Present: All the Justices 

LOWER CHESAPEAKE ASSOCIATES, A LIMITED 

PARTNERSHIP T/A WILLOUGHBY HARBOUR 

MARINA AND LITTLE BAY, LTD. 

v. Record No. 991787 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 June 9, 2000 

VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE COMPANY 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

Jerome James, Judge 

In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 

in ruling that the owner of a marina was entitled to insurance 

coverage under a commercial property insurance policy for damage 

to the marina's docks allegedly caused by a hurricane. 

 Lower Chesapeake Associates, a limited partnership trading 

as Willoughby Harbour Marina, and its general partner, Little 

Bay, Ltd. (collectively, Lower Chesapeake), operate a commercial 

marina in Norfolk on Willoughby Bay (the marina). The marina 

consists of four, seven-foot wide floating docks, designated as 

Docks A, B, C, and D, which provide about 300 boat slips for 

pleasure craft. 

On September 6, 1996, Hurricane Fran struck the coast of 

North Carolina and affected the Norfolk area with wind, rain, 

and a storm surge. About five months earlier, Lower Chesapeake 

had obtained a commercial property insurance policy (the policy) 

for the marina from Valley Forge Insurance Company (Valley 
Forge). Lower Chesapeake submitted a damage claim under the 

policy for "debris removal and repair and replacement of the 

damaged docks," based on damage allegedly caused by Hurricane 

Fran. After Valley Forge denied coverage for the claim, Lower 

Chesapeake brought this breach of contract action seeking, among 

other things, an award of compensatory damages in the amount of 

$1.2 million. 

 At a bench trial, James Ripley, Jr., the marina's dock 

master, testified that all four docks were damaged during 

Hurricane Fran as a result of wind blowing against the boats 

moored at the marina. Ripley stated that some of the lines 

securing the moored boats broke, and that the boats repeatedly 

collided with the short finger piers that project from the main 

docks. He also explained that many of the boat lines were tied 

to cleats that were affixed to the deck boards. The wind caused 

boats to draw against the lines and the cleats, causing the deck 

boards to "pull up." 

 Ripley testified that the waves during Hurricane Fran were 

insignificant and did not cause damage to the docks, but he 

agreed that the moored boats were "pitching" during the 

hurricane as a result of the wind and the waves. He also 

acknowledged that he had told an insurance investigator soon 

after the hurricane that wind caused the wave action that 

damaged the docks. 

2
 Ripley explained that the floating docks were comprised of 

separate sections linked together by joints constructed of metal 

brackets and a type of flexible plastic or rubber. He stated 

that before Hurricane Fran struck, the marina had experienced 

problems involving broken joints, and that additional joints had 

broken during a "nor-easter" storm in March 1996 (the March 

storm), prior to the effective date of the policy. 

 Whenever a joint broke, marina personnel routinely repaired 

or "patched" it by replacing the flexible joint with a rigid 

connection between the dock sections. These rigid connections 

were made by nailing or bolting boards across the top of the 

deck or onto the stringers, the horizontal support beams under 

the deck, at the location of a broken joint. Similar repairs 

were made to the connections between the finger piers and the 

main docks. Many of these repairs "gave way" during Hurricane 

Fran. 

 The marina also had a floating wooden breakwater located 

between the docks and the entrance to the bay, which served to 

shelter the docks. Ripley explained that many sections of the 

breakwater had broken away during the March storm and had not 

been replaced before Hurricane Fran struck. 

 Lower Chesapeake had obtained an estimate of $194,000 to 

make the permanent repairs necessitated by the March storm, but 

had not made those repairs before Hurricane Fran struck. Ripley 

3
described in detail the damage sustained by each section of each 

dock during Hurricane Fran, referring to numerous photographs 

that were admitted into evidence. The damage to all four docks 

included loose and missing deck boards, displaced pilings, 

overturned utility pedestals, broken deck joints, and missing 

finger piers. Ripley testified that Dock C "gave way" at its 

"dogleg" angle when wind pushed a moored boat against the dock. 

He acknowledged that the marina continued to use all of Docks A 

and B, and most of Docks C and D after the hurricane, without 

replacing any part of the docks. 

 Robert Layton, whose home is adjacent to the marina, 

testified that he went to the marina during Hurricane Fran to 

help secure the boats. He saw cleats, planks, and utility 

pedestals pull from the dock decking, and observed finger piers 

break loose from the docks after some of the boats hit against 

the docks. Layton stated that Hurricane Fran did not cause 

"significant" waves, and that "for a hurricane event, it was a 

relatively flat occurrence." 

