U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

30–498PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS IN SRI LANKA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 20, 2018

Serial No. 115–144

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

KAREN BASS, California 

AMI BERA, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. J.S. Tissainayagam, journalist and human rights advocate ......................... 4

Michael Jerryson, Ph.D., associate professor of religious studies, Youngstown 

State University ................................................................................................... 12

Mr. David M. Crane, principal, Justice Consultancy International, LLC .......... 20

Mr. John Sifton, Asia advocacy director, Human Rights Watch ......................... 25

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. J.S. Tissainayagam: Prepared statement ....................................................... 6

Michael Jerryson, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ...................................................... 15

Mr. David M. Crane: Prepared statement ............................................................. 22

Mr. John Sifton: Prepared statement .................................................................... 27

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 50

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 51

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations: 

Statement by Amnesty International USA ........................................................ 52

Sri Lanka Monitoring and Accountability Panel Written Statement .............. 56

Questions submitted to the witnesses for the record by the Honorable F. 

James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Wisconsin .......................................................................................................... 59

(1)

HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS IN SRI LANKA 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will come to order, and good afternoon to everyone. 

The Sri Lankan civil war ended almost 10 years ago this May. 

The 25-year war cost an estimated 100,000 lives and displaced 

hundreds of thousands more. 

The civil war was a brutal ethnic conflict between the majority 

Sinhalese and minority Tamils. Both sides—the Sri Lankan armed 

forces and the rebel Tamil Tigers—have been credibly accused of 

unimaginable war crimes. 

To this day, justice for many of the victims remains elusive. Although many observers hoped that the reformist government of 

President Sirisena would increase access to justice, focus on human 

rights, emphasize transparency and accountability, and improve 

the rule of law, his administration has been criticized for having 

an inadequate response. 

Despite having run on a platform of ethnic reconciliation, President Sirisena has done little to amend the ties between the groups 

and the political polarization has increased among both ethnic 

groups. 

As one of our experts today, J. S. Tissainayagam, will attest, 

there has been no progress on holding those responsible for war 

crimes to account, and he will describe forced disappearances of 

Tamils and torture that were endemic during the war. 

Much of this was facilitated by the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act, or the PTA. The PTA has yet to be repealed and is still 

in use by the government and security forces. 

Whereas most Tamils nowadays simply desire some semblance of 

self-government and federalism, their areas in the north and eastern part of the island are increasingly militarized. 

A concerning development in Sri Lanka is the resurgence of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism. As one of our expert witnesses, Dr. 

Michael Jerryson, will describe, this particularly virulent strand of 

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norities with Buddhist fundamentalists in groups such as the BBS 

saying this is not a multi-religious country—this is a Sinhalese 

country. 

What are the minority groups such as the predominantly Hindu 

Tamils then, or the Muslims who constitute a distinct minority, or 

the Christians, who could either be Sinhalese or Tamil? 

If the character of Sri Lanka is solely Buddhist and Sinhala, 

there is little room for these ethnic and religious minorities to 

thrive, and reconciliation will remain a far off goal. 

Unfortunately, the trend is heading in the opposite direction. In 

local elections in February of this year, a newly-formed Buddhist 

nationalist party gained 45 percent of the vote, beating the government coalition combined. 

Furthermore, in March of this year, Sinhalese mobs engaged in 

an anti-Muslim pogrom after a local dispute forcing the President 

to declare a state of emergency. 

Sri Lanka’s stability is of critical importance to the United States 

national interests. Strategically located in the sea lanes, linking 

the Persian Gulf to east Asia, this island nation has seen a spike 

in recent activity by the Chinese. 

China’s strategy globally is one of indenting countries and binding them in servitude so it can extract resources. So it is safe to 

say that Beijing’s initiatives will not emphasize ethnic reconciliation and/or human rights. 

This presents the United States with an opportunity to stand up 

for justice and the rule of law and to oppose China’s malign influence. 

After a brutal war that cost an unconscionable loss of life, we 

must do better to help Sri Lanka get on the right page again. The 

country has promise and the people deserve better. 

Once all sides recognize this, this island nation will finally have 

some semblance of peace. 

I’d like to now introduce our distinguished witnesses, beginning 

first with J. S. Tissainayagam, who was an English language journalist in Sri Lanka for over 20 years. In 2008, he was arrested for 

writing critically against the Sri Lankan Government and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. 

Tortured and imprisoned for 675 days, he was released due to an 

international outcry against his unjust imprisonment. He now lives 

in the United States. 

He was a Nieman Fellow at Harvard and a Reagan fellow at the 

National Endowment for Democracy. Named a prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International, he was awarded the International Press Freedom Award by the Committee to Protect Journalists in 2009, the Peter Mackler Award for courageous and ethical journalism in 2009 as well, and the British Press Freedom 

Award, foreign journalist of the year, in 2010. 

He now contributes to Foreign Policy Magazine and Asian Correspondent, among other publications. We welcome him to the subcommittee and eagerly await his testimony. 

We will then hear from Dr. Michael Jerryson, who is a professor 

of religious studies at Youngstown State University. An expert on 

religious conflict, he is the co-founder and co-chair of the ComparaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:09 Aug 02, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\062018\30498 SHIRL
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tive Approaches to Religion and Violence through the American 

Academy of Religion. 

Dr. Jerryson has studied and written on Buddhist fundamentalism extensively, his latest publication, ‘‘If You Meet the Buddha 

on the Road: Buddhism, Politics, and Violence.’’

Dr. Jerryson is also a former Peace Corps volunteer in Mongolia. 

We welcome him to the subcommittee and, again, look forward to 

his insights. 

Finally, we will hear from Professor Crane, who is a professor of 

practice at Syracuse University, School College of Law. 

From 2002 to 2005, Professor Crane was the founding chief prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, an international war 

crimes tribunal appointed to that position by Secretary General of 

the U.N. Kofi Annan. 

Serving with the rank of Undersecretary General, Professor 

Crane’s mandate was to prosecute those who bore the greatest responsibility of the war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other 

serious violations of international human rights committed during 

Sierra Leone’s civil war in the 1990s. 

An expert on international criminal law, international humanitarian law, and national security, he founded Impunity Watch—a 

law review and public service blog—he has briefed the Foreign Affairs Committee several times before, notably in 2014 with the Syrian army defector Caesar—an alias, of course—on war crimes committed by the Assad regime. 

He’s also been a frequent provider of insight and testimony to 

this subcommittee, especially on the importance of establishing adhoc tribunals like the one that he so nobly led. 

I would point out parenthetically that the prosecutions that he 

led to Charles Taylor, the President of Liberia, getting 50 years—

sentenced to 50 years at the Hague for his horrific crimes, and that 

would not have been possible without David Crane’s leadership. 

So just very grateful for that leadership. 

Then we will hear from John Sifton, who I understand is stuck 

in some traffic and will be here momentarily—serves as an advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. He works on South and 

Southeast Asia, East Asia, the Middle East, and East Africa. 

John Sifton began working at Human Rights Watch in 2001, first 

as a researcher in the Asia division, focusing on Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, and then as a senior researcher on terrorism and counter 

terrorism. 

He also founded a public interest investigation firm, One World 

Research, which he directed from—right on cue—he directed from 

2007 to 2010. 

In 2000 and 2001, Mr. Sifton worked for the International Rescue Committee, primarily in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in 

1999 he worked for the refugee advocacy organization in Albania 

and Kosova. We welcome him and, again, look forward to his remarks as well. 

Mr. Tissainayagam, the floor is yours. 

4

STATEMENT OF MR. J.S. TISSAINAYAGAM, JOURNALIST AND 

HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATE 

Mr. TISSAINAYAGAM. I wish to thank Chairman Chris Smith, 

Ranking Member Karen Bass, and other members of the subcommittee for hosting this hearing on Sri Lanka this afternoon. 

