LAW AND 


MILITARY 


OPERATIONS 


IN 


THE BALKANS 


1995-1998 


LESSONS 


LEARNED 


FOR 


JUDGE 


ADVOCATES 


Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) 


The Judge Advocate General's School 


United States Army 


Charlottesville, Virginia 

CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Director 


Colonel David E. Graham 


Director, Training & Support Deputy Director Marine Representative 

Captain Tyler L. Randolph Major John W. Miller II Major William H. Ferrell 

Observer-Controllers 

Battle Command Training Program 


Lieutenant Colonel William R. Gade 


Captain Matthew P. Ruzicka 


Combat Maneuver Training Center National Training Center 

Captain Eric Jensen Captain Randolph Swansiger 

Joint Readiness Training Center 


Major Brian S. Banks 


Captain JeffA. Bovarnick 


Captain Mark A. Blevins 


StaffSergeant Roderick Celestaine 


Reserve Component Liaisons 

United States Army Reserve Army National Guard of 

Colonel Keith H. Harnack, USAR the United States 

The Judge Advocate General established the Center for Law and Military Operations in 

1988 at the direction of the Secretary of the Army. The purpose of the Center is to examine legal 

issues that arise during all phases of military operations and to devise training strategies for 

addressing those issues. It seeks to fulfill this purpose in four ways. First, it is the central 

repository within The Judge Advocate General's Corps for memoranda, lessons learned, and afteraction materials pertaining to legal support for deployed forces. Second, it supports judge 

advocates in the field by disseminating key lessons learned, by building a database of legal issues 

encountered by previously deployed judge advocates, by creating guides to successful operational 

law training and evaluation, and by recommending refinements to doctrine for legal operations. 

Third, it integrates lessons learned from deployments into the curriculum of all relevant courses, 

workshops, orientations, and seminars held at The Judge Advocate General's School. Fourth, with 

The Judge Advocate General's School, it sponsors conferences and symposia on topics of interest 

to operational lawyers. 

The Director of the Center also serves as Chief, International and Operational Law 

Division, Office of The Judge Advocate General. The Deputy Director heads the main office in 

Charlottesville, where the Center forms an important part of The Judge Advocate General's School 

and represents the Corps' growing commitment to excellence in operational law. 

The contents of this report are not to be construed as official positions, policies, or 

decisions of the U.S. Army, The Judge Advocate General, the U.S. Marine Corps, or the Staff 

Judge Advocate to the Conunandant of the Marine Corps. The Center welcomes and solicits 

suggestions and contributions ofrelevant operational law materials from the field. Please call 934­

7115, ext. 339/448 (DSN) or (804) 972-6339/6448 (commercial); send electronic mail to 

millejw@hqda.army.mil, randot@hqda.army.mil, ferrewh@hqda.army.mil; or write Major 

Miller/CPT Randolph/Major Ferrell, Center for Law and Military Operations, The Judge Advocate 

General's School, 600 Massie Road, Charlottesville, Virginia, 22903-1781. 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


IN THE BALKANS, 1995-98 


LESSONS LEARNED FOR JUDGE 


ADVOCATES 


CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

13 NOVEMBER 1998 

Summary 

With this report, the Center for Law and Military Operations 

identifies lessons learned for judge advocates from United States 

military operations in Bosnia from 1995 to 1998. The report focuses 

on providing gu.idance and practical considerations for judge 

advocates that will be or are responsible for those who will deploy. 

The Center prepared the report based on after action reports 

submitted by judge advocate sections involved in the operation, 

materials gathered during a three-day conference attended by 

participants, materials gathered by judge advocates participating with 

the Center for Army Lessons Learned Combined Arms Assessment 

Teams, interviews ofindividualjudge advocates who deployed, and 

other sources. 

The Center finds that the Corps delivered legal services well in 

every functional area, and that doctrine for legal operations, while 

changing in many ways, is mostly sound. The JAGC must continually 

train, educate, and resource its youngjudge advocates to support 

battalion and brigade-sized task forces while physically apart from the 

main SJA office. These "all purpose" judge advocates must deliver the 

entire range ofoperational law advice to commanders while 

continuing to execute the critical military justice and client services 

functions. Among other suggestions, the Center recommends that 

judge advocates prepare for difficulties inherent in multinational 

operations, help develop situational training and conduct continuous 

refresher training on the rules ofengagement, develop a baseline of 

expertise in fiscal law-JAGC-wide, work seamlessly with the Reserve 

Component, keep detailed logs ofall significant actions, and be ready 

to deploy. 

Lessons learned materials, to include this report, would not be 

possible without the detailed logs, notebooks, computer files, and 

reams ofdata forwarded to the Center by dedicated judge advocates, 

legal administrators, non-commissioned officers, legal specialists, and 

civilians. To maintain the JA GC 's posture as a learning organization, 

the Center asks you to record, gather, and submit to the Center all 

materials that concern legal support to military operations. 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 


THE BALKANS, 1995-1998: 


LESSONS LEARNED FOR THE JUDGE ADVOCATE 


TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. INTRODUCTION •.....................................•................................... 15 


II. THE MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THEIR CONTEXT.. 28 


A. HISTORY .•..••....•••.•...•..•......••...•...........•.............................•...•.....• 28 


B." THE BALKAN CONFLICT, 1991-1995 •...........•..•••.....••••.••.••..•...••32 


1. 1991-The Fighting Resumes ............................................... 32 


2. 1992-U.N.ForcesStepln .................................................... 33 


3. 1993-The War Continues With Increased U.N. Involvement 

....................................................................................................... 35 


4. 1994 -NATO Employs Air Strikes; Muslim-Croats Make 

Peace............................................................................................. 37 


5. 1995 - The Conflict Ends ....................................................... 39 


C. OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 42 


1. /FOR Tasks & Milestones ...................................................... 42 


2. Command and Control ........................................................... 43 


3. /FOR Support to Civilian Implementation ofthe GFAP ••..• 43 


4. U.S. Military Role ................................................................... 44 


1 

2 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

5. Judge Advocate Support .•.••...•••.....•.•..••....•.•..••...•.•.•..••......•.... 46 


D. OPERATION JOINT GUARD (OJG)•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.47 


1. SFOR Tasks & Milestones •..........•...•.•.•.•....•...•........•..............41 


2. Command and Control ............................................................48 


3. SFOR Support to Civilian Implementation ofthe GFAP•.•.•48 


4. U.S. Military Role•.•.•.•.••....•••...•......•.••••••...•..••.•.••....••••••.•.••....•49 


5. Judge Advocate Support .•.•....•••.......••...•.....••.........•..••...•....••..50 


E. OPERATION JOINT FORGE (OJF) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••51 


I. SFOR Tasks & Milestones .•..........••............................••..........51 


2. Command and Control......•.•.•••.•..•..•..........••....•..........•.•........51 


3. SFOR Support to Civilian Implementation ofthe GFAP....•51 


4. U.S. Military Role..•......••.•..•.•...•...•........•...........•.•.....••.•.•.....•..52 


5. Judge Advocate Support................•...•....................................52 


III. LESSONS LEARN°ED •••..•.•••.....•.•.•••.....••.....•.•.••...••..•••.••..•...•.••.••53 


A. INTRODUCTION TO LESSONS LEARNED ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••53 


1. Command and control issues initially dominated legal 


support to operations in the Balkans••.........•..........•..•.....•......•... 53 


2. As the theater matured, sustainment issues quickly 


dominated legal support to operations, particularly regarding 


contract andfiscal law ••••.•.•••••...••...•..•......•..•.....•...•••..•••••...•.•.•.•.. 53 


3. Legal support within the personnel service and support 


function remained critical and relatively constant . .••..•••......•...• 54 

LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 3 

B. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) .•..•...........•..•........•...•......••.•....•56 


J. Expect difficulties with ROE in coalition operations ••......... 59 


a. Expect to train and deploy without the ROE; expect 


challenges in the first set of ROE ....•......•......•..•.••..•.......•..... 60 


b. Identify troop contributing nation counterparts and 

liaisons early ............................................................................ 60 


c. Account for troop contributing nations' (TCN) domestic 


law and sensitivities in mission planning ....... ..............•.......61 


d. Work with the operators and other staff sections to 


ensure all troop contributing nations (TCNs) have accurate, 


translated ROE and soldier cards •..........•............•................ 62 


2. Situational Training Exercises (STX) and mission-oriented 

refresher training best prepare soldiers to deal with peace 

operations..................................................................................... 63 


a. Judge advocates must have situational awareness 


(Bosnia) and understand pre-deployment contingency 


planning . .................................................................................. 63 


b. Use Situational Training Exercises (STX) •••••.••..•...••.•..••64 


c. Conduct continuous ROE mission and refresher training . 


................................................................................................... 66 


3. Staffintegration is essential for judge advocates to be a 


combat multiplier in ROE issues...•.•...•....••..••••.•.•••....•..••••••..•...• 67 


4. Establish straightforward standards for deployment and 


employment ofRiot Control Means (RCM), to include Riot 


Control Agents (RCA) • .••.•••...•.•••....•..••.•.....•.•..•••..•..••.••...•.•...•....• 69 


5. Maintain a constantly updated ROE battlebook.•.•.........••.•.• 71 

4 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

6. At the outset, seek ROE that allow soldiers to use deadly 


force against persons committing serious criminal acts . •••....... 72 


7. Expect U.S. servicemembers to fall under multiple ROE 


when operations use an Intermediate Stage Base (/SB) ........••..73 


c. INTERNATIONAL LAW •.......................•........•....•.•••.•.•••......••..•.•...75 


I. Know the international legal basis for the mission andfor 


the use offorce........•...........•..........•...........•......•.•.•........•.•...........76 


2. Consent-based peace agreements will affect every facet ofthe 

operation....................................................................................... 76 


3. International agreements directly impact a commander's 

options in operations ....................................................................78 


a. Account for LOGCAP personnel in all agreements .•.•...78 


b. Expect difficulties with information flow on 

international agreements ........................................................79 


c. Understand a host nation's legal and military cultures. 79 


d. Conduct SOFA training with PFP countries •.................79 


D. JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS (JMCs)•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••80 


I. JMCs are critical to mission success in peace operations ....80 


2. Empower the JMC• ..•..................•...............•....•.•..................•.84 


3. Train to do the JMC mission..................................................86 


E. TIIE ZONE OF SEPARATION (ZOS) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••90 


1. Every operation will create new law derived from its unique 


circumstances: ZOS v. CFL v. IEBL v. AOT-The commander 


expects the judge advocate to know it• •......•.....•.•..••••.•..••....•...•.••90 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 5 

2. New law must consider all the parties involved: people and 


weapons in the ZOS-Former Warring Factions, Police, 


Civilians, and /FOR...•.......•...•.....•............•...........•......•.•.....•....... 92 


3. Control ofan area means control ofthe terrain and the 

people on it . .................................................................................. 95 


a. Marking and clearing the ZOS .........................................95 


b. Checkpoints ........................................................................96 


c. Resettlement of the ZOS .............••...........•......................... 96 


F..WEAPONS CONFISCATION AND CONTROL ISSUES ••••••••••••••••••••• 97 


1. Determine what weapons control measures are necessary 


and desirable based on the mission . •.•.•...............•...••...•••....•.••..• 97 


2. Consider all possible parties, locations, weapons, and 

situations when developing guidance on weapons confiscation 

and control ................................................................................ 100 


3. Publish and disseminate clear and concise guidance on 


weapons confiscation and control.........•...••.............•............... 106 


G. LAw ENFORCEMENT ISSUES •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 109 


1. Develop clear, mission-oriented standards for detention of 

civilian personnel....................................................................... 109 


2. Develop clear, mission-oriented standards for detention of 


military (Entity Armed Forces) personnel. ....•...•...........•...•....• 111 


3. Beware a nation's police forces-often they are as potent and 

influential as the military . ......................................................... 112 


4. Reforming a nation's police force is essential to 


reestablishing a sound peace .•••...•......••.••.•......•.•.•••...•...•.•.•.•..••• 115 

6 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

H. wAR CRIMES ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••116 


1. Anticipate war crimes to pervade many oftoday's conflicts . 

•••..........•..•.....•...........•.•••........•...........••...............•...•............•....... 116 


2. Seek the specific legal authorities that address war crimes 


andjurisdiction over the war criminals .•.•••.•.•.......................... 119 


3. Guidance on handling persons indicted for war crimes 


(PIFWCs) must be specific and tied in with the Rules of 


Engagement .•.••...............•...•.......•.•.•..•.....••••.......•.•...•.....•.•.•.•.•...121 


4. Judge Advocates will be actively involved in the capture and 


handling ofpersons indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs) .•....•...125 


I. JOINT, INTER-AGENCY AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL 


COORDINATION •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••127 


1. Use judge advocate technical chains to augment information 

flow..............................................................................................127 


2. Judge advocates must include all unified components in their 


technical chain communications . ...•................•.•................•.•... 128 


3. Prepare to provide or coordinate legal.support to sister 


services •...••.••••.•.••.•...•••.••••.••••...••.•...••.....••..•.••.••...•••...•••......•.•...•. 129 


4. The Internet created new judge advocate technical channels . 

...•....•.............•..•..••...........••....•••......••.•..•.........•...•.•.......••.•...•..••..•130 


5. Develop skills for inter-agency comm unication ..•....•.•..•.....130 


J. INFORl\IATION OPERATIONS •••••••••••••••·•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••131 


1. Be prepared to participate in information operations working 


groups.....•...•.......•..•......•......•.......•........•.......•..................•.•........•132 


2. Information operations (JO) require planning and broad 


expertise-use IO planning cells where appropriate .•.......•••..• 133 

LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 7 

K. cl'VIL AFFAIRS ••.••..............••...•...•...••.•••.......••....•.............•....••.. 134 


1. Become involved early with civil affairs units . •.............••... 134 


2. Build effective relations with governmental and non­

governmental organizations (NGOs) ••..••.•.•••...••.••..•..••.........•..• 135 


3. Establish ground rules for nation rebuilding . ..........•..••..•.. 136 


4. Treat election support as an operation •.......•.......•..•..•......•.. 137 


L. RELATIONS WITH THE MEDIA••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 139 


1. Prepare for media interest in command decisions •.•.•....••.. 139 


2. Train soldiers in dealing with the media. ....•..•....•............... 140 


M. FISCAL LAw .............................................................................141 


1. Develop, take, and have access to persons with fiscal and 

contract law expertise . ............................................................... 141 


2. Centrally manage logistics support .•.•.•.........•.........•....•...•..• 143 


3. Care/ ully watch spending, Scenario One: The R & R 

program . ..................................................................................... 145 


4. Carefully watch spending, Scenario Two: Winning hearts 

and minds . .................................................................................. 145 


5. Carefully watch spending, Scenario Three: Construction. 148 


6. Judge advocates should gain familiarity with the LOGCAP 

Contract...................................................................................... 149 


7. Resolve the status ofcivilian contractors . ...•••.•..........•.•..•.... 151 


se'TVicing 

8. Designate 

agreements 

a single 

(A 

point 

CSA) 

of

• 

contact

............••.........•.•................•..•..•• 

for acquisition and cross152 

8 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

9. Expect tension between U.S. law and multinational 


operations . •.......••...............................•........•..•.....••••........•.•.......•153 


N. CLAIMS .....•..••••...........•.•..........•.............•••••.••...•...............•........154 


I. Address the lack ofuniform liability standards • •.•.....••.•...•. 156 


2. Use innovative methods to promote access to claimants •.•. 157 


a. Combine claims convoys, site visits, and fixed office 

operations for Foreign Claims processing in a large area of 

responsibility..........................................................................157 


b. Use Civil Affairs to assist claims intake and 

investigation...........................................................................158 


3. Prepare for difficulty with the combat exclusion in peace 

operations . .................................................................................. 159 


4. Be prepared to pay claims that you might not ordinarily 

accept . ......................................................................................... 160 


5. Train many members ofthe staffto be foreign claims 

commissioners, unit claims officers, and maneuver damage 

control officers . .......................................................................... 160 


6. Preventive measures reduce claims-use the digital camera . 

..................................................................................................... 161 


7. Educate soldiers about the limits of"reasonable" personal 

property before deployment . ...................................................... 161 


8. Process personnel claims in an expeditious manner .•...••.••162 


0. REAL ESTATE •••.••••••••••.••••.••.••••••.•••••••••.•••.••••••••.•••••.•..•••••••••••.••163 


1. Ensure real estate teams deploy with lease forms appropriate 

to the operation ...........................................................................163 

LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 9 

2. Include utilities in agreements for property use . ....•..•........ 164 


3. Be prepared to establish ownership standards for property 


claimed to be privately owned. •...•.....•....•..•.......•....................... 164 


4. Be aware ofreal estate issues when assuming use ofproperty 

from the United Nations ............................................................ 166 


5. Use SOFAs and other international agreements to establish 


property rules and land use rights . ••.•..••....•••..••...•...•...•••....•...•• 167 


p. ENV:IRON1\fENTAL LAw ............................................................. 167 


1. Peace operations require a dedicated environmental law 

specialist . .................................................................................... 167 


2. Ensure that environmental teams are available early in the 

deployment . ................................................................................ 168 


Q. INTELLIGENCE LAw .................................................................169 


1. Advise commands about the limits on collecting information 


on U.S. persons . ......................................................................... 169 


2. Prepare for classified access and for operational security 


. (OPSEC) needs........................................................................... 110 


R. MILITARY JUSTICE ......•.........................•..•..............•.•...•....•.•... 170 


1. Resolve UCMJjurisdictions immediately (pre-deployment) . 

..................................................................................................... 170 


a. Set up an early meeting with the Commanding General 

(CG) to explain jurisdiction options and to choose a course 

of action.................................................................................. 170 


b. Expect other issues to accompany jurisdiction 

realignment............................................................................ 172 

10 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

2. Artfully and thoughtfully craft General Order Number One . 

..................................................................................................... 175 


3. Expect rear detachment workload to increase 

proportionately . ........................................................................... 178 


4. The most common crimes in a deployed environment are 

violations ofGeneral Order Number One, disobedience, and 

disrespect..................................................................................... 118 


5. Use vehicle support to enable Trial Defense to see soldiers 

" on ClTCUlt. . . " • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 179 


6. Every TDS counsel should be trained and deployable .••..•.•180 


7. Peculiar issues will arise-the Lautenberg Amendment....180 


s. LEGAL ASSISTANCE ...•....•...•.•.............•........................•..•.•...••...181 


1. Alljudge advocates should prepare to practice legal 

as$istance . ................................................................................... 181 


2. Prepare for last minute (predeployment) family care plan 

failures . ....................................................................................... 182 


3. Create an advance packet to improve the SRP process . ...•..183 


4. Adapt the tax program to the situation-consider the costs 


and benefits ofelectronic filing ......•............................•..•.......... 183 


T. ADMINISTRATl'VE LAw..............................................................184 


1. Resolve questions ofaccess to AAFES and other service 

·1· • flacz ztzes....................................................................................... 184 


2. Educate forces about accepting foreign gifts . .....................185 


3. Supervise the conduct ofcommand investigations • •........... 185 

LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 11 

4. Remindpersonnel to complete disclosure forms. .••....•.....•• 186 


u. PERSONNEL •..•..........•.....•...•..............•..............•.•.•.•..............•... 187 


1. Deploy the ChiefLegal NCO (CLNCO) early . ..•................. 188 


2. Prepare for reserve augmentation ••.•...•..•••.•••...•..•...•..••..•..•. 188 


3. Tailorjudge advocate attachments to the force structure. . 190 


a. The mission may call for pushing judge advocates down 


to lower than normal echelons and for providing judge 


advocates to mission-specific organizations •................•..... 190 


b. A senior judge advocate must be on the ground..........191 


c. Judge advocate support must be mobile ................•....... 192 


4. Support the morale ofyour legal personnel•..•.••.....•..••....... 192 


V. EQUIPMENT AND MILITARY TRAINING •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 193 


1. Prepare StaffJudge Advocate (SJA) office equipment before 

deployment . ................................................................................ 195 


a. Stockpile supplies .............................................................. 195 


b. Stock you legal references and resources...................... 196 


c. Internet access is essential ............................................... 196 


2. Assign personnel to the lowest possible echelons during 

training events ............................................................................ 197 


3. Prepare for intra-theater travel and deployments....•........... 198 


4. Communications are always a problem-plan how you will 

communicate. ............................................................................. 198 

12 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

TABLE OF APPENDICES 


A. MAPs........................................................•.............200 


(1) Historical......................................................... 200 


(2) ACFL (OCT 1993), IEBL (NOV 1995) and Areas of 

Transfer...............................................................201 


(3) IFOR/SFOR Areas ofresponsibility: Multinational 

Division 

Sectors.................................................................202 


B. THE FORMER WARRING FACTIONS AND THEIR COMPETING 


STRATEGIC GOALS ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 203 


C. SUMMARY OF U.N./NATO AIR, LAND AND SEA OPERATIONS ••• 204 


D. ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••209 


(1) NATO TaskForce Organization .•••.••..•••••.•...•...•.••••209 


(2) SFOR Headquarters Structure •.•..•.••....••..•.•....••..•.• 210 


(3) Structure ofSFOR Multinational Divisions (MNDs) •... 211 


(4) Judge Advocate Disposition •..•••.••.•.••.•.••...•..•••.••••• 212 


(5) Command Post Layouts (/FOR) ..•••.•.••.••.•••••.•..•••••.• 215 


E. KEY AUTHORITIES•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 217 


(1) List ofCritical International Agreements ............•....• 217 


(2) Chapter VII ofthe United Nations Charter ••••.•••••••••• 218 


(3) U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 1031 ••• .••••••••••.• 222 


( 4) Index ofOther U.N. Resolutions •.••..•.•••.•••.•••••.•.•.. •..230 


(5) General Framework Agreementfor Peace in Bosnia and 


Herzegovina (GFAP) ••••••••.•.••••••••••. .•••••••••.•••.•••••.••••248 


Annex 1-A (Agreement on Military Aspects ofthe Peace 


Sett/ement)................................................... 253 

LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 13 

Appendix B (SOFA between NATO and Republic of 


Bosnia-Herzegovina) ••..•••••......••••..••.•..•..•.•.••.•. 275 


(6) Vienna Agreement (26 January 1996) .•••..•..•.•.....•.•..284 


(7) Florence Agreement (14June1996) ....•..•................ 311 


(8) SOFA Between NATO and Croatia •••.••..••..••.•....•.•... 330 


(9) Transit Agreement Between NATO and Federal 

Republic ofYugoslavia .............................................335 


F. SAMPLE MISSION STATEMENTS ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 339 


G. ROE CARDS (HUNGARY, IFOR, SFOR, AND OPERATION JOINT 

FORGE).•..••..•..•....••••.•.••.••••••.•••.•..••..•••.•..•••.•.•..•..•.•.•.••.. 342 


H. SAMPLE LEGAL APPENDICES •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 352 


(1) Legal Appendix by USAREUR .••..•••.•..•.•.......•.......•352 


(2) Legal Appendix by 1st Cavalry Division •...••.••.••.•••.•••360 


I. GENERAL ORDER NUMBER ONE••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 386 


J. JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION STRUCTURE FOR MND (N)••••• 398 


K. EXTRACT OF JMC HANDBOOK ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 399 


L. STATUS OF ACSA AGREEMENTS ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 429 


1\:1. MATRIX OF AUTHORIZED SUPPORT FOR NON-U.S. MILITARY 


ORGANIZATIONS•........•..•.•.•.••••..•••...••....•...•....•.•..••...•.••.432 


N. CLAIMS STRUCTURES••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 433 


(1) Deployment Claims Structure •.••.•..••.•••.•••.••..•..•..••• 433 


(2) SFOR Claims Structure •.••........••.•.........••...•..••...•.434 


0. CLAIMS CONVOY CHECKLIST AND SAMPLE CONVOY BRIEF•••• 435 


P. ONE BASE CAMP JA'S DESCRIPTION OF HIS DUTIES (CHART) ••• 443 


Q. SAMPLE REPORTS•••••••••.••••.•••••••.•••••..••••...•••.••.•.••••..••• 444 


(1) Sample Operational Law Weekly Report ...••••..•.•••••••.444 


(2) Sample SJA Weekly Status Report •....••...•..•.....•••.•.• 449 

14 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

(3) Sample Claims Status Report .••••••••••••..•.. ••.••••••••.•..454 

R. INTERNET WEB SITES•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 456 

s. KEY REFERENCES•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 469 

T. GLOSSARY••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••471 

u. ACRONY1\f.S•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 484 

*Unless otherwise indicated in the text of the 

report, IFOR and SFOR are interchangeable 

terms. The Implementation Force (IFOR) was 

the NATO-led multinational force in Bosnia 

from December 20, 1995 to December 20, 

1996. Since December 20, 1996, it has been 

known as the Stabilization Force (SFOR). 

-- On the footnotes that follow, this symbol 

means the cited reference is available on Lotus 

Notes through local judge advocate office 

servers or through the Internet at the JAGC's 

home page. To ask about access to these 

restricted databases, contact the Center for 

Law and Military Operations (see front cover). 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 15 

LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 

THE BALKANS, 1995-1998: 

LESSONS LEARNED FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 

"Last night, my son and I [both Croats] were 

having supper together when a Serbian patrol 

entered the house and shot and killed my son. He 

was a schoolteacher who never did anything to 

anyone. I went next door. Here lived my neighbor 

of5 0 years, who was eating supper with his family. 

He is a Serb. I shot and killed all ofthem. "

1 

I. Introduction 

To the Western observer, such ruthless, violent, and seemingly 

irrational ethnic hatred is beyond comprehension. Yet, from 1991 to 

1995, the seething cauldron ofwhat the world once knew as Yugoslavia 

erupted into a conflict of annihilation2 pitting former friends, neighbors, 

and even family members against each other along ethnic lines--Bosnian 

Serbs, Bosnian Muslims (Bosniacs), and Bosnian Croats. Today, we 

call these three groups the Entity Armed Forces (EAFs), formerly known 

as the Former Warring Factions (FWFs) and hereinafter known as 

EAFs.3 Nearly four years ofunchecked violence shocked the 

international communities' conscience and the results were staggering: 

I Ivo J. LEDERER, NATIONALISM AND THE YUGOSLAVS, NATIONALISM IN EASTERN EUROPE 396-397 

(Lederer et. al., eds.) (University of Washington Press 1969). 

2 Perhaps not in the classical sense of annihilating an enemy's army, but an entire ethnic class from a 

geographical area. At the very least, each EAF perceives that the other seeks to annihilate it. 

Allegations of ethnic cleansing on all sides of the conflict have likely strengthened this perception. 

See App. B, The Fonner Warring Factions and Their Competing Strategic Goals. 

3 For a great historical account, see ANDRAS RIEDLMAYER, A BRIEF HISTORY OF BOSNlAHERZEGOVINA (Harvard University Summer 1993). See also CLAMO databases and country 

studies.~ See page 14 for an explanation of this symbol. 
16 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

4

• 	 Over 200,000 dead men, women, and children

• 	 Approximately 2 million people displaced from their homes5 

• 	 Over 1 million refugees spread across 25 countries6 

• 	 About 500,000 homes destroyed/damaged7 

• 	 Allegations by all sides to the conflict of genocide, crimes 

against humanity, and other war crimes 

• 	 Creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 

9 Yugoslavia (ICTY)8 with 26 indicted war criminals in custody

Despite a Herculean diplomatic effort-thirty-six failed ceasefires, 10 at least sixty-one United Nations' Security Council 

Resolutions, 11 and36,000 U.N. troops 12 

on the ground in Croatia and 

Bosnia-Henegovina-the fighting continued unabated. On November 

21, 1995, the parties initialed the Dayton Peace Accord and on 

December 14, 1995, formally signed the General Framework Agreement 

4 Numbers vary. 

5 Figures for displaced persons vary widely. Most reports, however, agree that about one-half of 

Bosnia's prewar population of 4.3 million was displaced either with Bosnia-Herzegovina or 

externally displaced. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOSNIA: REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY 

DISPLACED PERSONS IN B-H (30 Apr. 1997). See also VNHCR COUNTRY PROFILES - BOSNIAHERZEGOVINA at 1 (Mar. 1997) <http://www/unhcr.ch/unhcr/world/euro/bosnia.htm>. 

6 Id. at 1. 

7 Id. at n. 5. 

8 See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3607 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (25 May 1993). See 

also U.N. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL <http://www.un.org/icty/i-b-en.htm>. 

9 At least 58 EAFs are currently indicted. Details of the ICTY, the indictments, and prosecutions are 

summarized on the ICTY homepage at <www.un.org/icty/glance/fact.htm>. 

1

°Changing of the Mandate Ceremony from IFOR to SFOR at xi (20 Dec. 1996). Available at 

<gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int/OO/yugo/IF20 l 2.96%09%09%2B>. 

11 25 Jan. 1993 through the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR on 20 Dec. 1995. The 

range ofUnited Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) includes 802-1031 (addendum), 

not inclusive (some of the UNSCRs in the group do not deal with the BTO). 

12 S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3055 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/743 (21 Feb. 1992) 

(establishing the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)). OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR: 

USAREUR HEADQUARTERS AFTER ACTION REPORT, Volume I at 27 (May 1997) [hereinafter 

USAREUR AAR]. ~ See App. E(4) for summary ofU.N.S.C. Resolutions. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 17 

for Peace (GF AP) in Paris. 13 On December 15, 1995, the U.N. 

authorized the creation of a multinational implementation force (IFOR)14 

and gave the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the mandate 

to implement the military aspects ofthe Peace Agreement. On 

December 16, 1995, the IFOR's main body of 60,000 troops began its 

deployment into Bosnia-Herzegovina, hereinafter known as BiH. 15 The 

IFOR accepted the Transfer ofAuthority16 from the United Nations 

Protection Force (UNPROFOR) on December 20, 1995-D-Day. 

Finally, the wanton destruction ofhuman life and property stopped. 17 

United States military operations in the Balkans from 1995 

through the present represented military and legal challenges of 

unprecedented scope and complexity. Even now, more than two years 

after U.S. forces first arrived in the region, the future ofUS military 

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Former Republic ofYugoslavia were the parties that 

initialed the Dayton Peace Accords on 21Nov.1995. They formally signed in Paris, France, on 14 

Dec. 1995 (signed by Bosnia-Herzegovina President lzetbegovic, Croatian President Tudjman, and 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia President Milosevic). The base document is known as the General 

Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina [hereinafter GFAP]. For text ofthe base 

document and Annex 1-A (Agreement on Military Aspects ofthe Peace Settlement) see Appendix 

E(5). The GF AP contains Articles I-XI and 11 Annexes. The Entity Armed Forces (EAFs) include 

the forces ofthe Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, and Croatian National factions. 

14 S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3607 mtg. at para. 14, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1031 (15 Dec. 

1995). Acting under Chapter VII ofthe U.N. Charter, the U.N. Security Council adopted U.N.S.C. 

Res. 1031 authorizing member states to establish a multinational implementation force (IFOR), 

under unified command and control and composed ofground, air, and maritime units from NATO 

and non-NATO nations, and to ensure compliance with the relevant portions ofthe GFAP. U.N.S.C. 

Res. 1031 authorized member states, amongst other things, to take all necessary measures to effect 

the implementation of and to ensure compliance with the military aspects of the GF AP, ensure 

compliance with the !FOR-established rules and procedures governing command and control over 

Bosnian airspace, and to defend itself from attack or threat of attack. See Appendix E(3). 

15 On 15 Dec. 1995, the North Atlantic Council (NAC} approved SHAPE OPLAN 10405 and 

OPORD. On 16 Dec. 1995, SACEUR issued Activate Order and CJCS and USEUCOM issued 

Execute Orders for the main body. 

16 S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess.,3607 mtg .. 14, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1031 (15 Dec. 1995). 

See Appendix E(3). 

17 The 5 Oct 1995 cease-fire, the 37th cease-fire, went into effect on 12 Oct. 1995. Some point to 

that day as the end ofthe bloodletting in Bosnia. Others may say the Advance Enabling Force of 

2,600 soldiers that began to deploy on 2 Dec. 1995, marked the end ofthe conflict. 
18 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

involvement in, and the stability of, the region remain in delicate 

balance.18 Though we cannot predict the future of operations in the 

theater, one thing remains certain and constant: judge advocates 

continue to perform superbly in an operation more legally intense than 

we have seen. 

The role of U.S. forces as part of NATO's19 first ever land 

component, out-of-area, and joint Partnership for Peace (PFP) 

operation20 was unprecedented. This groundbreaking operation 

demonstrated a successful application of the rule of law in a decidedly 

uncertain, devastated, and potentially hostile environment. For various 

political and military reasons, commanders, staffs, and soldiers 

simultaneously planned, trained, deployed, and began to implement the 

terms of the GF AP. The sheer number of Troop Contributing Nations 

(TCN) to IFOR21 thrust additional burdens upon U.S. commanders in 

this difficult and unique mission. The multiple, complex international 

treaties22 and the hundreds ofnon-governmental organizations (NGO) 

and private organizations (PYO) assisting in Bosnia intensified this 

potentially crushing burden. Judge advocates played a pivotal role in 

helping commanders overcome these challenges and accomplish the 

18 On 12-13 Sep. 1998, Bosnian voters stayed true to their ethnic divisions. Bosnian Serb hard-liner 

Nikola Poplasen defeated moderate Biljana Plavsic for the Presidency of the RS. Also, fighting in 

Kosovo between Serbian forces and ethnic Albanian rebels left hundreds dead and up to 250,000 

displaced persons. L.A. Times and the Associated Press. 

19 NATO signatories include Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, 

Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the 

United States. 

20 

PFP contributing nations to IFOR included Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 

Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Russia Federation, Sweden, and 

Ukraine. Other non-NATO, non-PFP contributing nations included Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, and 

Morocco, and Slovakia (civilian personnel). See NATO's Role in Bringing Peace to the Former 

Yugoslavia, NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. 4 at 12, and IFOR fact sheet at 3 

<gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int//OO/yugo/iffa2510. 96%09%09%2B>. 

21 Id. at 21. 

22 

See generally GF AP and its 11 appendices, Transit Agreements, SOF As, and technical 

arrangements. Supra note 13. See Appendix E(S) for text ofthe GFAP main body and its 

Appendix 1-A (Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 19 

mission. At all echelons of command,23 judge advocates interpreted 

and advised commanders on multinational Rules of Engagement 

(ROE), the 500-page GFAP, at least four applicable Status ofForces 

Agreements, multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions, and 

TCN support issues. 

Similar to events leading up to Operation Uphold Democracy in 

Haiti from 1994-1995, many Americans watched a region spiral into 

lawlessness, followed by the international community demanding 

measures for stabilization. Similar to Haiti, a large combat force then 

entered the region peacefully on terms negotiated just prior to deploying. 

In this case, the region was the Bosnia Theater of Operations (BT0).24 

It is here where the similarities in these two operations diverge. The 

history, geography, topography, command and control, size ofdeployed 

forces, presence ofthe GF AP, and lengths of these two operations varies 

drastically. This is not to say, however, that many ofthe lessons learned 

from Haiti are irrelevant to the Bosnia deployment. In fact, many are the 

same. Judge advocates that deployed to Bosnia cited the Center's Law 

(lnd Military Operations in Haiti, 1994-1995 and The Judge Advocate 

General's School's Operational Law Handbook as the two best 

predeployment operational law resources. This publication seeks to 

amplify those lessons learned and clarify issues that are offirst 

impression or of a relatively unique nature. 

Perhaps the greatest tribute to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 

marines ofOJE is the exemplary and even-handed manner

25 in which 

these Americans performed their duty in applying the rule oflaw in this 

complex environment. While standing firmly between three large and 

23 JCS, DOD, DA, USAR, NATO, EUCOM, USASOC, USAREUR, 21st T AACOM, V Corps, 

SETAF, lAD, lID, lCD, etc. 

24 In Haiti, U.S. forces entered Haiti peacefully at the 11th hour by duly empowered civilian 

representatives of the United States. In Bosnia, the timetable had a higher degree ofstability as the 

GF AP was initialed weeks before the deployment began. 

25 The IFOR Mission was to "In an evenhanded manner, monitor and enforce compliance with the 

military aspects ofthe Dayton Peace Agreement." See Appendix F. 
20 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

war-hardened armies, eighteen-year old Americans were well trained to 

protect themselves, their fellow soldiers, and their units. At the same 

time, they balanced initiative and restraint under the rules of engagement 

while facing the constant possibility that the wrong decision could 

undermine the GFAP and even re-ignite hostilities. 

Making proper decisions under the ROE occupied only a small 

portion of our service members' time in relation to their daily tasks-all 

in accordance with U.S. law and policy, operational directives, and a· 

host of international agreements. Infantrymen helped establish a Zone 

of Separation (ZOS) between the EAFs as established by the GFAP and 

other negotiated agreements. Artillerymen quickly and precisely 

demonstrated their resolve and their combat capabilities yet identified 

any maneuver damage caused by the demonstrations. Supply, 

maintenance, and POL (petroleum, oils, and lubricants) personnel 

provided support to other troop contributing nations strictly in · 

accordance with specific Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements 

and other appropriations laws. Soldiers on patrols and at checkpoints 

strictly .enforced the military aspects of the GFAP, yet treated the flood 

of displaced persons with dignity and respect. Commanders and their 

legal advisors applied the lessons learned from Haiti in detaining 

members of the EAFs in accordance with law and policy. Civil affairs 

personnel assisted in administering the Foreign Claims Act by acting as 

investigating officers and providing logistics support for the theater 

maneuver damage program. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines 

remained undistracted by personal concerns as judge advocates provided 

legal assistance throughout the Bosnian Theater of Operations. As seen 

in operation after operation,26America's men and women in uniform are 

disciplined and follow orders given by their chain of command, 

Operation Just Cause, Operation Uphold Democracy, Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Somalia, and 

now Operations Joint Endeavor and Guard all reflect lower discipline rates. 

26 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 21 

')ustifying a disciplinary system aclrnowledged by Congress and the 

courts to be essential to mission accomplishment."27 

This report reflects experiences ofjudge advocates that 

participated in military operations in Bosnia-whether they were at the 

NATO level, supporting rear detachments, or advising brigade and 

battalion commanders in the ZOS. Like the Haiti AAR, this report 

should be a valuable training tool for judge advocates deploying to 

Bosnia or other future operations in support ofour nation's security 

interests.28 This report is a living document that builds on past AARs 

and prepares future deploying attorneys and soldiers in an effort to 

minimize mistakes ofthe past.29 While nothing can replace solid home 

station training programs, Combat Training Center experiences, or just 

old-fashioned personal experience, this report seeks to "allow the 

organization to develop and improve and leave something for the next 

group ofpeople that come in behind and follow on and continue to 

improve."30 As General Franks noted when describing the AAR as one 

2

'. LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI 1994-1995: LESSONS LEARNED FOR THE JuDGE 

ADVOCATE at 2 (The Center for Law and Military Operations Dec. 1995) (HEREINAFTER HAIT! 

AAR]. cri 28 Particularly ifthe operation is a peace operation. For a definition, see FM 100-23. 

29 HAITI AAR at 8. 

30 See TAJAG's remarks in OPERATlON JOINT ENDEAVOR, AFTER-ACTION REVJEW 

(Heidelberg, Germany 24-26 Apr.1997) (An After Action Review conference ofjudge 

advocates held in Heidelberg, Germany. The transcript was reduced to writing in three 

volwnes and is available on Lotus Notes and JAG.net. Cited page numbers may vary 

slightly from electronic versions.) [hereinafter OJE-AAR] cri: 

In tenns of creating systems and implanting systems, and structures, 

that allow the organization to develop and improve and leave something 

for the next group of people that come in behind and follow on and 

continue to improve. 

The team ofjudge advocates that reviewed legal support provided during Operations Desert 

Shield and Desert Storm stated the need for capturing lessons learned in strong tenns: 

If[Desert Storm and this report] teach anything to the Army legal 

community, let it be to confirm the need for a continuing system of 

gathering, analyzing, and storing in retrievable form, the activities, 

accomplishments, shortcomings, and lessons learned ofthe JAGC in 

peace and throughout the operational continuum. 
22 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

of the greatest innovations in leadership, "It allows us to learn, to be 

bold without arrogance ....Many failures come from arrogance or failure 

to listen."31 That is what this report is about. 

As with any lessons learned publication designed for broad 

audiences, much of what follows will seem over simplified. For many 

inexperienced judge advocates and legal specialists, however, these 

lessons are cases of first impression. Other sections address issues of 

significant breadth, complexity, and of first impression for even 

seasoned judge advocates.32 This report cannot, however, answer or 

address fully every aspect of the hundreds of legal issues that arose, 

and, continue to develop during this ongoing operation.33 The Center 

has developed an information system (discussed in the next paragraph) 

that seeks to make available to judge advocates around the world the 

vast majority of legal issues and concerns that arise in operations. In 

pursuing the approach ofLaw and Military Operations in Haiti, 1994­

1995,34 the Desert Storm Assessment Team Report,35 and The Army 

See UNITED STATES ARMY LEGAL SERVICES AGENCY, DESERT STORM ASSESSMENT TEAM'S REPORT 

TO THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE ARMY at Intro-4 (22 Apr. 1992) ~ [hereinafter DSA T 

REPORT]; see also id. at Oral History Program-4 ("TJAG should establish, with quality resources, a 

JAGC version of the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) to capture lessons learned.").~ 

31 General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Soldiering: Today and Tomorrow, 4th Hugh J. Clausen 

Lecture on Leadership at The Judge Advocate General's School (Mar. 23 1998) (to be published in 

the THE ARMY LAWYER (Spring 1999), transcript available at the Legal Research and 

Communications Department, The Judge Advocate General's School). 

32 

For example, determining the application of the provisions of the General Framework Agreement 

for Peace that concern the Inter-entity Boundary Line and the Zone of Separation. 

33 

See the CLAMO-OJG database on Lotus Notes or through the Internet (JAGC.NET) for an 

updated compilation of legal documents from the Balkans. ~ 

34

HAmAAR.~ 

35 

References to the DSAT REPORT are not intended to imply that the Persian Gulf conflict is ideal as 

a model for the types ofmilitary operations judge advocates are likely to see. It is not. These 

refere~ces mere!~ acknowledge that many aspects of legal support are constant throughout the 

operational contmuum and that the last comprehensive collection and examination of lessons learned 

dealt with that conflict. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 23 

Lessons Learned Program,36 this report restates basic principles, but 

does not propose final solutions in each instance. 

The Center for Law and Military Operations,37 together with the 

automation wizards at the Pentagon and The Judge Advocate General's 

School, has pushed forward in its goal of developing automated 

databases ofoperational law materials and making them available to 

judge advocates, world-wide. To date, CLAMO has made available to 

active and reserve component judge advocates, via Lotus Notes38 

or the 

Internet (JAGC.NET), ten distinct operationally oriented databases. 

Some ofthese databases include SOFA agreements, Reserve 

Component-oriented After Action Reports, United Nation Security 

Council Resolutions, Government Accounting Office reports, opinions, 

memoranda, standard operating procedures, declassified operations plan 

annexes, and other useful forms, cards, and training aids. These 

databases allow judge advocates to design and tailor deployment 

packages and give them direct access to valuable resources. Perhaps 

most important is the near real-time access judge advocates have to the 

lessons learned ofother judge advocates. As this report was in progress, 

the judge advocates ofthe 1st Cavalry Division, who were preparing for 

deployment to Bosnia, had access to over 1000 documents, including 

numerous judge advocate interviews and AARs, either used by or 

prepared by those that had gone before them as part ofthe 

Implementation Force (hereinafter IFOR)39 

or the Stabilization Force 

36 See u.s. DEP'T OF ARMY' REG. 11-33, ARMY LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM: SYSTEM 

DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION (10 Oct. 1989). 

37 Hereinafter referred to in text and notes as either "CLAMO" or "the Center." 

38 See generally Lieutenant Colonel Robert Van Hooser, Regimental Technology Plan, in THE 

JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOLDESKBOOKFORPLENARY SESSIONS OF THE 1995 JAG CLE 

at Sec. IX 105, 113 (1-6 Oct. 1995) (describing the plan for work product retrieval (WPR) within the 

Judge Advocate General's Corps Wide Area Network (JAGC WAN)). cri 

39 IFOR was the name for the U.N.S.C. Res. and NATO-authorized operation until the Transfer of 

Authority (TOA) on 20 Dec. 1996. IFOR concerned the 1st Armored Division and the 1st Infantry 

Division's Covering Force for one month. 
24 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

(hereinafter SFOR).40 Access to such information does not replace the 

need for judge advocates to analyze every issue on its own merit and to 

ensure that their opinions are based on thorough research and current 

data. However, these databases provide raw data and legal information 

regarding virtually every functional area of the law in a deployed 

environment. 

Because ofthe size, complexity, and ongoing nature of operations 

in the Balkans, CLAMO's goal with this publication is to summarize 

useful lessons learned from legal support to operations in the Balkans 

from 1995 to 1998. Emerging doctrine and evolving organizational 

structure reflect that the Judge Advocate General's Corps' support to the 

battlefield commander falls into three distinct areas: command and 

control,41 sustainment,42 and personnel service support.43 The extended 

nature of the Bosnia deployment has allowed CLAMO to analyze these 

discrete areas in the context ofproviding professional legal services as 

far forward as possible at all echelons of command throughout the 

operational continuum.44 

For operations in the Balkans, the Center finds-through its 

survey ofvirtually hundreds oflessons learned-that judge advocates 

delivered quality legal support in a ground breaking fashion in all 

40 

The Stabilization Force (SFOR) is ongoing. 1st Infantry Division, 1st Armored Division, and now 

the 1st Cavalry Division participated in SFOR. 

41 

Ge~er~lly, issue~ d.irectly affecting the commander's decision making process on the battlefield 

fall within C2. This mcludes, but is not limited to, interpreting, drafting, disseminating, and training 

co~nd_ers,_staffs, a~~ soldier~ ?n the Rules of Engagement, participating in targeting cells, and 

partlc1patmg m the military dec1s1on making process. 

42 

~s includes, but ~s not limited to, negotiating ACSAs and other international agreements, 

con~?enc~ contractmg and fiscal law, administering the Foreign Claims Act, environmental law, 

administrative law, legal assistance for Pre-deployment Preparation (PDP) or Preparation for 

Overseas Movement (POM). 

43 

"I?is includes, but is not limited to, the administration of military justice, traditional legal 


assistance, and personnel claims. 


44 

See U.S. DEP'TOF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-100, para. 1-4 (3 Sep. 1991). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 25 

functional areas. Emerging doctrine should reflect the lessons learned 

from nearly three years in Bosnia. 45 

While CLAMO's lessons learned methodology is 

straightforward,46 operations in the Balkans have generated such 

voluminous reference materials that CLAMO gathered and analyzed 

resources in an exhaustive yet somewhat limited fashion. The Center: 

• 	 Focused on the transcripts from the 1997 AAR hosted by 

USAREUR and CLAM047 

• 	 Gathered AARs from legal offices worldwide-both Active 

and Reserve Components-that supported the mission 

• 	 Personally interviewed judge advocates that participated in 

the operation 

• 	 Gathered a vast array ofinformation through the CALLsponsored Combined Arms Assessment Team visits to 

Bosnia48 

• 	 Examined CALL materials49 

45 With the legally intensive nature and split-based nature ofpeace operations, judge advocates are 

often providing legal support at the battalion-level. From an MTOE, TDA, and doctrinal 

perspective, the JAGC is not structured to provide this level ofsupport. (MTOE is Modified Table 

of Organization and Equipment; TDA is Table ofDistribution and Allowances). During OPERATION 

JOINT FORGE, base camps in the Task Force Eagle Area of responsibility are commanded by 

battalion commanders and have a judge advocate in direct support. 

46 See HAITI AAR at 6-7. cr> 47 See Memorandum. Assistant Judge Advocate General for Military Law and Operations, DAJAZD, to Staff Judge Advocate, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg and other addressees, subject: 

After Action Report for Operation Uphold Democracy (2 Feb. 1995) cr> (directing that the 

conference take place). The conference was held and videotaped at Charlottesville between 8 and 

10 May 1995. This report at several points cites to remarks made at this conference, the videotapes 

of which are on file with CLAMO. 

48From 1996 to 1998 LTC Gaylen G. Whatcott and LTC Steve E. Castlen each spent several 

months preparing and deploying to Bosnia to gather valuable information from IFOR and SFOR. 

49The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) exists to collect and analyze data from a variety of 

current and historical sources, including Army operations and training events, and produce 

information serving as lessons for military commanders, staff, and students. CALL disseminates 

these lessons and other related research materials via a variety ofprinted and electronic media, 

including this web site. Obtain a listing and copies of these products by dialing DSN 552-2255/3035 
26 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

• 	 Reviewed AARs and other relevant documents produced by 

the United Nations,50 IFOR,51 SFOR,52 USAREUR,53 the U.S 

Army Peacekeeping Institute,54 and the Joint Uniform 

Lessons Learned System55 

This list reflects CLAMO's primary Balkan resources, but it is not 

exhaustive. 

This is a report ofkey lessons and not a history ofjudge 

advocate participation in the Bosnia deployment. Because of the 

nature of this peace operation-coalition forces putting themselves 

between three EAFs in a highly charged environment-a full 

appreciation of any legal or practical issue requires judge advocates to 

understand the historical setting which gave rise to the operation. In 

fact, understanding the historical backdrop of the Balkans, and trying 

to understand what occurred prior to the deployment, is lesson learned 

number one. Events leading to the explosive conflict in Bosnia 

combined with the experiences of the EAFs throughout the conflict 

shed light on the EAFs' intent, desired endstate, and ability to 

compromise over a given issue. Part II of this report provides a 

window into the Balkan past. It describes various organizations' (e.g., 

U.N., NATO) actions during the Balkan conflict, recounts the postconflict situation, discusses how the United States-led Implementation 

or (913) 684-2266/3035, faxing a request to DSN 552-9564 or (913) 684-9564, or visit the website 


<http://call.army.mil/call.htm>. 


so U.N. Website <htttp://www.un.org>. 


si CLAMO Lotus Notes, OJE Database. (J) 


si CLAMO Lotus Notes, OJG Database. (J) 


s

3 USAREUR AAR. (J) 


s

4 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY PEACEKEEPING INSTITUTE, AFTER ACTION REVIEW (BHAAR I) 

CONFERENCE REPORT ( 19-23 May 1996) and U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY PEACEKEEPING INSTITUTE, 

AFTER ACTION REVIEW (BHAAR II) CONFERENCE REPORT ( 13-17 Apr. 1997). (J) 

ss See DEP'TOF DEFENSE, TRAINING AND PERFORMANCE DATA CENTER, JOINT UNIFORM LESSONS 

LEARNED SYSTEM (JULLS), VERSION 3.10 USER'S MANUAL (1990). The hard copy of the EUCOM 

Lessons Learned are available at CLAMO. These lessons learned are focused at the EUCOM level. 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 27 

and Stabilization Forces executed operations in the Balkans, and 

concludes with the organization ofjudge advocate support in the 

Balkans. Part III summarizes lessons learned. 
28 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

II. The Military Operations and Their Context 

A. HISTORY6 

The Balkan57 region has been home to some ofmankind's most 

brilliant civilizations. Nevertheless, identity, determined by cultural 

and religious affiliation, has left a historical schism separating distinct 

ethnic groups. The Balkans has become a melting pot of shifting 

populations. Though these separate cultures have often melded 

cooperatively, much of their history has been marked by strife. 

Violence is ingrained and distrust runs deep in this 2000-year-old 

battleground. 

By the 7th century, after the fall ofthe Roman Empire, the Slavs 

first settled the area ofBosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). By the 9th century, 

Serbia (southeast ofBiH) and Croatia (west ofBiH) established 

themselves as competing kingdoms. By the 12th century, the "Kings 

of Hungary"58 took over the Kingdom of Croatia and the area of 

present.,.day BiH. By the 13th century, the Kingdom ofBosnia gained 

and retained its independence for about 250 years by fighting off the 

Hungarians and Serbs. During this time, the Bosnian population was 

mostly Roman Catholic (Christian). The Kingdom of Serbia was 

largely Eastern Orthodox (Christian). See Historical Maps at 

Appendix A(l). 

The 14th century marked the Ottoman Empire's conquest of the 

Balkan region-introducing Islam into the region. In 1389, the 

Ottoman Turks defeated the seat of Serbia's Kingdom and their 

cultural center at that time-Kosovo. The recent bloodbath in Kosovo 

56 See LEDERER, supra note 1. See also WILLIAM T. JOHNSON, DECIPHERING THE BALKAN ENIGMA, 

Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks Pa. 1995). 

57 The Balkan countries include Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia 

(Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo), Slovenia, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and 

Turkey. 

58 See LEDERER, supra note lat 2. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 29 

is rooted in this event that took place over 600 years ago. By 1463, the 

Kingdom ofBosnia joined Serbia's fate by losing its independence to 

the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire consolidated these former 

Kingdoms into one province called the Eyalet of Bosna. 

For the next 415 years (1463-1878), the Ottoman Empire 

remained in control of the region fostering the spread ofthe Islamic 

faith. During this period, the Ottoman Empire provided a somewhat59 

flexible religious environment that allowed converted Bosnians to 

adapt existing traditions to the new Islamic faith. Further, the Ottoman 

Empire was tolerant ofnon-Muslim minorities allowing them to 

practice religion, to live, and to trade as they chose. From this 

environment grew a Bosnian Muslim culture that co-existed with 

Catholicism (primarily Croats) and Orthodoxy (primarily Serbs). 

After the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, the Great Powers of 

Europe met in Berlin and decided the fate of the faltering Ottoman 

Empire. The Great Powers appointed Austria-Hungary as 

':ldministrator of Bosnia-Herzegovina and, at the Russian's insistence, 

granted independence to Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria. As the 

Ottoman Empire was pushed out of Europe, the Muslim Slav 

population in BiH increased. Muslims from the northern reaches of the 

shrinking Ottoman Empire found safe haven in BiH. Meanwhile, the 

Austrian administrators developed the BiH infrastructure, including 

parks and schools, which stimulated a building boom. In this relatively 

prosperous setting, the various ethnic groups again turned their 

attention toward nationalism and independence. Serb nationalists 

advocated the consolidation of all non-Muslim Slavs from Serbia, BiH, 

Croatia, and Slovenia. This consolidated Serb-state would be 

independent from Austria. On the other hand, many Bosnian Muslims 

advocated a pluralistic society, content to remain under the control of 

59 Non-muslims were subject to higher taxes and most civil and military offices were reserved for 

muslims. 
30 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Austria. By 1908, Austria formally annexed BiH, further hardening 

the Slav nationalists' position. 

This Balkan history plays largely into the strife that forms the 

basis of this report. It is the Balkan Wars of the early twentieth 

century,60 however, which have had the most dramatic consequences 

within the region. In these wars, Serbia played a large role in expelling 

the Turks from the region and regaining lands lost throughout history. 

In 1914, ethnic frictions flared and Gavrilo Princip, a Serb nationalist, 

assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the AustroHungarian throne, in Sarajevo, BiH. This led to the Third Balkan War 

(World War I), pitting the Bulgarians, Turks, Germans, Croats, and 

others against the Serbs, Greeks, the U.S. and other Allies. During the 

war, the Croats collected Serbs and Muslims into several concentration 

camps where thousands died.61 By the end of the war, millions were 

dead across Europe including half of Serbia's military age male 

population.62 World War I left approximately two and one-half million 

displaced persons in the Balkans, a result repeated in the disintegration 

ofBosnia in the 1990s. 

The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 created the Kingdoms of 

the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and only filled the void left by the 

collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It did not address the 

Muslim Slavs. The region was plunged into dictatorship and renamed 

the Kingdom ofYugoslavia.63 As we still see, today, the mere 

establishment of a single state did little to smooth fundamental 

differences among its twelve million inhabitants. Ethnic hatreds and 

tensions continued to plague the country. The Serb-dominated 

Yugoslav government soon alienated the Croat population. In 1928, a 

Serb politician killed a popular Croat on the floor of parliament in 

60 1912 First Balkan War, 1913 Second Balkan War, 1914 Third Balkan War {World War I). 

61 See LEDERER, supra note 1. 

62 See LEDERER, supra note l at 1. 


63 "Jug" in Cyrillic means South. Thus, Yugoslavia means kingdom of the South Slavs. 

LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 31 

Belgrade.64 The following year, a coup lead to the dissolution of 

parliament and the re-drawing ofinternal borders to account for Bosnia 

and Croatia. Discontent continued, however, as hard-line Serbs ruled 

the provinces with an iron fist, spawning anti-Serb extremist 

individuals and organizations that would surface, in earnest, during 

World War II. The Yugoslav regime further tightened their rule ofthe 

provinces after an anti-Serb assassinated the King of Yugoslavia. 

With Hitler's march across Europe in World War II, Nazi forces 

overran Yugoslavia and Greece in 1941. The Axis Powers occupied 

and partitioned Yugoslavia. The war years saw Yugoslavia become a 

killing ground where, in addition to German occupation forces, four 

distinct groups engaged in ruthless campaigns of ethnic cleansing. The 

Ustasi led the German puppet Croat-state and engaged in the cleansing 

ofSerbs, political opponents, and Jews. Some Bosnian Muslims 

joined in with the Ustasi.65 The German controlled regime in Serbia, 

led by a Serb, engaged in the cleansing ofnon-Serbs, political 

opponents, and Jews. The Chetniks, a guerrilla army led by a Serb 

army officer, 66 broke away from the German-controlled regime in 

Serbia. They fought the Germans and retaliated against the Ustasi by 

cleansing Croats and Muslims in Bosnia. The Partisans, a multiethnic guerrilla army led by Josip Tito, fought ruthlessly against the 

Germans, the German-controlled regime in Serbia, the Chetniks, and 

the Ustasi. With their ability to tie down the Axis Powers, and the 

subsequent backing of the Allies, Tito's communist Partisans emerged 

from World War II as the undisputed leaders ofYugoslavia. After 

eliminating his opposition,67 the now self-declared Prime Minister Tito 

declared the country the Federal People's Republic ofYugoslavia. Six 

64 See LEDERER, supra note 1 at 3. 

65 See LEDERER, supra note 1 at 4. 

66 COL Drazha Mihailovic, <htttp://www.xs4all.nVfrankti/warhistory/war_hist.html>. See also 

LEDERER, supra note I. 

67 See LEDERER supra note I at 5 (after the fall ofthe Axis Powers, the.Partisans kill thousands of 

the Ustasi (Croats and Slovenes)). 
32 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

republics were created, based largely upon geography and historical 

precedent: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

Montenegro, and Macedonia. Strictly administrative delineations, 

these lines did not reflect natural boundaries of the different groups 

and they did little to soothe tensions. Prime Minister Tito held 

together this confederation of provinces by repressing any ethnic 

divisiveness. Most ethnic infighting took a forty-year hiatus. 

Prime Minister Tito's death in 1980 began, again, the 

disintegration of this region. By the late 1980' s, deteriorating 

economic conditions, the fall of the Soviet Union, and demands for 

political reforms exacerbated tensions. Serb nationalism, fueled by 

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's68 calls for a Greater Serbia, 

once again reared its head. In 1989, Slobodan Milosevic sent a tremor 

through non-Serb Yugoslavia by cracking down on the ethnic 

Albanians that make up ninety percent of the population of Serbia's 

autonomous province ofKosovo. He stripped the autonomous status 

of all non-Serbian minority regions-to include Kosovo. This severely 

restricted the educational, political, and economic rights of the ethnic 

Albanians. 

B. THE BALKAN CONFLICT, 1991-1995 

1. 1991-The Fighting Resumes 

Against this ominous backdrop, Slovenia, a country without a 

Serb minority, declared its independence in June 1991. Though the 

mostly Serbian Yugoslav National Army (JNA) resisted temporarily, 

the well-armed and well-prepared Slovenians fended off the 

skirmishes. The JNA elected not to become heavily involved and 

withdrew to neighboring Croatia. See Historical Maps at Appendix 

A(l). 

68 President of the Serbian Republic. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 33 

Croatia likewise declared independence, but did not fare as well. 

Croatia was not prepared militarily and had a large Serb population 

within its borders. A protracted conflict resulted. Croatian Serb 

nationalists, with apparent backing from the JNA out of BiH and 

Serbia, seized about thirty percent of Croatia and proclaimed the 

independent Republic of Serb Krajina. Savage fighting, to include the 

near destruction of historical Dubrovnik, Vukovar,69 and other civilian 

population centers, allegations of targeting civilians, and ethnic 

cleansing70 set the tone for the next three and one-half years of conflict 

in the Balkans.71 On September 25, 1991, the U.N. stepped formally 

into the Balkan conflict by imposing a weapons and military 

equipment embargo on all of the former Yugoslavia.72 Then, pursuant 

to a U.N.-sponsored cease-fire between Croatia and the rebel Serbs, the 

JNA withdrew at the end of 1991 with control of roughly one-third of 

Croatia. See Summary of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 

at Appendix E(4). 

2. 1992 - U.N. Forces Step In 

The U.N. established the United Nations Protection Force 

(UNPROFOR)73 after recognizing that the cease-fire would not hold. 

See Summary ofUN/NATO Air, Land and Sea Operations at 

Appendix C. After international recognition74 of Croatian, Slovenian, 

and Macedonian secession from Yugoslavia, BiH held a referendum on 

69 Both Croatian cultural landmarks. Dubrovnik is a medieval port city and Vukovar is an old city 

with Baroque architecture. 

7

° Forcibly displacing an entire ethnic group from a particular area. 

71 At the same time, Serbian authorities tightened further their grip on Kosovo. This led the ethnic 

Albanians to unofficially declare independence. See LEDERER supra note 1 at 8. 

72 SC. . Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009 mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. S/Res/713 (25 Sep. 1991). 

73 S . . CRes. 743, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3055 mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. S/Res/743 (21 Feb. 1992). 

74 In Jan. 1992, the then EC (now EU) recognized Croatian and Slovenian independence. 

Department of State Fact Sheet. subject: Chronology of the Balkan Conflict (6 Dec. 1995). 

Macedonia would later receive formal recognition as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 

hereinafter FYROM. 
34 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

independence. Despite threats of violence from Bosnian Serb 

nationalists, Bosnian Croats and Muslims voted for independence. 

Most Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum. On April 5, 1992, 

people from all three Bosnian ethnic groups-Croats, Muslims, and 

Serbs-demonstrated in Sarajevo calling for peace. JNA-backed Serb 

nationalist snipers opened fire into the crowd. The next day, April 6, 

1992, the war in Bosnia began in earnest between Bosnian government 

forces and Bosnian Serbs. The JNA, with artillery positioned on the 

high ground around Sarajevo, laid siege to the city. On April 7, 1992, 

the U.N. authorized the full deployment ofUNPROFOR, sending 

approximately 15,000 peacekeeping troops into Croatia, and later into 

BiH and the Former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia, hereinafter 

FYROM. On May 22, 1992, the U.N. admitted the country ofBosniaHerzegovina75 as a full member. With the backing ofthe JNA, 

however, the militarily superior Bosnian Serbs controlled roughly sixty 

percent ofBiH by the end ofMay. Because ofthe continued Serb 

aggression, the U.N., at the end ofMay, imposed economic sanctions 

against Serbia. 76 

As the conflict in BiH continued unabated, and the rest ofthe 

world was flooded with images of emaciated captives in prison camps 

around the region, the U.N. took steps to contain the conflict. At the 

request ofthe President ofthe Former Yugoslav Republic of 

Macedonia (FYROM), the U.N., on December 11, 1992, expanded 

UNPROFOR's mandate to include monitoring the border between 

FYROM and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia-Serbia and 

Montenegro (FRY).77 Other U.N. actions included expanding the 

75 S.C. Res. 755, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3079 mtg .. 14, U.N. Doc. S/Res/755 (20 May 1992) 

(recommended to the General Assembly that the BiH be admitted to membership in the United 

Nations). 

76 S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3082 mtg .. 14, U.N. Doc. S/Res/757 (30 May 1992). 

77 S.C. Res. 795, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3147 mtg .. 14, U.N. Doc. S/Res/795 (11 Dec. 1992). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 35 

troop numbers for UNPROFOR, establishing a no-fly zone over BiH,78 

strengthening the existing embargo,79 and negotiating largely 

ineffective cease-fire agreements. 

The year 1992 ended with unabated fighting and continued 

ethnic cleansing. Allegations of systematic rape, torture, and murder 

of civilians permeated the news. Estimates reflect a total of 2.5 million 

displaced persons from the former Yugoslavia-1.8 million refugees 

within the former Yugoslav republics (i.e., uprooted ethnic groups). 80 

3. 1993- The War Continues With Increased U.N. 

Involvement 

While heavy fighting and the siege of Sarajevo continued, 

Croatian forces pushed into the Serb-held region ofKrajina, just before 

the expiration o~UNPROFOR's initial mandate, to regain lost territory 

and set a new cease-fire line. At the same time, Serb forces seized 

U.N. weapons from various U.N. depots. In BiH, the heretofore two­

~ided conflict-BiH government forces against Bosnian Serbs forcesexpanded dramatically as warfare broke out between the Bosnian 

Croats and Bosnian Muslims. The U.N. strengthened the no-fly zone 

by authorizing participating NATO forces to shoot down violators.81 

In June 1993, NATO ~uthorized, at the,request of the U.N., close air 

support for UNPROFOR troops. On April 12, 1993, NATO began 

combat patrols to enforce the U.N. no-fly zone-Operation Deny 

Flight.82 On February 28, 1994, NATO aircraft shot down four 

warplanes that violated the no-fly z9ne. Despite NATO's long and 

78 S.C. Res. 781, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3122 mtg.. 14, U.N. Doc. S/Res/781 (9 Oct. 1992). This 

ban worked after the United States stepped in and said that it would participate in enforcing the nofly zone. 

79 s.C. Res. 787, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137 mtg .. 14, U.N. Doc. S/Res/787 (16 Nov. 1992). 

80 UNHCR and RC committees. 

81 S.C. Res. 816, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/Res/816 (31Mar.1993). 

82 OPERATION DENY FLIGHT eventually involved 200 Alliance aircraft and over 100,000 Sorties. See 

SUMMARYOFU.N./NATO OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS App. C. 
36 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

successful lifespan, this act was the organization's first military 

engagement. See Appendix C. 

After Bosnian-Serb forces declared control of seventy percent of 

BiH, the U.N., in June 1993, authorized83 increased troop strength and 

the use of force to protect six Muslim enclaves (safe areas) under siege 

by Bosnian Serb forces: Bihac, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, 

and Zepa. NATO's decision in August 1993 to use air power to 

protect these safe areas provided Sarajevo some temporary relief from 

the year-long siege. This relief was short-lived. The war, now 

involving all three ethnic groups in BiH, intensified. Atrocities 

committed by all parties to the conflict continued, including the 

destruction of Serb-majority villages in Croatia.84 As these 

developments plunged further the region into darkness, the United 

States committed several hundred troops to the UNPROFOR mission 

in FYROM85 to help contain the conflict. · 

Several diplomatic initiatives in 1993, while short-term failures, 

provided the first real hope for peace and laid the groundwork for the 

agreement that would ultimately end the war-the General Framework 

Agreement for Peace (GFAP).86 Lord Owen of Britain and envoy 

Cyrus Vance of the United States proposed the Vance-Owen plan that 

included a Bosnia with ten ethnically divided provinces/divisions, all 

having significant autonomy. 87 These ten provinces would share one 

83 S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/836 (4 Jun. 1993). 

84 Remarks by Commander, UNPROFOR, Zabreb, Croatia (Operation Joint Endeavor, Able SentryBalkans, 1993-1996, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) database). 

85 S.C. Res. 842, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3239 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/842 (18 Jun. 1993). The U.S 

Force included 300 soldiers from USAREUR. 

86 See Appendix E(S). Other names include the Dayton Accord, Paris Peace Agreement, and Paris 

Agreement. 

87 See Operation Joint Endeavor, Able Sentry- Balkans, 1993-1996, CALL database. Lord Owen 

and the Hon Cyrus Vance put forth a plan that divided Bosnia-Herzegovina into IO provinces, 

established corridors for safe passage of aid and civilians, established constitutional principals 

giving the provinces autonomy with decentralized state, and set forth cease-fire and demilitarization 

arrangements. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 37 

central government, with limited authority, and a rotating presidency. 

In May 1993, the Bosnian Serb Parliament rejected this plan. In June 

1993, Croatian and Serbian leaders reached agreement on partitioning 

BiH into a confederation of three provinces-Serb, Croat, and Muslim. 

Initially, the Bosnian Muslim leaders refused to participate until the 

Serbs lifted the siege of Sarajevo. This plan evolved into the next 

failed proposal-the Owen-Stoltenberg plan. This plan called for an 

ethnically based, three-way split of territory.88 Various rigid 

conditions,89 not accepted by all warring factions, led the Bosnian 

Parliament to reject the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan in September 1993. 

Despite these political efforts to end the war, 1993 ended in 

much the same fashion as 1992-except now, all three factions were at 

war with one another. 

·4. 1994 -NATO Employs Air Strikes; Muslim-Croats Make 

Peace 

On February 6, 1994, an artillery shell detonated in the middle of 

a Sarajevo marketplace killing sixty-eight civilians and maiming scores 

of others. This attack in Sarajevo and the continued siege ofthe 

previously declared safe-areas led NATO, at the request of the U.N., to 

step up involvement in Bosnia. See United Nations Security Council 

Resolutions at Appendix E(4) and Appendix C. 

At the request of the U.N., the North Atlantic Coundl (NAC) 

reacted to the Sarejevo incident by authorizing NATO air strikes 

against artillery and mortar positions around Sarajevo on February 9, 

1994. Also, any heavy weapons not under UNPROFOR control and 

found within a twenty-kilometer exclusion zone around Sarajevo 

would be subject to NATO air strikes. In April, the safe haven of 

88 30% Bosnian Muslim; 18% Bosnian Croat; 52% Bosnian Serb. See CNBC History of the 

Balkans. 

89 The Bosnian leaders demanded restitution from the Bosnian Serbs for the territory they gained 

over the last eighteen months of conflict. 
38 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Gorazde was under Bosnian Serb attack. On April 10 and 11, 1994, 

NATO aircraft provided close air support to protect UNPROFOR 

troops in Gorazde by employing its first air strikes against Bosnian 

Serbs. As the attack on Gorazde continued, the North Atlantic 

Council, at the U.N. 's request, authorized air strikes against any 

Bosnian Serb heavy weapons within a twenty-kilometer exclusion zone 

around the previously declared safe haven ofGorazde. Up to this 

point, these largely Muslim cities were "safe havens" in name only and 

were under constant attack. Further, the NAC authorized air strikes 

against any heavy weapons that attacked, from any range, any of the 

six safe havens. 

With the above authority, and at the request ofthe U.N., NATO 

aircraft struck again, this time within the exclusion zone around 

Sarajevo. One attack was in response to the Bosnian Serbs seizing 

weapons from an UNPROFOR collection site and the other was in 

response to a Bosnian Serb attack on an UNPROFOR vehicle. In 

November 1994, in response to new fighting between the Bosnian 

Government and Bosnian Serbs near Bihac, BiH, NATO extended90 air 

strikes into Serb-held territory ofCroatia.91 

A second development in 1994 (the first being stepped-up 

NATO involvement) that eventually led to a shift in the balance of 

power in BiH away from the Bosnian Serbs was the United Statesbrokered Muslim-Croat federation, 92 ending hostilities between these 

two warring factions. This federation did two things. First, it set the 

condition~ for a direct role for the Croatian army in support ofthe 

Bosnian Muslims against the Bosnian Serbs that later, in 1995, tipped 

the military balance against the Bosnian Serbs. Second, the GF AP 

90 S.C. Res. 958, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3461 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/958 (19 Nov. 1994). 

91 On 21 Nov. 1994, NATO attacked the Udbina airfield in response to recent attacks launched from 

that airfield into BiH. On 23 Nov. 1994, NATO attacked air defense radars in Otoka after Serbs 

fired surface-to-air missiles at NA TO aircraft. 

92 Agreed to by t:-.e Bo-&nian Government, Bosnian Croats, and Croatian Government. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 39 

would ultimately reflect this Muslim-Croat federation. This 

development did not, however, lead to a quick political or military 

solution. The countries that made up the Contact Group93 offered 

another peace plan, this one giving fifty-one percent ofBiH to the 

Muslim-Croat federation leaving forty-nine percent to the Bosnian 

Serbs. The Bosnian Serbs rejected this plan. 

The year 1994 ended with intensified NATO involvement 

through the use of airpower, two sides at conflict instead of three (the 

Muslim-Croat federation against the Bosnian Serbs), and a new ceasefire. Former United States President Jimmy Carter negotiated this 

cease-fire and all parties to conflict agreed with its terms. This ceasefire held-for four months. 

5. 1995 - The Conflict Ends 

At the end of the four-month cease-fire, the fighting resumed. It 

included violations of the exclusion zones and the shelling ofthe 

declared safe areas-two of which were the tortured cities of Sarajevo 

and Srebrenica. NATO reacted with air strikes against Bosnian Serb 

ammunition depots in Pale, BiH, in May 1995. The Bosnian Serbs 

responded by taking captive 370 UNPROFOR troops and using them 

as human shields at potential NATO air strike targets. Television 

cameras beamed images ofU.N. troops tied to bridge supports around 

the globe. The government of Serbia helped negotiate the release of 

these hostages. The U.N. strongly condemned the mistreatment ofU.N. 

troops, the increased level ofhostilities, and the June 2 shooting down 

of a United State Air Force plane. As a consequence, the·U.N. 

withdrew all UNPROFOR forces that were isolated at weapons 

collection sites around Sarajevo. In June 1995, the NAC approved 

.

93 United States, Russia, France, Gennany, and Great Britain. The Contact Group's goal was to 

broker an agreement between the new Muslim-Croat federation and the Bosnian Serbs. 
40 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

plans for a NA TO-led operation to support the withdrawal of 

UNPROFOR from BiH and Croatia.94 The war appeared far from over. 

Against this ominous backdrop, the "tides of war turned 

dramatically."95 First, the newly fortified, combined armies of the 

Muslim-Croat federation, attacked and gobbled up chunks ofterritory 

in the northwest. Second, the fall of the safe areas Srebrenica and Zepa 

to the Bosnian Serbs and the renewed Bosnian Serb artillery shelling of 

Sarajevo finally galvanized NATO into acting decisively with a monthlong bombing campaign. Operation Deliberate Force, a joint U.N.­

NATO air campaign, successfully damaged the military capabilities of 

the Bosnian Serbs. This operation succeeded in reducing the threat to 

the Sarajevo safe area, deterring further attacks on all safe areas, 

enforcing the twenty-kilometer weapons-free exclusion zone around 

Sarajevo, providing unrestricted use of the Sarajevo airport, and in 

securing freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and nongovernmental organizations. With the threat ofresumed air strikes, 

Operation Deliberate Force concluded in September 1995.96 Third, the 

newly weakened Bosnian Serb military gave more ground to the fast 

moving Muslim-Croat offensive of September 1995. By November 

1995, the Bosnian-Serbs controlled just fifty percent ofBiH. 

With NATO's newfound resolve and the new territorial parity, 

diplomatic efforts increased dramatically. For the first time, the 

military focus shifted from extracting UNPROFOR under hostile 

94 AFSOUTH OPLAN 40104 provided for the extraction ofUNPROFOR under hostile conditions. 

At the direction of USAREUR, SETAF developed OP LAN Daring Lion. In Jun. 1993, SET AF 

participated in Mountain Shield at the Grafenwoeher Training Area to develop and validate OPLAN 

Daring Lion. In anticipation of conducting the UNPROFOR extraction, EU COM issued a warning 

order to SETAF for OPLAN Daring Lion and CINCSOUTH released OPLAN 40104. As the 

Bosnia Peace Plan and the 5 Oct. 1995 cease-fire held, NATO decided not to use OPLAN Daring 

Lion. See USAREUR AAR, supra note 12, at 19-30. 

95 See CNBC History ofthe Balkans. 

96 This did not, however, end NATO air strikes. OPERATION DENY FLIGHT was a continuing 

operation, and, on 4 Oct. 1995, when Bosnian Serb anti-aircraft radar locked onto NATO aircraft, 

NATO attacked two different radar sites. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 41 

conditions to conducting a peace operation. A United States-led 

mediation produced an October 5, 1995, cease-fire and brought the 

parties to the conflict to Dayton, Ohio, to work on a peace settlement.97 

Representatives from Serbia (Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic 

was already indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Former 

Yugoslavia (ICTY) and did not attend), Croatia, and the Bosnian 

Government all attended the conference. On November 21, 1995, the 

presidents of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia initialed the Dayton Peace 

Accord (DPA).98 The DPA, which is still in effect, is a wide-ranging 

· peace agreement that gave birth to a single Bosnian state with the 

Bosnian Serbs, later named the Republika of Serpska (RS), controlling 

forty-nine percent and the Muslim-Croat Federation controlling fiftyone percent of the territory. Federal elections would occur within nine 

months of the formal signing of the agreement. With the initialing of 

the Dayton Peace Accord, NATO expedited planning for a multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) to implement the military 

aspects of the DPA.99 On December 5, 1995, NATO endorsed OPLAN 

10405-0peration Joint Endeavor-the military plan for IFOR. This 

act set the stage for the largest military operation in NATO history. 100 

Then, on December 14, 1995, the parties101 signed the official Balkan 

peace plan, the General Framework Agreement for Peace, in Paris, 

France (hereinafter GFAP). The following day, the U.N. passed 

Security Council Resolution 1031, giving NA TO the peace 

enforcement mandate, under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, 102 to 

97 On 1 Nov. 1995, the peace talks opened at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, near Dayton, Ohio. 

98 The basic agreement and the military annex are at Appendix E(5). The text of the entire 


agreement is available on CLAMO's Lotus Notes database, or through JAGC.NET on the Internet. 


~ 

99 Three days after the 5 Oct. 1995 cease-fire, SACEUR invited the Partner for Peace nations to 


participate in the Implementation Force. 


100 Department of State Fact Sheet, subject: NATO Involvement in the Balkan Crisis (Bureau of 


European and Canadian Affairs 8 May 1997). 


101 President Franjo Trudjman, Croatia; President Alija Izetbegovic, Bosnia; President Slobodan 


Milosevic, Serbia. 


102 U.N. CHARTER, chapter VII (See Appendix E(2)). 
42 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

implement the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. On December 

16, 1995, the NATO-led IFOR began Operation Joint Endeavor-the 

deployment ofwhat would be, by February 1996, a 60,000 member 

multinational force with troop contributing nations from all 16 NA TO 

allies and 18 non-NATO countries, including Russia. 

C. OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE) 

1. IFOR Tasks & Milestones 

Recalling that the Entity Armed Forces (EAFs) voluntarily 

agreed to the terms of the GFAP, the IFOR's role was to assist, in an 

even-handed manner, the EAFs to implement the peace agreement. 

See Sample Mission Statements at Appendix F. Under the terms of 

Annex 1-A to the GFAP,103 the military annex, the Implementation 

Force successfully enforced the cease-fire, ensured the withdrawal of 

forces and the movement ofheavy weapons to designated storage sites, 

supervised the marking ofboundaries and the zone of separation 

between the EAFs, provided for the safe withdrawal ofUNPROFOR 

forces not participating in IFOR, and controlled the airspace over BiH. 

Finally, IFOR provided a secure environment for the multitude of 

other organizations responsible for implementing the civilian aspects 

of the GFAP. IFOR's success in carrying out the military aspects of 

the GFAP was pivotal in Bosnia's transition to peace in the first year 

after the signing of the GFAP. 

December 2, 1995, began the deployment to Croatia, Hungary, 

and Bosnia of the IFOR Enabling Force of2600 troops, who prepared 

for the 60,000 strong IFOR main body deployment. On December 20, 

1995, D-Day, the UNPROFOR Commander transferred authority to 

Commander, IFOR, of all NATO and non-NATO forces participating 

in IFOR. The next day, the first ever Joint Military Commission met in 

Sarajevo. On January 19, 1996, D+30, the EAFs withdrew their forces 

103 See GFAP supra note 13. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS JN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 43 

from the Zone of Separation on both sides of the agreed cease-fire line 


(ACFL). On February 3, 1996, D+45, the EAFs withdrew their forces 


from those areas to be transferred to another EAF. By March 19, 1996, 


D+90, the transfer of agreed-upon territory between the EAFs was 


completed, the cease-fire line was replaced with the inter-entity 


boundary line (IEBL ), and the new ZOS was established around the 


IEBL. See Map at Appendix A(2). The last major milestone in 


implementing the military aspects of the GFAP concerned 


demobilizing designated forces by moving them and all heavy weapons 


into designated cantonment areas. As the EAFs were unable to meet 


the initial April 18, 1996, (D+ 120) deadline, SACEUR pushed the 


deadline to June 27, 1996, (D+ 180). The EAFs met this deadline. 


2. Command and Control104 

The NATO-led OJE was under the political direction and control 


of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Military control of IFOR, the 


military force of OJE, included a unified command structure that began 


yvith NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), 


General George Joulwan. Also, General Joulwan was the Commander­


in-Chief, European Command (CINCEUCOM). SACEUR designated 


NATO's Commander-in-Chief, Southern Command (CINCSOUTH), 


Admiral Leighton Smith, as the first Commander of the 


Implementation Force (COMIFOR). COMIFOR, in turn, commanded 


the three multi-national divisions 105 through NATO's Allied Rapid 


Reaction Corps (ARRC). See Organization Charts at Appendix 


D(1)&(2). 

3. /FOR Support to Civilian Implementation ofthe GFAP 

IFOR's success in implementing the military aspects ofthe 


GF AP created a relatively secure environment for the 400-plus 


. 

104 See NATO Task Force Organization, Appendix D( 1 ). 105 U.S.-led MND-N, French-led MND-SE, and British-led MND-SW. 
44 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

international and non-governmental organizations responsible for 

implementing the civilian aspects of the peace agreement. 106 The 

December 8-9, 1995 Peace Implementation Conference named Carl 

Bildt as the High Representative (Office ofthe High Representative or 

OHR) in charge ofmonitoring and coordinating all aspects of the 

civilian implementation ofthe GF AP. IFOR provided support to the 

civilian implementation ofthe peace process at the request ofthe OHR 

and consistent with IFOR's mandate and available resources. 

IFOR worked closely with and provided significant logistical 

support107 to the OHR, the International Police Task Force (IPTF), the 

International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), the U.N. High 

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Criminal 

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the Organisation for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Significantly, IFOR 

assisted the OHR and the OSCE as they successfully prepared, 

supervised, and monitored the September 14, 1995 elections. 

IFOR stood up a Civil-Military Cooperation team (CIMIC) 

which rendered technical advice and expertise to the various 

international and non-governmental organizations, IFOR units, various 

commissions, the EAFs, and local authorities. The 350-person CIMIC 

included IFOR personnel, attorneys, educators, public transportation 

specialists, engineers, agriculture experts, economists, public health 

officials, veterinarians, communication experts, and other experts. 

4. U.S. Military Role 

While organizations all over the Department ofDefense played a 

role in the success ofIFOR, U.S. forces directly supported the 

operation in four primary locations. First, the U.S.-led Multi-National 

106 NATO Fact Sheet, subject: NATO's Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia (Mar. 97). 

107 Some of the support included transportation, medical treatment and evacuation, vehicle recovery 

and repair, and security information. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 45 

Division, North (MND-N), Task Force Eagle (TFE), was and continues 

to be responsible for the northeast one-third of BiH. This area of 

operations includes Tuzla, the Posavina Corridor, Doboj, Zvomik, and 

the highly charged city of Brcko. See Organization Chart at Appendix 

D(3). During IFOR, TFE represented the largest concentration of U.S. 

forces, numbering about 22,000. Second, U.S. commanders and 

personnel supported the multi-national headquarters in Sarajevo. 

Third, USAREUR and V Corps personnel supported TFE from the 

Intermediate Staging Base (ISB)in Hungary and from locations in 

Croatia. Fourth, U.S. forces continued to support the UNPREDEP 

(formerly UNPROFOR) mission in FYROM. 108 

· On December 20, 1995, UNPROFOR transferred authority to the 

Commarider of TFE, the Commanding General ofthe First Armored 

Division (now the Commander of IFOR's Multinational DivisionNorth). Despite the extremely harsh conditions that accompanied the 

worst winter in 40 years, V Corps and 1st AD engineers, many from 

Hanau, Germany, successfully bridged the Sava River on December 

31, 1995. 1st AD soldiers, augmented with V Corps personnel, 

immediately crossed the bridge into Bosnia becoming part of the most 

powerful organization in !FOR-Task Force Eagle. Forces from 

Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Poland, Denmark, Lithuania, Norway, 

Iceland, Sweden, Russia, and Turkey joined TFE adding 3 additional 

brigades to TFE-the Nordic-Polish, Russian, and Turkish Brigades. 

TFE now had 6 brigades (plus), fully armed and prepared for any 

contingency, hoping not to fire one round in anger. 

Amidst the highly charged and extremely volatile situation 

amongst the EAFs after 4 years ofbrutal conflict, TFE, with firm 

resolve, successfully implemented every military objective in the 

GF AP in an even-handed manner. After nine months on the ground, 

TFE supported the OSCE in the country's first democratic national 

elections. 

108 The U.S. contribution to UNPREDEP in FYROM is called Task force Able Sentry. 
46 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

5. 	 Judge Advocate Support 

Like operations in Haiti, Operation Joint Endeavor and the 

continuing operations in the Balkans profit from heavy judge advocate 

support. 109 Judge advocates, legal administrators, noncommissioned 

officers, and legal specialists, from the active and reserve components, 

deployed in support of OJE and the continuing operations. Reserve 

Component judge advocates and legal personnel distinguished 

themselves by their seamless integration into existing organizations in 

Bosnia, the ISB in Hungary, and backfilling legal centers in Germany. 

Initially, fifteen judge advocates, one warrant officer, and twenty-three 

71Ds deployed in support ofTFE. Five judge advocates and six 71Ds 

deployed with 21st TAACOM(F) to the ISB in Hungary. Also with the 

ISB in Hungary, four judge advocates and four 71Ds deployed as part 

of USAREUR(F). Finally, one U.S. judge advocate augmented the 

U.K. and Dutch attorneys at the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. See 

Judge Advocate Disposition at Appendix D(4). 

TFE judge advocates provided full legal support to two brigade 

combat teams, an aviation brigade, a corps support group, a military 

police brigade, the division artillery staff, the Division Main in Tuzla, 

and the Division Rear. 

Judge advocates at every level-from NA TO to the soldier on 

the ground-impacted on these operations. They: 

• 	 Helped craft the GF AP 

• 	 Assisted commanders at every level-from the coalition level 

to the base camp in the Zone of Separation-with every 

aspect ofthe Rules ofEngagement 

• 	 Helped negotiate, write, and interpret the crucial Status of 

Forces Agreements, Transit Agreements, Implementing and 

109 	 See HAITI AAR at 25. ~ 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 47 

Technical Arrangements, and Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreements 

• 	 Provided contract and fiscal law support 

• 	 Established responsive foreign claims procedures 

• 	 Assisted in the proper and effective administration of 

justice-of equal importance forward and in the rear 

detachments 

• 	 Supported soldiers and families both forward and in the rear 

detachments 

• 	 Developed expertise and procedures while participating in 

critical Joint Military Commission and bi-lateral meetings 

The day-to-day advice judge advocates provided to commanders in 

Bosnia proved crucial. Judge advocates serving in isolated base camps 

performed every aspect of legal support to operations. 

D. 	OPERATION JOINT GUARD (OJG) 

I. 	 SFOR Tasks & Milestones 

As IFOR's mandate-to implement peace--drew to a close, the 

North Atlantic Council (NAC) concluded that a reduced 110 military 

presence-a Stabilization Force (SFOR}-was required to stabilize the 

peace and to allow continued work on the implementation of the 

civilian aspects of the GFAP. See Sample Mission Statements at 

Appendix F. On December 12, 1996, the U.N. authorized111 SFOR to 

succeed IFOR with the same authority to implement the military 

aspects of the GF AP. SFOR accomplished its primary mission of 

contributing to a secure environment necessary for the consolidation of 

peace. 

·

1

°From 60,000 to about 31,000 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

Ill$ C 

..Res. 1088, U.N. SCOR, 5lst Sess., 3723 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1088 (12 Dec. 1996). 

1 
48 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

SFOR successfully deterred and prevented the resumption of 

hostilities, monitored and enforced compliance with the military 

aspects of the GF AP, ensured force protection at all times, operated 

Joint Military Commissions, enforced and controlled the military and 

civilian airspace, and within its capabilities, provided selective support 

to civilian organizations. 

2. Command and Contro/111 

Like IFOR, SFOR remained under the political direction and 

control of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Military control of 

SFOR, a unified command structure, remained with NATO's 

SACEUR, General Joulwan. With SFOR, the SACEUR made two 

significant changes in the command and control structure. First, 

SACEUR appointed the Commander of Land Forces Central Europe 

(CINCLANDCENT) as the Commander, SFOR (CINCSOUTH was the 

Commander ofIFOR). Second, the SACEUR removed the Allied 

Rapid Reaction Corps from the chain of command. Now, the 

COMSFOR directly commanded the three multi-national divisions. 

The three divisions now included troops from all 16 NATO allies plus 

20 non-NATO troop-contributing nations. 113 

3. SFOR Support to Civilian Implementation ofthe GFAP 

With the continued stabilization of the military situation by 

SFOR, all eyes turned to the need for success in implementing the 

civilian aspects of the GFAP. SFOR worked with the OSCE on 

elections, playing a critical role in ensuring a free and fair environment 

for elections to take place in the Republik of Serpska. 114 SFOR 

112 See NATO Task Force Organization. Appendix D(l). 


113 The 14 Partner for Peace troop-contributing nations are: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech 


Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden, and 


Ukraine. The remaining six non-PFP troop-contributing nations are: Egypt, Jordan, Ireland, 


Malaysia, Morocco, and Slovenia. 


114 This is discussed later in the ROE section. 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 49 

supported the UNHCR as it continued to struggle with the return of 

refugees and displaced persons, assisting, for example, to prevent the 

return of unauthorized weapons to the ZOS. SFOR continued to assist 

the IPTF in its mandate to promote local law and order and restore 

confidence in the rule oflaw, played an expanded role in assisting the 

ICTY, provided security and logistics support to ICTY investigative 

teams, and participated in the apprehension of alleged war criminals. 

Finally, SFOR continued to use the expertise ofthe Civil-Military 

Information Center. 

4. U.S. Military Role 

United States forces supported SFOR through the Intermediate 

Staging Base (ISB) in Hungary and Croatia, SFOR Headquarters in 

Sarajevo, and Task Force Eagle in the Multi-National Division-North. 

Also, U.S. forces continued to support the UNPREDEP mission in 

Former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia (FYROM). 

Initially, 1st Infantry Division (IID) deployed a covering force 

to Bosnia to secure 1st Armored Division's return to Germany. Two 

days after the transfer of authority, the 1 ID immediately intervened and 

defused two separate, potentially explosive demonstrations between 

the EAFs in the villages ofCelie and Gajevi. On November 10, 1996, 

the 1st Armored Division transferred authority--command and 

control-to the 1st Infantry Division from Wuerzburg, Germany (U.S. 

military calls this SFOR1). The Commander, 1st Infantry Division, 

deployed 1st Infantry Division (Fwd) to TFE while maintaining the 

Division "flag" at Wuerzburg, Germany. On December 20, 1996, 

COMIFOR transferred authority to COMSFOR, ending Operation 

Joint Endeavor and beginning Operation Joint Guard. The 1st Infantry 

Division stayed in place as part of the new Stabilization Force 

(SFOR1) in command ofTask Force Eagle. Together with the other 

nations making up the MND-N sector, the soldiers of the 1st Infantry 

.Division kept the peace in Bosnia and provided a stable climate in 

sector. 
50 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

On October 22, 1997-less than one year after spear-heading 

Operation Joint Endeavor, the 1st Armored Division(Fwd) returned to 

Bosnia, relieved in place the I st Infantry Division, and assumed 

command, again, ofTask Force Eagle (SFOR2). The 2d Armored 

Cavalry Regiment (ACR) from Fort Polk, Louisiana, deployed two 

battalion task forces to support I st Armored Division (Fwd). Unlike 

their deployment with TFE as part of IFOR, the Commander, 1st 

Armored Division, now maintained the division "flag" at Bad 

Kreuznach, Germany. The soldiers of the 1st Armored Division and 

the 2d ACR continued to keep the peace and provided that secure 

environment for the hard work that continued on the civilian aspects of 

the GFAP. 

5. Judge Advocate Support 

As OJE ended and OJG began, the 60,000 troops ofthe IFOR 

gave way to the 35,000 SFOR troops in theater. Likewise, force levels 

of TFE dropped from a Division (plus) to a Brigade (plus). For judge 

advocat~s, this new manning level carried great significance. See 

Judge Advocate Disposition at Appendix D(4). Instead ofjudge 

advocate support to brigade combat teams, judge advocates now 

provided full-time support to three, later four, battalion task forces in 

U.S. sector base camps. 1st Armored Division, 1st Infantry Division, 

and 2d ACR judge advocates provided full legal support to these 

battalion task forces, the brigade headquarters, an aviation brigade, and 

the Division Forward in Tuzla. These "all purpose"115 judge advocates 

continued to show the value that judge advocates bring to the 

commander in the decision making process and to supporting soldiers, 

both forward and in the rear detachments. 

115 Base camp judge advocates provided legal support to connnanders, staffs, and soldiers in 

virtually every area of the law. For a Base Camp Judge Advocate's description ofduties, see 

Interview ofCPT Wells.~ 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 51 

E. OPERATION JOINT FORGE (OJF) 

This operation will not change the name of the NATO-led force, 

SFOR. On June 20, 1998, the NATO-led coalition transitioned to a 

smaller follow-on force. Also, Operation Joint Guard ended and 

Operation Joint Forge began. "OJF will continue to build on the 

successes of Operation Joint Guard and Endeavor."116 No timeline 

exists for OJF. 

1. SFOR Tasks & Milestones 

SFOR will continue to deter the resumption of hostilities, 

stabilize the peace, contribute to a secure environment by providing a 

continued military presence, target and coordinate SFOR support to 

key areas and primary civilian implementation organizations, and 

further peace efforts until a NATO-led force is no longer needed in 

BiH. 

2. Command and Control 

No change in the NATO command and control structure from 

OJG to OJF. 

3. SFOR Support to Civilianlmplementation ofthe GFAP 

The same objectives continue from OJG to OJF. SFOR will 

target and coordinate support in the: rule of law; return and 

resettlement of displaced persons and refugees; dei:p.ocratization 

process; and in the improvement of public security, economic 

recovery, reconstruction ofinfra-structure, and media reform. Support 

will continue to key organizations to include the OHR, OSCE, ICTY, 

ICRC, UNHCR, and CIMIC. 

116 History ofTask Force Eagle. Task Force Eagle Homepage at 

<http://www.tfeagle.army.miVf askF orceEagle.htm>. 
52 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

4. U.S. Military Role 

United States forces will continue to support the SFOR at the 

ISB in Hungary and Croatia, SFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo, and 

Task Force Eagle in MND-N. U.S. forces will continue to support the 

UNPREDEP mission in FYROM. 

As SFOR transitioned to a smaller follow-on force, the U.S. has 

agreed to contribute roughly 6900 personnel.117 Beginning August 26, 

1998, the I st Cavalry Division became the first continental U.S. 

division to deploy to the Balkans. The I st Armored Division 

transferred authority--command and control-ofTFE to the lst 

Cavalry Division on October 7, 1998 (SFOR3). Two ofthe lst Cavalry 

Division's brigades, deploying in sequence for six months each, will 

provide support to the maneuver elements. SFOR 4 begins when the 

second ofthe two 1st Cavalry Division brigades deploy. 

5. Judge Advocate Support 

Like their predecessors, I st Cavalry Division judge advocates 

will continue the trend ofproviding full-time legal support to battalion 

task forces located in four base camps in the U.S. sector. Also, judge 

advocates will provide full legal support to the Brigade Headquarters, 

an Aviation Brigade; and the Division Headquarters (Eagle Base) in 

Tuzla. See Judge Advocate Disposition at Appendix D(4). 

117 Id 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 53 

III. Lessons Learned 

A. INTRODUCTION TO LESSONS LEARNED 

1. Command and control issues initially dominated legal 


support to operations in the Balkans. 


As stated in the Introduction, legal support to operations (the 

Judge Advocate General's Corps' support to the battlefield commander) 

· can be viewed in three discrete areas: command and control, 118 

sustainment,119 and personnel support.12°Command and control issues 

dominated the beginning ofOperation Joint Endeavor starting in 

December 1995-meting out the Rules ofEngagement (ROE), drafting 

and reviewing plans and orders, and interpreting and applying the GF AP 

and other international agreements to facilitate movement ofpeople and 

equipment into country. Once IFOR established its presence, command 

and control issues centered on interpreting and applying the GF AP's 

provisi_ons pertaining to the Former Warring Factions-gaining control 

ofthe Zone ofSeparation, monitoring and controlling weapons, 

facilitating freedom ofmovement, facilitating elections, etc. 

2. As the theater matured, sustainment issues quickly 


dominated legal support to operations, particularly regarding 


contract and fiscal law. 


Sustainment issues grew and eventually dominated legal support 


to the operation. Fiscal and contract law issues predominated. Issues 


included occupation and lease ofreal estate; construction and 


118 Including but not limited to interpreting, drafting, disseminating, and training commanders, staffs, 

and soldiers on the Rules of Engagement, participating in targeting cells, participating in the military 

decision making process, and dealing with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Generally, issues 

directly affecting the commander's decision making process on the battlefield fall within C2. 

119 Including but not limited to negotiating ACSAs and other agreements, contracting, and 

administering the Foreign Claims Act. 

. 	 120 Including but not limited to the administration ofmilitary justice, legal assistance services, and 

basic soldier-related claims issues. 
54 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

maintenance ofbase camps, roads, and bridges; the Logistics Civil 

Augmentation Program (LOGCAP-all the support required to move, 

house, feed our divisions); and support to our civilians, the host nation, 

the local populace, other contributing nations' forces, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Foreign claims were also a large 

part of the legal support provided within the sustainment arena. 