 Michael Whitt testified that he rented a boat slip on Dock 

D of the marina from March 1995 until after Hurricane Fran 

struck. He stated that he had complained to Ripley about the 

poor condition of the docks and the breakwater every week during 

the boating season. Whenever the wind exceeded 20 to 30 miles 

4
per hour, the cleats to which the boats were tied pulled from 

the deck boards because the deck wood was rotten. 

 Whitt testified that there had been numerous "Band-Aid 

fixes" made to the docks, such as boards being nailed or bolted 

over rotted dock joints and finger pier connections. He also 

explained that he frequently nailed boards across the decking 

near the cleats he was using in order to keep the cleats from 

"popping up," but that the deck wood was so rotten that these 

repair attempts were usually unsuccessful. Whitt stated that 

sections of the breakwater would "break loose during any type of 

storm that produced a good wind," and that some disconnected 

sections frequently floated loose in the water. He also 

testified that Dock C "broke in half" at its "dogleg" angle 

during Hurricane Fran. 

 James W. Smith qualified as an expert witness and rendered 

opinions on the damage to the docks and the estimation of repair 

and replacement costs. After Hurricane Fran, Smith inspected 

the marina's damage and estimated the cost of repairing all four 

docks. He concluded that 80% of Dock C and 88% of Dock D had 

sustained "considerable damage," and that the least expensive 

means of repairing these docks was to replace them completely. 

Smith also testified that about 40% of Dock B and 20% of Dock A 

were damaged and required replacement. 

5
 Smith's total assessment of the replacement cost for all 

four docks was about $1.3 million. He acknowledged, however, 

that he could not determine whether some of the damage he 

observed after Hurricane Fran had been caused by the earlier 

March storm. He also explained that he had not distinguished 

between storm damage and damage caused by rot or poor 

maintenance. 

 Jesse Herman Brown, Jr., also testified as an expert 

witness and rendered opinions on the damage to the docks and the 

estimation of repair and replacement costs. He examined the 

marina about a month after Hurricane Fran and concluded that the 

structural framework of Docks C and D had deteriorated to the 

point that these docks could not be repaired. Brown stated that 

this deterioration occurred over a period of years, and that the 

repairs made by marina personnel to the dock joints and finger 

pier connections were "[v]ery temporary, and dangerous." 

 Brown estimated a cost of about $991,000 to replace Docks C 

and D. He explained that he could not state the percentage of 

this cost attributable to the repair of damage caused by the 

hurricane, and that most of the damage he observed was caused by 

general deterioration and wear. 

 Richard Potts, a forensic civil engineer, qualified as an 

expert witness on the causes of structural failure and was the 

only expert to express an opinion about the cause of the storm 

6
damage incurred during Hurricane Fran. He examined the marina's 

docks about three weeks after the hurricane and also consulted a 

report on the hurricane issued by the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). That report indicated that 

the NOAA station nearest the marina recorded sustained wind 

speeds of 42 miles per hour, a peak gust of 63 miles per hour, 

and a storm surge of two feet, six inches. 

Potts explained that a storm surge is "the rise above 

normal elevation of the water due to the storm," and that this 

is a different phenomenon from waves or tides. Although he had 

no data establishing the height of the waves at the marina 

during the hurricane, he concluded that there was a high 

probability that there was wave action of some degree. Potts 

also explained that because large sections of the breakwater 

were missing, the breakwater could not dissipate as much of the 

wave energy as it was designed to do. 

 Potts testified that he found "excessive deterioration 

[and] decay," especially on Docks C and D, which had occurred 

over a period of between several months and a few years. He 

stated that the pattern of damage he observed on the docks was 

not consistent with damage caused by wind alone. In Potts' 

opinion, the primary cause of the damage was long-term 

deterioration, combined with the impact of waves and surging 

water. He noted that the docks failed at the joints, and that 

7
due to the existing deterioration, movement caused by even small 

waves would have been sufficient to inflict the damage. 

 Potts also testified that the repairs made by marina 

personnel to the docks' joints and finger pier connections prior 

to the hurricane were not effective. He stated that the purpose 

of having flexible joints was to permit the floating dock 

sections to move with the water without experiencing undue 

stress. The temporary repairs affixing rigid connections 

restricted the docks' flexibility and, thus, reduced their 

ability to withstand the stress caused by wave movement. 

