,” a term that is sometime used to describe the U.S. system of enlistment, 

the implication being contract NCOs are more interested in pay than service to the country 

(this argument likely carries little weight in the Russian military, as both officers and contract 

enlisted soldiers sign service contracts). 

Probably the strongest motivator for the Russia’s military leadership to support the formation 

of a contract NCO system is Russia’s lessons learned from Chechnya and other modern 

conflicts. Russia has changed its view on the nature of modern and future war. Local and 

regional conflicts, rather than large-scale high-speed maneuver are seen as the most likely 

manifestation of war. In addition, warfare will also now involve “indirect and asymmetric 

methods” and a general blurring of the lines between the tactical, operational, and strategic 

levels of military operations. The implication for Russia’s enlisted personnel, is that conscripts 

are unable to be effective warfighters on the modern battlefield, especially since the 

conscription period in the Russian Federation has been reduced to one year. Russia has 

vacillated back and forth between desiring a completely professional enlisted force, and 

continuing with the current hybrid system, albeit with a greater percentage of contract NCOs.7

Due to greater costs involved with contract NCOs and the aforementioned desire to maintain 

a mass mobilization capacity, it is likely that Russia will utilize a hybrid system for enlisted 

manning for the foreseeable future. In 2015, the number of contract soldiers in the positions 

of warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers reached 300 thousand, for the first time exceeding 

the number of conscripts.8

There is often a Western assumption that Russian contract sergeants are distributed 

throughout the ranks and are placed in positions of leadership over conscripts. A more 

accurate term for Russian contract sergeants would probably be “contract soldier,” because in 

the Russian system units are designated as either “conscript” or “contract sergeant,” and there 

is apparently little interaction between these enlisted personnel types. In general, contract 

NCOs fill “trigger puller” positions, and positions requiring advanced skills and training. 

Conscripts usually fill positions that require little training, such as drivers, cooks, laborers, or 

tradesman. Although one-year conscription terms give little time for training, conscripts do 

not necessarily join the military without militarily useful skills. The Russian Federation, as did 

the Soviet Union, has “patriotic education,” and certain rudimentary military skills (first aid, 

etc.) are included in the primary and secondary education curriculum for male and female 

students.9

7

 Charles K. Bartles, “Defense Reforms of Russian Defense Minister Anatolii Serdyukov,” Journal of Slavic Military 

Studies 24, no. 1 (2011). 8

 Lieutenant General Vasily Tonkoshkurov, “Important Priority for the General Staff: Is the Current Personnel 

System Adequate for Modern Requirements?” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 21 October 

2015, <http://vpk-news.ru/articles/27609>, accessed 1 May 2016. 9

 Ilya Rozhdestvenskiy, “Parade of Children’s Troops: How Children in Russia Are Taught to Love the Motherland 

and To Fight for It,” Medusa Online, 7 July 2015, <https://meduza.io/feature/2015/07/07/parad-detskih-voysk>, 

accessed 28 March 2016. The article has been reprinted in English, and may be found at: <https://meduza.io/en/

feature/2015/07/16/russia-s-littlest-soldiers>. 
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

6

DOSAAF

In terms of training, Russia does have one institution 

with no U.S. equivalent. The Volunteer Society for 

Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Fleet 

(DOSAAF) is a government-sponsored sports and 

outdoor enthusiast organization that promotes and 

funds militarily useful skills, such as flying, hiking, 

camping, shooting, skiing, parachuting, driving, and 

athletics, for young people.10 The predecessors to the 

organization were invaluable in the Great Patriotic War 

(Second World War) by providing skilled servicemen to 

the Armed Forces. DOSAAF, in one form or another, still exists in many states of the former 

Soviet Union. It is particularly valuable for the conscription-based manning system that the 

Russian Federation utilizes to fill its rank and file, but would be an inefficient way of imparting 

skills to a fully professional (non-conscript) army. Conscripts who have participated in 

DOSAAF activities gain skills that would be difficult to impart to troops who are only drafted 

for one year. The DOSAAF system is so well ingrained into the Russian military system that 

a DOSAAF representative sits on each draft board in order to advise the state on the best 

way to utilize each conscript. For example, a conscript who has participated in a DOSAAF 

parachuting club would be more likely to be assigned to an airborne unit.11 The DOSAAF 

program declined after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but in the last few years experienced 

a resurgence. According to a May 2015 article, about 40 percent of recruits enter the military 

with a military occupational specialty obtained from a DOSAAF program. The desire is that 

eventually all conscripts enter the military with some sort of military occupational specialty.12

Conscripts

The Russian Federation practices a conscription system, but this system differs greatly from 

the U.S. draft system with which many Americans were familiar from the Vietnam era. While 

Americans are familiar with the term “Draft Board,” the Russian Federation utilizes military 

commissariats, which is the local organization of military administration responsible for 

not only the semiannual conscription process, but also documentation of local human and 

economic resources for the State’s use in the event of war. Military commissariats parallel 

every level of the civilian administration in the military district. They are led by a lieutenant 

colonel or colonel, with a staff and a council of local officials. In regards to the conscription 

function of the commissariats, the commission usually consists of a chairman (typically an 

active duty colonel), doctor, and representatives from the education ministry, Federal Security 

Service (FSB), Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD), and DOSAAF, and possibly other members. The 

10 Viktor Khudoleyev, “Toward New Standards of Mobility,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 30 June 2015, <http://

redstar.ru/index.php/newspaper/item/24659-k-novym-standartam-mobilnosti>, accessed 1 May 2016.

11 Ray Finch, “Patriotic Education-DOSAAF,” OE Watch Online, May 2015

Viktor Khudoleyev, “Much Work Lies Ahead, 87 Years of DOSAAF,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 23 January 2014,

<http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/siriya/item/13872-vperedi-bolshaya-rabota>, accessed 1 May 2016.

12 Vladimir Mukhin “Military Commissars to Be Responsible for Service in Installments,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta 

Online, 25 June 2015, <http://www.ng.ru/armies/2015-06-26/1_voenkomy.html>, accessed 1 May 2016.

“DOSAAF trains 80,000 specialists for Armed Forces annually,” Interfax, 24 April 2013.

DOSAAF Flag

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
Personnel System

7

purpose of this commission is to determine the best utilization of the conscript. This requires 

sorting them for appropriate assignments. In general, the politically reliable are sent to the 

FSB or MVD, the physically strong to the airborne, those with language abilities to signal 

intelligence units, etc. The commission composition is intended to best conduct this sorting 

of human capital. Doctors assess physical fitness, educators describe academic performance, 

the FSB representative addresses political reliability, the MVD officer mentions any brushes 

with the law, and the DOSAAF member describes any militarily relevant activities in which the 

conscript may have participated.13

In 2013, the Russian Federation decided to take 

this concept a step further by creating “science 

companies” to best exploit the brightest and most 

promising recruits who are and will be entering the 

Russian Armed Forces. Although there have been 

few details about the exact role these companies 

will play, Defense Minister Shoygu has stated that 

they will become “an incubator for our institutions, 

scientific research institutes, design bureaus for naval, 

aviation, and space matters, and on other issues.” 

There are currently twelve science companies in 

the Russian military, with a total of 561 service 

members. Conscripted service in the science companies is apparently a gateway to the officer 

corps, as already 41 former science company service members have been commissioned as 

lieutenants.14 The science companies are reportedly participating in 20 research projects, and 

within one six-month period published 40 articles and prepared eight patent applications.15

Unlike the U.S. system, there is no presumption that a conscript does not have any 

militarily useful skills when entering the military. This difference is in part due to a slightly 

different civilian education system in the Russian Federation. The Russian system has some 

commonalities with the German system, which “tracks” students at an earlier age to university 

or vocational educations. The significance for the Russian military is that in some cases 

conscripts may already be entering military service with a few years of vocational training in a 

militarily useful specialty (pipe fitter, welder, machinist, etc.). 

In sum, the Russian conscription system has little in common with the U.S. enlistment or 

draft systems, which assess a new serviceman’s potential based primarily on a single test 

(Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery). Instead, the Russian system takes a more 

holistic approach. The implication is that although the Russian Federation has only a oneyear conscription, there still is substantial value that can be had from the individual conscript. 

13 Christopher N. Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War, first edition. (Coulsdon, 

Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 1988), pp. 155-176.

14 “The Realization of the ‘Scientific Companies’ Project Begins on Friday,” Interfax-AVN, 4 June 2015.

Viktor Khudoleyev, “Serve Worthily!” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 1 April 2016, <http://redstar.ru/index.php/

newspaper/item/28331-sluzhite-dostojno>, accessed 1 May 2016.

15 Vladimir Ivanovsky and Oleg Falichev, “Rear Service Eagles: MTO Academy Navigates ‘Invisible Bridges,’”

Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 13 April 2016, <http://vpk-news.ru/articles/30195>, accessed 1 May 2016.

Conscripts in the field

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

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In 2016, it was reported that 20,000 of the 155,000 conscripts inducted in the spring draft 

already had valid military occupational specialties.16

 

Contract NCOs 

The Russian Federation has practiced several different means of recruiting contract NCOs. 

Initially, upon conscription, conscripts were given the option of serving their conscription 

period or becoming a contract NCO (receiving more pay and privileges, but serving a 

longer term of service). There was much criticism of this method of recruiting, because 

many contract NCOs enlisted simply for better pay and living conditions and left the service 

immediately after their initial enlistments. Regulations were then changed so conscripts 

could opt for contract service after six months of conscripted service. In 2016, policies were 

again changed to allow newly inducted conscripts to immediately sign two-year conscription 

contracts (instead of their one-year conscription period).17 The most likely recruiting pools for 

contract NCOs are conscripts who have successfully completed their conscription and civilians 

who have some sort of militarily useful vocation. There appears to be strong recruiting 

efforts at vocational schools, including for females who may fill noncombat positions. One 

interesting aspect of recruiting is that it is not uncommon to see the wives of contract NCOs 

and officers enlist as contract NCOs. These spouses often serve as uniformed cooks, admin 

support, and radio/telephone operators (in garrison). This is beneficial for the spouses for 

financial reasons, as they earn more as uniformed service members than performing the same 

duties as civilians, and beneficial for the government, because it does not have to provide 

additional housing allowances, which is a significant cost savings.18

In the Russian system, if a person wants to lead he should 

become an officer; if he desires to be a “trigger puller” or 

perform a vocation, he should become a contract NCO. 

If a contract soldier desires to be a missile crewman, 

he will be a missile crewman for his entire career. The 

Russian system encourages specialization and technical 

expertise. There does not appear to be any out-ofbranch or broadening assignments for enlisted soldiers or 

officers. Such practices would be contrary to the mission 

to develop experts at their chosen profession. Although 

this appears to be a “dead-end” for Westerners, it is not 

so much for Russians. Russian contract NCOs appear 

to be content with this system, likely in part due to the 

Russian military pay system (discussed later), which is 

well structured for this contract NCO system. The Russian 

16 Viktor Khudoleyev, “Serve Worthily!” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 1 April 2016, <http://redstar.ru/index.php/

newspaper/item/28331-sluzhite-dostojno>, accessed 1 May 2016. 17 Yelena Loriya, and Dmitriy Litovkin, “Two Years for One. For the First Time, Conscripts Given Right to Turn Down 

Draft Service Immediately and Sign Two-Year Contract,” Izvestiya Online, 26 February 2016, <http://izvestia.ru/

news/605056#ixzz41HhAj5bx>, accessed 1 May 2016. 18 Anatoliy Yermolin, “Russian Paratroopers’ Participation in International Airborne Troops Competitions of 2015 

and Preparation for 2016 Contests ,” Ekho Moskvy Online, 28 November 2015, <http://echo.msk.ru/programs/

voensovet/1666594-echo>, accessed 1 May 2016.

Contract NCO

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
Personnel System

9

contract NCO system is ideal for retaining individuals who do not want to command, lead 

large units, or move from assignment to assignment. It is designed to retain individuals who 

simply want to be experts at doing their jobs.19

Since Russian contract NCOs fill a different niche than Western NCOs, they are trained 

differently. The Russian Federation has several different career paths for Russian contract 

NCOs (who are sometimes referred to as “officer assistants”), but the small unit “leadership” 

path involves the NCO graduating from an academy whose program lasts two years and 

nine months. (In the Russian system, contract NCOs are sometimes referred to as “officer 

assistants”) This amount of training is comparable to the amount of education/training a 

new lieutenant receives while attending a military academy (4-5 years). Hence, although the 

Russian Federation has a different vision of enlisted professionalization, this does not mean 

that Russia does not value training and educating its contract NCOs.20 One thing that does 

appear certain is that the Russian Federation is not interested in the U.S./Western officer/NCO 

model: the latter has been observed, evaluated, and rejected.21

Officers

If the backbone of Western armies is their NCOs, then the 

backbone of the Russian Army is the officer corps. Officers 

are the primary trainers, disciplinarians, and repositories 

for institutional knowledge in the Russian Armed Forces. 

The Russian officer education system emphasizes 

developing expertise in the officer’s particular specialty, 

and begins when the officer is a cadet. Russian military 

academies do not impart a general university education, 

as similar institutions do in the West, but instead create 

competent leaders and experts who immediately begin 

leading and executing their duties after graduation. 

The Russian emphasis on specialization precludes such 

practices as branch details, branch transfers, and out-ofbranch assignments. 

A system that has a weak or nonexistent NCO corps and 

relies on a strong officer corps inherently requires a larger 

number of officers, but, due to this reality and a much 

19 “Sergeant’s of a New Formation,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 15 January 2013, <http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/

nekrolog/item/6718-serzhantyi-novoy-formatsii>, accessed 1 May 2016. 20 Charles K. Bartles, “Noncommissioned Officers in the Russian Armed Forces,” OE Watch Online, March 2016.

Anatoliy Yermolin, “Russian Paratroopers’ Participation in International Airborne Troops Competitions of 2015 

and Preparation for 2016 Contests ,” Ekho Moskvy Online, 28 November 2015, <http://echo.msk.ru/programs/

voensovet/1666594-echo>, accessed 1 May 2016. 21 Charles K. Bartles, “Balancing: Conscription, Contract Service and a Reserve System,” OE Watch Online, August 

2015.

 Vladimir Mukhin, “Military Commissars to Be Responsible for Service in Installments,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta 

Online, 25 Jun 2015, <http://www.ng.ru/armies/2015-06-26/1_voenkomy.html>, accessed 1 May 2016.

Airborne cadet in training

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

10

different Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) these officers are distributed throughout 

the ranks much differently than in Western militaries. In the Russian system, units (battalions, 

companies, platoons, squads, etc.) tend to be smaller in order to facilitate the officer’s 

command and control, since there is no substantial NCO leadership. Another major difference 

between Russian and Western armies is that Russian staffs are substantially smaller than their 

Western equivalents. The combination of these factors means that Russian maneuver officers 

get ample opportunities to lead. 

The typical early years of a career for a maneuver officer will involve a succession of 

assignments that have the officer commanding and deputy commanding platoons, 

companies, and battalions. Only after mastering his specific branch of arms (motorized rifle, 

tank, artillery, etc.), will he be sent to a yearlong training course, such as the Combined Arms 

Academy, to learn the skills needed to command a combined arms unit, such as a regiment 

or brigade. Non-maneuver officers have similar career paths. In today’s Russian Army, the 

practice of having relatively small staffs and the development of the institution of NCOs and 

warrant officers to conduct technical tasks (in conjunction with the 2008 “New Look” reforms, 

which condensed regiments and divisions into brigades and removed most “cadre units” from 

the books) has likely created a Russian Armed Forces with a ratio of officers to enlisted soldiers 

on par with most Western Armies.

The Russian General Staff System

One of the most interesting differences between 

the armies of the post-Soviet Union and the West is 

the presence of Prussian-style General Staffs. These 

general staff systems provide far more than just a 

planning apparatus; they also function as doctrine and 

capability developers. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff is 

often equated with the Russian General Staff, but this 

is a great understatement of the Russian General Staff’s 

importance. The Russian Chief of the General Staff 

has far more authority than any flag grade officer in 

the U.S. military. In terms of equivalency, the Russian 

General Staff has the same responsibilities for longterm planning duties conducted by the U.S. Office 

of the Secretary of Defense and unified combatant 

commanders; elements of strategic transportation 

performed by USTRANSCOM; doctrinal and capabilities 

development, as well as equipment procurement for 

all branches of the Ministry of Defense. It even has an 

inspector general-like function for ensuring that its standards and regulations are adhered 

to.22 22 The term “doctrine” in this paper refers exclusively to doctrine at the tactical and operational levels. The 

General Staff publishes field manuals (Боевой устав по подготовке и ведению общевойскового боя) covering 

these activities. Russia’s official “Military Doctrine,” as was published in December of 2014, much more closely 

resembles a U.S. “National Security Strategy” document than U.S. military documents such as “AirLand Battle.” 

Russia’s official military doctrines are produced by the Russian Security Council, albeit likely with input from the 

Emblem of the Russian General Staff

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
Personnel System

11

In the Russian system, the General Staff is responsible for operational-strategic level planning. 

Russia has a fairly nuanced view of the differences between the tactical, operational, and 

strategic levels of military science. It believes that the difference between these levels is 

based upon the scope of mission, not simply the size of the unit. For example, a brigade 

fighting under an Army Group would be considered a tactical asset, but the same brigade 

fighting independently in a different situation could be considered a tactical-operational 

asset. Generally speaking, the General Staff’s operational planning duties typically involve 

echelons above brigade level, or, in Russian parlance, “operational art.” 

Proponency for strategic planning resides with the Russian Security Council, which is an interministerial body that is chaired by high-level officials, weighted heavily with the intelligence 

and security services. Although the Russian Security Council is the chief proponent of Russian 

strategy, the Chief of the Russian General Staff does sit on council, bridging operational art to 

the national security strategy. The General Staff does far more than just plan operations. It 

also has responsibility for the use of “foresight” to develop the theory and practice of future 

war.23 In Russian military thought foresight is directly linked to military science, with military 

science being the science of future war.24 The General Staff’s responsibility to predict the 

nature of future war makes it the logical place (in the Soviet/Russian system) for doctrine and 

capability development for the entire Ministry of Defense.

Just as important as what the General Staff does is what the General Staff does not do. It 

does not have operational control of the force. Although there were Goldwater-Nichols-like 

reforms that removed operational control from the branch chiefs (Ground Forces, Air Force, 

etc.) and placed the operational control of most forces with regional commands, little has 

changed with the General Staff’s role as operational planners and capability and doctrine 

developers since Soviet times. Probably the biggest change in the last several years has been 

downsizing to better align the size of the staff to the size of the military that it plans for, and 

the removal of some finance responsibilities, due to a few high profile corruption gaffes.25 The 

Chief of the General Staff does have day-to-day control of the Main Intelligence Directorate 

(GRU), a directorate of the General Staff, which, in turn, controls the GRU Spetsnaz Brigades 

and several strategic assets, including the Russian Airborne, which functions as a strategic 

reserve. In combat however, these war-fighting assets would be operationally controlled by 

the appropriate field commander, not by the Chief of the General Staff.

The General Staff Personnel System: How Russia Does “Joint”

The Russian General Staff system is based upon the Prussian-style general staff system, and 

so has retained its personnel system. Unlike the U.S. military, officers do not rotate through 

“joint” assignments. In the Russian system, “joint” matters, such as operational-strategic level 

planning and capabilities and doctrine development, are handled exclusively by General 

Staff personnel. Officers who serve in the prestigious General Staff are usually selected at 

General Staff.

23 Military Encyclopedia, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1983, 585. 24 Dr. Jacob Kipp, The Methodology of Foresight and Forecasting in Soviet Military Affairs, Soviet Army Studies 

Office, 1988, <www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a196677.pdf>, accessed 30 October 2015. 25 Charles K. Bartles, “Defense Reforms of Russian Defense Minister Anatolii Serdyukov,” Journal of Slavic Military 

Studies 24, no. 1 (2011).
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

12

the major/lieutenant colonel level (late twenties/early thirties). They permanently replace 

their branch insignia with general staff insignia and become General Staff personnel. Since 

matters of military doctrine and procurement are decided by the General Staff, it is considered 

essential that officers break their fixation with their branch of service (Ground Forces, Navy, Air 

Force, etc.) and branch of arms (infantry, armor, artillery, etc.) in order to avoid the “trade union 

mentality” that hinders military doctrine and procurement matters in Western armies.26 Once 

selected for the General Staff, a Ground Forces officer will usually spend the remainder of his 

career doing staff work at the Army Group, Military District, and General Staff Headquarters 

in Moscow. (Officers in other branches of service will have slightly different assignments.) 

These officers are subject matter experts about the branches of service and specialties in 

which they have previously served, and will be closely associated with these specialties, 

as planners, for the remainder of their careers (i.e., a signal officer in the General Staff, will 

typically always work signal issues). High level positions of leadership within the General Staff 

(for example, Chief of the Main Operations Directorate) are exclusively held by officers from 

maneuver (tank, motorized rifle, artillery, missile) branches, but specialty directorates, such as 

topography and electronic warfare will be led by an officer of the appropriate specialty.27

This system develops a caste of professional planners for handling operational-strategic 

matters, while freeing the remainder of the Russian Armed Forces officer corps to continue 

to specialize in their particular branch of service and arms at the tactical level. An obvious 

implication of this personnel system is that there are different career paths for officer 

advancement. Although selection for the General Staff is prestigious, it is not the desired 

path for all officers. Maneuver officers who enjoy command may best serve by not pursuing 

assignment to the General Staff. On this path officers get a chance to hone their tactical 

skills, since there is no necessity for service in joint or out-of-branch assignments. However, 

there still are educational requirements, such as attendance in a combined arms academy. 

Promotions typically happen much faster in the Russian military than in the U.S. (it is not 

uncommon to see a 32-year-old battalion commander), and command tours have been 

known to last up to six years. In this system, a brigade commander (on the tactical path) 

would have more years of command experience than his U.S. counterpart due to the ability to 

specialize in tactical leadership.28

Although the Chief of the General Staff is in charge of the General Staff, he does not 

necessarily need to be brought up through the general staff career path. Whatever career 

path an officer is on, if he reaches the highest ranks in the Russian military, invariably he 

will have several assignments in the General Staff. An interesting example of how career 

26 Although this system does alleviate many resource allocation problems within the Ministry of Defense, there 

are still significant battles for economic resources that the Ministry of Defense must contend with. Due to its 

Soviet heritage, Russia has powerful militarized intelligence and security services (FSB, Border Troops, MVD-VV, 

etc.) that directly compete with the Ministry of Defense for resources. This resource competition is especially 

acute now, because Russia no longer believes that the primary threat to its sovereignty stems from overt military 

invasion, but instead from social movements in the flavor of the “color revolutions,” the Arab Spring, and the 

Maidan movement. This perception of threat could increasingly divert certain funds away from the Ministry of 

Defense to militarized security forces with more of a dedicated internal security mission.

27 Donnelly, 139-145.

28 Dr. Lester Grau and Charles K. Bartles, “Tactical Combined Arms Leadership in the Russian Army: Operational 

Flexibility Through Tactical Rigidity,” publication forthcoming.
Personnel System

13

General Gerasimov 

1977-1984 Commander of a Platoon, Company, and Battalion

1984-1987 Student at the Malinovskiy Armor Academy

1987-1993 Chief Of Staff of a Regiment, Division

1993-1995 Commander of a Division

1995-1997 Student, Voroshilov General Staff Academy

1997-2001 First Deputy Commander of the Moscow Military District

2001-2003 Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff, Army Group Commander

2003-2005 Chief of Staff of the Far East Military District

2005-2006 Chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff

2006-2009 Commander of the Leningrad Military District

2009-2010 Commander of the Moscow Military District.

2010-2012 Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

2012-2012 Commander of the Central Military District

2012-Present Chief of the General Staff & Member of the Russian Security Council

General Makarov 

1971-1977 Commander of a Platoon, Company, and Battalion

1977-1979 Student at the Frunze Academy

1979-1980 Deputy Commander of a Regiment

1980-1981 Commander of a Regiment

1981-1991 Deputy Commander of a Division, Commander of Two Divisions

1991-1993 Student, Voroshilov General Staff Academy (graduated with Gold Medal)

1993-1993 Chief of Staff of the Russian Peacekeeping Forces in Tajikistan

1993-1996 Deputy Commander of an Army Group

1996-1998 Commander of an Army Group (2nd Tank Army)

1998-1999 Deputy Commander (for Coastal Defense) of the Baltic Fleet 

1999-2002 Chief of Staff, Deputy Commander, of the Moscow Military District

2002-2007 Commander of the Siberian Military District

2007-2008 Armaments Directorate Chief of the General Staff

2008-2012 Chief of the General Staff & Member of the Russian Security Council

2013-Present Inspector General of the Ministry of Defense

General Baluyevsky 

1970-1972 Commander of a Platoon, Company

1972-1974 Operations Officer on an Army Group Staff 

1974-1976 A Senior Operations Officer on an Army Group Staff 

1977-1980 Student at the Frunze Academy

1980-1982 A Senior Officer in the Operations Directorate of a Military District

1982-1988 A Senior Officer, then Chief of the Operations Branch of the 

Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff

1988-1990 Student, Voroshilov General Staff Academy (graduated with Gold Medal)

1990-1991 Special Assistant to Deputy Defense Minister Colonel-General Achalov

1992-1993 Deputy Chief of the Operations Department of the Main Operations

Directorate of the General Staff

1992-1993 Chief of the Operations Department 

of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff

1993-1995 Deputy Commander of Russian Ground Forces in the Transcaucasia

1995-1997 Deputy Chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff

1997-2001 First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces 

& Chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff

1997-2004 First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces

2004-2008 Chief of the General Staff & Member of the Russian Security Council

2005-2006 Chief of the Joint Staff of the Collective Security Treaty Organization

2008-2012 Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council

2012-present Retirement

Images Courtesy: 

Russian Ministry of Defense
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

14

progression can occur in the Russian Armed Forces is to look at the last three Chiefs of the 

General Staff, noting the differences in assignments between General Gerasimov (command 

path) and General Makarov (command path) in contrast to General Baluyevsky (General Staff 

path). These officers all reached the apex of a Russian military career, by becoming the Chief 

of the General Staff. Although there are two different ways of achieving this end, neither path 

is considered better or worse, just different.

Regardless of career path, the selection 

process for the absolute highest levels 

of the Russian officer corps is very much 

predicated upon the officer’s performance 

at the General Staff Academy. The top 

graduates receive the coveted “Gold Medal,” 

and, although not a prerequisite, the top 

military positions are often held by former 

Gold Medal winners from the Voroshilov 

General Staff Academy. Any mention of 

General Gerasimov being a Gold Medal 

winner is conspicuously absent from his 

posted biographical information, and in 

this aspect General Gerasimov differs from many of his predecessors; however, his combat 

experience and success at a volatile time in the North Caucuses apparently have made up for 

any academic slights.29

The role of the General Staff in the Russian system is far more important than the role of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the U.S. system. The General Staff is much more than a general’s 

personal staff; they are an elite caste of operational-strategic planners who also guide 

doctrine and capability development, freeing the remainder of the Russian Armed Forces 

officer corps to continue to specialize in their particular branch of service and arms at the 

tactical level. The General Staff system allows officers to specialize as operational or tactical 

planners. Unlike Western officers, General Staff officers are not required to divide their time 

between both of these challenging endeavors. Selection for service in the General Staff is 

considered prestigious, and means that an officer is one of the best in his field; there is no 

stigma associated with “staff work” in the Russian system. This is best exemplified by the fact 

that the most coveted position in the Russian Armed Forces is not a senior command, but 

instead becoming Russia’s senior operation-tactical planner, the Chief of the General Staff.

The Reserve System

The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense has been tinkering with wide-scale reforms of 

the military reserve system for several years. The current reserve system was inherited from 

the Soviet Union, and was designed for supporting a doctrine that required maintaining a 

large strategic reserve of troops that could be mobilized in the event of large-scale warfare. 

It was composed of conscripts and officers who had completed their mandatory service 

obligation and had been discharged from active service, with rare and infrequent call-ups to 

29 Insights from author’s conversation with noted Russian military scholar Dr. Jacob Kipp on 30 October 2015.

General Staff Academy, Moscow Russia

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
Personnel System

15

test mobilization capabilities. Another consequence of the Soviet Union’s mass mobilization 

doctrine was the necessity to maintain units and equipment for these mobilized reservists. 

These units were/are manned by small full-time cadres that would keep the equipment 

serviceable and maintain enough institutional knowledge to bring the mobilized reserve 

up to some level of combat readiness before deployment. Many of these “cadre units” were 

disbanded after the 2009 “New Look” reforms, as there was a belief that resources were being 

wasted on maintaining a mass mobilization capability to the detriment of bringing active 

units up to full levels of operational readiness.30

 There has been some debate about whether Russia 

needs to maintain a large strategic reserve or should 

switch to more of an operational reserve. Opinions 

vary between two major camps, the reformers saying 

that an operational reserve would do far more to 

enhance security because an operational reserve 

would be smaller, better trained, more able to quickly 

become combat ready in a national emergency, and 

more likely to called in an emergency, while older 

retired senior officers believe that the capability to 

mass mobilize should be maintained at all costs. The 

first talk of an operational reserve was in 2009, when 

the Defense Ministry announced that 60,000 junior 

officers were to be dismissed from active service, but 

would be afforded the opportunity to contract into 

a reserve status that would pay on average 20,600 

rubles ($870) per month. The idea of establishing 

an operational reserve has apparently gained some 

traction, based upon pronouncements by General 

Gerasimov. Reserve reforms may be one of the few 

instances in the highly controversial arena of Russian 

military reform, where both conservatives and reformers get what they want. Russia appears 

to be driving full ahead with a reserve system that maintains the large strategic reserve for 

potential mass mobilization, while developing a better operational reserve that can be called 

upon more frequently.31 

30 Charles K. Bartles, “Defense Reforms of Russian Defense Minister Anatolii Serdyukov,” Journal of Slavic Military 

Studies, 24, no. 1 (2011): 55–80.

Yuriy Gavrilov, “The General Staff Has Been Authorized To Report: Russia Is Creating Special Operations Forces,” 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 7 March 2013, <http://rg.ru/2013/03/06/sily-site.html>, accessed 1 May 2016. 31 Charles K. Bartles, “Russian MoD Wants U.S. Style Reserve System?” OE Watch Online, April 2013.

“Reserve to Be Formed of Officers to be Dismissed from Service,” Interfax-AVN, 21 January 2009.

“Laid-Off officers Will Be Put on Defense Ministry’s Staff Reserve,” Interfax, 22 October 2008.

V.A. Ordinsky, “A New System to Train and Accumulate Trained Reservists and Their Service in the Reserves,” 

Military Thought 4 (2008), pp. 78–82

“Mobilization Vacuum: Military Reform Does not Guarantee the Training of a Highly Skilled Reserve

for the Russian Army,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, 2 June 2010, <http://www.ng.ru/editorial/2010-06-02/2_red.

html>, accessed 1 May 2016.

Lieutenant General Vasily Tonkoshkurov, 

Chief of the Mobilization Directorate

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

16

Interestingly, the Russian Federation appears to be experimenting with two different models 

for an operational reserve. The first looks very similar to the US reserve system, consisting of 

an active reserve component and inactive reserve component (Individual Ready Reserve), 

with the Russian operational reserve conducting two-week annual training requirements, 

receiving monthly stipends, and being completely voluntary. The intent is to maintain a cadre 

of officers and enlisted soldiers who regularly train with particular active units; in the event of 

their unit’s mobilization, the reservist would be called to duty to provide support or backfill 

as needed. In the Vostok-2014 military exercise, Russia experimented with a new way to use 

an operational reserve by way of new stand-alone units called territorial-defense battalions 

(BTO).32 Territorial defense units have appeared elsewhere in Eastern Europe and usually 

consist of relatively lightly armed infantry who are assigned to secure critical infrastructure in 

the rear. These forces are not intended to serve in high-intensity combat operations abroad. 

The intent of this form of an operational reserve is to unburden the active duty force of these 

duties, allowing the latter greater freedom of movement to conduct combat operations.33 

Although, Russia is still experimenting with reserve force employment options, it appears to 

be gravitating toward the territorial-defense unit model.

Pay in the Russian Army

The Russian Federation has a complex system for paying its officers and contract NCOs, which 

requires some description. The biggest difference between the U.S. and Russian systems of 

military pay is the concept of base salary and entitlements. In the U.S., monetary entitlements 

(including housing allowances) are almost always a percentage of the base salary; in Russia 

the base salary is merely the starting point for calculating entitlements. A few entitlements 

are allotted by a fixed ruble amount, but the majority are calculated by indexing the base 

salary by a given percentage. The total sum of these additional entitlements is always many 

times greater than the soldier’s base salary. 

The two most important criteria for pay are the serviceman’s rank and position held 

(servicemen receive both salaries). Rank-based salaries are based on equivalent 

responsibility/skill levels of federal government employees, while the position salary is based 

upon the soldier’s current duty assignment, which must be on a valid TO&E. Positional salaries 

are typically higher than rank-based salaries, and are set by the Ministry of Defense. (In this 

system, a lieutenant colonel serving as a battalion commander is paid more than a lieutenant 

colonel serving in a brigade staff.) Both rank and positional salary tables are pinned to 

the Russian Federation civilian pay scales and receive equivalent indexes for inflation. 

Interestingly, officers are legally considered a type of contract serviceman. Their pay and 

32 Charles K. Bartles, “Russia Experiments with Two-Tier Operational Reserve System,” OE Watch Online, December 

2014.

Aleksey Ramm, “It Is Time to Return the Reserve to the Formation,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 8 

October 2014, <http://vpk-news.ru/articles/22165>, accessed 1 May 2016. 33 Charles K. Bartles, “Reserve Capability Development is High Priority for the General Staff,” OE Watch Online, 

December 2015. 

Lieutenant General Vasily Tonkoshkurov, “Important Priority for the General Staff: Is the Current Personnel System 

Adequate for Modern Requirements?” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 21 October 2015, <http://vpk-news.

ru/articles/27609>, accessed 1 May 2016.
Personnel System

17

benefits are governed by the same laws, rules, and regulations as their enlisted, non-conscript 

subordinates, who also serve under contract. Officers and enlisted soldiers serving on 

contract sign similar contracts for set periods. Although Russian officers and contract soldiers 

are in the same legal category, there is a sharp distinction between enlisted soldiers serving 

on contract and officers in the Russian Army; Russian officers are never referred to as “contract 

officers.” 

In addition to the base salary officers are paid several additional special pays, which are 

covered under Article 13 of the Federal Law “On the Status of Serviceman.” Most special 

pays are based on the serviceman’s base salary (rank or position). The income a serviceman 

receives from special pays is often many times greater than the soldier base salary. Article 

13 of the Federal Law “On the Status of Serviceman” stipulates that officers receive monthly 

allowances for the following: length of service, location, hardship and special circumstances 

duty, exemplary service, and physical fitness, in addition to a supplemental subsistence 

allowance. There are also several one-time, lump sum payments, and meal and clothing 

allowances.

The most contentious issue regarding serviceman pay in the Russian military has been 

housing. In Soviet times, benefits of military service included higher salaries and greater 

access to fringe benefits, such as free vacation resorts, premium medical facilities, and 

more educational opportunities for children, but the biggest benefit was access to housing. 

Housing in the Soviet era was state controlled and difficult to obtain. Military service 

On the March

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

18

guaranteed access to state-provided housing while serving and during retirement. In today’s 

Russia, this arrangement is still maintained, and has stymied some military reform efforts 

(such as downsizing) due to the legal requirement that officers must be provided housing 

(usually in the form of an apartment) before retirement. In past years housing has been in 

such short supply that some officers have been kept on active duty years past their planned 

retirement dates before housing could be provided. The Russian Federation has made great 

efforts to right this issue, including the development of a military-subsidized home mortgage 

program. This issue has been largely resolved, but occasionally embarrassing incidents still 

come to light. In general, Russia’s economic situation has greatly improved since the early 

years of the Russian Federation, and the currency of stories of destitute Russian serviceman 

have long passed. Russian military salaries, to include the intelligence and security services, 

are now dependable and somewhat competitive with the civilian sector. Although the 

accompanying graphic is intended to display information just for enlisted MoD soldier’s 

serving on contract, many of the pays and allowances are equally applicable to officers and 

other military personnel serving in other branches of government (MVD-VV, FSB, Border 

Troops, etc.).34 Conscripts are paid a small fraction of what contract NCOs and officers earn, 

but are provided free meals and housing. In 2012, it was reported that most conscripts 

earned $30-50 a month, but in conjunction with special duty pays, some conscripts could 

earn up to $200 per month.35

Ethics in the Russian Armed Forces

Stomping out military corruption has been a top priority of the Russian civilian and military 

leadership for quite some time. Due to the Russian Federation’s Tsarist/Soviet past, Russia, 

and by inheritance the Russian military, has developed a nuanced view towards corruption, 

which makes its eradication difficult. Crimes of theft against individuals are viewed the 

same as in the West, but crimes of theft against the state are seen as much more tolerable. 

Although they are seen as somewhat tolerable, they are still embarrassing The most recent 

high profile military corruption fiasco has involved the recent conviction and sentencing of 

Colonel General Vladimir Chirkin, the former Ground Troops Commander-in-Chief. Although 

there have been other high profile gaffes, such as Airborne Troops Commander-in-Chief 

Colonel General Shamanov dispatching an airborne unit to interfere in the prosecutorial 

investigation of a family member, the Chirkin case has garnered substantial interest, as it is 

unusual for such a high-ranking and prominent official to be tried, convicted, and sentenced. 

One of the most interesting aspects of the case is the involvement of the Chief of the Russian 

General Staff, General Valeri Gerasimov. General Gerasimov is an adamant supporter of 

General Chirkin and asked that Chirkin either be found not guilty or, if found guilty, that he 

34 Charles K. Bartles, “Pay in the Russian Military,” OE Watch Online, November 2015.

“Military Financial Literacy,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 23 September 2015, <http://www.vpk-news.ru/

articles/27161>, accessed 1 May 2015. 35 Dmitry Gorenburg, “New Pay Structure for Conscripts Announced,” Blog post on Russian Military Reform, 

January 6, 2012, <https://russiamil.wordpress.com/2012/01/06/new-pay-structure-for-conscripts-announced/>, 

accessed 1 May 2016.
Personnel System

19

be given no prison time. In the Russian system, 

personal connections and loyalties often trump 

institutional governance, and this appears to 

be such a case. It is important to note that 

these views towards “relaxed morals” are not 

reserved solely for senior leaders, as the Russian 

military justice system is now being amended to 

allow some crimes that once required dismissal 

from service to now allow lesser punishments. 

There appears to be concern that the previous 

regulation was weeding out too many good 

officers who had a few peccadilloes. In the 

Russian view, it is far better to have an army 

with the best and brightest, albeit ethically 

challenged, than an army of the ethical, but 

less capable. Undoubtedly, as Russia continues 

experimenting with undeclared wars and indirect and asymmetric methods, there is a 

need for officers who can operate in the grey area that results when what needs to be done 

conflicts with the letter of the law.

Perhaps the reason that the Russian military is having difficulty dealing with corruption is the 

view that Russia, and most Russians, have regarding the relationship between what is legally 

and morally right. These two concepts are very different in the West, but in Russia, whatever is 

considered “morally right” is usually interpreted to be “legally right.” This can be seen in state 

asset seizures of wealthy oligarchs’ property, the annexation of the Crimea, and in the conduct 

of an undeclared war Eastern Ukraine (in order to destabilize the Ukrainian government, a 

government which Russia perceives to be illegitimate and installed by the U.S.). This tendency 

to interpret morally right as legally right make the Russian Armed Forces, intelligence, and 

security services well suited to operating in the ambiguous “Grey Zone” that many operations 

are conducted and will occur. However, this way of thinking is certainly making the 

eradication of corruption difficult, as subordinates see their superiors growing wealthy from 

graft, and decide that it is only right to take a little for one’s self. 36

Rank Structure of the Russian Armed Forces

Some Soviet and even Tsarist uniform insignia are now being reintroduced into the Russian 

Armed Forces. In 2013, the Russian uniform regulations were amended so that a Russian 

four-star equivalent flag officer would wear one large star, instead of four smaller stars. In 

36 Charles K. Bartles, “Ethics, Military Corruption, and the Grey Zone,” OE Watch Online, July 2016.

Charles K. Bartles, “A Russian (Pragmatic) View of Army Ethics,” OE Watch Online, October 2015.

Sergey Shishkin, “Generals’ Advocacy,” Kommersant Online, 3 September 2015, <http://kommersant.ru/

doc/2802382>, accessed 1 May 2016.

Velimir Razuvayev, “Punishment Will Be Lessened for Corrupt Army Officers,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, 10 

August 2015, http://www.ng.ru/politics/2015-08-10/1_corruption.html>, accessed 1 May 2016.

Colonel General Vladimir Chirkin

Former Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

20

Conscript and Contract Serviceman Ranks
Personnel System

21

Officer Ranks
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

22

late 2016, the Russian Federation announced Russian 

officers occupying command positions would wear 

new badges to signify their positions. The new badge 

has unofficially been dubbed “wings” on account of 

its appearance, and is reportedly based on traditions 

from the Tsarist Army. These new badges are worn 

by commanders-in-chief of branches of the Armed 

Forces, commanders of military districts and branches 

of troops, and commanders of divisions, brigades, 

regiments, and separate battalions. The new symbols 

also appear on the uniforms of chiefs of military 

educational institutions and secondary educational 

institutions (Suvorov and Nakhimov military schools), 

that are administered by the military authorities. 

The new badge consists of the Russian tricolor with 

centrally placed badges of Armed Forces services 

(Ground Troops, Aerospace Troops, and Navy) or 

branches of troops (artillery, railroad, engineering, 

tank troops, etc.) and symbols of military units, military 

combined formations, and military educational institutions.37

Women in the Military

The Russian Federation has a long tradition of women in 

uniform.38 Women served in the Soviet military in many 

capacities in the Second World War. In addition to agricultural 

and industrial work, women served in noncombat positions such 

as uniformed secretaries, translators, nurses, and block wardens. 

Although rare, the Soviet Union was the only belligerent that 

utilized women in combat roles. Soviet women served as air 

defenders, in the infantry, and as snipers. There were also 

three women’s air force regiments including the famous 46th 

“Taman” Guards Night Bomber Aviation Regiment (known as the 

“Nachthexen” or night witches by the Germans). In the modern 

Russian military, women still regularly serve, but not in combat 

arms roles. As previously mentioned, it is not uncommon to see 

the wives of contract NCOs and officers enlist as contract NCOs. 

These spouses often serve as uniformed cooks, admin support, 

and radio/telephone operators (in garrison). But women may 

also serve in their own right, and are often encountered as medical and communications 

fields, in officer and contract NCO capacities. Women do not serve in combat arms branches, 

37 Aleksey Ramm, “Officers Will Be Denoted by Wings, Izvestiya Online, 6 December 2016, <http://izvestia.ru/

news/649705>, accessed 16 December 2016. 38 One of the most famous was Nedezhda Durova, who disguised herself as a man and served as a Russian 

officer for nine years in the Mariupol Hussars. She fought in the 1807 and 1812-1814 Wars against Napoleon. 

Alexsander Pushkin, the famous Russian poet, disclosed her story to Russia. Her book, “The Cavalry Maiden” is 

well known in Russia and Indiana University Press has published an excellent translation of it.

General Tatyana Shevtsova

Deputy Defense Minister (Finance)

Image Courtesy: Russian MoD

Field Training

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
Personnel System

23

but this does mean they only serve out of 

harm’s way. Women serve in Russia’s militarized 

intelligence services, and there have been 

reports of women fighting in various capacities 

on both sides of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. 

Although the U.S. and Russia both utilize women 

in their Armed Forces, U.S. observers will notice 

significant systemic differences. It is important to 

keep in mind that Russian servicewomen serve 

in the Russian military in the context of a broader 

Russian culture. It is common for Russian women 

to wear high-heals and other ornamentation 

in field uniforms, something that would be 

unacceptable in the U.S. for many reasons. They are generally treated as women first, and 

soldiers second. This is in stark contrast to the U.S. system, but it appears to be acceptable 

by all parties in Russia. Red Star [Красная Звезда], the daily Russian military newspaper, runs 

a weekly picture and short biography of “Miss Red Star,” an attractive young female who 

is serving the Armed Services in uniform or as a civilian. Sexual harassment, in a Russian 

context, is apparently not an issue in the Russian Armed Forces. And although it almost 

certainly happens, it likely happens at no greater level than encountered in Russian civil 

society. In short, there are obvious differences in the way women serve in the U.S. and Russia, 

but Russian servicewoman are treated as professionals and serve in the Russian military in a 

way acceptable to the military, women, and Russian society as a whole. 

Conclusion

The Russian Federation inherited a conscript system and an officer-heavy military. This 

system has been converted into a hybrid system of enlisted manning with conscripts and 

professional NCOs. Although Russia likely could not convert to a full professionally manned 

army for economic reasons, the Russian higher leadership seems to have little interest in 

achieving such an end state. While Russian conscripts serve only one year, due to a different 

civilian education system and the state DOSAAF program, new enlistees do not necessarily 

enter the military without militarily useful skills as their American counterparts. The Russian 

Federation still desires to maintain some large-scale mass mobilization capability that a mass 

conscription system supports well. In terms of the role of its officers and professional enlisted 

soldiers, Russia has decided to pursue a much different model of enlisted professionalization 

than the one practiced in the West. Except in regard to small unit leadership, leadership is the 

sole purview of the officer corps. At a time when the U.S. is broadening the education and 

experience of its NCO Corps, the Russian Federation is creating enlisted professionals who are 

experts in their fields, but little else. Russia does not desire to create enlisted leaders, it wants 

enlisted technical specialists. Russian professional enlisted soldiers’ assignments invariably 

involve learning, practicing, or teaching their trade. In this aspect, the Russian professional 

enlisted soldiers mirror their officers. The Russian system is not designed to produce “jacks-ofall-trades,” the Russian system is intended to create experts in a chosen military specialty for 

the conduct of war.

Contract NCOs Conducting Field Training

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
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24

Chapter 2 

Structure and Echelonment
Structure and Echelonment

25

What Kind of Military Action Does Russia Need to Prepare for?

Russia needs to defend itself against internal and external unrest or aggression and prepare to 

use force in support of its regional and international interests. Internal unrest and aggression 

may range from soccer riots to armed incursions (Dagestan) to attempted secession from 

the Federation (the two Chechen Wars) to civil war. External conflict may range from armed 

conflict (Donbass region of Ukraine) to local war (Soviet-Afghan War) to regional conflict 

(coalition against ISIS in Syria) to large-scale war (which may involve the territory of the 

Russian Federation). Additional military actions may involve humanitarian and disaster relief 

(Chernobyl during Soviet times), peace enforcement (Kosovo or the naval blockade and 

no-fly zone in Libya) or peace keeping (Golan Heights). To meet all these challenges, the 

Russians train the bulk of their force primarily to meet the most dangerous challenge/largescale conventional maneuver war under nuclear-threat conditions, and then train for other 

contingencies. However, they do not assume that competency in conventional maneuver will 

transition to all climates and geography. Mountain and arctic combat pose special difficulties, 

and the Russians commission officers from their five-year mountain combat or arctic combat 

academies. These lieutenants will spend their careers in Russia’s mountain or arctic brigades. 

What Constitutes the Russian Military?

Russia’s Soviet legacy made stove-piped militarized intelligence 

and security agencies the norm, as the Soviets were leery of 

investing all military power in a single organization or ministry, 

primarily due to fears of a coup. The Russian Federation inherited 

a system that has militarized intelligence and security services 

spread throughout its various ministries, services, and agencies. 

Often military forces that serve in ministries other than the 

Ministry of Defense (MoD) are labeled in the West as “paramilitary,” 

which implies these troops are somewhat less than military. This 

assumption would be incorrect, as the conscripts, contract NCOs, 

and officers who serve in these formations are, for the most part, 

indistinguishable from MoD forces.1 These non-MoD forces live 

in barracks and possess BTRs, BMPs, mortars, artillery, and other 

weapons appropriate for light or motorized rifle units. In common 

usage, when Russians speak of serving “in the Army” they may 

be referring to service in any of these organizations. Historically, 

the vast majority of the Soviet Union, and later Russia’s, military forces could be found in the 

MoD, Ministry of Interior (MVD), and Federal Security Service (FSB-formerly the Committee for 

State Security or KGB) and their subordinate Border Troops.2

 In general, troops serving in the 

MVD and Border Troops are more concerned with internal security, while the MoD is oriented 

towards external threats. 

1

 The officer academies of Russian military forces are so similar that officers can attend one ministry’s academy, 

but be commissioned as an officer into a different ministry.

2

 In some post-Soviet states, especially where external state actors are less of a concern, these other 

organizations have significantly more combat power than the Ministry of Defense units.

General Sergey Shoygu, 

Minister of Defense

Image Courtesy: Russian MoD
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

26

(Above) The above graphic was recreated from “Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year 

Perspective – 2016.” Of particular note, the graphic does not depict the National Security Council, 

which consists of various military officers and civilian ministry and agency heads. These members 

of the National Security Council serve in senior positions at the operational and strategic levels in 

the boxes shown above.3

The Russian Federation recently enacted a major reform of its military forces by establishing 

a National Guard. This National Guard is in no way similar to the U.S. National Guard, but 

consists of active duty troops who were already part of Russia’s other internally focused 

security services, reportedly including the Ministry of Internal Affairs-Internal Troops (MVDVV), Special Rapid-Response Detachment (SOBR), the Special-Purpose Mobile Detachment 

(OMON), the MVD Prompt-Response and Aviation Forces’ Special-Purpose Center, and aviation 

subunits. Estimates of the total National Guard personnel have varied between 200,000-

300,000. For the purposes of clarity, in this book, the term “Armed Forces” will refer specifically 

to the MoD, while the term “military” will refer to all of Russia’s militarized intelligence and 

security services, including the MoD.4

3

 “Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective – 2016,” Swedish Defence Research Agency,” 2016, <https://

www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI-R--4326--SE>, accessed 21 December 2016. 4

 Christopher N. Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War, first edition. (Coulsdon, Surrey: 

Jane’s Information Group, 1988), pp. 47.

Aleksandr Boyko, “Why Russia Needed a National Guard,” Komsomolskaya Pravda Online, 6 April 2016, <http://

www.kp.ru/daily/26510/3382734/>,accessed 15 April 2016.

Charles K. Bartles, “MVD-VV Spetsnaz: The Elite of Russia’s Ministry of Interior Troops,” OE Watch Online, October 

2015.

The Assessed Chain of Command for Combat Operations
Structure and Echelonment

27

The 2008 “New Look” Reforms

The Russian Federation had great difficulties reforming its Armed Forces after the collapse 

of the Soviet Union. Russia’s civilian leadership’s mantra of military reform was modernize, 

downsize, end conscription, and increase servicemen salaries. Former President Boris Yeltsin 

made these promises in the early 1990s, with decidedly mixed results. Russia’s massive 

conscript-based army was substantially trimmed down from the Soviet high of 5,000,000 

uniformed personnel. Aside from the significant changes that took place immediately after 

the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia generally took the “band-aid” approach to military 

reform by applying superficial fixes instead of serious reforms. The net result of this inaction 

was that Russia retained a bloated command structure designed for the command and 

control of literally thousands of divisions, regiments, and battalions. The vast majority of 

these units were “skeleton units” manned by small cadres who help flesh out the unit with 

conscripts and reservists in the event of a mass mobilization. In Soviet times, such a system 

made much sense due to the type of war expected and the economic costs of maintaining 

large military forces, but in the post-Soviet era such a system seemed unnecessary. Moreover, 

it hindered the formation of a more modern, and combat-ready force. 

Russia’s post-Soviet military experiences have occurred on a much smaller scale, which have 

been ill suited for a mass conscript army. Russia’s political leadership appeared to have turned 

a corner in 2007, when it decided to implement a massive reform of the Russian Armed 

Forces, which has been described as the greatest reform of the Russian Armed Forces in over 

one hundred years. This reform was led by a newly appointed Defense Minister, Anatoliy 

Serdyukov, and is often referred to as the “‘New Look” reforms of the Russian Armed Forces.5

 5

 Charles K. Bartles, “Defense Reforms of Russian Defense Minister Anatolii Serdyukov,” Journal of Slavic Military 

Studies 24, no. 1 (2011).

Structure of the Russian Ministry of Defense
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

28

Military District System Reform

One of the most high profile “New Look” reforms was that 

of the Russian military district system. This reform involved 

not only condensing six military districts into four, but also 

significantly changed command and control relationships. 

In the Soviet system, the military district commander 

(there were up to 16 military districts in Soviet times) was 

responsible for garrisoning, training, rear area logistical 

support, protection of strategically vital areas, and 

coordination of civil defense. These missions were his primary 

concern, and fulfilling them involved pre-conscription 

training, conducting the fall and spring conscription 

campaigns, operating military state farms, doling out 

pensions, etc. In wartime, the military district was responsible 

for conducting mass mobilization, including preparation of 

units for combat, transportation of units to the front, logistical 

support, and replenishment. The military district commander 

was not responsible for operational control of most units 

in his territory. This responsibility generally lay within the 

Branches of Arms (Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, etc.) in 

peacetime. 

The 2010 reform gave the military district commander operational control of most military 

and MoD forces in their respective regions, with the exception of all nuclear and certain 

Russian Operational Strategic Commands

Ground Forces Peacetime C2
Structure and Echelonment

29

strategic assets such as the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN), Airborne (VDV), and GRU spetsnaz 

units. At this time, the military districts were renamed “Operational Strategic Commands” 

(OSK), although the term “military district” is still used when referring to the organization 

when it is involved with more mundane rear-services activities. (Due to the periodic mentions 

of military districts in official pronouncements and the very different missions of the OSKs 

and military districts, it is possible the military district hierarchies were not completely 

subsumed by the OSKs. Instead, the military districts still exist, but are collocated at the same 

headquarters as their respective OSKs and are commanded by one 

four-star flag level officer who is dual-hatted for both commands.) 

In 2014, the Russian Federation established the Arctic Operational 

Strategic Command, based upon the Northern Fleet Headquarters 

at Severomorsk, due to the size and strategic importance of the 

Arctic region to Russia. Although the Arctic OSK is considered a 

Joint Strategic Command, it is apparent that it is not considered 

as a military district, as are its sister commands (Western, Central, 

Eastern, Southern), and is essentially “last among equals.” In regards 

to Russian Ground Forces’ maneuver brigades, the military districts 

control most maneuver brigades via Army Groups.6

6

 Donnelly, pp. 149–151.

Bartles, “Defense Reforms of Russian Defense Minister Anatolii Serdyukov.”

Charles K. Bartles, “Missions and C2 Structure of New Russian ‘Northern’ Strategic Command Analyzed,” OE Watch

Russian Ground Forces Dispositions

The above graphic annotates approximate locations of Army and Tank Groups, Divisions, and 

Brigades, where the vast majority of the Ground Forces’ 220,000 personnel may be found. Russia is 

in the midst of a major reorganization of assets in the Western and Southern Operational Strategic 

Commands (OSKs), so this depiction is speculative at best. The command and control relationship 

between the Army Groups (Combined Arms Armies and Tank Armies) is not depicted. 

ПУ фронта, рода войск, флота, военного 

округа, зоны ПВО

КП

Command Post of a Front, Fleet, Branch 

of Arms (with flag of corresponding 

branch color), Military District, Air Force 

Zone, Air Defense Zone, or Air Force and 

Air Defense Zone
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

30

The Role of the Army Group

The intermediate echelon of command between the OSKs and 

maneuver units is the Army Group (a Combined Arms Army or 

Tank Army).7

 The Army Group system was developed by the 

Soviets during the Second World War, when the echelons of corps 

and armies were merged together. Unlike Russian brigades and 

divisions, there is no uniform set of capabilities or assets that these 

Army Groups currently possess; some units do not even have 

motorized rifle or tank units. This is one area that is undergoing 

some change, as there appears to be an effort to develop a 

standard set of capabilities for each Army Group. It is likely that in 

the future each Army Group will have at least several motorized 

rifle and tank divisions and brigades; headquarters, artillery, air 

defense, reconnaissance, and MTO (logistics) brigades; and two 

regiments, an engineering regiment and a NBC defense regiment. 

During combat operations the Army Group detaches needed 

assets to support the various maneuver units. Perhaps the most 

important assets provided by the Army Group in this endeavor 

are the MTO brigades, which feed, fuel, supply, and maintain 

the maneuver brigade(s), and the artillery and/or MLRS artillery 

brigades, which regularly detach assets to support the formation 

of the Brigade Artillery Group (BrAG), which will be discussed in 

depth in the following chapter.8

Online, November 2014.

7 Russia also has Army Corps which serve a similar function, all Army Corps are currently oriented for coastal 

defense missions and are assigned to, and collocated with, the naval fleet headquarters. The 22nd Army 

Corps (Sevastopol/Black Sea Fleet), 11th Army Corps (Kaliningrad/Baltic Sea Fleet), and the 14th Army Corps 

(Severomorsk/Northern Sea Fleet) provide command and control of mostly Coastal Defense Troop units (Naval 

Infantry and Coastal Defense Artillery), and also some Ground Forces units.

Aleksey Nikolskiy, “Moscow Moves Staffers Up to the Front Line,” Vedomosti Online, 12 May 2016, <http://www.

vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2016/05/12/640715-shtabistov-peredovuyu>, accessed 15 June 2016. 8

 “Every Combined Arms Army Will Receive an Engineering Assault Brigade by 2020,” TASS Online, 2 December 

2015, <http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/2492454>, accessed 20 June 2016. 

КП

ПУ армии, армии ВВС и ПВО, флотилии, 

космодрома

Command Post of a Army, Air Force 

and Air Defense Army, Flotilla, or 

Cosmodrome

корпуса, района ПВО, корпуса ВВС и ПВО, 

эскадры, военно-морской базы

КП

Command Post of a Corps, Air Defense 

Corps, Air Force and Air Defense Corps, 

Squadron, or Naval Base

Proposed Baseline Army Group Structure
Structure and Echelonment

31

Transition to the Brigade Structure

In terms of brigade-level and below operations, these reforms are significant for several 

reasons. The first is that they are responsible for consolidating the division/regimental 

structure into modular maneuver brigades of approximately 3,000-

4,500 soldiers, each capable of conducting independent action and 

providing its own organic support (each brigade is typically also a 

separate garrison). The transition to the brigade not only reduced 

a level of management, but was also instrumental in reducing the 

bloated officer corps. When the Russian Federation converted to 

the brigade structure, it also designated all units as “permanent 

readiness units,” eliminating all “cadre units” and the positions of the 

cadre (mostly officers) that manned them. In all, the Russian Armed 

Forces reputedly downsized from 1,890 to 172 large units. 

In order to understand the impact that this change had on the officer corps, consider that in 

2008, the Russian Armed Forces was short some 40,000 officers. By 2010, even after ending 

the program of conscripting university graduates to serve as officers, the Russian Armed 

Forces had such an abundance of officers that in some cases lieutenants were placed in NCO 

positions. The reduction was so extensive that the Russian Federation reduced/consolidated 

the number of military academies from 65 to 10 to better match officer accession and 

training needs. In sum, the transition to the brigade structure was the key change needed to 

downsize a bloated officer corps. The funds freed from this endeavor were put towards the 

improvement of salaries and the modernization of equipment.9

9

 Major-General (retired) Ivan Vorobyev and Colonel Valeriy Kiselev, “Ground Troops Transition to Brigade 

Structure as a Phase of Improving Their Maneuverability,” Military Thought, 1-28 February 2010, No. 2, pp 18-24.

Igor Ivanov, ”Boys with Military Stripes: Where Are the Future Suvorov’s and Zhukov’s to Be Trained,”

Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 1 April 2010, <http://www.rg.ru/2010/04/01/armiya.html>, accessed 1 May 2016.

Alexander Golts, “Reform under the ‘SECRET’ Classification,” The New Times Online, 15 December 2008. <http://

Motorized Rifle Brigade Structure (variant)

ПУ бригады, укрепленного района

КП

Command Post of a Brigade, or Fortified 

Area
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

32

Russia has a somewhat sophisticated 

classification system for determining unit 

echelon type. There are several caveats and 

exceptions, but, in general, elements that are 

incapable of functioning independently over 

time, such as battalions, companies and below 

are considered “subunits” [подразделение]. 

Units that can function independently over 

time, such as regiments, are considered 

“units” [часть], while a formation that consist 

of a collection of units, such as a division, is 

considered a “soyedineniye” [соединение]. 

Serdyukov’s reforms converted most of the force 

into independent brigade soyedineniye. The 

regimental/division structure is still common 

in the Russian Airborne (VDV), and there are 

still a few of the Ground Forces divisions, but 

the vast majority of Russian combat power is 

now found in independent brigades. Although 

brigades and divisions coexist, brigades are 

not subordinated to divisions (unlike the U.S. 

system), each is considered a soyedineniye. 

Major military formations such as Corps, Army 

Groups, Fronts and Strategic High Commands 

(military districts) are considered “ob’yedineniye” 

[объединение].10 In terms of logistics, the difficulties of deploying and supporting a brigade 

is an order of magnitude easier than that of a division. Russia now has a much easier time 

projecting combat power by using smaller soyedineniye. This is in large part due to the fact 

that the Russian Ground Forces (and lesser extent VDV and Naval Infantry) makes extensive 

use of rail transport, smaller soyedineniye, are easier to deploy and sustain with Russia’s rail 

infrastructure. This discipline is regularly practiced. It is not uncommon for Russian brigades 

and their equipment to be transported (by ship or rail) thousands of kilometers for training 

events.11

lenta2012.ru/pulsblog/9705_reforma-pod-grifom-sekretno.aspx>, accessed 1 May 2016.

Marina Yeliseyeva, ‘On the Level of Training in the New Century,’ Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 2 April 2010,

<http://old.redstar.ru/2010/04/02_04/2_05.html>, accessed 1 May 2016. 10 ob’yedineniye [объединение] and soyedineniye [соединение] are often translated as “unit” or “formation,” which 

is technically correct, but loses some meaning in translation. 

11 Aleksey Ramm, “The Ukraine Test: New Image of Armed Forces Spoiled by Field Kitchens,” VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 29 April 2015, <http://vpk-news.ru/articles/25027>, accessed 1 May 2016.

Andrei Santarovich, “Second Ukrainian Front: Why Putin Is Redeploying Troops to Belarus,” Apostrof Online, 24 

November 2016, <http://apostrophe.ua/article/world/ex-ussr/2016-11-24/vtoroy-ukrainskiy-front-zachem-putinperebrasyivaet-voyska-v-belarus/8492>, accessed 22 December 2016.

Approximate Unit Manpower
Structure and Echelonment

33

Reintroduction of the Division?

Although Russia transitioned to a brigade structure 

in 2009/2010, a few divisions remained in the Ground 

Forces, but they were definitely the exception and not 

the rule. Now the Russian Federation is reintroducing 

the division into its organizational structure in a few 

key locations, notably on Russia’s Western border with 

Ukraine and NATO (reportedly, these divisions will deter 

any NATO invasion). There have been few details about 

these divisions and how they will be structured. They 

will reportedly resemble Soviet-era divisions, with three 

motorized rifle regiments and one tank regiment (for 

a motorized rifle division) or three tank regiments and 

one motorized rifle regiment (for a tank division) plus 

supporting units. According to one Russian journalist, 

these divisions will have fewer than the four maneuver 

regiments that were customary in Soviet times. Russian 

tacticians envisage the functioning of brigades and divisions in the same Army Groups.

Prior to 2009/2010 the Russian Ground Forces had never used 

maneuver brigades as permanent formations. When they were 

used, it was typically in an ad-hoc manner, being formed for a 

specific purpose or set period of time. Since these units are now 

functioning together, there is some thinking about how they would 

interact in large-scale combined arms warfare. The brigades will 

use their mobility to function as a combined arms reserve to either 

repel penetrations of the defense or exploit offensive successes. 

Unlike the U.S. system, division and brigades will be subordinated 

directly to a Combined Arms Army or Tank Army; the maneuver 

brigades will never be subordinated to a division. 

One reason that Russia turned away from the regimental/divisional structure was the 

difficulties with deploying these units. Russia determined it needed a brigade structure to 

more easily project combat power, as it is much easier to move a brigade than a division. 

Since these new divisions will be formed just on the western border (near the perceived 

threat), there is likely little concern about these units’ effect on strategic mobility. In 

sum, current Russian thinking sees value in maintaining both the brigade and divisional 

structures. The brigades provide needed strategic mobility to rapidly protect the vast 

borders of the Russian Federation, while the relatively static division provides an abundance 

of combat power in high risk areas. Although Russia has introduced a few new divisions, 

the vast majority of the Russian Ground Forces combat power will reside in brigades for the 

foreseeable future.12

12 Charles K. Bartles, “Fleshing Out the Details of Reintroducing Divisions,” OE Watch Online, June 2016.

Aleksey Ramm, “Russia Is Reviving Divisions,” Izvestiya Online, 10 May 2016, <http://izvestia.ru/

news/612939#ixzz48GcOt8FZ>, accessed 20 May 2016.

ПУ дивизии, авиационной дивизии, 

дивизии ПВО

КП

Command Post of a Division, Airforce 

Division, or Air Defense Division

Anatoliy Serdyukov, Minister of Defense

February 2007 to November 2012

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

34

Building Blocks of the Russian Brigade

Russian maneuver brigades are composed of battalions, companies, platoons, and squads. 

Unlike U.S. brigades, which typically have only battalions reporting directly to the brigade 

commander, Russian brigade commanders may also have companies, platoons, and squads 

reporting to them as well. This number of direct reporting units may seem daunting from 

a U.S./Western view, but not from a Russian one. Typically, Russian brigade (and to a lesser 

extent battalion) commanders have several deputy commanders who assist in the command 

and control of these directly reporting units. In addition, many of the commanders of these 

subordinate units are also on the commander’s staff. For instance, the senior signal officer not 

only sits on the staff, but also commands the signal unit. The building blocks of a brigades 

consist of:

- Squad [отделение]- The squad is the smallest troop formation in 

the Russian Armed Forces. They vary in size, but typically consist 

of 4-14 personnel. The motorized rifle squad is the basic building 

block of the motorized rifle battalion, consisting of seven-nine 

soldiers. Motorized rifle squads are mounted on a combat vehicle, 

either a BMP, BTR, or MT-LB (the MT-LB is considered a light tracked 

BTR). Typical personnel include vehicle commander, drivermechanic, grenadier, assistant grenadier, machine gunner, senior 

rifleman, and rifleman (in squads mounted on BTRs, a designated 

marksman).

- Platoon [взвод] - Russian platoons typically consist of two-four squads with 20-45 personnel 

led by a lieutenant or senior lieutenant with the help of an officer assistant (senior NCO). Most 

platoons are part of companies, but some platoons report directly to battalion, brigade, or 

higher echelon units. A motorized rifle platoon based upon BMPs has a command element 

with three squads. A motorized rifle platoon, based upon three BMPs, has a command 

element and three squads. The command element consists of a commander, senior sergeant, 

designated marksman, machine gunner, crewman and medic. The platoon has a total of 32 

personnel.

отделение взвод рота батальон

Squad Platoon Company Battalion

Subunit symbols are used in conjunction with vehicle, weapon systems, and other symbols to 

indicate unit size and type in Russian military graphics. 

Russian Graphic Symbols Depicting Subunits

Мотострелковое отделение

(мсо)

The single line representing a squad is 

often omitted in tactical maps 
Structure and Echelonment

35

- Company [рота] - Russian companies vary in size, but the majority have two-four platoons 

with a total of 30-100 personnel. Most companies are part of battalions, but some companies 

report directly to battalion, brigade, or higher echelon units. The motorized rifle company 

has three platoons led by a captain with the help of an officer assistant (senior NCO) and a 

small headquarters element (seven personnel- company commander, deputy commander, 

senior sergeant, senior mechanic, medic, grenadier, ground radar operator) for a total of 

approximately 100 soldiers. In motorized rifle companies based on BTRs, there may be an 

additional antitank squad.

- Battalion [батальон] - Battalions and below are considered 

“subunits” [подразделение] in the Russian system. Subunits are 

the basic building blocks of the Russian Armed Forces, creating 

whole units [войсковая часть] such as regiments and brigades. 

Battalions that are “separate” [отдельный] are considered 

“whole” units, and will have larger staffs to support the additional 

administrative overhead. “Whole” units in the MoD are referred to 

with five digit numbers, while FSB and MVD units are referred to 

with four digit numbers. For instance, the 54th Separate Guards 

Air Assault Battalion is в/ч [войсковая часть] 85954.

 

Motorized rifle battalions have very similar structures, whether they are based on MT-LBs, 

BTRs or BMPs. The subunit typically has three motorized rifle companies, a mortar battery, 

and reconnaissance, grenade launcher, antitank, signal, engineer, and combat support 

platoons, for a total of approximately 500 soldiers. Since BTRs have less fire power than BMPs, 

BTR-mounted battalions may have an additional antitank platoon. If the motorized rifle 

battalions is acting independently, the unit could have attachments including air defense 

artillery (missile), reconnaissance, and logistical support subunits as needed. A motorized rifle 

battalion is usually led by a lieutenant colonel, but a major may also be found in command. 

His staff typically consists of a senior deputy commander, deputy commander for personnel, 

deputy commander for logistics and maintenance, and advisor for artillery. 

батальон

A battalion may be represented with 

two different symbols 
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

36

Combined Arms Combat

Horse cavalry with horse-drawn artillery and wagonmounted machineguns was an important aspect of 

the Russian Civil War. These mobile forces were able to 

project power over Russia’s vastness, but cavalry clashes 

were seldom decisive. Sturdy foot-mobile infantry were 

necessary for decisive battle. World War I proved the 

effectiveness of combined arms combat and introduced 

the tank to modern warfare. The Soviet Workers and 

Peasants Red Army practiced combined arms battle as 

soon as practical. Artillery was integrated into infantry 

(later motorized infantry) battalions and tank battalions 

usually had infantry and artillery attached. Motorized rifle 

battalions usually had tanks and artillery attached, as well 

as its own organic artillery. While mortars and infantry 

direct support artillery batteries remained part of artillery 

branch, they were easy to integrate into motorized rifle 

battalions, as they maintained their own training program 

and used the same vehicles to move their weapons and 

ammunition. After World War II, the Soviets attempted to 

form permanent combined arms battalions of organic tank, 

motorized rifle and artillery companies/batteries, but the logistics and training frustrated the 

effort. Instead, the infantry, direct support artillery or mortar battery remained an organic 

part of motorized rifle and infantry units, while tanks and infantry regularly trained together 

and developed habitual partnerships.13 

The Russian Army has realized this long-term goal by regularly using battalion tactical 

groups incorporating tank and motorized rifle companies and artillery batteries in the same 

battalion tactical group (BTG).14 This makes coordination by mission, locale and time for the 

rapid destruction of the enemy possible and enables the battalion commander to tailor his 

force optimally for each combat mission. The Russians extend this combined arms combat 

philosophy throughout the organization of actions by their large strategic formations 

(ob’yedineniye), operational/tactical formations (soyedineniye) and units (chast’) for the 

fulfillment of their assigned missions.

13 Lester W. Grau, “The Soviet Combined Arms Battalion--Reorganization for Tactical Flexibility,” Soviet Army 

Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, September 1989.

14 The Russian media has reported that in 2016, that each brigade or regiment (Ground Forces, Airborne, and 

Naval Infantry) had at least two BTGs in that were completely manned with contract servicemen, and by the end 

of 2016, the Russian Armed Forces would have 96 BTGs, by the end of 2017- 115 BTGs, and by the end of 2018-

125 BTGs.

“The Armed Forces Will Increase by Twofold the Number of Reinforced Battalions with Contract Servicemen,” RIA 

Novosti Online, 14 September 2016, <https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20160914/1476912391.html>, accessed 20 

November 2016.

Colonel General Oleg Salyukov 

Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
Structure and Echelonment

37

The Role of the Battalion Tactical Group

The Battalion Tactical Group is now a commonly seen ad hoc formation, based upon a 

motorized rifle or tank battalion with attachments. It has been around in various forms 

since Soviet times, and is employed by not only the Ground Forces, but also Airborne and 

Naval Infantry units. The BTG appears to be Russia’s instrument of choice in Eastern Ukraine, 

prompting some analysts to speculate that Russia was fielding BTGs because it was difficult or 

impossible to field fully functional brigades. Since Russia now regularly transports brigades 

and their equipment considerable distances for exercises, it is unlikely that Russia is fielding 

BTGs in Ukraine due to logistic difficulties, but instead because they believe that the BTG is the 

most effective formation for combat in those circumstances.15

It is important to note that the BTG was always intended to be a means of projecting a 

brigade’s combat power, as the idea was discussed in the early years of implementing the 

brigade system.16 In 2005, well before the introduction of the brigades, Chief of the General 

Staff, General Yuri Baluyevskiy said: “events in Chechnya have shown that self-sufficient 

battalions and tactical groups with self-sufficient means of intelligence, communications and 

provisions operated more successfully in local conflicts. That is why we are considering the 

possibility of moving away from a strict organizational staffing structure today.”17 General 

Baluyevskiy is referencing BTGs. 

The combined arms BTG was intended to be used as a detachable instrument of the brigade. 

One lesson learned from Russia in 2008 was the difficulty in deploying troops far from their 

garrisons. In order to remedy this problem, Russia now routinely mobilizes brigade and 

division-size units and transports them and their equipment considerable distances before 

they begin exercises.18 The use of detached BTGs in the Ukrainian theater does not mean that 

the Russians cannot deploy full brigades. The use of BTGs in this manner may be a way that 

Russia is handling troop rotations through the conflict. It also could mean that the BTG is the 

best force mix for this particular environment.

Although the BTGs likely have a common training program, there still are problems. Problems 

with command and control and suitable employment of attached units are subjects that are 

not highlighted in open Russian military discussion. There are also logistical and maintenance 

15 Charles K. Bartles, “The Future is Bright for Battalion Tactical Groups,” OE Watch Online, April 2016. 16 Sergey Buntman and Anatoliy Yermolin, “Interview with Colonel Andrey Ivanayev, Commander of the 5th 

Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade,” Ekho Moskvy Online, 12 June 2010, <http://echo.msk.ru/programs/

voensovet/686657-echo.phtml>, accessed 15 June 2016. 17 Viktor Mikhaylov, “The Russian Military Brigade Contract” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online, 22 May 

2009, < http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2009-05-22/1_podryad.html?mthree=3>, accessed 8 May 2015. 

Igor Chernyak, “Igor Baluyevskiy: We Do not Intend Waging War with NATO,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 1 

November 2005, <http://www.rg.ru/2005/11/01/baluevsky.html>, accessed 8 May 2015. 18 “Information Resistance Has Detected Russian Troops from More Than 10 Brigades in Donets Basin,” Ukrayinska 

Pravda Online, 20 April 2015, <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2015/04/20/7065276/>, accessed 9 May 

2015. The US Army conducts EDREs-Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises- where combat battalions and 

larger units are transported over distance, after short notice, to a training site to draw equipment and train. 

Aleksey Ramm, “The Ukraine Test: New Image of Armed Forces Spoiled by Field Kitchens,” VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 29 April 2015, <http://vpk-news.ru/articles/25027>, accessed 6 May 2015.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

38

issues, although use of the Armata common chassis will mitigate some of them. One reform 

that has not been successful was the abolition of some logistics and maintenance units in 

favor of private contractors. Russia is currently trying to rebuild some of its organic logistics 

and maintenance units that were disbanded, but the process is slow going.19 BTGs are not 

immune to the logistics problems that still plague the Russian military, and BTG commanders 

still complain about them. There is also reporting that BTGs are augmented by staff at the 

Army Group and Military District level. Due to the Russian planning process, battalion staffs 

are quite small by U.S. standards. This augmented staff may substitute for the lack of an onsite higher headquarters (brigade/regiment), but these staff members might also be liaising 

with the General Staff and advising the unit commander as needed.20

The Battalion Tactical Group in Relation to Mission Command

The Russian military views the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare differently 

from the West. In the West these levels are typically defined by echelon size (battalion, corps, 

army, theater, task force, etc.), but in the Russian system these levels are more nuanced, 

defined by the unit’s scope of mission. For instance, a division operating under an Army 

Group would be considered to be acting at a tactical level, but if the same division were 

detached and operating under a Front-level command, it would be considered to be acting 

at the operational level. By the same token, a brigade is usually considered as acting at the 

tactical level, but in a conflict with a much smaller opponent—as in the Russian–Georgian 

War—a brigade could be a “war winner,” and therefore a strategic asset.21 In the Russian 

system, a BTG is a tactical entity. 

In the U.S. system, if at lower echelons Mission Command is more of a science than art and 

higher levels more of an art than science, this situation is even more so in the Russian system. 

The system of tactics lends itself well to mathematical precision and calculation. The science 

of command involves the commander picking the best option for accomplishing the mission 

and adjusting variables as needed. This process is assisted by rigid tactics and predictability 

that allow such practices as utilizing tables that estimate the percentage of an enemy unit 

that will be destroyed with a given amount of time from a specified unit (artillery firing tables, 

etc.). In terms of tactics, from a U.S. military decision-making process (MDMP) perspective, 

Russian military commanders have limited options for developing plans to accomplish given 

tasks. Commanders pick from the “menu” of known tactics. Although this would irk a U.S. 

commander, Russian commanders are comfortable with this system because, although tactics 

are simple, albeit in aggregate, when multiple simple tactics are combined to accomplish 

a given task, a given maneuver could appear complex. Since these maneuvers are not 

19 One factor complicating the matter is that contract troops are funneled into the combat arms, leaving combat 

support and combat service support roles being filled by conscripts. 

Charles K. Bartles, “Details of Russia’s Spring 2015 Conscription Campaign, ” OE Watch Online, May 2015.

Aleksey Durnovo, “Features of Organizing the Spring 2015 Draft of Citizens for Military Service,” Ekho Moskvy

Online, 4 April 2015, <http://echo.msk.ru/programs/voensovet/1522994-echo/>, accessed 8 May 2015. 20 Aleksey Ramm, “The Ukraine Test: New Image of Armed Forces Spoiled by Field Kitchens,” VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 29 April 2015, <http://vpk-news.ru/articles/25027>, accessed 6 May 2015. 21 Charles K. Bartles & Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Military Operation in Crimea: Road-Testing Rapid Reaction 

Capabilities,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 61, No. 6, November–December 2014, 51-52.
Structure and Echelonment

39

developed “on-the-fly” and are instead a collection of simple tasks, the planning process is 

much less involved than for an equivalent maneuver by a U.S. unit. At the tactical level, this 

system allows these units to have miniscule staffs in comparison to Western units and do not 

require extensive operations orders to plan their missions. All that is typically required in a 

Russian operation order is a map signed by the commander, with a few notes jotted in the 

margins. Tactics are simple and rigid, but since they are universal, when used in aggregate 

they can provide great operational flexibility.22 

The Battalion Tactical Group in Relation to Operational Art

The BTG has no relationship to operational art in a Russian military context.

This is because the term “operational art” has a much different meaning for the U.S. than 

Russia. In a NATO context it is defined as:

 ...the use of creative thinking by commanders and staffs to design strategies, campaigns, 

and major operations and organize and employ military forces. It is a thought process that 

uses skill, knowledge, experience, and judgment to overcome the ambiguity and uncertainty 

of a complex environment and understand the problem at hand. Operational art also 

promotes unified action by encouraging JFCs and staffs to consider the capabilities, actions, 

goals, priorities, and operating processes of interorganizational partners, while determining 

objectives, establishing priorities, and assigning tasks to subordinate forces. It facilitates the 

coordination, synchronization, and, where appropriate, integration of military operations with 

those of interorganizational partners, thereby promoting unity of effort.

23

In practice, this definition has led NATO militaries to think not just about the military aspects 

of force projection, but also about the coordination of the full gamut of the state’s means of 

leverage to achieve a desired end state. In contrast, the definition of the term in a Soviet/

Russian context is much more military oriented:

Operational art encompasses the theory and practice of preparing for and conducting 

operations by large units (fronts, armies) of the armed forces. It occupies an intermediate 

between strategy and tactics. “Stemming from strategic requirements, operational art 

determines methods of preparing for and conducting to achieve strategic goals.” Operational 

art in turn “establishes the tasks and direction for the development of tactics.” Soviet 

operational art provides a context for studying, understanding, preparing for, and conducting 

war...24

In a Russian context, operational art has typically been thought of in the way that the great 

Soviet military thinkers (e.g., Tuchachevsky, Svechin, Triandafilov and Isserson) had, focusing 

mostly on military matters, such as maneuvering of large military formations for optimum 

effect.25 Modern war is becoming more unpredictable. General Gerasimov, the Russian Chief 

of the General Staff stated: “In the 21st century, a tendency toward the elimination of the 

differences between the states of war and peace is becoming discernible. Wars are now not 

even declared, but having begun, are not going according to a pattern we are accustomed 

to.”26 While retaining the ideas of its major military theoreticians, there are some signs that 22 Ibid.

23 Joint Publication 3.0, Joint Operations, 11 August 2011, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf>, 

accessed 22 December 2014.

24 David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle. London, England: F. Cass, 1991. 25 Charles K. Bartles, “Russia’s Indirect and Asymmetric Methods as a Response to the New Western Way of War” 

Special Operations Journal, June 2016. 26 Valeriy Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and 

Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,“ Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 26 February 2013, <http://

vpk-news.ru/articles/14632>, accessed 22 December 2014.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

40

Russia may be expanding its definition of operational art to that of a definition more in line 

with U.S./NATO, due to current interests in new forms, methods, and ways of conducting 

warfare.27 Regardless of Russian interests in indirect and asymmetric methods (which the 

West has dubbed “hybrid warfare” or Russian “New Generation Warfare,”) and an increase 

in the quality of enlisted personnel through a new system of contract manning, in terms of 

systemic operation little, if anything, has changed at the tactical level for the Russian military. 

However the self-sufficiency of the BTG does expand the capability of the Russian Army to 

conduct deep tactical battle and provides a modality for the projection of the brigade or 

division’s combat power.

In short, Russian tactical leadership, especially as practiced at the brigade level and below, 

does not relate to operational art as defined by the Russian military, and is difficult to 

understand through a Western notion of the MDMP and a different world view of present 

and future war. Furthermore, the highly specialized nature of Russian personnel and training 

practice means that at the tactical level (generally brigade and below) Russian commanders 

will be primarily focused on the application of combat power (getting steel on target) and 

will be far less interested in the diplomatic, informational, and economic aspects of war, as are 

their Western counterparts. In the Russian system, these areas are generally the responsibility 

of higher echelons, or other branches of the Russian government. 

27 Aleksandr Korabelnikov, “Military-Field Breakdown: Armed Forces Need New Regulation Documents to Further 

Increase Combat Effectiveness,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 19 November 2014, <http://vpk-news.ru/

articles/22730>, accessed 16 December 2014.

Combat Missions for a Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Offense
Structure and Echelonment

41

Elements of Offensive and Defensive Combat

Combat Missions 

Soviet and Russian military theorists have long studied the changing nature of warfare. 

Modern combat will involve greater depth, fluidity and mobility than in the past. Contiguous 

defensive lines of shoulder-to-shoulder formations will give way to open flanks, meeting 

battles and the struggle to gain important areas that will undermine the tactical stability of 

defending forces.28 While objective lines remain important, linear combat based on linear 

defensive lines and defensive zones will give way to combat to defeat artillery groupings 

working in conjunction with maneuver forces. Russian tactical units will be assigned 

objective limits. Russian maneuver brigades normally are assigned an immediate and 

subsequent mission, and a mission of the day. The brigade’s immediate objective will usually 

be the rear of the enemy first-echelon battalion’s defensive combat formation. The brigade’s 

subsequent objective will usually be the rear of the enemy first-echelon brigade’s defensive 

combat formation. The brigade’s mission-of-the-day objective will usually be the rear of the 

enemy’s second echelon brigade’s defensive combat formation. The mission of the day is 

flexible and will change with the brigade’s restated mission every 24 hours. A first-echelon 

brigade’s subsequent objective may correspond to the parent army’s immediate objective. 

Battalions are normally assigned immediate objectives and a direction for further attack.

Getting to and Conducting Battle

Maneuver is the organized movement of troops during combat to a more advantageous 

position to attack or repulse the enemy. Maneuver makes it possible to seize and hold the 

initiative and prevent enemy success; however, maneuver alone does not accomplish the 

mission. Fire is an essential partner of maneuver. The long-range fire battle, especially 

the effective employment of reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fire assets, makes 

successful maneuver possible. Tank and motorized rifle tactical units and subunits generally 

use three basic types of formations when conducting movement to and during the attack: 

march formation, pre-combat formation, and combat formation.29

March Formation

For Russia, combined rail and road movement is often the most effective and quickest way 

to move brigades and other large units. March planning includes priority for movement, 

march capabilities (so that the forces and heavy equipment on rail arrive together) and march 

support in the form of air defense, security of bridges and choke points, supply of POL and 

material reserves, maintenance support, secrecy, assembly areas, dispersion areas, lager sites, 

rest sites, information operations cover and misdirection.30

Marches can be administrative or under threat. Marches under threat have usually been 

conducted at night for concealment. Depending on the state of electronic combat and air 

superiority, marches may be conducted during the day under smoke. The Russians use smoke 

in a variety of circumstances. It is used instead of building expensive counters to top-attack 

28 Lester W. Grau, “Changing Soviet Objective Depths in Future War,” Military Review, December 1989. 29 Major General (retired) Ivan Nikolayevich Vorobyov, “Know, Anticipate, Win: Revisiting the Issue of a 

Commander’s Tactical Foresight,” Armeyskiy Sbornik, June 2006. 30 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “March Preparation,” [Маршевая Подготовка], Military 

Encyclopedia [Военная Энциклопедия], Volume 5, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 2001, 20-21. 
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

42

and may be used to screen movement effectively, provided that its particulates serve as a 

screen against electronic probes. Heavy equipment transports are used to save wear and 

tear on tanks and artillery pieces. In marches under threat, it is optimal that first echelon 

brigades have three routes from the final assembly area to commitment. The march column 

is organized so that the battalions may move directly into combat if needed. March columns 

must flow smoothly and quickly from the march into battle in combat order determined by 

the enemy composition and terrain where contact is expected. This provides an advantage 

in the event of a meeting engagement or overcoming a surprise enemy defense. Marches are 

usually used in an attack from the depth, meeting engagement or pursuit.

Pre-Combat Formation

 The Tsarist and Soviet Army used the pre-battle formation to facilitate rapid and efficient 

maneuver of their units and subunits from the march to combat formation and back again. 

The Russian Ground Forces continue to use the pre-combat formation for this purpose. When 

in pre-combat formation, elements adjust the distance between vehicles and subunits to 

meet the realities of terrain and enemy forces. A Russian Ground Forces brigade, battalion, 

company, or platoon can transition from the march to pre-battle formation and back into 

march formation in a very short period of time. A unit in pre-combat formation is deployed in 

columns and dispersed laterally with less depth than in the march formation. The pre-battle 

formation is used when conducting a pursuit or an attack against a defending enemy, if the 

enemy’s defenses are relatively weak or are effectively suppressed. 