My remarks are a summary of the written statements submitted 

to the subcommittee and I request that my full statement be entered into the record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, so ordered, and that would be for 

everyone on the panel, and any extraneous material you’d like to 

include as well will be made a part of the record. 

Mr. TISSAINAYAGAM. Thank you. 

The Sri Lankan Government and the rebel LTTE were accused 

of war crimes and crimes against humanity at the end of the civil 

war in 2009. 

The best starting point to address the current human rights situation in Sri Lanka is by discussing what the present government 

pledged to the U.S. and the international community. 

The present government was formed in January 2015 after the 

election defeat of authoritarian President Mahinda Rajapaksa. 

In September 2015, it accepted human rights violations had occurred during the civil war. It proposed four transitional justice 

mechanisms to provide justice and lasting peace, which were incorporated into the U.N. Human Rights Council Resolution 30/1. 

This resolution was co-sponsored by the United States and Sri 

Lanka. Then Secretary of State John Kerry placed a seal of approval on this agreement by declaring, and I quote, ‘‘This resolution 

marks an important step toward a credible transitional justice 

process owned by Sri Lankans and with the support and involvement of the international community.’’

However, progress on the promises made have been dismal. The 

U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Al-Hussein, said 

in March this year, and I quote, ‘‘I regret the absence of meaningful progress. It is urgent for the sake of the victims that progress 

be made on accountability and transitional justice.’’

Let me elaborate on enforced disappearances where, while setting up structures, Sri Lanka has failed to build trust among its 

people. 

Out of the four transitional justice mechanisms that Sri Lanka 

promised, only the Office of Missing Persons, or OMP, has been established. 

However, by doing so, Sri Lanka has decided to ignore the most 

affected people—the families of the disappeared. 

The stated needs of families of the disappeared in the north are 

simple. One, they want to develop the role of the state agencies, 

the LTTE rebels, and paramilitary groups acknowledge in the disappearance of their family members. 

Two, they want justice, and three, they want to determine what 

that justice would be. The OMP does not serve those needs. It cannot try perpetrators and only under very limited circumstances can 

it refer cases to law enforcement authorities. It is because of the 

government’s unresponsiveness that many of the families of the 

disappeared want to boycott the OMP. 

5

For families of the disappeared, the most egregious form of enforced disappearances is the fate of their loved ones whom they 

handed over to the military at the end of the war in 2009 and 

never saw again. 

As one mother, Ms. Pushpambal, said last week while protesting 

the OMP, and I quote, ‘‘We are not here to speak about the missing. We are here to speak about our children who we took by the 

hand and gave to your military.’’

Since February 2017, family members of Sri Lanka’s north have 

been protesting every day, hoping their government will hear them. 

Finally, when President Sirisena met them, the families asked 

for the list of those who had been handed over to the military. The 

President promised to give them a list in 2 days, but defaulted. 

After a final meeting, Ms. Yogarasa Kankaranjini, whose son 

was disappeared, said, and I quote, ‘‘Today, we lost faith in this 

government. But we will continue our unrelenting struggle for our 

loved ones.’’

Finally, I would like to say—I would like to briefly touch on the 

issue of torture in Sri Lanka. 

Torture has continued even after the new government took office 

in 2015. The U.N. special rapporteur on conflict resolution and 

human rights, Ben Emmerson, said after his visit to Sri Lanka in 

2017, and I quote, ‘‘Eighty percent of suspects arrested under the 

flawed antiterrorist legislation in late 2016 had reported torture.’’

U.K.-based organizations have documented several cases of torture in 2016 and 2017, and their reports are available to this committee. 

Studies have shown that impunity for perpetrators of past crimes 

and continuing human rights violations are risk factors to trigger 

future atrocities. 

An example in Sri Lanka was the violence against Muslims in 

February this year. Sections of the police and STF, who have been 

accused of torture in the past, abetted ferocious Singhala Buddhist 

mobs who were attacking Muslims. 

While the future of Sri Lanka looks grim at this point, all is not 

lost. There is a silver lining. The affected citizens are doing their 

best to hold their government accountable. 

But they need the support of the United States to ensure their 

government keeps its promises made to them. 

The United States remains well placed to use its good offices to 

persuade the Sri Lanka Government to abandon its policy to protecting the military and the time for the U.S. to act is now. 

Recommendations: One, use the Global Magnitsky Act to sanction individuals accused of wartime atrocities; two, use the power 

of appropriations to ensure human rights violations end and hold 

Sri Lanka accountable; and three, use congressional oversight to 

see that the Leahy laws stringently vets individuals and military 

units in war and wartime atrocities, and ensure that U.S. tax dollars are not used for training those units in the U.S., in Sri Lanka, 

or in a third country. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tissainayagam follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you so very much for your testimony. 

I’d now ask Dr. Jerryson, if you would proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL JERRYSON, PH.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES, YOUNGSTOWN STATE UNIVERSITY 

Mr. JERRYSON. I would like to thank the chairman Smith and the 

distinct members of the committee. 

The task I was asked was to identify how we could avoid the escalation—elevation of violence in Sri Lanka. 

As a scholar of religion and violence, my goal is not to make prescriptive claims about a religion but to examine it on the ground. 

I want to also alert that I have been targeted by both Buddhist 

and Muslim groups in the past and my life is in jeopardy of this. 

So I have no leanings one way or another in this—these reflections. 

Religion has a powerful impact in the way people see things. It 

creates a world view, a way of how we see what’s right and wrong, 

what we should do, and oftentimes it can override human rights 

concerns, and I believe it’s been happening in Sri Lanka for quite 

some time. 

I won’t read the entire submission I have. I would like to read 

some excerpts of it. As has been mentioned before, the Buddhist’s 

nationalist rhetoric has been wedded to violence during the Sri 

Lankan civil war and its aftermath. 

The role of Sinhala Buddhism in the recent anti-Muslim violence 

suggests that this dominance has a pattern of harmful effects on 

Sri Lanka’s minority communities. 

And let me add also that dominance doesn’t simply affect adversely those who don’t have a lot of power but also those who do 

have power in both harmful and beneficial ways. 

National economic and political instability makes visible the systemic inequality. It also inflames tensions. This religious-ethno 

stratification engenders a society easily unmoored by ethno religious conflict. 

The recent violence in February and March of this year, which 

began when four Muslims attacked a Buddhist driver, is but a recent example. 

Sri Lankan society is also vulnerable to ethnical rhetoric, and 

we’ve seen a new surge of this arise with social media and 

Facebook posts that seem to inflame this. 

After Buddhist propaganda on Muslim halal conspiracies, the imminent Islamification of Sri Lanka, tag lines such as calling Muslims gonibilla, which interestingly is, in Sri Lanka, means monsters, widespread riots have taken place. 

The power behind propaganda are the Sri Lankan Buddhist 

monks. The more public and vocal conservative monks have stoked 

Sri Lankan fears and angers of minority and marginalized identities. 

This behavior is distinctly modern. Prior to British colonialism, 

Buddhist monks legitimated Sri Lanka’s governments. However, 

they did not directly participate in any political system. 

This historical role explains the Sri Lankan Buddhist monk’s 

symbol as society’s moral foundational and they are so looked upon 

in this way. 

13

So when Buddhist monks speak out publicly, they do so not only 

as holy voices, but also as political moral authorities. We have seen 

a rise in Buddhist monastic political participation. 

Monks in mass became active during the 26-year civil war. In 

2004, British monks formed the Jathika Hela Urumaya, the JHU—

the National Heritage Party. Their political candidates were Buddhist monks. Nine of them won seats in Parliament. 

As you mentioned before, Chairman, this has been even on a rise 

this year. 

Now, while some Sri Lankan monks have called on more pluralistic policies and rhetoric, there has been a political consolidation 

of conservatism among such as the JHU. 

