U

I

U.S. Marines In Iraq, 2004-2005: INTO THE FRAY Estes 
Cover: Regimental Combat Team 7 Marines,

alongside Iraqi Army Emergency Response

Unit Soldiers, prepare for offensive operations

against enemy insurgents inside a mosque in

the city of Fallujah, al-Anbar Province, Iraq, on

10 November 2004, during Operation al-Fajr.

(Photo by SSgt Jonathan C. Knauth)
U.S. MARINES IN IRAQ, 2004–2005

INTO THE FRAY

U.S. Marines in the

Global War on Terrorism

by

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth W. Estes

U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

History Division

United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C.

2011
ii

Other Publications in the Series

U.S. Marines in the Global War on Terrorism

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

Det One: U.S. Marine Corps U.S. Special Operations Command

Detachment, 2003–2006

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2008: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

PCN 106 0000 2300
iii

Foreword

The following account represents one of the earliest efforts to chronicle Marine Corps operations in Iraq

between 2004 and 2005. This was a significant period in the history of Operation Iraqi Freedom, seeing two

battles fought over the city of Fallujah, the eruption of the Sadr revolt in an-Najaf, continuous counterinsurgency operations throughout Iraq, and initial efforts on the part of Marines to cultivate and forge alliances with

the tribes of Iraq’s al-Anbar Province. 

Almost as soon as Saddam Hussein’s regime collapsed in 2003, it became apparent to U.S. commanders that

a second deployment of Marines to Iraq would be necessary to conduct security and stability operations. This

monograph recounts the first two years of this second deployment during which Marines were responsible

for Iraq’s vast al-Anbar Province. This study focuses on I Marine Expeditionary Force’s deployment in 2004

and II Marine Expeditionary Force’s deployment of 2005, paying close attention to planning, counterinsurgency

operations, and efforts to build civil-military relations with the Iraqi population. Particular attention is also

paid to the first and second battles of Fallujah and the battle of an-Najaf.

This book was commissioned and written while U.S. forces were still engaged in combat operations in

Iraq. Even now, just five years since the events recounted in this study, we already have a sense of the significance of these years and the Marine Corps’ operations to the overall course of the war, and we can thank

Dr. Estes for making this possible. 

This History Division monograph is based on the occasional paper, “U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Iraq,

2003–2006” by the same author. This revision slightly differs from that original publication in a number of ways.

First, it contains maps to help orientate and familiarize readers to Iraq, al-Anbar Province, and the two battles

for Fallujah. Second, the new edition contains photographs depicting major commanders, combat operations,

equipment, and civil-military operations. Third, several informative sidebars have been added to provide readers with detailed information on specific topics. And finally, references have been redacted into short bibliographical essays at the end of the book to give readers a concise overview of available documentary sources. 

The author, Dr. Kenneth W. Estes, is a 1969 graduate of the United States Naval Academy who served in a

variety of command and staff assignments in the U.S. Marine Corps before retiring as a lieutenant colonel in

1993. He earned his PhD from the University of Maryland in 1984 and has taught at Duke University and the

U.S. Naval Academy. His publications include The Marine Officer’s Guide, Handbook for Marine NCOs, Marines

Under Armor: The Marine Corps and the Armored Fighting Vehicle, 1916–2000, and A European Anabasis:

Western European Volunteers in the German Army and Waffen-SS, 1940–1945. He resides in Seattle, Washington.

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

Director of Marine Corps History
v

Preface

This is a story of Marines, missions, and machines. The deployment of the I and II Marine Expeditionary

Forces in that sequence to Iraq during 2004–05 contains a surprising number of turns of events. These were

largely successes, but the situations did not always appear so favorable at the time and often they required

tenacious efforts, skills, courage, and stamina of Marines and their Navy and Army comrades to reach the desired outcome. The combat record of Marine Corps forces in Iraq brings great credit upon the Corps and the

armed forces of the United States of America. But, as will be seen in the following pages, the combat record

lies interspersed with a seemingly endless range of tasks undertaken by the battalions and the squadrons the

Corps operated as it engaged in security and stabilization operations in al-Anbar and the surrounding provinces. 

Nation-building has existed as a military mission for the U.S. Marine Corps at various junctures in its history. In contemporary usage, it has sent chills through the ranks of politicians, pundits, and observers and military leaders. Nevertheless, most of the activities of the Marine expeditionary forces in Iraq fell within the main

lines of nation building in the classic sense. The restoration of order in the cities and towns, humanitarian assistance, training of security forces, and the facilitation of local government formed the bedrock of U.S. and

Coalition actions in Iraq. In addition the concerted efforts by Multi National Forces–West to repair and reconstruct the urban infrastructure far exceeded the war damage Iraq sustained during the U.S. occupation in

March–April 2003, and in reality began the long process of recovery from the extended period of deprivation

suffered in the dictatorial regime that the U.S. actions had removed. 

The emerging evidence of the 2004–05 campaign by Marine Corps forces and other elements of the U.S.

Central Command will remain ripe for discussion and review by our institutions for decades to come. Few examples exist, however, of the extremes in operational employment experienced by the forces. 

The military occupation of al-Anbar Province and its surroundings required the utmost of patience, perseverance, and fortitude, among many salient requirements. The cities and towns were damaged, inhabitants demoralized, and little vestige of civil authority remained. Hopes remained high, however, that the occupation

would prove limited or even unnecessary and that the Iraqis would pick themselves up and begin a rebuilding process in the light of newly gained freedom. But as Marines took up new and unplanned responsibilities, various forms of insurgency began to build and present increasing security threats. For the Marines, nation

building and combat operations would proceed in tandem, if not simultaneously for almost all of their service in Iraq.

The epic occupation of Iraq will long remain as one of the most novel military operations ever undertaken

by a Marine Corps organization. It only capped, however, the extraordinary performances of I and II Marine

Expeditionary Forces that remain as testimonials to the professionalism and preparedness of the U.S. Marine

Corps in the beginning of the 21st Century.

A work of this kind necessarily depends on the help and advice of many people. The original concept of

assigning this volume to an independent historian came from discussions in 2005 between then Lieutenant

General James N. Mattis, commanding the Marine Corps Combat Development Center, and retired Major General Donald R. Gardner, president of the Marine Corps University. General Gardner launched the project and

arranged for my appointment as a research fellow of his institution during 2006–08.

Officers and enlisted Marines of Inspector-Instructor, 4th Landing Support Battalion, Ft. Lewis, Washington,

cheerfully provided office space and support for my research and writing. Their readiness to assist extended

in many instances to their advice and valued explanations of current procedures and operational matters, including in several cases experiences in Iraq during the period treated by this work. In particular, I thank Lieutenant Colonel Richard C. Smith, Major Wesley E. Souza, Captain Gregory J. Chester, Captain Christopher J.

Murphy, Sergeant Major Thomas Glembin, and Staff Sergeant M. E. Johnston.

At the Marine Corps History Division, I enjoyed the camaraderie and shared knowledge of Dr. Charles

Neimeyer, director; Richard Camp, deputy director (2006-07); Colonel Patricia D. Saint, deputy director (2007-

08); Dr. Fred Allison, oral historian; and Master Gunnery Sergeant Robert A. Yarnall, field historian. I received
vi

careful assistance from the Reference Section gang: Danny A. Crawford, Robert V. Aquilina, Lena M. Kaljot,

Annette D. Amerman, Kara Newcomer, and Shelia Phillips. Julie H. Robert, a historical preservationist student

at the University of Mary Washington, researched and edited the photographic collection printed with this

work. The Marine Corps University Foundation and Marine Corps Heritage Foundation supported me with a

combined fellowship in 2006-08, administered by retired Brigadier General Thomas V. Draude. The staff of

the Archives Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Gray Research Center at Quantico, principally Michael Miller,

director, and Dr. Jim Ginther, manuscript curator, facilitated my use of their document collection. Scott A.

Allen assisted me in understanding some of the contributions of the Marine Corps Systems Command to the

campaign under study. I also received assistance from dozens of other Marines and civilians at Marine Corps

Base Quantico. Approximately 20 officers undertook evaluation of this work in various draft stages.

Dr. Kenneth W. Estes

Marine Corps University

Research Fellow
vii

Table of Contents

Foreword..................................................................................................................................iii

Preface.......................................................................................................................................v

Table of Contents....................................................................................................................vii

Chapter 1 The Return to Iraq..............................................................................................1

Chapter 2 The Deployment ..............................................................................................13

Chapter 3 Early Operations in Al-Anbar Province...........................................................19

Chapter 4 The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath ................................................31

Chapter 5 The Second Al-Fallujah Battle .........................................................................53

Chapter 6 Optimism and Doubt .......................................................................................79

Chapter 7 The Mission Continues.....................................................................................87

Chapter 8 Into the Fray .....................................................................................................95

Chapter 9 Protecting Self-Rule ........................................................................................105

Chapter 10 Protecting the Emerging Iraq.........................................................................115

Chapter 11 Continuous Operations ..................................................................................131

Chapter 12 Redeployment and Relief...............................................................................141

Epilogue: New and Old..................................................................................................149

Notes .....................................................................................................................................153

Appendix A Command and Staff List.................................................................................159

Appendix B Unit List...........................................................................................................165

Appendix C Selected Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations ............................................177

Appendix D Chronology of Events, 2004–2008.................................................................181

Appendix E Reviewers........................................................................................................187

Index......................................................................................................................................189
1

I Marine Expeditionary Force Prepares to

Return to Iraq

The long, hot summer of 2003 drew to a close for

the Marines in Iraq. Since the brief offensive of March

and April had overthrown Saddam Hussein’s regime,

Marines had conducted an unplanned occupation

and peacekeeping campaign. Lieutenant General

James T. Conway’s I Marine Expeditionary Force (I

MEF) staff had announced the transition to “Post-hostility Operations” on 15 April, redeploying his forces

to a new operating area south of Baghdad. Operation Iraqi Freedom shifted into security and stability

operations aimed at facilitating humanitarian assistance and restoring civilian rule.

The summer had seen a dramatic reduction in Marine Corps forces in Iraq. 1st Marine Division commander Major General James N. Mattis had set the

tone for the stability and security operations by drastically cutting his division troop list from some 23,000

to 8,000 Marines. He retained only seven battalions of

infantry and two light armored reconnaissance battalions under a reduced division headquarters. These

occupied seven key Iraqi “governorates” or

provinces, working to reinstate local police and security functions and revive the municipal services and

public utilities. The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing under

Major General James F. Amos redeployed to the

United States, leaving behind two detachments with

18 helicopters for support. The Marine Logistics Command under Brigadier General Richard S. Kramlich

worked in Kuwait to reload materiel into ships and

aircraft, supported the remaining units, and redeployed itself, leaving a special purpose Marine airground task force under Brigadier General Ronald S.

Coleman to oversee the withdrawal of Marine forces

in the theater.

On 3 September, General Conway held a transfer

of authority ceremony with the Polish Army commander of the Multi National Division Center–South.

The remaining Marines subsequently began their return to the United States. A 1st Marine Expeditionary

Brigade command element briefly served as interim

higher headquarters during this redeployment period.

A further three weeks of patrolling and occasional

fighting in an-Najaf fell to 1st Battalion, 7th Marines

before a turnover could be effected. The 1st Marine

Division sustained no combat deaths during its stability and security operations campaign period. The

last Marine Corps organization to reach home station,

Company C, 4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, returned to Salt Lake City, Utah, on 9 December 2003, after three months in Iraq followed by a

six-month Unit Deployment Program rotation in

Japan.

Marines of the special purpose Marine air-ground

task force (MAGTF) continued their mission into November along with a few other small elements, such

as Detachment B of the 4th Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, which supported the Multi National

Division Center–South; 5th Platoon, Fleet Antiterrorist Security Team (FAST), providing security for the

U.S. Embassy, Baghdad; and some 556 Marine Corps

personnel remaining in Iraq and Kuwait. Before departing for the United States, General Mattis questioned Brigadier General Coleman about some of his

equipment in the hands of the Marine air-ground task

force. General Mattis thought he might need the

equipment soon and set 10 November 2003 as the

date when the entire division’s personnel and equipment would be combat ready.

As the combat forces that conducted the original

invasion and occupation phase left Iraq, the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) arrived in the Persian

Gulf and reported to the Fifth Fleet on 29 September. These periodic and overlapping Marine Expeditionary Unit deployments operated as part of the

theater reserve for the Combatant Commander, U.S.

Central Command, Army General John P. Abizaid,

during the remainder of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In

this case, the 13th MEU operated with the British-led

Multi National Division–Southeast. Landing elements

included 1st Battalion, 1st Marines at Kuwait Naval

Base and Umm Qasr. The Marine expeditionary unit

then conducted anti-smuggling and security missions

on the Faw Peninsula during 11–25 October. 

Within a month of the change of command, Marine Corps Commandant General Michael W. Hagee

asked General Conway to prepare his forces for another deployment to support Operation Iraqi Freedom II. Discussions in Washington D.C. had

Chapter 1

The Return to Iraq
advanced to the stage that a U.S. force rotation plan

developed, and planners at Headquarters U.S. Marine

Corps began to assess another deployment to Iraq.

An initial request for three battalions quickly expanded, and within two months, 63 percent of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) was preparing to

return.

Fielding I MEF for combat operations in Operation

Iraqi Freedom caused considerable disruptions to the

forces and supporting establishment of the Marine

Corps during 2002–03. The staff of Headquarters U.S.

Marine Corps estimated that providing such a force

for another Iraq rotation would delay the normal unit

deployment cycle another year, disrupt the maritime

prepositioned shipping reconstitution by again drawing away essential equipment, and drastically impact

the Marine Corps personnel policy governing deployment length, reserve mobilization, and the involuntary extension of tours of duty. All of these

factors later affected retention in both active and reserve components.

Nevertheless, the Corps mobilized about 22,000 reservists by 1 May 2003 and retained over 10,500 on

duty in mid-October. A planned maximum of 3,000

would remain on active duty after March 2004 by

continued call-up and demobilization of reservists.

Active duty end strength had also climbed because of

“stop-loss” and “stop-move” manpower directives,

reaching a peak of 179,630 Marines in July 2003. The

number subsided to 177,756 at the end of September and presumably would return to the authorized

175,000 by March 2004.

Maintaining routine deployments to Okinawa had

also required moving several battalions and aircraft

squadrons from Iraq to the United States and then to

Okinawa with 90 days or less at home station. Of

equal concern to headquarters was the need to reconstitute the floating equipment pools carried in the

three maritime prepositioned ship squadrons that had

been used as part of the strategic deployment of I

MEF to Kuwait at the end of 2002. The forecast estimated the basic reconstitution of the three squadrons

by March 2004. The staff identified further challenges

in replacing aviation ordnance, antitank missiles, and

overcoming the depot overhaul backlog, but the

larger question remained, that of supporting the next

Marine Corps contingent in Iraq.

The shortfall in Coalition troops meant that the

2 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by LCpl Andrew Williams Defense Imagery VIRIN: 030903-M-7837W-007

At the relief in place ceremony at Camp Bablyon, Iraq, on 3 September 2003, Polish-led Coalition forces relieved

the Marines of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF).
The Return to Iraq 3

United States would have to replace one or two Army

divisions in March 2004. Although the final decision

would not be made until the end of the year, the Joint

Staff forecasted the need for three to six battalions

each from the Army and Marine Corps. General

Hagee decided to plan for the deployment of a Marine division built around six infantry battalions with

commensurate aviation and logistics support.

The Commandant and his staff saw a key issue in

the period of deployment and how it would affect

the rest of the Corps. A seven-month deployment

would permit much more flexibility in meeting global

requirements while maintaining unit cohesion. He

submitted the proposal to Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, who officially announced on 5 November 2003 that Marine Corps units would return to

Iraq as part of the U.S. force rotations. Twenty-thousand Marines and sailors of I Marine Expeditionary

Force would replace the Army’s 82d Airborne Division by February 2004 as the primary force responsible for security operations in western Iraq. The deployment was expected to last seven months, with

another 20,000-strong Marine force replacing them

after that for another seven months.

On 27 November, General Hagee finalized the

new deployment of Marines to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Marine Forces, Central Command, would be

provided with a reduced Marine Expeditionary Force

(Forward) for operations in Iraq. In addition to its

command element, a reduced Marine division with

nine infantry battalions would meet the requirements

of the Joint Staff and of U.S. Central Command. The

division would be accompanied by an aircraft wing

and force service support group, both reduced and

tailored for the smaller ground combat element. 

The key components of General Hagee’s guidance

reflected the earlier concerns over the reconstitution

of Marine Corps forces in the aftermath of the 2003

campaign. The seven-month unit rotation policy was

the cornerstone of the 27 November 2003 planning

guidance. Although the Army and other services

worked their deployments to Iraq around a 13-month

cycle, General Hagee wanted to maintain the by-now

customary deployment of six to seven months to preserve the continuing operations of the Corps in its

global commitments: the forward deployed III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) in Japan and the

smaller Marine expeditionary unit deployments from

the east and west coast organizations to the Mediterranean and Pacific.

The Commandant authorized the Marine Forces

Central Command planners to draw as required from

the scheduled unit deployments to III MEF (except

for the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit [31st MEU])

for its force list. To meet material concerns, General

Hagee requested the maximum use of in-theater

equipment used by the 82d Airborne Division and 3d

Armored Cavalry Regiment in their area of operations. Much of this was not common to Marine Corps

unit tables of equipment, such as new counter-battery radars, uparmored wheeled vehicles, and various other items. Finally, with the exception of the

first squadron that had been reconstituted—Maritime

Prepositioned Squadron 3, based in the Marianas—

General Hagee authorized the issue of equipment

stored on Okinawa and with maritime prepositioned

shipping squadrons.

The intended demobilization of the Marine Corps

Reserve would prove temporary. Further deactivations continued past 17 December 2003, even as 3d

Battalion, 24th Marines activated. But the activation of

an infantry battalion as well as other units added

While Commandant of the Marine Corps from 2003

to 2006, Gen Michael W. Hagee provided leadership

and guidance that laid the groundwork for the Marine Corps’ return to Iraq in 2004.

Photo by Sgt Roman Yarek, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 050617-M-9114Y-037
more than 3,000 reservists to the active force, not

counting individual augmentations, by the time the

2002-03 activations had been demobilized by March

2004.

Problems in Iraq: The Emerging

Insurgency: 2003–04

The fall of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime in

April 2003 marked the end of the first phase of the

Iraq War. The next, signaled by a deadly insurgency

against the Coalition occupation of Iraq, would begin

almost immediately after. This phase of the war, characterized by irregular warfare and sectarian violence

against Coalition forces and between Iraq’s religious

and ethnic groups, lasted considerably longer and

presented many unanticipated challenges and obstacles to the U.S. military. Although the planning

process by the United States for the invasion of Iraq

had exceeded a year, very little preparation for posthostilities operations existed by the time major operations had ended in April. Most authorities assumed

that the Iraqis would replace the Ba’ath regime with

new leaders and that government bureaucracies

would return to work and assist immediately in the

recovery effort. With the end of the first phase of the

war, however, the Coalition faced an Iraq whose political, civil, and economic institutions were in a state

of disrepair and collapse. 

At the same time as Coalition forces prepared for

post-war reconstruction, United States Central Command initiated a rapid drawdown of forces stationed

in the country. Most important, the Coalition Forces

Land Component Command under Army Lieutenant

General David D. McKiernan would transfer responsibility for stabilization to the Combined Joint Task

Force 7. Converted from the headquarters staff of

Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez’s V Corps, the

combined joint task force exercised command and

control over a multinational force of more than 30

countries. Its responsibilities extended over all Iraq,

and it reported directly to the new Coalition Provisional Authority under L. Paul Bremer III, the civilian

governing agency established by the United States to

oversee the establishment of a new Iraqi government.

Coalition leaders hoped that both agencies would be

able to create a new Iraq with reformed political institutions, a rebuilt infrastructure, and a reenergized

society.

Hoping for a steady improvement in general conditions, Combined Joint Task Force 7’s initial campaign plan of June 2003 anticipated decreasing

opposition to the Coalition. According to this plan,

the Coalition Provisional Authority would revive native institutions and governmental bodies at local and

national levels. Meanwhile, ongoing U.S. military actions would decrease support for the old regime by

destroying surviving paramilitary forces, and capturing, trying, and punishing former Ba’athists. The anticipated improvement of basic services and the

transfer of Iraqi sovereignty to an interim government

would further undercut the opposition of radical antiwestern religious groups and potential violence between different factions throughout the country. The

end of combat would permit the repairing of damaged infrastructure and bring about economic recovery, thus promoting a newly emerging democratic

government and discrediting antiwestern factions.

Above all, both the Coalition Provisional Authority

and Combined Joint Task Force 7 assumed that those

Iraqi institutions, which had survived the combat

phase as well as the final years of the Hussein

4 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by LCpl Andrew Williams, Defense Imagery VIRIN 030903-M-7837W-041 

LtGen James T. Conway commanded I Marine Expeditionary Force through both the 2003 and 2004

campaigns in Iraq, and succeeded Gen Hagee as

Commandant of the Marine Corps in 2006.
The Return to Iraq 5

regime, would continue to perform their usual security functions.

The overall goal for Iraq was to reduce the need

for a long-term, large-scale U.S. military presence in

the country. Creating a secure environment in which

to hold local elections would encourage transition to

local authority, allowing U.S. troops to withdraw

from urban areas. American forces planned to move

out of the cities into consolidated forward operating

bases in late September 2003 and to be ready to conduct combat operations, assist or otherwise reinforce

Iraqi security forces, and even expand the divisional

zones of responsibilities as units such as the 101st

Airborne Division, 82d Airborne Division, and the 3d

Armored Cavalry Regiment began to redeploy to

home stations. A single U.S. light infantry division

would replace the multidivision occupation force that

had been in place during the six months following

the invasion. Thus, the new plan entailed the rapid

training and development of robust Iraqi military

forces, a capable police force, and an interim government. To help fulfill these goals, a program for

training the new Iraqi Army would begin in August.

Nevertheless, these initial assumptions and plans

proved too optimistic, forcing U.S. planners to devise

a new campaign in August 2003 to confront the intensifying insurgency against the Coalition occupation. The insurgency had been growing at a rapid

pace. Individual and organized criminal activities had

appeared even before the occupation of Iraq began.

In April 2003, soldiers of the 82d Airborne Division

fired on a crowd of protesters in Fall, further inflaming hostility toward the U.S. presence in the country.

The Coalition Provisional Authority’s May 2003 decision to dissolve the Iraqi Army and dismiss all members of the Ba’ath Party from positions in the civil

government removed thousands of Iraqis, most of

them Sunnis, from positions of political power. Such

measures created the impression that Sunnis would

be a marginal group in the new Iraq and many former Ba’athists flocked to the ranks of the insurgency.

Alongside former Ba’athists and regime supporters

were more radical groups, such as fundamentalist

paramilitary groups and international terrorist organizations. 

In the new plan of Combined Joint Task Force

(CJTF) 7, General Sanchez stated his mission was to

conduct combat operations to destroy enemy forces

and establish a secure environment while also engaging in stability operations to support the establishment of Iraqi sovereignty. The plan also entailed

humanitarian assistance for the Iraqi population and

restoring essential services to the communities. The

protection of key sites and services, such as water,

power, and sewage plants, would also contribute to

general security and recovery. A large array of public works projects and conventional civil affairs programs would assist in restoring economic prosperity

to Iraq and maintaining a sustainable quality of life,

especially in the supply of power, fuel, water, and

sanitation services. The reopening of Baghdad International Airport and introduction of a new currency

were also major benchmarks. Finally, Combined Joint

Task Force 7 planned to assist in the installation of viable and fair neighborhood, district, and city governing councils.

Due to the increasing intensity of the insurgency,

continued combat operations would be significant

features of the new plan. Under the concept of “an

adapting enemy,” the combined joint task force campaign plan anticipated an enemy capable of changing tactics and targets to avoid U.S. attacks and

overcome improving security measures. The most

likely enemy actions would come in the form of isoArmy LtGen Ricardo S. Sanchez was commanding

general of Combined Joint Task Force 7 and senior

commander of coalition forces in Iraq from 2003 to

2004.

Photo by LCpl Andrew Williams, Defense Imagery VRIN 030903-M-7837W-040
lated and random attacks. Less likely, but much more

dangerous, would be the enemy mounting an organized, well-targeted, and highly lethal attack. In addition, planners recognized the potential for the

enemy to disrupt reconstruction of the country with

political assassinations.

Realizing the Coalition would be unable to rapidly

eradicate resistance to the U.S. presence in Iraq,

Sanchez and his staff proposed long-range plans to

defeat the former regime forces, to neutralize extremist groups, and to reduce crime by 50 percent. To

accomplish these goals, Combined Joint Task Force

7 would establish, equip, and train a large Iraqi security force; municipal police; battalions of the Iraqi

Civil Defense Corps; and thousands of Facilities Protection Service guards. Planners assumed that only

extremist groups, the most unpredictable enemy,

would remain likely opponents by the time of the

turnover to relief forces in 2004.

The end result, proposed in the August campaign

plan, was a safe and secure environment created by

a much more vigorous level of U.S. activities. Combined Joint Task Force 7 concluded that the initial

deployments for combat under Operation Iraqi Freedom would need to be extended by a full year with

a relief anticipated sometime in the spring of 2004.

The Force Takes Shape

The I MEF and 1st Marine Division operational planning teams worked on the force structure, framed the

mission, and formulated tasks and organizations from

late September through 19 October 2003. They then

identified units to be provided for operations in Iraq by

mid-December. The I MEF command element would require its usual detachments of civil affairs, intelligence,

force reconnaissance, communications, radio, air-naval

gunfire liaison, and Army psychological operations

units, all gathered under the administration of the I MEF

Headquarters Group. The 1st Marine Division, under the

command of Major General James N. Mattis, organized

its combat power around two reinforced infantry regiments (regimental combat teams), each with three infantry battalions (with a light armored reconnaissance

battalion standing as the third battalion in one regiment), a combat engineer company, and a combat service support detachment. The division also had an

artillery battalion transformed into a provisional military

police unit, a tank company, and an assault amphibian

company. 

The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward), commanded

by Major General James F. Amos, planned to employ a

single aircraft group. With the exception of tanker and

liaison aircraft detachments, it would include no

manned fixed-winged aircraft, entailing three mediumlift helicopter squadrons, one heavy-lift helicopter

squadron, and two light-attack helicopter squadrons. An

unmanned aerial vehicle squadron and an air defense

battalion also accompanied the group for air control and

ground support. Brigadier General Richard S. Kramlich’s

1st Force Service Support Group (Forward) organized

separate groups for the eastern and western sectors of

I MEF’s planned area of operations, the vast al-Anbar

Province. Each was to support one regiment, with the

remaining assests allocated to a brigade service support

group for the rest of the force. An engineer contingent

included a naval mobile construction battalion (the

“Seabees”), three engineer and engineer support companies, and several companies of military police.

Between 26 August and 9 September 2003, the

Army’s Task Force Baghdad conducted Operation

Longstreet in al-Anbar and northern Babil Provinces, revealing key insurgent sanctuaries and infiltration routes.

Consequently, U.S. Central Command commander,

Army General John P. Abizaid, planned to augment the

Marine Corps deployment with an Army brigade combat team, additional infantry battalions, a small boat detachment, and a requirement for counter-battery radars.

While the members of the I MEF, who returned to

6 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by SSgt Quinton Russ, USAF, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 040324-F-9927R-001

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III was head of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the chief civilian official in Iraq from May 2003 until the transfer of

sovereignty in June 2004.
The Return to Iraq 7

their home stations in 2003, were all veterans of combat, stability, and security operations, many units had

to be disbanded because of transfers and expired terms

of service. Replacements had to be obtained and

trained. Training schedules, family support, and maintenance programs were designed to maximize leave, to

retain cohesion, and to preserve combat readiness. The

1st Marine Division recuperated at its California home

bases but toiled anew to refurbish its materiel and to

prepare personnel for future operations. On 5 January

2004, the 1st Marine Division was rated fully mission

capable. At a cost of $79.9 million, extensive planning

and much effort, the division was prepared for immediate deployment.

The 1st Force Service Support Group, reformed in

November 2003 into the “expeditionary template” organization, was long under study in the Marine Corps.

This measure sought to change the combat service

support echelon of Marine Corps forces from ad hoc

units that had to be reorganized for each deployment,

defined by existing conditions, into permanent organizations with designated commanders and staffs, exercising command and control both in garrison and

when deployed. Intended for a nine-month “proof of

concept” period, 1st Force Service Support Group commander, Brigadier General Kramlich, ordered the creation of Combat Service Support Group 11, led by the

commander of the transportation support battalion,

and Combat Service Support Group 15 as a general

support group, led by the commander of the supply

battalion. This program would ultimately lead to the

redesignation of the Marine expeditionary force’s combat support element as a Marine logistics group in November 2005.

Although the rotation units for the second six-month

deployment had yet to be identified, General Conway

sent his final force list for Operation Iraqi Freedom II

to General Abizaid on 12 December 2003. This organization initially contained no artillery, except for that

organic to the U.S. Army 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. Marine Corps and Army infantry were cross-attached, with the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, joining the

brigade and the Army’s 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, attached to Regimental Combat Team 1. The Marine

Corps infantry contingent had grown in barely a month

to a total of eight infantry battalions, one reconnaissance battalion, and one light armored reconnaissance

battalion. The Army brigade contributed three more

MajGen James N. Mattis, commander of 1st Marine Division 2003–04, was already a veteran of Marine Corps

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq when I MEF returned to Iraq in the spring of 2004.

Photo by LCpl Christopher R. Rye, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 031007-M-6237R-024
battalions, including an armor battalion that was partly

reformed as vehicle-mounted infantry. This task organization was augmented, near the time of embarkation, with artillery batteries A and E, 11th Marines.

These two batteries arrived on 28 February 2004 and

drew 18 howitzers from the prepositioning ships supporting the deployment. Counter-battery fires against

indirect fire attacks from the insurgents became the initial mission for these two batteries. Later, when needs

became more urgent, the equipment aboard the maritime prepositioned shipping would permit very rapid

reinforcement of the Marine division. In addition to the

forces under I MEF control were two bridge companies

drawn from II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF)

and Marine Reserve Forces, a detachment of light attack helicopters to operate out of Balad Air Base, and

two Navy surgical companies.

Al-Anbar Province and the Insurgency

In October 2003, the Joint Staff decided that the

Marine Corps would relieve the Army’s 82d Airborne

Division. The area of operations included the large

al-Anbar Province and the northern Babil Province,

which was the heart of the Sunni Triangle and the

anti-Coalition insurgency west of Baghdad. The region posed challenges unlike those I MEF faced during the stability and security operations campaign it

conducted in the summer of 2003. While the northern Babil area was familiar to Marine veterans of

2003, al-Anbar Province was not. I MEF and division

operations planning team studied the province intensely, paying particular attention to terrorist infiltration routes, termed “rat lines,” extending from

Syria to the major cities of Fallujah and Ramadi.

Al-Anbar Province was an active center for the insurgency where its vast expanses served as an infiltration route, training ground, and sanctuary. It was

also a latent flash point with cities such as Fallujah

known throughout Iraq as a center of religious fundamentalism and general hostility to the central government, whether it was the Ba’ath Party, Coalition

Provisional Authority, or the Iraqi Interim Government. The original 2003 U.S. offensive through this

area had focused on enveloping Baghdad, thus by8 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by LCpl Jonathon T. Spencer, Defense Imagery: 040422-M-2900S-023

MajGen James F. Amos (right), commander of 3d Marine Air Wing from 2003 to 2004, speaks with Capt Shawn

Miller of Marine Wing Support Squadron 273 while deployed to al-Anbar province in April 2004.
The Return to Iraq 9

passing most of the major population centers of the

province. As a result, those elements that would constitute the bulk of the anti-Coalition insurgency, such

as veterans of the Republican Guard, Iraqi Intelligence Service, and the Ba’ath Party, remained relatively cohesive and unscathed by the initial invasion.

After initial combat operations ended, a single armored cavalry regiment was assigned to patrol a vast

area the size of North Carolina. Such a weak presence squandered the war’s gains and allowed an

enemy sanctuary to flourish. The region was also a

stronghold of Iraq’s Sunnis, and many of its population feared loss of status and marginalization as a result of Hussein’s fall, de-Ba’athification, and the

Coalition Provisional Authority’s plan to empower

Iraq’s Shi’a majority. Although most of the population did not actively work against the Coalition

forces, many did render support to the former regime

loyalist movements.

Al-Anbar Province’s geography helped make it a

safe haven for insurgents. Both its natural river and

man-made highways transformed it into a transit hub

for insurgent groups. Since the province shares

lengthy frontiers with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria,

insurgents could easily find cross-border sanctuaries

outside of Iraq. Age-old smuggling routes, tribal associations reaching across the political borders, and

Photo by LCpl Samantha L. Jones, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041115-M-3658J-011

BGen Richard Kramlich, commanding general of 1st

Force Service Support Group, talks with Marines at

Camp Fallujah in November, 2004.

Marines from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit establish a perimeter in Qalat Sukkar, Iraq in 2003 as civilians gather to welcome them as they secured the town. As they returned to Iraq, the Marines of I MEF could draw

on almost a century’s worth of experience conducting counterinsurgency operations.

Photo by SSgt Bryan Reed, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 030413-M-0175R-089
active support from Ba’athist Syria provided the insurgents a steady supply of money and sanctuaries.

Radical elements could infiltrate the country, relying

on counterfeit documents, safe houses, and training

areas.

The insurgents also had a ready source of muni10 INTO THE FRAY

History Division Map

In 2003, Marines had been primarily responsible for operations south of Baghdad; however, beginning in 2004,

Marine Corps deployments were based in the vast al-Anbar Province in Iraq’s west.
The Return to Iraq 11

tions and arms. U.S. Army sources identified 96

known munitions sites and indicated innumerable

uncharted ones in the province. A large portion of

Iraq’s arms industry was centered in the area—particularly in al-Ameriyah, Al Mahmudiyah, and Iskandariyah. Although some localities faced arms

shortages and the price of weapons increased as a

result of Coalition actions, the enemy had few supply

problems for its commonplace weapons: AK-47 rifles, explosives, ammunition, mortars, and rocketpropelled grenades (RPGs).

Building on Experience and Corporate

Memory: the Marine Corps

and Counterinsurgency

As challenging as the new operations in al-Anbar

Province would be, the stability and security operations conducted during the summer of 2003 had

demonstrated that the Marine Corps’ approach to

counterinsurgency, based on nearly a century’s worth

of experience, remained relevant. These experiences

would continue to influence Marine Corps plans for

their return to Iraq in 2004. On 18 January 2004, General Conway delivered a presentation to the Marine

Corps Association Ground Dinner in which he outlined the new challenges that the Marines would face

in their second deployment. He asserted that the leadership had to remember several factors. For example,

whereas the Marines had been responsible for an area

comprised mostly of Shi’a in 2003, the population in

the new area of operations would largely be Sunni.

Therefore, an important part of the expeditionary

force’s approach would involve finding a way to mitigate the perceived political losses suffered by the

Sunnis as a result of the fall of the Ba’ath regime. In

keeping with I MEF’s successful experience in 2003,

the Marines would focus on the Iraqi people—providing security and a better quality of life for the population and preparing the Iraqi people to govern

themselves.

General Conway noted that I MEF’s approach

would be based on three major lines of operation: security and stability operations, information operations,

and civil affairs. The goals of these operations were

far reaching and wide ranging, and included eliminating destabilizing elements, establishing training

programs for Iraqi security forces, developing an aggressive information campaign that promoted local

confidence and established effective means of disseminating information, identifying and securing

funding and resources for civil affairs initiatives, establishing local government, reducing unemployment,

and ultimately preparing for the transition to Iraqi

sovereignty. Success would be measured by the extent to which the Iraqi people could assume responsibility for their own security. The failure of any of

these elements would pose increasing difficulties and

dangers for the Coalition forces and the Iraqi population.

While the situation in al-Anbar Province in 2004

would be markedly different from the one Marines

confronted in southern Iraq in 2003, General Conway

nevertheless noted that those earlier experiences

would play an important role in the coming mission.

He highlighted the successful accomplishments of

2003, noting that Marines demonstrated the mental

and physical ability to shift rapidly from combat to

stability operations and were able to conduct both simultaneously. General Conway pointed out that the

culture of the Marine Corps as an infantry force with

strong, small unit leadership enhanced the Marines’

ability to effectively perform stability operations in

southern Iraq. Battalion commanders exercised total

authority in their areas of responsibility. Frequently,

no one doctrine governed particular problems, and

commanders adapted to their unique situation. The

expeditionary force deployed a significant infantry capability, and Marines made sure to patrol the streets

so that they could be seen by the locals and reassure

Iraqis looking for a safe and secure environment. 

The need to build good relations with the local

population had been critical, and General Conway reminded his audience of the several accomplishments

Marines had achieved in 2003. Operating from the belief that the quickest way to win the support of adults

was to improve the quality of life of their children,

Marines tried to move quickly to accomplish any project that benefited Iraqi children. These included making children aware of unexploded mines and

constructing and repairing playgrounds and schools.

Related to this, the Marines of I MEF had focused on

consulting Iraqis and included them in the decisionmaking process as they set priorities for reconstruction projects. The Marines’ philosophy of inclusion

gave the Iraqis a sense of having a stake in their own

future and confidence in American concern for their

welfare.

A “trust relationship” thus formed between Marines

and Iraqis. The fact that the Shi’a formed the majority

of the population in much of the I MEF area of operations in 2003 proved significant. Harshly oppressed

by the former regime, they demonstrated more sympathy for the Coalition than their Sunni neighbors to

the north, and Marines conducted themselves in a

manner to preserve good will with the Shi’as. 

To build good relations with the local population,
12 INTO THE FRAY

Marines worked to manage the levels of violence. If

fired upon, Marines achieved immediate fire superiority. The I MEF human exploitation teams constantly

worked to collect information, which was then combined with other data to form a useful intelligence

picture. When sufficient intelligence allowed targeting, Marines quickly killed or captured those who resisted. 

One result of their efforts to build strong relations

with the local population was that Marines were able

to work with the local police forces, thus allowing I

MEF to leave the built-up areas and towns. The Marine quick reaction forces always stood ready to provide “on call” support, but this was seldom necessary.

The Iraqis in the Marines’ area of operations soon

began to police themselves. They prevented looting,

destroyed improvised explosive devices, and in some

cases conducted raids on criminals and former regime

loyalists in their areas.
The planners of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I

MEF) and its subordinate units worked on the force

deployment in November 2003 and in December

began to develop the details of the strategic movement of all units identified for deployment. In addition to the forces under I MEF control, several

additional units deployed for duty with Combined

Joint Task Force 7. These included two bridge companies drawn from II Marine Expeditionary Force (II

MEF) and Marine Reserve Forces, and a detachment

of light-attack helicopters to operate out of Balad Air

Base. Two Navy surgical companies also deployed

to Kuwait, operating under control of Commander,

Marine Forces Central Command.

As in previous campaigns in the Persian Gulf, the

Marine Corps forces, deploying for the 2004 campaign in Iraq, shipped their equipment and a relatively small number of personnel by way of Navy

and military sealift shipping while the bulk of personnel and some cargo traveled via strategic airlift.

Only two Navy ships took part in this phase, each a

highly capable amphibious assault ship: the USS

Bataan (LHD 5) from the Atlantic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet’s USS Boxer (LHD 4). Fifty-five helicopters

deemed immediately necessary for the relief of the

aviation component of the Army’s 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment were loaded onto these ships. The remaining 59 helicopters, in various states of

disassembly, were shipped in the military sealift ships

(24 helicopters) and strategic airlift (35 helicopters).

The Boxer and Bataan sailed on 14 and 23 January

2004 from their ports of embarkation. Between 18

January and 28 February, ten Military Sealift Command ships sailed from their ports, all taking approximately a month for the transit. Additional

equipment for I MEF, principally vehicles drawn from

maritime prepositioned ships—USNS 1stLt Baldomero Lopez (T-AK 3010), MV Pvt Franklin J.

Phillips (T-AK 3004),and MV PFC William B. Baugh

(T-AK 3001)—awaited the arrival of the troops in

Kuwait. These ships arrived 10 February–5 March

and comprised the lead elements and main body of

the I MEF forces. Though small numbers of personnel continued to arrive in Kuwait through 13 March,

the main effort was preparing the relief in place of 3d

Armored Cavalry Regiment, planned for 20 March,

and the 82d Airborne Division, planned for 4 April.

Assembling the force in bases and camps in

Kuwait proved as complex as the deployment of I

MEF to the theater the previous year. The early 2004

relief in place for U.S. forces saw 12 Army brigades

and two Marine Corps regiments replacing 17 Army

brigades, most of which used the Kuwait expeditionary camps and training locales for three months

as the sites for the relief in place. An early problem

was the minimum requirement for 7,500 bed spaces

at Camp Udari to support the 1st Marine Division

through the standard joint processing known as Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration

of forces (RSOI). Reduced to 3,500 beds at Camp

Udari, I MEF staff found 1,000 additional beds each

at Camps Victory and New York. The remaining

shortfall could only be filled by moving two regiments into camps, training areas, and on to the border assembly areas. In all, I MEF used six camps,

three ports, and two air facilities during its RSOI

phase.

After all Marines assembled in their assigned units

and were issued equipment, they went to the range

area to test fire crew-served weapons and systems

unloaded from shipping and storage, and conducted

final battle training. The convoys were dispatched in

sequence by the 1st Marine Division, which also performed security functions for most convoys of the I

MEF headquarters group and the 3d Marine Aircraft

Wing. A three-day training period provided detailed

preparation for safe and secure convoys. The convoy

commanders formed, loaded, armed, and rehearsed

their convoys for the first day and a half under the

coordination of the division’s operations staff. On the

afternoon of the second day, each commander received the latest route and intelligence briefings, conducted a certification briefing for the division’s chief

of logistics, and got the assigned departure and convoy clearance information. For the final 24 hours, the

convoy remained under a safety stand-down calculated to ensure rested personnel and well-prepared

equipment for the single-day movement into the area

of operations destinations.

In addition to the convoys, intratheater air transportation lifted selected units and equipment from

Ali al-Salem Air Base to several air facilities in the

13

Chapter 2

The Deployment
14 INTO THE FRAY

new area of operations. The six newly arrived Lockheed KC-130F Hercules refueler-transport aircraft of

3d Marine Aircraft Wing supported this lift as well as

the wing’s internal missions.

I MEF headquarters established a garrison at Camp

Fallujah, outside the city of the same name. The 1st

Marine Division set up headquarters in the al-Anbar

capital ar-Ramadi, at Forward Operating Base Champion, which would soon be renamed Camp Blue Diamond. The aviation combat element was based at

al-Asad Air Base, and the 1st Force Service Support

Group was housed south of Fallujah at Camp Taqaddum airfield.

The initial ground deployment into Iraq saw Regimental Combat Team 7 occupy al-Asad Air Base and

deploy its units in the western half of the I MEF area

of operations, while Regimental Combat Team 1 occupied Camp Fallujah, taking responsibility for the

easternmost section of the area. The Army’s 1st

Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, remained at Ramadi

with additional responsibilities for the vast and less

populated area stretching south to the Saudi Arabia

frontier, later called Area of Operation Manassas.

The planning by I MEF before returning to Iraq

essentially sought to build on what had been widely

assumed was a successful period of stability and security operations by the 82d Airborne and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment. In particular, the Marine

plan hinged on a strong “first 60 days” as the best

method to maintain and continue progress toward a

secure and independent Iraq.

To maintain continuity in security and stability operations between the 82d Airborne and I MEF, the relief in place outlined in I MEF orders sought to

replace Army units sequentially, from the smaller up

to larger units. This process also took place geographically from west to east, as Regimental Combat

Team 1 and 3d Marine Aircraft Wing first relieved the

Army’s 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment of the huge

western section of al-Anbar Province as well as airspace management responsibilities handled by the

regiment’s air cavalry squadron. Then 2d Battalion,

4th Marines, reported to the Army’s 1st Brigade of

the 1st Infantry Division followed by the relief of 3d

Brigade, 82d Airborne, by Regimental Combat Team

1.

The Marines of I MEF at all levels carried out essential operations with their counterparts in the 82d

Airborne. These operations consisted of the so-called

“right seat, left seat” rides in which incoming I MEF

leaders and Marines patrolled with the soldiers of the

82d Airborne, then exchanged roles and took over

the operations with 82d Airborne personnel still in

place to provide assistance and advice. Each unit

Photo by Cpl Alicia M. Garcia, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 050620-M-5607G-063

Marine F/A-18 Hornet fighter-bombers from Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 224 sit on the flight

line of al-Asad Air Base, Iraq.
The Deployment 15

then transferred the responsibility and authority for

the district or sector. Before such transfer of authority occurred, the incoming Marine Corps units assumed security of all vital infrastructure and

institutions in their assigned sectors. They introduced

themselves to local, Coalition, and non-governmental organization leaders, supervised local infrastructure projects, assumed responsibilities for equipment,

and continued the ongoing process of collecting and

disposing of weapons and unexploded ordnance.

In each case, the transfers of authority occurred

well before the deadlines. General Conway recognized the need for an accelerated relief of Army units

deployed in Iraq and promised all due speed. The

early dispatch of Regimental Combat Team 7 from

Camp Udari paid off, as it completed its relief of 3d

Armored Cavalry Regiment on 15 March, five days

ahead of schedule. As part of the transfer, 3d Marine

Aircraft Wing assumed responsibility for airspace

management and aviation support for the area of operations. On 21 March, General Mattis relieved the

commander of the 82d Airborne Division, Major General Charles H. Swannack Jr., and assumed responsibility for ground operations in the Marines’ area of

operations, named Atlanta in Marine Corps orders

and plans. The 1st Force Service Support Group relieved the 82d Airborne Division Support Command

on 22 March. The 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division,

was relieved on 28 March, seven days ahead of

schedule.

Though the Marines of I MEF met General Conway’s expectations, al-Anbar Province also lived up

to its reputation as a tough area of operations, and as

such, Marines conducted combat operations for several days before the transfers of authority took place.

By 14 March, insurgents inflicted 11 casualties upon

the 1st Marine Division. On 18 March, insurgents

fired rockets at 3d Marine Aircraft Wing’s al-Asad Air

Base killing one Marine and wounding three. A

bombing killed a second Marine on 25 March 2004.

Equipping I Marine Expeditionary Force

Although the Marines newly arrived in al-Anbar

considered themselves better prepared and organized

The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing used Boeing-Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight (pictured below) and Sikorsky CH-53 Super

Stallion helicopters in Iraq. Both types received new armor and other upgrades upon returning there in 2004.

Photo by LCpl William L. Dubose III, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 060530-M-9529D-001
16 INTO THE FRAY

for the stability and security operations missions than

in the 2003 campaign, the Marine Corps equipment

needs had increased. The brief period of occupation

duty in mid-2003 allowed no time for incorporating

new technologies and engineering into the force. By

2004, however, the experiences of U.S. and Coalition

forces had generated a comprehensive set of new

equipment requirements. Thus, the second deployment presented a range of new equipment requirements. Stability and security operations demanded

increased numbers of vehicles of all types, yet the

force lacked funding for maintenance and facilities

that more equipment would require.

Aircraft survivability problems dated from the initial combat phase of the 2003 campaign, necessitating the installation of modernization systems. The

completion schedule anticipated for installing most

of these systems did not cover the initial part of the

2004 deployment of aircraft from 3d Marine Aircraft

Wing. The special schedule developed for the Aircraft Survivability Upgrade resulted in the installation

of lightweight armor kits and a ramp-mounted machine gun into the Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallion

heavy-lift helicopters by mid-April. The 36 BoeingVertol CH-46 Sea Knight medium-lift helicopters received infrared jammer upgrades and lightweight

armor kits beginning in April and July, respectively.

The six KC-130Fs also received infrared jammer upgrades in April. Much more time would be required,

however, to deploy the highly desired AN/AAR-47(2)

missile warning set and AN/ALE-47 countermeasures

dispenser into the light-attack squadrons. Only the

larger aircraft had these capabilities.

The hope that I MEF could obtain special equipment needed for the 2004 deployment from units departing Iraq would fall far short of expectations

despite a U.S. Central Command directive to leave all

“uparmored” High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled

Vehicles (HMMWV)—“Humvee” models M1114,

M1116, and M1109—and all tactical vehicles fitted

with bolt-on armor or ballistic doors. The 82d Airborne Division turned over 83 uparmored Humvees,

but the Marine expeditionary force required 250. Of

the highly desired Warlock radio frequency jammers

used to counter improvised explosive devices, only

25 could be gained from Combined Joint Task Force

7 sources; the Marine Corps required 61.

As in the case of the 2003 campaign, the supporting establishment of the Marine Corps, chiefly Marine Corps Systems Command, employed rapid

acquisition under the Urgent Universal Need Statement (UUNS) process. Commanders of forces assigned for the 2004 campaign received instructions

in November 2003 to request material required under

UUNS to General Conway for consolidation and forwarding. Ultimately, the Marine Requirements Oversight Council reviewed the requests and

recommended actions to the Commandant. The initial requests before the 2004 deployment totaled approximately $170 million, in comparison to

approximately $100 million provided for the entire

2003 campaign.

The requirement for uparmored Humvees took

immediate priority. The Marine Corps Logistics Command produced steel doors for delivery to the deploying units until more permanent solutions could

be approved and acquired through joint service and

Marine Corps specific programs to produce armor

kits and new production vehicles. As I MEF returned

to Iraq, the 2004 Urgent Universal Needs Statement

items already included the following (See Table 2-1):

In addition to compiling the initial requirements,

Systems Command deployed liaison teams to the I

MEF staff to assess new requirements and accelerate

the UUNS process.

The tandem requirements of human body armor

and armor kits for utility vehicles became more pressing in both military and political arenas after combat

continued in 2003 as the Iraqi insurgency gained moPhoto by LCpl Kevin C. Quihuis Jr., Defense Imagery VIRIN: 030410-M-5753Q-094

Capt Tom Lacroix, commanding officer, Company C,

1st Battalion, 7th Marines,speaks on the radio while

accompanied by radio operators Cpl Kenny Bergain

(left) and LCpl Travis Ball during the clearing of Qa

dawi Baghdad in 2003. All are wearing the Interceptor Multi-Threat Body Armor System Outer Tactical

Vests.
The Deployment 17

mentum after the declared “end of major combat operations.” Armoring a fleet of utility vehicles never

intended for use in close combat was a requirement

new to the logistics system, and the system’s response proved predictably slow as casualties increased. Likewise, distribution of the new Interceptor

body armor system to the troops was only partially

complete at the time of the 2003 invasion, and priorities of issue left large numbers of combat units with

older design armor vests. Moreover, defective quality control and the delays in providing upgrades to

Interceptor components (heavier insert plates and additional side and shoulder protection) exacerbated

the political uproar. The American government and

military underestimated the scope and ferocity of the

insurgency and the personal protection that fighting

insurgents would require. The military laboratories

and systems commands responded with designs encompassing almost total protection for vehicles and

persons alike.

The “hardness” or armor of Humvees remained a

critical problem for all U.S. troops, including Marines

as three different levels of protection appeared in the

uparmored Humvees, but only one of which offered

Table 2-1: Urgent Universal Needs Statement Items
18 INTO THE FRAY

adequate protection against the improvised explosive

devices employed by the enemy. As a result, some

units procured locally fabricated steel plates to augment the minimal protection offered by the unarmored Humvee. So scarce were the uparmored

Humvees that Marines began to improvise simple,

additional protection, such as hanging bags containing Kevlar plates salvaged from vests and vehicles on

the exterior of the otherwise thinly constructed doors

of their Humvees, thus making their vehicles into

“Hillbilly Hummers.” 

Personal body armor consisted of two types during the initial stages of the 2003-04 campaign. The

superior Interceptor System, used by front-line

troops, gradually replaced the older vests worn by

Marines during 1st MEF’s 2004 deployment. The

older design was the Personnel Armor System

Ground Troops (PASGT) vest that had replaced the

obsolete vinyl and ballistic plate combination of the

older M-1969 Fragmentation Protective Body Armor.

The PASGT ballistic filler consists of 13 plies of

treated (water repellent) aramid Kevlar 29 fabric and

improved the M-1969’s protection against fragments.

The more effective Interceptor Multi-Threat Body

Armor System consistes of two components:a Kevlarweave outer tactical vest, which can stop a 9mm bullet, and ceramic small arms protective inserts (SAPI)

or plates. The 16.4-pound system of vest with removable throat and groin protectors (8.4 pounds)

and insertable front and rear plates (4 pounds each),

can defeat the 7.62mm round common to the insurgents’ primary AK weapon types. Straps and Velcro

fasteners allow attachment of personal equipment.

