Forewor d

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls deals with amphibious warfare as waged

by American forces against the Japanese-held atolls of the Central Pacific

during World War II. The word amphibious, as here used, includes the landing

and supply of troopsin combat as well as the air and naval support of the

operations.

The atoll operations described in this volume were amphibious from beginning to end. They were not simple seaborne hit-and-run raids of the Dieppe

type. The objective was to secure the atolls as steppingstones to the next

advance. The islands were relatively small, permitting continual naval and air

support of the ground operations.

Some outstanding examples of the co-ordination of fire support by artillery,

naval gunfire, and air are found in this book. The advantages of simple plans

and the disadvantages of the more complicated will stand out for the careful

reader.

The story of the capture of these atolls of Micronesia offers some of the best

examples of combined operations that are available in the annals of modern

war. Ground, sea, and air components were always present, and the effectiveness with which they were combined and co-ordinated accounts in large measure for the rapid success enjoyed in these instances by American arms. Units of

the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps were active participants in the

operations and the role they played is treated in this volume as fully as is considered appropriate in a series devoted to the history of the U.S. Army in

World War II.

From the point of view of strategy, the significance of this volume lies in the

fact that it tells the story of the beginnings of the drive across the Central Pacific

toward the Japanese homeland. This concept of defeating Japan by pushing

directly westward from Hawaii through the island bases of the mid-Pacific was

traditional in American strategic thinking, but had never been put to test and

was seriously challenged in some quarters. As is shown here, the test was first

made in the campaigns against the Gilberts and Marshalls, the outcome was

successful, and the experience gained was of inestimable value in planning for

the subsequent conduct of the war in the Pacific.

Washington, D. C.

9 January 1953

ORLANDO WARD

Maj. Gen., U. S. A.

Chief of Military History

vii
The Authors

Philip A. Crowl, who has an M. A. from the State University of Iowa and a

Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University, taught History at the Johns Hopkins

University and at Princeton. Commissioned in the Navy in World War II, he

became a lieutenant (senior grade) and commanding officer of an LCI gunboat

that was in action at Leyte Gulf, Lingayen Gulf, and Okinawa. He is author of

Maryland During and After the Revolution (1943) and co-author of The U. S. Marines

and Amphibious War (1951). He was awarded the James V. Forrestal Fellowship

for 1953-54 to prepare a study of command relationships in amphibious warfare in World War II.

Before World War II Edmund G. Love, with an M.A. from the University

of Michigan, taught History in a Michigan high school. A captain of Infantry

in World War II, he became historical officer of the 27th Infantry Division and

observed the operations of that division on Makin, Eniwetok, Saipan, and

Okinawa.

From 1946 to 1 August 1949 Mr. Love was a member of the Pacific Section

of the Army's historical staff in Washington. Dr. Crowl has been a member of

that staff since 1949.

viii
Preface

This volume tells the story of the launching of the Central Pacific drive

against Japan in late 1943 and early 1944. Specifically, it deals with the amphibious operations against five Central Pacific atolls—Makin, Tarawa,

Kwajalein, Majuro, and Eniwetok. It was in these battles that American

amphibious doctrine received its first critical test in the Pacific war, and the victories achieved made possible a continuation of the highly important drive

against Japan's perimeter of island defenses in the Carolines, Marianas, Volcano Islands, and Ryukyus.

Numerically speaking, the Army's contribution to the forces responsible for

the capture of these atolls was not as great as that of the Marine Corps. Yet the

Army's role was a major one and is here set forth in minute detail. If the activities of other participating U.S. services receive less attention in these pages, it

is only because this volume is by definition a part of the history of the U.S.

Army in World War II.

For a variety of reasons this book has been a long time in preparation. A

draft was prepared by Mr. Edmund G. Love, then set aside, to be taken up

later by the undersigned for extensive revision, correction, and elaboration. The

authors' debts for aid and assistance are too numerous to acknowledge in detail.

Dr. Louis Morton and Dr. John Miller, jr., during their respective tenures as

Chief of the Pacific Section, Office of the Chief of Military History, read every

page with care and discrimination and offered invaluable guidance. In addition, Dr. Miller prepared a separate study of the strategic background of the

operations which was used as the basis for the first and part of the second chapter. Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian, Department of the Army,

gave liberally of his time and advice. To Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, formerly

Chief of Military History, Col. George G. O'Connor, Chief of War Histories

Division, and the military members of their staff a great debt is owed for their

sympathetic interest, technical assistance, and supervision of the publication of

the volume.

Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff and Mr. Charles von Luettichau not only prepared the maps but offered many important suggestions regarding tactical details. Mr. Thomas Wilds did a distinguished job of piecing together the complicated and often obscure story of Japanese defensive preparations and battle

operations. Miss Margaret Plumb checked all the footnotes of the original draft

for accuracy. Miss Mary Ann Bacon edited the manuscript and prepared the

index with imagination as well as meticulous care, and Mr. Alien R. Clark was

ix
copy editor. Maj. Arthur T. Lawry and Miss Margaret Tackley are responsible

for the selection of photographs. Mr. Israel Wice and his staff, Miss Lois Aldrich

of the Departmental Records Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, U.S.

Army, and Mrs. Vivian McCoy and Mr. Paul Rugen of the Records and Research Section, Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, are

to be thanked for their aid in the gathering of the documents and other source

materials that made up the framework of the volume. Mrs. Martha Willoughby

and Mrs. Marguerite Bartz typed the manuscript.

To the historical sections of the other U.S. services special thanks are due for

unfailing co-operation. Lt. Col. Frank Hough, USMC, Lt. Col. Harry Edwards,

USMC, and the staff of the Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U.S.

Marine Corps were especially generous in their assistance. The large number

of officers of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force who read and

criticized various portions of the manuscript, corresponded with the authors, or

permitted themselves to be interviewed, is acknowledged in the bibliographical

note appended to the volume.

Washington, D. C. PHILIP A. CROWL

28 January 1954

x
Contents

Chapter Page

I. THE DECISION TO STRIKE THROUGH THE CENTRAL

PACIFIC ....................... . 3

Prewar Plans ...................... . 3

Pacific Organization and Early Strategy ............ . 4

T h e Casablanca Conference ................ . 7

MacArthur's Strategic Plans ................ . 10

The Washington Conference and the Strategic Plan for the Defeat of

Japan ....................... . 1 2

II. SELECTION OF TARGETS AND TACTICAL PLANNING . 18

Selection of the Targets .................. . 18

Planning for Galvanic ................... 25

Intelligence on the Gilberts .................. 27

Organization and Command of the American Forces ....... . 34

III. PREPARING FOR THE ATTACK ............ . 44

Training ....................... . 4 4

Logistics ....................... . 4 7

Preliminary Air and Naval Action .............. . 52

Movement Overseas ................... . 5 6

I V. THE ENEMY ...................... . 6 0

Japanese Invasion of the Gilberts .............. . 60

Carlson's Raid and Its Aftermath .............. . 61

American Attacks and Japanese Responses ........... . 67

Japanese Defenses on the Eve of the Attack .......... . 70

V. THE LANDINGS ON MAKIN .............. . 75

R e d Beaches ...................... . 7 5

Establishing the Beachhead ................. 79

Yellow Beach ...................... . 8 2

VI. REDUCTION OF THE WEST TANK BARRIER .... . 89

Advance of the 2d Battalion to the Barrier ........... . 89

Advance of the 1st Battalion ............. ... 94

Holding Action on the East ................. 97

First Day: The Summing Up ............... . 100

VII. CONSOLIDATING THE BEACHHEAD .......... . 102

Build-up of the Assault ................... 102

First Night on Butaritari ................. . 106

Final Mop-up at the West Tank Barrier and Yellow Beach .... . 108

xi
Chapter Page

VIII. MAKIN TAKEN. .................... . 11 2

The Main Action of the Second Day ............. . 112

T h e Second Night .................... . 11 7

The Third Day: Capture of the East Tank Barrier ....... . 118

The Advance Beyond the East Tank Barrier .......... . 119

T h e Last Night ..................... . 12 2

Mop-up ........................ . 12 4

Profit an d Loss ..................... . 12 5

IX. THE CAPTURE OF TARAWA ............. . 127

Preliminaries to the Invasion ................. 127

The Landings on Red Beach ............... 1 . 132

Operations at Red Beach 2 . ................ . 135

The Landings at Red Beach 3 ............... . 138

Reinforcing the Beachhead ................. . 139

Supply, Communications, and Command ............ . 144

Consolidating the Beachhead: D Plus 1 ............ . 147

Tarawa Is Secured ..................... 150

Conclusion of the Operation ................ . 155

X. STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE

GILBERTS OPERATION ............... . 15 7

Strategic Consequences .................. . 15 7

Tactical Lessons Learned ................. . 15 8

Conclusion ....................... . 16 5

XI. TACTICAL PLANNING FOR THE MARSHALLS ..... . 166

Early Planning ..................... . 16 7

Spruance's Plan ..................... . 17 0

Admiral Turner's Attack Plan ............... . 172

The Landing Force Plans ................. . 175

XII. TRAINING, LOGISTICS, AND PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS ....................... . 18 3

Training the Army Ground Troops. ............. . 183

Training the 4th Marine Division .............. . 186

Logistics ....................... . 18 7

Preliminary Army Air Operations .............. . 193

Preliminary Naval Action ................. . 199

Approach of the Invasion Force ............... . 202

XIII. JAPANESE DEFENSES IN THE MARSHALLS ...... . 206

Before Pearl Harbor ................... . 206

From Pearl Harbor to the Eve of Invasion of the Marshalls .... . 209

The Defenses of Kwajalein Atoll, January 1944 ........ . 212

XIV. THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN ..... . 219

The Landings on D Day ................. . 219

The Landings on Kwajalein Island ............. . 230

xii
Chapter Page

XV. REDUCTION OF THE MAIN DEFENSES OF KWAJALEIN

ISLAND ...................... . 24 1

The Push Inland: First Day ................ . 241

The First Night on Kwajalein Island.............. 249

Second Day's Action ................... . 25 3

Situation at the End of the Second Day ............ . 259

XVI. KWAJALEIN ISLAND: THE THIRD DAY ........ . 262

The Plan for 3 February ................. . 264

The Attack of the 32d Infantry ............... . 264

The Morning Action in the 184th Infantry's Zone ........ . 266

The Revised Plan of Attack ................ . 273

Situation on the Night of 3 February ............. . 277

XVII. END OF THE BATTLE FOR SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN . . 283

Kwajalein Island Secured ................. . 28 3

Completing the Conquest of Southern Kwajalein ......... . 290

Chauncey Island .................... . 29 0

Burton Island ..................... . 29 1

Final Mop-up ..................... . 29 8

XVIII. THE CAPTURE OF MAJURO AND ROI-NAMUR .... . 302

Majuro ........................ . 30 2

D Day: Northern Kwajalein ............... . 304

Initial Landings on Roi and Namur ............. . 311

The Capture of Roi ................... . 316

The Capture of Namur .................. . 322

XIX. THE SEIZURE OF ENIWETOK ATOLL ......... . 333

Plans and Preparations .................. . 333

Preliminary Air Operations. ................ . 338

Japanese Defenses on Eniwetok Atoll.............. 339

The Seizure of Engebi Island ............... . 344

The Capture of Eniwetok Island. .............. . 348

Parry Island ...................... . 36 0

XX. CONSOLIDATING THE VICTORY ........... . 366

Mop-up in the Marshalls ................. . 366

Building the Marshalls Bases. ............... . 367

Neutralizing the Bypassed Atolls .............. . 368

XXI. TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE

MARSHALLS OPERATION ............. . 37 0

CONCORDANCE OF CODE AND NATIVE NAMES FOR ISLANDS IN

KWAJALEIN ATOLL .................... . 37 5

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ................... . 37 7

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................... . 382

GLOSSARY OF CODE NAMES ................. . 385

BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS ............... . 387

INDEX ............................. . 39 1

xiii
Tables

No, Page

1. Ammunition Expended by Japanese on Tarawa and Makin, 13-19 Novemb e r 1943 .......................... . 5 6

2. Japanese Strength in Southern Kwajalein Atoll on D Day ...... . 215

3. Combat Effectiveness of Japanese in Southern Kwajalein Atoll on D Day. . 217

4. Japanese Strength in Northern Kwajalein Atoll on D Day ...... . 218

Charts

1. Task Organization of Various Commands for the Attack on the Gilbert

Islands ........................... . 3 4

2. Task Organization of Major Commands for the Attack on Kwajalein

a n d Majuro Atolls ...................... . 17 1

3. Task Organization of Major Commands for the Attack on Eniwetok

Atoll ............................ . 33 7

Maps

1. The Pacific Areas, 1 August 1942 ................ . 6

2. Gilbert and Marshall Islands .................. . 19

3. Makin Atoll ......................... . 28

4. Tarawa Atoll ........................ . 32

5. First Night on Butaritari, 20-21 November 1943 ......... . 107

6. Second Day's Action, 21 November 1943 ............ . 114

7. Securing Makin, 22-23 November 1943 ............. . 120

8 . Kwajalein Atoll ....................... . 16 9

9. Southern Kwajalein ..................... . 176

10. Northeastern Kwajalein .................... . 181

11. Third Day on Kwajalein Island, Morning, 3 February 1944 ..... . 263

12. Third Day on Kwajalein Island, Afternoon, 3 February 1944 .... . 274

13. Last Day of Battle on Kwajalein Island, 4 February 1944 ..... . 284

14. Capture of Burton, 3-4 February 1944 ............. . 292

15. Majuro Atoll ........................ . 303

16 . Eniwetok Atoll ........................ . 33 5

17. Capture of Engebi, 17 February 1944 .............. . 346

18. Capture of Eniwetok Island, 19-21 February 1944 ........ . 350

19. Capture of Parry, 22 February 1944 ............... . 362

Maps I-VII Are in Accompanying Map Envelope

I. Butaritari Island (Western Portion)

II. Betio Island

III. D Day on Butaritari, 20 November 1943

xiv
No.

IV. Capture of Betio, 20-23 November 1943

V. Kwajalein Island

VI. Landings on First Two Days of Battle on Kwajalein Island, 1-2

February 1944

VII. Capture of Roi and Namur, 1-2 February 1944

Illustrations

Page

American Representatives at the Casablanca Conference ........ . 8

Butaritari from the Air ...................... . 29

Training Operations on Oahu, Hawaii ............... . 46

Supplies Palletized for Gilberts Operation .............. . 50

Nauru Island .......................... . 5 5

Southern Attack Force ...................... . 57

Briefing Troops on Scale Models of Butaritari ............ . 58

Japanese Coastal Defenses in Gilberts ................ . 66

Japanese Tank Defenses on Makin ................. . 72

Landings on Red Beach ...................... . 78

Dense Vegetation on Butaritari ................... . 80

Dummy Coast Defense Gun .................... . 81

Yellow Beach Landing Area .................... . 84

Yellow Beach Landing ...................... . 86

Hulks Off On Chong's Wharf ................... . 87

Defensive Positions on Makin ................... . 92

M3 Light Tank ......................... . 95

Unloading Supplies at King's Wharf ................ . 103

M3 Medium Tanks ........................ . 109

Beached Seaplane and Rifle Pits .................. . 115

Japanese Naval Guns Emplaced on Betio .............. . 128

Western End of Betio after Bombardment .............. . 131

Red Beach 1 .......................... . 133

Disabled LVT .......................... . 135

Landings at Red Beach 2 ..................... . 136

Red Beach 3 .......................... . 140

Damaged Medium Tank M4 .................... . 143

Damaged Japanese Type 95 Light Tank on Betio ........... . 144

Beach Defensive Positions ..................... . 149

Japanese Bombproof Shelters .................... . 152

Mille Under Air Attack ...................... . 195

Taroa After Being Bombed .................... . 196

Wotje Under Air Attack ...................... . 198

Action at Kwajalein ........................ 200

R o i Airfield ........................... . 20 4

Landing on Carlson Island .................... . 224

Demolished Communications Center and Strongpoint ......... . 226

xv
Page

105-mm. M2 Howitzers ...................... . 22 8

Effect of Bombardment of Kwajalein ................ . 231

Invasion of Kwajalein ........................ 234

Bulldozer Clears Route ...................... . 23 7

75-mm. Howitzer in Action .................... . 239

Flame Thrower ......................... . 24 5

Korean Laborers ......................... . 24 8

105-mm. Howitzer Crew in Action .................. 250

37-mm. Antitank Gu n Firing .................... . 25 4

Battalion Aid Station ........................ 260

Tank-Infantry Attack ....................... . 26 8

A .30-Caliber Machine Gu n .................... . 27 2

Pontoon Piers at Green Beach 4 .................. . 279

Burton (Ebeye) Island ...................... . 29 3

Japanese Entrenchments on Burton ................. . 294

Japanese Bombproof Shelter .................... . 29 6

Buildings and Shelters ....................... 299

Namur ............................. . 31 0

Landing Craft Head for Beach at Namur .............. . 315

Medium Tanks ......................... . 31 7

Neutralizing a Concrete Blockhouse ................. . 320

Namur Island Beachhead ..................... . 32 3

A Japanese Torpedo Warhead Magazine .............. . 326

Marines Take Cover ....................... . 32 8

Marines Attack Blockhouse .................... . 33 0

Attack on Engebi ......................... 347

Invasion of Eniwetok ........................ 352

Machine Gun Squad Firing .................... . 354

Marines Prepare To Attack ..................... 357

Parry Island Under Preliminary Bombardment ............ . 361

Photographs are from the Department of Defense files.

xvi
The U.S. Army Center of Military History

The Center of Military History prepares and publishes histories as required by the U.S. Army. It coordinates Army historical matters, including

historical properties, and supervises the Army museum system. It also

maintains liaison with public and private agencies and individuals to stimulate interest and study in the field of military history. The Center is located

at 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005-3402.

xvii

SEIZURE OF THE

GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

CHAPTER I

The Decision To Strike

Through the Central Pacific

In November 1943 American forces

successfully invaded the Gilbert Islands,

which the Japanese had wrested from

British control shortly after the attack on

Pearl Harbor almost two years earlier.

Thus the United States initiated the great

westward drive across the Central Pacific

that would eventually bring Allied forces

to the very doorstep of the Japanese homeland. This drive would constitute the

northern or upper part of a two-pronged

movement against the heart of Japanese

military and economic power in the Pacific. The lower prong would be represented by General Douglas MacArthur's

steady progress up the Solomon Islands,

up the northern coast of New Guinea, and

into the Philippine Islands. But it was to

the Central Pacific route, westward from

Hawaii through the myriad islands and

atolls of Micronesia, that the American

strategic planners had assigned the "main

effort" in the war against Japan. Along

this path U.S. naval, ground, and air

forces under command of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz were to begin a series of

amphibious assaults of size and scope unparalleled in the history of oceanic warfare.

Prewar Plans

There was nothing new in the idea that

the United States would have to seize

strategic island bases in the Central Pacific in the event of a war against Japan.

Throughout the 1920's and 1930's strategic planners in Washington had prepared

a series of plans, designated the ORANGE

plans, to provide for that contingency.

All of these chose the Central Pacific as

the main avenue of approach for a decisive move against the prospective enemy.

The first ORANGE plan, approved by the

Joint Army and Navy Board in 1924, conceived of an offensive war against Japan

that would be essentially naval in character. By cutting the Japanese Empire's sea

routes, and by air and naval operations,

Japan, it was believed, could be isolated.

The plan further provided that troops

from the continental United States would

be assigned to seize and hold islands in the

Central Pacific, including the Marshall

group, and that large bodies of troops

would be dispatched to reinforce the Philippines.

Between 1925 and 1938 this original

ORANGE plan was revised many times. In
4 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

the final revision it was decided that the

Philippines could be defended by their

peacetime garrison plus whatever other

local forces were available, without reinforcements from the United States. But

none of the changes affected one basic

aspect of the plan—U.S. naval forces

would move westward through the islands

of the Central Pacific to establish naval

dominance in the western waters of that

ocean.

The ORANGE plans had been prepared

on the assumption that only the United

States and Japan would be at war. By

1941 this assumption was no longer valid.

The emergence of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo

Axis, the American decision to support

Great Britain in her struggle against Germany and Italy, and the growing realization that the United States was likely to

become involved in war against the Axis

caused American and British officials to

prepare tentative plans for combined action. The last American plan made before

7 December 1941 was prepared on the assumption that the United States and

Britain would be allied and at war with a

combination of enemy powers and was

designated RAINBOW 5. Although never

formally approved by President Franklin

D. Roosevelt, it was the plan put into

effect at the outbreak of war between the

United States and the Axis Powers. In the

belief that Germany was the major enemy

and would have to be defeated first, RAINBOW 5 declared the Atlantic-European

theater to be the main area of operations.

In the Pacific and the Far East the Allies

would assume a role primarily defensive,

although limited naval offensive measures

were to be undertaken at the earliest

possible moment.

Specifically, the U.S. Army was to help

defend the Hawaiian and the Philippine

Islands, and to help hold the entrance to

Manila Bay. The U.S. Navy's role in the

Pacific was naturally more extensive. The

Navy was to conduct raids, defend such

American bases as Wake, Guam, Midway,

and Samoa, "prepare to capture" the

Japanese Mandated Islands and establish

a fleet base at Truk, maintain the line of

communications between the United

States and the Philippines, and establish

naval superiority in the western Pacific.1

Thus, with the assignment to the U.S.

Navy of the task of seizing the Japanese

Mandated Islands, including Truk, the

role of the Central Pacific in the forthcoming war was reaffirmed.

Pacific Organisation and Early Strategy

The success of Japan's offensive moves

in late 1941 and the first months of 1942

did not completely invalidate all Pacific

provisions of RAINBOW 5, but it did postpone any attempt to carry out the offensive provisions in the early part of 1942.2

By May 1942 the Japanese had seriously

weakened the U.S. Pacific Fleet, had

seized the Philippines, Wake, Guam, and

the Gilberts, had captured Malaya,

Burma, and the Netherlands Indies, and

had installed themselves in the Bismarck

Archipelago-New Guinea-Solomons area.

They held an enormous perimeter of bases

that included the Kurils, the Marianas,

Wake, the Marshalls, Rabaul in New

Britain, the Netherlands Indies, and

Malaya, with outposts in the Gilberts, the

1

 Information on ORANGE and RAINBOW plans is

derived from Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1953), Ch. IV. 2

 Morton, Fall of Philippines, p. 79. An exception

must be made for U.S. submarine warfare. As Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, USN (Ret), points

out, ". . . the first major naval offensive—that of

the Pacific Fleet submarines — began the day war

broke out." (Ltr, Adm Turner to Maj Gen Orlando

Ward, 12 Feb 52, Incl 1, p. 3, OCMH.)
THE DECISION TO STRIKE THROUGH THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 5

Solomons, and New Guinea. They apparently expected the United States to

grow war-weary launching attacks against

these strong positions, and to give up the

fight and agree to a negotiated peace.3

But by mid-1942 the Japanese had overreached themselves. Confident after their

first successes, they decided to capture

positions in the Aleutians, the Fijis, Samoa,

New Caledonia, and Midway, enlarge

their holdings in New Guinea, and then to

expand the main perimeter to include the

newly won bases as well as the Gilberts.

Seizure of Port Moresby in New Guinea

and of the Fijis, Samoa, and New Caledonia would have cut the line of communications between the United States

and Australia. Thus isolated, Australia

could not be used as a base for Allied

counteroffensives.

Frustrated in their attempt to take Port

Moresby by the Allied Coral Sea victory

in early May 1942, the Japanese turned to

Midway and the Aleutians and met with

disaster. Although they did obtain footholds in the Aleutians, their effort against

Midway was a costly failure. In the Battle

of Midway, 3-4 June 1942, the U.S.

Pacific Fleet destroyed four large aircraft

carriers plus hundreds of planes and many

of their best-trained pilots. Thus crippled,

the Japanese Combined Fleet was no longer

capable of offensive action. The time had

come for the Allies to seize the initiative.

The groundwork had already been laid

since the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),

who had been assigned responsibility for

the strategic direction of the war in the

Pacific, had already organized the Pacific

theater and undertaken measures to initiate at least limited offensives.

The Joint Chiefs on 30 March 1942,

with the approval of President Roosevelt

and the Allied governments concerned,

had organized the Pacific theater into two

great commands—the Southwest Pacific

Area and the Pacific Ocean Areas. (Map 1)

The Southwest Pacific Area, under General MacArthur, consisted principally of

Australia, New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Netherlands Indies, the

Philippines, and adjacent waters.

The Pacific Ocean Areas4 included

nearly all the rest of the Pacific Ocean. It

encompassed virtually everything south

of the Bering Strait, west of continental

United States, north of the South Pole,

and east of the Southwest Pacific Area and

China. The Pacific Ocean Areas was divided into three commands: the North

Pacific, which stretched north of latitude

42° north; the South Pacific, which lay

south of the equator and east of the Southwest Pacific; and the Central Pacific, lying

between the equator and latitude 42°

north. Major islands and groups in the

Central Pacific were the Hawaiian Islands,

Wake, part of the Gilberts, the Marshalls,

the Carolines, the Marianas, the Bonins,

the Ryukyus, Formosa, and the Japanese

home islands.5

Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean

3

 For a detailed discussion of Japanese strategy,

strength, and dispositions see below, Ch. IV. 4

 The directive establishing the command used

"Area." Memo, JCS for President, 30 Mar 42, incl

Directive to CINCPOA and Directive to Supreme

Commander, SWPA, ABC 323.31 POA (1-29-42),

1-B. Usage has authorized the plural, however. 5

 By the 30 March directive a third command, the

Southeastern Pacific Area, was set up but never became a theater of operations and so lapsed into insignificance. Directly under Admiral Ernest J. King

rather than Admiral Nimitz, its western limit ran

from Antarctica northward along the meridian of

100° west to latitude 11° north and thence east to

the coast of Central America.

On 2 July 1942 the boundary between the South

and Southwest Pacific Areas was moved from 160°

to 159° east longitude in order to place Guadalcanal

and adjacent islands in the South Pacific Area. (Joint

Directive for Offensive Opns in SWPA Agreed on

by U.S. Chiefs of Staff, 2 Jul 42, OPD 381, Sec. II,

Case 83).
6 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

MAP 1

Areas, with headquarters at Pearl Harbor,

was Admiral Nimitz, who concurrently

served as Commander in Chief, U.S.

Pacific Fleet. By the terms of his orders

from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Nimitz commanded virtually all Allied forces in his

areas. He directly commanded the Central

and North Pacific Areas, but according to

his instructions he appointed a subordinate as Commander, South Pacific Area.

After October 1942 this post was held by

Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr.

Missions assigned Nimitz and MacArthur were practically the same. They

were to hold bases essential to the security

of the U.S.-Australia line of communications, support operations that would contain the Japanese, support the defense of

North America, protect necessary sea and

air communications, and prepare for major

amphibious offensives.

The first offensive moves of the Allies in

the Pacific were undertaken in accordance

with the basic Allied strategy for the conduct of the war—Germany would be defeated first and, pending the defeat of the
THE DECISION TO STRIKE THROUGH THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 7

German forces, the Allies would defend in

the Pacific. But it had long been agreed

that the Commonwealth of Australia and

the Dominion of New Zealand, valuable

as integral economic and political units of

the British Commonwealth of Nations and

as bases for future operations, would not

be allowed to fall to the enemy. It was

therefore necessary that the Allies hold the

British Pacific possessions and retain control of the vital lines of communications to

them. In early 1942 a substantial number

offerees were sent from the United States

to Australia and the bases along the line of

communications. Defense of that line was

also a primary mission of the U.S. Pacific

Fleet.

Thus, when that fleet thrashed the

Japanese at Midway, the Joint Chiefs'

next move was clear. With the Japanese

infiltrating southward from Rabaul

through the Solomons and New Guinea

toward the line of communications and

Port Moresby, General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in

Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval

Operations, on 2 July 1942 ordered the

South and Southwest Pacific forces to advance through the Solomons and New

Guinea to seize Rabaul and remove the

enemy threats. Forces of the two areas

moved promptly to the attack, and in the

lengthy Guadalcanal and Papua Campaigns, which dragged on until early 1943,

succeeded in halting the enemy's southward advance.6

By February 1943 the armed forces of

the two areas were still far from capturing

Rabaul, but they had insured the safety of

the line of communications between the

United States and the British Pacific dominions. With the Japanese on the defensive, the supply lines fairly safe, and Allied

air and surface strength on the increase,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff could consider the

possibility of further offensive operations

in the Pacific, especially in the areas under

Nimitz' immediate command.

The Casablanca Conference

While the Guadalcanal and Papua

Campaigns were slowly drawing to a close,

American and British planners met once

more to decide, among other things, a

future course of operations for the Pacific

theater. The meeting was convened in

Casablanca, French Morocco, in January

of 1943. In attendance were President

Roosevelt with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of

Staff and Prime Minister Winston S.

Churchill accompanied by the British

Chiefs of Staff.7

At Casablanca, although the British

and Americans were agreed on such larger

issues as the necessity for beating Germany

first, there were some points of disagreement that had to be settled before the

Allied program for 1943 could be determined. The British were generally reluc6

 See John Miller, jr., Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1949); Samuel Milner, Victory

in Papua, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1955); Samuel Eliot Morison,

HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II, Vol. IV, Coral

Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions (Boston: Little,

Brown and Company, 1949), and Vol. V, The

Struggle for Guadalcanal (Boston: Little, Brown and

Company, 1949); Maj. John L. Zimmerman,

USMCR, The Guadalcanal Campaign (Washington,

1949); Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate,

eds., THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD

WAR II, Vol. IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan,

August 1942 to July 1944 (hereafter cited as AAF IV)

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950). 7

 The Joint Chiefs of Staff together with the British

Chiefs of Staff, or their representatives in Washington, constituted the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS).
8 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES AT CASABLANCA CONFERENCE. Back

row, standing, left to right: Mr. Harry L. Hopkins; Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Commanding

General, Army Air Forces; Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Services of Supply; Mr. W. Averell Haniman, Lend-Lease Coordinator in Great Britain. Front row, seated, left

to right: General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; President Franklin D. Roosevelt; Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations.

tant to go immediately as far in the Pacific

as the Americans desired.8

The position taken by the American

representatives was that, having seized the

the initiative from Japan the previous

August at Guadalcanal, it would be unwise to relinquish it and allow the Japanese

to dig in too strongly or to mount a

counteroffensive. Throughout the conference they continually stressed the importance of keeping constant pressure on

Japan. The British, on the other hand,

expressed their opposition to greater efforts

in the Pacific at that time. They reminded

their American colleagues of the extreme

importance of beating Germany first, and

in that connection of giving substantial aid

to the Soviet Union. The Japanese, they

suggested, should be contained by limited

offensives until Germany fell.9

The most articulate spokesman for the

American position was Admiral King,

who introduced the question of a Central

8

 For a more complete discussion see John Miller,

jr., "The Casablanca Conference and Pacific Strategy," Military Affairs, XIII (1949), 209-15. 9

 CCS 135, 26 Dec 42, title: Basic Strategic Concept for 1943; CCS 135/1, 2 Jan 43, title: Basic

Strategic Concept for 1943—The European Theater.
THE DECISION TO STRIKE THROUGH THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 9

Pacific offensive to the Combined Chiefs

in the afternoon of 14 January. He began

his discussion with an analysis of the

strategic situation in the Pacific, where, he

declared, the Allies were engaging the

enemy on four fronts: the Alaska-Aleutians area, the Hawaii-Midway line, the

South and Southwest Pacific Areas, and

the China-Burma-India theater. After

pointing out that the object of the Guadalcanal and Papuan operations was to secure the approaches to northeast Australia, and that Rabaul was the key to the

situation there, he brought forward the

problem of where to go after Rabaul was

captured by the Allies.

The Philippine Islands, King advocated

should certainly be a major objective,

although he was not prepared at that time

to rule out completely the possibility of

driving through the Aleutians against the

Japanese home islands. As between the

East Indies and the Philippines, the latter

was preferable since an attack on the

Indies would be a frontal assault against

a strong position, whereas the Philippines

could be taken on the flank. Although

King did not make the point explicitly,

implicit in his analysis was the fact that

seizure of the Philippines would cut off

Japan from the vast riches of the Indies,

especially oil, since the Philippines squarely

blocked the sea routes between Japan and

the Indies.

With the Philippines as a major objective, King argued, the next problem was

the selection of a route of approach. He did

not definitely commit himself on that

point, though from his analysis it appears

that he favored the Central Pacific. For

years, he observed, the Naval War College

had been studying the question of how to

recapture the Philippines in the event they

were taken by the enemy. Three routes of

approach had been considered: an approach from the north to Luzon via the

Aleutians; a southern route that was outflanked by enemy bases; and a direct route

through the Central Pacific. The direct

thrust, King declared, would necessitate

"establishing a base in the northwestern

Marshalls and then proceeding to Truk

and the Marianas." Later in the meeting

he spoke strongly in favor of taking Truk

and the Marianas. Both Admiral King

and General Marshall re-emphasized the

importance of keeping the Japanese under

pressure by retaining the initiative, for, as

King warned, there was always the danger

that the Japanese might mass their remaining aircraft carriers for another great

strike at either Midway or Samoa.10

Three days later the American representatives at Casablanca submitted a more

detailed proposal for immediate operations in the Pacific. Again arguing that it

was essential that the Japanese be kept

under "continual pressure sufficient in

power and extent to absorb the disposable

Japanese military effort," they proposed

that the following steps be taken:

1. Seizure and consolidation of positions

in the Solomons and in eastern New

Guinea up to the Huon Peninsula, and of

the New Britain-New Ireland area;

10

 Min, 56th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43. Proceedings and

papers of the Casablanca Conference are filed in

sequence with the CCS and JCS minutes and papers.

They were also printed and bound, along with the

proceedings of the meetings between the President

and Prime Minister, in a volume entitled Casablanca

Conference: Papers and Minutes of Meetings (edited

and printed by the CCS, 1943) and filed in the office

of the G-3. See also Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and

Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper &

Brothers, 1948), Ch. XXVII, for an analysis of the

conference from Harry Hopkins' point of view. The

discussion of strategy at the Casablanca Conference

will be more fully treated in Maurice Matloff, The

Strategy of Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, a volume

now in preparation for this series.
10 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

2. Seizure of Kiska and Agattu in the

Aleutians;

3. Seizure of the Gilberts, Marshalls,

and Carolines (including Truk) after the

capture of Rabaul;

4. Occupation of New Guinea as far as

the Dutch border as an extension of the

Truk operation; and

5. Operations in Burma to keep China

in the war and to intensify attacks by

China-based planes against shipping.

Increases in Allied forces for the Pacific

and Burma in 1943 would partly depend

on what the Japanese did, but the reinforcements were planned: 250,000 air and

ground troops, 500 planes, the larger portion of new U.S. warships, 1,250,000 tons

of shipping, and reinforcements to the

British Eastern Fleet for Burma.11

Once more the British objected on the

ground that Pacific operations might divert enough Allied strength to jeopardize

the fight against Germany. Again both

King and Marshall rose to defend the

American position. To the British suggestion that the Allies confine their Pacific

operations in 1943 to Rabaul and Burma

alone, King replied that there were resources available to include the Marshalls

as well. The month of May might find

Rabaul in Allied hands, he argued, and

since the Burma campaign would not begin until November, combat forces would

remain idle in the interim unless they

could be re-employed in the Marshalls.

General Marshall was able to allay the

British worries that Pacific offensives would

cut into operations against Germany by

proposing that the Gilberts-MarshallsCarolines invasions be undertaken "with

the resources available in the theater." The

British finally assented, and there were no

more disagreements at Casablanca over

Pacific strategy.12

Thus, for their Pacific program for 1943,

the Allies decided to "make the Aleutians

as secure as may be," to advance northwest from Samoa to protect the line of

communications to Australia, and to

mount diversionary operations against the

Malay Barrier. They decided to advance

directly west "as practicable" through the

Central Pacific toward the line TrukGuam, particularly against the Marshall

Islands, in conjunction with operations

against Rabaul, whose capture in 1943

was practically taken for granted. The advance through the Central Pacific would

not be allowed to prejudice the recapture

of Burma, nor would there by any northward advance from Rabaul toward Truk

and Guam unless sufficient forces were

available to complete the task and follow

up.13

As far as Pacific strategy was concerned,

the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had accomplished much at Casablanca. They had

expounded in some detail the significance

of Pacific operations to their British colleagues, and had secured approval of at

least a start on the drive across the Central

Pacific in 1943. The possibility of beginning the advance was of course closely

connected with MacArthur's and Halsey's

operations against Rabaul.

MacArthur's Strategic Plans

At his headquarters in Brisbane, General MacArthur had been preparing for

the recapture of Rabaul for some time, and

11

 CCS 153 (Revised), 17 Jan 43, title: Situation to

be Created in the Eastern Theater (Pacific and

Burma) in 1943. 12

 Min, 60th mtg CCS, 18 Jan 43. 13

 Proceedings of the last meeting, Casablanca

Conf, pp. 154-69; CCS 155/1, 19 Jan 43, title: Conduct of the War in 1943; CCS 168, 22 Jan 43, title:

Conduct of the War in the Pacific Theater in 1943;

CCS 170/2, 23 Jan 43, title: Final Report to the President and Prime Minister Summarizing Decisions by

the CCS.
THE DECISION TO STRIKE THROUGH THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 11

by February 1943 had completed a detailed, comprehensive plan known as

ELKTON.14 In addition, he and his staff

were considering ways and means to accomplish the ultimate defeat of Japan.

Looking far into the future, they concluded

that the recapture of Rabaul would gain

"important, but not decisive advantages"

that would help future operations but

would not adversely affect Japan's war

economy. In order to strike a great blow at

the enemy's capacity to wage war, MacArthur and his planners reasoned, Japan

should be cut off from the Netherlands

Indies with its great quantities of oil, tin,

and rubber. If the Allies seized the Philippines and developed air and naval bases

there, Japan could be denied access to the

Indies. Thus far MacArthur's conclusions

agreed with those expressed by the U.S.

Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca. But there

was one major difference—the route of

approach.

Whereas the Joint Chiefs had clearly

intimated that the Philippines were to be

approached through the Central Pacific,

MacArthur concluded that a drive through

the Marshalls and Carolines would have

to be made without land-based air support,

would be slow, would cost heavily in naval

power and shipping, and would "require a

re-orientation of front." Since according to

his reasoning the Central Pacific route was

unwise, MacArthur desired that after he

and Halsey had captured Rabaul, Southwest Pacific forces should advance west

along the north coast of New Guinea and

thence into Mindanao in the southern

Philippines. Neutralization of the Palaus

and seizure or neutralization of various

islands in the Banda and Arafura Seas

would protect the flanks of the advance.15

This long-range plan prepared by General

MacArthur's headquarters was designated

RENO.

In March 1943 representatives of the

Central, South, and Southwest Pacific

Areas convened in Washington to meet

with the Joint Chiefs and Joint Staff Planners in a series of sessions known as the

Pacific Military Conference. This conference paid only slight attention to the Central Pacific; its primary purpose was to

decide what should be the next immediate

steps in the South and Southwest Pacific

theaters. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not

at this time apprised of MacArthur's RENO

plan, but they were given the full details of

ELKTON. ELKTON contemplated a drive against

Rabaul along two axes—through New

Guinea and New Britain on the west and

through the Solomons to New Ireland on

the east—to culminate in a converging

assault on Rabaul. But to execute ELKTON

would have required 22 2/3 divisions and

45 groups of aircraft. The South and

Southwest Pacific Areas together had a

total of only 15 2/3 trained divisions and

less than half enough aircraft. Some reinforcements could be provided, but the

everlasting scarcity of troop transports and

cargo ships prevented reinforcement on

anything like the scale required by ELKTON. As a result, the Joint Chiefs decided

not to try to take Rabaul in 1943. Cutting

the objectives for 1943 in half, they ordered

MacArthur and Halsey to take Woodlark

Island and Kiriwina (Trobriand Islands)

in the Solomon Sea, to seize the LaeSalamaua-Finschhafen-Madang area of

14

 GHQ SWPA, ELKTON Plan for the Seizure

and Occupation of the New Britain-New IrelandNew Guinea Area, 12 and 28 Feb 43 versions. A copy

of the 12 February ELKTON is in OCMH files; a copy

of the 28 February version is in G-3 files. For a more

detailed treatment, see John Miller, jr., CARTWHEEL:

The Reduction of Rabaul, a forthcoming volume in

this series; for MacArthur's earlier plans see Milner,

Victory in Papua. 15

 GHQ, SWPA, Estimate of Situation and Rough

Draft, RENO Plan, 25 Feb 43, OCMH.
12 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

New Guinea, to capture western New

Britain, and to drive through the Solomons

to southern Bougainville.16

Thus, the Pacific Military Conference of

March settled for the time being the immediate future in MacArthur's and Halsey's

theaters of operation. By curtailing the list

of objectives to be captured in 1943, the

conference also indirectly gave impetus to

the Central Pacific drive since any addition to the total shipping, manpower, and

equipment that might be made available

to the Pacific in the future would not have

to be sent to bolster the capture of Rabaul.

Instead, it could be assigned to Nimitz'

Central Pacific theater. It remained for the

Combined Chiefs of Staff to come to a final

decision at their next meeting in respect to

forthcoming operations in the Central Pacific and to determine which of the two

theaters, MacArthur's or Nimitz', should

be allocated priority in the drive against

Japan.

The Washington Conference and the Strategic

Plan for the Defeat of Japan

In May 1943 President Roosevelt and

the Joint Chiefs of Staff met once more

with Prime Minister Churchill and the

British Chiefs of Staff, this time in Washington. The purpose of the Washington

conference, which is generally known by

its code name TRIDENT, was to re-examine

Allied strategy for 1943 in the light of

changes in the situation since the meeting

at Casablanca. Little had developed in the

Pacific since early February, and the conference concerned itself primarily with the

European bomber offensive, the crossChannel attack, possible operations after

the seizure of Sicily, and the Burma-ChinaIndia theater.17

 But the conference was

called upon to consider a tentative plan for

the war in the Pacific drawn up after Casablanca by the highest American strategists.

This plan, prepared by the U.S. Joint

Chiefs of Staff and their subordinate committees

 18

 and submitted to the Washington conference on 20 May 1943, was entitled "The Strategic Plan for the Defeat

of Japan."

 19

 "Strategic Plan" was actually

a misnomer. It was not a plan according to

strict military definition, for it gave no estimates of enemy strength and dispositions,

did not mention the types and numbers of

Allied forces that would be required to

accomplish the missions it described, said

nothing about command or commanders,

and did not establish time schedules.

Nevertheless, although more of a set of

ideas than a plan, the "Strategic Plan" became the cornerstone of Pacific strategy

for the remainder of 1943 and for 1944.

Furthermore, it diverged widely from

MacArthur's strategic concepts as expressed in RENO.

The plan as it stood in May 1943 involved operations by China, Great Britain,

and the United States. It also apparently

encompassed action by the Pacific domin16

 GHQ SWPA, ELKTON Plan for the Seizure and

Occupation of the New Britain-New Ireland-New

Guinea Area, 28 Feb 43; Notes on Pacific Conf Held

in March 1943, DRB AGO; JCS 238/5/D, 28 Mar

43, Directive: Plan for Opns for Seizure of the Solomon Islands-New Guinea-New Britain-New Ireland

Area. In the end, Rabaul was never assaulted, but

was neutralized by air action. For a fuller discussion

of these and related points see Miller, CARTWHEEL. 17

 Records of the conference are in the volume,

TRIDENT Conference, May 1943, Papers and Minutes

of Meetings (edited and printed by CCS, 1943), copy

in G-3 files. 18

 The subordinate committees included the Joint

War Plans Committee (JWPC), the Joint Strategic

Survey Committee (JSSC), and the Joint Staff Planners (JPS). 19

 JSSC 40/2, 3 Apr 43; JPS 67/4, 28 Apr 43; JCS

287, 7 May 43; JCS 287/1, 8 May 43; CCS 220, 14

May 43. All bear the title "Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan" or something very similar.
THE DECISION TO STRIKE THROUGH THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 13

ions of the British Commonwealth of Nations, although these were not mentioned

by name.

The ultimate objective of all operations

was naturally the unconditional surrender

of Japan. It was then thought that securing unconditional surrender might require

an Allied invasion of the Japanese home

islands, although the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

and their subordinates agreed that control

of the sea, especially of the western Pacific,

might bring about unconditional surrender without invasion, and even without an

air offensive. If invasion proved necessary,

it could not be successful unless the Japanese will to resist had been seriously weakened. Undermining the enemy's powers of

resistance and his desire to keep fighting

by a large, sustained air offensive against

the home islands was regarded as the best

method. The possibility of employing air

bases in the Kuril Islands, Formosa, and

Siberia to mount the offensive was discussed, but it was agreed that China

offered the best sites.20 China would thus

have to be maintained, and United States

and British forces would need to fight their

way to China in order to secure a good

port, preferably Hong Kong.

The two Allies would, according to the

plan, get to China by three general routes:

through Burma; through the Strait of

Malacca and the South China Sea to

Hong Kong from the west; and from the

east across the Pacific and through the

Celebes Sea to Hong Kong. The British,

assisted by the Americans and Chinese,

would recapture Burma, and would make

the drive through the Strait of Malacca to

Hong Kong by a series of amphibious

operations. The Chinese would help capture Hong Kong and with American aid

would seize and defend the necessary air

base sites. Meanwhile, United States forces

would be driving through the Celebes Sea

to Hong Kong. Then China, Great Britain,

the United States, and apparently the Pacific dominions would join forces in a

grand air bombardment of Japan. Nothing was said about the invasion of Japan

beyond the statement that it might be necessary. Although exact timing was not

discussed, it was then generally thought

that the final advances would not be undertaken before the fall of Germany, and

might last until 1948.

The next problem dealt with by the plan

was that of the selection of the route and

methods by which U.S. forces would approach Hong Kong from the east. Here

was one of the basic strategic decisions of

the Pacific war. United States forces, it

was decided, were to advance westward

from Pearl Harbor through the Central

Pacific, and through the South and Southwest Pacific Areas to open a line of communications to the Celebes Sea, recapture

the Philippine Islands, secure control of

the northern part of the South China Sea,

and join in the descent upon Hong Kong.

The main effort in the westward advance

would be made in the Central Pacific,21 a subsidiary effort through the South and Southwest Pacific. This choice of the Central

Pacific as the most advantageous route of

advance was dictated by several considerations. It was much shorter and less roundabout than the southern route and would

not require as many ships, troops, and supplies. It was far more healthful than the

pest-ridden jungles of the Solomons and

New Guinea. Through the Central Pacific,

the Allies could strike the enemy's most

20

 The Marianas were not mentioned as a possible

base for B-29's, whose capabilities had been briefly

discussed at Casablanca. 21

 Italics are the authors'.
14 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

vulnerable flank and isolate Japan from

her overseas empire. Furthermore, if Allied

fleets destroyed or contained the enemy

fleet, they could then strike directly from

the Pacific against the Japanese home

islands, without relying exclusively on

aerial bombardment from fields in China.

The Japanese could deploy only limited air

and ground forces in the islands and atolls

of the Central Pacific, whereas on the

southern route only the availability of

troops, planes, and ships would limit the

size of the Japanese forces. The Allies, on

the other hand, were under no such handicap because of their superiority in carrierbased air power. In the absence of landbased aircraft, carrier-based planes could

support amphibious operations against

island fortresses.

A successful drive through the Central

Pacific would outflank the Japanese in

New Guinea, whereas operations along the

northern New Guinea coast would neither

eject them from nor outflank them in the

Central Pacific, and the Japanese would

retain relative freedom of naval maneuver.

And, as Admiral King had pointed out at

Casablanca, an Allied drive exclusively

along the southern route would expose

flanks and rear to enemy attacks. Whereas

an attack through New Guinea into the

Philippines or the Indies would be a

head-on push against large islands containing positions closely arranged in depth,

one directed through the Central Pacific

would strike at vulnerable positions separated from one another by vast ocean

reaches, and thus not quite so well placed

to support one another. Seizure of the

Marshalls and Carolines would give the

Allies control of much of the Pacific and

place them in position to isolate Japan

from the Philippines-Indies salient, perhaps by the seizure of Formosa. Further,

the great American naval shipbuilding

program would be largely wasted if the

southern route were used, and certainly

the U.S. Pacific Fleet could best be used in

long-range offensives.

But if all these factors favored the Central Pacific as the area where the "main

effort" against Japan should be launched,

other considerations argued for continuing

the South-Southwest drive at least as a

secondary effort in support of the principal

offensive. In the first place, it was believed

that Australia would doubtless object to a

redirection of all offensive effort to the

Central Pacific. Besides, the oil fields of

the Vogelkop Peninsula of New Guinea,

then in Japanese hands, might be of some

use to the Allies. Furthermore, Allied

forces in the South and Southwest Pacific

Areas were already in close contact with

the Japanese, and shifting them all to the

Central Pacific would waste time and

shipping. Finally, and most important,

was the fact that twin drives along the central and southern axes would provide

more opportunities for mutual support,

and by preventing the Japanese from

being able to guess the time and place of

forthcoming advances would keep them

strategically off balance. For these reasons,

then, American strategic planners decided

to make the twin drives, with the main effort through the Central Pacific.

On 20 May the "Strategic Plan for the

Defeat of Japan" was submitted to the

Combined Chiefs of Staff. It was accepted

as a "basis for combined study and elaboration of future plans."22

 Next day Admiral King spoke to the Combined Chiefs

at some length to explain the American

proposals. He reverted to many of the

statements he and Marshall had made at

22

 Min, 90th mtg CCS, 20 May 43.
THE DECISION TO STRIKE THROUGH THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 15

Casablanca regarding routes across the

Pacific, the importance of the various

Allied lines of communications, and the

necessity for maintaining constant pressure

on the Japanese communication lines and

recapturing the Philippines. In pursuit of

these goals, Rabaul, Truk, and the Marianas were important intermediate objectives. The Marianas, which King stated

were an important base on the Japanese

lines of communications, he regarded as a

key to success.23

Two days later the Combined Chiefs of

Staff approved a lengthy paper containing

the U.S. Joint Chiefs' proposals for Allied

objectives in the Pacific and Far East in

1943 and 1944. This paper, based on the

"Strategic Plan," repeated previous arguments and provided estimates of forces required and forces actually available for

particular operations.

Offensives in 1943 and 1944 should aim

at the following:

1. Conduct of air operations in and from

China;

2. Conduct of operations in Burma designed to increase the movement of supplies to China;

3. Ejection of the Japanese from the

Aleutians;

4. Seizure of the Marshalls and Carolines;

5. Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck

Archipelago, and enemy-held New Guinea; and

6. Intensification of operations against

the Japanese lines of communications.

It was estimated that capture of the Bismarck Archipelago, which would secure

the line of communications to Australia

and help provide access to the Celebes Sea,

would require perhaps seven divisions of

which five would be amphibious units. If

Rabaul were effectively neutralized by air

bombardment, perhaps only five—three

amphibious—would be needed. Assuming

that Allied forces could capture western

New Britain and southern Bougainville by

December 1943, the Joint Chiefs concluded that the Bismarck Archipelago operations would not be completed before

April 1944.

Seizure of the Marshalls, it was agreed,

was essential to an extension of the line of

communications to the Celebes Sea, and

would also shorten and secure the routes

to Australia. From the Marshalls, landbased aircraft could help support naval

surface operations against the enemy's

communication lines, and there was always the possibility that an Allied push

into the Marshalls would force the Japanese fleet to come out fighting. The Marshalls operation would require two reinforced amphibious divisions, four heavy

bombardment and two fighter groups of

land-based planes, and aircraft from four

standard and four auxiliary aircraft carriers, in addition to four battleships, three

more auxiliary carriers, twelve cruisers,

sixty-three destroyers, twenty-four attack

transports, forty-four tank landing ships

(LST's), plus landing craft. Garrison

forces would include one reinforced division, 10 defense battalions, 545 planes, and

18 motor torpedo boats. The entire operation, from the initial invasion to the time

the assault troops were withdrawn and

readied for the invasion of the Carolines,

would last six and three-fourths months.

Capture of the Carolines would be a

much larger affair. Possession of this enormous string of atolls would help give the

Allies control of the Central Pacific, provide them with a major fleet base at Truk,

23

 Min, 92d mtg CCS, 21 May 43.
16 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

and put them in position to push on to the

southwest or to threaten the Japanese

archipelago directly. Truk and Ponape, as

well as various other atolls, would have

to be captured; air raids against Guam

and Saipan in the Marianas would be necessary. It was agreed that the Carolines

should be approached through the Marshalls even if Rabaul were in Allied hands.

No specific time limit was set, but the

Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that the

proposed Carolines campaign would be

lengthy. And it would require, they estimated, 3 reinforced amphibious divisions,

2 heavy bomber groups, 10 carriers of the

Enterprise and Essex classes, 7 auxiliary carriers, 4 modern battleships, 9 old battleships, 31 cruisers, 108 destroyers, 20 submarines, 45 attack transports, 15 attack

cargo ships, 6 LSD's (landing ships, dock),

3 headquarters ships (AGC's), and miscellaneous auxiliaries. To garrison the islands

would take two reinforced divisions and

three defense battalions, plus aircraft.

Controlling factors would include amphibious equipment and availability of

divisions with amphibious training. There

were then two Marine divisions (the 1st

and 2d, in the Southwest and South Pacific Areas, respectively) that were ready

to go, with the 3d Marine Division in the

South Pacific supposed to be ready for

combat by 15 July. The 4th Marine Division in California was expected to complete its training before the end of the year.

Since transferring divisions from the South

and Southwest Pacific to the Central Pacific would take many ships that were urgently needed elsewhere, it was agreed

that two more Marine divisions and two

more Army amphibious divisions were required in the Pacific.

As far as naval forces were concerned,

the picture was bright. The huge fleet

could be provided, the Combined Chiefs

asserted, and they concluded that the

forces listed would be sufficient to carry or

simultaneous operations in the Central

and South Pacific Areas in 1943 and

1944.24

The final resolutions of the conference,

as approved by President Roosevelt and

Prime Minister Churchill, established the

Allied objectives for the remainder of 1943

and part of 1944, and allotted certain

forces for reaching those objectives. All

decisions reached at Casablanca that did

not square with the Washington resolutions were canceled. The Americans and

British restated their determination to

force the unconditional surrender of the

Axis at the earliest possible date. They decided to "maintain and extend unremitting pressure" on Japan to reduce her

war-making power and to gain new bases

with the expectation that Britain, the

United States, and all Allied Pacific powers (including the Soviet Union if possible)

would direct all their resources to force the

surrender of Japan soon after Germany's

defeat.

The program for the Pacific and Far

East was ambitious and complicated.

Using as a basis the U.S. "Strategic Plan

for the Defeat of Japan," the Combined

Staff Planners were to prepare an "appreciation leading to a plan for the defeat of

Japan," including an estimate of the necessary forces. Recapture of Burma in 1943

was considered impossible, but preliminary operations were to be started, air

operations intensified, and the flow of supplies to China augmented.

In the Pacific, the objectives recommended by the Joint Chiefs—ejection of

24

 CCS 239/1, 23 May 43, title: Opns in the Pacific

and Far East in 1943-44.
THE DECISION TO STRIKE THROUGH THE CENTRAL PACIFIC 17

the Japanese from the Aleutians,25 seizure

of the Marshalls and Carolines, seizure of

the Solomons, Bismarck Archipelago, and

Japanese-held New Guinea, and intensification of operations against the Japanese

lines of communication—were all accepted.

Unlike Casablanca, the Washington

decisions included estimates offerees required, concluding on the cheering note

that the Allies had enough of everything,

granted that the rate of losses, especially

in shipping, did not markedly increase.26

By 1 January 1944, according to existing

plans, one Marine and three Army divisions would be in the Central Pacific; the

South Pacific would have two Marine, five

U.S. Army, and one New Zealand divisions; the Southwest Pacific, four U.S.

Army infantry, one U.S. Army airborne,

one Marine, and eleven Australian Army

divisions, of which three would be available for offensive operations. According to

the Joint Chiefs' estimates of 12 May two

more divisions were thus needed for the

Marshalls, two more for the Carolines, and

three additional for New Guinea.27

Thus the Washington conference of

May 1943, although not primarily concerned with Pacific strategy, made important decisions regarding the conduct of

the Pacific war. By approving in a general

way the "Strategic Plan for the Defeat of

Japan," it set the pattern of strategy for the

duration of the war against Japan. By

authorizing the drive through the Marshalls and Carolines and approving allocation of the required forces, it determined

the course of Admiral Nimitz' operations

for about a year.

With the selection of the classic Central

Pacific route, the Joint Chiefs now faced

the tasks of deciding on exact objectives

and of picking the precise units for the

forthcoming drive across the Pacific.

25

 In May 1943, while the Washington conference

was under way, naval forces from Nimitz' command

and the 7th Infantry Division from the Western Defense Command recaptured Attu. The Japanese

evacuated Kiska shortly before the landing of a joint

U.S.-Canadian force there in August. The Aleutians

were thus free of Japanese. 26

 CCS 242/6, 25 May 43, title: Draft of Agreed

Resolutions. See also CCS 232/1, 18 May 43, title:

Agreed Essentials on the Conduct of the War. 27

 CCS 244/1, 25 May 1943, title: Implementation

of Assumed Basic Undertakings and Specific Operations for the Conduct of the War in 1943-1944.
CHAPTER II

Selection of Targets and

Tactical Planning

Selection of the Targets

The Washington conference of May

1943 (TRIDENT) set forth the general outline of proposed operations in the Pacific

for the second half of 1943 and for 1944,

but much work, thought, and discussion

remained before detailed plans could be

devised to carry out these broad concepts.

Two main problems were still to be decided. The first of these was the choice of

exact targets within the Marshalls group.

The group consists of a double chain of

coral atolls lying between latitude 5° and

15° north and longitude 162° and 173°

east. There are altogether thirty-two

islands and atolls and some selection had

to be made between them.1 Also, the possibility early presented itself that the Marshalls might best be approached by way of

the Gilberts, a group of sixteen islands and

atolls formerly belonging to the British

and lying athwart the equator in the general area of longitude 173° east.2

 (Map 2)

More difficult of solution was the second

problem, which involved the balance and

co-ordination of the Allied offensive as between the Central Pacific theater and General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area.

Although the "Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan" had clearly indicated that

the "main effort" in the westward advance

would be through the Central Pacific,

there were still those among the various

planning staffs in Washington—in addition of course to General MacArthur himself—who doubted the wisdom of giving

the Central Pacific offensive priority over

MacArthur's proposed drive against Rabaul. These doubts had to be resolved or

the objections overruled before final plans

for a Marshalls operation could be developed. Any troops, aircraft, and shipping

that were to be made available to the Central Pacific drive would have to be diverted

from the pool either already under MacArthur's control or potentially assignable

to his theater. It was to these delicate and

difficult problems that planners in Washington addressed themselves in June and

July of 1943.

Work began immediately after the

Washington conference. On 27 May the

Joint Staff Planners directed the Joint War

Plans Committee to estimate the forces required for an invasion of the Marshalls

and to recommend target dates.3 The War

Plans Committee promptly delivered a

preliminary report suggesting that the in1

 R. W. Robson, The Pacific Islands Handbook, 1944

(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946), p. 146. 2

 Ibid., p. 161. 3

 Memo, JPS for JWPC, 27 May 43, sub: Examination into Pacific Theater, with JWPC 39/D in

ABC 384 Marshall Islands (10 Jun 43), 1.
SELECTION OF TARGETS AND TACTICAL PLANNING 19

MAP 2

vasion of the Marshalls be carried out in

three phases: (1) seizure of Kwajalein,

Wotje, and Maloelap Atolls in the center;

(2) occupation of Eniwetok and Kusaie as

outposts to the north and west; and (3)

mopping up to seize or neutralize the entire Wake-Gilberts-Marshalls system.

The operation, it was recommended,

should be launched toward the end of

October to coincide with planned Burma

operations. Since the initial attacks against

the Marshalls would be the first attempt

in U.S. military history to assault defended

atolls, it was believed that "battle-tested

shock troops with amphibious training"

totaling one corps of two divisions would

be needed for the first phase. The committee recognized that the best assault craft
20 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

for the invasions would be amphibian

tractors (landing vehicles, tracked) which,

when launched from tank landing ships

outside the range of shore batteries, could

deploy and proceed shoreward without

much danger of being stopped by the

fringing reefs so abundant in that part of

the world.

The only available battle-tested amphibious troops were the 1st Marine Division

in the Southwest Pacific and the 2d

Marine Division in the South Pacific, although it was thought possible to substitute the 7th Infantry Division for one of

the Marine divisions once the Aleutian

operations were concluded. Invasion of the

Marshalls in October would necessarily

deprive MacArthur and Halsey of their

only amphibious divisions with combat

experience and thus require that SouthSouthwest Pacific operations be halted by

early August. The Joint War Plans Committee therefore recommended that MacArthur and Halsey be ordered to conduct

a holding action along the line Russell

Islands-Woodlark-Kiriwina-Buna until

the Marshalls operation was concluded.4

The proposition that MacArthur and

Halsey merely conduct a holding action

until the conclusion of the Marshalls operation was met with little favor in the

Operations Division of the War Department General Staffer by General MacArthur. Members of the Operations Division argued that for both political and

military reasons MacArthur's campaign

against Rabaul (CARTWHEEL) should not

be impeded. Halting this campaign, it was

held, would cause difficult political repercussions "both in Australia-New Zealand, and in this country." On the military

side, any such cessation of the offensive

would decrease pressure on the Japanese,

warn them that they would be attacked

elsewhere, create a lull in an area where

Allied air operations were most effective,

and eliminate operations tending to relieve pressure on Burma. A defeat in the

Marshalls, continued the Operations Division's thesis, would leave the United States

for a time without forces to bring pressure

on Japan, and might expose the line of

communications to the Southwest Pacific.

If forces were transferred from MacArthur's area to Nimitz', any stalemate

that might develop in the Marshalls could

only result in an interval of complete inactivity. The commitment of all available

amphibious equipment would postpone

for a long time the renewal of amphibious

operations in the South-Southwest Pacific.

There were other logistical difficulties as

well. There probably would not be enough

cargo ships and transports. Besides, delivery of amphibian tractors (LVT's) in

quantity had just begun, and it was doubtful that enough would be ready by October. Success in these operations would be

dependent on this "new and untried type

of equipment," and the troops would need

to be trained in its use.5

Both the Joint Planners and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff agreed that MacArthur's

campaign against Rabaul should not be

interrupted but concluded that the Central Pacific drive could be launched concurrently anyway. The Joint War Plans

Committee was ordered to prepare a plan

for an offensive against the Marshalls to be

executed in November or December of

4

 JPS 205, 10 Jun 43, title: Opns Against Marshall

Islands. 5

 OPD brief, title: Notes on Preliminary Rpt by

JWPC, Opns Against Marshall Islands, atchd to JPS

205, ABC 384 Marshall Islands (10 Jun 43), 1.

OPD was wrong about the amphibian tractor,

which was neither new nor untried. It had given excellent service during the landings in the Solomons

in August 1942.
SELECTION OF TARGETS AND TACTICAL PLANNING 21

1943, but with the understanding that

MacArthur's campaign should proceed

according to schedule.6 The Joint Chiefs

directed Nimitz to prepare a tactical

plan for seizing the Marshalls and submit

it to Washington. They also radioed MacArthur explaining to him that more extensive operations in the Pacific were warranted by the increasing Allied naval

strength, and that they were contemplating invading the Marshalls about midNovember, employing the 1st and 2d

Marine Divisions plus all assault transports and cargo ships and the major portion of naval forces from Halsey's area.7

General MacArthur's response was immediate and unfavorable. On 20 June he

radioed the Chief of Staff that he was disturbed over the effect the proposed invasion of the Marshalls would have on future

operations in the South and Southwest

Pacific. Withdrawal of the two Marine divisions would prevent the ultimate assault

against Rabaul toward which his current

operations were leading. He refused to accept the proposition already agreed to by

the joint planners in Washington that the

main effort against Japan should be made

through the Central Pacific. On the contrary, he argued that "a diversionary attack [in the Marshalls] would of course

assist the main effort in this theater [Southwest Pacific]," but that troops should

come from the continental United States,

"rather than be subtracted from the main

attack to the extent that may result in its

collapse. ... I am entirely in ignorance

regarding the discussions and decisions of

the recent Washington conference and request that I be advised in this respect

insofar as it affects the broad concept of

operations in this theater. . . ." MacArthur went on to urge the principles of

the RENO plan, long cherished by his headquarters. "From a broad strategic viewpoint," the best method of defeating Japan

would be to move from Australia through

New Guinea to Mindanao with "utterly

essential" land-based air support all the

way. In this fashion could Japan best be

cut off from her conquered territory. An

attack through the Marshalls, he argued,

would involve a series of carrier-supported

amphibious attacks against objectives defended by naval units, ground troops, and

land-based aircraft. He made reference to

Midway as an example of what he considered such folly.8

 "Moreover," he maintained, "no vital strategic objective is

reached until the series of amphibious

frontal attacks succeed in reaching Mindanao."9

In the end, none of these arguments was

deemed compelling enough to dissuade

the Joint Chiefs of Staff from their intention to launch the Central Pacific drive in

1943. But the fear of diverting too large a

force from MacArthur's theater was primarily responsible for the eventual decision to initiate that drive against the

Gilberts rather than directly against the

Marshalls.

Even before the receipt of General MacArthur's radiogram, the Joint War Plans

Committee had proposed as a possible

alternative to a direct strike against the

Marshalls the preliminary capture of

islands in the Gilberts as well as Nauru,

some 390 miles to the westward. The committee's general concept embraced simul6

 Min, 80th mtg JPS, 13 Jun 43; JWPC 54/1/D,

14 Jun 43, title: Sequence of Certain Pacific Opns. 7

 Min, 92d mtg JCS, 15 Jun 43; Rad, COMINCH

to CINCPAC, CM-IN 9983, 16 Jun 43; Rad, JCS

to MacArthur, CM-OUT 6093, 15 Jun 43. 8

 MacArthur was referring here to the attempted

Japanese invasion of Midway, which was supported

exclusively by carrier aircraft. 9

 Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, CM-IN 13149, 20

Jun 43, and CM-IN 13605, 22 Jun 43.
22 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

taneous landings on Nauru, and on Makin

and Tarawa in the Gilberts, to be covered

by carrier attacks against other Japanese

bases in the Gilberts and Marshalls. These

islands, once secured, could then be employed as air bases from which to attack

the Marshalls and reconnoiter the Carolines. Invasion of the Gilberts and Nauru

would require, in addition to naval forces,

one Marine division and and one regimental combat team, several amphibian

tractor battalions and other reinforcing

units, five heavy bomber squadrons, and

one fighter group. The committee still considered this approach to be inferior to

a direct invasion of the Marshalls, but

recommended that it be undertaken if

enough forces could not be mustered for

the Marshalls.10

This proposal to attack the Gilberts

rather than the Marshalls found immediate favor with the Operations Division. It

would obviously require fewer forces and

thus be less likely to interfere with MacArthur's plans. Although recognizing that

heavy and medium bombers for the Gilberts could only be provided by taking

them from somewhere else, the division

nevertheless expressed itself to Col. Frank

N. Roberts, then acting as Army member

of the Joint Staff Planners, as favoring this

alternative plan.11

While various staff planners were thus

approaching what might be considered a

compromise between the Central and

Southwest Pacific concepts of strategy, the

idea of giving priority to the Central

Pacific once again received strong support

on 28 June when the Joint Strategic

Survey Committee presented its views of

Pacific strategy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This committee, consisting of Lt. Gen.

Stanley D. Embick of the Army, Vice

Adm. Russell Willson of the Navy, and

Maj. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild of the Army

Air Forces, pointed out that the Allies in

the South and Southwest Pacific, by driving northward against Rabaul, had been

attempting to reverse the polarity of the

Japanese campaign of early 1942. This

reversal held "small promise of reasonable

success in the near future." The committee

therefore recommended that a campaign

in Nimitz's area be given priority over

MacArthur's campaign against Rabaul.

Only in operations against the Marshall

and Caroline Islands, argued Embick,

Willson, and Fairchild, was there a chance

to use the fleet to best advantage. Central

Pacific advances would also support the defense of Australia and shorten the line of

communications to the Southwest Pacific.

The Strategic Survey Committee therefore

recommended that seizure of the Marshalls

and Carolines, which it regarded as the

best action that could be inaugurated in

1943, be the first step in the drive toward

the Celebes Sea.12

Next day this committee sat with the

Joint Chiefs and discussed the suggestions.

Admiral William D. Leahy, always a

strong supporter of MacArthur and his

strategic ideas, pointed out that granting

priority to the Central Pacific would be a

"complete reversal" of existing policy and

projected plans.13 On the other hand Admiral King, expressing dissatisfaction with

the slow "inch-by-inch" progress to date,

asserted that although Rabaul was important, Luzon was even more so, and that

10

 JPS 205/2, 18 Jun 43, title: Opns Against Marshall Islands. 11

 OPD brief, title: Summation of Memo on Opns

in CENPAC, with JPS 205/2 in ABC 384 Marshall

Islands (10 Jun 43), 1; OPD brief, Notes on 94th

Mtg JCS, 29 Jun 43, with JCS 386 in OPD 384 Pacific (28 Jun 43). 12

 JCS 386, 28 Jun 43, title: Strategy in the Pacific. 13

 Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, I Was There

(New York: Whittlesey House, 1950).
SELECTION OF TARGETS AND TACTICAL PLANNING 23

the latter could best be approached by

way of the Japanese Mandated Islands

and the Marianas. The Joint Chiefs then

turned over the committee's recommendations to the Joint Staff Planners for further

study.14 What emerged was in general a

vindication of the Central Pacific concept,

with the qualification that the first steps in

that direction be made by way of the

Gilberts.

On 19 July the Joint Staff Planners submitted to the Joint Chiefs a long analysis

summing up the relative importance of

Central and Southwest Pacific operations

as well as a draft of a directive to Admiral

Nimitz. The Staff Planners recommended

that continued pressure be applied against

Rabaul and then in detail spelled out the

reasons for the desirability of a concurrent

push through the Central Pacific. Such a

move, they argued, would have advantages: (1) it would force the Japanese to disperse their air strength; (2) it would allow

the United States to use its superior naval

forces in an area where enemy ground and

air forces were weak; and (3) it would enlarge the Allied front facing the Japanese

and at the same time take place near

enough to the Solomons to allow naval

forces to support operations in either or

both areas.

The first step in the Central Pacific

drive, they recommended, should be an invasion of the Gilberts and Nauru. Good

air photographs of the Marshalls would be

required before an invasion there, and the

islands to the south would provide convenient bases for air reconnaissance. Capture

of the Gilberts and Nauru, however, was

considered only a preliminary to the main

offensive against the Marshalls and Carolines—a drive already agreed on by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill,

and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The

Staff Planners therefore recommended

that the Gilberts and Nauru be invaded

by Admiral Nimitz' forces about 1 December 1943.15

Next day (20 July) the Joint Chiefs of

Staff met to discuss this analysis. Once

again Admiral Leahy expressed his sympathy with MacArthur's point of view by

insisting that the proposed Central Pacific

drive not be allowed to "interfere with . . .

operations being conducted by General

MacArthur. . . ."To this Admiral King

replied that the invasion of the Gilberts

would augment rather than curtail MacArthur's campaigns. General Marshall

added that the United States could ill

afford to let her great carrier forces in the

Pacific stand idle and agreed that a campaign in the Central Pacific would be

helpful to MacArthur's planned offensive

against Rabaul. General Henry H. Arnold,

the commanding general of the Army Air

Forces, agreed with the concept behind

the new offensive and stated that four

additional bomber squadrons could be

provided. The Joint Chiefs thereupon approved the Joint Planners' directive but,

on Admiral King's motion, set 15 November rather than 1 December as the date for

the invasion of the Gilberts.16

The Joint Chiefs sent Nimitz his orders

the same day. He was instructed to organize and train necessary forces, to "capture, occupy, defend, and develop bases in

the GILBERT GROUP and NAURU"

on 15 November, and to occupy other

islands and develop "airfields and facilities

thereon" as necessary to support the invasion of the principal objectives.

All surface forces of the Pacific Fleet

14

 Min, 94th mtg JCS, 29 Jun 43. 15

 JCS 386/1, 19 Jul 43, title: Strategy in the Pacific. 16

 Min, 97th mtg JCS, 20 Jul 43.
24 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

were available to Nimitz. The Joint Chiefs

estimated he would require five modern

battleships, seven old battleships, seventeen carriers (including four light and

seven escort carriers), and twelve cruisers,

plus thirty-seven troop transports and

cargo ships as well as other amphibious

craft assigned the Central Pacific. Air

units would include all Pacific Fleet naval

aircraft except those in the South and

Southwest Pacific, in addition to elements

of the Seventh Air Force and the additional bomber groups. Ground troops

would include the 2d Marine Division and

one Army division not yet designated,

three Army aviation engineer or construction battalions, one port battalion, and

three Marine defense battalions. Task

force commanders would be appointed by

Nimitz. The general concept, the Joint

Chiefs announced, involved mounting out

the task forces from Pearl Harbor and the

Fijis, or from both, and seizing the target

areas in simultaneous attacks. CARTWHEEL

would meanwhile be continued.

Purpose of the invasion of the Gilberts

and Nauru, the Joint Chiefs told Nimitz,

was "to improve the security of lines of

communication," "to inflict losses on the

enemy," and "to prepare to gain control of

the Marshalls." They therefore ordered

him to prepare plans for seizing the

Marshalls about 1 February 1944, under

the assumption that MacArthur would be

operating against positions in New Guinea,

the Admiralties, and New Ireland about

the same time.17

With the transmission of these orders to

Nimitz, there remained but one problem—

selection of the other division for the Gilberts. Admiral King for some time had

been advocating withdrawing the 1st

Marine Division from the Southwest Pacific, and General Marshall for some time

had been opposing its withdrawal.18 On

22 July King wrote Marshall to urge withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division and of

the 3d Marine Division from the South

Pacific to "avoid the inevitable consequences of 'mixed forces.' The Marines are

by tradition, experience, and training

eminently suited for amphibious operations," especially on the small islands of

the Central Pacific as contrasted with the

large land areas in the South and Southwest Pacific.19

 Marshall replied seven days

later. He pointed out that removal of the

two Marine divisions would cause profound dislocations in shipping as well as

seriously affect CARTWHEEL. In his view,

the 27th Division in Hawaii was the only

unit, Army or Marine, that could be made

available without creating great shipping

problems. It had not yet received its first

amphibious training but Marshall, stating

that amphibious training could start at

once and that by November the division

should be able to render good service,

offered the 27th Division.20

This offer must have satisfied King, for

on the last day of July Marshall was informed that King acceded to the employ17

 JCS 386/2, 20 Jul 43, title: Strategy in the Pacific; Rad JCS to CINCPAC, CM-IN 14465, 20 Jul

43.

18

 Memo, CNO for CofS, 14 Jun 43, sub: Withdrawal of 1st Marine Div, and Memo, CofS for CNO,

23 Jun 43, sub: Withdrawal of 1st Marine Div and

Change of Allocation of 2 Army Divs. Both in OPD

320.2 Australia 184. 19

 Ltr, CNO to CofS, 22 Jul 43, OPD 381 Security 196. 20

 Capt. Edmund G. Love, The 27th Infantry Division in World War II (Washington: Infantry Journal

Press, 1949), p. 21; Memo, CofS for CNO, 29 Jul 43,

sub: Release of 1st or 3d Marine Divs for Opns in

CENPAC, OPD 381 Security 196. General Marshall

does not seem to have been quite satisfied with the

status of the 27th Division. See his informal memo

for Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy in OPD 381 Security 196.
SELECTION OF TARGETS AND TACTICAL PLANNING 25

ment of the 27th Division in the GilbertsNauru operation.21

With the preparation of the directive of

20 July and the designation of ground

combat forces, then, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff had laid the strategic groundwork

for launching the Central Pacific drive

that would eventually bring American

and Allied forces almost to the doorstep of

Japan. Tactical planning for the operation

was left to the theater commanders involved. The code name established for the

operation was GALVANIC.

Planning for Galvanic

Planning and training responsibilities

for the forthcoming landings fell eventually to six separate headquarters. As in all

Pacific operations outside of General MacArthur's theater, Admiral Nimitz, as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific

Ocean Areas (CINCPAC-CINCPOA), exercised supreme command and held ultimate responsibility for the success of the

endeavor. Next in the chain of command

was Vice Adm. Raymond A. Spruance,

then designated Commander, Central

Pacific Forces, the highest operational

fleet command in the theater. Under him

was the Fifth Amphibious Force, an organization that was established on 24 August

1943 and commanded by Rear Adm.

Richmond Kelly Turner.

For purposes of training and controlling

the troop elements of future amphibious

landings in the Central Pacific, a separate

command was created on 4 September

1943. This was the V Amphibious Corps,

commanded by Maj. Gen. Holland M.

Smith, USMC.22 For this particular operation General Smith had at his disposal the

2d Marine Division, commanded by Maj.

Gen. Julian C. Smith, USMC, and the

27th Infantry Division, commanded by

Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith, USA, both of

whom prepared their own tactical plans

for assaulting their separate targets.

Responsibility for preliminary training

and logistical supply of the Army troops

committed to the operation fell to the

headquarters of the Commanding General, Central Pacific Area, Lt. Gen. Robert

C. Richardson, Jr., USA. This organization was activated on 14 August 1943 and

was charged among other things with the

duty of administering and training all

Army ground forces and Army air forces

in the Central Pacific, subject to the direction of Admiral Nimitz.23

In view of the fact that both the Fifth

Amphibious Force and V Amphibious

Corps were undergoing organization during the planning phase of the Gilberts

operation, much of the burden of devising

tactical plans for the troops fell originally

to the staffs of the two divisions involved,

the 27th Infantry Division and the 2d

Marine Division. Both were under some

handicaps. The 2d Marine Division was

stationed in New Zealand. Its commanding general, General Julian Smith, had

been alerted by Admiral Spruance early

in August to the fact that the capture of

Tarawa and Apamama (Abemama) Atolls

would be assigned to his forces, but not

until 15 September was the division formally attached to V Amphibious Corps

21

 Memo, Vice Adm Richard S. Edwards [CofS to

King] for Gen Marshall, 31 Jul 43, sub: Designation

27th Div to Gilbert Opn, OPD 381 Security 196. 22

 Cmdr Fifth Amph Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet,

Rpt of Amph Opns for the Capture of the Gilbert

Islands, 4 Dec 43 (hereafter cited as Fifth Amph

Force Rpt, Capture of Gilbert Islands), p. 1. 23

 History of United States Army Forces Middle

Pacific and Predecessor Commands During World

War II, 7 December 1941-2 September 1945 (hereafter cited as USAFMIDPAC Hist) p. 100, MS in

OCMH.
26 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

and not until 2 October did General Smith

and his staff personally report to General

Holland Smith, the corps commander, in

Pearl Harbor.24 Meanwhile, the division

staff prepared its own plans, which were

eventually approved with modifications

by the corps commander.

For the 27th Infantry Division, tactical

planning for its particular task was complicated by a midstream change of objectives.

The original directive from the Joint

Chiefs of Staff had assigned the entire division to the capture of Nauru. Acting on

this directive, the division's staff proceeded

to gather intelligence data about that

island from various sources and by early

October had devised a tentative plan of

attack employing two regiments in the

assault with the third regiment (less one

battalion) in floating reserve. Landing

beaches were laid out on the northwest

coast of the island.25

Meanwhile, higher headquarters were

beginning to doubt the feasibility of attacking Nauru at all. On 19 September V Amphibious Corps submitted a revised estimate of the situation that "envisaged

considerable difficulty in the capture of

Nauru" with the forces made available.

After further study in conjunction with the

various Navy echelons involved, it became

evident that the original concept of GALVANIC should be revised. Nauru offered too

many hitherto-unsuspected hazards for an

amphibious attack at this particular time.

It was about 390 miles west of the westernmost of the Gilberts and hence would

place an additional strain on available

shipping. Simultaneous landings in the

two places would furthermore necessitate

a wide dispersal of supporting fleet elements—a dangerous division of forces in

view of the presumed possibility of a Japanese naval counterattack. Finally, the precipitous terrain on Nauru would make an

amphibious assault and the land fighting

thereafter too costly to be warranted by

the strategic advantages to be gained.

Makin Atoll was considered no less suitable than Nauru as an air base for operations against the Marshalls and was

thought to be considerably less well defended. Furthermore, the fact that it was

only about 105 miles north of Tarawa

made it possible to concentrate the supporting fleet in one area and thus avoid the

danger of excessive dispersion.26

Hence, on 24 September Admiral Spruance recommended to Admiral Nimitz

that the projected invasion of Nauru be

dropped and that an amphibious landing

on Makin be substituted. After obtaining

the consent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Nimitz accepted this recommendation,

and early in October a revised plan was

issued to his command.27 Spruance was

ordered to seize Makin, Tarawa, and Apamama, to cover the amphibious landings

on each of these targets with air and naval

surface forces, and to deny to the enemy

use of land bases in the Marshalls and on

24

 Capt. James R. Stockman, USMC, The Battle for

Tarawa (Washington, 1947).

The present approved (Board of Geographic

Names) spelling is "Abemama." As of 1943-44, however, "Apamama" was in accepted usage and it was

this spelling that was uniformly employed in American military plans and reports. Therefore, the spelling "Apamama" will be used in this volume. 25

 Participation of the United States Army Forces

in the Central Pacific Area in GALVANIC Operation

(hereafter cited as USAFICPA Participation Rpt

GALVANIC), pp. 131-37; 27th Inf Div Rpt of G-2

Activities, GALVANIC Opn. 26

 Ltr, Cmdr Fifth Amph Force to COMCENPAC,

24 Sep 43, sub: GALVANIC Opn, Discussion of Substitution of Makin as Assault Objective Instead of

Nauru, Ser 0037, File 1975 Operation and Training

(GALVANIC), Folder I, VAC files, Naval Records

Management Center, Mechanicsburg, Penna. 27

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, 11 Jan 44, p. 2.
SELECTION OF TARGETS AND TACTICAL PLANNING 27

Nauru during the operation.28 D Day for

the landings was originally set as 19 November 1943. A month later this was postponed one day, to 20 November.29

Intelligence on the Gilberts

From the very outset of the planning

phase of the Gilberts operation, the chief

hurdle to be overcome was the initial absence of much reliable information about

the physical nature of the target islands

and of the disposition of the enemy defenses thereon. The most critical gap in

American intelligence, and one never satisfactorily filled, was the lack of any very

precise hydrographic data. Charts published by the Navy's Hydrographic Office

were so out of date and so inaccurate as to

be worse than useless. Also, published tide

tables were sketchy in the information they

contained. They listed only a few of the

Central Pacific islands and for these the

figures given for high and low tides were in

reference to points as distant as Valparaiso

in Chile and Apia in Samoa, thus rendering them highly unreliable.30

It is axiomatic that in amphibious operations reasonably accurate data on tides

and on hydrographic conditions offshore

of the proposed landing beaches are essential. On such information hinges the solution to such important problems as what is

the best time of day, month, and year to

launch the operation, what beaches are

most accessible, and what type of landing

craft can be employed to get troops ashore

in proper order with a minimum danger

of capsizing, grounding, broaching, or being swept off course by tidal currents.

In obtaining this essential information,

as well as intelligence of the probable number and disposition of enemy troops and

defense installations on the islands, intelligence officers of the appropriate staffs had

to rely on three main sources—aerial reconnaissance, submarine reconnaissance,

and reports from British citizens who had

lived or traveled in the Gilberts.

Photographic coverage of Tarawa was

made on 18-19 September and on 20

October, and of Makin on 23 July and 13

October. Excellent vertical and oblique

shots of Tarawa were obtained, both of

great value in studying beaches and locating weapons and installations. For Makin,

the vertical photographs were good, but

no large-scale obliques were turned in and

this hampered considerably the study of

hydrographic conditions as well as the interpretation of installations.31

Additional and highly detailed information was received from a reconnaissance

mission of the submarine USS Nautilus

conducted in late September and early

October. From this vessel's report much of

the missing data on hydrographic and

beach conditions on both of the main

islands could be filled in. Information as

to condition of surf, reefs, and beaches,

characteristics of lagoon entrances, current

data, tidal data, and so forth, was supplied. Periscopic photographs of the beach

lines showed many more details than had

appeared on the aerial photographs.32

28

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns Plan 13-43, 5 Oct

43.

29

 Fifth Amph Force Rpt, Capture of Gilbert Is- lands, Annex A, p. 5. Both of these target dates were

arbitrarily fixed as west longitude dates, although the

Gilberts lie in east longitude about seven degrees west

of the international date line. During this operation

then, the target islands were presumed to be in plustwelve time zone, although actually lying west of it.

In effect this meant that all local date-time groups

during the operation were computed as Greenwich

civil time minus twelve hours. 30

 Fifth Amph Force Rpt, Capture of Gilbert Islands, Incl C, p. 2. 31

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl C, p. 2. 32

 Fifth Amph Force Rpt, Capture of Gilbert Islands, Incl C, p. 2.
28 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

MAP 3

Finally, during September and October,

a total of sixteen former residents or travelers in the islands were attached to Admiral Turner's staff to supply additional

information from memory. These included

Australian, New Zealand, and Fiji naval

reserve officers, officials of the Western

Pacific High Commission, Australian

Army reserve officers and enlisted men,

and civilians. Part of this group was sent

to Wellington to assist the 2d Marine Division.33

 Others, more familiar with Makin,

worked directly with the staff on Oahu.

Among the latter were Lt. Comdr. Gerhard H. Heyen, R.A.N., and Pvt. Fred C.

Narruhn, 1st Fiji Infantry Regiment, a

native of Makin. Private Narruhn was assigned directly to the 27th Division's intelligence section and was particularly helpful in providing necessary information for

planning that operation. Another source

of information made available to the division shortly before it sailed was Lt. Col.

James Roosevelt, USMCR, who had been

a member of the 2d Marine Raider Battalion under Lt. Col. Evans F. Carlson,

33

 Stockman, Tarawa, p. 4.
SELECTION OF TARGETS AND TACTICAL PLANNING 29

BUTARITARI FROM THE AIR. Navy Wildcat fighters over the island on 20 November

1943.

USMC, which had staged a raid on Makin

on 16 August 1942.34

Final Intelligence Estimates: Makin

On the basis of these various sources of

information, V Amphibious Corps and the

two division headquarters committed to

the Gilberts were able to draw up reasonably complete and on the whole not too

inaccurate estimates of the geographical

nature and defensive strength of the target

islands.

Makin is an atoll located approximately

2,000 nautical miles southwest of Oahu. It

is north of Tarawa by about 105 miles,

southeast of Kwajalein in the Marshalls by

450 miles, and east of Truk by 1,265 miles.

The atoll is triangular in shape enclosing a

large lagoon. (Map 3) The southeastern leg

of the triangle holds the main land formation, consisting of two long islands, Butaritari and Kuma, which with their connecting reef are about thirteen miles long and

average five hundred yards in width with

the highest land point rising no more than

twelve feet above sea level. Butaritari was

rightly believed to contain the largest

number of natives, the entire population of

the atoll being estimated as about 1,700 at

34

 27th Inf Div Rpt of G-2 Activities, GALVANIC

Opn, p. 6; Ltr, Maj Gen Ralph Smith, USA (Ret),

to Chief. HD SSUSA, 31 Jan 49, Incl, p. 2, OCMH.
30 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

the time of the Japanese occupation in

December 1941.

Butaritari, according to the 27th Division's G-2 terrain study, was "shaped like

a crutch with the armrest facing generally

West and the leg of the crutch pointing

East and slightly North."35 For purposes

of tactical study the island was divided into

three parts. The extreme western area, that

is the armrest of the crutch, was thought to

be generally of good substantial footing

with scattered coconut trees and sand brush

on the northern part and thick coconut

groves interspersed with bobai (taro) pits in

the southern. East of this area was a stretch

of land designated the inland lagoon area.

Except near the shore this was believed

swampy, covered with saltbrush, and impassable in many parts for vehicles. Near

the geographical center of the island was

the main village of Butaritari situated on

fairly dry ground. The easternmost segment of the island was believed to contain

good land, with some bobai pits and gradually thickening coconut growth as the extreme eastern tip was approached. A road

had been observed running from Ukiangong Village, near the southwest point, in

a northerly direction about half way out

Flink Point, a promontory on the northwest side. The road connected with another that ran in a northeasterly direction

along the north shore of the island to its

eastern tip. A short cross-island road ran

through Butaritari Village from the northern (lagoon) to the southern (ocean) shore.

On the all-important question of suitable spots for landing, it was believed that

the best beaches were those on the lagoon

(north) shore and on the southern half of

the west coast of the island. On the west

coast the reef was thought to be very close

to the beach, therefore offering no particular hazard to ordinary landing craft. On

the lagoon side, the reef was estimated to

extend 500 to 1,500 yards out from the

shore, but was considered to be flat and

even enough to permit troop landings at

the reef's edge. Four prominent landmarks

presented themselves on the lagoon side.

These were, from west to east, On Chong's

Wharf, King's Wharf, Stone Pier, and

Government Wharf. All projected far

enough into the lagoon to be useful as

guide marks for landing craft.

No particular difficulties were contemplated by the division planners from tidal

or hydrographic conditions. It was believed that single boats could land at

almost any point on the island during high

water and two hours before and after high

water. This was an error as events were

soon to prove. Had the division planners

carefully consulted Admiral Turner's operation plan, they would have discovered

that during periods of neap tide (and 20

November fell in such a period) standard

Navy landing craft would be grounded on

the reef off the lagoon shore some 100-150

yards out.36

The Japanese garrison on Butaritari was

estimated to be from 500 to 800 troops

consisting of one rifle company, one field

battery of four heavy antiaircraft guns, and

two antiaircraft machine gun batteries

totaling four medium antiaircraft guns and

twenty machine guns.37 It was apparent

35

 27th Inf Div FO 21, 23 Oct 43, App 1 to Annex

2, p. 1. The account given here of intelligence estimates of Makin is derived from this appendix and

the situation map of Butaritari Island, Makin Atoll,

prepared by G-2, V Phib Corps. 36

 TF 54 Opn Plan A2-43, 23 Oct 43, Annex B,

p. 21. 37

 27th Inf Div FO 21, Annex 2, p. 1; V Phib Corps

GALVANIC Rpt, Incl C, p. 3. The estimate given in the

situation map prepared by G-2, V Phib Corps, differed as follows: heavy AA guns, 3 definite; medium

AA guns, 1 definite, 10 possible; machine guns, 24

definite, 89 possible.
SELECTION OF TARGETS AND TACTICAL PLANNING 31

from aerial photographs that the enemy

had concentrated the major part of his defenses in the central area of the island

around Butaritari Village. This fortified

area was bounded on east and west by

tank traps running generally in a zigzag

path from lagoon to ocean shore.38

Final Intelligence Estimates: Tarawa

Tarawa, like Makin, is a triangular coral

atoll and is roughly 18 miles long on the

east side, 12 miles long on the south side,

and 12.5 miles long on the west side. None

of the small islands comprising the atoll

rises to more than ten feet above sea level.

(Map 4)

The entire west leg of the triangle consists of a barrier reef through which there

is only one entrance into the lagoon passable by deep-draft vessels. Just 3.5 miles

south of this entrance lies the island of

Betio, resting on the southwest corner of

the triangle. It was here that the Japanese

had constructed an airfield and had concentrated their major defenses. It was here

that the first major amphibious assault by

American forces in the Central Pacific

would take place.

Betio itself is surrounded on all sides by

reefs. Along the south shore the reef extends to a uniform distance of about 600

yards from the high-water line. On the

narrow west shore it varies from 800 to

1,200 yards at the extreme southwest point

of the island where strong rip currents occur. Off the north shore, facing the lagoon,

also lies a fringing reef, but this is wider

and shelves more gradually than the reefs

elsewhere. This, plus the fact that the

lagoon was on the lee side of the island and

somewhat sheltered from heavy swells,

made this coast line the most desirable for

landing operations.39

Most of these facts were known to planners of the operation as a result of aerial

and submarine photographs and consultation with former residents and visitors

familiar with the atoll. What was not

known with any certainty, however, was

the condition of prevailing tides in the area.

The central problem that plagued all

planners of the Tarawa operation was the

question of the probable height of water

over the fringing reef off the north coast of

Betio. The 2d Marine Division, which was

assigned to the operation, had available

only a limited number (eventually 125) of

amphibian tractors. These vehicles, which

could carry about twenty troops each, were

equipped to operate both through water

and overland, and to them reefs offered no

particular obstacle. However, there were

not enough on hand to transport all of the

necessary assault troops from ship to shore.

The remainder would have to be carried

in standard "Higgins boats" (LCVP's)

which, when fully loaded, drew at least 3.5

feet. Thus about four feet of water above

the reef was essential if the landing craft

were to carry the assault troops from ship

to shore without interruption.

To complicate matters further the date

chosen for the invasion was in a period of

neap tide at Tarawa. Neap tides occur

during the first and third quarters of the

moon. During these times the range of

tide, that is the difference between high

and low water, is at its lowest point and

high tides are lower than usual. Thus, the

probability of there being sufficient water

over the reef even at high tide on the par38

 V Phib Corps G-2 Situation Map, Butaritari

Island. 39

 2d Marine Div, Special Action Rpt, 6 Jan 44,

Incl A, Narrative Account of the Gilbert Islands

Opn, p. 3.
32 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

MAP 4

ticular date chosen for the invasion was

decreased.40

These problems were all appreciated by

planners on both corps and divisional

levels, but their sources of information were

contradictory. Admiral Turner's intelligence staff, as for Makin, made a correct

estimate of tidal conditions at Tarawa on

the proposed day of landing. His operation

plan reads in part: "During high water

neap tides the reef [that is, the lagoon reef]

40

 For a more complete discussion of the question

of tides at Tarawa, see Jeter A. Isely and Philip A.

Crowl, The U. S. Marines and Amphibious War (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951),

Ch. VI.
SELECTION OF TARGETS AND TACTICAL PLANNING 33

off the north coast of Betio is covered by

from one to two feet of water. . . ."41 If

this analysis were to be believed, then it

was obvious that nothing but amphibian

tractors could negotiate the reef on 20

November, which was known to fall in the

period of neap tide. Standard landing craft

drawing from three to four feet would be

grounded on the reef. Admiral Turner's

staff also knew that during neap tides a

"dodging" tide frequently occurred at

Tarawa, that is, the tide instead of following the usual semidiurnal pattern, ebbed

and flowed several times in twenty-four

hours.42

 This might further complicate the

problem of getting standard landing craft

ashore, even through channels blown in

the reef.

Either this information was improperly

understood or it was disbelieved, because

up to the very date of the landing there

was still hope that at Betio there would be

enough water over the reef to float standard landing craft. This hope was nurtured

by several former residents of the Gilberts

and shipmasters who had navigated the

adjacent waters. All but one of these consulted by the staff of the 2d Marine Division affirmed that five feet of water could

be expected over the reef at Betio at high

tide. The single exception was Maj. F. L. G.

Holland, a British officer who had lived on

Bairiki, the island adjacent to Betio, for

fifteen years. During the Marine division's

final rehearsals on Efate in the New Hebrides before sailing for the target island,

Major Holland announced that during

neap tide periods less than three feet of

water could be expected at high tide.43

Major Holland was right and in general

his pessimism was shared by General Julian

Smith, the 2d Marine Division's commander. At least his troops were briefed to

expect no more than a fifty-fifty chance of

getting into the shore on Betio in boats.44

As events turned out even this was far too

optimistic an estimate.

Although hydrographic information for

Tarawa was faulty, the prelanding intelligence of Japanese troop strength and defense dispositions was excellent. This was

largely derived from aerial and submarine

photographs assembled by the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, and

interpreted by that headquarters and by

the intelligence section of the 2d Marine

Division. As of 11 November, the division

estimated enemy troop strength on Betio

alone to be not less than 2,500 and not

more than 3,100,45 a prediction that postbattle studies proved to be remarkably

accurate. Betio was known to be far more

heavily fortified than Makin. From aerial

photographs it appeared that the north

shore was defended by an elaborate system

of fire trenches, rifle pits, coastal and antiaircraft weapons, antiboat emplacements,

and machine gun positions. Defenses on

the west and south shores were thought to

be similar in all respects, including density.

On this tiny, narrow island only three

miles long and less than six hundred yards

across at its widest point, the Japanese

were believed to have 8 or 9 coastal defense

guns, 12 heavy antiaircraft guns ranging

from 75-mm. to 12-cm., 12 medium antiaircraft guns from 40-mm. to less than

75-mm., 81 antiboat positions for weapons

41

 TF 54 Opn Plan A2-43, 23 Oct 43, Annex B,

p. 11. 42

 Ibid., p. 29. 43

 Stockman, Tarawa, p. 4; Interv, Jeter A. Isely

with Lt Gen Julian G. Smith, USMC (Ret), 28 Oct

48, on file, Princeton University Library, Princeton,

N.J.

44

 Interv cited n. 43; Memo, Lt Col William C.

Chamberlin, USMC, for Jeter A. Isley, 29 May 50,

on file, Princeton University Library, Princeton, N.J. 45

 2d Marine Div Opn Order 14, 25 Oct 43, Addendum 1 to App 1 to Annex D, 11 Nov 43.
34 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

CHART 1—TASK ORGANIZATION OF VARIOUS COMMANDS FOR THE ATTACK ON THE GILBERT

ISLANDS

of sizes ranging from heavy machine guns

to 40-mm. guns, and 52 light weapons.46

There was good reason to believe that this

would be the fiercest amphibious battle yet

fought in the Pacific.

Organization and Command of the

American Forces

Admiral Spruance's Operation Plan

Number Cen 1-43 was issued on 25 October and, subject to some subsequent modifications, set forth the command organization of the GALVANIC operation and

outlined the tasks assigned to each subordinate command. The immediate task of

capturing and occupying Makin, Tarawa,

and Apamama, of destroying inferior

enemy surface forces attempting to interfere with the landing operations, and of

initiating the establishment of advance

bases and the construction of airfields on

the three islands was assigned to Admiral

Turner's assault force (Task Force 54). This

was in turn subdivided into a Northern

Attack Force (Task Force 52), also commanded by Admiral Turner, and a Southern Attack Force (Task Force 53) under

Rear Adm. Harry W. Hill, USN, plus

sundry other lesser task groups including

a reconnaissance group for Apamama, and

46

 2d Marine Div Opn Order 14, 25 Oct 43, App

1 to Annex D; Ibid., Addendum 1, 11 Nov 43.
SELECTION OF TARGETS AND TACTICAL PLANNING 35

garrison groups for the three islands. The

duty of the Northern Attack Force was to

capture Makin; that of the Southern Attack Force to take Tarawa and Apamama.

(Chart 1)

The main troop components of the

Northern Attack Force were to consist of

the 165th Regimental Combat Team (reinforced) of the 27th Infantry Division.

This combat team plus units of the 7th

Army Defense Battalion and various service units were to constitute the Northern

Landing Force, under command of General Ralph Smith. The parallel command

for the seizure of Tarawa was the Southern

Landing Force, consisting mainly of the

2d Marine Division plus assigned units of

the 2d and 8th Marine Defense Battalions,

all under command of General Julian

Smith. A separate task group was set up

for occupying Apamama. The commanding officer of the submarine Nautilus,

Comdr. Donald G. Irvine, USN, was directed to land a reconnaissance platoon of

V Amphibious Corps on that presumably

undefended island some time after the

main landings on Tarawa and Makin.

To transport the 165th Regimental

Combat Team and its supplies and equipment to Makin, Admiral Turner was able

to allocate four attack transports (APA's),

one attack cargo ship (AKA), one LSD,

and nine LST's. To screen the transports

and LST's, and to provide naval gunfire

and aerial support for the landing on

Makin, a total of four old battleships, four

heavy cruisers, thirteen destroyers, and

three escort carriers (CVE's) was provided.47

 To the 2d Marine Division for the

assault on Tarawa was assigned one transport (AP),48

 twelve attack transports, three

attack cargo ships, one LSD, and twelve

LST's. To screen these vessels and to bombard the shore at Tarawa, Southern Attack

Force had a total of three battleships, three

heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, twentyone destroyers, and five escort carriers.49

Thus, about equal shares of naval gunfire support were apportioned to the

Makin and Tarawa landings, although it

was known that the latter would be by far

the more formidable target. If the only

problem involved in the operation had

been that of landing troops on the two

islands, then logic would have dictated allocating a far heavier portion of naval

gunfire support to the Southern Landing

Force. As it was, purely naval considerations prompted a more equal division of

fire power. Makin was more than a hundred miles closer than Tarawa to the Marshalls and if any major sortie by the

elements of the Japanese fleet should develop, it would probably be from that

direction. Hence, it was considered prudent to dispose a good part of the American combat vessels in a position where it

could more quickly intercept a Japanese

naval counterattack.50

Within Admiral Turner's assault force

(Task Force 54), but not enjoying any

clear-cut authority, was the Commander,

V Amphibious Corps, General Holland

Smith. During the planning and training

phase, both the 2d Marine Division and

the 27th Infantry Division were clearly attached to Holland Smith's headquarters

47

 TF 52 Amph Attack Order A3-43, 23 Oct 43;

Fifth Amph Force Rpt, Capture of Gilbert Islands,

p. 5. 48

 The main differences between the AP and APA

were that the latter carried more landing craft and

was better constructed and rigged to unload assault

troops and their supplies rapidly. 49

 Fifth Amph Force Rpt, Capture of Gilbert Islands, p. 5; TF 53 Opn Order A104-43 (Revised), 4

Nov 43, pp. 1-2. 50

 COMCENPACFOR, Gen Instr to all Flag Officers, CENPACFOR, for Gilberts Opn, 29 Oct 43,

Naval History Division.
36 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

and were under his command. 5 1 But for

the operational phase, his position in the

chain of command was ambiguous. Admiral Spruance's operation plan provided

that the "Commanding General Fifth

Amphibious Corps will be embarked in

the flagship of the Assault Force [Task Force

54] and will command all landing force

troops."

 52

 However, by the same order,

all directives by Commander, V Amphibious Corps, had to be approved by Admiral Turner as Commander, Assault

Force, before they could be issued. Furthermore, the only authority specifically

delegated to Holland Smith under Admiral Turner's own operation plan was

that "Commanding General, Fifth Amphibious Corps, embarked in the Force

Flagship of the Commander Assault Force,

will advise the Commander Assault Force in

regard to the employment of the Landing

Forces at each objective and the employment of reserve troops . . . ."53

On the question of the immediate command of troops to be committed ashore at

Makin and Tarawa, both Spruance's and

Turner's orders bypassed Holland Smith.

At both objectives the related attack force

commanders—Turner, Commander, Task

Force 52, at Makin, and Hill, Commander,

Task Force 53, at Tarawa—were to command the troops through the appropriate

landing force commanders (that is, General Ralph Smith, USA, at Makin and

General Julian Smith, USMC, at Tarawa).

These last two officers would assume command ashore only when Admiral Turner,

as commander of the assault force, should

so direct.54

In other words, General Holland Smith

was given no tactical command over

troops.55 His capacity during the operation

was merely that of an adviser to Admiral

Turner. However, there is evidence that

in his own mind General Smith believed

that he held a more exalted position.

Later, he wrote, "As soon as the assault

waves hit the beach the status of my command was parallel, not inferior to, Kelly

Turner's."

 56

 This misconception could

easily have arisen from the paragraph of

Admiral Spruance's operation plan cited

above, which seemed to give the V Amphibious Corps commander command

over "all landing force troops." The confusion was further compounded when at

the last minute Admiral Nimitz issued a

directive removing General Holland

Smith's name from the command. Smith

protested and at last, in his own words,

"Admiral Spruance insisted that I go

along."57 Go he did, but as an adviser, not

a troop commander.

Comparable to, but not exactly analogous with, the position of General Smith

in the chain of command was that of the

Commander, Support Aircraft, Col. William O. Eareckson, AAF. At this juncture

in the Pacific war, the Navy's development of a centralized system of ground

control of support aircraft in amphibious

operations was still in a formative stage. At

Guadalcanal Admiral Turner had set up

a rather hasty, temporary control organization for aircraft assigned to troop support. Under his plan, during the amphibious phase of the operation, all troop

support aircraft were controlled by an air

support director group attached to his staff

51

 Stockman, Tarawa, p. 3; USAFMIDPAC Hist,

Vol I, pp. 108-09. 52

 COMCENPACFOR Opn Plan Cen 1-43, p. 11. 53

 TF 54 Opn Plan A2-43, 23 Oct 43, p. 9. 54

 COMCENPACFOR Opn Plan Cen 1-43, p. 12;

TF 54 Opn Plan A2-43, 23 Oct 43, p. 10. 35

 Ltr. Adm Turner to Maj Gen Harry J. Malony,

USA, Chief, HD SSUSA, 17 Jan 49, OCMH. 56

 Holland M. Smith, Coral and Brass (New York:

Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 113. 57

 Ibid., p. 117.
SELECTION OF TARGETS AND TACTICAL PLANNING 37

and aboard his flagship, the USS McCawley, with a similar stand-by group aboard

the USS Neville, which was assigned to

waters off Tulagi. In addition, a fighter

squadron, flown from carriers located far

out at sea and assigned the duties of combat air patrol in the immediate area of the

landing, was controlled by Rear Adm.

Victor A. C. Crutchley, R.N., Turner's

second in command, through a fighter director group located aboard the USS

Chicago.

58

Although this plan did not permit completely centralized control, it did embody

two important principles. First, all aircraft

in the objective area were under command

of units on board ships actually present.

Secondly, after the initially scheduled

strikes, all missions for troop support aircraft were established by the air support

director group aboard the force flagship

as a result of requests from the commanders of the landing forces, that is, of the

troops ashore.

After his appointment to the post of

Commander, Fifth Amphibious Force,

Central Pacific, Admiral Turner sought to

capitalize on his experience at Guadalcanal by setting up an air support control

organization on a permanent basis. But he

found little enthusiasm for the project

among naval air circles at Pearl Harbor

and no naval aviator who, in his opinion,

had sufficient rank or experience to do the

job. However, in the person of Colonel

Eareckson, then temporarily attached to

Admiral Nimitz's headquarters, he discovered an aviator who met his requirements. Colonel Eareckson had acted as an

air co-ordinator and air-ground liaison officer for close support missions flown by

planes of the Eleventh Air Force during

the invasion of Attu in May 1943.59 Although he had not previously worked with

naval aircraft, he was borrowed from Admiral Nimitz's staff for the Gilberts operation and designated Commander, Support Aircraft.

The scope of his duties and authority for

the forthcoming invasion was not made

entirely clear in the covering operation

plans, the ambiguity being a reflection of

a yet unmatured conception of the role of

close air support control in naval amphibious doctrine. According to Operation

Plan A2-43, issued by Admiral Turner as

commander of the assault force for the entire Gilberts operation (Task Force 54),

"The Commander Support Aircraft, GALVANIC [Eareckson], embarked in the

Force Flagship of the Commander Assault

Force [Turner], will advise the Commander

Assault Force in regard to the employment

of support aircraft at all objectives."60

In another paragraph of the same plan it

is stated, "At each objective, during the

assault, the related Attack Force Commanders [that is, Turner at Makin, and

Hill at Tarawa] will command the support

aircraft through the Air Commander of

the base to be established at the objective. . . ."61

This would seem to indicate that Colonel Eareckson's position in the chain of

command was, like General Holland

Smith's, merely that of adviser to the assault force commander, Admiral Turner.

Also, according to the above cited plan,

the attack force commander at each objective would presumably exercise direct

command over support aircraft through

the air base commander ashore, once such

bases were established. However, in prac58

 Ltr, Adm Turner to Gen Ward, 30 Oct 50, pp.

1-2, OCMH; Miller, Guadalcanal, pp. 37-39. 59

 Craven and Cate, AAF IV, pp. 382-86. 80

 TF 54 Opn Plan A2-43, 23 Oct 43, par. 5(d). 61

 Ibid., par. 5(f).
38 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

tice, this was not to be the case. Since this

command setup had been ordained by directives from higher authority, it could not

be changed. But Admiral Turner did succeed in radically modifying the arrangement by directing that at both Tarawa

and Makin flight leaders of combat air

patrols, upon being relieved from this type

of duty, should report to the Commander,

Support Aircraft, and be prepared to

strafe ground installations as directed by

him before returning to their carriers. To

insure safety to the ground troops, pilots

were warned that it was "imperative that

strafing attacks be delivered only as directed by the Support Aircraft Commander."

 62

 Also, supporting aircraft at

both Makin and Tarawa were ordered to

maintain twelve scout bomber planes and

six torpedo bomber planes on each station

during daylight at an "initial point" designated by the support aircraft commander

to give direct support to ground troops and

to replace the Support Aircraft Group as

requested by the support aircraft commander. In addition, antisubmarine patrol

aircraft were ordered to report to the support aircraft commander upon arrival on

and departure from station.63

As it finally went into effect, then, the

duties of the support aircraft commander

both at Makin and at Tarawa were made

more positive than had originally been

contemplated. Colonel Eareckson, who

would sail aboard Turner's flagship, was

given general direction over close air support and antisubmarine patrol for the

whole assault force (Task Force 54). In

addition, he had direct command duties

with respect to support aircraft of the attack force at Makin (Task Force 52). For

the Tarawa phase, a second commander

of support aircraft was assigned to Task

Force 53 and accompanied Admiral Hill

on his flagship Maryland, from which he

too would directly command close air support and antisubmarine patrol at that

objective.64 In later amphibious landings

in the Central Pacific this allocation of air

responsibilities was formalized and clarified, but it was in the Gilberts operation,

in spite of some confusion in the covering

plans, that this subsequent development

was clearly forecast.

Aerial support, both tactical and strategic, was to be provided in the main by two

separate task forces. The carrier force

(Task Force 50) was under command of

Rear Adm. Charles A. Pownall, USN,

and consisted of six large and five small

carriers with their accompanying battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. The bulk

of this force was assigned the task of destroying enemy aircraft and defenses on

Tarawa on D minus 2 and D minus 1 and

on Mille, Jaluit, and Makin on D minus 1.

At the same time, planes from this force

were to photograph both Makin and

Tarawa and deliver copies, together with

information of sea conditions at landing

beaches, to Admirals Turner and Hill on

their respective flagships. On D Day and

daily thereafter they were to conduct early

morning searches to the north and west of

the Gilberts and to provide air support for

the land operations. One relief group of

this task force was ordered to destroy aircraft and air harbor facilities on Nauru by

both air and surface bombardment.65

All shore-based aircraft for the operation were organized into Task Force 57

under the command of Rear Adm. John

H. Hoover. The Seventh Air Force provided Admiral Hoover with both fighters

and bombers. Ninety heavy bombers were

62

 TF 54 Opn Plan A2-43, 23 Oct 43, Annex C,

pp. 4, 10. 63

 Ibid., pp. 4, 10, 11. 64

 Ltr, Turner to Ward, 30 Oct 50, pp. 4-6. 65

 CENPACFOR Opn Plan Cen 1-43, pp. 4-5, 8-9.
SELECTION OF TARGETS AND TACTICAL PLANNING 39

organized into Task Group 57.2, commanded by Maj. Gen. Willis H. Hale,

AAF. Fifty-six Navy patrol bombers were

placed in Task Group 57.3 under direct

command of Admiral Hoover. A third task

group (57.4) consisted of ninety Marine

fighter planes, seventy-two Marine scout

bombers, twenty-four scout and utility

planes, and sundry Army and Navy transport planes—all to be based on the Ellice

Islands and all under command of Brig.

Gen. Lewie G. Merritt, USMC.

Task Force 57 was to attack enemy air

bases at Tarawa, Nauru, Mille, Jaluit, and

such other enemy positions in the Marshalls as were within range. The force was

to conduct photographic reconnaissances

of Kwajalein, Wotje, Maloelap, Mille, and

Jaluit, all in the Marshalls. Starting on D

minus 3, it was to conduct long-range

searches in areas not covered by carrier

planes. Other general duties were to attack

enemy ships and shipping, defend American bases in the Ellice and Gilbert Islands,

and provide air transportation.66

All of this air power was in addition to

the planes attached to the two attack

forces. At Makin, three escort carriers

would accompany Admiral Turner's

Northern Attack Force. Admiral Hill's

Southern Attack Force at Tarawa would

enjoy the support of five such vessels.67

Admiral Turner's Plan for the Attack

The general plan for the operation, as

worked out by Admiral Turner in conjunction with the staff of V Amphibious

Corps, contemplated the simultaneous

capture of Makin by the 165th Regimental

Combat Team of the 27th Infantry Division and of Tarawa by the 2d Marine Division, reinforced. One regimental combat

team of the Marine division (later designated the 6th RCT) was to be held as

corps reserve for the support of one or both

of these operations or for the subsequent

occupation of Apamama. This corps reserve was to be employed only as authorized by Admiral Turner as Commander,

Task Force 54, on the advice of General

Holland Smith.68

The assault was to be made initially by

troops carried in amphibian tractors, some

fitted with grapnels for destroying wire

and thus opening boat routes to the

beaches. The tractors would be carried to

the target areas in LST's, each of which

had space in its tank deck for seventeen

vehicles. The amphibian tractors would

be followed by troops in LCVP's (landing

craft, vehicle and personnel) and by medium tanks transported in LCM's (landing craft, mechanized), which would be

carried forward by Navy transports and

by LSD's.

On D Day at both Makin and Tarawa

Navy planes were to strike from 0545 to

0615, attacking coast defense guns, heavy

antiaircraft guns, observation towers, radio

installations, aircraft, and personnel, as

well as any barracks and buildings undamaged by previous attacks. From about

H Hour minus 5 minutes to H Hour plus

15 minutes (that is from 5 minutes before

to 15 minutes after the first troops hit the

beach), planes would attack installations

on the landing beaches. They were to

strafe along the water's edge until the first

wave of landing craft approached to within 100 yards of the beach, then shift fire

inland to a depth of 100 yards. Immediately thereafter, they were to bomb all

secondary defense installations behind the

beaches clear across each island as well as

all beach installations between 500 and

1,000 yards to both sides of the landing

66

 Ibid., pp. 5-6, 12-13. 67

 See above, pp. 00-00. 68

 TF 54 Opn Plan A2-43, 23 Oct 43, Annex A.
40

areas. Following these scheduled missions,

aircraft were to fly combat air patrol and

antisubmarine patrol and carry out bombing and strafing attacks in close support of

the ground troops.69

For Makin, naval gunfire support would

be provided by four old battleships, four

cruisers, and six destroyers.70 For Tarawa,

three battleships, two heavy cruisers, three

light cruisers, and nine destroyers would

be assigned to this duty.71 The general

plan for the employment of these vessels

at both objectives was as follows: During

the early morning of D Day, commencing

about 0615, the heavy ships would deliver

prearranged neutralization and counterbattery fires at moderately long range. As

mine sweepers gradually closed the

beaches off Makin and swept the lagoon

off Betio, support vessels would move to

closer range. Battleships and heavy cruisers were permitted to move in as close as

2,000 or 3,000 yards (that is, one to one

and a half nautical miles) in order to

knock out heavy turret guns ashore.

Shortly before the landing, light cruisers

and destroyers were instructed to move to

still closer range for a last-minute saturation fire. This was to terminate at H

minus 5 minutes so as to permit a final air

strike on the beaches immediately before

the first wave of troops hit. Under no circumstances were ships and planes to bombard the same areas simultaneously. After

the landings had been made ships were to

stand by to fire on targets of opportunity

on request of shore fire control parties attached to troop units and to deliver slow

neutralization fire on areas 400 to 800

yards or more from the nearest troops.72

It was believed by some naval planners

of the operation that this tremendous

volume of preliminary naval gunfire coupled with the proposed aerial bombardment would surely be ample to knock out

most of the heavier Japanese installations

and at the very least neutralize the beaches

during the assault phase of the operation.

Just before the 2d Marine Division sailed

from Efate, one of the ranking naval officers is reported to have stated of Betio:

"We do not intend to neutralize it, we do

not intend to destroy it. Gentlemen, we

will obliterate it."

 73

 Such optimism was

extravagant, as the course of the battle

would show, but it was based on the

knowledge that in no previous amphibious

operation had such a tremendous weight

of naval and air power been available to

landing troops. That a mere two and a

half hours of preliminary naval bombardment, no matter how concentrated, was

still not enough to "obliterate" even tiny

islands the size of Betio and Butaritari was

still to be proved.

The 27th Division's Plan: Butaritari

For the landing on Butaritari, total

troop strength of the 165th Regimental

Combat Team with its attached units came

to 6,470 men. This included, besides the

infantry troops of the 165th, detachments

from the 105th Infantry Regiment of the

27th Division, part of the 193d Tank Battalion, the 152d Engineer Battalion, coastal artillery and antiaircraft batteries of the

98th and 93d Coastal Artillery Battalions,

a platoon from the V Amphibious Corps

Reconnaissance Company, plus sundry

69

 Ibid., Annex C, pp. 2-4, 8-9. 70

 TF 52 Amph Attack Order A3-43, 23 Oct 43,

p. 1. 71

 TF 53 Opn Order A104-43 (Revised), 4 Nov 43,

pp. 1-2. 72

 TF 54 Opn Plan A2-43, 23 Oct 43, p. 5; Ibid.,

Annex C, pp. 2-3, 8-9. 73

 Earl J. Wilson, Jim F. Lucas, Samuel Shaffer,

and G. Peter Zurlinden, Betio Beachhead (New York:

The Putnam Company, 1945), p. 32.; Interv, Isely

with Julian Smith, 28 Oct 48, p. 4.
SELECTION OF TARGETS AND TACTICAL PLANNING 41

medical, signal, ordnance, quartermaster,

and bomb disposal detachments.

The plan for getting these troops ashore

on Butaritari was elaborate in the extreme

and unlike any adopted before or since in

the Pacific war. It was devised by General

Ralph Smith, Commanding General, 27th

Division, and approved somewhat reluctantly by General Holland Smith, commander of the V Amphibious Corps.74

 The

basic principle of the plan was to land two

battalions on the west coast of Butaritari,

followed quickly by tanks and artillery

pieces. Two hours after the main landing,

a third battalion was to be put ashore on

the north (lagoon) side of the island roughly 4,000 yards east of the main landing

beaches. This battalion would then split

into two groups, one heading eastward,

the other westward in the general direction of the main landing force. The object

was to envelop in an amphibious pincers

movement the Western Tank Barrier that

lay athwart the island between the main

landing beaches on the west coast and the

most heavily fortified area in the center—

the so-called Citadel area. (Map I)

The first wave to land on the west coast

(at Red Beaches) was to consist of thirtytwo LVT's embarked on two LST's,

manned by separate detachments of the

105th Infantry (called Detachments X

and Y). These were to land at Red

Beaches at H Hour and to clear a passage

through any barbed wire or other underwater obstacles that might impede the

succeeding landing craft. On hitting the

shore, the troops were to move south and

north respectively and cover the right and

left flanks of the main landing beaches.75

This scheme of manning the first wave

of LVT's with troops drawn from a regiment outside of the one that made up the

main landing force was a product of necessity rather than choice. Because of the prevailing shortage of LVT's at the time of the

operation, General Ralph Smith could not

be certain that any of these vehicles would

be available for the Makin landing. Not

until about two weeks before sailing from

Pearl Harbor did the tractors assigned to

the 27th Division actually arrive. Hence,

in working out a landing plan, General

Smith had to take into account the possibility that no amphibian tractors might

be ready for the operation, and therefore

assigned all of the assault troops of the

165th Regimental Combat Team to

LCVP's. Against the contingency that the

desired tractors would show up at the last

minute, he detached special units from the

105th Regimental Combat Team of his

division to make up the first wave and to

perform whatever duties thereafter that

might be considered desirable.76

Following this first wave of LVT's would

come the assault troops of the 1st and 3d

Battalion Landing Teams, 165th Regiment, boated in LCVP's. On the right, the

3d Battalion Landing Team would land

on Red Beach 2 and seize the right half of

the division beachhead to about 1,600

yards inland. It would then move right to

clear the area around Ukiangong Village

and Ukiangong Point. On the left, the 1st

Battalion Landing Team would land on

Red Beach, seize the division beachhead

in its zone of action and move left to capture the area from the north end of Red

Beach to Flink Point. Upon capture of the

division beachhead, it was to relieve the

right battalion on the entire front line and

74

 General Ralph Smith's personal diary, which he

kindly loaned to the authors, gives evidence of an

original disagreement between himself and General

Holland Smith on the landing plan. Holland Smith at

first favored a head-on assault from the lagoon, instead of landing two battalions on the west coast and

a third, later, on the lagoon shore. (Entry, 9 Oct 43). 75

 27th Inf Div FO 21, 23 Oct 43. 76

 Interv, Philip A. Crowl with Maj Gen Ralph C.

Smith, USA (Ret), 30 Oct 50, OCMH.
42 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

push reconnaissance as far east as "Jill"

Lake. Upon being relieved, the 3d Battalion would assemble in dispersed formation as division reserve in the area north of

Ukiangong Village.

Two hours later, at W Hour (1030), the

second landings were to be made on Yellow Beach 2 on the north shore between

On Chong's Wharf and King's Wharf,

both of which projected out into the

lagoon. Here, too, the first wave would consist of sixteen LVT's mounted aboard an

LST and would be manned by Detachment Z of the 105th Infantry Regiment.

On arrival at the beach the troops were to

dismount, half of them moving directly

east to clear the enemy from King's Wharf

and establish a beach block and defensive

position on the left flank of the beach. The

other half was to move directly west, clearing any Japanese found on On Chong's

Wharf and protecting the right flank of

the beach. Following this wave would

come the assault troops of the 2d Battalion

Landing Team, 165th, with Company A of

the 193d Tank Battalion attached and

boated in LCVP's and LCM's. Upon seizing the beachhead, this battalion was to

make its main effort to the westward to

effect contact with the 1st Battalion Landing Team, which at that juncture was supposed to be moving eastward from the

main division beachhead.

Meanwhile, at H Hour the platoon of

the V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance

Company with one reinforced infantry

platoon from the 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry, was to have landed on tiny Kotabu

Island just north of Flink Point so as to secure the seaward approaches into the

lagoon from possible enemy fire from that

quarter. As soon after H Hour as was permissible, the three artillery batteries of the

165th Regiment were to be landed over

Red Beach 2 and take position on Ukiangong Point. Two of these batteries consisted of the standard 105-mm. howitzers

organic to regiment. Because of limitations

in shipping space, 75-mm. pack howitzers

had to be substituted for the third battery.77

The basic premise upon which this plan

was made was that the first main obstacle

to a quick capture of the island would be

the West Tank Barrier. This consisted of

a trench about six feet deep and over fourteen feet wide and extended by log fences.

The whole system was laid out in a northsouth direction across the island about

3,400 yards east from Red Beaches.78 It

was believed that this barrier would seriously impede the progress of tank-infantry

teams approaching from the west coast,

and that the best method of eliminating

the hazard was to envelop it. Since this

would necessitate two battalions moving

toward each other, each was instructed to

use special colored-smoke grenades and to

maintain close radio contact. By these safeguards it was hoped that the danger of a

fire fight between the American units

would be minimized.79

What this plan failed to take into account was the potentiality of naval gunfire.

The tank barrier offered an ideal target for

enfilade fire by destroyers lying off either

the lagoon or the ocean side of the island.

However, as of the autumn of 1943, the

efficacy of naval gunfire against shore targets had not yet been proved to the satisfaction of 27th Division planners. General

Ralph Smith and his staff were still skeptical of this particular type of fire,80

 hence

they felt compelled to rely almost entirely

on their tank-infantry teams to overcome

77

 Ltr, cited n. 34. 78

 V Phib Corps G-2 Situation Map, Butaritari

Island. 79

 Ltr cited n. 34. 80

 Interv cited n. 76.
SELECTION OF TARGETS AND TACTICAL PLANNING 43

the western tank barrier and establish a

foothold on Butaritari.

Another defect in the plan was that it

relied too heavily on the assumption that

communications between separate units

would be adequate. To avoid the danger of

a fire fight between the two infantry forces

as they approached each other, it was essential that they be in perfect communication with each other. Also, if artillery was

to be used at all in the gap between the

two forces, it would be imperative that

close radio or telephone contact be maintained between the artillery battalion and

the various infantry commanders. As it

turned out, no such contact was established during the first day's fighting on

Makin.

2d Marine Division's Plan: Betio

By contrast, the plan for landing the 2d

Marine Division on Betio was a model of

simplicity. General Julian Smith had

under his control only two reinforced regiments of his division, the 2d and 8th Regimental Combat Teams. The 6th Regimental Combat Team was to be held in

corps reserve to be landed at Tarawa,

Makin, or Apamama as the situation dictated. General Smith's plan called for the

landing of three battalion landing teams

abreast on Red Beaches 1, 2, and 3 on the

north (lagoon) shore of Betio. (Map II)

The first three assault waves were to be

made up of amphibian tractors, the fourth

wave would be tanks boated in LCM's, the

fifth would be LCVP's, each carrying

about thirty-six troops.81

The first troops to land would be, from

east to west (left to right) the 2d Battalion,

8th Marines; 2d Battalion, 2d Marines;

and 3d Battalion, 2d Marines. The 1st

Battalion, 2d Marines, was to be held in

regimental reserve. In division reserve, to

be committed when and where the situation warranted, would be the 1st and 3d

Battalions of the 8th Marines.

As soon as the beachhead was secured,

the assault troops were to move directly

across the island to the south, seizing the

airfield and mopping up enemy positions

along the ocean beaches. When this task

had been completed, the two battalions

on the east were to pivot and move to the

left along the axis of the island to clean it

off to its eastern tip. The artillery regiment

(10th Marines) was to land on order on

the main beaches and prepare to mass the

bulk of its fires from Central Pier (which

jutted out into the lagoon almost on the

boundary between Red Beaches 2 and 3)

to the eastern end of Betio.

With the withdrawal of the 6th Marines

from division control, General Julian

Smith could count on having only about a

two-to-one superiority over the Japanese,

who were reckoned to number somewhere

between 2,500 and 3,100.82 This was considerably under the classic three-to-one

superiority which, according to standard

amphibious doctrine, is the minimum

ratio desirable. If the assault was to proceed with the speed and ease hoped for,

this deficiency in troop strength would

have to be made up for by the preliminary

naval and aerial bombardment and by the

sustained momentum of the first five waves

of assault troops and tanks. If any of these

failed to materialize—that is, if aerial and

naval bombardment proved less destructive than expected or if the ship-to-shore

movement broke down—then the burden

imposed on the invading troops would be

unduly heavy. Events at Tarawa were soon

to prove this to be the case.

81

 2d Marine Div Opn Order 14, 25 Oct 43, with

annexes. 82

 Stockman, Tarawa, p. 4.
CHAPTER III

Preparing for the Attack

Training

The Marine V Amphibious Corps,

under General Holland Smith, was responsible for supervision of the ship-toshore amphibious training of all units

scheduled to take part in the invasion of

the Gilbert Islands. General Richardson,

commanding general of United States

Army Forces in the Central Pacific Area

(USAFICPA), was in charge of the rest of

the training of Army units for this operation in addition to discharging the logistical and administrative duties of his

command.

Before its specific assignment to the

Gilberts operation, the 27th Infantry Division had been conducting preliminary

amphibious training for a period of about

eight months.1 The division had been a

National Guard unit from New York State

and was called into Federal service in

October 1940. Beginning in March 1942 it

was transferred to Hawaii and for the next

year and a half served as base defense

force, first in the outer islands and later on

Oahu after the 25th Infantry Division was

sent to Guadalcanal in November 1942.

While in Hawaii the division was triangularized, losing its fourth regiment, the

108th Infantry, to the 40th Division. This

left it with the 165th, the 105th, and the

106th Infantry Regiments.2

Since November of 1942 the division's

commanding general had been General

Ralph Smith. His previous wartime duty

had been with Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff

(G-2) and with the 76th Infantry Division

at Fort George G. Meade.3

In spite of the fact that its original duties

in the Hawaiian area were largely defensive in character, the division early commenced to make preparations against the

day when it might be called upon to participate in amphibious operations. In December 1942 two of its officers were detailed to attend an amphibious school conducted by the U.S. Marine Corps in San

Diego. On their return an amphibious

school was opened in Hawaii. This school,

conducted from 7 April to 12 May 1943,

was attended by regimental and battalion

commanders and their executive officers,

and staff intelligence, operations, and

logistics officers, and others.

Between May and August each battalion landing team was assembled at Schofield Barracks on Oahu and given instructions in the use of ropes, cargo net climbing

and descending, boat team drill, debarking and deployment from mock-up boats,

passage through wire entanglements and

other obstacles, and various other tech1

 USAFICPA Participation Rpt GALVANIC, p. 29. 2

 Love, 27th Infantry Division, pp. 1-2. 3

 General Officers Service Biographies, Public Information Division, Department of the Army.
PREPARING FOR THE ATTACK 45

niques peculiar to amphibious warfare.

Battalion staffs prepared boat assignment

tables, boat diagrams, shore party organization, landing diagrams, and debarkation

and approach schedules. Next, each battalion landing team received one week's

instruction at the Waianae Amphibious

Training Center where a pier was used to

simulate a Navy transport, and where a

specially constructed barge was anchored

offshore to give the troops experience in

embarking and debarking from a listing

vessel.4

In August, when General Richardson

assumed command of United States Army

Forces in the Central Pacific Area, steps

were taken forthwith to expand the amphibious training program in the Hawaiian

area with special attention given to the

units of the 27th Division scheduled to

participate in the forthcoming Gilberts

operation. Construction of three new training centers had already commenced and

before the end of August these were completed and ready for use. They were located at Waimanalo on the southeastern

shore of Oahu, at Kahuku Point on the

northernmost tip of Oahu, and in the Pali

region in the central part of the island. All

were equipped with mock-up ships' platforms and other facilities for specialized

amphibious training. It was planned that

each combat team of the 27th Division

would be rotated through each of these

camps as well as through the Schofield

training area. Each team was to spend

three weeks at each center.5

In addition to this general "preamphibious" training, various specialist courses

were set up. Shore fire control parties were

trained by division artillery for the purpose of directing naval gunfire after hitting

the beach. The division's G-4 (supply)

officer, Lt. Col. Charles B. Ferris, set up a

school for transport quartermasters, commencing on 17 September. Officers and

noncommissioned officers were made familiar with the characteristics of Navy

transports by visiting Pearl Harbor, measuring the ships, and observing the loading

of ships. Stowage plans used in the Attu

operation were studied and tentative stowage plans for the forthcoming operation

were devised.6

One of the main sources of amphibious

training doctrine available at this time was

the War Department Field Manual 31-5,

entitled Landing Operations on Hostile

Shores (1941). This was based in large

part on a previous Navy Department publication, Fleet Training Publication 167

(1938), which in turn originated in earlier

studies in amphibious warfare produced

by the Marine Corps in 1934 and 1935.7

In addition, at the suggestion of General

Ralph Smith, General Richardson's headquarters obtained copies of a detailed set

of notes prepared by the 9th Infantry Division covering its training at Navy amphibious training centers on the east coast

of the United States. These items and

other literature obtained from the Marine

training base at Camp Elliott, San Diego,

made up the bulk of the theoretical doctrine upon which the training in Hawaii

was based.8

Only one serious shortcoming in the

training program was subsequently noted.

No systematic training of Army tanks in

conjunction with small infantry units was

attempted. In view of the importance of a

smoothly functioning tank-infantry team

4

 USAFICPA Participation Rpt GALVANIC, pp.