In its inaugural year of activity, the JHU called on the extermination of the LTTE. They did not want to have any negotiations. 

Shortly after the civil war, two Buddhist monks broke off from 

the JHU and formed a new organization called the Bodu Bala 

Sena—the Buddhist Power Force—and within a year the Bodu 

Bala Sena shifted the rhetoric from the Tamils to Muslims as a 

threat to the entire country. 

When I interviewed founders of the Bodu Bala Sena, it had been 

only 2 weeks since the co-founder, Gnanasara Thero, had delivered 

an emotional intense speech that triggered Buddhist riots and attacks in Aluthgama. 

His colleague, Dilanthe, explained the Bodu Bala Sena’s reasons 

for the fears of Muslims, saying, ‘‘We want Sinhalese united in a 

Sinhalese government. We want protection. We have been protecting Theravada Buddhism for the last 2,300 years, and today, 

Theravada Buddhism is in the West and with the Sinhalese. But 

the Singhala race may be around only for the next 40 years,’’ and 

it’s a repeated rhetoric—the idea, the fear, that they’re going to be 

obliterated. The Sinhalese will be obliterated and true Buddhism 

will be obliterated in the process. 

Now, for Dilanthe, the Sinhalese Buddhists may enjoy a 69 percent majority, compared to the 8 percent Muslim minority. But Sri 

Lankan Buddhism is a global minority, in their views. 

He and his organization consider their efforts to defend Sri 

Lankan Buddhism necessary for its very survival. 

Now, the Sri Lankan Government has taken very little action 

against the Bodu Bala Sena. However, last week, the Sri Lankan 

Government jailed Gnanasara Thero, citing violence against Muslims—for him inciting violence against them. 

Reuters journalist Ranga Sirilal reports that Gnanasara Thero 

told reporters as he boarded the bus to take him to prison, ‘‘I have 

done my duty toward this country. Why should I regret?’’

So conservative Buddhist monastics such as Gnanasara Thero 

and Bodu Bala Sena see themselves as true to Sri Lanka because 

of protecting Sinhala Buddhism at the expense of minorities, ethnic 

and religious. 

Their decisions require a heightened level of accountability. My 

recommendations are as follows. 

Recent human rights abuses in Sri Lanka are a result of a larger 

and more historic, systematic, ethno religious problem. 

To reduce the potential for it devolving into another period of 

civil strife, I recommend the U.S. Congress support the Sri Lankan 

14

Government to increase efforts to identify its democratic processes 

of pluralism, to commission a neutral parties comprehensive review 

of the public education materials from the national to the local for 

any ethno religious biases, and, as Buddhist monastics become 

more political, to encourage the government to support the judicial 

branch in policing their actions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jerryson follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

I would like to now recognize Professor Crane. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID M. CRANE, PRINCIPAL, JUSTICE 

CONSULTANCY INTERNATIONAL, LLC 

Mr. CRANE. Thank you, Chairman Smith. It’s, again, my pleasure 

to be in front of you and the distinguished committee that you 

chair, along with all the members who we have worked together for 

almost two decades, bringing justice to the oppressed. 

I have submitted my comments and so you have put them in the 

record. I will not go through those. I would just like to make a few 

important points, particularly related to justice and the involvement of Congress and the United States, related to the tragedy 

that took place for—between 1983 and 2009. 

Like my colleague here, I approach this with nothing more than 

neutrality. I have been doing this for almost 40 years as far as advising and investigating and prosecuting those who commit mass 

atrocities. 

The conflict that took place—we’ve seen law of armed conflict 

violations, war crimes, crimes against humanity, committed on all 

sides. 

That’s a given. We can talk about that in further questioning. 

But let’s just use as a baseline that all parties committed violations 

of both domestic and international law. 

International efforts to try to bring the parties together have 

been, largely, neutral at best and a failure most of the time, and 

that is because of the long term challenges that go with long term 

guerrilla conflict. 

Sri Lanka will never be at peace—a sustainable peace—unless 

these is both truth and justice through some type of truth commission reconciliation as well as some type of justice mechanism, either domestically, regionally, or internationally. 

In my mind, with all of this experience and have studied and 

worked with and dealt with on a practical level these types of 

issues, the short and medium term outlook for any type of truth 

or justice is bleak, at best. 

I see little to no U.S. ability to influence any of the parties to 

bring them to the table to talk in a constructive and just like way. 

Perhaps in the long term there may be some political openings 

and sunlight that will appear on this beautiful land, which I have 

walked for many weeks, particularly exploring the—and visiting all 

the battlefields of that last 4 months in 2009 as a member of a 

panel of experts looking into potential war crimes and crimes 

against humanity. 

My suggestion would be this, Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, is 

that your committee—the committee headed by Chairman Royce 

and Congress at writ large, as well as the U.S. Government, to first 

show empathy—a recognition of the pain on all sides. 

If we lock ourselves into narrative on either side, then we are 

starting off on the wrong foot. I would also encourage engagement. 

Despite the challenges that we currently have as a nation that 

seems to be pulling away from the very fundamentals that’s established this country, particularly in the human rights realm, which 

we have led for so many years, we still need to be engaged with 

21

Sri Lanka at all levels, both economically, socially, culturally, politically, and practically, and engage all parties. 

We also should be encouraging to ensure that dialogue takes 

place both at the local, regional, and international efforts to move 

parities in a way or to a realization that the only real future for 

this war-torn land is through compromise, discussion, and accountability. 

And then, of course, I concur with my colleague at the end of the 

table. The real ability of the United States to draw attention is economic persuasion, both soft and hard persuasion. 

We do have some influence. They’re interested in our business. 

But that business comes with some type of quid pro quo. 

So that will conclude my remarks and I look forward to your 

questioning, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crane follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Professor Crane. 

John Sifton. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN SIFTON, ASIA ADVOCACY 

DIRECTOR, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 

Mr. SIFTON. Thank you. Thank you for providing Human Rights 

Watch the opportunity to testify also. 

More than 9 years after the conflict, the people of Sri Lanka are 

still struggling to rebuild their country’s democratic institutions 

but also obtain justice for the crimes that were committed during 

the conflict. 

It’s only after President Sirisena was elected in 2015 that the 

government really began to take more seriously the work that 

needed to be done to address past abuses. 

But this came about because of intense pressure from minority 

Tamil and Muslim communities and local activists, but also from 

strong pressure from concerned countries including the U.S. 

The U.S. played a huge role in convincing the government to engage with the U.N. Human Rights Council, and I am going to talk 

about the Human Rights Council a little later. 

I think we’ve heard—you know, we all know that the LTTE committed horrific abuses during the conflict—sectarian massacres, political assassinations, executing detainees, using child soldiers—

and as we documented, you know, terrorizing ethnic Tamils there 

and abroad to raise money for their operations. 

The Sri Lankan security forces, for their part, committed countless arbitrating tensions, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances. 

But the abuses at the end of the war were, obviously, among the 

worst of all, and between indiscriminately showing civilians using 

human shields and killing rendered combatants and other Tamil 

men who surrendered at the war’s end, it was a horrific time, and 

that’s why there was so much pressure by the U.S. at the Human 

Rights Council. 

The two resolutions since 2015 setting up these four different 

mechanisms, a special court for alleged war crimes, reparations, office of missing persons, a truth and reconciliation—you know, those 

were great resolutions and it marked a huge progress. 

Unfortunately, as we’ve already heard, it’s really only the Office 

of Missing Persons that’s up and running and even their work has 

not really shown a lot of fruit. 

The reparations process has been very slow. There was a bill but, 

you know, it’s still stalled out. But most worrying of all is that 

there’s no progress that’s really been made on creating a special 

court and both the President and the Prime Minister have all but 

said that there never will be a court, and that’s a huge tragedy 

that I think they should be criticized for a lot. 

