48318 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 178 / Monday, September 15, 1997 / Notices

for each site shall be exercised

biennially with full participation by

each offsite authority having a role

under the plan.

III.

In a letter dated August 18, 1997, the

licensee requested a one-time

exemption from the requirements of

Section IV.F.2.c of Appendix E to 10

CFR Part 50 to exercise Monticello

Nuclear Generating Plant’s offsite

emergency preparedness (EP) plans with

State and local government authorities

within the plant’s plume exposure

pathway emergency planning zone

(EPZ). The licensee requested this onetime exemption in support of the State

of Minnesota’s request for relief from

the Federal Emergency Management

Agency (FEMA) requirements in 44 CFR

Part 350 to biennially exercise offsite EP

plans. The State and local counties

requested relief from FEMA

requirements (in accordance with

Section 350.9.c of 44 CFR Part 350) due

to the hardships caused by recent

natural disasters. In a letter dated

August 12, 1997, to FEMA Region V, the

State of Minnesota provided the

following justification for its relief

request:

The Minnesota Division of Emergency

Management (DEM) and other State agencies

are in various phases of seven Presidential

Declarations of Major Disasters within the

last 2 years. The State experienced record

cold, crippling snowfall, and the worst floods

in its history. Thousands of State, local, and

Federal emergency responders were

activated. In July 1997, a string of severe

storms brought high speed straight line

winds, tornadoes, and more flooding to

central Minnesota. DEM continues to have 42

percent of its staff assigned to these natural

disasters.

Sherburne and Wright counties (the

counties within the plume exposure EPZ) are

still conducting damage assessment for their

third Presidential Declaration in the last 8

months. Personnel responsible for

coordinating the radiological response plan

implementation in the upcoming exercise are

still in the midst of clean-up, restoration,

recovery, and human services activities.

The State has a good record of exercise

performance and has not received an exercise

deficiency since 1991. Neither county has

ever received an exercise deficiency.

Minnesota received numerous accolades

from FEMA for the effective and efficient

way in which it responded to these natural

disasters. The State and county drew upon

the planning and exercise experiences from

the last 15 years in radiological EP and feel

that the actual use of plans and procedures

was far more valuable than an exercise.

As stated in 10 CFR 50.47, the NRC

bases its finding on the adequacy of

offsite EP on FEMA’s assessment. In a

letter dated August 21, 1997, FEMA

notified the NRC that it has determined

that granting this relief will have no

undue risk on public safety. Since the

licensee intends to perform the onsite

portion of the 1997 biennial exercise,

granting this one-time exemption will

not affect the status of onsite EP. Based

upon FEMA’s assessment of offsite EP

for the State and local counties within

Monticello’s EPZ, and since the onsite

portion of the biennial exercise will be

performed in 1997, granting this onetime exemption will not pose undue

risk to public health and safety.

Section 50.12(a)(2) of 10 CFR specifies

that special circumstances must exist for

the Commission to consider an

exemption request and provides a list of

conditions, any of which constitute

special circumstances. One of these

conditions is ‘‘the exemption would

provide only temporary relief from the

applicable regulation and the licensee

has made good faith efforts to comply

with the regulation.’’ The licensee will

perform the onsite portion of the 1997

biennial exercise and only requested

this exemption because of the hardships

that performing the offsite portion of the

exercise would have on the State and

local counties. The licensee expects full

participation of the State and local

agencies in the next biennial exercise

scheduled for June 22, 1999. In

addition, the State is scheduled to

participate in the July 1998 exercise at

the Prairie Island nuclear power plant.

Therefore, special circumstances exist

that allow for consideration of the

licensee’s exemption request.

IV.

Accordingly, the Commission has

determined, pursuant to 10 CFR

50.12(a), that this exemption is

authorized by law, will not present an

undue risk to the public health and

safety, and is consistent with the

common defense and security. The

Commission has further determined that

special circumstances as provided in 10

CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present justifying

the exemption.

Therefore, the Commission hereby

grants the requested one-time

exemption from the requirements of

Section IV.F.2.c of Appendix E to 10

CFR Part 50.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that the

granting of this exemption will not have

a significant effect on the quality of the

human environment (62 FR 47520).

This exemption is effective upon

issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day

of September 1997.

For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Frank J. Miraglia,

Acting Director Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 97–24382 Filed 9–12–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket 70–7002]

Notice of Amendment to Certificate of

Compliance GDP–2 for the U.S.