129-30. 5

 USAFMIDPAC Hist, Vol. 9, pp. 1847-48. 6

 USAFICPA Participation Rpt GALVANIC, p. 131. 7

 USAFMIDPAC Hist, Vol. 9, pp. 1943-44; Isely

and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, Ch. II. 8

 USAFMIDPAC Hist, Vol. 9, pp. 1944-45.
TRAINING OPERATIONS ON OAHU, HAWAII. Soldier hurdles barbed-wire obstacles (above); troops practice a landing operation (below).
PREPARING FOR THE ATTACK 47

in the forthcoming Makin operation, the

omission was serious.9

Following this period of shore-based

training, the 165th Regimental Combat

Team conducted joint amphibious training

on beaches in the Hawaiian area with

ships of Transport Division 20. Adverse

weather conditions and poor beaches detracted somewhat from the success of this

program. Also, no fire support or control

vessels were available, thus adding undesirable artificialities to the maneuvers.10

Finally, after all transports were loaded,

last-minute rehearsals were held between

31 October and 3 November 1943. Admiral Turner's Task Force 52, with the

troops and the equipment of the Northern

Attack Force aboard, proceeded from

Pearl Harbor to the vicinity of Maalaea

Bay, Maui, on the night of the 31st. Next

morning rehearsals were held off the coast

of Maui, with simulated naval gunfire and

air support. All troops were landed but no

supplies and equipment were sent ashore

for fear of damage to landing craft and

equipment, which could not be repaired

before final embarkation for Makin. This

exercise was repeated at daylight on 2

November. Finally, at dawn of 3 November a full-scale dress rehearsal was held off

the coast of Kahoolawe Island employing

actual gunfire and air support. Assault

troops were embarked and proceeded to

the line of departure, but did not land

because Kahoolawe's beaches were rocky

and therefore dangerous to the safety of

landing craft. After the completion of this

final exercise, the task force returned to

Pearl Harbor for final loading, repairs, and

briefing before sailing for Makin.11

Meanwhile at Wellington, New Zealand, the 2d Marine Division was carrying

on its own training program. One of its

regiments, the 2d Marines, had already

made one amphibious landing at Guadalcanal and the other two, the 6th and 8th

Marines, had participated in the subsequent land fighting on that island. In the

words of General Holland Smith, "They

were veterans of a campaign and needed

little training other than amphibious training."12

 This the division got during the

month of October as Navy transports were

made available.

Final rehearsals of the entire Southern

Attack Force, less its escort carriers, were

held at Efate in the New Hebrides between

7 and 12 November. Two separate landing

exercises were conducted at Mele Bay and

fire support ships held bombardment practice on Erradaka Island. Communications

equipment was tested and communications exercises were held at the same time.13

Although this training was valuable, especially for the personnel who had recently

joined the division to replace losses at

Guadalcanal, the rehearsals were still not

as satisfactory as desired, principally because the forces involved had too short a

time to prepare and co-ordinate their

plans.14

Logistics

The chief logistical problem in preparing for the Gilberts operation was the

shortage of amphibian tractors in the Pacific Ocean Areas. This vehicle was one of

the few truly amphibian pieces of equipment to be put to extensive use throughout

9

 Ltr, Hq 27th Inf Div to TAG, 14 Dec 43, sub: Participation of TF 52.6, 27th Div, in GALVANIC (Makin)

Opn, p. 10, AG 327-0.3(429) 16-25 Nov 43, DRB

AGO. 10

 Fifth Amph Force Rpt, Capture of Gilbert

Islands, Incl A, pp. 2-3. 11

 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 12

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, p. 5. 13

 Stockman, Tarawa, p. 9. 14

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, p. 5.
48 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

the war in the Pacific. It was capable of

about 4.5 knots in the water, and its tracks

enabled it to traverse coral reefs and other

obstacles not negotiable by standard landing craft. About twenty-six feet in length,

it could carry (at this date) upward of

twenty troops.

The LVT (sometimes called the "Alligator") had been first designed by one

Donald Roebling, a retired manufacturer,

for rescue work in the Everglades of Florida. Shortly thereafter the vehicle was

brought to the attention of Marine officers

stationed at Quantico, Virginia, who set

about adapting it to military purposes. By

1940, under Marine Corps pressure, the

Navy Department set aside funds for further development and by the outbreak of

the war the amphibian tractor's utility

both as a troop carrier and as a cargo carrier for amphibious landings had been

satisfactorily demonstrated.15 At Guadalcanal a few were used logistically to carry

supplies and ammunition directly from

shipboard to inland dumps, to move guns,

and to evacuate the wounded.16

Early during the planning stage for the

Gilberts, it was realized that certainly at

Tarawa and possibly at Makin standard

landing craft could not pass through the

protective wire and log barricades that

were known to have been erected to seaward on the reefs and beaches. Also, there

was some doubt as to whether there would

be enough water over the reef at Tarawa

to permit Higgins boats to get through.

Experiments in breaking up such barricades as were expected in the Gilberts

were made with these amphibian tractors

and turned out favorably.17

Steps were then taken to procure enough

amphibian tractors to carry the assault

troops ashore at both Tarawa and Makin.

At Efate the 2d Marine Division had on

hand about one hundred tractors, of which

seventy-five were considered to be operational. These were old models (LVT(1)'s),

unarmored and susceptible to mechanical

failure. The division requested the assignment of a hundred new models (LVT(2)'s)

from San Diego. The request was granted

but sufficient transport to carry the vehicles into the combat area could not be provided. In the end, naval authorities released three LST's to do the job and fifty

additional amphibian tractors reached the

2d Marine Amphibian Tractor Battalion

at Samoa just before it set sail for Tarawa.

Thus, for the attack on Betio, the marines

had a total of 125 amphibian tractors

which, excluding those earmarked for

purely logistical duties, was sufficient to

make up the first three waves of the

assault.18

The 27th Division received forty-eight

LVT's for use at Makin. These were not

delivered at Oahu until 29 October, only

thirteen days before sailing for the island.

Before the 29th only one tractor had been

available for training. Nevertheless, a provisional company from Headquarters,

193d Tank Battalion, had been organized

on 21 October to operate these vehicles

and was felt to be trained sufficiently to

warrant use in the operation.19

Another amphibious development introduced into the Central Pacific Area

during the Gilberts operation was the extensive employment of pallets for unloading supplies. Pallets had been employed

15

 Secretary of the Navy, Continuing Board for the

Development of Landing Vehicle, Tracked, History

of Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Washington, 1 Dec 45). 16

 Miller, Guadalcanal, p. 75. 17

 Fifth Amph Force Rpt, Capture of Gilbert

Islands, p. 10. 18

 Stockman, Tarawa, pp. 4-5. 19

 USAFICPA Participation Rpt GALVANIC, pp.

65-66, 97-98; 193d Tk Bn Rpt of Makin Opn, Sec.

XIII, Rpt of Provisional Amph LVT Co, p. 34.
PREPARING FOR THE ATTACK 49

by the 7th Infantry Division in the Aleutians and had been reported upon favorably by that division after its arrival in the

Hawaiian Islands. Pallets are sledlike

structures to which supplies are strapped.

Those used in the Aleutians had measured

about four by six feet and were smoothbottomed, like toboggans. Experiments

were conducted on Oahu both with this

type and with one that had runners attached. The toboggan type was found to

be more satisfactory on rough coral, while

the sled type was discovered to be better

on sand and finger coral. Fifteen hundred

pallets of the toboggan type and 350 of the

sled type were built for the Makin operation.20

 In the end, the assault force palletized virtually all of its supplies with the

exception of 55-gallon drums.21 These pallets, heavily loaded with supplies, could be

unloaded from landing craft by tractor

and moved to inland dumps so rapidly

that under ideal conditions a lighter could

be unloaded in an estimated one twelfth of

the time taken by the standard manhandling method.22

In the Gilberts operation, this technique

of palletization was used to an appreciable

degree only at Makin. The 2d Marine Division constructed few pallets. However,

the one battalion commander at Tarawa

who reported on the subject considered

that the employment of pallets there would

have been feasible, and the transport quartermaster of Holland Smith's V Amphibious Corps later commented favorably on

the experiment conducted by Army troops

at Makin.23

Troops, supplies, and equipment of the

Northern Attack Force were loaded in the

Hawaiian area aboard four APA's and one

AKA.24 Three LST's carried between them

the forty-eight amphibian tractors assigned

to the assault force and a company of medium tanks was carried aboard the LSD

Belle Grove. These four amphibious vessels

also carried between them 791 troops. All

of the transports were combat loaded—this

is to say, each tactical unit was embarked

aboard a single ship with its supplies and

equipment stowed in inverse order to their

probable tactical employment during the

landing. High-priority material was normally stowed near the top and center of

ships' holds; low-priority near the bottom

and on the outside. Thus, the 1st Battalion

Landing Team of the 165th Regimental

Combat Team, consisting of 1,044 officers

and men with their essential supplies and

equipment, was loaded aboard the Neville;

2d Battalion Landing Team, numbering

1,219, aboard Leonard Wood. In addition,

each of these vessels carried shore parties

from the 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, and

sundry other personnel including air liaison parties, shore fire control parties, observers, and newspaper correspondents.

The attack cargo ship Alcyone carried, in

addition to its load of supplies and equipment, miscellaneous units of the 165th

Regimental Combat Team such as the

Service Company, the Cannon Company,

27th Division Quartermaster Company

Detachment, 27th Division Signal Company Detachment—in all 288.25

20

 USAFICPA Participation Rpt GALVANIC, p. 46. 21

 Ibid., p. 27. 22

 Interv, Edmund G. Love with Col Charles B.

Ferris, Sep 47. 23

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl F, Rpt by

Special Staff Officers, Sec. VIII, Rpt by Transport

Quartermaster, p. 4. 24

 The troopships were Leonard Wood, Calvert, Neville

and Pierce; the cargo ship (which also carried some

troops) was Alcyone. 25

 Ltr, Hq 27th Inf Div to CG Port of Embarkation, Fort Mason, California, 7 Dec 43, Incl 2, sub:

Capacities of Listed Ships Cargo and Actual Combat

Load Details, AG 327-Inf (165)-4.8(25054), DRB

AGO.
SUPPLIES PALLETIZED for the Gilberts operation. Method of loading and strapping

(above); an LVT towing a loaded pallet during the actual operation (below).
PREPARING FOR THE ATTACK 51

Besides their troops, each of the three

attack transports was loaded with the following supplies and equipment: all Table

of Basic Allowance equipment and individual and organizational property for the

units aboard except for certain items, such

as chemical warfare equipment, that were

ordered left behind; 10 days' rations plus

2 days' K rations carried by each individual on board; one 5-gallon container of

water per man on board; 7 days' motor

fuel for bulldozers and other vehicles

aboard, 5 units of fire for all weapons, 10

days' medical supply for all units, and 7

days' supply of ordnance cleaning and preserving materials, and spare gun parts.

Average poundage per soldier on these

three ships came to 1,322.

The Alcyone, the only attack cargo ship

assigned to the Northern Attack Force,

carried in addition to the troops mentioned, the following supplies and equipment: 24 days' B rations for the entire

force; approximately 3,000 5-gallon cans

of water; sufficient gasoline for 8 days' operation for all motor vehicles; approximately 18,750 gallons of white gasoline;

over 70,000 gallons of diesel oil; 28,200

gallons of high-octane gasoline for the amphibian tractors; 7,684 gallons of motor

oil; 3,655 pounds of grease; 5 units of fire

for all weapons on board; 5 units of fire for

one battery of 105-mm. howitzers; 4 units

of fire for the weapons of the medium tanks

carried aboard the Belle Grove; 4 units of

fire for the two .30-Caliber and one .50-

caliber machine guns on each of the amphibian tractors carried aboard the 3

LST's; slightly more than 30 days of medical supplies; 30 days of maintenance for all

items in ordnance; about 1.5 tons of chemical warfare supplies; approximately 30

days' quartermaster supplies for the entire

force; 30 days' signal supplies; and 30

days' engineer maintenance for an engineer combat battalion and 20 days' maintenance requirements for an infantry division less the combat battalion.26

The 2d Marine Division, loading in New

Zealand, experienced somewhat more difficulty than did the 165th Regimental

Combat Team. This was because in many

cases ships assigned to the division failed

to arrive in Wellington until just before the

scheduled time for loading. Before their

actual arrival, division headquarters had

little information about ships' characteristics. Not knowing in many cases the names

of the ships or even the type of ships to be

assigned, Marine planners had no reliable

information on such vital matters as the

size of ships' holds and hatches, troop

spaces, and so forth. Hence, loading plans

could be only tentative and had to be revised at the last minute as individual vessels put in their appearance at Wellington.27

Nevertheless, the ships were combat

loaded in a manner at least satisfactory

enough to elicit no adverse comment from

the division commander. Thirteen APA's,

three AKA's and one LSD completed loading and left Wellington on 1 November

1943.28 In addition, three LST's carrying

amphibian tractors met the division at

Samoa.

26

 Ibid., Incl 1, Logistics of Makin Island Opn, 27th

Div Task Force; S. L. A. Marshall, Makin Notes (2d

draft), p. 182, OCMH. 27

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl F, Rpt of

Special Staff Officers, Sec. VIII, Rpt of Transport

QM, p. 1; Ibid., Incl G, Rpt by Special Observers, Sec.

II, Rpt by Capt Richard F. Whitehead, USN, p. 1. 28

 The following ships were used to lift the 2d

Marine Division: Zeilin, Heywood, Middleton, Biddle,

Lee, Monrovia, Sheridan, La Salle, Doyen (all APA's);

Thuban, Bellatrix (AKA's); and Ashland (LSD). 2d

Marine Div Special Action Rpt, 6 Jan 44, Incl A,

Narrative Account of Gilbert Islands Opn, p. 1.
52 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Preliminary Air and Naval Action

Well before the crystallization of plans

for the invasion of the Gilberts, bombers of

the Seventh Air Force had commenced to

harass those islands as well as nearby

Nauru. In January and February reconnaissance missions were sent over the Gilberts and on 20 April a flight of twentytwo B-24's took off from Funafuti for a

thousand-mile run to Nauru. There, in

spite of heavy interception, they hit the

runway recently constructed by the Japanese as well as the local phosphate plant.

Two days later twelve B-24's struck Tarawa with moderate success.29

At this time Funafuti and Canton were

the only two Allied bases within range of

the Gilberts, and these were so far away as

to make regular bombing runs difficult

and hazardous. Hence, in order to

strengthen American control of air approaches to these islands, the Joint Chiefs

in July authorized the seizure of other

islands for the construction of new airfields

from which to conduct neutralization and

reconnaissance.30 Accordingly, early in

August, Admiral Nimitz ordered three

Marine defense battalions to "occupy,

organize, and defend the atolls of Nukufetau and Nanomea at the earliest practicable date . . . and to construct airfields

thereon."31 These two islands, both in the

Ellice group, were respectively about 600

miles south and 350 miles east of Tarawa.

An advance survey party landed at Nanomea Atoll on 18 August to determine

whether it was occupied by the enemy and,

after reconnoitering, to select a site for an

airfield. No Japanese were discovered on

the atoll, and ten days later the advance

party was followed ashore by the forward

echelon of the 7th Marine Defense Battalion and detachments from two naval construction battalions. Meanwhile, on 22

August, an advance party of the 2d Marine Airdrome Battalion landed at Nukufetau, and was followed five days later by

the remainder of the battalion and elements of a naval construction battalion.

The Marine contingent at Funafuti was

strengthened and naval construction

troops sent there. All units began at once

the construction of new airfields and the

improvement and enlargement of existing

facilities.

The transformation of these atolls into

air bases progressed rapidly. By 7 September a 5,000-foot airstrip was ready for use

at Nanomea, and by the end of the month

a full squadron of planes was operating

from there. Work at Nukufetau was somewhat slower, but the strip was ready for

use by 9 October.32

On 11 August a small task force was sent

by General Richardson to develop Baker

Island, a U.S. possession about 480 miles

due east of the Gilberts. This expedition

was composed of the 804th Aviation Engineer Battalion, a provisional antiaircraft

artillery battalion, a provisional air service

support squadron, a fighter squadron, and

miscellaneous service elements. The force

carried equipment and supplies sufficient

to construct, operate, and maintain a base

for ninety days. It arrived at Baker on 1

September. A week later a strip capable of

supporting fighter planes was already in

use.33

Thus, on the eve of the invasion of the

Gilberts, the Seventh Air Force had five

29

 Craven and Cate, AAF IV, pp. 286-88. 30

 Rad, JCS to CINCPAC, CM-IN 14465, 20 Jul

43.

31

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Aug 43,

par. 56. 32

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Sep 43,

pp. 3-4. 33

 USAFICPA Participation Rpt GALVANIC, p. 145.
PREPARING FOR THE ATTACK 53

bases within bombing range of those

islands. Funafuti, Nukufetau, and Nanomea each had two bomber squadrons; on

Canton were stationed one bomber squadron, one fighter-bomber squadron, and one

fighter squadron; Baker had one fighter

squadron.34 Advance headquarters of the

Seventh Air Force was opened at Funafuti

on 6 November, and at approximately the

same time Admiral Hoover's flagship Curtis anchored in the lagoon.35

The first air attack in the Gilberts operation occurred on 13 November when

eighteen B-24's took off from Funafuti to

bomb Tarawa. They dropped about fifteen

tons of bombs on the target, starting a large

fire but causing no other observable damage. Although no enemy interception was

met, antiaircraft fire was unusually heavy.

On the next day nine B-24's bombed

Tarawa again, causing some damage to the

airstrip. The same day, the first strike was

launched against Mille Atoll, the nearest

of the Marshalls. Of the twenty planes that

started for Mille, only nine reached the

target. They dropped four tons of bombs

on the airfield. Although antiaircraft fire

from both Tarawa and Mille was heavy,

there was still no interception by enemy

planes. On 15 November the strikes were

extended to include Jaluit in the Marshalls. Seventeen bombers hit that atoll,

causing damage to the seaplane base and

sinking ships in the lagoon. Another strike

by eight B-24's was conducted against

Mille and Makin the same day. The airfield at Mille was again damaged and

again there was no air opposition.

On 16 November the air offensive

moved farther west, to Kwajalein Atoll. Of

twenty planes assigned the mission that

day, only one reached the primary target.

The others turned back and dropped their

bombs on Jaluit, in the Marshalls, and

Tarawa and Little Makin, in the Gilberts.

The same day six B-24's set out for Maloelap, but were unable to drop their bombs

because of poor weather. For the first time,

enemy fighters arose to intercept the attack. On 17 November, the day immediately preceding the scheduled arrival of

the American carrier force in the target

area, twenty bombers hit Tarawa, Mille,

and Maloelap. Considerable damage was

reported to have been done to the airfields

at Tarawa and Mille. At Maloelap the

bombers were intercepted by Japanese

fighters and in the ensuing action one B-24

was badly damaged and crashed at Baker

Island on its return flight.

In all, the heavy bombers of the Seventh

Air Force had flown 141 bombing sorties

against the Gilberts and Marshalls between 13 and 17 November. They dropped

about 173 tons of bombs and destroyed at

least five enemy aircraft. Of course, it is

impossible to calculate the extent of the

damage done to the airfields and defense

installations in the Gilberts, since the same

area was later covered by carrier aircraft

and then by naval guns just before the

invasion.36

While the bases for the air offensive

against the Gilberts were being built and

reinforced, other preliminary moves

against the targets were taking place. A

fast carrier task force (Task Force 50)

under command of Admiral Pownall was

organized early in September to strike the

Gilberts in order to "decrease enemy pressure on our holdings in the Ellice Islands,"

which the Japanese had bombed from

Tarawa and Makin. This force was to de34

 Craven and Cate, AAF IV, p. 298. 35

 Operational Hist of Seventh Air Force, 7 Dec 41-

6 Nov 43, p. 66, MS filed in Air University Historical

Liaison Office, Washington, D. C. 36

 Ibid., pp. 88-90; Craven and Cate, AAF IV, pp.

299-302.
54 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

stroy aircraft and installations at Tarawa,

Makin, and Apamama and to conduct

such reconnaissance as was possible.37

The naval force that approached the

Gilberts during the night of 17-18 September consisted of three carriers, three

cruisers, and eleven destroyers. It was to be

supported by twenty-four B-24's flying

from Canton and Funafuti and fourteen

flying from Guadalcanal. The planes of the

first group were to attack Tarawa just before dawn on 18 September; those from

Guadalcanal were to hit Nauru at the same

time. Twenty-eight photoreconnaissance

planes from Canton and Funafuti were to

join the task force in the area of Tarawa

and combine bombing runs on that island

with their photographic mission.

Arriving near Tarawa during the early

morning hours of 18 September, the carriers launched their first flight at approximately 0330, hoping to take advantage of

moonlight for their initial runs. There was

not enough light, however, and the planes

had to hover over the island until daybreak. Between then and 1822 of the same

day six separate attacks were made against

Tarawa, during which eighty tons of

bombs were dropped and all visible installations strafed. One attack was launched

against Makin at daylight and another

against Apamama later in the morning.

The airfield at Nauru was reported to be

neutralized. At Tarawa considerable quantities of fuel and ammunition were destroyed, several buildings were wrecked,

and a small freighter was sunk. At Makin

three large flying boats were set on fire,

and some damage was done to shore installations. The most important single

achievement of the strike was the photographic coverage of Tarawa and Makin by

both carrier- and land-based aircraft. At

Tarawa opposition from antiaircraft artillery was intense, but at Makin it was extremely weak. No fighter interception was

encountered at either target, but two Japanese medium bombers were shot down

northwest of Makin.

The carrier force retired to the south

during the night. Next day the attack was

continued by twenty B-24's from Canton

and Funafuti. The bombers were intercepted by enemy fighters over Tarawa,

where the airfield had been repaired during the night. Of the eighteen Japanese

fighters that rose to meet the attackers, six

were definitely destroyed and four more

listed as probably destroyed. During these

two days of operations American losses

were five planes, one of them a bomber

that crash-landed at Nanomea on its

return from the second flight.

The raid on the Gilberts was followed

eighteen days later by a naval carrier strike

against Wake. Led by Rear Adm. Alfred

E. Montgomery, USN, Task Force 14, the

largest carrier striking force yet assembled

in the Pacific, hit Wake on 5 and 6 October. Sixty-seven Japanese planes were reported destroyed in the air and on the

ground, and shore installations were

heavily damaged.38

Then, commencing on 13 November,

the land-based bombers of Admiral

Hoover's Task Force 57 made nightly attacks on Tarawa and Makin as well as on

Nauru and islands in the central Marshalls. A total of sixty-six planes participated in these raids before November 20.39

Finally, during the two days before the

landings, both Navy and Army planes delivered last-minute softening-up blows. The

37

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Sep 43,

pp. 7-10. 38

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Oct 43,

pp. 5-8. 39

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Nov 43,

Annex E, p. 20.
PREPARING FOR THE ATTACK 55

NAURU ISLAND under attack by Liberator bombers of the Seventh Air Force.

first strike was against Nauru. At 0300 on

18 November one group of Admiral Pownall's task force launched eighteen fighter

planes for a dawn strike against that

island. They were followed, three hours

later, by twenty more fighters and then, at

intervals of two to three hours, by dive

bombers, torpedo bombers, and more

fighters. All day long these planes bombed

and strafed Nauru. By the day's end about

ninety tons of bombs had been dropped.

Installations on the island were reported

to have been severely damaged. One Japanese ship was left burning, and three or

four medium bombers were destroyed on

the ground. Four or five enemy fighters

sought to intercept the attack, but all were

shot down.40

The carrier attack on Nauru was followed next day with strikes by land-based

planes. Seventh Air Force bombers, accompanied by Navy photoreconnaissance

aircraft, bombed both airfields and shipping, causing considerable damage and

removing Nauru as a threat to operations

in the Gilberts.41

At the same time the Gilberts themselves

were brought under heavy aerial attack.

On 19 November, nineteen B-24's from

Nukufetau and Funafuti dropped about

ten tons of bombs on Tarawa, causing fires

throughout the area and damaging the

airfields. Twelve more planes, from Nanomea, dropped twenty-three tons on

40

 Ibid., p. 26. 41

 Operational Hist of Seventh Air Force, 6 Nov 43-

31 Jul 44, pp. 91-93, MS filed in Air University Historical Liaison Office, Washington, D. C.
56 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

TABLE 1—AMMUNITION EXPENDED BY JAPANESE ON TARAWA AND MAKIN 13-19 NOVEMBER 1943

Tarawa

Makin

Type of

Ammunition

127-mm. AA

75-mm. AA

13-mm. MG

8-inch

14-cm.

13-mm. MG

Rounds Expended

a

 1,433127 a 51,160

46

104 a

 9,100

Rounds Remaining

3,290

1,345

14,903 b

b

2,400

a

 Minimum rounds expended.

b

 Not available.

Source: CINPAC-CINCPOA Translation 10018, Summary of the American Army Counterattack in the Gilbert Area of November 1943,

Imperial Headquarters, Army Department, dated January 1944; PACMIRS Captured Japanese Document MR-50 (D-65), Military Action

in the Gilbert Islands (Girubato shoto ni okeru sento), translated by Joseph Guilfoyle, filed in OCMH.

Makin.42 Planes from the Northern and

Southern Carrier Groups released ninetyfive tons of bombs on Makin and sixtynine on Betio Island. One enemy plane

was shot down by the Northern Carrier

Group off Makin while three were disposed

of near Tarawa. Cruisers and destroyers of

the Southern Carrier Group moved close

to Tarawa shortly before noon on 19

November and, between air strikes, bombarded ground defenses.

The same day the Interceptor Carrier

Group of Admiral Pownall's task force

moved into position northwest of Makin

and, from a point about midway between

the Gilberts and the Marshalls, launched

a series of attacks against Jaluit and Mille.

One hundred and thirty tons of bombs

were dropped on these two atolls. Power

stations at both places were destroyed,

hangars burned, and other buildings hit.

Runways were rendered unserviceable at

Mille and three vessels in the lagoon were

damaged. Seven aircraft were destroyed

on the ground.

Although it is impossible to determine

the exact amount of damage wrought by

this pre-D-Day bombardment, one certain

fact emerges—the Japanese wasted a considerable amount of their precious ammunition against these aerial attacks. Whatever else the preliminary bombardment

may or may not have accomplished, it

wreaked havoc on the enemy's ammunition

supply. (Table 1, above.)

The heavy expenditure of 13-mm. machine gun ammunition was particularly

important since these weapons were to

form the main basis of ground fire defense.

It is clear that the Japanese recognized the

seriousness of the problem. One of their

dispatches sent back to Tokyo warned,

"We must quickly replenish ammo for

the 13 mm. MGs on both Tarawa and

Makin."43

Movement Overseas

Following the final rehearsal at Maui

on 4 November the Northern Attack Force

had returned to Pearl Harbor, where most

of the troops debarked for a week's rest

42

 Ibid., pp. 90-91. 43

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Translation 10018.
PREPARING FOR THE ATTACK 57

SOUTHERN ATTACK FORCE steaming toward the Gilberts; in the foreground a TBF-1

Avenger performs an antisubmarine patrol.

and rehabilitation. Part of the task force

had already left for the Gilberts. On 31

October six LST's, escorted by a destroyer,

had left Oahu carrying part of the garrison troops that would occupy Makin after

its capture. Five days later, as soon as refueling could be completed after the return from the rehearsal, the three LST's

carrying amphibian tractors and the special landing groups that would man them

departed for Makin with a destroyer escort. They traveled by a shorter route than

the first convoy and were scheduled to

arrive at their destination at precisely the

same time as the main body of the assault

force, which was to leave Pearl Harbor on

the afternoon of 10 November.44 Although

the Northern Attack Force, the Northern

Carrier Group, and the Interceptor Carrier Group all departed from the Hawaiian

Islands at the same time, they did not

travel together; the two carrier groups

moved along a course parallel to that followed by the Northern Attack Force but

about 300 miles to the northwest. The two

routes of approach changed approximately 800 miles east of the Gilberts, with

the Northern Attack Force turning to meet

the Southern Attack Force, the two carrier groups diverging and moving directly

to their assigned stations.

Meanwhile, following rehearsals in

Efate, the Southern Attack Force, composed of transports, fire support ships, and

auxiliaries, sortied from that island on 13

44

 TF 54 Movement Order A1-43, 20 Oct 43;

CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Nov 43, Annex

E, Plate II.
58 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

BRIEFING TROOPS on scale models of Butaritari. This training during the voyage to

Butaritari facilitated the landings.

November. It was followed by the fast battleships, cruisers, and carriers of the Southern Carrier Group. Two days later, on 15

November, the Relief Carrier Force, composed of two carriers, three cruisers and

four destroyers, left Espíritu Santo, also in

the New Hebrides. The last-named force

moved almost directly north, toward

Nauru. The Southern Carrier Group and

the Southern Attack Force moved along

courses roughly parallel to each other,

which brought them to points just south of

Funafuti, where all ships refueled. From

there the courses diverged, the Southern

Carrier Group going directly to its appointed area west of Apamama and

Tarawa, and the Southern Attack Force

moving in a northerly direction to a rendezvous on 18 November with the Northern Attack Force coming from Pearl Harbor.45

 Thereafter, ships of the two convoys

moved along parallel courses toward the

Gilberts to the northwest, the Northern

Attack Force pulling slightly to the north

as the islands were approached.

Late on the afternoon of 18 November

the northern LST group, still ahead of the

rest of the assault force, had been discovered by Japanese planes. One enemy

bomber attacked the little convoy but was

driven off by antiaircraft gunfire. On 19

November at 1435 another Japanese plane

45

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Nov 43,

Annex E, p. 3 and Plate II.
PREPARING FOR THE ATTACK 59

appeared overhead, but just as it was

about to launch an attack, four U.S.

fighter planes arrived on the scene and

shot it down in flames. A more determined

attack on the LST's was made after dark

when two other Japanese bombers

swooped low over the slow-moving vessels.

The first, hit by ships' antiaircraft fire,

burst into flames and fell into the sea, just

missing the bow of one of the vessels. Burning gas lighted up the entire convoy for

several minutes. Soon afterwards the second enemy plane left without inflicting

any damage.46

Aboard the transports, troops were undergoing their final briefing. At the last

minute (on 19 November) General Ralph

Smith decided to make one minor revision

in the landing plan for the 165th Infantry

on Makin. He requested permission to

land one infantry company and one shore

fire control party on the northeast tip of

Butaritari on the afternoon of D Day and

to land the balance of the battalion and

one shore fire control party on the south

end of Kuma Island on the morning of D

plus 1.47 The object of this scheme was to

set up a second envelopment of the Japanese—to catch the enemy as he was

pushed eastward by the main attack or as

he attempted to move across the reef to

Kuma Island.48 Whatever merit the plan

may have had, it went untested. On General Holland Smith's advice, Admiral

Turner turned down the request and reaffirmed his intention to go through with the

original landing plan.

In the early hours of 20 November the

two attack forces reached their separate

destinations. The transports moved toward

their debarkation areas and the fire support ships moved into shore for the initial

bombardment. In the dim light of the

early morning, the invasion of Butaritari

and Betio began.

46

 USS LST 31 War Diary, pp. 50-52. 47

 Fifth Amph Force Rpt, Capture of Gilbert

Islands, Incl A, p. 14. 48

 Interv, Philip A. Crowl with Maj Gen Ralph C.

Smith, 30 Oct 50.
CHAPTER IV

The Enemy

Japanese Invasion of the Gilberts

Japanese interest in the Gilberts dated

from the earliest days of the war. The primary strategic purpose of the empire at the

beginning of the war was the occupation

and development of what was called the

Southern Resources Area—the Netherlands Indies and adjacent regions. It was

this part of the Pacific that contained most

of the raw materials considered essential

to Japan's economic welfare and military

potential. As a corollary to the seizure of

these islands, it was also believed necessary

to maintain free lines of communication

between the Japanese homeland and the

Southern Resources Area. Finally, to

guarantee the permanent success of its

ventures, Japan hoped to cripple Allied

naval strength in the Pacific and establish

a strong defensive perimeter to protect the

homeland and its new economic adjunct

to the south. To accomplish these objectives, Japanese strategists contemplated

three successive steps: the establishment of

a perimeter along a line from the Kurils

through the Marshalls, the Bismarcks,

Timor, Java, Sumatra, and Malaya to

Burma; the consolidation and strengthening of this perimeter; and the defense of

the perimeter.1

The responsibility for carrying out this

plan in the Central Pacific and in the Bismarcks area fell to the 4th Fleet, which before Pearl Harbor commanded naval

ground force garrisons in the mandated

islands from its headquarters at Truk. According to Imperial Navy plans formulated in November 1941, the mission of

the 4th Fleet at the beginning of the war

was:

1. Defend the South Sea Islands, patrol,

maintain surface communications, capture

Wake. At opportune time attack and destroy

enemy advanced bases in South Pacific Area.

In co-operation with Army capture Guam

and then Bismarck Area.

4. Defend and patrol points in South Sea

Islands and Bismarcks. Maintain surface

communications. Search for and attack enemy shipping. Make surprise attacks and de- stroy enemy bases on our perimeter.2

The main offensive thrust was to reach

southward to the Bismarcks area, while in

the east the perimeter was to be held and

strengthened by the capture of Wake. A

minor part of this plan was the seizure of

Makin Atoll in the Gilberts in order better

to protect the more important Marshall

Islands to the north. Makin, lying 0°40'

east of the boundary of the Japanese Mandate, offered the advantage of being located about 240 nautical miles southeast

of Jaluit, the most important seaplane base

in the lower Marshalls. The seizure of

Makin and its subsequent development

1

 United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS)

(Pacific), Naval Analysis Division, The Campaigns of

the Pacific War (Washington, 1946), pp. 2-3. 2

 Ibid., pp. 47-48.
THE ENEMY 61

into a seaplane base would make it possible to extend air patrols closer to Howland, Baker, and the Ellice Islands and to

protect the eastern flank of the Japanese

perimeter from possible Allied advance

through the Ellice-Gilberts chain. Also,

since Makin was the northernmost of the

Gilberts, it could be the most easily supplied by transport from the Marshall

Islands.3

On 3 December 1941 one company was

detached from the 51st Guard Force based

on Jaluit and constituted the Gilberts Invasion Special Landing Force under Air Force

command. This force, consisting of from

200 to 300 troops plus laborers, left Jaluit

by ship on 8 December and on the 10th

reached Makin Atoll, which was forthwith

occupied. One of the troopships also visited Tarawa on 24 December. The entire

operation yielded nine prisoners.4

After the invasion the Makin garrison

set about constructing a seaplane base and

coastal defenses. By August of 1942 the

garrison had dwindled to only 43 men

under a warrant officer, and it was this

tiny group that was called upon to defend

the atoll against the first American landing in the Central Pacific.5

Carlson's Raid and Its Aftermath

On 17 August 1942 the 2d Marine

Raider Battalion, consisting of 221 marines under the command of Colonel Carlson, landed on Makin from two submarines. The primary purpose of this raid

was to confuse the Japanese and cause

them to divert forces that might otherwise

be assigned to the Guadalcanal area.6

Carlson himself stated the secondary purposes of the raid:

This task group will execute landings on

Makin from the USS NAUTILUS and USS

ARGONAUT on 17 August for the purpose

of destroying enemy troops and vital installations and to capture important documents

and prisoners.7

In the early hours of 17 August the raiders disembarked from the two submarines

into rubber boats powered by outboard

motors and landed on the southern coast

of Butaritari. Heavy swells and mechanical failures in some of the engines prevented the party from making two separate

landings as originally planned, but eventually fifteen out of the eighteen boats

managed to get ashore at one landing

beach, while two others landed a mile

north and another a mile south.8

Just after the landing one of the marines

accidentally discharged his rifle. Believing that all chance of surprise was lost,

Colonel Carlson ordered Company A of

his battalion to proceed across the island

3

 USSBS (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division, The

American Campaign Against Wotje, Maloelap, Mille and

Jaluit (Washington, 1947), pp. 18-19. 4

 The 51st Guard Force was part of the 6th Base Force,

which was under command of 4th Fleet.

Base Forces, Guard Forces and Defense Forces

(Konkyochitai, Keibitai, Bobitai), Vol. 1, Dec 41-May

42, in U.S. National Archives, World War II Seized

Enemy Records, Record Group 242, NA 12029,

WDC 161090; 6th Base Force War Diary (Dairoku

konkyochitai senji nisshi), NA 12654, WDC 160599.

Hereafter documents contained in the National Archives collection will be cited by title, National Archives (NA) number, and Washington Document

Center (WDC) number. 5

 Land Forces (Rikujo butai), Vol. 2, NA 1 1665,

WDC 161013. 6

 Ltr, CinC US Pacific Fleet to CinC US Fleet, 20

Oct 42, sub: Solomon Islands Campaign — Makin

Island Diversion, 6-13.0002/42(20756), Hq USMC

Historical Division. 7

 TUG 7.15.3 (2d Marine Raider Bn) Opn Order

1-42, 7 Aug 42. 8

 This account of Carlson's raid is taken from the

following sources: CO 2d Marine Raider Bn, Rpt of

the Raid Against Makin, 17-18 Aug 42, dated 3 Sep

42; Ltr cited n. 6; Ltr, CTG 7.15 (USS Nautilus) to

CTF 7, sub: Rpt of Marine-Submarine Raider Expedition. All of these reports are on file at Headquarters, USMC Historical Division.
62 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

to the lagoon shore. By 0545 the company

commander, Capt. Merwin C. Plumley,

USMC, reported that he had captured

Government House without opposition,

and he was then ordered west along the

lagoon road. By this time it had become

apparent that the Japanese defenses were

concentrated at the base of On Chong's

Wharf on the lagoon shore and at Ukiangong Point, the southwesternmost promontory of Butaritari. Carlson asked for

naval gunfire in this area, and Nautilus

complied by firing some twenty-four

rounds. Throughout the day isolated

groups of Japanese were encountered,

spirited fire fights ensued, and a number

of enemy were killed. The chief Japanese

response to the landing was from the air.

At 1130, two Japanese naval reconnaissance planes scouted the island, dropped

two bombs and then flew back north to a

base in the Marshalls. About two hours

later, twelve enemy planes arrived and

bombed and strafed for an hour and a

quarter. Two of the planes landed in the

lagoon and were destroyed by Marine

machine gun and antitank rifle fire. The

third and last air raid occurred at 1630.

Shortly thereafter, at 1700, the marines

began an orderly withdrawal to the southern coast, and within two hours the bulk

of the battalion was boated, but only a few

were able to get through the heavy surf

and back to the submarines. A hundred

and twenty men were left on the beach

that night. By the following morning still

more marines made their way through the

surf, but at 0920 further evacuation was

halted by an air raid, leaving seventy

men, including Colonel Carlson, stranded

on the beach.

At this point, the battalion commander

discovered that Japanese resistance was

practically nonexistent, consisting of only

a few troops scattered about the island. He

sent out patrols to search for food and destroy the Japanese radio station at the base

of On Chong's Wharf. A cache of aviation

gasoline of 700 to 1,000 barrels was fired,

and the marines ranged freely about the

island, meeting only the most feeble resistance. The office of the Japanese commandant was searched and all available

papers secured. Finally, on the evening of

the second day, evacuation was completed

and all of the rubber boats reached the

Nautilus.

This expedition cost the lives of thirty

marines. Left ashore were twenty-one dead

and nine others who were later captured

and beheaded.9 In retrospect, the entire

expedition appears to have been ill advised. Though little of any importance was

learned and no subsequent attempt was

ever made in the Pacific war to emulate

the Makin raid, the observations of Major

Roosevelt, who was Carlson's executive

officer, were later of some value to the intelligence staff of the 27th Infantry Division in preparing plans for the ultimate invasion of Makin. Otherwise, there is no

evidence that the raid of August 1942

made any significant contribution to

Allied victory in the Pacific.

On the other hand, there is every reason

to believe that this raid induced the Japanese to commit to the Gilberts far heavier

forces than they had originally contemplated. To that extent the progress of

American arms across the Central Pacific

was made more difficult. The Japanese response to Carlson's expedition was immediate. Troops were drawn from the Marshalls, the Carolines, and Japan and sent

to garrison hitherto-unoccupied islands in

the British Mandates. The Gilberts now

9

 Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions,

pp. 240-41.
THE ENEMY 63

were occupied in force, and garrisons were

established as well on Nauru and Ocean

Islands. Before August, in all the islands

south of the Marshalls the enemy had

only the small force on Makin. After August they began a build-up in this area

that was to result in several island strongholds under an entirely new base force

command. Even if it cannot be proved

conclusively that Carlson's expedition was

the sole cause of this change in policy, the

raid can with certainty be credited with

a rapid acceleration in the Japanese

program of building up defenses in the

Gilberts.

No time was lost in replacing the Makin

garrison. On 19 August, four reconnaissance seaplanes from Kwajalein made a

close search of the Makin area and found

no trace of the Americans. This indicated

that the coast was clear for a counterlanding, in full company strength, which the

Japanese had started to organize at Jaluit

as soon as news of the raid was received.

On the 20th a small advance detachment

was flown to Makin from Jaluit and was

shortly followed by the bulk of the force

transported by ship. The nine marines left

on Butaritari were taken prisoner and the

equipment that Carlson was forced to

abandon was captured.10

Now began a series of small troop movements from all directions into the fringe of

British island possessions bordering the

Marshalls. Nauru was invaded on 25 August and Ocean Island on the 26th. On the

29th a landing force composed of one

company of the 43d Guard Force (western

Carolines) took over Nauru. Two days

earlier a company detached from the 62d

Guard Force (Jaluit) commenced to garrison Ocean. This unit was joined a few days

later by a company from the 41st Guard

Force from Truk. Another company, from

the 5th Special Base Force, left Saipan on 28

August and on the 30th arrived at Makin,

where it was to remain pending the arrival

of a special naval landing force from the

Japanese homeland.11

These moves were followed by the invasion of Apamama, which lasted from 31

August to 4 September.12 More important

still, the entire Yokosuka 6th Special Naval

Landing Force (SNLF) was dispatched from

Japan to the Gilberts in September. This

force consisted of 1,509 officers and men

and was the first unit of any considerable

size to arrive in the area. It was these

troops that were to remain in the Gilberts,

chiefly on Tarawa, until the American invasion in November 1943.13

 On 15 September the main portion of the 6th SNLF

arrived at Tarawa, and detachments were

subsequently transferred to Apamama

and Makin.

In September and October small parties

were sent from Tarawa to snuff out the few

remaining communications centers maintained by the Allies in the area. Since the

beginning of the war a number of Australian and New Zealand coastwatchers had

stayed in various islands of the central and

southern Gilberts, observing Japanese air

and surface movements and radioing important information to the Allies. These

the Japanese now proceeded to eliminate

quickly. On 26 September a small party

landed on Beru Atoll and destroyed a

British wireless station there. Next day

Tamana Atoll was invaded. Here the Jap10

 6th Base Force War Diary, NA 12654, WDC

160599; Base Forces, Guard Forces, and Defense

Forces, Vol. 2, Jun 42-Nov 42, NA 12053, WDC

161110. 11

 Ibid.; 41st Guard Force War Diary, NA 12134,

WDC 161744. 12

 Land Forces, Vol. 2, NA 11665, WDC 161013. 13

 JICPOA Translation 3998, 6th Base Force Secret

Directive 104-43.
64 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

anese destroyed communications equipment and captured two Allied soldiers and

one wireless operator. Also on the 27th, a

second landing party captured communications equipment on Maiana, Nonouti,

and Kuria Atolls. Later, in October,

Maiana and Nonouti were revisited and

Abaiang and Beru raided, netting more

wireless sets and a few prisoners. By 6 October the Japanese declared that the Gilberts were completely cleared of enemy

personnel, and that all communications

installations had been destroyed.14

Thus the Makin raid of August 1942

constitutes a clear line of demarcation in

Japanese policy in the Gilberts. Before

that time there were only forty-three men,

under command of a warrant officer, stationed in the whole area. Within a month

after Carlson's battalion landed on Makin,

the total garrison for the Gilberts came to

more than 1,500 troops plus four companies on Nauru and Ocean. Just as significant was the change in the command

structure for the area. Before August 1942

the only command located in the Gilberts

was the Special Landing Force at Makin.

This force was subordinate to the 62d

Guard Force based on Jaluit, which was

subordinate to the 6th Base Force on Kwajalein, in turn subordinate to the 4th Fleet

at Truk.15 The Yokosuka 6th SNLF, assigned

to the Gilberts with headquarters at

Tarawa after the Carlson raid, was immediately under the 6th Base Force at Kwajalein. Under this headquarters two subordinate commands were set up at Makin

and Apamama. In addition, two new

commands were set up under the 6th Base

Force—the 43d Guard Force Dispatched Landing Force on Nauru and the 62d Guard Force

Dispatched Landing Force on Ocean Island.16

The Gilberts and the nearby islands of

Ocean and Nauru were obviously achieving greater status in Japan's defensive

strategy.

Throughout the winter and early spring

of 1943 other steps were taken to improve

defenses in the Gilberts. Another recognition of the increased importance of this

area came on 15 February 1943 when the

Yokosuka 6th Special Naval Landing Force was

deactivated and the command in the Gilberts was renamed the 3d Special Base Force.

The new command was made responsible

not only for the defense of Tarawa, Makin,

and Apamama Atolls, but also of Nauru

and Ocean Islands.17 This was a significant command reorganization reflecting

clearly the change in Japanese attitude

toward the importance of the Gilberts

after Carlson's raid. In the beginning of

1942 Japan had nothing more than a

lookout station in the Gilberts subordinated to a guard force command, which

was in turn responsible to a base force at

Kwajalein. Now, in February 1943, Japanese forces in the Gilberts were constituted as a base force command on an

echelon equal to that of the Kwajalein

base force command.

Parallel to these developments in command organization was the steady progress

being made in fortifying the various islands

and improving their military potentialities.

Beginning about 1 January 1943, the Japanese steadily shipped 4th Fleet laborers,

mostly Koreans, to the islands south of the

Marshalls for construction work. Some in14

 Land Forces, Vol. 2, NA 11665, WDC 161013. 15

 4th Fleet War Diary (Daishi kantai senji nisshi),

NA 11398, WDC 160336; 6th Base Force War Diary,

NA 12654, WDC 160599; 4th Base Force Achievement

Records, in General Account of Achievements in

Campaigns of the Greater East Asia War (Daitoa

sen'eki koseki gaiken), NA 11617, WDC 160654. 16

 6th Base Force War Diary, NA 12654, WDC

160599. 17

 Base Forces and Guard Forces, Vol. 3, Dec 42-

May 43, NA 12055, WDC 161108.
THE ENEMY 65

dication of the cost involved in the fortifications under construction is afforded by

the fact that, on 4 March 1943, 7,409,000

yen ($1,736,669.60) was earmarked for air

base construction in the Gilberts and land

fortifications on Nauru.18

An even stronger indication of the increasing importance of the Gilberts to

Japanese defensive strategy was the detachment of the Sasebo 7th Special Naval

Landing Force from the Southeastern Area

Fleet (Rabaul) and its commitment to

Tarawa under the 4th Fleet. Arriving in

May, the force remained on Tarawa until

the American invasion in November.19

This move as much as any other single

event was evidence of the declining significance attached by the Japanese high

command to the Solomons-New Guinea

area, and by the same token of the increasing importance of the Central Pacific, including the Gilberts. Also in May, the

Japanese established a new plan of overall defense called the Z Operation. According to this plan the defensive perimeter

was drawn through the Aleutians, Wake,

the Marshalls, the Gilberts, Nauru, Ocean,

and the Bismarcks. The principal positions

along the perimeter were to be strengthened and local commanders were to be responsible for defense in case of invasion.

Garrison forces at the point of attack were

instructed to destroy the enemy at the

shore line. If the enemy should succeed in

forcing a landing, local forces were to

counterattack persistently in an effort to

delay the invaders as long as possible and

to prevent the establishment of bases.20

Meanwhile, construction of fortifications and airfields was proceeding apace.

The main concentration of effort was on

Tarawa. Concrete and log emplacements

for guns of all sizes up through 14 centimeters were constructed, transmitting and

receiving stations set up, coconut trees

logged and transported from outlying

islands, tank barricades and tank pits constructed, underwater obstacles emplaced,

and dugouts made for individual riflemen

and machine gunners.21 Similar though

not nearly so extensive preparations were

being made concurrently on Makin.

The air base on Makin was completed

and ready to accommodate reconnaissance

and fighter seaplanes by July 1943. At

Tarawa construction on an airstrip was

begun in October 1942, and a trial landing of a land-based bomber was made on

28 January 1943. By 31 May the major

runway on Betio, Tarawa Atoll, was 80

percent completed, positions for planes

100 percent, and a secondary runway 40

percent.22

Thus, while high-level staff planners of

the Allied forces were gradually coming to

the decision to institute a drive across the

Central Pacific, the Japanese in that area

were preparing against the expected attack as rapidly as conditions permitted.

Necessity had compelled the Japanese to

admit the probability of defeat in the

Solomons-New Guinea area though Rabaul, it is true, had not yet been given up

as lost, and valiant efforts were to be made

in the autumn of 1943 to save that bastion

from disaster. As the year wore on, however, it became more and more apparent

that the most immediate threat to Japan's

perimeter defense was in the Central Pacific, and it was here that the Japanese

18

 Special Forces (Tokusetsu butai, Vol. 3, Part 1,

NA 12032, WDC 161106. 19

 Tabular Records of Special Landing Forces, NA

11651, WDC 161406. 20

 USSBS, Campaigns of the Pacific War, pp. 6-7. 21

 JICPOA Translation 5085, Construction of Fortifications at Tarawa, Nauru, and Ocean Islands; Special Forces, Vol. 3, Part 2, NA 12028, WDC 161705. 22

 Japanese Bases in the Mandated Islands and

Gilberts, MS, Office of Naval History.
JAPANESE COASTAL DEFENSES. 8-cm. naval guns installed in log emplacements on

Makin (above) and Tarawa (below).
THE ENEMY 67

high command hoped to force a showdown with the invading forces from the

east.

American Attacks and Japanese

Responses

September witnessed the opening of the

first large-scale American aerial attacks

against the Gilberts and nearby islands.

Planes of Admiral Pownall's fast carrier

force, assisted by Army Air Forces B-24's

from Canton and Funafuti, struck Makin,

Tarawa, and Nauru on 18-19 September.

According to one Japanese diary, twentyeight laborers were killed during the strike

on Makin, probably from a direct hit on a

shelter.23 The damage done by the raid on

Betio was more serious. The runway was

hit, although not seriously enough to prevent repair by labor troops.24

 The antenna

mast of a receiving station was knocked

half down, and a transmitting station completely destroyed. A storehouse and a hospital were completely destroyed, as were

the entire air force kitchen and half of the

Sasebo 7th Special Naval Landing Force kitchen. The damage to air communications

installations was particularly serious. The

transmitting station destroyed by the air

raid was evidently the chief means of communication with other islands and on

Betio itself, judging by the measures taken

to restore it—two transmitters were borrowed from the Sasebo 7th Special Naval

Landing Force (one set from the receiving

room and one from the medium attack

plane command post) and another from

the 3d Special Base Force.25

Following the raid, one of the island

defenders wrote in his diary: "The island

is a sea of flames. . . . Seven of our medium attack bombers were destroyed and a

great number of our guns were damaged.

Moreover, shell dumps, ammunition

dumps, various storehouses and barracks

on Bairiki [the island just east of Betio]

were destroyed. A great number of men

were killed and wounded."26

Whether or not this individual report

was exaggerated, the response of the Japanese at Tarawa was immediate. On 24

September, Rear Adm. Keiji Shibasaki,

IJN, commanding officer of the 3d Special

Base Force, ordered the commanding officers of the 111th Construction Unit and the

4th Fleet Construction Department Detachment

to build immediately a bombproof shelter

for communications equipment.27 Later, it

was reported: "Work was started immediately and is scheduled to be completed

during October. After the work is completed, one transmitter and three receivers

will be installed in the station. No matter

what happens, we hope to be able to maintain radio communications."28

 At the

same time work was begun on a transmitting station, which according to plans

was to be of concrete and to contain three

short-wave transmitters and one longwave transmitter with attachments. Completion date was scheduled for December.29

Another important result of the September raids was the evacuation of aircraft

from Tarawa. Before the raids there had

been three air installations in the 3d Special

Base Force area, airfields at Nauru and

Tarawa, and a seaplane base at Makin.

23

 JICPOA Translation 4991, Extracts from a Diary

at Makin. 24

 Base Forces and Guard Forces, Vol. 4, Jun 43-

Nov 43, NA 12030, WDC 161091. 25

 JICPOA Translation 4051, Report of Present

Conditions at Tarawa Air Base on 29 September

1943, 755th Naval Air Group, Tarawa Detachment. 26

 JICPOA Translation 3872, Diary of an Artilleryman in Yokosuka 6th SNLF. 27

 JICPOA Translation 5071, Gilbert Area Defense

Force Special Order No. 18. 28

 JICPOA Translation 4051. 29

 Ibid.
68 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

One of the most important duties of these

installations was to maintain patrols in the

southeast corner of the Japanese-held Central Pacific. Patrols from Nauru covered

the area south of that island; patrols from

Makin covered the area to the east; and

patrols from Tarawa extended to the

southeast between the other two.30 The

Japanese had originally intended to build

up the Tarawa airfield and plane complement to considerable strength, and by

early September there were 330 air personnel on the island and 18 planes. However, the Allied carrier strike of 18-19

September seriously disrupted operations

and installations and destroyed nine of the

planes.31 After this it was decided to evacuate the air units, and Tarawa was never

again used as a Japanese air base. After

the removal of the planes from Tarawa,

Makin assumed full responsibility for patrolling the Gilberts. By November there

were only four amphibious reconnaissance

planes at Makin charged with the dual

mission of reconnaissance and antisubmarine patrol.32

 For all practical purposes,

Japanese local air defenses were eliminated by the strikes of 18-19 September.

Meanwhile, the Japanese Navy was

preparing its own plans for a defense of

the Gilberts-Marshalls area and for a decisive engagement with the U.S. Pacific

Fleet. Plans for the defense of the Gilberts

by the Japanese Fleet were drawn up

about 8 September 1943 and included the

following moves: (1) Large and, if possible, small submarines in the Rabaul area

were to move up and operate in the vicinity of the Gilberts. (2) The 2d Fleet was to

advance and operate in an area west and

north of Nauru so as to decoy the U.S.

Pacific Fleet. Then, after thirty-six landbased attack planes from Rabaul had carried out attacks against the invading fleet,

the 2d Fleet was to move up to the Mille

area and continue operations. (3) If necessary, a destroyer squadron was to come up

from the Rabaul area and participate in

the operations. (4) Planes of the 3d Fleet

that were undergoing training were to join

in these operations if necessary, regardless

of the amount of training they had completed.33

In September 1943 the main striking

force of the Japanese Navy was based at

Truk and was under the command of Admiral Mineichi Koga, Commander in

Chief, Combined Fleet. It consisted chiefly of

the superbattleships Yamato and Musashi,

and two battleships and a destroyer

squadron from the 1st Fleet. Also included

in Koga's force were the 2d and 3d Fleets,

which had the combined strength of 3

carriers, 2 battleships, 11 heavy cruisers, 3

light cruisers, and a large number of destroyers.34

 It was this force that Koga tried

to hold together for a decisive blow against

the U.S. Fleet. His was ".. . not a plan

of any positive action to draw the American Fleet into a decisive action, but rather

to wait until the American Fleet came

up; and he felt sure that they were bound

to come up if he only waited."

 35

On two occasions before the American

landings on Makin and Tarawa, Koga

sortied from Truk with part of this formidable task force in the hope of meeting

American warships. Each time he had to

30

 JICPOA Translation 3590, Incl 1, Location of

Patrols. 31

 JICPOA Translation 4051. 32

 JICPOA Bull 8-44, Japanese Forces in the Gilbert Islands, p. 1. 33

 USSBS, Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 200. 34

 Tabular Records of Daily Movements of Japanese Battleships, Carriers and Cruisers, NA 11792,

WDC 160677. 35

 USSBS (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, 2 vols. (Washington,

1946), Vol. II, p. 512.
THE ENEMY 69

return to his home base without having

given battle. The first expedition occurred

in September when the admiral learned

that Pownall's fast carrier force was approaching the Marshalls-Gilberts area. Immediately he dispatched a large force,

composed of elements of the 2d and 3d

Fleets, which proceeded to Eniwetok, the

location from which he considered it best

to base an attack. The force consisted of 3

carriers, 2 battleships, 7 heavy cruisers,

and 3 light cruisers.36 It left Truk on 18

September and arrived at Eniwetok on the

20th. Not finding the expected American

task force (then operating well to the south

and east) the Japanese fleet returned to

Truk.

The second large fleet sortie from Truk

occurred in October when Koga's radio

intelligence indicated the strong possibility

of an Allied raid against Wake or the

Marshalls. Koga, hoping that this was the

opportunity for the decisive engagement

he had missed the previous month, once

again dispatched a large fleet from Truk to

Eniwetok on 17 October. The October

force was even more powerful than the

September one. Included were the same 3

carriers, plus 6 battleships, 8 heavy cruisers, and 3 light cruisers. These ships remained in Eniwetok for a few days then

sailed north some 300 miles toward Wake

and returned once again to Truk.37 No elements of the American fleet were encountered. Pownall's carriers, which had

conducted a highly successful strike against

Wake on 5-6 October, were by that time

safely back in the Pearl Harbor area.

While Admiral Koga was playing cat

and mouse with the elusive American task

forces in the Marshalls, American pressure

was threatening the Japanese Southeast

Area. At the end of September Imperial

General Headquarters adopted an operational policy for the Rabaul area "consisting merely of a whittling-down campaign

against the enemy which relied upon the

momentary use of crucial battle forces

when conditions were favorable."

 38

 This

policy was embodied in the RO Operation,

which was to utilize the planes of Koga's

Carrier Division 1 from land bases in the

Rabaul area, and was to have been activated around the middle of October. Since

the carriers of Division 1 were the only

vessels of this type in the entire Japanese

Navy with anywhere near full plane complements at the time, the RO Operation

would partially incapacitate the Japanese

Fleet. It was undoubtedly this consideration that led Koga to postpone the RO

Operation in order to make one last attempt

at a decisive naval engagement while he

still had his fleet intact. After failing in this

attempt and after his arrival at Truk on 26

October, he ordered the RO Operation activated and took steps to dispatch the planes

of Carrier Division 1 to the Rabaul area.39

This decision had a profound, and from

the American point of view, wholly beneficial effect on the forthcoming invasion of

the Gilberts and Marshalls.

Leaving their carriers behind at Truk,

a total of 173 planes of Carrier Division 1

flew down to Rabaul on 1 November and

remained in the area until the 13th.40

38

 Tabular Records of Battleships . . . , NA

11792, WDC 160677. 37

 Ibid. 38

 Historical Section, G-2, General Headquarters,

Far East Command, Japanese Studies in World War

II, No. 50, Southeast Area Naval Operations, Vol.

III, p. 5, OCMH. 39

 Aircraft Carriers (Kubo), Vols. 3 and 4 in Merit

Board of the Imperial Japanese Navy, Greater East

Asia War Campaigns: Materials for Investigation of

Meritorious Service (Daitoa sen'eki koseki chosa shiryo

tsuzuri), NA 12552 WDC 161734, and NA 12060,

WDC 161102. 40

 Tabular Records of Battleships . . . , NA 11792,

WDC 160677.
70 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

While there, they engaged in three air

battles and lost 121 planes or roughly two

thirds of the entire force.41 At the same

time, on receiving word of the Allied landing at Bougainville (1 November), Admiral Koga dispatched the 2d Fleet along

with elements of the 3d Fleet to Rabaul.

The force arrived at Rabaul on 5 November and was immediately subjected to a

fierce attack by planes from Rear Adm.

Frederick C. Sherman's fast carrier force

(Task Force 38) and again on the 11th not

only by Sherman's force but also by Admiral Montgomery's Task Group 50.3.42

Altogether, four of Koga's heavy cruisers

(Takao, Maya, Atago, and Mogami) were so

damaged during these strikes as to be nonoperational during the Gilberts invasion.

Another two (Myoko and Haguro) had been

put out of operation by gunfire and by collision during the initial landings on Bougainville at Empress Augusta Bay. Still

another (Tone) was in dry dock undergoing periodic check-up. Thus, of the

eleven heavy cruisers that Koga had had

under his command in September of 1943,

only four remained operational in midNovember. All but one of the remainder

had been temporarily put out of operation

at Rabaul or Bougainville.43

The loss of these cruisers, coupled with

the tremendous attrition of carrier planes

at Rabaul, meant that the Japanese battleships based at Truk were virtually immobilized, since they would not dare enter

combat without proper protection. The

sorry plight in which the Japanese Navy

now found itself, facing as it did an impending American invasion of the Central

Pacific, can best be summarized in the

words of Vice Adm. Shigeru Fukudome,

IJN:

But in November, as Bougainville landing

operations commenced, he [Koga] was forced

to send his air strength to Rabaul. As it

turned out, practically all of them were lost

at Rabaul and Bougainville. Consequently,

the Fleet air strength was almost completely

lost, and although the Gilberts fight appeared

to be the last chance for a decisive fight, the

fact that the fleet's air strength had been so

badly depleted enabled us to send only very

small air support to Tarawa and Makin. The

almost complete loss of carrier planes was a

mortal blow to the fleet since it would require

six months for replacement. ... In the

interim, any fighting with carrier force was

rendered impossible.44

No better testimony could be adduced

to the mutual interdependence of the various Allied forces operating in different

areas of the Pacific. Without the tremendous losses inflicted on the Japanese by

forces under General MacArthur and Admiral Halsey, the Central Pacific forces

under Admiral Nimitz would certainly

have faced far greater odds in their invasion of the Gilberts.

Japanese Defenses on the Eve

of the Attack

By the morning of 20 November when

the ships of Admiral Turner's Northern

Attack Force hove into view of Makin

41

 Japanese Studies in World War II, No. 50, Vol.

III, p. 26. 42

 Samuel Eliot Morison, HISTORY OF UNITED

STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD

WAR II, Vol. VI, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, 22

July 1942-1 May 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950), pp. 323-36. 43

 Tabular Records of Battleships . . . , NA

11792, WDC 160677; USSBS, Campaigns of the Pacific

War, pp. 152-53. 44

 USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, Vol. II,

p. 516. Perhaps even more important than the plane

losses was the attrition of carrier pilots. Of 192 flight

crews from Carrier Division 1 dispatched to the Rabaul

area in November 1943, 86 were lost. Japanese

Studies in World War II, No. 50, Vol. III, p. 26.
THE ENEMY 71

Atoll, the Japanese had on the main island

of Butaritari an estimated 798 men under

command of Lt. (j.g.) Seizo Ishikawa, commander of the 3d Special Base Force Makin

Detachment. This figure by no means represents the enemy's combat strength since

the majority were labor troops (mostly

Korean) whose combat effectiveness was

only slightly more than nil. The organization of Japanese forces on D Day was

roughly as follows:

Unit Number

Total............................... . 79 8

3d Special Base Force Makin Detachment.......... 284

Air personnel............................. 100

111th Construction Unit. ...................... 138

4th Fleet Construction Department Detachment...... 276

The air personnel were ground crews

left marooned on the island after the planes

had escaped. How well they were armed

or how effective they were as combat

troops it is impossible to know. Of the

labor troops, about 220 were Korean, the

remainder Japanese who were not in the

service either because of age or physical

infirmities.45 None of the labor troops was

assigned a battle station and none had any

training, although it appears that the

Japanese workers and perhaps a few

Koreans were issued rifles on D Day.

Thus, the maximum total of trained combat troops on Makin came to no more

than 384, and the actual number was

probably no more than 300.

As to defense installations, the Japanese

had been able or willing to fortify Butaritari with only a bare minimum. A perimeter defense had been established around

the seaplane base on the lagoon shore. (See

Map 77.) Defenses on the lagoon shore were

comparatively light, consisting mainly of

three dual-purpose 8-cm. guns at the base

of King's Wharf and a few machine guns.

Running from the lagoon to the ocean were

two tank barrier systems, each partially

guarded by strands of trip wire and covered

by antitank guns, machine guns, and rifle

pits. The West Tank Barrier was made up

of a wide ditch and a coconut log barrier.

The ditch extended from the lagoon approximately two thirds of the way across

the island, was 12 to 13 feet wide, and

about 5 feet deep. The log barrier, starting

at the south end of the ditch and extending

to the ocean shore, was about 4.5 feet high

and braced from the east by diagonal logs.

Altogether a total of one antitank gun, one

concrete pillbox, 6 machine gun positions,

and 50 rifle pits covered this barrier.

The East Tank Barrier, more heavily

fortified than that to the west, consisted of

a trench 14.5 feet wide by 6 feet deep

stretching from the lagoon about two thirds

of the way across the island and bent in the

middle toward the westward. From the

southern terminus of this trench to the

ocean shore a log antitank barricade had

been erected and a similar barricade lay to

the east of the northern section of the

trench. Double-apron wire and trip wire

had been laid in continuous lines across

the entire island in the same area. West of

the trap itself was an intricate system of

gun emplacements and rifle pits. Three

pillboxes of either log or cement barred the

approach to the trap. Lying between these

emplacements and connecting them was a

series of forty-three rifle pits, interspersed

with machine guns. Immediately to the

west of this line in the center of the island

was another group of twenty-three rifle

pits. On the south shore between the terminus of the road running from the end of

Stone Pier and the southern end of the

tank barrier were located nineteen more

rifle pits, two machine guns, and a 70-mm.

45

 JICPOA Bull 8-44, pp. 8-9.
JAPANESE TANK DEFENSES ON MAKIN. The West Tank Barrier (above); one of

the antitank gun emplacements at the East Tank Barrier (below).
THE ENEMY 73

howitzer, all placed to protect the ocean

shore.46

Along the ocean shore a series of strong

points had been established, incorporating

3 8-cm. coast defense guns, 3 antitank positions, 10 machine gun emplacements, and

85 rifle pits. Obviously, the Japanese expected that any invasion of the island

would be made on the ocean shore, following the example of Carlson's raid. On

either side of the heavily defended area

was an outpost consisting of a squad of

men, a lookout tower approximately 70

feet high, and telephone communication to

command posts within the fortified area.

The defended area was divided into

three parts. Aviation personnel were quartered in the eastern portion, the majority

of the garrison force lived in the center,

and the Korean laborers were billeted in

the western part.

The island of Betio in Tarawa Atoll was

much more heavily manned and fortified.

There the garrison, commanded by Admiral Shibasaki, consisted of an estimated

4,836 men organized as follows:47

Unit Number

Total.............................. . 4,836

3d Special Base Force ...................... . 1,122

7th SNLF.. ............................. . 1,497

111th Construction Unit .................... . 1,247

4th Fleet Construction Department Detachment ... . 970

Of this number, the members of the 3d

Special Base Force and the Sasebo 7th Special

Naval Landing Force were trained combat

troops. The extent of combat effectiveness

of the labor troops on the island is more

difficult to determine. The combat importance of these construction units usually

varied with the number of Japanese personnel since the Koreans were almost never

given weapons. The 4th Fleet Construction

Department was about 85 percent Korean

and the 111th Construction Unit about 30

percent Korean.48 Thus, if all of the Japanese laborers at Tarawa were trained and

equipped for combat, the total effective

strength on that atoll would have been

over 3,600. However, it appears that the

military organization of the labor troops

may have existed mostly on paper, and the

training program set up for them by the

Japanese, even if carried out, would at best

have provided a reserve force of limited

value.49 Thus, a safe guess as to the number of combat effectives on Tarawa would

probably be about 3,000.

Betio itself had been built into an island

fortress of the most formidable aspect. The

island had been organized for an allround decisive defense at the beach. (See

Map II.) The basic beach defense weapon

along the entire north coast and on both

sides of the eastern tip was the 13-mm.

machine gun. Along the western and

southwestern coasts the 7.7-mm. machine

gun was used for the same purpose. The

guns were located in open emplacements

to allow the additional mission of antiaircraft fires. Those on the northern coast

were so positioned as to permit flanking

fire to the front of artificial barriers (tetrahedrons) that had been emplaced along

the reef, or frontal fire on the direct approaches to the beach.

Inshore, organization for defense was

more haphazard. Bombproof ammunition

and personnel shelters were put to use as

defensive positions in depth, although they

had not originally been constructed for

that purpose. In some cases, the fire from

the doorways of these shelters was mutu46

 JICPOA Bull 4-44, Study of Japanese Installations on Butaritari Island, Makin Atoll, map facing

p. 1. 47

 JICPOA Bull 8-44, p. 4. 48

 JICPOA Translation 4096, Projected Installations at Jaluit and Truk. 49

 JICPOA Bull 8-44, p. 4.
74 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

ally supporting, but this was only by accident. For the most part they were blind to

attack from several directions, and since

they had not been designed as blockhouses,

had only a few firing ports. The basic

weapons were complemented by a network

of obstacles including antitank ditches,

beach barricades, log fences and concrete

tetrahedrons on the fringing reef, doubleapron high-wire fences in the water near

the beach, and double-apron low-wire

fences on the beach itself. The larger obstacles on the reef were designed to canalize the approach of boats into areas that

could be swept effectively by antiboat fires

from 127-mm., 80-mm., 7-cm., 37-mm.,

and 13-mm. guns. The lighter doubleapron fences were laid along diagonal lines

from the beaches, and machine guns were

emplaced in every case so that flanking

fires could be laid parallel to the wire and

just forward of it. Altogether, on Betio there

was a total of four 8-inch guns, four 14-cm.,

four 12.7 cm., six 8-cm., ten 75-mm. mountain guns, six 70-mm. howitzers, eight

7-cm. dual-purpose single mounts, nine

37-mm. field guns, twenty-seven 13-mm.

single mounts, four 13-mm. double mounts,

and seven tanks mounting 37-mm. guns.

Fire control equipment was installed for

the coast defense, and antiaircraft batteries, including range finders, directors,

and searchlights, had been set up. For the

most part weapons were mounted in carefully and strongly constructed emplacements of coconut logs, reinforced concrete,

and revetted sand. Ammunition and personnel were protected from shelling and

bombing by log and concrete bombproof

shelters covered with sand to increase safety

and improve camouflage. These shelters

were ordinarily placed opposite the interval between, and inshore of, pairs of guns.

Heavy gun ammunition was handled from

bombproof shelters to ready boxes in concrete emplacements by narrow-gauge railway and overhead chain hoist gear.50

This bare recital of enemy defense installations on Betio does only scant justice

to the really horrible obstacles that the attacking forces would have to overcome.

Tarawa was the most heavily defended

atoll that would ever be invaded by Allied

forces in the Pacific. With the possible exception of Iwo Jima, its beaches were better protected against a landing force than

any encountered in any theater of war

throughout World War II. Makin, by comparison, was lightly held. But any beach

guns that are manned and ready to fire are

formidable enough to the men of the first

waves of an amphibious landing force.

Boated in slow-moving craft, as they make

their way from ship to shore they offer

ideal targets to the waiting defenders—unless the latter have been destroyed, or at

least dispersed, by the attackers' naval and

aerial bombardment. It was the hope of

the landing forces at both Makin and

Tarawa that this would be accomplished

before the first troops touched shore.

50

 JICPOA and Intelligence Section, 2d Marine

Division, Study of Betio Island, Tarawa Atoll, 2 parts,

Part I, pp. 4-7.
CHAPTER V

The Landings on Makin

Red Beaches

On 20 November sunrise at Makin

came at 0612. Weather was fair. Wind was

east-southeast at thirteen knots, which

meant there was relatively little surf either

at the main landing beaches on the west

coast or inside on the protected lagoon.1 At

0603 the first of the troop-carrying transports, Leonard Wood, arrived on station in

the transport area off Red Beaches on the

western coast of Butaritari and commenced to lower her boats. Within four

minutes the three other transports and the

cargo ship carrying the 165th Regimental

Combat Team had followed suit. Admiral

Turner sent the signal that H Hour would

be at 0830 as planned and that William

Hour for the landing on Yellow Beach on

the north shore of the island would tentatively be 1030, a time subsequently confirmed. (Map HI)

From 0610 to 0640 carrier-based planes,

as scheduled, bombed, dive-bombed, and

strafed the western beaches and inland.

As they drew away, naval guns of the accompanying battleships, cruisers, and destroyers opened fire and kept up a steady

rain of shells until 0825, just five minutes

before the first troops hit the shore. While

this was taking place a half-hour rain

squall almost hid the island from the

anxious watchers aboard ship. Happily,

by 0800 the rain lifted and landmarks,

though still obscured slightly by smoke

and dust raised by naval fire, came into

fairly clear relief. As the ships ceased fire,

aircraft again flew in low to strafe the

beaches in a five-minute attack. Twenty

minutes later naval guns again took up the

chorus, keeping their bombardment well

to the front of the advancing troops.2

The damage wrought during this first

day by naval and aerial bombardment

was considerable. In the immediate region

of the main beaches and eastward little

real damage was done—the destruction

was generally confined to coconut trees,

native huts, and a few dummy gun positions. In the area of the West Tank Barrier,

neither the ditch nor the log barricade of

the trap was seriously damaged except

for one direct hit from a heavy bomb near

the northern terminus of the trench system. Just to the east of the main tank trap

lay a well-defined trench system running

at right angles to the beach. These trenches

were comparatively shallow and were

revetted at ends and intervals with coconut logs. The area was reported to be

badly shot up. One trench received a direct hit from a 2,000-pound bomb which,

1

 TF 54 Opn Plan A2-43, 23 Oct 43, Annex B, p.

43; Commander Central Pacific Force U.S. Pacific

Fleet, War Diary, 1-30 November 1943, Annex A,

p. 1. 2

 Fifth Amph Force Rpt, Capture of Gilbert Islands,

Annex A, pp. 14-15; V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt,

Annex B, Rpt by G-3, pp. 1-2; 165th Infantry Regiment Combined Journal Events and Message File,

20 Nov 43, located in AGO Records Administration

Center, Kansas City, Missouri.
76 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

in the words of Admiral Turner, "considerably scrambled the trench, Japs and

trees for some distance." Sixty-two enemy

dead were later counted in this one area,

most of whom were the victims of a combination of concussion and air bursts. In the

area south of Yellow Beach and east to the

East Tank Barrier all buildings were reported destroyed. Three 80-mm. antiaircraft positions at the base of King's Wharf

and two light tanks revetted to act as pillboxes were severely damaged. Forty-one

enemy dead were counted, of whom

twenty-five were apparently killed by concussion from heavy bombs.3

Although the covered shelters in this

area were not destroyed, a careful examination made by the 27th Division's artillery commander after the landing showed

that there was little in the area around

Yellow Beach that was not covered either

by a direct hit or by fragmentation. In his

opinion, "a high degree of neutralization

was obtained."4 Admiral Turner's final

conclusion was that "the effect of naval

and air bombardment was highly satisfactory; and contributed materially in the reduction of hostile resistance." "However,"

he added, "there was not enough of it."5

While the ships of the naval gunfire support group pounded away at Butaritari,

troops of the 165th Infantry continued to

debark. In the early morning light they

clambered down rope cargo nets into the

waiting LCVP's. As soon as each craft had

received its allotted quota of men (about

thirty-six each), it moved off for a short

distance and joined other small boats circling in the assembly area.6

At 0643 two LCVP's left the side of

Neville. Carrying a special detachment of

the reinforced 2d Platoon of Company G,

165th Infantry, and nineteen marines of

the 4th Platoon of the V Amphibious

Corps Reconnaissance Company, they

were headed for Kotabu Island about a

mile and a half north of Flink Point. Naval

bombardment preceded them as they

plunged into the ground swell for a ride of

almost an hour's duration.7

Shortly thereafter the three tractorladen LST's that had moved in separate

convoy to Butaritari hove into view

through the morning mist and took station

in the transport area at about 0700. Within an hour all the amphibian tractors

bound for Red Beaches were in the water,

circling and waiting the signal to approach

the beaches.8

At 0750 the order was given to move to

the line of departure.9 The amphibian

tractors formed two inverted V's, each

pointed toward a beach, and one by one

the other landing craft pulled off from

their circles and formed a series of triangular formations constituting the subsequent landing waves. Two destroyers,

Phelps and MacDonough, had taken station

approximately 2,800 yards west of Red

Beaches. When the first landing wave was

between them, the two ships began to

move slowly toward the island firing their

5-inch guns. At 0815 the first wave of amphibian tractors passed through the escorting destroyers and headed for the beach.

3

 Fifth Amph Force Rpt, Capture of Gilbert Islands,

Incl H, pp. 6-10; V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl

F, Rpt by Special Staff Officers, Sec. II, Naval Gunfire Rpt, pp. 1, 3. 4

 Ltr, 27th Inf Div Artillery Officer (Col Harold G.

Browne) to CTF 52.6, 7 Dec 43, sub: Rpt on Naval

Gunfire in Makin Opn, p. 2, AG 327 Art 0.3.0

(22866), DRB AGO. 5

 Fifth Amph Force Rpt, Capture of Gilbert Islands,

Incl H, p. 10. 6

 USS Leonard Wood Action Rpt, 20 Dec 43, p. 2;

USS Calvert Action Rpt, 28 Nov 43, p. 2. 7

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl C, p. 342. 8

 Fifth Amph Force Rpt, Capture of Gilbert Islands,

Incl A, p. 15. 9

 USS Leonard Wood Action Rpt, 20 Dec 43, p. 3.
THE LANDINGS ON MAKIN 77

They were followed by two waves of

LCVP's carrying the main body of the 1st

and 3d Battalion Landing Teams at approximately five-minute intervals. The

first wave of the 1st Battalion headed for

Red Beach on the left and contained 233

men in seven boats; the following waves

consisted of only six boats each. In the first

wave, at the rear center, was Lt. Col.

Gerard W. Kelley, the battalion commander, together with the commander of

Company D, the air-ground and Navy

liaison parties, and some battalion communications personnel. To the right was

the first wave of the 3d Battalion, heading

for Red Beach 2. It had a similar boat

schedule, with Lt. Col. Joseph T. Hart, the

battalion commander, and the commanding officer of Company M riding in the

same boat. Each battalion was accompanied by two LCM's carrying light tanks

with their crews, one light machine gun

squad, two rifle squads, and other personnel.10

As the leading wave of LVT's approached the beaches they commenced to

fire their rockets, but with less than even

moderate success. Many fell short into the

water; others would not fire at all because

of defects in their firing mechanisms

caused by salt water. At 1,000 yards the

amphtracks' (amphibian tractors') .50-

caliber machine guns opened fire, joined

200 yards farther in by their .30-Caliber

machine guns. No sustained fire from the

beaches was encountered. Off Red Beach

2 enemy rifle fire wounded one seaman

and killed another, but these were the only

casualties recorded during the ship-toshore movement. About forty yards offshore the amphibians came over the coral

reef. No barbed wire, mines, or other obstacles impeded them. At approximately

0831 the tractors touched the rocks and

lumbered up the beaches. The men of the

special landing groups scrambled over the

sides.11 Some sought cover, but many stood

still, waiting first for enemy fire before

taking precautions. Maj. Edward T. Bradt,

commanding the 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, and in charge of the special landing

groups, later described his action. "I

jumped down from my boat [sic] and stood

straight up for two or three minutes, waiting for somebody to shoot me. Nobody

shot! I saw many other soldiers doing the

same thing."12

Following the LVT's came the first

three waves of landing craft at about fiveminute intervals. The first wave was

scheduled to put a total of 460 men and

eight tanks ashore in an area removed by

approximately 3,000 yards from the main

defenses on the island. Although intelligence had revealed the presence of rocks

and coral pinnacles along the approaches

to the shore, Admiral Turner's staff was

satisfied that landing boats could get

ashore there at any time.13

They were wrong. The reef was studded

with coral boulders about forty yards off

shore. Coming in on a rising tide, some of

the landing craft were able to slip past the

boulders and were held less than a boat's

length (thirty-six feet) from the water's

edge, but many were broached, stranded,

or forced to put to sea again. The tanks,

10

 USS Phelps Action Rpt, 20-26 Nov 43, p. 2; USS

MacDonough Action Rpt, Bombardment of Makin

Island, 20 Nov 43, pp. 2, 3; BLT 165-1 FO 4, 11 Nov

43, Annexes B and C. 11

 193d Tk Bn Rpt of Makin Opn, Sec. XIII, Rpt

of Provisional Amph LVT Co, p. 34; Marshall, Makin

Notes, p. D1; Maj Millard C. Inskeep, Tanks in the

Makin Action, and Sgt Frederick A. Baxter, Armored

Force Action on Makin, MSS, OCMH. Major Inskeep

was Executive Officer, 193d Tank Battalion. 12

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. D1. 13

 TF 52 Amph Attack Order A3-43, 23 Oct 43,

Annex I.
78 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

LANDINGS ON RED BEACH were hazardous because of coral rock formations.

waterproofed for the landing, rolled off the

ramps into water which did not quite

drown them out. Ahead of them, the men

struggled in swells sometimes over their

heads, stumbled over rocks and slipped on

boulders, or sought cover at the edge of

the beach.

Red Beach, on the left, was a rubble of

coral boulders and proved usable for only

fifteen yards of its width. The seven landing craft of the first wave encountered

great difficulties getting ashore. Some did

not make it. The amphibian tractors that

preceded the first wave had to abandon

their original objectives to assist the boats

stranded on the reef. Those few landing

craft that did reach shore, moreover, found

it difficult to withdraw and allow later assault waves to land. As the tide receded,

landing operations were further complicated. Only the absence of enemy opposition in this area made possible a landing

without heavy casualties. Under any kind

of enemy fire the natural obstacles to a

landing here would have probably proved

catastrophic to the attacking troops.14

The carefully prepared sequence for the

arrival of various elements of the assault

and shore parties on Red Beach was

thrown into confusion by these conditions.

At best, only three boats could be landed

at one time, and the fifth wave was not

able to get ashore until shortly after 1000,

over an hour behind schedule.15

The landing on Red Beach 2, despite

better conditions, was also delayed. The

14

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. D1; 193d Tk Bn Rpt

of Makin Opn, Sec. XIII, Rpt of Provisional Amph

LVT Co. 15

 27th Inf Div G-2 Jnl, 20 Nov 43.
THE LANDINGS ON MAKIN 79

3d Battalion Landing Team, composed of

1,250 men, was scheduled to land there in

seven waves at five-minute intervals. Beginning at 0840 the first three waves

landed, but the remaining boats landed

singly, and it was 1022 before the seventh

wave arrived off the beach. During D Day,

in addition to these troops, Leonard Wood

sent ashore 4 tanks, 1 bulldozer, 5 jeeps, 4

antitank guns, and other portable equipment.16

 For the same period the transport

Calvert disembarked 913 troops (of the 1st

Battalion Landing Team) and eighty-two

tons of equipment, but at nightfall much

of the cargo was still afloat in landing

craft.17

Establishing the Beachhead

General Ralph Smith's plan called for

the rapid capture of Flink Point and

Ukiangong Point and the occupation of

all of the area east of Red Beaches to the

first beachhead line about 1,300 yards inland. The 1st Battalion Landing Team on

the left was to take Flink Point and the

left half of the beachhead line. The 3d

Battalion Team on the right was to capture Ukiangong Village and Point and

was responsible for the right half of the

beachhead line. On the completion of this

phase of the action, the 1st Battalion

Landing Team would relieve the 3d and

the latter was to go into division reserve in

the area north of Ukiangong Village.18

The main force of the 1st Battalion

moved directly forward toward the beachhead line, meeting only insignificant rifle

fire but retarded somewhat by the thick

vegetation and by debris and water-filled

craters resulting from the air and naval

bombardment. Their supporting light

tanks were of no assistance to the infantry

until late in the day. Bad communications

between tanks and infantry and terrain

difficulties slowed up the former's advance.

Except by staying on the road, they could

make no headway against the combined

obstacles of debris, shell holes, and marsh,

and on the main road inland they were

held up by large craters left by naval

shells.19

The 1st Battalion advanced with two

companies abreast. On the right, Company B and part of the 1st Platoon of

Company D, a heavy machine gun platoon, covered the widest zone; their first

action was the seizure of an undefended

observation tower that was protected by

barbed wire and log barricades. On the

left, Company C moved straight ahead

without waiting for its heavy weapons

platoon to land. Company A remained in

dispersed formation in battalion reserve.20

At the end of the first phase, at approximately 1030, Companies B and C held the

left half of the beachhead line just east of

Rita Lake, the largest of several shallow

ponds. The eastern edge of this pond

stretched almost the entire length of the

beachhead line south of the point at which

it was crossed by the island highway.

There, Company B had established contact with Company K of the 3d Battalion

just across the highway on its right flank.

Meanwhile, Company A had been dispatched northward to occupy Flink Point

and had progressed about halfway out

that peninsula.21

While the 1st Battalion was pushing

16

 USS Leonard Wood Action Rpt, 20 Dec 43, p. 3. 17

 USS Calvert Action Rpt, 28 Nov 43, pp. 2-3. 18

 27th Inf Div FO 21, 23 Oct 43. 19

 193d Tk Bn Rpt of Makin Opn, pp. 71-77; V

Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl F, Rpt by Special

Staff Officers, Incl 3, Rpt of Engineer Officer, p. 3. 20

 Marshall, Makin Notes, pp. B2-B4. 21

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 20 Nov 43, Msgs 26,

29, 35, 39, 40, 42.
DENSE VEGETATION ON BUTARITARI retards the advance of the troops.
THE LANDINGS ON MAKIN 81

DUMMY COAST DEFENSE GUN made from a coconut log.

forward against practically no opposition

in its sector, the 3d Battalion on the right

was making almost equally rapid progress

against an area that it had been believed

would be more vigorously defended. The

special landing group of Detachment X

had swung to the right after landing in

amphtracks and established a defensive

position on the southern flank. Company

K moved almost straight eastward; Company I fanned out in a triangular area between the main highway and the ocean

south of Company K's sector; and Company L, assisted by a part of the special

landing group, turned south to take

Ukiangong Village and to clear the whole

point beyond it.22

Contrary to expectation, no enemy fire

came out of the huts of Ukiangong Village,

and the native residents had all deserted.

By 1040 Company L could report practically all of Ukiangong Point secured

without opposition.23 What had been

thought to be defense installations proved

instead to be a stone-crushing plant, two

large dummy guns, some square piles of

coral rock, and a few bomb shelters.24

Sixty natives were discovered on Ukiangong Point, but thus far no enemy had

shown himself.25

Meanwhile, Company K was pressing

its advance on toward and beyond Rita

Lake. Finally, almost two hours after the

landing, one unit of this company met the

first Japanese to be encountered. Five of

22

 Marshall, Makin Notes, 3d BLT map, after p. F3. 23

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 20 Nov 43, Msg 30,

and G-2 Msg File, Msg 55. 24

 JICPOA Bull 4-44, Part III, pp. 65, 73-77. 25

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 20 Nov 43, Msgs 42,

43.
82 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

the enemy were killed. At 1055 Company

K reached the first beachhead line on the

east shore of Rita Lake and shortly thereafter was relieved by elements of the 1st

Battalion and went into reserve.26

Thus within less than two and a half

hours after the initial landing, the beachhead had been secured to a line 1,300

yards inland. Ukiangong Point had been

occupied and preparations were already

under way for making that area suitable

for the establishment of artillery positions

from which the main attack eastward to

the tank barrier could be supported. Part

of Flink Point had been secured and nothing stood in the way of securing the whole

of that peninsula, which was completed, in

fact, by 1240. No opposition of any consequence had yet developed. Except for the

initial difficulties in getting the troops

ashore against natural rather than manmade obstacles, the landing had been a

pushover.

Yellow Beach

Early in the morning of D Day, Admiral Turner had confirmed that William

Hour for the landing on Yellow Beach

would be 1030. According to the plan this

beach, which lay between On Chong's

Wharf and King's Wharf on the northern

(lagoon) shore of Butaritari, would be assaulted by the 2d Battalion Landing Team

of the 165th Infantry reinforced by tanks

of the 193d Tank Battalion. This force was

to move the short distance across the island

to the ocean shore, then branch to right

and left (west and east). The group on the

right would move toward the West Tank

Barrier in conjunction with a simultaneous push from the other side of that barrier by the 1st Battalion Landing Team.

The group on the left would establish

positions west of the East Tank Barrier

and hold there pending the reduction of

the West Tank Barrier and the capture of

the entire "Citadel" area including the

village of Butaritari.

The troops charged with assaulting Yellow Beach were carried aboard the transport Neville, the LSD Belle Grove, and the

LST 779. Aboard Neville were the 2d Battalion of the 165th Regiment, commanded

by Lt. Col. John F. McDonough, and the

reconnaissance platoon that was scheduled

for tiny Kotabu Island just north of Flink

Point. Belle Grove carried the tanks of Company A, 193d Tank Battalion, boated in

LCM's. Embarked on LST 779 was Detachment Z of the 105th Infantry loaded

in the sixteen LVT's that would make up

the initial assault wave.

After receiving the word at 0800 that

the Kotabu detail had taken that island

without opposition, this naval task unit

moved into its assigned transport area just

west of the lagoon and commenced debarking its landing craft. The LST proceeded through the channel and into the

lagoon before launching its amphtracks

with the special landing groups aboard. As

the tractors circled, the landing craft behind them slowly formed assault waves.

By 0915 they were ready to move toward

the beach. In the first wave were the sixteen amphibian tractors. Following it at

an interval of about one minute came the

second wave, eight LCM's carrying medium tanks, followed about two minutes

later by the third wave, seven LCM's carrying medium tanks. In the fourth wave,

which came two minutes later, were two

troop-carrying LCVP's accompanied by

four LCM's with light tanks aboard. The

next four waves were made up of LCVP's

26

 Ibid., Msg 43.
THE LANDINGS ON MAKIN 83

carrying the bulk of the assault troops with

one bulldozer embarked in the seventh

wave.27

As the landing forces moved toward

Yellow Beach the destroyers MacDonough

and Phelps opened fire with their 5-inch

guns, commencing at 1005.28 The sun by

now was bright, and the lagoon calm. The

beach, in flames, was covered by billowing

smoke.29

 About 1,100 yards from the

beach the LVT's discharged their rockets—six from each boat—laying down an

area barrage along the beach's edge. In

contrast to what had happened earlier in

the morning during the approach to Red

Beaches, the rockets worked.30 At 1025,

with the first wave still about 600 yards off

the beach, the two destroyers ceased firing

to allow a last-minute strafing run by the

carrier planes.31 As the planes neared the

beach, the first waves of amphtracks

slowed down for fear of coming under their

fire. The later waves slowed down too, and

kept their proper intervals, except for

those carrying medium tanks, which

bunched up slightly. These delays caused

the landing schedule to be set back about

ten minutes, but at least there was no piling up of waves as there had been during

the approach to Red Beach.32

As the troops renewed their progress toward shore, they came under enemy fire

for the first time about 500 yards from the

beach. This may have come from two steel

hulks that lay sunk in the shallow water

of the lagoon, or from On Chong's Wharf,

or from a small green and white patrol

boat moored to the wharf, or from the

shore itself. Also, from King's Wharf on

their left, the amphtracks were hit by bullets. Under this cross fire the men crouched

low in their tractors as they made the last

three hundred yard run into the beach.

The first touchdown was at 1041.33

One of the amphtracks ran up the seaplane ramp on King's Wharf. The men

disembarked and worked their way inland

by crawling along the western slope of the

causeway, which masked them from enemy fire. Unable to bring their weapons to

bear, the Japanese quickly fled and the

pier was taken by the attackers without

further contest.34 On the far right of the

first landing wave one of the tractors developed a defective steering device and

landed too far to the west in the On

Chong's Wharf area. All of the others

landed properly on Yellow Beach and began to move inland, swerving to the right

or left before disembarking the men of the

special landing group. Enemy shellfire

struck two of these vehicles, and among

the dismounting men five were reported

killed and twelve wounded.35 One lone

tractor went completely out of control and

drove straight across the island toward the

ocean shore through the main Japanese

defenses. It finally hung up in a shell crater

and two of its crew were killed by enemy

machine gun fire while the others escaped

to take cover in the brush.36

The first mission of the two halves of the

special landing group was to clear the enemy from the two wharves and construct

27

 USS Neville Action Rpt, 5 Dec 43, pp. 1-3. 28

 USS Phelps Action Rpt, Seizure and Occupation

of Makin Island, 5 Dec 43, p. 3. 29

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. G1. 30

 Ibid., p. F36. 31

 Fifth Amph Force Rpt, Capture of Gilbert

Islands, Incl A, p. 16. 32

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl B, G-3 Rpt,

p. 3.

33

 Ibid., pp. 3-4; USS Neville Action Rpt, 5 Dec 43;

Interv, Capt Bernard E. Ryan, CO Co E, 165th Inf,

in S. L. A. Marshall, file of intervs (hereafter cited as

Marshall Intervs), p. 38, OCMH. 34

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. F37. 35

 Interv, Capt William Ferns, CO Co M, 105th

Inf, Marshall Intervs, p. 55. 36

 Marshall, Makin Notes, pp. F36-F41.
YELLOW BEACH LANDING AREA. Landing craft head for the beach under the smoke

of the preinvasion bombardment (above); King's Wharf (below).
THE LANDINGS ON MAKIN 85

defensive beach blocks from the base of

each wharf to points about 150 yards inland. King's Wharf fell without a contest,

once the first troops had landed. On

Chong's Wharf, although beaten to kindling wood, still offered some cover to the

enemy and a force moved in to seize it at

once.

Deploying by squads, the right half of

the special landing group swung forward

against light opposition, pivoting on the

base of the wharf. It continued to move

westward in a line stretching about 150

yards from the base of the wharf. Little except light rifle fire was encountered. Two

machine gun positions were found at the

base of the wharf, but they were manned

by dead Japanese, evidently killed by

naval fire. While a squad worked out

along the pier, the inland end of the

group's line came up against a series of

dugouts or bombproof shelters. Grenades

were thrown inside, killing some of the

enemy immediately. Others were taken

prisoner as they emerged and still others

stayed within and temporarily avoided

capture. Now and then the Americans received a random shot, but no one was injured. All the shelters inland from On

Chong's Wharf were cleaned out before

noon. About thirty-five prisoners, mostly

Koreans, were taken and an estimated

twenty of the occupants were killed.37

Only 100 yards behind the first wave of

amphibian tractors came the LCM's with

their medium tanks. They hit the reef

lying from 150 to 200 yards offshore and

could proceed no farther since there was

only about 2.5 to 3 feet of water over the

reef. Ramps were lowered and the medium

tanks lumbered forward through the

shallow water. All but two of the fifteen

tanks reached the shore safely. These two

foundered in shell holes in the reef. In one

of them was Capt. Robert S. Brown, who

commanded the medium tanks and who

was thus left out of the action during the

critical phase when his presence ashore

was most needed.38 The difficulties of the

other foundered tank were later described

by the sergeant in command:

We . . . went forward about 25 yards and

hit a shell hole. We got out of that and went

about 15 yards more and hit another. The

water was about 7 feet deep and our tank

drowned out. The tank immediately filled

with smoke after hitting the second shell hole.

My driver said the tank was on fire. The crew

dismounted right there with great speed

through the right sponson door. I remained

inside the tank. As soon as the crew got out

of the tank they were machine gunned from

the shore and with more speed they came

back inside the tank. Something like an hour

and a half later we were picked up by an

alligator.39

Two of the mediums to land were hung

up in taro pits, although one eventually

freed itself and succeeded in getting into

the action before being hung up again.

The remaining eleven made their way to

the ocean shore of the island, then split up

and moved east and west against the two

tank barriers. There was no effective coordination between tanks and infantry, the

tanks operating independently. One ran

over a shelter while the infantry stood by

and killed about a dozen Japanese who

came out. Another wiped out a machine

gun nest at the base of the sandpit before

proceeding across the island to join the

other tanks going east. One tank moved

directly into Butaritari Village but encountered no opposition. Machine gun

nests and pillboxes were found in fair

37

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. F37. 38

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. EE2; 193d Tk Bn Rpt

of Makin Opn, p. 44. 39

 193d Tk Bn Rpt of Makin Opn, p. 56.
86 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

YELLOW BEACH LANDING of the 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry.

abundance, but no difficulty was reported

in wiping them out. No personnel casualties were reported by any of the tank

crews.40

Behind the tanks in the fourth and fifth

waves came the troops of the 2d Battalion,

165th Infantry, boated in LCVP's. Like

the tank-carrying craft ahead of them,

these too grounded on the reef.41 After a

short hesitation the men debarked into

knee-deep water and began their slow passage into shore. The intensity of fire from

the enemy increased. Radios, flame throwers, bazookas, and other equipment were

soaked or lost. Yet, in spite of the fact that

the troops were fairly closely bunched in

the water, they escaped with few casualties. Most of the fire was low in the water

and generally inaccurate. Only two were

killed; none wounded.42

At the beach the men of Companies E

and F, constituting the fourth and fifth

waves, divided. Up to this time the landing troops had had little or no opportunity

to locate definitely the almost incessant

fire that was being poured upon them from

the right flank as they approached the

beaches. At the outset it was believed that

at least a portion of this fire originated

from the two battered and scuttled hulks

that rested on the bottom just off the end

of On Chong's Wharf. The first effort to

eliminate this source of fire was made by

an LCVP from Neville. Under command

of Bosn. Joseph V. Kasper, this boat

40

 Ibid., pp. 41-59. 41

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. G2. 42

 Intervs, Capt Bernard E. Ryan and Capt Francis

P. Leonard, CO Co F, 2d Bn 165th Inf, Marshall

Intervs, pp. 38, 48.
HULKS OFF ON CHONG'S WHARF being bombed (above), while soldiers on the reef

cease activities to watch (below).
88 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

mounted three of its guns on the starboard

side and ran for the hulks at an angle permitting all guns to fire at once. Until one

gun jammed and the cross fire from the

beach compelled it to withdraw, the boat

poured a rain of lead against the supposed

enemy position. The fact that Boatswain

Kasper was fatally wounded during the

run added weight to the belief that these

derelicts constituted a serious menace to

the attacking troops.43

For the next two hours naval attention

centered around the two wrecked ships,

somewhat to the detriment of the troops

already ashore. All landing operations

were held up for over an hour, from 1125

to 1250, while carrier planes bombed and

strafed the hulks. Five bombers missed by

wide margins and when an attempt was

made to skip-bomb the targets, the bombs

merely bounced over the hulks.44 Then at

1219 the destroyer Dewey opened fire on

the same targets and kept it up until

1257.45 In such close quarters, firing on the

hulks endangered American forces approaching the beach. Some of the destroyer's shells hit the old ships and inflicted observable damage, but others

passed over the heads of the special landing groups and hit inland. As a result

Capt. William Ferns, who commanded the

special landing group, pulled his men back

100 yards east onto On Chong's Wharf

and immediately requested the cessation

of all naval and aerial bombardment

Soon the bombardment ceased.46

Meanwhile, landings of later waves on

Yellow Beach had been interrupted. Medical aid men, who were needed ashore, and

Maj. Dennis D. Claire, who was supposed

to command the forces moving to the left

from Yellow Beach against the East Tank

Barrier, were still afloat in landing craft

waiting to go in.47 In spite of the distraction caused by the hulks, the assaulting

troops had penetrated the Citadel area,

the most strongly fortified on the island,

lying between the two tank barriers. In

spite of adverse hydrographic conditions

and in spite of moderate fire from the

shore, the first phase of the assault on

Yellow Beach had been successfully completed with only minor casualties.

43

 USS Neville Action Rpt, 5 Dec 43, pp. 7, 8; V

Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl B, G-3 Rpt, p. 4. 44

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. F30a; V Phib Corps

GALVANIC Rpt, Incl F, Rpt by Special Staff Officers,

Sec. 1, Rpt by Air Officer, p. 4. 45

 Fifth Amph Force Rpt, Capture of Gilbert

Islands, Incl A, p. 17. 46

 Interv, Capt Ferns, Marshall Intervs, p. 56.

Captain Ferns states that there were two destroyers

participating in this shelling. Admiral Turner's narrative of the action, however, indicates that only one,

Dewey, was firing at this time. Fifth Amph Force Rpt,

Capture of Gilbert Islands, Incl A, p. 17. 47

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. F30a.
CHAPTER VI

Reduction of the West

Tank Barrier

Advance of the 2d Battalion

to the Barrier

Following the leading waves of amphibian tractors and medium tanks in to Yellow

Beach of Butaritari came the assault companies of the 2d Battalion Landing Team,

Company E on the left and Company F on

the right. To Company E, commanded by

Capt. Bernard E. Ryan, was assigned the

task of establishing a line across the island

west of the East Tank Barrier and holding

there against possible attack from the east

until the West Tank Barrier had been

eliminated. This was intended to be primarily a defensive mission and the details

of the company's actions on D Day will be

treated later.1 Company F, under command of Capt. Francis P. Leonard, with

elements of Company G later attached,

had the main offensive mission of moving

against the West Tank Barrier in co-ordination with the 1st Battalion Landing

Team, which was supposed to be approaching the same objective simultaneously from the opposite direction. (See

Map III.)

The preliminary mission of Company

F was for its two assault platoons, the 2d

on the left and the 1st on the right, to

move directly across, the atoll. This mission

completed, the 1st and 3d Platoons were

to swing right, with the 1st on the left

flank, and head westward for the West

Tank Barrier. The 2d Platoon was to

revert to company reserve and follow the

center of the line some fifty yards behind.

Two light machine guns were stationed between the assault platoons, and the 60-mm,

mortars remained in the vicinity of Yellow

Beach to support the attack from that

area.2 To the rear of Company F, Company G (minus 2d Platoon), commanded

by Capt. Paul J. Chasmar, was to land

and to act as reserve force for Captain

Leonard's company as it moved to the

south and west.3

The main enemy installations of the

West Tank Barrier were first encountered

by Company F rather than by the right

half of the special landing group of the

105th Infantry, which had been landed in

amphibian tractors. That group had become involved almost immediately in

cleaning up the lower end of On Chong's

Wharf and in demolishing various shelters

between the wharf and the highway in the

area through which they were to deploy

for the move westward.

1

 See below, pp. 17-22. 2

 Interv, Capt Leonard, Marshall Intervs, p. 48.

Note: Because of poor visibility the mortars were not

used at any time to support Company F's attack

against the West Tank Barrier. 3

 Interv, Capt Chasmar, Marshall Intervs, p. 62.
90 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

As soon as the two assault platoons of

Company F waded ashore and finished

their reorganization at the beach, they

plunged inland. Only scattered rifle fire

greeted them during this movement. The

only established enemy positions found by

the assault troops during the first two

hours in this area were two machine gun

emplacements and seven wholly or partly

demolished buildings located at the base

of On Chong's Wharf and abandoned by

the enemy.

Company F's initial move from the

beach was, as planned, almost due south.

The 1st and 2d Platoons, with the two

light machine guns of Company H, the

heavy weapons company, carried along

between them, started out for the ocean

shore. It took them until shortly after noon

to reach the opposite side of the island.

They struggled through the debris and over

the marshy ground beyond the east-west

highway without coming to grips with the

unseen and scattered Japanese riflemen.

Some of the defenders withdrew deeper

into the woods, but some remained behind

in concealment to keep up a nerve-wracking fire on the American infantrymen as

they advanced across the island. Company

F lost one man killed and one wounded

from this harassment and managed to

eliminate four Japanese and four Korean

laborers.4 Although a number of shelters

were encountered, no fire was received

from them.

The only serious handicap to the troops

as they moved southward was the terrain

and vegetation and a breakdown of communications between the 1st and 2d Platoons of Company F. Their radios had become waterlogged and messenger service

between the platoons was inadequate. The

result was a gap between the two assault

platoons. To fill this growing hole in the

line, Company F's 3d Platoon was brought

forward from reserve and committed. This

meant moving Company G (less 2d Platoon) closer to the advance where it could

be used if further strength was needed.

However, Company G's 3d Platoon had

already been ordered to take a light machine gun squad and relieve the special

landing group at the base of On Chong's

Wharf. This relief started at 1145, and the

diversion of 3d Platoon, Company G, from

the main line of advance necessitated calling on some elements of Company H as

reinforcement for Company G in its role

as reserve.5 These reserve troops now

moved into the center of the island and

combed the area behind the advancing

line.

The mopping-up operations were described in detail by 1st Sgt. Pasquale J.

Fusco:

Smoking out the snipers that were in the

trees was the worst part of it. We could not

spot them even with glasses and it made our

advance very slow. When we moved forward, it was a skirmish line, with each man being

covered as he rushed from cover to cover. That meant that every man spent a large

part of his time on the ground. While at

prone, we carefully studied the trees and the

ground. If one of our men began to fire

rapidly into a tree or ground location, we

knew that he had spotted a sniper, and those

who could see the tree took up the fire. When

we saw no enemy, we fired occasional shots

into trees that looked likely.6

As the advance elements of Company F

reached the ocean shore they found no live

installations. The center platoon did come

upon two unoccupied machine gun emplacements with a barbed-wire barricade

4

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. F26. 5

 Intervs, Capt Leonard and Capt Chasmar,

Marshall Intervs, pp. 48-50, 62-63. 6

 Quoted in Marshall, Makin Notes, p. F30.
REDUCTION OF THE WEST TANK BARRIER 91

and a rifle trench—all abandoned by the

enemy. Though these positions had been

primarily designed to resist a landing from

the south and to control the road along the

ocean shore, they could have been used

upon troops advancing from the lagoon.

Luckily they were not. Company F's first

mission was accomplished with amazing

ease.7

On arrival at the ocean Company F

immediately began to reorganize its lines,

a movement completed by about 1230.

The platoon of Company G that had relieved the special landing group near On

Chong's Wharf had been forced to withdraw during the time the destroyer Dewey

shelled the hulks, but it now recovered the

ground it had given up and took position

straddling the island highway on the right

flank of Company F.

Meanwhile, Colonel McDonough, 2d

Battalion commander, had accompanied

Company F in its advance toward the

southern shore. Shortly before its reorganization, he left the line and returned to

Yellow Beach in an effort to bring up the

medium tanks to support the coming advance toward the West Tank Barrier. He

ordered Capt. Wayne C. Sikes, a tank officer, to take charge of the tanks in the

center of the line while Lt. Col. Harmon L.

Edmondson, commander of the 193d Tank

Battalion, proceeded at once to the south

shore with two of the mediums. By 1230,

five more had crossed the island and were

ready to assist on the left flank of Company

F's line.8

With these five tanks in support, Company F immediately jumped off for the

main attack to the westward. The tanktrap clearing still lay some 300 to 400 yards

away. As the troops approached it they

found a number of underground shelters

that yielded both Japanese soldiers and

labor troops. Some of the labor troops were

armed with knives and at least one carried

a rifle. After the tanks had moved up and

put heavy fire against the shelters, infantrymen followed with TNT pole charges,

which were shoved into the openings of

shelters. Flame throwers, which would

have been the ideal weapon against such

emplacements, had been doused during

the landing and were of no use. During

this first engagement Company F lost

eight killed and six wounded. By that time

it had come within range of fire from entrenchments running along the West Tank

Barrier. Later, five machine gun nests buttressing the trench defenses in this area

were discovered. For two hours no advance

was made on the right. Meanwhile, on the

left, the 1st Platoon, which was supported

by Colonel Edmondson's five tanks,

reached the barrier by 1330.9

On the right half of the line advancing

westward, the 3d Platoon of Company F

found the going tougher, partly because it

had only three tanks to support it. Directly

south of On Chong's Wharf and about half

way across the island was a large enemy

air raid shelter in the path of the advance.

It was about thirty feet long with blastproof entrances on either end. Hand grenades tossed into the shelter had been

tossed out again. One medium tank had

come up and shelled it with 75-mm. with

no apparent success. Finally the same tank,

accompanied by two infantrymen and four

engineers, succeeded in reducing it. The

tank, covering the dismounted personnel,

7

 Lt Col William R. Durand to G-3 USAFICPA,

8 Dec 43, Rpt on Makin Island Expedition, p. 4;

Interv, Capt Chasmar, Marshall Intervs, pp. 62-63. 8

 Baxter, Armored Force Action on Makin, pp. 13-

14; Marshall, Makin Notes, pp. EE2-EE6; Interv,

Capt Leonard, Marshall Intervs, pp. 48-50. 9

 Interv, Capt Leonard, Marshall Intervs, pp. 48-

50; Baxter, Armored Force Action on Makin, p. 14.
DEFENSIVE POSITIONS ON MAKIN. West Tank Barrier (above); a typical dugout

(below).
REDUCTION OF THE WEST TANK BARRIER 93

moved slowly in from the left flank. Two

BAR10 men, one on the flank of the tank

and one in the rear of it, moved with it

until they got to ground where they could

cover the baffle entrance. The four engineers, one of whom was 1st Lt. Thomas B.

Palliser, a platoon commander of Company C, 102d Engineers, advanced to the

rear of the tank and then between the two

BAR men. Palliser himself took the lead.

Behind him came the platoon sergeant.

Both were covered by two engineer riflemen. At first they tried to use a flame

thrower, but as in all other efforts to use this

weapon on Makin, the attempt failed because of the soaking the equipment had

received during the landing. This failing, a

TNT pole charge was employed. The

platoon leader placed the charge between

the outside of the baffle entrance and the

interior wall of the shelter. A fifteen-second

fuze gave the detail ample time to clear

back to cover. The resulting explosion did

not collapse the shelter, but it killed all the

personnel inside—twelve Japanese.11

In spite of this successful engagement in

the center of the line, the men on the right

remained pinned down by fire from rifle

pits fringing on the eastern edge of the barrier. At this juncture Colonel McDonough

sent in the 3d Platoon of Company G with

orders to take three medium tanks and

move around the Japanese left (north)

flank.12 On each side of the highway, along

which the center of this platoon advanced,

were three machine gun positions. Two

that faced the lagoon between road and

beach were connected by a trench with a

small shelter.13 To knock out these two emplacements, two eight-man squads crawled

forward to within about fifteen yards of

them and then took stations according to

available cover. The BAR men and their

assistants covered the main entrances. Two

men from each squad armed with grenades made ready on either side of the entrances. They rushed the pits and heaved

grenades in them; then, without stopping,

dashed to the other side and blasted the

entrances with several more grenades.

Once the grenades exploded, the BAR

men and assistants followed up with bayonets. Two other men then inspected the

pits covered by the rest of the squad. Not a

man was lost in this action, and the enemy

positions were silenced.14

This left one remaining machine gun

position in the area assigned to the 3d Platoon of Company G. Efforts on the part of

infantrymen to direct their supporting

tanks to attack it failed. No radio communications existed between tanks and infantry and an attempt on the part of one lieutenant to direct one tank against this target

by pounding his rifle butt on the top of the

tank failed to elicit any response from the

crew inside. As the three tanks moved on

past the emplacement without attacking

it, S. Sgt. Michael Thompson, commanding Company G's 3d Platoon, undertook

to rush the position singlehanded. His

action can best be described in his own

words:

I worked my way slowly forward, hugging

the ground. I could see the muzzle of the gun,

projecting beyond the pit, but it did not seem

to be manned. . . . I rushed the pit, jumped

in and seized the machine gun to swing it

around and face it down the connecting

trench. ... I dropped the machine gun . . . and grabbed my rifle. Three Japs in the

trench, a short distance from me, were begin- ning to stir. They looked as if they had been stunned by an explosion. So I shot them. Then

10

 Browning automatic rifle. 11

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. EE14a. 12

 Interv, Capt Leonard, Marshall Intervs, pp.

48-50. 13

 JICPOA Bull 4-44, map facing p. 1. 14

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. F30.
94 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

I walked down the trench and came to an object, well covered with palm leaves. I pulled

the leaves back and discovered a much-alive

Jap soldier. So I shot him also. Then the rest

of the platoon came up and took over.15

The three tanks that had left this emplacement undisturbed continued on

across the tank barrier without serious opposition. About 1600 they met some light

tanks attached to the 1st Battalion that

had come along the main highway from

the western beaches. Thus, a preliminary

junction of the two attacking forces on the

northern end of the line was achieved.16

Meanwhile, at the south end of the line an

advance patrol from Company B had succeeded in contacting Company F at about

1500.17 In the center resistance continued

until about 1650, by which time most of

the enemy fire had been eliminated by the

guns of the four medium tanks leading the

assault in that area. By 1655 firm contact

was established on the southern end of the

line between Companies B and F and an

hour later the troops of the 1st and 2d Battalions had established contact all along

the West Tank Barrier.18

Advance of the 1st Battalion

While the 2d Battalion was moving

across the island from Yellow Beach and

gradually wiping out resistance east of the

West Tank Barrier, Colonel Kelley's 1st

Battalion was moving toward the same objective from the opposite direction. On the

right (south) was Company B, commanded

by Capt. Henry Berger; on the left Company C with Capt. Charles E. Coates, Jr.,

commanding. Company A, commanded

by Capt. Lawrence J. O'Brien, after securing Flink Point went into reserve. From the

heavy weapons company a machine gun

platoon was assigned to each of the two

companies in attack. The mortar platoon

was assigned to operate as a separate entity

in support of the whole battalion, although

actually mortars were not used by the battalion during the first day's operation because of the thin deployment of the enemy

and because of the narrow gap between

troops of the 1st and 2d Battalions that

were approaching each other from opposite directions.19

About 1130 Colonel Kelley set up his

command post on the beachhead line on

the west edge of Rita Lake and began personally to direct the advance westward.20

The first objective was the Second Phase

Line, which ran through the east end of

Joan Lake about 1,200 yards ahead. Between these two lines the enemy was

afforded excellent opportunities to set up

positions easily covering the firm ground.

The defenders had taken advantage of the

first of these opportunities. In the area

around Jill Lake the Japanese had established two machine gun positions and an

antitank gun emplacement commanding

the main east-west highway, while fire

trenches and another machine gun nest

covered the ocean shore and the area immediately to the north of it. However, these

were unmanned and no fortifications were

to be found at the Second Phase Line.21

15

 Ibid., pp. F33-F34. 16

 Baxter, Armored Force Action on Makin, p. 13. 17

 Interv, Capt Henry Berger, Marshall Intervs, pp.

25-26; 1st Bn 165th Inf Regt Combined Jnl, 20 Nov

43, Msg 56; 165th Inf Regt Combined Jnl, 20 Nov 43,

Msg 65. 18

 Intervs, Col McDonough and Capt Leonard,

Marshall Intervs, pp. 48-50, 59-60; Msgs cited n. 17;

27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 20 Nov 43, Msg 100. 19

 Intervs. Capt Berger, Capt Coates, Capt O'Brien,

and Capt Paul E. Ryan, CO Co D, Marshall Intervs,

pp. 25-26, 24, 22-23, 19. 20

 1st Bn 165th Inf Regt Combined Jnl, 20 Nov 43,

Msg 24. 21

 JICPOA Bull 4-44, I, p. 28; Interv, Capt Berger,

Marshall Intervs, pp. 25-26.
REDUCTION OF THE WEST TANK BARRIER 95

M3 LIGHT TANK, bogged down in a shell crater, holds up the advance on the narrow causeway north of Jill lake.

Only occasional rifle fire met the advancing American troops. Most of this

came from lone riflemen, or snipers, stationed in trees or in the underbrush. Undoubtedly the prevalence of tree snipers on

Makin was sometimes exaggerated by the

American troops that fought there, with

the result that there was much promiscuous and sometimes dangerous strafing of

tree tops. Nevertheless, in this particular

area the Japanese had prepared among the

fronds at the tops of certain trees places

where they cached rifles and left gourds of

water and sake. To mark such trees they

tied to them girdles of fronds about four

feet above the ground so that a rifleman

could run to a tree, snatch off the marker,

climb up by notches cut in the trunk and

wait for likely targets.22

The light tanks had not come forward

beyond Jill Lake because on the highway,

between that pond and another just north

of it, a large crater made by a naval shell

had engulfed the leading tank of the column causing a roadblock. The highway at

that point was a causeway off of which

other tanks could not move to bypass the

first. Hence, the lead tank had to be towed

off and the shell hole filled before the column could proceed.23

By about 1400 the troops had reached

the Second Phase Line just east of Joan

Lake. In the advance from Jill Lake only

22

 Interv, Capt Berger, Marshall Intervs, pp. 25-26;

Marshall, Makin Notes, p. G4. 23

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl F, Rpt by

Special Staff Officers, Sec. 3, Rpt of Engineer Officer,

p. 3; 193d Tk Bn Rpt of Makin Opn, p. 68.
96 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

two Japanese were reported killed. About

the same time, the light tank mired on the

causeway was extricated, and the entire

tank platoon commenced moving to the

front to support the infantry. Meanwhile,

no direct radio communication had been

established with the 2d Battalion. Frantic

radio messages from Colonel Kelley to the

supporting planes and to regimental and

division command posts failed to elicit any

very clear information as to the position of

the 2d Battalion, which was advancing toward his own troops. At the same time fire

from friendly troops had pinned down his

own front lines.24 In spite of these difficulties, division headquarters dispatched the

message, "Continue your attack vigorously

to effect a junction with McDonough without delay." The advance was resumed.25

Company B on the right made the most

rapid progress. Fire from the east side of

the West Tank Barrier, then under attack

by the 2d Battalion, held them up for a

while, but an advance patrol under 1st Lt.

Patrick J. Raleigh was sent forward and

about 1500 succeeded at last in establishing contact with Company F.26

 On the left,

Company C ran into more difficulty when

it encountered the only determined resistance between Red Beach and the West

Tank Barrier. About 150 yards west of the

barrier and to the south of the east-west

road, the enemy had emplaced a Lewis

machine gun concealed by a natural dip in

the terrain and protected by riflemen concealed in and among surrounding trees.

The gun's fire cut obliquely across the

main highway, between two sharp bends,

and stopped the 1st Platoon, Company C,

in a small clearing south of the highway.27

North of this emplacement, on the lagoon

side of the highway, was a large palm tree

that had around its base a square of heavy

coconut logs and raised earth. The platoon

leader, 2d Lt. Daniel T. Nunnery, took

cover at the base of this tree and proceeded

to study the surrounding area. He was

shortly joined by Captain Coates, Company C's commander.

In a moment, Colonel Kelley, the 1st

Battalion commander, moved to reconnoiter the position indicated by Lieutenant

Nunnery. In an effort to keep Company C

moving to the tank trap and join with the

2d Battalion, he sought out Captain

Coates. On the way, he met Col. Gardiner

J. Conroy who was ordering a tank up to

fire into the enemy position. Colonel Kelley advised that his troops would be endangered by such fire and informed the regimental commander that he would have

Captain Coates continue the advance,

bypassing the pocket, and leave his support

platoon to reduce it.

Colonel Kelley moved out to the trees to

instruct Captain Coates, who promptly

shouted "get down." Just in time Colonel

Kelley threw himself to the ground, avoiding an enemy machine gun burst. When

Captain Coates signaled to his left platoon,

that unit moved over to the lagoon, and

under the cover of a three-to-four-foot

bank proceeded east and around the clearing toward the tank barrier.

In the meantime Lieutenant Nunnery,

still under the palm tree, was shot through

the head and killed. Between his body and

the machine gun lay an American rifleman, shot through the arm. Chaplain

Joseph A. Meany, who had come up with

Colonel Conroy a few minutes before,

rushed out to the wounded man and

dropped down beside him. He too was

24

 1st Bn 165th Inf Regt Combined Jnl, 20 Nov 43,

Msgs 28, 31, 34, 39, 40, 41. 25

 Ibid., Msg 43; 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 20 Nov

43, Msgs 56, 62. 26

 Interv, Capt Berger, Marshall Intervs, pp. 25-26. 27

 Interv, Capt Coates, Marshall Intervs, p. 28.
REDUCTION OF THE WEST TANK BARRIER 97

shot, although his life was saved by a small

medal and identification disk that deflected one of the bullets. Another soldier

dashed out to aid the chaplain and dropped

dead at his feet. The whole area was now

alive with the cracking of rifles and the

rattle of the machine gun.

From the lagoon side now appeared a

lone figure walking into the center of the

scene. It was Colonel Conroy, erect, evidently believing that only a few Japanese

riflemen were holding up the company.

Colonel Kelley shouted to him to get down.

He hesitated, and as he did a rifle cracked

and the regimental commander went down

with a bullet between his eyes. The time

was then 1455.28

Command of the regiment now passed

to Colonel Kelley, while that of the 1st

Battalion was assumed by its executive

officer, Maj. James H. Mahoney.29 The

light tanks that had been brought forward

by Colonel Conroy retired on Colonel Kelley's order without firing a shot because of

the danger of their hitting friendly troops.

For the same reason mortar and machine

gun fire had to be withheld.

1st Lt. Warren T. Lindquist, leader of

the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon was ordered to await the reduction of

the position by the support platoon of

Company C, or under cover of darkness

(whichever occurred first) to crawl out and

bring Chaplain Meany in. The latter

proved to be the solution, and as darkness

fell Lieutenant Lindquist and several of his

men crawled out, found the chaplain, who

had administered first aid to himself, and

carried him back to the 1st Battalion aid

station.30

Meanwhile, Company C had advanced

to the edge of the West Tank Barrier clearing. Company A, which had been in reserve throughout the first phase of attack,

was ordered to advance from its position

near Rita Lake and mop up in the rear of

Company B. By the time it had come up to

Company B, the latter unit had established contact with Company F on the opposite side of the barrier. By 1755, after

Company F had finally destroyed the last

of the enemy in the center of its line, contact between the two battalions extended

the length of the barrier.31

The first portion of the plan for occupying Butaritari Island was accomplished,

therefore, late on D Day. In the entire

zone from the western beaches to the center of the Citadel area, enemy resistance

had been overcome except for one small

wedge-shaped pocket northwest of the

West Tank Barrier clearing. On orders

from division headquarters the attack was

halted, and positions for the night were

selected and secured.32

Holding Action on the East

While Company F, with elements of

Company G attached, was moving across

the island and toward the West Tank Bar28

 This account of the incidents leading up to the

death of Colonel Conroy was derived from the following sources: Interv, Capt Coates, Marshall Intervs, p.

24; Marshall, Makin Notes, pp. F18-F19; Ltr, Col

Gerard W. Kelley to Maj Gen Harry J. Malony, 31

Jan 49, OCMH; 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 20 Nov

43, Msg 89.

Colonel Conroy's body was buried in Gate of

Heaven Cemetery on Makin Island on 21 November

1943, L. W. Yarwood conducting burial services.

(Sworn affidavit of L. W. Yarwood, 14 Sep 50, filed

in OCMH.) General Holland Smith's report that

Colonel Conroy's body was still lying where it had

fallen two days after his death is erroneous. Smith,

Coral and Brass, p. 126.) 29

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 20 Nov 43, Msgs 89-

91.

30

 Ltr, Col Kelley to Gen Malony, 31 Jan 49. 31

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 20 Nov 43, Msgs 98,

100.

32

 Ibid., Msgs 87, 88.
98 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

rier, a second force of the 2d Battalion

moved to the left to take up a holding

position. This left-wing force consisted of

Company E, half of Detachment Z of the

105th Infantry aboard LVT's, and before

the end of the day a platoon of light tanks.

Company H, the heavy weapons company, was in reserve on the beach.

The prescribed plan was for the 1st Platoon of Company E to push due south

across the island to the ocean shore on the

left flank of Company F. It was then to

turn left and act as company reserve behind the 2d Platoon. The mission of this

latter unit was to advance inland from the

beach to a point roughly fifty yards behind

the main east-west highway and then to

swing left and extend its line to the ocean

shore. The 2d Platoon would then form

the right flank of a line, running from the

lagoon to the ocean, which was intended

to seal off the eastern portion of the island.

One reinforced squad of the 3d Platoon

was to mop up the sandspit near King's

Wharf, while the main body of this platoon

pivoted to the left and tied in with the 2d

Platoon. The extreme left flank of the new

line would be manned by the left half of

the special landing group, Detachment Z.

It was expected that by nightfall this composite force would reach a line along a dirt

road that crossed the island from the foot

of King's Wharf, an advance of about 500

yards from the point of pivot on Yellow

Beach. During most of D Day these maneuvers would be commanded by the

Company E commander, Captain Ryan,

since the battalion commander, Colonel

McDonough, was personally supervising

the drive on the West Tank Barrier. Colonel McDonough's executive officer, Major

Claire, had been detained in his small boat

off the reef while the hulks were being

brought under fire.33

As Captain Ryan's 1st Platoon moved

south across the island it met only desultory resistance—chiefly random fire from

lone riflemen in trees and bushes. On its

left flank, near the main island highway,

the platoon encountered two fortified positions, one a machine gun and the other an

antitank emplacement containing a 37-

mm. gun commanding the highway. The

first had been abandoned and the second,

with its cover still on, had been disabled by

preliminary bombardment.

Near the ocean shore road the troops

discovered storage buildings for bombs

and food, but these too were undefended.

Just beyond the road was a machine gun

emplacement that had been designed

principally to cover the ocean approach

and was flanked by rifle pits and doubleapron barbed wire. The gun was turned

against the Americans approaching from

the north but was shortly put out of action

by the 75-mm. gun of a medium tank. Ten

Japanese were killed. Altogether the 1st

Platoon suffered only three killed and one

wounded during its trek across the island.34

The 2d Platoon of Company E met even

lighter opposition in an area having fewer

enemy installations. It moved up quickly

to take its position on the right flank of the

eastern line across the island. The platoon

met sniper resistance but continued to

move forward slowly to the line, only being

held up for a short while until the 3d Platoon on its left was able to move forward.

Three men were wounded during this

movement.

Mopping up the sandspit proved to be

an easy job for the reinforced squad of the

33

 Interv, Capt Bernard E. Ryan, Marshall Intervs,

pp. 38-41; Marshall, Makin Notes, pp. F22-F24. 34

 Interv, Capt Ryan, Marshall Intervs, pp. 38-41;

193d Tk Bn Rpt of Makin Opn, p. 53; JICPOA Bull

4-44, map facing p. 3.
REDUCTION OF THE WEST TANK BARRIER 99

3d Platoon. All resistance in that area had

previously been eliminated either by preliminary aerial and naval bombardment

or by the amphibian tractors that had

landed part of Detachment Z on the left

flank of the first wave. The squad, its mission completed, waited for the left wing of

the Company E line to move along the

beach as far as the base of the sandspit.35

Just southwest of King's Wharf, the

main body of the 3d Platoon, Company E,

was stopped before a group of positions,

strongly constructed and cleverly disguised, lying directly opposite the sandspit

south of the island's main highway. Essentially, this emplacement consisted of a

well-reinforced pit, three feet deep, immediately off the road and a tunnel that ran

some thirty-five yards south connecting

the pit to a concrete pillbox. The American troops approached the tunnel's west

side, which was "blind," that is, had no

apertures. It was merely a part of a dirt

bank that rose about eight feet from the

taro patch before it. The top of the tunnel

was no different in appearance from the

surrounding terrain, except that it contained small concealed burrow holes large

enough to permit a man to squirm out.

Running across the top was a shallow

trench about fifteen yards long. The east

wall contained a number of oblong apertures wide enough to permit ingress and

egress. The entire structure was heavily

constructed and may have served as an air

raid shelter as well as an entrenchment.36

In front of this position the 3d Platoon

was stopped for about four hours. As the

troops came up to the position, the Japanese held their fire and the nature of the

emplacement was not at first discerned.

Three men climbed the west wall and took

positions in the kneeling trench, apparently not realizing that there were Japanese beneath them and not noticing the

burrow holes. Meanwhile, the machine

gun on the right flank of the tunnel had

pinned down the body of the platoon, thus

leaving the men on top unsupported. Suddenly from the apertures on the east, or far

side of the tunnel, a group of Japanese

emerged and charged the men on top with

bayonets. One of the Americans was killed

and another wounded before the platoon's fire cut the Japanese down. More

came out. The wounded man was bayoneted to death and the third man was

bayoneted but later escaped. Other skirmishers who had not approached the tunnel embankment withdrew immediately.

Next, bazookas and rifle grenades were

brought to bear against the tunnel position

but with small success. Enemy fire was

now holding back the entire line. Finally

the battery of 105-mm.'s, which had by

now come ashore and set up positions on

Ukiangong Point, was requested to fire

into the area. A total of five missions was

fired, chiefly to interdict reinforcements

that might be brought to the tunnel from

the woods beyond King's Wharf. Company E's 60-mm. mortars also laid down

a barrage for the same purpose.37

Upon completion of the artillery fire,

Captain Ryan sent a detail of seven men

under S. Sgt. Hoyl Mersereau to work

around to the rear, east of the position.

Their mission was to take the apertures

under fire and keep any more enemy raiding parties from emerging. Mersereau and

his men crawled and crept in a wide circle,

eventually reaching a point about forty

yards away from the reverse slope of the

35

 Interv, Capt Ryan, Marshall Intervs, pp. 38-41. 36

 Ibid., pp. 44-45; Marshall, Makin Notes, p. F31. 37

 Marshall, Makin Notes, pp. F31-F32, EE10;

Interv, Capt Ryan, Marshall Intervs, pp. 38-41;

105th FA Bn Makin Rpt, 8 Dec 43, p. 6.
100 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

mound. Here, taking shelter behind a low

bank, they began firing into the openings.

With this protection, Company E now

worked men forward on the west side of the

tunnel. An attempt to use flame throwers

at this juncture failed since these weapons

were still out of commission. The company

commander then turned to the engineers,

who brought up charges of TNT and

dropped them into the machine gun positions at either end of the tunnel. After

these were detonated, light tanks were

brought up to fire their 37-mm. shells into

the entrances. At last the enemy, driven to

desperation, began to emerge from the

apertures with bayonets fixed, only to be

cut down by rifle fire from Mersereau's

detail. About 1600, some four hours after

the mound was first encountered, it was

possible to leave it and move forward. Eight

Americans had been killed or wounded in

the action. A small detail was left to mop

up as Ryan's company moved on.38

Another fifty yards eastward the advance was again halted, this time by enemy fire coming from a log emplacement

and a trench about five feet deep and

thirty-five yards in length. The terrain in

the area was too thickly wooded to set up

all-night positions, so, under orders received at 1720, Company E withdrew to

an area south of the sandspit's western

edge near the center of the island. As it

was digging in for the night, a platoon of

Company G appeared to reinforce it.39

First Day: The Summing Up

Thus by the end of the first day of fighting a firm foothold had been established

on Butaritari. The 2d Battalion occupied

an area between the West Tank Barrier

and a line extending from the base of

King's Wharf across the island to the

ocean shore. The 1st Battalion was in contact with the 2d all along the West Tank

Barrier, although a small wedgelike pocket

northwest of the barrier, which was contained by Company C, remained to be

cleaned out.40

Artillery was in position on Ukiangong

Point and had already fired missions in

support of the 2d Battalion on the eastern

front. About 1100, the 105th Field Artillery had commenced landing immediately

behind the combat elements of the infantry. All three batteries (less B Battery's

105-mm. howitzers) were in position by

1430.41

However, no artillery support was called

for or delivered in the main battle zone.

The scheme of maneuver did not permit

firing in support of the 1st and 3d Battalions after the landing of the 2d Battalion

on Yellow Beach. With the two forces moving toward each other, the gap between

them was too narrow to permit safe delivery of supporting fire.42

American casualties on the first day

were low. The total reported for 20 November was twenty-five killed and sixtytwo wounded seriously enough to require

evacuation.43 Estimates as to Japanese

casualties are impossible to arrive at with

any degree of accuracy. As of 2100 on D

Day, division intelligence estimated that

fifty Japanese had been killed. But next

morning, the 2d Battalion reported a total

of 200 Japanese dead to have been discovered in the Citadel area alone as of

38

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. F32; Interv, Capt

Ryan, Marshall Intervs, pp. 38-41. 39

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 20 Nov 43, Msg 88. 40

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl B, G-3 Rpt, p.