But this brings me to the issue of a human rights council. When 

we think about our recommendations, what needed to be done on 

this issue, obviously, U.S. is a big point of leverage and we urge 

Members of Congress and administration officials to keep pressuring that. 

But when I drafted my testimony, I had not yet watched Ambassador Haley’s comments yesterday, withdrawing the U.S. from the 

26

Human Rights Council, and it really just changes everything that 

I was going to say. 

I also had not read the letter that Ambassador Haley sent to my 

organization and Amnesty International this morning specifically 

blaming us for their withdrawal, saying that we had sided with 

Russia and China to sabotage their efforts at reform. 

The response within Human Rights Watch this morning to that 

letter was shocking. This country, Sri Lanka, was among the ones 

we worked with U.S. the closest to create resolutions to address the 

country’s human rights problems, and we found that letter to be 

not just an insult to us and our work, and our work together with 

U.S. officials but an insult to the people of Sri Lanka, to North 

Korea, to Burma, and other places where the U.S. have worked together. 

And so I hope one thing that can come out of this hearing is that 

Members of Congress can press Ambassador Haley on why she 

made the disastrous, shortsighted and, frankly, childish decision to 

withdraw from the Human Rights Council yesterday. 

Going forward, I think the U.S. could still use its role at the 

Council, even if it’s not a member, to urge the next resolution in 

March 2019 to find fault with Sri Lanka and say what is going on 

here—you’d agreed to do these four things and you haven’t done 

them. 

Unfortunately, if the U.S. is not going to be in Geneva to do that, 

it’ll fall to other countries, and that is a terrible indictment of this 

administration’s commitment to promoting human rights. 

I am sorry that this issue had to sideline, you know, the hearing 

about Sri Lanka. I would be glad to talk more about the Sri Lanka 

problems in particular. But I had to address this issue with the 

Human Rights Council. 

I have a written version of my testimony, which includes the 

World Report chapter from Human Rights Watch’s 2018 world report on Sri Lanka and I would ask that it be entered into the 

record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sifton follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. SIFTON. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Sifton. 

Let me just begin. 

You know, the Office of Missing Persons, and Mr. 

Tissainayagam, you were very, very critical of that and pointed out 

that many of the families said that they will boycott the office 

missing persons set up to probe disappearances. 

If all of you, perhaps, could focus on the shortfalls, what needs 

to be done to fix it, and, again, what pressure might we bring. I 

mean, missing persons—I’ve held hearings. 

I’ve done site visits all over the world, even during the war in 

former Yugoslavia. The issue of missing persons was a huge—still 

is—a huge issue at the time. 

Our own POW MIAs in North Korea as well as in Vietnam was—

I mean, the first speech I gave on the floor of the House in 1981 

was about our missing in Vietnam that we did not get a full accounting for. 

It seems to me that regarding the brokenness of the families—

asking for that basic information really needs to be pressed very 

hard. So if all of you could speak to that. 

Because, obviously, the families probably thought this would 

work and they have been disappointed. 

Mr. TISSAINAYAGAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me start by saying a few words about the—what led to the 

OMP. As I said, it was one of the—one of the proposals made by 

the Sri Lanka Government. At the U.N. Human Rights Council 

meeting in 2015 in Geneva, basically, what the OMP was supposed 

to do was to look not only—was supposed to looking to the missing—into missing persons across the board, but particularly, it was 

supposed to look into disappearances. 

When—but when the—but when it started the whole process of 

setting it up—when that started, there were a lot of issues that 

came which led to what came out finally, being truncated or a crippled version of what it ought to have been. 

What the people—the families of the disappeared wanted was 

not only that the OMP would look into finding out the truth about 

the disappearances because in the case of many people, as I said, 

who had handed over their children and their loved ones to the 

military at the end of the war, they didn’t need much information 

as to what happened to them. They saw their children be—or their 

husbands being handed over to the military and then they disappeared. 

What they wanted was justice. This does not preclude the fact 

that they didn’t want to know what happened to them eventually, 

but that was only one of the issues. 

What they wanted was justice, and if you see the way the office 

of missing persons has been now established, the law establishing 

the OMP excludes justice—the office of missing persons the power 

to punish perpetrators. 

That is because Section 13 says that whatever arises from the investigations of the office of missing persons will not give rise to 

civil or criminal proceedings. 

34

Secondly, it says that they are—I mean, the whole law is a bit 

confused. It also says that if the OMP wants it can hand over some 

of the investigative material to a court of law. 

But, that again, there are caveats. It says that it is only if there 

is no social or other problems or problems to the nearest relatives 

arising from that. 

Now, just imagine if a military officer is accused of war crimes, 

and if that matter goes to court, you can be pretty sure from what 

Professor Jerryson described, that the whole Singhala Buddhist 

ethos being what is is, there is going to be—there is going to be 

chaos. So the OMP has the discretion not to put it forward to their 

court of law. 

Now, that is completely against what the people, especially the 

victims, want. 

So, therefore, while the victims do want to know what happened 

to their loved ones and that is assuming that the OMP at least 

does that function properly, one of the other things that they have 

been asking for is justice, which the structure and the character of 

the OMP will not allow it to provide. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SIFTON. Just a brief word about the—it’s pretty clear that 

out of the menu of the four things that have been proposed to the 

resolutions that the government, obviously, prefers things that are 

less likely to cause high-level officials to worry that they be held 

accountable. 

And so reparations and the office of missing persons has been 

more appetizing to the leadership as things that can be done that 

won’t have that impact. 

And yet, not even these things appear to have been done. One 

warning sign is that a lot of families are now telling us that they 

won’t accept reparations unless there’s some progress made on justice or accountability or truth. They simply won’t take the money. 

That may be a sign that, you know, this could boil over in coming 

weeks and months. 

The other warning sign is that the debate over accountability can 

have political ramifications. You know, among the people who may 

run for office in the next election is Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, who was 

Defense Minister at the time of the worst abuses in the war and 

also, incidentally, a U.S. citizen who’s under investigation by the 

Justice Department for those alleged war crimes. 

He’s been implicated. That’s a huge political ramification right 

there in the sense that if he’s held accountable that could lead him 

to engage and have more political support. 

If he’s not held accountable, that, in turn, could provide a reason 

for why the ruling party may fail in the next election because the 

northern vote on which they were so dependent will not be delivered for them because of the profound disappointment in the government in not holding anybody accountable. 

Mr. CRANE. Just one point. You know, the issue of justice, which 

all victims—and it’s at the end of the day all about victims—what 

they want is truth and they want justice. 

They want to tell the world their story, what happened to them; 

whether it be before a small body like a truth commission or an 

international or a local court. 

35

But at the end of the day, particularly in Sri Lanka, but it’s also 

proven to be in my practice in international criminal law for over 

two over decades, is that the bright red thread of all of this is politics. 

It will be a political decision someday that someone’s going to say 

we’ve got to do something about this, and that time is not present. 

So we have to just understand that as a word of caution. 

When that happens, I have no idea. But it will be a political shift 

that will cause people to begin to move toward some of the—that 

four-cornered stool which the put in place in 2015, 2016, which has 

all the possibilities. 

But the politics of it weaken that whole structure. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask you, Mr. Crane, after the civil war 

of the Sri Lankan Government put together the commission of inquiry with the intention of investigating both the Sri Lankan military and the Tamil Tigers, can you describe your role in that commission and, if you could, how effective has it been? How disappointing has it been? 

And you also suggested in your testimony that a court, similar 

to the one that you so effectively led in Sierra Leone be established 

in Sri Lanka. 

How realistic is that? Do you think that is something that could 

be achieved? 

Mr. CRANE. Well, thank you for those questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Yes, I was on the panel. I was on the panel of experts with Sir 

Desmond De Silva and Sir Geoffrey Nice and myself, advising that 

initial commission looking at what the possibilities were related to 

war crimes and crimes against humanity took place. 