The 2003 Armor Protection Enhancement System

added sections to protect the neck, arms, and groin.

The later Deltoid Extension protected the sides of the

rib cage and shoulders but added pounds, provided

less ventilation, and limited body movement.

As the more than 20,000 Marines and sailors of I

MEF filled their new positions for the 2004 campaign,

equipped as well as the hurried measures and changing military environment permitted, the age-old problem remained: Who was the enemy; where was he;

and what were his intentions?

Photo by Sgt. Jeremy M. Giacomino, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 080709-M-6668G-021

Fighting the insurgency requried upgrades to the armor on High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles

(HMMWVs or Humvees). These adapted vehicles, such as this M1114, were known as “up-armored” Humvees.
19

Al-Anbar Province

At 53,208 square miles, Iraq’s al-Anbar Province

occupies 32 percent of the nation’s total area, and is

the country’s largest province. Nevertheless, the

province is largely an unpopulated desert with most

of its 1.3 million inhabitants densely packed along

the Euphrates River, which cuts through the northern

part of the province. Most of the inhabitants, who account for 4.9 percent of Iraq’s total population, are

Arab Sunnis of the large Dulaym tribal confederation.

The province’s capital is ar-Ramadi.

The river brings life to one of the harshest environments in the world. The region’s subtropical temperatures range, on average, from 90 to 115 degrees

Fahrenheit in summer to less than 50 degrees Fahrenheit in the winter. All of the province’s major cities sit

along or near the Euphrates’ banks: Husaybah, alQaim, Haditha, Hit, Ramadi, and al-Fallujah. From

Husaybah, where the river enters Iraq from Syria, it

progresses in a fairly eastwardly direction for a little

more than 50 miles before taking a sharp turn south

at the city of Rawah. Between there and Haditha is

Lake Qadisiyah, an artificial creation of the Haditha

Dam. From Haditha, the Euphrates snakes southeasterly through the eastern part of the province before

exiting east of Fallujah. Just south of Ramadi lie the

lakes al-Habbaniyah and al-Milh, filled with Euphrates water by canal. Lake Tharthar, supplied with

Tigris River water by canal, lies between the rivers.

Down river from Ramadi are irrigation canals and

most of the pumping stations. About 140 miles from

Ramadi the Euphrates splits into two branches, alHillah and al-Hindiyyah. The latter forms the main

channel and provides irrigation for rice crops, while

al-Hillah, separated among numerous canals, provides irrigation to the east and south.

The western desert, an extension of the Syrian

Desert, rises to elevations above 1,600 feet. Further

south, the Southwestern Desert (al-Hajarah) contains

a complex array of rock, wadis, ridges, and depressions. Through this region, running in a fairly direct

east-west direction from Syria and Jordon is a highway and rail network that transforms the province

into a bridge connecting Iraq’s most populated regions and capital to Saudia Arabia, Jordan, and Syria.

Al-Anbar Province, especially Ramadi and Fallujah, reflects the strong tribal and religious traditions

of its inhabitants. Saddam Hussein was constantly

wary of the volatile nature of the area. Depending

on which approach was most expedient, the Ba’ath

regime would alternate between openly supporting

the tribal groups through patronage and using the

tools of governance to isolate them. If it meant being

able to exert greater control over the region, the

regime was happy to curtail provincial authority to

better patronize the al-Anbari tribes. Iraq’s oil wealth

enhanced the ability of the ruling clique to bypass

government institutions. The revenue generated by

oil deepened the system of patronage, as funds were

controlled by the central figures of the regime who

funneled money and public works to loyalists. Tax

revenue, already tainted by corruption, became secondary to oil wealth. Sunnis benefited the most from

this system. In any case, the regime took more interest in population centers closer to Baghdad, leaving

most of the province untouched. Such conditions and

policies weakened governmental power in the

province. Crippled by persistent corruption, undercut by deal-making between the ruling regime and

tribal sheikhs, and monitored by an ever present,

heavy-handed security apparatus, the civic institutions of al-Anbar Province fell into disrepair until the

collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003.

The province stood rife with insurgent and criminal activity at the time I MEF took up its security and

stabilization task, and its major cities of Ramadi and

Fallujah were centers of anti-Coalition resistance.

Amid this hostile environment, the Coalition had labored to deliver on its promises to restore security,

essential services, government, and a viable economy

to the people of al-Anbar Province. However, it only

had limited resources to apply to its appalling situation.

Initial Deployment

The I Marine Expeditionary Force’s area of operations in al-Anbar Province—code named Atlanta—

was further divided. During the first two weeks of

March 2004, Colonel Craig A. Tucker, commanding

Regimental Combat Team 7, deployed his maneuver

Chapter 3

Early Operations in Al-Anbar Province
20 INTO THE FRAY

battalions throughout the newly designated Area of

Operations Denver to cover several population centers as well as known infiltration routes used by

enemy forces to cross the Syrian frontier into Iraq.

The area covered most of the province’s western region. The line companies went to Camp Hit, near the

Euphrates city of Hit. One line company then deployed to the more distant Camp Korean Village, at

ar-Rutbah, from which the borders with Jordan and

Syria could be observed. The 3d Battalion, 7th

Marines, as well as elements of the 1st Light Armored

Reconnaissance Battalion and 1st Force Reconnaissance Company made Camp al-Qaim their base. A

small detachment of the 1st Force Reconnaissance

Company remained at al-Asad Air Base. After a brief

stay at the air base, the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines,

moved to Camp Haditha and Patrol Base Rawah,

northwest of the Haditha Dam. 

Major General James F. Amos deployed his 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) to five facilities to provide four aviation functions—aerial reconnaissance,

assault support, command and control of aircraft and

missiles, and offensive air support—throughout Area

of Operations Atlanta. Elements of Marine Wing

Headquarters Squadron 3, Marine Aircraft Group 16,

Marine Wing Support Group 37, and Marine Air Control Group 38 were based at al-Asad Air Base with

forward air support elements at al-Taqaddum Air

Base, al-Qaim, Mudaysis, and Camp Korean Village.

Al-Asad Air Base had two medium-lift helicopter

squadrons; one and one-half heavy-lift helicopter

squadrons, a light-attack helicopter squadron, a

tanker-transport detachment, and a tactical air control center. Al-Taqaddum hosted the other mediumlift helicopter squadron and part of the light-attack

squadron. The three other sites hosted a medevac

helicopter detachment, and assault support and attack helicopter detachments were placed there to

meet tactical needs.

Support for the aviation element built up rapidly.

Air Force C-130s and 3d Marine Aircraft Wing KC130s moved over 462 tons of aviation ordnance for

operations. One hundred tons of aviation equipment

was dispersed to the al-Taqaddum Air Base, al-Qaim,

and Korean Village sites to support forward arming

and refueling activities. Maintenance and spare part

logistics began immediately, and an aircraft engine

pool was established with the assistance of depot

support from Naval Air Facility, Sigonella, Italy. Upon

taking responsibility for the expeditionary force’s area

of operations, the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing acted as

the responsible agency for air command and control

from ground level to 11,500 feet above it.

The 1st Force Service Support Group provided

Combat Service Support Battalions 1 and 7 from

Combat Service Support Group 11 for the direct support of the two regiments of the 1st Marine Division

and based the bulk of its units and resources at Camp

al-Taqaddum. Combat Service Support Group 11 also

provided direct support as required to the Army’s 1st

Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. Under the operational

control of the 1st Brigade at Ramadi was the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines. Brigadier General Kramlich employed Combat Service Support Group 15 as the

general support provider at Camp al-Taqaddum and

Brigade Service Support Group 1 functioned as his

Photo by LCpl Victor F. Cano Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 090401-M-1821C-028

An AH-1W Super Cobra and UH-1N Huey from Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 167 fly near the Euphrates River at al-Taqaddum during April 2009.
Early Operations in Al-Anbar Province 21

landing force support party in Kuwait. Upon arrival at

Camp al-Taqaddum, the group received vital reinforcements from 3d Battalion, 24th Marines, for local

security, and on March 20 the Army’s 120th Engineer

Battalion (Heavy) reported for operations, providing

myriad support ranging from fortifying the camp to

disposing of enemy ordnance.

At the same time, the 1st Marine Division completed its movement from Kuwait using the command post established in Ramadi as noted above,

where the Army’s 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division,

patrolled the Area of Operations Topeka. The 1st

Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, under the command of

Colonel Arthur W. Conner Jr., deployed its 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, and 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, at

Ramadi, where the 1st Battalion, 5th Field Artillery,

equipped with M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzers, was also stationed. Conner operated 1st Battalion, 34th Armor, out of Hibbinaya, halfway

between Ramadi and Fallujah. Battery I of 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, converted to military police duty,

operated from a camp at Madaysis from where it

could monitor the Saudi Arabia border crossing at

Ar’ar Wadi. A Marine expeditionary force order designated this zone Area of Operations Manassas. Last

to move into its base in Iraq, Regimental Combat

Team 1 occupied Camp Fallujah, sending battalions

to cover its Area of Operations Raleigh.

Regimental Combat Team 1 commander Colonel

John A. Toolan detailed 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, to

Camp Baharia, just east of Fallujah, and 1st Battalion,

5th Marines, to Camp Abu Ghraib, west of the town,

Abu Ghraib. He also covered the sector in north

Babil Province with 2d Battalion, 2d Marines at Al

Mahmudiyah and with the Army’s 1st Battalion, 32d

Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, at Camp Iskandariya. The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, less one

company assigned to Regimental Combat Team 7,

was also based at Fallujah but oriented its actions

throughout the area of operations. The units in Area

of Operations Raleigh were also responsible for conducting operations in the suburbs of Baghdad. These

included stopping insurgents from attacking Baghdad airport, Abu Ghraib Prison, north Babil, and Iraqi

national highways 8 and 9. The Camp Dogwood logistics support area of the Army, located 40 kilometers southwest of Baghdad, also required local

security support for its garrison.

1st Marine Division commander Major General

James N. Mattis set the tone for the new campaign

with a forthright message to his command (see sidebar). In it, he drew from the Marine Corps’ legacy of

fighting small wars, illustrating continuity between

the Marine’s current mission in Iraq and to the Central American intervantions of the 1920s and 1930s.

He warned the Marines to overcome the insurgents’

attempts to drive a wedge between the Americans

and Iraqis, and ordered his forces to “First, do no

harm,” when it came to the Iraqi civilian population.

General Mattis did not evade or soften the difficulPhoto by GSgt Shannon Arledge, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 050426-M-0502A-017

Most of al-Anbar Province is uninhabited desert, and the magnitude of this 2005 sandstorm striking al-Asad

Air Base attests to its harsh environment. The storm originated far to the west at the Syrian-Jordanian border.
ties of the Marines’ task, declaring that the mission

would be “hard, dangerous work.” The current mission would be their Guadalcanal and Hue City, and

would define the Marines’ legacy in the early 21st

Century.

At this point, the Marine Corps had deployed some

24,500 men and women to Iraq, approximately

24,300 under I MEF, drawn from Atlantic and Pacific

bases, augmented by 5,500 Navy construction and

Army troops. Some 3,900 Marines and sailors of Marine Corps Reserve organizations were serving on active duty with about 80 percent deployed to Iraq.

Another 1,900 individual augmentees from the Reserves served throughout the Marine Corps.

The Iraq Insurgency

The earliest classification of a post-hostilities threat

group was that of “former regime loyalists.” These included Ba’ath Party members, former Iraqi soldiers,

and remnants of the Fedayeen Saddam, a radical

paramilitary group loosely recruited into the Iraqi defense establishment. The insurgency also included

extremist groups, such as the Wahhabi movement,

the Iraqi Islamic Party, and pro-regime tribes. These

could be augmented by outside actors, including international terrorists interested in exploiting the unrest and U.S. vulnerabilities.

The insurgency continued efforts to reorganize

under various groupings to force the withdrawal of

Coalition forces and to regain power within Iraq. It

operated throughout several cities within the Sunni

Triangle from Ramadi in the west to Baghdad in the

east and Mosul in the north. The U.S. and Coalition

bureaucracy later coined successive terms according

to the political climate—“Anti-Coalition Forces” and

“Anti-Iraqi Forces” were favorites of political figures

loath to acknowledge the existence of a genuine Iraqi

insurgency against U.S. and allied forces.

22 INTO THE FRAY

We are going back into the brawl. We will be

relieving the magnificent soldiers fighting under

the 82d Airborne Division, whose hard won successes in the Sunni Triangle have opened opportunities for us to exploit. For the last year, the 82d

Airborne has been operating against the heart of

the enemy’s resistance. It’s appropriate that we relieve them: When it’s time to move a piano,

Marines don’t pick up the piano bench—we

move the piano. So this is the right place for

Marines in this fight, where we can carry on the

legacy of Chesty Puller in the Banana Wars in the

same sort of complex environment that he knew

in his early years. Shoulder to shoulder with our

comrades in the Army, Coalition Forces and maturing Iraqi Security Forces, we are going to destroy the enemy with precise firepower while

diminishing the conditions that create adversarial

relationships between us and the Iraqi people.

This is going to be hard, dangerous work. It is

going to require patient, persistent presence.

Using our individual initiative, courage, moral

judgment, and battle skills, we will build on the

82d Airborne victories. Our country is counting

on us even as our enemies watch and calculate,

hoping that America does not have warriors

strong enough to withstand discomfort and danger. You, my fine young men, are going to prove

the enemy wrong—dead wrong. You will demonstrate the same uncompromising spirit that has always caused the enemy to fear America’s Marines.

The enemy will try to manipulate you into hating all Iraqis. Do not allow the enemy that victory. With strong discipline, solid faith,

unwavering alertness, and undiminished chivalry

to the innocent, we will carry out this mission. Remember, I have added, “First, do no harm” to our

passwords of “No Better Friend, No Worse

Enemy.” Keep your honor clean as we gain information about the enemy from the Iraqi people.

Then, armed with that information and working

in conjunction with fledgling Iraqi Security Forces,

we will move precisely against the enemy elements and crush them without harming the innocent.

This is our test—our Guadalcanal, our Chosin

Reservoir, our Hue City. Fight with a happy heart

and keep faith in your comrades and your unit.

We must be under no illusions about the nature of

the enemy and the dangers that lie ahead. Stay

alert, take it all in stride, remain sturdy, and share

your courage with each other and the world. You

are going to write history, my fine young sailors

and Marines so write it well.

Semper Fidelis,

J. N. Mattis,

Major General, U.S. Marines

Letter to All Hands
Early Operations in Al-Anbar Province 23

The insurgents proved well armed. Although initially poorly trained, they were soon able to execute

lethal attacks against the Coalition forces and Iraqis

who sided with them. The intelligence services considered the former regime forces as compatible with

other groups, such as foreign fighters, transnational

terrorists, pro-Saddam tribes, radical Kurdish factions,

and Islamic extremists throughout Iraq. Former

regime loyalist elements continuously attempted to

gain favor in militant Sunni neighborhoods throughout Iraq. They used private homes to conduct meetings and cache their weapons. During the initial

period of its occupation of Iraq, the Combined Joint

Task Force 7 staff considered Ba’athist leadership

cadres and old regime forces as the primary threat to

Coalition operations. They probably were responsible for the majority of ambushes against “soft” targets, such as convoys, and symbolic centers of the

interim government, such as police stations and

council meeting locations. 

While many of the anti-Coalition organizations

drew their ranks from secular nationalists and former

supporters of the regime, other groups were organized along religious lines. Wahhabist influences remained strong with the Sunni tribes in the vicinity of

Fallujah with some support among their co-religionists within Baghdad. A radical religious organization

with origins in Saudi Arabia, Wahhabists preach nontolerance of infidels, jihad against Coalition forces,

and martyrdom in the name of their goals. Baghdad

Sunni and Ba’ath party members typically remained

more secular in thought than Wahhabists but they

would occasionally cooperate as a matter of convenience. U.S. and Coalition forces identified elements

of several recognized terrorist organizations in Iraq,

and these groups may have received support from

the former regime. Some of the Islamic extremist organizations suspected in the enemy ranks included

al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Islam, Hezbollah, and Wahhabis.

The insurgency was not only confined to militant

Sunni groups, however. Shortly after the fall of the

Ba’ath regime, radical Shi’a militias began to gain momentum and popularity. For example, the Supreme

Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (a Shi’ite

political party and armed militia) took advantage of

the security vacuum to increase influence throughout Iraq. In addition, the collapse of the Ba’athist

regime helped increase the relative influence of Ayatollah Sistani and other important clerics of the key

Shi’ite holy cities of an-Najaf and Karbala. The renewed emphasis on an-Najaf as a center of the Shi’a

religion— the largest in Iraq—countered the former

influence of Iranian clerics seeking to fill the void,

thus causing undoubted friction between Shi’ite elements.

While Iran traditionally supported all Shi’a organizations, the Supreme Council’s goal of creating an

Iraq independent of Tehran left it somewhat at odds

with the Islamic Fundamentalist Republic. The Badr

Corps, the military arm of the Supreme Council, reIn his Commander’s Intent, 1st Marine Division commander MajGen James N. Mattis characterized the

new mission in Iraq as a moment that would define

the Marine Corps, akin to the battles of Iwo Jima and

Hue City.

Photo by LCpl Henry S. Lopez, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 030312-M-0523L-003

Table 3-1: Marine Corps Forces In Support of Operations Iraqi Freedom II–April 2004
tained much stronger ties to Tehran, however, and it

continued to stage demonstrations openly hostile to

the Coalition. The Badr Corps’ followers in Iran reportedly crossed into Iraq with Iranian intelligence

agents within their organization. Many observers believed that the corps placed arms stockpiles in the

Shi’a sections of Baghdad and other cities to the

south. The Supreme Council later changed the name

of its militia to the Badr Organization, connoting a

more peaceful and political emphasis, but it remained a significant military presence in Iraqi public

life.

Other religious organizations, while not directly

rising against U.S. and Coalition forces, remained vital

sources of support for the insurrection and other

forms of opposition to them. The Howza (religious

seminaries teaching Islamic theory and law once

banned under Saddam Hussein) had three key elements for the Shi’a: the premier religious school in

the Shi’a religion located in an-Najaf, a body of leaders that guided the direction and conduct of the Shi’a

religion, and the mutually shared goals of all Shi’as.

All Shi’a-based organizations opposing the Coalition

forces had some affiliation with the Howza, including

24 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by Spc Ronald Shaw Jr., USA Defense Imagery VIRIN: 050414-A-3240S-026

Militant Sunnis and Shi’a, secular Ba’athists, and foreign fighters all took part in terrorist attacks against Coalition forces. Roadside bombs, such as the one whose aftereffects are depicted here, were a common weapon deployed by insurgent groups.

Table 3-2: I Marine Expeditionary Force Combat Power (On Hand/Ready)–April 2004
Early Operations in Al-Anbar Province 25

the SCIRI, Badr Corps, and the Iranian Dawa Party.

Several persons claimed to speak on behalf of the

Howza, such as the influential religious leader Muqtada al Sadr, son of a murdered Shi’ite cleric, and Ayatollah Sistani.

Marines Establish Their Presence

By 20 March 2004, the 1st Marine Division had completed its relief of the 82d Airborne Division in alAnbar and northern Babil Provinces. Regimental

Combat Team 7 went into action first. Its patrols and

limited offensive actions ranged far, and the 1st Light

Armored Reconnaissance Battalion reportedly put the

equivalent of 2.5 years worth of peacetime mileage on

its General Motors-Canada light-armored vehicles during its first month of operations. Security was scarce,

and resistance against U.S. and Coalition forces in the

region was persistent. The first casualties in the division came from an improvised explosive device detonated on 6 March against a vehicle in the 3d Battalion,

7th Marines, sector, injuring two Marines.

Two days later, Marines launched their first offensive action of the year when 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,

and the 1st Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment,

conducted a cordon and search of a house in Husaybah. Regimental Combat Team 7’s discovery of 10 improvised launchers and 60 57mm aerial rockets arrayed

around Camp Korean Village was sobering. On 15

March, Syrian border guards fired with small arms on

Marines of Company L, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, near

the Husaybah border crossing point. The Marines responded with rifles, heavy and light machine guns, and

a tube launched, optically tracked (TOW) antitank missile shot. One Marine was wounded while three Syrian

border posts were damaged or destroyed. Investigations by local Iraqi guards proved that the Syrians had

opened fire first and that neither side had crossed the

frontier at any point.

Iraq’s al-Anbar Province was divided into Areas of Operation. I MEF’s (code named Atlanta) included Area of

Operations Denver (western region), Area of Operations Topeka (Ramadi and its surrounding area), Area of

Operations Raleigh (Fallujah and surrounding areas), and Area of Operations Oshkosh (al-Taqaddum).

I MEF Briefing Map, Adapted by History Division
The regiment executed operations across Area of

Operations Denver that focused on identifying and

capturing enemy mortar men, explosive device

planters, and foreign fighters. Colonel Tucker’s primary

task remained to interdict the infiltration of foreign

fighters joining the Iraqi insurgent effort by using the

26 INTO THE FRAY

History Division Map

Although al-Anbar is geographically the largest of Iraq’s provinces, it is the least populated, with most of its inhabitants living along the Euphrates River. The majority of its inhabitants are Sunni Arabs of the Dulaym tribe.
Early Operations in Al-Anbar Province 27

so-called “rat lines” from the porous Syrian border and

the “white wadi” emerging from the border with Saudi

Arabia. In the vital security area around al-Asad Air

Base, Regimental Combat Team 7 executed a coordinated raid using special operations personnel with

Marines of the al-Asad garrison to capture suspected

insurgents conducting rocket attacks on the base. 

To establish a presence north of the Euphrates and

destroy key insurgency command and control areas,

the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, moved into Rawah on

21 March. Both mounted and dismounted patrols by

joint U.S.-Iraqi teams reinforced border security and

sought to deny emplacement and detonation of explosive devices along various routes. On 19 March, the

regiment reported that a patrol from 3d Battalion, 7th

Marines, stopped and seized a vehicle containing several grenades, RPG-type rockets, launchers, and machine gun ammunition. Three of the six suspects fled

the vehicle, and three were detained. On 22 March,

Marines from the same battalion again stopped a single vehicle for violating curfew, and the search of the

vehicle uncovered one U.S. identification card, a cellular phone, two handheld global positioning devices,

and a mortar firing table printed in Arabic. Two individuals were arrested and brought to Camp al-Qaim

for further questioning where they provided intelligence for a follow-on cordon-and-knock mission that

brought no further discoveries. 

In Rawah, the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, conducted

patrols with local police and began its campaign to secure the town. Far to the southwest in Area of Operations Denver, Marines of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,

conducted joint dismounted security patrols with the

Rutbah Iraqi Civil Defense Corps Company. The 1st

Force Reconnaissance Company tracked high-value insurgents and planned raids, maintained border observation, and deployed snipers as required. All units

produced information operations aimed at calming and

reassuring the local populace, while spreading the

fruits of civil affairs projects and other assistance proThe disposition of U.S. and allied forces in Iraq is shown as reported in a Pentagon press briefing on 30 April

2004.

Pentagon Press Briefing, April 30, 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/DODCMSShare/briefingslide/52/040430-D-6570C-006.jpg
28 INTO THE FRAY

grams. In this manner, the regiment executed General

Mattis’ intention of dual-track operations to kill insurgents and to help support the Iraqi people.

During this first partial month of operations (5–31

March) in Area of Operations Denver, Regimental Combat Team 7 experienced 24 mine or improvised explosive device attacks, found 73 other devices before they

could be detonated, and received 27 indirect- and 26

direct-fire attacks. Four Marines died in action and 51

were wounded in this introduction to the new area.

The 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, continued to

center its main effort on Ramadi, bolstered considerably by the attachments of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines,

and the provisional military police battalion formed by

3d Battalion, 11th Marines. The brigade’s eastern

boundary with Regimental Combat Team 1 moved to

the western bank of the Tharthar Canal with Regimental Combat Team 1 assuming responsibility for the battlespace north of the Euphrates near Saqlawiyah. The

military police company, transferred from the 4th Marine Division to 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, operated

the detention facility in Ramadi and made its first detainee transfer on 24 March, transporting 15 captives

to Camp Fallujah. As the unit moved, a bomb exploded. The detonation produced no casualties, and

the subsequent search of a house in the vicinity led to

the capture of four rifles, electrical switches, and a

large pile of wire. The brigade had two other such devices explode in its sector the same day. One of these

explosions injured two Marines, and the other targeted

an Army M1A1 Abrams main battle tank. The search

of the area by the Army’s 1st Battalion, 34th Armor, led

to the killing of two insurgents, one of whom had an

AK-47 rifle and a detonating device. Such events continued across the operating areas, taxing the men and

women of each regiment or brigade to remain vigilant

and ready for action.

Other 1st Brigade operations included security

sweeps against surface-to-air missile teams operating

around al-Taqaddum, convoy escort for units passing

between the two Marine regiment sectors, and covering the withdrawal of the last elements of 82d Airborne

I MEF Briefing Map, Adapted by History Division

Initial Deployment of I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) Units, March 2004.
Early Operations in Al-Anbar Province 29

Division to Balad Air Base, north of Baghdad. Continuing operations in Ramadi included sweeps, check

points, raids, and watching for highly-placed insurgent

leaders.

The movement of Regimental Combat Team 1 from

Kuwait took place during 14–21 March, and the regimental commanders and staff began work with the 3d

Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, at Camp Fallujah to effect the “right seat, left seat” turnovers at all levels. During this process, Colonel Toolan received operational

control of the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, from the 1st

Brigade, 1st Infantry Division’s Colonel Arthur W. Connor. Along with 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, the soldiers

would cover north Babil province. The external security responsibility for the Abu Ghraib Prison fell to 1st

Battalion, 5th Marines, and Colonel Toolan’s other two

battalions operated outside of Fallujah to isolate it from

infiltration. 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, covered the north

and east, while 1st Reconnaissance Battalion was responsible for the southern sectors. The unenviable mission for the Marines and soldiers of Regimental Combat

Team 1 consisted of stabilizing a large area that included the most volatile town in the notorious Sunni

Triangle, Fallujah.

Roughly nine square miles in size, the city sits like a

trapezoid along the Euphrates’ eastern bank with parallel northern and southern boundaries. As the Euphrates approaches the city, the river takes a sudden

turn in a northeasterly direction. Almost immediately,

however, the river returns to its southeasterly course.

The peninsula formed by this course change forms an

arrow-like formation aimed at the city’s northwestern

district, the Jolan Quarter. On the peninsula’s eastern

side are two parallel bridges that run into the city. The

southern bridge carries Highway 10 over the Euphrates.

The road runs through the city center and bisects HighFallujah is bounded on the west by the Euphrates River, a rail line on the north, and Highway E1 on the east.

Highway 10 bisects the city, running east and west.

2d Topographic Platoon Map, Adapted by History Division
30 INTO THE FRAY

way E1 just outside the eastern city limits.

On 18 March, insurgents attacked the Regimental

Combat Team 1 and 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division

command groups in Fallujah along Highway 10. A

week later, two more attacks on the highway within 15

hours of each other hit a special operations unit and a

Marine Wing Support Squadron 374 convoy. Colonel

Toolan ordered 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, to secure the

cloverleaf intersection with Highway 1, which runs

north-south on the eastern side of the city, and the

northeast portion of the city adjacent to Highway E1. At

dawn on 26 March, one rifle company of 2d Battalion,

1st Marines, seized control of the cloverleaf. Traffic was

stopped and diverted around Fallujah, and E and F

Companies entered the northeast portion of the city.

The insurgents responded to their approach by launching coordinated mortar and small arms ambushes

throughout the day against the Marines who engaged

the insurgents in numerous firefights. On 27 March, at

the request of the city council, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines,

pulled its forces from that portion of the city but retained surveillance over the cloverleaf. The next day,

the battalion reoccupied the intersection, remaining in

place through the end of the month to prevent further

attacks on convoys.

Under these less than auspicious circumstances, the

transfer of authority with the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne

Division, and that of the two divisions as well, took

place on 28 March at Camp Fallujah. Throughout the

week, 23–31 March, insurgents struck the camp with

indirect fire, and Abu Ghraib Prison received the same

treatment for three days. On 30 March, insurgents ambushed a convoy from the 1st Force Service Support

Group near Fallujah. The next day, a patrol from 1st

Reconnaissance Battalion discovered a cache of 300

mortar rounds southwest of Fallujah. As difficult as

these early experiences in al-Anbar Province had been

for the 1st Marine Division and its supporting aviation

and service contingents, hopes remained high that a

sustained and determined Marine Corps presence could

bring improved conditions to the chaotic province.

Among the many technological advantages Marines

exploited in this campaign was the much improved intelligence capability that had been developed over two

decades. The 2003 campaign in Iraq had seen the baptism of fire for the Marine Corps intelligence battalion

formed in the MEF headquarters group under normal

organization. Accordingly, the 2d Intelligence Battalion

established its Tactical Fusion Center with the division

command post at Camp Blue Diamond and proceeded

to operate information cells as low as the company

level in the ensuing campaign. The Tactical Fusion Center combined in a single place the intelligence from

higher echelons of national and military intelligence

services with the data from the many sources of local

Marine Corps and Army units. Overall, the positioning

of the Tactical Fusion Center adjacent to the divisional

operations center provided situational awareness unprecedented even by standards of the 2003 accomplishments.

General Mattis signaled his appreciation of the situation near the end of March. Colonel Tucker’s Regimental Combat Team 7 had successfully positioned

units to interdict the primary rat line. Concurrently,

Colonel Toolan’s Regimental Combat Team 1 had

moved aggressively against the enemy center of gravity in Fallujah, while Colonel Conner’s 1st Brigade preempted insurgent force efforts to disrupt the authorities

of al-Anbar Province. The Marines wanted to increase

human intelligence, fused with all sources, to create opportunities for strikes against the insurgent networks.

General Mattis saw in the opposition a combination

of classic insurgent tactics and terrorist activities, and

these had increased during the turnover. Not only were

the more plentiful road convoys attacked, but also violence in urban and rural areas across the province

heightened. Increased patrol activity into areas not normally covered had produced attacks by both improvised explosive devices and direct fire. In no case,

however, did the insurgents demonstrate any interest

in assaulting the new arrivals. Instead, they had fallen

before steady Marine infantry pressure and return fire. 

The opening of the I MEF stability and security

operations campaign in March ended with an insurgent ambush that left four U.S. security contractors

killed and mutilated on the Highway 10 bridge in

west-central Fallujah, prompting U.S. offensive actions in reprisal. The initial campaign plan for stability and security operations would give way to

full-spectrum combat operations for Marines and soldiers in Iraq and not exclusively in the I MEF zone.

General Mattis Urged His Division Onward

Demonstrate respect to the Iraqi people, especially when you don’t feel like it. As the mission continues, we will experience setbacks

and frustrations. In many cases our efforts will

seem unappreciated by those we are trying the

hardest to help. It is then that small unit leaders step up and are counted. Keep your soldiers, sailors and Marines focused on the

mission and resistant to adversarial relationships with the Iraqi people . . . We obey the

Geneva Convention even while the enemy

does not. We will destroy the enemy without

losing our humanity.
31

The offensive actions carried out by Regimental

Combat Team 1 on 25–27 March succeeded in sending a message to the people of al-Fallujah that the

Marines were there to stay. While setting back the

civil affairs process in the city, Marines felt they were

effectively dealing with the situation.

As noted, the 1st Marine Division had developed

a measured, phased approach to stabilizing the alAnbar region that combined kinetic operations, information operations, and civil affairs actions to show

the residents of Fallujah both the carrot and the stick.

This planning was described in a division order prepared for the regimental combat team called Fallujah

Opening Gambit. Despite these and other measures,

however, events in the city forced the division to confront a range of new circumstances and unanticipated

challenges.

Operation Vigilant Resolve

(3–30 April 2004)

On 31 March 2004 insurgents ambushed four

armed security contractors from the firm Blackwater

USA. The Americans died amid a volley of hand

grenades. A mob gathered, desecrated the bodies, set

them afire, and hung two of them from the nearby

Old Bridge spanning the Euphrates River. World

media broadcast the hanging bodies, and the American and western public saw shocking footage of

charred and almost unrecognizable bodies as residents of the city cheered and danced. Less known

was the cooperation of local Iraqis who helped the

Marines of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, recover the remains of three victims that night and the fourth the

following day.

After a series of conferences with the White House

and the Secretary of Defense, Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, commander of Combined Joint

Task Force 7, directed the Marines to undertake immediate military action. On 1 April 2004, Sanchez’s

deputy director of operations, Army Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, promised an “overwhelming” response to the Blackwater deaths, stating that “we will

pacify that city.” In the midst of calls for vengeance

including options of destroying what little critical infrastructure remained in the city, both I Marine Expeditionary Force commander, Lieutenant General

James T. Conway, and 1st Marine Division commander, Major General James N. Mattis, cautioned

against rash action. In the division’s daily report,

General Mattis’ assistant division commander,

Brigadier General John F. Kelly, strove to temper the

call for immediate offensive action:

As we review the actions in Fallujah yesterday,

the murder of four private security personnel

in the most brutal way, we are convinced that

this act was spontaneous mob action. Under

the wrong circumstances this could have taken

place in any city in Iraq. We must avoid the

temptation to strike out in retribution. In the

only 10 days we have been here we have engaged the “good” and the bad in Fallujah everyday, and have casualties to show for our efforts.

We must remember that the citizens and officials of Fallujah were already gathering up and

delivering what was left of three victims before

asked to do so, and continue in their efforts to

collect up what they can of the dismembered

remnants of the fourth. We have a well thought

out campaign plan that considers the Fallujah

problem across its very complicated spectrum.

This plan most certainly includes kinetic action,

but going overly kinetic at this juncture plays

into the hands of the opposition in exactly the

way they assume we will. This is why they

shoot and throw hand grenades out of crowds,

to bait us into overreaction. The insurgents did

not plan this crime, it dropped into their lap.

We should not fall victim to their hopes for a

vengeful response. To react to this provocation,

as heinous as it is, will likely negate the efforts

the 82d ABD paid for in blood, and complicate

our campaign plan which we have not yet been

given the opportunity to implement. Counterinsurgency forces have learned many times

in the past that the desire to demonstrate force

and resolve has long term and generally negative implications, and destabilize rather than

stabilize the environment.

Sanchez’ headquarters ordered immediate offensive action to re-establish freedom of maneuver in

Chapter 4

The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath
Fallujah on 1 April. At I MEF headquarters, General

Conway directed General Mattis to establish 12

checkpoints around the city using local Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and police personnel to prevent any

movement into or out of the city by younger males.

Iraqi paramilitary personnel, at this time still considered to be reliable, manned seven of the checkpoints

positioned as inner cordons, and Marines of Lieutenant Colonel Gregg P. Olson’s 2d Battalion, 1st

Marines, and Lieutenant Colonel Brennan T. Byrne’s

1st Battalion, 5th Marines, set up five outer checkpoints to complete the ring around the city. As this

was occurring, the two Marine battalions began moving significant combat power to the northeast corner

of the city, near the Jolan District.

On 3 April, General Sanchez issued his order for

Operation Vigilant Resolve. The mission aimed to

deny insurgents sanctuary in Fallujah and to arrest

those responsible for the Blackwater killings. The

two Marine battalions moved into positions around

the eastern and northern portion of Fallujah to seal

the outer cordon of the city. The Marine and Iraqi

positions continued to be fired upon and the friendly

Iraqis soon fled. The Iraqi 36th Commando Battalion

was subsequently dispatched to replace the fleeing

Iraqi forces. A specially trained unit augmented and

mentored by the U.S. Army’s Special Forces to fight

alongside American troops, the commandos would

acquit themselves well in combat during the weeks

ahead.

In his commander’s comments of 3 April, General

Mattis raised the difficulties of conducting offensive

operations in Fallujah:

My intent is to then enter the city from two directions, which will draw fire from guerillas and

put us in a position to exploit our own well

considered and conditions-based operation.

There are over 250,000 inhabitants in the city,

the vast majority of whom have no particular

love for the Coalition, but are also not insurgents. From a moral, ethical, legal, and military

32 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by 1st Lt Esteban Vickers, DVIDS, VIRIN 080410-M-2385J-003

On 31 March 2004, four Blackwater USA civilian contractors were ambushed and killed by insurgent forces

in Fallujah. Their bodies were burned and mutilated and two were hung from this bridge (pictured here in

2008).
The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath 33

perspective, we will fight smart: We do not

have to be loved at the end of the day, this is a

goal that is no longer achievable in Fallujah, but

we must avoid turning more young men into

terrorists. We will also avoid doing what the insurgents, terrorists, and foreign fighters, and

“Arab Street” all expect, and that is the thoughtless application of excessive force as if to strike

out in retribution for the murders.

General Mattis and his division staff planned decisive operations to bring Fallujah under control

while simultaneously maintaining the counterinsurgency operations in nearby Ramadi and the rest of

al-Anbar and north Babil Provinces to prevent conceding any advantage to the insurgents. 

His orders called for a four-phase operation to be

implemented by Colonel John A. Toolan’s Regimental Combat Team 1. In Phase I, the regiment would

begin sustained operations in Fallujah beginning

0100 on 5 April with a tight cordon of the city using

two battalion-sized task forces in blocking positions

and traffic control points on all motorized avenues

of approach. This stage included raids against high

value targets and the photography shop that printed

the murder photos. Phase II entailed continuous raids

against targets inside the city from firm bases established within northern and southern Fallujah. Messages concerning the operation would be broadcast

informing citizens of measures necessary to protect

themselves and families from harm and thanking the

local population for their cooperation and for information leading to the death or capture of insurgent

forces. In Phases III and IV, Regimental Combat

Team 1 would, at the moment of the commander’s

choosing, attack and seize various hostile sectors in

the city, integrating and eventually turning operations

over to Iraqi security forces.

Colonel Toolan ordered his two battalions, the

regiment’s supporting tank company, assault amphibian company, and its artillery battery into their

battle positions in the early morning hours of 5 April.

The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion swept to the north

and east of the city to target insurgents seeking to

fire mortar rounds and rockets into Marine positions.

Company D, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance BatCol John A. Toolan (left), commander of Regimental Combat Team 1, and 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, commander LtCol Willard Buhl, discuss progress made by their forces during Operation Vigilant Resolve. 

Photo by LCpl Jordan F. Sherwood, Defense Imagery, VIRIN 040813-M-0706S-030
talion, moved north to cover Highway E1. Marines

of Company B, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, and

Navy Mobile Construction Battalion 74 constructed a

berm around southern Fallujah, further isolating the

battle area.

As Captain Kyle Stoddard’s Company F, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, occupied its position, insurgents engaged his 2d Platoon and combat engineer

detachment with RPG-type rocket launchers and

small-arms fire. An Air Force AC-130 gunship arrived

on station and coordinated with the battalion for fire

support. When the AC-130 had stopped firing, the

Jolan District lay ablaze, and the enemy threat had

disappeared.

With 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, blocking any escape to the south of Fallujah, the assault of the city

commenced on 6 April with 2d Battalion, 1st Marines,

attacking the Jolan District in the city’s northwest corner while 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, attacked west

from its positions south of the cloverleaf connecting

34 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by MSgt Howard J. Farrell, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 040405-M-0049F-002

A Marine M1A1 Abrams main battle tank blocks access into Fallujah to isolate insurgent forces operating inside the city during Operation Vigilant Resolve. 

Marines from 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, set up a perimeter in the streets of Fallujah during Operation Vigilant

Resolve.

Photo by LCpl Kenneth E. Madden III, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 040405-M-5505M-042
The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath 35

Highways E1 to 10 into the industrial Sin’a District.

General Mattis planned to pinch the insurgents from

two directions, adding a steadily increasing pressure.

The fighting in late March had determined that the

enemy lacked the resolve and the fighting skill to

stop advancing Marine rifle units. A progressive advance into the city would exploit insurgent weaknesses and lead to their wholesale collapse. 

As Marines entered the city, Colonel Toolan’s estimation of the enemy’s posture proved consistent

with his expectations. The moves from north and

southeast into the city each night drew immediate

fire from insurgents, revealing their locations, and

thus allowing the Marines to destroy them. The Marine battalions attempted to integrate Iraqi Civil Defense Corps troops into the blocking positions and

new Iraqi Army units into Marine battalions as rapidly

as possible. Marine commanders, Coalition authority

representatives, and civil affairs officers advised the

civil, tribal, and religious leaders about the situation.

These locals predicted dire consequences if the Coalition continued to move into the city. But the Coalition’s response to the city’s leaders was that their

predictions lacked credibility and that they bore

major responsibility for the present conditions in Fallujah. The information operation campaign used public service announcements, handbills, and

notifications to the mayor, city council, sheiks, and

police. These announcements stated that a curfew

would be imposed and enforced between 1900–0600. 

As operations proceeded, General Mattis signaled

his concern about I MEF’s southern boundary because a revolt in Baghdad led by Shi’a cleric Moqtadre al-Sadr threatened I MEF’s communications to

the south and east. Elements of al-Sadr’s militia (also

termed the Mahdi Army) moved astride the Euphrates near al-Musayyib on the Karbala-Baghdad

highway. Iraqi police managed to restore order, but

the uprising remained a serious portent of the future. 

By 6 April, the inadequacy of Iraqi paramilitary

forces could no longer be denied. Most of the 2,000

Iraqi soldiers and police theoretically deployed to

support the 1st Marine Division had deserted as soon

as, or even before, the fighting began. The 2d Battalion, New Iraqi Army, for instance, took fire while

convoying from Baghdad on 5 April and refused to

go into action with some 38 percent of its forces disappearing at once. Many of these Iraqi soldiers reportedly entered insurgent ranks. Only the 36th Iraqi

Commando Battalion/Iraqi National Guard Battalion

(400 troops with 17 U.S. Special Forces advisors)

stayed the course, working alongside 2d Battalion,

1st Marines, in Jolan. The 506th Battalion of the Civil

Defense Corps proved unsteady but useful at manning exterior checkpoints, but no other Iraqi soldiers

served in this action. The Civil Defense Corps’ 505th

Battalion, for instance, never reported for operations. 

On 6 April, General Mattis decided to order in an

infantry battalion from Regimental Combat Team 7.

At the same time, he expressed frustration with the

Iraqi security force program:

A primary goal of our planning to date has

been to “put an Iraqi face” on security functions

as quickly as possible. With three weeks on the

ground, reporting and experience has indicated

that all Iraqi civil security organizations—police, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and border

force—are generally riddled with corruption, a

lack of will, and are widely infiltrated by antiPhoto by GSgt Chago Zapata, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 040812-M-0095Z-074

An Iraqi soldier of the 36th Commando Battalion,

Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade, waits to participate in a joint operation in Najaf Province in August 2004. The battalion was one of the few Iraqi units

to not desert during Operation Vigilant Resolve, and

elements of the force fought alongside 2d Battalion,

1st Marines, in Fallujah’s Jolan District. 
Coalition agents. In one case we have reporting

that an entire unit located in Fallujah has deserted and gone over to the insurgent side.

Their treachery has certainly cost us killed and

wounded.

There are a number of explanations for this

turn of events, not the least of which is that

until now the forces have been little more than

a jobs program. We are only now asking them

to man their posts, to step up and be counted,

and it would seem many are either voting with

their feet—or their allegiance. 

Starting on 7 April, Regimental Combat Team 1 attacked continuously for 48 hours, killing and routing

those insurgents who had stayed to fight. Fighting at

times was at close range, no more than 25 meters at

best. The Marines continued to push. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, moved through the southeastern

district sectors of the city proper and controlled 1,500

meters of Highway 10 west of the cloverleaf. The 2d

Battalion, 1st Marines, continued attacking in its corner of the city, expanding to the south and west. A

mosque gave special resistance to 1st Battalion, 5th

Marines, with small arms and rocket-launcher (RPG)

fire, leading to a coordinated assault to seize it, killing

one insurgent and taking three prisoner. Route E1 remained open for Coalition traffic to the north of the

city. Late on 7 April, the reinforcing battalion from

Regimental Combat Team 7, the 3d Battalion, 4th

Marines, began to move from al-Asad Air Base to Fallujah, where it would join Regimental Combat Team

1 for the fight by the following afternoon.

Marines fought in full-scale urban combat for almost six days for the first time since 2003. The insurgents proved to be an adaptive force, using small

three- to five-man teams, shoot-and-run tactics, and

sniper fire revealing some skill. They also used indiscriminate mortar, artillery rocket, and handheld

rocket-launcher fire at a safe distance from Marine

positions. They displayed organized battle order and

command and control using cellular phones, pigeons, and visual signals. Cached weapons and

equipment in numerous locations throughout the city

allowed them freedom of maneuver.

Marines saw numerous cases of civilian observers

cueing insurgents to their movements, thus exploiting

the rules of engagement under which Coalition

troops fought. In any case, after Marines achieved superior firepower, insurgents retreated and attempted

to blend with the civilian populace, allowing them to

fight another day.

Supporting arms proved essential even when

Marines engaged in close quarters combat. Lieutenant

Colonel Olson characterized it by stating that “wave

after wave of close air support aircraft: Air Force F16C, and AC-130, Marine AH-1W Cobras and UH-1N

handled the mission load.” Throughout the entire

month of April, Captain Brad S. Pennella’s Battery A,

1st Battalion, 11th Marines, shot 30 counter-fire missions against insurgent mortar and artillery rocket positions, and fired 14 missions to support the infantry.

36 INTO THE FRAY

Marines of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, patrol the streets of Fallujah during Operation Vigilant Resolve in April

2004. 

Photo by LCpl Kenneth E. Madden III, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 040405-M-5505M-041
The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath 37

In addition, Company C, 1st Tank Battalion (Captain

Michael D. Skaggs), attached a platoon to each infantry battalion in direct support. Repeatedly, under

steady RPG and small arms fire, the M1A1 tanks

rolled into enemy territory and demolished enemy

personnel and equipment.

Combat in Fallujah demonstrated many unusual

characteristics. Outside of the city’s industrial Sina’a

District, residential buildings make up most of its

more than 50,000 buildings. The brick or concrete

homes typically are one or two stories high with flat

roofs, enclosed courtyards, and perimeter walls.

While some neighborhoods have a normal grid pattern, the Jolan District revealed twisted alleyways and

jumbled streets, repeated to an extent in the industrial southeast.

The narrow streets and walled enclosures channeled attacking Marine rifle squads, but the enemy

engaged in little street fighting, preferring to hole up

and fight from ambush inside the houses themselves.

By doing so, they avoided exposure to Marines

placed in overwatch, observation, and sniper positions. The walls of the typical house resisted grenade

fragments, requiring each room to be cleared individually.

The windows typically were barred; doors, gates,

and even internal barricades were reinforced, making

some houses miniature forts, requiring multiple shots

of multipurpose assault weapons, rockets, and tank

guns to breach or reduce.

The houses offered multiple entry and exit points

at the front, kitchen, side, or rear, enabling insurgents

to move easily through the residential areas. Their

tactics frequently relied upon arms caches in many

houses, enabling them to move unarmed between

them in the guise of innocent civilians and then set

up ambushes. After they were inside, Marines usually found the same layout: the front door opened to

a small entryway with twin doors leading into two

sitting rooms. Beyond these one encountered interior doors opening to the central hallway, where all

first floor rooms led. In that hallway stood the typical stairwell to the second floor, containing more

rooms and an exterior stairwell to the rooftop.

The increased security focus and operational

tempo in the division’s zone fostered an additional

Photo by A1C Alicia M. Sarkkinen, USAF, Defense Imagery VIRIN 031125-F-7392S-030

Under pressure from the Iraqi Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority, the head of U.S.

Forces Central Command, Army General John P. Abizaid, (center), ordered a suspension of offensive operations in Fallujah on 9 April 2004. 
operational planning effort to develop preliminary

operations in and around Fallujah to support the

main effort. The intelligence analysis identified three

key cities harboring and supporting enemy activities:

Saqlawiyah, Karmah, and Jurf as-Sakhr. The staff

made plans for combined operations in these cities.

With Colonel Toolan and his staff focused on Fallujah, General Mattis activated the division’s alternate

command group “Bravo.” Led by 1st Marine Division

assistant commander, General Kelly, “Division Bravo”

moved to north Babil Province and assumed command of the two infantry battalions there. These

would play a key role in establishing a secure environment for the ongoing Arba’een pilgrimage, which

brought hundreds of thousands of Shi’a faithful into

Karbala. Some operational planning teamwork later

occurred to conduct a relief in place by the Army’s

1st Armored Division, which was by then beginning

to engage in operations to the south of Baghdad.

As Marines poised and repositioned for further operations on 9 April, orders arrived from General

Sanchez to cease all offensive operations in Fallujah.

L. Paul Bremer III and the Coalition Provisional Authority had prevailed upon General Abizaid, head of

Central Command, to order a cease-fire at the behest

of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) in Baghdad.

The halt was to allow IGC council representatives the

opportunity to negotiate the enemy’s surrender. Politics brought Regimental Combat Team 1’s momentum to a stop. Marines received the order to cease

offensive operations with some disbelief.

The insurgents’ use of information warfare played

a role in the cessation of operations. Although the

Marines of Regimental Combat Team 1 were achieving considerable gains, the insurgency was able to

effectively employ the media to stir up opposition to

the Coalition campaign. In addition to the insurgents’

surprising mobility and strength, the insurgents displayed an excellent grasp of information operations.

Their propaganda reached television and radio stations, appeared on the Internet, and spread through

the streets by word of mouth. Some groups distributed fliers and videos alleging Coalition atrocities and

insurgent successes. Arab satellite news programming, especially the ubiquitous Al Jazeera, highlighted the “excessive force” of the Marines and

soldiers of 1st Marine Division, making allusions to

the Israeli actions in Palestine as further denunciation. With no western press embedded with I MEF

forces and the streets too dangerous for independ38 INTO THE FRAY

Although the combat operations in Fallujah garnered the most attention in April 2004, intense fighting also took

place in al-Anbar’s capital, Ramadi (pictured here in 2008), during the same month. 

Photo by Cpl Jeremy M. Giacominol, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 080423-M-6668G-022
The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath 39

ent reporting, the media battlefield fell to the insurgents.

The Iraqi Governing Council caved in to pressures

within and without its chambers. Three of its members resigned in protest, and five others threatened

the same. Bremer met with the Council on 8 April

and received the opinions of the Sunni members that

Operation Vigilant Resolve amounted to “collective

punishment” and that even more massive demonstrations of resistance and opposition were in the offing.

Bremer was already under pressure to deal with

the al-Sadr revolt, and the British had criticized him

for his heavy-handed approach in Fallujah. He also

knew that the Abu Ghraib Prison scandals were

about to become public knowledge. Thus, he probably decided to cut his losses. For him, the larger objective of returning sovereignty to the Iraqis by 30

June likely took precedence.

An uncertain siege continued for three weeks. On

8 April 2004 the newly arrived 3d Battalion, 4th

Marines, launched an attack from Fallujah’s northeast,

oriented southwest. As it took up the main effort, the

other two battalions continued to reduce insurgent

pockets of resistance. The enemy fired rockets and

mortars from the city center but had by then lost all

of its initial defensive positions. Not surprising to the

Marine Corps battalions, the insurgents remaining

within the city limits tried to use the cease-fire to their

advantage. Colonel Toolan tightened the cordon on

the city to prevent the insurgents from withdrawing

from the city and to block reinforcements. The 36th

Iraqi Commando Battalion continued to fight alongside the Marines, distinguishing itself as the sole Iraqi

unit to prove itself in combat. Meanwhile, the Iraqi

505th Battalion manned checkpoints under supervision on the outskirts of the city.

Captain Jason E. Smith led his Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, through some of the heaviest

fighting in the industrial area during the formal offensive operation. He returned to the offensive again

on 13 April. The insurgents surrounded the attached

3d Platoon, Company A, which lost an assault amphibious vehicle and took several casualties. Leading

the rescue effort, Smith guided his convoy toward the

smoke of the burning vehicle and then dismounted,

racing to the first vehicles to lead his Marines to the

trapped platoon. With total disregard for enemy fire,

he coordinated attacks on the insurgents. Organizing

a defensive perimeter and evacuating casualties, he

supervised the recovery of the disabled tracked vehicle and coordinated the withdrawal as part of the

rear guard.

Following the cease-fire, representatives from I

MEF, the Coalition authority, and Iraqi organizations

began to negotiate with the insurgents, but little

Photo by SSgt D. Myles Cullen, USAF, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 040628-F-0193C-009

While the transfer of sovereignty from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the Iraqi Interim Government on

28 June 2004 occurred ahead of schedule, the country was far from stable or secure. U.S. Ambassador to Iraq,

L. Paul Bremer III, was photographed shortly before departing Iraq after the transfer. 
progress was made. Marines had to defend themselves from repeated insurgent cease-fire violations.