Combat Formation

Before engaging in battle, whether on the offense or in the defense, a Russian maneuver 

brigade and its subordinate units will deploy into a combat formation. These elements 

may deploy into the combat formation from the march or from a pre-combat formation 

depending on the mission and expected enemy strength. Instead of deploying into a 

combat formation, a brigade’s subunits may deploy into different configurations to support 

other mission-specific requirements. Maneuver brigades typically have a dedicated 

reconnaissance element, but since subunits usually do not, they form ad-hoc formations to 

fulfill these missions. Most units not in combat formation are in configurations for fulfilling 

reconnaissance and security missions. These configurations include reconnaissance 

detachments, reconnaissance groups, reconnaissance patrols, forward detachments, advance 

guard, raiding detachments, combat security outposts, combined arms reserves, antitank 

reserves, anti-airborne/air assault reserves, armored groups, special reserves, and flank and 

rear security elements.31

Reconnaissance Detachment [разведывательный отряд] - Reconnaissance detachments 

are typically mounted reinforced companies that are capable of conducting observation, 

searches, raids, ambushes, installing/removing observation equipment, and, if necessary, 

engaging the enemy. They move on primary axes in advance of a march, meeting battle or 

offensive and are normally proceeded by a reconnaissance patrol (platoon). The standard 

31 Major General (retired) Ivan Nikolayevich Vorobyov, “Tactics: The Art of the Offense,” Military Thought, March 

2003.
Structure and Echelonment

43

operating range of a Reconnaissance Detachment varies by mission, but an operational depth 

of 50 kilometers for company-sized units and 80 kilometers for battalion-sized elements is 

common.32

Reconnaissance Group [разведывательная группа] - Reconnaissance groups are typically 

motorized rifle or spetsnaz squads dispatched to reconnoiter in the enemy rear area to 

locate nuclear delivery systems, enemy forces, headquarters, airfields, signal sites and other 

important targets. Reconnaissance groups are capable of conducting observation, raids, 

ambushes, and installing/removing observation and communication equipment. They may 

be inserted by helicopter, vehicle or on foot.33

Reconnaissance Patrol [разведывательный дозор] - Reconnaissance patrols are typically 

platoon-sized elements, reinforced with engineers and other specialists, that reconnoiter up 

to 10 kilometers ahead of the parent unit. Reconnaissance Patrols can be combat, officer 

reconnaissance, NBC or engineer.34

Forward Detachment [передовой отряд] - A forward detachment is a combined arms force 

normally built around a reinforced maneuver battalion and capable of independent action. 

When conducting offensive combat, the forward detachment of a brigade moves well ahead 

of the advanced guard of the lead brigade but behind the brigade’s reconnaissance patrols. 

Its mission is to seize key objectives and water crossings in advance of its parent brigade 

to facilitate the fastest possible advance and to quickly wedge itself deep into the enemy 

territory or defenses. Sub-elements of a forward detachment may conduct raids against key 

targets en route to their objectives. A forward detachment is not assigned a specific march 

route and will attempt to avoid contact with enemy forces until it reaches its objective. 

Forward detachments often link up with air-landed forces on their objectives. Water-crossing 

sites of operational and tactical significance are very important forward detachment 

objectives. When conducting defensive combat, forward detachments are tasked to establish 

a series of defensive positions in the brigade’s security zone astride main avenues of approach 

to delay, disrupt, or destroy the advancing enemy. Forward detachments are essential for 

pursuit operations and will be described in greater detail in the Pursuit section.35

Advance Guard [авангард] - Each first-echelon brigade forms an advance guard from a 

first-echelon maneuver battalion while moving and expecting contact with the enemy. An 

advance guard ensures the high speed of the brigade in securing the advance of its parent 

brigade’s main body. Unlike forward detachments, advance guards move directly on the 

brigade’s route of advance. It is a security element and does not avoid contact with the 

enemy; rather, it seeks to defeat all enemy forces encountered. Its goal is to fight through 

32 Ministry of Defense, USSR, Military Encyclopedic Dictionary [Военный Энциклопедический Словарь], 2nd

Edition, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1986, 617.

33 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Military Encyclopedic Dictionary [Военный Энциклопедический

Словарь], Volume 2, Moscow: Ripol Klassik, 2001, 438. 34 Ministry of Defense, USSR, Military Encyclopedic Dictionary [Военный Энциклопедический Словарь], 2nd

Edition, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1986, 617.

35 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Military Encyclopedic Dictionary [Военный Энциклопедический

Словарь], Volume 2, Moscow: Ripol Klassik, 2001, 290.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

44

or fix all opposition to free its parent brigade from deploying its main body. It facilitates the 

movement of the main body while preventing enemy surprise attacks and overcoming the 

enemy security zone.36

Raiding Detachment [рейдовый отряд] - A raiding detachment is a reinforced battalion 

capable of functioning independently, which is dispatched to destroy important military 

targets, disrupt command and control, occupy key terrain and block enemy reserves. In this 

effort, it overlaps the mission of forward detachments; conversely, forward detachments may 

also conduct raids.37

Combat Security Outpost [боевое охранение] - Combat security outposts (CSOs) are security 

elements formed when a covering zone instead of a security zone is established forward 

of the main defensive area. CSOs are reinforced platoons deployed from the first-echelon 

companies of defending first-echelon battalions. They are placed up to 1,000 meters in front 

of the forward edge of defensive positions. The purpose of a CSO is to conceal the battalion’s 

main defensive position, prevent enemy reconnaissance, provide early warning, engage 

enemy forces, and slow the enemy’s rate of advance. Positions for the CSO are normally 

chosen by the brigade commander and refined by the battalion commander. These positions 

will be covered by direct fire from antitank weapons from the first-echelon companies’ 

strong points. CSO positions are improved by engineer obstacles and construction. A CSO 

is withdrawn only when ordered by the battalion commander with the concurrence of the 

brigade commander. CSO withdrawal, if ordered, is along predesignated, covered routes that 

afford whatever cover is available and that do not interfere with the battalion’s defensive fire 

plan.38

Combined Arms Reserve [общевойсковой резерв] - When organized as one echelon, 

brigades and battalions often form a combined arms reserve. This is a small force (about 

one-ninth of the force: a platoon at battalion and a battalion at brigade) that is directly 

subordinate to the commander. The combined arms reserve, unlike the second echelon, 

is not assigned a specific mission. This reserve is a contingency force used to meet any 

unanticipated requirements. Common contingencies include blocking a breakthrough, 

counterattacking, providing flank security and covering gaps.39

Antitank Reserve [противотанковый резерв] - Antitank elements at the brigade and 

battalion level form the antitank reserve and are often reinforced with engineer and artillery 

assets. The antitank reserve is usually employed as a blocking force against an enemy 

counterattack during the offense, covering threatened areas, open flanks and deployment 

areas. At the brigade level, it is usually led by the antitank artillery battalion commander.40

36 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Military Encyclopedic Dictionary [Военный Энциклопедический

Словарь], Volume 1, Moscow: Ripol Klassik, 2001, 8-9. 37 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Military Encyclopedia [Военная Энциклопедия], Volume 7, 

Moscow: Voyenizdat, 2003, 465.

38 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Military Encyclopedic Dictionary [Военный Энциклопедический

Словарь], Volume 1, Moscow: Ripol Klassik, 2001, 196. 39 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Military Encyclopedic Dictionary [Военный Энциклопедический

Словарь], Volume 2, Moscow: Ripol Klassik, 2001, 186. 40 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Military Encyclopedic Dictionary [Военный Энциклопедический
Structure and Echelonment

45

Anti-Airborne/Air Assault Reserve [противодесантный резерв] - This reserve is a mobile, 

combined arms force created from second-echelon assets. It was added to Soviet tactical 

units in the mid-to-late 1980s and has been used by the Russians since that time. This 

development was due to Soviet fears that NATO could deploy a prodigious “air echelon” 

that would be able to jump over Soviet defensive positions, wreak havoc in the Soviet rear 

and threaten the operational stability of the defense. The anti-desant reserve is a mobile, 

combined arms force created from second-echelon assets. It is used in defensive situations 

where there is a strong possibility that the enemy will air-land forces. If an anti-desant reserve 

is designated, a combined arms reserve usually will not be formed. The formation of an antidesant reserve will depend on the tactical situation. Russian units will only create an antidesant reserve when fighting a highly advanced enemy which has the capability to air-land 

troops into combat. The anti-desant reserve is composed of combined arms subunits drawn 

from the second echelon-similar to the combined arms reserve.41

Bronegruppa (Armored Group) [броннегруппа] - When motorized rifle forces have 

dismounted from their BMPs, BTRs or MT-LBs, they may remain with their dismounted 

personnel to provide fire support, or they may be withdrawn to form an armored maneuver 

reserve with a significant direct-fire capability. This grouping is particularly true when 

the Russian force is defending, occupying blocking positions or engaged in city fighting. 

Sometimes tanks augment the armored group. (The terms “bronegruppa” and “armored group” 

can be used interchangeably.) This armored reserve normally is constituted from platoon 

through brigade. It is particularly common among second echelon subunits. It is often 

commanded by a deputy commander. This concept was widely practiced during the SovietAfghan War and continued in the fighting in Chechnya and Georgia.42

Special Reserve [специальный отряд] - Special reserves, such as chemical defense or 

engineer, may also be formed, depending on the tactical situation. Special reserves are not 

normally found at battalion level because of their limited organic assets.

Flank and Rear Security Elements [боковое охранение и охрана тыловых районов] - During 

the march, every maneuver brigade in the first or second echelon provides flank security for 

itself using assets taken from its main body. Rear security in a brigade march is provided by 

the second-echelon battalions. Forces operating alone (forward detachments, advanced 

guards) provide their own rear and flank security. Flank and rear security elements normally 

operate up to five kilometers from and paralleling or trailing their parent organizations.

Air Assault Detachment [тактический воздушный десант] - This unit is part of a reinforced 

motorized rifle company trained to air assault into the rear area where an enemy has broken 

through. The air assault detachment will cooperate with subunits of the brigade’s second 

echelon in the conduct of a containment or counterattack. 

Словарь], Volume 2, Moscow: Ripol Klassik, 2001, 409. 41 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Military Encyclopedic Dictionary [Военный Энциклопедический

Словарь], Volume 2, Moscow: Ripol Klassik, 2001, 401. 42 Lester W. Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, Washington: NDU Press, 

1995, 2.
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46

Echelonment of Forces

A Russian maneuver brigade can attack independently, but will most often conduct maneuver 

combat as part of an army. As part of an army, it may be an enveloping force in a single or 

double envelopment to encircle an enemy force. It may be part of an army offensive on 

several axes. It may have a screening mission along a coastline or river. The meeting battle 

is the preferred form of offensive combat since the enemy has not had time to go to ground 

and entrench. Attacking an entrenched defending enemy can be costly in time and combat 

power.

An attack against a defending enemy can be from positions in direct contact with the enemy 

or from the march. When possible, Russians prefer to attack from the march. Often the first 

battle will be the covering force battle, where Russian forward detachments push through 

light enemy defenses and call in air, missile and artillery strikes on them. Air assaults may 

supplement forward detachment efforts to cut off enemy units in the covering force area.

A breakthrough attack against an entrenched enemy is difficult, and, consequently, it is 

a carefully choreographed event meshing air and missile strikes, phased artillery strikes, 

electronic countermeasures (ECM) and obscurants with the deployment of the attacking 

force from the march to pre-combat to combat formation. It brings the full firepower of the 

attacker to bear on the defender, either killing or incapacitating him. The attack is designed 

to rapidly punch through a sector of the defense and widen the gap while pushing followon forces through the gap to seize the enemy rear areas and defeat enemy reserve forces in 

meeting battles.

A Russian maneuver brigade (and subordinate units) will usually form two echelons in both 

the offense and in the defense. The first echelon typically has one-half to two-thirds of the 

brigade’s combat power, while the second echelon has one-half to one-third. The second 

echelon is a combined arms force that is assigned a specific mission, and this mission 

differentiates it from a reserve. 

On the offense, the first echelon conducts the main attack. It is charged with achieving 

the higher headquarters immediate objective and is usually responsible for attaining 

the subsequent objective. The second echelon is intended to exploit the success of the 

first echelon, continue the attack, and achieve the subsequent objective of the parent 

organization. If one sector of the first echelon’s attack fails and another succeeds, the 

second echelon will be committed into only the successful sector. Therefore, the second 

echelon’s attack may be in a different direction than originally planned. The second echelon 

is committed to combat through gaps between enemy strong points and breaches formed in 

the enemy’s lines as a result of nuclear and conventional fire strikes. Other specific secondechelon missions may be to conduct pursuit, destroy bypassed enemy elements, defeat a 

counterattack, or replace first-echelon units that are combat ineffective before or during 

commitment. The Russian defense is designed to defeat or mitigate the effects of enemy 

nuclear and MLRS strikes, air attacks, tank attacks and air assaults. To do so, it employs the 

following principles:43

43 The following discussion is based on G. D. Ionin and V.V. Turchenko, Ministry of Defense of the Russian 
Structure and Echelonment

47

Concentration and Dispersal 

Concentration of fire: Fires, not personnel and systems, are massed to achieve effect. Fire 

planning from squad to brigade designates areas of interlocking fire, massed fire, stopping fire 

and final protective fire. Artillery planning includes individual targets, concentrations, moving 

barrages, and standing barrages, as well as offensive fire planning to support counterattacks. 

It even plans for concentrated direct fires.

Disperse laterally and in depth: Defend in depth, limiting the effects of enemy fire and forcing 

constant attrition on the advancing enemy. Use a deep security zone where possible to draw 

out the enemy force, use his supplies, disclose his strength and create an opportunity for 

deep attack. High ground is often vital, but to sit on vital ground is to attract enemy fire. It 

may be better to defend the approaches while dominating the ground by fire from flank and 

rear. If it is necessary to put forces on that ground, minimal forces may hold the ground until 

enemy preparation artillery fire is concluded; the designated force is then quickly moved into 

position. The second echelon should be strong and tank-heavy. 

Activeness and Maneuver

Pre-empt the enemy: The defender cannot be passive and rely on positional defense. The 

defender must retain or attain the initiative. An aggressive defense is a stable defense. 

Destroy the enemy nuclear delivery systems. Alter unfavorable force ratios at the last minute 

or disrupt enemy timetables. Conduct spoiling attacks to disrupt enemy deployment.

Federation, “Defense,” Military Encyclopedia [Военная Энциклопедия], Volume 5, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 2001, 530-534 

and long conversations with Charles Dick, Retired Director of the British Combat Studies Research Centre.

Russian Classifications of Fire Theory
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

48

Maneuver: Maneuver by fire is key. Maneuver of forces is equally vital. Shift forces from 

quiet sectors or from the depth for counter-penetration or counterattack. Avoid loitering in 

assembly areas inviting enemy fires. Move counterstroke forces frequently.

Counter-attacks: Counterattack before the enemy commits his immediate reserve to maintain 

the stability of the defense.

Counterpenetration: Should the enemy disrupt the stability of the defense and penetrate 

with sufficient combat power, hold and shape the penetration with the second echelon and 

reserves while reinforcing first echelon forces. Leave the more decisive counterstroke to the 

senior commander. Do not just stop the enemy, destroy him. 

Reconnaissance: Constant, aggressive reconnaissance in the enemy depth must determine 

the enemy main axes, location of forces and time table to preempt his attack through longrange fires, maneuver and counterattack.

Conduct deep battle: Long-range fires, air strikes and amphibious and air assault landings 

will disrupt, damage and delay the attacker. Controlled partisan actions may tie down 

considerable enemy forces.

Steadfastness: Some areas and lines must be held to maintain the stability of the defense, 

disrupt the enemy and gain time for the use of outside maneuver to rectify the situation. 

Defending forces do not have the right to withdraw without orders from the senior 

commander. This is true even when communications are lost and the force is surrounded. It 

is better to hold and wait for the counterattack than to break out of the encirclement and 

lose the combat power and effectiveness of the force. An intact force in the enemy depth 

reduces enemy possibilities. The senior commander will determine which areas will be held 

steadfastly and which areas are appropriate for maneuver defense.

Engineering Preparation: Forces in positional defense must be well dug in to survive nuclear, 

precision and concentrated artillery fire. Second echelon and reserve forces will need to be 

similarly protected, as will assembly areas and deeper defenses. Obstacles are an important 

part of defense, and minefields are very effective. Minefields that are laid at the last minute 

in the path of the enemy advance are particularly effective, since the possibility of enemy 

detection is lessened, preventing him from having breaching equipment at the exact spot 

needed. Mobile obstacle detachments, working with the antitank reserve are key assets. 

Mines can also be quickly laid from helicopters or by multiple rocket launchers. These are 

especially useful in sealing gaps or frustrating the deployment of the enemy reserve during 

an attack.

Surprise: The side with the initiative has an advantage in achieving surprise; however, the 

defender can achieve surprise by concealing the defense, deceiving the attacker as to the 

location and alignment of the defense or by attacking to win the initiative. Techniques to 

achieve surprise include:
Structure and Echelonment

49

Avoid stereotypes: Published defensive graphics are a guide, not a directive. Lay out the 

defense to take advantage of the variations in the terrain without being predictable. Adhere 

to the norms, but use them imaginatively, remembering that they are averages that will vary 

due to terrain, mission, capabilities and weather.

Conduct counter reconnaissance: Locate, defeat and destroy enemy reconnaissance efforts. 

Use dummy positions and radio nets, conduct false movements. Camouflage real and dummy 

positions. Check the effectiveness of camouflage habitually and particularly from the air. 

Create a false forward edge of the defense: Where possible, create a false forward edge 

to draw enemy artillery preparation and premature deployment for attack. If that is not 

possible, consider withdrawing the bulk of the force secretly before the enemy air and artillery 

preparations and then reoccupy the fighting positions.

Counterpreparation: Secretly prepare to conduct artillery and airstrikes before the enemy has 

an opportunity to conduct his planned strikes.

Maneuver: Maneuver is essential for maintaining the stability of the defense, but maneuver 

must be covert to avoid enemy detection and counterattack or fire strikes. Prepare routes 

planning the use of concealment, bad weather, smoke and camouflage to cover movement.

Air Defense: Defeat of enemy aviation, missiles and UAVs is essential to deny enemy air 

reconnaissance, deter enemy air strikes and prevent or interdict enemy air assaults. Air 

defense should be multilayered, overlapping and redundant. It should involve missiles 

and guns so that it can function despite electronic jamming and ECM. Consider the use of 

particulate smoke.

Anti-desant Defense: Defend against aerial or amphibious raids and insertions by constituting 

an anti-desant reserve, constructing anti-landing obstacles, stringing overhead wire, 

mining landing zones and planning artillery strikes on landing zones. Air defense is an 

essential component against aerial insertions and direct fire artillery, and deployment of the 

bronegruppa can be an effective addition to the strength of the anti-desant reserve.

Deep battle: Deep battle is the concern of senior commanders using deep targeting, raids, 

sabotage, air assaults, missile strikes and air interdiction to weaken the attacking enemy.

In the brigade defense, the first echelon occupies the main forward position and is 

responsible for stopping the enemy’s attack in front of or within this position. It will normally 

have two battalions forward and two battalions in the second echelon. Should it defend with 

three battalions forward, it may also constitute a combined arms reserve. Where possible, 

the brigade will establish a security zone which may extend in excess of 20 kilometers in front 

of the brigade main defense. If it cannot establish a security zone, it will establish a forward 

position that will mimic the forward line of the defense.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

50

Battalions in the first echelon are intended to:

- Engage the enemy as it deploys and transitions from column movement to attack

formation

- Repel assaults by the enemy in order to avoid enemy pockets in the defensive area

- Deny enemy breakthrough into the depths of its defense;

- Destroy enemy subunit pockets at established kill zones and lines.

The second echelon (or reserve) is intended to:

- Deny the enemy’s seizure of strong points throughout the depth of the defense

- Prohibit enemy breakthroughs throughout the depth of the defense

- Defeat pockets of the enemy through actions of subunits at designated positions and lines 

- Conduct counterattacks 

- Reoccupy contested positions at the forward edge of the defense.

The brigade may employ a single echelon if the situation allows or if opposed by a weak 

enemy. When organized as one echelon, brigades and battalions often form a combined arms 

reserve. This is a small force (about one-ninth of the force: a platoon at battalion, a company 

at regiment, and a battalion at brigade) that is directly subordinate to the commander. The 

combined arms reserve, unlike the second echelon, is not assigned a specific mission. This 

reserve is a contingency 

force used to meet any 

unanticipated requirements.

A second echelon battalion 

does not normally conduct a 

counterattack. Usually all that 

is available to counterattack 

from within the brigade 

defensive area is the antitank 

reserve and the combined 

arms (anti-desant) reserve. 

If the enemy has managed 

to penetrate through the 

first-echelon defenses, it is 

a robust force. The second 

echelon (or combined arms 

reserve) needs to stop the 

penetration and hold it in place. Stopping the penetration is first priority, and it is safer to 

stop it from prepared defensive lines augmented with internal fire lines from the antitank and 

the combined arms reserves. Once the penetration is stopped, an external counterattack can 

then eliminate the enemy penetration with a flank attack. Of course, if the enemy penetration 

has been stopped before it has been fully engaged with the second echelon defense, it may 

be weakened enough that the two reserves can deal with it. What the Russians do not want 

is to launch a meeting battle from within the second echelon defenses-and lose the battle. 

Then, the brigade has been split open with no prepared defenses behind it to stop the enemy 

advance.

Russian Strike Classification Theory
Structure and Echelonment

51

Military Decision Making Process

The contemporary maneuver battlefield, under nuclear-threatened conditions, has changed 

in terms of tempo, reaction time, battle space and lethality. Once battle is joined, the 

tempo and sudden changes on the battlefield leaves little time to produce and disseminate 

intelligence and formulate plans and orders. Cyber-attacks and electronic warfare threaten 

timely communication. Parallel planning must supplant sequential planning. Battle 

management needs to be decentralized at the tactical level, but under centralized operational 

control. Tactical commanders need the authority and initiative to conduct battles in order 

to meet rapidly developing and changing situations in an effective and timely manner. In 

practice, battle drills are implemented at the squad through battalion levels. These battle 

drills, in conjunction with combined arms battalions, quick and effective staff procedures, and 

improved planning tools, aid rapid decision making and troop leading.

 

Commander and Staff Roles

The US Army uses a commander-driven decision making process where the staff uses 

direction and guidance from the commander to study the situation and develop courses of 

action for the commander’s review and approval. The Russian system is different. Although 

both systems are “commander-driven,” the role of the commander in these systems differ 

substantially. The Russian commander is much more involved with the orders process. In the 

Russian system, the commander, not the staff, develops the course of action. Upon receipt of 

orders, the Russian commander makes his decision based on his orders and understanding 

of the operational environment, and passes his decision to his staff and subordinate 

commanders for implementation. His decision has at least three elements: the concept of 

the fight, tactical missions, and coordination. The concept of the fight specifies which enemy 

elements are to be destroyed by what resources and in what order; the sector of main effort; 

and the organization for combat and the concept of maneuver. The tactical missions are 

specified for the first and second echelons, reserves, artillery, air defense and other subunits. 

Coordination includes objectives, phase lines, targets and times of link-up and achievement. 

The commander often outlines his plan on a battle map, selecting from a collection of 

well-rehearsed tactical battle drills. Following the commander’s decision, he and his senior 

commanders make an on-ground reconnaissance of the area that they intend to fight on. 

Since the role of the commander is different in the Russian system, so is the structure and 

role of the staff at tactical levels. The Russian tactical staff is normally smaller than Western 

counterparts, this is due not only to the more active role of the commander, but also due to 

the emphasis on battle drills and repetition, which lessens planning duties. In addition, the 

staff makes extensive use of nomograms to support most aspects of staff planning, especially 

in the areas of logistics, artillery planning, and determining the correlation of forces.44 

These nomograms are produced at higher levels (possibly at the General Staff, or one of its 

subordinate organizations) and are presumably updated as needed so they may be used to 

develop the staff’s running estimates.

44 A nomogram is a diagram representing the relations between three or more variable quantities by means of a 

number of scales, so arranged that the value of one variable can be found by a simple geometric construction, 

for example, by drawing a straight line intersecting the other scales at the appropriate values. For examples, 

see A. Ya. Vayner, Tactical Calculations[Тактические расчеты], Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1982. The formulae and 

nomograms in this book have since been computerized, updated and expanded to further speed up planning. 
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

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Nomogram Example

Nomogram for the destruction of enemy personnel and weapons with 100mm or 122mm 

artillery fire or 120mm mortar fire.

Example: Determine the area of destruction of enemy personnel and weapons by an artillery 

strike of 18 artillery pieces in the course of 7 minutes, if a single artillery piece can fire 25 

rounds per minute, with the required expenditure of rounds per hectare at 80 rounds.

This nomogram is used to determine quickly the planning data for various smaller caliber 

artillery systems for area fire with mathematical probability of achieving artillery destruction 

norms. 

Example #1: Determine the area of destruction of 12 122mm howitzers against enemy 

personnel in the open using a 15-minute artillery fire strike. This is shown by the red line.

Begin at the “Duration of Fire” axis and find 15 minutes. Go straight up to find the 122m 

“Type of Fire” line. Move horizontally left from that point to find the 12 line for the “Quantity 

of Artillery Pieces (Mortars)”. Drop from that point to the 122mm line for “Personnel and 

Weapons in the Open”. From that point, go horizontally to the “Area of Destruction” axis to 

read the answer-33 hectares. When the red line passed through the “Quantity of Rounds” axis, 

it showed that it will require 600 rounds.

Example #2: Determine the duration of a fire strike by 12 122mm howitzers to destroy enemy 

personnel in the open in a target area of 20 hectares. This is shown by the blue line.

Begin at the “Area of Destruction” axis and find 20 hectares. From that point, move 

horizontally to the 122mm line in “Personnel and Weapons in the Open”. From that point, 

Artillery Nomogram Formula (example)

18 artillery pieces x 25 rounds per minute S= 80 rounds per hectare S≈ 5.6 hectares
Structure and Echelonment

53

move vertically to the 12 line in “Quantity of Artillery Pieces (Mortars)”. From that point, move 

horizontally to the 122mm line in “Type of Fire”. From that point, drop down to the “Duration 

of Fire” axis to determine the answer-7 minutes. When the blue line passed through the 

“Quantity of Rounds” axis, it revealed that the mission will require 300 rounds.

Example #3: Determine how many 100mm cannon and the quantity of rounds needed to 

destroy dug-in personnel and weapons in a 7.2 hectare target area in a ten-minute artillery 

strike. This is shown by the green line.

Begin at the “Duration of Fire” axis and find 10 minutes. From that point, move vertically 

to the 100mm line in “Type of Fire”. Mark that point. Next, drop down to the “Area of 

Destruction” axis and find 7.2 hectares. Move horizontally to the 100mm line in “Covered 

and Concealed Personnel and Weapons”. Move vertically and determine where the second 

point on the “Type of Fire” line and this line intersect. They intersect at 36 on the “Quantity of 

Artillery Pieces (Mortars). The green line crossed the “Quantity of Rounds” axis at 1800. Thus, 

the mission will require 36 100mm cannon and 1800 rounds.

Artillery Nomogram (example)
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

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Another significant difference between the staff systems, are the duties of the staff members. 

In the Russian system, tactical staff members often command the troops associated with 

their staff section. (For instance, if the Russian system was implemented in a U.S. maneuver 

brigade, the brigade S-2 would also be the military intelligence company (MICO) commander.) 

Russian tactical staffs spend less time planning than their Western counterparts, but are 

more involved with the implementation of the commander’s orders, by directly tasking 

their subordinates. (This differs substantially from the U.S. system, where the members of 

the brigade staff typically directly control few personnel.) After the commander issues his 

initial orders, the staff and subordinate commanders begin their planning. The staff issues 

necessary warning orders while checking force ratios, requesting additional supplies, and 

adjusting frontages or dispositions to attain a mathematical probability of success. (In Russian 

parlance, Correlation of Forces and Means (COFM) analysis and mathematical verification) 

Fragmentary orders assist and adjust the parallel planning. The chief of staff produces the 

final battle map, which is the combat order and is signed by both the commander and chief 

of staff. There may be a small written annex of two to three pages. With the U.S. system, a 

Steps of the U.S. Army’s Military Decision Making Process 
Structure and Echelonment

55

military unit with a weak commander, and a strong staff, could conceivably be successful, as a 

strong staff may be able to shepherd a weak commander in the right direction. This is not the 

case with the Russian system, the commander is not just guiding and deciding, but also doing 

the planning. There is a Russian proverb “as goes the commander, so goes the unit.”

Military Decision Making in Relation to War Fighting Functions

Since the Russians use a much different military decision making process than used in the 

West, applying the Western concept of War Fighting Functions (WFFs) to their tactics and 

operations should be done with great care. In practice, the Russians do not discuss or even 

have a concept of WFF (Movement and Maneuver, Fires, Intelligence, Sustainment, Mission 

Command, Protection) as distinct elements assigned to various members of the staff. Instead, 

the WFF are always discussed in aggregate. As the commander is much more involved with 

the mechanics of planning, he is also responsible for the coordination of the WFFs essential 

for the execution of the mission. One example of how the Russian system is different from 

the U.S. system is by looking at how the Russians handle Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance (ISR). In the U.S. system, ISR falls squarely in the Intelligence WFF, with 

the intelligence staff bargaining and compromising with the other WFFs for resources and 

priorities, such as UAVs, which the brigade’s intelligence staff typically do not directly control. 

In the Russian system, the commander is responsible for intelligence, along with the other 

WFFs, and he decides what does and does not get resourced. All assets that are capable of 

Approximation of the Russian Military Decision Making Process

(Above) The above graphic is in no way “Russian doctrine” and is only intended to illustrate the 

authors’ understanding of the differences between the Russian decision making process and the 

U.S. Army process described in Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

56

performing ISR functions, such as the UAV company’s UAVs, the air defense battalions’ radars, 

the electronic warfare company’s sensors, and the brigade’s reconnaissance battalion and 

signal intelligence platoon are used as he deems fit, and are networked accordingly. The 

commander will pull assets as needed to perform other tasks associated with other WFFs, 

but this is done at his discretion, and never as a compromise among the staff. This system 

prevents any problems that could arise from a particularly dominant personality on the staff 

acquiring more resources than would otherwise be allocated. The commander’s personal 

attention to all of these aspects seems daunting to most persons familiar with the Western 

MDMP, but not unduly so for Russians. Since a Russian commander usually just selects 

maneuvers from his well-rehearsed tactical battle drills, the details of WFFs only need to be 

tweaked as necessary to fit the operational environment. The significance of differences 

between these systems is that a Russian unit in similar circumstances as it its Western 

counterpart may pursue a radically different “best” course of action due to these differences. 

In short, a U.S. staff cannot simply “put on their red hats” and reasonably expect to ascertain 

the decisions of their Russian counterparts, as both are using different systems for military 

decision making.

Theory of Implementation

The Russian education system continues to emphasize mathematics 

and science. Consequently, “math anxiety” is not a problem, 

particularly among military professionals. Mathematical determination 

articles are a normal part of most Russian professional military 

journals. Russian officers use mathematical models to aid in their 

planning. Nomograms and calculations quickly resolve issues 

such as determining pass times and march durations; duration and 

density of artillery fire to achieve necessary percentages of kills and 

equipment destruction in area fire missions; the time and place 

where the forces will encounter the enemy main force; the optimal 

march routes; the time required to move from the assembly area and 

transition from battalion to platoon attack formation; the artillery 

expenditure required during this transition; or the numbers of trucks and trips required 

to move tonnages of different cargo. The math does not stop there. A key component 

of operational and tactical planning is determining the Correlation of Forces and Means 

(COFM). This methodology is the mathematical determination of the combat power of the 

opposing sides after making mathematical adjustments for differences in combat systems, 

quantity and quality of systems, quality and training of the forces, terrain, morale, activity 

(attacking, defending, withdrawing, flanking, etc.), and combat experience. The Correlation 

of Forces and Means provides the ability to determine a mathematical probability of success, 

most advantageous avenues of attack or withdrawal and rate of advance in an operation or 

battle and can be the decisive determinant in the commander’s decision.45 Determination 

of the Correlation of Forces and Means used to be a fairly lengthy mathematical drill, but the 

methodology has been computerized and upgraded. Mathematical models are also widely 

used for ammunition, fuel and personnel expenditure rates.

45 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Correlation of Forces and Means” [Соотношение сил и

средств], Military Encyclopedia [Военная Энциклопедия], Volume 7, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 2003, 583-584.

Multiple headquarters in one 

location with an automated 

command and control capability

П

5 мсп

12 Тб

10 А

4 рвб
Structure and Echelonment

57

Implementation of the Planning Process

Computerization, automation and stream-lined staff procedures are a priority for Russian staff 

planners. The motorized rifle brigade has five personnel in its operations section (two officers, 

two sergeants and one civilian). According to a recent Russian estimate, “typical” brigadelevel staff procedures take up 200 man-hours per week. Experience shows that this translates 

to the requirement to produce 1.5-2 pages of printed text or enter 600-800 tactical symbols 

and operations notes per hour. Fatigue impacts on this output. For a “typical” brigade battle 

plan, the operations section spends three hours alone on planning rear services (supply and 

maintenance) support. Previously, this planning could take up to a day. The Russian goal 

is not simply to make the planning process faster, the Russian goal is to make the planning 

process faster than that of the potential adversaries. Current Russian estimates suppose that 

the most-advanced foreign armies require eight hours to produce a battle plan, the Russian 

goal is to reduce their planning process for a similiar Russian force to under six hours. In U.S. 

military speak, the Russians are attempting to gain a decisive Mission Command advantage 

by using a shorter OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) loop vis-à-vis their adversaries (see 

image above). 

Significance of Automated Command and Control

Perhaps the greatest factor that has caused the development of such a different planning 

process is Russian thinking on future war. The Russian Armed Forces still believe their first 

priority is high-speed maneuver warfare, and for this purpose, they believe their system is 

ideally suited. (The Russian Ground Forces do not see a need to implement a planning system 

that more easily facilitates counterinsurgency or nation building.) Although the study of 

Correlation of Operational Planning Time
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

58

battles in the Second World War is rare in the West, these battles are still widely studied in 

the Russian military at all levels. The Soviet experience in the Second World War has taught 

generations of Russian officers that high-intensity maneuver warfare is extremely fluid. The 

best laid plans are quickly overcome by events as the situation rapidly changes. The best way 

of military decision making (in the Russian view) is not an in-depth staff planning process 

that requires much coordination and de-confliction, but a system where one person (the 

commander), who has situational understanding, rapidly issues timely orders to perform 

standard tactics and/or battle drills (as appropriate) adjusted for the enemy, terrain, etc. 

(operational environment) to influence the outcome of the battle. While the U.S. and West 

have made great efforts to incorporate technological developments into modern warfare, 

there has been relatively little effort to refine the NATO military decision making process. 

This is not the case for the Russians. They believe that an automated command and control 

system is a key development for Russian attaining information dominance on the modern 

battlefield by allowing a Russian commander to more quickly gain situational understanding, 

draft and transmit plans, and execute operations more quickly than his adversary, (shorter 

OODA loop). As can be seen by the accompanying graphic, the desired Russian end state 

is to field a decision making system that cycles faster than the adversary’s decision making 

system. 46 Although automated command and control systems may be fielded (in some form 

or another) by the U.S. and NATO, these systems will likely have relatively less impact due to 

some of the automated command and control systems advantages being mitigated by the 

U.S./NATO military decision making process that requires more human inputs, such as staffing 

to provide coordination and de-confliction. 

The Russian tactical military decision process not only starts with the commander, but is also 

executed by him as well. This process is facilitated by well-rehearsed battle drills, permanent 

combined arms subunits, quick and effective staff procedures and improved planning tools. It 

is a different approach than that of Western armies and does not use their more staff-driven, 

war-fighting-functions methodology for military decision making. Although the Russian 

system is substantially less flexible than the U.S./NATO system, it does provide one advantagespeed. (In short, the Russians prefer to sacrifice flexibility for speed in planning and executing 

operations.) The Russian personnel system was built to support this system, battle drills are 

emphasized for junior officers and their enlisted soldiers, while more senior officers focus 

on the study of tactics and their historical employment. The Russians pursue a war fighting 

philosophy that in high-intensity maneuver warfare, it is far better to execute a satisfactory 

plan early, than a great plan late. Or more simply stated, a Russian commander prefers to 

execute a previously rehearsed mission that fulfills the mission requirements adequately, than 

attempting to plan and execute a custom planned mission that fulfills the mission perfectly. 

46 Blog site of Lieutenant General Sergei Skokov, former Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces, “Assessment 

of the Situation in the Military - Part Two” [Оценка обстановки в военном деле - часть вторая], <http://generalskokov.livejournal.com/2691.html>, accessed 27 November 2016.
Structure and Echelonment

59

Major General (ret.) Ivan Nikolayevich Vorobyov

Doctor of Military Sciences and Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General (retired) Ivan 

Nikolayevich Vorobyov has a distinguished military and civilian career. Born June 22, 1922, 

Major General Vorobyov served as an infantry officer in the Great Patriotic War (Second World 

War) from June 22, 1942 to May 9, 1945 in positions ranging from rifle platoon to battalion 

commander. He was three times awarded for actions in combat, and is a recipient of the 

“Order of the Red Banner” award. In 1950, he graduated from the Frunze Combined Arms 

Academy, earning a prestigious “Gold Medal” for academic excellence. In 1955 he completed 

a post-graduate program and taught tactics at the academy for the next seventeen years. 

Later, he served in the Science Division of the Soviet General Staff, retiring from uniformed 

service in 1987. Major General Vorobyov is a prolific writer, authoring over 200 papers on 

tactics and operational art. These works have included writings on principles of combined 

arms combat; the future of warfare; combat actions under special conditions; fighting at 

night; military-science methodologies; counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations; and 

interministerial cooperation during combat operations. Major General Vorobyov continues 

to author articles and still serves on faculty at the Russian Combined Arms Academy.47 Most 

of the sources in this, and the following three chapters can be directly or indirectly attributed 

to his work, as his influence on Soviet, and later Russian, tactics has no Western equivalent. 

Major General Vorobyov has also written extensively on the importance of the information 

component of war (including electronic warfare). In the past, Russian military thinkers 

have thought of combat in terms of space: depth, width and height. Due to Major General 

Vorobyov’s writings, many Russian officers believe that a fourth value – information - is now 

equally important.

47 Major General Ivan Nikolayevich Vorobyov’s biography as found at: <dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enc_

biography/131179/Воробьев>.

Image Courtesy:

 Russian Ministry of Defense
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

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Chapter 3 

The Defense
The Defense

61

Defensive Theory

The Goals of the Defense

- Deflect attacks by superior enemy forces

- Inflict maximum losses

- Retain important areas, objects, and key terrain

- Create favorable conditions for the conduct of an offensive1

Requirements for the Defense

The main requirements for the defense are that it is stable and active. In terms of stability, the 

defense should be able to withstand any type of enemy assault, including attacks by massed 

tanks and infantry and airborne/air assault landings. It must protect vital areas and destroy 

any enemy elements that penetrate the defense. In order to fulfill these requirements, the 

defense must have:

- In depth echelonment, prepared for an extended defense against an enemy with

weapons of mass destruction, precision-guided munitions, and electronic warfare

- Antitank Capabilities

- Air Defense Capabilities

- Anti-Assault Capabilities

Achieving Stability in the Defense

Stability in the Defense is achieved by the accomplishment of a number of objectives:

- It must be able to withstand the effects of nuclear weapons.

- It must have a low vulnerability to enemy precision weapons. In order to protect 

against precision weapons, forces must be dispersed, covered and concealed. Forces 

must have means of obscuring their positions from radar and thermal imaging 

devices, and means of protection from precision weapons using electronic warfare.

- It has to be antitank capable, able to repel assaults by tanks and armored vehicles.

- It must be capable of defending against tactical and operational air strikes.

- It has to be capable of repelling airborne (parachute) and air assault attacks, and

handling sabotage and reconnaissance groups.

Characteristics of an Active Defense

The characteristics of an Active Defense:

- Places the enemy under constant fire 

- Creates unfavorable conditions for the enemy to conduct battle

- Conducts extensive maneuver of forces and systems in the conduct of fires and assaults

- Conducts decisive counterattacks. 1

 This section, including graphics, has been compiled from many sources to include:

“Requirements for the Defense” [Требования предъявляемые к обороне], as found on Studiopedia, <http://

studopedia.info/1-67775.html>, accessed on 1 July 2016.

V.N. Zaritski and L.A. Kharkevich, General Tactics [Общая Тактика], Tambov: Tambov Government Technical 

University, 2007.

Field Manual: Preparation and Conduct of Combined Arms Warfare [Боевой Устав: По Подготовке и Ведению

Общевойскового Боя], Moscow: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2005.

Source material has also been obtained from a variety of training documents produced by Russian military 

academies and military departments in civilian academic institutions.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

62

Achieving an Active Defense

The Active Defense is achieved by:

- Careful organization of the means of nuclear and conventional fires to destroy the

enemy and the skillful implementation of this during combat.

- Timely maneuver of forces and systems, fires and obstacles against a threatened axis. 

- Jamming of enemy C2 systems, weapons, and aircraft.

The maneuver of forces and systems involved in the transfer of reinforcements and

their deployment on a new axis of advance, line or area is carried out to create a more

advantageous grouping of forces to fulfill a military mission. The maneuver of forces and 

systems in the defense may be carried out along the front line of the defenses, from the rear 

to the front or from the front to the rear, and includes units and subunits of all branches.

Types of Defense

Positional- This is the primary type of defense that more fully achieves these goals. This 

defense inflicts maximum losses upon the enemy by stubbornly holding prepared defensive 

positions.

Maneuver- The purpose of this defense is to inflict losses on the enemy, gain time and 

preserve one’s own force. This defense is conducted by successive defensive battles, planned 

in advance and echeloned throughout the depth of the defense. Short counterattacks 

augment the defense of the security zone.

Forms of Maneuver Defense

- The maneuver force has means to prevent attacks in the threatened area in order to

prevent an enemy breakthrough on the axis of the main attack, eliminating the 

threat of being flanked and exploiting an enemy flank or boundary. 

- Maneuver of the second echelon (reserve) for employment on a prepared firing lines

to close any gaps in the defense resulting from massive air strikes and enemy 

precision munitions, in order to repel any enemy breakthroughs. 

- Maneuver strikes and fires on essential enemy formations.

- Maneuver of antitank artillery and antitank guided missiles subunits, attack 

helicopters, the antitank reserve, and the mobile obstacle detachment on the axes of 

deployment in threatened areas to prevent enemy tank breakthroughs. 

- Anti-airborne/air assault maneuver by the reserve or an element of the second

echelon, as well as attack helicopters with goal of destroying the enemy air assaults.

Motorized Rifle Subunits in the Defense

Motorized rifle battalion- defends a fortified area 3-5 kilometers wide and 2-2.5 kilometers 

in depth. It is a unified position with the strong points of the battalion’s motorized rifle 

companies, which are prepared for 360° defense. In those areas where the terrain is not all 

accessible for attacking forces and in a security zone defense or with a forward position, the 

defense width may increase. The battalion position has three or four trenches, consisting of 

company strong points and positions for TO&E and attached weapons. These positions are 

linked by a unitary fire plan, obstacles and communications trenches.
The Defense

63

Motorized rifle company- defends a strong point up to 1.5 kilometers wide and one kilometer 

deep. It consists of two trenches and includes the strong points of the company’s motorized 

rifle platoons and fighting positions for company weapons and attached subunits. These 

positions are linked by a unitary fire plan, obstacles and communications trenches.

Motorized rifle platoon- defends a strong point up to 400 meters wide and up to 300 meters 

deep. The strong point consists of squad positions, fighting positions, and firing positions for 

BMPs or BTRs and attached weapons. The strong point for a tank platoon consists of firing 

positions for the tanks and attached weapons.

Conditions for the Transition to the Defense

In the absence of contact with the enemy (in advance), forces may transition to the defense 

for the following reasons and/or under the following conditions:

- To protect the state border

- On an axis where one’s offensive forces are not engaging, but where enemy

forces may attack

- On the coastal areas where there is a threat of enemy landings

- When assigned to the second echelon (reserve)

- On an axis required to transition to the offensive.

In direct contact with the enemy (forced), forces may transition to the defense for the 

following reasons and/or under the following conditions :

- To repel counterattacks

- To secure and retain captured defensive lines

- To cover the flanks of an advancing force on a threatened direction 

- Due to the results of an unsuccessful meeting engagement

- During an offensive when the force has suffered heavy losses.

Preparation of the Defense

Preparation of the defense begins with receipt of orders from the senior commander. It 

includes:

- Organizing for combat

- Decision making

- Giving the orders to subordinate units

- Reconnaissance

- Organization of cooperation and an integrated system of fires, comprehensive

logistic support and C2

- Development of diagrams for the battalion’s area of defense, company strong points

- Preparation to carry out combat missions

- Conduct of the defense, creation of combat orders and systems of fires

- Engineering support in the area of defense (strong point)

- Organization and conduct of morale and psychological work

- Practical work of the commander, his deputies, the battalion staff with the

subordinate subunits, and other activities.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

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The Defense in Special Conditions

Defense in a City (Village)

A battalion in a city (village) usually defends one or more blocks, a company a quarter or more 

of the buildings (defended by the battalion), and the platoon - one or two buildings. Every 

populated area and separate building held by a battalion (company) must be turned into an 

impregnable fortress with all-around defense, that can hold on, even when fully surrounded 

by the enemy.

Defense in the Mountains

Defense in the mountains, as a rule, is built on a broad front, intercepting the most accessible 

areas of enemy action, plateaus, and valleys, as in normal conditions. The main efforts are 

concentrated on the defense of the commanding heights, passes, road junctions and other 

important terrain. Strong points are prepared for a circular (360°) defense. Reconnaissance, 

patrols and ambushes and obstacles cover the areas between them.

Defense in the Forest

Defense in the forest is based on company and platoon strong points, prepared for a circular 

(360°) defense and on road intersections, clearings, and gorges between lakes and swamps. 

Reconnaissance, patrols and ambushes and obstacles cover the areas between them.

Defense in the Desert

Defense in the desert is established on the most probable direction of enemy advance. It is 

based on a well-organized system of fire and maneuver and a wide second echelon (reserve). 

Availability of rugged terrain with dunes and salt flats allows the battalion to build defenses 

on a broad front in one echelon with more gaps between strong points than usual.

Defense in the Northern Regions and Winter

Defense in northern regions is organized on a broad front on the axes available for an enemy 

attack. The defense usually consists of company and platoon strong points that are prepared 

for a circular (360°) defense. Efforts are focused upon securing roads and adjacent heights, 

settlements, gorges, crossings over water barriers and other important objects.
The Defense

65

Squad in the Defense

A motorized rifle squad in the defense works, as a rule, as part 

of a platoon, and can also be assigned as an ambush party. A 

BMP without dismounts can conduct a fire ambush, serve as a 

roving firing platform, and be part of a group of BMPs or part of 

the bronegruppa of a battalion or company. A squad defends 

a fighting position with up to a 100-meter frontage. A defense 

requires a combat formation, system of strong points and firing 

positions, and an integrated fire plan.2

Elements of the Combat Formation

The combat formation includes:

- Maneuver group

- Fire group

- BMP or BTR

System of Strong Points and Firing Positions

A motorized rifle squad consists of primary and alternate 

(temporary) firing positions for BMPs (BTRs), machine guns, 

grenade launchers and locations for rifle firing, in conjunction 

with adjacent squads destroying the enemy in front and on 

the flanks of the platoon’s strong point. The distance between 

the main and reserve positions for machine guns and rocketpropelled grenade launchers (sometimes riflemen) must be at 

least five meters. The fighting position of the squad may be 

co-located with weapons controlled by the senior commander. If 

time permits, the BMP (BTR), should be dug in. 

Integrated Fire Plan

A system of fire for a motorized rifle squad includes a zone of fire for the duty weapons, a zone 

of continuous multilayered squad fire to the front and on the flanks and planned maneuver 

fire on threatened axis of advance. The squad commander commands by radio, voice, signals, 

and personal example. The squad leader is positioned where he can best ensure effective 

fires.

2

 This section, including graphics, has been compiled from many sources to include:

“Squad in the Defense” [Отделение в обороне], as found on Studiopedia, <http://studopedia.info/1-67776.

html>, accessed on 1 July 2016. 

V.N. Zaritski and L.A. Kharkevich, General Tactics [Общая Тактика], Tambov: Tambov Government Technical 

University, 2007.

Field Manual: Preparation and Conduct of Combined Arms Warfare [Боевой Устав: По Подготовке и Ведению

Общевойскового Боя], Moscow: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2005.

Source material has also been obtained from a variety of training documents produced by Russian military 

academies and military departments in civilian academic institutions.

Composition of 

Dismounted Squad 

(variant)
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

66

Aspects of Fire for a Motorized Rifle 

Squad

(Left) The defending motorized rifle squad conducts frontal, 

flanking and enfilade fire. In the frontal example, the squad 

is the center squad of a platoon defending on line. It is 

supported by a tank and a medium machine gun from the 

platoon or company. Each has its limits of fire and these limits 

overlap with those of the flanking squads. In the flanking 

example, a motorized rifle squad, a tank and an AGS-17 

automatic grenade launcher crew have dug in at a position 

flanking an expected enemy axis of attack. As the enemy 

attacks the main defensive position, the defending flanking 

force takes the enemy under fire. In the enfilade example, the 

defending motorized rifle squad holds against a frontal attack 

while two tanks open enfilade fire from dug-in positions. 

The graphic on the facing page depicts the 1st Motorized 

Rifle Squad’s range card which the squad leader prepares 

and uses to ensure that there are no gaps or unintentional 

overlapping fields of fire. He is defending as part of a 

platoon and company defense, so necessary details from 

his neighboring squads and the company fire plan are 

included. The squad defends in the middle of the platoon 

defensive position. It is deployed in a fighting trench with 

an antipersonnel and antitank minefield and barbed wire 

to its front. It’s RPG and squad machine gun have their 

primary positions in the trench line and their alternate 

positions dug in against a rear or flanking attack. The 

squad BMP is dug in about 200 meters behind the trench. 

It has three alternate prepared fighting positions. Two 

are located just behind the trench on the left and right 

flanks of the squad. The third is located to the rear as part 

of a 360° defense. There are also prepared primary and 

alternate fighting positions for a tank on the squad’s right 

flank. The squad’s sector of fire is marked by landmark 

limits—the right limit is Target 4, the left limit is some trees. 

Crew-served weapons (RPG, machine gun and BMP) are 

assigned sectors of fire based on landmarks with a right 

and left limit. The squad and its crew served weapons 

may extend their sectors of fire on order. The new limits 

are drawn with dashed lines. Limit stakes, or the machine 

gun’s T&E mechanism, mark the sector limits for night firing or when firing through smoke. Part of the 

preparation includes walking the area forward of the trench to determine dead space that should be 

covered by rifle or hand grenades. The platoon leader has determined two concentrated fire areas in his 

sector. These areas are designed to stop an enemy advance on a likely axis of advance by focusing the 

entire platoon’s direct fire power on a line approximately 400 meters long. The first squad fires into box 

one. The company commander has also determined a company concentrated fire area for his company. 

Each platoon fires into its designated box.
The Defense

67

Motorized Rifle Squad Range Card
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Platoon in the Defense

A motorized rifle or tank platoon can occupy the defense in a first- or second-echelon 

company, be part of a combined arms reserve of a battalion or company, be in a combat 

security outpost, be a combat reconnaissance patrol and conduct ambush by fire, or be in 

a battalion or company bronegruppa. The defense must support the repulse of the enemy’s 

attack, and destruction of the enemy’s tanks and personnel on the forward edge of the 

defensive area, on the flanks, and throughout the depths of the defense. A motorized rifle 

or tank platoon is assigned to a strong point with a field of fire, a supplemental field of fire 

and one or two areas of concentrated fire. The platoon, when part of a battalion combined 

arms reserve, may have an additional one or two firing lines and routes of travel to them. A 

motorized rifle (tank) platoon defends a strong point up to 400 meters wide and 300 meters 

deep. A defense includes a platoon combat formation, system of strong points and firing 

positions, and integrated fire plan.3

3

 This section, including graphics, has been compiled from many sources to include:

“Platoon in the Defense” [Взвод в обороне], as found on Studiopedia, <http://studopedia.info/1-67777.html>, 

accessed on 1 July 2016. 

V.N. Zaritski and L.A. Kharkevich, General Tactics [Общая Тактика], Tambov: Tambov Government Technical 

University, 2007.

Field Manual: Preparation and Conduct of Combined Arms Warfare [Боевой Устав: По Подготовке и Ведению

Общевойскового Боя], Moscow: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2005.

Source material has also been obtained from a variety of training documents produced by Russian military 

academies and military departments in civilian academic institutions.

Positions for a Motorized Rifle Platoon in the Defense
The Defense

69

Motorized Rifle Platoon in the Defense

(Above) The motorized rifle platoon defends with two or three squads forward, and usually creates 

alternate positions for a 360° defense. The BMPs or BTRs have primary and alternate fighting 

positions, or may be withdrawn into a company bronegrupa (mobile armored reserve). In this 

case, the platoon defends with three squads forward. The BMPs of the 2nd and 3rd squads have 

fighting positions directly behind their squads, while the BMP of the 1st squad backs up the 1st 

squad and has a contingency mission to rove from position to position, securing the right rear of 

the platoon position. The 3rd squad BMP has an alternate position securing the left rear of the 

platoon position. The first squad BMP serves as an alternate platoon CP. The main platoon CP 

is located by the juncture of the communications trenches from the squads and leading to the 

company CP.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

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Motorized Rifle Platoon in the Defense

(Above) This graphic shows a motorized rifle platoon defending along a wood line. There is a tank 

dug in supporting the platoon. The tank has two alternate fighting positions. The BMPs are dug 

in back in the woods, but the intent is not to fight them from three individual positions. Rather the 

BMPs will be committed behind the 2nd or 3rd squad in a firing line. The tank has three prepared 

fighting positions. (Described in more detail on page 72.)

The graphics on the facing page depict 

three variants of a platoon defense. 

The first has three squads forward. The 

second has two squads forward and 

one back. The third has three squads 

forward with the right flank refused. 

All have a 360° defense and the second 

and third examples are reinforced with 

a medium machine gun and an AGS-17 

automatic grenade launcher squad.
The Defense

71

Combat Formation of a 

Motorized Rifle Platoon in the 

Defense 

(with one echelon)

Combat Formation of a 

Motorized Rifle Platoon in the 

Defense 

(with two echelons)

Combat Formation of a 

Motorized Rifle Platoon in the 

Defense

 (refused right flank)
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

72

Elements of the Combat Formation

- Squads in position

- BMPs (BTRs) in firing position

- Weapons fire controlled by the platoon leader

In addition, the platoon can constitute a grouping of military vehicles. Motorized rifle squads 

are usually located in a single trench in a line. In order to reinforce the stability of the defense, 

one of the squads of the platoon may be set back within the strong point and fight from a 

100-200-meter trench. If there is a threat of attack from the flanks, the combat formation 

can be laid out as an echelon right or echelon left. The command and control element and 

fire support is designed to control subunits and fire support during the battle, as well as to 

address a requirement for rapid response fires. It consists of weapons and firepower directly 

subordinate to the platoon commander and attached firepower. A group of combat vehicles 

is used to improve the stability and provide an active defense and support motorized rifle 

subunits on their firing line from previously selected positions. The group is located in a 

designated locale (back in the forest, on the heights of the opposite slope). On the command 

of the platoon commander, the group goes forward to a designated firing line and from that 

line defeats the enemy and returns to its original position, and is once again ready to act 

when needed. Every combat vehicle has a prepared fighting position in the designated firing 

lines. The group is controlled by the platoon commander’s deputy. (Graphic on page 70)

System of Strong Points and Firing Positions

The platoon’s strong point includes the platoon’s squad firing positions, the platoon 

command-observation post, the platoon’s organic and attached weapons and a deployment 

area for the group of combat vehicles. The gap between platoon strong points can be up to 

300 meters and up to 50 meters between the squad positions. A continuous trench may be 

dug across the front of the platoon strong point, which joins the squad fighting positions. 

Communications trenches [not shown] join the fighting trench with the vehicle fighting 

positions and extend into the depth of the defense to the next trench line. The trenches 

provide communication and move personnel to protected areas, fighting bunkers, squad 

sheltered quarters, ditches and dugouts for ammunition and rocket storage. The platoon 

commander controls his subordinates from the command-observation post, which is dug into 

the trench network communications (located either in a squad fighting position or deeper 

within the strong point). The commander of a tank platoon commands from inside his tank.
The Defense

73

Scheme of Fire for a Platoon in the Defense
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

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Integrated Fire Plan

- Participation in concentrated fire along the forward edge of the defense 

- Zones of antitank fires conducted by BMPs (tanks) and continuous multilayered fires

by other platoons’ weapons along the forward edge of the battle area, in the gaps, on 

the flanks, and throughout the depth of the defense

- Prepared maneuver fire by BMPs, tanks and other weapons systems on threatened

axes.

The system of fire for a motorized rifle (tank) platoon is an integral part of the system of fire for 

its company (battalion) and includes preparatory fires by duty weapons,4

 antitank and platoon 

multilayered continuous fire zones, concentrated fire sectors, and planned maneuver by 

fire. The system of fire is organized to take into consideration the combat potential of all the 

weapons of the platoon, attached weapons and integrated fires of neighboring units, all tied 

into engineer and naturally occurring obstacles. The system of fire should ensure the defeat 

of the enemy, particularly its tanks and other armored vehicles, on the approaches to the 

defense, on the forward edge of the defense, between squad fighting positions, and on the 

flanks of the platoon’s strong point throughout the depth of the defense, with the potential 

of conducting effective fire to the front, flank and overlapping fires. An all-round defense of 

the strong point is also conducted. The readiness of the system of fire is determined when the 

BMPs, tanks, crew–served weapons and other weapons are in their prepared firing positions, 

range cards and firing data are prepared and verified,5 and ammunition and rocket round 

supply points are dug in. Infantry fighting vehicles and tanks are located along the front and 

in the depth of the platoon fighting position, with at least a 200-meter interval between each 

other. Fields of fire for platoons and squads are determined by left and right boundaries. Each 

boundary is specified by two points (benchmarks). BMPs, tanks, antitank missile systems, 

grenade launchers, flamethrowers and machine guns have specified primary and secondary 

sectors of fire, and their firing positions have ranges and type of fire coverage indicated. 

These fields of fire should overlap.

Means of Reinforcement 

Common Attachments for a Motorized Rifle Platoon

- A Tank

- Antitank subunit

- AGS-17 subunit

- Flamethrower subunit

- Anti-aircraft subunit

- NBC Recon personnel

4

 Duty weapons are weapons deployed out of their primary firing positions for the purpose of drawing enemy 

fire and engaging enemy targets before the main battle is joined. Russian troops are trained to not respond to 

enemy probing fires or the appearance of enemy vehicles, since the enemy is hoping to determine the location 

and outline of the defense, location of crew-served weapons and vehicles, and the type and readiness of the 

defending unit. Duty weapons will fire from a temporary position and then move to another temporary position. 

On order, the duty weapons will reoccupy their primary fighting positions.

5

 Range cards are prepared for each primary and alternate firing position. Ranges are walked to identify dead 

space and other areas where the enemy may escape detection and destruction. Tranverse and elevating 

mechanisms are used on machine guns, particularly at night, to prevent weapons from being fired over the 

heads of the advancing enemy. 
The Defense

75

Sequence of Work after Receipt of Mission

In the absence of direct contact with the enemy, the platoon leader receives an order and 

does the following:

- Makes his decision and draws his plan of defense on his map

- Briefs his squad leaders

- Guides the platoon to its specified strong point or from concealed places on the 

approaches to the platoon position and covertly organizes its security

- Together with the squad and attached forces leaders, conducts on-site 

reconnaissance

- Gives his combat order

- Organizes his system of integrated fires, support and C2

- Organizes the occupation of the strong point

- Sites in positions of the combat formation and checks range cards and integration of

fires

- Organizes observation and engineer field fortification of his platoon strong point.

Having received the orders to transition to the defense while in direct contact with the enemy, 

a platoon commander must:

- Quickly make his decision for the conduct of the defense

- Give his orders to his squads to occupy the positions in the designated platoon 

strong point

- Organize surveillance to the front and on the flanks of the platoon’s strong point 

- Coordinate platoon interaction and the platoon system of integrated fires, as well as

logistic support, C2 and engineer field fortification of his platoon strong point

- Subsequently study the terrain, clarify squad missions and platoon layout, coordinate

platoon interaction and if necessary, deal with other matters.

Considerations of the Platoon Leader

- Missions of subordinate squads, their positions, fields of fire and additional sectors of

fire

- Main and reserve (temporary) firing positions of BMPs (BTRs), their primary and

secondary sectors of fire from each position

- Platoon zones of concentrated fire and each squad’s portion of the zone where it

must fire (similar to final protective fire) 

- Missions of attached weapons, their primary and reserve firing positions, and their

primary and supplementary sectors of fire for every position

- Designated marksman missions, their primary and alternate firing positions, and

sequence of observation and fire

- Missions for the combat medic and the sequence for the provision of medical

assistance to the wounded

- Which weapons will cover gaps with their neighboring units and secure flanks. 

The platoon commander’s orders specify the time to occupy the defense, prepare a 

system of fires, and the sequence and timing of engineering support.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

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Company in the Defense

A motorized rifle (tank) company may be part of a first or second echelon battalion in the 

defense, be in the security zone, occupy a forward position, or be a combined arms reserve or 

antilanding reserve. When breaking contact and withdrawing, a company may be designated 

as a point security march detachment, rear guard security detachment or flanking march 

security detachment. A motorized rifle (tank) company in the defense can occupy strong 

points up to 1.5 kilometers wide and 1 kilometer deep. Platoons in company strong points 

may be angled backwards, allowing them to be echeloned in various locations. A defense 

includes a combat formation, system of strong points and firing positions, integrated fire plan, 

and engineer obstacle system.6

Elements of the Combat Formation

The elements of the combat formation are structured as follows:

- The first echelon consists of two platoons

- A second echelon or reserve consists of one platoon

- An artillery subunit (artillery battery or mortar platoon, attached company) remains

subordinate to the company commander and is used to support the first-echelon 

motorized rifle platoons

- Subunits and weapons (ordnance) subordinate directly to the company commander.

Depending on the situation, a bronegruppa or ambush team may be formed. The combat 

formation of companies in the defense usually consists of two echelons. In some cases, the 

combat formation can consist of just one echelon, with a combined arms reserve.

System of Strong Points and Firing Positions

The system of strong points and firing positions are created to support the defense mission 

of the company in accordance with the commander’s decision, the combat capabilities of 

subunits, the time available and the nature of the terrain. They include:

- Combat security positions

- Firing positions for tanks, BMPs, BTRs, antitank missiles, TO&E and attached weapons 

- Trenches and communications trenches

- Platoon and company strong points united in the battalion defensive area.

A company strong point has two trenches and consists of strong points of the company’s 

subordinate platoons, firing positions for the company weapons and those of attached 

subunits, and a bronegruppa staging area. In addition, it is equipped with a commandobservation post.

6

 This section, including graphics, has been compiled from many sources to include:

“Company in the Defense” [Рота в обороне], as found on Studiopedia, <http://studopedia.info/1-67778.html>, 

accessed on 1 July 2016. 

V.N. Zaritski and L.A. Kharkevich, General Tactics [Общая Тактика], Tambov: Tambov Government Technical 

University, 2007.

Field Manual: Preparation and Conduct of Combined Arms Warfare [Боевой Устав: По Подготовке и Ведению

Общевойскового Боя], Moscow: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2005.

Source material has also been obtained from a variety of training documents produced by Russian military 

academies and military departments in civilian academic institutions.
The Defense

77

The gaps between the platoon strongpoints are up to 300 meters. The platoon strong points 

are placed on the most probable axes of enemy advance in order to intercept the enemy.

The first trench is the front edge of the defense. In front of the trench are mines and 

obstacles. The first trench is selected with consideration of the presence of natural antitank 

obstacles, ability to provide good observation of the enemy, and the best position to lay 

all types of continuous fire at the forward edge of the defense, the flanks, and in the gaps 

throughout the depth of defense.

The second trench is placed at a distance of 400-600 meters from the first trench, with an 

expectation that defending units can support subunits in the first trench, lay fire onto the 

approaches to the forward edge of the defense and provide covering fires onto the forward 

obstacles. 

Combat Formation of a Motorized Rifle Company in the Defense (in the first echelon)

(Above) This graphic depicts a typical layout of a defending first echelon motorized rifle company 

with an attached tank platoon. The commander defends with three motorized rifle platoons on 

line, but has refused the center to create a fire sac. A lone squad is positioned within the sac to 

deceive the enemy as to the defense’s forward edge and the presence of the fire sac. The plan is to 

pull the enemy attack within the sac where it will be decimated by enfilade fire. The company has 

two reserves-a motorized rifle platoon from another company and the company bronegruppa 

which is a mobile maneuver reserve.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

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Positions for a Motorized Rifle Company in the Battalion Defense

(Above)The motorized rifle company can be positioned in a variety of locations in the defense. The rear or 

flanking detachment is used during a fighting withdrawal while the screening detachment is used during a 

break in contact. 
The Defense

79

The command-observation post of the company is placed in the depth of the defense up to 

800 meters from the forward edge of the defense, where the terrain is best for observation 

and command and control. 

Integrated Fire Plan

The system of fire of a company consists of the massing the various weapons’ fires by the 

senior commander to destroy the enemy. The system of fire must be carefully integrated with 

the obstacle system. It includes:

- Zones of concentrated fire and lines of antiaircraft gun fire on the approaches to the

defense, in front of the forward edge of the defense, on the flanks and throughout 

the depth of the defense 

- Antitank zones of fire and continuous multilayered fire by all types of weapons before

the forward edge of the battle area, in the gaps, on the flanks and throughout the 

depths of the defense to destroy the first wave of tanks and other armored vehicles 

of the enemy

- Prepared maneuver fire.

Motorized Rifle Company in the Defense (in the second echelon)

(Above) This graphic shows a second echelon motorized company with an attached tank platoon 

defending in the second echelon of a battalion defense. It has incorporated a fire sac in its defense 

that is initially held by a tank. There is a fall-back position where a dug-in firing line of tanks and 

BMPs (a company bronegruppa) and an ambush prevent breakthrough.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

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The system of fire is formed by taking into account the following:

- The firing capabilities of all the types of weapons involved

- Their close integration of these weapons

- Their effect of these weapons when combined with the engineering obstacles and

natural barriers.

Readiness of the system of fire is determined by:

- Manning of the firing positions

- Prepared range cards and firing data

- The presence of missiles and ammunition.

Means of Reinforcement

The following are common attachments for a motorized rifle company:

- Tank platoon

- Artillery battery/platoon 

- Antitank platoon (crew)

- Anti-aircraft squad

- Engineer squad.

A company defending on a main avenue of approach may be reinforced with attached 

artillery units (mortar platoon or artillery battery), an AGS-17 grenade launcher and antitank 

subunits. A motorized rifle company may have an attached tank platoon, while a tank 

company may have an attached motorized rifle platoon.

Sequence of Work after Receipt of Mission

In the absence of direct contact with the enemy, the commander of a company: 

- Makes his plan of defense

- Briefs his deputies and subordinate commanders

- Conducts reconnaissance during which he refines his decision

- Gives his combat order

- Organizes cooperation and an integrated system of fires, support, and C2

- Guides the company onto a specified area of defense (strong point) and organizes its

engineer support.

After receiving an order to transition to the defense, while in direct contact with the enemy, 

the commander of the company:

- Organizes the seizure and fortification of designated (advantageous) lines

- In the course of fortifying the lines, makes his decision on the plan of defense

- Gives his combat order to his subordinate units

- Organizes cooperation and an integrated system of fires, NBC defense, and 

countermeasures against enemy precision weapons

- Gives orders on the basic issues of comprehensive combat support

- Organizes engineering support in the area of defense (strong point)

- Conducts reconnaissance, in course of which, he refines the subunit’s order, the order

of cooperation and, if necessary, other matters.
The Defense

81

Considerations of the company commander:

- Platoons of the first echelon – reinforcements; strong points and direction on which

to concentrate the main effort; tasks to repulse the offensive and destroy the enemy 

which has penetrated into one’s defenses; the number of trenches (including their 

physical location and layout); fields of fire, additional sectors of fire and zones of 

concentrated fire; what forces and means are needed to secure the flanks, joints, and 

gaps, and who is responsible for them; who provides support;

- Platoon of the second echelon - the same duties as that of their platoons of the first

echelon, plus, for companies, their lines of deployment for counterattack; for tank 

companies and motorized rifle companies with BMPs, their firing lines;

- Reserve - assembly area (strong point), on-order missions to prepare for; additionally,

for tank companies and motorized rifle companies with BMPs, their firing lines;

- Bronegruppa- composition, assembly area and time to occupy it, firing lines and onorder missions to prepare for;

- Ambush – composition, place, mission for engaging an advancing enemy and

sequence of withdrawal;

System of Fires for a Motorized Rifle Company

(Above) This graphic shows typical distances for laying out a company defense, but they will be 

modified to fit the demands of the situation, forces available, threat and terrain. The engagement 

lines for various firing systems is based on the location of the weapons systems closest to the front 

line and indicates the point where various weapons systems will begin engaging the advancing 

enemy. Individual range cards will be modified for those weapons positioned further back
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

82

- Attached artillery and mortar battery support – sequence of supporting fire for 

the security zone; fire missions during enemy movement to the forward edge of the 

defense and deployment and transition to the attack; fire against enemy stuck into 

the defense; support of the counterattack of the second echelon, main, alternate and 

temporary firing positions;

- Grenade launcher (AGS-17) - missions supporting companies of the first echelon and

repelling enemy infantry assaults; main and reserve positions; belts of fire; additional 

sectors of fire; zones of concentrated fire; lines of barrier fire.

- Antitank subunits - the place in the defense and the direction of the enemy 

advance; the line of deployment; the sequence for occupying positions and on-order 

missions to prepare for; the signal for opening and ceasing fire; actions after mission 

accomplishment;

- Anti-aircraft units - launch (firing) positions; sectors of reconnaissance to detect

enemy aircraft; time and degrees of readiness; sequence of conduct of fire;

- Security subunits forward of the defense – position; mission; weapons designated

for support; sequence of calls for fire; sequence of withdrawal - Concluding the orderthe time to be ready to fulfill the order, the time to occupy the defense, the time for 

readiness of the scheme of integrated fire and time for engineering obstacle work to 

be completed, the order and sequence for camouflage and field fortification of the 

area of defense (strong point).

(Right) The graphic on the facing page shows the scheme of 

fire for a company strong point defense. It is defending with 

two platoons forward and one back and is configured for a 

360° defense. There are an additional tank platoon and two 

flame projectors (the RPO shoulder-fired rocket launcher has 

the RPO-Z flame round, RPO-A thermobaric round and the 

RPO-D smoke screen round). There is the company medical 

point and feeding point in the second echelon platoon. The 

company commander has determined sectors of fire and 

marked the platoon and company areas of concentrated fire 

on the map. He has drawn the lines where ATGMs, tank main 

guns, BMPs and small arms and machine guns may open fire. 

As before, landmarks and benchmarks play a prominent role 

in laying out the range card.
The Defense

83

Motorized Rifle Company in the Defense
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84

Battalion in the Defense

A motorized rifle or tank battalion can serve in either the first or second echelons of the 

brigade, in the security zone, in a forward position or as part of the combined arms reserve. 

A battalion of the first echelon prepares and occupies the first defensive position. The 

battalion is assigned a defensive region. The width of the battalion defensive area is up to five 

kilometers and the depth of the defensive area is up to three kilometers. A battalion of the 

second echelon prepares and occupies the second defensive position. The mortar battery 

and AGS-17 grenade launcher platoon are, as a rule, directly subordinate to the battalion 

commander and remain intact to support the defending subunits. A defense includes a 

combat formation, system of strong points and firing positions, integrated fire plan, and 

engineer obstacle system.7

Elements of the Combat Formation

- 1st echelon motorized rifle companies with reinforcements 

- A second echelon motorized rifle company or reserve platoon 

- Weapons fire controlled by the battalion commander (artillery battalion, mortar

battery, antitank platoon, AGS-17 platoon, air defense platoon) 

- Bronegruppa (Armored Group) 

- Ambush team

The motorized rifle or tank battalion in the defense, as a rule, consists of two echelons, but 

sometimes one echelon, and has a combined arms reserve of at least one motorized rifle 

platoon. The combat formation consists of a first echelon comprising two-three motorized 

rifle companies. The second echelon consists of a motorized rifle company or combined arms 

reserve of at least one motorized rifle platoon. Artillery subunits include the mortar battery 

(an artillery battalion may be attached to a maneuver battalion). Subunits that are directly 

subordinate to the battalion commander include the: AGS-17 grenade launcher platoon, 

antitank platoon, and attached flamethrower company. Depending on the situation, the 

formation may include a bronegruppa and/or an ambush team. A bronegruppa is a mobile 

reserve that is formed primarily from the infantry fighting vehicles after the motorized rifle 

soldiers have dismounted from them. It occupies an assembly area and has designated firing 

lines and blocking positions within the defense.

A first echelon battalion is designed to:

- Defeat the enemy during his deployment and transition to the attack

- Repel the offensive

- Prevent the breakthrough of the forward defense

- Retain strong points

- Prevent an enemy breakthrough into the depths of the battalion defensive region. 7 This section, including graphics, has been compiled from many sources to include:

“Battalion in the Defense” [Батальон в обороне], as found on Studiopedia, <http://studopedia.info/1-67779.

html>, accessed on 1 July 2016. 

V.N. Zaritski and L.A. Kharkevich, General Tactics [Общая Тактика], Tambov: Tambov Government Technical 

University, 2007.

Field Manual: Preparation and Conduct of Combined Arms Warfare [Боевой Устав: По Подготовке и Ведению

Общевойскового Боя], Moscow: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2005.

Source material has also been obtained from a variety of training documents produced by Russian military 

academies and military departments in civilian academic institutions.
The Defense

85

A second echelon battalion is designed to:

- Prevent an enemy breakthrough of the first position.

- Destroy or counterattack an enemy breakthrough across the forward edge of the

defense. 

A motorized rifle company of the second echelon prepares strong points at full speed at the 

third trench, and then the fourth trench. 

The combined arms reserve of a motorized rifle battalion occupies a staging area behind 

the subunits of the first echelon, prepares a strong point, and prepares to carry out sudden 

developing missions. 

The artillery subunits of a motorized rifle battalion remain intact and are used to support 

the companies in the first echelon. A battery from an artillery battalion may be attached to a 

motorized rifle company. 

The grenade launcher (AGS-17) subunit, flamethrower subunit, and different means of fires

remain subordinate to the battalion commander, occupy positions in the company strong 

points or between them, and remain intact to concentrate on the direction of the main enemy 

effort to cover flanks and support counterattacks. 

The antitank reserve consists of the antitank platoon. It is designed to destroy tanks and 

other armored vehicles that penetrate into the depth of the defense and cover tank avenues 

of approach and the flanks. 

The bronegruppa is established for the purpose of closing gaps that formed due to enemy 

fire strikes, as well as other tasks. It consists of tanks, BMPs, and BTRs from first- and secondechelon units and defends against the main avenues of approach. It is commanded by the 

commander of a platoon of a first-echelon company. 

An ambush team attempts to inflict maximum destruction by sudden direct fire and use of 

minefields. It may consist of a motorized rifle platoon or squad reinforced by flamethrowers 

and sapper subunits. The firing positions for the fire ambush are put in fortified positions on 

tank avenues of approach, on the flanks, and on the outskirts of populated areas.

System of Strong Points and Firing Positions

The system of strong points and firing positions of the battalion includes:

- The strong points of companies, connected to each other along the front and 

throughout the depth, with an integrated system of fires and obstacles

- Primary, alternate and temporary positions for artillery, tanks, infantry fighting

vehicles, and other organic and attached firepower

- The positions of combat security outposts.

The battalion defensive area is based on its defensive positions. It has three or four trenches 

and consists of company strong points, firing positions for artillery subunits, firing positions 

for other weapons which remain under the direct command of the battalion commander, 

the assembly area and the firing line for the bronegruppa. The gaps between the company 

strongpoints are up to 1000 meters, and between platoon strong points are up to 300 meters.

The first trench is on the forward edge of the defense. The second trench is 400-600 meters 

from the first trench, the third trench is 600-1000 meters from the second, and the fourth is 

400-600 meters from the third trench.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

86

Positions for a Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Brigade Defense

(Above) This graphic shows the possible locations and missions for a motorized rifle battalion in 

the defense. 
The Defense

87

Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Defense

(Above) This graphic gives a range of distances involved in a defense by motorized rifle battalion 

with an attached tank company. This battalion is defending in two echelons and incorporates a 

fire sac. It has constituted a bronegruppa with the tanks and BMPs of the second echelon company 

and has positioned the primary firing positions for its mortar battery fairly deep. A battery of 2S6 

Tugunska self-propelled anti-aircraft gun and missile systems are deployed in the rear company. 

The location of systems and distances will be adjusted to fit the demands of the situation, threat, 

forces available and terrain.
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88

Integrated Fire Plan 

The system of fire of a battalion consists of the massing the various weapons’ fires by the 

senior commander to destroy the enemy. The system of fire must be carefully integrated with 

the obstacle system. It includes:

- Zones of concentrated fire and lines of antiaircraft gun fire on the approaches to the

defense, in front of the forward edge of the defense, on the flanks and throughout 

the depth of the defense 

- Antitank zones of fire and continuous multilayered fire by all types of weapons before

the forward edge of the battle area, in the gaps, on the flanks and throughout the 

depth of the defense to destroy the first wave of tanks and other armored vehicles of 

the enemy

- Prepared maneuver fire.

The system of fire is formed by taking into account:

- The firing capabilities of all the types of weapons involved

- Their close integration

- Their effect when combined with the engineering obstacles and natural barriers.

Readiness of the system of fire is determined by:

- Manning of the firing positions

- Prepared range cards and firing data

- The presence of missiles and ammunition.

Battalion command-observation posts are usually dug-in within the area of the first echelon 

companies or in the vicinity of the second echelon (reserve) company strong points two 

kilometers from the forward edge of the battalion’s defenses.

Engineer Obstacle System

Obstacles are objects prepared for on-order destruction (mining). They are emplaced in 

front of combat security outposts; on the forward edge of the battle area; in gaps between 

subunits; and on the flanks of the battalion (company) throughout the entire depth of the 

battalion defensive area in accordance with the planned system of fires and natural obstacles, 

and after considering the maneuver of subunits and neighboring units.

The system of engineer obstacles includes:

- Minefields

- Mine clusters

- Choke point obstacles

- Locally fabricated obstacles

- Different types of antitank and antipersonnel obstacles.

Means of Reinforcement

The following are common attachments for a motorized rifle battalion:

- Tank company

- Artillery battalion/battery

- Anti-aircraft battery

- Engineer platoon

- NBC reconnaissance subunit.
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Sequence of Work after Receipt of Mission

In the absence of direct contact with the enemy, the commander of a battalion: 

- Makes his decision of the plan of defense

- Briefs his deputies and subordinate commanders

- Conducts reconnaissance, during which he refines his decision

- Gives his combat order

- Organizes cooperation and an integrated system of fires, support, and C2

- Guides the battalion (company) onto a specified area of defense (strong point) and

organizes its engineer support.

After receiving an order to transition to the defense, while in direct contact with the enemy, 

the commander of the battalion:

- Organizes the seizure and fortification of designated (advantageous) lines

- In the course of fortifying the lines, makes his decision on the plan of defense

- Gives his combat order to his subordinate units

- Organizes cooperation and an integrated system of fires, NBC defense, and

countermeasures against enemy precision weapons

- Gives orders on the basic issues of comprehensive combat support

- Organizes engineering support in the area of defense (strong point)

- Conducts reconnaissance, in course of which he refines the subunit’s order, the order

of cooperation and, if necessary, other matters.

Considerations of the battalion commander:

- Companies of the first echelon – reinforcements; strong points and direction on

which to concentrate the main effort; tasks to repulse the offensive and destroy 

an enemy which has penetrated into one’s defenses; the number of trenches and 

their trace; fields of fire, additional sectors of fire and zones of concentrated fire; 

what forces and means are needed to secure the flanks, joints, and gaps, and who is 

responsible for them; who provides support;

- Company of the second echelon - the same duties as that of the companies

(platoons) of the first echelon, plus, for companies, their lines of deployment for 

counterattack; for tank companies and motorized rifle companies with BMPs, their 

firing lines;

- Reserve - assembly area (strong point); on-order missions to prepare for; additionally

for tank companies and motorized rifle companies with BMPs, their firing lines;

- Bronegruppa - composition; assembly area and time to occupy it; firing lines; on-order

missions to prepare for;

- Ambush team – composition; place; mission for engaging an advancing enemy;

sequence of withdrawal;

- Attached artillery and mortar battery support – sequence of supporting fire for

the security zone; fire missions during enemy movement to the forward edge of the 

defense; deployment and transition to the attack; fire against enemy wedged into 

the defense; support of the counterattack of the second echelon; main, alternate and 

temporary firing positions;

- Grenade launcher (AGS-17) - missions supporting companies of the first echelon and

repelling enemy infantry assaults; main and reserve positions; belts of fire; additional 
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sectors of fire; zones of concentrated fire; lines of barrier fire;

- Antitank subunits - the place in the defense; the direction of the enemy advance;

the line of deployment; the sequence for occupying positions and on-order 

missions to prepare for; the signal for opening and ceasing fire; actions after mission 

accomplishment;

- Anti-aircraft units - launch (firing) positions; sectors of reconnaissance to detect 

enemy aircraft; time and degrees of readiness; sequence of conduct of fire;

- Security subunits forward of the defense – position; mission; weapons designated for

support; sequence of calls for fire; sequence of withdrawal;

- Concluding the order-the time to be ready to fulfill the order, the time to occupy

the defense, the time for readiness of the scheme of integrated fire and time for 

engineering obstacle work to be completed, the order and sequence for camouflage 

and field fortification of the area of defense (strong point).
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91

Brigade in the Defense

A motorized rifle (or tank) brigade defends in either the first or second echelon of an Army 

Group, or Army Corps. (A Russian Army Group has approximately the same combat power 

as a small U.S. Army Corps.) It can also serve as a reserve or defend a separate axis. A firstechelon brigade defends on the first defensive axis, where it occupies two to three defensive 

positions. A motorized rifle brigade defending in the first echelon of the Army Group on 

the enemy main axis of attack may be reinforced with two or more artillery battalions, 

antitank subunits and subunits of rocket-propelled flamethrowers. If the brigade is part of 

an army, it constitutes a defensive belt. If it is serving independently on a separate avenue 

of approach or in a separate armed conflict, the brigade constitutes a zone of responsibility. 

The defensive belt or the zone of responsibility are assigned based upon the range of the 

reconnaissance systems and the flanks and rear of the boundary line that separates the 

brigade from neighboring units. The assigned size of the zone and area of defense must 

facilitate the counteraction against the attacking enemy and tactical cooperation between 

the combat elements of the brigade, and allow adequate space for the freedom of maneuver 

and dispersion of subunits.8

A motorized rifle or tank brigade in the defense includes:

- Brigade combat formation

- Integrated defensive positions, areas and lines

- “Kill zones” for destruction of the enemy

- Integrated air defense

- Integrated antitank defense

- Integrated obstacles

- Integrated air assault/air drop defense

- Integrated command and control.

Elements of the Combat Formation

Depending on the situation, the brigade combat formation in the defense can consist of one 

or two echelons. A combined arms reserve of at least a motorized rifle company should be 

constituted from one of these echelons.

The brigade combat formation in the defense includes:

- The first echelon (two or three motorized rifle battalions)

- The second echelon (or combined arms reserve) - one or two battalions, including a

tank battalion. The anti-assault reserve is at least a motorized rifle or tank company

- Brigade artillery group

- Air defense subunits

- Antitank reserve

- Obstacle construction detachment

- Anti-air assault subunits. 

The combat formation can include a forward detachment, tactical air assault units, and 

electronic warfare subunits, depending on the situation.

8

 “Composition of a Brigade in the Defense” [Построение обороны мотострелковой], as found on Studiopedia, 

<http://studopedia.info/1-67780.htm>, accessed on 1 July 2016. 
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Battalions in the first echelon are intended to:

- Engage the enemy as it deploys and transitions from column movement to attack

formation

- Repel assaults by the enemy in order to avoid enemy pockets in the defensive area

- Deny enemy breakthrough into the depths of its defense

- Destroy enemy subunit pockets at established kill zones and lines.

The second echelon (or reserve) is intended to:

- Deny the enemy’s seizure of strong points throughout the depth of the defense

- Prohibit enemy breakthroughs throughout the depth of the defense

- Defeat pockets of the enemy through actions of subunits at designated positions and

lines, conduct counterattacks, and reoccupy contested positions at the forward edge 

of the defense.

The combined arms reserve of the brigade is intended to:

- Deal with unexpected problems

- Reconstitute first echelon units in the event of their loss of combat effectiveness.

Artillery- A motorized rifle or tank brigade in the defense will be supported by a Brigade

Artillery Group (BrAG). The BrAG is usually composed of the maneuver brigade’s organic

two self-propelled artillery battalions and one MLRS battalion. It is intended to defeat the

enemy in the approach march, on the line of deployment, in the attack staging area, or, 

should the enemy penetrate the first defense positions, defeat them from temporary firing 

positions. The artillery primary fire positions are usually located 2-4 kilometers from the 

forward edge of the defensive and occupy an area of 3-5 kilometers wide and 1-2 kilometers 

in depth.

Air Defense- A defending brigade will be supported by its organic anti-aircraft and missile 

systems. These air defenses are designed to protect the brigade from air strikes and cruise 

missiles. The air defense missile battalion will provide zonal coverage to protect the brigade’s 

subunits and command post from air strikes. A battery of “Tunguska” rocket artillery protects 

the first-echelon forces. Two platoons of the “Strela-10” missile battery protect the BrAG. Two 

platoons equipped with “Igla” MANPADS cover the first echelon, while the third platoon in the 

“Igla” company protects the brigade command post.

Antitank Reserves- The antitank reserve is designed to destroy tanks and other armored 

vehicles that breach the defense, and cover other hazardous areas on the flanks. The basis of 

the antitank reserve is the brigade’s organic antitank artillery battalion.

Mobile Obstacle Detachment – The mobile obstacle detachment weakens the enemy by 

the emplacement of minefields. It works in conjunction with the antitank reserve. It is 

constituted from the brigade’s organic engineer company, particularly incorporating its 

mobile mine-layers.

Anti-Assault Reserve- The anti-assault reserve is designed to destroy enemy assaults in areas 

where sabotage and reconnaissance activities are expected. It usually consists of a motorized 

rifle company from the second echelon.
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93

Forward Detachment in the Security Zone- This subunit delays the arrival of the enemy or 

makes him deploy and attack prematurely in an unfavorable direction for him. The forward 

detachment is constituted using subunits from a motorized rifle battalion in the second 

echelon.

Air Assault Detachment- This unit is part of a reinforced motorized rifle company designed to 

conduct an air assault into the rear area where an enemy has broken through. The air assault 

detachment will cooperate with subunits of the brigade’s second echelon in the conduct of a 

counterattack. 

Electronic Warfare Subunits- These subunits are intended to suppress enemy radios and 

electronics and protect the brigade subunits from electronic proximity fuses and other signaldetonated munitions.

Motorized Rifle Brigade in the Defense

(Above) This graphic shows a notional laydown of additional forces, including the antitank reserve, 

the mobile obstacle detachment, the anti-assault reserve, the electronic warfare subunits and air 

defense subunits.
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Integrated Defensive Positions, Areas and Lines

The system of defensive positions, areas and lines include:

- Forward security zone

- Forward security outpost position

- Two to three defensive positions

- Alternative positions

- Separate areas and centers of resistance

- Areas for the firing positions of the BrAG and other artillery and initial positions for

anti-aircraft assets.

- Second echelon (reserves) assembly areas

- Firing lines for tanks and BMPs (infantry fighting vehicles)

- Counterattack deployment lines

- Antitank reserve deployment lines

- Mobile obstacle detachment deployment lines

- Anti-assault reserve assembly area

- Places for the construction of fire sacs

- Landing zones and ambush sites for combat helicopters

- Locations for troop control points

- False and reserve defensive areas (strong points, positions).

The security zone is created at a depth of up to 40 kilometers in front of the forward edge of 

the defense, when the defending force is not in immediate contact with the enemy. Within 

the security zone there are 5-6 positions, 6-8 kilometers from each other. Separate company 

(platoon) strong points designed to hold important areas are constructed and fortified with 

engineering obstacles in the defensive area.

When there is no combat security zone, a motorized rifle or tank brigade will establish a 

forward position 6-8 kilometers in front of the forward edge of the defense to deceive the 

enemy as to the location of the forward edge of the defense, to repulse sudden attacks on the 

first-echelon subunits, and to cause the enemy to prematurely deploy the main body of his 

force. Reinforced companies are dispatched from the first-echelon motorized rifle battalions 

to defend the forward positions by creating separate company and platoon strong points. 