The Valley Forge policy issued to Lower Chesapeake, in 

addition to standard provisions for commercial liability and 

property insurance coverage, also contained "commercial inland 

marine coverage." Included in the inland marine coverage 

provisions was a form entitled "Piers, Wharfs, and Docks 

Coverage Form" (dock coverage form). The relevant portions of 

the dock coverage form provide: 

A. COVERAGE

We will pay for "loss" to Covered Property from any of 

the Covered Causes of Loss. 

1. COVERED PROPERTY, as used in this Coverage 

Form, means: 

a. Floating or fixed piers, wharfs and 

docks; 

b. Anchors and floats used with floating 

docks; 

8
c. Covers, awnings, electrical wiring or 

plumbing which is permanently fixed to 

the pier, wharf or dock; or 

d. Buoys or moorings. 

. . . . 

3. COVERED CAUSES OF LOSS 

Covered Causes of Loss means RISK OF DIRECT 

PHYSICAL "LOSS" to Covered Property except 

those causes of "loss" listed in the 

exclusions. 

4. a. ADDITIONAL COVERAGE - COLLAPSE 

We will pay for direct "loss" caused by 

or resulting from risks of direct 

physical "loss" involving collapse of 

all or part of a building or structure 

caused by one or more of the following: 

(1) Fire; lightning; windstorm; hail; 

explosion; smoke; aircraft; 

vehicles; riot; civil commotion; 

vandalism; breakage of glass; 

falling objects; weight of snow, 

ice or sleet; water damage; all 

only as covered in the Coverage 

Form; 

(2) Hidden decay; 

(3) Hidden insect or vermin damage; 

. . . . 

We will not pay for loss or damage to 

the following types of property, if 

otherwise covered in this Coverage 

Form, under items (2), (3) . . . unless 

the loss or damage is a direct result 

of the collapse of a building: 

9
outdoor radio or television 

antennas, including their lead-in 

wiring, mast or towers; awnings; 

gutters or down spouts; yard 

fixtures; outdoor swimming pools; 

fences; piers, wharves and docks; 

beach or diving platforms or 

appurtenances; retaining walls; 

walks; roadways and other paved 

surfaces. 

. . . . 

 b. ADDITIONAL COVERAGE - DEBRIS REMOVAL 

We will pay for expenses you incur for 

the removal of debris of the Covered 

Property, which is occasioned by a 

"loss" covered by this Coverage Form. 

. . . . 

B. EXCLUSIONS 

1. We will not pay for a "loss" caused directly 

or indirectly by any of the following. Such 

"loss" is excluded regardless of any other 

cause or event that contributes concurrently 

or in any sequence to the "loss": 

. . . . 

e. WATER 

. . . . 

(4) Flood, surface water, waves, 

tides, tidal waves, overflowing of 

any body of water, or their spray, 

all whether driven by wind or not. 

. . . . 

3. We will not pay for a "loss" caused by or 

resulting from any of the following. But if 

10
"loss" by a Covered Cause of Loss results, we 

will pay for the resulting "loss": 

a. Weather conditions. But this exclusion only 

applies if weather conditions contribute in 

any way with a cause or event excluded in 

paragraph 1. above to produce the "loss"; 

. . . . 

c. Collapse except as provided in the 

Additional Coverage - Collapse section of 

this Coverage Form. 

d. Wear and tear, marring, denting or 

scratching; . . . gradual deterioration, 

depreciation; mechanical breakdown; insects, 

vermin, rodents, birds or other animals; 

corrosion, rust, dampness or dryness, . . . 

. . . . 

F. DEFINITIONS 

 "Loss" means accidental loss or damage. 

 After hearing the parties' evidence, the trial court found 

that part of Dock C had collapsed as a result of a "windstorm" 

and "water damage" and, thus, was covered under Section A(4)(a), 

"Additional Coverage - Collapse," of the dock coverage form. 

The court ruled that because part of Dock C had suffered a 

collapse, the policy's exclusions set out in Section B did not 

apply. However, the trial court concluded that Docks A, B, and 

D had not suffered collapses. The court found that the damage 

to these docks resulted from causes excluded under Section B of 

the dock coverage form. The trial court entered judgment in 

11
favor of Lower Chesapeake for the damage to Dock C in the amount 

of $500,000. 

 Lower Chesapeake appeals from the trial court's denial of 

coverage for the damage sustained by Docks A, B, and D. Valley 

Forge assigns cross-error to the trial court's ruling that the 

policy provided coverage for the damage to Dock C. 