5, and overlay attached. 41

 B Battery carried in addition to its organic 105's

four 75-mm. pack howitzers. 42

 105th FA Bn Makin Rpt, 8 Dec 43. 43

 USAFICPA Participation Rpt GALVANIC, Annex

10, Table IV.
REDUCTION OF THE WEST TANK BARRIER 101

0700. In addition, the battalion reported

the capture of forty-one prisoners, mostly

labor troops.44

One thing was clear. A far smaller number of enemy had been engaged by the attacking infantry and tanks than had been

anticipated. From Yellow Beach south to

the ocean and west to Red Beaches, only a

few fortifications and entrenchments had

been located and many of these were

abandoned. The supposition upon which

the landing plan had been based—that

the western end of the island would be the

main area of resistance—had proved false.

By the end of the day it was clear that the

bulk of enemy troops (estimated next

morning to be about 200) 4 5 had abandoned whatever defenses they had built

up in the area and had withdrawn to the

eastern end of the island to await the advance of the attacking troops.

44

 27th Inf Div G-2 Msg File, 21 Nov 43, Msgs 73,

75, 133, 145. 45

 Ibid., Msg 17.
CHAPTER VII

Consolidating the Beachhead

Build-up of the Assault

In the initial landings on Butaritari a

platoon of Company C, 102d Engineers,

was attached to each of the infantry battalion landing teams. One squad of each

platoon was distributed over the first-wave

boats of the assault companies and came

ashore prepared to clear beach and underwater obstacles with Bangalore torpedoes.

The remainder of the platoon of engineers

landed with the reserve of the infantry

battalion landing team.

Shore parties were furnished by the

152d Engineers. Company A was attached

to the 3d Battalion Landing Team at Red

Beach 2, Company B to the 1st Battalion

Landing Team at Red Beach, and Company C to the 2d Battalion Landing Team

at Yellow Beach.

All three shore parties encountered unexpected difficulties. As the 27th Division's

engineer reported, "Red Beach was a

beach in name only and afforded landing

with difficulty for about six boats at flood

tide." At Red Beach 2, landings could be

made only for about three hours before

and after flood tide, and even then only

with considerable difficulty. Since the tide

was high at H Hour, troops and supplies

could be landed there with relative ease

for the first few hours, but as the tide approached the ebb, progress in unloading

was slowed down. The lagoon off Yellow

Beach was of course too shallow to float

LCVP's or LCM's closer than 200 yards

offshore, and up to noon of the second day

of the operation the only supplies to reach

this beach had to be transferred from

landing craft to amphibian tractors at the

reefs edge. By that time, sectional pontoons, brought along by naval vessels and

set up on all beaches, projected far enough

to seaward to permit all types of landing

craft to debark their supplies directly

without transferring them first to amphibian tractors. Also by then, King's Wharf,

including the seaplane runway, was sufficiently repaired to accommodate all the

shore parties of the 152d Engineers, which

moved to the pier and organized two shifts

to assist in unloading.1

The difficulties at Red Beaches clouded

an otherwise successful landing. By the

close of the first day's action, only a small

part of the supplies and equipment had

been unloaded, and even some of the

troops were still far from shore aboard

small craft as night closed in. By evening

of D Day, Leonard Wood had unloaded approximately 38 percent of her supplies and

equipment and Calvert about 23 percent.

Not all of this had reached shore, however.

Some was still embarked in landing craft

at nightfall. By 1800 all the transports had

completed their unloading for the day and

got under way for night cruising dispositions.2

1

 Makin Task Force Engineer (Col Brendan A.

Burns), Rpt and Recommendations, 20 Dec 43, pp.

1-2.

2

 USS Calvert Action Rpt, 28 Nov 43, pp. 3-4; USS

Leonard Wood Action Rpt, 20 Dec 43, p. 4.
CONSOLIDATING THE BEACHHEAD 103

UNLOADING SUPPLIES AT KING'S WHARF

Also among the first waves to land at all

beaches were communications personnel

carrying both radio and telephone equipment. These were provided by the Detachment, 27th Signal Company, the communications platoon of the 165th Regimental

Combat Team, and three teams of the

75th Signal Company, each attached to a

battalion landing team. Shortly after landing they were able to establish radio contact between the troops ashore and the

division and regimental commanders still

afloat. Uninterrupted radio contact between ship and shore, however, was at first

difficult to maintain. Radio sets were wet

from the brief rain squall that had occurred early in the morning and were further damaged by waves and spray breaking over the landing craft during the long

wait between loading from the transports

and landing at the beaches. Landing craft

grounded on the reefs, and since all personnel had to wade ashore in water from

waist to shoulder depth, radio and telephone equipment was further damaged.

Some difficulty was also encountered in

maintaining contact by wire run laterally

along Red Beaches—amphibian tractors

churning across the beach, for example,

often tore up the wire. Wires strung from

trees later in the day made communications more reliable.3

3

 27th Inf Div Rpt of Participation of TF 52.6 in

GALVANIC (hereafter cited as TF 52.6 GALVANIC Rpt),

p. 3; Signal Officer 27th Inf Div Task Force (Lt Col

Thomas J. Murray), Summary of Signal Communications During the GALVANIC Operations of 27th Inf

Div Task Force, p. 3; Ltr, Maj Rex R. Stillwell,

USMC, to G-3 V Phib Corps, 4 Dec 43, in V Phib

Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl F, Rpt by Special Staff

Officers, Sec. V, p. 2.
104 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

More serious was the fact that during

the first day of landing no direct radio

communication was established between

the 1st and 3d Battalion Landing Teams

on Red Beaches and the 2d Battalion

Landing Team on Yellow Beach, although

previous arrangements had been made for

this by the allocation of an appropriate

frequency and the assignment of necessary

radio sets. Late in the day, it is true, occasional messenger service connected the

2d Battalion Landing Team with the rest

of the force on the west end of the island,

but not until the morning of the second

day of operations was full radio, wire, and

messenger service established between

Red and Yellow Beaches.4 In view of the

fact that these two forces were approaching each other in a delicate maneuver that

required precise timing and complete coordination, the absence of direct radio

contact between them was a serious handicap.

Another defect in communications

noted during the first days of the Makin

operation was faulty communications

procedures. Greenwich civil time and local

time were used interchangeably in the

date-time groups of messages and in the

time specified in the contents of the messages. Authenticators were seldom used,

although standard procedure required it.

Many message centers were apparently

under the impression that local time was

zone plus-91⁄2 (that is, Greenwich civil time

plus 91⁄2 hours) whereas it was actually

zone plus-12, thus causing a 21⁄2-hour error

in their dispatches. None of this was fatal,

but it did cause some avoidable confusion

at headquarters.5

Most serious was the failure, or rather

absence, of communications between tanks

and the infantry units that they were supposed to support. The tanks attached to

the 27th Division for this operation were

equipped with radio sets that could not

operate on either the infantry or artillery

nets. From the outset this caused considerable confusion and was largely responsible

for the poor infantry-tank co-ordination

that characterized the fighting on Makin.

The only sets in the division that could operate with the tanks were those of the 27th

Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop. Therefore, it was necessary to attach a radio

team from that unit to each battalion

landing team headquarters. In the lower

echelons (rifle companies, platoons, and

squads, and tank platoons and individual

tanks) there was no communication

agency capable of linking the components

of the infantry-tank teams.6

In spite of these difficulties and defects

in establishing and maintaining direct

contact between lower echelons, communications between the task force commander (Admiral Turner) and the various

units ashore and between the regimental

and division commanders and the elements under them were reported generally

satisfactory. This was provided in part by

the air liaison parties, and the shore fire

control parties, which were landed fairly

early in the operation and were attached

to each battalion landing team.7

Two shore fire control parties were assigned to each battalion. These landed

4

 Signal Officer 27th Inf Div Task Force, Summary

of Signal Communications, GALVANIC, p. 3. 5

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, G-2 Msg File, passim;

Ltr, Maj Stillwell to G-3 V Phib Corps, 4 Dec 43, in

V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl F, Rpt by Special

Staff Officers, Sec. V, p. 2. 6

 TF 52.6 GALVANIC Rpt, pp. 2-3. 7

 ALP U-13, attached to 3d BLT, was in position

ashore by 0910; ALP U-11, attached to 1st BLT, by

1110; ALP U-12, attached to 2d BLT, was held up

off Yellow Beach by the air attack against the hulks

but was landed by 1258. V Phib Corps GALVANIC

Rpt, Incl F, Special Staff Officers Rpt, Sec. I, Air

Officer Rpt, pp. 3-4.
CONSOLIDATING THE BEACHHEAD 105

with their respective infantry battalions

and were immediately able to furnish close

supporting fires on call. On D Day one

cruiser (Minneapolis) and two destroyers

(Dewey and Phelps) were designated to deliver fires on request from these parties.

However, no requests were received, either

on that day or later in the operation. This

failure to call upon naval guns can be explained in part by the relatively limited

area lying between Yellow Beach and Red

Beaches, an area apparently considered

by troop commanders to be too restricted

to risk calling on naval fire for support. In

spite of the fact that the shore fire control

parties were not called upon to perform

the functions for which they were primarily intended, they did provide a valuable

and sometimes the only communications

liaison between ship and shore.8

To each battalion landing team was also

attached an air liaison party whose function was to call for air strikes in support of

ground troops at the request of the respective troop commanders. Air Liaison Party

U-13, attached to the 3d Battalion Landing Team, was in position ashore about

100 yards from the beach by 0910. The

party attached to the 1st Battalion Landing Team (ALP U-11) reported in position

at 1110. That attached to the 2d Battalion

Landing Team (ALP U-12) was held up

off Yellow Beach by the air attack against

the hulks, but was able to get ashore by

1258.9 As in the case of naval fire, no close

air strikes were called for against land targets on D Day, but again the air liaison

parties had reliable and consistent communications with the various headquarters afloat and in many instances, especially

during the early hours after the landing,

these groups and the shore fire control

parties were the only sources of information available to higher echelons.10

One other important communications

net was that established between the field

artillery batteries and the division commander, once the latter got ashore. Although communications by wire between

artillery units and infantry units was impossible to maintain because of the damage wrought by tanks and tractors, radio

communications were deemed satisfactory.

Also, the radios manned by artillery personnel often filled the gap created by the

failure of communications between infantry units and command posts. It was

rare that the division commander could

not secure information from the front lines

of any battalion landing team through the

artillery communications setup.11

One result of these initial failures in

communications ashore (contrasted with

the comparatively superior ship-to-shore

communications setup) was to delay moving the entire division headquarters from

Leonard Wood until the second day of the

8

 Ltr, 27th Inf Div Artillery Officer (Col Harold

G. Browne) to CTF 52.6, 7 Dec 43, sub: Rpt on Naval

Gunfire in Makin Opn, p. 2, AG 327 Art 0.3.0

(22866), DRB AGO; Fifth Amph Force Rpt, Capture

of Gilbert Islands, Incl H, p. 4. 9

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl F, Special Staff

Officers Rpt, Sec. I, Air Officer Rpt, pp. 3-4. 10

 Ibid.; Ltr, Maj Stillwell to G-3 V Phib Corps, 4

Dec 43, p. 2. 11

 Signal Officer 27th Inf Div Task Force, Summary of Signal Communications, GALVANIC, p. 4;

TF 52.6 GALVANIC Rpt, p. 8; Ltr, 1st Lt James B.

Sullivan to Lt Col Arthur W. Tyson, 7 Dec 43, sub:

Observations on Makin Island Opn, p. 4.

The report of Admiral Turner's communications

officer is far less sanguine in its estimates of the efficiency of communications ashore than are the official

Army reports. It reads, in part, "Landing Force Communications ashore were largely non-existent. There

were no beach laterals and no command channels.

Some breakage of equipment, delays in loading, usual

losses and confusion and a lack of command organization appear to be the major causes of an outstanding lack of communications. Equipments which were

finally gotten ashore and in working condition were

not utilized on channels as planned." Fifth Amph

Force Rpt, Capture of Gilbert Islands, Incl D, pp. 7-8.
106 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

operation.12 In spite of these difficulties all

other command posts were set up on the

island before nightfall of the first day's action. Colonel Conroy had left his ship as

early as 0900, and by 1100 the regimental

command post was set up ashore.13 Meanwhile, Colonel Hart, commanding the 3d

Battalion Landing Team, had opened his

command post, as had Colonel Kelley of

the 1st Battalion Landing Team.14 By

1800 General Smith was ashore, although

his command post still remained afloat.15

First Night on Butaritari

By the time action against the enemy

had been closed in the late afternoon of 20

November, the first objectives of the invasion of Makin had in the main been accomplished. Except for the small pocket

contained by Company C, the West Tank

Barrier system had been reduced. Other

secondary aims had also been realized. A

solid holding line facing east had been

established, and the likelihood of any substantial Japanese reinforcement of the

West Tank Barrier reduced to a minimum.

Beachheads had been secured on two

shores and were in process of development.

Artillery was ashore and had already fired

a few missions in support of Company E's

advance eastward. All command posts

were ashore except the division's. (Map 5)

With the virtual reduction of the West

Tank Barrier, the troops facing the main

body of Japanese on the eastern part of the

island automatically became the front-line

units. The principal element in the east on

the night of D Day was Company E, reinforced by one platoon of Company G and

a part of Detachment Z of the 105th Infantry, one of the special landing groups.

The nearest American position behind

the front-line elements was the medium

tank park established by the 193d Tank

Battalion near the center of Yellow Beach.

This was some 500 yards to the rear of

Company E's line. Tank crews either

stayed in their vehicles or joined Company

H and the Yellow Beach shore party in

digging a perimeter defense. The command post of the 2d Battalion was also located on Yellow Beach, adjacent to the

perimeter established by the tank battalion.16

About five hundred yards farther to the

west, dug in near the lagoon along the

eastern edge of the West Tank Barrier system, was Company G, less the platoon that

had joined Company E. Company F dug

in directly south of Company G, in the

same area. Beyond the tank trap, Company C set up its night position just east of

the "pocket" that had caused so much

trouble during the afternoon. The other

three companies of the 1st Battalion were

in position along the southern half of the

west barrier system, bending back to the

west along the ocean shore. The remainder

of the 165th Regimental Combat Team

was spread out over the island from the

West Tank Barrier to Red Beaches. The 3d

Battalion had assembled just southwest of

Rita Lake shortly after its relief and dug in

there for the night. General Ralph Smith,

after coming ashore at 1800, had ordered

Colonel Hart to prepare his men for a

movement to Kuma Island, northeast of

Butaritari, at 0900 the next morning.

Disturbing news from Tarawa prompted

Admiral Turner to disapprove this projected move, however. The 3d Battalion

was to be maintained in readiness at Rita

12

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Nov 43, Msg 95. 13

 165th Inf Regt Combined Jnl, 20 Nov 43, Msg

File, Msg 22. 14

 1st Bn 165th Inf Regt Combined Jnl, 20 Nov 43,

Msg 16. 15

 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 20 Nov 43, Msg 95. 16

 Baxter, Armored Force Action on Makin, pp.

10-14.
CONSOLIDATING THE BEACHHEAD 107

MAP 5

Lake for transshipment to Tarawa if it

should be needed there.17

The 105th Field Artillery Battalion dug

in for the night near its guns south of

Ukiangong Village and was prepared, if

called upon, to furnish night fires for the

units farther to the east. Nearby was the

second bivouac area of the 193d Tank Battalion, occupied mainly by the amphibian

tractors of the Red Beach special landing

groups and by light tanks. Another platoon of light tanks was situated at Red

Beach 2, where practically all the remaining troops ashore had assembled.18

As night closed in on the island, it appeared probable that the enemy would

adopt one or more of three courses. He

could defend his current positions in

depth, withdraw to the eastern part of

Butaritari and then cross over to Kuma

Island, or counterattack in force.19

Actually, no major counterattacks were

undertaken by the Japanese during the

first night, nor was there any organized

withdrawal eastward. Some successful attempts were made to bolster defenses

along the eastern line and a few positions

at the base of King's Wharf were reoccupied and new machine gun emplacements

17

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 20 Nov 43, Msgs 86-

91.

18

 Baxter, Armored Force Action on Makin, pp.

10-14. 19

 27th Inf Div G-2 Periodic Rpt, Rpt 1, 20 Nov 43.
108 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

constructed facing the American lines.

One machine gun was placed in the

wrecked seaplane lying in the lagoon off

of King's Wharf, another at the base of

King's Wharf, and three more were set up

in buildings in the area immediately southward.20

Also, a few efforts were made to work

small patrols into the area of the West

Tank Barrier system. Some of these were

intercepted. One, of from twelve to sixteen

men, tried to move around the left flank

of Company E near the sandspit, but was

stopped by rifle fire.21 In the sector assigned to Detachment Z, 105th Infantry,

several enemy infiltrated American positions. Three were killed and two wounded

by rifle fire and grenades.22 One twelveman patrol did manage to slip along the

ocean shore and reach a point between

Companies A and B. Only twenty feet

from Company A its members stopped to

fire at Company B, which had been discovered to the front. When dawn came the

enemy was revealed only a few yards away

and the whole patrol was killed without

trouble.23

The communications breakdown among

units of the Japanese militated against any

successful reinforcement of the West Tank

Barrier system, for while patrols were attempting to infiltrate the system, survivors

behind the American lines were trying to

get out. For example, one ten-man group

was killed by grenades and BAR fire as it

tried to escape toward the ocean early in

the morning.24

These instances constituted the only recorded cases of organized Japanese counteractivity during the first night after the

landing on Butaritari, and there is no evidence that these various movements of

small patrols were in any way co-ordinated. Other than that, the enemy's countermeasures were limited to sniper fire from

lone riflemen located within or close to the

U.S. lines. This was kept up all night and

was reportedly accompanied by a variety

of ruses such as dropping lighted firecrackers to attract American fire and calling out messages in garbled English.25

One effect of these tactics was to precipitate a breakdown of fire discipline

among the green and nervous American

troops. "Trigger-happy" soldiers peppered

away indiscriminately at unseen targets

throughout the night, not only wasting

ammunition but, more important, drawing frequent counterfire. The worst example occurred just after daybreak when

a man from the 152d Engineers ran along

the lagoon shore from the direction of On

Chong's Wharf toward the command post

of the 2d Battalion, shouting, "There's a

hundred and fifty Japs in the trees!" A

wave of shooting hysteria swept the area.

When the engineer admitted that he had

seen no enemy but had merely heard firing, shouted orders to cease fire proved

ineffectual. Direct commands to individuals were necessary. The harassing tactics

of the enemy were to this extent effective.26

Final Mop-up at the West Tank Barrier

and Yellow Beach

The first problem to be solved on the

morning of the second day was the elimination of the enemy still left alive in or

near the West Tank Barrier system. The

20

 Interv, Capt Ferns, Marshall Intervs, pp. 55-58. 21

 Interv, Capt Ryan, Marshall Intervs, pp. 39-41. 22

 Interv, Capt Ferns, Marshall Intervs, pp. 55-58. 23

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. F14. 24

 Interv, 1st Sgt Bartholomew Mooney, Marshall

Intervs, pp. 20-21. 25

 Intervs, Capt Ben Krugman and Sgt Mooney,

Marshall Intervs, pp. 9-10, 14, 20-21. 26

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. F45; Durand, Rpt on

Makin Island Expedition, p. 4.
CONSOLIDATING THE BEACHHEAD 109

M3 MEDIUM TANKS shell the hulks of On Chong's Wharf.

Japanese still held a small wedgelike

pocket just northwest of the barrier and

from that position could bring guns to

bear on the east-west highway, which was

now the main supply route from Red

Beaches. Also, the approaches to Yellow

Beach were not yet secure, and any attempts to bypass the pocket by bringing

supplies through the lagoon would be

handicapped by fire from the west. The

two hulks on the reef near On Chong's

Wharf, Which had been so heavily attacked from the air and sea on D Day,

were once more believed to be occupied by

the enemy.

As landing craft came into Yellow Beach

early on the second morning, some of them

"returned" fire against the hulks, aiming

at the top decks of the ships. On shore,

among the American troops in or near the

West Tank Barrier clearing, intermittent

bursts of machine gun fire were received for

as long as two hours after dawn. These

were probably "overs" directed at the

hulks from the landing craft. At 0818,

while landing craft stayed clear, the first of

a long series of air strikes, which continued

until 1630, began against the hulks.27 At

0920 several of the medium tanks went to

the water's edge and shelled the derelicts

with their 75-mm. guns. They were reported to be overshooting by some 2,000

yards, their shells falling into the lagoon in

the middle of the boat lanes. Whether

from enemy or from friendly fire, the approach to Yellow Beach was so dangerous

27

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl F, Rpt by

Special Staff Officers, Sec. I, Air Officer's Rpt, Incl

A, pp. 6-8.
110 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

for the landing craft that, as late as 1230

when the tide was beginning to ebb, about

forty of them were still circling well out in

the lagoon, afraid to come in.28

Finally, late in the afternoon, Captain

Coates, commanding officer of Company

C, was ordered to dispatch a detail to investigate the hulks. He ordered 2d Lt.

Everett W. McGinley to take sixteen men

in two LVT's to board the two vessels and

eliminate whatever he found there in the

way of enemy positions. They found nothing. The top deck of each ship was so

wrecked, twisted, and torn that in McGinley's opinion no enemy could have

fired from there without being in plain

view. From the top deck there was a sheer

drop to the bottom of the hulks without

any intervening deck. Water, waist-high,

covered the bottom. The only possible location for hidden Japanese was a two-foot

ledge that ran around the interior walls of

both hulks. Although he found no empty

shells or weapons McGinley admitted that

some might have been on the lagoon

bottom hidden from view by the water.29

Whether or not the hulks had ever contained enemy positions remains doubtful.

Lt. Col. William R. Durand, the official

observer sent to Makin by General Richardson's headquarters, had no doubts. On

the question as to whether the hulk contained machine guns he reported, "I am

certain that it did; not only because it

interrupted landing operations and actually caused a few casualties but also because a captured overlay showed the positions."30

 The testimony was corroborated

by all the officers and men of Company F

who were interviewed on the subject. This

was the company that dug in along the

West Tank Barrier about 300 to 500 yards

from the hulks. All claimed that on the

second morning, for about an hour or

more at intervals of every few minutes, direct fire from the hulks hit into the dirt

right along their line of positions.31

On the other hand, in Colonel Kelley's

opinion, the belief that fire was being directed from the sunken vessels both against

the lagoon and inland was a hallucination

from beginning to end. It was his belief

that the fire that observers thought to be

coming from the hulks against landing

craft as they came through the lagoon was

actually coming from the shore. He also

believed that fire later received by troops

on shore from the direction of the lagoon

came not from the hulks but from landing

craft that were firing at the hulks and

sending "overs" into the areas occupied by

friendly troops. This conclusion was confirmed by Lt. Col. S. L. A. Marshall, the

official historian assigned to the operation

by the Historical Branch, G-2, War Department General Staff.32

With all this conflicting testimony, it is

impossible for the historian to reach any

final conclusion except to say that the

weight of the evidence would seem to indicate that the hulks had been unoccupied

by the enemy from the very beginning of

the operation. In any case, it is certain that

after the investigation conducted by Lieutenant McGinley, no more fire was heard

from the hulks or the area near them.

Meanwhile, operations against the pocket west of the tank barrier had begun at

0800 under the direction of Major Mahoney, the 1st Battalion commander. He

ordered S. Sgt. Emmanuel F. DeFabees to

skirt the pocket with a patrol and enter it

28

 27th Inf Div G-4 Jnl, 21 Nov 43, p. 5. 29

 Marshall Intervs, p. 37. 30

 Durand, Rpt on Makin Island Expedition, p. 2. 31

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. F42. 32

 Ibid.; Interv, Edmund G. Love with Col Gerard

W. Kelley, Sep 47; Ltr, S. L. A. Marshall to Dr.

Kent Roberts Greenfield, 2 Apr 52, OCMH.
CONSOLIDATING THE BEACHHEAD 111

from the right flank. The sergeant cut

sharp right for fifty yards and then sought

to force an entrance, his men crawling on

their bellies. The patrol "found the fire too

heavy." It then went obliquely for seventyfive yards and was again turned back. By

this time DeFabees was convinced that

much of the fire was coming from friendly

forces and the patrol was withdrawn. It

was about this time that Company A was

firing toward a supposed Japanese machine gun nest on the lagoon side of the

island and Company F along the tank

trap was receiving fire from the direction

of the lagoon itself, which may or may not

have been from American landing craft.

In any case, there was considerable confusion on the part of all hands as to just

what were the sources of fire against U.S.

positions in the west of the West Tank

Barrier.33

Thirty minutes after DeFabees had

withdrawn his patrol, at 0840, Major

Mahoney announced that Company C

had cleared out the pocket and was reorganizing and extending to Company B.34

This announcement was slightly premature since the flank was not considered entirely secure until about noon.35

The liveliest action in the West Tank

Barrier zone occurred in a coconut grove

along the eastern edge of the barrier clearing, just north of the middle of the island.

About 1030 a group of Japanese began

firing rifles and light machine guns into

the platoon of Company F that was mopping up along the former stronghold.

Captain Leonard asked for three light

tanks to come up and give him help. The

tanks, after reporting, moved over to the

highway, which skirted the northern edge

of the clearing, so that their line of fire was

toward the ocean. While the tanks were

spraying the tree tops with machine gun

fire and canister they were approached by

a fourth towing fuel along the highway.

After the latter's tow cable snapped it also

joined the other tanks in the attack.

The four tanks had been firing for about

five minutes when a Navy bomber suddenly swung over them at a very low altitude and dropped a 2,000-pound fragmentation bomb about twenty-five feet

from one of the tanks. 1st Lt. Edward J.

Gallagher, the tank officer in charge, was

killed, as were two enlisted men nearby.

Several others were injured. By the time the

tank crews had recovered from surprise

and concussion, the Japanese were giving

no further trouble.36

This episode at the tank trap closed the

action at the West Tank Barrier. No further important difficulty was encountered

with enemy stragglers in that zone. Attention could now be fully centered on the

drive eastward to secure the remainder of

the island.

33

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. F17. 34

 1st Bn 165th Inf Regt Combined Jnl, 21 Nov 43,

Msg 8. 35

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. F17. 36

 Interv, Lt Robert Welch, Marshall Intervs, pp.

32-33; Marshall, Makin Notes, pp. F43, EE6-EE7.
CHAPTER VIII

Makin Taken

The plan for the capture of Makin,

though divided into three phases, was a

continuing process that involved no major

regroupings offerees. After the establishment of the beachheads on Butaritari the

first objective had been the reduction of

the West Tank Barrier, and this was followed by a drive to the east and pursuit of

the enemy to outlying islands. The West

Tank Barrier had been reduced during the

first day's action. The second day would

see—in addition to the mopping up of the

area around the West Tank Barrier and of

the western end of Butaritari—the beginning of the drive to the east. The situation

at Tarawa had prevented General Ralph

Smith from moving the 3d Battalion, 165th

Infantry, to Kuma Island early on the

morning of the second day, a move that

would have eliminated much of the need

for the third phase of the operation. He

dispatched that morning, however, a small

party under Maj. Jacob H. Herzog, assistant intelligence officer of the division, with

orders to investigate Kuma for the presence of Japanese forces.1

 Also, air observers

were instructed to keep a close watch for

any signs of a large enemy movement to

the outlying islands.2 With these precautions, the main attention of the 165th Regimental Combat Team was centered during

the second day on the drive to the eastern

end of Butaritari.

The Main Action of the Second Day

The plan of attack for the second day

provided that Company E and attached

elements should immediately push eastward from positions of the night before

while Company F should remain in reserve

near Yellow Beach. General Smith's order,

sent out the previous evening, had set the

jump-off hour at 0700, following an intense

artillery preparation.3 Colonel McDonough, however, elected to defer the advance

of the infantry until the medium tanks

were ready, and these were delayed until

enough fuel could be brought forward.4

During the interim aircraft pounded the

area in front of the 2d Battalion. At 0843

the air liaison party attached to McDonough's battalion requested bombing and

strafing of the zone ahead of Company E

as far as the East Tank Barrier. This was

complied with. As soon as McDonough

had ascertained that the tanks would be

fueled by 1045 he ordered the attack to

1

 TF 52.6 GALVANIC Rpt, p. 8. 2

 It was possible for troops to move to Kuma from

Butaritari along the reef at low tide without recourse

to boats. 3

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 20 Nov 43, Msg 92.

Note: In spite of this order clearly specifying 0700

as jump-off hour, Captain Ryan, Company E's commander, was under the impression that the renewed

attack "was slated for 0800." Interv, Capt Ryan, Marshall Intervs, pp. 38-41. 4

 Durand, Rpt on Makin Island Expedition, p. 4.
MAKIN TAKEN 113

jump off at 1100. Meanwhile, at 1026 he

radioed to his supporting aircraft that

"tanks and troops are moving forward"

and that all bombing and strafing should

cease. Although this cancellation was acknowledged and confirmed, the air columns formed for the bombing runs kept

coming in as originally ordered. Fortunately, Captain Ryan, Company E's commander, exercised firm control over his

troops and was able to hold back their

advance until the air attacks had ceased.

Thus the faulty air-ground co-ordination

caused no damage beyond delaying the

attack even longer.5

By 1110 the attack was at last in progress.6

 Ten medium tanks had been refueled

and had moved into position to support the

troops,7 and Colonel McDonough chose to

rely exclusively on these vehicles to support

his infantry. Although both the forward

observer and the liaison officer from the

artillery battalion repeatedly suggested

that fire be placed well in advance of the

front line to soften up the enemy, the infantry commander declined it. He even

refused to allow the forward observer to

register the artillery battalion until after

the day's action had ceased.8 Although the

105-mm. pieces on Ukiangong Point fired

a total of twenty-one missions early in the

morning, not a single howitzer was fired

after 0630.9

On the extreme left was Detachment Z

of the 105th Infantry. Next to it came the

1st Platoon, Company G, which had reinforced the 3d Platoon, Company E,

throughout the night. In the center was the

1st Platoon and on the right the 2d Platoon

of Company E. All units moved forward in

a skirmish line. Fifty yards to the rear,

mopping up Japanese stragglers, was a second formation consisting of the 3d Platoon,

Company E, the 2d and 3d Platoons,

Company G, and a detail of marines consisting of the 4th Platoon of the V Amphibious Reconnaissance Company.10

 (Map 6)

The line advanced steadily, though

slowly, averaging about three yards a minute. 1st Sgt. Thomas E. Valentine of the

front echelon of Company E described the

opposition encountered:

On the second day we did not allow sniper

fire to deter us. We had already found that

the snipers were used more as a nuisance than an obstacle. They would fire, but we noted

little effect by way of casualties. We learned

that by taking careful cover and moving rap- idly from one concealment to another we

could minimize the sniper threat. Moreover,

we knew that our reserves would get them if

we did not. So we contented ourselves with

firing at a tree when we thought a shot had

come from it and we continued to move on.11

West of the tunnel that had been taken

during the previous afternoon but subsequently relinquished, the enemy fell back

again. In the next 200 yards, from the tunnel to the road crossing the island from the

base of King's Wharf, the stiffest resistance

of the day was encountered.

5

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl F, Rpt by Special Staff Officers, Sec. I, Air Officer's Rpt, Incl A, pp.

6-7; Durand, Rpt on Makin Island Expedition, pp.

4-5.

6

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 21 Nov 43, Msg 24. 7

 193d Tk Bn Rpt, pp. 41-57. 8

 105th FA Bn Informal Rpt of A Battery, Rpt of

Liaison Officer No. 2, 105th FA Bn, Kansas City

Records Center, AGO (KCRC). 9

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. EE11; 105th F A Bn

5-3 Rpt on Action, Butaritari Island, Makin Atoll,

p. 4, KCRC. 10

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl G, G-2 Rpt,

Incl D, Rpt of 1st Lt Harvey C. Weeks, USMCR, p. 2;

Interv, Capt Ryan, Marshall Intervs, pp. 38-41. These

marines had been part of the reinforced 2d Platoon of

Company G, which had been landed from Neville at

Kotabu and Tukerere Islands on D Day. Having reconnoitered the tiny islets and discovered no opposition, they had returned to their ship the same day and

were subsequently landed on Butaritari. 11

 Interv, 1st Sgt Thomas E. Valentine, Marshall

Intervs, pp. 42-43.
114 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

MAP 6

From an enemy seaplane beached on

the reef, machine gun and rifle fire struck

at the left flank and in toward the center of

the line. To allay this nuisance, four of the

medium tanks finally pumped enough

shells from their primary weapons at close

range to annihilate the eighteen occupants

concealed in the plane's body and wings.12

On the right an emplacement, intended

mainly for defense against landings from

the ocean, contained three dual-purpose

3-inch guns. Farther on, at the ocean end

of the cross-island road, a twin-barreled,

13-mm. dual-purpose machine gun also

covered part of the zone of advance.13

In the center, about thirty yards beyond

the tunnel, there was a large underground

12

 Interv, Capt Ryan, Marshall Intervs, pp. 38-41.

From the air an explosion in the seaplane was observed at 1146. V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl F,

Rpt by Special Staff Officers, Sec. I, Air Officer's Rpt,

Incl A, p. 7. 13

 JICPOA Bull 4-44, map facing p. 1.
BEACHED SEAPLANE AND RIFLE PITS (above and below, respectively) were Japanese points of resistance.
116 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

shelter, and about thirty yards farther on,

six rifle pits connected by a trench.

Squarely across the King's Wharf road, a

little south of the middle of the island, was

a longer trench with eleven rifle pits.14

Between noon and 1400 the advance

passed through one of the most heavily defended areas on the island. On the lagoon

shore at the base of King's Wharf, along

the east-west highway, and along King's

Wharf road were buildings and tons of

fuel and ammunition used by Japanese

aviation personnel. A group of hospital

buildings was situated near the lagoon at

the base of the wharf. Under coconut trees

along the ocean shore at the right were four

machine gun emplacements supported by

ten rifle pits, the whole group being protected on the east and west flanks by

double-apron wire running inland from

the water across the ocean-shore road.15

One after another, all of these positions

were overrun. On the left Detachment Z of

the 105th Infantry moved steadily along

the lagoon shore, wiping out trenches and

emplacements with the help of one medium tank. Combat engineers using TNT

blocks were also employed. By the close of

the day the detachment unit had advanced

from six to seven hundred yards east of

King's Wharf, suffering only six casualties.16

 In the center and on the right of the

line, Company E met with equal success.

Moving slowly but steadily forward, by

1700 it had pushed some 1,000 yards east

of Yellow Beach. Tank-infantry co-ordination was much improved over that of the

previous day. Infantry troops pointed out

enemy strong points to their supporting

tanks, covered them as the tanks moved in

for close-range fire, and mopped up the

positions once the tanks had withdrawn or

moved forward.17 Meanwhile, in the rear

areas, Company A joined Company F at

1300 in the vicinity of the West Tank Barrier and proceeded to mop up stranded

enemy riflemen in that area.18

The day's advance had wrested from

the Japanese their long-range radio receiving station, a heavily revetted, seventyeight by thirty-three foot underground

building at the south edge of a cleared

rectangular area east of King's Wharf.

Other installations captured or destroyed

left the main area of enemy military positions entirely in American hands.19

 When

action ceased about 1700, all Japanese resistance from Red Beaches to Stone Pier

had been eliminated with the exception of

a few isolated snipers.20 Total U.S. casualties for the day were even fewer than on

the previous day—eighteen killed and

fifteen seriously wounded.21 Still ahead lay

the East Tank Barrier system, resembling

that on the west and designed primarily to

stop an assault from the east.

The job of continuing the next morning's attack would not fall to McDonough's

battalion, which had carried the main burden of advance from Yellow Beach to Stone

Pier. Shortly after the day's fighting had

ceased, the 2d Battalion was ordered into

reserve by General Ralph Smith. At the

same time, Colonel Hart's 3d Battalion

was ordered to relieve the 2d, commencing

at daylight on 22 November, and to attack

eastward vigorously, commencing at 0800.

14

 Ibid.

15

 Ibid.

16

 Interv, Capt Ferns, Marshall Intervs, pp. 55-58. 17

 Interv, Capt Ryan, Marshall Intervs, pp. 38-41. 18

 Interv, Capt O'Brien, Marshall Intervs, pp.

22-23. 19

 JICPOA Bull 4-44, II, p. 24. 20

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 21 Nov 43, Msg 37;

27th Inf Div G-2 Msg File, 22 Nov 43, Msg 167. 21

 USAFICPA Participation Rpt GALVANIC, Annex

10, Table IV.
MAKIN TAKEN 117

Hart was directed to employ, as the situation dictated, Companies A and C of the

193d Tank Battalion, the 105th Field Artillery Battalion, and whatever naval gunfire and aerial support he required. This

relief was approved by General Holland

Smith, who had by that time come ashore

and was with the division commander.22

The Second Night

As night closed down on the second

day's fighting on Butaritari, the supply

situation was still unsatisfactory. Earlier

in the afternoon Colonel Ferris, the 27th

Division's supply officer, had reconnoitered

Yellow Beach and discovered that only

amphibian tractors could negotiate the

reef, that vehicles were being drowned out

when they struck potholes created in the

reef shelf by naval shells, and that pallets

were being dunked as they were pulled off

landing craft at the edge of the beach.

Also, the beachhead itself was so cluttered

with foxholes, tree trunks, and other obstacles that it was highly unsatisfactory as

a point of supply. Meanwhile, Admiral

Turner had ordered all ships excepting

Pierce to unload on Yellow Beach, with the

result that many landing craft that might

otherwise have been unloaded on Red

Beaches were tied up in the lagoon unable

to dump their loads because of adverse hydrographic and beach conditions. Ferris

consulted with Admiral Turner late in the

afternoon on board the flagship Pennsylvania, and the admiral approved using Red

Beaches as much as possible until conditions on Yellow Beach had improved. A

request to permit night unloading was

denied since Turner had already ordered

his ships to put to sea during the hours of

darkness.23

Ashore, Company A was ordered to

relieve at 1630 the advanced elements of

Company E and Company G on the front

line. The latter withdrew to the lagoon

shore west of Company A and dug in. A

little later Company E retired to a line

about 300 yards west of the Stone Pier

road. In the center of the forward line

Company A established its perimeter and

to the north, along the lagoon shore, was

Detachment Z, 105th Infantry.24

To the rear, Company B spread out to

cover the West Tank Barrier. In an effort

to prevent the indiscriminate firing that

had characterized the previous night,

orders were passed out to the troops to use

hand grenades instead of rifles. About a

hundred grenades in all were thrown from

Company B's perimeter during the night.

Next morning five dead Japanese were

found lying beyond the perimeter, all apparently killed by grenade fire. Then, just

before the men withdrew from their foxholes, they killed two more Japanese by

machine gun fire directed at surrounding

tree tops.25

Early in the morning hours a sentry on

the lagoon shore threw the troops in that

area into a brief fright by reporting the

approach of landing craft carrying Japanese reinforcements. "There are 200 Japs

out there," he claimed as he aroused Colonel Durand and Colonel McDonough in

their foxholes. The two officers got up and

reconnoitered the beach, talking in loud

voices to avoid being shot by their own

men. The boats proved to be American,

and the "200 Japs" an illusion.26

22

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 21 Nov 43, Msgs 24,

34, 37. 23

 27th Inf Div G-4 Jnl, pp. 5-6. 24

 Intervs, Capts O'Brien, Ryan, and Ferns, Marshall Intervs, pp. 22-23, 38-41, 55-58, respectively. 25

 Interv, Capt Berger, Marshall Intervs, pp. 25-26. 26

 Marshall, Makin Notes, pp. F30a-F30b.
118 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

The Third Day: Capture of the East

Tank Barrier

Well before nightfall on the second day

of fighting General Ralph Smith had requested permission to use the 3d Battalion,

165th Regiment, which was still held in

reserve against the possibility of being employed at Tarawa. Since the situation on

that island had improved considerably

during the day, his request was granted at

1705.27 The 27th Division commander

immediately ordered Colonel Hart to

leave his reserve area at daylight on the

22d and move to the relief of the 2d Battalion facing the East Tank Barrier system.

At 0800 the 3d Battalion, aided by light

and medium tanks as well as artillery,

naval gunfire, and carrier-based air support, was to attack vigorously to the east.

All command posts were to be moved forward to a point near Yellow Beach where

closer control could be exercised.28

In conjunction with the continuation

of the drive eastward, an expedition

under Major Herzog would set out in

LVT's early in the morning for Kuma

Island to intercept any Japanese who might

seek refuge there. Another party was to

attempt an amphibious encirclement, going through the lagoon to a point east of

the front line and establishing there a

strong barrier line across the narrowest

part of the island to stop any Japanese fleeing eastward from the pressure of the 3d

Battalion.29 Meanwhile, harassing artillery

fire was to be directed into the eastern end

of the island from time to time.

Commencing at 0600, 22 November, the

3d Battalion moved along the island highway in column of companies toward Yellow Beach. Elements of Company K led

the column, followed by a platoon of tanks.

Company I, the battalion's antitank platoon, the headquarters and headquarters

company, two platoons of Company M,

medical units, and Company L followed in

that order.30 As the column passed along

Yellow Beach, approximately thirteen medium and light tanks and some engineer

units fell in. Beyond King's Wharf, Company K swung to the right as far as the

ocean, while Company I filled the area at

the left to the lagoon. Together they moved

ahead in a skirmish line, all other elements

being in reserve.31 (Map 7)

At 0700 artillery on Ukiangong Point

commenced shelling the East Tank Barrier,

while Company A and Detachment Z,

105th Infantry, withdrew. From then until

0820 artillery fired a total of almost 900

rounds. The 3d Battalion's line moved

swiftly ahead across the area taken on the

previous afternoon but abandoned during

the night. At 0820, as the artillery preparation was lifted, the tanks and infantry

moved against the enemy. By 0915 the first

250 yards had been traversed with only

light opposition, but resistance became

more stubborn as the forces reached the

road running south from Stone Pier.32

The first mission of the tanks was to

shell the buildings ahead of them while the

infantry grenaded surface installations and

small shelters. The infantry-tank tactics

that had been developed in the two preceding days for the reduction of large

shelters were employed. As the infantry

approached air raid shelters, tanks opened

27

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 21 Nov 43, Msg 34. 28

 27th Inf Div G-2 Jnl, 22 Nov 43, Serial 10. 29

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 22 Nov 43, Msgs 8, 9,

10, 17, 19, 27. 30

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. DDL 31

 Baxter, Armored Force Action on Makin, p. 16;

Interv, 1st Lt Vernal E. Edlund, Marshall Intervs, pp.

66-68. 32

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 22 Nov 43, Msgs 11,

14, 16; Marshall, Makin Notes, p. EE11; 105th FA Bn

Makin Rpt, pp. 6-7, KCRG.
MAKIN TAKEN 119

up with their 75-mm. guns, knocking the

shelters out as the infantry line continued

on. Surface structures and smaller shelters

were disposed of with hand grenades.33

At the ocean end of the Stone Pier road,

and along the shore east of it, Company K

came upon a series of rifle pits and machine gun nests with one 70-mm. howitzer

position, all abandoned by the enemy.34

At 0945, as the barrier defenses came

within range of the tanks, field artillery

resumed its fire, first on the clearing and

then to the east of it. After twenty-five

minutes the shelling from Ukiangong

Point ceased.35 The 105th Field Artillery

Battalion then began moving forward to

a new position closer to the front while

tanks and troops entered the zone just

shelled.36

With the 3d Battalion's attack moving

steadily eastward, Colonel Hart, as previously planned, sent a special detachment

to cut off the enemy from retreat to the

eastern end of Butaritari. For this mission

two reinforced platoons of Company A,

which had only that morning been relieved from its position in the line, were

sent with additional reinforcement of one

section of light machine guns and one platoon of heavy machine guns from Company D. This detail, under command of

Captain O'Brien, embarked at 1100 in six

LVT's on a three-mile run across the

lagoon to a point on the north shore well

to the east of the East Tank Barrier.

Around noon Captain O'Brien's men

landed without opposition and set up a

line across the island. Ten natives encountered near the beach informed the captain

that the remaining Japanese were fleeing

eastward across the reef to Kuma.37

The longer U.S. amphibious move to

Kuma Island was made by a detail under

Major Bradt. This group, in ten LVT's,

was guided to Kuma by Major Herzog,

who had reconnoitered that island the day

before. At 1400 nine of the amphtracks

landed without opposition in the vicinity

of Keuea, about a mile from the southwestern tip of the island. The enemy on

Butaritari was now entirely cut off from

retreat.38

Meanwhile, tanks and infantry were

moving upon and through the East Tank

Barrier. Although more heavily fortified

than the West Tank Barrier, this strong defensive system offered no opposition whatever. The enemy had apparently abandoned the barrier during the night. Only

a few dead Japanese were found, evidently

killed by earlier bombardment, in the

barrier system.39

The Advance Beyond the East Tank

Barrier

After passing through the tank barrier

system, troops of the 3d Battalion did not

pause, but pushed eastward. Tanks were

operating 200 to 300 yards east of the barrier in the barracks area between the highway and the lagoon as early as 1042. Two

hours later, while men from Company A

were forming a line across the island neck,

tanks had reached a clearing about 800

yards short of that line, and the two forces

were in communication.40

33

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. DD1. 34

 Interv, Lt Edlund, Marshall Intervs, pp. 66-68. 35

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. EE11. 36

 27th Inf Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 3, p. 1. 37

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 22 Nov 43, Msgs 8, 9,

10, 17, 19; Interv, Capt O'Brien, Marshall Intervs, pp.

22-23. 38

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 22 Nov 43, Msgs 2,

20, 27. 39

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. DD1. 40

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl F, Rpt by Special Staff Officers, Sec. I, Air Officer's Rpt, Incl A,

p. 10; 27th Inf Div G-2 Msg File, 22 Nov 43, Msg 185;

27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 22 Nov 43, Msg 28; Interv,

Capt O'Brien, Marshall Intervs, pp. 22-23.


122 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

It was believed that the Japanese remaining between these two forces would

be trapped. In fact, no such event took

place. By the time the 3d Battalion had

reached Company A's barricade line at

1330, they had encountered no opposition.

Either the enemy remnants had evaded

discovery or had slipped east of the island's

neck before noon when Company A had

landed from its LVT's. The only sign of life

in that area occurred shortly after the

junction of forces when about three hundred natives emerged to be taken under

custody by the American soldiers and escorted outside of the line of advance. After

a short rest the 3d Battalion pressed forward again, while the Company A platoons and their attached units went to the

rear.41

At this point General Ralph Smith, in

pursuance of the original plans, assumed

full command of the island forces at 1510.42

Shortly thereafter he was ordered to reembark the 1st and 2d Battalions, all

medium tanks, all except five light tanks,

and all naval gunfire and air liaison parties the next morning (23 November).43

Beyond the narrow neck of the island

where they had joined forces with the

Company A detachment, the 3d Battalion

advanced some 2,100 yards, stopping

about 1645. With Company I on the right,

Company K on the left, and Company L

in the rear, the battalion dug in for the

night in perimeter defense.44

Ahead lay about 5,000 yards of Butaritari Island still unsecured by the attacking forces. The escape of any enemy that

might remain in that area across the reef

to Kuma was barred by Major Bradt's detachment on that island. From his positions at the southwestern end of Kuma he

could effectively cover any crossing and in

fact did repulse two enemy attempts to

land on Kuma during the night.45

The day's activity had been easy, except

for the heat and the tangled tropical

growth through which the 3d Battalion

had had to advance. Enemy resistance in

the area of the East Tank Barrier and eastward had been nominal. At the day's end

Admiral Turner announced the capture of

Makin "though with minor resistance remaining" and congratulated General

Ralph Smith and his troops. All that

seemed to remain was to mop up a now

thoroughly disorganized enemy trapped in

the extreme northeastern tip of Butaritari.46

The Last Night

After a wearisome but generally unopposed day's advance, the 3d Battalion dug

in in a series of separate company perimeters, stretching across the width of the

island in a line of about 300 yards in

length.47 At the north Company I covered

the lagoon shore, the main highway, and

about one half of the island's width. In an

oval clearing in the center of the island

two small ponds intervened between Company I and Company K, which set up a

perimeter covering the distance from there

to the ocean shore. West of these two companies in a long, narrow oval running all

the way across the island was Company L,

facing west. Spaced along this entire position were the light machine guns of the

various company weapons platoons, and

41

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. DD1; Interv, Capt

O'Brien, Marshall Intervs, pp. 22-23. 42

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 22 Nov 43, Msg 29. 43

 Ibid., Msg 32. 44

 3d Bn 165th RCT Combined Jnl, 22 Nov 43,

Serial 33. 45

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 23 Nov 43, Msg 3. 46

 Ibid., 22 Nov 43, Msg 36. 47

 This account is derived, except when noted, from

Marshall, Makin Notes, pp. DD1-DD13.
MAKIN TAKEN 123

the heavy machine guns of Company M.

The battalion antitank guns were placed

at the point where the lines of defensive

positions crossed the highway. One pair

faced to the west along the road while the

second pair faced to the east. The two antitank gun batteries were covered by heavy

machine guns of the antitank platoon and

a few riflemen. The men from Company

M covered their own guns, while riflemen

from the three rifle companies protected

the remainder.

No very serious effort was made to

establish a strong perimeter. No thorough

reconnaissance of the ground just ahead

was made, although about an hour and a

half elapsed between the time the battalion began to dig in (1645) and sunset

(1818) and another hour and a quarter remained before total darkness set in

(1931).48 During the heat of the day's

activity most of the men had dropped their

packs to the rear, including their entrenching tools. Foxholes were therefore shallower than usual. In some cases men did

not even bother with them. Instead, they

dragged coconut logs into place and built

themselves barricades above ground. The

truth is that very few, if any, of either officers or men entertained serious notions

that there was much danger from the

remnant of Japanese facing them. This

opinion was most succinctly expressed by

1st Lt. Robert Wilson who later said,

" Many of us had the idea there were no

Japs left; when the firing began, I didn't

believe it was the real thing."

 49

The first effort of the enemy to penetrate

the perimeter occurred shortly after dark.

Following close on the heels of a party of

natives who had safely made their way

into the American lines, a group of Japanese advanced close to the line, imitating

baby cries as they came. The ruse was

recognized by a member of the engineer

detachment, who opened fire with his machine gun killing about ten Japanese.

Thereafter until dawn, the night was

broken by intermittent fire fights, infiltrations, and individual attacks on the American positions.

This was no organized counterattack or

banzai charge such as occurred later on

Saipan. Rather, it was a series of un-coordinated small unit, sometimes individual, fights. In an effort to unnerve the

Americans, the Japanese periodically set

up a tom-tom-like beating all over the

front of the perimeter. Periodically, also,

they would yell or sing, apparently under

the influence of sake.50 They came on

sometimes in groups and sometimes singly.

A number of them filtered into the American lines, and their fire engaged the

perimeter from both sides. The brunt of

the attack fell on a few machine gun and

heavy weapons positions that were covering the front from the right and left of the

line. To the crews of these weapons the attack naturally appeared formidable indeed. Actually, although from three to

four hundred men of the battalion were

under Japanese mortar, machine gun,

rifle, and grenade fire from time to time,

the enemy onslaught broke and disintegrated around these relatively few positions

held down by the heavy weapons and machine guns on the front. Those who were

only slightly to the rear of the guns were

in the position of uneasy onlookers, bound

by the character of the defense to take

relatively little hand in the repulse given

the enemy.

48

 TF 54 Opn Plan A2-43, 23 Oct 43, Annex B, p.

43 (sunrise-sunset tables, Makin). 49

 Marshall, Makin Notes, p. DD9. 50

 Recently emptied bottles and canteens, which

had apparently contained this liquor, were reported

discovered the following morning.
124 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

When daylight finally came it was apparent that the night's attack had been

both less massive and less deadly than it

had seemed while it was going on. Fiftyone enemy dead were counted in front of

American guns, although more were later

found east of these positions. Some or all

of these may have been wounded during

the night's activity and dragged themselves away from the perimeter to die.

American casualties for the night came to

three killed and twenty-five wounded.51

A few of the enemy also had tried to

escape from Butaritari over the reef to

Kuma. At midnight about ten came upon

the defense line set up by Major Bradt's

detail from the 105th Infantry and were

either killed or wounded while making an

effort to cross it. Unless some had previously escaped beyond Kuma to the other

northern islets of the atoll, the last remnants of the original Japanese forces were

destined to be pinched off on 23 November, D plus 3.52

Mop-Up

The sixty-odd Japanese killed during

the night represented the bulk of the remaining enemy soldiers on Butaritari. All

that was left to be secured was the eastern

extremity of the island, including Tanimaiaki Village, and the few scattered

enemy left here were mostly labor troops

and airmen.

The American attack was launched at

0715 with Company I in the advance. As

many men as possible rode on the five light

and sixteen medium tanks that had been

sent up earlier to spearhead the drive. Behind them, Company K on the left and

Company L on the right formed a skirmish

line across the island. Still farther to the

rear came the men of Company B from the

1st Battalion, as reserve support. With the

left flank rode a special detail equipped

with loudspeakers through which nisei interpreters were to broadcast appeals for

surrender to whatever enemy troops might

be left in Tanimaiaki Village. About 1015

it was discovered that some Japanese had

moved across the rear of the advance unit

and cut its wire. Colonel Marshall, who

was in temporary command of the nisei

detail, was ordered to return to the rear

with a message requesting Colonel McDonough to get his support element forward. As his jeep started back from the

front line it ran into an ambush that the

Japanese had set up for about 300 yards

along the road, somewhat more than a

half a mile to the rear. At that point a support element making its way forward arrived on the scene and cleared out the ambush in a short, sharp fight. This was the

last tactical encounter on Makin.53

By 1030 advanced elements of the 3d

Battalion had reached the tip of Butaritari,

and organized resistance was declared to

be over.54 Only a few Japanese had been

encountered on the way and these had

been quickly silenced. An hour later General Smith radioed to Admiral Turner,

"Makin Taken! Recommend command

pass to Commander Garrison Force."

 55

Except for minor mopping-up activities,

the operation was over.

At 1400 the 2d Battalion under Colonel

McDonough started to board Pierce from

Red Beach 2.56 At 1630 Admiral Turner

ordered General Smith to turn over com- 51

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 23 Nov 43, Msg 9. 52

 Marshall, Makin Notes, pp. F11-F12. 53

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 23 Nov 43, Msg 9;

Marshall, Makin Notes, pp. DD14-DD15; Ltr,

S. L. A. Marshall to Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, 2

Apr 52, p. 8, OCMH. 54

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 23 Nov 43, Msg 18. 55

 Ibid., Msg 19. 56

 27th Inf Div G-4 Jnl, p. 10.
MAKIN TAKEN 125

mand of the island to the garrison force

commander, Col. Clesen H. Tenney, the

following day at 0800.57 From 1900 to

2120 that evening and again during the

next morning, the 27th Division staff and

the improvised staff of Colonel Tenney

conferred. It was decided to leave on the

island a considerable quantity of communications equipment already in operation,

with the personnel to operate it. All the

LVT's were left, and with them a Navy

boat pool of nine officers and 1,943 enlisted men. Many of the trucks, bulldozers,

and jeeps were also to remain.58

During the morning Major Mahoney's

1st Battalion went aboard Calvert, while

other detachments embarked on other

transports. At noon the special detail returned from Kuma and began to board

Leonard Wood, following the headquarters

staff.59 The 3d Battalion under Colonel

Hart was left behind to assist and protect

the construction forces. Also remaining for

the time being on the island were Battery

C, 105th Field Artillery; one platoon of

Company C, 193d Tank Battalion; the

LVT detachment from Headquarters

Company, 193d Tank Battalion; the Collecting Platoon and the Clearing Company and surgical team, 102d Medical

Battalion; Company C, 102d Engineers;

the 152d Engineers; Batteries K and L,

93d Coast Artillery (AA); Batteries A, B,

C, and D, 98th Coast Artillery (AA); and

the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, 165th Infantry.60

The remainder of the troops that had

fought on Butaritari were boated and

ready to sail by noon of 24 November. A

short delay caused by the report of nearby

enemy planes held up the convoy until

1400, but at that time the ships finally

shoved off for the more inviting shores of

Oahu.61 The capture of Makin was history.

Profit and Loss

Reckoned in terms of the casualties sustained by the 27th Division, the seizure of

Makin at first glance appears to have been

cheap. Total battle casualties came to 218,

of which 58 were killed in action and 8

died of wounds. Of the 152 wounded in

action and the 35 who suffered nonbattle

casualties, 57 were returned to duty while

action was going on.62 At the end of the

fighting, enemy casualties were estimated

to come to 550 including 105 prisoners of

war, all but one of whom were labor

troops.63 Later mopping-up activities accounted for still more, and in the end the

total enemy garrison, none of whom escaped, was either captured or killed. Thus,

a total of about 300 combat troops and

500 laborers was accounted for at Makin.64

In view of the tremendous superiority of

American ground forces to those of the

enemy and the comparatively weak state

of Japanese defenses, the ratio of American

combat casualties to those of Japanese

combat troops was remarkably high—

about two to three. In other words, for

every three Japanese fighters killed, two

Americans were either killed or wounded.

Thus the cost of taking Makin was not

quite so low as it had first seemed.

Naval casualties incident to the capture

of Butaritari were much higher than those

of the ground forces. During the prelimi57

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 23 Nov 43, Msg 38. 58

 27th Inf Div G-4 Jnl, Min of Conf, 23 Nov 43. 59

 USS Calvert Action Rpt, 28 Nov 43; USS Leonard

Wood Action Rpt, 20 Dec 43. 60

 27th Inf Div G-3 Msg File, 24 Nov 43, Msg 26;

USAFICPA Participation Rpt GALVANIC, pp. 17-18. 61

 27th Inf Div G-4 Jnl, p. 11; 27th Inf Div G-2 Jnl,

24 Nov 43, Serial 9, 11. 62

 USAFICPA Participation Rpt GALVANIC, Annex

X, Tables I and IV. 63

 27th Inf Div G-2 Periodic Rpt 5. 64

 See above, p. 71.
126 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

nary naval bombardment on 20 November, the battleship Mississippi had a turret

explosion resulting in the death of fortythree men and the wounding of nineteen

others. More important was the sinking of

the escort carrier Liscome Bay. On the

morning of 24 November she was operating about twenty miles southwest of Butaritari in company with two other escort

carriers, all under command of Rear Adm.

Henry M. Mullinix, USN. At 0513 Liscome

Bay was hit admidship by one or more torpedoes fired from an undetected enemy

submarine. Her bombs and ammunition

exploded and within twenty-three minutes

she sank. Fifty-three officers, including

Admiral Mullinix, and 591 enlisted men

were lost and many others seriously

wounded and burned.65

This sinking, occurring on D plus 4,

gave point to an argument repeatedly put

forth in naval circles that in amphibious

operations time was of the essence, that

ground operations prolonged beyond the

time compelled by absolute necessity constituted an unacceptable risk to naval shipping and to the lives of naval personnel.

Liscome Bay when torpedoed was standing

by to furnish air cover for Admiral Turner's

attack force on its voyage back to Oahu.

Had the capture of Makin been conducted

more expeditiously, she would have departed the danger area before 24 November, the morning of the disaster.

General Holland Smith was later of the

opinion that the capture of Makin was

"infuriatingly slow."66 Considering the

size of the atoll, the nature of the enemy's

defenses, and the great superiority offeree

enjoyed by the attacking troops, his criticism seems justified. It is all the more so

when to the cost of tardiness is added the

loss of a valuable escort aircraft carrier

with more than half the hands aboard.

65

 Samuel Eliot Morison, HISTORY OF UNITED

STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD

WAR II, Vol. VII, Aleutians, Gilberts, and Marshalls,

June 1942-April 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951), pp. 140-41. 66

 Smith, Coral and Brass, p. 125.
CHAPTER IX

The Capture of Tarawa

The seizure of Makin by the Northern

Attack Force had proceeded with relative

ease. The Southern Attack Force, commanded by Admiral Hill, which had the

mission of capturing Tarawa, was faced

with a numerically stronger and far better

prepared enemy.1 The landing force consisted of the 2d Marine Division less the

6th Marine Regiment, the latter originally

being held in corps reserve for employment at either Makin or Tarawa. The division was commanded by General Julian

Smith. His plan of attack called for the

original assault landings to be made on the

three westernmost beaches of the northern

(lagoon) shore of Betio Island at the southwestern corner of the atoll. These landing

beaches were designated, from west to east,

Red Beaches 1, 2, and 3. The attack was

to be made by three battalion landing

teams under command of Col. David M.

Shoup, commander of the 2d Marine

Regimental Combat Team. The first three

assault waves were to be carried from

ship to shore in amphibian tractors, of

which 125 had been made available to

the division. Tanks would be boated in the

fourth wave in LCM's, and the successive

waves of infantry would be carried by

standard personnel landing craft

(LCVP's). One battalion of the 2d Marines was to be held in regimental reserve,

and two battalions of the 8th Marines

would be in division reserve.2 (Map IV)

The Americans were opposed at Tarawa

by an enemy garrison whose combat

strength ran upward of 3,000 well-trained

men. Most of these troops were concentrated on Betio Island. For about nine

months fortifications along the island's

perimeter and obstacles in the water approaches had been in process of construction. By 20 November 1943, the date of

the invasion, Betio bristled with guns of all

calibers, well protected in emplacements

of steel, concrete, and thick coconut logs.3

Preliminaries to the Invasion

On 7 November most of the ships of Admiral Hill's Southern Attack Force (Task

Force 53) had assembled at Efate for lastminute rehearsals. The 2d Marine Division had arrived in transports from Wellington, New Zealand, and Rear Adm.

Howard F. Kingman had brought the supporting combat ships from Pearl Harbor.

Following rehearsals and critiques, the

force sailed for Betio on 13 November.4

Shortly after 2330 on 19 November the

1

 It is impossible in this volume, which is primarily

a history of Army operations, to give to the capture

of Tarawa the detailed attention that the comparative size and nature of the operation would otherwise

warrant. For a fully detailed and accurate account of

the capture of Tarawa see Stockman, Tarawa. This is

the official Marine Corps account of the operation,

published by the Historical Section, Division of Public

Information, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. 2

 See above, p. 43. 3

 See above, pp. 70-74. 4

 Stockman, Tarawa, p. 9.
128 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

JAPANESE NAVAL GUNS EMPLACED ON BETIO. These 8-inch (200-mm.) guns

were part of the fortifications installed on the island.

convoy entered the seventeen-mile-wide

channel between Maiana and Tarawa

Atolls and, on reaching the open sea west

of the atolls, swung north. The ships now

moved directly to assume their station

west of Betio. At 0356 the first transport

began to lower its boats; the others followed within a few minutes. With the approach of daylight at 0550, it became apparent that the transports were too far to

the south. The error, made because of a

heavy southward current and the inaccuracy of the charts, brought the transports

within range of the enemy's coastal guns

on Betio.5

Japanese patrol planes had spotted the

convoy on the 19th if not earlier, and

therefore by D Day the enemy had had

time to man his defensive positions.6 Shortly

after 0200 on 20 November the approaching convoy had been detected, evidently by

radar, and the Japanese had made their

final preparations for defense. They held

fire until the vessels halted and preparations for landing were begun.7

 At 0441 the

island commander, Admiral Shibasaki,

ordered a red star cluster fired over Betio

Island, the signal for the garrison to prepare to fire. Twenty-six minutes later a

coastal battery on the western end of Betio

opened up.8

5

 TF 53 Rpt of Tarawa Opns, 13 Dec 43, Incl A,

p. 9. 6

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Translation 10018. 7

 Army Section, Imperial GHQ, Special Report on

Lessons from the War, Vol. 25, Military Action in the

Gilbert Islands Area, Nov 43, p. 3. (Translation in

OCMH.) 8

 TF 53 Rpt of Tarawa Opns, 13 Dec 43, Incl A,

p. 30.
THE CAPTURE OF TARAWA 129

The first Japanese shells landing in the

midst of the American transports caused

little damage. American warships returned

fire immediately. The first salvo from the

battleship Colorado was away at 0507, followed almost at once by shells of other

support vessels including Admiral Hill's

flagship Maryland. Within a short time one

enemy gun was reported destroyed and its

magazine exploded in a great cloud of fire.

Other direct hits were believed scored soon

afterwards. As U.S. naval gunfire grew in

intensity, the Japanese were forced to take

cover with resultant lack of accuracy.9

By 0542 the action of the naval gunfire

support ships had neutralized, to some extent, Japanese attempts to halt the debarkation. The warships then ceased in order

to allow the planes to begin their dawn air

strike as planned. The planes, however,

failed to arrive on schedule and with no

naval gunfire to harass them, the enemy

batteries resumed full fire and for thirty

minutes peppered the transport area with

shells. One transport after another reported near misses. Finally, at 0605, Admiral Hill ordered the fire support ships to

reopen fire. Eight minutes later the planes

arrived over the target for the scheduled

air strike on the beaches. This lasted until

0622.10

Meanwhile, it had become apparent

that the transports would have to move

north out of range of the coastal batteries

and the move was undertaken at 0619,

being carried out during the period of the

resumed naval gunfire and the air strikes.

At approximately the same time Admiral

Hill announced that W Hour, the scheduled time for the prelanding naval bombardment, would be at 0620.11

While the transports were making their

way to safer berths, two mine sweepers,

Pursuit and Requisite, moved toward the

entrance of the Tarawa lagoon. Close

astern came two escorting destroyers, Ringgold and Dashiell, which were to take up

fire support positions inside the lagoon

once the entrance had been swept for

mines. Following closely behind the destroyers were several small landing craft

equipped with smoke pots designed to conceal the movements of the first waves as

they crossed the line of departure. As Pursuit, which was in the lead, neared the

lagoon entrance, shore batteries turned

9

 Ibid.

10

 Ibid.; 2d Marine Div Special Action Rpt Tarawa,

13 Jan 44, pp. 4-5.

Admiral Turner has offered as a possible explanation for the delay in the air strike the following: According to the original Air plan issued on 23 October,

the dawn air strikes at both Makin and Tarawa were

to begin at 0545 and end at 0615. Later, the Air representatives on the various naval staffs objected to such

an early strike because their experience had demonstrated that shortly before sunrise airplane pilots,

themselves high up in sunshine and thus good targets,

could not distinguish their own individual targets

hidden in the darkness below. Hence, on 5 November

it was agreed by all the principal commanders present

at the rehearsals of Task Force 52 in the Hawaiian

area that the air strike should be postponed from 0545

until 0610. Admiral Pownall, in command of the carrier task force, was informed of this change of plan and

in fact his pilots came in at Tarawa only three minutes late according to the revised schedule. Admiral

Hill was at Efate when the revised plan was decided

upon, and it is apparent that he was not aware of the

change. Admiral Turner suggests one of three possibilities to explain the failure of co-ordination of the

dawn strike at Tarawa: (a) either Turner's staff did

not send the change in plan to Hill; or (b) due to a

failure in fast mail or radio communications, Hill did

not receive the change; or (c) having received the

change, Hill's staff failed to act on it. (Ltr, Adm

Turner to Gen Ward, 12 Feb 52, Incl 1, p. 12.) When

interviewed, Admiral Hill was unable to throw further light on this subject (Interv, Philip A. Crowl with

Vice Adm Harry W. Hill, 9 Apr 52), nor do the

records consulted help to solve the mystery. At any

rate, if Admiral Turner's conjecture is sound, the aviators of Task Force 50 must be absolved from blame

in delivering their dawn strike later than was

expected. 11

 TF 53 Rpt of Tarawa Opns, 13 Dec 43, Incl A,

p. 31.
130 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

their attention to this little vessel. Waterspouts rose in the air as shells landed nearby. Aboard the mine sweeper, machine

guns and heavier weapons returned fire,

and Ringgold and Dashiell joined with their

5-inch guns. At 0646 Pursuit pushed

through the entrance channel. No mines

were found, and at 0715 the mine sweeper

took position as control vessel at the line of

departure inside the lagoon. Still returning

fire, the vessel swung to face the lagoon

entrance. Behind it dense clouds of dust

and smoke obscured the island and hung

low over the water. To make certain that

the line of departure would be clearly

marked, Pursuit turned on her searchlight.

The vessel still had suffered no serious

damage.12

The two destroyers pushed into the

lagoon a few minutes behind the mine

sweepers and immediately came under

heavy fire.13 Ringgold started firing with all

batteries as soon as she was inside the reef

line. At 0711 she suffered a direct hit from

a 5-inch gun, the shell entering the after

engine room, completely disrupting the

water, steam, and electricity supply to the

after part of the ship. Moments later another shell glanced off the barrel of a forward torpedo tube, passing through sick

bay and into the emergency radio room.

The ship continued to maneuver in spite of

the damage, trying to locate the larger

weapons that were firing on the ships inside

the lagoon.14

While the fire support vessels were moving to the lagoon, the first waves of amphibian tractors and landing craft began

their move from the rendezvous areas

toward the line of departure inside the

lagoon. It soon became apparent that they

would be late in arriving. The LVT's had

to contend with choppy seas, a strong head

wind, and a receding tide. Furthermore,

many of the vehicles were in poor mechanical condition.15

Pursuit, which had begun to track the

landing waves by radar, reported that they

were approximately forty minutes behind

schedule.16 Fifteen minutes later, further

reports showed that only a little over 500

yards had been traversed. In the air above,

observation planes gave various estimates

of the distance to be traveled to the beaches

and the probable times of landing. There

were many discrepancies in the reports,

but all agreed that the landings would be

late. As a result, Admiral Hill notified all

vessels and troop commanders at 0803 that

H Hour would be delayed until 0845.

Twenty minutes later it was changed once

more—to 0900. These messages, however,

failed to reach the fighter planes that were

scheduled to strafe the beaches immediately before the first troops landed. Operating on the assumption that H Hour was

still 0830 the planes started their strafing

mission at 0825, and naval fire had to lift

until the planes had cleared from the

area.17

Even this much of a delay proved overly

optimistic. In fact, the first amphibian

tractor to touch the beach did not arrive

until 0910. Although the mine sweeper

Pursuit and one observation plane had

already reported that 0900 was too early

by at least fifteen minutes to expect the

first touchdown, Admiral Hill nevertheless ordered all naval gunfire, except for

that of two destroyers, to cease by 0855.

12

 Ibid.; CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Nov

43, Annex E, p. 10. 13

 USS Ringgold Action Rpt, 21 Oct 43-2 Dec 43,

pp. 9-10. 14

 Ibid. 15

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Nov 43,

Annex E, p. 11. 16

 USS Pursuit Action Rpt, 6 Dec 43, p. 4. 17

 TF 53 Rpt of Tarawa Opns, 13 Dec 43, Incl A,

p. 32.
THE CAPTURE OF TARAWA 131

WESTERN END OF BETIO AFTER BOMBARDMENT. Open area in right center

is the end of the airstrip runway. Red Beach 1 is shown in upper right. Note coastal fortifications

in foreground.

He reasoned that to continue naval fire

through the heavy smoke that lay over the

lagoon was too risky to the assault troops as

they moved toward shore. Planes came in

again for a five-minute strike at 0855, but

from 0900 until 0910, except on Red Beach

3 at which two destroyers were still firing,

the Japanese were left unhampered to reinforce their beach positions and direct

accurate fire of all types on the approaching vehicles.18

What had been the effect of all this terrible pounding of Betio from air and ship on

the morning of the landing? A total of

about 3,000 tons of naval projectiles alone

had been thrown against the enemy in the

four hours before the first troops touched

down.19

 From the point of view of one observer, Admiral Kingman, who commanded the fire support group responsible

for the island's bombardment, "it seemed

almost impossible for any human being to

be alive on Betio."20

This of course proved to be an illusion,

as the marines ashore were soon to discover

to their sorrow. Yet certain concrete results

can be attributed to the preliminary bombardment. At least one 8-inch coast defense

battery and two 120-mm. antiaircraft batteries were silenced by naval gunfire after

receiving direct hits. Everything above

ground or in open pits, such as personnel,

18

 Ibid. 19

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl F, Sec. II, p. 2. 20

 TG 53.4 (Fire Support Group) Action Rpt, 17-22

Nov 43, p. 2.
132 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

bombs, and trucks, was probably destroyed. Camouflage screens over dugouts

and bombproof shelters were wiped away.

Most important was the fact that Shibasaki's network of telephone wire, most of

which was laid above ground, was to all

intents and purposes obliterated, and his

system of signal communications was completely paralyzed.21

However, even this destruction was not

enough. Along the beaches there were

many pillboxes of concrete, coconut logs,

and steel, most of which were not destroyed.22

 On Red Beaches 2 and 3 there

were at least five machine guns manned

and firing at the troops as they advanced

over the reef toward the shore. As Admiral

Hill put it, "that was five too many."

 23

 To

the marines who led the assault on Betio

without any armor heavier than their helmets and the shirts on their backs, this was

a gross understatement.

The Landings on Red Beach 1

The 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, which

was to land on Red Beach 1, had placed

two companies in the first three waves of

LVT's. Company K was to land on the left

of the battalion zone, while Company I, on

the right, was to touch down on the extreme northwest corner of the island. Each

was to be supported by elements of the

heavy weapons unit, Company M. The

third rifle company of the battalion, Company L, was boated in the fourth and fifth

waves along with the mortar platoon of

Company M. Maj. John F. Schoettel, battalion commander, was with the fourth

wave.24

Red Beach 1 presented the only irregular shore line on Betio Island, a deep cove

indenting the island just east of its western

tip. The boundary between the zone of

action of the 3d Battalion and the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, just east of it, lay

almost at the point where the shore line

straightened out to sweep in a fairly regular line toward the island tail. All along the

reaches of Red Beach 1 lay a coconut log

barricade, erected as an obstacle over

which invading troops must crawl. The

barricade was separated from the water on

the western half of the beach by approximately twenty yards of coral sand. On the

east the beach was much narrower, and in

most places the water lapped at the base of

the logs. High tide would cover all of the

beach strip within the cove.

The amphibian tractors of the 3d Battalion were the first by two or three minutes to land on Betio Island. As they

reached the reef and clambered over it

they met heavy fire from machine guns and

antiboat weapons. The LVT's had been

under scattered fire since leaving the line

of departure, but the volume that fell upon

the tractors as they waddled over the reef

toward the beach was so heavy that it

caused considerable disorganization in the

three waves. The principal source of enemy

fire seemed to be one large emplacement

at the left extremity of Red Beach 1, between it and Red Beach 2. The Japanese

here were in a position to rake the entire

approach formation. By the time the initial wave climbed out of the water at 0910,

casualties in Company K were already so

great as to make it extremely doubtful

whether that unit could establish a foothold on the shore. 21

 TF 53 Rpt of Tarawa Opns, 13 Dec 43, Incl A,

p. 48. 22

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, Incl F, Sec. II, p. 2. 23

 TF 53 Rpt of Tarawa Opns, 13 Dec 43, Incl A,

p. 48. 24

 2d Marine Regt Rpt of Opns on Betio Island, 20-

24 Nov 43, Incl G, Account of Tarawa Opns by 3d Bn

2d Marines (hereafter cited as 3d Bn 2d Marine Action Rpt), p. 1.
THE CAPTURE OF TARAWA 133

RED BEACH 1. Damaged LVT's and floating bodies testify to the ferocity of Japanese resistance at the junction of Red Beaches 1 and 2.

In Company I, which was farther away

from the troublesome strong point, casualties were less heavy at the outset, though

by 1100 both companies had sustained 50

percent casualties.25

 The movement toward

the island had been steady. Here and there,

a tractor, hit and burning, was stopped

dead in the water. If its occupants were

alive and able to do so, they climbed over

the sides and tried to wade ashore. From

those vehicles that pulled up before the log

barricade, the marines jumped to seek

whatever cover the barricade afforded.

Company K found itself under heavy machine gun fire from the strong position on

its left and the bullets sweeping up the

narrow sand shelf kept the men's heads to

the ground and forbade movement. Company I found the barricade offered some

protection from the fire. Within a few minutes, the riflemen of this company began to

infiltrate inland. As already indicated, during movement of the 3d Battalion toward

the beaches LVT's had been hit and were

either destroyed or burning. As the fourth

wave, including some tanks, approached

the beach, the men could see, ahead of

them through the smoke and dust from the

island, the disabled vehicles.

Everywhere the lagoon was marked with

the telltale splashes of bullets and larger

caliber shells. The first LCM's and

LCVP's discovered there was not enough

water to float their landing craft beyond

the reef line. Coxswains of some of the tank

lighters turned their craft away, seemingly

25

 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
134 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

in search of another more favorable landing site. The command boat came up just

as the LCM's were turning, and Major

Schoettel immediately ordered them to the

beach.26 Company L, under the command

of Maj. Michael P. Ryan, arrived at the

reef at this critical moment and the company commander ordered his men into the

water to wade ashore.

On the beach most of Company K and

part of Company I were drawn up before

the log barricade. To the left of Red Beach

1 the formidable emplacement at the battalion boundary had a clear field of fire all

along the narrow strip of sand between the

water and the sea wall. Company K, which

had already suffered heavily during the

landing, now had to lie in the exposed area

under constant fire, incurring further casualties. Company I, which had had fewer

losses during the ship-to-shore movement

and on the beach, had pushed inland for

fifty yards. Until 1100 there was little if

any communication between the two assault companies. Company K, after being

pinned down to the narrow sand beach,

had finally managed to push a few men

over the coconut barrier and to a point

fifty yards inland from the shore, about the

same distance as that reached by the unit

on the right.

More than half of Red Beach 1 was still

in the hands of the enemy. Along the eastern half, particularly at the main emplacement on the Red Beach 2 boundary, the

Japanese were still active and causing considerable damage to troops trying to get

ashore. Company L was severely hit while

wading in, losing about 35 percent of its

strength before reaching the beach on the

west end of the island.27

The platoon of medium tanks attached

to the 3d Battalion had been ordered by

Major Schoettel to debark and the tanks

were put into the water at the reef line,

about 1,200 yards from dry land, while

Company L was still struggling through

the water toward shore. In front of them

went the tank reconnaissance men to place

guide flags in the potholes offshore.

As soon as the guides entered the water,

they were subjected to fierce fire from the

enemy. Although the tanks came in safely

in spite of this fire, most of the guides were

killed or wounded. The vehicles came

ashore on the left half of Red Beach 1, in

the area swept most severely by Japanese

fire. The sand was covered with the bodies

of dead or wounded marines who could not

yet be moved because of the intense fire.

Rather than run the heavy tanks over these

inert forms, the platoon commander decided to go back into the water, around to

the extreme right flank of the beach, and

then move inland from there. As the tanks

executed this maneuver, four of them fell

into potholes in the coral reef and were

drowned out. Only two were able to make

shore and these were shortly knocked out

by 40-mm. gun fire.28

Major Schoettel had returned to the reef

after rounding up the tank lighters and

dispatching them to the reef's edge. The

scene confronting him was extremely confused. The men of Company L were in the

water and Schoettel could see most of them

wading ashore. The heavy fire from the

beaches was readily apparent. It was obviously coming from the position on the

boundary between the two beaches, and

when the battalion commander and his

group began to debark from their landing

craft they were brought under the same

fire. Faced with the choice of wading

ashore and probably losing all of his com26

 Ibid., p. 2. 27

 Ibid., p. 2. 28

 Ibid., p. 3.
THE CAPTURE OF TARAWA 135

DISABLED LVT in the water at the junction of Red Beaches 1 and 2. Note shattered Ml rifle

on the deck and tank turret showing above the water off the stern of the LVT.

mand group or remaining on the reef

where he could direct fire against the enemy position, Schoettel chose the latter.

Having established his command post on

the reef and made contact with Company

K by radio, Major Schoettel reported to

Colonel Shoup, commander of the 2d Marine Regimental Combat Team, who was

located on Red Beach 2, and explained the

situation to him. Colonel Shoup ordered

the major to land with the fourth wave on

Red Beach 2 and work from there onto Red

Beach 1. Major Schoettel, however, was

unable to get ashore until late afternoon.29

During the morning several requests

were made for air strikes against the main

beach position.30 One air strike was eventually delivered at approximately 1120,

but immediately brought complaints from

Company K that friendly troops were

being strafed and was accordingly discontinued.31

Operations at Red Beach 2

The 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, was

scheduled to land at Red Beach 2 with

Company F on the left and Company E on

the right and Company G in support.32

Red Beach 2 extended from the eastern

curve of the cove to Central Pier. As on

Red Beach 1, a four-foot-high log barri29

 2d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 19-20 Nov 43, p. 9. 30

 Ibid., pp. 9-13. 31

 2d Marine Regt Unit Jnl Tarawa Opn, 20 Nov

43, p. 2. 32

 2d Marine Regt Rpt of Opns on Betio Island, 20-

24 Nov 43, Incl F, Summary of Tarawa Opn by 2d Bn

2d Marines (hereafter cited as 2d Bn 2d Marines Action Rpt), p. 2.
LANDINGS AT RED BEACH 2. Troops wade ashore (above). The beach after the attack

(below); note half-submerged tanks in center background.
THE CAPTURE OF TARAWA 137

cade had been constructed to form a sea

wall. For the most part the barricade lay

about twenty yards from the water's edge,

thus leaving a narrow open strip of deep

coral sand over which the marines would

have to move after leaving the water. The

enemy had constructed pillboxes and shelters along the barricade at intervals, and

the defenders in these positions could keep

the narrow sand strip and its approaches

under heavy fire.

As the three original landing waves

headed for Red Beach 2 they were subjected to heavy concentrated fire from all

along the beach, the heaviest coming from

the same positions on the boundary that

were causing the 3d Battalion so much

trouble on the right.

There was no possibility of sideslipping

out of range of the enemy's guns, although

troops that were not mounted on LVT's

could find some protection by wading

ashore under Central Pier. As soon as the

first LVT's climbed over the reef on their

way to shore, the scene in the 2d Battalion

zone became one of almost indescribable

confusion. LVT's were hit by all types of

gunfire. Some of them were disabled and

lay helpless in the water. Crews and assault

troops climbed over the side and waded

toward shore. When their vehicles were hit,

the drivers of some LVT's lost control and

veered off course. Others, seeking vainly to

escape the direct frontal fire, eventually

landed on Red Beach 1. Even before the

first waves had landed on Red Beach 2,

reserve elements coming to the reef in

LCVP's found that there was not enough

water to float the small craft over the shelf.

The men in the boats without hesitation

leaped into the water for the long trek to

shore.

Company F landed on the left half of the

beach, near the base of the pier. This unit,

decimated on the way to shore, could do

little more than take possession of the sand

strip in its immediate area. Some of the

men pushed over to the coconut log barrier

and took cover behind it. A few others were

able to crawl over the barrier and move

inland, but at no point did the hold on the

beach extend more than fifty yards inland.

For the time being everyone was forced to

dig in and hold the small area gained in

landing. From hidden dugouts on either

flank, from pillboxes just behind the barrier, and from trees just inland, the Japanese poured a merciless fire into the men

lying in the coral sand.33

Once ashore, the units on Red Beach 2

found it impossible to establish firm physical contact. One platoon of Company E

had landed on Red Beach 1 in an isolated

position. The other two platoons had established a toe hold comparable to that seized

by Company F, but so far toward the western end of Red Beach 2 as to prevent coordination of the efforts of the two companies. When Company G, the reserve,

landed in the center of Red Beach 2, it was

also immediately pinned down on the narrow coral strip and was unable to move

forward over the sea wall. There was no

opportunity for the men to organize when

they reached the beach. In little groups of

two and three, sometimes even as individuals, they dug foxholes in the sand or

sought shelter beneath the log barricade.

The few men who were able to crawl over

the retaining wall were isolated and cut

off.34

Companies G and E made physical contact soon after reaching the beach, but it

was not until late in the day that a firm

line was formed by all three companies of

the battalion. The complete disorganiza33

 Ibid., pp. 1-3. 34 Ibid.
138 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

tion of the troops on Red Beach 2 may be

seen from the composition of Company F

in the late afternoon. At that time the company commander had under his control six

men from Company F, sixteen from Company E, ten from Company C, and fifteen

from Company H.

The 2d Battalion lost its commander, Lt.

Col. Herbert R. Amey, during the landing.

Approaching the reef in an LCM in the

fourth wave, which included half of the

battalion headquarters group and a few

observers, and discovering that there was

not enough water to float the lighter beyond that point, Colonel Amey hailed two

passing LVT's on their return from the

beach. The headquarters group scrambled

into the tracked vehicles and started toward shore. While still 200 yards from

land, the tractor containing Colonel Amey

was stopped by barbed wire. Rather than

spend time circling to look for a passage

the battalion commander ordered his men

over the side to wade ashore. As the group

waded toward the barbed wire, a burst of

machine gun fire killed Colonel Amey and

wounded three others. The remainder of

the headquarters immediately splashed to

cover behind an abandoned boat. Since

Maj. Howard J. Rice, the battalion executive, had landed on Red Beach 1, Lt. Col.

Walter I. Jordan, an observer from the 4th

Marine Division, assumed command of

the 2d Battalion until Major Rice could

rejoin his men. The command post was

eventually set up in a shell hole in the middle of Red Beach 2. Salt water or enemy

machine gun fire had rendered the battalion's radios useless, and communication

with the widely scattered elements, except

by runner, was impossible. It was not until

well after 1000 that a runner system began

functioning on Red Beach 2. Even then, no

attempt could be made to expand the area

seized by the first landing waves. Each of

the companies and the command post

group had to give full attention to survival.

Huddled along the coconut log barrier,

moving only when necessary, the battalion

turned its efforts to eliminating the enemy

positions that jutted out onto the beach itself. Groups from the 18th Marines (Engineers) that had landed with the first waves

moved up and down the narrow beach

area blowing up dugouts and emplacements with demolitions. Behind the battalion the water was filled with amphibian

tractors and debris. Troops still struggled

to get ashore, some wading, others approaching gingerly in commandeered landing tractors. Practically all the marines who

came ashore in this area had chosen the

relative shelter of Long Pier and were trying to push toward the beaches by threading their way along the piling.

Unlike the situation at Red Beach 1,

where ship-to-shore movement all but

ceased during the period immediately following the original assault, attempts to get

troops ashore on Red Beach 2 were continuous. Command groups and reserve elements landed through the lagoon in amphibian tractors or waded in beside

Central Pier throughout the day. During

the whole period, the approaches to Red

Beach 2 were under constant heavy machine gun and antiboat fire.35

The Landings at Red Beach 3

The original landings on the extreme

left were scheduled to be made by the 2d

Battalion, 8th Marines, under Maj. Henry

P. Crowe. The battalion had been attached

to the 2d Marines for the operation. The

two assault companies were E and F, sup35

 18th Marines Combat Rpt, Incl A, Rpt of Co A,

1st Bn 18th Marines, pp. 3-7; Stockman, Tarawa, p.

17.
THE CAPTURE OF TARAWA 139

ported by one platoon of Company G. One

reason that this landing was considerably

more successful than the others was the

longer period of naval bombardment before the landing. The fire from the two destroyers in the Red Beach 3 area lasted

until seven minutes before the first LVT

reached shore. Although heavy fire of all

types greeted the first waves, it was not as

effective as that on the other beaches. One

LVT received a direct hit and was stopped

in the water, and a few casualties were inflicted on other landing craft. The number

of men lost in the battalion totaled under

twenty-five. Five of these casualties, officers of Company E, were hit as they debarked from their respective landing craft

on the beach next to Central Pier.

Two of Company E's LVT's found a

hole in the coconut log barricade and

drove through, continuing as far inland as

the triangle formed by the main airstrip

and taxiways. The rest of Company E lost

no time in following on foot, and within a

few minutes after the first wave was ashore

a substantial beachhead extending to the

airfield had been established. Company F,

on the extreme left flank of Red Beach 3,

had less success but did establish a hold

with its left flank anchored on the short

pier known as Burns-Philp Wharf. Before

this company could expand its hold to

reach the inland line of Company E, it was

met by serious counterfire from a strong

Japanese position a few yards to its left

front. The supporting platoon of Company

G landed without incident, moved along

in the wake of Company E, mopping up

several enemy positions, and eventually

extending the left flank of the assault back

toward Company F. No firm physical contact between the left and right companies

was established, however, until late in the

day.36

Reinforcing the Beachhead

Colonel Shoup and the command group

of the 2d Marines had followed close behind the assault waves in an LCVP and

arrived at the reef a few minutes after the

first wave reached the beach. When it became apparent that the landing craft in

which he was boated could not get over

the reef, the regimental commander hailed

an LVT that was ferrying casualties back

from the beach. The wounded men were

transferred to the LCVP and Colonel

Shoup and his party started for Red Beach

2. After three separate attempts to reach

shore, all of which were halted by heavy

gunfire, the party was forced to debark

when the tractor's engine stopped. By 1030

the whole group was wading ashore along

Central Pier. Shortly afterwards the command post was established ashore on Red

Beach 2.37

Colonel Shoup had maintained constant radio communication with all three

of his landing team commanders until

Colonel Amey was killed. Shoup later regained contact with Colonel Jordan

through the radio of the 2d Battalion, 8th

Marines. Information from Red Beach 1

was scanty, owing to the failure of Major

Schoettel to get ashore.

In addition to the three companies of the

3d Battalion, 2d Marines, other scattered

units of the assault force had come ashore

on Red Beach 1, principally from the 2d

Battalion, 2d Marines, originally scheduled for Red Beach 2. The landing craft

carrying these battalion units had been

driven to the right, either by the heavy fire

36

 2d Marine Regt Rpt of Opns on Betio Island, 20-

24 Nov 43, Incl H, Rpt of Tarawa Opns by 2d Bn 8th

Marines (hereafter cited as 2d Bn 8th Marines Action

Rpt), pp. 1-2. 37

 Ibid., pp. 1-2; Stockman, Tarawa, pp. 16-17.
RED BEACH 3. Marines take cover behind the sea wall on the beach (above). A medium tank

supports the attack, Burns-Philp Wharf in the background (below).
THE CAPTURE OF TARAWA 141

from the strong point between the two

beaches or by mechanical failures of the

LVT's. One platoon of Company E, one

platoon of Company G, two platoons of

Company H, the 2d Battalion executive

officer, Major Rice, and a portion of the

battalion headquarters company landed

at the northwestern corner of the island on

Red Beach 1. Immediately upon landing,

Major Rice attempted to rejoin his own

battalion on Red Beach 2, but because of

the strong point between the two beaches

his attempts were to prove unsuccessful.38

While still afloat, Colonel Shoup decided

to commit his reserve. The reports from

the 2d Battalion, at this time principally

from Major Rice who described his unit

as isolated and pinned on the beach, and

the absence of information from Red

Beach 1, seemed to indicate to the regimental commander that the situation was

more precarious on the two right-hand

beaches. At 0958 he therefore ordered

Maj. Wood B. Kyle, commander of the 1st

Battalion, 2d Marines, to land on Red

Beach 2 and work to the west toward Red

Beach 1 in an attempt to assist the 3d Battalion in that area.39

Major Kyle moved at once to the reef

but found, as others had before him, that

the landing craft in which he was boated

could not negotiate the shallow water between there and shore. By this time, approximately 1030, more LVT's from the

original landing waves were returning to

the reef line. Major Kyle set about at once

to secure as many of these as possible. At

1100 he had commandeered enough of

them to boat Companies A and B. Company C remained at the reef until additional vehicles could be procured and did

not land until after 1300.40 Meanwhile,

during the transfer of the two assault companies of the battalion, enemy fire had

continued heavy throughout the lagoon.

Three of the 1st Battalion's boats were

sunk by direct hits during the debarkation.

When the LVT's turned and started again

for the beach they were met by the same

intense fire that had greeted the units

landing earlier. In the ensuing twenty

minutes many of the tractors received hits

from large-caliber shells or were riddled

with bullets. As in the case of the early assault waves, many marines were forced to

take to the water and wade ashore with

resultant heavy casualties. The tractors on

the right were forced off course. A total of

one officer and 110 men thus landed on

Red Beach 1 and eventually joined the 2d

and 3d Battalions.

The orders committing the reserve battalion had been intercepted aboard the

flagship Maryland and at 1018 General

Julian Smith ordered Col. Elmer E. Hall,

commander of the 8th Marine Regimental

Combat Team, to release one battalion

landing team of his regiment, which was

in division reserve, to Colonel Shoup at the

line of departure.41 The 3d Battalion, 8th

Marines, at this time debarking from its

transport, was designated for the job. The

landing craft bearing this battalion left the

line of departure at 1200 for Red Beach 3.

The battalion, boated in LCVP's, found it

impossible to proceed farther than the reef

line and, like others before them, debarked

to wade ashore. At the particular point of

debarkation the water was deep, and a

few of the heavily laden marines drowned.

The others were taken under heavy fire

from the beaches as they waded their way

38

 2d Bn 2d Marines Action Rpt, pp. 2-4. 39

 2d Marine Regt Rpt of Opns on Betio Island, 20-

24 Nov 43, Incl E, Rpt of Tarawa Opns by 1st Bn 2d

Marines (hereafter cited as 1st Bn 2d Marines Action

Rpt), p. 1. 40

 Ibid., pp. 1, 2. 41

 2d Mar Div D-3 Jnl, 19-20 Nov 43, p. 9.
142 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

to shore. Within the space of a few minutes

severe casualties had been suffered by the

battalion, and the survivors gravitated to

Central Pier to make their way inland. It

was late afternoon before elements of the

battalion were able to take an effective

part in the action.42

Development of the Situation

on 20 November

By early afternoon of D Day five battalions of marines had been committed at

Tarawa. All but one had sustained heavy

casualties and were in a badly disorganized state. On Red Beach 1 elements of

three battalions supported by two medium

tanks were fighting virtually separate

actions. On Red Beach 2 elements of two

battalions struggled to hold the ground

they had seized in the landings and fought

to clear out the positions from which fire

was being placed on the narrow beach

area. Some attempt was made to expand

the beachhead, but with little success. On

Red Beach 3 the early successes of Company E, 8th Marines, were consolidated,

and the major effort was directed toward

the reduction of the troublesome enemy

positions near Burns-Philp Wharf.

The Action Along the Western End

of the Island

As already related, Major Ryan, the

commander of Company L, had assumed

command of all elements of the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, ashore on Red Beach 1

shortly after his arrival there. For two

hours after the two assault companies had

established firm physical contact, Major

Ryan sought to organize the battalion's

remnants for a drive across the island.

With the arrival of the two medium tanks

early in the afternoon, this aggressive officer was finally able to drive forward toward the south shore of Betio. Working

from shelter to shelter, small detachments

made steady progress. The support of the

two tanks was extremely valuable, but

midway in the engagement one was disabled by a direct hit from an enemy gun

and the other was damaged in a duel with

an enemy tank. By that time Major Ryan's

force had moved to within 300 yards of

the south shore of the island, and the commander was anxiously trying to reach

higher headquarters with the information

that part of Green Beach, on the west coast

of Betio, was available for landing reserves.43

Major Ryan's reports of the conditions

on Red Beach 1 failed to reach their destination, and the suitability of Green

Beach for landings was not yet realized.

Neither General Julian Smith nor Colonel

Shoup was optimistic about the situation

on Red Beach 1. Both officers, who had

received their information during the

morning from reports of Major Schoettel,

were under the impression that the position of the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, was

extremely tenuous.44 It was only at 1800,

when Colonel Shoup finally succeeded in

establishing radio contact with Major

Ryan, that the real situation became

known. Major Ryan, in the meantime,

had withdrawn his lines into a more compact defensive position and reported that

the 3d Battalion held a beachhead approximately 300 yards deep and 150 yards wide.

Elsewhere in the Red Beach 1 area little

progress had been made. Throughout the

afternoon the units under Major Rice's 42

 3d Bn 8th Marines Special Action Rpt, 1 Dec 43,

pp. 1-2. 43

 3d Bn 2d Marines Action Rpt; Stockman,

Tarawa, p. 22. 44

 2d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 19-20 Nov 43, p. 10.
THE CAPTURE OF TARAWA 143

DAMAGED MEDIUM TANK M4

command had fought to destroy the positions separating the western beach from

Red Beach 2. Many of the marines who

had landed near the northwestern tip of

the island continued to be pinned down on

the narrow coral sand strip between the

water's edge and the coconut barricade

that had been erected twenty yards inland.

The stubborn system of Japanese defensive

positions at the boundary between beaches

continued to pour fire into this confined

space. As darkness fell, several hundred

yards still separated the landing forces on

the two beaches.45

Completion of the Action on D Day

Elsewhere on Betio Island the situation

of the troops improved only slightly during

the day. On Red Beach 3, Major Crowe's

battalion bent its efforts toward eliminating the strong steel-reinforced position on

its left flank. In vicious fighting throughout

the afternoon, the Japanese resisted efforts

to destroy the position. Buildings near it

were set on fire by marines, tanks and

flame throwers were brought into play,

and one section of 37-mm. guns was lifted

above the sea wall to take the position

under direct fire. The 1st Platoon of Company F, nearest the beach, was pinned

down most of the afternoon by a constant

shower of grenades and machine gun fire.

Late in the afternoon the 2d Platoon of

Company F was virtually wiped out while

trying to circle the emplacement on its inland side. The action of the tanks and guns

did succeed in breaking up one tank-supported Japanese counterattack.46

45

 Stockman, Tarawa, p. 22. 46

 2d Bn 8th Marines Action Rpt, pp. 2, 3.
144 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

On the right of Major Crowe's line,

Companies E and G, supported and reinforced by elements of the 3d Battalion, 8th

Marines, consolidated their hold on the

area between the beach and the airstrip

triangle. The advanced positions, however,

were under constant rifle and machine

gun fire from bypassed Japanese defenders

who had utilized every conceivable hiding

place from which to harass the invaders.

The most confused situation on the

island at nightfall was on Red Beach 2

where the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, had

been unable to organize a sustained attack

from the narrow toe hold originally established on the beach. Some small detachments had penetrated 125 yards inland

from the sea wall, while others still remained pinned down on the narrow sand

strip at the water's edge. Units were disorganized and scrambled, and large gaps

existed in the lines throughout the zone of

action. The 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, had

bolstered the 2d Battalion at various places,

but there was no organized line. One company commander later described the situation as "impossible to control." No officer

knew where all the component elements of

his command were, nor did he have the

necessary communications to control those

he could not see.47

Supply, Communications, and Command

Original supply plans of the 2d Division

had called for a routine discharge of cargo

from the transports into available lighterage following debarkation of assault troops.

47

 2d Bn 2d Marines Action Rpt, pp. 2ff.
THE CAPTURE OF TARAWA 145

These barges were to follow the landing

waves ashore, at first in waves and later,

as dumps were established ashore, moving

as directed by the control boat as fast as

the beach could handle them. Attempts to

follow this plan soon failed. Discharge of

cargo from transports was effected rapidly,

but the supply barges, when they arrived

at the reef line, found it impossible to

reach the beaches. During the earlier part

of the day LVT's were kept busy ferrying

reserve troops ashore and had little time

for transporting supplies. In this situation

many of the small craft loaded with supplies returned to the line of departure and

waited there for further orders. By early

afternoon a confused jam of boats had concentrated near the entrance to the lagoon.

Some supply craft did move to the end of

Central Pier and there discharged their

loads, but the movement of supplies along

the pier to the beaches was as difficult from

that point as it was from the reef itself.

This was partly because a section of the

log structure had been burnt out by earlier

American action and partly because of the

intense fire that the enemy placed along

the pier. In many cases the reserve troops

that worked their way shoreward along

the pier throughout the day carried some

of the more vitally needed supplies, such

as water, ammunition, and plasma, ashore

with them. By nightfall several carrying

parties had been organized under the direction of Brig. Gen. Leo D. Hermle, assistant division commander, and Maj.

Stanley E. Larsen, executive officer of the

3d Battalion, 8th Marines. The carrying

parties worked throughout the night to get

supplies ashore. Some supplies were also

ferried ashore in LVT's on D Day, but the

amount was negligible.48

The supply situation brought into sharp

focus another pressing problem of the

Tarawa invasion force—that of communications. Colonel Shoup had radioed to the

transports intermittently throughout the

day asking for more ammunition, water,

and medical supplies. As these calls

reached the ships they heightened the confusion there. The transport commanders

had been dispatching boatloads of cargo

since early morning, under the impression

that they were arriving safely at the

beaches. Because no accurate picture of

the situation between the transports and

the beach was available, the transport

group commander, Capt. Henry B.

Knowles, USN, sent Maj. Ben K. Weatherwax, assistant supply officer of the division, ashore to determine the exact status

of supplies there. This mission, begun at

2100, took until dawn to complete. Major

Weatherwax found that Colonel Shoup

had received virtually none of the supplies

dispatched to him and that the majority of

boats containing the badly needed materials was still at the line of departure. One

of the ironical features of Major Weatherwax's mission came when he tried to transmit this information back to Captain

Knowles by radio. Two different attempts

to reach the naval commander failed, and

eventually the supply officer had to make

the long, tortuous trip back along the pier

to a landing boat and report to the transport in person.49

The failure of communications had

other serious consequences. Aboard Maryland, the only information that the division

commander, General Julian Smith, had,

48

 TG 53.1 Rpt on Tarawa Opns, 1 Dec 43, p. 2;

Stockman, Tarawa, pp. 25-26; Ltr, CG 2d Marine Div

to CG V Phib Corps, 2 Jan 44, sub; Recommendations Based on Tarawa Opn, No. 3, Ship-to-Shore

Supplies, Beach and Shore Parties, p. 2, A 7-17, 2d

Mar Div/Recommendation Tarawa, Gilbert Area

files, Hist Branch, G-3, Hq USMC. 49

 Stockman, Tarawa, pp. 26-27.
146

came from the reports of observers in

planes, intercepted radio messages, and a

few direct reports from Colonel Shoup. At

1343 General Smith ordered General

Hermle to proceed at once to the end of

the pier, form an estimate of the situation

ashore, and relay the estimate to Maryland.50 The assistant division commander

reported at 1710 that he was at the pier,

but subsequent efforts to forward information to General Smith from that point

proved unsuccessful. The messages had to

be sent by hand to the nearest ship for relay to Maryland, with the result that they

did not arrive at the command post for

some time. For two hours General Hermle

was able to talk to Colonel Shoup and

Major Crowe and to assist in organizing

supply and evacuation procedure at the

pier. At 1930 all radio communications

with the shore ceased, and General Hermle

sent two officers along the pier to Colonel

Shoup's command post on the beach. They

returned at 0345 with an estimate of the

situation ashore.51 To transmit this to General Smith, General Hermle had to go to

the destroyer Ringgold. Even then General

Smith never received the message which

included, among other things, a recommendation that the 1st Battalion, 8th

Marines, be committed on Red Beach 2.

Meanwhile, General Smith had ordered

General Hermle to take command of

troops ashore. This order, issued at 1750

on D Day, was never received by the assistant division commander.52

 Colonel

Carlson, veteran of the Makin raid and

now an observer who had landed with the

assault troops, had left the beach at 1230

at the request of Colonel Shoup. He eventually reached Maryland with the first complete picture of Colonel Shoup's situation.53

The absence of a detailed estimate had

not prevented General Smith from acting

vigorously to relieve what he understood

to be a precarious situation ashore. After

releasing one battalion (the 3d) of the 8th

Marines to Colonel Shoup, he ordered, at

1130, all the remaining elements of the 8th

Marines to be boated. Next, he sent an inquiry to Shoup asking whether these elements were needed ashore.54

 The answer,

received an hour and a half later, was a

succinct "Yes."

 55

At 1625 General Smith ordered Colonel

Hall, commander of the 8th Marines, to

land on the eastern beaches. Colonel Hall

was already afloat, waiting at the line of

departure with the 1st Battalion for orders

to land. General Smith's message was

never received by him, and the remainder

of the 8th Marines stayed afloat throughout the night waiting for the orders that

never came. At division headquarters a

message was received at 2019 that Colonel

Hall had landed at Red Beach 2, and so

no further orders were issued.56 This erroneous report came from an air observer

who had mistakenly identified the landing craft of the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines

(Artillery), then heading for the shore as

those belonging to the 1st Battalion, 8th

Marines.57

The waves of the three assault battalions

and the elements of the two reserve battalions had spent the day on or near the

beaches with little or no resupply and very

little in the way of support. Only two medium tanks had joined the force on Red

Beach 1. Another platoon of mediums

50

 2d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 19-20 Nov 43, p. 17. 51

 Stockman, Tarawa, pp. 25, 26. 52

 2d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 19-20 Nov 43, p. 24;

Stockman, Tarawa, p. 26. 53

 Stockman, Tarawa, p. 25. 54

 2d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 19-20 Nov 43, p. 9. 55

 Ibid., p. 15. 56

 2d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 20-21 Nov 43, p. 2. 57

 Stockman, Tarawa, p. 24.
THE CAPTURE OF TARAWA 147

managed to get three vehicles ashore on

Red Beach 2. These were eventually ordered by Colonel Shoup to move across

the front to support the 3d Battalion, 2d

Marines, on Red Beach 1. As they approached the formidable Japanese position

between Red Beach 1 and Red Beach 2,

however, they were halted by marines who

told them they could not get through. The

tanks were eventually put to work by the

2d Battalion, 2d Marines, and aided materially in eliminating several of the pillboxes and reinforced emplacements behind

Red Beach 2. Two of the three vehicles

were put out of action during the first day.

Four medium tanks of the 3d Platoon,

Company C, 2d Tank Battalion, landed

on Red Beach 3 shortly after the first

waves had landed. Three were put out of

action during the first two hours. The

other, although set afire early on D Day,

continued to operate in support of the 2d

Battalion, 8th Marines, throughout the

engagement.58

Most of the support afforded the men

ashore on D Day was furnished by warships and carrier-based aircraft. It had

been planned to land artillery on Red

Beach 1 as soon as a sufficient beachhead

had been established. The battalion selected for this mission was the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines (75-mm. pack howitzers), under Lt. Col Presley M. Rixey,

USMC. Colonel Rixey landed on Tarawa

as a member of Colonel Shoup's command

group and took an active part in the direction of the landing operations. The artillery was held at the line of departure, however, until conditions ashore improved.

Later in the afternoon it was decided to

bring the howitzers ashore on Red Beach

2, rather than Red Beach 1 where the

situation was still obscure. By the end of

the day five gun sections of the battalion

had been brought ashore either in LVT's

or by boat and hand-carry. This completed the build-up of assault forces on

D Day.59

Consolidating the Beachhead: D plus 1

As night fell on Betio, the 2d Division

faced its most critical period—everyone

expected the Japanese to counterattack. At

every point on the beachhead the hold was

precarious. At 1911 General Smith had

radioed Colonel Shoup, "Hold what you

have."60 Efforts to expand the beachhead

were to be discontinued until morning.

Under cover of darkness, however, the task

of resupply and reinforcement was to

proceed.

Activities during the night proved anticlimactic. Instead of making vicious attempts to drive the marines back into the

sea, the Japanese allowed the hours of

darkness to pass in relative quiet. Here

and there small infiltrating groups of the

enemy wandered into American lines.

Some detachments even managed to swim

out into the lagoon and man machine guns

on old hulks west of Central Pier or to occupy burnt-out LVT's from which they

could place fire on the approaches to the

beaches. One Japanese unit attempted to

recapture Burns-Philp Wharf, but was

driven off by a patrol of the 2d Battalion,

8th Marines.61

As the second day on Betio dawned, the

furious battle was renewed. The first

American effort of the morning was aimed

at landing the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines,

which had remained afloat at the line of

departure throughout the night. Division

58 Ibid. 59

 Ibid., p. 28. 60

 2d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 20-21 Nov 43, p. 2. 61

 2d Bn 8th Marines Action Rpt, p. 3.
148 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

headquarters had not learned the whereabouts of this battalion until after midnight when Colonel Hall was finally

reached through the radios on Pursuit. First

plans envisioned the landing of the remainder of the 8th Marines at the eastern

end of the island. At 0513, however, division headquarters was notified that Colonel Shoup would prefer to have the battalion on Red Beach 2.62

 Accordingly, at

0615 the commander of the 1st Battalion,

8th Marines, Maj. Lawrence C. Hays, Jr.,

and his men clambered out of their landing craft at the reef line, just to the west of

Central Pier. An hour later the first four

waves were ashore, having suffered heavy

casualties while wading to the beach.63

Colonel Shoup immediately ordered Major Hays to reorganize and take up a position on the right flank of the 2d Battalion,

2d Marines. When ready, he was to launch

an attack against the stubbornly defended

position at the juncture of the two righthand beaches in an effort to re-establish

contact with the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines.64

Earlier, a serious attempt to eliminate

the blockhouses on the battalion boundary

had been made. During the landing of the

1st Battalion, 8th Marines, Colonel Rixey

had put the pack howitzers of his 10th Marines in position to fire directly upon these

emplacements. Using delay fuzes in order

to penetrate the coral and log shelters, the

howitzers succeeded in silencing the enemy's guns in this area, though only temporarily.65

Coincident with the attempt to bolster

the men ashore with reinforcements, was

the effort to straighten out the supply situation. The key to this seemed to lie in the

assembly of landing craft and amphibian

tractors that had been near the line of departure throughout most of the first night.

Early on the morning of 21 November,

Capt. John B. McGovern, USN, commander of Transport Group 4, was sent to

Pursuit to take control of the ship-to-shore

movement of supplies. By 1000 Captain

McGovern had commandeered eighteen

LVT's with which, in conjunction with

Marine Corps supply officers, he instituted

a ferrying system in which the amphibian

tractors shuttled supplies to shore and

evacuated wounded from the beaches to

the control vessel.66

Colonel Shoup from dawn until 1000 on

D plus 1 sought to launch a drive to expand the narrow beachhead held during

the night. On Red Beach 3 the primary

objective of Major Crowe's battalion was

the reduction of the strong system of emplacements near Burns-Philp Wharf. Although virtually all of the attention of the

U.S. troops in this zone was centered on

the position, little progress was made in reducing it or in eliminating the heavy fire

that poured along the beach from it.67

In the center of Betio, with support from

Colonel Rixey's artillery, the 2d Battalion,

2d Marines, soon consolidated a line just

short of the taxiway on the airfield and

began to move men into the triangle

formed by the taxiway and airstrip where

a few isolated individuals had spent the

night. Between the airfield and the northern beach, demolition groups moved

against Japanese stragglers. One by one

the stubborn positions that had harassed

landing operations for twenty-four hours

62

 2d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 20-21 Nov 43, pp. 1,

8-9.

63

 8th Marines Special Action Rpt, 1 Dec 43, p. 1;

1st Bn 8th Marines Combat Rpt, 28 Nov 43, p. 1. 64

 1st Bn 8th Marines Combat Rpt, 28 Nov 43, p. 1. 65

 Stockman, Tarawa, pp. 37-38. 66

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Nov 43,

Annex E, p. 12; Stockman, Tarawa, pp. 36-37. 67

 2d Bn 8th Marines Action Rpt, pp. 3-4.
BEACH DEFENSIVE POSITIONS, which had to be eliminated by small unit action.

Note wire beach obstacles in left background.
150 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

were reduced and some freedom of movement was at last achieved by the marines

on and near the water's edge. Also on Red

Beach 2, the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, concentrated first on removing enemy machine guns that interdicted the approaches

to the airstrip and then began a drive

toward the south shore of Betio.68 On Red

Beach 1 Major Ryan by 1100 had organized a drive that was to carry all the

way across the island and to secure Green

Beach—the western coast of Betio—so that

it could be freely used for subsequent landings. Close gunfire support by two destroyers paved the way for this advance.69

The attacks launched on the fronts during the afternoon were successful on all but

the left zone of action, where no advance

was made. On Red Beach 2 and Red

Beach 1 elements of three battalions drove

all the way across the island to the opposite

shore.70 Shortly after 1700 Colonel Shoup,

in the first encouraging message to division

headquarters, ended by adding the hopeful words "We are winning."71

About mid-afternoon on D Day, when

the situation ashore was most confused

and precarious and while reports of extremely heavy casualties were reaching

Maryland, Admiral Hill had radioed Admiral Turner, at Makin, asking for the release of the Expeditionary Troop Reserve

for use at Tarawa.72 As a result Col. Maurice G. Holmes, commanding officer of the

6th Marine Regimental Combat Team,

was notified some two hours later that his

regiment had been released from corps

reserve to 2d Marine Division control. The

next morning (21 November), at a conference aboard Maryland, General Smith

and Colonel Holmes discussed several possibilities for the employment of the reserve

regiment. No decision was made at the

conference but shortly after noon it was

decided to land one battalion over Green

Beach on the western coast of Betio. Colonel Holmes directed his 1st Battalion,

commanded by Maj. William K. Jones, to

prepare to go ashore.73 This was accomplished at 1640. The battalion landing

team was followed about two hours later

by a platoon of light tanks—the 3d Platoon, Company B, 2d Tank Battalion.74

Shortly after noon, Lt. Col. Raymond

L. Murray, commanding officer of the 2d

Battalion, 6th Marines, received orders to

land on Bairiki Island, less than three and

a half miles to the southeast of Betio.75 The

movement, designed to intercept enemy

troops that might be escaping across the

reef between the two islands and thence

into the far reaches of the atoll, was accomplished later in the afternoon following

an intensive naval and aerial bombardment. No live Japanese was discovered.76

Tarawa Is Secured

The afternoon of D plus 1,21 November, was the turning point in the battle for

Tarawa. At the close of the day there were

seven battalions of Marine infantry ashore

on Betio, the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines,

having landed at 1840 over Green Beach,

supported by a company of light tanks.

Early the next morning, a battalion of Marine artillery (2d Battalion, 10th Marines)

went ashore on Bairiki. Troops on Red

Beaches 1 and 2 had driven to the south

coast of Betio, although the stubborn

68

 1st Bn 2d Marines Action Rpt, p. 4. 69

 3d Bn 2d Marines Action Rpt, p. 2. 70

 2d Marine Div Special Action Rpt, p. 3. 71

 2d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 20-21 Nov 43, p. 25. 72

 Ibid., 19-20 Nov 43, p. 16. 73

 6th Marines Special Action Rpt, 20 Dec 43, p. 6. 74

 Stockman, Tarawa, p. 40. 75

 6th Marines Special Action Rpt, 20 Dec 43, p. 6. 76

 Stockman, Tarawa, p. 40.
THE CAPTURE OF TARAWA 151

pocket on the boundary between the two

beaches still defied all attempts to destroy

it and continued to harass, to some extent,

landing activities at both Red Beaches and

on Central Pier. At 2030 Col, Merritt A.

Edson, Chief of Staff, 2d Division, established an advance command post on Red

Beach 2, for the first time providing a

centralized headquarters ashore that

would not be subject to the vagaries of

communication failures. Colonel Edson

immediately assumed the burden of command until General Smith could come

ashore.77

Plans for the Third Day

Colonel Edson spent virtually the entire

night of 21-22 November in consultation

with Colonels Shoup and Hall before

issuing the orders for the co-ordinated attack of the next morning. Two of the great

deficiencies of the 21 November operations were provided for during the conference. The first, air and naval gunfire support, which had been present but in large

measure ineffective because of the inaccurate knowledge of American positions,

was now co-ordinated to provide thorough

and complete coverage of all target areas

in front of the proposed attack.78 In addition, at 0330, Colonel Edson ordered that

the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines (Artillery),

less one battery, be landed on Bairiki

Island to provide supporting fire for the

advance.79 To overcome many of the communications difficulties, the radios of the

separate landing teams of the 6th Marines

were brought into the command net of the

2d Division.80 Added precaution was

taken by sending information of the attack

by officer courier to the units on Red

Beach 1 and Green Beach.81

The attack of 22 November was to have

two objectives. The first was to advance to

the east along the south shore of the

island. This movement was to be made by

the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, attacking

from Green Beach through the lines then

held by the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines. The

advance was to continue through the area

of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 2d Marines,

tying in eventually with the right flank of

the 8th Marines, which was to change its

direction of attack from south to east. This

latter change was actually only a formality

inasmuch as Major Crowe's full attention

since shortly after landing had been centered on the position just inland from the

base of Burns-Philp Wharf, which was to

the east. This main attack was to be reinforced in the zone of the 6th Marines by

the 3d Battalion of that regiment, which

was held in reserve just off Green Beach.

Two battalions of the 8th Marines, the 2d

and 3d, were to make the main effort on

the left (north).

The second objective of the day was to

be the reduction of the pocket between

Red Beaches 1 and 2. This attack was to

be made by the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines.

The battalion was to pivot on the beach,

swing to the west, and move toward Red

Beach 1 through the pocket, which would

be contained on the opposite side by the

3d Battalion, 2d Marines.

Gains on 22 November

The 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, jumped

off at 0800. Moving with two companies

abreast down the narrow hundred-yard

strip of heavily fortified ground between

77

 Stockman, Tarawa, pp. 40-41. 78

 2d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 21-22 Nov 43, p. 4. 79

 6th Marines Special Action Rpt, 20 Dec 43, p. 5. 80

 Stockman, Tarawa, p. 43. 81

 2d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 21-22 Nov 43, p. 6.
JAPANESE BOMBPROOF SHELTERS, stubborn points of resistance, were reduced only

after hard and prolonged fighting.
THE CAPTURE OF TARAWA 153

the airfield and the south shore, Major

Jones and his men progressed rapidly and

by 1100 had reached the area held by the

1st Battalion, 2d Marines. An estimated

250 Japanese were killed and only light

casualties were incurred by the marines.82

During the forenoon the rest of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, landed over Green

Beach and began moving up in the rear of

the assault.83

Upon completion of the first phase of

the attack new orders were issued for a

continuation of the advance up the island

as far as the eastern end of the airfield.

This advance began about 1300 and continued in the face of stronger resistance

until the objective was reached late in the

afternoon.84

Elsewhere on Betio gains had also been

made during the day against heavier resistance and with less evident results.

Company F, 8th Marines, aided by Company K of the same regiment and detachments of the 18th Marines (Engineers),

finally succeeded in reducing the steel pillbox just inland from Burns-Philp Wharf,

together with two strong supporting positions. One of the positions, a large blockhouse, was counterattacked by the Japanese shortly after it had been captured,

but the attempt to retake it was broken

up.85 It was the successful completion of

this action during the morning that

brought about the issuance of the new

orders for the afternoon of the third day.86

Once the evidently strong enemy positions

there had been reduced, the 8th Marines

would be relieved while the relatively

fresh battalions of the 6th Marines continued to the eastern tip of the island.

The attack on the strong point between

the westernmost beaches proceeded slowly.

The two companies farthest inland made

some gains, but Company B, 8th Marines,

nearest the shore, met firm resistance and

was little nearer to the reduction of the

position at nightfall than it had been in the

morning. During the afternoon the 1st

Battalion, 2d Marines, was relieved by the

advance of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines.87

At nightfall on the third day Americans

were in possession of all the western end

of Betio Island as far east as the eastern

end of the airfield, except for the pocket

between Red Beaches 1 and 2. General

Julian Smith came ashore on Green Beach

shortly before noon and then moved to

Red Beach 2 by LVT and assumed command ashore.88

 Despite the relatively substantial gains, it was estimated that at

least five days of heavy fighting remained

before the atoll would be completely subdued.89

Events of the Third Night

General Julian Smith had already

begun the preparation of the attack order

for the fourth day when this pessimistic

prediction was made. On the next morning Colonel Holmes was to assume command of the final drive to the eastern tip

of Betio Island. The two battalions of the

6th Marines already on Betio were to be

joined by the 2d Battalion, which would

be moved from Bairiki.90 This plan for further reinforcement was to be rendered unnecessary before it could be executed, for,

as the order was being prepared, events

82

 6th Marines Special Action Rpt, 20 Dec 43, p. 6. 83

 2d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 21-22 Nov 43, p. 15. 84

 1st Bn 6th Marines Special Action Rpt, 3 Dec 43,

pp. 4, 5. 85

 2d Bn 8th Marines Action Rpt, p. 4. 86

 2d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 21-22 Nov 43, p. 17. 87

 1st Bn 8th Marines Combat Rpt, 28 Nov 43, p. 2. 88

 2d Marine Div D-3 Jnl, 21-22 Nov 43, pp. 18, 22. 89

 Ibid.,p. 27. 90

 6th Marines Special Action Rpt, 20 Dec 43, p. 6.
154 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

were already transpiring that were to end

Japanese resistance. Throughout the battle

the enemy had shown little inclination to

counterattack and seemed un-co-ordinated

and lacking in offensive leadership, apparently because of the breakdown in

communications caused by the preliminary aerial and naval bombardment. By

the evening of 22 November most of the

remaining enemy, approximately 1,000 in

number, were squeezed east into the narrow tail of the island. There, although

unable to maneuver, they could effect a

closer-knit organization than had heretofore been possible. The Japanese leaders

seemed to have determined, therefore, on

an offensive action against the invaders,

and this move they planned carefully. At

approximately 1930 a group of about fifty

Japanese attacked American positions established only a short time before.91

 The

1st Battalion, 6th Marines, had already

assumed responsibility for the whole crossisland line, and Major Jones had placed

all three of his rifle companies in position

with his weapons company, just in the

rear, in reserve. The Japanese succeeded

in finding a small gap between two of the

front-line units, but the battalion moved

in to close the hole and helped destroy the

attacking force without sustaining serious

damage. One significant feature of this action was the employment of grenades,

bayonets, and literally hand-to-hand action by the marines.92

 The reliance on

close-in methods of defense defeated the

whole purpose of the enemy's infiltration

attempt, which seems to have been to secure accurate information as to American

positions. The Japanese were forced to risk

a second probing attack later in the evening with the consequent attrition of their

already dwindling strength. Artillery was

brought within seventy-five yards of the

Marine front lines and acted as an effective screen before the infantry. The second

Japanese attack was a two-pronged movement, one group striking at Company B on

the right of the line and another group of

about the same size against the left center

of the line in the Company A sector. Both

enemy groups were destroyed—that attacking Company A was annihilated by

artillery fire and the one in front of Company B by a combination of close-in artillery fire and hand-to-hand infantry

fighting.93

The final and heaviest counterattack

was launched by the enemy at 0300 after

an hour of intense enemy machine gun fire

all along the line. Several of the Japanese

guns were destroyed by American grenades and counterfire from heavy machine

guns. The final attack, when it came, was

launched by about 300 enemy troops and

hit both Company A and Company B. It

was repulsed within an hour. Within an

area fifty yards deep in front of the Marine

positions, over 200 Japanese were found

dead next morning, while in the impact

area of the artillery, somewhat farther removed, another 125 badly mangled bodies

were found.94

Betio Island Secured

While the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines,

was repulsing the counterattack, preparations were made for the fourth day's action.

The 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, had been

moved before 2300 into position directly

behind the front line. At the time of the

second counterattack one company was 91

 1st Bn 6th Marines Special Action Rpt, 3 Dec 43,

p. 5. 92

 Stockman, Tarawa, pp. 52, 53. 93

 1st Bn 6th Marines Special Action Rpt, 3 Dec 43,

p. 6. 94

 Stockman, Tarawa, p. 54.
THE CAPTURE OF TARAWA 155

already in position there and before morning the whole battalion had formed a secondary line.95

 At 0800 the 3d Battalion

passed Companies I and L through the 1st

Battalion and attacked to the east down

the narrow tail of Betio. Only at one time

during the morning did the demoralized

remnants of the Japanese garrison offer any

resistance. At a point 350 yards beyond the

eastern end of the airfield a concentration

of pillboxes and fire trenches held up the

advance of Company I. On the left Lt. Col.

Kenneth F. McLeod, the battalion commander, immediately moved Company L

around the right of the strong point, leaving the position to be mopped up by Company I, and proceeded with only one

company in the advance. At 1310 the battalion reached the island's tip. Four hundred and seventy-five Japanese were

reported killed during the advance.96

The last organized Japanese resistance

on Betio was to cease a few minutes later.

By 1000 on the fourth day, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, and the 3d Battalion, 2d

Marines, had joined to form a semicircular

attack upon the position on the boundary

between Red Beaches 1 and 2. To accomplish the juncture, a platoon of marines,

under the command of Maj. Hewitt D.

Adams and supported by two 75-mm.

guns, waded out onto the reef in front of

the emplacement and made a direct frontal

assault on the strong point, eliminating

completely the positions that faced the

lagoon.97 The 3d Battalion, 2d Marines,

then advanced toward the beach. One last

pillbox had to be destroyed, and the weary

marines moved to mop up the stragglers

still holding out in holes and shelters. Major Schoettel then notified division headquarters that the task was complete.98

At 1330 the same afternoon, General

Smith announced the end of organized resistance on Betio.99

 Three jobs still remained, however, before the Gilberts

operation could be considered completed:

the rest of the islands of Tarawa Atoll had

to be taken; Apamama Atoll must be captured; and Abaiang, Marakei, and Maiana

Atolls occupied.

Conclusion of the Operation

During the afternoon of 23 November,

the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, which had

moved from Bairiki to Betio during the

morning, learned that it was to mop up

the remaining islands of Tarawa Atoll. At

0500 on 24 November it embarked for

Buota Island to begin the northward

march up the atoll. It was expected that

approximately a hundred Japanese would

be found somewhere along the eastern leg

of the atoll. A thorough search on 24 November failed to reveal the enemy, however, and a continued march on 25

November brought the battalion to Buariki, the northernmost island of the atoll,

where enemy troops were at last encountered. Here, on the evening of 26 November and throughout the following day, a

sharp engagement was fought in which

approximately 150 Japanese were killed at

a cost of 32 American dead and 60

wounded in action.100

Abaiang, Maiana, and Marakei Atolls

lie respectively north, south, and northeast

of Tarawa. On 29 November Company D,

95

 1st Bn 6th Marines Special Action Rpt, 3 Dec 43,

p. 6.

96

 6th Marines Special Action Rpt, 20 Dec 43,

Narrative Rpt of Opns of Landing Team 3d Bn 6th

Marines, pp. 3, 4. 97

 Stockman, Tarawa, p. 58. 98

 3d Bn 2d Marines Action Rpt, p. 3. 99

 Stockman, Tarawa, p. 59. 100

 6th Marines Special Action Rpt, 20 Dec 43,

Narrative Account of Opns of 2d Bn 6th Marines, 21-

29 Nov 43, pp. 1-2.
156 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

2d Tank Battalion, was dispatched aboard

the mine sweeper Pursuit to reconnoiter

these atolls on the assumption that they

might be sheltering Japanese coastwatchers. On Abaiang, five Japanese were

flushed out but managed to escape by

boat. On the other two atolls only natives

were discovered.101

Apamama, an atoll lying seventy-six

miles south of Tarawa, was captured by

the V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance

Company, less one platoon. Carried to

their destination aboard the submarine

Nautilus, the company landed on the atoll

in rubber boats in the early morning of 21

November. Aided by naval gunfire from

their submarine as well as from an escorting destroyer, the marines were able to

complete the occupation of the atoll by 24

November. The operation yielded twentythree Japanese dead, mostly by their own

hands. Next day General Hermle, in command of a landing force built around the

3d Battalion, 6th Marines, relieved the

reconnaissance company and completed

the organization of the atoll's defenses.

Thus from Makin southward 180 miles to

Apamama the whole island chain constituting the northern Gilberts was captured

or occupied by the American forces. The

capture of Tarawa yielded an estimated

4,690 Japanese killed, and 17 Japanese

and 129 Korean prisoners of war. Marine

Corps casualties, including killed, wounded, and missing in action, came to 3,301.102

This was a high price to pay for a few hundred acres of coral. Yet in the minds of

most American military planners and

strategists the cost of the capture of the

Gilberts was justified both in the terms of

the strategic gains realized and the tactical

lessons learned.

101

 Stockman, Tarawa, p. 65. 102

 Ibid., p. 72.
CHAPTER X

Strategic and Tactical

Significance of the Gilberts

Operation

Strategic Consequences

Writing some six years after the event,

General Holland Smith posed the question,

"Was Tarawa worth it?" "My answer," he

said, "is unqualified: No." General Smith

continued:

From the very beginning the decision of the

Joint Chiefs to seize Tarawa was a mistake

and from their initial mistake grew the terrible drama of errors, errors of omission rather

than commission, resulting in these needless

casualties. . . . Tarawa had no particular

strategic importance. . . . Tarawa should

have been by-passed. Its capture . . . was a

terrible waste of life and effort. . . . [We]

should have let Tarawa "wither on the vine." We could have kept it neutralized from our

bases on Baker Island, to the east, and the

Ellice and Phoenix Islands, a short distance

to the southeast.1

General Smith was alone among highranking officers to voice this opinion. Admirals King, Nimitz, and Spruance, as well

as General Julian Smith, were all in agreement that the capture of Tarawa and

Makin was a necessary prelude to the

invasion of the Marshalls.2

The strategic value of the Gilberts lay in

their geographic proximity to the Marshalls and therefore in their utility as air

bases for the forthcoming operations in the

Central Pacific. Before launching the Gilberts campaign, the United States had no

airfields within range of the Marshalls, the

closest being at Funafuti in the Ellice

Islands and at Canton—1,300 and 1,600

nautical miles from Kwajalein, respectively. The occupation of Baker Island and

Nanomea, which was incident to the capture of the Gilberts, closed this range

somewhat and allowed American planes to

operate from bases about 1,020 and 1,050

nautical miles from Kwajalein. But even if

these islands could have been held without

the elimination of the Japanese air potential in the Gilberts, which is in itself doubtful, Baker and Nanomea were still too

distant from the Marshalls to allow steady 1

 Smith, Coral and Brass, pp. 111-12. 2

 Admiral King, Official Rpt Covering Combat

Opns Up to March 1, 1944, p. 42; Admiral Nimitz,

quoted in New York Sun, November 16, 1948, Sec. II,

p. 1; Admiral Spruance, Address to the Royal United

Service Institution, London, October 1946, quoted in

Capt. Walter Karig, USNR, Lt. Comdr. Russell L.

Harris, USNR, and Lt. Comdr. Frank A. Manson,

USN, Battle Report, Vol. IV, The End of an Empire

(New York: Rinehart & Company, 1948), p. 77; Lt.

Gen. Julian C. Smith, USMC (Ret), "Tarawa," United

States Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXIX (1953),

1163-76.
158 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

bombing and photographic reconnaissance. The capture of key islands in the

Gilberts halved the distance between

American airfields and Kwajalein and

made possible the effective employment of

land-based aircraft against that target.

Almost immediately upon completion of

infantry fighting in the Gilberts, naval Seabees and Seventh Air Force engineers commenced work on airfield construction at

Tarawa and Makin. By 18 December the

field at Makin was well enough along to

base its first planes. Less than a week later

two fields at Tarawa (one on Betio and one

on Buota) were ready to fly and service

bombers. By mid-January a field at Apamama was in operation.3

The completion of these airfields in the

Gilberts changed the entire character of

operations against the Marshall Islands.

The long-distance raids with light bomb

loads now gave way to shorter flights with

heavier loads, and allowed flights of planes

with shorter ranges. Medium bombers,

attack bombers, and fighters were brought

into the attack. Army Air Forces B-25's

(medium bombers) were based at Tarawa

and Apamama; A-24's (fighter-bombers)

and P-39's (fighters) were based at Tarawa

and Apamama; A-24's and P-39's were

brought to Makin; and P-40's (fighters)

were based on Makin and Apamama.

Most of the B-24 (heavy bomber) squadrons that had been bombing the Gilberts

and southern Marshalls were moved to

Tarawa by the first week in January. Advance headquarters of the VII Bomber

Command and of the VII Air Service

Command were set up at Tarawa by 7

January.

During November the B-24's, which

were then carrying the entire load alone,

had totaled 237 sorties against the Gilberts

and Marshalls. In December these planes,

able to stage through Tarawa late in the

month, flew 365 bombing and photographic sorties against the Marshalls alone.

They were augmented by the B-25's that

were brought to Tarawa on 28 December

and the A-24's based at Makin.