The combat security zone is created at a distance of up to two kilometers from the forward 

edge of the defense on those approaches where there are no forward positions and where 

there is no contact with the enemy, with the goal of preventing a surprise attack and 

preventing enemy ground reconnaissance of the first-echelon motorized rifle battalions. 

In the event of no direct enemy contact, the mission of the combat security zone is 

accomplished by subunits from the first positions of the first trench. The combat security 

zone will be formed by reinforced motorized rifle platoons dispatched by the brigade’s 

subordinate battalions. 

The main defensive position consists of combined company strong points joined within the 

battalion defense area. The depth of these defensive positions will be up to 3 kilometers. 

They will be established within 3-4 trenches. 
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The First Trench- The first trench is located in the first defensive position on the forward 

edge of the defense, the trace of which is determined by the brigade commander. The exact 

location of this position is determined by the battalion commander and is defended by 

platoons of the first echelon. Mines are emplaced in front of this first trench. 

The Second Trench- The second trench is established 400-600 meters from the first trench. 

The positions of subunits occupying the first trench are covered by fire from the second 

trench. The second echelon subunits also cover the approaches to the forward edge of the 

defense and the obstacles arrayed in front of it. 

The Third Trench-The third trench is established 600-1000 meters from the second trench and 

is situated so its subunits can conduct direct fire on the zone between the second and third 

trenches, on separate sections and in front of the forward edge of the defense. The third 

trench can also be used as a starting position for maneuver against threatened areas in the 

event of an enemy counterattack.

Relative Positions of a Motorized Rifle Brigade in the Defense

This graphic shows the considerations and relative positioning of a brigade defending in two 

echelons with two battalions forward and two back. The location of forces, systems and distances 

will be adjusted to fit the demands of the situation, threat, forces available and terrain.
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The Fourth Trench- The fourth trench is established 600-1000 meters from the third trench. 

The positions of subunits occupying the third trench are covered by fires from the fourth 

trench, and the fourth trench also covers the approaches to the forward edge of the defense 

and the obstacles arrayed in front of it.

The first position in the brigade defensive belt is the most important. It is defined by the 

brigade’s first-echelon battalions. The second brigade position is defended by the brigades’ 

second-echelon battalions. The defensive positions of the brigade are the battalions’ areas 

of defense. The battalion areas consist of company strong points connected from the front 

to the depth by interlocking fires, obstacles, trenches and connecting passageways for the 

conduct of 360° defense. The gap between the company strong points is up to 1 kilometer.

Channeling and blocking positions are spread throughout the depth of the defense to deter 

enemy maneuver toward the flanks and drive them onto obstacles and blocking positions. 

These may be lines for commitment of a counterattack, as well as firing lines for tank units 

(subunits) located in the second echelon. These consist of 1-2 trenches and connecting 

communications trenches linking the front to the rear. 

Individual areas of defense (intersections) are created for the protection and support of 

intrapositioning stretches between road intersections, built-up areas, crossings and other 

important objectives for an air assault. 

The BrAG’s firing positions are assigned to those axes that could be threatened by enemy 

tanks (a Russian artillery mission is direct lay fire against armor). For the BrAG of an army’s 

first-echelon brigade, the firing positions are located between the first and second positions. 

The BrAG’s firing positions are selected based on the range of its artillery systems, 2-6 

kilometers from the forward edge of the defense. Reserve and temporary firing positions and 

routes to them are prepared for the BrAG’s artillery. 

A defending brigade will also be supported by its organic anti-aircraft systems. The Strela-10 

(SA-13) and Tor-M1 (SA-15) air defense missile systems are deployed in initial firing positions 

three-four kilometers along the front and in depth. The distances between the air defense 

batteries are eight kilometers or more. The initial positions of the Tor-M1 systems assigned 

to the first position are sited 5-10 kilometers from the forward edge of the defense, and 

the separation between them along the front and in depth are from 5-10 kilometers. Initial 

positions of a first-echelon motorized rifle or tank brigade’s anti-aircraft missile batteries and 

anti-aircraft artillery batteries are established at 0.5-1.5 kilometers from the forward edge of 

the defense. 

The reserve assembly area is held in pre-combat order as it prepares the second (and 

sometimes third) brigade defensive belt.

The firing lines of tanks, BMPs, and BTRs of the second echelon (combined arms reserve) 

are focused on areas where precision weapon or massed tank assaults are expected. Tank 
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97

battalions (or motorized rifle companies on BMPs) of the second echelon have one or two 

firing lines immediately behind the first strong point, and then between the first and second 

strong points.

A tank company (or motorized rifle companies on BMPs) is deployed on firing areas at the 

front, with 1-1.5 kilometer intervals between companies, with the total length of the firing 

line extending up to five kilometers. The firing line may coincide with the commitment line 

for the conduct of counterattacks.

To carry out counterattacks in the defense, the second echelon battalions plan one or two 

areas for a counterattack on the probable axes of enemy attack. On each avenue of approach 

the counterattack has a main and back-up line of deployment for counterattack, with 2-3 

kilometers between them.

Lines of deployment of the antitank reserve are assigned against probable areas where enemy 

precision weapons and large tank attacks will occur. In the defense, the antitank reserve is 

located in an assembly area. The brigade antitank reserve assembly area is located on an 

armor avenue of approach between the second and third positions or within the second 

position.

The antitank reserve may be assigned 3-5 deployment lines or more between the first and 

second positions. An antitank guided missile (ATGM) battery is deployed up to 2 kilometers 

from the front, the antitank battalion - up to 5 kilometers. The mobile obstacle detachment 

must protect the line of deployment of the antitank reserve. It is located in reserve close to 

the antitank assembly area and sometimes in it. 

Designated equipment is prepared to ambush by fire on the enemy unit’s flanks throughout 

the depth of the defense to limit the enemy’s ability to maneuver. The most appropriate 

places for these ambushes are the reverse slopes of hills, outskirts of populated areas, the 

forest edge, and at road junctions.

The anti-assault reserve assembly areas should provide rapid access to those objectives most 

likely to be assaulted by air. The brigade anti-assault reserve is located within the boundaries 

of the second (or third) position.

 

Designated control points (primary and reserve) are selected throughout the depth of 

defense in areas where tank assaults are difficult, away from the direction of the enemy main 

attack.

The brigade command post- is deployed 4-6 kilometers from the forward edge of the defense. 

From this point the commander can view the most likely enemy avenues of approach, 1-3 

kilometers from his forces. 

The brigade rear services command post is deployed 15 kilometers and sometimes more 

from the forward edge of the defense. It is located with the brigade trains (maintenance and 
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98

logistics elements).

The command-observation post for the motorized rifle battalion is located behind the 

first-echelon motorized rifle companies or in the vicinity of the battalion’s second-echelon 

company, which is approximately two kilometers from the forward edge of the defense. 

False strong points and false firing positions are constructed throughout the defense in 

between the defending units, on the flanks, and in unoccupied areas.

Fire Support

Fire support includes:

- Aviation strikes

- Direct and indirect fires from the BrAG

- Integrated fires from the maneuver battalions.

Air Defense 

The air defense system is created throughout the entire defense, and includes: 

- An integrated system of radar reconnaissance and early warning

- An integrated system of anti-aircraft missile and anti-aircraft artillery cover

- An integrated command and control system for air defense units.

The integrated reconnaissance of the aerial enemy is based on army radar sites. They are 

supplemented by the reconnaissance of the radar control posts of the brigade air defense 

subunits. The integration of missile and antiaircraft coverage includes the combat formation 

of brigade air defense forces and their integrated fires, coordinated by direction, height, lines, 

points to be protected, types of targets and time. 

The system of command and control unites the command posts, communication systems 

and computers with the air defense units and subunits to support the control of units and 

subunits and to direct their fires. 

Integrated Antitank Defense

Integrated antitank defense includes:

- Artillery fire against tanks and other armored vehicles from concealed locations;

- Integrated antitank fires (planned fires of antitank weapons, tanks and BMPs in direct

lay) by subunits on armor avenues of approach. 

The antitank reserve and mobile obstacle detachment prepare an assembly area and lines 

to mine plus lines of deployment during combat, starting at the security zone and forward 

position, to defeat a massed tank attack and destroy it as it attempts to wedge into the 

defense.

Integrated Engineer Obstacles

Obstacles can be made from anything that hinders movement (mines, electrified fences, etc.) 

to protect company strong points, areas between them, artillery emplacements, command 

posts, unit boundaries, and other points. These obstacles can be employed in conjunction 

with direct and indirect fires, as well as with naturally occurring obstacles.
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Integrated Air Assault Defense

The air assault defense force prevents enemy air assaults and destroys enemy forces before 

they land, during their landing and after they land, as well as countering airborne and 

airmobile sabotage and reconnaissance efforts. The integrated air assault defense includes:

- Anti-air assault defense reserve

- Subunits of the second echelon (reserve)

- Air strikes and air defense weapons fire

- Integrated direct and indirect fires, and anti-landing obstacles in potential landing

zones.

Fire Destruction of the Enemy by the Defense

Fire destruction of the enemy is the coordinated fires directed on the enemy by the 

designated forces and means of destruction using ordinary and incendiary ammunition to 

fulfill the tactical mission and achieve the aims of the battle. The goal of fire destruction is 

to diminish the combat potential of enemy subunits to the degree that it will guarantee that 

friendly subunits achieve their assigned missions without losing their combat capability. Fire 

destruction is organized by the senior commander with the agreement of the subunits that 

will carry it out during the period of fire destruction:

- Fire preparation to repel the advancing enemy

- Fire preparation to support the defending force

Fire preparation to repel the advancing enemy is conducted with the goal of disrupting 

his advance, deployment and transition to attack in order to inflict destruction on his firstechelon units and subunits. This phase continues until the enemy transitions to the attack. 

Fire preparation to support the defending force is conducted with the goal of inflicting 

maximum damage on the enemy and preventing his breakthrough into the depths of the 

defense. This phase continues throughout the entire defensive combat by friendly subunits.

During the conduct of counterattack, fire destruction of the enemy is accomplished in the 

periods of fire preparation for a counterattack and fire support of the counterattacking 

force. In order to achieve the effective destruction of the enemy by fire in battle, the brigade, 

battalions and companies create a system of fire which the senior commander uses as the 

basis for his unit’s system of fire destruction of the enemy. It includes the fires of artillery, 

tanks, BMPs, BTRs, antitank missiles, grenade launchers, and small arms, and also the use of 

flame and incendiary weapons [thermobaric]. The system of fire for the brigade (battalion) 

must include aviation strikes within the range of designated aviation resources.

The brigade’s (battalions’, companies’) integrated fires are organized as a strong response, 

using integrated fire destruction planned by the senior commander, with coordination with 

radio-electronic destruction and integrated engineer obstacles. The mission is to destroy 

enemy artillery subunits, command and control elements, troop control, the forces and 

weapons of the mechanized infantry and tank subunits of the first echelon and other enemy 

targets. For a discussion of artillery types of fire, see the artillery section in Chapter six.
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Commentary on Brigade in Defense

The motorized rifle brigade may defend with two or three motorized rifle battalions forward, 

depending on the situation. Its tank battalion may have platoons forward, but is usually 

located in the second echelon or reserve in the defense. When possible, the brigade creates 

a security zone. When it is not in direct contact with the enemy, this may be as deep as 40 

kilometers with five or six fallback positions. As a minimum, the brigade will man a forward 

position 6-8 kilometers in front of the main defense. The reason for the security zone or 

forward position is to deceive the enemy as to the location of the main defenses, slow 

and disrupt the enemy approach and make the enemy disclose his force disposition and 

strength. If the security zone or forward position actions can cause the enemy to deploy early 

(especially his artillery), it is well worth the effort.

Depending on the time available to prepare the defense, much of the brigade defense will 

be dug in. The work of trenching machines and bulldozers will be supplemented with oldfashioned shovels to provide protection for men and equipment. Land mines and other 

obstacles will protect the forward edge of the defense and canalize the enemy into fire sacs 

within the defense. Priority of effort will be to the first-echelon defenses and BrAG. Work on 

the defenses will continue throughout their existence. The emphasis on going underground 

is based on the requirement that coherent portions of the defense will survive a tactical 

nuclear strike. 

The BrAG consists of, at a minimum, the brigade’s organic two howitzer battalions and 

multiple rocket launcher battalion. Other nonorganic artillery battalions may be attached 

as necessary and other artillery battalions may provide support to the BrAG if in range. The 

organic antitank artillery battalion is normally not part of the BrAG, but serves in the brigade 

antitank reserve. The battalion mortars normally remain with the motorized rifle battalions in 

direct support of them, but are hooked into the brigade fire control net.

The brigade has the 2S-19 “Msta-S” howitzer (named after the Russian Msta River). It is a 

152mm self-propelled howitzer that entered the inventory in 1989, just before the Soviet 

Union collapsed. It is based on the T-80 tank chassis, but uses the T-72 tank diesel engine. It 

has a semi-automatic laying system, automatic loader, NBC protection system, wading kit, 

dozer blade, smoke generator and 81mm smoke launchers. It has an elevation of -4° to +68° 

and can traverse 360°. It fires 6-8 rounds per minute and can fire HE, HEAT, smoke, chemical, 

illumination, precision-guided and, theoretically, tactical nuclear rounds. It has a 29-kilometer 

range with base-bleed ammunition and 36 kilometers with a RAP round. It carries 50 rounds 

on board and has a five-man crew. There are 18 howitzers per battalion, and 36 per brigade.

The brigade also has a battalion of 18 BM-21 “Grad” multiple rocket launchers (grad is Russian 

for hail). The BM-21 has been around since 1963. It is basically a truck with 40 launch tubes 

that fire 122mm rockets. The system may be old, but the rockets are new and can project a 

20-kilogram warhead out to 45 kilometers. The warheads are HE, FRAG, chemical, smoke, 

antitank mines, antipersonnel mines and incendiary. It has a three-man crew and there are 

18 BM-21 Grads in the battalion. A launcher vehicle can clear the rack of all 40 rounds in 20 

seconds, and the battalion can fire a 720-round volley in close to the same time.
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The antitank artillery battalion has an antitank artillery battery of six MT-12 “Rapira” antitank 

guns. The towed MT-12 antitank gun fields a 100mm smoothbore gun and has a six-man crew 

(commander, driver of the towing vehicle, gun layer, loader, and two ammunition handlers). 

When the MT-LB is used as the tow vehicle, 20 rounds are typically carried (10 APFSDS, 4 HEFrag, 6 HEAT). The standard equipment consists of the panoramic PG-1M sight for indirect 

fire and an OP4M-40U telescope for direct fire. The APN-5-40 or APN-6-40 night sight is used 

for direct fire. The gun can be fitted with the LO-7 ski gear for travel across snow or swampy 

ground.

The brigade antitank battalion also has two batteries of 9P162 Kornet-T self-propelled heavy 

antitank guided missile vehicles (kornet means cornet in Russian). The Kornet missile entered 

the Russian inventory in 1994, and the 9P162 Kornet-T is on a BMP-3 chassis. It has two 

launchers and an autoloader and carries 16 missiles. The two launchers can engage the same 

target or two targets simultaneously. It is a fire-and-forget laser-guided missile with a range 

of 100-5,500 meters. It has tandem HEAT and thermobaric warheads. It has a two-man crew. 

There are six 9P162 Kornet-T in a battery, and 12 in the brigade.

Russia has fielded the most modern integrated ground-based tactical air defense system on 

the planet. There are two air defense battalions in the brigade. The schematic shows a missile 

battery of “Tunguska” protecting the first-echelon battalions. Two platoons of the “Strela-10” 

rocket battery protect the BrAG. Two platoons equipped with “Igla” MANPADS also cover the 

first-echelon battalions, while the third platoon in the “Igla” company protects the brigade 

command post. The “Tor-M1” anti-aircraft missile battalion provides zonal cover for the 

brigade to defend it from air strikes. The intent of this dense air defense is to deny the enemy 

use of helicopter gunships, fighter bombers, cruise missiles and unmanned aerial systems. 

Missiles are being upgraded to compensate for the increased range of some aerial ordnance.

This motorized rifle brigade defense has a stationary and a mobile component. It provides 

strong points designed to stop and destroy an enemy attack. Should the enemy break 

through, there are a series of fire sacs, canalizing obstacles, firing lines, counterattacks, and 

reserves. Some of the graphics and concepts for employing the Russian maneuver brigade 

are familiar to those students of the Soviet Army, but much is new. Fully integrated combined 

arms organization is becoming the standard at the battalion level. The brigade has four 

maneuver battalions, four artillery battalions, two air defense battalions and a more robust 

combat support and combat service support package. Equipment upgrades are evident 

throughout the brigade. Officer and NCO training has improved, with single-tracked officers 

who are commanders or chiefs of staff throughout their career. NCOs now attend a formal 

academy, which may take three years to complete. The force still has short-term conscripts, 

but the jobs requiring more skill and training are held by long-term contract soldiers. Brigade 

annual training usually requires a long-distance move by ship or rail, testing the unit’s ability 

to deploy on short notice.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

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Chapter 4 

The Offense
The Offense

103

Offensive Theory

The attack is a rapid and non-stop movement of armored and motorized rifle sub-units in 

a combat formation using the integrated intense fire from tanks and BMPs (BTRs) in order 

to close with the enemy. Fire is conducted with various weapon systems with the aim of 

destroying the enemy.

The attack is the main type of combat action. It is carried out in order to defeat the opposing 

enemy, to occupy a designated area (line), or to create the conditions for the conduct of 

the follow-on attack. It includes the destruction of the enemy using all available means, 

decisive attack, the rapid advance of forces into the depth of the defense, the destruction 

and/or capture of personnel and the capture of weapons, equipment, and various facilities 

and designated areas (lines). Depending on the situation and mission, the offensive may be 

carried out against a defending, advancing or withdrawing enemy. The offensive against 

enemy-occupied prepared defenses is carried out while in direct contact with the enemy, 

and having quickly overcome the defense, moving throughout the depth of his defense. The 

attack on an advancing enemy is conducted with a meeting engagement, while a retreating 

enemy is dealt with by a pursuit.

An advance against an enemy in a prepared defense most often begins with a breakthrough, 

which, as a rule, is carried out while in direct contact with him. During an offensive, there is 

the possibility of taking advantage of breaks, gaps and open flanks in the enemy defenses.1

 

Considerations for the attack include:

The Goals of the Attack

- Defeat the enemy

- Seize important areas (objects) sites

Implied Goals and Tasks

- Decisive attack

- Rapid advance of subunits into the depths of the defense

- Defeat of the enemy by all means available

- Destruction and capture of personnel and seizure of weapons, combat equipment,

and designated areas (lines) of terrain

Types of Attack

- Attack on a defending enemy

- Attack on a retreating enemy

- Attack on an advancing enemy (meeting engagement)

1

 This section, including graphics, has been compiled from many sources to include:

“Fundamentals of the Offense” [Основы наступления], as found on Studiopedia, <http://studopedia.info/1-

67784.html>, accessed on 1 July 2016. 

V.N. Zaritski and L.A. Kharkevich, General Tactics [Общая Тактика], Tambov: Tambov Government Technical 

University, 2007.

Field Manual: Preparation and Conduct of Combined Arms Warfare [Боевой Устав: По Подготовке и Ведению

Общевойскового Боя], Moscow: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2005.

Source material has also been obtained from a variety of training documents produced by Russian military 

academies and military departments in civilian academic institutions.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

104

Methods of Transitioning to the Offense

From positions in direct contact with the enemy: This method is initiated in accordance 

with the concept of the commander of the combat formation. The starting position for the 

attack depends on the size of the subunit (a motorized rifle battalion occupies an assembly 

area, a motorized rifle company occupies an assembly position, a motorized rifle platoon 

occupies part of the company assembly position). The attack occurs either after the necessary 

regrouping from within the defense or with the simultaneous attack by subunits from their 

defensive positions.

From the March: This method is initiated from an assembly area, usually selected at some 

distance from the forward edge of the enemy defense, which will prevent destruction of 

the subunit by long-range artillery fire and supports the concealment of ground forces from 

radio-electronic reconnaissance.

Fundamentals for Subunits Conducting an Offensive

(Above) This graphic portrays the span of distances and locations of elements of an attacking 

motorized rifle battalion with an attached tank company. The battalion objective is an enemy 

defending company and the width of the attack may be the width of the defending company 

or only a portion of it. The location of systems and distances will be adjusted to fit the demands 

of the situation, threat, forces available and terrain. The preferred method of attack is from the 

march where the attack originates from an assembly area. The battalion moves from its assembly 

area in march column and, during the march, deploys into company and platoon columns and 

then goes into platoon attack line. Forward of this, the line may slow to dismount squads who 

will form their own line of attack supported by fire from their carriers. If the situation warrants, 

the squads may stay mounted during the attack. The location of systems and distances will be 

adjusted to fit the demands of the situation, threat, forces available and terrain. 
The Offense

105

Methods of Attacking the Forward Edge of the Defense

Determining the layout of enemy defenses, the degree of destruction inflicted by one’s 

nuclear and conventional weapons, enemy unit equipment, and the nature of the terrain, an 

attack of the forward edge of the defense can be made as follows:

On BMPs (BTRs)

- Combat Formation – assault line

- Rate of Assault – 8 -12 kilometers/hour

Dismounted

- Combat Formation – infantry assault line

Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Offense

(Above) This graphic lays out typical distances for a motorized rifle battalion conducting an attack 

from positions in direct contact.
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Preparation for the offensive begins immediately after receipt of the order and includes:

- Organization for Combat: 

- Making the decision

- Reconnaissance

- Tasking subordinate units

- Coordination

- Defeating enemy fires

- Combat Support

- Command and Control

- Preparation of the battalion (company, platoon) to carry out missions

- Preparation in the assembly area

- Organization and conduct of training

- Practical work of the battalion (company) commander, his deputies, the battalion

headquarters, and subordinate units

- Other tasks.

An attack from positions in direct contact with the enemy begins with a deployed combat 

formation moving from starting positions into the offense. The starting positions for 

the troops conducting the offensive are occupied after the necessary regrouping within 

the defensive positions or with the simultaneous replacement of defending forces. This 

regrouping is carried out in order to create an offensive combat formation under the guise of 

Deployment Lines for Subunits in an Attack From The March

(Above) This graphic portrays the deployment lines for subunits to break into multiple columns, go 

on line and dismount. Artillery is well forward in the march order. Depending on the situation, the 

artillery may be positioned before the attack.
The Offense

107

reinforcing the defense. It is done quickly, and usually done the night before the offensive. 

The occupation of the starting positions for the offensive, when conducted while conducting 

a relief in place of defending forces, is done during the course of one-two nights prior to 

the offensive in accordance with the plan for the relief in place. During the relief in place of 

subunits of the first echelon, their BMP and attached tank subunits occupy the assembly area. 

The starting position for a brigade within the army’s first echelon is located within the first and 

second positions; the first-echelon battalions within the first position; the second-echelon 

battalions in the second position. Motorized rifle subunits occupy the starting position on the 

night before the offensive, and simultaneously artillery, guns and tanks designated for direct 

fire support occupy their positions.

An attack from the depth is conducted from assembly areas for the offensive, from permanent 

garrison deployment points, from alert assembly regions and from marches. An attack from 

the depth is usually conducted from an assembly area for the attack from where the units 

and subunits deploy into pre-combat and combat formation for the attack. The assembly 

area designated for the attack is 20-40 kilometers from the forward edge of the enemy’s main 

defenses. In order to ensure an organized attack, with all units and subunits attacking at the 

same time, the following are designated:

- Starting line

- Lines of deployment into battalion, company, and platoon columns

- Transition to the attack line

- Dismount line.

The Offense in Special Conditions

The Offense in Urban Areas 

During an offensive in a city (settlement) a special role is played by small units functioning 

separately on squad missions. The offensive is determined by the density of buildings and 

availability of space, parks, underground utilities, etc. The offensive is carried out along the 

streets. A successful attack can only be achieved by close cooperation of motorized rifle 

(tank) platoons (companies, battalions) with other kinds of troops, supported by artillery and 

aviation.

Offensive in the Mountains 

Significant factors in this type of terrain are: 

- steep terrain

- “dead” spaces and closed approaches

- rapidly flowing rivers

- mountains blocking vision

- a poor road net-work (or lack thereof)

- rocky soil that complicates engineering works

- other factors.

The attack is carried out along the roads and mountain ranges, on the slopes of heights and 

in other possible directions, with a wide possibility of flanking attacks and bypassing forces 

using concealed exits to hit the flanks and rear of the enemy.
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Offensive in the Forest

The factors for the conduct of the offense in forests are: 

- closed areas with wetlands

- a limited number of roads

- forest debris 

- fire (combined with minefields).

Observation is restricted, hindering target designation, adjustment of fire, and command 

and control. The attack is carried out primarily along roads and glades, using flanking and 

bypassing small subunits moving by compass azimuth. 

Offensive in the Desert

The factors for the offense in the desert are: 

- open terrain

- the almost complete absence of human settlements

- the almost complete absence of distinct landmarks

- poor road networks

- extremely poor vegetation

- sandy, rocky and saline soils

- an acute shortage or complete absence of water and building materials

- an arid climate

- abrupt temperature fluctuations. 

Daytime temperature may reach 50° C (122° F) and inside a tank 70° C (158°F). Therefore, it is 

better to attack at night. The offense is usually conducted on a broad front, off-road, in certain 

areas due to the need to capture vital areas, oases, and water sources. The open terrain is 

conducive to a wide variety of maneuver.

Defense in the Northern Regions and in Winter

The factors for the offense in the northern regions and winter are: 

- vast areas of tundra

- boggy tundra

- forest areas

- possibly large numbers of lakes

- boulders and rocky areas

- a limited number of roads

- difficulties for engineering fortification of an area, concealment, and orientation

- harsh climates

- polar nights lasting three to four months

- frequent snowfalls, snowstorms and blizzards

- deep snow (over 50 centimeters/19 inches) that severely limits the maneuverability

of units

- bad weather

- ionospheric and geomagnetic disturbances that disrupt radios and compasses (the

error can be up to 15°). 

The offensive is usually conducted from positions prepared for advancing or deploying subunits 

or from the march. The attack is conducted mainly along roads, rivers and other accessible areas.
The Offense

109

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Squad in the Offense

The motorized rifle squad attacks as part of a motorized rifle platoon or can be attached to a 

tank platoon. When dismounted, the motorized rifle squad attacks on a frontage of up to 50 

meters.2

2

 This section, including graphics, has been compiled from many sources to include:

“Squad in the Offense” [Отделение в наступлении], as found on Studiopedia, <http://studopedia.info/1-67785.

html>, accessed on 1 July 2016. 

V.N. Zaritski and L.A. Kharkevich, General Tactics [Общая Тактика], Tambov: Tambov Government Technical 

University, 2007.

Field Manual: Preparation and Conduct of Combined Arms Warfare [Боевой Устав: По Подготовке и Ведению

Общевойскового Боя], Moscow: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2005.

Source material has also been obtained from a variety of training documents produced by Russian military 

academies and military departments in civilian academic institutions.

The Combat Formation of a Motorized Rifle Squad on Foot

(Above) When dismounted, a motorized rifle squad moves in a 

column and fights in a line. The squad is split into a fire group and 

a maneuver group. The soldiers in both groups are dispersed within 

the squad column so that both groups go on line simultaneously. 

The squad leader leads the squad column and is followed by his 

machine gunner. The senior rifleman follows the machine gunner. 

When the squad column deploys on line, the squad leader controls 

the fire group and the senior rifleman controls the maneuver group.
The Offense

111

Combat Tasks

The motorized rifle squad in the attack is given an immediate objective and a direction of 

subsequent advance. The objectives of the attacks are usually enemy personnel in trenches, 

tanks, guns, antitank missiles, machine guns and other weapons located in the first trench and 

the near depth of the enemy defense. The direction of further advance will support achieving 

the immediate objective of the platoon. 

Squad Formation for Overcoming Mine 

Obstacle (maneuver group)

Squad Formation for Overcoming Mine 

Obstacle (fire group)

(Above-Left) This graphic shows the first 

stage of a squad moving through a minefield 

breach. The fire group and BMP provide 

suppressive fire on the enemy position as the 

maneuver group moves through the breach 

and takes up fire-in-support positions.

(Above-Right) The maneuver group join the BMP 

in laying down suppressive fire while the fire 

group moves through the breach and takes up 

fire-in support positions. Then, the fire group 

will join the BMP in laying down suppressive fire 

while the maneuver group assaults the enemy 

position. The squad leader is responsible for 

controlling fires to keep the enemy’s head down 

while not killing his own soldiers.
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Elements of the Combat Formation

The combat formation of a motorized rifle squad, may assault on foot or be part of a 

maneuver group or fire group mounted on a combat vehicle.

System of Fire and Command and Control 

Depending on the combat mission and situation, a combat group may attack on line, echelon 

left or echelon right with an interval between the soldiers in the group of 6-8 meters (8-12 

steps). To facilitate firing and for the best use of terrain, the soldiers may move in a file or 

a line with several soldiers behind and others forward. This should not limit the width or 

firepower of the squad attack line nor hinder the movement of neighboring units. The BMP 

(BTR) of the combat group may move on one of the flanks of the squad or in the middle of 

the squad line. When the attack is dismounted, the squad leader commands by radio, voice, 

signals, and personal example. The position of the squad commander ensures the effective 

fires. Targeting is done with tracer bullets (projectiles) and signal devices, using known 

landmarks, along the axis of movement (attack). 

Deployment of the Motorized Rifle Squad from Behind a Vehicle (variant)

(Above) The motorized rifle squad moves in a BMP, BTR or MT-LB and provides fire on the move. 

When the vehicle stops, the squad dismounts and goes on line. The fire group sits on one side of 

the vehicle and the maneuver group on the other. The first out are the assistant machine gunner 

and the senior rifleman. The squad leader is the last out, since he sits forward where he can 

communicate with the driver and vehicle commander. The squad leader is positioned where he 

can readily control the fires of the machine gunner and grenadier.
The Offense

113

Platoon in the Offense

A motorized rifle (tank) platoon may attack as part of a of a motorized rifle company, 

constitute the combined arms reserve of a battalion (company), operate as a combatreconnaissance patrol, and provide the bulk of an assault group. A tank platoon, motorized 

rifle platoon on BMPs in full, or by individual machines can be allocated for the destruction 

of the enemy by direct-fire weapons in preparation for the offensive. A platoon occupies a 

frontage of up to 300 meters in the attack. An offensive includes a platoon combat formation, 

system of fire, and system of command and control.3

3

 This section, including graphics, has been compiled from many sources to include:

“Platoon in the Offense” [Взвод в наступлении], as found on Studiopedia, <http://studopedia.info/1-67786.

html>, accessed on 1 July 2016. 

V.N. Zaritski and L.A. Kharkevich, General Tactics [Общая Тактика], Tambov: Tambov Government Technical 

University, 2007.

Field Manual: Preparation and Conduct of Combined Arms Warfare [Боевой Устав: По Подготовке и Ведению

Общевойскового Боя], Moscow: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2005.

Source material has also been obtained from a variety of training documents produced by Russian military 

academies and military departments in civilian academic institutions.

Combat Formation of a Motorized Rifle Squad in the Offense (variant)

(Above) The infantry fighting vehicle or personnel carrier is an important component of the 

infantry squad, both for its transport capacity and its heavy machine gun and antitank missile 

support. When possible, the squad in the attack hopes to provide some cover or concealment for 

its vehicle and some cover for its fire group. The maneuver group normally gets the open ground. 

The left hand example shows the squad BMP partially concealed by brush and firing over the 

heads of the maneuver group. The fire group is concealed partially by some woods and sawmill. 

The right hand example shows the BMP in hull defilade behind a hillock providing supporting fire 

while the fire group supports from the brush and the remnants of a timber-cleared copse of trees.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

114

Combat Tasks

In the attack, a motorized rifle (tank) platoon has an objective and a direction of further 

advance. A platoon, functioning as a combined arms reserve for a battalion (company) is 

given a direction or a march route, a position in the march column, and possible missions 

which it might have to accomplish. The objectives of a platoon attack may be enemy 

personnel detected in the trenches, tanks, guns, antitank missiles, machine guns and other 

enemy weapons located in the first trench and throughout the depth of the enemy’s defense. 

The direction of further advance will support achieving the immediate objective of the 

company.

Elements of the Combat Formation

A motorized rifle platoon combat formation typically includes:

- Motorized rifle squads

- Command and control

- Fire support 

In addition, the platoon can have a group of combat vehicles.

Depending on the mission and situation, motorized rifle squads attack in squad line, wedge, 

reverse wedge, echelon right or echelon left. The interval between squads on line or in depth 

is up to 50 meters. 

Combat Formation and Missions of a Motorized Rifle Platoon in the Offensive

(Above) A motorized rifle platoon in the offensive has an immediate objective and a direction of 

further movement.
The Offense

115

System of Fire and Command and Control

The command and control and fire support group is assigned to control the attacking 

subunits and fire support. In the course of the offensive, the command and control and 

fire support group maintains a distance of up to 50 meters from the combat formation or is 

part of it. The combat formation of a motorized rifle platoon attacking mounted on BMPs 

(tank platoon) moves in a vehicle line, wedge, reverse wedge, echelon right or echelon 

left. The interval between combat vehicles (tanks) can be up to 100 meters. The motorized 

rifle platoon may attack dismounted, on BMPs, or riding on tanks. A motorized rifle (tank) 

platoon may constitute a combined arms reserve for a battalion (company); it advances 

1.5-2 kilometers behind the first-echelon company and is prepared to fulfill any unexpected 

mission that arises. 

Combat Formation of a Motorized Rifle Platoon in the Offense (dismounted)
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

116

Roles of a Motorized Rifle Platoon in the Attack

As part of a another unit

- As part of a company

- In the battalion’s reserve

As a stand-alone unit

- In an assault group

- As an advance party for an air assault

- As a reconnaissance patrol

(Above) This graphic shows a motorized rifle platoon mounted on BMPs coming on line and 

dismounting with the squads then moving ahead of the BMPS. These are eight man squads (four 

in the fire group, two in the maneuver group and two vehicle crew). 

Dismount and Deployment of a Motorized Rifle Platoon into a Combat Formation (variant)
The Offense

117

Means of Reinforcement 

The following are means to reinforce a motorized rifle platoon

- Automatic grenade launcher

- Antitank subunit

- Flamethrower subunit

- Air defense subunit

- Engineer subunit

- A tank

- NBC subunits

Depending on the situation and mission, grenade launcher, antitank and flamethrower 

subunits and weapons may be attached to a platoon, and when performing independent 

tasks – an engineer subunit.

Combat Formation of a Motorized Rifle Platoon in the Offense (mounted)

(Above) This graphic shows a motorized rifle platoon in the mounted attack. The platoon is on 

line following a tank. A mounted attack, when possible, is quicker and the on onboard squad can 

assist by firing through vehicle firing ports.
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Sequence of Work after Receipt of Mission

After receipt of the order, the platoon commander states:

- The objective of the attack, the direction of the follow-on attack and line of transition

to the attack. If it is a dismounted attack, the dismount point

- Tasks for his deputy.

- The order in which the BMPs or BTRs will fire 

- Combat formations of the platoon and subordinate attachments

Combat Formation for a Motorized Rifle Platoon Breaching a Minefield

(Above) The graphic shows the four steps involved in a motorized rifle platoon crossing a minefield 

breach under fire. The platoon pulls up on line and dismounts while the BMPs provide suppressive 

fire. The maneuver group of the first squad crosses the breach first and established a support 

by fire position. The fire group of the first squad follows and joins the maneuver group in its 

support by fire position. Then the maneuver group of the second squad crosses the breach first 

and establishes another support by fire position. The fire group of the second squad follows and 

joins its maneuver group in its support by fire position. The third squad then follows the same 

procedure. Finally the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, designated marksman and any attached 

weapons (flame projectors, AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers) cross the breach and launch an 

attack on the enemy.
The Offense

119

Company in the Offense

A motorized rifle (tank) company can advance in the battalion first echelon or constitute the 

second echelon or reserve. It can serve as a forward detachment, a flanking detachment or a 

special purpose detachment. A first-echelon motorized rifle (tank) company’s attack frontage 

extends up to one kilometer and narrows to 500 meters at the breakthrough sector. An 

offensive includes a company combat formation, system of fires, and system of command and 

control.4

Combat Tasks

In the offensive, a first-echelon company has an immediate objective and a direction of 

further advance. Its immediate objective is to destroy the enemy in his first-echelon platoon 

strong points, and then control these positions. The direction of further advance will support 

achieving the immediate objective of the battalion. A second echelon company has an 

immediate objective upon being committed to combat and a direction of further advance. 

The immediate objective of a second-echelon company upon being committed to combat is 

to complete of the destruction of the enemy together with the companies of the first echelon 

in the enemy strong points throughout the depth of his defense and controlling his forward 

positions. The direction of further advance of second-echelon companies will support 

4

 This section, including graphics, has been compiled from many sources to include:

“Motorized Rifle (Tank) Companies in the Offense” [мотострелковой (танковой) роты в наступлении], as found 

on Studiopedia, <http://studopedia.info/1-67787.html>, accessed on 1 July 2016. 

V.N. Zaritski and L.A. Kharkevich, General Tactics [Общая Тактика], Tambov: Tambov Government Technical 

University, 2007.

Field Manual: Preparation and Conduct of Combined Arms Warfare [Боевой Устав: По Подготовке и Ведению

Общевойскового Боя], Moscow: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2005.

Source material has also been obtained from a variety of training documents produced by Russian military 

academies and military departments in civilian academic institutions.

Composition of a Motorized Rifle Company in the Offensive 

(Above) This graphic portrays the spacing in a motorized rifle company attack. The location of 

systems and distances will be adjusted to fit the demands of the situation, threat, forces available 

and terrain.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

120

achieving the subsequent objective of the brigade. An offensive requires a combat formation, 

system of fires and system of command and control.

Elements of the Combat Formation

An attacking company’s combat formation usually consists of one echelon. Depending 

on the combat mission and the situation, the combat formation can be a company in one 

echelon with a combined arms reserve of up to a platoon. A combat formation consists of:

- A first echelon

- A combined arms reserve

- Attached artillery subunits

- Weapons directly controlled by the company commander

During the offensive, the platoons of the company are deployed in line, wedge, reverse 

wedge, echelon right or echelon left formation. The first echelon is tasked with defeating 

the opposing enemy, achieving the immediate objective and developing the offensive 

with the combined arms reserve throughout the depth of the combat mission. It consists 

of 2-3 platoons with reinforcements. The combined arms reserve is tasked with handling 

unforeseen problems, replacing depleted first-echelon subunits, and other tasks. It consists of 

one platoon. During the offensive, it is 1.5-2 kilometers behind the units of the first echelon. 

Attached artillery subunits and weapons support the platoons of the first echelon and their 

attachments. 

Pre-Combat and Combat Formation

A company moves into pre-combat formation 1-3 kilometers from the enemy’s positions 

when its platoons deploy from the company march column into platoon columns. Platoon 

columns are usually separated by 150-300 meters. The company pre-combat formation 

provides a combination of speed, dispersion, flexibility, and firepower. As with the battalion, 

a company takes different formations, depending on the tactical situation. Company precombat formations are flexible and will change rapidly to facilitate movement through 

restrictive terrain or in response to enemy actions. 

A company is considered to be in combat formation when its subordinate platoons have 

deployed their individual combat vehicles on line. A company can assume a combat 

formation 800-1000 meters forward of enemy defensive positions. The combat formation 

maximizes the unit’s firepower by deploying its weapons systems forward. When the terrain 

is unfavorable for vehicular movement or when enemy antitank defenses are too strong, the 

motorized rifle squads will dismount and advance on line. The dismount line is no more than 

one kilometer from the forward line of enemy troops. Normally, the dismount line is some 

400 meters from the enemy and will be as close as concealing terrain allows. If dismounted, 

the motorized rifle squads follow close behind the supporting tanks and receive supporting 

fire from their BMPs or BTRs. These combat vehicles move up to 400 meters behind, on the 

flank of, or within the assault line of the advancing force, depending on terrain and enemy 

fire. The vehicles may also move by bounds from one firing position to another, supporting 

the attack by fire.
The Offense

121

System of Fire & Command and Control

The system of fire is based on the fires of motorized rifle and tank platoons and includes 

attached weapons, supporting artillery, and attached company weapons. To ensure adequate 

command and control, the commander of the company is in a BMP while his company is in 

its combat (pre-combat) formation. During a dismounted assault, the company commander 

usually dismounts.

Roles of a Motorized Rifle Company in the Attack

In the attack the motorized rifle company fulfills the following functions:

- As part of a motorized rifle brigade

- In a combined arms reserve of the brigade

- As part of a motorized rifle battalion

- In the first or second echelon

- As part of a tank company (in special conditions, the MRC can be supported by an

artillery {mortar} battery and be integrated into a tank company)

- As a stand-alone unit

- As a forward detachment

- As a flanking and special detachment

- The main component of an assault group

- As part of an air assault

Means of Reinforcement

Common attachments for a motorized rifle company are:

- Mortar (artillery) battery or platoon.

- Automatic grenade launcher, antitank, flamethrower, and engineer squads

- Tank platoon

It can be supported by an artillery (mortar) battery and be integrated into a tank company.

Company reinforcements depend on the situation and the assigned mission. Reinforcements 

may include artillery and flamethrower subunits, and engineer subunits. A first-echelon 

motorized rifle (tank) company will have a reinforcing tank (motorized rifle) subunit and be 

supported by the bulk of the senior commander’s artillery subunits. 
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Sequence of Work after Receipt of Mission

Decisions about the offense: The commander of the motorized rifle company personally 

makes the decision based on his understanding of the mission and determination the 

situation.

1. Concept of Battle

- The direction and concentration of the main efforts

- How to defeat the enemy

- Combat formation of the company (platoon)

Depending on the conditions when transitioning to the attack, he determines

- The assembly and holding areas

- The starting line

- The deployment lines and their safe distances from enemy attack

- The line for transitioning to the attack and march routes

2. Tasks of subordinate units

3. Main questions of coordination

4. Command and control and combat support

Considerations of the Company Commander

- Motorized rifle platoon: 

- reinforcements, objective of the attack 

- direction of the follow-on attack 

- assembly position

- Attached artillery subunits;

- fire missions 

- time and manner of their implementation

- firing positions 

- order of displacement

- Anti-tank squads and attached weapons;

- their targets for engagement during the attack on the forward edge of the

 enemy defense

- their position in the combat formation

- their order of displacement.

For an attack from the march, the company commander also directs the march for the 

company, the lines to deploy into company and platoon columns, the places where infantry 

will mount and dismount tanks (should this be part of the attack), the line of safety from 

enemy fire, the line to dismount motorized rifle company and platoon personnel when 

attacking dismounted and the line to transition to the attack.
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Battalion in the Offense 

A motorized rifle or tank battalion can advance in the first echelon of a brigade, constitute 

the brigade’s second echelon or combined arms reserve, act as an advance guard, forward 

detachment, raiding detachment, special purpose detachment, flanking detachment, and 

tactical air (sea) landing detachment, and also form the base of an assault detachment. A 

Combat Formation of a Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Offense

(Above) This graphic shows the usual distances involved with an attacking motorized rifle 

battalion
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motorized rifle or tank battalion’s mortar battery and grenade launcher platoon are directly 

subordinate to the commander of the battalion, and remain intact to support the attacking 

subunits on the axis of the main attack. In some situations, the mortar battery provides a 

platoon and the grenade launcher platoon provides a squad to the first-echelon companies. 

A first-echelon motorized rifle (tank) battalion advances on a front of up to two kilometers, 

with a depth of up to one kilometer. An offensive includes a battalion combat formation, 

system of fires and system of command and control.5

Combat Tasks

A battalion advancing in the first echelon is assigned an:

- Immediate objective

- Subsequent objective 

- A direction of further advance.

The immediate objective of a first-echelon battalion usually includes defeating the enemy in 

his first-echelon company strong point, which is contained within the width of the battalion 

attack sector, and controlling that area. A subsequent objective may be to continue the 

offensive, to defeat the enemy within the depth of the defense or to hold the enemy’s first 

position. The direction of further advance will support achieving the brigade’s subsequent 

objective.

5

 This section, including graphics, has been compiled from many sources to include:

“Motorized Rifle (Tank) Battalions in the Offense” [мотострелкового (танкового) батальона в наступлении], as 

found on Studiopedia, <http://studopedia.info/1-67788.html>, accessed on 1 July 2016. 

V.N. Zaritski and L.A. Kharkevich, General Tactics [Общая Тактика], Tambov: Tambov Government Technical 

University, 2007.

Field Manual: Preparation and Conduct of Combined Arms Warfare [Боевой Устав: По Подготовке и Ведению

Общевойскового Боя], Moscow: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2005.

Source material has also been obtained from a variety of training documents produced by Russian military 

academies and military departments in civilian academic institutions.

Composition of a Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Offensive 

(Above) This graphic shows the usual layout of a motorized rifle battalion in the offensive
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125

A battalion attacking in the second echelon is assigned an:

- Immediate objective

- A direction of further advance

The immediate objective of a second echelon battalion may be to continue the offensive, 

to defeat the enemy brigade or regimental reserves in conjunction with the first-echelon 

battalion or to control the enemy rear boundary. The direction of further advance of a 

second-echelon battalion will support achieving the brigade’s subsequent objective.

Areas, Positions and Lines for an Attack From Positions in Direct Contact with the Enemy

(Above) An attack from positions in direct contact with the enemy will preferably be from the 

march by a battalion moving from an assembly area through the friendly defensive area. The 

defending battalion will usually follow directly behind the attacking battalion. Usually the 

defending battalion will attack dismounted with its carriers following in a fire support mission or 

as a separate bronegruppa.
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(Right) This graphic on the facing page depicts two battalion attacks from the march. The top is 

a mounted attack by a tank battalion with an attached motorized rifle company and engineer 

platoon. The battalion has left its assembly area, deployed from battalion to company to platoon 

column and then into platoon line. The third tank company is trailing in reserve in platoon 

columns. There is no artillery depicted, although an artillery battalion in support of a maneuver 

battalion is common. For the amount of enemy depicted, two artillery battalions may well be in 

support. The enemy in sector is a defending mechanized infantry company plus two platoons of 

another mechanized infantry company reinforced with a tank platoon and two antitank platoons. 

The battalion immediate objective is the rear of the first echelon mechanized infantry company 

and the subsequent objective is beyond the enemy battalion CP. It has a direction of further 

advance. It anticipates a counterattack by up to a tank battalion reinforced with a mechanized 

infantry company.

The bottom graphic depicts a dismounted attack by a motorized rifle battalion with an attached 

tank company. The tanks and two motorized rifle companies are fully deployed and advancing 

on line with the third motorized rifle in reserve in company column. Again, there is no artillery 

depicted, only the battalion mortar battery. The enemy defense is robust and includes most of 

a mechanized infantry company reinforced with several tanks. The immediate objective is the 

rear of the mechanized infantry company and the subsequent objective breaks into the enemy 

battalion rear area. The battalion commander anticipates a counterattack from higher ground of 

up to a reinforced mechanized infantry battalion strength. The battalion has a direction of further 

attack.
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Combat Formation and Missions of Subunits in the Attack (mounted and dismounted)
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Elements of the Combat Formation

The combat formation of a motorized rifle or tank battalion consists of one or two echelons.

The battalion usually consists of two echelons for the breakthrough of an enemy defense. 

In the event of an attack using only one echelon, the formation will have a company-sized 

reserve. 

Elements of the combat formation include:

- First echelon

- Second echelon (or combined arms reserve)

- Artillery subunits

- Subunits and weapons, which remain directly subordinate to the battalion

commander.

The first echelon is designed to defeat the opposing enemy, carry out the immediate 

objective and continue the offensive together with the second echelon (or combined arms 

reserve) throughout the entire depth of the combat mission. This element consists of two 

or three companies and attachments. The second echelon exploits the successes of the 

first echelon, assists the first echelon in fulfilling its immediate and subsequent objectives, 

replaces or reinforces depleted first-echelon subunits, repels counterattacks, defeats enemy 

reserves, destroys any enemy on the flanks or in the rear of the first echelon, secures seized 

objective lines and performs other tasks as needed. It consists of up to a company. The 

combined arms reserve deals with unforeseen problems, replaces depleted first echelon 

units, repels counterattacks, destroys any enemy on the flanks or in the rear, performs other 

tasks assigned to the second echelon. It consists of up to a company. The second echelon 

(combined arms reserve) of the motorized rifle battalion stays 1.5-2 kilometers behind the 

companies of the first echelon while they deploy line by line. At the line for deployment into 

platoon columns, the second echelon remains in pre-combat formation or platoon columns. 

The mortar battery artillery subunit supports first-echelon units. It deploys to firing positions 

500 meters behind the first-echelon companies.

The following are subunits and weapons directly subordinate to the motorized rifle battalion 

commander:

- Grenade Launcher Subunit (the AGS-17 Grenade Launcher Platoon), which attacks

enemy personnel and lightly-armored objects, covers the flanks, and juncture 

points with adjacent friendly units. It occupies firing positions 300 meters behind 

companies in the first echelon to protect the gaps between company strong points 

and the flanks;

- Flamethrower subunits, which defeat the enemy using thermobaric and flame

rockets;

- Antitank platoon, which engages tanks and other armored vehicles.
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Pre-Combat and Combat Formation

The battalion assumes a pre-combat formation 4-6 kilometers from the enemy’s forward 

positions, when its companies deploy from the battalion march column into company 

columns. Company columns usually are separated by 500-800 meters. However, depending 

on the tactical situation, this distance may vary. A battalion can assume different formations 

as it moves forward. The deployment of the battalion in combat is determined by combat 

power, readiness of enemy and friendly forces, terrain, time, and weather. Because of these 

factors, a battalion’s pre-combat formation will change as it moves forward. A Russian 

commander will vary his formations to suit the situation and his concept of the operation. 

Because of these variables, there is no templated deployment scheme.

A battalion is in combat formation when its first-echelon companies are in columns. 

Depending on the tactical situation, a battalion’s second-echelon companies can be in either 

march or column formation.

System of Fire and Command and Control

The system of fire includes the systems of fire of the motorized rifle and tank companies, 

organic assets, attached and supporting artillery, the battalion’s direct-fire assets, the grenade 

launcher platoon, and attached antitank and flamethrower units. To ensure command and 

control, a command-observation post is deployed forward at a position that provides the 

best view of the terrain and the enemy. The position provides for continuous battlefield 

management and allows coordination with adjacent units. The position is placed up to 300 

meters from the front line.

Roles of a Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Attack

In the attack the motorized rifle battalion fulfills the following functions:

- As part of a motorized rifle brigade

- In the first or second echelon

- In a combined arms reserve 

- As a stand-alone unit

- As an advanced guard

- As a forward, flanking, raiding, assault or special detachment

- Conducting amphibious and tactical air assaults

Means of Reinforcement

Common attachments for a motorized rifle battalion include:

- 1-2 tank companies

- Artillery battalion or battery

- Engineer platoon, mine clearance means, scissor bridge and engineer route clearance 

vehicle

- Antitank subunits and means of repelling airborne assaults 

- NBC units.

A tank company is normally attached to a motorized rifle battalion, while a tank battalion 

normally has a motorized rifle company attached. An attached artillery battalion takes 

up firing positions 2-4 kilometers from the troops on the forward edge. In addition, the 
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motorized rifle battalion is supported by artillery battalion fire, direct support and brigade 

level air defense systems and sometimes by helicopter gunships.

Sequence of Work after Receipt of Mission

Decisions about the Offense: The commander of the motorized rifle battalion personally 

makes the decision based on his understanding of the mission and determination of the 

situation.

1. Concept of Battle

- The direction and concentration of the main efforts

- How to defeat the enemy

- Combat formation of the battalion (company, platoon)

Depending on the conditions when transitioning to the attack, he determines

- The assembly and holding areas

- The starting line

- The deployment lines and their safe distances from enemy attack

- The line for transitioning to the attack and march routes

2. Tasks of subordinate units

3. Main questions of coordination

4. Command and control and combat support

After receipt of the order, the battalion commander states:

- For the first-echelon companies, including an attached tank company - means of

reinforcement, immediate objective and direction of the subsequent attack, the 

assembly positions and the time of their occupation, and who provides support

- For the second-echelon company - the assembly (waiting) area and time of its

occupation, possible lines for commitment to battle, immediate objective and 

direction of the follow-on attack, reinforcements when entering into battle.

- For the reserve – assembly position, direction and order of displacement during the

offensive, and missions to prepare for 

- For attached subunits of artillery and mortar batteries - targets designated for 

destruction during the fire preparation of the attack and who directs them, firing 

positions, march routes and the order of movement, time to be ready to fire and 

order of displacement

- For dedicated direct fire (guns and tanks) - targets designated for destruction during

the fire preparation of the attack and who destroys them, firing positions and the 

time of their employment, actions after carrying out their missions

- For automatic grenade launcher subunits - targets designated for destruction during

the fire preparation of the attack, firing positions, place in the combat formation, 

routes, etc.

- For antitank subunits - targets designated for destruction during the preparatory

attack by fires, firing position, place in the combat formation, route, etc.

- For air defense subunits - direction in which to search for enemy aircraft, place in the

combat formation, etc.

- For engineer subunits - place and time for breaching minefields and obstacles and

method and marking of crossings through them.
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For an attack from the march, the battalion commander also directs the march for the 

battalion, the lines for deployment into company and platoon columns, the places where 

infantry will mount and dismount tanks (should this be part of the attack), the line of safety 

from enemy fire, the line to dismount motorized rifle company and platoon personnel when 

attacking dismounted and the line to transition to the attack.

 Motorized Rifle Battalion Assembly Area

(Above) This graphic is a representative motorized rifle battalion assembly area. It is designed 

for 360° defense with the mortar battery, battalion CP and trains in the center. Companies are 

located in separate areas and in order of their expected order of march. Vehicles are dug in and 

camouflaged. A BMP platoon is dug in on the likely avenue of approach. Other outposts screen 

the perimeter. Foot patrols cover the perimeter and interior of the assembly area. 
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(Right) The graphic on the facing page depicts the lines of deployment for an attacking motorized 

rifle battalion. The artillery will begin the fire preparation phase before the battalion leaves 

the assembly area. This phase can last 40-50 minutes, although all weapons will not be firing 

continuously. The preparation covers the attacking movement while attempting to gain fire 

superiority by suppressing enemy artillery and strongpoints and disrupting command and control. 

The artillery preparation concentrates on the enemy forward positions from the time when the 

brigade goes into battalion columns until it hits the line to deploy into platoon columns. The 

fires begin to lift and shift into the depth of enemy defenses. When the platoons have moved into 

squad columns and into attack line, all the fires have shifted to form a line of fire slowly advancing 

through the enemy first echelon defense (forward enemy platoon-battalion immediate objective). 

This is the beginning of the fire support phase. The artillery fires on the enemy immediately in front 

of and on the flanks of the attacking force. Successive fire concentrations and rolling barrages 

are employed during this phase. Artillery battalions or batteries may be attached to attacking 

companies during this phase. As the attack continues to the depth of the enemy company in the 

sector of attack (battalion subsequent objective), artillery begins displacing forward as the artillery 

accompaniment of the attack phase begins. Artillery supports the attack into the enemy positions, 

concentrating on newly discovered targets, antitank weapons, mortars and artillery. 
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Fundamentals for Conducting an Offensive by Combined Arms Subunits
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(Right) The graphic on the facing page shows a motorized rifle battalion and two companies 

of the tank battalion attacking in the south (notionally the brigade main attack), while the 

northern attack consists of a motorized rifle battalion and a tank company. The third motorized 

rifle company is moving to reinforce success with two companies. Its third company constitutes 

the anti-assault reserve. Normally the main attack sector will be narrower than the supporting 

attack sector. On a Russian military map, Russian maneuver unit positions, boundary lines, axes, 

deployment lines, command posts and equipment are drawn in red. Artillery boundaries, firing 

positions, planned fires, and equipment are drawn in black, as are air defense boundaries and 

equipment, electronic warfare units and equipment and the antitank units and equipment. 
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Offense

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Inserting Additional Armor for an Attack in Direct Contact
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(Right) The graphic facing page depicts an attack from a position in direct contact with the enemy 

[наступление из положения непосредственного соприкновения с противником] which 

is mounted from an established defense or when an attack from the march has failed. In either 

event, Russian subunits will remain in contact with the enemy. The attack can be launched by 

the forces already in contact with the enemy or by conducting an attack from the march through 

the Russian’s own forward defending forces. In either event, control of forces and movement will 

be a challenge. Artillery preparation will be intense since it will be difficult to attain operational 

surprise.

This graphic shows the defending 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion with an attached tank company 

and artillery battalion. It defends in two echelons with its 1st and 2nd MRC forward and its 3rd 

MRC in the second echelon. It is opposed by a dug-in mechanized infantry company with an 

attached tank platoon. The attack will be reinforced by two tank companies from the parent 

battalion of the attached tank battalion and the 4th MRC from the 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion 

of the parent Motorized Rifle Brigade. 

The first task is to concentrate forces for the attack. Forces will move under the cover of night, 

stormy weather, smoke, artillery fire or other obscurant. Ground guides and one-sided reflective 

trail markers will move forces into position. The 1st MRC will retain the northern part and second 

echelon position of its present position. The 4th MRC will move into the southern part of the 

1st MRC position and form a single echelon line. The 2nd MRC will concentrate its force in the 

southern part of its position in a single echelon. The 3rd MRC will move from its second echelon 

position into the northern part of the 2nd MRC position in a single echelon line. Battalion 

headquarters and the air defense battery will move forward behind the new 2nd MRC position. 

The mortar battery, AGS-17 platoon and antitank reserve will stay in position.

The battalion will attack with three motorized rifle companies abreast and the tank battalion in 

the second echelon. If the first echelon fails to complete the breakthrough, the second echelon 

may have to complete it. The 1st MRC moves as a reserve. The attack will be preceded by a 

short artillery preparation (10-25 minutes). Supporting artillery from brigade will add its fires. 

The attack will have an immediate objective (the depth of the defending enemy company) and 

a subsequent direction of attack. Should the attack succeed, the commander will attempt to 

maintain the momentum. After destroying the enemy, the battalions will usually form into precombat or march order and move without delay. Should the attack fail, the commander may 

attempt to bypass the enemy or resume the defense and prepare to try again.
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Transitioning to the Attack from a Position in Direct Contact with the Enemy
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Brigade in the Offense

The motorized rifle or tank brigade may be found in the first echelon, second echelon, or 

combined arms reserve of an Army Group or Army Corps. As a rule, a tank brigade is usually 

the main effort to defeat the main enemy force. The brigade is assigned an attack zone 

of up to 6 kilometers wide in the section of the breakthrough. Its zone of attack is up to 2 

kilometers. The depth of the brigade’s composition in the attack is 10-15 kilometers. For 

conducting the offensive, a motorized rifle or tank brigade will create a combat formation 

and determines tactics for the destruction of the enemy by fires, air defense, and air assault 

defense.6

Combat Tasks

A motorized rifle or tank brigade, advancing in the first echelon has the following combat 

tasks:

- Immediate objective – defeat the first echelon (brigade/regiment) of the enemy

defense and occupy its position. The depth of the immediate objective is up to 5 

kilometers;

- Intermediate objective – further develop the offensive by defeating the first echelon’s

reserve. The depth of the intermediate objective is up to 15 kilometers;

- Further objective- advance farther and defeat the Army Group’s divisional reserves,

which is the task of the army (corps) on the first day of the offensive. The depth of 

the further objective is 20-30 kilometers.

Elements of the Combat Formation

A two echelon system is used to defeat an enemy in a prepared defense. The following are 

the elements of the combat formation:

- The first echelon

- The second echelon

- Combined arms reserve

- Brigade Artillery Group (BrAG);

- Air defense subunits

- Antitank reserve

- Mobile obstacle construction detachments

- Counterair assault reserve.

Depending on the situation, the elements of the combat formation of the motorized rifle or 

tank brigade can be a forward detachment, an advance guard, special detachment, raiding 

detachment, helicopter subunit, tactical air assault subunit, electronic warfare subunit, or 

strike detachment. 

The first echelon is designed to defeat the first echelon of the enemy defense within the 

breakthrough sector of the brigade and then, together with the second echelon, continue 

the offensive until it extends throughout the entire depth of the defense. It consists of 2-3 

battalions with reinforcements.

6

 “Motorized Rifle (Tank) Brigades in the Offense” [мотострелковой (танковой) бригады в наступлении], as 

found on Studiopedia, <http://studopedia.info/1-67789.html>, accessed on 1 July 2016. 
The Offense

139

The second echelon is intended to exploit the success of the first echelon, complete the 

immediate and intermediate missions, reconstitute first echelon units, repel counterattacks, 

defeat enemy reserves, etc. During the offensive, the second-echelon battalions move behind 

the lines of the first-echelon battalions at a distance of 6-8 kilometers.

The combined arms reserve is designed to address unexpected problems, reconstitute units 

from the first or second echelon, defeat enemy airborne/air assault forces, defeat enemy 

elements at the rear or flanks, etc.

(Above) This graphic shows some of the considerations for a brigade in the attack. The brigade 

attacks from the march with two reinforced motorized rifle battalions and the tank battalion 

minus abreast. The attack is weighted with two battalions in the south. Air defenses are well 

forward and on the flanks. Three artillery battalions are in the brigade artillery group (BrAG). 

The antitank artillery battalion and engineer company are following the main attack. The third 

motorized rifle battalion is following in battalion column and can be committed to the northern 

or southern attack. The anti-assault reserve is protecting the brigade from aerial insertion or flank 

attack. The electronic warfare company is jamming enemy communications, precision-guided 

weapons and computer systems. While not depicted, smoke is frequently used to conceal artillery, 

command posts, flanks and minefield or water obstacle crossings. 

Motorized Rifle Brigade in the Offense
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Pre-Combat and Combat Formation

The brigade does not have a pre-combat formation. It is in its combat formation when its 

organic battalions have deployed out of the brigade march formation and into battalion 

columns. A brigade in a combat formation will usually occupy a sector 5-8 kilometers 

wide. However, depending on the tactical situation, these widths may vary. The number of 

battalion columns and the type of formation will vary. The brigade will split into battalion 

columns about 12 to 15 kilometers from the enemy’s forward defensive positions. A brigade 

is in combat formation when its first-echelon battalions have deployed into columns. The 

brigade’s second-echelon battalions normally remain in column formation.

Elements of the Offensive (organic and attached)

Combat Reserve – emplaced into position before employment. It is situated approximately 

6-8 kilometers from the first echelon, and moves with the second echelon. 

Brigade Artillery Group (BrAG) – conducts destruction by fire missions and supports the firstechelon maneuver battalions. It consists of organic and attached artillery assets of at least 

one MLRS and two howitzer battalions. The artillery firing positions are usually located in an 

area that is 3-5 kilometers wide, 1-2 kilometers in depth, at a distance of 2-4 kilometers from 

the forward edge of one’s own forces.

Air Defense assets - cover the main forces of the brigade from enemy air attacks. They 

consist of two air defense battalions- an anti-aircraft missile-artillery battalion and an antiaircraft missile battalion. A Tunguska missile battery protects the first-echelon battalions. 

Two Strela-10 missile battery platoons protect the BrAG. Two platoons equipped with Igla 

MANPADS cover the first-echelon battalions, while the third platoon in the Igla company 

protects the brigade command post. The Tor-M1 anti-aircraft missile battalion provides zonal 

cover of the brigade to defend it from air strikes.

Antitank Reserve- destroys tanks and other armored vehicles, protects the flanks and seams in 

the defense, and covers enemy avenues of approach. In motorized rifle brigades the antitank 

reserve consists of an antitank artillery battalion. In tank brigades, it is 1-2 tank companies. 

During the battle the antitank reserve moves with the first echelon, focusing on armorhazardous areas, road junctions and flanks. It works in conjunction with mobile obstacle 

detachments.

Mobile Obstacle Detachment - places mines on likely enemy counterattack avenues of 

approach, covers the offensive’s flanks, and protects gaps. It is the brigade’s organic engineer 

company with mine-laying vehicles.

Anti-Assault Reserve - destroys enemy assaults independently or in conjunction with the 

second echelon. The anti-assault reserve usually is a motorized rifle company from a secondechelon battalion.

Forward Detachment - breaches the enemy’s security zone, captures and holds crossings and 

accomplishes other tasks. It is a reinforced battalion.

Assault Detachment - destroys enemy troop concentrations, critical facilities, and strong 

points during the breakthrough of the offensive. It is a reinforced battalion or company.

Detachment for the Destruction of High-Threat Systems - destroys the enemy’s tactical 

nuclear systems, elements of his precision fire systems and reconnaissance strike complexes 

before they can be employed against the offensive. It is a reinforced battalion or company. 

(This detachment will probably not be constituted if the enemy lacks these capabilities.)
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Raiding Detachment- disrupts C2 and communications systems, destroys air defense units, 

blocks the employment of enemy reserves, destroys rear area support units, blocks the 

employment of enemy reserves, blocks withdrawal routes and destroys communications. It is 

a reinforced battalion or company.

Tactical Air Assault element- designated to cooperate with the brigade’s subunits to achieve a 

high tempo in the advance and to seize designated regions. It will destroy enemy command 

and control systems, forces and weapons, and disrupt enemy rear area support. It is a 

reinforced battalion or company and can be organic or attached. 

Electronic Warfare subunit- jams enemy radios and electronics, and protects the unit from 

radio-proximity-fused munitions. It is the brigade’s organic electronic warfare company.

Helicopter subunit- destroys enemy tanks, armored vehicles, antitank weapons, artillery, 

helicopters, enemy air assault forces, C2, reconnaissance assets and air assault landing zones. 

It also delivers supplies, evacuates wounded, and performs other tasks. It is an attached 

helicopter subunit. 

The system of destructive fires for a motorized rifle or tank brigade includes:

- Preparatory air strikes by supporting and assigned aviation

- Indirect fires from organic, attached, and supporting artillery

- Direct fires

- Fires from specialized troops (fuel-air explosives, flame projectors, chemical

(including smoke)

- A system of fire control for the battalions.

To ensure adequate C2 in the offensive, the command posts are deployed behind the forward 

edge of brigade troops:

- Command post – 3-5 kilometers

- Forward command post (element of the command post) - one kilometer

- Rear services command post - 15+ kilometers.

Lines of Deployment

The starting line is designated for the on-time start of movement out of the assembly area. Its 

distance from the forward perimeter of the assembly area must allow the full deployment of a 

battalion march column, achieving and maintaining the prescribed rate of march, and may be 

established 5-10 kilometers from the assembly area.

Lines of deployment into battalion columns: Deployments into battalion columns are 

conducted out of range of enemy artillery fire, usually at a distance of 12-15 kilometers from 

the forward edge of the enemy’s defenses.

Lines of deployment into company columns: Deployments into company columns are 

conducted out of range of enemy direct-fire guns, tanks and ATGMs, at a distance of 4-6 

kilometers from the forward edge of the enemy’s defenses.

Lines of deployment into platoon columns: Deployments into platoon columns are conducted 

out of the range of hand-held antitank weapons and small arms fire at a distance of 2-3 

kilometers from the forward edge of the enemy’s defenses.

At the lines for deployment into battalion, company, and platoon columns, the subunits each 
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begin to move on their own separate axes.

Lines of deployment into the attack: are designated at a distance out of the range of main 

weapons types and allow the subunit to reach the forward edge by “H-hour.” The line for 

deployment into the attack is 600 meters (sometimes more) from the forward edge of the 

enemy’s defenses. During an attack from positions in direct contact with the enemy, the line 

of deployment into the attack is the first trench. 

Line of dismount: When conducting a dismounted attack, motorized riflemen dismount 

as close as possible to the forward edge of the enemy’s defenses in areas sheltered from 

machine guns, antitank weapons and close combat fire. Sometimes this line coincides with 

the line of deployment into the attack. 

In order to coordinate the actions of the motorized rifle and tank subunits with artillery, which 

is firing from concealed firing positions, a “danger close” line is designated to protect friendly 

forces from the detonations of one’s own artillery rounds: 

- For dismounted motorized riflemen - 400 meters 

- For BMPs - 300 meters

- For tanks - 200 meters

Means of Reinforcement

A motorized rifle or tank brigade in the offense will form a BrAG, which is usually composed 

of the maneuver brigade’s two organic self-propelled artillery battalions and one MLRS 

battalion. The brigade may gain 2-4 additional artillery battalions from the army artillery 

group (AAG) to support the offensive, in addition to other forces.

Commentary on Brigade in Offense

A motorized rifle brigade can act in the offensive in a variety of circumstances: 

- Meeting engagement, where two moving opposing forces encounter each other with

little or no warning; 

- Attack from the march against an enemy who has gone into a hasty defense or one

that is in a well prepared defense;

- Attack against a withdrawing enemy who is fighting on successive lines or employing

a rear guard; 

- Attack from positions in contact;

- Attack through a defending friendly unit;

- Pursuit against a disciplined or broken enemy.
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The Russian Army is an artillery army with a lot of combat vehicles. While Western Armies 

have gravitated to precision fires delivered by fewer systems, the Russians maintain a 

large artillery park and employ mass fires to destroy hectares of enemy-occupied territory. 

Precision-fire systems are met with massed fires and electronic and masking countermeasures 

(as well as with Russian precision fires systems). The BrAG shown has the brigade’s two 

organic 152mm howitzer battalions and organic 122mm multiple rocket launcher battalion 

in position. More artillery battalions from outside the brigade can be added to the BrAG. The 

forward-most howitzer firing positions are 1-4 kilometers from the forward edge of one’s 

own troops to provide maximum depth in support of the attack. Howitzers usually have a 

main and two or more alternate firing positions within firing platoon positions. Weapons 

and platoons are usually shifted between firing missions. Artillery also has deception firing 

positions to mask the real positions with harassment and interdiction (H&I) fires and “duty” 

positions for “duty” weapons. Duty weapons provide artillery support in advance of the 

attack, but return to the main firing position as part of unit fire missions in support of the 

attack. During the attack the artillery will displace forward to provide fire into the depths. It 

may displace by battery or battalion, the key factor being the maintenance of fire support 

throughout the entire attack.

The Russian Army has a robust, modern air defense system that employs missiles and guns on 

mobile platforms to provide protection against enemy helicopters, jet aircraft and unmanned 

aerial systems. It consists of an air defense artillery and an air defense missile (rocket-artillery) 

battalion. Should jamming and/or EMP degrade missile effectiveness, the brigade still has 

rapid-fire anti-aircraft artillery. The graphic shows a Tunguska missile battery protecting 

the first-echelon battalions. Two Strela-10 rocket battery platoons protect the BrAG. Two 

platoons equipped with Igla MANPADS also cover the first-echelon battalions, while the third 

platoon in the Igla company protects the brigade command post. The Tor-M1 anti-aircraft 

missile battalion provides zonal cover to the brigade to defend it from air strikes. 

The brigade’s fourth artillery battalion is the antitank artillery battalion which has guns and 

missiles to engage enemy armor. It is deployed as the antitank reserve and works closely with 

the mobile obstacle detachment from the engineer company. It lays antitank mines where 

directed.

When the brigade attacks from the march, its total march column can extend over 30 

kilometers. Its zone of attack is 4-8 kilometers wide (6 kilometers is standard), which is 

concentrated in a 2-4 kilometer frontage (2 kilometers is standard). There are 5-15 kilometers 

between echelons. The first echelon is probably three kilometers deep and the forward 

area, including the BrAG is probably five kilometers deep. The brigade area, including trains, 

is 15 kilometers deep. When possible, the brigade moves on two or more axes. A brigade 

attacking mounted out of an assembly area on a single axis would require 20 kilometers 

to deploy from column to line, with battalions deploying 8-12 kilometers from the enemy 

front lines, company columns deploying 4-6 kilometers from the enemy and platoon 

columns deploying 1-4 kilometers from the enemy. A normal battalion attack frontage is 1-2 

kilometers within a 2-5 kilometer attack zone. The movement to contact is choreographed 

with the artillery fire of the BrAG. It begins with preparation fire to find and destroy enemy 
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artillery and then shifts to destroy the enemy in forward positions. As the motorized 

riflemen dismount and move into assault lines, the fire is shifted back through the forward 

enemy defenses to keep a wall of fire in front of the attacking infantry. As the brigade fights 

through the enemy’s first-echelon defense, supporting fires maintain fire superiority and ease 

the advance of maneuver subunits. As the attack continues, artillery displaces forward in 

accompaniment to provide responsive artillery support to the brigade.

(Right) This notional laydown does not provide the circumstances of the enemy defense. All we 

know is that it is not a meeting engagement or a pursuit and that there is a Russian brigade on 

either flank. The attacking brigade has an immediate and subsequent objective and either an 

objective of the day or a direction of further advance. Depending on the enemy strength and 

preparedness, a brigade’s immediate objective against a prepared defense in depth might be to 

breakthrough a defending enemy battalion’s forward defending companies, and the subsequent 

objective would be to push through to the rear of the enemy battalion defenses, with an objective 

of the day being the defeat of the defending enemy’s tactical reserve. The immediate and 

subsequent objectives on the graphic are not to scale, as the attack is expected to penetrate much 

deeper.
The

Offense

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Motorized Rifle Brigade in the Offense
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Chapter 5 

Tactical Maneuver
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The March

Russia covers more land mass than any other country. Its population density of 8.4 people 

per square kilometer make it one of the most sparsely populated countries on the planet. 

Russia’s ground forces have to be mobile and skilled in long-range deployment in order 

to deploy to threatened areas. Brigades deploy annually over a thousand kilometers to 

unfamiliar training areas. Emergency Readiness Deployment Exercises also move troop units 

over long distances to determine their ability to get to the fight efficiently and effectively. 

Brigade officers are skilled in conducting road, rail, boat/ship and aviation unit movements. 

The Soviet Army’s entrance into Afghanistan and its later withdrawal were excellently 

executed. When the Russian Army hit rock bottom just before the 1994 incursion into 

Chechnya, it still did an impressive job of quickly pulling together pieces of its shattered army 

from all over the country.

Initial operations shape the course of a war and which side is first to mobilize its forces, 

concentrate them at the contested area and deploy them for combat has a distinct, if 

not decisive advantage since that side has the initiative to establish a strong defense 

or to forestall the other side from creating prepared defenses and thus preempt costly 

breakthrough operations. For Russia, combined rail and road movement is often the most 

effective and quickest way to move brigades. March planning includes priority for movement, 

march capabilities (so that the forces and heavy equipment on rail arrive together) and march 

support in the form of air defense, security of bridges and choke points, supply of POL and 

material reserves, maintenance support, secrecy, assembly areas, dispersion areas, lager sites, 

rest sites and information operations cover, and misdirection.1

Marches can be administrative or under threat. Marches under threat have usually been 

conducted at night for concealment. Depending on the state of electronic combat and 

air superiority, marches may be conducted during the day under smoke. The Russians use 

smoke in a variety of circumstances. Instead of building expensive counters to top-attack, 

the Russians use smoke. Smoke may be used to screen movement effectively provided that 

its particulates serve as a screen against electronic probes. HETs are used to save wear and 

tear on tanks and artillery pieces. It is optimal that first echelon brigades have three routes 

from the final assembly area to commitment. The march column is organized so that the 

battalions may move directly into combat if needed. March columns must flow smoothly and 

quickly from the march into battle in combat order determined by the enemy composition 

and terrain where contact is expected. This provides an advantage in the event of a meeting 

engagement or overcoming a surprised enemy defense. March columns are normally headed 

by a reconnaissance detachment some 60 kilometers in front of the main body. A forward 

security element follows some 15 minutes behind. An advance guard battalion follows 

another fifteen minutes behind. Movement support detachments move behind the advance 

detachment, prepared to assist, repair or move stalled vehicles off the route. The main body 

moves behind the advanced guard with the headquarters and artillery usually in the forward 

portion of the main body. The march column has flank and rear security elements deployed 

during movement. 

1

 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “March Preparation” [Маршевая Подготовка], Military 

Encyclopedia [Военная Энциклопедия], Volume 5, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 2001, 20-21. 
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(Right) The graphic on 

the facing page shows 

the maintenance 

and combat service 

support provided to a 

tank battalion on the 

march.2 The graphic 

depicts logistics and 

maintenance support 

to a tank battalion on 

a march moving from 

an assembly area in 

the upper right corner to a day or night lager site. The graphic is not to scale, since a normal 10-12 

hour road march by a mixed march column of tanks and wheeled vehicles would stretch 200-350 

kilometers on paved roads, 120-240 kilometers on dry dirt roads and 80-140 kilometers on muddy, 

hilly or urban roads. In the assembly area are three tank companies; the battalion headquarters; 

armored, tracked recovery vehicles; a maintenance support element; the battalion support 

platoon and the medical platoon. A motorized rifle company (MRC) mounted on BMPs or BTRs 

could be attached to the battalion. A field kitchen is set up to provide hot food. During the 12-14 

hours in the assembly area, drivers and mechanics are required to spend 2-3 hours maintaining 

their tracked and wheeled vehicles. The assembly area is set up for 360° defense, and fighting 

positions are prepared and vehicles are camouflaged. 

The battalion departs the assembly area in column formation stretching over eight kilometers, 

with some five kilometers between it and another battalion. The combat support and combat 

service support trucks, including tow trucks, bring up the rear. After the first two hours, the column 

enters into a rest area for a half-hour halt. The first rest area on this graphic is a maintenance and 

control center, where drivers and mechanics spend 15-30 minutes in maintenance. Resuming the 

march, the column reaches a river, which is manned by traffic control personnel (traffic control 

point #1) to maintain intervals and loads on the crossing bridge. Air defense assets (not shown) 

will cover the bridge. Maintenance assets (in this case, tank recovery vehicles) are on hand to keep 

traffic moving and the bridge cleared. 

Two-three hours after leaving the first rest area, the battalion closes into a second rest area for 

another break, while the drivers and mechanics spend another 15-30 minutes on maintenance. 

The battalion is fed another hot meal at this rest area and the vehicles are refueled. The graphic 

shows two methods of refueling. The top left box shows 32 tanks parked in 4 rows so that fuel 

trucks can drive between them and refuel 4 tanks simultaneously. The bottom right box shows 

a field pumping station that can refuel 20 tanks simultaneously. The march continues and the 

battalion reaches traffic control point #2. The battalion moves into its day or night lager, takes up 

defensive positions, and camouflages vehicles, and the drivers and mechanics settle in to another 

2-3 hours of maintenance. Vehicles are refueled and a hot meal is served. Personnel get some 

sleep before the next march (or attack). 

2

 Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union, Tactics (company, battalion) [Тактика (рота, батальон)], Second 

volume, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1991, plate 28.

Battalion Tactical Group on the March (variant)
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Rear Service Support for a Tank Battalion on the March
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(Above) The above graphic depicts a rail march where the unit waits in a concealed waiting area 

some 3-5 kilometers from the railhead. The unit occupies the waiting area in tactical readiness and 

patrols the perimeter. There is a reserve concealed waiting area in case it is needed. Vehicles are 

maintained, troops are fed and rested in the area. The unit moves from the waiting area and loads 

onto train flat cars and box cars and boards personnel. When the trains arrive at the receiving 

railhead, the unit unloads and occupies another assembly area. Security is maintained while 

vehicles are topped off, equipment is sorted out and personnel are fed and rested. Once the unit is 

ready, it conducts a motor march to its next destination.

(Right) The graphic on the facing page shows ways to conduct marches. Each of the examples 

includes a long, white, jagged-ended belt snaking across the travel routes. This belt simply marks 

a long span of distance and time during which travel is conducted but the mapping of this area is 

not included. The top left example shows a subunit march combining a motor march and a foot 

march. The unit starts in an assembly area on the right, moves on vehicles to a dismount area 

and continues on foot. The top middle example shows a sequential combination march where a 

unit moves from an assembly area by river transport to a disembarkation point, where it boards 

railroad transport and continues to a detraining point and moves into a new assembly area. The 

top right example shows a combination march where part of the unit is moved by air transport 

and part by railroad simultaneously. The bottom left example shows a sequential combination 

march where a unit embarks on maritime transport, disembarks men and equipment, then moves 

to a road where it continues its march on vehicles. The last example is a combined simultaneous 

march where a unit conducts a road march while its heavy equipment (usually tracked vehicles) 

is moved by rail to meet up at a new assembly area. This last example is quite common as the 

Russian ground forces do not want to expend track and motor life unnecessarily for tanks, selfpropelled artillery, and the like.

Transportation of Troops by Rail
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The Combined Movement of Troops
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(Right) The graphic on the facing page depicts a hard-luck unit on a road march. Starting at the 

bottom right hand corner, the unit departs from its waiting area only to be met by enemy aircraft 

which attack the column and destroy a bridge crossing. The unit deploys its air defense assets 

while vehicles respond with on-board machine guns and defeat the air attack. The unit diverts to 

a river fording site and crosses the river successfully. After some time, the enemy hits the column 

with a nuclear weapon. The combat capable subunits withdraw from the strike zone on the 

upwind side. The units take measures (decontaminating men and equipment) to restore combat 

capability to the stricken units. The unit takes necessary measures to mitigate the effects of the 

strike in the area (road repair, fire control) and the subunits (including the restored units) resume 

their march. The determined unit drives on and, after a good while is attacked by enemy FASCAM. 

The intrepid unit conducts a reconnaissance to determine the extent of the mine field and employs 

its UR-77 or UR-83 line charge mine clearing systems to clear paths through the minefield. The 

trapped vehicles exit the minefield. The unit continues its march by either creating a bypass 

around the stricken area or clearing the route through the minefield.

Our hard-luck unit pushes on, but the enemy is determined to stop it. After driving further, the 

column encounters an air assault unit. The unit immediately puts artillery fire on the enemy 

and deploys tanks and motorized rifle subunits to deal with it. The attackers split the air assault 

unit into pieces and defeat it in detail. In the meantime, the main body of the unit column 

bypasses the fighting and continues the march. Trouble awaits and the column is now hit with 

an enemy chemical strike. The part of the column in the contaminated zone quickly exits the 

zone at maximum speed and spreads out the distance between vehicles. The stricken vehicles are 

decontaminated by the chemical defense subunit and medical personnel see to the personnel. 

The main body of the unit column bypasses the stricken area. Further, down the road, the forward 

detachment encounters the enemy and, in concert with the advance guard, conduct a meeting 

battle. This is joined by units and subunits of the main body which are in the proximity of the 

fight. The main body bypasses the fight and continues the march. Finally, the unit reaches its 

new assembly areas and deploys tactically into it. It’s time to maintain and fuel vehicles, clean 

weapons, feed the troops and get some rest. 

Convoy Operations

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
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A Rough March
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Meeting Battle (Engagement)

The meeting battle (engagement) is a variation of offensive combat where both sides strive to 

carry out an attack simultaneously, with the goal of destroying the other quickly, seizing the 

initiative and creating the conditions for further action.3 A meeting battle may arise while in a 

march column, particularly in the initial period of the war, when the enemy is surprised while 

deploying. A meeting battle may also occur while counterattacking from within the defense.4 

Some argue that the meeting battle is no longer possible where satellite and other high 

technology sensors will produce 100% battlefield clarity. This argument is made despite the 

recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, where coalition forces could not gain 20% battlefield 

3

 The term “meeting battle” typically refers to tactical situations, while “meeting engagement” refers to 

operational situations.

4 V. F. Mozolev, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Meeting Battle” [Встречный бой], Military 

Encyclopedia [Военная Энциклопедия], Volume 2, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1994, 305-306. 

Company Meeting Battle

(Above) This graphic shows a motorized rifle company with attached tank and artillery platoon 

engaging an enemy tank and mechanized infantry platoon. The Russian force detects the enemy 

force and immediately forms a two-platoon and two tank firing line. The first platoon goes into 

a hasty defense with a tank setting up a flanking ambush. The enemy force moves onto the 

open ground and is taken under fire. It drops off a mortar and deploys into assault line under 

fire incurring losses. The Russian force then counterattacks on line through the enemy force. The 

artillery platoon plans fire on the northern flank in the event of an enemy counterattack.
Tactical Maneuver

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clarity against an enemy who had no electronic countermeasures and satellite jammers or 

other high-tech counters. The Russians have extensive experience with all this technology 

and a history of employing smoke to mask their own movements and to protect against topattack munitions. 

The meeting battle is the preferred tactic when compared to a breakthrough attack and, 

often, to being on the defense. The Russians prefer having freedom of maneuver, and the 

meeting battle is an optimum tactic for achieving that freedom. Naturally, achieving the 

operational mission without a meeting battle or other fighting is even better. The Russian 

Army fights to be able to move, not moves in order to fight. 

Battalion Meeting Battle

(Above) This graphic shows a battalion meeting battle. A tank battalion with attached motorized 

rifle company, artillery battalion and air defense platoon encounter an enemy tank battalion with 

attached mechanized infantry company and artillery battalion. Two tank companies and the 

motorized rifle company go on line with a tank company (minus) in reserve. One tank platoon 

establishes a flanking ambush while a howitzer battery moves into direct lay positions behind the 

motorized rifle company. The artillery battalion (minus) lays down two barrier fire lines in support 

of the Russian lines. After causing enemy losses, the Russians attack on line through the remnants 

of the enemy tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, the enemy mortar position and artillery 

battalion. The reserve tank company follows to deal with pockets of enemy.
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The meeting battle is characterized by changing circumstances and short-term combat; the 

rapid closure of forces and commitment into combat from the march; the fight to win time to 

gain and maintain the initiative and fire superiority over the enemy; the discovery of the gap 

in the enemy combat formation; and the use of maneuver to penetrate his flank and rear.5

 

Since both sides are advancing, there will be little time once the presence of the other side 

is discovered. The situation will usually be obscure, as reconnaissance strives to uncover 

the rapidly changing situation when aggressive forces move where there is no continuous 

front. Units may be committed into combat directly from the march. The battlefield is fluid, 

where open flanks and gaps between units are common and decisive defeat or victory is the 

probable outcome. Well-rehearsed battle drills provide a marked edge in this type of combat, 

since they can be executed rapidly on the move without extensive orders and planning. 

Success in a meeting battle depends on constant, aggressive reconnaissance to determine 

enemy size, composition, order of march, and speed and deployment, and the location 

of nuclear and precision weapons. Pre-emption through air and artillery strikes and force 

deployment is key to seizing the initiative. Since there will be no time to regroup prior to 

a meeting battle, the order of march is the order of deployment and commitment. The 

commander’s decision and orders must be prompt, and the consequent maneuver must deny 

the enemy the advantage of terrain while finding gaps and opening up the enemy flanks. The 

march column must employ flank detachments and reserves to prevent the main body from 

being diverted from its primary mission.6

 

The motorized rifle or tank battalion or battalion tactical group will, most likely, be the 

first combined arms force committed in a meeting battle or meeting engagement, and its 

meeting battle will often be conducted as an independent action. The maneuver battalion 

that constitutes a covering force or is the brigade forward detachment, advanced guard or 

flanking detachment is most likely to meet an advancing enemy. A battalion from the main 

body may also conduct a meeting battle.7 

 

In a meeting battle, the battalion will have an immediate objective and a direction of further 

advance. If the battalion is serving as a forward detachment, the immediate objective is 

to seize and hold a designated line and to take the enemy lead elements under fire while 

supporting the movement and deployment of the main force of the senior commander. 

There are several possible immediate objectives for an advance guard battalion: destroy the 

enemy forward security element; decisively attack to break through to the enemy main body; 

and hold the enemy in place from the front while assisting the deployment and advance 

into combat of the senior commander’s main force. The immediate objective of a maneuver 

battalion in the main body may include destroying that part of a first-echelon enemy 

battalion that is within its sector of advance; destroying or capturing the enemy artillery and 

securing a line; or taking advantage of favorable conditions to destroy the enemy reserve and 

continue the advance. A maneuver battalion in a meeting battle usually attacks in a single 

5 Ibid, 305.

6

 Conversations with Charles Dick, former director of the Combat Studies Research Centre in the United 

Kingdom.