Enrichment Corporation (Portsmouth

Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Portsmouth,

Ohio)

The Director, Office of Nuclear

Material Safety and Safeguards, has

made a determination that the following

amendment request is not significant in

accordance with 10 CFR 76.45. In

making that determination the staff

concluded that (1) there is no change in

the types or significant increase in the

amounts of any effluents that may be

released offsite; (2) there is no

significant increase in individual or

cumulative occupational radiation

exposure; (3) there is no significant

construction impact; (4) there is no

significant increase in the potential for,

or radiological or chemical

consequences from, previously analyzed

accidents; (5) the proposed changes do

not result in the possibility of a new or

different kind of accident; (6) there is no

significant reduction in any margin of

safety; and (7) the proposed changes

will not result in an overall decrease in

the effectiveness of the plant’s safety,

safeguards or security programs. The

basis for this determination for the

amendment request is shown below.

The NRC staff has reviewed the

certificate amendment application and

concluded that it provides reasonable

assurance of adequate safety, safeguards,

and security, and compliance with NRC

requirements. Therefore, the Director,

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and

Safeguards, is prepared to issue an

amendment to the Certificate of

Compliance for the Portsmouth Gaseous

Diffusion Plant. The staff has prepared

a Compliance Evaluation Report which

provides details of the staff’s evaluation.

The NRC staff has determined that

this amendment satisfies the criteria for

a categorical exclusion in accordance

with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant

to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental

impact statement or environmental

assessment need be prepared for this

amendment.

USEC or any person whose interest

may be affected may file a petition, not

exceeding 30 pages, requesting review
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 178 / Monday, September 15, 1997 / Notices 48319

of the Director’s Decision. The petition

must be filed with the Commission not

later than 15 days after publication of

this Federal Register Notice. A petition

for review of the Director’s Decision

shall set forth with particularity the

interest of the petitioner and how that

interest may be affected by the results of

the decision. The petition should

specifically explain the reasons why

review of the Decision should be

permitted with particular reference to

the following factors: (1) the interest of

the petitioner; (2) how that interest may

be affected by the Decision, including

the reasons why the petitioner should

be permitted a review of the Decision;

and (3) the petitioner’s areas of concern

about the activity that is the subject

matter of the Decision. Any person

described in this paragraph (USEC or

any person who filed a petition) may

file a response to any petition for

review, not to exceed 30 pages, within

10 days after filing of the petition. If no

petition is received within the

designated 15-day period, the Director

will issue the final amendment to the

Certificate of Compliance without

further delay. If a petition for review is

received, the decision on the

amendment application will become

final in 60 days, unless the Commission

grants the petition for review or

otherwise acts within 60 days after

publication of this Federal Register

Notice.

A petition for review must be filed

with the Secretary of the Commission,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention:

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, or

may be delivered to the Commission’s

Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW,

Washington, DC, by the above date.

For further details with respect to the

action see (1) the application for

amendment and (2) the Commission’s

Compliance Evaluation Report. These

items are available for public inspection

at the Commission’s Public Document

Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L

Street, NW, Washington, DC, and at the

Local Public Document Room.

Date of amendment request: May 16,

1997.

Brief description of amendment: The

proposed amendment reduces the

minimum depth design feature

requirement for Borosilicate glass

Raschig rings (neutron poison) from 12

inches to 6 inches in Scale Pits 1A and

2 as stated in Technical Safety

Requirement (TSR) 2.5.4.4 entitled

‘‘Scale Pit Raschig Rings,’’ for the

Extended Range Product (ERP) facility

at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion

Plant. The proposed amendment request

is required to allow proper operation of

the scale mechanism at the ERP 1A

station. The request for reduction of the

minimum depth of Raschig rings for

ERP 2 station is to maintain consistency

of administrative control on this

neutron poison parameter.

Basis for finding of no significance: 1.

The proposed amendment will not

result in a change in the types or

significant increase in the amounts of

any effluents that may be released

offsite.

Borosilicate glass Raschig rings are

contained in ERP Scale Pits 1A and 2 as

enhancements to other primary

criticality controls. Modification to the

minimum depth requirement would not

result in significantly increasing the

potential for unconfinement of UF6

which could lead to an increase in

effluents that may be released offsite.

On the contrary, retaining the required

Raschig rings depth at ERP 1A station to

at least 12 inches may cause improper

operation of the scale which performs

the safety function of measuring

cylinder weight. When heated for

sampling or some other purpose, an

overfilled cylinder could rupture and

release a large quantity of UF6.

2. The proposed amendment will not

result in a significant increase in

individual or cumulative occupational

radiation exposure.