3. Legal support within the personnel service and support 


function remained critical and relatively constant. 


Issues of military justice, legal assistance, and personnel claims 

were ever present and critically important to supporting the command 

and the troops. Their volume remained somewhat constant throughout 

the various operations. 

Ifone were able to diagram these three functions or areas of 

legal support to military operations and their relative volumes (in terms 

ofnumber of issues raised and man-hours spent) through the Balkan 

operations, it might look something like this: 

Levels of Legal Support to Operations by 


Functional Area 


60 

50 

40 Rough %of 

30 issues 

20 

10 

o~_c:a--...-:;~a_a,~~E:a..1---~ 

; 

§. 

.2­

a. 

~ 

0 0 

E Ee: CIO NO ~ ... + + 

0 Q 

Time 

~Sustainment 

OPersonnel 

Support 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 55 

This pattern would likely be similar for other operations at the 

stability (e.g., peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement, etc.) 

end ofthe spectrum ofmilitary operations. For high intensity 

operations, command and control issues likely become the main effort 

during battlefield operations. Sustainment issues tend to predominate 

before and after battlefield operations, while personnel service support 

legal issues remain ever-present and relatively constant. 
56 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

B. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE). 

"The aggressiveness that is important in wartime 

operations must be tempered with restraint in the 

b. . if t. ,,j21 am zguous environment o peace opera zons. 

Aggressiveness 

Anyone - anyone - who takes on our troops will 

suffer the consequences. We will fight fire with fire 

- and then some. 

122 

But you will also have very clear rules of 

engagement. .. : If you're are threatened with 

attack, you mat respond immediately and with 

decisive force. 23 · 

Restraint 

We had a concept called strategic soldiers. 

We...were aware that that operation could have 

been totally messed up by one soldier-by one 

soldier from any one of36 different nations doing 

something which was contrary to his rules of 

engagement. 124 

• Our Mission is to Implement the Peace Plan125 

• We Are Not at War126 

121 See JOINT WARFIGHTING CENTER, JOINT TASK FORCE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK FOR PEACE 

Operations, 1-17, (16 Jun. 1997) [hereinafter JTF COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK]. ~ 

122 President William J. Clinton, Statement to the nation (27 Nov. 1995) (transcript available at 

<http:\\www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1995/dil0101.html>). See Bosnia: A Call to Peace, DEFENSE 

ISSUES, Vol. 10, No. 101. 

123 President William J. Clinton, Remarks to solders of Task Force Eagle at Smith Barracks, 

Baurnholder, Germany (2 Dec. 1995). >). See Bosnia: A Call to Peace, DEFENSE ISSUES, Vol. 10, 

No. 103. 

124 LTC Reddin, ARRC Legal Advisor for IFOR, in USAREUR AAR Vol. II.~ 

125 Powerpoint Presentation, CONUS Replacement Center, Fort Benning, Georgia (copy on file with 

CLAMO). 

126 Id. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 57 

These contrasting and seemingly conflicting quotations drive 

home the immense challenge facing land component forces on how to 

apply the use of force 127 in peace operations. 128 The quotes above 

reflect well the delicate balance of applying initiative and restraint-a 

tension that soldiers and marines face everyday in peace operations. 

The legal framework of operations in the Balkans-to include Chapter 

VII of the U.N. Charter, 129 UNSCR 1031, 130 the GF AP, and the 

ROE131-clearly provides for the use ofnecessary force, to include the 

use of deadly force. The robust nature of these peace enforcement 

ROE provided for decisive action, when appropriate, by Task Force 

Eagle {TFE) personnel. 132 On the other hand, military operations in the 

Balkans were undertaken with a cease-fire in place and with the 

consent of the Entity Armed Forces (EAF). To maintain the very 

fragile peace in Bosnia, TFE personnel had to maintain their 

impartiality-both actual and perceived. The ill-advised use offorce 

could eliminate this perception of impartiality and re-ignite the 

conflict. Against this backdrop of potentially conflicting messages, 

judge advocates successfully advised commanders and trained soldiers 

on "who can shoot at what, with which weapons, when, and where." 133 

127THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1-02, DEP'T OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND 

ASSOCIATED TERMS ( 1989) [hereinafter JOINT PUB. 1-02]. ROE are directives issued by competent 

authority to delineate the circumstances and limitations under which its own naval, ground, and air 

forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. They are the 

means by which the National Command Authority (NCA) and operational commanders regulate the 

use of armed force in the context of applicable political and military policy and domestic and 

international law. 

12s Id. 

129 See Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, Appendix E(2). 

130 S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3607 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1031 (15 Dec. 1995) (Text 

at Appendix E(3)). 

131 For IFOR, the ROE chain was as follows: SACEUR OPLAN 10405, Annex E, Rules of 

Engagement; CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40105, Annex E, Rules of Engagement; ARRC OPLAN 

60405, Annex P, Rules ofEngagement; TFE OPLAN 95-425, Annex T, Rules ofEngagement. 

in Id. 

133 Colonel Fred Green, Address to the American Society oflnternational Law, Implementing 

Limitations on the Use ofForce: The Doctrine ofProportionality and Necessity (1992) (reprinted in 

86 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 39, 62-67 (1992)) (using this informal definition ofROE); see also 
58 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

The ROE were multinational in character because OJE/OJG 

were NATO-led operations. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) 

reached a multinational consensus on the ROE (hereinafter NATO 

ROE). Based on the U.N. and GFAP mandates for the IFOR to use 

necessary force to accomplish the mission, the U.S. National 

Command Authorities-the President and Secretary ofDefenseapproved the NAC's ROE concept. From this, SACEUR, 

CINCAFSOUTH, COMIFOR, COMARRC, and COMEAGLE issued 

their respective OPLANs with ROE annexes.

134 See SFOR 

Headquarters Structure at Appendix D(2). ln·turn, each of the troop 

contributing nations could issue more restrictive ROE for their own 

forces (based on host nation law). For U.S. forces under the 

operational control (OPCON) of COMIFOR/COMSFOR, the CJCS 

Standing Rules of Engagement135 were NOT in effect. 136 This meant 

that most137 U.S. forces had to train on and apply the use of force under 

the NA TO ROE. 

DEP'TOF ARMY, SUBJECT SCHEDULE 27-1, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 AND THE HAGUE 

CONVENTION NO. IV OF 1907, para. 3a (29 Aug. 1975) (using this definition ofROE). Formally, 

ROE are "directives issued by competent authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations 

under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces 

encountered. JOINT PUB. 1-02 at 317. 

134 SACEUR- Supreme Allied Conunander, Europe; CINCAFSOUTH - Command in Chief, Armed 

Forces, South; COMIFOR - Commander, Implementation Force; COMARRC - Commander, Allied 

Rapid Reaction Corps; COMEAGLE - Commander, Task Force Eagle. 

135 See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01, subject: Standing Rules of 

Engagement for U.S. Forces (1 Oct. 1994) (classified SECRET but including an unclassified 

portion, Enclosure A, intended for wide distribution). The 1994 SROE are currently undergoing a 

five-year review and may change significantly in the near future. 

136 The SROE apply to U.S. forces in operations with limited exceptions for multinational force 

(MNF), civil disturbance and disaster relief operations. Enclosure A of the SROE, id., directs that 

U.S. forces assigned to the operational control (OPCON) of a multinational force will follow the 

ROE ofthe multinational force, unless the National Conunand Authority (NCA) directs otherwise. 

Because Bosnia was a multi-national operation and the NCA did not direct otherwise, the SROE did 

not apply to those soldiers under the OPCON ofIFOR/SFOR. 

137 U.S. Forces under the OPCON of the U.S. and located outside ofBiH, followed the SROE. This 

is discussed later in the text. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 59 

Judge advocate participation in interpreting, drafting, 

disseminating, and training ROE peaks in multinational peace 

operations. ROE are a commander's tool to control the use offorce 

and operators (i.e., S3/G3/J3) are and must remain responsible for the 

development ofthe ROE. 138 Nevertheless, commanders involved in 

preparing for and executing operations in the Balkans turned to their 

judge advocates to take the lead in interpreting, drafting, and training 

the ROE. 139 Within TFE, judge advocates-captains, majors, and 

lieutenant colonels-understood the legal, policy, and military140 

underpinnings ofthe ROE when advising commanders on the use force 

to accomplish the mission. Operations in the Balkans validated this 

critical function where soldier-lawyers, at all levels, provided advice 

that expanded or limited a commander's options to accomplish the 

m1ss10n. 

1. Expect difficulties with ROE in coalition operations. 

Operations in Bosnia involved 32 to 36 Troop Contributing 

Nations (TCN). All multinational forces in Bosnia were under the 

direction and political control ofthe North Atlantic Council (NAC). 

The sixteen nations that make up NATO reached a consensus on the 

ROE. Further, the non-NATO TCNs agreed to abide by the NATO 

ROE but could restrict further the application of the ROE based on 

TCN requirements. Judge advocates, at every level of command, had 

to work closely with each other in order to make the ROE a 

multinational success. 

138 

JTF COMMANDERS HANDBOOK at 1-13 - 1-19. 

139 

See OJE-AAR, supra note 30, vol. I. ~ When asked whether ROE were perceived as judge 

advocate functions or operator functions, judge advocates from TFE, IFOR, the ARRC, AFSOUTH, 

and NATO all agreed that action officers and commanders alike viewed the ROE as a judge 

advocate function. 

140 

See U.S. Navy Captain Ashley Roach, Rules ofEngagement, NAVAL WAR COL REV. 46, 48 

(1983) (for a discussion of the underpinnings ofROE). 
60 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

a. Expect to train and deploy without the ROE; expect 

challenges in the first set ofROE. 

The complexity inherent in large-scale multinational operations 

will likely result in last minute approval of the ROE. Fast paced events 

on the ground, the extraordinarily difficult negotiation process in 

getting multiple nations to agree on the ROE, 141 and varying political 

requirements virtually assure a similar result in future large scale 

multinational operations. That is "simply the way it is." 142 Further, 

once the ROE are approved, the various OPLANs in multinational 

operations may result in inconsistent terms, imprecise terminology (for · 

example, ill-defined acronyms), vague decision making authority (for 

example, senior commander verses senior soldier on the ground), and 

complicated weapons release matrices. 143 For the Implementation 

Force (IFOR), the Commander, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), 

used a detailed ROE matrix. The ARRC used the matrix to achieve 

unity of effort across the three multinational divisions. Generally, 

judge advocates and staffs liked the matrices. The Task Force Eagle 

Staff Judge Advocate also employed a ROE matrix. Despite the 

complexity of translating ROE annexes into matrices, operators and 

judge advocates alike thought that they worked well. 144 

b. Identify troop contributing nation counterparts and 

liaisons early. 

In Bosnia, the MND-N included troops from 12 nations: The 

U.S., Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Poland, Denmark, Lithuania, Norway, 

Iceland, Sweden, Russia, and Turkey. TFE established liaison points 

141 See remarks by EUCOM Legal Advisor in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, vol. I. ~ 

142 lAD Staff Judge Advocate in OJE-AAR supra note 30. See also agreement by all 


participants in the OJE-AAR, supra note 30, vol. I. 


143 CDR Mike McGregor, EUCOM/ECLA, Joint Universal Lesson Learned, subject: SHAPE 


Dissemination and Publication ofROE. 
 144 Interview with COL Maher, former Staff Judge Advocate, 1st Armored Division and Task Force 


Eagle. See also Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Legal Advisor comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, 


vol. I.~ 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 61 

of contact with each ofthese troop contributing nations (TCNs). TCNs 

may deploy with outdated or inaccurate translations ofthe ROE or may 

deploy without ROE cards for their soldiers. 145 Other TCNs may have 

little or no training in the use of force in peace operations. Judge 

advocates must make early contact with TCN liaisons to identify and 

fix these potentially dangerous shortfalls. In one instance, a U.S. judge 

advocate provided classroom and situational training exercises (STX) 

for Russian soldiers in the TFE area of operations. 146 

c. Accountfor troop contributing nations' (TCN) 

domestic law and sensitivities in mission planning. 

Commanders must assign missions in multinational operations 

with an understanding ofthe TCNs operational capabilities, 

national/political interests, and domestic legal constraints. TCN's may 

lack the necessary ROE training to adequately deal with a difficult 

enforcement situation. Multinational partners may have domestic 

limitations more restrictive than the ROE or may have a culture of 

~pplying force in peacekeeping operations. A multinational partner 

may have historical stigmas that may cause hesitation in the use of 

force. 147 For example, a TCN may have policy or legal restrictions on 

the use ofRiot Control Agents (RCA). 148 Still other TCNs may not 

agree with the U.S. 's view on particular definitions such as what 

constitutes hostile intent. By working closely with their TCN 

14s Interview with MAJ Mike lsaaco (11May1998) ~- 1ST ARMORED DIVISION OFFICE OF THE 

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE AFTER-ACTION REPORT, SEPTEMBER 1995 - DECEMBER 1996 at 16 (1st 

Armored Division Office ofThe Staff Judge Advocate 1997) [hereinafter lAD-AAR]. cr> 146 This was CPT Krauss. See Interview with LTC Denise K. Vowell, Staff Judge Advocate, 1st 

Infantry Division (Fwd), in Germany (27 Jan. 1998 and 22 Feb. 1998) [hereinafter Interview with 

LTC Vowell). ~ 

147 Interview with L TC Vowell, id. ~ 

148 Some examples ofRCA include pepper spray and CS/tear gas. See LTC Reddin, comments in 

OJE-AAR, supra note 30, vol. I. cr> Interview with COL Gerard A. St. Amand, former V Corps 

Staff Judge Advocate, at the Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia (2 Oct. 

1998) (host nation law in Britain stems from the situation in Ireland and limits the range ofoptions 

for British soldiers dealing with civilians). 
62 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

counterparts, judge advocates were a force multiplier for commanders 

in working through such challenges. 

d. Work with the operators and other staffsections to 

ensure all troop contributing nations (TCNs) have accurate, 

translated ROE and soldier cards. 

First, TFE judge advocates helped the G3 determine which 

TCNs, particularly their subordinate units, had the current ROE and 

whether they had ROE soldier cards available for their soldiers in the 

relevant language. 149 Many TCNs did not have the current ROE and 

did not have ROE soldier cards. The various ROE soldier cards are at 

Appendix G. In addition to interpreting, drafting, and training ROE, 

judge advocates ended up producing, laminating, and distributing ROE 

cards. Judge advocates should take steps to ensure that operators take 

the lead in developing the ROE, information managers produce and 

laminate ROE cards, and public affairs officers (PAO) coordinate all 

media release of the ROE. 

The second issue concerned the initial ROE classification as 

NATO Confidential. This classification kept the ROE out of the hands 

of non-NATO TCNs until they were in Bosnia for some time. Later, a 

FRAGO fixed this by classifying the ROE as NA TO ConfidentialReleasable IFOR. 150 This must be done at the earliest opportunity. 

The initial classification also hindered public affairs operations. Public 

affairs has a significant role in today's complex, operational 

environment and requires clear guidance on what can be released and 

when. While the ROE had a public dissemination annex, it failed to 

state a release authority. Judge advocates should work closely with the 

PAO to ensure relevant information is available for release in a timely 

fashion. 

149 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 16. ~ 

150/d. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS JN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 63 

2. Situational Training Exercises (STX) and mission-oriented 

refresher training best prepare soldiers to deal with peace operations. 

Units must conduct training from the commander level down, 

and include class and practical training, with the main effort on STX. 

STX, or Situational Training Exercises, focus on one or a few tasks 

within a particular mission scenario and require soldiers to practice 

until the tasks are executed to standard. 151 As noted previously, TFE 

soldiers deployed without the ROE. This is not to say that USAREUR 

units waited until they had the ROE to train. In fact, V Corps, 

Southern Europe Task Force (SETAF), and I st Armored Division 

commanders and judge advocates focused on Bosnia up to two years 

before the deployment. Senior commanders 152 planned and soldiers 

trained continuously for the uncertain future. 

a. Judge advocates must have situational awareness 

(Bosnia) and understand pre-deployment contingency planning. 

Judge Advocates helped develop pre-deployment training for 1st 

AD and other V Corps units that might be tasked to deploy to Bosnia. 

To develop this training, judge advocates had to understand the 

situation in Bosnia and the mission. Judge advocates read country 

studies, Civil Affairs Area Assessments, historical documents, and 

press reports to gain insight into what soldiers would face in Bosnia. 

Judge advocates also had to be integrated members ofthe staff to gain 

access to and understand the various contingency plans that the 

National Command Authority (NCA) might have asked U.S. forces to 

implement. From this understanding, judge advocates helped design 

home station STXs centered around the basic principals of selfdefense, the invaluable STXs used by V Corps in Mountain Eagles I & 

151 These scenario-based exercises are also called "lane training" because they confront the soldier 

with a controlled event and observe the response. 

152 Interview with COL Gerard A. St. Amand, fonner V Corps Staff Judge Advocate, at the Judge 

Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia (26 Sep.1998) (where he related that the V 

Corps Commander focused on preparing the Corps for Bosnia well before anyone knew what the 

mission would be). 
64 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

II153 (Bosnia preparatory field exercises), and Individual Readiness 

Training at Hohenfels, Germany. 154 

b. Use Situational Training Exercises (STX). 

This lesson learned is found in the Haiti AAR. It is a lesson, 

however, that bears repeating. Many155 judge advocates, commanders, 

and soldiers who deployed to Bosnia agree that soldiers were better 

prepared for the Bosnia missions because of the STX training. 

To conduct STX's on ROE, a commander, judge 

advocate, or other trainer places a soldier in a 

particular simulated METT-T156 and then 

confronts him with an event, such as the crashing 

of a traffic checkpoint barrier by a speeding 

vehicle. The trainer evaluates the soldier's 

response, and afterward discusses alternative 

responses available within the ROE. The STX 

brings to life abstract rules on the ROE card, 

giving the soldier concrete terms of reference 

within which to determine his response. In this 

way, the soldier achieves the balance between 

153 MAJ Ron Miller, V Corps, helped design 30-50 scenarios for STX training focused on individual 

and collective tasks-dealing with potential scenarios in Bosnia-for Mountain Eagle I and II. See 

also 1AD-AAR, supra note 145 at 13. {l> 

154 See USAREUR AAR; L TC Maher and Interview with LTC Vowell, supra note 146. {l) 155 We inserted the word "many" because we certainly did not talk to all who deployed. From our 

sampling of interviews, 100% agreed that situational training exercise (STX) training, particularly in 

peace operations, better prepared them for what they saw in Bosnia. 

156 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, SOLDIER TRAINING PUBLICATION No. 21-II-MQS, MILITARY 

QUALIFICATION STANDA RDS II: MANUAL OF COMMON TASKS FOR LIEUTENANTS AND CAPTAINS 3-86 

(31Jan.1991) (Task 04-3303.02-0014, Prepare Platoon or Company Combat Orders) (describing 

the factors of "mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available"). 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 65 

initiative and restraint so important to success in 

operations other than war.

157 

For Bosnia, various trainers used the widely known mnemonic, 

RAMP, 158 

as an effective training tool in preparing soldiers for 

deployment to Bosnia. In its generic form, RAMP training seeks to 

provide soldiers a baseline understanding of the application of the use 

of force-those rules articulated in the SROE-that follow soldiers in 

all operations. Then, when faced with a specific mission, those same 

soldiers are better equipped to deal with the mission-specific ROE. 

Deployment training at Fort Benning, Georgia, 159 Hohenfels, 

Germany, 160 the I 0th Mountain Division, 161 at home station in Germany, 

and in Bosnia successfully used RAMP as a training tool for deploying 

soldiers. Training soldiers on the principles that underlie ROE, and on 

the specific ROE that apply, prepare them to handle most situations 

appropriately. 162 

157 See generally Major Mark S. Martins, Rules ofEngagementfor Land Forces: A Matter of 


Training, Not Lawyering, 143 MILL REV. 1, n.274 at 90-92 (1994) (extolling the virtues of 


s·cenario training). (!) 


158 See id. at n. 274. (!) RAMP is an acronym summarizing the basic principles a soldier must 


know to legally and rightfully use force. It is part of a Rules of Engagement training and 


development mechanism developed by MAJ Mark S. Martins. It stands for: 


Return fire with aimed fire. 

Anticipate attack. 

Measure the force you use (graduated response if able). 

Protect only yourself, your unit and those persons and property designated by your 

commander with deadly force. 

159 Fort Benning is the CONUS Replacement Center for troops deploying to Bosnia from the 


Continental United States. 


160 Hohenfels is the Individual Readiness Training center where all Europe-based soldiers prepare to 

deploy to Bosnia. 

161 The 10th Mountain Division was responsible for deploying a rifle company to protect designated 

special property in Bosnia-a bridge. The Staff Judge Advocate noted that they supplemented the 

"P" in RAMP by instructing soldiers and training them on the use of minimum force, to include 

deadly force ifnecessary, to protect the bridge. The feedback from the soldiers and leaders to the 

. Staff Judge Advocate was extremely positive. 

162 See Interview ofLTC Vowell, supra note 146. (!) 
66 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Examples of how well the soldier on the ground and in the air 

163 1 . d d knew and applied the ROE abound. But severa JU ge a vocates 

cautioned that peace operations can cause greater, sometimes 

dangerous, reluctance on the part of soldiers to employ force when 

authorized and even perhaps, advisable. 164 

c. Conduct continuous ROE mission and refresher 

training. 

Before executing specific missions, judge advocates briefed 

soldiers and units on the ROE. For example, judge advocates briefed 

artillery units on the use of position defense, 165 aviators prior to 

specific show of force missions, 166 and various convoy operations 

including claims convoys. 167 Judge advocates agreed that continual 

ROE refresher training, based on a review and "analysis of events 

occurring throughout the area of operations," 168 is a vital link in 

maintaining our soldiers' edge in the use of force. Judge advocates 

continually drafted training scenarios based on recurring events in 

163 See lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 14-15. ~ 

164 See, e.g., Interview with LTC Steven T. Salata and MAJ Kevan J. Jacobson, 1st Armored 

Division (Fwd), at Eagle base, Tuzla (2-23 Feb. 1998) [hereinafter Interview ofLTC Salata and 

MAJ Jacobson] (reference incidents occurring at the riots in Brcko). <l> See also Interview of COL 

Vowell, supra note 146. ('!) 

165 The NATO ROE provide for position defense meaning, friendly forces are not required to 

withdraw or surrender their position, personnel, or equipment in order to merely avoid the 

authorized and legitimate use of force. See PowerPoint Brief, subject: SFOR Legal Update (Feb. 

1998). ('!) 

166 Commanders used attack aviation assets to demonstrate TFE resolve in various situations. The 

aviation assets would often photograph violations of the GF AP-such as a tank out of a specified 

cantonment area-for the commander's use in resolving the situation. 

167 s

ee, e.g., lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 13-16 and Interview ofLTC Vowell, supra note 146 

(discussion of aviation assets). ('!) 

168 Interview ofLTC Vowell, supra note 146, and lAD-AAR, supra note 145. ('!) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 67 

Bosnia. Finally, judge advocates must conduct or closely monitor all 

ROE training. 169 

3. Staffintegration is essential for judge advocates to be a 

combat multiplier in ROE issues. 

One of the first things I did with big OP LAW 

payoffs was to make friends with the planner in 

the S-3 shop .... I'd monitor the actions of the 

patrols and keep tabs with the battle captains .... It 

was the friendships and early preparation ... that 

made the difference. It ... forged a relationship of 

trust that made them want to include me ... after 

we got here. 170 

Every deployed judge advocate emphasized the importance of 

being an integral part of the commander's staff. Routine participation 

in targeting cells, 171 ROE planning cells, and other planning groups 

~eep judge advocates in the information loop172 and position judge 

advocates to be problem solvers before things break. See Assault 

Command Post Layout (FOR) at Appendix D(5). Initially, judge 

advocates were not "active members" 173 of targeting cells. By not 

169 In several interviews with the Center for law and Military operations (CLAMO), judge advocates 

noted that individual readiness training taught by non-legal NCOs fell short of what soldiers needed. 

170 Interview with CPT Warren L. Wells, 2/2 ACR base camp judge advocate at Camp Dobol, 

Bosnia (5 Mar. 1998). ~ 

171 See generally CPT Ramsey's corrunents in lAD-AAR, supra note 145, and in OPERATION JOINT 

ENDEAVOR, AFTER-ACTION REVIEW (Heidelberg, Germany 24-26 Apr.1997) (An After Action 

Review conference ofjudge advocates held in Heidelberg, Germany. The transcript was reduced to 

writing in three volumes and is available on Lotus Notes and JAG.net. Cited page numbers may 

vary slightly from electronic versions.) [hereinafter OJE-AAR]. <l) See also Powerpoint Brief, 

Subject: Less Than Lethal Munitions, Development and Training of the Rules ofEngagement 

During Operation Joint Endeavor Train-up, and Use of Judge Advocates in Targeting Cells (25 Apr. 

1997). ~ 

172 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 117. ~ 

173 See supra note 30. 
68 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

actively participating in the development of targeting folders/lists, 

judge advocates become naysayers instead of combat multipliers. 

Early participation in the targeting planning process helps commanders 

and staffs develop courses of action supportable by the ROE. Ifthe 

ROE are unclear for a particular mission, early planning allows time to 

obtain command guidance, necessary FRAGOs on the ROE, or even 

requests for changes in the ROE. 

Staff integration174 is particularly critical in the Bosnia base 

camp environment. Since the end of 1996, judge advocates have 

served as base camp judge advocates to battalion task force 

commanders. For the most part, battalion commanders and staffs are 

unaccustomed to having judge advocates on their team. It is 

imperative for these base camp judge advocates-usually captains-to 

begin the team building process at the first opportunity. The base 

camp judge advocates handled many complex, sensitive, and 

potentially explosive use of force issues 175 and they attribute their 

success, in part, to being part of the command team. One of the most 

importapt things that a judge advocate can do is train the battle staff to 

identify issues early and resolve them with the judge advocate. 

174 Staff integration really begins at home station. This lesson is not new. Attending Combat Training 

~enter Seminars/Leader Training Programs, deploying to the Combat Training Centers, participating 

m FTXs and CPXs, attending staff calls and functions, conducting aggressive leader development 

programs at home station, and developing tactical expertise at every opportunity, all make judge 

advocates better staff officers. 

175 Interview with CPT Wells, supra note 170. ~ See also 1 AD-AAR, supra note 145, and 

Interview with LTC Vowell. <J) Base camp judge advocates dealt with the entire spectrum ofROE 

issues: RCA, targeting, checkpoints, detention, weapons confiscation, etc. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 69 

4. Establish straightforward standards [~r deployment and 

employment ofRiot Control Means (RCM), 17 to include Riot Control 

Agents (RCA). 177 

To minimize the need to adjust tactics, training, and ROE in 

midstream to meet a crisis, commanders and judge advocates should 

plan for the use ofRCM at the earliest opportunity (may include 

batons, tear gas, pepper spray, rubber bullets, and even water cannons). 

The riots that occurred in Brcko in 1997 magnified the need for such 

planning and preparation. 178 Widely varying Troop Contributing 

Nation {TCN) laws and policies will affect this planning for the 

employment and deployment of RCM. Because the NATO ROE were 

not available until TFE deployed into Bosnia, little advanced planning 

could take place. 

In peace operations, commanders will want something other than 

deadly force available. 179 The tenuous situation ofBosnia called for 

U.S. forces to get between three Entity Armed Forces (EAFs), enforce 

the peace, and assist in the civilian implementation of the GF AP .

180 

Consequently, U.S. commanders sought the use ofRCM-to include 

Riot Control Agents (primarily cayenne pepper spray and CS/tear gas). 

176 RCM equates to what some call Less Than Lethal Means (LTLM). RCA is a subset ofRCM. 

RCA includes pepper spray and tear gas. RCM includes RCA and police clubs, rubber bullets, water 

cannons, riot control formations, etc. See PowerPoint Brief, subject: SFOR Legal Update (Feb. 

1998) (provides a detailed look at RCM). Also, a lAD briefing provides an excellent timeline 

on these RCA issues. ~ 

177 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3110.07 (3 Jul. 1995) (document classified SECRET) 

(outlines U.S. policy for using RCA during peacetime, in armed conflict, or peace operations). 

178 The Brcko riots presented our soldiers with old women wielding two-by-fours, teenagers 

throwing rocks, etc. Nonlethal weapons to include riot shields, batons, sponge grenades, plastic 

beehive M203 grenade rounds, and dye grenades were later brought in and required additional, 

reactionary training ofsoldiers. Interview ofCaptain David E. Dauenheimer, Squadron judge 

advocate, Camp McGovern, Bosnia (23 Feb. 1998) [hereinafter Interview ofCPT Dauenheimer], 

and his Memorandum, Captain David E. Dauenheimer, Squadronjudge advocate, Camp McGovern, 

Bosnia, subject: AAR (23 Feb. 1998). ~ 

179 Id. 

180 Support the OSCE in the election process. 
70 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), delegated to the 

Commander, Implementation Force (COMIFOR) (and later to the 

Commander, Stabilization Force) the release authority decision for the 

use ofRCA. Consistent with the SACEUR OPLAN, COMIFOR 

delegated RCA release authority to the Commander, Allied Rapid 

Reaction Corps (COMARRC). See NATO Task Force Organization at 

Appendix D(l). 

This meant the Commander of Task Force Eagle needed 

COMARRC approval to employ RCA. Although this seemed simple, 

it was not. Executive Order 11850 required U.S. Presidential approval 

for U.S. servicemembers to use RCA. A further complication was the 

ongoing process concerning the ratification ofthe Chemical Weapons 

Convention. 181 Yet the NCA approved the NATO ROE for IFOR 

which provided for the use ofRCA. The question became whether 

NCA approval ofthe NATO ROE equated to Presidential approval of 

the use ofRCA under Executive Order 11850. This question was left 

unresolved through most of Operation Joint Endeavor. Ultimately, 

TFE commanders, with specific approval from the Commander of 

SFOR, could utilize RCA. 

A second issue concerned the difference between employing 

(actual use) RCA and deploying (obtain, train, and issue) RCA. While 

the question of employment was debated, TFE sought to deploy RCA. 

The U.S. chain of command told TFE to first get authority to use (not 

authority to get, train, or issue) RCA from Commander, 

Implementation Force (COMIFOR). The COMIFOR legal advisor 

responded by telling TFE that release authority was unnecessary. After 

going back through U.S. channels, TFE received approval to obtain 

and issue RCA. 

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 

Weapons and on Their Destruction, 13 Jan. 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800. 

181 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATJONSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 71 

Judge advocates must recognize these issues and seek 

immediate, clear answers through judge advocate technical channels, 

and through command channels when appropriate. All levels of 

command and judge advocate technical channels must provide prompt, 

explicit, written guidance in this difficult area. Even though IFOR and 

later SFOR did not restrict the types ofRCM procured, trained, or 

carried by TCN troops, judge advocates and commanders must plan for 

TCN host nation law and policy to affect the use ofRCA. 

5. Maintain a constantly updated ROE battlebook. 

Judge advocates should expect broad, sweeping mandates in 

peace operations. In Bosnia, the U.N. and the GF AP provided such 

language in its "silver bullet"182 clause where IFOR could take 

appropriate action to enforce the peace agreement. The constantly 

changing situation on the ground caused constant analysis ofthe ROE 

and demanded further guidance. Accordingly, judge advocates 

maintained up-to-date UNSCRs, applicable international agreements 

(Vienna Convention), official versions ofthe GFAP, OPLANs, 

FRAGOs, command policy guidance letters, command standard 

operating procedures, technical channel legal opinions, and any other 

command messages or memorandums clarifying the command's 

position on the use offorce in various battle books. The one 

publication that puts together much ofthis guidance is the mission 

essential 183 Joint Military Commission, Policy and Planning Guidance 

Handbook, now in its 6th edition (January 1998). From the beginning, 

judge advocates played a critical role in putting this handbook 

182 The oft-cited silver bullet language comes from U.N.S.C. Res. I 031 and the GF AP and gave 

IFOR the authority to do what is necessary to enforce the peace. See Appendices E(3) and E(5). 

183 This Handbook is recognized, Anny-wide, as a tactic, technique, and procedure for operations in 

Bosnia. III Corps used it to help develop training scenarios for the Mission readiness Exercise 

(MRE) for the I st Cavalry Division. The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) and the Joint 

readiness Training Center (JRTC) use the Handbook to help their O/Cs coach, teach, and mentor the 

training units preparing for Bosnia. 
72 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

together. One judge advocate noted that it could be called the "SFOR 

ROE Handbook." 184 See Extract ofthe JMC Handbook at 

Appendix K. 

6. At the outset, seek ROE that allow soldiers to use deadly 

force against persons committing serious criminal acts. 

ROE should allow members of the multinational force to use 

deadly force, ifnecessary, to stop civilian-on-civilian violence that 

endangers life or is about to cause serious bodily harm (for example, 

murder, rape, serious assault). Today, this provision is part of the 

SFOR ROE. 185 For IFOR, however, this provision was missing and to 

some judge advocates left ambiguity in the ROE. 186 As the fall 

elections neared in 1996, COMARRC issued a message

187 that seemed 

184 E-mail message, 05/27 /98 11 :34am, from CPT Patrick Sullivan, l ' 1 Cavalry Division judge 

advocate, to Major John W. Miller, Center for Law and Military operations, subject: Pegasus Forge 

98-04 (SFOR3). 

185 "You may use minimum force, including opening fire, against an individual who unlawfully 

commits, or is about to commit, an act which endangers Life, or is likely to cause serious bodily 

harm, in circumstances where there is no other way to prevent the act." See SFOR ROE Card at 

Appendix G. 

186 One judge advocate explained that his unit conducted ROE training to stop such serious acts of 

civilian on civilian violence. 

187 The following is a TFE point paper on COMARRC's 2820472 Aug. 1996 message, concerning 

rules of engagement (ROE): ~ 

BACKGROUND: On 2820472 Aug. 1996, COMARRC issued the 

following message: "You may use appropriate force (including opening 

fire) in order to prevent a person you witness committing or threatening 

to commit a serious crime or any other act that could kill or cause 

serious bodily harm." 

KEY POINTS: 

a. The ROE have not changed as a result of the message from 

COMARRC. 

b. The purpose ofCOMARRC's message is to relay his 

interpretation ofour authority to use deadly force in the protection of 

persons without designated special status. This interpretation is that 

TFE soldiers may use force, including deadly force, to prevent the 

commission of a serious crimes on persons with or without designated 

special status. 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATJONSJNTHE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 73 

to allow the use of deadly force to stop serious civilian-on-civilian 

violence. Yet, the ROE had not changed. This same issue arose in 

Operation Uphold Democracy, and ended with a similar change in 

those ROE. 188 

A related issue that judge advocates can expect to see is the ability 

of soldiers to use deadly force to stop the destruction of civilian 

property. For example, the current SFOR ROE does not permit SFOR 

soldiers to use deadly force in this manner.

189 

In Bosnia, rogue factions hindered the return of displaced persons 

and refugees (DPREs) through arson and physical violence, thereby 

frustrating civilian implementation ofthe GF AP. Judge advocates 

should expect issues regarding protection of civilians and property in 

similar operations. 

7. Expect U.S. servicemembers to fall under multiple ROE 

when operations use an Intermediate Stage Base (/SB). 

In peace operations, the U.S. will likely use an ISB as a 

deployment, redeployment, and logistical support platform. As long as 

c. Any change to the ROE must be authorized by NATO. 

COMARRC's message stated that this message does not amount to a 

change in the ROE. This message is an interpretation within 

COMARRC's authority to apply "conditions to the application of 

certain rules." ROE, para. 1. There are no time limits associated with 

this message. 

STATUS: 

a. COMARRC has instructed the MND's that the new ROE cards 

are not to be distributed below brigade level "until clarification is 

received from the NAC that nations are content with the revised 

wording." ARRC Message, Revised ROE Card, DTG 032000Z Aug. 

1996. 

b. This issue is currently being reviewed by NATO. 

188 See discussion in HAITI AAR at 37-39. ~ 

189 LTC Vowell discusses this in some detail in her interview.~ 
74 · CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

the country hosting the ISB is a neutral party or participating member 

ofthe multinational force, the threat level should be minimal, calling 

for something other than robust ROE. This was the case for the ISB in 

Hungary. EUCOM190 and USAREUR agreed that the CJSC Standing 

Rules of Engagement191 (SROE) were appropriate for soldiers under 

the operational control of the U.S. and working in Hungary. 

Depending on whose operational control U.S. servicemembers fell 

under (U.S. or NATO), U.S. soldiers were subject to different ROE. 

This caused two issues to immediately surface. 

The first issue concerned the ROE for a U.S. soldier under the 

operational control (OPCON) of the U.S. (SROE apply) but traveling 

to and from Bosnia. For example, a fuel carrier (U.S. soldier) delivers 

fuel to TFE by driving from the ISB in Hungary, through Croatia, to 

Bosnia, and then returns to the ISB in Hungary. By requiring this 

soldier to comply with the SROE only, two U.S. soldiers, standing 

side-by-side (one is the fuel carrier; the other is a TFE soldier) in 

Bosnia, would use different ROE. Recognizing this dilemma, the 

European Command (EUCOM) issued a message on December 21, 

1996, setting up a geographic ROE concept where all U.S. soldiers, 

upon crossing the border in Croatia and regardless of any OPCON 

relationship, were subject to the NATO ROE. 192 

The second issue stemmed from the first. Once the geographic rule 

went into effect, legal advisors at USAREUR (Fwd) and 21st 

TAACOM(Fwd) in Hungary had soldiers that needed ROE cards and 

training on two very different sets of ROE-the SROE and the NATO 

ROE. This is a continuing training challenge for commanders, 

soldiers, and judge advocates but one that has caused few problems. 

190 See comments by Commander MacGregor, Legal Advisor, EUCOM in OJE-AAR, supra note 30. 

~ . 

191 See supra note 135. 

192 Id. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 75 

C. INTERNATIONAL LAW 

Operations in Africa, Haiti, Northern Iraq, and Bosnia-military 

operations other than war

193 -continually defy the traditional 

application of international law. Most judge advocates understand that 

peace operations rarely fit neatly under the legal framework of the Law 

of War194 or any other legal architecture. In the Balkans, the three 

Entity Armed Forces (EAFs) laid down their arms in October 1995 and 

the parties195 signed the General Framework Agreement for Peace, 

agreeing to cooperate "with all entities involved in the implementation 

of the peace settlement" 196 as detailed in 11 separate annexes. See 

Appendix E(5) for the text of the GF AP and its Military Annex. 

Thirty-six nations contributed military forces or logistical 

support to this peace enforcement action, authorized by a Security 

Council resolution that expressly invoked Chapter VII of the United 

Nations Charter. 197 See Appendix E(2) for text of U.N. Charter, 

Chapter VII. Acting under this U.N. mandate, NATO, in its first-ever 

out of area deployment, led 60,000 multinational forces into Bosnia to 

enforce the peace. Never before had so many nations participated in a 

193 Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations 

short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other 

instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called Military · 

Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1-02, 

DEPARTMENTOFDEFENSEDICTIONARYOFMILITARYANDASSOCIATEDTERMS (23 Mar. 1994). 

194 For a good discussion ofthe Law of War and peace operations, see INTERNATIONAL AND 

OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, 

OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, JA 422 11-1, 11-2 (1998) (Published and updated armually by the 

International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General's School, 

Charlottesville, Virginia. Available at several internet sites, to include the Air Force's Web Flite 

homepage and the Army JAGC web page). (hereinafter OP. LAW HANDBOOK] (J) 

195 The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of 

Yugoslavia (made up of Serbia and Montenegro). 

196 GFAP, supra note 13, Art. IX. See Appendix E(5). 

197 S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3607 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1031 (15 Dec. 1995) (Text 

at Appendix E(3)). 
76 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

multinational operation based entirely on a newly created international 

agreement-the GFAP. 

1. Know the international legal basis for the mission andfor 

the use offorce. 

Various international agreements and operational documents 

broadly defined the scope ofthe mission and how soldiers could use 

force. Commanders at all levels looked to judge advocates for 

innovative solutions to very complex problems. Judge advocates must 

have a firm understanding of all legal documents and how they fit 

together. For Bosnia, judge advocates must understand Chapter VII of 

the U.N. Charter, all applicable U.N. Security Council Resolutions, the 

GF AP and all relevant annexes, all OPLANs and ROE annexes, and 

applicable U.S. policy on the application ofthe Law of War in peace 

operations. 198 

2. Consent-based peace agreements will affect every facet of 

the operation. 

The GF AP, and its military annex, defined the roles and 

responsibilities of the EAFs and the multinational force and included 

the following among its comprehensive provisions: 

• 	 Broad justification for the use of force 

• 	 Specific timelines for action 

• 	 New terms of art such as Zone of Separation (ZOS) and InterEntity Boundary Line (IEBL) 

• 	 Status of various police forces and other organizations 

• 	 Rules on the withdrawal, demobilization, and control of 

forces and weapons 

• 	 Instructions on freedom ofmovement for IFOR 

U.S. DEP'TOF DEFENSE, DIR. 5100.77, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM paras. D.l. & E.l.a.(3) (10 

Jul. 1979). 

198 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 77 

• 	 The mandate for Joint Military Commissions 

• 	 Directives on the release of prisoners 

• 	 Status ofForces Agreements between NATO and Croatia and 

NA TO and Bosnia 

Judge advocates provided advice on every aspect of the GFAP. While 

the agreement contains many details, the language is sufficiently broad 

to allow commanders flexibility in enforcing the peace. The often­

. cited "silver bullet clauses"199 in UNSCR 1031 and the GFAP were a 

stroke of genius and should be included in future peace enforcement 

mandates.· 

...[T]o authorize the IFOR to take such actions as 

required, including the use of necessary force, to 

ensure compliance with this Annex, and to ensure 

its own protection .. .. 200 [B]oth [the Federation and 

the RS] shall be equally subject to such 

enforcement action by the IFOR as may be 

necessary to ensure implementation of this Annex 

and the protection of lFOR.201 •••The Parties 

understand and agree that the IFOR Commander 

shall have the authority, without interference or 

permission of any Party, to do all that the 

Commander judges necessary and proper, 

including the use of military force, to protect the 

IFOR and to carry out the responsibilities listed 

above..., and they shall comply in all respects with 

the IFOR requirements.202 

199 See OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. II at 21-22. Cl) 200 GFAP, supra note 13, Annex 1-A, para.2 (b) (see Appendix E(5) for text). 

201 Id. at paragraph 3. 

202 J,d. at para. 5. 
78 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

3. International agreements directly impact a commander's 

options in operations. 

Status of Forces Agreements (See Appendices E(S) and E(S) for 

examples), Transit Agreements (TA) (See Appendix E(9) for an 

example), Technical Arrangements, and Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreements (ACSA) define a commander's ability to sustain 

the force, to include: 

• 	 Deploy across international boundaries (TA} 

• 	 Secure privileges and immunities for the force (e.g., criminal 

jurisdiction; taxes on incomes, goods, and services; civil 

liability; hiring practices, customs paperwork, etc.) (SOFA) 

• 	 Provide goods and services, on a reimbursable basis, to 


multinational partners (ACSA) 


• 	 Purchase and move logistics supplies without import/export fees 

(SOFA and TA) 

• 	 Operate independent mail and telephone systems (SOFA) 

• 	 Use government-owned facilities for free (SOFA) 

• 	 Improve infrastructure (SOFA) 

• 	 Hire local national personnel (SOFA) 

a. 	 Accountfor LOGCAP personnel in all agreements. 

Whether LOGCAP personnel were covered by the various 

SOF As remained in doubt for much of the operation. While LOGCAP 

issues are covered later in this report, it is worth mentioning here that 

the status ofLOGCAP personnel, as a subset of civilians on the 

battlefield, is an issue ofmuch debate at the Department of the Army 

levels. Judge advocates should watch for doctrinal guidance in the 

future. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 79 

b. Expect difficulties with information flow on 

international agreements. 

Well-crafted agreements mean little if the lower level 

government employees do not get the word. For example, a TA 

allowing U.S. forces to move through Austria does not mean much to 

the uninformed customs official or border guard.203 Judge advocates 

should have copies of all necessary agreements for all key advance 

party personnel. This is particularly true since planning, deployment, 

and mission execution will likely occur simultaneously. 

c. Understand a host nation's legal and military 

cultures. 

Language barriers, definition of terms, and differing government 

and legal systems cause difficulty in implementing already concluded 

agreements. Judge advocates must educate themselves on these host 

nation practices. This is particularly true for the emerging Partnership 

F.or Peace (PFP) countries that have little experience in implementing 

SOFA or TAs.204 One example concerns claims. The PFP SOFA 

requires the host nation to investigate, adjudicate, and settle claims 

under their own laws. Judge advocates in Hungary, with little 

familiarity of the Hungarian legal system, had to quickly learn the 

system. 

d. Conduct SOFA training with PFP countries. 205 

Many PFP countries, just now emerging from the stifling 

bureaucracy of Soviet control, are unfamiliar with how a SOFA works 

(e.g., terms, conditions, responsibilities). These countries have very 

little experience in dealing with these complex issues. For example, 

taxes are a very politically sensitive issue in Hungary as they have only 

203 See the European Conunand Legal Advisor's comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, vol. I.~ 

204 See LTC Pribble, remarks in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, vol. I.~ 

20S Id. 
80 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

dealt with taxes within the last seven years-since the end of the 

Soviet regime. For Operation Joint Endeavor, Hungary was the first 

PFP country to deal with thousands of deployed troops and civilians 

within its borders and the application of a SOFA to that situation. 

Lack of detailed U.S. knowledge about the way the Hungarian system 

operated made the situation more challenging. To reduce future 

problems, U.S. commands should train PPP countries on the terms and 

conditions of the PFP (NATO) SOFA and their respective 

responsibilities. This training would benefit the U.S. as well-judge 

advocates can learn about the various PPP government and legal 

architectures.206 

D. JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS (JMCS) 

The most important lesson learned on JMC [Joint 

Military Commissions] . . .is the fact that we now 

know what a JMC is, and we have a fairly good 

idea on how to make a JMC work . .. 207 

1. JMCs are critical to mission success in peace operations. 

A Joint Military Commission (JMC) is an assembly of a 

commander, his or her chosen staff, and the military leaders with 

whom they are organized to interact. It is the commander's liaison 

mechanism to dea} with military and political factions, i.e. the Entity 

Armed Forces in Bosnia. The JMC is a body of commanders and staffs 

who work through meetings, liaison officers, and correspondence to 

coordinate military planning and operations, and to ensure compliance 

with relevant international agreements. In Bosnia, the JMC was a 

forum for military authorities to coordinate implementation of the 

military aspects of the GFAP. JMCs can be likened to the "team 

206 LTC Pribble and LTC Thompson, remarks in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, vols. I and II. ~ 

207 COL David E. Graham, remarks in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. II at 173. 'l) Prior to 

operation joint Endeavor, there was no doctrine or guidance on how to organize and utilize Joint 

Military Conunissions. OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. II at 159. 'l) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 81 

village" concept at the Joint Readiness Training Center.208 However, 

the JMC role and scope of operations is narrower, focusing on military 

and government leaders, organizations, and activities. 

The JMC was the key liaison and control mechanism for 

compelling compliance with treaty tasks209-the Task Force Eagle 

commander's "key non-lethal peace enforcement tool"210 and Task 

Force Eagle's focal point for compliance.211 It was a forum for 

military factions to coordinate their operations, a mechanism for IFOR 

to issue instructions and guidance to its own forces and to factions, and 

an arbitrator of entity disputes.212 See The Former Warring Factions 

and Their Competing Strategic Goals at Appendix B. 

a. JMC organization and structure. 

Operation Joint Endeavor saw JMCs organized at each 

command level from division through battalion. In 1996, the Center 

For Army Lessons Learned published a detailed guide on the initial 

setup ofJMCs.213 At each level the local IFOR commander served as 

the chairman. The commander chose his JMC staff separately or from 

existing staff. Local commanders from the three different Entity 

Armed Forces (EAFs) served as JMC members to represent the Army 

of the Republic ofBosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the Federation of 

Bosnia and Herzegovina or Bosnian Croat Defense Council (HYO), 

and the Republika Srpska (RS). 

208 See CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, 

U.S. ARMY, TACKLING THE CONTINGENCY DEPLOYMENT: A JUDGE ADVOCA TE'S GUIDE TO THE 

JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER, 243-248 (24 Dec. 1996). (l) 

209 CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED, JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM 

OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR, 4 (May 1996) (hereinafter CALL-JMC]. 

210 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 45. {l) 

211 lAD-AAR,supranote145 at47. {l) 

212 CALL-JMC, supra note 209 at 4. 

213 See supra note 209. 
82 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

(1) Theater/Corps. The Allied Command Europe 

Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) was the land component command for 

IFOR. The ARRC did not establish a completely separate JMC staff. 

It used existing staff sections and members, to include the ARRC 

commander, G3 Plans, a political advisor (a British civil servant), the 

legal branch, the media operations branch, a faction liaison (a 

Brigadier General, one field grade officer, and two interpreters), and a 

specially appointed JMC Secretariat. Unlike Multinational Division 

North (MND-N, discussed below) SFOR did not have an attorney 

assigned full time to the JMC.214 

(2) Division. Task Force Eagle's JMC section was 

comprised of a former Brigade commander, majors and captains from 

the G-2, G-3 and SJA sections, and foreign area officers {FAOs). It 

was organized into a Chief ofthe JMC, a noncommissioned officer in 

charge (NCOIC), an operations and administrative section, and a 

faction LNO. There were also desks and liaison officers (LNOs) for 

each subordinate IFOR brigade and a desk and group of Joint 

Commission Observers (JCOs).215 The JMC mission in Joint Endeavor 

subsumed a full time judge advocate.216 The JMC personnel did not 

214 Interview with MAJ Kurt Mieth, SFOR Legal Advisor's Office, at Sarajevo (2-23 Feb. 1998) 

[hereinafter Interview ofMAJ Mieth].~ 

215 Joint Commission Observers (JCOs) were UK Special Air Service (SAS) troops and Royal Dutch 

Marines conducting direct liaison with the EAFs. They were a carryover organization from the 

united Nations Protective Forces (UNPROFOR). JMCs used them as LNOs to the EAFs. See 

CALL-JMC, supra note 209 at 23. 

216 1st Armored Division's JMC JA member was Major Kevin Govern. He spent his entire 11­

month tour working in the Task Force Eagle JMC. While some of his duties in the JMC were nonlegal and perhaps attributable to "mission creep," his pennanent presence in the JMC appears to 

have been both desirable and necessary. See OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 30-172. ~ Future 

missions may or may not require such heavy judge advocate involvement in the JMC. Also, as time 

has passed and mission functions have grown routine, the judge advocate's role in the JMC has 

diminished. By Jan. 1998, CPT Carrier, the MND-N JMC Legal Advisor, was able to summarize his 

duties in 6 bullets: 

• Advise the JMC staff on Dayton, Vienna and Florence agreements 

• Keep current on events by reading intelligence summaries and reports 

• Monitor weapons seizures, destruction and returns 

• Help draft and review JMC correspondence 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 83 

operate in a vacuum. Primary staffs (G-1 through G-6) and 

Personal/Special Staffs provided political and operational analysis and 

other support during JMC operations.217 

(3) Brigade and battalion. The brigade and 


battalion commanders served as chairmen oftheir respective JMCs, 


selecting those members of their staff appropriate for JMC work. 


Entity Armed Forces (EAFs) sent commanders from the next higher 


level of command. In other words, IFOR battalion level JM Cs had 


· EAF brigade commanders as their counterparts, and IFOR brigade 

level JMCs had EAF division commanders as their counterparts.218 

b. 	 JMC tasks, functions, and duties. 

The role of the JMC is mission dependent. In Bosnia, where the 

peace enforcement mission called for dealing with numerous armed 

and political factions, JMCs were critical to mission success. Their 

functions and duties included: 

• 	 Treaty expertise 

• 	 Develop and disseminate policy 

• 	 Compliance (with military aspects of peace agreement) 

• 	 Track compliance 

• 	 Process EAF movement and training 

requests and monitor movement and 

training 

• 	 Document and record breaches ofPeace 

Agreement 

• Address enforcement and compliance issue 

• Help update JMC Policy and Planning Guidance Handbook 

217 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 45. ~ 

218 See Memorandum, LTC Jimmy M. Rabone, Chief, Joint Military Commission, subject: Joint 

Military Commission (JMC) Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) (3 Sep. 1996). ~ 
84 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

• 	 Develop and advise commanders on specific 

courses of action to ensure compliance 

• 	 Coordinate operations; integrate IFOR and 

faction operations 

• 	 Develop and track measures ofmission success 

• 	 Handle complaints (military complaints, complaints 

against IFOR troops) 

• 	 Coordinate civil/military actions where appropriate 

(e.g. assist elections) 

• 	 Develop confidence-building measures between parties 

• 	 Monitor and communicate with lower, report higher 

The JM Cs,' hence the commanders,' primary methods of 

carrying out these functions and duties were meetings, correspondence, 

and liaisons. Note that force is not listed as a mode. This is because 

the JMCs were so effective at using the other tools of enforcement that 

demonstrations of force were not often needed. The judge advocate 

was intimately involved at all levels. Judge advocates organized 

meetings with EAF leaders.219 Judge advocates drafted or reviewed 

virtually every piece of correspondence that went to EAFs with 

commanders' signatures. They also personally conducted briefings to 

the EAFs in English and in their dialects, to explain compliance 

requirements and other issues. 220 

2. 	Empower the JMC. 

To effectively carry out the functions and tasks listed above, 

JMCs must be empowered by the command. 

. a. Creation ofJoint Endeavor's JMCs. The creation of 

JMCs can be a specified or an implied task. The JMCs in Bosnia were 

a result ofthe General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). 

2191 	AD-AAR, supra note 145 at 46. \Y ~ 

220 Id. at 47. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 85 

Annex IA of the GFAP defined the Parties' agreed-upon military 

responsibilities, set forth NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) 

mandate rights and roles, formally created the JMC process as a forum 

for factions to coordinate operations, and defined the mechanism for 

issuing instructions and arbitrating entity disputes.221 On December 

15, 1995, Admiral Smith, the Commander, Implementation Forces 

(COMIFOR), issued a Statement of Procedures (SOP) that further 

defined the implied military tasks and the JMC process. The SOP 

established the JMC as the central body for EAF commander 

coordination and problem resolution. The COMIFOR delegated 

routine JMC chairmanship to COMARRC. The COMARRC issued 

instructions to ensure the Parties' compliance with the GFAP's military 

aspects. Below the COMARRC level, the multi-national divisions 

(MNDs) and their subordinate brigades and battalions conducted 

"subordinate military commissions."222 

b. Empowerment ofthe JMCs. The creation of the JM Cs 

did not guarantee success. They were effective because they had direct 

aGcess to the commanders, had commanders chairing them and the 

meetings they hosted, and had an authority comparative to a chief of 

staff for performing factional liaison functions. 223 They became 

institutions ofknowledge, expertise, and authority to which 

subordinate units, multi-national brigade liaisons, and EAFs looked to 

for guidance and assistance.224 At meetings commanders were the final 

arbitrators, not simply mediators.225 Task Force Eagle empowered 

brigade and battalion JMCs with broad authority. This worked so well 

that the ARRC and Task Force Eagle JMCs had to meet less 

frequently.226 

221 GFAP, supra note 13, Annex IA, Art. VIII (see Appendix E(5) for text). 

222 CALL-JMC, supra note 209 at 4. 

223 IAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 46. ~ 

224 CALL-JMC, supra note 209 at 21. 

225 MAJ Kevin Govern, Remarks in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 158. ~ 

226 See Id. at 164. ~ 
86 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

3. Train to do the JMC mission. 

JMC members, including the judge advocate, must train and 

rehearse. This training must be mission-focused and give examples of . 

what personnel will actually be doing. Inevitably judge advocates will 

be drawn into doing more than textbook legal analysis, and should be . 227

so prepared. 

a. Area Familiarization. Key to effective JMC 

functioning at all levels was having persons with detailed knowledge 

of the people, the area, and their history-someone who knows the 

culture and the personalities well enough to personally liaison and to 

manage other LNOs. At Theater/Corps level, this person was called 

the Factions Liaison.228 Task Force Eagle (Division level) used 

foreign area officers and already-in-place Joint Commission Observers 

as area experts and liaisons. The judge advocate and other JMC 

members must be familiar with the operational setting as well-the 

geography, peoples, key leader personalities, cultures, language, and 

29 history.2

. Without such knowledge, it is impossible to make effective 

use ofmeetings, correspondence, and LNOs. 

b. JMC Tool #1: Meetings. During its tenure alone, 

Task Force Eagle, I st Armored Division, held 11 large JMC Meetings 

(meetings between the commander and all three factions), 103 Bilateral 

meetings (72 meetings between the commander and a faction leader 

and 31 between the JMC staff or head and one faction leader), and 

numerous staff coordination meetings.230 Effective meetings ofhigh 

level leaders required consideration ofmeeting location, transportation 

227 

See Id. at 157-174 for discussion ofthe many functions the lst Armored Division Joint Military 

Commission judge advocate performed. cri 

228 OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 163-164. cri 

229 

OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 162. cri 

230 

MAJ Kevin Govern, Joint Military Commissions: The Task Force Eagle Experience, Remarks at 

U.S. Army Europe Operational Law Continuing Legal Education seminar (Feb. 1997). cri 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 87 

to and from the meeting, site security, the physical facility, seating 

arrangements, translators, the agenda, media relations and releases, and 

more. Joint Military Commissions: Lessons Learned from Operation 

Joint Endeavor, by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, May 1996, 

is an excellent source of tactics, techniques and procedures for the 

conduct ofJMC meetings. Here are just a few ofthe lessons learned: 

(1) US/NATO/ Coalition commanders, from 

division to company level chaired the JMC meetings.231 An 

authoritative presence-the Commander-made JMCs work. 

(2) The meeting location must be hospitable to all 

parties. A "neutral" location in proximity to all parties, i.e. in the Zone 

of Separation, was viewed as best.232 For example, the first JMC 

meeting was held at a bombed out building which had a mural where 

the eyes ofthe portrayed people had been scratched out. The problem 

was the mural portrayed Bosniac-Muslim peasants doing normal things 

like farming. 233 

(3) The U.S. Commander can bolster his power and 

authority by physical signs .during a meeting. Some techniques used 

included good security (armored vehicles, foot patrols, escorts), 

overflights ofthe meeting site by aircraft, and even a live 

demonstration of our aerial reconnaissance capabilities.234 

(4) Reducing the agreed upon points to writing and 

having the members sign them prior to departing prevented future 

disputes over the outcome of the meeting. Quick media releases by 

231 CALL-JMC, supra note 209 at 10. 

232 Id. 

233 OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 162. ~ 

234 OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 166. ~ 
88 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

JMC staff also prevented factions from misrepresenting meeting 

results.235 

c. JMC Tool #2: Liaisons. Joint Military Commissions 

relied heavily upon liaisons to the EAFs to track and monitor 

compliance, handle complaints, communicate with the EAFs, and 

develop a good rapport. Joint Commission Observers reported through 

command channels and received liaison and collection taskings from 

ARRC and Task Force Eagle levels. JMC chiefs "overwatched," 

coordinating JCO efforts and ensuring their information was shared 

among staffs.236 Joint Commission Observers were a wealth of 

information for JMCs, knowing with whom, where and how to 

establish contacts with the EAFs. They also provided valuable 

political and in-country-information on government, local laws, 

personalities, and more. JCOs and other liaisons monitored and 

reported activity, especially at critical locations/hot spots. They 

verified troop activity and reported violations of agreement. Liaison 

officers and observers were key to peace enforcement. They should be 

well trained in local language, culture, religions, etc., and must also 

have detailed political and operational awareness. 237 

d. JMC Tool #3: Correspondence. 

(1) To Entity Armed Forces (EAFs). 

Correspondence to faction leaders clarified compliance issues (e.g. to 

tell them about weapons storage and handling requirements, prior 

notification of troop movements, etc.), address complaints, and raise 

compliance violations. Judge advocates were key in writing and 

reviewing these letters before they were sent to ensure they were in 

accordance with the GF AP and subsequent agreements. Task Force 

m CALL-JMC, supra note 209 at 16. 

Id. at 23. 

n1 Id. 

236 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 89 

Eagle issued about 40 admonishments and other letters requiring 

compliance.238 A short but illustrative example: 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 


Headquarters, Task Force Eagle 


Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina 


APO AE 09789 


Major General 

Commander, Military Region Orasje 

Bosnian Croat Defense Council 

Wanted to forward to you a copy ofthe enclosed 

letter sent from COMARRC to General Budimir. Please 

make sure that your commanders, and the civil officials 

whom you contact, know that IFOR will not authorize the 

movement and use ofweapons outside barracks to support 

military training in schools. 

Let's continue to work together so that everyone in 

Bosnia-Herzegovina can look forward to peaceful, 

productive futures. School children should devote their time 

to activities which contribute to a peaceful future. Combat 

training is not one ofthose activities. 

Major General, USA 

Commanding 

(2) Within IFOR/SFOR Channels. Along more 

traditional judge advocate lines, judge advocates developed more than 

50 information papers to clarify the GF AP and United Nations Security 

Resolution 1031. They also helped develop, review, and publish six 

editions (to date) ofthe Task Force Eagle JMC Standing Operating 

Procedures and the Task Force Eagle Policies, Procedures and 

238 Likened to traffic tickets, though much more serious in nature. OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I 

at 169. ~ 
90 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Command Guidance Handbook (an approximately 40-70 page 

document giving the TF Eagle commander's intent and specific 

guidance on execution ofthe mission). (See extract of the JMC 

Handbook at Appendix K) The TFE Handbook was an outstanding 

way of compiling directives, policies and procedures issued to date in a 

user- friendly format. Any troop could pick up the Handbook, read the 

half-page section on the applicable topic, and know what to do. It is a 

model product for future operations, and can be credited for making 

many aspects of the mission as "routine" as possible in such an 

environment.239 · 

E. THE ZONE OF SEPARATION (ZOS) 

Perhaps the intertwined lessons to be learned from the ZOS are 

the intricacies ofreducing a peace plan to physical geography and the 

need to develop and widely disseminate clear policies and 

procedures.240 The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) 

and its signatory Parties expressly created all of the demarcations 

depicted and discussed below. Refer to the Map at Appendix A(2) for 

a general illustration and Appendix E(5) for an extract ofthe GF AP. 

1. Every operation will create new law derived from its unique 

circumstances: ZOS v. CFL v. IEBL v. AOT-The commander 

expects the judge advocate to know it. 

a. A CFL (Agreed Cease Fire Line). This is the line 

where the fighting stopped-"a clear and distinct demarcation between 

any and all opposing factions" according to the GFAP. 241 The 

opposing factions (also known as the Former Warring Factions or 

239 See Interview wit.11 CPT Christopher Carrier, JMC Legal Advisor, MND-N, at Tuzla (4 Feb. 

1998). ~ 

24 4> Tactical le--~ns learned on planning. establishing and controlling the ZOS are well addressed in 

Center for Army Le-.,sor.s Learned, Drawing a Line in the Mud, Newsletter No. 96-5 (May 1996). 

241 GFAP, supra r.ore 13, An."V:X lA, Art. IV, para. 2.a. (see Appendix E(5) for text). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 91 

Entity Armed Forces, and as the Parties (to the GFAP)) included the 

Republic ofBosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), the Federation of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina (or Croat Defense Counsel, HYO), and Republika Srpska 

(YRS). 

b. IEBL (Inter-Entity Boundary Line). This is the line 

the Parties to the GF AP agreed to in Dayton. It approximates the 

ACFL, but has variances. The Parties literally pulled out a map and 

drew a line. Variances to this map-drawn line obviously had to be 

made once on the ground. A specified task ofIFOR was to mark the 

IEBL and the ZOS boundaries. Task Force Eagle Commander had the 

authority to approve adjustments of 50 meters or less, to preclude 

splitting homes, utilities and the like. Other requests were forwarded 

through the Joint Civil Commission for COMIFOR approval. When 

marking the IEBL, members from both entities (the Federation of 

Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska) had to be present. 

The attempts to place a physical boundary between entities and peoples 

who occupied portions ofboth sides was often difficult. For example, 

a binding arbitration proceeding was held to delineate the IEBL 

vicinity the town ofBrcko in the northeast. Republika Srpska viewed 

Brcko as necessary to them because of its strategic location bisecting 

their two main regions and its proximity to a major river. At the same 

time, the Federation ofBosnia and Herzegovina viewed its 

overwhelming Bosniac population as grounds to draw the line to 

include Brcko on its side. Multinational divisions and sub-commands 

made sure their boundaries did not coincide with the Inter-entity 

boundary line to keep it from becoming a wall in the minds ofthe 

EAFs. 

c. AOT(Areas oftransfer). These are the areas where 

the ACFL and the IEBL differed. The areas enclosed by the two lines 

were to be turned over to the respective parties on a set schedule. By 

D+45 (February 3, 1996, where D-day was the day ofTransfer of 

Authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR), the Entities were to have 
92 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

vacated the AOTs. At D+90 (March 20, 1996), the Entities were 

allowed to move into the AOTs they were assuming. 

d. ZOS (Zone ofSeparation). The ZOS was a zone 

extending two kilometers to either side of the ACFL at first, and then 

to either side of the IEBL once the AOT transfers were complete. 

When IFOR troops marked the ZOS boundaries, only a member from 

the entity on whose side the marking occurred had to be present. See 

Map at Appendix A(2). 

e. 10 km Reporting Requirement. The GF AP imposed a 

requirement on the EAFs to report the location and status of forces and 

equipment within 10 kilometers on either side of the Agreed Cease Fire 

Line to IFOR by D+30 (January 19, 1996).242 This was not, however, a 

designated "zone" or demarcation for any other purpose. 

2. New law must consider all the parties involved: people and 

weapons in the ZOS-Former Warring Factions, Police, Civilians, 

and/FOR. 

a. Weapons. GF AP guidance on weapons within the ZOS 

was as follows: 

No weapons other than those of the IFOR are 

permitted in this Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of 

Separation except as provided herein. No 

individual may retain or possess any military 

weapons or explosives within this four-kilometer 

Zone without specific approval of IFOR.243 

Within the Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation, 

no individual may retain or possess any weapons 

242 GF 

AP, supra note 13, Annex lA, Art. V, para. 2 (see Appendix E(5) for text). 

243ld. at para. 2(b ). 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 93 

or explosives, other than a member of the IFOR or 

the local police exercising official duties as 

authorized by the IFOR in accordance with Article 

IV, paragraph 2(b). [above]244 

The phrasing "military weapons" caused IFOR to question whether the 

GF AP impliedly created a separate category ofZOS-allowable 

weapons-civilian weapons. Eventually IFOR allowed the following: 

• 	 Civilians could have civilian weapons (bolt, pump and 

semiautomatic rifles and shotguns and single-shot 

pistols or revolvers) provided they registered them 

with the nearest police station and carried a permit. 

However, soldiers were not allowed to carry weapons 

in the ZOS, even with permits. 

• 	 Civil police could carry sidearms, but had to meet the 

requirements for civil police operating in the ZOS 

(addressed below). 

• 	 Army officers in the rank of one-star General and 

above plus up to three bodyguards could carry 

sidearms while in the ZOS on IFOR business.245 

IFOR/SFOR troops had authority to confiscate and subsequently 

destroy all military weapons and civilian weapons found in the ZOS 

without a valid permit.246 

b. Entity Armed Forces (EAFs). At D+7 EAFs were to 

vacate and transfer selected positions along the ACFL. EAFs were to 

complete withdrawal of all forces from the ZOS by D+30. Task Force 

Eagle issued very specific guidance on how troops were to deal with 

244 Id. at para. 2(c)(3). 

245 SOP, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, subject: Amendment #2, Policy Guidance #2, para. 15 (23 

Sep. 1996). cri 

246 Id. 
94 

248 

CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

unauthorized faction weapons, units or soldiers in the ZOS (specific 

Rules ofEngagement). Detention ofEAF military members by task 

Force Eagle was almost always to verify movement approval at 

247 An ·1· checkpoints and did not exceed a few hours. Ynn 1tary 

Personnel active or reserve who actually had their residence in the 

' ' 

ZOS were required to register with the nearest IFOR command post. 

The GFAP permitted movement ofEAFs and their weapons through 

the ZOS with prior permission from and oversight by IFOR, for 

example, to allow movement to cantonment areas. 

c. Police. The GF AP specifically authorized civilian 

police to operate in the ZOS (see 2.a. above). However, IFOR forces 

were concerned about soldiers operating in the ZOS under the guise of 

police. The ARRC therefore issued guidance requiring civilian police 

operating in the ZOS to wear a distinctive uniform, carry an 

identification card, carry only a sidearm, and drive clearly marked 

vehicles. This guidance required !FOR to disarm individuals not 

meeting this criteria. Also, it required the entit~es to submit lists of 

authorized police to local commanders, specifically naming those 

designated for ZOS duty. The International Police Task Force (IPTF) 

was supposed to coordinate and monitor joint-entity police patrols for 

the AOT interim period. Because these were generally lacking and 

because the IPTF was largely ineffective, Task Force Eagle 

commanders were directed to gradually allow the AOT-gaining entities 

to assume police duties in the AOTs. 

d. Civilians. As previously stated, the ARRC created a 

ci~i.lian weapon exception to allow civilians with permits to carry nonmihtary weapons. However, the infamous "silver bullet" clause249 

allowed !FOR ~orces to confiscate any weapon if they perceived a 

threat or potential threat. Additionally, the GF AP mandated that IFOR 

247 

IAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 23. ~ 

24s GF 


AP, supra note 13, Annex IA, Art. IV, para. 3(b) (see Appendix E(5) for text). 


249 ld. at para. 6. 

LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 95 

disband all "armed civilian groups" 250 (broadly defined as two or more 

armed civilians) throughout BiH, not just within the ZOS. Otherwise, 

the GF AP imposed no real restriction on civilian movement through 

and in the ZOS. In fact, a GF AP stated goal was the resettlement of 

the ZOS and other areas. 

e. IFOR/SFOR. IFOR forces enjoyed complete freedom 

ofmovement throughout the ZOS. IFOR's mission was clearly stated 

in the GF AP-enforce GF AP provisions with regard to the EAFs and 

entities. This meant patrolling the ZOS to ensure EAF soldiers and 

unauthorized weapons did not permeate the ZOS, either overtly or 

under the guise ofpolice or civilians. Annex 6 (Agreement on Human 

Rights), Article I (Fundamental Rights and Freedoms) ofthe GF AP 

expressly stated "The right to liberty ofmovement and residence." 

However, by the GFAP terms, assuring these rights was left up to the 

Parties, not IFOR. On October 15, 1996, the Office of the High 

Representative, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 

the International Police Task Force, IFOR, and the European 

Command signed the Procedure for Return and Reconstruction in the 

Zone of Separation, which set out procedures for resettling the ZOS. It 

tasked IFOR to "ensure a secure environment" within the ZOS. 

3. Control ofan area means control ofthe terrain and the 

people on it. 

a. Marking and clearing the ZOS 

Years of war and scourge left areas in and around the ZOS 

dangerous and uninhabitable. The GF AP assigned responsibility for 

removal, dismantling and destruction of mines, equipment, obstacles, 

unexploded ordnance, demolitions and weapons to the responsible 

parties, not to IFOR. 251 IFOR monitored these removal, dismantling 

250 ld. at para. 3. 

251 Id. at para. 3(a). 
96 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

and destruction operations. TFE directed the factions to wear orange 

vests and helmets while clearing mines. 

b. Checkpoints 

The issue of checkpoints arose within and outside the ZOS. The 

Bosnia-Herzegovina Constitution, Annex 4, specifically provides for 

freedom of movement and prohibits the entities from establishing 

controls at the boundary between the entities. However, IFOR did not 

have a mandate to enforce the national constitution. Absent any GF AP 

prohibition on roadblocks, they were allowed outside the ZOS. IFOR 

called upon the police to follow internationally recognized 

standards,252 such as no arbitrary arrests, no levying of tolls or taxes, 

and no discriminatory right of passage. They also required 

checkpoints with three or more police to have a permit stating location 

and duration. Initially no checkpoints were allowed within the ZOS. 

By October 1996, however, requests by all sides for checkpoints within 

the ZOS led the International Police Task Force (IPTF) to establish 

IPTF/Federation (international) police checkpoints. 

c. Resettlement ofthe ZOS 

The GFAP provided that "All refugees and displaced persons 


have the right freely to return to their homes of origin,"253 and "The 


parties shall take all necessary steps to prevent activities within their 


territories which could hinder or impede the safe and voluntary return 


of refugees and displaced persons. "

254 The Procedure mentioned in 


paragraph 2.e. above provided that returnees who trespassed or could 


not establish the right to property under the Procedure (an interesting 


issue in itself given the prior lack of a clear private property scheme) 


252 s 

_ee, e.g., G.A. Res. 217a(III), U.N. GAOR, 2d or 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. N810 at 71 (1948) 


(Umversal Declaration ofHuman Rights). 


2s3 GFAP, supra note 13, Annex 7, Art. I, para. I (see Appendix E(5) for text) . 

. 254 Id. at para. 3. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 97 

could be in violation oftrespass and other local laws. It did not go so 

far as to say they would be violating the GF AP. 

F. 	WEAPONS CONFISCATION AND CONTROL ISSUES 

Confiscation and control ofweapons was one ofthe most 

important and imposing challenges that faced IFOR troops on first 

arriving in Bosnia. The first concern was controlling the military 

factions and their weapons. The focus then shifted to the police forces, 

often a guise for active and former military, and later to the civilians. 

By February 1998, there was still some confiscation and destruction of 

weapons, but far fewer than before and mostly from civilians without 

1255 penmts. . Th e m1 ·1· itary an d h . 	 t eir weapons were un der contro . 

1. Determine what weapons control measures are necessary 

and desirable based on the mission. 

Missions were derived from the General Framework Agreement 

for Peace. Given the peace enforcement nature ofthe mission, 

weapons control was critical. 

a. Task Force Eagle (TFE) derived specified and implied 

tasks from the military aspects ofthe GFAP, which included: 

• 	 Enforce a permanent cease fire 

• 	 Establish and mark the Zone of Separation (ZOS), Military 

Boundary Lines, and other specified locations in which the 

Parties256 must withdraw their forces 

255 See Interview ofLTC Vowel~ supra note 146 <l); Interview ofMAJ Mieth, supra note 214 ~; 

and Interview ofLTC Salata and MAJ Jacobson supra note 164. <l) 

256 ''The Parties" refers to the three Entity Armed Forces (formerly known as the Former Warring 

Factions}-the Republic ofBosnia-Herzegovina (Bill or B-H), the Federation ofBosnia and 

Herzegovina or the Croat Defense Council (HYO), and the Republika Srpska (RS). 
98 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

• On order, compel removal, withdrawal or relocation of any 

forces and weapons posing a threat or potential threat to 

IFOR 

• 	 Observe, monitor, and inspect Parties' military forces and 

facilities. Supervise heavy weapons withdrawal, 

demobilization and the Parties' removal of obstacles and 

explosive hazards 

b. TFE also derived specified and implied tasks for the 

Parties, which, among others, included: 

• 	 Conducting cease fire operations, to include: 

(I) No positioning forces forward of established Cease Fire 

Lines (CFLs), the Zone of Separation (ZOS), and other 

TFE designated areas 

(2) No firing ofweapons or explosives, except per the 

agreement 

(3) No additional mine, barrier or protective obstacle 

emplacement 

• 	 Allow TFE to observe, monitor and inspect military forces 

and facilities 

• 	 Conduct TFE and GF AP-directed heavy weapons 

withdrawal, demobilization and obstacles and explosive 

hazards removal 

c. The GF AP had very specific guidance on weapons, 


especially heavy (to include air defense) weapons. 


(1) After D+ 120 all the Parties were to withdraw all 

heavy weapons and forces to cantonment/barracks areas or other 

approved sites, which were subject to IFOR inspection. EAFs had to 

declare and report weapons and personnel to !FOR. EAFs bad to 

demobilize forces which could not be accommodated in the 

cantonment/barracks areas. The GF AP did not allow forces with longbarreled or automatic weapons outside the cantonment/barracks areas 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 99 

except for training approved in advance by IFOR/SFOR or for 

IFOR/SFOR-approved "special duties."257 

(2) "No weapons other than those of IFOR are permitted 

in this Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation except as provided 

herein. No individual may retain or possess any military weapons or 

explosives within this four kilometer Zone without the specific 

approval of the IFOR."258 

(3) The following GFAP language was the key to IFOR's 

execution of the mission: 

"IFOR has the right and is authorized to compel 

the removal, withdrawal, or relocation of specific 

forces and weapons from, and to order the 

cessation of activities in, any location in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina whenever the IFOR determines 

Forces, weapons or activities to constitute a threat 

or potential threat to either IFOR or its mission, or 

to another party."259 

Often called the "silver bullet" clause, it gave IFOR forces 

broad powers to act and implement rules and requirements felt 

necessary by individual units and commanders. The GF AP did not 

mandate IFOR to confiscate or destroy unauthorized weapons-those 

not properly stored, reported or open to inspection. This "silver bullet" 

clause, however, made confiscation and destruction a viable 

implementation tool for commanders to use. Placing a silver bullet 

clause in future agreements could be the key to mission success.

260 

257 GFAP, supra note 13, Annex 1-A (Military Annex), Art. IV, para. 5 (see Appendix E(5) for text). 

J,d• at para. 2. 

259 ,,'d. at para ..6 

260 See OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. II at 21-22. ~ 

258 
100 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

2. Consider all possible parties, locations, weapons, and 

situations when developing guidance on weapons confiscation and 

control 

The first two operations, Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard, saw 

written and verbal guidance given almost daily on weapons control 

(use, storage, inspection, reporting), confiscation, and disposition 

(hold, return, destroy).261 The changing and developing situation, or 

mission creep/flux, necessitated much of this. While this can never be 

totally avoided, the judge advocate on future missions can help the 

commander give more detailed guidance up front. This would help 

avoid responding to situations as they arise by considering the variety 

of situations and issues that arose in Joint Endeavor and exercising 

forethought. In developing guidance on weapons control and 

confiscation, judge advocates and commanders must consider the types 

ofpeople, weapons systems, and locations involved. The specifics, 

below, show how detailed the thought process must be. 

a. Parties involved. Joint Endeavor saw four types of 

personnel to consider: military, special police, police, and civilians. 

Because the GFAP addressed heavy-to include air defense-weapons 

in detail, most questions arising concerned small arms. 

(I) Military (the Parties). The GF AP and IFOR 

recognized the need for EAF military to train to maintain proficiency, 

and so had to accommodate that need while still fulfilling the peace 

enforcement mission. COMARRC (Commander, Allied Command 

Europe Rapid Reaction Corps) Policy Guidance Number 11 addressed 

individual weapons and EAF training. It prohibited armed individual 

soldiers or armed military groups outside barracks, except: 

(a) Participation in a notified and approved training, 

exercise or live fire; 

261 

By~~~· 1998~ disannam~nt ofEAJ'.s and police was infrequent and most weapons seized were 


from ClVlhans without penmts. Interview ofMAJ Kurt Mieth, SFOR Legal Advisor's Office at 


(15 Feb. 1998). Interview ofLTC Salata and MAJ Jacobson, supra note 164. ~ ' ­
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 101 

(b) Participation (without live ammunition) in a 

local ceremony; 

(c) Division commanders and above could carry 

sidearms and have three bodyguards with sidearms, as 

long as all were in uniform and on official duty; and, 

(d) Military police could carry sidearms, as long as 

all were in uniform and on official duty. 

To conduct training or an exercise, EAFs had to notify TFE five days 

in advance, get their approval on a case by case basis, and separate 

weapons and ammunition while traveling between sites. 

(2) "Special Police" (Military ofInterior Police). 

The GF AP considered the Military ofInterior Police, or "special 

police," to be "Forces" under the GFAP. They therefore were subject 

to the same terms as the EAF forces-withdrawal to 

cantonment/barracks areas subject to inspection, weapons and 

personnel declaration and reporting to IFOR, and no carrying of long­

.barreled or automatic weapons except for authorized training or IFORapproved "special duties." Thus, while performing regular duties, they 

could only carry sidearms. For the recognized "special duty" of 

guarding !FOR-approved sensitive government and military 

installations, special police had to submit to the joint Military 

Commission (JMC) a list of all locations at which they wanted armed 

guards and indicate which they wanted to guard with long barreled or 

automatic weapons. They could patrol only up to 50 meters outside the 

perimeter. The long barreled and automatic weapons, when approved, 

had to remain within the perimeter and could not include tripodmounted heavy machine guns. 

262 

(3) Police. Control ofpolice weapons was key 

because police were often a subterfuge for military forces. In addition 

to the IFOR conventional forces, civilian police had another body to 

262 Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, SOP 826 addressed "special police" or "MUPs." 
102 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

work with-the International Police Task Force (IPTF). The IPTF 

helped formulate policy for police use ofweapons.263 The COMARRC 

and IPTF policy authorized police in MND (N) (Task Force Eagle's 

sector) to only carry sidearms. Unless approved by IPTF, police on 

foot, in patrol cars, or at checkpoints could not carry shotguns or 

automatic rifles. When permitted, IPTF would issue a written permit 

to the police officer commanding the operation stating the quantity and 

type of weapons authorized. Otherwise, they were to be kept at police 

station armories. The police could not use, handle, or store militarytype weapons (AK-47s, Skorpion and UZI-type automatic weapons, 

were examples cited by TFE) in any way. 

· (4) Civilians 

a. "Armed civilian groups." When the Parties 

signed the GFAP, they committed to disarming and disbanding all 

armed civilian groups. The GF AP did not define "armed civilian 

groups," but the IFOR Commander's Statement of Procedures defined 

them as, "A group of two or more nonmilitary personnel in possession 

ofweapons." In this sense weapons meant any sort of weapon in a 

civilian's hands. This policy applied throughout Bosnia, not just 

within the ZOS. Policy letters and memorandums during the operation 

told commanders to exercise discretion in applying this definition. For 

example, hunting was a permissible activity and two (legitimate) 

hunters together were not really an "armed civilian group" requiring 

disarmament. 

b. Individual civilians. IFOR looked to local BiH 

law for guidance on possession of arms by individuals. Civilians could 

keep bolt action, pump, or semi-automatic rifles and shotguns and 

revolvers or single-shot pistols. All of these privately owned weapons 

had to be registered at the nearest police station and civilians had to 

263 . See th~ section on Police issues, which addresses the IPTF and other police concerns, such as the 

remfiltratmg of armed EAFs under the guise of police officers. 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINTHE BALKANS. 1995-1998 103 

have a permit with them when in possession of a firearm. Militarytype weapons were not authorized, even for "hunting." As in most 

other aspects of a peace enforcement mission, actions must be 

tempered by the overall intent and desired end-state. Thus TFE 

expressly stated that they were not there to disarm Bosnia,264 and 

therefore house-to-house searches were not to be done unless 

operationally necessary.

265 

IFOR did, however, view searches ofhomes within the Zone of 

Separation as sometimes necessary. During the resettlement effort, 

EAFs literally blew up and burned many homes to prevent members of 

opposing ethnic backgrounds from moving in. Based on informants, 

IFOR searched homes for explosives and weapons. The NORDPOL 

Brigade lawyer made good use ofpreventive law. He used 

waiver/consent-to-search forms whenever an occupant would sign 

them. After completing the search, he had the occupant sign a form 

stating there was no damage nor missing items on the departure of the 

SFOR troops. 266 

SFOR initiated a major effort to get civilians to voluntarily 

disarm in 1998. It ran from February 19 through March 26, 1998. It 

was an amnesty program that SFOR developed and the Entity 

governments and police implemented.267 

c. /FOR andNGO Civilians. While more of a 

force protection issue, control ofweapons involved not only weapons 

in possession of the Entity Armed Forces, or Parties, but also 

Department of Defense civilian employees and Nongovernmental 

264 Memorandum, Commander, Task Force Eagle, to Brigade Commanders, subject: (NONE) (28 


Apr. 1996). (1) 


265 Brigade commanders were left at their discretion to establish policies as to seizure ofweapons 


from civilians unable to produce a pennit. 


266 Interview ofLTC Vowell, supra note 146. (1) 


267 As ofthe writing ofthis work, no data was available as to the disarmament drives' results. 

104 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Organization (NGO) personnel. The EUCOM plan and USAREUR 

Regulation 690-9 provided that the USAREl!~ ~ommander. could 

authorize the issuance ofweapons to DOD c1v1hans deploymg to 

Bosnia.268 Emergency essential DOD civilian employees were issued 

government sidearms if they received training in accordance with 

military regulations and standards (e.g. Field Manual 23-35). NGO 

personnel normally were not to be armed and, under the GF AP's terms 

and the Rules ofEngagement, were subject to search. IFOR personnel 

were to inventory and report any confiscated NGO weapons to higher 

headquarters through military police channels. 

b. Locations. Just as laws and rules varied depending on 

who was being addressed, they also varied by location. 

(1) Nonmilitary Installations. The IFOR issued 

specific guidance for armed security ofnonmilitary installations. The 

EAFs, police, and other host nation authorities had to notify IFOR of 

all nonmilitary installations with armed security, to include grid 

coordinates, description of the site, rationale for needing armed 

security, phone numbers for emergencies, and requests for long 

barreled or automatic weapons. They could not use mines, explosive 

device, booby traps, heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, or antitank weapons, or arm civilians. 

(2) The Zone ofSeparation. See separate section 

on the ZOS. 

(3) Manufacture, Importation, and Movement of 

Weapons. In addition to accounting for existing weapons, IFOR had 

to address the issue ofnew weapons, either manufactured in country or 

imported. Article III (Regional Confidence- and Security-Building 

Measures) to Annex IB (Agreement on Regional Stabilization) to the 

U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE AND ARMY MOBILIZATION AND OPERATIONS PLANNING AND EXECUTION 

SYSTEM (AMOPES), DIR. 1404.10, EMERGENCY ESSENTIAL DOD CITIZEN CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES, 

APP. 3 (CIVILIAN PERSONNEL) TO ANNEXE (PERSONNEL) (10 Apr. 1992). 

268 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 105 

GF AP prohibited importing arms, but only for a 90-day period from 

the entry into force ofthe annex (until May 30, 1996). It also 

prohibited importing the following for 180 days from entry into force: 

heavy weapons or ammunition, mines, military aircraft, and 

helicopters. One judge advocate opined that movement of arms from 

one HYO pocket through Croatia into the other pocket was not a 

violation of the agreement. He noted that this movement did not 

violate the intent of the agreement, which was to prevent introduction 

of additional weapons. The GF AP did not prohibit the Parties from 

manufacturing weapons, ammunition, and explosives. However, a 

declaration ofproduction facilities had to be turned in to IFOR by July 

5, 1996, detailing location, items produced, production capacity, 

storage capacity, and whether armed guards would be used. 

c. Weapons Types 

(1) Air Defense and Heavy Weapons. Paragraph 

5(a) (Phase III) ofArticle IV (Redeployment of Forces) of the GFAP, 

required the EAF s to concentrate, secure, and store all "heavy 

weapons" in approved storage sites by 120 days after the transfer of 

authority to IFOR. The GF AP defined "heavy weapons" as all tanks 

and armored vehicles, all artillery 75 mm and above, all mortars 81 mm 

and above, and all anti-aircraft weapons 20 mm and above. Separate 

approved sites were set up for Air Defense Artillery (AAA) systems. 

At one point Task Force Eagle had to clarify this definition because 

14.5 mm anti-aircraft guns did not fall within the definition of "heavy 

weapons," and could be stored at either approved AAA sites or 

approved Weapons Storage Sites. As of 18 April 1996, COMARRC 

guidance was to confiscate all AAA systems not in approved AAA 

sites, hold them for 30 days while notifying higher, then destroy them. 

A hard line was not taken on other weapons systems until October 1, 

1996. 
106 CENTER FOR LAWAND MIUTARY OPERATIONS 

(2) Mines. The GF AP Military Annex required the . ,,269 . 

Parties-not IFOR-to "remove, dismantle or destroy a 11 IDines m 

the ZOS and areas to be transferred. Judge advocates helped 

commanders decline local national (other than the EAFs) requests for 

IFOR assistance in removing mines. However, judge advocates helped 

commanders develop incentives for the EAFs to do what the GF AP 

required-clear the minefields. For example, TFE approves or 

disapproves EAF training and movement requests contingent upon . . . 270 EAF progress m counter mme operations. 

(3) Civilian Explosives. While it was clear what to 

do with military weapons and explosives, the unique issue arose of 

how to handle civilian explosives (e.g. for quarries, construction, etc.). 

TFE forces stopped five vehicles in April 1996, alone, each carrying 

about 9.5 tons of explosives. The TFE commander was legitimately 

concerned about possible wrongful use of these explosives. The judge 

advocates did their legwork, met with local officials, and discovered a 

system was already in place for issuing permits and bills oflading and 

obtaining police escorts for shipments of civilian explosives. They and 

the commander then worked with local officials to have the system 

enforced, and notified them that they would seize any explosives 

shipped in violation of local requirements. This was a good example of 

trying to work from within the country's existing system to further 

restore order in the spirit of the overall mission, while simultaneously 

ensuring force security. 

3. Publish and disseminate clear and concise guidance on 


weapons confiscation and control 


. While military police channels were responsible for physically 

handlmg co!1fiscated weapons, the judge advocates were almost always 

269 

, 70 GFAP, supra note 13, Annex 1-A, Art. IV, para. 2(d) (see Appendix E(5) for text). 


- TASK FORCE EAGLE, JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION HANDBOOK, CHAPTER 17 (COUNTERMINE 


OPERATIONS) (6th ed.12 Jan. 1998). 

LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINTHE BALKANS. 1995-1998 107 

the ones to answer questions on searches, inspections, and confiscation 

of weapons. 

a. Determine what law or rules will govern search and 

seizure. The possible sources oflaw and rules governing searches and 

seizures for missions in other nations are too numerous to name. In the 

Joint Endeavor/Guard/Forge operations, IFOR/SFOR forces were 

fortunate. The Former Warring Factions all signed the GFAP, wherein 

they committed themselves to cooperate fully with and facilitate free 

and unimpeded access and movement for any international 

personnel.271 They also conceded to the IFOR the ''unimpeded right to 

observe, monitor and inspect any Forces, facility or activity in Bosnia 

or Herzegovina that the IFOR believes may have military 

capability."272 Note that the words "believe" and "may" set very low 

threshold standards for conducting searches and inspections. The 

fabled "silver bullet" clause273 lowered the threshold even more. These 

two provisions allowed the multinational force to justify the search of 

just about any persons or activities, as necessary. 

b. Give timely, clear, and specific guidance to ALL 

parties. 

(1) Giving Guidance. The policies on confiscation 

and control ofweapons changed frequently, due to unforeseen or 

unplanned situations and mission adjustments, or "creep". It was very 

important for judge advocates to continually seek clarification and 

inform the commanders ofpolicy changes. Rapid dissemination up 

and down the chain was essential. Sometimes the EAFs knew about 

changes before subordinate elements, creating embarrassing, and 

potentially volatile, situations.274 Another problem was keeping track 

271 GFAP, supra note 13, Art. II, para.4 (see Appendix E(5) for text). 

272 ld. at para. 6. 

273 Id. 

274 See OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. II at 95-96. cri 
108 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

of all the policies in an easy to use fonnat. Task Force Eagle's Joint 

Military Commission published an extremely well organized, user 

friendly Policies, Procedures and Command Guidance Handbook. It 

summarized the commander's intent and gave very specific 

instructions on topics such as disbanding anned civilians and detaining 

personnel, destruction ofmines and munitions, destruction ofheavy 

weapons systems in the Zone of Separation, movement ofweapons and 

forces, and many other issues. See Appendix J for an extract of the 

JMC Handbook. 

(2) Disposition ofUnauthorized Weapons. Once 

it was clear what weapons were authorized, there were questions about 

what to do with unauthorized weapons. Initially, the Commander, 

TFE, pushed down the power to make decisions and set policies to 

brigade and battalion commanders. Gradually, higher headquarters 

declared set policies in an effort to demonstrate resolve and to make 

IFOR actions uniform, predictable, and not subject to complaints of 

unequal treatment by the EAFs. 

The Commander, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps' (COMARRC) 

policy was: any weapons found in the ZOS were to be confiscated and 

destroyed after 30 days; intentionally concealed weapons were to be 

confiscated, destruction at lower commander's discretion (except 

destruction ofheavy weapons required COMARRC approval); and 

unauthorized weapons due merely to poor administration or 

inefficiency by the factions could be moved to an appropriate site (did 

not have to be confiscated). In August 1996, the TFE Commander 

reserved to his level the discretion to return weapons and ammunition 

to EAFs and the discretion not to confiscate unauthorized weapons and 

ammunition. Henceforth, TFE commanders had no choice-they had 

to confiscate unauthorized weapons. Effective October 1, 1996, 

COMARRC also cracked down requiring IFOR troops to immediately 

confiscate and destroy weapons and ammunition found at unauthorized 

sites, with no appeal period. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 109 

Tracking confiscated weapons was a problem. Commanders 

must establish a clear system ofinventory, to include weapons 

destruction certificates, early on. While not exactly in the judge 

advocate's zone, this duty fell upon the Joint Military Commission 

(JMC) judge advocate's shoulders.275 

G. LAW ENFORCEMENT ISSUES 

1. Develop clear, mission-oriented standards for detention of 

civilian personnel. 

Although the GF AP did not specifically give IFOR the authority 

to detain civilians, IFOR derived such a power from the "silver bullet" 

clause of the Accords.276 The very breadth of that clause, however, 

made specific guidance more vital. Therefore the NATO OPLAN had 

a legal annex that, among other things, spelled out the rules regarding 

detention. The plan correctly noted that NATO was not a party to an 

international armed conflict, and hence detained personnel were not 

~nemy prisoners ofwar. 

277 The plan required IFOR to tum over any 

detained person to local officials as quickly as practicable, and 

275 See Memorandum. CPT Christopher Carrier, MND-N JMC Legal Advisor, to Executive Officer, 

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, subject: Resolving Confiscated Weapons Inventories (24 Nov. 

1997) and Memorandum. CPT Christopher Carrier, MND-N JMC Legal Advisor, to Executive 

Officer, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, subject: Resolving Confiscated Weapons Inventories, (8 

Dec. 1997) (address the problems he faced in getting units to report).~ 

276 Called the "silver bullet" because it creates an expansive justification. GF AP, Annex 1 A, Art. 

VI, para. 5, reads, "The Parties understand and agree that the !FOR Commander shall have the 

authority, without interference or permission of any Party, to do all that the Commander judges 

necessary and proper, including the use of military force, to protect the IFOR and to carry out the 

responsibilities listed above in paras. 2, 3 and 4, and they shall comply in all respects with the IFOR 

requirements." (The paragraphs referred to herein set forth the IFOR responsibilities in very broad 

terms, and even include an open end by acknowledging that the NAC may add more terms.) 

277 See HAITI AAR at 53-56 for discussion ofmaintaining law and order and handling hostile persons 

when the law of armed conflict does not strictly apply. ~ 
110 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

mandated a legal review for anyone who was held for more than 72 

hours.278 

Specific IFOR guidance reminded soldiers that they could detain 

civilians where those civilians obstructed friendly forces, interfered 

with the mission, or committed a serious crime in the presence of 

IFOR. The JMC Handbook defined this last category to include any 

act or omission "which does or could reasonably be expected to cause 

serious bodily harm to civilians, non-belligerents or IFOR 

personnel."279 Soldiers were reminded to exhaust other available 

means before detention, to treat detainees humanely, to tum them over 

to military police at the earliest opportunity, and that the senior soldier 

present had the authority to release any detainee.280 

Counter-surveillance efforts were a common cause of detention 

of civilians. Soldiers often detained and questioned civilians who were 

seen sketching, photographing, or videotaping IFOR base camps. 

Although such activity was generally an innocent act of tourism, 

commanders appreciated the broad authority to prevent such 

potentially dangerous activity.281 

278 

NATO OPLAN, Operation Balkan Endeavor, Legal Annex, 2.m (2) and (3). The 72-hour 

limitation was derived from Western, not Bosnian, law. COL Berger, comments in OJE-AAR, supra 

note 30, Vol. II, at 89. See generally MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 

305(h)(2)(A) (1996); but cf Riverside County v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (imposing a 48­

hour rule for such reviews ofpretrial confinement). . 

279 

TASK FORCE EAGLE, JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION, POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND COMMAND 

GUIDANCE HANDBOOK 13 (2d ed. 12 May 1996). ~ 

280 Id. 

281 

MAJ Zolper, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. II at 87. ~ For examples of the kinds 

of anti-surveillance detentions which took place, see Memorandum, L TC Christopher Maher, for 

record, subject: Detention ofCivilian Calling Himself Timothy McLaurin (Aug. 1996) ~and 

Memo.randum, LTC Christopher Maher, for record. subject: Detention ofTwo Japanese Males From 

1st Bngade AOR (Emerald City) (11 Aug. 1996). ~ 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 111 

2. Develop clear, mission-oriented standards for detention of 

military (Entity Armed Forces) personnel. 

Another difficulty in the detention arena was distinguishing 

civilians from Entity Armed Forces (EAFs) military personnel.282 For 

EAF personnel, the most important issue requiring a detention decision 

was the subject's presence in the Zone of Separation (ZOS) after the 

redeployment period.283 The standards for handling military personnel 

were essentially the same as for civilians: humane treatment, brief 

detention, and rapid turnover to the military police. The military police 

would, in turn, hand the detainees over to local authorities. 284 

In addition to the general desirability ofmilitary personnel 

avoiding police duties, the lack of facilities also encouraged only brief 

detentions. The only detention site available in the Multinational 

Division North (MND-N) sector was one built by the military police, 

which could accommodate three persons. In one instance, a group of 

Bosnian Federation soldiers purporting to be from Croat forces were 

found well beyond the Zone of Separation (ZOS) and detained at a 

°Tactical Operations Center (TOC).285 

In one case, the rapid return-to-local- authorities policy proved to 

be discordant with overall strategic policy. As many have noted, one of 

the difficulties of a multi-entity federation is that the local authorities 

may be a hostile force to the detainees. 286 In the most notorious 

occurrence, seven Bosnian men (the "Zvornik Seven") turned 

themselves in to IFOR troops in Republika Serpska territory. They were 

282 MAJ Zolper, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. II at 87. ~ 

283 GFAP, supra note 13, Annex IA, Art. IV (see Appendix E(S) for text). 

284 IAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 22. ~ 

285 Id. at 23. ~ Unlike the case from Zvornik that follows, they were escorted back across the ZOS 

and returned to their own forces once their true identity was detennined. 