 The judgment of a trial court, sitting without a jury, is 

entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict and will not be 

set aside unless it appears from the evidence that the judgment 

is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Code 

§ 8.01-680; Willard v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 258 Va. 140, 

149, 515 S.E.2d 277, 283 (1999); Cardinal Dev. Co. v. Stanley 

Constr. Co., 255 Va. 300, 302, 497 S.E.2d 847, 849 (1998). The 

court's factual finding that part of Dock C sustained a 

collapse, while the other three docks did not, is central to the 

resolution of this appeal. Lower Chesapeake argues that the 

evidence established that all four docks suffered collapses, 

while Valley Forge contends that none of the docks did. 

 Since the term "collapse" is not defined in the policy, the 

term must be given its ordinary and accepted meaning. See Craig 

v. Dye, 259 Va. 533, 538, 526 S.E.2d 9, 11-12 (2000); 

Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Keller, 249 Va. 458, 460-61, 456 

S.E.2d 525, 526 (1995). An ordinary and accepted meaning of the 

word "collapse" is "to break down completely: fall apart in 

12
confused disorganization: . . . disintegrate." Webster's Third 

New International Dictionary 443 (1993). 

 The trial court stated that it did not use "a dictionary 

definition" of the term, but instead reviewed the photographs of 

the damaged docks and the other evidence and concluded that the 

damage to part of Dock C was "what the policy meant when it says 

collapse." The court also stated that it compared the 

photographs of the other docks to the photographs of Dock C and 

concluded that only Dock C satisfied the term "collapse" as set 

forth in the policy. 

 Despite the trial court's statement that it did not rely on 

a dictionary definition of the term "collapse," the court 

properly applied the ordinary and customary meaning of that term 

when reaching its conclusion. The photographs and evidence to 

which the trial court referred show that all the docks lost deck 

boards and finger piers, and sustained various other minor 

damage, but that only Dock C suffered a complete break, which 

occurred at its "dogleg" angle. A complete break of this nature 

falls within the ordinary and customary meaning of the term 

"collapse." Thus, the trial court's conclusion that only one 

section of Dock C had suffered a "collapse," within the meaning 

of the policy term, is not plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it. 

13
 Next, we consider whether the exclusions listed in Section 

B of the dock coverage form preclude coverage for the damage 

sustained by Docks A, B, and D. The trial court made a factual 

finding that these docks did not suffer a collapse, and that the 

damage to these docks was caused by wind-driven water and 

gradual deterioration, which were excluded causes under Sections 

B(1)(e)(4) and B(3)(d) of the dock coverage form. Lower 

Chesapeake contends, however, that even if these docks did not 

suffer a "collapse," the policy covers losses sustained to those 

docks because Valley Forge failed to meet its burden of proving 

that this damage resulted from an excluded cause. In response, 

Valley Forge asserts that the trial court correctly found that 

the damage to these docks resulted, at least in part, from 

excluded causes. 

 Under the plain terms of Section B(1), coverage is excluded 

under the policy if a loss is caused "directly or indirectly" by 

one of the enumerated causes or events, "regardless of any other 

cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence" 

to the loss. The evidence amply supports the trial court's 

finding that the damage to Docks A, B, and D resulted, at least 

in part, from the excluded causes of "[f]lood, . . . waves, 

tides, tidal waves, . . . all whether driven by wind or not," or 

from the excluded cause of "gradual deterioration," or from any 

combination of these excluded causes. Since the trial court's 

14
factual finding on this issue is supported by the evidence, we 

will affirm that part of the judgment denying coverage under the 

policy for the damage to Docks A, B, and D.*

 We next consider whether the trial court correctly 

concluded that the exclusions in Section B of the dock coverage 

form do not apply to losses encompassed within the provisions of 

the "Additional Coverage-Collapse" section of the form. Lower 

Chesapeake contends that the exclusions in Section B do not 

apply to losses resulting from a collapse, while Valley Forge 

asserts an opposite interpretation of the two sections of the 

policy. 

 Courts interpret insurance policies, like other contracts, 

in accordance with the parties' intentions as determined from 

the words they have used in their contract. Floyd v. Northern 

Neck Ins. Co., 245 Va. 153, 158, 427 S.E.2d 193, 196 (1993). 