Based on the staff’s review of the

adequacy of contingency analysis for all

credible process upsets, reliability of

controls, and adequacy of control

independence (common-mode failures),

the staff has determined that the

proposed amendment will not

significantly increase the risk of a

criticality accident. The basis for the

staff’s conclusion is based on the

following controls and requirements:

a. To maintain the integrity of the UF6

pressure boundary, which provides

geometry and mass control, USEC is

committed to applying appropriate

quality assurance requirements to

process gas piping and equipment

(including valves).

b. To provide moderation control,

scale pits are inspected weekly for the

presence of liquids. Any liquid found, is

transferred out of the scale pits

appropriately.

c. Maximum uranium enrichment of

ten percent is ensured by the use of inline gamma and mass spectrometers or

via samples if the spectrometers are not

operational.

d. Raschig rings in the scale pits are

inspected for settling and damage at

least on an annual basis. USEC is also

committed to maintaining the Raschig

rings according to other requirements of

ANSI/ANS–8.5 entitled ‘‘Use of

Borosilicate-glass Raschig Rings as a

Neutron Absorber in Solutions of Fissile

Material.’’

e. The scale pits are required to be

maintained free of uranium buildup.

f. To prevent recirculating cooling

water (RCW), which can act as a

moderator, from entering the coolant

system, the pressure of the RCW is

maintained at least 5 psi lower than the

coolant system. A pressure switch is

provided to automatically trip the UF6

withdrawal compressor if this minimum

pressure differential requirement is not

maintained.

g. Smoke detectors are provided in

ERP to monitor for UF6 releases. A UF6

out-leakage detection system has the

capability of automatically isolating the

pigtail if two smoke detector heads

detect smoke at the withdrawal station.

When these smoke detectors are not

operational, a smoke watch is

maintained. The pigtail isolation system

can also be manually actuated from

outside ERP.

h. The maximum UF6 pressure at the

ERP station is maintained below 60

psia.

i. Prior to withdrawing UF6 into a

product cylinder, a cold pressure check

of the cylinder is performed. The

cylinder is rejected if the pressure is

greater than ten inches of mercury

which provides indication of the

probable presence of moderator or a

hydrocarbon which can explosively

react with UF6. The cylinder is also

visually inspected for damage and

weighed before being attached to the

pigtail.

j. The staff independently reviewed

and found acceptable, USEC’s

assumptions and calculations leading to

the conclusion that for a large UF6

release in ERP, the heat generated by the

exothermic reaction of UF6 with water

vapor in ERP will not be sufficient to

actuate the sprinkler system which

could introduce moderator into the

scale pits.

k. There is a specific coolant pressure

TSR Safety Limit (SL) of 440 psig. The

purpose of this limit is to prevent the

over pressurization and rupture of the

coolant system which could result in

the subsequent release of UF6 due to

over pressurization and subsequent

rupture of the UF6 containment

boundary.

l. There are specific TSR Limiting

Conditions of Operation (LCOs), Action

Statements for conditions where LCOs

are exceeded, and Surveillance

Requirements (SRs), dealing with (1)

minimum number of operable smoke

detectors/alarms to detect and indicate

a release of UF6; (2) coolant high

pressure relief to ensure that the TSR SL
48320 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 178 / Monday, September 15, 1997 / Notices

of 440 psig is not exceeded; (3) pigtail

isolation system to limit the UF6 release

to less than 127 pounds in case of a

pigtail failure; (4) assay monitoring to

ensure that the TSR specified maximum

assays for the accumulators and

cylinders are not exceeded; (5) cylinder

cart movement restrictions to ensure

that a cylinder is not moved while it is

connected to the withdrawal manifold;

(6) liquid UF6 cylinder movement

methods and restrictions to minimize

the risk of a liquid UF6 cylinder drop

and rupture; (7) UF6 cylinder weight

monitoring to ensure that the TSR

specified fill weights are not exceeded;

and (8) restrictions on heating solidified

UF6 plugs to prevent pipe rupture that

could be caused by local liquefaction

and expansion.

m. There are specific general design

feature requirements and associated SRs

related to (1) design, construction,

testing and maintenance to ensure that

the intended functions of UF6 cylinders

and pigtails are met so that they do not

fail during normal operations; (2)

cylinder lifting cranes and fixtures to

ensure that a cylinder is not dropped

and ruptured; and (3) Raschig rings in

scale pits to enhance criticality safety.

Consequently, there will be no

significant increase in a risk of a

criticality accident which could

significantly increase individual or

cumulative occupational radiation

exposures.

3. The proposed amendment will not

result in a significant construction

impact.

The proposed amendment does not

involve any construction, therefore,

there will be no construction impacts.