On 25 April, both General Conway and General Mattis met with former Iraqi Army generals to discuss the

possible formation of a military unit in Fallujah. The

negotiations produced the Fallujah Brigade, which

gained the quick approval of the military chain of

command. By 28 April the Fallujah Brigade had

begun assembling and on the 30th, a turnover led to

the phased withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division

from Fallujah. While Bremer protested the creation

of the brigade, even more serious problems emerged

by the end of April that overshadowed his misgivings. For General Conway, the unusual negotiating

opportunity allowed at least a bad solution to an insoluble dilemma because the 1st Marine Division no

longer had authority to continue the assault and to

clear the city, and it lacked the manpower and other

resources to manage a prolonged siege.

Insurgency in Al-Anbar Province

April 2004

The 1st Marine Division fought its first battle for

Fallujah well but with considerable political interference. The ensuing days saw a widespread rise in violence and opposition to occupying forces, in some

instances reflecting the rising temperatures and the

public’s frustration with the squalid conditions in the

city. In other cases, violence was planned by antiCoalition factions and insurgents. In al-Anbar

Province, insurgent groups rallied to support their

brethren remaining behind in the city, spurred by the

Fallujah insurgent and foreign fighter leaders who escaped in the first days of April. But another crisis

overshadowed the difficulties of soldiers and Marines

in that province, one with considerable political impact.

The relatively young but influential Moqtadre alSadr, scion of a Shi’a clerical dynasty, enjoyed increasing power and popularity after the overthrow of

Saddam Hussein’s regime. Having served as a symbol

of Shi’a resistance to the former regime, he continued

as a resistance leader by opposing the U.S. and Coalition occupation of Iraq. In 2003 he formed a militia,

which became known variously as the Sadr Militia or

the Mahdi Army, and announced a shadow Shi’a government in al-Kufah, where he intended to establish

government ministries. Al-Sadr continued to pose obstacles to the Coalition Provisional Authority’s plans

for a transition to Iraqi self-rule via the Governing

Council, and on 5 April 2004, Coalition authorities

closed his newspaper and called for the leader’s ar40 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by Sgt Paul L. Anstine II, Defense Imagery VIRIN 040314-M-5150A-024

In April 2004, units from Colonel Craig A. Tucker’s Regimental Combat Team 7 were sent to Area of Operations Raleigh to relieve Regimental Combat Team 1 at Fallujah. 
The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath 41

rest on various charges. At the same time, thousands

of Iraqis in Baghdad (he was the de facto ruler of the

Sadr City section of Baghdad) and the Shi’a cities of

al-Kut, Karbala, ad-Diwaniyah and an-Najaf took to

the streets to support al-Sadr, while his militia seized

government buildings and police stations in a major

uprising and challenge to the Coalition Provisional

Authority.

For the first time in a year, cannon and gun fire resounded through the streets of the city. The 1st Armored Division halted its redeployment movements

on 6 April, having turned over the garrison mission

to the 1st Cavalry Division. General Sanchez issued

orders to the 1st Armored Division to deploy combat

units south of Baghdad with warnings of further actions to come. He ordered Operation Resolute Sword

on 7 April against the Mahdi Army:

The Mahdi Army is declared to be a hostile

2d Topographic Platoon Map, Adapted by History Division

Operation Vigilant Resolve, April 2004.

To provide better leadership over the Iraq War, the

Combined Joint Task Force 7 was replaced by the

Multi National Force–Iraq and the Multi National

Corps–Iraq in the summer of 2004. In July 2004,

Army LtGen Ricardo S. Sanchez was relieved as senior commander in Iraq by Army Gen George W. Casey

Jr. (shown below testifying before Congress in 2005). 

Photo by TSgt Myles D. Cullen, USAF, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 050623-F-0193C-022
force; Coalition forces are authorized to engage

and destroy the Mahdi Army based solely upon

their status as members of the Mahdi Army.

There is no requirement for members of Mahdi

Army to commit a hostile act or demonstrate

hostile intent before they can be engaged. Muqtada al-Sadr is the leader of Mahdi Army. Positive identification of Mahdi Army targets must

be acquired prior to engagement.

With the dispatch of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, to

Regimental Combat Team 1 in support of Operation

Vigilant Resolve, General Mattis sensed that the division had reached the end of its resources. Yet he suspected that an emerging danger to the east and south

remained with the al Sadr revolt; he wrote on 8 April:

The current tempo and widespread enemy

surge across our operations area has this division stretched. We are moving aggressively

against the enemy across our zone but there are

enemy forces operating in areas where we have

no forces and the Iraqi security forces are impotent. We lack sufficient forces to fully address

the enemy in the area north of Camp Fallujah

(vicinity of al Karma), Jurf al Sukr, Northern

Babil and the rocket belt south of Fallujah and

Abu Ghraib prison. We will address those enemies once we free up forces so we can destroy

their sanctuaries. Additional forces to command

and control the Northern Babil fight, a regiment

headquarters, a tank company (personnel

only), and one USMC infantry battalion have

been requested by separate correspondence.

In northern Babil Province, two U.S. battalions

under the 1st Marine Division sought to maintain the

flux of events between the Fallujah and al-Sadr uprisings. The U.S. Army’s 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry,

focused on securing routes for the Arba’een pilgrimage of the Shi’a. This required ambushing insurgents

setting explosive devices, mounting patrols along

routes in the zone, and supporting the traffic control

points manned by the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps.

When feasible, patrols of 1st Reconnaissance Battalion moved in from its usual areas south of Fallujah to

counter insurgent indirect fire and booby trap teams.

While escorting a convoy into al-Anbar Province,

the reconnaissance battalion’s 2d Platoon, Company

B, ran into a well-concealed and fortified position

southwest of Fallujah. When Captain Brent L. Morel,

the platoon commander, saw his lead vehicle

smashed by a rocket, he ordered his other two vehicles to flank the insurgent position. As insurgent mortar and machine gun fire increased, Captain Morel

led an assault across an open field and up a ten-foot

berm into firing positions from which the reconnaissance Marines eliminated 10 insurgents at close range

and forced the others to flee. Continuing the assault

against the other insurgents who continued to pin

42 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by Cpl Matthew S. Richards, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 040812-M-4358R-052

Marines from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit participate in a joint raid with Iraqi Security Forces against

the forces of Moqtada al-Sadr in an-Najaf, August 2004. 
The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath 43

down the convoy, Captain Morel received a fatal

burst of automatic weapons fire. Leadership fell to

team leader Sergeant Willie L. Copeland III, who continued the assault by fire with his five Marines while

shielding and attempting to save the life of his captain. Under the cover of hand grenades, they withdrew to safety with Morel’s body. In the same action,

Sergeant Lendro F. Baptista led his three-man team

against more insurgent positions, single-handedly

killing four of them at close range while directing fire

against several others. He then personally covered

the withdrawal of the team to safety with his own firing.

In Area of Operations Topeka, the soldiers and

Marines with the Army’s 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, fought feverishly against insurgents rallying to

support the fighting in Fallujah. Fighting in Ramadi

reached a new level of intensity, with 6 April being

the worst day, when 12 Marines of 2d Battalion, 4th

Marines, died in an urban firefight against insurgents

operating in small groups that initially attacked the

government center. The battalion succeeded in defending the government buildings, assisting in extracting Coalition authority officials, and pushing the

attackers into the eastern side of the city.

At 1048 on 6 April, Company G received small

arms and RPG fire in the al-Malaab District. The patrol, pursuing the attackers, cordoned off the buildings in the area, when small arms fire erupted. Two

squads engaged the enemy, and the battalion sent its

quick reaction force. At approximately 1145, Company G received more fire and at 1205 was pinned

down in a house. The quick reaction force moved to

the area in support but was engaged by insurgent

forces as well, one block east of Company G. Captain

Christopher J. Bronzi, the company commander, led

his Marines in the ensuing 24 hours of action, personally destroying several enemy fighting positions

and repeatedly exposing himself to small arms and

grenades. At one point on the sixth, he led a fire

team into a fire-swept street to recover the body of a

fallen Marine.

At this time the battalion received notice from 1st

Marine Division that three mosques in the area had

called for “jihad.” At approximately 1330 an explosive device was reported in Company E’s sector, on

the eastern outskirts of the city, and while cordoning

off the area the company received small arms fire. At

approximately the same time just to the east, one of

the battalion’s sniper teams set up near the Euphrates

River was attacked by 12 to 15 men. At approximately 1400, a Company E patrol was ambushed. A

quick reaction force was dispatched to reinforce the

patrol when it engaged with the enemy still further to

the east of the city. Two Humvees were hit, and its

platoon commander was critically wounded. Under

heavy machine gun and rocket fire, squad leader

Corporal Eric M. Smith assumed command of the plaA number of captured weapons and munitions found and seized by Marines during vehicle inspections conducted throughout an-Najaf Province were displayed before being destroyed in August 2004.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 040821-M-555Z-001
toon and led the Marines 50 meters across open

ground, where they set up in a few fighting holes

placed along Route 10. Smith then ran back across

the field to evacuate his platoon commander and the

platoon’s weapons. Employing machine guns from

the platoon’s seven-ton truck, Smith led a counterattack against the insurgent force and relieved another

squad that had been pinned down. When an Army

mechanized infantry platoon arrived, Corporal Smith

coordinated the evacuation of casualties and withdrew the platoon to the company command post.

The battalion determined that fighters came into

Ramadi on motorcycles and in pickup trucks, met at

a central location (likely the soccer field), and informed the town’s people that they were going to attack U.S. forces that day. On the spot interrogation

revealed that the insurgents forced residents out of

their homes as the fighters prepared to engage the

Americans. When the fighting subsided, the insurgents made a planned withdrawal on motorcycles

and possibly in boats on the Euphrates back to their

base camps.

The launching of Operation Vigilant Resolve ignited festering insurgent cells that had planned incursions of these types. Having stirred up a hornet’s

nest across al-Anbar Province, the Coalition forces

found themselves extended beyond tolerable limits.

The insurgents established ambushes, roadblocks,

emplaced explosive devices, and fired all kinds of

weapons indirectly at Coalition forces. As part of their

efforts to cut lines of communications, they moved

against key bridges, including the Tharthar Bridge

over the canal of the same name.

These were dark hours for the U.S. and Coalition

position in Iraq, and the political-military direction of

the campaign to clear Fallujah of insurgents demonstrated considerable weakness and discord. As

planned, the “transfer of sovereignty” between the

Coalition Provincial Authority and Iraq did occur on

28 June 2004. Bremer had advanced it two days

ahead of schedule to forestall further difficulties, and

he departed Iraq minutes after the ceremony. With

the establishment of Iraqi sovereignty, the U.S. led

Coalition Provisional Authority dissolved itself and

legal authority devolved upon the appointed Iraqi Interim Government. The United States and Coalition

forces continued to operate under the “all necessary

measures” language of the U.N. Security Council resolutions that identified the state of conflict existing in

Iraq and the need for the multinational force to conduct operations and to detain individuals to help establish a secure environment. 

In wake of the First Battle of Fallujah and the parallel al-Sadr rising in April, the transition to Iraqi sovereignty on 28 June 2004 took on a rather hollow ceremonial character. The equally symbolic raising of

the American flag over the new U.S. Embassy in

Baghdad by Marines, marking the first time the American flag had flown there in 13 years, did herald some

significant changes in U.S. policies and plans for the

future. But the idea of sovereignty had little meaning

in Iraqi streets. Still ahead lay several months of fighting and many casualties to restore a semblance of

order in Iraq. The lessons were hard, but Marines

knew from the moment the battle was terminated on

30 April that they would need to return to Fallujah.

Nominally, I MEF reported 27 U.S. killed in action

and more than 90 wounded in the first Battle of Fallujah, but Army and Marine Corps casualties, in related incidents in Ramadi and the area surrounding

Fallujah, were just beginning to show the extent of

their losses. In April, the 1st Marine Division alone

suffered 48 Marines, two soldiers, and one Navy

corpsman killed in action, and the wounded in action

totaled 412 Marines, 43 soldiers, and 21 sailors. Little

information exists on casualties for the few Iraqi

forces fighting with the Coalition. Enemy losses can

never be known, but are estimated by some intelligence sources as 800 Iraqis killed, which undoubtedly included noncombatants. 

Regimental Combat Team 7’s

Counterstrike in Operation Ripper Sweep

(14 April–1 May 2004)

Thwarted in their efforts to eradicate the insurgents from Fallujah, General Conway and General

Mattis turned to the many instances of insurgency in

the surrounding areas of the province. The Army’s

1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, worked unceasingly to maintain a semblance of order in Ramadi,

using the full panoply of raids, cordons, and various

types of patrolling and ambush actions. In the western areas of the province, Regimental Combat Team

7 continued to interdict insurgent transportation

routes while also raiding suspected insurgent cells

across the Euphrates valley between al-Qaim and

Rawah.

Beginning on 10 April, General Mattis’ staff began

to work with Colonel Craig A. Tucker’s Regimental

Combat Team 7 to develop a plan to move a key part

of the regiment into Area of Operations Raleigh. It

would relieve Regimental Combat Team 1 of its responsibilities outside Fallujah and deal with the incipient insurgent activity in the towns and

countryside surrounding that city. Tucker had his

staff devise a plan to free sufficient combat power

44 INTO THE FRAY
The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath 45

from the camps and duties in western al-Anbar

Province and to move it with the regimental tactical

command post to positions in its eastern areas.

The resulting plan juggled the missions of I MEF’s

many units. The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing would have

to assume responsibility for security of Camp Korean

Village to free the 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance

Battalion, which was leaving the border crossings

Trebil and Wallid uncovered (the crossings remained

closed for most of the month during the Fallujah crisis). The Azerbaijani company stationed at Camp Haditha Dam would be reinforced with only a

detachment from 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, and a

small craft company. The Taqaddum security battalion, 3d Battalion, 24th Marines, replaced 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, at Camp Hit. At Camp al-Qaim, only

3d Battalion, 7th Marines, remained to counter insurgents at the Syrian border zone. The Haditha Dam

and Hit zone formerly occupied by 2d Battalion, 7th

Marines, was covered by Task Force Walsh (Major

Bennett W. Walsh—who commanded the 1st Small

Craft Company) consisting of L Company, 3d Battalion, 24th Marines; Company C, 1st Combat Engineer

Battalion; the 1st Small Craft Company; a platoon left

by 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion; a platoon of military police; detachments of volunteers;

and the Azerbaijani company. The regiment’s executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel John D. Gamboa,

took command of what became known as Regimental Combat Team 7 West at the main command post

during the regiment’s offensive foray around Fallujah. As part of this offensive, General Mattis assigned

Tucker an additional mission of clearing the right

bank of the Euphrates along Route 10 as far as the

peninsula west of Fallujah, closed for several days

because of explosive devices and ambushes. 

The force taken by Colonel Tucker on this operation consisted of his tactical command group, the 2d

Battalion, 7th Marines; 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion; 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank

Battalion (attached at the time the Fallujah battle

began); Battery E, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines; and a

platoon from the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company. General Mattis clarified his plan on 13 April:

The division is stretched thin with the route security mission coupled with the Fallujah cordon. These missions tie down a significant

portion of our maneuver assets and the sooner

we receive direction about the anticipated resolution of Fallujah negotiations, the better.

While accepting a short term risk in the west

permits us to move against several enemy sanctuaries and dominated areas in area Raleigh,

Regimental Combat Team 7 must return to the

western operating area in approximately seven

to ten days or we will face setbacks along the

rat lines that may negate our successes further

east. Limiting defensive route security missions

and maintaining the cordon around Fallujah for

as short a period as possible are tactical imperatives; we need to return to the offensive as

rapidly as possible.

As the task force organized by Colonel Tucker

began to assemble at al-Asad Air Base, the situation

continued to deteriorate as the division reported on

the 13th: “the two companies of effective Iraqi Civil

Defense Corps from the 507th Battalion have essentially quit.”

The division’s order of the day for 14 April set out

the mission for Regimental Combat Team 7. Colonel

Tucker issued his orders for Operation Ripper Sweep

which would be conducted in three initial phases: 

At al-Asad: rearm, refit, refuel and rehearse in

preparation for upcoming operation in support

of the division’s efforts at Fallujah. Depart alAsad at 1400 on 15 April for area Raleigh. At

0600, 16 April, commence the attack astride the

main routes from Taqaddum, clearing the insurgents from the southwest of Fallujah through

al-Amirah. Continuing on order to clear Jurf as

Sakhr, preparing for further operations in the

security zone of Regimental Combat Team 1.

At 0600 on 16 April, the Ripper Sweep forces

began the offensive with 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion attacking southeast where a

blocking position was established to support the follow-on clearance by 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, between al-Taqaddum and Fallujah. Insurgent

resistance remained minimal. The only notable contact during the clearance occurred when 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance units were engaged by small

arms from a fuel truck while south of Fallujah. The

Marines suspected a vehicular bomb and destroyed

the truck with 25mm cannon fire, wounding both occupants, who received immediate medical evacuation. At 1300 on 18 April, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,

and 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion continued the attack into the center of al-Amiriyah town,

covered overhead by Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon

fighter-bombers and Marine Corps AH-1W Cobra attack helicopters. The reaction to the Marines who entered al-Amiriyah in their armored vehicles was
warm, despite the fact that intelligence had reported

the town was a sanctuary for insurgents. Colonel

Tucker said of the locals’ reaction to the Marines, “it

was like liberating France.” The picture began to develop that the “bow-wave” caused by the overwhelming offensive capability of the task force had

driven insurgent elements out of the entire zone well

before the Marines arrived. Among several detainees

the task force captured the eighth ranking person on

Regimental Combat Team 1’s high value target list.

General Mattis reacted positively to the restoration

of free movement from al-Taqaddum into and south

of Fallujah, linking with the main surface communications to Kuwait. He ordered Regimental Combat

Team 7 to continue movement as far as Jurf as Sak,

linking with 2d Battalion, 2d Marines. General Kelly’s

Division Bravo group had extended that battalion to

cover any move by al-Sadr militiamen toward the division’s flank. General Mattis communicated the following:

Following Regimental Combat Team 7’s actions

this week, we will be driving the tempo

throughout most of area Atlanta. Regimental

Combat Team 7 will then return to the west and

reestablish its dominance. The relief in place

with 1st Armored Division in North Babil, freeing up two battalions, and the arrival of additional tank and assault amphibious vehicle

companies will enable us to maintain the momentum we are now developing in the east.

More importantly, we will have the forces necessary to exploit our success with persistent

presence in key areas. It will soon be clear that

Blue Diamond is the dominant tribe in the alAnbar Province.

Tucker’s task force spent a day at Camp al-Taqaddum and Camp Fallujah conducting maintenance and

preparing to continue with Operation Ripper Sweep.

At 0400 on 22 April the force took its offensive to the

left bank of the Euphrates against al-Karmah, which

the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, had discovered was an

insurgent base after the initial Fallujah cease-fire.

Once again, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion led the offensive, followed by 2d Battalion, 7th

Marines. In a street-by-street search-and-clear operation, the two battalions again encountered no insurgents but found numerous weapons caches and 57

explosive devices. On 24 April the force moved to

Camp Fallujah, while some rifle companies remained

in al-Karmah and continued operations until the end

of the month.

Because of actions taken by both Regimental

Combat Team 1 and the Army’s 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, to support the Regimental Combat

Team 7 task force in its attack, the al-Karmah action

amounted to a division-level fight. With the exception

of the two battles for Fallujah, large-scale operations

of this kind were uncommon On the 20th, the division transferred responsibility for northern Babil

Province to the 1st Armored Division, which was

then in the middle of its campaign against the al-Sadr

uprising in the Karbala-Najaf-Kut region. The Division Bravo command group returned to the division,

and the two battalions—2d Battalion, 2d Marines, and

1st Battalion, 32d Infantry—reverted to Regimental

Combat Team 1 and 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, respectively. The battalions were welcome reinforcements for their actions around Fallujah and

Ramadi. The 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, formally relieved Tucker’s Regimental Combat Team 7 of its mission at al-Karmah on 25 April. The next day, 2d

Battalion, 7th Marines, moved back to Area of Operations Denver to reestablish its presence in Hit and

Haditha.

Although Operation Ripper Sweep officially terminated at this point, the task force remained at

Camp Fallujah until 1 May, while Colonel Tucker and

his staff planned a cordon of Fallujah in anticipation

of a renewed attack by Regimental Combat Team 1

to destroy remaining insurgent forces in the city. With

the creation of the Fallujah Brigade, however, General Mattis put these operations on hold. On 1 May,

the remaining Regimental Combat Team 7 forces departed Camp Fallujah and returned to al-Asad Air

Base and Camps al-Qaim and Korean Village to resume stability and security operations there. Western

al-Anbar Province had not remained quiet during the

regiment’s foray around Fallujah. Task Force Walsh

worked hard in its economy of force mission in the

Hit-Haditha zone, and the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines

(the sole infantry battalion remaining in Area of Operations Denver), encountered considerable action in

Husaybah and al-Qaim throughout the month.

The ambitious sweep by Regimental Combat Team

7 around Fallujah found few insurgents, but succeeded in restoring the tactical initiative to the 1st

Marine Division, opening land communications

routes, and scattering any insurgents who either

planned ambushes or hoped to join the insurgents in

Fallujah.

Restoring Balance in Al-Anbar Province

The festering problem of Fallujah would not see

resolution until after the U.S. forces had accom46 INTO THE FRAY
The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath 47

plished their unit rotations in mid-2004. In April and

May, reinforcements requested by General Mattis

began to arrive, with Company B, 1st Tank Battalion,

joining the Fallujah cordon on 25 April, and Company B, 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion, joining Regimental Combat Team 7 at al-Asad Air Base on 13

May. 

At the same time the first Marine reinforcements

began to arrive, a major shift occurred in the overall

command of the Coalition effort in Iraq. Since the

creation of the Combined Joint Task Force 7, it had

become clear that the full reconstruction effort in Iraq

was too large a project for what was initially a corpssized staff. General Abizaid responded to this by

placing Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz’s III

Corps in charge of tactical operations and giving

Combined Joint Task Force 7 commander Sanchez

responsibility for strategic operations. On 15 May

2004 this division of responsibility was made official

when Sanchez became the first commander of Multi

National Force–Iraq. General Metz became the new

commander of Multi National Corps–Iraq. The Marine

Corps area of responsibility subsequently became

Multi National Force–West. Less than two months

later, on 1 July, Army General George W. Casey Jr.

relieved General Sanchez of command of Multi National Force–Iraq, and thus became the commander

of the overall Coalition effort in Iraq.

The combat forces of I MEF concentrated on security and stability operations, keeping the routes

clear, and then turning to the major problem of training more reliable Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi security forces had failed to fight effectively in too

many instances, not only in the I MEF sectors but also

in face of the al-Sadr revolt, where more than 1,000

members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps at Karbala

and an-Najaf had deserted. The construction of the

India Base near Camp Fallujah for Iraqi forces allowed Regimental Combat Team 1 to begin training

in earnest. On 5 June, it opened to the initial class of

Iraqi Civil Defense Corps under the direction of the

regimental operations staff. With the turnover of sovereignty from the Coalition Provisional Authority to

the Iraqi Interim Government at the end of June, the

Iraqi Civil Defense Corps converted to the Iraqi National Guard. In addition, the regiment undertook the

training of the new Shahwani Special Forces, establishing a camp for their initial training at Camp Fallujah under the direction of Company A, 3d Assault

Amphibian Vehicle Battalion. In July the 1st Marine

Division convened two-week courses for National

Guard officers and non-commissioned officers at

Camp Ramadi, using embedded Army and Marine

Corps non-commissioned officers to mentor and to

train them.

In Area of Operations Raleigh, Regimental Combat Team 1 ran constant patrols of the main supply

routes thanks to the help of the Army 112th Military

Police Battalion. As the last of the reinforcing units

from Regimental Combat Team 7 units departed Area

of Operations Raleigh in early May, Colonel Toolan

divided the area into three sectors. The 2d Battalion,

1st Marines, oriented its efforts to the northwest of

Fallujah along Route E1 and the town of Saqlawiyah.

Photo by SSgt Demetrio J. Espinosa, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 040909-M-2361E-008

Marines from Company C, Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, 24th Marine Expeditionary

Unit, conduct a cordon-and-search operation in North Babil Province in September 2004.
From Camp Abu Ghraib, the 1st Battalion, 5th

Marines, were positioned north of Fallujah toward alKarmah, and 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, established a

presence to the south of Camp Fallujah at the Euphrates River. Engineers removed the Marine defensive positions in the southern and northern edges of

the city, now in the hands of the Fallujah Brigade and

the Iraqi National Guard. As the Marine battalions expanded their presence in the surrounding villages,

they began to mount combat patrols to attack insurgents attempting ambushes, laying explosive devices,

or setting up rocket or mortar attacks.

No end came to the insurgent challenges at Fallujah. On 24 June, they launched coordinated attacks

on Route E1 and Traffic Control Point 1. The fighting

began early in the morning and lasted throughout the

day. Marines of Company G, 2d Battalion, 1st

Marines, effectively defended the position with a variety of direct fire weapons and air support. Tanks

fired on buildings being used as insurgent bases

while a section of helicopters engaged other targets

as AV-8B Harrier attack aircraft circled overhead. 

A volley of handheld rockets damaged one of the

AH-1W Cobra attack helicopters. Multiple Harrier sections dropped laser-guided bombs on buildings from

which insurgents continued to engage the Marine positions. The fighting eventually subsided as Iraqi security forces eventually responded and established

control in the area.

The opportunity to focus all of Regimental Combat

Team 1’s efforts on the Fallujah situation soon faded,

however. The initial suppression of the al-Sadr revolt

allowed the Army to resume the redeployment of 1st

Armored Division back to home stations, and the responsibility for northern Babil Province once again

reverted to I MEF beginning 27 June. Marines of 2d

Battalion, 2d Marines, returned to their base camp at

Al Mahumdiyah. The soldiers of 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, returned to Colonel Toolan’s control and to

their base—Forward Operating Base Chosin—near

Iskandariyah. The Regimental Combat Team 1 area

of operations doubled in size. Consequently, the

need for more forces, including Iraqi units, became

more apparent.

In the west, Regimental Combat Team 7 reestablished its presence in the main population centers of

Area of Operations Denver. Although the improvised

dispositions managed to keep the Haditha-Hit zone

fairly stable, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, fought several fierce actions in and around al-Qaim and Husaybah, the contentious border town. Insurgents tried

several ambushes of Marine reconnaissance and security probes, and explosive devices detonated daily

against Marine patrols. Finally, a series of pitched

fights led the battalion commander, Lieutenant

Colonel Matthew A. Lopez, to personally lead a task

force in a two-day assault and clearing operation of

Husaybah using two of his rifle companies, the

weapons company, and a detachment of 1st Force

Reconnaissance Company to cordon and sweep the

town. The fighting intensified, and battalion mortars

and helicopter close air support added to the firepower that killed an estimated 120 insurgents amid

considerable mayhem. 

A newly constructed operations center greeted

Regimental Combat Team 7’s commander Colonel

Tucker upon his return to al-Asad Air Base. On 7

May, 220 combat replacements arrived at the base for

the 1st Marine Division, an indicator of the changed

circumstances of occupation duty in al-Anbar

Province. With the return of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines,

from its duty with Regimental Combat Team 1, beginning on 13 May the regiment could begin the

planning of new initiatives. From this planning

emerged Operation Rawah II.

The 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

moved on 1 June into blocking positions to the north

of Rawah. The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, set up a

staging area at Haditha Dam from where it planned

to take its objective by road. At the same time, the

battalion’s L Company would be airlifted by helicopter from al-Asad Air Base. The supporting unit, 3d

Battalion, 7th Marines, closed the borders and provided blocking force. Twenty-four aircraft flew in

support over the small town, which had not seen Marine operations in over five weeks. An EC-130 Compass Call electronic-warfare aircraft first over flew the

town to detonate explosive devices, followed by an

electronic snooper Lockheed EP-3 Orion. As the light

armored reconnaissance battalion units moved south

toward Rawah, multiple sections of AV-8Bs orbited

for surveillance and on-call close air support. Finally,

an AC-130 checked in for support as the main effort

moved out of Haditha toward Rawah. Company L

boarded its CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters at alAsad Air Base to be inserted at four different blocking positions simultaneously under cover of a section

of AH-1Ws. An additional section stood on the

ground in ready alert. Two CH-46Es Sea Knights carried the Regimental Combat Team 7 reserve platoon,

intended to land as Airborne Vehicle Check Points to

catch insurgents. Although Regimental Combat Team

7 had scheduled an EA-6B Prowler electronic-warfare aircraft to jam and perform electronic surveillance, it did not appear because of aircraft carrier

difficulties.

48 INTO THE FRAY
The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath 49

This raid netted six of the top-25 high-value target

persons on Regimental Combat Team 7 lists while the

companies of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, remained in

the town exploiting the movement’s success. The operation proved the last for this battalion; its relief unit,

1st Battalion, 8th Marines, began the turnover process

on 29 June, the first of the mid-deployment rotations.

General Mattis had detailed the outline of these

operations at the time the Fallujah situation came to

a standstill:

Following recent offensive operations the

enemy has fallen back and resorted to small

scale actions intended to inflict maximum casualties on our forces with minimal risk to his

own. The key to maintaining the initiative is patient, persistent presence throughout the zone.

This is best accomplished by dismounted

troops aggressively patrolling their area of operations, gaining information from the populace

and ambushing the enemy on his own ground.

Episodic vehicular forays from our firm bases

do nothing more than reveal our intentions,

make us easy targets and incur severe handicaps. When he is weak, as he is now, he will

implant improvised explosive devices along the

main service routes in periods of darkness in

our absence to strike our convoys. When he

comes out to operate like this—we must be in

ambush to meet and kill him. Through intelligence preparation of the battlefield, that identifies his likely avenues of approach and likely

improvised explosive device sites, we must anticipate his next operation. We must think,

move and adapt faster than he can and less

overtly than we have to date. When we can

keep the enemy at bay in an area, we must exploit the opportunity we have to conduct more

aggressive civil military operations and reinvigorate our programs to select trustworthy members for training the Iraqi security forces.

The 11th, 24th, and 31st Marine

Expeditionary Units Deploy to Iraq

Part of the solution to the challenges I MEF encountered in the expansion of its battle zone to the

east came in the timely appearance of three Marine

expeditionary units (MEUs) from the United States. A

combination of early sorties and extended deployments made these important reinforcements available

from July 2004 through the end of the year. On 4 May,

the 24th Marine Expeditionary Force (24th MEU)

under Colonel R. J. Johnson received its alert to prepare to deploy to Iraq from 15 June 2004 to 15 February 2005, instead of from 17 August 2004 to 17 February 2005 as originally planned. By deleting its

special operations capable exercises and certification,

the unit accelerated its preparations, loaded equipment on board USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) and USNS

Charleston (T-LKA 113) in early June and began its

airlift to Kuwait on 26 June. The expeditionary unit’s

ground combat element, the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines

(Reinforced), completed the required pre-deployment

training before beginning its airlift on 3 July. Assembling in Kuwait during early July, Johnson’s organization reported to 1st Marine Division for operations on

24 July and accepted responsibility for northern Babil

Province from Regimental Combat Team 1 on 1 August 2004. Johnson took operational control of 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, and relieved the Army’s 1st

Battalion, 32d Infantry, with his own 1st Battalion, 2d

Marines. Johnson’s unit then began security and stabilization operations on the essential main service

route south of Baghdad while asserting a continuous

presence in several key towns. His aviation combat

element, Medium Helicopter Squadron 263, only had

its normal inventory of CH-46E Sea Knights on board

the Kearsarge, and upon arrival at al-Taqaddum, drew

additional light-attack and heavy-lift helicopters from

3d Marine Aircraft Wing. 

The acceleration of Colonel Anthony M. Haslam’s

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (11th MEU [SOC]) in

its deployment came after it had completed its special

operations certification. It departed San Diego on 27

May 2004 instead of the planned departure date of 17

June, embarking aboard three ships of Amphibious

Squadron 5. It comprised part of Expeditionary Strike

Group 3, commanded by Brigadier General Joseph V.

Medina.

The initial assignment for 11th MEU was the smoldering city of an-Najaf. After unloading from its shipping at Kuwait, Haslam sent his aviation element,

Medium Helicopter Squadron 166, to al-Asad Air Base

while awaiting the preparation of Forward Operating

Base Duke. The MEU’s battalion landing team, 1st

Battalion, 4th Marines, and its attachments under the

command of Lieutenant Colonel John L. Mayer, used

Forward Operating Base Hotel, which was three kilometers north of the city’s center. The Marines and

sailors of the 11th MEU moved into an-Najaf Province

on 16 July. Five days later, the unit reported for operations to Major General Andrzej Ekiert, Polish Army,

the commander the Multi National Division Center–

South, and on 31 July they relieved the small battalion task force Dragon of the 1st Infantry Division. At

this point, the 2,165 Marines and sailors of Colonel
Haslam’s command held sole responsibility for the

16,000 square miles of the provinces of an-Najaf and

Qadisiyah.

The nominal mission received from Ekiert consisted of conducting “offensive operations to defeat

remaining non-compliant forces and neutralize destabilizing influences in an-Najaf Province” and to create

a secure environment, supported by the usual stability and humanitarian operations. In effect, 11th MEU

shouldered the responsibility of mopping up the remnants of the al-Sadr revolt following the departure of

major U.S. Army forces that had destroyed most of the

Mahdi Militia of al-Sadr during May and June.

In an-Najaf, the al-Sadr Militia had overwhelmed

both the Iraqi security forces and General Ekiert’s international military forces and occupied key positions,

including the governor’s compound and the two

highly significant Shi’a religious sites, Kufa Mosque

and the Imam Ali Shrine. Successive attacks by part of

the 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, and elements of

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment in April and May recovered most of the city except for exclusion zones of

one kilometer established around the two Shi’a holy

sites, including the Old City and cemetery adjacent to

the Imam Ali Shrine. The governor announced on 4

June that the Iraqi security forces would take responsibility for the exclusion zones, but the Mahdi Militia

never laid down arms nor left the holy sites. Upon

departing on 17 June, the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment staff estimated that about 100 hard core fighters

remained in each zone, along with an undetermined

number of untrained insurgents.

Haslam reported on the day he took responsibility

for the scene that “I anticipate aggressive surveillance

and incidents from Mahdi Militia in the near term to

test our reactions and resolve. The 11th MEU (SOC)

stands at the ready.” New outbreaks of fighting soon

dispelled any illusion that simply training local security forces could accomplish the mission. Most of

Colonel Mayer’s battalion fought an inconclusive engagement with the Mahdi Militia around the cemetery

and governor’s compound on 5-6 August, supported

by attack helicopters by day and an AC-130 Spectre

gunship at night. General Metz, the deputy commander of the overall effort in Iraq, assigned an Army

cavalry squadron to reinforce the 11th MEU after the

first day. On 7 August, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, reported to Haslam with the 1st Company,

227th Aviation Battalion’s AH-56A Apache attack helicopters in direct support.

On 9 August, Iraqi and U.S. military leaders met at

the governor’s compound to discuss future operations. This group included an-Najaf Governor Arufi,

Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, General Casey, General Metz, and General Conway and his deputy,

Brigadier General Dennis J. Hejlik. General Metz

transferred the responsibility for the area to General

Conway and assigned another Army squadron from

Task Force Baghdad, the 1st Cavalry Division, to

Colonel Haslam’s control. After a brief interlude of

fruitless negotiations between Allawi and al-Sadr’s

representatives, the Iraqi government finally authorized military force to settle the insurgency in an-Najaf.

General Hejlik oversaw the process with a small

staff and Colonel Haslam received his reinforcements

and planned the battle yet to come. As the reinforcements arrived, they applied a steady pressure against

the al-Sadr militiamen with raids, probes, and skirmishes designed to determine their positions and exhaust their resources. The Iraqi National Guard’s 404th

Battalion operated under Haslam’s control since the

31 July 2004 transfer of authority as the local garrison.

The 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, the additional

unit from 1st Cavalry Division, reported on 10 August.

The 36th Commando Battalion, veterans of the Fallujah battle, joined on 13 August, and the 2d and 4th

Battalions, 1st Iraq Army Brigade, arrived during the

operation, remaining under the tactical control of I

MEF. Several units of special operations forces operated in and around the city as well.

The final attack into the al-Sadr center of resistance

came with Haslam’s order of 16 August for a threephase operation by U.S. and Iraqi forces to “clear

Imam Ali Mosque Complex, to defeat Mahdi Militia,

and capture or kill Muqtada al-Sadr to facilitate the return of the Imam Ali Mosque to proper Iraqi authorities.” The first phase consisted of preliminary

operations in which the two cavalry squadrons (1st

Squadron, 5th Cavalry; 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry)

launched limited attacks to occupy the cemetery and

the old city zone south of the Medina. The 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, would attack in the vicinity of Kufah

and the remaining area of an-Najaf. This was followed

with penetration operations in which the cavalry

squadrons would fix the insurgents from the north

and southeast while Mayer’s 1st Battalion, 4th

Marines, would push through from the northwest to

encircle the shrine, bringing the Iraqi 36th Commando

Battalion in assault amphibians to its final assault position. A third phase would entail decisive operations.

The 36th Commando troops would assault and secure

the shrine, which would then be occupied and secured by follow-on troops of the 1st Iraq Army

Brigade.

After a final 22 August confirmation briefing to

General Metz, General Conway, and the Iraqi defense

50 INTO THE FRAY
The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath 51

minister, the attack began. Beginning late the night of

24 August, Marines and cavalrymen battled through

the streets and buildings through the following day,

culminating with Marines encircling the shrine at a

distance of 100 meters by the end of the 25th. Amid

heavy fighting, the issue never came into doubt.

Under fire support from artillery, mortars, attack helicopters and AC-130 aircraft, the infantry, tanks, and

other fighting vehicles cleared all opposition. For the

next 24 hours, while the Iraqi commandos prepared

to capture the shrine, mostly sniper engagements occurred in the area. 

The al-Sadr Militia suffered terrible losses and resistance ended. The occupants of the Imam Ali Shrine

had no hope of escape; their supporters fell back,

broken and depleted. In the end, the intervention of

Grand Ayatollah Sistani eliminated the need to assault

the shine and to continue the action against the Kufah

mosque. On 27 August, he brokered a truce on behalf

of the Iraqi government. The Mahdi Militia agreed to

surrender its weapons and to leave the Old City, including the Imam Ali Shrine. In addition, the militia

agreed to relinquish the entire Najaf-Kufah area over

to the Iraqi government, specifically the Iraqi police

and the Iraqi National Guard. From this point onward,

al-Sadr turned to peaceful and political options.

The 24 days of action in an-Najaf cost 11th MEU

seven killed in action and 94 wounded; the Army cavalry units lost two men. Iraqi force casualties also included one American advisor killed and a significant

number of Iraqi soldiers killed and wounded. These

numbers paled in comparison to those inflicted on the

Mahdi Militia. The 11th MEU estimated 1,500 of alSadr’s fighters were killed and an undetermined number wounded, most likely in the thousands. A positive

aspect was the steady performance of the Iraqi security forces at an-Najaf, as the Iraqi local police, 405th,

and 36th Battalions all fought well and steadily, wellserved by their embedded advisors. At an-Najaf, Marine Corps and Army units demonstrated an ability to

maneuver and to reinforce a deteriorating situation

even better than at the first battle of Fallujah.

The scarcity of capable Iraqi forces meant that

Coalition security efforts remained under strength and

under manned. To compensate for the shortage of

forces, General Abizaid deployed a third Marine expeditionary unit to Iraq, the 31st MEU. As with the

24th MEU, the 31st MEU dispensed with its special

operations capability requirement so that it could

speed up its deployment.

The 31st MEU had operated in the western Pacific

since January 2004, landing 2d Battalion, 3d Marines,

for training in the Marianas followed by routine exercises in Korea, Okinawa, and Thailand. As deployment orders to Iraq came, it replaced its ground

combat element with the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines,

and attachments on Okinawa and then embarked

with Amphibious Squadron 11 for training in the Marianas from 10 July to 4 August before going to Kuwait.

When it arrived at the end of the month, its estimated

deployment of 120 days (through 9 October) seemed

half over, but its Marines and sailors would follow the

experience of 11th MEU beginning in October.

In the midst of combat operations, the need to execute the scheduled turnover of forces in August and

September remained. In certain cases, this had already

begun, such as with the arrival of the 1st Battalion,

8th Marines, in western al-Anbar Province on 29 June.

As specified in General Hagee’s original decisions

from November 2003, combat units would serve a six

to seven-month deployment in Iraq while the personnel of I MEF’s other organizations and staffs would

be replenished with fresh groups flown in from their

home bases. 

The force turnover in I MEF took place over a

three-month period. In addition, in September the

Table 4-1: Ground Combat Turnover, July–October 2004
Army replaced the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division,

with the 2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, commanded by Colonel Gary Patton. The 1st Marine Division exchanged artillery batteries and force

reconnaissance, tank, combat engineer, and assault

amphibian companies with fresh units. The I MEF intelligence service based in Ramadi also rotated battalions, as 2d Radio Battalion relieved 3d Radio

Battalion and 1st Intelligence Battalion replaced 2d

Intelligence Battalion.

As of 31 July 2004, 29,129 Marines and sailors were

in Iraq with I MEF forces, with 190 more Marines stationed in Iraq with other organizations. Provided by

Marine Corps Reserve Forces, 10,929 Marine reservists

were on duty worldwide alongside their active component brethren, more than one-fourth the total reserve structure. Casualties to date in Iraq since March

2004 were 97 killed and 1,064 wounded in action, of

which 780 of the latter had returned to duty in theater.

With the situation in Fallujah yet to be resolved and

persistent spikes in combat and violence still occupying in Ramadi, western al-Anbar Province was still untamed.

52 INTO THE FRAY

Table 4-2: Aviation Turnover, August–September 2004
53

Following the first battle of al-Fallujah in April

2004, the Marines turned their efforts toward the

pacification of the surrounding areas. Many insurgents had fled Fallujah before the fighting began and

sought to establish themselves in new safe havens.

The withdrawal of the reinforcements, provided by

Regimental Combat Team 7, to western al-Anbar

Province and Regimental Combat Team 1’s continuing operations around Fallujah left the city itself in

the hands of a desultory assembly of Iraqi police,

Civil Defense Corps, and Fallujah Brigade “troops.” In

the ensuing month and a half, an uneasy peace settled on the city with few incidents reported. As a result, 1st Marine Division resumed civil affairs and

humanitarian actions to reconstruct the city’s infrastructure and support self-government. The division

commander, Major General James N. Mattis, entered

the city twice on well-armed “Fallujah patrols” to

meet with city officials, and the Marines of 3d Civil

Affairs Group resumed their efforts to identify and

fund reconstruction projects.

Fallujah in Repose

Marines continued to man traffic control points in

the outer cordon, while the police, Civil Defense

Corps, and Fallujah Brigade assembled and prepared

to patrol the city itself. Marines of Regimental Combat Team 7 and the Fallujah Brigade drove a demonstration convoy through the city on Route 10, halting

briefly at the municipal government center. At no

time, however, did the local security forces turn over

usable weapons or insurgent prisoners taken from

the city.

General Mattis saw some positive aspects of the

event:

Today's successful joint patrol with the Fallujah

Brigade represents the smallest of “baby steps”

and should in no way be considered an opening of the city. Fallujah is still closed and a very

dangerous place with large sections a “no man's

land” controlled by jihadists, foreign fighters,

and terrorists. In fact, an improvised explosive

device was, without explanation, detonated at

0530, we think during emplacement and generally where the convoy principals dismounted

to meet with the mayor. The convoy was

planned and executed as a combat patrol with

two powerful quick reaction forces waiting just

off stage ready to respond, supported by significant rotary and fixed wing close air support.

The good news is the general population, while

still openly hostile towards the Coalition, is reportedly tired of the fighting and disruption and

willing to allow civil affairs money to flow into

the city. They see the cease-fire, as well as

today’s events, as a continuation of their victory

over the Coalition.

On 20 May, I MEF commander Lieutenant General

James T. Conway expressed his satisfaction with the

relative calm in the entire province and prepared to

leave all Fallujah checkpoints in the hands of Iraqi

security forces, except for the cloverleaf intersection

of Routes 10 and E1 east of the city. More good news

came with the arrival of air reinforcement: 20 AV-8B

Harriers of Marine Attack Squadron 214, as requested

by Major General James F. Amos. He noted that day

that:

these aircraft with their third generation targeting forward looking infrared [system], the Litening II pod, equipped with a digital downlink

capability, will give the Marines on the ground,

in places such as Fallujah and Ramadi, the ability to see “real-time” what is going on around

them. The Harriers will then be able to deliver

ordnance as required, confident that what they

are attacking is exactly what our ground forces

want attacked.

Marine commanders judged sporadic but increasing attacks on Coalition forces in late May in opposition to the upcoming transfer of sovereignty to the

Iraqi interim government. Thus, on 31 May, the

Army’s 112th Military Police Battalion departed I MEF

control and returned to the 1st Cavalry Division after

two months’ service in al-Anbar Province.

The summer of 2004 saw the scheduled relief of

the commanders of I MEF’s major units. General

Amos turned over command of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing on 29 May to Major General Keith J.

Chapter 5

The Second Al-Fallujah Battle
54 INTO THE FRAY

Stalder and departed to assume command of II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) at Camp Lejeune.

Major General Mattis relinquished command on 29

August to Brigadier General Richard F. Natonski and

assumed command of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico. Both departing officers were promoted to lieutenant general in their

new commands and Brigadier General Natonski was

promoted to major general. Finally, on 12 September, Lieutenant General John F. Sattler relieved General Conway as commander of I MEF. General

Conway subsequently departed to serve as the new

Director of Operations for the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. These new commanders would undertake the

resolution of the Fallujah problem in the months that

followed.

The eruption of coordinated attacks against Marine positions around Fallujah on 24 June marked

what intelligence analysts considered spikes in insurgent activities. Reports of internecine fighting

among tribal and extremist factions added to the frustrations of trying to assess progress in Fallujah. Although the U.S. leadership hoped that these internal

rifts reduced the effectiveness of the anti-Coalition insurgency, intimidation campaigns against Iraqis seeking to work for the Coalition or in Iraqi security

forces continued to increase with deleterious effects

upon the local security forces. An assessment of the

Fallujah Brigade by the commander of Multi National

Corps–Iraq, Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz’s

strategic political-military staff in early July noted that

the brigade had expanded to an overall strength of

2,075, including 23 general and 375 other officers. Although capable of limited city patrols and maintaining liaison with I MEF representatives, the brigade

had not attained control over the city. In the view of

the analysts, the Fallujah Brigade was a failure. At

best, it could be converted into an Iraqi Army unit.

An ominous development surfaced with the continuing attacks upon 3d Marine Aircraft Wing helicopters flying in the Fallujah zone. The downing of

an AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopter during the

24 June attack was the second helicopter loss of the

campaign and the second one in the vicinity of Fallujah.

Following the downing of the Super Cobra on 5

July, small arms fire northwest of Fallujah damaged

a CH-46E Sea Knight transport helicopter of Marine

Medium Helicopter Squadron 161. The aircraft came

under fire soon after lifting off from its al-Taqaddum

base and both pilots were wounded by the attack.

The co-pilot, First Lieutenant Steven M. Clifton, assumed command of the aircraft. Ignoring his own injuries, he directed first aid efforts in the cockpit while

flying evasive maneuvers and returned to base safely

as the aircraft suffered electrical failures, a flash fire,

and degrading flight controls. There were two other

incidents where helicopters were damaged or destroyed by small arms fire, killing one pilot in one incident and wounding four crewmen in the other.

Unfortunately, the command seemed reluctant to

face these trends. For example, the I MEF situation

report for 9 September began with the following:

“The overall number of attacks across the area of operations remains at decreased levels from the recent

surge . . . However, a section of helicopters flying

south of Fallujah received small arms fire and RPG

fire and one helicopter was forced to land . . . Multi

National Force–West will continue to closely monitor

this emerging threat to Multi National Force–West air

assets.”

The decision process leading to the final assault

on Fallujah and the eradication of the extremist and

insurgent nests that it sheltered remained complex

and diffuse. Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and the new

Photo by LCpl William L. DuBose III, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 041205-M-9529D-002

The summer of 2004 saw the scheduled relief of most of

I Marine Expeditionary Force’s commanders. MajGen

Keith J. Stalder (above) relieved MajGen James F. Amos

as commander of 3d Marine Aircraft Wing in May.
The Second Al-Fallujah Battle 55

Iraqi political and military leadership had to be convinced of the benefits of the operation and that U.S.

and Coalition support could and would be mobilized

for the humanitarian relief and eventual reconstruction of the damaged city. The ability of U.S. forces to

limit and ameliorate damage remained a contentious

matter. 

In September, the U.S. and Coalition military command authorized initial planning and the early concept of operations began to emerge in the I MEF staff.

A briefing in the first week of that month characterized “Fallujah Clearing Operations” as a pending task

where, on order, the I MEF and Iraqi security forces

would conduct “clearing operations in the vicinity of

Fallujah proper, to defeat extremist forces in Fallujah

when ordered.” Shortly thereafter, a staff paper identified the initial concept for shaping the upcoming

battle. 

In sum, the I MEF staff believed that the preparation of the battlefield required a steady tempo of attrition operations sustainable “until time for decisive

action; mid-November.” It characterized Fallujah as a

safe haven for foreign fighters, terrorists, and insurgents, “a ‘cancer’ on the rest of al-Anbar Province.”

Among the operations necessary to prepare the city

for the final assault were precision air strikes against

leading insurgent operatives and foreign fighter

groups. Continued pressure in the form of traffic control points limited but did not stop movement into

the city. Marine attacks around the city limits could

increase pressure and instill uncertainty in the insurgents. By 23 September, 1st Marine Division planners

had produced a concept of operations for Fallujah,

doubtlessly reflecting the time spent on the same

problem in mid-April, when elements of both Regimental Combat Teams 1 and 7 stood in position

around the city and the staff had prepared a final,

decisive attack. 

The division’s plans called for building a target list

that included assessments of the secondary and tertiary impact of each type of strike. Typical targets included safe houses, meeting places, weapon and

ammunition caches, heavy equipment, insurgent patrols, crew-served weapons, indirect fire weapons,

fortifications (both surface and underground), and

communications. The plans proposed building pressure on the insurgents through selective strikes and

using deception operations to uncover communications and movement routes in the city and discredit

and humble the insurgent groups. After sufficient

command nodes, and unfortified and fortified positions had been reduced, the Marines and soldiers

would have accomplished the preliminary objectives

required before the “decisive operations” or the assault phase.

Continuing Operations in the Province

As important as the Fallujah situation became, the

rest of al-Anbar Province remained unsettled, and arRamadi frequently flared with new violence. Colonel

Craig A. Tucker’s Regimental Combat Team 7 conducted meetings with regional sheiks and town councils to determine their degree of support for

recruiting local security forces and making arrangements for their training in Iraqi and U.S. camps. The

return of troops to the Haditha-Hit corridor and arRutbah led to renewed counterinsurgency operations

in both locations. Road sweeps and road improvements were also a priority effort while battalions conducted their reliefs in place. Because of the heavy

fighting experienced in Husaybah and al-Qaim by 3d

Battalion, 7th Marines, Colonel Tucker also reviewed

the situation there. The Husaybah camp, now renamed Camp Gannon in memory of Captain Richard

J. Gannon, the late commander of Company L, received special attention because its new occupants,

1st Battalion, 7th Marines, would also stand in relative isolation there and at al-Qaim during the renewed battle at Fallujah.

As Regimental Combat Team 7 prepared to reinforce Regimental Combat Team 1 at Fallujah, Tucker’s

Marines executed a flurry of disruption actions in Operation Rodeo (26–28 September). The Regimental

Combat Team 7 forces executed 17 raids and cordon

operations within 48 hours: six in Haditha, ten in

Husaybah, and one in ar-Rutbah. On 27 September,

Colonel Tucker began a command tour of Area of

Operations Denver accompanied by Colonel W. Lee

In August, MajGen Richard F. Natonski relieved MajGen

James N. Mattis as commander of 1st Marine Division.

Photo by LCpl Bryan J. Nealy, Defense Imagery VIRIN 030526-M-5455N-003
Miller, commander of the 31st Marine Expeditionary

Unit (31st MEU), who would assume responsibility

for the area after Regimental Combat Team 7 departed for Fallujah. 

At ar-Ramadi, the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, and its relieving unit, the 2d Stryker Brigade, 2d

Infantry Division, conducted a continuing series of

raids, cordons, and other actions to maintain a rough

balance against the insurgents (Table 5-1). 

