## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## R E P O R T S Appellate Court

In re Receiv ership of Grnacek , 2012 IL App (3d) 110181

Appellate Court Caption In re Rece ivership of KENNET H A. GRNACEK (Da niel H. Kallan, Plainti ff -Appellee, v. J erome L arkin, Administrator of the Attorney Reg istration and Disciplinary Commi ssion, Defe ndant-Appe llant).

District & N o. Third District Docke t No. 3-11-0181

Filed J anuar y 5, 2012

Held (Note : T

his syl lab us

con st it ute s n o par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Rep o rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) The trial court’s order requiring the Attorney Reg istration and Disciplinary Co m m ission to pay the attorney appointed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 776 to act as the rec eiver of a disabled attorney for the leg al service s rende red to the disabled attorney ’s clients was reve rsed

on appea l, even though the appointed rec eiver was motivated by the desire to help a friend and to protec t the leg al profe ssion and he provided

an “extraordinar

y eff ort,” since Rule 776 does not authorize the trial court to order reimburse ment to a rec eiver for leg al service s on behalf of the clients of an attorney whose prac tice is in rec eiver ship and the rec eiver is
not reg arde d as having an attorney -client rela tionship with the clients and normally serve s without compensation.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Wil l County
, No. 10-MR-759; the Hon. Ger ald R. Kinney , J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Reverse d.Counsel on

Appea l J ames A. Doppke, J r. , an d Susan Fr eder ick Rhodes (ar g ued), both of Chicag o, for a

ppellant.

Daniel J

. Kallan (ar g ued), of Daniel J

. Kallan L td., of J oliet, for appellee

.

Panel PRES I DI NG J USTI CE SCHMI DT delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J ustices Carter

and Ly tton concurr ed in the judg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 J erome L arkin, Administrator o f th e A tt o r n ey Reg istration and Disciplinary Commi ssion (ARDC), appe als the trial court’s order requiringthe ARDC to pay attorney Daniel Ka llan $33,750 for leg al servic es re ndere d to the clients of Ke nneth A. Gr nace k. Kallan c oncede s that repr esenting Grna cek’ s clients was not one of his enumer ated duties as a rec eiver under Supreme Court Rule 776 (ef f. Mar . 25, 1991). We hold that Rule 776 does not authorize a trial court to orde r re imbursement to a rece iver for leg al servic es provided to the c lients of
an attorne y

whose pra ctice is in re ceive rship. We reve rse.

¶ 2 FACTS ¶ 3 As of 2009, attorney Kenne th A. Gr n ac ek h ad p ra ct i ce d l aw in Wil l County for approximately 35 y ear s. Grna cek’ s law prac tice was primarily conce ntrated in repr esenting defe ndants in rec idivist driving under t he influence case s befor e the circ uit courts and statutory summary driver’ s license suspension case s befor e the Secre tary of State. Grna cek
g ener ally obtained a f

lat fee for his leg al servic es upon re tention. ¶ 4 Grna cek beg an to experience phy sical and mental health problems four to five y ear s prior
to 2009, including a m ental and phy sical brea kdown, fatig ue, a collapsed lung and the inability to swallow. During 2008 and 2009, attorney s Kevin Cummi ng s and Kallan cover ed
court case s for Grna cek when his health did not allow him to appea r for schedule d hear ings. Kallan and Grna cek wer e friends; Kallan had been Grna cek’ s law partne r from 1988 to 1996. Cummi ng s had bee n a fr iend of Gr nace k since 1989. ¶ 5 Both Cummi ng s and Kallan appea red on behalf of Grna cek and reque sted continuance s in his scheduled matters. Trial judge s wer e becoming impatient due to the lack of progress being made in Grna cek’ s case s, many of which had been pending for sever al y ear s. Grna cek’ s clients expressed their frustra tion to C ummings and Kallan when they appea red fo r co urt hear ings, only to lear n that there would be a continuance due to Grn ac ek ’s unavailability . Something had to g ive.

-2-¶ 6 On or about April 22, 2009, Grna cek was admitt ed t o L o y o l a M ed i ca l C en ter. He

rema ined in the hospital f or approximately one month. On or befor e May 1, 2009, attorney I ra Goldstein filed a petition i n t h e Wil l County circ uit court to bring Grna cek’ s medical disability to the court’s attention. On May 1, 2009, Kallan volunteere d to serve as a rec eiver for Gr nace k’s law pr actice

. ¶ 7 The same day
, the chief judge of the circ uit court of the Twelfth J udicial Circuit entere d Administrative Orde r No. 09-16 for the appointment of a rec eiver on behalf of Grna cek. The order stated that it had been broug ht to the court’s attention that Grna cek was unable to proper ly discharg e his responsibilities to his clients due to a disability and that there wer e no partne rs, associate s, executors or other responsible parties capa ble of conducting Grna cek’ s aff airs. The court appointed Kallan as rec eiver “to take custody of and make an inventory of the files of the said Kenne th A