I was brought in in 2014 to advise that body, which we did. We 

found that as many of the inquiries have already found but unequivocally, neutrally, and with great depth, found that international and domestic crimes were replete. 

We focused particularly in a lot of the dust that was in the air 

related to those final 4 months, and the three of us, literally, 

walked that campaign all the way to the beach—last day of the 

conflict, for lack of a better term. 

At the end of the day, there are accountability on both sides. I 

could certainly go into my professional sense of this neutrally as to 

those 4 months. 

But at the end of the day, the commission—well, interesting 

enough, the President that had set that up, literally, 3 weeks after 

I left Sri Lanka was thrown out of office and just disappeared into 

a cloud. 

So at the end of the day, I would have to honestly say to you, 

Mr. Chairman, that really it just disappeared. There was no concrete ability to build from that. 

To answer your second question, yes, of course, when the political 

decision is made to do something, certainly, a hybrid international 

court such as Sierra Leone is certainly a possibility, and it’s and 

encouragingly possibility because we could involve all parties, 

which is what the Sierra Leone court was. 

It was an international court but we also had members of the 

country in key and significant positions and judges, deputy prosecutor, deputy registrar, what have you. 

36

You know, the history of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 

shows that a hybrid international war crime tribunal works and 

can be done efficiently and effectively, and yes, certainly that is a 

possibility. 

You know, really, at the end of the day, the real possibilities here 

are either a internationalized domestic court—I just don’t see a domestic court happening. 

Potentially, an internationalized domestic court or a hybrid international court of some sort with variations at a time yet to be determined when a political climate decision is made that that might 

be something that would be useful to the people of Sri Lanka. 

But, again, I have to underscore that it will be a political decision to do that. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Mr. JERRYSON. To add to this too—I applaud Professor Crane his 

suggestions. 

There’s a lot of delicacy right now that remains at the Sirisena 

administration in that if they push too much one direction they’re 

going to lose a lot of political support, with Rajapaksa waiting in 

the wing right now, who’s been much more supportive of the Bodu 

Bala Sena and other groups beside the Bodu Bala Sena. 

This is going to be, I think, a very careful approach I think we 

should be aware of. The Bodu Bala Sena has been training young 

monastics since 2013. They have been trying to change the way 

people see what it means to be a Sinhala Buddhist—what does it 

mean to be a Sri Lankan. 

And in the end, I think it’s going to be the long game, not the 

short game here. 

Mr. TISSAINAYAGAM. Thank you. 

While I agree with everyone here that politics will be a very important part in determining when this—a credible justice mechanism is going to be set up, I also feel that the Sri Lanka Government is using certain myths to push the fact that politics is not 

conducive to bring about a solution at this point of time. 

I am not saying that it can happen at this point of time, but I 

think it can be expedited. But that the Sri Lankan Government, by 

putting forward some of these myths is trying to delay it, for obvious reasons. 

Now, one of the main things that the Sri Lankan Government 

says, and I believe Professor Jerryson also referred to it, is about 

Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, who is the former Defense Secretary, and 

the general myth is that if he is arrested or if he is accused of anything there is going to be a huge outcry in the country and, more 

than that, that there is going to be a coup in the military. 

Now, this story has been there for about 2009. First and foremost, they said that Field Marshal Fonseca, who was at that time 

the—he’s known as the butcher of the north because he led the 

military and he’s accused of various war crimes—that anyone who 

touches him would end up killed or that they would—or that they 

would be victimized by the regime—yeah, by the regime and by the 

Sinhalese people. 

But then he was arrested, he was put behind bars, and then he 

came back. The military did not—did not revolt. 

37

Then they said, if Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, who is the Secretary of 

Defense, if something happens to him that there would be a huge 

outcry and there would be a coup. 

Gotabhaya Rajapaksa comes and goes to courts very regularly 

because he is charged with various crimes, but they’re not war 

crimes, but corruption issues, and the military has not erupted. 

They have not—there is no coup. 

Thirdly, there is—there is D.K.P Dasanayake, who is a 

Commodre—sorry, he’s a naval officer. He’s also a senior officer—

but who has been implicated in the disappearance of 11 people, and 

some of them are young kids. 

He, too, has been—he’s now on bail. But he was arrested, and 

there was no outcry or no coup. It was no big deal. 

So while I agree with everyone here that politics will play a role 

in when this is going to be set up, I think the Government of Sri 

Lanka propagated this myth to push it as much—as much backwards as possible. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Professor. 

Mr. CRANE. Thank you again for your time. 

As we were sitting here having this important discussion, things 

come to mind. You know, I’ve been sitting here thinking about this 

very intently for the past week and in my experience with working 

with the Government of Sri Lanka and others and meeting the 

President, all the way down to various individuals, I think what 

they’re doing right here right now is a waiting game. 

They are—it’s a slow roll. They’ll give and take here and there 

to ease pressure. But they’re looking at, over time, that the interest 

in accountability for Sri Lanka will wane because, again, the placement geopolitically of Sri Lanka itself puts it right in the middle 

of three major powers—particularly, India and China but also on 

and off interests by the United States and trying to develop and 

influence in that part of the world. 

And so they’re banking on their—the other geopolitical aspects of 

where they are versus—and just weighing this out and seeing what 

the result will be. 

Adjusting as it goes, maybe they’ll be forced to do something. But 

I think they’re on a waiting game at this point, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. If I could, Mr. Tissainayagam, you had focused on 

torture and the fact that the Prevention of Terrorism Act—the draconian PTA—not only permitted arbitrary detention but allowed 

confessions that were admission through torture. 

I wonder if you could speak to why the government has not dismantled, eviscerated, done away with, repudiated this terrible law. 

Mr. TISSAINAYAGAM. Thank you. Well, I think the very simple 

answer is that they don’t want to do that because it would take 

away a very important tool that the government has to punish people who they think are culpable or at least who have been charge 

on human rights—on various violations—but who can be charged 

as terrorists. 

One of the things that we have to understand is that from the 

time the PTA was made into law in 1979, not only were people who 

were charged who had—whose offenses were convincibly terrorist 

38

offenses, but even people who expressed dissent, people whose 

speech and whose actions should have been safeguarded and protected as legitimate, as only criticizing the government or the people in power, were made to look terrorist because the way the law 

is couched—the way the law is written is so broad that it includes 

almost anything as an act of terror. 

And once you do that, there are various things that you can use 

including confessions. Now, one of the things that—including confessions, which is made admissible under the PTA to charge these 

people, and torture is related to that. In the case of many of the—

many of the—many suspects who are taken in, usually what happens is that they are tortured. 

In fact, Ben Emmerson, as I said, said that 80 percent of the people who had been—who had been taken in between 2015 and 2016 

had complained of torture. 

Now, the problem here is that—this is a way of suppressing dissent and legitimate—people who are legitimately expressing something against the government. 

Now, I was a victim in that sense. I was a journalist, and I didn’t 

go around carrying a gun or killing people. But I was charged 

under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and I was jailed under the 

Prevention of Terrorism Act. 

I was arrested and jailed under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. 

So I think that is the main cause—how you can use this over 

broadly defined terrorism in the PTA to keep and discipline a society. That is why the government is keeping this and that is why 

it is also keeping torture, because you can torture people into making confessions which you can use. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SIFTON. Just to direct the committee’s attention to two facts. 

One is that the special rapporteur visited in July 2017 and found 

that torture is continuing apace and routine. We issued a report 

about the PTA as well a few months ago in which we documented 

several major cases of torture of PTA detainees. 

But it’s important to recognize not only have they failed to repeal 

it, these draft texts for new versions are even worse and they contain these broad definitions of political activity as terrorism, that 

are highly troubling. 

I think it’s good to pivot here to talk about how the U.S. can 

voice its displeasure with this situation. If we are not going to have 

the human rights council as a vehicle anymore then the United 

States at least can use its Embassy to voice these concerns and its 

spending power through appropriations. 