The Gilbert bases allowed the use of

land-based fighters for the first time in the

Central Pacific. The two P-39 squadrons

and the one P-40 squadron based at Makin

and Apamama accompanied bombing

sorties over the Marshalls from the day

they arrived in the Gilberts. In addition to

protecting the heavier planes, the fighters

also bombed and strafed Japanese installations and shipping. No longer did B-24's

have to assume sole responsibility for landbased photographic and bombing missions

against the Marshalls. Those of shorter

range could be turned over in part to medium bombers and fighters based in the

Gilberts. Also, the shortened distances between the new forward bases and the B-24

targets in the Marshalls allowed the heavy

bombers to fly with still heavier loads and

more frequently.4 Finally, as Admiral

Spruance pointed out, the superior photographic techniques of land-based aviation

made possible a more accurate picture of

terrain, hydrographic conditions, and

enemy defenses in the Marshalls than could

otherwise have been obtained.

Tactical Lessons Learned

The Gilberts operation, especially the

invasion of Tarawa, was the first instance

in the Pacific war of a large-scale amphibious assault against a well-fortified shore

line. Before the outbreak of the war the 3

 Operational History of the Seventh Air Force, 6

Nov 43-31 Jul 44, p. 14; Craven and Gate, AAF IV,

pp. 303-04. 4

 Operational History of the Seventh Air Force, 6

Nov 43-31 Jul 44, pp. 14-19; Craven and Gate, AAF

IV, pp. 304-06.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GILBERTS OPERATION 159

United States armed forces, chiefly the

Navy and the Marine Corps, developed a

systematic doctrine for landing waterborne

troops on hostile shores, supporting them

both before and after the landing by naval

guns and carrier-based air, and providing

the necessary logistical support by overseas

shipping. This doctrine had been set forth

in abundant detail in a series of military

manuals published by the two services.5

Yet, until Tarawa, it had never been put to

a severe test in the Pacific. The landings in

the Solomons, New Guinea, and the Aleutians had all been conducted against light

opposition or no opposition at all. Tarawa

was the first occasion in the Pacific war

when the enemy had heavily fortified the

beachhead that had to be seized if the

attacking force was to achieve its objective.

The fact that the atoll was captured with

acceptable casualties (about 20 percent)

provided incontestable proof that American amphibious doctrine was sound and

that the most formidable island fortress

could be taken even with the relatively

slender means then available to Allied

forces in the Pacific. Just as significant,

however, as the ultimate success of the

invasion were the various deficiencies in

equipment and techniques and the errors

in execution that the operation revealed. It

was the experience gained in the Gilberts,

coupled with a tremendous expansion of

all U.S. arms in the Pacific, that made the

more nearly perfect execution of subsequent amphibious operations possible.

Naval Support

According to the later testimony of

Admiral Hill, the "first and foremost"

among lessons learned during the Gilberts

operation was "that naval task forces accompanying the assault forces had the

power to move into an area, obtain complete naval and air control of that area,

and remain there with acceptable losses

throughout the entire assault and preliminary consolidation phases." "This," he

continued, "is a lesson which had never

been demonstrated before the Gilberts

operation and which formed the basis for

all subsequent operations in the Central

Pacific Area."6

Just as the invasion of Tarawa demonstrated that naval task forces could seize

control of the air and sea long enough to

support a successful landing, so did it indicate that a period of preliminary naval fire,

much longer than a few hours, was necessary if all beach defenses were to be eliminated or effectively neutralized. The consensus among observers at Tarawa was that

the three hours allotted for preliminary

naval bombardment was insufficient.7 Any

hopes that had been pinned on the ability

of naval gunfire and aerial bombardment

to "obliterate" the target proved false. In

spite of the more than 3,000 tons of explosives thrown at or dropped on the island of

Betio immediately before the landing, the

majority of Japanese weapons there were

still in operation when the troops reached

shore.

5

 The most important of these manuals were The

Tentative Manual for Landing Operations (Marine

Corps School, Quantico, 1934); Fleet Training Publication 167, Landing Operations Doctrine, United

States Navy (Office of Naval Operations, Division of

Fleet Training, 1938); and Basic Field Manual 31-5,

Landing Operations on Hostile Shores (War Department, 1941). For the prewar evolution of amphibious

doctrine, see Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, pp. 14-71. 6

 Ltr, Adm Hill to Gen Malony, 14 Feb 49, p. 4,

OCMH. 7

 Ibid., pp. 4-5; V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, pp.

16-17; Ltr, CG 2d Marine Div to CG V Phib Corps,

4 Jan 44, sub: Recommendations Based on Tarawa

Opn, Recommendation 5, Naval Gunfire, p. 1, A

7-17, 2d Mar Div/Recommendation Tarawa, Gilbert

Area files, Hist Branch, G-3, Hq USMC.
160 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

The difficulty was that there were too

many targets to be destroyed for the time

allowed. Naval ships had time to deliver

pinpoint destructive fire only against such

well-defined targets as coastal defense

weapons and heavy antiaircraft batteries.

If the beach preparation had been spread

over a longer period of time, with slower

fire to allow ships to observe their targets

and determine the effectiveness of that fire,

it would have been far more effective. As it

was, with the limited time available, ships'

guns had to resort to mere area bombardment, or neutralization fire, long before it

could be accurately determined how many

of the enemy's guns had been actually

knocked out of action. Neutralization is

not destruction, as the marines who went

ashore soon discovered. One solution for

the deficiencies of naval gunfire at Tarawa

was clear. For naval ships effectively to

support landing operations they would

have to deliver slow, deliberate, pinpoint

fire against selected targets and maintain

constant observation of the damage actually done by their salvos. This would require time—more time than was allotted

to the support ships at either Tarawa or

Makin.

Another conclusion in respect to naval

gunfire support that emerged from the

Tarawa operation was that an insufficient

proportion of major-caliber armor-piercing

shells was employed by the firing ships.

Against the steel-reinforced concrete pillboxes found on Betio, 5-inch antiaircraft

and 6-inch bombardment shells had little

effect. For future operations against wellfortified positions of this sort, it was recommended that greater reliance be put on the

heavy guns of battleships and that a larger

proportion of armor-piercing shells be

employed.8

Still another deficiency in both the plan

and the execution of preliminary naval

gunfire at Tarawa was the rapid shifting of

fire from one target to another. This was

based on the principle of keeping the

enemy guessing as to where to jump next

by placing fire into areas in an unpredictable sequence. Experience at Tarawa

showed that although this type of bombardment was useful for neutralization, it

failed to achieve the degree of destructiveness desired. Destructive fire called for

accurate control, which was rendered impossible by sudden, large, and frequent

shifts of fire. For future operations, it was

recommended that less radical shifting be

employed, and that naval fire be laid directly toward or away from, and right or

left of an established reference point. Thus,

it was believed, more accurate fire control

could be maintained and greater damage

be done to well-covered enemy emplacements.9

Also at Tarawa, naval gunfire on the

beaches was lifted too soon. One reason for

this was to permit a last-minute aerial

strafing and bombing run along the shore

line, but the precaution was unnecessary.

Actually, the planes did not fly low enough

to be endangered by ships' gunfire. The

desirability of a last-minute naval barrage,

more effective than aerial bombardment,

was clearly demonstrated. At Makin this

had been partially provided for by equipping some of the leading amphibian tractors with 4.5-inch rockets, which were fired

to good effect on Yellow Beach.10 At Tarawa only two small support craft (LCS's)

8

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA GALVANIC Opns, Preliminary Study of Action Rpts, 31 Dec 43, p. 2; TF 53 Rpt

of Tarawa Opns, 13 Dec 43, Incl A, p. 49; Ltr cited

n. 7, Recommendation 5, Naval Gunfire, p. 1. 9

 TF 53 Rpt of Tarawa Opns, 13 Dec 43, Incl A,

p. 45. 10

 Ltr, Hq 27th Inf Div to CG V Phib Corps, Rpt

of Opns GALVANIC, 18 Dec 43, p. 7.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GILBERTS OPERATION 161

were furnished with rockets. These were

fired from the flanks of the leading wave

with indeterminate effects. An alternative

to a last-minute rocket barrage would have

been the employment of armored amphibians (amphibian tanks) in the first wave.

These could be equipped with 37-mm. or

75-mm. guns and would have provided

excellent close support fire for the assault

waves. Another device that was clearly

suggested by the landing on Betio was the

continued employment of destroyer fire in

support of the leading waves until just before the landing. In the one instance where

this was done, on Red Beach 3 at Tarawa,

casualties to the troops in the ship-to-shore

movement were reduced to a minimum. In

the opinion of General Julian Smith, close

support fires by destroyers should have

been maintained all along the beach until

the troops were within a hundred yards of

the shore line.11

These various deficiencies in both the

quantity and quality of naval preparatory

fire at Tarawa pointed up a corollary lesson—the desirability of an early landing of

artillery on islands adjacent to the main

target to assist the attendant naval ships

and aircraft in laying down a heavy bombardment preliminary to the principal

landings. The configuration of Central

Pacific atolls was such as to make this tactic feasible, other conditions permitting. In

every case the larger islands, which were

invariably the most heavily fortified, were

separated by only short distances from

smaller neighboring islets within easy artillery range. During the invasion of

Tarawa it was not thought practicable to

emplace artillery on the islets adjacent to

Betio well in advance of the main landing

for the same reason that it was not believed

wise to provide for a more prolonged preliminary naval bombardment—the fleet

should not be exposed to enemy action any

longer than could possibly be helped. By

the time that the Marshall Islands were

invaded this danger was no longer so

acute, and it was possible for the planners

of those operations in each case to make

provision for placing artillery on the

smaller islets of the atolls some hours before the initial landings on the main

islands.12

Close Air Support

Clearly, the most disappointing aspect

of the entire Tarawa operation was the

execution of air support for the landing.

The inadequacy of air support was attributed in about equal measure to poor communications, poor co-ordination, and the

poor training of the carrier pilots.

The plans called for a dawn strike on

the beaches from 0545 to 0615. This strike

was twenty-five minutes later than was expected by the ground troops and naval

surface forces present. Admiral Hill's support aircraft commander aboard the flagship Maryland was unable to establish communication with the striking groups to

determine their status. Maryland's main

batteries were firing and the concussion

apparently disrupted her radio communications. The majority of planes attacked

between 0610 and 0620.

The H-Hour air strike was scheduled

for the period from H minus 5 to H plus

15 minutes, with H Hour set at 0830. At

0820 the air groups were informed that H

Hour would be delayed until 0900. This

change of plans was either not received or

was disregarded by the planes, and fighters

commenced strafing the beaches at 0825

as originally scheduled. At 0842 they were

11

 Ltr cited n. 7, Recommendation 2, Ship-to-Shore

Movement, pp. 12-13. 12

 See below, Ch. XI, pp. 19, 27.
162 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

finally reached and directed to cease firing.

At 0855, on the anticipation that H Hour

would be 0900, surface ships were directed

to stop firing and fighters were ordered to

strafe the beaches. In fact, the fighters did

not arrive to strafe until just before 0910,

and by that time the first troops were coming ashore and the mission had to be canceled.13

In addition to the poor co-ordination of

air support with the other arms, it was evident that the carrier squadrons were not

fully enough trained to provide efficient

air support of amphibious operations. One

carrier commander reported that carrier

flights operated over the target area on D

Day with little semblance of orderly procedure. Serious confusion resulted when

dive and glide bombing and strafing was

carried out to the taste of the individual

leaders.14 Pilots experienced considerable

difficulty in locating and striking targets

as requested, both before and after the

troops landed. It became apparent that

the pilots had not been thoroughly briefed

and that they lacked sufficient knowledge

of the general techniques employed by

landing forces in an amphibious operation.

One solution to the problems thus raised

was suggested by General Holland

Smith—to assign at least one Marine aircraft wing specifically to give direct air

support to landing operations. The wing,

he recommended, should make direct air

support a specialty, should train specifically for that purpose, and should be given

a complete background of amphibious operations and a period of thorough training

in the problems peculiar to air support of

landings.15

Communications

The failure of communications aboard

the battleship Maryland on several critical

occasions during the landing on Betio

served to point clearly to the need for specially constructed and equipped headquarters ships in future amphibious operations. The simple fact was that no battleship was suited to perform the duties imposed on Maryland. Her transmitters,

receivers, and antennae were too close together and caused mutual interference.

Several of her radio communications installations were so damaged by the shock

of her own naval guns as to be completely

inoperative. Furthermore, if a situation

had arisen where the vessel would have

had to leave the immediate area of Tarawa

to engage in a surface fleet action, the

ability of both Admiral Hill and General

Julian Smith to exercise command would

have been seriously impaired.16

All of these shortcomings were well

recognized before the operation. Specially

equipped headquarters ships were already

under construction, but none was ready in

the Pacific in November 1943. The ships

would make their appearance in the Marshalls operations, but until they were completed the only alternative was to make

the best of the means available. The experience with Maryland at Tarawa merely

confirmed what had already been realized—that the battleship was inadequate

as an amphibious command ship.17

The other outstanding communications

deficiency revealed in the Gilberts operation was in tank-infantry liaison. On

Tarawa as at Makin the communications

equipment carried by the tanks broke 13

 TF 53 Rpt of Tarawa Opns, 13 Dec 43, Incl A,

p. 55; V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, p. 15. 14

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA GALVANIC Opns, Preliminary Study of Action Rpts, p. 5. 15

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, p. 16. 16

 TF 53 Rpt of Tarawa Opns, 13 Dec 43, Incl A,

pp. 22, 54-55, 62. 17

 Ltr cited n. 6, Adm Hill to Gen Malony, p. 5,

OCMH.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GILBERTS OPERATION 163

down completely. Tanks could communicate neither with each other nor with the

infantry units they were supposed to be

supporting. On Betio not a single member

of a tank crew was killed inside a tank, but

several became casualties getting out of

their tanks in an effort to communicate

with infantrymen. This deficiency could

only be remedied by the installation of improved radio sets.18

Weapons

At Tarawa the 37-mm. gun, which was

mounted on the light tank, proved virtually useless in knocking out pillboxes and

various other enemy emplacements. However, fire delivered from the light tank was

effective for holding the enemy down while

infantry advanced. Whatever its merits in

this connection, the light tank was generally incapable of the duties imposed on it.

The consensus among most commentators

was that in future operations against the

Japanese the light tank be replaced by the

medium tank mounting a 75-mm. gun.19

Perhaps the most valuable weapon at

Tarawa proved to be the flame thrower.

The greatest obstacle facing the troops in

their advance was the extensive layout of

Japanese pillboxes and heavy emplacements. Against these, flame throwers firing

through ports and pillbox entrances

proved invaluable. However, not enough

had been assigned to the 2d Marine Division, and it was recommended that for

future operations at least one per rifle platoon be issued. Another suggestion made

as a result of this experience was that tanks

be equipped with large-capacity flame

throwers.20

Logistics

The plans for unloading supplies and

equipment on Betio followed the standard

doctrine as set forth in current naval

manuals on the subject.21 Control over

small boats was vested in the commander

of the naval transport group and priority

in unloading was given to the assault

transport division on which were embarked the assault troops. Each assault

landing team had a shore party that was

to function on its own beach, the 2d Marine Division shore party commander

co-ordinating the activities of the separate

shore parties. Parallel to the division shore

party commander was a naval senior

beachmaster whose job was to co-ordinate

the activities of three platoons of naval

personnel assigned to unloading duties on

the beach and to advise the transport

group commander on the best methods of

getting supplies and equipment from ship

to shore.

As events worked out, none of these

plans could be put into effect until late on

the second day of the operation. During

most of the first two days of fighting, the

beachhead was neither deep enough nor

safe enough to allow shore parties to function normally. Boats, on returning to parent ships, were loaded and dispatched to

various beaches without awaiting the call

of shore party commanders. Direct requests placed by the troops to the ships did

not give adequate information and therefore many boats were loaded with nonessential materiel. Finally and most important, there was an insufficient number of

control stations established off the beaches

18

 Ltr cited n. 6, Recommendation 4, Tanks, pp.

5, 7.

19

 Ibid., p. 8; V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, p. 17;

Ibid., Incl G, Rpt by Special Observers, Part A, Rpt

by Brig Gen James L. Underbill, USMC, p. 9, and

Part F, Rpt by Maj Clifton A. Woodrum, Jr.,

USMCR, p. 2. 20

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, p. 17; Ltr cited n.

6, Recommendation 4, Tanks, p. 8. 21

 Fleet Training Publications 167 and 211.
164 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

to regulate the traffic of boats returning to

the beach after their initial trips.

Much of this confusion was of course

unavoidable, given the extreme difficulties

of establishing the beachhead. The whole

concept of the shore party in amphibious

doctrine presumes the establishment of a

protected area along the shore line sufficient in depth to permit the physical unloading of boats and the dumping of

supplies and equipment on land in a relatively orderly fashion at places where

troops can get what they need when they

need it. None of these conditions obtained

during the first two days of fighting on

Betio. Yet this was not all that was amiss.

Even had a comparatively safe beachhead

been established, the offshore control system was inadequate to meet the requirements imposed on it.

Hence, it was recognized that in future

operations control boats should be stationed at or near the line of departure for

the purpose of directing traffic to and from

the beach. After the initial assault, only

such equipment and supplies as would

probably be immediately required ashore

should be boated and the boats should

then be dispatched to a central control

vessel offshore for assignment to separate

beaches. The control vessels, it was recommended, should be under control of a

senior naval officer assisted by an officer

representing the landing force. In this

manner, it was hoped, much of the confusion evident at Tarawa could be avoided.22

One final logistical lesson that was

pointed up by the Gilberts operation was

the desirability of pallet loading in amphibious landings. Pallets had been used

extensively at Makin and with excellent

results.23 None had been made available

to the 2d Marine Division for Tarawa and

the lack had been noted. Holland Smith's

headquarters concluded, "pallets are unquestionably necessary in landing operations," and set forth immediately to provide Marine divisions with the requisite

number for future landings.24

The Amphibian Tractor

Of all types of amphibious equipment

used in the Gilberts operation, the amphibian tractor was the most indispensable.

"Without the amphibian tractor," reported Holland Smith, "it is believed that

the landing at Tarawa would have

failed."

 25

 Speaking from his experience at

Makin, General Ralph Smith concurred.

"The use of amphibian tractors in this

type of operation," he said, "is considered

mandatory to insure success and reduce

casualties. . . . Their necessity cannot be

over-emphasized."

 26

Yet if the presence of these vehicles

spelled the difference between success and

failure in the Gilberts, it remained true

that there were not enough on hand, at

least at Tarawa. The 125 amphibian tractors assigned to the 2d Marine Division

were not enough. Only the first three assault waves could be initially carried

ashore by amphtracks. Subsequent waves

boated in standard Navy landing craft

were stopped at the reef, and the troops

had to wade into the beach or await transfer to LVT's. Thus, the momentum so

necessary to amphibious assault against a

well-defended shore line was halted. The

22

 TF 53 Rpt of Tarawa Opns, 13 Dec 43, Incl A,

pp. 21-22; Ltr cited n. 7, Recommendation 2, Shipto-Shore Movement, pp. 5-6. 23

 Ltr, Hq 27th Inf Div to CG V Phib Corps, Rpt

of Opns GALVANIC, 16 Dec 43. 24

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, p. 13; Ibid., Incl D,

p. 3.

25

 V Phib Corps GALVANIC Rpt, p. 12. 26

 Ltr cited n. 10.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GILBERTS OPERATION 165

result was only short of disaster for the attacking troops.

General Julian Smith recommended

that in the future no less than three hundred troop-carrying LVT's be furnished

each Marine division, plus an additional

twenty-five for cargo-carrying purposes.27

Admiral Nimitz concurred.28 Never again

in the Pacific war would the assault troops

be so handicapped as they had been at

Tarawa for lack of these essential vehicles.

Conclusion

Strategically speaking, the Gilberts operation was not a turning point in the

Pacific war. It was only a prelude to the

invasion of the Marshalls, which in turn

was a prelude to more decisive naval and

land victories in the Carolines and the

Marianas. The chief strategic significance

of this operation is that it was the beginning of the Central Pacific drive against

Japan. It had been decreed by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff that the Central Pacific

drive would constitute the "main effort" in

the Pacific war.

Largely because of the limited means

available to Admiral Nimitz' forces, the

drive was initiated not against the geographic center of Japanese power in the

mid-Pacific, but against the perimeter.

Yet victory in the Gilberts certainly paved

the way for the relatively easy conquests

in the Marshalls that were to follow. Air

bases were obtained without which adequate bombardment and photographic

reconnaissance of these more important

targets would have been difficult if not impossible to obtain.

Tactically speaking, the Gilberts landings, especially that on Tarawa, were

chiefly important as a testing ground of

established amphibious doctrine. Never

before in the Pacific war had such an experimental opportunity presented itself.

After Tarawa there was no doubt that the

techniques, tactics, and procedures set

forth in the basic U.S. manuals for landing operations were workable even under

the most difficult conditions. Some shortcomings and deficiencies in the execution

of the landings were revealed. The most

serious deficiencies stemmed from shortages of amphibious equipment and from

lack of sufficient naval power or previously

emplaced artillery to permit as prolonged

a period of preliminary bombardment as

was desirable. These could only be corrected as production of the necessary arms

caught up with the needs of the Central

Pacific drive. Meanwhile, avoidable errors

and omissions in execution were carefully

noted and studied by all echelons concerned in the Gilberts operation. And,

what is more important, steps were immediately taken to avoid their repetition

in the future. 27

 Ltr, CG 2d Marine Div to CG V Phib Corps, 27

Dec 43, sub: Recommendations Based on Tarawa

Opn, Recommendation 1, Amphibian Tractors, p. 2. 28

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA GALVANIC Opns, Preliminary Study of Action Rpts, 3 1 Dec 43, p. 11.
CHAPTER XI

Tactical Planning for

the Marshalls

In projecting the initial drive into the

Central Pacific, it had always been understood that the first big prize would be the

capture of strategic positions in the Marshall Islands. (See Map 2.) These consist of

32 island groups and 867 reefs scattered

over more than 400,000 square miles of

ocean. The islands lie in two roughly parallel chains about a hundred miles apart.

The northeastern chain, called Ratak—

meaning "sunrise"—contains the large

atolls of Mille, Maloelap, and Wotje. The

southwestern or "sunset" chain is called

Ralik and contains Jaluit, Kwajalein,

Rongelap, Bikini, and Eniwetok, as well as

numerous smaller atolls. Kwajalein is located approximately in the geographic

center of the group at longitude 167° 30'

east and latitude 9° north. From Pearl

Harbor it is about 2,100 nautical miles in a

southwesterly direction. Tarawa lies 565

miles to the southeast. Slightly south of

west and about 980 miles away is Truk,

which was believed to be the key bastion of

the Japanese in the Carolines.

All of the islands are coral and most of

them are atolls, each consisting normally

of a low-lying chain of islands connected

partially by reefs and surrounding a

lagoon. Most of the lagoons are circular in

formation and have good passages through

the reefs. The largest coral atolls in the

world are found in this part of the Pacific.

The coral chain of some of the larger atolls

extends upward of a hundred miles, encircling vast areas of water. The individual

islands contained in the atolls are small,

rarely more than two or three miles in

length, quite narrow, and flat, never rising

to more than a few feet above sea level.

The larger islands are covered with coconut palms, breadfruit trees, and pandanus.

The smaller ones are barren or covered

only with brush.1

The first European contact with the

Marshalls dates back to the period of

Spanish and Portuguese explorations in

the sixteenth century. The Marianas were

discovered by the Spaniards in 1521, the

Carolines by the Portuguese in 1527, and

the Marshalls by the Spanish navigator Miguel de Saavedra in 1529. In 1686

the Marshalls were formally annexed by

Spain and remained nominally attached

to that nation until late in the nineteenth

century. Then the German Empire began

to expand its influence into the South Seas

and in the 1890's commenced negotiations

with Spain for transfer of her holdings in

1

 Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Areas

(ICPOA), Bull 30-43, Enemy Positions Marshall-Gilbert Area, Vol. I, Marshall Islands, Ralik Chain, pp.

7-11; R. W. Robson, The Pacific Islands Year Booh

(Sydney, Australia: Pacific Publications, Ltd., 1943)

p. 99.
TACTICAL PLANNING FOR THE MARSHALLS 167

the area. The latter's defeat in the Spanish-American War sounded the death

knell to Spain's long-moribund empire in

the Pacific. She agreed to dispose of all her

possessions in the Marshalls, Carolines,

and Marianas to Germany except for

Guam, which was ceded to the United

States. The Germans commenced a vigorous colonization policy interrupted only

by the outbreak of World War I.2

In October of 1914 the Japanese Navy

commenced the seizure and occupation of

the main islands in this area. In December

of the following year, a military headquarters was established at Truk, and the

islands were divided into six administrative districts, each governed by a resident

garrison commander. At the conclusion of

the war all of the islands of the North

Pacific formerly under German possession

were turned over to Japan as a Class C

mandate as provided in Article 22 of the

Covenant of the League of Nations. Under

the terms of the mandate, Japan was

bound to prevent "the establishment of

fortifications or military and naval bases,"

and the neutralization of other islands in

the Pacific was further guaranteed by a

treaty between Japan and the United

States in 1922.3 The manner in which the

Japanese Empire honored these commitments will be treated later.4

Early Planning

Initial planning for the Marshalls invasion necessarily had to be conducted concurrently with that for the Gilberts operation, which would precede it, yet everyone

concerned realized that final plans could

not be matured until after the Gilberts

had been occupied. One of the chief reasons for taking those islands was, after all,

to provide bases from which the Marshalls

could be more easily bombed and photographed.

Nevertheless, as early as August 1943,

Admiral Nimitz requested of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff a specific directive authorizing him to seize the Marshalls. His reasons

were that the necessary strength appeared

to be available, that the islands would provide bases for further advance toward

communications lines vital to the enemy,

that Allied lines of communication to the

South and Southwest Pacific would thereby be strengthened, that the operation

might precipitate a fleet action with the

enemy on favorable terms, and that it

should cause the Japanese to divide their

available forces among various theaters.

"Thus," he concluded, "we get on with

the war."5

On 1 September the Joint Chiefs, as was

expected, dispatched an affirmative answer to Admiral Nimitz. He was ordered

to seize and control the Marshalls and, on

completion, seize or control Wake, Eniwetok, and Kusaie (the easternmost island

of the Carolines). The purposes of the

operation, as stated in the Joint Chiefs directive, were to be fourfold: (1) to prepare

to gain control of the Carolines; (2) to inflict losses on the enemy; (3) to improve

the security of the lines of communication;

2

 Robson, Year Book, p. 91. 3

 The Japan Year Book, 1940-41 (Tokyo: The Japan

Times Press), pp. 917-18; Denys P. Myers, Handbook

of the League of Nations (Boston: The World Peace

Foundation, 1935), p. 378; International Military

Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), International

Prosecution Section (IPS) Document 6257, Prepared

Statement and Report on Japanese Naval Preparations 1931-1941, p. 13. The proceedings of the

IMTFE and attached documents are filed in the Law

Library, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Navy. 4

 Ch. XIII, below. 5

 Ltr, CINCPAC-CINCPOA to COMCENPAC,

22 Sep 43, Serial 00190, Incl A, CINCPAC to

COMINCH, 20 Aug 43, Serial 00151.
168 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

and (4) to support other operations in the

Pacific and Indian Ocean theaters by extending pressure on the Japanese. The

target date was to be 1 January 1944, although this was made contingent upon the

successful completion of operations in the

Gilberts. Ground troops assigned to the

landing and capture of the principal

islands were to be the 4th Marine Division, the 23d Marine Regiment (reinforced), and the 7th Infantry Division.6

Nimitz then proceeded to prepare a

study of the forthcoming operation and

recommended that the advance into the

Marshalls be accomplished by the simultaneous seizure of Kwajalein, Maloelap,

and Wotje Atolls. Maloelap and Wotje

were on the eastern fringe of the group,

closest to Pearl Harbor, while Kwajalein

was roughly in the geographic center.

These three atolls, according to Nimitz'

estimate, contained 65 percent of the aircraft facilities in the Marshalls. The remaining 35 percent, located chiefly on

Jaluit and Mille, could, it was estimated,

be easily neutralized by operations from

the center.7

The code name settled upon for the

Marshalls operation was FLINTLOCK, and

immediately upon receipt of the Joint

Chiefs directive, appropriate staffs set to

work devising tentative plans for the landings. As planning progressed it soon became apparent in Pearl Harbor that the

Central Pacific forces would be unable to

meet the original target date of 1 January

1944. On 25 October Admiral Nimitz

wrote Admiral King in Washington,

"With considerable regret I now recommend that the Flintlock target date be 31

January, although every effort will be

made to anticipate the date given."8 The

reasons set forth for the desired delay were

that troop training would be incomplete;

that time would have to be allowed to repair damage done to ships returning from

the Gilberts operation; that the Gilberts

bases would not be ready in time to be

useful against the Marshalls; and, finally

and most important, that more time was

needed for photographic reconnaissance.

As further intelligence of the proposed

target in the Marshalls became available

and as news of the difficulties of the Gilberts operations reached Pearl Harbor,

Admiral Nimitz proposed another radical

revision of the original FLINTLOCK plan.

Instead of attacking Wotje, Maloelap, and

Kwajalein simultaneously, he proposed

bypassing the former two atolls and concentrating all his forces against Kwajalein

Atoll. In this he was opposed by all the

other Central Pacific commanders consulted on the matter, except for Rear

Adms. Charles H. McMorris and Forrest

P. Sherman of his own staff.9 Admiral

Spruance later recollected:

I argued as strongly as I could with Admiral

Nimitz against Kwajalein, proposing instead

Wotje and Maloelap. My argument was

based ... on the insecurity of our line of

communications in to Kwajalein after the

withdrawal of the Pacific Fleet. . . . With

the air pipe line through Eniwetok open back

to Japan and with the activity which had

been shown by Japanese air in the Marshalls

in their attacks on our fleet forces during the

Gilberts operation, I felt that our support

shipping moving into Kwajalein would have

6

 Ltr, CINCPAC-CINCPOA to COMCENPAC,

22 Sep 43, Serial 00190, Incl B, Dispatch, JCS to

CINCPAC, 1 Sep 43. 7

 Ltr, CINCPAC to CINCPOA, 22 Sep 43, Serial

00190, Incl C, CINCPAC Study of Marshalls Opn. 8

 Ltr, CINCPAC-CINCPOA to COMINCH, 25

Oct 43, Serial 00247. 9

 Ltr, Adm Nimitz to Jeter A. Isely. 18 Jan 49;

Interv, Isely with Adm Hill, 29 Oct 48; Ltr, Adm

Spruance to Isely, 3 Jul 49; all filed in Princeton

University Library; Ltr, Gen Richardson to Gen

Malony, 31 Jan 49, OCMH.
TACTICAL PLANNING FOR THE MARSHALLS 169

MAP 8

a tough time of it. In my arguments I was

supported by Admiral Turner and General

Holland Smith, but I was overruled by

Admiral Nimitz.10

Thus, Nimitz alone was responsible for

initiating the decision to hit straight into

the center of the Marshall Islands. Events

were to prove his boldness justified; the

dangers feared by his more cautious advisers never materialized.

The Joint Chiefs approved these changes

recommended by the theater commander

and, on 14 December, Admiral Nimitz

issued his revised Operation Plan 16-43,

which definitely assigned Kwajalein Atoll

as the target in the forthcoming operation.

The 7th Infantry Division was to take the

southern group of islands in the atoll, including Kwajalein Island. The 4th Marine Division was to capture Roi-Namur

and the other northern islands of the

atoll.11 (Map 8) Roi-Namur, lying at the

northeastern corner of Kwajalein Atoll, is

about forty-four nautical miles from Kwajalein Island, which is at the southeastern

corner.

One final change in the plan was made

on 26 December. Admiral Spruance, after

being overruled on the question of bypassing Wotje and Maloelap, asked that

Majuro, one of the easternmost of the

10

 Ltr, Spruance to Isely, 3 Jul 49. 11

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opn Plan 16-43 (Revised), 14 Dec 43.
170 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Marshalls, be included as an additional

objective. He wanted the atoll at the earliest possible moment as a fleet base, and he

believed that airfields constructed there

would help cover the line of communications to Kwajalein. A Navy reconnaissance

plane flying over that area in early December had drawn no antiaircraft fire and

had seen no activity, thus leading Nimitz

to believe that if a Japanese garrison was

there, it was small. Hence, it was agreed to

send a small expeditionary force consisting

of 2d Battalion Landing Team of the 106th

Infantry with the 1st Marine Defense Battalion attached, and the Reconnaissance

Company of V Amphibious Corps to occupy the atoll.12

 D Day for all landings

was to be 31 January 1944.

Spruance's Plan

As always in the Central Pacific, the

highest operational command for the

Marshalls invasion went to Admiral Spruance, now designated Commander, Fifth

Fleet (Task Force 50).13 Once again Admiral Turner commanded the Joint Expeditionary Force (Task Force 51). Command of the expeditionary troops fell to

General Holland Smith (Task Force 56).

General Smith's position in the chain of

command in relation to Admiral Turner

was made clearer than it had been in the

Gilberts operation, and his authority was

more precisely defined.14 He was put in

direct command of all landing forces and

garrison forces once they were ashore. The

troop commanders of each of the landing

forces, that is of the 7th Infantry Division

and the 4th Marine Division, were expressly placed under General Smith until

such time as Admiral Spruance should determine that the capture and occupation

phase of the operation had been completed. However, General Smith's authority as commander of expeditionary troops

had one limitation. Since it was recognized

that "the employment of troops, including

the reserve troops engaged in the seizure of

objectives, is subject to the capabilities of

the surface units to land and support

them," any directives issued by General

Smith as to major landings or as to major

changes in tactical plans had to have the

approval of Admiral Turner before they

could be issued. To this extent, the expeditionary troops commander was still subordinate to Admiral Turner.15

Immediately subordinate to Admiral

Turner as Commander, Expeditionary

Force, were the three attack forces. The

Southern Attack Force (Task Force 52),

commanded also by Admiral Turner, was

assigned the task of capturing Kwajalein

Island and the surrounding islands in the

southern half of the atoll. The Northern

Attack Force (Task Force 53), commanded

by Rear Adm. Richard L. Conolly, was

charged with the capture of Roi-Namur

and all other islands in the northern half

of the atoll. The Majuro Attack Group

(Task Group 51.2) was to be commanded

by Admiral Hill.

Under Holland Smith's immediate command were the three landing forces, one

assigned to each of the major objectives.

The Southern Landing Force (Task Group

56.1), composed primarily of the 7th Infantry Division, was commanded by Maj.

12

 Ltr, Spruance to Isely, 3 Jul 49; V Phib Corps

FLINTLOCK Rpt, Incl B, G-5 Rpt, p. 4; Rad,

CINCPAC-CINCPOA to JCS, 17 Dec 43. 13

 COMCENPAC Opn Plan Cen 1-44, 6 Jan 44.

Spruance's old designation, Commander, Central

Pacific Force, and his new title, Commander, Fifth

Fleet, were used interchangeably in the planning

stage of the Marshalls operation. 14

 See above, Ch. II, pp. 43-46. 15

 COMCENPAC Opn Plan Cen 1-44, 6 Jan 44, p.

18.
TACTICAL PLANNING FOR THE MARSHALLS 171

CHART 2—TASK ORGANIZATION OF MAJOR COMMANDS FOR THE ATTACK ON KWAJALEIN

AND MAJURO ATOLLS

Gen. Charles H. Corlett, USA. The Northern Landing Force (Task Group 56.2),

consisting of the 4th Marine Division with

attached units, was commanded by Maj.

Gen. Harry Schmidt, USMC. The Majuro

Landing Force, commanded by Lt. Col.

Frederick B. Sheldon, USA, was made up

of the 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, and

the V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance

Company. At each objective the attack

force commander (naval) was to command

the landing force through the landing

force commander (ground troops) until

the situation permitted the latter to assume command ashore.

Under Admiral Spruance and parallel

to Admiral Turner were three other commands. The first was the newly organized

Carrier Force (Task Force 58), under Rear

Adm. Marc A. Mitscher, which comprised

four groups of fast carriers each with a

varying number of the newest and fastest

battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. The

second was the Neutralization Group

(Task Group 50.15), under Rear Adm.

Ernest G. Small, consisting of three heavy

cruisers, four destroyers, and two mine

sweepers. The third was named Defense

Forces and Land Based Air (Task Force

57) and was commanded by Admiral

Hoover. Its chief components were the

Strike Command (Task Group 57.2) under
172 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

General Hale, consisting of eleven landbased Army bomber squadrons; three

Army fighter squadrons; and a Marine

Search and Patrol Group (Task Group

57.3) under the command of General

Merritt.

As outlined in Admiral Spruance's plan,

the jobs assigned to Mitscher's fast carrier

force were manifold. The force was to

move into the Marshalls area on 29 January (D minus 2) and destroy enemy aircraft and air facilities at Wotje, Maloelap,

Roi-Namur, and Kwajalein. The following day it was to co-ordinate air operations

against Wotje and Maloelap with bombardment of those islands by cruisers from

Turner's task force and Small's Neutralization Group. At the same time, other ships

of Mitscher's force would deliver both air

and surface bombardment against RoiNamur and Kwajalein Islands. Concurrently, Eniwetok was to be denied to the

enemy as an airfield. On D Day (31 January) the force was to furnish air support

over Kwajalein Atoll as requested by Admiral Turner.

The job of softening up the target islands

as well as other islands in the Marshalls

group was assigned to Admiral Hoover's

task force. Before the fast carriers moved

into the area the land-based planes of Task

Force 57 were to keep Mille and Jaluit

neutralized; destroy enemy aircraft and air

facilities at Roi-Namur, Kwajalein, and

Maloelap; mine the waters around Jaluit,

Mille, Maloelap, and Wotje; furnish air

support at Kwajalein on D Day as requested by Admiral Turner; and be responsible for the photographic reconnaissance

of the Marshalls as directed by Admiral

Nimitz. From 25 December through D Day

they were to search the entire Marshalls

area for enemy plane and ship movements,

attack enemy ships and shipping, protect

the Ellice and Gilbert Islands, and provide

air transportation. Finally, to this headquarters was assigned the duty of developing the advance bases in Kwajalein and

Majuro once these had been captured by

ground and naval forces.

Finally, Admiral Small's little force of

cruisers and destroyers was ordered to

operate off the atolls of Wotje and Maloelap and bombard those islands intermittently commencing on 29 January. The

purpose of this maneuver was to deny the

enemy the use of his airfields there.16

Admiral Turner's Attack Plan

The plan for the invasion of the Marshalls differed in many important details

from that for any previous amphibious

operation in the Pacific. The differences

resulted partly from the experiences gained

in the Gilberts and partly from the fact

that by this time a far greater quantity and

variety of amphibious equipment had been

made available to the Central Pacific

forces.

No longer did the attack force commanders have to rely on the faulty communications systems of battleships to

maintain proper radio liaison between ship

and shore and ship and air. Two newly

constructed headquarters ships, each

equipped with the latest developments in

radio and radar gear and unburdened by

gunfire support duties, were provided for

this operation. Admiral Turner at Kwajalein carried his flag aboard the USS Rocky

Mount and Admiral Conolly at Roi-Namur

rode the USS Appalachian. In addition, Admiral Hill was given a new flagship, the

APA Cambria, which had been partially

converted into a headquarters ship.

16

 Ibid., pp. 14-16.
TACTICAL PLANNING FOR THE MARSHALLS 173

In the interim between the Gilberts and

Marshalls invasions, several improvements

were made in the techniques of softening

up the enemy defenses before the first

troops touched shore. These all added up

to one factor: a great increase in both the

quantity and accuracy of fire power to be

delivered before the invasion. Provision

was made for a longer period of preliminary aerial bombardment both from the

newly acquired island bases in the Gilberts

and from the newly organized fast carrier

force. Naval ships and planes were ordered

to move into the target area and shell and

bombard enemy installations one day before the initial landings in the Marshalls

and a full two days before the main landings were executed. Also, provision was

made to land field artillery on islands

adjacent to Kwajalein Island and RoiNamur a day before these two main objectives were assaulted by ground troops. The

field pieces were to be registered on the

larger islands in time to support the assault

troops as they moved from ship to shore.

To provide a last-minute saturation of

the beaches, two new, or rather modified,

forms of older types of amphibious equipment were introduced. The first of these

was the armored amphibian or amphibian

tank (LVT(A)).17 This vehicle was merely

the standard amphibian tractor equipped

with extra armor plating and mounting a

37-mm. gun housed in a turret. It was to

precede or accompany the first wave of

troops from the line of departure to the

shore and provide extra fire support for

them. The second was the LCI gunboat

(LCI(G)). This little vessel (153 feet in

length), originally designed to land infantry troops at the shore line, had been converted into a gunboat by the addition of

three 40-mm. guns and banks of 4.5-inch

rocket launchers. The LCI(G)'s were to

precede the first wave of amphibian vehicles close into shore, firing their rockets

and guns in an effort to knock out any

enemy personnel and machine guns that

might still be functioning on the beaches

after the heavier naval and aerial fire had

lifted.

Finally, a sufficient number of amphibian tractors was provided to the battalion

landing teams to permit them to land their

assault waves in toto. This, it was hoped,

would provide the necessary momentum to

the assault, so noticeably lacking at Tarawa, and would eliminate the necessity of

transferring assault troops from landing

craft to amphibian tractors at the reef line.

To transport the troops and equipment

of the 7th Infantry Division to Kwajalein

Island, Admiral Turner was able to plan

on a total of 11 attack transports, one troop

transport ship, 3 attack cargo ships, 2 landing ships dock to carry the tanks, and 16

LST's to carry amphibian tractors and

trucks. To escort these ships to the target

area and provide naval and aerial support,

mine sweeping, and other functions, he

had 4 old battleships, 3 heavy cruisers,

21 destroyers, 2 high-speed transports

(APD's), 3 escort carriers, 12 LCFs (landing craft, infantry), and 4 mine sweepers

(AM's and DMS's). About the same number of troop and cargo ships were assigned

to Admiral Conolly's Northern Attack

Force to transport the 4th Marine Division

to Roi-Namur. Conolly's support shipping

was less than Turner's by one old battleship, one heavy cruiser, and eleven destroyers, but in partial recompense he was

awarded two light cruisers. The Majuro

Attack Group under Admiral Hill consisted of one heavy cruiser, two escort car17

 In Marine Corps terminology, this vehicle was

called the armored amphibian tractor; in the Army

it was called the amphibian tank.
174 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

riers, four destroyers, one mine sweeper,

one attack transport, one troop transport,

and two high-speed transports. The attack

force reserve group, which carried the 22d

Marine Regiment and the two battalions

of the 106th Infantry Regiment not assigned to Majuro, consisted of five attack

transports, one troop transport, two attack

cargo ships, and seven destroyers.18

Admiral Turner's plan called for extensive prelanding bombardment both from

surface ships and from the air. On D minus

1 (30 January) eight battleships from

Mitscher's fast carrier force, accompanied

by about a dozen destroyers, were to deliver a dawn bombardment against Kwajalein Island and Roi-Namur. The object

was to destroy aircraft, coast defense guns,

and personnel, and to render the airfields

temporarily useless. At the same time, two

advance units of cruisers and destroyers

from Turner's task force were to bombard

the airfields at Wotje and Maloelap. These

dawn bombardments were to be followed

by air strikes against each of the objectives.

After the strikes were completed the surface

ships would again take up the bombardment and maintain a steady fire until

about noon.19

On D Day (31 January) the schedule

called for initial landings on islands adjacent to Kwajalein and Roi-Namur upon

which artillery could be emplaced for the

main assaults. Cruisers, old battleships,

and destroyers of Turner's task force were

to conduct an all-day bombardment

against both the smaller islands and the

main targets in order to support landings

on the smaller islands, to destroy coastal

batteries, antiaircraft defenses, and beach

defenses on the main islands, and to continue the destruction of aircraft and airfield installations. Fifteen minutes before

the first wave of boats was scheduled to hit

the shore at Carlson (Enubuj),20 which lies

just northwest of Kwajalein Island, flights

of torpedo bombers, dive bombers, and

fighter planes were to deliver a last-minute

attack against the beaches. A similar strike

was to be delivered against Ivan (Mellu)

and Jacob (Ennuebing) Islands, which lie

southwest of Roi-Namur.

On D plus 1 (1 February) cruisers and

battleships and as many destroyers as

could be spared from screening duties were

to conduct bombardments in support of

the main landings on Kwajalein and RoiNamur. Other islands that could be used

by the Japanese to interfere with these

landings were to be kept neutralized by

surface bombardment. At daylight the

heavy ships were to open up with counterbattery fire to protect the transports as they

unloaded the troops, and with area bombardment to destroy secondary defenses

behind the beaches. As H Hour approached, destroyers and LCI gunboats

were to move into very close range of the

beaches. Close supporting fire for advancing boat waves as they moved in to the

shore line was to be delivered by cruisers

firing 8-inch and 5-inch shells from medium ranges and by destroyers and

LCI(G)'s at close ranges. Cruisers were

ordered to cease fire when the first wave

was about 1,000 yards from the beach.

Destroyers and LCI(G)'s were to continue

fire until the first landing wave was 500

yards or less from the beach. Thereafter

they would shift to the flanks to protect

succeeding waves.

Commencing forty-five minutes before

18

 TF 51 Opn Plan A6-43, 3 Jan 44, Serial 0013. 19

 Ibid., Annex C. 20

 Carlson is the code name used by the American

forces. In this volume the code names and, sometimes,

the native names (in parenthesis) will be used to

identify the lesser islands of Kwajalein Atoll. See list,

p. 375.
TACTICAL PLANNING FOR THE MARSHALLS 175

the first waves touched shore, air strikes by

the maximum available number of planes

were to be carried out against the main

landing beaches both at Kwajalein Island

and at Roi-Namur. These were to cease

twenty-five minutes before the first wave

touched shore in order to allow a resumption of ships' fire and of artillery fire from

Carlson, Ivan, and Jacob. In addition to

this air support provided by planes from

the escort carriers in Turner's task force,

Admiral Hoover's Task Force 57 was

ordered to provide one squadron of landbased heavy bombers to attack various

strong points and blockhouses, commencing sixty minutes before the first landings

on the main islands.21 With this tremendous bombardment by aircraft, surface

ships, and artillery, all to be executed before the first troops hit the shore line, it was

hoped that the bitter experience of Tarawa

would not be repeated.

The Landing Force Plans

Southern Kwajalein

Kwajalein Island is shaped like a crescent, its concave side being the lagoon or

north shore. It is approximately two and a

half miles in length and averages 800 yards

in width for two thirds of its length from

west to east, then tapers, after bending to

the north, to less than 300 yards in width

at its northeastern tip. It is the largest

island of the atoll.22 The island nearest to

the western end of Kwajalein is Carlson

(Enubuj), approximately two miles to the

northwest. (Map 9) Next to the northeastern end are two tiny pieces of land, Byron

and Buster Islands (no known native

names), then the larger Burton (Ebeye),

which is nearly two and a half miles from

Kwajalein. Photographs and intelligence

surveys showed that Carlson was weakly

defended if at all, while the Burton garrison was estimated to be at least 1,000

troops. Closer scrutiny of Burton also revealed extensive prepared positions. It was

estimated that there were eight antiaircraft

guns near the ramps and service apron,

and the island seemed to be ringed by a

series of pillboxes. In the opinion of General Corlett, 7th Division commander, and

of his division artillery officer, Brig. Gen.

Archibald V. Arnold, the artillery could be

placed on either Carlson or Burton and

deliver fire on the landing beaches in support of the main assault on Kwajalein

Island. The absence of defenses on Carlson

made this island seem to be the more desirable, but in order to utilize the fire power

of the division artillery to the fullest, it was

necessary to decide at exactly what spot on

Kwajalein Island the assault troops were

to go ashore. Should the landing beaches

be toward the northeastern end of the

island, Burton would serve better for artillery emplacements, even though it was

defended.

The reef along the ocean side of Kwajalein Island is from 100 to 130 yards wide

and precipitous. At low tide it is completely

bared and fairly smooth except near the

ends of the island. Heavy surf strikes the

eastern shore and rolls along the southern

shore, but at the southwestern corner the

swell becomes moderate, a circumstance

that favored landings in that area. On the

lagoon side, although the water is smooth,

the reef is from 500 to 800 yards wide.

Boulders and smooth coral outcroppings

21

 TF 51 Opn Plan A6-43, 3 Jan 44, Serial 0013,

Annexes C, E. 22

 Terrain data are from 7th Infantry Division Report on Operation FLINTLOCK 3 1 January-4 February 1944 (hereafter cited as 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK

Rpt), Vol. II, Field Orders and Report of Operation,

FO 1, 6 Jan 44, Intelligence Annex.

TACTICAL PLANNING FOR THE MARSHALLS 177

promised to make the approach to the

lagoon beaches even more difficult than

those at Tarawa or at Red Beaches, Makin.

The beaches along both the ocean and the

lagoon shore vary normally from ten to

twenty yards in width after rising from the

reef. At the two tips of the island, however,

the beaches rise more gradually and are

considerably more extensive, a smooth

beach of coral sand extending for approximately 250 yards inland at the northeastern tip and 450 yards at the western end.

It was generally believed that the Marshalls, having been prewar Japanese territory and being nearer to the heart of Japan,

would be more strongly fortified than the

Gilberts. Should the prepared positions

that had furnished such a costly obstacle at

Tarawa be excelled by those on Kwajalein

Island, the forthcoming attack would have

to be carefully planned to strike the weaker

portions of the Japanese defensive system.

The preliminary reconnaissance had shown

that the enemy had apparently long expected attack from the seaward side. But

photographs taken on 4 December showed

that the garrison had begun the erection

of positions along the lagoon, apparently

on the ground that Tarawa had been attacked from the lagoon shore and an invasion of Kwajalein might possibly come

from the same direction.

After weighing these various considerations, the planners decided that the 7th

Infantry Division should land at either end

of the island rather than in a frontal attack

against either the ocean or lagoon shore

line. Because reef and surf conditions were

more favorable at the western end, and

because Carlson Island would probably be

much easier to take quickly than would

Burton, plans were laid for the division to

land on the beaches at the western extremity. This would take place after the D-Day

invasion of Carlson Island, where the division artillery would be placed to support

the main landing on Kwajalein.23 Such a

course of action would give the assault

troops on Kwajalein Island the benefit of

high-angle artillery fire to supplement the

fire of the flat-trajectory naval guns.

Three other small islands in addition to

Carlson were to be captured during the

preparatory phase of the operation. These

were Carlos (Ennylabegan), Carter (Gea),

and Cecil (Ninni) Islands, all lying north

of Carlson. They guarded Cecil Pass, the

best deep-water channel into the lagoon at

southern Kwajalein, and were thought to

be lightly defended, if at all. It was Admiral

Turner's desire to move many of the transports and fire support vessels into the

lagoon, where they would be protected

from submarine attack and where naval

gunfire could be brought to bear directly

on the lagoon beach defenses. The 7th

Division's operation order, therefore, called

for the capture of four islands during Phase

I, which was to begin on D Day, 31 January.24

 Artillery was to be landed on Carlson and moved into firing position at the

earliest possible moment after troops had

landed.

The assault on Kwajalein Island, the

main objective, was to take place on the

morning of D plus 1 (1 February) if, by

then, Carlson had been captured and the

artillery placed in position. By close planning between division artillery representatives, Army and Navy air services, and

naval gunnery officers, all bombardment

and naval gunfire and Army artillery support were carefully co-ordinated for the

support of the main attack. Following a

preliminary (prelanding) bombardment of

one hour, each type of fire would lift in23

 Ibid., FO 2, 6 Jan 44. 24

 Ibid., FO 1, 6 Jan 44, p. 1.
178 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

land. Army artillery would be nearest in

advance of the troops; naval gunfire next;

and the aerial coverage still farther inland.25

The 7th Division had no organic 155-

mm. howitzer battalions, but during the

planning stage the 145th Field Artillery

Battalion was attached for the operation.

During the night of D Day (31 January-1

February) the 145th and two other field

artillery battalions were to deliver interdictory fire from Carlson on all the principal

fortified areas of Kwajalein Island and

place counterbattery fire on any enemy

artillery that might be emplaced on Burton. They were also to fire general support

missions for the infantry.26

The reduction of Kwajalein Island itself

was to constitute Phase II of the 7th Division operations. In the allocation of targets,

the 7th Division had been assigned all

islands south of the line running between

Arnold Island in the eastern side of the

atoll and Cohen (Ennugenliggelap) Island

in the western side. Of these, Burton was

believed to be the only one besides Kwajalein defended by a sizable garrison.

Plans for Phases III and IV to complete

the conquest of southern Kwajalein were

laid, but the time of execution was to depend upon progress made in Phase II. The

forces that were to seize Cecil, Carter,

Carlos, and Carlson on D Day would then

constitute a reserve for landing teams operating on Kwajalein Island.27

 Once the

need for this reserve had passed, the forces

could be committed in Phase III, the reduction and occupation of Burton Island

and the investigation of Buster, Byron,

Burnet, and Blankenship (Loi) Islands.

The final phase was to include the seizure

of Beverly (South Gugegwe), Berlin (North

Gugegwe), Benson, and Bennett (Bigej)

Islands in the eastern chain.28

To accomplish its mission at southern

Kwajalein, the 7th Division was organized

into nine battalion landing teams, each

consisting of three rifle companies, a heavy

weapons company, a platoon of engineers

from the 13th Engineer Battalion, a platoon of medium tanks from the 767th Tank

Battalion, a platoon from one of the regimental cannon companies, and small detachments of service troops.29

 A tenth

landing team, for use against small objectives, was formed by the 7th Cavalry

Reconnaissance Troop and Company B,

111th Infantry, a regiment that was part

of the prospective Kwajalein Garrison

Force but had been attached to the division for the assault phase of the operation.

In the event that a battalion landing team

was called upon to act separately, it could

be made self-sufficient by the addition of a

shore party team.

With the prospect of different elements

of the division operating at widely scattered points in the atoll and depending on

many varied arms for support, communications promised to be a major difficulty.

This problem was anticipated. A provisional communications unit, known as the

75th Joint Assault Signal Company

(JASCO), was organized for the 7th Division, and elements of the 295th JASCO

were furnished to the 106th Regimental

Combat Team.30 The 75th Provisional

JASCO, made up of the 75th Signal Company reinforced by naval and air force

25

 Ibid., FO 2, Annex 6, p. 1. 26

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. XII, Arty Jnl,

Msg 35, 31 Jan 44. 27

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. II, FO 1, 6 Jan

44, p. 2. 28

 Ibid., FO 4, 1 Feb 44. 29

 Ibid., FO 1, 6 Jan 44, Annex 1, p. 5. 30

 USAFICPA Report of Participation in the Kwajalein and Eniwetok Operations, 30 Nov 44 (hereafter

cited as USAFICPA Participation Rpt Kwajalein

and Eniwetok), pp. 143, 144.
TACTICAL PLANNING FOR THE MARSHALLS 179

personnel, totaled 592 officers and men. It

was to co-ordinate naval gunfire support

missions and direct air strikes, whether

performed by land-based bombers of the

Army Air Forces or carrier-based planes of

the Navy. It was also the channel through

which troops ashore communicated with

command posts afloat.

For operational purposes the 75th Provisional JASCO was divided into a headquarters, ten shore and beach party teams,

and nine shore fire control teams. Each of

the shore and beach party teams would

serve with a battalion landing team and

would be made up of thirty-two men,

drawn from both Army and Navy. The

nine shore fire control teams, composed of

Navy officers and Army signal men, were

to be distributed among the nine assault

landing teams. Also operating with, but

not a part of, the 75th JASCO were thirteen air-ground liaison teams of five men

each. Each battalion received one of these

teams, the other four being apportioned

among the various regimental headquarters and division artillery. Seventy-nine

men of the 75th Provisional JASCO were

retained by division headquarters to perform administrative functions and coordinate work of the various teams.

For the Kwajalein Island operation,

enough LVT's were provided to carry the

first four waves of assault troops into the

beach. A total of 174 amphibian vehicles

was assigned to the 7th Infantry Division.

Of these, 79 were amphibian tanks (or

armored amphibians) mounting 37-mm.

guns and designed primarily for close support of the first waves both during and

after the ship-to-shore movement. The remainder were standard amphibian tractors. For this operation, the tanks and

tractors were divided into four combat

tractor groups, each with 14 amphibian

tanks and 20 amphibian tractors, plus one

additional detachment of 17 amphibian

tanks to be distributed among the four

groups as the situation required. Twentyone vehicles were placed in a reserve LVT

pool that was to provide immediate replacement to the combat tractor groups.

One of the tractor groups was assigned to

the D-Day landings on Carlson Island and

one to Carlos Island. Two were assigned to

Kwajalein Island for the D-plus-1 landings. After carrying the troops of the first

four assault waves to the beaches, the tractors of these groups were either to support

the infantry advance inland, or, in the case

of Kwajalein Island, were to return to the

reef line and pick up reserve troops boated

in standard landing craft.31 By these measures, it was hoped to guarantee an uninterrupted movement of the assault troops from

ship to shore and an avoidance of the

breakdown of momentum such as had

occurred at Tarawa.

The first phase of the operations of the

Southern Attack Force was to open with a

predawn landing of one platoon of the 7th

Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop on each of

the two channel islands, Carter and Cecil.

These landings were to be accomplished

with the greatest secrecy, and the conquest

of the outposts was to be completed as

quickly as possible before the defenders

could reinforce the garrisons that might be

there. The reconnaissance troop was embarked on two high-speed transports

(APD's), along with two platoons of Company B, 111th Infantry. The landings were

31

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. II, FO 1, 6 Jan

44, Annex 8, pp. 1-2, and FO 2, 6 Jan 44, Annex 8,

pp. 1-2; Ibid., Vol. VII, G-4 Rpt, Annex E, Ordnance

Rpt, p. 5; 7th Infantry Division Report of Participation in Operation FLINTLOCK, 8 Feb 44 (hereafter

cited as 7th Inf Div Participation Rpt FLINTLOCK), p.

34; 708th Amph Tk Bn Special Action Rpt, Kwajalein Opns, 12 Mar 44, pp. 1-2.
180 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

to be made in rubber boats that would be

paddled ashore from 800 yards off the

beaches. The men would go over the side

of the APD's into their landing craft and

land at 0330. It was hoped the capture

would be completed shortly after daylight.

The next moves of the first phase were to

be the simultaneous landings on Carlos

and Carlson Islands. The 1st Battalion,

17th Infantry, was to land on the former

while the 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, invaded the latter. The 3d Battalion, 17th

Infantry was to be held in reserve, ready to

go to the aid of either landing team. While

the capture of Carlson Island was in progress, the division artillery, loaded for the

most part on amphibious trucks, was to

debark and proceed to a rendezvous area

offshore. Upon a signal from the commander of the Carlson landing force, the

guns were to be moved ashore and into

position.

The major part of the Southern Attack

Force plan was that dealing with Kwajalein Island, the main objective. After the

landing on the western tip of the island

with the two regimental combat teams

abreast—the 184th on the left and the 32d

on the right—the attack was to proceed

directly up the axis of the island with the

boundary between regiments drawn

roughly along a line that divided the island

into halves. In the left zone of action the

assault force would consist of the 2d and

3d Battalions, 184th Infantry; in the right

zone the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, was

to make the initial landings. The 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry, and the 2d and 3d

Battalions, 32d Infantry, were to be held

either at the line of departure or in the

lagoon ready for use in later aspects of the

attack.

Phases III and IV were dependent upon

the progress of the attack on Kwajalein

Island. The 17th Regimental Combat

Team, upon conclusion of the Carlson and

Carlos invasions, was to be held as division

reserve for the landings on the main island.

If it became evident that operations there

were going well and the 17th would not be

needed, the capture of the remaining

islands could proceed, using battalion

landing teams of this reserve regiment and

the 7th Reconnaissance Troop.32 Operations in the last two phases were not clearly

defined as to tactics; the exact procedure

to be used was left until the target was

reached and a closer survey made.

Northern Kwajalein Atoll

The plans drawn up by the 4th Marine

Division for the capture of Roi-Namur

and the adjacent islands in the northern

half of Kwajalein Atoll were similar in

most respects to those of the 7th Division.

The only important difference in the landing plan stemmed from the choice of

beaches. Whereas the 7th Division proposed to land on a narrow front on the

west end of Kwajalein Island and fight its

way up the long axis of the island, the 4th

Marine Division was able to undertake a

more orthodox amphibious maneuver and

land two regiments abreast on a broad

front on the lagoon shore of Roi-Namur.

(Map 10)

Roi Island measures 1,250 yards north

and south by 1,200 yards east and west. At

the time of the landing it was almost entirely cleared and was the site of the largest

enemy airfield in Kwajalein Atoll. The

field had three runways and was shaped in

the form of a figure 4. It also had four

turning circles, two service aprons, two

hangars, numerous service buildings, a 32

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. II, FO 1, 6

Jan 44, p. 2, and FO 2, 6 Jan 44, pp. 2, 3.
TACTICAL PLANNING FOR THE MARSHALLS 181

MAP 10

control tower, and some thirty revetments.

The dispersal area covered practically the

whole island. Namur Island, located 500

yards southeast of Roi, is connected with

the latter by a sand beach on the lagoon

(southern) side and a causeway between

the islands halfway between the lagoon

and ocean beaches. The island measures

approximately 900 yards east-west and 800

yards north-south. Unlike Roi, it was

heavily wooded at the time of the landings,

in spite of the fact that it contained a large

number of buildings.

The beaches along the seaward side of

Roi and Namur, as elsewhere in the atoll,

are approached over a reef from 125 to 400

yards wide that falls away sharply to seaward and has a ragged outer edge. This

reef, plus the fact that surf on Roi-Namur's

ocean coast was extremely heavy, made

landings from that side unfeasible. The

only possible location for a landing, therefore, was from the lagoon where the reef

fell gradually and was under water at high

tide, and where there was no considerable

surf.33

The 4th Marine Division's plan of attack closely paralleled that of the 7th Infantry Division in the south. On D Day,

while the Southern Attack Force would be

busy with the capture of islands adjacent

to Kwajalein, the 25th Marine Regimental Combat Team, commanded by Brig.

Gen. James L. Underhill, USMC, would 33

 4th Marine Div Opn Plan 3-43 (Revised), App

2 to Annex Fox, 30 Dec 43.
182 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

capture five islets near Roi-Namur. Two

of these guarded passes into the lagoon.

The most important of the northern channels was Ivan Pass guarded by Ivan

(Mellu) Island, about five miles to the west

of the main base at Roi. A nearer pass was

also guarded by Ivan as well as Jacob

(Ennuebing) Island, from which it took its

name. Just to the southeast of Namur lay

five other islets, three of them large enough

to be usable, the other two being simply

reef outcroppings. The three larger were

named Abraham (Ennugarret), Albert

(Ennumennet) and Alien (Ennubirr).

These three, as well as Ivan and Jacob,

were thought to be suitable for the emplacement of artillery.34

On D Day, General Underhill's landing

group was to seize Jacob and Ivan Islands

and establish thereon the 3d and 4th Battalions of the 14th Marine Regiment (Artillery). Thereupon, the group was to move

to Albert and Alien Islands where the

other two battalions of the Marine artillery

regiment were to be emplaced. The occupation of these islands, none of which was

expected to be heavily defended, was to

be completed before darkness on D Day.

On the next day the main landings were

to take place on Roi and Namur. The 23d

Regimental Combat Team was ordered to

land two regiments abreast on Red

Beaches 2 and 3 on the lagoon shore of

Roi. The 24th Regimental Combat Team

was to conduct simultaneous landings on

Green Beaches 1 and 2 on the lagoon shore

of Namur. The third and final phase of the

operation would include capture of the remaining islands in northern Kwajalein

and would be conducted on order depending upon the speed with which the main

objectives were attained.

These landings would of course follow

the same intense aerial, naval, and artillery preparatory fire outlined for southern

Kwajalein. The assault troops would all be

boated in amphibian tractors, which

would be preceded by a wave of LCI gunboats and a wave of armored LVT's. The

LCI(G)'s were instructed to proceed to

within 1,000 yards of the beach, fire their

rockets, and continue to support the landing of troops by gunfire. The armored

amphibians were to pass through the

LCI(G)'s and open fire with their 37-mm.

guns and machine guns. Finally, the amphibian tractors mounting the infantry

were to follow the armored amphibians

and pass through them if the latter had to

be stopped short of the beaches. Tanks,

boated in LCM's, would follow the first

waves of troops.35

Coincident with the seizure of Kwajalein, the separate task group (Task Group

51.2) under Admiral Hill was to invade

Majuro Atoll. This force was made up

principally of the 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, from the 27th Infantry Division,

and the V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company. Majuro was thought to

be lightly defended, perhaps not at all. For

this reason, plans for the occupation of the

atoll were dependent upon the results of a

preliminary reconnaissance to be carried

out by the reconnaissance company on D

Day after its seizure of Calalin Island,

which guarded the principal entrance pass

into the lagoon.36

34

 4th Marine Div Final Rpt on FLINTLOCK Opn,

17 Mar 44, Incl C. 35

 4th Marine Div Opn Plan 3-43 (Revised), 31

Dec 43, pp. 1-2; Ibid., Annex M. 36

 TG 51.2 Action Rpt Majuro Atoll, Marshall

Islands, 15 Feb 44, p. 4.
CHAPTER XII

Training, Logistics, and

Preliminary Operations

Training the Army Ground Troops

Of the troops who were to make the invasion of Kwajalein Atoll, only the 17th

and 32d Regimental Combat Teams of the

7th Infantry Division had seen previous

combat. The two Army regiments had

conducted successful amphibious landings

on Attu and captured it in May 1943.1

The 184th Infantry had made an unopposed landing at Kiska. Neither the 106th

Regimental Combat Team of the 27th Infantry Division, nor the 4th Marine Division, nor the 22d Marines, an independent

Marine regiment, had engaged in any previous operations. Even those units that had

been in combat were now faced with entirely new problems. The two combat

teams of the 7th Division that had landed

on Attu had fought under conditions very

different from those to be found on a coral

atoll. Each unit therefore underwent a

period of intensive training with emphasis

on the amphibious techniques that would

be used at Kwajalein Island and RoiNamur.

Initial training of the 7th Division for

the Marshalls operation fell under the

control of General Richardson's headquarters (USAFICPA). The entire division spent a week at a jungle training center on Oahu, where it was put through

battle-conditioning courses and received

instruction in jungle fighting, jungle living,

booby traps and demolitions, sniping and

infiltration, and defense against various

types of tactics that might be employed

against it in the forthcoming campaign.

Each company conducted exercises in the

attack of fortified positions involving the

use of chemical mortars, flame throwers,

grenades, engineer-infantry teams, tanks,

and machine guns and rifles.2

One of the chief tactical defects that had

been revealed in the ground fighting at

Makin and Tarawa was the poor communications and co-ordination between tanks

and infantry. Steps were taken before the

invasion of the Marshalls to rectify this

deficiency. On 5 November the 767th

Tank Battalion was attached to the 7th

Infantry Division and, as soon as reports

began to flow in from the Gilberts, tank

and infantry officers worked in close conjunction to prevent repetition of errors

committed in that operation. To improve

co-ordination, tank companies and platoons, as nearly as possible, were trained

with the infantry battalion with which

1

 Edmund G. Love, The Hourglass: A History of the

7th Infantry Division in World War II (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1950), Part II. 2

 USAFICPA Participation Rpt Kwajalein and

Eniwetok, p. 33.
184 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

they were to work. Frequent conferences

were held and a standard tank-infantry

doctrine was worked out. It was agreed

that tanks should precede infantry in the

assault against organized positions, but not

beyond the range of infantry covering fire.

Tanks were not to be used to eliminate

sniper fire, but should be employed against

automatic weapons holding up the infantry line. Tanks should be used as forward

scouts whenever the infantry was advancing into enemy country via a road. The

tank commander was always to be subordinate to the infantry commander.3

The difficulty of maintaining communications between infantry front-line companies and the supporting tanks, especially

when under machine gun and rifle fire,

had been made too painfully evident in

the Gilberts. As a solution a phone was

devised that could be used from the outside of the tank. The phone was located in

a metal box attached to the rear of each

tank. On the outside of the phone box was

placed a switch that operated a light on

the inside of the tank. An infantryman

wanting to communicate with his supporting tank had merely to flick the switch

to stop the tank, remove the phone, and

then talk to the tank commander inside.4

In addition to its responsibility for

ground combat training, General Richardson's headquarters also supervised the

preliminary amphibious training of the

7th Division and its attached units. Battalion landing teams were rotated through

a three-day period of advanced training

with floating equipment. Each team practiced embarkation, debarkation, and the

formation of boat waves. Following this

came battalion landing exercises, ending

in a tactical firing exercise ashore. One

combat company from each battalion and

the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop

were given intensive training in rubber

boats.5

Special schools were set up on Oahu at

Waianae and Makua to train 7th Division

troops to handle amphibian tractors and

amphibian trucks.6 These schools were

conducted under the direct supervision of

the 7th Division Ordnance Company. The

trainees for the DUKW's came from the

infantry regiment service companies and

the field artillery battalions. Those for

the LVT's were taken from the infantry

regiment antitank companies.7

One of the most pressing problems facing the 7th Division after its arrival in the

Hawaiian Islands was the procurement

and training of shore party personnel.

General Corlett had requested of General

Richardson's headquarters that his division be assigned three extra engineer battalions in addition to the organic combat

engineer battalion. These were to be employed exclusively for shore party work.

General Richardson was unable to meet

the request and informed the 7th Division

commander that he would have to draw

his shore parties from garrison troops assigned to the occupation of Kwajalein

after the assault phase was completed, that

is the 3d and 4th Army Defense Battalions. Consequently, seven engineer companies and two infantry companies of the

garrison force were used as a nucleus for

3

 767th Tank Battalion Report of Tank Operation

FLINTLOCK, 28 Feb 44 (hereafter cited as 767th Tk Bn

FLINTLOCK Rpt), pp. 2-3; S. L. A. Marshall, Notes

on Kwajalein Opn, MS, 3 vols, OCMH (hereafter

cited as Marshall, Kwajalein Notes), Vol. Ill, pp.

64-65. 4

 767th Tk Bn FLINTLOCK Rpt, p. 35. 5

 USAFICPA Participation Rpt Kwajalein and

Eniwetok, pp. 33-34; 7th Inf Div Participation Rpt

FLINTLOCK, p. 2. 6

 On the tactical employment of the DUKW, see

below, pp. 17-18. 7

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. VII, G-4 Rpt,

Annex E, Ordnance Rpt, p. 3.
TRAINING, LOGISTICS, AND PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS 185

the shore parties assigned to the nine battalion landing teams of the division. There

was not enough heavy equipment for both

the shore party operation and the garrison

resident engineer work so it was decided to

use the same equipment for both tasks.

Each shore party received five bulldozer

crawler tractors of various sizes, one 20-

ton 20-foot boom crane, one five-kilowatt

floodlight system, one sled-mounted fourton power winch, nine 21⁄2-ton trucks, 200

feet of steel roller conveyor, 1,000 feet of

beach mat, and a five-horn portable loudspeaker system.

After being issued this equipment each

shore party received its training along with

the battalion landing team to which it was

to be attached. To indoctrinate the shore

party personnel with the idea that they

"were as important members of the fighting

troops as any other component" of the

battalion, the shore parties were designated "beach combat teams." Training

included "dry boat" exercises in which

beaching conditions were simulated and

"wet boat" exercises in which each battalion and its shore party made actual landings in the beaches at Waianae Amphibious Training Center on Oahu.8

The amphibious training centers at

Waianae and Waimanalo were also used

to train joint assault signal company

(JASCO) personnel in the special signal

and communications problems involved in

joint operations. The 75th JASCO, assigned to the 7th Division, totaled 592

officers and men, drawn both from the

Army and the Navy. Elements of a similar

organization, the 295th JASCO, were assigned to the 106th Regimental Combat

Team of the 27th Division. Included in this

signal company were three shore fire control teams and three beach and shore

party teams. Operating with the 295th

JASCO were four air liaison teams.9

On 11 December, after the completion

of its preliminary training, the 7th Division and its attached units were turned

over to General Holland Smith's V Amphibious Corps for operational control

and advanced amphibious training. Shipboard exercises were conducted for the

184th Regimental Combat Team, which

had had the least amphibious experience

of the three regiments of the division.

Then, just before sailing, final rehearsals

were held at Maui and Kahoolawe,

Hawaii. On the former island actual landings were made, although naval gunfire

was only simulated. The next day, naval

ships fired live ammunition against the

beaches of uninhabitated Kahoolawe.

This completed the training for the amphibious units scheduled for the landings

on the southern half of Kwajalein Atoll.10

Meanwhile, the 106th Regimental

Combat Team had been undergoing a

similar training program. By 3 October,

when it was alerted for the Marshalls operation, it had already completed approximately eight weeks of intensive training

as part of the 27th Division's Nauru task

force. Thereafter, until it was turned over

to V Amphibious Corps on 11 December,

the regiment continued to be trained

under the supervision of 27th Division

headquarters. All officers and noncommissioned officers were thoroughly briefed

upon the division's experiences at Makin

during the week after the return of the

Makin force to Oahu. Attempts were

made to correct many of the deficiencies

that had been found in the Makin plan.

8

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. VII, G-4 Rpt,

Annex D, Engineer Rpt, pp. 2-3. 9

 USAFICPA Participation Rpt Kwajalein and

Eniwetok, pp. 143-44; see above, pp. 178-79. 10

 USAFICPA Participation Rpt Kwajalein and

Eniwetok, p. 34; V Phib Corps FLINTLOCK Rpt, p. 5.
186 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Particular attention was given, as it had

been in the 7th Division, to the problem of

tank-infantry co-operation. The 106th Infantry was also trained in co-ordination

with the 295th JASCO. Upon being assigned to V Amphibious Corps, it reviewed

all amphibious training, and on 21 December the regiment embarked on a nineday practice cruise and rehearsal off

Maui.11

Training the 4th Marine Division

The 4th Marine Division was activated

on 15 August 1943 at Camp Pendleton,

California, General Schmidt commanding. On 20 September it was assigned to

the V Amphibious Corps with the understanding that it would participate in some

undesignated Central Pacific landing and

that it must be fully trained and equipped

by 1 December. The division held frequent

boat exercises throughout September and

October, using boats furnished by the

Amphibious Training Command.12

Late in October, Group Three of the V

Amphibious Force was organized under

command of Admiral Conolly. Conolly's

task force (later designated Task Force 53)

was assigned the duty of carrying and supporting the 4th Marine Division in the invasion of Kwajalein Atoll. Admiral Conolly established his headquarters at Camp

Pendleton and worked in close conjunction with division headquarters in preparing a training schedule. The proximity of

the two headquarters made for excellent

co-ordination of their activities. Each regimental combat team of the Marine division was given a two-week period of actual

ship-to-shore training from transports.

One division rehearsal landing was conducted on the Aliso Canyon beaches of

Camp Pendleton during December. After

word arrived late in that month that the

target would be the northern part of

Kwajalein Atoll, plans for a final rehearsal

were drawn up to simulate as far as possible the actual conditions that could be

expected in the Marshalls.13

The 1st Joint Assault Signal Company,

with functions similar to the Army

JASCO's, was attached on 2 December

and commenced training with its assigned

infantry and naval units. On 20 November the 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion

was attached. As soon as the reports of the

2d Marine Division's experiences at Tarawa were received by 4th Marine Division

headquarters, training in the employment

of amphibian tractors was stepped up.

Early in December a new amphibian tractor battalion—in addition to the one

already organic to the division—was organized. Later still, an amphibian tractor

company was added. This led to an undesirable dilution of trained personnel. Also,

the fact that the tractors had to be

equipped with additional armor kept

many of them out of operation at the time

when intensive training of tractor crews

was most necessary. The result was that

the marines assigned to man the amphibian tractors were inadequately trained, a

defect that was to have serious effects on

the ship-to-shore movement at RoiNamur.14

 It was the opinion of General

Schmidt that "the greatest deficiency in

amphibious training [in the 4th Marine

Division] appeared to be in methods of

boat control, especially during the critical

stage of forming boat waves and groups for

the assault." He also noted that his LVT

11

 USAFICPA Participation Rpt Kwajalein and

Eniwetok, pp. 197-99. 12

 4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, p. 2. 13

 TF 53 Rpt of Amph Opns for the capture of

Roi and Namur Islands, 23 Feb 44, pp. 1-2. 14

 4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, p. 2.
TRAINING, LOGISTICS, AND PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS 187

crews lacked adequate training in troopcarrying operations, elementary seamanship, and in the use of the compass.15

Logistics

Supplying and Loading Army

Ground Troops

The burden of initial supply support for

the 7th Infantry Division and the 106th

Regimental Combat Team fell jointly on

Headquarters, United States Army Forces,

Central Pacific Area; the V Amphibious

Corps; and Commander, Service Force,

Pacific Fleet—all in Oahu. This division of

responsibility caused some confusion and

delay. The main source of difficulty was

that the place and responsibility of V Amphibious Corps was never clearly defined

in regard to supply, at least to the satisfaction of the logistics officers of the 7th Division.16

 General Holland Smith was in tactical command of the operation and

General Richardson was charged with

training and supplying the Army troops

that would participate. This dichotomy

tended to handicap the easy flow of supplies into the hands of the troops. As the

7th Division's logistics officer, Lt. Col.

David X. Angluin, reported: "On the one

hand there was the supply headquarters

without tactical authority or especial tactical consideration [USAFICPA], and on the

other hand there was the [ultimate] tactical

headquarters without supply responsibility

[V Amphibious Corps]. Considerable valuable time was lost in processing requests

because of the lack of early definition of

responsibility."17 Logistical planning on

the division level was always complicated

by the necessity for working through several responsible parties instead of one.

For example, during the four months of

planning and equipping, Class III supply

(fuels and lubricants) was passed back and

forth between Army and Navy authorities

until finally it was decided that the Navy

would be responsible for supplying bulk

fuels and the Army for filling and marking

five-gallon containers, while certain other

types of oils and greases would be bought

on the open market.18 Luckily, the division

was allowed ample time to prepare for the

Marshalls invasions and most of the difficulties arising from divided responsibility

were overcome.

The basic logistics plan was originally

prescribed by Admiral Nimitz on 11 November.19

 Only one major change was

later made; this was in the amount of

ammunition to be carried by the combat

troops. The original directive had provided

that the combat troops embarking on the

Marshalls expedition would carry five

units of fire for each weapon except for

antiaircraft guns, which were allowed

ten.20 As a result of the experience in the

15

 Ibid., Annex J, p. 18. 16

 V Phib Corps FLINTLOCK Rpt, Annex F, G-4

Rpt, p. 2; 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. VII, G-4

Rpt, Annex F, QM Rpt, p. 2. 17

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. VII, Part III.

p. 6.

18

 Ibid., Annex F. QM Rpt, p. 2. 19

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opn Plan 16-43, 12 Oct

43, Annex A, Logistic Plan for Land-Based Forces, 11

Nov 43. 20

 A unit of fire is by definition the number of

rounds of ammunition that will normally be used by

one weapon in one day. In the Central Pacific, the

Army unit of fire for each of the main weapons was

as follows:

Weapon Rounds

.30-Caliber carbine Ml ...................... . 30

.30-caliber rifle M1903 (Springfield)............ 70

.30-Caliber rifle M1 (Garand).................. 70

.30-caliber automatic rifle M1918A2 (BAR)...... 750

.30-caliber machine gun ..................... . 1,800

60-mm. mortar ............................ . 100

81-mm. mortar ............................ . 90

75-mm. howitzer (field)....................... 300

75-mm. gun (field and tank)................... 300

90-mm. gun (AA)........................... 125

105-mm. howitzer .......................... . 200

155-mm. howitzer .......................... . 150

Source: 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. VII, G-4 Rpt,

Annex E, Ordnance Rpt, Incl 3.
188 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Gilberts, officers of the 7th Division became

dissatisfied with this allotment, particularly

the allowance to artillery weapons. Late in

the preparatory phase, the division initiated a request for an increase in the total

number of units of fire to be taken to the

Marshalls.21 This was finally approved by

Admiral Nimitz on 5 January, and the

total units of fire for 105-mm. howitzers

were increased from five to ten and for

other ground weapons from five to eight.22

As finally drawn up, the logistics plan

for the Marshalls operation provided that

assault forces would carry 30 days of B

rations, 5 days of C rations, 5 days of K

rations, 2 days of D rations, and 5 days of

water in cans. Thirty days of Class II

(maintenance), Class III (fuels and lubricants), and Class IV (medical, aviation,

and construction) supplies were also to be

carried by the assault troops. The garrison

forces were supplied with like amounts

except that the number of units of fire

provided for them was reduced.23

The 7th Division had been the first in

the Pacific to experiment with pallets, and

once again, as at Attu, these amphibious

sleds were used extensively. The division

engineer was charged with the responsibility of palletizing supplies and certain

items of equipment. By the end of the

preparatory phase a total of 4,174 sled

loads were palletized. This included 3 days

of K and C rations, 3 days of Class III supplies carried in five-gallon cans, 3 units of

fire for all weapons except the artillery

howitzers and chemical mortars, 2 units of

fire for four 105-mm. howitzer battalions,

8 units of fire for one 155-mm. howitzer

battalion, 4 units of fire for the 4.2-inch

chemical mortars, and sundry items of

engineer, medical, signal, ordnance, and

hospital equipment. None of the supplies

carried in LST's or LSD's were palletloaded since these ships were not considered suitable for easy handling of pallets.24

No single item of equipment was more

eagerly sought by planners at all echelons

than the amphibian tractor, whose utility

as a carrier of assault troops had been so

fully demonstrated at Tarawa and Makin.

Late in November Admiral Nimitz informed General Richardson that a minimum of four tractor battalions per division

was desirable for atoll operations. One of

these battalions, he added, should consist

of amphibian tanks—amphibian tractors

carrying extra armor plate and mounting

37-mm. guns. Richardson promptly requested the War Department to make the

allocation.25 This could not be honored in

its entirety, but the newly formed 708th

Amphibian Tank Battalion, then training

in California, was dispatched to Oahu.

Although the personnel of the battalion

had scarcely become acquainted with their

vehicles, the unit was attached to the 7th

Division on 15 December for the Marshalls

operation.26

An antitank company from each of the

three regiments of the 7th Division was

converted into an LVT group and added

to the amphibian tank battalion. When

finally organized the battalion's total came

to one company of amphibian tanks of

seventeen LVT(A)'s and four amphibian

tractor groups of thirty-four each. Each of

these groups was then organized into waves

to carry the assault troops. The first wave

21

 Hist AFMIDPAC, I, 130. 22

 CINCPAC Opn Plan 16-43 (Revised), Annex A,

Logistic Plan for Land-Based Forces, CINCPACCINCPOA Secret Serial 000204, 5 Jan 44. This plan

replaced the original plan of 11 November 1943. V

Phib Corps Adm Order 1-44, 5 Jan 44. 23

 V Phib Corps Adm Order 1-44, 5 Jan 44. 24

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. VII, G-4 Rpt,

Part V, pp. 5-6, and Annex I, pp. 1-2. 25

 Rad, USAFICPA to WD, 28 Nov 43, CPA 7528. 26

 7th Inf Div G-4 Jnl, 15 Dec 44.
TRAINING, LOGISTICS, AND PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS 189

was to consist of eight amphibian tanks, the

second of six amphibian tanks and two

amphibian tractors, the third and fourth of

eight amphibian tractors each. In addition,

two tractors in each group were designated

as free vehicles. All were loaded on LST's,

seventeen vehicles per ship. Finally,

twenty-one tractors were formed into a

reserve LVT pool that was to provide immediate replacements to the combat teams

when necessary. These spare vehicles were

loaded on an LSD. In all, a total of 174

amphibian tanks and tractors was provided for the 7th Division's invasion of

Kwajalein. In order to maintain and repair them it was necessary to make provision for shops to be assigned exclusively to

this work. Four LST's were designated as

repair ships and to each were assigned

mechanics who were specialists in this

field.27

One of the novel features of the Marshalls operation was the tactical employment for the first time on any extensive

scale in the Pacific of a newly developed

amphibian vehicle, the 21⁄2-ton amphibian

truck or DUKW. It was a six-wheeled

truck with a boat hull, a tunnel propeller,

and a small rudder, and could carry

twenty-five troops or 5,000 pounds of

cargo.28 Just as the U.S. Navy and Marine

Corps had been primarily responsible for

the development of the LVT, so the Army

can be credited with the pioneer work that

produced the DUKW. Since 1940 various

organizations within the Army had been

experimenting with amphibian trucks of

the smaller variety, and several models had

been perfected, chiefly for employment as

personnel carriers. In April 1942 the War

Department authorized the Quartermaster

Corps to develop an amphibian truck

based on the standard Army 21⁄2-ton sixby-six truck. Research was turned over to

the National Defense Research Committee, which in turn designated the New York

yacht designing firm of Sparkman and

Stephens to work out the details. A contract was signed with General Motors Corporation, and by June 1942 the first model

was ready for demonstration. After a series

of tests conducted under the auspices of

the Quartermaster Corps and the Transportation Corps, the original model, with

modifications, was accepted, and production on a large scale commenced. The

vehicle was designated "DUKW" according to the code system employed by General Motors and this was inevitably translated into "duck" by the troops in the

field.29

The 7th Division was allowed a total of

a hundred DUKW's for the invasion of

southern Kwajalein. Forty DUKW's were

organized into two groups of twenty each

and assigned to the infantry, chiefly for

logistical purposes. Sixty were allocated to

division artillery.

The DUKW's for the artillery were divided into four groups of fifteen vehicles,

each group serving one firing battalion,

five DUKW's to each 105-mm. howitzer

battery. They were to be carried aboard

LST's, one ship being assigned to each

105-mm. howitzer battalion. Certain

changes had to be made before the DUKW

could be used to carry artillery pieces.

27

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. VII, G-4 Rpt,

Annex E, Ordnance Rpt, pp. 5-6; 708th Amph Tk

Bn Special Action Rpt, Kwajalein Opn, 12 Mar 44,

pp. 1-2. 28

 Office of Naval Intelligence, Confidential Publication 226 (Washington, 1944). Two DUKW's had

been used at Makin with altogether favorable results, but the number was insufficient to demonstrate

conclusively how efficiently these vehicles could be

used in amphibious operations. 29

 Col. Edwin S. Van Deusen, "Trucks That Go

Down to the Sea," Army Ordnance, XXV (1943), 555-

58.
190 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

First, the center of gravity had to be lowered so that the truck would not capsize in

rough water with a top-heavy load. This

was accomplished by lowering the floor

boards in the cargo box. The second

change would have involved widening the

cargo space by from six to eight inches but

no way was found to do this. It was discovered, however, that the oversize combat

wheels on the pieces could easily be replaced by ordinary truck-type wheels and

tires, allowing the howitzers to fit perfectly

into the DUKW's. In addition, out of each

group of fifteen artillery DUKW's, three

were fitted with A-frames by which the

pieces could be easily lifted from the cargo

box into position.

As in the case of the LVT's it was realized that floating shops for repair of

DUKW's would be needed. Certain LST's

were assigned this duty and were issued

special parts and a sizable stock of patching

and welding material for the purpose.30

The precaution was to prove its worth in

the fighting to come.

One final logistical lesson that had

emerged from the Tarawa operation was

that pointing to the necessity for establishing some system of floating supply until

the beachhead had been expanded sufficiently to permit the uninterrupted operation of inland supply dumps. Shortly after

the termination of the Tarawa fight, logistics officers of the 7th Division held a series

of conversations with Captain Knowles,

naval transport group commander, and Lt.

Col. Jesse S. Cook, USMC, the D-4 officer

of the 2d Marine Division. On the basis of

the information gained from these interviews it was decided that at Kwajalein a

better system of combat supply would have

to be set up. It was essential that plans be

made for the immediate delivery of priority supplies to the fighting troops ashore

before the shore parties were organized.

On the suggestion of Warrant Officer (j.g.)

John T. Dalton, it was finally decided to

stow initial combat supplies on LST's and

use DUKW's to carry them to the shore as

needed. Thus the LST's would act as floating supply dumps until such time as it was

possible to set up inland dumps.

A plan of supply was compiled that required stowage space aboard seven LST's

for two units of fire for all weapons except

artillery, four days' emergency rations, one

and a half days of water, two days of Class

III supplies, quartermaster and ordnance

cleaning and preserving kits, and approximately fifty-five tons of explosives. A portion of these supplies was "preloaded" in

the forty infantry DUKW's that were embarked in two of the seven LST's. The remaining five LST's embarked seventeen

amphibian tractors each in addition to the

priority supplies.

This proposal was presented to Captain

Knowles for recommendations and comments. He approved the solution as presented. It was then presented to Admiral

Turner, who gave his approval and made

the necessary arrangements for the shipping required to carry out the plan.31

In addition to the 7th Division, other

Army units scheduled for the Marshalls

had to be supplied in the Hawaiian area.

These were the 106th Infantry Regiment

of the 27th Division and the 3d and 4th

Army Defense Battalions, the latter two

being designated as the chief components

of the garrison force for the Marshalls.

The 106th Infantry Regiment, as a reserve, expected to land, if at all, over

30

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. VII, G-4 Rpt,

Annex E, Ordnance Rpt, p. 10; 7th Inf Div Rpt,

Use of DUKW's by the Artillery of the 7th Infantry

Division in the FLINTLOCK Operation, 4 Apr 44. 31

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. VII, G-4 Rpt,

Annex A, Initial Combat Supply, p. 1.
TRAINING, LOGISTICS, AND PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS 191

beaches already secured and was therefore

equipped to operate as a combat team only

in land operations. The regiment had originally begun training with the 27th Division for operations against Nauru. When

that target was dropped in favor of Makin,

the Gilberts force was reduced to a single

regimental combat team, the 165th. Only

a five-day interval elapsed, however, before Admiral Nimitz included the 106th in

his plans for the Marshalls invasion. Although under the operational control of the

V Amphibious Corps, the regiment remained attached to the 27th Division until

11 December and during this period was

brought up to strength and fully equipped

by the 27th Division and General Richardson's headquarters.

The 106th Infantry was reinforced during this period by the addition of one provisional clearing company, a provisional

hospital, a tank maintenance ordnance

detachment, and a bomb disposal squad.

Two tank companies were also added.

Company B of the 102d Engineer Battalion and elements of that battalion's headquarters were attached to the 27th Division, and from it to the 106th Infantry, as

were various special troop detachments

from the division's headquarters. When

the 295th JASCO was attached to the division after Makin, detachments were in

turn assigned to the 106th Infantry.32

The 106th was to carry a thirty-day level

of supplies with it to Kwajalein in all

classes except ammunition. Five units of

fire of all types were allotted. As a result of

the Makin experience, 27th Division supply officers sought and received approval

of a modification in the USAFICPA unit

of fire tables to provide increased supplies

of 60-mm. illuminating shells and 37-mm.

canister as well as more 81-mm. heavy

mortar shells for use against concrete emplacements. In contrast to the regiments of

the 7th Division, which altogether used

only 4,174 pallets, the 106th Infantry alone

used 3,000 for the Kwajalein reserve

mission.33

Soon after the regiment's formal attachment to the Marshalls force, further

changes in the supply plan had to be made.

Late in December the 2d Battalion was

assigned to the Majuro mission and all

logistic and loading plans had to be revised.

Enough supplies were turned over to the

Majuro battalion to make it self-sufficient.

The regiment's shipping, which was reduced by two vessels after the subtraction

of those assigned to the 2d Battalion,

proved insufficient, thereby causing shifts

on loading plans.34

The plans for loading the various ships

that would carry the assault troops and

their supplies and equipment were worked

out by consultation between representatives of the staffs of Admiral Turner, General Holland Smith, and the 7th Infantry

Division. Since it was decided to increase

the number of units of fire to be carried by

the 7th Division, it was impossible to

combat-load all the ships assigned to carry

the troops. Accordingly, the attack transports and their accompanying attack cargo

ships were loaded between decks with initial combat equipment and supplies; the

bulk of the remaining supplies was stowed

in the holds of the cargo ships without any

attempt at genuine combat loading. Loose

emergency supplies of all classes were carried aboard the LST's. This resulted in a

combat load of about 600 short tons in

each APA and AKA, with an additional

1,000 tons of maintenance supplies in each

32

 USAFICPA Participation Rpt Kwajalein and

Eniwetok, pp. 197-99. 33

 Ibid., p. 199. 34

 Ibid., p. 201.
192 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

AKA and emergency supplies on the

LST's. The LST's that carried the amphibian tractors also were stowed with an

average load of 350 tons of miscellaneous

supplies.35

The procedure established for working

out the details of loading was as follows:

each regimental commander upon receiving approval of his equipment list conferred with the naval transport division

commander to which his regiment was assigned. Together they allocated personnel

and cargo to ships in such manner as to

support the tactical plans of the ground

troops and provide for a balanced unloading of the ships. The next step was for the

battalion landing team commander or the

senior troop officer embarking on each

ship to confer with the ship's commanding

officer, who was responsible for proper

loading plans for his ship. Actual loading

was performed by troop working details

with ships' crews manning the winches and

supervising the stowing of cargo in the

holds. The port authorities at Honolulu

and Pearl Harbor furnished the necessary

dock equipment and the personnel to man

it. Each troop unit had a transport quartermaster who dealt with the ships' transport

quartermaster in supervising the actual

details of loading.36

When the loading was finally completed, the 21,768 officers and men of the

7th Infantry Division, reinforced, with all

their initial supplies and equipment were

embarked aboard one headquarters ship,

eleven attack transports, three attack cargo

ships, nineteen LST's, three LSD's, and

two high-speed transports. The corps reserve, consisting of the 22d Marine Regimental Combat Team and the 106th Infantry (totaling 9,325 officers and men),

was carried aboard six attack transports,

one troop transport, one attack cargo ship

and one cargo ship (AK). The 2d Battalion Landing Team of the 106th Infantry

Regiment, scheduled to land on Majuro,

was for the most part embarked on an

attack transport, USS Cambria, which was

also Admiral Hill's flagship. Two accompanying LST's carried the remainder of

the troops. The V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company, also assigned to

this mission, was aboard a high-speed

transport.37

4th Marine Division Logistics

Navy and Marine Corps authorities in

the San Diego area assumed responsibility

for supplying and loading the 4th Marine

Division. In the matter of special amphibious equipment the Marine division was

both more and less fortunate than the 7th

Division. Altogether the Marines took with

them to Roi-Namur 280 amphibian tractors and 75 armored amphibians, a far

larger number than was allowed to the 7th

Division. These were organized into the

4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, the 10th

Amphibian Tractor Battalion with Company A of the 11th Amphibian Tractor

Battalion attached, and the 1st Armored

Amphibian Battalion.38 On the other hand

no DUKW's were made available to the

Marine division and it had to rely exclusively on landing craft and amphibian

35

 Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet, Publication P002, Amphibious Operations in the Marshall Islands

January-February 1944, 20 May 44 (hereafter cited

as COMINCH P-002), Ch. V, p. 1. 36

 Ibid., Ch. V, pp. 4-5. 37

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. VII, G-4 Rpt,

Annex H. Transport QM Rpt, p. 2; V Phib Corps,

Summary of Units and Ships Upon Which Embarked,

FLINTLOCK: TF 51 Rpt FLINTLOCK, p. 3. 38

 TF 51 Rpt FLINTLOCK, Annex J to Incl J; V Phib

Corps, Summary of Units and Ships Upon Which

Embarked, FLINTLOCK.
TRAINING, LOGISTICS, AND PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS 193

tractors to carry its artillery and supplies

ashore.39

The division was also handicapped by

the fact that shipping was available for

only 30 percent of its transportation. Only

eight one-ton cargo trucks and twenty-five

21⁄2-ton dump trucks could be taken along

and all the 21⁄2-ton cargo trucks had to be

left behind. According to the division commander, at least twice the amount of transportation taken should have accompanied

his troops on the invasion.40

To carry the marines to their destination

Admiral Conolly's Task Force 53 included

one headquarters ship, eleven attack transports, one troop transport, three attack

cargo ships, one high-speed transport,

fifteen LST's, and two LSD's. Four attack

transports and one attack cargo ship constituted a transport division, lifting the

personnel, equipment, and supplies of a

regimental combat team. Each battalion

landing team embarked in one attack

transport, and the fourth attack transport

of each transport division carried the regimental support group and headquarters.

The attack cargo ship of each transport

division lifted a few personnel and a great

part of the regimental supplies.41

The division headquarters was embarked aboard the AGC USS Appalachian,

which was Admiral Conolly's flagship. All

the 105-mm. artillery was embarked in

one LSD (Epping Forest), each weapon

with its supply of ammunition preloaded

on an LCM. All the Marine 75-mm. pack

howitzers were preloaded in LVT's, which

were carried aboard three LST's. Medium

tanks were preloaded in LCM's and embarked in the other LSD (Gunston Hall),

light tanks in the attack transports, amphtracks and armored amphibians in LST's

and LSD's.42

The only serious problem to arise while

these vessels were being loaded came about

as a result of Admiral Nimitz' order to increase the number of units of fire from five

to ten for 105-mm. howitzers and from five

to eight for all other weapons. This had

been done in the instance of the 7th Division, but the staff of the 4th Marine Division was opposed to it. Five units, said

General Schmidt, would have been sufficient.43

 Certainly this midstream change

in the amount of required ammunition

complicated the division's loading in San

Diego. Prepared loading plans had to be

scrapped and various desired items of supply and equipment left ashore to make

room for ammunition. "Of utmost importance," complained the division commander, "is the cessation of logistical planning once the loading has begun."44

Preliminary Army Air Operations

The first strikes against the Marshalls

by land-based aircraft took place as part

of the plan to neutralize them in preparation for the landings in the Gilberts on 20

November. Following the seizure of Makin

and Tarawa, operations against the various

important Marshalls atolls continued

without interruption. The previous mission of temporary neutralization now gave

way to one of permanent neutralization or

destruction of defenses. Until the middle

of December all operations were conducted by B-24's based south and east of

the Gilberts and were restricted by the dis39

 4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK., Incl J, p.

27.

40

 Ibid., p. 29. 41

 TF 53 Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incl H, p. 1. 42

 Ibid., p. 2; V Phib Corps, Summary of Units and

Ships Upon Which Embarked, FLINTLOCK. 43

 4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incl J, p.

28.

44

 Ibid., p. 46.
194 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

tances that had to be flown; after 23 December flights could be made by planes

based in the Gilberts, and in January the

B-24's began operating from the Gilberts

to strike more deeply and more powerfully

into the Marshalls.

During November and December two

atolls received more attacks than the

others. Mille, nearest to the Gilberts and

therefore more easily reached and immediately dangerous, was the center of attention, but Maloelap with its large air facilities had to be kept under constant

surveillance and attack. Jaluit was a less

important target. Kwajalein and Wotje

received most attention during January as

the softening-up before the invasion went

into high gear.

Mille

Mille Atoll was subjected to a carrier

strike on 18-19 November, by which time

most of its air facilities had been damaged

extensively. Because it was their only base

within fighter range of the Gilberts, the

Japanese concentrated every effort to get

the runways back into condition at the

earliest possible moment and to keep the

base well reinforced with planes. Their

success was attested to by the appearance

of several Japanese fighters west of Makin

as early as 20 November.45 That same

night enemy bombers were over Tarawa.

On 24 November eleven B-24's staged

through Baker Island for a raid on Mille

Atoll. At the target they were intercepted

by approximately eight fighters that

caused minor damage to the bombers but

did not prevent the dropping of bombs on

Mili, the main island of the atoll. Between

that date and 19 December 106 heavy

bombers dropped a total of 122 tons of

bombs on the runways and installations.

All of these missions were flown from Canton, staging through Baker, or from Nanomea, Nukufetau, or Funafuti. The largest

single mission was flown on 4 December

when thirty-four B-24's bombed Mili

Island. Throughout the period Japanese

fighters operated from the Mille base and

rose to intercept the American formations.

Beginning on 18 December the pattern

of attacks against Mille changed. That

day saw the first strike by American attack

bombers and land-based fighters. Twelve

A-24's, escorted by thirteen P-39's, appeared over the atoll and damaged three

enemy fighters on the ground. On the

same day six more P-39's destroyed six out

of eight interceptors in the air and four

more planes on the ground. The following

day, the 19th, the last B-24 strike on Mille

was executed. Approximately twenty-five

interceptors arose to meet the flight of

nineteen B-24's, and seven of the Japanese

planes were shot down. From then until

25 December, fighters and attack bombers

kept up daily attacks on Mille. Confirmed

damage to the enemy during the period 18

through 25 December included virtually

all the fuel dumps on the atoll bombed

and most of the buildings leveled. A total

of eleven enemy planes were destroyed on

the ground. There was no further Japanese

interception from Mille after 25 December. On only two occasions after that date

were enemy aircraft found on this eastern

atoll. Three planes were observed on the

ground on 3 January and destroyed. Five

days later a routine reconnaissance flight

discovered approximately four more

parked along the runways. By the time an

attack group hit the island on 10 January,

even these few planes had disappeared.

45

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Nov 43,

Annex E, p. 21.
TRAINING, LOGISTICS, AND PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS 195

MILLE UNDER AIR ATTACK

After 25 December, with both attack

bombers and fighters regularly available

from the new bases at Makin, Tarawa, and

Apamama, the neutralization of Mille entered its final phase. Fighters conducted

daily reconnaissance over the atoll. Their

findings were usually transmitted to their

home bases, and a task group of either

fighters or attack bombers made a flight

on the same day to knock out whatever

had been uncovered by the reconnaissance

flight. On four occasions between 1 January and 31 January American planes

were on station over Mille for the whole

day. The airfield was rendered useless.

Ships disappeared from the lagoon, and

even antiaircraft fire became scarce and

ineffective. Strafing and bombing had left

the installations virtually in ruins and had

so completely isolated the atoll that after

22 December only submarines and small

fishing craft ventured into the area. All of

the latter were destroyed.46

Maloelap

Although Mille was extremely dangerous to American bases and offensive efforts

because of its nearness to the Gilberts,

Maloelap was considered the greatest potential threat to operations in the Marshalls. Taroa, the principal island of this

atoll was, except for Kwajalein, the most

46

 Operational History of the Seventh Air Force, 6

Nov 43-31 Jul 44. This account of operations against

all the Marshall atolls has been reconstructed from

the chronological log attached to the operations report. See also Craven and Cate, AAF IV, pp. 302-10.
196 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

TAROA AFTER BEING BOMBED

important air base between Tarawa and

Truk. It bristled with antiaircraft installations and heavy guns; its airfields supported by far the largest number of planes

in the eastern Marshalls; its garrison was

well armed.

The first post-Gilberts air strike on this

formidable base was carried out by ten

B-24's flying from Nanomea on 26 November. Primarily directed against Taroa's

runways, the planes dropped twenty-two

tons of bombs from an altitude of approximately 10,000 feet. Of the two interceptors

that arose to meet the attack one was shot

down.

Between 26 November and 10 January

all flights against Maloelap were made by

B-24's, flying from Nanomea, Nukufetau,

and Canton. The round-trip distance from

the two former bases was 2,000 to 2,200

miles, and the Canton squadrons staged

through Baker Island on round-trip flights

of approximately 3,100 miles. All flights

were met by interceptors. For thirty to

fifty minutes on each flight bomber crews

were forced to fight their way into the target and out again. During the period nine

B-24's were shot down by enemy action

and fifty-nine Japanese fighters were destroyed. Damage to the Maloelap base was

extensive, but not crippling. Large fires

were started, buildings destroyed, and two

ships bombed with inconclusive results.

Runways were never put entirely out of

operation, always being repaired the same

day they were damaged.
TRAINING, LOGISTICS, AND PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS 197

The second period of the offensive

against Maloelap can be said to have begun on 11 January, when the long flights

from the south were superseded by shorter

and more frequent strikes by B-25's. The

character of the fighting did not greatly

change, however. As late as 26 January

about twenty-five interceptors rose to meet

the attack. The pounding of Taroa and

adjacent islands in the atoll continued.

Between 11 and 25 January inclusive, approximately seventy tons of bombs were

dropped from the light bombers flying at

treetop level, and the island was systematically strafed by machine gun fire and

75-mm. shells from the B-25's. Fifteen enemy fighters were destroyed as against an

American loss of six B-25's. Shipping was

thoroughly cleared from the lagoon, and

the ground installations seemed to be totally destroyed; but the airfield remained

in operation.

The last phase of the attack on this stubborn base was begun on 26 January with

the introduction of fighter escorts for the

B-25's. On the first day nine B-25's, followed at a considerable distance by twelve

P-40's, flew into Taroa for a low-level attack. The B-25's destroyed nine interceptors on the ground and five more after

they were airborne. The control tower and

two other buildings on the airfield were

set afire and four tons of bombs were

dropped in fuel dump and dispersal areas,

starting large fires. As the B-25's left the

target to return to Makin they were followed by about fifteen Japanese fighters.

Thirty miles south of Maloelap the twelve

P-40's met the bomber formation and immediately engaged the enemy fighters, destroying eleven of them and severely damaging two more.

The strike of 26 January was decisive.

Practically all of the remaining enemy air

strength at Maloelap had been destroyed,

and the once formidable base was rendered almost powerless to defend itself

against air strikes. On 27 January a formation of seven B-24's struck Taroa from

Makin, dropping seventeen tons of bombs

on the airfield area, setting fire to more

dumps and damaging the runway. No interception was attempted although a few

planes were sighted on the ground. On 28

January, the tactics of the first bomberfighter attack were repeated, the airfield

on Taroa again being the target. Five

enemy planes managed to become airborne, but their pilots were neither aggressive nor experienced. One was shot down

by the B-25's, but when the formation

attempted to lead the other enemy planes

back toward the fighter escort, the engagement was broken off. The last low-level

attack was made on 29 January, the B-25's

attacking ammunition dumps and buildings on the outer islands. There were no

signs of enemy planes. Maloelap had been

almost completely neutralized at last, and

only on the day the carrier task force

moved into the Marshalls.

Jaluit

Because of its reduced importance as a

naval base and its lack of air installations,

Jaluit received much less attention than

Mille and Maloelap. Two strikes against

this former administrative center of the

Marshalls had been conducted during the

action preliminary to the Gilberts invasion.

On 23 November, as the action at Makin

and Tarawa was drawing to a close, eight

B-24's struck Jaluit from Nukufetau, dropping eight tons of bombs on the target and

meeting little opposition. Three float-type

fighters were seen, but instead of attacking

the bombers they flew off in the opposite
198 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

WOTJE UNDER AIR ATTACK. Note columns of smoke rising from hits on the runway.

direction. Only two more strikes were directed at Jaluit before the opening of bases

in the Gilberts. In both cases large fires

were started. There was no interception on

either raid and only moderate antiaircraft

opposition.

From 12 December through 29 January

Jaluit was subjected to a total of thirteen

separate strikes, mostly by attack bombers

and fighters from Makin and Tarawa.

Concentrating on low-level bombing and

strafing, the strikes reduced Jaluit to

rubble. Oil and ammunition dumps, communications facilities, and buildings were

destroyed. Three ships were sunk in the

lagoon. At no time during this entire

period were the attackers intercepted by

enemy planes, although antiaircraft fire

was usually intense and accurate. By the

time the carrier task force approached,

two days before the invasion of Kwajalein,

Jaluit had been reduced to impotence. It

could send neither reinforcements nor air

support to the garrison that would need

help.

Wotje

No American strike at Wotje was conducted until 13 December, when ten

B-24's made the 3,100 mile round trip

from Canton, staging through Baker. One

subsequent raid by the same route was

made before 23 December, on which day

bombers based at Canton carried out the

first of a series of three flights through

Tarawa. After 8 January both B-24's and

B-25's, using the new bases at Makin and

Tarawa, made ten strikes on Wotje in the

period through 29 January. On only one
TRAINING, LOGISTICS, AND PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS 199

occasion did Japanese fighters intercept

the flights. On 26 December six planes attacked a formation of seventeen B-24's.

During the period 13 December-29

January approximately 325 tons of bombs

were dropped on Wotje. As in the other

Marshalls atolls the primary targets were

airfields, dumps, and shipping. A few

cargo vessels were found in Wotje Lagoon

as late as 29 January, but every other form

of communication with the outside world,

except possibly radio, had been destroyed.

Kwajalein

Because, with the exception of Eniwetok, it was the farthest west of all the principal atolls of the Marshalls, Kwajalein

received relatively little attention from the

Seventh Air Force bombers. During the

preliminaries to the Gilberts invasion a

group of eight B-24's had attempted the

flight from Nanomea, but because of bad

weather and the great distance only one

plane managed to get through to drop

fragmentation bombs on Roi-Namur. The

next Seventh Air Force strike against

Kwajalein (there was in the meantime a

carrier strike on 4 December) came on 21

December, when four B-24's and four

PB4Y photoreconnaissance planes from

Nanomea succeeded in dropping six tons

of bombs on various islands of the atoll and

in taking valuable pictures of installations.

Although they were intercepted by nine

fighters, none of the planes was lost.

In nine subsequent missions during December and January, about 200 tons of

bombs were distributed throughout the

atoll, causing some damage to installations

and shipping. No interception of American land-based bombers was made after

22 January. As late as 29 January, however, the airfield at Roi-Namur was still

operative, and the Japanese had continued

to bring in planes.

Preliminary Naval Action

One naval strike was delivered against

the Marshalls in the period between 24

November and 29 January. The force for

this strike, Task Groups 58.1 and 58.3, was

organized from Task Force 50,47 which had

supported the Gilberts invasion while the

ships were still west of Makin and Tarawa

late in November. Admiral Pownall combined most of the vessels of his Interceptor

and Northern and Southern Carrier

Groups into two new task groups for movement to the target area. Upon arrival

there the two groups were brought together for operation against Kwajalein

Atoll and Wotje.

Pownall's task groups consisted of six fast

carriers, five heavy cruisers, two light

cruisers, three of the new class of antiaircraft cruisers, and twelve destroyers. After

a rendezvous for refueling 820 miles northeast of Kwajalein Atoll on 1 December,

the force moved southwest and arrived unobserved near Kwajalein on the morning

of 4 December. The first planes were

launched at 0630. A total of 246 took part

in the various attacks on this atoll.48

At Roi-Namur the early flights discovered Japanese planes parked on the airstrip and many fighters airborne. In addition, two light cruisers and one large

freighter were at anchor off the islands. In

the ensuing engagement, nineteen of the

47

 In January 1950, the designation Task Force 50

was taken over by Admiral Spruance's Fifth Fleet.

The fast carrier force of the Central Pacific became

Task Force 58, and was commanded by Admiral

Mitscher. 48

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Dec 43,

Annex A, pp. 6-8.
ACTION AT KWAJALEIN. Cargo ships at anchor in the lagoon (left-hand page) are sitting ducks
for U.S. carrier-based planes. Japanese torpedo planes strike back at the U.S. task force (right-hand page)
202 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

interceptors were destroyed, and one Japanese medium bomber was shot down as it

tried to escape from the field. Three more

bombers were destroyed on the ground,

but most of the remainder of the Japanese

aircraft on the ground escaped damage

because the American pilots did not receive word of their camouflaged locations.

Several hits were scored on the cruisers

and the freighter.

No planes were found at Kwajalein

Island since the field there was still under

construction. Nearly thirty cargo vessels

of various types were anchored, however,

in the lagoon off this island. Seven of these

were sunk and several others damaged. At

a nearby island two large multiengined

flying boats were strafed and set on fire.

At noon, while the strikes on RoiNamur and Kwajalein Island were still in

progress, twenty-nine aircraft attacked

Wotje, where they destroyed five planes on

the ground and set fire to hangars, machine shops, and barracks. At both Kwajalein and Wotje complete photographic

coverage was secured.

The original plans for the carrier attack

on Kwajalein had contemplated a twoday strike, but shortly before noon of the

first day enemy planes, evidently from

Roi-Namur, began a series of counterattacks on the carrier groups. Although no serious damage was inflicted in these daylight

attempts to sink the carriers, recovery of

planes was hampered by the maneuvers

the attacks made necessary. One of the

carriers received a torpedo hit but fortunately was not sunk. The task groups

withdrew the next day, and the rest of the

strike was abandoned.

Damage to the enemy's bases had been

extensive. It was considered necessary,

however, for the land-based planes of the

Seventh Air Force to continue attacks

upon Kwajalein and Wotje, and in actuality a considerable portion of the task of

softening Japanese resistance upon Kwajalein was left to the larger carrier force

that would arrive in the area on 29 January just ahead of the landing forces.

Approach of the Invasion Force

By 20 January 1944 all preparations in

the Hawaiian Islands for the invasion of

the Marshalls were completed. Although

it was to be surpassed in size later, the

combined ground, air, and naval force

that was ready to sail for the Marshalls at

that time comprised the largest expedition

ever assembled in the Pacific under the

American flag. About half of the expedition had originated in the Hawaiian

Islands, but its other elements had moved

there from points as widely separated as

San Diego on the west coast, the Fiji

Islands, the Samoan Islands, and the Ellice

Islands.

Plans called for the neutralization phase

to be followed by simultaneous assaults on

Majuro, northern Kwajalein, and southern Kwajalein. After the month of intensive bombing and strafing raids by the

Seventh Air Force against airfields and

shipping, Mille and Jaluit were almost

useless to the enemy. Wotje and the great

base at Maloelap were largely neutralized,

but there were numerous Japanese aircraft

at Roi-Namur at the time of the carrier

strike on 29 January. Task Force 58—with

its four separate groups of carriers, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers and its 700

carrier-based planes—was to enter the

Marshalls area on 29 January, two days

before D Day, to complete the neutralization.49

All of the task groups sailed from the

Hawaiian Islands within a few hours of

49

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Feb 44,

Annex A, pp. 10, 11.
TRAINING, LOGISTICS, AND PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS 203

their scheduled times of departure. For the

assault troops the day of departure was 22

January. The Southern Attack Force departed from Pearl Harbor and Honolulu,

while the Northern Attack Force sailed on

the same day from Lahaina Roadstead in

the outer islands after a thirty-hour break

in their journey from San Diego. The

southern force moved about thirty-five

miles ahead of the northern group. Embarkation had taken most of the preceding

day, and the slower-moving LST groups

carrying the amphtracks and a detachment of the 1st Marine Defense Battalion

for the defense of Majuro had cast off and

departed while the main convoy was being

prepared. The Attack Force Reserve and

the Majuro Attack Group left together on

23 January. The reserve force was to go to

no specified destination other than the

general vicinity of the three landings,

any one of which might require reinforcement.50

The American submarines that had

been operating throughout the Marshalls

area for the past month now took stations

to the west. Three patrolled near Truk,

one near Ponape, one near Kusaie, and

one near Eniwetok.51

The week's voyage to the area of the

eastern Marshalls was made by all the

groups without mishap. At dawn on 29

January the four task groups of Task Force

58 and the Neutralization Group (Task

Group 50.15) moved into the first attack

positions assigned to them. Despite squally

weather and overcast skies, which severely

handicapped action, Rear Adm. John W.

Reeves of Task Group 58.1 launched aircraft from Enterprise, Yorktown, and Belleau

Wood. A few moments later the planes were

attacking Taroa, giving special attention

to the airfields and shipping. Air strikes

were continued all day, and by nightfall

Taroa's airfield, which had still been considered able to put up interceptors, was

completely neutralized. The second task

group (Task Group 58.2) of Task Force 58,

under Admiral Montgomery, had meanwhile attacked Roi-Namur. Planes from

Essex, Intrepid, and Cabot bucked northeasterly winds to bomb and strafe once

more the important airfield at that base.

Ninety-two enemy planes were based on

Roi airfield when the attack developed.

Command of the air was seized by American planes at the outset and after 0800 no

enemy planes was seen airborne over RoiNamur. Numerous hits were made on runways, hangars, fuel dumps, and gun

positions.

The third group (Task Group 58.3) of

Task Force 58 had sortied from Funafuti

under the command of Admiral Frederick

Sherman. An hour before sunrise the

group took position southwest of Kwajalein Island and planes of Cowpens, Monterey,

and Bunker Hill took off for the target. The

airfield and adjacent buildings on Kwajalein Island were bombed on the first strike.

During the rest of the day the remainder

of Kwajalein Island was subjected to strafing and bombing. During the evening

Admiral Sherman's group moved northwestward toward Eniwetok to be in position to launch an attack at dawn of D

minus 1. The fourth task group (Task

Group 58.4), under Rear Adm. Samuel P.

Ginder, included the carriers Saratoga,

Princeton, and Langley. It sent a succession

of flights against Wotje, beginning early in

the day and met very little serious opposition.52

 In addition to the attack, Wotje was

subjected to fire by units of Task Group

50.15.

While the carriers were still operating

in the vicinity of the targets, land-based

50

 Ibid., Annex A, p. 21. 51

 Ibid., p. 17. 52

 Ibid., pp. 10-15.
204 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

ROI AIRFIELD. The causeway connecting Roi and Namur is shown in upper left. Note

height of smoke columns as indicated by ground shadows.

planes from the Gilberts joined in the general attack. At Kwajalein one flight of

seven B-24's dropped fifteen tons of bombs

on Roi-Namur and three more tons on

Kwajalein Island during the morning and

early afternoon. As the carrier planes retired at dusk another seven heavy bombers

arrived for a night attack, dropping twenty

tons of bombs on Kwajalein Island.53

At Wotje, flying through heavy overcast, one flight of three B-24's dropped

seven tons of bombs, causing fires and

damaging the runways. A few hours later

a flight of nine B-25's dropped three tons

of bombs on the island in a low-level attack and strafed and sank a small cargo

vessel in the lagoon. During this late attack carrier planes from the task force mistakenly intercepted the B-25's and shot

down two before it was realized they were

American planes.

Maloelap, Jaluit, and Mille also received land-based attacks during the day.

At Taroa, two and a half tons of bombs

were dropped by B-25's, which then joined

carrier planes in strafing the island. At

Jaluit, attack bombers and fighters

dropped seven tons of bombs and afterwards strafed the island. Mille was covered

all day by twenty fighters, flying in flights

of four. Planes that had been scheduled to

strike these targets but that were unable

to get through because of weather or mechanical difficulty flew over Mille on the

53

 Operational History of Seventh Air Force, 6 Nov

43-31 Jul 44, pp. 121, 122.
TRAINING, LOGISTICS, AND PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS 205

way back to American bases in the Gilberts and dropped their bomb loads on the

islands of that atoll.

The air strikes from the various task

groups were supplemented by naval bombardment from battleships, cruisers, and

destroyers in the carrier groups. In the

cases of Wotje and Maloelap the Neutralization Group moved in when the faster

ships had finished their day's work late on

the afternoon of 29 January.

While the initial strikes of this day were

going forward, Task Forces 52 and 53, conveying the two landing forces, were about

to enter the waters between the two chains

of atolls. Approaching from the northeast,

their gradually converging courses finally

met north of Ailuk Atoll in the eastern

chain, approximately 200 miles east of

Kwajalein. The tractor groups were still

ahead although their lead was being

steadily reduced. In another twenty-four

hours it disappeared.

On the morning of 30 January the destroyers and cruisers accompanying the

landing forces turned aside to bombard

Maloelap and Wotje, joining the other

forces already there. During the afternoon

the vessels resumed their journey to Kwajalein, joining the main convoys there in

time for the bombardment preparatory to

the landings of the two assault groups. On

30 January the strikes of carrier-based aircraft continued at Kwajalein, Wotje,

Taroa, and Roi-Namur, but with some adjustment in forces to allow one task group

to take Eniwetok under attack. This task

group, which on the previous day had

struck Kwajalein Island, had now moved

northwestward toward the new target. Its

place was taken by Task Group 58.1,

which had previously been engaged at

Taroa. Task Group 58.4, which had previously been concerned only with Wotje,

now assumed responsibility for continued

neutralization of Taroa as well. Task

Group 58.2 continued to be primarily concerned with Roi-Namur.

The group attacking Wotje and Taroa

concentrated upon runways at Taroa and

airfield installations and buildings at

Wotje. At Kwajalein Island and RoiNamur over 400 sorties were flown. During the afternoon surface ships of the force

conducted a four-hour bombardment of

both targets. Task Group 58.3 launched

its planes for the attack on Eniwetok at

0450. Torpedo bombers, which made the

first sweep over the atoll, and later fighters

found and destroyed nineteen planes on

the ground. In subsequent action virtually

every building in the atoll was destroyed,

the runways were filled with craters, and

various defensive positions were taken under gunfire from the surface ships. Task

Group 58.3 was to remain south of Eniwetok until 6 February and was to be joined

there by Task Group 58.4, which would

move from the Wotje-Maloelap area on 3

February.

While the second day's bombardment

was being carried out, the Northern and

Southern Attack Forces remained on

course together for approximately half the

distance between Ailuk and Kwajalein,

then separated, each going directly to its

own transport and fire support area off

Kwajalein. All elements arrived in their

assigned places during the night of 30-31

January. Lights could be seen on Kwajalein Island by troops aboard the ships of

the Southern Task Force as the vessels

neared the end of their journey. These

lights were presumably from fires started

by the air strikes of the day just passed.

Before the sun rose on the new day, the

first phase of the occupation of Kwajalein

Island was to begin.
CHAPTER XIII

Japanese Defenses in

the Marshalls

Before Pearl Harbor

Under the terms of Article 22 of the

Covenant of the League of Nations, Japan

was bound to prevent "the establishment

of fortifications of military and naval

bases" in the former German possessions in

the Pacific mandated to her—the Marianas, Palaus, Carolines, and Marshalls.

The neutralization of other Japanese-held

islands was guaranteed by the Washington Naval Limitations Treaty of 1922,

signed by the United States and Japan, as

well as by the British Empire, France, and

Italy.1 On 27 March 1933, Japan gave the

required two years' notice of her intention

to withdraw from the League, and the official withdrawal was consummated on 27

March two years later. This action, being

unilateral, did not relieve Japan of her obligation not to fortify the mandated islands

under the terms of the Covenant.2 However, the League was powerless to enforce

the Covenant and after 1935 the islands

were for the most part closed to foreign visitors. From 1935 until 1944 the nature and

extent of Japanese activities in the mandated islands remained veiled in mystery.

One inevitable result of this policy of exclusion, coupled with the known aggressive

intentions of the Japanese Empire on the

Asiatic mainland, was in the late 1930's to

raise grave suspicions among the Western

powers that Japan was fortifying the islands

contrary to her commitments stipulated

under the terms of the League Covenant.

One Australian commentator put it, "It is

believed that Japan has assembled, in these

islands, equipment and supplies which

would be of great value to her in any policy

of aggression."3 Evidence brought to light

since the close of World War II amply

justifies the suspicion.

From 1934 through 1941 the Japanese

undertook considerable construction activity in their island possessions, allegedly for

nonmilitary purposes. According to the

testimony of Capt. Hidemi Yoshida, IJN,

who was intimately connected with naval

construction in the mandates, this program

was aimed primarily at the building of

"cultural and industrial facilities."4 Under

the category of "cultural and industrial

facilities" were listed such items as ramps

and runways for aircraft, wireless stations,

direction finders, meteorological stations,

and lighthouses. These improvements,

Yoshida claimed, were necessary for safe

navigation, promotion of commerce, and

other peaceful pursuits.

1

 Myers, Handbook of the League of Nations, p. 378;

IPS Document 6257, p. 13. 2

 IMTFE Proceedings, pp. 39, 43, 205-16, 408-15. 3

 Robson, Year Book, p. 94. 4

 IMTFE Defense Document 1518, pp. 4-5.
JAPANESE DEFENSES IN THE MARSHALLS 207

Unquestionably many of these installations could be employed for commercial

purposes. It is equally true that their nature was such as to permit an easy conversion to military uses, if the situation so

demanded. It also appears certain that the

Japanese made a deliberate effort to disguise military construction projects in the

cloak of harmless peaceful endeavors. For

example, in 1940 the Naval Secretariat

set aside the sum of 4,635,750 yen

($1,086,619.80) for lighthouse construction

throughout the Palaus, Carolines, and

Marshalls. Among the items authorized for

these "lighthouses" were military barracks,

generators, ammunition storage buildings,

command posts, lookout stations, roads,

and water storage facilities. No mention

was made of towers, searchlights, bells, foghorns, or the other paraphernalia usually

associated with such aids to navigation.5

Whatever the extent of Japanese military construction in the Pacific islands was

before 1940, it is clear that from that year

until the outbreak of war with the Allied

Powers in December 1941 the mandated

islands were being fortified as rapidly as

conditions would permit.

Late in 1939 the 4th Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy was organized and

charged with the mission of protecting the

mandated area. With headquarters at

Truk, the 4th Fleet's area of command

roughly coincided with the area mandated

to Japan. After the commencement of hostilities Wake, Guam, the Gilberts, Nauru

and Ocean Islands were added. This

"fleet" had only a few combat vessels under

its command, its primary duties being to

build up and defend air and naval bases in

Japan's island possessions. Throughout

1940 the 4th Fleet existed mostly on paper,

and did not really start to grow until the

end of the year.

About the same time that the 4th Fleet

was being activated, the Imperial Navy

sent a large team to survey the Marshalls

with the object of laying plans for a fairly

large-scale construction program. Up until

late 1939 far more attention had been devoted to the Carolines and Marianas than

to the more distant Marshalls. Now, improvements in warships and naval weapons, and especially the advent of heavy

land-based bombers, forced the Japanese

to re-evaluate the importance of the Marshalls and to concentrate more heavily on

their defense.6

In January 1941, the 6th Base Force was

activated as a subordinate command and

assigned to the Marshalls, where it remained to command the Marshalls sector

until destroyed by the American invasion

of Kwajalein. At the same time, a subordinate unit, the 6th Defense Force, was also

activated and arrived in the Marshalls in

March.7 Finally, in September 1941, three

guard forces (the 51st, 52d and 53d) were

activated and ordered to the Marshalls

where they were made directly responsible

to the 6th Base Force for the defense of

Jaluit, Maloelap, and Wotje.8 Similar units

were dispatched to the other mandates at

the same time.

Concurrently with this movement of

troops and workers into the Marshalls, airfield construction in the area was accelerated. Early in 1941 the 4th Fleet assumed

control of all unfinished aircraft installa5

 Special Forces, Early Series, Vol. 9, NA 12226,

WDC 160867. 6

 USSBS (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division, The Reduction of Truk (Washington, 1947), p. 2; Japanese

Studies in World War II, No. 173, Marshall Islands

Operations, pp. 5-6, OCMH. 7

 Base Forces, Early Series, Vol. 9, NA 12245, WDC

160869. 8

 Base Forces, Early Series, Vol. 10, NA 12229,

WDC 160867; Special Forces, Early Series, Vol. 10,

NA 12255, WDC 161009.
208 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

tions and also commenced many new projects. Most of the money appropriated for

the defense of the mandated islands was

allocated to the building of airfields and

other aircraft facilities. During the period

16 November 1940 to 31 May 1941, a total

of 49,526,396 yen ($11,608,987.22) was

appropriated for airfield and seaplane base

construction and this figure represented

about 70 percent of the total sum appropriated for the erection of defenses in the

islands.

Work on other types of installations was

also commenced and in most cases completed before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Communications installations were concentrated on the four islands or atolls

where four base force headquarters were

located—Truk, Saipan, Palau, and Kwajalein. Barracks were placed on the most

important islands and atolls, while office

construction was concentrated mostly at

Truk, with lesser concentrations at Saipan

and Palau. Saipan and Palau were supply

centers and staging points for the advance

into the Philippines and into the south

after the start of the war. Fuel oil and coal

storage facilities, including tanks and

pumps, were highly important since they

extended the effective range of the Japanese fleet beyond the main bases in the

homeland. Such facilities had been located

at Saipan, Truk, Palau, Ponape, and Jaluit

according to earlier appropriations. Later

construction projects activated near the

close of 1941 under 4th Fleet administration

included fueling facilities at Wotje, Taroa,

Roi, Eniwetok, and Kwajalein, all in the

Marshalls. Submarine bases were established at Truk, Ponape, and Roi. Gun positions were placed on Palau, Saipan, Taroa,

Roi, Wotje, and Jaluit in the latter part of

1941. As was the case in fueling facilities,

the Marshalls were developed as military

bases later than the Marianas and Carolines. First, priority went to Truk, Saipan,

and Palau, with concurrent but less important developments of Ponape, Pagan, and

Tinian. Later, priority was given to four

atolls in the Marshalls—Jaluit, Wotje,

Maloelap, and Kwajalein—with minor

attention to Majuro and Eniwetok. Water

installations, command posts, ammunition

storage facilities, and minor fortifications

were ubiquitous.9

Prewar Japanese records of garrison

forces stationed in the Marshalls leave no

doubt that extensive military developments

were undertaken before Pearl Harbor. The

6th Base Force, which was assigned the mission of defending these islands, reached

Wotje early in 1941. It was transferred the

following August to Kwajalein, which then

became the administrative center of the

Marshalls sector of the 4th Fleet's area of

responsibility. The main troop concentrations under the 6th Base Force coincided

with the concentration of construction

projects on the four atolls of Kwajalein,

Wotje, Jaluit, and Maloelap. Mille, which

was to be extensively developed during the

war, was at this time merely a lookout station. The mission of the 6th Base Force was

to defend the Marshall Islands and adjacent sea areas, plan the rapid completion

of accelerated military preparations within

the area and strengthen preparations for

actual combat, plan and supervise all types

of measures relating to defense and attack

and for supply and transportation service,

engage in all types of combat training, and

conduct weather observation in the Marshalls area.10

9

 4th Fleet Construction File, Special Forces, Early

Series, Vols. 9 and 10, NA 12226 and 12255, WDC

160867 and 161009. 10

 Base Forces, Early Series, Vol. 10, NA 12229,

WDC 160867.
JAPANESE DEFENSES IN THE MARSHALLS 209

The 6th Defense Force, which reached the

Marshalls in March 1941, included four

gun batteries distributed, one battery

apiece, to Wotje, Kwajalein, Maloelap,

and Jaluit. Its mission was to construct

gun positions and other defense installations on each of these islands; supply ships,

special lookout stations, and weather stations; send out antiair and antisubmarine

patrols; and conduct accelerated training

for all types of warfare.11

Still another group assigned to the Marshalls was the 6th Communications Unit,

whose prewar missions were to maintain

communications and liaison in the Marshalls area, with fleet units, and with the

homeland, and to intercept foreign communications.12

 Finally, the 51st, 52d, and

53d Guard Forces arrived at Jaluit, Maloelap, and Wotje in October and November

1941 with the general duties of defense of

those atolls.13

Thus it can be seen that, in the year or

more preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Marshalls along with the other

mandated islands were becoming rapidly

integrated into the Japanese defensive system. Contrary to the Covenant of the

League of Nations and to the treaty of

Washington, Japan had fortified those

islands, established air bases there for military purposes, and garrisoned them with

armed troops. With the outbreak of actual

hostilities this program was to be rapidly

accelerated.

From Pearl Harbor to the Eve of

Invasion of the Marshalls

The period from the beginning of the

war to the middle of 1943 saw considerable expansion of the 6th Base Force. Wake,

after its seizure, was placed under 6th Base

Force command and extensively developed.

Early in 1942 Makin was made a seaplane

base and, after Carlson's raid, the Gilberts

with Nauru and Ocean were strongly garrisoned by forces under 6th Base Force command. During this eighteen-month period,

Mille was transformed from a lookout station to a major base, while installations

and fortifications on Kwajalein, Jaluit,

Maloelap, and Wotje were constantly improved. In June of 1943 the 66th Guard

Force was activated at Yokosuka and assigned to Mille.14

 Originally, the Japanese

had intended to use this atoll as a staging

point for aircraft in a proposed campaign

against the Ellice, Fiji, and Samoan Islands, a plan abandoned after the American invasion of the Gilberts.15

 Some air

facilities were completed by November

1942, but the atoll was not fully developed

until a year later. By that time Mille was

one of the best defended atolls and had the

largest garrison in the Marshalls if Kwajalein and Roi-Namur are counted separately.