4. The proposed amendment will not

result in a significant increase in the

potential for, or radiological or chemical

consequences from, previously analyzed

accidents.

For similar reasons (adequacy of

contingencies, reliability of controls,

and unlikelihood of common-mode

failures) provided in the assessment of

criterion 2, the proposed amendment

will not significantly increase the risk of

a criticality accident. Therefore, the

proposed amendment will not

significantly increase the potential for,

or radiological or chemical

consequences from, previously analyzed

accidents.

5. The proposed amendment will not

result in the possibility of a new or

different kind of accident.

Based on the adequacy of

contingencies, reliability of controls,

and unlikelihood of common-mode

failures provided in the assessment of

criterion 2, the NRC staff has

determined that the proposed

amendment will not result in the

possibility of a new or different kind of

accident.

6. The proposed amendment will not

result in a significant reduction in any

margin of safety.

For similar reasons (adequacy of

contingencies, reliability of controls,

and unlikelihood of common-mode

failures) provided in the assessment of

criterion 2, the proposed amendment

will not significantly increase the risk of

a criticality accident. In addition, the

amendment is required to ensure proper

operability of the ERP 1A scale, which

performs the safety function of

measuring the weight of the cylinder as

it is being filled. Properly and safely

weighing the cylinder is necessary to

ensure safety of the facility. Therefore,

the proposed amendment will not result

in a significant reduction in any margin

of safety.

7. The proposed amendment will not

result in an overall decrease in the

effectiveness of the plant’s safety,

safeguards or security programs.

For similar reasons (adequacy of

contingencies, reliability of controls,

unlikelihood of common-mode failures,

and operability of ERP 1A scale)

provided in the assessment of criteria 2

and 6, the proposed amendment will

not significantly increase the risk of a

criticality or UF6 release accident.

Therefore, the proposed amendment

will not result in a decrease in the

plant’s overall safety program.

The staff has not identified any

safeguards or security related

implications from the proposed

amendment. Therefore, the proposed

amendment will not result in an overall

decrease in the effectiveness of the

plants safeguards or security programs.

Effective date: The amendment to

GDP–2 will become effective 30 days

after issuance by NRC.

Certificate of Compliance No. GDP–2:

Amendment will incorporate a revised

requirement of a General Design Feature

contained in the Technical Safety

Requirements.

Local Public Document Room

location: Portsmouth Public Library,

1220 Gallia Street, Portsmouth, Ohio

45662.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day

of September 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

William F. Kane,

Acting Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear

Material Safety and Safeguards.

[FR Doc. 97–24380 Filed 9–12–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket 70–7001]

Notice of Amendment to Certificate of

Compliance GDP–1 for the U.S.

Enrichment Corporation Paducah

Gaseous Diffusion Plant Paducah, KY

The Director, Office of Nuclear

Material Safety and Safeguards, has

made a determination that the following

amendment request is not significant in

accordance with 10 CFR 76.45. In

making that determination, the staff

concluded that: (1) There is no change

in the types or significant increase in

the amounts of any effluents that may be

released offsite; (2) there is no

significant increase in individual or

cumulative occupational radiation

exposure; (3) there is no significant

construction impact; (4) there is no

significant increase in the potential for,

or radiological or chemical

consequences from, previously analyzed

accidents; (5) the proposed changes do

not result in the possibility of a new or

different kind of accident; (6) there is no

significant reduction in any margin of

safety; and (7) the proposed changes

will not result in an overall decrease in

the effectiveness of the plant’s safety,

safeguards or security programs. The

basis for this determination for the

amendment request is shown below.

The NRC staff has reviewed the

certificate amendment application and

concluded that it provides reasonable

assurance of adequate safety, safeguards,

and security, and compliance with NRC

requirements. Therefore, the Director,

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and

Safeguards, is prepared to issue an

amendment to the Certificate of

Compliance for the Paducah Gaseous

Diffusion Plant. The staff has prepared

a Compliance Evaluation Report which

provides details of the staff’s evaluation.

The NRC staff has determined that

this amendment satisfies the criteria for

a categorical exclusion in accordance

with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant

to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental

impact statement or environmental

assessment need be prepared for this

amendment.

USEC or any person whose interest

may be affected may file a petition, not

exceeding 30 pages, requesting review

of the Director’s Decision. The petition

must be filed with the Commission not

later than 15 days after publication of

this Federal Register notice. A petition

for review of the Director’s Decision

shall set forth with particularity the

interest of the petitioner and how that

interest may be affected by the results of

the decision. The petition should