. Grna cek, notify the lawy er’ s clients in all pending case s as to his disability and take appropr iate steps to sequester client fu n d s o f t he said Kenne th Grna cek, as well as to take whateve r other action that may be nece ssary to protec t the interest of said attorne y , his clients or other a ffe cted pa rties.” ¶ 8 Grna cek appointed Ka llan as his power of attorney from May 1, 2009, to Ma y 1, 2010. Kallan assisted Grna cek with financ ial matters and a p p ly in g f o r So c ia l Security disability due
to Grna cek’ s medical condition. Kallan told the court, at the September 2, 2010, hear ing on his petition for attorney fee s, that Gr n ac ek wa s “not able to ever prac tice law ag ain” as a result of his medica l condition. ¶ 9 Kallan’ s appointment as re ceive r for Grna cek’ s law prac tice was in e ffe ct from May 1, 2009, until Kallan filed a final repor t and petition for attorney fee s on J uly 30, 2010. Kallan testified at the hear ing on his p et i t ion for attorney fee s that he volunteere d to serve as

rec eiver out of

friendship for

Grna cek. K allan wa s familiar with Grna cek’ s law prac tice of defe nding clients on alcohol-r elated driving offe nses, as Kallan also handles such matters as part of his lawprac tice. ¶ 10 Due to Grna cek’ s illness, Kallan was not able to communi ca t e wi t h h i m t o obtain assistance in perf

orming his duties as a rec eiver

. Howeve r, Grna cek’ s secr etar y was helpful
to Kallan. She box ed up all of Grna cek ’s fi les and put them in alphabe tical order in
prepa ration for storag e. Grna cek’ s office rema ined open for approximate l y o n e month. Kallan g ave the key s to the landlord ar ound Memorial Da y

. ¶ 11 Kallan made an inventory of Grna cek’ s open files and notified Grna cek’ s clients of his disability . On May

8, 2009, he sent notice s to 65 clients reg ardingGrna cek’ s disability

. ¶ 12 T h e r e w e r e a

p p r o ximately nine statutory summary suspension matters pending befor e t h e Secre tary of State, which Kallan was able to ref er to other attorney s. Kallan did not know the fee arr ang ement those attorney s made with Grna cek’ s clients. He was able to find substitut e counsel for a criminal battery case

. I n one client matter, involving a pending felony driving under the influence of intox icants, the client reta ined co-c ounsel to ass i s t Kallan in the
repres en tation. Kallan filed his appea ranc e as substitut e counsel in 31 of Grna cek’ s

rema ining open files, which consisted mostly of case s of driving under the i n fl u en ce of intox icants. ¶ 13 Kallan did not see k additional attorney fee s from any of Grna cek’ s clients. He testified

-3-that he knew that these clients had already paid Grnace k. The fees h ad b ee n spent prior to

Grna cek’ s completion of the case s; he too k o n t h ei r repr esentation with the intention of finishing up the case s for Grna cek so that his c lients did not have to hire and pay substitut e counsel. Kallan stated in the aff idavit he filed with his motion to supplement the rec ord that Grna cek’ s clients wou l d h av e had to obtain substitut e counsel at their expense had he not repr esente d them. ¶ 14 Two of Gr

nace k’s ca ses wer e pendingin the appellate court a nd Kallan pr epar ed re ply briefs and prese nted oral arg ument in those matters. Kallan rec eived a t o t al $ 4,450 from those two clients for attorney fee s owed to G rnac ek for work Grna cek had previously done on the appe als. Kallan g ave one -half of the collecte d fee s to G rnac ek and he kept the other half for himself. The propr iety

of this action is not before this court. ¶ 15 Kallan testified that he decide d to take over the repr esenta t i o n o f Gr n ac ek’s c lients himself as it was easie r than trying to find other attorney s to take the case s. Both Kallan and Cummi ng s indicated that Grna cek had lost the g ood will of the bench and that most attorney s did not want to take over Grna cek’ s cas es b ecause trial dates had alre ady been continued numerous times on Grna cek’ s motions. ¶ 16 There was approximately $8,000 in Grna cek’ s client trust acc ount at the time that Kallan

was appointed as rec eiver. I n addition, there was approximately $2,000 in Grna cek’ s operating acc ount. K allan used a por tion of the funds to pa

y expenses, including the salary of Grna cek’ s secr etar

y for one month and “short money” for Grna cek’ s landlord. ¶ 17 Kallan stated that there wer e no funds available to provide a ref und to Grna cek’ s clients for the attorney fee s they had paid to Grna cek at the beg inning of the repr esenta tion; Grna cek had perf ormed much of the leg al service s for his clients at the time of the rec eiver ship. One client who was being repr esente d by Grna cek on a case o f d ri v i n g under the influence of intox icants reque sted a ref und of his reta iner and filed a complaint ag ainst Grna cek with the ARDC; Kallan returne d $4,000 to the client from funds in Grna cek ’s cl i en t trust acc ount. Kallan pa id out the rema ining $4,000 in the acc ount “ to pa y a proper ty damag e acc ident to an insuranc e compa