7

 David A. Dragunskiy, Motorized Rifle (Tank) Battalion in Combat [Мотострелковый (Танковый) батальон в

бою], Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1986, 156.
Tactical Maneuver

157

echelon with a designated reserve. This allows it to concentrate the maximum quantity of fire 

and systems forward in a maximum strength preemptive strike, envelop open enemy flanks 

or conduct a withdrawal, with the goal of inflicting maximum damage on the enemy while 

covering friendly flanks.8

In the graphic on the following page, an enemy force broke through Russian defenses west of 

Zaprudnoe and committed its reserve, which began advancing east at dawn on 15 June. It is 

expected to follow the route which will take it through Zaprudnoe and Vlasovo. The 3rd Motorized 

Rifle Battalion (MRB) is serving as advance guard for a march column moving west. The march 

route goes through Vlasovo, Bessonovka, Zaprudnoe and Mukhino. The battalion’s mission is 

to reach the line Mukhino-Peschanka by 1000 hours, 15 June and support the approach and 

deployment of the brigade main body. The battalion is reinforced with the 3rd tank company, the 

1/9 Artillery Battalion (minus one battery), an antitank platoon, an air defense missile platoon, an 

air defense gun platoon, an engineer platoon, an NBC defense platoon and an armored launch 

bridge. 

The commander formed his march column into a combat reconnaissance patrol (1st platoon, 9th 

MRC); forward security element (7th MRC with a tank platoon, an artillery battery, the antitank 

platoon, the air defense missile platoon and an engineer squad); the main body (headquarters, 

engineer platoon, NBC defense platoon, the tank company minus, the air defense gun platoon, the 

8th MRC with the mortar battery and AGS-17 platoon, the 9th MRC minus a platoon, the artillery 

battalion minus a battery, and the supply, maintenance, medical and other support elements). 

The unit is at 90% strength and is topped off and fully equipped. The march column’s next rest area 

is 50 kilometers east of Vlasovo.

At 0830, when the battalion main body is southeast of Vlasovo, the forward security element 

(FSE) reports, “Have reached eastern slope of elevation 97.4 and am engaging enemy mechanized 

infantry force up to platoon-sized. Can observe up to a company of mechanized infantry and an 

artillery battery deploying south of Zhigarevo.” 

The combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP) reports, “Located in the brush 500 meters north of 

Mukhino. Have observed the passage of a column of armored personnel carriers (APC), tanks, 

artillery to the west of the outskirts of Kruzhilino (two kilometers west of Mukhino and not on this 

graphic).”

The brigade commander radios, “Up to two mechanized infantry battalions with tanks in march 

column are moving on the axis Kruzhilino-Mukhino-Zaprudnoe. Your battalion will seize the 

line Zhigarevo-Hill 99.6 and support the deployment of the main body on the line Krugloe LakeTugarovo for a strike in the direction of Osinki, Zaprudnoe, Mukhino.” As the brigade transitions 

to the attack, the battalion will continue its advance in the direction of height 94.6, Mukhino. At 

0850, airstrikes will attack the moving enemy. 

The 3rd Battalion commander orders his FSE, “Seize height 97.4 and support the deployment of the 

battalion main body.”

8

 Ibid, 158-159.
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The graphic displays how the FSE seized height 97.4, defeating a defending enemy element, and 

how the battalion deployed on both sides of it. The solid red and blue lines show the situation at 

0830 and the initial positions the battalion seized. The battalion’s northern flank is covered by 

the river and a patrol squad from the 9th MRC while the antitank reserve moves to the south of 

the FSE to cover the southern flank. The broken red lines show the initial assembly areas for the 

trail units - the 9th MRC (-) and the rear services, while the broken black lines show the artillery 

battalion position. The broken red lines also show the planned line that the battalion will seize and 

the disposition of the battalion in the attack. The battalion will attack in a single echelon with the 

9th MRC (minus the platoon serving as the CRP) as the reserve. The tanks will be concentrated in 

the north as the 3rd Tank Company (now complete, as the FSE has relinquished its tank platoon), 

the 8th MRC and the 7th MRC make the battalion attack, supported by the antitank platoon. The 

artillery has established two standing barrage lines on the approach to the Zhigarevo-Hill 99.6 

line and plotted concentration areas on high ground, attack axes, a traffic congestion point and a 

possible assembly area. 

The situation at 0850 hours is shown by red and blue lines that are backed with thinner broken 

lines of the same color. The antitank platoon reports destroying two enemy APCs attempting 

to enter the “Orekhovyy” woods. A mechanized infantry company is deploying into combat 

formation opposite the FSE and an enemy artillery battery located south of Zhigarevo is firing on 

the FSE. An enemy fighter bomber has attacked the artillery battalion and the air defense gun 

platoon has returned fire. The CRP reports that a column of enemy APCs and artillery is moving 

from Mukhino to the outskirts of Zaprudnoe. The 3rd MRB commander orders the artillery 

battalion to take the column under fire. The 9th Tank Company and 8th MRC advance to the top of 

Hill 101 and its southern slope, but are pushed back by an enemy counterattack. 

The battalion attacks at 0950. The situation is shown by red and blue lines backed by a dotted 

line of the same color. The 3rd Tank Company advances through Pirogovo and meets no 

resistance. While attacking the northern slope of hill 101, it comes under antitank fire and loses 

two tanks. An enemy mechanized infantry company holds the heights of hill 101. The tank 

company commander calls in artillery fire on hilltop 101. Meanwhile the 8th MRC, mounted on 

BMPs, advances to the southeast of Pirogovo, advancing toward Zhigarevo. It encounters an 

enemy mechanized infantry platoon that is withdrawing in small groups. The 7th MRC attacks 

dismounted, its right flank constricted by the enemy along the road. Its left-flank platoon moves 

around the battalion antitank platoon position to make its advance. In front of the 7th MRC are 

two mechanized infantry platoons. Up to a company of mechanized infantry on APCs bypasses 

the left flank of the 7th MRC. The antitank platoon engages the APCs and enemy artillery answers 

their fire. Two of the ATGM launchers are knocked out.

The battalion commander observes the enemy deploying on the southeast slope of hill 101 

and from the east. In Zaprudnoe, up to a battalion of enemy artillery is firing on the 3rd MRB. 

Further, the CRP reports the passage of a column of tanks, which is approaching the outskirts of 

Gorodishche. The squad leader of the 9th MRC patrol on the battalion’s northern flank reports 

that as he approached the bridge, two enemy light tanks fired at him from the woods. The tanks 

are located about 700 meters from Pirogovo and 1.5 kilometers southeast of Lyzhany. The artillery 
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battalion commander reports that his three batteries (which are not masked by smoke) are being 

fired on from the high ground 800 meters southeast of Bessonovka. The brigade commander 

informs the battalion that at 0955, an airstrike will target the moving enemy force. The brigade is 

approaching its deployment line to move into combat formation.

The battalion commander orders the 1/9 Artillery Battalion to conduct a ten-minute fire strike 

on Hill 101 to suppress the enemy antitank and mechanized infantry defenders. He commits his 

reserve, ordering the 9th MRC (-) to form a firing line between the barn and Orekhoviy Woods, 

where, in conjunction with the antitank platoon, they will repulse the enemy advance from Hill 

99.6 to Bessonovka. The 3rd Tank Company and 8th MRC will resume their attack to regain Hill 

101 and constitute the line Zhigarevo-Hill 99.6 as ordered by the brigade commander. The 7th 

MRC will join the attack to constitute the line Zhigarevo-Hill 99.6, but will leave part of its force in 

place to assist the reserve and antitank platoon in containing the enemy advance from Hill 99.6 

to Bessonovka. The engineer platoon will move forward to place antitank mines in front of the 

antitank platoon and reserve.

By 1030, the 3rd MRB secured the line Zhigarevo-Hill 99.6 and continued to fight the enemy from 

this firing line, supporting the deployment of the brigade main body on the line Krugloe LakeTugarovo and attacking in the direction of Osinki, Zaprudnoe, Mukhino. 

The above vignette portrays the fast-moving situation that accompanies a meeting battle. The 

value of quick, accurate spot reports, radio discipline, responsive fires and well rehearsed battle 

drills are evident throughout the example. 

To smoke or not to smoke is an irrevocable decision in a meeting battle. The artillery can fire 

and maintain smoke screens, but this may detract from its ability to conduct other fire missions. 

Russian vehicles are capable of creating their own smoke screens, and smoke pots are standard 

issue for mobile forces. In this vignette, the artillery was very busy and had not laid its own smoke 

screen before it came under direct fire. It probably responded by using on-board smoke generation 

and pots while it continued its mission. 
Tactical Maneuver

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Flanking Detachment

Where possible, it is usually better hitting an enemy on the flank or rear than running into 

his prepared defense with a frontal attack. In wars with contiguous lines, the frontal attack 

is often the only option, but once the enemy defense is penetrated, the opportunities for 

flanking attacks open up. 

Modern maneuver warfare may not have contiguous lines like World Wars I and II. The recent 

fighting in the Donbass region involved companies and battalions fighting with open flanks, 

and flanking detachments were frequently employed on the plains of Eastern Ukraine. Plains 

are not the only terrain feature where flanking detachments can be deployed. Russian 

military history shows the wide use of flanking detachments in desert, deep forest, marshland 

and urban combat. During the Soviet-Afghan War, the Soviets used flanking detachments to 

trap Mujahideen guerrillas in their mountain sanctuaries. Lester Grau published the following 

as “A Flanking Detachment in the Mountains” in the May-August 2010 issue of Infantry 

magazine:

Defending mountain terrain has its own challenges. While mountains offer good observation, 

they also block it, particularly close up. Mountains offer good long-range fields of fire, but 

they are also full of dead space and concealment. Mountain defenses are not continuous, but 

are normally separate outposts and fighting positions which may be mutually supporting, 

but usually are not. They are often not even in the same plane. Mountain fighting positions 

are difficult to construct and maintain. Mountain fighting positions can be stockpiled with 

ammunition, but food and water quickly run out at these positions. The latter two are 

normally supplied in the villages and hamlets down in the mountain valleys and canyons. 

Consequently, in Afghanistan, the Mujahideen usually congregated in the valley, except when 

they felt threatened. Some security was maintained at the fighting positions, but this was 

usually slack, without indications or intelligence of enemy actions.

Attacking in the mountains has its own set of problems. First, the enemy holds the high 

ground and, if he has occupied the area for any time, he has had time to establish fighting 

positions and emplace long-range crew-served weapons, such as mortars, heavy machine 

guns, recoilless rifles and even direct-lay artillery. He has had time to reinforce the defenses 

with mines and other obstacles. Entries into the mountain valley or canyon are limited and 

liable to interdiction by a skilled defender. 

Still, the irregular mountain terrain offers distinct advantages to the attacker. The enemy is 

seldom able to mass fires, and the terrain offers numerous concealed attack approaches to 

defending positions. Enemy withdrawal will be by small groups, often forced to abandon 

heavy weapons, ammunition stockpiles and wounded.

Too often during the Soviet-Afghan War, Soviet attacks in the mountains were frontal 

attacks. The Mujahideen response was to kick out a rear guard and exfiltrate. After much 

effort and the expenditure of much artillery fire and aerial ordnance, the Soviets found 

themselves somewhat in control of a mountain that they had no intention of garrisoning. The 

Mujahideen had lived to fight another day. The following article describes the Soviet use of a 
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162

flanking detachment to seize high ground within the depths of a Mujahideen defense located 

in the mountains. The attacking troops were paratroopers, trained and equipped to fight as 

both mechanized infantry and light airborne or air-assault infantry. Each regiment had its 

compliment of armored personnel carriers, assault guns or tanks, artillery and sappers. 

Flanking Detachment- Vignette

A FRONTAL ATTACK...IS NOT RECOMMENDED

by Major V. A. Selivanov9

In April 1985, according to intelligence reports, there was a significant grouping of the armed 

opposition concentrated in the Mazlirud and Kakh Canyons. Their number was estimated at 1,200. 

Besides assault rifles, this group had 35-40 DShK heavy machine guns and up to 15 ZU anti-aircraft 

machine guns, as well as mortars, recoilless rifles and rockets.10 The main body of the enemy (400-

600 men) was located in the village of Malakhairu. The general situation was complicated by the 

fact that earlier large-scale operations in the area showed that surprise was not possible and that, 

other than the casualties inflicted, the results were insignificant. The main body of the enemy, as a 

rule, managed to withdraw from the canyon before our troops arrived. The enemy had managed to 

establish a significant, well constructed system of observation and early warning. Further, this region 

was particularly unsuited for air assaults, and military vehicles could enter the canyon only on one 

road, which ran through Mazilishakhr, Zagan and Malakhairu. (See the map).

Considering the peculiarities of the region, during planning, our battalion commander determined to 

carry out the mission in the following fashion. We were briefed at an officers call that at 1330 hours 

on 9 April, the bronegruppa of the main body would move from its base camp along the road from 

the south, with the mission of closing in to the village of Mazlishakhr by 1800 hours.11 My parachute 

company was ordered to support the departure and movement of the march column. Then, after 

the column had passed, my company was to return to garrison to carry out guard duty. The combat 

action to destroy the enemy grouping was planned for 10 and 11 April by moving the bronegruppa to 

link up with its paratroopers who would move from the west into the valley.

However, at noon on 7 April, my regimental commander, without any witnesses, gave me an 

order for a totally different plan.12 The new mission was a follows: At 1600 hours on 8 April, 

my parachute company would serve as a flanking detachment, and, without attracting any 

attention, would secretly move to the region of Khakfakhai village in order to conduct a route 

reconnaissance for movement through the Afedshakh Pass. With the advent of darkness, I would 

leave my combat vehicles on the road, go on foot through the pass, enter into the Mazirrud Valley 

9 Major V. A. Selivanov, “A Frontal Aattack...Is not Recommend,” Armeykiy Sbornik, October 2009, 21-22. 10 The ZU is an anti-aircraft 23mm machine gun which comes in a single- and dual-barrel model (the ZU-23-1 

and ZU-23-2). 

11 The bronegruppa (armored group) consists of a unit’s tanks and personnel carriers which, after the infantry has 

dismounted the carriers, are used as a separate reserve. It is usually commanded by the unit’s first deputy. In 

this case, it has the BMPs of two companies (22 vehicles), probably at least 2 tank platoons (6 tanks) and 12 selfpropelled howitzers plus other vehicles supporting the mortar platoon, signal platoon and so on.

12 The Soviets always insured that orders and plans were witnessed and approved so that if things went wrong, 

the blame might be assigned or shifted. The regimental commander is undertaking a risky ploy, so he issues 

the order without any witnesses. Apparently, even the battalion commander does not know that one of his 

subordinate units has this mission. The company commander is on his own if things go wrong.
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Flanking Detachment
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and, by dawn, occupy positions on Khaduzan Mountain. At dawn on 9 April, I would be in 

position to adjust artillery fire and direct close air support, with the goal of creating panic among 

the assembled Mujahideen and not allowing them to exit the canyon before the main body struck 

them. While carrying out this mission, very strict attention had to be paid to the secret movement 

and independent actions, since it would be impossible to support my detachment in case we were 

discovered.

At 1800 hours on 8 April, my company was assembled in the designated area near Khakfakhai 

village. Soon, our observation disclosed that groups of armed men periodically moved on the path 

through the Afedshakh Pass. There was also a group of eight Mujahideen located in a guard post 

on that very same pass. Everything appeared calm in the target area. Everyone discussed it and 

agreed that the “ghosts” [Mujahideen] were not expecting our force. With the onset of darkness, we 

conducted a radio check with our armored vehicles and our higher headquarters, and then I gave the 

order to begin movement.

We crossed through the pass by 2200 hours, bypassing the guard post to the south without drawing 

the attention of the Mujahideen. During nighttime, this post was a main [security] link. They were 

tied in with other posts using a complex system of varying signals. Even though these “stinkers” were 

one of the [security] links, we bypassed them literally in 15 minutes.

Just as we began to descend into the canyon, we lost radio contact with our company bronegruppa 

and with our higher headquarters. By all rules of military science, I must immediately either restore 

communications or return.13 But then our company’s combat mission would not be accomplished. 

Therefore, I made a decision to continue to move and to restore communications once we reached 

high ground. I had to make this decision because I knew that if the Mujahideen discovered our 

company at night, we could only count on ourselves for help.

From the depths of the canyon, we heard the noise of night firing. We were convinced that the 

Mujahideen were not expecting the appearance of our force and had occupied their fighting positions 

to sort things out [conducted an alert]. At midnight, we entered the hamlet of Gusak. This is 

where I, the company commander, made a mistake that might have compromised all our measures 

for secrecy. Despite the ample number of night-vision devices that we had, we discovered too late 

that there were two Mujahideen patrols that we barely avoided running into. Taking necessary 

precautions, we lost about two hours before we exited the village. At 0300 hours, the company 

assembled at the foot of Khaduzan Mountain.

The heavens were clear and things were now visible thanks to the appearance of the moon. This 

additional lighting “worked” to the enemy’s advantage and forced us to hurry up. The first platoon, 

commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. Mikenin, climbed the mountain. After an hour, he reported 

that his platoon had occupied positions on the heights. I placed two platoons, under the command of 

Senior Lieutenant V. Plotnikov, in an ambush directed against the hamlet of Gusak, and I followed 

the path of the first platoon to the top. We established our primary observation post on height 

2705.0. I placed Lieutenant Mikenin’s platoon on the northern slope and I placed the other two 

platoons on the southern slope. From these positions, they could also interdict paths on the eastern 

13 The commander is already out there on his own without support and loses communication. By Soviet 

regulations, he is required to reestablish communications or abort the mission. This is a very risky decision.
Tactical Maneuver

165

side and partially on the western side, while blocking enemy bands located in the hamlet of Gusak. 

At 0500 hours, we were prepared to carry out our mission. At that time we were able to reestablish 

radio contact. An under-strength paratrooper company had secretly crossed 12 kilometers of enemycontrolled territory, assembled in the rear of a strong enemy force and taken the commanding 

heights. It should be noted that the secret movement of the company was key to the success of the 

action and the complete lack of company casualties.

On the morning of 9 April, the bronnegrupa of the main body of the battalion inconspicuously 

passed through the village of Mazilishakhr and began to enter the canyon. Instantly, the signal 

(three individual shots) repeatedly rang from the mountain slopes from the north to the south and 

even the west. It announced the arrival of our force. Some 15-20 minutes after the signal, a band 

of 120-200 men emerged from the hamlet of Gusak and began to advance on my company. When 

the Mujahideen were close to our second and third platoon positions, my paratroopers opened up 

on them with deadly fire. It caught the Mujahideen completely by surprise and inflicted such heavy 

casualties on them, that they were unable to offer resistance. The “ghosts” panicked and ran back 

into the hamlet.

At this point, I should note that the sun was in our eyes and it was hard to find the enemy. After five 

minutes, the Mujahideen suddenly launched an attempt to break out of the canyon to the northeast. 

I called artillery fire on them. Again, after a half hour, they attempted to bypass the company to the 

north and up the southern slope of height 2946.6, but they came under the fire of Senior Lieutenant 

A. Mikenin’s platoon.

From 1400-1500, we conducted two tactical air assaults [with the remaining two companies of 

paratroopers] on the western side of the canyon. The [bronegruppa of the] main force, by this time, 

had already pushed through the hamlet of Gusak. The company’s mission was over.

Thinking over our combat action as a flanking detachment in the mountains of Afghanistan, I 

have arrived at several conclusions. First, in order to conduct combat in similar circumstances, 

it is necessary to plan to assign an element of the combat formation to be a flanking detachment. 

It will be able to secretly enter the flank or rear of the enemy without engaging in combat with 

small subunits and guard posts. It will be able to prevent the enemy withdrawal and hit him with 

a surprise attack to destroy him and his capabilities in order to facilitate the successful mission 

accomplishment of the main force.

The experience of conducting such operations shows that most successful flanking detachments are 

company-sized. Well trained subunits and personnel should be used in forming the detachment. 

Second, the nature of mountainous terrain prevents small subunits from carrying heavy weapons 

and ammunition. At the same time, it is necessary to have sufficient fire power to conduct effective 

fires at various ranges. Besides our assault rifles and sniper rifles, my company carried one AGS-17 

and a heavy machine gun.14 In every squad, we had one AKM assault rifle with the under-barrel 

14 The AGS-17 is a tripod-mounted 30mm automatic grenade launcher which fires rounds out to 1,700 meters. 

The machine gun was probably the 7.62mm PKM machine gun.
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grenade launcher.15 Our ammunition load was 600-700 rounds per assault rifle and 1200 rounds for 

the machine gun. Our special gear included some night-vision devices.

The successful actions of a flanking detachment in the mountains is dependent on close, well planned 

coordination with the forces and resources of the senior commander. Of primary importance is 

the support of artillery and aviation as well as agreement on the action with the main force 

before it departs to carry out its mission. Thus, in the course of combat it is impossible to fulfill 

the mission without reliable uninterrupted communications. Experience shows that in order 

to guarantee communications, it is better to establish retransmission stations or simply to use 

aircraft that are equipped for retransmission [emphasis is in the original].

In conclusion, selection of company-grade officers for assignment to a flanking detachment requires 

care. You know that they will be required to make independent mission decisions while separated 

from the main body on unfamiliar territory that is controlled by the enemy. This requires detailed 

planning and thorough preparation, as well as a high degree of individual training. In part, it is 

absolutely necessary that the commander has concrete experience working with maps and can 

quickly detect objectives in the mountains, determine the necessary data for their destruction, 

precisely direct the fires of his subordinate units, and skillfully use all possibilities for secret and 

sudden actions.

Analysis of the Vignette

In this article, the Soviets conducted the apparent main attack with their armored vehicles 

moving into the canyon on the only road. This attack included the personnel carriers of two 

paratroop companies, attached tanks, and an attached battalion of self-propelled artillery. 

There was little infantry in this attack. The two airborne companies that the armored vehicles 

belonged to conducted an air assault approximately six hours after the beginning of the 

supposed main attack to eliminate Mujahideen positions in the west and then moved into the 

canyon to link up with their vehicles. Helicopter gunships provided close air support to the 

air assault. The flanking detachment, which had inserted itself into the depths of the enemy 

position, was particularly useful in calling in artillery strikes and defeating the enemy advance 

and his withdrawal attempt. Although the article provides no casualty figures, the flanking 

detachment suffered none, while the Mujahideen did. 

There are some interesting aspects to this attack. The flanking detachment left its armored 

personnel carriers (bronegruppa) at the dismount point. It was responsible for its own 

security and served as a mobile reserve in the event that the flanking detachment got into 

trouble. Once the flanking detachment was deep into enemy territory, however, the reserve 

role was problematic. A self-propelled artillery battery joined the bronegrupa for the attack 

the following morning. The Soviets had entered this war with a limited ability to conduct 

split-fire direction center operations. By 1986, this capability was well developed. Soviet 

artillery usually accompanied the ground attack, since it was more accurate than jet aircraft 

in support in the mountains. Further, the artillery was often used in direct-lay against a 

15 The GP-25 sub-barrel grenade launcher fires a 40mm grenade out to 100 meters. These paratroopers preferred 

the older AKM Kalashnikov, with its 7.62mm round, over the newly issued AK-74 with its 5.45mm round. Combat 

in the mountains is long-range and requires a subsonic medium-weight bullet. The AK-74 was designed for close 

combat and has less range and punch over distance.
Tactical Maneuver

167

stubborn enemy.

The flanking detachment was not part of the original battalion planning and was controlled 

by regiment. In the interests of operational security, the company’s role and presence were 

not disclosed to the rest of the battalion. The company, except for on-call artillery and close 

air support, was basically on its own for at least 15 hours. Both require communications and 

were iffy at night. 

Communications were a problem and remain such in the mountains, despite modern 

technology. Mountains absorb radio waves and distort GPS signals.16 Satellite 

communications are spotty and a savvy opponent could jam the GPS and satellite telephone 

receivers in the mountains. Ground retransmission units are hard to move, emplace and 

defend, and retransmission aircraft are few and seem to go down for maintenance at critical 

points.

The infantryman’s load remains a problem, and in Afghanistan, where the bulk of 

engagements are beyond 500 meters, small-caliber supersonic bullets fired from shortbarreled carbines are ineffective. The fight devolves to the machine gunners while the rest 

of the platoon tries to get involved. The Soviets issued the AK-74 with the thought that the 

infantryman could now carry more ammunition. Where possible, units such as this airborne 

unit went back to the longer-range, medium weight 7.62 cartridge. Still, the weapons that the 

airborne carried did not give it an advantage over its opponent. The paratrooper’s position on 

commanding terrain did.

Going into the mountains is critical to gaining the initiative and bringing the fight to the 

enemy’s sanctuary. Still, bulling into the mountain valleys and canyons without securing high 

ground or establishing a blocking force is futile. The lightly equipped enemy will withdraw 

over familiar territory, leaving his burdened attacker behind. Flanking detachments are an 

excellent way to shape the battlefield and hold the enemy in place for punishment.

16 In the mountains, GPS accuracy can slip from a 5-meter diameter circle to a 500-meter diameter circle or more. 
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Relief in Place

A relief in place is the organized reception and dispatch of subunits, units and large units 

occupying positions, lines, sectors and belts during combat. It is conducted in the defense, 

in the course of regrouping for deployment into another area, when placing forces in their 

positions for an offensive or counteroffensive, while in direct contact with the enemy and 

under other circumstances.17 It is often used to replace subunits that have lost their combat 

potential through casualties.18 It is normally conducted at night or during periods of limited 

visibility. It demands thorough preparation, quick and secret conduct, and strict observance 

of the schedule and orders of the conducting force.

A relief in place is one of the more difficult measurements of the readiness of subunits to 

conduct defensive and offensive combat. It is executed under conditions where the enemy 

has effective reconnaissance systems and fire delivery systems. Since the relief in place is 

usually conducted at night or under conditions of limited visibility, it is necessary to consider 

that people hear better at night than during the day since sound travels farther at night.19 

Range that Sound Travels at Night When the Wind is not Blowing

Person’s quiet footsteps 40 meters

Single person’s speech 50 meters

Sound of a breaking branch 80 meters

Conversation of several people 100 meters

Sound of a weapon bolt closing 300 meters

Sound of a falling tree 300 meters

Strike of a hammer, cross-cut saw 300-400 meters

Troops moving on a country road 300 meters

Troops moving on a hard-surface road 600 meters

Loading a machine gun 500 meters

Hammering in a stake 700 meters

Truck movement on a hard-surface road 800 meters

Truck movement on a country road 1000 meters

Tank moving on a country road 1200 meters

Tank moving on a hard-surface road 3000-4000 meters

Observation at night is affected by the degree of darkness present at different times of night. 

Modern sensors are able to detect movement through heat, movement, signals traffic, night 

vision devices and radar imaging. Relief in place may take place in daylight, but requires the 

cover of airstrikes, artillery strikes, flat trajectory weapons fire, air defenses, particulate smoke 

screens and radio-electronic suppression or destruction of the enemy command and control 

system. It is best to conduct the relief in place at night.20

17 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Relief in place” [Смена войск], Military Encyclopedia [Военная

Энциклопедня], Volume 7, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 2003, 522. 18 A. V. Vlasov, “When subunits are no longer combat-ready, conduct a relief in place” [Когда подразделенния

уже не боеспособны, то происходит смена войск], Army Digest [Армейский Сборник], December 2010, 23. 19 Vlasov, 23.

20 Ibid.
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Night Observation Conditions

Very dark night: The eyes are unable to see much except nearby movement against the 

backdrop of an open horizon. Noise carries far, particularly when there is no wind. Use of 

night vision devices provides excellent results.

Moderately dark night: The eyes can detect the movement of personnel and equipment on 

open country (100-150 meters). Various sounds carry as well as on a very dark night.

Moonlit night: Vision is notably improved. Excellent results can be achieved with highresolution binoculars. The eyes can readily determine what objects are and all contours are 

sharply delineated. Night vision devices are usable.

Stormy night: Hearing is difficult, making it easier to move closer to the enemy. Night vision 

devices may be used, but the field of vision is strained.

Rainy night: Observation is difficult and hearing is poor. Instead it produces a sound which 

resonates off of raincoats, tents and feet splashing through puddles and mud. Night vision 

devices are not effective.

Frozen winter night without snow: Demands the adoption of special measures to prevent 

the sound of footsteps and the possibility of slipping. Night vision devices produce excellent 

results.

Snowy winter night: Improved visibility. If snow is not falling, then sound transmission is 

greatly improved over greater distances. Dark items appear distinctly against a white field of 

vision. Night vision devices do not work.

Foggy night: Everything is indiscernible and vague. Night vision devices do not work.

Preparations for a relief in place begin during the day. Rendezvous areas are designated for 

the departing force and assembly areas for the relief force. Any indications of the location of 

these areas must be concealed from ground and air observation, protected from air strikes 

and the approach and withdrawal routes must be hidden. The rendezvous and assembly 

areas may coincide. The areas for the first echelon battalions may be located between the first 

and second defensive positions (3-5 kilometers from the forward edge of the defense). The 

areas for the second echelon battalions or combined arms reserve and the remaining units 

would be behind the defensive area involved in the relief in place.21

The commander begins his work in the rendezvous area or assembly area, where he 

will organize a defense or an attack from positions in direct contact with the enemy 

in conjunction with the relief in place of a defending combined arms unit. The senior 

commander will determine the combat formation and the time to conduct the relief in place. 

The plan will be issued on a map sheet which the relief subunit commanders must verify and 

refine onsite. They do so during a commanders’ reconnaissance along with the full assistance 

of the commanders that they will relieve to occupy defensive positions, strong points 

fighting positions or the assembly area for an attack. In the course of the reconnaissance, the 

relieving commander must determine the enemy situation; the dispositions of the subunit; 

the handover of the defense and the schedule for its conduct; the organization of the system 

of fire; the air defense layout; the engineering improvements to the defense; the strong 

points, fighting positions and obstacles; and the NBC situation. Further, it is necessary to 

coordinate with the commanders being relieved as to the defensive area (strong points and 

21 Ibid, 24.
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fighting positions); or the attack assembly area; the rendezvous area for the relieved force; the 

assembly area for the relieving force; the approach routes used to accomplish the relief; the 

place to meet the guides from the force being relieved; and the exit routes for the relieved 

force from the various positions. The commanders must also determine where the enemy 

positions are; the areas susceptible to fire and radio-electronic attack; and the lines where 

smoke screens may be laid to cover the relief in place.22 

The commanders of the subunits being relieved must handover their detailed maps and 

sketches showing their defenses, strong points, fighting positions and firing data as well 

as details as to enemy firing positions, weapons and obstacles. Considering the complex 

circumstances involved with a relief in place, the commanders’ reconnaissance must include 

not only the subordinate commanders, but also the drivers and vehicle commanders. 

Experience has shown that having the vehicle crews study the approach route, the vehicle 

destination position, the order of march and the route markers is necessary as is repeated 

training in night movement behind a ground guide.23 

During the coordination among the subunit commanders, the following must be agreed on: 

the actions of subunits during the period of movement from the assembly area through the 

period of the relief in place, which will include whether to conduct a fire strike on the enemy 

with all weapons; whether to conduct remote mining on enemy routes using engineer assets; 

whether to employ smoke to cover the movement and relief; whether to conduct artillery and 

radio-electronic strikes during the relief; actions of air defense assets; the recognition signals 

between the guides and the relief force commanders; the timing and requirements for signal 

communications between the forces during relief; and who will command during the entire 

relief and from where. During the organization of fire support, determine how to attack the 

enemy to destroy him during a possible counterattack and to forestall enemy actions during 

the relief in place.24

During the relief in place, the defense must remain stable while replacing departing elements 

with arriving elements and retaining a combat formation for upcoming missions. The 

reconnaissance subunits are the first to arrive and move into position. The artillery subunits 

are next. They must be in position and ready to fire before the combined arms subunits 

begin their relief. It may happen that the relieving subunits may not be immediately ready for 

combat, so, in order to maintain the stability of the defense at this time, the artillery subunits 

assume their firing positions on the order of the senior artillery commander or his deputy. An 

attached artillery subunit assumes its firing positions upon the command of the commander 

of the combined arms subunit. A motorized rifle battalion mortar battery assumes its firing 

position upon the command of the motorized rifle battalion commander. Only after this, 

do the waiting motorized rifle and tank subunits begin the relief in place, occupying the 

defensive region, strong points and fighting positions while organizing their system of 

fire and command and control. Artillery battalions or batteries supporting the subunits 

defending the forward position (the position in front of the main defense) are the last 

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid, 25.
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relieved. Should the senior artillery commander decide to conduct a fire strike on the enemy, 

the relief artillery units will occupy their primary firing positions after the mission is fired.25 

Simultaneously with the relieving artillery subunits taking up positions to repel an enemy 

attack, the brigade conducts expedient planning for the movement of antitank subunits to 

defeat enemy armor. At this point, the relieving motorized rifle subunits and their equipment 

move forward. In the interests of security, the approach movement to the forward defenses is 

on foot. The BMPs, BTRs and other tracked vehicles will move when the tank subunits move. 

The subunits move quickly into position and, by dawn, are completely camouflaged. The 

distance between the assembly and/or rendezvous areas and the front line is no closer than 

5-7 kilometers. If the relief in place is being conducted during a transition to a defense under 

the cover of supporting fires, the distance may be shortened to 2-4 kilometers.26

After the relieving motorized rifle subunits complete their hike and meet with their guides, 

they move into the forward defensive area to a forward withdrawal area. There they meet 

other guides from the company, platoons and squads being relieved who bring the relief 

force to their new area, strong points or fighting positions which they occupy. During the 

movement to the forward edge of the defense, haste and fuss are inadmissible. It is necessary 

to consider that all movement at night takes longer than during the day and guiding in 

every individual is of vital consequence. It follows that if the entire subunit does well, but 

one scatter-brain makes a serious mistake (for example, an accidental discharge of a weapon 

or the non-observance of night discipline) everyone could get killed. In this manner, night 

movement demands not only excellent training of the subunit, but also strict training of every 

soldier. 27 

During the relief in place of the motorized rifle subunits, the danger of weakening the first 

echelon or sometimes a sector of the defense arises, which the enemy could take advantage 

of. To eliminate this problem, use different variants of the relief in place. If there is sufficient 

time, move a relieving company from the second echelon in the battalion defense forward, 

a platoon at a time, to occupy the front line and ward off an enemy attack. If there is 

insufficient time, move all the platoons of a relieving company simultaneously forward. 

However, this requires taking measures to cover a potential weak area with fire from all means 

deployed at this time. The relieving units assume the defensive mission, organize a system 

of fire and observation and fine tune plans to defeat a possible enemy attack. Subunits 

deployed in the forward position or in combat security are relieved after the main defense has 

been relieved.28 

A more difficult problem is the relief of combat vehicles, particularly those located in firing 

positions on the forward edge of the battlefield or close behind. The first approach is to 

exchange a large part of the vehicles already deployed forward with relief force vehicles in the 

rear by the order of the senior commander. Second is to camouflage the shape and muffle the 

sound and use firepower during a simultaneous movement of vehicles, hopefully lessening 

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid, 26.
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the possibility of their destruction. The third approach is move the armored vehicles 

during an artillery fire destruction of the enemy mission while simultaneously moving the 

vehicles. This could result in the loss of a large part of the relieving and relieved vehicles. 

A consideration is that when combat vehicles are damaged and evacuation machines tow 

them off, it is difficult to differentiate between a vehicle moving under its own power or being 

towed away or merely starting up its engine or giving another vehicle a push. Besides which, 

combat vehicles in a defending subunit are used differently than during normal combat. The 

crews carefully study the location of the enemy weapons when digging in with the result that 

the enemy efforts to pinpoint their position is very difficult and practically useless.29

The motorized rifle combat vehicles that are already positioned in the defense are sited for 

one purpose-to defeat an enemy attack. It is ineffective to use those vehicles in an attack 

during the artillery fire preparation of the attack and the fire support of the attack, since these 

vehicles are in the wrong positions. Consequently, the senior commander may decide to 

exchange a number of the combat vehicles of the relief force with the relieving force.30

If the relief in place is done during the day time, the relieving and relieved combat machines 

may occupy the same firing position simultaneously. However, this requires reliable 

covering fire from aviation, artillery fire, flat-trajectory fire, air defense systems and an aerosol 

curtain of particulate smoke and radio-electronic warfare conducted against the enemy 

communications and command and control systems of missile forces, artillery, helicopter and 

fixed-wing aviation, combined arms subunits, reconnaissance subunits and electronic warfare 

units.31

Relieving tank subunits move into their designated positions or assembly areas: as the 

relieved force transitions to the attack-particularly during the artillery fire preparation 

phase; and during the transition to the defense, particularly at the beginning of the 

artillery destruction of an attacking enemy phase. If subunits are exchanged during these 

firing phases, an assembly area should be set up beforehand as the place to meet subunit 

representatives who will serve as guides. The remaining subunits and elements of the combat 

formation meet their guides and move to their positions and areas. Air defense subunits 

conduct their movement under the cover of the other subunits.32

During the relief in place, the commanders of the subunit being relieved remain at their COPs 

for the area, position or strong point. During this time, command and control of the subunits 

is conducted over landline, which is normally stays in place. The relieving subunit supplies an 

identical set of wire communications gear to the departing subunit.33

Covering the relief in place is the responsibility of the subunits being relieved. Should the 

enemy attack during the relief in place, all the subunits will defeat the attack. The departing 

commander is in charge of the fight and will command his and the relieving subunits. After 

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.
Tactical Maneuver

173

the attack is defeated, the relief in place will resume. An officer and several sergeants from the 

relieved subunit, who know the area and the enemy dispositions well may remain with the 

relief force to assist in studying the area and enemy until the subunit transitions to the attack 

or initiates defensive combat. The commander of the relief subunit submits a report on the 

completion of the relief in place in two copies promptly.34

The relief in place is difficult and begins with the reconnaissance and artillery. Motorized rifle 

subunits follow. It is difficult to move BMPs or BTRs from forward firing positions. Brigades 

and subunits that constitute bronegruppa should not have difficulty, but it is often better 

to swap forward vehicles rather than try to move them back and forward at night. Wire 

communication is almost always swapped. Tanks move once the motorized rifle units are in 

place and defending. The final relief is of the subunits positioned in the forward position or 

security zone. Remote mining by engineer vehicles or MLRS is possible, but hard to conceal.

34 Ibid.
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Breaking Contact and Withdrawal

Withdrawal is either premeditated or from necessity. A force leaves an occupied line or region 

and withdraws for the purpose of avoiding the strike of a superior enemy force and occupying 

a more advantageous position for subsequent action. A premeditated withdrawal is usually 

connected with a deteriorating situation on a neighboring sector of the front or in the rear. 

A forced withdrawal normally arises when a neighboring unit’s strength is such that they are 

unable to continue occupying the line or region and it follows that enemy military action 

must result in the destruction of the defending force. 

In either circumstance, the withdrawal is conducted only by the order of or permission from 

the senior leader, it is organized in secret with the goal of conducting a timely, withdrawal 

of forces in combat-capable condition. The withdrawal begins with forces breaking contact 

with the enemy. Brigades and units will designate a line or a withdrawal march route with a 

start and finish line and the order for their occupation, the location of areas for rocket units 

and artillery firing positions, the site for deployment and the control points. Further, the 

brigade or unit commander focuses on the characteristics of the follow-on military action 

after the withdrawal. During the withdrawal, the combat formation usually includes units or 

subunits designated to cover the break in contact, the main body and the rear services. The 

rear service units and subunits withdraw in the first march order. Breaking contact begins 

after the rearguard brigade or unit occupies the start line and continues until after the entire 

main body has crossed the start line. In order to conceal the activities of the force as it breaks 

contact and moves away from the enemy, it is conducted at night and during other periods 

of limited visibility and is supplemented with a variety of camouflage and concealment 

measures. If the enemy is not particularly active (aggressive), the second echelon and reserve 

withdraw in the first march order. The entire first echelon of the brigade or regiment (in a 

division) moves simultaneously to a rear defensive line that is not in direct contact with the 

enemy. This movement is covered by subunits left on the front line trace. 

After breaking contact, the main body assembles into march column and, not delaying 

at intermittent lines, withdraws under the cover of the rear guard to its designated area. 

Units or subunits designated as a covering force, maintain the previous pattern of military 

activities and do not allow the enemy to transition to an organized pursuit. The covering 

forces withdrawal begins, as a rule, after the main force has all passed the start line and the 

rear guard has occupied the start line. The covering force withdraws quickly and usually 

simultaneously. With the goal of preventing the enemy from seizing gorges, bridges, 

crossings, road intersections and other important points on the withdrawal routes, subunits 

(or units) are designated to cover these obstacles to movement and hold them until the main 

body has withdrawn and the rear guard has taken over.35 

The rear guard occupies a rear line and actively and decisively contains the enemy advance 

and secures the uninterrupted withdrawal of the main body. It maneuvers from one line 

to the next, in accordance with the orders of its commander and is conducted in sequence. 

The rear guard uses ambushes, obstacles and controlled destruction extensively during 

35 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Withdrawal” [Отход], Military Encyclopedia [Военная

Энциклопедия], Volume 6, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 2002, 201-202.
Tactical Maneuver

175

its maneuver, particularly at the lines of withdrawal and on the flanks. Depending on the 

situation, the main body, or units from it, may deploy back into battle along an intermittent 

line, should the rear guard and march security elements be unable to contain the enemy 

pursuit or an attack on the march route. Depending on the situation, at the last designated 

position or region, the rear guard withdraws as a group.36

The rear guard is usually a tank or motorized rifle brigade or battalion that is capable of 

independent action and is supported by long-range artillery and army aviation. It may be 

reinforced with self-propelled artillery, subunits of other branches and specialized troops. Its 

mission is to occupy a designated position or line and to hold it for the required time and then 

withdraw when ordered to the next position or line. The withdrawal can be simultaneous 

or by leapfrogging. When the withdrawal is simultaneous, a company per battalion will 

first withdraw to the next line and occupy a broad front. The company will then cover the 

withdrawal of the remaining rear guard force. When the withdrawal is by leapfrogging, the 

rear guard occupies two successive lines in the depth simultaneously. When the first line 

withdraws, it withdraws past the second line and occupies a third. When the second line 

withdraws, it passes through the third line and occupies a fourth. This may continue until the 

end of the rear guard mission. A rear guard may be designated during the entire march from 

the front to the rear. The rear guard will constantly conduct reconnaissance for the purpose of 

determining the enemy composition, groupings and direction of advance.37

The more roads that are available for a withdrawal, the better. A brigade prefers that each 

maneuver battalion, the artillery and the trains each have their own routes. Often, subunits 

will have to share routes and the challenge is not to have traffic bunched up on them. Cross 

traffic must be avoided or tightly controlled. Vehicle spacing, evacuation vehicles and 

engineer road repair and constructions assets are key. Reserve roads, unused up until the 

withdrawal, are ideal for withdrawals. The engineer battalion will employ corner reflectors, 

laser deflectors, false radar signals and physical masking to cover movement. Mining the 

withdrawal routes can aid the withdrawal provided that it does not interfere with the rear 

guard. Night, rain and particulate smoke help the effort and supplement ECM efforts. 

Historically, if wind and weather conditions permit, grass and forest fires can aid a withdrawal. 

Air defense of bridging and fording sites are critical, and engineer crossing assets need to be 

available to assist water crossings. 

36 Ibid.

37 Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, “Rear Guard” [Арьергард], Soviet Military 

Encyclopedia [Советская Военная Энциклопедия], Volume 1, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1990, 247.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

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(Above) The above graphic depicts a notional motorized rifle brigade withdrawal. The forward 

two motorized rifle battalions each leave a company covering force as they secretly withdraw. 

The enemy is not too active at this time, so the brigade commander has decided to withdraw the 

trains and second echelon first. A second echelon motorized rifle battalion assumes the rear guard 

mission. It is reinforced with an artillery battalion as well as tanks, engineer mining assets and air 

defense assets. This brigade withdraws on three primary routes. The trains, an artillery battalion 

and brigade forces withdraw on one route. The MLRS battalion and a motorized rifle battalion 

withdraw on a second route, while the tank battalion and a first echelon motorized rifle battalion 

withdraw on the third route. Determination of the start line and the sequential positions for the 

rear guard are a function of terrain, weather, enemy activity, subsequent mission and hours of 

darkness available. The start line and first position of the rear guard do not have to be the same. 

Which units travel on what routes is a function of which are the safest and more exposed routes, 

expected enemy actions, using more trafficable routes for heavy equipment, water crossings 

enroute and potential traffic problems (built up areas, road intersections, mud, blown bridges and 

the like). 

Theory of the Withdrawal
Tactical Maneuver

177

The covering force is usually withdrawn after the main body has passed the start line. It 

withdraws through the rear guard and follows the route taken by its parent battalion. In 

this example, the rear guard will withdraw simultaneously from position line to position line 

instead of leapfrogging back. 

Withdrawal under heavy enemy pressure may devolve into a series of hard-fought 

engagements while attempting to preserve as much combat power as possible on a more 

advantageous line. Historically, the Russian soldier is a stubborn defender. During the 

Second World War, Stalin’s famous order 227 issued on 28 July 1942 “Not one step backward” 

[Ни щагу назад], caused a lot of units to die in place, rather than withdrawing. When ordered, 

the Russian soldier will stand his ground tenaciously. 

Withdrawal in Practice
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

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(Right) The graphic on facing page depicts a withdrawal under pressure by a defending motorized 

rifle battalion with an attached tank company. It is defending with two companies forward and 

one back. There are two east-west roads through the battalion defense that meet behind the 

battalion defense. Since the enemy is attacking, the battalion must conduct a fighting withdrawal. 

The northern company is defending in two echelons with a tank platoon and the 1st MRP in the 

north on higher ground. The 2nd platoon defends the main road. In the south, the 2nd MRC 

defends in two echelons with the 1st MRP and a tank platoon on higher ground. The 3rd MRC 

defends in a single echelon in the battalion rear. 

The withdrawal begins with a feint attack by the 2nd platoon of the 1st MRC which then withdraws 

into a temporary assembly area in a covered patch of woods behind their position. After assembly, 

the platoon withdraws to a company assembly area behind the battalion defensive position. The 

3rd platoon withdraws directly to the company assembly area. Simultaneously with the feint 

attack, the 2nd and 3rd platoons of the 2nd MRC, the entire 3rd MRC (with attached tank platoon) 

and the mortar battery withdraw to company assembly areas behind the battalion defenses. The 

mortar battery moves to the 3rd MRC assembly area.

Upon a signal from battalion, 1st platoon of the 1st MRC and 1st platoon of the 2nd MRC 

withdraw, along with their attached tank platoons, to the vacated positions of their 3rd platoons 

and defend. The 3rd MRC and mortar battery move to the battalion assembly area in the vicinity 

of the road junction, followed by the two platoons of the 1st and 2nd MRCs. As the enemy pressure 

mounts, the embattled 1st platoons with their attached tank platoons withdraw again and take 

up a defense in the vacated positions of the 3rd MRC. Finally, upon signal from battalion, the 

battered 1st platoons and tank platoons move quickly into their company areas for a quick nose 

count and then move to the battalion assembly area. The battalion has probably begun its march 

and the battered platoons join the march column, with luck, not as the rear guard. 

The battalion marches a distance to its new positions and assumes a single echelon defense. The 

battalion commander’s intent was to preserve as much combat power as possible, while banking 

on two motorized rifle and two tank platoons to conduct a determined fighting withdrawal from 

three prepared fighting positions. His feint created a diversion under which the withdrawal began. 

He took advantage of high ground defenses while leaving the road approaches subject to flanking 

fire in a variant of the fire sac. He will have available artillery fire planned on the roads.
Tactical Maneuver

179

Withdrawal of a Motorized Rifle Battalion
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Fighting in an Encirclement and Breakout

The rolling plains, forests and marshlands of Western Russia and Eastern Europe invite the use 

of combined arms battalion and brigade maneuver. The nature of the terrain and the tempo 

of the maneuver can readily allow open flanks, gaps and bypassed forces. The probability of 

conducting or falling into an encirclement multiplies in this terrain. For the Soviet Union, the 

opening weeks of the Second World War (the Great Patriotic War in Russian parlance) resulted 

in massive operational-level encirclements of Soviet forces with chilling losses. As the war 

progressed, the Soviets were gradually able to turn the tables and conducted twelve of their 

own operational-level encirclements of German forces and their allies.38 The operational 

encirclement differs from the tactical encirclement in terms of scope, duration and response. 

During the Great Patriotic War, the Soviets employed an inner encirclement line and an outer 

encirclement line against the Germans. The purpose of the inner encirclement line was 

to prevent the trapped enemy from breaking out. The purpose of the outer encirclement 

line was to prevent a rescue force from breaking in and expanding the encircled area into 

a bulge in the defensive line or extracting the entrapped force. Operational encirclements 

were designed to destroy the combat effectiveness of the entrapped major force and to 

capture equipment and units. The encirclements could be porous, allowing individuals to 

escape individually or in small groups with their rifles, but little else. The idea was to destroy 

the combat potential or capture the encircled units and equipment, but not become overly 

concerned with individuals. In the Soviet-Afghan War, the porous nature of the Soviet 

encirclements worked to the Mujahideen advantage, but the Mujahideen usually lost their 

trucks and heavy weapons when encircled.39

Often, when combating an enemy, it is more advantageous to isolate a dangerous force and 

let artillery weaken that force before committing to a decisive attack. When conducting an 

encirclement, the encircling force will take advantage of the terrain to isolate the enemy force 

rapidly and seize road intersections, escape routes and approach routes for an enemy relief 

force. The outer encirclement line may be fragmented and the outer encirclement force will 

first seize the key routes to prevent the enemy from escaping while preventing the external 

enemy force from approaching the inner encirclement force. An encirclement is normally 

reduced by sectors, rather than simultaneously. The reserve of the outer encirclement force is 

frequently used in sector reduction.40

Based on their Great Patriotic War experience, the Soviets and Russians studied and have 

developed operational and tactical techniques for conducting encirclements and fighting 

when encircled. Larger-scale encirclements are likely to occur during the initial period of a 

war or when forces are pinned against a natural obstacle such as a seacoast or major river 

or are within a city.41 Since an advance guard mission, meeting battle, forward position 

38 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Encirclement” [Окружение], Military Encyclopedia [Военная

Энциклопедия], Volume 6, Moscow; Voyenizdat, 2002, 43-45. 39 Ali A. Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, 

Quantico: US Marine Corps Study DM-980701, 1998, 241-266.

40 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Encirclement” [Окружение], Military Encyclopedia [Военная

Энциклопедия], Volume 6, Moscow; Voyenizdat, 2002, 43-45. 41 I. N. Manzhurin, “Actions of forces in an encirclement,” [Действия войск в окружени], Military Thought

[Военная мыслъ], February 1990, 14-21. 
Tactical Maneuver

181

in a security zone, failed counter-attack or inability to retreat pose the greatest danger of 

encirclement for a battalion, battalion-level fighting in encirclement and breakout training 

exercises have been conducted. 42 These exercises involved a combined arms battalion 

or task-organized motorized rifle battalion with tanks, BMPs and artillery. The best way to 

break out of a tactical encirclement is not to be encircled in the first place. The battalion 

commander does so by additional reconnaissance, placing ambush sites on the flanks 

and boundaries with adjacent subunits, concentrating fires (especially antitank fires) on 

threatened avenues of approach, and grouping forces and means to conduct a counterattack. 

Should the battalion find itself in the rear of an advancing enemy, it must actively and 

decisively commit its maximum strength to retain the most tactically significant feature of the 

area or the area which will support its breakout of encirclement.43 

Tactical Considerations

Experience shows that being encircled is not necessarily a catastrophe that leads to death or 

captivity, but it is a serious situation. It is a situation where one is fully or partially cut off from 

his own force; fighting a superior force simultaneously to the front, flanks and rear; fighting 

under conditions where maneuver is limited, resupply is difficult, and casualties to men and 

material mount to a significant level. An encirclement may involve a single or double pincer 

movement designed to cut off a unit from its neighboring and second echelon units, disrupt 

its ability to receive supplies and assistance and establish an unbroken containment area. The 

encircled force must break out to restore its freedom of maneuver.44 

Primary tactical missions required for forces fighting in an encirclement:

- prepare a defense and construct strong points or a defensive area;

- ward off aerial attacks;

- repulse enemy ground attacks and retain established firing lines, positions and areas;

- prevent the enemy from breaking through into the depths of the defense;

- destroy enemy forces wedged into the defense;

- restore the situation on the primary axes;

- eliminate enemy assault forces, sabotage and diversionary groups acting in the rear

area and irregular armed formations.45 

The requirements for fighting in an encirclement require that the commander and staff:

- seize and retain the most important tactical position in the path of the enemy;

- constitute a strong, mobile antitank reserve and deploy it on the most-threatened

axes;

42 N. Vinokur, “Combat in an encirclement” [Бой в окружении], Military Herald [Военный Вестник], December 

1979, 38-40. 

E. Denizhkin, “In extreme situations (Motorized rifle battalion combat in an encirclement and breakthrough 

from it)” [В экстремальных услонях (Бой мотострелкового батальона в окржении и вызход из него)], Military 

Herald [Военный Вестник], September 1990. Although these are Soviet examples, the theory is still quite 

relevant, particularly on a fluid, maneuver battlefield.

43 Denizhkin, 40.

44 A. P. Kozachenko, “From combat-out of encirclement: Algorithms for commander and staff work” [С боем-из

окружения: Алгоритм работы командир и штаба], Army Digest [Армейский Сборник], April 2011, 8. 45 Ibid.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

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- position part of the artillery so that it can conduct direct fire to defeat an enemy tank

attack;

- prepare to mass fire and maneuver artillery on the most-threatened axes;

- order the combat engineers to mine the most-probable enemy approach;

- maintain uninterrupted communications with the senior commander and, most

importantly, with neighboring units in order to combine efforts to thwart enemy 

intentions.46

Combat in an encirclement requires active and decisive actions to pin down a larger force and 

to be prepared to fight for an extended period of time. Offset insufficient forces and means 

with active combat, skilled maneuver and military cunning. Subunits must staunchly defend 

their strong points and areas, not allow the fragmentation of the encirclement, not lose 

close contact with the enemy, and not allow their own forces to bunch up in a small space 

where they can be destroyed by all types of fire. The commander must establish a coherent 

perimeter defense; secure the junctures between subunits; assume command of all forces in 

the encirclement and assign them missions; maintain a high fighting spirit, while organizing 

and maintaining combat readiness; establish and maintain coordination with forces fighting 

outside of the encirclement; and at all times know the situation in each of his subunits.47

Further, the commander must employ aviation, all means of fire, surprise and courageous 

counterattacks to evict enemy wedged into his defenses; quickly and secretly maneuver 

subunits, fires and particularly tanks and BMPs against a threatened axis; reconstitute the 

reserve; support helicopter landings and position them; receive and collect cargo dropped 

from aircraft; institute strict rationing of rockets, ammunition, food and fuel.48 

The basic tactical missions for fighting in an encirclement include:

- seizing a region that provides freedom of internal maneuver;

- block enemy attacks, direct and deploy our forces and destroy any enemy wedged

into our defenses;

- preserve command and control and maintain combat readiness during the breakout

from encirclement;

- prevent forces from crowding into a small area that can be attacked by enemy

artillery;

- establish a group of forces and weapons to break through the encirclement.49

Tactical missions for a breakout of an encirclement include:

- regrouping forces and resources and creating an attack combat formation;

- retaining the perimeter with a covering force while breaking out and withdrawing;

- breaking out through the encircling enemy defense with the main force and

withdrawing from the encirclement;

- breaking contact and withdrawing the covering force from the encirclement.50

46 Ibid, 8-9.

47 Ibid, 9.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid, 10-11.
Tactical Maneuver

183

The breakout sector of the encircled force should line up with the breakthrough sector of 

the external force. The combat formation for the breakout is usually the breakout force, the 

support force and the reserve. There will be a requirement to assemble and direct these 

elements in the direction of the breakthrough. The initial withdrawing force will normally 

include no less than half the force and the bulk of tanks and artillery. The flanks of the 

breakthrough must be held against enemy counter attack. Normally one-third to one-fourth 

of the force will perform this mission. The commander will specify each subunits mission, the 

time and method of the breakthrough and the order of withdrawal from the encirclement.51

The commander’s concept must include:

- the sector, direction and time for the breakout, if these are not included in the senior

commander’s orders, and the sectors for diversionary actions;

- the method and sequencing of the breakout and withdrawal from the encirclement;

- the order of withdrawal of subunits holding the encirclement perimeter and the

flanks of the breakthrough sector;

- the sequencing of destruction of the enemy by fire;

- the follow-up mission of the withdrawing breakthrough subunits and the order of

their readiness;

- the formation of the combat formation (forces and means assigned to the

breakthrough, diversionary actions, flank security and perimeter security);

- provision for secrecy during preparations and for fulfilling the assigned missions.52

The designation of the breakout, diversionary, flank security and perimeter defense forces and 

systems and their actions during each phase of the breakthrough and withdrawal, plus their 

missions upon reaching friendly positions, is critical. The flank security subunits are the last 

to withdraw and will withdraw on the order of the commander by lines, each of which they 

will defend. They may have to conduct a limited counterattack to check an enemy pursuit 

and gain time for the withdrawing subunits. The withdrawal should conduct a determined 

and crippling blow to the enemy on the chosen axis. The breakout of small groups from the 

encirclement is forbidden. A night breakout of force and tanks requires tight discipline and 

order, surprise, and an attack on enemy forces astride the selected axis. A daytime breakout 

requires a short, but intense, artillery preparation and, if possible, air strikes.53

After the breakthrough, the organized withdrawal is quickly conducted. The maintenance 

and supply subunits move with the breakout force. The sick and wounded are moved on 

available transport. If necessary, vehicle cargo may have to be unloaded in a heap to make 

room. Destroy the heap.54 

When the commander receives the order to break out of an encirclement, he must 

concentrate his forces and means into a mighty fist for the breakthrough. A determined 

and energetic effort is necessary to conduct this mission. Active reconnaissance, a sober 

assessment of the situation, a clear decision, precise coordination between forces, strict 

51 Ibid, 11.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.
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184

command and control and courage will not only result in the breakthrough and withdrawal 

from an encirclement, but destroy a significant group of the enemy in the process.55

Encirclement Training Example

The following deals with the tactical fighting within an encirclement and breakout by a 

motorized rifle battalion. It is taken from a battalion exercise conducted shortly before the 

collapse of the Soviet Union, so the battalion is part of a regiment, but is fighting combined 

arms and the principles covered are still valid and instructive.

In this exercise scenario, the enemy has broken into a defense and encircled a motorized rifle 

battalion. The 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion is mounted on BMPs and has a tank company, an air 

defense missile platoon and a self-propelled howitzer battalion. It is joined by another tank company 

and the 9th Motorized Rifle Company that have been isolated as well. At 1500 hours, the battalion 

commander received his orders: “Assume command of the encircled subunits and constitute an 

unbroken defensive perimeter. Your mission: Firmly retain the area within the limits delineated by 

Clear Pond-height 178.6-the irregular grove, prevent the enemy from weakening the combat power of 

the battalion, pin down those enemy subunits not in direct contact through combat, and hinder their 

maneuver in the direction of the dairy farm to the village of Sentsovo.” The battalion commander 

also learned that the enemy reserve might commit a tank battalion against his encirclement. The 

enemy battalion could cross the departure line, dairy-farm to long woods, in one to 1.5 hours.56

The battalion commander considered his situation. He had an extensive perimeter of up to 10 

kilometers to hold, there were several threatening avenues of approach on different sides of his 

perimeter and there were insufficient forces and means. In order to allow his subunits to inflict 

significant casualties required the ability to concentrate his force quickly against any avenue of 

approach. Therefore, he decided to conduct a single-echelon defense with a strong reserve located 

near the command post. The commander considered the northern enemy avenue of approach as the 

most likely and dangerous. He positioned his 2nd Motorized Rifle Company on it with a recessed fire 

sac. Two tank ambushes secured its flanks and another tank platoon had a firing line directly behind 

its position. The battalion reserve was the 9th Motorized Rifle Company and a tank company (minus 

one platoon). The artillery battalion was located in the center of the defense, where it could fire in 

any direction. The battalion’s mortar battery was attached to the 3rd Motorized Rifle Company.57 

The commander paid close attention to maintaining the steadfastness and activeness of his defense, 

and to the tactical and fire coordination among subunits, their tenacity and their protection from 

high precision fires, aerial attack and artillery fire. The company and platoon positions were 

prepared in order to provide a zone of unbroken defensive fire to the front and flanks, guaranteed 

to break up an armored and/or infantry attack on the various approaches. The company defensive 

areas occupied 1500 meters of frontage and 500 meters of depth with gaps of up to 1,500 meters 

between them. Platoon strong points occupied 300-400 meters of frontage and 200 meters of depth 

with gaps of 300 meters between them.58 

55 Ibid.

56 Denizhkin, 40.

57 Ibid, 40-41.

58 Ibid, 41.
Tactical Maneuver

185

Fighting in an Encirclement
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186

The battalion commander was concerned with organizing his system of fire. The basis of this 

is concentrated barriers of artillery and mortar fire before the forward edge and in the depth of 

his defense, combined with the antitank fires of the tanks, BMPs, ATGMs, ordnance, grenade 

launchers and other means. The positioning of machine guns and small arms completed turning the 

encirclement front into a solid multi-trajectory fire zone with frontal, flanking, interlocking and close 

combat fires. The battalion commander also planned for the maneuver of artillery, tanks, BMPs and 

the reserve from unthreatened sectors. This included planning for alternate firing positions, firing 

lines and assembly areas.59

The battalion commander assigned missions to his air defense missile platoon to protect his subunits, 

the command post and his helicopter landing zone. He had to consider the strict rationing of 

ammunition, fuel and other supplies and take the necessary steps to receive cargo delivered by 

helicopter or parachute. His staff established radio contact and coordinated with those subunits 

that were outside the encirclement. The battalion used landline communications primarily within 

the defense. Wire was laid and buried in the trenches and in the communications trenches as a 

protection from artillery fire.60 

The enemy attacked the 2nd Motorized Rifle Company positions at 2130 hours. Two tank companies 

and some mechanized infantry managed to wedge some 400 meters into the fire sac and overrun 

part of the 1st and 2nd platoon positions. The battalion commander focused the fire of his artillery 

battalion on the enemy self-propelled artillery positioned south of long woods. He committed his 

antitank reserve to firing line #1 to combat the enemy incursion. While the 2nd MRC fought to retain 

the second and third trenches, they were supported by fires from the mortar battery. The battalion 

commander attached a motorized rifle platoon from the quiet sectors of the 1st and 3rd Motorized 

Rifle Companies to the 2nd MRC as reinforcements in the fight. These measures enabled the company 

to stop the enemy and reoccupy some lost positions. A similar attempt by the enemy to penetrate the 

1st MRC position near the ravine was also unsuccessful.61 

Taking advantage of the situation, the battalion commander ordered his reserve, in coordination 

with the tank platoons and the 2nd MRC, to destroy the enemy within the 2MRC area and restore 

the 2MRC original defensive front line. They secretly approached the jump-off line and launched a 

counterattack. The determined night attack regained more of the company positions and inflicted 

heavy losses on the enemy.62 

Breakout Training Example

The next mission was the breakout from encirclement at 0300 hours the next morning. The 

battalion commander’s decision had to determine the breakout sector and the diversionary action; 

the direction and time of the breakout; what forces and means to commit to the breakout, covering 

force and flank security (blocking force); the missions of each; as well as the withdrawal mission 

and the time required to carry it out. The commander planned the order of withdrawal from the 

encirclement, the withdrawal of the covering force and flank security, and coordination with the 

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid, 42.

62 Ibid.
Tactical Maneuver

187

Breaking Out of an Encirclement
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linkup forces outside the encirclement.63 

The commander decided to have the 2MRC conduct the diversionary action in the area where the 

enemy was still wedged into part of the 2MRC forward defenses. He calculated that the enemy might 

think that action in this area indicated an attempt to restore the positions and undo his successful 

breakthrough attack [in the north]. In reality, the breakout axis would follow the ruins, the 

individual house and the village of Ivanovka.64 

The battalion commander began the covert repositioning of the 3rd MRC, the 9th MRC along with the 

tanks and self-propelled artillery battalion to break through the encirclement. The breakout would 

be assisted by the 2nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, whose commander planned to conduct an air assault 

at 0300 hours in a counterattack in the direction Ivanovka-Klimovo. The rest of the perimeter would 

be held by the 1MRC and 2MRC covering force.65

At 0045 hours, the battalion commander gathered his company commanders and other subunit 

commanders and briefed them on his decision: The main force will concentrate on the direction 

ruins-single house-Ivanovka. The 3MRC, 9MRC and the tanks will conduct a night attack to break 

through the enemy defenses in the region of the barn, Kilmovo, the boulder, the southern edge of the 

“irregular” bushes. Destroy the enemy in the region of the barn, single house and boulder. By 0400 

hours 10 June, seize the line between the western limits of Klimovo and the southern edge of the 

“irregular” bushes.

Continue the attack in the direction of the single house-Ivanovka, and in cooperation with the air 

assault forces, destroy the enemy and by 0430, link up with the subunits of the 2nd Motorized Rifle 

Regiment who will meet you.

The fires of the artillery battalion, mortar battery and tanks will destroy the enemy in the two 

platoon strong points and the command post of the mechanized battalion and provide support to the 

covering force and flank security force. 

At 0200, the 2MRC will conduct a phony attack as a diversionary action in the sector between the 

brush and “Clear” Lake. The perimeter will be held by the covering force-1MRC and 2MRC. The 

flanks in the vicinity of the breakthrough will be held by two platoons of the 3MRC who will hold 

positions and assist in the orderly evacuation of subunits from the encirclement.

Combat formation is a single echelon: breakthrough subunits-3MRC, 9MRC, tank company; 

covering force: 1 MRC and 2MRC; flank force-1st and 3rd Platoons, 3MRC after the breakthrough. 

Reserve-2nd Platoon, 3MRC.66

An hour before the breakthrough, the 2MRC launched a diversionary attack to cover the 

concentration of the breakthrough force. At 0300, following a short but powerful fire strike, the 

battalion commander signaled the start of the attack. The attack met its immediate objective and 

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid, 42-43.

66 Ibid. 43.
Tactical Maneuver

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continued the advance. Two platoons from the 3MRC moved to the flanks and took up firing 

positions. Their action prevented the enemy from sealing the breach and supported the withdrawal 

from the encirclement-first the artillery and reserve and then the covering force.67

In one-and-a-half hours of night combat, the battalion defeated the enemy opposite the breakthrough 

sector, moved over five kilometers and at 0430 hours, east of Kilmovo, linked up with subunits of the 

2nd Motorized Rifle Regiment.68 

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.
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Maneuver Defense

Russia’s long borders, smaller army and evolving mobilization system, coupled with the 

presence of enemy electronic reconnaissance systems and precision weaponry dictate that 

tied-in Russian defensive lines stretching for hundreds of kilometers will not exist, at least 

during the initial period of war. Aleksandr A. Svechin (1878-1938), who is now considered the 

preeminent Russian strategist, argued before the Second World War that the best strategy for 

the USSR would be the conduct of a protracted defense during the initial period of war. The 

enemy would be drawn into Russia’s vastness where his strength would be weakened and 

his supply lines over-extended. Once the enemy drive had culminated, the Red Army would 

counterstrike and destroy the aggressor. The Soviet leadership did not heed his attrition 

strategy and the debacle of 1941 was the result.69 Svechin’s ideas are now well regarded in 

the Russian General Staff. 

Much of Russia is ideal for Svechin’s strategy (the exemption being the 84 miles between 

the Estonian border and large, urban Saint Petersburg). Most major cities are well-removed 

from the border areas, industry is well-distributed over the country and rail is the primary 

method of transport. The river network, snow, the spring thaw and fall flooding limit outside 

aggressors’ mobility. Russian military equipment is designed for this terrain. The best option 

for Russia is to establish a maneuver defense that eventually leads to a positional defense 

where the enemy will finally be defeated. 

Maneuver defense is a form of defense whose purpose is to inflict enemy casualties, gain time, 

and preserve one’s own force while risking the loss of territory. As a rule, it is conducted when 

the defending force has insufficient personnel and weapons to conduct a positional defense.70 

However, the impact of new technology has changed warfare and the basic relationship 

between the offense and defense. Many of the advantages of the offensive are negated by 

the new technology. The initiative can be seized while on the offense or defense. Just before 

the collapse of the Soviet Union, leading military theoreticians were looking to the strength of 

the defense against the new technology.

Today, battle may be initiated by a bitterly contested, long-range engagement, well before 

the combatants come into contact. Under these circumstances, defending forces in prepared 

positions, which are deployed with fewer forces and combat power than the attack, may 

obtain a definitive superiority. This is done by the more effective protection of personnel and 

weapons systems during the massive fire strikes and the preservation of the combat potential 

of one’s own armies and divisions.71

Defense may be conducted in direct contact with the enemy and out of direct contact with 

enemy forces. Establishing coordinated defenses when not in direct contact with the enemy 

69 A. A. Kokoshin and V. V. Larionov, Introductory Essay to English translation of Alexander A. Svechin’s 1927 

Strategy [Стратегия], Minneapolis: East View Publications, 1992, 7. 70 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Maneuver Defense” [Манёвренная Оборона], Military 

Encyclopedia [Военная Энциклопедия], Volume 4, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1999, 554. 71 I. N. Manzhurin, “Some questions on the preparation and conduct of the counterstrike during defensive 

operations” [Некоторый вопросы подготовки и нанесения контраударнов в оборонителъных операцыях], 

Military Thought [Военная Мыслъ], January, 1989, 14. 
Tactical Maneuver

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is common just prior to the initiation of hostilities. It is also encountered when preparing to 

meet counterattacks, when regrouping and refitting during an offensive, when preparing 

to absorb an enemy offensive strike prior to a counteroffensive or when conducting an 

economy-of-force mission in support of an offensive.72

Security Zone

Positions in front of the main defense are outposts, forward positions and security zone/

maneuver defense consecutive positions. A company or platoon establishes outposts, a 

battalion establishes a forward position, a brigade establishes a maneuver defense and an 

army or military district establishes a security zone. The purpose of combat outposts is early 

warning and concealment of the main defense. The purpose of the forward position is early 

warning, concealment of the trace of the main defense, forcing the enemy to deploy early and 

attrition of the attacking force. The purpose of the security zone is to provide early warning, 

mislead the attacker as to the location, configuration and actual composition of the defense 

and gain time for the construction of the main defense. The security zone determines the 

composition of the enemy forces, intentions and axes of advance. It provides adequate 

reaction time to the defender and forces the attacker to deploy early. It may force the enemy 

to attack in a disadvantageous direction and weakens the enemy force well before it closes 

with the main defense. It does such through the conduct of maneuver defense. The security 

zone is normally established when preparing defenses that are not in direct contact with the 

enemy. The depth of a security zone may extend 40 kilometers in front of the main defense.73 

There are indications that in some cases, it may extend out as far as 90 kilometers.

The depth of a security zone depends on the mission and conduct of the operation, the 

terrain and the time required to establish the defense. It includes several battle positions, 

strong points and obstacle networks. If it is located close to an international border, it might 

be defended by forward detachments and border guard units. These forces will fight from 

a series of positions prepared in depth and tied in with mine fields, ambushes and prepared 

demolitions.74

Security zone defensive positions are established on important axes of advance into the main 

defensive area to increase the tactical depth of the defense. The depth of the security zone 

prevents the enemy from rapidly reaching the main defensive zone, provides for the support 

of the forward combined arms combat force with its main force and establishes adequate 

maneuver room for the forward combat force. Defensive positions and obstacles are situated 

where they cannot be bypassed and are strong enough to make it difficult for the enemy to 

overcome without significant expenditure of forces, resources and time. Tank-heavy forces 

and the preponderance of obstacles are positioned on the armor axes of advance. Reinforced 

motorized rifle battalions usually defend secondary axes. Forces and resources in a security 

zone include reconnaissance, combined arms forces, long-range attack systems, command 

and control elements, ambush forces, engineers, forward position forces and helicopter 

72 Lester W. Grau, “Absorbing the Initial Attack: The Security Zone in the Contemporary Russian view of Defense”, 

Red Thrust Star, October 1992, 4. 73 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Security Zone” [Полоса Обеспечения], Military Encyclopedia

[Военная Энциклопедия], Volume 6, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 2002, 493-494. 74 Ibid.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

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gunships.75 

A battalion defending in the security zone normally deploys in a single echelon (seven to 

ten kilometers width) with a reinforced platoon as a reserve. The battalion does not wish to 

become decisively engaged and holds a wider frontage than usual (normally three to five 

kilometers width). Companies and platoons defend their normal strongpoint frontages. 

Gaps are allowed depending on the terrain and obstacles. The reserve normally occupies a 

blocking position on the most dangerous approach and two-three kilometers back of the 

battalion’s front line. The reserve adds depth to the battalion defense and prevents the 

enemy from reaching the battalion’s flanks and rear. The reserve holds its position while the 

battalion disengages. The reserve seldom counterattacks.76 

Positions in the Security Zone

The number of consecutive prepared positions in a security zone depends on the terrain, the 

existence of naturally defensible lines and the depth of the zone. The first position (closest 

to the enemy) should be along a favorable, naturally defensible line at a depth from which 

main force artillery can support from temporary firing positions. The next (second) position 

should also be along a naturally defensible line and at a distance from the first position 

that would require the enemy to displace his artillery and mortars forward in order to shift 

fires. The positions are dug in and provided with obstacles to the extent possible in the time 

available. Up to two companies of engineers are assigned to a maneuver battalion to provide 

obstacles and positions. Companies and platoons are sited in order to provide coordinated, 

interlocking fields of fire. Additional positions (third, fourth and so on) are constructed 

depending on time, resources and the depth of the security zone. The final position is 

closest to the main defensive line and could be a forward position (Передовая позиция) 

located three to five kilometers from the main defensive line. Companies and battalions from 

the depths of the main defense will hold the critical forward positions, while the forward 

detachment battalions, which have fought the mobile defense and expended resources and 

taken casualties, will occupy the forward positions on secondary approaches.77 

The forward detachment’s artillery, mortars and air defense weapons will have primary, 

alternate and reserve firing positions throughout the depth of the security zone. Maneuver 

and withdrawal routes will be reconnoitered, prepared, marked and maintained. Deployment 

firing lines for tanks, BMPs and the antitank reserve will cover armor avenues of approach. 

Deployment counterattack lines will be selected as well as direct fire positions for select 

artillery. Camouflage discipline will be enforced. Obstacles will usually be placed in front of 

security zone fighting positions and in gaps between strongpoints. Bridges and key sites will 

be prepared for demolition. Should the enemy attempt to bypass obstacles, the bypass will 

lead to other obstacles or exposure to flanking fire.78

75 Ibid.

76 Grau, 5.

77 Ibid, 6.

78 Ibid, 7.
Tactical

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Artillery Planning for the Security Zone

(Above) The accompanying graphic is an example of a fire plan for a security zone employing three positions in a 42-kilometer depth. Standing barrage lines, MLRS concentrations and massed fire concentrations and planned nuclear strikes are depicted. Whereas the motorized rifle or tank subunits in the security zone fight consecutively from one position to the next, artillery subunits normally leapfrog back so that artillery support is constant and uninterrupted. Fixed-wing aviation and helicopter gunships may also provide fire support to the maneuver battle. 
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(Right) The graphic on the facing page illustrates a security zone with a series of four prepared 

positions and a main defensive line. The northern-most company (3rd Motorized Rifle Company) 

fights its way back from the first and second positions to the third position, as does its southern 

neighbors. Unlike the 1st and 2nd Motorized Rifle Companies, the 3rd Motorized Rifle Company does 

not fall back and defend the forward position in front of the main line of defense. Instead, it moves 

from the third position directly back into the main defense. A fresh company (coincidently also 

the 3rd) from a first-echelon battalion in the main defense defends the northern forward position 

on the main axis of enemy advance. The 1st and 2nd Motorized Rifle Companies of the forward 

detachment occupy forward positions astride secondary avenues of advance. The Russians 

forecast that the forward detachment will be too weakened, too rushed and in need of refitting at 

this point in the battle to handle the enemy main attack adequately.79 

One or two artillery battalions are normally attached to the forward detachment in the security 

zone. Additional supporting artillery (normally MLRS) is also positioned in the security zone 

and controlled by the army or district commander who constituted the security zone. Artillery 

positions are selected to interdict major axes of advance and sited so that the guns may deliver 

effective indirect and direct fire. Direct fire antitank killing zones are tied in with tank ambushes 

and engineer obstacles, often as part of a fire sac. Fire planning covers probable enemy avenues of 

advance, probable firing locations of enemy artillery and movement routes. Planned mortar and 

artillery fires cover gaps between platoon and company strongpoints, the area forward of engineer 

obstacles and critical points in the defense. 

79 Ibid.
Tactical

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Disposition of Forces in the Security Zone
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The Brigade and Maneuver Defense

Maneuver defense [маневренная оборона]

80 is a fundamental form of defense for a 

motorized rifle battalion within a maneuver brigade. The maneuver defense is used on 

those axes where the enemy has a significant strength advantage and is facing an area 

that the Russian forces are allowed to withdraw from temporarily. In this situation, a 

maneuver defense may gain time and allow an advantageous regrouping of forces for the 

decisive destruction of the enemy. The battalion commander singles out those forward 

and consecutive defensive positions that his motorized rifle battalion will hold until the 

last minute against impending enemy breakthrough, while inflicting maximum casualties. 

Therefore the main mission of the battalion commander is to coordinate the fires of all 

systems against the advancing enemy while abandoning positions consecutively. Then 

the battalion commander supports his subunits’ withdrawal to their next positions while 

preserving their combat strength.81

The motorized rifle battalion conducting the maneuver defense may be drawn from the 

brigade first or second echelon. The battalion will resume its defensive positions in the 

main defense at the conclusion of the maneuver defense. Fires of the various systems are 

planned for engaging the enemy at a distance, while moving, deploying and just forward of 

the front line. Forces, systems and fires maneuver and counterattacks are launched when 

circumstances are favorable. Counterattacks are usually conducted by the reserve or second 

echelon against the enemy flank and rear. Fire sacs, which are shaped by mine fields and 

obstacles, are effective tools in maneuver defense. Covert, surprise and quick maneuver 

allows subunits to move to advantageous positions with respect to the enemy. There, the 

subunits can inflict casualties or even destroy the enemy. Maneuver defense concludes with 

the uninterrupted destruction of the enemy using all means to frustrate his will and force 

him into a disadvantageous position for continuing the attack. Maneuver by fire is widely 

employed during all stages of the battle.82

The accompanying graphic shows one of the consecutive positions occupied by a motorized 

rifle battalion in the maneuver defense of a brigade.83 This maneuver defense employs a 

motorized rifle battalion with an attached howitzer battalion, a tank company, an antitank 

battery, and an air defense SA-18 or SA-25 battery. Other artillery and engineer units provide 

support as required. The battalion frontage may be a bit wider than a usual defense and 

extend 5-10 kilometers. The graphic shows the battalion astride an east-west road that forks 

behind the battalion defensive line. The terrain is fairly flat and partially wooded with a lake 

80 Maneuver defense should not be confused with the Western term-active defense or the shared historic termcovering force. An active defense is the “employment of limited offensive action and counterattacks to deny a 

contested area or position to the enemy.” A covering force is a “force operating apart from the main force for 

the purpose of intercepting, engaging, delaying, disorganizing, and deceiving the enemy before the enemy can 

attack the force covered.” It can also be any “body or detachment of troops which provides security for a larger 

force by observation, reconnaissance, attack, or defense, or by any combination of these methods.” The Russians 

use a different terminology for active defense [активная оборона] and covering force [заслон].

81 D. Kalachev, “Defense is also maneuver-The motorized rifle battalion and maneuver defense” [Оборона-тоже

маневр: Мотострелковый батальон и маневренная оборона], Army Digest [Армейскнй сборник], October 

2016, 27.

82 Ibid, 28-29.

83 Ibid, 30.
Tactical Maneuver

197

in the southeastern portion of the position. The first platoon of the 2nd MRC holds an outpost 

position protected by two mixed mine fields of 150 and 250 meters length and a barbed wire 

entanglement. A squad ambush and a tank ambush flank the outpost. The main defensive 

line has the battalion’s three companies deployed in a defensive line. The 1st MRC holds its 

forward positions with its 1st and 2nd platoons. The 3rd platoon is the battalion combined 

arms reserve, and is positioned in the battalion northeast rear covering the anticipated main 

enemy axis of advance. The 1st MRC bronnegruppa holds the 3rd platoon’s usual rearward 

platoon position. The company is protected by a barbed wire entanglement and a 130-meterlong mixed minefield. Its southern flank is protected by a tank in ambush. The 2nd MRC 

straddles the road and deploys its 2nd and 3rd platoons forward. The 1st platoon is deployed 

in the battalion outpost position. The 1st platoon’s normal place is held by a dummy platoon 

position. The enemy is expected to make its main attack along the road and into the 2nd MRC 

position. The 2nd MRC is protected by a 60-meter long two-row antitank obstacle of sunk 

heavy metal stakes and a 110-meter-long mixed minefield. The 3rd MRC is angled forward to 

give flanking shots on the main road. Its 1st and 3rd platoon defend forward. Its 2nd platoon 

is to the southeast of the battalion position serving as the anti-air assault reserve. A tank 

platoon occupies the rearward platoon position in the 3rd MRC company defense. The 3rd

MRC company bronnegruppa initially defends forward of the 3rd MRC position. The 3rd MRC 

is protected by a barbed wire entanglement and an 80-meter-long mixed minefield while an 

ambush position protects its southern flank.

Combat Formation of a Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Maneuver Defense
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Supporting subunits back the three defending motorized rifle companies. The SA-18 

or SA-25 MANPADS battery establishes mutually supporting air defense positions. The 

battalion bronnegruppa, automatic grenade launcher platoon, mortar battery and battalion 

headquarters are located where they can stop an attack through the 2nd MRC position. A 

152mm howitzer battery has located forward and deployed in direct lay positions backing the 

2nd MRC. Further back, the antitank reserve is split into two locations covering the anticipated 

primary and secondary enemy avenues of approach. The artillery battalion covers the area 

between the two antitank reserve positions where it can cover both enemy avenues of 

advance by direct fire if necessary.

The battalion normally defends in a wide single echelon, prepared to flow back intact to its 

subsequent positions. Its’ reserve(s) is/are positioned to react in a variety of directions to 

transition to a defense, occupy a firing line or conduct a counterattack. In order to support 

the necessary independence of the subunits, most of the artillery and other firing systems 

are attached to companies. The firing systems are positioned where they can conduct the 

bulk of their fires to the front, beginning at their maximum range limits. Their positions fill 

the gaps between the neighboring company strong points, where, if necessary they can 

cover the withdrawal of first echelon companies, covering force subunits and others earlier 

located within the forward subunits. Artillery, tank, BMP, grenade launcher and other fires are 

planned on likely enemy avenues of approach, on gaps and on the flanks of the strongpoints 

and are organized into fire ambushes anchored on engineer obstacles and demolished 

points. The battalion commander may establish security in front of his forward position. This 

may include a reconnaissance patrol, engineer obstacles on likely avenues of advance and 

ambushes.84 

The brigade may be part of a security zone. Then, the maneuver of the battalion to a new 

position may be on the command of the brigade commander or the battalion commander, his 

battalion now designated as a forward detachment in the security zone. If the brigade is part 

of a security zone, engineering obstacles will usually be sited on tank avenues of approach 

forward of platoon and company strong points. Mine fields are sited on regions of probable 

enemy deployment and on roads which are not covered by friendly fire. Road and railroad 

bridges are prepared for demolition. Artillery subunits may occupy temporary firing positions 

in the security zone or behind the forward position and as part of the main defensive belt. 

The security zone battle will unfold as discussed earlier in this article.85 

Military exercises in the Central Military District in 2014 and the Far East Military District 

in 2015 highlighted the following key issues for motorized rifle battalion commanders 

conducting a maneuver defense: sequencing the destruction of the enemy starting from 

maximum range and preventing the enemy from rapidly transitioning to the attack; the 

possible direction of maneuver by fire and forces to prevent the enemy from flanking 

the battalion defensive area; sequencing breaking contact and withdrawal (including 

composition of the covering force and its subsequent withdrawal); the order in which to 

conduct the withdrawal of the maneuver subunits during the withdrawal to its subsequent 

84 Ibid, 30-31.

85 Ibid, 31.
Tactical Maneuver

199

position; and the places to constitute fire sacs, lay obstacles and conduct demolitions.86

Maneuver Defense Conclusion

Ever since the Gulf War, ground forces have realized that unprotected maneuver in the 

open may lead to decimation. Less-modern ground forces have attempted to negate this 

by moving the fight to terrain that defeats or degrades high-precision systems-mountains, 

jungle, extensive forest, swamps and cities while conducting a long-term war of attrition 

to sap the political will of the enemy. This difficult terrain will be a valuable ally in future 

conventional maneuver war as will camouflage, electronic and aerial masking, effective air 

defense systems and secure messaging. Maneuver defense will clearly be a feature of future 

conventional maneuver war. One thing that may change dramatically is the fundamental 

concept of the main, linear, positional defense that the maneuver defense leads to. Perhaps 

the main linear defense will be anchored in difficult terrain. Perhaps the main defense will 

more closely resemble the security zone maneuver defense. The main defense may become 

an expanded security zone containing counterstrike/counterattack forces and a concentration 

of high-precision weapons systems. Open flanks may be covered by maneuvering artillery 

fires and positional forces not under duress. The Russian concept of maneuver by fire may 

dominate the battlefield as it alone may enable maneuver.

The linear battle field may be replaced by the fragmented [очаговый] battlefield where 

brigades maneuver like naval fleets, deploying maneuver and fire subunits over large areas, 

protected by air defense systems, electronic warfare and particulate smoke. Strong points will 

be established and abandoned, artillery fires will maneuver and difficult terrain will become 

the future fortresses and redoubts. The First World War in the West was a positional fight 

where artillery, field fortifications and interlocking machinegun fire prevented maneuver. 

The First World War in the East, however, was not positional, but fluid. The antithesis to the 

stalemate in the West was the tank. Yet the tank did not spell the end of the linear defense. 

During the Second World War, the tank enabled maneuver in some places, but in other 

places, difficult terrain and integrated defenses prevented maneuver and fires prevailed. The 

Korean War was about fires and not much maneuver. Vietnam was about the maneuver of 

the helicopter, but difficult terrain dominated the battlefield. The antitank guided missile 

and precision guided munitions currently threaten maneuver. Still, advances in fires, ECM, 

robotics and air defense may enable maneuver. The Serbian Army proved quite adept at 

hiding and surviving in difficult terrain during the 78-day Kosovo air war. What they lacked 

was a ground force to combat at the termination of the bombing. 

The fragmented battlefield has become common following the Gulf War. The Soviet-Afghan 

War, the Angolan Civil War, the Chadian-Libyan Conflicts, the Battle of Mogadishu, Operation 

Enduring Freedom, most of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Libyan Civil War, the Sudan conflicts, 

the Saudi Arabian-Yemen conflict—all have involved fragmented battlefields. How do peer 

forces fight conventional maneuver war on a fragmented battlefield? Permanent combined 

arms battalions appear to be an important component. For decades, the Soviets and Russians 

have struggled with fielding, training supporting and fighting a combined arms battalion 

with its own tanks, motorized rifle, artillery, antitank, and support subunits capable of fighting 

86 Ibid.
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and sustaining independently over a large area. The Russian maneuver brigades now have 

one or two battalion tactical groups and are working to achieve four.87 The Russians have a 

long history of conducting a fragmented defense on a fragmented battlefield. The Russian 

Civil War is replete with such examples.88 During the Second World War, the Soviets fielded 

the largest Partisan Army in history. It conducted a fragmented offense and defense against a 

linear German force.89 As Mark Twain noted, “history may not repeat itself, but it does rhyme.”

87 See Lester W. Grau, “Restructuring the Tactical Russian Army for Unconventional War”, Red Diamond, February 

2014.