The interpretation of policy provisions presents a question of 

 *

Lower Chesapeake also argues that the trial court erred in 

denying coverage for Docks A, B, and D because the evidence 

showed that the damage was caused by decay, not by gradual 

deterioration and, thus, Section B(3)(d) is inapplicable. Lower 

Chesapeake further contends, in essence, that because Valley 

Forge failed to conduct a "loss control survey" of the marina, 

as permitted by the policy, Valley Forge has forfeited any right 

to assert deterioration as an excluded cause of loss. However, 

the trial court based its denial of coverage to Docks A, B, and 

D on a finding that the damage to these docks was caused by 

deterioration and wind-driven water. Thus, we do not address 

these arguments since the trial court's finding that wind-driven 

water contributed to the damage is a sufficient reason to 

exclude coverage under the policy language. 

15
law that we consider de novo. Craig, 259 Va. at 537, 526 S.E.2d 

at 11. 

 When an insurer drafts policy language setting forth 

exclusions that limit coverage under a policy, the insurer is 

required to use language that clearly and unambiguously defines 

the scope of the exclusions. See S.F. v. West Am. Ins. Co., 250 

Va. 461, 465, 463 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1995); Granite State Ins. Co. 

v. Bottoms, 243 Va. 228, 233, 415 S.E.2d 131, 134 (1992); Smith 

v. Allstate Ins. Co., 241 Va. 477, 480, 403 S.E.2d 696, 697-98 

(1991). If exclusionary provisions are ambiguous, such that 

they may be understood in more than one way, we will interpret 

the policy in a manner that provides coverage. S.F., 250 Va. at 

464, 463 S.E.2d at 452; Granite State Ins. Co., 243 Va. at 234, 

415 S.E.2d at 134; Smith, 241 Va. at 480, 403 S.E.2d at 697. 

 We conclude that the disputed policy language permits more 

than one reasonable interpretation of the applicability of 

Section B to collapse losses covered under Section A(4)(a). As 

Lower Chesapeake notes, under Section B(3)(c) of the dock 

coverage form, losses resulting from collapse are specifically 

excluded from coverage "except as provided in the Additional 

Coverage-Collapse section of the Coverage Form." Further, the 

exclusions set forth in Section B are specifically referenced in 

Section A(3), but Section A(4)(a) is silent regarding any such 

exclusions. Based on these considerations, one reasonable 

16
conclusion concerning the disputed policy language is that the 

Section B exclusions are inapplicable to the losses covered by 

Section A(4)(a). 

 In contrast, as Valley Forge observes, Section A(4)(a)(1) 

provides coverage for losses resulting from collapse caused by 

windstorm or water damage "all only as covered in the Coverage 

Form." Valley Forge contends that this language clearly 

subjects the collapse coverage of Section A(4)(a) to the other 

terms of the dock coverage form, including the exclusions set 

forth in Section B. Under these considerations, a second 

reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the disputed 

language is that the Section B exclusions are applicable to the 

collapse of part of Dock C.

Because these provisions of the dock coverage form are 

ambiguous, we construe the policy in favor of providing coverage 

and hold that the exclusions in Section B are inapplicable to 

the collapse coverage of Section A(4)(a). The evidence supports 

the trial court's findings that the collapse of part of Dock C 

was caused by "windstorm" or "water damage" and, thus, that this 

collapse is included within the coverage provisions of Section 

A(4)(a). Therefore, we will affirm the trial court's judgment 

that the policy provides coverage for Lower Chesapeake's loss 

resulting from the collapse of part of Dock C. 

17
 Finally, Valley Forge argues that the evidence does not 

support the amount of damages awarded by the trial court for the 

damage sustained to Dock C. We agree. As stated above, Dock C 

sustained a complete break at its "dogleg" angle. This damage 

to a limited portion of Dock C was the only damage found by the 

trial court to have resulted from a collapse and, thus, to 

qualify for coverage under the policy. 

 Neither party presented evidence concerning the cost of 

repairing only the collapsed portion of Dock C. Instead, James 

Smith testified that it would cost $584,551 to completely 

replace Dock C, plus an additional amount to pay for debris 

removal. Jesse Brown testified that it would cost $991,014 to 

replace both Docks C and D entirely, except for one 16-foot 

section of Dock C that was salvageable. Therefore, the trial 

court's award of $500,000 in damages to Lower Chesapeake as 

compensation for its loss resulting from the collapse of a 

limited portion of Dock C is not supported by the evidence and 

must be set aside. 

 For these reasons, we will affirm in part, and reverse in 

part, the trial court's judgment and remand the case to the 

trial court for a determination of damages owed to Lower 

Chesapeake as a result of the collapse of part of Dock C. 

Affirmed in part,

reversed in part,

 and remanded.

18