286 See, e.g., LTC Fucci and MAJ Zolper, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. II at 87-88. 

~ 
112 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

quickly turned over to the local authorities.287 Those authorities . 

proceeded to torture confessions from several ofthem. After. a year m 

Prison they were tried and convicted. Three of the seven ultimately 

. ' . 288 received twenty-year pnson sentences. 

3. Beware a nation's police forces-often they are as potent 

and influential as the military. 

The constitution ofBosnia-Herzegovina, agreed to as part ofthe 

GFAP, includes the "right to liberty ofmovement and residence" as 

one ofthe fundamental rights of the people.289 The GFAP envisioned a 

multi-ethnic Federation where refugees who had been "ethnically 

cleansed" from their homes because they were in the minority could 

return to their historic residences. A critical part ofthe IFOR mission, 

then, was to ensure that the dispossessed could return home once the 

armed groups left or IFOR removed them from the Zone ofSeparation. 

287 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 22. ~ 

288 The men had been residents ofSrebrenica, site ofa large "etlmic cleansing" ofBosnian Muslims 

by Bosnian Serb forces in the summer of 1995. See Indictment ofDrazen Erdemovic, International 

Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (22 May 1996). On 10 May 1996, they approached a 

U.S. artillery platoon, claimed they had been recently fired at, and surrendered. The men were in 

violation ofthe Dayton Accords because they were a group that was armed: they carried five knives, 

two pistols, and a couple of hand grenades among them. Within two hours they had been handed 

over to Serbska police in Zvornik. Later-they claimed after they were coerced by beatings-three 

confessed to murdering four missing Serbian woodcutters, and the other four confessed to helping 

dispose ofthe bodies. In the intervening time an American patrol had been sent to the police station 

to retrieve the men, but had been turned back by hostile Serbian crowds. See Tracy Wilkinson, LOS 

ANGELES TIMES, 24 May 1996. See also Alex Ivanko, Transcript ofIFOR Press Briefing, Sarajevo 

Coalition Press Information Center, 18 May 1996 (confirming IFOR 's view that the men had been 

beaten, and that they were on the list ofthose missing from Srebrenica, but finding also some 

"peculiarities" in their overall level of health and grooming when taken with their story that they had 

survived for the last ten months in the woods). At the eventual trial the defendants were not 

permitted to have attorneys from the Federation; during the two-day trial their Serbska attorneys 

"spoke only briefly." See Amnesty International News Release, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Amnesty 

International Condemns Unfair Trial of "Zvornik Seven" (24 Apr. 1997). For an observation that 

the presence of a judge advocate at the relevant headquarters might have prevented the entire 

incident, see LTC Christopher Maher, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 59. ~ 

289 GF AP, supra note 13, Annex 4, Art. II, para. 3(m). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 113 

The immediate difficulty for the refugees in exercising this right 

was the EAF's use of a system of checkpoints that began during the 

war as a method to control civilian movement. Local police and the 

Interior Police, often subterfuge organizations for military members,290 

were the "bullies" behind most of these restrictive checkpoints. 

However, from the earliest days of the operation, IFOR recognized that 

there were some legitimate reasons why the entity governing bodies 

might need to use checkpoints, at least for short periods.291 For 

example, local truckers often tried to move through Croatia and 

Bosnia-Herzegovina under the guise of transporting SFOR freight, 

thereby illicitly gaining Status of Forces Agreement protection and 

avoiding legitimate taxes, fees, and inspections. (Efforts would range 

from simply painting "SFOR" on the side of their vehicles to forging 

documents.) Thus our forces had to develop a coherent approach to 

handling the checkpoints. Judge advocates played a key role in 

resolving this complex situation. 

As U.S. forces came across checkpoints, they turned to their 

attorneys' advice to evaluate their options based on an application of 

the rules to the particular situation. Sometimes IFOR allowed the 

checkpoints to remain; sometimes IFOR removed them. The reliance 

on the judge advocate's advice was the consistent theme among these 

types of issues.292 Eventually IFOR issued guidance requiring any 

checkpoint of two or persons in operation for more than 30 minutes to 

have documented IFOR approval. IFOR could detain violators and 

290 See Interview ofL TC Vowell, supra note 146. ~ 

291 TASK FORCE EAGLE, JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION, POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND COMMAND 

GUIDANCE HANDBOOK 6 (2d ed. 12 May 1996). ~ ("Police forces are only authorized to establish 

checkpoints to control/stop criminal activity or for legitimate purposes". The handbook goes on to 

list a few of those legitimate purposes, including traffic direction, temporary road closure, and 

reaction to life threatening emergencies). 

292 See, e.g., Information Paper, CPT Matthew D. Ramsey, Operational Law, First Armored 

Division, subject: Proposed Language For Frago Allowing Police Checkpoints In The ZOS (20 Oct. 

1996) and Information Paper, CPT Mark Tellitocci, Assault Command Post judge advocate, 1st 

Armored Division, subject: Check Points By Local Military And Police Personnel (24 Jan. 1996). 

~ 
114 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

seize their weapons and roadblock equipment. Whether IFOR could 

detain police at illegal roadblocks was a divisive issue. The Joint 

Military Commission viewed it as dangerous and inflammatory. The 

command decided to allow detentions necessary for force security or 

fulfillment of the mission, but no "punitive detentions."293 

One high profile situation was the Republika ofSrpska (RS) 

imposed "road tax" over the Brcko Bridge. RS police manned the 

"toll" station. All parties recognized and agreed that, by terms of the 

new constitution among other authorities, only the country as a 

whole-the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), not the 

individual entities--could charge transit fees or visas. In response, the 

RS devised a "road tax." This so-called "road tax," however, was 

remarkably disparate along ethnic lines. It charged nothing for 

vehicles with RS or Yugoslavian plates, 200 DM for foreign registered 

cars, 500 DM for foreign trucks, and 50 DM for Slovenian vehicles. 

Judge advocates and attorneys at all levels-TFE, SFOR, the United 

Nations Office of the High Representative, and the International Police 

Task Force--concluded the tax was illegal because it was excessive 

and discriminatory, violated BiH Constitutional provisions on freedom 

ofmovement and equal treatment within BiH, and provisions allowing 

only the Federation, not individual entities, to establish visa and 

immigration policy.294 The High Commissioner's office told the RS to 

dismantle the toll station or face action by the IPTF and IFOR to close 

it down. 

293 

Memorandum, CPT Christopher Carrier, JMC Legal Advisor, subject: Carrier's Greatest Hits 

Poland, A Review of Key Documents (20 Jan. 1998). cr> 

294 

This issue developed back in Aug. 1996 and was still unresolved as of 21 Aug. 1997, when 

Ambassador Gerd Wagner of the Office ofthe High Representative wrote an ultimatum to Madame 

Biljana Plavsic, President ofthe Republika Srpska, and Mr. Gojko Klickovic, the Prime Minister. 

Because there was some question whether the RS tax may have been legal under Chapter VI of the 

Law on the Roads ofRepublika Srpska (1995) entitled "Road Toll and Roads Financing," attorneys 

~t all levels examined the issue and reached agreement before acting. There are numerous materials 

m the CLAMO OJG-AAR database addressing this issue. Cl) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 115 

4. Reforming a nation's police force is essential to 

reestablishing a sound peace. 

Part ofthe peace process for Bosnia-Herzegovina was the 

creation of an International Police Task Force (IPTF) under U.N. 

auspices. The IPTF did not have a mission to be the nation's police 

force: rather, they were to serve as observers and advisors to the 

governments of the entities as they established their own effective 

police forces. 295 

As with all other international organizations, the resolution of 

the IPTF requests for support required resolution by judge advocates. 

IFORjudge advocates and other soldier-lawyers in the theater helped 

the IPTF with its organization oflocal police units and with 

determinations oflawful possession ofweapons. Judge advocates also 

helped determine what logistics and personal support, such as access to 

pontoon bridges and base camp Army & Air Force Exchange Services, 

that IFOR would provide to the IPTF.296 

One additional and critical piece of support for the IPTF was 

part of the basic IFOR mission: the ability to regulate the size ofthe 

local police forces.297 Two disquieting facts motivated the IFOR 

295 Information Paper, CPT Tellitocci, subject: International Police Task Force ( 19 Jan. 1996). (l) 

296 lAD-AAR supra note 145 at 28. (l) Memorandum, MAJ Maggioncalda, for Chief, Joint 

Military Commission, subjett: lBCT Input to FWF Weapons-Carrying Police (31 May 1996) 

(describing the position advocated by lBCT judge advocates)~; Memorandum, BG James P. 

O'Neal, Headquarters, to Hannu Juvonen, Regional Commander Task Force Eagle, subject: Reply, 

UNIPTF TUZLA, Re: Priority U.N. IPTF Zupanija Bridge (16 Feb. 1996),~; Memorandum, CPT 

Eric Jensen, for Commander Task Force Eagle, subject: IPTF Use Of AAFES. ~ 

297 Memorandum, CPT Tellitocci, for ADC (M), subject: Controls of Civilian Police in the ZOS (23 

Jan. 1996) (noting that, although there was no specific authorization in the Dayton Accords to limit 

police size, "this authority is inherent in our mission .... Primarily it comes from our authority to 

order the cessation of activities that pose a threat to our mission, IFOR, or to another party"). ~ 

See also Information Paper, LTC Christopher Maher, subject: Regulation of Civilian Police (26 Jan. 

1996) (observing that the Military Annex to the Dayton Accords prohibited weapons, and armed 

groups, in the ZOS unless they had !FOR approval, and this allowed Task Force Eagle to establish 

rules prior to granting such approval). ~ 
116 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

interest in the formation of these forces. The first was the concern that 

many of the demobilized military personnel of the entities would 

simply be reclassified as police and used to carry on the war at a lower 

level.298 The second was the way in which the police forces had 

themselves become an instrument oflawbreaking, especially by 

mistreating members of minority ethnic groups in their region.299 In 

order to make the local police an agency ofprogress toward peace 

rather than a hindrance, IFOR delegated authority to the brigades to 

limit local police size and to register them by name.300 

H. WAR CRIMES 

1. Anticipate war crimes to pervade many oftoday's conflicts. 

The conflict in the Former Yugoslavia has been and remains a 

political, military, and legal quagmire. No issue has combined all three 

factors in a manner that interested the general public more than war 

crimes. Violations of the law ofwar occurred on all sides of the 

conflic~. The nature of the barbaric acts alleged subjected military and 

political leaders to extensive media scrutiny and, therefore, intense 

public interest. Ethnic hatred-based conflicts are ripe for war crimes. 

In June 1991 conflict broke out between forces loyal to the 

Muslim-led government and forces loyal to the concept of a Bosnia 

Serb Republic. These Serb forces were comprised offormer Yugoslav 

298 

Memorandum, CPT Tellitocci, for ADC(M}, subject: Controls of Civilian Police in the ZOS (23 

Jan. 1996). ~ 

299 

See U.N. Sec. Gen., Letter to the President ofthe Security Council, subj: Implementation Force 

Operations (Second Report, High Representative for the Implementation ofthe Peace Agreement on 

Bosnia and Herzegovina) Appendix II, U.N. Doc. S/1996/542 (10 Jul. 1996) ("Human rights 

monitors, including the IPTF receive regular reports of brutality by police and other security forces 

in violation of international human rights standards. The most common incidents reported are 

be.atin~s ofdetainees while in police custody. A large percentage of these reports involve ethnic 

nnnonty returnees who are detained by police upon arrival.") 

~T . ASK FORCE EAGLE, JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION, POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND COMMAND 

GUIDANCE HANDBOOK (2d ed. 12 May 1996). ~ 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 117 

military forces, militias, paramilitary groups, and special forces-all 

under the attenuated, but clear command of General Radtko Mladic 

who had served in the Yugoslav People's Army and subsequently took 

control of the Bosnian Serb Army.301 

Though months of intense fighting ensued, the incidents which 

brought the subject ofwar crimes into the international spotlight did 

not occur until late May, 1992, when Serbian military units re-took 

control of Prejidor, a small town in northwestern Bosnia. The largescale attack, conducted with armored forces and small arms, followed 

an uprising by a group of about 150 non-Serbs that had wrested control 

from the Serbs. In re-taking control ofPrejidor, Serb forces advanced 

street-by-street, ejecting non-Serbs from their homes, mistreating them 

and, in most cases, killing them. Serb forces herded most that were not 

killed, especially surviving men who were able to escape the 

onslaught, into deplorable conditions in concentration camps at 

Keratem and Omarska, where most eventually were tortured and killed. 

On July 13, 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 764, 

which reaffirmed that all parties to the Yugoslav conflict must comply 

with international humanitarian law, particularly the 1949 Geneva 

Conventions. It also stated that all persons who commit or order the 

commission of grave breaches of those conventions are individually 

responsible for war crimes. 302 This had no practical effect and 

continued allegations ofwidespread torture and killing prompted the 

United Nations Security Council on October 6, 1992 to ask the 

Secretary General to establish a Commission of Experts to investigate 

the alleged war crimes.303 The Secretary General established a five 

member Commission that began investigating allegations in November 

1992. 

301 UNITED NATIONS FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED 

PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780, to the President ofthe Security 

Council 29-33, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674(24 May 1994). 

302 S.C. Res. 764, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3093 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/764 (13 Jul. 1992). 

303 S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Resn8o (6 Oct. 1992). 
118 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

In an interim report published within four months of the date of 

its establishment, the Commission concluded that grave breachessuch as willful killing, "ethnic cleansing," mass killings, torture, 

rape-and other crimes had been committed in the Former 

Yugoslavia. In response, the Security Council on February 22, 1993, 

decided to establish an international tribunal to prosecute the 

offenders,304 called the International Criminal Tribunal for Former 

Yugoslavia (ICTY). 

On May 25, 1993, the Security Council, acting pursuant to 

Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, formally established the tribunal and 

enacted the tribunal's constitutive statute.305 On February 11, 1994, 

pursuant to Article 15 of the statute, the eleven appointed judges of 

the newly established Tribunal adopted rules of procedure and 

evidence.306 

For the world, the GF AP held the promise of progress toward 

resolution of four years of intense fighting and senseless killing. For 

international lawyers, the establishment of the ad hoc tribunal signaled 

the potential for the first international war crimes trials since those 

that followed World War IL Two fundamental questions remained, 

however. The first question was purely a legal one-whether this 

court actually had jurisdiction over the alleged offenses. The larger 

question revolved around how this tribunal, without an international 

police force or its own enforcement powers, might bring war criminals 

to justice. 

304 S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/808 (22 Feb. 1993). The 

report was submitted to the Security Council. Letter from the U.N. Secretary General (9 Feb. 1993) 

(U.N. Doc. S/25274). 

30S 

S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (25 May 1993). 

306 I

NTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS 

VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED JN THE TERRITORY OF THE 

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991: RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, U.N. Doc. IT 32 (adopted 

11Feb.1994, entered into force 14 Mar. 1994) (reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 484-554 (1994). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 119 

2. Seek the specific legal authorities that address war crimes 

andjurisdiction over the war criminals. 

The rules of international law that apply in conflict vary 

depending on whether the conflict is international or internal in nature. 

While this distinction is important in several respects, it is most 

important in terms of this discussion because the concept ofindividual 

responsibility for grave breaches ofhumanitarian law does not extend 

to internal armed conflict. While a general duty exists among the 

parties to suppress violations of humanitarian law, no specific duty 

exists to punish individuals responsible for the commission of such 

violations.307 

Stated simply, in order for the tribunal to acquire jurisdiction to 

try individuals for "grave breaches" such as willful killing, torture, or 

willfully causing great suffering, it would first have to make a 

determination that the conflict was international and not internal in 

nature. While space precludes this report from examining each aspect 

of this question, the Commission of Experts concluded that "the 

character and complexity of the armed conflicts concerned, combined 

with the web of agreements on humanitarian issues the parties have 

concluded among themselves, justify an approach whereby [the 

Commission] applied the law applicable to international armed 

conflicts to the entirety of the armed conflicts in the territory of the 

former Yugoslavia.308 

In reaching this conclusion, the Commission placed great 

emphasis on a series of agreements entered into by the principle parties 

to the conflicts. The United Nations admitted these parties to 

membership in the United Nations by resolutions adopted in May 

307 See generally preliminary remarks of the International Committee of the Red Cross to U.N.S.C. 

Res. 808, at 2. Page 54 ofICTY Paper, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 

Yugoslavia (text available from CLAMO). 

308 U.N. Doc. S/25274 at 14. ICTY Paper, supra note 307, at 54. 
120 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

1992.309 The Republic of Slovenia, the Republic of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, and the Republic of Croatia, entered into a series of 

agreements brokered by the ICRC. In the Croatian conflict for 

example, the parties agreed to apply the Geneva Conventions and 

Additional Protocol I in their entirety.310 Included in this agreement 

were provisions concerning individual criminal responsibility for grave 

breaches. Agreements concerning conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 

however, were less extensive and, while they provided for punishment 

of violations, they excluded the concept of individual criminal 

responsibility.311 

Despite the determination of the Commission, the 

applicability and enforceability of these agreements remains in doubt. 

The few decisions rendered by the Tribunal have failed to shed much 

light on the issue ofthe enforceability of the agreements. Neither, 

unfortunately, has the Tribunal resolved the question ofjurisdiction as 

it relates to the nature of the conflict. In its August 1995 decision on 

defense motions contesting the jurisdiction of the court in the case 

versus Dusan Tadic, the Tribunal made no finding regarding the nature 

ofthe armed conflict in question. Rather, the Tribunal took a much 

narrower approach, holding that the requirement ofinternational armed 

conflict does not appear on the face of Article 2, which confers subject 

matter jurisdiction to prosecute grave breaches ofthe Geneva 

Conventions.312 

The foregoing does not assert that judge advocates need to know 

the nuances of the international justice system or the intricacies of 

309 G A R . . 
 es. 236, 237 and 238, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Docs. A/Res/236,237,238 (adopted 

22 May 1992). 


310 

Addendum (23 May 1992) to the Memorandum of Understanding (27 Nov. 1991), ICTY Paper, 

supra note 307, at 54. 

311L fr C etter. om ~natl~ to the U.N. pursuant to U.N.S.C. Res. 771 (1992) and 780 (1992) concerning 

Human Rights Violations in Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/25392, at 30 (9 Mar. 1993). 

312 

°l!·N· International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor Against Dusko 


Tad1c, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defense Motion on the Jurisdiction ofthe Tribunal. 

LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 121 

international law as it relates to the inner-workings of such a tribunal. 

It does illustrate that topics such as the Law ofWar and the Geneva 

Conventions, which many believe are inapplicable or outdated, remain 

as important as ever--even in peace operations. 

3. Guidance on handling persons indicted for war crimes 

(PIFWCs) must be specific and tied in with the Rules ofEngagement. 

By using the Security Council to establish the Tribunal, the U.S. 

and other participating U .N. members agreed that "war crimes" were a 

direct violation of international law, and the Tribunal could try these 

cases. The parties to the Dayton Peace Accords agreed to "cooperate in 

the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of 

international humanitarian law."313 What qualifies as "cooperation" is 

subject to debate. 

The Tribunal issued its first indictments in November 1995. 

Initial guidance with respect to TFE's policy on detention ofwar 

criminals came in the form of an information paper issued by the 

Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, TFE, on February 6, 1996.314 This 

information paper summarized IFOR guidance dated January 10, 1996. 

It also contained information distributed by the tribunal itself, as well 

as that given by the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. 

The Task Force Eagle Staff Judge Advocate and legal staff 

received copies of the original indictment and made arrangements with 

the Tribunal to receive all forthcoming indictments. Of immediate 

concern to TFE legal personnel were requests from local civilian 

officials to receive copies ofthe indictments. ·Though the indictrrients 

were technically matters ofpublic record and had been distributed, 

media outlets were damaged greatly by the conflict and news simply 

313 GFAP, supra note 13, Art. IX (see Appendix E(5) for text). 

314 Information Paper, Staff Judge Advocate, Task Force Eagle, subject: Policy Guidance on 

Detention ofWar Criminals (6 Feb. 1996). cri 
122 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

was not getting out. Citing policy reasons, TFE legal personnel, in a 

memorandum to the Commander, TFE, recommended against 

distributing copies ofTribunal materials to local officials. Their 

rationale was simple: the Tribunal is a civilian organization, and 

enforcement and liaison should be a civilian police concem.

315 

This memorandum further explained who had been indicted for 

what and clarified Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) Rules of 

Engagement (ROE) relating to indicted war criminals. The ARRC 

ROE provided the following guidance with respect to indicted war 

criminals: 

Detention of persons indicted by the International 

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia with whom 

IFOR comes into contact in the execution of their 

assigned tasks is permitted. It is emphasized that 

the UNSCR does not task either the detention of or 

search of such persons indicted for war crimes [by 

the Tribunal]. IFOR should detain indicted 

persons, but only if they come into contact with 

such individuals in the execution of assigned tasks 

and the situation permits detention.316 

Initial TFE guidance echoed this position. Essentially, TFE 

personnel were authorized to detain indicted war criminals (but only 

those indicted by the Tribunal) and would do so only in accord with an 

ROE matrix which provided authority levels for such detention. While 

authority for detention was unrestricted, the policy dictated that 

mM . emora~dum, Staff Judge Advocate, Task Force Eagle, to Commander, Task Force Eagle, 

subject: Indicted War Criminals (no date). \l) 316 

Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Rules of Engagement, Fragmentary Orders 5 and 6. cri In reality, 

S~?R forces were proactive in securing some PIFWCS, such as the former Chief ofPolice in 

PnJedor. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 123 

"reasonable efforts should be made to coordinate with TFE Main prior 

to detention."317 

Other guidance included the use of "common sense and prudent 

judgment when assessing the appropriateness of detaining an IWC 

[indicted war criminal]," and the proviso that PIFWCs would be 

detained only when encountered by TFE personnel in the "regular 

course of duty." Only minimal force could be applied to affect a 

detention or prevent escape. Deadly force was authorized only ifthe 

PIFWC committed a "life threatening hostile act or demonstrate[ d] life 

threatening hostile intent."318 

Further provisions were made for interrogation, rights warnings, 

reporting to TFE and higher headquarters after detention, and 

coordination with the Joint Military Commission. Judge advocates 

should direct legal determinations of appropriate support to the 

International Tribunal, the policy advised, to SHAPE HQ via HQ IFOR 

Legal.319 

ARRC SOP 285 provided further guidance when it was revised 

on May 13, 1996. These revisions to the ARRC SOP provided 

additional details on reporting, restraint, detention, and transfer of 

PIFWCs. While TFE soldiers were still authorized to detain PIFWCs 

and directed to do so when they encountered them in the execution of 

assigned duties, the level of force allowed in doing so was restricted: 

"use of deadly force is not authorized to prevent the escape of a 

detained war criminal. Use minimal force to recapture, and deadly 

force is only authorized in self-defense."320 

317 Infonnation Paper, Staff Judge Advocate, Task Force Eagle, subject: Policy Guidance on 

Detention ofWar Criminals (6 Feb. 1996). cri 31s Id. 

319 Id. 

320 Headquarters, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, Standing Operating Procedures 285(13 May 1996), 

as reflected in Infonnation Paper, Staff Judge Advocate, Task Force Eagle, subject: Policy Guidance 

on Detention of War Criminals ( 19 May 1996). cri 
124 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

This seemingly incremental shift in the use of force, the greatly 

exacerbated procedures after detention, and the requirement that "the 

t d"321 

detention of · · 1 b 11 coord' indicted war cnmma s must e we ma e 

created a policy and procedure that turned into a public relations 

nightmare. While much of the world community b~lieved all al?n? 

that all coalition forces should make the apprehension ofwar cnmmals 

a priority, U.S. military leaders asserted, for justified and very 

principled reasons, that we could not do so. While this policy was 

questioned, it did not create a furor. The seeming shift in policy, 

evidenced by the new ARRC SOP and its beefed-up reporting 

requirements before detention, however, did cause a furor. 

Whether justified or not, the world community now perceived 

our policy to detain only "in the course of assigned duties," combined 

with greater restrictions on the use of force, and the increased reporting 

requirements, to constitute a "look the other way" approach. This view 

may have been justified. Several judge advocates related 

conversations with personnel conducting missions at guard posts who, 

after recognizing PIFWCs, advised those PIFWCs to stand fast while 

the soldiers advised headquarters of a possible detention. The effect, 

intended or otherwise, was to provide the PIFWC the opportunity to 

leave the area with the soldier unable to use any other than minimal 

force to apprehend if he or she even bothered to attempt to do so. 

Despite these criticisms, the basic policy (Rules of Engagement) 

with respect to apprehension ofPIFWCs did not change during IFOR. 

IFOR issued subsequent guidance regarding the Tribunal but changes 

related mostly to logistical support which TFE personnel could provide 

to the Tribunal and its personnel. A July 15 1996 information paper 322 ' ' ' for example, provided guidance relating to TFE support to 

International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 

321 I fi . p n ~rmation aper, Staff Judge Advocate, Task Force Eagle, subject: Policy Guidance on 


Detention of War Criminals, para. c ( 19 May 1996). ~ 

322 Inti . p
 o~tion . a~r, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Task Force Eagle, subject: Supporting 

International Crurunal Tribunal for the Fonner Yugoslavia (I 5 Jul. 1996). ~ 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 125 

investigative teams such as life support, emergency assistance, 

helicopter reconnaissance, and security considerations. The paper also 

delineated types ofsupport not allowed, including guards, direct 

escorts, investigation of graves, and witness protection. 

The Joint Military Commission provided the last piece of formal 

command guidance to IFOR TFE personnel in October 1996.323 

Again, while !FOR remained authorized to detain PIFWCs by the 

Tribunal, they could not conduct manhunts, and no changes were made 

to the ROE applicable to detention. 

4. Judge Advocates will be actively involved in the capture and 

handling ofpersons indicted for war crimes (PJFWCs). 

Opinions varied by nation as to what should be SFOR's role in 

handling Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs). The NORDPOL 

Brigade viewed hunting down PIFWCs as an obligation. The United 

States viewed PIFWC apprehension as outside the scope ofour 

mission. NATO's position, the controlling view, has been to detain war 

criminals in the execution of assigned tasks if the tactical situation 

permits. It is as ambiguous or flexible a statement as the U.S. makes it. 

Prior to the summer of 1997, neither IFOR nor SFOR made any effort 

to go hunting for them. In fact they went out of our way to avoid them. 

On one occasion, when IFOR forces knew that a war criminal was in a 

building that they were going in, they waited a half an hour to go in the 

building-until they knew he had left. 

Since then SFOR troops have been involved in several detention 

operations, resulting in many PIFWCs captured and one killed. Judge 

advocates have written the contingency plan for what happens when 

SFOR detains a PIFWIC. After detention, a judge advocate 

accompanies the detainee to the tribunal and ensures proper transfer of 

TASK FORCE EAGLE, JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION, POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND COMMAND 

GUIDANCE HANDBOOK (3d ed. 20 Oct. 1996). ~ 

323 
126 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

custody to the tribunal. Each PIFWC going to the Ha~ue was 

accompanied by a judge advocate. They serve SFOR interests by 

protecting against possible allegations of wrongdoing. 

On July 1 O, British SAS commandos seized two indicted Serb 

war criminals at the northern Bosnian town ofPrijedor (one of who 

pulled a pistol, fired on the British, and was killed). The legal advisor 

was closely involved in the planning and implementation of this 

operation. Pursuant to that plan, two U.S. judge advocates 

helicoptered north to the U.S. base at Tuzla to meet with the surviving 

PIFWC to supervise the reading ofhis rights and the indictment, take 

witness statements from the SFOR troops, and tum him over to the 

ICTY representatives for immediate flight to the Court at The Hague, 

Netherlands. This incident precipitated a series of Serb small arms and 

grenade attacks on several isolated SFOR outposts (mostly Civil 

Affairs and Intelligence detachments). While SFOR personnel 

suffered some casualties, no one died. 

Two weeks later a Croat appeared at a Dutch outpost in the 

central Bosnian town of Vitez at about midnight, saying he had 

committed war crimes and thought he might be on the non-public list 

ofPIFWC. The Dutch checked with their higher headquarters, the 

British Sector HQ (Multinational Division Northwest at Banja Luka), 

but were told the man was not on any list. The next morning the judge 

advocates went to the Sarajevo ICTY office to brief them on the 

incident. After checking with The Hague, they discovered that the man 

had indeed been indicted and by an oversight did not appear on the 

lists provided to SFOR or the ICTY office in Sarajevo. As the man 

indicated he would return, and the Dutch had retained some documents 

he had brought, an ICTY investigator and the judge advocates went to 

the Dutch outpost and stayed for four days, until the Dutch dismantled 

and closed it. Unfortunately the PIFWC never showed up. The Dutch 

and SFOR were criticized in the press for "letting a war criminal get 

away," but all had acted in accordance with law and agreements. 

Liaison with ICTY was improved after this and succeeded in getting a 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 127 

complete list of indictees at HQ SFOR in Sarajevo for immediate 

reference should such a situation reoccur. U.S. judge advocates were 

later involved in planning for a mass surrender of ten to twelve 

PFWICS from the Vitez area in early October, but at the last minute 

they decided to transport themselves to Croatia (outside the SFOR area 

of operations for detention ofPIFWCs) and surrender to the authorities 

there before being flown to The Hague by ICTY personnel. 

I. JOINT, INTER-AGENCY AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION 

1. Use judge advocate technical chains to augment 

information flow. 

Command information normally flowed through the command 

group or G3 operations, to a unit's commander or S3, then to the 

various staff sections. Time delays and poor dissemination, however, 

caused a lag to judge advocates, who then lacked sufficient knowledge 

to advise the command. Judge advocates developed and fully 

exercised their technical chain of communication-talked to each 

other-up, down, and laterally. Judge advocates addressed operational 

law issues in information papers (with copies going to all judge 

advocates, multinational brigades and key staff officers), emails, and in 

a compiled format-the Joint Military Commission (JMC) Policies, 

Procedures and Command Guidance Handbook. 324 Commanders did 

not mind judge advocates using their technical chain to share 

information. They often appreciated receiving critical information 

through it more quickly than through command channels. In addition, 

some commanders felt more comfortable with their judge advocate's 

advice knowing their judge advocate had sought guidance from the 

next higher commander's judge advocate, beforehand.325 

3'4 ~ - See IAD-AAR, supra note 145, at 24-25. \...!! 

m See OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 108-110. (!) 
128 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

2. Judge advocates must include all unified components in 

their technical chain communications. 

Operations in Bosnia involved judge advocates from many 

nations and levels of command. Judge advocates in the U.S. division, 

MND-N, essentially had two technical chains of command. See 

Organizational Charts at Appendix D. SFOR was the theater force 

headquarters in Sarajevo, while United States Army Europe 

(USAREUR) was the administrative headquarters in Germany. MNDN judge advocates would report to SFOR first, and then coordinate 

with USAREUR where appropriate. 326 

The IFOR/SFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo, multinational 

divisions, and the supporting units had judge advocates from 

American, British, Russian, Norwegian and Swedish troop units, and 

from NATO joint and combined headquarters. Language and different 

approaches to legal issues were obstacles to bridging the technical gap 

among these judge advocates. Resolving coalition legal issues 

required translators and common approaches and solutions to legal 

issues. Task Force Eagle's StaffJudge Advocate bridged the gap by 

using translators, weekly meetings with Troop Contributing Nation 

judge advocates, and legal specialist "work exchanges."327 Task Force 

Eagle also chose a judge advocate as the liaison officer to the 3rd UK 

Armored Division for a period.328 . 

326 S I . ee nterv1ew ofLTC Salata and MAJ Jacobson, supra note 164. ~ 

321 l 

AD-~ supra note 145, at 24-25. ~ These work exchanges included reciprocal visits 

between enlisted legal personnel from various troop contributing nations. 

328 lAD-AAR. supra note 145, at 59. ~ 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 129 

3. Prepare to provide or coordinate legal support to sister 

services.319 

. Army judge advocates provided legal assistance, foreign and 

personnel claims, administrative law, and criminal law support to the 

United States Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy as follows: 

• 	 Legal assistance to hundreds ofMarines that were part of an 

aerial observation unit 

• 	 Legal assistance to over 500 airmen at Tuzla Air Base 

• 	 Base operations (administrative law) to the Air Force in 

Tuzla, BiH and Taszar, Hungary (the Intermediate Staging 

Base) 

• 	 Legal support to two Marine Corps' (JAGMAN section 

0208) investigations of aircraft crashes. 

• 	 Processed foreign claims (e.g., for the Marines, damage to 

roads and fields) and personnel claims (e.g., for the Air 

Force, lost laundry) 

• 	 Criminal law jurisdiction issues. While UCMJ authority 

remained within service lines, Army judge advocates played 

a critical role in coordinating military justice for sister 

services. For example, a Navy servicemember was attached 

to a Naval unit in Italy, reattached to an Army unit in Bosnia, 

and loaned to a NATO unit in Sarajevo. In ·this example, 

Army judge advocates had to determine who could impose 

UCMJ punishment, track his orders, and find the appropriate 

Navy Personnel Service Support for answers. 

These efforts were in support of the sister service judge advocates that 

were in place. For example, an Air Force judge advocate from Aviano, 

Italy flew to Taszar, Hungary, monthly. 

329 E-mail message, 10/23/98 7:43am, from Mr. (Formerly Captain) Anthony F. Febbo, to MAJ John 

W. Miller, subject: Re: Hi (on file with CLAMO). 
130 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

4. The Internet created new judge advocate technical 


channels. 


Judge advocates repeatedly touted internet access to be an 

invaluable resource. Aside from the numerous website resources, 

judge advocates used the Internet to ask questions of subject matter 

experts in the JAG Corps located at The Judge Advocate General's 

330 

School, Charlottesville, Virginia, the Pentagon, and elsewhere. 

5. Develop sk1

"llsfi . . t" or inter-agency comm unica zon.331· 

Judge advocates at all levels had to communicate with both 

government and non-government agencies and organizations. For 

example, the Joint Military Commissions existed down to the battalion 

level and required judge advocates to communicate with Entity Armed 

Forces (Former Warring Faction) leaders, local officials, the 

International Police Task Force, local police, and more. Situation 

awareness, political savvy, communications skills, and patience were 

key to ~eaningful communications that furthered the mission. 

Consider one judge advocate major from the Office ofthe Legal 

Advisor at IFOR/SFOR headquarters in Sarajevo, for example. He 

liaisoned with the U.N. Mission, the U.N. Office of the High 

Representative, the Organization for Cooperation and Security in 

Europe (OCSE), the International Police Task Force headquarters, the 

Pope's staff for the papal visit, and local officials such as the President 

ofthe Constitutional Court ofBosnia and Herzegovina and the 

Minister ofJustice ofBiH. He represented SFOR in two cases before 

330 See Interviews with CPT Paul N. Brandau, Chief, Military Justice and Administrative Law, Eagle 

Main, at Tuzla (5 Feb. 1998) <l); Interview with MAJ Castlen, ofLTC Lyle W. Cayce, Regional 

Defe~e Counsel, ~egion VU, at Tuzla at Eagle Base, Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina (5 Feb. 1998) 

[heremafter Interview ofLTC Cayce] <l); MAJ Mieth, Legal Advisor's Office, SFOR, at Sarajevo 

(6-10 Feb. 1998) <l); CPT Dauenheimer, Squadron JA, at Camp McGovern (23 Feb. 1998) (J); 

and LTC Salata and MAJ Jacobson, supra note lAD. ~ 

331 Th" 1 is was a esson learned from Haiti. HAITI AAR, supra note 27, at 89-93. ~ 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS. 1995 -1998 131 

local courts, and drafted memorandums of agreement between SFOR 

and Bosnian entity-level civil aviation authorities for the reopening 

and use of airports.332 

Communications with the Entity Armed Forces (EAFs) was also 

critical to mission success. Judge advocates drafted many letters to 

EAFs to explain compliance requirements, raise noncompliance issues, 

and address complaints. Joint Commission Observers (JCOs) helped 

overcome the lack of commercial mail and phone systems by making 

face-to-face contact, using tactical satellite (TACSAT) 

communications and acting as couri~rs. Judge advocates personally 

conducted briefings to EAF members and attended Joint Military 

Commission, bilateral, and work coordination meetings with EAF 

members. Quick, accurate dissemination of guidance and response to 

questions made it easier and more desirable for EAFs to comply.333 

The Joint Military Commission (JMC) was the key method oftying the 

EAFs to IFOR and SFOR. 

J. 	INFORMATION 0PERATIONS334 

The multinational force recognized the need for the coordinated 

and synchronized use ofinformation activities to successfully 

implement the peace plan. Accordingly, IFOR/SFOR launched an 

information campaign. This campaign had three components: 

• 	 A Public Information campaign to bolster NATO's credibility 

with the media and to garner support from the troop 

contributing nations 

332 Memorandum by MAJ David C. Rodearmel, 153d LSO, SFOR Legal Advisor, subject: After 

Action Report (21Mar.1998). ~ 

333 See lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 46-47. ~ 334 See PASCALE COMBELLES SIEGEL, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL 

DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, TARGET BOSNIA: INTEGRATING INFORMATION ACTIVITIES IN PEACE 

OPERATIONS (Jan. 1998). This source provided the foundation for this section ofthe report. This is 

an outstanding reference which details all aspects ofinfonnation operations in Bosnia. 
132 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

• 	 A Psychological Operations campaign to influence local 

nationals and their leaders 

• 	 A Civil-Military Cooperation campaign to inform local 

nationals and their leaders 

Operations in Bosnia validated judge advocate participation in 

.c, • 335 d J . 336 d . information operations, as called 1or IQ Army an omt octnne. 

Coordination mechanisms for the information campaign existed at 

IFOR/SFOR headquarters, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) 

during !FOR, and at Task Force Eagle. Two key IFOR/SFOR 

information coordination mechanisms were the CJ3 (operations) 

information operations cell and the Combined Joint Information 

Campaign Task Force (CJICTF). The ARRC had several information 

coordination mechanisms which included a daily Information 

Coordination Group meeting. Task Force Eagle used an Information 

Coordination Group to plan its information operations. Judge 

advocates participated at each of these meetings. 

I. Be prepared to participate in information operations 

working groups. 337 

While the term information operations is a relatively new term 

with an evolving definition, judge advocates were key players in 

information operations meetings. During IFOR, the Commander, Task 

Force Eagle (COMEAGLE) stood up the Commander's Information 

Coordination Group. Every morning, COMEAGLE met with his 

"principal IO personnel and operations staffi338 (principal staff officers 

attended, not their representatives). They included the Chief of Staff, 

335 

See u.s. DEP'T OF ARMY' FIELD MANUAL 100-6, INFORMATION OPERATIONS Appendix D (Aug. 1996). 	 ' 

336s 


337 ee THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-13, INFORMATION OPERATIONS (9 Oct. 1998). 


See INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, LESSONS 


FROM Bo_SNIA: THE IFOR EXPERIENCE 219 (Larry Wentz ed., 1997); Telephone Interview with 


COL Christopher Maher, Staff Judge Advocate, Fort Polk, Louisiana (26 Oct. 1998). 


33& S I 


ee 	NSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, supra note 337, at 219. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 133 

G2, G3, GS, Staff Judge Advocate, Political Advisor, Psychological 

Operations Officer, Public Affairs Officer, and the Joint Information 

Bureau. 

The purpose of these information operations meetings was to 

determine how to best use information to further the peace process. 

These staff principals: 

• 	 Identified what information was circulating in the area of 

operations among the EAFs and local population (i.e., through 

JMCs, local radio interviews, international media events, etc.). 

• 	 Identified potential flashpoints in the peace process 

• 	· Developed information campaign strategies to address those 

flashpoints and further the p~ace process 

• 	 Deconflicted COMEAGLE's information campaign plan with 

that ofIFOR's Information Campaign Task Force 

2. Information operations (IO) require planning and broad 

expertise-use IO planning cells where appropriate. 

One example of what may be considered an information 

operation was SFOR's response to the Entity Armed Forces' use of 

media broadcasts that the international community perceived as an 

obstruction to the peace process. Before the 1997 elections, the Office 

of the High Representative (OHR) viewed EAF use ofstate-owned 

media (television and radio stations) as an attempt to undermine free 

and fair elections. The OHR asked the Supreme Allied Commander, 

Europe (SACEUR) to intervene. SACEUR then tasked SFOR to 

develop courses of action. The SFOR CJ3 information operations cell 

developed various courses of action. SFOR legal advisors participated 

in every one ofthese planning or decision meetings. At the same time, 

these legal advisors worked with SHAPE to develop the rules of 

engagement for the various courses of action. Complex issues 

regarding electronic jamming capabilities, possible collateral damage, 

and mission requirements demanded detailed coordination. 
134 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

K. CIVIL AFFAIRS 

1. Become involved early with civil affairs units. 

Like other recent deployments, civil affairs units, primarily 

hailing from the reserves, extensively supported operations. Because 

these units do not have a habitual relationship with the active 

component unit they find themselves supporting, the civil affairs units 

easily slip out of the main effort, and their effect as a combat multiplier 

· for the supported unit is lost.339 An additional difficulty is that their 

technical channels will generally include lawyers.340 As their actions 

are under the authority of the supported commander, however, the 

commander needs to be accustomed to checking out the missions with 

his own judge advocate. Judge advocates at all levels need to cultivate 

a relationship with their commander that will lead him to tum 

immediately to them when legal issues present themselves.341 

Soldiers in civil affairs units, by virtue of their mission, often 

believe. that they have both the duty and the authority to resolve claims 

based on the activities of U.S. forces. This caused frequent concerns 

because they sometimes made representations to local claimants that 

339 LTC George B. Thomson (Ret.), comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 40 ("they tend 

to become free agents, uncontrollable, out there in heart ofdarkness land operating on their own"). 

cr> 

340 In addition to the judge advocate positions within the civil affairs structure, many of the soldiers 

are attorneys-indeed, some are Department of the Army Civilian attorneys-in their full-time 

occupations. See COL Joseph A. Russelburg, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 42. 

cr> 

341 BG (now MG The Assistant Judge Advocate General) John D. Altenburg Jr., comments in OJEAAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 41. cr> The broader judge advocate community needs to work on 

establishing structural relationships with the civil affairs units. See COL David E. Graham, 

comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I, at 43. cr> These relationships are already established 

doctrinally. See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY FJELD MANUAL 27-100, LEGAL OPERATIONS, paras. 7-4, 8-14, 

and esp. ch. 11 (1991). Unfortunately, U.S. DEP'TOF ARMY FIELD MANUAL41-10, CIVIL AFFAIRS 

OPERATIONS (11 Jan. 1993) contains no overt requirement for civil affairs units to coordinate with 

the Staff Judge Advocate of units they serve with, even ifthe relationship is that of direct support. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 135 

were inconsistent with actual resolution of the matters by the claims 

service.342 

Early coordination with these units can make lemonade of this 

problem, however. As one claims officer noted, civil affairs personnel 

have vehicles, translators, and contacts in the local commtinity. With 

.training and coordination with the office of the staff judge advocate, 

they could function as unit claims officers, investigating and reporting 

on the relative merit of claims. In this way, they become a vital part of 

the process while simultaneously being educated in the importance of 

withholding comment to the claimant until after the claims commission 

has made its decision.343 

· 2. Build effective relations with governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 

Many international governmental and non-governmental 

organizations were critical components in the overall success of 

operations in Bosnia. In addition to elections support for the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (see 

paragraph 4., below), IFOR/SFOR assisted the International Criminal 

Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia with the excavation ofmass graves, 

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with 

refugee repatriation,344 and the International Police Task Force (IPTF) 

with the accomplishment ofits law enforcement mission. 

The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia 

(ICTY) had sole responsibility for investigation of war crimes. IFOR 

342 "The civil affairs people see it as part of their mission to go out and do the hearts and minds 

thing. and that includes taking care of meritorious claims .... [S]ome ofthem take this a little bit 

further than they should. They don't have the experience, they don't have the expertise, and quite 

frankly, most importantly of all, they don't have the money." MAJ Jody M. Prescott, comments in 

OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. II at 131. cri 

343 Id. 

344 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 28. <!) 
136 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

did provide support to these efforts such as dealing with mass grave 

sites. Soldiers were to report such sites if discovered. The ICTY could 

ask IFOR/SFOR to monitor them initially through observation points 

(OPs) or checkpoints ifthe ICTY suspected or discovered tampering of 

these sites. Although IFOR could not clear mines, provide 

transportation, or guard sites for the ICTY, they could provide a liaison 

team and life support at the nearest IFOR base camp. IFOR could also 

provide area military security to prevent military disruption of the 

I CTY by any party. 345 

In the area ofrefugee resettlement, the General Framework 

. Agreement for Peace called for freedom of refugees who had formerly 

lived in the Zone of Separation (ZOS) to return to their homes.346 The 

local police forces had the duty of ensuring that the only settlers in the 

ZOS were legitimate former residents. The GFAP, however, gave 

IFOR the authority to evict those who illegitimately attempted to settle 

there. Therefore, although U.S. forces were not required to conduct 

this law enforcement function, the GF AP empowered them to do so. 

This enabled judge advocates to advise, and commanders to decide, on 

particular actions based on unit and mission concems.347 

3. Establish ground rules for nation rebuilding. 

In the course of peace operations, numerous bits of technical 

assistance and advice will be given to civic officials of the host nation. 

Because much of the advice will center on legislative and judicial 

matters, units will rely upon their judge advocates for coordinating and 

providing such advice. In order to do so appropriately, judge 

advocates must stay in communication with the Political Advisor 

345 

TASK FORCE EAGLE, JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION, POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND COMMAND 


GUIDANCE HANDBOOK 25 (2d ed. 12 May 1996). <l) 


346GFAP, supra note 13, Annex 4, Art. II, Para. 5, and Annex 7. 

347 

See Memorandum by CPT Eric Jensen, subject: Interim Legal Opinion, Legal Authority to Evict 

Persons who Wrongfully Resettle in the ZOS (no date). <l) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINTHE BALKANS; 1995-1998 137 

(POLAD) to ensure that all contacts with officials-whether the 

national legislative body or the local bar-are consistent with broader 

U.S. policy.348 

4. Treat election support as an operation. 

Article IV of the GF AP announced that the "Parties welcome 

and endorse the elections program for Bosnia and Herzegovina."349 

Annex 3 to that agreement spelled out the program implementing those 

elections. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(OSCE) was the lead international organization for elections. The 

Provisional Election Commission (PEC) was directly responsible for 

the election rules and regulations. The Local Elections Conunission 

(LEC) was responsible for running the elections. IFOR/SFOR forces 

had the task of creating conditions for free elections. 

The OSCE, its Election Appeals Sub-Commission, the PEC and 

the LEC had the primary duties in running free elections. The 

IFOR/SFOR mission to create conditions allowing for free elections 

translated into U.S. forces providing security at elections sites and 

along routes to the polling stations and sites, and transportation to the 

polling stations. 350 This support required significant military police, 

civil affairs, and transportation support.351 There were many 

348 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 29. ~ Occasionally, U.S. forces, especially judge advocates, will 

assist the nation's civil institutions merely by accomplishing their usual missions. See, e.g., 

Memorandum for Record by CPT Thomas Gauza, subject: 20 May 1996 Hearing in Bosnian Court 

(no date)~ (discussing the author's appearance in a Bosnian court representing the U.S., which 

was the victim in the computer theft case being tried). 

349 GFAP, supra note 13, Art. IV (see Appendix. E(5) for text). 

350 See Interview ofLTC Vowell, supra note 146 ~.and Interview ofLTC Salata and MAJ 

Jacobson, supra note 164. ~ 

lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 27. ~This provision ofsupport, of course, also raised questions 

about the use of O&M funds in support of OSCE. For a determination that such funds were 

expendable because election support had become a military mission and were civil-military actions · 

rather than civil and humanitarian support, see Memorandum For The Judge Advocate, 

Headquarters, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, LTC Maher, Subject: Funding for 

OSCE Support, 18 Aug. 1996. cri But cf. Memorandum, CPT Matthew D. Ramsey, to ACofS G3, 

351 
138 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

elections-municipal elections in September 1997, the Serb national 

assembly in November 1997, and national elections. Task Force Eagle 

treated each election as a military operation. For example, Operation 

Plan Libra addressed the municipal elections. Before the support was 

rendered, the task force analyzed the mission and created an 

information paper and a slide briefing that outlined the duties and 

limitations that the soldiers had regarding the elections.352 A constant 

theme of those briefings was that soldiers had the right to prevent acts 

ofviolence around polling places, but that "local election commissions 

(LECs) [were] responsible for protecting the integnty ofthe election 

process."353 

Judge advocates were involved at every stage-reading, 

proofing, and preparing plans, orders, and annexes.

354 Two reserve 

judge advocates in particular became critical to the success of the 

mission. One was the liaison from IFOR to the OSCE; the other 

orchestrated the civil affairs support for the elections.355 All judge 

advocates by virtue oftheir training and expertise, should expect to 

play key roles in advising connnanders about elections during similar 

operatiems. 

356 

subject: Office ofthe Staff Judge Advocate Election After Action Review Comments ( 4 Oct. 1996) 

("On 6 Jul. 1996, HQ ARRC Phase IV Directive identified support to the OSCE as the Corps' main 

effort. Fiscal law questions inherent in this change in mission were never fully resolved.")~ 

352 Specifically, soldiers were obligated to use force to protect personnel with "special status"­

election monitors and the like. They were also permitted to use force to protect others, but only with 

the authorization of"the commander on the scene." See Information Paper, CPT Matthew D. 

Ramsey, subject: Election Guidance for TF Eagle Forces ( 17 Aug. 1996). (1) Although the 

restriction to commanding officers might potentially have led to inflexibility (such an order might 

prevent a commander from assigning a platoon to a mission alone, for example), it does seem to 

have prevented a recurrence ofthe Haiti scenario when U.S. forces who misunderstood the ROE 

stood by watching a civilian being beaten to death. See HAITI AAR, supra note 27, at 37-38. cr> 3S3 S ee Memorandum, CPT Matthew D. Ramsey, to ADC(M), TF Eagle, subject: OSCE Election 

Security Plan (9 Sep. 1996). ~ . 

354 Interview with MAJ Mieth, supra note 214. ~ 

m IAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 27. (1) 

356 Id. at 28. ~ . 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 139 

Free elections are no small task. Civilians and faction police 

falsified identifications and residency records, bused elderly and 

disoriented persons to the wrong polling stations, destroyed homes 

earmarked for occupancy by political minorities, and loitered in 

registration centers with weapons to intimidate voters. 357 One party 

official even made a public death threat to a specific OSCE 

representative.358 The Election Appeals Sub-Commission (EASC) of 

the OSCE took courageous steps in the face ofsuch danger to enforce 

free elections. Election Appeals Sub-Commission judges exercised 

their powers to strike members of offending parties offthe ballot, to 

totally prohibit a party from participating in an election, and to publish 

their stinging decisions in the local press and media.359 

L. RELATIONS WITH THE MEDIA 

1. Prepare for media interest in command decisions. 

As was true in other recent deployments, commanders and staff 

~fficers had to include media considerations in their planning 

processes. This was true at all levels of the operation. SFOR took 

press releases so seriously that the staff would drop all other activities 

to react.360 Media operations became part of the core business of the 

Joint Military Commissions (JMCs). A preparation team consistently 

assessed the public relations effects of proposed JMC decisions.361 

IFOR/SFOR planned and made press releases available immediately 

after key JMC meetings. This prevented attending parties from 

misstating or distorting the agenda and outcome of these meetings and 

won favor with the local populace. Judge advocates also integrated 

357 See numerous rulings by the Election Appeals Sub-Conunission (EASC) ofthe OSCE, e.g., Case 

Numbers ME-050, ME-065, ME-108, ME-126, ME-127. cri 

358 See Election Appeals Sub-Commission Case Number ME-073 A. cri 

359 The GF AP: supra note 13, Annex 3, laid the framework for the Election Appeals SubCommission (EASC). 

360 Interview with MAJ Mieth, supra note 214. cri 361 CALL-JMC, supra note 209. 
140 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

press concerns into their consideration of issues, ranging from local 

police and EAF checkpoints362 to LOGPAC labor agreements.

363 

2. Train soldiers in dealing with the media. 


The U.S. extensively trained all soldiers to deal with and react to 

members of the press. This preparation was fundamental to the success 

of operations. The public affairs-created Soldier's Guide contained a 

list of eight clear, concise bullets to aid in "meeting the media."364 The 

Joint Military Commission Handbook, one ofthe most useful 

documents produced in the series of Balkan operations to date and a 

362 lnfonnation Paper, CPT Mark Tellitocci, subject: Check Points by Local Military and Police 

Personnel (24 Jan.1996). ~ 

363 Memorandum, LTC Christopher M. Maher, to Commanding General, Task Force Eagle, subject: 

Brown and Root Employment Contract (no date).~ 

364 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. ARMY, EUROPE, A SOLDIER'S GUIDE TO BOSNIAHERZEGOVINA ( 1996) (COMMAND INFORMATION BOOKLET PUBLISHED UNDER AUTHORITY OF U.S. 

DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 360-81). ~ The eight points are: 

0 Know who you are talking to. Accredited media will be escorted by 

public affairs staff or have authorization to operate in the area. Think 

OPSEC. When in doubt, call the PAO. 

0 Listen to the question. Ifyou are unsure of a question, ask the 

reporter to repeat it or clarify it. Take time to think about your answer. 

0 Be honest. There is nothing wrong with saying "I don't know" or I 

can't tell you." However, never lie to a reporter. 

0 Stay within your responsibility or expertise. Just remember: if you 

command it, own it or did it, then talk about it. A void hypothetical 

questions. 

0 Do not discuss classified or sensitive information. If you're not sure if 

a topic is sensitive or classified, don't talk about it. 

0 Anything you say is on the record. Assume everything you say will 

appear in print or on the air. 

°Keep your answers brief and to the point. Broadcasters will edit your 

30 seconds of comments into a single 3- to 5-second sound bite. 

0 Relax and be yourself. Reporters are interviewing you because of 

who you are you are; do not try to be anyone else. 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 141 

model for future operations, contained a similar section on dealing 

with the media. 

Finally, pre-deployment training included media training. Media 

training was the only category of training that USAREUR specifically 

required twice-it was taught at both the CO NUS Replacement Center 

(CRC) and at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), 

Hohenfels, Germany.365 Soldiers underwent three to five days of 

individual readiness training, which included STX (Situational 

Training Exercise) lanes on media. The resulting proficiency among 

the soldiers was a consistent source of praise for the deployment.366 

M. FISCAL LAW 

Again and again, especially in operations other 

than war, everyone wants to drink from the . l l . . lfi . 367 Amerzcan uxury ogzstzca ountazn. 

Fiscal and procurement law issues rear their ugly head any time 

support is proposed for our civilians, local civilians in the area of 

operations, other nations' forces, non-governmental organizations, and 

even ourselves. · 

1. Develop, take, and have access to persons with fiscal and 

contract law expertise. 

Fiscal restraints travel with the money. 

368 

365 Memorandum, CPT Keith J. Parker, subject: Observations on what is taught at the CONUS 

Replacement Center (CRC), Fort Benning (20 Jan. 1998). ~ 

366 LTC George B. Thomson, connnents in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I. at 40. ~ 

367 MAJ Kurt Mieth, Interview with, supra note 214. ~ 

368 Interview with MAJ Paul D. Hancq, Deputy Chief, Contract Law Division, Office of the Staff 

Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Europe, at Heidelberg, Germany (9 Mar. 1998) [hereinafter Interview 

ofMAJ Hancq]. ~ 
142 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

One of the biggest lessons learned of the Balkan Operations is 

the heightened need for procurement and fiscal law expertise in a 

peace operation.369 Fiscal and procurement issues were the most 

pervasive and time consuming of sustainment issues, and perhaps of all 

three categories oflegal support to military operations (command and 

control, sustainment, and personnel service support). Some judge 

advocates estimated that they spent 75% to 90% of their time on 

. procurement and fiscal issues. 370 Many sources of funds exist in 

today's operations-Operations & Maintenance (O&M), Mobility 

Enhancement Fund, OMA, Humanitarian Assistance, and CINC 

initiative funds, for example. Finding the right funding source, 

determining that funding should come from other than U.S. dollars 

only, or justsaying no is a constant and challenging task. Contracting 

issues were as varied as the parties with whom our forces had to deallocal civilians, contractor-hired locals, other troop contributing 

nations, the United Nations, and more. The issues started from day one 

in theater with !FOR forces using CONEX shelters, vehicles, and other 

equipment that belonged to the United Nations Protection Forces.371 

It is axiomatic that the obligation and expenditure of 


appropriated funds are subject to stringent purpose, time, and amount 


controls.372 In the freewheeling world of a peace operation, the 


369 See, e.g., Interview ofLTC Vowell, supra note 146 ~.and Interview ofCPT Paul N. Brandau, 

Chief ofMilitary Justice and Administrative Law, 1st Armored Division (Fwd), at Tuzla (5 Feb. 

1998) ~ 

370 See, e.g., Interview ofMAJ Kurt A. Mieth, supra note 214, and Interview ofLTC Salata, supra 

note 164. (l) 

371 A problem arose when a Brigade S4 signed a Temporary Possession Document for U.N. 

CONEXES. The CONEXES were "relocatable buildings" governed by U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 

420-18, which provides their purchase, regardless ofprice, must be approved by the Assistant 

Secretary ofthe Army, Installations, Logistics and Environment (ASA(l,L&E)). AR 420-18, para. 

5-3c(4). Then there was the color-of-money issue-which funds could be used to acquire the 

CONEXES. See, e.g., Memorandum, L TC Harry L. Dorsey, to Judge Advocate, USAREUR (Fwd), 

subject: Purchase ofCONEX Containers from the U.N. (21Mar.1996) ~.and Memorandum, MAJ 

Paul D. Hancq, to Office ofthe StaffJudge Advocate, V Corps, subject: Temporary Possession 

Document (19 Dec. 1995). ~ 

372 10 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1341, and 1502(a), addressing purpose, amount, and time, respectively. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 143 

purpose requirement becomes a dangerous trap for well-intentioned 

commanders and staffs. During Joint Endeavor, three limitations in 

particular proved troubling for U.S. forces: morale programs, civilhumanitarian affairs, and the special rules regarding construction. In 

addition, the experiences ofthe LOGCAP contract and its contracted 

employees, as well as the tensions that arose from the cross-servicing 

agreements and other aspects ofmulti-national operations provided 

great opportunities for judge advocate excellence. 

2. Centrally manage logistics support. 

Logistics support in the Balkan operations was multiple source: 


it came from Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) contracts, the 


Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), acquisition and 


cross-servicing agreements, leases, host nation support, and more. 


Demands on these various sources were as diverse as the people 


making theni-units and commands at all levels, other troop 


contributing nations, and civilians. From the beginning of any similar 


.operation, U.S. commanders must consider standing up a joint 


acquisition board to minimize confusion and duplication of effort and 


allow economies of scale.373 The committee should include the varied 


organizations and activities involved in the process of acquiring 


logistics. This committee should receive, manage, and coordinate all 


requests for logistics support. 


The use ofmultidisciplinary boards to deal with acquisition 


issues is a success story from Bosnia. Below is a useful example for 


planning future operations (the particular operation will dictate the 


appropriate number and level of committees).· This is how one 


command used acquisition boards in Bosnia:374 


373 See Interview ofMAJ Hancq, supra note 368. ~ See also, Operation Joint Endeavor 

Observation Forni, Task Title: Provide Supplies and Services for Theater Forces, Observation 

Number 4, Task/Air Number: ST 4.3.2 (15 Apr. 1996). ~ 

374 See Interview ofCPT Brandau: supra note 369; Telephone Interview with CPT Paul Brandau, 

Trial Defense Service, Fort Gordon, Georgia (26 Oct. 1998); and Telephone Interview with LTC 
144 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

• 	 Base camp commanders forwarded requests for logistics 

support through S4/G4 channels to the Base Camp 

Commissioning Authority (BCCA). The BCCA was located 

at Eagle Base in Tuzla. 

• 	 The BCCA could act on requests for support up to $2,500, 

inclusive. 

• 	 The Commander, Task Force Eagle, delegated to the Chief of 

Staff (CofS) the authority to act on requests for new 

construction or modifications (LOGCAP) between $2,501 

and $25,000. The Commander, TFE could act on all nonLOGCAP requirements that did not exceed the Base 

Operations budget. The Chief of Staff could act or send the 

request to the Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB). In 

most cases, the CofS sent the request to the JARB. 

• 	 The JARB would make recommendations through the BCCA 

to the CofS for action. The JARB included: 

• 	 Five voting members. The chief of the JARB (LTC), a 

logistics representative (L TC), a comptroller (CPT), a 

contracting representative (MAJ), and an engineer (MAJ). 

• 	 Two permanent non-voting members. The legal advisor 

(usually a CPT or MAJ) and a recorder. 

• 	 Various interested parties all without vote. For example, 

the requesting base camp or organization (e.g., G2, CA, 

etc.), safety team, and a Brown & Root representative 

• 	 USAREUR handled LOGCAP requests in excess of $25,000 

(now up to $50,000) and those non-LOGCAP requests that 

exceeded the Base Operations budget. 

Karl Goetzke, Professor and Chair, Administrative & Civil Law Department, The Judge Advocate 

General's School (26 Oct. 1998). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 145 

3. Carefully watch spending, Scenario One: The R & R 

program. 

To maintain the morale ofJoint Endeavor soldiers high despite 

demanding work under difficult conditions, the command wished to 

establish a program based upon the DoD Directive authorizing Rest 

and Recuperation programs (R & R). Commanders initially intended 

to fly soldiers to recreation centers in Germany, paying for their food 

and lodging from appropriated funds. The same funds would pay for 

buses to take them back to their home stations, and pay for hotel rooms 

there if they had previously given up assigned quarters.375 

The difficulty with this particular good intention is that the DoD 

Directive requires soldiers in the R & R program to be in a leave status 

once they arrive at the R & R site.376 Judge advocates had to inform 

the command that soldiers in a leave status accumulate only personal 

expenses, which cannot be paid for from appropriated funds. 377 The 

cost in congeniality among the staff for such advice was high.378 

4. Carefully watch spending, Scenario Two: Winning hearts 

and minds. 

A second fiscal difficulty arises in peace operations because of 

the unusual intertwining ofmission-directed spending (including 

protection ofthe force issues) and humanitarian assistance (HCA) that 

375 MAJ Paul D. Hancq, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 213. <J) 

376 "Transportation to and from R & R areas shall be provided ori a space-required basis, and travel 

time shall not be charged to the service member's leave account. However, the actual period in the 

R & R area shall be charged to the service member's leave account." U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 

1327.5, LEAVE AND LIBERTY para. 17.b.(1)(24 Sep. 1985). 

377 MAJ Paul D. Hancq, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 213. <J) See also 

Memorandums, LTC Harry L. Dorsey, Office ofthe Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Europe, to 

ODCSPER, subject: Rest and Recuperation (R & R) Issues (7 and 13 Mar. 1996). <J) 

37~ MAJ Paul D. Hancq, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 214 (noting that the 

"working group looked at me like I was some sort of enemy alien"). <J) 
146 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

can be provided only subject to its own statutory authority.379 Units 

initially arriving in the devastated area of operations were quickly 

confronted with civic requests to construct or rebuild everything from 

sewage pumps to garbage dumps. The judge advocates proactively 

advised commanders that most such projects were not permissible 

subjects for O & M funds.380 Some representative issues that arose are 

discussed below. 

Judge advocates must always consider the mission when 

analyzing what funds are available for an issue. IFOR/SFOR was not 

on a Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) mission. Thus 

movement of and support to displaced persons and refugees (DPREs) 

was a mission for UNCHR and non-governmental organizations. 

IFOR/SFOR was "merely" to provide a secure and safe environment 

C'. h . . . 381 1or sue organ1zat10ns to operate m. 

Roads and bridges provided fertile ground for judge advocates to 

tighten the fiscal reigns. One commander wanted to pursue what 

seemed like a great idea-cost-sharing the expense ofrepairing 380 

kilometers ofMSR road with Hungary. Proble~id the U.S. have 

an operational need for the work? Ifnot, we could not contribute. If 

so, we had to pay for it all, or risk violating the miscellaneous receipts 

379 See 10 U.S.C. § 40l(a) and U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 2205.2, HUMANITARIAN AND CTVIC 

ASSISTANCE (HCA) PROVIDED IN CONJUNCTION WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS (6 Oct. 1994). Other 

than De Minimis activities, HCA activities require approval ofthe Secretary of State. HCA 

activities must promote the security interests ofboth the United States and the assisted country, the 

operational readiness skills ofthe participating armed forces, and the foreign policy interests of the 

United States. There are other limits, also, such as the HCA may not be given directly or indirectly 

to any individual, group or organization engaged in military or paramilitary activities. 

IAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 52. (1) For a concise summary ofthe law in this area, see Fiscal 

Law and Logistics Support in a Coalition Environment (paper presented at the USAREUR Judge 

Advocate Management CLE 1995). (1) 

381 See, e.g., Information Paper, CPT Ralph J. Tremaglio, III, Office ofthe StaffJudge Advocate, 

subject: Support for Returnees and Displaced Persons (1 Jan. 1997) (which concluded, for example, 

support was limited to emergency medical treatment to save life or limb and to distributing NGO 

medical supplies as "true volunteers," not pursuant to any official tasking). cr> 

380 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 147 

statute or receiving prohibited augmentation of appropriations.382 

Another short-lived proposal was to "donate" some ofour bridges by 

leaving them in place at the operation's end.383 Finally, judge 

advocates had to consider whether civilians could use our bridges.384 

Support to the elections was a sticky issue. Under terms of the 

GF AP, IFORJSFOR forces were to promote conditions for free 

elections. U.S. forces were tasked to provide security at polling 

stations and along routes to and from the polling station, and even to 

provide transportation. Unique issues arose, such as the purchase of 

donuts and coffee for the locals as a successful improvised force 

protection measure: Operation "Dobro Donut."385 

Other taskings were even further from the general mission, for 

example transporting polio vaccine for host national civilians. As in 

all settings, judge advocates had to analyze the situation and advise the 

command of courses of action that would accomplish the mission 

effectively without violating law or regulation.386 

382 A detailed analysis of this issue was done by MAJ Paul D. Hancq, Deputy Chief, Contract Law 

Division, OJA, USAREUR. ~ 

383 In MND-N alone, there were at least 20 A VLB bridges, 4 Bailey bridges, 9 ARRC bridges, and 2 

float bridges. Besides the funding restrictions, there was also a directive by CINCUSAREUR 

requiring recovery of all U.S. bridging assets at the operation's conclusion, whenever that may be. 

384 This was the subject of some email traffic between MAJ Paul D. Hancq, Deputy Chief, Contract 

Law Division, OJA, USAREUR, and others. ~ 

385 See Memorandum for Resource Management, subject: Operation Iron Donut (6 Oct. 1996) ~: 

During national elections, elements of2BCT conducted operation 

'Dobro Donut' at the bus transload points in their area ofresponsibility. 

At these points, civilians were offioaded from their buses and searched. 

Besides being time consuming, the process was invasive. Donuts and 

coffee were provided to give the civilians something to do while being 

searched, and to quell their hostilities toward both the searching and TF 

Eagle soldiers involved in the process. The lack of violence at these 

'feed and search' points speaks for the overwhelming success ofthis 

tactic. 

386 That fiscal law lends itself to fact-specific determinations and individual exercises ofjudgment is 

demonstrated by the fact that a collection ofjudge advocates at the after-action review could not 

agree as to whether the NATO order directing the movement ofpolio vaccines could be 
148 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

5. Carefully watch spending, Scenario Three: Construction. 

As might be expected, the largest deluge of questions regarding 

fiscal law came from the construction area. Confusion often arose as 

to the distinctions between repair, maintenance, and construction 

especially when it came to work on existing roads and bridges. 

Engineers are useful in helping to make that determination.387 The 

obvious impact ofsuch a determination is what funds are available to 

support the project. 

Many of the problems arose when commanders and staff officers 

sought to use Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding for 

construction projects in the million-dollar range. When judge 

advocates reminded commanders and staff of the legal limits on their 

authority to spend funds for construction, they sometimes responded 

by stressing the need for the construction to accomplish their "title 10 

responsibility."388 It probably added to the confusion that during the 

course of the deployment the statutory ceiling for O&M use for 

construction was raised from $300,000 to $500,000.389 In an 

oversimplified view, this changed the three-tier "structure" of 

construction spending to O&M appropriations for $500,000 and less, 

Minor Military Construction, Army, for $500,001-$1.5 million, and 

specific approval through the Specified Military Construction Program 

(MILCON appropriations) for amounts over $1.5 million. 

accomplished without violating U.S. fiscal law. See the discussion at OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. 

I at 231-235. (10 U.S.C. § 2551 was cited as authority to fund transport ofHumanitarian 

Assistance Program-Excess Property (HAP-EP) medical equipment purchased by the State 

Department with Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funding). 

387 See the ternlS section ofU.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 420-10, MANAGEMENT OF INSTALLATION 

DIRECTORATES OF ENGINEERING AND HOUSING (2 Jul. 1987), and Memorandum, the Comptroller, 

Office of the Secretary ofDefense, subject ofDefinition for Repair and Maintenance (2 Jul. 1997). 

See also U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 420-72, SURFACED AREAS, BRIDGES, RAILROAD TRACK AND 

AsSOCIATED APPURTENANCES (21 Mar. 1991) (also helpful in discerning maintenance and repair 

from construction in these specialized areas). 

388 MAJ Paul D. Hancq, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I, at 215. ~ 

389 See 10 U.S.C. § 2805(c). The change was accomplished by Public Law 104-201 (1996). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 149 

One possible source of confusion was the citation in the 1995 

Operational Law Handbook to a practice note regarding possible 

expansion ofpermissible uses of 0 & M funds during "operational 

settings. "

390 More recent versions of the handbook remark-in 

successive footnotes-that this possible expansion is limited to 

"combat operations," and that it is, after all, "based on policy, not law 

or regulation."39 1. Judge advocates must stay aware of current law and 

use technical channels in complex fiscal issues. There is no 

operational exception to fiscal law in the construction area.

392 

6. Judge advocates should gain familiarity with the LOGCAP 

Contract. 

The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract 

is designed to be a force multiplier by providing logistical support for 

the deployed force. 393 Although it is generally perceived to work well, 

there remain some difficulties with performance under it to which 

judge advocates should be attentive. 

The primary (initial) problem was disunity of command. 

Without a centralized process for requesting logistics support, U.S. 

390 OP. LAW HANDBOOK. supra note 194, at 12-4. 

391 OP. LAW HANDBOOK. supra note 194 at nn. 2, 3, Chap. 12 

392 MAJ Paul D. Hancq, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 216. ~ There is, 

however, a separate-and underused-authorization for contingency construction for unforeseen 

military facilities requirements. Because this authorization had only funded two projects between 

1992 and 1996, Congress reduced the budget from the requested nine and one-half million dollars to 

five million dollars. To use these funds requires an authorization by the Secretary of Defense and a 

twenty-one day waiting period following notification to Congress, but it is an option in contingency 

situations. See 10 U.S.C. § 2804. 

393 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 52. SEE U.S. DEP'TOF ARMY, REG. 700-137, LOGISTICS, CIVIL 

AUGMENTATION PROGRAM (LOGCAP) (16 Dec. 1985). The Corps ofEngineers administers the 

contract. However, as one experienced judge advocate noted, units using the services provided by 

LOGCAP will want legal advice concerning the contract from their own contract attorney. 

Therefore, the deploying contract attorney should immediately get a copy of the LOGCAP contract, 

as well as the telephone number for the point of contact for administration. MAJ Susan Tigner, 

comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 236. ~ 
150 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

units yanked contractors from job to job. Besides being inefficient for 

work already contracted for, this added costs for those jobs that were 

not originally estimated for. The accessibility of the contractor meant 

that costs increased and productivity diminished because the contractor 

was frequently pulled from Project A and sent to Project B, which 

sometimes was unauthorized (a sort of "mission creep"). With no 

central authority to prioritize requests for logistics support, various 

commanders and senior officers in theater imposed their individual and 

sometimes conflicting priorities on Brown and Root.394 

To administer the contract efficiently (to avoid unauthorized 

commitments), communication links were establish~d between the 

headquarters and the contractor, and units were told to seek LOGCAP 

support through the headquarters rather than going directly to the 

contractor. To enforce this from the contractor side, the unit made 

clear that it would not reimburse unauthorized work-that done at the 

request ofsomeone other than the designated point of contact.395 See 

Lesson Learned M.2. above for details. 

Other problems with the LOGCAP contract included inadequate 

management-Brown and Root did not have enough managers on the 

ground-and employees not willing to work holiday seasons despite 

offerings of more pay (this was much less of a problem after the 

onslaught of requirements the first year).396 

394 Memorandum, Contract Law Division, Office ofthe Judge Advocate, U.S. Anny Europe, subject: 

Lessons Learned ( 17 Jan. 1996). See also Memorandum, MAJ Paul D. Hancq, for Chief, 

International Law and operations Division, subject: Problems with LOGCAP Contract (6 Jan. 1996). 

~ 

395 See MAJ Susan Tigner, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 237 ("That really got 

their attention"). ~ 

396 See Memorandum, MAJ Paul D. Hancq, for Chief, International Law and Operations Division, 

subject: Problems with LOGCAP Contract (6 Jan. 1996). ~ 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 151 

7. Resolve the status ofcivilian contractors. 


Increased reliance on the support of contractor personnel, largely 

through the LOGCAP, necessitated an emphasis on the status of such 

personnel when negotiating the international agreements supporting 

the deployment. During Operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard, 

issues regarding contractor employees arose both in the former 

Yugoslav Republics and in Hungary, and they involved questions of 

entry and customs, registration as foreign corporations, and taxation.397 

The resolution of these problems differed in the various parts of 

the theater. In Bosnia, U.S. forces argued that the LOGCAP contractor 

personnel were a "constituent element" of NATO forces, and had full 

exemption under the SOFA from any host national law.398 In Hungary, 

on the other hand, the demand for contractor compliance with host 

nation law was strong enough to cause the creation of a legal advisor 

position to the USAREUR liaison team.399 In response to Hungarian 

income tax claims, the contractor held five million dollars in escrow 

a,gainst asserted income tax liability. Ultimately, the Hungarian 

government refunded the money as a part of the Omnibus 

Agreement.400 

397 Memorandwn, Contract Law Division, Office of the Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Europe, subject: 

Lessons Learned (17 Jan. 1996). (!) 

398 LTC Christopher Maher, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I, at 63. (!) This, of 

course, created a situation in which such personnel were subject to no criminal jurisdiction 

whatsoever. See Reid v. Covert, 3S4 U.S. 1 (1957) and United States ex. rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 

U.S. 11 (1955). See discussion, OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I, at 64-65 (The decision was made 

to treat the contractors in this fashion because of concern with the implications for U.S. forces if 

those personnel were subject to the tax and registration schemes of a former communist country). 

But, cf Mr. George Bahamonde, Legal Comment, Office of the Judge Advocate, U.S. Army 

Europe, Subject: Issue of Weapons to Civilian Personnel in Bosnia(!} ("DoD civilians deploying to 

Bosnia may be subject to Bosnian criminal prosecution for criminal acts committed outside their 

official capacity"). 

399 LTC Fred T. Pribble, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I, at 172. (!) 

400 Id. at 194. (!} 
152 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

The status of contractors with regard to U.S. forces must also be 

resolved early, preferably within the terms of the contract. Issues that 

must be addressed include criminal jurisdiction, weapons carry and 

use, taxation, customs, access to/use of military dining facilities, the 

. PX, shelter/housing, medical care, legal assistance, and flights. For 

example, contractors were not supposed to eat in dining facilities 

unless their contract specifically provided for such support. Dining 

facilities cracked down, requiring contractor personnel to show proof 

of eligibility to the chow line head counter.401 

8. Designate a single point ofcontactfor acquisition and 


cross-servicing agreements (A CSA). 


In a multinational setting, much ofthe logistical support is 

achieved through ACSAs. These agreements provide for reimbursable 

or reciprocal logistics support with other NATO nations, and other 

countries on coordination ofthe Secretaries ofDefense and State.402 

ACSA "orders" are distinct from Federal Acquisition Regulation 

(FAR) ~·contracts."403 (See Appendix L for a list ofACSAs) 

Unfortunately, neither contracting personnel nor most judge advocates 

had significant training in ACSAs when Operation Joint Endeavor 

began.404 Task Force Eagle addressed this problem by designating a 

single point of contact for cross-servicing agreements during the 

operation.405 

401 See Interview ofMAJ Hancq, supra note 368. ~ 

402 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2341 - 2350. 

403 10 U.S.C. Chapter 138, Subchapter I provides the statutory basis for ACSAs. See ALSO DEP'T OF 

DEFENSE, DIR. 2010.9, U.S. DEP'TOF ARMY, REG. 12-16, ED 60-8, and UR 12-16. Note, however, 

that references in these sources to compliance with commercial contracting procedures are 

superseded by legislative changes dating back to FY 1995. FAR, DFARS, and AFARS principles 

are guiding as "general principles ofprudent procurement practice" but not mandatory in ACSA 

orders. 

404 MAJ Susan Tigner, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 238. These agreements 

have subsequently become part ofthe curriculwn at Acquisition Law CLE's. Id. at 239. 

40

s LTC Maher, comments in OJE-AAR, ~upra note 30, Vol. I ~t 240. <l) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 153 

- Support to other nations' forces may only be given on a 

· reimbursable basis under recognized legal authority. An ACSA is one 

such legal authority. The lack of an ACSA can cause problems. For 

example, most all ofthe troop contributing nations working with the 

U.S. forces in MND-N had ACSAs with the United States. Russia, 

Romania and others did not. Thus, they were not supposed to use our 

dining facilities or receive any other support in kind. However, 

European Command-Supreme Allied Headquarters Europe (EUCOMSHAPE) used a "work around." They considered the EUCOM-SHAPE 

ACSA a basis for exchanging support with these nations as long as 

they would abide by the reimbursement terms ofthat ACSA and the 

EUCOM J4 and Legal Advisor approved. 

9. Expect tension between U.S. law and multinational 


operations. 


The ever-present tension between mission requirements and 


fiscal limitations is heightened in multinational operations. In Bosnia, 


U.S. forces were under the operational control of a multinational force 


headquarters (IFOR/SFOR). NATO sometimes assigned missions to 


U.S. forces that conflicted with U.S. fiscal constraints. Judge 


advocates must maintain a heightened awareness of possible conflicts 


between law and mission, and prepare to raise questions through 


technical channels regarding these limits.406 Other troop contributing 


nations face similar host nation legal constraints. 


An example ofthe intricacies faced was the coordination 


required to fix CINCUSAREUR's Suburban vehicles. Because 


CINCUSAREUR used the vehicles in his capacity as the NATO 


Commander ofLand Forces, Central Europe, U.S. Army repair ofhis 


vehicles would constitute support to NATO. Thus the 21st TAACOM 


could not simply "just do it." They had to provide NATO 


Headquarters (SHAPE) information on availability ofservices, price, 


406 COL Graham, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 234. cri 
154 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

and method ofrepayment. After that they had to wait for SHAPE to 

agree to the services and place an order requesting the logistical . . f h d . 407 support, t hereby comm1ttmg to payment o t e quote pnce. • 

Additionally, in a multinational setting, NATO will do much 

contracting and blanket ordering. Operations orders from EUCOM 

and.NATO stressed the use ofthe NATO Contract Coordination 

Center (KCC) Basic Purchase Agreements (BP As) and Basic Ordering 

Agreements (BOAs) to purchase common items. Nations providing 

forces would probably be better served by increasing NA TO funding 

and conducting more joint purchasing ofsupplies where their needs 

coincide.408 Unfortunately, no authority currently exists for a 

simplified transfer offunds to NATO for such purchasing. Therefore, 

U.S. forces could not use blanket purchase agreements negotiated by 

NATO's contracting office which prevent troop contributing nations 

from bidding against one another.409 The U.S. should consider 

amending the Federal Acquisition Regulation to allow the U.S. to order 

directly on NATO contracts when U.S. forces operate under NATO 

command.410 

N. CLAIMS 

The initial claims structure411 prescribed the Ministry ofInterior 

ofthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the primary intake office 

407 See Memorandum, COL Malcolm H. Squires, Jr., for Staff Judge Advocate, 2 lst T AA COM, 

subject: Vehicle Maintenance (no date). (!l 

408 Memorandum, Contract Law Division, Office ofthe Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Europe, subject: 

Lessons Learned ( 17 Jan. 1996). (!l 

409 MAJ Susan Tigner, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 240. (!l 

410 Joint Universal Lesson Learned, Task/Air Number: ST4.3.2, Task Title: Provide Supplies and 

Services for theater, Observation Number: 2a, Observer Name/phone: LTC Dorsey/370-6569 (22 

Apr. 96). See also Interview ofMAJ Hancq, supra note 168, Lessons Learned: Fiscal Support of 

Other Nations or groups and Acquisition Policy ( 15 Apr. 1996). ~ 

411 Established by Annex 17, Claims Annex to the Technical Agreement between the Republic of 

Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry ofJustice and the Implementation Force (23 Dec. 1995). 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 155 

for claims against !FOR contingents. The Ministry was to conduct the 

initial investigation and adjudication. This arrangement was short 

lived. In the Spring 1996, the !FOR Legal Advisor and the Ministry of 

Justice for the Federation ofBosnia-Herzegovina and the Ministry of 

Justice, Republika Srpska negotiated separate agreements. These 

claims protocols gave the troop contributing nations (TCNs) and the 

claimants primary responsibility for settling claims against them. The 

Claims Annex to the Technical Agreement between the Republic of 

Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry ofJustice and the Implementation 

Force, December 23, 1995, established a Claims Commission. The 

Claims Commission would settle issues only if disagreements arose 

and mediation failed between a TCN and the claimant. Thus, it 

became business as normal for the claims community.412 See 

Appendix N for a diagram ofthe Claims Structures. 

In a peace operation, where the combat exclusion does not 

usually apply, the Foreign Claims Act reigns predominant.413 A strong 

claims operation can foster goodwill and cooperation.414 It 

demonstrates a respect for the law and a desire to make redress for 

damages. It also fosters fruitful contacts with the local populace.415 

The. deployed environment in a unified operation creates unique claims 

challenges and issues. 

412 See Memorandum, the IFOR Claims Office, subject: The Legal Bases for the IFOR Claims 

Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (20 Jul. 1996) {for a detailed explanation of the authorities 

pertinent to claims). <J) See, e.g., Article 15 of the Dayton SOFA (23 Nov. 1995) and GFAP, supra 

note 13, Annex 1-A, Art. VI, para. 9 (see Appendix E(5) for text) . 

. 

413 Claims against the United States in a deployed environment are usually addressed pursuant to two 

authorities: Title IO U.S.C. § 2734 (The Foreign Claims Act) and Title IO § 2734a (The 

International Agreement Claims Act). 

414 An explicit purpose of the Foreign Claims Act. See Title 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a). 

41 5 Interview with LTC William F. Ridlon, Chief, SFOR Claims Operations (Feb. 1998). <J) 
156 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

1. Address the lack ofuniform liability standards. 

Troop contributing nations (TCNs) handled claims in a diverse 

manner because of the unified nature of the operation and the unique 

local laws. IFOR/SFOR headquarters stated they would only pay for 

damages arising from negligence on the part ofIFOR/SFOR personnel. 

The headquarters would not pay for non-negligent damage (e.g., 

maneuver damage). The United States, however, much to the chagrin 

of other TCNs, chose to pay maneuver damage and other claims 

allowable under the Foreign Claims Act. 

The United States also differs from some countries in who 

handles claims. Some nations use private insurance companies and 

civilian employees to handle claims against their armed forces. The 

U.S. method ofhandling claims within military channels was more 

responsive. This caused the U.S. to gain the reputation ofbeing the 

fastest with the "mostest." The result was a flood of claims 

submissions to the U.S. for damages done by other TCNs, for 

fraudulent and inflated claims, and disdain from the other nations who 

did not want to put their pocket book on the table.416 

Another problem was the lack ofsound host nation liability 

standards. The U.S. Anny generally looks to "the law and custom of 

the country where the accident occurred"417 for liability standards. The 

U.S. claims personnel could not turn to local law for liability standards 

in Bosnia. For example, Bosnia assigns strict liability on the owner of 

a vehicle for any accident, regardless ofwho was driving. This was an 

issue in accidents involving contractors driving military vehicles where 

the contract assigned liability to the contractor.418 Therefore, U.S. 

claims personnel referred to the general principles oftort liability 

416 See Id. 

417 U.S. DEP'TOFARMY. REG. 27-20, Cl.AIMS para. 10-8.a (31 Dec. 1997). 

418 See Interview ofLTC William F. Ridlon, Chief, SFOR Claims Operations (Feb. 1998). ~ 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALK.ANS, 1995 -1998 157 

outlined in paragraph 3-8 ofDepartment ofthe Army Regulation 27­

20, Claims. 

U.S. forces and IFOR/SFOR worked hard to ensure that the 

standards were uniform within their claims arenas. IFOR quickly 

issued a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) from their main office in 

Sarajevo. The SOP described how IFOR would handle claims that 

claimants submitted directly to IFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo. Task 

Force Eagle and the United States Army Claims Service, Europe, 

published general claims guides or SOPs and specific guides on 

handling real estate and timber claims. These were all "on the street" 

early in the operation and amended as needed. 

2. Use innovative methods to promote access to claimants. 

a. Combine claims convoys, site visits, and fu:ed office 

operationsfor Foreign Claims processing in a large area of 

responsibility. 

A part ofrunning a successful claims operation is to promote the 

claimants' access to the system. Normally, the Army takes in and pays 

out claims at a fixed location/office. However, in Bosnia the area of 

responsibility was large and the populace was scattered. Further, local 

nationals lacked transportation or refused to travel to U.S. locations 

because offear ofEntity Armed Force violence.419 Thus the "claims 

convoy" became a regular mode of claims service. 

The "claims convoy" involved a judge advocate, a Class A 

agent, a translator, and support personnel traveling together to intake, 

investigate, and pay claims. Often convoys would travel to remote 

sites and set up shop out ofthe back ofa HMMWV vehicle. Task 

Force Eagle expanded this concept to establish regularly scheduled 

419 Primarily these were Bosnian Serbs who were unwilling to enter Federation territory, lAD-AAR, 

supra note 145 at 58. ~ 
158 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

stops, or site visits. Word would spread among the locals, and they 

would appear at the stops on the scheduled days to take care of 

business. The disadvantage of the claims convoys was the security 

requirements. Travel within the theater required at least four vehicles, 

two personnel per vehicle, one M60 machine gun with gunner and 

assistant gunner, and a combat lifesaver.420 These requirements had the 

added undesirable effect of intimidating some residents, making them 

view us as an occupational force. 421 

Judge advocates were often convoy commanders. This required 

judge advocates, 71 Ds, and legal specialists to be well-versed in all 

aspects of convoy operations (e.g., ROE, safety, vehicle maintenance, 

driver licensing, land navigation, weapons proficiency, radio · 

procedures). See Appendix 0 for a claims convoy checklist and a 

sample convoy brief. 

b. Use Cfril Affairs to assist claims intake and 

investigation. 

\Yith proper coordination and training by judge advocate 

personnel, civil affairs provided invaluable claims support.422 They 

assisted in taking in and investigating claims. Civil affairs personnel 

regularly interacted with locals and thus provided claims personnel 

greater access to local nationals. For example, civil affairs personnel 

manned an office in d0\\1ltown Brcko once a week to intake claims. 

Their knowledge of where to go and who to see also helped 

investigations.423 

._.~ S.:e Interview ofCPT Chad T. Sa.~hio, Chief ofClaims., !Armored Division (Fwd). at Eagle 

B.l..'\e, Tuzla {-'Feb. 1998). (!) 

1 lnterview ofLTC WilliamF. Rid.lo~ Chief. SFOR Claims Operations (10 Feb. 1998). (!) 

4 

2.? Th~ key was making sure that they made no promises or representations, as discussed in the Civil 

Affairs s~tion surra.. 

Cl Sw lnterview ofand Memorandum by CPT Dauenhei.mer. supra note 178. ~ 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERA TIO NS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 159 


3. Prepare for difficulty with the combat exclusion in peace 

operations. 

The Foreign Claims Act provides for the settlement and payment 

of claims caused by or incident to noncombat activities ofU.S. armed 

forces.424 Unfortunately, this leaves a gap, as noted by one judge 

advocate: 

There is a gray area between combat and combat 

related activity, which of course is excluded, and 

then torts and noncombatant activity that we 

would ordinarily pay for, in a peacetime situation. 

We are down there with enough men, women, 

materiel, and of course in the positions to conduct 

a war if we had to. The only thing that's missing 

is the fighting. But that means that we have had to 

take measures for force protection and otherwise, 

that were we anyplace else it would be a combat 

425 

zone. 

Long-term occupancy ofreal property, including the fortification 

of such property, caused significant claims activity. Ultimately the 

NA TO countries that were among the troop contributing nations 

agreed that such claims should not be paid, based upon the language of 

the GFAP.426 For future operations, judge advocates must be aware of 

the fact that peace operati<:>ns will often call for commanders and 

soldiers to make decisions regarding the host nation comparable to 

what would be done in combat, but without the claims protection 

offered for combat activity. 

424 10 u.s.c. § 2734. 

425 MAJ Jody M. Prescott, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. II at 122. (1) 

426 LTC Fred T. Pribble, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. II at 123. (1) See GFAP, supra 

note 13, Annex IA, Art. VI, para. 9.(a) ("It [IFOR] shall have the right to bivouac, maneuver, billet, 

and utilize any areas or facilities to carry out its responsibilities as required for its support, training, 

and operations, with such advance notice as may be practicable.") 
160 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

4. Beprepared to pay claims that you might not ordinarily 

accept. 

Peace operations call for an increased attentiveness to the 

relationship between U.S. forces and citizens of the receiving state. 

Although the GF AP arguably precluded claims against IFOR for 

necessary activities, commanders often found it appropriate to settle 

such claims in order to generate or preserve goodwill. Whether this 

involved small payments to farmers for the deprivation of grazing land 

or spot repairs to roads damaged by U.S. military equipment, it was 

often in the U.S. interest to make things right.427 

5. Train many members ofthe staffto be foreign claims 

commissioners, unit claims officers, and maneuver damage control 

officers. 

The wide geographic dispersion ofunits andjudge advocates 

during Operation Joint Endeavor made it imperative to establish 

numerous foreign claims commissioners. Base camp, brigade, or 

battalion task force judge advocates will normally operate apart from 

the headquarters. These judge advocates are often inexperienced in 

claims. Therefore supervisors should make foreign claims training a 

priority before deployment. By training more than 30 judge advocates 

as commissioners, and an additional 25 enlisted soldiers to assist, Task 

Force Eagle was able to resolve foreign claims swiftly by 

decentralizing their investigation and settlement.428 Judge advocates 

should use Unit Claims Officers (UCOs) and Maneuver Damage 

Control Officers (MDCOs) at the battalion level to assist claims 

operations. Legal personnel should assist them to prevent, document, 

and investigate all incidents that may result in a claim against or on 

behalf of the United States. 

427 MAJ Jody M. Prescott, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. II at 126. ~ 

428 Id. at 130-131. 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 161 

6. Preventive measures reduce claims-use the digital camera. 

Part ofwhat made the investigations successful was the fielding 

of digital cameras (a standard component of the Rucksack Deployable 

Law Office, or RDL 429

). They provided almost instant access to 

photographic evidence, alleviating the traditional difficulty of getting 

film developed while deployed. They played a key role in claims 

investigations and investigations conducted under Department of the 

Army Regulation 15-6.430 Perhaps one of their most useful roles was 

to take pictures of sites before friendly units occupied or moved 

through them. They could document the condition ofroads, structures, 

and vegetation in order to later accurately pay legitimate claims or 

dismiss fraudulent claims. 

The Nordic-Polish Brigade's legal advisor initiated another 

preventive measure that met with great success. Whenever their forces 

conducted a search of a home or building, they had the occupant sign a 

form before leaving verifying that they caused no damage and that no 

items were missing.431 

7. Educate soldiers about the limits of"reasonable" personal 

property before deployment. 

As the theater matured during Operation Joint Endeavor, 

soldiers worked to make their living areas more comfort':lble. The mail 

system and an increasing AAFES presence began to fill the camps with 

429 The RDL is a proven set of off-the-shelf capabilities that inclU:des a laptop computer, CD-Rom, 

modem and network capabilities, scanner, printer, digital camera, TACSAT phone, appropriate set 

of hardware and software, and hard-shell case. 

430 SFC Trejo, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 101. For an example of their use 

in the base closing process, see Memorandum, CPT Richard J. Raleigh, for Staff Judge Advocate, 

Task Force Eagle, subject: 19 September 1996 BCCA Inspection ofCamp Linda (22 Sep. 1996). ~ 

They were generally very reliable, but if the computer became infected with a virus, of course, the 

camera was less useful. See Memorandum for Record, CPT Mark Tellitocci, subject: After Action 

Report; Task Force Eagle, The First 120 days (14 Apr. 1996). ~ 

431 Interview ofLTC Vowell, supra note 146. ~ 
162 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

televisions, VCR's, substantial CD collections, and even 

refrigerators.432 When these items were stolen, damaged, or ruined by 

the Sava River flooding, the soldiers turned to the claims system for 

reimbursement. 

The Personnel Claims Act, however, only allows payment for 

items that are possessed reasonably.433 Task Force Eagle had to 

determine what was reasonable for such entertainment items. 

Ultimately, even though soldiers were able to purchase such items 

from the camp AAFES, the SJA opined that it was not reasonable to 

have more than twenty-five compact discs, or to have $400 

combination TVNCR units in theater.434 Noteworthy was that the 

standard evolved: all agreed that what would clearly be unreasonable 

during the initial phases of a deployment might not be so during later 

stages of an extended peace operation.435 Although there were soldiers 

who complained about the arbitrariness ofsuch determinations, the 

process of line drawing is fundamental to the claims business.436 The 

critical task from a morale perspective is to let the soldiers know 

early-.ideally as part of the SRP process before deployment-what is 

reasonable under the claims system.437 

8. Process personnel claims in an expeditious manner. 

Judge advocates assigned to the division.main and rear 

headquarters investigated soldier claims and took a flexible view 

432 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 38. Cl) 

433 See DEP'TOF ARMY, REG. 27-20, CLAIMS para. 11-11.d. (1 Aug. 1995) {"The type of property 

claimed and the amount or quantity claimed was reasonable or useful under the attendant 

circumstances for the claimant to have used or possessed incident to military service or 

employment.") 

434 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 39. Cl) 

435 LTC Denise Vowell, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. III at 86. Cl) 

436 BG John D. Altenburg, Jr., comments- in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. III at 88 (discussing 

Claims Service position on "Buffies" during Vietnam). Cl) 

437 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 39. Cl) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 163 

regarding proof. A memorandum containing the observations of the 

chain of command was generally sufficient to substantiate a soldier's 

loss.438 

Task Force Eagle created an efficient records base and 

consistency throughout the unit by centralizing the processing of 

claims at the Division Rear (D-Rear). This arrat).gement placed a 

burden on the D-Rear judge advocates requiring them to conduct 

claims interviews and follow-ups. Civil affairs teams helped 

investigate claims and provided transportation to outlying camps.

439 

0. REALESTATE 

1. Ensure real estate teams deploy with lease forms 

appropriate to the operation. 

Real estate teams deployed into Bosnia with form leases similar 

to those used to acquire temporary possession ofland for training 

within the United States. Because Operation Joint Endeavor required 

the commissioning of operational, semi-permanent camps for IFOR 

soldiers, these leases were inadequate. Numerous legal issues arose 

and judge advocates had to resolve them on the scene to enable 

continued productive use of the land.440 

438 CPT Scott E. Stauffer, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. iII at 81. ~ 

439 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 39. ~ 

440 Id. 48. The role for judge advocates in real estate is a cradle-to-grave one. The deployed 

judge advocate must be prepared to play a key role in decommissioning when camps are being 

closed due to consolidation or redeployment. The critical issues at that time will include 

environmental remediation, contract termination, fiscal questions regarding property handovers, and 

claims. See Appendix 5 (Basecamp Decommissioning Tirneline) To Annex L (Basecamp 

Operations) To Frago_ (Withdrawal) (calling for a final turnover of the land to the owner in a 

meeting with "Real estate, CA, [and] JAG"). 
164 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

2. Include utilities in agreements for property use. 

The war devastated the utility infrastructure. As a result, power, 

water, and telephone companies sometimes sought to maximize profits 

from facilities used by IFOR. Frequently, local governments and 

military forces had not paid for their utilities. This increased the cost 

for other users, and made it difficult for IFOR forces to determine a fair 

price for using utilities.441 Some IFOR forces using government land 

mistakenly assumed they too would be exempt from utility payments 

and were later presented with astronomical bills to be negotiated after 

the fact. One effective technique for dealing with this problem was to 

define or at least cap the utility cost as a part of the negotiations for the 

lease ofthe property.442 

3. Be prepared to establish ownership standards for property 

claimed to be privately owned. 

The GF AP gave rise to two new· governments in Bosnia-both 

with CC?mmunist traditions. Both new governments emerged from the 

ruins of a devastating war. This combination was the worst possible 

situation· for determining property ownership. Much property had been 

state-owned before the war and those individuals that owned property 

were displaced by the war. After the war, "squatters," those displaced 

by the war and living on whatever spot on the ground they could find, 

claimed land ownership by adverse possession. Others asserted title 

merely because no one else in the area claimed a particular piece of 

property.443 Task Force Eagle had to sort out what property was 

available for use, ownership, and ifnon-government property, how 

much to pay. To do this, TFE devised a four-part classification system 

for real property. 