88 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Очаговая Оборона” [Fragmented Defense], Military 

Encyclopedia [Военная Энциклопедия], Volume 6, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 2002, 214. 89 Recommend The Red Army Do-It-Yourself Nazi-Bashing Guerrilla Warfare Manual (The Partisan’s Companion), 

Lester W. Grau and Michael Gress (editors), translation and commentary of the 1943 Soviet edition of the manual 

used to train Partisans to fight the Nazis. Philadelphia: Casemate, 2010. 
Tactical Maneuver

201

Soviet/Russian Tactical Nuclear Planning and Future War

The Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb on 29 August 1949. It was a 22 kiloton blast (the 

first US atomic bomb test on 16 July 1945, near Alamogordo, was a 20 kiloton blast). The next 

two Soviet atomic bomb tests were in September and October of 1951and had blasts of 38.3 

and 41.2 kilotons. In December 1953, the Soviets tested a 400 kiloton atomic bomb and a 1.7 

megaton atomic bomb in November 1955. The nuclear race escalated into thermonuclear 

weapons and hydrogen bombs.90 The initial weapons were strategic weapons developed 

for delivery by long-range bombers. However, over time, nuclear weapons designers were 

able to build smaller nuclear weapons that could be delivered by fighter-bombers, rockets 

and tube artillery. The Soviets built nuclear weapons of varying yields and classified them by 

yield.91

Russian Nuclear Yield Classifications

Very small Up to one kiloton

Small One to ten kilotons

Medium Ten to one hundred kilotons

Powerful One hundred kilotons to one megaton

Very Powerful Over one megaton

According to training material, a nuclear shock wave travels 1000 meters in two seconds, 

2000 meters in five seconds and 3000 meters in eight seconds. Its thermal radiation travels 

at 300,000 kilometers an hour and the time of exposure is dependent on the nuclear round’s 

yield.92

The Effective Time of Exposure to Thermal Radiation by Weapon’s Yield

Very small Approximately 0.2 seconds

Small One to two seconds

Medium Two to five seconds

Powerful Five to ten seconds

Very Powerful Twenty to forty seconds

Tactical and operational-level nuclear munitions were introduced into the Soviet ground 

forces and Army Air Forces. They were delivered by aviation bombs, rockets (and later 

missiles) and tube artillery. The primary question was where these weapons can be used 

most effectively. At the tactical level, the primary concern was breaking through a prepared 

enemy defense. 

The initial planning for tactical use of nuclear weapons involved their mass use to create a 

gap in the defense. Tank battalions and motorized rifle forces would then conduct a mounted 

attack through the gap and drive deep to exploit the strike. In effect, the nuclear strike was 

90 V. M. Temnov, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Nuclear Weapons” [Ядерное Оружие], Military 

Encyclopedia [Военная Энциклопедня], Moscow: Voyenizdat, 2004, 548. 91 B. A. Konyakhin and A. A. Nezhaiko, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Nuclear Munitions” 

[Ядерные Боеприпасы], Military Encyclopedia [Военная Энциклопедня], Moscow: Voyenizdat, 2004, 550. 92 Yu. A. Haumenko, “Preparation for Reserve Officers of the Ground Forces”[Подготовка Офицеров Запаса

Сухопутных Войск], Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1989, 356-357.
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the main attack. The graphic to the right 

is from the 1966 tactics manual. It shows 

a tank attack through a gap created by a 

belt of small nuclear weapons, followed 

by a belt of medium nuclear weapons 

and capped by a powerful nuclear 

weapon.93 The T-54 and T-55 tanks of 

that day were fitted with a lead interior 

lining to mitigate somewhat the intense 

radiation this nuclear pounding would 

create. The infantry personnel carriers 

and trucks that would follow the tanks 

were not similarly shielded.

There was a problem. This many nuclear 

rounds would clearly create a hole in the 

defense, but getting through that hole 

could be a problem even for tracked 

vehicles. Fire, torn-up terrain, cratering, 

blowdown, rubble and airborne dust 

would complicate crossing the area 

with any kind of speed or formation and 

would greatly reduce visibility. Residual 

radiation would drastically shorten the 

combat life of the soldiers-particularly 

those following in personnel carriers 

and trucks. By 1984, the expected 

expenditure of nuclear rounds for 

blowing a hole in the enemy tactical 

main defense was reduced to one per 

breakthrough sector.94

There is still a problem here. (facing page) The battalion is attacking on line through the 

blast area with dismounted troops. By 1988, the expected tactical use of nuclear rounds was 

against the second echelon or reserve. Conventional artillery would blow the hole through 

the main defense.95 Of interest is that the Chernobyl disaster preceded this text by two years. 

The lesson is not to dismount and advance through a radiated blast area.

93 V. G. Reznicheko, Tactics[Тактика], Officer’s Library Series, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1966, 79. 94 V. G. Reznicheko, Tactics[Тактика], Officer’s Library Series, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1984, 273. 95 N. P. Moiseenko, “The Motorized Rifle (Tank) Company in Combat: Training Textbook”[Мотострелковая

(Танковая) Рота в Бою: Учебное Пособие], Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1988, 277.

Early Tactical Nuclear Employment
Tactical

Maneuver

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Tactical Nuclear in Support of a Battalion in the Offense (1984)
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(Right) The graphic on the facing page depicts a nuclear round being used against the reserve 

of a defending mechanized infantry company. The tank battalion with an attached motorized 

rifle company on the attack is part of a larger offensive. The neighboring attacking battalion 

to the south is not shown completely, since the text focuses on the actions of the tank battalion. 

The battalion’s subordinate companies are attacking mounted and skirting the blast area of the 

nuclear blast. 

The Nuclear Dilemma

Early in the nuclear period, the assumption was that nuclear weapons would greatly increase 

operational tempo and that the conflict would soon be over as mechanized columns would 

rapidly advance through enemy defenses and seize capitals, economic areas, ports and 

harbors. However, the reality was somewhat different. In the European theater, the Soviets 

planned to use thousands of nuclear weapons to blast NATO forces as Warsaw Pact columns 

snaked their way to the English Channel.96 The problem with this massive use of powerful 

nuclear weapons was that it would retard movement more than it would assist it. Forest fires, 

flooding, radiated zones, rubble and destroyed infrastructure could actually make a nuclear 

war advance much slower than a conventional fight. There had to be a better approach than 

laying waste to Europe, particularly since the prevailing winds blow back toward the Soviet 

bloc. The major problems encountered in mitigating the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986 

added to the planners’ dilemma. Nuclear weapons have a deterrent value as well as a fall back 

value when the fortunes of war are decidedly hostile. 

Future War

How do nuclear weapons fit in with future war with peer competitors? Before the collapse 

of the Soviet Union, the General Staff’s view of future war envisioned dynamic, high-tempo, 

high-intensity land-air operation that would extend over vast expanses and include new 

realms such as space. Tactical combat would be even more destructive than in the past and 

would be characterized by fragmented or non-linear combat. The front line would disappear 

and terms such as “zones of combat” would replace terms like FEBA and FLOT. No safe 

havens or “deep rear” would exist. Nuclear war must be avoided as it could lead to strategic 

exchange. The Soviets announced a “defensive orientation” during the initial period of 

war-a way to inflict severe losses on the enemy with fewer forces and create the conditions 

necessary for a counteroffensive. Qualitative improvements in firepower and mobility, 

coupled with operational surprise would allow a combatant to insert forces rapidly inside his 

opponents’ territory while covering his own flanks with long-range fires. Aviation and longrange fires would attack reserves and support bases. High-precision weapons systems would 

take the place of nuclear systems.97 

This view of future war was put on hold following the collapse of the Soviet Union and a 

weakened Russia renounced the “no first use of nuclear weapons” proviso in Russian defense. 

Nuclear weapons figured prominently in Russia exercises. However, Russian conventional 

military power is clearly now in ascendency in Eurasia and Russia is considering how to fight 

96 When the Soviets pulled out of East Germany, they left a lot of equipment and ammunition behind. They also 

left nuclear planning documents for possible war against NATO which depicted thousands of nuclear rounds 

expended in a two-phase operational nuclear strike.

97 Lester W. Grau, “Soviet Nonlinear Combat in Future Conflict”, Military Review, December 1990, 16-17.
Tactical Maneuver

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Tactical Nuclear Strike on the Reserve (1988)
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under nuclear-threatened conditions 

and win. Advances in technology, 

modernization of the force and a 

more mobile ground force support 

this effort. Russian nonlinear battle 

apparently sees separate tacticallyindependent battalions and brigades 

fighting meeting battles while 

covering their flanks with obstacles, 

long-range fires and tempo. There 

are no safe areas and combatants 

will suffer heavy attrition. Armies 

may influence the battle through 

employment of their reserves and 

long-range attack systems, but the 

outcome will be decided by the 

actions of battalion tactical groups 

and brigades fighting separately on 

multiple axes in support of a common 

plan and objective. Attacks against 

prepared defenses are undesirable and 

neither side will be able to tie in their 

flanks or prepare defenses in depth.98 

The new brigade and battalion tactical 

group structure fits this role. 

The initial period of war is crucial 

in future war as initial actions can 

disrupt enemy attempts to establish 

a cohesive, coordinated defense and 

drive forces deep into enemy territory 

to conduct fragmented, nonlinear 

maneuver war. Defensive war may be part of future war and the Russians plan to conduct 

this with a combination of maneuver defense and positional defense. Maneuver defense 

is designed to trade space for time and weaken the enemy force while pulling it deep into 

the expanse of Mother Russia. As the enemy supply lines are overextended and the enemy 

momentum is slowed, the Russians plan to conduct a counterstroke to destroy the enemy 

within the depths of the country and then rapidly advance through the shattered enemy force 

into the enemy rear area. Multiple attacks on multiple axes will frustrate enemy attempts to 

stem the advance. Before an attack on one axis has culminated, the Russians plan to launch 

an attack on a different axis to wrong-foot the operational reserve.

Still, Russian force modernization includes a rigorous program to modernize and improve 

tactical, operational and strategic nuclear weapons. Clearly, the Russians see a need to retain 

98 Ibid, 17.

Motorized Rifle Battalion Attacking in One Echelon

Motorized Rifle Battalion Attacking in Two Echelons
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an up-to-date nuclear force for an uncertain world. The Russians also see a need to train for 

nuclear war. NBC defense units are well-equipped and an integral part of maneuver brigades. 

Russian wargames and major field exercises frequently include nuclear strikes and their 

aftermath. Most US and NATO wargames and major field exercises terminate when nuclear 

strikes are introduced. 

The Russians would prefer to fight under nuclear-threatened conditions, but not go nuclear 

due to the threat of escalation to strategic exchange. The Russians see two serious challenges 

to the current status quo and nuclear balance. The first is ballistic missile defense. In late 

2001, the United States withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, stating that 

it needed to protect the US from nations that were developing long-range missiles and 

weapons of mass destruction (i.e. Iran). In 2007, as plans to install portions of the system in 

Europe were being discussed, Russia offered to cooperate by letting the US use its Gabala 

Radar Tracking Station in Azerbaijan. The US insisted that, due to technical and operational 

concerns, the best locale for combating Iranian launches was in Poland and the Czech 

Republic (later Romania). Russian saw this as an attempt to weaken the system of nuclear 

deterrence, since the MK-41 launch system used in the Aegis-Ashore system is also capable of 

launching Tomahawk cruise missiles against Russian ICBM sites.99

The second serious challenge is the US Prompt Global Strike Program (PGS). The US Air 

Force’s Global Strike Command, headquartered in Barksdale AFB, was established in August 

2009 with the mission of providing strategic nuclear deterrence and operational capability to 

carry out rapid precision conventional strikes. The Russians believe that PGS is designed to 

neutralize Russian military capabilities by eliminating their offensive and defensive strategic 

deterrent forces without using nuclear weapons. The result has been an expanded Russian 

program to hide and improve nuclear and nonnuclear strategic and operational systems.100

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid.
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Chapter 6 

Branches of Arms
Branches of Arms

209

Motorized Rifle Troops

Although I love the cavalry madly, although I am a horse soldier from my cradle, every time I watch 

the infantry advancing at a sure, firm pace, with fixed bayonets and menacing drum-roll, I feel an 

emotion which has something of both reverence and dread. I don’t know how to express it. All that 

comes to mind at the sight of a formation of hussars or uhlans flying past is the thought of what 

gallant lads they are, how well they ride, how dashingly they cross sabers! Woe to the enemy, and 

this woe usually consists of more or less dangerous wounds or captivity, and nothing more. But 

when the columns of infantry rush toward the enemy with their rapid, smooth, disciplined motion, 

there are no more gallant lads, that’s all over: these are heroes who bear inevitable death or go to 

inevitable death themselves—there is no middle ground. The cavalryman gallops up, gallops away, 

wounds, rushes past, turns back again, and sometimes kills. But his every motion is eloquent of 

mercy for the enemy: all this is merely the harbinger of death. But the infantry formation is death 

itself, dreaded inevitable death. 

 -Nadezhda Durova, The Cavalry Maiden, 1836

The Motorized Rifle Troops is the largest of the Branch of Arms in the Ground Forces, 

providing the foundation of the Ground Forces. In conjunction with Tank Troops, they 

perform the following tasks: 

- In the defense – retain occupied areas, lines and positions, repulse the enemy’s

attacks and defeat its attacking groups

- In the offense– break through the enemy’s defense, destroy enemy troop units,

capture important areas, lines and objects, cross water obstacles, and pursue the 

retreating enemy 

- In meeting engagements and battles – act as part of amphibious and airborne

assaults and tactical landings.

The epitome of the Motorized Rifle Troops is represented by the motorized rifle brigades, with 

their high operational autonomy, versatility and firepower. They are able to conduct day/

night combat under conventional and weapons of mass destruction conditions in different 

physical environments. They can quickly perform marches over long distances, rapidly deploy 

into combat formations, break through the enemy’s defenses (prepared or hasty), conduct 

a broad variety of maneuver on the battlefield, develop the offensive rapidly and advance 

to significant depths, ford water barriers, strengthen and retain captured lines, and quickly 

transition to a stable defense.

In terms of modernization and capability development, the Motorized Rifle Troops will 

increase their capabilities for airlift deployment; conducting independent, high maneuver 

combat in remote areas; transitioning rapidly from one form of warfare to another; rapidly 

changing directions and areas of action; and rapidly concentrating and dispersing units.1

 

In general, each motorized rifle brigade has three motorized rifle battalions, based upon a 

BMP, BTR, or MT-LB chassis (in tank brigades, there is one motorized rifle battalion). Motorized 

rifle battalions based upon BTRs and MT-LBs are slightly larger than units based upon BMPs. 

These units are larger because they have dedicated antitank units, a capability battalions 

based upon BMPs do not require, because of the BMPs greater firepower. The accompanying 

1

 “Motorized Rifle Troops,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, <http://eng.mil.ru/en/structure/

forces/ground/structure/motorised.htm>, accessed 1 May 2016.
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Motorized Rifle Battalion (on BTRs)
Branches of Arms

211

Motorized Rifle Battalion (on BMPs)
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

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graphics illustrate the differences between the two motorized rifle battalion types. 

Russia is strong and respected when it has a strong, respected ground force and a strong, 

charismatic leader. Historically, Russian infantry has been the foundation of its ground force 

and has a long history of toughness, endurance and discipline. Modern Russian infantry 

is shaped by the concepts of reliable transport, tactical drills, terrain appreciation, and 

overmatching fire. 

Reliable Transport

The vast Russian landmass has few high-capacity, all-weather roads and little year-round 

navigable terrain. Infantrymen are of little value if they are late to the battle, tired when they 

arrive, hungry and short of ammunition, unable to keep up with the tanks or committed 

piecemeal. During the 1930s, the Soviet Union realized the value of moving ground forces 

to the battlefield and having them arrive fit and provisioned to fight, but World War II broke 

out before it was able to implement its military motorization program fully. The Soviets were 

quick to grasp the value of the tank and the truck, which, coupled with the railroads and 

river barges, could move impressive combat power across the plains and marshes of Russia 

and beyond. Although during World War II Russian infantry rode on trucks and tanks when 

it could, most of Russian infantry was foot mobile and slow to mass and disperse. The Soviet 

Army began mounting its infantry on armored personnel carriers in the 1950s and succeeded 

in creating a 100% motorized ground force. This continues to this day. Even airborne, air 

assault, and special purpose (spetznaz) infantry are all mechanized forces. Airborne, riverine, 

amphibious and airmobile insertions include purpose-built infantry carriers, assault guns, 

artillery and transport. There is no light infantry in the Russian Army; it is all mechanized 

or motorized, in the Russian vernacular. In fact, in the Russian Army, Infantry is referred to 

as Motorized Rifle Troops and all these forces ride to combat in tracked or wheeled infantry 

fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers.

Tactical Drills

The Russians expect motorized rifle subunits to perform to a standard and to produce a 

quantifiable amount of combat power that can produce a mathematical certainty of success 

when applied correctly. Too much combat power is a waste of effort and resources and too 

little is a guarantee of defeat. How does one train to a standard to produce a quantifiable 

amount of combat power? The answer is tactical drills. Football teams and SWAT teams use 

drills to speed up the orders process and to make complicated tasks quick and simple. Every 

U.S. Army infantryman knows how to do the four-man stack to enter a room. The Russian 

Ground Forces have a series of such tactical drills that they practice over and over and over 

until they become embedded muscle memory. The drill may be as simple as exiting a combat 

vehicle and going into an assault line. The continued practice of these drills makes them swift 

and smooth and gives the soldier something to focus on in the midst of the noise, confusion 

and terror of the battlefield. The drills replace thought when the soldier is cold, tired, hungry, 

and frightened, and perhaps is a reservist mobilized 15 years after his initial service.

The Russian commander is aided by these drills and a collection of tactical calculations 

and nomograms, which help him mathematically determine the length and duration of a 
Branches of Arms

213

march, the time it will take to cross a river, the time it will take to catch up to a retreating 

enemy, fuel consumption of a column, degree of destruction expected from an artillery 

strike, the optimum duration of fire before weapons should switch firing positions, and so 

on. These formulae and nomograms speed up planning and execution. They also add a 

tactical predictability (and rigidity) that provides operational flexibility. During World War 

II, German tactical units were more effective than comparable-sized Soviet (and US) units, 

but the Soviets were far more effective at the operational level and the Germans were never 

able to shift their operational reserve in time to block the Soviet penetration. The variety of 

battle drills available to the Russian commander allows sufficient flexibility to not disclose 

his game plan, while providing a quantifiable amount of combat power that can produce a 

mathematical certainty of success. The Russians use military history as operations research 

and have developed a mathematical system of comparing opposing forces and war-gaming 

courses of action. The study of the Correlation of Forces and Means determines the combat 

power of friendly and enemy weapons systems based on a selected Russian weapons system, 

which becomes the measurement standard. The system is assigned a value, and other 

similar friendly and enemy systems are rated against this measurement standard based on 

weapons, armor, on-board munitions, speed, range, and the like. Dissimilar systems (e.g., 

an infantry fighting vehicle versus the measurement-standard tank) are also compared and 

assigned values based on the standard measurement. These values are rolled into TO&Es to 

find the combat power of a unit. This is good as long as the fight is between equally-trained 

and experienced units fighting on a featureless plain. Variables (“K” values) are then entered 

to adjust the combat powers to reflect the terrain, the state of unit training, the number of 

days of combat experience that the unit has, maintenance standards, logistics support, the 

nationality and ideological/religious fervor of the soldiers, and whether the unit is fighting 

on its own or foreign soil. This system was developed during Soviet times and has been 

upgraded and revamped to take advantages of improved computer capabilities and the 

introduction of new weapons systems, improved electronic warfare (EW), and improved 

weaponry. 

Terrain Appreciation

Much of the terrain on which Russia has fought its major wars is open plain, woodland and 

marshland intersected by large and small rivers. Maneuvering over this terrain has given 

the Russian commander a good eye for finding high ground and concealed avenues of 

approach. During World War II, German commanders frequently 

commented on the almost fanatical zeal that Russian forces 

displayed in order to seize a seemingly inconsequential piece 

of high ground. High ground is like a magnet to the Russian 

commander. This terrain has influenced Russian equipment 

design. Tanks and infantry fighting vehicles have much lower 

silhouettes than their Western counterparts. Tracks are much 

wider and vehicle clearance is much higher. Most vehicles 

are fitted with a self-recovery system. Most vehicles have an 

amphibious or fording capability. This terrain has also influenced 

Russian warfighting. Russian military history emphasizes large 

turning movements, highly mobile operations in the enemy 

depth, use of massed artillery fires in areas where the impacts 

cannot be observed to be adjusted, use of rivers as barriers and 

lines of communication and the use of winter for decisive actions.

SBR-3 Ground Surveillance Radar

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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Overmatching Fire

Americans enjoy the tradition of the frontiersman and his Kentucky rifle, who boasted of “one 

shot, one kill.” Although marksmanship is a recognized sport in Russia, suppression of enemy 

small-arms fire is valued over accuracy. At the start of World War II, the Russian infantry was 

armed with the Model 1891, five-shot, 7.62mm Mosin-Nagant bolt-action rifle. It could kill 

at over 800 meters and was accurate to 500 meters. It could fire a maximum of ten rounds 

per minute (rpm). The problem was that the Germans brought the MG-34 7.92mm machine 

gun (800-900 rpm), the 9m MP-40 submachine gun (500-550 rpm) and the M1898, fiveshot, 7.92mm Mauser bolt-action rifle (12 rpm) to the infantry fight. The rates of fire of the 

MG-34 and MP-40 kept the Soviet infantrymen’s heads down while the M1898 picked them 

off. The Soviets needed to suppress the German rates of fire. Their answer was to develop 

and issue their own 7.62mm submachine guns, the PPD-40 and the PPSh-41. They could fire 

over 900 rpm, but were only accurate out to 100 meters. The Mosin-Nagants were pulled out 

of infantry units as the submachine guns became available. Now the Soviets had infantry 

weapons that could provide suppressive fire while they advanced close enough to kill the 

enemy. The problem was that if the enemy was over 100 meters away, the infantry could get 

badly hurt while trying to get into range. The Soviets began reissuing the Mosin-Nagants - 

this time with improved optics and an effective range of 1000 meters.

The Russians believe in suppressive fire. The famous Kalashnikov selector switch goes from 

safe to automatic to semiautomatic. Automatic is the preferred mode of fire. The US M16 

selector switch goes from safe to semiautomatic to automatic, reflecting the US belief in 

marksmanship. Despite this, both armies fire thousands of small-arms rounds to inflict a 

single casualty. This Russian preference for suppressive fire extends to artillery, where massed 

artillery fires still hold a major place in maneuver warfare planning.

Small Arms Characteristics
Branches of Arms

215

 Small Arms

The venerable AK-74 is available in quantity and 

will be the standard for years to come. Still, there is 

competition, as the AK-12, A-545 and AN-94 look to 

replace this 42-year-old weapon. The AK-74 is part of the 

Kalashnikov family of small arms. A lineal descendant 

of the 7.62X39mm AK-47 and AKM, the AK-74 joined the 

small bullet craze introduced by the Colt M-16 during 

the Vietnam War. The 5.45x39mm cartridge fires a 

lightweight, high velocity bullet at the rate of 600 rpm 

and is effective out to 500 meters, although the maximum range is over 3000 meters. It is not 

particularly accurate, but since its primary role is suppressive fire, it is suited to its role. 

The RPK squad automatic weapon is a rugged 

veteran performer that has been around since 

the 1960s. It has a longer, heavier barrel than the 

standard Kalashnikov and fires the 7.62x39mm 

round effectively out to 1,000 meters. Squad 

engagements normally extend from 10 to 800 

meters, so the RPK covers the gap between the 

suppressive fire of the AK-74 (effective to about 

300 meters at burst rate) and the limits of normal 

squad engagements. The Russians have also fielded an RPK-74, which fires the 5.45X39mm, 

which has the same improved range and accuracy of the RPK, but the effectiveness of the 

lighter bullet falls off significantly over 500 meters, so the older 10-pound RPK remains in 

active service. 

The PKP Pecheneg 7.62X54mm medium machine 

gun may be issued in lieu of the RPK squad automatic 

weapon. Like the RPK, it has a bipod, but it has an 

increased effective range of 1500 meters and a carrying 

weight of 18 pounds. 

The RPG-7V2 is the most widely used anti-armor 

weapon in the world. Its ruggedness, simplicity, 

low cost, and effectiveness have kept it in the 

Russian motorized rifle squad and elsewhere since 

1961. It has a HEAT, tandem HEAT, fragmentation 

and thermobaric round, with an effective range of 

200 meters and a maximum range of 920 meters. 

The round detonates at 920 meters - a feature that has even enabled it to be used as an air 

defense weapon. 

AK-74 Automatic Rifle

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

RPK Machinegun

Image Courtesy: http://www.defenselink.mil/

PKP Machinegun

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

RPG-7 Grenade Launcher

Image Courtesy: U.S. Airforce
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The Dragunov SVD-63 is a semi-automatic sniper/

designated marksman rifle that is chambered for 

7.62x54mm ammunition and is found in the scout 

platoon. It was originally designed as a squad 

support weapon because the squad’s long-range 

engagement ability was lost when submachine 

guns and assault rifles (which are designed for 

close-to-medium-range, rapid-fire combat) were issued as the primary infantry weapon. 

The Dragunov is accurate to 800 meters. The Soviet TO&E had a sniper per platoon, but the 

“sniper” was really a designated marksman. The scouts are also designated marksman. Russia 

has world-class snipers and world-class sniper weapons in the military and state security 

spetsnaz, internal security forces, river police and the new presidential guard. Some of their 

newer weapons are replacing the Dragunov in motorized rifle forces. 

Combat Gear and Load-Bearing Equipment

Dismounted troops carry too much weight. The 

Russians have introduced new load-bearing 

equipment and combat gear. The new combat 

gear (Ratnik) is an integration of protection, 

destruction, life support, and energy supply 

systems. Ratnik envisions the use of a total of 

more than 150 components. A variety of helmets 

and body armor, combat overalls, a headset with 

a hearing protection system, protective glasses, 

and a knee and elbow joint protection set are 

included. One can use a grenade launcher, an 

assault rifle, or a sniper rifle. Ammunition, a 

combat multifunction knife, standard reconnaissance instruments, small binoculars, a light 

signal flashlight, a shock-resistant and waterproof watch, winter and summer two-sided 

camouflage kits, and standardized optical and thermal-imaging gun sights supplement the 

new gear. There is also an autonomous heat source, assault pack, individual water filter, 

and lung protection, decontamination, and first aid equipment. 

Ground Troops Commander-in-Chief General Oleg Salyukov 

stated that the Ratnik (Warrior) system has reduced the weight of 

individual equipment by nearly 1.5 times, from 34 to 24 kilograms 

(75 pounds to 53 pounds). Furthermore, the effectiveness of 

the small arms that are part of Ratnik (the A545 assault rifle) has 

increased by 1.2 times. The designers have doubled the protection 

of the integrated body armor. However, perhaps the main thing 

is that they have managed to integrate the new combat gear’s 

command and control system and communications systems with 

its other elements. This will permit soldiers to accomplish combat 

missions at any time of day and under various climactic conditions. 

Experts expect that the effectiveness of their actions will increase 

by at least 1.5-2 times.

Dragunov SVD-63

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

Ratnik Equipment Display

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

Soldier Wearing Ratnik Kit

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
Branches of Arms

217

Crew-Served Weapons

The AGS-17 automatic grenade launcher 

(Plamya) fires linked 30mm grenades 

from a tripod or vehicle mount to a 

maximum range of 1700 meters. The 

maximum effective range is 800 meters 

and it fires at the rate of 400 rpm 

(practical rate of fire is 50-100 rpm). It is 

used for direct and indirect fire and fires 

fragmentation and smoke rounds. It 

weighs a hefty 31 kilograms (68 pounds) 

and is being replaced by the AGS-30, 

which weighs 16 kilograms (35 pounds) 

and has a maximum range of 2100 

meters. 

The PKM machine gun fires the 7.62x54mm round at a rate of 

600 rpm (250 practical rpm) to a distance of 3800 meters, with 

a maximum effective range of 1500 meters. It has a bipod 

and tripod mount. The weapon is found throughout the 

motorized rifle battalion. The vehicle mounted variant is the 

PKT. 

The 9P151 antitank wire-guided missile launcher fires the 

9M115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn) or the Metis-M 

9M131(AT-13 Saxhorn-2) missile. It has an 

engagement range of 40-1000 meters and can 

engage targets traveling up to 37 miles per hour. It carries a 

HEAT warhead. The weapon is found in the motorized rifle 

antitank platoon. 

AGS-17 Grenade Launcher

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

9M115 Metis

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

PKM Machinegun

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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BTRs and BMPs

Motorized riflemen ride into combat on the 

wheeled BTR-80 or BTR-82, the tracked BMP-3 

or, in the northern latitudes, the MT-LB. The 

BTR-80 is an 8x8 wheeled amphibious armored 

personnel carrier, and is the most common 

chassis found in the Russian Ground Forces, 

entering service in 1986. It has a crew of two 

and carries a motorized rifle squad of eight. It 

has a turret-mounted KPVT 14.5x114mm heavy 

machine gun (.57 caliber) with a coaxial 7.62-

54mm PKT machine gun. The KPVT has a maximum effective range of 3000 meters and a 

range of 4000 meters. Seven firing ports enable the squad to fire from within the vehicle. 

It has a top speed of 50 mph and a combat radius of 375 miles. Some models mount the 

30mm 2A72 automatic cannon, which fires the 30x165mm round to an effective range of 

4000 meters. It fires HE-T and AP-T rounds up to 550 rpm. The infantry squad exits the BTR-80 

through the roof hatches or from the two side doors. This arrangement has been criticized, 

since the squad is exposed to fire while dismounting, vice dismounting through (nonexistent) 

rear doors.

The BTR-82 is an upgraded version of the BTR-80. It was first fielded in 2011 and now can be 

found in the Russian Ground Forces, Naval Infantry, and Airborne. It is manufactured at the 

81st Armored Vehicle Repair Plant in Armavir, Russia, and differs from the BTR-80 due to a 300-

hp engine in place of the BTR-80’s 260-hp engine, and a number of design features to protect 

the crew from mines and small-arms fire. The bottom of the vehicle is designed with a new 

two-level system for absorbing blasts, and all internal parts of the armored body are covered 

Portable ATGM Characteristics

BTR-80

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
Branches of Arms

219

by a special spall liner to provide better protection from 

shrapnel and other projectiles. These modifications 

reportedly give the BTR-82 a twenty percent higher 

survival rate than the BTR-80. 

Versions of the BTR-82 are equipped with air 

conditioning, digitally-encrypted R-168 radios, and 

the Trona-1 topographic navigation system. Although 

Russia will field the new wheeled “Bumerang” BTR 

in the next few years, the BTR-82 will likely still be in 

production for the foreseeable future, as its designation 

refers to not only newly produced vehicles, but also 

BTR-80s that have been upgraded to the BTR-82 

standard. (The BTR-82 is also finding success on the export market; versions of it can be 

found in found in the armies of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Syria.) Common variants of the 

BTR-82 include the BTR-82A, armed with a 30-mm cannon and 

coaxial 7.62-mm machine gun; the BTR-82AM, designation of a 

BTR-80 after upgrade to the BTR-82A standard; the BTR-82A1, 

equipped with an unmanned turret that has a 30-mm cannon and 

coaxial 7.62-mm machine gun; and the Taifun-M reconnaissance 

vehicle, developed as an escort vehicle for intercontinental ballistic 

missile launchers. Russian efforts to build and/or modernize the 

BTR-82/BTR-80 line, while simultaneously fielding a new system 

(the “Bumerang” BTR), parallel Russia’s modernization of the T-72 

line of tanks while fielding the T-14 tank. Russia sees no need 

to completely change out its inventory of older vehicles, and 

BMP and BTR Characteristics

BTR-82A

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

Armored Personnel Carrier

(BTR)

Бронетранспортер

(БТР)
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instead has adopted a hybrid approach towards modernization. The Russian Armed Forces 

have chosen to approach institutional modernization by modernizing older platforms, while 

simultaneously fielding new platforms. This practice allows them to significantly enhance 

their combat power through wide-scale modernization, while developing new technologies 

at a sustainable cost. This approach is far from perfect, but it appears to be a long standing 

practice, instituted well before the time of current financial difficulties.2

The MT-LB was originally designed as an 

armored, amphibious artillery tractor. It 

has excellent marsh and snow mobility and 

has become a motorized rifle carrier (BTR), 

particularly for brigades in the northern 

latitudes. It has a crew of 2 and can carry up 

to 11 passengers. The squad mounts and 

dismounts through two rear doors. Some MT-LB 

carry the 12.7x108mm (.50 caliber) NSVT heavy 

machine gun, which has a rate of fire of 780 rpm 

and a maximum effective range of 1500 meters.

The BMP-3 is an amphibious, tracked infantry 

fighting vehicle that is fitted with a lowvelocity 2A70 100 mm rifled gun, which can 

fire conventional shells or 9M117 ATGMs (AT-10 

Stabber). It also has a 2A72 30 mm dual feed 

and a 7.62mm PKT machine gun. These are all 

mounted coaxially in the turret. There are also 

two 7.62mm PKM bow 

machine guns. The 

BMP-3 is capable of 

engaging targets out 

to 5000–6000 meters 

with its ATGM weapon 

system 9K116-3 “Basnya.” The BMP-3 has a crew of three and carries 

a motorized rifle squad of seven. The squad dismounts out of the 

vehicle rear doors. It has a top speed of 45 mph and a combat 

radius of 370 miles. 

2

 Charles K. Bartles, “The BTR-82 and the Implementation of Modernization,” OE Watch Online, August 2016.

“BTR-82: Armored personnel carrier” as found on the website Military-Today <http://www.military-today.com/

apc/btr_82.htm>, accessed 1 May 2016.

Igor Melnikov, “Military Motor Transport Operator Day” Voyennyy Vestnik, 24 May 2014.

“Baltic Fleet Naval Infantry is Mastering the New BTR-82A Armored Personnel Carrier,” Ministry of Defense of the 

Russian Federation, 11 June 2013, <http://structure.mil.ru/structure/okruga/west/news/more.htm?id=11773465@

egNews>, accessed 1 May 2016.

BMP-3

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

MT-LB

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

Infantry Fighting Vehicle 

(BMP)

Боевая машина пехоты

(БМП)
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221

Modernization and Modularity

In Western Armies, the term 

“motorized” refers to wheeled 

vehicles and units, while 

“mechanized” refers to tracked 

vehicles and units. In the Russian 

Army, “motorized rifle” refers to any 

infantry unit mounted on tracked 

or wheeled vehicles. Russia’s 

modernization and standardization 

efforts have included the creation 

of not only the Armata tracked 

heavy chassis, but also the 

Kurganets-25 tracked utility chassis 

and the Bumerang wheeled chassis. 

Interestingly, these three chassis 

types, made by three different 

manufactures, are all designed 

to accept the same turret, the 

“universal combat module” known 

at the “Epoch” or “Bumerang-BM,” made by a fourth 

company. (The universal combat module consists of 

a 30mm automatic cannon, four “Kornet” antitank 

missiles, and a 7.62mm PKT machine gun.)

This level of interoperability is unheard of in Western 

defense industries, where proprietary technology 

and financial considerations would make the 

pursuit of such an effort difficult. The imposition 

of such a standard must have been implemented 

several years ago, as some reports have implied the 

BTR-82A (armored personnel carrier) and BMD-4 

(infantry fighting vehicle for the Airborne) have 

already entered service, and may also be capable of 

mounting the “universal combat module.” Russia has 

put great stock in the concepts of interoperability 

and modularity. Russian media have reported that 

the “Armata” chassis (and likely the other two as 

well) will serve Russia throughout the 21st century. 

Russia appears to believe that although the chassis 

may be suitable throughout the 21st century, the 

weapons systems which it carries will not. After 

these three chassis are fielded, Russia will likely 

“Epoch” Universal Module

New Russian BTRs with “Epoch” Module

Images Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

222

pursue capability improvements through upgrading the turrets for the foreseeable future 

(not by the purchase of completely new vehicles). Other more novel innovations involve 

giving the Kurganets-25 vehicles a Sony PlayStation-like controller for steering to ease driver 

training and facilitate future automation. Aside from the obvious cost savings due to the 

economies of scale and the ability to relatively quickly repurpose equipment as needed, this 

development will also likely spur innovation. Weapons manufactures will now only have to 

design for one turret specification, which could lead to significant cost savings. This could be 

especially significant if these chassis enter the export market, as they likely will. The Russian 

military and Russia’s export customers will be able to “plug-n-play” a variety of capabilities, 

based upon turret design, with their particular desired chassis type. Perhaps one of the 

most interesting implications of these universal chassis and turret specifications is that 

manned vehicle turrets may be a thing of the past, and the terms “infantry fighting vehicle” 

(IFV or BMP) and “armored personnel carrier” (APC or BTR) may become unimportant when 

describing these vehicles, as the only difference is the turret type.3

3

 Charles K. Bartles, “Modularity Facilitates Russian Armored Vehicle Innovations,” OE Watch Online, October 2015.

“BTR ‘Kurganets-25’: The Little Brother of the New Infantry Fighting Vehicle,” Interpolit Online, 9 September 2015, 

<http://interpolit.ru/blog/btr_kurganec_25_mladshij_brat_novoj_boevoj_mashiny_pekhoty/2015-09-12-5605>, 

accessed 1 May 2016.

Yuriy Belousov, “Only an Armata is More Awesome than an Armata,” 3 July 2015, 

Krasnaya Zvezda Online, in Russian 03 July 2015, <http://redstar.ru/index.php/newspaper/item/24718-kruchearmaty-tolko-armata>, accessed 20 September 2015.

T-90SM T-80U

Images Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

Barrel-Launched ATGM Characteristics
Branches of Arms

223

Tank Troops

Tank Troops are a Branch of Arms, and the main strike force of the Russian Ground Forces. 

They are used in conjunction with the motorized rifle units and perform the following tasks:

- In the defense – direct support of the motorized rifle units in repelling the enemy’s 

offensive and the conduct of counterattacks and counterstrikes

- In the offence – deep strikes, development of success, and defeat of the enemy in 

meeting engagements and battles.

Russian Tank Troops are found in tank brigades and divisions, and 

in the tank battalions of motorized rifle brigades. Armor units are 

resistant to the effects of nuclear weapons, provide good firepower 

and protection, and have high mobility and maneuverability. 

Russian armor capabilities enable them to lead active combat 

operations, day and night, independent of other elements. They 

can also overcome NBC-contaminated areas and surmount 

water barriers, and are able to quickly form a solid defense to 

successfully resist enemy attacks. In terms of modernization and 

capability development, Russia is improving organizational issues 

by continuing the development of combined arms doctrine using 

armor, enhancing the firepower, protection, and maneuver capabilities of existing weapons 

platforms (primarily T-72), and developing new systems.4

 It is important to note that Russians 

4

 “Tank Troops,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, <http://eng.mil.ru/en/structure/forces/

ground/structure/tank.htm>, accessed 1 May 2016.

Tank Characteristics

Tank

Танк
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

224

do not view future war solely as counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and area control, but 

also consider high-intensity maneuver warfare as an equally likely form of future war. Despite 

economic difficulties since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russians have developed 

three new tanks and are fielding two (T-90 and T-14). In terms of the maneuver brigades, 

there is one tank battalion (31 tanks) in each motorized rifle brigade, and three tank battalions 

in each tank brigade. Some motorized rifle brigades have one tank battalion with four 

companies (41 tanks).

The Armata Chassis and T-14 Tank

Russia has been experimenting with a 

common heavy tracked chassis for tanks, 

armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting 

vehicles, and other tracked vehicles standard 

in the Russian Ground Forces TO&E. The 

Russian Ground Forces took its first deliveries 

of T-14 tanks and T-15 heavy BMPs (mounted 

on the Armata chassis) early in 2015, and there 

have been unsubstantiated claims that the 

Armata entered serial production in March 

2016.5

 If the Armata chassis proves successful, 

5

 “Tanks A Lot: Russia’s Advanced Armata T-14 ‘Already in Serial Production,’” Sputnik Online, 14 March 2016, 

Tank Battalion

T-14

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
Branches of Arms

225

it could become the basis of many other Russian vehicle types.6 Russia is considering the 

following Armata based variants:

- T-14 Tank

- BMP-T (T-15) infantry fighting vehicle

- BREM-T recovery vehicle

- USM-A1 general-purpose mine-laying system 

- 2S35 Koalitsiya-S 152-mm self-propelled howitzer

- BMO-2 transport vehicle for shoulder -fired rocket-propelled flamethrower operators

- TOS BM-2 launch vehicle in a system for heavy rocket-propelled flamethrowers

- TZM-2 support vehicle in a system for heavy rocket-propelled flamethrowers

- MIM-A multipurpose engineer vehicle

- MT-A armored bridge layer

- UMZ-A general-purpose minelayer and obstacle clearer

- SPM special firefighting vehicle

- PTS-A amphibious transport vehicle.

<http://sputniknews.com/russia/20160314/1036238101/russia-armata-production.html>, accessed 20 March 

2015.

6

 Charles K. Bartles, “Russia Considers Standardized Chassis for Most Tracked Vehicles,” OE Watch Online, March 

2015.

“Uralvagonzavod to deliver 20 new tanks and heavy infantry fighting vehicles in Feb-March,” 28 January 2015, 

<http://www.interfax.com/>, accessed 1 May 2016.

Aleksandr Kurennoy and Aleksey Naryshkin: “Vyacheslav Khalitov, Deputy Director of the Uralvagonzavod 

Science and Production Corporation Open Joint-Stock Company for Specialized Technology,” transcript of 

Arsenal radio program posted on Ekho Moskvy Online, 26 January 2015, <http://m.echo.msk.ru/interview/detail.

php?ID=1480668>, accessed 1 May 2016.

T-14 “Armata” Characteristics

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

T-14
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

226

The Russian Armed Forces consider the T-14 

tank, a medium tank, as it weighs approximately 

50 tons, but it has a chassis that supports 

approximately 65 tons, likely to allow for future 

modifications. The road wheels are reportedly 

based upon the T-80 tank. They were used 

because they were significantly lighter than the 

T-72 wheels (120 kilograms vs. 194 kilograms, 

resulting in an approximately one-ton savings 

in weight). The T-14 tank will be equipped with 

an adjustable suspension capable of adapting 

to varying relief, terrain type, and vehicle speed, 

resulting in increased speed while moving in 

columns, as well as over rugged terrain. The 

suspension system will also alleviate crew fatigue, 

while assisting the fire control system to deliver 

accurate fire while on the move. Unlike previous 

Soviet/Russian vehicles, crew safety (survivability) 

and comfort appear to be a concern. The crew is 

in an armored capsule that is somewhat roomy, 

compared to other Soviet/Russian tanks. The 

composite multilayered passive armor protection 

of the T-14 tank is built with steel made by electroslag remelting and is combined with new 

composites to protect it against the most advanced modern weaponry. It also has the Afganit 

active protection complex, capable of intercepting shaped-charged grenades, antitank 

missiles, and subcaliber projectiles. 

The tank’s main armament is the 2A82-1M 125mm smoothbore cannon, capable of firing 

high-powered munitions, including armor-piercing discarding sabot, guided missile, and 

shaped-charge, as well as other types.  There are also plans to equip versions of the T-14 with 

the 2A83 152mm gun. This gun can fire a heavier projectile that has greater range, and is 

more powerful in terms of explosive and kinetic energy; and allows the firing of a larger barrel 

launched antitank guided missile (ATGM), which most modern Russian tanks and infantry 

fighting vehicles (BMPs) can fire.7

 The T-14 is equipped with the Chelyabinsk A-85-3A X-diesel 

engine capable of producing up to 1500 hp. The tank also has a Tank Information Control 

System (TICS), which monitors all assemblies and components, diagnoses malfunctions, 

and controls onboard systems, andwill receive a new protection system.8 One interesting 

7

 Vladimir Tuchkov, “The Armata Penetrates One and a Half Meters of Armor,” Svobodnaya Pressa Online, 24 

November 2016, <http://svpressa.ru/war21/article/161227/>, accessed 19 December 2016. 8

 Charles K. Bartles, “Technical Specifications of Russia’s T-14, ‘Armata’ Chassied Tank,” OE Watch Online, March

2015.

“Can’t Touch This! Russian Armata Tanks to Get New Active Protection System,” Sputnik Online, 15 March 2016, 

<http://sputniknews.com/military/20160315/1036302986/armata-active-protection-system.html>, accessed 1 

May 2016.

Sergey Ptichkin, “The Tank Maintains a Circular Defense: New T-14 Tank will Become the Sensation of the Year,” 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 03 February 2015, <http://www.rg.ru/2015/02/02/tank.html>, accessed 1 May 2016.

Tank Gun Characteristics
Branches of Arms

227

development is that plans to affix a tethered UAV to the T-14 tank. Due to the T-14’s main gun 

having a range of up to 8km, but only a sighting capability of up to 5km, the advantages of 

the T-14 are not fully realized. A tethered drone would provide a field of view of up to 10km, 

and would allow the tank to sit in covered positions while surveying the battlefield. This 

line of development is in sync with other Russian developments to provide improved and 

decentralized C4ISR assets. These UAVs are also likely intended to be networked together 

to augment the “netcentric” warfare concept that the Russian Armed Forces are pursuing.9 

Russia plans on attaining 2,300 vehicles on Armata chassis by 2025, a prospect that seems 

unlikely considering past procurement endeavors and the state of the Russian economy.10

Modernization of the T-72

Although there has been much hype about 

the introduction of the Russian T-14 tank, the 

bulk of Russia’s armored power will still reside 

in the T-72 series of tanks.11 This means that 

when considering the Russian Ground Forces’ 

combat power, one should primarily focus on 

modernized T-72s, not T-14s, for the foreseeable 

future. Although Russia is adopting the T-14, at 

no time has it stated the desire to completely 

9

 Aleksey Moiseyev, “They Will Equip the Armata with a Reconnaissance Drone,” Izvestiya Online, 18 November 

2016, <http://izvestia.ru/news/645502>, accessed 19 December 2016. 10 Sergey Ishchenko, “Assault Tanks Will Support the Armata,” Svobodnaya Pressa Online, 15 December 2016, 

<http://svpressa.ru/war21/article/162629/>, accessed 27 December 2016. 11 Russia does have T-80s and T-90s in its inventory, but the vast majority of Russian tanks are T-72s.

Tank Characteristics Comparison

T-72B3M

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

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replace its tank fleet with T-14s, and there have been pronouncements that the T-14s would 

only be found in the 1st Tank Army and the 20th Combined Arms Army. Although the T-72 will 

still be the backbone of most Russian maneuver formations. Current Russian T-72s are much 

different than the ones that rolled of the assembly lines when the system was first produced 

in the early 1970s. Russia has embarked on a massive modernization program for the 

venerable T-72 that involves a frame-off refurbishment of the chassis and the additions of new 

cannons, engines, machine guns, optics, stabilization systems, reactive armor, and electronics. 

After this modernization the T-72 is redesignated a “T-72B3,” and is essentially a new tank. In 

terms of characteristics, the T-72B3 has much more in common with the T-90 than with older 

T-72s, and it is almost certain that that many T-72s can be refurbished for the price of one 

T-14.12 The Russian media reported that Russia had upgraded approximately 1,000 T-72Bs to 

the T-72B3 standard, and there are plans to upgrade 300 more.13

Tank Combat Support Vehicle (BMPT)

Russians consider tanks essential to warfighting, but in order for tanks to dominate the future 

battlefield, they must survive. One idea is that the BMPT Terminator could be reborn, but this 

time on an Armata chassis.14 Despite the closeness of the acronyms, the BMPT is not classified 

by Russia as an Infantry Fighting Vehicle (BMP), but instead as a Tank Combat Support Vehicle 

(BMPT) [боевая машина поддержки танков (БМПТ)]; it is also sometimes referred to as a 

Combat Fire Support Vehicle (BMOP) [боевая машина огневой поддержки (БМОП)].15 The 

concept of a Tank Combat Support Vehicle is not a new one in the Soviet/Russian experience. 

In theory, mechanized infantry, self-propelled artillery, and armored forces are mutually 

supporting. Artillery rains destruction onto the front and flanks as infantry personnel carriers 

and dismounted infantry protect tanks from enemy antitank systems and enemy infantry. 

Simultaneously, tanks protect the personnel carriers and dismounted infantry from enemy 

tanks and strong points. In practice, personnel carriers have problems keeping up with 

12 Charles K. Bartles, “More Bang for the Buck: The Modernized T-72,” OEWatch Online, February 2016.

“Oldies but Goodies: Upgraded ‘Invulnerable’ Т-72 Tanks Join Russian Army,” Sputnik Online, 20 December 2015, 

<http://sputniknews.com/russia/20151220/1032041217/russia-tanks-upgrades.html>, accessed 15 January 2015.

Oleg Valentinov, “With Tank Through Life: Servicing of Arms and Military Equipment Remains A Big Problem,” 

Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 28 October 2015, <http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/27722>, accessed 1 

May 2016.

Dave Majumdar, “Russia’s Cold War T-72 Tank Set for a Big Upgrade,” The National Interest, 31 March 31, 2016, 

<http://www.realcleardefense.com/2016/03/31/russia039s_cold_war_t-72_tank_set_for_a_big_

upgrade_280588.html>, accessed 1 May 2016. 13 “On the Order of a Thousand T-72B3 Tanks have been Modernized by ‘Ulralvagonzavod,’” RIA Novosti Online, 9 

September 2016, <https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20160908/1476388731.html>, accessed 1 October 2016.

“The Armed Forces Will Receive More than 300 Modernized T-72B3 Tanks,” RIA Novosti Online, 9 September 2016, 

<https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20160909/1476498530.html>, accessed 1 October 2016. 14 Expert “Alexei Xlotov: The Syrian War, The BMPT [Tank Combat Support Vehicle] and BAM [Combat Artillery 

Vehicle] on the Armata Chassis,” MyInforms Online, 2 April 2016, http://myinforms.com/ru-ru/a/16171669-

ehkspert-aleksejj-khlopotov-o-sirijjskojj-vojjne-bmpt-i-bam-na-baze-platformy-armata/, accessed 1 May 2016.

“Russia Unveils ‘Terminator-2’ Tank Support Vehicle” Sputnik News Online, 25 September 2013, <http://

sputniknews.com/military/20130925/183720985.html>, accessed 10 April 2015. 15 Lev Romanov, “Recall the ‘Terminator,’” Oborona, March 2015, <http://www.oborona.ru/includes/periodics/

armament/2015/0216/180015213/detail.shtml>, accessed 1 May 2016.
Branches of Arms

229

fast-moving tanks, their armor protection is too thin to survive at the point of the attack, and 

battle drills between tanks and mechanized infantry frequently break down due to the lack 

of sufficient team training prior to combat. Artillery fire may be on or off target, or too early 

or too late. The bottom line is that there is often too great a gap between the tanks and the 

mechanized infantry at the crucial point, and artillery may not bridge that gap.16

Despite the impressive technology and 

tactics, tanks still tended to separate from 

BMPs and artillery during the advance. The 

1973 Arab-Israeli War proved the value 

of the RPG and antitank guided missile 

(ATGM) to the defender. Tanks had to fight 

as a combined arms team to survive, but 

could not afford to slow down and lose 

the momentum of the attack. The answer 

appeared to be better combined arms 

training. In the late 1980s, the Soviets began 

forming combined arms battalions, which 

had organic tanks, BMPs, and artillery. The 

combined arms battalion allowed units to train for mutual support continuously, instead of 

only during scheduled exercises. However, the combined arms battalion required seasoned 

commanders who could deal with the training, supply, and maintenance demands of this 

complex unit. Soviet junior officers were usually younger and less experienced than their 

Western counterparts when they commanded at various levels, although they tended to 

command longer during a career. The combined arms battalion experiment initially failed 

due to its complexity, internal turmoil in the army, and leadership challenges, but is now a 

well established institution in the Russian Armed Forces, being the most common formation 

type battling in Eastern Ukraine.

The proliferation of rocket-propelled grenade RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers and antitank 

missiles has complicated the task of tanks and mechanized infantry working together. The 

Soviet-Afghan War and the Chechen Wars emphasized the tactical gap for the Soviets and the 

Russians. The enemy was not modern, nor mechanized, nor arrayed in a defense in-depth. His 

RPG gunners knew where the soft spots were on the various Soviet/Russian vehicles.17 The 

terrain worsened the problem of the tactical gap and, in the areas where the tanks could go, 

tanks and BMPs were often separated and unable to support each other. In the mountains 

of Afghanistan, tanks were often left behind and BMPs, and BTRs had to accomplish an 

independent mission they were not designed for. The Russians decided that the tactical gap 

between tanks and mechanized infantry is almost inevitable. The battle of Grozny on New 

Year’s Eve 1994 provided the impetus to develop a heavily armored close combat system. The 

Russians discovered that the thinly armored ZSU 23-4 self-propelled antiaircraft gun was the 

16 Lester W. Grau, “Preserving Shock Action: A New Approach to Armored Maneuver Warfare,” Armor, SeptemberOctober 2006, < http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Preserving%20Shock%20action.pdf>, accessed 

10 April 2015. Much of the following seven paragraphs has been extracted from that article.

17 Lester W. Grau, “Russian-Manufactured Armored Vehicle Vulnerability in Urban Combat:

The Chechnya Experience,” Red Thrust Star, January 1977.

Tank Combat Support Vehicle (BMPT) “Terminator-2”

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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optimum system for tank support in city 

fighting, but its vulnerability offset the 

efficiency of its four 23mm automatic 

cannons.18

To ensure the survivability of tanks, they 

needed a new system that was built 

like a tank, but provided mutual close 

combat support. The new system had 

to provide protection against enemy 

antitank weapons, infantry, strong points, 

helicopters, and fixed wing aviation. 

It needed to be an integral part of the 

armored unit, but it could not be a modern T-35 with five turrets and multiple weapons. 

The Russian answer was the BMPT tank support vehicle.19 It was not an infantry fighting 

vehicle (BMP), and the Russians were not discounting the value of mechanized infantry in 

the combined arms team. They were recognizing that the mechanized infantry may not be 

at the critical point at the critical time to support tank operations in traditional and urban 

combat roles. Russia’s first BMPT was nicknamed the “Terminator,” due to the anti-personnel 

capabilities of the system. It was built upon a T-72 or a T-90S tank chassis.20 The BMPT has 

the armored protection, maneuverability, and ruggedness to maneuver directly with the 

tank platoon, has laminated and reactive armor, weighs 47 tons and carries a 5-man crew 

with a low-profile turret, housing a 30mm automatic cannon with a coaxial AG-17D grenade 

launcher, an AT-14 Kornet ATGM, and a 7.62mm machine gun.21 

The most recent version of the BMPT has been renamed as a Combat Fire Support Vehicle 

(BMOP) and nicknamed the “Terminator-2.” Despite the name change, the Terminator-2 

fulfills the same role as originally intended, and was also built upon the T-72 or T-90S chassis. 

However, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who oversees the Russian defense 

industries, suggests that the Terminator-2 could also be built upon Russia’s newest heavy 

chassis platform, the Armata.22 The Terminator-2 is primarily intended to destroy personnel, 

antitank grenade launchers and antitank missiles, but also has capabilities to destroy lightly 

armored vehicles, tanks, BMPs, fortified structures, and low flying aircraft. The system is 

equipped with dual 2A42 30mm automatic cannons with 1700 rounds of ammunition 

18 Dmitriy Litovkin, “Battlefield Combine. Tank Support Combat Vehicle to Enter Service Soon,” 

Izvestia Online, 15 March 2005, <http://izvestia.ru/news/300570>, accessed 10 April 2015. 19 Sergey Severinov, “Homeland Armor,” Red Star Online, 10 September 2005, <http://old.redstar.

ru/2005/09/10_09/1_01.html>, accessed 10 April 2015. 20 Sergey Mikhaylov, “The Armed Forces Are on the Upswing: Marginal Polemical Notes on the Speech by CINC 

RF Ground Troops Colonel-General Oleg Salyukov,” Stoletiye Online, 8 October 2014, <http://www.stoletie.ru/

obschestvo/armija_na_podjeme_129.htm>, accessed 10 April 2015. 21 Russian Ministry of Defense, pp. 208-213. The Russians have developed a variety of thermobaric munitions for 

bunker busting, minefield clearing and artillery preparation. See, Lester W. Grau and Timothy Smith, illustrated 

by John Richards and Ivan Pavlov, “A Crushing Victory: Fuel-air Explosives and Grozny 2000,” Marine Corps Gazette, 

August 2000, pp. 30-33.

22 “Russia Unveils ‘Terminator-2’ Tank Support Vehicle” Sputnik News Online, 25 September 2013, <http://

sputniknews.com/military/20130925/183720985.html>, accessed 10 April 2015.

Tank Combat Support Vehicle (BMPT) “Terminator-2”

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
Branches of Arms

231

capable of destroying lightly armored vehicles and low-speed air targets (2500 meters) and 

ATGM systems, personnel, and other unarmored objects (4000 meters); a PKTM 7.62mm 

coaxially mounted machine gun with remote loader and 2100 rounds of ammunition 

capable of destroying personnel and unarmored targets (1600 meters);23 and two AG17D automatic grenade launchers with 600 rounds of ammunition capable of destroying 

lightly armed targets (1400 meters). The BMPTs antitank capability comes from four Ataka-T 

guided missiles with general purpose (9M120-1F) and antitank (9M120-1) warheads (5000 

meters).24 These weapons can reportedly clear the enemy from a city block at a distance of 

three kilometers.25 The Terminator-2 has a five-man crew consisting of a vehicle commander, 

gunner, driver-mechanic, and two grenadier gunners. It is designed to let the crew fight 

from the safety of the vehicle, and does not require any exiting for any weapons operation 

or routine reloading. All weapons systems are remote controlled, and there is an optical 

system to assist the weaponeers with target acquisition. The vehicle has an aerosol capability 

(presumably smoke) to obscure its location from target acquisition systems, and when lased, 

the commander’s panoramic sight will acquire the offending laser to readily direct fires. The 

vehicle’s chassis will also permit the vehicle to be mounted with mine or obstacle plows to 

facilitate maneuver.

Hopes for fielding the BMPT were dashed in 2010, when the Russian MoD announced that 

funding for it had been cancelled. Despite this setback, the manufacturer, Uralvagonzavod, 

did not give up and began to look for customers in the export market. In 2012, Kazakhstan, 

a country with a post-Soviet Army that somewhat resembles the Russian military in force 

structure and tactics, signed an agreement to purchase nine BMPTs on T-72 chassis, with 

deliveries starting in 2013.26 Apparently, the BMPT was perceived as a great success, and in 

April 2014 Kazakhstan signed another contract with Uralvagonzavod to produce the BMPT in 

Kazakhstan under a licensing agreement.27 In 2013, Rogozin’s statement that the Terminator-2 

could be built on the Armata chassis may be seen as evidence that the BMPT program was not 

cancelled by Russian MoD, but was instead put on indefinite hold until a new universal chassis 

was put into production.28 

23 Anatoli Antipov, “Tanks Need Support,” Red Star Online, 22 December 2004, <http://old.redstar.

ru/2004/12/22_12/7_03.html>, accessed 10 April 2015. 24 “Russia Unveils ‘Terminator-2’ Tank Support Vehicle” Sputnik News Online, 25 September 2013, <http://

sputniknews.com/military/20130925/183720985.html>, accessed 10 April 2015. 25 Dmitriy Litovkin, “Battlefield Combine. Tank Support Combat Vehicle to Enter Service Soon,” 

Izvestia Online, 15 March 2005, <http://izvestia.ru/news/300570>, accessed 10 April 2015. 26 Kazakhstan Purchased Unique Tank Combat Support Vehicles from Russia, Interfax-Kazakhstan Online, 5 May 

2012, <http://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/kazahstan-zakupil-rossii-unikalnyie-boevyie-mashinyi-195486/>, 

accessed 10 April 2015.

27 “In 2015, Kazakhstan will build BMPT ‘Terminator,’” Meta.kz Online, 10 April 2014, 

<http://meta.kz/novosti/kazakhstan/879813-v-2015-godu-v-kazahstane-nachnut-sborku-bmpt171terminator187.html>, accessed 10 April 2015. 28 Anton Valagin, “Terminator on Armata Chassis Will Be Armed with Two Guns,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 23 

November 2016, <https://rg.ru/2016/11/23/reg-urfo/terminator-na-baze-armaty-vooruzhat-dvumia-pushkami.

html>, accessed 19 December 2016.

Dr. Les Grau and Charles K. Bartles, “New System Preserves Armor Dominance of Future Battlefield: BMPT 

‘Terminator-2’” Armor Online, April-June, <http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/content/issues/2015/

APR_JUN/Apr-Jun_2015_edition.pdf>, accessed 1 May 2016.
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Artillery Troops

The Missile and Artillery Troops is a Branch of Arms in the Ground Forces, which is the 

primary means of destroying the enemy by conventional and nuclear fires during conduct of 

combined arms operations. They are designed to perform the following main tasks:

- achieve and maintain fire superiority 

- defeat of the enemy’s means of nuclear attack, manpower, weapons, military and

special equipment

- disrupt troops and command and control, reconnaissance, and EW systems

- destroy permanent defense installations and other infrastructure

- disrupt the enemy’s operational and tactical logistics

- weaken and isolate the enemy’s second echelons and reserve 

- destroy enemy tanks and other armored vehicles that breach the defense 

- cover open flanks and junctions

- participate in the destruction of enemy aircraft and the amphibious assault forces

- conduct remote mining operations

- provide illumination to troops maneuvering at night

- provide smoke screens and blind enemy targets

- distribute propaganda materials.

Self-Propelled Artillery Characteristics
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233

The Missile and Artillery Troops consist of missile, rocket, and artillery brigades, including 

high-power mixed units (tube and rocket), artillery battalions, rocket artillery regiments, 

and separate artillery reconnaissance battalions, as well as artillery units of combined 

arms brigades and military bases. In terms of modernization and capability development, 

the Missile and Artillery Troops will increase their capabilities by creating reconnaissancefire units, including on interim basis; ensuring defeat of targets in real time; fielding more 

precision weapons; and increasing weapons’ firing ranges, the power of the ammunition, and 

the automation of the processes for preparation and firing.29

Maneuver with Fire and Maneuver by Fire

Artillery has always held pride of place in the Russian and Soviet Armies. Imperial Russian 

Artillery officers enjoyed a reputation for intellectual and professional excellence above 

the other branches.30 The Soviet Army was an artillery army with many tanks. The Soviets 29 “Missile Troops and Artillery,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, <http://structure.mil.ru/

structure/forces/ground/structure/rvia.htm>, accessed 1 May 2016. 30 Top graduates of the Artillery School were commissioned with seniority over graduates of the Infantry school 

and the Aristocratic Corps of Pages. Count Leo Tolstoy, the author of War and Peace, was a professional artillery 

Towed Artillery Characteristics
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structured their army around artillery. 

The Russian Army is also artillery-centric. 

Fire and maneuver is a common concept 

among militaries, as artillery fire removes 

or suppresses opposing enemy groupings, 

which allows the supported maneuver 

element (infantry or tanks) to advance 

simultaneously without incurring heavy 

casualties. The artillery is lifted and shifted 

shortly before the maneuver element closes 

with the enemy being pummeled by artillery 

and direct fire. 

Maneuver by fire is a Russian concept whereby fire is shifted from one target, line or sector 

without moving the firing positions of the artillery pieces. It is used in battle to cause mass 

destruction of important targets in a short period of time. All of the fires can be conducted 

officer who served in the Caucasus and at Sevastopol during the Crimean War. He authored technical papers on 

artillery issues as well as his more-famous literary works. 

Self-Propelled Howitzer Battalion

Msta-S

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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235

against one target simultaneously or conducted 

against that target and then other targets one 

after another. Maneuver by fire may also be 

used to redirect fire from one axis of advance 

to another.31 In this way, the physical effects 

of artillery destruction may be maneuvered 

to achieve the effects of a maneuver force. 

Maneuver by fire is used to achieve fire 

superiority rapidly over an enemy while putting 

one’s own artillery at risk; therefore, it is a 

massed artillery gambit. The Russian Army still 

believes in the efficacy and effectiveness of 

massing the effects of massed artillery fire to 

achieve maneuver and to support maneuver. 

Brigade and Battalion Artillery

The post-Soviet Russian Army has undergone the most sweeping reform in over a century. 

The new-model Russian Army has restructured around the brigade. A motorized rifle 

(mechanized infantry) or tank brigade has four maneuver battalions, four artillery battalions, 

two air defense battalions, a logistics battalion, a maintenance battalion, a signal battalion, 

an engineer battalion, an electronics warfare company, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 

company, an NBC company and a medical company. The artillery battalions are two howitzer 

battalions, a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) battalion and an antitank artillery 

battalion. 

Thirty-six 2S19 Msta-S 152mm self-propelled, tracked howitzers form the firing base of the 

modern brigade’s howitzer battalions (eighteen in each battalion). The 2S19 was introduced 

into the Ground Forces in 1989, just before the collapse of the Soviet Union. It has seen action 

in the Second Chechen War and in the current fighting in Eastern Ukraine. It is built on the 

T-80 tank chassis and is powered by the T-72 tank engine. It has an automated fire control 

system, automatic loader, NBC protection system, passive night vision device for the driver, 

wading kit, dozer blade, smoke generator and 81mm smoke launchers and a generator. The 

152mm barrel fires HE, HEAT-FS, HE-BB, HERA, smoke, chemical, nuclear, illumination 

and improved conventional munitions 

(ICM) rounds, as well as the laser-guided 

“Krasnopol” round. The 2S19 has been 

upgraded several times since its introduction, 

and is also produced in a towed, wheeled and 

export variant. It has a range of 29 kilometers 

(18 miles) using standard base-bleed 

ammunition and 36 kilometers (22 miles) 

using rocket-assisted ammunition. It can fire 

31 Institute of Military History of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, Military Encyclopedic Dictionary in 

two volumes [Военный Энциклопедеческий Словар в двух томах], Volume II, Moscow: Ripol classic, 2001, 27.

2S1 “Gvozdika”

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

2S3 “Akatsiya”

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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6-8 rounds per minute and has a main gun elevation 

of 4° to +68° and a 360° weapon’s traverse. Some 

brigades may still have the older 2S3 self-propelled 

152mm howitzers. 

Eighteen truck-mounted BM-21 122mm MLRSs 

form the firing base of the brigade’s MLRS battalion. 

Each one of these Grad launchers carries 40 122mm 

rockets, which can be launched individually or in 

salvo. The original rockets are capable of engaging 

targets up to 20 kilometers, and a 720 rocket 

battalion salvo impacts an area of approximately 

10 square acres. The BM-21 is an old design that first appeared in the Soviet Army in 1963, 

and it is a veteran of combat from Vietnam to Ukraine. Russia has engaged in a number of 

improvements to enhance its capabilities. A new generation of rockets have increased ranges, 

are GPS/GLONASS-capable, and field a variety of warheads, including High Explosive (HE), 

smoke, radio jamming, mines, and cluster munitions. Some new rockets for the BM-21 Grad 

reportedly have a range of up to 45 kilometers. 

MLRS Battalion

BM-21 “Grad”

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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237

The brigade MLRS battalions are being refitted with the 9A52-4 Tornado, built upon a Kamaz63501 chassis, which will reportedly be able to launch rockets/missiles of any of the three 

Russian MLRS calibers. The BM-27 220mm Uragan rockets carries HE-FRAG, chemical, ICM or 

scatterable mine warheads out to 35 kilometers (22 miles). The BM-30 300mm Smerch rocket 

carries HE-FRAG, antitank and antipersonnel 

ICM and thermobaric warheads out to 90 

kilometers (56 miles). The Tornado will, for 

the first time, use guided missiles, instead 

of unguided rockets, which will improve 

capabilities significantly.

The brigade’s fourth artillery battalion is the 

antitank artillery battalion. It has an antitank 

artillery battery of six MT-12 Rapira antitank 

cannons and two ATGM batteries of six each 

9M123 Khrizantema or 9P162 Kornet-T tank 

destroyers, both of which mount two 9M133 

Kornet ATGM launchers. The towed MT-12 

Antitank Battalion

9M123 “Khrizantema”

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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antitank cannon fields a 100mm smoothbore cannon that has a six-man crew (commander, 

driver of the towing vehicle, gun layer, loader, and two ammunition handlers). When the 

MT-LB is used as the tow vehicle, 20 rounds are typically carried (10 APFSDS, 4 HE-Frag, 6 

HEAT). The standard equipment consists of the panoramic PG-1M sight for indirect fire and 

an OP4M-40U telescope for direct fire. The APN-5-40 or APN-6-40 night sight is used for direct 

fire. The gun can be fitted with the LO-7 ski gear for travel across snow or swampy ground. 

The armored, tracked, amphibious Krizanterna or Kornet-T 

antitank destroyers’ 9M133 Kornet ATGM rails have a range of 

100-10,000 meters. The Kornet is a laser-beam rider with a HEAT 

warhead designed to defeat reactive armor and a thermobaric 

round designed to defeat bunkers. 

Each motorized rifle battalion has its organic artillery battery of 

eight 2S12 Sani towed 120mm mortars. In the Russian Army, 

mortars belong to the artillery and so all the mortar battery are 

branched artillery. The 2S12 has a range of 0.5 (.31 miles)-7100 

meters (4.4 miles). It fires HE, smoke, illumination and incendiary 

rounds, as well as a laser-guided round and a rocket-assisted 

round which fires over 13 kilometers (8 miles). A trained crew 

can fire 15 rounds per minute. 

Mortar Characteristics

2S12 “Sani”

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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239

The 2S9 Nona tracked, lightly armored, amphibious, 

breech-loading 120mm mortar/cannon is incorporated 

in some motorized rifle battalions instead of the 2S12 

Sani. The Nona also comes in a wheeled BTR chassis 

variant (2S23 Nona-SVK) and in a towed version (2B16 

Nona-K). The system is unique in that this mortar/cannon 

has a direct-fire capability and has an antitank round 

available for it. When used as a cannon, it has a range of 

13 kilometers (8 miles). The Nona may be replaced by 

the 2S31 Vena, which has been designed and tested but 

not put into full production. There is some speculation 

that the system is intended for the export market. 

The advent of UAVs heralds a new age of Russian artillery, providing real-time, accurate 

targeting, fire adjustment and post-strike assessment. The UAV is an enabler, while artillery 

remains the all-weather means of Russian destruction and maneuver support. Currently 

the Russian Army is assigning a UAV company to each maneuver brigade. The brigade has 

four artillery battalions, but organic artillery can be reinforced with attached, reinforcing or 

supporting artillery from artillery or MLRS brigades from an Army Group. The UAV company 

is not assigned to any of the artillery battalions, but is a separate brigade unit, since the 

UAV company has several types of short- and medium-range UAV systems and a variety of 

UAV missions, including artillery support, EW and communications retransmission. A more 

detailed discussion can be found in chapter eight, “Russian UAV Developments.”

2S9 “Nona”

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

2B14 “Podnos”

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense

2B9 “Vasilek”

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense

MT-12 “Rapira”

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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Artillery Terms and Concepts

Although the Russians have precision-guided munitions for their artillery, they still believe 

in the effectiveness of massed artillery fire. Tactical EW systems may jam or prematurely 

detonate electronic VT fuses, but the mechanical fuses of conventional artillery rounds cannot 

be jammed by electronic signals. There are occasions that call for the use of surgical, precision 

fires, but massed artillery fires carry a mathematical probability of kill with which it is easier 

to predict tactical success. Artillery missions include annihilation, destruction, neutralization/

suppression and harassment of a target. Missions are assigned according to the nature of the 

target, overall mission and type of target. 

Annihilation [уничтожение] inflicts such losses 

or damage on a target that it completely loses 

its combat effectiveness. In the annihilation 

of unobserved targets, fire is conducted 

until a mathematically determined number 

of rounds are expended that assures a 70-

90% kill probability of individual targets or 

the mathematical expectation of 50-60% 

of targets destroyed in a group target. The 

implication is that the target is so damaged 

that it cannot be reconstituted and is 

incapable of even token resistance.

Russian Artillery Classifications

BM-30 “Smerch”

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
Branches of Arms

241

Destruction [разрушение] puts a target into an “unfit” condition. It is so damaged that it 

cannot be reconstituted without a significant expenditure of time and resources, and is 

capable of only sporadic, uncoordinated resistance.

Neutralization/suppression [подавлениие] inflicts such losses and creates such conditions 

that the target is temporarily deprived of its combat effectiveness, its maneuver is restricted 

or prohibited or its control is disrupted. In neutralizing an unobserved group target, the 

expenditure of a norm of rounds assures the mathematical expectation of 30% of the targets 

destroyed. The implication is that the target is severely damaged, but would be capable of 

eventual coordinated resistance once the suppressive fire is lifted.

Harassment [изнурение] involves a limited 

number of artillery tubes and a specified 

number of rounds fired within a prescribed 

time to exert moral-psychological pressure 

on enemy personnel in defensive positions, 

in assembly areas, at control points or in 

logistics areas. Firing platoons or batteries 

normally conduct harassing fire from 

temporary firing positions or positions 

previously occupied by a larger artillery unit.32

Much of the terrain in which Russia may fight is fairly flat; consequently, it is difficult 

to get forward observers into good positions to spot artillery targets. Hence, Russian 

artillery planning involves the expenditure of significant amounts of artillery ammunition. 

Annihilation artillery missions against unobserved targets involve the physical removal of 

hectares. However, the availability of a UAV company may significantly diminish artillery 

ammunition expenditure. UAVs can identify targets, adjust artillery fire and perform poststrike damage assessments. 

Artillery fire is further classified as fire against an individual target, fire concentration, standing 

barrage fire, defensive rolling barrage fire, successive fire concentration, offensive rolling 

barrage fire, and massed fire.33 UAV support will prove most effective in supporting the first 

two classifications, since the rest are predetermined and fired against a schedule.

One of the problems with Soviet artillery was that it was not always able to conduct splitbattery fires, since the battalion fire direction center could only conduct a limited number 

of fire missions simultaneously. Now, with improved communications and computer 

technology, split-battery fire is possible and common. Each battery now has its own fire 

direction center (FDC). 

32 G. E. Peredel’skiy and M. P. Pankov, The Artillery Battalion in Combat [Артллерийский Дивизион в Бою], 

Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1989, 20-21.

33 Ibid.

2S5 “Giatsint-S”

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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Positioning of Artillery

In the offensive, a howitzer battalion is commonly 

attached to or put in support of a maneuver 

battalion.34 Howitzer battalions are also 

incorporated into Brigade Artillery Groups (BrAG), 

which include gun and multiple rocket launcher 

battalions. Surface-to-surface missile battalions 

(Iskanders and Tochkas) are not incorporated into 

BrAGs, but remain in support of the Army Group. 

In the defense, artillery battalions are more 

often placed in support of forward maneuver 

battalions.35 Gun and howitzer batteries are 

positioned astride armored axes of approach in 

order to employ their direct fire capability. Mortar batteries and multiple rocket launcher 

batteries are located in areas inaccessible to tanks. Firing positions are located away from 

prominent features which would aid the enemy in registration. Intervals of 20-40 meters are 

maintained between guns, howitzers and mortars, while a 50-60-meter interval is maintained 

between multiple rocket launcher platforms.36

An artillery battalion has one primary and one or two alternate positions. A battalion may 

have a temporary firing position in the security zone, in defending a forward position, when 

conducting fire against distant targets or when acting as a roving battalion. Each battery has 

a primary and one or two alternate positions in a battalion area. In addition, a battery may 

have a temporary firing position when serving as a roving battery or duty battery.37 Batteries 

normally shift positions following a fire mission.38

Artillery reconnaissance is conducted from the battalion artillery command/observation 

post (COP) and the battery COPs. Normally the artillery battalion commander collocates 

34 Attached artillery [приданная артиллерия] is directly subordinated to the commander of the force to 

which it is attached. Attached artillery is normally exclusive and fires only those missions assigned by the 

force commander. In an emergency, fire missions for a senior commander may be fired. Supporting artillery 

[поддерживаущая арттллерия] is under the command of the senior artillery commander and fires assigned 

missions established by the combined arms commander. Thus, a supporting artillery battalion may be in 

support of several maneuver battalions, whereas an attached artillery battalion will fire exclusively for one 

maneuver battalion/brigade. Usually a supporting artillery battalion will be in support of one specific maneuver 

unit and will collocate its headquarters with that of the maneuver unit, but will take its firing mission from the 

senior artillery commander. V. Y. Lebedev, Field Artillery Officer’s Handbook [Справочник Офицера Наземной

Артеллерии], Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1984, 8. UAV will doubtless be attached or supporting to artillery units in the 

same manner.

35 Peredel’skiy, 10-11.

36 Ibid, 18-19. 37 Ibid, 194-195. A roving battery is used to engage targets of opportunity without disclosing the location of the 

main battalion firing positions. It moves after firing. It uses the battalion FDC and battalion and battery forward 

observers. Logically, it will use a UAV in a supporting role. A duty battery is the fire unit designated to return 

enemy artillery H & I fire, engage enemy reconnaissance efforts and ground probes, conduct harassing fire and 

serve as first responder when artillery is needed. 

38 Lester W. Grau, “Soviet Artillery Planning in the Tactical Defense,” Soviet Army Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas, September 1990, 11. 

ATS-59G Artillery Tractor

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
Branches of Arms

243

himself and his COP with the maneuver battalion command post. Battery commanders are 

often collocated with maneuver company commanders. The artillery battalion may also 

establish forward and lateral observation posts to provide complete observation. With 

sufficient time, artillery observation posts and supporting vehicles are dug in with overhead 

cover. Radio intercept and radar intercept provide target intelligence to the artillery. Soundranging platoons and ground reconnaissance patrols provide target locations as well.39 The 

battalion FDC is located near one of the artillery batteries. The battalion chief of staff controls 

the battalion’s fires, since the battalion commander is forward at the COP. Ideally the UAV 

operator control station for the medium-range Orlan-10 would be located with the battalion 

FDC, if its electronic signature does not attract enemy fire. The UAV operator control station 

for the short-range Granata-1 will probably be located with the battery COP.

Revitalization and Downsizing the Reconnaissance-Fire Group

In the mid-1980s, the Soviets developed and fielded a 

first-generation reconnaissance-fire complex - a tactical 

range system linking a real-time reconnaissance/target 

designation/vectoring system with an intelligence 

fusion center and an FDC. In turn, this was linked to 

dedicated, precision weaponry which could destroy 

the target in near-real time. The targets were tactical 

nuclear delivery systems, self-propelled artillery and 

mortar batteries, FASCAM (family of scatterable mines) 

delivery systems, command posts, reconnaissance 

systems, aircraft parked on airfields and carrier decks 

and other high-value targets.40 The reconnaissance-fire 

group (разведивательно-огневая группа) consisted of 

several artillery battalions, a dedicated artillery reconnaissance platoon, a group headquarters 

and often a helicopter. The assets normally came from division assets. With the brigade as 

the primary maneuver unit, this mission would now become a brigade mission. The UAV 

capability should greatly enhance the reconnaissance element for the BrAG.

Artillery Fire Planning

On a map or plotting screen, Russian maneuver forces are depicted in red, enemy forces in 

blue and Russian artillery in black. Russian artillery planning initially identifies targets and 

plots them as artillery concentrations on the map or screen. The artillery concentration 

identifies the firing batteries and number and type of rounds required for each concentration. 

Then the concentrations are connected by lines. In the attack, these lines are fired 

consecutively to insure that no identified targets are missed or that they are fired at out of 

turn, giving the survivors the opportunity to recover and fight advancing maneuver forces. 

Artillery fire is further classified as fire against an individual target, fire concentration, standing 

barrage fire, defensive rolling barrage fire, successive fire concentration, offensive rolling 

barrage fire, and massed fire.41

39 A. I. Kirillov, V. P. Kuznetsov, V.I. Agafonov, Preparation of the Reserve Officer [Подготовка офицера запаса], 

Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1989, 250.

40 Ibid, 15. 41 Peredelskiy, 10-11. Remainder of Artillery Fire Planning section is extracted from Peredelskiy, 20-32.

2S4 “Tulpan” (240mm mortar)

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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Fire against an individual target

(Above) Fire against an individual target is most often conducted against single targets that are 

discovered during the course of an attack and are addressed promptly. In the accompanying 

figure, the Russians are advancing against a withdrawing enemy. An enemy ATGM is covering the 

withdrawal and has disrupted the advance of the northern Russian attack. The enemy location 

is now known and identified as target 28. One or more platoon fires may be directed to deal with 

a newly discovered target. In this case, an individual Russian howitzer is directed to eliminate the 

target using direct fire (firing over open sights). 

Fire concentration 

(Above) Fire concentration is used against an attacking or defending enemy. It is depicted 

with a black rectangle (square for MLRS) and delineates the physical area of impact. The fire 

concentration is conducted by several batteries or battalions simultaneously against one target 

box. Fires are planned to provide an even distribution of rounds within the target box. The 

accompanying figure depicts a howitzer battalion supporting an attacking motorized rifle 

company as it advances against a prepared enemy defense. An enemy machine gun, antitank 

weapon and ATGM have been identified within fire concentration 101. As usual, the artillery 

battalion command post is collocated with the maneuver battalion command post.
Branches of Arms

245

Standing barrage fire 

(Above) Standing barrage fire is a single wall of fire planned on an enemy axis of advance or 

counterattack axis. It is designed to inflict such casualties on the enemy so as to stop his advance, 

destroy his combat formation and create the conditions to facilitate the destruction of his antitank 

systems. Standing barrage fire is planned on avenues of approach and placed where it can be 

observed from command and observation posts. Sometimes, by necessity during the course of 

combat, they must be planned outside of direct observation. Standing barrage fires are fired by 

howitzer and cannon artillery, since the desired effect is a curtain of fire, not an area of destruction. 

The accompanying figure shows a standing barrage fire Acacia (standing barrages are named 

after flowers or trees) that is conducted by an artillery battery against an enemy axis of advance. 

A standing barrage fire is normally planned no closer than 300-400 meters in front of forward 

defending Russian soldiers, and its width is usually no wider than 50 meters per participating 

artillery piece. Thus, an 18-gun artillery battalion could have a standing barrage of up to 900 

meters. 

Protecting one’s own troops from friendly artillery is an important planning factor. Charges are 

selected which provide minimum dispersion, mixed ammunition lots are not fired in the proximity 

of friendly troops and fragmentation rounds are fired in lieu of HE when close to friendly troops. 

The Russians do not plan standing barrages along tree lines, hill crests, trench lines or the outskirts 

of populated areas, since an enemy approach to these features may not be detected and 60 -70 

seconds will pass from detection to first round impact, allowing the enemy to advance 120-150 

meters past these features. Consequently, standing barrage lines are planned 150-200 meters 

from these features. A standing barrage can consist of more than one line. 
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 (Above) A deep standing barrage can by fired by a single howitzer battalion on a narrow approach 

(300 meters with an 18-gun battalion) or by several battalions on a regular approach. All the lines of 

the deep standing barrage are fired simultaneously and continuously throughout the duration of the 

fire mission. Line three is planned 300-400 meters from forward defending Russian soldiers. The deep 

standing barrage is named after a tree. The accompanying figure shows a defending artillery battalion 

firing a narrow deep standing barrage against an enemy on an armor axis of advance. Each battery is 

firing a separate line within the standing barrage. 

A deep standing barrage 

(Above) A double moving barrage may be planned, particularly on enemy armor avenues of approach. 

Figure 6 shows two howitzer battalions positioned to fire the Tiger moving barrage. As the enemy 

approaches Tiger, one artillery battalion will fire Tiger 1 and the other will fire Tiger 2 simultaneously. 

This will continue until the enemy column is exiting Tiger 1 or the enemy column is approaching Tiger 

3. The lead battalion commander lifts and shifts the fires from Tiger 1 to Tiger 3. The second battalion 

commander will then follow his lead and shift to Tiger 4. Tiger 4 may become a standing barrage, 

reinforced with the fires of the lead defending motorized rifle or tank battalion. Both battalions are laid 

out for direct fire should the enemy penetrate the forward defenses. 

A double moving barrage
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247

(Above) A moving barrage is located on an enemy axis of advance and named after a predatory 

animal. The lines are fired sequentially (“Lion 1”, “Lion 2”, “Lion 3”). The first line is 2-4 kilometers 

from the forward edge of one’s own troops. At this point, the attacking enemy is expected to be 

moving in platoon column. The second line is 700-1000 meters from the forward edge of one’s 

own troops at the point where the attacking enemy is expected to move from platoon column to 

attack formation. The last line is 400-600 meters from the forward defense and is that point where 

the enemy infantry will probably dismount for the assault. Danger close is 300 meters from one’s 

own troops dug into prepared positions and 400 meters from one’s own troops in a hasty defense. 

MLRS is not planned closer than 1000 meters from one’s own troops. The moving barrage may 

have a standing barrage fire line positioned at the end of the moving barrage, or the last line of the 

moving barrage may become that standing barrage. The accompanying graphic shows moving 

barrage Lion planned on an enemy avenue of approach. The artillery battalion is positioned 

on line so that it can shift to direct fire in case of an enemy breakthrough. There is no standing 

barrage line at the end of the moving barrage, so Lion 3 will become the standing barrage line.

Moving barrage 
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(Above) Successive concentrations of fire are planned on the axis and flanks of a Russian attack. 

Artillery planners plot artillery concentrations on defending enemy positions and systems and 

link them in firing lines. Each concentration is numbered and each firing line is named after a 

different predatory animal. The accompanying graphic shows an artillery battalion attached 

to a motorized rifle battalion attack. The artillery battalion will first destroy defensive positions 

in concentration 115 on Line Lion. It will then attack an ATGM position (concentration 225) and 

machine gun position (concentration 229) on Line Tiger. Subsequently it will attack another ATGM 

position (concentration 331) and a command post (concentration 335) on Line Wolf, and then 

attack company reserve positions (concentration 415) on Line Lynx. Targets that are discovered 

during the attack will be addressed during the course of the attack.

Successive concentrations of fire
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249

Offensive rolling barrage

(Above) The offensive rolling barrage is used to support a Russian attack when the enemy is in a strong 

point defense or a fortified region that is well dug in, with ample trenches, communication trenches, 

bunkers and fortified fighting positions. The density of the defense hinders precisely determining the 

location of strong points. The offensive rolling barrage is a solid curtain of fire shifted ahead of attacking 

maneuver subunits to neutralize enemy personnel and weapons. One or two lines of fire can be fired 

simultaneously. The first line is planned along the first trench of the enemy defense. Intermediate lines are 

planned to neutralize the enemy located between the primary lines and to prevent his maneuver along 

communication trenches. The distance between intermediate lines (named after predatory animals) is 100-

300 meters apart, depending on the enemy strength, positions, geography and expected rate of advance. 

The barrage is walked forward by incremental extensions of range. Each battery has a numbered section 

of the moving barrage that it is responsible for firing. Each artillery piece has a frontage of 15-25 meters, 

depending on its caliber. The barrage moves at least 500 meters in front of friendly forces and is designed 

to destroy the enemy in his positions. MLRS fire is conducted beyond the first wall so that it is no closer than 

1000 meters to its own troops. The maneuver commander shifts the primary firing line when his troops 

reach the troop safety line. The artillery commander shifts the intermediate line at the end of the prescribed 

time for fire, which is normally 2-3 minutes. Due to the restricted frontages and anticipated ammunition 

expenditure, the offensive rolling barrage is normally an artillery brigade mission. This figure shows an 

artillery battalion supporting a motorized rifle battalion with a single rolling barrage where the enemy 

has a dense trench network. Artillery fire planners usually assign sector lines, which are solid black arrows 

to mark the area of fire and planning responsibility for the artillery unit. Black interrupted arrows depict 

additional areas of fire and planning areas that may be assigned under certain contingencies. 
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Massed fire

(Above) The massed fire graphic is used to plan a simultaneous massed fire strike against an area 

target executed in a short period of time. Usually battery or battalion concentrations are plotted 

within the area of massed fire and the concentrations are numbered to correspond to the battalion 

(battery) assigned to the mission. Cannon/howitzer targets are indicated by rectangles and MRLS 

targets by squares. The massed fire graphic is designated by a planetary name. Number and 

type of rounds to be expended and the duration of the strike are assigned to each firing unit. This 

graphic is not widely used today, but can still be expected against high-value targets whose exact 

locations are unknown. This graphic shows a simultaneous fire strike by five cannon/howitzer 

battalions and an MRLS battalion. This massed fire strike is designated “Jupiter”.
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Artillery Fire Control

The Russian and Western systems for the command and control of artillery differ substantially. 

