IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 


FOR THE 


MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 


GABRIEL PITTMAN, 

Plaintiff CIVIL NO. 3:CV-15-1793 

v. 

(Judge Conaboy) 

PRESIDENT WILLIAM CLINTON, 

ET AL., :' 1115 

Defendants &_­

MEMORANDUM 

Background 

Gabriel Pittman, an inmate presently confined at the Mahanoy 

State Correctional Institution, Frackville, Pennsylvania (SCIMahanoy) initiated this Q£Q se civil rights action. 1 The Plaintiff 

subsequently filed a request for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis. See Doc. 2. The Complaint is currently before the Court 

for preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (b). 

For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's action will be dismissed 

as frivolous. 

Named as Defendants are former President William Jefferson 

Clinton, United States Senator Orrin Hatch, and unknown members of 

the 104 th Congress. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated 

Plaintiff also indicates that he wishes this matter to be 

construed as a class action. See Doc. 1, p. 1. 

1 

Case 3:15-cv-01793-RPC-JVW Document 7 Filed 10/21/15 Page 1 of 8
his constitutional rights via the enactment the Antiterrorism 

Effective Death Penalty Act. 2 Pittman nerally contends that t 

limitations on seeking federal habeas corpus relief which wer 

created by AED?A: violated his clearly established 

constitutionally guaranteed right to seek habeas corpus relief; 

exceeded the De s' respective Ie slative and execut 

authority; and was in violation of s ration of powers 

doctrine. PIa iff seeks compensato and punitive damages as 

well as injunctive and declaratory relief. 

Discussion 

Class Action 

Numerous I courts have i that a pro se litigant 

such as Pittman lacks the capacity to sent the interests of 

his fellow innates a class action. 

F. Supp.2d 537, 547 (D.N.J. 2003); ======~~~~~, 800 F. Supp 

168, 170 (D. N.J. 1992); 

161 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 1998) (non-attorneys cannot litigate t 

rights of others); , 937 F. 2d 

876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991). It is plain error to t a pro se 

inmate litigant to represent fellow innates. Whalen v. Wiley, No. 

06- 809, 2007 WL 433340 *2 (D. Col. Feb. 1, 2007). 

However, a 2£Q se litigant seeking class certification may 

2 On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorisn and 

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L.No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 

1214 (April 24, 1996), ("AEDPA") which ied the procedures for 

habeas corpus p ngs in federal Court. 

2 


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II "continue individually to pursue his cIa Simply put, a 

pro se prisoner pursuing a civil rights aim ral court 

"must allege a personal loss and seek to ivation of 

his own constitutional rights." • I

Supp. 1186, 1190 (S.D. N.Y. 98 ). 

Accordingly, since a pro se liti cannot sent and 

protect the interests of a class fairly and ly, this action 

deemed to be solely filed by Pittman. 

2007 WL 38905 *3 (D. K.J.Jan. 4, 2007) . Plaintiff's 

670 F . 

informal request for class certification will be deni 

Standard of Review 

When considering a complaint accompanied by a motion to proceed 

forma pauperis, a district court may rule that cess should not 

issue if the complaint is malicious, presents an y 

meritless legal theory, or is predicated on clearly seless factual 

contentions. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 32 28 (1989), 

Douris v. Middleton Township, 293 Fed. Appx. 130, 132 (3d Cir. 

2008). Indisputably ICleri tIessIegal theories are se II whi 

either it is readily apparent that the plaintiff's a lac 

an arguable basis in law or that the defendants are early entitled 

to irr~unity from suit ... II 904 F.2d 192, 194 ( 

Cir. 1990) (quoting Sultenfuss v. Snow, 894 F.2d 1277, 1278 (11th 

C r. 1990)). 

Injunctive/Declaratory Relief 

The Complaint includes allegations the legality of 

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?laintiff's state COUyt cyiminal conviction as well as well as a 

request for injunctive relief that he granted a "full and fair 

s corpus p ng." Doc. 1, ~ V. 

In~ates may not use civil rights actions to chall the fact 

or duration of their confine~ent oy to seek earliey or ier 

release. 411 U.S. 475 (1975). United 

States Court of als foy the Third Circuit has similarly 

recognized that civil rights claims see ng release from confinement 

sounded in habeas corpus. See -'='-'==-=~"'-'-~.:..:--'"-''---.!~~~~, 7 7 2 F. 2 d 1 0 7 8 , 

1086 (3d Cir. 1985). 

The United States Supreme Court 

641, 646 (1997), similarly concluded that a civil rights cIa for 

declaratory relief "based on all ions ... that necessaYily imply 

the invalidity of the punishment imposed, is not cognizable" in a 

civil rights action. at 646. Bas on the reasoning announced 

Georgevich and ?laintiff's present clai~ that the AEDPA 

is unconstitutional and any related habeas corpus type requests to 

have his cri~inal c ction overturned are not properly raised in a 

civil rights complaint. Accordingly, any such claims 11 be 

dismissed without prejudice to any ri plaintiff may have to 

puysue such a s via a federal habeas COYPUs petition. 

Statute of Limitations 

In yeviewi the applicability of the statute of limitations to 

a civil rights action, a federal court must apply the riate 

state statute of limitations which s personal injury actions. 