The latter half of 1943 was distinguished by a marked increase in the number of troops, especially Army personnel,

dispatched to the Marshalls. Up to that

time the Marshalls had been garrisoned

exclusively by Navy units, but in early

1943 it had become apparent to the Japanese that they were faced with a series of

probable defeats so long as their forces

continued to be tied up in the SolomonsNew Guinea area. The deterioration of the

11

 Base Forces, Early Series, Vol. 9, NA 12245,

WDC 160869; Special Forces, Early Series, Vol. 10,

NA 12255, WDC 161009. 12

 Special Forces, Early Series, Vols. 9 and 10, NA

12226 and 12255, WDC 160867 and 161009. 13

 Base Forces, Early Series, Vol. 10, NA 12229,

WDC 160867. 14

 Tabular Records of Special Landing Forces, NA

11651, WDC 161406. 15

 USSBS, The American Campaign Against Wotje,

Maloelap, Mille and Jaluit, p. 18.
210 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Japanese position in the southeast posed a

threat to the island garrisons of the Central

Pacific, which were considered too weak to

ward off American attack. The Japanese

responded by drawing Army units from

the Philippines, Manchuria, and the homeland and dispatching them to the Central

Pacific.16

By the end of August 1943 the Japanese

position in the Southeastern Pacific Area

was such that all thought of offensive operations had to be abandoned. The surrender of Italy on 8 September was a

further blow to the Japanese Empire, for

it was felt that a powerful portion of the

British fleet would be freed to bring pressure on the Indian Ocean front. Until this

time, the Japanese defense perimeter had

run through the Marshalls, Gilberts, the

Southeastern Pacific Area, the Netherlands Indies, and Burma. Now the Solomons and New Guinea were cracking, exposing the Gilberts and Marshalls to the

ever-increasing danger of American attack. Hence, the old defensive perimeter

had to be abandoned and a new one

erected in its place. On 15 September Imperial General Headquarters decided to

contract the perimeter to a line running

from the Banda Sea through the Carolines

and Marianas. The new line was to be

made impregnable to American assault

during the time gained by delaying actions

in the Marshalls and Gilberts, and in the

Japanese Southeastern Pacific Area. Thus,

these areas were written off as a loss as

early as September, but the Japanese were

determined to make the American advance toward their new perimeter as costly

as possible in order to gain time and wear

down the American will to fight. It was in

accordance with this strategic concept of

fighting a delaying action in the Marshalls

that Imperial General Headquarters decided to send large numbers of Army reinforcements there in September 1943.17

Army units in Japan, the Philippines,

and Manchuria were reorganized as amphibious brigades and South Seas detachments, and dispatched to the Central Pacific as fast as possible.18

 Even though the

Marshalls had been written off as indefensible from the long-range point of view,

they received a considerable share of the

Army reinforcements because of the Japanese intention to conduct strong delaying

actions there. The troops were distributed

mostly on the periphery—on the atolls and

islands of Wake, Eniwetok, Kusaie, and

Mille. Kwajalein, Jaluit, Maloelap, and

Wotje already had sizable garrisons, while

those on the peripheral islands, except

Wake, had been previously quite small.

By January of 1944 Army troops in the

Marshalls, Wake, and Kusaie totaled

13,721. The units involved were the 1st

South Seas Detachment; the 1st Amphibious

Brigade, A Detachment; the 2d South Seas Detachment; and the 3d South Seas Garrison Detachment. They were distributed among the

islands and atolls as follows: Kwajalein,

933; Jaluit, 620; Maloelap, 404; Wotje,

667; Mille, 2,530; Eniwetok, 2,586; Wake,

2,050; and Kusaie, 3,931.19

16

 Japanese Studies in World War II, No. 72, History of the Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters, 1941-45, p. 77, OCMH. 17

 Ibid., pp. 87-88; Japanese Studies in World War

II, No. 55, Operations in the Central Pacific, pp. 8-9,

and No. 50, Southeast Area Naval Operations, Vol.

III, pp. 1-5, OCMH. The Japanese Southeastern Pacific Area conformed roughly to the American Southwest Pacific Area. 18

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Translation 9499A, Order of Battle for Palau Sector, Marshalls, Marcus,

Wake and Kusaie. 19

 JICPOA Translation 6234, Distribution of Forces

and Dispositions of the 1st South Seas Detachment;

JICPOA Bull 88-44, 1st Amphibious Brigade, Japanese

Army, 13 Jun 44; JICPOA Bull 89-44, Japanese Defense of Eniwetok Atoll, 12 Jun 44; CINCPACCINCPOA Translation 9614, Summary of the Re-
JAPANESE DEFENSES IN THE MARSHALLS 211

mounting losses from the homeland and

other parts of the Empire. As of January

1944 their air installations in the area included, in the Kwajalein Atoll, an incompleted land base on Kwajalein Island, a

land base on Roi, and a seaplane base on

Burton; elsewhere in the Marshalls, land

bases on Maloelap, Wotje, Mille, and Eniwetok, and seaplane bases on Jaluit,

Wotje, Majuro, Taongi, and Utirik.24

During the month of November 1943

the Japanese lost about 71 planes in the

Marshalls, chiefly as a result of carrier and

land-based strikes incident to the American invasion of the Gilberts. Nevertheless,

they were able to balance almost all of

these losses with reinforcements flown from

the homeland and from the 3d Fleet at

Truk.25 The planes from Truk, 32 in number, represented virtually all the remaining

carrier air, and most of these fell victim to

American attack by the end of November.

By 25 January 1944, Roi had about 35

planes; Kwajalein Island, about 10 reconnaissance planes; Maloelap, 50 planes;

Wotje, 9; and Eniwetok, 15.26 As American aerial attacks on the Marshalls were

stepped up in December and January,

Japanese air strength dwindled rapidly.

organization of the Third, Fifth, and Thirteenth Divisions, the Independent Mixed Brigades, the Amphibious Brigades, and the South Seas Detachments, and

of the 250th Return Demobilization, War Ministry

Order, 16 Nov 43; CINCPAC-CINCPOA Translation

9499A; CINCPAC-CINCPOA Translation 9536, Excerpts Taken from the 31st Army Monthly Reports for

March and April 1944, dated 30 Apr 44; JICPOA

Translation 5545, Inner South Seas Force Secret Opr

Order 26-43.

20

 See Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, Ch.

XV, and passim. 21

 Military Intelligence Division, War Department,

Order of Battle of the Japanese Armed Forces (Washington, 1945), p. 116. 22

 JICPOA Bull 88-44, 1st Amphibious Brigade Japanese Army, 13 Jun 44, p. 1. 23

 JICPOA Translation 7224, Extracts from the

Diary of Kinichi Ijiya, entry of 25 Jan 44. 24

 JICPOA Air Target Folders 50A (1 Dec 43), 53A

(15 Dec 43), 58A (20 Dec 43), 3A (20 Jan 44);

JICPOA Bull 46-44, Base Installations Roi, Namur

and Ennubirr Islands, Kwajalein Atoll, 15 Apr 44:

CINCPAC-CINCPOA Translation 9138, Naval Air

Headquarters: Digest of Japanese Naval Air Bases,

Sep 43. 25

 4th Fleet War Diary, NA 11398, WDC 160336. 26

 USSBS, The Campaigns of the Pacific War, pp.

201-02.
212 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Mille, Jaluit, and Wotje ceased to be effective as air bases. Wotje had from 30 to

35 planes in November, but this force was

almost completely destroyed by two American carrier strikes. By 29 January there

were only twelve "Kates" on Wotje; that

day six failed to return from a mission and

the rest were evacuated to Roi. The Japanese managed to keep the air strength at

Maloelap at 50 planes throughout November and into December, but by January

only 13 fighters were operational; 40 had

been damaged and grounded. On 29 January, the American carrier raid reported

the destruction of 10 planes in the air, and

all that were on the ground. By 1 February,

the only remaining Japanese planes in the

Marshalls proper were the few on Eniwetok.27

 Thus, by the time of the American

invasion, the enemy's power to resist by

aerial attack had wasted away to almost

nothing. Complete mastery of the air, so

essential to success in amphibious operations, had been assured to the attackers.

The Defenses of Kwajalein Atoll,

January 1944

Kwajalein Atoll had been the hub of

Japanese military activity in the Marshalls

since August 1941. As headquarters of the

6th Base Force, it was the nerve center of the

surrounding bases. Reinforcements coming into the Marshalls almost invariably

passed through Kwajalein, to be parceled

out from there. Supplies were usually distributed from this atoll, which was the

closest major base to Truk and to the supply lines from the homeland. Branches of

various departments of the 4th Fleet were

located there to supervise supply, transportation, and the more technical aspects

of construction. Kwajalein was the center

of communications not only for all other

bases in the Marshalls, but for the Gilberts, Nauru, and Ocean as well. The air

base on Roi commanded all Japanese air

forces in the Marshalls and Gilberts. All

this gave Kwajalein some of the characteristics of a rear area, with more red tape

than bullets, far from the front-line outposts on the periphery of the Marshalls. As

a matter of fact, an American amphibious

landing on Kwajalein was discounted by

most Japanese as only a remote possibility,

and it was fortified accordingly. As one

Japanese naval commander put it, speaking of the Japanese estimate of American

intentions after the Gilberts campaign:

"There was divided opinion as to whether

you would land at Jaluit or Mille. Some

thought you would land on Wotje but

there were few who thought you would go

right to the heart of the Marshalls and

take Kwajalein."28

Japanese island defense doctrine in the

campaigns in the Gilberts and Marshalls

stressed defense at the beaches. Every attempt was to be made to annihilate the

enemy before he could get ashore, and if

he did reach the beaches, the defenders

were to counterattack before he could consolidate his positions. Since it was assumed

that the enemy might be destroyed at the

beaches, the island defenses were strung in

a thin line along the shores, with little or

no defense in depth. This doctrine was the

product of the offensive character of Japanese military thought in general, and also

was influenced by the geography of coral

atolls, which were composed chiefly of

thin flat islands surrounding a lagoon.

Most of the islands had very little depth

to defend, and the occasional wider islands

27

 USSBS, The American Campaign Against Wotje,

Maloelap, Mille and Jaluit, pp. 35-36. 28

 USSBS, Naval Analysis Division, Interrogations of

Japanese Officials (Washington, 1946), Vol. I, Interrogation of Comdr Chikataka Nakajima, IJN, pp.

143-44.
JAPANESE DEFENSES IN THE MARSHALLS 213

or wider sections of islands were usually

occupied by airstrips. Later, on Iwo Jima,

which was larger than most coral islands,

the American attack encountered prepared defenses in depth. Later still, on

Okinawa, the Japanese abandoned completely the concept of shore defense and retired to prepare defenses some distance

away from the landing beaches. This

change in Japanese island defense doctrine

came about as a result both of experience

and of the recognition of geographic realities.29

 But at the time of the Marshalls invasion, Japanese tactical doctrine still

stressed beach-line defense to the neglect

of defense in depth.30

Originally the plan for defending the

atoll had been based on the assumption

that the attack would come from the sea.

After the experience at Tarawa, the Japanese appear to have changed their minds

about American intentions and shifted

their emphasis from defending the ocean

shores to defending the lagoon beaches of

the islands. Gun positions were set up

along the lagoon, trenches dug, and antitank obstructions erected to prevent or

delay a landing over these beaches.31

The three most heavily defended islands

of the atoll were Roi-Namur, Kwajalein,

and Ebeye (Burton), in that order of

strength.32 Roi-Namur was somewhat better fortified than Kwajalein Island, but

neither approached Tarawa as to the size

and number of weapons or the construction and concentration of positions. These

northern islands contained four 12.7-cm,

twin-mount dual-purpose guns that were

divided into two batteries of two, one located near the northwest corner of Roi and

the other on the northernmost tip of

Namur. (See Map VII.) Four 37-mm. gun

positions were established. One was located on the west shore of Roi near the

southwest tip of the island, another near

the northeastern corner of Roi; the other

two were on the southeastern tip and in

the center of the east coast of Namur.

Nineteen 13.2-mm. single-mount dualpurpose guns were located in strong points

mostly along the ocean shores, from the

east coast of Namur to the west coast of

Roi. Ten 20-mm. antiaircraft guns were

emplaced, most of them along the shore

line and near the airfield taxi circles on

Roi; three were part of the strong point on

the northwest tip of Namur and one was

located on the south shore of that island.

Machine guns were emplaced in concrete

pillboxes, although many of the light machine guns were not permanently emplaced, but shifted from position to position as the battle demanded. The many

rifle pits and fire trenches were located in

the beach areas of both islands. There were

three concrete blockhouses on Roi. One

was located on the southwest tip, one in

the northwest corner, and one in the

northeast corner. Another was in the center of the east shore of Namur. The blockhouses were all located in strong point

areas, housed 13-mm. machine guns, and

were probably used as command posts.

The reefs off Roi-Namur were not

mined, and very few antipersonnel mines

29

 War Department Technical Manual E 30-480,

Handbook on Japanese Military Forces, 1 Jun 45, Ch.

VII, Part III, pp. 64-68; Roy E. Appleman, James

M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens, Okinawa: The Last Battle, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1948), Ch. IV. 30

 JICPOA Bull 48-44, Japanese Defenses, Kwajalein Atoll, 10 Apr 44, p. 1. 31

 War Department Mission, Marshall Islands, Japanese Defenses and Battle Damage, 14 Mar 44, p. 10;

Japanese Studies in World War II, No. 73, Marshall

Islands Operations, pp. 34-36, OCMH. 32

 The following detailed description of enemy defenses on Kwajalein Atoll is derived, unless otherwise

indicated, from JICPOA Bull 48-44, Japanese Defenses, Kwajalein Atoll, 10 Apr 44.
214 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

were encountered inland. Wire entanglements were found at two points—on the

beach around the northeast taxi circle on

Roi, and on the narrow bit of land connecting Roi with Namur. The beach

around the northeast taxi circle also

boasted a tank obstacle in the form of large

rocks jutting out of a rock wall. Antitank

ditches had been dug throughout the two

islands.

The defenses of Roi-Namur were quite

clearly organized around a series of seven

strong points, four on Roi and three on

Namur, all on the ocean side. Starting

from the southwest tip of Roi, the first was

located along the southern shore of the

west coast. The second and third were to

the south and north of the northwest taxi

circle. The fourth was on both sides of the

wire and stone barriers next to the northeast taxi circle. The fifth, sixth, and seventh were on the northwest, north, and east

tips of Namur, respectively. From the

lagoon side the approaches were covered

mostly by nothing heavier than 7.7-mm.

machine guns.33

Kwajalein Island was less well fortified.

A study of enemy defenses, made there by

the engineering officer of V Amphibious

Corps after the operation was concluded,

stated, "The prepared defenses of this island were surprisingly weak. . . ."34

On Kwajalein, four 12.7-cm, dual-purpose twin-mount guns were divided into

batteries of two, one located at each end

of the island. (Map V) Each battery was

protected by 7.7-mm. and 13-mm. machine guns along the nearby beaches. Near

each gun were two 150-cm. searchlights.

In addition, the northern end of the island

was guarded by a twin-mount dual-purpose 13-mm. machine gun on the lagoon

shore. Several 7.7-mm. machine guns were

in position on the western end and other

heavy machine guns were scattered about

the center of the island, some mounted on

wooden sleds for easy movement to critical

points.

On the ocean shore were six 8-cm. dualpurpose guns, divided into two batteries of

three guns each. One battery was east of

the tank ditch and the other was opposite

the center of the airfield. The first had a

360-degree traverse and could fire either

to seaward or landward. The other formed

the nucleus of a strong point composed of

a semicircle of rifle pits facing the beach

supported by one heavy and one 13-mm.

machine gun, and also included an observation tower, a range finder, and a 110-cm.

searchlight.

Two other 8-cm. guns were in position

on the lagoon shore, and the blockhouse

on the main pier (Nob Pier), which jutted

out into the lagoon near the northern tip of

the island, had a 13-mm. dual-purpose

gun on its roof and firing ports on the

ground floor allowing machine guns to fire

in all directions.

Other sheltered positions included about

forty reinforced concrete pillboxes on the

beaches of the ocean shore and at the

northern and western ends of the island,

and about twelve U-shaped standing pits.

Fire trenches encircled the island, just inland from the beach. At intervals along

the ocean shore were squad positions with

ten to fifteen rifle pits each. These were

usually arranged in a semicircle facing the

beach and were camouflaged with grass.

There was a concrete sea wall along

most of the ocean shore and around the

northern and western ends of the island.

The section at the northern end had posts

set into it, probably to act as a tank barricade. East of the area cleared for the air33

 See JICPOA Bull 48-44, Map 4. 34

 Ltr Rpt, Kwajalein Atoll, Study and Report of

Japanese Defenses by Engineers, V Phib Corps, 15

Feb 44, p. 1.
JAPANESE DEFENSES IN THE MARSHALLS 215

TABLE 2—JAPANESE STRENGTH IN SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN ATOLL ON D DAY

a

 Unknown.

Source: JICPOA Bull 88-44, 1st Amphibious Brigade, Japanese Army, 13 Jun 44; JICPOA Bull 89-44, Japanese Defense of Eniwetok

Atoll, 12 Jun 44; CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bull 11-45, Japanese Naval Ground Forces, 15 Jan 45; JICPOA Translation 3998, 6th Base Force

Secret Directive 104-43; Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. III, pp. 54-55; JICPOA Translation 7354, Personnel Figures of the Fourth Construction Unit; JICPOA Preliminary POW Interrogation Reports 42, Interrogation of Shoan Gishifu, 43, Interrogation of Toshio Nabata,

S1c, 952d Air Group, 48, Interrogation of Katsuhide Okueno, Superior Seaman, Kwajalein SS Base.

field was a tank ditch extending halfway

across the island, and three smaller tank

ditches ran between the ocean shore and

the road in the vicinity of the airfield. The

lagoon shore was protected by a two-strand

barbed-wire fence at the water's edge. The

large tank ditch was supported by trenches,

rifle pits, and machine guns.

The fortifications on Burton were much

lighter than those on Kwajalein, mostly

machine gun positions and rifle pits. (See

Map 14.) These were organized at the

beaches with a concentration of dual-purpose machine guns grouped around the

seaplane base in the lagoon. At the base

of the south seaplane ramp was a 20-mm.

antiaircraft machine gun. Near it, and

between the two seaplane ramps, were two

13-mm. single-mount machine guns, three

7.7-mm. machine guns, and a concrete pillbox. Two 8-cm. dual-purpose guns were

located on the ocean shore. The large

number of empty machine gun emplacements would seem to indicate that the

defenses of the island had not been completed at the time of the invasion. The few

pillboxes found in the vicinity of the seaplane base were small, reinforced concrete

shelters, each with two firing ports facing

seaward. Most of the fire trenches and rifle

pits were on the ocean side at the center of

the island and at the north and south ends

of the island.

The total number of Japanese on Kwajalein, Burton, and other islands in the southern part of the atoll on D Day came to

about 5,000 men. (Table 2)

The Army troops on Kwajalein consisted of the Kwajalein and part of the

Wotje detachment of the 1st Amphibious

Brigade. The Kwajalein detachment, under

a Capt. Kenzo Tsuyuki, numbered 204

men and consisted of one rifle company

and one mortar platoon. The 729 men of

the Wotje detachment had arrived on

Kwajalein about 10 January 1944 and
216 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

were awaiting transportation to their assigned location when the invasion began.

They were commanded by a Col. Tarokichi Aso and comprised the 2d Battalion

(less the 1st and 3d Companies), three signal

squads, and an engineer platoon.35

The 6th Base Force headquarters in January of 1944 included about 80 military personnel and somewhere in the neighborhood

of 200 civilians.36 This unit, the headquarters for all shore and surface forces in

the Marshalls, was commanded by Rear

Adm. Monzo Akiyama, IJN, who was the

highest-ranking officer in the Kwajalein

garrison at the time of the American assault. Under the 6th Base Force was the 61st

Guard Force, which since before Pearl Harbor had borne the chief responsibility for

defending the atoll. The main body of this

force was stationed in Kwajalein Island

and a detached force was on Roi. The main

body was divided into two small battalions,

four antiaircraft batteries, and six lookout

stations, of which three were on Kwajalein and one each on Bigej (Bennett), Gea

(Carter), and Ennylabegan (Carlos).37 Also

attached to the 6th Base Force was one company of about 250 men from the Yokosuka

4th Special Naval Landing Force, which arrived in Kwajalein in October 1942.38

The labor troops on Kwajalein and adjacent islands were engaged in the construction of the airfield on Kwajalein and

other projects. Fourteen hundred of these

were provided by the 4th Fleet Construction

Department Detachment and were either Koreans or Japanese unfit for ordinary military duties. Their combat effectiveness was

probably close to nil. Another 260 laborers,

from Okinawa, were provided by the

Sankyu Transportation Company, which

was a purely civilian organization. These

were used as stevedores and are not considered combat effectives.

The three remaining military units in

the area were the 952d Air Unit, the 6th

Communications Unit, and the 6th Submarine

Base Force. The air unit, consisting of about

160 men, was stationed on Burton, and

when the invasion began the duty of defending the island fell to that unit. Since

there were only enough rifles for about half

the men and not even one hand grenade

apiece, their combat effectiveness cannot be

regarded as very important. The 6th Communications Unit handled communications

command, code and voice signal, code signal dispatch and reception, and the radio

direction finder equipment on Kwajalein

and Enubuj (Carlson). No information is

available as to the combat potential of this

group of 350 men, but it was probably

slight.39 The 6th Submarine Base Force, consisting of about a hundred electricians,

mechanics, seamen, doctors, corpsmen,

and maintenance men, had some weapons

including thirteen machine guns and sixty

rifles, but the force was established chiefly

for the purpose of providing a rest and

recreational depot for submarine crews

and is not to be regarded as a combat

unit.40

All together, of the enemy personnel in

southern Kwajalein, only about 1,820

could be considered combat effectives at

the time of the invasion. The remainder

can be classified as only partially effective

or not effective at all. (Table 3)

35

 JICPOA Bull 88-44, 1st Amphibious Brigade, Japanese Army, 13 Jun 44, pp. 6-7. 36

 Answers Received by a Representative of Capt.

Samuel Eliot Morison, USNR, from Japanese Naval

Oncers, Tokyo, 1946, MSS on file at Office of Naval

History. 37

 61st Guard Force War Diary, NA 12147. 38

 Special Landing Forces, Early Series, Vol. 8, NA

11647, WDC 160871 (2). 39

 6th Base Force War Diary, NA 12654, WDC

160599; CINCPAC-CINCPOA Special Translation

51, Japanese Land-Based Communications Units,

p. 18. 40

 JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Rpt 48, Interrogation of Katsuhide Okueno.
JAPANESE DEFENSES IN THE MARSHALLS 217

TABLE 3—COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF JAPANESE IN SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN ATOLL

ON D DAY

• Unknown.

Source: See sources for Table 2.

Roi-Namur and the other islands of

northern Kwajalein, although somewhat

more elaborately fortified than the southern islands, had fewer people on hand to

resist the invasion. Actual figures for northern Kwajalein are harder to come by than

those for the southern part of the atoll. A

postbattle count of enemy killed and prisoners taken would indicate that on the

northern islands there were 3,563 enemy,

including Korean laborers.41 No complete

breakdown is available, but Table 4 represents the best possible estimate from

known sources.

The 61st Guard Force Dispatched Force had

been on Roi since before Pearl Harbor and

constituted the main body of combat

troops. It was responsible for operating

most of the weapons on Roi-Namur above

the small arms category. It was probably

under the tactical if not the administrative

control of Headquarters 24th Air Force, and

itself exercised tactical command over all

or part of the 4th Fleet laborers.42

The 24th Air Force headquarters commanded all air units in the Marshalls

except the 952d at Burton, which was controlled by the 6th Base Force.43 This headquarters was commanded by Rear Adm.

Michiyuki Yamada, who was responsible

to 4th Fleet headquarters at Truk and who

was the highest-ranking officer at Roi.44

On 25 January there were two medium

bomber units, one with twelve land-based

planes and one with three, and a fighter

unit of twenty planes under this headquarters command.45

As to the combat effectiveness of these

people, it is difficult to hazard anything

more than a guess since the extent of mili41

 V Phib Corps FLINTLOCK Rpt, Incl D, G-2 Rpt,

p. 12. 42

 61st Guard Force War Diary, NA 12147. 43

 6th Base Force War Diary, NA 12654, WDC

160599. 44

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bull 43-45, Register of

Japanese Naval Officers, Parts I and II, 20 Feb 45;

CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bull 90-45, Command and

Staff List, Japanese Navy, 17 Apr 45. 45

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bull 16-45, Japanese Naval Air Organization, 22 Jan 45.
218 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

TABLE 4—JAPANESE STRENGTH IN NORTHERN KWAJALEIN ATOLL ON D DAY

a

 281st, 275th, and 753d Air Units. b

 Attached Special Landing Force, communications personnel, and naval stragglers. c

 Unknown.

Source: JICPOA Bull 48-44, Japanese Defenses, Kwajalein Atoll, 10 Apr 44, Map 3; Answers Received by a Representative of Capt Samuel

Eliot Morison, USNR, from Japanese Naval Officers, Tokyo, 1946; JICPOA Translation 7354, Personnel Figures of the Fourth Construction

Unit.

tary preparedness of the air force personnel is not known. The best estimate would

be that on Roi-Namur there were 345

combat effectives of the 61st Guard Force

Dispatched Force; 2,150 air force personnel

partially effective as combat troops; 357

4th Fleet laborers, ineffective; and about

700 miscellaneous personnel including marooned sailors whose combat effectiveness

was probably nonexistent.

It would appear, then, that neither RoiNamur nor Kwajalein Island was a formidable island fortress in the category of

Tarawa or, later, of Iwo Jima. The Japanese had skimped on fortifications of this

central atoll in favor of the atolls in the

eastern sector of the Marshalls, which they

considered more likely to be the objects of

attack. By D Day Japanese air power

throughout the entire Marshalls area had

been reduced to ineffectiveness. Manpower in the islands under attack was of

limited military value. On Roi-Namur the

bulk of the enemy consisted of air force

personnel; on Kwajalein a large percentage was labor troops. Even before American naval guns and aircraft and artillery

placed on nearby islands had completed

their bombardment of the main defenses,

the capacity of the Japanese to ward off the

attack was comparatively slight.

The invasion of Kwajalein Atoll was

notable for the innovations in amphibious

techniques and amphibious equipment

used there. To these can be given much of

the credit for the ease with which the operation was completed, in contrast to the

earlier landings at Tarawa. But equally or

more notable was the fact that the strategic

planners for the operation, especially Admiral Nimitz, correctly estimated that this

was a weak spot in the Japanese defense of

the Central Pacific and exploited it accordingly. The decision to bypass the eastern

Marshalls and strike directly at Kwajalein

was fully justified by the comparatively

weak state of enemy defenses there. Hitting

the enemy where he was not was impossible in the Central Pacific, since all the

islands and atolls of any strategic importance were fortified. The only alternative

was to hit him where he was least able to

defend himself, and this was done in the

invasion of Kwajalein Atoll.
CHAPTER XIV

The Invasion of Southern

Kwajalein

The Landings on D Day

Occupation of Carter and Cecil Islands

As the Southern Attack Force approached its transport and fire support

areas located six to ten miles southwest of

Kwajalein, the APD's Overton and Manley

slipped ahead in the early morning of 31

January toward the two channel islets that

were the first points to be seized by the invading troops.1

 (See Map 9.) Carter (Gea)

Island lay about nine miles northwest of

Kwajalein Island. A half mile farther, on

the opposite side of the channel, was Cecil

(Ninni). Each of the two APD's was carrying 155 men organized into a provisional

unit, in part from the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop and in part from Company B, 111th Infantry. Troop A, on Overton, consisted of the headquarters platoon

of the reconnaissance troop plus sixty-one

officers and men of the infantry company,

all under command of Capt. Paul B.

Gritta. In Troop B, transported on Manley

and commanded by 1st Lt. Emmett L.

Tiner, the 1st and 3d Platoons of the reconnaissance troop were supplemented by

ninety-three infantry officers and men.

Both units were attached for the forthcoming operation to the 17th Regimental

Combat Team, under Col. Wayne C.

Zimmerman.2

Troop A was to take Cecil Island and

Troop B, Carter Island. The islets were

tiny, without known defenses, and were assumed to have but small garrisons. Once

the two islands were under control, the

four platoons of the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop were to be reunited and

taken aboard Overton to their next mission,

which was tentatively set as the reconnoitering of Chauncey (Gehh) Island,

about one mile northwest of Cecil. The infantry elements of the two provisional

units would remain as garrison and defense

forces on the channel islands.3

In the darkness of the moonless night,

the islands could not be seen from the

ships. The sea was running high as the

high-speed transports, about 2,600 yards

out, each dispatched one motor launch

and a number of rubber boats filled with

reconnaissance troops followed by the in1

 TF 51, Rpt of Opns for the Capture of the Marshalls (hereafter cited as TF 51 Marshalls Rpt), Incl

C, p. 2. 2

 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, Rpt of Kwajalein Opn, 20 Feb 44 (hereafter cited as 7th Cav

Rcn Tr Rpt), p. 1; 111th Infantry Report After

Action Against Enemy, 3 1 Jan-1 Feb 44, 15 Apr 44

(hereafter cited as 111th Inf AAR). 3

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. II, FO 1, 6 Jan

44, Phase I, pp. 1-2; 7th Cav Rcn Tr Rpt, pp. 1-2.
220 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

fantry carried in Higgins boats.4 The plan

for landing on each island required that

the rubber boats be towed by a launch to

within 800 yards of the shore and then be

paddled to a rendezvous halfway in. There

they were to wait until two men went forward on an electric-powered raft, made a

beach reconnaissance, and set up directional lights marking the best landing spot.

The rest of the men in the rubber boats

were to follow them ashore and, while

establishing a beach defense, guide the

Higgins boats in with red lights. Leaving

the infantry to defend the beach, the two

reconnaissance platoons were first to occupy the side of the island nearest the

channel and then to reconnoiter and make

secure the remainder of the island.

At the outset some delay was encountered in dispatching Troop B from Manley

because of the difficulty in finding Carter

Island. Then the lead boat mistook Cecil

for Carter and by the time this confusion

righted itself it was almost daylight. Hence,

plans for a preliminary beach reconnaissance were abandoned, and the rubber

boats were paddled to shore at the southern end of Carter at 0620. No resistance

was met on the beach. Defenses were set

up and the infantry boats guided in while

a reconnoitering patrol struck through the

fringe of brush at the edge of the beach

and entered the heavy tropical undergrowth beyond.

The patrol returned without discovering

any enemy, and the reconnaissance platoons, with an infantry platoon providing

flank and rear protection, pushed off

toward an observation tower at the northwest corner of the island. The area around

the tower was soon discovered to be unoccupied except for one Japanese soldier,

who was killed. The first reconnaissance

platoon then turned around to comb back

down the island again, concentrating this

time on the ocean side. As the skirmish

line pushed back into the tangle of undergrowth again, it was suddenly taken under

fire from Japanese concealed in a shell

crater and surrounding trees. The platoon

leader, 2d Lt. Claude V. Hornbacher,

ordered a machine gun set up in the

crotch of a tree, and with it in position a

covering fire was laid down on the whole

area. Under protection of this fire, Sgt.

Leonard C. Brink took personal charge of

the situation. In ten or fifteen minutes he

hurled grenade after grenade into the

crater while the machine gun fired over

his head. The Japanese replied in kind.

Finally, after enemy resistance seemed to

have dwindled, Sergeant Brink and other

members of the platoon crawled forward

and jumped into the hole with knives and

bayonets. Within seconds the skirmish was

over and nineteen Japanese soldiers were

dead at the cost of one American wounded.

The island again fell silent. A few more

Japanese were flushed from their hiding

places near the ocean shore, and by 0930

the capture of Carter Island was completed.

Intelligence materials were gathered up

and sent to Admiral Turner's flagship,

Rocky Mount, and at 1000 responsibility for

controlling the island was transferred to

the infantry elements. The southeast side

of the channel was secured.

At the same time that Troop B was seizing Carter, Troop A was engaged in a

parallel mission. At 0430 Troop A started

from Overton toward what was supposed to

be Cecil Island. The craft moved against

a strong current and an offshore wind.

4

 7th Cav Rcn Tr Rpt, p. 2. Unless otherwise indicated, the account of the action on Chauncey, Carter, and Cecil Islands is drawn from this report or

that of the 111th Infantry.
THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN 221

Although the rubber boats were cast loose

too soon and had to be rounded up and

again taken in tow until brought within

paddling distance of the shore, they made

an unopposed landing at 0545, thirty-five

minutes earlier than Troop B's on Carter.

Guide lights were placed and the infantry's

landing craft came in just at daybreak,

while the beachhead defense was being

established.

After a brief reconnaissance during

which four enemy were killed and two

captured, Captain Gritta, commanding

Troop A, came to the conclusion that he

was on the wrong island. He suspected

that his party had been landed at Chauncey, the small island next northwest of

Cecil. This was confirmed by General

Corlett, who at 0810 ordered Troop A to

"forget about Chauncey; proceed on regular mission."5

Leaving a small party of infantrymen to

stand guard over a Japanese tugboat

stranded near the beach, Captain Gritta

embarked the remainder of his troop in

rubber boats and proceeded along the reef

to Cecil. That island was found to be unoccupied and by 1235 was reported secured.6

 The pass into the lagoon could now

be swept in preparation for the entry of

ships to provide fire support for the landings planned the next day.

Back on Chauncey, Capt. Gilbert

Drexel and his men of Company B, 111th

Infantry, kept the stranded tugboat under

surveillance and started to comb the woods

and underbrush thoroughly. An enemy

force estimated at 100, which had escaped

the initial reconnaissance, engaged the infantry near the center of the island.7

 Others

appeared on the tugboat, fired on strafing

planes and on the American detail left to

guard the tugboat, and were in turn taken

under fire by Overton. Under orders to

move to Cecil, the company broke off the

engagement in the woods, which had cost

them two deaths in return for an estimated

forty-five enemy killed. The infantrymen

set up a defensive perimeter for the night

and waited for boats to transfer them to

Cecil the following day. Chauncey was

left for a later date to be cleared of the remaining enemy on it. Only one squad of

infantrymen reinforced by members of

Overton's crew were left to guard the

stranded tug. On 1 February they were

reinforced by a platoon and ordered to set

up a perimeter defense at the beach until

more troops could be landed to clean out

the remnant of Japanese still on the island.8

Carlson and Carlos

The seizure of Carlson and Carlos Islands on D Day was assigned to the 17th

Regimental Combat Team. Carlson was to

be used for the emplacement of divisional

artillery and Carlos for supply dumps and

repair stations. The capture of Carlson was

considered the most important D-Day mission for the Southern Landing Force because of its proximity to Kwajalein Island

and its importance as a site for the fortyeight 105-mm. and twelve 155-mm. howitzers that were to provide artillery support

for the main landing the next day.

Carlos and Carlson Islands extended

along the reef northwest of Kwajalein.9

Both islands were long and narrow. Carlson was about two-thirds of a mile in

length and under 300 yards in width;

Carlos about a mile long and 300 yards

5

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. VI, G-3 Jnl, 31

Jan 44, Msgs 22a, 23; Marshall, Kwajalein Notes,

Vol. II, pp. 20-21. 6

 7th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 31 Jan 44, Msg 90. 7

 111th Inf AAR, p. 3. 8

 7th Cav Rcn Tr Rpt, p. 6. 9

 7th Inf Div FO 1, Annex 3, App 4, p. 9.
222 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

wide. Between the two lay a gap of approximately 4,300 yards, but the water

over the connecting reef was never deep

enough to float even small boats. Reconnaissance flights had revealed on Carlson

the presence of radio towers and other installations including a 100-yard finger

pier on the lagoon side. It was estimated

that a force of from 250 to 300 was stationed on the island to defend it and maintain defense communications there. Carlos

Island, it was believed, would contain a

much smaller garrison, if any.10

The 17th Regimental Combat Team's

plan called for simultaneous attacks of battalion strength on the northwestern tip of

each island.11 The 1st Battalion, Lt. Col.

Albert V. Hartl commanding, was to attack Carlos; the 2d Battalion, commanded

by Lt. Col. Edward P. Smith and supported by one platoon of Company A,

708th Amphibian Tank Battalion, was to

land on Carlson. The 3d Battalion, Lt. Col.

Lee Wallace commanding, was to remain

afloat in landing craft at the line of departure and be available for either island

as needed. Two light tanks were designated

for the fourth wave of those landing on

Carlos and four were allocated to the

fourth landing wave for Carlson. The

tanks were provided by Company D,

767th Tank Battalion. Company C of the

tank battalion was to stand by to provide

support missions if called on.

The transports carrying the three battalion landing teams arrived in the transport area six miles to seaward of Carlson

at 0544 on 31 January.12 Five LST's carrying four amphibian tractor groups had

already arrived in an assigned area westward from Carlos Island, and on order

they moved through the pitch darkness to

the transport area to take aboard the assault troops of the first four waves. The

men were to disembark from the transports into Higgins boats, move about 600

yards to their assigned LST's, and then

distribute themselves among the amphibian tractors at the rate of fifteen men per

vehicle. On order, the LST's were then to

move close in to the line of departure and

disgorge their amphibian tractors through

their open bow doors.

This complicated maneuver, carried out

as it was in total darkness, inevitably resulted in confusion. The LST's were unable to find the transports until the latter

turned on identification lights. This caused

delay and Admiral Turner found it necessary to postpone H Hour from 0830 to

0910.13

As the LST's left the transport area, one

pair carried the LVT group taking the 1st

Battalion to Carlos, and another pair carried the LVT group conveying the 2d to

Carlson. Other craft followed, including

six tank lighters, twelve LCI(G)'s equipped

with 40-mm, guns and rockets, and an

additional LST carrying the fifteen amphibian tanks of Company A, 708th Amphibious Tank Battalion.14

Preparatory naval bombardment

opened at 0618 when Pennsylvania and

Mississippi commenced firing on the western end of Kwajalein Island. As daylight

revealed three enemy merchant ships in

the lagoon, these also received fire from

the destroyer Ringgold and the cruiser San

Francisco. In spite of squally showers and a

low ceiling, the first of the carrier planes 10

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. II, FO 2, 6 Jan

44, pp. 1-4. 11

 Ibid., Vol. VIII, RCT 17 FO 1, 17 Jan 44, p. 2. 12

 TF 51 Marshalls Rpt, Incl A, p. 2: 7th Inf Div

FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. VIII, RCT 17 Rpt of Opns, 15

Feb 44 (hereafter cited as RCT 17 Rpt), pp. 3, 63, 64;

767th Tk Bn FLINTLOCK Rpt, pp. 84-85. 13

 7th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 31 Jan 44, Msg 14. 14

 LST 224 Action Rpt Kwajalein, 8 Feb 44; 767th

Tk Bn Jnl, 31 Jan 44, p. 3.
THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN 223

reported on station at 0840 to commence

the first of many strafing and bombing

runs on Kwajalein Island.15 Observation

planes later spotted fire for the battleships

and cruisers. At 0810 the scheduled plotted

bombardment began with shells from four

battleships (New Mexico, Mississippi, Idaho,

and Pennsylvania), three cruisers (Minneapolis, San Francisco, and New Orleans) and

four destroyers (Stevens, McKee, Ringgold,

and Sigsbee) systematically striking Carlos,

Carlson, Kwajalein, Burton, and Beverly

Islands.16

The line of departure for the landing on

Carlos lay about 3,000 yards west of the

island's northwestern tip, Harvey Point.

The plan called for the first four waves of

the 1st Battalion Landing Team to start for

the shore in thirty-two LVT's manned by

seven officers and 140 enlisted men. Each

of the first two waves was to consist of eight

amphtracks in staggered rows of four, the

two waves to be spaced three minutes

apart. The third wave was to contain five

armored LVT's in the first row and four in

the second. Wave four consisted of more

LVT's in a similar formation; wave five,

LCM's carrying tanks and self-propelled

mounts (75-mm. howitzers); and wave six,

standard landing craft carrying one heavy

machine gun platoon, battalion headquarters elements, advance personnel of the

battalion aid station, and a squad of engineers.17

The ship-to-shore movement proceeded

in general according to plan, and the first

troops, two infantry platoons and part of

the 1st Platoon, Company A, 13th Engineers, reached shore at 0910. They came

into a wide, shallow cove near the northwestern end of the island, which seemed

wild and uninhabited. On the left, on

Harvey Point, and to the right, tall palms

could be seen in small groves, but waisthigh underbrush interspersed with small

patches of bare sand extended across the

island directly back of the beachhead line.

Vegetation had been only slightly disturbed by the preliminary bombardment.

Behind the first two waves of infantrymen

were landed a platoon of heavy machine

guns, the communications section of the

beach and shore parties, forward observers

for the mortars, advance elements of the

Signal Corps detachment, infantry reserves, light tanks, self-propelled mounts,

battalion headquarters elements, and

medical personnel. By 1040, the first five

waves were ashore. The landings were

unopposed.18

The occupation of Carlos was easily accomplished. Company A, which landed on

the right, pushed southward along the

ocean side of the island; Company C, on

the left, made its way across to the lagoon

side and then proceeded in a southerly direction. Near the pier on the lagoon shore,

men of Company C encountered their first

enemy—three unarmed Japanese, whom

they promptly killed. Five others in this

area were found to have committed suicide. Company A captured seven or eight

prisoners in their southward march. When

the front had advanced two thirds of the

way down the island, Company C halted

and Company A took over the entire line.

About two hundred yards from the southern point of the island, Company A met a

group of nine Japanese, who were cut

down by rifle fire as they tried to rush the

Americans. The southern point of the

15

 TF 51 Marshalls Rpt, pp. 32-33 and Incl E,

App 2, p. 1. 16

 Ibid., Incl E, App 2, p. 1. 17

 7th Inf Div FO 1, Annex 8; Marshall, Kwajalein

Notes, Vol. II, p. 1 2; RCT 1 7 Rpt, Jnl, 3 1 Jan 44,

Msgs 3 1,37 . 18

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. II, p. 12; RCT

17 Jnl, 31 Jan 44, Msgs 31, 37.
224 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

LANDING ON CARLSON ISLAND. Note DUKW (right center) equipped with

A -frame device.

island was reached by 1400. The force

found an observation tower and sheds

with a radio in working order. At 1615 the

1st Battalion reported the island secured.

No casualties were reported. No prepared

defenses had been found.19

Resistance on Carlson Island was expected to be considerably stronger than

that on Carlos or any of the other islands

occupied on D Day.20 The first four assault

waves of the 2d Battalion Landing Team

were carried ashore in amphibian tractors.

The later waves approached the reef in

LCVP's from which they were obliged to

wade in for the last seventy-five yards. The

wave formations were similar to those at

Carlos, and the support from destroyers

and LCI(G)'s was the same.

The first wave hit the sandy beach at

the northwestern corner of Carlson at

0912. The beach was about 300 yards wide

with a treeless sandspit at the left and a

thin growth of coconut palms behind a

shoulder in the coast line at the right. The

amphibians crawled up the beach, meeting no resistance. Company E came in on

the left and Company F on the right, while

Company G was kept in floating reserve,

prepared to land at a point near the middle of the island if the tactical situation so

required. In the first wave with the rifle

squads were rocket grenadiers, demolition

engineers, flame thrower operators, and

wire-cutting specialists, all of the 13th

19

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. II, p. 14; RCT

17 Rpt, S-2 Worksheets, p. 133. 20

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. II, pp. 14-15;

RCT 17 Rpt, pp. 4, 137-39.
THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN 225

Engineers. The second wave landed at

0920, and the third was ashore ten minutes

later. LCI gunboats continued their fire

until the third wave had landed. Carrier

planes strafed and bombed the island,

moving to the southeastern extremity by

0938.

Company F on the right pushed straight

across the island to the lagoon, and at

0941 swung southeastward for the push

along the length of the island. Company

E on the left mopped up the northern end

before starting down the ocean side, somewhat behind Company F. At 0958 enemy

artillery fire from Kwajalein was reported,

but by 1120 naval gunfire and an air attack had put a stop to all Japanese shelling from that quarter.21

Meanwhile, a section of the shore party

in two amphibian tractors had reconnoitered the reef during the initial landings

and selected a route ashore for the four

light tanks and four self-propelled 75-mm.

howitzers, which came in by 1010.22 The

tanks disembarked from their LCM's on

the reef and made their way to the shore,

minus one vehicle that broke its final drive

and remained incapacitated for the rest of

the operation. Once ashore, the tanks

found passage through the thick underbrush and coral extremely difficult and a

second tank was temporarily disabled.23

The infantrymen accompanied by combat engineers continued southeastward

toward the communications center, which

was almost in the middle of the island,

arriving there at 1105.24 The preliminary

bombardment had knocked down one

radio tower and weakened another as well

as smashing the major buildings, even

those constructed of reinforced concrete.

The enemy fled, offering no resistance as

Company F searched the area. Company

E on the ocean side discovered three sets of

dummy emplacements but only light

enemy resistance. Small arms fire fell

briefly among the infantrymen as the two

companies moved in line abreast southeastward from the radio tower. Only one

man was wounded, however. No further

opposition was met. By noon the southeastern tip of the island was reached, and

at 1210 the battalion reported the island

secured. Twenty-one Korean prisoners

were captured. No live Japanese were

found on the island, although the battalion

commander reported, somewhat ambiguously, that "it is believed that some of the

Koreans were part Japanese."25

Development of Positions

The unexpected ease with which Carlson was occupied led to an early landing of

the divisional artillery—even before the

island was officially declared secured. At

1125 General Corlett sent orders to the 7th

Division artillery group to begin getting its

pieces ashore.26 This group, commanded

by General Arnold, consisted of four battalions of 105-mm. howitzers (31st, 48th,

49th, and 57th Field Artillery), and one

battalion of 155-mm. howitzers (145th

Field Artillery), plus headquarters, medical, communications, and special troops.

The 105-mm. howitzer battalions were

loaded mostly on LST's. The 145th Field

Artillery with its 155-mm. pieces had to be

loaded on two larger transports—the AKA

Virgo and the APA President Polk. Liaison

and forward observation parties were on

21

 RCT 17 Jnl, 31 Jan 44, Msgs 15, 23, 24, 26. 22

 767th Tk Bn Jnl, 31 Jan 44, p. 3; RCT 17 Rpt,

p. 4.

23

 Lt Paul R. Leach, Tanks on Kwajalein Atoll,

MS, p. 7, OCMH. 24

 Ibid. 25

 Ibid., p. 4. 26

 7th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 31 Jan 44, Msgs 67, 72.
DEMOLISHED COMMUNICATIONS CENTER AND STRONGPOINT

(above and below, respectively). Preliminary bombardment destroyed many defensive installations

and demoralized the defenders.
THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN 227

the transports with the infantry to which

they were attached; the five air observers

were on three cruisers of the attack force;

and the division artillery command party

was on Rocky Mount with General Corlett.27

The 155-mm. howitzers with their tractors, equipment, and ammunition were

loaded onto LCM's. These craft grounded

in three feet of water offshore but the howitzers were hauled to the beach and

dragged to their designated areas, where

some were ready for registration fire by

1525. However, the last were not emplaced

until long after dark.28

The 105-mm. howitzers were, on the

other hand, more expeditiously unloaded.

Their DUKW's moved with relative ease

from their mother LST's about 1,000 yards

offshore to the positions where the batteries

were to be emplaced. Certain DUKW's,

especially equipped with A-frame hoists

mounted in the rear, took their places near

the battery positions. The other vehicles

with guns aboard were driven one at a

time at right angles across the rear ends of

the A-frame DUKW's and halted under

the hoists. There, each piece was lifted

clear of the DUKW that had transported

it, lowered to the ground, hooked to the

pintle of the same vehicle and pulled into

position. Under the most favorable conditions, a whole battalion could be brought

into position in seven minutes.29

The 31st Field Artillery Battalion was

the first to commence unloading its howitzers. Its DUKW's proceeded from the

beach across the island and along the

lagoon shore to a spot opposite the battalion area. Then, with the aid of a bulldozer

and much tree cutting, they hauled the

pieces to a thick coconut grove, unloaded

them, and returned to the beach to pick up

ammunition. Shortly after 1500 the 105's

commenced registration fire on a Kwajalein Island check point, using smoke shells

to distinguish their fire from that of the

naval vessels, which were concurrently

bombarding that island. Observation

posts were later established in the radio

tower, on the end of the pier, and in an

LVT out in the lagoon, while registration

was accomplished with the help of an observation plane launched from one of the

cruisers.30

The 48th, 49th, and 57th Field Artillery

Battalions followed a similar pattern, occupying areas in the center and on the southern half of Carlson Island. At nightfall the

last registration fire was being delivered on

a check point on Kwajalein Island by the

49th Battalion. Ammunition was being

rapidly loaded into DUKW's from beached

LST's, and before dawn a large supply of

shells was on hand to support the main

attack on Kwajalein.31

The divisional artillery was concentrated

within an unusually limited area. The

twelve batteries of 105's were crowded together in an area only 900 yards long by

150 yards wide. The guns of the 49th Battalion were at the southeastern end of the

island; those of the 57th Battalion in the

adjacent area to the northwest on the

ocean side of the island; those of the 31st

in a zone west of the pier line on the ocean

side; and those of the 48th Battalion closely

grouped south of the radio tower. The

155-mm. howitzers of the 145th Battalion

27

 7th Inf Div Southern Landing Force Arty Rpt

Kwajalein Opn, 12 Mar 44, pp. 3-11. 28

 145th FA Bn Rpt of FLINTLOCK Opn, p. 4. 29

 7th Inf Div Rpt, use of DUKW's by the Artillery of the 7th Infantry Division in the FLINTLOCK

Operation, 4 Apr 44, p. 5. 30

 7th Inf Div Southern Landing Force Arty Rpt

Kwajalein Opn, pp. 7, 13. 31

 Of these, 45 percent were high explosive, 40

percent time-fuzed, and 15 percent smoke. 7th Inf

Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. XII, Arty Rpt, S-4 Rpt on

Kwajalein, p. 2.
228 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

105-MM. M2 HOWITZERS in position on Carlson Island.

were emplaced farthest from Kwajalein

Island between two roads near the middle

of Carlson. Following registration, the batteries prepared for an irregular schedule of

harassing fire on both Kwajalein and

Burton Islands so that the enemy would be

prevented, if possible, from repairing and

reorganizing his defenses.32

The night of D Day on southern Kwajalein found the Southern Attack Force, despite the unfinished business on Chauncey

Island, with all its scheduled objectives

attained. The channel islands were secured; the channel itself and an anchorage

in the lagoon had been swept for mines;

and a part of the invading force had entered the lagoon to take stations there. On

Carlos and Carlson the Americans were in

full possession.

During the early afternoon, the 3d Battalion Landing Team of the 17th Infantry

and one platoon of the 31st Field Hospital

had been brought ashore on Carlos. By

1200 men of Company A of the 7th Medical Battalion were ashore and operating a

collecting station at the beach.33 The 1st

Battalion had returned to the northwest

section of Carlos and the 3d Battalion, the

reserve force, occupied the southeastern

half.

Supply sections of the 7th Division,

which had been separated during the journey to the island, had assembled ashore,

co-ordinated their work, arranged their

communications, and were beginning to

32

 Cpl Millard Rogers, The Artillery Action of the

Battle of Kwajalein Atoll, MS, p. 21, and App II,

Map 1, OCMH. 33

 7th Inf Div Med Bn Rpt of Activity During

FLINTLOCK Opn, 22 Jan-8 Feb 44, pp. 12, 23.
THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN 229

build dumps. At 1800, on the northern tip

of Carlos, a detachment of the 707th Ordnance Company had set up the LVT maintenance shop capable of handling heavy

repairs.34 At the southern end of the island

a consolidated ammunition dump was prepared during the night and was ready for

use by 0800 on 1 February.

Carlson Island was the scene of even

greater night activity. As planned, the 7th

Division's headquarters, rear section, had

remained on board Admiral Turner's flagship, Rocky Mount, together with that of the

V Amphibious Corps, but during the afternoon the command posts and headquarters

had been set up on Carlson by the 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, by the division artillery, and by the 7th Division forward

echelon, the latter commanded by Brig.

Gen. Joseph L. Ready. At 1645 General

Corlett, having observed the early landing

of the division artillery, ordered harassing

fire placed on Kwajalein Island throughout the night. As a result, there was a much

longer preliminary artillery bombardment

than the one-hour preparation indicated

in the plans as a minimum. During the

night both Kwajalein and Burton Islands

were treated to a continuing harassing fire

by the artillery emplaced on Carlson.35

After dark, naval support vessels joined

with the artillery to keep a constant harassing fire over Kwajalein and Burton. The

larger island was shelled by San Francisco,

Idaho, New Mexico, and their screening destroyers, while Burton was covered by the

destroyer Hall. Troops of the 32d and

184th Regimental Combat Teams had

moved during the afternoon from their

transports to LST's, which were spending

the night either west of Kwajalein Island

or in the lagoon with orders to return to

the transport area at 0530. The remaining

vessels of the Southern Attack Force operated in waters southwest, south, and southeast of Kwajalein Island with orders to be

in the transport area at 0600.36

One of the novel experiments of the

Marshalls operation had also been carried

out on D Day with successful, although in

a sense inconclusive, results. This was the

employment for the first time in the Pacific

of an underwater demolition team, composed in this instance of both Army and

Navy personnel, whose duties were to conduct close reconnaissance of the beaches

at the western end of Kwajalein Island

and, if necessary, detonate any underwater

obstacles found there. At high tide on the

morning of 31 January, shortly after 1000,

and again at low tide at approximately

1600, this detachment worked its way to

points within 300 yards of the beach. Fire

from the battleships Pennsylvania and Mississippi covered these intrepid individuals

as they ranged over the approaches to the

main landing beaches in rubber boats.

Having ascertained that surf and reef conditions were satisfactory and that no underwater obstacles or antiboat mines were

located off the beaches, they returned without casualty. Since there were no underwater obstacles present, no opportunity

was allowed the team to test its detonation

equipment technique under combat conditions. Nevertheless, the team performed

valuable service later in the operation in

the demolition of wrecks, coral heads, and

other underwater obstructions along the

lagoon shore of the island.37

34

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. VII, G-4 Rpt,

Annex F. QM Rpt, p. 1, and Annex E, Ordnance

Rpt, 707th Ord Co Narrative Rpt, p. 1. 35

 7th Inf Div Southern Landing Force Arty Rpt

Kwajalein Opn, p. 11; 145th FA Bn Rpt of FLINTLOCK. Opn, p. 171 ; 7th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 3 1 Jan 44,

Msgs 87, 125. 36

 TF 51 Marshalls Rpt, Incl A, p. 4. 37

 Ibid., Incl E, pp. 7-8.
230 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

With all the conditions for a successful

landing deemed favorable, Admiral Turner

issued the order at 1622 on 31 January that

the main assault on the western beaches of

Kwajalein Island should proceed the following day. The scheduled time of landing, H Hour, was set at 0930. The attack

would be carried out according to the

original plan.38

The Landings on Kwajalein Island

Long before sunrise on the morning of

1 February 1944 the Southern Attack

Force at Kwajalein Atoll moved from its

night cruising dispositions to the positions

assigned for the day's operations against

Kwajalein Island. The eight LST's on

which the leading wave of assault troops

had spent the night were the first to approach their rendezvous, at 0530, and

within half an hour the larger transports

and the warships that were to provide fire

support were taking stations. At 0618 Mississippi and Pennsylvania took up the harassing fire, which had been maintained during

the night by other ships and by the artillery

on Carlson.39 Squalls, frequent rain

showers, and scudding clouds lowered visibility. They threatened to hamper the

attack but not to compel either its postponement or the adoption of the alternative plan for a complicated landing from

the lagoon.40 The assault was to be made

from the ocean against the western end of

Kwajalein Island.

As the sun rose at 0712, Mississippi

moved to a range of about 1,500 yards to

fire broadsides on visible targets. The other

support vessels closed to about the same

range when the systematic preparatory fire

was begun at 0745. At that time Mississippi

switched her salvos to Burton, northeast of

Kwajalein, and Pennsylvania, New Mexico,

Minneapolis, New Orleans, and San Francisco,

screened by eight destroyers, directed their

main batteries at the western end of

Kwajalein Island in direct preparation for

the landings. The destroyers Ringgold and

Sigsbee entered the lagoon and prepared to

prevent interisland movement by the

enemy.41

The preparatory bombardment of Kwajalein Island was unprecedented in the

Pacific in both volume and effectiveness.

During one period two shells per second

were hitting specific targets or areas in the

path of the assault troops. The 14-inch

naval shells of the battleships were most

effective in piercing and destroying reinforced concrete structures. From the

cruisers and destroyers, 8-inch and 5-inch

shells ploughed into bunkers and tore up

the thick growth of pandanus and palm

trees. All together on 1 February, almost

7,000 14-inch, 8-inch, and 5-inch shells

were fired by supporting naval vessels at

Kwajalein Island alone,42 and the bulk of

these were expended against the main

beaches before the landing. The field artillery on Carlson also joined in the preparatory fire. Its total ammunition expenditure

on 1 February against Kwajalein was

about 29,000 rounds.43 Finally, aerial bombardment added its bit to the pulverization

of Kwajalein's defenses. At 0810 six Liberators (B-24's) of the 392d Bombardment

Squadron based on Apamama reported on

station. Between 0830 and 0910 they flew

above the trajectory of the naval and artillery shells and dropped fifteen 1,000-pound

and 2,000-pound bombs on the blockhouse

38

 7th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 31 Jan 44, Msg 122. 39

 TF 51 Marshalls Rpt, Incl E, App 2, p. 4. 40

 Ibid., Incl F, p. 3. 41

 Ibid., Incl E, App 2, p. 4. 42

 Ibid., Incl E, App 1, Table 3. 43

 7th Inf Div Southern Landing Force Arty Rpt

Kwajalein Opn, p. 11.
EFFECT OF BOMBARDMENT OF KWAJALEIN. Preinvasion attacks reduced defensive positions in the beach area to rubble.
232 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

and dual-purpose twin-mount guns at the

northwestern end of Kwajalein Island.44

This was followed almost immediately by

bombing and strafing attacks carried out

by carrier-based aircraft. From the carriers

Enterprise, Yorktown, Belleau Wood, Manila

Bay, Corregidor, and Coral Sea eighteen dive

bombers and fifteen torpedo bombers

struck the western part of Kwajalein Island

while as many fighters strafed the area with

machine guns and rockets. All together

ninety-six sorties were flown from the carriers in support of the troop landing on

Kwajalein Island.45

The results of all this expenditure of

explosives were devastating. The damage

was so intensive that it is impossible to determine the relative effectiveness of the

three types of bombardment—naval, artillery, and air. The area inland of Red

Beaches was reduced almost completely to

rubble. Concrete emplacements were shattered, coconut trees smashed and flattened,

the ground pock-marked with large craters, coral ripped to splinters. As one

observer reported, "The entire island

looked as if it had been picked up to 20,000

feet and then dropped."46

The Assault Landings

The first touchdowns were to occur at

0930. As the time for departure approached, ships, amphibian vehicles, and

landing craft began to take their assigned

places. The line of departure was 5,000

yards northwest of Kwajalein Island, south

of the center of Carlson Island, and the

transport area was about 3,000 yards

southwest of the line.47 Control over the

landing waves was vested in the commanding officers of the 184th and 32d

Regimental Combat Teams, who were located on the control ship, a subchaser (SC

539).

48 The LST's carrying the amphibian

tractors went into position about 1,000

yards west of the line of departure, lowered

their ramps, and launched their amphtracks with the troops loaded. The tractors

began to circle slowly in a column of

waves, waiting the signal to move into line.

The LSD's Lindenwald, Belle Grove, and

Ashland in an area west of the LST's

launched the LCM's containing the medium tanks of Companies A, B, C, and

part of D of the 767th Tank Battalion.49

Two small control boats, assigned to keep

the landing craft moving toward the shore

at proper intervals, took stations just

seaward of the line of departure. Near

the ends of the line the amphibian tanks

of Company A, 708th Amphibian Tank

Battalion, circled after being released from

their mother LST, waiting to take their

wing positions with the first waves to go

ashore.50 Farther back in the transport

area, the landing craft on the transports

were swung out from the decks and

launched. They were to carry the supporting waves with extra ammunition and

equipment. Two LST's with high priority

supplies and the DUKW groups waited to

move near enough to the beaches to send

in supplies quickly.51

The northern (left) part of the 500-yard

44

 Operational History of the Seventh Air Force, 6

Nov 43-31 Jul 44, p. 125; Craven and Cate, AAF IV,

p. 306. 45

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Feb 44,

Annex A, p. 35; TF 51 Marshalls Rpt, Annex F, p. 3. 46

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Feb 44,

Annex A, p. 35; TF 51 Marshalls Rpt, Incl E, p. 11. 47

 TF 52 Attack Order A1-44. 48

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. XI, RCT 184

Rpt of Opns and Jnl, 31 Jan-6 Feb 44 (hereafter cited

as RCT 184 Rpt and RCT 184 Jnl), p. 2. 49

 7th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msg 13; 767th

Tk Bn Jnl, 31 Jan 44, pp. 2, 32. 50

 LST 224 Action Rpt Kwajalein, 8 Feb 44. 51

 7th Inf Div G-4 Rpt, Annex A, Initial Combat

Supply, p. 3.
THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN 233

western shore line had been designated

Red Beach 1, and the southern (right) part

was Red Beach 2. (Map VII) Preliminary

reconnaissance had indicated the existence

of the stronger fortifications along the

ocean side, and for that reason the combatseasoned 32d Regimental Combat Team,

under Col. Marc J. Logie, was assigned the

landing on Red Beach 2. The 184th Regimental Combat Team, under Col. Curtis

D. O'Sullivan, was to land on Red Beach

1 at the same time. The two combat teams

were to make their assaults in columns of

battalions, led by the 1st Battalion of the

32d, containing 84 officers and 1,628 enlisted men, and the 3d Battalion of the

184th, consisting of 73 officers and 1,489

enlisted men. Of the three companies of

the 767th Tank Battalion, Company B

would support the landing of the 184th on

Red Beach 1 and Company A that of the

32d on Red Beach 2, while Company C

would be held in reserve under division

control.52

The enemy offered some resistance to

the gathering attack in spite of the overwhelming preparatory fire that had already

wrecked most of their guns on the western

end of Kwajalein Island. A few antiaircraft

shells fell among the assembling landing

craft, one of them striking an LVT, injuring two men and knocking the vehicle out

of action. The rest of the amphibian tractors, separated by about twenty yards

between vehicles and about 100 yards between waves, continued to circle under

excellent control. Nevertheless, one accidental collision between two amphibians

occurred, damaging one of them and interfering slightly with the landing schedule.53

The first waves of the 3d Battalion,

184th, commanded by Lt. Col. William P.

Walker, and of the 1st Battalion, 32d,

under Lt. Col. Ernest H. Bearss, started for

the shore precisely on time at 0900 after

receiving the signal from the control boat.54

The LVT's mounted at least two, sometimes three, machine guns each, and, in

addition, twenty of them had specially

mounted infantry-type flame throwers that

could be operated from the assistant

driver's seat.55

 At each outside wing and in

the center between the first two waves, platoons of amphibian tanks were echeloned.

From their turrets, 37-mm. guns protruded.

Behind the first wave came three succeeding waves of infantry at two-minute

intervals.

As the tractors set out for their thirtyminute run from the line of departure to

the shore, Navy aircraft strafed the

beaches in a last-minute blow. At 0905

artillery and naval ships resumed fire

against the beaches and kept it up until

0928, two minutes before the touchdown,

after which they moved their fire inland.

LCI gunboats added the final touch. Firing from outside the lanes of approach at

the northern and southern extremities of

the landing area, they let go their 4.5-inch

rockets at 1,100 yards from the shore line

and again at 800 yards and fired their

20-mm. and 40-mm. guns at still closer

ranges. The seventeen amphibian tanks on

the wings and in the center, and the tractors in between them also rode in firing.

Small arms and mortar fire from the Japanese inflicted few injuries among the incoming troops, and for the most part the

waves preserved their formation.56

There was, however, some shifting to the

right (south). The steering mechanism of

52

 7th Inf Div FO 1, p. 7; 7th Inf Div FO 2, p. 2. 53

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, pp. 5-6. 54

 7th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msg 22. 55

 Flame throwers were also installed on eighteen

light tanks. 767th Tk Bn FLINTLOCK Rpt, pp. 52, 53;

Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 2. 56

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, pp. 1-6.
INVASION OF KWAJALEIN. Following the preinvasion bombardment (above), landing

craft head for the beaches (below).
THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN 235

the LVT that had been damaged in the

collision caused it to veer from its position

and move to the right among the tractors

of the 1st Battalion, 32d Regiment. All the

landing vehicles inclined slightly to the

right toward the southern boundaries of

the boat lanes, and after they crossed the

reef the current took them still farther in

that direction. The result was some crowding on the south, but not enough to interfere seriously with the landing.57

Artillery fire from Carlson was still falling on the beaches as the LVT's reached

positions only thirty-five yards offshore.

Thereupon it was shifted to a zone 200

yards inland. Although most of the defensive positions immediately inland of the

shore line had been obliterated, shell craters and piles of debris everywhere remained to deter the invaders. The first

wave landed on schedule at 0930. In the

zone of the 32d Regimental Combat Team

enough of the enemy survived in their

underground shelters or filtered back

through the curtain of artillery and naval

gunfire to greet the attackers with small

arms fire and grenades. From a few undestroyed pillboxes inland of the beaches, the

Japanese opened up with light mortar and

automatic fire—fire heavy enough to

cause a few casualties among the first

waves.58

As the first troops dropped down from

the high sides of the amphtracks into the

shallow water or onto the beach itself, most

of them ran over the dune and sought

shelter behind the wreckage of a sea wall

until the artillery and naval fire lifted inland. On Red Beach 1, where the sea wall

was almost at the water's edge, the LVT's

were tilted up enough to obtain a fair field

of fire inland. On Red Beach 2 the amphibians stopped at the water line, their

fire sweeping barely above the men of the

1st Battalion. For about two minutes the

men of the first wave on Red Beach 2

waited in the shelter of the sea wall while

LVT's poured fire over their heads. Then,

while a detail demolished one remaining

pillbox on the beach itself, the rest of the

men moved forward rapidly to seek out the

enemy just beyond the beach.59 On the

left, the two assault companies (Companies

I and K) of the 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, were also making progress. By 1122

both assault battalions were reported to

have advanced 150 yards inland against

only slight resistance.60

Combat engineers carrying demolition

charges and wire cutters were distributed

among the first wave of infantrymen and

were prepared to clear the way for the second and subsequent waves to move inland.

The preparatory fire, however, had been

so effective that further demolition work

was unnecessary. Both engineers and covering infantry were therefore able to

advance inland with the second wave.61

The amphibian tanks of the first line of

attack were expected to proceed inland,

striking targets found within a hundred

yards of the shore. The LVT's in the second and third waves were to move to the

flanks and circle back to the ships to bring

in the men of the later waves who were embarked in landing craft too deep-drafted to

get over the reef. All vehicles met serious

difficulties on the beaches. Some found the

undestroyed portions of the sea wall too

high to cross; others fell into shell holes or

57

 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 58

 Ibid., p. 14; 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. IX,

RCT 32 Rpt of Opn PORCELAIN (Kwajalein) Island,

and Jnl, 31 Jan-6 Feb 44 (hereafter cited as RCT 32

Rpt and RCT 32 Jnl), p. 30. 59

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 7; RCT

32 Rpt, p. 30. 60

 RCT 184 Jnl, 1 Feb 44. 61

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 14.
236 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

got hung up on high stumps. Most of the

tractors, after landing their troops, found

lateral movement along the beaches so impeded by the litter left by the first wave of

infantrymen and engineers that, instead of

adhering to the original plan of moving to

the flanks before returning seaward, they

turned around on the beach or backed into

the water. This caused considerable congestion and slowed the fourth wave's

approach to the shore. Troops in this wave

either waded in or waited for the beach to

be cleared.62 In spite of these difficulties,

the first four waves of both battalion landing teams were ashore within fifteen minutes after the designated H Hour.63

Build-up of the Assault

While some elements of the first four

waves pressed forward in the wake of the

artillery barrage and others organized the

beaches, additional infantry and units of

supporting arms and services continued to

come ashore throughout the day.

The 32d Regiment's forward command

party landed at 0950 and set up a command post a few yards inland in the center

of Red Beach 2.64 The 184th's advance

command post was established on Red

Beach 1 at 1235.65

The light tanks, carried in LCM's, approached the beach in the fifth wave.

Stopped on the reef at 0947, the tank

lighters discharged their tanks, which then

tried to make shore under their own power.

Three light tanks were stranded on the

reef. All six of the medium tanks of the

sixth wave assigned to Red Beach 2 got

ashore, but two destined for Red Beach 1

were held up by the reef and an underwater shell hole. After drying out motors

and radios, those tanks that had landed

struggled inland across the crowded, shelltorn beach and over the sea wall. Most of

the tanks succeeded in pushing on, but the

marshy land behind Red Beach 2 held

four up.66

At 1205 the 2d and 3d Platoons, Company A, 767th Tank Battalion, were ordered into shore and, with one casualty on

the reef, proceeded inland via Blue Beach

1, which was located on the southwest

corner of the island to the right of Red

Beach 2. The 2d Platoon was sent forward

and the 3d Platoon remained on the beach

in reserve. The 2d Platoon of Company B

reached Red Beach 1 at 1400. It landed

without mishap, being guided ashore by

four stranded medium tank crewmen of

the 1st Platoon who stood on the reef in

water up to their armpits and directed the

tanks around the underwater hazards. The

tanks went forward to support the infantry

without delay, using a new route from the

beach that had been cleared by bulldozers.67

 The 1st Platoon, Company B,

and the 2d Platoon, Company C, brought

their twelve mediums in at 1600 while the

1st Battalion, 184th, was still being landed.

One medium tank was disabled on the

reef; the others went into bivouac. When

the 1st and 3d Platoons, Company C, were

sent to Red Beach 2 by error between 1630

and 1700, they were kept ashore overnight

and re-embarked late the next day to participate with the 17th Infantry Regiment

in the forthcoming operations on Burton

Island.68

62

 RCT 32 Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msg 18. 63

 7th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msg 45; 767th Tk

Bn Jnl, 1 Feb 44, p. 4; Marshall, Kwajalein Notes,

Vol. I, p. 3. 64

 RCT 32 Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msg 18a. 65

 RCT 184 Jnl, 1 Feb 44. 66

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, pp. 9, 15, 94. 67

 RCT 32 Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msg 50; Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 9; 767th Tk Bn Jnl, 1 Feb 44,

p. 4.

68 767th Tk Bn Jnl, 1 Feb 44, p. 6; Leach, Tanks on

Kwajalein Atoll.
BULLDOZER CLEARS ROUTE from beach (above) to facilitate the movement of M4

medium tanks supporting the infantry (below).
238 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Combat engineers found their problems

fewer than had been anticipated. Without

much difficulty they cleared the beach of

enemy explosives, set up demolition

dumps, and replenished forward ammunition supplies. They later joined the shore

party engineers in smoothing out the rough

passage from the beach to the western section of the island highway (Wallace Road)

with bulldozers and in repairing that section of the highway. The first of the supply

DUKW's came ashore just before noon.

Seven were sent forward over the new

route with grenades, 75-mm. shells, and

other ammunition.69 The materiel dropped

from the LVT's was gathered by engineers

and put in a dump about fifty yards inland.

Regimental supply personnel arrived at

Red Beach 2 about 1115. They later

established a supply point well inland in

the wake of the assault forces.70

One platoon of the 184th Regiment's

81-mm. mortars erroneously landed at

1025 on Red Beach 2, but was quickly

moved to Red Beach 1 to support the regiment's attack.71

 Late in the afternoon the

1st Platoon of the 91st Chemical Company, which was attached to the 32d Regiment, was emplaced near the southern

limit of Red Beach 2, having been landed

during the morning and early afternoon.

Extra ammunition with which to fire night

missions, however, was unavailable until

early the next morning. The 2d Platoon,

91st Chemical Company, landed at 1630

on Red Beach 1 in support of the 184th.

After having been afloat in landing craft

for seven hours, it came ashore in four

crowded amphtracks with its mortars unassembled. The weapons were assembled

near the lagoon shore about 150 yards

from Red Beach 1, and a fire direction

center was established near the mortars.72

The Cannon Companies of the two regimental combat teams landed one platoon

at a time with each battalion. Some of the

75-mm. howitzers were packed ashore,

while others were waterproofed and towed

over the reef from landing craft. The howitzers of the 32d Regiment were emplaced

by 1700 in the southwest corner of a natural clearing just beyond the beachhead

line, which lay about 250 yards inland.73

As early as 1330 one section of the 184th's

Cannon Company was firing from a position on the lagoon shore line; about three

hours later three more pieces were in battery formation with it. The remaining platoon landed about 1900 and went into

bivouac.74

Each of the nine battalion landing teams

at southern Kwajalein was assigned a collecting platoon of the 7th Medical Battalion. The first to land was the 1st Platoon,

Company B, which came in at Red Beach

2 with the 1st Battalion, 32d Regiment, at

1130. An hour later the 3d Platoon, Company C, landed on Red Beach 1 with the

3d Battalion, 184th. Each platoon set up a

collecting station on the beach and evacuated casualties by LVT's to the transport.

When the shore party medical sections

were ready on the beaches, evacuation of

casualties was turned over to them, and

the collecting platoons, each now reinforced by a second, moved inland from the

beaches to set up two collecting stations.

Before night, all collecting platoons and

headquarters of each medical company

69

 RCT 32 Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msg 54. 70

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 95; RCT

32 Rpt, p. 34. 71

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. XI, RCT 184

Rpt of Opns, BLT 184-1 Rpt of Opns, Jnl, 1 Feb 44,

p. 87. 72

 91st Chemical Co Rpt of Participation in Kwajalein Opns, 18 Feb 44, pp. 131-41. 73

 RCT 32 Rpt, p. 22. 74

 RCT 184 Rpt, p. 43.
THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN 239

75-MM. HOWITZER IN ACTION against enemy positions across the lagoon.

were ashore.75 Evacuation of the injured

along the highway to the beaches was

swift. Because of the small number of

casualties, only one platoon was needed to

operate a collecting station in each regimental zone. Men of the other two platoons were sent forward to act as litter

bearers, thus accelerating the medical service. About 1530 the 7th Infantry Division

Medical Battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment established the battalion command post about 200 yards

inland, midway between the two beaches.

The 1st Platoon, Company D, 7th Infantry

Division Medical Battalion, landed some

three hours later and was held in reserve

near the command post pending the establishment of a clearing station, which was

not put into operation until the morning

of 4 February.76

On Red Beach 1 a switchboard set up

by the 75th JASCO and wire laid by 7th

Infantry Division Signal Company elements connected the two regimental command posts with each other and with that

of the 7th Division on Carlson Island, and

also linked the six battalions with the division artillery batteries. Amphibian tractors

laid 4,500 yards of submarine cable along

the atoll reef between the two islands.

Later, the ebb and flow of the sea dragged

the cable over the sharp coral and broke it

from time to time, but cable laying details

continually repaired the damage.77

The 2d Battalion, 32d Regiment, was

available for support from the moment the

75

 7th Inf Div Med Bn Rpt of Activities During

FLINTLOCK Opn, 22 Jan-8 Feb 44, pp. 13, 14. 76

 Ibid., pp. 14, 15. 77

 RCT 184 Rpt, p. 37.
240 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

landings began; its four assault waves had

embarked in amphibian tractors and its

four supporting waves in landing craft

shortly after sunrise. They were ordered

ashore at 1035. After the first waves had

landed, the LVT's returned to pick up the

troops of the four supporting waves at the

edge of the reef. Early in the afternoon

they reorganized near the beach and

started eastward in column of companies.

The 3d Battalion, 32d, spent most of the

day at sea, coming ashore in the afternoon.

This battalion, the regimental reserve, was

not committed until the next day.78

The 2d Battalion, 184th Regiment, the

support battalion, landed on Red Beach 1

between 1330 and 1630, formed a column

of companies to mop up the area behind

the 3d Battalion, and later established a

defensive perimeter for the night. The 1st

Battalion, in reserve, landed between 1800

and 1930 and crowded into the limited

bivouac area near the lagoon.79

Throughout 1 February the Southern

Landing Force thus built up its assault and

support elements on the western end of

Kwajalein Island as rapidly as reef and

beaches could be crossed. Their task was

relatively easy because of the light opposition encountered on the beaches. The confusion that had marked the landing of

assault and support units at Tarawa was

nowhere apparent at Kwajalein. Naval,

artillery, and aerial bombardment had

done their work well. The troops had been

carried ashore on schedule and in sufficient

number to sustain the assault. The ship-toshore movement was an eminent success. 78

 RCT 32 Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msgs 29a, 35, 101. 79

 RCT 184 Rpt.
CHAPTER XV

Reduction of the Main Defenses

of Kwajalein Island

The Push Inland: First Day

There was one main highway on Kwajalein Island, which completely circled it,

paralleling the shore line for most of its

length and inland from the beach about a

hundred yards. (See Map V.) The northern (lagoon) section of the highway was

known as Will Road; the southern (ocean)

section, as Wallace Road. At the western

end of the island, the loop ran somewhat

farther inland, but there, and at various

points along the ocean shore, secondary

roads branched from the highway to installations nearer the water. Approximately twenty cross-island roads shortcircuited the main loop. In the narrow,

northeastern end of the island among the

various buildings, these cross-island roads

were near enough together to seem like

streets of a village. Air photographs showed

that the small airfield near the center of

the island was still under construction just

before the landings. It consisted of a single

runway paralleled on the north by a narrower strip used for dispersal. Between the

dispersal strip and the runway, wooded

areas had been separated by two transverse clearings and further divided by

straight narrow road's that ran almost all

the way across the island from ocean to

lagoon. Less than one eighth of the runway had been paved in concrete.1

Construction materials for the Japanese

installations on Kwajalein were delivered

to the lagoon at wooden docks directly

north of the center of the airfield and at a

long coral-filled pier nearer the northeastern end of the island. The docks, referred

to in the operation maps as Center Pier,

were shaped like a wide capital H, and

were accessible to boats of shallow draft

only. The long pier, designated Nob Pier,

almost a mile farther northeast along the

lagoon shore, projected westward across

the reef for some five hundred yards to

reach deep water. It was shaped much like

a hocky stick with a wide blade projecting

at an angle from its long slender causeway.

Just west of the airfield and lying within

the western loop of the island highway was

a depressed area of land, largely cleared

except for some brush, designated Wart

Area on operation maps. It stretched from

Will Road on the north to a fringe of trees

near Wallace Road on the south, a distance of 450 yards; the distance from the

highway loop on the west to a semicircle of

trees ringing the eastern edge of this clearing was about 500 yards. In this area the

1

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. II, FO 1, Opns

Map; JICPOA Bull 48-44, Jul 44, p. 1.
242 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Japanese had set up a radio direction

finder with auxiliary radio installations in

four buildings. About 1,500 yards farther

east, at the eastern end of the runway, another clearing, approximately 300 yards

by 600 yards, extended along the ocean

shore. It was crossed by Wallace Road, by

two cross-island roads (Cox and Carl

Roads), and by an antitank ditch.

Commencing near the base of Center

Pier and extending along the lagoon side

of the island to the northeastern tip, the

Japanese had constructed most of their

buildings. North of the base of Nob Pier

these structures filled most of the area

within the loop of the highway.

The Advance From the Beaches

The beachhead line lay about 250 yards

inland, along the western loop of the main

island highway, which there ran north and

south roughly parallel to the two Red

Beaches. The shore rose just behind the

beaches to an island rim a few yards wide

and about ten feet above sea level. East

of this higher ground as far as the beachhead line were marshy dips covered with

thick underbrush. Vegetation was thickest

behind Red Beach 2, in the line of the 32d

Regiment advance. The northern zone,

which was drier, having been shaded only

by tall coconut palms more widely spaced,

contained several buildings strung along

an additional loop of secondary road that

linked the northwest point and the highway. From the shell-pocked reef and tornup terrain along the beach itself, the advance had to be made through debris and

soft ground, both of which presented great

difficulty to tanks and other vehicles.

The northern boundary of the 32d Regiment's zone ran a little north of the middle

of the island, from Red Beach 2 to a road

junction at the western edge of Wart Area.

The ocean shore on the regiment's right

curved southeast, widening the area from

about 275 yards at the beach to about 400

yards at the beachhead line. Within the

32d's zone the enemy defenses, referred to

as Wet Strong Point, were expected to consist of pillboxes and antiaircraft gun positions, directly back of Red Beach 2, and

a closely associated network of installations

along the ocean shore.

As the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, advanced after landing on Red Beach 2, it

discovered the enemy defenses surprisingly

weak. Although several log shelters not indicated on the operations map were met,

the group of prepared firing positions at

Wet Strong Point was found to be nonexistent. Moreover, very few dead Japanese were counted by the 1st Battalion as

it moved toward the beachhead line with

Company A on the right, Company B in

the inner zone at the left, and part of Company C following in reserve. The battalion

reported only light, scattered enemy resistance to its advance.2

 (See Map VI.) No

large pillboxes remained to be demolished.

Only a few of the enemy were discovered

in small underground shelters. Japanese

riflemen usually preferred to let the line

pass, withholding fire until more profitable targets appeared. The advance platoons were at the north-south portion of

Wallace Road within an hour after the

landing. The rest came up more slowly,

but at 1130 the battalion was at the western edge of the Wart Area clearing.

In the northern zone, the 3d Battalion,

184th Infantry, experienced more resistance during this phase of the battle than

was met in the southern zone. Except for

twenty-two men from Company K who

2

 RCT 32 Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msgs 23a, 26, 28, 33a, 36,

54a, 68; Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 14.
REDUCTION OF THE MAIN DEFENSES OF KWAJALEIN ISLAND 243

had been carried by a disabled LVT to

Red Beach 2, and twenty-one men transferred from another damaged tractor to

one in the fourth wave, the first two waves

of the 3d Battalion on Red Beach 1 contained all the troops of Companies K, I,

and L, plus the 3d Platoon, Company C,

13th Engineer Battalion.3

Ahead of them lay a network of several

pillboxes, which still contained live Japanese in spite of the heavy preliminary

bombardment. These were silenced in

short order in a series of almost simultaneous actions in which many varieties of

weapons were used. Typical of the action

at this juncture was the experience of two

infantrymen of Company K, Pvt. Parvee

Rasberry and Pfc. Paul Roper. The two

men had landed near the left of Red

Beach 1 and had run about twenty-five

yards inland when they came under fire

from one of the pillboxes in the area.

Quickly taking shelter in a shell hole, they

started lobbing grenades at the enemy position about fifteen yards ahead. The Japanese merely threw the grenades back and

the volley kept up until a flame thrower

was brought forward. That, too, proved

ineffective; the flames only hit the box and

bounced back. Finally, Private Rasberry

got out of his foxhole, crawled to within

about five yards of the pillbox and threw

in a white phosphorus smoke grenade. This

flushed several Japanese from their cover

into open positions where they could be

taken under rifle fire. Those who weren't

hit ran back to the pillbox. Rasberry threw

white phosphorous grenades until he had

none left, by which time about eight of the

enemy had been killed. At this juncture,

T. Sgt. Graydon Kickul of Company L was

able to crawl up to the pillbox and on top

of it. He emptied his M1 rifle into it, killing the remainder of the Japanese inside.

To make doubly certain that the job was

done, an amphibian tank was then brought

forward to fire both its flame thrower and

its 37-mm. gun into the aperture.

In much the same manner, all of the

pillboxes were taken out or sufficiently neutralized to permit bypassing. When the

work was completed, the assault Companies L and I passed through the first

landing wave and continued on up the island. Company K now went into battalion

reserve and, to the rear of the assault wave,

continued to mop up positions that were

bypassed as the attack progressed.4 Company I on the right and Company L on the

left moved rapidly forward under protection of artillery from Carlson Island. The

184th Infantry was receiving direct support from the 57th Field Artillery, which

at 0947 had already established communications with its forward observers in the 3d

Battalion's front lines.5

Meanwhile, the 49th Field Artillery was

furnishing direct support to the 32d Infantry and at 0949 had its forward observers for Battery A reporting at a point

150 yards inland from Red Beach 2.6 The

remaining three battalions of divisional

artillery continued general support by

dropping barrages successively farther inland. During the initial phase neither battalion had effective support from tanks,

and the LVT(A)'s were left behind near

the beaches. In the southern sector the

swampy terrain held up the tanks until the

infantrymen and engineers were well beyond the beachhead line. In the northern

sector the two medium tanks that had not

foundered on the reef or at the approach

3

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, pp. 10-11. 4

 Ibid., Vol I, pp. 10-13. 5

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. XII, 7th Inf Div

Arty Rpt, Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msg 23. 6

 Ibid., Msg 24.
244 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

to the beach joined the 3d Battalion, 184th

Infantry, just before it reached the beachhead line.7

Enemy dead, estimated at 250, lay

scattered among the desolate ruins and

tangled wreckage of the coconut grove or

in the rubble and debris of shattered buildings behind Red Beach 1. Although for

over half an hour hidden Japanese stragglers fired on the beach and harassed the

advancing troops, both advance companies

of the 184th reported insignificant opposition. By 1135 they had come up to the

north-south sector of Wallace Road and

had reorganized for the next stage of the

advance.8

The Second Phase

The next objective of the two assault

battalions was the line of Wilma Road, a

north-south road that ran east of Wart

Area and west of the landing strips, connecting Will Road on the north with the

ocean-shore stretch of Wallace Road.

The zone ahead of the 32d Infantry included the southern part of Wart Area at

the left and at the right some 550 yards of

the shore stretch of Wallace Road, together

with a band of wooded ground between

that road and the ocean. The shore defenses in this section were grouped in two

organized systems, designated Whistler

Strong Point and Wheeler Strong Point.

Each was thought to consist of machine

gun and antiaircraft gun positions fronting

the ocean, and a line of rifle pits and connecting trench just inland.9

After halting at the beachhead line,

Company B furnished covering fire over

Wart Area while Company A continued to

advance, with Company C behind it, along

the wooded ground that stretched from the

clearing to the ocean shore.10 The forward

company was out of communication with

the battalion for over half an hour. At 1220

it was reported to be progressing against

rifle and machine gun fire only, and to

have pushed to a point 250 yards west of

Wilma Road.11 Whistler Strong Point had

proved to be unoccupied.

Moving on toward Wheeler Strong

Point, Company A encountered its first

organized resistance of the day from pillboxes along the ocean shore and suffered

ten or eleven casualties. At 1330 steps were

taken to shift the burden of the assault

from the 32d Regiment's 1st Battalion to

its 2d, commanded by Lt. Col. Glen A.

Nelson. Company C, which had been following behind Company A, was sent

northeastward to clean up the dispersal

area east of Wilma Road. Companies A

and B were to be relieved by the 2d Battalion. As the latter came abreast of

Wheeler Strong Point, it was fired upon

from three pillboxes that Company A had

failed to mop up completely. These were

attacked and wiped out by infantrymen

with the assistance of a platoon of medium

tanks that had moved ahead to support the

2d Battalion.12

Meanwhile, to the north, the 3d Battalion, 184th, was finding the resistance somewhat tougher, as it had earlier in the

morning. Before jumping off for the second

7

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. XI, RCT 184

Rpt of Opns, BLT 184-3, Chronological Rpt of Opns

(hereafter cited as BLT 184-3 Rpt), p. 1. 8

 RCT 184 Jnl, 011135 Feb 44, 011240 Feb 44. (All

messages of the 184th Infantry's Journal are timedated in this manner and not numbered. The first two

digits represent the day of the month, the last four

the time of day.) Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I,

pp. 94-95. 9

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. II, FO 2, 6 Jan

44, Opns Map, Phase II. 10

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 14. 11

 RCT 32 Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msg 57a. 12

 Ibid., Msgs 75, 75a, 92; Marshall, Kwajalein

Notes, Vol. I, pp. 15-16.
245

FLAME THROWER in use against a Japanese blockhouse.

phase of the attack, the battalion reorganized. Company K took up the right half of

the battalion line along the north-south

segment of Wallace Road to furnish covering fire over Wart Area, and Company I

shifted to the rear of Company L, supporting its advance at a distance of about two

hundred yards.13 Jumping off at noon,

Company L fought for twenty minutes to

reduce a bunker of reinforced concrete

that had an extension constructed of logs

and sand. Halfway between Will Road

and the lagoon shore, it had been spotted

as a pillbox but proved instead to be a very

large shelter. Flame throwers proved ineffective, and the occupants emerged one

at a time only after high-explosive and

white phosphorus charges were used.14

Rifle fire and thick underbrush along

Will Road north of the direction finder

site, as well as machine gun and small arms

fire, slowed Company L's progress. By

1310, nevertheless, it had come to the positions defending Wilma Road, and at

1450 reported that the road in its zone was

secured.15 Company I pushed southeastward through the wreckage of a group of

buildings to establish contact along Wilma

Road with the left-hand elements of the

32d Regiment. Some difficulty in achieving contact arose from the fact that Company C of the 32d had continued beyond

Wilma Road into the dispersal area of the

airfield, which was actually within the

184th Regiment zone of action.16

13

 BLT 184-3 Rpt, p. 2. 14

 RCT 184 Jnl, 011205 Feb 44, 011240 Feb 44. 15

 Ibid., 011450 Feb 44. 16

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, pp. 16, 17.
246 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Seizure of the Airfield Begins

The area east of Wilma Road contained

the airfield. Two bands of wooded ground,

studded with fortified positions and laced

with trenches, lay along and back of the

lagoon and ocean beaches on either side of

the airfield. In the center of the field, between the airstrips, stretched a third

wooded area about a hundred yards wide.

The rest of the sector had been cleared of

trees by the Japanese. Immediately east of

Wilma Road was a major dispersal area,

shaped much like a fishhook, curving away

from the line of advance at the right to a

barbed point on the regimental boundary,

and broadening at the left into the western

terminus of the airstrips. This terminus

was a single clearing, 300 yards from north

to south and 75 yards from west to east.

The two airstrips—one a runway strip and

the other a dispersal strip—extended eastward about 1,200 yards to another unbroken cleared area. The northern (dispersal) strip was about 50, and the southern

over 100 yards wide. The boundary between the zones of the 184th and 32d

Regiments had been set along the southern

(runway) strip, about one fourth of the distance from its northern edge. Bombardment had shattered most of the trees not

previously cleared by the Japanese from

the wide area extending from Will Road

on the north to Wallace Road on the south.

Except for a jumble of trunks, branches,

and fronds in the area between the airstrips and between the southern strip and

Wallace Road, the island seemed to have

become one broad clearing between coastal

fringes of vegetation.

Some of the enemy held out at the

western end of the field as the advance battalions continued the attack and the 2d

Battalion, 32d Infantry, moved forward to

pass through the 1st Battalion.17 No firm

defensive position commanding the entire

width of the island had been established,

however. The bulk of the defenders had

simply retired eastward.

Three coastal defense positions were

anticipated on the ocean side along the

shore. They were labeled on the operations

map Worden, Canary, and Cat Strong

Points.18 Worden Strong Point was believed to contain a covered artillery position for a field piece, a heavy antiaircraft

gun, four machine gun emplacements, a

network of rifle trenches, and some unidentified buildings. Canary Strong Point was

thought to include two groups of positions,

each similar to Worden and separated by

over a hundred yards of brush-covered

ground, in which the presence of pillboxes

and connecting trenches was suspected but

not definitely established. Worden was 200

yards beyond the Wilma Road line, and

Canary about 800 yards farther. Four

hundred and fifty yards beyond Canary

was Cat Strong Point, extending along

some three hundred yards of ocean shore

south of the airfield's eastern end. The

troops of the 32d Infantry would not reach

it until the next day.

The attack eastward began to move into

the airfield area as early as 1440.19 An air

attack on the defenses at Canary Strong

Point, south of the middle of the airfield,

was not thought safe because of the presence of American troops within 500 yards

of the target. Artillery fire, however, was

heavy; 300 rounds of 105-mm. and 155-

mm. artillery fire from Carlson Island was

delivered between 1405 and 1425. Company A, 32d Infantry, remained tempo17

 RCT 32 Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msg 104. 18

 7th Inf Div FO 2, Opns Map, Phase II. 19

 RCT 32 Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msg 92; RCT 184 Jnl,

011442 Feb 44, 011550 Feb 44; 7th Inf Div Arty Rpt,

Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msg 99.
REDUCTION OF THE MAIN DEFENSES OF KWAJALEIN ISLAND 247

rarily near the south end of Wilma Road,

mopping up enemy positions, while Company B pushed forward about 100 yards

beyond the road. Company C, after passing through the western dispersal area,

continued eastward into the wooded area

between the airstrips, well into the zone of

the 184th Regiment.20

The progress of the 1st Battalion, 32d,

from Wilma Road along the ocean side of

the island continued to be somewhat more

rapid than that of the 3d Battalion, 184th,

in its zone. Company B, 32d Infantry, met

only scattered resistance during its first

two hundred yards of advance, while Companies L and I, 184th, ran at once upon

large underground shelters and defenses

as well as rifle fire. Moreover, a fuel dump

that had been ignited by artillery fire from

Carlson Island exploded and temporarily

barred the 184th's advance.21

Any attempt of the enemy to reinforce

his troops already in the wooded strip between the lagoon and Will Road was prevented by a creeping barrage along Will

Road and by a concentration from 155-

mm. howitzers upon an assembly of Japanese troops observed near the northeastern

end of the island.22 Organized enemy resistance to the 3d Battalion, 184th, was

also forestalled by sixty rounds from the

57th Field Artillery Battalion, dropped on

a nearer concentration of the enemy forces

between the airfield and the lagoon.23

At 1525, Company L, 184th Infantry,

was reported to be two hundred yards east

of Wilma Road, while Company I of the

same regiment was at the northwestern

corner of the airfield.24 On the right, Company C, 32d Infantry, had moved into the

wooded panel between the airstrips, pursuing a few of the withdrawing enemy.

Company B, 32d Infantry, pushed through

the ruined concrete-mixing plant and the

other debris at Worden Strong Point, leaving the mopping up of all bunkers to Company A. Company B then moved forward

against Canary Strong Point, preceded by

an artillery preparation that commenced

at 1515. By 1540 friendly troops were so

close to the target that artillery fire had to

be discontinued.

At 1525 Company B, 32d Infantry, was

ordered to hold while Company E of the

2d Battalion passed through and commenced reducing the defensive positions in

the western section of Canary Strong Point.

Some of these positions, which extended

along each side of Wallace Road, were defended by Japanese who ducked and

crawled through rubble heaps and bunkers

in such a way that Lt. John L. Young,

commanding Company E, became convinced that they were using connecting

tunnels. For an hour the fighting persisted,

but not more than ten enemy dead could

be counted above ground.25

Company E continued through a litter

of small works, moving so slowly that it

was necessary to commit Company F,

which undertook a flanking movement at

the left. The maneuver was intended to cut

the strong point off, but the company

promptly ran into fire that slowed its advance to about fifty yards in thirty minutes. It then became clear that the whole

movement had been stopped. The attack

was consequently broken off at 1800 and

defensive positions were organized for the

night.26 At 1820 the 32d Regimental Com- 20

 RCT 32 Jnl, Msg 82; Marshall, Kwajalein Notes,

Vol. I, p. 16. 21

 7th Inf Div Arty Rpt, Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msg 98;

Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 95. 22

 7th Inf Div Arty Rpt, Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msgs 95,

101.

23

 Ibid., Msg 102. 24

 BLT 184-3 Rpt, p. 2. 25

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, pp. 16-17. 26

 Ibid., p. 17.
248 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

KOREAN LABORERS, captured on Kwajalein, point out the location of enemy positions on

a map.

bat Team casualties were reported at seven

dead and twenty-three wounded.27

In the 184th Regiment's zone, the attack

stopped at 1700, when Company L arrived at the western edge of a group of

ruined storage buildings that extended as

far as the H Docks (Center Pier).28 Defensive perimeters were prepared. The

day's casualties in the 184th's 3d Battalion

were reported to be ten killed and thirteen

wounded.29

The enemy losses on Kwajalein at the

close of the day's righting were estimated

at five hundred killed and eleven captured.

Approximately 450 of the dead Japanese

counted were in the zone of the 184th, and

this regiment also was responsible for the

capture of ten of the eleven prisoners

taken.30

Of course, a large share of the enemy

casualties must be attributed to the heavy

bombardment from ships and aircraft and

from artillery based on Carlson. Estimates

made by assault troops and by others, including doctors following the assault, indicated that the preparatory bombardment caused from 50 to 75 percent of all

Japanese casualties on Kwajalein Island.

These estimates probably run high, but

there can be no doubt that the preliminary

fire, especially from ships' guns and shorebased artillery, was exceptionally effective.31

27

 RCT 32 Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msg 134. 28

 BLT 184-3 Rpt, p. 2; Marshall, Kwajalein Notes,

Vol. I, p. 96. 29

 RCT 184 Jnl, 011745 Feb 44. 30

 RCT 32 Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msgs 134, 142a, 147b. 31

 Col Claudius H. M. Roberts et al., Report on
REDUCTION OF THE MAIN DEFENSES OF KWAJALEIN ISLAND 249

The first day's field artillery operations,

however, were not without cost to the

American units involved. When Battery

C, 145th Field Artillery, fired its first

round, one gun had a premature burst of a

fuzed projectile, causing two casualties.

A few minutes later, a muzzle burst in Battery A occurred, seriously wounding five

men. Not long afterward, just after 1000,

the principal air observer, Capt. George

W. Tysen, USN, and his pilot, Ensign William J. Sayers, USNR, in a spotting plane

from Minneapolis flew below the safety level

into a curtain of artillery shells from Carlson Island. The plane was struck and destroyed in mid-air.32

The two forward battalions established

defensive perimeters that crossed the terrain on each side of the airfield but then

looped westward along its edges and joined

in the dispersal area near Wilma Road. In

the northern zone Companies L and I,

184th Infantry, shared the most advanced

position, with Company L on the left.

Company K, except for one platoon sent

to support Company L, extended along

Will Road and linked the two forward

companies with those of the 2d Battalion,

184th, east of Wilma Road.33 In the southern zone, Company F, 32d Infantry, alone

held the forward line from the ocean beach

to the southern edge of the landing strip.

The remainder of 2d Battalion, 32d, took

up positions west and northwest of Company F. Three antitank guns were set up at

equal intervals, interspersed with machine

guns, in Company F's easterly line. The

men were well dug in, two or three men to

a foxhole.34

Between the southernmost position of

Company I, 184th Infantry, and the northernmost position of Company F, 32d Infantry, the width of the landing strip intervened; moreover, Company F's line lay

about 250 yards farther east than that of

Company I. The wide gap was devoid of

cover for either defending or attacking

troops, but to guard against the possibility

of infiltration, Company C was again sent

forward early in the morning of 2 February to guard the area.35

The First Night on Kwajalein Island

When darkness fell on Kwajalein Island

after the first day of battle, the front lines

crossed the island at points more than one

fourth of the distance from the landing

beaches to the northeastern tip. Six infantry battalions were ashore, supported by

four tank companies (forty-four medium

and eighteen light tanks were operative),

five self-propelled 75-mm. guns, and two

platoons of 4.2-inch chemical mortars. The

two Red Beaches had been fully organized, cleared of enemy explosives, graded

by bulldozers, and linked with the island's

road system. Shell holes in the highways

had been filled, debris removed, and supply points established. Command posts

were established in each battalion area,

and regimental command posts were set

up about fifty yards inland, near the

northern limits of each of the two beaches.

The 13th Engineer Battalion had its command post near that of the 184th Infantry,

while the 767th Tank Battalion's was a

hundred yards east of Red Beach 2.36

Kwajalein and Eniwetok Operations, 14 Mar 44

(hereafter cited as Roberts Report), pp. 34ff. The

Roberts Mission was sent to the Marshalls to evaluate

the effect of both U.S. and enemy weapons and report its findings to General Richardson.

32

 7th Inf Div Arty Rpt, Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msgs 21, 31,

32; TF 51 Marshalls Rpt, Incl A, p. 6. 33

 BLT 184-3 Rpt, 1 Feb 44, p. 1. 34

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, pp. 17-18. 35

 Ibid., p. 18. 36

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. VII, G-4 Rpt,

Annex B, p. 3; 767th Tk Bn Jnl, 1 Feb 44, pp. 4-5.
250 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

105-MM. HOWITZER CREW IN ACTION on Carlson Island.

In the lagoon, the destroyer Sigsbee was

stationed to furnish searchlight illumination of a zone crossing the island at the

eastern end of the airfield. It was scheduled to light the area during the first half

of each hour.37 Provision was made for

harassing fire to be delivered into the areas

east and north of the illuminated zone

from the divisional artillery on Carlson

Island, the regimental Cannon Companies, and the twelve mortars of the 91st

Chemical Company.38

While the men were being soaked by a

chill rain in the perimeter foxholes and in

bivouac areas nearer the landing beaches,

plans for the next day's operations were

reviewed at the regimental command post.

Intelligence from prisoners and from

enemy documents indicated that about

1,500 Japanese remained alive on Kwajalein Island. Contrary to an earlier estimate

that only small arms and light machine

guns remained, the enemy was known to

be able still to use some artillery, although

his heavier 5-inch guns had been destroyed.39

Despite a hard day, the divisional artillery batteries on Carlson prepared for the

night's action. During the day they had

fired 20,949 rounds of 105-mm. and 759

rounds of 155-mm. shells, most of them

during the artillery preparation from 0800

to 1200.40 A strong wind had swept the

smoke and dust away from the guns and

37

 TF 51 Marshalls Rpt, Incl A, p. 6. 38

 RCT 184 Rpt, p. 2. 39

 RCT 184 Jnl, 012400 Feb 44. 40

 These figures are calculated from the 7th Inf Div

Arty Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msg 134, which lists rounds expended between shorter intervals than those of the

Southern Artillery Report. For 1 February 1944, the

latter gives the figures for 155-mm. as 873 and for

105-mm. as 28,120 rounds between 0600 on 1 February and 0600 on 2 February 1944.
REDUCTION OF THE MAIN DEFENSES OF KWAJALEIN ISLAND 251

cooled the crews as they maintained a rate

of fire of from three to four rounds per

minute. Cooks, clerks, and drivers participated as ammunition handlers, while

the guns were manned by teams of eight,

permitting rest periods for three or four

men at a time. The crews broke open pallets and passed tons of ammunition. "The

men can stand more than the guns," said

Lt. Col. George D. Preston, commanding

the 145th Field Artillery.41

The 49th and 57th Field Artillery Battalions prepared to deliver night barrages

east of the battalions that they were supporting. The 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry,

had reached an area dangerously near

that on which the guns of the 57th Field

Artillery had registered in front of the

184th less than an hour earlier, and that

artillery battalion had to swing its fire

closer to the lagoon and farther from the

184th's night perimeter. The 32d's late

advance also delayed, until twilight, the

registration of the 49th. The first shells

from the 49th Field Artillery's preparatory

fire fell among troops of the 32d Infantry.

After the 49th's range had been corrected,

however, later barrages were repeatedly

requested during the night. A total of

4,556 rounds was expended by the unit

between 1800 and 0600.42

Naval gunfire on 1 February totaled

6,574 rounds of which 1,342 were 14-inch

shells from four battleships, 397 rounds

were 8-inch projectiles from three cruisers,

and 4,835 rounds were 5-inch shells fired

from battleships, cruisers, and five destroyers. In addition to the fire preparatory to

landing, naval guns were repeatedly employed in close support of the infantry advance as it moved up Kwajalein Island.43

As the day's advance had entered the

last stage, General Corlett and the rear

echelon of his staff moved ashore to the

command post on Carlson Island previously held by the advance party under

General Ready.44 General Holland Smith,

commanding the V Amphibious Corps,

remained aboard the flagship Rocky Mount

with Admiral Turner.

During the day's operations the enemy

had fought primarily from underground

shelters and pillboxes. A few large bunkers

and interconnected positions had delayed

the advance until details "peeled off' to

dispose of them while the remainder of the

American line continued forward. Certain

positions thought to have been wiped out

by grenades, flame throwers, and highexplosive charges or projectiles remained

quiet for hours, only to have surviving occupants recover and resume the battle by

any means remaining to them. Those Japanese who fired rifles from trees or underbrush were relatively few and scattered.

The organized resistance that occasionally

developed in the open had provided a

series of skirmishes for small details working with the tanks but had resulted in no

large-scale encounters.

After dark, however, a large number of

the enemy emerged from bunkers and air

raid shelters and tried to disrupt the invading force by a series of counterattacks

upon the forward perimeters. Individual

enemy riflemen and machine gun squads

sought to infiltrate along the flanks of the

American line or between the two regiments. To the men in the foxholes it was

a long night full of action and confusion.45

At the northern tip of the island, three

enemy dual-purpose guns continued in

action, dropping shells at various points

41

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. III, p. 26. 42

 7th Inf Div Arty Rpt, Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msgs 137,

138, and 2 Feb 44, Msg 43; 49th FA Bn AAR, p. 3. 43

 TF 51 Marshalls Rpt, Incl E, App 1, p. 3. 44

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. III, 7th Inf Div

G-1 Rpt, Annex VIII, p. 2; Ibid., Vol. VI, 7th Inf

Div G-3 Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msg 111. 45

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 97.
252 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

near the Red Beaches. Japanese mortars,

which had registered along the northern

end of Will Road late in the afternoon,

struck repeatedly during the night.46 The

enemy directed an antiaircraft gun,

mounted on Nob Pier, against the destroyer Sigsbee to suppress the searchlight illumination it was furnishing. When the destroyer succeeded in silencing the gun,

another was brought to bear from the same

position, and when that was knocked out,

enemy artillery on Burton Island tried unsuccessfully to hit Sigsbee. Though it seemed

to annoy the Japanese, illumination by

searchlight did not serve the needs of the

infantry as well as did flares and star shells

closer to their front lines.47

Naval gunfire from the lagoon, and the

division and regimental artillery deprived

the Japanese of any opportunity to deliver

blows with great force. Nevertheless, they

were able to mount a series of counterattacks covered in part by their own sporadic

artillery and mortar fire. A number of

these were broken up by American artillery while still in the preparatory stages,

but several had to be repulsed by the infantry in close-range fighting.48

In addition to concerted attacks, the

Japanese tried persistently to infiltrate in

small groups. In the 32d Regiment's zone,

flares over the ground in front of Company

F revealed the enemy to the Americans,

but enough got through to justify a warning order to the 1st Battalion, 32d, to be

ready to come to the support of the 2d Battalion. From the panel between the airstrips, intermittent enemy machine gun

fire from the flank passed over the forward

troops, most of it too high to do any damage.49

 Similar tactics in the 184th's zone

brought Japanese riflemen deep within the

American lines. One Japanese was killed

by a sentry as far west as the message center on Wolf Point, near the northern end

of Red Beach 1.50

One attack almost attained the proportions of a successful break-through in the

American defenses but was not exploited

by the enemy, either because of ignorance

of his opportunity or because of insufficient

strength. This attack was launched against

the 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, and

started at about 0130.51 During a heavy

rain squall in the last hour before midnight, the Japanese had moved back into

positions that they had vacated in the

afternoon. They had located Company L's

machine guns in the course of an earlier assault, and proceeded to lay down a dense

concentration of light mortar fire on the

portion of Company L's line nearest to the

lagoon. Three mortar shells fell directly on

the heavy machine gun position, wounding several men and killing one. A light

machine gun went out of operation nearby, and the remainder of the 1st Platoon,

Company L, was forced into a temporary,

hasty withdrawal. While some of the enemy infiltrated through this gap and

struck the left of the 2d Platoon, the heavy

machine gun in the center of that part of

Company L's line was swung to the left

and fired over the previous location of the

1st Platoon. By this fire on the Japanese

flank, a machine gun was silenced and

Will Road was closed to the enemy.

While the 1st Platoon withdrew, a call

for reinforcements and a resupply of am46

 RCT 184 Jnl, 011800 Feb 44; Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 18. 47

 TF 51 Marshalls Rpt, Incl E, App 2, p. 8. 48

 BLT 184-3 Rpt, p. 3; 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK

Rpt, Vol. IX, RCT 32 Rpt of Opns, BLT 32-2 Jnl,

012355, 020320 Feb 44. 49

 RCT 32 Jnl, 1 Feb 44, Msg 149c, and 2 Feb 44,

Msgs 1, 2. 50

 RCT 184 Rpt, S-1 Rpt, 9 Feb 44, p. 1. 51

 RCT 184 Jnl, 020137 Feb 44; Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, pp. 97-98.
REDUCTION OF THE MAIN DEFENSES OF KWAJALEIN ISLAND 253

munition had been sent to the regimental

command post. Company C, 184th Infantry, was sent forward but the thin lines

were restored even before the reinforcements had arrived. The two machine gun

sections of Company C were placed at the

extremities of the 1st Platoon line with the

rifle platoons in supporting positions. From

division artillery heavy fire was sent into

the area directly in front of Company L,

starting at 0158, and the immediate threat

of a break-through in this area was forestalled.52

During the early hours of morning, enemy offensive action dwindled to occasional harassing fire. Just before dawn,

mortar fire hit one of the machine gun

crews that had come forward as reinforcement to Company L, 184th Infantry, causing six casualties.53

 About 0600 steps were

being taken for the day's attack by the 2d

Battalion, 32d Infantry, when another

shell fell squarely beneath one of the antitank guns in Company F's line killing two,

wounding one, and disabling the gun.54

The 3d Battalion, 184th, was to be relieved at the end of this first dismal night

on Kwajalein. It had sustained casualties

of 14 killed and 54 wounded for the entire

period of its fighting on the island.55 The

2d Battalion of the same regiment was

ordered to move through the 3d's forward

positions and take up the attack. In the

32d regimental zone, the 2d Battalion was

to continue in the line. Fresh troops would

relieve that unit later in the morning.

Second Day's Action

The second day's action on Kwajalein

Island required more co-operation between the two regimental combat teams

than had been necessary on the previous

day. General Corlett had ordered the two

assault regiments to launch a co-ordinated

attack at 0715. The 32d Regiment on the

right, with Company A, 767th Tank Battalion, attached, was to drive rapidly to the

northern tip of the island. The 184th Regiment, with Company B, 767th Tank Battalion, attached, was to push hard on the left,

breach fortified positions, assist the advance of the 32d Infantry across the tank

trap and push rapidly to the end of the

island. Division artillery was ordered to

support the attack by a fifteen-minute

preparation commencing at 0700 and

thereafter by successive concentrations.

Artillery was to cease fire during a scheduled twenty-minute air strike by naval

planes to commence at 0800.56

Following the preparatory fire, in which

the battleship Idaho, the cruiser Minneapolis,

four destroyers, and five field artillery battalions on Carlson participated, the attack

opened. The 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry,

passed through the 3d Battalion of the

same regiment during the hour after 0715,

Company E on the left and Company F on

the right. Company G followed about 150

yards behind as a mopping-up force, while

the 1st Battalion came on in close support.

Each company of the leading battalion

was strengthened by one section of heavy

machine guns, one 37-mm. antitank gun,

five medium tanks, and two light tanks.57

On the other side of the island, as the 2d

Battalion, 32d Infantry, began to advance,

52

 7th Inf Div Arty Rpt, Jnl, 2 Feb 44, Msg 6; BLT

184-1 Rpt, p. 4. 53

 BLT 184-1 Rpt, p. 5. 54

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 18. 55

 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 98. 56

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. II, FO 3, 1 Feb

44.

57

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. XI, RCT 184

Rpt of Opns, BLT 184-2 Rpt of Opns (hereafter cited

as BLT 184-2 Rpt), pp. 3-4; TF 51 Marshalls Rpt,

Incl E, App 2, pp. 8-9; Marshall, Kwajalein Notes,

Vol. I, pp. 98-99.
254 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

37-MM. ANTITANK GUN FIRING on an enemy strongpoint.

enemy dual-purpose gun and mortar fire

struck the leading elements, killing two

men and wounding one. At 0800 fifteen

dive bombers commenced their scheduled

strike against the area in which the dualpurpose guns had been observed from the

air, and the battalion pushed forward with

its tanks according to plan. Company G

was in front, with Company E in close support and Company F in reserve.58

Occupation of the Airfield Is Completed

The first stage of the second day's action

would bring the leading battalions to the

eastern end of the airfield.59 Carl Road

crossed the island there, approximately

800 yards east of the 32d Regiment's starting line and 1,000 yards east of the 184th's.

The zone to be covered by the 2d Battalion, 32d, contained the westerly portion of

Canary Strong Point, just short of which

the battalion had spent the night, and all

of Cat Strong Point, some 500 yards farther along the ocean shore. The dense

vegetation between the shore and Wallace

Road and the taller coconut palms between the road and the southern edge of

the airfield had been badly blasted and

burned by the bombardment, but they

were less thoroughly flattened than those

at the western end of the island. The tank

trap given such prominence in the division's field orders cut left diagonally across

Carl Road in front of the 32d Infantry, but

58

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 18. 59

 Terrain description is based on operations map

and aerial photographs now in files of OCMH. The

description of the defenses is also based on the map

and photographs as corrected by JICPOA Bull 48-44.
REDUCTION OF THE MAIN DEFENSES OF KWAJALEIN ISLAND 255

most of its length was in the area beyond

the road.

Because of the northward curve of the

island, the area between the airfield and

the ocean narrowed quite sharply at the

end of the airfield nearest Carl Road, and

the regimental boundary down the middle

of the island cut diagonally across the airfield's eastern end. Near Carl Road the

wider portion of the 32d's zone was thus

open ground, consisting of the end of the

landing strip and part of the dispersal

space just north of it. The 184th Infantry's zone of advance for several hundred

yards ranged from the northern edge of

the landing strip to the lagoon. The central, wooded panel between airstrips was

at the right; next was the dispersal strip,

which curved southward at the far end; to

its north was the wooded area between the

airfield and Will Road; and between the

road and the lagoon beach was a curving

belt about seventy-five to a hundred yards

wide in which, commencing in the area of

Center Pier, there was a continuous series

of buildings. Although bombardment and

air strikes had wrecked the docks and destroyed most of the buildings and a direct

hit during the naval bombardment of 30

January had sent an ammunition dump

skyward with devastating results in a wide

area near the base of the docks, a number

of active gun positions had been spotted

along the lagoon. Also, in the area near

Carl Road, where the thickly wooded strip

between the dispersal strip and Will Road

greatly widened, some enemy resistance

might be expected.

It was thought, as the battalions jumped

off toward Carl Road for the first phase of

the second day's attack, that the 184th

could expect more difficulty than the 32d,

unless Cat Strong Point proved to be formidable. Enemy riflemen who had taken

positions behind the advanced perimeters

of the 3d Battalion, 184th, fired on the 2d

Battalion as it passed through the 3d. Return fire carried past them and some of it

fell among the 3d Battalion, causing four

casualties.60 By 0816 the entire 2d Battalion had passed the 3d's advanced positions.61

At first the advance of the 2d Battalion

was cautious as the men felt their way forward, but after they began to familiarize

themselves with the terrain ahead they

pushed forward rapidly. Scattered enemy

points of resistance were encountered,

mostly small pillboxes, sometimes with interconnecting trenches but with no shelters. The positions on the lagoon shore had

been mostly knocked out by the artillery.

The assault waves advanced about two

hundred yards before they came into a

perimeter of heavy sniper fire from an area

that was still studded with trees and underbrush in spite of the preparatory bombardment. Snipers worked from behind rubble

heaps and from the ruins of old buildings,

but the effect was more harassing than

deadly.62

By 0900 the advance of the leading companies had passed the H Docks and was

continuing. The 1st Battalion was closely

following the assault, mopping up rear

areas and eliminating snipers. In the assault waves the medium tanks and infantry advanced abreast. Tanks sprayed the

treetops with their .30-caliber machine

gun fire, coming to a stop when it was

necessary to turn their 75-mm. guns

against pillboxes. The standard procedure

when one of these positions was encountered was for the tank to advance up to the

60

 BLT 184-2 Rpt, p. 61; RCT 184 Jnl, 020732 Feb

44.

61

 RCT 184 Jnl, 020816 Feb 44. 62

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 99.
256 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

pillbox with two or three infantrymen covering it and one tankman on the ground

guiding his vehicle. The tank ordinarily

then took its position so that its machine

gun could cover the entrance to the pillbox

while the 75-mm. gun fired at the wall.

Frequently while this action was taking

place the infantry wave bypassed the structure and continued beating the ground

ahead. By 1040 these maneuvers had succeeded so well that Companies E and F

were across Carl Road. As of 1030 the

advance had cost twenty-five casualties.63

On the opposite shore of the island, the

2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, met greater difficulties, although it did reach Carl Road

at the same time as the 184th. Shortly after

the strafing attack carried out by naval

planes from 0800 to 0820, Company G

came across an unexpected tank ditch running from the landing strip to Wallace

Road. To avoid this obstruction, the accompanying tanks swung wide left to go

along the airstrip, thus exposing the infantrymen to fire from a pillbox on the left.

Two of the tanks attempted to silence this

position, but failed to do so and moved on

toward the airstrip. Three more tanks

came along and joined the fusilade, which

continued for fifteen minutes. Finally,

Capt. Albert W. Pence of Company G

succeeded in establishing contact with his

supporting tanks and in a few minutes the

infantrymen had the position under control.64

That part of Company G that was moving along the ocean shore had relatively

little trouble, but the platoon on the left

ran into considerable organized resistance

in the form of riflemen working from trees

and shallow fire trenches and of automatic

fire from strongly revetted pillboxes. The

positions backed up those along the ocean

front, and while the latter were the more

conspicuous, the former were the more

deadly. It took two hours of fighting for

Company G to advance two hundred

yards through this belt of works with the

aid of tanks and engineer demolition crews.

By 0926 they had reached the end of

Canary Strong Point.

The 2d Battalion then moved on rapidly

until it reached the perimeter of fire from

Cat Strong Point where its earlier experience was repeated. Once more it became

evident that the beach positions were the

outer crust and not the core of resistance.

They yielded readily and the right platoon

advanced well ahead of the left. But inland from the road were well-concealed

tiers of defensive works which, in spite of

the artillery fire, were still capable of

action. Not until 1020 was Cat Strong

Point finally cleared on the right, and not

until 1040 did the left platoon finally reach

Carl Road abreast of the 184th Infantry.65

The Area of the Main Tank Trap

Upon crossing Carl Road, the two regiments began the second stage of their attack of 2 February. A section between Carl

Road and Nora Road, some three hundred yards farther along the island, was to

be traversed. Will Road continued to parallel the lagoon beach. Wallace Road, at

a point a hundred yards beyond Carl

Road, swung left away from the ocean for

a hundred yards to join Nora Road, thus

narrowing the distance between Will and

Wallace Roads.

A deep tank trap lay immediately before

the 32d Infantry. The longer section of this

trap ran for two hundred yards straight

63

 BLT 184-2 Rpt, p. 4. 64

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 19. 65

 RCT 32 Jnl, 2 Feb 44, Msgs 30, 31, 32, 33; Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 19.
REDUCTION OF THE MAIN DEFENSES OF KWAJALEIN ISLAND 257

east from Carl Road to the bend in Wallace Road; and, from the other side of the

highway at that point, a shorter section

extended for ninety yards south to the

ocean beach. Just beyond the angle of the

trap, between the long bend in Wallace

Road and the ocean shore and short of the

Nora Road line, lay one of the most extensive and elaborately organized sets of

defensive positions on the island. Designated as Corn Strong Point, it extended

inland to a depth of about a hundred yards

and was believed to contain three pillboxes

and an open artillery position, both near

the beach, and up to seven machine gun

emplacements inland. These positions

were interspersed with storage pits and

antitank trenches.

North of the main tank trap a long rifle

trench ran in an irregular line across the

island diagonally from Corn Strong Point

to a point near the junction of Carl Road

with Will Road. The 184th Infantry had

come upon its northern extremity just before reaching the Carl Road line. The

trench, with a connected loop in the middle of the island, extended through most

of the ground to be covered by the 184th's

right elements. It was clear that the long

rifle trench, the tank trap, and the associated gun emplacements of Corn Strong

Point were intended to be the main defense

system obstructing movement from the

western part of Kwajalein Island, containing the airfield, into the northeastern portion, containing most of the installations.

Along this line the Japanese were expected

to make their most determined stand.

For the initial assault on the tank trap

and Corn Strong Point, the 32d Infantry's

3d Battalion was ordered to pass through

its 2d Battalion at Carl Road and to lead

the attack. These fresh troops were to be

supported by the tanks of Companies A

and D, 767th Tank Battalion and, from

the left flank, by the tanks of Company B,

which would be temporarily detached

from the 184th.66 Preparatory and supporting fire from the artillery on Carlson

Island and from the 32d's Cannon Company in Wart Area was to be co-ordinated

with the tank and infantry movements.

While the new assault units were moving

up, the enemy in Corn Strong Point was

kept under heavy artillery bombardment

and was isolated from possible reinforcement by naval gunfire.67

 Enemy guns that

were still active in the northeastern end of

the island were struck by dive bombers.

The jump-off was ordered for 1245.

A series of delays deferred this crucial

attack over an hour. To assemble the staff

and co-ordinate the plans for employing

tanks, artillery, and infantry while the 3d

Battalion made its approach march,

proved difficult to arrange. The time for

the assault had passed before the planning

difficulties were resolved. Then came

notice of an air strike to be made at 1315—

later postponed, on Admiral Turner's

order, to 1330—thus necessitating the suspension of all artillery fire.68

 Since the attack on Corn Strong Point was to be immediately preceded by a heavy artillery

barrage, the whole operation was postponed to 1400.

The tanks of Company A, 767th Tank

Battalion, lined up along Carl Road to

fire against the strong point, while those

from Company B took positions almost at

right angles to that road and prepared to

strike the enemy from the left flank during

the first stage of the attack. One of the batteries on Carlson continued to fire during

66

 RCT 32 Jnl, 2 Feb 44, Msg 340; 7th Inf Div FO

2, Opns Map, Phase II. 67

 RCT 32 Jnl, p. 121. 68

 Ibid., Msgs 37, 43.
258 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

the air strike, and the Cannon Company's

howitzers also laid a preparation on the

target area before the advance commenced

at 1400.69 Then, while the artillery lifted

fire to ground northeast of the target, the

tanks and infantry approached the tank

trap in a 225-yard advance across open

ground. The tanks poured machine gun

fire into the area. Thirty yards behind

them the troops came forward to the shelter of the tank ditch without receiving an

enemy shot. The Japanese were pinned

down.70

While the left wing of infantry troops

started to push across the wide tank barrier, the tanks on their left momentarily

broke off fire from the flank. A few tanks

from Company A, 767th Tank Battalion,

moved toward the ocean to bypass the

deep ditch, and the others after a brief

hesitation laid a base of fire to cover the

infantry's advance. The tanks hesitated to

poke out along the flimsy wooden bridge

by which Wallace Road cut through the

angle of the tank trap.

At this stage, a concentration of white

phosphorus shells commenced to fall into

the area in which Company I, 32d Infantry, was moving, and some two score of the

men were burned. After hesitating briefly

the infantry moved steadily to the tank

ditch.

There the troops remained for some

time because the medium tanks pulled

back claiming they could not get over the

ditch. This impasse was finally broken

when two light and two medium tanks

made their way along the ocean beach

around the right end of the ditch and took

the pillboxes in Corn Strong Point under

fire. The infantry wave then pushed forward and with the aid of engineers proceeded to destroy that strong point in detail. There were no American casualties.

An estimated hundred Japanese were

killed in the area, the majority by demolition charges carried forward by engineer

details while rifle and BAR men covered

them. Little or no defense was put up

against these tactics. The Japanese remained huddled in their shelters in spite

of efforts made to coax them out to surrender. Only one prisoner was taken in the

whole area. Grenades were thrown into

the shelters, and those who survived were

then destroyed by demolition charges. Altogether, it took about thirty-five minutes

to reduce Corn Strong Point once the

American infantry got beyond the tank

trap.71

Contact between the forward battalion

of the 32d Infantry and that of the 184th

was temporarily lost during this fray, and

Company K, 32d Infantry, moved through

the left platoon of Company I to establish

the contact firmly as soon as Corn Strong

Point was taken. Advance to the Nora

Road line seemed practicable within the

time remaining before taking defensive

positions for the night. To escape spending

the night in an area too heavily wooded for

security, the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry,

planned to advance northeast of the junction of Nora Road and Wallace Road,

even though that would place its perimeter

slightly forward of the 184th's front-line

elements, which were resting just short of

Nora Road itself.72

Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion, 184th,

had crossed Carl Road before 1040 but

was held up until 1245 in order to advance

69

 7th Inf Div Arty Rpt, Jnl, 2 Feb 44, Msgs 91, 99,

100, 101, 104, 108. According to this journal, all battalions ceased fire between 1327 and 1407; however,

at 1350 the 32d Infantry's journal records that the

49th Field Artillery Battalion had continued to fir e

during the air strike. See also Marshall, Kwajalein

Notes, Vol. I, p. 20. 70

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 20. 71

 RCT 32 Jnl, 2 Feb 44, p. 128; Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 21. 72

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 21.
REDUCTION OF THE MAIN DEFENSES OF KWAJALEIN ISLAND 259

evenly with the 32d. At that time it moved

out with Company F on the right and

Company E on the left along the lagoon.

For the first forty-five minutes no serious

resistance was met. There was no tank obstacle in the area and the enemy's positions

along the lagoon shore were less formidable than had been expected. At 1330,

however, the 184th had to lend its medium tanks to the 32d Infantry as the latter moved against Corn Strong Point. This

left the infantry unprotected at a time

when they began to meet their first serious

resistance. The tanks returned about an

hour later but were so low on ammunition

and fuel that they had to be sent back to

Wolf Strong Point for resupply. Without

this tank support the infantry advance was

stalled. Altogether, the 184th suffered over

sixty casualties by the end of the day, including the loss of Company F's commanding officer. At 1630 Company G was sent

forward to relieve Company F.73

When the time arrived to organize night

defenses, the forward perimeter of the

184th, instead of being located on Nora

Road as planned, was withdrawn to a line

only seventy-five to a hundred yards

northeast of Carl Road.74 This necessitated an even greater withdrawal on the

part of the 32d Regiment. From a line

well beyond Nora Road the 3d Battalion,

32d, fell back to another somewhat short

of the road and took positions in the abandoned trenches and shell craters of Corn

Strong Point. The line bent westerly from

Wallace Road to reach the regimental

boundary at a point about a hundred

yards beyond the main portion held by the

2d Battalion, 184th Infantry.75

Situation at the End of the Second Day

As night closed in the naval planes retired to their carriers, having made seventy

sorties over Kwajalein Island dropping 40

tons of bombs and expending 20,800

rounds of .30-caliber ammunition in special missions and general ground support.

The close support carriers and battleships,

with their screens, cruised a few miles

south of Kwajalein Island. No enemy aircraft had been discovered operating in

the entire Marshall Islands area.76

During 2 February the transports had

continued unloading the supply and ammunition for dumps on Carlson, Carlos,

and Kwajalein Islands. A forward ammunition dump and maintenance point was

set up between Wilma Road and the airfield and maintained by DUKW's until

their withdrawal during the late afternoon

for service in the next day's assault on Burton Island. By the end of 2 February

the unloading of materiel for Carlos and

Carlson had reached a point where it

could be estimated that it would be completed by noon of the 3d. The shore parties

on Kwajalein Island were reinforced during the day by elements of the defense

force. Green Beach 4, facing the lagoon at

the western corner of the island, was put

into use during the afternoon.77

American casualties recorded on 2 February included 11 killed in action and 241

wounded, of whom 34 were returned to

duty.78 Evacuation of the wounded on 2

February had been rapid, especially after

the arrival of the ambulances during the

afternoon. Litter squads took the wounded

to the battalion aid stations for treatment,

after which they were brought along the

73

 RCT 184 Jnl, 021330 Feb 44, 021831 Feb 44;

767th Tk Bn Jnl, p. 6; Marshall, Kwajalein Notes,

Vol. I, p. 100. 74

 BLT 184-2 Rpt, p. 4. 75

 Ibid., p. 4; Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I,

p. 22. 76

 TF 51 Marshalls Rpt, Incl F, p. 4. 77

 Ibid., p. 109, and Incl A, p. 7. 78

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. VII, G-4 Rpt,

Annex C, Medical Rpt, p. 127.
260 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

BATTALION AID STATION near the beach and corpsmen administering blood plasma to

a casualty.

main highways in ambulances to the two

collecting stations. At the beach, the shore

party medical section evacuated them to

the transports in LVT's. Late in the afternoon, the collecting station of Company B,

7th Medical Battalion, which served the

32d Regimental Combat Team, moved

along Wallace Road to a position some

seven hundred yards east of Red Beach 2.

No clearing station had yet been established.79

The enemy was believed to be near the

end of his strength. His casualties were

thought to be from 1,000 to 1,200 dead.

One of the few captured prisoners declared

the remaining defenses in ruins, communications broken, and only 200 to 300 of the

remaining soldiers able to resist.80 In such

circumstances, the stage was set for the

characteristic "banzai" attack. General

Corlett's headquarters warned, "Be alert

for counterattack at anytime day or night,

it's bound to come. The Jap makes his

suicide counterattack at dawn on the day

after his cause becomes hopeless. Watch

out tomorrow morning."81

The night's operations nevertheless

proved to be relatively quiet. Enemy artillery fired some white phosphorus in front

of both regiments, dropped a mortar shell

near the tanks bivouacked at the western

end of the airfield, and after midnight sent

over a substantial volume of grenades and

small arms, automatic, and mortar fire, 79

 7th Inf Div Med Bn Rpt of Activity During

FLINTLOCK Opn, 2 Feb 44, pp. 10, 11. 80

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. III, G-1 Rpt,

Jnl, 2 Feb 44, p. 9; RCT 32 Jnl, 022030 Feb 44. 81

 RCT 32 Jnl, 2 Feb 44, Msgs 71, 72.
REDUCTION OF THE MAIN DEFENSES OF KWAJALEIN ISLAND 261

such as might be preliminary to a counterattack. Yelling and the throwing of grenades continued in front of Company G,

184th Infantry, but no major counterattack developed, and after 0320 the front

line quieted down.82 From the 32d Infantry's side of the island, firing and star shells

on the lagoon side could be observed, but

no corresponding action, not even active

evening patrols, disturbed the waiting men

in their own zone.83

The night did not pass without some

casualties, however. At approximately

2300 an enemy shell burst above the position of the 2d Platoon, 91st Chemical

Company, causing a conflagration that

wounded seven men.84 Soon thereafter one

of the 155-mm. howitzers in Battery B,

145th Field Artillery Battalion, suffered a

premature burst that split the tube, sent

one large piece four hundred yards through

the air, and set the nearest powder cases

ablaze. One man was killed at once, three

later died of wounds, and thirteen others

were wounded, of whom five had to be immediately evacuated. Live ammunition

was hastily removed to safety, the fire

gotten under control, and the position

saved.85

The situation at the end of the second

day's fighting on Kwajalein Island encouraged expectations of a speedy victory on

the following day. For the next day's operations, General Corlett ordered the two

assault regiments: "Organize vigorous attack 0715 tomorrow. . . . Finish the job

not later than 1500 3 February. The

Northern Force [at Roi-Namur] has finished the job. . . ."86

82

 Ibid., pp. 136-39; Marshall, Kwajalein Notes,

Vol. I, p. 101. 83

 RCT 32 Jnl, 3 Feb 44, p. 139. 84

 91st Chemical Co Rpt of Participation in Kwajalein Opns, 18 Feb 44, p. 137. 85

 145th FA Bn Jnl, 3 Feb 44, pp. 187-88; Marshall,

Kwajalein Notes, Vol. III, pp. 27-29. 86

 RCT 32 Jnl, 2 Feb 44, Msg 71.
CHAPTER XVI

Kwajalein Island:

The Third Day

From the line of departure of 3 February

to the northeastern extremity, Kwajalein

Island curved and narrowed for about

2,000 yards.1 Halfway along the lagoon

shore was Nob Pier, while on the ocean

side the distance around the outside of the

curve from Corn Strong Point to Nathan

Road, which extends across the island from

Nob Pier, was approximately 1,500 yards.