441 LTC Karl M. Goetzke, comments in OJE-A.AR., supra note 30, Vol. III at 14. ~ 

442 !AD-A.AR, supra note 145 at 48. ~ 

443 Id. at 50. See also LTC Karl M. Goetzke, conunents in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. III at 24 

("We paid in cash. Cash has a way ofbringing owners out of the woodwork .... "). cri 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATJONSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 165 

The first category was property that was clearly public. The 

nature ofthe property often demonstrated its public natureschoolhouses, military barracks, and the like. This category also 

included those factories that were clearly government property. For 

public buildings, the GF AP required no lease. TFE, however, used 

accommodation agreements to address utilities, improvements, 

easements, etc.444 

The second category was recently privatized land. Often this 

property was transferred by the government to a private landowner as 

late as one day before the arrival ofIFOR troops. The typical response 

by U.S. forces in such circumstances was to demand the property but to 

lease it as if it were legitimately privately held. This decision was 

primarily based on long-term considerations for dealing with the 

parties.445 

The third category was clearly private property. The U.S. forces 

did not want to remove people from their homes or use recently tilled 

fields, but TFE required some private property for mission 

accomplishment. In those cases, the U.S. leased the property.446 

The final category was presumed public property. Such cases 

often involved mines or other formerly state-owned enterprises. TFE 

treated this property as public when no objective record ofprivate 

ownership could be found. Accommodation agreements were created 

with responsible parties. In some instances the units could not find 

accountable individuals so they essentially seized the property and 

waited for any claiming owners to come forward. 447 

444 lAD-AAR. supra note 145 at 22. ~ 

445 lAD-AAR. supra note 145 at 23. ~ 

446 lAD-AAR. supra note 145 at 23. ~ 

447 . rt!\ lAD-AAR. supra note 145 at 23. \.!I 
166 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

In the second and third categories, the real estate teams often had 

difficulty detennining ownership. There was no true system of title 

recording in Yugoslavia. Essentially, the land offices could print from 

their computerized-and easily amended-land record system at any 

time.448 As a result, teams used varying and extensive approaches to 

ensure that they were paying the right people. One team even used 

church baptismal records to determine whether claiming farmers had 

actually lived on particular property since their youth.449 

4. Be aware ofreal estate issues when assuming use of 

property from the United Nations. 

The U.N. forces that preceded IFOR brought a great deal of 

property into the theater. IFOR took over much ofthis equipment 

from the U.N. pursuant to Section 607 of the Foreign Assistance Act 

(this Act allows the U.S. and U.N. to enter into reciprocal support 

agreements). Judge advocates had to remind commanders that this 

property was not free. Before agreeing to accept a piece of equipment, 

resource managers had to determine that: 

• 	 There was a true need for the property in question 

• 	 The cost of reimbursement to the U.N. would be less than the 

cost for the U.S. logistical system to acquire or bring the 

equipment into the theater450 

448 LTC Christopher Maher, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. III at 7. ~See also LTC 

Denise Vowell, comments in OJE-AAR. supra note 30, Vol. III at 8 ~(noting that many of the 

records offices are in the Republic ofSerpska and "they mysteriously aren't available" if the owner 

was a Bosnian Muslim or Croat). 

449 LTC Karl M. Goetzke, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note Vol. III at 5-6. ~ 

00 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 50. ~ 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 167 

5. Use SOFAs and other international agreements to establish 

property rules and land use rights. 

The GF AP and its attendant SOF As gave great latitude to the 

troop contributing nations (TCNs) in enjoying unhindered access to the 

property of the signatory nations.451 On the other hand, the very broad 

language created some tension between IFOR rights and host nation 

responsibilities. 

The same dichotomy of approaches between TCN s that occurred 

in the claims arena also occurred with real estate. Some TCNs read the 

terms of the GFAP quite broadly. They concluded that furnishing land 

for IFOR use was entirely a responsibility of the Bosnian government 

and would pay nothing at all for their use ofland. Future multinational 

operations should strive to resolve this discrepancy among the 

participating nations prior to the deployment of forces.452 

P. ENVIRONMENT AL LAW 

1. Peace operations require a dedicated environmental law 

specialist. 

Complicated issues of environmental law arose during the 

course ofOperation Joint Endeavor. Task Force Eagle noted that 

environmental considerations in peace operations are enormous 

because preserving the mission's legitimacy is as critical as combat 

readiness to overall success. 

453 

451 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 51. ~ 

452 COL Redding, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. III at 26. ~An apocryphal (but 

illustrative) story from the theatre tells ofthe French officer who responded to a claim for damage to 

property from a local owner by saying, •'No, this has already been paid for with the lives of four 

French soldiers who died here." LTC Goetzke, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. III at 

47.~ 

453 lAD~AAR, supra note 145 at 27. ~ See also Tab B (Environmental Standards) To Appendix 4 

(Environmental) To Annex L (Basecamp Operations) To Frago (Withdrawal) ("Focus will be on 
168 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Bosnia h~s little meaningful environmental law.454 Determining 

the appropriate clean-up standards for POL spills was often the first 

challenge. After that determination, ensuring compliance with the 

standard required environmental expertise. Fortunately, one of the 

reserve soldiers in the G-5 was an attorney with considerable 

experience in environmental law. Future deploying units should 

request augmentation by an environmental law expert in peace 

operations.455 

2. Ensure that environmental teams are available early in the 

deployment. 

Monitoring the environmental status of an area is critical early in 

deployment. Two distinct causes account for this. First the terrain 

considered operationally important to commanders may be 

environmentally suspect, even dangerous to U.S. forces. 456 Second is 

the ~laims process. Conducting an early environmental survey of the 

property can set a baseline for measuring later claims of environmental 

damage.457 That survey then becomes one of the critical docum~nts for 

the base camp· decommissioning process when force requirements 

dictate the closure ofparticular camps.

458 

prevention ofimmediate threats to the human health and safety, legal responsibility, and maintaining 

the good name ofUS Anny environmental stewardship.") 

454 E-mail, 03/01/98 8:08am, from MAJ Sharon E. Riley, to MAJ Stephen E. Castlen, subject: RE: 

Environmental Law in Bosnia. (l) 

455 IAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 26. ~ 

456 ·'. •• the locations that we picked in some cases were picked for force protection reasons. The coal 

factory would have been an eminently defensible location ifwe had to get into a high intensity 

combat type situation ....There were extensive berms in place; there were concrete walls 7, 8 feet 

high out from our location ....The coal mining areas, there were slab heaths literally that we set 

soldiers up on. But once again, it was eminently defensible terrain; probably not the best location in 

terms ofesthetics, but in terms ofa defense it was believed to have been a usable location." LTC 

Karl M. Goetzke, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. III at 48-9. (l) 

451 /d. at 43-4. (l) 

458 See Appendix 4 (Environmental) To Annex L (Basecamp Operations) To Frago_ 

(Withdrawal) ( ..Failure to address environmental considerations in all aspects of the operation may 
LAWANDMILJTARYOPERATIONSINTHEBALKANS.1995-1998 169 

Q. INTELLIGENCE LAW 

1. Advise commands about the limits on collecting information 

on U.S. persons. 

Congress placed strong limitations on the collection of 

information by U.S. military intelligence operations ofU.S. citizens. 

Congressional interest stems from a concern about the liberty interests 

of American citizens. The regulation governing intelligence operations 

limits collecting information about U.S. persons to select categories. 

These categories include physical security investigations, 

counterintelligence, threats to safety, and foreign intelligence.459 

Judge advocates frequently found themse~ves called on to assist 

in the interpretation of this regulation and the limits that it places on 

operations in a deployed environment.460 Additionally, judge 

advocates can assist their units by providing oversight and 

coordination of counterintelligence activities, tasks in which their 

supported units are not likely to have much experience.461 

cause WUlecessary harm to the environment, and subject the US Government to unfavorable 

publicity and future damage claims.") 

459 U.S. DEP'TOF ARMY, REG. 381-10, U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES paras. 2-1, 2-2 (1 Jul. 

1984). Note that "U.S. person" can here include corporations, unincorporated organizations, and 

pennanent resident aliens. For a good discussion on the threat to safety exception, See Haiti Lessons 

Learned, paragraph C.l., pages 58-59 (11 Dec. 1995). 

460 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 20. See also Memorandum For Record, LTC Christopher M. 

Maher, subject: Detention of Civilian Calling Himself Timothy McLaurin (Aug. 1996) ~.and 

Memorandum, CPT Timothy Gramme!, for Commander, 1/4 Section, Allied Counter Intelligence 

Unit, subject: Collection oflntelligence About United States Persons (13 Feb. 1996). ~ 

461 MAJ Pete C. Zolper describes some of the problems in this area. See MAJ Zolper, comments in 

OJE-AAR, supra note 30. (J) Because the supported unit (a brigade, in this instance) had little 

institutional expertise with counterintelligence, that unit tended to set its own agenda. Some of the 

mission choices of the counterintelligence unit seemed unwise, such as the decision to gain valuable 

information by travelling to bars and cafes in downtown Brcko at night-in uniform--to ask people 

questions about possible threats to the IFOR (this segment of the AAR conference was not 

transcribed, but is on videotape on file with CLAMO). This problem appears to be Army-wide. See 

CMTC Trends Compendium (Apr. 1998), at 3 (identifying among the trends in the intelligence BOS 

that "[a]ttached elements not fully integrated into the collection plan," and noting that 
170 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

2. Preparefor classified access andfor operational security 

(OPSEC) needs. 

To advise their clients effectively, judge advocates need to have 

sufficient security clearances to gain access to relevant information. 

For example, judge advocates in planning cells and advising 

intelligence units should have at least TOP SECRET clearances before 

deployment.462 Additionally, operational judge advocates require 

access to secure communication systems and classified storage 

facilities. Judge advocates must know how to mark, handle, store, and 

destroy classified documents and materials. 

R. 	MILITARY JUSTICE 

1. 	Resolve UCMJ jurisdictions immediately (pre-deployment). 

a. Set up an early meeting with the Commanding 

General (CG) to explain jurisdiction options and to choose a course 

ofaction. 463 · 

The CG can elect to: 

• 	 Transfer rear detachment jurisdiction to another 

GCMCA (lAD-IFOR option, 1995-1996464

) 

"Counterintelligence (Cl), civil affairs (CA), ground surveillance radar (GSR), and psychological 

operations (PSYOPS) often tasked reactively or not at all.") 

462 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 21. See also MAJ Peter C. Zolper, comments in OJE-AAR, 

supra note 30 (untranscribed portion of the conference, on file with CLAMO). 

463 See Infonnation Paper, Major Rich Whitiker, subject: Partial Unit Deployment-Preparation for 

Deployment and Post Deployment (undated) (available on file with CLAMO). 

464 See Memorandum, StaffJudge Advocate, 1st Armored Division, to Commander, 1st Armored 

Division, subject: 1st Armored Division Rear (Provisional) Command ( 14 Dec. 1995), to include 

TAB A (Memorandwn Creating lAD Rear (Prov)), TAB B (Memorandum Appointing LTC Dyson 

as lAD Rear (Prov)), TAB C (Signature Copy of lAD 27-10-1), and TAB D (Memorandum 

Transferring Referred Cases to V Corps) (documents on file with CLAMO). See generally. DEP'T 

OF ARMY' REG. 220-5, DESIGNATION, CLASSIFICATION, AND CHANGE IN STATUS OF UNITS para. 2-5 

(3 Sep. 91); DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE paras. 2-5.a(2) and 5-29 (6 May 
LAW,ANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 171 

• 	 Leave the "division flag" (GCMCA) behind (a rear 

detachment general officer assumes command, e.g. the 

Assistant Division Commander (Operations) or the 

Assistant Division Commander (Support)) 

• 	 Set up a rear provisional command with GCMCA 

(requires Secretary of the Army approval) 

(1 CD-SFOR option, 1998-1999) 

• 	 Change nothing and shuttle military justice actions 

between the home station and the deployed setting 

(lID-SFOR and lAD-SFOR option,465 1996-1998) 

The mission, home station location, transportation availability, 

cominunication channels, number of deployed troops, and other 

METT-T466 factors will influence the CG's decision. These factors led 

the U.S. forces to establish jurisdictions using the options indicated in 

the bullet comments above. 

The key is to fully explain the options and to lock the 

Commanding General down on a decision. Have the CG approve a 

formal action memorandum, selecting one of the foregoing options. 

Have a good grasp on how much time is required to execute each of 

these options. For example, setting up a rear command requires a new 

Unit Identification Code (UIC) and requires the Secretary of the Army 

to appoint a new General Court-Martial Convening Authority 

(GCMCA). Then the G-1 must reassign soldiers remaining behind to 

the new unit. Next the newly appointed GCMCA must select a new 

1996); DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 600-20, ARMY COMMAND POLICY para. 2-5.b (30 Mar. 1988); and 1st 

Armored Division Regulation 27-10-1. 

465 Telephone interview with COL Denise Vowell, former StaffJudge Advocate for IID and Task 

Force Eagle (22 Oct. 1998). The commanding general retained GCMCA over all HD troop whether 

deployed or at home station (Germany). The existing SPCMCAs picked up jurisdiction over 

deploying unit personnel that remained in the rear. 

466 METT-T is an analytical framework designed to assist commanders in the military decision 

making process. It stands for mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, and time available. See 

generally; DEP'TOFARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS (Jun. 1993). 
172 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

court-martial panel, administrative separation boards, etc. Judge 

advocates must brainstorm, apply METT-T analysis, and war game the 

process and integrate these steps into the plan. 467 

b. Expect other issues to accompany jurisdiction 

realignment. 

The initial jurisdictions established for Operation Joint Endeavor 

proved effective, but still provided challenges to the administration of 

justice in the rear. USAREUR used area jurisdiction, where 

jurisdiction is based on geographical assignment of the soldier, not 

where the crime occurred nor the soldier's particular unit of 

assignment: 

The 1st Armored Division Commander ofTask Force Eagle took 

his flag, hence his jurisdiction, into theater-he exercised jurisdiction 

over all soldiers assigned to Task Force Eagle.468 In 1995, the 1st 

Armored Division establ~shed the following jurisdictions:469 

• 	 The Commander, 1st Armored Division (1AD), retained 

General Court-Martial Convening Authority (GCMCA) over 

all deploying units assigned or attached to 1AD. 

• 	 The Commander, IAD, relinquished GCMCA authority over 

non-deploying units in 1AD's jurisdictional area to the 

Commander, V Corps. 

• 	 The Commander, IAD, created a 1AD Rear (Provisional) 

Command and appointed a lieutenant colonel as the 

467 See supra note 463. 

468 The 21st Theater Anny Area Command (TAA COM) (Forward) exercised jurisdiction over all 

non-Task Force Eagle soldiers deployed to Hungary, Croatia, BiH, Austria, and Slovenia. Later 

2 lst TAACOM (Forward) was disbanded and replaced by USAREUR (Forward), with jurisdiction 

going to V Corps. Sister services handled UCMJ actions for the non-Army U.S. military personnel 

assigned in the Bosnian theater of operations. 

469 See supra note 464. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 173 

commander. This commander exercised Special CourtMartial Convening Authority (SPCMCA) over all nondeploying lAD units assigned or attached to the lAD Rear 

(Provisional) area jurisdiction. 

• 	 The Commander, 53d Area Support Group (ASG) exercised 

SPCMCA over all non-divisional units assigned or attached 

to the lAD Rear (Provisional) area jurisdiction. 

• 	 The Commander, lAD, realigned seven total Summary 

Court-Martial Convening Authorities (SCMCA) under the 

above two SPCMCAs-four under the lAD Rear Provisional 

Commander and three under the 53d ASG Commander. Each 

SCMCA included personnel/units within their geographic 

area. 

1 AD promulgated local regulations which had "savings clauses" to 

pick up any military personnel in the community not otherwise 

accounted for, which assisted in resolving potential problems with 

reserve augmentees. 470 

With the vast majority of lAD soldiers deployed into Bosnia, 

this jurisdictional alignment worked very well. However, judge 

advocates should prepare for challenges in the administration of 

justice, two ofwhich are discussed below. 

(1) Conductfrequent and detailed military justice 

training for rear detachment commanders. 

Many ofthe rear detachment co_mmanders were junior officers 

with little or no command or UCMJ experience. First lieutenants and 

captains commanded rear detachment battalions. An aggressive and 

comprehensive military justice training program for rear detachment 

470 IAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 29. <l) 
174 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

commanders is necessary to ensure proper administration ofmilitary 

justice and to minimize problems of overreaching command authority. 

Rear detachment judge advocates had to guard against 

allegations of unlawful command influence.471 Due to their 

inexperience and junior grade, many rear detachment commanders did 

not truly view themselves as being in command. Often very junior to 

the deployed commanders, and in frequent communication with the 

deployed commanders, they sought or received advice in military 

justice matters from the deployed commanders who no longer had 

jurisdiction over personnel in the rear. 

Another problem was rear detachment commanders who 

believed their authority to be greater than it actually was.· One major 

commanding a provisional rear detachment battalion thought that, 

because he was in a command position otherwise occupied by a 

lieutenant colonel, he could reduce non-commissioned officers. 

Although his misunderstanding-based upon AR 27-10-was 

underst.andable, he nonetheless was unable to promote to the grades of 

ES and E6 under AR 600-8-l 9. He therefore did not have the 

appropriate authority to reduce soldiers ofthose grades. Judge 

advocates must continually educate commanders on the limits oftheir 

authority.472 

(2) Expect delays in military justice and 

administrative actions. 

The rear detachment provisional units in First Armored 

Division's area included only two SPCMAs, and both were located at 

Bad Kreuznach. Also, the GCMCA moved to Heidelberg, Germany, 

several hours from the SPCMCAs. Occasionally this led to delays in 

processing both UCMJ and administrative actions (e.g., appointment 

471 MAJ William D. Palmer, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. III at 162. ~ 

472 Id. at 30. ~ 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS JN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 175 

ofArticle 32 investigating officers, processing of administrative 

discharges, awards, promotions, evaluations), especially in the other 

1st Armored Division communities.473 

2. Artfully and thoughtfully craft General Order Number One. 

General Order Number One (GO #1), a roughly two page 

document outlining prohibited activities deemed harmful to the 

mission by the commanding general, went through several reactionary 

changes. (See Appendix I for the text ofGO #1 and changes.) GO #1 

contained provisions governing gambling, weapons and other 

munitions, currency exchange, war trophies, and respect for local 

culture. GO #1 's prohibition of alcohol was essential to force 

protection and good order and discipline in an unstable environment. 

It was also the source ofmany legal and morale issues.474 

The blanket alcohol prohibition caused difficulties to Operation 

Joint Endeavor almost immediately. Local culture deemed 

consumption ofsome alcohol a necessary part ofnegotiating, both 

politically and in the business community. Failure to accept an offered 

drink was viewed as a sign ofweakness or impotence, and could be 

considered an insult. This caused the first ofmany changes to GO #1. 

The first group excepted from· the alcohol prohibition were members of 

the force serving with Joint Military Commissions and those attending 

official ceremonies where drinking was in line with "local custom.''475 

Next came an exception for service members who were on a special 

pass to Hungary (e.g., Budapest and Lake Balaton) and those in the 

473 IAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 29. (l) Note: The Hanau field office consolidated four Special 

Court-Martial Convening Authorities (SCMAs) into one because ofthe deployment of IAD and V 

Corps. 

474 Memorandum, Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, subject: General Order #1, Operation Balkan 

Endeavor, Title: Prohibited Activities for US Personnel Serving in Operation Balkan Endeavor (28 

Dec. 1995). (l) 

475 Memorandum, General William W. Crouch, Commander in Chief, Headquarters, U.S. Army 

Europe and Seventh Army, for HQ USEUCOM, ATTN: USEUCOM Legal Adviser, subject: 

Exception to USEUCOM General Order 1. (l) 
176 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation tent at the ISB.476 Additional 

exceptions were granted for those serving with the British headquarters 

at Zagreb and the French headquarters at Sarajevo,477 others who 

"deem it advisable" to consume alcohol in their dealings with allies or 

local nationals,478 and those sent on leave to cities and islands in 

Croatia.479 . 

Because most of the persons doing JMC business or dealing 

with allies and local nationals in situations fitting the exceptions were 

officers and higher ranking NCOs, and because some people abused 

the exceptions, some soldiers perceived favorable treatment based on 

rank. The many exceptions that were made for officers with regards to 

gifts and war trophies aggravated this perception. Also, some Troop 

Contributing Nations (TCNs) were not subject to the same restrictions. 

A real morale problem developed among some troops. Eventually the 

on-duty alcohol exceptions were tempered with a one drink limit. One 

StaffJudge Advocate for Task Force Eagle simply stated that for judge 

advocates, there were no qualifying ceremonial occasions calling for 

drinkin.g.480 To avoid a bewildering array oforders and exceptions, as 

well as perceived tinequal treatment ofjunior and senior soldiers, units 

must be advised to consider a wide range of possible circumstances 

before promulgating the rules regarding consumption of alcohol. 

476 Memorandwn, General William W. Crouch, Commander in Chief, Headquarters, U.S. Army 

Europe and Seventh Army, for HQ USEUCOM, A1TN: USEUCOM Legal Adviser, subject: 

Exception to USEUCOM General Order 1 (date after Memorandum referenced in note 475 supra). 

~ 

477 Memorandwn, General William W. Crouch, Commander in Chief, Headquarters, U.S. Army 

Europe and Seventh Army, for HQ USEUCOM, A1TN: USEUCOM Legal Adviser, subject: 

Exception to USEUCOM General Order 1 (20 Jan. 1997). ~ 

478 Memorandwn, General William W. Crouch, Commander in Chief, Headquarters, U.S. Army 

Europe and Seventh Army, for HQ USEUCOM, A1TN: USEUCOM Legal Adviser, subject: 

Exception to USEUCOM General Order 1 (21 Jan. 1997). ~ 

479 Memorandwn, General William W. Crouch, Commander in Chief, Headquarters, U.S. Army 

Europe and Seventh Army, for HQ USEUCOM, A 1TN: USEUCOM Legal Adviser, subject: 

Exception to US EU COM General Order 1 ( 19 May 1997). ~ 

480 Interview ofLTC Vowell, supra note 146. ~ 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 177 

In lengthy operations like Bosnia, commanders must remember 

to reissue GO #1 for each transfer of authority or change of operation. 

One would not want a court-martial charge ofviolating Article 92 by 

disobeying the General Order for Operation Joint Endeavor to be 

dismissed because the violation occurred after Operation Joint 

Endeavor changed to Operation Joint Guard.481 

Commanders should consider prohibiting or restricting 

relationships between soldiers and local nationals and perhaps even 

Troop Contributing Nation personnel. Such relationships could 

endanger the United States position of impartiality in the eyes of the 

Entity Armed Forces and local nationals. 

Finally, judge advocates and commanders must continually 

educate soldiers on the provisions ofGO #1. One key example was the 

weapons and ammunition policy. Soldiers love souvenirs which are 

representative oftheir trade. For this reason attempts to prohibit the 

collection ofweapons, ammunition, and military gear, as well as inert 

.mementos made from the like, must be worded with extreme care. The 

initial General Order #1, which hoped to prevent acquisition ofsuch 

items by outlawing the retention ofproperty "seized or captured during 

military operations," failed to accomplish its goal. Soldiers proceeded 

to find and retain abandoned property, as well as to purchase such 

·items from local civilians.482 Through the publication of a FRAGO the_ 

481 This was a lesson learned cited by LTC Manuel Supervielle, Chair, International and Operational 

Law Department, The Judge Advocate General's School, based on court cases arising during 

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. No documents to date have cited a similar problem in 

the Balkan operations, but it is one to remember given the ever changing operations. 

482 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 42-43. (1) Especially popular were mortar casings and small arms 

shells which had been polished and stamped with words or pictures-such as flags-to 

commemorate the operation. CPT Matthew D. Ramsey, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, 

Vol. II at 153. There continues to be difficulty in employing a consistent standard across units and 

ranks in this area. See Memorandum, CPT John L. Clifton, IV, for Commander, Division Engineer, 

subject: Legal Opinion (2 Aug. 1996) (opining that a colonel could accept gifts of an inert mine and 

mine probe without violating the General Order #1). ~ 
178 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

command resolved these issues, but future deploying forces need to be 

sensitive to the great importance of clarity in these situations.483 

3. Expect rear detachment workload to increase 

proportionately. 

Although the senior leadership and the majority of the soldiers 

will deploy in an operation such as Joint Endeavor, judge advocates 

remaining behind should not expect the workload to decrease. 

Frequently, soldiers are not deployed because they are already pending 

some action or are viewed as potential disciplinary problems. The 

combination of problem soldiers with less experienced and junior rear 

detachment commanders created an explosive scenario in the criminal 

law area. Rear detachment judge advocates must prepare to spend 

significant amounts of time trying cases, conducting boards, and 

assisting a less proficient chain of command with nonjudicial 

punishment and other matters. 484 

4. The most common crimes in a deployed environment are 

violations ofGeneral Order Number One, disobedience, and 

disrespect. 

In descending order, the most common crimes and offenses 

during the Balkan operations have been violations of General Order_ 

Number One, disrespect, disobedience, sleeping on guard, and 

483 IAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 43. cri 484 The experiences ofone large branch office prove instructive in this regard: 

The rear detachment at Baurnholder had approximately 1,000 soldiers 

in it versus a normal garrison environment of 5,000. However, our 

experience was that we issued 204 Article 15's during that deployment 

year versus 358 Article 15's for the previous non-deployment year. We 

executed 8 courts-martial during the deployment year versus 18 during 

the non-deployment year. 

William D. Palmer, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. II at 68. <l) 
LAWAND MIUTARY OPER4TIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 179 

accidental weapons discharges.485 Commanders handled most offenses 

through non-judicial punishment and resignations in lieu of c_ourtmartial (Chapter 10). There have been very few (less than ten) courtmartials in over two years. During 1st Armored Division's second 

tenure in Bosnia, there were only two court-martials through February 

1998, a Bad Conduct Special (BCD-Special) court-martial for 

aggravated assault (one soldier locked and loaded an M 16 as his fight 

with another soldier escalated) and a BCD-Special for theft ofphone 

services.486 

While there is never an excuse for criminal misconduct or for 

not placing the mission first, looking at underlying trends can help a 

commander reduce the likelihood of crime. Many of these crimes were 

likely attributable to the cramped living conditions, the nonstop yet 

tedious pace, lack of a way to "get away from it all" for any period, and 

troops feeling uninformed.487 

5. ·Use vehicle support to enable Trial Defense to see soldiers 

."on circuit." 

The presence ofa Trial Defense Service (TDS) counsel at each 

camp in a geographically dispersed deployment is neither necessary 

nor possible. In order to provide service to soldiers throughout the 

area ofresponsibility (AOR), defense counsel "rode circuit" among the 

camps of the MND(N) area as well as in Hungary. This technique 

required units at smaller camps to wait occasionally for TDS 

representation, particularly for nonjudicial punishment counseling. 

However, with support from the SJA office, extensive use of logistics 

convoys, and, in one instance, a helicopter dispatched by the affected 

485 See Interview ofLTC Cayce, supra note 330 ~;Interview ofLTC Salata and MAJ Jacobson, 

supra note 164 ~;Interview of and AAR Memo by CPT Dauenheimer, supra note 178 ~; and 

Interview of CPT Elizabeth R. Carty, CJA, Camp Bedrock (21 Feb. 1998) [hereinafter Interview of 

CPT Carty]. ~ 

486 See Interview ofLTC Salata and MAJ Jacobson, supra note 164. ~ 

487 ' ~ See Interview of CPT Carty, supra note 485. \.V 
180 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

unit, defense services were delivered in a timely fashion.488 During the 

visits to outlying camps, the defense counsel frequently assisted the 

command by providing legal assistance counseling.489 

6. Every TDS counsel should be trained and deployable. 

Because unit needs in the military justice area fluctuate during 

deployments, every available TDS counsel near the theater should be 

prepared to deploy. The TDS was able to support the commanders and 

soldiers ofTask Force Eagle with timely and effective representation 

because the Regional Defense Counsel had required each defense 

counsel to process through the SRP, and undergo the required STX 

training. Predeployment preparation and training enabled new TDS 

counsel to quickly deploy, particularly in conflict cases.490 

7. Peculiar issues will arise-the Laufenberg Amendment. 

On September 30, 1996, Congress passed the Lautenberg 

Amendment to the Brady Bill,491 making it a crime for anyone 

convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to ship, 

transport or.possess any firearm or ammunition. It also made it a crime 

to issue individual firearms or ammunition to anyone convicted of a 

misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. This law applies to all Army 

issue and privately owned firearms and ammunition except issued 

crew-served weapons. By its terms, this law could not and did not 

apply overseas. However, Department of Defense policy made it 

488 MAJ Peter G. Becker, comments in OJE-AAR. supra note 30 at 72. ~ 

489 . 

lAD-AAR. supra note 145 at 35~ See also, DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE, 

para. 6-8c ( 6 May 1996). 

490 MAJ Peter G. Becker, comments in OJE-AAR. supra note 30, Vol. II at 76. See also 

Interview with LTC Cayce, supra note 330. ~ 

491 The Lautenberg Amendment to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, P .L. 104-208, Title 

VI,§ 658, 110 Stat. 3009.371; codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(9), 922(g)(9), and 925(a)(l) (30 Sep. 

1996). 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 181 

applicable to all DOD personnel, military and civilian, to include those 

in the Balkans. 

This law has caused problems both domestically and overseas. 

Fortunately, the number of affected persons in the Balkan operations 

has remained low. The prohibition on weapons and ammunition 

handling by those persons with a qualifying conviction directly 

conflicts with force protection measures. Affected pilots can fly their 

planes, but carry no sidearm for protection if shot down. Affected 

soldiers can man TOW and other large crew-served weapons systems, 

but cannot carry an M16 to handle a firefight. Department'ofDefense 

Form 2760, dated October 1997, was circulated for soldiers to fill out 

certifying whether or not they may have had a qualifying conviction. 

Commanders were called upon to check "local unit files." The 

CO NUS solution ofmoving subject soldiers to permanent staff duty, 

gym crews, etc. was not available. The solution has been to move such 

soldiers, and many DOD civilians, out oftheater. 

S. LEGAL ASSISTANCE 

Wherever you have Judge Advocates among 

soldiers, you will have the practice of Legal . 492 Asszstance. 

1. Alljudge advocates should prepare to practice legal 

assistance. 

Judge advocates at all levels, from IFORJSFOR headquarters 

down to the base camps, practiced legal assistance. Trial Defense 

attorneys also provided legal assistance. One base camp judge 

advocate said she spent as much as 40% of her time handling legal 

492 Interview with CPT Nicole Farmer, Chief ofLegal Assistance, 1st Armored Division {Fwd) (Feb. 

1998) ~.and Interview with MAJ Mieth, supra note 214. ~ 
182 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

assistance issues.493 The latest Task Force Eagle ChiefofLegal 

Assistance said she devoted 30% of her time to legal assistance, with 

the remaining 70% being devoted to civil and administrative law 

issues.494 Legal assistance issues primarily concerned financial 

problems, the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act, and family law. 

Accordingly, access to domestic law resources from the soldiers' home 

stations-U.S. and German-was key. 

2. Preparefor last minute (predeployment) family care plan 

failures. 

Commanders must scrupulously follow family care plan 

guidance in Dep't. ofArmy, Regulation 600-20, Army Coinmand 

Policy (DA Form 5305-R, Statement ofUnderstanding and 

Responsibility, DA Form 5304-R Family Care Plan Checklist). Even 

so, when faced with the specter oflong-term deployments, many 

family care plans will fail just before deployment. Many failures are 

legitimate-care providers will often back out at the last minute. Some 

soldiers, however, view family care failures as a means of avoiding 

deployment. Commanders can deploy the soldier, keep them in the 

rear, or keep them in the rear and begin separation procedures. If the 

commander deploys the soldier, a family member may be left without 

care. On the other hand, leaving the soldier behind may cause a critical 

gap in the unit (when it is too late to get a replacement), espedally if 

the soldier·is in a critical or shortage MOS. This situation can hurt 

morale for two reasons. First, many soldiers may perceive that the 

family care plan failure was intentionally used to get out ofthe 

deployment. Second, another soldier, possibly untrained for the MOS, 

will have to pick up the slack as an additional duty. · 

Commanders and judge advocates must prepare for and establish 

procedures to deal with this situation. Encourage col11Il1anders to 

493 Interview with CPT Elizabeth (Libby} Carty, CJA, Camp Bedrock (21 Feb. 1998). ~ 

494 Interview ofCPT Farmer, supra note· 492. ~ 
LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSIN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 183 

regularly validate family care plans to minimize last minute family care 

plan failures. 

3. Create an advance packet to improve the SRP process. 

Judge advocates wrote and distributed a packet ofmaterials that 

included information papers on wills, will worksheets, powers of 

attorney, and the claims process. Legal personnel distributed these 

materials to company level before units were scheduled for the Soldier 

Readiness Program (SRPs ). Thus soldiers and family members were 

able to think about their legal needs before they reached the SRP point. 

They arrived at the legal station with prepared questions and the 

information necessary to designate beneficiaries.495 

4. Adapt the tax program to the situation--consider the costs 

and benefits ofelectronic filing. 

For the first time during a major deployment, an SJA office had 

the equipment and communications to electronically file taxes.496 

Soldiers did not use the program as extensively as expected. Possible 

reasons for this were the filing extension available for deployed 

soldiers,497 the availability of the service only at the Division Rear 

which many soldiers could reach,498 and that soldiers did not have the 

required documents.499 Nonetheless, an extensive tax program was 

established, complete with some 90 unit tax advisers (UTAs). 

495 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 37-8. <J) See also CPT Scott E. Stauffer, conunents in OJE-AAR, 

supra note 30, Vol. III at 63. <J) 

496 CPT Scott E. Stauffer, conunents in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. III at 75. <J) 

497 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 40. <J) 

498 CPT Scott E. Stauffer, conunents in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. III at 74. <J) 

4

_

99 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 40. <J) 
184 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

T. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 

1. Resolve questions ofaccess to AAFES and other service 

facilities. 

Access to AAFES facilities, MWR events and dining facilities 

raised numerous legal issues. Everyone wanted access to U.S. 

facilities-host nation civilians, contractors, troop contributing 

nations, and other NATO personnel. At AAFES facilities, these people 

could buy items not available on the economy and without paying 

taxes. Dining facilities provided readily available, decent chow. 

SOFAs excluded non-NATO troop contributing nation forces and 

locally hired contractor employees from these facilities. Inconsistent 

contract terms, however, caused problems by establishing PX 

privileges for some locally hired contractor employees, while 

excluding others.500 An early, consistent approach to AAFES and 

other facility use and access prevents violations of law and regulation. 

It also could prevent aggravation to would-be-customers and to the 

host nation that is foregoing tax revenues. 

Even with a set policy as to facility access and use, enforcement 

presents another problem. Many locally hired AAFES employees 

would allow anyone to purchase .goods ifno supervisors were 

watching. Similarly, many of the dining facilities did not have 

effective cash-collection procedures. If a person who was authorized 

to use the dining facility only on a reimbursable basis arrived, the staff 

would often record them as just another authorized military user.

501 

soo CPT Matthew D. Ramsey, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. II at 150. (l) Because of 

their work with translators, the chain of command occasionally advocated to have increased 

availability to AAFES for local nationals, in violation ofthe SOFA. Judge advocates had to contend 

with this understandable impulse. See Memorandum, CPT Timothy Gramme I, for Chief of Staff, 

Task Force Eagle, subject: AAFES Privileges for Bosnian Translators (22 Feb. 1996). (l) 

soi lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 42. (l) Ultimately the International Police Task Force was 


extended AAFES privileges. Task Force Eagle issued them an authorization based, in part, on 


observations by the legal offices oflFOR and USEUCOM that they should be treated as the 

LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 185 

2. Educate forces about accepting foreign gifts. 

Grateful soldiers, government officials, and other civilians 

frequently offered gifts to U.S. forces. These ranged from a tank and 

several handguns given to the division commander502 to handmade 

coffee grinders worth a few dollars.503 The advice ofjudge advocates 

at all levels played a crucial role in ensuring compliance with the Joint 

Ethics Regulation (JER). 504 Attorneys provided guidance on which 

gifts could be retained and which could be accepted as gifts to an 

appropriate museum, and the method for doing so.

505 Judge advocates 

must constantly balance U.S. law with local gift-giving customs 

courtesies. Finally, U.S. reserve component personnel play a big role 

in today's operational environment. One United States Army Reserve 

judge advocate noted that reservists are not widely exposed to the 

Joint Ethics Regulation and related issues.506 Judge advocates should 

develop ethics training programs accordingly. 

3. Supervise the conduct ofcommand investigations. 

Deployed judge advocates should expect to spend considerable 

time and effort participating in significant or high profile 

investigations.507 For example, judge advocates were sent with an 

Assistant Division Commander to investigate allegations of 

equivalent ofNATO personnel within the meaning ofthe Dayton Accords. See Memorandum, CPT 

Eric Jensen, for Commander, TF Eagle, subject: IPTF Use ofAAFES (no date). cr> 

soi lAD-AAR. supra note 145 at 44. cr> See also Memorandum. LTC Christopher M. Maher, for 

COMEAGLE, subject: Gift from East Bosnian Corps - T34 Taruc (21Oct.1996). cr> 

so3 LTC Karl M. Goetzke, comments in OJE-AAR. supra note 30, Vol. II at 157. <l) 

S04 See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 5500.7-R. JOINT ETHICS REGULATION para. 2-300.b. (Gifts 

from Foreign Governments) (1993). 

sos CPT Matthew D. Ramsey, comments in OJE-AAR. supra note 30, Vol. II, at 155. <l) 

S06 LTC William F. Ridlon, Presentation to the Reserve Component Continuing Legal Education 


Conference, United States Army Reserve (23 Apr. 1998). 


so 7 CPT Matthew D. Ramsey, comments in OJE-AAR. supra note 30, Vol. II, at 141. <l) 

186 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

misconduct by a senior officer, the mine strikes in Dugan, and the U.S. 

Navy bomb that accidentally fell in the vicinity of Camp McGovem.508 

The new version ofArmy Regulation 15-6, Investigations, 

requires not only a legal review after the investigation is completed, 

but that the investigating officer consult with a judge advocate before 

conducting the investigation.509 During Operation Joint Endeavor, 

however, many units deployed with old copies ofthe regulation. These 

tended to be battalions and below, the units least likely to have a judge 

advocate attached, and most likely to have "simple" problems present 

themselves for investigation under the provisions ofAR 15-6.510 Judge 

advocates should continue to seek out investigating officers and ensure 

the investigation is properly conducted.511 Otherwise the judge 

advocate performing the legal review often will need the investigating 

officer to re-do the investigation.512 

4. Remind pers'!nne/ to complete disclosure forms. 

Requirements for confidential disclosure. (using the SF 450) and 

public disclosure (with the SF 278) do not change during a 

deployment, but are more difficult to execute. Judge advocates must 

deploy with abundant supplies of the relevant forms, and distribute 

them to filers earlier than usual as many of those required to file will 

not have the necessary information with them when they deploy.513 

508 Interview with COL Christopher Maher, Staff Judge Advocate, Fort Polk, Louisiana, at The 

Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia (9 Oct. 1998). 


509 DEPT OF ARMY, REG. 15-6, INVESTIGATIONS, CHANGE 1 (30 Oct. 1996) adds para. 3-0, 


Preliminary Responsibilities, which reads: "Before beginning and informal investigation, an 


investigating officer shall review all written materials provided by the appointing authority and 


consult with the servicing staff or command judge advocate to obtain appropriate legal advice." 


510 LTC Denise Vowell, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. II at 149. CJ) 

511 Id. at 143. CJ) See BG John D. Altenburg, Jr., comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. II at 

143 ("a lot oftimes you don't know what an ordinary 15-6 is until it's been done badly"). CJ) 

512 LTC Christopher Maher, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. II at 148 ("We sent every 

battalion investigation back for more investigation, every single one.") CJ) 

513 Id. at 154. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 187 

U. PERSONNEL 

Several personnel issues arose during the operations in Bosnia 


with implications for future legal operations. The Balkan operations 


saw the necessity of "split-base operations." Operations were split on 


two levels. 1st Infantry Division, I st" Armored Division on their 


second rotation through Bosnia, and now the 1st Cavalry Division have 


had to support a "forward" operation (in Bosnia) and, at the same time, 


maintain operations at the home station garrisons. (Note: I st Armored 


Division did not face this challenge on their first rotation because 


nearly the whole Division deployed into Bosnia for Joint Endeavor). 


This created challenges for deploying units as they strove to provide 


effective legal support both to the deployed units and soldiers as well 


as to the rear activities and personnel. Essential to split-based 


operations at this level was the creation of a permanent Deputy Staff 


Judge Advocate position in Bosnia.514 This Deputy provided much 


needed continuity in BiH. The positioning of the chieflegal NCO, 


augmentation by members of the reserve component, and staffing 


decisions made about subordinate headquarters were also key to 


solving these difficulties. 


The second level at which operations were split-based was 

within BiH itself. Friendly units in BiH were geographically located 

by base camp and isolated by force protection measures. Initiallyduring Joint Endeavor, lst Armored Division's first rotation (IFOR)­

brigade combat teams and other brigade-sized units occupied these 

base camps. Later, as the number oftroops in Bosnia was reduced, 

units occupying these base camps changed from brigades to battalions. 

This did not, however, change the need for judge advocate support at 

each base camp. Thus, each battalion caine to have a judge advocate. 

This was a significant change from prior practice and doctrine, which 

called only for judge advocates at brigades . 

. 

514 LTC Kevan Jacobson was the first judge advocate to fill ~is position. 
188 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

1. Deploy the ChiefLegal NCO (CLNCO) early. 

Particularly in an immature theater, the support of a senior 

noncommissioned officer is vital to mission success. Many of the early 

site and equipment issues are handled through NCO support channels. 

Ifthe Chief Legal NCO (CLNCO) is not available for deployment with 

the Staff Judge Advocate (because he or she is responsible for the 

overall movement of the office, for example), some other senior NCO 

should accompany the Staff Judge Advocate.sis When engaged in 

split-based operations, a strong warrant officer or NCO in the rear 

· detachment is also indispensable. He or she will be called upon to 

push supplies forward, and to help coordinate contacts, actions, and 

requests in the rear.s 16 

2. Prepare for reserve augmentation. 

During the· operations in Bosnia, augmentation by reserve 

personnel occurred at every level and proved essential to the success of 

the legal mission.s 17 In order to use these assets effectively, it is 

critical to identify requirements early. Backfilling of deployed 

personnel is an important role because the garrison legal mission does 

not cease upon deployment.sis Several communities (branch offices) 

in Germany were without legal assistance attorneys until reserve 

augmentees arrived. Five reserve judge advocates backfilled positions 

in Germany from legal assistance attorney to officer in charge (OIC) of 

a branch office. In addition, reserve augmentees greatly improved 

soldier readiness processing during the predeployn~ent preparation and 

sis SFC Joachin Trejo, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 109-110. The CLNCO 


will also play a critical role in ensuring the proper employment of legal specialists throughout the 


command, and therefore needs to be mobile. Id. 


si6 Interview ofLTC Vowell, Staff Judge Advocate of 110 (Fwd).~ 

si 7 COL (now BG) Thomas J. Romig, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 153 ~;see 

also COL Joseph A. Russelburg, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 163. ~ 

sis LTC James M. Coyne, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 83-84. ~Indeed, in the 

military justice arena, it does not even decrease proportionally to the decrease in personnel. 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 189 

training period. 519 One reservist remained in Bosnia through both 

IID's and IAD's tenures and was the backbone to efficient claims 

operations, especially during the transition period. Other reservist 

judge advocates deployed to the Stabilization Force's headquarters, 

base camps, and the Intermediate Staging Base in Hungary. 

Making the deployment a success for the reserve officers and 

enlisted soldiers also takes substantial planning. A sponsor should be · 

assigned quickly, and the office should prepare to assist with housing, 

transportation, finance, medical, and personnel support. Many ofthe 

augmentees will not have been on active duty for as long as the 270 

days for which they are called.520 Generally the most critical need for 

the arriving reservist-especially in an OCONUS situation-will be 

transportation.521 

Finally, be prepared for surprise arrivals. Despite the thorough 

work in the assignment/call-up area, reservists occasionally were 

mobilized by their home reserve units or in response to volunteer calls 

out ofARPERCEN. Until their arrival, no one in the chain of 

command or the technical chain knew that they were coming. 522 

519 MAJ William D. Palmer, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. III at 151 (Noting that this 

frees up deploying personnel to prepare themselves for deployment and spend time with their 

supported commanders). <l) 

520 LTC James M. Coyne, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 96-97. <l) 

521 See After Action Report, MAJ (JA, USAR) D.S. O'Lochlayne, MAJ, subject: Mobilization and 

Deployment ofTeam 2, 91st Legal Services Organization (LSO), in Support ofOperation Joint 

Endeavor (1997): 

Transportation: This is the system's Achilles heel for reservists. 

Mission demands lead to long hours, yet the transportation net 

continues on the usual day to day basis. This forces personnel to seek 

out other forms oftransport in order to fulfill their mission. This 

situation was compounded when personnel were billeted miles from 

their duty locations. 

522 LTC Coyne, comments in OJE-AAR, Vol. I at 88 <l) ("lo and behold, a month and a half ago 

for whatever reasons a Major shows up at EUCOM, a reserve. He answered something over the 

BBS or the E-mail out ofARPRCEN who wants to volunteer to go to Bosnia and he showed up"). 

For another example, see LTC Christopher Maher, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 

89-90. <l) 
190 · CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

3. ·Tailor judge advocate attachments to the force structure. 

a. The mission may callfor pushingjudge advocates 

down to lower than normal echelons andfor providing judge 

advocates to mission-specific organizations. 

Once Task Force Eagle replaced brigade combat teams with 

battalion task forces, Staff Judge Advocates decided to support these 

now battalion-sized base camps with judge advocates.523 The 

operational situation left SJ As with no other choice. Without judge 

advocates at the base camps, many obstacles and problems would have 

critically hindered legal support to operations, e.g., loss of situational 

awareness, loss of direct support to ground commanders, and 

transportation and communication problems.524 

Although it will not always be possible nor desirable to support 

battalions with their own attached judge advocates, the Sinai Desert 

observer mission has used this configuration for more than sixteen 

years. Also, a judge advocate has supported a battalion task force in 

Macedonia (as part ofUNPREDEP) for several years. Under some 

circumstances, it proves to be an effective method for supporting 

widely dispersed units. 525 Judge advocates supporting dispersed 

battalions or brigades in this fashion must be "jacks of all trades"­

m See Appe~dix D(4), Judge Advocate Disposition. After lAD reassumed the mission from lID in 

Oct. 1997, they chose to configure about the same as llD had. They had 12 Judge Advocates and 15 

enlisted personnel in the area of operations. There were 7 JAs at their main headquarters (Eagle 

Main)-the Staff Judge Advocate (Forward), the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (Fwd), Chief of 

Operational Law, Chief ofAdministrative Law and ofMilitary Justice (combined), a Legal 

Assistance/Civil-Administrative Law attorney, Chief ofClaims, and the Joint Military Commission 

(JMC) attorney. Eagle Main had 7 enlisted-I E7, 1E6,3 E5s and 2 E4s. 1 03 JA and 1 E4 were 

the Trial Defense Service (TDS). 1 03 JA, 1 E6 and 1 E2 served Camp Comanche, the IAD's 4th 

Brigade (aviation assets). 1 03 JA and 1 E5 served a battalion task force at Camp Bedrock and also 

the hospital at Guardian Base. 1 03 JA and 1 E4 served a battalion task force at Camp McGovern 

and also Camp Colt. And 103 JA and 1 E4 served the battalion at Camp Dobol and also Camp 

Demi. 

524 MAJ Sharon E. Riley, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. III at 128. ~ 

525 BG John D. Altenburg, Jr., comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. III at 187. ~ 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 191 

proficient in all areas oflaw. They will be responsible for advising the 

commander on rules of engagement, interpreting and implementing 

international agreements, issues offiscal law, foreign and personnel 

claims, military justice, legal assistance and more. Home station 

training ofthese versatile judge advocates is especially important 

because they are usually junior in grade and vary in experience. 

The nature ofthe SFOR mission called for the assignment of 

judge advocates to organizations to which they were not usually 

assigned. The SFOR Office ofthe Legal Advisor consisted of the 

Legal Advisor (LEGAD) to the SFOR commander-duty rotated 

between two Colonels normally serving as the Staff Judge Advocate 

and Deputy Staff Judge Advocate for USAREUR, three Majors, one 

NCO and one Bosnian civilian attorney. In IFOR, two judge advocates 

served in the Division Assault Command Post, providing a vital early 

legal presence for the deployment. Other officers served as legal 

advisors to the Joint Military Commission and other mission-specific 

organizations such as the Crisis Action Team. One judge advocate 

even temporarily became a liaison officer to a British armored 

division.526 

b. A senior judge advocate must be on the ground. 

To manage the manpower and assets spread among base camps 

and mission-specific organizations, it was essential to have a senior 

judge advocate forward, on the ground. First Armored Division's Staff 

Judge Advocate, initially assigned a major to be the "Deputy SJA 

forward" in Bosnia. Thus, there was always a senior judge advocate on 

the ground to serve as the senior legal advisor to commanders and to 

manage the other judge advocates. One important function ofthe 

senior judge advocate was to ensure the judge advocates did not 

become subjeCts of"mission creep"-performing too much non-legal 

' 

26 IAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 59. (J) 
192 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

work.527 On the advice of the task force Staff Judge Advocates, the 

JAG Corps leadership decided later to create an additional slot-the 

deputy in Bosnia. This was the key to the continuity in units rotating 

in and out oftheater. 

c. Judge advocate support must be mobile. 

Each judge advocate must be ready to pick up and go in 

support of a commander and/or the mission at distant sites and 

locations. The judge advocate cannot become settled in a routine of 

staying at oue Tactical Operations Center (TOC) tent or one building. 

Commanders grew accustomed to taking "their Judge" with them on 

missions lasting hours to days. Handling claims (intake and payment) 

meant frequent travel to distant and remote areas. To use the I st 

Armored Division's vernacular, you must be a "JAG with a bag"­

have an overnight rucksack and the Rucksack Deployable Law Office 

(RDL) ready to go on a moment's notice.528 The Staff Judge Advocate, 

Deputy StaffJudge Advocate, or Operations Lawyer was thus ready to 

travel with a representative of the command group at any time. This 

proved particularly valuable to a subordinate brigade commander 

whose staff had been integrated into the division. That commander 

was always able to take a judge advocate with him when his mission 

required that he travel to one ofhis geographically separate units.529 

4. Support the morale ofyour legal personnel. 

Senior leaders must motivate their judge advocates, Legal NCOs 

and legal specialists. They must communicate with their people, rotate 

them, and instill a strong sense of duty and sacrifice~ With a mission 

whose end is still not in sight after almost three years, communication 

527 See Interview ofLTC Vowell. supra note 146. (J). 

52s Id. 

529 MAJ Sharon E. Riley, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. III at 131-133. (!) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 193 

with subordinates is essential. Keep them informed.530 Troops must 

be rotated in and out of the theater and afforded R&R. Staffjudge 

advocates viewed six to eight months as about the ideal rotation. TDS 

viewed two to three month rotations as ideal.531 Finally, senior leaders 

must instill a sense of duty and commitment.532 The majority of 

criminal offenses fell within the realm of disrespect, disobedience, and 

General Order Number One violations. This illustrates the morale 

problems that develop in a long, tedious rotation with personnel living 

in crowded, less than ideal conditions. 

V. EQUIPMENT AND MILITARY TRAINING 

As in previous deployments, legal support to operations was 

possible or1ly because of soldier training and equipment. The train-up 

gave judge advocate officers and enlisted soldiers both proficiency and 

confidence in a range of common soldier tasks. 533 The Balkan . 

operations confirmed the validity ofpast lessons learned, many cited in 

the Haiti Lessons Learned volume: 

• The importance ofmodem automation equipment534 

530 Id. 

531 Interview ofLTC Cayce, supra note 330. ~ 

532 Interview of LTC Salata, supra note Staff Judge Advocate (Fwd), lAD. ~ 

533 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 60: ~ 

TFE JAs and Legal Specialists had weapons qualification, protective 

mask confidence training, and a nearly three-week train-up in 

Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels for peace operations, to include situational 

training exercises oriented on mine awareness. Upon deployment, the 

Office of the Staff Judge Advocate's senior enlisted leadership 

recognized that the offic~'s Legal Specialists were highly proficient in 

MOS-related skills. Despite that proficiency, junior soldiers needed 

hands-on, remedial training on tent setup, basic vehicle maintenance, 

map~reading skills, and other common task skills. 

534 SFC Joachin Trejo, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at I 00. See also HAITI 

AAR at 162-5. ~ 
194 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

• 	 The necessity ofpre-packing legal resources and forms for 

deployment535 

• 	 The value ofpacking in a vehicle or hand-carrying the most 

critical resources to eliminate problems of loss and dela/36 

• 	 The vital nature of over-all soldier training537 

There were, however, some new observations: a heightened 

emphasis on preventing equipment shortfalls before deployment, a 

recognition of the importance of decentralized training, and a 

recommendation to prepare for intra-theater deployments in future 

operations such as this. 

Particularly in a dispersed theater, the success or failure of the 

provision oflegal support to the force will often hinge on the abilities 

ofjunior judge advocates and 71 Ds at brigade and battalion levels. 

Many of these officers and enlisted soldiers have been, and will 

continue to be, first-term soldiers. The solution to the problem of 

transforming a recent law school graduate or enlistee into the 

professional command judge advocate or legal specialist of an isolated 

brigade remains what it has always been: "training, training and more 

training. "538 

535 SFC Joachin Trejo, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 106. {l) See also After 

Action Report, US Army Legal Operations, Operation Restore Hope, 5 Dec. 1992 - 5 May 1993 at 

4. (l) 

536 CWO Mark E. Brown, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 107. {l) See also 

Memorandum. MG John L. Fugh, The Judge Advocate General, for Deploying Staff Judge Advocate 

Offices, subject Lessons Learned-Operation Desert Shield at 5 (5 Dec. 1990). (l) 

537 SFC Joachin Trejo, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 98. See also HAITI AAR at 

159. (l) 


538 BG John D. Altenburg, Jr., comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. III at 189. (l) 

LAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONSINTHEBALKANS.1995-1998 195 

1. Prepare StaffJudge Advocate (SJA) office equipment 


before deployment. 


Advances in technology require that staffjudge advocate offices 


maintain current equipment to the greatest extent possible. It is a 


reality, however, that much ofthe latest equipment will only become 


available just before or even during a deployment. 539 Deploying 


offices must also be aware ofthe danger that equipment which is 


designated for the SJA office may be redistributed among other staff 


sections during train-up exercises ifthere is no judge advocate 


presence in the field. 540 · 


a. Stockpile supplies. 

The seven-day-a-week operations expended supplies much more 


quickly than originally expected. Supplies such as paper, pens, and 


printer cartridges thus became major concerns, not only for the SJA 


office, but for all staff sections.541 How supplies were brought to the 


theater was as critical as what was brought. Key resources and 


equipment should be carried or packed on vehicles, and CONEXs 


should be packed to support a longer operation than contemplated542 


539 SFC Joachin Trejo, comments in OJE-AAR, supra not~ 30, Vol. I at 100. (J) 

• 

540 Particularly MSE telephone sets. See id. at 102. 

541 lAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 62. (J) Additionally, "maintenance" in the Information Age has a 


slightly different meaning than it has historically: The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate learned 


from its Mountain Eagle experiences, and while deployed to BiH and CRO, that preventive 


maintenance supplies are invaluable to successful field and garrison operations. Such supplies 


should include notebook and desktop computer keyboard covers, compressed air cans to blow dust 


out ofkeyboards and hard drives, fine hair brushes to do periodic screen and keyboard dusting, 


alcohol or "baby wipes" to clean hardware surfaces, and clean cloths for the same purpose. If at all 


possible, deploying legal offices should also bring along 110/220V transformers, power adapter 


plugs and extension cords, surge suppressers, power conditioners and continuous power supply 


equipment, and operating system dis.cs (in the event ofa hard drive "crash"). There is no guarantee 


that signal support will have these items in theater, or even in the rear detachment area. Failure to 


keep equipment clean and secure might result in reports of survey, or at very least a shortfall of 


weeks or months while computer equipment is "evacuated" to a CSS-AMO shop in the rear. 


542 SFC Joachin Trejo, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 106. (J) 
196 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

(six months worth to start).543 Plan on the supply system not working 

fast or well in the beginning. No space should go unused. SJA offices 

are well advised to "deploy with items necessary to create comfortable, 

professional work and off-duty conditions."544 Space and furniture 

were scarce. A field desk may save having to build one yourself. 545 

b. Stock you legal references and resources. 

Many judge advocates initially found themselves stuck only with 

what they brought themselves for legal research and reference. This 

was true not only for the first units arriving, but also for each rotation 

thereafter: departing units and people took their resources with them, 

leaving the incoming units to fend for themselves.546 Many judge 

advocates lacked basic, essential references, such as the GF AP, 

SOF As, Geneva and Hague Conventions. The most widely 

recommended general resource was the Operational Law Handbook. 547 

It is essential to bring the specific regulations, directives, forms, and 

field manuals that apply to each specific area oflaw (e.g., fiscal, 

contracts, claims). Legal personnel should prepackage many ofthese 

resources onto a computer hard drive or CD-ROM to save space and 

weight. 

c. Internet access is essential. 

This was the Army's initial "Internet deployment,"548 and the 

first to test many of the latest technological changes. Numerous judge 

advocates cited Internet access as the prime resource for research, 

543 See Interviews of SFC Murray, NCOIC, Office ofthe Staff Judge Advocate (Fwd) <J), lAD and 

MSG Spearman, Chief Legal NCO, lAD. <J) 

544 IAD-AAR, supra note 145 at 63. <J) 

545 See Interview ofCPT Carty, supra note 493. <J) 

546 See Interview of LTC Salata and MAJ Jacobson, supra note 164. <J) 

547 OP. LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 194. {J) 

548 Commander Michael E. McGregor, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. III at 140. <J) 
LAWANDMIUTARYOPERATIONSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 197 

electronic mail, and even voice communication.549 A Rucksack 

Deployable Law Office and Library (RDL) with modem components 

allows the best use of the Internet and other electronic resources, such 

as CD-RO Ms. Judge advocates must be cautious, however, of the 

source's· credibility and of the validity and accuracy of documents 

downloaded from the Internet. There is also the risk of downloading 

computer viruses that can render the computer inoperable. 

2. Assign personnel to the lowest possible echelons during 

training events. 

As was noted earlier soldiers-both officer and enlistedperformed military duties well. Nonetheless, units found that they 

would have been better served by integrating both common-task and 

MOS-specific events550 into pre-deployment training. The most 

efficient way to accomplish this is to decentralize the legal centers 

during training events, so that they reflect the arrangement that will 

occur during deployments. Judge advocates, NCOs, and legal 

specialists should train with the units they support.551 Such a strategy 

allows a legal specialist to build a relationship with the deploying 

battalion552 and to better learn soldier skills from line units.553 

549 See, e.g., Interview ofLTC Vowell, supra note 146 (l); Interview ofMAJ Hancq, supra note 368 

(l); Interview of LTC Cayce, supra note 330 (l); and Interview ofLTC Salata and MAJ Jacobson, 

supra note 164 (l). A program called "net to phone" allowed toll free calls to subject matter experts 

at The Judge Advocate General's School and in Washington. 

550 SFC Joachin Trejo, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 98. (l) 

551 LTC Christopher M. Maher, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 114 (noting that 

such de-consolidation "presents a special challenge.") (l) 

552 Memorandum for Record, Captain Mark Tellitocci, Operational Law Attorney, Task Force 

Eagle, Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, AETV-THH, subject: After Action Report; Task Force Eagle, 

The First 120_ days (14 Apr. 1996) (l) 

553 One technique learned during cold-weather operations in Bosnia was to obey the "Wait" light on 

the dash ofthe HMMWV when starting the vehicle. Vehicles were unnecessarily deadlined because 

"people don't always want to abide by that," resulting in loss of the glow plugs, which disables the 

vehicle. See SFC Trejo, comments in OJE-AAR, supra note 30, Vol. I at 105. (l) 
198 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

3. Prepare/or intra-theater travel and deployments. 

Because ofthe wide geographic dispersal of units in BiH during 

Joint Endeavor, the command group frequently traveled throughout the 

theater. Such travel often was a response to a particular event or crisis 

that required legal support for the command. As a result, the SJA 

office created the "JAG with a bag" concept, discussed in paragraph 

U.3.c. above. 

While mentioned in paragraph N.2.a. above, training for the 

stringent convoy requirements in Bosnia bears further mention. Four 

vehicles with internal and external communications, a crew served 

weapon, and a combat lifesaver were the minimum permissible for a 

convoy. Judge advocate offices must scrap for vehicles, consider 

assignment of a crew-served weapon to the section, and seek to train 

their personnel on combat lifesaving and crew served weapons, among 

other soldier tasks. Prior planning and home station training can make 

convoys for claims investigations and the like considerably easier.554 

4. Communications are always a problem--plan how you will 

communicate. 

Communications, both within and outside the theater, were a 

problem. Many camps had bad phone systems, no Internet access, no 

secure communications, and no FAX capabilities. Talk to the signal 

and communications experts. Know the communications architecture 

that will exist and become a part ofit. Do not forget the need for 

interoperability. For example, United States forces used the STU-III 

system for secure transmissions, but NATO stocks the STU-II-they 

cannot talk to each other. Thus, some judge advocates needed both 

systems.555 

SS4 Id. at 103-104. 

sss See Interview ofMAJ Mieth, supra note 214. ~ 
LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS, 1995 -1998 199 

APPENDICES· 

200 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Appendix A(l): Historical Maps 

1350 

llOLYROMAN 

EMPIRE 

HISTORICAL YUGOSLAVIA 

AUSJRIA· 

llUl'\CARY 

1529 

SERBIA 

MACEDO~IA 

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 

1991 

Appendix A(l) 

• • • • • • • • AGREED CEASE FIRE 

LINE(ACFL) 

\. .-....

. ... • \ I • I . ...., . 

LAW AND MIUTARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 201 


Appendix A(2): ACFL (OCT 1993), IEBL (NOV 1995) & Areas of 

Transfer 

ACFL, IEBL &AREAS OF TRANSFER 


• Prijedor ....... • • • 

- - • INTER-ENITITY BOUNDARY LINE (IEBL) 

AREAS OF TRANSFER GOING TO THE BOSNIAN FEDERATION 

AREAS OF TRANSFER GOING TO THE REPUBLIKA SERPSKA 

!to 

ZONE OF SEPARATION (ZOS) = 2 KILOMETERS ON EITHER 

SIDE OF THE ACFL (ON EITHER SIDE OF IEBL AFTER AOTS 

WERE TRANSFERRED) 

· Appendix A(2) 
202 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Appendix A(3): IFORISFOR Area ofResponsibility- Multinational 


Division Sectors 


SFOR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR) 


D Bosniac 

CJ Croat 

Serb 

51,233 km2 

Slightly Larger 

than 

TENNESSEE 

)· 

305km 

v 

Appendix A (3) 
----------- --------- ---------

---------- --------- ---------

LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-98 203 

Appendix B: The Former Warring Factions (FWFs) and Their 

Competing Strategic Goals 

COMPETING STRATEGIC GOALS OF THE PARTIES 

CROATIA BOSNIAN BOSNIAN. BOSNIAN FRY 

CROATS MUSLIMS SERBS (SERBIA& 

(BOSNIACS) (RS) MONTENEGRO) 

MAINTAIN MUSLIM PERPETUATE GREATER GREATER EXTERNAL DOMINATED ETHNICALLY SERBIA CROATIA TIES TO CROATIA MUL Tl-ETHNIC SEPARATE WITHIN EU WITHIN EU REPUBLIKA 

SRPSKA 

STATE 

GAIN ACCESS 


GAIN.ENTRY 


CONTROL ACCESS GAIN ACCESS 

TO SEA \I TO SEAPORT & ' I TO SEA 


INTO EU 
 REINTEGRATE 

-.;;;,.;;;:;,~--+-:~~---'f-.;e;..-.s,;;;-­ INTO

CONTINUE INTERNATIONAL 


EXPANSION 
 MOSTAR ' . OF MOSTAR, ' CONTROL OF COMMUNITY 


OF DOMESTIC 


ECONOMY ----------~-~~---1-".'.".'.'.'::'_".'.~ IMPROVE

ENSURE LOCAL EXERCISE RETAIN FULL . DOMESTIC 


CONSOLIDATE 
 CONTROL . SINGLE CONTROL ECONOMY 

SOVEREIGNTY OVER CROAT , AUTHORITY OVER SERB / OVER EASTERN AREAS . OVER 8-H AREAS KEEP A LID 

SLAVONIA ON KOSOVO 

CROAT 

NATIONALISM SECURE AN EVEN RETAJN 1991 ESTABLISH A 

SHARE OF POWER \ , BORDERS SEPARATE STATE 

GAIN CONTROL OF IEBL) 


BIH ARMED FORCES. 


RESETTLE TO GET PROMOTE BLOCK OTHER 

KEY LAND , ,. FREEDOM OF \ PARTIES FROM 

t.[\ 	 MOVEMENT & ,;r. RESETTLING 

ENCOURAGE 

DPRE RETURNS 

AppendixB 
204 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Appendix C: Summary ofUN/NATO Operations in the Balkans 

(Operations Categorized by the Preponderance of the Forces) 

Ground Operations 

United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) - (21 FEB 92 - 20 DEC 

95). The UN established UNPROFOR on 21 February 1992 to create the 

conditions for peace and security in the former Yugoslavia (UNSCR 743). 

UNSCR 758 enlarged the mandate to encompass the delivery of 

international humanitarian assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 7 April 

1992, the UN authorized UNPROFOR's deployment to Croatia and, later, 

Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 

(FYROM) (UNSCR 795). With the 20 December 1995 transfer of authority 

from UNPROFOR to IFOR, UNPROFOR ceased to exist. JTFPP 

commanded all U.S. forces operating in support of UN operations in the 

Balkans (JTFPP is discussed below). 

United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) - (31 MAR 95 ­

Present). On 31 March 1995, the UN changed the name of the FYROM 

part of UNPROFOR to UNPREDEP (UNSCR 983). On 1 February 1996, 

the UN made UNPREDEP an independent mission [UNPREDEP is the first 

and only UN operation to have a preventive mandate]. UNPREDEP is a 

monitoring mission between FYROM and the Federal Republic of 

Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Albania. UNPREDEP has 700 

troops from 27 nations. 

United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) 

(92- 95). This is an outgrowth of UNPROFOR like UNPREDEP. 

UNCRO's mandate included implementing the 1994 cease-fire between 

Croatia and its secessionist Serb population, facilitating economic 

agreefDents, and monitoring Croatia's borders. UNCRO ended in 1995 

after Croatia regained control of all Serb-he.Id territory {except for Eastern 

Slavonia-·see UNTAES) 

United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia 

(UNTAES)- (15 JAN 96- 15 JAN 98). UNSCR 1037 established a 

transitional administration to govern the peaceful integration of the region 

into Croatia's legal and constitutional system. It authorized an international 

force to maintain peace and to otherwise assist in the implementation of the 

agreement. 30 nations contributed forces totaling 2,847 personnel. 

Appendix C 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 205 


Operation Able Sentry - (18 JUN 93 - Present). On 18 June 1993, the 

UN authorized the deployment of UNPROFOR personnel to the FYROM. 

As part of the UNPREDEP, 300 U.S. soldiers (per rotation) observed, 

monitored, and reported troop movements along the FYROM border with 

Serbia and Albania. This operation continued after UNPROFOR became 

UNPREDEP. 

Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE)- (20 DEC 95- 20 DEC 96). NATO-led 

multinational force from 20 December 1995 to 20 December 1996. The 

Implementation Force (IFOR) was the military force of OJE. 

Operation Joint Guard (OJG) - (20 DEC 96- 20 JUN 98). NATO-led 

multinational force 20 December 1996 to 20 June 1998. The Stabilization 

Force (SFOR) was the military force of OJG. 

Operation Joint Forge (OJF) - (20 JUN 98 - Present). NATO-led 

multinational force from 20 June 1998 to a date to be determined. The 

SFOR is the military force of OJF. 

Naval Operations 

Maritime Monitoring Operations- (JUL 92- NOV 92). NATO ships 

began monitoring operations in the Adriatic Sea in July 1992. These 

operations were in support of the UN arms embargo (UNSCR 713) and 

sanctions against the FRY (UNSCR 757). These efforts were limited to 

registering possible violations. NATO aircraft assisted the monitoring effort. 

Extended Monitoring Operations - (NOV 92 - JUN 93). NATO and 

Western European Union (WEU) forces began enforcing the UN sanctions 

and embargo (UNSCR 787). These operations included stopping, 

inspecting, and diverting ships, as required. 

Operation Sharp Guard - (8 JUN 93 - 1 OCT 96). This operation began 

on 8 June 1993 (maritime operations actually began in November 1992). 

14 NATO and WEU member states,. to include U.S. forces, contributed 

naval and air forces to Operation Sharp Guard. This operation put the 

NATO and WEU forces under the OPCON of COMNAVSOUTH and 

stepped up enforcement of the UN sanctions and embargo. The forces 

suspended enforcement of sanctions on 22 November 1995 (UNSCR 

1022) and Operation Sharp Guard was terminated on 1 October 1996. 

·NATO and WEU forces challenged 74,192 ships, inspected 5,951 ships at 

AppendixC 

206 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


sea, diverted and inspected 1,480 ships in port, and caught 6 attempting to 

break the embargo. 

Air Operations 

Operation Provide Promise - (3 JUL 92 -15 MAR 96). Joint Task Force 

Provide Promise (JTFPP) commanded all U.S. forces operating in support 

of UN operations in the Balkans. The U.S. contributed in four ways: 

• 	 Humanitarian Airlift to war-tom Sarajevo. This was the longest running 

humanitarian airlift in history supplying over 160,000 metric tons of food, 

medicine, and supplies (18,000 tons were air dropped). 

• 	 UN field hospital in Zagreb, Croatia serving a UN military population of 

over 47,000. 

• 	 Operation Able Sentry. As part of the UNPREDEP, 300 U.S. soldiers 

(per rotation) observed, monitored, and reported troop movements 

along the FYROM border with Serbia and Albania. This mission 

continues under USAREUR. 

• 	 UN reconnaissance operations involving Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

(UAV). 

Monitoring Operations - (OCT 92- MAR 93). NATO Airborne Early 

Warning and Control System aircraft began monitoring operations in 

October 1992. These operations supported the UN established no-fly zone 

over Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNSCR 781 ). These operations were limited to 

registering violations. 

Extended Monitoring Operations - (31MAR93- 12 APR 93). On 31 

March 1993, UNSCR 816 authorized enforcement of the no-fly zone and 

extended it, banning all fixed and rotary wing aircraft except those 

authorized by UNPROFOR. 

Operation Deny Flight - (12 APR 93 - 20 DEC 95). This NATO 

enforcement operation included 12 NA TO members, flying from airbases in 

Europe and from aircraft carriers in the Adriatic Sea. It enforced the no-fly 

zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNSCR 816), using over 200 fighter and 

reconnaissance aircraft, and flew nearly 100,420 sorties by December 

1995. On 28 February 1994, NATO aircraft shot down four warplanes 

violating the no-fly zone. This was NATO's first-ever military engagement. 

On 4 October 1995, NATO aircraft fired missiles at a Bosnian Serb radar 

sites after air defense radar locked onto NATO aircraft. The Transfer of 

AppendixC 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 207 

Authority from UNPROFOR to NATO on 20 December 1995 terminated 

the mandate of Operation Deny Flight. 

• 	 Close Air Support (CAS) to UNPROFOR- In June 1993, NATO 

offered UNPROFOR CAS. On 19 November 1994, NATO extended 

CAS to protect UNPROFOR troops in Croatia (UNSCR 958). 

• 	 On 10-11 April 1994, NA TO provided CAS to protect 

UNPROFOR troops in Gorazde, Bosnia-Herzegovina (a UNdeclared Safe Area). 

• 	 On 11 July 1995, NATO CAS protected UNPROFOR troops from 

Bosnian Serb forces advancing on Srebrenica (a UN-Declared 

Safe Area). Despite the NATO CAS, Srebrenica fell to Bosnian 

Serb forces. 

• 	 On 9 October 1995, the UN asked again for NATO CAS to 

protect UNPROFOR troops from artillery shelling from Bosnian 

Serb forces. NATO aircraft attacked a Bosnian Serb command 

and control bunker near Tuzla. 

• 	 UN/NATO Air Strikes - From August 1993 to August 1994, NATO 

provided air strikes, upon request from the UN, to protect Sarajevo 

and the other UN-designated Safe Areas. One such decision was to 

enforce a weapons free exclusion zone around Sarajevo and to 

respond to any heavy weapons attacks against the other Safe 

Areas. Both UN and NATO commanders had to agree before 

commencing operations-this limited the effectiveness of the air 

strikes (a.k.a. "dual key" approach). NATO carried out the following 

operations for UNPROFOR. 

• 	 On 5 August 1994, NATO aircraft attacked a target in the 

weapons free exclusion zone around Sarajevo. 

• 	 On 22 September 1994, NATO aircraft attacked a Bosnian Serb 

tank after an attack against an UNPROFOR vehicle near 

Sarajevo. 

• 	 On 21 November 1994, NATO aircraft attacked the Serb-held 

airfield in Udbina, Croatia. This was in response to the use of the 

airfield to launch attacks into Bosnia-Herzegovina Safe Areas. 

• 	 On 23 November 1994, conducted air strikes against air defense 

radars in Otoka, Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was in response to 

· two attacks from a surface-to-air missile site against two NA TO 

aircraft. · 

• 

Appendix C 
208 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


• 	 On 25-26 May 1995, NATO aircraft struck Bosnian Serb 

ammunition depots in Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina. This attack was 

in response to numerous violations of the exclusion zones and 

the shelling of the Safe Areas. In response, the Bosnian Serbs 

took 370 UNPROFOR troops hostage and used them as human 

shields to stop further air attacks. 

• 	 On 4 August 1995, NATO aircraft struck Croatian Serb air 

defense radars near Udbina airfield and Knin, Croatia. · 

Operation Deliberate Force - (30 AUG 95 - 20 SEP 95). Operation 

Deliberate Force was NATO's response to continued artillery attacks on 

Sarajevo. This UN and NATO enforcement operation began on 30 August 

1995 (UNSCR 836 and earlier NATO decisions simplified the UN/NATO 

"dual key" approach to targeting). On this date, NATO aircraft began a 

series of attacks against Bosnian Serb military sites around Sarajevo and 

other places in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This operation sought to reduce the 

threat to Sarajevo and the other UN-designated Safe Areas, force the 

withdrawal of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from the exclusion zone 

around Sarajevo, allow complete freedom of movement for UNPROFOR 

forces and non-governmental organizations, and secure unrestricted use of 

the Sarajevo Airport. On 20 September 1995, NATO and UNPROFOR 

determined that the mission was accomplished and stopped the air strikes. 

NATO reserved the right to resume operations. NATO aircraft flew 3,515 

total sorties. 

AppendixC 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 209 


Appendix D(l): NATO Task Force Organization 

NAC IFOR (Polltlcal Control) 

(1996) 

SAC EUR 

(Belglum) 

: 

U.S. Adrrin. & Logistics S!wcrt **** ............................. 
 AFSOUTH USEUCOM :

(Stuttgart) (Naples) 

. 

. 

  . ~ ** ** ···:~~~~~--~~~1~~~~~~~~~~·d IFOR : USAREUR :

(Sarajevo) ; (Heidelberg) ;

~***k1 L ..•..•.• T.•••.••••

Naval Component 

  

(COMNAVSOUTH) 

(Naples) 

MNO-SW (UK) 

(Banja Luka) 

**  


.Alllecl Rapid Reaction ClllP 

(ARRC) (Sarajevo) 

*** 


NAC 

(Polltlcal Control) 

SAC EUR 

(Belgium) 

  
 SFOR 

(Sarajevo)

** ** 


AJr Component 

(CAOC) 

(Vlcenza) 

•..•••.•••.l•....••.•• ; USAREUR (Fwd) :

1 1 (Hungary) 

L.~..1 


MND.SE (French) 

(Mostar) 

** 

MNl).N (US) 

{Tuzla) 

** .................................... 


us. Admn. & Logistics &.q>ort 

. . ···························­ ; USEUCOM ; 

l

~··::::::::::r:::::::~·j   1 

l USAREUR l l (....._rg) !** **!l 

~:::::::::I:::::::::~ l USAREUR (FWd) l (Hungary) 

SFOR 

(1998) 

MND.SW(UK) 

(Banja Luka) 

** 


MNO-SE 

(Mostar) 

(French) L~···

** .......................... MNO.N (US) 

{Tuzla) 

** 

USTukForce .............., Russian BOE 

NORDPOLBDE Tur1dshBDE 

Appendix D( I) 
210 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 


Appendix D(2): SFOR Headquarters Structure 

(as ofFEB 1998) 

SFOR Headquarters Structure 

i:rtf~~ a POLAD 

II§ LEGAD 

m§ PIO 

DCOMSFOR D

:;& 1ocJ•1:m 

CJSOTF I ~ 

-

Appendix D(2) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 211 

Appendix D(3): Structure ofSFOR Multi-Natio1ull Divisions 


. (MN!Js) (as ofFEB 1998) 


SFOR Multi-National Divisions (MNDs) 


MND-N (13,.000) 

'IP 

UK 

~us~us ~~ Bia RUS RUS FR GE UKR ~NL(·) SP 

TU 

NOROPO 

~TU ~ fiilcze SP 

~ nltl 

DA PL iiMAL(+) 

~~ NOR SWE ~ ~ ~ IT PO EGY 

(-) 