ny ” on beha lf of a c lient. ¶ 18 On J uly 30, 2010, Ka l l an fi l ed a final repor t with reg ard to the Grna cek r ece ivership. Kallan repor

ted that all of Grna cek’ s court files wer e closed, except for one pending matter in which the client was schedule d for sentenc ing in Aug ust 2010. Kallan conclude d that there

was no further need for the rec eiver ship. On the same day Kal l an also filed a petition for attorney fee s. He soug ht attorney fee s for the leg al service s he provided to some of Grna cek’ s clients, including the two appellate case s, four or five driving under the influence t ri als
, approximately four bench trials, and a number of ancillar y matters. He stated in the petition that he had been able to find volu n t ee r s u b s t i tute counsel for many of Grna cek’ s pending

case s, but he had substitut ed as counsel in t h e re m aini ng open case s for which no other volunteer attorney s wer e immediately available

. He prese nt ed i n his petition that this

rec eiver ship was extraordinary and did cause substantial hardship. He soug ht $47,612.50 for 208.25 hours at $250 an hour, which h e s tated was the customary fee for an experience d attorney to repre sent clients in traff ic and c riminal case s in W ill C ounty

. ¶ 19 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 776(e) (2), Kallan s er v ed n o t i ce of his petition for

-4-attorney fee s and final repor t on the ARDC. On August 13, 2010, the Administrator filed an objection to the petition for attorney fee s arguing that Supreme Court Rule 776 does not contemplate that an attorney appointed as a rec eiver shall take over the repr esentation of the clients of the di s ab l ed lawy er and rec eive compensation for such repr esentation. The Administrator argued that, under Rule 776(d), the attorney appointed as the rec eiver shall not “be reg arde d as having an attorney -client relationship with the clients of the disabled, absent

or dece ased lawy er.” I ll. S. Ct. R. 7 7 6 (d )(1) (ef f. Mar. 25, 1991). I n addition, the Administrator argued that Rule 776(e) provides that the attorne y appointed as the receive r shall normally serve without compensation. The Administrator acknow ledg ed t h at, under Rule 776(e)
, the circ uit court has the discretion to awa rd compensation to a rec eiver to be paid from the Disciplinary Fund administered by the ARDC, but only if the natur e of the

rec eiver ship was extraordinary and the failure to awa rd com p en sation would work a substantial hardship o n t h e receiver

. I f those two criter ia are met, compensa tion may be

awa rded only t o t h e ex tent that the eff orts of the rec eiver “have exceede d those normally require d in a

n amount to be deter

mined by the cour t.” I ll. S. C t. R. 776(e)(2) (ef f. Mar

. 25, 1991). ¶ 20 The Administrator went o n t o ar gue that Kallan had failed to meet the criter ia for a n

awa rd of compensation under Supreme Court Rule 776. The Admi n istrator argued that Kalla n d i d n o t prese nt any sug g estion of an extraordinary nature of the nece ssary work in Grna cek’ s rec eiver sh ip, such as a larg e client base or a particula rly disorg anized law prac tice. I n addition, the Administrator pointed out that Kallan did not seek attorney fee s for his work

as the rec eiver
, but only for his fee s in repr esenting Grna cek’ s clients in their pending leg al
matters. The Administrator argued that there is no authorization in Supreme Court Rule 776 for compensation to a rec eiver for providing leg al service s to the clients of the lawy er who is the subject of the r ece ivership. ¶ 21 Attache d to the Administrator’s objection to the petition for attorney fee s was a copy of

an article that had been published in the Aug ust 2004 I llinois Ba r J ournal, entitled, Serving

as Court-Appointed Rec eive rfor a Missing Lawyer: A Step-by -Step Guide
, by J ohn Cesario,

an attorney with the ARDC. The Administrator asked the circ uit court to con s i d er t he “Rec eiver ’s Checklist,” at pag es 6 and 7 of the article
, which descr ibed the eff orts normally require d of a rec eiver
, such as taking inventory of the disabled lawy er’ s client files, notify ing the clients of their lawy er’ s disability
, assisting the client in finding other leg al counsel and petitioning the court for permission to disburse funds in the disabled or dece ased lawy er’ s client trust acc ount. ¶ 22 Finally
, the Administrator objected to Kallan’ s petition for attorney fee s on public policy
g rounds. The Administrator argued that the purpose of the Disciplinary Fund is to defr ay the
costs and expenses of functions perf ormed by the ARDC. The Administrator pointed to the lang uag e of Rule 776(e) that enunciates the p u b l i c p o licy of limit ing the awa rd of
compensation to rece ivers from the Dis ciplinary Fund only to the ex tent that the efforts of the rec eiver exceed those normally require d of a rec eiver

. The Administrator conclude d that Kallan’ s reque st for an awa rd of attorney fee s, incurre d in his perf ormanc e of leg al service s outside the scope of

his appointment as a re ceive r, should be denie d. ¶ 23 A hear ing was held on Kal l an ’s p et i t i o n fo r at t o rn ey fee s on September 2, 2010.