I think it’s a good opportunity that there’s a new Ambassador 

coming in. We’ve worked with her very closely in Nepal and other 

places. 

I mean, not to say anything bad of the current Ambassador. Atul 

is a wonderful servant of the U.S. and we wish him well. 

But the next Ambassador, coming in like this, can bring a new 

approach—a little tougher and say to these—this government, look, 

we have a problem. There’s a lot of restrictions on what we can do 

with you militarily—you know, our spending on law enforcement, 

counterterrorism, the Leahy law. 

39

A lot of this will be made better if you start reforming and if you 

show progress on human rights and accountability it will make it 

easier for Congress to approve funding for more and more things 

and we can have joint training. This addresses the issue of the 

sandwiching between China and India. 

Having been to PACOS and Honolulu, I can tell you that the Pacific Command looks at Sri Lanka with, you know—they’re very appetizingly looking at Sri Lanka as a place where they want a closer 

military relationship. But they can’t have it because of appropriations. 

This is something Ambassador can say to them and say it in sort 

of an offering way. We want to be closer to you but you need to 

help yourself by reforming. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask you—I was the prime sponsor of the 

Frank Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, which takes us 

further down the road of trying to hold designated persons lists, 

the use of sanctions, which are parallel to the Global Magnitsky 

Act—I was the House Sponsor of that. 

It did get passed into law by way of amendment, which was 

great, through the NDAA. 

And that is another tool that you mentioned, Mr. Tissainayagam, 

as something we ought to, in your list of recommendations. 

Is it time to really pull the trigger on those kinds of tools that 

are in the toolbox? Seems to me. 

Mr. SIFTON. I wish it was. I wish I could say yes. 

The problem is that the current way in which the administration’s State Department considers sanctions under Global 

Magnitsky requires that the abuses in question be somewhat recent, and so you would really have to focus on current bad actors 

in the last 3 to 5 years. 

You cannot really make a successful Magnitsky petition to the 

government about abuses that took place in 2009. It’s intensely 

frustrating to us as a human rights group. But that’s the reality 

that we are dealing with. 

Mr. SMITH. Especially since the torture is ongoing. 

Mr. SIFTON. That you could. If you identify Sri Lankan officials 

who are implicated in torture in the last 3 to 5 years, by all means 

they should be recommended for sanctioning under——

Mr. SMITH. Is Human Rights Watch compiling lists of people that 

could be held accountable? 

Mr. SIFTON. Sri Lanka is one of several countries that we’ve recommended. 

Mr. SMITH. For those names—could you convey them to this subcommittee? That would be very helpful. 

Yes, Professor. 

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Chairman, though I would—I certainly would 

love to see that kind of movement I helped in the Senate draft the 

Magnitsky Act. 

But the point is, is how far do we want to—how hard do we want 

to push right now? 

I agree with my colleague here we have new Ambassador coming 

in. If we push too hard, what ends up happening is nothing happens. 

40

Go ahead, they’ll say do it, but then they’ll turn to India or 

China, and we lose that important base. And, again, remember, 

just within a month the Department of Defense did something that 

it rarely does—change the name of a combatant command to the 

Pacific India Command, which shows you how important, from a 

geopolitical point of view they see this region. 

So it’s a delicate dance. Yes, altruistically, that’s t the way to go. 

But I think, practically speaking, we need to be able to show them 

that we could do this but there are other openings that might be 

able to allow us, because again, it’s been my experience if you push 

the Sri Lankan Government in whatever the issue may be too 

hard, they will dig their heels in and throw the baby out with the 

bathwater. And so all of a sudden we had something and now all 

of sudden we have nothing. 

Mr. SMITH. Before I go to one of my final questions, we are joined 

by a constituent of mine, Balan Akuga Palan, who is from Mercer 

County. He and his family are here today. I want to welcome them. 

Thank them for coming. 

Let me just ask you a couple final questions. The state of the 

media or lack of media freedom in Sri Lanka today—where is it 

today? 

Can journalists write openly and critically without the fear of 

that knock on the door in the middle of the night? 

And how do we address, or how are they addressing, the plight 

of religious and ethnic minority groups such as Christians? 

And before you go to your answers, just let me also point out that 

Tikuma is here. Tikuma is with Amnesty International. He spent 

over 5 years as a prisoner of conscience. So I want to thank him 

for his insights. 

He frequently testifies before this subcommittee. So I want to 

thank him for those insights which are very much valued. 

If you could speak to those issues—status of press freedom or 

lack of it, as well as the issue of other minority groups and how 

well or poorly they’re treated. 

Mr. TISSAINAYAGAM. Thank you. 

Well, basically, when you look at Sri Lanka’s performance with—

as far as free press—as far as press or media freedom goes, generally, it has improved from what it was in 2009, and in fact from 

2015. 

And when you look at the RSF’s index, for instance, Sri Lanka 

has come from the 162nd position to 142. So when you look at it 

from that point of view, people can write, people can say what they 

want and stuff like that. 

But I think there is a very important think that we have to recognize. There are certain things that cannot be spoken about in the 

Sri Lankan media and one of those about things like war crimes 

and crimes against humanity and about disappearances and issues 

like that. 

So while there is much more freedom to write about general political issues, there is absolutely nothing, or I would say very little 

to speak—to have in-depth discussion on issues like war crimes, 

disappearances, torture, and stuff like that. 

41

Now, I think it’s really important—I mean, people might say, 

okay, there is just one thing. I mean, you can speak about everything else. 

But I think it’s fundamental. If Sri Lanka is to reconcile—if its 

groups are going to reconcile and come together that you have a 

situation where the media is free enough to be able to discuss and 

have conversations on this matter. 

So I think there are—the main issue that does not permit this 

is the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The PTA does not allow you to 

write. I mean, if you want to write something that is critical of the 

government, even today, especially something that is—that 

doesn’t—something that the—on ethnic reconciliation and stuff like 

that, it is not permitted. 

So this is done in two ways. In the north and east, even yesterday, someone was covering something on the disappearances, was 

arrested—was harassed by the military, and this happens right 

along. 

So anyone who does anything about the military or—sorry, about 

the protests or about any sort of—or disappearances or anything 

like that—journalists can be harassed. They can be asked to give 

their names of their sources. Their photographic equipment has 

been taken away from them and stuff like that. 

In the south, it’s different. While this happens—this happens, 

the other problem is that the government looks upon anybody who 

is Sinhalese—or most Sinhalese who are writing about the ethnic 

issue and asking uncomfortable questions, as traitors, you know, 

you are going against our government. And our government, which 

destroyed terrorism and killed off the LTTE. 

So that project does not allow some of the editors and journalists 

who want to write to write, and that, very importantly, creates selfcensorship as far as the southern newspaper and media people are 

concerned. 

That’s all. And also the other—the third thing is that a lot of—

a lot of Web sites that speak about some of these issues are now 

blocked in Sri Lanka, 13, as of 2017 December. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Garrett. 

Mr. GARRETT. I will yield for the time being. I will wait in reserve. 

Mr. SMITH. Close to the end. 

If anyone would like to touch on the—how the Christians and 

other religious minority groups are being treated. 

Mr. JERRYSON. I think we can look at the—I mean, there has 

been a rise in the persecution of Christians. They were—first off, 

the Tamils during the civil war were not just all Hindus. There 

were Christians as well that were persecuted during that time period. 

There’s been an increase in persecution of Christians in Sri 

Lanka. Not to the extent that we see Muslims being persecuted. 

This is, I think, being a ripple effect throughout not just Sri Lanka 

but also in South Asia as a whole with India as well—the mobilization of Hindutva and, so yes. 

Mr. SMITH. Is there anything else before we go to Mr. Garrett 

that any of you would like to add that we have not touched upon 

today, just so we have a complete comprehensive record? 