Colonel Gary S. Patton’s newly arrived 2d Brigade

proved as well prepared as the 1st Brigade in meeting the challenges posed by Ramadi and its surrounding area. Patton’s force was composed of two

motorized and one mechanized infantry battalions,

an artillery battalion (half employed as motor infantry), a combat engineer battalion, and Lieutenant

Colonel Randy Newman’s 2d Battalion, 5th Marines.

The weapon systems in the brigade included 28

M1A1 Abrams tanks, 44 Bradley fighting vehicles, and

six M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzers. 

Amid stabilization operations and counterinsurgency strikes, more mundane missions also required

the attention of Marines and soldiers in al-Anbar

Province. To help rebuild local infrastructure, the

56 INTO THE FRAY

One characteristic of the Iraq War was that there

were no true front lines. All Coalition soldiers,

sailors, and Marines were vulnerable to insurgent

assaults. This is clearly illustrated by the experience

of the 1st Marines (Regimental Combat Team 1) in

September 2004. On 14 September Colonel John

Toolan relinquished command of Regimental Combat Team 1 to Colonel Lawrence D. Nicholson.

That evening, Colonel Nicholson was discussing future operations with Regimental Combat Team 1’s

communications officer, Major Kevin M. Shea,

when a 122mm rocket struck the Colonel’s office.

The explosion killed Major Shea and severely

wounded Colonel Nicholson. Major Keith A.

Forkin, Regimental Combat Team 1’s Staff Judge

Advocate, was near the blast and also injured. Despite suffering concussive effects from the explosion, Major Forkin provided life saving aid to

Colonel Nicholson. 

Colonel Nicholson was taken to Bethesda Naval

Hospital for treatment. In December, just months

after the attack, he returned to Iraq to serve as the

Operations Officer for 1st Marine Division and

eventually took command of the 5th Marines. On

September 15, Colonel Michael A. Shupp took

command of Regimental Combat Team 1.

Rocket Attack on 1st Marines Headquarters

Photo by LCpl James J. Voorist, VIRIN 050222-M-8205V-037.

In September, LtGen John F. Sattler relieved LtGen

James T. Conway as commander of I Marine Expeditionary Force.

Col Lawrence D. Nicholson (left) in October 2006.

Photo by Sgt. Chad Simon, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 061001-M-8299S-009
The Second Al-Fallujah Battle 57

United States procured several large generators for

power plants in Iraq, replacing destroyed or obsolete

equipment. Immediately christened the “mother of

all generators” by Marines and soldiers, these huge

and expensive machines originated in Jordan and

were eventually installed in Baghdad power stations.

Six or seven combined heavy-lift vehicles moved

each General Electric Frame 9E generator, weighing

more than 250 tons. A convoy for a single generator

comprised 15 heavy-lift vehicles accompanied by 10

private security vehicles. Civilian engineers preceded

each convoy to lift or cut power lines, remove fences

and guardrails, and make other minor improvements

necessary for passage.

An even larger generator, the Siemens V94, was

moved to the city of Taza using similar arrangements.

These slow-moving (6 kph) convoys received the

highest priority protection during weeks of transit

through the various areas of operations. The two missions conducted to transport these generators were

called Terrapin I and Terrapin II respectively. In each

case, a security detachment of 2d Battalion, 11th

Marines, remained with the generator all the way to

its final destination. Thus, amid the smoke and dust

of constant stability operations and the preparations

for the major battle of Fallujah, Operations Terrapin

I and II wound slowly across the I MEF battle space

from 24 September to 12 October.

Assembling the Fallujah Assault Force

The 1st Marine Division began detailed preparations for an urban battle of proportions not seen by

the Marine Corps since the Vietnam Battle of Hue City

in 1968. As in that battle, Marines would share a significant part of the fight with comrades of the U.S.

Army. The basic concept reprised some of the planning from mid-April, drawing as many forces as possible from two Marine regimental combat teams. In

this case, each of them would conduct an assault on

the city, working from north to south. Reinforcements

from Multi National Force–Iraq would add both Army

and Iraqi combat units to the Marine assault regiments

as well as additional forces to establish an effective

cordon of the battle space surrounding Fallujah.

The first of these reinforcements, the 1st Battalion

of the British “Black Watch” Regiment, reported to the

1st Marine Division on 27 October. The unit reported

to Colonel Johnson’s 24th MEU to assist in securing

northern Babel Province and the vital main service

routes running south of Baghdad.

On 31 October, six battalion-sized Iraqi units were

attached to the division for the operation, now called

Operation Phantom Fury. Previously assigned to the

U.S. 1st Cavalry and 1st Infantry Divisions, these Iraqi

units appeared likely to perform their missions better

than the Iraqi troops fighting alongside Marines in

April. Following their arrival and assembly in Camp

Fallujah, they received U.S. liaison teams and fell

under the operational control of the commanders of

Regimental Combat Team 1, Regimental Combat

Team 7, and the incoming 2d Brigade Combat Team,

the Blackjack Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division. A

mechanized task force from the Army’s 1st Infantry

Division, the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, arrived for duty

on 31 October. Heavily equipped with armor, mechanized infantry, engineers, cavalry, and self-propelled

artillery components, it added considerable power to

As the Coalition prepared for a second assault on Fallujah, they made sure not to repeat mistakes committed during the first battle. Among these measures was

ensuring the Coalition assault would receive the

backing and support of the Iraqi Interim Government,

then under the leadership of Prime Minister Ayad

Allawi (below).

Photo by SrA Jorge A. Rodriguez, USAF, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 040614-F-4441R-016.

Table 5-1: Al Anbar Province Operations, 2004
Colonel Tucker’s Regimental Combat Team 7. In like

fashion, Regimental Combat Team 1, now commanded by Colonel Michael A. Shupp, received another powerful battalion task force that day, the 2d

Squadron, 7th Cavalry, bringing more armor and

mechanized infantry to the fight.

The vital mission performed by the Army’s Blackjack Brigade, commanded by Colonel Michael

Formica, consisted of taking over the entire battle

space outside Fallujah, thus freeing both Marine

Corps regimental combat teams for their assault roles.

Upon the deployment of the brigade, the Marine assault units assembled in Camps Fallujah, Baharia, and

Abu Ghraib for dispersal, rehearsals, and final preparations. Initially, the Iraqi battalions would operate in

support of the attacking Marine Corps and Army battalions. Their essential missions eventually would include securing every building and position of the city.

Perhaps the most demanding reinforcement mission sent to the 1st Marine Division fell to the 31st

Marine Expeditionary Unit. During 18 September–2

October, the Marines of Colonel Miller’s command

trained ashore in Kuwait at the Udairi Range to prepare for combat. On 3 October, Central Command

head General Abizaid relinquished control of 31st

MEU to General Sattler for operations with I MEF. The

key roles envisioned for the 31st MEU included reinforcing the Fallujah assault and relieving Colonel

Tucker’s Regimental Combat Team 7 of his responsibility for western al-Anbar Province during Operation

Phantom Fury. Accordingly, 31st MEU passed to the

operational control of Major General Natonski on 14

October and began moving to al-Anbar Province. Its

ground combat element, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines

(commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Michael R.

Ramos) reported on 24 October to Colonel Tucker's

Regimental Combat Team 7, where it provided additional infantry, armored vehicle, and artillery to the

assault force. Lieutenant Colonel James A. Vohr’s MEU

Service Support Group 31 (MSSG-31) provided direct

logistics support to Regimental Combat Team 7 during the operation with augmentation from Combat

Service Support Battalion 7 (CSSB-7). The 31st MEU

command and aviation combat elements flew and

convoyed to al-Asad Air Base, from where Colonel

Miller would take command of forces in Area of Operations Denver on 20 October. The 31st MEU’s aviation combat element, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew G.

Glavy’s Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265,

then joined the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing.

During the second battle of Fallujah, the 31st MEU

would maintain the stability of Area of Operations

58 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by LCpl Joel A. Chaverri, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041109-M-2789C-124

The combat zone facing Marines in Fallujah in November 2004 was an urban setting of densely packed, lowlevel buildings and a number of mosques.
The Second Al-Fallujah Battle 59

Denver, continue civil affairs operations, and support

the Iraqi security forces. After the departure of Regimental Combat Team 7 and the other units assigned

to Operation Phantom Fury, Colonel Miller reallocated the Denver battle space. The 1st Battalion, 7th

Marines, now covered the Euphrates River Valley

from the Syrian border to a boundary about 20 kilometers short of Haditha while 1st Battalion, 23d

Marines, assumed responsibility to the eastern

boundary of Area of Operations Denver. Ar-Rutbah

and the extreme western sector became the responsibility of Task Force Naha, built around reduced

companies from 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance

Battalion, 1st Battalion, 23d Marines, and Battery S,

5th Battalion, 10th Marines, a provisional rifle company.

Target Fallujah

The pause between the first and second battles of

Fallujah had permitted the insurgency to improve

their defenses, which Marines had penetrated with

comparative ease during the April battle. Intelligence

reports estimated that between 3,000 and 4,000 insurgents had taken up positions in the city, thus exceeding the numbers Marines had faced in April.

These sources also predicted insurgent leaders

planned to hinder any I MEF assault on Fallujah by

attacking external areas and routes, and cities such as

Ramadi and Husaybah. The reported departure of

many insurgents before the assault on Fallujah gave

credence to this prediction.

Satellite and other forms of aerial surveillance revealed that the city had several lines of obstacles and

fortified positions. The monitoring of insurgent responses to the Marine’s preliminary operations also

revealed the insurgents’ defensive points. The relative densities of these apparent insurgent lines of resistance suggested the insurgents feared an attack

from the east, especially from the much contested

cloverleaf and zones north and south of Route 10,

the location of the largest concentrations of roadblocks, berms, fighting positions, sniper holes, and

checkpoints. A secondary concentration of positions

on the southeast edge of the city showed attention

paid to the Shuhada (Martyrs) District. Analysts also

discerned likely positions prepared for later use by

indirect fire weapons and small arms. The successive

positions showed a willingness to fight in depth

along Route 10 as well as much preparation for fighting in all directions from the strongholds of Jolan,

Sook, and Muallimeen Districts. Planners presumed

all routes into and within the city were armed with

bombs and other types of booby traps.

After the Coalition forces began their attacks and

pushed the insurgents out of their initial line of resistance, analysts assumed the insurgents would

move in small elements into the interior positions.

Four- to eight-man teams would fight a delaying battle back to strong points where up to platoon-sized

elements would form to resist and even counterattack any Coalition troops that could be isolated in

small numbers. The enemy would remain mobile and

exploit any operational pause offered by Coalition

forces. The enemy fighters would move through a

series of caches and engagement areas built around

major intersections and public buildings such as

schools, mosques, civic buildings, and parking

garages. Marine Corps and Army leaders expected

the enemy to continually attempt to re-enter areas already cleared and to interdict supply lines after combat units penetrated the city. Some insurgent teams

would stay behind hoping that the assault troops

would bypass them, leaving them free to surface later

and to cut Coalition lines or even to escape from the

city. While insurgents favored improvised explosive

devices, they also intended to fire mortars and rockets into Coalition positions within range after the attack of the city began. Infiltration routes, especially

along the Euphrates River, could be used for resupply or for withdrawal as needed.

I MEF anticipated Fallujah insurgent groups would

attempt to rally international opinion and mobilize

propaganda to interfere with the planned assault,

with the ultimate aim of disrupting it and causing a

suspension of offensive operations. This time, however, the Iraqi interim government was involved almost from the beginning, and the Coalition planned

a large-scale information operation to complement

the planned battle and counter the worst charges of

enemy propaganda. In short, the disadvantages encountered in the impromptu conduct of the first battle of Fallujah would not likely reappear in the more

deliberately planned second battle for the city.

The Assault Plan and Aviation Support

Although directed tactically by Major General

Richard F. Natonski and his 1st Marine Division command, Operation Phantom Fury required the participation of the entire I MEF organization and vital Army

and Coalition reinforcements. During the battle, the

stability operations of the 31st and 24th MEUs in the

western and eastern extremes of I MEF’s zone of responsibility and the operations by the U.S. Army’s 2d

Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, at Ramadi ensured that

the operations in Fallujah took place without interference by the enemy in those areas. The full array of 3d
Marine Aircraft Wing capabilities was engaged in the

action as well as the resources of the 1st Force Service Support Group.

As early as 24 September, Colonel Shupp and

Colonel Tucker, the respective commanders of Regimental Combat Teams 1 and 7, had planned the assault operation with only four Marine infantry

battalions (two from each regiment) with additional

Iraqi forces. As commanders realized the extent of the

problems they would be confronting, planners began

to augment the force, and the forces allocated quickly

grew. The final plan emerged by the beginning of October and passed through successive analysis and wargaming until the commanders had settled upon the

details.

The objective of the attack remained as desired in

April: to occupy the entire city, defeating all opposition, and clearing any caches or other resources that

might sustain the insurgency. General Sattler’s mission

statement to I MEF set the tone:

On order, Multi National Force–West attacks to

destroy the Anti-Iraqi forces and insurgent forces

in Fallujah-Ramadi to deny the use of FallujahRamadi as their safe haven and to facilitate the

restoration of legitimate governance, security,

and reconstruction.

The operational plan to retake Fallujah consisted of

five phases. The first would last from September to

October and entailed what planners described as “limited shaping operations.” These are actions conducted

to collect intelligence, disrupt, isolate, and reduce the

enemy while securing key infrastructure and routes.

Information operations would highlight enemy failures

and atrocities. Leaflets and broadcasts encouraged the

citizens of Fallujah to leave the city. At the last moment, the information campaign would notify inhabitants to take cover in cellars and remain away from

any fighting.

Planners described Phase II, or D-day, as “enhanced shaping” operations. These included “violent”

action over a short period of time (approximately 24

hours) and the positioning of I MEF forces to attack

Fallujah. Phase III, or D+1, would entail “decisive operations” to destroy the insurgents in Fallujah and to

seize control of the city and to deny the use of Fallujah as a safe-haven. The “transition to an interim emergency government” would be Phase IV of the

operation. Combined Multi National Force–West and

Iraqi forces operations and reconstruction projects in

Fallujah would help build the legitimacy of the Iraqi

Interim Government in the eyes of the citizens. Multi

National Force–West forces would provide security to

facilitate reconstruction projects and establishing an

60 INTO THE FRAY

A Marine F/A-18D Hornet fighter-bomber of All-Weather Fighter/Attack Squadron 332 blasts away in full afterburner from al-Asad Air Base. Hornets provided close air support throughout the second battle of Fallujah.

Photo by LCpl Sheila M. Brooks, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 051025-M-7404B-455
The Second Al-Fallujah Battle 61

Iraqi government and police force. The operation

would be completed with Phase V, the transition to

permanent, local government and security.

Little difference remained between “limited” and

“violent” shaping operations in the vicinity of a dangerous place such as Fallujah. The shaping operations

of Phase I were typified by an air strike called on 9

September, just after midnight, by special operations

forces against a house being used as an insurgent

headquarters. An Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle fighterbomber destroyed the house with two 500-pound

guided bombs with minimal collateral damage to adjacent buildings. Two days earlier, the 2d Battalion,

1st Marines, conducted a typical feint using tanks, LAV25 light armored vehicles, and armored Humvees

against the southeast corner of the city. This set the

pattern of seemingly endless forays of various sorts

against the insurgent positions, all aimed at disguising

the true intentions of the attack, its location, and its

timing.

Apart from shaping operations, Operation Phantom

Fury began with the deployment of the 2d Blackjack

Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, directly from its Baghdad bases to relieve Regimental Combat Teams 1 and

7 of their positions so that they could regroup and rehearse their battle plans at Camps Fallujah and Bahariah. As the brigade relieved the two regiments, it

received tactical control of the 2d Reconnaissance Battalion and the Iraqi 6th Battalion, 3d Brigade. The

planned positioning of the Army brigade at the last

minute gave minimal alert to the insurgents that a

major alteration of the balance of forces had been accomplished.

Within hours of the establishment of the Blackjack

Brigade around Fallujah’s outskirts, the plan called for

Task Force 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion to advance on D-day. The force included headquarters, one light armored reconnaissance company,

one rifle company, a mechanized company and engineer platoon from the 2d Striker Brigade, 2d Infantry

Division, and the Iraqi 36th Commando Battalion. The

plan called for the task force to maneuver the length

of the peninsula formed by the Euphrates River to the

the west of the city. By securing the peninsula, the

Coalition would prevent the hospital there from being

used by insurgents as either a sanctuary or battle position. In the last hours of D-day, initially scheduled for

5 November, but changed to 7 November, the attack

battalions moved through the night from their base

camps and occupied attack positions along the northPhoto by SFC Johan Charles Van Boers USA, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041109-A-1067B-011

Soldiers from the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, prepare to enter and clear a building in

southern Fallujah in the early stages of Operation al-Fajr.
ern outskirts of Fallujah, attacking at “A-hour” (for

stage A of Phase III, Offensive Operations) of 1900 on

D+1, or 8 November. During D-day, the assault battalions of Regimental Combat Teams 1 and 7 moved

into covered locations beyond the railroad station and

rail lines that constituted the first barriers guarding

entry into the city from the north.

The division planned the assault to begin on D+1,

whereupon both regimental combat teams would

launch penetration attacks to prevent insurgent forces

from evading U.S. forces and escaping the city. The

leading assault battalions had the mission of overcoming obstacles and defeating insurgents wherever

encountered. Any buildings or areas not cleared in the

initial assault had to be cleared and secured by additional battalions fighting in trace, using the support of

the Iraqi battalions assigned to each regiment. The division plan assigned the main effort to Regimental

Combat Team 1, which would attack from north to

south through the familiar Jolan district. The regiment

would then continue until the northwestern quarter of

the city had been searched and cleared. The eastern

half of the city fell to Regimental Combat Team 7 to assault and clear in like fashion. Jolan Park and the Government Center became division objectives one and

two, respectively, for the two regiments. At this point,

the plan called for Regimental Combat Team 1 to consolidate and mop up in its sector, securing Route 10

for use in supporting the remainder of the operation.

Iraqi troops were to take the forefront of the mop-up

in an attempt to demonstrate Iraqi sovereignty. The

assault battalions of Regimental Combat Team 7 would

continue south and southwest, clearing and securing

the rest of Fallujah, south of Route 10. At the conclusion of the mop-up of remaining resistance and the

clearing of all enemy materiel and personnel, conditions for Phase IV would be met and the forces would

turn to the stabilization and recovery of the city. 

Logistics preparations initially centered on stockpiling the forward bases with the required materiel

62 INTO THE FRAY

A Marine from Company B, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, mans a rooftop security post during Operation al-Fajr.

The buildings in Fallujah were relatively low, and most of the roofs were enclosed by a low wall that created

an easily defensible firing position for insurgents and Marines alike.

Photo by LCpl Jeremy W. Ferguson, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041117-M-2353F-013
The Second Al-Fallujah Battle 63

and supplies in what came to be known as the “Iron

Mountain.” Marine planners had noted the largely unsuccessful attempts by insurgents to interdict routes

and supply lines during the April Fallujah operations.

This time, the 1st Force Service Support Group provided forward operating bases a minimum 15 days of

supply in advance of the operation. Because of problems with civilian contractors, the group also mobilized the I MEF Engineering Group on short notice to

build camps for the Iraqi Army battalions that had to

move into the Fallujah camp complex before the operation.

The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing designed an aviation

integration plan for Operation Phantom Fury after

studying the after-action reports from the first battle

of Fallujah and the battle of an-Najaf. During Operation Vigilant Resolve in April, the air observers and

forward air controllers had to coordinate through two

levels of air command and control systems before connecting the attacking aircraft to the terminal controller.

The lack of a common grid reference system made for

very long times from target acquisition and engagement for both fixed and rotary wing aircraft. After

studying these and other lessons from April, the air

plan established a “high density air control zone” and

devised a “keyhole template” inside it. These tactical

control measures emerged from a U.S. Central Command tactics review board held in July. In it, representatives from I MEF’s division and aircraft wing

briefed the command on the airspace requirements

and the need for unity of command to support the forward air controllers. The density of the airspace and

the proximity of ground forces made the keyhole template a good solution to achieve the safety, unity of

command, and integration of fires required by the

urban operation.

For airspace management, two temporary flight restrictions established templates over both Ramadi and

Fallujah. Each city had a 15 nautical mile radius and

shared a center cap. After evaluating the many variables to include the size of the cities, weapon release

parameters, Litening pod capabilities, ranges of insurgent weapons, safe release, egress maneuver room,

and drone employment, a five-nautical-mile radius

was chosen for this inner ring. This template essentially required aircraft to hold between the contact

point and the initial point. The outer ring of 15 nautical miles served as that contact point and the 5-nautical-mile ring served as the initial point for the use of

forward air controllers. This area needed to be defined

carefully to minimize interference with neighboring air

patrols. Two semi-cardinal lines extending out of the

city center point defined each air patrol or sector. The

airplane holding technique remained at the discretion

of the pilots as long they remained within the lateral

limits of the sector and altitude assigned.

The altitudes assigned for aircraft loiter and holding in the keyhole template also reflected the paPhoto by LCpl Joel A. Chaverri, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041109-M-2789C-113

A Marine from 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, fires a MK153 Shoulder-launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon

round at an insurgent stronghold during the opening phase of Operation al-Fajr.
rameters of target acquisition, insurgent weapons,

and the need to stack multiple sections of different

types of aircraft in each sector. In the case of the Fallujah keyhole, the east sector, placed over the

friendly bases of Baharia, Camp Fallujah, and Abu

Ghraib, allowed a primary altitude of 13,000–15,000

feet and a secondary altitude of 18,000–20,000 feet.

This arrangement also allowed fixed wing aircraft on

the east and west to drop simultaneously. The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing planners added procedures for the

use of odd-numbered “time over target” for Regimental Combat Team 1 and even ones for Regimental Combat Team 7 for fixed-wing aircraft. A poor

weather scheme changed the sector altitudes for a

“high war,” “low war,” or “split war,” based upon

cloud layers.

Considering combined arms needs, the plan incorporated the maximum elevation for artillery ordnance required to shoot across the city from

proposed battery locations. This measure set the minimum operating altitude of the inner ring so that aircraft remained above 9,000 feet while inside,

permitting artillery and mortar fire to a maximum elevation of 8,500 feet. Outside the ring, artillery could

fire up to 11,000 feet. In both cases, no need remained to clear aircraft before firing artillery missions. If artillery required higher elevations for their

missions, standard clearance procedures would be

used. 

The plan held rotary-wing aircraft in battle positions around the city at no closer than 1 kilometer

from the city edge. Planners selected positions from

which helicopters could fire an AGM-114 Hellfire

missile against any target in the city. Operating at altitudes from the surface to 1,500 feet, no coordination

would be required to clear their operations. 

The planners recognized the need to operate unmanned aerial vehicles over the city but also acknowledged the risk of UAVs colliding with aircraft.

They used a “little UAV, big sky” approach, hoping

for a low probability of collisions because of the

small size of the UAVs. Planners anticipated using

four to five drones in the inner ring at anytime. North

and south tracks for the drones permitted a certain

measure of control such that they could be moved

to a known track if necessary. The altitudes used depended on the characteristics of the three main

drones employed: Predator, Pioneer, and Scan Eagle.

The aviation support plan specified standard loads

for each aircraft type: AH-1W Super Cobras would

be armed with four Hellfire antitank missiles, two

Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided

64 INTO THE FRAY

GySgt Ryan P. Shane (center) is hit amid heavy enemy sniper fire as he and an unidentified Marine, both from

Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, try to pull a fatally wounded comrade to safety during Operation alFajr. The second battle of Fallujah was among the fiercest in the history of the Marine Corps.

Photo by Cpl Joel A. Chaverri, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041109-M-2789C-016
The Second Al-Fallujah Battle 65

(TOW) antitank missiles, a rocket pod, and 300 to

400 rounds of 20mm cannon ammunition. F/A-18

Hornet fighter-bombers were equipped with one

GBU-38, 500-pound JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition) bomb, two GBU-12 500-pound laser guided

bombs, or one GBU-12 and one laser-guided Maverick air-ground missile. The F/A-18 airborne controller

replaced one of the weapons noted above with four

5-inch Zuni rockets. AV-8B Harriers were armed with

one GBU-12 or Maverick.

The Marine fixed-wing aircraft all carried a Litening targeting pod. Mounted externally, the system

provided an infrared detector, video camera, laser

rangefinder, and laser designator in a single unit.

Four of these pods were downlink-capable to the

RQ-2B Pioneer drone system operated by the Marine

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadrons 1 and 2. The

Army also furnished continuous coverage with two

AH-64 Apache helicopters in a direct support role of

the Blackjack Brigade

The air plan used a single “gridded reference

graphic” based upon the target reference points,

phase lines, and building naming conventions of the

two assault regiments. The graphic was designed for

both cockpit and ground use and was made readable

in red lighting, which is used to preserve night vision. The 1:7,500 scale image included overlays with

the grid lines, phase lines, and target references. The

image was further subdivided into 250 meter increments and labeled for eight-digit grid coordinates to

facilitate quick target acquisition. A 1:5,000 scale version was also available. An additional overlay of approximately 700 buildings with accompanying

coordinates and designated city blocks outlined for

ground combat use was provided. All units received

these aids through the military secure internet about

four weeks before Operation Phantom Fury began.

Each regiment was assigned an AC-130 gunship,

with both aircraft given the call sign “Basher.” These

would operate at night at altitudes of 9,000–11,000

feet initially with slightly overlapping tracks. While

hesitant about operating two aircraft inside the fivenautical-mile ring, the Air Force crews practiced this

procedure before the commencement of Phantom

Photo by SSgt Jonathon C. Knauth, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041110-M-5191K-035

Marines from Regimental Combat Team 7 are deployed along a roadway in Fallujah during Operation alFajr. The regiment’s drive into the city’s western districts provided important support for the main thrust conducted to the east by Regimental Combat Team 1.
Fury and executed it without error or mishap. During

Operation Vigilant Resolve, AC-130s often ran out of

ammunition, but 3d Marine Aircraft Wing succeeded

in having the aircraft “floor loaded” with additional

40mm and 25mm ammunition for the second battle.

Having prepared command and control measures in great detail for the operation, schedulers

had to line up the required aircraft. The fixed-wing

aircraft would be “pushed” from bases to provide

two sections of aircraft continuously overhead for a

17-hour period. With AC-130s on station at night,

the requirement dropped to a single section of

fixed-wing aircraft as augmentation. 3d Marine Aircraft Wing’s KC-130 refueling planes provided

around the clock coverage to prevent fuel exhaustion limiting ordnance delivery. The usual procedure of strip alert, quick fueling, and rearming also

would be used so that tempo, not fuel, drove the

fight. In short, the airmen wanted to respond to the

tactical situation without concerns for logistical

needs.

Additional AV-8B Harrier aircraft deployed to

Iraq for this battle in addition to the first squadron

ordered in after Operation Vigilant Resolve, Marine

Attack Squadron (VMA) 214, which had arrived on

20 May. By the time the battle began, the 3d Marine

Aircraft Wing wielded a “super-squadron” of AV-8Bs

built around VMA-542, supplemented with planes

and pilots from VMA-214, a detachment from the

31st MEU’s VMA-211, and a detachment from VMA311. The relief squadron for VMA-214 arrived at alAsad Air Base on 17 August and Marine All Weather

Fighter-Attack Squadron (VMFA[AW]) 242, operated

its two-seat F/A-18D Hornets to good effect. The

rotary-wing plan used the scheme of “pull” in that

a two-section presence with two more available in

alert status would be maintained for about 17 hours

a day. The attack helicopters planned to fly from

0900–0200 daily, thus providing overlap of the AC130 by several hours to attack targets on the outer

edges of the city, to support additional ground

units, and exploit their night combat capabilities.

The Seizure of Fallujah

(7–19 November 2004)

At the urging of the Iraqi Interim Government,

66 INTO THE FRAY

A Marine from 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, Regimental Combat Team 7, uses his helmet to draw insurgent fire

from atop a Fallujah roof during the early phase of Operation al-Fajr.

Photo by LCpl Joel A. Chaverri, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041110-M-2789C-005
The Second Al-Fallujah Battle 67

the U.S. military command renamed Operation

Phantom Fury Operation al-Fajr (Dawn). Hours before the assault, Major General Natonski visited Army,

Marine Corps, and Iraqi units in their attack positions

outside the city. The Iraqi Interim Government invoked emergency powers and instituted a curfew in

the Fallujah/Ramadi area. I MEF expected a surge in

insurgent violence when the operation commenced.

Commanders initiated curfews throughout the I MEF

area of operations as engineers prepared to cut the

city’s power supply.

These final measures reflected the political preparations deemed necessary by the Coalition military

commanders for successful operations in Fallujah.

Leading up to the decisive assault, the Iraqi Interim

Government announced the upcoming joint operations by the Coalition to re-establish Iraqi governmental control of Fallujah and to liberate the citizens

from the insurgents. The Iraqi Interim Government

appointed an ambassador to make political overtures

of inclusion and reconciliation to the people of Fallujah but in the meantime declared a state of emergency. Iraq closed its borders with Syria and Jordan

(although the Jordanian crossing was only partially

closed) and made available the Iraqi security forces

necessary to support the operation, including Iraqi

Army, National Guard, and police units.

D-Day and D+1 (7–8 November)

On 7 November, the Iraqi 36th Commando Battalion and 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

task force seized the Fallujah Hospital on the penin2d Topographic Platoon Map, Adapted by History Division 

The al-Fajr plan called for Task Force LAR and supporting Iraqi units to seize and secure the hospital located

west of Fallujah on 7 November. Meanwhile, Army mechanized infantry and cavalry units would set up cordons to the east and south of the city in order to prevent insurgents from escaping the city.
68 INTO THE FRAY

2d Topographic Platoon Map, Adapted by History Division

The second day of the assault on Fallujah was 8 November. With the hospital to the city’s west secure and escape routes to the east and south cut off by U.S. Army forces, Marine Corps and Army battalions attacked the

city from the north, clearing the city of insurgents as they methodically advanced south.

sula at 2207. The reconnaissance battalion secured

the bridges from the peninsula to Fallujah at 0005 on

8 November and established three vehicle checkpoints. By 1045, Marines of 4th Civil Affairs Group

completed their survey of the hospital and unloaded

medical and humanitarian assistance supplies for its

use.

The units of Regimental Combat Team 1 and Regimental Combat Team 7 moved to attack positions

during the night of 7-8 November. The 3d Battalion,

5th Marines, attacked at 1052 on 8 November to clear

an apartment complex northwest of Fallujah and

completed its seizure of the area at 1255 with only

light resistance. The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, prepared to seize the train station east of the apartment

complex. The A-hour of 1900 approached for the assault battalions, beginning the vital clearing of the

lines of departure of remaining obstacles and explosive devices. To breach the railroad tracks at the

planned penetration point, four F/A-18Ds of

VMFA(AW)-242, one flown by wing commander

Major General Stalder, dropped eight GBU-31 2,000-

pound guided bombs on the berms and tracks at

1420 when 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, assaulted the

station to effect the breach. As a final step, a team of

Navy Seabees and 4th Civil Affairs Group Marines entered the power substation just west of the apartment

complex and cut Fallujah’s electricity supply at 1800.

The Marines hit the train station at 1859, taking sporadic small arms and rocket launcher fire. They secured the station by 2034 and began the hasty

clearing of the breach area. The lead companies of 3d
The Second Al-Fallujah Battle 69

Battalion, 5th Marines, jumped off from their positions at the apartment complex at 1926, with tanks

leading through their breach lanes, joining the tanks

supporting 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, as they engaged

insurgent antitank teams.

The engineers began their breach operations at

2200, and the advance elements of 2d Squadron, 7th

Cavalry, began to cross at 0014, 9 November. The

cavalrymen judged the breach as insufficient for their

wheeled vehicles, however, so the engineer efforts

continued. The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, passed

through the breach between 0503–0538, and 2d

Squadron pushed its lead armor elements forward in

sufficient strength to protect the left flank of the main

effort by that Marine battalion as it thrust south into

the heart of Jolan. By 0636, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines,

neared its limit of advance for the first day, having

cleared the Jolan Cemetery, and the cavalry squadron

began to occupy strong points along its axis of advance. The Iraqi follow-on forces began to cross into

the city in trace of the assault battalions at 0852, and

began to secure cleared areas and guard some of the

numerous weapons caches uncovered in the assault.

The small craft company, placed under Colonel

Shupp’s Regimental Combat Team 1 for the operation, began to fire and move at 1114 against insurgents trying to flee the city along the bank of the

Euphrates where it rounds the peninsula.

The assault of Regimental Combat Team 7 into its

zone of action began at A-hour using three reinforced

battalions line-abreast, attacking to penetrate the city

and clear an area to Route 10, seizing the Government Center (Division Objective 2) and supporting

Regimental Combat Team 1’s attack. Colonel Tucker

assigned his main effort to 1st Battalion, 8th Marines,

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gareth F. Brandl,

on his right flank, moving somewhat east of the

boundary with Regimental Combat Team 1, designated Phase Line George, but angling to the west to

seize the Government Center and coordinating with

Colonel Shupp's regiment via the 2d Squadron, 7th

Cavalry. The center unit, 1st Battalion 3d Marines, attacked in zone at the center, and the U.S. Army 2d

Battalion, 2d Infantry, attacked on the left flank of

Colonel Tucker’s force.

On 9 November, accompanied by Iraqi Special

Photo by LCpl J.A. Chaverri, Defense Imagery, VIRIN 041111-M-2789C-038

In contrast to the first battle of Fallujah, during Operation al-Fajr the Iraqi forces trained and assigned to 1st

Marine Division did not desert, and fought alongside Coalition troops throughout the battle.
Forces, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, penetrated

along Phase Line Ethan and took the regimental objective, Hadrah Mosque, at 0900 . The Army mechanized infantry battalion moved rapidly along the left

edge of the city, all the way to Route 10, killing approximately 48 enemy and then sending indirect fire

into insurgent targets. The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines,

experienced difficulty clearing its penetration point

and instead moved its vehicles through the Army battalion, continuing to move south afterward with little

further difficulty.

Leading the attack, Lieutenant Jeffrey T. Lee (Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines) aggressively directed his tank platoon through major firefights.

Initially operating continuously for over 12 hours, he

ran the risk of low fuel while continuing to destroy

insurgent resistance, enabling the battalion to reach

its objectives. Days later, while leading Company A in

its drive south, he was shot through his right arm yet

refused to leave his unit and instead advanced two

blocks further south, reaching the assigned battalion

phase line. Surrounded by enemy insurgents, he supported the Marine riflemen taking positions in nearby

buildings, eliminating more insurgents who attempted to attack the position. His aggressiveness

and bravery contributed to the breaking of enemy resistance.

D+2 to D+3 (9–10 November)

While the Army cavalrymen of the 2d Squadron,

7th Cavalry, continued south on their thrust along the

boulevard of Phase Line Henry, the 3d Battalion, 5th

Marines, cleared its zone in the northern half of the

Jolan District. The regiment’s other Marine assault

battalion cleared areas in the cavalry squadron’s rear.

The intense fight for the heart of Jolan District by the

3d Battalion, 1st Marines, took the rest of 9 November and culminated in a turn to the west in preparation to complete clearing operations to the river’s

edge. The 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, reached Route

10 (Phase Line Fran) at 2200 and controlled the

streets to the east and west of its attack route. The accompanying Iraqi 4th Battalion continued to clear

buildings along Phase Line Henry, which had armor

strong points now posted along its entire length

north of Route 10. The insurgents could do little

against the firepower and armor of the cavalry

squadron, and any who resisted were quickly eliminated. Fire from tanks and 25mm automatic cannon

fire from armored vehicles destroyed many of the improvised explosive devices and car bombs arrayed

along the routes, with little effect on the attacking

forces. The cavalrymen took Jolan Park (Division Objective 1) at the end of the day, well ahead of the attack plan schedule. The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,

began its attack to the west at 1305 on 10 November to clear the remaining unoccupied part of Fallujah north of Route 10 to the river’s edge. On its left

flank, the cavalrymen of 2d Squadron attacked along

Route 10 to secure the two highway bridges from the

east at 1424 . The 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance

Battalion already held the western sections. By the

70 INTO THE FRAY

A Marine from Company B, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, watches the smoke rise as a building in Fallujah burns

in the distance.

Photo by LCpl Jeremy W. Ferguson, Defense Imagery: 041112-M-2353F-002
The Second Al-Fallujah Battle 71

end of 10 November, Colonel Shupp’s regiment had

captured the entire northwest quadrant of Fallujah

with a classic cavalry screen established on the eastern edge of his zone and the two Marine battalions

poised to mop up the interior and continue the attack

south of Route 10. 

In Regimental Combat Team 7’s zone of operations to the west, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines,

began its movement at 0100 on 10 November south

from the Hadrah Mosque area with two rifle companies. At 0400 it launched Company A, mounted in

amphibious assault vehicles and escorted by tanks

and light armored vehicles. The mounted company

seized the Government Center at noon, but the other

companies fought for several more hours to overcome snipers and pockets of resistance before securing their sections of Route 10. Two rifle platoons,

however, had to return to the Hadrah Mosque that

night to prevent insurgent reoccupation of the site.

As 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, joined the rest of Regimental Combat Team 7 on the Route 10 line, several

changes to the planning took place on 10 November. The rapid advance of both regiments to Route 10

(Phase Line Fran) had eliminated any need for Regimental Combat Team 7 to undertake the clearing of

southern Fallujah alone. Instead, each regiment

would continue south following the extended traces

of the same boundaries and phase lines already in

use. The securing of the northern part of the city,

however, already taxed the Iraqi forces in the operation even though they had performed well supporting the assault battalions. Command and control

of Iraqi units remained problematic, and Marine battalions would remain behind in each regimental zone

to complete the mopping up phase. Therefore, 3d

Battalion, 5th Marines, and 1st Battalion, 3d Marines,

were assigned to secure the northern half of Fallujah

within their respective regimental sectors while the

assault to the south ensued. 

Sergeant Jeffrey L. Kirk led his 1st Squad, 3d Platoon, K Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, in successive assaults of a fortified building and courtyard,

eliminating insurgents and a machine gun position

personally with rifle fire and grenades. Although

wounded, he refused medical attention and led a

third assault. Nearby, K Company’s Private First Class

Christopher S. Adelsperger executed a series of single-man attacks, clearing houses, rescuing wounded

Marines, and leading the charge into a courtyard after

an assault amphibious vehicle crashed through its

wall. Although he did not survive his wounds,

Adelsperger used amazing courage and energy in destroying the last strongpoint in the Jolan district.

The broadcast by loudspeakers of the Marines’

Hymn over Fallujah by B Company, 9th Psychological Operations Battalion, took place in the early

evening of 10 November as units set in for the night.

The observation of the Marine Corps birthday varied

throughout the zone, and most units celebrated in

small groups during the early morning hours. Observing the date allowed Marines to revel in their

cherished traditions at a time of great danger.

D+4 to D+13 (11–20 November)

Regimental Combat Team 1 continued the attack

into southern Fallujah, sending 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, south along Phase Line Henry to act once again

as the supporting effort beginning at 1900. The armor

company leading the thrust encountered a complex

obstacle that required close air support and AC-130

fire to reduce. The armored attack continued south to

the assigned limit of advance for the day, some 1,200

meters south of Route 10, by 0300 on 12 November.

Supporting arms suppressed enemy fire, and the

mechanized infantry company, following in trace, established a screen. Operating several hundred meters to the east, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, began its

main attack at 1600 on 11 November, undertaking the

mission of clearing the entire zone between the cavalry advance and the river’s edge.

During the daylight hours of the 11th, the insurgents in front of Regimental Combat Team 1 had retreated south and attempted to regroup and

reorganize what men they could for their defenses.

Marines and soldiers moved into the night, not making much contact. The cavalry screen anchored the

regiment’s left, with a section of either M2 Bradley

fighting vehicles or M1A1 Abrams tanks at every

major intersection. True to form, as the sun came up

on 12 November, the enemy came out to fight.

At 1030, Marines of 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, reported strong insurgent contact, receiving mortar and

small arms fire about 500 meters south of Route 10

near the cavalry advance. A Pioneer drone showed

eight to 10 men fighting along rooftops of four

houses. Although the battalion reported two companies were running low on fuel and ammunition, one

of these companies had reached the limits of south

Fallujah by 1640.

The last major contact by Regimental Combat

Team 1 with organized resistance came the next day

(13 November) at 1017, when Marines of 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, fought squad-sized enemy elements.

Several Marines fell wounded in one house and six

insurgents in the upper floor prevented four of the

Marines from being evacuated. First Sergeant Bradley
A. Kasal ran forward from the unit providing cover

for the endangered Marines and joined a squad making a fresh assault inside the house. Killing one insurgent at close quarters, he was struck down by rifle

fire and fell with another Marine. He shielded the

wounded Marine with his body from hand grenade

fragments and then refused evacuation until all other

Marines had been removed. He shouted encouragement to all concerned as more Marines cleared the

house. Inside the house, Corporal Robert J. Mitchell

Jr., leading the squad Kasal had joined, charged

through rifle fire and grenades to reach a critically

wounded Marine and begin first aid treatment. His

covering fire permitted a corpsman to join him, and

Mitchell was then hit while crossing the lower room

to assist other casualties. At close quarters, he killed

an insurgent with his combat knife and then turned

to assist in the evacuation of the wounded. After they

had been rescued, a Marine tossed in a satchel

charge, which brought the house down and finished

the last insurgent resistors.

At the end of 12 November, Colonel Shupp signaled that Regimental Combat Team 1 had completed

its initial assault through the west side of Fallujah:

The soldiers of 2-7 [Cavalry] demonstrated extraordinary courage in the face of the enemy.

Their firepower and can-do spirit has saved Marine lives. 3/5 [3d Bn, 5th Mar] conducted detailed house-to-house searches and have

uncovered tens of thousands of unexploded

ordnance, which they are systematically destroying to ensure the safety of the Jolan. 3/1

[3d Bn, 1st Mar] successfully seized the southern portion of the Regimental Combat Team 1

zone. Without regard for their own safety, the

Marines and sailors of 3/1 made great gains despite running into some of the stiffest resistance

since the fighting began. Resistance included

suicide attacks by suspected foreign fighters.

On the other hand the continued clearing of Fallujah proved difficult. Enemy contact was heavy during the early afternoon of 13 November and

continued at lesser levels through the night and into

the morning of 14 November.

Marines and soldiers of Regimental Combat Team

1 now entered an even more dangerous period in

the operation. An increasingly desperate and tenacious enemy used suicide attacks, snipers, and

booby-trapped buildings to inflict more casualties.

The assault troops, however, continued to dominate

72 INTO THE FRAY

Marines from 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, guard captured Iraqis after a December 2004 cordon-and-knock operation in Fallujah. Photo by LCpl James J. Vooris, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041206-M-8205V-016
The Second Al-Fallujah Battle 73

what they already termed the “ten-second firefight”

and effectively applied combined arms to eradicate

resistance at every encounter.

As his regiment continued clearing its zone,

Colonel Shupp crossed the south bridge over the Euphrates on 15 November, officially opening it for military traffic. Navy Seabees assessed the north bridge

as being in good condition, and it opened shortly

thereafter. The next day, shortly after noon, the 3d

Battalion, 1st Marines, reported that its sweep of the

south bridge with dogs and explosives ordnance disposal teams had uncovered six bombs. The removal

of these came just before the symbolic crossing of

the bridge by General Casey, accompanied by

Colonel Shupp, and led by Lieutenant Colonel

Willard Buhl, the commander of 3d Battalion, 1st

Marines. 

On the eastern side of Fallujah, Colonel Tucker resumed his advance with the Army’s 2d Battalion, 2d

Infantry, pushing armor south of Route 10 at 1900, 11

November, along the eastern fringes of the city. 1st

Battalion, 8th Marines, operated further to the west in

the zone. The Marine battalion crossed Route 10 in

the attack at 1500 with two companies on line, tanks

in the lead, and assault amphibious vehicles following in trace. Here they encountered their heaviest resistance in the entire operation. Marines crossed the

highway, and insurgents responded with automatic

gunfire and antitank rockets. In three hours of fighting, both companies battled their way 250 meters to

the south and stopped in some buildings at dusk.

They advanced another 250 meters under the cover

of darkness beginning at 0001 on 12 November without incident and again set into defensive positions.

Iraqi troops joined later in the morning and cleared

a mosque with no resistance. At 1800, another move

south and west, under the cover of darkness, brought

the lead companies of the battalion to the vicinity of

Regimental Combat Team 1’s 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, screen without incident.

Although the Army mechanized task force encountered some heavy resistance in the southeast

corner of Fallujah, Colonel Tucker’s regiment effectively switched from its attack phase on 15 November and commenced mopping up in the interior of

the city.

Combat operations did not cease with the occupation of the city. Hard pockets of resistance continued even as most insurgents sought to flee the city.

The reports of the two assault regiments for 20 November showed each using two Marine infantry battalions in clearing operations, encountering some

defended houses, especially in the southern sectors.

The Army’s 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, continued

house clearing as well, and 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, continued occupying strong points on the

boundary between the regiments. Of the assault battalions, the Army mechanized battalion task force became the first to depart Fallujah, leaving on 21

November for its parent organization.

Phase IV Operations in Fallujah

(21 November–23 December 2004)

There was no clear-cut distinction between combat and stabilization operations following the successful assault on the city. The assault battalions

occupied assigned sectors of the city and crossed and

re-crossed them in sweeps and house-clearing operations, using the attached Iraqi battalions to the extent that their abilities permitted.

Colonel Shupp’s Regimental Combat Team 1 reports noted increasing humanitarian assistance efforts

and civil-military operations in the last third of the

month. Colonel Tucker’s Regimental Combat Team 7

reported the same by 27 November and the regiment

began rotating Marines by platoon back to base

camps for 24-hour rest periods beginning on 29 November. The 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, completed its

withdrawal to Camp Fallujah on 23 November. Continuing discoveries of arms caches plagued the operation in its final weeks, creating security problems

and also permitting renewed attacks in the city by

surviving insurgents. The total number of caches uncovered reached 370 at the end of the month.

Throughout the last weeks of November and the

first two weeks of December, the 4th Civil Affairs

Group staff worked with a variety of higher commands and the Interim Iraqi Government to develop

a return and reconstruction plan for the city that

would allow its residents to return to their homes but,

at the same time, preclude insurgents from returning

to the city. A new scheme of internal movement control came into practice, making use of biometric identification technology, a variety of scanners, and a new

series of movement control points. The city’s water,

sewage, and electrical systems were repaired as the

more than 200,000 residents of Fallujah began to return and restore the city to some sense of normalcy.

I MEF’s staff created an inter-ministerial coordination

group, located in the civil-military operations center

that coordinated all Iraqi and Marine stabilization operations in Fallujah.

On 23 December 2004, the shift from assault to recovery operations in Operation al-Fajr occurred. It

was the first day that Fallujah’s inhabitants began to

return to the city as 600 civilians returned to the al-
Andalus District. In other respects, the day was little

different from previous ones as Marine rifle companies with attached Iraqi troops continued to conduct

security patrols. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, fought

10 to 15 insurgents in northern Fallujah. Its Marines

employed tanks and air strikes to destroy buildings

occupied by the combatants. Three Marines were

killed in action, and five more suffered wounds. Sergeant Jarrett A. Kraft led three assault squads on three

separate instances to repel insurgents and clear

houses. Despite receiving repeated blast effects from

grenades and being knocked down stairwells, he

continued to lead his Marines with courage and spirit.

At the same time, another squad leader in the same

platoon, Corporal Jeremiah W. Workman, led his

Marines into several buildings, rescued wounded

Marines, and then personally covered them with his

fire after receiving fragment wounds in his arms and

legs. He led his Marines in one more assault before

reinforcements arrived to complete the action.

The Phase IV (stability operations) plan used by I

MEF and the 1st Marine Division aimed at establishing competent Iraqi security forces in the city that

would require only minimal backup from U.S. forces.

Civil affairs group teams and detachments from 1st

Force Service Support Group operated with every

battalion in the Fallujah operation, assessed damage,

and sought to protect infrastructure wherever possible. In the aftermath of combat operations, the priorities for Marine commanders in restoring the city’s

operation were public health, public works and utilities (water, food, electricity, medical), infrastructure

(communications and transportation), the economic

infrastructure, emergency services, and finally the

reevaluation of projects previously begun that might

prove salvageable. During 14–16 December, the

Army’s 2d Blackjack Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division,

departed 1st Marine Division, transferring responsibility for the area outlying Fallujah to Regimental

Combat Team 7. The latter regiment left Fallujah on

10 December, leaving 1st Battalion, 3d Marines,

under the tactical control of Colonel Shupp’s Regimental Combat Team 1, which now conducted the

occupation and stabilization of the city proper.

Colonel Shupp’s instructions to Regimental Combat Team 1 conveyed the complexity of the change

in mission:

Our operational success depends on our efforts

in this phase. At no time is the phrase “No better friend, no worse enemy” more applicable.

This phase however, will be complicated with

no clear beginning and probably starting as

areas of Fallujah are cleared of enemy activity.

Identified forces must roll into these tasks on

the heels of our advance. We must keep the citizens of Fallujah informed through creative info

ops that readily offer aid and assistance. We

must reach out to the citizens to reduce their

human suffering and quickly restore daily operations. We must introduce the Interim Iraqi

Government as soon as possible and steadily

transition to their control and operations. The

citizens must be impressed with the power of

Iraq’s legitimate authorities and identify with

the government as their benefactor and hope

for the future. We must destroy any ties to criminal elements and seek the assistance of the

people. Maintaining security is paramount to

enabling all other operations, but it must not

consume our focus.

As the troops of Regimental Combat Team 1 began

to occupy the “secured” eastern half of Fallujah, some

surprises occurred. Although combat also continued

in the western half, where 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,

held security and stabilization responsibilities, most

engagements and many cache discoveries occurred

in the eastern side after 10 December. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, and 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, combined to fight and kill approximately 35 insurgents

on 12 December using tank fire and close air support. Another engagement on the following day saw

seven bombs dropped and more tank fire used to kill

five insurgents. Assistant division commander,

Brigadier General Joseph F. Dunford, told the division that more clearing and reclearing operations

would be required even as the city was returned to

a more peaceful state.

As in all combat operations conducted in Iraq, the

civil affairs teams accompanying the assault troops

included payment teams compensating owners for

battle damage to property and paying death claims to

families who lost members during the battle. As soon

as feasible, labor and construction contracting would

employ local workers and provide basic items

(wheelbarrows, shovels, etc.) to clear and repair

roads and streets. Humanitarian assistance measures

sought to provide essential services (initially water,

food, and fuel distribution) to mosques and 1st Force

Service Support Group operated humanitarian service centers. Depending upon the Iraqi government

actions, the civil-military teams (Marine Corps and

U.S. diplomatic) sought to once again establish a

civil-military operations center with the local government in the downtown government center capa74 INTO THE FRAY
The Second Al-Fallujah Battle 75

ble of coordinating military assistance.

As stabilization operations came to a close, Iraqi

forces were given responsibility for maintaining security in the city (Phase V). Meanwhile, U.S. quick

reaction forces were maintained to support subsequent security and civil military operations.

Assessing Operation al-Fajr/Phantom Fury

The second battle of Fallujah defined I MEF’s campaign of 2004–05. Marines and soldiers fought

through the city at close quarters, frequently engaging

in point-blank firefights and hand-to-hand fighting.

No enemy tactic or procedure sufficed to repel the

ferocity and effectiveness of squads, teams, and even

individual Marines and soldiers. Caught in their defensive maze, the insurgents fought to the death, surrendered, or fled, the latter move becoming

increasingly difficult as the assault forces cleared the

city.

An exchange monitored between two insurgents

demonstrated the decisive blow of the battle:

A: Where is this shooting?

B: Everywhere. In every area.

A: What is it, artillery?

B: Artillery, mortars and tanks everywhere.

A: Where are you?

B: By the flour mill.

A: They are attacking the flour mill?

B: Yes, and they are attacking us too. The artillery

is destroying us. All of Fallujah is in ruins. Not a house

is left standing. What can stand? The tanks come

down every street with artillery falling ahead of them.

A: Get out of there!

B: Where? How? If I go in the streets I get shot. If

I stay inside I get shelled. And let’s not forget the mortars and the aircraft and the snipers!

A: But . . . They said the Americans had withdrawn!

B: The Americans are everywhere.

A: They said Nazl was still safe . . .

B: Nazaal is a warzone.

A: Where is A_____?

B: No one knows.

A: Try to make it somewhere . . .

B: Even if I go in the yard I will be attacked.