-5-Attorney s Cummi ng s and Kallan testified reg arding Grna cek’ s disability and their eff orts in assisting him and his clients prior to a nd afte r Ka llan’s appointment as re ceive r. ¶ 24 Kallan testified that, althoug h he calc ulated his attorney fee s at $250 per hour, he did not expect the court to allow his fee s at that rate

. Kallan further testified t h at he rea liz ed that “ther e is a pro bono fac tor and, well, there should be
, beca use I did voluntee r to do this out of friendship for Mr. Grna cek.” Kallan stated that he took on the repr esentation of Grna cek’ s clients to make sure that the client matters wer e taken car e of and so that the courts and the leg al profe ssion did not “ look ba d.” Kallan told the court that he wa s “not looking for a lot of compensation, but I think I should be compensated somewhat.” Kallan believed that the circ umstances o f t h e rec eiver ship wer e extraordinary
, in that Grna cek had no family or partne rs to “take over these duties that neede d to be done to protec t his reputation, the bar’ s reputation and the profe ssion’s reputation.” ¶ 25 On November 29, 2010, the court filed a written deci s i o n o n Ka l l an ’s p et ition for attorney fee s. The court found that the eff orts taken by Kallan wer e extraordinary : Kallan

re s o l v ed pending case s within the circ uit court sy stem, protec ted the rig hts of Grna cek’ s clients, protec ted Grna cek from possible disciplinary action, “and otherwise fulfil l ed the spirit and letter of Supreme Court Rule 776.” The court conclude d that Kallan’ s conduct of criminal trials on behalf of Grna cek’ s clients constituted extraordinary eff orts that should be
compensated. The court set the rate of compensation at $250 per hour and fix ed the number

o f h o u rs t o be compensated at 135 hours. The court order ed the ARDC to pay Kal l an $33,750 from the Disc iplinary Fund. ¶ 26 On Dec ember 27, 2 0 1 0
, th e A d mi n istrator filed a motion for rec onsideration, arguing that

an awa rd of attorney fee s to the rec eiver for repr esenting the clients of a disabled lawy er was inconsistent with the express terms of Supreme Court Rule 776. The Administrator argued that the court’s order would set a prec edent for attorney s appointed as rec eiver s under Rule 776 to seek compensation for nonrec eiver ship service s, which would result in the depletion of the Disciplinary Fund for purposes not envisioned b y t he supreme court. The Administrator expressed his conce rn that rec eiver ships may becom e m o re common in the future, g iven the need for support and assistance to the g reater perc entag e of ag ing lawy ers in the coming y ear s. ¶ 27 On J anuar

y 6, 2011, Kallan filed a mot ion to supplement t h e re cord with his affidavit. The aff idavit provided additional information reg arding the acc ounts of Grna cek at the time that Kallan was appointed rece iver. Kallan also aver red that Grnace k char g ed his clients a fix ed fee for repr esenta

tion in ag g ravated traff

ic case s, and that Grna cek’ s “fe e was paid up front and was considere d non ref undable.” Kallan stated in his aff idavit that he found no funds ava ilable to ref

und Grna cek’ s clients, that Grna cek had perf ormed much of the leg al

wo rk re q u i red by the clients’ leg al matters at the time of the rec eiver ship and that th o s e clients would have had to obtain substitute counsel at their e x pense. ¶ 28 On J an u ar y 6
, 2 0 11, Kallan also filed a response to the Administrator’s motion for

rec onsideration. Kallan argued that the lang uag e of Rule 776 was clea r and unambiguous and authorizes a rec eiver “to take whateve r other action is indicated to protec t the interests of the lawy er, his clients, or other aff ecte d parties.” He further argued that there is no lang uag e in

-6-Rule 776 that prohibits a rec eiver from providing leg al service s to the disabled l aw y er ’s

clients. Kallan cited t o o t h er ty pes of rec eiver ships, such as for the manag ement of rea l
proper ty during a leg al dispute and for a dissolved co rporation, in which the rec eiver is
compensated for service s rende red, i n an am o u nt deter mined within the discretion of the
court. Kallan believed that the proper issu e p re s en t ed in the Administrator’s motion for

rec onsideration was whether the circ uit court abused its discretion by finding that the service s he rende red as rec eiver wer e extraordinary and, thus, subjec t to compensa tion. He
argued that the evidenc e supported a finding that his leg al repr esentation of Grna cek’ s clients

was nece ssary for the protec tion of both Grnace k an d h i s clients. We note there was no evidenc e that the clients Kallan repr esente d wer e unable to pay for substitut e counsel. Most of the case s Kallan took on wer e for jailable o ff en s es and, there fore
, indige nt defe ndant’s could have reque sted a public defe nder. L ikewise, there was no evidenc e that Grna cek was without the means to ref

und any unear ned fe es fr om his personal asse ts. ¶ 29 On J anuar

y 13, 2011, a hear ing was held o n t h e Ad m i n i s t ra t o r’ s m o t i o n fo r