4 


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II~~~~~~~==' 471 

II~~~~~~~~~~' 91 

U.S. 261, 276 (1985); 


F.3d 451, 457 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1996); 


Bridgewater Twp. Police Dep't, 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989). 

The United States Supreme Court clarifi s decision in 

Wilson when it Id that "courts considering § 1983 claims should 

borrow the ral or residual [state] statute for personal injury 

actions." 488 U.S. 235, 250 (1989); Little v. 

Lycomina County, 912 F. Supp. 809, 814 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd 101 F.3d 

691 (3d Cir. 1996) (Table). Pennsylvania's applicable personal 

injury statute of limitat is two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 

Ann. § 5524(7) (Purdon Supp. 1996); Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 

190 (3d Cir. 1993); 764 F.2d 188, 194

(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 950 (1985). Finally, the statute 

of limitations "begins to run from the t when the plaintiff knows 

or has reason to know of the jury which is the basis of the 

Section 1983 action." 937 F.2d 

899, 919 (3d r. 1991) tations omitted). 

In his complaint, Plaintiff clearly alleges that t underlying 

constitutional misconduct occurred on April 24, 1996, when Congress 

enacted the AEDPA. Pittman's pending Co~plaint is dated S ember 

0, 2015, will be filed as of that date. 

Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271 (1988) (a prisoner' s co~plaint is deemed 

filed at the time it was g ven to prison officials for rna ling to 

the Court) . Despite Plaintiff's vague contention that he did not 

discover that Defendants acted in a pu rtedly unconstitutional 

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manner until September 1, 2015, it is apparent that Plaintiff 

obtained knowledge of the purported violations of his constitutional 

rights at the time the AEDPA was enacted or shortly thereafter, yet 

he failed to initiate this act within the following two (2) years 

but rather waited over nineteen (19) years before seeking relief. 

Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense 

which may be voluntarily waived, it has been recognized that a 

strict court may volunta ly dismiss as frivolous a complaint when 

it is apparent on its face that the statute of limitations has 

expired. See Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 293 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2002) (a 

district court has inherent power to sua sponte di ss a complaint 

which facially olates a bar to suit); 49 F.3d 51, 53 

(2d Cir. 1995); Miller v. Hassinger, Civil No. 02 1520, slop. at 

4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2002) (Muir, J.); Norris v. Vaughn, Civil No. 

00 1856, sl op. at 4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2000) (Rambo, J.). 

Consequently, the sent complaint, which seeks rel f regarding a 

1996 legislative enactment, is clearly barred by Pennsylvania's 

controlling statute of limitations. 

AEDPA 

Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to relief because 

AEDPA is unconst utional. It is noted that P tman has not 

provided the Court with any authority whatsoever supporting his 

vague contentions that the AEDPA is unconstitutional. He also does 

3 See Doc. 1, p. 3, ~ 1. 


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not set forth any discernible basis which would warrant a holding 

that the AEDPA is unconstitutional. 

Furthermore, since its inception in 1996 federal court across 

the country including our own Third Circuit Court of Appeals have 

continuously applied the provisions of the AEDPA. generally, 

197 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 1999) and Mason v. 

~~-=, 208 F.3d 414 (3d Cir. 2000). This Court is also not aware 

of any holding by any federal court which has dete ned that the 

AEDPA is unconstitutional. Likewise, based upon a careful of 

the Petition, Pittman has not set forth any discernible argument or 

facts which could conceivably support a findi that the AEDPA is 

unconstitutional. 

Pursuant to the above discussion, even if this matter was to be 

deemed t ly filed, P iff's wholly speculative unsupported bald 

assertions that the AEDPA is unconstitutional lack arguable Ie 

merit. 

United States S Court in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 

477 (1994), ruled that a constitutional cause of action for damages 

does not accrue "for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness 

would render a conviction or sentence invalid," until the aintiff 

proves that the "conviction or sentence has been reversed on rect 

appeal, expunged by execut order, declared invalid by a state 

tribunal authorized to make such dete nation, or called into 

7 


I 

Case 3:15-cv-01793-RPC-JVW Document 7 Filed 10/21/15 Page 7 of 8
question by a federa-L court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." 

Id. at 486-87. 

As ous y noted, Pittman's action raises claims that his 

state criminal conviction shou d be overturned because the AEDPA is 

unconstitutional. Based on the nature of P-La iff's al egations, a 

finding in his favor would i~ply the invalidity of his ongo state 

confinement. There is no indication that Pittman has successfully 

appealed or otherwise challenged his state criminal conviction. 

Consequently, pursuant to , Plaintiff's instant Complaint 

to the extent that it seeks an award of monetary damages on the 

basis of and illegal Pennsylvania state conviction and confinement 

is premature because he cannot maintain a cause of action for an 

un'awful c ction or an excessive imprisonment until the basis for 

the conviction and imprisonment is overturned. 

Conclusion 

Since Pittman's civil rights compla is "based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory," it will be dismissed, without 

judice, as legally frivolous. Wilson, 878 F.2d at 774. An 

appropriate Order will enter. 

~/~ R I CHAR0 

United States 

P. -:C::-O~N-:C.-=-A-=B-:O-C-y-=--~·---~'-'\--

District 

<'7/ DATED: OCTOBER ../} 2015 

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