A: What about Shuhada?

B: Just bombing there, they have not entered yet.

A: Listen, on the streets, it’s just tanks right? Nobody on foot . . .

B: Yes but you see, a tank is roughly as big as a

house . . . You can hit it with a rocket and it doesn't

blow up.

A: What about Jolan?

B: War zone.

A: They said Mujahideen reinforcements were arriving.

B: Well they haven't arrived yet. There are still Mujahideen in Askeri, only because they regrouped there

from Souq and crossed over the new road. Fallujah is

finished. It is the attack of all attacks. All the sheikhs

have left us and are happily organizing demonstrations and protests in other parts.

A: How can you say the sheikhs have left?

B: They fled with the families from Jolan and elsewhere. They may still be leaving; they are still getting

families out somehow. Today a family of a woman

and children had a house fall down around them.

They got them out and took them to Jubeil or somewhere . . .

A: Look, call me if anything develops. I don't care

what time you call. Try to find A____.

B: I’ll do what I can. We did burn one tank.

A: That’s good at least.

B: Yes, but if you burn one tank they send three

more. It's useless.

A: Two aircraft were brought down. Hang in there.

The tactical surprise accomplished at the second

battle of Fallujah ranks as one of several remarkable

accomplishments of I MEF and the 1st Marine Division during a highly complex battle. The attack disoriented the insurgent defenses at the outset, and they

never recovered their balance. Although the Jolan district contained the heart of Fallujah’s insurgency, the

rapid penetration into it forced insurgents from their

positions and prevented a sustained defense. After the

operation Coalition soldiers and Marines discovered

the majority of safe houses and other insurgent sanctuaries in the area. In the south, specifically in Nazl

and Shuhada, the assault units found the most formidable defenses, including foxholes, spiderholes, and

tunnels inside and between fortified houses and insurgent billeting areas. Considerable caches of ordnance were found throughout the city.

The enemy typically fought in small groups of four

to 12 individuals, armed with small arms and RPGtype rocket launchers, who generally chose to fight

from inside buildings rather than out in the streets. In

general, the insurgents chose not to fight at night. Although these groups tended to congregate in houses,

which were close to one another, they fought as individual groups rather than establishing a mutually supporting series of positions. Although Marines sustained

some casualties from rooftop shootings, most casualties occurred inside buildings where the enemy waited
for assault troops to come to him. These tactics were

probably a result of dominant U.S. firepower on the

streets and rooftops. The enemy usually opened fire

on Marines as the latter were entering a house or ascending the stairwell. The insurgents often used rifles

and grenades to initiate the engagements and would

usually continue to fight until killed. Fighting to the

death does not mean, however, that Marines fought a

suicidal enemy. In many instances, insurgents attempted to escape by throwing down their weapons

and either trying to evade U.S. units or approaching

them pretending to be civilians. By all accounts, however, the enemy that Marines encountered in Fallujah

proved more willing to stand and to fight to the death

than any enemy forces met elsewhere in al-Anbar

Province.

As noteworthy as the ground assault of 1st Marine

Division and its reinforcements was, the employment

of the aviation support of the Coalition and 3d Marine

Aircraft Wing and the various artillery batteries provided supporting arms fire. The operating altitudes

changed to the poor weather plan on D+1. The fixedwing aircraft loitering for close air support came to the

10,000 to 12,000 or 11,000 to 13,000 feet blocks many

times due to the weather. In the following days, these

lower blocks continued in use even when the weather

was good. Lower altitudes enhanced targetting ability

by reducing slant range for sensor acquisition and had

very limited effect on the clearance of artillery fires.

Although insurgent antiaircraft missiles were always a

concern, the airmen accepted the risk of low-altitude

flight needed to retain the accuracy demanded in this

complex environment. Many times fixed-wing aircraft

would use the lower block to find or verify the target

location and then exit the ring and come in at a higher

altitude for release of guided bombs. Several times

during the battle multiple aircraft in multiple sectors

worked on targets both inside and outside the 5-nautical-mile ring.

The staging of multiple aircraft in the keyhole pat76 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by Cpl Theresa M. Medina, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 041202-M-2583M-007 

Maj M. Naomi Hawkins, the public affairs officer of the 4th Civil Affairs Group, is interviewed by an Arab television news crew in front of the Dr. Talib Al-Janabi Hospital in Fallujah. The foreign media toured the city in

December 2004 to view ongoing reconstruction efforts by multi national forces in the wake of the November battle of Fallujah.
The Second Al-Fallujah Battle 77

terns served to maximize the response time and

tempo of air support. Often a section of aircraft performed target acquisition in the ring at 16,000 to

18,000 feet for one assault regiment while another aircraft section circled at 13,000 to 15,000 feet delivering

ordnance for the other regiment. These aircraft shared

their space with five to seven drones while six to eight

battalions engaged insurgent forces on the ground. A

thorough knowledge of the plan and good situational

awareness allowed these operations with minimal

risks. No friendly fire of any kind occurred at the second battle of Fallujah as the result of supporting arms

fire.

Many times rotary wing aircraft flew up to 3,000 to

4,000 feet to avoid the high volume of small arms fire

and to improve pilot visibility. Drone and manned surveillance aircraft flights over the city averaged seven at

night and four to five during the day. Although more

than anticipated, the keyhole system template accommodated them well.

The employment of laser-guided Maverick and gun

attacks required more coordination. The keyhole template was designed for efficiency and speed, and when

aircraft used such flat trajectory weapons, the controllers

moved the drones and restricted the maximum elevation of artillery and mortar fire. The pilots and forward

Table 5-2: Artillery Missions Fired during Second Fallujah Battle

Table 5-3: Second Fallujah Battle Casualties
78 INTO THE FRAY

air controllers modified the delivery parameters to accomplish the Laser Maverick and gun attacks. While

these required more coordination, only minutes were

required to move the drones and to coordinate other

fires.

During Operation al-Fajr, aviation expended approximately 318 precision bombs, 391 rockets and missiles, and 93,000 machine gun or cannon rounds. The

artillery consumption demonstrated the relative intensity of the ground fighting during the battle.

The overall Marine Corps casualties for the operation, according to summaries of the Manpower Department, Marine Corps Headquarters, totaled 70 Marines

killed in action, 651 wounded in action (394 returned to

duty), with another three non-battle deaths and five

deaths from wounds received in action.

The brunt of these losses fell upon the 1st Marine Division and its attachments.

Among the immediate results of the second battle of

Fallujah, non-combatants fled the fighting in large numbers before the operation, and many insurgents left the

city by hiding among the non-combatant populace departing Fallujah. The attempts at organizing sympathetic

uprisings in other parts of the province failed. The surviving insurgents could only seek to rearm and reorganize, waiting for a return of civilians to the city.

In the immediate aftermath, the insurgent operational

capacity seemed severely impaired as indicated by the

notable drop in indirect fire attacks on Coalition bases

and camps. These indications directly encouraged I MEF

and the staff of Multi National Force–Iraq to set conditions for some form of exploitation operations.
79

During the last phases of Operation al-Fajr,

Marines began to pursue those forces no longer capable of offering effective resistance. These operations would continue into 2005 and would comprise

part of the military operations conducted in support

of the 30 January elections. In the al-Anbar Province

insurgency, however, the multifaceted and numerous

enemy factions and elements had simply melted into

the network of hiding places, sanctuaries, and training areas. Bringing them to battle remained difficult.

Making contact proved typically elusive.

Operations outside Fallujah

Pursuit operations began with Operation Plymouth

Rock, conducted by the 24th Marine Expeditionary

Unit (24th MEU) in northern Babil Province between

24 and 27 November 2004. A complicated series of

targeted raids on known and suspected insurgent

sites by 1st Battalion, 2d Marines was combined with

maneuvers by the British Black Watch Battalion and

2d Battalion, 24th Marines, with Iraqi units in blocking positions. These raids and maneuvers were intended to keep the enemy off balance and away from

the vital Route 8 linking Baghdad to Kuwait. The twostage Operation Lightning Bolt (28–30 November, 3–

19 December) saw the 2d Blackjack Brigade first

isolate and clear Amariyah, with the Black Watch Battalion blocking from the south, and then execute a

similar operation on the opposite side of al-Fallujah

against Al Khalidiyah and Karmah, while cooperating with 2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, to clear

Saqlawiyah. A second Plymouth Rock operation (22-

23 December) repeated raids in northern Babil

Province as the 24th MEU sought to capitalize on the

resulting enemy movement away from the Army

brigades in Area of Operations Raleigh. At this last

juncture, however, the responsibility for northern

Babil Province and tactical control of the 24th MEU

had already (6 December) moved to the 1st Cavalry

Division, another regional modification undertaken

as the Coalition commanders shifted priorities toward

Baghdad and the January election. From 4–5 December, the Black Watch Battalion began its return

to southern Iraq, having sustained five soldiers killed

in action while serving with I MEF. At that point, all

the non-Marine Corps reinforcements previously detailed for Operation al-Fajr had departed.

As 2005 began, I MEF planners focused on the 30

January national election, defeating the insurgency,

preparing Iraqi security forces, and repopulating Fallujah. The expected arrival of II Marine Expeditionary

Force (II MEF) in February and March instilled

thoughts of a smooth turnover and departure by the

sailors and Marines for their home stations. For the

election to succeed, its security and the smooth functioning of the electoral process had to be guaranteed

by military authorities throughout Iraq. Soldiers and

Marines carried out numerous operations in Areas of

Operations Raleigh, Topeka, and Denver, aimed at

upsetting insurgent regrouping, destroying arms

caches, and, where feasible, supporting Iraqi security and government entities, however disparate they

might be in their nascent state. The border stations

with Syria remained closed, and Jordanian access was

limited to authorized commercial traffic.

In the eastern part of al-Anbar Province, 1st Cavalry Division’s responsibilities and the Baghdad political center of gravity led to the turnover of all of

an-Najaf and Karbala Provinces to I MEF. Given the

number of units already transferred out of the Fallujah operation, the additional area had to be taken

over by Colonel Haslam and his 11th MEU, a logical

choice in light of the unit’s success in stabilizing anNajaf the previous summer. All the Marine expeditionary units sent to Iraq, however, now required

relief and return to home stations in the very near future. An Army brigade would arrive in February and

relieve both the 11th MEU and 24th MEU of their responsibilities in a combined Area of Operations

South, operating under the tactical control of the I

MEF commander, Lieutenant General Sattler. For the

time being, however, Colonel Johnson’s 24th MEU

continued to operate with the cavalry division, which

even took tactical control of 2d Battalion, 24th

Marines, on 27 December to support its operations

securing Route 8. Meanwhile, 1st Battalion, 2d

Marines, continued to cover Taheer Firm Base, Eskan

Patrol Base, Haswah Police Station, and patrols in

zone. Only on the first day of February did 24th MEU

return to I MEF tactical control, when it began relief

in place activities with elements of the U.S. Army

155th Brigade Combat Team. On 6 February, 1st BatChapter 6

Optimism and Doubt
talion, 155th Infantry, and 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, relieved 1st Battalion, 2d

Marines.

The 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, handed over

responsibility for Karbala Province to 11th MEU on 22

December, bringing it not only extensive territorial

responsibilities but also new Iraqi police and military

units for its Marines to train, direct, and mentor. With

very little interference from insurgents and criminal

elements, the 11th MEU ended its first campaign in

Iraq with major success in stability operations and in

facilitating the elections in Karbala and an-Najaf. On

14 February, Colonel Haslam transferred authority of

his vast area of responsibility to the 155th Brigade

and the next day his organization joined the departure movements to Kuwait and local air bases. By this

point, the newly arrived 15th MEU under Colonel

Thomas C. Greenwood offloaded in Kuwait and as of

20 January was the Central Command operational reserve.

Security for the 30 January Elections

The Iraqi elections directly affected the pace of operations in al-Anbar Province, as well as the efforts to

plan and to conduct the repopulation of Fallujah. It

was hoped that the displaced inhabitants could return in time to participate in the elections and at the

same time they could receive humanitarian relief and

begin the reconstruction of their city.

The efforts of Regimental Combat Team 1 Marines

and sailors produced one significant benchmark

when the notorious Jolan District opened on 30 December to receive citizens. The openings of specific

districts continued until 14 January, when all of them

stood ready to receive their residents. Civil-military

operations at this point focused on resettling Fallujah,

rendering humanitarian assistance, and re-establishing Fallujah and al-Anbar Province’s governance at

all levels.

The bulk of election support actions centered on

the key cities of ar-Ramadi, Fallujah, Karbala, and anNajaf. In mid-January, the Independent Election

Commission of Iraq (IEC-I) requested that Coalition

military forces provide “life support” (meaning shelter and subsistence), transport election materials, and

support Iraqi forces as they provided security at

polling sites. Anticipating these needs, the Marine

commanders had begun preparations for election

support by surveying and determining the most suitable voting sites.

80 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by LCpl Zachary R. Frank, VIRIN: 041201-M-5901F-010

In the aftermath of the second battle of Fallujah, Marines from I MEF conducted a series of pursuit operations

to destroy insurgent forces that had fled the city. Here, Marines from Company B, Battalion Landing Team,

1st Battalion, 2d Marines, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, fire at enemy insurgents in Jurf as Sakhr, during

Operation Plymouth Rock, a counterinsurgency operation conducted in November and December 2004.
Optimism and Doubt 81

Operationally, the Coalition plan for securing the

elections involved controlling borders, securing

Baghdad, neutralizing insurgents in selected key

cities, and supporting the election process. Dubbed

Operation Citadel II, the Coalition military election

support countered insurgent activities, selected offensive actions against known targets, erected multiple cordons of security for voting sites, and organized

the logistical support for the election process.

Marines and sailors of the 1st Force Service Support Group (1st FSSG) and the MEF Engineer Group

(MEG) hardened the polling sites with field fortification and highway barrier materials. They also received and transported election materials and life

support sets to the sites for the workers and the Independent Election Commission personnel who

would train and supervise the workers. Most workers

and IEC-I personnel arrived in al-Anbar Province on

board C-130 flights of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing,

which transported some 2,300 of these passengers

between 26 and 29 January.

At Fallujah, units of Regimental Combat Team 1

cooperated with Iraqi security forces and provided

outer cordon security for voting centers. Citywide,

they enforced election curfews and operated the

entry checkpoints and humanitarian assistance missions. The infantry battalions also screened the city

perimeter to prevent infiltration by insurgents, encountering light enemy contact. A raid conducted on

the peninsula captured 17 men suspected of insurgent activity.

In the area surrounding the city, Regimental Combat Team 7 provided similar security at its polling

centers while enforcing election day curfew, driving,

and weapons restrictions. The 2d Reconnaissance

Battalion patrolled Zaidon with the Iraqi 2d Battalion, Muthanna Brigade, during which the troops discovered weapons caches near Nasr Wa Salam and

Abu Ghraib. 

In and around ar-Ramadi, the U.S. Army 2d

Brigade enforced curfews, provided the outer cordon

at election sites, and conducted patrols, random

checkpoints, and raids. The insurgents launched nuPhoto by GSgt Kevin W. Williams, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 050130-M-9015W-005

Providing a secure and stable environment for elections on 30 January 2005 was a critical mission objective for I MEF. Here, an Iraqi translator attached

to 1st Battalion, 23d Marine Regiment, prepares to

submit his vote at Haqlaniyah.

On 26 January 2005, a CH-53E Super Stallion from Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 (similar to the one

pictured here) crashed in a sandstorm in western al-Anbar province. Thirty Marines and a Navy corpsman died

in the crash.

Photo by LCpl William L. Dubose III, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041213-M-9529D-01
merous small attacks, several of which targeted

polling centers or troops guarding them. Marines of

2d Battalion, 5th Marines, guarded the government

center and conducted security patrols along Route

10. In western al-Anbar Province, the battalions of

31st MEU stretched to counter numerous attacks with

rockets, mortars, and improvised explosive devices.

It was during these operations that a CH-53E crashed

26 January in a sand storm near ar-Rutbar, killing the

four-man crew from Marine Heavy Helicopter

Squadron 361 and the 26 Marines and a Navy corpsman from 1st Battalion, 3d Marines. As of mid-2010,

this event remained the deadliest single incident suffered by U.S. forces during the Iraq War.

In considering the results of the 30 January election, the deep sectarian division within the Iraqi population was apparent. In the mixed and Shi’a

dominant provinces of Karbala and An-Najaf, an estimated 90 percent of eligible voters turned out at 431

polling centers, with women representing more than

half that number. In Sunni-dominated al-Anbar

Province, the Sunni election boycott prevailed and

only 16,682 voters entered the 49 polls. The exception came at Fallujah, where 7,679 persons, believed

to number one-third to one-half of the eligible voters

present, cast their ballots. This first of several elections in 2005-06 created a 275-seat transitional National Assembly, a provincial assembly in each of the

18 provinces, and a Kurdistan regional assembly. The

election system used proportional representation

with voters indicating a preference for a list of candidates posted by a specific party or other political

entity.

Conducting a fair and secure election remained

the primary objective of the I MEF commanders. Despite the Sunni boycott, I MEF met those objectives.

The insurgents made considerable efforts to disrupt

voting, making 38 separate attacks on 16 sites during

28–30 January. No voters were harmed. The Marines

and soldiers remained alert after the polls closed and

until all workers and their election materials had left

the sites. On 31 January, border crossings reopened

and on 2 February, the Iraqi security details returned

to their garrisons.

The results of the January election became known

about two weeks later, and the clear winners

emerged among the Shi’ite United Iraqi Alliance,

Kurds, and a few secular parties. Sunni Arabs won

only 17 national assembly seats spread over several

lists and very few seats on the provincial assemblies.

82 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by MSgt Dave Ahlschwede, USAF, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 050130-f-1631A-029

Fingers stained with purple ink became the symbol of

the 30 January 2005 Iraqi elections. An Iraqi citizen

Table 6-1: Polling Sites Established in I MEF Area of in Baghdad proudly displays proof that he voted.

Operations, January 2005
Optimism and Doubt 83

After the first tumultuous sessions of the national assembly, a somewhat balanced government formed

with some Sunni representation, including the assembly speaker, one of two deputy presidents, one

of three deputy prime ministers, and six cabinet ministers. The presidency went to Kurdish leader Jalal

Talabani while the Shi’a leader Ibrahim al-Jafari became prime minister.

Resettling Fallujah

Despite U.S. efforts to limit collateral damage, Fallujah’s residences, mosques, city services, and businesses all received varying degrees of damage in the

course of Operation al-Fajr. Of the city’s more than

200 mosques, about 60 were destroyed in the fighting. An estimated 7,000 to 10,000 of approximately

50,000 residences were destroyed, and a large portion of the remainder was damaged. Of the nearly

350,000 inhabitants, up to 200,000 were likely displaced as a result of the two battles for the city.

Fallujah’s repopulation began only after returnees

received biometric identification and new identity

cards. Residents of Fallujah continued to return to the

city and evaluate their holdings and life support

means, often departing again to displaced persons

camps. An increasing number gradually remained in

the city and sought to re-establish their lives. Businesses began to reopen, and the Marines and sailors

patrolling the city and operating the humanitarian assistance sites detected a sense of purpose. The Iraqis

displayed an open friendliness toward the Americans,

and in many cases assisted Marines by showing them

hidden weapons caches and unexploded ordnance.

A new newspaper hit the streets in February, Al Fajr,

published by Regimental Combat Team 1. It found

an accepting audience, especially because it contained information on security rules governing the

city, reconstruction programs, and how to make damage claims and obtain medical treatment. On 12 February, Fallujah traffic police began routine patrols of

the city streets.

By 25 February, the pace of resettlement indicated

genuine progress. On that single day, almost 15,000

civilians entered the city with over 2,000 vehicles. In

addition, 466 contractors and 1,117 government

workers came through the entry control points. By

that date, over 87,000 individuals had visited the humanitarian assistance sites, and 32,546 claims payments totaling over $6.5 million had been paid. A

shattered city showed signs of mending. An estimated 30 percent of the population had returned by

the end of March.

Post-Election Return to Normal Operations

in Al-Anbar Province

The increasing stabilization in Fallujah and the

pending turnover to units of the incoming II MEF led

to the redeployment of I MEF organizations to their

original bases. The departure of Regimental Combat

Team 7 from Camp Baharia to Area of Operations

Denver began on 1 February. The final turnover of

Area of Operations Raleigh to Regimental Combat

Team 1 was conducted on 5 February. Regimental

Combat Team 7 commander Colonel Tucker’s immediate task, the relief of 31st MEU, had to be accomplished rather quickly in December. The U.S. Joint

Chiefs of Staff had approved the extension of 31st

MEU’s deployment in December for another 45 days,

but the expeditionary unit had to first recover all its

component units before moving to Kuwait and embarking in amphibious shipping in time to exit the

U.S. Central Command theater by 15 March. The

turnover came promptly at al-Asad Air Base on 7 February. The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, had returned

from Fallujah in late January and Medium Helicopter

Squadron 265 flew its last combat mission for Regimental Combat Team 7 units at Camp Korean Village

in support of Task Force Naha on 7 February. The

Photo by TSgt Cherie A. Thurlby, USAF, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 050412-F-7203T-453

Jalal Talabani, who was elected President of Iraq on 30

January 2005, listens to a question during a Baghdad

press conference.
squadron returned to al-Asad Air Base the following

day and rejoined the 31st MEU. Colonel Miller then

began the retrograde movements of his reunited organization back to Kuwait, using both ground convoys and aircraft of 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. The

embarkation on USS Essex (LHD 2) and accompanying ships of Amphibious Squadron 11 began on 26

February, and the force sailed for Okinawa on 6

March 2004.

The reconstitution of Regimental Combat Team 7

in Area of Operations Denver during February culminated in the launch of Operation River Blitz (20 February–6 March), the last major operation conducted

by 1st Marine Division before its rotation to home

bases. Centered in the western Euphrates River Valley,

the operation assigned Regimental Combat Team 7

and the Army 2d Brigade, 2d Infantry, to a series of

counterinsurgency operations against major sanctuaries and logistical routes to prevent any interference

with the pending turnover of forces with the 2d Marine Division. The staffs of both divisions participated

in the planning and execution of River Blitz with 2d

Marine Division taking over the operation under the

successor name, Operation River Bridge (10–25

March). The transfer of authority between the two divisions took place on 17 March, and the second campaign of I MEF in Iraq ended on 27 March. At that

point, 307 Marines had died in action and 3,456 were

wounded. Added to the 2003 campaign losses, I MEF

had sustained 365 killed and 3,740 wounded in action since the Iraq War began. Of the wounded, 2,203

had returned to duty. Furthermore, there were 90

non-combat deaths and 145 non-combat injuries in I

MEF.

In the aftermath of the Fallujah Campaign, Marines

of the outgoing I MEF saw the tide apparently turning against the Iraqi insurgency. The operational reporting emphasized nearing success, and I MEF

planning forecast the pending establishment of Iraqi

regional control.

Considerable doubt remained, however, that favorable conditions had been achieved. During December, as the Army reinforcements sent to

participate in the second battle of Fallujah began to

withdraw from Area of Operations Raleigh, Lieutenant

Colonel Jeffrey R. Chessani, the operations officer of

84 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by LCpl Ryan L. Jones, Defense Imagery: VIRIN: 050131-M-4329J-005

An Iraqi woman and boy walk toward the female and children search tent at the edge of Fallujah in January

2005. Residents began to return to the city in December 2004, and by the end of March, about 30 percent of

the city’s pre-battle population had resettled in the city.
Optimism and Doubt 85

Regimental Combat Team 1, sent a poignant memo

to his commander, Colonel Shupp:

I spoke with the [division] G-3 this evening and

he indicated that the chain of events that are

eventually going to happen is going to happen

sooner than we like, but when we expected it. 

The G-3 indicated that Blackjack Brigade would

be folding up shop and heading out on 15 Dec,

which means there will be a relief in place beginning on or about 12 Dec between Regimental Combat Team 7 and Blackjack Brigade.

Regimental Combat Team 7 will take 1/8 [1st

Battalion, 8th Marines] out of the city with them

to relieve Blackjack Brigade. Regimental Combat Team 7 will have 1/8 and 2d Recon Bn to

run area Raleigh. As you know 1/8 and 3/1 are

slated to go home on time and currently have a

latest available date of 13 January. If they were

to execute this, 3/1 would need to leave Fallujah in December so they could embark and prepare for redeployment. Exactly when would be

up to you. However, their initial cut for being

relieved in place is 15 Dec. Not sure they need

an entire month to get ready to redeploy. It can

be done in less time. . . . But why would higher

headquarters want to create a vacuum like this

after successfully crushing an insurgency that

has been a thorn for more than a year? I understand there are other fish to fry in Iraq, that we

are not the only show. What I do not understand is why higher headquarters would not

want to ensure there was some semblance of

stability in Fallujah before they walked away

from Fallujah. Higher headquarters got what it

wanted . . . a destroyed insurgency in Fallujah

or so it would appear. They are going to walk

away thinking they did their part and the smoldering heap of rubble that is Fallujah is going to

start sparking again because higher headquarA Marine MK48/18A1 Series Logistics Vehicle System delivers humanitarian aid to the Jolan District of Fallujah in December 2004. Photo by Cpl Theresa M. Media, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041211-M-2583M-082
ters failed to follow though with the resources

we need to smother the embers. Then they are

going to ask us why we let the embers become

a fire again.

I sincerely believe . . . our immediate headquarters is going to contribute to snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. By forcing division

to move Regimental Combat Team 7 and 1/8 out

of Fallujah before the conditions are right, Multi

National Force–Iraq will in effect contribute directly to the destabilization of a situation that is

currently under control. I am not sure they have

even thought about let alone considered the 2d,

3d and 4th order effects of simply moving

Blackjack Brigade out of area Raleigh. This is

not a hard one to read, but they seem to be

missing the effects and the situation they will

create by re-deploying the Blackjack Brigade. 

The first stabilization campaign of I MEF ended

with the recapture of Fallujah. A large number of local

insurgent fighters were killed and a surging Sunni rebellion had been defeated. The level of destruction

achieved in the Fallujah battles, however, almost prohibited repetition by the Iraqi-U.S. leadership. The

costs and efforts required to repopulate and rebuild

the city would in fact tie down enormous resources

when the rest of al-Anbar Province remained outside

of Coalition control. The battle did not engage the insurgents decisively, for their leadership and many

non-local insurgents had likely fled before the November assault, leaving mostly local militants behind.

Much work remained, therefore, for the incoming II

Marine Expeditionary Force.

86 INTO THE FRAY
87

Following the national elections in 2005 and the

creation of a national assembly, the Iraqi Interim

Government (IIG) was replaced by the Iraqi Transitional Government. The government ministries already bore the responsibility for governing at

regional and local level as well as the administration

and control of Iraqi security forces. U.S. forces in Iraq

would no longer control the pay and formation of

these forces. For the foreseeable future, the Iraqi Civil

Defense Corps and new Iraqi Army would remain

under the operational control of the Commander,

Multi National Corps–Iraq, who also took the responsibility to equip, train, and mentor them in the

field. Regardless the outcome of these ambitious

plans for Iraq’s future, the Multi National Force–Iraq

staff forecast that a force totaling 17 U.S. or Coalition

brigades would be required to meet the security mission for the ensuing 12 to18 months.

The Multi National Corps–Iraq staff also undertook

a new campaign plan because the scope of the existing one had extended only to the transition to Iraqi

sovereignty. Thus, effective from that point, the new

mission called for:

full spectrum counter-insurgency operations in

support of the Interim Government, and in

partnership with the Iraqi security Forces, to

provide a safe and secure environment; enabling the functioning of legitimate governance

and allowing the restoration and development

of Essential Services and the Economy; to assist Iraq in rebuilding itself as a stable and responsible sovereign state and to permit the

redeployment of Coalition Forces.

In the summer of 2004, Headquarters Marine

Corps began planning for a series of deployments to

replace I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) in early

2005. Marine Corps Commandant General Michael

W. Hagee, promulgated his guidance for the relief

deployment, tentatively termed “Operation Iraqi

Freedom III” by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early July.

Based upon initial planning conducted since the requirement had first been identified in February 2004,

the Commandant published the task organization

agreed to by mid-summer:

II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)

2d Marine Division

Regimental Combat Team 8–three infantry battalions, a company each of light armored reconnaissance, tanks, assault amphibious vehicles, artillery

and combat engineers.

Regimental Combat Team 5–three infantry battalions, a company each of light armored reconnaissance, tanks, assault amphibious vehicles, and

combat engineers.

2d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward)

Marine Aircraft Group 26–three light attack, three

medium transport and two heavy helicopter

squadrons, plus one fighter or attack squadron and

an aerial refueler detachment.

Ground support units and a squadron of unmanned aerial vehicles.

2d Force Service Support Group–six support battalions of various types.

As with the previous guidance given for the deployment of I MEF, the plan included the authority to

draw upon normally scheduled deployments of

ground and aviation units of III Marine Expeditionary

Force (III MEF) on Okinawa. Planning anticipated the

assignment of an Army brigade to the force, with the

required capability of supporting an additional Army

brigade for surge operations. The secretary of defense approved the planning on 21 June. Because the

new Multi National Corps–Iraq organization placed a

lieutenant general in overall command of the forces,

a major general would now head the Marine Corps

contingent. Considerable thought was given to assigning the commanding general, 2d Marine Division,

to a dual position as the commander of II MEF (Forward), but in the end the force structure included

separate commanders and staffs. Marine Corps doctrine prevailed amid the inevitable bureaucratic infighting in the Iraq military command structure, and

Major General Stephen T. Johnson, the deputy II MEF

commander, led the new contingent relieving Lieutenant General Sattler’s I MEF.

The assignment of only three battalions from the

1st Marine Division to the 5th Marines to create Regimental Combat Team 5 in the June force plan did

not survive long, probably reflecting uncertainties

Chapter 7

The Mission Continues
about the readiness of 2d Marine Division forces to

handle all competing global requirements. By August, the 2d Marine Regiment had been selected as

the second regimental combat team headquarters in

the task organization, and was assigned only two infantry battalions normally assigned to the 1st Marine

Division. The staff officers of II MEF and subordinate

commands developed the details of the deployment

including the final organization and the identity of almost all units during August and September. Given

the ongoing campaign of the two battles for Fallujah

then being waged by I MEF, the studies and planning

ranged widely.

The planning guidance’s initial assessment of Area

of Operations Atlanta highlighted the persistent unrest that II MEF would be facing:

As the provincial capital Ramadi will be the

focus of Anti-Iraqi Forces attacks, Anti-Coalition

Forces will continue standoff attacks, assassinations and coercion of IIG leaders, Coalition

Forces and perceived collaborators in an attempt to disrupt election preparations and delegitimize the Iraqi Interim Government.

Anti-Coalition Forces may increase the level of

attacks or attempt a “spectacular” attack prior

to the elections to prevent popular support of

the Iraqi Interim Government and promote instability throughout the area of operations.

There are indications that the rift between competing agendas of different Anti-Coalition

Forces is widening and Coalition Forces information operations may be able to exploit it. Developing credible Iraqi security forces and

performing successful civil military operations

will help win the information operations war

during this pivotal period. The potential for violence hinges on success or failure of these efforts.

The two regiments of Major General Richard A.

Huck’s 2d Marine Division brought six infantry, one

reconnaissance, and one light armored reconnaissance battalion to Iraq. The force was smaller than

the one sent the previous year, lacking the two infantry battalions and a provisional military police battalion that had been deployed a year earlier with 1st

Marine Division. In theory, the more robust Iraqi security forces now present in the province would

compensate for such a shortfall in ground combat

power. However, that Iraqi security presence had

proven illusory in 2004 and remained to be proven in

2005. 

Though the deployment of II MEF varied considerably from I MEF, there was wide agreement on the

exchange of equipment and like Marine Corps units

replaced each other in all cases. For the renamed

“Operation Iraqi Freedom 04-06.1” (a new Joint

Chiefs of Staff term reflecting the fiscal year and sequencing of the deployment) strategic deployment

by II MEF, little sealift took part although the presence of prepositioned shipping in Kuwait ports

served to provide fresh ground and aviation support

equipment as required. A single roll-on, roll-off ship,

USNS Cape Hudson (T-AKR 5066), supported the II

MEF movement. The scheduled air transport movements of civilian charter and military aircraft moved

the more than 22,000 Marines and sailors of II MEF

in approximately eleven weeks during the period 9

January to 30 March. This comparatively unforced

pace of the relief of I MEF by II MEF permitted sequential relief of battalions with key areas such as alFallujah and Area of Operations Topeka first in the

cycle. It also allowed for a generous overlap in forces

88 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by Kayli Olinde, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 031001-M-1527O-016

The creation of the Multi National Corps–Iraq meant

that the most senior Marine in Iraq from 2005 on

would be a two-star general. In 2005, II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) deployed under the command of the MEF’s deputy commanding general,

MajGen Stephen T. Johnson (pictured in 2003).
The Mission Continues 89

such that no vulnerability could develop before the

transfer of authority took place. For instance the percentage of I MEF departures to II MEF arrivals on 10

February stood at 11:26 and on 24 February was

24:55. On 8 March, 45 percent of I MEF personnel

had departed while 75 percent of the II MEF manpower had arrived.

One difference in the deployment of II MEF compared to I MEF was the much-abbreviated Reception,

Staging, Onward movement, and Integration of forces

phase, which proved mostly unnecessary because of

the pre-deployment training of II MEF forces in the

United States and the convenience of relieving like

forces in theater. For example, 3d Battalion, 25th

Marines of the Marine Corps Reserve, 4th Marine Division, mobilized at eight home stations in January

and deployed to the Air-Ground Training Center,

Twentynine Palms, California, on 10 January, where

it conducted combat training through the end of the

month. In February, the battalion completed its combined arms exercise and conducted a stability and security operations exercise at March Air Force Base,

California. On 19 February its advance party departed

for Iraq, and the remainder of the battalion flew on

1 March to Kuwait, spending only a day there to

change mode of transport to C-130 aircraft for the

final arrival at al-Asad Air Base. It conducted a transfer of authority with 1st Battalion, 23d Marines, on 15

March.

Some equipment concerns in Iraq had begun to

surface before the arrival of II MEF. The high usage

rate for ground vehicles and aircraft of all types in

just months was the equivalent of years of peacetime

use. Almost predictably, the tracked armored fighting vehicles showed signs of deterioration first. The

2d Assault Amphibian Battalion dispatched a team of

90 Marines to Fallujah in early January 2005 as a “reconstitution detachment” built around the battalion’s

A Company. A six-week effort refurbished or replaced a total of 84 AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicles, including 42 brought from Camp Lejeune in

North Carolina. After six weeks, the equipment in the

hands of I MEF, with few exceptions, showed readiness in the 80–95 percent range. An equivalent effort

in the following month swapped the tanks and tank

recovery vehicles of the two tank companies with vehicles drawn from the maritime prepositioned shipping.

Aviation also suffered from heavy use, and serious

concerns surfaced in particular with the readiness of

light attack and heavy lift helicopters. The entire aviation complement of I MEF had operated consistently

at high tempo, as shown in the typical 30-day cycle

ending on 9 March (see table 7-1).

One particular aspect of materiel readiness troubled II MEF considerably less than its predecessor.

The various armor enhancement programs for the

wheeled tactical vehicle fleet had reached fruition by

February 2005. The Maintenance Center, Marine

Corps Logistics Command, Albany, Georgia, had

The 2d Marine Division under MajGen Richard A.

Huck (center) relieved MajGen Natonski’s 1st Marine

Division in 2005.

Photo by LCpl Matthew Hutchison, Defense Imagery: VIRIN: 050418-M-9470H-007

Table 7-1: Typical Monthly Aircraft Usage Data, early 2005

*Weapons Systems Planning Document (WSPD) Standard
served as the primary producer of Marine Corps

armor for the program, both in the form of kits and

armor plates. This effort included fabrication of the

3/16-inch and 3/8-inch plates for the Marine armor

kit as well as explosive resistant coating processes.

Later in the year, the equivalent facility at Barstow,

California, became an armor producer. Additional

armor components for undercarriage, tailgate, back

plates, and gunner’s shields also entered production

during 2004. In that year, the Logistics Command

processed some 5,000 tons of steel to produce armor

for 5,000 vehicles, including 1,000 delivered to the

Army.

The next objective was upgrading the force with

uparmored and armor-kit Humvees and fitting all

seven-ton trucks with their specific armor systems.

The Albany armor installation team arriving at Camp

Taqaddum in late February was ordered to begin installation in March, building to a capacity of 200 units

per month. The parallel seven-ton truck armor installation began in May at 40 per month. By 30 April,

II MEF reported the processing of 276 Humvees by

the Marine armor installation site.

Initial Employment of II Marine

Expeditionary Force

Colonel Stephen W. Davis, commanding Regimental Combat Team 2, deployed his three battalions

to Iraq during 24 February–1 March from Camp Lejeune. He conducted his relief with Regimental Combat

Team 7 in Area of Operations Denver. From 10–17

March, Regimental Combat Team 7, followed by Regimental Combat Team 2 from 17–25 March, conducted Operation River Bridge, interdiction

operations to disrupt and defeat enemy elements that

might endanger the relief as well as countering

enemy infiltration in the area. On 17 March, Regimental Combat Team 2 effected its transfer of authority at al-Asad Air Base. As an indicator of the new

look hoped for in future operations, the battalion

commander of the 503d Iraqi National Guard Battalion, operating out of Camp Hit, attended the ceremony. During this phase, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines,

replaced 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, at al-Qaim, and

3d Battalion, 25th Marines, relieved 1st Battalion, 23d

Marines, at Hit and Haditha. The 2d Light Armored

Reconnaissance Battalion initially operated with two

90 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by LCpl Tasha M. Fontaine, VIRIN: 050619-M-1828F-019

The major commanders of Multi National Force–West units in June 2005 included (from left): BGen Robert E.

Milstead Jr, commanding general, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward); Army BGen Yves J. Fontaine, commanding general, 1st Corps Support Command; BGen Ronald S. Coleman, outgoing commander, 2d Force

Service Support Group (Forward); BGen John E. Wissler, incoming commander, 2d Force Service Support Group

(Forward); LtGen James F. Amos, commanding general, II Marine Expeditionary Force; MajGen Stephen T.

Johnson, commanding general, II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward); and Army BGen Augustus L. Collins,

commanding general, 155th Brigade Combat Team.
The Mission Continues 91

line companies and K Battery, 3d Battalion, 10th

Marines, attached as a provisional rifle company as it

relieved 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

at Camp Korean Village. Each infantry battalion gave

up a rifle company to the security force assigned to

al-Asad Air Base. The remaining attachments clustered with the Regimental Combat Team 2 headquarters at al-Asad Air Base for operations as required

in Area of Operations Denver: 1st Force Reconnaissance Company; Company A, 2d Tank Battalion;

Company A, 4th Combat Engineer Battalion; and

Company A, 4th Assault Amphibian Battalion.

Units of Regimental Combat Team 2 continued

their tasks under Operation River Bridge. This operation remained focused on interdicting insurgent logistical routes east of the Euphrates River between

Hit and Haditha. Tactics included small unit raids, vehicle checkpoints, cordon and knock, and cordon

and search. In addition, specialized teams conducted

raids in search of high value individuals to kill or capture. The regiment’s main effort centered on Task

Force 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, operating in Hit and

along the Hit-Haditha corridor with direct support

from 1st Force Reconnaissance Company. The other

battalions conducted tasks in their zones, contributing to the operation.

Regimental Combat Team 8, commanded by

Colonel Charles M. Gurganus, conducted its transfer

of authority with Regimental Combat Team 1 slightly

later than Regimental Combat Team 2. Two of its battalions had deployed considerably earlier in the II

MEF deployment schedule to relieve battalions covering Fallujah, where they operated under Regimental Combat Team 1 until the transfer of authority. The

3d Battalion, 8th Marines, departed home station on

14 January and relieved 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, at

Fallujah on 20 January. The battalion immediately

commenced its operations in support of the Iraqi

elections. It provided security of polling sites as well

as participating in training and integrating Iraqi forces

into the operation. On 30 January, a rocket attack

wounded 11 Marines from the 3d Battalion, 8th

Marines, just south of al-Karmah. The attack was a

precursor to what awaited the rest of the II MEF

forces.

On 9 January 2005, the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines,

left its California base and arrived at Camp Abu

Ghraib on the 17th. Three days later, the battalion

conducted its transfer of authority with 1st Battalion,

3d Marines. Thus began 3d Battalion, 4th Marines’

third deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom, coming only five months after it had returned from Iraq

following the first battle of Fallujah. The battalion assumed responsibility for the southern half of Fallujah

and for operating entry control point 1, the primary

entrance route into the city of Fallujah for contractors, government officials, and vehicles carrying cattle and produce. The battalion also relieved Company

A, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, on 13

February and assumed responsibility for the battle

space west of Fallujah, known as the Peninsula.

The remainder of Regimental Combat Team 8

mostly deployed with the main body of II MEF from

its bases during 5–15 March. It immediately began relief of Regimental Combat Team 1 until assuming sole

responsibility for Area of Operations Raleigh on 21

March, with a final transfer of authority on 27 March.

The leading battalions already in place, Colonel Gurganus assigned 2d Reconnaissance Battalion to the

Zaidon area and 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, to Camp

Bahariah, east of Fallujah. An additional battalion deployed with the regiment, but 1st Battalion, 5th

Marines, actually traveled independently from its

Camp Pendleton home station and replaced 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, at Camp Hurricane Point, operating under the Army 2d Brigade task organization and

missions on 17 March after an 11-day transfer of authority process. The regiment’s combat support attachments settled into Camp Fallujah before

beginning their supporting missions in Area of Operations Raleigh: Battery A, 1st Battalion, 10th

Marines; Company A, 2d Combat Engineer Battalion;

Maj Todd C. Waldemar, assigned to 3d Battalion,

25th Marines, practices his Arabic with Iraqi children

while on patrol in Haditha during Operation River

Bridge. Throughout 2005, Marines from II MEF (Fwd)

conducted a range of operations focused on establishing a military presence in the towns and cities

along the Euphrates River Valley.

Photo by Cpl Neill A. Seveluist, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 050318-M-2819S-027
Company B, 2d Tank Battalion; Anti-Tank Platoon,

2d Tank Battalion; Company B, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion; and Scout Platoon, 8th Tank Battalion.

Regimental Combat Team 8 entered its first full

month of operational control by holding Fallujah and

striving to disrupt insurgent bands throughout the

area. Operation White Feather began on 1 April with

a mission to clear main supply roads of improvised

explosives and other threats. Marines of 3d Battalion,

4th Marines, routinely screened Iraqi civilians, government officials, and contractors entering the city at

entry control points 1, 4, 5, and 6. Elements of 1st

Battalion, 6th Marines, conducted equivalent searches

at entry control points 2 and 3. Regimental Combat

Team 8 and the 5th Civil Affairs Group also worked

to improve the quality of life for the Fallujans and the

inhabitants of the surrounding areas. The regiment

experienced its first coordinated attack on 2 April,

when the Abu Ghraib prison received an indirect fire

and small arms insurgent attack.

Brigadier General Robert E. Milstead’s 2d Marine

Aircraft Wing (Forward) replaced the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing elements in detail, sending a light attack

helicopter squadron detachment to al-Qaim; another

92 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by Cpl Robert R. Attebury, VIRIN: 050629-M-3301A-025

Marines from Company A, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, prepare to raid a house occupied by suspected insurgents

in Saqlawiyah. With cooperation between Marines and Iraqi forces a critical component of counterinsurgency

operations in Iraq, the Marines are assisted in the June 2005 operation by Iraqi Security Forces (wearing green

helmets).

Table 7-2: Tactical Vehicles Operated by Marine Corps Forces in Iraq (February 2005)

Note: UAH: Up-Armored HMMWV, a new production item (M1114) AOA: Add-on Armor, armor kits, installed in theater. “Hardening”: expedient or improvised of plating.
The Mission Continues 93

detachment to Camp Korean Village. General Milstead also deployed a light attack helicopter

squadron, a medium helicopter squadron, and most

of the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to al-Taqaddum. At al-Asad Air Base, Colonel Thomas M. Murray, commanding Marine Aircraft Group 26, exercised

control over all aircraft squadrons at al-Asad Air Base,

including a second light attack helicopter squadron,

two medium helicopter squadrons, and one heavy

helicopter squadron, as well as one squadron of F/A18D Hornets, one AV-8B Harrier squadron, and a

squadron of EA-6B Prowlers. The usual aerial refueler squadron detachment provided logistics support

using the KC-130J. An Army air ambulance company

was attached for casualty evacuations. At Fallujah, the

air control squadron and a detachment of drones

supported the immediate needs of the II MEF commander. The two aircraft wings conducted their transfer of authority on 1 March. 

In June, command of II MEF (Fwd)’s support element, the 2d Force Service Support Group (Forward),

changed from Brigadier General Ronald S. Coleman

to Brigadier General John E. Wissler. The task-organized detachments deploying from the al-Taqaddum

base reflected the new logistics doctrine under way

in the Marine Corps. Combat Logistics Regiment 25

provided general support to the entire II MEF (Fwd)

area of operations. Combat Logistics Battalion 2 supported the vast Area of Operations Denver from

Camp al-Asad, while Combat Logistics Battalion 8

performed the same from Camp Fallujah in Areas of

Operations Raleigh and Topeka. The supporting 22d

Naval Construction Regiment based one battalion at

Camp Fallujah and another in Ramadi. The Seabee

regiment executed a transfer of authority with the I

MEF Engineer Group on 11 March, and the two force

service support groups transferred authority the following day.

The deployments of the 11th and 24th MEUs came

to an end on 14 and 15 February, respectively. The

Army’s 155th Brigade Combat Team, deployed from

Mississippi and other home stations, took responsibility for the northern Babil, Karbala, and an-Najaf

Provinces, an area designated Area of Operations

Initial Deployment of II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) Units in al-Anbar Province, March 2005.

I MEF Briefing Map, Adapted by History Division
Biloxi. Unlike the previous command relationships,

where Army brigades were under the operational

control of the deployed Marine division, the 155th

Brigade was under the tactical control of the commanding general, I MEF, with the commanding general, Multi National Corps–Iraq, retaining operational

control. Although this arrangement spared the 1st

and 2d Marine Division commanders the additional

operational responsibilities, the Marine expeditionary

force commanders and staffs had to work out the operating relationships, with special attention to air support and logistics responsibilities yet to be specified.

With a battalion each of motorized infantry, armor,

armored cavalry, combat engineers, and field artillery, the 155th Brigade, under Colonel (later

Brigadier General) Augustus L. Collins, proved a capable partner in the campaign, operating under the

tactical direction of the II MEF commander.

Almost unnoticed in the shuffling of the forces,

the special operations capable 15th MEU operated in

Iraq during the period 11 March–7 April, but only

partially with I MEF and II MEF. Colonel Thomas C.

Greenwood reported this organization for duty as the

new Central Command theater reserve on 23 January, having conducted humanitarian operations in

Sumatra and Sri Lanka for two weeks while en route

from the United States. After a period of combat training in Kuwait, the 15th MEU moved to the southeastern edge of Baghdad, and on 11 March occupied

Forward Operating Base Falcon, the former base of

the 5th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. Now under the

tactical control of the 3d Infantry Division, the

Marines and sailors of the 15th MEU secured a portion of northern Babil province until the later arrival

of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment the following

month. The 15th MEU Marines stopped insurgent

mortar and rocket attacks into the city from the south

as the newly elected Iraqi parliament convened for

the first time.

The aviation component of 15th MEU did report to

I MEF tactical control, however, and Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 operated from al-Asad Air Base

and al-Taqaddum bases with the 2d Marine Aircraft

Wing, supporting I and II MEF activities during the

deployment. From its Falcon base, the rest of Colonel

Greenwood’s command, especially 1st Battalion, 1st

Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel David J.

Furness, worked for Army commanders while conducting mechanized patrols on National Route 8,

counter-rocket and counter-mortar sweeps, and the

usual range of security patrols and cordon operations

in its sector. MEU Service Support Group 15, under

Lieutenant Colonel Jay L. Hatton, provided the usual

logistical support for all 15th MEU operations from

Falcon and carried out six humanitarian assistance

operations at villages in the 15th MEU area. In addition, the MEU Service Support Group 15 Marines conducted a number of security missions to complement

the efforts of the infantry battalion, including route

security patrols, security for raids, and vehicle check

points. For these missions, the Army Multi National

Command–Iraq issued 15th MEU a large number of

uparmored Humvees with radios and a few Blue

Force tracker devices to perform these missions and

to interface adequately with the Army command and

control systems. After participating in Army directed

Operations River Sweep, Iron Fist, Warning Track,

and Strong Will, 15th MEU returned to Kuwait after

having turned over its responsibilities to 3d

Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, on 6 April.

It left the theater on 22 April.

The 2d Marine Division executed its transfer of authority with 1st Marine Division on 17 March. Meanwhile, subordinate elements continued their own

reliefs. This was an advantage of having major formations of the same service at hand, each containing

units of the two U.S.-based Marine divisions. II MEF

conducted its transfer of authority on 27 March and

subsequently stood up as Multi National Force–West.

Expeditionary force units continued to flow into theater until months’ end, when 22,630 Marines and

sailors of II MEF were in Iraq with 10,599 Army and

Navy personnel attached with various units. Marine

Corps forces in Iraq totaled 30,887, including 5,699

personnel of I MEF awaiting redeployment. At this

point 12,997 Marine and Navy reservists of the Marine

Corps Reserve were on active duty Marine Corps–

wide, of whom 92.5 percent served in operating

forces with 43 percent serving in Iraq.

The relief operation by the two Marine expeditionary forces required 325 inter-theater and 1,059

intra-theater airlift missions to transport some 52,010

Marine Corps and Navy personnel during 10 January–4 April 2005. This effort represented a significant

level of achievement for Marine Corps operations but

remained somewhat obscured by what was likely the

largest troop rotation in U.S. military history.

94 INTO THE FRAY
95

To prevent insurgent cells from taking advantage

of the transition from experienced to newly arriving

units, forces from I Marine Expeditionary Force (I

MEF) and II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF)

conducted a series of operations intended to disrupt

and damage insurgent cells. This reflected the overall strategy of U.S. forces in Iraq during the spring of

2005, as the Army conducted its own annual turnover

of forces .

In al-Anbar Province, these operations differed little from most other major efforts mounted against insurgent enclaves and operating areas. The transfer

presented insurgents with the opportunity to damage

U.S. and Coalition troops and discredit their mission

objectives. Consequently, stopping any enemy actions affecting or occurring during this period was

imperative.

The 1st Marine Division’s Operation River Blitz (20

February–5 March) began the series of offensive actions as II MEF forces began to arrive. Typically, it

served as an overall directive that guided subordinate

commands as they conducted operations to counter

insurgent moves and deployments while accounting

for local conditions and the views of local commanders.

1st Marine Division commander General Richard F.

Natonski estimated likely results at the outset:

Operations at both ends of the Husaybah-Baghdad corridor preceded initiation of operation

“River Blitz.” We assess that the insurgents may

perceive the [operations] to the north in Rawah

and Regimental Combat Team 1’s raids in

Karmah and entry control pointss [established]

around Nasr Wa Salam and Shahabi as part of

Multi National Force’s overall operation.

As yet, there is no reporting suggesting that insurgents are fleeing; they are waiting to determine the scope and duration of Multi National

Force operations. The formal release in the

media headlining “River Blitz” will further amplify the scale of the operation in insurgents’

eyes. Arabic media agencies are providing sensationalized coverage; al Jazeera news carried a

headline of troops “flooding” into Ramadi. Insurgents will begin to flow toward gaps around

Lake Tharthar, Akashat, and the Salafist seam

south of Fallujah as Multi National Force make

current safe havens untenable. Key insurgent

leaders may flee.

In the far west, Regimental Combat Team 7 continued the division’s program with Operation River

Bridge (10–17 March). This was continued by Regimental Combat Team 2 (Regimental Combat Team

7’s relieving unit) through 25 March. The operation

consisted of interdiction efforts in Area of Operations

Denver to disrupt and defeat insurgent elements, prevent infiltration of terrorist bands into Mosul and arRamadi, and prevent enemy interference with the

relief by Regimental Combat Team 2.

Operation River Bridge focused on interdicting insurgent logistical routes east of the Euphrates River

between Hit and Haditha. In Haditha, Company L,

3d Battalion, 25th Marines, engaged insurgents,

killing four by an aircraft delivering a GBU-38 500-

pound JDAM bomb. In Haditha and Hit, the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, operated with tank and assault

amphibian support and were assisted by Iraqi National Guard troops.