THEATER 


RESERVE 


us 

~us 

BELUGA 


GR2UP 


~~~~ 

Appendix D(3) 
D-REARCP 

1XMAJ 

2XCPTs 

1XCW2 

7 X 71Ds 

NORDPOLBDE 

1 XMAJ (NOR) 

1 XMAJ (SWE) 

vacant 

IFORLE GAD 

1 XUSJA 

1 X UK Solicitor 

1 X Dutch lawyer 

USBDE 

1 XCPT 

2 X 71Ds 

212 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Appendix D(4): Judge Advocate Disposition 

IFOR Legal Personnel 

Note: At any given time, IFOR had approximately 50 lawyers from 20 nations. Nearly half were 

U.S. JAs. U.S. JAs were In two key locations-the ISB In Hungary and the MND-N (US) Sector. This 

shows the position (and location) of the U.S. JAs and key foreign lawyers. 

MND-N Sector (US} 

RUSSBDE 

1 X LTC (RUS) 

D-MA!NCP 

1 X LTC (SJA) 

2 X MA.ls (DSJA 

&Claims) 

3 X CPTs (Ops, 

Adlaw &JMC) 

5X 71Ds 

USAVN BDE 

1 XCPT · 

2 X 71Ds 

MPBDE 

1XCPT 

2 X 71Ds 

Support 2rJ2 

1 XCPT 

1X71Ds 

TDS 

1XMAJ 

1XCPT 

2X 71Ds 

ISB (HUNGARY) 

USAREUR(F) 

4XJAs 

4x 71Ds 

21st TAACOM (fl 

5XJAs 

6 X 71Ds 

Appendix D(4) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-98 213 

SFOR Legal Personnel 

Note: The change from IFOR to SFOR reduced the forces from approximately 60,000 to 35,000. 

The IFOR MND-N had 2 U.S. ground maneuver brigades (each with its own JA). The SFOR 

MND-N has only 1 U.S. ground maneuver brigade. This brigade has 3 battalion task forces (BN 

TFs) - each with its own JA. This is the first large-scale operation where JAs have been routinely 

assigned at the battalion level! 

MND-N Sector (US} 

,_ .-·-----~,, 

NORDPOLBDE 

1 XMAJ (NOR) 

1 X MAJ (SWE) 

vacant 

··--, 

RUSSBDE 

1 X LTC (RUS) 

D-MAINCP 

1 X LTC (SJA) 

2 X MA.ls (DSJA 

~:z~t=~77~-1 & Claims) 

3 X CPTs (Ops, 

Adlaw &JMC) 

5X71Ds 

USAVN BOE 

1 XCPT 

1 X71D 

TDS 

US BNTF 

1 XCPT 

US BNTF 

1 XCPT 

1 XCPT 

1 X71D 

1 X71D 1 X71D 

SFOR 

LEGAD 

8 X JAs (Incl. LEGAD) 

1 X UK Solicitor (Dep LEGAD) 

1 X Bosnian Lawyer 

1 X71D 

ISB (HUNGARY) 

USAREUR (Fl (before downsizing) 

9XJAs 

11x71Ds 

USAREUR CF) (after downsizing) 

5XJAs 

7 X 71Ds 

Appendix D(4) 
214 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 


OJF (1CD) Legal Personnel 

This diagram includes Base Camp designations. Base Camps Colt, Blue Factory, and 

Guardian are now closed. As of 28October1998, TFE had 13 JAs authorized and assigned. 

The fifth base camp, Demi, is covered by Base Camp Dobol legal personnel. A 30 mile 

drive to Base Camp Demi can take over 2 hours in a 4-vehicle up-armored HMMWV convoy. 

The trip to Base Camp McGovern takes almost 3 hours. 

MND-N Sector (US) 

McGOVERN 


EAGLE BASE 

0 Z.vldovlc 

DOBOL 

1 X LTC (SJA) 

2XMA.Js 

4XCPTs CAMP 1 X CPT (TDS) 

7 X 71Ds 


1 XCPT 


BEDROCK 

(5 X NCOs & 2 X SPCs) 

1 X 71 D 

1ST BOE 

1 XCPT 

2X71D COMANCHE 

1 XCPT 

2X71D 

AND DEMI 

1 XCPT 

1 X71D 

Appendix D(4) . 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-98 215 

Appendix D(S): Command Post Layouts (/FOR) 


Assault Command Post 


This was the configuration ofthe U.S. task force's Assault Command 

Post (ACP) on first entering Bosnia. Key to note is the inclusion ofthe 

JA and the JA 's location with the G3 and proximity to the front map 

boards and briefing area. 

WARLORD MCS 


IFHR AM Radio 

TACFAX 

Map Boards 

II = a Computer 

Terminal 

Appendix D(5) 
216 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 

Appendix D(5) (continued): Division Main/Rear Command Posts 

This is representative ofthe Task Force Eagle (MND(N)) 

Headquarters layout. It is representative only-not all inclusive nor 

intended to be the answer on how such a headquarters should be set 

up. Both the main and the rear headquarters used similar concepts of 

arranging staffmembers in layered tiers, centered around the map 

boards and battle captain area. There were staffsections and 

representatives too numerous to name or depict on the representatiye 

diagram, below~ 

Battle Control Center -Task Force Eagle HQ 


Battle Update Brief (BUB) Tent - IFOR 


Wing Board w/ROE Release 

.. Wing B~ ----M•a•pB•o•ar•d•s--­::?Icy M•Uh 

Bd•LNO.-+[] Radlos---··D o~ G3, G2 Battle 

Captains 

.... VTCand 

updated .ppt lcors CG ADC-Ml 

slides running 

24hrs. 

JIB PA GS/PO LAD JMC JCO SJA 


.a. 

Stepped Rows ~ Ir 

MP PSYOPs CAS FA G4/DTO MED LNOs 

Appendix D(5) 

LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 217 

AppendixE(l): List ofC~itical International Agreements 

Critical International Agreements 

Hungary 

• 	 Partner For Peace (PFP) Status of Forces Agreement 

• 	 Transit Agreement 

• 	 Acquisition Agreement 

• 	 Omnibus Agreement (a supplementary agreement to the 

above agreements) · 

• 	 Real Estate Leases for the ISB 

Bosnia-Herzegovina 

• 	 General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) 

• 	 Status of Forces Agreement (Appendix to the GFAP) 

• 	 Transit Agreement 

• 	 Technical Arrangements 

Croatia 

• 	 General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) 

• 	 Status of Forces Agreement (Appendix to the GFAP) 

• 	 Transit Agreement 

• 	 Technical Arrangements 

Austria, Czech State, Slovakia, Slovenia, Serbia, Switzerland, Former 

Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia 

• 	 Transit Agreements 

SOFAs - Define the legal position (privileges and immunities) of a 

visiting military force deployed in the territory of another state. 

TRANSIT AGREEMENTS-Provide clearance from non-NATO 

countries to rail/road march and overfly from Germany via several 

routes to Hungary {can define privileges, immunities, responsibilities, 

and customs procedures) 

TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS/IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENTS ­

Supplement, In detail, SOFAs and Transit Agreements 

Appendix E(J) 
218 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 

Appendix E(2): Chapter VII ofthe United Nations Charter 

CHAPTER VII 

ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, · 

BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION 

Article 39 

The Security Council shall determine the existence l>f any threat to the 

peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 

recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in 

accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 

international peace and security. 

Article 40 

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security 

Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon 

the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties 

concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems 

necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without 

prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. 

The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with 

such provisional measures. 

Article 41 

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use 

of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it 

may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such 

measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of 

economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and 

other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 

relations. 

Appendix E(2) 

LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 219 


Article 42 

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in 

Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it 

may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary 

to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action 

may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, 

sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. 

Article 43 

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the 

maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to 

make available to the Security Council, on its call and in 

accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, 

assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary 

for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. 

2. 	 Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and 

types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and 

the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided. 

3. 	 The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as 

possible on the initiative of.the Security Council. They shall be 

concluded between the Security Council and Members or between 

the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject 

·to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their 


respective constitutional processes. 


Article 44 

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before 

calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces 

in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that 

Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of 

the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of 

that Member's armed forces. 

Article 45 

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, 

Members shall hold immediately available national air-force 

contingents for combined international enforcement action. The 

strength and degree of readiness of these contingents as:id plans for 

Appendix E(2) 
220 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down 

in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by 

the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff 

Committee. 

Article 46 

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security 

Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. 

Article 47 

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and 

assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security 

Council's military requirements for the maintenance of 

international peace and security, the employment and command of 

forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and 

possible disarmament. 

2. 	 The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of 

the permanent members of the Security Council or their . 

representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not 

permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the 

Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of 

the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that 

Member in its work. 

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the 

Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces 

placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating 

to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently. 

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security 

Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, 

may establish regional sub-committees. 

Article 48 

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security 

Council for the maintenance of international peace and security 

shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some 

of them, as the Security Council may determine. 

2. 	 Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United 

Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate 

international agencies of which they remembers. 

Appendix E(2) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 221 


Article 49 

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual 

assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security 

Council. 

Article 50 

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by 

the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United 

Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic 

problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have 

the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of 

those problems. 

Article 51 

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 

individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against 

a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 

measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 

Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of selfdefence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and 

shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 

Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such 

action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 

international peace and security. 

Appendix E(2) 

222 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Appendix E(3): United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 

1031 

UNITED 

NATIONS 

Security Council 

Dis tr. 

GENERAL 

S/RES/1031 (1995) 

15 December 1995 

RESOLUTION 1031 (1995) 

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3607th meeting, on 15 

December 1995 

The Security Council, 

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions concerning the conflicts 

in the former Yugoslavia, 

Reaffirming its commitment to a negotiated political settlement of the 

conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, preserving the territorial integrity 

of all States there within their internationally recognized borders, 

Welcoming the signing on 14December1995 at the Paris Peace 

Conference of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina and the Annexes thereto (collectively the Peace 

Agreement, S/1995/999, annex) by the Republic of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of 

Yugoslavia and the other parties thereto, 

Welcoming also the Dayton Agreement on implementing the 

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 1ONovember 1995 

(S/1995/1021, annex), 

Appendix E(3) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 223 

Welcoming further the conclusions of the Peace Implementation 

Conference held in London on 8 and 9 December 1995 (the London 

Conference) (S/1995/1029), and in particular its decision to establish a 

Peace Implementation Council and its Steering Board as referred to in 

those conclusions, 

Paying tribute to the International Conference on the Former 

Yugoslavia (ICFY) for its efforts aimed at achieving a peace settlement 

and taking note of the decision of the London Conference that the 

Peace Implementation Council will subsume the ICFY, 

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 13 December 

1995 (S/1995/1031), 

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a 

threat to international peace and security, 

Determined to promote the peaceful resolution of the conflicts in 

accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 

United Nations, 

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 

1. Welcomes and supports the Peace Agreement and calls upon the 

parties to fulfil in good faith the commitments entered into in that 

Agreement; 

2. Expresses its intention to keep the implementation of the Peace 

Agreement under review; 

3. Welcomes the progress made towards mutual recognition among 

the successor States to the former Socialist Federal Republic of 

Yugoslavia, within their internationally recognized borders; 

4. Reaffirms its resolutions concerning compliance with international 

humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, reaffirms also that all 

States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal for the 

Former Yugoslavia and its organs in accordance with the provisions 

of resolution 827 (1993) of 25May1993 and the Statute of the 

Appendix E(3) 
224 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

International Tribunal, and shall comply with requests for assistance 

or orders issued by a Trial Chamber under article 29 of the Statute, 

and calls upon them to allow the establishment of offices of the 

Tribunal; · 

5. Recognizes that the parties shall cooperate fully with all entities 

involved in implementation of the peace settlement, as described in 

the Peace Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the 

Security Council, including the International Tribunal for the Former 

Yugoslavia, and that the parties have in particular authorized the 

multinational force referred to in paragraph 14 below to take such 

actions as required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure 

compliance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement; 

6. Welcomes the agreement by the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE} to adopt and put in place a programme 

of elections for Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the request of the parties 

to Annex 3 of the Peace Agreement; 

7. Welcomes also the parties' commitment, as specified in the Peace 

Agreement, to securing to all persons within their jurisdiction the 

highest level of internationally recognized human rights and 

fundamental freedoms, stresses that compliance with this 

commitment is of vital importance in achieving a lasting peace, and 

welcomes the invitation by the parties to the United Nations 

Commission on Human Rights, the OSCE, the United Nations High 

Commissioner for Human Rights and other intergovernmental or 

regional human rights missions or organizations to monitor closely 

the human rights situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina; 

8. Welcomes further the parties' commitment to the right of all 

refugees and displaced persons freely to return to their homes of 

origin in safety, notes the leading humanitarian role which has been 

given by the Peace Agreement to the United Nations High 

Commissioner for Refugees, in coordination with other agencies 

involved and under the authority of the Secretary-General, in assisting 

with the repatriation and relief of refugees and displaced persons, and 

stresses the importance of repatriation being phased, gradual and 

orderly; 

Appendix E(3) 
II 

LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 225 


9. Emphasizes the importance of the creation of conditions conducive 

to the reconstruction and development of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

and encourages Member States to provide assistance for the 

programme of reconstruction in that country; 

10. Underlines the relationship, as·described in the conclusions of the 

London Conference, between the fulfilment by the parties of their 

commitments in the Peace Agreement and the readiness of the 

international community to commit financial resources for 

reconstruction and development; 

11. Welcomes the agreement of the parties to Annex 1 ·B of the Peace 

Agreement that establishment of progressive measures for regional 

stability and arms control is essential to creating a stable peace in the 

region, emphasizes the importance of all Member States supporting 

their efforts to this end, and supports the OSCE's commitment to 

assist the parties with the negotiation and implementation of such 

measures; 

12. Welcomes the willingness of the Member States acting through or 

in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1 ·A of the 

Peace Agreement to assist the parties to the Peace Agreement by 

deploying a multinational implementation force; 

13. Notes the Invitation of the parties to the international community 

to send to the region for a period of approximately one year a 

multinational implementation force to assist in implementation of the 

territorial and other militarily related provisions of Annex 1 ·A of the 

Peace Agreement; 

14. Authorizes the Member States acting through or in cooperation 

with. the organization referred to in Annex 1 ·A of the Peace Agreement 

to establish a multinational implementation force (IFOR) under unified 

command and control in order to fulfil the role specified in Annex 1-A 

and Annex 2 of the Peace Agreement; 

15. Authorizes the Member States acting under paragraph 14 above to 

take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to 

ensure· compliance with Annex 1 ·A of the Peace Agreement, stresses 

Appendix E(3) 

226 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

that the parties shall be held equally responsible for compliance with 

that Annex, and shall be equally subject to such enforcement action 

by IFOR as may be necessary to ensure implementation of that Annex 

and the protection of IFOR, and takes note that the parties have 

consented to IFOR's taking such measures; 

16. Authorizes the Member States acting under paragraph 14 above, in 

accordance with Annex 1 ·A of the Peace Agreement, to take all 

necessary measures to ensure compliance with the rules and 

procedures, to be established by the Commander of IFOR, governing 

command and control of airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina with 

respect to all civilian and military air traffic; 

17. Authorizes Member States to take all necessary measures, at the 

request of IFOR, either in defence of IFOR or to assist the force in 

carrying out its mission, and recognizes the right of the force to take 

all necessary measures to defend itself from attack or threat of attack; 

18. Demands that the parties respect the security and freedom of 

movement of IFOR and other international personnel; 

19. Decides that, with effect from the day on which the SecretaryGeneral reports to the Council that the transfer of authority from the 

United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to IFOR has taken 

place, the authority to take certain measures conferred upon States by 

resolutions 770 (1992) of 13 August 1992, 781 (1992) of 9 October 

1992, 816 (1993) of 31 March 1993, 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993, 844 

(1993) of 18 June 1993 and 958 (1994) of 19November1994 shall be 

terminated, and that the provisions of resolution 824 (1993) of 6 May 

1993 and subsequent resolutions regarding safe areas shall also be 

terminated from the same date; 

20. Requests the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate 

with the IFOR Commander to ensure the effective management of the 

airports in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the light of the responsibilities 

conferred on IFOR by Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement with regard 

to the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina; 

21. Decides, with a view to terminating the authorization granted in 

paragraphs 14to17 above one year after the transfer of authority from 

UNPROFOR to IFOR, to review by that date and to take a decision 

Appendix E(3) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 227 

whether that authorization should continue, based upon the 

recommendations from the States participating in IFOR and from the 

High Representative through the SecretaryGeneral; 

22. Decides also that the embargo imposed by resolution 713 (1991) of 

25September1991 shall not apply to weapons and military equipment 

destined for the sole use of the Member States acting under 

paragraph 14 above, or of international police forces; 

23. Invites all States, in particular those in the region, to provide 


appropriate support and facilities, including transit facilities, for the 


Member States acting under paragraph 14 above; 


24. Welcomes the conclusion of the agreements concerning the status 

of forces as referred to in Appendix B to Annex 1-A of the Peace 

Agreement, and demands that the parties comply fully with those 

agreements; 

25. Requests the Member States acting through or in cooperation with 

the organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to 

report to the Council, through the appropriate channels and at least at 

monthly intervals, the first such report be made not later than 10 days 

following the adoption of this resolution; 

26. Endorses the establishment of a High Representative, following 


the request of the parties, who, in accordance with Annex 10 on the 


· civilian implementation of the Peace Agreement, will monitor the 

implementation of the Peace Agreement and mobilize and, as 

appropriate, give guidance to, and coordinate the activities of, the 

civilian organizations and agencies involved, and agrees the 

designation of Mr. Carl Bildt as High Representative; 

27. Confirms that the High Representative is the final authority in 

· theatre regarding interpretation of Annex 10 on the civilian 

implementation of the Peace Agreement; 

28. Decides that all States concerned, and in particular those where 

the High Representative establishes offices, shall ensure that the High 

Representative enjoys such legal capacity as may be necessary for 

the exercise of his functions, including the capacity to contract and to 

acquire and dispose of real and personal property; 

Appendix E(3) 
228 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


29. Notes that close cooperation between IFOR, the High 

Representative and the agencies will be vital to ensure successful 

implementation; 

30. Affirms the need for the implementation of the Peace Agreement in 

its entirety and, in this context, stresses the importance it attaches to 

the urgent implementation of Annex 11 of the Peace Agreement, 

decides to act expeditiously on the report of the Secretary-General 

recommending the establishment of a United Nations Civilian Police 

Force with the tasks set out in that Annex, together with a civilian 

office with the responsibilities described in the report of the 

Secretary-General, and further decides that in the interim civilian 

police, de-mining, civil affairs and other personnel that might be 

required to carry out the tasks described in that report shall continue 

in theatre, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 33 and 34 

below; 

31. Stresses the need for early action in Sarajevo to create confidence 

between the communities and to this end requests the SecretaryGeneral to ensure the early redeployment of elements of United 

Nations civilian police from the Republic of Croatia to Sarajevo; 

32. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Council reports 

from the High Representative, in accordance with Annex 1 Oof the 

Peace Agreement and the conclusions of the London Conference, on 

the implementation of the Peace Agreement; 

Ill 

33. Decides that the mandate of UNPROFOR shall terminate on the 

date on which the Secretary-General reports to the Council that the 

transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR has taken place; 

34. Approves the arrangements set out in the report of the 

SecretaryGeneral on the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and headquarters 

elements from the United Nations Peace Force (UNPF), including the 

arrangements for the command and control of UNPROFOR following 

the transfer of authority from it to IFOR; 

Appendix E(3) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 229 

35. Expresses its warmest appreciation to all UNPROFOR personnel, 

who have served the cause of peace in the former Yugoslavia, and 

pays tribute to those who have given their lives and those who have 

suffered serious injuries in that service; 

36. Authorizes the Member States acting under paragraph 14 above to 

use all necessary means to assist in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR; 

37. Calls upon the parties to ensure the safety and security of 

UNPROFOR and confirms that UNPROFOR will continue to enjoy all 

existing privileges and immunities, including during the period of 

withdrawal; 

38. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council when the 

withdrawal of UNPROFOR is complete; 

IV 

39. Recognizes the unique, extraordinary and complex character of 

the present situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, requiring an 

exceptional response; 

40. Decides to remain seized of the matter. --· • · 

Appendix E(3) 
230 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Appendix E(4): Index ofUnited Nations Security Council 

Resolutions 

713 	 September 25, 1991 

The Council fully supports the collective efforts for 

peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia, and decides that all 

States immediately implement a general and complete 

embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military 

equipment to Yugoslavia. 

721 	 November 27, 1991 

The Council approves the efforts towards the possible 

establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping 

operation in Yugoslavia, and urges the Yugoslav parties 

to comply fully with the agreement signed in Geneva on 

23 November 1991. 

724 	 December 15, 1991 

The Council endorses the Secretary-General's offer to 

send to Yugoslavia a small group of personnel to 

prepare for possible deployment of a peace-keeping 

operation, and decides to establish a Committee to 

ensure that the general and complete embargo 

imposed by resolution 713 is effectively applied. 

727 	 January 8, 1992 

The Council welcomes the signing of an Implementing 

Accord at Sarajevo on 2 January 1992, and endorses 

the Secretary-General's intention to send to Yugoslavia 

a group of up to 50 military liaison officers to promote 

maintenance of the cease-fire. 

740 	 February 7, 1992 

The Council reaffirms its approval of the United Nations 

peace-keeping plan, approves the Secretary-General's 

proposal to increase the authorized strength of the 

military liaison mission, welcomes the continuing efforts 

to rem.ave the remaining obstacle in the deployment of 

a peace-keeping operation, and calls upon all States to 

Appendix E(4) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 231 


cooperate with the Committee established by resolution 

724. 

743 	 February 21, 1992 

The Council decides to establish a United Nations 

Protection Force (UNPROFOR), requests the 

Secretary-General to immediately deploy those 

elements of the Force which can assist in developing an 

implementation plan for the earliest possible full 

deployment of - UNPROFOR, and decides that the 

embargo imposed by paragraph 6 of resolution 713 

shall not apply to weapons and military equipment 

destined for the sole use of UNPROFOR. 

749 	 April 7, 1992 

The Council decides to authorize the earliest possible 

full deployment of UNPROFOR, and appeals to all 

parties and others concerned in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina to cooperate with the efforts of the 

European Community to bring about a cease-fire and 

negotiated political solution. 

752 	 May 15, 1992 

The Council demands that all parties concerned in 

Bosnia and Herzegovina stop the fighting immediately, 

that ·all forms of interference from outside, as well as 

any attempts to change the ethnic composition of the 

population, cease immediately and that those units of 

the Yugoslav People's Army and elements of the 

Croatian Army either be withdrawn, or be subject to the 

authority of the Government of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, or be disbanded and disarmed with their 

weapons placed under effective international inventory. 

753 	 May 18, 1992 

The Council recommends to the General Assembly that 

the Republic of Croatia be admitted to membership in 

the United Nations. 

754 	. May 18, 1992 

The Council recommends to the General Assembly that 

Appendix E(4) 
232 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

the Republic of Slovenia be admitted to membership in 

the United Nations. 

755 	 May 20, 1992 _ 

The Council recommends to the General Assembly that 

the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina be admitted to 

membership in the United Nations. 

757 	 May 30, 1992 

The Council condemns the failure of the authorities in 

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 

Montenegro) to take effective measures to fulfil the 

requirements of resolution 752, and decides to impose 

comprehensive mandatory sanctions against that 

country. 

758 	 June 8, 1992 

The Council notes the agreement of all parties to the 

reopening of Sarajevo airport for humanitarian purposes 

under the exclusive authority of the United Nations, 

decides to enlarge the mandate and strength of 

UNPROFOR, strongly condemns all those parties and 

others concerned that are responsible for violations of 

the cease-fire, and demands that all parties and others 

concerned create immediately the necessary conditions 

for unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to 

Sarajevo and other destinations in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. 

760 	 June 18, 1992 

The Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of 

the United Nations, decides that certain prohibitions 

contained in resolution 757 shall not apply, with the 

approval of the Committee established by resolution 

724 under the simplified and accelerated "no objection" 

procedure, to commodities and products for essential 

humanitarian need. 

761 	 June 29, 1992 

The Council authorizes the Secretary-General to deploy 

immediately additional elements of UNPROFOR to 

Appendix E(4) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 233 


ensure the security and functioning of Sarajevo airport 

and the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and calls 

upon all States to contribute to the international 

humanitarian efforts in Sarajevo and its environs. 

762 	 June 30, 1992 

The Council recommends the establishment of the Joint 

Commission under the chairmanship of UNPROFOR, 

and authorizes the strengthening of the Force to 

perform additional functions in certain areas ("pink 

zones") in Croatia. 

764 	 July 13, 1992 

The Council authorizes the Secretary-General to deploy 

immediately further additional elements of UNPROFOR 

to ensure the security and functioning of Sarajevo 

airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and 

reaffirms that all parties are bound to comply with the 

obligations under international humanitarian law. 

769 	 August 7, 1992 

The Council authorizes the enlargement of 

UNPROFOR's mandate and strength to enable it to 

perform immigration and customs functions on the 

international borders in Croatia, and resolutely 

condemns the abuses committed against the civilian 

population, particularly on ethnic grounds. 

770 	 August13, 1992 

The Council calls upon States to "take nationally or 

through regional agencies or arrangements all 

measures necessary" to facilitate the delivery of 

humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever 

needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

771 August13, 1992 

The Council strongly condemns any violations of 

international humanitarian law, including those involved 

in the practice of "ethnic cleansing", demands that 

. relevant international humanitarian organizations, and in 

particular the ICRC, be granted immediate, unimpeded 

Appendix E(4) 

234 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


and continued access to camps, prisons and detention 

centres within the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and 

calls upon States and, as appropriate, international 

humanitarian organizations, to collate substantial 

information in their possession or submitted to them 

relating to the violations of humanitarian law committed 

in the former Yugoslavia and to make this information 

available to the Council. The Council decides, acting 

under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 

that all parties and others concerned in the former 

Yugoslavia, and all military forces in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, shall comply with the provisions of the 

present resolution. 

776 	 September 14, 1992 

The Council authorizes the enlargement of 

UNPROFOR'S mandate and strength in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina to provide protection to UNHCR-organized 

humanitarian convoys, as well as to convoys of 

released detainees if requested by the ICRC. 

777 	 September 19, 1992 

The Council considers that the Federal Republic of 

Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue 

automatically the membership of the former Socialist 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations, 

and recommends to the General Assembly that it 

decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 

and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the 

United Nations and that it shall not participate in the 

work of the General Assembly. 

779 	 October 6, 1992 

The Council authorizes UNPROFOR to assume 

responsibility for monitoring the arrangements agreed 

for the complete withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from 

Croatia, the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula 

and the removal of heavy weapons from neighbouring 

areas of Croatia and Montenegro. 

Appendix E(4) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 235 


780 	 October 6, 1992 

The Council requests the Secretary-General to 

establish an impartial Commission of Experts with a 

view to providing him with its conclusions on the 

evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 

and other violations of humanitarian law committed in 

the territory of the former Yugoslavia. 

781 	 October 9, 1992 un/r0781.txtun/r0781.txt 

The Council decides to establish a ban on military 

flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("NoFly Zone"), and undertakes to examine without delay all 

the information brought to its attention concerning the 

implementation of the ban and, in the case of violations, 

to consider urgently the further measures necessary to 

enforce it. 

786 	 November 10, 1992 

The Council reaffirms its ban on military flights in the 

airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, endorses the 

general concept of operations described in the 

Secretary-General's report (S/24767 and Add.1 ), and 

approves his recommendation that the strength of ­

UNPROFOR be increased to enable it to implement the 

concept of operations. 

787 	 November 16, 1992 

The Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 

decides to prohibit the transshipment through the 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 

Montenegro) of certain products unless such 

transshipment is specifically authorized, and that any 

vessel in which a majority or controlling interest is held 

by a person or undertaking in or operating from the 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 

Montenegro) shall be considered a vessel of the 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 

Montenegro) regardless of the flag under which the 

vessel sails. The Council calls upon States, acting 

Appendix E(4) 
236 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 

nationally or through regional agencies or 

arrangements, to use such measures as may be 

necessary to halt all inward and outward maritime 

shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and 

destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the 

provisions of resolutions 713 (1991) and 757 (1992). 

795 	 December 11, 1992 

The Council authorizes the Secretary-General to 

establish a presence of UNPROFOR in the former 

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; requests him to 

deploy immediately the military, civil affairs, and 

administrative personnel; and also requests him to 

deploy the police monitors immediately upon receiving 

the consent of the Government in the former Yugoslav 

Republic of Macedonia. 

798 	 December 18, 1992 

The Council, appalled by reports of the massive, 

organized and systematic detention and rape of women, 

in particular Muslim women, in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, strongly condemns these acts of 

"unspeakable brutality" and requests the SecretaryGeneral to provide such necessary means of support as 

are available to him in the area to facilitate the 

European Community's investigative mission to have 

free and secure access to the places of detention. 

802 · 	 January 25, 1993 

The Council demands the immediate cessation of 

hostile activities by Croatian armed forces within or 

adjacent to the UNPAs and their withdrawal from these 

areas, strongly condemns the attacks by these forces 

against UNPROFOR and demands their immediate 

cessation. It also demands that the heavy weapons 

seized from the - UNPROFOR-controlled storage areas 

be returned immediately, and that all parties and others 

concerned comply strictly with the cease-fire 

arrangements already agreed and cooperate fully and 

Appendix E(4) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 237 

unconditionally in implementing the United Nations 

peace-keeping plan, including the disbanding and 

demobilization of Serb Territorial Defence units or other 

units of similar functions. 

807 	 February 19, 1993 

The Council demands that the parties and others 

concerned comply fully with the United Nations peacekeeping plan in Croatia and with the other commitments 

they have undertaken, demands also the full and strict 

observance of all relevant Council resolutions relating to 

the mandate and operations of UNPROFOR in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina, and decides, in the context of these 

demands, to extend UNPROFOR's mandate for an 

interim period terminating on 31 March 1993. The 

Council urges the parties and others concerned to 

cooperate fully with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering 

Committee of the International Conference on the 

Former Yugoslavia in order to ensure full . 

implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping 

mandate in Croatia. It invites the Secretary-General to 

take all appropriate measures to strengthen the security 

of UNPROFOR and requests him to submit a report on 

the further extension of - UNPROFOR's mandate. 

808 	 February 22, 1993 

The Council decides to establish an international 

tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for 

serious violations of international humanitarian law 

committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 

1991, and requests the Secretary-General to submit for 

consideration by the Council at the earliest possible 

date a report on all aspects of this matter. 

815 	 March 30, 1993 

The Council extends UNPROFOR's mandate for an 

add_itional interim period until 30 June 1993. It decides . 

.to reconsider within one month, or at any time at the 

request of the Secretary-General, the Force's mandate 

Appendix E(4) 
238 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

in light of developments of the International Conference 

on the Former Yugoslavia and the situation on the . 

ground and requested the Secretary-General to report 

urgently to the Council on how the United Nations 

Peace Plan for Croatia can be effectively implemented. 

816 March 31, 1993 

The Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 

authorizes Member States, seven days after the 

adoption of the resolution, acting nationally or through 

regional arrangements, to take, under the authority of 

the Security Council and subject to close coordination 

with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all 

necessary measures in the airspace of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, in the event of further violations, to ensure 

compliance with the ban on flights, and proportionate to 

the specific circumstances and the nature of flights. 

817 April 7, 1993 

The Council recommends that the General Assembly 

admit to membership in the United Nations the State 

which is being provisionally referred to for all purposes 

within the United Nations as "the former Yugoslav 

Republic of Macedonia" pending settlement of the 

difference that has arisen over the name of that State. 

819 April 16, 1993 

The Council demands that all parties treat Srebrenica 

and its surroundings as a safe area which should be 

free from any armed attack or any other hostile act. It 

also demands the immediate withdrawal of Bosnian 

Serb paramilitary units from areas surrounding that 

town and the cessation of armed attacks .against it, 

requests the Secretary-General to take steps to 

increase the presence of UNPROFOR in Srebrenica 

and to arrange for the safe transfer of ill and wounded, 

and decides to send a ·mission of Council members to 

ascertain, firsthand, the situation in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. 

Appendix E(4) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 239 


820 	 April 17, 1993 

The Council commends the peace plan for Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, welcomes the fact that the plan had been 

accepted in full by two of the Bosnian parties and calls 

on the Bosnian Serb party to accept the peace plan in 

full. It decides to strengthen the sanctions regime 

imposed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

(Serbia and Montenegro), effective nine days after the 

date of adoption of the resolution, unless the Bosnian 

Serb party sign the peace plan and cease their military 

attacks in Bosnia and Her.legovina. 

821 	 April 28, 1993 

The Council reaffirms that the Federal Republic of 

Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue · 

automatically the membership of the former Socialist 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations, 

and recommends to the General Assembly that it 

decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 

and Montenegro) shall not participate in the work of the 

Economic and Social Council. 

824 	 May 6, 1993 

The Council declares that the capital of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, Sarajevo, and other such threatened 

areas, in particular the towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, 

Bihac, as well as Srebrenica, should be treated as safe 

areas by all the parties concerned and should be free of 

armed attacks and from any other hostile act. 

827 	 May 25, 1993 

The Council decides to establish an International 

Tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons 

responsible for serious violations of international 

humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 

Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991 and a date to be 

determined by the Security Council upon the restoration 

of peace. 

836 	 June 4, 1993 un/r0836.txtun/r0836.txt 

Appendix E(4) 
240 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

The Council decides to extend the mandate of 

UNPROFOR in order to enable it to deter attacks 

against the safe areas referred to in resolution 824 

(1993); authorizes UNPROFOR, acting in self-defence, 

to take the necessary measures, including the use of 

force, in response to bombardments against or armed 

incursion into the safe areas by any of the parties or in 

the event of deliberate obstruction in or around those 

areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of 

protected humanitarian convoys; decides that Member 

States, acting nationally or through regional 

organizations or arrangements, may take, under the 

authority of the Security Council and subject to close 

coordination with the Secretary-General and 

UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the use 

of air power, in and around the safe areas in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the 

performance of its mandate. 

838 June 10, 1993 

The Council requests the Secretary-General to submit a 

further report on options for the deployment of 

international observers on the borders of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. 

842 June 18, 1993 

The Council welcomes the offer made by a Member 

State (United States of America) to contribute additional 

personnel to the UNPROFOR presence in the former 

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 

843 June 18, 1993 

The Council welcomes the establishment by the 

Committee [set up pursuant to resolution 724 (1991 )] of 

its working group and invites the Committee, as it 

completes the examination of each request for 

assistance under the provisions of Article 50 of the 

Charter, to make recommendations to the President of 

the Council for appropriate action. 

Appendix E(4) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 241 


844 	 June 18, 1993 

The Council authorizes the reinforcement of 

UNPROFOR to meet the additional force requirements. 

845 	 June 18, 1993 

The Council urges Greece and the former Yugoslav 

Republic of Macedonia to continue their efforts, under 

the auspices of the Secretary-General, to arrive at the 

speedy settlement of the remaining issues between 

them. 

847 	 June 30, 1993 

The Council decides to extend UNPROFOR's mandate 

for an additional interim period terminating on 30 

. September 1993. 

855 	 August9, 1993 

The Council calls upon the authorities in the Federal 

Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to 

reconsider their refusal to allow the continuation of the 

activities of the CSCE missions in Kosovo, Sandjak and 

Vojvodina. 

857 	 August20, 1993 

The Council establishes the list of candidates for 

Judges of the International Tribunal. 

859 	 August24, 1993 

The Council affirms that a solution to the conflict in 

Bosnia and Herzegovina must be.in conformity with the 

United Nations Charter and the principles of 

international law, and declares its readiness to consider 

taking necessary measures to assist the parties in the 

effective implementation of a fair and equitable 

settlement once it has been freely agreed by the 

parties. 

869 	 September 30, 1993 

The Council decides to extend UNPROFOR's mandate 

for an additional period terminating on 1 October 1993. 

870 	 ·October 1, 1993 

The Council decides to extend UNPROFOR's mandate 

Appendix E(4) 
242 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

for an additional period terminating on 5 October 1993. 

871 	 October 4, 1993 

The Council declares that continued non-cooperation in 

the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the 

Council or external interference in respect otthe full 

implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping 

plan for the Republic of Croatia would have serious 

consequences, and decides to extend UNPROFOR's 

mandate for an additional period terminating on 31 

March 1994. 

877 	 October 21, 1993 

The Council appoints Mr. Ram¢n Escovar-Salam, 

Attorney General of Venezuela, as Prosecutor of the 

International Tribunal. 

900 	 March 4, 1994 

The Council requests the Secretary-General to appoint 

a senior civilian official, who will act under the authority 

of his Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia, 

to draw up an overall assessment and plan of action for 

the restoration of essential public services in the various 

opstinas of Sarajevo, other than the city of Pale; 

requests the Secretary-General to present a report on 

the feasibility and modalities for the application of the 

protection, defined in resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 

(1993), to Maglaj, Mostar and Vitez. 

908 	 March 31, 1994 

The Council extends UNPROFOR's mandate until 

September 30, 1994. Also, it authorizes an increase of 

UNPROFOR's personnel by up to 3,500 troops. 

936 July 8, 1994 

The Council appoints Mr. Richard J. Goldstone as 

Prosecutor of the International Tribunal. 

·94 7 	 September 30, 1994 


The Council extends UNPROFOR's mandate until 


March 31, 1995. 


958 	 November 19, 1994 un/r0958.txtun/r0958.txt 

Appendix E(4) 
LA·WAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 243 


The Council affirms commitments to the sovereignity 

and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia. The 

Council approves the use of airpower to support 

UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate. 

981 	 March 31, 1995 un/r0981.txtun/r0981.txt 

The Council establishes the United Nations Confidence 

Restoring Operation (UNCRO) in Croatia. It approves 

the extention of close air support to the territory of the 

Republic of Croatia in defence of UNCRO. 

1021 	 November 22, 1995 

The Council decides that the arms embargo shall be 

terminated in phases. See the Council's 3595th 

meeting. 

1022 	 November 22, 1995 

The economic sanctions imposed by the resolutions 

757, 787, 820, 942, 943, 988, 992, 1003, and 1015 are 

suspended indefinitely. 

1023 	 November 22, 1995 

The Council recognizes the request to establish a 

Transitional Administration and authorizes an 

appropriate force to consider the request. 

1025 	 November 30, 1995 

The Council requests a report on the transitional 

administration and a transitional peace keeping force to 

implement provisions of the Base Agreement. Also, the 

mandate of UNCRO terminates on January 15, 1996. 

1026 	 November 30, 1995 

The Council extends the UNPROFOR mandate until 

January 31, 1996. 

1027 	 November 30, 1995 

The Council extends the mandate of UNPREDEP until 

May 30, 1996. 

1031 	 December 15, 1995 un/r1031.txtun/r1031.txt 

The Council authorizes the establishment of a 

·multinational Implementation Force. The Council" 

authorizes all measures to assist IFOR and authorizes 

Appendix E(4) 
244 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

IFOR to defend itself from attacks or threats of attacks. 

Further, the resolutions 770, 781, 816, 836, 844, 958, 

and 824 will be terminated. See the Council's 3607th 

meeting. 

1035 	 December 21, 1995 un/r1035.txtun/r1035.txt 

The Council decides to establish the Implementation 

Force for one year and also authorizes the 

establishment of a UN civilian police force (International 

Police Task Force - IPTF). 

1047 	 February 29, 1996 


Appoints Mrs. Louise Arbour as Prosecutor of the 


International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 


Responsible for Serious Violations of International 


Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 


Former Yugoslavia and the International Tribunal for 


Rwanda with effect from the date on which Mr. 


Goldstone's resignation takes effect. 


1066 	 July 15, 1996 

UNSC requests that a report be submitted on the 

situation in the Prevlaka peninsula as well as on the 

progress made by the Republic of Croatia and the 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia towards a settlement 

which would peacefully resolve their differences on this 

issue. The current UNMOP mandate expires January 

15, 1997. 

107 4 	 October 1, 1996 

In accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 1022 

(1995), the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of that 

resolution are being terminated. This also implies 

termination of Operation SHARP GUARD. 

1082 	 November 27, 1996 

Authorizes extension of the mandate of UNPREDEP for 

a period terminating on 31 May 1997 with a reduction of 

its military component by 300. 

1088 	 December 12, 1996 u n/r1088. txtu n/r1 088. txt 


Authorizes the IFOR follow-up: Stabilization Force. 


Appendix E(4) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 245 


1093 	 January 14, 1997 

This resolution calls on parties to adopt measures to 

improve safety of UN military observers in Prevlaka 

peninsula. It authorizes UNMOP (UN Military Observers 

Prevlaka Peninsula) to continue monitoring the 

demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula until 15 July 

1997. 

1103 	 March 31, 1997 

Authorization of increase in strength of United Nations 

Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). 

1104 	 Apri/8, 1997 

Nominations for judges of the International Criminal 

Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 

1105 	 February 22, 1997 

Suspension of reduction of the military component of 

the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force 

(UNPREDEP) until May 31, 1997. 

1107 	 May16, 1997 

Authorization of increase in strength of United Nations 

Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). 

1110 	 May28, 1997 

Extention of the UNPREDEP mandate until November 

30, 1997. 

1112 	 June 12, 1997 

Designation of Carlos Westendorp as High 

Representative for Implementation of the Peace 

Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, in succession 

to Carl Bildt. 

1119 	 July 14, 1997 

Authorizes the military observers to continue monitoring 

the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula. 

1120 	 July 14, 1997 

Calls upon the Government of the Republic of Croatia 

and the local Serb community to cooperate fully with 

·UNTAES. 

Appendix E(4) 
246 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


1126 August 27, 1997 

The terms of three retiring judges are extended so they 

may complete adjudication of 'complex case'. 

· 1140 November 28, 1997 

Extend the mandate of the United Nations Preventive 

Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) for an additional 

period terminating on 4 December 1997. 

1142 December 4, 1997 

Extends the mandate of UNPREDEP for the final period 

until 31 August 1998. 

1145 December 19, 1997 

Calls upon the Government of the Republic of Croatia 

to implement fully and promptly all of its obligations· and 

commitments. 

1147 January 13, 1998 

Authorizes the United Nations military observers to 

continue monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka 

peninsula. 

1166 May 13, 1998 

Establishes a third Trial Chamber of the International 

Tribunal. 

1168 May 21, 1998 

Authorizes an increase to the International Police Task 

Force (IPTF). 

1174 June 15, 1998 

Calls for compliance with the Peace Agreement. 

1183 June 15, 1998 

Authorizes the UN Military Observers to continue 

monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka. 

1184 July 16, 1998 

Calls on UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 

monitor and assess the court system in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina as part of an overall program of legal 

reform. 

1186 July 21, 1998 

Appendix E(4) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 247 

Authorizes an increase in the troop strength of the UN 

Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) up to 

1,050 and to extend the current mandate of 

UNPREDEP. 

1191 August 27, 1998 

Considers Judge nominations for the International 

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 

1199 September 23, 1998 

Demands an immediate cease fire in Kosovo. 

Appendix E(4) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------

248 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Appendix E(5): General Framework Agreementfor Peace in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina to Include Annex 1-A (Agreement on Military 

Aspects ofthe Peace Settlement) and Its Appendix B (SOFA Between 

NATO and Republic ofBosnia-Herzegovina) 

General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 


Herzegovina 


Text of Dayton Peace Agreement documents initialed in Dayton, Ohio 

. on November 21, 1995 and signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. The 

agreement is known as the Dayton Peace Accords. The following text 

was released by the Office of the Spokesman, December 1, 1995. 

GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR PEACE IN BOSNIA AND 

HERZEGOVINA 

·The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and 

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the "Parties"), 

Recognizing the need for a comprehensive settlement to bring an end 

to the tragic conflict in the region, 

Desiring to contribute toward that end and to promote an enduring 


peace and stability, 


Affirming their commitment to the Agreed Basic Principles issued on 

September 8, 1995, the Further Agreed Basic Principles issued on 

September 26, 1995, and the cease-fire agreements of September 14 

and October 5, 1995, 

Noting the agreement of August 29, 1995, which authorized the 

delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to sign, on behalf of 

the Republika Srpska, the parts of the peace plan concerning it, with 

the obligation to implement the agreement that is reached strictly and 

consequently, 

Appendix E(5) 

LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 249 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article I 

The Parties shall conduct their relations in accordance with the 

principles set forth in the United Nations Charter, as well as the 

Helsinki Final Act and other documents of the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe. In particular, the Parties shall 

fully respect the sovereign equality of one another, shall settle 

disputes by peaceful means, and shall refrain from any action, by 

threat or use of force or otherwise, against the territorial integrity or 

political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any other State. 

Article II 

The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been 

made concerning the military aspects of the peace settlement and 

aspects of regional stabilization, as set forth in the Agreements at 

Annex 1 ·A and Annex 1 ·B. The Parties shall fully respect and promote 

fulfillment of the commitments made in Annex 1 ·A, and shall comply 

fully with their commitments as set forth in Annex 1-B. 

Article Ill 

The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been 

made concerning the boundary demarcation between the two Entities, 

the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, as 

set forth in the Agreement at Annex 2. The Parties shall fully respect 

and promote fulfillment of the commitments made therein. 

Article IV 

The Parties welcome and endorse the elections program for Bosnia 

and Herzegovina as set forth in Annex 3. The Parties shall fully 

respect and promote fulfillment of that program. 

Article V 

The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been 

made concerning the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as set 

Appendix E(5) 
250 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

forth in Annex 4. The Parties shall fully respect and promote 

fulfillment of the commitments made therein. 

Article VI 

The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been 

made concerning the establishment of an arbitration tribunal, a 

Commission on Human Rights, a Commission on Refugees and 

Displaced Persons, a Commission to Preserve National Monuments, 

and Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations, as set forth in the 

Agreements at Annexes 5-9. The Parties shall fully respect and 

promote fulfillment of the commitments made therein. 

Article VII 

Recognizing that the observance of human rights and the protection 

of refugees and displaced persons are of vital importance in achieving 

a lasting peace, the Parties agree to and shall comply fully with the 

provisions concerning human rights set forth in Chapter One of the 

Agreement at Annex 6, as well as the provisions concerning refugees 

and displaced persons set forth in Chapter One of the Agreement at 

Annex 7. 

Article VIII 

The Parties welcome and endorse the arrangements that have been 

made concerning the implementation of this peace settlement, 

including in particular those pertaining to the civilian (non-military) 

implementation, as set forth in the Agreement at Annex 10, and the 

international police task force, as set forth in the Agreement at Annex 

11. The Parties shall fully respect and promote fulfillment of the 

commitments made therein. 

Article IX 

The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in 

implementation of this peace settlement, as described in the Annexes 

to this Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the United 

Nations Security Council, pursuant to the obligation of all Parties to 

cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and 

other violations of international humanitarian law. 

Appendii E(5) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 251 

Article X 


The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Bosnia and 


Herzegovina recognize each other as sovereign independent States 


within their international borders. Further aspects of their mutual 


recognition will be subject to subsequent discussions. 


Article XI 


This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature. 


DONE at Paris, this [21st] day of [November] , 1995, in the Bosnian, 


Croatian, English and Serbian languages, each text being equally 


authentic. 


For the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 


For the Republic of Croatia 


For the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 


Witnessed by: 


European _Union Special Negotiator 


For the French Republic 


For the Federal Republic of Germany 


For the Russian Federation 


For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 


For the United States of America 


ANNEXES 


Annex 1-A Agreement on Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement 


Appendix E(5) 
252 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Annex 1-B Agreement on Regional Stabilization 

Annex 2 Agreement on Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Related Issues 

Annex 3Agreement on Elections 

Annex 4 Constitution 

Annex 5 Agreement on Arbitration 

Annex 6 Agreement on Human Rights 

Annex 7 Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons 

Annex 8 Agreement on the Commission to Preserve National 

Monuments 

Annex 9 Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations 

Annex 10 Agreement on Civilian Implementation 

Annex 11 Agreement on International Police Task Force 

Appendix E(5) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPS/NTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 253 


Annex lA: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace 


Settlement 


Text of Dayton Peace Agreement documents initialed in Dayton, Ohio 

on November 21, 1995. Released by the Office of the Spokesman, 


December 1, 1995. 


The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia 

and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska (hereinafter the "Parties") 

have agreed as follows: 

Article I 

General Obligations 

1. The Parties undertake to recreate as quickly as possible normal 

conditions of life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They understand that 

this requires a major contribution on their part in which they will make 

strenuous efforts to cooperate with each other and with the 

international organizations and agencies which are assisting them on 

the ground. They welcome the willingness of the international 

community to send to the region, for a period of approximately one 

year, a force to assist in implementation of the territorial and other 

militarily related provisions of the agreement as described herein. 

(a) The United Nations Security Council is invited to adopt a resolution 

by which it will authorize Member States or regional organizations and 

arrangements to establish a multinational military Implementation 

' 	Force (hereinafter "IFOR"). The Parties understand and agree that this 

Implementation Force may be composed of ground, air and maritime 

units from NATO and non-NATO nations, deployed to Bosnia and 

Herzegovina to help ensure compliance with the provisions of this 

Agreement (hereinafter "Annex"). The Parties understand and agree 

that the IFOR will begin the implementation of the military aspects of 

Appendix E(5) 
254 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


this Annex upon the transfer of authority from the UNPROFOR 

Commander to the IFOR Commander (hereinafter "Transfer of 

Authority"), and that until the Transfer of Authority, UNPROFOR will 

continue to exercise its mandate. 

(b) It is understood and agreed that NATO may establish such a force, 

which will operate under the authority and subject to the direction and 

political control of the North Atlantic Council ("NAC") through the 

NATO chain of command. They undertake to facilitate its operations. 

The Parties, therefore, hereby agree and freely undertake to fully 

comply with all obligations set forth in this Annex. 

(c) It is understood and agreed that other States may assist in 

implementing the military aspects of this Annex. The Parties 

understand and agree that the modalities of those States' participation 

will be the subject of agreement between such participating States 

and NATO. 

2. The purposes of these obligations are as follows: 

(a) to establish a durable cessation of hostilities. Neither Entity shall 

threaten or use force against the other Entity, and under no 

circumstances shall any armed forces of either Entity enter into or 

stay within the territory of the other Entity without the consent of the 

government of the latter and of the Presidency of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. All armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall 

operate consistently with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 

Bosnia and Herzegovina; 

(b) to provide for the support and authorization of the IFOR and in 

particular to authorize the IFOR to take such actions as required, 

including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with this 

Annex, and to ensure its own protection; and 

(c) to establish lasting security and arms control measures as 

outlined in Annex 1-B to the General Framework Agreement, which 

aim to promote a permanent reconciliation between all Parties and to 

facilitate the achievement of all political arrangements agreed to in the 

General Framework Agreement. 

Appendix E(5) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 255 

3. The Parties understand and agree that within Bosnia and 

Herzegovina the obligations undertaken in this Annex shall be applied 

equally within both Entities. Both Entities shall be held equally 

responsible for compliance herewith, and both shall be equally 

subject to such enforcement action by the IFOR as may be necessary 

to ensure implementation of this Annex and the protection of the 

IFOR. 

Article II 

Cessation of Hostilities 

1. The Parties shall comply with the cessation of hostilities begun 

with the agreement of October 5, 1995 and shall continue to refrain 

from all offensive operations of any type against each other. An 

offensive operation in this case is an action that includes projecting 

forces or fire forward of a Party's own lines. Each Party shall ensure 

that all personnel and organizations with military capability under its 

control or within territory under its control, including armed civilian 

groups, national guards, army reserves, military police, and the 

Ministry of Internal Affairs Special Police (MUP) (hereinafter "Forces") 

comply with this Annex. The term "Forces" does not include 

UNPROFOR, the International Police Task Force referred to in the 

General Framework Agreement, the IFOR or other elements referred to 

in Article I, paragraph 1 (c). 

2. In carrying out the obligations set forth in paragraph 1, the Parties 

undertake, in particular, to cease the firing of all weapons and 

explosive devices except as authorized by this Annex. The Parties 

shall not place any additional minefields, barriers, or protective 

obstacles. They shall not engage in patrolling, ground or air 

reconnaissance forward of their own force positions, or into the 

Zones of Separation as provided for in Article IV below, without IFOR 

approval. 

3. The Parties shall provide a safe and secure environment for all 

persons in their respective jurisdictions, by maintaining civilian law 

enforcement agencies operating in accordance with internationally 

recognized standards and with respect for internationally recognized 

human rights and fundamental freedoms, and by taking such other 

Appendix E(5) 
256 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERA TIONS 


measures as appropriate. The Parties also commit themselves to 

disarm and disband all armed civilian groups, except for authorized 

police forces, within 30 days after the Transfer of Authority. 

4. The Parties shall cooperate fully with any international personnel 


including investigators, advisors, monitors, observers, or other 


personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina pursuant to the General 


Framework Agreement, including facilitating free and unimpeded 


. access and movement and by providing such status as is necessary 

for the effective conduct of their tasks. 

5. The Parties shall strictly avoid committing any reprisals, counter­


attacks~ or any unilateral actions in response to violations of this 


Annex by another Party. The Parties shall respond to alleged 


violations of the provisions of this Annex through the procedures 


provided in Article VIII. 


Article Ill 

Withdrawal of Foreig·n Forces 

1. All Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as of the date this Annex 

enters into force which are not of local origin, whether or not they are 

legally and militarily subordinated to the Republic of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Republika 

Srpska, shall be withdrawn together with their equipment from the 

territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina within thirty (30) days. 

Furthermore, all Forces that remain on the territory of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina must act consistently with the territorial integrity, 

sovereignty, and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 

accordance with Article II, paragraph 1, this paragraph does not apply 

to UNPROFOR, the International Police Task Force referred to in the 

General Framework Agreement, the IFOR or other elements referred to 

in Article I, paragraph 1 (c). 

2. In particular, all foreign Forces, including individual advisors, 

freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel from 

neighboring and other States, shall be withdrawn from the territory of 

Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with Article Ill, paragraph 1. 

Appendix E(5) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 257 


Article IV 

Redeployment of Forces 

1. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities shall 


redeploy their Forces in three phases: 


2. PHASE I 

·(a) The Parties immediately after this Annex enters into force shall 

begin promptly and proceed steadily to withdraw all Forces behind a 

Zone of Separation which shall be established on either side of the 

Agreed Cease-Fire Line that represents a clear and distinct 

demarcation between any and all opposing Forces. This withdrawal 

shall be completed within thirty (30) days after the Transfer of 

Authority. The precise Agreed Cease-Fire Line and Agreed Cease-Fire 

Zone of Separation are indicated on the maps at Appendix A of this 

Annex. 

(b) The Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation shall extend for a 

distance of approximately two (2) kilometers on either side of the 

Agreed Cease-Fire Line. No weapons other than those of the IFOR are 

permitted in this Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation except as 

provided herein. No individual may retain or possess any military 

weapons or explosives within this four kilometer Zone without 

specific approval of the IFOR. Violators of this provision shall be 

subject to military action by the IFOR, including the use of necessary 

force to ensure compliance. 

(c) In addition to the other provisions of this Annex, the following 

specific provisions shall also apply to Sarajevo and Gorazde: 

SARAJEVO 

(1) Within seven (7) days after the Transfer of Authority, the Parties 

shall transfer and vacate selected positions along the Agreed CeaseFire Line according to instructions to be issued by the IFOR 

Commander. 

Appendix E(5) 

258 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


(2) The Parties shall complete withdrawal from the Agreed Cease-Fire 

Zone of Separation in Sarajevo within thirty (30) days after the 

Transfer of Authority, in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 2. The 

width of this Zone of Separation will be approximately one (I) 

kilometer on either side of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line. However, this 

Zone of Separation may be adjusted by the IFOR Commander either to 

narrow the Zone of Separation to take account of the urban area of 

Sarajevo or to widen the Zone of Separation up to two (2) kilometers 

on either side of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line to take account of more 

open terrain. 

(3) Within the Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation, no individual 

may retain or possess any weapons or explosives, other than a 

member of the IFOR or the local police exercising official duties as 

authorized by the IFOR in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 2(b). 

(4) The Parties understand and agree that violators of subparagraphs 

(1), (2) and (3) above shall be subject to military action by the IFOR, 

including the use of necessary force to ensure compliance. 

GORAZDE 

(1) The Parties understand and agree that a two lane all-weather road 

will be constructed in the Gorazde Corridor. Until such road 

construction is complete, the two interim routes will be used by both 

Entities. 

The Grid coordinates for these alternate routes are (Map References: 

Defense Mapping Agency 1 :50,000 Topographic Line Maps, Series 

M709, Sheets 2782-1, 2782-2, 2782-3, 2782-4, 2881-4, 2882-1, 2882-2, 

2882-3, and 2882-4; Military Grid Reference System grid coordinates 

referenced to World Geodetic System 84 (Horizontal Datum): 

Interim Route 1: From Gorazde (34TCP361365), proceed northeast 

following Highway 5 along the Drina River to the Ustipraca area 

(34TCP456395). At that point, proceed north on Highway 19-3 through 

Rogatica (34TCP393515) continuing northwest past Stienice 

(34TCP294565) to the road intersection at Podromanija 

(34TCP208652). From this point, proceed west following Highway 19 

to where it enters the outskirts of Sarajevo (34TBP950601 ). 

Appendix E(5) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 259 

Interim Route 2: From Gorazde (34TCP361365), proceed south 


following Highway 20. Follow Highway 20 through Ustinkolina 


(34TCP218281). Continue south following Highway 20 passing Foca 


along the west bank of the Drina River (34TCP203195) to a point 


(34TCP175178) where the route turns west following Highway 18. 


From this point, follow Highway 18 south of Miljevina (34TCP097204) 


continuing through Trnovo (34TBP942380) north to the outskirts of 


Sarajevo where it enters the town at Vaskovici (34TBP868533). 


There shall be complete freedom of movement along these routes for 

· civilian traffic. The Parties shall only utilize these interim routes for 

military forces and equipment as authorized by and under the control 

and direction of the IFOR. In this regard, and in order to reduce the 

risk to civilian traffic, the IFOR shall have the right to manage 

movement of military and civilian traffic from both Entities along these 

routes. 

(2) The Parties understand and agree that violators of subparagraph 

(1) shall be subject to military action by the IFOR, including the use of 

necessary force to ensure compliance. 

(3) The Parties pledge as a confidence building measure that they 

shall not locate any Forces or heavy weapons as defined in paragraph 

5 of this Article within two (2) kilometers of the designated interim 

routes. Where those routes run in or through the designated Zones of 

Separation, the provisions relating to Zones of Separation in this 

Annex shall also apply. 

(d) The Parties immediately after this Annex enters into force shall 

begin promptly and proceed steadily to complete the following 

activities within thirty (30) days after the Transfer of Authority or as 

determined by the IFOR Commander: (1) remove, dismantle or destroy 

all mines, unexploded ordnance, explosive devices, demolitions, and 

barbed or razor wire from the Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation 

or other areas from which their Forces are withdrawn; (2) mark all 

known mine emplacements, unexploded ordnance, explosive devices 

and demolitions within Bosnia and Herzegovina; and (3) remove, 

dismantle or destroy all mines, unexploded ordnance, explosive 

devices and demolitions as required by the IFOR Commander. 

Appendix E(5) 
260 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

(e) The IFOR is authorized to direct that any military personnel, active 

or reserve, who reside within the Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of 

Separation register with the appropriate IFOR Command Post referred 

to in Article VI which is closest to their residence. 

3. PHASE II (AS REQUIRED IN SPECIFIC LOCATIONS) 

This phase applies to those locations where the Inter-Entity Boundary 

Line does not follow the Agreed Cease-Fire Line. 

(a) In those locations in which, pursuant to the General Framework 

Agreement, areas occupied by one Entity are to be transferred to 

another Entity, all Forces of the withdrawing Entity shall have forty· 

five (45) days after the Transfer of Authority to completely vacate and 

clear this area. This shall include the removal of all Forces as well as 

the removal, dismantling or destruction of equipment, mines, 

obstacles, unexploded ordnance, explosive devices; demolitions, and 

weapons. In those areas being transferred to a different Entity, in 

order to provide an orderly period of transition, the Entity to which an 

area is transferred shall not put Forces in this area for ninety (90) days 

after the Transfer of Authority or as determined by the IFOR . 

Commander. The Parties understand and agree that the IFOR shall 

have the right to provide the military security for these transferred 

areas from thirty (30) days after the Transfer of Authority until ninetyone (91) days after the Transfer of Authority, or as soon as possible as 

determined by the IFOR Commander, when these areas may be 

occupied by the Forces of the Entity to which they are transferred. 

Upon occupation by the Entity to which the area is transferred, a new 

Zone of Separation along the Inter-Entity Boundary Line as indicated. 

on the map at Appendix A shall be established by the IFOR, and the 

Parties shall observe the same limitations on the presence of Forces 

and weapons in this Zone as apply to the Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of 

Separation. 

(b) The IFOR is authorized to direct that any military personnel, active 

or reserve, who reside within the Inter-Entity Zone of Separation 

register with the appropriate IFOR Command Post referred to in 

Article VI which is closest to their residence. 

4. GENERAL. The following provisions apply to Phases I and II: 

Appendix E(5) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 261 

(a) In order to provide visible indication, the IFOR shall supervise the 

selective marking of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line and its Zone of 

Separation, and the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and its Zone of 

Separation. Final authority for placement of such markers shall rest 

with the IFOR. All Parties understand and agree that the Agreed 

Cease-Fire Line and its Zone of Separation and the Inter-Entity 

Boundary Line and its Zone of Separation are defined by the maps 

and documents agreed to as part of the General Framework 

Agreement and not the physical location of markers. 

(b) All Parties understand and agree that they shall be subject to 

military action by the IFOR, including the use of necessary force to 

ensure compliance, for: 

(1) failure to remove all their Forces and unauthorized weapons from 

the four (4) kilometer Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation within 

thirty (30) days after the Transfer of Authority, as provided in Article 

IV, paragraph 2(a) and (b) above; · 

(2) failure to vacate and clear areas being transferred to another Entity 

within forty-five (45) days after the Transfer of Authority, as provided 

in Article IV, paragraph 3(a) above; 

(3) deploying Forces within areas transferred from another Entity 

earlier than ninety (90) days after the Transfer of Authority or as 

determined by the IFOR Commander, as provided in Article IV, 

paragraph 3(a) above; 

(4) failure to keep all Forces and unauthorized weapons outside the 

Inter-Entity Zone of Separation after this Zone is declared in effect by 

the IFOR, as provided in Article IV, paragraph 3(a) above; or 

(5) violation of the cessation of hostilities as agreed to by the Parties 

in Article II. 

5. PHASE Ill 

The Parties pledge as confidence building measures that they shall: 

(a) within 120 days after the Transfer of Authority withdraw all heavy 

weapons and Forces to cantonment/barracks areas or other locations 

Appendix E(5) 
262 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

as designated by the IFOR Commander. "Heavy weapons" refers to all 

tanks and armored vehicles, all artillery 75 mm and above, all mortars 

81 mm and above, and all anti-aircraft weapons 20 mm and above. 

This movement of these Forces to cantonment/barracks areas is 

intended to enhance mutual confidence by the Parties in the success 

of this Annex and help the overall cause of peace in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. 

(b) within 120 days after the Transfer of Authority demobilize Forces 

which cannot be accommodated in cantonment/barracks areas as 

provided in subparagraph (a) above. Demobilization shall consist of 

removing from the possession of these personnel all weapons, 

including individual weapons, explosive devices, communications 

equipment, vehicles, and all other military equipment. All personnel 

belonging to these Forces shall be released from service and shall not 

engage in any further training or other military activities. 

6. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Annex, the Parties 

understand and agree that the IFOR has the right and is authorized to 

compel the removal, withdrawal, or relocation of specific Forces and 

weapons from, and to order the cessation of any activities in, any 

location in Bosnia and Herzegovina whenever the IFOR determines 

such Forces, weapons or activities to constitute a threat or potential · 

threat to either the IFOR or its mission, or to another Party. Forces 

failing to redeploy, withdraw, relocate, or to cease threatening or 

potentially threatening activities following such a demand by the IFOR 

shall be subject to military action by the IFOR, including the use of 

necessary force to ensure compliance, consistent with the terms set 

forth in Article I, paragraph 3. 

Article V 

Notifications 

1. ~mmediately upon establishment of the Joint Military Commission 

provided for in Article VIII, each Party shall furnish to the Joint Military 

Commission information regarding the positions and descriptions of 

all known unexploded ordnance, explosive devices, demolitions, 

minefields, booby traps, wire entanglements, and all other physical or 

military hazards to the safe movement of any personnel within Bosnia 

Appendix E(5) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSJNTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 263 

and Herzegovina, as well as the location of lanes through the Agreed 

Cease-Fire Zone of Separation which are free of all such hazards. The 

Parties shall keep the Joint Military Commission updated on changes 

in this information. 

2. Within thirty (30) days after the Transfer of Authority, each Party 

shall furnish to the Joint Military Commission the following specific 

information regarding the status of its Forces within Bosnia and 

Herzegovina and shall keep the Joint Military Commission updated on 

changes in this information: 

(a) location, type, strengths of personnel and weaponry of all Forces 

within ten (10) kilometers of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line and InterEntity Boundary Line. 

(b) maps depicting the forward line of troops and front lines; 

(c) positions and descriptions of fortifications, minefields, unexploded 

ordnance, explosive devices, demolitions, barriers, and other manmade obstacles, ammunition dumps, command headquarters, and 

communications networks within ten (10) kilometers of the Agreed 

Cease-Fire Line or Inter-Entity Boundary Line; 

(d) positions and descriptions of all surface to air missiles/launchers, 

including mobile systems, anti-aircraft artillery, supporting radars and 

associated command and control systems; 

(e) positions and descriptions of all mines, unexploded ordnance, 

explosive devices, demolitions, obstacles, weapons systems, 

vehicles, or any other military equipment which cannot be removed, 

dismantled or destroyed under the provisions of Article IV, 

paragraphs 2(d) and 3(a); and 

(f) any further information of a military nature as requested by the 

IFOR. . 

3. Within 120 days after the Transfer of Authority, the Parties shall 

furnish to the Joint Military Commission the following specific 

information regarding the status of their Forces in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina and shall keep the Joint Military Commission updated on 

changes in this information: 

Appendix E(5) 
264 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


(a) location, type, strengths of personnel and weaponry of all Forces; 

(b) maps depicting the information in sub-paragraph (a) above; 

(c) positions and descriptions of fortifications, minefields, unexploded 

ordnance, explosive devices, demolitions, barriers, and other manmade obstacles, ammunition dumps, command headquarters, and 

communications networks; and 

(d} any further information of a military nature as requested by the 

IFOR. 

Article VI 

Deployment of the Implementation Force 

1. Recognizing the need to provide for the effective implementation of 

the provisions of this Annex, and to ensure compliance, the United 

Nations Security Council is invited to authorize Member States or 

regional organizations and arrangements to establish the IFOR acting 

under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The Parties 

understand and agree that this. Implementation Force may be 

composed of ground, air and maritime units from NATO and nonNATO nations, deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina to help ensure 

compliance with the provisions of this Annex. The Parties understand 

and agree that the IFOR shall have the right to deploy on either side of 

the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and throughout Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. 

2. The Parties understand and agree that the IFOR shall have the right: 

(a) to monitor and help ensure compliance by all Parties with this 

Annex (including, in particular, withdrawal and redeployment of 

Forces within agreed periods, and the establishment of Zones of 

Separation); 

(b) to authorize and supervise the selective marking of the Agreed 

Cease-Fire Line and its Zone of Separation and the Inter-Entity 

Appendix E(5) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 265 


Boundary Line and its Zone of Separation as established by the 


General Framework Agreement; 


(c) to establish liaison arrangements with local civilian and military 

authorities and other international organizations as necessary for the 

accomplishment of its mission; and 

(d) to assist in the withdrawal of UN Peace Forces not transferred to 

the IFOR, including, if necessary, the emergency withdrawal of 

UNCRO Forces. 

3. The Parties understand and agree that the IFOR. shall have the right 

to fulfill its supporting tasks, within the limits of its assigned principal 

tasks and available resources, and on request, which include the 

following: 

(a) to help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other 

tasks associated with the peace settlement, including free and fair 

elections; 

(b) to assist the movement of organizations in the accomplishment of 

humanitarian missions; 

(c) to assist the UNHCR and other international organizations in their 

humanitarian missions; 

(d) to observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian 

populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond 

appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person; and, 

(e) to monitor the clearing of minefields and obstacles. 

4. The Parties understand and agree that further directives from the 

NAC may establish additional duties and responsibilities for the IFOR 

in implementing this Annex. 

5. The Parties understand and agree that the IFOR Commander shall 

have the authority, without interference or permission of any Party, to 

do all that the Commander judges necessary and proper, including the 

use of m·ilitary force, to protect the IFOR and to carry out the 

Appendix E(5) 
266 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

responsibilities listed above in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, and they shall 


comply in all respects with the IFOR requirements. 


6. The Parties understand and agree that in carrying out its 

responsibilities, the IFOR shall have the unimpeded right to observe, 

monitor, and inspect any Forces, facility or activity in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina that the IFOR believes may have military capability. The 

refusal, interference, or denial by any Party of this right to observe, 

monitor, and inspect by the IFOR shall constitute a breach of this 

Annex and the violating Party shall be subject to military action by the 

IFOR, including the use of necessary force to ensure compliance with 

this Annex. 

7. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croat 

Defense Council Forces, and the Army of Republika Srpska shall 

establish Command Posts at IFOR brigade, battalion, or other levels 

which shall be co-located with specific IFOR command Vocations, as 

determined by the IFOR Commander. These Command Posts shaU 

exercise command and control over all Forces of their respective 

sides which are located within ten (10) kilometers of the Agreed 

Cease-Fire Line or Inter-Entity Boundary Line, as specified by the 

IFOR. The Command Posts shall provide, at the request of the IFOR, 

timely status reports on organizations and troop levels in their areas. 

8. In addition to co-located Command Posts, the Army of the Republic 

of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croat Defense Council Forces, and 

the Army of Republika Srpska shall maintain liaison teams to be colocated with the IFOR Command, as determined by the IFOR 

Commander, for the purpose of fostering communication, and 

preserving the overall cessation of hostilities. 

9. Air and surface movements in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be 

governed by the following provisions: 

(a) The IFOR shall have complete and unimpeded freedom of 

movement by ground, air, and water throughout Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. It shall have the right to bivouac, maneuver, billet, and 

utilize any areas or facilities to carry out its responsibilities as 

required for its support, training, and operations, with such advance 

notice as may be practicable. The IFOR and its personnel shall not be 

liable for any damages to civilian or government property caused by 

Appendix E(5) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 267 

combat or combat related activities. Roadblocks, checkpoints or other 

impediments to IFOR freedom of movement shall constitute a breach 

of this Annex and the violating Party shall be subject to military action 

by the IFOR, including the use of necessary force to ensure 

compliance with this Annex. 

(b) The IFOR Commander shall have sole authority to establish rules 

and procedures governing command and control of airspace over 

Bosnia and Herzegovina to enable civilian air traffic and non-combat 

air activities by the military or civilian authorities in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, or if necessary to terminate civilian air traffic and noncombat air activities. 

(1) The Parties understand and agree there shall be no military air 

traffic, or non-military aircraft performing military missions, including 

reconnaissance or logistics, without the express permission of the 

IFOR Commander. The only military aircraft that may be authorized to 

fly in Bosnia and Herzegov:na are those being flown in support of the 

IFOR, except with the express permission of the IFOR. Any flight 

activities by military fixed-wing or helicopter aircraft within Bosnia 

and Herzegovina without the exp~ess permission of the IFOR 

Commander are subject to military action by the IFOR, including the 

use of necessary force to ensure compliance. 

(2) All air early warning, air defense, or fire control radars shall be 

shut down within 72 hours after this Annex enters into force, and shall 

remain inactive unless authorized by the IFOR Commander. Any use 

of air traffic, air early warning, air defense or fire control radars not 

authorized by the IFOR Commander shall constitute a breach of this 

Annex and the violating Party shall be subject to military action by the 

IFOR, including the use of necessary force to ensure compliance. 

(3) The Parties understand and agree that the IFOR Commander will 

implement the transfer to civilian control of air space over Bosnia and 

Herzegovina to the appropriate institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

in a gradual fashion consistent with the objective of the IFOR to 

ensure smooth and safe operation of an air traffic system upon IFOR 

departure. 

(c) The IFOR Commander is authorized to promulgate appropriate 

rules for the control and regulation of surface military traffic 

Appendix E(5) 
268 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the movement of the 

Forces of the Parties. The Joint Military Commission referred to in 

Article VIII may assist in the development and promulgation of rules 

related to military movement. 

1O. The IFOR shall have the right to utilize such means and services 

as required to ensure its full ability to communicate and shall have the 

right to the unrestricted use of all of the electromagnetic spectrum for 

this purpose. In implementing this right, the IFOR shall make every 

reasonable effort to coordinate with and take into account the needs 

and requirements of the appropriate authorities. 

11. All Parties shall accord the IFOR and its personnel the assistance, 

privileges, and immunities set forth at Appendix B of this Annex, 

including the unimpeded transit through, to, over and on the territory 

of all Parties. 

12. All Parties shall accord any military elements as referred to in 

Article I, paragraph l(c) and their personnel the assistance, privileges 

and immunities referred to In Article VI, paragraph 11 •• 

Article VII 

Withdrawal of UNPROFOR 

It is noted that as a consequence of the forthcoming introduction of 

the IFOR Into the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the conditions 

for the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR established by United Nations 

Security Council Resolution 7 43 have been met. It is requested that 

the United Nations, in consultation with NATO, take all necessary 

steps to withdraw the UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

except those parts incorporated into the IFOR. 

Article VIII 

Establishment of a Joint Military Commission 

Appendix E(5) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 269 

1. A Joint Military Commission (the "Commission") shall be 


established with the deployment of the IFOR to Bosnia and 


Herzegovina. 


2. The Commission shall: 

(a) Serve as the central body for all Parties to this Annex to bring any 

military complaints, questions, or problems that require resolution by 

the IFOR Commander, such as allegations of cease-fire violations or 

other noncompliance with this Annex. 

(b) Receive reports and agree on specific actions to ensure 

compliance with the provisions of this Annex by the Parties. 

(c) Assist the IFOR Commander in determining and implementing a 

series of local transparency measures between the P&rties. 

3. The Commission shall be chaired by the IFOR Commander or his or 

her representative and consist of the following members: 

(a) the senior military commander of the forces of each Party within 

Bosnia and Herzegovina; 

(b) other persons as the Chairman may determine; 

(c) each Party to this Annex may also select two civilians who shall 

advise the Commission in carrying out its duties; 

(d) the High Representative referred to in the General Framework 

Agreement or his or her nominated representative shall attend 

Commission meetings, and offer advice particularly on matters of a 

political-military nature. 

4. The Commission shall not include any persons who are now or who 

come under indictment by the International Tribunal for the Former 

Yugoslavia. 

5. The Commission shall function as a consultative body for the IFOR 

Commander. To the extent possible, problems shall be solved 

promptly. by mutual agreement. However, all final decisions 

Appendix E(5) 
270 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


concerning its military matters shall be made by the IFOR 

Commander. 

6. The Commission shall meet at the call of the IFOR Commander. The 

High Representative may when necessary request a meeting of the 

Commission. The Parties may also request a meeting of the 

Commission. 

7. The IFOR Commander shall have the right to decide on military 

matters, in a timely fashion, when there are overriding considerations 

relating to the safety of the IFOR or the Parties' compliance with the 

provisions of this Annex. 

8. The Commission shall establish subordinate military commissions 

for the purpose of providing assistance in carrying out the functions 

described above. Such commissions shall be at the brigade and 

battalion level or at other echelons as the local IFOR Commander 

shall direct and be composed of commanders from each of the Parties 

and the IFOR. The representative of the High Representative shall 

attend and offer advice particularly on matters of a political-military 

nature. The local IFOR Commander shall invite local civilian 

authorities when appropriate. 

9. Appropriate liaison arrangements will be established between the 

IFOR Commander and the High Representative to facilitate the 

discharge of their respective responsibilities. 

Article IX 

Prisoner Exchanges 

1. The Parties shall release and transfer without delay all combatants 

and civilians held in relation to the conflict (hereinafter "prisoners"}, 

in conformity with international humanitarian law and the provisions 

of this Article. 

(a) The Parties shall be bound by and implement such plan for release 

and transfer of all prisoners as may be developed by the ICRC, after 

consultation with the Parties. 

Appendix E(5) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS INTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 271 

(b) The Parties shall cooperate fully with the ICRC and facilitate its 

work in implementing and monitoring the plan for release and transfer 

. of prisoners. 

(c) No later than thirty (30) days after the Transfer of Authority, the 


Parties shall release and transfer all prisoners held by them. 


(d) In order to expedite this process, no later than twenty-one (21) 


days after this Annex enters into force, the Parties shall draw up 


comprehensive lists of prisoners and shall provide such lists to the 


ICRC, to the other Parties, and to the Joint Military Commission and 


the High Representative. These lists shall identify prisoners by 


nationality, name, rank (if any) and any internment or military serial 


number, to the extent applicable. 


(e) The Parties shall ensure that the ICRC enjoys full and unimpeded 

access to all places where prisoners are kept and to all prisoners. The 

Parties shall permit the ICRC tD privately interview each prisoner at 

least forty-eight (48) hours prior to his or her release for the purpose 

of implementing and monitoring the plan, including determination of 

the onward destination of each prisoner. 

(f) The Parties shall take no reprisals against any prisoner or his/her 


family in the event that a prisoner refuses to be transferred. 


(g) Notwithstanding the above provisions, each Party shall comply 

with any order or request of the International Tribunal for the Former 

Yugoslavia for the arrest, detention, surrender of or access to persons 

who would otherwise be released and transferred under this Article, 

but who are accused of violations within the jurisdiction of the 

Tribunal. Each Party must detain persons reasonably suspected of 

such violations for a period of time sufficient to permit appropriate 

consultation with Tribunal authorities. 

2. In those cases where places of burial, whether individual or mass, 

are known as a matter of record, and graves are actually found to 

exist, each Party shall permit graves registration personnel of the 

other Parties to enter, within a mutually agreed period of time, for the 

limited purpose of proceeding to such graves, to recover and 

evacuate the bodies of deceased military and civilian personnel of that 

side, including deceased prisoners. 

Appendix E(5) 
272 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Article X 

Cooperation 

The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in 

implementation of this peace settlement, as described in the General 

Framework Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the 

United Nations Security Council, including the International Tribunal 

for the Former Yugoslavia. 

Article XI 

Notification to Military Commands 

Each Party shall ensure that the terms c;f this Annex, and written 

orders requiring compliance, are immediately communicated to all of 

its Forces. 

Article XII 

Final Authority to Interpret 

In accordance with Article I, the IFOR Commander is the final authority 

in theatre regarding interpretation of this agreement on the military 

aspects of the peace settlement, of which the Appendices constitute 

an integral part. 

Article XIII 

Entry into Force 

This Annex shall enter into force upon signature. 

For the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

For the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

Appendix E(5) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 273 

For the Republika Srpska 

Endorsed: 

For the Republic of Croatia 

Endorsed: 

For the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

Appendices to Annex 1A: 


Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement 


Text of Dayton Peace Agreement documents initialed in Dayton, Ohio 


on November 21, 1995. Released by the Office of the Spokesman, 


December 1, 1995. 


Appendix A to Annex 1A 

Appendix A to Annex 1-A consists of this document together with (a) a 

1 :600,000 scale UNPROFOR road map consisting of one map sheet, 

attached hereto; and (b) a 1 :50,000 scale Topographic Line Map, to be 

provided as described below. 

On the basis of the attached 1 :600,000 scale map, the Parties request 

that the United States Department of Defense provide a 1 :50,000 scale 

Topographic Line Map, consisting of as many map sheets as 

necessary, in order to provide a more precise delineation of the lines 

and zones indicated. Such map shall be incorporated as an integral 

part of this Appendix, and the Parties agree to accept such map as 

controlling and definitive for all purposes. 

For the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

For the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

For the Republika Srpska 

Appendix £(5) 

274 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Endorsed: 


For the Republic of Croatia 


Endorsed: 


For the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 


[MAP COPY NOT AVAILABLE] 


Appendix E(5) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 275 


Appendix B to Annex lA 

Agreement Between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Concerning the Status of 

NATO and its Personnel 

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organisation have agreed as follows: 

I • For the purposes of the present agreement, the following 

expressions shall have the meanings hereunder assigned to them: 

·"the Operation" means the support, implementation, preparation and 

participation by NATO and NATO personnel in a peace plan in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina or a possible withdrawal of U.N. Forces from former 

Yugoslavia; 

·"NATO personnel" means the civilian and military personnel of the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation with the exception of personnel 

locally hired; 

·"NATO" means the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, its subsidiary 

bodies, its military Headquarters and all its constituent national 

elements/units acting in support of, preparing and participating in the 

Operation; 

·"Facilities" mean all premises and land required for conducting the 

operational, training and administrative activities by NATO for the 

Operation as well as for accommodations of NATO personnel. 

2. The provisions of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities 

of the United Nations of 13February1946 concerning experts on 

mission shall apply mutatis mutandis to NATO personnel involved in 

the Operation, except as otherwise provided for in the present 

agreement. Moreover NATO, its property and assets shall enjoy the 

privileges and immunities specified in that convention and as stated 

in the present agreement. 

3. All personnel enjoying privileges and immunities under this 

Agreement shall respect the laws of the Republic of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina Insofar as it is compatible with the entrusted 

Appendix E(5) 
276 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 


tasks/mandate and shall refrain from activities not compatible with the 

nature of the Operation. 

4. The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

recognizes the need for expeditious departure and entry procedures 

for NATO personnel. They shall be exempt from passport and visa 

regulations and the registration requirements applicable to aliens. 

NATO personnel shall carry identification which they may be 

requested to produce for the authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina but operations, training and movement shall not be 

allowed to be impeded or delayed by such requests. 

5. NATO military personnel shall normally wear uniforms, and NATO 

personnel may possess and carry arms if authorized to do so by their 

orders. The authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

shall accept as valid, without tax or fee, drivers' licenses and permits 

issued to NATO personnel by their respective national authorities. 

6. NATO shall be permitted to display the NATO flag and/or national 

flags of its constituent national elements/units on any NATO uniform, 

means of transport or facility. 

7. NATO military personnel under all circumstances and at all times 

shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective 

national elements in respect of any criminal or disciplinary offenses 

which may be committed by them in the Republic of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. NATO and the authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina shall assist each other in the exercise of their respective 

jurisdictions. 

8. As experts on mission, NATO personnel shall be immune from 

personal arrest or detention. NATO personnel mistakenly arrested or 

detained shall immediately be turned over to NATO authorities. 

9. NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, 

aircraft and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded 

access throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina including 

airspace and territorial waters of the Republic of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of 

bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities as 

required for support, training, and operations. NATO shall be exempt 

Appendix E(5) 

LAWAND MILITARY OPS INTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 277 

from providing inventories or other routine customs documentation 

on personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment, supplies, and 

provisions entering, exiting, or transiting the territory of the Republic 

of Bosnia and Herzegovina in support of the Operation. The 

authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall facilitate 

with all appropriate means all movements of personnel, vehicles, 

vessels, aircraft, equipment or supplies, through ports, airports or 

roads used. Vehicles, vessels and aircraft used in support of the 

Operation shall not be subject to licensing or registration 

requirements, nor commercial insurance. NATO will use airports, 

roads and ports without payment of duties, dues, tolls or charges. 

However, NATO shall not claim exemption from reasonable charges 

for services requested and received, but operations/movement and 

access shall not be allowed to be impeded pending payment for such 

services. 

10. NATO personnel shall be exempt from taxation by the Republic of 

Bosnia and Herzegovina on the salaries and emoluments received 

from NATO and on any income received from outside the Republic of 

Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

11. NATO personnel and their tangible movable property imported into 

or acquired in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall also beexempt from all identifiable taxes by the Republic of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, except municipal rates for services enjoyed, and from all 

registration fees and related charges. 

12. NATO shall be allowed to import and to export free of duty or other 

restriction equipment, provisions, and supplies, necessary for the 

Operation, provided such goods are for the official use of NATO or for 

sale via commissaries or canteens provided for NATO personnel. 

Goods sold shall be solely for the use of NATO personnel and not 

transferable to other parties. 

13. It is recognized by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina that the use of communications channels shall be 

necessary for the Operation. NATO shall be allowed to operate its own 

internal mail and telecommunications services, including broadcast 

services. This shall include the right to utilize such means and 

services as required to assure full ability to communicate, and the 

right to use all of the electro-magnetic spectrum for this purpose, free 

Appendix E(5) 
278 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 


of cost. In implementing this right, NATO shall make every reasonable 

effort to coordinate with and take into account the needs and 

requirements of appropriate authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. 

14. The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall 

provide, free of cost, such facilities NATO needs for the preparation 

for and execution of the Operation. The Government of the Republic of 

Bosnia and Herzegovina shall assist NATO in obtaining, at the lowest 

rate, the necessary utilities such as electricity, water and other 

resources necessary for the Operation. 

15. Claims for damage or injury to Government personnel or property, 

or to private personnel or property of the Republic of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina shall be submitted through governmental authorities of 

the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the designated NATO 

Representatives. 

16. NATO shall be allowed to contract direct with suppliers for 

services and supplies in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

without payment of tax or duties. Such services and supplies shall not 

be subject to sales and other taxes. NATO may hire local personnel 

who shall remain subject to local laws and regulations. However, local 

personnel hired by NATO shall: 

(a) be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or 

written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity; 

(b) be immune from national services and/or national military service 

obligations; 

(c) be exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to 

them by NATO. 

17. NATO may in the conduct of the Operation, have need to make 

improvements or modifications to certain infrastructure of the 

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina such as roads, utility systems, 

bridges, tunnels, buildings, etc. Any such improvements or 

modifications of a non-temporary nature shall become part of and in 

the same ownership as that infrastructure. Temporary improvements 

or modifications may be removed at the discretion of the NATO 

Appendix E(5) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 279 

Commander, and the facility returned to as near its original condition 

as possible. 

18. Failing any prior settlement, disputes with regard to the 

interpretation or application of the present agreement shall be settled 

between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO 

Representatives by diplomatic means. 

19. The provisions of this agreement shall also apply to the civilian 

and military personnel, property and assets of national elements/units 

of NATO states, acting in connection to the Operation or the relief for 

the civilian population which however remain under national 

command and control. 

20. Supplemental arrangements may be concluded to work out details 

for the Operation also taking into account its further development. 

21. The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall 

accord non-NATO states and their personnel participating in the 

Operation the same privileges and Immunities as those accorded 

under this agreement to NATO states and personnel. 

22. The provisions of this agreement shall remain in force until 

completion of the Operation or as the Parties otherwise agree.23. This 

Agreement shall enter into force upon signature. 

Done at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio on November 21, 1995 

and 

at on , 1995. 

For the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina: 

For the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: 

Appendix E(5) 

280 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Letters to Annex 1A: 


Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement 


Text of Dayton Peace Agreement documents initialed in Dayton, Ohio 


on November 21, 1995 and later signed by all parties in Paris on 


December 14, 1995. The agreement is known as the Dayton Peace 


Accords. 


Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio November 21, 1995 


Excellency: 


I refer to the Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace 


Settlement, which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has endorsed, 


and the Agreement Between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 


and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Concerning the 


Status of NATO and its Personnel. 


On behalf of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, I wish to assure you 


that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall take all necessary steps, 


consistent with the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 


independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to ensure that the 


Republika Srpska fully respects and complies with commitments to 


NATO, including in particular access and status of forces, as set forth 


in the aforementioned Agreements. 


Sincerely, 


Slobodan Milosevic 


His Excellency 


Sergio Silvio Balanzino 


Acting Secretary General 


North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 


1110 BRUSSELS 


Belgium 


---···--···-------­

Appendix E(5) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 281 

Republic of Croatia 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

Minister 

Dayton, November 21, 1995 

Excellency: 

I refer to the Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace 

Settlement, which the Republic of Croatia has endorsed, and the 

Agreement Between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Concerning the Status of 

NATO and its Personnel. 

On behalf of the Republic of Croatia, I wish to ass•ue you that 

Republic of Croatia shall take all necessary steps, consistent with the 

sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia 

and Herzegovina, to ensure that personnel or organisations in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina which are under its control or with which it has 

influence fully respect and comply with the commitments to NATO, 

including in particular access and status of forces, as set forth in the 

aforementioned Agreements. 

Sincerely, 

Dr. Mate Granic 

His Excellency 

Sergio Silvio Balanzino 

Acting Secretary General 

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 

1110 BRUSSELS 

Belgium 

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 

November 21, 1995 

Excellency: 

Appendix E(5) 
------------

282 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


I refer to the Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace 

Settlement, which the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has 

signed as a Party, and the Agreement Between the Republic of Bosnia 

and Herzegovina and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 

Concerning the Status of NATO and its Personnel. 

On behalf of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I wish to 

assure you that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will adhere 

to and fulfill its commitments regarding access and status of forces in 

general, including in particular, Its commitments to NATO. 

Sincerely, 

Jadranko Prlic 

Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister 

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

His Excellency 

Sergio Silvio Balanzino 

Acting Secretary General 

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 

1110 BRUSSELS 

Belgium 

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 

November 21, 1995 

Excellency: 

I refer to the Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace 

Settlement, which the Republika Srpska has signed as a Party, and 

the Agreement Between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Concerning the Status 

of NATO and its Personnel. 

On behalf of the Republika Srpska, I wish to assure you that the 

Republika Srpska will adhere to and fulfill its commitments regarding 