42

We do have a number of submissions for the record: A statement 

by Amnesty International USA and also a testimony from MAP. So 

without objection, those two testimonies will be made part of the 

record. 

Mr. GARRETT. So I would speak briefly and begin with an apology 

for my tardiness, and I know that Mr. Sifton in particular has 

raised a number of concerns as it relates to the United States action with regards to the UNHRC. 

I would submit that membership in an entity who purports to 

espouse particular values as it relates to basic human rights and 

yet allows actors who are some of the most egregious violators of 

those values the positions and authority that the UNHRC has over 

the years almost undercuts the mission purported by the entity to 

begin with. 

I would also submit, at least in the opinion of this member, that 

advocacy on behalf of human rights of one group at the expense of 

human rights of another group also becomes self-defeating. 

And so I certainly don’t commend all actions as it relates to the 

United States with regard to the UNHRC. But I understand that 

perpetuating the idea that the UNHRC and the membership thereof is somehow worthy to pass judgment wherein member states like 

China, like Saudi Arabia, like Russia, like Cuba, and, in the past, 

Venezuela, whose human rights records are far from gleaming, 

again, undercuts the stated mission of the entity. So it’s a little bit 

more complicated than I think perhaps it could be made. 

With that, again, my sincerest apologies and I thank the chairman for the time and would yield back, reserving. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Garrett. 

The chair recognizes my good friend from California, Brad Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, and I want to thank you for allowing 

me to participate. I am not a member of this subcommittee but I’ve 

been very involved in Sri Lanka as ranking member of the Asia 

Subcommittee, which had its own hearing, hence delaying me from 

being here. 

Although the war ended in 2009, Sri Lanka’s northern and eastern provinces have an awful lot of property controlled by the ministry of defense, including an extensive portfolio of previously civilian properties, a number of businesses, and multiple hotels. 

Is it inappropriate for these civilian properties to remain under 

military control almost 10 years after the end of the conflict? And 

is the Sri Lankan Government taking steps to restore civilian control to these properties in the northern and eastern provinces? 

Mr. TISSAINAYAGAM. Thank you. 

Well, originally, these properties were taken over by the government, saying that this was for security and related reasons. This 

was during the war. And this happened over a period of about almost 30 years. 

The problem is that the war came to an end in 2009 and, to your 

question, there is no need for the Sri Lankan Government to hold 

on to all this amount of land. 

What the government says is that it needs this land to establish 

camps and control the security of the area. There are a couple of 

problems here. 

43

The first is what I referred to in my written—in my written 

statement about militarization. First and foremost, you don’t need 

so many soldiers and military personnel in the north and east. 

According to some statistics that came out very recently, in a 

town called Mullaitivu, the ratio between soldiers to civilians is two 

to one. There are 130,000 people to 60,000 soldiers. 

So first and foremost, we don’t need so many soldiers there so 

you can close some of those camps. Coming down—coming back to 

the—coming to the land itself, there are two types of land that is 

being held. 

One is state-owned land and the other is private land. So while 

the government, under a lot of international and local pressure 

from human rights organizations and stuff like that, are giving 

back land, it is nowhere near what the people want because many 

of those people who are not—who want that land back, especially 

in the case of private owners, they are mostly in refugee camps. So 

you don’t want to live as a refugee when the army is occupying 

your land. 

So while land is being given back, it is very slow and not in keeping with the demand of the rate at which people want that land 

to be given back. That is the first—that’s a second issue. 

The third issue is that the government tells you, okay, right, we 

are giving you 20 acres, 100 acres, or whatever it is, and the people 

go and settle there. 

But then the next day the military comes and says, no, no, you 

can’t—you can’t—I mean, we said that, but there are land mines 

here or that for security reasons you can’t go and live there. So 

those people go back. 

So even if there isn’t—officially this land is given back, actually 

it is not. So in reality, those people continue to live in refugee 

camps. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I wonder if any of the other witnesses has a comment on that question. 

Mr. Crane. 

Mr. TISSAINAYAGAM. Thank you. 

Mr. CRANE. Thank you, sir. 

Yes, I do, you know, and the international humanitarian laws 

are in conflict too to recognize property seizure in a general sense 

but there’s got to be an appropriate and, in most cases, militarily 

necessary reason to seize that property. 

And even if that is done, particularly in situations like that, 

some type of compensatory arrangement is made. You know, Geneva IV deals with the laws of occupation and, of course, during conflict a party to the conflict can seize property for an appropriate 

reason. 

Initially, after the conflict ended, movement of military forces 

into that part of Sri Lanka was legal and probably appropriate. 

But what’s over a period of 10 years now is that the militarily 

necessary reason for them to be doing that has waned, and now all 

this is is really just a visible reminder of raw power and the——

Mr. SHERMAN. Does it produce a stream of income that goes directly to the military coffers? 

Mr. CRANE. Congressman, I just don’t know those facts so I 

would not comment on that. 

44

Mr. SHERMAN. That’s—I don’t know if Mr. Sifton——

Mr. SIFTON. The assumption is that that would not be a stretch 

of an assumption. But let’s be clear about the laws at work. The 

conflict is not underway. There is no active state of armed conflict 

in Sri Lanka today. 

Mr. SHERMAN. It ended in 2009. 

This year’s omnibus appropriations law conditions U.S. economic 

and security aid to Sri Lanka on its government meeting certain 

human rights benchmarks. 

Should we further condition our assistance to Sri Lanka on 

progress on human rights issues including accounting for missing 

persons and providing some degree of political autonomy to the 

Tamil minority? 

Mr. SIFTON. In a perfect world, that’s a recommendation that we 

would make. But, honestly, not necessary in the sense that the existing law already gives tools and ammunition to the incoming Ambassador and other U.S. officials to say to the Sri Lankan Government there’s more that we could do if you started taking actions 

on——

Mr. SHERMAN. That assumes that the executive branch and the 

legislative branch are agnostic as to which of them is controlling 

American policy. Would that the executive branch always take our 

advice, we wouldn’t need to put provisions in the statute. 

I will ask any other witness whether you have a comment on 

whether it would be important for Congress to put such conditions 

into statute or should we be confident that the executive branch 

will use the tools that other statutes have given them and doesn’t 

need to be told what to do on further statutes. 

Does any—yes, Mr. Crane. 

Mr. CRANE. Yes. It’s always a good thing to have legislation that 

highlights human rights and links it to moneys that would be benefit of a country that is maybe violating those human rights. 

I think it’s a decision by both the legislative branch and the executive branches, and I had mentioned this to the chairman—how 

hard do we want to push at this moment? 

You would know as well as anybody in this room the Sri 

Lankans are very sensitive about this. If we go all out, we may lose 

everything. If we continue to engage quietly and encourage versus 

jam it down their throats, then that’s exactly what’s going to happen. They’re going to gag and we are going to be back at ground 

zero. 

So that’s not an answer but a caution. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And I would point out the one disadvantage we 

have as a legislative branch is when we want to influence the executive branch we can do that quietly, but when we want to control 

the executive branch it’s in a public statute—which means that it’s 

not subtle, and sometimes we should be subtle and sometimes we 

should be less than subtle. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Let me just ask one final question, if I could, and the question 

is to you. 

Oh, go ahead. 

45

Mr. JERRYSON. Just one thing to note. If you’re going to put anything into the statutes about the Tamil minorities, please also include Muslims as well. Many of them do not identify as Tamil and 

they’re also being persecuted at this time. 

Mr. SMITH. If you could elaborate—you noted in your testimony 

that you interviewed the founders of the BBS in the summer of 

2014, only 2 weeks before Gnanasara Thero gave a speech that 

triggered Buddhist riots and attacks on Muslims. 

Could you elaborate on this seemingly escalating threat of this 

extremism? 

Mr. JERRYSON. Absolutely, Chairman. Just to be clear, do you 

want me to reflect more on the meeting or on the current escalating threat? 