In the Russian system, the artillery commanders do not sit with their artillery pieces. Instead, 

artillery battalion and battery commanders are typically collocated with the supported 

maneuver commander in order to relay calls for fire to the artillery; or they are on the 

battlefield, calling for fire on targets of opportunity. Artillery commanders have Command 

Observation Post (COP) vehicles with appropriate communications, navigation, and sighting 

gear to fulfill this function.42 The fire control for artillery units is provided by the chief of 

staff for battalions, and senior battery officer (the senior platoon leader) for batteries. These 

officers, not the commanders, are the ones actually collocated with the artillery, providing 

them with fire solutions. They man Fire Direction Center (FDC) vehicles to fulfill this function.43 

The FDC vehicles are similarly equipped as the COP vehicles, but are designed to function as 

FDCs, and so they usually have less or no sighting equipment, more fire control equipment, 

and may be on a chassis more suitable to functioning as a FDC, than a COP that is conducting 

artillery reconnaissance on the battlefield. The Russian Armed Forces use a variety of artillery 

fire control systems, but they all generally follow this described scheme, the following three 

systems, and their derivatives, are most common in the Russian Ground Forces.

1V12 “Kharkov” Artillery Fire Control System

The 1V12 Kharkov artillery fire control system 

is based upon the MT-LBu chassis, and is 

primarily designed to service self-propelled 

howitzer units. A battalion level set consists 

of eight vehicles: three 1V13 battery FDC 

vehicles, three 1V14 battery COP vehicles, one 

1V15 battalion COP vehicle, and one 1V16 

battalion FDC vehicle. The 1V12M Faltset 

artillery fire control system is a modernized 

version of the 1V12 Kharkov, and its 

constituent vehicles follow the same naming 

convention as the 1V12 Kharkov system, 

except with an “M” suffix (IV13M, IV14M, IV15M, IV16M).

The IV13 functions as the FDC for the battery, and is manned by the senior officer of the 

battery (typically the first platoon leader). It has direct radio communications with the battery 

COP (IV14), the battalion COP (IV15), and the battalion FDC (IV16). 

The IV14 functions as the COP for the battery. The IV14 is typically collocated with the COP of 

42 Antitank artillery units typically do not align to this command and control scheme. This difference is likely due 

to the different role that antitank units fill in the Russian Armed Forces, and the fact that the antitank artillery 

does not need as sophisticated system for command and control since targets are generally within line of site. In 

terms of reconnaissance assets, most antitank artillery units have portable ground surveillance radars instead of 

artillery reconnaissance vehicles. These radars are appropriate for the antitank units’ primary mission, securing 

enemy high-speed avenues of approach. 

43 One of the differences between NATO-standard and Russian designed fire computation is that the NATOstandard circle has 6400 mils, while the Russian-standard has 6000 mils. The computing results of each will differ 

slightly due to this basic difference in standards.

IV13M Fire Direction Center Vehicle

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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the supported maneuver unit commander so targets can be relayed from the supported unit 

to the artillery, or is on the battlefield calling for fire. It has direct radio communications with 

the battery FDC (IV13), the battalion COP (IV15), and the battalion FDC (IV16).

The IV15 functions as the COP for the battalion. The IV15 is typically collocated with the COP 

of the supported maneuver unit commander so targets can be relayed from the supported 

unit to the artillery, or is on the battlefield calling for fire. It has direct radio communications 

with the battery FDCs (IV13), the battery COPs (IV15), and the battalion FDC (IV16).

The IV16 functions as the FDC for the battalion, and is manned by the battalion’s chief of staff. 

It has direct radio communications with the battery FDCs (IV13), battery COPs (IV14), and the 

battalion COP (IV15).

1V17 “Mashina-B” Artillery Fire Control System

The 1V17 artillery fire control system was developed to service towed and MLRS artillery 

units. Unlike the 1V12 system that has all vehicles built upon one chassis (MT-LBu), the IV17 

uses several different chassis types. The BTR-60 chassis is used for the COP vehicles, the 

GAZ-66 chassis for the battery FDC vehicles, and a ZiL-131 chassis for the battalion FDC. In 

most units, these chassis have likely been upgraded to newer BTR-80, KamAZ, or Zil chassis as 

appropriate. A battalion level set consists of eight vehicles: three 1V110 battery FDC vehicles, 

one 1V111 battalion FDC vehicle, three 1V18 battery COP vehicles, and one 1V19 battalion 

COP vehicle.

The IV110 functions as the FDC for the battery, and is manned by the senior officer of the 

battery (typically the first platoon leader), on a BTR-60/BTR-80 chassis. It has direct radio 

communications with the battery COP (IV18), the battalion COP (IV19), and the battalion FDC 

(IV111). 

The IV111 functions as the FDC for the battalion, and is manned by the battalion’s chief of 

staff, on a Zil-131 chassis. It has direct radio communications with the battery FDCs (IV110), 

battery COPs (IV18), and the battalion COP (IV19).

The IV18 functions as the COP for the battery. The IV18 is typically collocated with the COP of 

the supported maneuver unit commander so targets can be relayed from the supported unit 

to the artillery, or is on the battlefield calling for fire. It is built upon a GAZ-66 chassis, and has 

direct radio communications with the battery FDC (IV110), the battalion COP (IV19), and the 

battalion FDC (IV111).

The IV19 functions as the COP for the battalion, The IV16 is typically collocated with the COP 

of the supported maneuver unit commander so targets can be relayed from the supported 

unit to the artillery. It is built upon a GAZ-66 chassis, and has direct radio communications 

with the battery FDCs (IV110), the battery COPs (IV18), and the battalion FDC (IV111).
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1V126 “Kapustnik-B” Artillery Fire Control System

The 1V126 artillery fire control system 

was developed to service a variety 

of artillery systems for the domestic 

and export markets. The 1V152 is the 

designation for the battalion and battery 

COP vehicles, and is often mounted 

on a BTR-80 chassis. The 1V153 is the 

designation for the battalion and battery 

FDC vehicles, and is often mounted on 

a Ural-4320 chassis. The battalion COP 

and FDC vehicles can support up to four 

batteries, while the battery COP and 

FDC can support up to eight artillery pieces. The 1V126M Kapustnik-BM (1V152M, 1V153M) 

is a modernized version of the 1V126 Kapustnik-B. The 1V127 Kapustnik-C modification is 

designed for self-propelled artillery systems.

The IV153 functions as the FDC for the battery, and is manned by the senior officer of the 

battery (typically the first platoon leader). It has direct radio communications with the battery 

COP (IV152), the battalion COP (IV152), and the battalion FDC (IV153). 

The IV153 functions as the FDC for the battalion, and is manned by the battalion’s chief of 

staff. It has direct radio communications with the battery FDCs (IV153), battery COPs (IV152), 

and the battalion COP (IV152).

The IV152 functions as the COP for the battery. The IV152 is typically collocated with the COP 

of the supported maneuver unit commander so targets can be relayed from the supported 

unit to the artillery, or is on the battlefield calling for fire. It has direct radio communications 

Model of the IV126 Artillery Fire Control System

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

IV110 Fire Direction Center Vehicle
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with the battery FDC (IV153), the battalion COP (IV152), and the battalion FDC (IV153).

The IV152 functions as the COP for the battalion. The IV152 is typically collocated with 

the COP of the supported maneuver unit commander so targets can be relayed from the 

supported unit to the artillery. It has direct radio communications with the battery FDCs 

(IV153), the battery COPs (IV152), and the battalion FDC (IV153).

1V118 Reostat/1V119 Spektr Artillery Fire Control System

The 1V118 Reostat/1V119 Spektr artillery 

fire control system was developed to 

service self-propelled, towed, and MLRS 

artillery and mortar units in Airborne 

(VDV) and Naval Infantry units. This 

system is built upon BMD-1 chassis. The 

1V118 Reostat is the COP vehicle, while 

the 1V119 Spektr is the FDC vehicle. 

The 1V118-1 Reostat/1V119-1 Spektr 

is a modernized version of the 1V118 

Reostat/1V119 Spektr artillery fire control 

system. The Russian Armed Forces are 

currently testing the “Zavet-D” system as a possible replacement.

The IV119 functions as the FDC for the battery, and is manned by the senior officer of the 

battery (typically the first platoon leader). It has direct radio communications with the battery 

COP (IV118), the battalion COP (IV118), and the battalion FDC (IV119). 

The IV119 functions as the FDC for the battalion, and is manned by the battalion’s chief of 

staff. It has direct radio communications with the battery FDCs (IV119), battery COPs (IV118), 

and the battalion COP (IV118).

The IV118 functions as the COP for the battery. The IV118 is typically collocated with the COP 

of the supported maneuver unit commander so targets can be relayed from the supported 

unit to the artillery, or is on the battlefield calling for fire. It has direct radio communications 

with the battery FDC (IV119), the battalion COP (IV118), and the battalion FDC (IV119).

The IV118 functions as the COP for the battalion. The IV118 is typically collocated with 

the COP of the supported maneuver unit commander so targets can be relayed from the 

supported unit to the artillery. It has direct radio communications with the battery FDCs 

(IV119), the battery COPs (IV118), and the battalion FDC (IV119).

Brigade-Level Artillery Fire Control & Reconnaissance Systems

Maneuver brigades usually have a deputy commander for artillery. The brigade’s fire control 

battery [батарея управления и артиллерийской разведки] is commanded by, or reports 

to this officer. As would be expected, the fire control battery contains assets for detecting, 

determining coordinates, and the transmission of targeting data and orders. The typical 

configuration for brigade-level fire control batteries include platoons for: artillery spotting 

(PRP-4A Argus), radars (1RL232-2M SNAR-10M1 and 1L219M Zoopark-1), listening posts, 

geodesy, and communications. UAVs now regularly supplement artillery fire control, for a 

detailed discussion of this issue, see the “UAV Development” section in Chapter 9.

IV119 Fire Direction Center Vehicle

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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PRP-4A “Argus” Artillery Reconnaissance Vehicle

The PRP-4A Argus artillery reconnaissance vehicle is used to conduct artillery reconnaissance 

of point and mass, fixed and moving, and open and camouflaged targets, and process, store 

and transmit this data to artillery units. It is equipped with optical, electro-optical, and radar 

siting devices, a GLONASS enabled navigation system, and radios. The PRP-4A has two 

workstations and an equipment set for a remote observation post.44

44 Yuriy Avdeyev, “The New Capabilities of Artillery Reconnaissance,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 7 November 

2016,<http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/news-menu/vesti/tablo-dnya/item/31079-argus-neusypnyj-strazh>, 

accessed 20 December 2016.

Fire Control Battery

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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1RL232-2M “SNAR-10M1” Radar Vehicle 

The SNAR-10M1 is a battlefield surveillance radar vehicle used to locate moving ground and 

sea-surface targets. The SNAR-10M1 is designed to locate convoys, ground targets, seasurface targets, and low-flying aircraft and UAVs. The system is also used to locate shell bursts 

in order to adjust friendly artillery fire. The SNAR-10M1 is equipped with modern radios and 

communications systems to facilitate the automated data transmission. It also has a GLONASS 

enabled navigation system and digital terrain map.45

1L120 “Kredo-M1” Portable Radar 

The Kredo-M1 Portable Radar is designed for the detection of moving surface targets. It 

is also used to adjust friendly artillery fire, especially for antitank units. The Kredo-M1 is a 

man-portable system capable independent operation, but it can be networked with other 

systems.46

45 “Russian SNAR-10M1 battlefield surveillance radar,” as found at: Army Recognition, <http://www.

armyrecognition.com/weapons_defence_industry_military_technology_uk/new_snar-10m1_1rl232-

2m_battlefield_surveillance_radar_unveiled_at_oboronexpo_2014_in_russia_1408145.html>, accessed 20 

December 2016.

46 “Kredo-M1,” as found at Almaz-Antey [The manufacturer’s website],

<http://www.almaz-antey.ru/en/catalogue/millitary_catalogue/1219/1242/1331>, accessed 20 December 2016.

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin 

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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1L219M “Zoopark-1M” Counter-Battery Radar Vehicle

The Zoopark-1 counter-battery radar vehicle is designed to determine the coordinates of 

enemy artillery positions (field artillery, MLRS, mortars,) and tactical missile launch positions 

in order to provide targeting information for counterbattery missions, and to adjust friendly 

artillery fire. The Zoopark-1 can reportedly determine the coordinates of 60 batteries in 

a minute, and the position of a concealed mortar in an urban environment. The Russians 

consider the Zoopark-1 to be an equivalent of the AN/TPQ-36.47

1L271 “Aistenok” Portable Counter-Battery Radar

The Aistenok is primarily a counter-battery radar designed to determine the coordinates of 

81–120mm mortar firing positions and monitoring their flight trajectories. It is also capable of 

monitoring 122–155mm artillery shell bursts, and determining the coordinates of “tank” type 

moving surface targets.48

47 Sergey Ptichkin, “Our Army Has the Best Artillery Reconnaissance Complexes in the World, but Cannot 

Effectively Utilize Them,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 2 October 2008, <https://rg.ru/2008/10/02/zoopark.html>, 

accessed 20 December 2016.

48 “Syrian Army Receives Advanced Mobile Radar System from Russia,” as found at SouthFront, <https://southfront.

org/syrian-army-receives-advanced-mobile-radar-system-from-russia-photos/>, accessed 20 December 2016.

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin 

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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(Right) The graphic on the facing page shows a motorized rifle battalion in the defense, with the 

battalion scheme of fire and artillery plan incorporated on the same map. The planners have 

determined the coordinates and distance to various visual benchmarks within the security zone. 

These are used to determine company sectors of fire, as well as reference points for designated 

weapons systems that can engage them or nearby targets. The green positions are deception 

positions designed to disguise the true front-line trace and in-depth positioning. The deception 

front-line trace is held by a minefield, temporary positions for the AGS-17 grenade-launcher 

platoon, the bronegruppa, the antitank reserve and the reserve. The mortar battery is temporarily 

forward to cover the forward position in the forward defensive zone.49 The battalion is defending, 

with two motorized rifle companies forward and one back. There is an attached tank company 

which has attached a platoon to each of the forward motorized rifle platoons and has a platoon in 

the security zone. This last platoon will join the bronegruppa upon withdrawal. Artillery planning 

has determined several possible enemy axes of advance throughout the security zone. The 

planners expect the enemy to move from company to platoon column at the limits of the security 

zone and have plotted some artillery concentration boxes on the expected deployment line. The 

battalion has the second echelon company forward holding the forward position in the security 

zone. The forward position is protected by a minefield and obstacles. The artillery planners have 

plotted moving barrages Lion and Snow Leopard on the flanks of the forward position to assist in 

its withdrawal. 

The artillery planners have plotted artillery concentrations on the lines where they expect the 

enemy platoons to move from platoon column to platoon line. Concentrations for tank fire 

platoons are also plotted in red. The final dashed blue lines are where enemy troops are expected 

to dismount and form into assault lines. Moving barrages Fox and Wolf are plotted before and 

after this line. Sectors of concentrated company fire (divided into platoon sections) are plotted 

before the expected dismount lines. The artillery planners have plotted standing barrage lines 

Acacia, Birch, Oak and Pine between the expected assault lines and the forward deception 

positions. Behind the deception positions is the third minefield and forward edge of the defense. 

Should the enemy penetrate the forward defense, there is an antitank ditch, antitank reserve, 

bronegruppa, and the reserve firing lines, as well as a firing line from the brigade’s tank battalion. 

At this point, the artillery will be firing missions within the fallen defensive area and may be 

deployed in a direct fire role. The artillery may also deploy to alternate or reserve firing positions.

49 This graphic shows a forward position in a rather shallow forward defensive area. The Russians prefer having 

a security zone of at least 15 kilometers depth. With a deep security zone, the mortar battery would deploy into 

it and have at least three firing positions. Artillery firing platoons or roving guns would also deploy into the 

security zone.
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Artillery Fire Plan for the Defense
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Artillery Modernization

In the U.S. military, the infantry is often 

referred to as the “Queen of Battle,” but in the 

artillery-centric Russian Army, the artillery 

is often referred to as the “God of War.” In 

keeping with this theme, Russia has put a 

great emphasis on the modernization of 

artillery pieces to project combat power 

more effectively. In terms of tube artillery 

developments, Russia is pursuing two lines 

of effort. The first is the creation of a new 

howitzer, the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV 152mm 

self-propelled howitzer. The Koalitsiya-SV is 

a new howitzer design, with an unmanned 

turret, capable of firing 16 shells per 

minute, allowing each Koalitsiya-SV to achieve the same effects as an artillery battery (with 

6 howitzers) using older guns. Although it is currently mounted on a T-90 based chassis, 

there are plans for it to also be fielded on the Armata chassis. As with other technological 

innovations, it will be modified and used by other branches of service, namely the Navy’s 

Coastal Defense Troops. The Coastal Defense Troops are considering a wheeled variant 

that the Ground Forces is testing for use by “mountain” designated units. This capability, to 

be mounted on different chassis, suggests the Koalitsiya-SV is following the same design 

pattern as other Russian military combat vehicles, i.e., the turret may be attached to a variety 

of tracked and wheeled chassis, likely an innovation furthered for the benefit of the Russian 

Defense Ministry, but also as a selling point on the lucrative international arms export market.

Another Russian artillery combat vehicle innovation pattern is fielding a small number of 

new systems, while conducting a major refurbishment of existing systems. Unlike the U.S. 

system, Russia does not find a need to retire functioning equipment, but rather prefers to 

refurbish this equipment at a fraction of the price of purchasing new systems. Although 

these refurbished systems have less impressive capabilities as newly purchased systems, 

these refurbished assets are a great bargain and deliver more “bang-for-the-buck.” This 

institutional practice allows Russia to upgrade existing capabilities for a majority of the 

force, while buying a few expensive new technologies. Since Russia pursues a more 

“evolutionary” than “revolutionary” approach to arms procurement and utilizes only a few 

equipment manufacturers, there is substantial overlap in parts and components that are 

used in new and refurbished vehicles. This use of a combination of refurbished and brand 

new equipment does not cause the logistical headaches which would be expected from 

the increased production load list required for brand new systems using different parts and 

components. Thus, while Russia is preparing to field the Koalitsiya-SV, it is also modernizing 

its predecessor, the 2S19 (Msta-S) 152mm self-propelled howitzer, which reportedly boasts 

a firing rate of 10 rounds per minute and is designated the Msta-SM after refurbishment. 

Russian commentators have mentioned the possibility of these systems being capable of 

functioning in a “simultaneous fire assault” mode, a practice where both types of howitzers 

fire at different trajectories on the same target, causing the rounds to land on the target at 

2S35 “Koalitsiya-SV”

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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the same time. Russia’s efforts to modernize tube artillery are in sync with efforts to develop 

a “reconnaissance-fire delivery system,” a system for the rapid integration of targeting, fire 

control, and fires. As with other Russian developments, current innovations focus upon 

modularity and interoperability. The 9A53 Uragan-1M, a modernized version of the Uragan, 

has recently passed state trials. Instead of a rack of 16 rockets that the Uragan sports, the 

Uragan-1M has 2 pods of 6 rockets each. This pod system is intended to increase firing 

rates by speeding the replenishment process. The Uragan-1M will be reloaded by removing 

an empty pod and replacing it with a full one, which is presumably quicker than loading 

one rocket at a time. In addition, a pod system will allow the “Uragan-1M” to fire rockets of 

varying calibers. This pod system is being incorporated into Russia’s next generation of MLRS 

launchers, the “Tornado” family. One member of this family, the 9A52-4 Tornado, built upon a 

Kamaz-63501 chassis, will reportedly be able to launch pods of any of the three caliber types, 

albeit of fewer number for the larger caliber rockets.

 

Russian capability improvements have not 

stopped at material improvements, but also 

include doctrinal improvements. The Russian 

Army has been experimenting with the use 

of MLRS systems in direct fire roles and has 

recently changed doctrine (field regulations) for 

engaging observable targets from unprepared 

positions.50 Russia is not only modernizing 

tube and MLRS platforms, but also pursuing 

modernization plans for automated command 

and control and fire control systems, with a 

keen interest in the integration of UAVs.

50 Charles K. Bartles, “Russia Increasing Already Robust MLRS Capabilities,” OE Watch Online, January 2016.

Sergei Ptichkin, “A Younger Katyusha,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 20 November 2014, <http://www.

rg.ru/2014/11/20/katyusha.html>, accessed 15 December 2014.

Ilya Shchegolev, “Bi-caliber MLRS “Uragan-1M” Passed State Tests,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 24 August 2015, 

<http://www.rg.ru/2015/08/24/uragan-site-anons.html>, accessed 15 December 2015.

“Troops in Western Russia to be reinforced with 50 MLRS systems by year end,” I Interfax-AVN, 2 December 2015.

BM-27 “Uragan” 9A53 “Uragan-1M”

Images Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

9A52-4 “Tornado”

Images Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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The end state of these endeavors is to acquire targets more rapidly and appropriately task 

decisive fires. 

Another interesting aspect of Russian artillery developments is the topic of relative cost. 

Consider the Russian 152mm GPS/GLONASS-enabled artillery shell in relation to the U.S./

NATO 155mm M982 Excalibur artillery shell. Reportedly, the Russian shell costs about $1000, 

while the U.S./NATO shell costs about $80,000 to manufacture. Issues of cost and affordability 

have always been top concerns in the Soviet, and later Russian, arms production cycles. In the 

Russian system, the cost of a given technology is one of the first criteria checked for feasibility, 

not the last. For Russia, it would be far better to use a less capable technology that can be 

used as desired than a more capable technology seldom used due to cost issues.51

51 Charles K. Bartles, “Innovation, Cost, and Compromise Regarding the ‘God of War,’” OE Watch Online, June 2016.

“Advanced Self-Propelled Russian Rifle Gets Satellite-Navigated Shells,” Sputnik Online, 24 April 2016, <http://

sputniknews.com/russia/20160424/1038522310/russiagunmissilesatellite.html>, accessed 20 May 2016.

“Fast and Accurate: Best-Kept Secrets of Russia’s ‘Sniper’ Howitzer Revealed,” Sputnik Online, 20 December 2015, 

<http://sputniknews.com/russia/20151220/1032044882/russiahowitzerdetailsvideo.html>, accessed 20 May 

2016.

MLRS Characteristics
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The 9K720 Iskander System

Although Russian maneuver brigades do not have organic Short-Range Ballistic Missile 

(SRBM) systems, they can be expected to support maneuver brigade commanders in 

high intensity conflict situations. The Missile and Artillery Troops operate these systems 

in dedicated missile brigades at the Army Group level. The Iskander missile system is a 

significant improvement over its predecessors (Tochka and Oka) and fills an important niche 

in Russian force projection. Tactical and theater ballistic missiles are far more important for 

Russia than for the U.S./NATO. In general, Russia believes that the U.S./NATO will maintain air 

superiority, and so has heavily invested missile technologies to fill a niche that air power fills 

for the U.S./NATO. For similar reasons Russia has also heavily invested in EW and air defense 

capabilities.

In terms of capabilities, the Iskander missile system has little in common with its predecessors. 

The system is capable of not only transporting and launching two missiles, but also firing 

two different types of missiles. The Iskander, which Russia classifies as a tactical-operational 

missile system, can fire two SRBMs (SS-26 Stone) or two ground-launched cruise missiles 

(referred to as the R-500 or Iskander-K in Russian), and possibly could fire a combination of 

these missiles. These missiles can carry a variety of payloads weighing 480-700 kilograms, 

including cluster warheads (antipersonnel/antimateriel), fragmentation submunitions, 

area denial submunitions, HE, thermobaric, high explosive earth penetrators for bunker 

busting, and electromagnetic pulse, decoy, and nuclear warheads. The Iskander’s missiles are 

reportedly compliant with the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, but there 

are allegations that these missiles could be easily modified to violate the 500-kilometer lower 

limit of the treaty.52 

Perhaps the biggest difference between the Iskander and its predecessors, is its accuracy. 

While the Circular Error Probability (CEP) of the Iskander’s predecessors was often estimated in 

hundreds of meters, the Iskander reportedly has a CEP of 10-30 meters. The warheads have an 

inertial unit with a terminal guidance electro-optical seeker and topographic data for finding 

targets. Some versions reportedly have guidance systems capable of GPS/GLONASS satellite 

navigation and active radar and/or infrared imaging seekers. A CEP of 10-30 meters may not 

seem impressive in the days of GPS, but it is important to note that Russians believe that GPS/

GLONASS signals will not be available (jamming, spoofing, or other denials of service) in a 

conflict with a peer such as the U.S. or China. Although the warheads equipped with GPS/

GLONASS systems are likely to have a better CEP than their non-GPS/GLONASS-equipped 

brethren, Russia appears to be betting that these types of systems will only be feasible in an 

engagement with a less capable opponent.

Russia touts the capability of the Iskander’s missiles to evade missile defense systems by 

being able to vary their flight paths and deploy various countermeasures. Russia has stated 

on several occasions that one purpose of the Iskander missile system is to destroy U.S.

“Packing a Punch: A Self-Propelled Gun That’s Worth a Whole Battery,” Sputnik Online, 22 November 2015, 

<http://sputniknews.com/military/20151122/1030528826/russiakoalitsiyaartillery.html>, accessed 20 May 2016. 52 One of the Iskander’s predecessors, the Oka, was decommissioned due to the provision of the INF Treaty that 

the missile range is limited to 500-5500 kilometers.
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strategic missile defense assets at their launch sites which are located in Eastern 

Europe. The first combat use of the Iskander was during the 2008 Russo-Georgian 

War. Iskander SRBMs armed with cluster and high-explosive warheads reportedly 

destroyed most of a tank battalion and an ammunition depot. The Iskander is 

forward deployed in the Kaliningrad enclave in Eastern Europe and has also been 

deployed to Syria.

Iskander brigades consist of three Iskander battalions, with each battalion having two 

Iskander batteries. Each Iskander battery has two transporter erector launcher (TEL) 

vehicles, two reload vehicles, a command and control vehicle, a maintenance vehicle, and a 

support vehicle. In total, an Iskander brigade has 51 vehicles, consisting of 12 launchers, 12 

transporter-loaders, 11 command and control vehicles, 14 support vehicles, 1 servicing and 

maintenance vehicle, and 1 information preparation vehicle.53

Iskander is a tactical-operational artillery asset that can support the maneuver brigade 

through long-range fires and interdiction, but it also has a nuclear capability, which raises 

issues of area denial and possible conflict escalation whenever it is employed. 

53 Mikhail Barabanov, “Iskander the Great,” Moscow Defense Brief, Issue #4, 2008.

Charles K. Bartles, “Russia Touts Roles, Capabilities, and Possible Targets for the Iskander,” OE Watch Online, 

January 2015.

“America in Shock: All Europe in Iskander-M’s Sights,” Zvezda Online, 13 November 2014, <http://tvzvezda.ru/

news/forces/content/201411121543-iiyl.htm>, accessed 1 May 2016.

9K720 “Iskander”

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
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265

Conclusion

The Russians have continued to upgrade their artillery systems and bring new systems on line. 

Many of the improvements have been in the range, type and lethality of artillery ammunition. 

The Russians appreciate the potential for surgical strikes with precision munitions and have 

developed their own precision systems. However, they also believe that massed artillery 

fires will continue to hold pride of place in future maneuver combat and are effective when 

precision fires are not. Improvements in EW and the need to establish fire superiority at 

war’s onset confirm their belief that quantity has a quality of its very own. Florent-Jean de 

Vallière (1667-1759), Director-General of the Battalions and Schools of Artillery, standardized 

French artillery sizes, making it less expensive and more abundant. On his largest cannon, the 

24-pounder, was inscribed the Latin phrase “Ultima Ratio Regum.” The Russians subscribe to 

this thought: artillery remains the “Last Argument of Kings.” 

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense

9K720 “Iskander” Conducting Launch Operations
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Air Defense Troops

The Air Defense Troops are a Branch of Arms of the Russian Ground Forces. They are intended 

to protect troops and facilities from different means of air attack (strike aviation, cruise 

missiles, UAVs) in a combined arms combat environment and on the march. They perform the 

following tasks:

- air defense combat 

- detection of enemy aircraft and warning the troops covered

- destruction of the means of an enemy air attack 

- theater missile defense support.

Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion
Branches of Arms

267

Organizationally, the Air Defense Troops consist of military control bodies, command points, 

anti-aircraft missile (rocket-artillery) and radio-technical formations, military units and 

subunits. They are capable of destroying enemy means of air attack throughout the range 

of altitudes: extremely low (up to 200 m), low (200-1000 m), medium (1000-4000 m), high 

(4000-12,000 m), and in the stratosphere (above 12,000 m), and at different flight speeds. 

The Air Defense Troops are equipped with anti-aircraft missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, antiaircraft gun-and-missile systems and portable anti-aircraft missile systems. These systems 

have differing ranges, channeling ability and means of missile guidance. Depending on the 

range of destruction of aerial targets, they are divided into the systems of near range (up to 

10 km), short range (up to 30 km), medium range (up to 100 km), and long range (more than 

100 km). In terms of modernization and capability development, the Air Defense Troops are 

interested in improving mobility, survivability, covertness of operation, degree of automation, 

fire efficiency, expansion of denial areas, reduction of response times, and improvement of 

the weight and size characteristics of missiles.54

54 “Air Defense Troops,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, <http://eng.mil.ru/en/structure/

forces/ground/structure/vpvo.htm>, accessed 1 May 2016.

Anti-Aircraft Missile-Artillery Battalion
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Although there has been much discussion of Russia’s long-range operational/strategic 

air defense assets (S-300, S-400, S-500, etc.) found in the Aerospace Defense Forces, the 

vast majority of Russian air defense assets are of the short-/medium-range variety and 

are found in the Air Defense Troops of the Russian Ground Forces. Russia has long been a 

strong proponent of Air Defense at all levels, due to fears of U.S./NATO air superiority. It has 

continued this tradition into the present and has expanded air defense capabilities to counter 

not only hostile airplanes and helicopters, but also cruise missiles and UAVs. The Russian 

Ground Forces have medium- and short-range air defense assets in dedicated air defense 

brigades, but maneuver brigades also have significant organic short-range air defense 

capabilities. These capabilities reside in the maneuver brigade’s two air defense battalions, 

with four different air defense systems that provide the brigade an overlapping zonal defense. 

Although these capabilities are formidable, they are not the sole means of air defense for 

the brigade. Russian maneuver brigades have substantial EW capabilities that complicate 

attack aviation targeting, and Russia has touted the abilities of its “Vikhr” and “Ataka” missiles 

to hit relatively low- and slow-flying aircraft. In addition, Russia’s fielding of small, unmanned 

turrets, which will be mounted as secondary weapons on heavy weapon platforms and as the 

primary weapon on armored cars and support vehicles, will also have a limited air 

defense capability for low- and slow-flying aircraft.55 

Commonly Found Organic Air Defense Assets in a Maneuver Brigade

The 2K22 Tunguska (SA-19 Grison) is a short-range missile-gun heavy tracked, 

lightly armored system that has twin 2A38M (30 

mm) guns and 8 short-range missiles designed 

to engage low-flying aircraft and cruise missiles 

at a distance of up to 8 km and flight ceiling of 

3.5 km. The twin 2A38M (30 mm) guns are useful 

for engaging extremely close targets, where the 

expenditure of a missile would be uneconomical 

(such as a small UAV), targets that are have EW 

protection capabilities (that missiles cannot 

engage), and, when necessary, ground targets. 

Each maneuver brigade typically has six launcher 

vehicles within a battery of the air defense 

missile-artillery battalion. Russia is now planning 

on developing a successor to the Tunguska, equipped with a 57mm autocannon.

55 Charles K. Bartles, “Flying the Unfriendly Skies: Air Defense in the Russian Ground Forces,” February 2016.

Charles K. Bartles, “Unmanned Turrets to Increase ISR Capabilities and Lethality,” OE Watch Online, November 

2015.

Dmitry Fedyushka, “Secrets of a Deserted Tower,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 7 October 2015, <http://

vpk-news.ru/articles/27399>, accessed 1 May 2015.

Aleksandr Luzan, “The Fight above the Forwardmost Defensive Positions- Part I,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer 

Online, 18 November 2015, <http://vpk-news.ru/articles/28054>, accessed 1 May 2016.

Aleksandr Luzan, “The Fight above the Forwardmost Defensive Positions- Part II,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer 

Online, 25 November 2015, <http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/28156>, accessed 1 May 2016.

2K22 “Tungunska”

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
Branches of

Arms

269

The Brigade’s Organic Air Defense Units

This graphic adds details to the air defense laydown covering the brigade defense. It adds range considerations that help determine the positioning of these subunits.
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The 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher) is a close- 

(very short) range missile system, usually 

built upon a MT-LB (light tracked) chassis. It 

has four close-range, visually sited missiles 

capable of engaging targets at a distance of 

up to 5 km and flight ceiling of 3.5 kilometers. 

The system was reportedly designed to 

complement the Tunguska, as the Strela-10 

costs less and is much less susceptible to EW 

countermeasures, due to its targeting system. 

Each maneuver brigade typically has six 

launcher vehicles within a battery of the air 

defense missile-artillery battalion. 

The 9K310 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) is a close- 

(very short) range, man-portable airdefense system (MANPADS), capable 

of engaging targets at a distance of up 

to 5 kilometers and flight ceiling of 3.5 

kilometers. Each maneuver brigade 

typically has 27 MANPADS within a battery 

of the air defense missile-artillery battalion. 

It is being replaced by the 9K333 Verba, 

which has similar characteristics as its 

predecessors, but has a better guidance 

system and increased abilities to circumvent 

EW countermeasures.

The 9K330 Tor (SA-15 Gauntlet) is a shortto-medium-range heavy tracked, lightly 

armored, platform that packs 8 missiles that 

are primarily designed to engage cruise 

missiles and other precision guided weapons 

at a distance of up to 12 kilometers and flight 

ceiling of 6 kilometers. It is being replaced by 

the Tor-M2, which sports 16 missiles with an 

increased flight ceiling (10 kilometers) and can 

engage up to 4 targets simultaneously, while 

firing on the move. Each maneuver brigade 

typically has 12 launcher vehicles within the 

batteries of the air defense missile battalion.

9K35 “Strela-10”

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

9K310 “Igla”

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

9K330 “Tor”

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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271

Modernization of Russian Ground Force’s Air Defense Assets 

Russian Ground Forces are in the midst of a mass modernization of air defense systems. These 

upgrades include systems that carry more missiles, have better radar and C2 capabilities, and 

have missiles with greater ranges and better abilities to circumvent EW countermeasures. 

These modernizations include:

The 9K330 Tor (SA-15 Gauntlet): The Tor is being replaced by the Tor-M2, which sports 16 

missiles with an increased flight ceiling (10 kilometers) and can engage up to 4 targets 

simultaneously, while firing on the move.

The 2K22 Tunguska (SA-19 Grison): The 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) was initially 

thought to be the successor to the Tunguska, as it has a similar missile-gun combination, 

but is armed with 12 short-range missiles designed to engage low-flying aircraft and cruise 

missiles at a distance of up to 20 kilometers and flight ceiling of 15 kilometers. Despite 

similar appearances, the Pantsir-S1 does not appear to be the successor to the Tunguska. 

Instead, The Pantsir-S1 is being used to protect strategic (long-range) air defense assets of 

the Aerospace Defense Forces, such as the S-300 and S-400. The role of the Pantsir-S1 as a 

strategic protection asset may be one reason that the system can be provided on a wheeled 

chassis. Russia is now planning on developing a successor to the Tunguska, equipped with a 

57mm autocannon. 

The 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher): The 

Strela-10 is being replaced by the Luchnik-E, 

which has 8 missiles with a 6-kilometer range 

and 3.5-kilometer flight ceiling, with the most 

important capability improvements being 

the addition of all weather and day/night 

firing capabilities. There are also reports 

that the Strela-10 could be replaced with the 

Sosna that has twelve Sosna-R missiles with 

a 10-kilometer range and 5-kilometer flight 

ceiling.

- The 9K310 Igla (SA-18 Grouse): a close- (very short-) range MANPADS, capable of engaging 

targets at a distance of up to 5 kilometers and flight ceiling of 3.5 kilometers. It is being 

replaced by the 9K333 Verba, which has similar characteristics as its predecessors, but has a 

better guidance system and increased abilities to circumvent EW countermeasures.

- The 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly): is not a part of Ground Forces maneuver units, but is instead 

found within the Ground Forces’ air defense artillery brigades. It is a short-to-mediumrange missile system on a heavy tracked platform that has 4 missiles with a range of up to 30 

kilometers and flight ceiling of 14 kilometers. It is being replaced with the 9K317M Buk-M3 

(SA-17 Grizzly), which is equipped with 6 missiles that have ranges of up to 70 kilometers 

and flight ceiling of 35 kilometers. The most interesting purported capability is being able to 

engage not only air targets, but also ground targets.

Luchnik-E

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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Chapter 7 

Specialty Branches
Specialty Branches

273

Reconnaissance, Spetsnaz, and SOF

Reconnaissance units are a branch of the Russian Ground Forces. These units are intended to 

perform a wide range of tasks in order to ensure commanders and their staffs receive accurate 

and timely information about the enemy, terrain and weather, to support decision making 

and prevent surprise enemy action. Reconnaissance units [разведывательные воинские

части] and formations [разведывательные соединения] may consist of any of the following: 

combined arms, spetsnaz, signals intelligence, or dedicated TO&E reconnaissance subunits 

[подразделения] and units [воинские части]. 

Reconnaissance units fulfill the following objectives, in preparation for, and during, the 

conduct of combined arms operations:

- determining the enemy’s order of battle, immediate preparations for battle, and

warning signs of surprise attack

- identifying the enemy’s composition, position, echelonment, status and capabilities

of forces, system of command and control

- determining which targets to engage and their locations

- finding significant enemy theater-level weapons and equipment, detecting enemy

engineer field fortifications and his integrated obstacle network 

- determining the difficulty of crossing terrain, the status of communications, the

nature of water obstacles, the boundaries and size of areas of destruction, fires 

and floods, disease-contaminated areas, and the possible axes of overcoming or 

bypassing them

- identifying new enemy weapons and methods of warfare, as well as the conduct and

measures required for the 360° security of the operation or combat 

- determining the morale of enemy troops and the local population, and the economic

status of the area of operations.

Intelligence units and formations collect intelligence by:

- monitoring and eavesdropping

- ground and air photography

- signal intercept, to determine object coordinates

- conducting search, raid, ambush, reconnaissance missions

- questioning local residents, and interrogating prisoners and deserters

- analysis of captured enemy documents, equipment and weapons.

In terms of modernization and capability development, the reconnaissance units will increase 

their intelligence capabilities by developing new and/or improved: means of technical 

intelligence, including ones based on new physical principles; tactical reconnaissance 

complexes, that utilize unmanned aerial vehicles; and automated collection, processing and 

that will bring intelligence to the commander (commander) and headquarters in real-time.1

Relationship of Reconnaissance and Intelligence 

In the Soviet/Russian system, the term for intelligence [разведка] can mean “intelligence” or 

1

 Reconnaissance Formations and Units,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, <http://structure.

mil.ru/structure/forces/ground/structure/reconnaissance.htm> accessed 1 May 2016.
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274

“reconnaissance” or a combination of both these terms. In a military context, especially at 

the tactical levels, the term usually refers to reconnaissance activities. In the Russian system, 

the intelligence staff section directly commands dedicated reconnaissance units and other 

intelligence assets. At the battalion level (of maneuver units), the officer in charge of the 

intelligence staff section is also in charge of reconnaissance, but since at the battalion level 

most maneuver units do not have dedicated reconnaissance assets, regular units from the 

battalion are assigned for this purpose on an ad hoc basis. This officer is a career (branched) 

maneuver officer (as appropriate to the type of unit), whose primary responsibility is 

determining the position of the enemy through the personnel and assets under his direct 

control. In the US/NATO system, the officer in charge of the intelligence staff section (S-2) is 

usually a career (branched) intelligence officer, and is primarily responsible for analyzing and 

presenting information about the enemy and environment to the commander. A U.S./NATO 

S-2 typically does not command reconnaissance units (reconnaissance teams, Long Range 

Reconnaissance Patrols, etc.) as does his Russian counterpart. In the Western system these 

assets are typically directly controlled by the operations section. In short, at tactical levels, the 

Soviet officer in charge of the intelligence staff is a maneuver officer, a fellow “meat eater” that 

works closely with the commander, functioning as his eyes and ears by deploying his own 

subordinate assets on the battlefield. This is in stark contrast to most U.S./NATO battalion S-2s 

that are relegated to purely staff work, and having a much more distant relationship with their 

commanders. The implication of this systemic difference between the Russian and Western 

acquisition of intelligence is that Soviet/Russian reconnaissance units, such as spetsnaz, would 

be normally associated with the intelligence staffs, as opposed to the operations staff as in 

most Western Armies.

Tactical Reconnaissance

Russia broadly views military intelligence at the strategic, operational-tactical, and tactical 

levels. Operational-tactical and tactical military intelligence are divided into five functionbased spheres: ground, air, sea, space, and “special.” Military intelligence conducted at the 

tactical level for ground forces focuses on determining the position of the enemy, finding 

strong and weak points in the defense, and uncovering obstacles to maneuver. The term 

“tactical reconnaissance” best describes the military intelligence activities occurring at the 

tactical level of ground operations. Tactical reconnaissance is doctrinally divided into several 

categories including: combat reconnaissance, signals intelligence, radar, electro-optical, 

artillery, engineer, medical, route, and nuclear, biological and chemical detection. Tactical 

reconnaissance is performed by intelligence, motorized rifle, tank, airborne, air assault, and 

spetsnaz units; and is conducted through observation, signal intercept, search, raid, ambush, 

and patrol.

Task Organized Reconnaissance Elements by Echelon

Since most Russian units do not have dedicated reconnaissance units below brigade/

division level, Russia has a well-defined system for task organizing units for this purpose. 

The following lists each maneuver echelon with its typically associated task organized 

reconnaissance elements. It is important to remember that these elements will not be found 

on standing TO&Es, but will be encountered in the field.
Specialty Branches

275

Brigades/Divisions - reconnaissance detachments [разведывательные отряды], 

reconnaissance patrols [разведывательные дозоры], reconnaissance groups 

[разведывательные группы], leader’s reconnaissance [офицерские разведывательные

дозоры], search units [подразделения для проведения поисков], ambush units 

[подразделения для устройства засад], reconnaissance in force [подразделения для

проведения разведки боем], observation posts [наблюдательные посты].

Regiments (in a division) - reconnaissance detachments [разведывательные отряды], 

reconnaissance patrols [разведывательные дозоры], leader’s reconnaissance [офицерские

разведывательные дозоры], search units [подразделения для проведения поисков], 

ambush units [подразделения для устройства засад], observation posts [наблюдательные

посты]

Battalions - combat reconnaissance patrols [боевые разведывательные дозоры], ambush 

units [подразделения для устройства засад], patrol squads [дозорные отделения], 

observation posts [наблюдательные посты]

Companies - patrol squads [дозорные отделения], observation squads [наблюдателие

отделения], combat reconnaissance patrols [боевые разведывательные дозоры],

Platoons- patrol squads [дозорные отделения], observation squads [наблюдателие

отделения]

Task Organized Reconnaissance Elements

Reconnaissance Detachment [разведывательный отряд] - 

Reconnaissance detachments are typically mounted reinforced 

companies that are capable of conducting observation, searches, 

raids, ambushes, installing/removing observation equipment, 

and, if necessary, engaging the enemy. They move on primary 

axes in advance of a march, meeting battle or offensive and are 

normally proceeded by a Reconnaissance Patrol (platoon). The 

standard operating range of a Reconnaissance Detachment varies 

by mission, but an operational depth of 50 kilometers for companysized units and 80 kilometers for battalion-sized elements is 

common.2

Reconnaissance Group [разведывательная группа] - 

Reconnaissance groups are typically motorized rifle or spetsnaz 

squads dispatched to reconnoiter in the enemy rear area to locate 

nuclear delivery systems, enemy forces, headquarters, airfields, 

signal sites and other important targets. Reconnaissance groups 

are capable of conducting observation, raids, ambushes, and 

installing/removing observation and communication equipment. 

2

 Ministry of Defense, USSR, Military Encyclopedic Dictionary [Военный Энциклопедический Словарь], 2nd

Edition, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1986, 617.

Разведывательный отряд

Reconnaissance Detachment

(Боевой) Разведывательный дозор 

Reconnaissance Patrol or Group
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276

They may be inserted by helicopter, vehicle or on foot.3

Reconnaissance Patrol [разведывательный дозор] - Reconnaissance patrols are typically 

platoon-sized elements, reinforced with engineers and other specialists, that reconnoiter up 

to 10 kilometers ahead of the parent unit. Reconnaissance patrols can be combat, officer 

reconnaissance, NBC or engineer.4

Reconnaissance Units in the Brigade and Division

The “New Look” reforms downsized reconnaissance battalions to companies, when the 

maneuver divisions transitioned to brigades. The Russian Ground Forces are now in the 

process of reversing this reform, as brigade commanders complained that reconnaissance 

companies are insufficient for the brigade’s required ISR tasks.5

 (The accompanying graphics 

depict both the company and battalion structures, as Russia is still in the process of this 

transition.) Unlike the personnel in other Ground Forces’ Branches of Arms or Specialty 

Branches, most personnel serving in these reconnaissance battalions and companies are 

usually motorized rifle troops, in terms of military occupational specialty. Reconnaissance 

personnel typically conduct reconnaissance with BTRs, BMPs, Combat Reconnaissance Patrol 

Vehicles (BRDMs), or Tigr/Tigr-M reconnaissance vehicles.

3

 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Military Encyclopedic Dictionary [Военный Энциклопедический

Словарь], Volume 2, Moscow: Ripol Klassik, 2001, 438. 4

 Ministry of Defense, USSR, Military Encyclopedic Dictionary [Военный Энциклопедический Словарь], 2nd

Edition, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1986, 617.

5

 Aleksey Ramm, “Ground Troops’ Super-Sophisticated Look” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 10 

September 2013, <http://vpk-news.ru/articles/17376>, accessed 20 July 2016. 

“Interview with Chief of Intelligence of the Russian Ground Forces, Major General Vladimir Nikolayevich Marusin” 

Ekho Moskvy Online, 1 November 2014, <http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/voensovet/1428450-echo/>, 

accessed 17 July 2016.

Reconnaissance Company 
Specialty Branches

277

Reconnaissance Battalion
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The Combat Reconnaissance Patrol Vehicle 

(BRDM-2) is designed to perform enemy 

and terrain reconnaissance while in combat 

conditions, performing march security, 

and monitoring lines of communication. 

The amphibious BRDM is capable of 

overcoming ditches and water obstacles, 

and is equipped with an environmental 

system to protect the crew from NBC 

threats. The BRDM is typically equipped 

with radios, night vision devices, navigation 

equipment and other reconnaissance 

related equipment. The vehicle is manned 

by four personnel, is relatively light, (seven tons) and has two crew-served weapons, 14.5mm 

KPVT and 7,62mm machine guns.

The GAZ-2330 Tigr is a 4x4 multi-role, all-terrain light armored 

vehicle that serves as a reconnaissance vehicle. The vehicle is 

primarily operated by Russian Defense Ministry and Ministry 

of the Interior forces, and can be found conducting escort and 

reconnaissance missions, patrols, and counter-terrorist operations. 

The Tigr resembles a HMMWV, and has engine forward, crew cab 

in the middle and a troop section in the rear. The modular design 

of the Tigr allows the conversion of the base vehicle platform into 

11-passenger, armored or cargo vehicles. The Tigr’s crew-served 

weapon is mounted on the roof, and can be a 7.62mm or 12.7mm 

machine gun, or 30mm automatic grenade launcher.6

 The GAZ233114 Tigr-M is an improved version of the Tigr.7

6

 “GAZ-2330 Tigr Light Armoured Vehicle,” as found at: Army-Technology, <www.army-technology.com/projects/

gaz-2330-tigr-light-armoured-vehicle/>, accessed 17 July 2016. 7

 “Tigr-M GAZ-233114 Multipurpose 4x4 armoured vehicle” as found at: Army Recognition, <http://www.

armyrecognition.com/russia_russian_army_wheeled_armoured_vehicle_uk/tigr-m_gaz-233114_4x4_

multipurpose_tactical_armoured_vehicle_technical_data_sheet_specifications.html>, accessed 17 July 2016.

Combat Reconnaissance 

Patrol Vehicle

Боевая разведывательная машина 

(БРДМ)

Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (BRDM-2)

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

Taifun-M

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

GAZ-2330 “Tigr” with ATGMs

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
Specialty Branches

279

What is Spetsnaz?

In the West, the terms “spetsnaz” and “special operations” are used as synonyms. In Russia, 

these terms are related but different terms. The word spetsnaz [спецназ] is a Russian 

abbreviation of the words spetsialnovo naznacheniya [специального назначения], a term 

which can roughly be translated as “special designation” referring to troops with a special 

purpose. The word “special” is used in a very broad way that can indicate that the unit has a 

very narrow area of specialization, such as signals intelligence, engineering, reconnaissance, 

etc.; or the unit is experimental or temporary in nature; or the unit conducts tasks of special 

importance such as sensitive political or clandestine operations.8 This broad usage of the 

term means that “spetsnaz” cannot be thought of as equating to the Western concept of 

Special Operation Forces (SOF).

Soviet Roots of Spetsnaz

The Soviets started experimenting with elite reconnaissance and sabotage units in the 

Spanish Civil War, and employed such units in the Soviet-Finnish War, and in Romania, 

Yugoslavia, and Belarus during the Second World War. But modern usage of the term 

spetsnaz started in the 1950s. The development of modern spetsnaz was the direct result 

of the US introduction of tactical nuclear weapons systems into the European theater. 

The United States employment of tactical missiles was problematic for the Soviets. U.S. 

tactical nuclear weapons in the 1950’s had relatively short ranges (Little John-19 kilometers, 

Honest John-25 to 50 kilometers) but could rapidly deploy and deliver a devastating 

payload. Conventional Soviet forces were ill equipped to handle such a threat, so spetsnaz 

reconnaissance companies were formed to identify and neutralize such targets quickly, while 

operating at ranges up to 200 kilometers in the enemy rear. As the range of U.S. tactical 

missiles increased throughout the 1950s and 1960s, so did the Soviet need for spetsnaz forces 

capable of actions at greater operational depths. Spetsnaz battalions were formed later for 

missions up to 400 kilometers in the enemy rear, and eventually in 1962, in response to the 

Lance, Sergeant, and Pershing missile systems, spetsnaz brigades were established to operate 

up to 750 kilometers in the enemy rear. Although the primary driving force for the creation 

of the spetsnaz had been finding and eliminating tactical nuclear weapons, the spetsnaz 

also retained an important secondary mission, related to its roots in the Spanish civil-war, 

identifying and destroying other key objectives behind enemy lines.9

“The evolution of the Spetsnaz, after the war, was directly connected to the development of 

nuclear weaponry, although eliminating these weapons and their delivery systems has never 

been our only task. We have also been trained for pure reconnaissance and for guiding artillery 

and aviation.”

 Spetsnaz Colonel Vassily Kolesnik10

8

 David Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle, London, England: F. Cass, 1991, pg. 214-

215.

Aleksey Nikolsky, “Russian ‘Spetsnaz’ Forces — from Saboteurs to Court Bailiffs,” Moscow Defense Brief, #2 (40), 

2014, <http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/1-2014/item4/article2/>, accessed 24 April 2014. 9

 S. Kozolov, GRU Spetsnaz: History of Creation from Companies to Brigades, 2009, pg. 11-32.

Carey Schofield, The Russian Elite: Inside Spetsnaz and the Airborne Forces. London: Greenhill Books, 1993. pg 34-

36.

10 As quoted by Carey Schofield in: Carey Schofield, The Russian Elite: Inside Spetsnaz and the Airborne Forces. 

London: Greenhill Books, 1993. pg 35.
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Command & Control of the Spetsnaz

In the pre-Cold War years, reconnaissance and 

sabotage units that were formed under the 

Main Intelligence Directorate of the General 

Staff, were typically operationally controlled 

by the intelligence sections of the respective 

Front Commanders. In the post-Cold War years, 

proponency passed from the Second Directorate 

to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General 

Staff (GRU)11, and the operational control of the 

spetsnaz companies passed from the Fronts to the 

intelligence sections of their subordinate Army 

Groups. The spetsnaz’s primary mission of nuclear 

weapon destruction would become the main 

factor driving how the units were operationally 

controlled. The relatively short range of early 

U.S. tactical nuclear weapons (20-50 kilometers) 

placed the launch vehicles well within the 

Army Groups’s area of responsibility. Since the 

tactical nuclear weapons were within the 1st echelon Army Group’s area of responsibility, it 

was logical that the spetsnaz companies be assigned directly to these Army Groups. As the 

effective ranges of tactical nuclear weapons increased, command and control passed from 

Army Group, with an area of responsibility of up to approximately 100 kilometers. (spetsnaz 

companies), to Fronts with the responsibility for an operational depth of several hundred 

kilometers (spetsnaz battalions), and finally, with the introduction of the Pershing system, 

with a operational-strategic level reach, to the General Staff (spetsnaz brigades).12

Spetsnaz in the Post-Soviet Era

By the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the term “spetsnaz” when used in reference 

to the Soviet Union’s elite combat units usually referred to the GRU’s Spetsnaz Brigades and 

Combat Swimmer units (roughly the GRU’s naval reconnaissance force with a saboteur/antisaboteur capability) , the Russian Airborne’s 45th Spetsnaz Regiment (later brigade), or select 

elite anti-terrorist units. (such as the FSB’s Alpha and Vympel). In a more general context, the 

term “spetsnaz” also found use while referencing special purpose units such as certain signals 

intelligence, experimental, or other atypical sorts of troop formations. (In these instances 

perhaps a better translation would be “special troops” instead of “spetsnaz” to differentiate.) 

11 The GRU is the probably the largest directorate of the general staff, being an organization unto itself, that 

performs many of the same functions as the US Defense Intelligence Agency, including managing Russia’s 

military attaché program, operating covert agents abroad, and performing analysis.

A rough way of explaining the relationship between the GRU and spetsnaz brigades in the Russian system, is to 

imagine if the U.S. Army Special Forces Groups were directly subordinated to the Defense Intelligence Agency, 

which was a component of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This relationship does not exist in the US since the Special 

Forces Groups are directly subordinate to a Unified Combatant Commander or Theater and the DIA is directly 

subordinate to the Secretary of Defense.

12 David Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle, London, England: F. Cass, 1991, pg. 215- 

227.

Emblem of the GRU Spetsnaz 

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
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... various armed units subordinated to Russia’s numerous government agencies began 

to borrow the word Spetsnaz for their own titles so as to sound more important, even though 

in many cases these units were just glorified guard and protection squads. The term was 

also borrowed by some highly trained and well-armed police units, the Russian equivalent 

of America’s SWAT teams13

In the post Soviet era, the term spetsnaz grew considerably in usage and were increasingly 

found in a wide range of titles of units with diverse, and sometimes relatively mundane, 

missions in a variety of ministries. In all, Russia has an estimated 50,000 personnel in 

“spetsnaz” designated units. It is important to note that in the West, the term “military” is 

typically associated with uniformed serviceman, whose primary occupation is war fighting, 

that serve under the Ministry or Department of Defense. In Russia the term “military” has a 

much broader context, due to the militarization of the police (internal security services) and 

intelligence services. This means that many of these 50,000 spetsnaz personnel were not 

necessarily found within the Ministry of Defense, but also found throughout the other Russian 

security services.

Russian Spetsnaz within the Hierarchy of Elites

Perhaps the biggest difference between 

American/Western SOF and Russian 

Spetsnaz, referring specifically to personnel 

serving in the GRU Spetsnaz brigades, is 

the perception of these forces as elites. In 

the U.S., SOF have the highest prestige, 

and are considered the crème de crème of 

trigger pullers. This is in marked contrast 

to the Russian system, where the true elite 

“trigger pullers” are members of the Russian 

Airborne (VDV). One of the best examples 

of how Russia values these units is in terms 

of manning. In the Russian system units 

are manned with a combination of officers, 

contract soldiers, and conscripts, the more elite the unit, the higher percentage of contract 

personnel vis-à-vis conscripts. Currently, the Russian VDV is manned with approximately 80% 

contract, a far higher percentage than the GRU Spetnaz.14 In general, this difference between 

American SOF and Russian Spetsnaz can be attributed to very different origination stories, 

namely American SOF growing out of the U.S.’s Vietnam experience as direct action forces, 

training guerillas, and conducting COIN versus the Russian usage of GRU spetsnaz as primarily 

ISR assets.

13 Aleksey Nikolsky, “Russian ‘Spetsnaz’ Forces — from Saboteurs to Court Bailiffs,” Moscow Defense Brief, #2 (40), 

2014, <http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/1-2014/item4/article2/>, accessed 24 April 2014. 14 “Special Operations Forces Created in Russian Armed Forces,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 13 May 

2015, <http://vpk-news.ru/articles/25170>, accessed 1 May 2016.

BRM-3K Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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Differentiating American SOF from Russian Spetsnaz 

Perhaps the biggest difference between the U.S. and Russian system is the idea of 

specialization. In the U.S. system, Navy SEALs may be found conducting a hostage rescue in 

an urban area, providing ISR on a remote mountain in the middle of Afghanistan, performing 

sniper duties in Iraq, or acting in a more traditional frogman role placing or removing 

explosives in a naval setting. In the Russian system, spetsnaz and SOF appear to much more 

rigidly stick with their areas of expertise. GRU Spetsnaz conduct ISR for conventional forces, 

Russian frogman work exclusively with naval missions, elite FSB units conduct hostage 

rescue operations, elite MVD units conduct SWAT and riot control missions. Although these 

units may conduct direct action missions, they are in no way seen as a substitute for the 

Ground Forces, VDV, or Naval Infantry. Russian Spetsnaz are elite, but the main instrument 

for projecting combat power is seen as the conventional forces, even if Russia is engaged 

in what the West would consider Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) or low 

intensity conflict. This manner of thinking explains why the Russian Federation has made 

great increases in her conventional capabilities, but has shown little interest in increasing 

her spetsnaz/SOF capabilities. These capabilities are seen as important, but they are seen as 

enablers for conventional forces, not means of conducting war in themselves.

Russian Special Operations Forces

“Having studied international practice in creating, training and using special operations forces, 

the Ministry of Defense has started to build a similar force...We have set up a special command, 

which has already begun to put our plans into practice as part of the Armed Forces training 

program. We have also developed a set of key documents that outline the development 

priorities, the training program, and the modalities of using these new forces... ” 

- General Valeri Gerasimov 

 General Valeriy Gerasimov, 

 Chief of the Russian General Staff

 March 6, 201315

In 2013, The Russian Federation announced the creation of a Special Operations Command.16

Although it may be tempting to assume this Russian Special Operations Command will 

resemble its Western brethren, it important to remember some differences between the 

organizations. According to some reporting the command was partially activated in 2009, 

due to the aftermath of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, where the GRU Spetsnaz had a few 

high-profile gaffes. There was also speculation that the command was formed due to the 

new Defense Minister’s interest in creating a more “Western” military, with an emphasis on 

quality instead of quantity. Whatever reason the command was stood up, it appears to have 

no Western or Russian equivalent. The most striking aspect of the command is that it appears 

more of a branch proponent than an actual functional command. The command (в/ч 92154 

HQ & Doctrine Development) will reportedly standardize doctrine and capabilities for Russia’s 

premiere SOF units in all military forces, and have the capability to provide command and 

15 Interfax Online, 6 March 2013, <http://www.interfax.com/>, accessed 28 April 2014. 16 In 2013, it was announced that another training facility would be established on the outskirts of Moscow, 

Kubinka-2, with accommodation for 500 trainees

Defense Ministry setting up special operations training center near Moscow, Interfax Online, 15 March 2013.

Yuriy Gavrilov, “The General Staff Has Been Authorized To Report: Russia Is Creating Special Operations Forces,” 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 7 March 2013, <http://rg.ru/> , accessed 17 March 2014.

William H. Burgess, Inside Spetsnaz : Soviet Special Operations : A Critical Analysis, Novato, CA: Presidio, 1990. 
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control for these units in wartime.17

The premier elite units are found in 

the: 

- Ministry of Defense

- Federal Security Service

- Ministry of Internal Affairs

- Federal Protection Service 

- Federal Penal Service

- Federal Narcotics Trafficking

Control Service

The command also provides dayto-day control of a Training Center 

(в/ч 99450) and MoD unit (в/ч 01355 

Operational Detachments & Support). 

From a Russian view, the most 

interesting aspect of the command is 

that it reports to the General Staff, but 

not the Main Intelligence Directorate 

(GRU) as do the spetsnaz brigades. 

Although the exact directorate has yet 

to be named, it is likely the operations 

directorate. If this is true, this would 

be a major doctrinal change, and 

suggests that the unit could have a much more of a direct action, as opposed to ISR role. 

There has been some reporting that the unit is intended to conduct peacetime missions such 

as hostage rescue, evacuation of civilians from war zones, and operations against criminal 

groups, and in wartime missions such as destruction of enemy strategic weapons, command 

and command, and disrupting communications and logistics.18

There have been few details about the structure or manning of the command, but the 

command reportedly has about 1000 personnel, roughly half in the headquarters and 

training center, and the rest in a newly created MoD unit (with personnel recruited from 

GRU Spetsnaz Brigades). In some aspects, this new unit will closely resemble other Russian 

Spetsnaz units, and is likely structured on the basis of a GRU regiment, consisting of saboteur 

reconnaissance teams equipped with armored vehicles. Unlike other spetsnaz units, that 

are seen as elite forces that perform missions (reconnaissance, direct action, etc.) for the sole 

17 Aleksey Nikolsky, “The Olympic Reserve: Why Russia Has Created Special Operations Command,” Moscow 

Defense Brief Online, Issue #2 (40), 2014, <http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/4-2013/>, accessed 28 April 2014.

Aleksey Mikhaylov article: “General Staff Asks Shoygu To Create ‘Commandos,’” Izvestiya Online, 27 November 

2012, <http://www.izvestia.ru/>, accessed 28 April 2014.

Denis Telmanov, “MVD, FSB, and FSIN Subunits Will Become Part of the Special Operations Forces: The New 

Composite Troops Are Being Created in the Event of War and to Counter Saboteurs,” Izvestiya Online, 15 March 

2013, <http://www.izvestia.ru/>, accessed 28 April 2014.

Source: Aleksey Ramm “The Winged Spetsnaz: Should Yet Another ‘Legacy’ of Anatoliy Serdyukov be 

Abandoned?,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 9 July 2014 <http://vpk-news.ru/articles/20965> , accessed 

14 July 2014.

18 “Russian intelligence officers seek speedy creation of new special ops center,” Russia Today Online, 28 

November 2012, <http://rt.com/politics/russian-intelligence-spec-ops-789/>, accessed 28 April 2014.

Lieutenant Colonel Boris Nikolaev

Commander of the “Saturn” Spetsnaz Detachment of the 

Federal Penal Service

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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purpose of furthering the movement and maneuver of the conventional Armed Forces, this 

new MoD unit’s structure suggests that it is intended to act independently. The command 

has a dedicated special aviation brigade that is responsible for the coordination of, or directly 

controls, Army combat aviation assets at Torzhok, and a squadron of the Il-72 transporters 

at the Migalovo airfield near Tver, and the command has supporting elements that provides 

Combat Support and Combat Service Support functions.19 These developments coincide with 

legislative changes that provides a legal mechanism for certain extraterritorial deployments, 

as there has been some interest in deploying the elite counter narcotics unit to Central Asia 

for narcotics interdiction mission.20

Although Russia has established a special operations command and is experimenting with SOF 

forces in a way more accustomed to the ways they are used in the West, Russia does not appear 

interested in the U.S./Western model of SOF employment. Russia appears to have more faith 

in its conventional forces, than the West has in its own. Russia used spetsnaz and SOF in the 

Crimea, but the vast majority of the “polite people” were almost certainly from elite conventional 

units. Russia executes operations in this manner, not due to the lack of special operations forces, 

but simply because many missions that the West would consider “SOF missions,” are missions 

that Russia performs with her elite conventional forces such as the Airborne, Naval Infantry, 

or even elite conventional motorized rifle or tank units. In the Russian system, direct action is 

conducted primarily by the conventional warfighter, not the special operator. 

19 Aleksey Mikhaylov article: “General Staff Asks Shoygu To Create ‘Commandos,’” Izvestiya Online, 27 November 

2012, <http://izvestia.ru/news/540120>, accessed 28 April 2014.

20 Konstantin Volkov and Mariya Ablinova, “FSKN Wants to Conduct Special Operations Abroad,” Izvestiya Online, 

20 February 2014, <http://izvestia.ru/news/566191>, accessed 28 April 2014.

One Vehicle of the “Redut-2US” Operational-Strategic Communications System 

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
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Signal Troops

The Signal Troops are intended to deploy communications systems, and support the 

command and control of Ground Forces units in war and peacetime. They are also responsible 

for operating automated command and control systems. Signal Troops may be found in 

regular line units and technical support units, operating automated command and control 

systems, in the signal communications security and postal-and-courier communications 

services, and in other places. Signal Troops are equipped with a variety of mobile and reliable 

equipment related to: radio relay, tropospheric and satellite communications, telephony, 

tone telegraphy, television, photography, signal switching, and cryptography. In terms of 

modernization and capability development, the Russian Federation is interested in equipping 

the Signal Troops with modern means of signal communications, as well as automated 

command and control systems that provide reliable, fast, encrypted communications 

throughout the chain of command in war and peacetime conditions, even in the most difficult 

physical and climatic conditions. Particular emphasis is being made on automated command 

and control systems that function at the tactical level, that provide individual troops with 

secure, jam-resistant means of communication.21 In terms of the maneuver brigades, each 

has a signal battalion. Since Russian brigades are garrisoned individually, the signal battalion 

supports both tactical and garrison communications.

Network-Centric Warfare

Command and control (C2) has long been 

a problem in both the Soviet and Russian 

militaries. At the tactical level, radio 

technology was generally lacking, and the 

ability to transmit digitally nonexistent. 

In the last few years, this has begun to 

change. The Russian Federation has made 

a great effort to develop a “network-centric” 

command and control system. The Signal 

Troops are at the center of this effort that is 

one the main components of the Russian 

Armed Forces’ 2008 “New Look” reforms. 

Network-centric warfare can roughly be 

described as the wide-scale use of networked 

electronic reconnaissance and targeting systems (satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, etc.) 

coupled with mobile formations that can be quickly deployed throughout the entire theater 

of military operations to deliver decisive strikes on the enemy’s flanks and rear, as quickly and 

efficiently as possible. The Signal Troops appear to be the key to implementing this program, 

as they man the automated command and control systems, radios, and landline infrastructure 

required for this endeavor. At the highest levels, this concept has led to the establishment 

of a national command center that will reportedly be connected to subordinate command 

centers at the operational strategic command (military district) and Army Group levels. At 

the tactical level, the Armed Forces are overcoming C2 problems and implementing network21 “Signal Communications Troops,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, <http://eng.mil.ru/en/

structure/forces/ground/structure/link.htm>, accessed 1 May 2016.

Platoon/squad leader tablet PC

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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centric warfare through a variety of new 

technologies including: new tactical radios, 

a tactical digital mobile subscriber system 

(roughly a military digital cell phone and data 

system), and tactical laptops and tablets. 

Despite these advances, Russia has still had 

difficulties fielding a modern, unified C2 system 

for tactical units. The answer to this problem 

is the fielding of the ‘Andromeda’ C2 system, 

which has been in development for several 

years. This system is in many ways similar in 

purpose and capabilities to the US’s Force XXI 

Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) 

system. The Andromeda is intended to provide 

situational awareness to the commander and 

allow for the real-time exchange of information 

from the highest commander down to the squad, and even individual soldier. The Andromeda 

can reportedly interface with space based networks and has extensive counter electronic warfare 

capabilities. The system utilizes digital mapping technologies, allowing terminal operators to 

annotate the positions of troops, armaments, and equipment. Vehicles, and in some reports 

eventually even individual Soldiers, will be automatically tracked via a GPS/GLONASS connection. 

If the fielding of the Andromeda is deemed a success for the Russian VDV, it is very likely the 

system would also be adopted by the Russian Ground Forces. Even if the ‘Andromeda’ C2 system 

is not ultimately adopted throughout the Russian Armed Forces, Russia will likely continue to 

experiment with command and control systems to unify the information space, integrate fires and 

effects, manage robotics and other unmanned technologies to ultimately more efficiently mass, 

and then apply combat power.22

Tactical Radio Communications

The Russian Federation has made great efforts 

in transitioning away from Soviet era analog 

based equipment, to digital equipment with 

substantial data transmission, encryption, and 

anti-jamming capabilities. The Russian Ground 

Troops, the Aerospace Forces, and the Navy 

have been receiving fifth generation R-168 

Akveduk radios for the last few years. The entire 

Russian Ministry of Defense, as well as Russia’s 

other militarized intelligence and security 

structures appear to be transitioning to the 

same radios for interoperability reasons. The 

22 Roger N. McDermott, “Russian Perspective on Network-Centric Warfare: The Key Aim of

Serdyukov’s Reform,” 2011,<http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA549119>, accessed 1 May 2016.

“Russian Armed Forces Should be Capable of Network-Centric Warfare by 2015,” RIA Novosti, July 14, 2010

Charles K. Bartles, “Russia Fields New Tactical C2 System with FBCB2-like Capabilities,” OE Watch Online, July 2015.

Laptop

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

R-168 Radio

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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Russian Federation has also started introducing the sixth generation R-187 Azart radio series. The 

compact, frequency hopping VHF capable, Azart made its first public appearance in 2014 when 

carried by the “polite people” that occupied the Crimea in early 2014. These radios reportedly 

implement a Software-Defined Radio (SDR) technology that replaces some of the radio’s 

components (mixers, filters, amplifiers, modulators/demodulators, detectors, etc.) with software 

solutions. The manufacturer of these radios, the United Instrument Manufacturing Corporation 

(UIMC), has stated that the SDR technology 

allows the radios to have features such as 

multitasking, multiple waveband capability, 

and better protection against surveillance 

and jamming. These sixth generation radios 

are capable of self-testing communication 

links and self-rebooting. Due to the high 

degree of automation and “smart” technology, 

these radios will lower the probabilities for 

operator error. Russia’s sixth generation 

radios will provide faster and more secure 

communications, and offer a software based 

upgrade capability. The Soviet Army lagged 

greatly behind the U.S./NATO in terms of 

tactical radio communications, the Armed Forces of today’s Russian Federation do not.23

23 “United Instrument Corporation: Navy Will Receive First Sixth-Generation Communication Systems in 2016,” RIA 

Novosti Online, <http://ria.ru/interview/20151228/1350434123.html#ixzz42tseP5fV>, accessed 1 May 2016.

R-149 Command Vehicle

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

R-142N Command Vehicle

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

Р-149
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Signal Battalion 
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289

Electronic Warfare Troops

The Russian Federation has made Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities a high priority for 

development. Although EW was considered vital even in Soviet times, the impetus for 

recent developments likely stems from the aftermath of the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, 

when Russia lost five aircraft in the first two days of fighting. Only after the arrival of Russian 

EW troops were Georgian air defense systems suppressed. This lesson was not lost on the 

Russian Federation. Not only would EW be important for countering the capabilities of 

technologically advanced opponents, but it is also useful for combatting technologically less 

advanced opponents. After the conflict, Russia allocated funds for the development of new 

EW systems, and made organizational, personnel, and industrial changes. The result of these 

endeavors was the emergence of a Russia’s next generation of electronic intelligence and 

jamming systems. These new systems, with some rather ominous sounding names, include 

the: President-S, Leer-3, Moskva, Krasukha-4, Leyer-2 , Rtut-BM, Rychag, Lorandit, Infauna, 

Borisoglebsk-2, and Khibiny.

These “next generation” defensive and offensive EW systems are found throughout the 

Russian Armed forces. Like the U.S. Navy and Air Force, Russia’s Navy and Air Force have 

significant EW capabilities. Where Russian and U.S. EW capabilities radically differ are the 

use of these systems by the fighters on the ground. While the U.S. Army and Marine Corps 

have few EW assets, the Russian Ground Forces, and to a lesser extent Airborne (VDV) and 

naval infantry, have dedicated EW companies, battalions, and brigades. The Russian Ground 

Forces even appear to be EW’s main proponent in the Russian Armed Forces. Russia’s 

largest and most powerful EW systems such as the Murmansk-BN, Krasukha, Leer-3, and 

Moskva, are found in the Ground Forces’ EW brigades. EW brigades have capabilities to 

work at the tactical, operational, and arguably strategic levels. These capabilities include 

Leer-2 Electronic Warfare System 

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
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wide area cellular communications jamming, GPS location spoofing, reconnaissance and 

communication satellite jamming, and disrupting early warning aircraft such as the E-3 Sentry 

(AWACS). While the EW brigades are capable of fulfilling operational and strategic objectives, 

each Russian maneuver brigade has a dedicated EW company with tactical capabilities. On 

order, these EW companies are capable of jamming communications (R-934B/ R-378B/ R-330B 

Mandat/Borisoglebsk-2), interfering with radio controlled artillery fuses (SPR-2 Rtut), and 

jamming GPS signals that are essential for precision weapons (R-330ZH Zhitel/Borisoglebsk-2) 24 

In terms of organization and function within the maneuver brigades, Russian EW companies 

could be equally at home in the U.S. warfighting function of Fires, Protection, and Intelligence. 

In general, at the tactical level, most systems have varying capabilities to interfere with hostile 

communications, disrupt precision targeting, and determine the location of the sources of 

hostile emissions. There appears to be a close relationship between artillery, signal, and 

24 Charles K. Bartles, “Electronic Warfare: Russia’s Next Generation, and Beyond,” OE Watch Online, March 2016.

Yuriy Rossolov, “Shortwave Screen,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 18 January 2016, <http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/

component/k2/item/27355-korotkovolnovyj-zaslon>, accessed 10 February 2016.

“Electronic Warfare Crews have been Alerted in the Central Military District,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer

Online, 3 February 2016, <http://vpk-news.ru/news/29041>, accessed 10 February 2016.

Sergey Ptichkin, “Jammers to Blind: New Generation Electronic Warfare Systems Are Being Created,” Rossiyskaya 

Gazeta Online, 21 January 2016, <http://www.rg.ru/2016/01/22/oruzie.html>, accessed 10 February 2016.

Maksim Shepovalenko, “Combat Lasers of Future Wars,“ Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 2 July 2013, 

<http://vpk-news.ru/articles/16579>, accessed 10 February 2016.

Electronic Warfare Company 
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electronic warfare in the Russian Armed Forces. EW units not only protect the artillery from 

hostile targeting, but also perform a signals intelligence (SIGINT) function that tips and cues 

artillery and air defense units to the locations of potential targets. Most tactical Russian EW 

systems provide an azimuth to a potential target (within 1-2 degrees), and these systems can 

provide a general position of a given target (through triangulation) when connected to a 

command center, such as the R-330K Mobile Command Post.

It is also very likely that there is a strong relationship of EW with the Signal Troops. Although 

the Russian military presumes that GPS and GLONASS signals will be disrupted by Russia’s 

own EW units in a combat situation with a near peer, they assume radio communications 

will be available, and so there is likely much coordination with signal units to ensure friendly 

communications are not disrupted.25 In sum, Russia believes that EW capabilities are essential 

for victory with technologically unsophisticated, as well as technologically sophisticated 

opponents. These capabilities will create a contested environment for any adversary utilizing 

terrestrial or satellite radios, GPS-based positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) information, 

and especially precision guided munitions. 

25 Aleksey Ramm: “Electronic Warfare - Myths and Truths - Part 1: How Unique Are the Russian Army’s EW Assets?” 

Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 30 September 2015, <http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/27272>, accessed 

1 May 2016.

Aleksey Ramm, “Strike, Another Strike: Three Types of Robotic Combat Machine Are Being Built on a Common

Platform,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 23 December 2015, <http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/28600>, 

accessed 1 May 2016.

Anatoliy Yermolin and Aleksey Durnovo, “Technical Reequipping of Airborne Troops Communications Subunits 

and Their Provision With Modern Automated Control Systems,” Ekho Moskvy Online, 17 October 2015, <http://

echo.msk.ru/programs/voensovet/1641616-echo/>, accessed 1 May 2016.

Russian Concept of the Aspects of Electronic Warfare
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Russian EW Systems Organic to Maneuver Brigades

R-378AM Automated HF Communications Jammer System

The R-378AM High Frequency (HF) communications jammer is designed for the detection, 

finding direction, and of enemy HF radio frequencies. These HF frequencies may be 

tactical command and control links at fixed frequencies with conventional waveforms, in 

programmable and automatic frequency tuning modes, as well as for transmitting short 

encoded messages. The jammer also provides analysis and selection of emitters’ signal 

parameters. 

Operating frequency range 1.5 – 30 MHz

Panoramic scan rate 480 MHz/s

Jamming output power 1.0 kW

Narrowband 3.0; 10.0; 20.0; 50.0

Response rate (from detection to jamming) 15 ms

Multitarget jamming capability up to 5

Deployment time less than 40 minutes

Scan rate up to 7,000 MHz/s

Detection-to-suppression time less than 5 ms

Frequency hopping signal detection up to 300 hop/s

Crew 4

Truck chassis Ural-43293

RP-377L (LORANDIT) Compact Multifunctional Radiomonitoring, Direction-Finding And 

Jamming Complex 

The RP-377L (LORANDIT) Compact Multifunctional Radio monitoring, Direction-Finding and 

Jamming Complex provides for the search of, position location, and jamming of VHF/UHF 

radio electronic communications. The RP-377L complex can be vehicle mounted or placed 

in two cases and four canvas bags, and be carried by 2-3 persons. Depending on mission 

requirements, multiple complexes can work together, with one complex configured as a 

command post.

Frequency range (search and detection) 20-2000 MHz

Frequency range (direction and finding) 25-2000 MHz

RMS direction-finding error not more than 3 degrees

Instant monitoring bandwidth 180-1200 kHz

Types of searching signals FM, AM, SSB, FSK, PSK

Transmitter output greater than 100 W

Deployment time 15 minutes
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R-330B/R-330T Automated VHF Jamming System 

The upgraded R-330B/R-330T Very High Frequency (VHF) jamming system is designed for 

detection, direction finding and jamming of VHF communications. The jamming system 

provides analysis and selection of emitters’ signal parameters. The R-330B/R-330T VHF 

jamming system consists of an equipment vehicle on a wheeled (R-330T) or tracked (R-330B) 

chassis, a diesel electric power station mounted on a two-axle trailer (R-330T), or MT-LBu 

armored tracked chassis (R-330B). 

Frequency range 30–100 MHz

Transmitter power 1 kW

Jammed RF links (at fixed frequencies) 3

Jammed RF links (with frequency hop) 1

RMS direction-finding error not more than 3 degrees

Azimuth search coverage 360 degrees

Types of received signals AM, FM, CW, SSB, ISB, FSK, PSK, keying, PFT

Scan rate up to 7,000 MHz/s

Detection-to-suppression time less than 5 ms

Frequency hopping signal detection up to 300 hop/s

Crew 4

Truck chassis Ural-43293

R-330T

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

Р-330Т
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R-934B VHF/UHF Aircraft Communications Automated Jamming Station

R-934B Automated VHF-UHF Aircraft Radio Communication Jamming Station is designed 

for detection, direction finding, position finding (using two jamming stations) and jamming 

of VHF-UHF aircraft radio communication means, tactical aircraft guidance systems in 100-

150 MHz and 220-400 MHz frequency bands as well as terrestrial radio communications and 

mobile radios in 100-400 MHz that use fixed frequencies, frequency hopping and transmission 

of short telecode messages. R-934B AJS can operate under a command post or be remotely 

controlled.

Frequency range 100-400 MHz

Transmitter power 500 W

Jammed RF links (at fixed frequencies) 4

Jammed RF links (wit frequency hop) 1

RMS direction-finding error not more than 3 degrees

Time of deployment 30 minutes

Crew 3

Types of jamming signals:

- high-frequency signal modulated in frequency by noise with deviation of 800 and

6000 Hz

- high-frequency signal modulated in frequency shift of 5, 10, 20 and 40 kHz and unit

intervals of 150 and 800 μs

- high-frequency signal manipulated in phase (0–180°) with discretization of unit

elements

R-934UM

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

Р-934
Specialty Branches

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Frequency range 100-2000 MHz

Transmitter power 10 kw

Suppression range 20-30 km

RMS direction-finding error not more than 2 degrees

Time of deployment less than 40 minutes

Crew 4

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

P-330ZH “Zhitel” 

Automated Jamming 

Station 

The P-330ZH “Zhitel” 

automated jamming 

station provides for the 

automated detection, 

direction finding and signal 

analysis of radio emission 

sources in the designated 

operating frequency range. 

The system is capable 

of disrupting finding 

mobile ground stations 

(user terminals) of the 

“INMARSAT”, “IRIDIUM,” and 

GSM-900/1800 satellite 

communication systems, 

and the “NAVSTAR” (GPS) 

satellite navigation system. 

and the base stations cellular 

communication system. 

These signals are completely 

suppressed within a radius 

of 20-30 kilometers from 

the operating station. 

The P-330ZH “Zhitel” can 

operate under an automated 

command post, or operate 

independently.

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense

Р-330Ж
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SPR-2 (RTUT-B) Artillery Radio Proximity Fuse Jamming Station

The SPR-2 (Rtut-B) jamming station is designed to protect friendly troops and equipment 

against artillery fire equipped with radio proximity fuses by causing premature detonation. 

The station is powered by a dedicated generator (primary source) or onboard electric system 

(standby source). The SPR-2 station is mounted on a variety chassis, and can operate on the 

move. 

Protected area .5 km 

Frequency range 95-420 MHz

Energy potential not less than 300 W

Deployment times less than 4 minutes

Crew 2

RTUT-BM

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

R-330K Mobile Automated Command Post

The R-330K Mobile Automated Command Post is designed for centralized control of 

automated jamming stations, such as R-330T, R-378A, R-934B. The R-330K Automated 

Command Post consists of protected computers with special software in a local area network, 

radios, data transfer equipment to synchronize automated jamming stations cycles, an 

embedded electric generator, as well as life-support system. 

Controlled jamming stations up to 20 stations

Deployment time less than 40 minutes

Crew 4

Communication links (radio relay) 2

Communication links (wire) 4

Transport chassis Ural-43203 truck

Power consumption not greater than 8 kW

Ртуть-БМ
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Borisoglebsk-2

The Borisoglebsk-2 is one of Russia’s newest tactical EW systems, and started replacing 

the R-330 “Mandat” in 2012. Although there have been few published details about the 

characteristics of the Borisoglebsk-2, it reportedly can suppress twice the frequency 

bandwidth of its predecessor in the HF and UHF bands, 100 times faster. There are also 

reports that it has the capability to disrupt mobile satellite communications and radar 

navigation systems. The Borisoglebsk-2 consists of several different systems mounted on 

MT-LBu chassis.

R-330BMB

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense

Р-330БМВ
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(Right) The graphic on the facing page shows an enemy brigade has seized and occupies the 

high ground to the west of the city as well as four bridges on roads leading into the city. The 

enemy brigade is split by the east-west river and its feeders. Russian forces hold the east bank 

of the north-south branch of the river and one bridge on the north-south road to the city. 

They are contesting ownership of another bridge on the central east-west road. The Russians 

are conducting an advance to capture the northernmost east-west road bridges and attacking 

into the enemy brigade along the central east-west road.

Russian electronic warfare involves 

the normal missions of controlling 

and denying the enemy use of the 

electromagnetic spectrum through 

electronic attack (countermeasures), 

electronic protection (countercounter-measures) and electronic 

warfare support (search, interception, 

location and identification measures). 

However, the Russians include physical 

destruction as an integrated part 

of electronic warfare. To do this, 

they will assign high-performance 

aircraft, helicopter gunships, artillery 

and mortars and ground assault to 

the assets included in an electronic 

warfare maneuver group. The 

electronic warfare maneuver group 

may be formed in support of an attack, 

withdrawal or march under threatened 

conditions. The Russian maneuver 

brigade’s electronic warfare company 

is a central actor in this effort but the 

effort is controlled by the brigade.

As the Russian forces attack out of the city going north, the electronic warfare company jams 

the enemy brigade communications between the brigade headquarters and its battalions, 

between the brigade and several bridge and road intersection sites, and between controlling 

headquarters and bridge sites. Fighter-bomber and helicopter gun ship strikes launch against 

critical communications sites. Air assault landings are conducted against the enemy brigade 

headquarters and one of its battalion headquarters. The brigade artillery group and battalion 

mortars are involved with supporting the ground attack, however, these assets may also be 

attached or tasked for electronic warfare physical destruction missions.
S

pecialty Branches

299

Actions of an Electronic Warfare Maneuver Group in Support of the Offense
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RB-531B Infauna

The RB-531B Infauna is intended primarily to provide protection from radio controlled mines 

and explosive devices, and disrupt enemy tactical communications. The RB-531B Infauna 

is mounted on a modified BTR-80 chassis, has a crew of two, operates in the 20-2020 MHz 

frequency range, and is in use by the Russian VDV. 

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
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301

Engineer Troops

The Engineer Troops is a Specialty Branch in the Ground Forces formed to accomplish 

complex engineering missions in support of combined-arms operations and combat that 

require specialized training of personnel and the use of engineer equipment, as well as 

inflicting casualties on the enemy through the use of engineer charges and explosives. The 

engineers are organized into formations, units and subunits for various purposes: engineer 

reconnaissance, combat engineering, obstacle construction and clearing, engineer assault, 

road construction, pontoon bridge construction, river assault-crossing, camouflage, 

engineering technology, field water supply, etc.

- engineer reconnaissance of the enemy, terrain and features;

- construction (layout) of field fortifications (firing positions, ditches and

communication trenches, shelters, bunkers, dugouts, etc.) and the layout of field 

troop installations (residential, logistical, medical);

- the planning and layout of engineer obstacles, including installation of mine fields, 

demolition work, the planning and layout of non-explosive obstacles (anti-tank 

ditches, scarps, counterscarps, stakes, etc.);

- clearing mines from areas and key points;

- preparing and maintaining march routes and roads;

- equipping and maintaining ferries across water barriers, including the construction of

bridges;

- extracting and purifying water in the field and other tasks.

In addition, engineers are involved in countering the intelligence systems and targeting by 

the enemy’s weapons (camouflage), creating the illusion of troops and facilities, providing 

misinformation and conducting actions to deceive the enemy as well as to eliminate the 

effects of enemy weapons of mass destruction.

In peacetime, military engineers carry out a number of important and socially significant 

missions: they clear areas of explosive hazards; they assist in the aftermath of man-made 

accidents, catastrophes and natural disasters; and they prevent the destruction of bridges 

and waterworks by floating ice. Engineer Troops are being equipped with new, high-quality, 

highly effective, versatile equipment. This equipment is built with standard components 

and modules and is replacing the redundant non-standardized equipment built for the same 

purpose.26

There is an organic engineer battalion in the maneuver brigade. Its function is to aid in the 

mobility of own forces and hinder or deny the mobility of enemy forces. In order to do so, the 

battalion provides route clearing, construction and maintenance; engineer reconnaissance; 

water crossing support; camouflage/deception; water supply; mine field and other obstacle 

breaching; mine field and other obstacle construction and preparation of defenses.