As a result of Operations River Blitz and River

Bridge, the enemy was unable to disrupt or capitalize on the transfer of authority. Some intelligence reporting indicated that the enemy did not know or

suspect that a relief had occurred until it was completed. Further, the detention of nine insurgent leaders or collaborators and the killing of two more

significantly decreased insurgent activity throughout

Area of Operations Denver, especially in the Hit-Haditha corridor. The intelligence analysts suspected

that insurgent higher-level leaders moved to alternate

sanctuaries such as Rawah, Tikrit, and Mosul.

A more routine event took place shortly thereafter,

with yet another transfer of a commercial generator

for the Mosul power grid from Jordan. Dubbed Operation Terrapin III (22–31 March), the convoying of

another “Mother of all Generators” through Area of

Operations Denver occupied Regimental Combat

Team 2 until it transferred the generator to the U.S.

Army’s 42d Infantry Division across the Euphrates for

continued movement to Mosul. Elements of the 2d

Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion and 224th

Chapter 8

Into the Fray
Engineer Battalion escorted the convoy without incident.

In a special effort against saboteurs, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company and 3d Battalion, 25th

Marines, conducted Operation Nightstalker I. The first

in a nearly continuous series of operations to kill insurgents placing mines and explosive devices on the

main supply and auxiliary supply routes, the operation saw units deploying sniper teams and directing

precision fires. This first operation focused on known

areas of interest in the Hit-Haditha corridor.

Maintaining the Momentum

Operation Patriot Shield, covering April–May 2005,

consisted of a series of tactical actions clearing the

Hit-Haditha corridor. These locations included Barwanah, Baghdadi, Abu Hyat, Muhamadi, Kubaysah,

the three train stations between Hit and Haditha and

Haqlaniyah. Marines encountered small-arms engagements, mines, improvised explosive devices, and

indirect fire attacks. They confiscated several small

caches of weapons. Commanders estimated that the

limited contact and low resistance to Coalition force

moves confirmed that the insurgents had not found

alternate sanctuary in lesser population centers but

simply had “gone to ground” in the major population

centers or were displaced out of Area of Operations

Denver. Sniper teams of 1st Force Reconnaissance

Company and 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, combined

efforts again for a repeat Operation Nightstalker II (1–

10 April), between Haditha and Camp al-Qaim.

On 23 April, Regimental Combat Team 2, commanded by Colonel Stephen W. Davis, received its

first Iraqi Army unit as a partner for combined operations. The 7th Reconnaissance Company, consisting

of 34 soldiers, reported for operations. These soldiers

had been former Iraqi Republican Guardsmen who

then joined the Shahwani Special Forces, one of the

first Iraqi units formed to fight for the new Iraq before

the establishment of the new Iraqi Army. In eight-man

squads, the Iraqi soldiers began to work with Marine

Corps battalions throughout Area of Operations Denver. Regimental Combat Team 2 began to integrate

the Iraqi National Guard units in its area of responsibility as well. The Iraqi government offered enlistment

in the army only to the 503d and 504th Battalions. A

96 INTO THE FRAY

I MEF Briefing Map, Adapted by History Division

II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) Counterinsurgency Operations Conducted in 2005.
Into the Fray 97

total of 127 of these personnel agreed to continued

service, whereupon they boarded buses for their

movement from Hit to Kirkush Military Training Base

for basic training.

During May, Colonel Davis shifted his focus to the

far west of his regiment’s zone of operations. With

Operation Matador (8–14 May), he sought to sweep

enemy sanctuaries north of the Euphrates. With only

three battalions at his disposal in the vast Area of Operations Denver, he could concentrate forces only at

the expense of drawing down security in the more

populated areas, which also tended to be the insurgent objective areas. The key element in Matador,

therefore, consisted of a very rapid assembly of designated units from the three battalions and an immediate maneuver through the objective area, using

assault amphibian vehicles and helicopter mobility as

available.

The enemy had attacked Camp Gannon the previous month in an unusually brazen and coordinated

attack. Located on the Iraqi-Syrian border, Camp Gannon occupied an abandoned warehouse complex on

the northwest corner of the town of Husbayah, located on the Syrian border. Considered the “mouth” of

the insurgent logistical routes leading to Baghdad and

points north, the Marine Corps presence there continued to attract attention from insurgents.

Beginning at 0815, 11 April 2005, insurgents fired

mortars and launched three suicide vehicle bombs.

They tried to pin down the camp guard with mortar

and rocket fire while the three explosive-laden vehicles moved in succession to break through and destroy the base. The first vehicle blew up against

Guard Post 2, but the defenders rallied and stopped

the next two, a dump truck and a fire engine. The fire

engine had a driver, a spotter, and a bulletproof windshield, and carried bottled gas containers filled with

explosives. 

The initial blast scattered fragments and debris,

damaging a few structures including the detention facility and Post 2. Also, the lightweight counter-mortar

radar was destroyed during the fighting that followed.

One officer reported that the attack “demonstrates an

extremely mature and capable insurgency. It showed

its ability to mass a very complex attack very quickly.”

The garrison, consisting of Company I, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, deployed its quick reaction force and

called for support. Enemy mortar and rocket launcher

fire continued for an hour, but AH-1 helicopter gunship fire and F/A-18 air strikes turned the tide against

the enemy. The small arms volume fire ceased around

0930, but some random shots continued for another

A Marine Corps M1A2 Abrams main battle tank attached to 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, patrols the streets of alUbaydi during Operation Matador in May 2005. Photo by Cpl Neill A. Sevelius, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 050512-M-2819S-036
98 INTO THE FRAY

10 hours. While the exact number of enemy killed in

action or wounded remained unknown, commanders

estimated that the Marines killed at least 16 enemy insurgents and wounded 15 during the 24-hour engagement. The enemy force, including support

personnel, must have approached 100.

With Operation Matador, Regimental Combat Team

2 responded to insurgents in the 3d Battalion, 2d

Marines, sector to eliminate their sanctuaries in the

vicinity of Ramana. Several elements comprised Lieutenant Colonel Timothy S. Mundy’s Task Force 3d Battalion, 2d Marines: Companies I and K, 3d Battalion,

2d Marines; Company L, 3d Battalion, 25th Marines;

Company B, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion; Combat Logistics Battalion 2; and the Army’s

814th Bridge Company. The initial plan called for the

deployment of two rifle companies, (Company L, 3d

Battalion, 25th Marines; and Company K, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines) by helicopter using six CH-46E and

four CH-53E helicopters in three waves. Intelligence

received shortly before the operation, however,

caused a shift from helicopters to assault amphibious

vehicles, because the insurgents seemed to be reacting too well in advance. The tank and light armor sections secured the old Ramana Bridge site near Ubaydi,

and tank sections and the Army bridge unit moved to

place a temporary span across the Euphrates, permitting all Regimental Combat Team 2 vehicles to operate throughout the city. The assault amphibious

vehicles filled with the assault companies moved forward as well and prepared to sweep the objective

area with mounted infantry and tanks, while the light

armored reconnaissance company screened the

northern flank. A vehicle accident and other difficulties with the bridging company, however, led to a 13-

hour delay before the assault units crossed the river.

The operation produced some fierce fighting during the first 24 hours when both the blocking position

at the Ramana Bridge and the bridge-crossing units

became decisively engaged, leading to significant insurgent losses and the clearing of most of New

Ubaydi, which had been considered calm after a recent civil-military operation. On the morning of 9

May, the amphibious vehicles crossed the river and

the mounted infantry commenced clearing operations. By the evening of the ninth, the Army ribbon

bridge became operational and with it Regimental

Combat Team 2 established a secure line of communications on the north shore of the river. The Task

Force cleared from Ramana to ar-Rabit. Once at arRabit, the Marines scoured the suspected cave networks lining the dominating escarpment that

bounded the river valley. As the task force withdrew

to the south side of the river on 14 May, it attacked

New Ubaydi prior to returning to base. All forces returned to al-Qaim by 1930 on 14 May.

At the Ramana Bridge position, Second Lieutenant

Brian M. Stann led his mobile assault platoon of 3d

Photo by Cpl Neill A. Sevelius, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 050511-M-2819S-001

Marines from 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, provide security for a patrol as al-Ubaydi is secured during Operation

Matador in May 2005.
Into the Fray 99

Battalion, 2d Marines Weapons Company, to seize the

position and then defend it by traversing across four

kilometers of urban terrain at New Ubaydi. Effectively

employing air support with his heavy machine gun

Humvees and attached tanks, Stann defeated every

insurgent attack over a six-day period. The regiment’s

air officer made good use of ground-data links to the

Litening system on board the supporting F/A-18D aircraft, which permitted him to see and then to direct

strikes at the insurgents in the town. Enemy casualties included an estimated 144 killed and 40 prisoners. Ongoing intelligence collection confirmed the

presence of foreign fighters.

During the operation six vehicles rigged with

bombs were captured and destroyed along with a

significant quantity of enemy weapons and bombmaking materials. Friendly casualties as a result of

Operation Matador included nine killed and 39

wounded. Equipment losses consisted of two assault

amphibious vehicles, one M1A1 tank, one M88A2

tank recovery vehicle, and four armored Humvees. 

Ten days later, Haditha received the same treatment. On 24–30 May, Regimental Combat Team 2

conducted Operation New Market to neutralize and

disrupt insurgents there. This operation was led by

Lieutenant Colonel Lionel B. Urquhart’s Task Force

3d Battalion, 25th Marines, reinforced with Company

K, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines. 

Company K, 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, made a

helicopter assault on the left bank of the Euphrates,

while two companies, Company K, 3d Battalion, 2d

Marines, and Company L, 3d Battalion, 25th Marines,

swept into town from the west, mounted in assault

amphibians and accompanied by tanks and LAVs.

The operation killed 11 insurgents, wounded eight,

and produced 31 detainees. Over 300 82mm mortar

rounds were seized and destroyed as were several

other, smaller caches of ordnance. Friendly losses in

Operation New Market included two killed, nine

wounded, and the disabling of two assault amphibians.

During one of the 25 May sweeps by Company L,

an insurgent ambush pinned down the command element. To overcome the enemy, Sergeant David N.

Wimberg left his covered position and crossed enemy

fire to scale a wall and enter a courtyard from which

the fire originated. Opening the gate to the courtyard,

he covered the entry of his fire team and then led

the assault on the door of the house containing the

insurgents. Breaking in, he came face-to-face with

LCpl Williams, radio operator with Company L, 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, carries the radio used by Capt

Toland, the commanding officer of Company L’s 3d Platoon, during Operation Matador. 

Photo by Cpl Eric C. Ely
100 INTO THE FRAY

four insurgents, fired his rifle until he was wounded,

wounding one, but stunning the enemy. Corporal Jeff

S. Hunter, stepped forward to assist Wimberg, firing

his rifle at the four men as he pulled the sergeant out

of the house. He then led a squad back into the

house and killed the insurgents. Wimberg died but

saved many lives by his selfless actions. Hunter virtually repeated the feat three days later, leading a

squad in three repeated assaults, the last with tank

support, to capture a house from which insurgents

had ambushed another squad.

The 1st Force Reconnaissance Company conducted Operation Night Stalker III during 4–8 June.

Snipers killed seven insurgents who were positively

identified as they were digging and emplacing mines

or bombs. Marines also uncovered bomb making materials that had been cached for use. This typical discovery included one 152mm round, four 130mm

rounds, three 122mm rounds, a video camera, two

Motorola receiver-transmitters, a cell phone, and a

washing machine timer.

During 15–20 June, Regimental Combat Team 2

conducted Operation Spear in the vicinity of Karabilah, located on the south shore of the Euphrates midway between al-Qaim and the border town of

Husaybah. As in previous operations, it was a show

of force drawing several units temporarily from

nearby Regimental Combat Team 2, and aimed to disrupt insurgent refuges and kill or capture their leadership. This force consisted of the regimental

command element, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines; Company L, 3d Battalion, 25th Marines; Company C, 2d

Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion; Company

A tanks and assault amphibians, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company; Iraqi 7th Reconnaissance Company; and Iraqi 2d Battalion, 4th Brigade. After

establishing blocking positions south and northeast

of the town, Task Force 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, sent

Company K, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, and Company

L, 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, to clear the town of

Karabilah from south to north, beginning at 0300.

As they cleared the town, Marines fought numerous engagements with insurgents, and several buildings were destroyed by attack helicopter fire and

fixed wing aircraft bombs to overcome resistance.

The advancing riflemen found numerous caches of

weapons and explosive materials, and a tank section

discovered and eliminated more than two dozen vehicles, rigged with bombs, discovered in a parking

lot.

Photo by Cpl Eric C. Ely, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 050621-M-8172E-004

Col Stephen W. Davis, commanding officer of Regimental Combat Team 2, examines weapons captured from

caches in Karbilah in June 2005 during Operation Spear.
Into the Fray 101

All units withdrew from Karabilah to al-Qaim on 20

June. While disrupting this insurgent nest, Task Force

3d Battalion, 2d Marines, destroyed 24 vehicles rigged

with bombs, two explosive devices, and numerous

munitions caches. Marines killed an estimated 47

enemy fighters and detained one suspect. The Marines

suffered one killed, six wounded, and eight non-combat injuries.

Operation Sword, conducted from 28 June to 6 July

brought the Regimental Combat Team 2 clearing effort to the town of Hit. 

The operation commenced with 1st Force Reconnaissance Company conducting a raid into the city

aimed at capturing an insurgent leader while elements

of Task Force 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, simultaneously moved into blocking positions to isolate Hit

from the north, east, and west. For this operation,

Company C, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry; Company B,

2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion; and two

Iraqi companies reinforced 3d Battalion, 25th Marines.

The raid detained two people while 3d Battalion, 25th

Marines, moved through Hammadi and Company L,

3d Battalion, 25th Marines, and Company C, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, gained a foothold in their respective sectors in southern Hit. The light armored

reconnaissance company drove by night from Rutbah

and crossed the Euphrates Bridge and secured the far

shore. The task force cleared Hit and established two

“firm bases” intended for permanent occupancy in an

abandoned school and a youth center. Hit thus became the first town in Area of Operations Denver permanently occupied by Regimental Combat Team 2.

Marines of Combat Logistics Battalion 2 provided

Texas and Jersey barriers (usually made of concrete

to separate traffic lanes or to stop vehicles) as it fortified both bases. They also set up generators and

swamp coolers to improve living conditions. Explosive devices remained the most likely threat at Hit with

19 destroyed on 2 July alone. 

Operation Sword ended on 5 July with the detachment of the Army and light armor companies. From 27

June to 5 July the battalion received Task Force Lionheart from the control of Colonel Davis. This task

force swept the left bank of the Euphrates River for

weapons caches with limited results. The battalion

then received two infantry companies and a headquarters company from the 2d Battalion, 1st Brigade of

the Iraqi Army. Each Iraqi infantry company was assigned to a firm base. Company I, 3d Battalion, 25th

Marines, rejoined its battalion from al-Asad Air Base

and conducted a relief in place at Firm Base 1 with

Company L on 19 July. Company K remained at Firm

Base 2. The battalion also transferred its main headquarters from Camp Haditha to Camp Hit on 15 July.

The two rifle companies conducted joint combat patrols with their Iraqi partners daily. Engagements with

the insurgents varied as the patrols encountered car

bombs, explosive devices, and indirect and direct fire

engagements. Task Force Lionheart returned in the

middle of July and swept south of Hit, locating and

destroying a large number of weapons caches.

In Area of Operations Topeka, 1st Battalion, 5th

Marines, occupied the central core of Ramadi, between the Euphrates River and the canal, with 1st Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry (motorized), covering

the eastern quarter of the city and its approaches and

the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, holding the sector extending south of the canal into farmland beyond. In its

exclusively urban sector, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines,

worked diligently to maintain patrol coverage and operated entry checkpoints, traffic control points, observation posts, and secured vital government facilities

in the city. The continuous patrolling and constant

pressure of raids kept the insurgents off balance. During 15–16 June the battalion saw its heaviest fighting,

and simultaneous attacks against several of its positions confirmed that the enemy remained present and

offensively oriented. The battalion responded with

mandatory vehicle inspections at chokepoints, increased patrolling, and cordon and search operations

of the more troublesome neighborhoods.

Checkpoint duty continually exposed the soldiers

and Marines to perils. On 3 May, First Lieutenant

David T. Russell oversaw his platoon’s operation of an

A Marine from Company L, 3d Battalion, 25th

Marines, stands on lookout on a rooftop in the city of

Hit during Operation Sword in June 2005. Hit was

the first town permanently occupied by Regimental

Combat Team 2 during the operation.

Photo by Eric C. Ely, VIRIN: 050628-M-8172E-039
entry control point in Ramadi when 13 insurgents assaulted it with small arms, machine guns, and

grenades. From his position on the second level of a

building, he saw an insurgent manning the machine

gun and killed him with a single shot. Ignoring the

fire of six insurgents, he then crossed to a bunker

where one of his Marines needed ammunition. While

directing subsequent fire and maneuver, a rifle bullet

hit his helmet, knocking him to the ground with head

injuries. After recovering his wits, he crossed the kill

zone several more times to direct his Marines and also

retrieve a wounded Iraqi soldier. Only when ordered

to receive medical treatment did he relinquish command at the scene.

Colonel Gurganus’s Regimental Combat Team 8

commenced its portion of the 2d Marine Division’s

Operation Patriot Shield with Operation White

Feather, conducted from 1–7 April. It focused on the

main service roads in Area of Operations Raleigh and

disrupting insurgent actions, especially those placing

bombs. Battalions continued integrated patrols with

their Iraqi counterparts throughout Fallujah and along

nearby major routes. In addition, the 1st Battalion, 6th

Marines, secured Jolan Park to support Operation

Greenback, which was the extensive compensation

payment program for the people of Fallujah who had

lost property during the November offensive. Third

Reconnaissance Battalion commenced its Operation

Zaidon Focus with offensive actions in the southern

portion of Area of Operations Raleigh.

Operation Clear Decision, conducted from 30 April

to 5 May, marked the beginning of Regimental Combat Team 8’s efforts to clear towns that Coalition forces

had not garrisoned. Colonel Gurganus deployed Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Neary’s 3d Battalion, 8th

Marines, to al-Karmah, reinforced by elements of 3d

Reconnaissance Battalion, Company B tanks and assault amphibians, Company A engineers, Combat Logistics Battalion 8, and the Regimental Combat Team

8 command group with its security detachment. After

establishing a cordon with the tank unit at 0300, a pair

of CH-46E Sea Stallions dropped leaflets, and 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, began to clear the town at 0530,

using cordon and knock techniques. The reconnaissance battalion scoured the countryside north of the

town. Combat Logistics Battalion 8 and the regimental commander’s security detachment took the normal

posts of 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, during the operation.

Company L, 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, and the

102 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by Cpl Robert R. Attebury, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 050618-M-3301A-059

A house is searched by Marines of Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, during Operation Khanjar at Lake

Tharthar in June 2005. Khanjar was one of several dozen counterinsurgency operations conducted by Multi

National Force–West units to clear al-Anbar Province of insurgent activity.
Into the Fray 103

Iraqi 2d Muthanna Battalion moved into the southern

sector of al-Karmah. Marines reestablished old Camp

Delta and established observation posts in and

around the city. Scout-sniper teams dispersed to several locations to conduct surveillance and to prevent

insurgents from escaping the cordon. Company B

moved its assault amphibians into the city and secured the police station to facilitate its use by civil affairs and medical units. Company I, 3d Battalion, 8th

Marines, and the 1st Company, 2d Muthanna Battalion, then moved into the northern sector of alKarmah. By 2 May, al-Karmah was declared secure

with no friendly casualties and only one civilian casualty from an escalation of force incident. Third Reconnaissance Battalion continued to find several

weapons caches, including a large cache just inside

the 3d Infantry Division’s Baghdad area of operations. On 13 May, the town was turned over to the 2d

Muthanna Battalion.

Team Brawler, comprising elements of Company

B, 2d Tank Battalion, and Team Gator, similarly

formed from Company B, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, moved into the regimental security sector

north of Fallujah. Regimental Combat Team 8 subsequently began Operation Firm Control on 8 May,

which lasted until the 16th. At 0300 on 8 May, Team

Brawler commenced cordon and search tasks in the

eastern portion of the northern regimental security

area, while Team Gator worked the western half.

Regimental Combat Team 8 established a joint combat operation center in the area. Simultaneously, 3d

Reconnaissance Battalion conducted two raids in the

Zaidon area in the southern portion of the regiment’s

area of operations and 1st Battalion, 6th Marines,

continued with its operations in northern Fallujah, as

did 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, in the south. Third Battalion, 8th Marines, continued to maintain security in

al-Karmah, Nassar Wa Salaam, and connecting routes.

The move north by Teams Brawler and Gator initiated a string of significant events for Regimental

Combat Team 8. The first 24 hours produced two indirect fire attacks, five by small arms, and then the

discovery of three explosive devices. Insurgents

made several efforts to strike 3d Battalion, 8th

Marines, in al-Karmah, and the tank and assault amphibian units continued to uncover significant caches

of weapons and ordnance, including one uncovered

on the last day near Lake Tharthar by Team Gator,

which included 19 mortars and two rocket launchers.

June inaugurated 2d Marine Division’s Operation

Guardian Sword. Regimental Combat Team 8 contributed with Operation Dagger conducted from 1–21

June. Attacking as far as the Lake Tharthar resort to

disrupt insurgent operations, Company B, 2d Assault

Amphibian Battalion, and Company B, 2d Tank Battalion, surged into the northeast region to find enemy

command and control, logistical, and training areas.

Within hours of arriving in their zone, Marines of

Team Gator discovered a cache containing 11 122mm

rockets and 71 120mm mortar rounds. The team later

found intelligence materials and military manuals

near the northeast corner of the regimental security

zone as well as several underground facilities and

more weapons and ammunition caches. One house

held insurgent materials and evidence of recent use.

These discoveries by Regimental Combat Team 8 indicated that the insurgents used this area for training,

equipment storage, and planning. Dust storms then

pummeled Area of Operations Raleigh between 6

and 8 June, resulting in the early return of the teams

from the northern regimental security area.

At 0330 on 18 June, Task Force 1st Battalion, 6th

Marines, with supporting attachments (Company B,

2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, and B Company, 2d

Tank Battalion) moved to the northern regimental security area to conduct the next stage of Operation

Dagger. These units received support from elements

of Combat Logistics Battalion 8, including a fully

functional field surgical hospital.

U.S. Army forces located further north outside the

II MEF area also operated to support the regiment,

blocking insurgents from fleeing. The Army’s 2d

Brigade supported 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, providing mortar fire and blocking positions southwest

of the Marine battalion. Aviation and fire support furAs the sun sets, Marines with 2d Squad, 1st Platoon,

Military Police Company, Combat Logistics Regiment

25, 2d Force Service Support Group, mark improvised

explosive devices in an up armored Humvee at alTaqaddum.

Photo by LCpl Bobby J. Segovia, Defense Imagery: 050930-M-3717S-117
nished key elements of the operation. Battery A, 1st

Battalion, 10th Marines, moved two 155mm artillery

pieces north to the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, forward

command post to provide on-call fire support for the

task force. Marine and Coalition aviation units came

to the fight, providing almost 20 hours of continual

air support during the first day of task force actions.

Company K, 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, reported for

operations as Regimental Combat Team 8’s reserve

to the south.

The more detailed coverage of the zone by the infantry battalion uncovered caches of munitions that

were confiscated and destroyed (Table 8-1):

These results remained typical throughout the

campaign of 2004–2005 for that level of effort and indicated that a seemingly inexhaustible supply of munitions remained within easy reach of the insurgents

and foreign fighters. Upon return of its units from

Operation Dagger, Regimental Combat Team 8 had

completed numerous major and minor operations

since its assumption of the mission. Thus far, six of

its Marines and sailors had died in action and 88

more were wounded. Still, the focus remained on

maintaining control of Fallujah. 

On the southern approaches to the city, a mobile

patrol of Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 4th

Marines, ran into an ambush on 19 June when an estimated 50 insurgents triggered an explosive device

and opened fire with small arms. The section leader

on the scene, Corporal Wyatt L. Waldron, ordered his

vehicles into the oncoming automatic weapons fire,

gained fire superiority with vehicular weapons, and

then called for a dismounted assault against the

enemy flank. Waldron personally killed five insurgents and captured two of their fighting positions as

the Marine assault broke the enemy’s resistance. Waldron’s team then remounted, pursued, and killed 16

and captured six more insurgents. Another six improvised explosive devices were found at the ambush site.

On 23 June a car bomb ambush in Fallujah killed

the first female Marine during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The coordinated attack with small arms fire left

five Marines and one sailor dead and more than 12

Marines wounded. The daily rituals at Camp Fallujah, however, continued with female Marines ready

to conduct searches of female Iraqis while continuing

to provide basic security for Fallujah’s inhabitants.

On 30 June, Regimental Combat Team 8 assumed

control of Area of Operations Jackson from the 155th

Brigade Combat Team. This measure expanded its

area of operations another 1,000 square kilometers.

Such boundary shifts in this area continued to ebb

and flow throughout the Iraq campaign depending

upon the priorities claimed for the Army forces operating in and around Baghdad.

II MEF headed into July and the pending rotation

of its Army brigade after a highly active period in

which U.S. forces and insurgents tested each other.

With limited manpower, the regiments and brigade

managed to extend their reach with operations outside urban boundaries, striking into the countryside

to disrupt enemy sanctuaries. Inside the urban cores,

they continued stability and security operations to

deny easy movement to the insurgents, to assist the

public with civil affairs and security measures, and

to find insurgent cells with cordons and raids. The

enemy replied with continued attacks by explosives,

small arms, and indirect fire. An unsettling discovery,

given the mission at hand, came with the unreliability of the Iraqi Security Forces, which were repeatedly formed and trained only to dissolve and

necessitate reformation and retraining. The Iraqi government and its advisors had yet to develop an indigenous security force of any depth and reliability.

104 INTO THE FRAY

Table 8-1: Munitions Confiscated and Destroyed
105

Assessing the Mission

Major General Stephen T. Johnson’s campaign

planning before the entry of II Marine Expeditionary

Force (Forward) (II MEF) into al-Anbar Province recognized the essential need for Iraqi security forces to

augment his forces and to take over local security.

The campaign planning by the staff of Multi National

Force–Iraq had set specific goals in this regard: local

control in key cities by 30 December 2004; provincial

authority established by 31 July 2005; and constitutional elections in mid-December. That ambitious

plan, however, had already failed since local control

in key cities remained an illusion to date.

Thus, the outlook for Marine Corps commanders

in 2005 changed in the face of these and other realities. The establishment of local control could only be

hoped for in Karbala and an-Najaf by mid-2005, and

perhaps the ar-Ramadi–Abu Ghraib sector by mid-December and the elections. Expectations remained that

local control might be established in all of al-Anbar

Province by March 2006 and provincial control by 31

July.

The planned establishment of a division and two

brigades of Iraqi security forces in al-Anbar Province

remained key to these plans. Whether those forces

proved capable or not, the political goal of conducting national elections in mid-December was an unalterable requirement for II MEF and the other U.S.

forces in Iraq. With or without the recovery of Iraqi

political and security authority at the local and

provincial levels, the elections remained a paramount

goal.

Coalition forces also adjusted the estimated enemy

order of battle by adding a new sub-category of

enemy: “Sunni Arab Rejectionists.” This group, made

up primarily of former regime loyalists, now posed

the most significant threat to stability in Iraq. Although the Sunnis ranked statistically as an ethnic minority in Iraq, they had maintained political,

economic, and military dominance over the country’s

other major ethnic groups for nearly 600 years. Given

the Coalition objective of assisting Iraq in forming a

democratic form of government, the Sunnis stood to

lose considerable influence. As discussed in Chapter

1, the loss of political and economic power, a lack of

security, and decisions made following the collapse

of Saddam Hussein’s regime acted as catalysts for this

insurgency. While many Sunnis did not necessarily

oppose a new form of government, the perceived injustices imposed on them since the collapse of their

minority rule in 2003 created a level of distrust and

animosity toward the Coalition and Iraq’s Interim

Government. This particular insurgency therefore

sought to rouse Sunni anxieties and create a pool of

recruits. Their motivations reflected a wide range of

political objectives primarily driven by socio-economic concerns.

The II MEF campaign strategy for counterinsurgency centered on conducting five “Lines of Operation” simultaneously to improve local conditions and

counter the discontent and chaos that fed the insurgencies: Security, “Operationalize” the Iraqi Security

Forces, Governance, Economic development, and

Influence. These concepts provided an operational

Chapter 9

Protecting Self-Rule

Table 9-1: Ground Combat Turnover, July–October 2005
framework for applying the kinetic and non-kinetic

actions necessary to change the environment, which

alone could bring a separation of the insurgents from

the Iraqi population of al-Anbar Province.

The plan provided specific definitions for each of

the lines of operations:

Security. Create an environment in which insurgents are not allowed to intimidate or to cause fear

among the people, to inhibit legitimate self-governance, or to prevent the development of Iraqi infrastructure.

Operationalizing the Iraqi Security Forces. The Iraqi

Security Forces must be trained, equipped, supported, and mentored in a manner enabling their organizations to grow in size, confidence, and skill. The

effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces must be developed so they can assume an increasingly greater

role, allowing Multi National Force–West (II MEF)

presence to be proportionally reduced.

Governance. Create an environment that allows

elected officials to govern in an effective manner consistent with the expectations of the electorate. The

Iraqi populace must perceive that its local elected officials can provide basic security and quality of life

services such as electricity, water, and sanitation. Alleviating legitimate political grievances is an important element for a successful counterinsurgency.

Economic Development. Create an environment

allowing jobs to be created, where people are free to

earn a living and can procure or receive essential

services fundamental to a decent quality of life, and

where critical infrastructure exists to support economic growth.

Influence. Influence binds the other four lines of

operation by affecting information content and flow

in the area of operations, particularly into and out of

its key population centers. This will involve affecting

three distinct information audiences: anti-Iraqi forces,

local and regional populations, and friendly forces.

II MEF and the 2d Marine Division sought to implement these lines of operation for the rest of the

year following the transfer of authority from I MEF.

After the March operations successfully protected the

turnover between the two Marine expeditionary

forces, the 2d Division ordered Operation Patriot

Shield in April and May. As noted in the previous

chapter, the two Marine regiments and the Army’s 2d

Brigade planned and conducted numerous local

combat operations under Patriot Shield to interdict

insurgent lines of communications from the border,

106 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by LCpl Vrian M. Henner, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 050220-M-9019H-048

One of the coalition’s primary goals in 2005 was to stand up effective Iraqi military forces. Cpl Robert W. Johnson, from the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, sights targets alongside an Iraqi soldier during marksmanship training in February 2005.
Protecting Self-Rule 107

to operationally shape the Ramadi sector by controlling access and establishing Iraqi security forces, and

to protect the gains made in pacifying al-Fallujah by

disrupting insurgent enclaves in the surrounding

areas.

Under the overarching II MEF operation plan for

2005, Operation Sunrise, the Marines in al-Anbar

Province conducted a wide range of operations. The

Patriot Shield series ended on 30 May and gave way

to Operation Guardian Sword, actually a series of operations conducted between 6 June and 15 August.

Here, the objectives called for neutralizing the insurgencies in Ramadi while covering the rotation of

combat units and personnel in other units for the second half of the deployment, including the Army’s rotation of the 2d Brigade. Guardian Sword was

followed by Operation Sanguine Thunder after the

completion of final rotations in September. The operation entailed a range of goals, including training

and arming Iraqi police in northern Babil Province,

transferring Karbala and an-Najaf to Iraqi local control, and in general supporting Operation Liberty ExMarines from the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, and Iraqi Special Forces prepare to enter a building in Karabilah

during Operation Spear in July 2005. Photo by Cpl Neil A. Sevelius, Defense Imagery VIRIN 050618-M-2819S-131

Table 9-2: Aviation Turnover, August–October 2005
press, the Coalition program for safeguarding and

supporting the December national elections.

Major General Richard A. Huck predicted favorable results for Operation Guardian Sword in a 30

May message to his division:

Operation Patriot Shield comes to a close today

and Operation Guardian Sword is ready to

commence 6 June. I feel confident that we will

be able to pick up the tempo of operations and

apply more Iraqi security forces to operations

in Guardian Sword. As you know, the Iraqi security forces projections for Operation Patriot

Shield fell short of the mark. Our ability to train,

integrate and operate with Iraqi security forces

will allow us to significantly increase our forces.

Put an Iraqi face on all of our operations.

As noted in the preceding chapter, the battalions

of Regimental Combat Team 2, Regimental Combat

Team 8, and the Army’s 2d Brigade continued to execute the same types of operations as under

Guardian Sword. These organizations truly had few

new options for kinetic or offensive combat operations because their extensive static security responsibilities aggravated the relative paucity of units

available for offensive operations. In addition, the

routine logistical and administrative support for the

three major units of 2d Marine Division, spread over

the 335-kilometer corridor from al-Qaim to Abu

Ghraib, required frequent recourse to armed convoys, road sweeps, and other force protection tasks

that reduced even more the resources available for

commanders to employ against enemy targets.

In westernmost al-Anbar Province, Regimental

Combat Team 2 commander Colonel Stephen W.

Davis deployed 3d Battalion 25th Marines, to find

arms caches and to interdict insurgent flow near

Dulab, on the left bank of the Haditha Dam reservoir. The 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, continued its normal cordon and knock operations and similar cache

searches in its zone, exclusive of Husaybah and Karabilah which remained highly contested, while beginning a site survey for polling stations. The 2d Light

Armored Reconnaissance Battalion continued patrolling main routes, especially against bomb and

mortar teams and provided direct support to the

Army 224th Engineer Battalion, assigned to clear and

to maintain the main supply routes for the regiments

as Task Force Ironhawk. The 1st Force Reconnaissance Company continued its sniper operations, and

the Azerbaijani Company, charged with internal security at the Haditha Dam, prepared for its own relief slated for early July.

The Army’s 2d Brigade employed 1st Battalion, 5th

Marines, with combined U.S.-Iraqi combat patrols,

cache sweeps, and stay-behind ambushes in western

Ramadi, partnered with the Iraqi 2d Battalion, 1st

Brigade, 7th Division. On the other side of Ramadi,

1st Battalion, 503d Infantry, conducted a company

movement in the Mulaab district. In Tammin, the 1st

Battalion, 9th Infantry, patrolled, deployed snipers,

and planned company-size attacks if targets appeared. The 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, partnered

with the Iraqi 3d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division,

for patrols in Civil Camp and Abu Flies.

108 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by Cpl Robert R. Attebury, Defense Imagery: VIRIN: 050629-M-3301A-007

Marines from Company A,1st Battalion, 6th Marines, search a car for weapons during Operation Shadyville

in Saqlawiyah. The operation was conducted by the 2d Marine Division and Iraqi security forces.
Protecting Self-Rule 109

Colonel Charles M. Gurganis continued the Regimental Combat Team 8 program of security and

counterinsurgency operations in Fallujah and the rest

of Area of Operations Raleigh. His tank and assault

amphibian company teams continued to operate in

the “regimental security area” extending north of Fallujah to the Lake Tharthar resort. The 3d Reconnaissance Battalion covered the comparable security area

to the south of Fallujah, where potential polling stations also required survey and assessment. The newly

secured Karmah area also required combined operations with the Iraqi 1st Battalion, 4th Brigade, 1st Division, now based there.

Force Rotation in Mid-deployment

For the rest of July, Regimental Combat Team 2

conducted Operation Saber, an umbrella operation

that assigned each battalion to conduct counterinsurgency actions in their respective zones from 23–31

July. Aimed at disrupting insurgents while unit rotations took place in the other areas of operations, it

netted an average amount of cached arms and munitions but also resulted in 39 insurgents killed and

177 people detained.

The last major operation planned by Regimental

Combat Team 2 before the rotation of its battalions

was Operation Lightning Strike II in August. This

multi-battalion attack on the south bank of the Euphrates River roughly midway between al-Qaim and

Haditha targeted the city of Anah and nearby village

of Qadisiyah. In addition to disrupting insurgent activities and eliminating foreign fighters in the zone,

the operation aimed at demonstrating the deployment by the Iraqi government of a competent security force in the form of its 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry

Division. The Army’s 2d Squadron, 14th Cavalry, assisted in isolating the objective area by blocking the

bridge over the river in the direction of Rawah in its

sector. Regimental Combat Team 2 planned to employ elements of 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance

Battalion, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, and 3d Battalion,

25th Marines, as well as tank, assault amphibian, engineer, and Iraqi Army support to cordon the two

towns, to raid specific targets, and then to clear them

of insurgents.

That operation never occurred because the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, was ambushed. The battalion

had completed its transfer to Hit by mid-July but also

kept units in its former garrison in Haditha. On 1 August, insurgents attacked two sniper teams of the battalion scout-sniper platoon operating together in a

firing position 3.5 kilometers northwest of Haditha

on the east bank of the Euphrates overlooking Barwanah. A third sniper team, Team Six, located 2 kiloThe lack of adequate manpower to patrol Iraq’s often porous western borders was a perennial challenge faced

by Coalition forces in 2005. Here, Iraqi students stand in formation before their graduation ceremony at the

al-Asad Iraqi Border Patrol Academy in April 2005.

Photo by Cpl Alicia M. Garcia, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 050409-M-5607G-008
meters to the north heard a few seconds of small

arms and machine gun fire coming from that location, then radioed the two teams without receiving a

response. Team Six requested permission to move

south and investigate. The battalion approved and

also launched its quick reaction force from Haditha

Dam. On the scene, Team Six found five Marines

dead and one missing, and their weapons and

weapon systems were missing.

Lieutenant Colonel Urquhart detailed the L and

Weapons Companies of 3d Battalion, 25th Marines,

to cordon Barwanah to search for the insurgents responsible for this attack. In the early hours of 2 August, reports from tip lines indicated that a body was

located 3 kilometers south of Haditha on the west

bank of the Euphrates. The body was the sixth Marine, and they recovered his remains that day from

the village of Haqlaniyah. This killing of a trained and

experienced team of Marine rifleman brought a rapid

response from Colonel Davis’ regiment. The forces

slated for Operation Lightning Strike II instead were

reset for Operation Quick Strike (3–6 August, extended to 11 August), a cordon and search of

Haqlaniyah and Barwanah.

While 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

screened the flanks, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, moved

with Companies K and L and 2d Platoon, Company

A, 1st Tank Battalion, into an assembly area on the

west bank of the Euphrates after an Iraqi Special Operations Company had secured it. At the same time,

a 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, task force comprised of

L and Weapons Companies, and Company A, 1st

Tank Battalion, prepared to clear Barwanah on the

east bank of the river, where the 3d Battalion, 25th

Marines, task force had been operating for three

days, fighting insurgent small arms and mortar teams

with infantry and tank weapons and precision air

strikes. The Marine battalions had with them the 3d

and 2d Companies, respectively, of the Iraqi 2d battalion, 1st Infantry Division. These companies had reported to Regimental Combat Team 2 on 17 July. The

1st Force Reconnaissance Company provided raid

and sniper support as required. Late in the first day

of the operation, an assault amphibian vehicle carrying Marines of Company L, 3d Battalion, 25th

Marines, was hit by an explosive device of such size

that it badly damaged and overturned the vehicle,

killing 15 crewmen and passengers.

On 4 August, Marine battalions attacked north and

conducted cordon and searches through the villages.

The 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, encountered only sporadic resistance in Haqlaniyah and established a base

to support continuing actions. Resistance then stiffened for both engaged battalion task forces, and a

number of air strikes were used to destroy buildings

from which insurgents fired small arms and rocket

launchers.

Operation Quick Strike, which began as a response to the killing of Marine snipers, uncovered a

considerable nest of resistance in the three towns lo110 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by A1C Kurt Gibbons III, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 050408-F-8584G-079

Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 155th Brigade Combat Team, uncover the grave of a victim of an insurgent attack near al-Iskandariyah.
Protecting Self-Rule 111

cated only a few kilometers south of Haditha. The

operation netted the destruction of nine car bombs

and 23 improvised explosive devices. Marines destroyed seven buildings defended by insurgents,

killing 15 and detaining another 63. Friendly casualties included 14 U.S. killed, six wounded, one Iraqi

Special Forces soldier killed, three wounded and one

assault amphibian vehicle a total loss. During 9–10

August, the participating units returned to their bases.

The 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, lost 19 men in

three days in an Iraq deployment which cost the unit

48 killed in action. The loss sustained by this reserve

forces unit proved especially devastating to the Marine Corps, the families of those lost, and the public.

During 12–18 August, the units received visits from

the commanders of 2d and 4th Marine Divisions, II

MEF and Multi National Force–Iraq.

The next increase in insurgent activity in Area of

Operations Denver took place 24–29 August at

Husaybah. The outbreak in violence was possibly

prodded by the departure of Company L, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, from al-Qaim to Kubaysah, where it

joined 2d Force Reconnaissance Company and Company C, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion,

in a cordon and knock clearing operation. Camp

Gannon exchanged small arms and rocket fire with

insurgents on 24 August. Two days later, the Regimental Combat Team 2 targeting staff identified an

al-Qaeda safe house and leveled it with multiple air

strikes, delivering two GBU-38 joint direct attack munition bombs, six GBU-12 laser-guided 500-pound

bombs, three Maverick guided missiles, and five 5-

inch unguided rockets on the target. A similar effort

the next evening brought eight buildings down with

a total of 5 GBU-12s, 1 GBU-38, and 7 Mavericks.

The regiment now considered all the enemy’s safe

havens inside the Regimental Combat Team 2 area

of operation destroyed. Small arms fire hit Marines

of Company I, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, the evening

of 29 August, and another air strike destroyed an insurgent house with a GBU-38. As these actions continued, the relief battalion, 3d Battalion, 6th Marines,

began to arrive at al-Qaim.

The force turnover in II MEF, covered in part by

Operation Guardian Shield, spanned a two-month

period. In addition, the Army replaced 2d Brigade,

2d Infantry Division, with the 2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, under the command of Colonel John

Gronski, formed principally from the Pennsylvania,

Utah, and Vermont National Guard. With a one-forone replacement of battalions in operations Area of

Operations Topeka, no let-up in the struggle to pacify

and shape Ramadi would occur.

In addition, the 2d Marine Division exchanged artillery batteries and force reconnaissance, tank, combat engineer, and assault amphibian companies with

fresh units from the U.S. During the same rotation

period, ground support aviation units and the 2d

Force Service Support Group remained in place, with

a rotation of personnel. The Ramadi-based intelligence services of II MEF also rotated battalions, as

3d Radio Battalion relieved 2d Radio Battalion on 11

June and 2d Intelligence Battalion replaced 1st Intelligence Battalion on 24 September 2005.

The aircraft squadrons of 2d Marine Aircraft Wing

mostly rotated during August–September. The wing

retained two fixed-wing, four rotary-wing squadrons,

and the aerial refueler detachment based at al-Asad

and two rotary wing squadrons and the unmanned

aerial vehicle unit at Taqaddum.

The combat power now available for II MEF to

employ in Area of Operations Atlanta thus amounted

to the following as of 1 September 2005 (see table 9-

3).

Operation Guardian Sword ended with the relief

in place of the Army brigade assigned to the 2d Marine Division. In its last weeks (through 15 August),

Guardian Sword planned for the newly arrived units

to assist with election preparations and economic development programs and enhance the ability of local

leaders to exercise authority. The Army’s 2d Brigade,

28th Infantry Division, received tactical control of the

Iraqi 3d Brigade, 1st Division, and conducted its first

major action, Operation Heavy, on 29 August with a

counterinsurgency clearing of Jazirah. The units of

Regimental Combat Team 8, carrying out rotations

from late July to early October in Area of Operations

Raleigh, continued actions in and about Fallujah and

searched for weapon caches in Operations Vital

Ground (2–14 June), Scimitar (7–14 July), and Southern Fire (24–29 August).

Securing the Border: Operation Hunter

The emphasis on Regimental Combat Team 2 operations in July and August continued after Operation Guardian Sword because of a higher

headquarters order. With Operation Hunter, the commander of Multi National Force–Iraq, General George

W. Casey Jr., required operations within the II MEF

Area of Operations Atlanta to secure the Syrian border by establishing a presence along the frontier and

capturing al-Qaeda fighters north of the Euphrates

River. The operation lasted from the middle of July

until late August. During this period, Operation

Hunter combat operations continued within the Euphrates River valley, specifically in the cities already
112 INTO THE FRAY

targeted by Regimental Combat Team 2: Hit, Haditha,

Husaybah and al-Qaim. Operation Hunter included a

task force from 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment operating out of Combat Outpost Rawah in the former

Regimental Combat Team 2 zone of operations north

of the Euphrates River, now designated Area of Operations Saber by the cavalry regiment. The timeline

for the operation extended until 15 December and

became part of Operation Liberty Express, the series

of operations conducted to protect the Iraqi elections.

The occupation of border posts experienced continuous delays, however, and during September, the

Multi National Force–Iraq commander restored Area

of Operations Saber to II MEF and transferred tactical control of four U.S. Army units to 2d Marine Division and Regimental Combat Team 2 for the

continuation of Operation Hunter: 4th Squadron,

14th Cavalry; 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry;

Task Force 2d Battalion, 114th Field Artillery; Company F, 51st Infantry; 519th Military Intelligence Battalion; and Task Force Phantom, an intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance unit.

The 4th Squadron, 14th Cavalry, cleared the village of al-Ash on 16 September in Operation Mustang and repeated the effort at Qadisiyah and Anah

on 28-29 September in Operation Lightning Strike.

The 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry, cleared a

military housing compound at Baghdadi during Operation Green Light (21-22 September), and the 2d

Battalion, 114th Field Artillery, road marched from

the 155th Brigade Combat Team (155th BCT) in Area

of Operations Biloxi to Hit, beginning on 20 September, effecting a relief of 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,

there on 28 September. 

The reinforcement of Regimental Combat Team 2

by Task Force 2d Battalion, 114th Field Artillery, provided a boost for the over-extended forces in western al-Anbar Province. It also demonstrated an early

success for the 155th Brigade in achieving provincial

and regional control in Area of Operations Biloxi,

where the cities of Karbala and an-Najaf remained

relatively quiet. That situation thus precipitated the

reinforcement of Colonel Davis’ regiment.

The border forces that General Casey sought to

bolster on the Syrian frontier with Operation Hunter

did not yet exist in the II MEF area of operations. In

2005, only the three border zones covering ports of

entry at Ar Ar (from Saudi Arabia), Trebil (from Jordan) and Walid (from Syria) operated with battalions

of three Department of Border Enforcement Brigades

manning the border forts in an-Najaf and al-Anbar

Provinces. Iraq operated no port of entry in an-Najaf

Province. The U.S. units stationed in Camp Mudaysis

and at Camp Korean Village operated to support the

al-Anbar and Nukhayb Department of Border Enforcement Brigades in al-Anbar Province, and the

Marines from 2d Platoon, Company K, 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, and the 2d Combat Engineer Battalion scan

the area for weapons caches near the town of Zaidon in July 2005.

Photo by LCpl Mathhew Hutchison, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 050710-M-9470H-009
Protecting Self-Rule 113

Army’s 155th BCT covered the an-Najaf Department

of Border Enforcement Brigade in Area of Operations

Biloxi. The Department of Border Enforcement services planned a fourth battalion of its al-Anbar Brigade

at al-Qaim to occupy nine border forts covering the

rest of the Syrian border in al-Anbar Province northeast of the last manned Border Fort 10 at Akashat.

After it was properly secured, that sector of the frontier would reopen for commerce with Syria by reactivating the abandoned port of entry facilities at

Husaybah.

The Iraqi Armed Forces and Its Problems

In mid-2005, however, the Iraqi forces were inadequate for operations along the al-Anbar Province

border. The third and fourth battalion of the al-Anbar

Province Department of Border Enforcement Brigade

had not formed, and the building of forts had not

even begun. In any case, the Marine Corps had yet

to send the required 10 border transition teams for

assignment to each brigade and battalion of the border forces in the II MEF area of operations. These

ten-man teams, specially prepared and trained at

Camp Lejeune, arrived during July and by August and

evaluated the border forces based at an-Najaf, Trebil,

and Waleed. Given the continuing delays in construction and operations, three of the border transition teams converted to military transition teams and

assisted in the stand-up of new Iraqi Army units at

Ramadi. In the last two months of the year, the border posts began to take form north of Walid, and the

makings of a three-brigade Department of Border Enforcement structure emerged: 1st Brigade operating

from an-Najaf and covering all the posts facing Saudi

Arabia; 2d Brigade at Waleed operated four battalions covering the posts facing Jordan and Syria, and

a new 3d Brigade at al-Qaim operated a single battalion stationed in Area of Operations Saber. The

seven Marine Corps transition teams operated with

the 2d and 3d Brigades, and two units of Regimental

Combat Team 2 provided the decisive military power

if required: 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (Korean Village) and 3d Battalion, 6th Marines

(al-Qaim).

From the outset of its campaign, the II MEF staff

planned to eventually receive control of two Iraqi

Army divisions comprising six brigades and 18 battalions for operational commitment in al-Anbar

Province, with another brigade and three battalions

established in an-Najaf and northern Babil Province.

In tandem with the political consolidation of the Iraqi

government through the national elections, estabTable 9-3: II MEF Combat Power, September 2005
lishing a trained and viable Iraqi security force remained the real pillar of achieving regional control.

The Iraqi Army lacked a combat service support

capability and remained dependent upon Coalition

support. Contractors built a support base at Habbaniyah for a division headquarters and two brigades.

Some form of base support unit was proposed for

Habbaniyah as the initial Iraqi logistics hub for alAnbar Province with the addition of another when a

second division came to al-Anbar Province. A nearby

“India” base was built to support the third brigade.

The units of the new Iraqi Army replaced the last

of the Iraqi National Guard battalions that had proven

ineffective in al-Anbar Province because of their evident tribal affiliation and vulnerability to the insurgent murder and intimidation campaign. Thus, no

new Army units reconstituted from formerly Sunniaffiliated National Guard forces were acceptable in

al-Anbar Province, and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense

policy took recruits from al-Anbar Province to units

outside the province. 

Initially, the Ministry of Defense and the Coalition

command assigned the 1st and 7th Iraqi Army Divisions to II MEF for employment in counterinsurgency

operations. In addition, the 25th Brigade, organic to

the 8th Division, drew the assignment to the an-Najaf

and northern Babil Province sector (Area of Operation Biloxi). In all, the Coalition planned sending

seven Iraqi brigades to Multi National Force–West in

addition to the specialized military and paramilitary

units designed for border and internal security tasks.

Under the same plan, the Iraqi 1st Division headquarters at Habbiniyah exercised control over all Ministry of Defense units from Ramadi to the eastern

boundary of Area of Operations Raleigh. From Ramadi, the 7th Division headquarters controlled similar forces west of Ramadi to the Syrian border.

Numerous operational requirements existed

throughout the Marine Corps zone of action and several Iraqi Army battalions and brigades deployed to

al-Anbar Province before the 7th Division established

its headquarters in the province.

The conditions demanded considerable operational flexibility by the fledgling Iraqi units to operate with their American counterparts before the rest

of the Iraqi Army had in fact developed as a fully capable and manned combat force.

Timing, as usual, counted for almost everything.

By October 2005, the 1st and 4th Brigades of the 8th

Division, based at an-Najaf and Karbala, operated

three battalions, all partnered with the U.S. 155th

Brigade in Area of Operations Biloxi with military

transition teams provided by the 155th. These teams

rated the battalions as becoming militarily capable in

three to six months. The Iraqi 1st Division, which had

a Marine Corps transition team since May, arrived in

Camp Habbiniyah in October. Most of its three

brigades and nine battalions preceded it, but it required another three to four months to reach a “capable” rating. That tentative status did not apply to

the 1st and 2d Battalions, 1st Brigade, 1st Division,

which had joined the U.S. Army’s 2d Brigade at Ramadi and Regimental Combat Team 2 at Hit and Haditha during Operation Guardian Sword.

Characteristic of the initial operations of the Iraqi

security forces, those two battalions had operated

without their parent brigade (never assigned to alAnbar Province) under direct control of 2d Marine

Division, yet remained two to six months short of

being fully fighting capable because of their chronic

shortage of personnel. The Iraqi 7th Division headquarters lagged considerably in arriving in the

province, first to Fallujah in January and then to the

Iraqi compound in Camp Blue Diamond, Ramadi in

late February 2006. Its 1st and 2d Battalions, 1st

Brigade, had joined the U.S. Army 2d Brigade at Ramadi during Operation Guardian Sword. Their personnel, leadership, and equipment shortfalls placed

them in an 8- to 10-month delay in reaching full fighting capability. Their transition teams came from the

three Marine Corps border transition teams left unassigned because of delays in activating the Iraqi units

to cover the Syrian frontier. The remaining units of

7th Division formed in July–September 2005 and after

training deployed to al-Anbar Province from September 2005 to January 2006. 