acces~ and status of forces in general, including in particular, its 

commitments to NATO. 

Appendix E(5) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 283 

Sincerely, 

Momcilo Krajisnik 

President of the Republika Srpska 

His Excellency 

Sergio Silvio Balanzino 

Acting Secretary General 

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 

11 10 BRUSSELS 

Belgium 

Appendix E(5) 
284 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Appendix E(6): Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building 


Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina (The Vienna Agreement, 26 


January 1996) 


The following is the body ofthe Vienna Agreement and an outline of 

the Protocols thereto. For complete text ofthe agreement and/or 

protocols, contact the Center for Law and Military Operations 

(CLAMO). Full text ofthese agreements is also available at the 

internet web address: http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/osce/docs/bosnia.htm. 

Agreement on Confidence- and Security­


Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina 


The Parties concemed with Article II of Annex 1-B of the General 

Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina have 

engaged in negotiations under the auspices of the Organization for 

Security and Co-operation in Europe (hereinafter referred to as "the 

OSCE") and have agreed upon a series of measures to enhance 

mutual confidence and reduce the risk of conflict in accordance with 

that Article. 

Desiring to implement the General Framework Agreement for Peace in 

Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter "the Peace Agreement") fully, 

and in particular to fulfill the Provisions set forth in the Agreement on 

Regional Stabilization (hereinafter "Annex 1-B"), 

They have agreed, in accordance with their rights and obligations 

under the Peace Agreement and its Annexes, to implement the 

following: 

ARTICLE I 

Definitions 


For the purposes of this Agreement: 


(1) "Annex 1-A" means Annex 1-A of the General Framework 

Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Agreement on 

the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement. 

Appendix E(6) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 199 5-1998 285 


(2) "Annex 1·B" means Annex 1 ·B of the General Framework 

Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Agreement on 

Regional Stabilization. 

(3) The term "Point of Contact" means a Party's authorized 

representative or representatives to the Personal Representative 

which shall be designated by each Party not later than 10 days 

after entry into force of this Agreement and shall ensure 

uninterrupted communication of it with its relevant political and 

military authorities. 

(4) The term "zone of application" means the entire territories of the 

Parties. 

(5) The term "Inter-Entity Boundary Line" means the boundary line 

between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 

Republika Srpska, as defined in Article I of Annex 2 of the General 

Framework Agreement: Agreement on Inter-Entity Boundary Line 

and Related Issues. 

(6) The term "weapon manufacturing facility" means any facility in 

which heavy weapons, munitions for these weapons, mines and 

other weapons used in military forces, including small arms, are 

or may be produced, including after non-significant modification 

of the manufacturing facility. 

(7) The term "battle tank" means a self-propelled armoured fighting 

vehicle, capable of heavy firepower, primarily of a high muzzle 

velocity direct fire main gun necessary to engage armoured and 

other targets, with high cross-country mobility, with a high level of 

self-protection, and which is not designed and equipped primarily 

to transport combat troops. Such armoured vehicles serve as the 

principal weapon system of ground-force tank and other armoured 

formations. 

Battle tanks are tracked armoured fighting vehicles which weigh 

at least 16,5 metric tons unladen weight and which are armed with 

a 360-degree traverse gun of at least 75 millimeters calibre. In 

addition, any wheeled armoured fighting vehicles entering into 

service which meet all the other criteria stated above shall also be 

deemed battle tanks. 

(8) The term "armoured combat vehicle" means a self-propelled 

vehicle with armoured protection and cross-country capability. 

Armoured combat vehicles include armoured personnel carriers, 

armoured infantry fighting vehicles, and heavy armament combat 

vehicles. 

Appendix E(6) 
286 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


The term "armoured personnel carrier" means an armoured 

combat vehicle which is designed and equipped to transport a 

combat infantry squad and which, as a rule, is armed with an 

integral or organic weapon of less than 20 millimeters calibre. 

The term "armoured infantry fighting vehicle" means an armoured 

combat vehicle which is designed and equipped primarily to 

transport a combat infantry squad, which normally provides 

the capability for the troops to deliver fire from inside the 

vehicle under armoured protection, and which is armed with 

an integral or organic cannon of at least 20 millimeters calibre 

and sometimes an antitank missile launcher. Armoured 

infantry fighting vehicles serve as the principal weapon 

system of armoured infantry or mechanized infantry or 

motorized infantry formations and units of ground forces. 

The term "heavy armament combat vehicle" means an armoured 

combat vehicle with an integral or organic direct fire gun of at 

least 75 millimeters calibre, weighing at least 6,0 metric tons 

unladen weight, which does not fall within the definition of an 

armoured personnel carrier, or an armoured infantry fighting 

vehicle or a battle tank. 

(9) The term "unladen weight" means the weight of a vehicle 

excluding the weight of ammunition, fuel, oil and lubricants; 

removable reactive armour; spare parts, tools and accessories; 

removable snorkeling equipment; and crew and their personal kit. 

(10) The term "artillery" means large calibre systems capable of 

engaging ground targets by delivering primarily indirect fire. Such 

artillery systems provide the essential indirect fire support to 

combined arms formations. 

Large calibre artillery systems are guns, howitzers, artillery pieces 

combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers, mortars 

and multiple launch rocket system with a calibre of 75 

millimeter and above. In addition, any future large calibre 

direct fire system which has a secondary effective indirect fire 

capability shall be covered. 

(11) The term "armoured vehicle launched bridge" means a selfpropelled armoured transporter-launcher vehicle capable of 

carrying and, through built-in mechanisms, of emplacing and 

retrieving a bridge structure. Such a vehicle with a bridge 

structure operates as an integrated system. 

(12) The term "combat aircraft" means a fixed-wing or variablegeometry wing airc!aft armed and equipped to engage targets by 

Appendix E(6) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 287 


employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, cannons or 

other weapons of destruction, as well as any model or version of 

such an aircraft which performs other military functions such as 

reconnaissance or electronic warfare. The term "combat aircraft" 

does not include unarmed trainer aircraft. 

(13) The term "combat helicopter" means a rotary wing aircraft armed 

and equipped to engage targets or equipped to perform other 

military functions. The term "combat helicopter" does not include 

unarmed transport helicopters. 

(14) The terms "armoured personnel carrier look-alike" and "armoured 

infantry fighting vehicle look-alike" mean an armoured vehicle 

based on the same chassis as, and externally similar to, an 

armoured personnel carrier or an armoured infantry fighting 

vehicle, which does not have a cannon or a gun 20 millimeters 

calibre or greater and which has been constructed or modified in 

such a way as not to permit the transportation of a combat 

infantry squad. Taking into account the provisions of the Geneva 

Convention "For the Amelioration of the Conditions of the 

Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field" of 12 August 

1949 that confer a special status on ambulances, armoured 

personnel carrier ambulances shall not be deemed armoured 

combat vehicles or armoured personnel carrier look-alikes. 

(15) The term "heavy weapons" means all tanks and armoured 

vehicles, all artillery 75 mm and above, all mortars 81 mm and 

above, and all anti-aircraft weapons 20 mm and above. 

(16) The term "forces" means all formations and units, both combat 

and support, of the land, naval, air, and air defense forces of the 

Parties. 

(17) The term "personnel" means all military personnel both of 

peacetime and reserve units in all formations and units in all 

institutions in all branches and services. 

(18) The term "Personal Representative" means the Personal 

Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE or his/her 

designated agent(s), who is designated by the Chairman-in-Office 

in consultation with the Parties. 

(19) The term "military activity" means activities, including 

deployment, re-deployment, mobilization, concentration, 

movement of forces, exercise, training, etc. with the engagement 

of land, naval, air or air defense forces of any of the Parties under 

a single command. 

Appendix E(6) 
288 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


(20) The term "exit/entry point" means the geographic point at which 

foreign forces enter or leave the zone of application. 

(21) The term "military base" means a facility or a precisely delineated 

geographic location at which one or more military 

formations/units are permanently or temporarily based and where 

all unit activities take place except military exercises. 

(22) The term "IFOR" means the multinational military force 

established under Article I, paragraph 1 (A) of Annex 1-A of the 

General Framework Agreement. 

(23) The term "unusual military activity" means any military activity 

which is threatening due to its size, location, direction of fire or 

other specific features of the activity. 

(24) The term "hazardous incident of a military nature" means 

accidents or other events caused by military vehicles, other 

military equipment or materiel threatening civilian population or 

the security of another Party. 

(25) The term "military exercise" means activities of units and/or 

formations envisaged by a training programme, carried out with 

weapons and equipment on permanent or temporary training 

sites/exercise sites or on other areas specially designated for 

such activities. 

(26) The term "mobilization" means the organized call-up of combat 

and combat support personnel and elements of commands to 

report to designated assembly sites where weapons and other 

military equipment are available or are being transported out of 

reserve storage and connected with the called up personnel. This 

process includes establishment of management and command for 

the formations and units being mobilized as well as a necessary 

minimum of refresher training for carrying assigned tasks. 

(27) The term "demobilization" means an activity by which mobilized 

personnel are dismissed from units and commands, and upon 

which materiel is returned to their owners or is stored at reserves 

storage, or is allocated to peacetime units. Demobilization is 

carried out in order to re-establish peacetime conditions after the 

state of war, or to disband units mobilized for training or military 

exercises. 

(28) The term "special operations" means the offensive activities of 

organized military or para-military groups, such as 

reconnaissance forward of force positions, and the preparation 

and carrying out of sabotage, diversions or assassinations. 

Appendix E(6) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 289 

(29) The term "armed civilian group" means any group of three or 

more armed persons not wearing uniforms. 

(30) The term "conventional armaments and equipment" means 

armaments as defined in definitions 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 

above. 

(31) The term "foreign forces" means any armed and organized group 

or formation or individuals (civilian, police or military) coming 

from any country to the zone of application, whether entering 

illegally or coming with the approval of the relevant authorities of 

the Parties. 

(32) The term "storage site" means areas on the ground or 

underground shelters where weapons, ammunition, combat or 

non-combat vehicles, communication devices, fuel, mines or other 

explosive devices or other military equipment are or can be 

collected and kept. 

(33) The term "training site" means an area with appropriate 

infrastructure used for training of military formations or units 

which can be used by peacetime or wartime units without leaving 

their barracks/garrison, where such units are located. 

(34) The term "exercise site" means an area which is suitable for 

training in conditions similar to a possible conflict (war) situation. 

The deployment to such sites requires movement of formations 

and units from peacetime locations. 

ARTICLE II 

Confidence- and Security-building Measures 

Measure I 

Exchange of Military Information 

(I.) EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 

1. The Parties shall exchange information on their forces 

concerning the military organization, manpower, and major 

weapons systems, as specified below, in the zone of 

application. Information shall be exchanged annually on 15 

December each year and shall be valid as of 01 January for the 

next year. In addition, for 1996 information shall also be 

exchanged on 15 June valid as of the following 01 July. 

Appendix E(6) 
290 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 

• 	 The first exchange of information • exchange of baseline 

data • shall take place on 15 February 1996, and shall be 

valid as of 1 March 1996. 

• 	 Information shall be provided in an agreed format (see 

Annex 2) to each Party as well as to the OSCE through the 

Personal Representative. 

• 	 The information shall include all personnel and 

organizations with a military capability, including national 

guards, military reserves, military police, ministry of internal 

affairs special troops, police, and paramilitary troops with 

conventional armaments. On all other such organizations 

only the command structures and the overall personnel 

strength shall be included in the information. 

2. The Parties shall include the following in their information: 

(A) Information on the command organization of all forces 

under the control of the Party or within the territory under its 

control, specifying the designation and subordination of all 

formations and units at each level of command down to and 

including brigade/regiment, independent battalion or 

equivalent level. 

(B) Information on the Party's total equipment holdings in each 

of the categories as well as information on each military and 

civilian installation, storage site or production plant having 

battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery pieces, 

combat aircraft or combat helicopters, as well as formation 

and unit down to and including the brigade/regiment, 

independent battalion or equivalent level specifying: 

(1) the designation and subordination; 

(2) the location of its headquarters by exact geographic 

terms and coordinates; 

(3) the personnel strength; 

(4) the major organic weapons and equipment systems, 

specifying the numbers of each type of: 

• ·battle tanks 

• • armoured combat vehicles (armoured personnel 

carriers, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, heavy 

armament combat vehicles) 

• 	 ·armoured personnel carrier look-alikes and 

armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes) 

• • artillery pieces 

• 	 ·combat aircraft 

Appendix E(6) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 291 

• 	 - combat helicopters 

• 	 - anti-tank guided missile launchers, permanently/ 

integrally mounted on armoured vehicles 

3. 	 The information provided shall be verified in accordance with 

the provisions of the Protocol on Verification. 

4. 	 The verification of the baseline data, i.e. data provided on 15 

February 1996 shall only take place in 1996, shall start on 1 

March 1996 and shall last 120 days. 

(II.) DATA RELATING TO MAJOR WEAPON AND 


EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS 


1. The Parties shall exchange data relating to their major weapon 

and equipment systems. 

2. 	 Data on existing weapon and equipment systems shall be 

provided to each Party and to the OSCE through the Personal 

Representative not later than 1 March 1996. 

3. 	 Data on new types or versions of major weapon and equipment 

systems shall be provided by the Parties when its deployment 

plans for the systems concerned are provided in an agreed 

format (see Annex 2), for the first time on 1 March 1996 or, at 

the latest, when it deploys the systems concerned for the first 

time. 

4. 	 Each Party shall, at the time the data are presented, ensure that 

each Party and the OSCE through the Personal Representative 

are provided with photographs presenting the right or left side, 

top and front views for each of the types of major weapon and 

equipment systems concerned. 

Photographs of armoured personnel carrier look-alikes and armoured 

infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes shall include a view of such 

vehicles so as to show clearly their internal configuration illustrating 

the specific characteristic which distinguishes each particular vehicle 

as a look-alike. 

The photographs of each type shall be accompanied by a note giving 

the type designation and national nomenclature for all models and 

versions of the type which the photographs represent. The 

photographs of a type shall contain an annotation of the data for that 

type. 

(Ill.) DEMONSTRATION OF NEW TYPES OF MAJOR 

WEAPON AND EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS 

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292 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


1. 	 The Party which deploys with its military forces a new type of 

major weapon and equipment system shall arrange at the 

earliest opportunity, but not later than 90 days after deployment 

has started, a demonstration for representatives of each Party 

and the Personal Representative. This demonstration may 

coincide with other events stipulated in this Agreement. 

2. 	The modalities regarding demonstration of new types of major 

weapon and equipment systems shall, mutatis mutandis, 

conform to the provisions in paragraph (Ill) of Measure XI. 

3. 	 The invited Party may decide whether to send military and/or 

civilian visitors. Military visitors shall normally wear their 

uniforms and i!'lsignia during the visit. 

(IV.) INFORMATION ON PLANS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF 

MAJOR WEAPON AND EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS 

1. 	The Parties shall exchange annually information on their plans 

for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems. 

2. 	 The information shall be provided in an agreed format to each 

Party and to the OSCE through the Personal Representative the 

first time on 15 May, 1996 and thereafter not later than 15 

December of each year. It shall cover plans for the following 

year and shall include: 

• 	 the type and name of the weapon/equipment systems to be 

deployed; 

• 	 the total number of each weapon/equipment system; 

• 	 whenever possible, the number of each weapon/equipment 

system planned to be allocated to each formation or unit; 

• 	 the extent to which the deployment shall add to or replace 

existing weapon/equipment systems. 

(V.) INFORMATION ON DEFENCE RELATED MATTERS 

1. 	In a written statement the Parties shall inform each other and the 

OSCE through the Personal Representative, every year, two 

months after the military budget has been approved by the relevant 

authorities, in the form of a general description: · 

• 	 the size, structure, personnel, major weapon and equipment 

systems and deployment of their armed forces and the 

proposed changes thereto, 

• 	 the training programs for their armed forces and planned 


changes thereto in the forthcoming years; 


Appendix E(6) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 293 


• 	 the procurement of major equipment and major military 

construction programs on the basis of the categories as set out 

in the United Nations "Instrument for Standardized International 

Reporting of Military Expenditures" adopted on 12 December 

1980 either ongoing or starting in the forthcoming years, if 

planned, and the implications of such projects, accompanied by 

explanations, where appropriate; and 

• 	 the realization of the intentions previously reported under this 

paragraph. 

2. 	 In order to facilitate the understanding of the information provided, 

the Parties are encouraged to use illustrative charts and maps, 

wherever applicable. 

Measure II 

Notification of Changes in Command Structure 

or 	Equipment Holdings 

Each Party shall notify each Party and the OSCE through the Personal 

Representative in an agreed format (see Annex 2) of: 

1. 	Any permanent change in the command structure of its armed 

forces, not later than 10 days before such change occurs. 

2. 	Any change of 1Oper cent or more, lasting 20 days or more, in 

personnel, the holdings of battle tanks, armoured combat 

vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and combat helicopters 

assigned to any of its military units, down to and including 

brigade/regiment, independent battalion or equivalent level. 

Such notification shall be provided not later than 10 days after 

such change occurs, indicating actual holdings after the 

notified change. 

3. 	 The information provided shall be verified in accordance with 

the provisions of the Protocol on Verification. 

Measure Ill 

Risk Reduction 

(A) Mechanism for Consultation and Co-Operation as Regards 

Unusual Military Activities 

1. The Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other about 

any unusual military activities. 

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294 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


2. The Party which has concerns, or the Personal Representative, 

shall in such a case transmit a request for an explanation to the 

other Party where the activity is taking place and shall, at the 

same time, also inform each Party and the Personal 

Representative. 

The request shall state the cause or causes of the concern and, 

to the extent possible, the type and location or area of the 

activity. The lack of precise data in the request cannot serve as 

a reason not to comply with the request. 

3. The reply shall be transmitted to the requesting Party and the 

Personal Representative as soon as possible, but in any case 

within not more than 48 hours after rP.ceipt of the request. 

4. The reply shall give answers to the questions raised, as well as 

contain any relevant information which might clarify the activity 

giving rise to concern. 

5. The requesting Party and/or the Personal Representative, after 

considering the reply provided, shall have the right to request a 

meeting with the responding Party to discuss the matter. The 

request for such a meeting shall also be transmitted to each 

Party. 

6. Such a meeting shall be convened immediately, but in any case 

not later than within 24 hours of receipt of a request. 

7. Such a meeting shall be held at a venue mutually agreed upon 

by the requesting and the responding Party. If there is no 

agreement on the venue at least 8 hours before the meeting is 

scheduled, the venue shall be decided by the Personal 

Representative and shall be communicated to each Party 

without delay. In taking such a decision the Personal 

Representative shall consider the specific circumstances for all 

Parties to be able to attend the meeting. 

8. Such a meeting shall be chaired by the Personal Representative. 

A factual report of the meeting shall be prepared by the 

Personal Representative and shall be transmitted to each Party 

without delay. 

9. Should these procedures fail to produce an agreement on the 

clarification of the questions raised, the Personal 

Representative shall issue an impartial assessment of the 

situation and shall propose to the Parties any necessary steps 

to reduce tension. 

(B) Co-Operation as Regards Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature 

Appendix E(6) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 295 


1. The Parties shall cooperate by reporting and clarifying 

hazardous incidents of a military nature in order to prevent 

possible misunderstandings and mitigate the effects on another 

Party. 

2. 	 In the event of such a hazardous incident the Party whose 

forces are involved in the incident shall provide the information 

available on this incident to each Party and the Personal 

Representative without delay. Any Party and/or the Personal 

Representative shall have the right to request clarification of the 

incident, as appropriate. Such requests shall receive an answer 

within 24 hours. 

Measure IV 

Notification and Observation of and Constraints 

on Certain Military Activities 

(A) Notification 

1. The Parties shall notify in writing and agreed formats (see 

Annex 2) each Party and the Personal Representative 42 days or 

more in advance of the start of notifiable military activities. 

2. 	 Each of the following military activities conducted as a single 

activity at or above the levels defined below shall be notified. 

3. 	 The military activity shall be subject to notification when the 

forces or equipment engaged exceeds any one of the following 

categories at any time during the activity: 

• 	 1.500 troops, including support 

• 	 25 battle tanks 

• 	 40 armoured combat vehicles 

• 	 40 artillery pieces 

• 	 3 combat aircraft 

• 	 5 combat helicopters 

4. 	The participation of the air forces of the Parties shall be 

included in the notification if in the course of the activity 60 or 

more sorties by combat aircraft or/and combat helicopters shall 

be flown, independently or in connection with the activities or 

land forces. 

5. 	 Notification shall be given separately of each notifiable military 

activity of the following: 

• 	 general information; 

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296 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


• 	 the designation of the military activity, including the tactical 

purpose of each phase of the activity; 

• 	 the general purpose of the military activity; 

• 	 the area in which the military activity is carried out delimited 

by geographic features and geographic coordinates; 

• 	 the level of command organizing and commanding the 

military activity; 

• 	 the designation, subordination, number and type of units; 

• 	 the total number of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, 

artillery pieces, combat aircraft, combat helicopters and 

troops; 

• 	 the total number of aircraft sorties; 

• 	 the purpose of air missions; 

• 	 the engagement of military forces in an amphibious landing, 

heliborne landing or parachute assault; 

• 	 in case of a notifiable landing, the point(s) of notifiable 

amphibious/ heliborne landing(s), 

• 	 the engagement of the Parties' forces in a transfer from/to 

outside the area of application and the arrival and/or 

concentration point(s); 

• 	 the start and end dates of the military activity. 

(B) Observation 

1. The Parties shall invite observers from each Party and the 

OSCE through the Personal Representative to the notifiable 

military activities. 

2. 	 Each Party may send up to two observers and the OSCE 

through the Personal Representative up to four observers to the 

military activity to be observed. The invited Party shall decide 

whether to send military and/or civilian observers. Military 

observers shall wear their uniforms and insignia while 

performing their tasks. No observer shall have weapons. 

3. 	 The observation shall last from the beginning until the end of 

the military activity. 

4. 	 The receiving Party shall be responsible for the security and 

safety of the observers during the entire period of their stay. 

5. 	 The observers may make additional requests with regard to the 

observation program. The receiving Party shall, if possible, 

accede to them. 

6. 	 The receiving Party shall ensure that the personnel and troops 

taking part in the observed military activity, as well as other 

armed personnel and military and civilian authoriti~s, are 

Appendix E(6) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 297 


adequately informed of the presence, status, program and 

functions of observers. 

7. 	 The Parties shall, to the extent possible, permit media 

representatives from each Party to attend observed military 

activities in accordance with the concrete accreditation 

procedures. The general provisions of these accreditation 

procedures shall be set down by the Personal Representative 

(see Annex 6). Concrete instructions.shall be issued, on this 

basis, by the receiving Party. 

8. 	 The presence of the observers shall not interfere with the 

normal activities of the units participating in the observed 

militar/ activity. The presence of media ri!'presentative-.; shall 

not interfere with the observers carrying out their functions nor 

with the flow of military activity. 

9. 	 The receiving Party shall provide the observers with 

transportation from a suitable location announced in the 

invitation to the military activity. This location shall be 

determined and transportation ~hall be organized in such a way 

that observers are in position before the start of the observation 

program. It shall also provide the observers with appropriate 

means of transportation in the area of the military activity and 

return the observers to the same or another suitable location, 

announced in the invitation, at the conclusion of the 

observation program. 

10.The receiving Party shall provide the observers with board and 

lodging during the observation program and shall bear the 

costs for them. All other costs shall be born be the sending 

Party. 

(C) Constraining Measures 

1. 	 No Party shall carry out in 1996 and 1997 more than one military 

activity invoh1ing more than any one of the following categories 

at any time during the activity: 

• 	 4.000 troops, including support 

• 	 80 battle tanks 

• 	 100 armoured combat vehicles 

• 	 100 artillery pieces 

• 	 15 combat aircraft 

• 	 20 combat helicopters 

2. 	 Thereafter no Party shall carry out within two calendar years 

more than one military activity involving more than any one of 

the following categories at any time during the activity: 

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298 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERA TIONS 


• 	 16.000 troops, including support 

• 	 80 battle tanks 

• 	 100 armoured combat vehicles 

• 	 100 artillery pieces 

• 	 25 combat aircraft 

• 	 30 combat helicopters 

3. 	 No Party shall carry out within a calendar year more than three 

military activities involving more than any one of the following 

categories at any time during the activity: 

• 	 7.000 troops, including support 

• 	 75 battle tanks 

• 	 100 armoured combat vehicles 

• 	 100 artillery pieces 

• 	 15 combat aircraft 

• 	 20 combat helicopters 

4. 	 Of these military activities no Party shall carry out more than 

three within a calendar year. 

5. 	 Of these military activities no Party shall carry out two or more 

simultaneously. 

6. 	 The duration of any exercise shall not exceed the duration 

specified in the annual calendar. 

7. 	 The Parties shall communicate in writing and agreed format to 

each Party and the Personal Representative by 15 November 

each year, the first time by 15 March 1996, information - the 

annual calendar (see Annex 2)- concerning military activities 

subject to constraints as defined in this Measure. Such a 

communication shall include preliminary information on the 

activity, as to its general purpose, time-frame and duration, 

area, size, planned forces involved. 

8. 	 If a Party does not forecast any such military activity, it shall so 

inform each Party and the Personal Representative in the same 

manner. 

9. 	 No Party shall carry out a military activity subject to the 

provisions of this Measure, unless it has been the object of 

communication as defined above and unless it has been 

included in the annual calendar, not later than 15 November 

each year and 15 March in 1996, respectively. 

1O. If notifiable military activities not subject to constraining 

measures but subject to prior notification shall be carried out, 

they should be limited to a minimum, agreed upon by the 

Appendix E(6) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 299 


Parties and the Personal Representative before the exchange of 

annual calendars. 

Measure V 

Restrictions on Military Deployments and Exercises 

in Certain Geographic Areas 

1. All military activities shall be conducted in previously 


designated and specified cantonment/barracks or other 


designated areas as established and agreed to under the 


provisions of Annex 1-A during the mandate of the IFOR. 


2. 	 The Parties shall not conduct or participate in notifiable military 

activities as defined in Measure IV within 1 Okilometers of: 

• 	 an international border; 

• 	 eithe.?r side of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line between the 

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika 

Srpska, as established L'nder Article I of Annex 2 of the . 

General Framework Agreement; 

• 	 the city limits of the city of Gorazde and the boundaries of 

the all-weather road and/or interim routes to that city as 

specified in Article IV, paragraph 2 of Annex 1-A; the 

limitations regarding the interim routes only apply as long as 

they are in use; 

• 	 the agreed city limits of the city of Brcko and all areas within 

the Posavina Corridor, 

• 	 territory transferred from one entity to another entity under 

the provisions of Annex 2 for two years after the transfer;. 

3. 	 The provisions of this Measure shall be verified in accordance 

with the provisions of the Protocol on Verification. 

Measure VI 

Restraints on the Reintroduction of Foreign Forces 

1. 	 All forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as defined in Annex 1-A of 

the General Framework Agreement as of December 14, 1995 

which are not of local origin, whether or not they are legally and 

militarily subordinated to Bosnia and Herzegovina or the 

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Republika Srpska, 

in particular all foreign forces, including individual advisers, 

freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers and personnel from 

Appendix £(6) 

300 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


neighbouring or any other states, which are withdrawn together 

with their armaments and equipment in accordance with Article 

Ill of Annex 1-A, shall not be reintroduced into the territory of 

Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

2. 	 The Parties shall notify each other and the Personal 

Representative on the first of each month on the status of any 

foreign military personnel that are physically present on their 

territory. 

3. 	 The provisions of this Measure shall be verified in accordance 

with the Protocol on Verification. 

Measure VII 

Withdrawal of Forces and Heavy Weapons to 

Cantonments/Barracks or Other Designated Areas 

1. The Parties shall withdraw their forces and heavy weapons to 

cantonments/barracks or other designated areas by Apri! 18, 

1996 as provided in Annex 1-A. 

2. 	The Parties shall inform each Party and the Personal 

Representative by 18 April 1996 of any forces or heavy weapons 

not removed to cantonments/barracks or other designated 

areas on that date. 

3. 	 The Parties not later than 18 April 1996 shall demobilize and 

disband any forces not removed to cantonments/barracks or 

other designated areas by 18 April, 1996. The Parties shall 

inform each Party and the Personal Representative on their 

steps taken for this purpose on that day. 

4. 	The Parties shall not remove their forces or heavy weapons 

from the designated areas except as provided under 

paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Measure. 

5. 	 Heavy weapons and military forces may be removed for 

exercises. The Parties shall notify each Party and the Personal 

Representative of their intention to remove these forces and 

weapons, in writing and in an agreed format (see Annex 2) at 

least 21 days in advance stating: 

• 	 the overall number of personnel to be removed, 

• 	 the number of equipment to be removed by type, 

• 	 the purpose of the removal, 

• 	 the duration of the removal, 

Appendix E(6) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 301 

• 	 the place where the weapons removed shall be 

deployed during their removal. 

6. 	 Heavy weapons and forces shall be returned immediately to 

cantonment/barracks or other designated areas at the 

conclusion of the exercise. 

7. 	 The provisions of this Measure shall be verified in accordance 

with the provisions of the Protocol on Verification. 

Measure VIII 

Restrictions on Locations of Heavy Weapons 

1. The Parties shall, ~ommencing April 18, 1996 mainiain heavy 

weapons exclusively in cantonments/barracks or other areas 

designated by the IFOR Commander in accordance with the 

provisions of Annex 1 ·A. 

2. The Parties shall not remove these heavy weapons from such 

areas at least until 11 December 1997. 

3. 	 Heavy weapons may be removed only in accordance with 


paragraphs 5 and 6 of Measure VII. 


4. 	 The provisions of this Measure shall be verified in accordance 

with the provisions of the Protocol on Verification. 

Measure IX 

Notification of Disbandment of Special Operations 

and Armed Civilian Groups 

(A) SPECIAL OPERATIONS 

1. 	 The Parties shall inform each Party and the Personal 

Representative in writing and agreed format (See Annex 2) of all 

special operations groups by 1 March 1996. 

2. The Parties shall not resume the operation of these groups. 

3. 	 The Parties agree that, in the event that a Party or the Personal 

Representative becomes aware that such a group is conducting 

activities, forbidden by Annexes 1 ·A and 1-B on the territory of 

Bosnia and Herzegovina, either in the Federation of Bosnia and 

· Herzegovina or In the Republika Srpska, and informs the Party 

in whose territory such a group is active, the Party on whose 

territory the group is active shall immediately commence an 

Appendix E(6) 
302 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


investigation of the group, in cooperation with the Personal 

Representative. 

The Party carrying out the investigation shall present the results of 

the investigation to each Party and the Personal Representative not 

later than 48 hours after the receipt of the information. 

If the investigation identifies the activities of such a group, the Party 

on whose territory the group is active shall ensure the immediate 

halting of the activities of the group within 48 hours and include the 

steps taken for this purpose in the investigation report. 

(B) ARMED CIVILIAN GROUPS 

1. Takin2 int\l account that all armed civman groups were to be 

disbanded in accordance with Annex 1 ·A, the Parties agree that, 

in the event that a Party or the Personal Representative 

becomes aware that an armed civilian group exists on the 

territory of Bosnia ana Herzegovina and informs the Party in 

whose territory such a group is present, the Party on whose 

territory the group is present shall immediately commence an 

investigation of the group, in cooperation with the Personal 

Representative. 

2. 	If the investigation determines the existence of an armed 

civilian group on the territory of any one Party, then the Party on 

whose territory such a group exists shall ensure the disbanding 

of that group immediately but not later than 48 hours after the 

conclusion of the investigation. The respective Party shall 

inform each party and the Personal Representative on the 

results of the investigation as well as the as steps taken for the 

purpose of disbandment of such groups. 

3. 	 The provisions of this Measure shall be verified in accordance 

with the provisions of the Protocol on Verification. 

Measure X 

Identification and Monitoring of Weapons 

Manufacturing Capabilities 

1. The Parties shall provide each Party and the OSCE through the 

Personal Representative with a list of all weapon manufacturing 

facilities identifying their name and location by exact 

geographical coordinates not later than 12 April, 1996. 

Thereafter this information shall be provided annually, by 15 

December each year. 

Appendix E(6) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 303 


The information shall include data on the production rates and 

disaggregated production of the manufacturing facilities. 

2. Monitoring of notified weapon manufacturing facilities shall be 

carried out, at the request of any one Party or the Personal 

Representative, through visits. Such visits of any one facility 

shall not take place more frequently than once every month. 

The modalities for such a visit shall be in accordance with the 

provisions of Section II, Ill, IV, V, VI, VII, IX and X of the Protocol 

on Verification. 

Measure XI 

Programme of rvlilitary Contacts and Co-operation 

(I.) MILITARY CONTACTS 

To improve their mutual relations in the interest of strengthening the · 

process of confidence· and security-building, the Parties shall 

voluntarily promote and facilitate: 

• 	 exchanges and visits between members of the armed forces at 

all levels, especially those between junior officers and 

commanders; 

• 	 contacts between relevant military institutions, especially 

between military units; 

• 	 exchanges and contacts between academics and experts in 

military studies and related areas; 

• 	 participation and contribution by members of the armed forces 

· of the Parties, as well as civil experts in security matters and 

defence policy, to academic conferences, seminars and 

symposia; 

• 	 issuing ofjoint academic publications on security and defence 

issues; 

• 	 sporting and cultural events between members of their armed 

forces. 

(II.) MILITARY CO-OPERATION 

1. 	Joint military exercises and training 


The Parties shall conduct, on a voluntary basi~ and as 


·appropriate, joint military training and exercises to work on 

tasks of mutual interest. 

2. Provision of experts 

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304 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


The Parties express their willingness to provide to any other 

Party available experts to be consulted on matters of defence 

and security. 

The modalities regarding provision of experts shall be agreed 

directly between the Parties concerned. 

3. 	Seminars on co-operation in the military field 

Subject to the approval of the appropriate OSCE bodies, the 

Conflict Prevention Center shall organize seminars on cooperation between the armed forces of the Parties. 

The agenda of the seminars shall concentrate primarily on 

OSCE-oriented tasks, including the participation of the armed 

forces in peacekeeping operations, in dis·1ster and emergency 

relief, in refugee crisf:!s, and in providing humanitarian 

assistance. 

4. 	Exchange of information on agreements on military contacts 

and co-operation 

The Parties shall exchange information on agreements on 

programs of military contacts and co-operation concluded with 

other Parties within the scope of these provisions. 

(Ill.) VISITS TO MILITARY BASES 

1. 	Each Party with military formations/units reported under 

Measure I shall arrange visits for representatives of each Party 

and the Personal Representative to one of its normal peacetime 

military bases where such formations/ units are located in order 

to provide the visitors with the opportunity to view the activity 

at the military base, including preparations to carry out the 

functions of the formation/unit and to gain an impression of the 

basic mission of the formation/unit stationed there. 

2. 	 No Party shall be obliged to arr!Jnge more than two such visits 

every year. 

3. 	 As a rule, up to two visitors from each Party and the Personal 

Representative shall be invited. 

4. 	 The invited Party may decide whether to send military and/or 

civilian visitors. Military visitors shall normally wear their 

uniforms and insignia during the visit. 

5. 	 The visit to the military base shall last for a minimum of 24 

hours. 

6. 	 In the course of the visit, the visitors shall be given a briefing on 

the purpose and functions of the military base and on its 

current activities, including appropriate informaticm on the force 

Appendix E(6) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 305 


structure and operations so as to explain the specific role and 

subordination of the military base. The Party arranging the visit 

shall provide the visitors with the opportunity to view routine 

activities at the military base during the visit. 

7. 	 The visitors shall have the opportunity to communicate with 

commanders and troops, including those of support/logistic 

formations/units located at the military base. They shall be 

provided with the opportunity to view all types of equipment 

located at the military base. 

8. 	 At the close of the visit, the Party arranging the visit shall 

provide an opportunity for the visitors to meet together and also 

with Party officials and senior military base personnel to 

discuss the course of the visit. 

{IV.) ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY LIAISON 

MISSIONS 

The Parties reiterate their obligation to comply with the Provisions of 

the Protocol on the Establishment of Military Liaison Mission, adopted 

on January 5, 1996 i11 Vienna. 

Measure XII 

Principles Governing Non-Proliferation 

The Parties shall contribute to efforts to prevent the proliferation of 

nuclear weapons, the acquisition, development, production, 

stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons and to 

control the transfer of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass 

destruction and their components and technology. 

Measure XIII 

Verification and Inspection Regime 

1. The information provided in accordance with the provisions of 

this Agreement shall be verified in accordance with the 

provisions of the Protocol on Verification. 

2. The verification of the information provided shall be carried out, 

as a rule, through on-site inspections, observation and 

monitoring. Different measures may require different 

verification procedures. Nothing in this Agreement shall inhibit 

the use of technical means of verification. 

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306 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


3. 	 Verification shall be the responsibility of the Parties. The OSCE 

shall assist the Parties in the implementation. 

4. 	 Detailed verification procedures are set out in the Protocol on 

Verification. 

Measure XIV 

Communications 

1. The Parties shall establish direct communication lines between 

the Commanders/Chiefs of Armed Forces of the Parties as well 

as with the Personal Representative not later than 1 March 

1996. . 

2. 	 Initially, these lines shall provide for direct connection. Later on 

the lines· may be upgr'}:::~•::J to provide for on-line computer 

connection. Secure lines may also be added. 

3. 	 The Personal Representative shall support the Parties' efforts 

to establish these communication lines. 

4. 	 Detailed procedures for communications are set out in the 

Protocol on Communication. 

Measure XV 

Implementation Assessment 

1. 	 The Parties shall create a Joint Consultative Commission. The 

Joint Consultative Commission shall be composed of one highlevel representative of each Party and the Personal 

Representative. 

2. The Personal Representative shall chair the meetings of the 

Joint Consultative Commission in 1996 and in 1997. Thereafter 

the Joint Consultative Commission shall be chaired by the 

Parties on the basis of rotation. The Personal Representative 

shall remain a member of the Joint Consultative Commission. 

Decisions of the Joint Consultative Commission shall be taken 

by consensus. In urgent matters, when delay would endanger 

the implementation of this Agreement, the Personal 

Representative shall, in 1996 and 1997 propose to the Parties 

steps to facilitate the implementation of the Agreement. 

3. 	 Detailed procedures for the functioning of the Joint 

Consultative Commission are set out in the Protocol on the 

Joint Consultative Commission. 

Appendix E(6) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 307 

ARTICLE Ill 

The provisions of this Agreement do not apply to the IFOR, the 

International Police Task Force referred to in the General Framework 

Agreement, or other elements referred to in Article I, paragraph 1 (c) of 

Annex 1-A of the General Framework Agreement. 

ARTICLE IV 

Privileges and Immunities 

1. 	 To exercise their functions effectively, for the purpose of 

implementing the Ag""eP-ment and not for their personal benefit, 

inspectors, crew members, observers, monitors and visitors, 

and Representatives in the Joint Consultative Commission shall 

be accorded the following privileges and immunities: 

• 	 their person shall be inviolable. He/she shall not be liable to. 

any form of arrest or detention. The receiving Party shall 

treat them with due re:;pect c:and shall take c.U appropriate 

steps to prevent any attack on his/her person, freedom or 

dignity; 

• 	 their residence shall enjoy the same inviolability and 

protection as the working premises. His/her papers, 

correspondence and his/her property shall likewise enjoy 

inviolability, except in an action outside his/her official 

functions; 

• 	 they shall enjoy immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the 

receiving Party and also enjoy immunity from its civil and 

administrative jurisdiction. They shall not be obliged to give 

evidence as a witness. Their immunity from the jurisdiction 

of the receiving Party shall not exempt them from the 

jurisdiction of the sending Party; 

• 	 they shall be exempted from all dues and taxes, personal or 

real, national, regional or municipal; 

• 	 they shall be exempted from all personal services, from all 

public service of any kind whatsoever, and from military 

obligations such as those connected with requisitioning, 

military contributions and billeting; 

• 	 they shall be permitted entry of, and granted exemption from 

all custom duties, and related charges other than charges 

for storage, cartage and similar services on, articles for the 

official use of the mission and articles. for their personal use. 

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308 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


2. 	 The transportation means of the inspection team shall be 

inviolable, except as otherwise provided for in the Agreement. 

3. 	 The inspecting Party may waive the immunity from jurisdiction 

of any of its inspectors or crew members, observers, monitors 

and visitors, members of Military Liaison Missions and 

Representatives in the Joint Consultative Commission in those 

cases when it is of the opinion that immunity would impede the 

course ofjustice and that it can be waived without prejudice to 

the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement. Waiver 

must always be express. 

4. 	 The privileges and immunities provided for in this Article shall 

be accorded to inspectors, crew members, observers, monitors 

and visitors, members of and Representatives in the Joint 

Consultative Commission: 

(A} while transiting through the territory of any Party; 

(B) throughout their presence on the territory of the Party where 

the inspection is carried out; and 

(C} thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the 

exercise of official functions as an inspector, crew member, 

observer, monitor and visitor, and Representatives in the 

Joint Consultative Commission. 

5. 	 If the inspected Party considers that an inspector, crew 

member, observer, monitor and visitor, member of Military 

Liaison Missions and Representative in the Joint Consultative 

Commission has abused his or her privileges and immunities, 

then the provisions set forth in Section Ill paragraph 4, 5 and 7 

of the Protocol on Verification shall apply. At the request of any 

of the Parties concerned, consultations shall be held between 

them in order to prevent a repetition of such an abuse. 

ARTICLEV 

APPLICATION OF THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK 

AGREEMENT 

The Parties hereby agree and understand that nothing contained in 

this Agreement or its Annexes shall be interpreted or understood to 

alter, change, amend, or otherwise modify any of the conditions, 

provisions, commitments, responsibilities, or obligations of the 

Appendix E(6) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 309 


Parties contained in the General Framework Agreement For Peace in 


Bosnia and Herzegovina. 


AMENDMENTS AND RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL 

This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration. It may be 

supplemented by amendments or an additional Agreement. The 

Parties, however, hereby specifically agree not to withdraw from this 

Agreement during the calendar years of 1996 and 1997. Following the 

end of calendar year 1997, each Party shall have the right to withdraw 

from this Agreement if it determines that extraordinary events related 

to the subject matter of this Agreement have jeopardized its interests. 

A Party intending to withdraw shall give notice of its decision to do so 

to each Party and to the OSCE through the Personal Representative. 

This notice shall be in writing and shall include a statement of the 

extraordinary events that the Party intending to withdraw regards as 

having jeopardized its interests. The withdrawal shall take effect 2 

months after such notification. 

Any Party may propose amendments to this Agreement. In 1996 and 

1997 the text of a proposed amendment shall be submitted to the 

Personal Representative, who shall circulate it to each Party. The · 

Personal Representative may decide to convene a meeting of the Joint 

Consultative Commission to discuss the proposed amendment. 

Thereafter proposed amendments shall be submitted to the Chairman 

of the Joint Consultative Commission who shall convene its meeting. 

If an amendment is approved by all the Parties it shall enter into force 

in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Article governing 

the entry into force of this Agreement. 

REVIEW CONFERENCE 

The OSCE, by the Personal Representative shall convene a Review 

Conference on February 15, 1998. After that the Parties shall decide to 

hold Review Conferences regularly, at least once every second year. 

ENTRY INTO FORCE 

This Agreement shall enter into force at 24.00 on January 

26, 1996. 

Done in Vienna on the 26 January, 1996 in the English language. 


Authentic translation into the languages of the Parties shall be 


provided by the Personal Representative. 


Annex 1: Protocol on Verification 


Appendix £(6) 

310 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 


Annex 2: Protocol on Exchange of Information and Notification 

Annex 3: Protocol on Existing Types 

Annex 4: Protocol on Communications 

Annex 5: Protocol on the Joint Consultative Commission 

Annex 6: Media Guidelines 

Annex 7: Protocol on the Establishment of Military Liaison Missions 

Appendix E(6) 

LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 311 


Appendix E(7): Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control (Florence 

Agreement, 14June1996) and Outline ofProtocols 

The following is the body ofthe Florence Agreement and an outline of 

the Protocols thereto. For complete text ofthe agreement and/or 

protocols, contact the Center for Law and Military Operations 

(CLAMO). Full text ofthese agreements is also available at the 

internet web address: http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/osce/docs/bosnia.htm. 

Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control 


Guided by the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, Annex 1-B, Agreement on Regional Stabilisation, Article 

IV, signed in Paris on 14December1995, and having engaged in 

negotiations under the auspices of the Organisation for Security and 

Co-operation in Europe (hereinafter "the OSCE") in Vienna from 4 

January 1996, 

Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic 

of Yugoslavia,. the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 

Republika Srpska, hereinafter, for the purposes of this Agreement, 

referred to as the "Parties", 

Recalling the agreement of the Parties, as set forth in Article I, Annex 

1-B, Agreement on Regional Stabilisation, that establishment of 

measures for regional stability and arms control is essential to 

creating a stable peace in the region, 

Committed to the objective of establishing new forms of cooperation 

in the field of security aimed at building transparency and confidence 

and achieving balanced and stable defence force levels at the lowest 

numbers consistent with the Parties' respective security and the need 

to avoid an arms race in the region, 

Conscious of the common responsibility of the Parties for seeking to 

achieve greater stability and security in the region, 

Appendix E(7) 
312 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATJONS 

Have agreed as follows : 

ARTICLE I 

1. 	 Each Party shall carry out the obligations in accordance with 

provisions set forth in this Agreement relating to the armaments 

limited by the Agreement: battle tanks, armoured combat 

vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. 

2. 	 Each Party also shall carry out the other obligations set forth in 

this Agreement. 

3. 	 The Parties affirm that nothing contained in this Agreement or 

its Protocols shall be interpreted or understood to alter, 

change, amend, or otherwise modify any of the conditions, 

provisions, commitments, responsibilities, or obligations of the 

Parties contained in the General Framework Agreement for 

Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

4. 	 This Agreement incorporates the Protocol on Reduction; the 

Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reclassification of 

Specific Models or Versions of Combat-Capable Trainer Aircraft 

Into Unarmed Trainer Aircraft, hereinafter referred to as the 

Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification; the Protocol on Exchange 

of Information and Notifications, hereinafter referred to as the 

Protocol on Information Exchange; the Protocol on Existing 

Types of Armaments, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on 

Existing Types; the Protocol on Inspection; the Protocol on The 

Sub-Regional Consultative Commission. Each of these 

documents constitutes an integral part of this Agreement. 

ARTICLE II 


For the purposes of this Agreement: 


1. The term "area of application" means the entire land territory of 

the Parties within Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of 

Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 

2. The term "armaments limited by the Agreement" means battle 

tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and 

attack helicopters subject to the numerical limitations set forth 

in Article IV of this Agreement. 

3. 	 The term "battle tank" means a self-propelled armoured fighting 

vehicle, capable of heavy firepower, primarily of a ~igh muzzle 

Appendix £(7) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS JN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 313 


velocity direct fire main gun necessary to engage armoured and 

other targets, with high cross-country mobility, with a high level 

of self-protection, and which is not designed and equipped 

primarily to transport combat troops. Such armoured vehicles 

serve as the principal weapon system of ground-force tank and 

other armoured formations. 

Battle tanks are tracked armoured fighting vehicles which 

weigh at least 16.5 metric tonnes unladen weight and which are 

armed with a 360-degree traverse gun of at least 75 millimetres 

calibre. In addition, any wheeled armoured fighting vehicles 

entering into service which meet all the other criteria stated 

abcve shall also be deemed battle tanks. 

4. 	 The term "armoured combat vehicle" means a self-propelled 

vehicle with armoured protection and cross-country capability. 

Armoured combat vehicles include armoured personnel 

carriers, armoured infantry fighting vehicles and heavy 

armament combat vehicles. 

The term "armoured personnel carrier" means an armoured 

combat vehicle which is designed and equipped to transport a 

combat infantry squad and which, as a rule, is armed with an 

integral or organic weapon of less than 20 millimetres calibre. 

The term "armoured infantry fighting vehicle" means an 

armoured combat vehicle which is designed and equipped 

primarily to transport a combat infantry squad, which normally 

provides the capability for the troops to deliver fire from inside 

the vehicle under armoured protection, and which is armed with 

an integral or organic cannon of at least 20 millimetres calibre 

and sometimes an antitank missile launcher. Armoured infantry 

fighting vehicles serve as the principal weapon system of 

armoured infantry or mechanised infantry or motorised infantry 

formations and units of forces. 

The term "heavy armament combat vehicles" means an 

armoured combat vehicle with an integral or organic direct fire 

gun of at least 75 millimetres calibre, weighing at least 6.0 

metric tonnes unladen weight, which does not fall within the 

definitions of an armoured personnel carrier, or an armoured 

infantry fighting vehicle or a battle tank. 

5. 	The term "unladen weight" means the weight of a vehicle 

excluding the weight of ammunition; fuel, oil and lubricants; 

removable reactive armour; spare parts, tools and accessories; 

Appendix E(7) 
314 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

removable snorkelling equipment; and crew and their personal 

kit. 

6. 	 The terms "armoured personnel carrier look-alike" and 

"armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alike" mean an 

armoured vehicle based on the same chassis as, and externally 

similar to, an armoured personnel carrier or armoured infantry 

fighting vehicle, respectively, which does not have a cannon or 

gun of 20 millimetres calibre or greater and which has been 

constructed or modified in such a way as not to permit the 

transportation of a combat infantry squad. Taking into account 

the provisions of the Geneva Convention "For the Amelioration 

of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 

the Field" of 12August1949 that confer a special siatus on 

ambulances, armoured personnel carrier ambulances shall not 

be deemed armoured combat vehicles or armoured personnel 

carrier look-alikes. 

7. The term "artillery'' means large calibre systems capable of 

engaging ground targets by delivering primarily indirect fire. 

Such artillery systems provide the essential indirect fire support 

to combined arms formations. Large calibre artillery systems 

are guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the 

characteristics of guns and howitzers, mortars and multiple 

launch rocket systems with a calibre of 100 millimetres and 

above. In addition, any future large calibre direct fire system 

which has a secondary effective indirect fire capability shall be 

counted against the artillery ceilings. For the purposes of this 

Agreement, "artillery" shall also include those systems with a 

calibre less than 100 millimetres but greater than 75 millimetres 

listed in Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on Existing 

Types. 

8. 	 The term "combat aircraft" means a fixed-wing or variablegeometry wing aircraft armed and equipped to engage targets 

by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, 

cannons, or other weapons of destruction, as well as any model 

or version of such an aircraft which performs other military 

functions such as reconnaissance or electronic warfare. The 

term "combat aircraft" does not include primary trainer aircraft. 

9. 	 The term "combat helicopter'' means a rotary wing aircraft 

armed and equipped to engage targets or equipped to perform 

other military functions. The term "combat helicopter" 

comprises attack helicopters and combat support helicopters. 

Appendix £(7) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 315 

The term "combat helicopter" does not include unarmed 

transport helicopters. 

10.The term "attack helicopter" means a combat helicopter 

equipped to employ anti-armour, air-to-ground, or air-to-air 

guided weapons and equipped with an integrated fire control 

and aiming system for these weapons. The term "attack 

helicopter" comprises specialised attack helicopters and multipurpose attack helicopters. 

11.The term "specialised attack helicopter'' means an attack 

helicopter that is designed primarily to employ guided weapons. 

12.The term "multi-purpose attack helicopter'' means an attack 

helicopter designed to perform multi;>fa mmtary functions and 

equipped to employ guided weapons. 

13.The term "combat support helicopter" means a combat 

helicopter which does not fulfil the requirements to qualify as 

an attack helicopter and which may be equipped with a variety 

of self-defence and area suppression weapons, such as guns, 

cannons and unguided rockets, bombs or cluster bombs, or 

which may be equipped to perform other military functions. 

14.The term "reduction site" means a clearly designated location 

where the reduction of armaments limited by the Agreement will 

take place. 

15.The term "reduction liability" means the number in each 

category of armaments limited by the Agreement that a Party 

commits itself to reduce during the period of 16 months 

following 1 July 1996 in order to ensure compliance with Article 

IV. 

16.The term "Personal Representative" means the Personal 

Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE or his/her 

designated agent(s), who is designated by the Chairman-inOffice in consultation with the Parties in order to assist the 

Parties in the implementation of this Agreement. . 

17.The term "armed forces" means all organisations which 

possess armaments limited by the Agreement other than those 

designed and structured to perform peacetime internal security 

functions. 

18.The term "export site" means a designated location at which 

armaments are prepared for export and from which they are 

shipped to a location outside the territory of the exporting 

Party. 

Appendix E(7) 
316 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 


ARTICLE Ill 

1. 	 For the purposes of this Agreement, the Parties shall apply the 

following counting rules: 

All battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat 

aircraft and attack helicopters, as defined in Article II and either 

in the possession of or belonging to the Parties, within the area 

of application shall be subject to the numerical limitations and 

other provisions set forth in Article IV with the exception of 

those which in a manner consistent with a Party's normal 

practices: 

a. 	 are in the process of manufacture, including manufact•iringrelated testing; 

b. 	are used exclusively for the purposes of research and 

development; 

c. 	 belong to historical collections; 

d. 	are awaiting disposal, having been decommissioned from 

service in accordance with the provisions of Article VII; 

e. 	 are awaiting, or are being refurbished for, export or re-export 

and are temporarily retained within the area of application. 

Such battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, 

combat aircraft and attack helicopters shall be located 

elsewhere than at sites declared under the terms of Section 

Ill of the Protocol on Information Exchange or at no more 

than 10 such declared sites which shall have been notified in 

the previous year's annual information exchange. In the 

latter case, they shall be separately distinguishable from 

armaments limited by the Agreement; 

f. 	 are, in the case of armoured personnel carriers, armoured 

infantry figthting vehicles, heavy armament combat vehicles 

or multi-purpose attack helicopters, held by organisations 

designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal 

security functions; or 

g. 	are in transit through the area of application from a location 

outside the area of application to a final destination outside 

the area of application, and are in the area of application for 

no longer than a total of seven days. 

2. 	 If, in respect of any such battle tanks, armoured combat 

vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or attack helicopters, the 

notification of which is required under Section IV of the 

Protocol on Information Exchange, a Party notifies an unusually 

Appendix E(7) 

LAWANDMILITARYOPSJNTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 317 

high number in more than two successive annual information 

exchanges, it shall explain the reasons in the Sub-Regional 

Consultative Commission, if so requested. 

ARTICLE IV 

SECTION I. LIMITATIONS ON ARMAMENTS. 

1. 	 In recognition of the importance of achieving balanced and 

stable defence force levels at the lowest numbers consistent 

with the respective Parties' security, the Parties agree that the 

establishment of a stable military balance base~ on the lowest 

level of armaments will be an essential element in the 

establishment of peace and security and the building of 

confidence. 

2. 	 All battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat 

aircraft and attack helicopters, as defined in Article II, within the 

area of application and in the possession of or belonging to the· 

Parties shall be subject to the numerical limitations and other 

provisions of this Article, except as provided for in Articles Ill, 

VII and XI. 

3. 	 Within the area of application, as defined in Article II, each Party 

shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured 

combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack 

helicopters, so that 16 months from 1July1996 and thereafter, 

the armament holdings of any individual Party do not exceed 

the following ceilings: 

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: 

(1) 1025 battle tanks; 

(2) 850 armoured combat vehicles; 

(3) 3750 pieces of artillery; 

(4) 155 combat aircraft; and 

(5) 53 attack helicopters. 

The Republic of Croatia: 

(1) 410 battle tanks; 

(2) 340 armoured combat vehicles; 

(3) 1500 pieces of artillery; 

(4) 62 combat aircraft; and 

(5) 21 attack helicopters. 

Appendix E(7) 
318 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Bosnia and Herzegovina: 

(1) 410 battle tanks; 

(2) 340 armoured combat vehicles; 

(3) 1500 pieces of artillery; 

(4) 62 combat aircraft; and 

(5) 21 attack helicopters. 

of which: 

The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: 

(1) 273 battle tanks; 

(2) 227 armoured combat vehicles; 

(3) 1000 pieces of artillery; 

(4) 41 combat aircraft; and 

(5) 14 attack helicopters. 

The Republika Srpska: 

(1) 137 battle tanks; 

(2) 113 armoured combat vehicles; 

(3) 500 pieces of artillery; 

(4) 21 combat aircraft; and 

(5) 7 attack helicopters. 

ARTICLE V 

1. 	 The numerical limits on armaments limited by the Agreement as 

set forth in Article IV of this Agreement shall be achieved only 

by means of reduction in accordance with the Protocol on 

Reduction, the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, or by 

export in accordance with Article VI of this Agreement. The 

Parties shall have the right to implement all the procedures of 

the reduction of armaments limited by the Agreement in 

accordance with the Protocol on Reduction or the Protocol on 

Procedures Governing the Reduction of Conventional 

Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty on 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. 

2. The categories of armaments limited by the Agreement subject 

to reduction are battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, 

artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. The specific 

types are listed in the Protocol on Existing Types. 

Appendix E(7) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 319 


a. 	 Battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles shall be reduced 

by destruction, export, conversion for non-military purposes, 

placement on static display, or use as ground targets. 

b. 	Artillery shall be reduced by destruction, export or 

placement on static display, or, in the case of self-propelled 

artillery, by use as ground targets. 

c. 	 Combat aircraft shall be reduced by destruction, export, 

placement on static display, use for ground instructional 

purposes, or, in the case of specific models or versions of 

combat-capable trainer aircraft, reclassification into 

unarmed trainer aircraft. 

d. Attack helicopters sha!! be reduced by destruction, export, 

placement on static display, or use for ground instructional 

purposes. 

3. 	 Armaments limited by the Agreement shall be deemed to be 

reduced upon execution of the procedures and satisfaction of 

the criteria established in the Protocol on Reduction or in the 

Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reduction of 

Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty 

on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and upon notification 

as required by this Agreement. Armaments so reduced shall no 

longer be counted against the numerical limitations set forth in 

Article IV of this Agreement. 

4. 	 Reductions shall be effected in two phases and completed no 

later than 16 months after 1July1996. The Parties undertake to 

start the process of reduction as soon as possible after that 

date, so that: 

a. 	 by the end of the first reduction phase, that is, no later than 6 

months after 1July1996, each Party shall have ensured that 

at least the following portions of its total reduction liability 

for each of the categories of armaments limited by the 

Agreement have been reduced: 

(1) 40 percent of its total reduction liability for artillery; 

(2) 40 percent of its total reduction liability for combat 

aircraft; 

(3) 40 percent of its total reduction liability for attack 

helicopters; 

(4) 20 percent of its total reduction liability for tanks; and 

(5) 20 percent of its total reduction liability for armoured 

combat vehicles. 

Appendix E(7) 

320 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


b. 	 by the end of the second reduction phase, that is, no later 

than 16 months after 1 July 1996, each Party shall have 

reduced its total reduction liability in each of the categories 

of armaments limited by the Agreement. Parties carrying out 

conversion for non-military purposes shall have ensured 

that the conversion of all battle tanks and armoured combat 

vehicles in accordance with Section VIII of the Protocol on 

Reduction shall have been completed by the end of the 

second reduction phase. 

5. 	 Armaments limited by the Agreement to be reduced shall have 

been declared in the 21 June 1996 exchange of information. 

6. 	 No later than 30 days after signature of this Agreement, each 

Party shall provide notification to all other Parties and to the 

Personal Representative of its reduction liability. Reduction 

liability is the difference between a Party's holdings notified in 

the 21June1996 exchange of information and its ceilings for 

holdings specified in Article IV of this Agreement. 

7. 	 Within two months after signature of this Agreement, each Party 

shall notify the other Parties and the Personal Representative of 

the locations of its reduction sites where reduction of 

armaments limited by the Agreement will be carried out. 

8. 	 Reduction of armaments limited by the Agreement shall be 

carried out at reduction sites unless otherwise specified in the 

Protocol on Reduction. 

9. 	 The reduction process shall be subject to inspection without 

right of refusal, in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection. 

ARTICLE VI 

1. 	 The numerical limits on armaments limited by the Agreement as 

set forth in Article IV of this Agreement shall be achieved only 

by the procedures governing reduction in accordance with the 

Protocol on Reduction, the Protocol on Aircraft 

Reclassification, or by export in accordance with this Article. 

No more than 25 percent of any Partys total reduction liability 

during a single reduction phase may be achieved by export. 

2. 	 In the notification of its reduction liability, in accordance with 

Article V of this Agreement, each Party shall indicate the 

approximate amount, if any, by which it plans to decrease its 

reduction liability through the export of armaments limited by 

the Agreement in accordance with this Article. ·. · 

Appendix E(7) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 321 


3. 	 Armaments limited by the Agreement exported and counted 

against a Party's reduction liability shall have been notified as 

being held by that Party in the 21 June 1996 exchange of 

information. 

4. 	 Armaments limited by the Agreement must be exported outside 

of the territory of the Party no later than 15months after 1 July 

1996 in order to count against the reduction liability notified in 

accordance with Article V of this Agreement. Armaments limited 

by the Agreement which are not exported must be reduced in 

accordance with the Protocol on Reduction by the end of the 

reduction period. 

5. 	 Each Party shall have the right to inspect, without. right of 

refusal, armaments limited by the Agreement to be exported, in 

accordance with this Article, at the export site. Inspections of 

armaments to be exported in accordance with this Article shall 

be conduct'1d in accordance with the provisions in Sections 1,· 11, 

Ill, IV, V, VI, X and XI of the Protocol on Inspection and the 

following: 

a. 	 Inspections of armaments to be exported under this Article 

shall not count against the quotas established in Section II 

of the Protocol on Inspection. Inspection teams conducting 

such inspections shall be composed of inspectors of the 

Parties to this Agreement. The inspected party shall not be 

obliged to accept more than two inspections at a time at 

each export site. 

b. Inspections of armaments to be exported shall not interfere 

with the on-going activities at the export site or 

unnecessarily hamper, delay or complicate the export 

process. 

c. 	In addition to the notification of approximate amounts of 

armaments to be exported in a.:.~ordance with paragraph 2 of 

this Article, each Party will notify the other Parties and the 

Personal Representative no later than the 15th of each 

month the numbers of armaments to be exported the next 

calendar month. Such notifications shall include: 

(1) the date(s) of export; 

(2) the export site(s); 

(3) the dates the armaments to be exported will be present 

for inspection; 

(4) the number(s) and type(s) of armaments that will be 

exported; 

Appendix E(7) 
322 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


(5) The object of inspection(s) from which the armaments 

have been withdrawn. 

d. 	For the purposes of inspection, such armaments shall be 

present at the export site for a minimum of three days during 

the calendar month they are to be exported. The inspection 

team shall have the right to arrive or depart at any time 

during these three days, or the day prior to the first day. 

Throughout the period that the inspection team remains at 

the export site, it shall have the right to observe the 

armaments to be exported. 

e. 	 In accordance with the provisions set forth in this Article, the 

inspection team shall have the right to freely record factory 

serial numbers from the armaments to be exported. 

f. 	 At each export site, the inspection team shall be provided 

with shipping invoice document numbers, shipping vessel 

name or railroad schedule information, and country of 

destination of the armaments to be exported. 

ARTICLE VII 

1. Other than removal from service in accordance with the 

provisions of Articles V and VI, battle tanks, armoured combat 

vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters within 

the area of application shall be removed from service only by 

decommissioning, provided that: 

a. 	 such armaments limited by the Agreement are 

decommissioned and awaiting disposal at no more than 

eight sites which shall be notified as declared sites in 

accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange and 

shall be identified in such notifications as holding areas for 

decommissioned armaments limited by the Agreement. If 

sites containing armaments limited by the Agreement 

decommissioned from service also contain any other 

armaments, the decommissioned armaments limited by the 

Agreement shall be separately distinguishable; and 

b. the numbers of such decommissioned armaments limited by 

the Agreement do not exceed, in the case of any individual 

Party, one percent of its ceilings for holdings of armaments 

limited by the Agreement pursuant to Article IV, or a total of 

100, whichever is greater, of which no more than 75 shall be 

battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and ·pieces of 

Appendix E(7) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 323 


artillery, and no more than 25 shall be attack helicopters and 

combat aircraft. 

2. 	 Notification of decommissioning shall include the number and 

type of armaments limited by the Agreement decommissioned 

and the location of decommissioning and shall be provided to 

all other Parties in accordance with Section Ill of the Protocol 

on Information Exchange. 

ARTICLE VIII 

1. 	 For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the 

provisions of this Agrflement, each Pa1·ty shall provide 

notifications and exchange information pertaining to its 

personnel and armaments in accordance with the Protocol on 

Exchange of Information and Notifications. 

2. 	 Such notifications and exchange of information shall be 

tr~nsmitted in written form through diplomatic or other official 

channels as may be agreed by the Parties. 

3. 	 Each Party shall be responsible for its own information; receipt 

of such information and of notifications shall not imply 

validation or acceptance of the information provided. 

4. 	 Information shall be exchanged annually by 15 December each 

year and shall be valid as of 01 January for the next year and 

one additional exchange of information at the end of the 

reduction period valid as of the date of the end of the reduction 

period. In addition, for 1996 information shall be exchanged by 

21 June valid as of 01 July. 

ARTICLE IX 

1. 	For the purposes of ensuring verification of compliance with 

the provisions of this Agreement, each Party shall have the right 

to conduct, and the obligation to accept, within the area of 

application, inspections in accordance with the Protocol on 

Inspection. 

2. 	 The purpose of such inspections shall be: 

a. 	 to verify, on the basis of the information pursuant to the 

Protocol on Exchange of Information and Notifications, the 

compliance of the Parties with the numerical limitations set 

forth in Article IV of this Agreement; 

Appendix E(7) 

324 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


b. 	to monitor the process of reduction of armaments limited by 

the Agreement carried out at reduction sites in accordance 

with Article V of this Agreement and the Protocol on 

Reduction; 

c. 	 to monitor the export of armaments limited by the Agreement 

used to decrease a reduction liability in accordance with 

Articles V and VI of this Agreement; and 

d. 	to monitor the certification of reclassified combat-capable 

trainer aircraft carried out in accordance with the Protocol 

on Aircraft Reclassification. 

3. 	 Verification shall be the responsibility of the Parties. The 

Personal Representative shall assist the Parties in the 

implementation. 

ARTICLE X 

1. The Parties shall create a Sub-Regional Consultative 

Commission. The Sub-Regional Consultative Commission shall 

be composed of one high-level representative of each Party. 

The Personal Representative shall be present for the meetings 

of the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission. 

2. 	 Chairmanship of the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission 

shall rotate alphabetically among the Parties, beginning with 

Bosnia and Herzegovina, changing after every meeting, unless 

otherwise decided by the Parties. 

3. 	 Decisions of the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission shall 

be taken by consensus. Consensus shall be understood to 

mean the absence of any objection by any representative of a 

Party to the taking of a decision or the making of a 

recommendation. 

4. 	Detailed procedures for the functioning of the Sub-Regional 

Consultative Commission are set out in the Protocol on the 

Sub-Regional Consultative Commission. 

ARTICLE XI 

1. Armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by organisations of a 

Party designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal 

security functions, which are not structured and organised for 

ground combat against an external enemy, are not limited by 

Appendix E(7) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSJNTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 325 

this Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, in order to 

enhance the implementation of this Agreement and to provide 

assurance that the number of such armaments held by such 

organisations shall not be used to circumvent the provisions of 

this Agreement, armoured infantry fighting vehicles assigned by 

a Party to organisations designed and structured to perform in 

peacetime internal security functions in excess of the aggregate 

number held by such organisations at the time of signature of 

the Agreement, as notified pursuant to Article VIII, shall 

constitute a portion of the permitted levels specified in Article 

IV. If the number of such armoured infantry fighting vehicles 

reported was less than the maximr.:m agreed number for such 

armoured infantry fighting vehicles, each Party shall have the 

right to increase its holdings of such armoured infantry fighting 

vehicles up to the maximum agreed number. Maximum agreed 

numbers for such armoured infantry fighting vehicles shall be: 

a. 	 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 152 

b. Rer,ublic of Croatia 76 

c. 	 Bosnia and Herzegovina 76 

d. 	ofwhich 

e. 	 Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 38 

f. 	 Republika Srpska 38 

2. 	 A Party that intends to reassign battle tanks, armoured infantry 

fighting vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack 

helicopters in service with its armed forces to any organisation 

of that Party not a part of its armed forces shall notify all other 

Parties no later than the date such reassignment takes effect. 

Such notification shall specify the effective date of the 

reassignment, the date such armaments are physically 

transferred, as well as the numbers, by type of the armaments 

limited by the Agreement being reas~ignad. 

ARTICLE XII 

1. This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration. It may be 

supplemented by a further Agreement by the Parties within the 

framework of the Review Conference pursuant to Article XIV of 

this Agreement. 

2. 	 The Parties hereby specifically agree not to withdraw from this 

Agreement during the first 42 months after entry into force of 

the Agreement. Following the first 42 mohths after entry into 

Appendix E(7) 

326 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

force of the Agreement, each Party shall have the right to 

withdraw from this Agreement if it determines that extraordinary 

events related to the subject matter of this Agreement have 

jeopardized its interests. A Party intending to withdraw shall 

give notice of its decision to do so to each Party and to the 

Personal Representative at least 150 days prior to the intended 

withdrawal from this Agreement. This notice shall be In writing 

and shall include a statement of the extraordinary events that 

the Party intending to withdraw regards as having jeopardized 

its interests. 

ARTICLE XIII 

Any Party may propose arre~dments to this Agreement. In 1996 and 

1997 the text of a proposed ~mendment shall be submitted to the 

Chairman of the Sub-Regaonal Consultative Commission who shall 

circulate it to each Party. The Chairman shall convene a meeting of 

the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission to discuss the proposed 

amendment. If an amendment is approved by all the Parties it shall 

enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the 

entry into force of this Agreement. 

ARTICLE XIV 

The Chairman of the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission shall 

convene a Review Conference on June 11, 1998. After that the Parties 

shall decide to hold Review Conferences regularly, at least once every 

second year. 

ARTICLE XV 

The original of this Agreement, of which the English text is authentic, 

shall be deposited by each Party. Duly certified copies of this 

Agreement in Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian shall be transmitted by 

the Personal Representative to all the Parties. 

Done at Florence, 14 June 1996 

Entry into Force 

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.­

Appendix E(7) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 327 


For the Republic of For Bosnia and For the Federal 

Croatia Herzegovina Republic of Yugoslavia 

For the Federation of For the Republika Srpska 

Bosnia and Herzegovina 

Witnessed by: 

For the French Republic For the Federal For the Russian 

Republic of Germany Federation 

For the Republic of For the United Kingdom For the United States 

Italy of Great Britain and of America 

Northern Ireland 

The following is merely an outline ofthe contents ofthe Protocol on 

Reduction, which gave specific guidance on how weapons systems 

were to be destroyed, converted or stored. There were also Protocols 

on (1) Procedures Governing Reclassification ofSpecific Models or 

Versions ofCombat-Capable Trainer Aircraft into Unarmed Trainer 

Aircraft, (2) Exchange ofinformation and Notifications, (3) Existing 

Types ofArmaments, (4) Inspection, and (5) the Sub-Regional 

Consultative Commission . These Protocols contain details on the 

implementation ofthe above Florence Arms Control Agreement. Full 

text ofthese agreements is available at the internet web address: 

http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/osce/docs/bosnia.htm 

PROTOCOL ON REDUCTION 

The Parties hereby agree upon procedures and criteria governing the 

reduction of armaments limited by the Agreement on Sub-Regional 

Arms Control (hereinafter referred to as "the Agreement") as set forth 

in Articles V and VI of the Agreement. 

Appendix E(7) 
328 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 


SECTION 1. General Requirements for Reduction 

1. Armaments limited by the Agreement shall be reduced in 

accordance with the procedures and criteria set forth in this 

Protocol. 

2. 	 Each Party shall have the right to use any technical means it 

deems appropriate to implement the procedures and meet the 

criteria for reducing armaments limited by the Agreement while 

making every effort to prevent causing pollution. 

3. 	 Each Party shall have the right to remove, retain and use those 

components and parts of armaments which are not themselves 

subject to reduction in accordance with the provisions of 

Section II of this Protocol, and to dispose of debris. 

4. 	 Unless otherwise provided for in this Protocol, armaments 

limited by the Agreement shall be reduced through Irreversible 

damage to parts and elem~nts, as defined in Sections Ill 

through XII of this Protocol. Irreversible damage to the parts 

and elements of itoms of armaments means damage to the 

extent to render them incapable of their further use or · 

restoration for military purposes. 

5. 	 After entry into force of the Agreement, additional procedures 

for reduction may be proposed by any Party. Such proposals 

shall be communicated to all Parties and to the Personal 

Representative, and shall provide the details of such 

procedures in the same format as the procedures set forth in 

this Protocol. Any such procedures shall be deemed sufficient 

to carry out the reduction of armaments limited by the 

Agreement so long as they shall meet the criterion of 

irreversibility specified above, and upon a decision to that effect 

by the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission. 

SECTION II. Standards for Presentation at reduction Sites 

SECTION Ill. Procedures and Criteris for Reduction of Battle 

Tanks by Destruction 

SECTION IV. Procedures for the reduction of Armoured 

Combat Vehicles by Destruction 

SECTION V. Procedures for the Reduction of Artillery by 

Reduction 

SECTION VI. Procedures for the reduction of Combat 

Aircraft by Destruction 

Appendix E(7) 

LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 329 

SECTION VII. Procedures for the Reduction of Attack 

Helicopters by Destruction 

SECTION VIII. Rules and Procedures for Reduction of 

Armaments Limited by the Agreement by Conversion for 

Non-Military Purposes 

SECTION IX. Procedure for Reduction in the Event of 

Destruction by Accident 

SECTION X. Procedure for Reduction by Means of Static 

Display 

SECTION XI. Procedure for reduction by Use as Ground 

Targets 

SECTION XII. Procedure for reduction by Use for Ground 

Instructional Purposes 

Appendix E(7) 

330 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 

Appendix E(8): SOFA Between NATO and Croatia 

NATO-Croatia SOFA 

Agreement Between the Republic of Croatia and the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organisation (NATO) Concerning the Status of NATO and its 

Personnel 

The Republic of. Croatia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 

have agreed as follows: 

1. For the purposes of the present agreP.ment, the following 

expressions shall have the meanings hereunder assigned to them: 

- "the Operation" means the support, implementation, preparation and 

participation by NATO and NATO personnel in a peace plan in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina or a possible withdrawal of U.N. Forces from former 

Yugoslavia; 

- "NATO personnel" means the civilian and military personnel of the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation with the exception of personnel 

locally hired; 

- "NATO" means the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, its subsidiary 

bodies, its military Headquarters and all its constituent national 

elements/units acting in support of, preparing and participating in the 

Operation; 

- "Facilities" means all premises and land required for conducting the 

operational, training and administrative activities by NATO for the 

Operation as well as for accommodations of NATO personnel. 

2. The provisions of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities 

of the United Nations of 13February1946 concerning experts on 

mission shall apply mutatis mutandis to NATO personnel involved in 

the Operation, except as otherwise provided for in the present 

agreement. Moreover NATO, its property and assets shall enjoy the 

Appendix E(8) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 331 


privileges and immunities specified in that Convention and as stated 

in the present agreement. 

3. All personnel enjoying privileges and immunities under this 

Agreement shall respect the laws of the Republic of Croatia, insofar 

as it is compatible with the entrusted tasks/mandate and shall refrain 

from activities not compatible with the nature of the Operation. 

4. The Government of Croatia recognizes the need for expeditious 


departure and entry procedures for NATO personnel. They shall be 


exempt from passport and visa regulations and the registration 


requirements applicable to al!~ns. NATO personnel shall carry 


identification which they may be requested to produce for Croatian 


authorities but operations, training and movement shall not be 


allowed to be impeded or delayed by such requests. 


5. NATO military personnel shall normally wear uniforms, and NATO 

personnel may possess and carry arms if authorized to do so by their 

orders. Croatian authorities shall accept as valid, without tax or fee, 

drivers' licenses and permits issued to NATO personnel by 

theirrespective national authorities. 

6. NATO shall be permitted to display the NATO flag and/or national 

flags of its constituent national elements/units on any NATO uniform, 

means of transport or facility. 

7. NATO military personnel under all circumstances and at all times 

shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective 

national elements in respect of any criminal or disciplinary offenses 

which may be committed by them in the Republic of Croatia. NATO 

and Croatian authorities shall assi:at each other in the exercise of their 

respective jurisdictions. 

8. As experts on mission, NATO personnel shall be immune from 

personal arrest or detention. NATO personnel mistakenly arrested or 

detained shall immediately be turned over to NATO authorities. 

9. NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, 

aircraft and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded 

ac~ess throughout Croatia including Croatian airspace and territorial 

waters. This shall include, but not be limited to,-_the right of bivouac, 

Appendix E(8) 

332 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities as required 

for support, training, and operations. NATO shall be exempt from 

providing inventories or other routine customs documentation on 

personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment, supplies, and 

provisions entering, exiting, or transiting Croatian territory in support 

of the Operation. The Croatian authorities shall facilitate with all 

appropriate means all movements of personnel, vehicles, vessels, 

aircraft or supplies, through ports, airports or roads used. Vehicles, 

vessels and aircraft used in support of the Operation shall not be 

subject to licensing or registrationrequirements, nor commercial 

insurance. NATO will use airports, roads and ports without payment 

of duties, dues, tolls or charges. However, NATO shall not claim 

exemption from reasonable charges for services requested and 

received, but operations/movement and accessshall not be allowed to 

be impeded pending payment for such services. 

10. NATO personnel shall be exempt from taxation by the Republic of 

Croatia on the salaries and emoluments received from NATO and on 

any income received from outside the Republic of Croatia 

11. NATO personnel and their tangible movable property imported into 

or acquired in Croatia shall also be exempt from all identifiable taxes 

by the Republic of Croatia, except municipal rates for services 

enjoyed, and from all registration fees and related charges. 

12. NATO shall be allowed to import and export free of duty or other 

restriction equipment, provisions, and supplies, necessary for the 

Operation, provided such goods are for the official useof NATO or for 

sale via commissaries or canteens provided for NATO personnel. 

Goods sold shall be solely for the use of NATO personnel and not 

transferable to other parties. 

13. NATO shall be allowed to operate its own internal mail and 

telecommunications services, including broadcast services. 

Telecommunications channels and other communications 

needswhich may interfere with Croatian telecommunication services 

shall be coordinated with appropriate Croatian authorities free of cost. 

It is recognized by the Government of Croatia that the use of 

communications channels shall be necessary for the Operation. 

Appendix E(8) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 333 


14. The Government of Croatia shall provide, free of cost, such 

facilities NATO needs for the preparation for and execution of the 

Operation. The Government of Croatia shall assist NATO in obtaining, 

at the lowest rate, the necessary utilities such as electricity, water and 

other resourcesnecessary for the Operation. 

15. Claims for damage or injury to Croatian Government personnel or 

property, or to private personnel or property shall be submitted 

through Croatian governmental authorities to the designated NATO 

Representatives. 

16. NATO shall be :tllowed to contract direct with suppliers fer 

services and supplies in the Republic of Croatia without payment of 

tax or duties. Such services and supplies shall not be subject to sales 

or other taxes. NATO may hire local personnel who sha:I remain 

subject to locallaws and regulations. However, local personnel hired 

by NATO shall: 

(a) be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or 

written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity; 

(b) be immune from national services and/or national military service 

obligations; 

(c) be exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to 

them by NATO. 

17. NATO may in the conduct of the Operation, have need to make 

improvements or modifications to certain Croatian infrastructure such 

as roads, utility systems, bridges, tunnels, buildings, etc. Any such 

improvements or modifications of a non-temporary nc:ture shall 

becomepart of and in the same ownership as that infrastructure. 

Temporary improvements or modifications may be removed at the 

discretion of the NATO Commander, and the facility returned to as 

near its original condition as possible. 

18. Failing any prior settlement, disputes with regard to the 

interpretation or application of the present agreement shall be settled 

between Croatia and NATO Representatives by diplomatic means. 

Appendix E(8) 

334 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


19. The provisions of this agreement shall also apply to the civilian 

and military personnel, property and assets of national elements/units 

of NATO states, acting in connection to the Operation or the relief for 

the civilian population which however remain under national 

command and control. 

20. Supplemental arrangements may be concluded to work out details 

for the Operation also taking into account its further development. 

21. The Government of Croatia shall accord non-NATO states and 

their personnel participating in the Operation the same privileges and 

immunities as those accorded under this agreement to NATO states 

and personnel. 

22. The provisions of this agreement shall remain in force until 

completion of the Operation or as the Parties otherwise agree. 

23. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature. 

Done at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio on November 21, 1995 

and at on , 1995. 

For the Republic of Croatia: 

For the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: 

Appendix E(8) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 335 

Appendix E(9): Transit Agreement Between NATO and Federal 

Republic ofYugoslavia 

NATO-Federal Republic ofYugoslavia Transit Agreement 

Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Concerning Transit Arrangements 

for Peace Plan Operations 

Considering that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is conducting 

contingency planning in coordination with the United Nations to 

support the implementation of a peace plan in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina or a possible withdrawal of U.N. Forces from former 

Yugoslavia, and may berequested by the United Nations to execute 

either such operation; 

Considering the necessity to establish adequate transit arrangements 

for the execution/implementation of this Operation; 

It is agreed that: 

1. For the purposes of the present agreement, the following 

expressions shall have the meanings hereunder assigned to them: 

- "the Operation" means the support, implementation, preparation and 

participation by NATO and NATO personnel in a peace plan in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina or a possible withdrawal of U.N. Forces from former 

Yugoslavia; 

- "NATO personnel" means the civilian and military personnel of the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization with the exception of personnel 

locally hired; 

- "NATO" means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its subsidiary 

bodies, its military Headquarters and all its constituent national 

elements/units acting in support of, preparing and participating in the 

Operation. · 

Appendix E(9) 
336 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


2. The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall allow 

the free transit over land, rail, road, water or through air of all 

personnel and cargo, equipment, goods and material of whatever 

kind, including ammunition required by NATO for the execution of the 

Operation, through the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

including Federal Republic of Yugoslavia airspace and territorial 

waters. 

3. The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall 

provide or assist to provide, at the lowest cost, such facilities or 

services as determined by NATO as are necessary for the transit. 

4. NATO shall be exempt from providing inventories or other routine 

customs documentation on personnel, equipment, supplies, and 

provisions entering, exiting, or transiting the Federal Republic of 

Yugoslavia territory in support of the Operation. The Federal Republic 

of Yugoslavia authorities shall facilitate with all appropriate means· all 

movements of personnel, vehicles and/or supplies, through ports, 

airports or roads used. Vehicles, vessels and aircraft in transit shall 

not be subject to licensing or registration requirements, nor 

commercial insurance. NATO shall be permitted to use airports, roads 

and ports without payment of duties, dues, tolls or charges. NATO 

shall not claim exemption for reasonable charges for services 

requested and received, but transit shall not be allowed to be impeded 

pending negotiations on payment for such services. The modes of 

transport will be communicated by NATO to the Government of the 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in advance. The routes to be followed 

will be commonly agreed upon. 

5. The provision of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of 

the United Nations of 13 February 1946 concerning experts on 

mission shall apply mutatis mutandis to NATO personnel involved in 

the transit, except as otherwise provided for in the present 

Agreement. Moreover, NATO, its property and assets shall enjoy the 

privileges and immunities specified in that Convention and as stated 

in the present agreement. 

6. All personnel enjoying privileges and immunities under this 

Agreement shall respect the laws of the Federal Republic of 

Yugoslavia, insofar as respect for said laws is compatible with the 

Appendix E(9) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 337 


entrusted tasks/mandate and shall refrain from activities not 


compatible with the nature of theOperation. 


7. The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia recognizes 

the need for expeditious departure and entry procedures for NATO 

personnel. They shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations 

and the registration requirements applicable to aliens. NATO 

personnel shall carry identification which they may be requested to 

produce for Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities, but transit 

shall not be allowed to be impeded or delayed by such requests. 

8. NATO military pcrson:lel shall normally '·11ear iJi1ifonns, and NATO 

personnel may possess and carry arms if authorized to do so by their 

orders. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities shall accept as 

valid, without tax or fee, drivers' licenses and permits issued to NATO 

personnel by their respective national authorities. 

9. NATO shail be permitted to display the NATO flag and/or national 

flags of its constituent national elements/units on any NATO uniform, 

means of transport or facility. 

10. NATO military personnel under all circumstances and at all times 

shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective 

national elements in respect of any criminal or disciplinary offenses 

which may be committed by them in the Federal Republic of 

Yugoslavia. NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities 

shall assist each other in the exercise of their re:;pective jurisdictions. 

11. As experts on mission, NATO personnel shall be immune from 

personal arrest or detention. NATO personnel mistakenly arrested or 

detained shall immediately be turned over to NATO :iuthorities. 

12. NATO personnel and their tangible movable property in transit 

through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall also be exempt from 

all identifiable taxes by the Government of the Federal Republic of 

Yugoslavia. 

13. NATO shall be allowed to operate its own telecommunications 

services. This shall include the right to utilize such means and 

services as required to assure full ability to communicate, and the 

right to use all of the electro-magnetic spectrum for this purpose, free 

Appendix E(9) 

338 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

of cost. In implementing this right, NATO shall make every reasonable 

effort to coordinate with and take into account the needs and 

requirements of appropriate Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

authorities. 

14. Claims for damage or injury to Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

Government personnel or property, or to private persons or property 

shall be submitted through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

governmental authorities to the designated NATO Representatives. 

15. Failing any prior settlement, disputes with regard to the 

interpretation or application of the present agreement shall be settled 

between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO 

Representatives by diplomatic means. 

16. The provisions of this agreement shall also apply to the civilian 

and military personnel, property and assets of national elements/units 

of NATO states, acting in connection to the Operation of the relief for 

the civilian population which however remain under national 

command and control. 

17. Supplemental arrangements may be concluded to work out details 

for the transit also taking into account its further development. 

18. The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall 

accord for the transit of non-NATO states and their personnel 

participating in the Operation the same privileges and immunities as 

those accorded under this agreement to NATO states and personnel. 

19. The provisions of this agreement shall remain in force until 

completion of the Operation or as the Parties otherwise agree. 

20. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature. 

Done at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio on November 21, 1995 

and 

at on , 1995. 

For the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: 

For the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: 

Appendix E(9) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 339 

Appendix F: Sample Mission Statements 

IFOR Mission Focus (MAY 1996)1 

• 	 Ensure complaince by all parties with the withdrawal and 

redeployment of forces within the agreed time frames 

and established Zone of Separation (ZOS). 

• 	 Demarcate the ZOS. 

• 	 Establish liaison with local authorities and international 

organizations. 

• 	 Separate Former Warring Factions (FWFs). 

• 	 Establish/maintain Zone of Separation. 

• 	 Enforce demobilization of FWFs and establish heavy 

weapons cantonment sites. 

• 	 Provide "secure environment" for civil implementation of 

the GFAP. 

• 	 Help establish International Police Task Force. 

• 	 Help establish Office of High Representative. 

• 	 Initial round of national elections. 

1 Bosnia Country Handbook (IFOR, May 1996) at 1-2. 

AppendixF 
340 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


SFOR Mission 

Stabilization Force executes military tasks of the General 

Framework Agreement for Peace within the Area of 

Responsibility for 18 months, deters hostilities, stabilizes 

Bosnia-Herzegovina and assists in the consolidation of the 

peace in order to contribute to a secure environment and 

foster ongoing civil implementation plans. 

MND (North) MISSION 

Conduct Peace Operation in sector as outlined in the GFAP, 

maintain force protection, ensure EAF military compliance 

with Annex 1A of the GFAP, and promote a secure and 

stable environment to foster the ongoing civilian and 

international community implementation of the GFAP. On 

order, set the conditions for and execute a transition to 

follow-on forces and withdraw from sector. 

AppendixF 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 341 


THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 


AppendixF 

342 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Appendix G: Rules ofEngagement Cards 

HUNGARY ROE CARD 


ROE CARD FOR HUNGARY 

1. The Mission. 


> The U.S. is not at war with a:1yone. 


> You are here at the invitation of the host nation. 


> Your mission is to assist in providing logistical support to the 


Implementation Force (IFOR). 

2. Right of Self-Defense. 


> You always have the right and duty to defend yourself. 


> If anyone commits a hostile act against you (an attack which 


could cause death or serious injury) or is about to attack you, 

you may use all means necessary to defend yourself, 

consistent with the principles set forth below. 

> You may also use force to defend other U.S. Forces. 

3. Attempt to Control the Situation Without Use of Force. 


> Use force only as a last resort. 


);. If circumstances permit, attempt to warn first. 


4. Use the Minimum Force Necessary to Defend Yourself and 


Others. 


> If circumstances permit, attempt to use non-deadly force 


before resorting to deadly force. 

Front Side 

Appendix G 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 343 

HUNGARY ROE CARD 


5. If You Have to Use Deadly Force: 


> Fire only aimed shots; 


> Fire no more rounds than necessary; 


> Try not to injure anyone other than your target; 


> Try not to unnecessarily destroy property - Stop firing as soon 


as the situation permits; ar;d 

> Care for the sick and wounded. 

6. Respect Private Property at All Times. 


> Do not take anything that does not belong to you. 


7. Immediately Report Any Incidents or Violations of the Law of 


Land Warfare. 


8. Show Courtesy in Executing Your Duties. 


> 	 Learn local, social, and religious customs and respect them at 

all times. 

Reverse Side 

Appendix G 
344 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

IFOR ROE CARD 

AS OF 10 JAN 96 

NATO UNCLASSIFIED 

IFOR ·OPERATION DECISIVE ENDEAVOR 

Commander's Guidance on Use of Force 

MISSION 

Your mission is to stabilize and consolidate the peace in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina 

SELF DEFENSE 

1. You have the right to use force (including authorized weapons 

as necessary) ir. self defense. 

2. Use only the minimum force necessary to defend yourself. 

GENERAL RULES 

1. Use the minimum force necessary to accomplish your mission. 

2. Hostile forces/belligerents who want to surrender will not be 

harmed. Disarm them and tum them over to your superiors. 

3. Treat everyone, including civilians and detained hostile 

forces/belligerents, humanely. 

4. Collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe. 

5. Respect private property. Do not steal. Do not take "war 

trophies". 

6. Prevent and report all suspected violations of the Law of Armed 

Conflict to superiors. 

CHALLENGING AND WARNING SHOTS 

1 .If the situation permits, issue a challenge: 

In English: "IFOR! STOP OR I WILL FIRE!" 

or in Serbo-Croat: "IFOR! STANI Ill PUCAM!" 

Pronounced as: "IFOR! STANI EEL LEE PUTSAM!" 

2. If the person fails to halt, you may be authorized by the onscene commander or by standing orders to fire a warning shot. 

NATO UNCLASSIFIED 

Front Side 

Appendix G 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 345 

IFOR ROE CARD 


AS OF 10 JAN 96 


NATO UNCLASSIFIED 

OPENING FIRE 

1. You may open fire only if you, friendly forces, or persons or 

property under your protection are threatened with deadly force. 

This means: 

a. You may open fire against an individual who fires or alms his 

weapon at you, friendly forces. or persons with designated 

special status under your protection. 

b. You may open fire against an individual who plants, throws, or 

prepares to throw an explosive or incendiary device at you, 

friendly forc<-:s, or persons with designated special status or 

property with designated special status under your protection. 

c. You may open fire against an individual who deliberately 

drives a vehicle at you, friendly forces, persons with a 

designated special status or property with designated special 

status under your protection. 

2. You may also fire against an individual who attempts to take 

possession of friendly force weapons, ammunition, or property 

with designated special status, and there is no other way of 

avoiding this. 

MINIMUM FORCE 

1. If you have to open fire, you must 

- Fire only aimed shots, and 

- Fire no more round as necessary, and 

- Take all reasonable efforts not to unnecessarily destroy property, 

and 

- Stop firing as soon as the situation permits. 

2. You may not intentionally attack civilians or property that is 

exclusively civilian or religious in character, except if the property 

is being used for military purpose and engagement is authorized 

by your commander. 

NATO UNCLASSIFIED 

Reverse Side 

Appendix G 
346 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

SFOR ROE CARD 

AS OF 20 DEC 96 

NATO UNCLASSIFIED 


SFOR - OPERATION CONSTANT GUARD 


Commander's Guidance on Use of Force 


MISSION 

Your mission is to stabilize and consolidate the peace in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina 

SELF DEFENSE 

1. You have the right to use force (including authorized weapons 

as necessary) in self defense. 

2. Use only the minimum force necessary to defend yourself. 

GENERAL RULES 

1. Use the minimum force necessary to accomplish your mission. 

2. Hostile forces/belligerents who want to surrender will not be 

harmed. Disarm them and tum them over to your superiors. 

3. Treat everyone, including civilians and detained hostile 

forces/belligerents, humanely. 

4. Collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe. 

5. Respect private property. Do not steal. Do not take "war 

trophies". 

6. Prevent and report all suspected violations of the Law of Armed 

Conflict to superiors. 

CHALLENGING AND WARNING SHOTS 

1 .If the situation permits, issue a challenge: 


In English: "SFOR! STOP OR I WILL FIRE!" 


or in Serbo-Croat: ·"SFOR! ST ANI Ill PUCAM!" 


Pronounced as: "SFOR! STANI EEL LEE PUTSAM!") 


2. If the person fails to halt, you may be authorized by the onscene commander or by standing orders to fire a warning shot. 

NATO UNCLASSIFIED 

Front Side 

Appendix G 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 347 

SFOR ROE CARD 

AS OF 20 DEC 96 

NATO UNCLASSIFIED 

OPENING FIRE 

1. You may open fire only if you, friendly forces, or persons or 

property under your protection are threatened with deadly force. 

This means: 

a. 	 You may open fire against an individual wlio fires or alms his 

weapon at you, friendly forces, or persons with designated 

special status under your protection. 

b. 	 You may open fire against an individual who plants, throws, or 

prepares to throw an explosive or incendiary device at you, 

friendly forces, or persons with designated special status or 

property with designated special status under your protection. 

c. 	 You may open fire against an individual who deliberately 

drives a vehicle at you, friendly forces, persons with a 

designated special status or property with designated special 

status under your protection. 

2. You may also fire against an individual who attempts to take 

possession of friendly force weapons, ammunition, or property 

with designated special status, and there is no other way of This para. 3. Is This para. 3. Is , avoiding this. the key the key 3. You may use minimum force, Including opening fire,

difference difference against an Individual who unlawfully commits, or is about to 

between the between the 

previous /FOR 

commit, an act which endangers Life, or is likely to cause > 

previous /FOR 

card and this, the 

serious bodily harm, in circumstances where there is no 

other way to prevent the act card and this, the 

SFORcard. .. MINIMUM FORCE SFOR card. 

1. If you have to open fire, you must: 


- Fire only aimed shots, and 


- Fire no more rounds than necessary, and 


- Take all reasonable efforts not to unnecessarily destroy property, 


and 


- Stop firing as soon as the situation permits. 