rec onsideration. The Administrator argued t h at the lang uag e of Rule 776 indicated the intention of the supreme court to limit compensation from the Disciplinary Fund to rec eiver s and to limit the duties of a rec eiver appointed under the rule. The Administrator acknow ledg ed that Rule 776 does not prohibit a rec eiver from subsequently enter ing into an attorney -client rela

tionship with the clients of the disabled lawy er for whom the rec eiver ship

was established, but he argued that such a relationship require s an independe nt fee ag ree ment betwee n the attorney -re ceive r and the former client of the disabled lawy er with reg ard to the
scope of the repr esentation unrelated to the rec eiver ship. The Administrator argued that the circ umstances unde r which Kallan was appointed as a rec eiver for Gr nace k’s law pr actice
, wher e Grna cek was a sole prac titioner with no one available t o co n du ct t he aff airs of his
prac tice, ar e esse ntially

prese nt in almost every

rec eiver ship. ¶ 30 I n commenting on the Administrator’s arg ument, the circ uit court indicated that Kallan’ s eff orts on behalf of Grna cek’ s clients potentially had the result of re d u cing the number of client complaints filed with the ARDC agai n s t Grna cek and, there fore
, saved the ARDC “some time and trouble on that.” The court stated that one could view Kallan’ s eff orts in that
reg ard to be extraordinary as contemplated by Rul e 7 7 6

. C o u nsel for the Administrator informed the cour t t h at t h e ARDC is able to handle such a situation, by conducting investigations into any complaints rec eived about Grna cek’ s failure to co m p lete the
repr esentation of his clients due to his disabili ty

. ¶ 31 Ka l l an argued that, applying the rules of statutory construction, Rule 77 6 i s n o t as restric tive as ar g ued by

the Administrator. Ka llan cited to the languag e in Rule 776(b) that the rec eiver is to take whateve r other action that may be nece ssary to pr otect the interest of said attorney , which is Mr. Grna cek, his clients, and other aff ecte d parties. Kallan argued that he had compl i ed with that authorization by repr esenting Grna cek’ s clients and that the judicial sy stem and the ARDC wer e the “other aff ecte d partie s” to his repr esentation of Grna cek’ s clients. He also argued that he had protec ted Grna cek’ s interests, stating that one client had filed a reque st for an investigation of Grna cek with the ARDC and speculating that Grna cek’ s clients could have filed disciplinary complaints or civil lawsuits ag ainst Grna cek for f ailing to c omplete their leg al matters.

-7-¶ 32 Kallan told the circ uit court that he had not wanted to repr ese n t Gr n acek’s clients and

that, “I t’s not something that I would have said, ‘Oh, I ’m g oing to repr esent y ou g uy s and I ’m
g oing to seek compensation f rom the Attorney Reg istration a nd Disciplinary Commi ssion; they ’ll pay me.’ That’s not how t his worke d at all. I had a number of clients who had–Mr. Grna cek’ s clients who had paid up front. There was no money left, and I felt that in order to protec t their interest and their rig hts I would do this–repre sent the clients.” Kallan conclude d his ar gu m en t b y stating that it is within the discretion of the chief judge of eac h judicial circ uit to deter

mine whether a rec eiver ’s service s are extraordinary
, and the circ uit court did not abuse its discretion in awa rding him attorney

fee s. ¶ 33 I n rebuttal, the Administrator ar gu ed that if Kallan’ s interpre tation of Rule 776 wer e adopted by

the circuit court, costs associated with re ceive rships could spiral out of contr ol if rec eiver s took on the repr esentation of the clients of the lawy er for whom the rec eiver ship

was established. The Administrator cited to the example of a disabled lawy er’ s law prac tice of criminal defe nse or class action litigation, wh e r e a rec eiver ’s repr esentation of the disabled lawy er’ s clients could consist of complex and leng thy trials. He arg ued that the pay

ment of attorney fee s for such repr esenta tion, under Rule 776, would neg atively aff ect the ability of the ARDC to administer the Disciplinary Fund. I n response to Kallan’ s arguments reg arding the lang uag e o f Rule 776(b), authorizing the rec eiver to take whateve r other steps are

nece ssary to protec t the interest of the disabled lawy er, his clients, or other aff ecte d parties, the Administrator argued that the rule did not envision the repr esentation of th e d i s ab l ed lawy er’ s clients to conclusion of their le g al matters in the list of the duties of the r ece iver. ¶ 34 On Fe bruar

y 8, 2011, the circ uit court issued a written order denying the Administrator’s motion for rec onsideration. The court reje cted the Admi n i s t ra t o r’s position that Rule 776 “envisioned the Rece iver to be an individual who would simply fac ilitate in the closi ng of the office of the lawy er and not a ctually conduct trials that would lead to the dispositi on of the clients’ under ly ing claims or disputes.” The court found, rathe r, that Kallan’ s eff orts in disposing of t he case s of Grna cek’ s clients amounted to extraordinary eff orts, as contemplated by Rule 776, that Kallan “we nt far beyond” what was requ i re d of him as a