The manpower requirements for the military transition teams, providing liaison and training advice for

elements of the Iraqi Army sent to the II MEF area of

operations, proved demanding. In addition, local U.S.

commanders and staffs spent considerable effort

mentoring their counterparts. These demands fell

upon the combat units despite efforts by Marine

Corps Headquarters and the Multi National Forces–

Iraq to provide them from the United States and allied nations. In all, the Marine Corps provided 366

officers and enlisted personnel to the teams in 2005,

170 of whom came from II MEF. A few of the II MEF

Marines became involved with the unending police

training team mission in Fallujah as did Army solders

in Ramadi. The Iraqi security forces began to assemble under the tactical direction of 2d Marine Division

in al-Anbar Province and under the Army 155th

Brigade in an-Najaf, northern Babil Province. 

114 INTO THE FRAY
115

The U.S. and Coalition strategy for 2005 was based

on two pillars. The first, building security and stability, was showing little headway due to the slow development, provisioning, and deployment of Iraqi

military and paramilitary forces. The second, self-government, became the focus of operations in late 2005.

Despite the lack of improvement in the security situation, plans proceeded to hold elections for a new

national government. Concurrent with these plans,

Coalition forces continued to conduct counterinsurgency operations.

Supporting the Election

Operation Liberty Express, lasting from 1 September to 30 December 2005, covered the military actions of II Marine Expeditionary Force and its

subordinate units as they provided security and ensured conditions for a successful Iraqi national constitutional referendum on 15 October 2005 and

national election on 15 December. Although the 2d

Marine Division provided the major contribution to

this operation, the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing and the

2d Marine Logistics Group (the new designation for

the 2d Force Service Support Group) remained indispensable throughout the operation.

Major General Richard A. Huck published his operations order for Liberty Express on 30 July, setting

three phases: completing unit rotation, as an extension of Operation Guardian Sword; supporting the

referendum; and supporting the national election. He

identified his mission as:

2d Marine Division continues partnership with

the Iraqi security forces and conducts combined

counterinsurgency operations in al-Anbar

Province to neutralize anti-Iraqi forces, secure

designated polling centers, and provide support

to the Independent Election Commission–Iraq

to maintain operational momentum, prevent

anti-Iraqi force interference with unit rotations,

and ensure the conduct of free, fair and legitimate constitutional referendum and national

elections.

To support the referendum, the 2d Marine Division planned continuing counterinsurgency campaigns in al-Anbar Province that would provide the

secure environment for polling sites managed by the

Iraqi transitional government and the election commission. In particular, the subordinate commands

would “execute focused disruption operations from

1–12 October, targeting extremist groups with the capability and intent of interfering with the referendum

to disrupt their operational planning and execution

cycle.”

Using Iraqi security forces remained essential to

securing and operating the polling sites and providing force protection, transportation, and sustainment.

The U.S. and Iraqi forces would have to provide an

election support team for each polling site within the

zone for liaison with and support to the election

workers.

According to the 2d Marine Division estimates, the

expected threat to the elections included both Muslim extremists and the Sunni Arab resistance. Muslim

extremists sought to inflict a high U.S. and Coalition

casualty rate in Iraq while also waging an aggressive

information operations campaign to erode public

support and force a Coalition withdrawal from Iraq.

They also aimed to prevent any strong central government from establishing itself in Iraq. The Sunni

Arabs in Iraq had lost ground to the Shi’a and Kurdish factions in the 2004 election, and moderates in

their ranks sought to regain some degree of Sunni influence through the political process.

Marine Corps intelligence estimates predicted that

insurgents would focus on Ramadi because of its significance in the governmental process and Fallujah

because of its symbolic importance. Their expected

tactics included attacking polling sites and the areas

around them using proven techniques such as indirect fire, improvised explosive devices, and sniping.

Their information campaign painted the elections as

a conspiracy of the Shi’a, Kurdish, U.S., and Zionist

interests against the Sunni Arabs. Thus, the extremists

portrayed themselves as the defenders of Sunnis in

Iraq.

The Coalition hoped that the moderate Sunnis and

some insurgent groups would urge their followers to

vote and avoid the debacle caused by the Sunni boycott of the 2004 elections. The Coalition feared that

uncontrollable sectarian violence would persuade

Chapter 10

Protecting the Emerging Iraq
Sunni Arabs that a favorable outcome in the elections

remained impossible. Such an outcome could lead

Sunnis to align with extremist elements.

General Huck and 2d Marine Division planners

sought to meet these conditions by combining the

types of combat operations successfully used in Operation Guardian Sword with a civil affairs campaign

that focused on the local Sunni leaders and public

opinion. The II MEF Campaign Plan thus continued

in effect with the goals of interdiction in Regimental

Combat Team 2’s Area of Operations Denver, neutralizing extremists in the Army 2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division’s Area of Operations Topeka (which

included ar-Ramadi), while continuing to control alFallujah and the remainder of Regimental Combat

Team 8’s Area of Operations Raleigh. Marines estimated that they could maintain operational momentum throughout al-Anbar Province and thereby

disrupt insurgent operations, develop and act upon

intelligence, and establish a “relatively secure environment” for the Iraqi referendum and election. In

contrast to 2004, Marines could look to newly arriving Iraqi units, with up to three brigades joining to

add combat power and an improved measure of internal security in the cities. The orders to civil affairs

commanders and planners were equally clear. They

were to continue efforts supporting the nascent

provincial councils and provincial reconstruction development committees and to improve economic and

infrastructure development throughout al-Anbar

Province. Specific actions, however, would also support the elections. These included persuading local

Iraqi leaders to encourage their followers to participate in the electoral process and to themselves educate the populace about the elections and their

importance. On the other hand, the U.S. forces had

to avoid a perception that they controlled or directed

the election process, which had to remain an autonomous and fair Iraqi action in the eyes of all. Finally, Marine commanders ordered a surge in

counterinsurgency operations immediately before the

voting days that, combined with the civil-military engagement of the al-Anbar leaders at municipal and

provincial level, would persuade the Iraqi public that

participating in the voting was safe.

Supporting the elections required considerable

planning and allocation of resources for both the 15

October and 15 December polls. Throughout the II

116 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by SSgt Michael E. Schellenbach, Defense Imagery, VIRIN 050708-M-9708S-020

MajGen Richard A. Huck, commanding general, 2d Marine Division, speaks with Marines from Regimental

Combat Team 8 at Camp Fallujah in the summer of 2005.
Protecting the Emerging Iraq 117

MEF zone of responsibility, Marines set up several

dozen voting centers, encompassing 15 to 24 sites in

each area of operations to handle the voter turnout,

which the Iraqi Independent Election Commission estimated would be some 575,000 persons in al-Anbar

Province. At each of the polls, election support teams

of one or two Marines or soldiers and an interpreter

would maintain order over the election commission

workers and equipment provided by the Coalition.

They also served to maintain liaison and communications at each site with the U.S. and Coalition forces.

In the 2d Marine Division areas of responsibility, for

example, more than 170 military personnel and 70

interpreters comprised this contingent. Although

many of these Marines and soldiers came from the

civil affairs units, the combat and support units of the

division provided approximately half of these personnel. 

Logistical support for the estimated 3,000 poll

workers included flying them from Baghdad International Airport to al-Asad and al-Taqaddum Air Base,

and driving workers to camps where they received

billeting and subsistence, and instruction from the

election commission. Poll workers hired within the

province reported to local bases for transportation to

the camps. From there, the election workers were

driven to military forward operating bases near their

polls three or four days before the elections. At each

point of entry, the forces screened and processed the

poll workers and segregated potential security risks

for further scrutiny. At all assembly locations for the

poll workers, Coalition forces provided emergency

medical care, billeting, feeding, and hygienic facilities.

Security measures for the poll worker camps and

voting sites required dedicated security forces in both

close and distant protection modes and materials for

segregating the inner and middle cordons and the

traffic and entry checkpoints. Fortification material

came from the 30th Naval Construction Regiment

while 2d Force Service Support Group provided all

other items. Election materials arrived in packaged

containers for each site, and election commission

personnel retained responsibility for the chain of custody and accountability of ballots. Route security

measures included surged sweeps by both ground

LCpl Mike O’Rielly, attached to Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, checks an ID card as he searches Iraqis

in Ramadi for weapons and contraband. Throughout 2005, Anbar’s capital city was targeted by insurgents because of its administrative and political importance.

Photo by LCpl Kenneth Lane, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 050518-M-0616L-016
and aerial electronic devices. Aviation support remained dedicated to normal military operations in

September and early October, although the KC-130

transport-refueler aircraft would support movement

of election commission and polling workers into the

air bases. During 11–14 October, and on election day,

most rotary-wing aircraft (transport and attack) increased flights to support aerial and ground movements.

The 6th Civil Affairs Group relieved the 5th Civil

Affairs Group between 8 September and 22 September 2005. Much of the efforts required in working

with local leaders and public affairs would come

from the newly arrived group. Colonel Paul W. Brier’s

concept of support called for a major effort to engage the provincial and local civilian leadership. The

governor, provincial council, and mayors received

briefings to inform them of the importance of the

constitutional referendum, to encourage them to inform their constituents, and to provide them with

election materials for their constituents. Working with

the governorate election official of the Independent

Election Commission, Marines of the 6th Civil Affairs

Group sought to help develop ideas and strategies

to identify poll workers from al-Anbar Province and

help the election commission inform the public about

the election processes. Colonel Brier’s command also

played a key role in planning the movement, billeting, and training of polling workers for al-Anbar

Province, providing civil affairs Marines as members

of the election support teams as well as liaison personnel during all the poll workers’ movements and

processing.

Counterinsurgency Operations Before

the Elections

The combat operations supporting the summer

turnover of units and personnel gradually evolved

into a new series of operations designed to shape the

battlefield and to disrupt any insurgent disruption of

the electoral processes. The operational pattern remained unchanged, as noted above, in Major General

Huck’s orders: interdict in the west, neutralize insurgents around Ramadi, and hold Fallujah and areas further east under firm Coalition control. Largely for this

reason, Operation Hunter continued as Operation

Hunter II. Not only did the operations support the establishment of the Iraqi forces in al-Anbar Province

and strengthen the border defenses, but they also

covered the desired interdiction of the al-Qaim–Hit

118 INTO THE FRAY

Cpl Michael R. McMaugh, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 051106-M-8530M-019

Sgt Dennis Howard of the 6th Civil Affairs Group interacts with Iraqi children at the displaced persons compound in Husaybah during Operation Steel Curtain.
Protecting the Emerging Iraq 119

corridor of the western Euphrates River Valley.

Phase II of Operation Hunter in September continued the efforts to restore Iraqi control of its border

with Syria. In addition, II MEF received orders to construct two combat outposts, north and south of the

river. These would support the border defenses that

the Department of Border Enforcement began to reconstruct on the Syrian border region. Coalition engineers would build the combat outpost in the south

while an Iraqi contractor built the other on the northern side of the river valley. The planned presence of

Coalition forces, mostly border units and Iraqi Army

units, would at last cover the western Euphrates River

Valley. The Iraqi Army would also establish permanent garrisons in al-Qaim, Rawah, Haditha, and Hit.

By default, combat service would have to provide

support for all the Iraqi and Marine Corps forces in

western al-Anbar Province. In addition, Marines established random vehicle checkpoints on the routes

connecting al-Qaim, Haditha, and Hit. As a new initiative, they destroyed bridges across the Euphrates

at key crossing sites near the Syrian border, thus depriving infiltrators their usual line of communication.

As a matter of priority, the Haditha sector was chosen

for special attention before the referendum, and alQaim before the national election. This prioritization

clearly reflected the relative security of each sector

and the limited military resources, a perennial problem in western al-Anbar Province. Destroying the

bridges also indicated the weakness of the border security, and the construction of Border Forts 1 through

8 remained slow, with Forts 1 through 4 still incomplete at year’s end.

After receiving approval from Central Command

and Multi National Corps–Iraq headquarters to remove the bridges from the “No Strike” target list, Marine air started bombing the bridges (the Al Bu

Hardan and Mish Al Bridges crossing the Euphrates

northeast of Karabila and east of al-Ubayd) on 3 September. On 3 September, the aircraft dropped inert

guided BDU-type 500-pound cement-filled practice

bombs, reporting some damage to the bridges, but

imagery showed three of the eight bombs did not

strike the bridges. Accordingly, the Regimental Combat Team 2’s planners requested another attack. On 6

September, aircraft dropped GBU-12 bombs directed

at the bridge abutments. Again, desired effects were

not achieved and required an additional strike.

Marine Corps Oral History Collection 590 Tape# HUT_OIF2_Seabees

Throughout 2005, many of the strategic border forts along the Syrian-Iraqi Border were incomplete and in a

state of disrepair. Among them was Border Fort 4 near Husaybah, shown earlier in August 2004.

Table 10-1: October 2005 Voting Patterns
On 11–12 September, the attacks resumed after

preparing targeting packages employing M270A1

guided multiple-launched rocket systems supporting

the Army units in Area of Operations Sabre. Six rockets hit the Mish Al Bridge and destroyed it. Aircraft

attacked Al Bu Hardan Bridge with GBU-38 and GBU12 bombs following a mechanical malfunction of both

M270A1 launchers. The eight 500-pound bombs used

this time achieved the desired effects.

Due to the lack of available forces in western alAnbar Province, the 2d Marine Division concurred in

the destruction of the bridges without using forward

controllers or the direct involvement of ground

troops. Given the number of units rotating in Regimental Combat Team 2 during the month, small scale

local raids and patrolling remained the norm except

for the Army units operating in Area of Operations

Sabre. 

The 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

developed Operation Cyclone with Regimental Combat Team 2 support to clear ar-Rutbah of persistent

insurgent activity. Assembling reinforcements at

nearby Camp Korean Village on 9 September, the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Austin E. Renforth, and his staff briefed and incorporated 2d Force

Reconnaissance Company; Company K, 3d Battalion,

6th Marines, and an Iraqi special forces unit into his

task force. Moving out of their camp at 0100 on 11

September, the light armored reconnaissance units established a cordon of the city and launched two assault forces to clear its eastern and western parts. The

force reconnaissance and Iraqi Special Forces troops

cleared their sectors from north to south. Moving in

the opposite direction, the Marines of Company K, reinforced by a section of amphibious assault vehicles

and a platoon of Company C, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, cleared their zone. At 1100

the next day, the troops had detained a total of 61

people and had confiscated numerous weapons and

explosive devices. 

The relative lull during September permitted the

planning of several larger scale operations for October, and here Operation Hunter II began to show

some results. The operations of October coincided

with the arrival of three battalions of the Iraqi 7th Division’s 3d Brigade, deploying to Hit, Haditha, and

Rawah. At the same time, the Iraqi 1st Brigade, 1st Division, established its headquarters at al-Qaim with its

120 INTO THE FRAY

SSgt Dan Jamison, crewchief of a UH-1N Huey helicopter of Marine Light Attack Squadron 369, checks his

GAU-16/A machine gun while flying close air support over Ubadyi during Operation Steel Curtain in November 2005.

Photo by Cpl James P. Aguilar, VIRIN: 051115-M-6538A-154
Protecting the Emerging Iraq 121

1st Battalion, the beginning of a long awaited Iraqi

covering force on the Syrian border in al-Anbar

Province.

Lieutenant Colonel Julian D. Alford’s 3d Battalion,

6th Marines, executed its first major operation since

relieving 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, at al-Qaim. Beginning in the early morning hours of 1 October, the battalion began to clear the village of Sadah and the

eastern half of Karabilah under Operation Iron Fist, a

seven-day effort designed to eradicate insurgents,

clear routes, and establish battle positions. It also provided a deception operation to distract insurgents

while units assembled and prepared for Operation

River Gate. Supported by a platoon each of tanks,

combat engineers, and assault amphibious vehicles,

Alford’s task force cleared Sadah from east to west

with three rifle companies on line the first day. Insurgents fought from prepared positions with small

arms, rocket launchers, mortars, and explosive devices. In sporadic fighting, the Marines killed an estimated 12 enemy and encamped in positions on a

wadi separating Sadah from Karabilah. A troop of the

4th Squadron, 14th Cavalry, screened the left bank of

the Euphrates River, and mobile assault platoons of

the Marine battalion’s weapons company blocked the

roads between the two towns.

The next day saw much stiffer opposition from the

insurgents fighting from Karabilah. Advancing

through the town over the next three days, Marines

employed all their direct fire weapons and mortars,

and Marine aircraft delivered rockets, Hellfire missiles,

and GBU-12 and -38 guided bombs. The enemy death

toll increased to 51 while the task force suffered one

Marine killed and 12 wounded. The operation ended

on 7 October, with two battle positions constructed

for rifle platoons. Patrolling and small arms engagements continued for several weeks. The 3d Battalion,

6th Marines, now had a foothold for continued operations to the west. But that moment would await further reinforcement and Operation Steel Curtain. Until

then, Marines killed an estimated 200 insurgents while

operating from the new battle positions and Camp

Gannon. Lieutenant Colonel Alford’s double-size

sniper platoon of some 38 Marines accounted for

most of the enemy killed, followed in number of kills

by his attached tank platoon and battalion heavy machine guns.

The Army’s 2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, executed its own large-scale sweep at the same time on

the southern outskirts of Ramadi. Operation Mountaineers sought to kill or capture insurgents and to locate arms caches on 4 October. After four Boeing

CH-47E Chinook helicopters lifted A Troop, 1st

Squadron, 167th Cavalry, into a blocking position

southeast of the city, Company C, 1st Battalion, 172d

Armor Battalion, established a cordon isolating the

Photo by Spc Jefffery Sandstrum, USA, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 0501010-A-2098S-033

Iraqi men and woman wait in line prior to casting their votes on the constitutional referendum at a polling

station in Mosul on 15 October 2005.
122 INTO THE FRAY

southeast corner of the city from the north. Two Army

infantry companies, accompanied by the Iraqi 1st and

3d Battalions, 1st Brigade, 7th Division, cleared and

secured their targeted districts on the southern side

of the canal, while 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, cleared

the northern side accompanied by the 2d Iraqi Battalion and supported by a tank platoon of Company

D, 2d Battalion, 69th Armor. Marines, soldiers, and

Iraqi troops searched all houses and vehicles in a

major demonstration of combined U.S. and Iraqi military presence. After being attacked by explosive devices, small arms, and rocket fire, the 3d Battalion,

7th Marines, called in both fixed- and rotary-wing air

support, which remained overhead until all objectives

had been cleared and the ground Marines had returned to their base.

With the even larger Operation River Gate, Regimental Combat Team 2 placed more pressure on insurgent groups operating in the western Eurphrates

River Valley, well-timed with Operation Iron Fist.

Commencing on 3 October, elements of three U.S.

and one Iraqi battalions searched the towns of Haditha, Haqlaniyah, and Barwanah, the scene of the

impromptu Operation Quick Strike conducted in reaction to the killing of the Marine sniper teams of 3d

Battalion, 25th Marines, in August. In addition to

killing foreign fighters and insurgent groups, Colonel

Davis sought to establish a U.S. and later Iraqi army

presence and in general prepare these towns for elections.

Under the control of Colonel Davis and his Regimental Combat Team 2 command group, the operation opened with isolation moves blocking movement

out of the target area: an Iraqi special operations company blocked movement to the north near Haditha

Dam, and on the left bank of the Euphrates River, the

Iraqi 7th Reconnaissance Battalion, 7th Division, covered the eastern flank while 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion screened and then occupied

Barwanah. On the right bank, 3d Battalion, 504th

Parachute Infantry, moved against Haqlaniyah by air

assault, using 12 CH-46E helicopters supported by 3d

Platoon, Company B, 1st Tank Battalion, and a company of the Iraqi 2d Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st Division. At Haditha, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey R. Chessani, moved into three zones supported by the tank

company headquarters and 1st Platoon; another company from the Iraqi 2d Battalion, 1st Brigade; and the

2d Battalion, 3d Brigade, 7th Division.

During this operation, Iraqi troops discovered sophisticated propaganda production equipment in a

house in Haditha. The items seized included numerous al-Qaeda in Iraq compact discs and audiotapes,

LCpl Christopher Ahrens of 1st Platoon, Company G, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, uses the scope on his M4 rifle

to scan the horizon during a security patrol in downtown Kharma in October 2005.

Photo by Sgt Paul S. Mancuso, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 051026-M-5213M-032
Protecting the Emerging Iraq 123

three computers, several printers, banner makers,

multi-disc copiers, and thousands of blank discs and

tapes. Troops later discovered a complete bomb-making facility in the same town.

When the operation terminated on 20 October,

Huck reported construction of the firm bases underway and polling places secured. The damage to the

enemy included 12 enemy killed and 172 suspects detained with 30 caches and 96 explosive devices discovered. The 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Combat

Engineer Battalion, built the firm bases Sparta, Raider,

and Horno in the three towns (Haditha, Haqlaniyah

and Barwanah). In addition to the helicopter support

for the Army paratroopers, Regimental Combat Team

2 also conducted a combined air assault raid by 2d

Force Reconnaissance Company and the Iraqi special

operations company in the vicinity of Abu Hyat

against a known, high-value target, taking several detainees in the process. Marines called for air support

to deliver ordnance as large as 2,000-pound bombs,

when targeting a cave complex.

Operations Iron Fist and River Gate also covered

part of the continued Iraqi Army movement into alAnbar Province, as the three battalions of the Iraqi 3d

Brigade, 7th Division, deployed to Hit, Haditha, and

Rawah, while the 1st Brigade headquarters and its 1st

Battalion of the 1st Division deployed to al-Qaim. On

13 October came another welcome reinforcement in

the form of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (13th

MEU) under Colonel James K. La Vine, reporting to

Huck for tactical direction after it reported to Major

General Stephen T. Johnson for operations and received its own Area of Operations Tucson on 26 October, where it began counterinsurgency and route

security operations.

The Constitutional Referendum,

15 October 2005

During the weekend of 1–2 October, the Independent Election Commission–Iraq, apparently on

the basis of local sentiments and to demonstrate

greater autonomy, changed the logistics and security

arrangements for the more settled parts of al-Anbar

Province. Instead of using the voting centers surveyed and secured by Coalition forces, the election

commission opened approximately 87 independent

Photo by LCpl Samuel D. Corum, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 051118-M-6412C-004

In the early morning fog outside a forward operations base in November 2005, vehicles of Company E, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, await their drivers who are preparing for Operation Trifecta in Zaidon.
centers, operated and provisioned by the local Iraqi

population, with local police and unarmed guards for

security. Accordingly, the centers east of Ramadi to

the eastern limits of the II MEF area of operations operated with Facility Protection Service and Iraqi police security. In the western zones, the original plan

prevailed for employing Iraqi Security Forces, including Iraqi Army troops, in the inner and middle

cordons of the polling centers, backed up by Coalition military quick reaction forces at the outer cordon.

Despite these changes, II MEF helped to execute

the referendum with few setbacks and successfully

supplied, transported, and billeted the poll workers.

Providing sufficient food had been more problematic. Contractors provided food to poll workers at alAsad and Taqaddum Air Bases. Beyond these

arrangements, the plan was to provide workers with

halal meals and bottled water. Most remained for one

to three days at the air bases before moving on to

forward bases near their polling centers. In some instances poll workers staged protests due to their dissatisfaction with halal meals. Providing adequate

communications for them was also an issue. At Baghdad International Airport, airport security personnel

confiscated the cellular telephones of election commission personnel assembled there for flights to alAsad and Taqaddum Air Bases. Although al-Anbar

Province had limited cell phone service, the commission relied on these phones for communications

nationwide. Even satellite telephones failed to connect in western al-Anbar Province, and so Marines

had to assist in unsnarling the communications at

most polling centers.

The commission’s expectations for local arrangements in the eastern part of the zone were met. Besides moving commission officials, polling center kits

and ballots between air bases and local distribution

points, Marines there provided little in the way of logistics support to the commission. The “local” model

likely succeeded for a number of reasons such as the

improved security environment, emergent Fallujah

leadership, and the adaptability of Marine and Army

units. The security model used by 2d Marine Division proved effective, however. On 12 October, Marine units seized polling sites and immediately moved

pre-staged force protection materials to properly barricade the sites. Between 13 and 14 October, poll

124 INTO THE FRAY

EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft helped jam insurgent communications during cordon-and-knock

operations. Below, a Prowler from Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 4 taxis to a hangar at al-Asad

Air Base in May 2005. Photo by LCpl Andrew D. Pendracki, VIRIN: 050511-M-5865P-020
Protecting the Emerging Iraq 125

workers occupied the sites with U.S. units providing

security escort. While insurgents conducted a few harassing attacks during the referendum, no voters or

poll workers were injured at a voting site.

Imperceptible to the outside observer, several

measures taken by II MEF provided for better results

than in the January 2005 election. In the days leading

up to the referendum, 2d Marine Division attacked locations considered likely firing positions for insurgent

rocket and mortar attacks by indirect fire. During the

January 2005 election, the daily average of indirect

fire attacks had increased from the usual 12 to 36 the

day before the election to 57 on the day of the election. Radar coverage of potential attack sites was evaluated to ensure previously used firing locations were

appropriately covered. In the case of the referendum,

no increase in these kinds of attacks occurred. Only

five attacks by explosive devices happened during the

voting period, all while the supporting electronic warfare aircraft was off-station refueling. The division requested continuous airborne fixed-wing coverage for

close air support and surveillance patrols over three

sectors: Ramadi-Fallujah, Hit-Haditha, and al-Qaim–

Rawah. These aircraft remained on station from six

hours before the polls opened until six hours after

voting ended. Finally, E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) aircraft monitored vehicle movement along routes around Ramadi during

voting and curfew hours. The aircraft also remained

ready to track indirect fire trajectories, although none

occurred in that sector.

Due to the detailed planning and actions of

Marines, soldiers, and Iraqi security troops, tens of

thousands of voters in al-Anbar Province ignored

the threat of attack. They cast ballots in the constitutional referendum on a remarkably calm day with

isolated insurgent attacks but no major bombings or

mass killings. Ramadi, however, remained a problem, and U.S. soldiers forced three of the city’s main

polling centers to close shortly after opening at

0700. Hospital officials said that at least seven people seeking to vote were killed by insurgents.

Ammar Rawi, manager of the electoral commission

in Ramadi, added that most of the “turnout came

from the outskirts of the city.” Muhammed Jamaili,

manager of the electoral commission in Fallujah,

opined that 93 percent of the city’s 257,000 registered voters participated in the referendum. The

population in the far west, in the area of Regimental Combat Team 2, cast a mere 7,510 votes, virtually

none at Hit and Haditha.

Although Sunni Arabs rejected the terms of the

constitution, they took a significant part in the voting in this referendum and therefore in the process

of moving toward self-government. The soldiers,

sailors and Marines under the direction of II MEF

could take pride in the results posted in their areas

of responsibility. 

With the approval of the constitution, Operation

Liberty Express remained in effect to support the required 15 December elections for a permanent government. Had the constitutional referendum failed,

the National Assembly would have been dissolved,

and a new transitional government would have

been elected to attempt to write another permanent

constitution, thus reverting to the awkward situation

of the previous year.

Continued Counterinsurgency Operations

Supporting ‘Liberty Express’

Area of Operations Tucson furnished battle space

for the newly arrived 13th MEU elements. General

Huck charged it with interdicting smugglers and insurgents operating in the vast area between ar-Rutbah in the west and al-Muhammadi in the east,

where Iraqi Route 10 approaches its junction with

Route 12 (the main route running along the right

bank of the Euphrates from Hit to al-Qaim). Because

of the frequent assignments of the light armored reconnaissance battalions to operations in the western Euphrates River valley throughout the campaign,

Marines had spent little time covering the valley to

date. Colonel La Vine established his headquarters at

al-Asad Air Base, where his Medium Helicopter

Squadron 163 worked under the direction of 2d Marine Aircraft Wing. He detailed 2d Battalion, 1st

Marines, to Rutbah on 26 October, where it operated out of Camp Korean Village. At the other extremity of Area of Operations Tucson, Battery C, 1st

Battalion, 11th Marines, an artillery battery turned

into a provisional rifle company, covered the intersection of the two highways, taking its direction directly from Colonel La Vine’s command post. This

security mission also served to prepare 13th MEU

for its major contribution the next month in Operation Steel Curtain.

The II MEF staff also worked to support the new

“Desert Protector” program, used as a form of tribal

engagement to produce reliable scouts in the

province. The initial cohort came from the Albu Mahal

tribe of al-Qaim. They were sent to the East Fallujah

Iraqi Army Camp for two weeks of training and then

returned to al-Qaim to work with special operations

units as scouts. Coalition and Iraqi commands released little information about special forces’ missions

in Iraq, but 2d Division monthly summaries indicated
Army, Navy, and Iraqi special forces’ missions excluding Area of Operations Biloxi.

In the aftermath of the referendum, where the aim

of II MEF actions focused upon the main population

centers, the moment finally arrived to pacify the tumultuous border towns around al-Qaim. Operation

Steel Curtain was conducted in Husaybah, Karabilah,

and Ubaydi from 3 to 22 November. The operation

marked the first large-scale employment of multiple

battalion-sized units of Iraqi army forces in combined

operations with Coalition forces since the second battle of Fallujah. The objective was to restore Iraqi sovereign control along the Iraq-Syria border and to

destroy foreign fighters operating throughout the alQaim region. Beginning in the summer, the combat

capabilities of the Iraqi forces in al-Anbar Province

had grown, approaching the numerical equivalent of

two full infantry divisions of Iraqi army soldiers. Iraqi

soldiers now worked alongside soldiers and Marines

in detailed clearing missions. In addition, Iraqi soldiers

provided security and helped facilitate the care and

well-being of residents displaced from their homes because of the operation. They provided perimeter security and screened displaced civilians to detect

foreign fighters trying to infiltrate the shelter areas or

to escape cordons. They also helped to distribute

thousands of meals, blankets, and health and sanitation items to their fellow citizens. Operation Steel Curtain also saw the employment of locally recruited and

specially trained scout platoons. The Desert Protectors

assisted the combat units clearing the city. Because of

their familiarity with the region, the local tribes and

dialects, these scouts could detect suspicious individuals, including terrorists attempting to evade identification by wearing women’s clothing. Twenty-one

suspected insurgents were discovered hiding among

the civilians in a displacement camp near Ubaydi.

Assembling more than 4,500 Marines, sailors, and

soldiers, for the largest Marine Corps operation since

Operation al-Fajr, Colonel Davis’ Regimental Combat

Team 2 began Steel Curtain with a clearing of Husaybah. His task organization for the operation included

3d Battalion, 6th Marines, Battalion Landing Team 2d

Battalion, 1st Marines from 13th MEU; 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 2d Force Reconnaissance Company; 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute

Infantry; 4th Squadron, 14th Cavalry, and the Iraqi 1st

Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st Division (later joined by 2d

and 3d Battalions). Moving in the early hours of 1 November, 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, concentrated its

126 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by LCpl Sheila M. Brooks, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 051215-M-7404B-007

Iraqi citizens in Husaybah line up to vote in parliamentary elections held on 15 December 2005.
Protecting the Emerging Iraq 127

three rifle companies at Camp Gannon facing the

town with the Syrian frontier to the rear. Affecting a

lodgment in the town’s northwestern corner at 0400

on 5 November and then joined by a company of the

Iraqi 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, the battalion held while

2d Battalion, 1st Marines, and another Iraqi company

moved into the southwest quadrant of the town and

came abreast at about 1000 . Together, the two battalions then advanced to clear every structure in Husaybah, from west to east. By the end of the first day, the

two battalions held a quarter of the town, inflicting

several casualties on the insurgents and foreign fighters, who defended with small arms, rocket launchers,

and explosive devices. In three days, the two battalions cleared the town and encamped on its eastern

limits, having killed dozens of enemy and detaining

more than 200 additional suspects while other elements of Regimental Combat Team 2 gathered several

hundred displaced persons into holding areas where

they received food, water, and medical attention, and

processing.

The two battalions continued across an open triangular area between Husabayah and the next objective,

western Karabalah, clearing houses and encountering

explosive devices and mines the next two days, 8-9

November. Shifting to the north, the 3d Battalion, 6th

Marines, cleared western Karibalah from north to

south in three days, encountering mostly mines and

booby traps, while 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, moved

west to east in coordination. By 12 November, both

of these towns had been cleared of enemy insurgents,

foreign fighters, and their explosive devices.

Leaving 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, holding the two

cleared towns, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, and the Army

parachute infantry battalion shifted east to repeat the

clearing operation, this time at Ubaydi. Beginning in

the early morning of 14 November, the Army paratroopers cleared Old Ubaydi in a day, while 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, took two days to clear New Ubaydi

against stiff opposition. The 2d and 3d Battalions of

the Iraqi 1st Brigade also provided a company each

in the clearing of this, the last targeted town of the operation. With the occupation of a battle position in

Ubaydi by Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 6th

Marines, all three towns had been cleared. As Lieutenant Colonel Alford noted to a combat correspondent on 20 November, “This place has needed to be

cleaned out for awhile.” 

The two Marine Corps assault battalions lost 10

men killed in the operation, and a total of 59 Army

and Marine Corps and nine Iraqi Army wounded. The

enemy lost 139 killed with one wounded prisoner. A

further 388 suspected insurgents became detainees

and more than 1,000 displaced persons entered Coalition humanitarian relief facilities from Husabayah and

Ubaiydi. Operation Steel Curtain saw nearly continuous air support, with 67 air strikes called in by controllers. Over 100 precision-guided munitions were

employed during this operation. Aviation also played

a key role by providing combat re-supply of tank ammunition and water as well as multiple casualty evacuation missions. 

In the aftermath of Operation Steel Curtain, the

Iraqi 1st Brigade began to establish itself with headquarters at al-Qaim. As the soldiers of its 1st Battalion

patrolled the streets of Husaybah, Karabilah and

Ubaydi, the 3d Battalion occupied the newly built

northern combat outpost on 30 November, partnering

with 4th Squadron, 14th Cavalry, in backing up the reoccupied border forts to the north of the Euphrates,

and the 2d Battalion occupied the southern combat

outpost on 14 November, although then only 15 percent complete.

The upcoming rotation of the Army’s 155th Brigade

signified that a relief of its 2d Battalion, 114th Field

Artillery, at Hit would become necessary. The Army

declined to replace the battalion, so the II MEF and

2d Marine Division commanders alerted Colonel La

Vine that 13th MEU would take responsibility for Hit

and its surrounding battle space. On 23 November,

Colonel La Vine assumed tactical control of the Army

battalion, the Iraqi 1st Battalion, 2d Brigade, 7th Division, and a new Area of Operation Fairbanks.

This area assigned not only Hit to the 13th MEU

but also maintained much of the eastern portion of

former Area of Operations Tucson. After a brief peAfter three months of negotiations following the 15

December 2005 national elections, Nouri al-Maliki

(below) became Prime Minister of a national coalition government in Iraq.

Photo by Sgt David J. Murphy, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 070313-M-0948M-046
riod of reconstitution, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines relieved the Army unit at Hit, supported by Lieutenant

Colonel Donald J. Liles’ MEU Service Support Group

13, with a transfer of authority on 10 December 2005.

As the national election approached, the 2d Battalion,

1st Marines, undertook a clearing action across the Euphrates from Hit in Operation Iron Hammer from 30

November to 4 December. While the 2d Battalion,

114th Field Artillery, and 1st Battalion, 2d Brigade, 7th

Division, maintained security in Hit itself, the Marine

battalion, the 1st Company of the Iraqi battalion, and

30 Desert Protector scouts crossed to clear the Hai Al

Becker district and to establish a base for the Iraqi battalion to occupy, thereby securing the eastern side of

the city. With this improvement of security, the Hit

Bridge was opened to foot traffic. During this operation, troops destroyed five explosive devices and detained 19 suspected insurgents.

During the same month, Regimental Combat Team

8, now under command of Colonel David H. Berger,

conducted Operation Trifecta from 10 to 20 November

to disrupt insurgent activity in the Zaidon area. This

operation included aviation support with a simultaneous insertion of 144 Marines into three landing zones.

The 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, conducted a helicopter

born cordon of Sadan Market while follow-on forces

conducted the sweep. This rapid cordon prevented insurgents from escaping. The cordon and knock operation also integrated communications jamming by

EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft. The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion also conducted a helicopter insertion to support its Operation Southern Hunter.

These battalion sweeps resulted in the capture of

numerous arms caches and detainees, but no close

combat occurred. The reconnaissance battalion also

received dedicated utility helicopter support on strip

alert if its sniper teams were compromised. These aircraft also performed other missions, but launched with

the sniper extract locations already briefed in case

they were needed. Ongoing missions included company-sized raids, cordon and knock operations, and

convoy escort. For example, on 1 December, a sniper

attack on civilians produced a two-company sweep

by 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, aided by Iraqi Army

search teams and a FAST platoon (Fleet Antiterroist Security Team) through city zones 51 and 52 to find and

to kill the snipers.

The 2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division, conducted

Operation Tigers (25–26 November), a clearing operation in the Mulaab District of eastern Ramadi with

both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft in support.

Colonel Gronski then sent the 3d Battalion, 7th

Marines, and the 2d Battalion, 1st Brigade, 7th Division, against the same area for a cordon and search

operation and targeted raids, continuing into the adjacent al-Dubaht District in his Operation Shank during 2–3 December to find weapons caches and to

disrupt enemy activity. Similar operations covered

most other districts of the city, along with an intensive

route clearance effort and several terrain-denial artillery missions, all in late November through mid-December. In a local setback, soldiers had to raid the

home of Brigadier General Shakir to recover the Iraqi

Police payroll on 4 November. New Iraqi units arrived

in Ramadi, including the 2d Special Police Commando

Brigade on 7 December and the 1st Company, 9th

128 INTO THE FRAY

Table 10-2: Operations Sayaid 2004–05 Summary
Protecting the Emerging Iraq 129

Tank Battalion, equipped with T-55 tanks, on 10 December, indicating the importance of taming this most

dangerous Iraqi city.

Supporting the National Election

(15 December 2005)

Marine Corps and Army commanders in al-Anbar

Province benefited greatly from the previous experiences with election security and support. Planning for

the national election in December now incorporated

the contingencies of adjusting to frequent and unpredictable changes in the concept for conduct of the

election by the Independent Electoral Commission of

Iraq. This aspect bore fruit right away because the

commission this time allowed the citizens of Ramadi

to provide security for the voting sites within the

provincial capitol and surrounding area. Ultimately,

this concept provided an expanded voting opportunity by adding to the number of polls on election day.

The Action Plan to increase Sunni participation in Ramadi from only two percent for the October 15 Referendum was based on the assumption that

intimidation by al-Qaeda of Iraq and other extremist

and foreign groups was the principal cause of the

province’s chaos. The plan’s countermeasures included the assignment of the 2d Special Police Commando Brigade and the Iraqi Army tank company to

Ramadi to assist in bolstering official Iraqi presence in

the city.

As before, the 2d Marine Division and 155th

Brigade Combat Team began securing voting sites on

12 December and transporting poll workers and material from forward bases to election sites. In eastern

al-Anbar Province, U.S. and Iraqi forces provided area

security and limited logistics support for the 113 Independent Election Commission voting centers. In

western al-Anbar Province the Coalition forces provided both area and point security and logistics support for 30 Coalition-established sites. By noon on 14

December, troops or police had secured all polling

centers throughout al-Anbar Province with their workers inside.

To facilitate the vote and aid security measures, the

Iraqi government declared a national holiday during

13–15 December, a nationwide curfew for 13–17 December from 2200 to 0600, and a prohibition on carrying of weapons, even with a valid weapons card,

during 13–17 December. In addition, the government

closed international and provincial borders, except for

fuel, food, and medical vehicles; closed international

airports; placed all security forces on full standby status; and prohibited vehicular movement during 14–17

December except for security forces and vehicles with

placards issued by the Ministry of Interior.

Essentially, the U.S. forces in al-Anbar Province employed the same measures for air and electronic support, and surveillance as in the October referendum,

achieving at least equal success. Approximately 800

poll workers and election support team members

were flown by helicopter between the transit centers,

such as al-Asad Air Base, and nine outlying sites.

While complex, the air movements were executed

smoothly because lift requirements and movement

plans were identified and coordinated with higher

headquarters early in the planning process and then

synchronized daily with subordinate units. Additionally, back up ground movement plans were developed as an alternative if inclement weather precluded

air operations. Providing contracted hot meals for poll

workers helped maintain morale and alleviate behavior problems. In addition, commission officials billeted

at the command and control locations for extended

periods required sustenance. In eastern al-Anbar

Province, Coalition and Iraqi army forces provided

area security, while Iraqi police and local guards gave

point security. In western al-Anbar Province, Coalition

and Iraqi security forces served point and area needs.

The troop commitments required for security in western al-Anbar Province limited the number of voting

sites the division could establish.

Only two attacks by indirect fire occurred during

the national election, compared to ten during the referendum. By almost every measure, the 15 December

election succeeded in al-Anbar Province beyond expectations. Sunnis turned out in such large numbers

that additional ballot materials had to be provided

from reserves held by the regiment and brigade commanders in each area of operations.

Just over 12 million people voted, about 75 percent

of the electorate. Sunnis in particular voted in much

greater numbers than in January, and perhaps more

than in the October election judging by the temporary

ballot shortages in al-Anbar Province. Some insurgent

groups apparently kept their promised election day

moratorium on attacks, even going so far as to guard

the voters from attack. 

Six months after the election, negotiations for a

“government of national unity” succeeded and a political coalition supported it under the leadership of

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

Closing Out 2005: Counterinsurgency

Operations and Force Realignments

With the completion of the national election, Operation Liberty Express terminated on 22 December.

That day also marked the official end of Operation
Hunter. The Iraqi government had announced the

restoration of control of its borders on 30 November,

with a celebration conducted for the benefit of the

media. The 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, participated in

a flag raising ceremony at battle position Hue at

Husaybah, signifying the transfer of control of the area

from U.S. to Iraqi forces. General Casey attended, accompanied by the Iraqi defense and interior ministers,

and the battalion provided a rifle company reinforced

by tanks as security, which also included continuous

air coverage. In the view of the II MEF commander,

Major General Johnson, “This is a significant milestone

that will highlight the initial progress to date in border

defenses, training of Department of Border Enforcement personnel, and the commitment and growing capability of the Iraqi government and its security

forces.” Although Border Forts 4 through 6 remained

incomplete at the end of the year, Iraqi Army units

had already moved into border town garrisons and

manned the combat outposts north and south of the

Euphrates. Construction would begin before year’s

end in refurbishing the former port of entry at Husaybah. In December, however, the II MEF staff urged

higher headquarters to first upgrade the ports of entry

at Walid and Trebil before opening the port of entry

in the al-Qaim zone.

Very few named counterinsurgency operations occurred in the immediate aftermath of the December

election, but the ongoing operations sufficed to keep

order in the province, and a certain euphoria could

be noticed among the population as well as the U.S.

and Coalition fighting forces. In the Haditha area, 3d

Battalion, 1st Marines, ran some sweeps through suspected cache sites in Operation Red Bull (20–31 December). A similar operation, Operation Green Trident

(23–31 December), saw 1st Reconnaissance Battalion

sweeping around the Coalition logistics base Area of

Operations Dogwood and uncovering numerous

caches. Outside Ramadi, 1st Battalion, 172d Armor,

cleared Tammin and Jazirah on the eastern and northern outskirts as a disruption effort in Operation Bulldog (28–31 December) but in this case fought four

engagements, taking 17 detainees and had two attacks

each by indirect fire and explosive devices. Clearly,

Ramadi remained a dangerous area.

In total, Operation Hunter encompassed 3,840 actions during the second half of 2005. The number reflects the vastness of western al-Anbar Province as

well as the absence of adequate control over the region. At the same time that II MEF’s staff reported

these accomplishments, it began to adjust to reductions in its forces in the aftermath of the elections and

the focus of effort that Ramadi and Fallujah had attracted from the Multi National Corps–Iraq.

The pending rotation of the Army’s 2d Battalion,

112th Infantry, in December left al-Taqaddum without

a local security infantry unit, and the Army offered no

replacement for it. The same applied to the 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry, which had served in the

2d Marine Division only as part of the Operation

Hunter reinforcements received with the return of

Area of Operations Saber in October. The II MEF planners began to study base consolidation as a way to

continue operations with fewer units, although the

Iraqi Army forces at year’s end began to approach

what the campaign plan had envisioned as the minimum requirement for success. In the end, the Army

made available for al-Taqaddum the Illinois National

Guard 2d Battalion, 130th Infantry, one of many units

it began to extend to meet increasing manpower

needs. The future was clear for succeeding Marine

Corps deployments: more and more of these security

unit assignments would come from Marine Corps

commands.

One reduction in II MEF responsibilities came with

the decision by the Multi National Corps commander

to realign the provinces of Karabala, An-Najaf, and

northern Babil under the Multi National Division–

Baghdad, commencing with the relief of the 155th

Brigade and the transfer of its authority to the incoming 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, on 5 January

2006. Henceforth, the Marine Corps contingent took

responsibility in Iraq for al-Anbar Province.

The end of the 13th MEU’s deployment to Iraq

drew closer. The incoming 22d MEU had been made

available for employment in al-Anbar Province in time

for a relief by like units in Area of Operations Fairbanks. The decision by Central Command chief General Abizaid to permit the 13th MEU to remain ashore

in Hit through mid-February allowed for its relief to

be incorporated into the rotation of the entire II MEF

in 2006. Accordingly, Colonel Kenneth F. McKenzie

reported with his 22d MEU to 2d Marine Division on

17 December and relieved 13th MEU ten days later.

Only two more months remained for the II MEF campaign at this point. Since late 2003, 470 Marines had

been killed in action and 4,823 wounded in Iraq.

130 INTO THE FRAY
131

from assault amphibian, reconnaissance, light armored reconnaissance units, and an infantry regiment

headquarters. In the Marine aircraft wings, the 2d and

4th Light Antiaircraft Defense Battalions were employed as provisional infantry battalions defending

al-Asad Air Base. Antitank platoons, not needed as

such, were used as convoy escorts and mobile reaction forces. The scarcity of civil affairs units and

graves registration or personnel remains platoons

caused the formation of provisional units to perform

these tasks as well, drawing from various organizations of the Marine Corps Reserve.

Civil Affairs

One of the most persistent challenges in the Marine Corps campaign in Iraq remained the lack of

civil affairs organizations available for employment.

The Marine Corps had only two civil affairs groups,

both comprised of Selected Marine Corps Reservists:

3d Civil Affairs group based at Camp Pendleton, California, and 4th Civil Affairs group based at Anacostia, Washington, D.C. As the campaign in Iraq entered

its third year, the tempo and duration of operations

made clear that the 3d and 4th groups would deploy to Iraq every seven months. Accordingly, Marine Corps Commandant Michael W. Hagee approved

establishing two provisional civil affairs groups to

provide operational and personnel relief for the two

existing groups, the 5th and 6th Civil Affairs groups

(Provisional). On 4 January 2005, the Marine Corps

activated the 5th Civil Affairs group (Provisional),

using cadres drawn primarily from the 4th Combat

Engineer Battalion, 4th Marine Division, and deployed it to Iraq from March to September 2005 with

the initial II MEF contingent. 

Planning continued to prepare and activate the 6th

Civil Affairs group (Provisional) for activity beginning

in September 2005. The 6th was activated on 1 June

2005, less than a month after it had been established,

using cadre drawn principally from the 4th Maintenance Battalion. 

In each case, the challenge remained to identify

more than 190 Marines and sailors from Marine Corps

Reserve Forces to comprise a complete group and to

qualify most of them in the civil affairs military occupational specialties required for officers and nonAlthough no large urban battle occurred during

the II Marine Expeditionary Force campaign in Iraq,

the myriad of tasks confronting its Marines, soldiers,

and sailors differed little from the previous year’s effort. The immediate military tasks included the continuous requirements for military checkpoints,

patrols, police patrols, road sweeps, offensive missions, raids, cordons, and searches. The force protection requirements were equally large, and the

additional penetration by 2d Marine Division units

into the towns and villages surrounding the major

cities and in the western Euphrates River valley multiplied greatly the number of forward operating bases

and camps requiring garrisons and guards.

These continuous missions required everyone to

perform typical infantry roles and tasks regardless of

the type of unit or its members’ specialties. Everybody had his or her duty manning guard posts and

check points, mounting convoy security, and conducting all forms of surveillance. Proper force protection in populated areas, however, required more

than sentry duty; it also required frequent sweeps

well outside the perimeter, local counterinsurgency

measures, and serving in quick reaction forces designated for responses both inside and outside the

camps. Marines and soldiers of all specialties found

themselves conducting offensive missions such as

raids and neighborhood sweeps. Because of the

shortage of women in combat units, most female

Marines, sailors, and soldiers were assigned to search

female civilians, suspects, and detainees.

In addition, the Marine Corps employed many

units in the Iraq campaign in “provisional” roles, i.e.,

performing missions they were not trained or meant

to perform. Combat engineer, amphibious assault,

and artillery units were often used as provisional infantry units. The Iraq campaign saw the fielding of

such units in an increasingly widespread fashion. The

initial employment of the entire 3d Battalion, 11th

Marines—an artillery unit—as a provisional military

police battalion in 2004 set the mark for using other

artillery units in similar roles. What followed was

their widespread use as well as headquarters and line

companies from 4th Tank and 4th Assault Amphibian

Battalions as military police units. Provisional small

boat detachments for Haditha Dam security came

Chapter 11

Continuous Operations
commissioned officers. For instance, only the commanding officer and 14 Marines who joined the 6th

Civil Affairs group had civil affairs qualifications, The

need for this training greatly complicated existing requirements to complete other required combat skills

training they would need for deployment to Iraq.

Civil affairs training began using mobile training

teams formed by the 3d and 4th Civil Affairs groups

after their return from Iraq. As a result of their experiences, the training teams brought not only “book”

training to the provisional civil affairs groups, they

also provided recent experience and lessons-learned

from their tours of duty in Iraq. The training covered

a full range of civil affairs topics: roles and missions

units, civil-military operations, the Iraqi Transitional

Government, and interactions with U.S. government

agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and the

media. Additional training focused on the law of war,

information operations, psychological operations,

human exploitation teams, interpreters, negotiations,

and mediations. In addition to the classroom training, the Marines of the provisional groups participated in practical exercises such as how to hold town

meetings and manage crowds while conducting patrols. The civil affairs training conducted by the 3d

and 4th Civil Affairs groups, combined with the

mandatory completion of the U.S. Army correspondence course and three months on-the-job training,

finished the necessary qualification of the provisional

groups.

Each civil affairs group organized personnel into a

headquarters detachment and four detachments. Detachment 1 comprised the government support team

and the Marines who would man the civil-military

operations center collocated with the II MEF operations center in al-Fallujah. Detachments 2, 3, and 4

would support the ground combat elements in the

field. Each detachment comprised five civil affairs

teams of six to seven Marines each.

The 5th Civil Affairs group deployed to Iraq with

II MEF and relieved the 4th Civil Affairs group at Fallujah on 10 March 2005. It immediately began to

work with the temporary Fallujah city council, established a civil-military operations center in al-Karmah,

and began to facilitate completion of key projects,

such as reopening the ar-Ramadi glass factory. In

western al-Anbar Province, teams worked with Regimental Combat Team 2 to support operations. Dur132 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by LCpl Ryan B. Busse, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 041228-M-5585B-011. 

Cpl Erica Renee Steel searches an Iraqi woman at an entry point outside Fallujah in December 2004.
Continuous Operations 133

Civil affairs groups were an integral means for engaging the Iraqi population and supporting counterinsurgency efforts. In November 2006, Capt Charece D. Martin of the 4th Civil Affairs Group participated in an Iraqi

Woman’s Engagement to provide solutions and aid to Iraqi women and their children.

Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 061105-M-8213R-010

ing June, the group was reassigned to the 2d Marine

Division because it contained most of the key civil

affairs functions. The 5th Civil Affairs group formed

the Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee, and a new provincial civil-military operations

center opened at Ramadi. On 21 September, the 6th

Civil Affairs group took over the civil affairs functions and continued the mission, with increasing attention to the pending constitutional and national

elections.

The 6th Civil Affairs group continued to maintain

its Headquarters Detachment with the 2d Marine Division headquarters at Camp Blue Diamond. A civil

affairs cell of ten Marines from the group served in

the G-5 (Plans) staff section of II MEF at Camp Fallujah, where Detachment 1 operated the government

support team and civil-military operations center at

Fallujah and the second (provincial) center at Ramadi

in the governor’s complex. Detachment 2 supported

the Army brigade in Ramadi. Detachment 3 aided

Regimental Combat Team 2 operations in western alAnbar Province. Detachment 4 remained at Camp

Fallujah to help Regimental Combat Team 8 in Area

of Operations Raleigh. Between September and December 2005, three events influenced the 6th Civil

Affairs group’s operations and civil affairs operations:

Operation Hunter; the constitutional referendum on

15 October 2005; and the election of the permanent

Iraqi National Assembly on 15 December 2005.