Russia has a less-developed road system than in the West. Paved, multi-lane roads in good 

condition are less common, particularly away from the urban centers. Dirt roads are common 

in the countryside and Russian engineers are skilled in route clearance, maintenance and 

26 “Engineer Troops,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, <http://structure.mil.ru/structure/

forces/ground/structure/engineers.htm>, accessed 1 May 2016.
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Engineer Battalion
Specialty Branches

303

construction. Russian combat engineers classify roads as directional (frontal-leading to the 

combat front; lateral-running parallel to the line of contact); primary (march column route, 

supply route, evacuation route) or auxiliary (access road, detour road, reserve road and 

dummy road); and by the nature of the traffic (wheeled, tracked or combined wheel and 

track). They may be further classified/restricted as battalion, brigade (division), army and 

military district roads. Military roads and march column routes will incorporate existing roads 

and build new ones using locally-available material. They must support the prescribed rate 

of movement, pass through the locale with the best defensibility and concealment, do not 

require an excessive amount of preparation, have sections where they can bypass narrow 

sites that might hinder the spacing of the column, and bypass those areas that are subject to 

enemy interdiction.27

Movement

During a march, the engineer commander will constitute a movement support detachment 

[отряд обеспечения движения] (OOD) for each column. The mission of the OOD is to move 

behind the advance guard or forward detachment (about two hours ahead of the main 

body) to conduct engineer reconnaissance and to improve the axis of advance by filling in 

craters, constructing bypasses, improving rugged sections, bridging minor gaps or repairing 

bridges and clearing paths through minefields. The OOD will have a force of motorized rifle 

or tank troops to protect its bulldozers, cranes, dump trucks, tank or truck-launched bridges, 

mine clearers as well as trucks carrying explosives and pierced steel plating (PSP).28 Should 

the march culminate in an attack, the OOD then moves behind the attacking first echelon 

or prepares a route for the commitment of the second echelon. OODs are primarily used in 

the attack for mine and obstacle breaching. OODs may also be constituted in the defense to 

prepare concealed counter-attack routes.

The engineer battalion route construction 

and clearing equipment includes four BAT-2 

combat engineer vehicles. The battalion 

also has two DZ-180A wheeled road 

scrapers and a KRAZ-257B wheeled crane. 

The battalion’s four TMM-3 or TMM-6 trucklaunched bridge sets are each capable of 

laying down a 10 meter span. The spans 

can be connected. This gives the option of a 

10.5 meter, 21 meter, 31.5 meter or 42 meter 

bridge that is 3.8 meters wide.29 Depending 

on the terrain, all or most of these are part 

of the OOD. The BAT-2 combat engineer 

vehicles are almost always included. These armored tracked bulldozers have an adjustable 

width dozer blade and a two ton crane with a maximum 7.3 meter boom reach. It has a 700 

horsepower diesel engine, can ford up to 1.3 meters of water and can winch up to 25 tons.

27 V.V. Varenyshev, K. N. Dubinin, and I. P. Mydragey, Combat Engineer Preparation: a Teaching Test [Военноинженерная подготовка: Учебное пособие], Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1982, 79. 28 Ibid, 198. 29 Ibid,165.

BAT-2 Combat Engineer Vehicle

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

БАТ
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Elements or all of the mine clearing platoon may accompany the OOD. The platoon has two 

UR-77 mine clearing vehicles and two IMR-3M combat engineer vehicles. The UR-77 “Dragon” 

(ustanovka razminirovaniya) is a mine clearing vehicle with two launch ramps on its turret 

mounted on the same chassis as the 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzer. The ramps fire 

rockets towing line charges of explosive hose. A single line charge will clear a path of 90 

meters by 6 meters. The UR-83 is a similar system, but is not mounted on a vehicle chassis. 

The IMR-3M is a combat engineer vehicle built on the T-90 tank chassis. It has a multipurpose 

bulldozer blade as well as a mine plow. It has a telescopic boom with an 8.15 meter reach that 

can be fitted with a manipulator. The boom can lift 2.2 tons. 

Obstacles

Neither the United States nor Russia are 

signatory to the Ottawa Convention 

that bans the ownership and use of antipersonnel mines. The United States has 

agreed to abide by the treaty except in 

defense of South Korea. Russia continues 

to stockpile and train in the use of antipersonnel and anti-tank land mines and has 

not announced any plans to sign the Ottawa 

Convention. Land mines still constitute 

a significant part of Russian defensive 

and offensive actions. Land mines can 

be emplaced manually or by minelaying 

vehicles/trailers, helicopters, artillery fire and 

aviation bombs. The Russian engineer commander will normally constitute a mobile obstacle 

detachment [подвижный отряд заграждений] (POZ) that can quickly emplace mines to 

protect a flank or block an attack or support a counterattack. The POZ normally works with 

a flank security detachment or the anti-tank reserve to lay rapid minefields and create other 

obstacles, primarily against an armored thrust. Besides mine-laying vehicles and trailers, the 

POZ may use ditching machines and explosives to create craters and downed tree obstacles. 

Anti-tank mines are usually laid by vehicles and trailers or helicopters whereas anti-personnel 

UR-77

Images Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

KDMB Armored Wheeled Bulldozer

IMR-3M Combat Engineer Vehicle

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

ИМР

УР БКТ
Specialty Branches

305

land mines are normally laid by hand. The Russians have a variety of enemy-triggered and 

command detonated mines. Howitzers and MLRS can lay both anti-tank and anti-personnel 

scatterable mines.30

The Russians prefer short, but deep, 

minefields to long, shallow ones which 

may lack stopping power. Brigade armored 

minelayers can lay a quick 1000 meter 

minefield in three panels of approximately 

3,000 meters, 1000 meters and 300 meters 

from the forward edge of the battle area in 

under ten minutes. The three GMZ-3 tracked 

mining vehicles of the obstacle platoon 

can lay a 1,200-meter, three-row minefield, 

containing 624 mines, in 26 minutes. The 

Russians prefer to lay minefields shortly 

before an enemy advance to prevent enemy 

knowledge of their location. Defensive antitank minefields laid out sometime before the 

battle are normally 200-300 meters wide and 60-120 meters in depth with four rows per 

minefield. These minefields are carefully surveyed and placed on likely avenues of approach. 

Antipersonnel minefields are placed on likely dismounted infantry avenues of approach. 

They are located in front of fighting positions or in gaps between fighting positions and 

are 30-300 meters wide and 10-50 meters deep. They usually contain a mixture of blast and 

fragmentation mines. Placing mines by hand is time-consuming and the Russians employ the 

UMZ-3 remote mine delivery system for deploying antipersonnel mines, as well as antitank 

mines. UMZ stands for universal’nogo minnogo zagraditelya (universal mine-layer). The UMZ 

consists of six firing modules mounted on the back of a ZiL-131 truck. Each module has thirty 

firing tubes, so the UMZ has 180 firing tubes. Depending on the type minefield desired, the 

UMZ can lay from 180 to 11,520 mines 

without reloading. The UMZ can launch an 

antitank or antipersonnel minefield 30-60 

meters from itself while the truck is driving 

from 10 to 40 kilometers per hour. It takes 

two men from one and a half to two hours 

to reload the UMZ. One UMZ can lay a three 

row minefield stretching from 150 to 1,500 

meters long, depending on the mine that 

is used. The UMZ can be used to restore 

a breached or depleted minefield during 

combat.31 Command detonated mines are 

often placed directly in front of fighting 

30 “Mobile obstacle detachment” [Подвижный отряд заграждений], Military Encyclopedia [Военная

Энциклопедия], Volume 6, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 2002, 434-435. 31 Dorian D’Aria and Lester Grau, “Instant Obstacles: Russian Remotely Delivered Mines”, Red Thrust Star, January 

1996, <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/mines/mines.htm>, accessed 1 July 2016.

GMZ-3 Tracked Mine Layer

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

Uran-6 Mine Clearing Robot

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

ГМЗ
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positions. As time and resources permit, Russian engineers construct minefields within the 

defensive positions to slow and canalize an enemy attack, support a fire line or protect the 

flanks of the defense or a counterattack. Engineers also mine roads, bridges and fords and 

likely water crossings.32 

Defensive positions

When on the defensive and time permits, Russians dig in. They start with crew-served 

weapons positions and two-man fighting positions, then connecting fighting trenches and 

bunkers. Much of this work is done by soldiers with shovels, however most combat vehicles 

are equipped for self-emplacement and engineer bulldozers and trenching machines 

supplement these efforts. The priority field construction tasks for the engineers are security 

zone or forward positions, CPs, artillery firing positions, artillery ammunition storage, artillery 

transport and communication trenches. 

(Right) The graphic on the facing page shows the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade defending in two 

echelons with a forward position. The enemy is defending along an international boundary, so the 

Russian Army is apparently constituting a defense before the outbreak of hostilities. In the forward 

position, the 7th and 8th Motorized Rifle Companies from the 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion (second 

echelon) plus a tank company from the tank battalion (second echelon) are establishing defensive 

positions opposite the international border. A tank ambush and a motorized rifle ambush cover 

gaps in the forward position. The engineers may assist these companies in digging in. Each of the 

company positions require constructing 11 dug-in vehicle fighting positions, a personnel bunker, 

three command bunkers, 13 covered trenches, five observation posts, and 11 squad fighting 

positions (except for the tank company). Behind the forward positions is a stream crossed by two 

bridges, the bridge to the north runs over the top of a dam. The annotation “time” would indicate 

the time by which the construction would be completed.

Two motorized rifle platoons from the 1st and 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalions are dug-in forward of 

the main defense. Their purpose is to provide cover for the withdrawal of the companies of the 

forward position, deceive the enemy as to the location of the main defense and to canalize the 

attacking enemy into the fire sac between the 1st and 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalions. Each platoon 

position requires the construction of three dug-in vehicle fighting positions, one command bunker, 

four covered trenches, five observation posts and three squad fighting positions.

The first echelon defense is manned by the 1st and 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalions. The 1st and 2nd 

MRBs have two companies forward and one back and defends in two echelons. There is a dummy 

platoon position between the two battalions. It is manned by a platoon from the 2nd MRB and 

has a fallback fighting position behind it. The purpose of this position is to create a penetration 

point for the attacking enemy. The enemy will attack, thinking that the two forward platoons are 

the forward edge of the defense. The southern bridge and main defense fire will guide the enemy 

to the false position. After a fight, the platoon will fall back to its actual position, creating a fire 

sac and blunting the penetration. The advancing enemy will then be caught in flanking cross 

fire. The 2nd MRB/s northern company is short one platoon (the one in the false position) and so 

32 E. S. Kolibernov, V. I Kornev and A. A Soskov, Инженерное Обеспечение Боя [Engineer support of Combat], 

Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1984, 87-111.
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pecialty Branches

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Engineer Fortifications in the Brigade Defense
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defends with one platoon forward and one back (when it pulls back from the forward position). 

The two platoons have been incorporated into the defense of its southern neighboring MRC and 

comes under its temporary command. The northern company commander will fight the fire sac 

fight. The southern MRC commander will fight the forward platoon fight and then withdraw it to 

his second echelon position. Both forward MRBs have an engineer platoon assigned to help with 

fortifications. Field fortifications in both forward battalions will require construction of 39 BMP 

fighting positions, 9 mortar firing positions, 42 vehicle shelters, 9 personnel bunkers, 37 command 

bunkers, 70 covered trenches, 18 observation posts and 27 squad fighting positions.

Behind the first echelon battalions, the brigade 

commander has established three stop lines for 

the antitank reserve. Number one covers the 

southern bridge approach and fire sac. Number 

two covers the brigade southern flank. Number 

three covers the brigade northern flank. All 

require dug-in positions in advance. The brigade 

commander also established two fortified firing 

lines –both containing and firing into the fire sac 

created by the false position in the first echelon 

defense. Number one tank is the tank battalion 

line to the rear of the 2nd MRB. Number two mrb 

is for two companies of the 3rd MRB. Number 

one mrb is also a firing line for the 3rd MRB as is 

advances to occupy prepared positions to block the fire sac if needed. Construction of fortifications 

to support the anti-tank stop line number three and the three firing lines and positions to deal with 

the fire sac includes 39 vehicle fighting positions, 2-3 kilometers of communications trenches and 9 

mortar firing positions. A PZM trenching and digging machine and a platoon are assigned to this 

effort. 

The brigade artillery group’s howitzer and MLRS battalions are dug in at primary and alternate 

firing positions in the area between the two defensive echelons. That also contains the assembly 

area for the antitank reserve, the mobile obstacle detachment (POZ) and the anti-assault reserve 

(a motorized rifle company from the 3rd MRB). Air defense elements are dispersed across both 

echelons with MANPADS and anti-aircraft guns forward and missiles further back. The brigade 

command post is located just in front of the second echelon defense. Construction of the brigade 

command post entails 1 observation post, 2 reinforced bunkers, 8 covered trenches, 9 vehicle 

shelters for the command post vehicles, 8 vehicle shelters for other vehicles, and 7 fighting 

positions.

The second echelon defense will be manned by two companies of the 3rd MRB and the tank 

battalion. The 3rd MRB defends with two companies forward and a platoon-sized reserve. An 

engineer platoon will assist the battalion after it completes other work. The tank battalion 

defends with two companies forward and one back. An engineer platoon assists the tank 

battalion in constructing 31 tank fighting positions, 2 BMP shelters, 18 truck shelters, 5 personnel 

bunkers, 11 command bunkers, 45 covered trenches, 13 observation posts and 4-5 kilometers of 

Lieutenant General Yuriy Stavitskiy

Chief of the Russian Armed Forces’ Engineer Troops

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
Specialty Branches

309

communications trenches. The battalion will use its tank dozers for much of this effort. 

The brigade rear services area (this graphic is not to scale) is located further back and contains the 

alternate brigade command post, the material support company, the pontoon bridge set and the 

maintenance company. It requires the construction of 1 personnel bunker, 2 command bunkers, 8 

covered trenches, 3 vehicle shelters for CP vehicles, 8 vehicle shelters and 3 fighting positions. An 

engineer squad assists the rear area units in this effort. The Russian Army is a digging army and a 

brigade has an abundance of engineer equipment to help it.

Camouflage

The purpose of camouflage is to conceal soldiers, weapons, positions and movement quickly; 

disorient the enemy and create an advantage for the force. It is an ongoing process that 

includes hiding the force; portraying another force using mockups, dummy equipment and 

positions, and corner reflectors; using smoke, light and noise discipline and signals deception. 

Soldiers are responsible for camouflaging themselves, their weapons and their positions. 

Engineers advise and inspect camouflage and conceal large and important facilities and 

important points such as river-crossing sites, roads, road traffic, command posts and fueling 

areas. Engineers create phony positions within and outside the defensive area.33

Hydrology

Large rivers and lakes dominate Eurasia and 

have served as major arteries of industry 

and commerce, defensive barriers, lines of 

communication and avenues of advance. 

Armies are more accustomed to solving 

the problem of crossing rivers rather than 

controlling stretches or the entirety of the 

river or lake. Yet control of the river or lake 

is often more decisive to a campaign than 

a crossing. In Russia, the Volga, Vistula, 

Danube, Dnieper, Oder and Amur Rivers form 

operational/strategic barriers. The Danube, 

Dnieper, Oka, Koma, Neman, Don and Amur 

Rivers form avenues of approach. Lakes Ladoga, Onezh, Beloye, Il’men, and Chyda may serve 

as barriers or avenues of approach. During conflict, control of the rivers and lakes is often 

vital to controlling a country. A brigade may engage in riverine combat and operations to 

deal with significant bodies of water.

Rivers start on high ground and run to lower. Upriver, the river is normally deeper, narrower 

and faster. The river valley is V-shaped and the river forms waterfalls, rapids, gullies, and 

potholes. River erosion is primarily at the river bottom. Mid-river, it widens and slows as 

the slope lessens. The river valley widens and forms a flood plain. Erosion is from the river 

bottom and banks. Downriver, it widens more, becoming shallower and slower. The river 

slope is gradual. The erosion is primarily from the banks. At places the river may split or bend 

(meander). The river may form terraces, levees, and swamps. Where the river meets the sea or 

33 Varenyshev, Dubinin, and Mydragey, 138-146.

TMM-3 Bridge Layer

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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lake, the river may braid over its flood plain, forming multiple channels and islands. 

River bottoms tend to change depending where they are on the river. Upriver, the bottom 

is usually bed rock, and boulders. Mid-river, the bottom is usually gravel and sand in the 

channel with fine sandy mud over older sediment closer to the banks. Downriver, the bottom 

is usually mud and fine sand. Where the river meets the sea or lake, the river bed rises and the 

river becomes shallower from the built-up sediment. River aquatic vegetation increases midriver and downriver.

Rivers are best crossed at bends which loop into the side of the crossing element. This means 

that the channel runs next to the bank held by the crossing party and the deepest part of the 

river is closest to the crossing party. Further, the opposite bank is the shallowest part of the 

river. Thus the crossing party can deal with the hardest part of the crossing from the adjacent, 

friendly shore and land on the shallowest. Crossing at bends which loop into the side of the 

crossing element may also provide the opportunity to cut off an enemy force defending along 

the river bank. 

River Bend and Crossing Sites
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311

Canals are manmade, generally straight, of uniform depth, and have steep sides. They are 

difficult to cross due to the high, steep, often-concrete banks. They have less current than 

nearby rivers and are primarily located on flat ground. Special locks and other devices are 

sometimes needed to deal with changes in elevation. 

Lake and inland sea shores vary from shallow and sediment-covered to steep and inaccessible 

due to prevailing winds and geologic formations. Large lakes and inland seas can be 

treacherous during harsh weather and high winds. Key terrain in riverine operations includes 

population centers, industry, bridges, fords, dams, headwaters, river junctures, levees, canals, 

pumps, effluent stations, and dominating ground that threatens primary movement on or 

adjacent to the waterway.

Riverine operations are axial or trans-sectional. They can deal with control of the entire length 

of a waterway (axial) or with a slice of it, usually for water-crossing (trans-axial).34 The Russian 

experience with axial riverine operations is to constitute a naval river flotilla, with a strong 

naval infantry contingent, which is subordinated to the operational ground commander. The 

Russians have spent a great deal of time and resources on developing trans-axial capabilities. 

In Eastern and Central Europe, an advancing or retreating army can expect to meet a sixmeter wide water obstacle every 20 kilometers, up to a 100 meter-wide water obstacle 

every 35-60 kilometers, a 100 to 300 meter wide obstacle every 100-150 kilometers and a 

water obstacle over 300 meters wide every 250-300 kilometers.35 River crossing capabilities 

depend, of course, on the width, current, banks, river bottom and surrounding terrain of 

the river crossing site. The optimum way to cross a river is over an established heavy-duty 

34 Much of this section is taken from Lester W. Grau and Leroy W. Denniston, “When a River runs through it: 

Riverine Operations in Contemporary Conflict”, Infantry July-September 2014 edition, <http://www.benning.

army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2014/Jul-Sep/Grau.html>, accessed 1 June 2016.

For a discussion of riverine naval flotilla operations, see Lester. W. Grau, “River Flotillas in Support of Defensive 

Ground Operations: The Soviet Experience, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, January-March 2016 edition, 

<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/River%20Flotillas%20in%20Support%20of%20Defensive%20

Ground%20Operations%20The%20Soviet%20Experience.pdf>, accessed 1 June 2016. 35 Conversations with Charles Dick, citing Soviet sources.

PTS-2 Tracked Amphibious Transport

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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bridge or in the dead of winter when the 

river is frozen over solid. The Russians have 

amphibious personnel carriers, artillery, 

air defense, and antitank combat vehicles. 

Tanks are equipped with snorkels and can 

cross rivers with good bottoms and nottoo-much depth (5.5 meters). The Russians 

have truck-launched and tracked launched 

bridges for narrow waterways. They have 

vehicle ferries, prefabricated bridges and 

assault boats for major waterways. Russian 

engineers can also construct bridges using 

local materials (trees, stone). During World 

War II, the Russians were skilled at building 

underwater bridges-bridges that were a 

foot or so under the water so they could not 

be detected by aircraft, but could easily be 

driven over by trucks.

The Russian Army conducts two types of 

river crossing-unopposed and opposed. 

The unopposed river crossing [переправа

через реку] is conducted against little or 

no effective opposition. The opposed river 

crossing [форсирование] is conducted 

against an effective opposition on the 

obstacle line. The attack from the march 

(hasty attack) is the preferred method 

of conducting an opposed river crossing. Should that fail, a deliberate attack will be 

Elements of a Pontoon Bridge Unit

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

MTU-90 Heavy Bridge Layer

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

TMM-6 Bridge Layer

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

ТММ

ПМП
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considered.36 The brigade’s engineer battalion has the previously mentioned four TMM-3 or 

TMM-6 truck-launched bridge sets and a PP-61 pontoon bridge company capable of spanning 

268 meters. A 268 meter long bridge can carry 60 tons, a 165 meter bridge can carry 90 tons 

while a 141 meter bridge can carry 120 tons. It takes under an hour to emplace with a welltrained engineer company.37 It has six BMK-255-1 cutter vessels to help in the assembly and 

in maintaining its position in the current. In addition it has seven PTS-2 tracked amphibious 

transports. Each can carry up to ten tons. Not part of the engineer battalion, but available in 

the tank brigade is the MTU-90 heavy bridge layer. Based on the T-90 tank chassis, the vehicle 

can lay a 25 meter bridge in under three minutes. It can support 50 tons.38 

A hasty attack across a water obstacle from the march is conducted to maintain the high 

tempo of the advance, seize bridgeheads, rapidly develop the opposite shore or secure an 

assembly area for an upcoming operation. Water crossings differ by season and weather. In 

the winter, crossing depends on the strength and stability of the ice. In the spring, there is 

drifting ice and flooding. In the summer and fall, TO&E and attached crossing equipment 

can be used. If the water obstacle is less than five meters deep, and the river banks and 

bottom are suitable, tanks can snorkel across. Crossing on a wide front at a quick tempo 

using a forward detachment or advanced guard is preferred. The crossing plan designates 

the crossing sector, the departure area, the attack crossing line (1 to 2 kilometers from the 

water’s edge), the troop embarkation or cargo loading area (5 to 6 kilometers from the water’s 

edge) and the tank sealing area for snorkeling (also 5 to 6 kilometers from the water’s edge). 

Air defense assets will cover the crossing and preparation areas. If possible, an air assault 

may conduct a landing to seize the far shore.39 A deliberate attack will normally involve far 

more artillery and aviation preparation and involve an attack from the march through friendly 

forces in contact with the enemy. Smoke, air defense and counterbattery efforts will be 

particularly critical. 

36 Kolibernov, Kornev and Soskov, 161.

37 “Russian military forces,” as found at: <http://militaryforces.ru/weapons-3-73-470.html>, accessed 16 June 

2016.

38 Ibid. 39 A. F. Bulatov, “Forcing a water obstacle” [Форсирование водной преграды], Military Encyclopedia [Военная

Энциклопедия], Volume 8, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 2004, 276-278.

Pontoon Bridging Operations

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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(Right) The graphic on the facing page provides further details of engineer support to the above 

brigade defense when the enemy attacks and the brigade conducts one of its counterattacks. In 

this instance, the enemy attacked with two reinforced mechanized battalions reinforced with a 

reinforced tank company. The two battalions were stopped by the brigade defense, but the enemy 

forced his way through the false position into the fire sac. The brigade commander committed the 

antitank reserve to “Stop Line Number 3.” The brigade commander decides to commit his northern 

counterattack from the 3rd MRB position to drive the remaining enemy from the fire sac and restore 

the main defense. There is a small lake and a stream in front of the 3rd MRB position that has two 

bridges over the stream (this was not shown on the previous graphic). The engineers installed 25 

corner reflectors on the northern and southern counterattack routes to conceal movement from 

enemy radar. They also installed two phony radar transmitters on the northern and southern 

routes. They also provided overhead screening over part of both routes. At the deployment line, 

the engineers installed laser reflectors to defeat beam-riding artillery and aviation ordnance. The 

engineers installed reflective markers of different colors marking the deployment routes for the 

motorized rifle and tank platoons to the counterattack line.

While war gaming the counterattack, the brigade determined that the weak points were the two 

bridges that the counterattack force would have to use. The brigade posited that the enemy might 

attack the northern bridge with scatterable mines (FASCAM) and destroy the southern bridge 

with air strikes. The counterattack went over these bridges. Engineer reconnaissance determined 

new routes for the counter attack and, in the north, laid a tank-launched bridge. In the south, the 

engineer reconnaissance determined a new counter attack route across a stream ford. Continuing 

to war game the counterattack, the brigade determined that the enemy could fire FASCAM to block 

the counterattack during the enemy withdrawal. The engineer battalion alerted and positioned 

minefield clearing assets (UR-77, BAT-2, IMR-3M) to deal with such an eventuality. Some of the 

tanks of the tank battalion are equipped with mine plows and could also be used if needed.
Specialty Branches

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Engineer Support of a Counterattack
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NBC Defense Troops

The Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defense (NBC) Troops of the Russian Ground 

Forces are intended to mitigate the Ground Forces losses associated with environments 

that are contaminated with radioactive, chemical and biological contaminates. The NBC 

Troops ensure that the Ground Forces can fulfill their combat tasks in NBC contaminated 

environments, as well as enhancing their survivability and protection from high-precision 

weapons and other weapons.

The basis of the NBC Defense Troops are multipurpose NBC brigades that have subunits 

capable of performing NBC tasks, these tasks include:

- identification and assessment of the radiological, chemical and biological

environment, the scale and effects of radiological, chemical and biological damage;

- the protection of units from radiological, chemical and biological contamination;

- reducing the visibility of troops and facilities;

- disaster (damage) recovery;

- use of flame and thermobaric weapons.

The NBC Defense Troops are organized and conduct operations in normal and NBC 

conditions, and in hostile and non-hostile environments, and includes:

- nuclear detection;

- NBC reconnaissance and control;

- the collection and processing of data and information on radiological, chemical and

biological environments;

- the notification of troops about NBC contamination;

- conducting special treatment (decontamination, degaussing and disinfection) of 

armaments, military and special equipment, buildings and other objects, as well as 

the decontamination of personnel;

- aerosol countermeasures against the enemy’s reconnaissance and targeting means.

Russia is concerned about defense against nuclear weapons as well as reconstituting the 

force and fighting on after nuclear exchange has begun. Military equipment is designed with 

overpressure systems to keep out chemical and radioactive material and the NBC Defense 

troops are practiced in vehicle, weapons 

and personnel decontamination. The NBC 

Defense Troops are a dual-purpose force 

that have both war and peace time missions, 

such as NBC contamination resulting 

from industrial accidents. In terms of 

modernization and capability development, 

the NBC Defense Troops are interested in 

increasing their capabilities to: identify and 

assess the extent and effects of weapons 

of mass destruction; integrate automated 

control systems; and developing strong 

electronic countermeasures. The Russian 

RXM-6 NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

РХМ-6
Specialty Branches

317

Federation is equipping units with: new means of NBC reconnaissance, including new NBC 

reconnaissance vehicles; new means of individual and collective NBC defense; means of 

reducing the visibility and masking; thermobaric weapons; as well improving the materials, 

formulations, methods and technical means of decontamination.40

In general, Russian NBC Defense Troops are in many ways very similar to their Western 

counterparts. They are tasked with identifying NBC threats in the environment, performing 

decontamination of troops and equipment, but they also deploy aerosols and flame weapons 

to engage the enemy.41 (In most militaries, flame weapons have traditionally belonged to the 

NBC Troops.) The popularity of such weapons has waned significantly throughout the world, 

but not so in the Russian Armed Forces. While the utility of NBC Troops in today’s asymmetric 

warfare is questioned in other armies, Russian NBC Troops firm grasp of flame weapons 

keeps them relevant, engaged, and makes them an important asset in the Russian maneuver 

commander’s toolbox. The term “flamethrower” itself conjures ideas of the Second World 

War, with soldiers carrying backpack mounted aerosol tanks spewing flame from hand-held 

wands, or the M-67 flame throwing tank that was utilized by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps 

in Vietnam. In current Russian military parlance the term “flamethrower” usually refers to 

projectile launched flame, smoke and thermobaric weapons.42

The Rocket Propelled Infantry Flamethrower (RPO)

The Rocket Propelled Infantry Flamethrower (RPO), colloquially known as the Shmel, Russian 

for bumblebee, is a family of multi-use firing devices that fire expendable rocket-assisted 

projectiles, but with a substantially different design than its prototype, the Rys . The RPO 

Shmel was first fielded in the 1980s, and proved to be a great improvement over both the 

Rys and the traditional back packed LPO-50, both of which the Shmel quickly replaced. The 

Shmel is lighter, has a longer range, and packs far more of a punch than the Rys. The RPO 40 “Troops of Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation 

Website, <http://eng.mil.ru/en/structure/forces/ground/structure/rhbz.htm>, accessed 1 May 2016. 41 Viktor Khudoleyev, “We Will Not Allow the Enemy to Steal a March,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 13 November 

2014, <http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/daty/item/19846-nakhimichit-vragu-ne-dadim>, accessed 16 

December 2014.

42 Backpack mounted flamethrowers expend most of their fuel by getting the flame to the target. Projected fuel 

aerosol canisters are a much more efficient, and lethal, use of energy.

NBC Defense Company
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Shmel proved very effective while being deployed in urban and mountainous terrain, and even 

earned the nickname “Satan Pipe” among the Afghan Mujahedeen. The thermobaric warhead of 

the Shmel was expected to kill all personnel within a 50 meter radius in an open area, and within 

an 80 cubic meter area in a closed structure. Due to the thermobaric properties of the warhead, it 

is estimated to have about the same amount of energy as a 107 mm artillery shell on impact. The 

RPO Shmel is capable of firing three types of munitions. The RPO-A is thermobaric, and is most 

often used for the destruction of buildings, bunkers, and personnel in enclosed areas. The RPO-Z is 

an incendiary munition, and the RPO-D is for smoke. The RPO Shmel was used extensively in the 

First and Second Chechen Wars, and its performance was much lauded. In 2003, The RPO Shmel-M 

entered service, the Shmel-M, also known as the RPO PDM (Increased Range and Lethality), has 

improved characteristics (weight, range, strength of blast, etc.), reportedly having about the 

same amount of energy as a 152 mm artillery shell on impact, and is replacing the RPO Shmel as 

inventories are depleted.43 The newest addition to the family is the MRO Borodach, (Small Caliber 

Infantry Flamethrower), which was fielded in 2013 and has reportedly seen service in Eastern 

Ukraine. The Borodach is not replacing the Shmel-M, but instead is likely to be a special version 

of the RPO family designed for urban warfare. The Borodach is smaller and lighter than both the 

Shmel and the Shmel-M, has a much shorter range, causes less blast damage, and has a different, 

easier to use, optical system. In terms of munitions, the projectiles are similar to the rest of the 

family: thermobaric (MRO-A), incendiary (MRO-Z), smoke (MRO-D), smoke/incendiary (MRO-DZ).44

43 Aleksey Mikhaylov, “Spetsnaz Will Receive the New Shmel,” Izvestiya Online, 31 May 2013, <http://izvestia.ru/

news/551156#ixzz2Urax7xgv>, accessed 18 December 2014.

“New Thermobaric Shell Tested in Southern Military District,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 17 

September 2013, <http://vpk.name/news/96881_v_yuvo_protestirovali_novyii_termobaricheskii_snaryad.

html>, accessed 18 December 2014.

44 MRO Borodach data as found at: Nevskii-Bastion.ru, <http://nevskii-bastion.ru/mro-a/>, accessed 18 

December 2014.

Rocket Propelled Flamethrower Characteristics
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319

Employment of the RPO

The Russian Federation believes that rocket propelled flamethrowers are best employed by 

NBC troops. Although promotional materials for these weapons tout them as “easy to use,” 

there is apparently a great deal of training provided to their operators, including a virtual 

training simulator, the 9F700-2M. The conditional usage of the thermobarics may be another 

reason they are used almost exclusively by the NBC troops, although Russia does field 

thermobaric munitions for other rocket propelled grenade systems. A Russian motorized rifle 

brigade typically has one flamethrower platoon in its NBC Defense Company. Flamethrower 

platoons usually consist of three six-man squads mounted on specialized BMP-2 (BMO1) or T-72 (BMO-T) chassised transport vehicles capable of carrying their 6 man squad 

(vehicle driver included) and 30-60 Shmel or Shmel-Ms.45 Depending on circumstances, the 

platoon may be attached as a platoon, squads, or as individual members as needed to the 

supported unit, usually a motorized rifle battalion. A common scenario for the employment 

of flamethrowers against an entrenched conventional enemy would involve a flamethrower 

platoon being attached to a motorized battalion, the flamethrower platoon advancing to 

within 1.5 to 2.0 km of the enemy line, dismounting and with each soldier carrying two 

RPOs, advancing to within 600 meters of enemy positions (the maximum effective fire rage 

within the Shmel-M), discharging their weapons, and then returning to their vehicles for 

replenishment. Aside from the flamethrower platoons found in the motorized rifle brigades, 

the Russian Federation also has flamethrower battalions in NBC Defense Brigades and 

Regiments. These assets can be attached as needed to support maneuver units and would 

almost assuredly be assigned (if available) to any maneuver commander expecting urban 

warfare 46

45 “Combat Vehicle for Flamethrower Operators (BMO-T),” btvt.narod.ru, <http://btvt.narod.ru/4/bmot/bmot.

htm>, accessed 22 December 2014.

Combat Vehicle for Flamethrower Operators (BMO-1), btvt.narod.ru <http://btvt.narod.ru/4/bmo-1.htm>, 

accessed 22 December 2014. 

46 Pavel Bagreev, “Employment of a Flamethrower Platoon in a Daytime Assault,” Armeyskiy Sbornik, August 2014.

See also, Lester W. Grau, “The Inquisitive Bumble Bee: Tactical Russian RPV May Soon Enter the Marketplace”, Red 

Thrust Star, PB-30-97-2, April 1997.

RPO Shmel-M

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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Heavy Flamethrower System 

The Heavy Flamethrower System (TOS1), colloquially known as the Burantino, 

Russian for Pinocchio, was the Soviets first 

attempt to field a heavy, rocket propelled, 

flamethrower system in the 1980s. The 

TOS-1 is a heavy flamethrower system that 

consists of two different vehicles (a launcher 

and support vehicle), but in common usage, 

the launch vehicle itself is often referred to 

as the “TOS-1.” The TOS-1 system consists 

of a Combat (launch) Vehicle (BM-1/Object 

634B) equipped with 30 220mm rocket 

tubes mounted on top of a T-72 tank chassis, 

and a Transport-Loader Vehicle (TZM-T), also on a T-72 chassis, that carries an additional set 

of rockets and a loading boom. Doctrinally, the TOS-1 was envisioned to decimate a large 

area, by charging ahead, while under the protection of tanks, launching its rockets in rapid 

succession (all 30 rockets in 7.5 seconds), and then returning to the rear for rearmament and 

redeployment. The TOS-1 has a much shorter range (approximately 3.5km), and its rockets 

were substantially less accurate than conventional artillery systems, but the combined blasts 

of the thermobaric rockets produce mutually reinforcing shockwaves that have an impressive 

effect that has been described as appearing as a nuclear explosion. The TOS-1 saw its first 

action in Afghanistan, where it was very effective in mountainous terrain, as gorges and 

valleys are favorable environments for the use of thermobarics.47

During combat actions in Afghanistan, some deficiencies were identified with the TOS-1. 

The 30 barrel rocket housing proved vulnerable to rocket propelled grenades, a dangerous 

proposition considering the volatile cargo, so the employment of the TOS-1 always required 

a substantial covering force. To correct this deficiency, Russia developed a second version 

of the TOS-1, the TOS-1A Solntsepek. The TOS-1A has an added heavy housing to protect 

the rocket tubes from premature detonation; this armor has reduced the rocket capacity 

from 30 to 24 rockets. In order to increase mobility, the T-72 chassis has an upgraded 

engine that produces 800 more horsepower than the TOS-1. The TOS-1A saw combat in 

Chechnya, its performance was well lauded in mountainous and urban environments alike.48 

Organizationally, the TOS-1 series of heavy flamethrowers are organized in a similar fashion 

as Russian artillery units, batteries generally consisting of six TOS-1 or TOS-1As (six BM-1s 

launch vehicles and six TZM-T support vehicles), with each battalion having three batteries.49

In general, the TOS-1 or TOS-1As fills the same niche as the RPO series flamethrowers, but on a 

47 Anton Valagin, “Buratino Sets Alight: How Flamethrower System That Frightened Militants to Death Is 

Organized,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 16 May 14, <http://m.rg.ru/2014/05/16/tos-site.html>, accessed 17 

December 2014.

48 Anton Valagin, “Buratino Sets Alight: How Flamethrower System That Frightened Militants to Death Is 

Organized,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 16 May 14, <http://m.rg.ru/2014/05/16/tos-site.html>, accessed 17 

December 2014. See also, Lester W. Grau and Timothy Smith, “A ‘Crushing’ Victory: Fuel-Air Explosives and Grozny 

2000, The Marine Corps Gazette, August 2000, <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/fuelair/fuelair.

htm>, accessed 1 July 2016. 49 As discussed at http://www.anna-news.info/node/11822, accessed 17 December 2014. 

TOS-1A Heavy Flamethrower

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
Specialty Branches

321

much larger scale. They will most often be utilized in urban warfare settings, bunker busting, 

and clearing light infantry. Although the TOS-1/TOS-1A are not organic to Russian maneuver 

brigades, they are a likely attachment, especially if the brigade is operating in urban areas, or 

engaging an enemy that is entrenched.

The Future of Flame and NBC Defense Troops

From a Russian military perspective, 

flamethrowers are not seen as weapons 

simply to be handed out to the rank-and-file 

for any ad-hoc use, but instead are seen as 

a mature weapon system that fills specific 

capabilities gaps in the Russian Armed 

Forces force structure. While maneuver 

units do have limited flamethrower assets 

in their NBC defense units, all heavy 

flamethrowers and flamethrower battalions 

reside in NBC Defense Regiments and 

Brigades. At a time when other armies 

are reevaluating the role of NBC troops in 

their militaries, the Russian NBC Troop’s 

monopoly on flame, and its usefulness for urban and mountain warfare, bunker busting, and 

clearing light infantry has required the expansion of NBC troops in the Russian military with 

the creation or reconstitution of at least four NBC Defense Regiments in 2014.50

Although Russia is expanding her flame capabilities for urban warfare and other niche 

purposes, Russia’s expansion of her NBC Troops may also be due to concerns about 

conventional maneuver warfare. The Russians still plan and practice for surviving and 

conducting tactical nuclear battle. This is in stark contrast to Western military exercises and 

wargames, where a tactical nuclear exchange is usually the culminating event. In Russian 

exercises and wargames a tactical nuclear exchange can be an early or mid-point event 

as they wrestle with the problems of survival, force reconstitution and maneuver in future 

war. The NBC Defense Troops have a clear role in “thinking the unthinkable.” In sum, Russian 

concerns about urban warfare and the effects of nuclear weapons on conventional maneuver 

will likely cause Russia’s flame wielding NBC Defense Troops to continue to be a high priority 

for development.51

50 Aleksey Paramonov “Deserving of the Honor: Military Chemist,” Flag Rodiny, 9 December 2014, <http://sc.mil.

ru/files/morf/military/archive/flagr_2014-12-09.pdf >, accessed 22 December 2014.

“Two New NBC Defense Regiments in the Southern Military District by the End of the Year,” VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 25 September 2014,

<http://vpk.name/news/118214_do_konca_goda_v_sostav_voisk_yuvo_voidut_dva_novyih_polka_rhbz.html>, 

accessed 22 December 2014.

“NBC Defense Troops Boost Presence in Western Russia,” Interfax-AVN Online, 17 December 2014, <http://www.

militarynews.ru>, accessed 22 December 2014. 51 Valeriy Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms 

and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,“ Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 26 February 2013, 

<http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14632>, accessed 22 December 2014.

BMO-T Heavy Combat Vehicle for Flamethrower Operators

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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Material Technical Support Troops

In the Russian Armed Forces, logistics is referred to as “Material Technical Support” (MTO). 

Despite the different naming, the Material Technical Support Troops have the same function 

as their Western counterparts, essentially provisioning and maintaining the force to help 

ensure constant readiness. Organizationally, MTO structure parallels the echelons of 

command. In terms of the Ground Forces, at echelons below brigade there are no dedicated 

MTO units, MTO functions at this level (supply, unit maintenance) are provided by units’ 

organic or attached assets, typically in the form of a support platoon or squad. The lowest 

echelon MTO unit is the MTO Battalion, which is found in all Ground Forces maneuver 

brigades. At the Army Group level, MTO Brigades are found. Dedicated supply depots 

and refurbishment plants are at the Military District/Operational Strategic Command level. 

Responsibility for logistic issues culminates at the Ministry of Defense, with a dedicated 

Deputy Defense Minister. The incumbent, General Dmitri Bulgakov, is Russia’s top Russian 

logistics officer. In terms of organic MTO support in the maneuver brigades, two dedicated 

battalions were typically found: a logistic battalion (primarily a motor transport unit) and a 

maintenance battalion which provides organizational-level maintenance for the brigade. 

These battalions are now being combined into a ‘MTO Battalion’. The Russian Federation is 

still in the process of transitioning to this new system, so both systems may be found.

Material Technical Support activities include:

- provisioning the Armed Forces with weapons and military equipment;

- providing fuel;

- clothing and feeding personnel;

- providing issue items (uniforms, equipment, household items, etc.);

- providing stations for changing, washing and repairing clothes in garrison and field

conditions;

- repairing and restoring road and rail access; 

- organizing the transportation of military cargoes and personnel;

- receiving, accounting, and issuing material warehouse resources;

- organizing the maintenance and repair of weapons, military equipment and supplies;

- servicing and repairing buildings and public utilities on military installations;

- ensuring the accuracy and reliability of standards of measurements;

- training military personnel for MTO related military occupational specialties;

- providing controls for food and fire protection at military installations.

The Material Technical Support system includes:

- The Material Technical Support Headquarters of the Russian Armed Forces;

- Department of Transportation Support of the Russian Armed Forces;

- Department of Maintenance and Security of the Public Utilities of Military Units and

Organizations of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation;

- Main Armor Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces;

- Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces;

- Main Directorate of the Railway Troops;

- Department of Meteorology of the Russian Armed Forces.
Specialty Branches

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Logistic Battalion (old system)

Maintenance Battalion (old system)
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The Material Technical Support main activity areas are:

- planning the state arms program;

- organizing the supply of products, works and services;

- controlling MTO personnel, weapons, military equipment and other materiel;

- ensuring quality standards;

- providing regulations about MTO processes;

- developing the equipment needed for the provision of MTO services;

- training military personnel for MTO related military occupational specialties.52

Perhaps one of the most controversial of the “New Look” reforms was the reform of the 

Russian logistics system. Russia inherited its military logistics and combat service support 

system from the Soviets. The Soviet system was based upon the idea of mobilizing the whole 

societal and economic potentials of the Soviet Union for the conduct of war.53 In practice, this 

meant that all civilian resources could and would be used in the event of war. In particular, 

civil manufacturing and transportation/infrastructure were designed to also facilitate the 

conduct of war. In recent years, the Russian Federation has come to the conclusion that mass 

mobilization, and its required logistics requirements, is no longer desired nor sustainable. The 

Soviet logistic system was based upon several “Rear Services,” material support organizations, 

and a separate armaments branch to sustain the force in war and peace. In order to 

streamline or right size some of the massive logistics capabilities, the “New Look” reforms 

merged these various organizations into the Material Technical Support (MTO) structure. 

“The new superstructure, aimed at simplifying the system, merged numerous preexisting 

organizations. The MTO Department of Planning and Coordination includes departments of 

resource and transport support, the former Main Directorate of the Railway Troops, the Main 

Vehicle, Armoured Vehicle and Tank Directorate, the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate and 

the Metrological Service. Within the military districts MTO bases and brigades were formed, 

as well as arsenals for the storage of missiles, ammunition, and missile and artillery weapons. 

Moreover, within the combined-arms brigades, MTO battalions were created; these include 

separate logistics and maintenance battalions in each brigade...Underlying the reform of 

the structure of the rear services system, according...was an effort to combine rear services 

with various material support structures and the Deputy Defence Minister post into one ‘MTO’ 

organization.”

 - Roger N. Mc Dermott54

There has been some up and downs, but this reform has generally been successful, and is 

still in the process of being tweaked.55 Other logistic reforms have had varying degrees of 

success. Russia briefly attempted “outsourcing” the maintenance component of its logistics 

system, an effort that was unsuccessful. Commanders complained about the level of 

52 “Material Technical Support of the Russian Armed Forces,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, 

<http://function.mil.ru/function/mto/info.htm> accessed 1 May 2016. 53 Christopher N. Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War, first edition. (Coulsdon, 

Surrey: Janes Information Group, 1988), pp. 104-106.

54 Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Strategic Mobility: Supporting ’Hard Power’ to 2020?” April 2013, <http://www.

foi.se/ReportFiles/foir_3587.pdf>, accessed 21 June 2016. 55 Aleksey Trofimov, “Zone of Responsibility from the Volga to Eastern Siberia,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 25 

February 2015, <http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/advice/item/21964-zona-otvetstvennosti-ot-povolzhya-dovostochnoj-sibiri>, accessed 21 June 2016.
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Material-Technical Support System Comparison
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service and feasibility of contractor-provided maintenance services on the battlefield. In 

current practice, operator, unit, and organizational maintenance is provided by uniformed 

servicemen, while depot-level maintenance is provided by contract labor (usually by way 

of a state owned company) at a maintenance depot or by the equipment manufacturer.56 

Other logistic problems related to the “New Look” reforms, have not been the result of the 

logistic system itself, but of the personnel system. In general, most contract NCOs fill “trigger 

puller” positions, and positions requiring advanced skills and training. This means that 

combat support and service support roles have a lower percentage of contract NCOs. This 

is occurring at the same time the Russian Armed Forces are procuring more technologically 

advanced equipment, which subsequently require more maintenance support. This situation 

has resulted in maintenance issues being one of the top complaints of Russian maneuver 

commanders.57 

Deploying and provisioning forces in the field 

and abroad is supported by the Department of 

Transportation Support, an entity in the Russian 

General Staff. The Department of Transportation 

Support is roughly a Russian equivalent of the U.S. 

Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), albeit 

much smaller, that is responsible for: 

- development of a military shipping system

for the Armed Forces using general use 

transport;

- placement of orders for military shipments

and performance of other transport 

services for the Armed Forces;

- development of plans for military

shipments by common carrier, finalizing 

these by established procedures, and 

facilitation, execution, and control of these shipments;

- establishing oversight over the preparation of common carrier transport to carry out

military shipments; and

- planning and disbursement of funds for military transport, and monitoring such

expenditures.58

The Department of Transportation Support is the Ministry of Defense’s authorized 

representative for common carrier rail, air, sea, and inland water transport intended for 

military shipments. In general, the department is responsible for the coordination and/or 

contracting of commercial transport.59

56 Vladimir Shcherbakov, “Misconceived Logistics: Provisioning of the Armed Forces needs priority attention,” 

Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, 24 May 2013, <http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2013-05-24/1_nedorazumenie.html>, 

accessed 20 June 2016

57 Aleksey Ramm, “The Ukraine Test: New Image of Armed Forces Spoiled by Field Kitchens,” VoyennoPromyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 29 April 2015, <http://vpknews.ru/articles/25027>, accessed 21 June 2016. 58 “Interview with Major-General Boris Svistkov, Chief of VOSO,” Krasnyi Voin, 17 July 2009. 59 For an in depth discussion of Russian military logistics see: Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Strategic Mobility: 

Supporting ’Hard Power’ to 2020?” April 2013, <http://www.foi.se/ReportFiles/foir_3587.pdf>, accessed 21 June 

General Dmitry Bulgakov

Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian 

Federation, Chief of Logistics

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
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327

In terms of force projection, perhaps the most 

important logistical asset in the Russian toolbox 

is the nation’s massive railroad system. The vast 

majority of personnel and cargo are transported via 

rail for civil and military purposes. Rail transport is 

the primary means of logistical support for most 

military operations (including current operations 

in and around Eastern Ukraine) and is an absolute 

necessity for any type of large-scale movement 

throughout the great expanse that is the Russian 

Federation. Due to the importance of rail for military 

operations, the Russian Federation has a separate 

branch, the Railroad Troops, dedicated to protecting, 

servicing, and maintaining rail service in combat and 

austere conditions for the Russian Armed Forces. They consist of ten brigades and several 

independent battalions scattered throughout the Russian Federation which are operationally 

attached to their respective military districts. These units provide rail-related logistical support 

for military operations to include repair, bridge building, and concealment.60

The Unfinished Debate

During the 1920s and 1930s, a far-reaching debate on the nature and conduct of future 

war was conducted by the leading theorists of the Soviet Red Army. Mechanization of war 

meant that the stationary warfare of World War I probably would not be repeated. Two 

schools of thought emerged, that of the attrition and the offensive. The attrition school, led 

by General-Major Aleksandr A. Svechin posited that the Soviet Union’s vast expanse should 

be used to draw attacking armies deep within the territory of the country, and, once the 

enemy was overextended, counterattack and destroy him. Marshal of the Soviet Union M. 

N. Tukhachevsky led the offensive school which held that if the Soviet Union were attacked, 

the Soviets should launch a swift, decisive mechanized counterstrike at the enemy country, 

restricting the ravages of warfare to the territory of the enemy. The debate was more 

complicated than this and eventually led to debates by the protagonists. Tukhachevsky’s 

side prevailed and Svechin was branded as a class enemy. When Germany invaded the 

Soviet Union, the Soviet counterstrike fizzled and the forward Soviet armies were surrounded 

and lost. Svechin was right, but neither he nor Tukhachevsky were alive, as they both were 

executed as part of Stalin’s purges of the Red Army officer corps in the late 1930s61

The nature of future war and the best strategy to resolve it was not resolved in 1931. Will 

Russia be faced with a large-scale World War III, requiring millions of soldiers? What is Russia’s 

2016.

60 Charles K. Bartles, “Russian Strategic Mobility Highlighted in Vostok-2014 Exercises,” OE Watch Online, 

November 2014.

61 Recommended readings on this period include David M. Glantz, “The Nature of Soviet Operational Art”, 

Parameters, Spring 1985; Jacob W. Kipp, “General Major A. A. Svechin and Modern Warfare: Military History and 

Military Theory” in Aleksandr A Svechin, Strategy, Minneapolis: Eastview Publications, 1992 and Jacob W. Kipp, 

“Soviet Military Doctrine and the Origins of Operational Art, 1917-1936” in Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to 

Gorbachev, 1915-1991, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1992.

MTO Soldiers Laying Pipe

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best strategy to maintain the 

nation? Svechin has been officially 

exonerated and is a favorite theorist 

of many of today’s Russian military 

leaders. However, the distance 

between the Estonian border and 

St. Petersburg is under 100 miles. 

In this case, attrition may be an 

unacceptable strategy. The West is fearful of a Russian offensive strategy, but this is usually 

viewed in Russia as a counterstroke following a Western provocation. The Russians have 

transitioned to a brigade structure with divisions planted on critical directions of advance. 

Brigades are far more mobile, but lack the long-term combat power of divisions. A major 

change in the nature and conduct of future war is the presence and role of nuclear weapons 

and a major concern is accidental war and the role of nuclear weapons. Although the West is 

concerned with NATO’s Eastern border, Russia is also concerned with defending its vast land 

mass along the Black Sea, the troubled Caucasus, an increasingly unpredictable Central Asia, 

the long border with China, the Pacific Coast-and the Arctic. What does all this have to do 

with logistics? Plenty. Russia has to defend in 360°. It is heavily dependent on barge and rail 

movement. It does not have the manpower of Soviet times. It cannot be strong everywhere 

at once and has gone to highly mobile brigades so that it can rapidly assemble forces 

where needed. It is a regional power, not a super power-but it still has the nuclear power to 

drastically reshape the world. 

Tactical Logistical Theory

The Russian Ground Forces, and to a similar extent the Russian Airborne and Naval Infantry, 

utilize six principles of tactical logistics support. 62

Centralized Control. The bulk of 

supplies and transport resources 

are held at army and higher level. 

This enables commanders to focus 

support where it is needed. Support 

can be shifted rapidly from one 

area to another if needed. This is 

not “everyone gets a fair share.” At 

times, a unit may have to live on 

what it has or what it can forage 

since the priority has shifted 

elsewhere. 

Forward Delivery. Higher commanders are responsible for keeping their subordinates 

supplied. Higher delivers to lower-either to dumps or directly to the brigade. Military Districts 

manage in-area railheads and have transportation brigades of trucks for delivery. In terms of 

62 This section based on conversations with Charles Dick and Jacob Kipp, eminent scholars of the Soviet and 

Russian military.

Comprehensive Support

Combat Support
Specialty Branches

329

fuel distribution, the Army Groups 

have dedicated field pipeline units 

that are capable of tapping into 

the national infrastructure’s civil 

pipelines, and then piping the fuel 

to rear service areas. This may then 

be trucked from the rear service 

areas up to the end user.

Maintenance of Stockage. A combined arms brigade carries three to five days of supplies 

as mobile stocks on its organic vehicles. The Russian Army uses a push system for tactical 

logistics. The logisticians have determined brigade consumption rates for combat and heavy 

combat. These consumption rates are determined for expected ammunition, POL, parts and 

food expenditure and constitute “push packages” of supplies that are pushed forward. The 

familiar Western “requisition and receive” model does not apply for these classes of supply, 

however, the Russian logisticians keep the rear area logisticians apprised of combat and 

maintenance losses of vehicles, weapons and personnel, as well as unusual consumption of 

ammunition and fuel. The Military 

District maintains “float” vehicles 

and weapons and would push part 

of this float forward to the Army 

logisticians in wartime. This push 

system enables the brigade to 

weather a temporary disruption 

of its lines of communication and 

continue fighting. This is “timely 

logistics” rather than “just in time 

logistics”.

Supply Priorities. Ammunition, POL, technical supplies, rations, non-technical supplies. Nonessentials will not be delivered if it will reduce the provision of essential combat supplies. 

In a pursuit, ammunition and POL may switch priority. Ammunition is accounted for and 

issued in units of fire. For example, a unit of fire for each AK-74 assault rifle is 400 rounds, for 

each mortar it is 80 rounds, for each T-72 tank main gun it is 40 rounds and for each 152mm 

howitzer it is 60 rounds. Since the brigade has 36 howitzers, the brigade composite unit of fire 

for 152mm howitzer is 2160 rounds. The brigade will have normally have six composite units 

of 152mm howitzer ammunition 

or 12,960 rounds. The number 

of composite units of fire in the 

brigade varies by weapons type. For 

example, the composite unit of fire 

for tank main gun ammunition is 

four. POL is calculated in refills. A 

refill is the amount required to fill 

each vehicle in the brigade (one fill 

Moral Psychological Support

Technical Support

Rear Support
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provides a 500 kilometer range on roadways for most vehicles). A brigade starts with three 

refills, one in the vehicles and the rest on transport.

Forward Positioning of Support Elements. Army and brigade medical, equipment recovery, and 

repair elements will keep up with the advance. They move forward to the last area of combat 

to treat the personnel and equipment casualties on site. Priority is given to returning lightly 

wounded soldiers and lightly damaged equipment to battle and evacuating the seriously 

wounded and heavily damaged to the rear for extensive healing and repair.

Force Restoration. In the past, the Soviet and Russian practice has been to replace depleted 

units, not individuals. Depleted units were reorganized as smaller units, combined with 

other depleted units or reconstituted with healed hospital patients and repaired equipment. 

There has been no move to adopt the Western system of individual replacement. However, 

the strategic reserve system is no longer built around the “cadre unit” mobilization concept, 

which involved a small cadre maintaining equipment until the unit was fleshed out with 

personnel in the strategic reserve, since Russia is no longer preparing for a long war scenario. 

The military districts will likely constitute replacement units of reservists who will be grouped 

by military occupational specialty and organized into platoon or company-sized subunits for 

further deployment where needed. First priority, however, may go to transferring subunits 

from an uncommitted brigade to a depleted brigade. The longer-term goal of converting 

Organization of Ammunition Distribution for a Motorized Rifle Battalion in the Defense
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331

all maneuver battalions in a brigade into battalion tactical groups would support this 

replacement scheme optimally. It would also provide a trained combined arms team that 

could readily integrate into a different brigade with a minimum of adjustment and stand-up 

time.

Material-Technical Support Units (MTO)

In terms of organization, the system of material technical support of the Russian Armed 

Forces is divided by the scale (tactical, operational, and strategic) and type of support 

provided. The types of support include: national level support, support for branches of 

service and arms, support for forces in a theater of military activity (TVD), fleets, armies 

(combined arms armies, rocket armies, etc.), long-range aviation, military-transport aviation, 

naval bases, divisions, brigades, regiments and battalions. MTO support for the Ground 

Forces, Airborne (VDV), and Naval Infantry units is generally provided in the following 

manner. Military districts and army groups are supported by MTO brigades, divisions by MTO 

battalions, brigades by MTO battalions or MTO companies (depending on brigade type), and 

regiments by MTO companies. The most important change regarding recent MTO reforms 

is the relationships of the battalions’ material support (logistic) platoons to their battalions. 

Previously, these platoons were organic to the battalions, now it appears these platoons 

will be organic to the MTO battalion, and attached as needed. The following description 

of a MTO battalion, describes a MTO Battalion that is supporting a Motorized Rifle Brigade 

mounted on BTRs (approximately 4,500 personnel). Although MTO battalions vary in size and 

structure depending on the supported brigades type and size, this description provides a 

reasonable baseline for the function, size and capabilities for other MTO battalions that may 

be encountered. There is one discrepancy that should be noted. In current Russian logistical 

training materials, the MTO Battalion has platoons that are attached to the maneuver 

brigade’s subordinate battalions, but when attached these platoons are often depicted as 

companies for unknown reasons. These apparent discrepancies were likely not done in error, 

as they were found in several different sources. We have not discovered the reasoning behind 

this practice, and have elected to present the information as found.63

63 The source material for this section has been obtained from a variety of training documents produced by 

Russian military academies and military departments in civilian academic institutions.

Convoy Operations

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MTO Brigade

MTO brigades support Military Districts and Army Group level organizations. MTO brigade 

capabilities differ substantially, but there is a concerted effort to develop a somewhat 

standardized TO&E that would give every MTO brigade: a command and control element, two 

motor transport battalions, a maintenance battalion, a pipeline battalion, road-commandant 

battalion (traffic/movement control), warehouses, a field refueling company, a motor 

transport company (water), a general support company, bath and laundry services, and 

mobile bakeries. Any of these assets may be attached to a particular brigade or division to 

support operations as needed.

MTO Battalion

The MTO battalion consists of approximately 1000 personnel and 408 transport vehicles (148 

general freight/260 specialized/48 trailers), and can reportedly haul 1,870 tons of cargo (1190 

tons of dry cargo, 680 tons of liquid). MTO battalions typically have a: command and control 

element, motor transport companies (general cargo, ammunition, and POL), a maintenance 

company, and support companies. The majority of the battalion’s personnel (672) are 

located in the MTO battalion’s two support companies and support platoon. Since maneuver 

battalions have relatively few organic logistical assets, these units rely on logistic and 

maintenance assets provided by MTO battalions to conduct operations. During operations, 

the MTO battalion’s support companies are detached and their subordinate platoons are 

attached to the maneuver and fires battalions. The MTO battalion’s support platoon detaches 

its subordinate squads to support the engineer battalion and brigade headquarters. Typically, 

each maneuver or fires battalion has a dedicated support platoon, with motor transport and 

maintenance squads. The mission of these subunits is to haul materiel from the depots of 

the logistic support battalions or companies directly to the units at the front line and provide 

limited maintenance support or evacuate inoperable vehicles as needed. In non-combat/

field/expeditionary conditions, typically only 10-12 trucks of the MTO battalion are involved 

in supporting a maneuver brigade’s daily needs. The remaining vehicles wait at depots, fully 

loaded, fueled, but with batteries removed. 

Material Technical Support Brigade (variant)
Specialty Branches

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Material Technical Support Battalion (new system)
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Support Platoon (for a Motorized Rifle Battalion)

 Support Platoon Vehicles for a Motorized Rifle Battalion (variant)

BREM-L

БРЭМ-Л

Armored Maintenance-Recovery Vehicle

REM-KL

РЭМ-КЛ

Wheeled Maintenance-Recovery Vehicle

MTO-UB1

МТО-УБ1

Universal Maintenance Vehicle

Images Courtesy:

 Vitaly Kuzmin
Specialty Branches

335

PAK-200M

ПАК-200М

Mobile Kitchen

KP-130

КП-130

Kitchen Trailer

Ural-4320

Урал-4320

Truck

Ural-43202

Урал-43202

Truck

ATZ-7,5

АТЗ-7,5

Fuel Truck

DDU-1

ДДУ-1

Mobile Shower System

ATsPT-4,7

АЦПТ-4,7

Water Truck

ATs-7,5

АЦ-7,5

Tanker Truck

MTO-UB1 

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
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A maneuver brigade’s logistics subunits may spread over an area of 40-70 square kilometers 

and may move twice in 24 hours if the brigade advance is rapid. Normal logistics activities will 

include supply points, ammunition points, POL points, assembly points for damaged vehicles, 

technical inspection points, a repair and evacuation group (REG) and medical aid posts. 

Medical aid posts will be 10-20 kilometers from the forward edge of the fight. Ammunition 

and POL points will be 20-40 kilometers from the fight in an advance and 35-50 kilometers in 

the defense. Supply points are generally further back. The Russians hope to hold the battle 

area at the end of the day since it contains the disabled Russian and enemy vehicles and 

weapons, they also hope to maintain equipment strengths with float vehicles and rapid repair. 

During 1944-1945, 25% of Soviet tank losses were unrepairable, but 80-90 % of the remainder 

were returned to service within two days. If Russia does move to three standard chassis, 

common turrets and PLL, Russia will likely speed vehicle repair times.

Organization of the MTO Battalion in the Defense

The defense is one of the primary forms of combined arms combat, which has the goal of 

destroying the advancing superior enemy force, inflicting maximum damage on him, while 

retaining important regions or lines of territory and establishing advantageous conditions 

for the conduct of further actions. Preparation of units and subunits of MTO support is 

conducted simultaneously with the preparation of combat subunits of the brigade and begins 

with the receipt of the commander’s orders for material-technical support and directives of 

the senior MTO chief.

Field Fueling Operations

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Preparations include:

- receipt of the decision on material-technical support;

- establishing the fire and maneuver subunits missions involving MTO issues and also

the MTO subunits’ missions;

- conducting a reconnaissance of the rear area;

- organizing all the types of MTO support;

- planning material-technical support;

- organizing coordination and deployment of control systems of MTO support;

- organizing the protection, defenses, security and camouflage of MTO units and

subunits;

- controlling the preparation and readiness of MTO subunits for combat, as well as the

readiness of MTO units and subunits to fulfill established missions under combat.

The MTO Battalion area must support:

- the smooth placement of battalion subunits considering mission accomplishment;

- the dispersion and concealed placement of the combat equipment and personnel of

MTO subunits;

- the rapid assembly of battalion subunits, the timely exit of battalion wheeled vehicle

columns, the transport of supplies, the deployment and redeployment of the 

battalion to a new area using existing roads and trail spurs;

- meeting the requirements to safeguard the various types of supply dumps;

- ideal conditions for protection from air attack and battalion command and control;

- nearby access to an area suited for a transport assembly or waiting area that can be

used as a battalion arrival and departure area;

- nearby access to a water source of sufficient size;

- a sufficient separation distance from large industrial centers and inhabited regions

which may be the target of enemy strikes.

The total operating area of an MTO 

battalion is up to 80km2

, or if subordinate 

MTO companies are not present (i.e. 

deployed forward) 40km2. During the 

conduct of a brigade defense, the MTO 

battalion is situated according to the 

brigade plan in a designated area at a 

safe distance from the forward edge of 

the defense, taking in account the enemy 

use of nuclear and NBC weapons and the 

nature of the terrain. If the defending 

brigade is in the first echelon-the MTO 

battalion is located away from the main 

enemy avenue of attack. If the brigade is 

in the second echelon (or is the reserve) 

the battalion deploys behind the brigade 

second echelon or reserve. 

Naval Infantry Medics

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The MTO support companies are located in corresponding regions to support the brigade 

combat subunits. The MTO battalion of a second echelon brigade (or combined arms reserve) 

in the defense is located behind the combat formation (in an assembly area) prepared 

to move to support brigade subunits in a counterattack or to carry out the commander’s 

decision regarding a short-notice mission. The senior commander orders the movement from 

the MTO battalion’s designated area. In the event of the surprise enemy use of weapons of 

mass destruction, high-precision weapons, incendiary weapons or FASCAM mines, and if the 

senior commander cannot be informed expeditiously, the MTO battalion commander may 

make the movement decision. However, the battalion commander must follow this up with a 

report to the senior commander.

The deployment and redeployment of the MTO battalion depends on the combat formation 

and mission of the supported brigade; the safe distance from the supported subunits; the 

NBC situation; the terrain; if the brigade is in the first echelon-the battalion is located away 

from the main enemy avenue of attack; or if the brigade is in the second echelon (or is the 

reserve). In that case, the battalion deploys behind the brigade second echelon or assembly 

area. The battalion may deploy in two parts assigned to two planned axes of advance by 

friendly forces, but in areas not accessible from all directions and behind natural or manmade 

barriers.

MTO battalion support companies may be 

deployed into adjacent regions supporting 

combat subunits of the brigade. Primarily this 

will be in support of a security zone or forward 

position. Trucks from the transport company may 

haul ammunition and engineer obstacle material. 

Repair personnel may be deployed to combat 

subunits defending the forward position. The 

MTO battalion designates main and reserve areas 

for support. They are located 5 to 7 kilometers 

apart. The total MTO battalion support area is 

up to 80km2

 or if subordinate companies are 

not present (i.e. deployed forward) 40km2

. The 

MTO deployment area is selected by the senior 

commander or by the battalion commander in agreement with the brigade staff. 

The battalion truck companies transport material to the subunits:

- during a positional defense, the battalion provides the primary forces and means and

supports maneuver (if necessary);

- during maneuver defense, part of the cargo and repair subunits may be detached to

strengthen the first echelon brigade;

- including ammunition transport, delivery to the designated points and to points

separated from the firing positions; to the point of material transfer with an 

ammunition reserve and the redeployment of it during battle. On the return trip, the 

trucks are used to evacuate the sick and wounded and shuttle supplies. 

Vehicle Maintenance

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Refueling is based upon the brigade commander’s decision (which establishes the order, 

times, the routes used by the supporting units, refueling the units and the strict observance of 

camouflage discipline):

- at occupied positions, refill vehicles move to the military equipment under the cover

of darkness;

- in the depth of the defense, refill at the end of the end of the day’s fighting using a

combination of methods, depending on the situation (the refueling trucks can move 

to the combat vehicles or vice versa. Also, refueling can use the field refill points);

- refill tanks, BMPs, BTRs moving in the combat formation, artillery tractors and

specialized vehicles at the place of their deployment;

- refill combat equipment supporting subunits within the second echelon (combined

arms reserve), and the subunits of the MTO supporting subunits at the place of their 

deployment.

The battalion commander organizes the provision of 

bread. Bread is delivered according to plan, twice in 

a 24-hour day. Bread is baked at a central location. In 

some cases, subunits send vehicles back to pick up 

bread. The bakery squad usually distributes bread 

to one area and then another or brings all deliveries 

to a single central area. The battalion commander 

organizes the shower and laundry support. The 

shower and laundry point personnel are protected 

by the military unit being supported. The repair and 

evacuation of armored vehicles, trucks and rocket and 

artillery vehicles, weapons and military equipment is 

provided by the repair companies. 

Evacuation of armored vehicles and weapons includes: 

- Dragging out stuck, overturned, buried and sunk equipment;

- Restoring that equipment to a transportable state and transporting the damaged

(nonfunctioning) equipment from the combat area or from the place it broke down 

to the evacuation route and then to the repair site at the damaged equipment 

collection point.

Organization of the MTO Battalion in the Offense

The advance is one of the primary forms of combined arms combat, which has the goal of 

destroying the resisting enemy and seizing designated lines or regions and establishing the 

conditions for the conduct of further actions. The preparation of MTO units and subunits of 

is conducted simultaneously with the preparation of combat subunits of the brigade and 

begins with the receipt of the commander’s orders for MTO support and directives of the 

senior MTO chief.

Mobile Bakery

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Preparations include:

- receipt of the decision on MTO support;

- establishing the fire and maneuver subunits missions involving MTO issues and also

the MTO subunits’ missions;

- conducting a reconnaissance of the rear area;

- organizing all the types of MTO support;

- planning MTO support;

- organizing coordination and deployment of control systems of MTO support;

- organizing the protection, defenses, security and camouflage of MTO units and

subunits;

- controlling the preparation and readiness of MTO subunits for combat, as well as the

readiness of MTO units and subunits to fulfill established missions under combat.

The MTO Battalion area must support:

- the smooth placement of battalion subunits considering mission accomplishment;

- the dispersion and concealed placement of the combat equipment and personnel of

MTO subunits;

- the rapid assembly of battalion subunits, the timely exit of battalion wheeled vehicle

columns, the transport of supplies, the deployment and redeployment of the 

battalion to a new area using existing roads and trail spurs;

- meeting the requirements to safeguard the various types of supply dumps;

- ideal conditions for protection from air attack and battalion command and control;

- nearby access to an area suited for a transport assembly or waiting area that can be

used as a battalion arrival and departure area; 

- nearby access to a water source of sufficient size;

- a sufficient separation distance from large industrial centers and inhabited regions

which may be the target of enemy strikes.

The total operating area of an MTO battalion is up to 80km2

, or if subordinate MTO companies 

are not present (i.e. deployed forward) 40km2. During the conduct of a brigade attack from 

the march (or departure area or assembly 

area), against a defending enemy, the 

MTO battalion is situated on a designated 

area at a safe distance from the forward 

edge of the enemy defense. During the 

brigade movement from a departure area 

or assembly area to the line of attack, the 

MTO battalion follows the second echelon 

combat formation. The senior commander 

orders the movement from the MTO 

battalion’s designated area. In the event 

of the surprise enemy use of weapons of 

mass destruction, high-precision weapons, 

incendiary weapons or FASCAM mines, 

and if the senior commander cannot be 

Soldiers’ Mess

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341

informed expeditiously, the MTO battalion commander may make the movement decision. 

However, the battalion commander must follow this up with a report to the senior commander.

Organization of the MTO Battalion on the March

Military equipment is refueled in rest stop areas and in the assembly area at the end of the 

march. However, tanks and other equipment with smaller fuel tanks are fueled additionally 

at a stop during the second half of a 24-hour march day. With this goal in mind, the senior 

commander designates brigade refueling areas along the march route where he will 

concentrate transport subunits with fuel reserves ahead of time and deploy fueling systems of 

the higher commander. If the refueling systems of the brigade are stationed forward with the 

MTO subunits, then they will move to the refueling areas ahead of time and deploy to conduct 

a mass refueling of the entire brigade in a short time. The Russian Federation currently utilizes 

the PZP-10, PZP-10A, PZP-14, and PZP-20 field fueling systems.

The norms for refueling equipment at a field refueling point (using the PZP-10A) are:

- Motorized rifle company-10 minutes

- Motorized rifle battalion-30 minutes

- Motorized rifle brigade-2-2.5 hours

Hot food is prepared at TO&E food preparation points and is fed to personnel at stops 

lasting up to two hours, at a stop during the second half of a 24-hour march day and at the 

day (night) lager. When it is not possible to feed three hot prepared meals in a day, two are 

provided. The first at the start of the march and the second, after completing a 24-hour 

march, at the day (night) lager. During the interval, the personnel are provided dry rations 

(bread, sugar, tea, cans of meat, fish or fruit compote) to provide the complete daily food 

ration. Under circumstances where hot meals cannot be provided, the brigade commander 

Field Fueling Systems
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will order the issue of individual combat field rations (similar to MREs) from the emergency 

ration reserve. Water reserves are established to the degree determined by the brigade’s 

location relative to a water spring or water supply point (where all the water tanks can be 

refilled). 

Transport of material supplies is organized considering 

not only how the MTO battalion will routinely transfer 

the reserve military supplies to the combat subunits, 

but also how to accomplish this when in regions not 

directly contiguous with the rest areas or if out of 

direct contact with their higher formations and units. 

Usually, the MTO transport companies move to the 

rest stops of the subunits ahead of time, issue the 

required supplies and then replenish their reserve 

stores from those of the MTO organs of their higher 

headquarters. 

MTO technical support is organized and conducted to provide repair and maintenance to 

sustain readiness and support required work using the MTO systems and proper technical 

service, maintenance, upkeep, scheduled services and evacuation. During the march, 

technical support is provided in the rest stops and day (night) lager. At the rest stops, only a 

general inspection and the elimination of detected faults is conducted. During the march, 

missions for technical support by the MTO march column are conducted by the technical 

maintenance section (usually at the tail end of the column).

Technical support for vehicles that breakdown during the march is usually accomplished by 

pulling the vehicles over to the right onto the road shoulder where the technical maintenance 

section and drivers work on them. If it is impossible or inadvisable to fix the vehicle on site, 

the vehicle is towed to the nearest damaged vehicle collection point. This is usually located at 

the day (night) lager and sometimes on the march route itself where organized by the brigade 

MTO Brigade on the March

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense

Field Fueling System
Specialty Branches

343

or army. Unit and medium repairs are primarily conducted at the damaged vehicle collection 

point. Vehicles requiring a major overhaul are evacuated to a final collection and restoration 

area after the conclusion of the march. During the preparation of units (subunits) of the MTO 

brigade, the battalion undertakes the following measures to fulfill their missions during the 

march:

- finish bringing up to strength the MTO subunits with personnel, equipment and

parts;

- implement technical services, repairs and preparations for MTO technical services,

tables of equipment and material services reserves;

- evacuate MTO technical service equipment that cannot be repaired before the start

of the march on the order of the senior commander for dispatch to the higher level 

repair facilities;

- organize training for personnel on embarking on vehicles and on loading parts and

supplies on trucks or railroad cars (or ships, aircraft and helicopters);

- instruct personnel in the warning signals and vehicle assignments and loading order;

- instruct drivers on march preparation and main features of the march, march route

and safety measures; 

- where necessary, provide additional measures (outfit vehicles with entrenching tools

and drivers instruments, provide sketch maps showing the march route and the more 

dangerous sections on it).

The MTO battalion preparations must include its own road march, transport on train, ship, 

river transport, aircraft, helicopter or any combination of these. The battalion must be intact 

with its required load of supplies and material, on time at the designated area and fully 

prepared to undertake its required mission. The MTO battalion preparations take place as part 

of the brigade or independently, concluding with assembly at the designated area. Orders for 

the battalion preparations for the march are issued by the Brigade Deputy for MTO Support 

(the battalion commander may be dual-hatted in this position in some brigades). Subunits 

of the battalion move on one or two march routes some 5 to 10 kilometers from the brigade 

main body.

Depending on the situation, the battalion column may have various compositions. During a 

march that will terminate in combat, the battalion column, as a rule, has battalion subunits 

transporting ammunition reserves well forward and during marches that will last more than 

24 hours and have little expectation of meeting the enemy, fuel reserves will travel well 

forward. The distance between the day (night) lagers may extend 250-300km.

Distances during the movement of a march column:

- 2-3 km between company columns and various battalion subunits;

- 0.5-1km between platoon columns and their various subunits;

- 25-50m between vehicles.

Average speed of battalion subunits:

- 20-25kph for a mixed column of wheeled and tracked vehicles;

- 25-30kph for a wheeled vehicle column.
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Pushed from Higher Echelons

Pulled from Higher Echelons

Supply delivery is accomplished by “pushing” supplies to subordinate units. This method is 

used while in the offense for the supply of first echelon and artillery units and subunits when 

the higher echelon unit has a sufficient number of vehicles for the task. The above graphic 

depicts supplies being pushed from the depots of the MTO brigade, to the MTO battalion, to the 

MTO company, and eventually to the end user.

Supply delivery is accomplished by subordinate units “pulling” supplies from higher echelon 

units. This method is used in the initial period of the war; during the preparation for the 

offensive; during the defense, before the enemy’s attack; by units conducting actions on 

secondary axes; units in the second echelon or reserve; and/or when the higher echelon unit 

does not have a sufficient number of vehicles for the task. The above graphic depicts supplies 

being pulled from the depots of the MTO brigade, to the MTO battalion, with the MTO company 

pulling supplies from the MTO battalion pushing them to the end user.

Methods of Supply Delivery
Specialty Branches

345

Pushed and Pulled from Higher Echelons

Pushed, Bypassing Intermediate Echelons

This method of supply delivery is conducted by “pushing” supplies from higher level unit to 

lower level units by bypassing intermediate echelons. The above depicts supplies being pushed 

from the depots of the MTO brigade directly to the MTO company, bypassing the depots of the 

MTO battalion.

Supply delivery is accomplished by higher echelon units “pushing” supplies to subordinate 

units and subordinate units “pulling” supplies from higher echelon units. This method is used 

when higher echelon units do not have sufficient capabilities to solely supply subordinate 

units. Usually, the higher echelon will provide the majority of support in this situation. The 

above graphic depicts supplies being pushed from MTO brigade, the MTO battalion pulling 

supplies from the MTO brigade and pushing supplies to the MTO companies, and the MTO 

company pulling supplies from the MTO battalion and pushing them to the end user.
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(Right) The graphic on the facing page depicts a standard motorized rifle brigade defense 

defending with two motorized rifle battalions forward in the brigade first defensive echelon and 

a motorized rifle battalion and tank battalion in the brigade second defensive echelon. The 

brigade has its artillery battalions, air defense battalions, antitank reserve and mobile obstacle 

detachment deployed primarily between the brigade first and second defensive echelons. There is 

a well-defined fire sac between the brigade first and second defensive echelons. The MTO battalion 

is in the rear. The brigade has two main east-west roads and two north-south connecting roads. 

Route and Traffic control points limit the amount of traffic and vehicle spacing on the roads to 

prevent vehicles from bunching up in observable target sets. The brigade headquarters has 

a forward and alternate CP location as well as a main CP location in the rear area. The MTO 

battalion has a forward and alternate command post location in the area between the brigade 

first and second defensive echelons and a main CP in the rear area. There is a reserve rear area 

services location.

Each battalion has its organic support platoon which provides vehicle evacuation, messing, motor 

transport, laundry and bath support and limited vehicle maintenance. This platoon remains with 

the battalion when it is detached on separate missions such as forward detachment, advance 

guard, flanking detachment, rear guard or raiding detachment. An organic medical platoon 

is also a permanent part of the battalion, but is separate from the organic support platoon. 

The support platoon belongs to the battalion, but it is also part of an MTO company. The MTO 

companies deploy forward to the rear of the fire and maneuver battalions during the defense 

and provides additional maintenance, fueling, food service, supply, ammunition and transport 

support.
Specialty Branches

347

MTO Brigade Subunits in the Defense
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(Right) The graphic on the facing page shows the location of MTO subunits during the phases of 

a motorized rifle brigade attack from the march. The brigade attacks with three motorized rifle 

battalions on line. Either the tank battalion has detached a company to each of the attacking 

motorized rifle battalions and is not depicted or the tank battalion is following as a second echelon 

attack battalion. The artillery and air defense battalions and other supporting elements are not 

depicted. The graphic shows the location of MTO subunits during seven time hacks. Conveniently, 

there are three east-west roads running through the attack area. 

The first time hack occurs while the entire brigade is in an assembly area 20-40 kilometers from the 

enemy front line defense. The MTO subunits are busy filling, feeding and maintaining the brigade 

in preparation for the attack.

The second time hack occurs while the artillery conducts preparatory fires and the maneuver 

battalions form into march columns and advance toward the enemy. As they advance the 

battalions deploy into battalion precombat, company precombat and platoon precombat 

formations, each carefully choreographed with the phases of artillery preparatory fires. The 

platoons go on line and conduct the assault. During this time, the organic battalion support 

platoons and medical platoons accompany the battalions. The MTO companies cross the start 

line and follow well behind the attack. The rest of the MTO subunits load and prepare to leave the 

assembly area.

The third time hack occurs when the battalions achieve their immediate objective and usually 

commit or prepare to commit their second echelon attack subunits. Artillery is beginning to 

displace forward while the rest of the artillery conducts supporting fire. As the MTO companies 

move, they begin evacuating or repairing damaged maneuver battalion vehicles and weapons. 

The MTO subunits in the assembly area finish loading up and move to the start line. 

The fourth time hack occurs when the first echelon battalions achieve their subsequent objective. 

Artillery continues to displace forward and the BrAG is reconstituted forward. Other artillery 

continues to move forward. The MTO companies move forward, collecting and repairing as they 

go. The remainder of the MTO subunits and command elements have crossed the start line and 

are marching toward the initial attack line.

The fifth time hack is the Brigade immediate objective and is practically identical to the first 

echelon battalions’ subsequent objective. The sixth time hack is the subsequent objective of the 

second echelon battalions. The BrAG is reconstituted forward. The MTO companies have formed 

vehicle collection and supply points and have pushed subunits forward to join the battalion 

organic supply platoons to refit, refuel, feed and evacuate casualties. The MTO headquarters and 

battalion CP have formed a rear area supply and repair area short of the first echelon battalion 

immediate objective. The seventh time hack is the Brigade subsequent objective and is practically 

identical to the second echelon battalions’ subsequent objective. This is also referred to as the 

objective of the day and is often the time for a pause in the brigade’s offensive to refit while a 

follow-on brigade is committed to continue the attack. 
Specialty Branches

349

MTO Brigade Subunits in the Offense
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

350

Logistic Vehicle Modernization

The Russian Armed Forces are not 

only incorporating interoperability 

and modularity into combat vehicles, 

but also into logistical vehicles. 

This goal has presented some 

significant difficulties as the Russian 

Federation inherited Soviet logistical 

vehicles made by six different 

manufactures: Kama Automobile 

Plant (KamAZ), The Urals Automotive 

Plant (Ural), the Likhachov Plant 

(ZiL), Gorky Automobile Plant (GAZ), 

Kremenchuk Automobile Plant 

(KrAZ), and the Minsk Automobile 

Plant (MAZ). By the mid-1990s, the 

Russian Federation had stopped the 

procurement of most now “foreign” 

vehicles produced by MAZ (Belarus) 

and KrAZ (Ukraine). Even though 

the number of manufacturers of 

logistical vehicles had decreased, 

there were still significant problems. 

Russia’s four domestic manufacturers of vehicles (KamAZ, Ural, Zil, GAZ) each had their own 

subcomponents and parts, that were not interchangeable. Some vehicles, such as the ZiL131, were gasoline powered, while the vast majority of the fleet was diesel powered. For 

these reasons they decided to adopt a single manufacturer, and family of vehicles, to fulfill 

logistical duties. In 1998, The Urals Automotive Plant was selected to produce the “Motovoz” 

family of trucks. The Motovoz consists of three chassis, the Ural 43206 (4x4), Ural-4320-31 

(6x6), and Ural-5323 (8x8). These vehicles reportedly share 95% of their components. Due to 

financial difficulties, only one vehicle of the Motovoz family, the Ural-43206 (4x4), was fielded 

in large numbers from 2006-2008.

Former Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov decided to shift course on the logistical vehicle 

modernization effort by abandoning the Ural’s Motovoz family in favor of the KamAZ’s 

Mustang family. The Mustang family also consists of three chassis, the KamAZ-4350 (4x4), 

KamAZ-5350 (6x6), and KamAZ-6350 (8x8). There is some speculation about the cause of this 

shift ranging from corruption to production problems at the Urals plant, but it is most likely 

that the transition was due to KamAZ being part of the State Corporation for Assisting the 

Development, Production, and Export of High-Tech Industrial Products (Rostekh). Currently, 

the Russian Armed Forces have almost completely retired their Ural-4320s, ZiL-131s, and 

GAZ-66s. The Motovoz trucks are still in service, and will remain in service for the foreseeable 

future, but are small in number. But the vast majority of logistical vehicles in service with the 

Armed Forces are of KamAZ’s Mustang family, the KamAZ-4350 is now the standard vehicle 

found in the battalion’s logistical support platoons. 

Russian Logistic Vehicle Families
Specialty Branches

351

In terms of capabilities, the Mustang family has about the same payload capacities as the 

Motovoz family of vehicles, but Russian logisticians point out other differences between the 

families. In general, most Russian logisticians are of the opinion that the KamAZ Mustang 

family is best suited for over-the-road hauling at distances of over 500-600 km, while the Ural 

Motovoz family is best in more austere environments where off road characteristics are most 

important. Another difference is technical complexity, the Mustangs are substantially more 

complex than the Motovoz vehicles, preventing operators and organizational level mechanics 

from conducting many repairs on the Mustang vehicles that they could otherwise perform on 

the Motovoz family of vehicles. Due to this situation, the brigades’ MTO battalions, and army 

group and military district MTO brigades have greatly increased their lift capacities, but are 

not always capable of delivering materials directly to the subunits at the forward edge of the 

battle area. In general, The Russian Armed Forces and military forces of the Interior Troops 

(MVD-VV) appear to be integrating both the Mustang and Motovoz family of vehicles as they 

complement each other.

In terms of standardization, reportedly 90-95% of logistical vehicle components (including 

POL) are now interchangeable. These vehicles not only have components interchangeable 

with other KamAZ vehicles, but also interchangeable with subcomponents and parts of 

other manufacturers such as engines produced by the Urals Automotive Plant (Ural) and cabs 

produced by the Italian firm Industrial Vehicles Corporation (Iveco). This line of effort towards 

interoperability and modularity is paralleled throughout the Russian defense industry and 

is most apparent in combat vehicle development. Although the Mustang family is currently 

Russia’s solution for interoperability, Russia has already started its next generation of logistic 

vehicles, the Tayfun and Platforma families. These vehicles will take integration one step 

farther, by utilizing a common chassis for logistic and some combat vehicles.64 

64 Aleksey Ramm, “There Process Has Gotten Bogged Down: Military and Industrialists Unable to Standardize 

Truck Transport,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 8 April 2015, <http://vpk-news.ru/articles/24654>, 

accessed 15 September 2016.

Logistic Vehicle Characteristics
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

352

Russian Logistic Vehicles

ZiL-131

The ZiL-131 is a 6x6 general-purpose military truck that 

has an all-metal cab which provides seating for the 

driver and two passengers. Its production commenced 

in 1966, as a replacement for the ZiL-157. Production 

of the ZiL-131 ceased in 1994 after the production of 

nearly 1,000,000 vehicles. The baseline model of the 

ZiL-131 is a cargo truck with a payload capacity of 5,000 

kg on hard surface roads and 3,500 kg off-road, often 

being used to carry troops, cargo and other military 

equipment. The cargo area can be covered with bows 

and canvas. The ZiL-131 can tow trailers or artillery 

pieces with a maximum weight of 6,500 kg on hard 

surface roads and 4,000 kg off-road. The ZiL-131 is powered by a 150 hp V8 gasoline engine 

with a 5-speed manual gearbox. The vehicle is all-wheel drive, however the front axle can 

be disconnected on hard surface roads, and is equipped with a central tire inflation system. 

Some models are equipped with a self-recovery winch. Variants of the ZiL-131 include a ZiL131V tractor truck for towing semi-trailers, ZiL-131D dump truck and fuel and water tankers. 

It is used as a chassis for the Grad MLRS system. An improved variant, the ZiL-131N, was 

introduced in 1986. A civilian version of this truck, the ZiL-130 with 4x4 configuration was also 

produced in large numbers. In 1995 a new ZiL-4334 was proposed as a replacement of the 

ZiL-131N. A small number of these trucks are in service with the Russian Army.65

GAZ-66

The GAZ-66 is a 4x4 light general-purpose truck with 

a cab over engine design that has seating for the 

driver and one passenger. Production of the GAZ-66 

commenced in 1964 at the Gorkiy Automobile Plant, as 

a replacement for the GAZ-63. The design follows the 

usual Soviet guidelines of relative simplicity, strength 

and versatility, being produced for both civilian and 

military use. There are no design frills on the GAZ-66, 

it can be produced in, or modified into, many different 

versions. Production ceased in 1999, after almost 

1,000,000 were built. The GAZ-66 is simple and easy 

to maintain, with a 2,000 kg payload capacity. The 

basic cargo/utility model has an all-steel cargo body with an optional bow and canvas cover 

mounted on a chassis frame that can be arranged to carry any number of body styles. The 

GAZ-66 is powered by a 115 hp 4.2-liter V8 gasoline engine. The vehicle is all-wheel drive, 

and has superb cross-country mobility characteristics, some models have a winch. Models 

produced from 1968 have a central tire pressure system and may feature a soft-top cab. The 

65 “ZiL-131,” as found at: Military-Today.com, <http://www.military-today.com/trucks/zil_131.htm>, accessed 15 

September 2016.