rec eiver in taking on Grna cek’ s clients and resolving their leg al matters to c onclusion. The
court co n cl u d ed, “That is the t y pe of extraordinary eff

ort that this Court believes the Rule envisioned.” ¶ 35 On Fe bruar

y 28, 2011, the circ uit court allowed the Administrator’s motion for a stay of enfor ceme nt of the judgme nt. On Marc h 10, 2011, the Administrator filed a notice of appea l fr o m t h e order of November 29, 2010, and the order of Fe bruar y 2, 2011, denying t h e Administrator’s motion for re consideration. ¶ 36 On Marc h 21, 2011, the supreme court denied the Adm i n i s t ra t o r’ s m o t i o n fo r a supervisory order to direc t J udg e Kinney to vacate the awa rd of compensation to Kallan for his attorney fee s in repre senting Grna cek’ s clients to the completion of t heir lega l matters. The supreme co u rt d en ied the motion for a supervisory order without prejudice to file an appea l in this court fr om the circ uit court order s. This appea l followed.

-8-¶ 37 ANALYSI S

¶ 38 This case prese nts an issue of first impression of the construction of Supreme Court Rule 776. The construction of a statute is a question of law revie wed de novo

. People v. W illiams
, 239 I ll. 2d 119, 127 (2010); In re Marriage of Anderson
, 405 I ll. App. 3d 1129, 1134 (2010). The rules of statuto ry co n s t ru ction apply equally to the construction of the supreme court rules, and the lower court’s construction of the supreme court rules is re v i ew ed de novo

. People v . Garsteck

i , 382 I ll. App. 3d 802, 810 (2008), aff’d , 234 I ll. 2d 430, 437 (2009). ¶ 39 The ARDC is the body cre ated by the supreme court for the supervision, reg istration, a nd
prosec ution of di sciplinary proce eding s aff ecting members of the I llinois bar. I ll. S. Ct. R. 751(a) (ef f. J an. 1, 2010). J erome L arkin, as Administrator, is the principal executive office r of the ARDC, having been appointed to that position by the Commi ssioners with the
approva l of the supreme court. I ll. S. Ct. R. 751(e) (l) (ef f. J an. 1, 2010). One of the functions of the ARDC is to “ collect and administer the disciplinary fund provided f

or in Rule 756.” I ll. S. Ct. R. 751(e) (6) (eff

. J an. 1, 2010). S upreme Court Rule 756, in turn, provides for a schedule of reg istration fee s to be paid by I llinois lawy ers and collecte d by the Administrator. Thus, the Disciplinary

Fund c onsists of monies paid by the l icense d attorney s in this state. I ll. S. C t. R. 756 (eff. Sept. 1, 2011)

. ¶ 40 The supreme court, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 776, relies on members of the local bar and the circ uit courts to identify lawyers who ar e unable to proper ly discharg e their responsibilities to clients due to disability
, disappea ranc e, or death, and who have no partne r, associate
, executor, o r o t h er responsible party who is capa ble of conducting the lawy ers’ affai rs

. I l l

. S. Ct. R. 776(a) (ef f. Mar. 25, 1991). The supreme court further relies on the presiding judge of the circ uit court i n wh ich such a lawy er maintained a law prac tice to appoint another lawy er from the same judicial circ uit to ser v e as a rec eiver

. Id. Where no attorney from the judicial circ uit is available to serve as a rec eiver
, the Admin i s t ra tor is appointed to perf

orm the duties of the rec eiver

. I ll. S. Ct. R. 776(b)( 2) (ef f. Mar. 25, 1991). ¶ 41 Subsection (b) of Rule 776 sets forth the duties of a rec eiver with rega rd t o t h e law
prac tice of a

disabled, dec ease d or missing law y er a s follows:
“As expeditious ly as possible, the rec eiver shall take custody of and make an inventory of the lawy er’ s files, notify the lawy er’ s clients in all pending ca s es as to the lawy er’ s disability
, or inability to conti nue leg al repr esentation, and rec ommend prompt substitut ion of attorney s, take a ppropriate steps to sequester client funds of the lawy er, and to take whateve r other action is indicated to protec t the interests of the attorney , his clients, and other a ffe cted pa rties.” I ll. S. C t. R. 776(b) (ef f. Mar . 25, 1991). ¶ 42 Thus, the duties of the rec eiver under Rule 776(b) ar e co n s i s t en t wi t h t h e gen era l principles g overning rec eiver ships. Our supreme court has h el d that the object of a

rec eiver ship is “to secur e and prese rve the proper ty or thing in controve rsy for the benef it of all conce rned *** so that it might be subjected to such order or decr ee as t h e co urt might make or rende r.” Firebaugh v

. Mc Gove rn , 404 I ll. 143, 149 (1949). The person appointed

as the rec eiver serve s as an office r o f the court, secur ing and prese rving the proper ty in question on behalf of t he court for the benef it of all concerne d until such t ime as t he court
enter s an order for the dispositi on of the proper ty