The island was over 600 yards wide where

the day's advance was to start but narrowed to almost 300 yards at Nathan

Road. (Map 11)

Nathan Road was the day's first objective. At the left, between the lagoon and

Will Road, the band of buildings that had

begun near Center Pier continued unbroken. Another concentration of buildings lay in the middle of the island some

250 yards north of Nora Road, in a diamond-shaped area of approximately 250

by 350 yards. Here, according to a captured enemy map, were the headquarters,

communications center, shops, and other

installations of the Admiralty section, as

distinguished from those related to the airfield. Except along its southeastern side,

the area of these buildings had been

cleared, and a loop of secondary road connected it with Will Road. The third aggregation of enemy buildings to be encountered in the area before Nathan Road was

the southern section of the heavily built-up

area that stretched to the end of the island.

Buildings extended, within a grid of crossisland and north-south streets, from a

wooded area some 500 yards south of

Nathan Road to the northern highway

loop. Halfway between Nora and Nathan

Roads, among the southernmost buildings

of this northern aggregation, was Noel

Road, which also linked the two main

island highways.

Photographic reconnaissance of the part

of Kwajalein Island yet to be captured on

3 February had been limited by the heavy

woods. Coastal installations stood out most

clearly, and these appeared to be considerably stronger on the ocean side. South of

Nathan Road two concentrations had

been detected along the ocean shore. The

first, organized around 300 yards of trench,

lay parallel to the shore, 600 to 900 yards

beyond Corn Strong Point, from which the

right elements of the 32d Infantry were to

start. In the narrow area between the

trench and the ocean, two covered artillery

positions and five pillboxes were anticipated. Immediately beyond the trench the

second concentration, designated as Nap

Strong Point, consisted of nearly 400 yards

of organized positions in which three heavy

1

 Description based upon 7th Inf Div Opns Map,

JICPOA Bull 48-44.

264 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

and five light machine gun emplacements

had been observed and at least one pillbox

was expected.

The Plan for 3 February

The two regiments faced, on what was

expected to be the last day of attack, the

island's area of densest construction. Estimates of remaining Japanese fortified positions other than those along the shores had

been made from information supplied by

Japanese prisoners and the captured Marshalls natives but, although the latter had

warned of reinforced concrete shelters

among the other structures in the northern

portion of the island, their actual number

and strength was not anticipated.2

Progress on Kwajalein Island on 3 February required co-ordinated movement

through strong defenses and heavy concentrations of enemy troops. The axis of advance would turn gradually from northeast

to north, as the troops advanced along the

narrowing curve of the island. Except for a

brief loop to the east to bring all of the

Admiralty area into the 184th Infantry's

zone, the regimental boundary continued

along the middle of the island. To make

the swing along the island's curve while

maintaining alignments of the two regimental fronts demanded greater rapidity

of advance in the 32d Infantry zone.

General Corlett's plan for 3 February

anticipated rapid occupation of the rest of

the island. It called for a "vigorous attack,"

beginning at 0715.3 At 0700 a ten-minute

artillery preparation would begin in which

the eighteen heavy regimental mortars

would supplement the division artillery in

hitting Kwajalein Island, while the naval

gunfire was being directed on Burton

Island.4 During this preparatory fire, the

1st Battalion, 184th Infantry, was to pass

through the 2d Battalion and jump off

from the line of departure at 0715, Company A on the right, Company B on the

left, and Company C in reserve. Each company was to have a detachment of the 13th

Engineers, a platoon of heavy machine

guns, and one 37-mm. antitank gun. The

engineers were to prepare the charges to

blow up enemy shelters. Each of the leading companies would be supported by four

medium tanks, and in addition two light

tanks would operate with Company A on

the right.5

The 32d Infantry's attack was to be carried by the 3d Battalion, Company I on

the right along the ocean shore, Company

K on the left between Wallace Road and

the regimental boundary, and Company L

mopping up behind Company K. One

platoon of medium tanks and two light

tanks were to support the assault, with a

second platoon of mediums in reserve. A

destroyer would furnish naval gunfire on

call, and air support would continue as on

the previous days. The 1st Battalion was to

pass through the 2d Battalion and follow

in close support, covering any gaps in

depth that might develop.6

The Attack of the 32d Infantry

The execution of the plan began at 0705,

with the ten-minute preparatory fire. The

troops jumped off on schedule while the

artillery continued to fire ahead of the

troops in a creeping barrage. When the 1st

Battalion, 184th Infantry, had come

abreast of the 32d Infantry, the latter

moved forward across a hundred yards of

2

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, pp. 68, 101. 3

 RCT 32 Jnl, 2 Feb 44, Msg 71. 4

 RCT 184 Jnl, 021830 Feb 44. 5

 RCT 184 Rpt, pp. 53-54. 6

 RCT 32 Rpt, p. 5.
KWAJALEIN ISLAND: THE THIRD DAY 265

brush to a woods that had been under

bombardment. No fire was received until

the troops had pressed though the woods

for another two hundred yards. Only ruins

of a few structures were found there, but

about 150 yards to the northwest was the

corner of the Admiralty area, where a

large concrete pillbox partly commanded

the 32d Infantry's route of advance. Protected by the trees, most of Companies K

and I passed beyond this installation, while

Company K's support platoon and two of

the medium tanks turned left to attack it.

Driven into the open by demolition charges

and 75-mm. shells, the enemy occupants

ran out one by one to seek shelter among

nearby buildings. Lt. Col. John M. Finn,

executive officer of the 32d Infantry, and

Capt. Sanford I. Wolff, observer from the

33d Infantry Division, shot them as they

ran. The Japanese buildings on the left

flank could not be cleared unless Company

K moved into the field of fire of Company

A, 184th Infantry, which was just beginning to push along the southwestern edge

of the Admiralty area. A local arrangement

was therefore made by Colonel Finn and

1st Lt. Norvin E. Smith, commanding

Company A. Company L, 32d Infantry,

with the support platoon of Company A,

184th Infantry, would mop up the building

area by house-to-house action; the remainder of Company A would continue north,

and in so doing protect Company K's left

flank. Company L would also maintain

connection between the two battalions.

The arrangement in effect modified the

regimental boundary.7

Enemy positions in the 32d Infantry's

zone were not only scattered but also such

as to enable rapid movement without detailed search of all cover. The more thorough mopping up could be done by support

elements. General Corlett ordered the 32d

Infantry to "keep smashing ahead."

 8 The

growing gap between the leading elements

of the two regiments was, however, a cause

of increasing concern to Colonel Finn. By

shortly before noon the right wing had

pushed through the first aggregation of defenses along the ocean shore and had

reached Noel Road. The 32d Infantry's

line bent southwest from that point to a

point about two hundred yards north of

the Admiralty area. The 184th Infantry's

lines extended from the southwestern edge

of the Admiralty area southwest to the

lagoon shore about a hundred yards from

Nora Road.9 Between the two regiments

there was a vertical gap including most of

the Admiralty area. To care for this and

any other strain on the lengthening gap

between the two regiments, the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, had been sent forward

at 0900. Early in the afternoon Company

B relieved Company L, which had been

mopping up in the Admiralty area; Company L then moved north to fill in the

vertical gap; Company C filled in south of

Company L along the gap; and Company

A, in reserve, stood ready to shift to the

south of Company C should the gap

become longer.10

Had the enemy defense been co-ordinated, the long spearhead on the eastern

side of the island might have been struck

effectively from the west, but actually the

danger most apparent to the 32d Infantry's

command was that of fire from the zone of

the 184th. In fact, small arms fire from the

184th's zone did fall from time to time east

of the Admiralty area.11 As the 184th Infantry swung north, the line of fire could

increase this risk. 7

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 80. 8

 RCT 32 Jnl, 3 Feb 44, Msg 17. 9

 Ibid., 3 Feb 44, pp. 155-56. 10

 Ibid., 3 Feb 44, pp. 144, 157. 11

 Ibid., 3 Feb 44, p. 160.
266 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

The Morning Action in the 184th Infantry's

Zone

The division plan for 3 February had

envisioned heavy opposition in front of the

32d Infantry and very little of consequence

facing the 184th. Within thirty minutes of

the move northeastward, however, the 1st

Battalion, 184th Infantry, had run into the

first of the many surprises it was to encounter during the day.

The Early Phase of the Attack

After passing through the 2d Battalion,

184th Infantry, and continuing into the

area temporarily penetrated on the previous afternoon, the 1st Battalion had

reached the line of departure at 0715 in

accordance with orders.12 The advance

was started without supporting tanks,

which had failed to arrive because of a

misunderstanding about their rendezvous

with infantry guides.13 In the first 150

yards Company B, along the lagoon, and

Company A, at the right, advanced

through rubble and broken trees west of

Nora Road without more than scattered

rifle fire from Japanese riflemen and occasional light machine gun fire from pillboxes. Their momentum carried them on

for another seventy-five yards with such

rapidity that the prospects for swift advance seemed excellent. Company B

cleaned out an air raid shelter with grenades and shot down fleeing Japanese

wearing arm bands like those of the American troops. Both companies were advancing over ground that had been under

American mortar fire just before the jumpoff. At 0806 enemy opposition was reported

to be weak.14

Then Company B looked ahead at a

sight for which no warnings had prepared

them. As far as could be seen along either

side of Will Road—along the lagoon and

in the Admiralty area—amid dust and

smoke, lay the dense ruins of frame structures, the shattered walls of concrete buildings, some of them very large, and a

confused tangle of trees and rubble. Interspersed among the wrecked buildings were

several underground shelters with great

earthen mounds above them, and concrete

blockhouses, intact and active. At the

nearer edge of this formidable barrier was a

great, round blockhouse of reinforced concrete; fifty yards beyond the blockhouse,

among the buildings, two huge shelters

could be seen side by side. Thick, reinforced

concrete, steel plates, logs, and a blanket of

sand several feet thick had enabled them

to withstand artillery fire without significant damage. Smaller bunkers at their

right were part of the system of organized

defensive positions that the men of Company B had to reduce. As the line approached the blockhouse, enemy fire

strengthened.

The Split in Company B

Capt. Charles A. White, the Company

B commander, had placed two rifle platoons in line at the start of the morning's

attack. The blockhouse was almost entirely

in the zone of the 1st Platoon, on the right.

Just to the east of the built-up position lay

a long, open corridor where a building had

once stood. All that remained was the

concrete floor.15

The company had come up to the block12

 RCT 184 Jnl, 030745 Feb 44; RCT 184 Rpt,

BLT 184-1 Rpt, p. 7. 13

 BLT 184-1 Rpt, p. 7. 14

 RCT 184 Jnl, 030806 Feb 44; Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 24. 15

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, pp. 24ff.

Unless otherwise noted, the following account of the

action of Company B is taken from this source.
KWAJALEIN ISLAND: THE THIRD DAY 267

house with no supporting weapons. Before

any attack was made, it was decided to

wait until the heavier pieces could be

brought to bear. 1st Lt. Harold D. Klatt,

commander of the 1st Platoon, upon receiving a 37-mm. antitank gun, the first

heavy weapon to be brought up, moved it

to the entrance of the blockhouse, and the

crew fired several rounds into it. Nothing

seemed to happen as a result of these shells,

so the gun was withdrawn. While the 1st

Platoon had been working on the position

from the right, the 2d Platoon, under 2d

Lt. Frank D. Kaplan, had meanwhile

swung more to the left toward the lagoon,

partly to pass the blockhouse and partly to

follow the curve of the lagoon shore.

After his 1st Platoon had withdrawn its

antitank gun, Lieutenant Klatt decided to

bypass the position to the right and leave it

for the tanks and reserve company to finish

when they came up from the rear. To keep

from being too badly mauled by the enemy

still in the blockhouse, however, the platoon had to take maximum advantage of

cover. Lieutenant Klatt ordered his men

to move by bounds, swinging just to the

right of the open corridor provided by the

demolished building's floor. Several things

happened now almost simultaneously: In

the course of moving forward the 1st Platoon broke up into small groups and thus

became a whole series of more or less independent bodies, each engaged in some

small mission; the Japanese in the blockhouse, seeing that they were about to be

bypassed, evidently decided to make some

attempt to get out and back to other positions in the rear; and Lieutenant Klatt discovered that he was actually lost—in the

piles of rubble and debris that littered the

whole area. Although the men of Lieutenant Kaplan's 2d Platoon were not more

than twenty yards away on a straight line,

they could not be seen; nor could Lieutenant Klatt's operator reach them on his

radio.

The men of the 1st Platoon gave their

full attention to their own situation. Their

most immediate problem seemed to be the

elimination of the Japanese who were trying to escape from the blockhouse. Wherever they could, the men took up firing

positions and cut down the enemy, one by

one, as they appeared at the entrances.

Elsewhere, Japanese in trees, in numerous

supporting pillboxes and shelters, and even

under and behind the rubble piles, began

a counterfire on the little groups. Some of

the platoon broke off fire at the blockhouse

and began to search through the debris for

the sources of the harassment. Others

crouched in shell holes or behind the piles

of rubble trying to find the enemy from the

relatively protected vantage points. Meanwhile, medium tanks had at last moved up

the road from the rear and approached the

blockhouse. There they stopped and sat

idly since neither Lieutenant Klatt nor

any of his men could get to them to tell the

crews what had to be done.

The truth is that it would probably have

made little difference at this point whether

the infantrymen could have reached the

tanks. The improvised telephone sets that

had been installed on the rear of the tanks

for the Kwajalein operation were usually

shorted out because their boxes were inadequately waterproofed. The only sure

way for Klatt to have contacted a tank

would have been to rap on its outside with

a rifle butt. This would have entailed stopping the tank and opening its hatch while

the infantry and tank commanders conferred. In a close-fire fight such as this, the

danger to all parties concerned would have

been too great to warrant the risk.16

16

 USAFICPA Participation Rpt Kwajalein and

Eniwetok, pp. 176-78; 767th Tk Bn FLINTLOCK Rpt,

28 Feb 44, p. 66.
TANK-INFANTRY ATTACK amid the rubble of the fortifications on Kwajalein. A 37-mm.

antitank gun being brought into position (above); infantrymen, supported by M4 tanks, prepare to

attack (below).
KWAJALEIN ISLAND: THE THIRD DAY 269

While the 1st Platoon had been working

around the right of the big blockhouse, the

2d Platoon had moved to the left and then

halted to reorganize and wait for the 1st

Platoon to re-establish contact. Ahead of

his men, Lieutenant Kaplan could see

nothing but debris. From the littered

ground and from a small wharf that jutted

out into the lagoon, rifle fire was being received in fairly heavy volume. To eliminate

this, the platoon commander decided to

call in artillery fire, but he asked the artillery forward observer to confine it, if possible, to the area between the lagoon and the

road. He did not know exactly where the

1st Platoon was, but suspected it might be

ahead of him. When the fire was finally

brought in, some of it spilled across the

road and began bursting within 20 to 25

yards of Lieutenant Klatt's men. Klatt

sensed that the bursts were from American

artillery, and, as they appeared to be getting closer, he yelled for his men to pull

back behind the blockhouse. In one case

four men had just left a crater when the

exact spot on which they had been lying

was hit by a shell. The 1st Platoon reorganized and took up a position approximately on a line with the blockhouse.

The Second Attack

More than an hour had elapsed since

the company first entered the area, and

battalion headquarters was beginning to

notice that there had been no advance in

the Company B area. Headquarters called

Captain White so frequently for information that the company commander finally

left his command post to join Lieutenant

Klatt in the debris ahead. Before he left for

the front line he committed part of his 3d

Platoon along the lagoon shore where, according to an air observer, some Japanese

were gathering for a counterattack.

Upon his arrival at the front lines, Captain White reorganized his whole line,

bringing up machine guns to cover the gap

between his two assault platoons and lining up the tanks for a co-ordinated drive

against the numerous shelters that lay

ahead. Because of the failure of previous

tactics against these positions, the tanks

were now to precede the infantry, moving

slowly and firing all their weapons at targets of opportunity. The infantry, under

cover of this fire, would move directly up

to the shelters and throw in satchel charges.

Company B's second attack began at

approximately 0945. Two hours and a half

had elapsed since the initial effort had begun, and no appreciable gains had been

registered since the company had first

reached the fortified area.

The new tactics proved unsatisfactory

from the first. The fire from the tanks was

directed at random and proved to be more

dangerous to the infantry than the action

of the enemy. When Captain White sought

to co-ordinate the work of tanks and infantry, the problem of communications again

became a major one. The phones on the

rear of the vehicles would not work, and

the company commander had to scramble

up on the top of the turret and beat a tattoo

with the butt of his weapon to get the

attention of the men in the lead tank. By

the time he had told the commander what

he wanted, the whole platoon of tanks had

become separated from the infantry, and

each tank was proceeding on an independent mission. For the time being, the value

of the tanks was lost to the infantry. Moreover, the two assault platoons, pushing

through the rubble, had themselves once

more become separated and all co-ordination between them was lost.

On the left, between the highway and
270 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

the lagoon, all of the 2d Platoon and part

of the 3d were driving forward steadily.

Each pile of debris was investigated, blown

up with satchel charges, and then set afire.

Working in small groups, the men on the

left moved forward one hundred yards in

an hour. Conditions were such that two

details working less than ten yards apart

did not know of each other's presence. The

high piles of splintered wood and smashed

concrete, together with the dense smoke

that now covered the area, isolated and

split up the various actions. Japanese who

fired from under the debris, sometimes at

almost point-blank range, had to be routed

out.

On the right, Lieutenant Klatt's platoon

had also separated into small groups to

carry the fight to the shelters and piles of

debris in its area. Captain White, after his

episode with the tanks, tried to re-establish

a solid company front and sent his runner

to Lieutenant Klatt with orders to close

the gap between himself and Lieutenant

Kaplan. Klatt replied that this was impossible until the big blockhouse, now to his

left rear, had been cleaned out. White,

upon receiving this message, ordered his

runner to take a detail from company

headquarters and see if he could knock out

the blockhouse. The runner, together with

the company bugler and the mail orderly,

moved up with two satchel charges and

threw them inside. There was a terrific

explosion, but there seemed to have been

little damage done to the position. The

company's executive officer reported that

there were many signs of Japanese still inside, and a platoon of Company C was

brought forward to work on the position

and keep it under surveillance. Enemy

soldiers were still being killed there late in

the evening as they tried to wriggle out

and escape.

Captain White had followed the action

at the blockhouse by again trying to get

the two assault platoons of his company in

direct contact. He moved up the road and

found Lieutenant Kaplan. After failing

once more to get satisfactory co-ordination

in tank-infantry efforts, the company commander began the task of extending the 2d

Platoon's right flank to meet Lieutenant

Klatt's left. Between Will Road and the

point at which he judged the 1st Platoon's

right elements to be, there were three large

shelter-type buildings, one close to the road

and the other two well back from it. The

latter were definitely concrete reinforced

shelters, but the former could not be

identified.

There appeared to be no enemy in any

of these shelters, but to make sure a 37-mm.

antitank gun was brought forward and

placed on the road to bear on the nearest

building. It fired several rounds of high

explosive and canister, which completely

wrecked the structure and set fire to it.

Much to the chagrin of the whole company, the building was later found to contain virtually all the sake, beer, and candy

that the Japanese had on the island. Only

a few bottles of beer were saved.

Meanwhile, without the company commander's knowledge, a small patrol of the

1st Platoon had reached the farthest inland

of the two remaining shelters. Two of the

men, Sgt. Melvin L. Higgins and Pvt.

Arthur T. Contreras, after taking cover in

a shell hole and surveying the two buildings, decided to throw satchel charges in

the main entrance and see what would

happen. By this time the company had

used so many of the charges that it had

exhausted the supply in the regimental

dump. The company executive officer,

however, had brought up several blocks of

Composition C, a high explosive, and
KWAJALEIN ISLAND: THE THIRD DAY 271

members of the company were improvising satchel charges by tying the blocks together and putting them into gas mask

carriers. Two of these improvised charges

were now made up, and each of the two

men ran twenty-five yards over to the entrance, threw one in, and ducked back to

the cover of the shell hole. The explosion

shook the building but caused no appreciable damage. Another charge was placed

with the same apparent lack of effect. As

he ran back for cover, however, Higgins

noticed two Japanese machine guns between the left-hand building and the road.

There seemed to be no enemy around these

weapons, but almost directly behind them

was a little trench, which made Higgins

suspicious. Instead of running over to the

guns, he went over to one of two medium

tanks nearby, talked the crews into opening their hatches, and pointed out the machine guns. The tank lumbered toward the

position. As it did so, a white flag began

waving a short distance behind the guns.

Nevertheless, the tank opened fire and a

few moments later Sergeant Higgins

crawled forward and found twelve dead

enemy soldiers directly behind the guns in

a camouflaged ditch, from which they

could have fired at anyone curious enough

to approach.

The action of the tank had, it appeared,

opened the way for a resumption of contact between the two platoons. Without

either knowing of the other's actions,

Kaplan and Klatt each sent patrols to find

the other. The group from the 1st Platoon

consisted of only two men, S. Sgt. Roland

H. Hartl and Pfc. Solteros E. Valenzuela.

That from the 2d Platoon was composed

of ten men under the command of Sgt.

Warren Kannely. Both groups were concerned with the shelter into which Higgins

and Contreras had just thrown charges.

Neither group knew of the other's presence.

Sergeant Hartl's group reached the

building first. Hartl came up to the front

entrance from the southeast side. The

building was, therefore, interposed between

himself and Kannely. Hartl and Valenzuela crept up to the entrance, looked in,

and saw nothing. Hartl got to his feet, nonchalantly pulled the pin on an offensive

grenade, and tossed it in the door. Then

the two men sprinted out of sight from

everyone around a big pile of rubbish, and

Hartl stopped and took a long drink of

water from his canteen.

At the moment Sergeant Hartl's grenade exploded, Pfc. Harold S. Pratt was

creeping up on the entrance from the opposite direction with another improvised

satchel charge. He had not seen Hartl, nor

had Hartl seen him. Only a moment after

the grenade exploded, Pratt heaved his

charge in the entrance, yelled "Fire in the

hole" at the top of his voice, and ducked

back toward the point where Sergeant

Kannely and his patrol were hiding in

shell holes, twenty yards away. At that

moment several things happened quickly.

The charge exploded. Japanese came

streaming out of the shelter at two entrances, shooting rifles, brandishing bayonets, and throwing grenades as they rushed

pell-mell toward Sergeant Kannely and

his men. Sergeant Hartl dropped his canteen, and he and Valenzuela dove for the

shell craters in which the 2d Platoon's

patrol was hiding. Sergeant Higgins and

his group on the opposite side took up fire

on the screaming Japanese. For ten minutes the whole area was a melee of struggling men. Grenades were exploding and

rifle bullets flying in all directions. One

Japanese machine gun opened fire from

beyond the shelters and enemy soldiers

began taking up the fire from under heaps
272 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

A .30-CALIBER MACHINE GUN emplacement on Kwajalein.

of wreckage and from trees nearby. The

combined action of Kannely's and Higgins' groups soon killed all the Japanese

who had come from the shelter, but in the

process Kannely and two others of his

group had been killed and several seriously

wounded, including Valenzuela. The remainder were now under heavy fire from

enemy machine guns and riflemen. Pratt

crawled back to the road and asked Captain White, who was still standing near the

wrecked and burning storage house, to

send tanks, machine guns, and litter

bearers into the area. He explained what

had happened. The company commander

immediately sent two tanks off the road

toward the shelters. The tanks soon drove

the Japanese out of their hiding places and

silenced the machine guns, but in the

process also fired on Sergeant Higgins'

group, which was still hiding on the opposite side of the shelters. Neither Higgins

nor any of his men could see the tanks or

the machine guns, but they could hear

them; and the volume of fire meant only

one thing to them, a Japanese counterattack. T. Sgt. Ernest Tognietti, the platoon sergeant, who had now come forward

to join Higgins, ordered a withdrawal to a

line of machine guns that Lieutenant Klatt

had set up forty yards to the south of the

shelters. Behind this defensive position, the

platoon leader reorganized his platoon and

ordered the men to hold.

In the 2d Platoon area, meanwhile,

Lieutenant Kaplan had still been trying to

push his men forward on the lagoon side of

the road beyond the sake storage house.

Because of the debris he had not seen the

action involving Sergeant Kannely's patrol
KWAJALEIN ISLAND: THE THIRD DAY 273

and was unaware of the casualties incurred

there. When the opposition of the Japanese

became stronger along his immediate

front, shortly after this incident, the platoon leader came back along the road to

see Captain White and find out whether

he could have more tank support. The

company commander informed him of

Kannely's death and of the fact that only

two of the ten men sent to the right of the

road were left. He advised Kaplan to hold

up his attack until the whole company

front could be reorganized. It was now

1230. Before Company B could launch a

third attack through the area, the whole

attack plan for the 184th Infantry was

changed.

Action of Company A

At Nora Road, Company A, 184th Infantry, had also found a totally unexpected

group of buildings, pillboxes, and shelters

through which it moved during sharp

fighting.17 Enemy riflemen behind fallen

trees and piles of debris kept up a heavy

fire as six or more defended points were

brought under control. When two medium

tanks and one light tank, with one selfpropelled 75-mm. howitzer, reported at

0830, they joined in the attack. The company's progress was more rapid than that

of Company B, past whose right wing it

continued as far as the Admiralty area.

The eight large structures and twelve or

more smaller buildings of this area had

been thoroughly bombed and shelled, but

active blockhouses and shelters were scattered among them. To comb the enemy

from the wreckage and clear out the shelters was certain to take a long time

and perhaps more than one company's

strength. Company A suffered several

casualties as it began the task, although

resistance was less determined than that

encountered by Company B.18 Company

A pushed about a hundred yards beyond

the Admiralty area before it was ordered

to advance slowly rather than move too far

beyond Company B. At its right, Company K, 32d Infantry, continued to advance and took over a wider front. Company A's right platoon was pulled back

behind the left and Company K moved

forward somewhat to the west of the established regimental boundary.19

The Revised Plan of Attack

Company B, 184th Infantry, was faced

with a situation that it could not handle

alone. It could not move ahead, leaving

mopping up to supporting units. The enemy was too numerous and too firmly

established and the terrain continued to

be so badly disrupted that co-ordinated

action could not be maintained. Shortly

before noon, the regiment produced a revised plan of attack. The 2d Battalion,

184th Infantry, was to move through the

right wing of the 1st Battalion and then

swing left, taking over the entire regimental zone from a line a hundred yards southwest of Noel Road. The 1st Battalion was

itself to swing left and shift the direction of

its attack to a broad front parallel to the

lagoon.20 This order was modified by a

division order at 1225.21 The 2d Battalion,

184th Infantry, was limited to a northern

boundary that curved from Noel Road to

the juncture of the lagoon and Nathan

Road. The 32d Infantry was to take over

all the island north of that point, pinching

17

 BLT 184-1 Rpt, p. 7. 18

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 60. 19

 BLT 184-1 Rpt, p. 7. 20

 RCT 184 Jnl, 031150 Feb 44. 21

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. VI, 7th Inf Div

G-3 Jnl, 3 Feb 44, Msg 72.

KWAJALEIN ISLAND: THE THIRD DAY 275

off the 184th's zone there. The 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry, was to attack toward

the lagoon but over a less extended front.

By 1330, maneuvers to carry out the new

plan of attack were in progress. (Map 12)

Execution of Attack in the 184th's Zone

At the time when the revised plan of operations was adopted, the enemy was

being engaged along an irregular front

that extended from the Noel Road line on

the ocean side to the northwestern edge of

the Admiralty area, and thence westward

to the lagoon at a point about a hundred

yards north of Nora Road. The 32d Infantry was three hundred yards nearer

Nathan Road than the 184th, the right

wing of which was in turn well ahead of its

left and able to advance more freely. The

2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, which had

been mopping up in the rear, moved forward at once, only six hours after being relieved, with Company G at the right,

Company F behind G, and Company E at

the left.22 The battalion was to march

along the eastern edge of the regimental

zone to the area in which Company A was

operating, to pass through or around

Company A, and to swing northwest toward Nob Pier and the lagoon. It expected

to reach the northern edge of Company

A's area at approximately 1430. Shortly

after the 2d Battalion moved off in the attack, Companies A and C were to turn

west and approach the lagoon with the

former on the right. Company B was to

serve as the hinge, furnishing fire in front

of Company C from the south until Company C itself masked B. Then Company B

was to swing around to the lagoon beach.23

As the 2d Battalion approached the Admiralty area about 1400, a conflagration

among its ruined structures made movement through it impossible.24

 Company E

kept to the left of it; Company G, followed

by Company F, went to the right, losing

contact. Company E had expected to

reach a line at least partly held by Company A. A guide was killed on the way

forward, and the company moved uncertainly through the welter to what was

thought to be its line of departure. Company A was not there; it had already been

pulled back in order to reorganize for its

new attack toward the lagoon. A gap between Company A and Company E thus

developed directly northwest of the burning Admiralty area. Company G and

Company F passed by Company A over

ground well east of the regimental boundary, then turned northwest toward their

line of departure. When Company G renewed contact with Company E, after at

least half an hour, G had lost touch with

the left-hand elements of the 32d Infantry.25

Lt. Col. Carl H. Aulich and the forward

echelon of the 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, command post came up to a tentative

location northeast of the Admiralty area

amid heavy rifle fire, smoke, and confusion. Attempts to co-ordinate the movements of the 2d Battalion with those of

Company A, with which it was to maintain contact on its left, proved inordinately

difficult.26

About 1545 Company A was joined by

two medium tanks and Company C by two

mediums and two M10 tank destroyers.

The attack was mounted by 1605 on the

western edge of the built-up Admiralty

area along a three-hundred-yard front,

22

 BLT 184-2 Rpt, p. 6. 23BLT 184-1 Rpt, p. 8. 24

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 60. 25

 Ibid., pp. 62-64. 26

 Ibid., pp. 73-74.
276 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

with Company A's right wing somewhat

south of Noel Road. Ten minutes later the

advance toward the lagoon began. From

the line of departure to Will Road, a distance of about seventy-five yards, movement was steady and opposition quickly

overcome. Will Road was crossed shortly

after 1630. The enemy was much more

firmly established between the highway

and the beach, in pillboxes, blockhouses,

and strong shelters. Mortar fire on this

area kept the enemy down until the tanks

and infantry approached. The co-ordinated work of tanks, infantry, and demolition teams ran smoothly. At 1800 they

were at the lagoon.27

Company C began to mask Company

B's fire about 1630, releasing the latter to

re-form on Company C's left wing, in the

vicinity of Will and Nora Roads. Company A received a counterattack from

about twenty of the enemy on its right

flank, just as its advance was ending, but

destroyed the attacking force. There was

still no contact with Company E.28

Company E had started its attack before

those of either Company G or the 1st Battalion. At 1440 it began moving northwest.29

 Somewhat more than half an hour

later Company E was reported to have

crossed Noel Road, with Company G on

its right. Two medium and two light tanks,

taken over from the 1st Battalion, moved

forward with each of the companies, and

each had one squad of engineer troops

with demolitions. Enemy rifle fire was

heavy. The men broke up into small

groups, proceeding unevenly in the general direction of Nob Pier. Between 1830

and 1900, Capt. Peter Blaettler, Company

E's commander, was seriously wounded.30

Control from the battalion command post

had been lost—that element was hugging

the ground to avoid sharp fire from enemy

riflemen. Colonel Aulich had become separated from the main part of his battalion

and was to remain so until the next morning. To all intents and purposes he had lost

command of his unit.31

The 2d Battalion's attack was pushed

along the eastern side of Will Road toward

Nathan Road, but as sunset approached

it became evident not only that Company

E would not reach Nob Pier but also that

across Will Road on the left flank there

was an area with many strong enemy defense positions too powerful to be occupied

in the forty-five minutes before dark.32

Action of the 32d Infantry After

Change of Plans

The 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, with

the support of Company C of the same

regiment, pushed rapidly toward Nathan

Road to execute its mission under the revised plan of attack, which became effective at 1330. On the extreme right wing,

Company I achieved excellent co-ordination of infantry-engineer teams with medium tanks, and rapidly reduced Nap

Strong Point, which proved to be only

weakly defended. The company was reported at 1355 to have reached Nathan

Road.33 Company K, in the inner zone,

had much more difficulty. Its route lay

through a maze of ruined buildings, debris, connecting trenches, and still active

pillboxes, as well as shelters crowded with

hiding enemy. The terrain and poor communications prevented tank-infantry cooperation, and while the tanks were reduc27

 BLT 184-1 Rpt, p. 9. 28

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 72. 29

 BLT 184-2 Rpt, p. 7. 30

 Ibid., p. 8. 31

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 73. 32

 Ibid., p. 74. 33

 RCT 32 Jnl, 3 Feb 44, p. 163.
KWAJALEIN ISLAND: THE THIRD DAY 277

ing enemy positions the infantry had to

work near rather than with them.34 Company K was about two hundred yards to

the left rear when Company I reportedly

reached the road. Company L, in fulfillment of an understanding reached during

the morning by the two leading battalions,

was withdrawn from the Admiralty area

to cover the gap on the left of the 3d Battalion's front when it was found that Company A, 184th Infantry, had pulled back

for its new mission under the revised

plan.35 Behind L, Company C, in support,

received heavy rifle fire from the left, by

which Capt. Charles W. Murphy, Jr., the

company commander, was wounded.36

Company B and then Company A, 32d

Infantry, were both committed to mopping up the Admiralty area, from which

they moved north toward Noel Road.37

As the reports sent back to regimental

headquarters were persistently conflicting

and confused, it proved impossible to coordinate company movements. Perhaps

even more important was the battered and

shattered condition of the terrain. The terrible pounding to which Kwajalein had

been submitted by artillery and naval

shells was not an unmixed blessing to the

infantry. The difficulty of getting around

the rubble and other physical impedimenta tended to diffuse units and keep

their flanks dangling. In the middle of the

island near Noel Road the conditions of

battle and terrain made co-ordination almost out of question since enemy fire was

being delivered against the advancing battalions from positions between them and

even to their rear.38

Company I, 32d Infantry, remained

near Nathan Road, unable to advance

until the line at the left came up. General

Corlett came ashore and at 1640 held a

telephone conference with his assistant

division commander, General Ready,

Colonel O'Sullivan of the 184th Infantry,

and Colonel Logic of the 32d Infantry. He

was reassured concerning the progress of

the attack.39 Thinking ahead to the remaining enemy blockhouses and other

concrete positions that might still be in the

northern portion beyond Nathan Road,

General Corlett arranged for naval gunfire

to be spotted. This fire, from a heavy

cruiser, was to be controlled through the

naval liaison officer with the 32d Regiment, and it was to be delivered wherever

the regiments desired. The regimental

commanders later decided, however, that

they were not yet in position to use this

support. The main effort, they felt, had

first to be the straightening of the line

across the island.40

Between 1630 and 1730 Company K

was moved up beside Company I by a

maneuver that enabled Company I to furnish protection for its rear while it moved.

Company L then advanced along the

same route. As it moved, fire hit it from its

left flank, possibly originating among

friendly troops. The company did not

complete its mission. It stopped for the

night in the middle of the island between

Noel and Nathan roads and its exact position was not accurately reported until next

morning.41

Situation on the Night of 3 February

All planes had returned to their carriers

by 1857. The 3d of February had been a

34

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, pp. 82-83. 35

 RCT 32 Jnl, 3 Feb 44, p. 165. 36

 Ibid., p. 164. 37

 Ibid., p. 171. 38

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 83. 39

 RCT 32 Jnl, 3 Feb 43, p. 171. 40

 Ibid., p. 174. 41

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, pp. 43-44.
278

quiet day for the planes over Kwajalein

Island, where patrol and observation duty

rather than air strikes had occupied

them.42 Admiral Reeves' carrier group,

part of Task Force 58, departed during the

evening for Majuro to refuel. One group of

small escort carriers remained to furnish

protection for the remainder of the battle

for Kwajalein. The lagoon anchorages had

filled steadily during the day. Transports

carrying the reserve force, which it was

clear would not be committed in this

action, came into the lagoon from their

previous station east of the atoll. All the

transports of the attacking force were also

at anchor. One group was so nearly unloaded that it could plan to depart for

Funafuti early in the morning.43

The eight LST's and three LCT's of the

Kwajalein Island Defense Group, which

arrived about noon on 2 February, had

unloaded enough men and material to undertake the general defense of the western

end of the island as far as Wilma Road.

The group had brought ashore and emplaced its 40-mm. antiaircraft batteries on

the western beaches.44

During the day, Green Beach 4, the

westernmost portion of the lagoon shore,

became the principal scene of shore party

operations. Pontoon strips brought by

LST's were lashed together to form the

first of two causeway piers there, and progress was well advanced toward the completion of a good road connection from the

beach to the island's highway system. All

beach and shore parties were consolidated.

One of the transport groups shifted its unloading operations from Carlos Island to

Kwajalein Island. The hospital ship Relief

anchored in the lagoon at noon and began

to take aboard the casualties already in

the sick bays of the transports and to receive others directly from the beaches.

Those on Kwajalein Island were carried

directly from beach to ship in landing

craft, thus avoiding the previous days' delays caused by transferring the wounded

from LVT's to boats at the edge of the reef.

Heavy engineer equipment began to come

ashore, although the main stream of such

traffic was not to be released until the

beachhead was better prepared.45

The advance along the axis of Kwajalein Island on 3 February had progressed

about 1,000 yards. The hard fighting had

been more costly than on either of the

preceding days. Fifty-four were reported

killed in action, and 255 wounded of

which 60 were returned to duty.46 The enemy, however, had paid heavily in lives as

well as in lost ground. The 32d Infantry

estimated that 300 had been killed on its

side of the island, and the 184th estimated

at least 800 and perhaps 1,000 in its zone.

In the one huge blockhouse alone, 200

dead had been found, many of them evidently suicides.47

Neither of the regiments had reached

Nathan Road in spite of optimistic reports

to regimental headquarters. The 32d Infantry was on one of the smaller streets

among the cantonments, a road that paralleled Nathan Road about 150 yards

south. At the extreme right of the eastern

zone was Company I and at the left of the

zone, Company L. Holding a line that

folded back from Company L's left flank

as far as Carl Road were Companies B

and A. Companies K and M were bent

42

 TF 51 Marshalls Rpt, Incl F, p. 5. 43

 Ibid., Incl A, p. 8. 44

 7th Inf Div G-3 Periodic Rpt 4, 031700 Feb 44. 45

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. VII, 7th Inf Div

G-4 Jnl, 3 Feb 44, Incl 3, p. 4. 46

 Ibid., Annex 3, Incl 1, p. 127. 47

 RCT 184 Jnl, 031930 Feb 4-4; 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. HI, G-1 Jnl, 3 Feb 44, p. 14, and G-1

Rpt, p. 2; RCT 32 Jnl, 3 Feb 44, p. 181.
KWAJALEIN ISLAND: THE THIRD DAY 279

PONTON PIERS AT GREEN BEACH 4

back along the ocean shore. Company C,

which had been supporting the 3d Battalion during the afternoon, was to be placed

across the zone behind the two forward

companies despite some remaining uncertainty about its release for that mission by

the 1st Battalion, which was expected to

lead the assault next day, and even though

no one knew exactly where Company L

was located. In the last minutes of daylight, largely on the initiative of 1st Lt.

Ramon Nelson, a platoon leader temporarily in command of Company C, that

company started marching to its widely

dispersed position while its other officers

were still in conference with battalion and

regimental commanders over the orders to

move. Its elements were separated during

the movement and its exact situation was

not well understood at regimental headquarters until next morning.48

 From Carl

Road back to Wilma Road, the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, covered the regimental

zone; and from Wilma Road to the end of

the island, on order of General Ready, the

division's shore party provided defense of

supply installations.

The 184th Infantry was about seventy

yards farther south than the 32d Infantry.

The two leading companies, E and G, had

pushed into an area between Will Road

and buildings on the left of Company L,

32d Infantry. West of the highway, as well

as in front of the two companies at the

north and in the uncleared buildings on

the east, the enemy had control. A gap

actually existed in the rear of Company E

in a portion of the island over which no

48

 RCT 32 Jnl, 3 Feb 44, pp. 183-88; Marshall,

Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 85.
280 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

contact with Company A had been established. Thus, the energetic push toward

Nathan Road and Nob Pier had moved

these companies into a salient. Heavy and

light machine guns were set up to cover

the areas at the left and front, but from

the ruined structures on the right, rifle fire

on Company G was heavy and incessant

during the night, its accuracy improving

with approaching daylight. The 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, held the sector from

Nora Road to the western edge of Center

Pier. Defense of the supply installations in

the remaining portion of the island as far

west as Red Beach 1 was the mission of the

shore party and, in part, of the 184th Infantry's Cannon Company.49

Eagerness to reach the Nob Pier line on

3 February had induced the leading elements of both regiments to advance with

all possible speed, without paying full attention to local security. Night found them

in positions in which they were intermingled with the enemy, sometimes at such

close range that fighting was restrained for

fear of damage to friendly troops. At many

points along the front, and at several spots

in the rear, flickering fires lighted up adjacent areas and silhouetted moving men.

Typical of the experiences all along the

line on this evening were those that befell

Company C, 32d Infantry.50 This unit had

begun moving into position across the rear

of the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, at approximately 1930. It was then nearly dark.

There had been little time to investigate

the ground the company covered, but in

the gathering dusk, three large Japanese

shelters and one pyramidal tent were

found in the defensive area. The men of

Company C felt that Japanese were still

hiding under the canvas and were reasonably certain that the shelters contained

several enemy soldiers. The men were torn

between two courses of action: clean out

the enemy, or simply let them remain

where they were until morning. Because

the company radio was not working and

no information could be passed on to

neighboring units that Company C was

actually moving in across the rear of the

front line, the latter course was chosen.

There was some fear that firing in the rear

might be misinterpreted by the forward

companies. Any pitched battle in the area

would be almost certain to draw heavy

American fire from the front and flanks.

Company C "bedded down" in the

midst of the enemy. The darkness and uncertainty of its position prevented its digging in. Behind the men of Company C

were 150 yards of ground filled with debris

that had not been investigated or cleaned

out. On the right, 150 yards away, Company K had placed its flank on the ocean

shore and extended forward and inland in

a great arc. On the left, its exact whereabouts unknown to Company C, was the

184th. To the rear, two great fires burned

brightly, casting a red light over the whole

area. At five-minute intervals flares and

star shells from the mortar sections and

ships drifted over the front, and sometimes

directly over troops in the eastern zone.

From 2000 to almost 0300 moonlight also

faintly illuminated the area.

Whenever the illumination became unusually bright, enemy machine guns swept

Company C's area, and from time to time

mortar shells and grenades landed among

the men. American BAR's, directed

against scattered Japanese, threw bursts of

49

 RCT 184 Rpt, p. 96 (see map); Ibid., BLT 184-3

Jnl, 3 Feb 44, p. 3. This journal mistakenly substitutes

Carl Road for Nora Road. 50

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I pp. 85ff. Unless otherwise noted, the account of Company C's

action on the night of 3-4 February is drawn from

this account.
KWAJALEIN ISLAND: THE THIRD DAY 281

fire from the company's rear. When fire

became too heavy in certain parts of their

area, elements of Company C tried to

move to more favorable positions. Somewhere during these movements six men of

the mortar section of the weapons platoon

were killed, although their presence was

not missed until next morning.

Japanese were in the areas south of the

front line in greater numbers than on

either of the preceding nights of the Kwajalein Island operation. They prowled in

the forward area all night. Some incidents

occurred as far to the rear as Corn Strong

Point, more than a thousand yards from

the 32d Infantry's advanced position.51

Japanese came out of shelters, screaming

and yelling, throwing grenades, and

charging at the men in foxholes. They fired

rifles and threw grenades from buildings

that offered places of advantage. In a

pocket northeast of the Admiralty area,

they greatly harassed the companies near

them.

Attacks from the north and from the

lagoon shore were also attempted by enemy troops at various times during the

night. Just after sunset, a bugle could be

heard sounding among the enemy shelters

near the base of Nob Pier, and shortly

afterward a headlong counterattack by

screaming Japanese was made toward

Company E and Company G, 184th Infantry. As the Japanese tried to cross Will

Road, they were cut down to the last

man.52 Five prospective attacks were

broken up before they were actually in

progress by barrages along the entire front

from mortars and from the supporting

batteries of artillery on Carlson Island.53

Just before 0400, nevertheless, heavy

enemy mortar and dual-purpose gunfire,

which struck Companies I and L, 32d Infantry, was closely followed by a surprise

attack by an unknown number of enemy.

This effort was beaten off and no other

was tried for an hour. Then a second organized attack came and was also repulsed

by Companies I and L.54 Sometime after

midnight, an effort by a group of the enemy to come ashore from the lagoon reef

at a point opposite Company A, 184th Infantry, was foiled by automatic fire. Infiltration by individual Japanese was repeatedly stopped in the Company A area. In

the morning twenty-seven enemy dead

were found there.55 About 0530 an attack

by from thirty to forty Japanese upon the

front line of Company E, 184th Infantry,

wilted under the bursts from the machine

guns set up there.56 This attempt was the

last of the night's futile sorties by enemy

groups. From various positions beyond

Nathan Road, enemy machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire was directed into the

forward area at irregular intervals during

the night, sometimes coinciding so closely

with the fire from Carlson Island that Japanese monitoring of the artillery radio was

suspected.57

The 49th Field Artillery Battalion fired

1,492 rounds of ammunition on Kwajalein

Island between 1800 and 0600, and the

47th Field Artillery Battalion fired 716.58

In position near Carl and Will Roads, the

six 81-mm. mortars of the 3d Battalion,

32d Infantry, sent approximately 1,500

rounds into the enemy area after dark, and

the 60-mm. mortars with the companies

51

 RCT 32 Jnl, 3 Feb 44, p. 186; Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 115. 52

 RCT 184 Jnl, 032000 Feb 44; Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, pp. 44-45. 53

 57th FA Bn AAR, p. 137. 54

 RCT 32 Jnl, 4 Feb 44, p. 189. 55

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 75. 56

 Ibid., p. 44. 57

 Ibid., pp. 115-16; 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt,

Vol. XII, 7th Inf Div Arty Rpt, Jnl, 4 Feb 44, Msg 3. 58

 7th Inf Div Arty Rpt, Jnl, 4 Feb 44, p. 29.
282 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

were also active.59 Harassing fire ceased at

0600 as the artillery was made ready for

the morning's preparatory fire at 0700.

The 49th Field Artillery Battalion, however, shelled the northern end of the island

during that period in the last of several

attempts to silence enemy guns.60

Thus as dawn broke on the morning of

4 February the men of the 32d and 184th

Regiments prepared to make their final

drive to the northern tip of Kwajalein Island. The complete capture of the island

was taking longer than had been expected.

In spite of the excellence of both naval

gunfire and land-based artillery, this

northern sector of Kwajalein had proved

still to contain a sizable number of Japanese well concealed among the damaged

buildings and in underground shelters and

pillboxes. Infantrymen, engineers, and

tanks, working separately and in co-ordination, still had to feel their way cautiously among the remnants of the enemy's

defenses. Another hard day's fighting remained ahead.

59

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol, I, p. 75. 60

 7th Inf Div Arty Rpt, Jnl, 4 Feb 44, Msg 21.
CHAPTER XVII

End of the Battle for

Southern Kwajalein

Kwajalein Island Secured

Occupation of Kwajalein Island had

reached an advanced stage by the morning of 4 February. The end of enemy resistance during the day could definitely be

anticipated. The advance from the western

beach had covered more than three fourths

of the island's length and considerably

more than three fourths of its area. The

stretch that remained was less than 1,000

yards long and 400 yards wide, a section

containing the ruins of about thirty buildings amid the scorched and battered remnants of many trees.1

 The ground north of

Nathan Road was divided into segments

by four east-west roads at intervals of approximately 100 yards and, some 300

yards farther north, by the loop of the

island highway. The ocean shore was

studded with pillboxes, gun positions, machine gun emplacements, antitank sea wall

barricades, and shelters. Most of these

works were oriented toward attack from

the water rather than along the island

from the south, and all had been heavily

pounded by naval gunfire, artillery fire,

and air bombing. The interior could be

presumed to hold concrete shelters and

earth-and-log bunkers resembling those

that had proved to be such substantial obstacles to the advance of the previous day.

(Map 13)

Plans for the Attack of 4 February

Plans for the attack on 4 February had

been made during the night of the 3d in

partial misconception of the actual location of the front-line troops. At division

and regimental headquarters it was supposed that the Nob Pier-Nathan Road

line had been reached. The 2d Battalion,

184th Infantry, was understood to have

reached the base of the pier, and the 3d

Battalion, 32d Infantry, was believed to be

on the Nathan Road line, from which the

32d Infantry was to take over the entire

assault to the end of the island. These estimates were based on the overoptimistic reports of the front-line units, issued the

evening before, and had not been contradicted during the night. Nor was there full

recognition of the condition of the areas

directly behind the reported front lines. As

indicated, the late afternoon drive on 3

February had been pushed forward with

little attention to the task of mopping up

the enemy troops hiding under rubble

piles, in shelters, and in the few buildings

still left standing. Reserve units had not

been able to complete the task. Until the

remnants of the enemy force thus bypassed

could be destroyed, confusion would exist,

1

 Terrain description drawn from 7th Inf Div Opns

Map, JICPOA Bull 48-44.

END OF THE BATTLE FOR SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN 285

communications would be disrupted, and

the attack delayed.

An exact knowledge of the location of

various units still could not be had as

morning approached. Company and battalion commanders did not know where

many of the components of their units

were, and radio contact with the rear continued to be poor. In the 184th Infantry

zone of action, moreover, one entire section of enemy-held territory—that south of

Nob Pier between Will Road and the lagoon—had not even been entered, although regimental and division headquarters assumed that it had been seized. The

2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, which had

been charged with the capture of this

ground, had failed to enter it by dark on 3

February and planned to complete its mission early the next morning.

Regimental orders for the 32d Infantry

attack of 4 February called for the 1st Battalion to attack through the front lines held

by the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, and by

the 2d Battalion, 184th Infantry. It was to

jump off at 0715, following fifteen minutes

of preparatory fire by artillery and naval

guns.2 In order to execute this attack, however, it was thought necessary to get all

companies of the 1st Battalion into position

before dawn. Company A was to form the

right of the battalion line, Company B the

center, and Company C the left. At the

moment this plan was decided upon, Companies A and B were in reserve some distance to the left rear of the 3d Battalion

line, and Company C was stretched out

across the rear of the front in a badly disorganized state. The weapons platoon of

the latter company was "missing" after

becoming involved in the previous night's

counterattack, having actually pulled back

to the ocean shore.

To launch the attack as early as possible,

Colonel Logic about midnight ordered 1st

Lt. Robert J. Kretzer, the Company C

commander, to move his men to the lagoon side of the island before dawn. Company A would relieve Company C in its

earlier position at approximately 0230.

Lieutenant Kretzer, realizing that such a

movement would be extremely dangerous

under the conditions then existing behind

the front lines, made a personal reconnaissance of the route his company would

follow and visited the command posts of

the 184th's advance companies, notifying

them that Company C would be moving

through the area later in the night.

Company A arrived in the area behind

the front lines at 0230, as ordered, but because of the confusion the relief was not

completed until 0400. By that time the

moon had gone down, but fires and flares

still cast enough light over the area to

silhouette moving men. Lieutenant Kretzer

executed his move to the lagoon shore in

the simplest manner possible. After organizing his company, he simply faced

them to the left and marched them westward in a long column. At one time two of

the platoons became separated in the

debris, but they found each other again

quite accidentally. At another time the

column passed close to a Japanese shelter.

The men could hear the enemy soldiers

talking inside. As the rear marched along

the side of the dugout, four enemy soldiers

came charging out of it straight for the last

few men. A Japanese officer, swinging a

saber and yelling, threw a grenade from

about thirty feet away. The Americans,

who could see the trail of sparks as it sailed

toward them, scattered in all directions.

Two men were wounded in the explosion,

but the four Japanese were all killed in ex2

 RCT 32 Jnl, 3 Feb 44, pp. 182-83.
286 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

change. During the rest of the march two

other Company C men were hit in the legs

by rifle fire. By 0530 the company was in

position somewhere in the rear of the 184th

Infantry line.3

Morning Attack of 4 February

Sunrise on 4 February came at a few

minutes after 0700. It found the forward

elements of the attacking force intermingled with the defending enemy in a

wide zone between Noel and Nathan

Roads. The attack began in considerable

confusion. Companies A and B, 32d Infantry, moved forward on the right according to plan. Supporting tanks were with

them from the start. Ten medium tanks

preceded the main body of the infantry by

about fifty yards, and four light tanks

moved along the ocean beach. Before

either company reached the front-line

positions of the 3d Battalion, however,

they had become involved in a full-scale

battle with the Japanese who had been bypassed the day before and who now poured

heavy fire on the companies as they advanced toward the line of departure. By

0730 the 32d Infantry attack had almost

stalled as groups of infantrymen turned

aside to clean out the positions that poured

fire into their ranks. It was not until 1000

that the two 1st Battalion companies

reached the lines held by the 3d Battalion.

Company L, 32d Infantry, was finally

pinched out by Company B at 1030.4

Until after 1000 the whereabouts of

Company C on the lagoon side of the

island was unknown at the 32d Infantry

command post because of failure of the

company's radio communications.5 During

this period Lieutenant Kretzer found himself confronted by a peculiar situation. The

2d Battalion, 184th Infantry, was still following the orders issued to it the day

before and, despite the presence of Company C in its rear, it proceeded to complete mopping up the last 300 yards between it and Nathan Road as well as the

area between Will Road and the lagoon.

Without further orders from his own battalion, Lieutenant Kretzer could do nothing but wait until the units to the front

moved out of his way.6

As many Japanese had been bypassed in

the 184th's zone as had been overlooked on

the ocean side of the island. Company G,

184th Infantry, had serious difficulty even

in organizing the attack upon which Lieutenant Kretzer's unit was waiting. Besides

withstanding counterattacks, Company G

had been under fire in its perimeter

throughout the night from enemy riflemen

firing from every direction but west. When

daylight came, riflemen—especially in

buildings along the eastern edge of the

perimeter—pinned the unit down and prevented it from forming for an attack at

0715. Low in ammunition, hampered by

unevacuated wounded, and facing an extensive air raid shelter in the center of the

perimeter in which a large contingent of

the enemy was believed to have taken

refuge, the company decided to await the

arrival of tanks. When the tanks arrived,

fire was directed into the shelter, and the

first large-scale surrender on Kwajalein

took place. Thirty-one Koreans and one

Japanese scurried out of the structure with

their hands up and much of their clothing

removed. One of the tanks herded them to

the rear.7

Company C, 32d Infantry, began the

3

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 90. 4

 RCT 32 Jnl, 4 Feb 44, pp. 197-99. 5

 Ibid., p. 197. 6

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 91. 7

 Ibid., pp. 76-77; BLT 184-2 Rpt, p. 9.
END OF THE BATTLE FOR SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN 287

day by capturing many prisoners while

waiting for the battalion ahead of it to

move. Aided by tanks of Company B,

767th Tank Battalion, the platoon on the

left brought five Koreans up from an underground shelter. Then, covering the

Koreans with BAR's, the unit moved from

shelter to shelter while the prisoners persuaded others to surrender. In less than an

hour thirty-three of the enemy were taken

in this fashion.8

In the area between the Admiralty ruins

and Noel Road the 1st Battalion, 184th

Infantry, began mopping up at daybreak.

When at 0830 an order was received from

the regimental commander to send one

company to participate in the assault,

Company B was attached to the 2d Battalion, which ordered it to attack along the

lagoon shore from the northern limit of the

1st Battalion's night perimeter.9 The company moved along Will Road in columns

of platoons, crossed its line of departure at

approximately 0900, and worked through

the area in the rear of Companies E and G,

at the same time swinging toward the

lagoon.10

The action of Company B, as had been

hoped by Colonel O'Sullivan, commander

of the 184th Infantry, cleared out many of

the Japanese who had been harassing the

2d Battalion and gave Company C, 32d

Infantry, a chance to move through the

front lines and proceed with its attack to

the north. At approximately 1100 Lieutenant Kretzer pushed his company beyond Nathan Road for the first time, and

shortly before 1200 the unit came abreast

1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, the right flank

of which had reached Nate Road, two

hundred yards north of Nathan, in a badly

disorganized condition a short time before.11

 Some of the tanks were approximately three hundred yards ahead, approaching the northern highway loop, but

orders had been issued for the 1st Battalion

to halt its advance pending relief by the 2d

Battalion, 32d Infantry. The latter unit

was to carry the battle for Kwajalein

Island through to the end.

Completion of the Mission of the

184th Infantry

At daylight on 4 February the actual

disposition of the forward troops became

known to 184th Infantry headquarters,

and the plan of attack in that regiment's

zone was modified. The movement of

Company B, 184th Infantry, and the use

of Japanese-speaking teams to induce surrender were the earliest of several steps

taken to restore motion to the northward

attack and to control the enemy within the

area south of Nathan Road. To drive to

Nob Pier and secure that structure, "the

remnants of all three companies" of the 2d

Battalion were placed under the command

of Capt. Rene E. Maysonave of Company

G, with orders to bypass Company B

whenever B should be held up.12 Shortly

after 1300 Captain Maysonave's consolidated unit swept by Company B's right

wing and took up the attack on the base of

Nob Pier. The 2d Battalion cut off any

enemy withdrawal across Nathan Road

and sent patrols, by tank, on foot, and in a

small boat, out to the pier's end. No enemy

was found on the pier.13 By 1435 all resistance had ceased along the lagoon side

of the island from Nob Pier back to Green

Beach 4.

The surrender of a considerable number

8

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, p. 91. 9

 BLT 184-1 Opns Rpt, p. 10. 10

 BLT 184-2 Rpt, p. 9. 11

 RCT 32 Jnl, 4 Feb 44, p. 203. 12

 BLT 184-2 Rpt, p. 9. 13

 RCT 184 Jnl, 041350 Feb 44.
288 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

of Japanese and Koreans continued to be

a notable feature of the action of 4 February. Only a remnant of the original garrison was still capable of fighting. Fragments

of the enemy force, after several days in

isolation and without water, abandoned

their shelters. From the first hour of the

renewed attack until darkness, the compounds filled with a stream of prisoners.

Maj. Jackson C. Gillis, intelligence officer of the 184th Infantry, accompanied

Company B with a loudspeaker and a nisei

interpreter. After heavy tank fire on shelters, the loudspeaker went into action. The

enemy was promised food and water and

immunity from further harm if he came

out and surrendered. When the loudspeaker broke down, prisoners were recruited to talk directly to the men in the

shelters, in some cases even going down

among them. Though two Koreans were

tortured by the Japanese in one shelter

that they entered on such a mission, before

the end of the morning over ninety prisoners were taken by the 184th. The 32d

Infantry used the same method beyond

Nathan Road.14

The Afternoon Attack of the 2d Battalion,

32d Infantry

The 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, passed

through the 1st Battalion at 1345 to complete the assault along Kwajalein Island.15

All forward movement of the 1st Battalion

had stopped, its line consisting of a series of

small, exhausted groups in a dense confusion of debris. The ground was interlaced

with innumerable trenches and foul with

bodies of the enemy, many of them long

dead. Some of the corpses had been mangled by maneuvering tanks, adding greatly

to the nauseating stench that blighted the

area.16

Company F, on the right, held its position until Company G brought the left

wing in line; then both advanced. After

going for seventy-five yards, Company F

and its seven supporting tanks came to a

large blockhouse into which the tanks directed their fire. While Company F was

thus engaged, Company G moved ahead

for about a hundred yards, occasionally

coming under fire from Company F. Both

companies eventually resumed their progress with the left still far advanced; they

cleared the surface and underground shelters of living enemy all the way to Nero

Point at the end of the island. Camouflaged

dugouts and ruined concrete blockhouses

and shelters contained Japanese against

whom it was necessary to employ scores of

satchel charges, hundreds of grenades, and,

ultimately, flame throwers.

The 1st Platoon, Company G, on the

extreme left, reached Nero Point at 1515

and reported its arrival to the regimental

command post. The men then sat around

on the beach and discussed the battle, oblivious of further combat behind them.

The 3d Platoon, Company F, nearer the

island's center, in the meantime came upon

three long concrete shelters, side by side.

The first was sixty feet long and about six

feet above ground. Its left end had been

blown off and a hole had been broken in

the top near the right end, but the remainder held some of the enemy. Under command of S. Sgt. Raymond Borucki, the

platoon started to pass the structure after

hurling two satchel charges in an entrance.

14

 RCT 32 Jnl, 4 Feb 44, p. 204; RCT 184 Jnl,

041349 Feb 44. 15

 RCT 32 Jnl, 4 Feb 44, p. 207. 16

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. I, pp. 102ff. Unless otherwise noted, the action of the 32d Infantry on

the afternoon of 4 February is drawn from this account.
END OF THE BATTLE FOR SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN 289

Finding that living enemy were still inside,

they then threw in more heavy demolition

charges and many grenades. Pvt. Elmer

Collins and Pfc. Franklin S. Farr volunteered to investigate. They crawled to a

door, walked in, and found themselves facing several of the enemy. Firing as fast as

they could, they hurriedly backed out,

dropped to the ground, and threw in grenades while their comrades fired into the

doorway. Another squad covered a second

entrance most effectively. When Collins

and Farr re-entered, the only man they

saw alive was the leader of the other squad,

S. Sgt. Eugene M. Rider; he had just come

in through the other entrance on the same

mission. All the enemy were dead. After

this operation, which required nearly half

an hour, the 3d Platoon, Company F, took

the two remaining shelters in a similar

manner.

Machine gun bullets began to whine

over the heads of the 1st Platoon, Company

G, on the beach. The men investigated.

Soon they were back in action, mopping

up circular 5-inch twin-mount gun positions and other places concealing small

numbers of the enemy, and helping to

establish a cordon within which to confine

the remnants of the enemy at the island's

tip.

Company F's methodical movement

among the enemy positions in its path subjected it to well-aimed rifle fire, which inflicted numerous casualties and delayed

the last stages of the battle. Obstinate Japanese resistance continued as evening

approached. About 1900, Captain Pence,

commanding Company G, walked over to

Company F's area to confer with Capt.

Mark E. Barber, and was shot by an observant enemy rifleman before he could

heed the warning shouts of men in Company F's forward line. Even with the

battle's end so near, the troops became

increasingly cautious.

At dusk tanks were brought up to reduce

the last 150 yards of the island. The tanks

remained for only a few minutes, but they

either drove to cover or killed the enemy

riflemen who had been pinning down

Company F. The attack again got underway and continued until 1920, when the

entire northern end of the island was

secured.

Even before that time, General Corlett

had announced the island of Kwajalein

secured. At 1610 he radioed to Admiral

Turner: "All organized resistance . . . has

ceased. The troops have been organized

for mopping up operations."

 17

The cost of the fourth day's fighting had

been somewhat higher than that of the

preceding day. The number killed in

action on Kwajalein Island and adjacent

Burton Island came to 65; 252 men were

wounded.18

The operation had been a model one in

almost every respect. The attacking force

had achieved strategic surprise. The Japanese were not expecting a landing in the

central Marshalls and were generally unprepared to meet one when it came. To a

degree, even tactical surprise was won

since it was obvious that the enemy was

better prepared to meet an invasion either

from the lagoon shore or from the ocean

side than from the end of the island where

it came. Except for the occasional failure

of tank-infantry co-ordination, no important deficiency had been revealed in the

execution of the plan. Artillery preparation, naval gunfire, and aerial bombardment had softened up the target in a fashion unexcelled at any other time in the

17

 RCT 32 Jnl, 4 Feb 44, p. 212. 18

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. VII, G-4 Rpt,

p. 127, Annex C, Incl 3.
290 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Pacific war. The ship-to-shore movement

had been conducted expeditiously and

without serious hitch. Supplies flowed

ashore and to the front lines smoothly and

without interruption. The infantry-engineer teams assisted by tanks moved

steadily, if somewhat more slowly than had

been anticipated, up the axis of the island

clearing the enemy from shelters and pillboxes. American casualties were light.

All together, the battle for Kwajalein

Island represented the ideal for all military

operations—a good plan, ably executed.

Completing the Conquest of Southern

Kwajalein

The Southern Attack Force, which had

captured Kwajalein Island after establishing supporting units on Carlson, Carlos, and the channel islands, was also

charged with the seizure of the many other

islets and coral outcroppings of southern

Kwajalein Atoll north as far as Bennett

Island (Bigej) on the eastern leg of the

atoll and Cohen Island (Ennugenliggelap)

on the southwestern leg. (See Map 9.) Running north from Kwajalein Island on the

eastern leg, these included in order, Byron,

Buster, Burton (Ebeye), Burnet, Blakenship (Loi), Beverly (South Gugegwe), Berlin (North Gugegwe), Benson, and Bennett.19

 Running north from Chauncey

(Gehh) lay Chester, Clarence (Torrulj),

Clement (Mann), Clifford (Legan), Clifton (Eller), and Cohen. No specific times

for the capture of these outlying islands

had been set, since the situation on Kwajalein Island was to be the determining

factor in governing the timing of the landings on each.

Chauncey Island

During 1 February the troops that had

landed by mistake on Chauncey Island

that morning were removed without completing the occupation. The infantry went

to Cecil Island, and the reconnaissance

troops were brought back aboard their

high-speed transport, Overton. Only a small

force of eleven sailors was left to guard the

barges on the nearby reef, but when the

enemy opened fire on these men it was decided to send reinforcements ashore from

Overton and complete the occupation of the

island without further delay.20

Between 0800 and 0900 on 2 February

elements of the 7th Reconnaissance Troop

landed from Overton on the northwestern

end of Chauncey. Four 60-mm. mortars

were set up at once and began a searching

fire over the island. For twenty minutes

the APD also shelled the ocean side.21

Three platoons formed abreast and moved

along the island through the thick woods,

with the headquarters platoon in the center rear. None of the enemy was discovered until the left wing of the line had

reached that part of the island opposite the

beached tugboat. Then the silence was

broken by heavy machine gun and rifle

fire, falling mostly on the left center of the

American force.22

A long mound of earth, about five feet

high and sloping at both ends, was discovered to be undefended. Investigation of the

end of the mound brought rifle fire from

nearby trees, and it soon became apparent

that the Japanese were concentrated about

twenty yards beyond the mound in a shallow trench behind a rock parapet. Over

their heads was a tent, camouflaged with

19

 Byron, Buster, Burnet, and Benson had no known

native names. See JICPOA Bull 53-43, 1 Dec 43, map

facing p. 2; 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. II, FO 1,

19 Feb 44, map. 20

 7th Cav Rcn Tr Rpt, p. 6. 21

 Ibid., p. 7. 22

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. II, pp. 22-27.

Unless otherwise noted, the account of the capture of

Chauncey Island is drawn from this source.
END OF THE BATTLE FOR SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN 291

palm fronds and masked by the deep

shade of tropical vegetation.

To overcome this position the 1st and 3d

Platoons, on the flanks, moved forward far

enough to assault the position obliquely,

while the 2d Platoon crawled near enough

to direct machine gun fire at the parapet

and to throw grenades into the position

beyond it. For about forty-five minutes a

fire fight ensued, and only after a bazooka

rocket exploded inside the tent in which

the Japanese were concealed were they

finally subdued.

A count of the enemy dead revealed

that sixty-five had fallen in the action. Out

on the tugboat, to which troopers of the 2d

Platoon rowed in rubber boats, twelve

others were found dead, possibly from

shelling by Overton. In a small landing

barge were thirteen others, and along the

beach were thirty-five more probably

killed by air attacks earlier in the day.

While the American flag was being raised

on the beached Japanese tugboat, charts

and other documents were found containing intelligence material that was to

prove of considerable assistance in completing the capture of Kwajalein. The

rest of Chauncey was soon secured without

further trouble. The total American loss

on the island that day was fourteen

wounded.23

Burton Island

Among the islands in southern Kwajalein known to have Japanese garrisons,

Burton was believed to be second to Kwajalein Island in importance. A plan for its

capture was prepared before and during

the approach from the Hawaiian Islands,

and perfected after arrival at the atoll.

The assault forces were to be drawn from

the 17th Infantry.24

This regiment had completed its mission

of taking Carlos and Carlson Islands on 31

January and had been assembled on Carlos to reorganize and re-equip while holding itself in readiness on 1 February to

support the attack on Kwajalein Island, if

necessary. When such employment was

deemed to be unlikely, it was decided to

make the landing on Burton Island at

0930 on 3 February.25

Terrain and Enemy Defenses

The southern extremity of Burton Island is less than three miles north of Kwajalein Island, and there are two minute

outcroppings of the atoll reef between

them. Along a straight axis, Burton extends almost directly north for 1,800 yards,

its width being an unvarying 250 yards.

The southern end curves to the southwest

and is shaped somewhat like the bow of a

freighter; the northern shore line runs

squarely east and west.26 (Map 14)

Before being heavily bombarded, it had

had more than 120 machine shops, warehouses, and other buildings. Coconut

palms dotted most of the island, but along

the ocean shore the major vegetation was

sand brush and small mangrove trees. The

most conspicuous clearing was a concrete

apron for seaplanes, extending 100 yards

in width for about 300 yards along the

lagoon shore in the northern quarter of the

island. Jutting a hundred yards into the

lagoon from the apron were two concrete

seaplane ramps, and nearby were large

hangars and repair shops. From the southern edge of the hangar area to the southwestern point of the island, a narrow, surfaced road paralleled the lagoon beach

23

 7th Cav Rcn Tr Rpt, p. 8. 24

 RCT 17 Rpt, p. 5. 25

 Ibid., S-3 Rpt, p. 3. 26

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. II, 7th Inf Div

FO 4, 1 Feb 44, Opns Map.

END OF THE BATTLE FOR SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN 293

BURTON (EBEYE) ISLAND from the air. The tip of Kwajalein is visible in upper right.

for 1,200 yards. From the northern side of

the seaplane area, a curving road with

several spurs ran to the northwestern

point. Trails extended along the ocean

shore.

In addition to the seaplane area and the

roads, one of the most noticeable of the enemy's improvements at Burton Island was

a concrete pier 160 yards long extending

into the lagoon from a point almost midway along the coast. Known to the attacking force as Bailey Pier, it was shaped like

an L, with the arm jutting north at right

angles to the main stem, but with a spur

extending obliquely southwest halfway out

from shore. At the pier's base were several

buildings and two high radio masts.

Preliminary air reconnaissance indicated that Burton was defended by pillboxes and machine gun emplacements

near the beaches and surrounding the seaplane area. The enemy had evidently

originally expected an attack to come from

the ocean side, where the shore could be

more closely approached by ships of deep

draught. Prepared positions had been organized to meet such an assault. Much attention had recently been given, however,

to defense of the lagoon side. On the lagoon beach and near the hangars a number of pillboxes and machine gun emplacements had been spotted. One heavy and

eight medium antiaircraft guns had also

been observed near the apron.27

27

 JICPOA Bull 48-44, pp. 21ff. Also see above, Ch.

XIII, p. 23.
294 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

JAPANESE ENTRENCHMENTS ON BURTON

The lagoon beach had been designated

by the invading force as Orange and

marked off into four sections, of which that

farthest south was known as Orange 4. On

Orange 4, a stretch about five hundred

yards in length, the defenses seemed lightest, and here the landing was to be made.

After getting ashore and making a left

turn, the attacking force would move

northward along the axis of the island.28

On 2 February, Maj. Maynard E.

Weaver, executive officer of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, with engineer officers

and representatives of other elements of

the regiment, made an offshore reconnaissance of Burton Island from the destroyer

Franks, which was supplemented by a twohour seaplane flight by Major Weaver.

These investigations confirmed the earlier

choice of Orange 4 and revealed defenses

that had been concealed by vegetation before the bombardment.29

The Landings and First Day's Action

The 17th Infantry was to hit Orange

Beach at 0930, 3 February. The last details of the assault plan, including naval

participation, were co-ordinated during

the night of 2-3 February.30 The first four

waves of the 1st Battalion had already embarked from Carlos Island in two LST's,

and the first waves of the 3d Battalion were

in two other LST's. The 2d Battalion, in

reserve, was in a transport equipped with

LCVP's.

28

 7th Inf Div FO 4, 1 Feb 44, Opns Map and p. 1. 29

 RCT 17 Rpt, p. 5. 30

 Ibid., S-3 Rpt, p. 3.
END OF THE BATTLE FOR SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN 295

To support the landing, not only the

platoon of light tanks from Company D,

767th Tank Battalion, but also the seventeen mediums of Company C that had

been landed by error on Kwajalein Island,

were assigned to the force. The amphibian

tanks of Company A, 708th Amphibian

Tank Battalion, were also ready. During

the night the regimental field order for the

attack was distributed. Harassing artillery

fire was thrown at Burton from the 155-

mm. howitzers emplaced on Carlson, supplementing the pounding that had been

given the island by the guns of Minneapolis

and San Francisco during the afternoon.31

The landings on Orange Beach 4 followed the standard pattern. At 0730 the

5-inch and 8-inch guns began firing.32

Half an hour later the artillery on Carlson

Island again opened fire. The 145th Field

Artillery Battalion sent 981 rounds of 155-

mm., while the 31st and 48th Battalions

fired so intense a barrage of 105-mm. that

the enemy were driven to cover and the

ground over which the attack was to move

was devastated.33 The bombardment was

suspended for an air strike from 0845 to

0906 in which carrier planes dropped

thirty-three tons of general purpose bombs

and fired 88,000 rounds of .50-caliber ammunition. Artillery fire was lifted inland

at 0933 and farther inland at 0951. The

bombardment had been so effective that at

the beach itself and for the first two hundred yards no live enemy was encountered.34

The 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, commanded by Colonel Hartl, landed in

LVT's with two companies abreast. Despite the mechanical failure of one tractor

and a collision between two others, the first

three waves made the shore without casualty.35

 An LCI gunboat moved shoreward

on each flank of the first wave, blasting the

area near the beach with rockets and machine gun fire. The amphibian tanks and

tractors directed their machine guns into

the few palm trees that still retained

enough foliage to conceal snipers. At various points about 150 yards offshore the

reef was hit, and then the tractors ground

their way through the foamy water to

make the beach at 0935.36 Far off at the

left, a machine gun on the end of the pier

fired among the boats of the fourth wave

and caused the first casualties of the landing. Four men were wounded. An LVT

containing artillery observers drew machine gun fire from Buster Island but this

was quickly silenced by counterfire from

the 31st Field Artillery Battalion.37 While

the men still afloat were meeting the fire,

those on shore reorganized and formed a

line of attack.

Company A, under Capt. Richard H.

Natzke, was on the right and Company C,

commanded by 1st Lt. George E. Linebaugh, was on the left, each reinforced by

a platoon of heavy machine guns from

Company D. Company B, the remainder

of Company D, and one platoon from the

50th Engineer Battalion were in reserve.

After traversing the southern end of the

island, the line started toward the northern end. The amphibian tanks moved at

its left flank, pouring fire ahead of the

troops. The ground was thoroughly torn

up and strewn with debris, but few enemy

31

 145th FA Bn AAR, p. 172; TF 51 Marshalls Rpt,

Incl E, p. 4. 32

 TF 51 Marshalls Rpt, Incl E, App 2, p. 10. 33

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. XII, 7th Inf Div

Arty Rpt, Jnl, 3 Feb 44, Msgs 13, 87; 31st FA Bn

AAR, Jnl, p. 90; 145th FA Bn AAR, p. 173. 34

 7th Inf Div Arty Rpt, Jnl, 3 Feb 44, Msgs 23, 26;

RCT 17 Jnl, 3 Feb 44, Msg 17; TF 51 Marshalls Rpt,

Incl F, p. 5. 35

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. II, pp. 31, 42. 36

 RCT 17 Jnl, 3 Feb 44, Msg 14. 37

 31st FA Bn AAR, p. 68.
296 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

JAPANESE BOMBPROOF SHELTER of reinforced concrete and steel. Note steel door

visible in the lower part of the entrance.

dead were seen. Almost an hour passed

after the first wave hit the beach before the

first general contact with the enemy was

made. When the battalion was stretched

across the island on a line even with the

northern limit of Orange Beach 4, it received small arms fire at all points. The

enemy had come up from shelters after the

artillery barrage moved northward and

was taking full advantage of the plentiful

cover. Bursts of Japanese machine gun fire

swept diagonally across the front from

positions near the beaches.38

Supporting tanks began to cross the

landing beaches at 1016.39 They assembled at the southwestern point of the island

and then struggled through the rubble

north toward the line of attack. A tank

trap across the island was easily passed,

but the island was too narrow to make use

of more than four tanks on the line at a

time, and co-ordination with the infantry

was unsatisfactory.40

The attacking force met its strongest opposition on the extreme left, along the lagoon shore, where Company C bore the

brunt. At the right, movement was deliberately retarded to keep the line even;

Company A could have gone forward

much more rapidly than it did. Enemy

resistance consisted of individual and

small-group activity, without apparent

general plan or direction. Japanese troops

38

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. II, pp. 32-33,

43.

39

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. VI, 7th Inf Div

G-3 Jnl, 3 Feb 44, Msg 39. 40

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. II, pp. 34-35.
END OF THE BATTLE FOR SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN 297

were armed with .25-caliber rifles, 7.7-

mm. and 13-mm. machine guns, and one

77-mm. dual-purpose antiaircraft gun that

was still in operation after the bombardment. Some of the Japanese, and even the

Korean laborers among them, had taken

up crudely improvised dynamite throwers

and spears made of bayonets attached to

poles.41

Most machine gun positions were eliminated by directed artillery or mortar fire.

Some were destroyed by tanks. In the forward line demolition charges were used by

the infantrymen, while combat engineers

worked among the supporting elements.

The enemy, following a pattern of behavior now familiar to the American

troops, remained in shelters until they were

blasted out by explosive charges, flame

throwers, and sometimes bazookas. Holes

were made by repeated point-blank fire

from the 75-mm. guns of the tanks and by

the self-propelled M8's, of which four

came ashore in the afternoon. More often,

hand-placed charges were used to create

working space for flame throwers. Although this type of work on the larger

shelters was frequently left for the engineers by the advancing front-line infantry,

the work of the 1st Battalion in eliminating

riflemen lurking in rubble heaps and

among the trees was very thorough and

the advance, while persistent, was slow.

The rear was well secured.42

Progress on the extreme left wing was

slowed not only by the many active pillboxes but also by the large number of individual rifle pits in which the enemy lay

concealed under palm fronds, waiting as

usual for opportunities to fire or to throw

grenades upon our troops from behind.

First the 2d Platoon, Company C, and

then the 3d carried the advance in this

zone. The 3d thoroughly cleared one hole

after another and in one place eliminated

a group of the enemy firing from a large

excavated pigpen.43

Although one tank had made an advanced reconnaissance as far as the base of

Bailey Pier, the line was about a hundred

yards south of the pier when, shortly before 1700, Company B passed through

Company C to take over the front at the

left. About 1900 consolidation for the

night began. The forward elements of the

1st Battalion were strung across the island

on a line just south of Bailey Pier, and the

area inland from the landing beaches and

to the rear of the 1st Battalion was covered

by the 3d Battalion.44

Evacuated from Burton Island during 3

February were twenty litter cases and

twenty-three ambulatory wounded. The

1st and 3d Platoons, Company A, 7th

Medical Battalion, had landed within the

first ten minutes, set up a collecting station

near the beach, and operated together

under company control. They had used

five 1⁄4-ton trucks converted to ambulances

and had also served as the shore party

medical section in evacuating wounded by

LVT's to ships.45

On Burton during the night of 3-4 February constant illumination and artillery,

mortar, machine gun, and naval fire

helped to to forestall any counterattack

that might have been organized. An enemy 77-mm. dual-purpose gun was silenced by the intermittent counterbattery

fire of 81-mm. mortars, which was later

41

 Ibid., pp. 36-38; RCT 17 Rpt, p. 7. 42

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. II, pp. 35-36;

RCT 17 Rpt, Engineers Rpt, p. 3. 43

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. II, pp. 48-51. 44

 RCT 17 Jnl, 3 Feb 44, Msg 102; 7th Inf Div

FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. VIII, S-3 Periodic Rpt No. 2, 3

Feb 44. 45

 RCT 17 Rpt, Medical Rpt, FLINTLOCK, p. 52; 7th

Inf Div Med Bn AAR, p. 14.
298 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

found to have killed several Japanese relief

crews. In the half light of dawn the enemy

attempted several counterattacks, none of

which materialized into any serious

threats. The last was broken up at about

0700 with the aid of called artillery concentrations.46

Completion of the Conquest of Burton

When on the second morning the attack

was resumed at 0730, the main enemy resistance had shifted to the eastern side of

the island. The Japanese had reoccupied

four pillboxes close to the American front

line on the ocean side, and were able to

hold up Company A until, with the aid of

self-propelled mounts, the company took

the positions.47 During the morning, a

flight of five Navy bombers made two runs

over targets that had been spotted with the

aid of information from a prisoner. The

planes dropped a total of two and threequarters tons on an ammunition dump, a

shelter, and a heavy machine gun that had

an excellent field of fire across the hangar

apron. Direct hits on these targets apparently disheartened the enemy. Not a single

shot was fired by them at any later time

during the operation.48 They remained

buried in their dugouts until forced out or

until they killed themselves.

By 1130, when the 3d Battalion passed

through and took up the assault, Company

B had moved about 350 yards to the

southern edge of the concrete apron, and

on the right Company A was fifty to

seventy-five yards farther back. On the left

Company L advanced behind the tanks

across the open area, while on the right

Company K pushed swiftly through the

heavily bombarded section of hangars, repair shops, small buildings, trenches, and

shelters, arriving at the northeastern corner of the island at 1210. After this the last

of the enemy were readily mopped up. By

1337 the island was fully secured.49

The official estimate of the enemy

dead totaled almost 450. Seven Japanese

were captured. The 17th Infantry lost

seven killed in action. Eighty-two were

wounded.50

Final Mop-up

During the two days in which Burton

Island was being captured (3 and 4 February), two pairs of smaller islands south and

north of it were also brought under American control. Detachments of amphibian

tanks were dispatched on 3 February to

Buster and Byron, two tiny outcroppings

above the main reef between Kwajalein

and Burton. The amphibian tanks met no

opposition. Troops of the 2d Battalion,

17th Infantry, landed the following day on

Burnet and Blakenship north of Burton.

On the former, about forty natives cheerfully submitted to capture. On the latter,

somewhat more than a score of marooned

Japanese sailors and Korean laborers had

to be clubbed or bayonetted into submission before the island could be declared

secure at 1212.51

For the continuation of the mop-up on

5 February, the 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, less a beach combat team and the

46

 RCT 17 Rpt, p. 6, and Jnl, 4 Feb 44, Msg 9;

Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. II, p. 38; 31st FA Bn

Jnl, 4 Feb 44. 47

 RCT 1 7 Rpt, p. 7; Marshall, Kwajalein Notes,

Vol. II, pp. 39-40. 48

 TF 51 Marshalls Rpt, Annex F, p. 5; Marshall,

Kwajalein Notes, Vol. II, pp. 39-40. 49

 RCT 17 Rpt, p. 7 and Jnl, 4 Feb 44, Msgs 55, 60;

7th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 4 Feb 44, Msg 57. 50

 RCT 17 Rpt, pp. 7, 20; 7th Med Bn AAR, pp.

14-15. 51

 RCT 17 Rpt, pp. 6, 7, and Jnl, 3 Feb 44, Msg 76,

4 Feb 44, Msgs 14, 39; 708th Amph Tk Bn, Sp Action Rpt, 12 Mar 44, p. 3.
END OF THE BATTLE FOR SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN 299

BUILDINGS AND SHELTERS after heavy air and artillery bombardment.

Blakenship security detail, was organized

into an Eastern Force and a Western

Force, each consisting of a reinforced rifle

company. The Eastern Force went first to

the northern end of the southeastern leg

of Kwajalein Atoll and worked south toward Bennett Island. In succession it visited Ashberry, August, Barney, Augustine,

and Bascome Islands, meeting no resistance, but finding seven natives on Augustine Island.52

 (See Map 9.)

The Western Force moved northward

from Carlos Island. Clement, Clarence,

and Clifford Islands were quickly secured

and without opposition.53 On Clifton a

small Japanese force had to be subdued

before the island could be declared secured. Troops of Company E met some

desultory machine gun fire as they moved

up the island from the landing beach on

the southern tip. From a wounded prisoner

it was learned that over a hundred sailors

had come ashore from ships that had been

bombed in the lagoon and had brought

with them antiaircraft machine guns and

other weapons. This little force could offer

no serious resistance to the attackers, although one American soldier was killed

and four others were wounded. By nightfall the island was declared secure. The

enemy had lost 101 killed, many of them

suicides. The next day neighboring Cohen

Island was occupied without opposition.54

Meanwhile, the remaining islands on

the southeastern leg of the atoll were being

seized by other units of the 17th Infantry,

52

 RCT 17 Rpt, pp. 9-10. 53

 Ibid.; Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. II, pp.

55-56. 54

 Marshall, Kwajalein Notes, Vol. II, pp. 56-64.
300 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop,

and a detachment from the 184th Infantry. At 0930, 5 February, the 3d Battalion,

17th Infantry, made an unopposed landing on the northern end of Beverly Island

and completed its occupation in less than

an hour, having discovered only three Japanese on the island. Simultaneously, the

1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, landed on

Berlin. After moving slowly through the

underbrush some distance up the island

from the southern end, the attackers encountered some small arms fire from dugouts, costing them altogether three men

killed and four wounded. These dugouts

were quickly demolished and by 1514 Berlin was secured. One hundred and ninetyeight enemy were killed and one captured.

Immediately thereafter, Company C, preceded by a platoon of medium tanks,

crossed the reef to Benson Island. The

crossing was unopposed and the advance

up the island was rapid. One Japanese was

killed and two natives taken prisoner at

the cost of one American killed and one

wounded.55

The task of capturing Bennett Island

was assigned to the 7th Reconnaissance

Troop, which was to repeat the procedure

it had followed in capturing Carter and

Cecil Islands on D Day. The troops were

taken from Carlos through the lagoon to

a point near Bennett in the high-speed

transports Manley and Overton and disembarked before dawn. In rubber boats they

moved ashore, landing at the northern

point of the island at 0600. Hastily, before

daybreak, a defensive position was established there. At dawn the force moved out,

with the 3d Platoon in front, the 1st Platoon on the left flank, the headquarters

platoon supporting the center rear, and

the 2d Platoon acting as rear guard.56

About a hundred yards from the line of

departure, the advance platoon came

across a well-protected bunker containing

an unknown number of Japanese. Neither

grenades, bazookas, nor clusters of grenades were powerful enough to destroy the

position, so Captain Gritta, commanding

officer, ordered it bypassed. The 1st and

3d Platoons then moved forward to meet

an attack of Japanese infantry approaching from the south. After a brief exchange

of machine gun and small arms fire, fifteen

of the enemy were killed and one machine

gun was captured, another knocked out.

As the front line continued toward the

center of the island, it came across another

bunker, which appeared to be much

stronger than the first.

Meanwhile, Captain Gritta had called

for reinforcements. The 3d Battalion,

184th Infantry, had been standing by in

floating reserve to assist in the capture of

Berlin or Beverly, if necessary. The battalion was ordered instead to Bennett, where

the resistance appeared to be heavier. Accompanied by two medium tanks and

under command of Lt. Col. William B.

Moore, executive officer of the 17th Infantry, this reserve force began to come ashore

on Bennett about 1100. The unit moved

up at once, getting into the front lines

shortly before noon. Meanwhile, the destroyer Noel had moved to a station west of

Bennett in order to furnish fire on call.57

In the absence of other orders, Colonel

Moore and his infantrymen took over the

ocean side of the island while Captain

Gritta's troop covered that nearest the lagoon. By this time the occupants of the first

dugout had committed suicide, and after

the tanks subdued the second dugout the

55

 RCT 17 Rpt, pp. 7-8. 56

 7th Cav Rcn Tr AAR, pp. 9-10. 57

 Ibid.; 7th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 5 Feb 44, Msgs 5, 7; TF

51 Marshalls Rpt, Incl E, App 2.
END OF THE BATTLE FOR SOUTHERN KWAJALEIN 301

advance southward along the island began. After hardly more than twenty-five

yards' progress, machine gun fire from a

pier on the right stopped the advance for

a few minutes while mortar and tank fire

knocked out the machine guns.58

The attack was almost halfway to the

southern tip before division orders authorized Colonel Moore to take command of

the operation. The 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop withdrew to the beach,

and the infantry, supported by two light

and two medium tanks, completed the attack. Early in the afternoon the troop overcame another set of pillboxes near the center of the island. Through the dense underbrush the process of mopping up was continued until 1642, when the island was

reported fully secured. At the cost of one

killed and two wounded in the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop and no casualties among other components, Bennett

Island had been captured and some

ninety-four Japanese had been killed or

had died by their own hands.59

The Southern Landing Force thus completed its mission, with losses for the entire

operation in southern Kwajalein reported

as 142 killed, 845 wounded, and two missing in action. The best estimate of enemy

losses was 4,938 dead and 206 prisoners,

79 of whom were Japanese and 127

Korean.60 Meanwhile, some forty-five

miles to the north, operations of the Northern Landing Force against the sixty-two

islands of the upper half of Kwajalein

Atoll were also nearing completion.

58

 RCT 17 Rpt, p. 9; 7th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 5 Feb 44,

pp. 68, 88. 59

 RCT 17 Rpt, p. 9; 7th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 5 Feb 44,

pp.149-51. 60

 7th Inf Div FLINTLOCK Rpt, Vol. III, G-1 Rpt,

pp. 18, 19, 70.
CHAPTER XVIII

The Capture of Majuro

and Roi-Namur

Majuro

On the same day that the first landings

were being made on Kwajalein Atoll,

American forces with far less difficulty

were occupying Majuro Atoll about 265

nautical miles to the southeast. Majuro

was correctly believed to be only lightly

defended, if at all, and the configuration of

the atoll plus its location on the eastern

rim of the Marshalls made it an ideal location for an advance naval base. Hence the

decision to include its capture as a secondary phase of the FLINTLOCK operation.

The atoll contains a large lagoon, about

twenty-six miles long and six miles wide,

surrounded by a narrow ribbon of islets

covered with low-lying vegetation and connected by submarine reefs. (Map 15) Some

portions of this rim are distinguishable as

separate islands. The largest of these,

Majuro Island, extends from the southwestern corner of the atoll about fifteen

miles east. Between Majuro Island and

Dalap Island, twelve miles to the east,

there is a string of small islets. On the

eastern leg of the atoll north of Dalap lie

Uliga and Darrit Islands. The northern

side of the atoll is irregular and broken.

Along it, and elsewhere around the lagoon

are many tiny islets too small to be of any

consequence. Near the middle of the

northern leg are the two best entrance

channels, separated by Eroj Island. Calalin

Pass, to which the attacking force was directed, was that at the east, lying between

Eroj and Calalin Islands.1

The Majuro Attack Group (Task Group

51.2), commanded by Admiral Hill, left

Pearl Harbor on 23 January in company

with the Reserve Force destined for Kwajalein. The ground forces committed to

Majuro consisted of the 2d Battalion,

106th Infantry, reinforced, of the 27th Infantry Division, under command of Colonel Sheldon, and of the V Amphibious

Corps Reconnaissance Company, commanded by Capt. James L. Jones, USMC.

These troops, totaling over 1,500 officers

and men, were carried aboard the transport Cambria, which also served as Admiral Hill's flagship, and the high-speed

transport Kane.

Protection was initially provided by the

cruiser Portland, escort carriers Nassau and

Natoma Bay, and later by Destroyer Division 96, consisting of Bullard, Black, Kidd,

and Chauncey, which rendezvoused with

the attack group at sea after a voyage from

Funafuti. Three mine sweepers, Chandler,

Sage, and Oracle and the LST 482, carrying

1

 Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), The Assault

on Kwajalein and Majuro, Washington, 1944, 2 vols.,

Vol. I, p. 7 (map).
THE CAPTURE OF MAJURO AND ROI-NAMUR 303

MAP 15

the amphibious vehicles for the landing,

completed the group.2

At 0300 on 30 January, the Majuro

group broke off from the remainder of the

convoy bound for Kwajalein and headed

directly for its target.3 About two hours

later Kane sped forward alone and reached

Calalin Pass about 2130 that evening.

Under cover of darkness she launched her

rubber boats that were to carry ashore the

first American troops to land on a possession held by the Japanese before the outbreak of the war. Led by 1st Lt. Harvey C.

Weeks, USMC, elements of the V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company

landed on Calalin Island close to the entrance to the pass. They found one native

and at 2345 reported by radio that he had

told them that about 300 to 400 enemy

were on Darrit Island, but that none were

elsewhere on the atoll.4

Meanwhile, Kane had continued around

the eastern end of the atoll and at 0200 on

31 January commenced to land the remainder of the reconnaissance company,

under Captain Jones, on Dalap Island.

Proceeding north along the island, they

found a native from whom they learned, in

direct contradiction of the earlier report,

that all but four of the enemy had left

Majuro more than a year earlier and that

those four Japanese were at the other end

of the atoll on Majuro Island. Confirmation of this second account was next obtained from an English-speaking halfcaste, Michael Madison, who was discovered on Uliga Island. By this time Ad2

 TG 51.2 Action Rpt, Majuro Atoll, Marshall Islands, 15 Feb 44, Incl A, pp. 2, 8. 3

 Ibid., p. 11. 4

 V Phib Corps FLINTLOCK Rpt, Incl J, V Phib

Corps Amph Rcn Co, War Diary, Sundance Atoll, 20

Jan 44, Annex H, p. 2.
304 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

miral Hill's ships had commenced their

scheduled naval gunfire on Darrit Island

at 0600, and Captain Jones had some difficulty in getting in touch with the flagship

by radio to call off the fire, which was not

needed since no known enemy was on the

island. Finally, after about fifteen minutes,

radio contact was established and the

naval bombardment of the eastern section

of the atoll ceased.

A detail from the reconnaissance company then walked across the reef from

Uliga to Darrit and verified the report that

had prompted suspension of the bombardment. They found the village on Darrit

deserted and installations only partly damaged by the naval gunfire. Incomplete

buildings and useful construction material

were also discovered.5

That afternoon the marines of the reconnaissance company boarded Kane to be

taken to Majuro Island itself, where it was

hoped they would find the remnant of

Japanese reported to be still in the atoll.

At 2145 that evening a detail of forty-two

men landed from rubber boats and commenced patrolling the island. Only one

Japanese was discovered, a Warrant Officer

Nagata of the Imperial Japanese Navy,

who had been left as overseer of Japanese

property in Majuro. Several machine guns

and a small store of dynamite and hand

grenades were taken, and with that the

"capture" of Majuro Atoll was completed.6

D Day: Northern Kwajalein

The 4th Marine Division's plan for the

capture of the northern half of Kwajalein

Atoll was in most respects a duplicate of

that of the 7th Infantry Division's for the

southern half. The principal target was

Roi-Namur, twin islands on the northern

tip of the atoll, connected only by a strip of

sandy beach and an artificial causeway.

The day before the main landing was undertaken, adjacent islands were to be captured in order to make safe the passage of

naval vessels into the lagoon and provide

location for artillery to support the assault

on Roi-Namur. This preliminary task was

assigned to a special landing group (designated Ivan Landing Group) commanded

by General Underhill. It consisted of the

25th Marines (reinforced), the 14th Marines (Artillery), Company D (Scout) of

the 4th Tank Battalion, and other attached

units.

Ivan and Jacob

At 0900 on 31 January the 1st Battalion,

25th Marines, plus the Scout Company,

was to make simultaneous landings from

the ocean side on Ivan (Mellu) and Jacob

(Ennuebing) Islands, which guarded the

deep water pass into the lagoon. (See Map

10.) After the lagoon had been swept for

mines, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the

same regiment were to move in and land

on Albert (Ennumennet) and Alien (Ennubir) Islands, which lay southeast of

Namur. If time permitted, the 3d Battalion

was then to capture Abraham (Ennugarret) Island thus completing the chain surrounding Roi-Namur. The four battalions

of the artillery regiment (14th Marines)

were to be emplaced respectively on Ivan,

Jacob, Albert, and Alien, from which positions they could support the next day's

landings on Roi and Namur.7 Only

enough amphibian tractors (from the 10th

Amphibian Tractor Battalion) were available to carry two landing teams at a time,

5

 Ibid., Annex E, pp. 2-3. 6

 Ibid., Annex H, pp. 4-6. 7

 4th Marine Div Opn Plan 3-43 (Revised), 30 Dec

43; 4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, 17 Mar 44,

Incl C, Rpt of Gen Underhill, CG Ivan Landing

Group, p. 1.
THE CAPTURE OF MAJURO AND ROI-NAMUR 305

the 1st and 2d Battalions. The plan called

for the 1st Battalion to release its tractors

to the 3d upon completion of the capture

of Ivan and Jacob.8 This shortage of amphibian tractors, the inevitable complications involved in making five separate

landings in one day, and other factors yet

to be mentioned led to such confusion and

delay that all of the plans for D Day

quickly went awry.

At 0535 on 31 January Admiral Conolly's flagship, Appalachian, in convoy with

the transports and fire support ships of the

Northern Attack Force took station southwest of Ivan and Jacob Islands and commenced preparing for the initial attack on

northern Kwajalein. The sky was overcast;

a 19-knot wind blew from the northeast,

which meant that the amphibian craft

bound for Ivan and Jacob would have to

buck both wind and sea.9

Shortly before sunrise Conolly's fire support ships took station, and at 0651 Biloxi

and Maryland commenced shelling. In

addition to these two vessels, the landings

were to be supported by the old battleships

Tennessee and Colorado, the heavy cruisers

Louisville, Mobile, and Indianapolis, the light

cruiser Santa Fe, escort carriers Sangamon,

Suwanee, and Chenango, seventeen destroyers, one destroyer escort, and three mine

sweepers. At 0715 naval gunfire was

checked to permit a scheduled air strike

by planes from the escort carriers. This

was completed within eight minutes, and

the naval guns again took up the blasting

of Roi and Namur.

Meanwhile, the troops that were to land

on Ivan and Jacob were facing unexpected

difficulties getting debarked from their

transports into landing craft and transferred into the amphibian tractors, which

had been carried aboard LST's. Before the

operation, landing team commanders had

estimated that their debarkation interval

would be about sixty minutes. This proved

to be grossly optimistic. Once the troops

were loaded in their assigned landing craft

they had to make their way through

choppy seas to the LST area for transfer to

amphibian tractors. At this juncture all

semblance of control broke down.

Landing craft were about two hours late

in reaching the LST area. Choppy seas

and a head wind were partly responsible

for the delays. Boat control officers left the

tractors in frantic search for the landing

craft and failed to return in time to lead

the LVT's to the line of departure. Tractors

were damaged or swamped while milling

around their mother LST's waiting for the

troops to show up. Radios in LVT's were

drowned out. One LST weighed anchor

and shifted position before completing the

disembarkation of all its tractors. The elevator on another broke down so that those

LVT's loaded on the topside deck could

not be disembarked on time. In short,

almost every conceivable mishap occurred

to delay and foul up what, under even the

best of circumstances, was a complicated

maneuver.10

8

 4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, 17 Mar 44,

Incl C, p. 1. 9

 4th Marine Div Jnl, 31 Jan-2 Feb 44, Roi-Namur,

Operational Narrative, 31 Jan 44, p. 2. The following

narrative of the landings on Ivan and Jacob is derived

from this source and from the following: TF 53 Rpt

Roi-Namur, 23 Feb 44, Incl A, pp. 10-14; 4th Marine

Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, 17 Mar 44; Ibid., Incl C,

Rpt of CG Ivan Landing Group; Ibid., Incl F, Rpt of

RCT 25; 1st Bn 25th Marines Rpt of Activities, 16

Feb 44; 10th Amph Trac Bn Rpt of Opns During the

FLINTLOCK Opn, 17 Mar 44; 14th Marines Opns Rpt.

Also, the authors are indebted to the U.S. Marine

Corps Historical Division for permission to read the

first three chapters of a draft study of Marine Corps

operations in the Marshalls prepared by Lt. Col.

Robert D. Heinl, USMC. 10

 See reports of platoon leaders of the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion in 10th Amph Trac Bn Rpt

FLINTLOCK.
306 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

At 0825 another air strike was launched

against Roi and Namur and ten minutes

later the naval ships again resumed fire.

By this time it had become apparent to the

control officer who was stationed aboard

the destroyer Phelps on the line of departure that the scheduled H Hour could not

be met and he so advised Admiral Conolly.

The admiral postponed the time of landing by thirty minutes and advised the

planes that were to deliver a last-minute

bombing and strafing on the beaches to coordinate their actions with the progress of

the landing waves, holding their strike

until the tractors were twenty minutes off

the beach.

Not until 0917 were enough tractors

present on the line of departure to warrant

starting the final movement forward. As

the first wave moved toward the beaches

of Ivan, Col. Samuel C. Cumming, commanding officer of the 25th Marines,

radioed, "Good luck to first Marine to

land on Japanese soil."11 Ahead of the

troops bound for Jacob moved a wave of

armored amphibians and ahead of them a

wave of LCI gunboats. Eleven hundred

yards off the shore these ugly little vessels

released their barrage of rockets and immediately thereafter the final air strike against

the beaches of Ivan and Jacob was delivered. As the LCI's lay to in the water, the

wave of amphibian tanks passed through

to pound the beaches with 37-mm. shells.

These then deployed to port and starboard

and the troop-laden amphibian tractors

moved to the shore. The first tractor

touched the coral beaches of Jacob at 0952,

almost a full hour behind the original

schedule.

The landing on Ivan, carried out in the

same manner, was even further delayed.

Unable to negotiate the reefs on the seaward side the Scout Company, contrary to

orders, moved into the lagoon and landed

on the southeast beach about 0955. There

they quickly built up a firing line across

the southern end of the island from east to

west. When the remainder of the Ivan

Landing Group (C Company) landed on

the southwest (seaward) side of the island

at 1015, they quickly established liaison

with the Scout Company and together the

two units moved up the island.12

There was only token resistance on Ivan

and Jacob. By 1015 Jacob was reported

secured with thirteen Japanese killed and

three taken prisoner. An hour and a half

later Ivan was completely overrun with

seventeen enemy killed and two taken prisoner. By early afternoon the 3d Battalion,

14th Marines (75-mm. pack howitzers),

had been carried ashore to Jacob Island in

LVT's, and the 4th Battalion (105-mm.

howitzers) was landed on Ivan from

LCM's.13 With this accomplished, the

regiment's attention could now be turned

to the capture of Albert, Alien, and Abraham Islands on the other (eastern) flank of

Roi-Namur.

Albert and Alien

The plan for the next stage of D-Day

operations called for the 2d Battalion, 25th

Marines, commanded by Lt. Col. Lewis C.

Hudson, to capture Alien Island, and for

the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, under

command of Lt. Col. Justice M. Chambers,

to take Albert and, if possible, Abraham.

A Hour for landing on Albert and Alien

was 1430; B Hour for landing on Abraham

11

 4th Marine Div Jnl, 31 Jan 44, p. 6. Colonel

Cumming was in error. Marines of the V Amphibious

Corps Reconnaissance Company had landed the night

before at Majuro. 12

 1st Bn 25th Marines Rpt, p. 1. 13

 14th Marines Rpt FLINTLOCK, p. 1.
THE CAPTURE OF MAJURO AND ROI-NAMUR 307

was 1600. The 2d Battalion had already

been boated in LVT's (except for one wave,

which was in LCVP's) and was standing

by as the reserve force for the Ivan-Jacob

landings. There had not been enough

LVT's, however, to carry the 3d Battalion,

which had to wait until early afternoon in

LCVP's until the 1st Battalion had released sufficient tractors to carry the 3d to

its destination.14

The first step was to clear the passes and

the lagoon off the southern shore of RoiNamur of any possible mines. By 1116 the

mine sweepers had moved under cover of

smoke through Jacob Pass and within 1,500

yards of Albert Island. As the sweepers retired southward into the lagoon, Albert

and Alien were bombed and strafed by

carrier aircraft, and LCI's moved close in

to add to their 20-mm. and 40-mm. fire to

the din. Then, about noon, as both mine

sweepers and LCI's moved out of Jacob

Pass back into the ocean, six torpedo

planes and seven bombers delivered an

attack on Albert and four bombers hit

Alien. As soon as this was completed naval

fire from two destroyers, Porterfield and

Haraden, was resumed. Meanwhile the

larger vessels were pouring shells into

Namur. At 1210 Admiral Conolly sent the

order, "Desire MARYLAND move in

really close this afternoon for counter battery and counter blockhouse fire, using

pointer fire for both main and secondary

batteries."

 15

 Thus was born the affectionate title "Close-in Conolly," which was

endowed upon the admiral for the rest of

the war and never failed to endear him to

soldiers and marines who liked the comfortable feeling of battleships and cruisers

close behind their own unarmored backs.

Meanwhile, another mix-up in the landing plan had occurred. As naval gunfire

and mine-sweeping operations were proceeding inside the lagoon, the landing craft

and vehicles to carry the 2d and 3d Battalions, 25th Marines, to Alien and Albert

were supposed to be forming in transfer

areas about 3,000 yards southeast of the

Ivan-Jacob line of departure, which was

marked by the destroyer Phelps. Up to 1130

no boats or LVT's were anywhere near

these areas. About this time Phelps, which

had been acting as central control vessel

for all D-Day landings, received orders to

leave station as control vessel and proceed

into the lagoon to deliver fire support missions. In obedience to these instructions

Phelps announced over her bull horn to the

SC 997, aboard which rode General Underhill, "Am going to support minesweepers.

Take over." Whereupon the destroyer

steamed through Ivan Pass into the lagoon,

leaving the job of boat control to the surprised party aboard the subchaser. Unfortunately the SC 997 had been furnished

none of the plans for boat control and furthermore had an insufficient number of

radios aboard to carry on proper communications with the milling tractors and

landing craft. To compound the confusion,

most of the tractors of the 2d Battalion

Landing Team took out after Phelps and

started to follow her through the pass.

General Underhill immediately ordered

SC 997 to overtake the retreating troops.

Their tractors and landing craft were ordered by megaphone to return to the

proper transfer area. En route, the newly

appointed control vessel collected a few

14

 This account of the Albert, Alien, and Abraham

landings is derived from the following sources: 4th

Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incls C and F; 4th

Marine Div Jnl, 3 1 Jan 44; 2d Bn 25th Marines Rpt,

20 Feb 44; 3d Bn 25th Marines Rpt, 9 Feb 44; 10th

Amph Trac Bn Rpt FLINTLOCK; TF 53 Rpt RoiNamur, Incl A. 15

 4th Marine Div Jnl, 31 Jan 44, p. 15.
308 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

aimlessly wandering tractors as well as

most of the boats carrying the 3d Battalion Landing Team. Then Admiral Conolly

was informed that the assault troops for

Alien and Albert would probably be ready

in the transfer areas by 1230. With this information, A Hour was postponed to

1430.16

By about 1250 a few more tractors had

come into the transfer area, and General

Underhill then ordered the SC 997 to lead

the two assault battalion landing teams

through Jacob Pass to Phelps, which was

now lying off Albert and Alien waiting to

direct the final attack. By this time Colonel

Chambers' 3d Battalion had only enough

LVT's to make up the first wave and a half.

The remainder of these vehicles, which

were supposed to have been released by

the 1st Battalion, were either sunk or

otherwise incapacitated, still drawn up on

the beaches of Ivan or Jacob, or simply lost

in the melee. General Underhill ordered

Chambers to make do with what he had

and proceed with the scheduled attack.17

At 1342 Phelps, which was now stationed

on the line of departure, radioed to Admiral Conolly that the first wave of tractors

was not going to meet the 1430 A Hour

and recommended that it be delayed by

half an hour. It was so ordered. At 1420

the scheduled last-minute air attack was

ordered to be executed. Six bombers and

one torpedo plane bombed Alien and six

bombers and five torpedo planes covered

Albert for fifteen minutes. Immediately

upon suspension of this attack, the

LCI(G)'s moved forward from the line of

departure followed by a wave of armored

amphibian tractors, which were followed

in turn by the amphtracks and landing

craft carrying the assault troops. The three

destroyers that had been shelling the beach

up to this time were ordered to cease fire at

1450. As the waves moved closer to the

beaches, the LCI(G)'s opened up with

their 40-mm. and 20-mm. guns and their

4.5-inch barrage rockets. On Albert a tremendous explosion was observed as a result

of the barrage. Meanwhile, nine dive

bombers and nine torpedo bombers from

the escort carrier Suwannee were sent in to

bomb and strafe Sally Point, the southeast

promontory of Namur. At 1513 the first

wave of the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines,

touched ground on Albert, and about five

minutes later the leading troops of the 2d

Battalion hit Alien.18

Resistance on both islands was light.

Within twenty minutes after the first touchdown, the 3d Battalion had pushed across

Albert, and killed the ten Japanese present

at the cost of one marine killed and seven

wounded. The 2d Battalion had only a little more difficulty. On the northern half of

Alien they ran into about a platoon of

Japanese, but after sustaining seven casualties the attackers killed the twenty-four

enemy and declared the island secure.

Then Company G, supported by five armored amphibians, pushed across the reef

to Andrew Island, a little sandspit south of

Alien, and took it without suffering casualties. Before dark the 75-mm. pack howitzers of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 14th

Marines, had been landed respectively on

Alien and Albert, thus completing the

bracketing of the main targets of Roi and

Namur from both sides.19 All that remained

to complete the day's operations was the

capture of Abraham Island lying immediately southeast of Namur.

16

 This account is derived from General Underhill's

report, 29 Feb 44, in 4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, Annex C. 17

 Ibid., p. 4. 18

 4th Marine Div Jnl, 31 Jan 44, pp. 19-24. 19

 14th Marines Rpt FLINTLOCK, pp. 1-2.
THE CAPTURE OF MAJURO AND ROI-NAMUR 309

Abraham

Plans for the capture of Abraham were

greatly complicated by the premature departure from Albert of all but two LVT's.

This situation came about as a result of a

midstream modification of plans and ignorance on the part of the LVT commanders

of the proposed scheme for landing on

Abraham. After leaving Hawaii and while

still aboard ship, General Underhill received a change of D-Day plans to include

the capture of Abraham about 1600. This

plan was supposed to have been forwarded

to the commander of the 10th Amphibian

Tractor Battalion and his subordinate

commanders on the morning of D Day. In

the confusion that attended the transfer of

troops to the LVT's, the change of orders

was not received by the tractor units.

Hence they were under the impression that

once Alien and Albert were secured they

were at liberty to return to the LST's to

take on much-needed fuel.20

Late in the afternoon, Colonel Cumming, commanding officer of the 25th

Marines, conferred with Colonel Chambers, the 3d Battalion commander, on the

feasibility of an immediate landing on

Abraham. It was agreed and subsequently

ordered that B Hour for the landing would

be 1800. No artillery support would be

available because the pack howitzers had

not yet had time to get into position and

register. It was too late to establish contact

with the naval fire support ships to get

naval gunfire support, and although a request was made for air support, it was

refused. This meant that the only preliminary fire that Chambers could count on

would be from his own 60-mm. and 81-mm.

mortars plus the half-tracks that had been

attached to his battalion for the invasion of

Albert.21

Before the hour for jumping off arrived,

two more LVT's were commandeered,

bringing the total number available for the

attack to four. The commanding officer of

Company A, 4th Tank Battalion, 1st Lt.

Robert E. Stevenson, personally reconnoitered the depth of water by wading

almost the whole distance to Abraham. A

small sandspit lying between Albert and

Abraham (called Albert Junior) was occupied without any opposition except for

light fire from Abraham. Then, starting at

1750, the half-tracks and mortars delivered

a ten-minute preparatory fire against

Abraham, and 81-mm. mortars laid smoke

on the landing beach. With 120 officers

and men of Company L aboard, the four

LVT's hit the beach on schedule. After putting up a token resistance the few enemy

on the island withdrew. Within thirty

minutes two rifle companies (Companies

L and K, reinforced) had been shuttled to

the island. By 1915 the initial occupation

of the island was completed, although

20

 4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, Annex G,

p. 5; 10th Amph Trac Bn Rpt FLINTLOCK, p. 3; 3d Bn

25th Marine Rpt, p. 1.

Part of the confusion resulted from a conflicting

interpretation of orders. The Northern Landing Force

Operation Plan 3-43 of 31 December 1943 provided

that at the completion of Phase I on D Day, the LVT's

should revert to division control. Since the tractors had

not been apprised of the decision to take Abraham,

their commanders assumed that with the securing of

Alien and Albert, Phase I was completed and they

were free to return to the LST area (10th Amph Trac

Bn Rpt FLINTLOCK, p. 3). On the other hand, General

Underhill's Ivan Landing Group order directed the

LVT's attached to 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, to

return to their LST's only when released by his command. According to this interpretation, ". . . there

was no authority for LVT(A)'s to detach themselves

from CT-25 or leave ALBERT or ALLEN until

ordered by G.G., IVAN Landing Group or by C.O.,

CT-25 and no release had been given." (4th Marine

Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, Annex C, p. 5.) 21

 The account of the capture of Abraham is derived

from 4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incl F,

Rpt of RCT 25, and 3d Bn 25th Marines Rpt.
NAMUR as it appeared before (above) and during (below) the bombardment.
THE CAPTURE OF MAJURO AND ROI-NAMUR 311

mopping-up operations continued for several hours. Six enemy were killed and

others appear to have escaped to Namur

after darkness set in.

Immediately upon its capture, steps

were taken to convert Abraham Island into

a base for regimental weapons to support

the next day's attack on Namur, which lay

only 460 yards away. Ammunition and

supplies were brought from Albert

throughout the night. Battery B of the 4th

Special Weapons Battalion and the 75-mm.

platoon of the regimental Weapons Company were landed. Before daylight the entire north coast bristled with flat-trajectory

weapons and mortars. The total fire power

located on Abraham came to five 75-mm.

half-tracks, seventeen 37-mm. guns, four

81-mm. mortars, nine 60-mm. mortars,

and sixty-one machine guns. The 24th

Marines, which next day would attack

Namur, would have reason to be thankful

for all this additional support on their right

flank.

Thus, by the close of D Day the 25th

Marines had captured five islands flanking

the main target of Roi-Namur. Four battalions of artillery (three of 75-mm. pack

howitzers and one of 105-mm. howitzers)

had been emplaced, and all but the one

105-mm. battalion had commenced registration. Mortars, machine guns, and regimental weapons in considerable number

had gone into position to support the right

flank of the assault on Namur. An estimated 135 Japanese had been killed at the

cost of eighteen marines killed, eight missing, and forty wounded in action.22

On D Day, Roi and Namur had both

been subjected to constant bombardment

from air and from sea. The lagoon off the

southern landing beaches had been swept

and found clear of mines. Under cover of

darkness an underwater demolition team

had reconnoitered south of Roi and Namur

to within fifty yards of the beaches and

found no mines or obstructions.

On the night of 31 January-1 February,

as the marines and sailors ashore and afloat

anxiously awaited the dawn that would

initiate the main assault on northern Kwajalein, three destroyers kept up an intermittent fire on those islands to harass the

Japanese and prevent them from resting

up for the coming attacks. Star shells from

the destroyers from time to time pierced

the murky darkness. The LST's of the

initial group stayed at anchor inside the

lagoon, fueling their embarked LVT's and

otherwise preparing for the main assault.

The flagship Appalachian lay to just outside

the lagoon, as did the ships of Transport

Division 26, which spent the night disembarking ammunition and supplies to Ivan

and Jacob. The remainder of the large

ships of the Northern Attack Force cruised

at sea waiting the signal to return to the

attack area at daylight.23

Initial Landings on Roi and Namur

The plan for the main assault on RoiNamur called for simultaneous landings

by the 23d Marine Regimental Combat

Team on Red Beaches 2 and Red 3 on the

lagoon (south) shore of Roi and of the 24th

Marine Regimental Combat Team on

Green Beaches 1 and Green 2 on the lagoon

shore of Namur (Map VII). Each regiment

would attack with two battalions abreast

and one in reserve. The assault waves were

to be carried in LVT's, which would be

preceded by armored amphibians as far as

the shore line. LCI gunboats, as usual,

22

 4th Marine Div Jnl, Operational Narrative, 1 Feb

44, p. 1; 4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incl

F, p. 3. 23

 TF 53 Rpt Roi-Namur, p. 6, Incl A, p. 14.
312 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

would lead the waves close in to shore, firing their guns and rockets as they went. W

Hour for Roi and Namur was to be 0900

on 1 February.24

The original plan had called for the

transfer of the troops of the 23d and 24th

Regimental Combat Teams from their

transports to LST's outside the lagoon on

the afternoon of D Day while the outlying

islands were being captured. Then, in the

early morning hours of 1 February, the

LST's were to launch their troop-laden

amphibian tractors, which would proceed

into the lagoon under their own power and

take station on the line of departure. Because of the many difficulties that had

beset the LVT's on D Day, this plan was

changed. After the troop transfer had been

completed, the LST's were ordered to

move into the lagoon themselves early on

the 1st before discharging their amphibian

tractors.25

While the LST's got under way preparatory to moving into the lagoon and making ready to put their amphibian tractors

into the water, naval ships and planes

commenced their final softening up of the

target. At 0650 the first bombardment began when Santa Fe, Maryland, Indianapolis,

Biloxi, Mustin, and Russell opened fire on

Roi, and twenty minutes later Tennessee,

Colorado, Louisville, Mobile, Morris, and

Anderson commenced pounding Namur.

Artillery fire commenced at 0645 with the

1st and 2d Battalions, 14th Marines, firing

on the beaches of Namur and the 3d and

4th Battalions on those of Roi.26

Meanwhile, the assault troops were

struggling, as often as not unsuccessfully, to

get into their LVT's and move toward the

line of departure. The 23d Marines were

to be carried to their beaches by the tractors of the 4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, which had rested idle aboard their

LST's outside the lagoon on D Day. To the

24th Marines bound for Namur were

assigned the tractors of the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion that had participated

in the preceding day's actions.

The troubles that had beset the 10th

Amphibian Tractor Battalion on D Day

were titanic. They had been launched too

far from the line of departure in the first

place. They had had to buck adverse

winds and unexpectedly choppy seas. Radio failures had tremendously complicated

the problem of control, causing still further

delay and much unnecessary travel

through the water. All of this spelled excessive fuel consumption and many of the

tractors ran out of gas before the day was

over. For an LVT to run out of fuel in a

choppy sea was usually disastrous. This

model, the LVT(2), shipped water easily

and its bilge pumps could not be manually

operated. Thus, when the gasoline supply

was gone the vehicle could not be pumped

out and usually sank. In addition, many of

the tractors of the 10th Battalion had not

been released from their duties on D Day

until after dark, were unable to get back to

their mother LST's for refueling, and had

spent the night on various outlying islands.

Thus, as the hour for descending on Namur

approached, the 24th Marines could muster only 62 of the 110 tractors that had

been assigned to them.27 A hurried call

was sent out for LCVP's to make up the

difference. Since the regimental commander, Col. Franklin A. Hart, USMC,

had not yet received the report of the pre24

 4th Marine Div Opn Plan 3-43 (Revised). 25

 TF 53 Rpt Roi-Namur, p. 6. 26

 4th Marine Div Jnl, Operational Narrative, 1 Feb

44, p. 1; 14th Marines Rpt FLINTLOCK, p. 2. 27

 10th Amph Trac Bn Rpt FLINTLOCK, 1st Ind by

CG 4th Marine Div, 27 Mar 44; 4th Marine Div Final

Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incl E, Rpt of RCT 24, p. 6.
THE CAPTURE OF MAJURO AND ROI-NAMUR 313

vious night's beach reconnaissance by the

underwater demolition team, he was not

sure whether there was enough water off

the beach to float LCVP's. Hence he had

to make last-minute changes in the scheduled wave formation. In the zone of the 2d

Battalion, which was destined for Green

Beach 2, the original fourth wave was

ordered to go in as the second and third

waves on the left of the line. This was because Company E, which had originally

been designated as reserve, had all of its

twelve amphibian tractors available whereas Company G, designated the left assault

company, had only three.28

To the left, off the beaches of Roi, the

23d Marines were having their own share

of problems. Their LST's were late in

arriving on station inside the lagoon and

once there they encountered serious difficulties in disembarking their tractors. Elevators jammed when the effort was made

to lower the LVT's stowed on the top decks

into the tank decks for launching. To add

to these mechanical failures, the naval personnel of the LST's were for the most part

inexperienced. Some of these ships had

been rushed from their Ohio River building yards to San Diego only a few days

before final departure for the Marshalls.

Their crews had had only the most rudimentary basic training and very little time

to work with the troops and the equipment. On one LST, only one man in the

entire crew professed to having actually

seen an LVT lowered down the elevator

from the main deck to the tank deck.29

As soon as Admiral Conolly was made

fully aware of this series of delays, he realized that the original W Hour of 1000

could not possibly be met. Accordingly, at

0853 the time for the first landing was

postponed an hour, and shortly thereafter

fire support ships were ordered to adjust

their schedules to the new W Hour.30

As tractors and landing craft struggled

to reach the line of departure and form in

some semblance of orderly boat waves,

naval ships and planes continued their

devastating attack on the landing beaches

and inland. At 1026 naval and artillery

fire ceased as sixteen torpedo bombers and

dive bombers from the light carrier Cabot

flew in to drop their 2,000-pound bombs

on assigned targets. Ten minutes later fifteen dive bombers arrived from Intrepid to

drop their loads, followed by a dozen

fighters from the same ship, who flew in

low and strafed the landing beaches. At

1055 Admiral Conolly ordered all planes

out of immediate area of the islands and

ships and artillery were told to resume fire.

Roi and Namur were covered with such

towering plumes of smoke that one air observer reported the ceiling to be "absolutely

zero."31

At the line of departure, marked again

by the destroyer Phelps, confusion still

reigned as W Hour approached and then

passed. Off the beaches of Roi, Col. Louis

R. Jones, commanding the 23d Marines,

was out of radio contact with the commander of the 4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Radios had been doused with rain

and salt water and, as had been the case

the day before, very few were functioning.

Lt. Col. Edward J. Dillon, commanding

the 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, reported

that he was completely out of touch with

the regimental commander, and similar

28

 2d.Bn 24th Marines, Narrative of Battle RoiNamur, p. 1. 29

 4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incl D,

Rpt of RCT 23; Ltr, Adm Richard L. Conolly to

Jeter A. Isely, 31 Aug 49, in Princeton University

Library. 30

 4th Marine Div Jnl, Operational Narrative, 1 Feb

44, p. 3. 31

 Ibid., p. 4.
314 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

communications difficulties beset other

units.32

By the time the 1st Battalion, 23d Marines, reached the line of departure it was

after 1000, the time originally set for the

initial landing. Neither the troops nor their

officers had yet received word of the delay

in W Hour and therefore "felt that they

had failed miserably to perform their mission."

 33

 In one case, the naval wave commander had lost some of the LVT's en

route to the line of departure and the senior

Marine officer had to hold up the wave

until the missing tractors could be located.

In the case of the fourth wave, consisting of

LCM's carrying tanks, no wave commander ever appeared to guide the craft

into the line of departure. Since no radio

contact could be established, dispatch

boats had to be sent out to locate the missing tanks and lead them into position. Not

until 1045, roughly an hour and a half behind schedule, were all the tractors and

boats of this battalion ready on or near the

line of departure to make the run for the

beach.34

At the same time Colonel Dillon of the

2d Battalion, 23d Marines, was having his

share of grief. At 1040 he got word from

the commanding officer of Company E

that the elevator on the company's LST

had jammed and that some of his tractors

would be delayed reaching the line of departure. Since this company was scheduled

for the first two waves, readjustment in the

wave formation was required. Dillon simply ordered all tractors afloat to proceed

independently to the line of departure and

form themselves into a third and a fourth

wave in the order of their arrival.35

Eleven o'clock came and went and still

no order had been given to land the troops.

The 23d Regiment had enough of its tractors in the area of the line of departure to

start the assault, but the 24th on its right

was still not ready. The run from the line

of departure to the beach, it was estimated,

would take thirty-three minutes, but by

1027 there were still not enough tractors

on the line of departure off of Namur to

make an orderly attack. At 1041 Colonel

Hart reported that his waves were still not

ready for the attack and at about the same

time Admiral Conolly advised the fire support ships that W Hour might be delayed

another fifteen minutes.36 Colonel Hart

meanwhile was under the impression that

W Hour would be delayed indefinitely

until his troops could form in sufficient

number and in correct enough order to

make a sustained attack.

By 1110, however, both Admiral Conolly and General Schmidt decided that

there had been enough delay. The stunning blows delivered by aerial bombardment and naval gunfire might soon wear

off and the tractors' fuel supply could not

last forever.37 Therefore, Phelps was granted permission to send in the first wave, and

at 1112 the flag Baker was hauled down

from her yardarm giving the signal to start

for shore. Off the beaches of Roi this was

welcome news to the anxious troops of the

23d Marines, who had for some time been

drawn up in fairly good formation on the

line of departure. Colonel Jones some minutes before had been impatiently demanding of the control craft in his area why the

first wave had not been sent in. But to

32

 4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incl D; 2d

Bn 23d Marines Rpt of Landing Opns Roi-Namur, 14

Feb 44, p. 3. 33

 Rpt of BLT 1, RCT 23, 4th Marine Div, FLINTLOCK, 10 Feb 44, p. 3. 34

 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 35

 2d Bn 23d Marines Rpt of Landing Opns RoiNamur, p. 3. 36

 4th Marine Div Jnl, 1 Feb 44, p. 12. 37

 Ltr, Adm R. L. Conolly to Jeter A. Isely, 31 Aug

49.
THE CAPTURE OF MAJURO AND ROI-NAMUR 315

LANDING CRAFT HEAD FOR BEACH AT NAMUR

Colonel Hart lying off Namur the order

was an unwelcome surprise. Indeed, the

first indication he received that the order

to land had been executed came only

when he spotted the tractors of his 3d Battalion Landing Team start off for the

beach. Thinking they had jumped the

gun, he immediately dispatched a control

vessel to intercept them, but then observed

that the tractors carrying the 23d Regimental Combat Team had also started for

the line of departure. In view of this, there

was nothing to do but send in those of his

straggling waves that were on or near the

line and trust to fortune that the landing

would not be too chaotic.38

Ahead went the LCI gunboats, behind

them the armored amphibians, and behind them the infantry in tractors, followed by tanks in LCM's. On Roi the 1st

Battalion, 23d Marines, landed on the left

on Red Beach 2, and the 2d Battalion on

the right on Red Beach 3. Armored amphibians of the 1st Battalion touched down

at 1133 and moved inland to the antitank

trench to take up firing positions. There

they continued firing their 37-mm. guns

and .30-caliber machine guns across the

entire landing team zone of action. One of

the armored amphibians was hit by .50-

caliber fire from the rear, killing one marine. Shortly thereafter a platoon of the

LVT(A)'s moved around the left flank

through the water and over Wendy Point

to open fire on Norbert Circle at the west

end of the northern runway. By 1158 the

first two waves of infantry had landed,

somewhat west of the assigned zone, but

38

 4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, Annex D,

p. 3, Annex E, p. 7.
316 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

not sufficiently so to prevent their taking

up assigned positions. Resistance up to this

point was characterized as very light. On

the right the assault wave of the 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, reached shore at 1150,

passing through the armored amphibians.

The heavy pall of smoke that covered the

island obscured the vision of the first

troops to get ashore, and for that reason

four tractors of the right assault company

(Company F) landed on the right of the

regimental boundary line between Red

Beach 3 and Green Beach 1. There they

silenced a few Japanese positions still operating before moving northwest into their

proper zone of action.39

On Namur, the first troops hit the shore

about 1145. On the left was the 3d Battalion, 24th Marines, and on the right the

2d Battalion. On the left the first wave of

the 3d Battalion did not land on Green

Beach 1 until 1200. Its substitute reserve

company, Company B, got ashore about

forty-five minutes later. The 2d Battalion

Combat Team, at Green Beach 2, was

somewhat prompter. Its first troops got

ashore at about 1145, although by the time

they landed the first and second waves had

become scrambled. Company G, in reserve, landed at only about 50 percent

strength somewhat later than scheduled

and was followed piecemeal by the balance of the reserves as they were able to

secure LCVP's. Very little fire was encountered except friendly fire from the

rear. The armored amphibians that had

led the tractors into the beach had been

ordered to land and precede the assault

troops up to a hundred yards inland. Instead, they halted offshore and let the tractors pass through them. This created an

unexpected traffic congestion in a movement that was already far from orderly.

Worse still, the amphibians kept up their

fire at the beach through the troops as the

latter worked inland, causing some casualties and more indignation among the infantry.40

The Capture of Roi

The main effort in the attack on Roi was

on the right in the zone assigned to Colonel Dillon's 2d Battalion, 23d Marines.

The battalion had been ordered to land on

Red Beach 3 and move up the east coast of

the island where, according to photographic intelligence, most of the enemy's

hangars, buildings, and other aviation

base facilities were. To this landing team

had been assigned a full company of armored amphibians plus most of the division's medium tank company (Company

C, 4th Tank Battalion, less one platoon)

and an additional platoon of light tanks

from Company A. The tanks were to land

from LCM's in two waves immediately

following the first two waves of infantry.41

The first two waves of infantry landed

easily. Colonel Dillon, on receiving word

that there were no obstacles present either

under water or on the beaches themselves,

ordered his two waves of tanks to come

in.42 The LCM's carrying the tanks were

supposed to proceed through a channel

immediately west of Tokyo Pier, but since

the pier had been demolished some of the

coxswains failed to find the channel and

the first platoon of medium tanks grounded on the coral shelf about two hundred

39

 1st Bn 23d Marines Rpt FLINTLOCK, p. 5; 2d Bn

23d Marines Rpt of Landing Opns Roi-Namur, p. 4. 40

 4th Marines Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, Annex E,

p. 8; 2d Bn 24th Marines Narrative of Battle RoiNamur, p. 2. 41

 2d Bn 23d Marines Opn Order 2-44, 19 Jan 44. 42

 This account of action in the zone of the 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, is derived, unless otherwise noted,

from 2d Bn 23d Mar Rpt of Landing Opns RoiNamur, pp. 4-5.
THE CAPTURE OF MAJURO AND ROI-NAMUR 317

MEDIUM TANKS move across the airfield on Roi Island.

yards offshore. About half of the vehicles

had to drive through water up to five and

a half feet deep before touching ground,

but each LCM carried aboard an extra

tank man who waded through water

ahead of the tank and guided it around

potholes, so all reached shore safely. Once

ashore, the tanks were temporarily held up

by an antitank ditch directly behind the

beach. Proceeding eastward in column

they quickly found a place where the ditch

had been filled in by preliminary bombardment and made their way across.