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

ZiL-131

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

GAZ-66
Specialty Branches

353

vehicle can operate in climatic conditions ranging from -50°C to +50°C. The GAZ-66 is still 

used by the Russian Army, many ex-Warsaw Pact armed forces and wherever Soviet influence 

had spread. Many are used throughout the Middle East and nations in Africa. A follow-on 

version was developed, the GAZ-3308 Sadko, but it was abandoned in favor of the KamAZ4350. The GAZ-66B is the modified version for the airborne forces. It is air droppable, and 

has an open cab with a canvas cover. Its windshield can be folded over the hood. The GAZ66-40 was the final production model. It is powered by a 123 hp GAZ-5441 turbocharged 

diesel engine. There are numerous variants of the GAZ-66 including models for: NBC 

decontamination, POL distribution, supply, command and control, and communications. The 

GAZ-66 is used to carry the 2B19 Podnos and 2B9 Vasilek mortars.66

 

Ural-43206

The Ural-43206 4x4 light general-purpose truck is a 

member of the Motovoz family of vehicles produced 

by the Ural Automotive Plant. Other family members 

include the Ural-4320 (6x6) and Ural-5323 (8x8). The 

Ural-43206 reportedly shares 95% of its components 

with the other vehicles in the Motovoz family, and was 

developed from the larger 6x6 Ural-4320. The Ural43206 uses the same cab as the Ural-4320 and provides 

seating for the driver and two passengers. It was 

accepted into the Russian Armed Forces in 1996, often 

being used for troop or cargo transport. The Ural-43206 

has a payload capacity of 4,200 kg, and can carry up to 24 troops in the rear cargo area. The 

cargo area can be covered by bows and canvas, and has drop sides and tailgate. It is capable 

of towing trailers or artillery pieces with a maximum weight of 7,000 kg. The Ural-43206 

is powered by a 180 hp YaMZ-236M2 turbocharged diesel engine with a 5-speed manual 

gearbox. It is an all-wheel drive vehicle that is designed to operate on and off road, and has 

a central tire pressure system. The Ural-43206 comes in several body types and variants. The 

Ural-43206-41 has a more powerful 230 hp YaMZ-236NE2 turbocharged diesel engine. The 

Ural-43206-0551 has a four-door cab, which accommodates the driver and 5 passengers, but 

only has a payload capacity of 3,650 kg. The Ural-43206-47 has an Iveco cab, and a 250 hp 

YaMZ-236BE2 turbocharged diesel engine, with a 5,200 kg payload capacity.67

Ural-4320

The Ural-4320 6x6 medium general-purpose utility truck was designed to supersede the Ural375D, and is a member of the Motovoz family of vehicles, which it reportedly shares 95% of 

its components. It is produced by the Ural Automotive Plant. Other family members include 

the Ural-43206 (4x4) and Ural-5323 (8x8). The cab of the Ural-4320 provides seating for the 

driver and two passengers and can be equipped with an add-on armor kit to protect the cab 

and engine from small arms fire and artillery shrapnel. Production commenced in 1976, and 

is still ongoing. Since then the Ural-4320 has assumed many of the roles previously filled 

66 “GAZ-66,” as found at: Military-Today.com, <http://www.military-today.com/trucks/gaz_66.htm>, accessed 15 

September 2016.

67 “Ural-43206,” as found at: Military-Today.com, <http://www.military-today.com/trucks/ural_43206.htm>, 

accessed 15 September 2016. 

 Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

Ural-43206
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354

by the Ural-375D. The Ural-4320 is in service with the 

Russian military as well as the militaries of many other 

countries. It has a conventional design and is easy to 

repair. It has a payload capacity of 4,500 kg off-road and 

6 tons on hard surfaced roads. A standard troop/cargo 

platform has drop sides, drop tailgate and removable 

tarpaulin and bows. In the troop carrier configuration it 

accommodates 27 troops. This military truck also tows 

trailers or artillery pieces with a maximum weight of 12 

tons. The Ural-4320 was first powered by 210 hp YaMZ740 10.85-liter V8 diesel engine, then a 220 hp diesel 

engine, and is currently being produced with a 240 hp 

YaMZ-238M2 engine. Some models have even been equipped with Caterpillar engines, but 

all have a standard 5-speed manual transmission. The Ural-4320 is an all-wheel drive vehicle 

equipped with a centralized tire pressure system, which can operate in climatic conditions, 

ranging from -50°C to +50°C. There are many versions of the Ural-4320, including: Ural-4420 

tractor truck for towing semi-trailers. The Ural-4320-0911-30 is a large wheelbase model with 

a payload capacity of up to 10 tons that can carry up to 39 troops.68

Ural-5323

The Ural-5323 is the 8x8 heavy general-purpose truck 

member of the Motovoz family of vehicles produced 

by the Ural Automotive Plant. Other family members 

include the Ural-43206 (4x4) and Ural-4320 (6x6). The 

vehicle has a cab over engine design that provides 

seating for the driver and one passenger. The Ural5323 was specifically developed in the early 1990s for 

military service. It has a relatively simple design, and 

it is easy to maintain, using a number of components 

from other Ural and KamAZ trucks. The Ural-5323 

was designed to be a heavy transport for troops and 

supplies. It has a payload capacity of 9,000 kg, with 

some versions having a payload capacity of up to 12,000 kg, and can tow a trailer with a 

maximum weight of 16,000 kg. The cargo bed has hinged side benches for troop transport of 

up to 39 troops, and can be covered with bows and a tarpaulin. The Ural-5323 can also mount 

various heavy weapons systems. The standard engine is a 260 hp KamAZ-7403 turbocharged 

diesel. Other engine options are available, including the 290 hp Ural-745 and 320 hp Ural746 air-cooled diesels. The vehicle is equipped with a central tire inflation system and has a 

climatic operational range from -50°C to +50°C.

The Ural-5323 has many variants. The Ural-5323-20 is fitted with KamAZ cab, Ural-5323-21 is 

fitted with Iveco cab, and the Ural-5323-23 is fitted with armored cab. The Ural-5323-41, -42, 

-61 and -62 models are intended to mount various heavy weapon systems. The Ural 5423 is 

a tractor truck for towing semi-trailers. The Ural-E5323D is fitted with an armored cab and 

68 “Ural-4320,” as found at: Military-Today.com, <http://www.military-today.com/trucks/ural_4320.htm>, accessed 

15 September 2016. 

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

Ural-4320

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

Ural-5323
Specialty Branches

355

armored body with a V-shaped hull, providing protection against small arms fire, mine blasts, 

and IEDs. The Ural-5323 serves as the chassis for the KET-T recovery vehicle and the REM-KL 

repair and recovery vehicle.69

KamAZ-4350

The KamAZ-4350 is the 4x4 light general-purpose truck 

member of the Mustang family of vehicles produced 

by the KamAZ Corporation. Other family members 

include the KamAZ-5350 (6x6) and KamAZ-6350 (8x8). 

The KamAZ-4350 has the same three-person cab with 

a sleeping compartment as the rest of the Mustang 

family that can accept an add-on armor kit. It traces 

its origins back to the KamAZ-4310, launched in 1981. 

The KamAZ-4350 was accepted into service with 

the Russian Armed Forces in 2002, with small-scale 

production commencing in 2003, as a replacement 

for the GAZ-66 light utility truck. It has a conventional 

design with a payload capacity of 4,100 kg and can tow trailers or artillery pieces with a 

maximum weight of 7,000 kg. It can be fitted with a variety of body types, as well as shelters 

and removable containers. The standard troop/cargo version carries up to 30 troops, is 

fitted with drop sides and tailgate with removable bows and tarpaulin. The KamAZ-4350 is 

powered by a 240 hp KamAZ-740.11.240 turbocharged diesel engine that is compliant with 

EURO II emission requirements, and equipped with a cold weather starting device that allows 

operation at temperatures down to -50°C. The KamAZ-4350 is an all-wheel drive vehicle that 

is equipped with a central tire inflation system. The KamAZ-4350 comes in several variants, 

including the Airborne Troops’ KamAZ-43501, nicknamed “Flying KamAZ,” that has a shorter 

wheelbase and can be airdropped using a parachute.70

KamAZ-5350

The KamAZ-5350 is the 6x6 medium general-purpose 

utility truck member of the Mustang family of vehicles 

produced by the KamAZ Corporation. Other family 

members include the KamAZ-4350 (4x4) and KamAZ6350 (8x8). The KamAZ-5350 has the same threeperson cab with a sleeping compartment as the rest of 

the Mustang family that can accept an add-on armor 

kit. This general utility truck is a further development 

of the KamAZ-4310, which was launched in the early 

1980s. The KamAZ-5350 was accepted into service 

with the Russian Armed Forces in 2002, with smallscale production commencing in 2003, as with 

other members of the Mustang family. The KamAZ-5350 has a conventional design with 

69 “Ural-5323,” as found at: Military-Today.com, <http://www.military-today.com/trucks/ural_5323.htm>, accessed 

15 September 2016. 

70 “KamAZ-4350,” as found at: Military-Today.com, <http://www.military-today.com/trucks/kamaz_4350.htm>, 

accessed 15 September 2016. 

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

KamAZ-4350

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

KamAZ-5350
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356

a payload capacity of 6,000 kg, and it can also tow trailers or artillery pieces. It can carry a 

variety of shelters or container-type loads. A standard troop/cargo platform has drop sides, 

drop tailgate and removable bows and tarpaulin. The KamAZ-5350 is powered by a 260 hp 

KamAZ-740.13.260 turbocharged diesel engine that is a compliant with EURO II emission 

requirements, and equipped with a cold weather starting device that allows operation at 

temperatures down to -50°C. The KamAZ-5350 is an all-wheel drive vehicle that is equipped 

with a central tire inflation system. There are numerous variants of the baseline model, 

including the KamAZ-53501 bridge transporter and the KamAZ-53504 tractor truck for towing 

semi-trailers.71

KamAZ-6350

The KamAZ-6350 is the 8x8 heavy general-purpose 

truck member of the Mustang family of vehicles 

produced by the KamAZ Corporation. Other family 

members include the KamAZ-4350 (4x4) and KamAZ5350 (6x6). The KamAZ-6350 has the same threeperson cab with a sleeping compartment as the rest of 

the Mustang family and can accept an add-on armor 

kit. The development of the KamAZ-6350 began in 

1987, with the first prototypes being completed in 

the early 1990s. The KamAZ-6350 was accepted into 

service with the Russian Armed Forces in 2002, with 

small-scale production commencing in 2003, as with 

other members of the Mustang family. The vehicle has a conventional design with a payload 

capacity of 10,000 kg and can tow trailers or artillery pieces with a maximum weight of 12,000 

kg. It can carry a variety of shelters or container-type loads. A standard troop/cargo platform 

has drop sides, drop tailgate and removable bows and tarpaulin. It is powered by a 360 hp 

KamAZ-740.50.360 turbocharged diesel engine that is a compliant with EURO II emission 

requirements, and equipped with a cold weather starting device that allows operation at 

temperatures down to -50°C. The KamAZ-6350 is an all-wheel drive vehicle that is equipped 

with a central tire inflation system. There are numerous variants of the baseline model, 

including the KamAZ-63501 that has a payload capacity of 15 000 kg. The KamAZ-6450 is 

a tractor truck for towing semi-trailers and artillery pieces. The KamAZ-6350 serves as the 

chassis for the Pantsir-S1 air defense system; the Semser 122mm truck-mounted howitzer; and 

the 9A52-4 Tornado, Naiza, and Lynx MLRS systems72

BREM-1

The BREM-1 armored repair and recovery vehicle [бронированная ремонтно-эвакуационная

машина] was developed to support a fleet of T-72 main battle tanks and its derivatives. The 

main role of this vehicle is to recover damaged tanks and other armored vehicles from the 

battlefield. It tows damaged vehicles to the nearest shelter, assembly point, maintenance 

unit or repair depot. The BREM-1 also recovers stuck, swamped or overturned vehicles, and 

71 “KamAZ-5350,” as found at: Military-Today.com, <http://www.military-today.com/trucks/kamaz_5350.htm>, 

accessed 15 September 2016. 

72 “KamAZ-6350,” as found at: Military-Today.com, <http://www.military-today.com/trucks/kamaz_6350.htm>, 

accessed 15 September 2016. 

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

KamAZ-6350
Specialty Branches

357

assists field repairs and servicing of armored vehicles. 

The BREM-1 is based on a modified T-72A main battle 

tank chassis. The turret has been removed and new 

superstructure fitted. It is fitted with a front-mounted 

dozer blade, crane, winch and other specialized 

equipment. The BREM-1 is operated by a crew of three, 

including commander, driver and handler. The BREM-1 

is fitted with a 4.4 meter crane. It has a 19 ton capacity 

at 2 meters and 3 ton capacity at 4.4 meters. It is used 

to lift damaged or stuck vehicles. Also the crane can 

be used to lift vehicle for access and repair. The main 

winch has a 25-ton capacity that can be increased 

to 100 tons using snatch blocks. The cable is 200 meters long. It can be also used for selfrecovery. There is also a 530 kg capacity auxiliary winch with 425 meters of cable. The BREM-1 

can tow a vehicle of up to 50 tons over a prolonged distance. There is also a 3.1 meter-wide 

bulldozer blade that can be used for excavation, rubble clearing, and filling ditches. It also 

carries various tools for tank repair and servicing, including welding equipment. The BREM1M is an improved version with a 840 hp V-84MS or 1,000 hp V-92S2 engine. The BREM-L is 

based on a BMP-3 chassis. There are also reportedly plans to create versions based on the 

Armata and Kuganets chassis.73

MTO-UB1

The MTO-UB1 Universal Maintenance Vehicle is the 

designated system for the maintenance and routine 

repair of weapons and equipment found in motorized 

rifle and tank battalions, and can service tanks, BMPs, 

BTRs, MT-LBs and logistic vehicles. The system consists 

of the Ural-4320 chassis, workshop, and 2.5-ton crane. 

It has a crew of five: squad leader/mechanic, crane 

operator, mechanic, machinist, and driver. An MTOUB1 crew can detect and repair minor faults in vehicle 

and weapon systems and has the capability to perform 

metal work, arc welding, battery maintenance, 

lubrication and tire servicing, filter replacement and 

painting as needed.74

73 “BREM-1,” as found at: Military-Today.com, <http://www.military-today.com/engineering/brem1.htm>, 

accessed 15 September 2016. 

“Russian Army Tests Next-Generation Armored Recovery Vehicle,” Sputnik Online, 5 September 2016, <http://

sputniknews.com/military/20160905/1044981634/russia-army-tests-new-arv.html>, accessed 15 September 

2016.

74 “The Universal Maintenance Vehicle for the Servicing of Motorized Rifle and Tank Battalions,” as found 

at: Project Technika, <http://www.pr-t.ru/catalog/masterskie-tekhnicheskogo-obsluzhivaniya/masterskayatekhnicheskogo-obsluzhivaniya-i-remonta-vvt-motostrelkovogo-tankovogo-batalona-mto-ub1/>, accessed 15 

September 2016.

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

BREM-1

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

MTO-UB1
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

358

Chapter 8 

Other Tactical Considerations
Other Tactical Considerations

359

Airborne (VDV)

Although the Russian Airborne, and to similar extent 

Naval Infantry, are not a part of the Russian Ground 

Forces, they are significantly different than their 

Western counterparts and have much in common with 

their land-based brethren. Structurally, the Russian 

Airborne is a heavily mechanized force and is divided 

between parachute and air assault units. In terms of 

function, the Russian VDV fulfills many of the same 

roles as those in the West, but also fills another niche 

not filled by Western airborne forces, that of a reliable 

enforcer for politically sensitive operations. This role 

began in Soviet times, with the Soviet invasion of 

Hungary in 1956 to quell the Hungarian uprising. 

VDV units began quietly occupying Hungary weeks 

before overt Soviet action began, and after the 

commencement of hostilities they gained a reputation 

for quickly and efficiently seizing objectives in an urban 

battle space to which conventional Soviet commanders 

were not accustomed.1

 Although exact details have 

yet to emerge, reportedly VDV units were involved in 

operations in Crimea, and if previous behaviors are 

indicators of the operational tactics in the recent campaign, it will likely be discovered that 

the VDV elements began arriving there well before masked gunmen started showing up on 

the streets of Crimea.2 It is also likely that the vast majority of “polite people” and “little green 

men” seen in Crimea were VDV and Naval Infantry troops, not special operations forces as 

many analysts have speculated. In terms of training, Russian experts estimate that around 40 

percent of specialties require significantly more training than elsewhere in the Russian military, 

increasing the requirement for contract personnel.3 In the Russian system, the best and 

brightest often vie for careers in the VDV, and not in the various spetsnaz units.

1

 In all, 1710 Soviet paratroopers were decorated in the Hungarian campaign, including four recipients of the 

Soviet Union’s highest award, the Hero of the Soviet Union. In total, the VDV garnered 18% of the total medals 

awarded for the campaign, despite only having 6 percent of the troops. The VDV actions in Hungary set a 

precedent in the Soviet Armed Forces of using the VDV as special operation forces are used in the West, namely 

to enter an area of operations discretely and then begin conducting operations. This pattern played out again 

in the 1968 Czech uprising, when the VDV flew into the Prague Airport in commercial aircraft and then began 

fanning out through the city with commandeered vehicles in order to secure Czech command and control and 

communications infrastructure quickly. This role of the VDV in Soviet times has undoubtedly been inherited by 

today’s Russian VDV. 

Steve Zaloga, Inside the Blue Berets: A Combat History of Soviet and Russian Airborne Forces, 1930-1995. Novato, CA: 

Presidio, 1995.

2

 Ivan Petrov and Ivan Stolnikov,” Among the Military in Crimea They Managed to See a Chechen Battalion and 

Airborne Troops from Ulyanovsk,” RBK Daily Online, 6 March 2014, <http://top.rbc.ru/politics/06/03/2014/909718.

shtml>, accessed 17 March 2014. 3

 Charles K. Bartles & Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Military Operation in Crimea: Road-Testing Rapid Reaction 

Capabilities,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 61, No. 6, November–December 2014, 51-52.

See: Rod Thornton, “Organizational Change in the Russian Airborne Forces: the Lessons of the Georgian Conflict,” 

SSI: US Army War College, December 2011.

Colonel General Andrei Serdyukov

VDV Commander-in-Chief 

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

360

The Russian Airborne (VDV) has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of the Russian 

Federation’s efforts to increase conventional military capabilities. The VDV’s 38th Signal and 

45th Spetsnaz regiments have been upsized to brigades; a third parachute/air assault regiment 

will be added to each division; and a new maneuver brigade (345th Air Assault Brigade) will 

be created; and there are plans to reactivate the 104th Air Assault Division. This increase in 

forces is in addition to current plans to add a tank battalion to each division and brigade.

Airborne Dispositions

BTR-MDM

Images Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

BMD-4M
Other Tactical Considerations

361

Airborne Equipment and Modernization

The VDV is a mechanized force for several 

reasons. The Soviets believed in the concept 

of “deep battle” which required high 

levels of mobility, leaving no place for any 

infantryman without vehicle transportation. 

Other reasons stem from the lethality of the 

modern battlefield, and NBC protection, 

which the Soviets believed would be a factor 

in any conflict with NATO. Today, Russia still 

believes in the importance of battlefield field 

mobility, and has all infantryman mounted 

on wheeled or tracked vehicles, including 

its special operations forces and airborne 

infantryman. But, in order to be “airmobile,” and mechanized, the VDV has had to utilize 

substantially lighter vehicles. The VDV’s newest 13.5 ton Infantry Fighting Vehicle (BMD-4M) 

and 13 ton Armored Personnel Carrier (BTR-MD) weigh several tons less than their cousins in 

the Ground Forces. In order to maintain an airmobile tank capability, the VDV has fielded light 

tanks capable of being transported, and air dropped with crew, by the IL-76 transport aircraft. 

(As mentioned earlier, the VDV is also now fielding non-airmobile T-72B3s). The amphibious 

2S25 Sprut-SD is a 125mm tank turret mounted on a BMD chassis. The Sprut-SD has a threeman crew, and is equipped with an autoloader, capable of firing 4-6 APFSDS, HE-Frag, HEAT 

and ATGM per minute. Reportedly, new versions of the Sprut (Sprut-SDM1) will be placed on 

a BMD-4M chassis, and be equipped with 

new electronics, targeting, and fire control 

capabilities that will give the Sprut roughly 

the equivalent firepower of a T-90 tank. The 

Russian Federation was also developing 

another “big gun on a little chassis,” the 

2S36 “Zauralets” artillery system. The 

Zauralets was intended to replace the 

2S9 Nona-S, reportedly being capable of 

functioning as a field gun, howitzer, and 

mortar, and was chambered in 120 and 

152 millimeter versions. Development of 

the Zauralets system has been suspended 

in favor of a similar system known as the “Lotos.” The amphibious and air droppable Lotos 

will be capable of being mounted on a BMD-4M or a wheeled armored car (Volk-3) chassis. 

In general, airmobile operations require vehicles of lighter weight, the VDV has faced this 

reality, as the BTR-MD, BMD-4M, Sprut-SD, Zauralets, and Lotos exemplify, by sacrificing lots of 

armored protection, but very little lethality.4

4

 Charles K. Bartles, “Russia’s Multipurpose and Airmobile ‘Zauralets’ Artillery System: A Big Gun on a Little 

Chassis,” OE Watch Online, November 2015.

“The ‘Zauralets’ Self-Propelled Artillery System Has Completed Preliminary State Trials,” Lenta Online, 5 October 

2015, <http://lenta.ru/news/2015/10/05/zauralets/>, accessed 13 October 2015.

 Nikolay Grishchenko, “The New Self-Propelled Weapon for the Airborne Troops Has Been Named ‘Lotos’,” 

2S25 “Sprut-SD”

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

2S36 “Zauralets”

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

362

Coastal Defense Troops

The Russian Coastal Defense Troops consist of two 

separate organizations, the Coastal Defense Artillery 

Troops and the Naval Infantry. In terms of command 

and control, the Coastal Defense Troops are part of 

the Russian Navy. The Navy’s command and control 

of these forces is exercised through the four fleets 

and one flotilla, where the commander of the Coastal 

Defense Troops units in each of these commands 

serves on the fleet (flotilla) staff.

Naval Infantry

The Naval Infantry garners much less coverage in 

the Russian media than the Russian Ground Forces 

and VDV, but still is a major beneficiary of efforts to 

reform and modernize the Russian Armed Forces. The 

Naval Infantry is undergoing an overhaul to improve 

equipment and training and has recently expanded 

the Third Naval Infantry Regiment of the Pacific 

Fleet and the Sixty-First Naval Infantry Regiment of 

the Northern Fleet into full-fledged brigades. 5

 It 

is important to note that the Russian Naval Infantry is not the United States Marine Corps 

(USMC), having only an estimated 8,000-9,000 personnel. Since the Naval Infantry is much 

smaller than the USMC, and is subordinated to fleets/flotilla, the Naval Infantry is only 

capable of coastal defense missions and offensive missions at a tactical level, not large-scale 

(operational level) missions. Other differences involve the Naval Infantry’s close relationship 

to the VDV. This relationship dates back to the Second World War, when certain Naval Infantry 

units were commanded by VDV officers. 6 These close ties continue today: Naval Infantry units 

have select units on jump status, and naval infantrymen routinely train at the VDV training 

center in Ryazan. The current commander of the Coastal Defense Troops, Major-General 

Aleksandr Kolpachenko, is a career VDV officer.7 The Naval Infantry likely has a far different 

doctrine for amphibious landings than the USMC. Although Russia does have an impressive 

array of armed hover and landing craft, Russian doctrine for amphibious assault likely 

involves using aviation assets to air assault or parachute initial forces into a contested area 

to first neutralize coastal defenses and secure a beachhead for the landing of heavier followon forces, as each Naval Infantry brigade has an airborne/air assault battalion. The Russian 

Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 14 June 2016, <https://rg.ru/2016/06/14/novuiu-samohodku-dlia-vdv-nazvali-lotos.

html>, accessed 20 June 2016. 5

 Naval Infantry Brigades to be Reestablished in Pacific, Northern Fleets” RIA Novosti Online, 27 November 2013, 

<http://rian.ru/>, accessed 17 March 2014.

Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Website, “Navy Coastal Defense Troops Chief Major-General Aleksandr 

Kolpachenko Tells of the Development of the Coastal Defense Troops and Naval Infantry,” 1 January 2014, 

<http://www.mil.ru>, accessed 17 March 2014. 6

 Steve Zaloga, Inside the Blue Berets: A Combat History of Soviet and Russian Airborne Forces, 1930-1995. Novato, 

CA: Presidio, 1995.

7

 Russian Wikipedia website: <ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Колпаченко,_Александр_Николаевич>, accessed 17 

March 2014.

Lieutenant General Alexander Kolpachenko

Coastal Defense Troops Commander-in-Chief

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
Other Tactical Considerations

363

Naval Infantry is a heavily mechanized force, and has much in common with the Russian 

Ground Forces and VDV in terms of tactics, doctrine, and equipment, including the fact that 

it does not possess its own organic aviation assets, relying on the Russian Aerospace Troops 

(Air Force) for all aviation support. These similarities make the practice of detaching units 

from one of these services, and attaching them to another, a routine practice in the Russian 

Armed Forces. The Russian Naval Infantry is considered an elite force in the Russian Armed 

Forces, regularly training and operating with the Russian Airborne Forces. Although the 

Naval Infantry are mostly formed into brigades, these brigades are significantly smaller, and 

subsequently have far less combat power than Ground Forces, and even Airborne brigades.

Coastal Defense Artillery Troops

The Coastal Defense Artillery Troops are responsible for manning fixed and mobile missile 

and tube artillery systems and protecting the State borders along Russia’s 38,000 kilometers 

of coastlines. This unique mission has had a great impact on the Coastal Defense Artillery 

Troops’ equipment and vectors for future development. Unlike the Ground Forces, Airborne, 

and Naval Infantry, the Coastal Defense Artillery Troops generally prefer wheeled vehicles 

(to more quickly traverse the vast coastlines) and artillery systems that provide good long 

distance stand-off capabilities. Many Russian artillery systems have specially modified 

versions for coastal defense use, such as the Koalitsiya-SV self-propelled howitzer and the 

BM-21 Grad 122mm MLRS. Although the Coastal Defense Artillery Troops protect ports, 

harbors, and other shore based facilities, it’s most interesting capability is naval area denial, 

which is provided by tactical-operational missiles. Russia is currently fielding several tacticaloperational missile systems, the Iskander surface-to-surface missile system is operated by the 

Russian Ground Forces, but the Bal and Bastion coastal missile defense systems are operated 

by the Coastal Defense Artillery Troops. One advantage of coastal missile defense systems, 

Naval Infantry Dispositions
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

364

is that they are not subject to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) that 

limits the Iskander and other surface-to-surface missile systems to a less than a 500 kilometer 

range.

The Bal is equipped with eight Kh-35 missiles with an approximately a 130 kilometer range. 

There are typically four systems in a battery. 

Interestingly, the same missile system 

used on the road-mobile Bal, may also be 

operated from a standard sized shipping 

container. Russia sells this “shipping 

container” missile system as the Club-K on 

the export market. The Russian Federation 

has recently increased the range of the 

Kh-35 to 300 kilometers (The Club-K can 

fire a variety of Kh-35 and 3M-54 missile 

types). Russia has been keen to tout the 

new range and concealability of the Kh-35 

and the Club-K, and makes it very apparent 

that this system is intended to negate some 

of the U.S. Navy’s overmatch of weaker navies. The modular design of the system allows for 

the missiles to be fired using their internal sensors for targeting, or they may use a similarly 

“containerized” C2/Radar system, or they may be directed from other target acquisition 

systems (AWACS, another vessel, etc.). Undoubtedly, an extended range Kh-35 and Club-K 

combo that can “hide-in-plain-sight,” should be of some concern in increasingly crowded sealanes. Promotional materials for the Club-K also mention the possibilities of deploying the 

system on rail or on the back of a flatbed truck, a possibility that turns any common shipping 

container into a possible threat.8

The “Bastion” coastal missile defense system was developed by the Machine-Building Science 

and Production Association for the 3M55 

Onyx missile. (export designation Yakhont, 

NATO classification SS-N-26 Strobile). The 

Onyx is Russia’s latest anti-ship missile 

that has a range of approximately 600 

kilometers. The Bastion comes in two 

variants, the fixed-position “Bastion-S”, and 

the mobile “Bastion-P”. The Bastion-P is 

comprised of four mobile launchers (two 

missiles per launcher), a command vehicle, 

and loader/transporter vehicles. Vehicles 

mounted with the “Monolit-B” radars may 

also be employed to enhance targeting. 

The Onyx (Yakhont for exported systems, 

8

 Charles. K. Bartles, “Russia Puts US Navy on Notice with Improved ‘Shipping Container’ Missile,” OE Watch Online, 

June 2015.

“Bal-E” Coastal Defense Missile System

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

“Bastion” Coastal Defense Missile System

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
Other Tactical Considerations

365

with a 300 kilometer range) 

missile is a supersonic homing 

anti-ship missile developed 

to destroy surface ships 

of all classes, particularly 

vessels comprising: surface 

strike groups, carrier battle 

groups, amphibious assault 

forces, and convoys. The 

system can be situated up 

to 200 kilometers inland, 

and is capable of protecting 

a stretch of coastline 

measuring in excess of 600 

kilometers against potential 

enemy amphibious landing 

operations. The manufacturer 

purports the time between 

receipt of a call for fire mission 

and full deployment of the 

system is five minutes, and 

that the system can remain in 

firing position 72-120 hours, 

depending on available fuel 

reserves.

The Onyx/Yakhont anti-ship missile is stored inside a hermetically sealed transport and 

launch container. The missile is fully combat ready when it leaves the manufacturing plant, 

and is stored, transported, and mounted on the launcher inside this container. The missile’s 

diagnostics can be monitored without opening the container. The Onyx uses a ramjet engine 

with a solid-propellant booster, allowing the missile to reach a cruise velocity of Mach 

2.0-3.5 at an altitude of up to 20,000 meters. One of the Onyx missile’s most interesting 

characteristics is its guidance system. The guidance system can purportedly work in tandem 

with other missiles, and can allocate and classify targets based on their importance, and then 

select an appropriate attack scheme. Following the destruction of the primary target, the 

remaining missiles attack other ships, so no target is attacked by more than one missile. After 

an initial target lock is achieved, the Onyx shuts down its radar and descends to a low altitude 

(5 to 10 meters), below the operational level of most air defense radars. Once the missile 

emerges from beneath the radar horizon, the missile radar is reactivated and locks back on to 

the target. This feature, in conjunction with the Onyx’s high rate of speed, greatly complicates 

adversarial air defense and electronic warfare countermeasures.9

9

 Charles K. Bartles, “‘Bastion’ Coastal Defense System Increases Area Denial Capabilities,” OE Warch Online, 

December 2015. 

Area Denial Capabilities
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

366

Military Police

The institution of a Military Police Corps is a relatively new concept in the Russian Armed 

Forces. The route security duties of U.S. Military Police are performed by Commandant Service 

or Road Commandant units in the Russian military, but the Russian military has never had 

a dedicated internal security apparatus until 2012. During Soviet times, the commander of 

a subunit or a unit had the authority to send subordinates to the local guardhouse (jail) for 

discipline infractions. This practice was subsequently abolished by the Russian Federation 

after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the reasoning being that only a judge had the right 

to imprison someone. Commanders were unhappy with this reform because according to 

the new rules, there is a required court proceeding, and only after due process could he 

send the soldier to jail. Since months could elapse between the discipline infraction and 

the punishment, few commanders were interested in pursuing charges. This reform left 

commanders without their most effective method for dealing with discipline problems. Only 

commanders that could find other means to enforce unit discipline maintained order. Some 

officers attributed the loss of their jailing authority as a reason that “dedovshchina”, or brutal 

hazing, became more problematic in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 

order to impose discipline and decrease the number of embarrassing hazing and corruption 

problems, the establishment of a Military Police Corps was proposed by both civilian and the 

military authorities.10

The path to the establishment of a Military Police Corps in 

the Armed Forces has been a long one. In 1992, the Russian 

Prosecutor General’s Office proposed the creation of a Military 

Police Corps to conduct criminal investigations and combat 

economic crimes, but the State Duma did not pass the bill. 

In 1996, due to some embarrassing corruption incidents, 

the State Duma Committee for Defense again proposed the 

establishment of a Military Police Corps outside of the military’s 

chain of command, but the proposal encountered resistance 

from the military and was eventually dropped to due to 

funding concerns. In 2005, Human Rights Commissioner 

Vladimir Lukin suggested creating a Military Police Corps to 

combat hazing, and in 2006 the high profile case of Private 

Andrey Sychev, a conscript who lost his legs from a severe 

hazing incident, caused President Vladimir Putin to back the 

idea. After a few more false starts, in 2012, former Chief of the 

Russian General Staff, General Nikolay Makarov announced 

that by December 1, 2012, Military Police units would begin operations, and that a Defense 

Ministry main directorate and units in the military districts and the fleets had already been 

established. In 2015, the charter defining the Military Police’s structure, functions, and tasks 

10 Aleksandr Khramchikhin, “Legacies of Peter’s Trade Unions: Russian Military Police Must Handle the Most 

Serious Tasks,” Argumenty Nedeli Online, 22 December 2010, <http://argumenti.ru/vpk/n269/88381>, accessed 1 

May 2016.

Roman Kretsul, “They are Inquiring: Authorities of the Military Police have been Expanded,” Vzglyad Online, 25 

June 2014, <http://www.vz.ru/society/2014/6/25/692720.html>, accessed 1 May 2016.

Military Police Badge

Image Courtesy: Russian MoD
Other Tactical Considerations

367

was confirmed by Presidential Edict No. 161 on 25 March 

2015.11 

In terms of function, Russian Military Police are intended to 

uphold law and order, provide physical security, conduct 

investigations into acts of disciplinary and general criminal 

misconduct, operate military jails, and ensure general 

traffic safety, but they do not provide route security.12 In 

certain situations, the Military Police provide protection 

for victims, witnesses, and other participants in criminal 

proceedings such as service personnel, military court 

judges, and military prosecutors. The Military Police have 

assumed control of Ministry of Defense disciplinary units and 

garrison guardhouses (jails). Russian Military Police are also 

considered an agency of inquiry in the Armed Forces, which 

gives them the authority to conduct inquests. In the past, 

when commanders wanted to conduct an investigation, they 

appointed one of their subordinate officers as an investigating 

officer for the matter. Usually these officers have no 

investigative or legal experience, and would have to conduct 

an investigation with little guidance. Now, when an investigating officer is appointed, he may 

request assistance from the Military Police, with the eventual goal that all investigations in the 

Armed Forces will be conducted by the Military Police. Although this practice will relieve the 

commander of some administrative burdens, there is reporting that the intent of this reform 

is to remove any commander influence, to ensure a fair and thorough investigation. The 

approximately 10,000 strong Military Police Corps operates under the authority of the Russian 

Armed Force’s Prosecutor General and his subordinate military prosecutors. This command 

relationship allows the Military Police to cordon off or blockade military garrisons and areas 

without consulting the unit commander.13

11 “Putin Approves Charter for Russian Military Police,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Online, 27 

March 2016 <http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12011886@egNews>, accessed 1 May 

2016.

“Putin Signs Law on Military Police,” RIA Novosti Online, 4 February 2014, <http://ria.ru/defense_

safety/20140204/992897811.html#ixzz2sMiubPrC>, accessed 1 May 2016. 

Ivan Safronov and Viktor Khamrayev, “Anatoliy Serdyukov Has Prepared Bill ‘On Military Police’,” Kommersant

Online, 10 October 2012, <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2041082>, accessed 1 May 2016.

“Three of Five Penal Battalions Disbanded in Russian Armed Forces,” Interfax, 21 September 2011. 12 Yuriy Gavrilov, “Eastern Military District Military Police Equipped with Nonlethal Weaponry,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta

Online, 29 June 2014, <http://www.rg.ru/2014/06/29/policia-site.html>, accessed 1 May 2016.

Yuriy Gavrilov, “Jailhouse Handed Over to Police,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 27 January 2014, <http://www.

rg.ru/2014/01/25/police-site.html>, accessed 1 May 2016.

“Military police will become involved in guard, patrol service in Russian army,” Interfax, 10 December 2012. 13 Aleksandr Khramchikhin, “Legacies of Peter’s Trade Unions: Russian Military Police Must Handle the Most 

Serious Tasks,” Argumenty Nedeli Online, 22 December 2010, <http://www.arumenti.ru/vpk/n269/88381/>, 

accessed 1 May 2016.

Yuriy Gavrilov, “Appointing Police Officers: Officers Unsuitable for Headquarters and the Field Could Be Called 

to the New Military Body,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 18 October 2010, <http://www.rg.ru/2010/10/18/police.

html>, 1 May 2016.

Military Police Officer

Image Courtesy: Russian MoD
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

368

Arms Procurement Process

The Russian Federation has demonstrated an impressive capability to design and rapidly field 

new large end items such as tanks, BTRs, and BMPs, a process which takes substantially longer 

in the U.S. One example is the fielding of Russia’s T-14 tank mounted on the Armata chassis. 

In March of 2016, Sergey Chemezov, head of the Russian state corporation Rostec, announced 

that the T-14 tank had already begun serial production.14 If this statement is accurate, the T-14 

and its Armata chassis have entered serial production less than five years after the May 12, 

2011 announcement in Rossiyskaya Gazeta that Russia had abandoned development of the 

T-95 (object 195) tank in favor of the development of the Armata chassis and associated T-14 

tank.15

The fielding of the Armata chassis appears 

not to be the exception, but the rule, as it 

apparently takes about five years from the 

beginning of the Russian design process 

until serial production begins for most 

major Ground Forces/Airborne end items, if 

the initial prototype is deemed viable. The 

Ground Forces’ 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV howitzer 

(replacement for the Msta-S 2S19 howitzer), 

the Russian Airborne’s 2S36 Zauralets-D 

mortar/howitzer (replacement for the 2S9 

Nona) and the 2S25 Sprut-SD light tank have 

all took about five years to get from the 

issue of requirement/ initial design concept 

to the serial production phase.16 Problems delaying the production of Russian armaments are 

usually in regard to the state’s financial resources, and not due to bureaucratic, production, or 

parliamentary constraints.

The Russian Federation is able to enter serial production quicker than the U.S. due to a much 

different arms development cycle. Capability development questions are settled in the 

Russian General Staff with inputs from the branch chiefs (far fewer bureaucratic hurdles in 

the Russian system). There also appears to be no bidding process. A manufacture is simply 

assigned, and they build a few prototypes, if the prototype is unacceptable, the manufacture 

returns to the design phase. Innovations are accepted or rejected at the prototype 

phase, many designs make it no further than this phase. If the prototype is acceptable, 

improvements are made, and a test batch (approximately a battalion set) of vehicles is 

14 “Tanks A Lot: Russia’s Advanced Armata T-14 ‘Already in Serial Production,’” Sputnik Online, 14 March 2016, 

<http://sputniknews.com/russia/20160314/1036238101/russia-armata-production.html>, accessed 20 March 

2015.

15 Semen Zverev, “They Have Given Up on T-95” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 12 May 2011, <http://www.

rg.ru/2011/05/12/tank.html>, accessed 14 March 2016. 16 “Zauralets self-propelled artillery weapons to enter service in Russian Airborne Troops in 2019,” Interfax, 6 

October 2014.

“The ‘Zauralets’ Self-Propelled Artillery System Has Completed Preliminary State Trials,” Lenta Online, 5 October 

2015, < http://lenta.ru/news/2015/10/05/zauralets/>, accessed 14 March 2016.

Skorpion 2MB

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
Other Tactical Considerations

369

produced for field testing.17 This field testing takes approximately a year or two, after which, 

the product is further refined and put into full serial production. If the initial prototype is 

deemed viable, serial production of a major end item can begin approximately five years 

after the receipt of requirement and the design process begins. This appears to be the case 

with the Armata. Prototypes of the Armata chassis (as a BMP and tank) participated at the 

May 9, 2015 Victory Parade. On November 17, 2015 Interfax announced that UralVagonZavod

was producing a test batch of 20 T-14s for 

government trials, and on February 29, 

2016 Interfax announced these that 20 T-14s 

were undergoing state trials. Full serial 

production of the Armata was expected 

in 2017-2018, but the announcement 

that serial production had already begun 

in March 2016, earlier than anticipated, 

may have been due to many of the design 

problems being worked out during the 

course of the T-95 (object 195) project, which 

shares many features with the Armata, and 

likely had the same design team.18

Another reason that Russia is able to reach serial production quickly is the emphasis on 

interoperability and modularity.19 All new Russian designs for BTRs and BMPs (Armata, 

Kyrganets, Atom, BTR-82, BMD-4M) are manufactured to accept BMP-3 turret specifications. 

Manufactures only have to design for the weapon capability and turret specification. 

(mobility characteristics are determined by the chassis selected.) In situations where the 

chassis is not sufficient (such as ground pressure issues resulting from heavier loads), instead 

of developing a new chassis, the existing chassis are heavily modified. For example, the 

BMD-4M chassis had additional road wheels mounted to support the heavier components 

of the 2S25 Sprut-SD light tank, and the Armata chassis can have the engine situated 

in the front (BTR/BMP) or rear (tank) as needed. Russia’s unified design standards make 

many combinations of turrets and chassis possible, despite being produced by different 

manufacturers, a beneficial situation for the export market. It appears that cost (both 

production and operation/maintenance) is a key factor that is considered from the very 

beginning of development. Innovations that are deemed too costly are weeded out early, the 

17 Sergey Mikhaylov, “The Armed Forces Are on the Upswing,” Stoletiye Online, 7 October 2014, <http://www.

stoletie.ru/obschestvo/armija_na_podjeme_129.htm>, accessed 14 March 2016. 18 “Russian tank maker supplying over 20 new Armata tanks to army”, Interfax-AVN Online, 17 November 2015.

Dave Majumdar “Surprise: Russia’s Lethal T-14 Armata Tank Is in Production,” The National Interest Online, 

13 March 2016, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/surprise-russias-lethal-t-14-armata-tankproduction-15480>, accessed 14 March 2016.

Matthew Bodner, “Russia’s New Armata Tank ‘Invisible,’ Says Manufacturer,” Moscow Times Online, 4 August 

2015, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-s-new-armata-tank-invisible-saysmanufacturer/526974.html>, accessed 14 March 2016. 19 Aleksandr Kurennoy and Aleksey Naryshkin: “Vyacheslav Khalitov, Deputy

Director of the Uralvagonzavod Science and Production Corporation Open Joint-Stock Company for Specialized 

Technology,” transcript of Arsenal radio program posted on Ekho Moskvy Online, 26 January 2015, <http://m.

echo.msk.ru/interview/detail.php?ID=1480668>, accessed 14 March 2016.

Tigr-M SPN (with remotely operated 30mm cannon) 

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

370

design must not only be combat effective, but also feasible in terms of cost.

In order to develop new technologies and control costs, Russia appears to pursue the 

incremental “evolutionary” approach, as opposed to “revolutionary” approach to development 

and design. Many of the design elements of the T-95 tank prototype are found in the 

T-14, to include the gun (2A82 125-mm smoothbore gun/ ATGM launcher), active defense 

system (Afganit), engine (Chelyabinsk A-85-3A X-diesel engine), and several other systems.20 

Russia can apparently overcome any proprietary issues and may “plug-n-play” options and 

features from different manufactures as desired. Although Russia will experiment with new 

innovations (such as double barreled howitzers), they will usually build these innovations on 

the backs of known and trusted components. For instance the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV howitzer 

has a completely automated turret (new innovation) with plans to reduce the crew to twothree personnel, but this turret is on the same chassis that has reliably served Msta-S for many 

years. (there are plans that Koalitsiya-SV will eventually be on an Armata chassis) This system 

assures that Russian weapons manufacturers never really “start-from-scratch” and allows for 

the efficiency of smaller production runs. Russia is also pursuing this evolutionary strategy 

in terms of robotization. Instead of attempting to develop robotic combat vehicles from 

scratch, Russia is incrementally adding robotic capabilities (autoloaders, unmanned turrets, 

computerized steering, etc.) to existing systems and reducing crew sizes, with the desired end 

state of eventually eliminating the entire crew for some combat vehicles, including the T-14.21

One advantage that likely allows a quicker run to serial production is Russia’s use of only a 

few manufacturers. Russia’s primary manufactures of combat vehicles are UralVagonZavod 

(T-72,T-90, Armata) and KurganMachineZavod (BMP-1, BMP-2, BMP-3). These production 

lines may be kept “warm” through the steady production of new combat vehicles and the 

refurbishment of old combat vehicles. UralVagonZavod is currently conducting “frame-off” 

upgrades of Russia’s entire T-72 fleet, converting them into T-72B3s. Russian manufacturers 

have also touted the capabilities of new computer software that more quickly facilitates 

production than traditional paper plans and have recently introduced 3D printing technology 

that has also sped development.22 

20 Yaroslav Vyatkin, “Next Is the T-14: Newest Russian Tank Demonstrated to a Very Small Circle,” Vzglyad Online, 

26 September 2013, <http://www.vz.ru/society/2013/9/26/652197.html>, accessed 14 March 2016. 21 Charles K. Bartles, “Modularity Facilitates Russian Armored Vehicle Innovations,” OE Watch Online, October 

2015.

 Charles K. Bartles, “The Russian Approach to Robotization: Evolution Not Revolution,” OE Watch Online, February 

2016.

22 “Technological Breakthrough: Russia to Debut 3D Printed Armata Tank,” 2 February 2016, Sputnik Online,

<http://sputniknews.com/military/20160206/1034346115/russia-3D-printed-armata.html>, accessed 20 March 

2015.

Yuriy Belousov, “Only an Armata is More Awesome than an Armata,” 3 July 2015, Krasnaya Zvezda Online, in 

Russian 03 July 2015, <http://redstar.ru/index.php/newspaper/item/24718-kruche-armaty-tolko-armata>, 

accessed 14 March 2016.
Other Tactical Considerations

371

UAV Development

UAV development is being pursued in the Russian Federation by all of the main and lesser 

branches (including the airborne forces) of the Ministry of Defense, in a variety of sizes 

ranging from smaller models, similar to the US “Raven,” to larger models similar in size and 

purpose to the US “Predator.” As for the Russian Ground Forces (GF) in particular, GF officials 

have mentioned that the UAVs will be used for communications, intelligence and electronic 

warfare tasks. 23 In practice, the Russian GF appear to be focusing on the use of UAVs as 

artillery spotters. Russia has fielded several models for this purpose (Granat, Eleron, Takhion, 

Orlan and Zastava), with maximum ranges of about 40 kilometers, appropriate for Russian 

artillery systems.24

In 2014, Russia added almost 200 UAVs to its inventory and activated 14 UAV companies, with 

plans that each of Russia’s motorized rifle brigades will gain a dedicated UAV company in the 

next few years. The Russian Ministry of Defense has also announced plans to field its first 

UAV regiment and set up an inter-ministerial UAV training center.25 At present, the Russian 

Federation has no capability for placing a weapon system on a UAV, but there are plans for the 

introduction of such a weapon in the next few years.26

23 Charles K. Bartles, “Russian Federation Ground Forces and UAVs,” OE Watch Online, May 2013.

“Ground Troops Will Receive New Unmanned Aerial Vehicles into the Inventory,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer

Online, 21 February 2013, <http://vpk-news.ru/news/14584>,

accessed 20 July 2015. 

“Typhoon-5 Lightweight UAV Being Tested as Repeater-Processor,” Interfax, 27 March 2013. 24 Charles K. Bartles, “Ground Forces Integrate UAVs into Artillery Reconnaissance Units,” OE Watch Online, 

September 2014.

Yuriy Gavrilov, “Western Military District Servicemen Test New Drones,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 5 July 2014, 

<http://www.rg.ru/2014/07/05/bespilotniki-site.html>, accessed 20 July 2015.

Central Military District Artillerymen Destroyed 200 Camouflaged Targets,” RIA Novosti Online, 2 July 2014, 

<http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20140702/1014408009.html#ixzz38G3Wj9bx>, accessed 20 July 2015.

Vasilisa Yegorova, “Drone in Inventory of Russian FSB Spotted Over Ukraine,” Novyy Region Online, 24 July 2014, 

<http://nr2.com.ua/hots/ATO_Donbass/Nad-Ukrainoy-zasekli-bespilotnik-kotoryy-nahoditsya-na-vooruzhenii-uFSB-Rossii-76754.html>, accessed 20 July 2015. 25 Charles K. Bartles, “Russian Armed Forces UAV Developments in 2014,” OE Watch Online, February 2015.

“Russia To Set Up UAV Regiment In Crimea,” RIA Novosti Online, 14 January 2015, <http://ria.ru/defense_

safety/20150114/1042532956.html>, accessed 20 July 2015.

“Russian Defense Ministry Bought Nearly 200 Spy Drones in 2014,” Interfax Online, 12 January 2015, <http://www.

militarynews.ru/>, accessed 20 July 2015.

Aleksandr Stepanov, “Defense Ministry Began Centralized Training of Military Drone Operators,” Moskovskiy 

Komsomolets Online, 24 December 2014, <http://www.mk.ru/politics/2014/12/24/minoborony-nachalocentralizovannuyu-podgotovku-operatorov-voennykh-dronov.html>, accessed 20 July 2015.

“The Russian General Staff’s UAV Center Will Determine Its Three Year Agenda,” RIA Novosti Online, 26 Dec 2012, 

<http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20121226/916286337.html>, accessed 20 July 2015.

“Russian Industry Today Can Create Pilotless Systems for the Army -- the Ministry of Defense,” Interfax, 26 

December 2012.

26 Charles K. Bartles, “Capabilities of Russia’s “Predator” UAV,” OE Watch Online, April 2015.

Ilya Shchegolev, “Dozor-600 UAV Will Overtake MQ-1 Predator,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 17 February 2015, 

<http://www.rg.ru/2015/02/17/dozor-site.html>, accessed 20 July 2015.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

372

Organization and Structure of Russian Ground Forces’ UAV Units

There have been conflicting reports about how these assets would be controlled. Some 

reports have stated that UAVs would be considered a brigade-level asset and assigned to the 

brigade’s reconnaissance company or intelligence support platoon (attached to subordinate 

units as required); other reports state these particular UAVs (artillery spotters) would be 

organic to the artillery companies’ reconnaissance platoons. In the last few years this issue 

has apparently been resolved. Russia has decided the best way to organize its UAV fleet is by 

putting all of a brigade’s UAVs in a single company. The companies are divided into platoons 

based on the size and range of the UAVs they operate. For instance, the “mini-platoon” 

operates the hand launched Granat-1, while the “short-range platoon” operates the larger 

Orlan-10 and Granat-4 airframes. One UAV company mentioned had six platoons, but this 

may be atypical as the unit was located at the 201st Motorized Rifle Division base in Tajikistan, 

and may have had a larger complement due to its unique status of serving a division in a 

geographically disparate location.27 Russia likely places all of its UAVs in a single company 

and splits the companies into platoons based on size instead of function to more easily 

facilitate C2 and maintenance of these high value and limited assets. Since there is mention 

of “payloads” on the UAVs, there appears to be some capability for repurposing of mission if 

needed (artillery reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and communications, etc.). The Orlan-10 

is used for both artillery reconnaissance and electronic warfare missions.28

UAV Company Personnel

In 2013, the Russian Air Force Academy accepted its first UAV class. Russian UAV officers 

will be trained in 4-5 year academies, which would resemble a combination of a U.S. service 

academy and an initial officer basic course for occupational training. Upon completion of 

the academy, graduates will be commissioned as lieutenants and be sent to their gaining 

units. Although the program is located at the Russian Air Force Academy, it would not be 

unusual for a Russian Ground Forces officer to attend such a program, as it is not uncommon 

for service members from other branches of service and even ministries to attend other 

service academies for certain “low-density” specialties such as UAV officer.29 Since the first 

62 graduates of the academy do not graduate until 2018, current UAV unit officer vacancies 

are being filled by officers from other branches with other specialties, with a preference for 

artillery officers. These “shake-n-bake” UAV officers are sent to the Russian Defense Ministry 

Interbranch Center for Unmanned Aviation in Kolomna, where they receive a short course on 

UAV operations.30

27 Andrey Bondarenko and Igor Shcherbakov, “General Tubol’s Winged Artillery,” Uralskiye Voyennyye Vesti, 15 

November 2014, accessed 20 July 2015. 

28 Charles K. Bartles, “Russia’s Use of Unmanned Vehicles as Electronic Warfare Platforms,” OE Watch Online, 

August 2015.

“Russian Servicemen in Tajikistan Improve UAV Skills,” Interfax, 28 March 2014.

Yuri Gavrilov, “Electronic Warfare Units in Far East Will Get Leer-3 Drones,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 28 June 

2015, <http://rg.ru/2015/06/28/leer-site.html>, accessed 15 July 2015. 29 Charles K. Bartles, “Russian Air Force Academy Welcomes First UAV Class,” OE Watch Online, October 2013.

“Preparation of UAV Specialists Starts in Russia,” ITAR-TASS, 4 September 2013, <http://www.itar-tass.com/>, 

accessed 20 July 2015.

30 Andrey Bondarenko, “Drones for Gods of War,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 25 October 2014,

<http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/2011-07-25-15-55-32/item/19538-bespilotniki-dlya-bogov-vojny>, accessed 

20 July 2015.
Other Tactical Considerations

373

It appears that enlisted personnel operate most UAVs, but officers do fly certain missions. 

Russia does practice a conscription system, but all UAV operators are “contract NCOs” that 

attend the UAV operator course at the Inter-Branch Center for the Training of Specialists for 

the Ground Troops in Kolomna, Russia. Conscripted soldiers do serve in the UAV companies, 

but they serve in support roles such as wheeled vehicle drivers.31 

Artillery Spotting

Since artillery systems have ranges well beyond the line of sight, (the Russian Msta-S selfpropelled howitzer has a range of 29-36 km) they rely on forward observers to find targets 

and adjust fire. In the Russian system, on the offensive, the artillery battalion commander’s 

headquarters is collocated with the maneuver commander leading the offensive. The 

battalion commander’s senior deputy (roughly equivalent to a chief of staff) is located 

with the artillery CP. In the batteries, the battery company commanders are in a forward 

observation posts directing fires, while the senior battery officer (roughly equivalent to an 

executive officer) is located with the battery. 

The use of UAVs for artillery spotting significantly supplements forward observation 

capabilities, a very important technological development for an artillery-centric post-Soviet 

army. For artillery purposes, UAV support is provided by the “mini” and “short-range” UAV 

platoons.32 Although Russia is experimenting with a number of airframes, the mini-class 

“Granat-1” and short-range “Orlan-10” are most frequently mentioned. It is clear from various 

video segments and articles that the UAVs do not usually directly communicate with the 

fire direction centers of the batteries.33 Apparently, the UAV operators determine target 31 Viktor Litovkin, “They Installed UAVs behind a Desk: Reporting from the Inter-Branch UAV Center,” Nezavisimoye 

Voyennoye Obozreniye Online, 6 December 2013, <http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2013-12-06/1_drones.html>, accessed 

20 July 2015.

Gennadiy Miranovich and Aleksandr Khvastov, “138th On the Up: Special Reportage from the Separate Guards 

Motorized Infantry Brigade,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online in Russian 1 April 2015, <http://redstar.ru/index.php/

newspaper/item/22792-138-ya-nabiraet-vysotu>, accessed 20 July 2015. 32 Andrey Bondarenko and Igor Shcherbakov, “General Tubol’s Winged Artillery,” Uralskiye Voyennyye Vesti, 15 

November 2014, accessed 20 July 2015.

33 “Enemy’s Gun Posts Destroyed by Artillerymen in Primorskiy Kray With Aid of Reconnaissance and Strike 

Complex,” Interfax, 14 January 2015.

Orlan-10

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

Range: 50 - 120 km

Flight Duration: 10 hours

Maximum Takeoff Weight: 15 kg

Maximum Payload: 5 kg

Wingspan: 3.1 m

Length: 1.8 m

Speed. 75-170 km/h

Maximum Altitude: 6000 m

Fuel: A-95 Gasoline

Operating Temperature: -35C to + 40C

Takeoff: Catapult

Landing: Parachute
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

374

coordinates and relay that information to forward observers on the Artillery Reconnaissance 

Vehicles (ARVs), who in turn relate the information to the fire direction centers34 

Due to differing ranges, it is likely the Orlan-10 operators are collocated with the batteries 

and their accompanying ARVs. There have been some discrepancies about the range of the 

Orlan-10. The specifications list the range as 50-120 kilometers, while articles referring to use 

for artillery spotting mention 40-50 kilometers. This variance may have to do with the UAV’s 

broadcast range of its gyro-stabilized Full Motion Video (FMV), which may not be possible 

with current capabilities at distances that exceed 50 kilometers.35 Due to the relatively short 

range of FMV transmission for the Granat-1 (10 kilometers), it is very likely the Granat-1 

operators are collocated with the battalion’s forward observation post or battery COP. In 

addition to targeting, it was also mentioned the Granat-1 had a role in providing information 

for damage assessments.36

Methods of Target Acquisition

On July 7 2015, TASS news service published an article about the training of officers in the 

use of the Orlan-10 UAV for artillery spotting purposes. The following day, a Russian blogger 

posted his theory of how artillery spotting can be conducted with UAVs, and observed the 

Orlan-10 is only capable of conducting the two simplest methods of artillery spotting. (see 

graphic) The blogger appears quite knowledgeable about Russian UAV capabilities and the 

modern battlefield, and his observations agree with observed Russian artillery procedures as 

viewed on various online videos.

Although the Orlan-10 and Granat-1 are not capable of the more advanced methods of 

artillery spotting, they can still be quite effective. Although less desirable than some other 

methods, the capability to fix a target’s location by relative terrain feature (method 1) is 

sufficient for many Russian artillery purposes. Russian artillery batteries and battalions 

annihilation and destruction missions make precise target information useful, but 

unnecessary. In addition, the Russian Federation has a strong cartographic tradition, 

undoubtedly any Russian serviceman referencing terrain features for targeting purposes 

would have access to high quality, large scale, digital maps of most places within the former 

Soviet Union. Although current UAV artillery spotting capabilities may be adequate for 

current purposes, these capabilities are very likely to continue to develop.37

UAV Granat-1 in artillery units, published 19 January 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=Vu2baqAexCU>, accessed 20 July 2015. 34 Taras Rudyk, “In Reconnaissance with a Takhion: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Permit the Spetsnaz to Observe 

the Enemy from Siberia in Online Mode,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 21 May 15, <http://redstar.ru/index.php/

newspaper/item/23777-v-razvedku-s-takhionom>, accessed 20 July 2015. 35 Complex «Leer» With Unmanned Aerial Vehicle «Orlan-10», Bastion-opk, 17 April 2012, <http://bastion-opk.ru/

orlan-10/>, accessed 20 July 2015.

Oleg Zheltonozhko, “The Reconnaissance and Target Designation System: the Priority is on Qualitative 

Parameters,” Uralskiye Voyennyye Vesti, 1 June 2013. 36 Andrey Bondarenko and Igor Shcherbakov, “General Tubol’s Winged Artillery,” Uralskiye Voyennyye Vesti, 15 

November 2014, accessed 20 July 2015.

37 Charles K. Bartles, “The Orlan-10 and Artillery, Let’s Ponder How They Work Together...” OE Watch Online, 

August 2015.

“Officers of Western Military District Adjusts Fire with Help of the Orlan-10 in 3D,” Tass Online, 7 July 2015, <http://
Other Tactical Considerations

375

Artillery Spotting Methods for UAVs

1st Method- Use of a reference point. This method can be used if the 

coordinates of a given reference point (landmark or intersection) 

are known. The disadvantage of this system is that the coordinates 

of the reference point must be known with certainty, requiring 

detailed maps and/or GIS data. In addition, target accuracy 

diminishes the farther the target is from the reference point. 

Conclusion: This method works, but is the least suitable for artillery 

spotting.

2nd Method- Fly above the target. The UAV flies above the target 

and its position is recorded. Target accuracy depends on the 

accuracy of the UAV’s navigation system. The disadvantage of this 

is method is that it requires flying over the target, meaning that 

only a limited number of targets may be acquired and that the UAV 

is extremely susceptible to enemy fire. Conclusion: This method 

works, but is most suitable for less organized adversaries, such as 

insurgents.

3rd Method- Use of range finder. Requires a gyro stabilized 

electro-optical system with a laser rangefinder. The coordinates 

of the target are calculated using basic trigonometry. The 

accuracy depends on the accuracy of the UAV’s navigation system 

and rangefinder. This method provides good accuracy and the 

capability to acquire many targets, sufficient for several batteries or 

battalions. The disadvantage of this is method is the use of an active 

sensor (the laser) which can be easily detected by modern military 

equipment. Conclusion: This method is very effective, but requires a 

sophisticated UAV and would be more susceptible to enemy fire.

4th Method- Use of multiple azimuths. The UAV takes several 

azimuths on a given target, while in flight. Trigonometry is than 

used to calculate the position of the target. This method provides 

good accuracy and the capability to acquire many targets. This 

method requires a sophisticated UAV, but is completely passive, an 

advantage that can significantly increase the UAV’s life expectancy 

above the modern battlefield. Conclusion: this is preferred method 

for UAV artillery spotting.
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

376

Artillery Spotting at Night

Russian UAVs reportedly have a night-targeting capability that operators regularly practice.38

This capability is most likely provided by thermal imagers that are found in many short-range 

Russian UAVs, including the Orlan-10.39 Thermal imagers are probably the most common 

since there was only one report of an infrared sensor, and no reports have mentioned or 

implied any radar capability.40 Since terrain association with a thermal imager would be 

difficult at best, and the risk of the UAV being shot down at night is significantly reduced, it 

is likely the UAV operator uses the “fly-over-the-target” method (2nd method in the above 

graphic) to fix the target. Target acquisition with a thermal imager is also significantly more 

difficult due to the reduced spatial resolution of the technology in comparison to video. 

There is likely not much difference in signature between a BTR and a SUV when viewed 

through the type of thermal imagers that can be mounted to a small UAV. Since determining 

what exactly the imager is viewing is much more difficult, the acquisition of the wrong target 

is much more likely. Although identification of the wrong target is problematic, the Russian 

military does not have a “Zero Defect” view of various indiscretions, and any errors made in a 

combat situation with such a method of targeting would likely be looked upon as an accident 

tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/2099301>, accessed 1 August 2015.

Blog post from lopatov_45, “The Orlan-10 and Artillery, Let’s Ponder How They Work Together...” Livejournal.com, 

8 July 2015, <http://lopatov-45.livejournal.com/30166.html>, accessed 1 August 2015.

Alexander Krivorechek, “The Federal Security Service Will Adopt 80-Megapixel Cameras for Reconnaissance,” 

Izvestiya Online, 27 December 2013, <http://izvestia.ru/news/563168#ixzz2oy9AxUUc>, accessed 20 July 2015.

UAV Granat-1 in artillery units, published 19 January 2015

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vu2baqAexCU>, accessed 20 July 2015. 38 “Artillery Troops of Russian Military Base in Abkhazia Learn to Strike Targets Using UAVs,” Ministry of Defense 

of the Russian Federation, 3 July 2014, <http://function.mil.ru/news_page/world/more.htm?id=11965188@

egNews>, accessed 20 July 2015.

39 Taras Rudyk, “In Reconnaissance with a Takhion: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Permit the Spetsnaz to Observe 

the Enemy from Siberia in Online Mode,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 21 May 2015, <http://redstar.ru/index.php/

newspaper/item/23777-v-razvedku-s-takhionom>, accessed 20 July 2015.

“Russia to set up UAV Regiment in Crimea,” RIA Novosti Online, 14 January 2015,

 <http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20150114/1042532956.html>, accessed 20 July 2015. 40 Yuriy Gavrilov, “Eagle-Eyed. Deliveries of State-of-the-Art Unmanned Air Vehicles to the Field Have Increased 

Fourfold,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 16 December 2014, <http://www.rg.ru/2014/12/15/bespilotniki-site.html>, 

accessed 20 July 2015.

Orlan-10 Launching

Images Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense

Orlan-10 Landing
Other Tactical Considerations

377

due to the “fog of war.”

Outlook for UAVs and Russian Artillery Spotting

Undoubtedly, Russia will continue to improve its UAV artillery spotting capabilities. Russia is 

heavily investing in UAVs in general, and have claimed they will spend 9.2 billion US dollars 

on the technology and overtake the U.S.’s position as the preeminent UAV power in the 

next few years.41 The Russian Federation is also looking at ways of reducing prices for UAV 

technologies, and has expressed interest in using 3D printers to “bake” the next generation 

of Russian UAVs.42 The most likely advancement will be the integration of the UAV directly 

into one of the new Russian C2 systems under development, the most likely of which is the 

“Andromeda” (the Russian version of FBCB2). Russia has made frequent comments about the 

need to “unify the information space” and the integration of UAVs into that space would be in 

furtherance of that goal. How likely this is to occur is anyone’s guess, unsurprisingly marrying 

up differing technologies (Andromeda, the UAV, and the existing artillery fire control system) 

is difficult, time consuming and costly. One aspect of Russian artillery spotters that is not 

likely to change, is their size. Since the Orlan-10 and its cousins are attached to the units they 

serve and their ranges are more than adequate for the missions they support, developing 

larger airframes for fire control purposes would not be advantageous, as any requirement for 

a takeoff/landing area would be prohibitive.43

41 Charles K. Bartles, “Russian Armed Forces UAV Developments in 2014,” OE Watch Online, February 2015. 42 Charles K. Bartles, “3D Printers Will “Bake” Future Russian UAVs,” OE Watch Online, July 2015.

Yuriy Zaynashev, “The ‘Baking’ of Russian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles is Planned to be Put into Production,” Vzglyad

Online, 4 Jun 2015, <http://www.vz.ru/economy/2015/6/4/749145.html>, accessed 20 July 2015. 43 Dr. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, “Integration of Unmanned Aerial Systems within Russian Artillery,” 

Fires Bulletin Online, July-August, <http://sill-www.army.mil/FiresBulletin/2016/jul-aug/jul-aug.pdf>, accessed 20 

July 2016.

Granat-1

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense

Range (Full Motion Video): 10 km

Range (Camera): 15 km

Flight Duration: 75 minutes

Maximum Takeoff Weight: 2.4 kg

Payload: Camera or Video

Wingspan: 82 cm

Speed. 60 km/h

Maximum Altitude: 1500 m

Fuel: Electric

Operating Temperature: -35C to + 40C

Takeoff: Catapult or Hand Launched

Landing: Parachute
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

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Robotics in the Russian Armed Forces

The Russian military, as many other 

militaries, is now seriously considering the 

role of robotics and artificial intelligence on 

the modern battlefield. Despite references 

to the Terminator® franchise, Russia does 

not appear to see a future, in the near 

term, where combat is conducted solely 

by autonomous robots. Instead remote 

controlled and semi-autonomous robotics 

will be integrated into conventional units, 

serving in the most dangerous roles as fire 

fighters, mine clearers, EOD technicians, 

armed sentries, and as the accompanying 

articles describe, cannon fodder for the 

initial assaults on fortified positions. In keeping with these functions, and unlike many of the 

robots in Terminator®, Russian robots have a distinctively “mechanized” appearance, with most 

systems being found on tracked chassis. In fact, just as much discussion of robotics deals 

with automating existing platforms (such as the Armata, Kurganets, and even T-72 chassis) as 

with creating new systems. Russia’s newest generation of light track chassis, the Kurganets, 

reportedly utilizes a Sony PlayStation® like controller for steering. Apparently, designers 

think that Russian soldiers of the future will be much more comfortable with this scheme of 

maneuver, than steering levers and a manual transmission. But these sorts of novel designs 

will also more easily facilitate the installation of automated control systems.44

In general, The Russian Federation has adopted an evolutionary, as opposed to revolutionary, 

approach to robotization. In practice, this means that instead of trying to develop completely 

new systems, a majority of Russian efforts in this area have focused on grafting robotic 

capabilities on to existing platforms. These 

efforts have not only included experimenting 

with remote controlled and semiautonomous 

heavy tracked platforms (such as the Armata, 

Kurganets, T-90, and even T-72 chassis), but 

have also included fielding small robotic 

turrets on traditional (manned) heavy and 

light chassis. These developments mesh well 

with Russia’s considerable experience fielding 

auto loading tanks and self-propelled artillery 

systems, a necessity for fielding any robotized 

weapons platform. In general, most Russian 

robotics developments, and other “incremental” 

44 Charles K. Bartles, “Theorist Proposes a Doctrinal Usage for Russian ‘Combat Robots,’” OE Watch Online, January 

2016.

Leonid Orlenko, “Breakthrough Robots,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 23 September 2015, <http://www.

vpk-news.ru/articles/27159>, accessed 1 June 2016.

MRK Robotic System

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

“Crossbow-DM” Remote Controlled Turret

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
Other Tactical Considerations

379

technology advancements are useful not only for future robotic platforms, but also for current 

systems, supporting Russia’s line of effort, to do more, with less personnel.45

Robotics utilization is not limited to unmanned platforms in the Russian Federation. The 

Russian Armed Forces is also developing small automated turrets for placement on manned 

armored personnel carriers, armored cars, support vehicles, and even used as secondary 

weapons on large weapon systems such as self-propelled artillery pieces. Russia believes 

that the era of the manned turret has come to an end, and is now fielding unmanned 

turrets. These turrets are not only viewed as beneficial for crew protection, but also 

from an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) perspective. These Remote 

Controlled Turret Modules (DUBM) are equipped with a variety of sensors which far exceed 

the capabilities of the human eyes and ears of a manned turret. Other reports about these 

systems have touted their ability to engage low flying and low speed aircraft. This capability 

may be a result of the Russian belief that the battlefield of the future will increasingly involve 

more UAVs controlled by both state and nonstate actors. A limited ability for air defense, such 

as these Remote Controlled Turret Modules, would be a great benefit in such an environment. 

Most DUBM configurations involve the use of a a 12.7-mm 6P49 “Kord” machine gun, a rough 

equivalent to the U.S. Browning .50 caliber machine gun. If Remote Controlled Turret Modules 

become common place in the Russian military, even Russian armored cars and support 

vehicles would be equipped with about the same firepower as most U.S. Army Strykers, as 

Strykers are most often equipped with a .50 caliber machine gun as their main armament.46

45 Charles K. Bartles, “The Russian Approach to Robotization: Evolution Not Revolution,” OE Watch Online, 

February 2016.

Aleksey Ramm, “Strike, Another Strike: Three types of robotic combat machine are being built on a common 

platform,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 23 December 2015, <http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/28600>, 

accessed 15 January 2013.

46 Charles K. Bartles, “Unmanned Turrets to Increase ISR Capabilities, and Lethality,” OE Watch Online, November 

2015.

Dmitry Fedyushka, “Secrets of a Deserted Tower,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 7 October 2015, <http://

vpk-news.ru/articles/27399>, accessed 15 June 2016.

Controlled Turret Module Workstation
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Cold Weather and Arctic Combat

Russia has hard winters and the Russian military has long trained for and fought during the 

winter. A large portion of Russia lies north of the Arctic Circle and Russia is preparing seriously 

for conflict in this region. The land areas approaching and within the Arctic Circle provide 

unique challenges to military operations. In the Arctic, there are permanent ice and snowcovered areas, but much of this area is devoid of snow and cold during the summer thaw 

and movement and combat during the thaw can be quite difficult and requires different 

techniques and equipment.47 

Significant, large-scale combat has taken place in the higher latitudes. The terrain, weather 

and limited infrastructure impose severe difficulties on untrained and non-acclimated 

soldiers. The prime concerns are mobility and shelter. Tactics and force structure require 

modifications and adjustments. Equipment does not run as efficiently and may require 

special lubricants, garaging, fuels and support. Everything takes more time. 

On 30 November 1939, the Soviet Union attacked Finland in the Winter War that lasted 

until 20 March 1940. It was a short, brutal war that cost the Red Army 65,384 KIA or died of 

wounds, 14,142 MIA, 186,584 WIA, 5468 POWs and 9614 cold-weather casualties.48 Finnish 

casualties were lower (some 26,662 dead and 39,886 wounded), but Finnish forces were much 

smaller and the Soviets won the 105-day war. Some of the fighting occurred on the Kola 

Peninsula within the Arctic Circle, but the main fight occurred in south and central Finland.49 

The Finnish forces were able to withstand the Soviet onslaught for as long as they did due to 

their specialized training, acclimation and familiarity with winter movement. 

In October 1944 the largest Arctic ground operation 

in history occurred in Northern Finland and Norway 

between the Soviet 14th Army and the German 20th

Mountain Army. The 133,500 men of the Soviet Army, 

supported by the Soviet Northern Fleet, faced some 

45,000 Wehrmacht and German allies. The Soviet 

Petsamo-Kirkenes offensive forced the German Army 

to withdraw and captured the crucial Finnish nickel 

mines in Pechanga/Petsamo. The Soviets massed ski 

troops, naval infantry, artillery and tanks, supported 

by 30 engineer battalions, horse and reindeer 

transport companies and significant airpower. The 

Soviet advance was successful but limited by the 

retreating German destruction of the meager road 

47 This section is extracted from Lester W. Grau, “A Cold, Soggy, Boggy Slog: Ground Forces in Higher Latitude 

Combat”, Infantry, April-July 2016. 48 The Secret seal is lifted: Casualties of the Armed Forces of the USSR in war, combat actions and military 

conflicts [Гриф Секретности Снят: Потерн вооруженных сил СССР в войнах, боевых действиях и военных 

конфликтах], Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1993, 99. 49 Carl Van Dyke, The Soviet Invasion of Finland 1939-1940, London: Frank Cass, 1997 provides a good overview of 

the war, mostly from a Soviet perspective.

Ski Training 

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
Other Tactical Considerations

381

network.50 Soviet losses were 21,233 (6084 KIA and 15149 WIA) in 

the 23 days of fighting.51 Soviet sources estimate German losses 

at 18,000 KIA and 713 POW.52

In the northern sector during the Winter War and the SovietFinnish/German Continuation War, fought from 25 June 1941 

–19 September 1944, the fights were in the forests and on the 

tundra for possession of the few east-west roads in the region. 

Down south on the Karelian Peninsula, defensive lines were 

continuous and tied in. Further north, open flanks were common 

by necessity and the fights were attempts to turn a flank while 

maintaining pressure along the road. Soldier survival was of 

paramount importance and, in winter, required nearby warming 

stations and living accommodations to keep soldiers alive. 

During the Continuation War, the Finnish efforts were directed to 

restoring territory lost to the Soviets during the Winter War, maintaining border integrity and 

interdicting Soviet railroad lines. Railroad was the most reliable means of transport in the far 

north and, along with the roads and population centers, represented key terrain.

Mobility and Maneuver

Vast swampy tundra, mountains, rivers, large quantities of boulders and limited roads 

complicate mobility and maneuver in the higher latitudes. It is a difficult region for 

even simple engineering projects, and, in winter, deep snow drifts, polar night and low 

temperatures add to the difficulty. Weather is always a complicating factor and radio 

communications are often interrupted by metrological conditions. The Russians consider 

50 David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler, Lawrence: 

University Press of Kansas 1998 provides a concise summation of this operation. James Gebhardt, The PetsamoKirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944, Fort Leavenworth: Leavenworth 

Press, 1989 is the most comprehensive study of this operation in the English language. 

51 The Secret seal is lifted: casualties of the Armed Forces of the USSR in war, combat actions and military conflicts, 

210.

52 Kh. Khudalov, “Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation,” Military History Journal, No. 10 (October 1969), 116.

Arctic Sniper

Image Courtesy: Russian 

Ministry of Defense

DT-30 Articulated Winter Vehicle

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces

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March/April through October as the best time for maneuver in the north. The snow melt 

starts in the spring and the “white nights” allow 24-hour observation.53 Russia prefers the 

warmer weather with nearly 24-hour visibility, a reduced requirement for warming-up 

stations during operations, lessened chances of blizzards and other incapacitating weather 

for the trade-off of more difficult cross-country and road mobility. They build their wheeled 

and tracked vehicles with high-clearances for use in their native terrain. Their track width 

is usually broader than similar US tracked vehicles. Military advances and retreats normally 

follow roads, rivers, beach and trails across the tundra. Military objectives are frequently 

villages, road intersections, defiles, isolated heights, mountain passes, river crossing sites and 

water-landing points. Tracked vehicles are often optimum for movement, but they can tear 

up the rather delicate earth surface and create their own obstacles.

Amphibious landings and raids are often a major component of Arctic ground maneuver.54 

During the spring and summer, rivers and lakes provide the ability to move and maneuver 

using shallow draft boats with low overhead clearance. However, navigation of glacier-fed 

waterways can be treacherous due to the shifting channels, sand or gravel bars and other 

obstructions.

High-latitude combat is seldom settled over a single season. Simple tasks take longer in the 

higher latitudes and complex tasks may become impossible. The primary concern of highlatitude combat is to keep one’s soldiers alive, disciplined and capable of coordinated combat. 

The critical component of arctic and 

subarctic combat is keeping the force alive 

and motivated. Snow and cold dictate a 

heating plan, establishing winter garrisons, 

warming stations and countering thermal 

and smoke detection sensors. Warming 

and maintaining warmth in normal tents 

requires inordinate amounts of fuel and are 

readily identifiable to heat sensors. Engineer 

support in constructing troop shelters is 

complicated by the cold and wind, reducing 

their effectiveness some 30%-50%.55

Eating, drinking, field sanitation and 

prevention of cold-weather injuries are difficult in the arctic, particularly for soldiers not 

trained and accustomed to working there. Poor morale and psychotic behavior can also 

break out quickly. Aggressive small-unit leadership can prevent or mitigate problems in these 

areas, but ground units need to plan frequent rotation of ground units to keep them combat 

effective.56

53 V. Kuselev and I. Vorobyev, “The Offensive in Northern Regions,” Army Digest, February 2013, 2-3. 

54 Viktor Leonov, Blood on the Shores: Soviet Naval Commandos in World War II, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 

1993, 63-127.

55 V. K. Shamshurov, Engineer Combat Support in Special Conditions, Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1985, 193. 56 Kuselev and Vorobyev, 3.

Arctic Sledding

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
Other Tactical Considerations

383

Ground combat in the Arctic often begins with the contending forces not in direct combat, 

and the depth of the objectives can be significant. This requires combined-arms task 

organization blending tanks, mobile infantry, mortars, artillery and engineers. If the region 

has lakes, amphibious vehicles may be needed in the summer, whereas skis will do as well 

in the winter. Flanking detachments frequently work with air assault forces to seize road 

junctions and bridges. Planning considerations for the scheme of maneuver include swamps, 

regions of deep snow pack, order of march, flank and rear security and increased combat 

support. Movement across snow may require marking the way with dye, coal dust or oil. 

Naturally, flank and rear attacks are better than frontal attacks. Ground combat may require 

movement during polar night, blizzards, fog, and snow storms. Most of this movement will be 

directed by compass azimuth or satellite signal. In many areas of the arctic, compasses and 

satellite signals are not reliable. Keeping units warm, intact and moving will be a challenge.57

57 Kuselev and Vorobyev, 3.
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Close Air Support

During World War II, Britain, the United States and 

Germany placed a great deal of confidence and 

resources backing the theory of the decisive nature of 

strategic bombing. Strategic bombing failed to deliver 

decisive victory. The terrorized urban populations did 

not overthrow their governments and demand peace 

at any price. Instead, the populations of 

England and Germany learned to survive bombing 

attacks and bonded closely to their governments 

until victory or the bitter end. The Soviet Union did 

not conduct a strategic bombing campaign although 

the Soviets had the world’s largest multi-engine 

bomber fleet at the start of the war. Their experience 

in the Spanish Civil War convinced them that tactical 

air attack was far more effective than strategic. The 

Soviets believed that the war would be won by ground 

power and that air power could make its significant 

contribution by supporting ground operations. The 

Red Army Air Force was not an independent air arm, 

as were the Royal Air Force and the Luftwaffe, but, like 

the US Army Air Corps, the Red Army Air Force was an 

auxiliary of the Red Army and an essential part of the ground-air team. Air units were always 

subordinate to ground-force commanders, although there was a separate air force chain of 

command for administration, personnel, training and logistics.58

The Soviet Air Force became a separate service after World War II. Nuclear weapons were a 

major concern and long-range aviation and air defense aviation aircraft became a priority 

in the Soviet Union. Air defense became a separate service in 1949, combining aircraft, 

antiaircraft artillery and air defense missiles into strategic air defense and tactical air defense 

branches. The Soviet Air Force had a long range aviation branch, military transport branch 

and an aviation of the front branch. The 

aviation of the front branch provided close 

air support to ground forces and had the 

largest number of aircraft in the Soviet Air 

Force-particularly as missiles took over 

as the primary nuclear weapons delivery 

means. Long-range aviation shrunk in 

importance after the Strategic Rocket Forces 

were formed in 1959. Aviation of the front 

assets included fighter bombers and army 

aviation. Army aviation were helicopters 

and Su-25 Frogfoot close air support aircraft 

58 John T. Greenwood, “The Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945”, Soviet Aviation and Air Power: A Historical View (edited 

by Robin Highham and Jacob W. Kipp), London: Brassey’s, 1978, 70.

Mi-24PN

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin

Colonel General Viktor Bondarev

Aerospace Forces Commander-in-Chief 

Image Courtesy: Russian Ministry of Defense
Other Tactical Considerations

385

flown by Air Force pilots. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union had the largest military aviation force 

(air force plus air defense force) in the world (some 10,000 aircraft).

In 2015, the Russian Aerospace Defense Troops and Russian Air Force were combined into 

a new branch of service called the “Aerospace Forces” branch. In the Russian system, the 

Aerospace Defense Troops are considered “troops,” roughly a lesser branch of the Armed 

Forces, and are responsible for strategic air defense and the operation of military space 

assets. The Air Force is a considered a full branch of service, but has struggled in recent years 

to maintain operational control of its army aviation (ground attack aircraft and helicopters) 

and transport aviation from the Russian Ground Forces and Airborne (VDV), which have long 

desired to integrate these capabilities as organic assets into their own organizations. The 

“ground-centric” Russian Armed Forces consists of three branches – the Aerospace Forces, the 

Ground Troops, and the Navy; and two types of troops–the Strategic Missile Troops (RVSN) 

and Airborne Troops (VDV). Although the benefits of putting air force, strategic air defense, 

and space assets under a single unified command covering “air and space” are obvious, this 

reorganization also significantly weakens the position of the Aerospace Forces in the Ministry 

of Defense. It increases the probability that the Aerospace Forces could lose its ground 

aviation and some transport aviation assets, retaining operational control of relatively few 

assets.59

59 Charles K. Bartles, ”Air Force and Aerospace Defense Troops Will Be Combined,” OE Watch Online, December 

2014.

Mi-28N

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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Air Support of Ground Troops

Aviation attack is closely integrated with 

artillery planning and priorities. Target 

priorities remain nuclear delivery systems, 

conventional artillery and air defense, 

attack groupings or defensive strong 

points, command and control, enemy 

air assault forces and assets, enemy 

penetrations, enemy reserves and logistics 

and illumination. Artillery remains the 

24-7, all-weather primary fire support, 

but given sufficient visibility, the speed, 

flexibility, range and accuracy of aircraft 

can be decisive during a high-speed 

advance, particularly if artillery is unable to keep up. High-performance aircraft belonging 

to the aviation of the front will be involved in air superiority and interdiction missions, but 

will also provide close air support for difficult missions such as air assault, river crossings or 

breakthroughs. The helicopters and close air support aircraft of army aviation will routinely 

provide close air support.

During planning, aircraft are given point targets and missions for seeking out those targets 

outside of artillery range or not located with sufficient accuracy for an artillery strike. Fixedwing aircraft attack deep targets while helicopters operate over their own force or the forward 

line of contact. Helicopters may also go deeper during meeting battles, air assaults or the 

pursuit. Helicopters are commonly employed in flank protection missions.

Coordination between ground and air is always a concern. The Russians address this through:

- shared frequencies and radio systems: This has long been a strength of the Soviet

and Russian joint air-ground system. The ground soldier and the aircraft pilot can 

talk to each other directly over common radio systems and frequencies. 

- liaison: Artillery, air and air defense staffs maintain close cooperation. The Russians

primarily have ground FACs and some air FACs. Ground FACs are found at maneuver 

brigade and battalion level and are experienced pilots. The ground FAC controls 

both fixed and rotary-wing assets. Russians have employed air FACs, however, 

they consider that the ground FAC has much better situational awareness and 

understands the ground commander’s intent more clearly.

- separation: Artillery, fixed wing and rotary-wing assets can be employed

simultaneously in the same area. The strikes will coincide in time, however different 

target sectors will be assigned to each type of asset. 

- “weapons tight”: Ground-based air defense assets may be constrained in select

sectors or along designated flight corridors during air missions.60

- minimum safe distances: The minimum safe impact distances of aerial ordnance

near friendly forces are 1,000 meters for free-flight rockets, 500 meters for helicopter 

cannon and 300 meters for helicopter machine guns.61

60 Conversations with Charles Dick and Jacob Kipp.

61 The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, (translated and edited by 

Su-25SM

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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387

The aviation preparation of the attack begins with joint planning at the Army or Military 

District level, with the second and third parts of the air strike planning conducted at 

maneuver brigade and battalion level. In the course of the air preparation of an attack, strikes 

are delivered at the targets chosen beforehand at designated times, either simultaneously 

or consecutively. In actions on predetermined targets, aviation units and combat control 

bodies are given the necessary time for a thorough preparation of crews and aircraft to strike 

after receiving mission assignments. Optimal means of destruction for specific targets and 

combat equipment are selected, the composition of an attack group is determined, as well 

as the method of attacking the target, the assigned direction and height of target approach, 

maneuvers in the vicinity of the target, and other key tactical options. The composition of 

support groups is also decided. The strike and support groups use various flight formations 

along the route and near the target, depending on the combat actions, conditions and 

tactical situation.

On call fires in the course of the aerial support of an attack deal with newly-discovered targets 

and are initiated by FACs. These are first serviced by available aircraft circling in an airborne 

alert area. If these are not available, the FAC contacts a duty officer at an airfield, preferably 

one with a 5 to 15-minute readiness standby unit. For on-call fires, army aviation units are 

usually only given information on the probable area of action and type of target. The strike 

group (usually a couple or a squadron of helicopters) act without support groups. TakeLester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress), Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002, 215.

Mi-26

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
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off is made on command 

from the control post. If the 

helicopters are circling on 

aerial alert and are within 

the control area of the FAC, 

the command to attack is 

given by the combat actions 

control group or by a forward 

air controller upon target 

acquisition. The forward 

air controller corrects the 

targeting trajectory of 

helicopter gunships right 

up to the moment of target 

detection by the group 

leader.

Other missions of army aviation include air assault, mine laying and mine clearing from 

the air, control and communications assurance, correction of artillery fire, electronic 

countermeasures, resupply, as well as guarding troop rear areas, illumination, search and 

rescue and medical evacuation.62

Fighter bombers from the Aviation of the Front can effectively deliver ordnance in close 

air support. Minimum safe distances are increased over helicopter and Su-25 distances. In 

Afghanistan, fighter bomber pilots began dropping bombs and firing rockets on the same 

pass. They learned to make multiple passes with multiple planes from multiple headings. 

They learned to attack difficult targets in the mountains by developing diving attacks, pitchup bombing and the carousel attack.63 Support of ground forces remains a key mission of 

Russian military aviation. UAV are beginning to supplement this effort, however the Russians 

have been slow to arm their UAVs, using them primarily as reconnaissance and BDA assets.

62 A. S. Budnik, “Army Aviation Helicopters in Local Wars and Armed Conflicts” Military Thought

Volume 1 2016, 01 January 31 March 2016, 53-54.

63 Recommended readings include Lester W. Grau, Aviation on the Other Side of the Northwest Frontier: Flying 

the Unfriendly Skies of Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan War”, From Fabric Wings to Supersonic Fighters and 

Drones: A History of Military Aviation on both sides of the North-West Frontier, (Brian Cloughley, Lester W. Grau 

& Andrew Roe), Solihull: Helion & Company Limited, 2015, 162-180 and Viktor Markovskiy, The Hot Skies of 

Afganistan [Жаркое Небо Афганистана], Moscow: Tekhnika-Molodezhi, 2000.

Ka-52

Image Courtesy: Vitaly Kuzmin
Other Tactical Considerations

389
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Appendix 

Russian Military Symbology

 
Russian Military Symbology

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