. People ex rel. Scott v. Pintozzi
, 50 I ll. 2d

-9-115, 123 (1971); see also Jones v. Hodges
, 2 I ll. App. 2d 509, 517-18 (1954) (re ceive r was

an office r of the court and held money and proper ty subject to the order and direc tion of the court). The re ceive r must inform the cour t of his intentions wit h reg ard to the receive rship and obtain the court’s permission to take any action aff ecting the proper

ty in his car e. I n City of Chicago v. Hart Building Corp.
, 116 I ll. App. 2d 39, 51 (1969), the court found that an at t o rn ey who held proper ty as a rec eiver and secr etly acquir ed owner ship of the same proper ty brea ched the trust place d in him by the court that appointed him as the rec eiver

. As such, a rec eiver has “no discretion or persona l control over the proper ty in his hands.” First N ational Bank of Vandalia v. Trail Ridge Farm, Inc.
, 143 I ll. App. 3d 244, 2 5 1 (1 9 8 6 ) (re ceive r not liable to investors for following court d i rectives conce rning the assets in his possession). ¶ 43 Simi larly
, the duties of the rec eiver under Rule 776(b) are int en d ed t o ensure that the rig hts of t he dis abled law y er’ s clients are not prejudice d by virtue of the l awyer’ s inability
to continue repr esenting them by
, for example, notify ing the clients of the disability of their lawy er, advising the clients to promptly seek substi tution of ot her counsel, and prese rv i ng their funds he ld by

the disabled law y er. I ll. S. C t. R. 776(b) (ef f. Mar . 25, 1991). ¶ 44 Subsection (c ) o f R u l e 7 76 authorizes the rec eiver to appea r in court on behalf of the cli ents of the lawy er for whom the rec eiver ship was established under cer tain ex i gen t circ umstances. Rece ivers may “apply to the court for a stay of any appl i ca b l e statute of limit ation, or limit ation on time for appea l, or to vacate or obtain relief from any judgme nt, for a period not to exceed 60 day s.” I ll. S. Ct. R. 776(c) (ef f. Mar. 25, 1991). The provision of Rule 776(c) is consistent with the rec eiver ’s duties under subsection (b) of Rule 776 to take nece ssary steps to pr otect the intere sts of the disabled lawy er and his c lients until new counsel c an be r etained to a ssist t he clients in their pe nding le g al matters. ¶ 45 Subsection (d) of Rule 776 is entitled, “L iabi l i t y o f R ec ei v er

. ” S u b s ection (d)(1) expressly provides that the rec eiver sh al l “not be reg arde d as having an attorney -client relationship wit h t h e clients of the disabled, absent or dece ased lawy er.” I ll. S. Ct. R. 776(d)( 1) (e ff. Mar. 25, 1991). S ubsections (d)(2) and (d)( 3) protect the receive r from any liability to the clients or to the lawy er for whom the rec eiver ship was established for exercising au t h o rized duties as the rec eiver

. I ll. S. Ct. Rs. 776(d)( 2), (d)( 3) (ef f. Mar. 25, 1991). ¶ 46 Subsection (e) of Rule 776 provides the authorization for compensation of a rec eiver . As the g ener al rule, rec eiver s “shall normally serve without compensation. ” I l l

. S. Ct. R. 7 7 6 (e )(1) (ef

f. Mar. 25, 1991). Howeve r, Rule 776(e) (2) allows a rec eiver t o s ee k
compensation for service s relat ed t o t h e rec eiver ship under the following limit ed circ umstances: “[U]pon showing by the rec eiver that the natu r e of the rec eiver ship was extraordinary and that failure to awa

rd compensation would work substantial hardship on the rec eiver
, the
court may awa

rd rea sonable compen s at ion to the rec eiver to be paid out of the Disciplinary Fund, or any other fund that may be desig nated by the supreme court. I n such event, compensation shall b e awa rded only to the extent that the eff orts of the

rec eiver have exceede d those normally require d in an amount t o b e deter mined by the

-10-court.” I ll. S. C t. R. 776(e)(2) (ef f. Mar . 25, 1991). ¶ 47 Thus, under Rule 776(e) (2), if the rec eiver establishes that the nature of the re ceive rship

was extraordinary
, the rec eiver must further demons t ra t e t hat the failure to awa rd
compensation would work a substantia l h ar d s h i p on the receive r. After t he rece iver meets those two criter ia, the circ uit court may awa rd compensation, but only to the extent that the eff orts of the re ceive r excee ded those norma lly require d of a r ece iver. ¶ 48 We believe the nature of a rec eiver ship may be considere d “extraordinar y ” wher e, for example, the receive rship involves a law of fice in disarra

y that require s hundreds of hours of labor to org anize documents and files, or wher e the rec eiver is require d to file numerous motions t o vaca

te dismissals for want of prosecution or t o stay the statute of limitations in

a high- volume persona l injury prac tice. The nature o f t h e rec eiver ship might also be considere d “extraordinar

y ” wh e r e th e r e c e iv e r d is c o v e r s client files containing wills prepa red
y ear s ear lier and the rec eiver is require d to spend consider able time to locate the clients or to file the wills in the probate c ourt to protect the inter ests of unfound c lients. ¶ 49 R ep re s en t at i on of the disabled lawy er’ s clients in pendin g l ega l m at t er s i s n o t contemplated as a duty to be performe d by a rece iver under S upreme Court Rule 776