Once over the ditch, the tanks assumed a

line formation and moved directly across

the airfield toward the first objective line.43

Behind them came the first waves of infantry. Resistance was light and scattered.

"The air and naval gunfire bombardment," reported the battalion commander,

"had reduced the entire zone of action

to a shambles."

 44

 One pillbox located in

the middle of the sand strip connecting

Roi and Namur was still intact and functioning, and some fire was still coming

from positions among the debris of the

beach defenses, along the eastern edge of

the island, and in the southeast corner of

the airfield. Otherwise, the enemy was

silent.

In spite of the weakness of the opposition, the troops moved forward cautiously.

It was their first experience under fire and

43

 4th Tk Bn Rpt FLINTLOCK, 31 Mar 44, Incl C,

Rpt of Co C, p. 1. 44

 2d Bn 23d Mar Rpt of Landing Opns RoiNamur, p. 5.
318 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

they had expected to meet much heavier

resistance than they actually did. Also,

they thought it necessary to investigate almost every square foot of ground on the

not unlikely chance that Japanese would

be hiding under the debris of demolished

fortifications.

Tanks and troops moved forward together and in about half an hour reached

the first objective line (0-1 line) located

about 200 to 350 yards inland from the

shore line. Once there, the medium tank

company commander radioed his liaison

officer on the beach, requesting permission to cross the 0-1 line. Unfortunately,

the frequencies assigned to the tanks and

to supporting aircraft were so close together that they caused mutual interference, and the message could not be gotten

through. What bothered the tank commander was that the enemy antitank guns,

located in the blockhouses on the northern

edge of the airfield, might still be operating and he was afraid to leave his vehicles

immobilized on the open runway. Failing

to establish radio contact, the tanks proceeded across the line without permission.

Shortly thereafter, front-line elements of

the infantry followed the tanks, also without orders to do so.45

On the left of the 2d Battalion, the 1st

Battalion, 23d Marines, commanded by

Lt. Col. Hewin O. Hammond, had landed

on Red Beach 2. They, too, found the resistance unexpectedly light. A group of

pillboxes thought to be located on Wendy

Point, the southwest promontory of the island, proved to have been wiped out by

preliminary bombardment. As in the case

of the 2d Battalion, the infantrymen

pushed on ahead of the 0-1 line without

orders, following the medium tanks ahead

of them. There were a number of reasons

for this: the runway that marked the line

was so covered by debris as to be unrecognizable; radio communications between

the landing team commander and his assault company commanders failed; and

platoon leaders found it hard to maintain

control because, in the words of one sergeant, "the men wanted to kill a Jap so

they went out on their own."

 46

By 1311 Colonel Jones, the 23d's commander, was ashore and radioed back to

General Schmidt, "This is a pip. No opposition near the beach. Located scattered

machine gun fire vicinity of split between

. . . [Roi] and . . . [Namur]. Landing

teams moving in to O-1 line. Little or no

opposition." Fifteen minutes later he followed this announcement with the message, "Give us the word and we will take

the rest of the island."

 47

In spite of this optimism, division headquarters was disturbed that front-line elements had crossed the O-1 line without

orders and that the tanks were operating

independently to the north of the line. Any

attempt at a co-ordinated push to the

northern shore of the island was out of the

question until some order had been

brought out of the confusion that existed

on the front. Furthermore, neither close

air support nor naval call fire could be

utilized until the front line had been stabilized. At 1325 General Schmidt notified

Colonel Jones to await orders for further

attack and urged him to get his tanks

under control and bring them back to the

0-1 line.48

Finally, the order came to push off in

a co-ordinated attack from the 0-1 line at

45

 4th Tk Bn Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incl C, p. 2; 2d Bn

23d Mar Rpt of Landing Opns Roi-Namur, p. 5. 46

 Rpt of BLT 1, RCT 23, 4th Marine Div, FLINTLOCK, 10 Feb 44, p. 3; Ibid., Incl, Rpt of Go A, p. 5. 47

 4th Marine Div Jnl, 1 Feb 44, pp. 21-22. 48

 Ibid.
THE CAPTURE OF MAJURO AND ROI-NAMUR 319

1530.49 About the same time the 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, assigned to the eastern (right) zone of Roi, moved out closely

behind its supporting medium tanks. From

left to right (west to east) were Companies

E, G, and F.50 In reserve was the 3d Battalion Landing Team of the 23d Regiment,

which had come ashore at about 1450. Its

duty was to defend the right flank of Roi

to the 0-1 line. Troops of the reserve landing team not thus occupied were to support the advance of the 2d Battalion to

the north shore of Roi.51

On the left, Company E met practically

no opposition and reached its objective by

1600. On the right and in the center the

going was somewhat rougher, although at

no time did the enemy offer any really

serious obstruction to the progress of Companies G and F. The first obstacle to be encountered was a concrete administration

building with steel doors, which by some

freak of chance had not been touched by

naval gunfire, planes, or artillery. Troops

of Company F advanced toward it cautiously but received no fire. One man was

sent forward toward the door under cover

of fire. He kicked it open and tossed in a

grenade. Only one Japanese was found inside and the grenade disposed of him.

A few minutes later the company commander called for a dive bombing attack

on a blockhouse located about 500 yards

north of the 0-1 line. This installation was

constructed of reinforced concrete approximately three feet thick and had three gun

ports, one each facing north, east, and

west, another indication of the enemy's

mistaken assumption that the Americans

would attack from the sea rather than the

lagoon shore. Two heavy hits had been

made on the blockhouse, one apparently

by 14-inch or 16-inch shells and the other

by an aerial bomb. Nevertheless, the position had not been demolished and Colonel

Dillon asked for a dive bombing attack

against it. The air support commander

refused the request because the front-line

troops were less than three hundred yards

away from the target, too close for safety.

Dillon then ordered Company G to take

the blockhouse. The company commander

first sent forward a 75-mm. half-track,

which fired five rounds against the steel

door. At this point, a demolition squad

came up and its commander volunteered

to knock out the position with explosives.

While the half-track continued to fire, infantry platoons moved up on each flank of

the installation. The demolition squad

placed charges at the ports and pushed

Bangalore torpedoes through a shell hole

in the roof. "Cease fire" was then ordered

and, after hand grenades were thrown inside the door, half a squad of infantry went

in to investigate. Unfortunately, the engineers of the demolition squad had not

got the word to cease fire and had placed

a shaped charge at one of the ports while

the infantry was still inside. Luckily, no

one was hurt, but as the company commander reported, "a very undignified and

hurried exit was made by all concerned."

 52

Inside were found three heavy machine

guns, a quantity of ammunition, and the

bodies of three Japanese.

49

 The time of attack of 1530 had been sent by

radio; subsequently a verbal order from the commanding officer of the 23d Marines set this back to 1515.

This caused some confusion in the minds of battalion

commanders, but did not seriously interfere with the

attack. (2d Bn 23d Mar Rpt of Landing Opns RoiNamur, p. 5.) 50

 This account of the movement of 2d Battalion,

23d Marines, from 0-1 line is derived from 2d Bn 23d

Mar Rpt of Landing Opns Roi-Namur, pp. 5-6, and

inclosed reports of Companies E, F, and G. 51

 3d Bn 23d Marines Record of Events, 31 Jan-5

Feb 44, 12 Feb 44, p. 2. 52

 2d Bn 23d Mar Rpt of Landing Opns RoiNamur, Incl L, Rpt of Co G, p. 4.
320 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

NEUTRALIZING A CONCRETE BLOCKHOUSE

Extending east from the blockhouse,

overlooking the beach, was a system of

trenches and machine gun positions, some

connected by tunnels. Here the few remaining Japanese put up a feeble resistance. Most of those who had stayed in the

trenches were already dead. The pillboxes

were still firing but these were taken out

by the demolition squad of Company F

aided by the 37-mm. guns from the division special weapons battalion. Companies

F and G then moved on to Nat Circle in

the northeast corner of Roi and wiped out

what few enemy remained in that area by

1 700. The 2d Battalion then secured for

the day and set up night defensive positions.53

Meanwhile, in the left (west) half of

Roi, the 1st Battalion, 23d Marines, was

having an even easier time in accomplishing its objectives. Company A had landed

on the left, Company B on the right, with

Company C coming in somewhat later as

reserve. By 1215 the battalion commander

learned that his Company A had passed

beyond the 0-1 line and immediately

ordered its withdrawal. This took some

time to accomplish, as the company commander could establish no radio contact

with his platoon leaders and had to rely on

runners to get the order through. Gradually, the forward platoon was drawn back

and preparations made to start a co-ordinated attack to the north.54

At 1530 the battalion commander called

a conference of all company commanders

53

 Ibid., Incl L, p. 5; Ibid., Incl K, Rpt of Co F, p. 2. 54

 Rpt of BLT 1, RCT 23, 4th Mar Div, FLINTLOCK,

p. 5; Ibid., Incl, Rpt of Co A, p. 2.
THE CAPTURE OF MAJURO AND ROI-NAMUR 321

and ordered the reserve Company C to

pass through Company A and press the attack up the west coast of Roi. It was to be

supported by one platoon of the weapons

company, a platoon of medium tanks, and

three half-tracks. Company B on the right

was to hold its position on the 0-1 line.55

Company C jumped off at 1600 hugging

the west coast of the island. Infantry and

demolitions engineers moved forward slowly behind the tanks, meeting only light

rifle and machine gun fire. A few scattered

enemy riflemen continued to fire as the

troops approached the north shore. These

were quickly disposed of by the tanks firing 75-mm. and machine guns. The preliminary bombardment had virtually annihilated the enemy in this part of Roi. In

one trench on the north coast were discovered forty to fifty recently killed Japanese—the only enemy, dead or alive, encountered. By 1800 Company C reached

the northwest corner of the island at Norbert Circle and was ready to secure for the

night. Casualties during the day for the

entire battalion had come to only three

killed and eleven wounded.56

Thus, by early evening, marines of the

23d Regimental Combat Team had, with

comparative ease, established a firm

beachhead on the lagoon shore of Roi and

had captured most of the land lying along

the east and west coasts. All that remained

was for the small pocket in the center of

the airfield to be mopped up.57

The only feature to mar the complete

success of the day's ground fighting was a

rash of indiscriminate firing that broke out

all over Roi, starting about 1800 and lasting for more than half an hour. The

sources were not clearly established, but

on later investigation it was obvious that

trigger-happy, green marines both on Roi

and on Namur were responsible. Following this episode, Lt. Col. John J. Cosgrove,

Jr., commanding officer of the 3d Battalion, 23d Marines, concluded "that fire discipline was poor, . . . that 95% of those

firing had no definite idea as to why they

were firing . . . [and] . . . that a large

portion of those firing were doing so because they wanted to be able to say they

had fired at a Jap."

 58

As night settled down, fire discipline was

once again restored, and the marines on

Roi rested in their shelters and foxholes

uninterrupted by enemy counterattack.

For all practical purposes the island was

secured. All that remained next day was

to mop up the few remaining Japanese,

and this was accomplished without much

difficulty.

Credit for the ease with which Roi was

taken goes largely to the preliminary bombardment by naval guns and aircraft and

Marine artillery. Colonel Dillon, commanding the 2d Battalion, 23d Marines,

estimated that of the 400 Japanese dead

in the eastern half of the island, 250 were

killed by action prior to W Hour.59 Since

most of the resistance encountered on Roi

was in the zone of this battalion, it is reasonable to believe that a similar ratio obtained on the rest of the island.

But to the eastward, affairs were not

proceeding so smoothly for the 24th Regi55

 Ibid., Incl, Rpt of Go B, p. 2, and Incl, Rpt of Go

C, p. 2. 56

 Ibid., Incl, Rpt of Co C, p. 3, and Incl, Rpt of Bn

Executive Officer, p. 4. 57

 During the afternoon's fighting on Roi, Pfc. Richard B. Anderson won (posthumously) the Medal of

Honor by covering an armed grenade with his body,

thereby saving the other men sharing his foxhole from

injury. (Citation quoted in Carl W. Proehl, The Fourth

Marine Division in World War II (Washington, 1946), p.

12.)

58

 3d Bn 23d Marines Record of Events, 3 1 Jan-5

Feb 44, Incl D, p. 4. 59

 2d Bn 23d Marines Rpt of Landing Opns RoiNamur, p. 6.
322 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

mental Combat Team. Namur was proving a much harder nut to crack.

The Capture of Namur

An air observer flying over the beaches

of Namur about twenty minutes after the

initial landing reported, "There is no enemy resistance. . . . Don't think a bird

could be alive."

 60

 This was somewhat of

an exaggeration. The troops of the 24th

Marines were to encounter considerably

more resistance on Namur than was being

met on Roi. Roi was almost all airfield,

open and uncluttered by many buildings

or much vegetation. Namur, on the other

hand, contained the bulk of the shelters

and buildings housing the aviation and

other personnel located in northern Kwajalein. Furthermore, it was thickly covered

with underbrush that even the heavy preliminary bombardment had not succeeded

in burning off.61 Here was congregated the

majority of enemy troops assigned to the

twin islands. They were concealed among

the numerous buildings scattered through

the area and were afforded ample protection by the thick vegetation that remained

standing.

The four assault companies of the 3d

and 2d Battalion Landing Teams had

landed on Green Beaches 1 and 2 respectively between 1145 and 1200. From left

to right they were Companies I, K, E, and

F. Because of the shortage of amphibian

tractors, the original reserve companies of

each of these battalion landing teams

could not be boated soon enough to perform the missions assigned to them, so the

reserve landing team, the 1st Battalion,

24th Marines, which was already boated

in LCVP's behind the line of departure,

was ordered to send one assault company

to the 2d Battalion and another to the 3d

Battalion to substitute for the reserve companies. Thus, Company B landed about

1245 as reserve for the 3d Battalion on

Green Beach 1 and Company A got ashore

shortly after 1300 to act as reserve for the

2d Battalion on the right half of the island.

The plans called for the assault companies

to proceed inland a hundred yards before

pausing, in order to place the assault

troops inside the perimeter defense of the

island. All four companies were then to

move as rapidly as possible on to the initial

objective (0-1) line, which was marked by

Sycamore Boulevard, a road running

athwart the island about 400 to 500 yards

inland of the beach.62

Of the two battalion landing teams allocated to Namur, that on the left had the

easier going at first. About 1200 Company

I landed on the extreme left and most of

Company K came in on its immediate

right. One platoon of Company K was

sent to Pauline Point, the name given to

the tiny spit of land that lay between Roi

and Namur. This was the only unit that

landed exactly on the proper beach as directed by the landing diagram.63

 Enemy

resistance to the initial landing was light

60

 4th Marine Div Jnl, 1 Feb 44, p. 18. 61

 The napalm bomb, which was later demonstrated to be so effective in burning off vegetation, had

not yet made its appearance in the Pacific. It was first

employed at Tinian in July 1944. 62

 4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incl E,

Rpt of RCT 24, pp. 2, 8. 63

 The account of the activities of the 3d Battalion

Landing Team, 24th Marines Regimental Combat

Team, is derived from 4th Marine Div Final Rpt

FLINTLOCK, Incl E, Rpt of RCT 24, and Lt Col A. R.

Brunelli, USMC, The Capture of Namur Island,

Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, 1-2 February 1944,

MS, U.S. Marine Corps Schools, Record Section.

Colonel Brunelli was battalion commander and prepared this monograph as a historical tactical study for

the Amphibious Warfare School, Marine Corps

Schools, Quantico, Senior Course, 1946-47. In the

absence of any known official battalion action report,

this monograph has been used.
THE CAPTURE OF MAJURO AND ROI-NAMUR 323

NAMUR ISLAND BEACHHEAD. Men and equipment crowd the narrow beach before

advancing inland.

and unorganized. What fire there was

from pillboxes, shell holes, and debris

was neither mutually supporting nor coordinated. Nevertheless, the enemy had

not been entirely silenced by the heavy

preparatory fire and from the remains of

the blockhouses and concrete air raid shelters he was able to pour out enough fire to

slow down the progress of the attack.

In spite of this, Companies I and K

moved ahead in skirmish line, leaving

some positions to be mopped up by the reserves. Company B, the reserve company,

landed about 1245 and commenced mopping up. Fifteen minutes later, three light

tanks of the 3d Platoon, Company B, 4th

Tank Battalion, got ashore but were almost immediately bogged down. The

beach was congested with men and supplies and in trying to get around the congestion, two tanks were bellied up in the

soft sand that had been churned up by the

preliminary bombardment. The one remaining tank got inland about thirty

yards, where it slipped into a shell hole

and threw a track, thus immobilizing itself

for the time being.64

By 1400, about two hours after their

touchdown on the beach, both of the assault companies of the 3d Battalion had

reached the 0-1 line on Sycamore Boulevard. There they were ordered to stand by

and prepare for a co-ordinated attack

northward with the 2d Battalion Landing

Team on their right. The jump-off was to

be 1630.

64

 4th Tk Bn Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incl B, Rpt of Co B,

p. 2.
324 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

During the two hours and a half of delay before pushing forward the assault,

other elements of the battalion landed and

various shifts were made along the forward

line. The plan called for the left flank of

the attack north of 0-1 line to be supported

by machine guns and other weapons based

on Pauline Point. Between 1430 and 1533

Company M, the weapons company, emplaced its 81-mm. mortars and some of its

heavy machine guns on Pauline Point.

Company L, which had initially been

scheduled to act as battalion reserve, was

finally boated, got ashore at 1531, and was

ordered to release one assault team to

Company I and to relieve Company B in

reserve. Company B then relieved Company K on the 0-1 line, while the latter

was shifted to Pauline Point. Thus, as the

hour for the jump-off approached, Companies I and B rested on the 0-1 line from

left to right; Company L was in reserve to

their rear; and Company K occupied Pauline Point along with elements of the regimental weapons company.

On Green Beach 2, Companies E and

F, from left to right, came ashore within

five minutes of each other around noon.

Within ten minutes the landing team reserve, Company G, started to land to the

right of Yokohama Pier, which was on the

boundary between Green Beaches 1 and 2.

At 1215 landing team headquarters came

ashore, followed approximately five minutes later by the weapons company (Company H) less its detached machine gun

platoons. By early afternoon ten light

tanks of the 1st and 2d Platoons, Company

B, 4th Tank Battalion, were safely ashore

and in a tank assembly area about sixty

yards inland.65

As on the rest of the island, initial resistance in this zone of action was light. It

had been anticipated that Sally Point, the

southeast promontory of Namur, would be

alive with Japanese weapons. Since the

landing beaches extending to the west of

Sally Point were concave in shape, this

would have been an ideal position for enfilade fire against the shore line and the

approaches thereto. That such was not the

case can be attributed to the effectiveness

of the preliminary air, naval, and artillery

bombardment as well as to the supporting

fires from the 3d Battalion Landing Team

of the 25th Marines, which had emplaced

so many weapons on Abraham Island the

night before.

Only desultory fire greeted the assault

troops as they pushed inland toward the

0-1 line. At first they were temporarily delayed by an unexpected antitank ditch

that extended laterally behind part of

Green Beach 2. Most of the amphibian

tractors found it impossible to get across

this obstacle and had to discharge their

troops at the edge of the shore instead of

proceeding a hundred yards inland as

originally planned.

As the infantrymen moved forward,

naval gunfire began to fall too close for

comfort, and on the request of the battalion commander all naval ships were ordered to cease fire at 1250. By that time

the artillery regiment would have completed its schedule of fire. One final divebombing attack was delivered against

65

 This account of action of the 2d Battalion Landing Team, 24th Regimental Combat Team, is derived

from 4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incl E,

24th Marines Rpt; 2d Bn 24th Marines Narrative of

Battle of Roi-Namur; Lt Col Richard C. Rothwell,

USMC, A Study of an Amphibious Operation, The

Battle of Namur, 31 Jan 44-2 Feb 44, Kwajalein

Operation, Second Battalion, Twenty-Fourth Marines, 4th Marine Division, MS, Marine Corps

Schools, Record Section. Colonel Rothwell served as

battalion executive officer on Namur and prepared

this monograph for Amphibious Warfare School, Marine Corps Schools, Senior Course, 1946-47.
THE CAPTURE OF MAJURO AND ROI-NAMUR 325

Natalie Point on the northeastern tip of

the island. Thereafter, the fighting was too

close and the advance of front-line elements too uneven to justify the use of further support fires. The infantry would

have to rely on its own weapons.

By 1300 elements of both assault companies of the 2d Battalion, 24th Marines,

were on or close to the 0-1 line. On the

right, Company F had overrun Sally Point

and cleared out two machine guns that

had fired a few rounds at the advancing

marines. On the left, one boat team of

Company E had quickly occupied Yokohama Pier without opposition while the

rest of the company moved slowly through

the underbrush and debris toward the 0-1

line. In the absence of any well-distinguished landmarks, Company E veered

somewhat to the right of its zone of action

and later became intermingled on the O-1

line with elements of Company F.66 The

reserve company, G, had been landed in

its entirety on the left half of Green Beach

2. It moved straight ahead in the expectation of coming up on the rear of Company

E. But since that company had moved to

the right, Company G found itself unexpectedly in the position of being in the assault on the battalion left. There, it met

with sporadic machine gun and rifle fire

and by 1300 was able to move only about

175 yards from the beach.

Up to this point progress in the zone of

the 24th Marines had been fairly steady

in spite of the confusion incident to dispatching of boat waves from the line of departure, the failure of the armored amphibians to precede the troops inland, and the

somewhat piecemeal landing. Resistance

was light and scattered, and the main impediment to the advancing troops was the

thickness of the underbrush and the presence of a multitude of only half-destroyed

buildings and installations, which had to

be thoroughly investigated before the advance could proceed.

Then, shortly after 1300, an incident occurred that brought the advance to an

abrupt halt and temporarily threw out of

gear all plans for an orderly movement

across the island to the north shore. With a

tremendous roar a revetted building exploded in the zone of Company F.67

 Immediately a thick cloud of pungent black

smoke billowed upward a thousand feet

and covered the entire island. The odor

was so acrid that many thought a gas

storehouse had been blown up. At the 2d

Battalion command post there was a

frenzied search for gas masks that had been

discarded as unnecessary impedimenta.

Down came a rain of large concrete fragments, twisted pieces of steel, shrapnel,

and torpedo heads. Casualties to American troops in the immediate area ran from

fifty to a hundred, of whom about twenty

were killed, either by concussion or by the

falling debris. In a few minutes two other

less violent explosions occurred somewhat

forward of Company F's front lines. Altogether these three explosions accounted

66

 The "boat team" or "assault and demolitions

team" represented an innovation in Marine Corps assault tactics. Each team in the assault companies consisted of a light machine gun group of four men, a

demolitions group of five men, a bazooka group of

three men, a support group consisting of two BAR

teams, and an officer in charge. The reserve companies were organized into similar boat teams minus

the machine gun elements. Each type of team was

capable of embarking in entirety in an LVT(2). (4th

Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incl E, Rpt of RCT

24, p. 4.) 67

 The exact time of this incident is not clearly

established. The regimental action report sets it at

1245 (4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incl E,

Rpt of RCT 24, p. 9). Colonel Rothwell's monograph

puts it at 1305 (Rothwell, Battle of Namur, p. 22).

1305 seems to be the more accurate since the first

report made by an aerial observer of the explosion was

at 1308 (4th Marine Div Jnl, 1 Feb 44, p. 21).
326 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

A JAPANESE TORPEDO WARHEAD MAGAZINE explodes on Namur. Note

splashes in the water caused by falling debris.

for more than 50 percent of all the casualties suffered on Namur by the 2d Battalion

Landing Team of the 24th Marines.68

The cause of this disaster was not clearly

understood at the time, but subsequent investigation makes it reasonably certain

that at least the first explosion was set off

by a Marine demolitions group. These

men had moved forward under cover of

rifle fire and placed a shaped charge to

penetrate the wall of the building near the

ground. Once this was done, a sixteenpound satchel charge was tossed into the

building and immediately thereafter it

blew up. What had been thought to be a

possible gun position turned out to be a

torpedo warhead magazine.69

The immediate results of the explosions

were to stop any further co-ordinated forward movement in the zone of the 2d Battalion and to delay the organization of

units already near the O-1 line. All radio

communication between battalion and the

assault companies was knocked out and

the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Francis

68

 4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incl E, Rpt

of RCT 24, p. 9. 69

 These conclusions are based on a monograph entitled The Battle of Roi-Namur, Marshall Islands,

prepared by Joseph E. Lo Prete for Marine Corps

Schools, Amphibious Warfare School, Junior Course,

8th Class, MS, pp. 8-9. Major Lo Prete was one of the

few surviving eyewitnesses to the incident and reiterated his conclusion as to the cause of the explosion

in an interview with P. A. Crowl, at Quantico, 16 November 1951. The regimental commander of the 24th

RCT, Franklin A. Hart, confirms this explanation of

the event. (Interv, P. A. Crowl with Lt Gen Franklin

A. Hart, 16 Nov 51.)
THE CAPTURE OF MAJURO AND ROI-NAMUR 327

H. Brink, had to rely exclusively on runners. Individual boat teams on the front

line had already become intermingled and

after the explosion the company commanders found it virtually impossible to

reorganize their units into any semblance

of order or integrity. Moreover, the enemy

was becoming more active. Japanese machine gun and rifle fire now enfiladed the

entire right half of the 0-1 line.

Nevertheless, Company G on the left

succeeded in pushing forward to the 0-1

line by about 1330. Meanwhile, Company

A had landed shortly after the first explosion and had moved immediately to Sally

Point behind Company F. About 1430 it

was attached to the 2d Battalion Landing

Team and ordered to pass through Company F and continue the attack on order.

By 1545 Company A was in position on

the 0-1 line along Sycamore Boulevard

from the sea to a point about two hundred

yards northwest. There, it came under fire

from either flank of its line. Two light

tanks were ordered forward to take out the

installation close to the sea on the right. At

the same time fifteen LVT(A)'s were

ordered to proceed through the water

along the east coast of Namur and take the

same blockhouse under fire. Meanwhile,

on the left of the battalion's zone, Company C had landed and was ordered to

relieve Company E, the latter to go into

battalion reserve.70

1630 was the jump-off hour prescribed

by the regimental commander, Colonel

Hart, for a two-battalion push from the 0-1

line to the north shore. On the regimental

left the 3d Battalion Landing Team had

been in position for almost two and a half

hours and launched its attack as scheduled. Unfortunately during the long delay

on 0-1, the Japanese had been able to recover from the shock of the initial heavy

shelling and put up much stiffer resistance

than they had yet been able to make. The

fighting was too close and the front lines

too hard to identify to justify the use of

artillery, naval call fire, or close aerial

support.71

In the right zone, the 2d Battalion Landing Team was experiencing greater difficulty in getting organized for the attack to

the north coast. Not until about 1700 did

Company C get into position to relieve

Company E on the battalion left. Also, the

light tanks were late in arriving and the attack did not get under way until 1730.

Many of the small units of Companies E,

F, and G had not received the word that

they were to retire into the reserve area, so

when the attack jumped off there were elements of five companies intermingled in

the assault. As the troops advanced behind

the tanks, they came under steady fire

from the large blockhouse on the right and

from small arms all along the line. Progress

on the battalion left was fairly steady, but

on the right the line remained pinned down

by fire from the blockhouse.72

Communication between tanks and infantry was faulty and co-ordination between the two generally poor. Tanks frequently moved out of sight or fire range of

the troops that were supposed to be supporting them and engaged in independent

fire fights. Infantrymen in their turn often

70

 Rothwell, Battle of Namur, pp. 25-26. 71

 Brunelli, The Capture of Namur Island, p. 15.

It was in this phase of the action that 1st Lt. John

V. Power met his death and won the Medal of Honor.

While setting a demolition charge on a Japanese pillbox, he was wounded in the stomach. Refusing to

withdraw from the fight he pressed forward against

another pillbox, stopping the flow of blood with his

left hand and firing with his right. After emptying his

carbine into this second pillbox he stopped to reload

and was shot again in the stomach and head and

killed. (Citation quoted in Proehl, The Fourth Marine

Division in World War II, p. 11.) 72

 R. C. Rothwell, Battle of Namur, p. 27.
MARINES TAKE COVER from Japanese small arms fire. Note the split-toed footgear on

the dead Japanese soldier in the foreground (below).
THE CAPTURE OF MAJURO AND ROI-NAMUR 329

failed to keep pace with the tanks, even

when it was possible, or to provide them

with the support that was their due. It was

during this phase that Capt. James L.

Denig, who commanded Company B of

the 4th Tank Battalion, got separated from

his own tanks as well as his supporting infantry unit. As he stopped to get his bearings, six Japanese leaped out of the underbrush and swarmed over his tank. One of

them dropped a grenade down the visual

signal port, which had been left open to

allow the foul air to escape from the turret.

The explosion that followed mortally

wounded Denig and killed his driver, and

only by the timely intervention of some infantrymen who happened on the scene was

the remainder of the crew rescued.73

As nightfall approached some tanks

pushed forward as far as the north shore,

but had to pull back for want of fuel or infantry support. A few of the troops also got

as far as Narcissus Street, which ran parallel to the north coast less than a hundred

yards from the shore line. This was the

ultimate extent of Marine progress on 1

February. About 1820 the regimental commander ordered the rest of the island to be

taken but it soon became apparent that

this would be impossible before nightfall,

and at 1930 the order came down to dig in

on a perimeter defense, hold the ground

gained, and prepare to continue the attack

the following morning. By that time the 3d

Battalion Landing Team had two companies abreast on a line about 175 yards

north of the 0-1 line, or halfway between

Sycamore Boulevard and the north shore.

The 2d Battalion Landing Team's line was

tied in with the 3d's and then bent back to

the east to the point where the 0-1 line met

the eastern shore.74

The night was far from restful. Japanese

who had been bypassed during the day

came to life to harass the Americans from

the rear. Others infiltrated from the front.

To compound the confusion, trigger-happy

marines in the rear areas kept up a running fire that seriously endangered troops

at the front. The only organized Japanese

counterattack occurred just at daybreak.

Company I had lost contact with Company B on its right, thus facilitating enemy

infiltration of the line. About a hundred

Japanese, organized into groups often to

twenty, fell upon the two companies in a

desperate charge that took thirty-five minutes of intense hand-to-hand fighting to

repulse.75 Meanwhile, Company L was

ordered into the front line, and Company

K was moved from Pauline Point to

Namur as landing team reserve.76

For the final push to the northern shore,

the 24th Regimental Combat Team was to

have for the first time the additional fire

power of the division's medium tanks.

These had been detached from the 23d

Marines the previous evening and had

already made one sortie up the west coast

of Namur as far as Natalie Point and

helped to break up the dawn counterattack.77

At 0900 the 3d Battalion Landing Team,

supported by the mediums, resumed the

attack up the left half of Namur. Company

73

 4th Tk Bn Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incl B, Co B Rpt, pp.

4-5.

74

 4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incl E, Rpt

of RCT 24, p. 11. 75

 During this counterattack, Pvt. Richard K.

Sorenson saved the lives of five of his companions by

hurling his own body on a Japanese hand grenade.

For this action, which he survived, he was awarded

the Medal of Honor. (Citation quoted in Proehl, The

Fourth Marine Division in World War II, p. 12.) 76

 4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incl E,

Rpt of RCT 24, pp. 11-12; Brunelli, The Capture of

Namur, p. 17. 77

 4th Tk Bn Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incl C, Co C Rpt, pp.

2-3.
MARINES ATTACK BLOCKHOUSE. Note the Japanese crawling out from under the

shelter in right center (below).
THE CAPTURE OF MAJURO AND ROI-NAMUR 331

K was on the left, Company I in the middle, and Company L on the right. Company B went into battalion reserve. In the

right sector of the island the attack was delayed until about 1000 because of the late

arrival of the light tanks that were to support it. Meanwhile, command had been

transferred from the 2d to the 1st Battalion

Landing Team, the latter under Lt. Col.

Aquilla J. Dyess. Dyess had a conglomerate

command. In addition to Companies A, C,

and E, which held positions on the front

line from right to left, elements of Companies F and G still remained on the front

line in spite of the fact that their parent

units had been withdrawn into the rear

area.

Both battalion landing teams pushed

steadily forward along the west and east

coasts. By 1100 the 3d Battalion had

reached Nora Point, the northwestern tip

of the island. By that time, the two battalions were within visual contact of each

other. The supporting tanks were then sent

to the rear and the infantry, aided by halftracks, continued the fight. By 1215 the 1st

Battalion and Company L had secured

Natalie Point and, except for mopping up,

the battle was ended. During this final assault, Colonel Dyess personally led his battalion against the final pocket of Japanese

resistance. While standing in the parapet

of an antitank trench directing a group of

infantry in a flanking attack against the

last enemy position, he was killed by enemy

machine gun fire.78

At 1418 on 2 February General Schmidt,

commanding the 4th Marine Division, officially announced the end of organized

resistance on Namur.79 All that remained

was to mop up the few live Japanese still

concealed in the underbrush and debris of

Namur and to secure the rest of the islets

of the northern half of Kwajalein Atoll.

This latter task was assigned to the 25th

Regimental Combat Team, which had

made the initial D-Day assault on the

islands immediately adjoining Roi-Namur

and which had since been in division reserve. Between 2 February and 7 February this regiment occupied some fifty-five

islands in the northern part of the atoll.

Since it was at first believed that there

might be enemy garrisons on these islands,

artillery concentrations were fired from

Alien and Albert, but this was unnecessary

and was discontinued. No opposition was

encountered and the natives proved

friendly and anxious to be taken into

American custody.

Thus, with the capture of Roi-Namur

and surrounding islands, U.S. forces completed the occupation of the northern half

of Kwajalein Atoll. In approximately two

and a half days of fighting, the 4th Marine

Division had suffered only 737 casualties,

of which 190 were killed or died of

wounds.80 Enemy losses totaled 3,563 including 3,472 enemy dead, 51 Japanese

prisoners of war, and 40 Korean laborers

captured.81

In comparison to Tarawa, the operation

was both easy and cheap in terms of lives

expended. The reasons for this are not

hard to discover. The enemy garrison in

northern Kwajalein was fewer in number

than that on Tarawa by about a thousand.

The Japanese had not been expecting such

a deep penetration into the Central Pacific

and were generally caught off balance.

78

 For his aggressive leadership he was posthumously

awarded the Medal of Honor. (Citation quoted in

Proehl, The Fourth Marine Division in World War H, p.

11.)

79

 4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incl A, p.

32.

80

 4th Marine Div Final Rpt FLINTLOCK, Incl I,

Med Rpt, p. 4. 81

 V Phib Corps FLINTLOCK Rpt, Incl D, G-2 Rpt,

p. 12.
332 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Their fortifications were not particularly

strong nor were they well enough emplaced to resist an invasion from the lagoon

shore. Hydrographic conditions were favorable for an amphibious landing, and

the Marines of the 4th Marine Division

were much better supplied with the necessary amphibious equipment to effect such

a landing than had been the 2d Marine

Division at Betio. Finally, and most significant, was the tremendous quantity of

shells and bombs thrown into and dropped

on the target before the main landings

took place. Admiral Conolly's Northern

Attack Force conclusively demonstrated

that in small-island amphibious operations

a prolonged preliminary bombardment

could preclude a high casualty list.
CHAPTER XIX

The Seizure of Eniwetok Atoll

Plans and Preparations

The easy capture of Kwajalein Atoll

provided the Central Pacific forces with an

unexpected opportunity to advance their

schedule of operations. Since the original

directive of 20 July 1943, plans had been

formulated by Admiral Nimitz, with the

concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for

an expansion of the American offensive in

the Central Pacific. These plans had contemplated the capture of Eniwetok Atoll,

on or about 1 May 1944, in preparation

for a possible seizure of Truk or other

islands in the Carolines. A strike by the

main elements of the Pacific Fleet against

Truk had been tentatively scheduled for 24

March 1944, prior to the landings on Eniwetok and Truk.1

 The 27th Infantry Division had been alerted on 13 January 1944

to prepare for the seizure of Eniwetok.2

Preparations for this new move were

already in their preliminary stage when

the landings in the Marshalls took place.

The possibility that the operations

against Kwajalein might be concluded

early enough to step up the advance

against Eniwetok had been considered by

Admiral Nimitz and other naval planners

even before the Marshalls operation was

launched. Admiral Spruance later recalled

that before sailing for Kwajalein from

Pearl Harbor he had received the first

aerial photographs of Eniwetok indicating

that the atoll was only lightly defended,

but other indications were that the garrison was being reinforced by several thousand troops. He reported these findings to

Nimitz and expressed the hope that immediately upon the conclusion of the Kwajalein-Majuro operation he might proceed

to the capture of Eniwetok rather than

send his fleet to the South Pacific for the

attack against Kavieng, which the Joint

Chiefs of Staff had scheduled for 1 April

1944.3

By 2 February it had become apparent

that Kwajalein could be completely secured without the commitment of the

reserve troops—the 22d Marines and the

106th Infantry (less 2d Battalion). Admiral

Nimitz radioed Spruance asking his recommendation on proceeding immediately

to the capture of Eniwetok, covering it with

a carrier strike against Truk. After consulting with Admiral Turner and General

Holland Smith at Kwajalein, Admiral

Spruance recommended approval, and the

decision to strike at Eniwetok was confirmed.4

On 3 February, Admiral Hill, who had

commanded the brief assault on Majuro,

1

 Memo, CINCPOA for JCS, 13 Jan 44, CINCPOA

Serial 004, Campaign Plan GRANITE. 2

 Rad, COMGENCENPAC to CG 27th Inf Div, 13

Jan 44, in 27th Inf Div G-3 Jnl, 13 Jan 44. 3

 Ltr, Vice Adm Raymond A. Spruance to Jeter A.

Isely, 14 Jan 49, filed in Princeton University Library;

Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, p, 285. 4

 Ltr, Vice Adm Raymond A. Spruance to Maj Gen

Harry J. Malony, 6 Jan 49, filed in OCMH; Ltr,

Spruance to Isely, 14 Jan 49.
334 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

was flown by seaplane to Kwajalein. He

proceeded at once to a series of conferences

with Admirals Spruance and Turner, and

from these conferences the basic plans for

the invasion of Eniwetok were formulated.5

No operation that preceded or followed

it in the Central Pacific had the same impromptu character that marked the seizure

of Eniwetok. Formal planning may be said

to have begun no earlier than 3 February

and lasted until 15 February, the day on

which the expedition sailed for Kwajalein

lagoon. The invasion force was assembled

in a seven-day period, beginning with the

conclusion of the Kwajalein campaign and

ending the moment the ships sailed into

the open sea. While the expedition against

Eniwetok was not exactly makeshift, it was,

by previous standards, thrown together

hurriedly without the meticulous preparation that characterized most large-scale

amphibious operations.

The plan for the seizure of Eniwetok

included the ambitious project of a fullscale carrier strike against Truk, which lay

about 670 nautical miles southwest of Eniwetok Atoll. Truk had long been known to

Americans as the "Gibraltar of the Pacific"

and the "Japanese Pearl Harbor." It possessed the best fleet anchorage in all the

Japanese Mandated Islands and since July

1942 had been the base for the Combined

Fleet, now under command of Admiral

Koga. Also, Truk served as headquarters

for the 6th Fleet (submarines) and was an

important air base and staging point between Japan and the South Pacific.6

Admiral Mitscher's fast carrier force

(Task Force 58) was assigned the job of

conducting a full-scale strike against Truk

on 16 February, partly to cover the Eniwetok landing but, more important, to hit the

Combined Fleet, which was thought to be

still based there, as well as to damage the

airfields and destroy any planes that might

be found there. After completion of the

move against the eastern Carolines,

Mitscher's task force was to proceed on

northwest and strike at the Marianas, if

feasible.7

Eniwetok Atoll, the target assigned to

Admiral Hill's task group, lies 330 nautical

miles northwest of Kwajalein.8 It is a typical Central Pacific coral atoll with a circular reef surrounding a lagoon, which at its

widest point is seventeen miles from east to

west and twenty-one miles from north to

south. Some thirty small islands rise from

the reef, most of them along the eastern

half. The main islands, three in number,

were Engebi in the north, Parry in the

southeast, and Eniwetok in the south.

There were, at the time of the invasion,

only two deep-water passages into the

lagoon. One, called Wide Passage, was located at the extreme southern end of the

lagoon to the west of Eniwetok Island. The

other was Deep Passage, lying between

Parry and Japtan Islands. (Map 16)

When planning for the operation began,

intelligence of the atoll was vague. One

reconnaissance mission, flown from the

Gilberts on 28 December, had managed to

reach the atoll and take air photographs

from an altitude of 20,000 feet. Other aerial

photos, taken during the neutralization

strikes that accompanied the Kwajalein

landings, became available during the

planning period, and additional photographs were dropped from planes onto the

5

 Commander Eniwetok Expeditionary Group (TG

51.11) (Adm H. W. Hill) Report of Eniwetok Operations, 7 Mar 44 (hereafter cited as TG 51.11 Eniwetok

Rpt), p. 1. 6

 Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, pp. 315-

17.

7

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Feb 44,

Annex B. 8

 JICPOA Bull 3-44, 20 Jan 44, pp. 1-5.
THE SEIZURE OF ENIWETOK ATOLL 335

MAP 16

ships of the invasion convoy while the vessels were en route to the target.9

Until early January, the best American

intelligence sources indicated that there

were only about 700 Japanese in the atoll,

mostly concentrated on Engebi Island,

which contained the only airstrip in the

area. Late in January, however, it became

apparent that the atoll might have been

recently reinforced. From documents captured at Kwajalein, the presence of the

Japanese 1st Amphibious Brigade in the Marshalls became known. American intelligence staffs at that time knew it as the 1st

Mobile Shipborne Brigade and surmised from

its designation that it might be stationed

aboard ships so as to be transferred readily

from one atoll to another. The brigade had

been traced to Truk, thence eastward, but

had been lost by American submarines be9

 COMINCH P-002, p. IV-7.
336 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

fore its arrival at its ultimate destination.

The ships had not been located during the

invasion strikes. Captured documents from

Kwajalein and a prisoner of war who had

formerly been a member of the Kwajalein

detachment of the brigade confirmed the

planners' fears that the main strength of

the unit was at Eniwetok. This information, received during the first week of planning, caused the estimate of the Eniwetok

Atoll garrison to be revised upward to

2,900-4,000 troops. Air photographs taken

during the assault on Kwajalein indicated

that most of the above-ground installations

on Engebi showed a considerable increase

in the foxhole and trench systems, but

failed to disclose any indication of troops

on Parry beyond the location of a few new

foxholes. On Eniwetok Island, approximately fifty new foxholes were discovered

as well as indications of small enemy forces

near the southwest end of the island. On

the basis of interpretations made from

these later photographs, it was assumed

that the main body of the Japanese garrison, whatever its strength, would be found

on Engebi, and that Parry and Eniwetok

Islands would be only lightly defended.10

Composition of the Force

The Eniwetok expedition was to be

much smaller than the one that had just

captured Kwajalein. In organizing it, Admiral Hill modeled his force after the

Majuro Landing Force rather than adopt

the more elaborate task force organization

for Kwajalein. The force was known as the

Eniwetok Expeditionary Group. Admiral

Hill's flagship was the attack transport

Cambria, which had been converted to an

amphibious headquarters ship by the addition of much additional radio equipment

and other communications facilities. The

troops with their supplies and equipment

were to be lifted aboard five attack transports, one transport, two attack cargo ships,

one cargo ship, one dock landing ship, two

high-speed (destroyer) transports, and nine

LST's. This transport group, which also

included six LCI's, was to be screened en

route by ten destroyers. The naval fire

support group, commanded by Rear Adm.

Jesse B. Oldendorf, USN, contained three

battleships, three heavy cruisers, and seven

destroyers. Air support would be provided

by an escort carrier group containing three

escort carriers and three destroyers, and a

fast carrier group (Task Group 58.4, detached from Admiral Mitscher's carrier

task force) containing one heavy carrier

(CV), two light carriers (CVL), two heavy

cruisers, one light antiaircraft cruiser

(CL(AA)), and eight destroyers. Finally,

a group of three mine sweepers was

attached.11

The assault troops assigned to the expedition consisted mainly of the 106th Infantry Regiment, reinforced (less the 2d

Battalion), commanded by Col. Russell A.

Ayers, USA, and the 22d Marine Regimental Combat Team commanded by Col.

John T. Walker, USMC. Both were joined

under a temporary command echelon entitled Tactical Group One, V Amphibious

Corps, commanded by Brig. Gen. Thomas

E. Watson, USMC. This command also

included several other units that had been

detached from the Kwajalein attack forces

after completing their duties there. These

included the V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company, the Scout Company

(Company D) of the 4th Marine Tank

Division, Company A of the 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion (17 amphibian

10

 RCT 106 Unit Opns Rpt DOWNSIDE, 25 May 44,

p. 10; TG 51.11 Eniwetok Rpt, pp. 1-2. 11

 TG 51.11 Eniwetok Rpt, Incl A, pp. 1-4.
THE SEIZURE OF ENIWETOK ATOLL 337

CHART 3—TASK ORGANIZATION OF MAJOR COMMANDS FOR THE ATTACK ON ENIWETOK

ATOLL

tanks), the 708th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (less one LVT group) totaling 102

LVT's, a provisional DUKW company of

the 7th Infantry Division (30 DUKW's

and 4 LVT's), and part of Demolition

Team 1. The total landing force came to

7,997 men.12

Except for those units that had participated in the landings at Kwajalein, the

assault troops assigned to Eniwetok lacked

the intense training that usually preceded

amphibious invasions in the Pacific. The

106th Regiment had received some amphibious training in the Hawaiian area in

the early autumn of 1943 when it had been

thought that the entire 27th Division would

invade Nauru, but subsequent specialized

training had been only sketchy because of

the last-minute assignment of the unit to

the reserve force for the Kwajalein operation.13

 The 22d Marines, stationed on

Samoa since mid-1942, had only moved to

the Hawaiian area in November of 1943,

and its eleventh-hour training too was

sketchy.14 Both units suffered from want of

realistic amphibious rehearsals. About all

they had been able to accomplish before

sailing for Kwajalein were simple practices

12

 RCT 106 FO 2, Annex B, 12 Feb 44, p. 1;

CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Feb 44, Annex

B, p. 7. 13

 USAFICPA Participation Rpt Kwajalein and

Eniwetok Opns, p. 199. 14 Bevan G. Cass, ed., History of the Sixth Marine Division (Washington, 1948), p. 8.
338 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

in ship-to-shore movements. Not enough

amphtracks were available and there were

no DUKW's. During the operation itself

most of the troops were landed in amphtracks for their first time. The Marine

artillery battalion landed for its first time

in DUKW's. The rehearsal held on the

island of Maui had not permitted any

appreciable advance inland, no combat

firing, no infantry-tank team movement.

In short, the troops destined for Eniwetok

were greener than most going into actual

amphibious combat for the first time.15

Tactical Plans

Initially, the target date recommended

was 12 February, but was later changed to

15 February, and finally established for

the 17th of that month.16 The assault was

originally divided into four phases. Phase

I was to take place on D Day, 17 February.

Following the usual preliminary gunfire,

aerial bombardment, and mine sweeping

operations, the Reconnaissance Company,

V Amphibious Corps, was to land initially

on Camellia (Aitsu) and Canna (Rujoru)

Islands southeast of Engebi. At the same

time the scout company (Company D), 4th

Marine Tank Battalion, was to land on

Zinnia (Bogon) Island northwest of Engebi

to prevent any escape of the enemy from

Engebi in that direction. Once Camellia

and Canna were secured, the 2d Separate

Pack Howitzer Battalion (Marine) with

75-mm. pack howitzers was to land on

Camellia, and the 104th Field Artillery

Battalion (Army) with 105-mm. howitzers

was to land on Canna. The two battalions

were then to prepare to support the next

day's attack on Engebi. Phase II was to

commence on 18 February. The 22d Marine Regiment was to land on the lagoon

shore of Engebi with two battalions abreast

and capture that island. One platoon of

the 106th Infantry's Cannon Company,

consisting of two self-propelled 105-mm.

guns, was to support the marines. The

106th Regimental Combat Team was to

act as group reserve during this phase.

During Phase III of the operation, Eniwetok and Parry Islands in the southern

sector of the atoll were to be seized, the

date depending upon the progress of the

attack on Engebi. The 106th Infantry with

the 2d Separate Tank Company (Marine

medium tanks) attached, was to land in

column of battalions on Eniwetok Island

and capture it. One battalion of the 22d

Marines was to be prepared to land in support if necessary, while the remaining marines were to occupy the other small islands

in the northern sector of the atoll. It was

presumed that Eniwetok Island would be

only lightly defended, so the 106th was

ordered to be prepared to land on Parry

Island within two hours after the initial

assault on Eniwetok. During Phase IV, the

remainder of the islands in the atoll were

to be occupied by troops of both the Marine

and the Army regiments.17

Preliminary Air Operations

As the Eniwetok Expeditionary Group

sailed from Kwajalein lagoon on 15 February, Marc Mitscher's mighty flotilla of

fast carriers was moving swiftly westward

toward that most fearsome of all of Japan's

island bases in the Central Pacific—Truk.

With three of its fast carrier groups (the

fourth was detached to support the Eniwetok landings), Task Force 58 set sail from

15

 CG Tactical Group I, V Amphibious Corps (Gen

Watson), Special Report Concerning FLINTLOCK and

CATCHPOLE Operations, 1 Mar 44 (hereafter cited as

Tac Gp 1 Sp Rpt),p. 7. 16

 TG 51.11 Eniwetok Rpt, p. 2. 17

 Tac Gp 1 Opn Order 2-44, 10 Feb 44.
THE SEIZURE OF ENIWETOK ATOLL 339

Majuro on 12 February. Operating under

the command of Admiral Spruance, who

carried his flag aboard the new battleship

New Jersey, Task Force 58 consisted of 5

heavy carriers, 4 light carriers, 6 battleships, 10 cruisers of various sizes, and 28

destroyers.18 After refueling at sea, Mitscher's ships arrived off of Truk in the early

morning of 17 February (Tokyo time) and

launched their first fighter sweep of seventy

planes, which attacked aircraft and airfields at dawn. The strike was eminently

successful. A total destruction of 128 enemy

planes (72 on the ground and 56 in the air)

was credited to the U.S. naval pilots with

the loss of only four American planes.19

Immediately after the fighter strike, eighteen torpedo bombers dropped fragmentary

clusters on most of the airfields, rendering

them temporarily unserviceable. Next day

the main strike against shipping in the

harbor was made. Naval planners had

hoped to catch a sizable element of the

Combined Fleet at Truk, where it had been

sighted two weeks earlier by Marine reconnaissance planes. Unfortunately, Admiral

Koga was alert to the impending danger

and had set sail with most of his fleet for

Palau before the U.S. carriers arrived.

Nevertheless, the Japanese merchant marine suffered a severe blow as a result of

the strikes. A total of about 200,000 tons of

merchant shipping was destroyed in the

harbor. Also, while the carrier planes were

working over Truk itself, Admiral Spruance's support ships were able to intercept

and sink one light cruiser and one destroyer trying to escape from the area. A

third Japanese destroyer got away.

Meanwhile, the fourth fast carrier group

(Task Group 58.4), which had been

attached to Admiral Hill's command, proceeded directly against Eniwetok on 16

February, the day before the expeditionary

force arrived. There, the planes destroyed

all buildings of any consequence, rendered

the airfield at Engebi temporarily useless,

and demolished one of the two coastal defense guns on the northeast corner of that

island. The airfield was pitted with bomb

craters, and an estimated fourteen enemy

aircraft were destroyed on the ground. In

addition, last-minute aerial photographs

were taken and delivered to Admiral Hill's

flagship, Cambria, at sea en route to the

target.20

Japanese Defenses on Eniwetok Atoll

Although before the attack on Pearl

Harbor the Japanese Navy had conducted

extensive construction projects in the Marshall Islands, Eniwetok had been largely

overlooked. Up to that time Japanese plans

called for the atoll to be used only as a fuel

storage depot, and on 5 September 1941,

the 4th Fleet ordered 1,416,000 yen

($336,583.20) to be set aside for the construction of a fuel tank, feed pipe, and living quarters for the personnel to man the

depot.21

Evidently, the first Japanese garrison on

Eniwetok was a small detachment of six

men sent from the 61st Guard Force at Kwa18

 This account of the Truk strike is derived from

the following sources: CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in

POA, Feb 44, Incl B, pars. 164-219; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Weapons Systems Evaluation

Group, Staff Study 4, Operational Experience of Fast

Carrier Task Forces in World War II, 15 August 1951,

pp. 163-64; Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls,

pp. 315-32. 19

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Feb 44,

par. 177. These claims are probably exaggerated.

Morison estimates Japanese losses in the air to be over

thirty and on the ground about forty. (Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, p. 320.) 20

 TG 51.11 Eniwetok Rpt, Incl A, p. 38. 21

 Special Forces, Early Series, Vol. 10, NA 12255,

WDC 161009.
340 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

jalein to man a special lookout station.22 In

November 1942 about three hundred construction workers landed at Engebi. The

next month about five hundred workers of

the 4th Fleet Construction Department were

sent to Eniwetok to construct an airfield.

The field was completed in June or July of

1943, whereupon the majority of the construction personnel were transferred to

Kwajalein. Sometime between August and

October 1943 a small naval garrison force,

never totaling more than sixty-one men,

arrived at the atoll to garrison Engebi and

its air base. This garrison maintained three

lookout stations, a branch naval post office,

a battery of two 12-cm. guns, and two twinmount 13-mm. machine guns. The tiny

force was the only ground combat unit on

Eniwetok Atoll before the arrival of the 1st

Amphibious Brigade on 4 January 1944.23

Thus Eniwetok Atoll was left practically

unprotected, with no major system of prepared defenses. The 1st Amphibious Brigade

arrived less than a month and a half before

the American landings and barely had

time to dig in. The contrast between the

Japanese capacities here and at Kwajalein

are obvious. In the latter atoll the fortifications had taken years to construct. Some of

the units at Kwajalein had been there since

before Pearl Harbor and were certainly

prepared to defend the base long before

U.S. forces attacked it. At Eniwetok, over

2,500 troops were dumped on a lonely atoll

almost barren of defenses only six weeks

before the American landings.

The 1st Amphibious Brigade, which totaled

3,940 troops, may have originally been intended to serve as a mobile reserve force

for the entire Marshalls area, to be based

at Kwajalein and rushed to other threatened atolls. But when the brigade reached

Truk on 27 December it was ordered to be

parceled out to Wotje, Maloelap, Kwajalein, and Eniwetok to reinforce the garrisons on those atolls. The brigade left Truk

on 30 December, reaching Eniwetok on 4

January. There, the Eniwetok detachment

consisting of 2,586 troops was detached

and the convoy left for Kwajalein and

elsewhere.24

In addition to the 2,586 troops of the

brigade, there were stationed on Eniwetok

Atoll at the time of the attack almost a

thousand other enemy personnel: civilian

employees of the brigade; fifty-nine men of

the 61st Guard Force Detachment, which had

been there since October of 1943; air personnel that were in the process of being

evacuated; a small survey party of about

fifty men; Japanese and Korean construction workers; laborers hired by the Sankyu

Transportation Company; and an unknown number of naval stragglers. This

brought the total to about 3,500, but of this

number only the brigade and the 61st Guard

Force Detachment could be considered effective combat troops.25

 Thus, in terms of

numbers alone, Eniwetok housed more

combat troops than Kwajalein, but this

difference was more than offset by the

comparative paucity of fortifications on

Eniwetok Atoll.

Contrary to American expectations, the

bulk of the enemy personnel at the time of

the landings was located on Parry Island

rather than on Engebi. Parry was the

headquarters of Maj. Gen. Yoshimi Nishida, who commanded the brigade, and on

22

 JICPOA Translation 3998, 6th Base Force Secret

Directive 104-43. 23

 JICPOA Bull 89-44, Japanese Defense of Eniwetok Atoll, 12 Jun 44, p. 3. 24

 The 729 men for the Wotje detachment were

caught at Kwajalein by the American invasion.

(JICPOA Bull 88-44, 1st Amphibious Brigade, Japanese

Army, 13 Jun 44, pp. 6-7.) 25

 JICPOA Bull 89-44, Japanese Defense of Eniwetok Atoll, 12 Jun 44, pp. 4-5.
THE SEIZURE OF ENIWETOK ATOLL 341

this island Nishida had stationed the brigade reserve and the Parry Island garrison,

totaling 1,115 troops, with almost 250

other personnel. The troops had with them

a total of thirty-six heavy grenade dischargers, thirty-six light machine guns, six

heavy machine guns, ten 81-mm, mortars,

three 20-mm. automatic guns, two mountain guns, one 20-mm. cannon, and three

light tanks.

The defense plans for Parry were outlined in a brigade order dated 5 February

1944. About one half of the troops were

disposed at the water's edge, where they

were to be grouped into strong points about

140 feet apart. The defense of the beaches

was to be supported by mountain guns,

20-mm. automatic guns, and other weapons. The mountain guns and 20-mm.'s

were to fire first. Light and heavy machine

guns were to fire on landing craft before

and after they reached the underwater obstacles. Next, mortars and grenade throwers were to deliver concentrated fire against

the enemy at the beaches and were to

cover the sectors between fortified areas

and strong points. To facilitate the employment of artillery and heavy weapons, the

order called for fields of fire to be cleared

through coconut groves. The order gave

quite explicit instructions for measures

against tanks: "Destroy enemy tanks when

they are stopped by obstacles by means of

hollow charge anti-tank rifle grenades,

close-in attack, land mines, water mines,

and Molotov cocktails. Especially at night,

have a part of the force attack them."26

The order made it very clear that the

brigade was not expected to survive an

American assault once it had established a

beachhead. Any troops remaining after

the Americans had landed in force were to

assemble in a central area. Then, the order

continued, ".. . sick and wounded who

cannot endure the battle will commit suicide. [Others] . . . will reorganize, return

to battle as a unit, and die fighting."27

The Japanese were able to construct

very few installations and gun positions

above ground on Parry in the short time

that the brigade was there. With very few

exceptions, the defenses consisted of foxholes and trenches. These fell into two

categories, the old and the new. The old

foxholes and trenches were located on the

ocean side, were well constructed, and

often lined with rocks or coconut logs.

Relying on their estimate of American amphibious tactics as demonstrated at Tarawa, the Japanese more recently had

undertaken heavier defenses on the lagoon

side. These were freshly and hastily constructed, and therefore much inferior. All

entrenchments were well camouflaged,

although the camouflage was superior on

the ocean side. A typical strong point consisted of a spider-web pattern of entrenchments. In the center of the web was a large

personnel shelter lined and covered with

coconut logs. Strips of corrugated iron and

a thick layer of sand were placed over the

log roof. The center was surrounded by a

circle of foxholes ten to fifteen feet apart,

mostly roofed over with corrugated iron.

These holes were connected with one another by narrow trenches or tunnels. The

trenches and tunnels on the outer edge of

the web were in turn joined by radial

trenches and tunnels to the shelter or control foxhole in the center of the position.

The entire web was extremely well camouflaged and very difficult to locate. Parry

was honeycombed with positions of this

sort.28

26

 Ibid., pp. 31-32. 27

 Ibid., p. 34. 28

 TG 51.11 Eniwetok Rpt, Incl A, p. 62; Tac Gp 1

Sp Rpt, Incl C, p. 1.
342 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

On neighboring Eniwetok Island were

stationed 779 Japanese combat troops of

the brigade plus 24 civilian employees and

5 naval personnel manning the lookout

station. The island was commanded by Lt.

Col. Masahiro Hashida, and the garrison

originally possessed a total of two flame

throwers, thirteen grenade dischargers,

twelve light machine guns, two heavy machine guns, one 50-mm. mortar, eleven

81-mm. mortars, one 20-mm. automatic

gun, three 20-mm. cannons, and three light

tanks.29 The garrison was divided into five

forces, three on the lagoon shore, one

placed so as to cut off the narrow eastern

neck of the island, and one to be held in

reserve. The three lagoon shore forces were

to place their weapons so as to obtain interlocking bands of fire over the surface of

the lagoon. The force in the east was to

protect the rear of the three lagoon shore

forces from any American units landing on

the northern tip of the island. The reserve

force was placed to the rear of the forces on

the lagoon shore, near the western tip of

the island.30

As on Parry, the defenses consisted

mostly of foxholes and trenches. Those on

Eniwetok Island were better constructed

and better camouflaged. After the capture

of Kwajalein, the Japanese had begun construction of concrete pillboxes on the southwest tip of the island and had dug

additional foxholes. Land mines were also

found on Eniwetok.31

On Engebi, at the northern tip of the

atoll, the garrison consisted of about 692

members of the 1st Amphibious Brigade plus

54 naval personnel of the 61st Guard Force

Detachment and an additional 500 noncombat personnel. The garrison was commanded by Col. Toshio Yano. Its total

weapon strength came to two flame

throwers, thirteen grenade dispatchers,

twelve light machine guns, four heavy machine guns, two 37-mm. guns, one 50-mm.

mortar, eleven 81-mm. mortars, one

20-mm. automatic gun, two 20-mm. cannons, two mountain guns, three light tanks,

and two 12-cm. coast defense guns.32

Colonel Yano on 10 February made a

very accurate estimate of American intentions:

The enemy will bomb this island either

with carrier or land based planes and will

bombard us from all sides with battleships

and heavy cruisers. Directly following these

bombardments, an amphibious force landing

will be carried out. It will be extremely difficult for the enemy

to land here from the open sea because of the

high waves and rugged reefs. [Therefore] it is expected that they will

. . . enter the atoll and carry out landing

operations from the lagoon . . . making as- saults on outlying islands, they will approach

this island from all directions.33

Yano accordingly planned to concentrate his defensive system on the lagoon

shore of this triangularly shaped island.

The Japanese defenders were ordered to

". . . lure the enemy to the water's edge

and then annihilate him with withering

fire and continuous attacks." Most of the

29

 JICPOA Bulls 88-44 and 89-44. In addition the

island may have contained two 75-mm. mountain

guns (JICPOA Bull 89-44), although this was denied

in Admiral Hill's report (TG 51.11 Eniwetok Rpt,

Incl A, pp. 62-63). 30

 Reproduction of Japanese map in JICPOA Bull

89-44 p. 35.

The compass directions given here are not exact.

Eniwetok Island does not lie due east and west, but is

shaped like an arc. One end faces west but the rest of

the island curves gradually so that the opposite tip

faces approximately north-northeast. The bulk of the

island, however, runs generally along an east-west axis,

so to avoid confusion, locations on the island and direction of movement are stated in terms of cardinal

compass points. 31

 TG 51.11 Eniwetok Rpt, Incl A, pp. 62-63. 32

 JICPOA Bulls 88-44 and 89-44. 33

 JICPOA Bull 89-44, p. 24.
THE SEIZURE OF ENIWETOK ATOLL 343

prepared defenses and over half of the brigade detachment were concentrated at the

center of the lagoon shore. The approach

to this strong point was flanked by the fire

of two 75-mm. mountain guns on the

northwest corner and two 20-mm. machine

cannon in the southern part of the concentration itself, as well as two 37-mm. guns

emplaced on the southern tip. Frontal fire

could be delivered by the 20-mm. automatic guns and the three tanks, each

mounting 37-mm. guns.

Besides the main area of defense on the

lagoon shore, three other strong points

were established, one in each of the three

apexes of the island triangle. The south

corner contained the 2d Rifle Company (less

one rifle platoon) plus the 37-mm. gun platoon detached from Yano's artillery company. The west corner was composed of

the artillery company (less its 37-mm. gun

platoon) plus the rifle platoon detached

from the 2d Rifle Company. In the north

corner of the island was located the 61st

Guard Detachment, manning the two 12-cm.

coast defense guns.

Before the arrival of the 1st Amphibious

Brigade, the defensive system had been

predicated on an assault from the ocean,

for it was on the ocean sides of the island

that the better-prepared and older trenches

and dugouts were found. Not until after

the arrival of the brigade were hasty efforts

made toward fully organizing a defensive

system along the lagoon shore. While the

lagoon foxholes and trenches were numerous, they were hurriedly and rather poorly

constructed. Most of them were located

about three hundred yards inland and parallel to the lagoon beach. Dugouts of coconut log and earthwork embankments as

well as some concrete pillboxes were on

Engebi. The concrete was less than one

foot in thickness, not reinforced, and had

a very low resistance to penetration and

blast.34

The effectiveness of the Japanese defense

of Eniwetok Atoll cannot, however, be estimated on the basis of Japanese plans, for

by the time the first American troops

landed on the atoll the enemy's strength

had been greatly reduced. Air strikes were

successful in inflicting considerable damage on installations and weapons and in

causing a large number of casualties. The

raids reduced the ammunition supplies

and food stores. The medical situation at

Eniwetok was very poor in the first place,

and the reduction of food rations lowered

the health and energy of the Japanese to

such an extent that many were physically

incapable of carrying on their assigned

duties. Moreover, the frequency of the

raids resulted in constant interruption to

the work schedule and forced the Japanese

to work at odd hours, often at night. These

factors, together with the speed of the

American advance from Kwajalein to Eniwetok, meant that the Japanese were only

partially prepared before the preinvasion

bombardment. This bombardment had

the further effect of causing more damage

and casualties, and partially, though not

completely, disrupting organized resistance.35

34

 TG 51.11 Eniwetok Rpt, Incl A, p. 61; Tac Gp 1

Sp Rpt, p. 4. 35

 For Japanese accounts of the damage done by the

preliminary aerial bombardment see: JICPOA Translation 7603, Excerpts Taken from the Diary of a

Member of the 1st Amph Brigade; JICPOA Translation

7811, Complete Translation of the Diary of 2d Lt

Kakino; JICPOA Translation 6808, Excerpts from the

Diary of Cpl Masamichi Kitama, 1st Bn Arty Co, 1st

Amph Brigade; JICPOA Translation 7005, Diary of

WO Shionoya; JICPOA Translation 8200, Extracts

from the Diary of NCO Norio Miyada; JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Rpt 47, Interrogation of Sgt

Takumi Furukawa, Transportation Squad, Captured 19

Feb 44 on Engebi.
344 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

The Seizure of Engebi Island

The two sections of Admiral Hill's Eniwetok Expeditionary Group arrived off the

southeast coast of Eniwetok Atoll during

the early morning of 17 February. The fire

support ships separated for bombardment

missions against Engebi, southwestern Eniwetok Island, and the islands flanking

Deep Entrance, while the escort carrier

group diverged to take station northeast of

the atoll.36 Naval gunfire opened at 0659

without eliciting return fire from the enemy. At 0750 the ships halted their bombardment for air attacks against Engebi

and Eniwetok. These were completed at

0825 and 0907, respectively, and the firing

ships then resumed their bombardment.

Meanwhile, at 0700 mine sweepers commenced sweeping a channel through Wide

Passage. LST's, though temporarily held

up as the mine sweeper Sage swept a

moored mine inside the lagoon, followed.

Then the fire support ships and the main

transport group steamed through Deep

Passage, pouring 40-mm. automatic fire on

Parry, Lilac (Jeroru), and Japtan Islands

without response. Somewhat more than

three hours later, the attack force reached

its first stations in the northern part of the

lagoon and preparations were begun for the

initial landings on Canna and Camellia

Islands, southeast of Engebi.

H Hour for the first landings was set at

1230, but unexpected delays developed.

The subchaser, SC 1066, which was supposed to act as convoy guide, took station

off the wrong island. The high-speed transport Kane sent her boats to the wrong LST,

and the Marine artillery battery was delayed in getting boated and to the line of

departure. As a result, the commanding

officer of SC 1066 was relieved as was the

commander of the Marine 2d Separate

Pack Howitzer Battalion.37

In spite of these contretemps, the first

amphtracks, carrying troops of the V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company

and supported by two destroyers, made

unopposed landings on Canna and Camellia Islands at 1318. Shortly before 1400

the landing troops reported that no enemy

was present, and the 75-mm. pieces of the

2d Separate Pack Howitzer Battalion and

the 105-mm. howitzers of the 104th Field

Artillery Battalion were taken ashore in

DUKW's manned by the provisional

DUKW company of the 7th Infantry Division. As at Kwajalein, some of the

DUKW's carrying the 105-mm. pieces

were fitted with special A-frames for use in

unloading after landing. Guns, five units of

fire, and gun crews were landed without

difficulty. At 1602 all artillery had reached

the beach and within half an hour was in

position and prepared to register on Engebi. Registration was carried out without

cessation of naval gunfire and was completed by 1902. About forty minutes later

night harassing fires were commenced

against Engebi. The mean range for the

pack howitzer battalion was 6,900 yards

and for the field artillery battalion, 8,100

yards. Fires throughout the night were executed at the rate of two rounds per gun per

minute for five minutes every half hour.38

While the artillery was being emplaced,

the naval underwater demolition unit reconnoitered the lagoon beaches off Engebi.

As the battleships Colorado and Tennessee,

destroyers Heermann and McCord, and one

LCI(G) fired over their heads, the doughty

36

 This account of D-Day activities, unless otherwise

indicated, is derived from the following sources: TG

51.11 Eniwetok Rpt, Incl A. pp. 18-20, 64, 85; Tac

Gp 1 Jnl, 17 Feb 44. 37

 Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, p. 291;

Tac Gp 1 Jnl, 17 Feb 44, Msg 83. 38

 TG 51.11 Eniwetok Rpt, Incl A, p. 85.
THE SEIZURE OF ENIWETOK ATOLL 345

swimmers went as close as fifty yards from

the shore. In spite of intermittent machine

gun fire from the beaches, the team accomplished its mission without casualties. No

underwater obstacles were discovered, and

boat lanes and shoal spots were buoyed.

After securing Canna and Camellia, the

Reconnaissance Company landed, against

no opposition, on the three islands northwest of Camellia and on two small unnamed islands west of Canna. These landings were made to offer security to the

artillery units against possible Japanese

infiltration during the night. In addition,

the scout company of the 4th Marine

Tank Battalion was ordered to land on

Zinnia (Bogon), just west of Engebi, to

forestall the possibility of Japanese escaping from Engebi. This latter plan miscarried somewhat when some of the rubber

boats carrying the scout company got lost

in the dark and had to return to their

mother ship, the APD Schley. The remainder, however, under the company

commander, succeeded in landing at a

point two islands below Zinnia and by

0315 worked their way northward to the

proper island, which they found unoccupied.

Thus D-Day operations were carried

through successfully in spite of some minor

delays and errors in landing. No American casualties were sustained. The stage

was set for the attack on Engebi.39

The plan for the main attack on 18 February called for an assault by the 22d Marines against the lagoon shore of Engebi.

W Hour was set at 0845. The two landing

beaches extended 750 yards along the

lagoon, with a finger pier as a dividing

marker. (Map 17) The 1st Battalion, 22d

Marines, was to land on White Beach 1 on

the right, the 2d Battalion on Blue Beach

3 at the left. The two battalions were to be

supported by medium tanks of the 2d Separate Tank Company, and a platoon from

the Cannon Company, 106th Infantry,

with two 105-mm, self-propelled guns. The

3d Marine Battalion was in regimental

reserve while the 1st and 3d Battalions,

106th Infantry, waited aboard ship, prepared to support the attack if necessary.

At 0655 Colorado and Louisville began

shelling the northern and eastern part of

the island. Tennessee and Pennsylvania moved

at dawn to deliver close-range destructive

fire against beach defenses from flanking

positions on each side of the boat lanes. At

0720 two destroyers, Phelps and Hall, moved

into position as direct support ships, but

because of the smoke and dust rising from

the island, Hall was unable to fire. Just

before 0800 the naval guns ceased fire to

allow a half-hour air strike to take place.

This was completed ahead of schedule and

naval fire was resumed at 0811 and increased steadily in intensity until just

before the first troops landed. Shortly after

the air strike was lifted, artillery on Canna

and Camellia joined the naval guns and

began to fire on the beaches at maximum

rate until just after the first wave landed at

0844, whereupon the artillery barrage was

lifted inland to the center of the island for

another five minutes. Thereafter, because

of the smallness of the island, very few call

missions were fired.

As usual, LCI gunboats preceded the

first wave firing rockets and 40-mm. guns.

On each flank of the first wave were five

39

 The following account of the action on Engebi on

18 February is, unless otherwise indicated, derived

from: TG 51.11 Eniwetok Rpt, Incl A, pp. 2, 6, 21-24,

67; Tac Gp 1 Jnl, 18 Feb 44; 22d Marines Reinforced,

Rpt on CATCHPOLE Opn, 9 Mar 44, pp. 6ff; Lt Col

Arthur H. Weinberger, USMC, A Study of Amphibious Tactics—The Capture of Engebi Island, a monograph prepared for the 10th Section, Marine Corps

School, Amphibious Warfare School, Senior Class.
346 SEIZURE OP THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

MAP 17

armored amphibians; seven others were in

V formation in the center. As the leading

waves moved slowly from the line of departure, smoke and dust from the heavy

bombardment swept out over the water

obscuring the beaches from the crews and

disguising the gradual divergence of the

two assault battalions. The first waves of
THE SEIZURE OF ENIWETOK ATOLL 347

ATTACK ON ENGEBI.

amphibian tractors tended to guide on

LCI's operating to their flanks, and when

the LCI's swung out from their direct approach to the beach and moved parallel to

it, the leading LVT's tended to follow suit.

Thus there was a gap between the two assault battalions by the time they reached

the beach.

The armored amphibians moved quickly

inland about a hundred yards, firing their

37-mm. guns at likely targets. Behind the

first three waves of troops came the medium tank company, boated in LCM's.

These landed on schedule with one unfortunate exception. One of the LCM's

commenced to ship water because of a premature partial lowering of the bow ramp.

In the tank this craft was carrying the crew

was "buttoned up" and remained oblivious to frantic warnings as the craft filled up

and sank in forty feet of water, five hundred yards from the shore. Only one man

escaped as the tank sank to the bottom of

the lagoon.40

Enemy opposition on the beach was at

first light. Almost the only noteworthy resistance came from a few automatic guns

on Skunk Point, the southeastern tip of the

island. Company A on the right of the 1st

Battalion found its right flank exposed and

had to delay the attack until the aid of a

tank platoon was obtained. On the left, the

2d Battalion pushed forward rapidly, bypassing isolated points of resistance. These

consisted chiefly of "spider-web" covered

foxholes, similar to those that were to be

encountered in greater number on Parry

and Eniwetok Islands.

40

 USS Ashland Action Rpt Eniwetok Atoll, 3 May

44, p. 1.
348 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

The 2d Battalion overran the airfield

quickly and within less than an hour tanks

had pushed forward as far as the northern

part of the island. By 0925 the troops were

so far inland that the scheduled naval gunfire had to be called off. At 0955 the 3d

Battalion in reserve was landed and started

the tedious job of ferreting the Japanese

out of various tunnels and covered foxholes

that had been bypassed by the assault

battalions.

The only organized resistance occurred

in the zone of the 1st Battalion in the area

of Skunk Point. There, a large number of

Japanese put up a stiff fight, but were

slowly forced northward along the island's

eastern shore and eventually isolated and

cut down. This took time, not only because

of the stubborness of the Japanese but also

because of the heavy underbrush through

which the marines had to move.

At 1450, about six hours after the initial

landing, the island was declared secured.

Mopping up continued, however, until the

following afternoon. Meanwhile, before

dark on 18 February the 3d Battalion and

the 2d Separate Tank Company re-embarked for operations against Parry and

Eniwetok. Total Marine casualties came to

85 killed and missing, and 521 wounded in

action. In exchange, 1,276 of the enemy

were killed and 16 prisoners of war taken.41

On the 18th and 19th of February the

Scout and Reconnaissance Companies

completed the search of all the smaller islands between Engebi and the major

targets in southern Eniwetok Atoll.42

The Capture of Eniwetok Island

Before the arrival of the task force at

Eniwetok, Phase III of the operation had

been planned to include the capture of

both Eniwetok and Parry Islands the day

after Engebi was secured. Little was known

about the defenses or garrisons of those two

islands when this plan was drawn. It was

hoped that information gathered at the

targets would be sufficient to elaborate

upon the original scheme of maneuver or

to change it.

During the capture of Camellia and

Canna Islands on 17 February, the V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company

had captured several natives who said that

a thousand Japanese soldiers were stationed on Parry and Eniwetok. Attempts

to verify this information proved futile,

and its reliability was doubted because the

prisoners questioned seemed to have no

very clear idea as to what the numbers

given really meant. On 18 February Japanese documents and prisoners taken on

Engebi indicated that Eniwetok Island was

defended by 556 soldiers, and that Parry's

garrison came to 326, including General

Nishida's brigade headquarters.43

In view of this increase in the estimated

strength of the enemy garrison on Eniwetok Island, Admiral Hill modified his

orders. The original plan called for sending the 106th Infantry into Eniwetok in

column of battalions, then two hours later

withdrawing one battalion to support the

22d Marines' attack on Parry. The new

order called for the two battalions of the

106th to land abreast on Yellow Beaches

1 and 2 on the lagoon shore of Eniwetok.

(Map 18) Attached was the 2d Separate

Tank Battalion (Marine) and the 3d Battalion, 22d Marines, in reserve.44

 Immediately upon receipt of this change of orders,

41

 JICPOA Item 89-44, CINCPAC Analysis, Feb

44.

42

 TG 51.11 Eniwetok Rpt, Incl A, p. 23. 43

 RCT 106 FO 4, 181500 Feb 44; RCT 106 Rpt of

Opns at Eniwetok, Incl 4, p. 1; TG 51.11 Eniwetok

Rpt, Incl A, p. 58. 44

 RCT 106 Rpt on Amph Opns, 13 Mar 44, p. 18.
THE SEIZURE OF ENIWETOK ATOLL 349

Colonel Ayers, commanding the 106th

Regimental Combat Team, called a meeting of the members of his staff and other

interested officers aboard the transport

Custer. There, he set forth in detail his new

plan of operation. The 1st Battalion was

ordered to land on the right on Yellow

Beach 2 and was charged with making the

main effort to the west to clear the lower

end of the island. The 3d Battalion was to

land on Yellow Beach 1 and form a covering line just east of a road that bisected the

island from the lagoon to the ocean shore.

Only one company was to be employed for

this maneuver, the purpose of which was to

seal off the eastern end of the island against

possible Japanese infiltration while the 1st

Battalion was capturing the western end

where most of the enemy defenses were

presumed to be. The remainder of the 3d

Battalion was to stand in regimental reserve in readiness to assist the 1st Battalion

if necessary. After the west end of the island was cleared, the 1st Battalion was

then to pass through the 3d Battalion and

clean out the rest of the island.

The 3d Battalion, whose primary job

was merely to conduct a holding action,

was instructed to take only the combat

equipment necessary for temporary action

on the island. Its orders were: "If rifle fire

is drawn, don't sit and take it if [you] . . .

can clean it out. But don't try to take the

rest of the island—limited movement

only."45 Two platoons of medium tanks

were assigned the 1st Battalion, the third

platoon to be in reserve. Light tanks were

ordered to remain aboard ship.

The Assault

The scheduled time for the landing on

Eniwetok was 0900, 18 February. At 0710

two cruisers and two destroyers took position on the flanks of the boat lanes and

commenced to deliver fire on the landing

beaches at close range. Half an hour later

a third destroyer commenced delivering

interdiction fire east of the landing beaches

and in another thirty minutes a fourth destroyer took position off the ocean side of

the island and commenced bombardment

from there. The amount of naval fire

placed on Eniwetok was considerably less

than that for either of the other two main

targets. Whereas a total of 1,179.7 tons of

naval shells had been fired on Engebi and

944.4 tons were to be used on Parry, Eniwetok Island received only 204.6 tons altogether.46

 Also, the attackers of Eniwetok

were at a disadvantage since they did not

have any preliminary artillery bombardment to support their landing.

Here as elsewhere in Eniwetok Atoll,

the problem of delivering effective fire

from naval ships differed from that in

other parts of the Pacific. In former atoll

operations, the main job for naval gunfire

was to destroy heavy defenses, mostly

above ground, such as pillboxes, blockhouses, and bomb shelters, all visible from

the ships at close range. With a few exceptions on Engebi, this type of target was not

in evidence at Eniwetok, the main defenses

being covered foxholes and trench systems.

Close-in direct fire could not be effectively

delivered against these, because they were

invisible from the ships and because at

close range naval shells with their flat

trajectory fire simply overshot the targets.

A higher angle of fire was necessary, so

Admiral Hill ordered his ships to increase

their range once they had completed the

destruction of all visible targets.47

45

 Ibid., p. 19. 46

 Tac Gp 1, V Phib Corps, Rpt on Naval Gunfire

Support During CATCHPOLE Opn, 19 Mar 44, p. 2; TG

51.11 Eniwetok Rpt, Incl A, p. 69. 47

 TG 51.11 Eniwetok Rpt, Incl A, p. 77.
350 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

MAP 18

At 0810 naval gunfire was checked for

fifteen minutes to allow carrier planes to

bomb and strafe the beaches. LCI gunboats followed with a last-minute rocket

saturation of the landing area and then

turned right to deliver a special rocket

bombardment against the western end of

the island. Meanwhile, six LST's, each

with seventeen LVT's aboard, had disembarked their contingents of assault troops

at approximately 0730. There the amphtracks circled, waiting the arrival of the

medium tanks of the 2d Separate Tank

Company, which had been boated aboard

LCM's the night before in the northern

part of the atoll and were moving slowly

through twenty-five miles of choppy water

toward the line of departure off of Eniwetok Island. Fearful of a delay in the arrival of the tanks, Admiral Hill postponed

H Hour fifteen minutes. It shortly became

apparent that the LCM's would arrive on

schedule, so at 0909 the first wave drew up

on the line of departure.

On the left in the zone of the 3d Battalion, Lt. Col. Harold I. Mizony, battalion commander, had Company L at the

left and Company K on the right, with

Company I following as reserve. Company

L was to pivot on the pier on the left of

Yellow Beach 1, turn left, and extend its

line toward the ocean beaches. Company

K was to open a corridor across the island

behind it and then mop up in the rear of

Company L's right flank near the ocean

shore. In the right zone, Lt. Col. Winslow

Cornett had planned a somewhat similar

deployment for his 1st Battalion landing

on Yellow Beach 2. Company B was to

push straight inland along the battalion
THE SEIZURE OF ENIWETOK ATOLL 351

boundary until it had crossed the east-west

trail about a third of the way across the island. Then it was to swing to the right

until its left wing reached out to the ocean.

Company A was to land on the right half

of Yellow Beach 2, pivot to the right, tie in

with Company B, and together the two

would move west to the end of the island.

Company C, in reserve, was to advance to

just south of the trail and secure a perimeter there, establishing a point for the

battalion command post.

At 0917, just two minutes after the scheduled H Hour, the first wave hit the beach.48

The landing plans went somewhat awry at

the very outset. The island rose abruptly

from the shore where a steep bluff eight or

more feet high denied further progress to

the LVT's. While some struggled to climb

it, others remained on the beach or backed

off, cluttering the landing area and tending

to force later waves to come ashore beyond

the assigned beach limits. Men dropped

from LVT's onto the sand and obtained

shelter behind the vehicles or the defilade

next to the bluff, but enemy automatic and

mortar fire caught some units and contributed to their disorganization. The

enemy's plan of defense required sturdy

opposition to the landings themselves. Preparatory fire had left the Japanese still

48

 Unless otherwise indicated the following account

of the morning's action on Eniwetok Island is derived

from: RCT 106 Rpt on Amph Opns, 13 Mar 44; RCT

106 Jnl, 18 Feb 44; Tac Gp 1 Jnl, 18 Feb 44; War Department Special Staff Historical Division, Operations

on Eniwetok Atoll, MS in OCMH. (This monograph

was prepared by Edmund C. Love, historian attached

to the 106th Regimental Combat Team during the

Eniwetok operation. It is cited hereafter as Love,

Opns on Eniwetok.)
INVASION OF ENIWETOK. Landing craft pass support warships as they fire on the beach

defenses of the island.
THE SEIZURE OF ENIWETOK ATOLL 353

able to resist from prepared positions directly inland from the beach and, in particular, from well-concealed positions that

enfiladed parts of Yellow Beach 2.

Company B, on the left (east) of Yellow

Beach 2, met difficulties at once. Its left

and right flanks landed at the proper

points, but the rest of the company was set

ashore to the right and left of the designated positions. In front of the 3d Platoon

at the left was an enemy strong point that

had not been neutralized by preparatory

fire. It consisted of a spider-web network

of firing pits and radiating trenches, artfully concealed by vegetation, from which

automatic and rifle fire and grenades

struck the troops on the shore. As the men

pushed inland through the position, the

Japanese struck them from the flank or

rear and then shifted by underground passages to other hidden vantage points. The

enemy had to be rooted out by tactics improvised on the spot.

2d Lt. Ralph W. Hills and Pfc. William

Hollowiak, caught within the strong point,

at first merely lay on the ground shooting

the enemy as they rose in their pits to fire

toward the beach. Hollowiak found this

method too slow. He got Hills to cover

him while he crawled forward and fired

into a hole, after which he would lift the

covering frond and throw in a grenade.

Then he in turn covered Hills while the 1st

Platoon leader repeated the process. Hollowiak picked up a Japanese rifle and took

ammunition from every dead Japanese

and obtained grenades from all the

wounded or dead Americans in his path.

Scrambling forward in this fashion, the two

men alone killed perhaps twenty of the

enemy and knocked out seven or eight of

the positions in fairly rapid sequence, thus

neutralizing enough of the east side of the

strong point so that Company K's right

wing could also press on toward the ocean.

1st Lt. Arthur Klein and one section of

Company B's weapons platoon were set

ashore on the westernmost portion of the

beach. They made their way with some

difficulty along the shore through Company A before striking inland from that

part of Yellow Beach 2 originally assigned

to Company B. The section reached the

road by crossing the right side of the enemy

strong point from which, however, the Japanese were no longer resisting; they then

waited for Company A to arrive. Klein

moved eastward alone along the road until

he came upon Lieutenant Hills and Private Hollowiak, leaving the rest of his

group to await Company A. He joined the

Company B main body, which cleared the

last of the enemy positions in the defense

system there with the aid of an amphibian

tank and its 37-mm. gun. In the absence

of the company commander, Klein took

command and reorganized the elements of

Company B along the road, with the exception of the group he had led ashore,

starting them on the second phase of their

mission. By 1145 the left flank, under Lieutenant Hills, had pushed across the island

jointly with elements of Company K, had

subdued another enemy defense position,

and had captured five native prisoners.

Contact between Lieutenant Hills' detail

and the remainder of Company B had

been lost, however, during this advance.

The right wing of Company B, about thirty

men with rifles and carbines, was itself

quickly divided into many small groups,

separated by dense underbrush, and gaps

also developed on both of its flanks.

Company A landed on the right (west)

part of Yellow Beach 2 and struggled

through a thick tangle of underbrush to

the crest of the knoll on which it was to

pivot to the west. Its right flank was cov-
354 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

MACHINE GUN SQUAD FIRING its .30-caliber water-cooled weapon on an enemy

position.

ered by a patrol of four men under S. Sgt.

Joseph A. Jasinski. Although the main

body of the company made no contact

with the enemy until it turned, the patrol

encountered the first of a series of dugout

and trench defenses almost immediately.

The company's right flank also ran upon

the eastern limits of these works shortly

after it started inland but it was able to

proceed well ahead of the hard-pressed

patrol. Reinforcements, including two amphibian tanks with 37-mm. guns and some

light tanks, were sent back, and the destruction of the enemy in these positions

went forward rapidly. About 1330 the line

from the lagoon inland was straightened.

Company C was expected to land behind Company B and to advance southward in the rear of Company B's turning

movement to the west, beyond the trail.

1st Lt. Robert T. Bates, company commander, brought part of his unit ashore in

one long line on Yellow Beach 2 in the fifth

and sixth waves. The beach was already

badly congested. Four boatloads of Company C were accidently brought in west of

Yellow Beach 2, beyond the point at which

Lieutenant Klein's section of Company B

had landed. Three of the boats, a little

apart from the others, were under heavy

small arms fire for the last 150 yards; when

the men in them started to rush across the

beach, they were cut down by heavy fire

from enemy machine guns. The machine

guns were mounted on jutting points that

permitted enfilade. Mortar fire also fell

upon the attacking elements as some of the

Americans sheltered behind their boats
THE SEIZURE OF ENIWETOK ATOLL 355

threw grenades into the area beyond the

sea wall. Out of fifty-three men in the three

boats, twenty were killed, fifteen were

wounded, and only eighteen escaped unhurt in a fight that lasted over four hours.

They were saved from complete annihilation by the westward advance of Company

A along the lagoon shore.

The 1st Platoon of Company C had proceeded from the left side of Yellow Beach 2

without mishap and took up a front-line

position in one of the gaps in the Company

B line. They were under the mistaken impression that Company B was actually

ahead of them. Shortly before noon, the

platoon engaged in a stiff fire fight with a

number of Japanese entrenched in a position beyond the trail. It was joined on the

right by the 2d Platoon, Company B.

At noon, therefore, the front line of the

1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, was in the

shape of an S, extending from the lagoon

to the ocean. On the lagoon side, near the

southwestern edge of Yellow Beach 2, the

flank patrol of Company A was trying to

work its way through an uninterrupted

series of spider-web defenses. On the ocean

side, a small detachment of Company B

was digging in among the pits and trenches

of an enemy position that they, with elements of Company K, had just captured.

Between these two extremities, Company

A extended from the lagoon to the trail,

while Company C and Company B, intermingled, held a line running southerly

through brush and palm grove, from trail

to ocean. In the curving corridor crossing

the island between the two battalions,

Company K was then swinging to the

eastward from the ocean side, having detached two squads to support Company B.

A platoon of the 106th's Cannon Company, with two 75-mm. guns, was also in

Company B's rear. Such was the situation

when the Japanese launched a counterattack.

The Japanese Counterattack

The American plan of attack, to establish a line holding the enemy at the east

while the western end of the island was

swept clear for field artillery emplacements, inadvertently brought the assaulting forces inland through outposts of the

main enemy defensive system. In the western end of the island, the Japanese construction that had been noted in reconnaissance photographs was in fact part of an

elaborate system. Underground and surface positions, including concrete pillboxes,

immobilized tanks, and wire barricades,

had been prepared to resist landings on

that corner of Eniwetok Island. To meet

the American attack after it penetrated the

island farther east, the enemy abandoned

all but the most important of the positions

and sent between 300 and 400 men to deliver a counterattack. Well out of sight,

they moved east in the brush on the southern side of the road and when they came to

the American line shortly after noon,

struck it on both sides of the trail.

Detachments of the enemy hit in quick

succession and with severe effect parts of

the American line extending southward as

far as the ocean shore from a point just

north of the trail. At some points, the Japanese actually broke through before they

were cut down. In the center, their assault

was prefaced by a concentrated mortar

barrage and pressed home with extremely

heavy small arms fire. Company B's line

was temporarily broken but was re-formed

under the determined leadership of Lieutenant Klein. The machine gunners of

Companies B and D stood firm and finally

stopped the enemy's advance. From posi-
356 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

tions about thirty yards west of their farthest progress, the Japanese then sent

heavy automatic fire over the ground they

had so recently assailed. The remnants of

Company B, supported by elements of

Company K and by machine guns, eventually wore the enemy down. At the extreme left of the American line, next to the

ocean, a bitter five-minute hand-to-hand

fight with knives and grenades checked

one Japanese assault. A second charge was

stopped by a supporting squad from Company K, aided by Sgt. William Toppin, a

BAR man with Company I. By 1245 the

counterattack had spent its force. The

American line had been thinned but not

broken.

Capture of Southwestern portion of the Island

The American attack to the west was

now resumed. Company A on the right

wing made slow progress through the

enemy positions near the lagoon, but the

mingled elements of Companies C and B,

even after being reorganized and supported

by three Cannon Company guns, could

not push through the line taken up by the

enemy at the end of his counterattack. Although it steadily reduced the Japanese

positions, the attacking force was unable to

move forward.

At 1245 Colonel Ayers ordered the 3d

Battalion, 22d Marines, the reserve battalion, to land as soon as possible after 1330

to relieve the left half of the 1st Battalion

line.49 It had become apparent that one

battalion was not sufficient to clear the

western portion of the island. The 3d Battalion, 106th Infantry, had already been

ordered at 1205 to attack to the eastern

end of the island,50 so the only alternative

was to send in the Marines. The 3d Battalion, 22d Marines, commanded by Maj.

Clair W. Shisler, USMC, was ashore by

1425, passed through the 1st Battalion

about an hour later and by 1605 had established contact with Company A. The

boundary line between the Marine and

Army battalions was to run down the middle of the island.51

 As the Marine battalion

moved through the area south of the Japanese defensive positions that Lieutenant

Klein's small force had engaged for the

preceding three hours, it quickly straightened the line. Movement accelerated after

1645.52

Following the relief of the 1st Battalion

on the left side of the line, Company C took

over part of Company A's line on the right.

Company B, after completing the reduction of a stubbornly defended pillbox near

Yellow Beach 2, rested, reorganized, and

eventually moved up to support the other

two companies. About 1830 the swift movement of the marines on the left of the line

had reached the last Japanese defensive

position in the southwest corner of the

island. As darkness approached, a gap existed between the Marine and 1st Battalion

positions.

To deny to the enemy an opportunity for

his customary aggressive night tactics,

Colonel Ayers at 1850 ordered that the

attack be pressed during the night.53 Colonel Cornett then ordered Company B to

relieve Company A. During these last minutes of daylight, Company A decided to

continue its advance, which brought it

abruptly to the seashore before Company

B had arrived. In the darkness, units of the

three companies joined in an irregular

perimeter near the beach on the western

49

 RCT 106 Rpt of Opns at Eniwetok, Incl 5. 50

 RCT 106 Jnl 19 Feb 44, Msg 43. 51

 Love, Opns on Eniwetok, pp. 56-57. 52

 RCT 106 Jnl, 19 Feb 44, Msg 72. 5 3 Ibid., Msgs 78, 82.
THE SEIZURE OF ENIWETOK ATOLL 357

MARINES PREPARE TO ATTACK a Japanese defensive position. Note flame thrower,

which was frequently used to rout the defenders from their dug-in positions.

corner of the lagoon shore. The Marines'

right flank rested on the battalion boundary more than a hundred yards from the

1st Battalion's position. A gap existed

through which the enemy could readily

infiltrate. At 0910 a counterattack all

along the Marines' front was repulsed, but

from a deep shelter that had been missed,

or through the gap between battalions, one

group of about thirty Japanese succeeded

in striking the Marine battalion command

post.54

On the morning of 20 February the

action on the western end of the island

was concluded with some heavy fighting.

The 3d Battalion, 22d Marines, found one

of the main enemy defenses, manned by a

strong and determined force, at the southwestern corner of the island in its zone. A

combined force of light and medium tanks,

five guns from the Cannon Company,

106th Infantry, and a supporting rifle company from the 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, joined the Marines in destroying the

enemy during the day.55 The back of

enemy resistance had been broken before

the second night, and, except for small

parties trying to infiltrate, no attacks upon

the southern force were made during the

night on Eniwetok Island. Early on the

third morning the Marines and the tanks

re-embarked in preparation for one more

assault landing, that on Parry Island.

54

 Tac Gp 1 Unit Rpt 4, 20 Feb 44, p. 1. 55

 RCT 106 Jnl, 20 Feb 44, Msgs 101, 116, 120, 124,

135; RCT 106 Rpt of Opns at Eniwetok; Love, Opns

on Eniwetok, p. 70.
358 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

The 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, besides sending Company A to support the

Marine unit on 20 February, mopped up

its zone. Next day, after the withdrawal of

the Marines, the battalion ran a line across

the island from the pier and mopped up to

the western end. Company A, at the right,

finished first and returned to the battalion

area near the landing beach. Company B,

in the center, reached the end of the island

a little later and then went for a swim.

Company C, on the ocean side, found

twenty-two of the enemy in hiding and destroyed them in a fire fight that sent some

bullets over the heads of Company B's

swimmers. Company B came out of the

water, dressed, and rejoined the fight.

The western end of Eniwetok Island was

finally clear of Japanese. When the 3d

Battalion left on 22 February on the LSD

Ashland to be in floating reserve for the

Parry Island action, the 1st Battalion assumed responsibility for the eastern part

of Eniwetok Island as well. One more

mopping up of the whole island took place

on the 22d.56

Action of the 3d Battalion

The 3d Battalion, under Colonel

Mizony, landed on Yellow Beach 1 simultaneously with the 1st Battalion at 0917 on

19 February. Company L was on the left,

Company K on the right, Company I following in support. Beach conditions were

quite similar to those on Yellow Beach 2.

Enemy installations in the sandbank itself

had been wrecked by the preparatory fire,

but the damage to other covered defenses

along the shore failed to neutralize them.

When the assault squads of the first wave

found themselves in the same sort of strong

point as that holding up Company B on

their right, they too had to investigate all

holes. Supporting troops working over the

same ground later found some of the enemy

still there.

Company L, at the extreme left, readily

made its way beyond the trail, but there its

right wing was engaged by two pillboxes.

One platoon then went on ahead to the

ocean beach, arriving there at 1010, It

swung left to take up the eastward-facing

line, found a hole covered by a palm frond,

and a grenade was dropped. Following the

explosion, the sounds of a familiar Christian hymn came from within the hole.

Further investigation revealed an old man,

the natives' chief, with six companions,

and in another shelter nearby were twentysix others. None had been hurt by the

American fire. A sociable exchange of souvenirs and cigarettes ensued, after which

the prisoners progressed to the beach.57

Company L's line was established at the

western edge of the area designated on the

maps as a village. All the structures had

been flattened except some concrete revetments. The enemy moved into position

behind these barriers while the American

line held a stationary position for over an

hour, under a Japanese mortar barrage.

Company K's progress to the ocean side

was impeded first by the eastern edge of

the enemy strong point on which Lieutenant Hills and Private Hollowiak were

working, next by a thick tangle of underbrush beyond the trail, and finally by an

especially difficult area along the ocean

shore. A belt of bushes rising six to twelve

feet high, growing densely in a fringe of

from ten to thirty-five yards in width, paralleled that shore for most of its length. In

it, the enemy had concealed firing positions from which they inflicted so much

damage that the entire area had to be

56

 Love, Opns on Eniwetok, p. 73. 57

 Ibid., p. 77.
THE SEIZURE OF ENIWETOK ATOLL 359

combed painstakingly during the movement along the island. As Company K began to swing east, it started to work through

this barrier. At the same time, some of its

units were engaged in repelling the major

counterattack from the west.

The attack to the east, which was begun

at 1515, was undertaken by Company L

on the left and by Company I on the right.

The latter company passed through Company L's right flank to take over that half

of the line. Company K followed the advance as battalion reserve. After a fifteenminute air strike the attack began.58

 Company L was able to sweep forward more

rapidly than Company I because of the

latter's difficulties with the belt of brush

along the ocean. Contact was maintained

during the remainder of the day, and as

night fell, Colonel Mizony pulled back

Company L sufficiently to straighten the

line. For the remainder of the drive along

the island, the company on the right was

designated as the base unit. Thus, the entire line was paced by the slow advance on

the extreme right wing. Barrages from

artillery and naval guns failed to solve the

problem. Light tanks were brought forward to run up and down through the

brush; the bushes bent over as they passed

and rose back in place behind them. Sgt.

William A. Forsyth of the 2d Platoon,

Company I, was sent to investigate after

the tanks had run over one hidden Japanese position several times. He found what

appeared to be a frond-covered hole, lifted

the cover, and found two of the enemy

grinning up at him. When all fire from this

particular area had ceased, the whole platoon waded in and found the bodies of

twenty-one Japanese.

One of the light tanks engaged in the

task of reducing the enemy positions in the

heavy foliage struck a land mine late in the

afternoon while it was at the upper end of

its run, some two hundred yards ahead of

the infantry. Unable to move because of a

lost track, the vehicle's occupants remained

unresponsive to every effort to communicate with them. A small patrol managed

to reach the tank and banged on its side,

but the occupants, sure that the noise came

from Japanese, refused to unbutton. The

patrol retired. Just before sunset the vehicle's commander cautiously opened the

turret, looked around and then crawled

out to inspect the damage, leaving the turret open. As he reached the ground he was

subjected to a fusillade of fire from several

Japanese nearby and was forced to crawl,

wounded, under the tank for protection.

The enemy then came out of hiding and

dropped a series of grenades and fired rifles

into the open turret. Only two of the crew

survived this attack, one of them the man

lying underneath the vehicle. The 3d Battalion had continued to advance after dark,

following the orders issued by Colonel

Ayers. The night was dark, but frequent

illumination was furnished by mortar

flares. Its progress was slow and brought it

to the tank at 0200. The Japanese, using

the vehicle as a fortress, put up a stubborn

fight at that point. When they were finally

driven off, they left over forty bodies

behind them.

The line moved forward twenty-five

yards farther, again ran into heavy enemy

fire and, at 0430, dug in for the remainder

of the night. Naval guns continued, at intervals, to illuminate the enemy area with

star shells. When daylight came at 0700,

both Company L and Company I renewed

the attack. At 1030, after two hard fire

fights with the enemy in the brush belt,

Company I was relieved by Company K.

58

 COMINCH P-002, p. II-19.
360 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

The line had reached the island's slender

waist. No strong organized resistance was

met thereafter but the brush was beaten

continuously and slowly. Artillery and naval gunfire furnished support and drove

the enemy from a machine gun nest observed near the center of the island. At a

tank ditch that crossed the island from

shore to shore, the enemy left rather clearly

marked channels through a field of improvised land mines, and the attack was not

seriously delayed by the obstacle. Gunfire

destroyed other mines ahead of the advance.59

 Movement continued through

thick smoke from brush fires in the center

of the island, fires that detonated duds

from the naval bombardment at considerable danger to American troops. During

the second night, white phosphorus naval

shells kept the eastern end of the island

ablaze. Several casualties resulted from

indiscriminate shooting and grenading in

one of the company perimeters. Preceded

by time fire to explode mines and harass

the foe, the troops reached the tip of the

island at 1630, 21 February.

Thus, in two and a half days Eniwetok

Island was secured with a loss of 37 Americans killed and 94 wounded in action. Except for 23 prisoners taken, the total Japanese garrison of about 800 men was killed.60

The capture of the island had been much

slower than planners had anticipated. This

was in part due to the relatively small

amount of preparatory bombardment (as

compared with that placed on other islands

in the atoll), in part to the heavy underbrush that covered most of the eastern

end of the island, and in part to the cleverness with which the enemy had constructed

and concealed his underground entrenchments. However, some of the responsibility

for the delay must be laid to the extreme

caution that the troops of the 3d Battalion,

106th Infantry, displayed in their movement eastward.

Parry Island

The unexpected delay in the seizure of

Eniwetok Island and the commitment of

the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 106th Infantry in its reduction had caused a major

change in plans for the seizure of Parry

Island. Instead of a landing being made

there on the same day as at Eniwetok

Island, the initial invasion was postponed

until the latter was secured.

Plans and Preparations

The delay in attacking Parry Island

permitted better preparation than had

been possible for the assault on Eniwetok

Island. The most striking contrast was in

the volume of preliminary fire, for which

ample incentive was found in the report of

prisoners that the Japanese force there was

larger than on the other islands, and in the

evidence supplied by a captured map of

the enemy's prepared defenses.61 For three

days bombs and naval and artillery shells

pounded the target. Naval shells dropped

on the target totaled 944.4 tons, considerably more than the weight delivered on

Eniwetok Island; the weight of artillery

shells came to 245 tons, and bombs added

99 tons more.62 The 104th Field Artillery

Battalion had begun landing on Eniwetok

Island late in the afternoon of 19 February

and had completed its registration on

Parry by noon the next day.63 The 2d Sep59

 Love, Opns on Eniwetok, pp. 73-95. 60

 Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, p. 304. 61

 TG 51.11 Eniwetok Rpt, Incl A, p. 60. A copy of

the captured map is attached to this report. 62

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in POA, Feb 44,

Annex B, p. 21. 63

 RCT 106 Jnl, 19 Feb 44, Msg 49.
THE SEIZURE OF ENIWETOK ATOLL 361

PARRY ISLAND UNDER PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT

arate Pack Howitzer Battalion had landed

on Japtan Island before noon on 20 February and joined in the preparation.64

The extra time was also used to give the

landing forces of the first few waves some

rest on LST's. The 3d Battalion, 22d Marines, was withdrawn accordingly from

Eniwetok Island. Since the defense battalion had arrived at Engebi, the 1st and 2d

Battalion Landing Teams of the 22d Marines were brought from there to southern

Eniwetok in transports. To the main body

of the landing troops, the two reconnaissance units that had completed the investigation of all the small islands were

attached. The task group reserve was to

consist of the 3d Battalion, 106th Infantry,

kept in readiness afloat, and a battalion

consisting of five improvised rifle companies, each of a hundred men, drawn

from the 10th Marine Defense Battalion

shortly after its arrival on 21 February.65

The expedition was running low on

ammunition and weapons. Naval and

artillery shells were carefully apportioned.

From all the ships, available grenades and

demolition charges were gathered. To supplement them, 775 grenades and 1,500

percussion caps were flown in from Kwajalein while the attack was in progress. Other

units surrendered BAR's and rifles to equip

the 22d Marines.66

The regiment's plan of attack was completed and approved during the afternoon

of 21 February in time to be fully understood by the participants. At 0900 the following morning, the touchdown was to be

64

 Tac Gp 1 Sp Rpt, p. 9. 65

 Ibid.

66

 Ibid., p. 10.

THE SEIZURE OF ENIWETOK ATOLL 363

made on about six hundred yards of sandy

beach just north of the pier on the lagoon

side. (Map 19) From right to left, the 1st

and 2d Battalions, 22d Marines, would go

in abreast in the hard-worked LVT's and

landing craft, and land between two areas

developed as strong points by the defenders. The 3d Battalion would be in

regimental reserve. The amphibian tanks

of the 708th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

would, for the third time at Eniwetok

Atoll, slightly precede the waves of assault

troops on the flanks and in the center, to

deliver cross fires against enemy resistance

at the beach. Medium tanks were to land

in the third wave in LCM's. After seizing

the beachhead, tanks and infantry were to

press forward to the ocean side of the

island, which at this point was about five

hundred yards eastward from the landing

beaches. An artillery barrage across the

island south of the pier would block reinforcement from the southern part of the

island, while the two portions of the attacking force prepared for the next phase of the

operation.67 The 2d Battalion, 22d Marines, at the left, was to clear the Japanese

from the northern lobe of the island while

the 1st Battalion would attack to the right

and capture the southern portion.

The Seizure of Parry

The preliminary naval and air bombardment of Parry Island opened at dawn

on 22 February. The battleships Tennessee

and Pennsylvania took positions only 1,500

yards north of the landing area and not

only mauled it with their big guns but also

covered it with their 40-mm. automatic

weapons batteries. From the other side of

the boat lanes, the heavy cruisers Indianapolis and Louisville and the destroyer Hailey

also fired. Smoke and dust blew out over

the lagoon without masking the target for

the battleships but with serious consequences for the other three warships and

for the landing craft that started ashore at

0845. Three of the LCI(G)'s that approached through the haze with the first

wave to fire rockets were hit by 5-inch

shells from Hailey, killing thirteen and

wounding forty-seven.68 Some LVT's

landed outside the designated beaches,

thus widening the front and making necessary the suspension of artillery fire in their

vicinity. Other tractors crisscrossed or fell

behind, so that the landing teams had

difficulty in reorganizing on the beaches.

While the tractors made their fifteenminute run from the line of departure, two

formations of planes bombed Parry in the

last of 219 sorties made during the six days

of action at Eniwetok Atoll. This time they

only bombed the island, omitting strafing

runs because of the type of defense trench

systems on Parry Island.69

The first troops struck Green Beaches 2

and 3 at 0900, with a wave of tractors and

one of LCM's carrying medium tanks directly behind them. Heavy machine gun

and mortar fire greeted the marines at the

water's edge. As they tried to form an

assault line, enfilading machine gun fire

also struck them from a concealed position

on the pier at the right. The machine guns

were silenced by grenades and by shells

from the amphibian tanks. Then the assault passed inland. Some of the enemy in

trenches and foxholes in the dune line on

the beach, men who had survived the

bombardment, were overcome in hand-tohand fighting. Most of the Japanese had

either taken refuge in covered defense sys67

 TG 51.11 Eniwetok Rpt, Incl A, pp. 9, 10. 68

 Ibid., pp. 10, 72, 92. 69

 Ibid., p. 10; CINCPAC-CINCPOA Opns in

POA, Feb 44, Annex B, p. 20.
364 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

terns farther inland or had been beyond

the range of the main preparatory fire in

positions along the ocean shore.70

Prepared defenses on Parry were much

like those on Eniwetok Island.71 Foxholes,

covered shelters, and gun emplacements,

sometimes open but often covered, were

organized into strong points fronting and

flanking the most favorable landing

beaches. They extended in depth as much

as the size of the island would permit.

Spider-web systems provided much the

same difficulty as on Eniwetok Island. A

large shelter would be excavated, then

lined and roofed with heavy coconut logs.

Corrugated iron sheets, sand, and palm

fronds covered it. In a circle around this

shelter, covered foxholes of varying depth

were placed from ten to fifteen feet apart.

Radial trenches and tunnels connected

each of these holes with the central position, while peripheral tunnels connected

them with each other. Often oil drums

with the two ends removed, when placed

end to end and covered with earth, served

as tunnel passages. Foxholes were also dug

at the bases of coconut palms, hidden by

the roots. In addition to these covered positions, on Parry Island many open trenches

had been prepared along the shore.

Marines found the best method of securing areas containing such defense systems

to consist of three phases. Infantry-tank

teams first pushed rapidly ahead to assigned objectives. Demolitions and flame

thrower parties followed and cleared out

each hole, trench, and shelter. Small teams

of three or four men worked together in

covering such operations, then mopped up

the remaining Japanese in the position.

Among the demolitions teams, the favorite

weapon was a hand grenade taped to a

block of explosive.

About 1000, shells from Japanese 77-

mm. field pieces began to strike from the

right flank among the leading units of the

1st Battalion, 22d Marines. Neither an air

strike nor naval gunfire could be directed

on the source without danger to friendly

troops and tanks, but the urgency of the

request for such support finally prevailed.

Five salvos from 5-inch naval guns, although damaging to our troops and tanks,

did smash the enemy's guns and break his

resistance to the advance. Before 1010 the

front line had pushed forward about three

hundred yards inland from the beach. Additional forces were being committed or

made ready. The 3d Battalion, 22d Marines, started ashore at 1001 to take position on the right half of what was to be the

southward-moving line of attack. From

Eniwetok Island, the 3d Battalion, 106th

Infantry, was preparing to move to Parry

as reserve. The two reconnaissance companies joined the attack early in the afternoon, but the 106th Battalion was to remain afloat.72

At 1330 the 2d Battalion, 22d Marines,

had reached the northern end of Parry

and was mopping up while the other two

battalions were in line abreast due east of

the pier and about to begin their main attack to the south. A fifteen-minute barrage

by field artillery from the adjacent islands

and by naval guns on the enemy's flanks

had just been concluded. The southern

force extended across the island, with the

medium tanks about a hundred yards in

front of them.73 Ahead of the tanks, the destroyer Hailey fired on call until it was hitting only the most southern target areas.

As the attack jumped off, the troops

pressed through thick underbrush and

70

 Tac Gp 1 Sp Rpt, p. 11. 71

 TG 51.11 Eniwetok Rpt, Incl A, p. 62. 72

 Tac Gp 1 Sp Rpt, p. 11. 73

 Ibid., pp. 11, 12.
THE SEIZURE OF ENIWETOK ATOLL 365

continued over an area in which land

mines had been strewn promiscuously.

Overrunning a series of trench and foxhole

defenses, they gathered speed until, at

1930, resistance ceased and the end of the

island was in sight. At that time the island

was reported secured. The two battalions

dug in for the night, prepared to mop up

in the morning.

To forestall enemy infiltration or counterattacks, both ends of the island were illuminated by star shell and searchlight

from a cruiser and three destroyers. Enemy

movement was quickly detected and suppressed. In a long series of fruitless attempts to strike back, small groups of Japanese invited destruction.

Tanks and infantry scoured Parry Island

on 23 February. The 3d Battalion, 106th

Infantry, landed that morning to assume

its duties as a garrison force. With all possible speed, other Army and Marine units

withdrew from the island and prepared to

depart from the atoll.74

Total American casualties on Eniwetok

came to 1,096, with 262 killed, 757

wounded, and 77 missing in action. Sixtysix Japanese and Korean prisoners of war

were taken; the rest of the enemy garrison

was destroyed.75 Eniwetok Atoll was completely under American control.

74

 TG 51.11 Eniwetok Rpt, Incl A, pp. 72, 73. 75

 Ibid., Incl F.
CHAPTER XX

Consolidating the Victory

With the fighting on Eniwetok Atoll

ended, U.S. forces in the Central Pacific

were now free to consolidate the gains

achieved by the capture of the three key

positions in the Marshalls group. Three

tasks remained before them. First, a host

of undefended and lightly defended atolls

and islands in the area had to be occupied.

Secondly, air and naval bases had to be

constructed to support the continued drive

across the Central Pacific. Finally, the bypassed strongholds of Wotje, Mille, Jaluit,

Maloelap, and Truk had to be kept under

constant aerial bombardment to assure

their neutralization.

Mop-up in the Marshalls

The job of occupying the various atolls

and islands that the Japanese had chosen

not to fortify fell largely to the 22d Marine

Regimental Combat Team, with a slight

assist from the 111th Infantry Regiment.1

First to be occupied were the atolls of

Wotho, Ujae, and Lae, lying immediately

to the westward of Kwajalein. A detachment of about 350 marines from the 1st

Battalion, 22d Marines, accompanied by

eight amphibian tractors, all loaded

aboard an LST, landed unopposed on

Wotho Atoll on 8 March and subsequently encountered twelve Japanese, the

crew of a plane that had recently crashlanded on the reef. All twelve committed

suicide. Two days later the same force

landed without opposition on Ujae, where

it discovered six enemy operators of a

weather station that had previously been

bombed out by American planes. Five of

the Japanese committed suicide; the sixth

was taken prisoner. On 13 March a landing was made on Lae Atoll. No Japanese

were on the island and the natives reported that none had ever been there. The

same proved to be true of Lib Island southwest of Lae.

Next to fall under American control

were a number of atolls lying southeast of

Kwajalein. The job of occupying these was

assigned to two groups of about 325 troops

each from the 3d Battalion, 22d Marines,

to which were attached seven amphibian

tractors, all loaded on an LST. Both groups

of this force proceeded in company to

Ailinglapalap Atoll for the first phase of

their operation. Before any landing in

force was attempted, a native was picked

up who revealed that the crews of two

Japanese picket boats, numbering about

forty men and equipped with four machine

guns and numerous rifles, were on the

main island of the atoll. On the night of

20 March and the following morning, the

1

 This account of the occupation of the minor atolls

and islands in the Marshalls is derived from: 22d Marines Reinforced, Rpt of Operations into the Lesser

Marshalls, 6 Apr 44; TU 57.10.9 Rpt, Reconnaissance of Ailinglapalap, Kili, Ebon, and Namorik

Atolls, 30 Mar 44; Co I, 111th Inf Regt, Rpt on Opns,

Occupation of Ujelang, 27 Apr 44, in 111th Inf Regt

Unit History, 1 Jan-31 Dec 44.
CONSOLIDATING THE VICTORY 367

entire force of marines, numbering about

650, was landed without opposition. The

Japanese were discovered drawn up in a

prepared position, which was successfully

assaulted. Thirty-seven of the enemy were

killed, two taken prisoners and two or three

escaped. The marines suffered three

wounded. The escaped enemy were pursued around the island for a while, but the

hunt was finally abandoned as futile and

the marines returned to their LST to proceed to the next objective. One group went

on to Namu Atoll, where it landed without

opposition on 24 March. There, were found

seven Japanese including one woman and

four children, all of whom voluntarily surrendered. The second group proceeded to

Namorik Atoll and landed on 26 March.

Natives reported one unarmed Japanese

on the atoll but after extensive patrolling

failed to locate him, the search was finally

abandoned as a waste of time.

To a detachment from the 2d Battalion,

22d Marines, fell the task of securing the

group of atolls and islands lying northeast

of Kwajalein. Aerial reconnaissance and

the interrogation of natives indicated that

Ailinginae and Rongerik Atolls were uninhabited, so the marines were ordered not

to investigate them unless it should be subsequently discovered that Japanese had

fled to these places after other atolls in the

northern group had been captured. The

first of these to be visited was Bikini, later

to become famed as the site of postwar

U.S. experiments with the atomic bomb.

It was invaded on 28 March, and the five

Japanese located on the atoll committed

suicide. Three days later unopposed landings were made on Rongelap Atoll, where

eleven Japanese were reported but none

discovered. The same day a detachment

from the 3d Battalion, 22d Marines, landed

on Ailuk Atoll and discovered no enemy

there. Within a few days the same force

had invested the Mejit Islands and Likiep

and Utirik Atolls, netting a small bag of

enemy stragglers. Finally, late in April,

Company I of the lllth Infantry Regiment completed the occupation of the

lesser Marshalls by capturing Ujelang

Atoll, which lies about 140 nautical miles

southwest of Eniwetok. The landing was

made without opposition on 22 April and

eighteen Japanese were flushed out and

killed. Thus ended the American occupation of the Marshall Islands with the exception of Wotje, Mille, Jaluit, and Maloelap, which were left to "wither on the vine"

subject to constant harassment by American planes and ships.

Building the Marshalls Bases

Immediately after Majuro Atoll was

occupied, naval Seabees went ashore on

Dalap Island to commence construction of

an airstrip.2 When this was completed in

March, it measured 4,800 by 445 feet and

was thereafter constantly in use for raids

against Mille, Wotje, Maloelap, and

Jaluit. A naval base was established on the

atoll to support two Marine dive bomber

squadrons, half of a Marine patrol squadron, and temporary staging for one Army

fighter group flying out of Makin against

the bypassed Marshalls. In addition, Majuro provided a fleet anchorage (without

shore-based facilities), medical facilities for

2

 This account is derived from: Building the Navy's

Bases in World War II, History of the Bureau of

Yards and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps, 1940-

1946. Vol. II, prepared under the general supervision of the Director of Naval History, Washington,

1947. filed in Naval Records and History Division;

U.S. Naval Administration in World War II,

CINCPAC, Marshalls-Gilberts Area, Part IV, first

draft prepared under general supervision of Director

of Naval History, filed in Naval Records and History

Division.
368 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

the fleet, and a loran transmitting station.

Repair ships and submarine and destroyer

tenders, together with tankers and supply

ships, rode at anchor in the lagoon to supply the needs of whatever elements of the

fleet passed through. Majuro, along with

Eniwetok and Kwajalein, was to serve as a

primary staging base for the American

forces when they attacked the Marianas

from June through August of 1944.

On Roi-Namur the 121st Naval Construction Battalion went ashore on 5 February, only three days after the island was

declared secured. A day later it was joined

by the 109th Naval Construction Battalion, and Seabees set to work immediately

repairing and enlarging the Japanese airstrip on Roi. Progress was temporarily

interrupted on 13 February when a flight

of enemy bombers launched a heavy attack

against Roi, setting fire to a bomb dump.

Altogether the Seabees suffered 157 personnel casualties, and the 109th Battalion

lost 75 percent of its material and 35 percent of its equipment. Nevertheless work

continued, and on 15 May the field on Roi

was commissioned, with a hundred planes

based there. Long before the final commissioning of the field, it was in daily use as a

base for strikes against Wotje, Jaluit, and

Kusaie, and subsequently it became one of

the primary bases for raids against Truk.

In March the 74th and 107th Naval

Construction Battalions went ashore on

Kwajalein Island, where they rebuilt the

Japanese runway into a 6,300-foot coralsurfaced strip with two 80-foot taxiways

and 102 hard stands for heavy bombers.

In addition, water-front facilities were developed to provide for minor fleet repairs,

the Japanese pier reaching into the lagoon

was restored, a 250-ton pontoon drydock

was assembled, and a 2,000-ton floating

dock was provided. On nearby Ebeye other

Seabees developed a seaplane base, which

was completed by April. Kwajalein Island

was to become the primary base for Army

bombers flying against Truk. On Eniwetok

Atoll Seabees began repairs and construction work late in February. By 5 March the

airstrip on Engebi was able to accommodate three Army medium bombers

(B-25's), which went into action against

enemy shipping at Kusaie five days later.

By 20 March a 6,000-foot airstrip had been

completed on Eniwetok Island as well.

Parry Island was used as a small-boat repair base and a seaplane base, the ramp

and facilities for servicing seaplanes being

ready for use early in May.

Eniwetok Atoll thereafter served as an

advanced fleet anchorage without shorebased facilities, as well as an air base capable of handling two heavy seaplane patrol

squadrons, two fighter squadrons, one half

of a night fighter squadron, one scout

bomber squadron, two heavy bomber

squadrons, and one photographic squadron. From May through October 1944,

Army squadrons staging through Eniwetok

and Navy and Marine squadrons based

there flew continuous sorties against Truk

and Ponape. In addition, Navy bombers

staging through Eniwetok delivered lowlevel bombing and strafing attacks against

Wake, and daily reconnaissance of Wake

was conducted by seaplanes based on

Parry.

Neutralizing the Bypassed Atolls

From February 1944 until the close of

the war, that area of the middle Pacific

containing the Gilberts, Marshalls, and

eastern Carolines became virtually an

American lake through which ships and

troops passed freely with little danger of

enemy interception. The reason, of course,
CONSOLIDATING THE VICTORY 369

was that the capture of key bases in the

Marshalls and the establishment of airfields thereon made it possible for the superior American air arm to keep the atolls

still remaining in Japanese hands under

constant surveillance and bombardment.

By the time of the capture of Kwajalein,

Japanese aircraft in the eastern Marshalls

(Mille, Wotje, Jaluit, and Maloelap) had

been either completely destroyed by Army

and Navy aircraft or evacuated.3

Thereafter, the main effort of American

aircraft was to prevent these bases from

being reinforced and rehabilitated and to

bomb out and starve out the enemy abandoned there. After mid-March, when the

base at Majuro was completed, Army medium bombers flew regular flights out of

Tarawa and Makin, bombed two of the

bypassed islands, landed at Majuro for

rearming and refueling, and then bombed

the other two targets on the way home. At

the same time ten fighter squadrons and

two bomber squadrons of the 4th Marine

Air Base Defense Wing at Kwajalein flew

a steady series of sorties against the same

islands. After June 1944, Marine flyers

assumed sole responsibility for these

targets.4

In March two heavy bomber groups of

the Seventh Army Air Force moved onto

Kwajalein for the primary purpose of conducting bombing raids against Truk.5

 In

conjunction with planes of the Thirteenth

Army Air Force based in the South Pacific,

bombers of the Seventh, flying out of

Kwajalein and staging through Eniwetok,

kept Truk effectively neutralized from

April 1944 until the end of the war.6

3

 USSBS, The American Campaign Against Wotje,

Maloelap, Mille and Jaluit, p. 35. 4

 Robert Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation in

World War II (Washington: Combat Forces Press,

1952), Ch. VII. Mr. Sherrod has kindly allowed the

authors to read this book in galley proof. 5

 Craven and Cate, AAF IV, p. 672. 6

 Ibid., pp. 683-86; USSBS, The Reduction of Truk.
CHAPTER XXI

Tactical and Strategic

Consequences of the Marshalls

Operation

Writing soon after the capture of the

Marshalls, General Holland Smith reported, "Recommendations made and

acted upon . . . as a result of the Gilberts

offensive proved sound. In the attack of

coral atolls, very few recommendations can

be made to improve upon the basic techniques previously recommended and utilized in the Marshalls . . ."

 1 As a matter

of fact, after the capture of Eniwetok it was

found unnecessary to seize any more welldefended atolls in the Pacific. Thereafter,

all major landing operations were conducted against larger island masses ranging

in size from such small volcanic islands as

Iwo Jima and Ie Shima to such comparatively large land masses as Luzon and New

Guinea.

In the latter phases of the Pacific war,

then, many new problems presented themselves on which the experience in either the

Gilberts or the Marshalls had no particular bearing. Large bodies of troops of corps

and army size had to be maneuvered over

relatively vast areas of land. Campaigns

were to be measured in months, not days.

The burden of supply, transportation, and

medical care and evacuation were correspondingly increased. Tactical aviation

assumed a new role. On Luzon and again

at Okinawa, fighter and bomber planes

were to be used extensively in close support

of ground troops that had penetrated far

inland from their original beachheads.

Fleet tactics, too, underwent considerable

revision. Continuous attrition of Japanese

naval and air strength plus the mighty

build-up of American naval power freed

the U.S. Fleet from the cautious hit-andrun tactics it had been compelled to resort

to as late as February 1944. For the most

part thereafter, the fleets that struck succeeding objectives in conjunction with

landing forces came prepared to stay at

least until all serious ground resistance had

been eliminated. In the Marianas, the

Palaus, the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and,

finally, Okinawa, the U.S. Fleet stayed

close offshore of the land targets for prolonged periods of time, ready to render

constant support to ground troops as they

pressed forward toward their objectives.

And this in spite of the growing menace of

the Japanese Kamikaze (suicide) Corps,

which mounted steadily from October 1944

to May 1945.

Yet notwithstanding these changes the 1

 V Phib Corps FLINTLOCK Rpt.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE MARSHALLS OPERATION 371

progress of the war in the Pacific was to

bring about, one aspect of most of the subsequent campaigns remained basically unchanged—the technique of the amphibious

landing. Insofar as this phase of Pacific

warfare was concerned, Holland Smith's

generalization that "very few recommendations can be made to improve upon the

basic techniques previously recommended

and utilized in the Marshalls" proved

quite valid. The techniques that had been

perfected in the capture of tiny atolls in the

Central Pacific proved applicable, and

were in fact applied, with only minor variations in most of the subsequent island

landings as U.S. and Allied forces worked

their way closer and closer to the heart of

the Japanese Empire.

In the Marshalls operations some important innovations were made in the

techniques and equipment of American

amphibious assault procedure. The amphibious headquarters ship, which had

already seen action in the Mediterranean

theater, was first introduced into the Pacific at Kwajalein, where it conclusively

demonstrated its value. For the first time

there also, infantry landing craft were

equipped with both 40-mm. guns and

rockets and were effectively employed to

lay down a last-minute barrage just before

the troops landed. Underwater demolition

teams demonstrated their ability to swim

close to shore into the very teeth of the

enemy under the protective cover of naval

fire. The DUKW saw its first action on any

large scale at Kwajalein and proved its

immense value as a cargo and artillery carrier. At Eniwetok naval star shells were for

the first time extensively employed to illuminate areas behind friendly lines and

thereby impose a serious check on the

standard Japanese tactic of night infiltration.

With the conclusion of the Marshalls

operation, the standard pattern of American amphibious landings was set and was

thereafter followed with a high degree of

consistency by U.S. forces whenever they

attacked an enemy beachhead in the Pacific. A few new items of equipment and a

few new techniques were to be evolved that

would improve still further on this pattern,

but they introduced no major changes.

After February 1944, standard procedure

called for as heavy and as prolonged preliminary naval and aerial bombardment of

the beachhead as conditions permitted.

Where feasible, this was supplemented by

the emplacement of land-based field artillery on islands near the main landing

beaches before the principal landings were

made. Underwater demolition teams

searched the shore line and the shallow

water offshore for obstacles and mines and

detonated them where necessary. Just before the landings, a last-minute preparatory fire was delivered by shallow-draft

vessels of various types firing a variety of

missiles from 20-mm. shells up through

4.5-inch rockets. The assault troops, boated

insofar as possible in amphibian tractors,

landed in waves and pressed the attack

forward, followed by waves of tanks, artillery, and supplies and equipment, which

were carried in amphibian tractors, amphibian trucks, and landing craft and

ships of all sorts and sizes. Naval and landbased aircraft kept the enemy under continuous pressure and naval ships, where

possible, supplied close and deep support

to the troops as they advanced forward.

Some of these elements of force were

omitted in subsequent island landings in

the Pacific, especially in the various amphibious operations on the New Guinea

coast, where enemy opposition was relatively light and such a preponderant dis-
372 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

play of power was unnecessary. But most

of the techniques were employed in the

major landings and all of them were used

with brilliant success at Tinian and Okinawa. By the close of the Marshalls campaign, the basic pattern for the Pacific

style of amphibious assault was set and any

subsequent deviations therefrom were

minor.2

Strategically speaking, the easy capture

of main bases in the Marshalls, coupled

with the successful raid on Truk, was of utmost significance in its influence on the

course of the future conduct of the war in

the Pacific. First, the combined operations

against the Marshalls and Truk served to

confirm and reinforce the opinions already

held by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other

strategic planners that the Central Pacific

drive offered the most profitable route by

which Allied forces could deliver a death

blow against the Japanese Empire. Second,

the strike against Truk revealed that base

to be far weaker than had originally been

supposed by most American planners and

led to the final decision to bypass it altogether. Finally, the economy of force with

which the Marshalls had been taken and

the removal of Truk from the list of prospective targets made available to Admiral

Nimitz a large body of trained troops that

could now be employed to accelerate the

Central Pacific drive to a far greater degree than had originally been planned.

In the spring of 1943, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff had decided that the main effort in

the war against Japan should be made

along the Central Pacific axis, with a simultaneous but subsidiary effort to be launched

through the South and Southwest Pacific.

This decision had been reached in spite of

the strong recommendations by General

MacArthur that his own theater be given

paramount consideration in Pacific planning.3

 The quick victories in the Marshalls

confirmed the original judgment of the

Joint Chiefs and strengthened their resolution to continue the main pressure along

the Central Pacific axis. Two questions,

however, called for immediate solution.

The first was whether to launch the next

attack in Admiral Nimitz's theater against

the Marianas. The second was whether or

not to bypass Truk, keeping it neutralized

from the newly acquired bases in the Marshalls and letting it "wither on the vine."

The feasibility of an attack against the

Marianas had long been discussed and debated among members of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, their subordinate committees, and

theater staffs in the Southwest and Central

Pacific. Admiral King had firmly declared

that the capture of the Marianas was the

"key to success" in the Pacific war,4 and he

was supported in that opinion by the Army

Air Forces representative on the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Arnold,

who wanted the Marianas as bases for B-29

raids against the Japanese homeland.5

In the meetings of the Combined Chiefs

2

 For more details on Pacific amphibious operations after February 1944 see: Isely and Crowl, The

U.S. Marines and Amphibious War; Appleman et al.,

Okinawa; M. Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: Return to the Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1954); and the following forthcoming volumes in the Pacific series of UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, to be published by the Office of the Chief of Military History,

Department of the Army: Robert Ross Smith, The Approach to the Philippines; John Miller, jr., CARTWHEEL,

The Reduction of Rabaul; Philip A. Crowl, Campaign

in the Marianas; Robert Ross Smith and M. Hamlin

Cannon, Triumph in the Philippines. 3

 See above, Ch. I. 4

 Min, 92d mtg CCS, 21 May 43, TRIDENT Conference, pp. 429-37. For a more detailed discussion of

the planning for the Marianas see Philip A. Crowl,

Campaign in the Marianas. 5

 Min, 109th mtg JPS, 27 Oct 43; Min, 123d and

124th mtgs JCS, 15 and 17 Nov 43; Henry H. Arnold,

Global Mission (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949),

pp. 476-80.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE MARSHALLS OPERATION 373

of Staff held in Cairo in November and

December 1943, the King-Arnold argument was accepted by the Allied strategic

planners. The advance westward through

the Central Pacific, through the mandated

islands to the Palaus, and north to the

Marianas was approved. Again, it was

stated that Central Pacific operations were

to have priority over those of the Southwest Pacific.6

On the basis of the Combined Chiefs'

decision, Admiral Nimitz had issued a

tentative plan of operations on 13 January

1944, designated GRANITE. Initial landings

in the Marshalls were to be undertaken on

31 January. Late in March a carrier strike

against Truk was to be executed, and in

May amphibious landings were to be made

in the western Marshalls. Landings on

Truk and Mortlock in the Carolines would

be initiated on 1 August. If Truk were bypassed, the Palaus would be invaded instead on approximately the same date.