2. You may not intentionally attack civilians or property that is 


exclusively civilian or religious in character, except if the property 


is being used for military purpose and engagement is authorized 


by your commander. 


NATO UNCLASSIFIED 

Reverse Side 

Appendix G 
348 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

OPERATION JOINT FORGE 

STANDING ROE 24AUGUST1998 

SELF-DEFENSE 

1. NOTHING IN THESE RULES PROHIBITS YOU FROM 

EXERCISING YOUR INHERENT RIGHT TO DEFEND 

YOURSELF, SFOR SOLDIERS AND PERSONS WITH 

DESIGNATED SPECIAL STATUS. 

2. Use the minimum force necessary when you use force. 

3. You may use deadly force to defend yourself, SFOR 

soldiers and per:;ons with designated special status from 

immediate threat of serious injury or death. 

4. You do not need permission to act in self-defense. 

PROTECTION OF PROPERTY 

1. Use the min. force necessary, which may include deadly 

force (Five S's), to protect classified documents and 

property, weapons, ammo, explosives, and property with 

designated special status. 

2. Use the min. force necessary, BUT NOT deadly force, to 

protect all other SFOR property. 

MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT 

1. IAW command guidance, the senior leader present is 

authorized to direct the use of force, including deadly force 

(Five S's), to accomplish the mission. 

Front Side 

Appendix G 
LAW AND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 199 5-1998 349 

OPERATION JOINT FORGE 

STANDING ROE 24AUGUST1998 

2. REMEMBER. even in absence of command guidance or 

orders from the senior leader present, you may always use 

force to defend yourself, SFOR soldiers, and persons with 

designated special status from immediate threat of serious 

injury or death. 

SERIOUS CRIMINAL ACTS 

You may use the min. force necessary (Five S's). including 

deadly force, to stop and detain persons committing, or 

about to commit, in your presence, serious criminal acts 

upon other persons (murder, rape, serious assault). 

MINIMUM FORCE 

1. Evaluate the threat using Hand-SALUTE. Identify what is 

in the person's hand, then apply the standard SALUTE 

factors. 

2. FIVE S's. When possible, use the following degrees of 

force: 

a. SHOUT verbal warnings to halt! ("STANI") 

b. SHOW your weapon and demonstrate intent to 

use it. 

c. SHOVE. Use non-lethal physical force. 

d. SHOOT a WARNING shot after issuing a verbal 

challenge. In English: "NATO! STOP OR I WILL FIRE!" In 

Serbo-Croat: "NATO! STANI EEL LEE PUTSAM!" 

e. SHOOT to eliminate the threat. Fire only aimed 

shots. Stop firing when the threat is gone. 

• Respect civilians and their property. Treat all people 

humanely and with dignity. 

Reverse Side 

Appendix G 
350 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


IFOR SOFA CARD FOR BOSNIA· 


HERZEGOVINA 


NATO UNCLASSIFIED 

IFOR SOFA CARD (BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA) 

Privileges and Obligations for IFOR personnel under the Status of 

Forces Agreement with the Republic of BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA. 

• IFOR personnel, both military and civilian, are entitled entry into the 

Republic of BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA based upon national military or 

IFOR identity cards without requirement for passport or Visa. 

• Military personnel are entitled to wear unifonns, and carry anns. 

Civilian personne: may be authorized to carry anns if required. IFOR and 

national flags an;,; 1:isignia may be displayed. 

·All IFOR personnel are required to respect the laws of the Republic of 

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA. However, IFOR perso11nel are entitled to 

immunity (total for military, with limitations for civilians) from BOSNIAHERZEGOVINA criminal and civil jurisdiction. They are immune from 

personal arrest or detention. 

If questions arise involving BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA military or civilian 

police notify your command authorities immediately. ­

• IFOR is exempt from taxation, duties, tolls or other governmental 

charges. Services actually provided may be paid for. IFOR is entitled to 

import goods and supplies into BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA for the mission 

without tax or duty. 

• IFOR is entitled to freedom of movement within BOSNIAHERZEGOVINA on land, sea or air. They are exempt from inventories 

and customs documentation requirements. They are not subject to 

licensing, registration or commercial insurance requirements. BOSNIA· 

HERZEGOVINA authorities will assure that IFOR transportation is not 

impeded. 

• Claims for damage to government or third person property should be 

made through BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA authorities to the designated 

NATO representative. However, incidents Which may give rise to claims 

should be reported immediately and investigated by IFOR authorities to 

prevent false daims. Claimants should be instructed to go through their 

government to present the daim. 

• IFOR is entitled to operate mail and telecommunications services. 

Coordination with BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA authorities is required. 

Facilities are to be provided free of cost as agreed between IFOR and 

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA authorities. 

• Contracting and hiring of personnel is authorized as prescribed by IFOR 

regulations. 

IF there are any questions in regard to any of these SOFA provisions you 

should immediately notify IFOR HQ through command channels. 

NATO UNCLASSIFIED 

Appendix G 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 351 

IFOR SOFA CARD FOR CROATIA 


NATO UNCLASSIFIED 

IFOR SOFA CARD (CROATIA\ 

Privileges and Obligations for IFOR personnel under the Status of Forces 

Agreement with the Republic of Croatia. 

- IFOR personnel, both military and civilian, are entitled entry into the 


Republic of Croatia based upon national military or IFOR identity cards 


without requirement for passport or Visa. 


- Military personnel are entitled to wear uniforms, and carry arms. 

Civilian personnel may be authorized to carry arms if required. IFOR and 

national flags and insignia may be displayed. 

- All !FOR personnel are required to respect the laws of the Republic of 

Croatia. However, !FOR personnel are entitled to immunity (total for 

military, with limitations for civilians) from Croatian criminal and civil 

jurisdiction. They are immune from personal arrest or detention. 

If questions arise involving Croatian military or civilian police notify your 

command authorities immediately. 

- !FOR is exempt from taxation, duties, tolls or other governmental 

charges. Services actually provided may be paid for. IFOR is entitled to 

import goods and supplies into Croatia for the mission without tax or duty. 

• !FOR is entitled to freedom of movement within Croatia on land, sea or 

air. They are exempt from inventories and customs documentation 

requirements. They are not subject to licensing, registration or 

commercial insurance requirements. Croatian authorities will assure that 

IFOR transportation is not impeded. 

- Claims for damage to government or third person property should be 

made through Croatian authorities to the designated NATO representative. 

However, incidents which may give rise to claims should be reported 

immediately and investigated by IFOR authorities to prevent false claims. 

Claimants should be instructed to go through their government to present 

the claim. 

- IFOR is entitled to operate mail and telecommunications services. 

Coordination with Croatian authorities is required. 

- Facilities are to be provided free of cost as agreed between !FOR and 

Croatian authorities. 

- Contracting and hiring of personnel is authorized as prescribed by IFOR 

regulations. 

IF there are any questions, in regard to any of these SOFA provisions you 

should immediately notify IFOR HQ through command channels. 

NATO UNCLASSIFIED 

Appendix G 
352 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Appendix H(l): Legal Appendix by USAREUR 

HQ, USAREUR & 7th ARMY 


APO AE 09014 APRIL 1998 


CU) APPENDIX 4 (LEGAL) to ANNEX E (PERSONNEL AND 


ADMINISTRATION) CS) TO SUPPLAN 003 {REDPLOYMENT) TO 


USAREUR OPORD 4246 OPERATION JOINT GUARD 


REFERENCES 

a. The United Nations Charter. 

b. Conventions on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 13 

February 1946. 

c. General Framework Agreement for Peace GFAP in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. 

d. NATO Status of Forces (NATO SOFA) and Supplementary Agreement 

(SA). 

e. SACEUR OPLAN 10407. 

f. COMSFOR OPLAN 31407. 

g. USAREUR CAM PLAN 40105. 

h. Army FM 27-10, Law of Land Warfare. 

i. DA Pamphlet 27- 1, Treaties Governing Land Warfare. 

j. DA Pamphlet 27-1-1, Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 

1949. 

k. DA Pamphlet 27-161 -2, International Law, volume H. 

I. USEUCOM Directive 45- 1. Law of War Program, IS NUY 1989. 

m. DA Pamphlet 27-162, Claims. 

n. AR 27-20, Claims. 

Appendix H(J) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 353 


o. DoDD 5519, 8, Assignment of Single Service Claims Responsibility. 

p. Memo, 12 March 1996, DoD Office of the General Counsel, Subject: 

Assignment under DoDD 5518.8 of the Department of the Army as the 

Single Service Claims Authority for Operation Joint Endeavor. 

q. Partnership for Peace (PIP) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). 

r. Omnibus Agreement between the United States of America and Hungary. 

s. U.S. - Hungary Amendment to the "Administrative Arrangement 

Concerning Procedures for the Operation of the Joint Claims Oversight 

commission and the Settlement of Claims Arising from the Activities of U.S. 

Forces in Connection with the Peace Implementation Force." 

t. Claims Annex to the Technical Arrangement between the Republic of 

Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Implementation Force 

u. Claims Annex to the Technical Arrangement between the Republic of 

Croatia and the Implementation Force. 

v. The Protocol made on 4 April 19% between the Minister of Justice of the 

Republika Srpska and the WOR Claims Officer. 

w. USACSEUR Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), Affirmative Claims 

for Property Damage, U.S. Forces in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

x. OPORD 4246, Technical Implementing Guidance - Processing of Claim 

(Demand for Payment} for Rent (the Use of Real Property) for which there 

is no lease. 

y. M Manual for Courts-martial, United States, 1996. 

z. AR27-10, Military Justice. 


aa. UP, 27-10, Military Justice. 


bb. AR ?7-3, Army Legal Assistance Prqgram. 


cc. EUCOM General Order# 1. 


Appendix H(J) 

354 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 


dd. COMSFOR General Order# 1. 

ee. COMSFOR General Order 0 2. 

1. (U) GENERAL. This annex prescribes policies and procedures for legal 


support and services provided to U.S. organizations that are members of 


the NATO peace Stabilization Force (SFOR). 


a. (U) NEO Authority Operations will be conducted IAW national law 

and Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNSCR 1088 (or its successor), the 

General Framework Agreement for Peace GFAP USAREUR OPORD 4246, 

and pertinent international agreements. 

b. (U) Impartiality. The operational environment is influenced by the 

degree to which the Forces act in an impartial and neutral manner and also 

the degree to which the Forces art perceived to be partial or impartial by 

both friendly or unfriendly elements. 

2. (U) ASSUMPTIONS. Commander, Task Force Eagle (TFE) will be 

designated as the single GCMCA for U.S. Army personnel assigned to the 

SFOR mission within the geographical boundaries of the SFOR Theater 

Area of Operations (TAOO). 

3. (U) SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES 

a. (U) Legal Personnel. Subordinate U.S. commands deploy with 

adequate legal assets to include judge advocates (]As) to support legal 

operations including claims, legal assistance, military justice, international 

and operational law, administrative law, fiscal and contract law, and 

environmental law. 

b. (U) International and Operational Law. 

(1) Captured Property and War Trophies. USCINCEUR 

General Order I and COMSFOR General Order I contain provisions 

concerning the acquisition of public and/or private prop" and "war trophies." 

Commanders must consult and comply with the provisions of these General 

Order as well as U.S. national law and military regulation regarding the 

importation of firearms, ordnance, and other dangerous items. 

(a) Individual members of SFOR are prohibited from 

taking, possessing, or shipping captured or confiscated public or private 

Appendix H(J) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 355 


property {to include weapons seized in the course of military operations) for 

personal and/or private use. All personnel participating in the SFOR 

mission are also prohibited from importing, exporting, purchasing, or 

possessing weapons, ammunition, or ordnance (other than those officially 

issued) while in the SFOR TAOO. 

{b) As an exception to this rule, units may retain 

property other than firearms or ammunition obtained during the course of 

military operations within the SFOR TAOO as unit "historical artifacts," 

provided they do so in accordance with "war trophy and historical artifact" 

memorandum to be published by the USAREUR Judge Advocate and 

approved by CG, USAREUR. As described in that memorandum, no "war 

trophy firearms" are allowed to be retained by units participating in the 

SFOR mission. 

{c) Commanders will aggressively control conduct 

concerning confiscated or captured public and/or private and "war trophies" 

and will brief their personnel on policies which apply to them. 

(2) Rules of Engagement. 

(a) U.S. forces under NATO SFOR OPCON will 

continue to follow NATO SFOR ROE, four:td at Annexes E, {Rules of 

Engagement) to SACEUR OPLAN 10407 and COMSFOR OPLAN 31407. 

U.S. forces under US. national control that are operating in the SFOR 

T AOO will follow NATO SFOR ROE. Nothing in these ROE limit either the 

individual or collective right of self-defense. 

(b) US forces that are operating outside of the NATO 

SFOR TAOO will continue to use the JCS Standing ROE (JCS SROE, 

CJSSI 3121 -01, October 1994). 

(c) Close adherence to the applicable ROE will prevent 

violations of the Laws of Armed Conflict, the General Framework 

Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, international law, and 

U.S. national law and policy. Commanders will ensure that all personnel 

participating in this Peace Enforcement Operation are properly briefed on 

the applicable ROE, Laws of Armed Conflict, and other U.S. and 

NATO/SF OR OPLANS governing this operation. Any violation of the Laws 

of Armed Conflict, the ROE, and other laws listed above must be reported 

promptiy through both the unit's s U. S. national chain of command and the 

NATO SFOR operational chain of command. At .a minimum, a report must 

Appendix H (1) 
356 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 


be rendered to HQSFOR. 

c. (U) Law Enforcement and Regulatory functions. Same as 

USAREUR OPORD 4246 and USAREUR CAM PLAN 40105. 

d. Immunity from host nation criminal prosecution. In accordance 

with agreements between NATO and the governments of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (found in the 

Appendices to Annex I A of the General Framework Agreement for Peace 

in Bosnia and Herzegovina), all NATO personnel participating in the 

SFOR mission shall enjoy "envoys on mission status" and be immune from 

personal arrest or detention by host nation authorities. 

e. (U) Detainees Refugees, and Asylum Seekers. 

(1) TAW COMSFOR OPLAN 31407, persons detained during 

SFOR operations will be released to host nation law enforcement 

authorities as soon as possible. Any confrontation resulting in detention 

should be reported through the chain of command. 

(2) When allegations against a detainee appear to warrant 

detention beyond 24 hours, the matter must be reviewed by the 

servicing legal advisor ofthe command seeking to extend the 

detention. The commander seeking to extend the detention beyond 24 

hours should consult the unit judge advocate prior to doing so. 

(3) IAW U.S. law and policy, commanders may not grant 

"political asylum" to foreign nationals. Any requests for asylum will be 

coordinated with the servicing U.S. Embassy and forwarded via immediate 

message to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security 

Affairs). "Temporary refuge" may be granted to foreign nationals who are 

under immediate threat of death or serious bodily harm. Applicants for 

asylum or temporary refuge will not be surrendered to foreign powers 

without approval from HODA or higher. 

f. (U) Claims. The claims program in effect during the previous 

phases of the operation will be continued. The U.S. Army has been 

assigned Single-Service Claims responsibility (SSR) for all U.S. forces 

during this operation. This responsibility extends to those countries and 

areas comprising the former Yugoslavia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 

Slovakia. The US Army already has SSR for Austna ·. 

Appendix H(J) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 357 

{1) The US Army Claims Service Europe (USACSEUR) will 


continue to be the executive agent for the U.S. Army claims program and 


will maintain technical supervision over all claims activities in the TAOO. 


(2) USACSEUR will coordinate with the U.S. form in the TAOO 

to ensure that adequate claims personnel are available to provide the 

appropriate level of support for deployed USAREUR Judge Advocates and 

responsible Staff Judge Advocates who provide legal support to U.S. forces 

in the TAOO. 

(3) Other national elements operating in conjunction with US 

forces are responsible for processing the claims of their own force 

personnel suffering damage to or loss of personal property. 

{4) Unit Claims Officers {UCOs) and Maneuver/Convoy 

Damage Control Officers {MDCOs) will continue to document and 

investigate incidents of foreign property damage and personal injury or 

death to foreign nationals or governments allegedly caused by U.S. military 

personnel and members of the civilian component as they depart the 

TAOO. 

(5) UCOs and MDCOs will ensure final coordination of their 

claims activities with servicing Judge Advocates {JAs) or Foreign Claims 

Commissions (FCCs) during redeployment. JAs and FCCs will coordinate 

with USACSEUR will continue coordination with SFOR Claims Offices in 

Sarajevo and Zagreb. 

(6) Affirmative Claims in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia 

will be processed in accordance with USACSEUR Standard Operating 

procedures {SOP), Affirmative Claims for Property Damage, U.S. Forces in 

Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

g. (U) Legal Assistance. Same as USAREUR OPORD 4246-97 and 

USAREUR CAM PLAN 40105. 

h. {U) Military Justice. U.S. commanders have no authority to 

discipline members of foreign armed forces. 

{1) General Court-Martial Convening Authority (GCMCA) for all 

U.S. Army personnel assigned to duty in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 

and Hungary will be exercised in accordance with the orders of the CG, 

Appendix H (1) 
358 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

USAREUR as published in a Jurisdictional memorandum by the USAREUR 

Judge Advocate. 

(2) The USAREUR Judge Advocate is responsible for 

coordinating adequate Judicial support. The SJA, Task Force Eagle is 

responsible for coordinating all Trial Defense Service Support. All requests 

for TDS support will be made to the TDS, Tuzla Office. Requests for 

judicial support will be made to the Chief Circuit Judge 5th Judicial Circuit, 

Mannheim. 

i. (U) Status of Forces and Host Nation Support (HNS). 

(1) All phases of the operation addressed by USAREUR 

OPORD 4246 and USAREUR CAMPLAN 40105, and the other applicable 

plans, will be conducted in compliance with relevant international 

agreements by which the U.S. is bound, including those obligations under 

customary international law. Currently the Partnership for Face Status of 

Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the addition of the Hungarian Omnibus 

Agreement are in effect with Hungary. These documents incorporate by 

reference the NATO SOFA of June 19, 1951. SOFA agreements exist 

between NATO/SFOR and Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

(FRY), and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These agreements were adopted as part 

of the Dayton Peace Accords and will remain in effect during all phases of 

the operation. 

(2) The availability and extent of host nation support will 

depend on the capabilities of each host nation and the specific provision of 

the SOFA and other implementing arrangements with that nation. 

Supplemental agreements, contingency contracts, and other agreements 

may not be entered into without proper authority. 

(3) Problems which arise with host nation authorities that 

cannot be resolved will be referred to the HO, SFOR, A TIN: Legal Advisor, 

for coordination with appropriate diplomatic authorities for resolution 

j. (U) Environmental Law. Protecting the environment of the host 

nation must be a priority of commanders as they depart the TAOO. The 

international community is increasingly vigilant in its oversight of the 

environmental consequences of military operations. Deployed judge 

advocates in support of this operation must ensure that commands are 

aware of the applicable rules (such as COMSFOR Campaign Directive 24) 

and the requirement to comply with them. Failure to comply ~ith 

Appendix H(l) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 359 

environmental concerns can jeopardize current and future operations, and 


produce costly claims. 


k. (U) Contract Law. 

(1) Since this operation has been declared a contingency 

operation by the Secretary of Defense for contracts awarded and 

performed outside the US simplified acqui.sition procedures are appropriate 

for contractual actions up to $200,000. Full and Open Competition is 

required for contractual actions over$ 200,000.00. These procedures will 

continue. 

(2) The primary means for filling anticipated repetitive needs 

for supplies or services during redeployments will be Blanket Purchase 

Agreements (BPA). Competition requirements for micropurchases up to 

$2,500 will consist of acquiring one oral quotation, if the Contracting Officer 

finds the price to be fair and reasonable. 

(3) It is important to emphasize that although this is a declared 

"contingency operation," the normal requirements of U.S. law are generally 

in effect. Purchases must be made through a Contract Officer (KO) or a 

Field Ordering Officer (FOO). The Office of the USAREUR Judge 

Advocate, Contract Law Division (KLD), will review the Logistics Annex of 

this plan to ensure that redeploying units have planned for purchasing 

emergency food, fuel, and lodging while returning enroute to the Central 

Region. 

4. (U) SERVICE AND SUPPORT. See Basic Plan. 

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL . See Basic Plan. 

Appendix H(J) 

360 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


"Appendix H(2): Legal Appendix by 1st Cavalry Division 

APP. 4 (LEGAL) TO ANNEX I (SERVICE SUPPORT) TO 1ST CAV. DIV. 


OPLAN 98-04 (PEGASUS FORGE) 


References: 

1. AR 27-3, The Army Legal Assistance Program, 10 Sep 95. 

2. AR 27-10, Military Justice, 24 Jun 96. 

3. AR 27-20, Claims, 1Aug95. 

4. AR 27-40, Litigation, 19 Sep 94. 

5. AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian 


Internees and Other Detainees, 1 Oct 97. 


6. AR 190-14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement 

and Security Duties, 12 Mar 1993. 

7. AR 550-1, Procedure for Handling Requests for Political Asylum and 


Temporary Refuge, 1Oct81. 


8. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 3121.01, Standing Rules of 


Engagement for US Forces (SROE) (1 Oct. 1994) (Change 1) (note that 


portions of this document are classified SECRET). 


9. COMSFOR OPLAN 31407. 

10. Conventions on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 


13 February 1946. 


11. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 

Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 

1993, 32 I. L. M. 800 [hereinafter CWC]. 

12. DA Pamphlet 27-1, Treaties Governing Land Warfare. 

13. DA Pamphlet 27-1-1, Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 

August 1949. 

14. DA Pam 27-162, Claims, 1Apr98.. 

15. Department of Defense Instruction 1000.1, ID Cards Required by the 

Geneva Convention, 5 Jun 91. 

16. Department of Defense 2000.11, Procedures for Handling Requests 

for Political Asylum and 

Temporary Refuge, 3 March 1972, ASD (ISA), thru Ch 1, 17 May 73. 

17. Department of Defense Directive 5100.77 (DOD Law of War Program), 

10 Jul 79. 

18. Department of Defense Directive, Assignment of Single $ervice Claims 

Responsibility. 

19. Depa.rtrrienl of Defense Directive 5530.3 International Agreements, 11 

Jun 87 w/C118 Feb 91. 

20. FM 27-10, Law of Land Warfare, July 1956. 

Appendix H(2) 

LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS. 1995-1998 361 


21. FM 27-100, Legal Operations, 3 Sep 91. 

22. FORSCOM Message, Subject: Review of Operations Plans (292030 

Oct 84). 

23. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina 

(GFAP), Paris, 14 December 1995. 

24. General Order #1, USEUCOM, 28 December 1995. 

25. General Order #1, SFOR, 20 January 1997. 

26. General Order #2, SFOR, 20 January 1997. 

27. General Order#1, TFE, 2May1998. 

28. JA 422, Operational Law Handbook, The Judge Advocate 


General's School, 1997. 


29. Joint Chiefs of Staff Memoranda, Subject: Implementation of DOD 

Law of War Program (MJCS 59-83, 1 Jun 83, and MJCS 0124-88, 4 Aug 

88). 

30. Joint Pub 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) 

for Peacekeeping Operations, April 1994. 

31. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984. 

32. Memorandum, 12 March 1996, DoD Office of the General Counsel, 

Subject: Assignment under DoDD 5518.8 of the Department of the Army as 

the Single Service Claims Authority for Operations Joint Endeavor. 

33. NATO Status of Forces {NATO SOFA) and Supplementary 

Agreement. 

34. Omnibus Agreement between the United States of America and 

Hungary, 28 November 1995. · 

35. The Protocol made on 4 April 1996 between the Minister of Justice 

of the Republika Srpska and the !FOR Claims Officer. 

36. U.S.- Hungary: Amendment to the "Administrative Arrangement 

Concerning Procedures for the Operations of the Joint Claims Oversight 

Commission and the Settlement of Claims Arising from the Activities of 

U.S. Forces in Connection with the Peace Implementation Force." 

37. The United Nations Charter. 

38. Weapons and Their Destruction, January 13, 1993, 32 l.L.M. 800 

[hereinafter CWC]. 

39. SACEUR OPLAN 40105. 

40. USEUCOM Directive 45-1, Law of War Program, 18 May 1989. 

41. USAREUR CAM PLAN 40105 

42. 1st Cavalry Division Reg 350-1, First Team Training, 10 Mar 97 

43. 1st Cavalry Division Supp. to AR 27-10, Military Justice, 8 August 

94. 

1. (U) SITUATION. 


Appendix H(2) 
362 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


a. Enemy. See ANNEX B. INTELLIGENCE. 

b. Friendly. See ANNEX A. TASK ORGANIZATION. 

2. (U) MISSION. The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) provides 

legal advice, guidance, an~ :egal services to 1st Cavalry Division 

commanders and soldiers as Tar forward as possible and at all echelons of 

command throughout the operational continuum. 

3. (U) EXECUTION. 

a. General. 

(1) This annex prescribes policies and procedures for legal support 

and services provided to U.S. organizations who are members of the NATO 

Peace Stabilization Force (S=OR). 

(2) Operations will be conducted in accordance with national law 

and Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNSCR 1088'(or its successor, the 

General Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP), 

USAREUR OPORD 4246, and pertinent international agreements. 

(3) The operational environment is influenced by the degree to which 

the forces act in an impartial and neutral manner and also the degree to 

which the forces are perceived to be partial or impartial by both friendly or 

unfriendly elements. 

b. Assumptions. Commander, Task Force Eagle (TFE) will be 

designated as the single GCMCA for U.S. Army personnel assigned to the 

SFOR mission within the geographical boundaries of the SFOR Theater 

Area of Operations (TAOO). 

c. Specific Responsibilities. 

(1) Legal personnel. Subordinate U.S. commands deploy with 

adequate legal assets to include judge advocates (JAs) to support legal 

operations including claims, legal assistance, military justice, international 

and operational law, administrative law, fiscal and contract law, and 

environmental law. 

Appendix H(2) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 363 


(2) Operational law. Commanders will seek legal review of any 

targeting decision involving targets other than weapons systems, troop 

formations, military bases or where collateral damage or injuries to civilians 

may be significant. 

d. International Law. 

(1) Rules of engagement. See ANNEX E (RULES OF 


ENGAGEMENT} TO OPLAN 98-04 (PEGASUS FORGE} 


(a) NOTHING IN THESE ROE LIMIT EITHER THE INDIVIDUAL 

OR COLLECTIVE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE. 

(b) Report any use of force against civilians, women, children, 

hungry mobs, and rioters. Use graduated force, the 5S's (Shout, Show 

weapons, Shove, warning Shots, Shoot to kill). 

(c) U.S. forces under NATO SFOR OPCON will continue to follow 

NATO SFOR ROE, found at Annex E, (Rules of Engagement) to SACEUR 

OPLAN 10407 and COMSFOR OPLAN 31407. U.S. forces under U.S. 

national control that are operating in the SFOR AO will follow NATO SFOR 

ROE. 

(d) U.S. forces that are operating outside of the NATO SFOR 

TAOO will continue to use the JCS Standing ROE (JCS SROE, CJSSI 

3121.01, October 1994). 

(e) Close adherence to the applicable ROE will prevent violations 

of the Laws of Armed Conflict, the General Framework Agreement for 

Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, international law, and U.S. national law 

and policy. Commanders will ensure that all personnel participating in this 

Peace Enforcement Operation are properly briefed on the applicable ROE, 

Laws of Armed Conflict, and other U.S. and NATO/SFOR OPLANs 

governing this operation. Any violation of the Laws of Armed Conflict, the 

ROE, and other laws listed above must be reported promptly through both 

the unit's U.S. national chain of command and the NATO SFOR operational 

chain of command. At a minimum, a report must be rendered to HQ, 

SFOR. 

· (f) Law Enforcement and Regulatory Functions. Same as 

USAREUR OPORD 4246 and USAREUR CAM PLAN 40105. 

Appendix H(2) 

364 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

(g) Immunity from host nation criminal prosecution. In 

accordance with agreements between NA TO and the governments of 

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

(found in the Appendices to Annex 1A of the General Framework 

Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina), all NATO personnel 

participating in the SFOR mission shall enjoy "expert on mission status" 

and be immune from personnel arrest or detention by host nation 

authorities. 

{2) Detainees, refugees, and asylum seekers. 

(a) In accordance with COMSFOR OPLAN 31407, persons 

detained during SFOR operations will be released to host nation law 

enforcement authorities as soon as possible. Each confrontation resulting 

in detention should be reported through the chain of command. 

{b) When allegations against a detainee appear to warrant 

detention beyond 24 hours, the matter must be reviewed by the servicing 

legal advisor of the command seeking to extend the detention. The 

commander seeking to extend the detention beyond 24 hours should 

consult the unit judge advocate prior to doing so. 

{c) In accordance with U.S. law and policy, commanders may not 

grant "political asylum" to foreign nationals. Any requests for asylum will be 

coordinated with the servicing U.S. Embassy and forwarded via immediate 

message to the Assistant Secretary of Defense {International Security 

Affairs). "Temporary refuge" may be granted to foreign nationals who are 

under immediate threat of death or serious bodily harm. Applicants for 

asylum or temporary refuge will not be surrendered to foreign powers 

without approval from HODA or higher. 

(3) Status of forces and host nation support (HNS). 

(a) All phases of the operation addressed by USAREUR OPORD 

4246, USAREUR CAM PLAN 40105, and the other applicable plans will be 

conducted in compliance with relevant international agreements by which 

the U.S. is bound, including those obligations under customary international 

law. Currently the Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement 

(SOFA) with the addition of the Hungarian Omnibus Agreement are in 

effect with Hungary. These documents incorporate by reference the NATO 

SOFA of June 19, 1951. Status of Forces Agreements exist between 

NATO and Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and BosniaAppendix H(2) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS JN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 365 


Herzegovina. These agreements were adopted as part of the GFAP and 

will remain in effect during all phases of the operation. 

(b) The availability and extent of host nation support will depend 

on the capabilities of each host nation and the specific provision of the 

SOFA and other implementing arrangements with that nation. 

Supplemental agreements, contingency contracts, and other agreements 

may not be entered into without proper authority. 

(c) Problems which arise with host nation authorities that cannot 

be resolved will be referred to the HQ, SFOR, A TT: Legal Advisor for 

coordination with appropriate diplomatic authorities for 

resolution. 

(4) Reporting law of war violations. Any person with knowledge of a 

suspected law of war violation will immediately report the incident through 

the servicing JA to the SJA. The SJA will forward the report to the 

appropriate commanders. 

(5) Protected persons investigations. Commanders will promptly 

investigate all suspected law of war violations or incidents involving injury or 

death of protected persons, whether by or against friendly personnel. 

Commanders should immediately report the incident through the servicing 

JA to the SJA. 

(6) Responsibility for foreign units. Commanders are responsible 

for the conduct of all personnel under their operational control, regardless 

of their nationality. 

(7) Identification cards. Ensure that all personnel, including 

medical, religious, and nonmilitary personnel accompanying the unit 

(civilian contractors), possess proper identification cards as required by 

SFORCOM and TFECOM. 

(8) Respect for civilians. Treat the local populace and civilian 

detainees strictly in accordance with the local customs, the Law of Land 

Warfare, applicable international law, and the Geneva and Hague 

Conve~tions. Respect their personal property. 

· (9) Do not enter into international agreements. Commanders may 

not enter into any international agreement. Authority to enter into 

Appendix H(2) 
366 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


international agreements must be specifically authorized by the cognizant 

approval authority in accordance with DOD Directive 5530.3. 

(10) Interpreting agreements. Direct all questions concerning the 

interpretation or implementation of international agreements to the servicing 

JA. 

(11) International incidents. Commanders will immediately report 

any serious incident that could have international impact, soldiers 

confronting someone claiming diplomatic immunity. See [TAB C]. 

e. Claims. 

(1) Commanders will handle claims brought against the United 

States Government in accordance with AR 27-20. 

(2) Commanders of separate companies, detachments, battalions, 

and brigades will ensure that they have appointed and trained: 

(a) A primary and an alternate unit claims officer appointed in 

writing and trained to investigate and report all incidents which may give 

rise to claims by or against the U.S. Government as a result of the unit's 

activities or occurring in the UP"'.·~." :..o. The unit claims officer may be a 

commissioned officer, warran:. -:>:~1cer, non-commissioned officer or qualified 

civilian employee. 

(b) Assistant claims officers, as necessary, to ensure each 

subordinate unit geographically separated from its parent unit can promptly 

investigate and report claims incidents resulting from their activities. 

(3) The claims program in effect during the previous phases of the 

operation will be continued. The U.S. Army has been assigned SingleService Claims Responsibility (SSR) for all U.S. forces during this 

operation. This responsibility extends to those countries and areas 

comprising the former Yugoslavia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 

Slovakia. 

(a) The U.S. Army Claims Service, Europe (USACSEUR) will 

continue to be the executive agent for the U.S. Army claims program and 

will maintain technical supervision over all claims activities in the TAOO. 

Appendix H(2) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 367 

(b) USACSEUR will coordinate with the U.S. forces in the TAOO 

to ensure that adequate claims personnel are available to provide the 

appropriate level of support for deployed USAREUR judge advocates and 

responsible staff judge advocates who provide legal support to U.S. forces 

in the TAOO. 

(c) Other national elements operating in conjunction with U.S. 


forces are responsible for processing the claims of their own force 


personnel suffering damage to or loss of personal property. 


(d) Unit claims officers {UCOs) and maneuver damage control 

officers (MDCOs) will continue to document and investigate incidents of 

foreign property damage and personal injury or death to foreign nationals or 

government allegedly caused by U.S. military personnel and members of 

the civilian component as they depart the TAOO. 

(e) UCOs and MDCOs will ensure final coordination of their 

claims activities with servicing judge advocates (JAs) or foreign claims 

commissions {FCCs) during redeployment. JAs and FCCs will coordinate 

with USACSEUR; USACSEUR will continue coordination with SFOR 

Claims Offices in Sarajevo and Zagreb. 

{f) Affirmative claims in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia will 

be processed in accordance with USACSEUR Standard Operating 

Procedures (SOP), Affirmative Claims for Property Damage, U.S. Forces in 

Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

f. Contract Law. 

{1) Only properly warranted contracting officers can enter into and 

sign contracts on behalf of the U.S. Army or U.S. Government. Personnel 

making unauthorized commitments risk personal liability and administrative 

or disciplinary action. Commanders will promptly report all unauthorized 

commitments through the SJA to the G4 using the Serious Legal Incident 

Report provided in Tab C. 

(2) Commanders of brigades, battalions, and separate companies 

will ensure that they have appointed and trained: 

(a) Two class A agents on formal appointment orders and 

trained .to disburse funds for authorized purchases by the unit's field 

ordering officers. Class A agents may not also serve as field ordering 

officers. 

Appendix H(2) 
368 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


(b) Two field ordering officers trained and placed on orders by 

the applicable directorate of contracting. 

(3) Contracting matters will be coordinated with the U.S. Army 

Contracting Agency. 

(4) Commanders must ensure that U.S. funds and resources are 

used in accordance with applicable fiscal limitations. Fiscal law questions 

should be directed to the servicing JA and comptroller. 

g. Fiscal Law. 

(1) Operation and maintenance appropriations (O&M funds}. O&M 

funds may not be used for: 

(a) Procurement of end items costing over $100,000. 

(b) Exercise-related construction that is not truly temporary in 

nature. 

(2) This operation has been declared a contingency operation by 

the Secretary of Defense. For contracts awarded and performed outside 

the U.S., simplified acquisition procedures are appropriate for contractual 

actions up to $200,000.00. Full and Open Competition is required for 

contractual actions over $200,000.00. See JA 422, Operational Law 

Handbook, Chapter 12. 

(3) The primary means for filling anticipated repetitive needs for 

supplies or services during redeployments will be Blanket Purchase 

Agreements (BPA). Competition requirements for micropurchases up to 

$2,500.00 will consist of acquiring one oral quotation, if the Contracting 

Officer finds the price to be fair and reasonable. 

(4) It is important to emphasize that although this is a declared 

"contingency operation," the normal requirements of U.S. law are generally 

in effect. Purchases must be made through a contract officer or a field 

ordering officer. The office of the USAREUR judge advocate, contract law 

division, will review the LOGISTICS ANNEX of this OPORD to ensure that 

redeploying units have planned for purchasing emergency food, fuel, and 

lodging while returning enroute to the Central Region. 

Appendix H(2) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 369 


h. Administrative Law. 

(1) Captured property and war trophies. A war trophy is any enemy 

property obtained, collected, retained, possessed, distributed, transferred 

or transported for private purposes. 

(a) USCINCEUR General Order #1 and COMSFOR General 

Order #1 contain provisions concerning the acquisition of public and private 

property and "war trophies." Commanders must consult and comply with 

the provisions of these general orders as well as U.S. national law and 

military regulation regarding the importation of firearms, ordinance, and 

other dangerous items. 

(b) Individual members of SFOR are prohibited from taking, 

possessing or shipping captured or confiscated public or private property 

(to include weapons seized in the course of military operations) for personal 

and private use. All personnel participating in the SFOR mission are also 

prohibited from importing, exporting, purchasing or possessing weapons, 

ammunition or ordinance (other than those officially issued) while in the 

SFORTAOO. 

(c) Commanders will aggressively control conduct concerning 

confiscated or captured public and private property or war trophies. 

Commanders will brief their soldiers on policies that apply to them. 

(2) Environmental law. Protecting the environment of the host nation 

must be a priority of commanders as they depart the TAOO. The 

international community is increasingly vigilant in its oversight of the 

environmental consequences of military operations. Judge advocates who 

deploy in support of this operation must ensure that commands are aware 

of the applicable rules (such as COMSFOR Campaign Directive 24) and 

the requirement to comply with them. Failure to comply with environmental 

concerns can jeopardize current and future operations and produce costly 

claims. 

i. Military Justice. Commanders may initiate nonjudicial punishment 

and administrative actions. Soldiers attached for UCMJ purposes will be 

attached for administrative purposes. Unit or individual soldier orders will 

be issued specifying attachment for UCMJ and administrative purposes. 

(1) U.S. commanders have no authority to discipline members of 

foreign armed forces. 

Appendix H(2) 
370 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


{a) General Court-martial Convening Authority {GCMCA) for all 

U.S. Army personnel assigned to duty in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 

and Hungary will be exercised in accordance with the orders of the CG, 

USAREUR, as published in a jurisdictional memorandum by the USAREUR 

Judge Advocate. 

{b) The USAREUR Judge Advocate is responsible for 

coordinating adequate judicial support. The SJA, Task Force Eagle, is 

responsible for coordinating all Trial Defense Service support. All requests 

for TDS support will be made to the TDS, Tuzla Office. Requests for 

judicial support will be made to the Chief Circuit Judge, 5th Judicial Circuit, 

Mannheim. 

(2) Foreign criminal jurisdiction. 

{a) Commanders will not surrender any person under their 

command or any U.S. civilian to local authorities without coordination with 

the SJA. Only the Commander, 1st Cavalry Division, may approve the 

release of a U.S. soldier or civilian to local authorities. 

{b) All courts-martial will be conducted IAW applicable 

agreements with the host nation. 

(c) Report any incident involving U.S. soldiers and foreign 

personnel which could result in police or judicial action by foreign 

authorities to the SJA. 

j. Legal Assistance. Commanders will coordinate with the servicing trial 

counsel or civil law attorney for legal assistance support. 

4. {U) SERVICE SUPPORT. 

a. Technical assistance will be provided by the SJA office of the next 

higher command. 

b. Questions regarding this appendix should be addressed to the Staff 

Judge Advocate. 1st Cavalry Division. 

5. {U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL. See OPLAN 98-04 (PEGASUS 

FORGE). 

Appendix H(2) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 371 


ACKNOWLEDGE 


BYRNES 

MG 

OFFICIAL: 

LISOWSKI 


SJA 


TAB A (SUSPECTED FRATRICIDE INCIDENT REPORT) 


TABB (LAW OF WAR VIOLATIONS AND PROTECTED PERSONS 


INCIDENTS) 


TAB C (REPORT OF SERIOUS LEGAL INCIDENT) 


TAB D (REQUESTS FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM OR TEMPORARY 


REFUGE) 


TAB E (CLAIMS AGAINST THE U.S. GOVERNMENT) 


Appendix H(2) 
372 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERA TIONS 


TAB A {SUSPECTED FRATRICIDE INCIDENT REPORT) 

1. {U) PURPOSE: Ensures the division commander meets his obligation to 

report, investigate, and take appropriate corrective actions concerning all 

suspected fratricide incidents. Also ensures that each incident is quickly 

investigated and that the commander has complete and accurate 

information before an incident is publicized. 

2. {U) REFERENCE. Ill Corps and Fort Hood Regulation 27-2 {Ill Corps 

Law of War Program) 

3. {U) WHEN REPORT REQUIRED AND WHO REPORTS: Every soldier 

will immediately report any suspected fratricide incident caused by US or 

allied forces. Commanders at company level and higher will submit reports 

by the fastest available means in the attached format, in writing, if possible. 

Any commander or staff officer who receives a fratricide incident report will 

note it in the unit or staff journal and will immediately fo'rward a written 

report through command channels to the 1st Cavalry Division ACofS, G 1; 

G2, ACofS, G3, PMO; SJA; and PAO. After consulting with the CG {or 

CofS), the SJA will forward a report in the same format to Commander, Ill 

Corps through the Ill Corps ACofS, G1, G2, ACofS, G3, PMO; SJA, and 

PAO. Initial reports will not be delayed for unknown information. 

4. {U) REPORT FORMAT: See [Next Page] 

Appendix H(2) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 373 


SUSPECTED FRATRICIDE REPORT 


AFVA-__ _ ___19_ 

MEMORANDUM THRU Commander, 1st Cavalry Division, A TIN: ACofS, 

Staff Judge Advocate, G1, G2, ACofS, GS; Provost 

Marshall, Public Affairs Officer. 

FOR Commander, Ill Corps and Fort Hood, ATIN: ACofS, G2; ACofS, GS; 

Provost Marshall, Staff Judge Advocate 

SUBJECT: Suspected Fratricide Report 

1. (U} Description of the incident (who reported the incident, what appears 

to have happened, number of casualties): ---------­

2. (U} Location of the incident (grid location or location near a known point): 

3. (U) Time of occurrence and time of discovery: -------­

4. (U) Unit(s) involved in the incident: -----------­

5. (U) Name of witnesses (w/unit or address): --------­

Appendix H(2) 
374 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 

6. (U) Unit point of contact: ------------­

Appendix H(2) 

LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 375 


TABB (LAW OF WAR VIOLATIONS AND PROTECTED PERSONS 


INCIDENTS) 


1. (U) PURPOSE: This appendix outlines the responsibilities of 

commanders to report and investigate incidents involving suspected law of 

war violations and protected persons incidents. Reports of enemy 

violations provide information higher authorities need to determine an 

appropriate US response. 

2. (U) REFERENCES: 

a. (U) FM 27-10, Law of Land Warfare, July 1956; 

b. (U) 1st Cavalry Division Regulation 350-1, First Team Training, 10 

Mar 97. 

3. (U) WHEN REPORTS ARE REQUIRED AND WHO REPORTS: Every 

soldier will immediately report any suspected law of war violation committed 

by US, allied, or enemy forces, and any incident or death or injury to a 

protected person as a result of combat operations or combatant conduct. 

Commanders at company level and higher will submit reports in the 

attached format, in writing, if possible. Any commander or staff officer who 

receives a law of war/protected person incident report will forward it through 

command channels to the Commander, 1st Cavalry Division, A TIN: Chief 

of Staff, SJA, G2, GS, Provost Marshal, and PAO. 

4. (U) EXAMPLES: 

a. (U) Grave Breaches of the Geneva Convention: 

(1) (U) Willful killing, especially DCs, EPWs, or sick and wounded; 

(2) (U) Willfully causing great suffering or serious injury (rape, 

torture, beatings) to civilians, EPWs, or other protected persons; 

(3) {U) Taking hostages; 

(4) {U) Extensive destruction of property not justified by military 

necessity; 

b. (U) Simple Breaches of the Geneva Convention: 

Appendix H(2) 
376 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 


{1) {U) Maltreatment or mutilation of dead bodies; 

(2) (U) Firing on localities which are undefended and without military 

significance; 

(3) (U) Misuse of the Red Cross emblem; 

(4) (U) Improper use of privileged buildings for military purposes; 

(5) (U) Stealing personal property from civilians or prisoners; 

(6) (U) Purposeless destruction of non-military targets; 

(7) (U) Compelling prisoners of war to perform prohibited labor; 

(a) (U) Work which is of military character and purpose; 

(b) (U) Work that is inherently dangerous or demeaning 

(8) (U) Compelling civilians to perform prohibited labor; 

(a) {U) Clearing mines: 

(b) (U) Forced to join US forces: 


{c) (U) Work that is inherently dangerous or demeaning; 


(9) {U) Using poisoned or forbidden arms or ammunition; 


(10) (U) Feigning a request for surrender; 


{11) (U) Abuse of or firing on the flag of truce; 


{12) {U) Use of civilian·clothing to conceal military character during 


battle; 

{13) (U) Poisoning wells or streams. 

5. (U) REPORT FORMAT: See [NEXT PAGE]. 

REPORT OF LAW OF WAR VIOLATIONS AND PROTECTED PERSONS 

INCIDENTS 

Appendix H(2) 

LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 199 5-1998 377 


AFVA- 19_ 

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, 1st Cavalry Division, A TIN: Chief of 

Staff, SJA, G2, GS, Provost Marshal, and PAO. 

SUBJECT: Suspected Law of War Violation and Protected Person Incident 

Report 

1. Description of the incident/suspected violation (who reported the 

incident and what appears to have happened): --------­

2. Location of the incident/suspected violation (grid location or near a 

known point): -------------------­

3. Time of occurrence and time of discovery: ---------­

4. Who caused (if known) the incident/suspected violation or identity of the 

friendly or enemy units operating in the immediate area (if known): __ 

5. Name of witnesses (w/unit or address): ---------­

6. Unit point of contact: ----------------­

Appendix H(2) 
378 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Appendix H(2) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 379 


TAB C (REPORT OF SERIOUS LEGAL INCIDENTS) 

1. (U) PURPOSE. Ensures that the commander, 1st Cavalry Division, is 

made aware of serious incidents (not covered by other reports in this 

annex) in the 1st Cavalry Division sector which may have a significant legal 

impact upon the division. 

2. (U) REFERENCE. Army Regulation 27-100, Legal Operations, 3 Sep 

91. 

3. (U) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS: Any commander or trial counsel 

will immediately report any information related to serious incidents 

encountered by US or allied forces which may have a significant legal 

impact upon the 1st Cavalry Division. Commanders and trial counsel at 

company level and higher will submit reports by the fastest available means 

in the attached format, in writing, if possible. Any commander or staff 

officer who receives a serious legal incident report will note it in the unit or 

staff journal and will immediately forward a written report through command 

channels to the Commander, 1st Cavalry Division, ATIN: Staff Judge 

Advocate, Provost Marshall, and Public Affairs Officer. 

4. (U) EXAMPLES: 

a. Any deliberate criminal act committed by a US soldier against 

another US or allied soldier or host nation civilian (stealing, rape, murder, 

assault). 

b. Claim of diplomatic immunity by third country nationals. 

c. Detention or death of civilians related to US military operations. 

d. Claims made against the United States Government. 

e. Mass civilian transfers or evacuations ordered by 1 CD 

Commanders. 

f. Acqidents or deliberate actions by US or other forces that will have a 

significant environmental impact (fuel spills, industrial chemical releases, 

discovery of mass graves). 

g. Recovery of formally captured US or allied personnel. 

Appendix H(2) 
380 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

5. REPORT FORMAT: See [PREVIOUS PAGE] 

Appendix H(2) 
LAW AND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 381 


TAB D (REQUESTS FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM OR TEMPORARY 


REFUGE) 


1. (U) PURPOSE. Establishes procedures for handling requests by foreign 

nationals for political asylum or temporary refuge in areas outside of the 

United States. 

2. (U) REFERENCES. 

a. (U) AR 550-1, Procedure for Handling Requests for Political Asylum 


and Temporary Refuge, 1 Oct 81. 


b. (U) Department of Defense Directive 2000.11 Procedures for 


Handling Requests for Political Asylum and Temporary Refuge, March 3, 


1972, ASD (ISA), thru Ch 1, May 17, 1973. 


3. (U) GUIDANCE. 

a. (U) Commanders "MAY NOT" grant political asylum. Only the State 

Department or Department of Justice has that authority. 

b. (U) Commanders "MAY" grant temporary refuge if the person 

requesting temporary refuge is in imminent danger. See below. 

c. (U) All requests for temporary political asylum or temporary refuge will 

be treated as requests for temporary refuge. These requests may become 

politically sensitive or generate media interest. Report requests using the 

form provided in Appendix 2 to Annex V to Part II to 1st Cavalry Division 

Regulation 525-40. INITIAL REPORTS WILL NOT BE DELA YEO 

PENDING COMPLETE DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATION. 

d. (U) Once temporary refuge is granted, the person will be protected 

and temporary refuge will end only when directed by the Commander, 1 

CD. 

4. (U). DEFINITIONS. 

a. (U) Political asylum is protection and sanctuary that may be granted 

by the United States (US), within areas of exclusive US control to any 

foreign person who applies for protection and sanctuary from persecution 

Appendix H(2) 
382 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 


or well-founded fear of persecution, because of race, religion, nationality, 

· political opinion, or membership in a particular group. 

b. (U) Temporary refuge is protection for humanitarian reasons to any 


person requesting such protection, afforded under conditions of urgency 


and in order to secure the life or safety of such person against imminent 


danger (such as pursuit by a mob). 


5. (U) RESPONSIBILITIES. 

a. (U) Commander, 1st Cavalry Division provides procedures for political 

asylum or temporary refuge in accordance with (IAW) DOD Directive 

2000.11 and AR 550-1, and coordinates with the nearest United States 

Embassy in all cases. 

b. (U) Brigade commanders ensure that all subordinate commanders 


are aware of procedures applicable to requests for political asylum and 


temporary refuge. 


c. (U) Report to the DMAIN and SJA whenever political asylum or 

temporary refuge has been requested using the form provided in Appendix 

2 to Annex V to Part II to 1st Cavalry Division Regulation 525-40. 

6. (U) POLICIES. 

a. (U) Political asylum. 

(1) (U) Once requesting political asylum, no individual will be left 

unprotected under circumstances where there is an imminent threat to the 

individual's safety or liberty. In such cases, persons seeking political 

asylum will be regarded as seeking temporary refuge and treated 

accordingly pending referral to the US Embassy. 

(2) (U) Immediately consult the SJA. 

(3) (U) Do not surrender persons to foreign jurisdiction. 

(4) (U) In response to inquiries, say that "the case has been referred 

to higher headquarters" for instructions. · · 

(5) Report all requests for political asylum through command 

channels to the Army Operations Center (AOC). ·. 

Appendix H(2) 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 383 


b. (U) Temporary refuge. 

(1) (U) Requests will not be arbitrarily or summarily refused. In 

cases of imminent danger, the senior officer present will provide temporary 

refuge. 

(2) (U) Once granted, temporary refuge will not be terminated unless 

directed by Commander, 1 CD. An applicant will be released only to the 

authorities designated in the termination message. If the individual himself 

demands release, force (up to, but not including deadly force) will be used 

to prevent the individual from leaving. Coordinate all cases with the SJA. 

Appendix H(2) 
384 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

TAB E (CLAIMS AGAINST THE U.S. GOVERNMENT) 

1. (U) PURPOSE. Provide guidance to commanders on the policy and 

procedures for handling claims made by friendly or unfriendly nationals 

against the United States Government. 

2. (U) REFERENCE: Chapter 10, Foreign Claims Act, AR 27-20, Claims. 

3. (U) GENERAL. 

a. (U) Applicability. The Foreign Claims Act (FCA) applies outside the 

United States (US). The inhabitants of a receiving state and all levels of its 

government, national and local, are proper claimants. Enemy or 

"unfriendly" nationals or governments, insurers and subrogees, US 

inhabitants, and US military and civilian component personnel, if in the 

receiving state incident to service, are all potential claimants. 

b. (U) Causation. To be allowable, the claim must result from noncombat activity (see glossary) or a negligent or wrongful act or omission. 

Damage, injury, or loss of property incident to combat (except the lawful 

seizure of personal property), whether in time ~f war or not, are excluded. 

c. (U) Combat acquisitions. Although enemy property may be "seized" 

as the need arises in combat, the appropriation of private property for such 

purposes may result in allowable claims for damage or destruction of 

property. The combat exclusion found at AR 27-20, paragraph 10-9a may 

obviate many such claims, but the US may still be liable for damage or 

destruction of the property if it was surrendered to US forces under either 

an express or implied agreement. AR 27-20, paragraph 10-8d(2). 

4. (U) PROCEDURE. 

a. (U) Commanders will refer claims to appointed and trained unit claims 

officers (UCOs). 

b. (U) Unit claims officers will use DA Form 1208 or its equivalent to 

thoroughly investigate and report all incidents (see Appendix 6) which may 

give rise to a claim by or against the US government. Units wm·torward 

these reports thro~gh the servicing JA to the SJA, 1st Cavalry Division for 

processing. Reports will include, as a minimum, the facts and 

circumstances of the incident, name and unit/address of the personnel 

Appendix H(2) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 385 

involved, and action taken or contemplated. The claims officer will contact 

the servicing JA if he is unsure whether to conduct an investigation. 

c. (U) Units will immediately report (see Appendix 6) to their servicing JA 

incidents involving non-US property or persons and those which may give 

rise to a claim against the US government in excess of $25,000.00. Under 

no circumstances will any person who is not empowered to adjudicate 

claims make any promise of payment to any claimant or potential claimant. 

Financial liability and disciplinary action may result from such a 

commitment. 

Appendix H(2) 
386 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Appendix I: General Order Number One and Exceptions 

The following is only a sample ofGeneral Order Number One 


and its exceptions and modifications. This should not be taken as the 


authoritative source ofany General Order now in place. 


GENERAL ORDER G0-1 28Dec1995 

OPERATION BALKAN ENDEAVOR 

TITLE: Prohibited Activities for US Personnel Serving in Operation Balkan 

Endeavor 

AUTHORITY: Title 1 OUnited States Code Section 164(c)(?)(?) and the 

Uniform Code of Military Justice (Title 10 United States Code Section 801­

940). 

APPLICABILITY: this General Order is applicable to all US military 

personnel and to US personnel serving with or accompanying the armed 

forces of the United States who are deployed in the USEUCOM Area of 

Operations in support of Operation Balkan Endeavor. For the purposes of 

this order, the Area of Operations consists of the territory and the airspace 

of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Hungary, Austria, 

Slovakia, Czech Republic, Slovenia. 

1. STATEMENT OF MILITARY PURPOSE AND NECESSITY: 

Restrictions upon certain activities are essential to maintain the security, 

health and welfare of the US forces; to prevent conduct prejudicial to good 

order and discipline or of a nature to bring discredit upon the US armed 

forces; and to improve US relations with the region. These restrictions are 

also essential to preserve US relations with host nations and the combined 

operations of US, NATO, and other friendly forces. Furthermore Operation 

Balkan Endeavor places US Armed Forces into countries where local laws 

and customs may prohibit or restrict certain activities. It is the purpose of 

this General Order to ensure good order and discipline is maintained an 

host nation laws are respected tot he maximum extent consistent with 

mission accomplishment. 

2. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES: 

Appendix/ 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 387 


a. Taking, possessing or shipping for personal use captured 


weapons. 


b. Introduction, possession, use, sale, transfer, manufacture, or 


consumption of any alcoholic beverage. 


c. Possessing, touching, using, or knowingly approaching without 

legal authority any unexploded munitions or ordnance, or any kind or 

description whatsoever. "Without legal authority" means any act or activity 

undertaken by US personnel which is not done at the direction of a 

commander or as a result of military necessity during the performance of 

military duties. 

d. Purchase possession, sale or introduction of privately owned fire 

arms, ammunition and explosives. 

e. Gambling of any kind, including sports pools, lotteries and raffles. 

f. Selling, bartering, or exchanging any currency other than at the 

official host nation exchange rate. 

g. Entrance into a mosque or other site of Islamic religious 

significance by non-Muslims unless directed by military authorities or 

compelled by military necessity. 

h. Removing, possessing, selling, transferring, defacing, or 

destroying archeological artifacts or national treasures. 

3. PUNITIVE ORDER. This order is punitive. Persons subject to_t he 

Uniform Code of Military Justice who violate this order may be punished 

under Article 92, UCMJ, for violating a lawful general order. Civilians 

accompanying the US Armed Forces may face adverse administrative 

action. 

4. INDIVIDUAL DUTY. All persons subject to this General Order are 

charged with the individual duty to become familiar with and respect the 

laws, regulations, and customs of the host nations insofar as they to not 

interfere with the execution of their official duties. Individual acts of 

disrespect or flagrant violations of host nations laws, regulations, and 

customs may be punished as a violation of the Uniform Code of Military 

Justice. Civilians accompanying the US Armed Forces may face adverse 

administrative action. 

Appendix I 
388 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 


5. UNIT COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITY: Unit commander and 


supervisors are charged to ensure all, repeat all, personnel are briefed 


about the prohibited activities. 


6. CONTRABAND: Items which are determined to violate this General 

Order may be considered contraband and may be confiscated. Before the 

destruction of the contraband, commanders or law enforcement personnel 

should coordinate with their servicing staff judge advocates. " 

7. EFFECTIVE DATE: This General Order is effective immediately. 

Except for alcoholic beverages, an amnesty period of 72 hours is granted, 

from the effective date of this General Order, for personnel to surrender or 

dispose of items which violate this General Order. Individuals or 

commanders may arrange for safekeeping of personal firearms with their 

unit military law enforcement activity. 

8. EXPIRATION: This General Order will expire upon the completion of 

Operation Balkan Endeavor unless rescinded, waived or modified. 

9. WAIVER AUTHORITY: Because mission requirements may permit and 

host nation tolerance may allow for the consumption of alcohol in portions 

of the USEUCOM Area of Operations authority to waive or modify the 

prohibitions of this order relative to alcoholic beverages is delegated to the 

EUCOM Component Commanders. Before granting a waiver to a 

geographical area where personnel from more than one service are 

deployed, each component commander with personnel who will be affected 

by the waiver must agree to the terms of the waiver. In situations where a 

consensus cannot be reached, the request will be forwarded to the DCINC, 

USEUCOM for resolution. 

10. Staff Judge Advocates for the waiver authorities will provide the 

USEUCOM Legal Advisor with copies of all waivers granted to this order. 

GEORGE A. JOULWAN 

General, US Army 

CINCEUR 

Appendix/ 

LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 389 


DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 


HEADQUARTERS. UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE AND SEVENTH 


ARMY 


THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 


UNIT 23351 


APOAE 09014 


MEMORANDUM FOR HQ USEUCOM, ATIN: USEUCOM Legal Adviser, 

Unit 30400, Box 1000, ADO AR 091284209 

SUBJECT: Exception to USEUCOM General Order 1 

1. Reference USEUCOM General Order I (G0-1), 28December1995, 

Prohibited Activities for U.S. Personnel serving in Operation Balkan 

Endeavor. 

2. According to the waiver authority granted in GO-I, paragraph 9, the 

following exception to GO-I, paragraph 2b, is granted: 

Members of the U.S. Forces and U.S. personnel accompanying the U.S. 

Forces in Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 

Hungary, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia who are taking part in 

Joint Military Commissions or official ceremonies involving foreign national 

officials may consume alcoholic beverages according to local custom. 

3. This exception applies to USAREUR, USNAVEUR, and USAFE. 

WILLIAM W. CROUCH 

General, USA 

Commander in Chief 

Appendix I 
390 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 


HEADQUARTERS. UNITED STATES ARMY. EUROPE AND SEVENTH 


ARMY 


THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 


UNIT23351 


APO AE 09014 


MEMORANDUM FOR HQ, USEUCOM, ATTN USEUCOM Legal Advisor, 

Unit 30400, Box 1000, APO AE 09128-4209 

SUBJECT: Exception to General Order 1 

1. Reference USEUCOM General Order 1 (GO 1 ), 28 Dec 95, Prohibited 

Activities for US Personnel Serving in Operation Balkan Endeavor. 

2. According to the waiver authority granted in GO 1, paragraph 9, the 

following exemption is to GO 1, paragraph 2b, is granted: 

Members of the US Forces and US personnel accompanying the 

accompanying the U.S. Forces in Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovakia, and 

Slovenia, who are on special pass participating in the OPERATION JOINT 

ENDEAVOR Fighter Management Program in Budapest, Hungary may 

consume alcohol beverages. Those who are on special pass in the Lake 

Balaton, Hungary, may also consume alcoholic beverages, but only at 

facilities approved for MWR ·use. Additionally, US Forces and US 

personnel accompanying the forces may consume alcoholic beverages in 

the MWR tent established at the ISB LSA. Guidelines for the consumption 

of alcoholic beverages at Lake Balaton and the ISB LSA will be published 

by USAREUR (Forward). 

3. This exception applies to USAREUR, USNAVEUR, and USAFE. 

WILLIAM W. CROUCH 

General, US Army 

Commander in Chief 

Appendix/ 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 391 


DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 


HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY EUROPE and SEVENTH ARMY 


THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 


UNIT 2935 


APO AE 09014 


AEAJA-MC 20 January 1997 


MEMORANDUM FOR HQ, USEUCOM. ATTN: USEUCOM Legal Advisor1 


Unit 30400, Box 1000. APO AE 091284209 


SUBJECT: Exception to USEUCOM General Order #1 

1. Reference USEUCOM General Order#1 (GO-i). 28 Dec 95, Prohibited 

Activities for US Personnel Serving in Operation Balkan Endeavor. 

2. According to the waiver authority granted in G0-1. paragraph 9, the 

following exception to G0-1, paragraph 2b, is granted: 

Members of the U.S. Forces and U.S. personnel accompanying the U.S. 

forces in Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech Republic. 

Hungary, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia who are located in 

Zagreb, Croatia, and Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, may consume 

alcoholic beverages. Guidelines for the consumption of alcoholic beverages 

in Zagreb, Croatia, will be published by the Deputy Commander. Support 

Command, SFOR, and guidelines for the consumption of alcoholic 

beverages in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, have been published by 

the Commandant, HQ. SFOR. 

WILLIAM W. CROUCH 

General, USA 

Commander-in-Chief 

Appendix! 

392 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 


HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY EUROPE and SEVENTH ARMY 


THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 


UNIT 29351 


APO AE 09014 


AEAJA-MC 21 January 1997 


MEMORANDUM FOR HQ, USEUCOM, ATTN: USEUCOM Legal Advisor, 

Unit 30400, Box 1000, APO AE 09128-4209 

SUBJECT: Exception to USEUCOM General Order #1 

1. Reference USEUCOM General Order#1 (G0-1). 28 DEC 95, Prohibited 

Activities for U.S. Personnel Serving in Operation Balkan Endeavor. 

2. According to the waiver authority granted in G0-1, Paragraph 9, the 

following exception to G0-1, paragraph 2b. is granted: 

Members of the U.S. Forces and U.S. personnel accompanying the US 

Forces in Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia. the Czech Republic 

Hungary, Montenegro. Serbia. Slovakia, and Slovenia Who, in the conduct 

of their official duties with allies, local national officials, former warring 

faction personnel or other foreign counterparts, deem it advisable to 

consume alcohol in order to establish and maintain rapport may consume 

alcohol in moderation, using common sense, self-discipline and good 

judgment to ensure that any consumption does not limit their ability to 

perform the mission at hand. 

WILLIAM W. CROUCH 

General, USA 

Commander-in-Chief 

Appendix I 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 393 


HEADQUARTERS 


STABILIZATION FORCE 


Sarajevo, Bosnia - .Herzegovina 


FOR COMMANDER 

GENERAL ORDER G0-1 20 Jan 1997 

OPERATION CONSTANT GUARD 

1. APPLICABILITY. This order is applicable to all military and civilian 

personnel of the Peace Stabilization Force (SPOR) serving in support of 

Operation CONST ANT GUARD while located within the Theater Area of 

Operations (TAOO) as defined by SFOR Operations Order 31406, dated 

17 December 1996. This includes both NATO and non-NATO personnel 

assigned or attached to SFOR. 

2. PURPOSE These rules are established to provide uniformity in regard 

to certain basic forms of conduct which are objectionable both to good 

order and good relations with host state authorities. They do not exclude 

further national enforcement of other disciplinary rules as appropriate: 

3. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES. 

a. Taking of trophies. No weapon, munitions, or military article, or 

private or public property seized during military operations may be taken, 

possessed, kept, or shipped as personal property. 

b. Purchase, possession, sale, transfer, or use of privately owned 

firearms, ammunition, or explosives, or the introduction of these items into 

the TAOO. Private weapons officially authorized to be carried in 

connection with duty are an exception to this rule. · 

c. Possessing, touching, using, or knowingly approaching without 

legal authority any unexploded munitions or ordnance, of any kind or 

description whatsoever. "Without legal authority" means an act or activity 

undertaken by SFOR personnel which is not done at the 

direction of a commander or as a result of military necessity during the 

performance of 

military duties. 

Appendix I 
394 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERA TIONS 


d. Removing, possessing, selling, transferring, defacing, or 


destroying archaeological artifacts or national treasures. 


e. Selling, bartering, or exchanging any currency other than at the 


official host nation exchange rate. 


f. Entrance into a mosque or other site of Islamic religious 


significance by non-Muslims unless directed by military authorities or 


compelled by military necessity. 


4. PUNITIVE ORDER. This order is punitive. US military personnel who 

violate this order are subject to punishment under Article 92, Uniform Code 

of Military Justice. For violating a lawful general order. Military personnel of 

other nations who violate this order are subject to punishment/disciplinary 

action by their national military element. Civilian personnel who violate this 

order are subject to adverse administrative action. 

5. INDIVIDUAL DUTY. All persons subject to this General Order are 

charged with the individual duty to become familiar with and respect the 

laws, regulations. and customs of the host nations insofar as they do not 

interfere with the execution of their official duties. Individual acts of 

disrespect or flagrant violations of host nation laws, regulations, and 

customs may be punished as a violation of national element laws or 

regulations. Civilians accompanying the SFOR may face adverse 

administrative action. · 

6. UNIT COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITY. Unit commanders and 

supervisors are charged to ensure all personnel are briefed about the 

prohibited activities. 

7. CONTRABAND. Items which are determined to violate this General 

Order may be considered contraband and may be confiscated. Before 

destruction of contraband, commanders or law enforcement personnel 

should coordinate with their servicing legal advisors. 

8. EFFECTIVE DATE. This General Order is effective immediately. An 

amnesty period of 72 hours is granted, from the effective date of this 

General Order, for personnel to surrender or dispose of items which violate 

this General Order. Individuals or commanders may arrange for 

safekeeping of personal firearms with their unit military law enforcement 

activity. 

Appendix I 

LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 395 


9. EXPIRATION. This General Order will expire upon the completion of 

Operation CONSTANT GUARD and any successor operation, unless 

rescinded, waived, or modified. 

WILLIAM W. CROUCH 

General, US Army 

Commander 

Appendix I 

396 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERA TJONS 

HEADQUARTERS 


STABILIZATION FORCE 


Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina 


FOR COMMANDER 

GENERAL ORDER G0-2 

OPERATION CONSTANT GUARD 20 January 1997 

1. All provisions of USCINCEUR General Order #1, dated 28 December 

1995, Prohibited Activities for U.S. Personnel Serving in Operation Balkan 

Endeavor, apply to all U.S. military personnel and U.S. personnel serving 

with or accompanying the US Forces who are part of the Peace 

Stabilization Force (SFOR) serving in support of Operation CONST ANT 

GUARD while located within the Theater Area of Operations as defined by 

SFOR Operation Order 3 1406 dated I 7 December I 996. 

2. This General Order is effective immediately. 

3. This General Order will expire upon completion of OPERATION 

CONSTANT GUARD, or any successor operation, unless rescinded, 

waived or modified. 

WILLIAM W. CROUCH 

General, US Army 

Commander, SFOR 

Appendix! 

LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 397 


DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 


HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY EUROPE AND SEVENTH Army 


THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 


UNIT 29351 


APO AE 09014 


AEAJA-NC 19 May 1997 


MEMORANDUM FOR HQ {USEUCOM, A TIN: USEUCOM Legal Advisor, 

Unit 30400, Box 1000, APO AB 09129-4209 

SUBJECT: Exception to USEUCOM General Order #1 

1. Reference USEUCOM General Order#1 {G0-1 ). 28 Dec 95, Prohibited 

Activities for US Personnel Serving in Operation Balkan Endeavor.· 

2. According to the waiver authority granted in G0-1. paragraph 9, the 

following exception to G0-1, paragraph 2b, is granted: 

Members of the U.S. Forces and U.S. personnel accompanying the U.S. 


forces in Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech Republic. 


Hungary, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia who engage in 


Rest and Recuperation {R&R) on leave or pass status in the Croatian cities 


of Dubrovnik, Split, Trogir, Makarska, Brae Island, Hvar Island, Opatija, and 


lance, may consume alcohol in moderation, using common sense, 


self discipline, and good judgment. Guidelines for consumption of alcoholic 


beverages in these areas will be published by the Deputy Commander, 


Support Command, SFOR. 


William. W. CROUCH 

General, USA 

Commander-in-Chief 

Appendix I 
398 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Appendix J: Joint Military Commission (JMC) Structure/or 

MND(N) 

COL McftlTlft 


Cllllf,JMC 


I 


LTCHoward 


Deputy Chief, JMC 


I 

I I I I I I I 

CW2McKimey 

Chief, Compliance Cell 

CPT Carrier 

JMC Legal 

CPT Harrison 

Operations Of!iur 

MAJ Devine 

Compliance Assistance 

CPT Sadar 

YRS Desk Officer 

CPTDavis 

Federation Desk Officer 

llAJ Groover 

JPC Desk Of!ictr 

I I I I 

SSGWeeks 

NC~ 

SFCHargrm 

~OIC 

CPTLeeman 

Operations Officer 

CPTBRUCE 

JPCLNO 

I I 

SSG Fuller 

Training &MO'l'ements 

SSG llcCcnnick 

Operations NCOIC 

AppendixJ 

LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS 1995-1998 399 

Annex K: Extract ofJoint Military Commission (JMC) Handbook 

The following is an extract from the 6th Edition ofthe 

Joint Military Commission Policy and Planning Guidance 

Handbook. This Handbook was instrumental to communicating the 

commander's intent and specific tasks and guidance throughout the 

Balkan Operations. It was distributed down to company level, and 

often to individual persons, teams and platoons. 

This Handbook was a collaborative effort. However, the 

Judge Advocate led the way in its creation. Legal interpretation, 

guidance and authorship was necessary for most every section ofthe 

handbook. This Handbook provided commanders and soldiers an 

immediate answer for most ofthe issues and questions faced in 

theater. It should serve as a model product for future missions. The 

Combat Training Centers have used it to guide their training and 

evaluation ofunits. 

Forfull text ofthis Handbook, or ofits prior editions, 


contact the Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO). 


Below is merely a representative sample ofthe 6th Edition 's first 


several chapters. 


AppendixK 
400 · CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 


JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION 


Policy and Planning 

Guidance Handbook 

12 JANUARY 1998 

AppendixK 

LAWAND MILITARY OPS JN THE BALKANS 1995-1998 401 


JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION POLICY AND PLANNING GUIDANCE 

HANDBOOK, 61

H EDITION 

PAGE 


Chapter 1 SFOR MISSION AND STRUCTURE 1-1 


Chapter 2 TASK FORCE EAGLE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY 2-1 


Chapter 3 THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR PEACE 3-1 


Chapter 4 REGULATING THE POSSESSION OF WEAPONS 4-1 


Section 1 AUTHORIZATION TO POSSESS WEAPONS 4-1 


Section 2 SAMPLE WEAPONS PERMITS 4-3 


Section 3 CONFISCATION OF CARRIED WEAPONS 4-7 


Chapter 5 SFOR CHECKPOINTS 5-1 


Chapter 6 DETAINING CIVILIANS OR HOSTILE FORCES 6-1 


Chapter 7 PERSONS INDICTED FOR WAR CRIMES (PIFWCs) 7-1 


Chapter 8 WAR CRIMES SCENES 8-1 


Chapter 9 PRISONER RELEASES 9-1 


Chapter 10 CIVILIAN CROWDS OR DEMONSTRATIONS 10-1 


Chapter 11 ASSISTANCE TO EAF DEMOLITION OF UNEXPLODED 


ORDNANCE 11-1 


Chapter 12 CONFISCATION AND CUSTODY OF WEAPONS 12-1 


Chapter 13 DESTRUCTION OR RETURN OF WEAPONS 13-1 


Chapter 14 CANTONMENT SITES 14-1 


Section 1 CLASSIFICATION OF SITES 14-1 


SITES TABLE 14-3 


Section 2 AIR DEFENSE SITES 14-3 


Section 3 ORDNANCE FACTORY SITES 14-4 


Section 4 SFOR SITE INSPECTIONS 14-4 


Section 5 SANCTIONS FOR NONCOMPLIANCE 14-6 


Chapter 15 EAF MOVEMENT AND TRAINING 15-1 


Section 1 EAF MOVEMENT OF TROOPS AND WEAPONS 15-1 


MOVEMENT TABLE 15-2 


Section 2 MOVEMENT OF "TRAIN AND EQUIP" WEAPONS 15-3 


Section 3 SFOR RESPONSE TO UNAUTH. EAF CONVOYS 15-3 


Section 4 EAF TRAINING AND LIVE FIRE EXERCISES 15-4 


TRAINING TABLE . . 15-5 


Section 5 EAF AIR DEFENSE TRAINING 15-5 


Section 6 MILITARY FUNERALS AND CEREMONIES 15-6 


AppendixK 

402 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Section 7 APPROVAL OF NEW EAF RANGES AND TNG AREAS 15-6 


Chapter 16 MARKING THE IEBL AND ZOS 16-1 


Chapter 17 COUNTERMINE OPERATIONS 17-1 


Chapter 18 LAW ENFORCEMENT ISSUES 18-1 


Section 1 UNAUTHORIZED USE OF SFOR OR PROTECTED 


SYMBOLS 1~1 

Section 2 SFOR RC'·'-= IN ENSURING CIVILIAN FREEDOM 


Section 1 CIVILIAN POLICE 18-1 


Section 2 CIVILIAN POLICE CHECKPOINTS 18-2 


Section 3 SPECIAL POLICE AND EAF MILITARY POLICE 18-4 


Section 4 SPECIALIST POLICE. 18-5 


Chapter 19 CIVIL-MILITARY ISSUES 19-1 


OF MO\,::: .. :NT 19-1 


Section 3 DISPLACED PERSON AND REFUGEE OPERATIONS 19-2 


Section 4 DEALING WITH THE PRESS 19-2 


Section 5 ELECTIONS 19-3 


Section 6 NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 19-4 


Chapter 20 PROPERTY AND PERSONS WITH DESIGNATED 


SPECIAL STATUS 20-1 


Section 1 PROPERTY WITH DESIGNATED SPECIAL STATUS 20-1 


Section 2 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 20-2 


Appendices: ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS HANDBOOK 

DEFINITIONS 

AppendixK 

LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS 1995-1998 403 


Chapter 1 SFOR MISSION AND STRUCTURE 

References: General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP); United 

Nations Security Council Resolution 1031: United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 1088. 

• 	 In December 1995, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations 

Charter, the Security Council authorized member states to establish a 

multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) to deter a resumption of 

hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina by implementing the military aspects of 

the General Framework Agreement for Peace. 

• 	 In December 1996, the Security Council created a Stabilization Force 


(SFOR) as legal successor to IFOR. 


• 	 SFOR is led by NATO, but includes 17 non-NATO countries. There are 


about 31,000 troops in SFOR. 


• 	 Essential Tasks: 

• 	 Ensure force protection and deter a resumption of hostilities or new 

threats to peace. 

• 	 Control the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina and control military traffic 

over key ground routes. 

• 	 Monitor the movement and training of Entity Armed Forces (EAF). 

• 	 Ensure safe conditions for the implementation of the non-military aspects 

of the Dayton Peace Accords. 

• 	 Assist the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 

other international organizations in their humanitarian missions. 

• 	 Prevent serious crimes or interference with civilian freedom of movement. 

• 	 Monitor and support the clearance of minefields by the Bosnians. 

AppendixK 

404 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

SFOR COMMAND AND CONTROL 

SA CE UR 

CINCEUCOM GEN CLARK DPTY FOR RUSSIA!'li FORCES 

GEN CLARK USA COL GEN KRIV ALOPOV 

USA RUSSIAN ARMY 

I 

CG, USAREURnA COMSFOR 

GEN SHINSEKI GEN SHINSEKI 

USA USA 

DCDR, USAREURnA (FWD) I

CDR, VCORPS I I I 

LTGHENDRIX CG,MND(N). CG,MND(SW) CG,MND(SE) 

USA MG ELLIS MG RAMSEY MGDELOUNGE 

USA UKARMY' FRENCH ARMY 

I 

ADC(FWD) 

I BG JONES 

CDR,2ACR USA 

COL HARDY 

USA 

I I 

2d Squadron 3d Squadron 418 Squadron Task Force 4 1

•1mE 

2ACR 2ACR 2ACR 1-36 IN IAD 

I T I 

Task Force DIV ARTY TURKISH NORDPOL RUSSI

Pershing IAD BDE BDE BDE 

AppendixK 

LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS 1995-1998 405 


Chapter 2 TASK FORCE EAGLE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY 

CROATIA 

NORDPOLBDE 

SERBIA 

t--~~~~~~~~--. 

•Sarajevo 

Nonheast Bosnia-Herzegovina 

D Republika Srpska 

D Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 

Appendix K 
406 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Chapter 3 THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR PEACE 

lGFAPl 

References: GFAP; Agreement on Confidence and Security-Building 

Measures in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Vienna Agreement), 31 January 1996; 

Agreement on Subregional Arms Control (Florence Agreement), 14 June 

1996. 

• 	 The official name of the Dayton Peace Accords is the General Framework 

Agreement for Peace (GFAP). 

• 	 The Parties who signed the GFAP in Paris on 14December1995 were 

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Croatia, and the 

Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (the U.S. is not a Party to the GFAP). 

• 	 Bosnia-Herzegovina remains a single state, but comprised of two Entities. 

The Entities are the Muslim and Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 

and the Bosnian Serb Re~L;Dlika Srpska. 

• 	 The Parties' forces ceased all hostilities and withdrew behind a 2-km zone 

of separation (ZOS). 

• 	 Bosnia-Herzegovina has a central government in Sarajevo. The Parties 

agreed to a constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina that creates a threemember presidency, a two-house legislature, and a constitutional court. 

• 	 All of Bosnia-Herzegovina's people have the rig~t to move freely 

throughout the country without harassment or discrimination. Displaced 

persons and refugees (DPREs) have the right to return home or obtain 

compensation from civil authorities. 

• 	 The Parties committed to cooperate fully with the prosecution of persons 

indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs) and violations of international and 

humanitarian law. 

• 	 The Parties reported to IFOR, and must continue to provide updated 

reports to SFOR, on the following: 

• 	 Positions and descriptions of all known unexploded ordnance, 

explosive devices, demolitions, minefields, booby traps, wire 

. entanglements and other physical hazards to safe movement. 

• 	 Locations of lanes through the Agreed Zone of Separation (ZOS) that 

are free of all such hazards. 

• 	 Positions and descriptions of fortifications, barriers and other manmade obstacles,· ammunition dumps, command headquarters and 

communication networks. 

AppendixK 

LAW AND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS 1995-1998 407 


+ 	Positions and descriptions of all surface-to-air missiles and launchers, 

including mobile systems, supporting radars, and associated command 

and control systems. 

+ 	 Locations, types, and quantities of any toxic chemical or biological 

warfare agents (including irritants). 

• 	 Locations, types, and strengths of personnel and weaponry of all 

forces. 

• 	 Locations and descriptions of all fixed and rotary wing aircraft. 

• 	 Any other information of a military nature requested by SFOR. 

• 	 In furtherance of the GFAP, the Organization for Security and Cooperation 

in Europe (OSCE) sponsored additional agreements signed by the Parties 

in Vienna and Florence. 

• 	 The January 1996 Vienna Agreement (which expanded on the GFAP, 

Annex 18, Art. II) established procedures for the Parties to monitor 

each other's military forces, under OSCE supervision. 

• 	 The June 1996 Florence Agreement (which expanded on the GFAP, 

Annex 1 B, Art. IV) established limits for the Parties' weapons in five 

key categories: artillery, main battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, 

helicopters, and combat aircraft. 

AppendixK 

408 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Chapter 4 REGULATING THE POSSESSION OF WEAPONS 

References: GFAP, Annex 1A, Art. IV, para. 2(b) and para. 6; SFOR 

SOPs 3400 and 3403; SFOR FRAGO 317; SFOR Commander's 

Instructions to the Parties (COMSFOR's ITP); TFE FRAGOs 274, 315, 

1563, 1942, and 2211. 

Bottom Line: Persons carrying weapons must have a permit or fall 

into a permitted category described in this Section. SFOR 

commanders may confiscate unauthorized weapons. Report 

weapons confiscations to MND(N) HQ, which must approve their 

destruction or return. 

• 	 Civilians, including off-duty EAF may carry side arms or hunting and 

sporting weapons ("civilian weapons") subject to the following 

requirements: 

• 	 When in possession of a civilian weapon, a civilian must have a valid 

civilian weapons permit (see sample in section 2 of this chapter), and 

the weapon must be registered at the local police station. 

• 	 If a civilian is carrying a concealed side arm in public, he or she must 

have a concealed weapon permit issued by the local police, in 

addition to the ordinary weapons permit. 

• 	 Hunting and sporting weapons must be used only for shooting sports 

or hunting. 

+ 	 In the ZOS, civilian weapons permits must be endorsed by an MND. 

MND(N) has not yet granted any such endorsements. Therefore, 

civilian weapons found in the ZOS, even with a valid permit, may be 

subject to confiscation. If a civilian is truly using the weapon for 

hunting, the commander on the ground has the discretion to allow the 

person to retain the weapon, with a warning that weapons are not 

otherwise allowed in the ZOS. 

• 	 Even if a civilian has a valid permit issued by the local police, SFOR 

may confiscate a weapon if it is carried or used in a threatening or 

negligent manner. 

• 	 Armed civilian groups will be disarmed and disbanded, and may be 

detained by the civilian police, the IPTF, or SFOR. 

• 	 The Vienna Agreement defines an armed civilian group as "any group 

of 3 or mor~ armed persons not wearing uniforms." (Art. I, para. 29). 

• 	 However, our policy is that the on-scene commander decides what is 

or is not an armed civilian group that needs to be disbanded. For 

example, a legitimate hunting party may not need to be disarmed and 

disbanded. 

AppendixK 
LAW AND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS 1995-1998 409 


• 	 Privately-owned businesses may not use long barreled or military 

weapons to guard their businesses. 

+ 	Civilian guards may only carry side arms in visible holsters, and they 

must havea valid civilian weapons permit. 

+ 	The Entity governments may classify privately-owned businesses as 

sensitive government sites, which are guarded by an armed police 

force (consult SFOR CJ2 for approved sites). 

• 	 Civilian Police: See Law Enforcement chapters for rules on their carriage 

of weapons. 

• 	 Military Officers: 

+ 	Outside the ZOS, any general officer and his party of three (3) 


bodyguards or MPs, may carry unconcealed side arms when 


performing official duties in uniform. 


+ 	 In the ZOS, any general officer and his party of three (3) bodyguards or 

MPs may carry unconcealed side arms while in or transiting the ZOS 

on SFOR business, with prior MND(N) approval. If the general officer 

has an SFOR Faction Commander's ZOS Permit {see chapter on 

SFOR checkpoints), presume he has prior MND(N) approval and do 

not search his vehicle at SFOR checkpoints unless reasonable 

grounds warrant a search. Only the general officer must have a 

Commander's permit. 

+ 	Outside the ZOS, military officers below the rank of one-star general 

who have a legitimate civilian weapons permit may carry side arms. 

Officers who do not have a legitimate weapons permit, but who have 

written authority from their Corps or separate Division HQ to carry side 

arms, may do so only while on dutY and in uniform. 

• 	 Military Personnel: 

+ 	Military personnel going to, conducting, or returning from MNDapproved military events or training are authorized to carry the 

weapons listed on the approved movement and training request. 

Ammunition and weapons must be moved in separate vehicles. 

+ 	Military personnel with weapons going to or from a remote authorized 

place of duty must have individual proof of a standing arrangement 

between the MND and the lowest practical level of command 

(company or battalion}. The military personnel must have an SFOR 

Permit for the Carriage of Long Barreled Weapons, as shown in this 

Handbook, and an SFOR-stamped letter of explanation. 

+ 	MNDs may grant written permission in exceptional circumstances for 

soldiers to carry long barreled weapons and ammunition to escort 

arms, ammunition, or sensitive items. Such escorts must carry an 

SffiR~rm~ · 

• 	 EAF Military Police: 

AppendixK 
410 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 

+ 	EAF MPs may carry side arms on authorized official duty, while in 

uniform, with clearly identifiable MP insignia. See the section on EAF 

MPs. 

+ 	EAF MPs are allowed to carry side arms in the ZOS when escorting 

OSCE inspection parties. The following conditions apply: (1) not more 

than eight MPs; (2) clearly identifiable with OSCE forms 10, 11, or 19; 

and (3) traveling in MP vehicles only. 

• 	 Military Sites Guards: 

+ 	Military guards may carry side arms within fifty meters of authorized 

sites. Guards must be in uniform with their side arms not concealed. 

+ 	Military guards may carry long barreled weapons only within the 

perimeter of the site. 

+ 	Ordnance Factory Guards: · 

• 	 HQ MND(N) approves each site's number of guards, who must be 

civilians from a private security force or from the Ministry of Defense. 

• 	 These civilian guards may carry unconcealed side arms, within the 

perimeter of the site, if they have valid civilian weapons permits. 

• 	 The guards may carry long barreled weapons in emergency situations 

if they have an IPTF permit. 

• 	 Sensitive Government Installation Guards: 

• 	 These guards must be either civilian or specialist police, who as police 

may carry side arms without permits. 

+ 	If carrying long barreled weapons, they must remain within the 

perimeter (or under exceptional circumstances, within fifty meters of 

the perimeter) of the installation they are guarding. Guards carrying 

long barreled weapons outside the perimeter must have an IPTF 

permit. 

• 	 Foreign Civilians: 

• 	 To carry a weapon, foreign (non-Bosnian) civilians (non-SFOR) and 

their official civilian bodyguards must have either a Diplomatic 

Identification Card or an SFOR Weapons Authorization Certificate. 

• 	 MND(N) personnel encountenng armed foreign civilians should request 

one of the above listed items, and may confiscate the weapons of 

individuals unable or unwilling to produce one. Issue a receipt for any 

weapon confiscated. 

• 	 HQ SFOR decides whether to issue weapons permits for bodyguards 

and other authorized personnel on a case by case basis, and will 

generally authorize only the possession of side arms. Foreign civilians 

may not carry weapons without advance authorization. 

+ 	Personnel belonging to NGOs, private organizations, and 


governmental charity organizations are not authorized to carry 


weapons in BiH. 


AppendixK 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS 1995-1998 411 

• 	 MND(N) soldiers are not authorized under normal circumstances to carry 

weapons when dressed in civilian clothes. Only HQ SFOR Force 

Protection Branch can grant exceptions. 

AppendixK 
412 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Section 2 SAMPLE WEAPONS PERMITS 

[J 

SFOR PERMIT FOR THE CARRIAGE 

OF LONG BARRELED WEAPONS 

Div Serial No: i 

This permit is wanted to: • I 

Of(Unit): I 

I 

I 

' 

For the purpose of the temporary carriage of: I 

I 

; 

~ 

I 

I 

Valid from (DTG): Until (DTG): ! 

for the purpose of: 

SIGNED: 

NAME rN BLOCK LETTERS: 

POSmON I APPOINTMENT: 

DATE/ 19. I 

ll!CITED NATIOl'IS J'jATION lll'llES 

U.... N•-M--•k-.~H...... .. 

.._. ...... L•..•"._,..H.,.•1•"­ 1-,... • l•1ena16e•al Poltrt Task Fent 

POLICE WEAPONS PERMIT 

This permit is cranted to----------­

Police Chirf at police station, 

and authorises the followin& police personnel:---­

to carry tht under described firearms:------­

at---------on (date)-----­

--------•forthe purpose of______ 

SIGNED: 

NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS: 

IPTf DISTRICT COM MANDEil 

Inf DISTlllCT HQ: 

DATE: ------'"'· 

AppendixK 

LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS 1995-1998 413 


SAMPLE WEAPONS PERMIT FOR FOREIGN CIVILIANS: 


HEADQUARTERS 


STABILIZATION FORCE 


SARAJEVO 

AUTHORIZATION FOR CARRIAGE OF WEAPONS BY MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONA 

OMMUNITY 

SFOR CERTIFICATE SERIAL NUMBER: .............. . 


1. The following individual is authorized to carry weapons on his person in order to carry out his official 

uties of Civilian 


Bodyguard/ Civilian Pay Agent/ (Other) (Delete As Necessary) 


a. Name(s): 

b. Nationality: 

c. l.D. number: 

d. Organization name, contact phone number and Fax number: 

e. Type ofweapon: 

f. Weapon serial number: 

g. Period of activity: 

h. Date of expiration: 

2. Any extensions to this authorization must be in writing and approved in the fonn of another authorizati 

ertificate. 

SFORSTAMP Signed ................. . 


COPY TO: -INDIVIDUAUORGANIZATION -HQ SFOR CJJ OPS ·. 

-ALL MNDS -HQ SFOR CJ3 COORD 

AppendixK 
414 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 

SAMPLE WEAPONS PERMIT FOR BOSNIAN CIVILIANS: 

FRONT: 

Dpc1ine J!IHCIHBX Dop!!XI 

rromm ypiwih podatau 

Holo npc6HllBJDltlm I a.npcca; IDN P«· (lpoj 

opyIHDr ,nm; HOBO JDAHQ HMe; H08K per. 

6poj .ISH'UtC IClpre; llOlll A-..> cpyz) K Ml'OI ~ 

Jlll1YW yrurta HomtX IJO,gTllCl 

Now prcbiYaliitc i adrcsa; 1cni reJ. broj 

oru DOI lilta; aovo libx> ime; non reg. broj 

lime bnc; lmi dio orutja i njc1ov broj I 4attm 1pi::9a norih ,Matan 

(CHANGES TO l'E•MITJ. 

Ymte HOBlll llO,llTIU OlqJla cc ncmJHaJN 

CB1IEDbaa- ll DNtoW qnHI 

t1..!. -.....:L pod-•-'-- • • v.- uuna w ~llfUC Po1Pim 

COUHJAJIHCJlf1JKA ~AmBHA 

PmYDJlHKA JYrOCJIABH1A 


COQHIAJIMC'IlAKA PBilY5Jll1KA 


DOCHA HXEPUEI'OBIDIA 


SOCJAIJmCcAFEDERATIVNA REPUBUKA 


IDGOSLAVIJA 


SOCUAUmtxAREPUBLIKA 


. BOSNA IHERCEGOVINA 


On.umdla -----

Opdna I OOJNIWALrrn I 

omarn~ ORU2NIU ~NOODJ I 

flp::tKMe ~ lf/'C 

Prezimc i wf (USTNAME, FIRST NAJIE) I 

..._mj (ADDJESS) I 

Adrcsa ltln-------' 

kJlHHCTBCH MllT. 6poj 

Jcdimlvcn maL broI' _ (SSN) 

hrfipoj JIJl'Ote u 

Reg. broj liQie tartyl (ID,, 

6X HO --~==- DH NO I{/HINUAIBERI! 

ovla§reenog radnika i peeatom organa 

AppendixK 

-------------------------------------

LAW AND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS 1995-1998 415 

SAMPLE WEAPONS PERMIT FOR BOSNIAN CIVILIANS: 


BACK: 


~= arrE1 I 

Mapxa --- Marka I 00.UJ I 

CPl\6psrqU DpOJ t;;;;; 

Fabrial broj c NUM!ERJ 

~~,o--,C4U!El)--....., 

CHl)1ep . 

Snajper f-'SN1.-~:-:-.J ........,..________, 


Mmai~ANDNUMBER) I 

PmlmlUH f>IX>~~·----­ Rcgi.uanki broj 1CUG15Tlit110NJL I 

Mil IIOftlliC oaumheaor MUI 

MP Potpis ovimno,g lica 

fGN.ntJMOF A.lml0m£D1EMSONl 

5.Bprn avma ______________________ 

Mapa 

Marki 

41&fipHtml fJpoj Fabri&ibroj,_____________________ 

IWH6ap 

Kalibar 

Ctmjiep 


Snajpcr__________~~----~~ 

Mapa•6poj 

Marbibroj 

Perxcrap:u 6poj 

Rcptmki broj ---------­

Mil llamKc C11U11mb9ll' mna 

MP ~tpil OYWCenog lica 

PODACI ooRUZJ4(1'WONSINFOJ I 

u. Bpm CVma.________________~ 

Mapa Mub___________________ 

~6poj 

Fabri&i broi..._·-------------------------­

Kull6tp 

K.ahbar 

CHl_ilep 

Snajpcr 

MapxaH~ 

Markaibroj 

PencmpcXH 6poj 

Rcgiltarski bro' 

Mn rlomHC ommheHar !Ht.ta 

MP Potpis ovWCcnog lica 

J].. Bpcra 


D.Vnt& 


Mapo 

Muka 

4116pHqxl! fipoj 

Fabri&ibr · 

Kamt&\p 

Kalibar 

CHajtep 

Scajpcr 

Mapa e6poj 

Markaibroj 

PtrllmPCXl( 6poj 

RcgilwUi bro' 

Mil IlDl'UKC oanamheHOr JDILla 

MP. Potpis ovtueenos lica 

AppendixK 
416 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 

Section 3 CONFISCATION OF CARRIED WEAPONS 

References: GFAP, Annex 1A, Art. IV, para. 2(b) and para. 6; SFOR SOP 

3400; COMSFOR's ITP; TFE FRAGOs 274, 315, and 1563. 

• SFOR commanders have the authority to confiscate any military or 


civilian weapons carried without a valid permit or other proper 


authorization. 


• After confiscating weapons, MSCs must submit a Request for 

Destruction/Return to MND(N) JMC within forty-eight hours (see chapter 

12). 

• The senior ground commander always has the authority to confiscate a 

weapon, even if the bearer has a permit, if: 

• 	 the individual poses a potential or actual threat to SFOR or its 

mission. 

• 	 the validity of the permit is questionable. 

• 	 the weapon is used or carried in a threatening or negligent 

manner. 

• If you confiscate a weapon because of the civilian's weapons permit is 

questionable, coordinate with the IPTF to deliver the weapon to the civilian 

police. 

• Use the minimum force necessary to confiscate unauthorized weapons 

or detain individuals. Deadly force is only authorized in response to 

hostile intent or acts. 

IChapter 5 FOR CHECKPOINTS 

References: SFOR SOP 3400; COMSFOR's ITP; TFE FRAGO 2672. 

Bottom Line: SFOR uses checkpoints to ensure force protection, to keep 

weapons out ofthe ZOS, and to compel compliance with treaty provisions. 

• 	 Purposes of SFOR checkpoints: 

• 	 Securing approaches and entrances to SFOR locations. 

• 	 Securing the population and sensitive areas from in~ltrated weapons or armed 

groups. 

• 	 Enforcing treaty provisions, including keeping unauthorized weapons and 

soldiers out ofthe ZOS, and preventing interference with civilian freedom of 

movement. 

AppendixK 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS 1995-1998 417 


• UN and IPTF personnel and vehicles will not be searched unless suspicious 

activit warrants a search. The following is an example ofUN identification: 

UNITED • NATIONS 

""'CPOOl404 ... lllcm 

EXPIRES 

04 

AUG. 

96 

SHWARTZKOFF, NORMAN H. 

~~ 

The beam of !his card is 1 nianbcr of lho Unned N-""*<ti'"' FOf<C 

AU ci>ilian and miliwy pmanncl arr -odIO allow the barer 

oflnD\......m ...S alTord Ibo bcam 111 privilqea na:aury 10 any OU1 

hislhcr dulles I ··-·-·--

........c...... 


I Same statement u above la CyrtlUc 

• 	 EAF personnel with a Commander's ZOS Permit will not be searched unless 

suspicious activity warrants a search. 

+ 	 Faction Commander's ZOS Permits authorize commanders and their 

bodyguards (up to three) to carry side arms (not long barreled weapons) while 

in the ZOS on SFOR business. 

+ 	The following is an example ofthis permit: 

I Jre Skhxb1 

VALJDCN..YIN 

1TTI.Ell'!\IT l\1ND (N) pmliUX§. N Cap; AmI I 

lhebeoraoflhi1 Clld.a scniorainmndor. is aithorim:l lhc i>llowiag: 

I. TmdinlheZOSiaTaskfonzEaglc"s/M'ID(N)sa:uiranlyv.tiilc 

cmm.cringolci.11 SfORsaidioncd business. 

2. Alllhorim:l IO any11idannonly ·DO ai1ona1ic """""'50fmty cthcrniliury 

~s. l.haithonmi """""'1 will be ainisaaal. 

3. Bod)'gllllds in Ydiide me aithorim:l IO any asidcrmonly. 

4. 'W:hidewill not beseardia111 SfORchedcpoinls. wilcss l'CllSOlllhle gniundl 

1n1m111SC3ldl. if~ 

"'AJKA'1Ya: '"-.==­

W::::==================::!:::::========~ 

• 	 Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs): 

• 	 The International Council ofVolunteer Agencies (ICVA) issues credentials 

for NGOs operating in BiH. All NGOs in BiH, except UNHCR 

"implementing partners," should have the following blue ICV A ID card with 

the acronym "ICV A" superimposed over a crimson flash on its face. 

AppendixK 
418 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 

• IfNGO personnel do not have an ICV A card, they should carry, as a 

minimum, credentials from their own organization. 

• The following is an example ofthe ICVA card: 

The bu,. of "'9 card is• s1an rnem- ol • rvn.nota""n organosaaon 

oper11ang on,.,,,,_ Yupie.,.. You .,.1unc11y rwques1ec1 to attortl 

lwnltwr el poulllle USl-.c:a m.,. fulfilment ol h"'* duly ICV4 os !IOI rnpanaGle lot 1111 echill• ol ... 81)811CY. 

Nc»iioe(: - ....,. je csobe zapcslena U ltun\8Ntarnq Ol'llanwlCIJI 

llqa Clfell..;e rw pcOuc:ju bYM Jugaslevije. MaMmo Vas Cla ..asnlku 

- ....,. prUZlle Pl*9tnl pomoc u t1111U1'8_,,., ~b. ICVA no,e 

ze dfelelncat owi organw1a,.. 

Hoc'l'iU'f - 1<apTe J8 OC069 Unoc:K.... 'I ll)'UllH"1T•pttq Qpr8H"1UT'\J'l 

kOfll Ml•y,e He 11o>.pyy;y a,,_.IY'OC"IH'IJ8 Mol!'1MO 1ac A.I 111a0<1111'J 

- l<apTe npyxnTe noTpe6Hy noMOll y "ICfl'JHaUHy A'JXHOCT'l. 

' 'IT la H'IJ8 O~U AnaTHoT OM Oll'llH'lt:rf'l)e. 

Certified by:-----------­

• 	 Diplomatic Personnel: 

• 	 SFOR personnel should identify and not unnecessarily detain diplomatic 

personnel. The letter "A" in the center ofthe license plate indicates a 

member of the Diplomatic Corps (see diagram below). 

• 	 Diplomatic personnel should have a diplomatic passport or other 

diplomatic identification (see diagram below; .a diplomatic passport may 

also have the letters "CMD" on its face rather than "CD"). 

• MND(N) checkpoints will expedite the passage ofdiplomats. Once you 

have confirmed their identity, do not search or delay, unless there is: 

• Clear evidence ofunauthorized arms or ammunition (they may carry 

civilian weapons to protect themselves); 

• 	 Clear evidence that they have committed a serious crime; or 

• 	 The vehicle license or identification documents are suspect. 

• Ifyou suspect misconduct by diplomatic personnel that does not 

jeopardize force protection, allow them to proceed and report the misconduct. 

• Report any problems with diplomatic personnel to the MND(N) HQ Battle 

Captain. 

DIPLOMATIC REGISTRATION PLATES IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: 

France 10 -A- 001to004 Great Britain· 20 - A - 001to003 

USA 11 -A- 001to022 Libya 24-A- 001 to 005 

Iran 12 -A- 001to006 Lebanon 25 -A- 001to005 

Croatia 13 -A- 001 to 013 Slovenia 28 - A- 001to002 

Turkey 14-A- 001 to 005 OSCE 29 - A - 001to010 

Germany 15 - A - 001 to 007 Sweden 32 - A - 001 

AppendixK 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS 1995-1998 419 


Austria 16 - A - 001 to 007 United Nations35 - A - 001 


Italy 18 - A - 00 I to 008 Pakistan 36 - A - 00 I 


AppendixK 
420 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

ANNEX A TO 

ARRC SOP 834 

DATED NOV9§ 

SPECIMENS OF DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS 

1. The following are specimens of internationally accepted Diplomatic passports 

issued In Bosnia & Herzegovina: 

a. Corps Diplomatigue fCDl. 

SOSNA I HERCEGOVINA 
 MINISTARSlVO \l.\NJSKIH POSl.OVA 


CD 

SLUZBENA ISKAZNICA 

ZA OSOBE DIPLOMATSKIH 


I KONZUl.ARNIH MISl.IA 


········································· ... -~·-·--

PHOTOGRAPH 


OF 


HOLDER 

N°CD 0002 7 

·················-....;........,················· 


Page2 

Front cover 

············································· -·­

············································· --~-·-

············································· -·­

................................................ 


Page3 

A ·1 

AppendixK 

Page 1 

-TARS'IYO VAllJIKIH l'OSLOVA 

llOINE I HEllCEGOVINE TllAZI OD IVIH 


NADl.EZNIM DllQANA BOIN!! I HEllCEOOYllll! 


DA lllADCU OVE ILUZBENE llKAZNICI 


l'ltUZE POllOC U IKLM>U IA ZAKONOtl 


1P'llONIMA IVOJI! ILunE, 


UKAZWUCI DUZNO POITONAN.IE 


ILUZBl!NOll ITATUIU KO.II lllALAC 


OVE llKAZNICE UZIVA NA TElllTOllUI 


llAIE DRZAVI! 


+++ 

1ME -TRY Of FDllEIGN AFFAlltl 


Of~ AND Hll!llZEGOVINA llEQUUTa 


ALL COlll"ETENT A~Of TltE 


llOINIA AND HEllZEOOVINA 'TO llEllDEll 


AUllTENCE 'TO THE HDLDElll OF THll l'All 


Ill AC~OllDANCI! WITH Tl« LAW 


AND A""'Ol'ltlATE llEOULATIOlll, 


DNINO DUE CDNllDEllATION 'TO THE 


OFFICIAL ITATUS WHICH THE HOU>Ell 


OI' THll Mii ENJOYI ON 'TM! TElllllTOR'f 


OI' DUii ITATL 


Page4 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS 1995-1998 421 


Chapter 6 DETAINING CIVILIANS OR HOSTILE FORCES 

References: GFAP, Annex 1A, Art. IV, para. 2(b) and para. 6; SFOR 

SOPs 3409 and 3412; SFOR OPLAN 31406, Annex I; TFE FRAGOs 

1086, 1550, 2161, and 2178. 

Bottom Line: SFOR personnel may detain anyone who obstructs 

friendly forces, interferes with the execution of the SFOR mission, or 

commits a serious crime in the presence ofSFOR personnel. 

• 	 A detainee is a person involuntarily taken into SFOR custody. Persons 

should be detained if SFOR personnel see them commit or attempt to 

commit murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, or any other serious 

crime. 

+ 	 A serious crime is any act that causes, or could reasonably be expected 

to cause, death or serious bodily harm to anyone. 

• 	 Whom SFOR may detain: 

• 	 Persons who obstruct friendly forces or SFOR progress·. 

+ 	Persons who attack SFOR property. 

• 	 Members of armed civilian groups. 

• 	 Persons engaged in violent demonstrations or riots. 

• 	 Persons who commit or threaten to commit serious crimes. 

• 	 Persons conducting surveillance or suspicious, repetitive behavior that 

might indicate surveillance against MND(N) forces, base camps, and 

convoys. MND(N) troops may confiscate film from persons conducting 

unauthorized surveillance on MND(N) forces. MND(N) will implement 

a proactive and vigorous counter-surveillance program for all base 

camps to minimize the threat of surveillance. 

• 	 Report all detentions immediately through command channels, and 

exhaust all appropriate non-forcible means before detention. 

• 	 Length of detention: 

• 	 SFOR will hold detainees only long enough to investigate fully the 

circumstances that caused their detention. 

+ 	SFOR will normally release detainees within seventy-two hours. 

+ 	Should it be necessary to hold detainee for more than seventy-two 

hours, obtain a legal review by the Staff Judge Advocate (MSE 553­

3568). 

+ 	Give temporary refuge to anyone who surrenders to SFOR, and obtain 

instructions from the MND(N) Commander through lhe chain of 

command. Do not tum over detainees to local authorities without the 

approval of the MND(N) Commander. 

AppendixK 
422 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

• 	 Detention Standards: 

• 	 Disarm detainees. Confiscate only items that pose an immediate 

threat. 

• 	 Do not use searches to humiliate, harass, or molest. Use a scanner or 

same-sex search when possible. 

• 	 Provide armed SFOR cover when conducting a search. 

• 	 The senior SFOR soldier present is authorized to release any detained 

person, if appropriate. 

• 	 Treat detainees humanely. Provide food, water, and first aid. 

• 	 Do not physically or sexually abuse detainees. 

• 	 Do not exchange money or gifts. 

• 	 Do not use detainees for manual labor or subservient tasks. 

• 	 Keep detailed records on all detainees. 

IChapter 7 PERSONS INDICTED FOR WAR CRIMES (PIFWCs) 

References: GFAP, Annex 1A, Art. VI, para. 2(c), and Arts. IX and X; 

SFOR SOP 3409; HQ SFOR Campaign Directive No. 13 to OPLAN 31405 

dated 20November1996; HQ SFOR OPLAN 31406 dated 17 December 

1996; TFE FRAGOs 2261, 2692, and 3106. 

Bottom Line: If the situation permits, SFOR will detain PIFWCs 

encountered during the execution ofnormally assigned duties, such 

· as monitoring checkpoints. SFOR will not conduct manhunts. 

• 	 Note: MSCs will disseminate PIFWC posters down to squad level. 

• 	 Detain PIFWCs identified during the regular course of duty, if the situation 

permits. 

• 	 The MSC commander decides whether to attempt detention. 

• 	 On-scene commanders will apply the rules of engagement (ROE) and 

prudent military judgment. 

• 	 Report detention to MND(N) HQ Battle CPT (MSE 553-2301/553­

3356/5564704}. 

• 	 Task Force Eagle CP will use Blue Dart to notify of PIFWC detention. 

• 	 MND(N} Commander will inform COMSFOR, who decides whether to 

detain or release. 

• 	 Do not question the PIFWC. 

• 	 Read, as soon as practical, the following rights warning to the detainee in 

a language he will understand: · 

AppendixK 
LAW AND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS 1995-1998 423 


"You are detained as a person believed to be indicted for war 

crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 

Yugoslavia. You will soon be transferred to their custody, and 

they will provide you details of the charges against you. I 

caution you that you are not obliged to say anything unless 

you wish to do so, but that whatever you say will be recorded 

and may be given in evidence. Do you understand that?" 

• 	 After the initial detention, and preferably through a U.S. interpreter, 

read this secondary caution to the PIFWC in a language he 

understands: 

"You are detained as a person believed to be indicted for war 

crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 

Yugoslavia. You have been charged in that indictment with 

having committed serious violations of international humanitarian 

law on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. 

Arrangements will now be made for you to be transferred without 

delay to the international tribunal in The Hague to answer these 

charges. The tribunal has been informed of your detention, and 

members of the prosecutor's office will meet you as soon as 

possible. They will give you full details of the charges against 

you when they arrive. The tribunal will, as appropriate, ensure 

that you can consult with legal counsel. You are not obliged to 

say anything unless you wish to do so but whatever you say will 

be recorded and may be given in evidence. Nothing else is going 

to happen until you are transferred to the custody of the tribunal. 

Do you understand?" 

• 	 Troops may search the detainee. Searches must not be intended to 

humiliate or embarrass, and should be conducted by a member of the 

same sex if possible. 

• 	 Treat detained PIFWCs in accordance with the Detention Standards in 

the previous Section. 

• 	 Evacuate PIFWCs according to the above references and orders from 

your chain of command. 

Chapter 8 WAR CRIME SCENES 

References: GFAP, Annex 1A, Art. II, para. 2; Art. IX, para. 2; and Art. X; 

SFOR SOPs 3407, 3408, 3409, and 3412; Campaign Directive 16 to 

OPLAN 31405; TFE FRAGOs 309, 315, 981, 1086, 1299, 1406, 2012, and 

2171. 

AppendixK 
424 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Bottom Line: SFOR is not responsible for seeking out and 

investigating war crimes. However, ifSFOR soldiers discover a 

suspected war crime scene, they will preserve the evidence under 

the guidelines below, and report It through the chain of command to 

MND(N) HQ, who will forward it to SFOR CJ3 COORD. 

• 	 SFOR will not investigate or excavate any suspected evidence, but will 

provide a secure environment for investigators from the International 

Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 

• 	 Report suspected mass graves or dead bodies as fully as possible in the 

following format: 

+ 	Line 1- Time of discovery. 

+ 	Line 2- Location, including the vicinity name and eight digit grid 

coordinates. 

• 	 Line 3- What was found? 

+ 	 Line 4- Why it is suspicious? 

• 	 Line 5- If reported to military authorities by a civilian, his or her name, 

address, and contact details. 

• 	 Make initial reports as soon as the tactical situation permits. 

• 	 On order, MND(N) units may conduct reconnaissance of specified 

locations to identify and report possible tampering with suspected mass 

graves. Tasked units will perform a visual ground and/or air 

reconnaissance on suspected mass graves, including still and video 

photography, and will report signs of possible tampering (e.g., the 

presence of excavation, or heavy equipment in the vicinity of the possible 

grave site). 

• 	 If tampering is discovered at any identified mass gravesites, be prepared 

to establish observation posts (OPs) or checkpoints (CPs) to monitor 

access to the site. If a patrol finds someone tampering with a site under 

surveillance, it should act to prevent any further damage to the site. The 

patrol may detain the individual(s) involved, and hand them over to the 

civil authorities after making a full report through the chain of command. 

Be prepared to prevent e~cavation equipment from entering gravesites. 

• 	 Deter further tampering with suspected gravesites through patrolling and 

force presence. 

• 	 MND(N) soldiers will not: 

• 	 Clear mines for ICTY; 

• 	 Transport ICTY personnel, equipment, or evidence; or 

• 	 Protect witnesses, except in accordance with the ROE rule about 

preventing serious crimes. . 

• 	 MND(N) may provide to the ICTY on a case-by-case basis: 

• 	 A liaison team to the ICTY team investigating a specific mass grave or 

suspected war crime site. 

AppendixK 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS 1995-1998 425 


• 	 Billeting (although ICTY will usually "live on the economy"}. 

• 	 Area security to prevent military intervention in the vicinity of the 

investigation site. 

• 	 Emergency medical care and medical evacuation. 

• 	 ICTY vehicle recovery and repair within limits of technical knowledge 

and parts availability. 

• 	 Liaison Teams: SFOR has no duty to provide direct security for ICTY 

investigators. However, MND(N} may direct that a liaison team, a low 

profile security team, be assigned to an ICTY investigation. Liaison teams 

remain removed from evidence collection activity, but within sight and 

communications range of ICTY team. The ICTY teams understand that 

they must defer to the tactical decisions of the senior liaison team 

member. 

• 	 Media Inquiries: 

• 	 All questions regarding the investigation should be directed towards 

ICTY. 

• 	 Be prepared to respond to ICTY-generated media inquiries about the 

discovery of war crimes evidence. 

+ 	 ICTY, not SFOR, determines the significance of war crimes evidence. 

• 	 ROE note: ICTY personnel are persons with designated special status. 

• 	 Reporting procedures: Provide oral report of ICTY activities daily to 

MND(N) G3 Battle CPT, MSE 553-2301. Follow this with a complete 

written report in the CDR's ASSESSREP. . 

• 	 Non-ICTY exhumations. The OHR, IPTF, UNHCR, and the civilian police 

may coordinate legitimate non-ICTY exhumations with the consent of the 

Entities. Exhumations taking place in the ZOS must be coordinated with 

SFOR. 

Chapter 9 PRISONER RELEASE 

References: GFAP, Annex 1A, Art. II, para. 3; Art. IX, para. 1; Annex 6, 

Art. I; and Annex 11, Art. I, para. 1; SFOR SOP 3411; SFOR 

Memorandum on Prisoner Exchanges, 29 December 1996; TFE FRAGO 

2312: MND(N) Policy on Prisoner Release, distributed at MND(N) JMC on 

20 August 1997. 

• 	 The Parties agreed in the GFAP (Annex 1A, Article IX) to release by 19 

January 1996 all prisoners taken during the conflict. Therefore, anyone 

still imprisoned is an illegally-held ·prisoner," and not a POW. 

• 	 In the fall of 1997, the VRS and AFBiH commanders in the MND(N) AOR 

declared in writing that they have no knowledge of any former POWs stilr 

in their custody. · 

• 	 ICRC is responsible for prisoner releases. 

AppendixK 
426 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

• 	 The IPTF should be called if civilian police have held the prisoners. 

• 	 MND(N) units should not volunteer their facilities for prisoner releases. 

SFOR will support ICRC and IPTF prisoner releases only by providing 

requested area security, emergency logistical support, or intelligence. 

• 	 SFOR will never offer payment or payment in kind for prisoners. 

Chapter 10 CIVILIAN CROWDS OR DEMONSTRATIONS 

References: .GFAP, Annex 1A, Art, II, para. 3; and Annex 11, Art. 1, para. 

1; COMSFOR's Guidance on Property, Presence, Crowds, and Police 

(March 1997); CALL Newsletter No. 96-11; 28 April 1996 Information 

Paper; TFE FRAGO 2667. 

Bottom Line: Civilian law enforcement agencies, not SFOR, are 

responsible for maintaining civil order and ensuring civilian freedom 

ofmovement. SFOR is not structured for civil disturbance or riot 

control and should avoid getting involved in efforts by the local 