. S ee I ll. S. Ct. R. 776(c ) (e ff

. Mar. 25, 1991) (authorizing a rec eiver to appea r in court to seek immediate relief to protec t the rig hts of the clients of the lawy er for whom the rec eiver ship

was established); I ll. S. Ct. R. 776(d)( l) (ef f. Mar. 25, 1991) (“A rec eiver appointed pursuant to this rule shall *** not be reg arde d as having an attorney -client relationship with the clients of the disabled, absent or dece ased lawy er ***.”); I ll. S. Ct. R. 776(e) (l) (ef f. Mar. 25, 1991) (“The rec eiver shall normally serve without c ompensation.”). Represe ntation of the clients

o f t h e disabled or dece ased lawy er in the clients’ underly ing leg al matters bey ond th at descr ibed in Rule 776(c) is not a duty of a r ece iver, ordina

ry , extraordinary , or otherw ise. ¶ 50 The g oal of construction of a rule or statute is to asce rtain and g ive eff ect to the intent of
t h e draf ters. In re Estate of Rennick
, 181 I ll. 2d 395, 404-05 (1998). As the s upreme cour t held in Rennick

, “The most reliable indicator of intent is the lang uag e used, which should be
g iven i ts plain and ordina ry meaning .” Id. at 405. I n addition, it is a well-settled maxi m of
statu t o ry co n s t ruction that eac h provision of a statute or rule should be construed in

connec tion with ever

y other section so that no part is rende red meaning less or superf luous. Solon v. Midwest Medic al Rec ords Ass’n
, 236 I ll. 2d 433, 440-41 (2010); W eather-Tite, Inc. v. University of St. Francis , 233 I ll. 2d 385, 389-90 (2009). The circ uit court’s application of Rule 776(e) (2) as authorizing the awa rd of attorney fee s to a rec eiver who enter ed into an attorney -client relationship with the clients of the disabled lawy er for whom the rec eiver ship

was established disreg arde d the lang uag e of Rule 776(d)( l) and Rule 7 7 6(e) (l), rende ring those provisions meaning less. Where the supreme court expressly provided that the rec eiver shall not be reg arde d as having an attorney -client rela tionship with those clients and that the

rec eiver shall normally serve without compensation, Rule 776(e) (2) should not be construed
to authori z e compensa

tion to a rec eiver for attorney fee s in repr esenting the clients of the disabled lawy er for whom the rec eiver ship was established–not with reg ard to the

rec eiver ship–but in t heir unde rlying le g al matters. ¶ 51 There is no doubt that the rule authorizes compensation only for work done as a re ceive r.

-11-Given the langua ge o f t he rule, which st ates that no attorney -client relationship is cre ated,

work done in further ance of an attorney -client relationship is outside the g ambit of the rule. Kallan conce des that he was not acting as a rec eiver when he perf ormed leg al service for Grna cek’ s former

clients. ¶ 52 Kallan did not enter into a fee ag ree ment with any of Grna cek’ s clients befor e providing leg al service s to them, neither did he seek compensation for his attorney fee s from Grna cek, who had alre ady been paid for the repr esentation of those clients. Nothing in Supreme Court Rule 776 obligated Kallan, as the rec eiver
, to repr esent Grna cek’ s cl i en t s. The evidenc e prese nted to the circ uit court demonstrated that Kallan acte d bey ond the scope of his duties

as rec eiver
, not out of a belief that it was require d of him as rec eiver
, bu t , rather, out of friendship and loy alty to Grna cek. No doubt Kallan’ s decision to take up Grna cek’ s y oke is admirable

. We also ag ree that Kallan’ s service s to these cli ents undoubtedly avoided additional litigation. ¶ 53 The circ uit court ac k n o wl edg ed, in the order denying the Administrator’s motion for

rec onsideration, that Kallan went bey ond the responsibilities of a rec eiver enumer ated under Supreme Court Rule 776(b) in taking on the repr esentation of Grna cek’ s clients. The circ uit
court found that Kallan’ s eff orts wer e the ty

pe of “e x traordina

ry eff ort” envisioned by Supreme Court Rule 776(e )(2)

. ¶ 54 We believ e t h at Ka l l an was motivated by a desire to help his friend and to protec t the leg al profe ssion. Howeve r, the fac t t h at Ka l l an acte d with the best of intentions does not chang e the fac t that R u l e 776 does not authorize the trial court to order the ARDC to pay what amounts to the leg al fe es of Gr nace k’s forme r clients.

¶ 55 CONCL USI ON ¶ 56 For the fore g oing rea sons, the judgme nt of the circ uit c ourt of Wil l County is r ever sed.

¶ 57 Reverse d.

-12-