Amphibious operations against the Marianas were to begin about 1 November.7

The early successes in the Marshalls

operation and the successful carrier raid

against Truk of 17-18 February enabled

Admiral Nimitz to step up this program

considerably. He became more convinced

than ever of the feasibility of bypassing

Truk and so recommended to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. He advocated instead an

invasion of the Marianas on 15 June, to be

followed by the seizure of Ulithi Atoll,

about 360 miles southwest of Guam; the

capture of Yap Island, a Japanese air base

100 miles southwest of Ulithi; and the

capture or neutralization of the Palaus,

about 300 miles still farther to the southwest. Woleai, in the Carolines, 360 miles

due south of Guam, should also be captured, he recommended, to assure the neutralization of Truk and to protect the lines

of communication from the Marianas to

Yap and Ulithi.8

With these and other recommendations

in hand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued on

12 March a new operational directive for

action in the Pacific during 1944. General

MacArthur was ordered to cancel the proposed Kavieng operation and complete the

neutralization of Rabaul with the minimum of forces. Following the development

of Manus Island in the Admiralties as an

air and fleet base, he was to occupy Hollandia on or about 15 April and conduct

operations along the New Guinea coast

preparatory to an invasion of the Palaus

and Mindanao, southernmost of the Philippines. Admiral Nimitz was ordered to

cancel his plans for seizing Truk and expedite the neutralization of Truk and other

islands in that immediate area. Nimitz was

also to conduct carrier strikes against the

Marianas, the Palaus, the Carolines, and

other profitable targets. The Marianas

were to be invaded on 15 June 1944, after

which Central Pacific forces were to move

to the Palaus.9

Thus, with the successful conclusion of

the campaign in the Marshalls, it became

possible to launch the drive against the

Marianas at a far earlier date than had

originally been anticipated. Truk was to

6

 CGS 417, 2 Dec 43, title: Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan; CGS 397 (Revised), 3 Dec 43, title: Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944; CCS

426/1, 6 Dec 43, title: Rpt to the President and Prime

Minister. All foregoing documents located in bound

volume of SEXTANT papers, copy in G-3 files. 7

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Campaign Plan GRANITE,

13 Jan 44, Naval History Div. 8

 JCS Memo for Information 200, 7 Mar 44, sub:

Sequence and Timing of Operations, Central Pacific

Campaign, a Rpt by CINCPOA, ABC 384 Pacific

(1-17-43) Sec. 3a; Supplementary Min, 140th mtg

JCS, 7 Mar 44. 9

 JCS 713/4, 12 Mar 44, title: Future Operations in

the Pacific.
374 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

be bypassed and kept neutralized by aircraft operating chiefly out of the newly

seized Marshalls bases. These bases were

also to be put to good use in staging fleet

elements that would later be used not only

against the Marianas but also against the

Palaus and the Philippines themselves.

Most important, the early and quick capture of the Marshalls released a volume of

manpower for early employment against

the Marianas. Originally, Admiral Nimitz

had allocated the task of seizing Eniwetok

to the 2d Marine Division and two regimental combat teams of the 27th Infantry

Division. When it was found possible to

employ the reserve force initially assigned

to Kwajalein for this task, the 2d Marine

Division and the two regimental combat

teams of the 27th Division were immediately set upon the task of training for the

forthcoming Marianas campaign. The decision to bypass Truk freed still more

ground forces for future operations. In

January 1944, Nimitz had earmarked

three Marine divisions, two Army divisions, and an independent Marine regiment for the capture of Truk and adjacent

atolls.10 Three of these divisions (the 2d

and 4th Marine Division and the 27th Infantry Division) were now free to be trained

for employment in the invasion of Saipan.

Two others, the 3d Marine Division and

the 77th Infantry Division, as well as the

22d Marine Regiment, were to be used

against Guam.

With the quick termination of the capture of the main Japanese bases in the

Marshall Islands, the drive of U.S. forces

through the Central Pacific against Japan

was greatly speeded up. Any previous

doubt as to where would lie the "main

effort" against the enemy was permanently

dispelled.

"Thus," to quote Admiral Nimitz again,

"we get on with the war."

 11

10

 CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Outline Plan for Operations in Pacific Ocean Areas, 13 Jan 44. 11

 Ibid.
Concordance of Code and

Native Names for Islands in

Kwajalein Atoll

Code Native

Abraham Ennugarret

Albert Ennumennet

Alien Ennubirr

Arlington Gagan

August Omelek

Bascome Meek

Bennett Bigej

Berlin North Gugegwe

Beverly South Gugegwe

Blakenship Loi

Burlesque Roi

Burton Ebeye

Camouflage Namur

Carlos Ennylabegan

Carlson Enubuj

Carter Gea

Cecil Ninni

Chauncey Gehh

Clement Mann

Clifford Legan

Clifton Eller

Cohen Ennugenliggelap

Homer Boggerik

Ivan Mellu

Jacob Ennuebing

Porcelain Kwajalein
Bibliographical Note

This volume is based primarily on the

official records of the U.S. armed services

and of the planners of strategy, both

American and Allied. Supplementing

these are the interviews conducted by official Army historians in the field while the

fighting was going on and postwar interviews and correspondence of the authors

with the chief participants. Special preliminary studies, officially sponsored by

the various armed services or by their respective service schools, have been consulted and full use has been made of the

pertinent published works. Finally, the

authors of this volume have been especially

fortunate in having access to the wealth of

Japanese records available in this country

both in their original form and in translation.

Official Records

Strategic Planning

Materials concerning strategic planning

on the highest Allied and U.S. levels are to

be found in the records of the Combined

Chiefs of Staff (Allied) and the U.S. Joint

Chiefs of Staff and its subordinate committees. Copies of these records were kept for

the Army by the Strategy Policy Group of

the Operations Division and are identified

by the initials ABC. They may be obtained

through the G-3 Division of the General

Staff. Other papers concerning the planning for the Gilberts and Marshalls operations are to be found in the OPD central

files currently located in the Departmental

Records Branch, Adjutant General's Office (DRB AGO), in Alexandria, Virginia.

U.S. Army

The official U.S. Army records constitute the backbone of the study. They fall

into three general categories—operation

plans (or field orders), after action reports,

and unit journals. The after action reports

used include those of the highest theater

command, Headquarters, U.S. Army

Forces in the Central Pacific Area

(USAFICPA), divisions, regiments, battalions, and attached units. The journals

consulted were those on the level of division, regiment, and battalion. Generally

speaking, the daily journal has been found

to be the most reliable and most complete

of all official records. The after action reports are usually little more than a recapitulation of the main events of the day as

recorded in the journals, but they do furnish convenient guides to an understanding of the course of the battle. Usually, but

not always, the lower the echelon, the

more reliable and more detailed is the

after action report. Most of these records

are in the custody of DRB AGO, although

many administration files and some unit

journals are in the Kansas City Records

Center, AGO.

U.S. Navy

For the Navy, the same types of records

have been used except that it has not been

felt necessary to consult ships' logs, which
378 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

are the naval equivalent of the unit journal. The naval action reports

 1

 covered include those of the Commander in Chief

U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations

(Ernest J. King, Official Report, Covering

Combat Operations Up to March 1, 1944,

Washington, 1944); Commander in Chief

U.S. Pacific Fleet and U.S. Pacific Ocean

Areas (CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas [monthly

from September 1943 through February

1944]); various subordinate Pacific Fleet

task forces, and individual ships. All World

War II U.S. Navy records are located in

the Classified Operational Records

Branch, Naval History Division, and

copies of most of those used in this volume

can be found in DRB AGO or in the

Records and Research Section, Historical

Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U.S. Marine

Corps.

U.S. Marine Corps

The action reports and daily journals of

the Marine Corps units have been covered

in the same manner as those of the Army.

The issuing authorities range from V Amphibious Corps to battalion. These records

are also located in the Records and Research Section, Historical Branch, G-3,

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

Interviews, Field Histories, and Letters

Each of the Army operations described

here was covered by a field historian and a

team of specialists sent by Headquarters,

U.S. Army Forces in the Central Pacific

Area, to accompany the troops during the

actual fighting. For Makin and southern

Kwajalein the historian was Lt. Col. S. L.

A. Marshall; for Eniwetok it was Capt.

Edmund G. Love, coauthor of this volume.

The original notes of their interviews and

firsthand observations are filed in the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (OCMH). It was at

Makin and Kwajalein that Colonel Marshall first developed the techniques of combat interviewing for which he became

famous during and after World War II,

and which, with variations, have been

adopted by the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps.

Since the beginning of the preparation

of this volume the authors have consulted,

either by personal interview or through

correspondence, more than a score of officers who participated in the operations.

Their names are listed here:

 2

Maj. Gen. Archibald V. Arnold, USA,

Col. Russell G. Ayers, USA, Lt. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin, USA, Admiral

Richard L. Conolly, USN, Maj. Gen.

Charles H. Corlett, USA (Ret.), Col. Winslow Cornett, USA (Ret.), Lt. Col. Victor

Croizat, USMC, Col. William A. Eareckson, USAF, Col. Charles B. Ferris, USA,

Col. Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC, Lt.

Gen. Franklin A. Hart, USMC, Vice

Adm. Harry W. Hill, USN, Col. Gerard

W. Kelley, USA, Col. S. L. A. Marshall,

USAR, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz,

USN, Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr.,

USA (Ret.), General Harry Schmidt,

USMC (Ret.), Lt. Gen. Julian C. Smith,

USMC (Ret.), Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith,

USA (Ret.), Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN (Ret.), Admiral Richmond

1

 Army and Navy nomenclature differs here. The

same report is called "after action report" by the

Army and "action report" by the Navy. The U.S.

Marine Corps for the most part uses the Navy term.

Other variations that occasionally appear are "special

action report," "operations report," and "participation report." 2

 Ranks are those held as of date of letter or interview.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 379

Kelley Turner, USN (Ret.), Lt. Gen.

Thomas E. Watson, USMC (Ret.).

The letters and reports of interviews of

the above are filed in OCMH. Another

important collection of letters from leading figures in the Pacific campaigns of

World War II is located in the Princeton

University Library with the manuscript

copies of The U.S. Marines and Amphibious

War by Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl

(Princeton: Princeton University Press,

1951).

Special Studies

Among other sources used were several

special studies prepared after the operations, either under the official auspices of

particular commands or by individuals attending service schools or attached to the

historical sections of the various services.

In the former category are: History of

United States Army Forces Middle Pacific

and Predecessor Commands During World

War II, 7 December 1941-2 September

1942, 60 vols., MS in OCMH; Office of

Naval Intelligence (ONI), The Assault on

Kwajalein and Majuro, 2 vols. (Washington, 1945); Commander in Chief U.S.

Fleet (COMINCH), Publication P-002,

Amphibious Operations in the Marshall

Islands, January-February, 1944, 20 May

1944; Office of the Secretary of Defense,

Weapons Evaluation Group, Staff Study

No. 4, Operational Experience of Fast

Carrier Task Forces in World War II, 15

August 1951, MS in OCMH; Operational

History of the Seventh Air Force, 7 December 1941-6 November 1943, and Operational History of the Seventh Air Force,

6 November 1943-31 July 1944, MSS in

Air University Historical Liaison Office.

Individual special studies consulted are:

Sgt. Frederick A. Baxter, Armored Force

Action on Makin, MS in OCMH; Lt. Col.

A. R. Brunelli, USMC, The Capture of

Namur Island, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall

Islands, 1-2 February 1944, MS in Record

Section, Marine Corps Schools (RSMCS);

Lt. Col. Robert D. Heinl, USMC, Marine

Corps Operations in the Marshalls, MS

(unfinished) in Records and Research Section, Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; 1st Lt. Paul R.

Leach, Jr., Tanks on Kwajalein Atoll, MS

in OCMH; Capt. Joseph E. Lo Prete,

USMC, The Battle of Roi-Namur, Marshall Islands, MS in RSMCS; Cpl. Millard Rogers, The Artillery Action of the

Battle of Kwajalein Atoll, MS in OCMH;

Lt. Col. Richard Rothwell, USMC, A

Study of an Amphibious Operation, The

Battle of Namur, 31 January 1944-2 February 1944, Kwajalein Operation, Second

Battalion, Twenty Fourth Marines, 4th

Marine Division, MS in RSMCS; Lt. Col.

Arthur H. Weinberger, USMC, A Study

of Amphibious Tactics—The Capture of

Engebi Island, MS in RSMCS.

Japanese Records

The National Archives houses a tremendous number of original Japanese records

of World War II in the collection called

World War II Seized Enemy Records.

After the war the G-2 Section of General

Headquarters, Far East Command (GHQ

FEC), directed a group of Japanese officers to prepare a series of special studies

of Japanese operations, based on their personal recollections and on the official Japanese records in Tokyo. These were translated and incorporated into a series entitled Japanese Studies in World War II,

manuscript copies of which are filed in

OCMH. Those studies used in the preparation of this volume are numbered 50,
380 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

55, and 72. The largest collection of translated captured enemy records is contained

in the bulletins and translations prepared

during the war by Headquarters, Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and Pacific

Ocean Areas and by the Joint Intelligence

Center, Pacific Ocean Areas (JICPOA).

Complete collections are deposited in the

Classified Operational Records Branch,

World War II, Office of Naval History, and

in the Records and Research Section, Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U.S.

Marine Corps.

Published Works

Arnold, Henry H., Global Mission (New

York: Harper & Brothers, 1949). Personal

memoirs of the Commanding General,

U.S. Air Force.

Cass, Bevan G., ed., History of the Sixth

Marine Division (Washington, 1948).

Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea

Cate, eds., THE ARMY AIR FORCES

IN WORLD WAR II, Vol. IV, The Pacific:

Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July

1944 (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1950). A volume in the U.S. Army

Air Forces official history of Army air

operations.

Historical Division, War Department,

The Capture of Makin, 20 November-24 November 1943, AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION SERIES (Washington, 1946). One

of a series of detailed but undocumented

combat studies prepared during the war

mostly for the benefit of hospitalized veterans. A documented manuscript version

of this monograph is in the custody of

OCMH.

Heinl, Lt. Col. Robert D., Jr., USMC,

and Lt. Col. John A. Crown, USMC, The

Marshalls: Increasing the Tempo, Historical

Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S.

Marine Corps (Washington, 1954). The

final official Marine Corps history of operations in the Marshalls. This monograph

was not published until after the present

volume was completed.

Isely, Jeter A., and Philip A. Crowl, The

U.S. Marines and Amphibious War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951). A

survey of prewar developments in amphibious warfare and of the amphibious

phase of the Pacific campaigns in which

Marines participated.

Johnston, Richard W., Follow Me, The

Story of the Second Marine Division in World

War II (New York: Random House, 1948).

King, Ernest J., Fleet Admiral King, A

Naval Record (New York: W. W. Norton &

Company, Inc., 1952). Personal memoirs

of the Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet and

Chief of Naval Operations.

Love, Edmund G., The 27th Infantry Division in World War II (Washington: Infantry

Journal Press, 1949).

Love, Edmund G., The Hourglass: A History of the 7th Infantry Division in World War

II (Washington: Infantry Journal Press,

1950).

Marshall, Lt. Col. S. L. A., Island Victory

(Washington: Infantry Journal Press,

1944). An intimate contemporary history

of infantry action on Kwajalein by the

official Army historian who accompanied

the troops there.

Miller, John, jr., Guadalcanal: The First

Offensive, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1949). As

in the case of the other volumes in this

series, cited below, this is the final official

Army history of the operation.

Morison, Samuel E., HISTORY OF

UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II, Vol. IV,

Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions,
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 381

May 1942-August 1942 (Boston: Little,

Brown and Company, 1949); Vol. VI,

Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, 22 July 1942-

1 May 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown and

Company, 1950); Vol. VII, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls (Boston: Little, Brown

and Company, 1951). Semiofficial.

Morton, Louis, The Fall of the Philippines,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1953).

Myers, Denys P., Handbook of the League

of Nations (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1935).

Proehl, Carl W., ed., The Fourth Marine

Division in World War II (Washington,

1946).

Robson, R. W., The Pacific Islands Tear

Book (Sydney, Australia: Pacific Publications, Ltd., 1943). A descriptive survey of

the islands of the Pacific, their history,

geography, culture, etc.

Smith, Holland M., Coral and Brass

(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949).

Personal memoirs of the Commanding

General, V Amphibious Corps.

Smith, Robert Ross, The Approach to the

Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953).

Stockman, Capt. James R., USMC, The

Battle for Tarawa, Historical Section, Division of Public Information, Headquarters,

U.S. Marine Corps (Washington, 1947).

The final official Marine Corps history of

the operation.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division, The

Campaigns of the Pacific War (Washington,

1946); Interrogations of Japanese Officials, 2

vols. (Washington, 1946); The American

Campaign Against Wotje, Maloelap, Mille and

Jaluit (Washington, 1947); The Reduction of

Truk (Washington, 1947).
List of Abbreviations

AA

AAF

AAR

AGC

AK

AKA

ALP

AM

Amph

AP

APA

APD

App

Arty

BAR

BLT

Bn

Bull

Cav

CCS

CENPAC

CENPACFOR

CG

CINCPAC

CINCPOA

CL(AA)

Antiaircraft

Army Air Forces

After action report

General communications vessel

Cargo ship

Cargo ship, attack

Air liaison party

Mine sweeper

Amphibious

Transport

Transport, attack

Transport (highspeed)

Appendix

Artillery

Browning automatic

rifle

Battalion landing

team

Battalion

Bulletin

Cavalry

Combined Chiefs of

Staff

Central Pacific Area

Central Pacific

Forces

Commanding general

Commande r in

Chief, U.S. Pacific

Fleet

Commande r in

Chief, Pacifi c

Ocean Areas

Light cruiser, antiaircraft

CM-IN

CM-OUT

CNO

Co

CO

CofS

COMCENPAC

COMCENPACFOR

COMGENCENPAC

COMINCH

CTF

CV

CVE

CVL

D-3

Div

DMS

DRB AGO

DUKW

FA

FO

Classified message,

incoming

Classified message,

outgoing

Chief of Naval Operations

Company

Commanding officer

Chief of Staff

Commander, Central Pacific Area

Commander, Central Pacific Forces

Commanding General, Central Pacific Area

Commande r in

Chief, U.S. Fleet

Commander Task

Force

Aircraft carrier

Aircraft carrier,

escort

Aircraft carrier,

small

Operations officer or

section (Marines)

Division

Mine sweeper (converted destroyer)

Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant General's

Office, Alexandria,

Virginia

Amphibian truck, 21⁄2

tons

Field Artillery

Field Order
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 383

G-1

G-2

G-3

G-4

Gp

HD SSUSA

ICPOA

IJN

IMTFE

Incl

Inf

Interv

IPS

JASCO

JCS

JICPOA

Jnl

JPS

JSSC

JWPC

KCRC

LCI

LCI(G)

Personnel section of

a general staff

Intelligence section of

a general staff

Operations section of

a general staff

Supply section of a

general staff

Group

Historical Division,

SSUSA

Intelligence Center,

Pacific Ocean

Areas

Imperial Japanese

Navy

International Military Tribunal for

the Far East

Inclosure

Infantry

Interview

International Prosecution Section,

IMTFE

Joint Assault Signal

Company

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joint Intelligence

Center, Pacific

Ocean Areas

Journal

Joint Staff Planners

Joint Strategic Survey Committee

Joint War Plans

Committee

Kansas City Records

Center, AGO

Landing craft, infantry

Landing craft, infantry, gunboat

LCM

LCS

LCVP

LSD

LST

LT

Ltr

LVT

LVT(l)

LVT(2)

LVT(A)

Med

Memo

Min

MS

Msg

Mtg

NA

OCMH

OPD

Opn

Ord

PACMIRS

Phib

POA

Rad

R.A.N.

Landing craft, mechanized

Landing craft, support

Landing craft, vehicle and personnel

Landing ship, dock

Landing ship, tank

Landing Team

Letter

Landing vehicle,

tracked

Landing vehicle,

tracked, unarmored (Mark I)

("Alligator")

Landing vehicle,

tracked, unarmored (Mark II)

("Water Buffalo")

Landing vehicle,

tracked, armored

Medical

Memorandum

Minutes

Manuscript

Message

Meeting

National Archives

Office of the Chief of

Military History

Operations Division,

War Department

General Staff

Operation

Ordnance

Pacific Military Intelligence Research Section

Amphibious

Pacific Ocean Areas

Radiogram

Royal Australian

Navy
384 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Rcn

RCT

Regt

R.N.

Rpt

S-1

S-4

SAR

SC

Sec

SNLF

Sp

SSUSA

Sub

SWPA

Reconnaissance Tac

Regimental Combat TF

Team TG

Regiment Tk

Royal Navy Trac

Report TU

Personnel section of

a. regiment or

smaller unit

Supply section of a

regiment or smaller unit

Special Action Report

Subchaser

Section

Special Naval Landing

Force

Special

Special Staff, U.S.

Army

Subject

Southwest Pacific

Area

USA

USAFICPA

USAFMIDPAC

USMC

USMCR

USN

USNR

USSBS

WDC

Tactical

Task Force

Task Group

Tank

Tractor

Task Unit

U.S. Army

U.S. Army Forces in

the Central Pacific

Area

U.S. Army Forces,

Middle Pacific

U.S. Marine Corps

U.S. Marine Corps

Reserve

U.S. Navy

U.S. Naval Reserve

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey

Washington Document Center
Glossary of Code Names

CARTWHEEL MacArthur's drive against Rabaul

ELKTON MacArthur's plan for recapture of Rabaul

FLINTLOCK The Marshall Islands operation

GALVANIC The Gilberts-Nauru operation

GRANITE Nimitz' plan for operations in 1944

ORANGE Prewar plan of operations in event of war with Japan

RAINBOW Various plans prepared between 1939 and 1941 to meet Axis

aggression involving more than one enemy

RENO MacArthur's plan for advancing along north coast of New

Guinea and thence to Mindanao

SEXTANT International conference at Cairo, 22-26 November and 3-7

December 1943

TRIDENT International conference at Washington, 12-25 May 1943
Basic Military Map Symbols*

Symbols within a rectangle indicate a military unit, within

a triangle an observation post, and within a circle a supply

point.

Military Units—Identification

Antiaircraft Artillery ................................ .

Armored Command................................... .

Army Air Forces...................................... .

Artillery Cavalry, Hors , excepe ....................................... t Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery ........... ..

Cavalry, Mechanized. ................................. .

Chemical Warfare Service.............................. .

Coast Artillery ....................................... .

Engineers ........................................... .

Infantry............................................. .

Medica Ordnancl Corp e Department................................. s ....................................... .

Quartermaster Corps.................................. .

Signal Corps ......................................... .

Transportatio Tank Destroyer....................................... n Corps.................................. .

Veterinary Corps...................................... .

Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing

symbol with the arm or service symbol:

Airborne Artillery..................................... .

Airborne Infantry..................................... .

*For complete listing of symbols see FM 21-30, from which these are taken.
388 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Size Symbols

The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or

above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying

arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization:

Squad .............................................. .

Section .............................................. .

Platoon ............................................. .

Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight ................. .

Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron ......... .

Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT following identifying numeral) .......................... .

Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force

Wing. ............................................ .

Division or Command of an Air Force .................... .

Corps or Air Force .................................... .

Army ............................................. .

Group of Armies .................................... .

EXAMPLES

The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the

unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent

unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below

boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines:

Company A, 137th Infantry ..................... .

8th Field Artillery Battalion...................... .

Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division........ .

Observation Post, 23d Infantry................... .

Command Post, 5th Infantry Division ............. .

Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry ....... .

Weapons

Machine gun ................................. .

Gun......................................... .

Gun battery .................................. .

Howitzer or Mortar ............................ .

Tank ......................................... .

Self-propelled gun ............................. .
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War Department

Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945

The Army and Economic Mobilization

The Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground Forces

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops

The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service Forces

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western Hemisphere

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the Pacific

The Fall of the Philippines

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive

Victory in Papua

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls

Campaign in the Marianas

The Approach to the Philippines

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

Triumph in the Philippines

Okinawa: The Last Battle

Strategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy

Salerno to Cassino

Cassino to the Alps

The European Theater of Operations

Cross-Channel Attack

Breakout and Pursuit

The Lorraine Campaign

The Siegfried Line Campaign

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge

The Last Offensive

The Supreme Command
Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II

The Middle East Theater

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India Theater

Stilwell's Mission to China

Stilwell's Command Problems

Time Runs Out in CBI

The Technical Services

The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War

The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field

The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany

The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor

Theaters

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War

The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply

The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany

The Signal Corps: The Emergency

The Signal Corps: The Test

The Signal Corps: The Outcome

The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special Studies

Chronology: 1941-1945

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945

Rearming the French

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt

The Women's Army Corps

Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors

Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces

The Employment of Negro Troops

Manhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial Record

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Japan
Index

A-24's: 158

Abaiang Atoll: 64, 155, 156

Abraham Island: 182, 304, 306-07, 308, 309-11, 324

Adams, Maj. Hewitt D.: 155

Admiralty Islands: 24, 373

Aerial reconnaissance. See Reconnaissance, U.S.

A-frames: 190

Agattu: 10

AGC's

Appalachian: 172, 193, 305, 311

for Carolines operations: 16

in Marshalls: 172, 192, 193

need for: 162

Rocky Mount: 172, 220, 227, 229, 251

Ailinginae Atoll: 367

Ailinglapalap Atoll: 366-67

Ailuk Atoll: 205, 367

Air attacks, Japanese

on Butaritari: 62

on Ellice Islands: 53

on Gilberts convoy: 58-59

on Tarawa: 194

Air attacks, U.S. carrier-based

on Albert and Alien: 307, 308

on Apamama: 53-54

appraisal of: 160

on Betio: 56, 67

on Burton: 295, 298

on Butaritari: 99, 104n, 105, 109, 111, 112-13, 118

on Carlson: 225

on Engebi: 339, 344, 345

on Eniwetok Atoll: 203, 205

on Eniwetok Island: 344, 350

on Gilberts: 53-54, 56, 67

on Ivan and Jacob: 306

on Jaluit: 56, 204

Japanese reaction to: 67

on Kwajalein Island: 199-202, 203, 205, 222-23,

232, 233, 253, 254, 256, 259

on Makin: 53-54, 55-56, 67, 75-76, 83, 88

on Maloelap: 205

on Marianas: 334

on Mille: 56, 194, 204-05

on Nauru: 54-55, 67

on Rabaul: 70

on Roi-Namur: 199-202, 203, 205, 305-06, 308,

311, 313, 319, 324-25

on Tarawa: 53-54, 56, 67, 129, 129n, 130-31, 135,

147, 150

on Taroa, 203, 205

on Truk: 333, 334, 338-39, 373

on Wake: 54, 69

on Wotje: 199, 202, 203, 204-05

Air attacks, U.S. land-based

on Betio: 67

in Central Pacific: 157-58

on Gilberts: 52, 53-54, 67

on Jaluit: 53, 197-98, 204, 366, 367, 368

Japanese reaction to: 52, 53, 54, 67

on Kwajalein Atoll: 53, 199

on Kwajalein Island: 202, 204, 230-32

on Little Makin: 53

on Makin: 53-54, 55-56, 67

on Maleolap: 53, 194-97, 204, 366, 367, 369

on Marshalls: 53, 54

on Mille: 53, 194-95, 204-05, 366, 367

on Nauru: 52, 54, 55, 67

on Roi-Namur: 204

on Tarawa: 52, 53, 54, 55, 67

on Taroa: 204

on Truk: 366, 368, 369

on Wotje: 198-99, 202, 204, 366, 367, 368

Air bases. See Airfields.

Air Forces, U.S. See Eleventh Air Force; Seventh Air

Force; Thirteenth Air Force.

Air liaison parties, U.S.: 104-05, 104n, 185

Air losses, Japanese: 59, 194, 196, 197, 199-202, 211

Engebi: 339

in Gilberts operations: 53, 54-55, 56

Rabaul: 70

Truk: 339

Air losses, U.S.: 53, 54, 197, 249, 339

Air plans, U.S.

for Carolines: 16

for Gilberts: 36-39, 52-53

for Marshalls: 15

Air support, U.S. See Air attacks, U.S. carrier-based;

Air attacks, U.S. land-based.

Aircraft carriers, Japanese: 68-69

Aircraft carriers, U.S.: 134

Belleau Wood: 203, 232

Bunker Hill: 203

Cabot: 203, 313

for Carolines: 16

Coral Sea: 232

Corregidor: 232

Cowpens: 203

and Eniwetok operations: 336

Enterprise: 203, 232

Essex: 203

Gilberts: 24, 38, 57, 58

Intrepid: 203, 313

at Kwajalein Atoll: 232

Langley: 203

Manila Bay: 232

Marshalls: 15, 199, 202, 203
392 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Aircraft carriers, U.S.—Continued

Monterey: 203

at northern Kwajalein Atoll: 313

Princeton: 203

Saratoga: 203

Truk: 338-39

Yorktown: 203, 232

Airfields

Apamama: 158

Baker: 52, 157

Betio: 43, 65, 67-68, 139, 148-50, 153, 155, 158

Buota: 158

Burton: 211

Canton: 157

construction of: 52, 158

Dalap: 367

Engebi: 339, 340, 348, 368

Eniwetok: 172, 205, 211, 212

Funafuti: 157

Gilberts: 157-58, 165, 168

Jaluit: 168, 211-12

Kwajalein Atoll: 174, 211

Kwajalein Island: 172, 202, 203, 211, 214-15, 241,

246, 249, 254, 368

Majuro: 65, 158, 169-70, 211

Makin: 65, 158

Maleolap: 172, 174, 211-12

Marshalls: 168, 172, 174, 180, 207-08

Mille: 53, 56, 168, 194, 195, 211, 212

Nanomea: 52-53, 157

Nauru: 52, 54, 67-68

Nukufetau: 52-53

Roi: 172, 174, 180-81, 199-202, 203, 211-12, 214,

315, 317, 321, 368

Tarawa: 53, 65, 158

Taroa: 195-96, 197, 203, 205

Truk: 339

Wotje: 172, 174, 199, 204, 211-12

Aitsu Island. See Camellia Island.

AK's: 192

AKA's

Alcyone: 49-51, 49n

and Carolines operations: 16

and Eniwetok operations: 336

and Gilberts operations: 24, 35, 49-51, 49n, 51n,

75

at Kwajalein Atoll: 225-27

and Marshalls operations: 173-74, 191-92, 193

Virgo: 225

Akiyama, Rear Adm. Monzo: 216

Alaska: 9

Albert Island: 182

operations on: 304, 306-11, 331

Albert Junior Island: 309

Alcyone: 49-51, 49n

Aleutian Islands: 5, 9, 10, 15, 17, 17n, 20, 45, 49,

65, 159

Aliso Canyon: 186

Alien Island: 182

operations on: 304, 306-09, 331

"Alligators." See LVT's.

AM's. See Mine sweepers, U.S.

Amey, Lt. Col. Herbert R., USMC: 138, 139

Ammunition, Japanese

shortage of in Gilberts: 56

supply of: 74

Ammunition, U.S.

appraisal of: 160-61

armor-piercing: 160

expenditure of, on Kwajalein Island: 250-51, 250n

for Gilberts operations: 51

for Marshalls operations: 187-88, 191, 193

4.5-inch rocket: 160-61

5-inch: 160, 174, 230

6-inch: 160

8-inch: 174, 230

14-inch: 230

75-mm.: 238

Amphibian tanks. See LVT(A)'s.

Amphibian tractors. See LVT's.

Amphibian trucks. See DUKW's.

Amphibious operations, U.S.

at Apamama: 156

appraisal of: 158-59, 159n, 163-64, 165

at Burton: 294-95

at Butaritari: 118, 119

at Engebi: 344-48

at Eniwetok Island: 349-60

at Kuma Island: 118, 119

at Kwajalein Atoll: 218, 219-40

at Majuro: 302-04

at Makin: 75-88

at northern Kwajalein Atoll: 305-07

at Parry: 363-65

at Roi-Namur: 311-32

supply: 145-47

tactical: 130-44

tactical plans for: 166-82

tactics of: 371-72

at Tarawa: 130-55

training for: 184, 185, 186-87

Amphibious Training Command: 186

Anderson: 312

Anderson, Pfc. Richard B., USMC: 321n

Andrew Island: 308

Angluin, Lt. Col. David X.: 187

AP's: 35, 35n

APA's: 35n

Calvert: 49n, 79, 102, 125

Cambria: 172, 192, 302, 336, 339

for Carolines operations: 16

and Eniwetok operations: 336, 339

in Gilberts operations: 24, 49, 49n, 51, 51n

at Kwajalein Atoll: 225-27

Leonard Wood: 49, 49n, 75, 79, 102, 105, 125

at Makin: 35, 75, 79
INDEX 393

APA's—Continued

McCawley: 37

in Marshalls operations: 15, 172, 173-74, 191, 192

Neville: 37, 49, 49n, 76, 82, 86, 113n

Pierce: 49n, 117, 124

President Polk: 225-27

for Tarawa: 35

Apamama Atoll: 58

air attacks on: 54

as air base: 195, 230

airfield on: 158

Japanese strength on: 63, 64

operations on: 155, 156

tactical plans for: 25, 34, 35, 39, 43

target date for: 26-27

APD's

and Eniwetok operations: 336, 344, 345

Kane: 302-04, 344

at Kwajalein Atoll: 219, 220-21, 290, 291, 300

and Majuro operations: 302-04

Manley: 219, 220, 300

and Marshalls operations: 173-74, 179, 192, 193

Overton: 219, 220-21, 290, 291, 300

Schley: 345

Appalachian: 172, 193, 305, 311

Arafura Sea: 11

Argonaut: 61

Armored amphibian tractors. See LVT(A)'s.

Arnold, Brig. Gen. Archibald V.: 175, 225

Arnold, General Henry H.: 23, 372-73

Arnold Island: 178

Artillery, Japanese

for Eniwetok: 341, 343

on Kwajalein Island: 252, 260, 281

on Tarawa: 129, 297

Artillery, U.S.

appraisal of: 161

and Burton operations: 295, 297, 298

on Butaritari: 99, 100, 112, 113, 118, 119

on Carlson: 221, 224-27, 229, 230, 233

and Eniwetok operations: 338, 344, 345, 360, 364

and Kwajalein operations: 238, 243, 248-49, 250-

51, 250n, 253, 257-58, 258n, 261

and Makin operations: 42, 43, 106, 107

and Marshalls operations: 173, 174, 175, 177-78,

180, 182, 189-90, 193

at northern Kwajalein Atoll: 304, 308, 309-11,

324

as part of communications net: 105

and Roi-Namur: 312

tactics: 371

and Tarawa operations: 43, 146, 147, 148, 150-51,

154, 155

Ashberry Island: 299

Ashland: 51n, 232, 358

Aso, Col. Tarokichi: 216

Assault and demolition teams, Marine: 325n, 326

Atago: 70

Attack cargo ships. See AKA's.

Attack transports. See APA's.

Attu: 17n, 37, 45, 183, 188

August Island: 299

Augustine Island: 299

Aulich, Lt. Col. Carl H.: 275, 276

Australia: 5, 9, 14, 15

Australian Army: 17

Ayers, Col. Russell A.: 336, 349, 356, 359

B-24's: 52, 53-54, 55, 67, 158, 193-94, 196, 197-99,

230

B-25's: 158, 194

B-29's: 13n, 372

Bairiki Island: 33, 67

operations on: 150, 153, 155

Baker Island: 52, 53, 61, 157, 194, 196, 198

Banda Sea: 11, 210

Bangalore torpedoes. See Weapons, U.S., bangalore

torpedoes.

Barbed wire, Japanese: 90, 98, 138

Barber, Capt. Mark E.: 289

Barney Island: 299

Bascome Island: 299

Bates, 1st Lt. Robert T.: 354

Battleships, Japanese: 68-69

Battleships, U.S.

for Carolines operations: 16

Colorado: 129, 305, 312, 344, 345

and Eniwetok operations: 336, 344, 345, 363

in Gilberts operations: 24, 38, 58

Idaho: 223, 229, 253

at Kwajalein Atoll: 221-23, 229, 230, 251, 253

and Makin operations: 35, 40, 75, 117

in Marshalls operations: 173-74, 202, 205

Maryland: 38, 129, 141, 145-46, 150, 161, 162, 305,

307, 312

Mississippi: 222-23, 229, 230

New Jersey: 339

New Mexico: 223, 229, 230

at northern Kwajalein Atoll: 305, 307, 312

Pennsylvania: 117, 222-23, 229, 230, 345, 363

and Tarawa operations: 35, 40, 141, 145-46, 150,

161, 162

Tennessee: 305, 312, 344, 345, 363

and Truk operations: 339

Bayonets. See Weapons, Japanese, bayonets; Weapons, U.S., bayonets.

Bazookas. See Weapons, U.S., rocket launchers, 2.36-

inch.

Bearss, Lt. Col. Ernest H.: 233

Bellatrix: 51n

Belle Grove: 49, 51, 82, 232

Belleau Wood: 203, 232

Bennett Island: 178, 216, 290, 299, 300-301

Benson Island: 178, 290, 300

Berger, Capt. Henry: 94

Bering Strait: 5
394 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Berlin Island: 178, 290, 300

Beru Atoll: 63-64

Betio: 48, 59, 159, 161, 163, 164, 332. See also Gilbert

Islands; Tarawa Atoll.

air attacks on: 56, 67

airfield: 43, 65, 67-68, 139, 148-50, 153, 155, 158

bombardment of: 129-32

Burns-Philp Wharf: 139, 142, 147, 148, 151, 153

Central Pier: 43, 135-37, 138, 139, 142, 145, 147,

148, 151

description of: 31, 32-33, 132, 135-37

estimate of Japanese strength on: 43

forces for: 43

Green Beach: 142, 150, 151, 153

Japanese defense of: 128-29, 130, 132, 134, 135-

37, 141, 147, 150-51, 154, 155

Japanese defenses on: 31, 33-34, 73-74, 128, 131-

32, 135-37, 143

Japanese strength on: 73

landing operations on: 132-55

Long Pier: 138

Red Beach 1: 43, 127, 132-35, 137, 138, 139-41,

142, 146-47, 150, 151, 153

Red Beach 2: 43, 127, 132, 134, 135-38, 139-41,

142, 143, 144, 146-47, 148, 150, 151, 153

Red Beach 3: 43, 127, 131, 132, 138-39, 141-42,

147, 148, 161

supply operations on: 144-47, 148

tactical plans for: 43, 127, 132, 147-48, 150, 151,

153-54

Beverly Island: 178, 223, 290, 300

Biddle: 51n

Bigej Island. See Bennett Island.

Bikini Atoll: 166, 367

Biloxi: 305, 312

Bismarck Archipelago: 4, 5, 15, 17, 60, 65

Black: 302

Blaettler, Capt. Peter: 276

Blakenship Island: 178, 290, 298, 299

Boat teams, Marine: 325n

Bogon Island. See Zinnia Island.

Bombardment Squadron, 392d U.S.: 230

Bombers, heavy, U.S. See B-24's.

Bombers, medium, U.S. See B-25's.

Bombers, very long range, U.S. See B-29's.

Bonin Islands: 5

Borucki, S. Sgt. Raymond: 288

Bougainville: 12, 15, 70

Bradt, Maj. Edward T.: 77, 119, 122, 124

Brink, Lt. Col. Francis H.: 326

Brink, Sgt. Leonard C.: 220

British Chiefs of Staff: 7, 12

British Eastern Fleet: 10

British Mandated Islands: 62

Brown, Capt. Robert S.: 85

Browne, Col. Harold G.: 76, 76n

Brunelli, Lt. Col. A. R., USMC: 322n

Buariki Island: 155

Bullard: 302

Buna: 20

Bunker Hill: 203

Buota Island: 155, 158

Burma: 4, 10, 13, 16, 19, 20, 60. See also ChinaBurma-India theater.

Burnet Island: 178, 290, 298

Burton Island

air attacks on: 295, 298

airfield: 211

artillery fire on: 228, 229

Bailey Pier: 293, 297

casualties on: 289-90, 298

description of: 291-93

intelligence on: 175

Japanese artillery on: 252

Japanese defense of: 295-98

Japanese defenses on: 175, 178, 215, 293

Japanese strength on: 213, 215, 216, 217

as naval base: 368

naval bombardment of: 223, 229, 230, 264

operations on: 236, 291-98

Orange Beach 4: 294-96

reconnaissance of: 293, 294, 297

tactical plans for: 178, 259, 291, 294

Buster Island: 175, 178, 290, 295, 298

Butaritari: 59, 63. See also Gilbert Islands; Makin

Atoll.

Carlson's raid on, 1942: 61-62, 73

Citadel area: 41, 82, 88, 97, 100

communications on: 103-06

description of: 29-30

East Tank Barrier: 71, 76, 82, 85, 88, 89, 112, 116,

118-19, 122

at end of D Day: 100-101

forces for: 40-41

Government Wharf: 30

hulks off of: 86-88, 91, 98, 110

hydrographic conditions at: 102

intelligence on: 77

Japanese defense of: 89-91, 93-94, 96-97, 98, 99-

100, 113-14

Japanese defenses on: 30-31, 41, 42, 71-73, 75-76,

90-91, 93, 94, 96, 98, 99, 100, 107-08, 114-16

Japanese strength on: 71

Jill Lake: 42, 94-96

Joan Lake: 94, 95

King's Wharf: 30, 42, 71, 76, 82, 83-85, 98, 99, 100,

102, 107-08, 113, 116, 118

mopping-up operations on: 90-91, 98-99, 100,

108-111

naval bombardment of: 62

On Chong's Wharf: 30, 42, 62, 82, 83-85, 86, 88,

89, 90, 91, 108, 109

operations on: 75-88, 89-101, 102-11, 112-25

Red Beach: 41, 42, 75, 76, 78, 79, 83, 96, 102,

103-04, 105, 106, 107, 109, 116, 117

Red Beach 2: 41, 42, 75, 76, 77, 78-79, 102,

103-04, 105, 106-07, 109, 116, 117, 124

Rita Lake: 79, 81, 97, 106
INDEX 395

Butaritari—Continued

Second Phase Line: 94, 95

Stone Pier: 30, 71, 116, 117

supply operations on: 102, 109

tactical plans for: 41-43, 89, 91, 93, 94, 96, 98, 101,

108, 112, 117, 118, 122

West Tank Barrier: 41, 42-43, 71, 75, 82, 85, 89-97,

89n, 98, 100, 106-07, 108-09, 110-11, 112, 116,

117, 119

Yellow Beach: 42, 75, 76, 82-88, 89, 91, 94, 98, 100,

101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 109, 112, 116, 117, 118,

160

Butaritari Village: 30, 31, 82, 85

Byron Island: 175, 178, 290, 298

Cabot: 223, 313

Calalin Island: 182, 302, 303

Calalin Pass: 302, 303

Calvert: 49n, 79, 102, 125

Cambria: 172, 192, 302, 336, 339

Camellia Island: 338, 344, 345

Camp Elliott: 44, 45

Camp Pendleton: 186

Canna Island: 338, 344, 345

Cannon Companies

of the 32d Infantry: 238, 250, 257

of the 106th Infantry: 338, 345, 355, 356, 357

of 165th Infantry: 49

of 184th Infantry: 238, 250, 280

Canton Island: 52, 54, 67, 157, 194, 196, 198

Cargo ships. See AK's; AKA's.

Carlos Island: 177, 178, 179, 180, 216, 290, 291, 294,

299, 300

operations on: 221-22, 223-24, 228-29, 259, 278

Carlson, Lt. Col. Evans F., USMC: 28-29, 61-62, 146

Carlson Island: 216, 290, 291

operations on: 221-22, 224-29, 230, 235, 239, 243,

246-47, 248-49, 250-51, 250n, 252, 253, 257-58,

258n, 259, 261, 281, 295

tactical plans for: 174-75, 174n, 177-78, 179-80

Carlson's raid, effect of, on Japanese strategy: 209

Caroline Islands: 5, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 62, 165,

166-67, 206, 207, 208, 210, 333, 334, 373

Carrier Force. See Task Force 58.

Carter Island: 177, 178, 179, 216, 219-20, 300

CARTWHEEL. See Rabaul.

Casablanca Conference: 7-10, 16

Casualties, Japanese

Burton: 298

Butaritari: 100

Chauncey: 291

Clifton: 299

Engebi: 248

Eniwetok Atoll: 360, 365

Ivan: 306

Jacob: 306

Kwajalein Island: 244, 248, 278

Makin: 67, 76, 125

northern Kwajalein Atoll: 311

Casualties, Japanese—Continued

Roi-Namur: 321, 331

southern Kwajalein Atoll: 301

Tarawa: 153, 154, 155, 156

Casualties, U.S.

Burton: 297, 298

Butaritari: 100, 116

in Carlson's raid, 1942: 62

Chauncey: 291

Engebi: 348

Eniwetok Atoll: 365

Eniwetok Island: 360

Kwajalein Atoll: 289, 301, 311

Kwajalein Island: 248, 253, 259, 278

Makin: 125

naval: 125-26

Roi-Namur: 321, 325-26, 331

Tarawa: 133, 134, 139, 141-42, 155, 156, 157, 159

CCS. See Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Cecil Island: 177, 178, 179, 219-21, 300

Cecil Pass: 177

Celebes Sea: 13, 15, 22

Central Pacific Area: 368

Japanese strategy in: 60-61, 62-67, 206-09, 212-13

organization of: 5-6

U.S. strategy in: 3-4, 9-12, 13-17, 18-25, 157-58,

165, 218, 370-74

Chain of command, U.S.

for Gilberts: 25-26, 34-39

for Marshalls: 170-72, 187, 191

in Pacific: 4-6

Chambers, Lt. Col. Justice M.: 306, 308, 309

Chandler: 302

Chasmar, Capt. Paul J.: 89

Chauncey: 302

Chauncey Island: 219, 221, 228, 290-91

Chemical Company, 91st: 238, 250, 261

Chenango: 305

Chester Island: 290

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. See Marshall, General

George C.

China: 12-13, 14, 16. See also China-Burma-India

theater.

China-Burma-India theater: 9, 10, 12, 13, 15

Churchill, Winston S.: 7, 12, 16, 23

CL(AA)'s. See Cruisers, U.S.

Claire, Maj. Dennis D.: 88, 98

Clarence Island: 290, 299

Clement Island: 290, 299

Clifford Island: 290, 299

Clifton Island: 290, 299

Close air support, U.S.: 161-62. See also Air attacks,

U.S. carrier-based; Air attacks, U.S. land-based.

Coast Artillery Battalions (AA)

93d: 40, 125

98th: 40, 125

Coastwatchers: 63-64

Coates, Capt. Charles E., Jr.: 94, 96, 110

Cohen Island: 178, 290, 299
396 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Collins, Pvt. Elmer: 289

Colorado: 129, 305, 312, 344, 345

Combined Chiefs of Staff: 7n, 9, 23

and strategy in Pacific: 12, 14-17, 372-73

Combined Fleet: 5, 68, 334, 339

Combined Staff Planners: 16

Commander, Support Aircraft, Gilberts. See Eareckson, Col. William O.

Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. See King, Admiral

Ernest J.

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific

Ocean Areas. See Nimitz, Admiral Chester W.

Communications, Japanese: 67, 108, 116, 132, 154

Communications, U.S.

efficiency of: 90, 96, 103-05, 105n, 161-63, 286,

312,313-14, 318

Gilberts operations: 43, 90, 96, 103-05, 105n, 138,

145-46, 148, 151

Kwajalein Atoll: 239

Marshalls operations: 183-84, 185, 186

radar: 172

radio: 86, 90, 93, 103, 138, 139, 142, 145-46, 148,

151, 172, 305, 312, 313-14

ship-to-shore: 105

shortage of: 93, 307

tank-infantry: 79, 93, 104, 318, 327

telephone: 103

Conolly, Rear Adm. Richard L. See also Task Force

53.

command of: 170

and logistics for Task Force 53: 193

and Roi-Namur operations: 305-06, 307, 308, 313,

314, 332

and tactical plans for Marshalls: 173

and training of Task Force 53: 186

Conroy, Col. Gardiner J.: 96-97, 97n, 106

Contreras, Pvt. Arthur T.: 270, 271

Convoys: 128, 129, 202-05

Cook, Lt. Col. Jesse S., USMC: 190

Coral Sea: 232

Coral Sea, Battle of: 5

Corlett, Maj. Gen. Charles H. See also Infantry Divisions, 7th; Task Group 56.1.

command of: 170-71

and Kwajalein operations: 221, 225, 227, 251, 253,

261, 264, 265, 277, 289

and tactical plans for Kwajalein: 175

and training of 7th Division: 184

Cornett, Lt. Col. Winslow: 350, 356

Corregidor: 232

Cosgrove, Lt. Col. John J., Jr.: 321

Cowpens: 203

CPS. See Combined Staff Planners.

Crowe, Maj. Henry P., USMC: 139, 143-44, 146, 148,

151

Cruisers, Japanese: 68-69, 70, 199-202, 339

Cruisers, U.S.: 54, 56

Cruisers, U.S.—Continued

for Carolines operations: 16

and Eniwetok operations: 348, 349, 363, 365

for Gilberts: 24, 35, 38, 40, 58, 75, 105

Indianapolis: 305, 312, 363

at Kwajalein Atoll: 222-23, 229, 230, 249, 251, 253,

302, 305, 312

Louisville: 305, 312, 345, 363

in Marshalls: 15, 173-74, 199, 202, 205

Minneapolis: 105, 223, 230, 249, 253, 295

Mobile: 305, 312

New Orleans: 223, 230

Portland: 302

San Francisco: 222-23, 229, 230, 295

Santa Fe: 305, 312

and Truk operations: 339

Crutchley, Rear Adm. Victor A. C., R.N.: 37

Cumming, Col. Samuel C., USMC: 306, 306n, 309

Curtis: 53

Custer: 349

CV's. See Aircraft carriers, U.S.

CVE's.

Chenango: 305

and Eniwetok operations: 336

at Kwajalein Atoll: 278, 302, 305, 308

Liscome Bay: 126

and Makin operations: 35, 39, 126

in Marshalls operations: 173, 175

Nassau: 302

Natoma Bay: 302

Sangamon: 305

Suwanee: 305, 308

for Tarawa: 35, 39

CVL's. See Aircraft carriers, U.S.

Dalap Island: 302, 303, 367

Dalton, Warrant Officer (j.g.) John T.: 190

Darrit Island: 302, 303-04

Dashiell: 129-30, 131, 139, 150

Deep Passage: 334, 344

DeFabees, S. Sgt Emmanuel F.: 110-11

Defense Forces and Land Based Air. See Task Force

57.

Defenses, Japanese

Betio: 31, 33-34, 73-74, 128, 131-32, 135-37, 143

Burton: 175, 178, 215, 293

Butaritari: 30-31, 41, 42, 71-73, 75-76, 90-91, 93,

94, 96, 98, 99, 100, 107-08, 114-16

Engebi: 336, 340, 342-43, 347

Eniwetok Atoll: 339-43

Eniwetok Island: 336, 342, 347-48, 351-53, 355

Jaluit: 208-09

Kwajalein Island: 209, 211, 212, 213, 214-15, 242,

244, 246, 254-55, 256-57, 262-64, 266, 283

Makin: 48, 65, 71-73, 74, 75-76, 85

Maloelap: 208-09

Marshalls: 206-10, 211, 212-18

Parry: 336, 341, 347-48, 363-64
INDEX 397

Defenses, Japanese—Continued

Roi-Namur: 213-14, 319

Tarawa: 48, 62, 65, 73-74, 128, 132, 135-37, 143

Wotje: 209

Demolition Team 1: 337

Denig, Capt. James L.: 329

Destroyer Division 96: 302

Destroyers, Japanese: 68, 339

Destroyers, U.S.: 54, 56

Anderson: 312

Black: 302

Bullard: 302

for Carolines operations: 16

Chauncey: 302

Dashiell: 129-30, 131, 139, 150

Dewey: 88, 88n, 91, 105

and Eniwetok operations: 336, 344, 345, 349, 363,

364, 365

Franks: 294

and Gilberts operations: 38, 57, 58, 91

Hailey: 363, 364

Hall: 229, 345

Haraden: 307

Heermann: 344

Kidd: 302

at Kwajalein Atoll: 222-23, 229, 250, 251, 252, 253,

294, 302, 305, 306, 307, 308, 312, 313, 314

MacDonough: 76-77, 83

for Makin: 35, 40, 42, 75, 76, 83, 105

and Marshalls operations: 16, 173-74, 199, 202, 205

McCord: 344

McKee: 223

Morris: 312

Mustin: 312

Phelps: 76, 83, 105, 306, 307, 308, 313, 314, 345

Porterfield: 307

Ringgold: 129-30, 131, 139, 146, 150, 222-23, 230

Russell: 312

Sigsbee: 223, 230, 250, 252

Stevens: 223

and Tarawa operations: 35, 40, 129-31, 139, 146,

150, 156

and Truk operations: 339

Detachment Z. See Infantry Regiments, 105th.

Dewey: 88, 88n, 91, 105

Dillon, Lt. Col. Edward J.: 313, 314, 316, 317, 319,

321

DMS's. See Mine sweepers, U.S.

Doyen: 51n

Drexel, Capt. Gilbert: 221

DUKW's: 371

and Eniwetok operations: 337, 344

history of: 189, 189n

at Kwajalein Atoll: 227, 232, 238, 259

in Marshalls: 180, 184, 189-90, 192

shortage of: 338

Durand, Lt. Col. William R.: 110, 117

Dyess, Lt. Col. Aquilla J., USMC: 331, 331n

Eareckson, Col. William O.: 36-39, 161

Ebeye Island. See Burton Island.

Edmondson, Lt. Col. Harmon L.: 91

Edson, Col. Merritt A.: 151

Efate: 33, 47, 57, 127

Eleventh Air Force: 37

ELKTON:11

Eller Island. See Clifton Island.

Ellice Islands: 39, 52-53, 148, 157, 172, 202, 209

Embick, Lt. Gen. Stanley D.: 22

Empress Augusta Bay: 70

Engebi Island. See also Eniwetok Atoll.

air attacks on: 339, 344, 345

as air base: 368

airfield: 339, 340, 348, 368

Blue Beach 3: 345

description of: 335

Japanese defense of: 347, 348

Japanese defenses on: 336, 340, 342-43, 347

Japanese strength on: 334-36, 342-43

naval bombardment of: 344, 345, 349

operations on: 345-48

Skunk Point: 347, 348

tactical plans for: 338, 345

White Beach 1: 345

Engineer Battalions

13th: 178, 223, 224-25, 243, 249, 264

50th: 295

102d: 93, 102, 125, 191

152d: 40, 102, 108, 125

804th Aviation: 52

Engineers: 91-93, 100, 238. See also Engineer Battalions.

Eniwetok Atoll: 69, 166, 199, 203, 205, 366, 370, 374.

See also Engebi Island; Eniwetok Island; Marshall Islands; Parry Island.

air attacks on: 205, 339, 343

as air base: 368, 369

airfields, 172, 205, 211, 212

casualties in: 365

description of: 334

forces for: 333, 336-37

intelligence on: 333, 334, 335-36

Japanese defenses in: 339-43

Japanese strength in: 208, 210, 333, 335-36, 339-41,

342-43

as naval base: 368

operations in: 344-65

in Pacific strategy: 333

reconnaissance of: 334-36, 339

tactical plans for: 19, 167, 168, 172, 334, 338

target dates for: 333, 338

Eniwetok Expeditionary Group: 334, 336, 338, 344

Eniwetok Island. See also Marshall Islands.

air attacks on: 344, 350

casualties on: 360

description of: 334

forces for: 348
398

Eniwetok Island—Continued

Japanese defense of: 351-53, 354-56, 358-59

Japanese defenses on: 336, 342, 347-48, 351-53,

355

Japanese strength on: 342, 348

naval bombardment of: 344, 349, 360

operations on: 348-60

tactical plans for: 338, 348-49, 350-51

Yellow Beach 1: 348-49, 358

Yellow Beach 2: 348-49, 350-51, 353-55, 356, 358

Ennubirr Island. See Alien Island.

Ennuebing Island. See Jacob Island.

Ennugarret Island. See Abraham Island.

Ennugenliggelap Island. See Cohen Island.

Ennumennet Island. See Albert Island.

Ennylabegan Island. See Carlos Island.

Enterprise: 203, 232

Enubuj Island. See Carlson Island.

Epping Forest: 193

Eroj Island: 302

Erradaka Island: 47

Escort carriers, U.S. See CVE's.

Espiritu Santo: 58

Essex: 203

Evacuation of casualties, U.S.: 238-39, 278

Fairchild, Maj. Gen. Muir S.: 22

Farr, Pfc. Franklin S.: 289

Fast carrier task forces. See Task Forces 50, 58

Ferns, Capt. William: 88, 88n

Ferris, Lt. Col. Charles B.: 45, 117

Field Artillery Battalions

31st: 225, 227, 295

47th: 281

48th:225, 227, 295

49th: 225, 227, 243, 251, 258n, 281-82

57th: 225, 227, 243, 247, 251

104th: 338, 344, 360

105th: 100,107, 113, 117, 119,125

145th: 178, 225, 227-28, 249, 251, 261, 295

Field Hospital, 31st: 228

V Amphibious Corps: 29, 229. See also Reconnaissance Companies, V Amphibious Corps; Smith,

Maj. Gen. Holland M.; Tactical Group 1, V

Amphibious Corps.

commander of: 25, 35

and Eniwetok operations: 338, 344

on invasion of Nauru: 26

and logistics for Marshalls operations: 187, 191

missions of: 25, 44, 49

and training for Marshalls operations: 185-86

Fifth Amphibious Force: 25. See also Turner, Rear

Adm. Richmond Kelly.

Fighter-bombers, U.S. See A-24's.

Fighters, U.S. See P-39's; P-40's.

Fiji Islands: 5, 24, 202, 209

Finn, Lt. Col. John M.: 265

Finschhafen: 11

Firing on friendly troops, U.S.: 96, 111, 135, 204, 251,

316, 363, 364

Flink Point: 30, 41, 42, 76, 79, 82, 94

FLINTLOCK.: 168, 302. See also Marshall Islands.

Formosa: 5, 13, 14

Forsyth, Sgt. William A.: 359

Franks: 294

Fukudome, Vice Adm. Shigeru: 70

Funafuti: 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 67, 157, 194, 203, 302

Fusco, 1st Sgt. Pasquale J.: 90

Gallagher, 1st Lt. Edward J.: 111

GALVANIC: 25. See also Betio; Butaritari; Gilbert

Islands; Makin Atoll; Tarawa Atoll.

Gea Island. See Carter Island.

Gehn Island. See Chauncey Island.

General Motors Corporation: 189

Gilbert Islands: 4-5, 172, 207, 212, 370. See also Betio;

Butaritari; Makin Atoll; Tarawa Atoll.

air attacks on: 52, 53-56, 67

as air base: 194, 204

air-ground liaison in: 77

air support commander for: 36-39

airfields in: 157-58, 165, 168

amphibious training for operations in: 44-47

Army forces for: 22, 23-24

chain of command: 25-26

decision on invasion of: 21-22

effect of campaign in, on Japanese tactics: 213

effect of campaign in, on Marshalls operations: 184,

186, 187-88, 189n, 190, 191

importance of: 22, 23, 24

intelligence on: 27-34, 77

Japanese defenses in: 209, 210

Japanese invasion of, December 1941: 60-61

Japanese reinforcement of: 62-65

Japanese strategy in: 62-65, 68-69.

Japanese tactical plans for: 210, 212-13

King on invasion of: 23

logistics of operations in: 47-51

movement of invasion convoys to: 56-59

naval forces for: 22, 24, 34-39

naval liaison in: 77

operations in: 75-88, 89-101, 102-11, 112-26,

127-56

strategic significance of operations in: 157-58, 165

tactical lessons learned in: 158-65

tactical plans for: 10, 18-20, 21-22, 23, 25-27, 39-

43

target dates for: 23, 27, 27n

Gillis, Maj. Jackson C.: 288

Ginder, Rear Adm. Samuel P.: 203. See also Task

Group 58.4.

GRANITE: 373

Grenades, U.S. See Weapons, U.S.

Gritta, Capt. Paul B.: 219, 221, 300

Guadalcanal: 7-9, 36-37,44, 47, 48, 54, 61

Guam: 4, 10, 16, 60, 167, 207, 373
INDEX 399

Guns, Japanese

Lewis machine: 96

3-inch dual-purpose: 114

5-inch: 130

8-inch: 74, 131

7.7-mm.: 73, 214, 215, 297

13-mm. 73, 74, 114, 213, 214, 215, 297, 340

13.2-mm.: 213

20-mm. 213, 215, 341, 342, 343

37-mm. 74, 213, 342, 343

40-mm. 33, 134

75-mm. antiaircraft: 33

75-mm. mountain: 74, 341, 342, 343

77-mm. 297, 364

80-mm. 74, 76

120-mm.: 131

127-mm.: 74

7-cm: 74

8-cm.: 71, 73, 74, 214, 215

12-cm.: 33, 340, 342, 343

12.7-cm.: 74, 213, 214

14-cm.: 74

Guns, U.S.

appraisal of: 161, 163

.30-caliber machine: 77, 255-56, 315

.50-caliber machine: 77, 79

5-inch: 76, 83, 174, 364

8-inch: 174

20-mm.: 308, 371

37-mm.: 100, 143, 161, 163, 173, 179, 182, 188,

243, 249, 253, 311, 315, 320, 347, 353, 354

40-mm.: 173, 222, 308, 344, 345, 363, 371

75-mm.: 91, 98, 109, 119, 161, 163, 249, 255-56,

297, 321, 355, 356, 357

105-mm. self-propelled: 338

Gunston Hall: 193

Haguro: 70

Hailey: 363, 364

Hale, Maj. Gen. Willis H.: 39, 172. See also Task

Group 57.2.

Half-tracks: 319, 321, 331

Hall: 229, 345

Hall, Col. Elmer E., USMC: 141, 146, 148, 151

Halsey, Admiral William F., Jr.: 6, 10, 11-12, 20, 21,

70

Hammond, Lt. Col. Hewin O.: 318

Haraden: 307

Hart, Col. Franklin A., USMC: 312-13, 314-15,

326n, 327, 329

Hart, Lt. Col. Joseph T.: 77, 106, 116-17, 118, 119,

125

Hartl, Lt. Col. Albert V.: 222, 295

Hard, S. Sgt. Roland H.: 271

Hashida, Lt. Col. Masahiro: 342

Hawaiian Islands: 3, 4, 5, 9, 44-47, 49, 202

Hays, Maj. Lawrence C., Jr., USMC: 148

Headquarters ships, U.S. See AGC's.

Heavy bombers. See B-24's.

Heermann: 344

Hermle, Brig. Gen. Leo D., USMC: 145, 146, 156

Herzog, Maj. Jacob H.: 112, 118, 119

Heyen, Lt. Comdr. Gerhard H., RAN: 28

Heywood: 51n

Higgins, Sgt. Melvin L.: 270-72

Higgins boats. See LCVP's.

High-speed transports. See APD's.

Hill, Rear Adm. Harry W.: 38, 162. See also Eniwetok

Expeditionary Group; Task Group 51.2.

commands of: 34, 36, 37, 170

and Eniwetok operations: 333-34, 336, 339, 344,

348, 349-50

on Gilberts operations: 159

and Majuro operations: 183, 302, 303-04

and Marshalls operations: 192

and Tarawa operations: 127, 129, 129n, 130-31,

132, 150

Hills, 2d Lt. Ralph W.: 353, 358

Holland, Maj. F. L. G.: 33

Hollandia: 373

Hollawiak, Pfc. William: 353, 358

Holmes, Col. Maurice G., USMC: 150, 153

Hong Kong: 13

Honolulu: 192, 203

Hoover, Rear Adm. John H.: 38-39, 53, 54, 171, 172,

175. See also Task Force 57.

Hornbacher, 2d Lt. Claude V.: 220

Hospital ships: 278

Howitzers, Japanese, 70-mm.: 71-73, 74, 119

Howitzers, U.S.

75-mm. pack: 42, 100n, 147, 148, 155, 193, 238,

306, 308, 309, 311, 338, 344

75-mm. self-propelled: 223, 225, 273

105-mm.: 42, 99, 100, 100n, 113, 189, 193, 221,

225-28, 246, 250, 295, 306, 311, 338, 340, 345

155-mm.: 178, 221, 225-28, 246, 247, 250, 261, 294

Howland Island: 61

Hudson, Lt. Col. Lewis C.: 306

Hydrographic conditions

in Gilberts: 77-78, 85, 88, 102, 117, 128, 130, 133,

137

in Marshalls: 175, 177, 181

Idaho: 223, 229, 253

Ie Shima: 370

Imperial General Headquarters: 69, 210

Imperial Japanese Navy: 60-61, 68-70

Indian Ocean: 168

Indianapolis: 305, 312, 363

Infantry Battalions

1st, 17th Regiment: 180, 222, 223-24, 228, 294,

295-98, 300

2d, 17th Regiment: 180, 222, 224-25, 229, 294,

298-99

3d, 17th Regiment: 180, 228, 294, 297, 298, 300
400 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Infantry Battalions—Continued

1st, 32d Regiment: 180, 233-36, 238, 242, 243, 244,

245, 246-47, 249, 252, 264, 265, 276-77, 278-79,

280-81, 285-87, 288

2d, 32d Regiment: 180, 239-40, 244, 246, 247, 249,

251, 252, 253-54, 256, 257, 264, 279, 281, 287,

288-89

3d, 32d Regiment: 180, 240, 257-58, 259, 264-65,

276-77, 278-79, 280, 281-82, 283, 285, 286

3d, 105th Regiment: 77

1st, 106th Regiment: 345, 349, 350-55

2d, 106th Regiment: 170, 171, 182, 191, 192, 302,

333

3d, 106th Regiment

commander of: 350

and Engebi operations: 345

on Eniwetok Island: 348-49, 350-53, 355, 356,

358-60

missions of: 349

on Parry: 361, 364, 365

1st, 111th Regiment: 178, 179, 219-21

3d, 111th Regiment: 367

1st, 165th Regiment

on Butaritari: 77-79, 82, 89, 94-97, 100, 106,

110-11, 116, 117, 118, 119-22, 124, 125

commander of: 77

efficiency of communications of: 104-05, 105n

missions of: 41-42

2d, 165th Regiment

on Butaritari: 82-85, 89-94, 96, 97-100, 106,

109, 110, 111, 112-16, 112n, 117, 118, 122,

124

command of: 82

efficiency of communications of: 104-05, 105n

on Kotabu Island: 76, 82-83, 86-88

missions of: 42, 89-90, 98

3d, 165th Regiment

on Butaritari: 77, 79, 81-82, 100, 106-07, 112,

116-17, 118-24, 125

commander of: 77

efficiency of communications of: 104-05, 105n

missions of: 41-42

1st, 184th Regiment: 180, 240, 253, 256, 264, 265,

266-76, 277, 279-80, 281, 287

2d, 184th Regiment: 180, 240, 253, 255-56, 258-59,

261, 264, 266, 273-76, 279-80, 281, 283, 285,

286-87

3d, 184th Regiment

on Bennett: 300-301

casualties of: 248, 253

commander of: 233

on Kwajalein Island: 233-36, 238, 240, 242-

43, 244-45, 247, 248, 249, 252-53, 255, 273,

280

missions of: 180

3d Army Defense: 184, 190

4th Army Defense: 184, 190

7th Army Defense: 35

Infantry Divisions

7th: 20, 49. See also Corlett, Maj. Gen.

Infantry Regiments, 17th, 32d, 184th.

and Aleutians operations: 17n

artillery: 225-29

combat experience of: 183

commander of: 170-71

composition of: 178-79

logistics for Kwajalein operations: 187-92

missions of: 177-78

and tactical plans for Marshalls operations:

168,170,173, 180

training of: 183-85

9th: 45

25th: 44

27th: 28, 35, 62, 374. See also Infantry Regiments,

105th, 106th, 165th; Smith, Maj. Gen. Ralph C.

amphibious training of: 44-47

casualties on Makin: 125

command of: 35-36

commander of: 25

composition of: 44

and Eniwetok operations: 333, 336

on hydrographic conditions at Butaritari: 102

intelligence on Butaritari: 30-31

logistics for Marshalls operations: 187, 190-91,

192

LVT's for: 48

Marshall on use of, in Central Pacific: 24-25,

24n

mission of: 25-26

pallets for: 49

tactical plan for Butaritari: 40-43

training of: 183, 185-86, 337-38

33d:265

40th: 44

76th: 44

77th: 374

Infantry Regiments

17th, 7th Division: 299-300

on Burton: 236, 291, 294, 295-98

on Carlos: 221, 222, 223-24

on Carlson: 221, 222, 224-25, 228-29

casualties of: 297, 298

commander of: 219

logistics for: 187-90, 191-92

missions of: 180

training of: 183-85

32d, 7th Division

casualties of: 247-48

commander of: 233

on Kwajalein Island: 229, 232, 233-36, 238,

239-40, 242, 243-44, 245-48, 249, 251, 252,

253-55, 256-59, 261, 262-65, 273-75, 276-

77, 278-82, 283-87, 288-89

logistics for: 187-90, 191-92

missions of: 180

training of: 183-85
INDEX 401

Infantry Regiments—Continued

105th, 27th Division: 40, 44, 77

on Butaritari: 41, 42, 77, 81, 89, 90, 91, 98,

106-08, 113, 116, 117, 118, 124

on Kotabu: 82

loading of: 49

mission of: 41-42

106th, 27th Division: 44, 333

commander of: 336

on Engebi: 345

on Eniwetok Island: 348-49, 350-60

logistics for: 187, 190-91, 192

and Majuro operations: 302

missions of: 349

on Parry: 360, 361, 364, 365

and tactical plans for Eniwetok: 338

and tactical plans for Majuro: 170, 171, 174,

182

training of: 183, 185-86

108th, 40th Division: 44

111th: 178, 179, 219-21, 366, 367

165th, 27th Division: 44, 51, 59, 191

on Butaritari: 75, 76-85, 86-88, 89-101, 106-

07, 108, 109, 110-11,112-25

casualties of: 100, 125

efficiency of communications of: 103-05, 105n

on Kotabu Island: 76

loading of: 49

mission of: 39

supply operations for: 102

tactical plans for: 40-43

training of: 47

transportation for: 35

184th, 7th Division

on Bennett: 300-301

commander of: 233

on Kwajalein Island: 229, 232, 233-36, 238,

240, 242-46, 247, 248, 249, 251, 252-57,

258-59, 261, 264-76, 277, 278, 279-80, 281,

282, 283-85, 286-88

logistics for: 187-90, 191-92

missions of: 180

training of: 183-85

Intelligence, Japanese: 69

Intelligence, U.S.

on Carlson: 175

on Eniwetok: 333, 334, 335-36

on Gilberts: 27-34, 77

on Kwajalein Island: 177

from prisoners of war: 360

sources of: 27

on Tarawa: 27, 31-34

Interceptor Carrier Group: 56, 57

Intrepid: 203, 313

Irvine, Comdr. Donald G.: 35

Ishikawa, Lt. (j.g.) Seizo: 71

Ivan Island: 174-75, 182, 304-06, 308, 311

Ivan Pass: 182, 307

Iwo Jima: 74, 213, 218, 370

Jacob Island: 174-75, 182, 304-06, 307, 308, 311

Jacob Pass: 307, 308

Jaluit Atoll: 166, 202, 212, 369. See also Marshall

Islands

aerial reconnaissance of: 39

air attacks on: 38, 39, 53, 56, 194, 197-98, 204, 366,

367, 368

as air base: 211-12

airfield: 168, 211-12

importance of, to Japanese: 60

as Japanese base: 61, 63, 64

Japanese defenses on: 208-09

Japanese strength on: 207-09, 210

tactical plans for: 168, 172

Japanese Army units

Regiments

107th Infantry: 211

122d Infantry: 211

Detachments

1st South Seas: 210-11

2d South Seas: 210

3d South Seas Garrison: 210

miscellaneous

2d Independent Garrison Unit: 211

Japanese Mandated Islands: 4, 23, 60

Japanese naval units. See also Combined Fleet; Imperial

Navy, Japanese.

1st Amphibious Brigade: 210, 211, 215, 335, 340-41,

342, 343

1st Fleet: 68

1st Mobile Shipborne Brigade. See 1st Amphibious

Brigade.

2d Fleet: 68, 69, 70

2d Rifle Company: 343

3d Fleet: 68, 69, 70

3d Special Base Force: 64, 67, 73

3d Special Base Force Makin Detachment: 71

4th Fleet: 60-61, 61n, 63, 64-65, 207-08, 212, 217-

18, 339

4th Fleet Construction Department Detachment: 67, 71,

73, 216, 340

5th Special Base Force: 63

6th Base Force: 61n, 64, 207, 208, 209, 212, 216, 217

6th Communications Unit: 209, 216

6th Defense Force: 207, 209

6th Fleet: 334

6th Submarine Base Force: 216

24th Air Force Headquarters: 217

41st Guard Force: 63

43d Guard Force: 63

43d Guard Force Dispatched Landing Force: 64

51st Guard Force: 61, 61n, 207, 209

52d Guard Force: 207, 209

53d Guard Force: 207, 209

61st Guard Force: 216, 339, 340, 342, 343

61st Guard Force Dispatched Force: 217, 218
402 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Japanese naval units—Continued

62d Guard Force: 63, 64

62d Guard Force Dispatched Landing Force: 64

66th Guard Force: 209

111th Construction Unit: 67, 71, 73

281st Air Unit: 217

753d Air Unit: 217

952d Air Unit: 216, 217

Carrier Division I: 69-70, 70n

Gilberts Invasion Special Landing Force: 61, 64

Sasebo 7th Special Naval Landing Force: 65, 67, 73

Southeastern Area Fleet: 65

Yokosuka 4th Special Naval Landing Force: 216

Yokosuka 6th Special Naval Landing Force: 63, 64

Japtan Island: 334, 344, 361

Jasinski, S. Sgt. Joseph A.: 354

Java: 60

JCS. See Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Jeroru Island. See Lilac Island.

Joint Army and Navy Board: 3

Joint Assault Signal Companies

75th: 178-79, 185, 239

295th: 178, 185, 186, 191

Joint Chiefs of Staff: 7n

and airfields for invasion of Gilberts: 52

and Casablanca Conference: 7-10

and directive to Nimitz on operations in Central

Pacific: 23-24

and objectives in Gilberts: 26-27

and Pacific Military Conference: 11

and strategy in Pacific: 5-7, 20-21, 22-23, 25, 165,

333, 372, 373

and tactical plans for Marshalls: 167-68, 169

and Washington conference, May 1943: 12-17

Joint Expeditionary Force. See Task Force 51.

Joint Intelligence Center, POA: 33

Joint Staff Planners: 11, 12n, 18, 20, 22, 23

Joint Strategic Survey Committee: 12n, 22

Joint War Plans Committee: 12n, 18-20

Jones, Capt. James L., USMC: 302, 303

Jones, Col. Louis R.: 313, 314, 318, 320-21

Jones, Maj. William K.: 150, 153, 154

Jordan, Lt. Col. Walter I., USMC: 138, 139

JPS. See Joint Staff Planners.

JSSC. See Joint Strategic Survey Committee.

JWPC. See Joint War Plans Committee.

Kahoolawe Island: 47, 185

Kahuku Point: 45

Kamikaze Corps: 370

Kane: 302-04, 344

Kannely, Sgt. Warren: 271-73

Kasper, Bosn. Joseph V.: 86-88

Kavieng: 333, 373

Kelley, Lt. Col. Gerard W.: 77, 94, 96-97, 106, 110

Keuea: 119

Kickul, T. Sgt. Graydon: 243

Kidd: 302

King, Admiral Ernest J.

command of: 5n, 7

on forces for Central Pacific: 24-25

and Gilberts operations: 157

and Marshalls operations: 160

and Pacific strategy: 8-10, 14-15, 22-23, 372-73

Kingman, Rear Adm. Howard F.: 127, 131

Kiriwina Island: 11, 20

Kiska: 10, 183

Klatt, 1st Lt. Harold D.: 267-69, 270, 271, 272-73

Klein, 1st. Lt. Arthur: 353-54, 355, 356

Knowles, Capt. Henry B., USN: 145, 190

Koga, Admiral Mineichi: 68-70, 334, 339. See also

Combined Fleet:

Koreans: 216, 225, 298

Kotabu Island: 42, 76, 82, 113n

Kretzer, 1st Lt. Robert J.: 285, 286, 287

Kuma Island: 29, 59, 106, 107, 112, 112n, 118, 119,

122, 124, 125

Kuria Atoll: 64

Kuril Islands: 4, 13, 60

Kusaie Island: 19, 167, 203, 210, 368

Kwajalein Atoll: 29, 157, 158, 166, 333, 334, 338,

339-40, 371, 374. See also Kwajalein Island;

Marshall Islands.

aerial reconnaissance of: 39

air attacks on: 53, 194, 199-202, 203-04

airfields: 174, 211

garrison forces for: 184-85

Japanese strength in: 63, 64

logistics of operations in: 187-93

operations in: 219-40, 241-61, 262-82, 283-301,

304-32

tactical plans for: 19, 168-70, 172, 173-82, 202

training for operations in: 183-87

Kwajalein Garrison Force: 178

Kwajalein Island: 219, 221. See also Kwajalein Atoll;

Marshall Islands.

Admiralty area: 262, 264, 265, 266, 273, 275-76,

277, 281, 287

air attacks on: 202, 203-04, 205, 232, 233, 253, 256,

259

as air base: 368, 369

airfield: 172, 202, 203, 211, 214-215, 241, 246, 249,

254, 368

appraisal of operations on: 289-90

Blue Beach 1: 236

bombardment of: 222-23, 227-28, 229, 230

Canary Strong Point: 246, 247, 256

Carl Road: 242, 254-55, 256-57, 258-59, 278-79,

281

casualties on: 289, 290

Cat Strong Point: 246, 255, 256

Center Pier: 241, 242, 248, 255, 262, 280

Corn Strong Point: 257, 258-59, 262, 281

Cox Road: 242

description of: 175-77, 241-42, 255, 256, 262, 266,

277, 283
INDEX 403

Kwajalein Island—Continued

Green Beach 4: 259, 278, 287

Japanese defense of: 233, 235, 245, 251-53, 254,

256, 281

Japanese defenses on: 209, 211, 212, 213 214-15,

242, 244, 246, 254-55, 256-57, 262-64, 266, 283

Japanese strength on: 208, 210, 211, 215-17, 218

logistics for operations on: 187-92

medical operations for: 238-39, 259-60

Nap Strong Point: 262, 276

Nate Road: 287

Nathan Road: 262, 273, 275, 276, 277, 278, 280,

281, 283, 286, 287-88

Nero Point: 288

Nob Pier: 214, 241-42, 252, 275, 276, 280, 281,

283-85, 287

Noel Road: 262, 273, 275, 276, 277, 286, 287

Nora Road: 256-57, 258, 259, 262, 265, 266, 273,

275, 276

operations on: 230-40, 241-61, 262-82, 283-90

reconnaissance of: 229, 233

Red Beach 1: 232, 233, 235, 236, 238, 240, 242,

243, 244, 249, 252, 280

Red Beach 2: 232, 233, 235, 236-38, 242-44, 249,

252, 260

supply operations for: 238, 259

tactical plans for: 169, 170, 172, 173-75, 177-80,

233, 253, 255, 257, 264, 273, 283-85

training for operations on: 183-86

Wallace Road: 238, 241, 242, 244, 245, 246, 247,

254, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 264

Wart Area: 241-42, 244, 257

Wet Strong Point: 242

Wheeler Strong Point: 244

Whistler Strong Point: 244

Will Road: 241, 244, 245, 246, 247, 249, 252, 255,

256, 257, 262, 266, 270, 276, 281, 285, 286, 287

Wilma Road: 244-45, 246-47, 249, 259, 278, 279

Wolf Strong Point: 252, 259

Worden Strong Point: 246, 247

Kwajalein Island Defense Group: 278

Kyle, Maj. Wood B., USMC: 141

La Salle: 51n

Ladyslipper Island. See Japtan Island.

Lae Atoll: 11, 366

Lahaina Roadstead: 203

Landing beaches

Betio: 31-33

Green: 142, 150, 151, 153

Red 1: 43, 127, 132-35, 137, 138, 139-42,

146-47, 150, 151, 153

Red 2: 43, 127, 132, 134, 135-38, 139-41,

142, 143, 144, 146-47, 148, 150-51, 153

Red 3: 43, 127, 131, 132, 138-39, 141-42,

147, 148, 161

Burton: 294-96

Landing beaches—Continued

Butaritari: 30

Red: 41, 42, 75, 76, 78, 79, 83, 96, 102, 103-

04, 105, 106, 107, 109, 116, 117

Red 2: 41, 42, 75, 76, 77, 78-79, 102, 103-04,

105, 106-07, 109, 116, 117, 124

Yellow: 42, 75, 76, 82-88, 89, 91, 94, 98, 100,

101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 109, 112, 116, 117,

118, 160

Engebi

Blue 3: 345

White 1: 345

Eniwetok Island

Yellow 1: 348-49, 358

Yellow 2: 348-49, 350-51, 353-55, 356, 358

Kwajalein Island

Blue 1: 236

Green 4: 259, 278, 287

Red 1: 232, 233, 235, 236, 238, 240, 242, 243,

244, 249, 252, 280

Red 2: 232, 233, 235, 236-38, 242-44, 249,

252, 260

Namur

Green 1: 182, 311, 316, 322, 324

Green 2: 182, 311, 313, 316, 322, 324, 325

Parry: 363

Roi

Red 2: 182, 311, 315, 318

Red 3: 182, 311, 315, 316

Landing craft. See by name.

Landing operations

Engebi: 344-47

Eniwetok Island: 350-55

Kwajalein Atoll: 219-20, 222, 223, 224-25, 232-36

Makin: 83, 85, 86-88

in northern Kwajalein Atoll: 305-06, 307

Parry: 363

on Roi-Namur: 312-17, 322-24

on Tarawa: 132-39

training for: 184, 186

Landing ships. See by name.

Langley: 203

Larsen, Maj. Stanley E., USMC: 145

LCI's: 174, 182, 306, 307, 336, 344, 347

LCI(G)'s: 173, 174, 182, 222, 224, 225, 233, 295,

306, 307, 311-12, 315, 345, 350

LCM's: 39, 42, 43, 77, 82, 85, 102, 127, 133-34, 138,

182, 193, 223, 225, 227, 232, 236, 306, 314, 316-

17, 347, 363

LCS's: 160-61

LCT's: 278, 371

LCVP's: 30, 31-33, 39, 41, 42, 43, 48, 76, 77, 82-83,

86-88, 102, 127, 133, 137, 139, 141, 148, 164,

220, 222, 223, 224, 278, 294, 307, 308, 312-13,

316, 322

Leahy, Admiral William D.: 22, 23

Lee: 51n

Legan Island. See Clifford Island.
404 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Leonard, Capt. Francis P.: 89, 111

Leonard Wood: 49, 49n, 75, 79, 102, 105, 125

Liaison, U.S.

air-ground: 77, 112-13, 130, 161-62

infantry-artillery: 243

lateral: 42, 90, 103, 105n, 134, 137, 139, 258

naval: 40, 77

naval-air: 40

tank-infantry: 162-63, 243-44

Lib Island: 366

Liberator bombers. See B-24's.

Likiep Atoll: 367

Lilac Island: 344

Lindenwald: 232

Linebaugh, 1st Lt. George E.: 295

Lines of communications, Japanese: 3, 9, 11, 15, 17,

60

Lines of communications, U.S.: 4, 6-7, 10, 20

Linquist, 1st Lt. Warren T.: 97

Liscome Bay: 126

Little Makin: 53

Lo Prete, Maj. Joseph E., USMC: 326n

Logie, Col. Marc J.: 233, 277, 285

Logistics, Japanese: 208

Logistics, U.S.: 20, 47-51, 163-64, 173-74, 187-93.

See also Supply operations, U.S.

Loi Island. See Blakenship Island.

Louisville: 305, 312, 345, 363

LSD's: 39

Ashland: 51n, 232, 358

Belle Grove: 49, 51, 82, 232

for Carolines operations: 16

and Eniwetok operations: 336, 358

Epping Forest: 193

in Gilberts: 49, 51, 51n

Gunston Hall: 193

Lindenwald: 232

in Marshalls: 173, 189, 192, 193, 232

LST's 20, 39

179: 82

482: 302-03

air attack on: 59

and Eniwetok: 336, 344, 350, 361

in Gilberts: 35, 42, 48, 49, 51, 56, 57, 58, 76, 82

in Marshalls: 15, 173, 189, 190, 191-92, 193, 203,

222, 225-27, 229, 230, 232, 278, 294, 302-03,

305, 309, 309n, 311-12, 313, 314, 366-67

training for: 313

Luzon: 9, 22-23, 370

LVT's: 20, 20n, 31, 39, 371

appraisal of: 164-65

description of: 47-48, 51

and Eniwetok: 337, 344, 347, 350, 351, 363

in Gilberts: 41, 42, 43, 48, 49, 57, 76-78, 82-83,

85, 102, 103, 107, 110, 117, 118, 119, 125, 127,

130, 132-33, 137, 138-41, 145, 147, 148, 153,

160-61

LVT's—Continued at Guadalcanal: 48

in Marshalls: 173, 179, 182, 184, 186-87, 188-89,

190, 192-93, 222-23, 224-25, 227, 229, 232,

233-36, 238, 240, 243, 260, 278, 295, 297, 304-

06, 307-08, 309, 311-14, 315, 316, 322, 324, 366

shortage of: 41, 47, 307, 308, 312, 313, 322

LVT(A)'s: 173, 173n, 179, 182, 188-89, 192, 222, 232,

233, 235, 238, 243, 295, 298, 306, 308, 311, 315-

16, 325, 327, 336-37, 345-47, 353, 354, 363

LVT(l)'s: 48

LVT(2)'s: 48, 312

Maalaea Bay: 47

MacArthur, General Douglas: 3, 5, 6, 10-12, 18-21,

25, 70, 372, 373

MacDonough: 76-77, 83

Machine guns, U.S. See Guns, U.S., machine.

Madang; 11

Madison, Michael: 303

Mahoney, Maj. James H.: 97, 110-11, 125

Maiana Atoll: 64, 128, 155-56

Majuro Atoll: 278, 333. See also Marshall Islands.

aerial reconnaissance of: 170

as air base: 211, 367, 369

description of: 302

importance of: 170

Japanese strength on: 208

logistics for operations in: 191, 192

as naval base: 367-68

operations on: 302-04, 306n

tactical plans for: 169-70, 172, 173-74, 182, 202,

203

troops for: 170, 171, 302

Majuro Attack Force. See Task Group 51.2.

Majuro Landing Force: 171. See also Sheldon, Lt. Col.

Frederick B.

Makin Atoll: 57, 68, 156, 188, 189n, 191, 209. See also

Butaritari; Gilbert Islands.

aerial reconnaissance of: 54

air attacks on: 53-54, 55-56, 67

as air base: 195, 197, 198, 367, 369

air support for: 38-40

airfield in: 65, 158, 169-70, 211

appraisal of operations in: 125-26

Carlson's raid on, 1942: 61-62

casualties at: 125

decision to invade: 26

description of: 29-30, 31

garrisoning of: 124-25

importance of, to Japanese: 60-61

intelligence on: 27, 28-31

Japanese defenses at: 48, 65, 71-73, 74, 75-76, 85

Japanese occupy: 61

Japanese reinforcement of: 62-65

Japanese seaplane base at: 67
INDEX 405

Makin Atoll—Continued

Japanese strength at: 71

landing craft for: 48

naval support for: 35, 40

operations at: 89-101, 102-11, 112-26

results of operations at: 157

shipping for: 35

supply operations at: 49

tactical lessons learned at: 160, 162-63, 164

tactical plans for: 21-22, 39-40, 43, 59

target date for: 27

troops for: 34-35

Makua: 184

Malaya: 4, 10, 60

Maleolap Atoll: 166, 202, 340, 369. See also Marshall

Islands.

aerial reconnaissance of: 39

air attacks on: 53, 194, 195-97, 204, 366, 367

airfield: 172, 174, 211-12

Japanese defenses at: 208-09

Japanese strength at: 207, 208-09, 210

naval bombardment of: 205

tactical plans for: 19, 168-69, 172, 174

Manila Bay: 4

Manila Bay: 232

Manley: 219, 220, 300

Mann Island. See Clement Island.

Manus Island: 373

Marakei Atoll: 155-56

Mariana Islands: 4, 5, 9, 13n, 15, 16, 23, 165, 166-67,

206, 207, 208, 210, 334, 368, 370, 372-74

Marine Air Base Defense Wing, 4th: 369

Marine Airdrome Battalion, 2d: 52

Marine Amphibian Tractor Battalions

2d: 48

4th: 192,312, 313, 316

10th: 192, 304, 309, 312

11th: 192

Marine Armored Amphibian Battalion, 1st: 186, 192

Marine Artillery Battalions

1st, 10th Regiment: 146, 147

2d, 10th Regiment: 150, 151

1st, 14th Regiment: 304, 308, 312

2d, 14th Regiment: 304, 308, 312

3d, 14th Regiment: 182, 304, 306, 312

4th, 14th Regiment: 182, 304, 306, 312

2d Separate Pack Howitzer: 360-61

Marine Artillery Regiments

10th: 43, 146, 147, 148, 150, 151

14th: 182, 304, 306, 308, 312

Marine Defense Battalions

1st: 170, 203

2d: 35

7th: 52

8th: 35

10th: 361

Marine Engineer Regiment, 18th: 138, 153

Marine Infantry Battalions

1st, 2d Regiment: 43, 141, 144, 150, 151, 153

2d, 2d Regiment: 43, 132, 135-38, 139-41, 142-43,

144, 147, 148, 151

3d, 2d Regiment: 43, 132-35, 137, 139-41, 142, 148,

151, 155

1st, 6th Regiment: 150, 151-53, 154

2d, 6th Regiment: 150, 153, 155

3d, 6th Regiment: 151-53, 154-55, 156

1st, 8th Regiment: 43, 146, 147-48, 151, 155

2d, 8th Regiment: 43, 138-39, 142, 143-44, 147,

148, 151-53

3d, 8th Regiment: 43, 141-42, 144, 145, 146, 151-

53

1st, 22d Regiment

and Engebi: 345, 347-48

and mop-up in Marshalls: 366

and Parry: 361, 363, 364

2d, 22d Regiment

and Engebi: 345, 347-48

and mop-up in Marshalls: 367

and Parry: 361, 363, 364

3d, 22d Regiment

commander of: 356

and Eniwetok Island: 348-49, 356-58, 361

and Engebi: 345, 348

and Parry: 363, 364

1st, 23d Regiment: 314, 315-16, 318, 320-21

2d, 23d Regiment: 313-14, 315-18, 319-20, 321

3d, 23d Regiment: 319, 321, 366-67

1st, 24th Regiment: 322, 323-24, 327-29, 331

2d, 24th Regiment: 313, 316, 322, 323-29, 331

3d, 24th Regiment: 315, 316, 322-23, 322n, 327,

329-31

1st, 25th Regiment: 304-05, 306-07, 308

2d, 25th Regiment: 304-05, 306-08

3d, 25th Regiment: 304-05, 306-09, 324

2d Raider: 28-29, 61-62

Marine Infantry Divisions

1st: 16, 20, 21, 24

2d: 16, 20, 28, 31, 35, 49, 127, 144, 163, 164, 186,

190, 332, 374. See also Marine Infantry Regiments, 2d, 6th, 8th; Smith, Maj. Gen. Julian C.,

USMC.

combat experience of: 47

commander of: 25-26, 35-36

intelligence on Tarawa: 31-34

loading for: 51

and LVT's: 48, 164

MacArthur on use of: 21

mission of: 39

selection of, for Gilberts operation: 24

tactical plan for Betio: 43

training of: 47

transportation for: 35

weapons for: 163

3d: 16, 24, 374
406 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Marine Infantry Divisions—Continued

4th: 16, 138, 374. See also Marine Infantry Regiments, 23d, 24th, 25th; Schmidt, Maj. Gen.

Harry, USMC.

casualties of: 331

combat experience of: 183

commander of: 171

logistics for Kwajalein operations: 192-93

supply of: 332

and tactical plans for Marshalls operations:

168, 170, 173, 180, 181-82

training of: 183, 186-87

Marine Infantry Regiments

2d, 2d Division

on Betio: 132-38, 139-41, 142-43, 144, 147,

148-50, 151-53, 155

casualties of: 133, 134

combat experience of: 47

commander of: 127

missions of: 43

6th, 2d Division

at Apamama: 156

on Bairiki: 150, 153, 155

on Betio: 150-55

on Buota: 155

combat experience of: 47

missions of: 39, 43, 127

8th, 2d Division: 43

on Betio: 138-42, 143-44, 145, 146-48, 151-

53, 155

casualties of: 139

combat experience of: 47

mission of: 127

22d: 168, 333

commander of: 336

on Engebi: 345, 347-48

on Eniwetok Island: 348, 356-58

logistics for: 192

and mop-up operations in Marshalls: 366-67

on Parry: 361-63, 364

tactical plans for Eniwetok: 338

training of: 183, 337-38

23d, 4th Division

casualties of: 321

commander of: 313

mission of: 311-12

on Roi: 311-12, 313-21, 329

tactical plans for: 182

24th, 4th Division

casualties of: 325-26

commander of: 312

mission of: 311-12

on Namur: 311-13, 314, 315, 316, 321-22

tactical plans for: 182

25th, 4th Division: 181-82, 304-05, 306-08, 309-

11, 324, 331

Marine Joint Assault Signal Company, 1st: 186

Marine Search and Patrol Group. See Task Group

57.3.

Marine Special Weapons Battalion, 4th: 311

Marine Tank Battalions

2d: 147, 150, 155-56

4th:

and Eniwetok operations: 336, 338, 345

on Ivan and Jacob: 304, 306, 309

on Namur: 323, 324, 329

2d Separate: 338, 345, 348, 350

Marshall, General George C.: 7, 9, 10, 14, 21, 23, 24-

25, 24n

Marshall, Lt. Col. S. L. A.: 110, 124

Marshall Islands: 3, 4, 5, 26, 206. See also Eniwetok

Atoll; Eniwetok Island; Jaluit Atoll; Kwajalein

Atoll; Kwajalein Island; Majuro Atoll; Maleolap

Atoll; Mille Atoll; Wotje Atoll.

aerial reconnaissance of: 157-58, 168, 170

air attacks on: 53, 54, 158, 193-205

airfields in: 168, 172, 174, 180, 207-08

chain of command in: 170-72, 187, 191

consequences of operations in: 370-74

decision to invade: 18-23

description of: 166

effect of Gilberts campaign on operations in: 157-

58, 161, 165, 184, 186, 187-88, 189, 190, 191

history of: 166-67

importance of: 15, 23

importance of operations in, in Central Pacific

strategy: 368-69

Japanese defenses in: 206-10, 211, 212-18

Japanese occupation of: 167

in Japanese strategy: 60-61, 62-67, 68-69

Japanese strength in: 207-08, 210-18

Japanese tactical plans for: 210-11, 212-13

logistics of operations in: 187-93

Nimitz on operations in: 167

operations in: 219-40, 241-61, 262-82, 283-301,

302-32, 333-65, 366-74

tactical plans for: 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18-22, 23,

167-82, 202

target dates for: 20-21, 24, 168, 170, 177

training for operations in: 183-87

troops for: 15, 18-20, 21, 34-35, 168, 170

Maryland: 38, 129, 141, 145-46, 150, 161, 162, 305,

307, 312

Maui: 47, 56, 185, 186, 338

Maya: 70

Maysonave, Capt. Rene E.: 287

McCawley: 37

McCord: 344

McDonough, Lt. Col. John F.: 82, 91, 93, 96, 98,

112-13, 116, 117, 124

McGinley, 2d Lt. Everett W.: 110

McGovern, Capt. John B., USN: 148

McKee: 223

McLeod, Lt. Col. Kenneth F.: 155
INDEX 407

McMorris, Rear Adm. Charles H.: 168

Meany, Chaplain Joseph A.: 96-97

Medals of Honor

Anderson, Pfc. Richard B.: 321n

Dyess, Lt. Col. Aquilla J.: 331, 331n

Power, 1st Lt. John V.: 327n

Sorenson, Pvt. Richard K.: 329n

Medical Battalions

7th: 228, 238-39, 260, 297

102d: 125

Medical operations

on Burton: 297

on Kwajalein Island: 238-39, 259-60, 278

at Makin: 88

Medium bombers. See A-24's; B-25's.

Mejit Islands: 367

Mele Bay: 47

Mellu Island. See Ivan Island.

Merritt, Brig. Gen. Lewie G., USMC: 39, 172. See

also Task Group 57.3.

Mersereau, S. Sgt. Hoyl: 99, 100

Micronesia: 3

Middleton: 51n

Midway: 4, 5, 9

Midway, Battle of: 21, 21n

Mili Island: 194

Military Intelligence Division, WDGS: 44

Mille Atoll: 68, 166, 202, 212, 369. See also Marshall

Islands.

aerial reconnaissance of: 39

air attacks on: 38, 39, 53, 56, 194-95, 197, 204-05,

366, 367

airfield: 53, 56, 168, 194, 195, 211, 212

Japanese defenses at: 209

Japanese strength at: 208, 209, 210

tactical plans for: 168, 172

Mindanao: 11, 21, 373

Mine sweepers, U.S.

Chandler: 302

and Eniwetok operations: 336, 344

in Gilberts: 40, 129-30, 148

in Marshalls: 173, 302, 305, 307

Oracle: 302

Pursuit: 129-30, 148

Requisite: 129

Sage: 302, 344

Minneapolis: 105, 223, 230, 249, 253, 295

Mississippi: 222-23, 229, 230

Mitscher, Rear Adm. Marc A.: 171, 172, 199n, 334,

338. See also Task Force 58.

Mizony, Lt. Col. Harold I.: 350, 358, 359

Mobile: 305, 312

Mogami: 70

Monrovia: 51n

Monterey: 203

Montgomery, Rear Adm. Alfred E.: 54, 203. See also

Task Force 14; Task Group 58.2.

Moore, Lt. Col. William B.: 300-301

Morison, Samuel Eliot: 339n

Morris: 312

Mortars, Japanese: 252, 281, 354-55

50-mm.: 342

81-mm.: 341, 342

Mortars, U.S.

4.2-inch chemical: 249

60-mm.: 89, 89n, 94, 99, 281, 290, 309, 311

81-mm.: 238, 281, 297-98, 309, 311, 324

Mortlock Island: 373

Mullinix, Rear Adm. Henry M.: 126

Murphy, Capt. Charles W., Jr.: 277

Murray, Lt. Col. Raymond L.: 150

Musashi: 68

Mustin: 312

Myoko: 70

Nagata, Warrant Officer, IJN: 304

Namerik Atoll: 367

Namu Atoll: 367

Namur. See also Roi; Roi-Namur.

appraisal of operations on: 331-32

bombardment of: 324

casualties on: 331

description of: 181, 322

Green Beach 1: 182, 311, 316, 322, 324

Green Beach 2: 182, 311, 313, 316, 322, 324, 325

Japanese defense of: 322-23, 329

Narcissus Street: 329

Natalie Point: 325, 329, 331

Nora Point: 331

operations on: 311-13, 314, 315, 316, 322-32

Pauline Point: 322, 324, 329

Sally Point: 308, 324, 325, 327

Sycamore Boulevard: 322, 323, 327, 329

tactical plans for: 182

Yokohama Pier: 324, 325

Nanomea Atoll: 52-53, 54, 55, 157, 194, 196, 199

Narruhn, Pvt. Fred C.: 28

Nassau: 302

National Defense Research Committee: 189

Natoma Bay: 302

Natzeke, Capt. Richard H.: 295

Nauru: 58, 185, 191, 207, 209, 337

air attacks on: 38, 52, 54-55, 67

airfield: 52, 54, 67-68

decision on operations against: 21-22, 26-27

importance of: 23-24

Japanese reinforcement of: 63, 64

in Japanese strategy: 65

target dates for: 23

troops for: 22, 24

Nautilus: 27, 35, 61-62, 156

Naval bombardment, U.S. See Naval gunfire support, U.S.
408 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Naval Construction Battalions

74th: 368

107th: 368

109th: 368

121st: 368

Naval gunfire support, U.S.: 56

Albert and Alien: 307

Apamama: 156

appraisal of: 159-61, 165

Butaritari: 62, 91, 99, 105, 118

Carlson: 225

Engebi: 344, 345, 349

Eniwetok Island: 344, 349

for the Gilberts: 35, 40, 42, 43

Kwajalein Island: 222-23, 229, 230, 233, 251, 252,

253

Majuro: 304

Makin: 75-76, 83, 88, 88n

Parry: 344, 349, 360, 363, 364-65

Roi-Namur: 305, 306, 311, 312, 321, 324

Tarawa: 129-32, 139, 150

Nelson, Lt. Col. Glen A.: 244

Nelson, 1st Lt. Ramon: 279

Netherlands Indies: 4, 5, 9, 11, 210

Neutralization Group. See Task Group 50.15.

Neville: 37, 49, 49n, 76, 82, 86, 113n

New Britain: 9, 11-12, 15

New Caledonia: 5

New Guinea: 3, 4-5, 7, 9-10, 11, 13-14, 15, 17, 21,

24, 65, 159, 209, 210, 370, 371, 373

New Hebrides: 58

New Ireland: 9, 11, 24

New Jersey: 339

New Mexico: 223, 229, 230

New Orleans: 223, 230

New Zealand: 7, 25

Night perimeters, U.S.: 122-23, 249, 252-53

Nimitz, Admiral Chester W.: 5n, 70

and air bases for Gilberts operations: 52

command of: 5-6

and command of Holland Smith: 36

and directive on operations in Central Pacific:

23-24

and Gilberts operations: 157, 165

and logistics for Marshalls operations: 188, 191, 193

on LVT's: 165

missions of: 3, 6-7, 12, 17, 17n, 25

and Pacific strategy: 20, 23, 218, 333, 372, 373-74

and Spruance's mission in Gilberts: 26-27

and tactical plans for Marshalls: 167-70, 172

Ninni Island. See Cecil Island.

Nisei: 124, 288

Nishida, Maj. Gen. Yoshimi: 340-41, 348

Nonuti: 64

North Gugegwe Island. See Berlin Island.

North Pacific Area: 5-6

Northern Attack Force (Gilberts): 34-35, 38-40, 47,

49-51, 56-59. See also Task Force 52 (Gilberts).

Northern Carrier Group: 56, 57

Northern Landing Force (Gilberts): 35, 36

Northern Landing Force (Marshalls). See Task Force

53 (Marshalls); Task Group 56.2.

Nukufetau Atoll: 52-53, 55, 194, 196, 197

Nunnery, 2d Lt. Daniel T.: 96

Oahu: 28, 44, 45, 49, 184, 185

O'Brien, Capt. Lawrence J.: 94, 119

Ocean Island: 63, 64, 65, 207, 209, 212

Oldendorf, Rear Adm. Jesse B.: 336

Okinawa: 213, 370, 372

Operation Plan Cen 1-43: 34-39

Operation Plan 16-43: 169

Operations Division, WDGS: 20, 22

Oracle: 302

ORANGE Plans: 3-4

Ordnance Company, 707th: 229

O'Sullivan, Col. Curtis D.: 232, 277, 287

Overton: 219, 220-21, 290, 291, 300

P-39's: 158, 194

P-40's: 158, 197

PB4Y's: 199

Pacific Fleet, U.S.: 4, 5, 7, 14, 68, 168, 169-70

Pacific Military Conference: 11-12

Pacific Ocean Areas: 5-6

Pagan Island: 208

Palau Islands: 11, 206, 207, 208, 339, 370, 373, 374

Pali: 45

Pallets: See Supply operations, pallets.

Palliser, 1st Lt. Thomas B.: 93

Papua: 7, 9

Parry Island. See also Eniwetok Atoll.

air attacks on: 363

description of: 334

Green Beach 2: 363

Green Beach 3: 363

Japanese defense of: 363

Japanese defenses on: 336, 341, 347-48, 363-64

Japanese strength on: 340-41, 348, 360

as naval base: 368

naval bombardment of: 344, 349, 360, 363, 364-65

operations on: 360-65

tactical plans for: 338, 348, 360, 361-63

troops for: 348, 357, 358

Patrols, Japanese: 108, 128

Pearl Harbor: 3, 4, 13, 24, 26, 47, 127, 166, 168, 192,

203

Pence, Capt. Albert W.: 256, 289

Pennsylvania: 117, 222-23, 229, 230, 345, 363

Phelps: 76, 83, 105, 306, 307, 308, 313, 314, 345

Philippine Islands: 3-4,-5, 9, 11, 13, 14-15, 370, 374

Phoenix Islands: 157
INDEX 409

Pierce: 49n, 117, 124

Plumley, Capt. Merwin G., USMC: 62

POA. See Pacific Ocean Areas.

Ponape Island: 16, 203, 208, 368

Port Moresby: 5, 7

Porterfield: 307

Portland: 302

Power, 1st Lt. John V., USMC: 327n

Pownall, Rear Adm. Charles A.

and air attack on Wake: 69

command of: 38

and operations in Gilberts: 53, 55, 56, 67, 129

and operations in Marshalls: 199

Pratt, Pfc. Harold S.: 271-72

President, U.S. See Roosevelt, Franklin D.

President Polk: 225-27

Preston, Lt. Col. George D.: 251

Princeton: 203

Prisoners of war

of Americans: 85, 101, 223, 287-88, 360

of Japanese: 62

Pursuit: 129-30, 148

Quantico: 48

Quartermaster Company, of the 27th Division: 49

Quartermaster Corps: 189

Rabaul: 4, 7, 9, 10-12, 15, 65, 68, 69-70, 373

Radio, U.S. See Communications, U.S., radio.

RAINBOW 5: 4

Raleigh, 1st Lt. Patrick J.: 96

Ralik Chain: 166

Rasberry, Pvt. Parvee: 243

Ratak Chain: 166

Ready, Brig. Gen. Joseph L.: 229, 251, 277, 279

Reconnaissance, Japanese: 63

Reconnaissance, U.S.

aerial: 27, 30-31, 39, 52, 54, 55, 112, 158, 165, 168,

170, 177, 194-95, 199,202, 222, 233, 293, 294,

333, 334-36, 339

ground: 112, 220, 285

submarine: 27, 31, 61-62

tank: 297

Reconnaissance Company, V Amphibious Corps: 40,

42, 76, 82, 113, 192

and Apamama operations: 156

and Eniwetok operations: 336, 338, 344, 348

and Majuro operations: 170, 171, 182, 302-04, 306n

Reconnaissance Troops

7th Cavalry

on Bennett: 300-301

on Cecil and Carter: 219-21

on Chauncey: 290-91

and Kwajalein operations: 178, 179, 180

training of: 184

27th Cavalry: 104

Reeves, Rear Adm. John W.: 203, 278. See also Task

Group 58.1.

Relief: 278

Relief Carrier Force: 58

RENO: 11, 12, 21

Requisite: 129

Rice, Maj. Howard J., USMC: 138, 141, 142-43

Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C., Jr.: 110

and air base on Baker: 52

and amphibious training: 45-47

command of: 25

and logistics of Marshalls operations: 187, 188, 191

mission of: 44

and training of 7th Division: 183, 184

Rider, S. Sgt. Eugene M.: 289

Ringgold: 129-30, 131, 139, 146, 150, 222-23, 230

Rixey, Lt. Col. Presley M., USMC: 147, 148

RO Operation: 69-70

Roberts, Col. Frank N.: 22

Rocky Mount: 172, 220, 227, 229, 251

Roebling, Donald: 48

Roi. See also Namur; Roi-Namur.

air attacks on: 313, 319, 368

as air base: 368

airfield: 172, 174, 180-81, 199-202, 203, 211-12,

214, 315, 317, 321, 368

description of: 180-81

Japanese defense of: 317

Japanese defenses on: 319

Japanese strength on: 208

Norbert Circle: 315, 321

Nat Circle: 320

operations on: 311-12, 313-21, 322

Red Beach 2: 182, 311, 315, 318

Red Beach 3: 182, 311, 315, 316

tactical plans for: 182

Tokyo Pier: 316

Wendy Point: 315, 318

Roi-Namur. See also Namur; Roi.

air attacks on: 199-202, 203-04, 205, 305, 306, 308,

311, 313, 324-25

description of: 180-81

Japanese defenses on: 213-14

Japanese strength on: 209, 216, 217-18

logistics for operations on: 192-93

naval bombardment of: 305, 306, 311

operations on: 311-32

tactical plans for: 169, 170, 172-75, 180-82, 304-05,

311-12

training for operations on: 183, 186-87

Rongelap Atoll: 166, 367

Rongerik Atoll: 367

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 4, 5, 7, 12, 16, 23

Roosevelt, Lt. Col. James, USMCR: 28, 62

Roper, Pfc. Paul: 243

Rothwell, Lt. Col. Richard C., USMC: 324n

Rujoru Island: See Canna Island.
410 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Russell: 312

Russell Islands: 20

Ryan, Capt. Bernard E.: 89, 98, 99-100, 112n, 113

Ryan, Maj. Michael P.: 134, 142, 150

Ryukyu Islands: 5

Sage: 302, 344

Saipan: 16, 63,123, 208

Salamaua: 11

Samoan Islands: 4, 5, 9, 10, 48, 202, 209, 337

San Diego: 44, 45, 202, 203

San Francisco: 222-23, 229, 230, 295

Sangamon: 305

Sankyu Transportation Company: 216, 340

Santa Fe: 305, 312

Saratoga: 203

Sayers, Ensign William J., USN: 249

Schmidt, Maj. Gen. Harry, USMC. See also Marine

Infantry Divisions, 4th; Task Group 56.2.

command of: 171

and logistics for 4th Marine Division: 193

and Roi-Namur operations: 314, 318, 331

and training of 4th Marine Division: 186-87

Schoettel, Maj. John F., USMC: 132, 134-35, 142,

155

Schofield Barracks: 44

Seaplane bases, Japanese: 67-68, 291-93

Searchlights, Japanese: 214

Seventh Air Force, U.S.: 369

commander of: 38

deployment of forces of: 52-53

and Gilberts operations: 24, 52-53, 55

and Marshalls operations: 53, 193-99, 202, 203-04

other operations of: 52

Sheldon, Lt. Col. Frederick B.: 171, 302

Sheridan: 51n

Sherman, Rear Adm. Forrest P.: 70, 168

Sherman, Rear Adm. Frederick C.: 70, 203. See also

Task Group 58.3.

Shibasaki, Rear Adm. Keiji: 67, 73, 128, 132

Shipping, Japanese, air attacks on: 54, 55, 56, 195,

197, 198-202, 203, 204, 339, 368

Ship-to-shore movement. See Amphibious operations,

U.S.; Supply operations, U.S.

Shisler, Maj. Clair W., USMC: 356

Shore fire control parties: 40, 59, 104-05

Shore party teams: 184-85

Shortages, U.S.

of ammunition: 361

of artillery: 349

of DUKW's: 192, 338

of Engineer battalions: 184

of LVT's: 41, 47, 304-05, 307, 308, 312, 322, 338

of radios: 307

Shoup, Col. David M., USMC: 127, 135, 139-41, 142,

145-48

Siberia: 13

Signal Companies. See also Joint Assault Signal Companies.

7th: 239

27th: 49, 103

75th: 103

Sigsbee: 223, 230, 250, 252

Sikes, Capt. Wayne C.:91

Small, Rear Adm. Ernest G.: 171-72. See also Task

Group 50, 15.

Smith, Lt. Col. Edward P.: 222

Smith, Maj. Gen. Holland M., USMC: 25, 41, 41n,

49, 59, 251. See also V Amphibious Corps; Task

Force 56.

commands of: 25, 35-36, 170

on death of Colonel Conroy: 97n

and Eniwetok operations: 333

and Gilberts operations: 126, 157, 162, 164

on Gilberts and Marshalls operations: 370, 371

and logistics for Marshalls operations: 187, 191

on LVT's: 164

mission of: 44

on 2d Marine Division: 47

and tactical plans for Marshalls: 169, 170

and training for Marshalls operations: 185

Smith, Maj. Gen. Julian C., USMC: 162. See also

Marine Divisions, 2d.

command of: 25, 35, 36

and Gilberts operations: 33, 127, 141, 142, 145-46,

147, 150, 153, 155

on LVT's: 165

mission of: 25-26

Smith, 1st Lt. Norvin E.: 265

Smith, Maj. Gen. Ralph C.: 106, 122, 124. See also

Infantry Divisions, 27th.

and amphibious training: 45

biography of: 44

command of: 25, 36

and communications at Butaritari: 105

on LVT's: 164

and tactical plans for Gilberts: 41-43, 41n, 59, 79,

106, 112, 116-17, 118, 122

Solomon Islands: 3, 4-5, 7, 9, 11-12, 13, 15, 17, 20n,

65, 159

Solomon Sea: 11

Sorenson, Pvt. Richard K., USMC: 329n

South China Sea: 13

South Gugegwe Island. See Beverly Island.

South Pacific Area: 5-6, 5n, 9, 11, 13-17, 20, 21, 22,

24, 333

South Sea Islands: 60

Southeastern Pacific Area: 5n

Southern Attack Force (Gilberts)

air support for: 38-40

command of: 34
INDEX 411

Southern Attack Force (Gilberts)—Continued

composition of: 35

at Efate:47, 127

loading of: 51

missions of: 35, 127

naval support for: 40

route to Gilberts: 57-59

Southern Attack Force (Marshalls). See Task Force

52; Task Force 53; Task Group 56.1.

Southern Carrier Group: 56, 58

Southern Landing Force (Gilberts): 35

Southern Resources Area: 60

Southwest Pacific Area: 5, 5n, 9, 11, 13-17, 18-20,

21, 22-23

Spruance, Vice Adm. Raymond A. See also Task

Force 50.

command of: 25, 170, 170n

and command organization for Gilberts: 34-39

and Eniwetok operations: 333-34

and Gilberts operations: 26-27, 34-39, 157, 158

and Marshalls operations: 168-72, 199n

and Truk operations: 339

Stevens: 223

Stevenson, 1st Lt. Robert E.: 309

Strait of Malacca: 13

"Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan": 12-17, 18

Strategic plans, Japanese, in Pacific: 4-5, 60-61,

62-67, 68-70

Strategic plans, U.S.

for Central Pacific: 18, 20-24, 218, 333-34, 370-74

for Europe: 7-8, 12, 16

Japanese estimate of: 212

for Pacific: 5-17

prewar: 3-4

Strength, Japanese

on Betio: 43

on Burton: 213, 215, 216, 217

on Butaritari: 71

at Eniwetok Atoll: 333, 335-36, 339-41, 342-43,

348, 360

on Kwajalein Island: 208-09, 210, 211, 215-17, 218

at Majuro: 208

on Makin: 7 1

on Maloelap: 207, 208-09, 210

on Mille: 208, 209, 210

in Marshalls: 207-09, 210-18

naval: 70

naval air: 70, 70n

in Pacific: .17, 61, 63-67

on Tarawa: 67-68, 73, 127, 154

Strike Command (Marshalls). See Task Group 57.2

(Marshalls).

Subchasers, U.S.: 232, 307-08, 344

Submarines, Japanese: 68, 208, 334

Submarines, U.S.: 4n

Argonaut: 61

for Carolines operations: 16

Submarines, U.S.—Continued

in Gilberts: 61-62, 156

in Marshalls: 203

Nautilus: 27, 35, 61-62, 156

Sumatra: 60

Superbattleships, Japanese: 68

Supply opreations, U.S.

appraisal of: 163-64

at Kwajalein Atoll: 228-29, 232, 238, 259, 278

at Makin: 79, 102, 109, 117

use of pallets: 48-49, 117, 188, 191

at Tarawa: 144-47, 148

Suwanee: 305, 308

SWPA. See Southwest Pacific Area.

Tactical Group One, V Amphibious Corps: 336. See

also Watson, Brig. Gen. Thomas E., USMC.

Tactical plans, Japanese

in Central Pacific: 212-13

for Engebi: 342-43

for Eniwetok Island: 342

for island defense: 65

for Parry: 341

for Tarawa: 154

Tactical plans, U.S.

Betio: 43, 127, 132, 147-48, 150, 151, 153-54

for Burton: 178, 259, 291, 294

for Butaritari: 41-43, 89, 91, 93, 94, 96, 98, 101,

108, 112, 117, 118, 122

for Engebi: 338, 345

for Eniwetok Atoll: 19, 167, 168, 172, 334, 338

for Eniwetok Island: 338, 348-49, 350-51

for Gilberts: 10, 18-20, 21-22, 23, 25-27, 39-43

for Jaluit: 168, 172

for Kwajalein Atoll: 29, 157, 158, 166, 333, 334,

338, 339-40, 371,374

for Kwajalein Island: 169, 170, 172, 173-75,

177-80, 233, 253, 255, 257, 264, 273, 283-85

for Majuro: 169-70, 172, 173-74, 182, 202, 203

for Makin: 21-22, 39-40, 43, 59

for Maloelap: 19, 168-69, 172, 174

for Marianas: 368

for Marshalls: 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18-22, 23,

167-82, 202

for Mille: 168, 172

for Parry: 338, 348, 360, 361-63

for Roi-Namur: 169, 170, 172-75, 180-82, 304-05,

311-12

for Tarawa: 21-22, 39-43, 127, 132, 147-48, 150,

151, 153, 155

for Truk: 333

for Wotje: 19, 168-69, 172, 174

Tactics, Japanese

ambush: 124

antitank: 71

camouflage: 132, 214, 341

counterattack: 123, 252-53, 281
412 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Tactics, Japanese—Continued

deceptive: 108, 123

harassing: 108

infiltration: 108, 123, 147, 252

sniper: 95, 98, 108, 113, 255

Tactics, U.S.

air: 173

amphibious: 126, 371-72

appraisal of: 158-65

artillery: 161, 173, 175, 371

to avoid friendly fire fights: 42-43

close-in: 154

combat-loading: 49, 51

engineer-infantry: 235

envelopment: 59

flanking: 247

harassing: 250

infantry: 319, 353

infantry-artillery: 243

infantry-engineer: 321

LCI(G): 173

LVT(A): 173, 179

mopping-up: 90, 112, 113, 116, 148-50

naval bombardment: 159-61, 165, 173, 349

smoke: 129, 309

tank-infantry: 42-43, 45-47, 79, 85, 91-94, 96, 100,

104, 112, 116, 118-19, 142, 147, 162-63, 183-84,

243-44, 255-56, 258, 286, 296, 318-19, 321,

327-29, 338, 364, 365

Takao: 70

Tamana Atoll: 63

Tanimiaki Village: 124

Tank Battalions

193d: 40, 42, 48, 106, 107

on Butaritari: 82, 91-93, 117, 125

767th:

on Burton: 295

on Kwajalein Island: 178, 233, 236, 249, 253,

257-58, 287

training of: 183-84

708th Amphibian

on Burton: 295

on Carlson and Carlos: 222

and Eniwetok operations: 336-37

on Kwajalein Island: 232

training of: 188-89

Tanks, Japanese, light: 76, 142, 143, 341, 342, 343

Tanks, U.S. See also LVT(A)'s.

on Bennett: 300-301

on Betio: 43

on Burton: 295, 296-97, 300-301

on Butaritari: 91-94, 95-96, 97, 98, 100

efficiency of tank-infantry communications: 104

at Eniwetok Atoll: 338, 345, 347, 349, 350, 354,

357, 359, 363, 364, 365

in Gilberts: 104, 107, 109, 111

in Kwajalein Atoll: 178, 222, 225, 232, 233n, 236,

243-44, 249, 253, 256, 258, 259

Tanks, U.S.—Continued

on Kwajalein Island: 286-87, 288

light: 77, 79, 93-94, 95-96, 97, 98, 100, 107, 111,

118, 119, 122, 124, 150, 162-63, 193, 222, 225,

233n, 236, 249, 253, 258, 286, 295, 301, 316, 323,

324, 327, 331, 349, 354, 357, 359

on Makin: 77-78, 79, 82, 85-86, 112-13, 114, 116,

118-19, 122, 124, 162-63

in Marshalls: 183-84, 193

medium: 82, 85-86, 91-94, 98, 109, 112-13, 114,

116, 118-19, 122, 124, 134, 142, 146-47, 163,

178, 193, 232, 236, 243-44, 249, 253, 258, 286,

295, 300, 316, 318, 319, 329-31, 338, 345,

347-48, 350, 357, 363, 364-65

on Roi-Namur: 314, 316-19, 321, 323, 324, 327-31

at Tarawa: 127, 133, 134, 142, 143, 146-47, 150,

162-63

waterproofed: 77-78

Taongi:211

Tarawa Atoll: 58, 68, 166, 186, 188, 190, 196, 218,

240. See also Betio; Gilbert Islands.

aerial reconnaissance of: 54

air attacks on: 52, 53-54, 55-56, 67, 194

as air base: 195, 198, 369

air support for: 38-40

airfields in: 53, 65, 158

bombardment of: 56, 129-32, 150

casualties at: 133, 134, 139, 141-42

description of: 31

effect of campaign in, on Japanese tactics: 213

evacuation of Japanese aircraft from: 67-68

Holland Smith on operations in: 157

intelligence estimates of: 27, 31-34

Japanese defenses at: 48, 62, 65, 73-74, 128, 132,

135-37, 143

Japanese strength at: 63, 64, 65, 67-68, 73

landing craft for: 48

naval support for: 35, 40

operations at: 112, 118, 127-56

reinforcement of: 107

results of operations at: 157

supply operations at: 144-47, 148

tactical lessons learned at: 158-65

tactical plans for: 21-22, 39-43, 127, 132, 147-48,

150, 151, 153, 155

target date for: 26-27, 31-32

troops for: 25-26, 34-35

Target dates

Bismarck Archipelago: 15

Bougainville: 15

Burma: 19

Central Pacific: 19, 20-21, 23, 24

Eniwetok: 333, 338

Gilberts: 27, 27n, 31-32

New Britain: 15

Southwest Pacific Area: 23

Truk: 333

Taroa Island: 195-97, 203, 204, 205
INDEX 413

Task Forces

in Gilberts

50: 38, 53-55, 67, 69, 129n

52: 34-35, 47, 129n. See also Northern Attack

Force (Gilberts).

53: 34-35, 127. See also Southern Attack Force

(Gilberts).

54: 34. See also Northern Attack Force (Gilberts); Southern Attack Force (Gilberts).

57: 38-39, 54

in Marshalls

50: 170, 170n, 199n. See also Spruance, Vice

Adm. Raymond A.

51: 170. See also Turner, Rear Adm. Richmond

Kelly.

52: 170, 172, 173-74, 175, 179-80, 203, 205,

219, 221, 228, 229, 230, 240. See also Turner,

Rear Adm. Richmond Kelly.

53: 170, 173, 186-87, 192-93, 203, 205, 305,

311, 332. See also Conolly, Rear Adm.

Richard L.

56: 170. See also Smith, Maj. Gen. Holland M.,

USMC.

57: 171-72, 175. See also Hoover, Rear Adm.

John H.

58: 171-72, 174, 199, 202-03, 278, 334, 338-39,

343. See also Mitscher, Rear Adm. Marc A.

at Rabaul

38: 70

at Wake

14: 54. See also Montgomery, Rear Adm.

Alfred E.

Task Groups

in Gilberts

50.3: 70

57.2: 39

57.3: 39

57.4: 39

in Marshalls

50.15: 171-72, 203, 205. See also Small, Rear

Adm. Ernest G.

51.2: 170-71, 173-74, 182, 203, 302-04. See

also Eniwetok Expeditionary Group; Hill,

Rear Adm. Harry W.

56.1: 170-71, 301. See also Corlett, Maj. Gen.

Charles H.

56.2: 171. See also Schmidt, Maj. Gen. Harry,

USMC.

57.2: 171-72. See also Hale, Maj. Gen. Willis H.

57.3: 172. See also Merritt, Brig. Gen. Lewie G.,

USMC.

58.1: 199, 203, 205, 278. See also Reeves, Rear

Adm. John W.

58.2: 203, 205. See also Montgomery, Rear

Adm. Alfred E.

58.3: 199, 203, 205. See also Sherman, Rear

Adm. Frederick C.

58.4: 203, 205, 336, 339, 343. See also Ginder,

Rear Adm. Samuel P.

Tennessee: 305, 312, 344, 345, 363

Tenney, Col. Clesen H.: 125

Terrain

Betio: 132, 135-37

Butaritari: 29-30, 90, 100

Eniwetok Atoll: 334

Kwajalein Atoll: 175, 180-82

Kwajalein Island: 175

Roi-Namur: 180-81

Tetrahedrons, Japanese: 73, 74

Thirteenth Air Force, U.S.: 369

Thompson, S. Sgt. Michael: 93-94

Thuban: 51n

Timor: 60

Tiner, 1st Lt. Emmett L.: 219

Tinian: 208, 372

TNT pole charges. See Weapons, U.S., TNT pole

charges.

Tognietti, T. Sgt. Ernest: 272

Tone: 70

Toppin, Sgt. William: 356

Torpedo bombers, U.S.: 339

Torrutj Island. See Clarence Island.

Tracked landing vehicles. See LVT's.

Tractor Battalion, 708th Amphibian: 337, 363

Training, U.S.

amphibious: 44-47, 184, 185

for Eniwetok operations: 337-38

of 4th Marine Division: 183, 186-87

for landing operations: 184, 185

of LST crews: 313

for Marshalls operations: 168, 183-87

of 106th Infantry: 185

of pilots for air support: 161-62

of 2d Marine Division: 47

of 7th Infantry Division: 183-85

tank-infantry: 183-184

of 27th Infantry Division: 24, 44-47

Transport Division 20: 47

Transport Division 26: 311

Transport Group 4: 148

Transportation Corps: 189

Transports, U.S.

attack. See APA's.

cargo. See AKA's.

high-speed. See APD's.

TRIDENT. See Washington conference, May 1943.

Trobriand Islands: 11

Truk: 4, 9, 10, 15-16, 29, 166, 167, 196, 203, 207, 208,

211, 212, 217, 335, 340, 372, 373-74

air attacks on: 333, 334, 338-39, 366, 368, 369, 373

airfields: 339

as Japanese base: 60, 64, 68-69, 334

tactical plans for: 333

Tsuyuki, Capt. Kenzo: 215

Tukerere Island: 113n

Tulagi: 37
414 SEIZURE OF THE GILBERTS AND MARSHALLS

Turner, Rear Adm. Richmond Kelly: 4n, 47, 59,

124-25. See also Fifth Amphibious Force; Task

Forces, 51 (Marshalls) and 52 (Marshalls).

on bombardment of Butaritari: 76

and Butaritari operations: 75, 82, 88n

commands of: 25, 34, 170

and communications at Butaritari: 104, 105n

and Kwajalein operations: 220, 222, 230, 251, 257,

289

and logistics of Marshalls operations: 190, 191

and Makin operations: 117, 122

operational plan for Gilberts: 30, 39-40

and reinforcement for Tarawa: 106-07

and tactical plans for Marshalls: 169, 170, 172-75,

177

and Tarawa operations: 129n, 150

Tysen, Capt. George W., USN: 249

Ujae Atoll: 366

Ujelang Atoll: 367

Ukiangong Point: 41, 42, 62, 79, 81-82, 99, 100, 113,

118, 119

Ukiangong Village: 30, 41-42, 79, 81, 107

Uliga Island: 302, 303, 304

Ulithi Atoll: 373

Underhill, Brig. Gen. James L., USMC: 181-82, 304,

307-08, 309

Underwater demolition teams: 37 1

at Eniwetok: 337

at Engebi: 344-45

at Kwajalein Island: 229

at Roi-Namur: 311, 313

Utirik Atoll: 211, 367

Valentine, 1st Sgt. Thomas E.: 113

Valenzuela, Pfc. Solteros E.: 271-72

Very long range bombers. See B-29's.

Virgo: 225

Vogelkop Peninsula: 14

Waianae: 184, 185

Waianae Amphibious Training Center: 45, 185

Waimanalo: 45, 185

Wake: 4-5, 19, 54, 60, 65, 69, 167, 207, 209, 210, 368

Walker, Col. John T., USMC: 336

Walker, Lt. Col. William P.: 233

Wallace, Lt. Col. Lee: 222

Washington conference, May 1943: 12-17, 18

Watson, Brig. Gen. Thomas E., USMC: 336

Weapons, Japanese. See also Guns, Japanese; Howitzers, Japanese; Mortars, Japanese; Tanks, Japanese.

bayonets: 99, 100, 297

20-mm. cannon: 341, 342, 343

flame throwers: 342

grenade launchers: 341, 342

grenades: 144

Weapons, Japanese—Continued

land mines: 213, 342, 360, 365

mortars: 235

naval mines: 344

tank traps: 71, 74, 215. See also Butaritari, East and

West Tank Barriers.

Weapons, U.S. See also Guns, U.S.; Howitzers, U.S.;

Mortars, U.S.; Tanks, U.S.

Bangalore torpedoes: 102, 319

bayonets: 93, 154, 220

Composition C: 270

demolition charges: 235, 258, 297, 319

flame throwers: 86, 91, 93, 100, 143, 163, 233, 233n,

243, 245, 297, 364

grenades: 42, 85, 91, 93, 99, 108, 117, 118-19, 154,

220, 238, 243, 245, 258, 266, 289, 291, 319, 364

rocket launchers, defective operation of: 77, 83

rocket launchers, 2.36-inch: 86, 99, 291

rocket launchers, 4.5-inch: 173, 222, 233, 308, 371

satchel charges: 270, 271, 288, 326

TNT blocks: 116

TNT pole charges: 91, 93, 100

Weatherwax, Maj. Ben K.: 145

Weaver, Maj. Maynard E.: 294

Weeks, 1st Lt. Harvey C., USMC: 303

Wellington: 28, 47, 51, 127

White, Capt. Charles A.: 266, 269-70, 272, 273

Wide Passage: 334, 344

Willson, Vice Adm. Russell: 22

Wilson, 1st Lt. Robert: 123

Woleai Atoll: 373

Wolff, Capt. Sanford I.: 265

Woodlark Island: 11, 20

Wotho Atoll: 366

Wotje Atoll: 166, 212, 340, 540n, 369. See also Marshall Islands.

aerial reconnaissance of: 39

air attacks on: 194, 199, 202, 203-04, 205, 366, 367,

368

airfield: 172, 174, 199, 204, 211-12

Japanese defenses in: 209

Japanese strength in: 207, 208-09, 210

naval bombardment of: 205

tactical plans for: 19, 168-69, 172, 174

Yamada, Rear Adm. Michiyuki: 217

Yamato: 68

Yano, Col. Toshio: 342

Yap: 373

Yorktown: 203, 232

Yoshida, Capt. Hidemi, IJN: 206

Young, Lt. John L.: 247

Z Operation: 65

Zeilin: 51n

Zimmerman, Col. Wayne C.: 219

Zinnia Island: 338, 345

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1993 333-164