Mr. SMITH. Current escalating threat. But you, obviously, having 

talked to them—the founder back in 2014—I think would have 

some very useful insights. 

Mr. JERRYSON. The Buddhist nationalist groups right now in Sri 

Lanka are feeding off of not just themselves but also adjoining 

Buddhist organizations, such as the Ma Ba Tha and the 969 Movement in Myanmar. 

And so they are beginning to feel more and more emboldened of 

the fact that they’re alone—that the West is only concerned with 

Christians and colonial rhetoric, and that they have to take matters into their own hands. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, we speak out—if you would yield for a moment—very aggressively on the Rohingya, which, obviously, are in 

the crosshairs. 

Mr. JERRYSON. Yes. Yes, absolutely. 

There was—actually, in September of this past year there was a 

U.N.-sanctioned refugee camp in Sri Lanka for Rohingya refugees 

that were attacked by Buddhists and Buddhist monks that were 

Sri Lankan. 

So this is—the rhetoric of pointing out that Buddhism is under 

threat is becoming more and more, I think, solidified, more clear 

for many people. It’s getting more traction. 

The one small silver lining is, again, the fact that Gnanasara 

Thero was arrested and there’s rumors that he’s going to be defrocked. But this is something that, hopefully, we can see more of. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Jerryson—yes. 

Mr. SIFTON. I would just add to that. I think there is—with respect to what Representative Sherman said about the administration, there are some allies who are willing to be more forceful on 

some of these issues. They’re spread a little bit thin. One of them 

is former Senator Brownback, who is now Ambassador-at-Large on 

these issues. 

Encouraging him to visit the country would probably be to the 

country’s benefit in the sense that it would revitalize efforts at C 

Street and in Washington, in general, to really address these issues 

with a little bit more vigor. 

Mr. SMITH. I will take that up with him. A great idea. 

Anything else you’d like to add before we conclude? 

Mr. SIFTON. I would like to respond to the issue of the Human 

Rights Council, if I may, very briefly. 

46

There is no doubt that the Human Rights Council in Geneva is 

deeply flawed. But it has also given us things like the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on North Korea and the two resolutions that 

pressured Sri Lanka to do everything that they have done, as inadequate as it is. 

There was a reform process underway in Geneva. Ambassador 

Haley, instead of working within that process, tried to lead a shortcut through the U.N. General Assembly where the U.S. lacked requisite political support and where also would have opened a Pandora’s Box of other amendments by bad actors, including Russia 

and China, that would have ended with a net result of a worse 

Human Rights Council. 

So for all those reasons, we suggest that they not do this, and 

I would submit that if the measure of how flawed a U.N. body is 

is its members have egregious human rights records, then what are 

we to do with the U.N. Security Council? Should we withdraw from 

that as well? 

Mr. SMITH. I thank you. 

I would just provide one insight: When the Human Rights Commission was established, the predecessor for the Human Rights 

Council—many of us had very, very high hopes that it would matriculate into a true, robust human rights organization of U.N. 

member states that really had as close to impeccable records as 

possible. 

I, for one, believe that we should always stay and fight from 

within. But it is so egregiously flawed. The way it focuses on Israel 

is an abomination and when countries like China, where torture is 

absolutely pervasive and all their other human rights abuses—I’ve 

gone to the Council many times, raised issues. Went to the press 

conference that the Chinese held and raised these issues—they just 

closed down the press conference and didn’t want to talk any further. 

So, hopefully, withdrawal—if that’s what will actually happen—

will lead to some very robust introspection. I’ve raised issues with 

Prince Zeid many times. I think he has made numerous mistakes. 

I am sure he’s well meaning, but numerous mistakes, especially 

as it relates to Israel. I mean, how many votes are had in that 

Council that are all directed at Israel when so many—I mean, even 

on the issue of killing or enabling terrorists subsidized by the PLA 

and paying their families—pay to slay is what we call it. 

We recently had legislation on the floor of the House to at least 

ding them on some of the money. I am going to introduce a new 

bill that says we’ll hold criminally and civilly liable those at the 

PLA who provide this blood money to terrorists and to their families and also hold the position in the PLA leadership depending on 

how many years you spend in prison when you commit a terrorist 

act. I mean, there were a few—and yet, does the PLA—I know it’s 

an organization. It’s not a de facto government, per se. It is a government—that gets away with this murder. 

So I thought we should have stayed and fought from within. But 

I am shocked and dismayed how the cast of human rights abusers 

remain dominant at the Human Rights Council. It’s not much different, if at all, from the Human Rights Commission. So the hope 

that, as a replacement, it would have led to a more transparent, 

47

open, aggressive, ‘‘This is where human rights are really done’’ institution didn’t happen. 

Mr. SIFTON. Well, we’ll keep fighting to reform it. We will keep 

fighting, because it needs help and it will reform, whether the U.S. 

is there or not. 

Mr. SMITH. Gotcha. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JERRYSON. If I can add to this discussion, briefly. 

So as I mentioned before, there’s a battle of rhetoric taking place 

in Sri Lanka about the fact that there might be Western propaganda taking place, Western interests. 

My concern is the timing of all this. The fact of being pulled out 

of the Human Rights Commission means also the Council can also 

start looking at the United States about possible human rights 

problems that we have here and that could be used as fuel for fake 

news and false information in Sri Lanka and disregard what we 

have to say. So just a concern I just want to put out there. 

Mr. GARRETT. Mr. Chairman? 

So would you suggest then that if we hadn’t pulled out of the 

UNHRC that there wouldn’t be any fake news or propaganda? 

Mr. JERRYSON. No. No. Not at all. 

Mr. GARRETT. So, in other words, we are going to get that either 

way, right? 

I mean, this is almost like, I would argue, giving the fox the keys 

to the proverbial henhouse, and if you wanted to have credibility 

then maybe there should be some standards for membership thereon. That’s a rhetorical assertion. 

But, again, I have great sympathy for the administration, for the 

chair, for Ranking Member Sherman. There’s no right answer here. 

Having said that, as it relates to Mr. Sifton’s comment to the 

U.N. Security Council, you know, there are those who would say 

you’re absolutely correct, right. 

The question is what baby do you throw out with the proverbial 

bathwater. Having said that, if I were to review and enumerate the 

human rights violations of the members of the UNHRC just right 

now, we’d have to book another several hours. [Laughter.] 

Right? That’s all. I don’t disagree with you guys. In fact, I admire 

you and I think you’re doing the right thing. But there is no panacea here wherein we go, well, if we are a member everything will 

be good and if we are not everything will be bad. 

It’s frustrating. Thank you. 

Mr. SIFTON. One point is that the Human Rights Council votes 

on these resolutions passed by unanimous consent. So these egregious human rights actors who have, you know, caused our staff 

huge problems, put us in peril, allowed these resolutions to go forward. 

So yes, it’s flawed, and yes, there are egregious human rights 

violations. 

Mr. GARRETT. But by virtue of participation you essentially legitimized those edicts. That’s the problem. If you turn and walk 

away from it—you say, we don’t recognize the authority of this particular entity, right—we’ve seen this recently as it relates to the arbiters of what is and isn’t, for example, a hate group. 

When you give blanket authority to a subset of individuals to determine who is bad and who is good, ultimately, those individuals, 

48

in a world corrupted and inhabited by fallen human beings, would 

probably tend to err on the side of whatever agendas they harbor, 

right. 

You can know, and I do, that Israel is not perfect without agreeing with every assertion that somehow Israel is evil. 

Mr. SMITH. I want to thank all of my colleagues. I want to thank 

our very distinguished witnesses for your extraordinarily incisive 

and illuminating testimony. It helps us to do a better job on the 

subcommittee, and we will be in touch with the administration on 

many of the recommendations you have made. So thank you so 

very much. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:56 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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