civilian authorities to quell civil disorder through appropriate 

measures. Unless a crowd, armed or unarmed, presents a threat to 

SFOR, its mission, or another party, the Entities must take 

responsibility for police work. 

• 	 Indicators that a crowd movement may be a threat: 

• 	 Groups of more than fifty people, and groups that are entirely or mostly 

military-age males. 

• 	 Gatherings of women and children as a screen for a following crowd of 

military-age males. 

• 	 Advance media promotion. 

• 	 Failure to coordinate with police and government authorities on both 

sides of the IEBL, or with UNHCR or IPTF. 

• 	 Gatherings of counter-demonstrators, or persons intending to oppose 

the movement. 

• 	 Presence of weapons or any expression of hostile intent. 

+ 	 SFOR will: 

• 	 Immediately bring the crowd action to the attention of the local police. 

• 	 Take actions to delay, defuse, frustrate, or otherwise influence the 

crowd to disperse, if necessary: 

• 	 Close established checkpoints when a hostile confrontation is 


expected. . 


• 	 Establish temporary checkpoints to control the movement of hostile 

crowds. 

• 	 Disarm hostile civilian groups outside the ZOS. 

AppendixK 
LAW AND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS 1995-1998 427 


• 	 Take a position of tactical advantage over the crowd, regardless of 

whether the police are present, and observe, record (taking 

photographs if possible), and report. 

• 	 Disengage before being surrounded by the hostile crowd. Use force in 

accordance with the ROE. 

• 	 Support legitimate, controlled, non-threatening movement across the 

IEBL. 

• 	 Arrange advance meetings of IPTF, local political authorities, local 

police, and UNHCR. · 

• 	 Enlist the support of faction military commanders. Ensure they 

understand that their forces may not become involved directly either to 

provide security or to block movement. Military faction support is 

limited to using their influence with civil authorities. 

• 	 Monitor properly coordinated events. 

• 	 Hold the Parties accountable when they fail to meet their 

responsibilities to ensure freedom of movement and to control civil 

violence. 

• 	 SFOR will not: 

• 	 Assume responsibility for controlling civil disturbances. 

• 	 Provide security for demonstrators. 

• 	 Interpose themselves between a crowd and its possible objective, or 

between crowds. · 

• 	 Enter a crowd (except in accordance with the ROE to stop a serious 

. crime). 

• 	 Legal notes: 

• 	 A civilian crowd that meets peacefully and moves with no hostile intent 

is not illegal. However, such a crowd has the potential to become a 

mob and commit criminal acts. 

• 	 COMSFOR is the release authority for the use of riot control measures. 

• 	 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures: 

• 	 The most likely confrontation sites are at the IEBL. 

• 	 The next most likely confrontation site is the marchers' destination (e.g., a 

cemetery or village). 

• 	 Keep the crossing or visiting group on a bus. 

• 	 Check passengers for weapons. 

• 	 Halt the bus before it reaches a confrontation site. 

• 	 Do not allow passengers to dismount if there is an uncontrollable 

crowd at the destination. 

• 	 Prevent a counter-protest group from forming at the confrontation site. 

• 	 Establish temporary checkpoints on routes leading to the confrontation 

site. 

• 	 Check for weapons. 

Appendix K 
428 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

• 	 Halt vehicles as far away as METT-T permits; force personnel to walk 

to the confrontation site. 

+ 	 Avoid conspicuous, stationary SFOR presence at a location where 

such a presence may draw a hostile crowd (i.e., next to a political party 

headquarters). 

• 	 When a hostile crowd gathers: 

• 	 Inner Ring: 

+ 	 Connect IPTF with the local police. 

• 	 Connect the SFOR MSC Commander with senior town officials. 

• 	 Keep civil police in front if a crowd gathers. 

• 	 Confiscate weapons from unauthorized persons. 

• 	 Using caution, get photos and video of participants, particularly 

agitators, and others who are not working to defuse the situation. 

• 	 Outer Ring: 

• 	 Be prepared to seal off Weapons Storage Sites that could affect 

situation. 

• 	 Be prepared to counter a misinformation campaign. 

• 	 Be prepared to meet with senior local officials. 

• 	 Be prepared to stop all traffic through affected SFOR checkpoints. 

For complete text ofthe Joint Military Commission Handbook, 6th 

Edition, or any previous edition, contact the Center for Law and 

Military Operations (CLAMO). The above is merely an exemplary 

extract ofthe first several chapters. 

AppendixK 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 429 


Appendix L: Status ofACSA Agreements 

AEAJA-KL 1 February 1998 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JUDGE ADVOCATE 

SUBJECT: Status of ACSA Agreements 

1. EUCOM has completed cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs) and 

implementing arrangements (IAs} with the following countries and 

international organization: 

Belgium Czech Republic Denmark France 

Germany Greece Hungary Italy 

Lithuania Luxembourg Norway Poland 

Portugal SHAPE Tunisia Turkey 

United Kingdom 

An ACSA/IA exists with Canada, but Atlantic Command (ACOM) 

administers it and must approve its use. Support to NORDPOL Bde 

nations via Norwegian ACSA is authorized. 

2. EUCOM has completed cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs ). but no 

implementing arrangements (IAs}, with the following countries and 

international organization: 

Israel NAMSA Netherlands Spain 

It is EUCOM policy that there will be no cross servicing with the above 

countries, except for emergencies, until the IAs are concluded. 

3. EUCOM has authority from OSD to negotiate cross-servicing 

agreements, but has not yet concluded the agreements, with the following 

countries: 

Albania Austria Botswana 

Bulgaria Cote D'Ivoire Cyprus 

Estonia Finland FYROM (Macedonia) 

Ghana Kyrgyzstan Latvia 

Morocco Namibia Romania 

Appendix L 
430 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Russia Senegal Slovakia 

Slovenia Sweden Turkmenistan 

. Uganda Ukraine 

4. Estimating the completion date for concluding an ACSA or IA with any 

given country is virtually impossible. KLD will keep you posted. 

5. The enclosed chart depicts the status of ACSAs. 

Encl ANTHONY M. HELM 

LTC, JA 

Chief, Contract Law Division 

STATUS OF ACSA Cross-Servicing Agreements (9 May 97) 

Country Year 

Sioned 

Approved for 

Neootiation 

In Active 

Neootiation? 

Albania Feb. 1996 No 

Austria Yes 

Beloium 1982/1997 

Botswana Yes 

Bulqaria Feb. 1996 Yes 

Canada 1993 NEED ACOM 

APPROVAL TO 

USE 

Cote D'Ivoire Feb. 1996 Yes 

Cyprus Yes 

Czech Republic 1996 

Denmark 1982/1998 

Estonia Yes 

France 1987 

Finland Nov. 1995 Yes 

FYROM (Macedonia) Feb. 1996 Yes 

Germany 1983 

Ghana Feb. 1996 Yes 

Greece 1996/1998 

Hungary 1996 

Appendixl 

LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 431 


Israel 1988 Yes (IA) 

Italy 1983 

Kyravzstan Feb. 1996 Yes 

Latvia Feb. 1996 Yes 

Lithuania 1996 

Luxembourq 1983 

Morocco Yes 

NAM SA 1982 Yes (IA) 

Namibia Feb. 1996 Yes 

Netherlands 1983 Yes (IA) 

Norway 1982 

Poland 1996 

Portugal 1998 

Romania Feb. 1996 Yes 

Russia Nov. 1995 Yes 

Senegal Yes 

SHAPE 1995 

Slovakia Feb. 1996 Yes 

Slovenia Feb. 1996 Yes 

Spain 1984 Yes (IA) 

Sweden Nov. 1995 Yes 

Turkey 1996 

Turkmenistan Feb. 1996 Yes 

Tunisia 1994 

Uqanda Feb. 1996 Yes 

Ukraine Feb. 1996 Yes 

United Kingdom 1984 

Other Unified Command ACSAs 

ACOM 

CENTCOM 

Canada 

Bahrain 

Jordan 

PACOM Australia 

Japan 

Korea 

Malaysia 

Thailand 

AppendixL 

432 · CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Appendix M: Matrix ofAuthorized Supportfor Non-U.S. Military 


Organizations 


SUPPORT MATRIX1 

Category Water IFood Fuel PX Priv !Medical 

Local Nationals No !No No No No 

Local Nationals (Contractors) 2 2 No No No 

Translators Yes Yes No No No 

IPTF 3 3 No 4 No 

UN 3 3 No No No 

MPRI No No No No 5 No 

Turk Bde Recip 6 Recip 6 Reimb 7 Yes Reimb 

Nord Pol Recip 6 Recip 6 Reimb 7 Yes Reimb 7 

Russ Bde Recip 6 Recip 6 No 8 Yes No 8 

NATO Recip 6 Recip 6 9 Yes 9 

Non-NA TO Allies Recip 6 Recip 6 9 Yes 9 

FWF No No No No No 

MWR Personnel Yes Yes No Yes 3 

Brown & Root Yes Yes 10 Yes 11 Yes 11 

Private Organizations No No No No No 

Red Cross 3 3 3 3 3 

1. Requests for other types of support must be forwarded to Division for approval. Fuel may be 

provided in deminimis quantities when based on operational necessity. Food, water, and medical 

care may be provided in deminimis quantities when necessary to save life or limb. 

2. Support to Local National contractor personnel is dependent upon the contract terms. JCC or 

OSJA must be consulted prior to provision of support. 

3. This issue is still being researched. 

4. American IPTF personnel may use the PX. Other IPTF personnel are not authorized to use the 

PX. 

5. Retired military personnel employed by MPRI are not authorized to use U.S. PX facilities in BiH. 

They do not have access to U.S. camps in BiH, but may cash checks at U.S. finance offices. 

6. Multi-national forces (NATO and non-NATO allies) are provided food and water pursuant to a 

reciprocal agreement. We are reau:reo to account for the number of meals provided to ensure the 

exchange is of equal value. 

7. Fuel and medical support may be provided to these groups on a reimburseable basis only. A 

form 3381 must be completed and submitted to G4. The form is used to compute the value of the 

goods or services rendered and to bill the recipient. Prior approval is required. 

8. Requests for assistance from the Russian BOE must first be approved by SHAPE HQ. Russia 

has not signed the type of agreement used to provide support to the Turk and NORDPOL BDEs. 

9. Support may be provided to NATO and non-NATO allies only if the country in question has 

signed a Standardization Agreement (STANAG). 110 does not have authority to enter into 

STANAGs. · 

10. Fuel is provided to Brown~ Root according to the terms of the contract. 

11. Local hire Brown and Root employees are not authorized to receive PX or Medical support. 

AppendixM 
AU

TE

USA CSEUR 

~EPLOYMENT C

' DEPARTMENT ........., ••• •IACI 


OF THE ARMY 

SECRmARY 

OFTHEAR~Y 

CLAIMS, REPORTS 

>$ llX>.OOO ~ USARC

~ M

~ COMMANDER. ~ AUTHORITY: 11SARCS ~· TECHNICAi. 

~50K - $ IOOK ADVICE ~ 

-:::: 

1\lITllORITY: 

TECHNICAL 

ADVJCF., $ 

AD

'"----------------------
~ ~ 

~ 

~ 

~ ~ 

lj USACSEUR 

•&... SFOR CLAIM

..,~,.. "m mer I SFOR CLAIMS PROCESS JN 

1 .., 

1.......... . ....- ' ,..... :.:.. ....... _':.:..·. --- ..... UNAN

.... 

CLAIMANT· :· 

Al.PS a.AIM, 

NATIONAL. 

CON11NOl?NT 

I ~~~ 

I 

·~·::1~ t I DF.C

INVESTIGATION, ·.,,j' ..., 

ADIUDICATION . ·.,, '...

.. 

··.. 

··..

DENIED, IN SETl'LEMENT..·' :.• 

PAYMENT· .. WHOLE OR 


IN PART 


PAYOlllEI - - - - • 

l'AY ClllDU Rl:fllSED 

L.....--------------
JAG CLAIMS C

D

~ "15 

~ ~ 

S1' 

0 

VEHICLE #/SECTION/DRIVER 

llQ99/SJA SPC 1. CPT 

TRl9/HQ CMUT SPC }. SFC 

HB106/G-2 (A2C2) ISPC 1. MAJ 

HQ71/MSR PFC 1. SSG 

X-7/MDNG 29TH MPAD SGT J. 

CPT 

1. 

ITEM I GING 

G 

G 

G 

G 

~ 
436 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Below is the transcript ofa typical briefgiven to a claims 

convoy before departure. It is very tellingfrom many aspects. It talks 

about the mission from the top down to the specific mission ofthe 

claims convoy. It discusses Rules ofEngagement. attitudes ofthe 

Serbs toward the United States. and more. Bottom line: even the 

seemingly smallest oftasks and missions was a major undertaking, 

requiring planning and preparation. 

VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF FOREIGN CLAIMS CONVOY BRIEFING 


9 AUGUST 1996 


CPT __ 


OIC, FOREIGN CLAIMS CONVOY COMMANDER 


Good Morning! I'm Captain . I'm the convoy commander this 

morning. I'm the OIC for the mission. Sergeant First Class , who's 

driving the lead vehicle, also from the JAG Office, is the NCOIC of the 

mission. Today we're going out to pay claims. We're going to pay six 

claimants on the Serb side-six Serbian claimants for maneuver damage. 

As you know, when our tanks are rolling across the countryside, they 

ten up a lot of stuff. And today, we're going out to compensate individuals. 

These are not government officials. These are just regular people who had 

their property damaged by the United States Army. 

We typically have to go on back roads to find the claimants. Them 

are two cases today. We do not know exactly where we're going because 

all we have is the claimants name and his hometown. So we have to go to 

the town and our interpreter hops out and asks people in that town, "Where 

does this guy live?,• and then we go find the guy. So, it makes for 

interesting convoying. But, many times we have to tum our vehicles 

around. 

So what I'm going to do this morning is I'm going to talk about safety 

and I'm going to talk about the accomplishment of our mission. 

Appendix 0 
LAW AND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 437 


First, I want to talk about safety. We have five vehicles in the 

convoy today, and I'm going to talk to you about the order of the vehicles in 

a minute. But, the five vehicles are supposed to stay together at all times. If 

we have any kind of problem today with any of the vehicles, we're all 

stopping, okay? We are a unit. We operate as a unit today. We're not 

going to be getting too far separated. I want the five vehicles to stay 

together. When we are passing through the Zone of Separation, we can go 

a little bit further apart because of the danger of mines. But, other than 

that, when we are in regular non-mine territory, try to stay close together, 

okay? 

Now, let's look at the route first. We're leaving Dubrave Air Base 

and we are heading east on Route Hawk and then we're going to Osmaci 

which is a small Serb village. 

We're going to pay a claimant there. Then we're getting back on Route 

Sparrow and we're going to Zvomik and we're going to pay a claimant in 

Zvornik and then we are going to take Route Camel south, which is one of 

the prettiest routes I've seen in Bosnia. It's night on the Drina River the 

whole way. And we'll be passing a lot of beautiful scenery there, going 

through some mountain tunnels. 

We're going to end up in Vlasenica where the Id Brigade 

Headquarters is located. We're going to pay two claimants there and 

hopefully a third claimant there, if we can find him. We're going to eat 

lunch there at the 2'd BOE dining Hall which is one of the best chow halls in 

theater. On the way back, we're going to pay one claimant. We should be 

back as early as 3:30- as late as 5:30 this afternoon, okay? 

Now, when we cross the Zone of Separation here, in the KalesijaMelici area, it's important you follow certain guidelines when you're driving 

your vehicles. First and foremost, you do not stop your vehicle on the side 

of the road. Everybody knows that. But, I want to reiterate it. That means 

that the way this vehicle is parked right now is not acceptable if we're 

stopping in the ZOS because the driver has to get out on dirt, okay? 

So, it should be further over here, so that people on both sides of the 

vehicle when they're getting out are getting out on hardtop. Does 

everybody understand that? 

[Affirmative response from everybody.) 

AppendixO 

438 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 


I don't want any feet anywhere near grass an)where near the ZOS. Is 

everybody clear on that? 

[Affirmative response from everybody.) 

Okay. Let's talk about traffic control. When we stop our five 

vehicles on the side of the road when we're going to pay a claimant, I'm 

going to put an NCO in charge of the convoy while Sergeant and I 

and others go in to pay the claimant, okay? Sergeant is also the 

Class A agent on this mission. That means, that he actually has the money 

that we're going to pay the people in cash. 

I'm the Foreign Claims Commissioner. I'm the one that decides how 

much they get paid. Sergeant is, in the sense, the banker. He's the 

one that has the money. I'm not supposed to touch the money. He's the 

one that has the money, okay? 

So, Sergeant has to go in and pay the claimants with me 

today. I see some other good NCOs here today. So, I'm going to put one 

of you in charge when we go in. And you're going to be in charge of 

security of our vehicles and raffle control. 

Now hopefully, we're going to be able to park each time in a situation 

where our vehicles are off the road. But if our vehicles have to be in the 

road blocking one of the lanes of traffic I'm going to require you to put one 

person on each end. I want you to stop the traffic. I don't want you to kind 

of slow it down. I want you to stop it at both ends and then let it pass one 

direction at a time. 

Now, in order to stop a vehicle in Bosnia, you have to get in front of 

the vehicle, okay? You have to stand in its way and stop it. They do not 

know what these Army hand signals mean. They do not know what this 

means [gesturing]. Okay? So you have to literally get in front of them. 

And especially with trucks, that can be a real interesting experience 

because they're not really interested in stopping. And you have to stop 

them. 

The reason I say that is, we could have a serious injury if a truck is 

going past our convoy 25-30 kilometers and somebody is walking out from 

behind a Humvee. Humvees make a lot of noise when they're running. 

You can't hear the traffic that's coming by. · 

AppendixO 

LAW AND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 439 


So, I want any vehicles that are going past our convoy to be crawling 

past. So, I'm going to ask-alright, we've got three interpreters on this 

mission. So we're fortunate. I'm going to ask the interpreters to also help 

out to be able to teach the person at either end how to say "sporija," which 

means "slowly." You're going to tell the people to go slowly, okay? And if 

they don't go slowly enough, then you're going to go back to them, stop 

them again, and tell them, "puno sporija," which means, "very slowly," 

okay? And you're going to emphasize that until they go slowly enough. 

Let me talk to you about if we get into a bad situation today. Now, 

we've been here in Bosnia for over seven months now. We have not had 

any fighting to speak of. Today could be the first day. We need to be 

prepared for that. I know that everyone kind of acts lulled to sleep. But we 

need to be prepared for something bad happening. 

If something happens, we're going to react to it. First of all, when we 

leave base today we're going to put a magazine in our weapons. We are 

not going to chamber rounds. We are not going to take our weapons off 

safe. Does everybody understand that? Everybody knows that, right? 

[Affirmative response from everybody.) 

Okay. The only time that you're going to load your weapon off safe 

and chamber a round is if I tell you to. Or, if I'm not able to tell you to, then 

you're going to use the good training the Army has given you, okay? 

We're going to follow the chain of command. We have a Major here 

today, we have NCOS, we have a Lieutenant. If I'm incapacitated, 

obviously, people who are supposed to take charge, I expect you to take 

charge. I expect you to do what you are trained to do, okay? Most 

importantly, I expect everybody to use their good common sense. 

It's not our job to engage the enemy, okay? It is our job to safely 

return to this base tonight. Our job is to pay foreign claims today. So, if we 

get into a situation where we are being fired on, our primary coal is to 

protect ourselves and get to a safe position. There are plenty of M1 Tank 

commanders and Bradley commanders in 2nd Brigade that have been 

itching to fire ever since we came to Bosnia. And they wrn be more than 

willing tp fire all of their large weapons. That is their mission when needed. 

Today we have only five Humvees and a M-60. So, we are riot prepared to 

do major combat. 

Appendix 0 
440 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


First and foremost, we are going to use our vehicles to escape the 

situation, okay? If we are able to, we're going to try to drive out of the 

Situation. Drive forward, backward, sideways. Whichever way we have to 

go to get away. If we cannot use our vehicles, we're going to go to plan B. 

What is plan B? I don't know what plan B is. But, we'll come up with it at 

the time. 

I will be in charge. I will give orders. I expect everybody to follow 

those orders just as if we were in an organized unit okay? And that includes 

the way in which the rules of engagement work. In other words, decisions 

about whether or not we're going to actually fire our weapons, depends on 

the degree of threat with which are being confronted. 

Okay. We're going to have a good time today- We always have a 

good time on our claims missions. I know Sergeant Day has been before. 

I think you're the only that's been before. I got a lot of new people that 

haven't been on our missions before. 

This is our 20th mission. We've gotten to see a great deal of the 

countryside because we go on a lot of the back roads to find the claimants. 

The damage is usually done on a main MSR route. BUL the claimants 

don't live where the damage was done. They live up on a mountainside in 

a small house. So, we have to go find them 

The rear vehicle is. going to be in charge of the speed of the convoy. 

The rear vehicle decides how fast we go. Obviously, the front vehicle to a 

degree decides how fast we go. But, if there's one of the vehicles that can't 

keep up with the lead vehicles, the rear vehicle radios us and tells us. Tne 

rear vehicle is going to tell us every time we go through a tum, that they 

have completed the tum. So, the first four vehicles go through the tum. 

When the fifth vehicle goes through the tum, "New York" calls" "North 

Carolina"' and says, "North Carolina, we're through the tum-over." If we're 

going past a slow moving tractor, same thing. Many times when you're in 

the mountains, the front vehicle cannot see the rear vehicle because of the 

curves. 

When we pass a vehicle, many times the front vehicle makes a 

decision to pass a slow moving vehicle with enough space for perhaps two 

vehicles to get around, okay? Those first two vehjcles are going to then 

slow down and wait for a spare for the next three vehicles to have a chance 

to pass. There's very few places in Bosnia where there's ~nough room for 

Appendix 0 

LAW AND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 441 


five vehicles to pass a slow moving vehicle. Especially in the mountains. 

So, you just got to be patient. Don't do anything that's dangerous. 

If you're in the third, fourth, or fifth vehicle, I don't want you to hurry 

and try to make a dangerous pass. We're going to be up there waiting for 

you. We're going to go slow until you have a chance to pass. So, wait for 

a good space to pass. Okay? 

The order of the vehicles today is ... the Civic Center from Tuzia 

West underneath Lieutenant is the fourth vehicle, and the Air Force 

vehicle is the fifth vehicle. Okay-any questions'? 

All of you have been well trained by the United States Air Force and 

United States Army. We are going to be on the Serbian side today. I 

always like to remind people that our efficient United States Air Force 

bombed the Serbs for about eighteen months. So, there's always going to 

be some people over there that don't like us. 

We have found that most people treat us very friendly because we 

are paying them. But, you know, if you see a situation that you're worried 

about I want you to bring it to my attention or one of the NCO's attention 

immediately, okay? 

The most important thing today is safety and security. I want 

everybody to come back safe. And if you got any situation that you're 

concerned about-if you see anybody with weapons-there's going to be 

one place where you're going to see a VRS soldier guarding a place that's 

. right across the street from where we're going to pay the water company. 

Don't w6rry about that. That's an army post. That is a containment area. 

They're allowed to have their people there. But, if you see somebody with 

a weapon-even worse, if you see somebody pointing a weapon, that's a 

serious thing that everybody needs to know about immediately, okay? 

Don't take your time coming up to tell me about it. I want you to run and tell 

me about it, okay? 

Alright. We're going to go out the east gate and we're going to tum 

right when we get to the east gate. Any questions? 

[Convoy member asked a question.] 

Yeah. It's on the front page of your itinerary. Did you get one? 

Appendix 0 

442 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


[Affinnative response from convoy member.) 

Okay. Frequencies and passwords-good question. On the front 

page of your itinerary. 

Okay. Let's rock and roll. 

AppendixO 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 443 


Appendix P: One Base Camp Judge Advocate's Description ofHis 

Duties (Chart) 

CPL Greer 

• Inprocess All Foreign Claims 

• Maintain FCC Database 

•Process Article 15 Requests 

•Maintain Article 15 Log and 

•Database 

• Process Chapter Requests 

• Maintain Chapter Log 

• Inprocess Legal Asst. Clients 

•Maintain Legal Assistance 

Stats 

•Provide Weekly Updates to 

Tuzla 

•Office Administration 

• Pursue Personal College 

Education Credits 

"rrl Snn~rlron 

Wolf pack 

CPT Dauenheimer 

•Advise Commanders on LOW, 

GFAP, etc. 

•Adjudge Foreign Claims w/i 

Jurisdiction 

•Review Article 15s -Advise 

Commanders 

• Review Chapters - Advise 

Commanders 

• Counsel Legal Asst. Clients 

• Attend Command Briefings to 

include the Joint Military 

Commission 

• Oversee Office Administration 

Teach with Local Colleges 

AppendixP 
1997 

444 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Appendix Q(l): Sample Operational Law Weekly Report 

MEMORANDUM FOR DSJA 16 November 1997 

SUBJECT: Operational Law Weekly Report, 10 November - 15 November 

1. Daily meetings are: 0730 Staff BUB (except Sundays), 0800 J3-G3 

VTC, 0830 Commander's Conference (except Sunday), 1800 

Commander's BUB (except Sundays), 1900 VTC. 

2. ·Weekly meetings are: R&S Meetings- Thursdays & Saturdays, Synch 

Meetings - Saturdays, Vision Meetings - Sundays, Force Protection 

Meetings - Fridays, Election Meetings - Fridays, Civil & Military 

Operations Coordination Meeting - Tuesdays & Thursdays, and 10 

Working Groups - Wednesdays. 

3. The following is a summary of this week's significant activities, 

appointments and actions: 

DAY DAILY MEETINGS1 ACTIVITIES & DESCRIPTION 

ASSESSMENT BRIEFSI OR 


APPOINTMENT 


s 

Overall a quiet day. 1. Reviewed FRAGOs. 


9NOV 


SUN Election 

Prepared to deoloy Meeting 2. Deployed to NORDPOL Bde 

with the OTAC to Headquarters with the OTAC. 

Doboj for Operation 3. Worked on the Minesweeper 

Full House. 2000 letter for the Division 

Enaineers. 

MON It was a quiet day at 1. G2: MAJ Lewallen informed 

10NOV the NORDPOL Bde me about a Russian soldier 

Headquarters. who was caught at SWEDBAT 

Operation Full House with an expired SFOR ID card 

went forward without that did not belong to him. 

any difficulties. At The ID card belonged to a 

first the Danish Russian officer. The soldier 

Battalion was a Russian private. Action 

Commander did not taken: Talked to the Chief of 

want to Qo into the Staff, drafted a letter for MG 

Appendix Q(J) 

LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 445 

Specialist Police 

Headquarters and 

begin the 

confiscation 

procedures until he 

received further 

guidance. MG Ellis 

met with Gen. Saric 

and Saric agreed to 

allow TFE to go in 

and complete the 

mission. Although 

Saric at first did 

everything to delay 

informing the Doboj 

Specialist Police he 

did so after MG Ellis 

threaten to go in with 

force. Fortunately 

the operation went 

down without any 

injuries or casualties. 

Ellis' signature to the Russian 

Bde Commander notifying him 

of the situation and 

recommending that he take 

appropriate action. 

TUE Shots were heard on TJAG visit 1. Reviewed FRAGOs. 

11 NOV Eagle Main. MPs 

went to investigate a 

possible negligent 

discharge in the 

clearing barrel in 

front on the DEFAC. 

Nothing was ever 

discovered. 2-2 

reported an 

explosion outside 

Dobol. IPTF did not 

find anything. 

2. Reviewed a PMO memo for 

the CG's signature that would 

provide SFOR assistance to 

the IPTF in their restructuring 

effort. 

3. Was asked about creating a 

temporary restriction zone in 

Doboj around the Specialist 

Police station. 

4. Was asked what kind of SOFA 

protection local companies 

that contract with SFOR have 

when confronted by local 

police check points. 

5. Wrote a legal opinion about 

the legality of moving the POL 

to another site on Tuzla Main. 

6. Wrote a legal opinion about 

constructinQ new routes on 

Appendix Q(l) 
446 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Tuzla Main. 

1. Reviewed FRAGOs. 

12NOV 

WED A report was LIWAIO

2. Received a question about 

NORDPOL that 3 - 4 

received from Meeting.

crossing the border between 

pistol shots were Croatia and 8-H. 

fired in the area of 2 3. Received a question about 

Danish soldiers riding crossing the IE8L. Had to 

in a Gelande Wagon. explain that the IE8L is not an 

The incident international border and that 

occurred 5 km south the people of 8-H have the 

of Zenica. The two right to cross it freely. 

soldiers drove away 4. Received a general question 

from the scene and about the SSCRA-how does it 

the other car apply in postponing court 

disappeared. IPTF dates. 


and local police 


conducted an 


investigation but the 


perpetrators were not 


found. 


THURS At 1930 the previous OPD: US 1. Reviewed Fragos. 

13 NOV night a report was Ambassador to 2. Reviewed a Ch. 14 and 

received that a B&R 8-H spoke to prepared a legal review. 

truck had broken the Staff 


down at the 
 Primaries and 


intersection of 
 field grade 


Ostrich and Hawk 
 officers. 


and that a mob had 


formed around it. 


The mob threatened 


to bum the truck. 


The B&R security 


was called in and the 


truck was safely 


retrieved. At another 


demonstration that 


same day in which a 


UN bus was pelted 


with rocks, it turned 


out that 141st Signal 


had soldiers in that 


Appendix Q(J) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS. 1995-1998 447 

area. Fortunately the 

Russian Bde 

retrieved the soldiers 

and brought them to 

their base camp for 

safety. 

FRI 

14 NOV 

Claims convoy. 

SAT A report was R&S meeting. 1. Reviewed FRAGOs. 

15 NOV received about an 

unidentified 

helicopter in the Turk 

AO. A Turkish patrol 

was sent out to 

Zenica airfield to 

count the aircrafts 

and check the tail 

numbers. The patrol 

did not find any 

discrepancies. There 

were no warm 

engines. The patrol 

reported that the 

helicopter was not 

from the Zenica 

airfield. All MND (N) 

units deriy having 

aircrafts in that area. 

This is still a mystery. 

Also, a group of 

young, military age 

men managed to get 

up to one of the radio 

towers in MND (SE). 

Force 

Protection Drill. 

2. Received a question about 

FRAGO 5 and if it is 

permissible to OPCON US 

helicopters to a US rapid 

deployment unit that operates 

outside of MND (N). 

According to L TC Muir, G3, 

FRAGO 5 is still in effect. 

More to follow as to how his 

credence now plays into this 

growing black hole. 

3. ROE Question: Who has 

release authority for 

illumination rounds and for 

mortars. 

Appendix Q(l) 
448 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 

They snuck through 

the mine-riddled 

forest. MND (SE) 

soldiers managed to 

hold them off and 

eventually the men 

left. MND (N) spun 

up its force 

protection measures 

at Mt. Zep and ·the 

two hill tops. 

Preparing for the 

worse case scenerio. 

4. POC for this report is the undersigned. 

SUSANNE A. MILLER 

MAJ, JA 

Operational Law Attorney 

Appendix Q(l) 
LAW AND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 449 


Appendix Q(2): Sample SJA Weekly Status Report 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 


Headquarters, 1st Armored Division (Forward) 


Office of the Staff Judge Advocate 


Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina 


APO AE 09789 


AETV-THH-JA 1 February 1998 

MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE ADVOCATE, HQ, USAREUR & 7TH ARMY, 

UNIT #29351, APO AE 09014 

SUBJECT: SJA Weekly Status Report for the Week of 25 - 31 January 


1998 


1. Personnel. 

a. Present For Duty, Officer/ Enlisted: 9/13. Assigned personnel 

consist of three 1AD JAs, one USAREUR JA, three 2d ACR JAs, one JA 

each from I Corps, Ill Corps, V Corps, and XVIII Airborne Corps, and one 

USATDS JA. There are four enlisted soldiers from 1AD, three from Fort 

Polk, two from V Corps, and six from assorte·d CONUS installations. SGT 

Patrice Jones of Fort Gordon redeployed to CONUS on 31 January. SGT 

James Mersfelder of White Sands Missile Range and SPC Michael Enright 

of Fort Leonard Wood arrived from CONUS on 27 January. SSG Ricky 

Simpson of V Corps arrived at Comanche Base on 27 January. 

b. Leave or TOY, Officers/Enlisted: 1/0. CPT Jeria Ward, USATDS, 

is TOY to Central Region from 24 January - 3 February. 

c. R&R Leave/Pass, Officer/Enlisted: 2/2. SGT Mike Cantu, 2d 

ACR, is on R&R leave from 18 January - 3 February. CPT Carlene 

Christie is on R&R leave from 23 January - 6 February. CPT Chad Sarchio 

is on R&R pass to Budapest until 2 February. CPL Martin Greer, 3/2 ACR, 

returned from R&R leave on 31 January. 

d. Hospital, Officers/Enlisted: 0/1. SPC of 

______was hospitalized at the Blue Factory the night of 30 

January due to acute abdominal pain. Medical personnel have ruled out 

Appendix Q(2) 
450 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


appendicitis. SPC Kraft is doing well and is expected to be released on 2 

February. 

e. Kill~d/lnjured/Missing, Officer/Enlisted: 0/0 

2. Contract/Fiscal/Administrative Law. 

a. Contracts. 

(1) Number of Claims Filed: None 

(2) Amount of Claim: None 

(3) Number of Bid Protests: None 

(4) Unauthorized Procurements/Amount: None 

(5) Other. NIA 

b. International Logistics. 

(1) ACSA Transfers by Country/$ Amount: TFE provided 

helicopter support to the Danish Prime Minister and his 30 member 

delegation on 28 and 29 January. Service was pursuant to the new ACSA 

and IA with Denmark at a cost of approximately $10,000. Other routine 

food/water/fuel/ammunition transfers with SFOR troop contributing nations. 

(2) Requests for Donations of Equipment/Country: None 

reviewed. 

c. Administrative Law. 

(1) Report of Survey Legal Reviews: 3 

(2) PAO Article reviews: 0 

(3) 15-6 Investigation Advice/Review: 3/4 

(4) Other Admin Law: 3 

3. Military and Civil Law [This section does not include any actions from 

the 1AD rear area of operations]. 

Appendix Q(2) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 451 

a. Soldiers in Pretrial Confinement: 0. 

b. Summary Courts-Martial Preferred/Tried: 010 

c. Special Courts-Martial Preferred/Referred/Tried: 01010 

d. BCD Special Courts-Martial Preferred/Referred/Tried: 1/0/0. PVT 

Lawrence Propst, 2/2 ACR, is charged with two brief AWOLs (in CONUS), 

disobeying an NCO, disobeying an officer x 2, and concealing stolen 

property (4 compact discs). Charges were preferred on 26 January. 

e. General Courts-Martial Preferred/Referred/Tried: 21010. PFC 

Donald O'Connor and SPC Kenneth Schwarz, 3/2 ACR were charged with 

desertion. Charges were preferred (in absentia) on 7 and 6 January 

respectively. The soldiers failed to return from R&R leave and surrendered 

to military control about 30 days later. They have been returned from 

CONUS to be tried here. 

f. Nonjudicial Punishment, Summarized/CG/FG/GO: 1/6/2/0, 

Enlisted/Officers: 9/0 · 

g. Chapter 1 O's: 0 

h. Administrative Boards: 0 

i. Chapter actions: 0 

4. Legal Assistance. 

a. Clients seen this week: 72 

b. Legal Separations/Divorce Counseling: 1/4 

c. POAs: 38 

(1) General/Specials: 14/24 

(2) To Whom Given: Spouse/Parent/Friend. 

(3) If General POA, Length of POA: 2 years 

Appendix Q(2) 
452 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


(4) Revocations of POAs: 1 

d. 	Notarizations: 19 

e. 	Wills: 0 

f. 	S.S.C.R.A: 2 

g. 	Tax Counseling: 3 

h. 	Attorney Counseling: 12 

i. Other (not involving attorney counseling): 4 

5. 	 Reported incidents of Misconduct by: 

a. 	 US Contractor Personnel: None. 

b. 	 GS Employees Accompanying the Force: None. 

c. 	 UN Employees Accompanying the Force: None. 

6. 	 Claims: 

a. 	 Number of Claims filed by US Personnel: 0 Cumulative: 8 

b. 	 Number of Claims adjudicated: 0 Cumulative: 7 

(paid: O; denied: O; transferred: 0) 

c. 	Amount paid this week: 0 Cumulative: $325 

d. 	 Number of Bosnia Foreign Claims filed this week: 7 

Cumulative: 151 

e. 	 Number of Bosnia Foreign Claims adjudicated: 7 

(paid: 5 denied: 2; .transferred: 0) Cumulative: 188* 

f. 	Amount paid this week: 4,345 DM 

Cumulative: 254,802 DM 

*Includes both 110 and 1AD Claims since TOA on 22October1997. 

Appendix Q(2) 

LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 453 


7. International Law; Number of Personnel Confined by Civil Authorities: 

None 

8. Assessment: The delivery of legal services remains green. 

9. Summary of Operational Law issues and events. 

(1) The OPSJA continued her review of various CONPLANS, 

OPLANS and MND(N) FRAGOs. 

(2) The DSJA and OPSJA attended numerous planning meetings 

pertaining to an anticipated meeting of the Vares municipal council. The 

council meeting was ultimately postponed until the week of 1-7 February. 

Vares is a contentious area with significant tensions between the Croat and 

Bosniac population. It was the site of a violent confrontation on 4 

December. 

STEVEN T. SALATA 

LTC, JA 

Staff Judge Advocate 

Appendix Q(2) 
454 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Appendix Q(3): Sample Claims Status Report 

SAMPLE CLAIMS STATUS REPORT 

The following is a summary of the claims received at the Tuzla Airbase SJA. This report 

includes potential claims and claims filed at.the Brigade SJA Offices. 

Date of Amount 

Incident Claimed Neg. Amount Date Paid 

CLAIMS PAID 

Mr. Selimovic Safet 13 Jan 1996 3,300 OM 5500M 22 Feb 96 

A U.S. Apache helicopter flew over Mr. Safet's house. The rotor wash knocked off 180-200 

roof tiles, knocked over a fence, filed his house with soot, knocked over a stack of hay, and 

frightened his wife and children. I estimated that the tiles cost 2 OM a piece and the loss of 

about 1/3 of the hay was worth 60 OM. A professional roofer earns 35 OM per day. The 

remainder of the agreed amount was for the other 

miscellaneous damages. 

Mr. ·Glavinic Hamdija 13 Jan 96 640M 640M 22 Feb 96 

A U.S. Apache helicopter flew over Mr. Haindija's house. The rotor wash knocked off 22 

roof tiles and tore off metal flashing. I estimated that the tiles cost 1.5 OM a piece and the 

metal cost 20 OM. Since this wa5 the most reasonable claim I have received, I was not 

going to squabble over the remaining few marks. 

Mr. Mandalovic Seiko 14 Jan 96 4,600 OM 4,350 OM 22 Feb 96 

The vehicle accident claim involves a U.S. Soldier. The accident occurred in Zivincie. The 

vehicle is a 1985 Opel Askona-C diesel. Originally the claim and estimate of repairs were 

for 9,839 OM. However, Mr. Seiko stated he could get the repairs done at a cheaper repair 

shop. He stated that he paid 7,000 OM for the vehicle in August 1995. kle has no receipts 

for the vehicle. According to Mr. Setko the diesel engine is brand new. The U.S. driver 

was cited for excessive speed. The only issue is the value of the vehicle vs. costs of the 

repairs. 

CLAIMS RECOMMENDED FOR APPROVAL 

Ourakavid Redzo 20Jan 96 5000M 5000M Pending 

A U.S. bulldozer buried about a 100 meters of his fence. His property is below a helicopter 

landing site. When they expanded the parking lot, they covered his fence with tons of dirt. 

The owner does not want us to remove the dirt. He only wants to replace his barb wire and 

wood post fence. Barb wire fences and posts cost about 6 DM per meter. This claim could 

be a lot higher. I will not argue about the price. 

Appendix Q(3) 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 455 


CLAIMS VOUCHERS SUBMITTED FOR PAYMENT 

Kovacevic Samid 19 Jan 96 2,239 OM 989 OM Pending 

This vehicle accident involved a U.S. soldier The claimant is claiming 1000 DM for stress, 

250 OM for lost wages, and 989 OM for damage to his vehicle. According to the repair 

shop, the 1980 Zastava was totaled. They estimated the value at 1522 OM less 533 OM for 

salvage value. They used a standard 35% for salvage value. We settled on the cost of the 

vehicle (989 OM) 

Mrs. Zulic Devieta 23 Jan 96 SOOOM 3500M Pending 

A U.S. vehicle damaged the comer of her home and destroyed a few fruit trees. The 

woman is poor, elderly, and blind. There appears to be about 70 tiles missing and some 

structural roof damage. In my opinion, the value of the damage is about 300 OM. I will 

negotiate a fair settlement. 

Appendix Q(3) 
456 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Appendix R: Internet Web Sites 

Most every Judge Advocate interviewed indicated the internet 

was an invaluable resource for research and communication. 

Accordingly, this list ofpotentially relevant internet websites is 

provided. The Operattonal Law Handbook1 also contains a list of 

internet sites.from which many ofthese sites were obtained. 

Bosnia Links 

DOD Bosnia Link http://www.dtic.mil/bosnia/ Outstanding source 

of information with many links. 

NATO IFOR & SFOR 

Homepage http://www.nato.int/ 

General information http://www.nato.int/ifor/ifor.htm 

Fact Sheets http://www. nato. int/ifor/general/fact~. htm 

The GFAP http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-home.htm 

USAREUR HQs homepage http://www.hgusareur.army.mil/ 

Task Force Eagle's Homepage http://www.tfeagle.army.mil/ 

UN 

International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia 

http://www.un.org/icty/ 


Office of the High Representative http://www.ohr.int/ 


UN Security Council Resolutions 


qopher://gopher.undp.org/11 /undocs/scd/scouncil 

OSCE-Agreements http://www. fsk. ethz.ch/ osce/ docs/bosni a.htm 

Educational Resources on Bosnia 

http://www.law.vill.edu/vcilp/bosnia/bosurls.htm 

http://www.cco.caltech.edu/-bosnia/bosnia.html 

1 The product ofthe International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General's 

School, Charlottesville, Virginia. 

AppendixJ? 
UWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 457 


Acquisition Deskbook Homepage 


http://deskbook.wpafb.af.mil/deskbook/newletr.html 


AirForce 


Material Command www.afmc.wpafb.af.mil 


Publications http://farsite.hill.at.mil/vfaffarl. htm 


Air Power Journal http://www.cdsar.af.mil/apje.html 

ABA http://www.abanet.org 

Armed Forces Staff College http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/afsc/afsctop.html 

Army 

Acquisition http://acgnet.sarda.army.mil/ 

Homepage http://www.army.mil/ 

Material Command http://amc.citi.net/index.html 

Regulations http://www-usa ppc. hoffman .army. mil 

Field Manuals/TNG Cir./ Graphic TNG aids http://www.atscarmy.org/atdls.html 

Associated Press http://www1.trib.com/new/f listintro.html 

Association of the United States Army http://www.ausa.org/ 

Automated Historical Archives System http://leavwww.army.mil/akn/ahas.htm 

Battle Labs (TRADOC) http:/1157.185.5.3/DefaultBL.html 

Brookings Institution http://www.brook.edu/ 

Cable News Network 

http://www.cnn.com/ 

http://www.allpolitics.com/ (CNNfflME AllPolitics) 

Center for Army Lessons Learned http://call.army.mil:1100/call.html 

http://www.call.army.mil 

Center for Defense Information http://www.cdi.org/ 

Appendix R 
458 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Center for Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 

http://website.tamc.amedd.army.mil/ 

Center for Nonproliferation Studies http://cns.miis.edu/ 

Center for Strategic and International Studies http://www.csis.org/ 

Center for Strategic Leadership http://carlisle-www.army.army.mil.usacsl/ 

Central Intelligence Agency http://www.odci.gov/CIA 

Centre for Strategic Studies http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/ 

China News Digest http://www.cnd.org 

CNET http://www.cnet.com (a news and information service) 

Coast Guard www.dot.gov/dotinfo/uscg 

Code of Federal Regulations http://www.access.gpo.nara/cfr OR 

www.law.cornell.edu/regs.html 

College and University Home Pages 

http://www.mit.edu:80G ·; /people/cdemello/univ.html 

Combined Arms Research Library http://wwwcgsc.army.mil/cgsc/carl/carl.htm 

Commander's Conference http:/1204. 7 .227 .67 /force21 /confrnce/conftoc.html 

Comptroller General Decisions 

http://www.gao.gov/decisions/decision .html 

Conflict Studies Research Centre 

gopher.//marvin .stc. nato. int: 70/00/secdef /csrc/csrcma in.txt 

Congressional E-mail Directory 

http://www.webslingerz.com:80/jhoffma n/congress-e-mail. html 

AppendixR 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 459 


Congress 


gopher://gopher.senate.gov 


http://www.house.gov 


http://thomas.loc.gov 


Congressional Record http://www.access.gpo.gov/su docs 


Country Studies (DoS) http://www.access.gpo/su docs/aces820. html 


Court opinions 


http://www.mindsprinq.com/-wmunQylQQinions.html (11th Cir.) 


http://www.law.emorv.edu (includes decisions for 4th, 6th, and 11th 


Cir.) 


http://www.law.vill.edu (includes decisions for 3rd & 9th Cir.) 


Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces www.armfor.uscourts.gov 

Criminal Justice sites http://broadway.vera.org/pub/ocjsites.html 

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations (DFARS) www.dtic.mil/dfars 

See also Federal Acquisition Virtual Library, infra. 

Defense Financial Accounting System (DFAS) www.dfas.mil/ 

Defense Intelligence Agency http://www.dtic.dla.mil:BO/defenselink/ 

Defense Link http://www.dtic.dla.mil/defenselink 

Defense Technical Information Web http://www.dtic.dla.mil/dtiw/ 

Demining http://www.demininq.brtrc.com 

. Department of the Army Publications 

http://www-usappc.hoffman.armv.mil/ 

http://books.hoffman.army.mil/cgi-bin/bookmgr/Shelves 

Department of the Army Information Management Homepage 

http://www.aeaim.hgusareur.army.mil/ 

Department of Defense http://www.defenselink.mil/ 

Appendix R 
460. CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Department of Defense Directives and Instructions 


http://web7.whs.osd.mil/corres.htm 


http://web7.whs.osd.mil/ 


Table of DOD Directives with links 


http://web7.whs.osd.mil/dodiss/directives/direct2.htm 

Table of DOD Directives with links 

http://web7.whs.osd.mil/dodiss/directives/direct7.htm 

Department of National Defence http://www.dnd.ca/dnd.htm 

Department of Justice http://www.usdoj.gov 

Department of State http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:80/dosfan.html See also 

http://www.state.gov and gopher: dosfan.lib.uic.edu port 70 

Department of Treasury http://www.ustreas.gov 

Early Bird http://iiacsun1.army.mil/earlybrd/ 

Electronic Headquarters for the Acquisition of War Knowledge 

(EHAWK) http://www.olcommerce.com/cadre/index.html 

Embassies http://www.embassy.org 

Environmental Protection Agency http://www.epa.gov 

Europa http://www.cec.lu/ 


Eurpoean Line http://www.europeonline.com (provides latest info on 


events in europe) 


Executive Orders http://www2.whitehouse.gov/reguest=Executive0rder 

Federal Acquisition RegulatJons http://www.gsa.gov/far (includes FAR 

Circulars) 

Federal Acquisition Virtual Library 

http:/1159.142.1.21 O/References/References.html . 

Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) http://www.fbi.gov 

AppendixR 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 461 


Federal Communications Commission http://www.fcc.gov 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) http://www.fema.gov 

Federal Register http://www.access.qpo.gov/su docs/aces/aces/40.html 

FedWorld http://www.fedworld.gov/ - FedWorld (a one-stop location to 

locate/order USG documents) 

Fletcher Forum http://www.tufts.edu/fletcher/forum.html 

Force XXI http://204.7.227.67/f21 home.html 

Forces Command (FORSCOM) www.forscom.army.mil/jag 

Foreign Affairs http:l/www.enews.com:80magazines/foreign affairs 

Foreign Military Studies Office http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/fmso.htm 

Foreign Policy http://www.enews.com:BO/magazines/foreign policy 

France Defence http://www.ensmp.fr/-scherer/adminet/min/def/ 

General Accounting Office http://www.gao.gov 

GAO Comptroller General Decision · 

http://www.access.gpo.gov/su docs/aces/aces170.shtml?desc017.ht 

ml 

General Service Agency http:l/www.legal.qsa.gov (contains over 1,400 

site links) 

German Information Center http://langlab.uta.edu/langpages/GIC.html 

Government Printing Office (GPO) Access 

http://www.access.gpo.gov/su docs/aces/aaces001.html or 

http://thorplus.lib.purdue.edu/gpo/ 

Hoover Institution http://hoover.stanford.edu/ 

House National Security Committee 

http://policy.net/capweb/House/HComm/hns.html 

AppendixR 
462 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

House of Representatives http://www.house.gov/ 

Human Rights http://www.umn.edu/humanrts (Univ. Of Mn. Human Rights 

library) 

Industrial College of the Armed Forces 

http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/icaf/icafhp.html 

Information Warfare http://www.infowar.com 

Institute for National Strategic Studies 

http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/insshp.html 

Institute for the Advanced Study of Information Warfare 

http://www.psycom.net/iwar.1.html 

lntelWeb http://www.awpi.com/lntelWeb/ 

Intelligence Related links 

http://www.fas.org/pub/gen/fas/iro/intelwww.html 

Internal Revenue Service (IRS) http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/prodl 

International Committee of the Red Cross http://www.icrc.org 

International Court of Justice Opinions http://www.law.cornell.edu/icj/ or 

www.icj-cij.org/ 

International Criminal Tribunal For the Former Yugoslavia 

http://www.cij.org/tribunal 

or http://www.un.org/icty/ 

International Institute for Strategic Studies http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/dreok/fsk/iiss/iisshome.html 

International Laws and Treaties 

http://www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multilaterals/warfare.html 

gopher://qopher.peachnet.edu (Eastern European Info) 

http://solar.rtd.utk.edu/-nikforov/main.html (Russia legal info) 

http://www.jura.uni-sb.de (contains German & European codes) 

AppendixR 
LAWANDMJLITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 463 


·International Tribunal Resources 

http://jagor.srec.hr/-mprofaca/tribunal. html (includes Tokyo & 

Nuremburg) 

http://www.umn.edu/-vuksan/mario/tribunal.html 

International Organizations 

gopher://gopher.enews.com/11/magazines/alphabetic/all/iorg 

International Security 

gopher://gopher.enews.com/11 /magazines/alphabetic/all/int security 

International Security Network http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/dreok/fsk/defs horn.html 

Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/ 

JAG Homepage 

http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/jagcnet/jagcnetsite1 .nsf/webbody?openf 

orm 

Janes's Information Store http://www.janes.com/janes.html 

Joint Chiefs of Staff http://www.dtic.dla.mil:80/defenselink/jcs/ 

Joint Doctrine http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine 

Joint Electric Library (JEL) http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/index.html 

Joint Forces Q_uarterly http://www.dtic.mil/doctrineliel/jfg-pubs/index.htm 

Journal of Humanitarian Assistance http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk 

Joint Readiness Training Center http://www.jrtc-polk.army.mil 

Judge Advocate General Corps (Army) 

http:/1160.14 7 .194.13/jagcnet/jaqnetsite.nsf/?open 

Judicial sources http://www.yahoo.com/government/judicial branch 

Justice Information Center (NCJRS) http://www.ncjrs.org/drgs.docs.htm 

(drugs & crime Docs) 

Appendix R 
464 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Legal Research 

http://lawsearch.com/index.htm 

http://www.lawcrawler.com 

Legislative Information 

http: http://thomas.loc.gov 

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode (access to the U.S.C.) 

Library of Congress http://www.loc.gov/ 

http://lcweb.loc.gov/homepage/lchp.html 

http://thomas.loc.gov 

Marine Link http://www.usmc.mil or http://www.hgmc.usmc.mil 

Marshall Center http://www.marshall.adsn.int/marshall.html 

Military Spending Working Group http://www.clark.net/pub/gen/mswg/ 

MILNET http://www.onestep.com/milnet/ 

Ministry of Defense (U.K.) http://www.mod.uk/ 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs http://www.nttls.eo.jp/infomofa/ 

Multilateral Treaties gopher://gopher.law.cornell.edu/11 /foreign/fletcher 

National Archives and Records Administration http://www.nara.gov 

National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/ 

National Public Radio http://www.npr.org/ 

National Security Agency http://www.fas.org/pub/gen/fas/irp/nsa/ 

National Technical Information Service 

http://www.fedworld/gov/ntis/ntishome.html 

National War _College http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/nwc/nwchp.html 

NATO http://www.nato.int/ 

AppendixR 
LAWANDMIUTARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 465 


NavyOnline http://www.ncts.navv.mil/ 


Naval Postgraduate School http://www.nps.navv.mil/ 


Net Surfer Digest http://www.netsurf.com/nsd 


New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/ 


See also http://nytimesfax.com 

News Briefings from the ANC http://pantheon.cis.yale.edu/-jadwat/anc/ 

News http://www.leadstorv.com (summary of leadstories in major 

newspapers) 

OMRI (Open Media Research Institute) Daily Digest 

http://www.omri.cz/Publications/digests/digestindex.html 

Organization of American States http://www.oas.org/ 

Peacekeeping Institute http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usacsl/pki/pki. htm 

PERSCOM Homepage http://www-perscom.army.mil/ 

Personnel Command (Army) http://www-perscom.army.mil 

RAND Corporation http://www.rand.org/ 

Search tools http://www.lycos.com 

http://www2.infoseek.com 


http://www.excite.com 


http://www.altavista.digital.com 


http://www.yahoo.com 


http://www.mckinley.com 


http://www.pointcom.com 


Senate http://www.senate.gov 

Senate Armed Services Committee 

http://policy.net/capweb/Senate/SenateCom/ Armed. html 

Smithsonian Institution http://www.si.edu 

Appendix R 
466 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Social Security Administration http://www.ssa.gov 

Standards of Conduct http://www.dtic.mil/defenselink/dodgc/ 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 

http://www.sipri.se/ 

Strategic Studies Institute http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ 

Time Magazine http://www.pathfinder.com 

TRADOC http://www-tradoc.army.mil/ 

Treaties See United Nations 

Unified Commands 

http://www.dtic.dla.mi1:80/defenselink/unified.html 

http://www.acom.mil (ACOM) 

http://ustcweb.safb.af.mil/ustel.html (TRANSCOM) 

http:/1199.56.154.3/ (EUCOM) 

http://www.dtic.dla.mil/defenselink/factfile/chapter1/pacom.html 

(PACOM) 

http://www.dtic.dla.mil/defenselink/factfile/chapter1/southcom.html 

(SOUTHCOM) . 

http://www.dtic.dla.mil/defenselink/factfile/chapter1/centcom.html 

(CENTCOM) 

http://www.dtic.dla.mil/defenselink/factfile/chapter1/spacecom.html 

(SPACE COM) 

http://www.dtic.dla.mil/socom.mil (SOCOM) 

United Nations http://www.un.org/ 

http://www.un.org/cgi-bin/Treaty2.pl/ (provides direct access 

to the UN's Treaty data base) 

http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/pkrep.htm (UN PKOs) 

United Nations Scholars' Workstation 

http://www.library.yale.edu/un/unhom.htrn 

USAREUR, HQ FWD OJA (in support of IFOR) 

http:/1199.123.110.242/jaqhorne.htrn 

Appendix R 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSJNTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 467 

United States Agency for International Development 


http://www.info.usaid.gov 


U.S. Army Command and General Staff College http://leav­


www.army.mil/ 


United States Code (U.S.C.) 


http://www.law.cornel.edu/uscode 


http://law.house.gov/usc.htm 


U.S. Congress (Thomas) 

http://thomas.loc.gov/ 

http://law.house.gov (lots of hypertext links to other law homepages) 

U.S. Government (General) http://www.fedworld.gov 

U.S. Institute of Peace http://witloff.sjsu.edu/peace/usip.html 

U.S. Information Agency http://www.usia.gov 

U.S. Marine Corps: See MarineLink 

U.S. Military Academy http://www.usma.edu/ 

U.S. News & World Report http://www.usnews.com 

U.S. State Department http://www.state.gov/ 

U.S. Supreme Court Info http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/supct.table.html 

See also http://www.uscourts.gov 

USA Today http://www.usatoday.com/ 

Veterans Affairs http://www.va.gov 

Virtual law library http://www.law.indiana.edu/law/lawindex.html 

Voice of America http://niss.ac.uk/news/voiceofam.html 

Weather info http://www.nws.noaa.gov (Nat'I Weather Service) 

http://cirrus.sprl.umich.edu/wxnet 

AppendixR 
468 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Web Crawler http:/lwebcrawler.com/ 

West's Legal Directory http:/lwww.wld.com 

White House http:/lwww.whitehouse.gov/ 

Executive Orders 

http:/lwww2.whitehouse.gov/?reguest=Executive0rder 

World News Connection http:/lwnc.fedworld.gov/haroldkl/index.html 

Yahoo WWW Server http:/lwww.yahoo.com/Govemment/law 

AppendixR 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 469 


Appendix S: Key References 

REFERENCE LIST 

The following are recommended references for all Judge Advocates 

deploying to the Balkans. These references are in addition to those 

requiredfor specific legal disciplines (Claims, Legal Assistance, etc.): 

1. 	 Operational Law Handbook (JA 422), 1998 Ed. 

2. 	 UN Charter, Chap. VII. 

3. 	 UN Resolution 1031. 

4. 	 The General Framework Agreement (for Peace) (GFAP), (Dayton 

Accord) 15 December 1995. 

5. 	 The Agreement on Confidence and Security Building Measures in 

Bosnia and Herzegovina, (Vienna) 31 January 1996. 

6. 	 The Agreement on Sub-~egional Arms Control, (Florence) 18 June 

1996. 

7. 	 The Agreements of the Peace Implementation Council, (London) 

December 1996 and 1997. 

8. 	 The Sintra (Portugal) Declaration of the Peace Implementation Council 

Steering Board, 30 May 1997. 

9. COMSFOR's Instructions to the Parties, as amended. 

10.SFOR SOPs 3400, as amended, and 3110. 

11.The Task Force Eagle Joint Military Commission Policy and Planning 

Guidance Handbook, 51t1 Edition, 12 January 1998. 

12.The MND(N) Cantonment Sites Compliance SOP, 2"d Edition, 2 October 

1997. 

. Appendix S 
470 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


13.JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, 16 June 1997 (with 

accompanying CD-ROM). 

14.Legal Guide to Peace Operations, 1May1998 (US Army Peacekeeping 

Institute). 

15.JAGC LAAWS CD-ROM, September 1998. 

16. FM 100-23, Peace Ooerations, December 1994. 

Appendix S 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 471 


Appendix T: Glossary of Terms 


Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA)-Agroomonts 

between governments for acquisitions and for mutual logistics support. 

Allows reimbursement of supplies and services in kind, cash or trndo of 

support, services or supplies of equal value. Authority lies In Tltlo 10 

U.S.C. Subchapter 138. 

A CU-Area Common User telephone system. A secure network of 

multichannel radios and automatic switchboards used In the division ond 

corps areas and extending down to major subordinate commands. 

Currently, MSE fulfills this requirement at division level. 

Administrative/Logistics Order-Sets forth the plan for tho combnt 

service support of the command during a combat operation or manouvor. 

AfterAction Review (AAR)-A retrospective examination of tho conduct 

of an action and thosE:1 issues arising therein. Conducted In Socratic 

method, with a view toward improving future performance. 

Air Liaison Officer (ALO) -Air Force officer who advises Army command 

and staff on capabilities, limitations, and employment of tactical air 

operations. 

Administration-Logistics Operations Center (ALOC)-This is whoro 

supply, maintenance, and personnel actions in a brigade are planned and 

coordinated. The logistics officer (S-4) and adjutant (S-1) share the ALOC. 

Allied Rapid Reaction Corps {ARRC)-This was the operational . 

headquarters between Task Force Eagle and IFOR. This headquarters 

was removed when IFOR became SFOR. 

ANGLICO-Marine Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company 

Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C 2)-The effort nf:cs::r:..~arJ to 

coordinate airspace use for concurrent employment of muttiple aircraft and 

weapons systems. 

Attachment-Temporary assignment of a force to another h~her 

headquarters. Along with tactical control, the new command~ mu~1 in~ure 

full logistical support for the attachment 

Appendix T 
472 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) -Seven distinct functions 

recognized as those which the Army must perform in order to accomplish 

the military objective: 

- Command and Control (Battle Command) 

. - Maneuver 

- Intelligence 

- Fire Support 

- Mobility and Survivability 

- Air Defense 

- Combat Service Support (Logistics) 

Battle Task-a mission essential task which is critical to the next higher 

organization's performance of its own mission essential task. 

Bosnia and Herzegovina-A picturesque, mountainous country located in 

the heart of Europe. It has a total land area of approximately 20,000 

square miles and its traditional borders, established in medieval times, are 

the Sava River on the north, the Drina River on the east and southeast, and 

the Dinaric Alps on the west. Its capital city is Sarajevo, and its 

southwestern region (around the town of Mostar) is known as Herzegovina 

("the Duchy"). 

Brigade Support Area (BSA)-The center of logistical services and 

supplies for a brigade. 

Brown and Root Services Corporation (B&R)-An American corporation 

and U.S. Government contractor. The largest government contractor in the 

Balkans. 

Button-up-Close the hatches on an armored vehicle. Generally, vision is 

greatly limited when the hatches are closed. 

C-Day-The unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins. For 

Operation Joint Endeavor it was 2 December 1995. 

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)-Collects and disseminates 

lessons learned from real-world army operations and from rotations at the 

Combat Training Centers. 

Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO)-Center established 

to collect, analyze, and disseminate judge advocate lessons learned from 

real-world military legal operations (See inside front cover of this book). 

Appendix T 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 473 


Chain of Command-Pre-established organization consisting of 

subordinate leaders bearing the title of commander and having analogous 

responsibility for their units. 

Circular Error Probable (CEP)-An indicator of the delivery accuracy of a 

weapon system, used as a factor in determining probable damage to a 

target. It is the radius of a circle within which half of the projectiles are 

expected to fall. This factor, along wi~h bursting radius of a particular 

projectile, is key in determining the lawfulness of targeting decisions. 

Civil Affairs-The area of operations which concerns the interaction 

between military operations and the civilian populace. Responsibility in this 

functional area usually falls to the G-5 (a special staff assistant to the 

commander) and the Staff Judge Advocate. 

Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC)-The Army's European CTC 

for maneuver located in Hohenfels, Germany. 

Combat Decision-Making Process-An expedited decision-making 

process during operations. Allows staffs to amend decisions after 

operations commence 

Combat Training Center {CTC)-Specially designed training facilities 

where military units engage in collective train.ing. They include NTC, JRTC, 

CMTC and BCTP. Typically, brigade- or battalion-sized elements deploy 

and train as a unit under strictly controlled conditions. 

Combined Arms Assessment Team (CAA T)-A team of subject matter 

experts from all the TRADOC schools that observes and collects lessons 

learned for CALL. 

Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise (CALFEX)-A training mission 

involving the integration of all direct fire, indirect fire, Army aviation, and Air 

Force close air support. 

Combined Operations-Operations involving the military forces of two or 

more nations acting in concert. 

Command Post (CP)-A facility employed by a commander to command 

and control operations 

Appendix T 
474 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 

Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR}-Criteria which 

identify that information which is so crucial to the commander's decision 

making process that its exclusion might seriously affect the likelihood of 

success in an operation. 

Commander's Estimat&-Step in the decision making process which 

incorporates METI-T, commander's knowledge, and staff estimates. 

Company team-A combined arms organization of tank and mechanized 

infantry platoons under a tank or mechanized infantry headquarters. 

Coordinating StaffGroup-The principal assistants to the commander, 

consisting of the S1 - SS at Battalion and Brigade levels (G1 - GS at 

Division and Corps levels). Together, they coordinate the plans, activities 

and operations of the command. 

Concept-One of the final stages of the decision-making process, this is 

how the commander visualizes the conduct of the operation. 

Cross-attachment-The exchange of one or more mechanized infantry 


platoons from a mechanized infantry company for one or more tank 


platoons from a tank company. 


CS-a riot control chemical agent (RCA) creating acrid fumes which affect 

the respiratory tract and exposed skin surfaces. CS causes tears, skin 

irritation, and possibly nausea. It is also used as a chemical warfare 

training aid by U.S. forces. 

Combat Service Support (CSS}-Combat service support; supply, 

personnel administration, maintenance and medical services. 

Contingency Plan (CONPLAN}-A plan for using military forces in an 


emergency caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by 


required military operations. 


Deep Attack-Attack characterized by long-range attacks focused on 

specific enemy regiments or other priority targets. Usually accomplished by 

Army attack helicopters, Air Force Close Air Support, and long-range 

. artillery. 

Deliberate Decision-making Process (DDP}-The classic military 


decision-making process, characterized by elaborate staff/command 


Appendix T 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 475 

. interaction resulting in the formulation and execution of operations plans or 

orders. 

Deputy Fire Support Coordinator (DFSCOORD)-The assistant fire 

support coordinator. Serves as member of fire support element and 

targeting cell. 

Direct Support (DS)-This relationship requires one support unit 

(engineers, field artillery, e.g.) to furnish priority support to a designated 

unit. A direct support unit responds to the needs of this single element, 

rather than to the force as a whole. 

Displacement-Planned movements of segments or entirety of units in 

order to increase security and avoid detection. Usually referred to as 

ujumping." 

Division-The largest integrated Army unit that trains and fights as a unit. 

Commanded by a major general, a division typically consists of 

approximately 14,000 troops, has three maneuver brigades and support 

elements allowing it to exist, train and fight on its own. · 

Division Main Command Post (D-Main)-The division's main command 

post - See TOC. The D-MAIN normally plans and coordinates future 

operations (and "deep" or strategic operations). 

Division Rear Command Post (D-Rear)- The division's equivalent of an 

Administrative-Logistics Operations Center (ALOC). 

Division Tactical Command Post(D-TAC) or Assault Command Post 

(ACP)-The forward division command post. The D-TAC normally controls 

current operations (the close-in, tactical operations). 

Engagement Area (EA)-An targeted area in which the commander 

intends to trap and destroy a force with the massed fires of all available 

weapons. 

-

Enhanced Position Location Reporting System-Computer-based 

communications system designed to provide secure, jam-resistant 

contention-free, data transmission and distribution. 

Estimates-·Prepared by the coordinating staff officers in reliance upon the 

restated mission and any planning guidance, estimates reflect an 

Appendix T 
476 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


interactive dynamic process which analyzes relevant factors and their effect 

on potential courses of action. 

Family ofScatterable Mines (FASCAM)-Encompasses all selfdestructing mines designated for quick emplacement in front, to the flanks, 

the rear, or on top of advancing enemy forces 

Fire Support Team (FIST}-The artillery forward observers/fire planners 

sent over to direct artillery, mortars, and close air support for infantry and 

armored companies. 

Fire Support Element (FSE)-Functional element of TOC providing 

centralized targeting, coordination, and integration of fires. 

Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD)-The senior field artillery officer at 

each echelon above maneuver platoon who serves as the principal advisor 

to the commander for the planning and coordination of all available fire 

support. 

Foreign Claims Act (FCA)-Legislation at 10 USC 2734 as amended, 

included in AR 27-20, which authorizes payments by the United States in 

local currency to inhabitants of foreign countries for personal injury, death, 

or property loss caused by United States military personnel outside the 

United States. 

Former Warring Factions (FWFs)-The forces of the Bosnian Serbs, 

Bosnian Muslims, and Croatian National factions. 

Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP)-A temporary facility that. 

provides fuel and ammunition for combat aviation {helicopters). 

Fragmentary Order (FRAGO)-An abbreviated operations order, which 

supplements (or changes) instructions to a current operations order while 

the operation is in progress. 

G-Day-The day when the deployment of the main body of the IFOR 

commenced (16 December 1995). 

General Support (GS)-A command relationship requiring one support 

unit to respond to the force as a whole. A GS unit has the flexibility to 

provide support to the needs of several units or the requests of the 

supported commander. 

Appendix T 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 477 


General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP)-The official title of 

the Bosnian Peace Plan negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, and signed in Paris. 

Also called the "Dayton Accord." 

Global Positioning System (GPS)-Navigational system used to pinpoint 

present location, routes to desired locations and routes of return. The 

system receives signals transmitted by satellites. 

High Payoff Target List (HPTL)-A list of set targets, the attack of which 

would contribute substantially to the success of the mission. The list is 

assembled by the targeting cell and submitted to the Chief of Staff. 

High Value Target List (HVTL)-A precursor to the HPTL. These are 

targets identified by the targeting cell of which loss to the enemy could be 

expected to substantially degrade one of more of his battlefield operating 

systems. 

/FOR-Implementation Force. The military force that originally had the 

mission of enforcing the GFAP. 

/MA-Individual Mobilization Augmentee. Members of the Reserve 

Component, usually the USAR, who are called to active duty to augment 

active forces. 

Individual Deployment Site Battalion (IDSB)-Organization for 

processing soldiers through the Fort Benning deployment station. 

- Intermediate Staging Base (ISB)-Area in which units assemble prior to 

deployment. Final preparations, such as equipment maintenance, and 

logistic disbursement are usually performed here in preparation for 

operations. USAREUR has an ISB in Hungary. 

International Police Task Force (IPTF)-UN organization established to 

monitor and train police in the Balkans. 

/RT--lndividual Replacement Training. Course of training conducted to 

prepare personnel for entry into the Bosnian Theater of Operations. 

Joint Commission Officer (JCO)-An impartial officer who ensures that 

all sides understand and enforce the GFAP. 

Appendix T 
478 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 


Joint Endeavor (OJE)- IFOR Operations in the Balkans (from 


20 Dec 95 - 20 Dec 96). 


Joint Forge (OJF)- Current SFOR Operations in the Balkans (from 


20 Jun 98 - Present). 


Joint Guard (OJG)- SFOR Operations in the Balkans (from 20 Dec 96 ­

20 Jun 98) . 

. 

Joint Military Commission (JMC)-A forum for coordination of effort 

between military leaders of the Former Warring Factions and IFOR/SFOR. 

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)-Army CTC for maneuver 


focusing on light forces, low-to-mid intensity conflict, and joint training. 


Located at Fort Polk, Louisiana. 


Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)-Multivolume publication that details a coordinated Joint Staff Procedure by 

which a commander in Chief of a Combatant Command determines the 

best method to complete assigned tasks and to direct actions necessary for 

mission accomplishment. 

Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS)-Joint system 

used by Army Air Defense Artillery and the Air Fore~ which distributes 

encrypted information at high rates and is resistant to jamming in a hostile 

. electromagnetic environment. 

Liaison Control Element (LCE)-A special operations detachment used 


to establish links with multinational forces and assist with their integration 


into TF Eagle. 


Live Fire Training (LFT}-Live ammunition is used, usually against 


automated targets. 


Liaison Officers (LNOs)-Representatives of the commander at other 


headquarters. 


Listening Posts (LPs)-Listening posts; usually u·sed at night. 

LOGSTAT--Logistical Statistics Report provided by the S-4. The 


LOGSTAT normally contains statisitcs on status of all supply. 


Appendix T 

LAW AND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 479 


Low-Intensity Conflict-Political-military conflict between contending 

states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful 

competition amongst states. It frequently involves protracted struggles over 

competing principles or ideologies and may range from aid and assistance 

to an allied government to full combat operations against a hostile force. 

LTL-Less Than Lethal. Category of weapons employed with the intent to 

compel or deter adversaries by acting on human capabilities or materiel 

while minimizing fatalities and damage to equipment or facilities. Also 

known as Nonlethal Capabilities. 

Mechanized-U.S. infantry units that employ armored personnel carriers or 

combat fighting vehicles to convey troops. 

METT-TC-Six factors considered by U.S. commanders in the military 

decision-making process. They are: mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time 

available and civilians. The change from METI-T (the inclusion of 

civilians), represents the trend toward OOTW. 

Mid-Intensity Conflict (MIC)-armed confrontations against conventional 

regular armed forces of hostile regional powers. 

Mission Analysis-The second stage of the decision-making process. At 

this stage the commander performs a formal analysis of the situation to 

determine what requirements exists. Tasks are identified, a purpose is 

determined, and a time scheduled is established. 

Mission Essential Task List (METL)-Because a unit cannot achieve 

and sustain proficiency in every possible training task, units formulate those 

tasks upon which they will concentrate in order to accomplish the mission. 

The METL is this list. 

Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP)-The use of chemical 

protective overgarments including mask, suit, gloves, and boots in various 

combinations as dictated by weather and combat conditions. 

MSE-Mobile Subscriber Equipment. U.S. military tactical phone system. 

Multi-National Divisions (MNDs)-The main peacekeeping forces in the 

Balkans, each composed of forces from several Nations. IFOR and SFOR 

both had 3 MNDs - MND-N (with a U.S. HQ), MND-SE (with a French HQ), 

and MND-SW (with a UK HQ 

Appendix T 
480 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Mu/ti-National Divisions (North) (MND-N, a.k.a. Task Force Eagle)-The 

multinational division for the North Sector of SFOR's AOR. This division 

has a U.S. HQ, and forces from the U.S., Russia, Turkey, Norway, Sweden, 

Denmark and Poland. 

NA TO- The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its subsidiary bodies, its 

military Headquarters and all its constituent national elements/units acting 

in support of, preparing and participating in the Operation. 

Observer-Controllers (OCs)-Personnel who observe and train units 

during rotations to the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). 

Observation Post (OP)-A position from which military observations 

(visual, audible, or other means) are made, or fire is directed and adjusted, 

and that possesses appropriate communications; it may also be airborne. 

Operational Control (OPCON)-Command relationship in which a 

subordinate unit is placed under another headquarters for tactical orders 

only. The parent formation retains supply and administrative responsibility. 

Operations Order (OPORD)-A five-paragraph document giving 

subordinate commanders the essential information needed to carry out an 

operation. The order consists of the situation, mission, commander's 

concept of the operation, assignment of tasks, and support to be provided. 

Operations Plan (OPLAN)-The operation plan is developed by the staff 

in response to guidance from the commander, specifying that at a particular 

time or under certain conditions the OPLAN will be issued as an Operations 

Order. 

Phase Lines (PL)-A line used for control and coordination of military 

operations. It is usually a recognizable terrain feature extending across the 

zone of action. Units usually report crossing phase lines, but do not halt 

unless specifically directed. Phase lines are often used to prescribe the 

timing of delay operations. Designated on map by PL followed by name 

(e.g., PL DEL TA). 

Planning Guidance-After the commander restates the mission in the 

decision-making process, he may provide staff members with guidance as 

necessary at this stage or any other of the process. 

Appendix T 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 481 

Preci$ion Lightweight Global Positioning System Receiver (PLGR)­

Hand-held navigational unit which receives signals from pre-positioned 

satellites, enabling the user to determine present location, and routes 

(pronounced "plugger"). 

Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)-Commander's stated priorities 

for intelligence to be used in planning and decision making; PIR are 

frequently disseminated in OPLANs and OPORDs. 

Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)-A planned psychological activity in 

peace and war directed toward the enemy, friendly, and neutral audiences, 

in order to create attitudes and behavior favorable to the achievement of 

political and military objectives. 

"Pull" Logistics-The use of requests to supply centers, followed by pickup of requested supplies by the acquiring unit. 

''Push" Logistics-also called "Logpacks," the assembly of ready-made 

collections of food, fuel, and ammunition, brought forward to fighting units 

by escorted convey under battalion task force supervision. 

Receipt ofMission-The initial stage of the decision-making process, 

when information is received from higher headquarters or deduced by a 

commander from circumstances. 

Restated Mission-The third step of the decision-making process 

following the mission analysis. At this stage, the commander reforms the 

mission based upon his analysis of the facts at hand. 

Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG)-A man-portable weapon; usually an 

antitank weapon. 

Rules ofEngagement (ROE)-Directives issued by competent authority 

that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States 

forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces 

encountered. 

S-1-Adjutant; personnel officer (G-1 at Division and Corps). 

S-2-lntelligence officer (G-2 at Division and Corps). 

S-3-0perations officer (G-3 at Division and Corps). 

Appendix T 
482 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

S-4--Logistics officer (G-4 at Division and Corps). 

Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS)­

secure voice and data transmission radio system featuring frequencyhopping technique which decreases risk of signal degradation. 

Special Forces-Specifically organized, trained, and equipped units which 

conduct all of the principal special operations missions and collateral 

activities. 

Special Staff Group-Assists the commander in professional, technical 

and other functional areas. Members prepare plans, orders and reports 

and also supervise their own staff sections, providing input to the 

commander on the level of training throughout the command. This staff is 

frequently composed of the JA, IG, PAO, Chaplain, Finance Officer and 

Surgeon. 

Stabilization Force (SFOR)-The military force with the mission of 

enforcing the GFAP. 

StaffEstimate-Report preoared by a staff member which involves 

analysis of relevant informat:cri for developing, within the time limits and 

available information, the best solution to a problem. 

Standardized Integrated Command Post System (SICPS)-Pronounced 

"sic-ups." These are a family of CP tents, most common being the 11'x11' 

tent with interchangeable side walls, any of which can be removed for 

combining two or more tents or systems. 

Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)-These are standing orders that 

prescribe routine methods t.:. oe followed in operations. An SOP usually 

expedites actions as it establishes set procedures to be employed upon the 

occurrence of events. 

Suppression ofEnemy Air Defenses (SEAD)-That activity that 

neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades enemy air defense systems. 

Tactical Assembly Area (TAA)-Area in which force prepares or regroups 

for further action. 

Appendix T 

LAW AND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 483 

Tactical Operations Center (TOC)-command Post where combat 

operations are planned and controlled. Operations, intelligence and fire 

support cells comprise the TOC, along with affiliated communications and 

security elements. The Operations Officer (S-3) is responsible for internal 

TOC structure and function. The Headquarters Commandant is 

responsible for moving and securing the TOC. 

Tactical Satellite Radios (TACSA 7)-Secure, single-channel, satellite 

radios which provide highly mobile and flexible transmission links. 

Task Force Eagle (TFE)-See Multi-National Division (North) (MND-N) 

Team-A portion of an infantry squad, or a company-sized combined arms 

organization. 

Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL)-Part of the joint 

operations plan, identifies types of units and actual units required to 

support the plan and indicates the origin of those units, their points of 

debarkation or their ocean area of operation. It also established the 

sequence in which units deploy relative to other forces. The list is 

generated from a database known as the TPFDD. 

TOW-Tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided antitank missile. 

Trains-Logistic facilities. At each progressive level, the logistic facility 

grows larger and becomes less mobile. 

Troop list-A list of all subordinate units, assigned, attached, or under the 

operational control of the unit that will participate in the BCTP exer~ise. 

Unified Command-Military command composed of forces from two or 

more military departments, usually with broad continuing missions. 

Warning Order-Gives preliminary notice of actions or orders that are to 

follow. Its purpose is to provide maximum preparation time. 

Appendix T 
484 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


Appendix U: Acronyms 


AA 

AAA 

AACG 

AAFES 

AAR 

ABCT 

AC 

ACE 

ACIU 

ACS 

ACSA 

ACSRM 

ACT ORD 

ACTREQ 

AD 

ADAMS 

ADC 

ADCATT 

ADCON 

ADC-S 

ADCSOPS 

ADCSPER 

ADP 

ADSW 

ADT 

AE 

AETCAE 

AFBiH 

AFCS 

AFEB 

AFN 

AFPEO 

AFRC 

AFRTS 

AFSOF 

AF SOUTH 

AGCCS 

AGR 

acquisition arrangement 

Army Audit Agency 

arrival airfield control group 

Army and Air Force Exchange Service 

after action review 

airborne combat team 

active component 

Allied Command Europe; analysis and control element; 

air combat element; assistant corps engineer 

allied counterintelligence unit 

Army Community Service 

acquisition cross servicing agreements 

assistant chief of staff, resource management 

activation order 

activation request 

armored division 

Allied Deployment and Movement System 

assistant division commander 

Air Defense Combined Arms Tactical Trainer 

administrative control 

assistant division commander, support 

assistant deputy chief of staff, operations 

assistant deputy chief of staff, personnel 

automated data processing 

active duty, special work 

active duty for training 

aerial exploitation 

Army Europe Technical Control and Analysis Element 

Bosnia-Herzegovina 

Army Facilities Components System 

Award Fee Evaluation Board 

Armed Forces Network 

Armed Forces Professional Entertainment Office 

Armed Forces Recreation Center 

Armed Forces Radio and Television Service 

(U.S.) Air Force Special Operation Forces 

Allied Forces Southern Europe 

Army Global Command and Control System 

Active Guard and Reserve · 

Appendix U 
LAW AND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 485 


AHA ammunition holding area 

ALO authorized level of organization 

AMC Army Materiel Command; Air Mobility Command 

AMCC ACE Movement Control Center 

AMEDCOM Army Medical Command 

AME DD 

AMF(L) 

AM MAD 

AMOPEs· 

AMRMC 

AMT 

AO 

AOC 

AOCG 

AOR 

APOD 

APOE 

AR94 

AR COM 

AR FOR 

ARI 

ARL 

ARNG 

ARRC 

ARSOF 

ASCC 

ASG 

ASL 

ASP 

AT 

ATAF 

ATC 

ATM 

ATMCT 

ATP 

AUEL 

AVIM 

AVLB 

AVUM 

AWE 

Army Medical Department 

ACE Mobile Force Land 

anti-magnetic mine activating device 

Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution 

System 

Army Medical Research and Materiel Command 

Aerial Mail Terminal 

area of operations 

air operations center 

airlift operations coordination group 

area of responsibility 

aerial port of debarkation 

aerial port of embarkation 

Atlantic Resolve 94 

Army Reserve Command 

army forces 

aviation restructure initiative 

aerial reconnaissance low 

Army National Guard 

Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. TF Eagle's operational higher 

headquarters. 

Army Special Operations Forces (U.S.) 

Army service component command 

area support group 

authorized stockage list 

ammunition supply point 

annual training 

allied tactical air force 

army training center 

air tasking message 

air terminal movement control team 

ammunition transfer point 

automated unit equipment list 

aviation intermediate mai~tenance. 

armored vehicle launched bridge 

aviation unit maintenance 

Advanced Warfighting Experiment 

Appendix U 
486 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


AWN 

AWR 

BAC 

BAS OPS 

BBPC&T 

BBPT 

BBT 

BCCA 

BCT 

BCTP 

BOU 

B-H 

BMCT 

BOS 

BOSS 

BRSC 

BSB 

C2 

C3 

C31 

C4 

C41 

CA 

CAAT 

CALL 

CAOC 

CAPS 

CAT 

CATT 

CAX 

CBS 

CCA 

CCIR 

CCIRM 

Automated Weather Network 


Army War Reserve 


Brcko Arbitration Commission 


base operations support 


blocking, bracing, packing, crating, and tiedown 


Better Business Practices Team 


blocking, bracing and tiedown 


· Base Camp Construction Agency 

brigade combat team 

Battle Command Training Program 

battle dress uniform 

Bosnia-Herzegovina 

branch movement control team 

battlefield operating system 

better opportunities for single soldiers 

Brown & Root Services Corporation 

base support battalion 

command and control 

command, control and communications 

command, control, communications, and intelligence 

command, control, communications, and computers 

command, control, communication, computers, intelligence 

civil affairs 

combined arms assessment team. A team of subject matter 

experts from all the TRADOC schools that observes and 

collects lessons learned for CALL. 

Center for Army Lessons Learned. An organization based at 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, that gathers observations, 

lessons learned, and recommendations from ongoing training 

events and Army operations around the world. 

combined air operations center 

Commercial Accounts Payable System 

crisis action team 

combined arms tactical trainer 

crimputer assisted exercise 

Corps Battle Simulation (System) 

Contingency Construction Agency 

commander's critical information requirements 

collection coordination intelligence requirements 

management 

Appendix U 
LAW AND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 487 


· COAT civil disturbance assessment team 

C-DA Y The unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins. 

For OJE it was 2 December 1995. 


CEGE Combat Equipment Group, Europe 


CETAE Army Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Program Center, 


Europe 

CEWI combat electronic warfare intelligence 

CHE container handling equipment 

CHOP change of operational control 

Cl counterintelligence 

CIF central issue facility 

CIMIC civil military information center 

CINC commander in chief 

CINCEUCOM Commander in Chief, U. S. Europen Command 

CINCSOUTH Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe 

CINCUSAREUR Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Europe 

CINCUSNAVEUR Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy Europe 

CJCCC combined joint communications control center 

CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.) 

CJTF combined joint task force 

CMS Capacity Management Board 

CMMC corps materiel management center 

CMTC combat maneuver training· center 

COA course of action 

COCOM combatant command 

COG Chief, Operations Group, 7th ATC 

COMAIRSOUTH Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Region 

COMARRC Commander, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. 

COMEAGLE Commander, Task Force Eagle. 

COMEX communications exercise 

COMFJVEATAF Commander, Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force 

COMIFOR Commander, Implementation Force 

COMINT communications intelligence 

COMLANDCENT Commander, Land Forces, Central Command 

COMMZ communications zone 

COMNAVSOUTH Commander, Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe 

COMPASS Computerized Movement Planning and Status System. 

COMSEC communications security 

CONOPS contingency operations 

CONUS. Continental United States 

COR contracting officer's representative- concept of requirements 

COSCOM corps support command 

Appendix U 
488 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


COTS commercial-off-the-shelf 

CPX command post exercise 

CR Central Region (NATO) 

CRC CONUS Replacement Center 

CREST contingency real estate support team 

CS combat support 

CSA Chief of Staff, U.S. Army 

CSB corps support battalion 

CSC convoy support centers; combat stress control 

CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

CSG corps suppon group 

CSH combat support hospital 

CSS combat service support 

CSSAMO CSS Automation Management Office 

CSSCS CSS Control System 

CSSSTAMIS CSS Standard Army Management Information Systems 

CSSTSS CSS Training Simulation System 

C-SPT commander for support 

CST chaplain support team 

CTC combat training center 

CTF combined task force 

DA Department of the Army 

DAC Department of the Army Civilian 

DACG departure airfield control group 

DAMMS-R Department of the Army Movements Management System 

Redesign 

DBB Deutsches Bundesbahn 

DBOF Defense Business Operations Fund 

DCA director of community support 

DCAA Defense Comra:::t Audit Agency 

DCG deputy commanding general 

DCGUSAREUR Deputy Commanding General, USAREUR 

DCINC deputy commander in chief 

DCINCEUCOM Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. European 

Command 

DCMC-1 Defense Contract Management Command, Internal 

DCPDS Defense Civilian Personnel Data System 

DCSHNA deputy chief of staff, host nation affairs 

DCSIM deputy chief of staff, information management 

DCSINT deputy chief of staff, intelligence 

DCSLOG deputy chief of staff, logistics 

Appendix U 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS INTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 489 


DCSOPS 


DCSPER 


DCSRM 


D-DAY 


DORE 

DEPEX 

DEPLOYEX 

DER OS 

DFAS 

DFRE 

DFSC 

OHS 

DISA 

DISCOM 

OISE 

DJMS 

DJ MS-AC 

DJMS-RC 

DLA 

OMA 

DMMC 

DNZ 

DOC 

DOD 

DODAAC 

OOPS 

DOS 

DOT 

DPA 

DPSC-E 

OS 

DSG 

DSN 

DSU 

DTLOMS 

OTO 

DTRACS 

DTS 

OTIS 

deputy chief staff, operations 


deputy chief of staff, personnel 


deputy chief of staff, resource management 


The unnamed day on which operations commence or are 


scheduled to commence. For OJE it was 20 December 


1995. 

Defense Depot Region East 


deployment exercise 


deployment exercise 


date of estimated return from overseas 


Defense Finance and Accounting Service 


Defense Fuel Region, Europe 


Defense Fuel Supply Center 


Defense HUMINT Service 


Defense Information Systems Agency 


division support command 


deployable intelligence support element 


Defense Joint Military Pay System 


Defense Joint Military System, Active Component 


Defense Joint Military System, Reserve Component 


Defense Logistics Agency 


Defense Mapping Agency 


division materiel management center 


National Democratic Unoin 


division operations center 


Oepartment of Defense 


Department of Defense activity address code 


Disbursing Operations Processing System 


Department of State; days of supply 


Director of Training 


Dayton Peace Agreement 


Defense Personnel Support Center, Europe 


direct support 


deployment control group 


Defense Switched Network 


direct support unit 


doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel, 

and soldier considerations 

division transportation office 

Defense Transportation Tracking System 

Defense Transportation System 

Defense Transportation Tracking Sys~em · 

Appendix U 
490 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


DUIC 


DX 


EAC 

EAD 

EAF 

EC 

ECHO 

ECOMOG 

ECWCS 

EDD 

ELINT 

ENCOM 

ERF 

ERMC 

ET RAC 

EU 

EUAM 

EW 

EXEVAL 

EX ORD 

FAA 

FAC 

FACEX 

FACNET 

FAR 

FARA 

FASA 

FB 

FBS 

FCX 

FIN COM 

FIP 

FISTEX 

FLE 

FMD 

FOB 

FOO 

FORSCOM 

FP 

derivative unit identification code 


direct exchange 


echelons above corps 

echelons above division 

Entity Armed Forces 

European Community 

European Community Health Organization 

Economic Community of West African States Military 

Observer Group 

Extended Cold Weather Clothing System 

explosives detector dog 

electronics intelligence 

Engineer Command 

European Redistribution Facility 

European Regional Medical Command 

Enhanced Tactical Radar Correlator 

European Union 

European Union Administration of Mostar 

electronic warfare 

external evaluation 

execution order 

functional area assessment 

family assistance center 

family assistance center exercise 

Federal Acquisition Network 

Federal Acquisition Regulation 

Federal Acquisition Reform Act 

Federal Acquisition Streamlining Acts 

finance battalion 

Finance Battlefield System 

fire coordination exercise 

finance command 

Facilities Improvement Program 

fire support team exercise. 

forward logistics element 

Force Modernization Division 

forward operations base 

field ordering officer 

U.S. Army Forces Command 

force protection 

Appendix U 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS.1995-1998 491 


FPIR 

FRAGO 

FRY 

FSB 

FSE 

FSG 

FSOP 

FSS 

FST 

FSTE 

FTX 

FWF 

FY 

FYROM 

GAO 

GCCS 

GCSS 

G-Day 

GDP 

GDS 

GFAP 

GOCOM 

GP 

GRA 

GS 

GSR 

GSU 

GTN 

GTA 

HAST 

HCA 

HDZ 

HET 

HMMVW 

HN 

HNS 

Force Protection Information Report 

fragmentary order 

Former Republic of Yugoslavia 

forward support battalion 

forward support element; forward surgical element 

family support group 

field standing operating procedures 

Family Support System 

forward surgical team 

foreign service tour extension 

field training exercise 

Former Warring Factions. The forces of the Bosnian Serbs, 

Bosnian Muslims, and Croatian National factions. 

fiscal year: former Yugoslavia 

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 

General Accounting Office 

Global Command and Control System 

Guardrail Common Sensor System 

The day (16 December 1995) when the deployment of the 

main body of the IFOR commenced. 

general defense plan 

Civic Democratic Party 

General Framework Agreement for Peace. The official title of 

the Bosnian peace plan brokered in Dayton, Ohio, and signed 

in Paris. Also referred to as 'The Agreement." · 

General Officer Command 

German Police 

government relations advisor 

general support 

ground surveillance radar 

Garrison Support Unit 

Global Transportation Network 

Grafenwoehr Training Area 

humanitarian assistance survey team 

Head of Contracting Agency 

Croatian Democratic Union (political party) 

heavy equipment transporter 

high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle 

host nation 

host nation support 

AppendixU 

492 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


HQ 

HSS-BH 

HUM INT 

HVO 

IA 

IATS 

IAW 

ICFY 

ICTY 

ICRC 

ID 

IDA 

IDNX 

IDSB 

IEBL 

IEW 

IFBS 

IFOB 

IFOR 

IFRC 

IFSTE 

IG 

IGNET 

ILAP 

IMA 

INMARSAT 

IMINT 

IPB 

IPR 

IPTF 

IRACO 

IRR 

IRS 

IRT 

ISB 

ISM 

ITV 

headquarters 


Croatian Peasant Party BH 


human intelligence 


Croatian Defense Council 


implementing agreements 

Integrated Army Travel System 

in accordance with 

International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia 

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 

International Confederation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 

infantry division 

Institute for Defense Analyses 

Integrated Digital Network Exchange 

individual deployment site battalion. Organization for 

processing soldiers through the Fort Benning deployment 

station. 

Inter-Entity Boundary Line 

intelligence electronic warfare 

Interim Finance Battlefield System 

intelligence forward operating base 

Implementation Force. The military force with the mission of 

enforcing the General Framework Agreement for Peace. 

International Federation of Red Cross 

involuntary foreign service tour extension 

inspector general 

Inspector General World Wide Network. 

Integrated Logistical Analysis Program 

individual mobilization augmentee 

International Maritime Satellite 

imagery intelligence 

intelligence preparation of the battlefield battles pace) 

in-process review; in-progress review 

International Police Task Force, Bosnia 

Internal Review and Audit Compliance Office 

individual ready reserve 

Internal Revenue Service 

individual replacement training 

intermediate staging base 

· intelligence synchronization matrix 

in-transit visibility 

Appendix U 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSJNTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 493 


JAB 

JAC 

JARB 

JCC 

JCO 

JCS 

JDISS 

JFACC 

JFIT 

JIB 

JINTACCS 

JLOC 

JMC 

JMCC 

JMCT 

JMRO 

JOPES 

JPEC 

JSCP 

JSO 

JTAV 

JTB 

JTF 

JTFPP 

JVB 

joint acquisition board 

joint analysis center 

joint acquisition review board 

joint civilian commission; joint contracting center 

joint commission officer. An impartial officer who ensures that 

all sides understand the proper legal implementation of the 

GFAP. 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.) 

Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System 

joint force air component commander 

joint field intelligence teams 

joint information bureau 

Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command & Control Systems 

joint logistics operations center 

joint military commission. A forum for coordination of work 

and implementation of the GFAP between military leaders of 

the FWF and IFOR. 

joint movement control center 

joint military contact team 

Joint Medical Regulating Office 

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 

Joint Planning and Execution Community 

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

joint service officer 

Joint Total Asset Visibility 

Joint Transportation Board 

joint task force 

Joint Task Force Provide Promise 

joint visitors bureau 

KCC 	 contracting coordination center 

KIC 	 Kaiserslautem Industrial Complex 

KM 	 kilometer 

LAN 	 local area network 

LANDCENT Land Forces, Central Command 

LBO 	 Liberal Bosnian Organization (political party) 

LCE 	 liaison coordination element. A special operations detachment 

used to establish initial links with multinational forces and 

assist their integration into TF Eagle. 

LO 	 Logistics Directorate 

LES 	 leave and earnings statement 

LFX 	 live fire exercise 

Appendix U 
494 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


LNO 

LOADEX 

LOC 

LOGCAP 

LOGNET 

LPB 

LPT 

LRMC 

LSA 

LSE 

LTA 

LTL 

liaison officer 

load exercise 

lines of communications 

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 

Logistics Data Network 

logistics preparation of the battlefield 

logistics preparation of the theater 

Landstuhl Regional Medical Center 

logistics support area; life support area 

logistics support element-, life support element 

local training area 

less than lethal 

MACOM major Army command 

MARFOREUR (U.S.) Marine Forces Europe 

MASF medical aeroevacuation staging facility 

MASH mobile army surgical hospital 

MASINT measurement and signature intelligence 

MBO Muslim Bosniac Organization (Political Party) 

MC military committee (NATO) 

MCB Movement Control Board 

MCC movement control center 

MCT movement control team 

MOD mine detector dog 

MEL master events list 

MERC medical evacuation regulating cell 

MET Military Engineering and Topography Office 

METL mission-essential task list 

METT-T mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available 

MGB medium girder bridge 

MHE materiel handling equipment 

Ml military intelligence 

MMC material management center 

MMPA Master Military Pay Account 

MND multinational division 

MND{N) Multinational Division {North) 

MND{S) Multinational Division (South) 

MND(SE) Multinational Division {Southeast) 

MNLS multinational logistics support 

MOB main operating base 

MOBPLAN mobilization plan 

MOB SPT CTR mobilization support center 

Appendix U 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHEBALKANS, 1995-1998 495 


MOC 


MOD 


MOG 


MOI 


MOL 


MOS 


MP 


MRT 


MSB 


MSC 


MSE 


MSEL 


MSR 


MST 


MTMC 


MTOE 


MTP 


MTT 


MUP 


MUTA 


MWD 


MWR 


NAC 

NACC 

NACOSA 

NAEWF 

"NAI 

NAM SA 

NATO 

NBC 

NCA 

NCMC 

NCO 

NOD 

NEO 

NES 

NGB 

NGO 

NICP 

NIST 

movement operations center, media operations center 

ministry of defense 

maximum on ground 

memorandum of instruction 

Ministry of Logistics (Hungary) 

military occupational specialty · 

military police 

movement regulating team; mobile radio-telephone 

main support battalion 

major subordinate command 

mobile subscriber equipment 

master scenario events list 

main supply route 

maintenance support team 

Military Traffic Management Command 

modified table of organization and equipment 

mission training plan 

mobile training team 

Ministry of Interior Police 

multiple unit training assemblies 

military working dog 

morale, welfare, and recreation 

North Atlantic Council 

North Atlantic Cooperation Council 

NATO Communication Support Activity 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Airborne Early Warning 

Force 

named areas of interest 

NATO Maintenance and Supply Activity 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

nuclear, biological, chemical 

National Command Authorities (U.S.) 

national collection management cell 

non-commissioned officer 

narcotics detector dog 

noncombatant evacuation operations 

Network Encryption System 

National Guard Bureau 

non-governmental organization 

national inventory control point 

national intelligence support team 

Appendix U 
496 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERA TIOJ,·s 


NLT 

NMCB 

NSA 

NSC 

NSE 

oc 

OCAR 

OCE 

OCHAP 

OCIE 

OCPA 

OCSURG 

ODCSENG 

ODCSINT 

ODCSIM 

not later than 

naval mobile construction battalion 

National Security Agency 

National Security Council 

national support element 

observer-controller 

Office, Chief of Army Reserve 

operational control elements 

Office of the Chaplain 

organizational clothing and individual equipment 

Office of the Chief, Public Affairs 

Office of the Command Surgeon 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineers, HQ 

USAREUR&7A 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, HQ 

USAREUR&7A 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Information Management, 

HQ USAREUR&7A 

ODCSLOG Office of the Deputy ChiefofStaff, Logistics, HQ 


ODCSOPS 

ODCSPER 

ODCSRM 

ODS 

ODT 

OHR 

OIG 

OJA 

OJE 

OJG 

OMA 

OPCOM 

OPCON 

USAREUR&7A 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, HQ 

USAREUR&7A 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, HQ 

USAREUR&7A 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management, 

HQ USAREUR& 7 A 

Operation Desert Storm 

overseas deployment for training 

Office of the U.N. High Representative 

office of the inspector general 

office of the judge advocate 

Operation Joint Endeavor 

Operation Joint Guard 

Operations & Maintenance, Army 

operational command. Authority granted to a commander to 

assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to 

deploy units, reassign forces, and to retain or delegate 

operational or tactical control as deemed necessary. It does 

not necessarily include administration or logistics. {NATO) 

operational control. Authority granted to a comma:ider to 

direct forces assigned so the commander cah accomplish 

Appendix U 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 497 


OP LAN 

OPM 

OPORD 

OPSEC 

OPTEMPO 

ORB 

ORF 

ORH 

osc 

OSCE 

OSINT 

specific missions or tasks, usually limited by function, time, or 

location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign 

tactical control of those units. It does not necessarily include 

administration or logistics. 

operations plan. A plan for a single or series of connected 

operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. 

Office of the Provost Marshal 

operations order. A directive, usually formal, issued by a 

commander to subordinate commanders to effect the 

execution of an operation. 

operational security. The process of denying adversaries 

information about friendly capabilities and intentions by 

identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated 

with military operations. 

operating tempo 

officer record brief 

operational readiness float 

Operation Return Home 

objective supply capability 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

open source intelligence 

PAO public affairs officer 

PARC Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting 

PAS personnel accounting system · 

PBAC program budget advisory committee 

PC personal computer 

PCH press camp headquarters 

PCs permanent change of station 

PERSCOM personnel command 

PERST AT Personnel Status Report 

PF Parties' Forces 

PfP Partnership for Peace 

PG personnel group 

PIFWC Person Indicted for War Crimes 

PIFWCDETREP PIFWC Detainment report 

PIO Public Information Office (NATO) 

PIR priority intelligence requirements 

PLL prescribed load list 

PLS palletized loading system · 

POD point of departure; point of debarkation 

POE point of embarkation 

Appendix U 
498 C?NTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 


POI program of instruction 

POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants 

POLAD political advisor 

POL-MIL political-military 

POMCUS pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets 

PRB personnel replacement battalion 

PROFIL Professional Filler System 

PSB personnel services battalion 

PSG personnel support group 

PSRC Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up 

PSS personnel service support 

PSYOP psychological operations 

PUD parent unit designator 

PUL pre-configured .unit loads 

PVO private volunteer organization 

OOL quality of life 

ORF quick reaction force 

ORO quick response option 

RA requiring activity; risk analysis 

RAOC rear area operations center 

R & R rest and recuperation 

RC reserve component-, replacement company 

RCTDAP Reserve Component Training Development Action Plan 

RCTP Reserve Component Training Command 

RD replacement detachment, rear detachment 

RDC rear detachment commander 

ROD required delivery date 

RED HORSE Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy Operational Repair 

Squadron, Engineer (U.S.A.F.) 

REFORGER Return of Forces to Germany 

REMBASS Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor Systems 

RF radio frequency 

RFI request for information 

RLD ready to load date 

RM resource management 

RMMT rail movement management team 

ROC redeployment operations center; replacement operations 

center 

ROE rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent 

authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations 

Appendix U 
LAWANDMILITARYOPSINTHE BALKANS, 1995-1998 499 


under which United States military forces will initiate or 

continue engagement with other forces. 

ROI 	 rules of interaction. Directives issued by competent military 

authority that set out the circumstances and limitations under 

which military forces will interact with other forces and 

civilian populations in an operation. They may incorporate 

ROE and are useful in stability operations where the mission 

is not exclusively characterized by combat. 

ROM 	 rough order of magnitude 

RRF 	 rapid reaction force 

RS 	 Republika Srpska 

RSA 	 railhead support activity 

RSB 	 redeployment staging base 

RSN 	 role specialist nation 

RSOI 	 reception, staging, onward movement, and integration 

RSR 	 required supply rate 

RTOC 	 rear tactical operations center 

RTT 	 redeployment training team 

RVT 	 remote vehicle terminal 

S & S supply and service 

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (NATO) 

SACONS/EDI Standard Army CoAtracting System/Electronic Data 

SAILS 

SAMS 

SARSS 

SARSS-0 

SATCOM 

SbiH 

SCI 

SCIF 

SDA 

SOP 

sos 

S-Day 

SEABEE 

SECDEF. 

SET AF 

SFOB 

SFOR 

Interchange 

Standard Army Integrated Logistics System 

Standard Army Maintenance System 

Standard Army Retail Supply System 

Standard Army Retail Supply System, Objective 

satellite communications 

Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina (coalition) 

sensitive compartmented information 

sensitive compartmented information facility 

Party for Democratic Action {political party) 

Social Democratic Party {political party) 

Serbian Democratic Party {political party) 

The day when the President authorizes selective reserve callup. For OJE it was 8 December 1995. 

construction battalion (U.S.N.) 

Secretary of Defense 

See USASETAF 

special forces operating base 

stabilization force 

Appendix U 
500 CENTERFORLAWANDMILITARYOPERATIONS 


SHAPE Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (NATO) 

SIDPERS Standard Installation/Division Personnel System 

SIMEX simulation exercise 

SINCGARS single channel ground and airborne radio system 

SOC EUR Special Operations Command Europe (U.S.) 

SOCIFOR Special Operations Command IFOR 

SOF special operations forces 

SOFA status of forces agreement 

SOP standing operating procedures 

SOR statement of requirement. A NATO document that identifies 

the requirements of fielding the type force to accomplish a 

specific mission. 

SOTP senior officer training program 

SOW statement of work 

SPOD sea port of debarkation 

SPOE sea port of embarkation 

SPRS Socialist Party RS (political party) 

SRJOIC Southern Region Joint Operations Intelligence Center 

SRP Soldier Readiness Program 

SRS Serbian Radical Party 

SSA supply support activity 

SSJ Party of Serbian Unity 

SSS Serb Republic Peasant's Party 

ST ACCS Standard Theater Army Command and Control System 

STAMIS Standard Army Management Information System 

STANAGS Standardization Agreements (NATO) 

STANAVFORMED Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (NATO) 

STON short ton 

STOW synthetic theater of war 

STX situational training exercise 

SUPPLAN supporting plan. An operations plan prepared by a 

supporting commander or a subordinate commander to 

satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported 

commander's plan. 

SWA Southwest Asia 

swo staff weather operations 

TAA tactical assembly area 

TAACOM theater army area command 

TAAD Tne Army Authorization Document 

TAC type address code 

TACCS Tactical Automated Command and Control System 

Appendix U 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 501 


TACON 	 tactical control. Detailed and usually local direction and 

control of movements or maneuvers needed to accomplish 

missions or tasks assigned. 

TACP 	 tactical control party 

TACSIM · 	tactical simulation 

TADSS 	 training aids, devices, simulators and simulations 

TALCE 	 tanker airlift control element 

TAML 	 Theater Army Medical Laboratory 

TAMMC 	 theater army materiel management center 

TAOR 	 tactical area of responsibility 

TAQ 	 Total Army Quality 

TAT 	 to accompany troops 

TAV 	 total asset visibility 

TC-ACCIS Transportation Coordinator's Automated Command and 

Control Information System 

TCN troop contributing nations 

TCS temporary change of station 

TE tactical exploitation 

TF task force 

TFE Task Force Eagle 

TFV Task Force Victory 

TMB Transportation Management Board 

TMCA Theater Movement Control Agency 

TMDE test measurement and diagnostic equipment 

TO theater of operations 

TOA tr?lnsfer of authority 

TOC tactical operations center 

UBSD Union of Social Democrats 

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 

Organization 

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

UNICEF United Nations Children's Emergency Fund 

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 

USASC U.S. Army Signal Command 

USASETAF U.S. Army Southern Europe Task Force 

USASOC U.S. Army Special Operations Command 

USATB U.S. Army Training Board 

USC U.S. Code 

USCENTCOM U.S. Central Command 

USEUCOM U.S. European Command 

Appendix U 
502 CENTER FOR LAWAND MILITARY OPERATIONS 

USMC U.S. Marine Corps 

USNIC U.S. National Intelligence Center 

USSSOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command 

USTRANSCOM U.S. Transportation Command 

UWF unified weather forecast 

VF STE voluntary foreign service tour extension 

VRS Army of Republika Srpska 

VTC video teleconferencing 

WASP Wartime Augmentation of Safety Personnel 

WES Waterways Experiment Station 

WEU Western European Union 

WPC Warrior Preparation Center 

Ws weather squadron (U.S.A.F.) 

WWMCCS Worldwide Military Command and Control System 

zos Zone of Separation. The two km zone on either side of the 

agreed cease fire line (ACFL) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

Appendix U 
LAWAND MILITARY OPS IN THE BALKANS, 1995-1998 503 


THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 


Appendix U 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

This publication is a tribute to every judge advocate, warrant officer, nonconunissioned officer, legal specialist, civilian employee, and their families who selflessly 

served in or in support ofoperations in the Balkans 

The Center for Law and Military Operations-while assuming full responsibility for 

any errors contained in this report-gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the following 

individuals in preparing the original report: 

MG John Altenburg LTC Renn Gade LTC Larry Morris 

COL Jeff Arnold COL Dave Graham MAJ Mike Newton 

BG Joseph Barnes MAJ Tom Hong LTC Fred Pribble 

CPT Patrick Barnett MG Walt Huffinan MAJ Sharon Riley 

MAJ John Bickers CPT Pat Huston BG Tom Romig 

CPT Glenn Bowens MAJ Mike Isaaco MAJ Mike Sainsbury 

1 LT Alex Bustamante LTC Dick Jackson LTC Steve Salata 

LTC Steve Castlen MAJ Kevan Jacobson COL Mac Squires 

CPT Jan Chapman CPT Eric Jensen CPT Patrick Sullivan 

MAJ Mitch Chitwood LTC John Kent LTC Brad Stai 

MAJ Geoff Com CPT Elizabeth Killibre\\ MAJ Mark Tellitocci 

LTC Mark Cremin MAJ Pat Koepp SFC Joachin Trejo 

LTC Jim Coyne 1 LT Charles Kovats COL Denise Vowell 

MAJ Jam es Eicher COL Pat Lisowski MAJ Dave Wallace 

L TC Karl Ellcessor LTC Kevin Lovejoy COL Mac Warner 

MAJ Karen Fair COL Chris Maher LTC Mark Warren 

. CPT Tony Febbo MAJ Kurt Mieth LTC Gaylen Whatcott 

MAJ Mike Flynn LTC Michele Miller MAJ Rich Whitaker 

CLAMO "South" expresses special gratitude to COL David Graham. MAJ Mark 

Martins, and MAJ Paul Kantwill who built the foundation of this organization; the 

Commandant ofThe Judge Advocate. General's School, COL Gerry St. Amand, and to the 

Deputy Commandant, COL Michael Chapman for providing a perfect home and working 

environment for CLAMO; to the amazing MAJ Randy Keys who helps the Center do 

everything; to COL Malcom Squires, COL Warren Hall, LTC (Ret.) George Thompson, 

LTC John Kent, and all of the participants in the April 1997 Joint Endeavor After Action 

Review held in Heidelberg, Germany, a huge success; to every TJAGSA Division Chair 

and their Professors of Law for providing subject matter expertise, insight, and advice; to 

Mr. Chuck Strong of the Legal Research and Communications Division (T,JAGSA) for his 

tireless editing; to the Judge Advocate Guard & Reserve Affairs Division (OTJAG) for 

making sure we bad the "total" picture; to Mr. Al Costa, LTC Rob Van Hooser, LTC Joe 

Lee, CW4 Sharon Swartworth, CW4 Linda Powell, CW2 Richard Johnson, SFC Cheryl 

Simpson, SSG Marybeth Fangman, SSG James Stewart, SGT Harold E. Mountain, SGT 

Rachelle Mathes, SGT Luis Maldonado, Mr. Jan Schleifer, and Ms. Brenda Harrison for 

continuous and· immediate automation support; to Mr. Fred Edwards, Mr. Byrd Eastham. 

and Mr. Dennis Mills for expert graphics and presentational help; to Mrs. Lynn 

Beauchamp ·and Ms. Phyllis Bowman for skillful and prompt (911) printing, reproduction, 

and binding assistance; to Ms. Barbara Wood for taking care of "those CLAMO guys;" 

and to some very understanding families. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

(CONTINUED) 

The Center also gratefully acknowledges the following individuals, who significantly 

improved the final version of this report by proposing changes to the draft and 

contributing documents: COL Gregory Fontenot, COL David Graham, COL Christopher 

Maher, COL St. Amand, COL Denise Vowell, LTC Steve Castlen, LTC Renn Gade, LTC 

Karl Goetzke, LTC Tony Helm, LTC Kevan Jacobson, LTC Kevin Lovejoy, LTC 

Michele Miller, LTC Larry Morris, LTC Steve Salata, LTC Marc Warren, MAJ Brian 

Banks, MAJ Holly Cook, MAJ Will Ferrell (USMC), MAJ Paul Kantwill, MAJ Randy 

Keys, MAJ Kurt Mieth, MAJ Mike Newton, MAJ Mark Tellitocci, MAJ Rich Whitaker, 

CPT Pat Barnett, CPT Jeff Bovarnick, CPT Paul Brandau, CPT Tony Febbo, CPT Pete 

Hayden, CPT Pat Huston, CPT Eric Jensen, CPT Rick Martin, lLT Alex Bustamante, 

lLT Will Helixon, lLT Charlie Kovats, SSG Rod Celestaine, Dr. Mark Foley, and Mr. 

Chuck Strong. 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 


THE BALKANS 


No language can describe adequately the condition of that large 

portion of the Balkan Peninsula-Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and 

other provinces-political intrigues, constant rivalries, a total 

absence ofall public spirit . . . hatred ofall races, animosities ofrival 

religions and absence ofany controlling power . .. nothing short ofan 

army of 50,000 ofthe best troops would produce anything like order 

in these parts. 

UK Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli 

August 1878 in the House of Lords 

I have lived through most of this century. I remember that it began 

with a war in Sarajevo. Mr. President, you must not let it end with a 

war in Sarajevo. 

Pope John Paul II 

November 1995, speaking to President 

William Clinton 

As I speak to you, NATO is completing its planning for !FOR, an 

international force for peace in Bosnia ofabout 60,000 troops ... 

Implementing the agreement in Bosnia can end the terrible suffering 

ofthe people-the warfare, the mass-executions, the ethnic cleansing, 

the campaigns ofrape and terror. . . Now the war is over. American 

leadership created the chance to build a peace and stop the suffering. 

President William Clinton 

27 November 1995, Statement to the Nation