The civil affairs groups provided military support

for the provincial and local governments critical to

the success of the Coalition throughout al-Anbar

Province. Before 2005 the provincial government of

al-Anbar Province and the city councils of most major

cities there remained mostly ineffective. Insurgents

continued to intimidate and infiltrate these bodies.

Fallujah remained the sole major exception, where

the insurgents had been removed, and the citizens

were attempting to begin self-governance. During

2005 the 2d Marine Division strove to remove the insurgents from all the major cities: Ramadi, Habbaniyah, al-Qaim, and Rutbah. In the process several

smaller towns became safer. Immediately after each

city or town was cleared of insurgents the civil affairs
detachments began to work with the leadership of

the city. The Marines spoke continuously with local

officials to address their needs and determine priorities for projects to improve the quality of life for

civilian inhabitants.

Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marine Division, installed a communications network at the Provincial

Civil Military Operations Center at Ramadi. This service helped facilitate a more expeditious flow of information to research and staff for provincial

reconstruction projects. The civil affairs detachment

supporting Regimental Combat Team 8 rehabilitated

the Fallujah mayor’s building, which became the center for the ongoing efforts by local officials to make

Fallujah autonomous and self-sufficient in governmental matters.

A key civil affairs function in every operation in

the Marine Corps campaign in Iraq aimed at building

positive relationships and securing the trust of Iraqi

citizens and influential local officials. This process

began with the distribution of 150 billion Iraqi dinars

as financial compensation for damages and loss

caused by the insurgents and operations against

them. The Iraqi Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee promoted provincial government

capability and legitimacy as it acted to determine the

allocation of Coalition projects. Two water treatment

facilities were restored in addition to constructing five

new facilities for villages in al-Anbar Province to provide fresh water for more than 100,000 inhabitants.

The civil affairs relationship with electrical representatives brought improvements to three substations,

and the installation of additional electrical transformers increasing electrical output. Using funds from the

Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)

allowed the refurbishing of over 25 schools for use

by more than 10,000 students as well as providing

medical supplies, incubators, and funding for new

medical clinics. Civil affairs Marines provided food,

water, shelter, clothing, blankets, and medical assistance to 4,000 displaced persons in al-Ubaydi. In the

Hit area they provided 1,200 hygiene kits, 2,000

water buckets, 1,600 kerosene heaters, 1,700

sweaters, 10,000 blankets, and several thousand

pounds of food items. Additionally, civil affairs personnel delivered 39 primary care health care kits en134 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by LCpl Daniel J. Klein, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 050128-M-8096K-026

It was not all combat for the Marines in Fallujah. They helped out the local population when they could, such

as these Marines from the 4th Civil Affairs Group aiding Iraqis in loading a water tank onto a pickup truck to

move it to a more accessible area.
Continuous Operations 135

abling the Iraqi Ministry of Health to provide service

to 1.5 million citizens of al-Anbar Province. The overall reconstruction efforts resulted in completing 483

projects worth $18.3 million with 183 projects valued

at $13.3 million in progress.

The civil affairs effort discovered the absence of a

functioning plan for economic development, so one

was developed to engage U.S. agencies to determine

programs for economic development and what funding was available to begin pursing an economic development plan in Fallujah. The city was chosen

based on its improved security situation. Execution

typically began in a simple meeting with Iraqi businessmen and quickly grew to include more businessmen, key leaders, representatives from the

United States Agency for International Development,

the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, and

nongovernmental organizations. Civil affairs Marines

developed relationships to fund a micro-financing

program and develop a business center to promote

economic growth, training, and better business practices. The plan injected more than $5 million in Iraq

Reconstruction Management Office funds for alAnbar Province. From this beginning in Fallujah, the

same plan was used in Ramadi where 6th Civil Affairs

group began developing a business center and systematic micro-financing. Civil affairs actions also established an agriculture development plan addressing

irrigation as the primary means to improve crop production. Canals were cleared of debris using funds

primarily from the United States Agency for International Development Office of Transitional Initiative.

The Regional Reconstruction Operation Center supported II MEF, the Iraqi government, the U.S. Embassy,

and all organizations involved in reconstructing Iraq

by coordinating reconstruction efforts, information, logistics, and security between the contracting community, military, and Iraqi government. The reconstruction

program included 531 projects in al-Anbar Province,

valued at $440 million with 92 percent contracted and

45 percent work-in-place by February 2006. The reconstruction projects restored essential services in several infrastructure sectors including electrical, water,

wastewater, health, education, security, justice, transportation, and communication.

Aviation Support

The chief aviation challenge in 2005 continued to

be the excessive operation of aircraft because of the

continuous need for numerous mission types. The

School supplies are distributed to Iraqi children in Fallujah by Marines of the 4th Civil Affairs Group. The pupils

were returning to school in February 2005. Photo by Cpl Thomas D. Hudzinski, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 050205-M-7403H-027
daily routine support of personnel and cargo movements directly aiding combat operations required

strip alert aircraft constantly ready to provide casualty

and medical evacuation, tactical recovery of aircraft

and personnel, quick reaction forces, and both rotary- and fixed-wing close air support responding to

“troops in contact.” Other mainstay missions, usually

conducted daily, included convoy escort, armed reconnaissance, intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance over-watch of critical areas and routes,

fixed-wing aerial refueling, and radio relay.

Specialized requirements included electronic surveillance and jamming missions flown by Marine

Corps and Navy detachments of EA-6B aircraft in frequent rotation from bases in the United States to alAsad Air Base. While technical details and capabilities

remain classified, the efforts of the detachments and

aircrews frequently required 14 hours per day of coverage of priority areas such as Ramadi and important

surface routes. In general, aircraft of all types under

control of 2d Marine Aircraft Wing during the 2005–

2006 campaign operated at 2.5 times greater than acceptable usage specified in technical documents. Few

measures existed to reduce this high rate given the

global commitments of Marine Corps aviation and the

high priorities of almost all the missions being flown.

One possible remedy remained the unmanned aerial

vehicle program, the drones flown by Unmanned

Aerial Vehicle Squadrons (VMU) 1 and 2. The only

such squadrons—each comprising three detachments—existed in the Marine Corps, and their Pioneer and Scan Eagle drones already flew to the

maximum extent that the craft and their operators

could sustain, exceeding 1,100 hours a month. Ironically, more mission capabilities and new technical

upgrades had been developed and introduced by operators since 2004, which increased the demand for

the drones, now employed day and night.

Second Marine Aircraft Wing’s close air support remained highly valuable on the battlefield. In an action typical of the larger, multi-battalion operations,

the week-long combat of Task Force 3d Battalion, 2d

Marines in Operation Matador (May 2005), numerous

air strikes contributed to success in battle: strikes

from one armed drone, 12 helicopters, and 16 fighterbombers damaged enemy forces during the action.

As the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing and Marine Aircraft

Group 26 prepared to relinquish operations to the 3d

Marine Aircraft Wing in 2006, the tabulated statistics

below show the pace of aviation operations in the

first II MEF campaign in Iraq.

136 INTO THE FRAY

A Pioneer unmanned aerial vehicle of Marine Unmanned Vehicle Squadron 2 departs on a mission in

al-Taqaddum in June 2006.

Photo by Sgt Jennifer L. Jones, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 060621-M-8484J-024

In executing the tactical air requests, the aircraft,

both fixed- and rotary-wing, expended 209 tons of

ordnance, including 3,176 rockets and 614 precision

guided munitions. The aircraft flew some 3,900 convoy escort missions, and the ground support services

pumped 64 million gallons of aviation fuel, while another 30 million gallons were used in aerial refueling.

Logistics Operations

Although often overlooked in combat reports

and the press, logistics remained at the heart of the

II MEF campaign in Iraq. The activities of Brigadier

General Wissler’s 2d Force Service Support Group,

(renamed 2d Marine Logistics Group in 2005), at the

al-Taqaddum Air Base centered on the overall coordination of non-aviation logistics activities in alAnbar Province. This included theater

responsibilities for route and convoy security, support to almost all Coalition forces in the area of operations, operations and security of Camp

al-Taqaddum, and supervising tenant activities supTable 11-1: II Marine Epeditionary Force Air Operations
Continuous Operations 137

porting II MEF. The principal subordinate units (8th

Engineer Support Battalion, Combat Logistics Regiment 25, and Combat Logistics Battalions 2 and 8)

all executed continuing and special tasks specific

to their missions and assigned areas. These units

provided the critical and continuous logistic aid to

the 2d Marine Division and all its attached units and

partially to the Army’s 155th Brigade as well. Related tasks included convoy and route security, road

sweeps, and repair and explosive ordnance disposal support, aided in the last three functions by

companies of the 8th Engineer Support Battalion

usually in direct help to the combat logistics battalions.

Locally at Camp Taqaddum, the Marine Armor

Installation Site operated throughout the year installing kits and new protective features on the

wheeled tactical vehicles of the force, principally

Humvees and seven-ton trucks. Although the rate of

installation increased, the continued turnover of vehicles gave an endless aspect to this work. Improvement of the cargo and personnel capacity of

the airfield came with the completion of the Joint

Air Cargo Operations Terminal in late June 2005.

The consolidated passenger and air cargo facility

improved the ability of Taqaddum to function as an

air logistics hub. Because of the growing threat to

ground transportation, air transport continued to

grow in priority and quantity through the campaign.

The group engineers also consolidated the use of

Taqaddum as a primary stop in the theater ground

resupply system operated by the Army support system. A convoy marshalling yard entered service the

same month, a vast graveled lot suitable for hanPhoto by LCpl Brian A. Jacques, Defense Imagery: 050319-M-1327J-003

A convoy of vehicles from Combat Logistics Battalion 2 leaves Camp al-Asad for Camp Haditha on a resupply

mission in March 2005.
138 INTO THE FRAY

dling the new convoy routes also was introduced in

the theater. 

The theater transportation network depended to

a great extent on privately contracted flat-bed delivery systems, drivers, and commercial equipment

items supplied by the principal contractor, Kellogg

Brown, & Root. By December 2005, the contracted

support was so inadequate that 2d Marine Logistics

group had to employ organic tactical vehicles and

engage in open contracting of third country national equipment and drivers. The demands in December grew partly from the national election

support but also from the decision made by the

commander, Multi National Corps–Iraq, to close the

An explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technician, among Marines and soldiers attached to Combat Logistics

Battalion 8, 2d Marine Logistics Group, stages unexploded ammunition at Camp Fallujah. The EOD technicians were preparing the ordnance for destruction.

Photo by LCpl Bobby J. Segovia, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 051119-M-3717S-114
Continuous Operations 139

Coalition logistics base at Camp Dogwood, further

ordering II MEF to effect the transfer of U.S. equipment, munitions, and supplies to Taqaddum. On 28

December the last convoy departed Dogwood for

Taqaddum, completing the movement of 599 tractor-trailers in the month.

Related to all the reshuffling of storage capacity,

the group completed the enlargement of Taqaddum’s field ammunition storage point in December

by adding seven new magazines to accommodate

a new explosive weight of 35 million pounds,. An

equally important task performed by the group

came in the maintenance of worn equipment to the

Arifjan, Kuwait, rework facility operated by Commander, Marine Forces Central Command, and to

depots in the United States. A constant flow of generators, material-handling and construction equipment, and combat systems moved by air and

ground transportation in and out of Iraq.

Security at Taqaddum largely centered on the assigned infantry battalion provided by the Army:

first by the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, of the

Texas National Guard, and then by the 2d Battalion, 130th Infantry, from the Illinois National

Guard. These soldiers not only provided point defense of the base and related facilities but also

mounted most of the essential security patrols in

the surrounding areas required to stop insurgents

capable of firing mortar shells and rockets into the

base or firing hand-held missiles at aircraft.

In the field, Colonel Robert Destafney’s Combat

Logistics Regiment 25, based at Camp Fallujah, essentially provisioned the two direct support combat

logistics battalions aiding Regimental Combat

Teams 2 and 8 and the Army brigade at Ramadi.

The primary means of resupply was by convoy in

the eastern part of Area of Operations Atlanta and

by air in western al-Anbar Province. The latter effort required a daily C-130 sortie dedicated to the

regiment’s requirements, but occasionally operations in the west required up to three daily flights

as well as ground convoys sent as far as Camp Korean Village.

The situation for the two direct support battalions varied drastically with the terrain and end organizations. At Camp Fallujah, Lieutenant Colonel

Patrick N. Kelleher directed his Combat Logistics

Battalion 8 to aid Regimental Combat Team 8 and

the Army brigade at Ramadi, especially its attached

Marine Corps infantry battalion, with occasional

missions to the 155th Brigade in Area of Operations Biloxi. In a typical month, the battalion dispatched up to 100 supply convoys, also termed

combat logistics patrols, to needy units as well as

hundreds of crane and material handling missions.

The military police and explosives ordnance disposal platoons performed dozens of convoy escort,

road sweep, road repair, and explosives disposal

missions each week. The battalion maintenance

company provided dozens of vehicle recovery missions and contact team visits each week, including

several dozen “rapid requests” in the same interval. The battalion also coordinated explosive ordnance disposal for the region, handling responses

called in on the telephone hotlines for that purpose. Because of its personnel composition, the

battalion also provided a squad of female Marines

each day for duty with Regimental Combat Team 8

entry control points and checkpoints to assist in

screening and searching Iraqi women. Battalion engineers constructed several of the control and

checkpoints for the combat team and provided engineer support to it as well as the II MEF headquarters group, and Iraqi security forces in Area of

Operations Raleigh.

In the non-urban “wild west” of al-Anbar

Province, Colonel William S. Aitkin’s Combat Logistics Battalion 2 relied much more on aviation

support in performing its mission as well as using

three ground supply routes while assisting Regimental Combat Team 2 and its units from al-Asad

Air Base. With Company A, 8th Engineer Support

Battalion, in direct support, the battalion also undertook road sweeps, road repair, and explosives

disposal tasks throughout Area of Operations Denver. The surface convoys, several dozen per month,

drove to Korean Village, Hit, Haditha, and al-Qaim

initially, expanding their routes as other towns

came under control of Regimental Combat Team 2

and Iraqi forces. The initial airdrops began in April

and became a regular adjunct to helicopter support

to the outlying operating bases.

The frequency varied according to operations,

but the routine became three helicopter missions

and two airdrops to al-Qaim per week with one

additional airdrop to Camp Korean Village. The engineers of the battalion and attached engineer support company worked to expand the al-Asad Air

Base ammunition capacity and found considerable

work constructing forward operating and permanent bases, as well as platoon battle positions in

the area as more towns and villages came under

presence and control of U.S. and Iraqi forces.

Because of the distances involved and relative

scarcity of quick reaction forces, the convoys and

road sweeps of Combat Logistics Battalion 2 and
140 INTO THE FRAY

upgrades to existing buildings, constructing roads

and berms, runway repairs, and building camps for

Iraqi security forces ranging from the 670-man

combat outpost south in the border defense

scheme to the Iraqi 1st Division’s headquarters

camp at Ramadi for 2,100 people.

its attachments almost always relied upon reconnaissance, escort, and close air support by light and

attack helicopters of the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing.

The air logistics effort in al-Anbar Province supporting II MEF forces contributed in no small way

to the high operating tempo of the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing. At the end, the 2d Marine Logistics

group staff calculated that it had saved 3,115 outbound and 5,034 inbound tractor-trailer equivalent

loads of cargo by employing air transportation.

Using aircraft to move supplies undoubtedly prevented many casualties that many have been incurred in ground transportation especially given the

increasing mine and improvised explosive device

threat in theater.

In summarizing its activities in this first II MEF

campaign in Iraq, the 2d Marine Logistics Group

noted that it had completed the following (Table

11-2):

The 30th Naval Construction Regiment used its

considerable capabilities to improve camps and facilities throughout the II MEF area. Typical contributions included electrical and force protection

Table 11-2: 2d Marine Logistics Group Accomplishments
141

Although the optimism following the second battle of al-Fallujah and January 2005 elections had

faded for the Marines of II Marine Expeditionary

Force, indications suggested in early 2006 that the insurgency had passed its apogee and that self-government and security for Iraq would be obtained in

the near future. Hope existed that the culmination of

these efforts would occur in 2006 and that II MEF’s

relief units from I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) might be the last deployment of Marines as the

Multi National Forces–West in Iraq.

In addition to the December 2005 national election and the noteworthy Sunni participation that took

place, Marines and soldiers also took heart in the

long-awaited arrival of new Iraqi military and security

forces in al-Anbar Province. The Iraqi divisions and

brigades even began to take over forward operating

bases previously manned by U.S. forces and emboldened thoughts that they would replace American forces in their roles and tasks as well. Although

fielding an effective police force remained a difficult

objective, planners sought to produce a new police

force in the same manner that an effective national

Army seemed to be taking form.

Near Term Missions Assessed

The II Marine Expeditionary Force (Fwd) commander Major General Stephen W. Johnson and his

staff presented their assessment to the incoming Multi

National Corps–Iraq commander, Army Lieutenant

General Peter W. Chiarelli and his V Corps staff in

January. Although Marines and soldiers had registered success in 2005, al-Anbar Province remained a

dangerous place with a local active Sunni insurgency.

It was also frequently targeted by insurgent forces

operating across the Iraqi state. A persistent and permanent presence of Coalition troops continued as a

requirement for future success. Only with such a

sound military presence could the development of

the Iraqi Army and police forces be undertaken.

Operating in tandem, Coalition and Iraqi forces

needed both experience and numbers to carry the

fight to the enemy and deny it sanctuary and freedom of movement. Only when augmented by sufficient and capable Iraqi forces would the Coalition

begin to effectively interact with the local civilian

population. Thus, no reductions in force levels for

the foreseeable future would be considered. Rather,

the existing Coalition forces had to maintain their

presence and to exploit the successes claimed for

Operation Hunter.

The enemy situation by year’s end indicated that a

change in the Sunni resistance in the province might

be occurring. The insurgency continued to demonstrate resiliency with the ability to re-arm and reconstitute forces and to fund itself. At this point, the

insurgency included religious extremists, former

regime elements, emerging elites, tribal groups, and

criminals.

The oft-touted foreign fighter element in the overall insurgency posed less of an immediate problem.

In all of 2005, forces under II MEF had detained 9,695

Iraqis as suspected insurrectionists, some 40 percent

of those captured nationally, compared to only 141

third-country nationals detained or killed, amounting

to 30 percent of those taken across Iraq.

Marines and soldiers at the forward operating

bases had reported incidents of combat between

competing insurgent groups during the year. Analysts

determined that the second half of 2005 had seen a

widening schism developing. Extremists and moderate Iraqi groups pursued divergent agendas, mainly

over the alternatives of participating in the Iraq political process or in continuing to wage war. The

Sunni who had previously rejected the political alternative began to see participation as a means to

counter the perceived Shi’a threat and to restore

Sunni power and influence in what seemed now an

emerging, democratic Iraqi state.

If the Coalition forces could demonstrate the

power to restore at last the damaged infrastructure

and to provide local security for the population, U.S.

analysts foresaw a possible weaning of the Iraqi insurgents from violence and redirecting them into supporting the political processes. The reconstruction

effort in al-Anbar Province drew from a fiscal pooling

of $202.5 million from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Relief Fund, $65.5 million of the Development Fund for Iraq and $92.3 million of the

Commander’s Emergency Response Program. The

first two programs supported 239 projects in al-Anbar

Province, all but ten under contract by 10 January

Chapter 12

Redeployment and Relief
2006. These projects completed by then amounted

to those shown in Table 12-1.

The Commander’s Emergency Response Program

added local projects reported in separate categories 

During the same year, the fielding of Iraqi security

forces to al-Anbar Province had improved markedly 

The missing link at this juncture was the police forces

required for the Euphrates River Valley west of Fallujah.

The ‘Year of the Police’

in Al-Anbar Province, 2006

Using a model developed in Fallujah, Marine

Corps commanders and their planners saw a solution

to establishing a police force. Beginning in al-Qaim

and working through the Haditha-Hit corridor, assessment teams engaged the local leadership to determine their level of support, calculating numbers

of former police officers, equipment, and infrastructure remaining and required for each town and village. The teams included engineers able to assess

station suitability and begin drafting the renovation

projects. After finishing their surveys, the teams returned to al-Qaim and began screening candidates

for the police academy. Police transition teams then

took over and sustained the process.

The fielding of an effective police force in alAnbar Province was the priority task for the Multi National Forces–West during 2006: the goal was to transition from Coalition and Iraqi security forces to

civilian police. The plan for reconstruction of the police sought to establish nine districts deploying 11,330

policemen in the province, with the main concentrations at these locations (Table 12-2): 

The “Fallujah Model” consisted of screening and

vetting the candidates and training them at the Baghdad or Joint Iraqi Police Center. After their training

and equipping, the police units would deploy with

advisors, local military assistance, and with a system

of mentoring and partnering with experienced police

officers including transition teams from Coalition nations. Ongoing assessment and retraining remained

the last crucial parts of the model.

The establishment of local police would signal the

ability of Iraqi security forces to at last take the lead

in providing local security, freeing U.S. and Coalition

forces for purely military operations to support the

pacification of the province.

Combat Operations Continue with

the Rotation of Forces

Operations in al-Anbar Province in the first two

months of 2006, leading up to the relief of II MEF by

the incoming I MEF, fell under Operation Patriot

Shield II (2 January–4 April). Because of the almost

continuous rotation of battalions and squadrons during the period, no major operations occurred in January and February. The operational objective

remained to disrupt, neutralize, and interdict insurgent operations in every area of operations while the

reliefs took place.

A few examples must suffice for the many reported

in the period. Operation Red Bull II teamed 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, with the Iraqi 2d Battalion, 2d

Brigade, in counterinsurgency operations aimed at

three towns downstream from the Haditha Dam. Beginning on 14 January, companies and sniper teams

moved into assigned zones and then commenced

clearing operations simultaneously in four zones.

Company K cleared South Dam Village, while Companies I and L and the Mobile Assault Company

cleared Senjick, Khaffayrah, and the nearby train sta142 INTO THE FRAY

Table 12-1: Commander’s Emergency Response Program

Table 12-2: Concentration of Police Officers
Redeployment and Relief 143

tion. The last phase, ending on 25 January, saw companies L and I clearing each side of the river up to the

Area of Operations Fairbanks boundary with 22d

MEU. The operation netted only one detainee but uncovered 31 caches and two explosive devices.

At nearly the same time, Colonel McKenzie’s 22d

MEU launched 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, in Operation

Koa Canyon (15–26 January), a combined sweep on

both sides of the Euphrates with the Iraqi 1st Battalion, 2d Brigade, moving north to south from Jubbah

to the Hit operating base. The operation resulted in

20 detainees and the discovery of three explosive devices while uncovering 44 caches of weapons and

ordnance.

Far to the west, the 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion conducted a novel isolation action on

ar-Rutbah in Operation Western Shield (18–25 January). After establishing three traffic control points and

battle positions, Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Kosid’s

Marines brought in three teams of four bulldozers

each and progressively excavated a berm surrounding

the town, thus preventing any traffic from entering or

departing except through the control points. This effort considerably reduced the city’s value as a logistical haven for insurgents. 

North of Fallujah, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion inserted teams by helicopter to scout suspected insurgent locations and disrupt activities during the

changeover of an infantry battalion in the city.

Dubbed Operation Lakota Sunrise (22-29 January),

the effort sent teams ranging widely in a cordon and

search southward from the shore of Lake Tharthar

and also in interdiction operations along an east-west

corridor some 20 kilometers north of the city.

The relief of II MEF by I MEF in early 2006 demonstrated once again the value of replacing like organizations as well as indicating some new aspects of the

deployment effort in the continuing campaign for alAnbar Province. Although relieved of its operational

responsibility for an-Najaf and Karbala Provinces

upon the departure of the 155th Brigade, Major General Johnson negotiated with the Army commands for

specific replacements for the 22d MEU, 1st Battalion,

Photo by Cpl Seth Maggard, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 080425-M-1391M-005

An Iraqi policemen bags a piece of evidence during a

crime investigation course in al-Asad. 

In January 2006, LtGen Peter W. Chiarelli, USA

(below), relieved LtGen Thomas F. Metz, USA, as the

head of Multi National Corps–Iraq and as second in

command of Coalition forces.

Photo by LCpl Gabriela Garcia, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 061118-M-4937G-010

Table 12-3: Combat Operations
506th Parachute Infantry, at ar-Ramadi, and Task

Force Phantom. Although not successful in replacing

the last, a highly specialized unit, he did receive assurance by 20 January that the 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry, would replace the 22d MEU in Area Of

Operations Fairbanks and that the airborne battalion

would not depart its current Ramadi assignment.

The combat power fielded by II MEF, with the departure of the 155th Brigade, became the following

for 2006, intermittently swelled by the addition of a

Marine expeditionary unit:

The relief of the 2d Battalion, 69th Armor, by the

1st Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry, 2d Brigade,

28th Infantry Division, at Ramadi officially began the

2006 transfer of authority effort, and the first Marine

Corps organizations to participate in the process executed their transfers on 23 January, when the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, turned over its sector in Fallujah

to the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, newly arrived on its

third rotation to Iraq.

In contrast to previous turnovers of Marine Corps

forces in Iraq, the transfer of authority between II MEF

and I MEF lasted over three months instead of two.

The last unit of the 2d Marine Division, Company A,

2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, departed Iraq in midApril. In particular, the aircraft squadrons arrived and

departed with little or no overlap, and the gaps in the

Marine Corps air order of battle perhaps reflected the

global demands on the aviation arm. When Colonel

Jonathan G. Miclot relieved Brigadier General Robert

E. Milstead as Multi National Forces–West’s aviation

component commander on 8 February at al-Asad Air

Base, his 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) only had

ground support units, and both his wing staff and that

of Marine Aircraft Group 16, which had relieved Marine Aircraft Group 26 on 7 February, operated at halfstrength until more personnel arrived from the United

States. Effectively, this measure guarded against a perceived personnel manning trend of major rotations

occurring increasingly early in the calendar year. All

of Colonel Miclot’s aircraft squadrons, however, continued en route to the theater of operations, and

squadrons of the 2d Aircraft Wing’s order of battle

maintained the required functions. Such flexibility remained characteristic of Marine Corps aviation, but

there was more variation: two of the usual three

medium helicopter squadrons in the Marine aviation

order of battle were replaced in this period by a

heavy helicopter squadron of CH-53D helicopters and

a Virginia Air National Guard helicopter battalion that

144 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by Sgt Cooper I. Evans, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 060831-M-5265E-004

MajGen Richard C. Zilmer (left) meets with BGen Tarq Abd-Al Whab-Jassem of the 1st Iraqi Army Division before a transfer of authority ceremony in August 2006. Zilmer served as both commander of I MEF (Fwd) and

of I MEF’s ground combat element in Iraq from 2006 to 2007.
Redeployment and Relief 145

operated the UH-60–series Blackhawk helicopters. 

This turnover also maintained an element of continuing Army ground reinforcement in the province,

but it could only be temporary until the Army spring

rotations were completed. The Army, as strained as

the Marine Corps, could not leave all its units in

Iraq—most would have to rotate to the United States

following their normal rotation schedule. In some instances, their return dates were extended, but in the

end I MEF would be reinforced by one Army brigade,

as it had been during its al-Anbar Province campaign

in 2004. 

The last turnover of major subordinate commands

under the two Marine expeditionary forces came on

14 February when the forward deployed headquarters of the 1st Marine Logistics Group, led by Colonel

David M. Richtsmeier, relieved Brigadier General

Wissler and his 2d Marine Logistics Group at Taqaddum. The 2d Marine Division headquarters departed

Iraq during February. 

In contrast to earlier deployments, the 1st Marine

Division headquarters did not deploy with I MEF. This

unusual departure from standard Marine Corps organization and doctrine began with the consolidation

of the 2d Marine Division and II MEF staffs and operations centers at Camp Fallujah on 31 January. The

measure had its origins in 2004, when Major General

James N. Mattis assumed responsibility from the 82d

Airborne Division and noted how that division handled the ground command and control requirements—specifically, the Army’s method of detailing a

commanding general and two deputy commanders

for maneuver and support. He also sensed that the

BGen Robert B. Neller (left) served as I MEF (Fwd)

Deputy Commanding General for Operations.

Photo by LCpl Angela Hitchcock, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 060823-M-7416H-006

Table 12-4: II MEF Combat Power, January 2006
physical division of Marine Corps headquarters staffs

between Camp Fallujah and Camp Blue Diamond

might not be efficient. “This was a ground intensive

campaign, with no deep battle and only limited aviation play, apart from the persistent interest of USAF

commands in the use of USMC aviation. On the other

hand, the support function remained as intensive as

any corps level operation. It made little sense to have

layers of command and we could make economies.”

General Mattis approached the Commandant, General

Hagee, with his ideas. The concept lay fallow until

the following year. During his visit of April 2005, the

Commandant asked II MEF (Fwd) commander, Major

General Johnson, to study cutting manpower needs

between the two staffs. After planning discussions

with Major General Huck and staff lasting two

months, Johnson assured General Hagee that they

could consolidate the staffs early enough so that I

MEF would be able to duplicate the structure upon arrival. The restructuring of the II MEF command element provided a single staff capable of functioning

both in the MEF role of Multi National Forces–West

and in directing the ground war, as had the staff of the

Marine division in 2004 and 2005.

The resulting organization essentially charged the

II MEF current operations staff section with performing the daily ground operations coordination among

the remaining ground combat elements, two regiments and an Army brigade combat team. The commanding general of the Marine expeditionary force

received two deputy commanders, one for operations

and the other for logistics. These actions reorganized

the expeditionary force command structure so that

the force now resembled an Army ground corps

headquarters. The resulting economies in manpower

and materiel could be realized in this instance only

because of the much less demanding air-ground coordination and the fixed set of military requirements

in the current counterinsurgency campaign. In the

end, the incoming I MEF command headquarters exercised control over three regimental-sized ground

combat elements, an aircraft wing, and a logistics

group.

1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade commander

Major General Richard C. Zilmer headed I MEF’s forward command element. He was assisted by a

deputy commanding general for operations, Brigadier

General Robert B. Neller, and a deputy commanding

general for support, Brigadier General David G. Reist,

who was also commanding general of 1st Marine Logistics Group. On 28 February, Major General Huck

relinquished his responsibilities to Major General

146 INTO THE FRAY

Photo by Sgt Franciso Olmeda, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 061213-M-0914O-017

BGen David G. Reist (second from right), the 1st Marine Logistics Group commander, served as MajGen Zilmer’s

second deputy—the Deputy Commanding General for Supply.
Redeployment and Relief 147

Zilmer as Commanding General, Multi National

Forces–West. The first campaign of II MEF in Iraq had

come to its conclusion.

As the first units of II MEF began to redeploy to

their home bases at the end of January, the final tally

of operations showed that its Marines sailors and soldiers had conducted 9,476 direct actions consisting

of the following: discovering and destroying 2,141

improvised explosive devices, destroying 1,950 arms

caches, taking 4,607 offensive actions of various

types, firing 638 counter-battery fire missions, and

conducting 140 formal operations. These actions

killed 1,702 and wounded 405 insurgents, and detained 10,578 suspected insurgents.

The human cost to friendly forces was heavy. During this initial campaign in Iraq II MEF units sustained

some 2,942 casualties. At the time of the transfer of

authority between Major Generals Huck and Zilmer

on 28 February, the combat losses to I MEF and II

MEF in Iraq since the first departure of forces in September 2003 totaled 5,541 (500 killed and 5,041

wounded in action).

I believe 2006 is going to be another decisive

year for Iraq and for her people. They’ll begin to

see the benefits of the recent election and the increased capability and strength of their developing security forces. Since I last briefed you, the

Iraqis of al-Anbar have stepped forward and exercised their right to vote in unprecedented numbers. Al-Anbar saw more than 250,000 Sunnis

vote in the October referendum and approximately 370,000 in the December election. The

people have shown their resolve by participating in a new and unfamiliar process, but one that

offers hope for the citizens of Iraq. 

If you look back over the past year at al-Anbar

Province, the growth of the Iraqi Army in size,

capability and professionalism has been quite remarkable. Last April, there were two Iraqi Army

brigades in al-Anbar Province. Today, partnered

with Multi National Force–West units, we have

two divisions of the Iraqi Army that comprise

nearly 20,000 soldiers. Currently three brigades

have the lead in counterinsurgency operations in

their own area, and across the region, Iraqi Army

battalions are bearing an increasingly larger share

of the counterinsurgency fight. Along the entire

border with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria, construction is complete on all but a few of the forts,

and the soldiers of the Iraqi border forces are patrolling and providing security.

In the coming year in al-Anbar Province, I

think you’re going to see continued progress in

four key areas. First, that of presence. After the

recent and successful operations along the western Euphrates River Valley, a persistent presence

Major General Johnson Reflects on Marine Corps

Operations in Iraq in 2005

Table 12-5: Ground Combat Turnover January–April 2006

*Of the Marine Corps Reserve infrantry battalions, the 1st Bn, 25th Mar became the first to deploy for a second tour in Iraq, March 2006.
148 INTO THE FRAY

has been established at key points with Coalition

forces and increasingly capable Iraqi Army

forces. This presence is providing the conditions

under which Iraqi police will be introduced and

assist the local governments in assuming a

greater role in providing services to their people.

Secondly, Coalition force partnering with the

Iraqi security forces will be key. Coalition partnership with Iraqi security forces for training of

operations is key to their continued growth.

Through this partnership, Iraqi security forces

and readiness will grow, security conditions will

improve, and opportunities for good governance,

reconstruction and economic development will

appear.

Third, police. The reestablishment of Iraqi police in Fallujah has been a success story. With

1,200 trained police on the streets supported by

limited numbers of Iraqi Army and Coalition

forces, Fallujans were able to vote safely and in

large numbers in the recent election and the referendum. With 350 locally recruited police in

training and 160 more in training, the force will

soon reach its authorized strength of 1,700.

In other parts of the province, an assessment

of conditions conducive to the introduction of

police in towns and cities is under way. Police

stations are being identified for repair. The local

police chief has been nominated in the al-Qaim

region, and Iraqis are screening and recruiting

potential policemen. The reintroduction of a professional police force in al-Anbar will provide

local leaders with security and stability that they

need to take care of their own. These police will

start to be introduced over the coming months

in conjunction with the completion of their training. And finally, the political process. As a result

of the recent elections and increased persistence

conditions are favorable for change and for providing Iraqis with an opportunity to take advantage of the choices that are before them. 

We are hearing an increasingly larger number

of moderate voices. We want to give the political

opportunities, political process a chance. The

people want an inclusive government that provides an alternative to the violence like we saw

yesterday in Ramadi and to sectarian divisiveness. They want to focus on the needs of their

community: schools, hospitals, jobs and their

families. We’re continuing to see a Sunni insurgency in al-Anbar Province, and I think we will

continue to see it manifested until the political

process has time to develop. The people have

gone to the polls and voted. They’ve elected officials. Those officials will be seated and that

process will allow people to see that they have

the opportunity for success, that they have the

opportunity to be heard, and that there are alternatives to violence.

The detainees that we take in this province are

primarily local. They are people who live in the

towns in the Euphrates River Valley. When we

fight them, we fight them locally. That’s where

they live, and that’s where they come from. The

vast majority is local. And while there is an element of foreign fighters who influence or who

try to influence the local insurgency, it’s a very,

very small part of the insurgency.

Ramadi is not in flames. There are key places

where there are more insurgents than are others,

and we, along with our Iraqi security force partners, are going after them. But I do not see that

Ramadi has become a place where they are focusing a lot more effort. I think, again, it is local

people, local insurgents, primarily, who are causing the difficulties in key places, not the entire

town of Ramadi. 

As far as turning it over [to Iraqi forces], our

forces are still partnered with those Iraqi security

forces. We still provide support—logistics support, communication support and so forth, and

we still work very closely with them. But they’re

taking the lead in planning in a number of areas.

Also, where and when those forces take over is

a function of how long they have been together,

how long their training is—or how long have

they been functioning together. Some have only

come out of training since September, those in

the western Euphrates primarily, and those to the

east are a little more mature. One size doesn’t fit

all with the Iraqi security forces. Some will mature more quickly, and others will take longer. I

suspect within the next—probably in the next

four to six months you’re going to see a number

of forces who will be able to take an increasing

role in the lead or increasing lead here in this

area, down here in the Fallujah-Ramadi area, and

it’ll take a little longer for those that are newer

out in the Euphrates River Valley to assume a

greater role in their area. But I think in 2006 you

will see a continuation and a continuing to mature of these forces throughout the battlespace. 
149

The 2004–05 security and stability campaign by

Marine Corps forces in Iraq began with the objective

of reversing the nascent Iraqi insurgency and beginning the process of rebuilding a shattered society.

The emerging resistance against the allied Coalition

that had defeated Iraq in 2003 took U.S. forces and

civilian authorities by surprise. Higher authorities calculated that the extended presence of occupation

forces, the persistent application of counterinsurgency and security techniques, and the fielding of

Iraqi security forces would pacify the country. In parallel with the establishment of security, the U.S.-directed Coalition Provisional Authority projected the

creation of a provisional Iraqi government and the

facilitation of democratic elections at national and regional levels such that “governance” would be established within a year of the scheduled mid-2004

“reversion of sovereignty” to the Interim Iraqi Government.

In almost every aspect, the expectations of these

higher civil and military authorities proved overly ambitious and, in effect, repeated their earlier underestimation of resistance and insurgency in Iraq. The

U.S. military forces deployed in Iraq remained undermanned and thus incapable of maintaining the security presence in numerous Iraqi towns that could

and did shelter dissident elements that plotted and

executed violent attacks upon security forces and

civilians alike. Predictably, hopes that an Iraqi constabulary could be formed failed when a large contingent of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps refused to

participate in face of the Sunni revolt in al-Anbar

Province and the al-Sadr uprising of April–August

2004 or otherwise failed to report for duty in assisting U.S. and coalition forces in smaller scale security

operations throughout Iraq.

The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps received too little

basic training, no more than three to four weeks in

duration, intended for the more benign environment

expected in mid-2003. Instead, these newly formed

and untested units faced insurgents and extremists

that had gained combat experience fighting against

well-armed and seasoned troops, mostly fielded by

the United States. Nevertheless, when the first annual

rotation of U.S. forces began in the spring of 2004,

preparations continued to move the Iraqi security

units into the towns and to shift the U.S. forces outside the urban areas in permanent base camps already under construction to replace the forward

operating bases improvised from Iraqi military and

government compounds.

Into this tenuous situation of early 2004 came I

Marine Expeditionary Force, returning after the brief

and successful 2003 operation in which the Iraqi defenses had been overcome with such quick, decisive

and violent action that vast areas and major cities fell

with relative ease to U.S. and coalition control. The

summer and fall occupation duty experienced by approximately 8,000 Marines of the 1st Marine Division

in the largely Shi’ite populated areas between Baghdad and Basrah bore little resemblance to the challenges that the new campaign in al-Anbar Province

would bring.

The Marines, sailors, and soldiers comprising the

Multi National Force–West comprised by I MEF and

its reinforcements came prepared for the challenges

in the spring of 2004 and harbored no illusions that

the “Sunni Triangle” would prove easy as a security

and stabilization operation. The extent to which the

various Sunni insurgencies and small foreign terrorist elements thrived in both urban and rural areas exceeded all predictions. Although leaders such as I

MEF commander Lieutenant Generals James T. Conway and 1st Marine Division Major General James N.

Mattis sensed that the larger numbers of infantry they

introduced in the area of operations would significantly effect the security situation, the number of

Marines remained woefully insufficient to cover an

area of approximately 32 percent of Iraq’s total surface area. To that end, the Marine Corps commanders saw only the possibility of applying the patience,

persistence, and presence of their troops, and attacking the insurgent leadership when detected and

raiding the sanctuaries of the insurgents to destabilize

their activities.

These realities came to fruition very quickly in the

spring of 2004. After a few sporadic encounters with

insurgents in each of the regimental zones of operations, the murder of civilian contractors in al-Fallujah

and the mutilation and display of their corpses

brought orders to I MEF and 1st Marine Division to

clear the city of insurgents. The subsequent effort that

Epilogue

New and Old
exposed the scope and depth of the insurgencies in

the province at large. The two battles for al-Fallujah

remained pivotal in the I MEF campaign of 2004–

2005, although the successful measures for subduing

that urban center could not be repeated because of

the cost and destruction wrought in its execution.

Even as the scheduled election of January 2005 took

place, the situation faced by I MEF and the incoming

II MEF remained all too clear. Until some form of reliable Iraqi security forces could be established in sufficient numbers and competence, the U.S. Marine

Corps forces in al-Anbar and neighboring provinces

would have to wage an aggressive campaign. The

enemy had to be dug out of their enclaves and

brought to battle, but in selected cases and in situations in which the rest of the province would not suffer without sufficient security. At the same time, what

few Iraqi security forces could be established had to

be nurtured and mentored to the point that they

could at least operate with U.S. forces such that the

coalition could begin to overcome the cultural barriers that separated the public from the coalition forces

that sought to protect it.

The firepower and military technology wielded by

Marine Corps forces with all their training and expertise remained decisive, vital weapons when combat occurred: armored vehicles, artillery, and various

forms of air support could and did dominate portions

of the battlefield, but in the end the Marines soldiers

and sailors used rifles, grenades, and explosives to

confront insurgents at close quarters to eliminate their

hold over the population. Such work did not always

fall to the lot of the infantrymen, who remained

sorely under strength for the distances and scope of

the assignments. Many military personnel, regardless

of specialty, found themselves engaged in routine

scouting, patrolling, convoying, and screening tasks

in which ambushes or other forms of combat led to

counterattacks, pursuit, or search and clearing operations that many men and women of I MEF and II

MEF and other services experienced for the first time.

The progress in fielding an Iraqi security force

proved slow. What the Marines of I MEF initially

found in al-Anbar Province largely comprised only

seven Iraqi Civil Defense Corps battalions, renamed

Iraqi National Guard after the assumption of sovereignty by the Interim Iraqi Government. These units

mostly comprised local Sunnis recruited and trained

by the U.S. Army. Only one such unit could be

moved from its recruiting locale. When added to

what local police remained on duty, this force

amounted to approximately 2,000 Iraqis. A reasonable formula for counterinsurgency would have required over thirty battalions of combat troops for alAnbar Province. The I MEF was comprised of only

eleven U.S. battalions, not counting provisional units

employed for base defense. II MEF arrived in early

2005 with even fewer battalions.

The Iraqi security units displayed key vulnerabilities: they were subject to local infiltration, intimidation, and threats by local Sunnis. Regardless of the

degree of assistance provided by local Marine and

Army units, even including the vaunted Combined

Action Platoon doctrine used successfully by the Marine Corps in Vietnam, the Iraqi battalions failed to

the point of wholesale breakdown. A few units

manned by Shi’a or Kurdish soldiers proved much

less vulnerable to the Sunni insurgents’ intimidation

tactics. In general, however, the Iraqi units fielded in

2004–05 lacked strength, experience, and resilience

to fight the insurgents or to continue operating for

sustained periods of time. The Iraqi defense establishment also failed consistently to replace losses of

Iraqi soldiers and to provide adequate equipment for

their forces in al-Anbar Province. With the eventual

arrival of over two divisions of the Iraqi Army in the

province by early 2006 along with a marked improvement in the military competence of the Iraqi

soldiers, the continuing problems of violence and insecurity in the Marine Corps’ areas of responsibility

began to dissipate. These units drew their soldiers

largely from the Shi’a population but added somewhat to the existing discontent of the Sunni population of al-Anbar Province.

Improvements in security, realized by the end of

the two-year pacification campaign, meant that a certain part of the Sunni population could be persuaded

to cooperate with governmental authorities and to

participate in the basic restoration of Iraqi governance, rebuilding damaged towns and cities, and opposing the further use of violence. Results remained

uneven, and already in early 2006, the realization that

ar-Ramadi was one of—if not the most—dangerous

cities in Iraq suggested that it, not the infamous alFallujah, functioned as the true center of the Sunni

resistance and insurgency in the surrounding lands.

The continuing campaign to gain control over ar-Ramadi, without resorting to the devastation wrought

against al-Fallujah, remained a slow and often unrewarding process of vigilance, combat, and persistence. Aerial and artillery bombardment in many ways

threatened to become counterproductive. The Sunni

population continued to resent its lost status in the

former regime, and local leaders were skeptical that

U.S. forces would continue to fight insurgents and

terrorists with vigor. The Sunni population also be150 INTO THE FRAY
Epilogue: New and Old 151

lieved that the Iraqi national government would

never earn Sunni support and participation in moderate forms of political action.

For the men and women serving in the two Marine

expeditionary forces and numerous Marine expeditionary units deployed to Iraq, the tasks at hand remained all too obvious and challenging. Marines

could not engage in self-doubt or self-pity. All the

day-to-day violence, aggravated by devastating explosions of improvised devices, mines, and suicide

bombers, had to be endured with patience, resolve,

and tactical savvy. They continued to treat the population as a peaceful entity, requiring the Marines’

protection and vigilance. The dissident and insurgent

elements required the use of violent force, but still

preserving the essential humanity of the situation

such that Marines soldiers and sailors could discern

the boundaries between the violence of combat and

the limitations posed by a nearby civilian populace

that in the end had to be “won over” to the cause of

the western occupier and the awkwardly functioning

native government. For the Marines, soldiers, and

sailors of the Marine expeditionary forces in Iraq,

service there was their “finest hour,” especially since

it was under great military and political pressures.

These included at times being outnumbered, being

watched from near and far for any signs of weakness,

being second-guessed by military and civilian officials and the mass media; operating under restrictive

rules of engagement preventing them from using

their full array of combat power and weaponry; and

fighting an enemy, often at close quarters, who did

not wear a uniform and who blended in the population of noncombatant civilians. In such an environment, the thought of failure or letting down one’s

fellow Marines remained unthinkable. The attitude

and accomplishments of the Marines inspired new

legendary feats of courage in the long history of the

Marine Corps.

The Marine Corps forces in Iraq, with the reinforcing organizations that joined them in Multi National Force–West operated with initial handicaps that

could be overcome only by gaining experience and

applying it at a rapid pace. The myriad tasks facing

Marines in both urban and wide open rural terrain

almost defy description. A series of broken cities and

communities literally lay at their feet, occupied by inhabitants thoroughly demoralized by the shock of

war and occupation, lacking any level of experience

in self-government and self-sufficiency to make a

concerted effort at rebuilding. The Marines, however,

did not, as other armies have done, celebrate victory

with triumphant parades and speeches. Their actions

and attitudes were low key and those of professionals who had accomplished their missions to the best

of their abilities. They did not treat the Iraqis as the

enemy or a conquered people. They did not hoist

American flags atop buildings in triumph.

In a remarkable series of events, the Marines and

their comrades reached into themselves and drew

upon their training, discipline, pride, dedication to

duty, physical readiness, and fighting spirit to adapt

to the novel conditions and dangers of counterinsurgency missions and executed them with steady resolve, overcoming setbacks and generally remaining

benign in victory.

Those mission successes and achievements did not

come without cost. During the campaign of 2004–05,

some 500 Marines of Multi National Force–West were

killed while serving in Iraq with thousands more

wounded—many grievously—in combat. Since 20

March 2004, elements of I MEF and II MEF, augmented by the rest of the active and reserve establishments, provided continuous presence in Iraq.

The new battle streamers on the two Marine Expeditionary Forces’ colors symbolize much. They represent more than a year of the lives and the service of

the individual Marines and sailors. They recall the 500

fellow Marines and sailors who lost their lives for the

mission and who made the journey home ahead of

their comrades. They represent great courage in battle. They represent remarkable stamina over months

and even years. They represent unshakable honor

tested in a war against a treacherous, often invisible

enemy in the worst of conditions. They represent immeasurable personal sacrifice by the Marine expeditionary forces’ Marines and sailors and their families.
152 INTO THE FRAY
153

Chapter 1

The principal sources for this and subsequent

chapters are the official records and working papers

held by the Marine Corps Archives, Gray Research

Center, Marine Corps University, located at Marine

Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia. In addition, certain

reference materials located at the Marine Corps History Division, Marine Corps University, have been

used. Relevant classified records held by the

archives of the Gray Research Center were examined and catalogued by the author during 2006-07.

Because no formal inventory or finding aids have to

date been produced by the archives, the classified

records used herein are identified by use of their

classified material control center (CMCC) registry

number assigned by the CMCC, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, the cognizant security management authority. These registry

numbers take the form of S-1234-06, in which the

letter designates a classification of secret, the four

numbers the sequential assignment of the item or

document by the CMCC in its registry, and the last

numbers the year of accession into the control system, i.e. not the date of the document concerned.

Although less satisfactory than a true inventory, the

use of the CMCC registry numbers permits the researcher to locate the requisite items.

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from the following material:

For the situation in Iraq following the overthrow

of Saddam Hussein, see Donald P. Wright and

Colonel Timothy R. Reese with Contemporary Operations Study Team, On Point II: Transition to the

New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003–January 2005 (Fort

Leavenworth, KS, 2008); Michael R. Gordon and

General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside

Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New

York: Pantheon Books, 2006); Kenneth W. Estes,

“1st Armored Division: Operation Iraqi Freedom,

May 2004–July 2004” (Wiesbaden: HQ 1st Armored

Division, 2005); Charles E. Kirkpatrick, “V Corps Becomes CJTF-7: The Month of Plans and Decisions”

(Heidelberg: HQ V Corps, draft November 2004).

For the Iraqi insurgency, see Carter Malkasian,

“Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” in Counterinsurgency

in Modern Warfare, edited by Daniel Marston and

Carter Malkasian (New York: Osprey Publishing,

2008) and Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and

Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

For General Hagee’s plans for the Marine Corps’

second deployment to Iraq, see General James T.

Conway Interview, in Al-Anbar Awakening, Volume

I American Perspectives: U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004–2009, edited by Chief

Warrant Officer–4 Timothy S. McWilliams and Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler (Quantico: Marine

Corps University Press, 2009); General Michael W.

Hagee oral history, part I, 14 July 2005. Unedited

and unreleased version provided by Dr. Fred Allison, Marine Corps Historical Center. 

For the challenges and problems faced by the

new deployment, see Headquarters Marine Corps,

EOS Update Briefing, 15Oct03; S-3991-06; Marine

Corps Chronology 2003, Reference Section, Marine

Corps Historical Center; Headquarters Marine Corps

Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations

Briefs” for 01Dec03, 17Dec03, 23Feb04, S-1764 to

1816-06. 

For the makeup of the I Marine Expeditionary

Force deployment, see 1st Marine Division Operation Iraqi Freedom II draft manuscript, (unpublished, undated); Headquarters Marine Corps

Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief”

21Nov03; 1st Force Service Support Group Command Chronology (ComdC), July-Dec03; “I MEF OIF

II RFP MSG FINAL,” S-3937-06\ Archived OIF-II-1

Files; “Matrix_New_Baseline_09_JAN_2004_1100,” S3937-06\Archived OIFII-1 Files; Regimental Combat

Team 7 ComdC Feb-Mar04 shows E/2/11 arriving

Kuwait 28Feb04, S-0306-06\1MarDivClassified

\Disk2\Regimental Combat Team 1 Mar04PartV\CC

A/1/11 Feb–Mar04.

For the situation in al-Anbar Province and I MEF

planning for operations there, see Bing West No

True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah (New York: Bantam, Books, 2005); Commanding General Talking Points-OIF II Update,

Ground Dinner-18Jan04, S-3937-06; Headquarters

Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current

Notes
Operations Briefs” for 5Jan04, 12Jan04, 28Jan04,

“Force Flow Update” 28Jan04, S-3937-06. 

Chapter 2

For information on the deployment of forces, see

1MarDiv ComdC Jan-Jun04; “Draft I MEF OM and RIP

Frag 18Feb04,” S-3937-06\Archived OIF-II-1 files; “First

60,” S-3937-06; “I MEF input DRAFT 2 MARCENT to

CJTF-7 confirmation of dates” 23Jan04 in S-3937-

06\RIP&TOA; 1MarDiv ComdC Jun-Jun04 (unclassified); “Sequential Listing of Significant Events (U)”

S-3801-06\1MarDiv June-Jul04; 1FSSG ComdC JanJune04; 3MAW (fwd) ComdC 10Feb-31Mar04; Operation Iraqi Freedom–II ASE Completion Schedule,

System description, Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief”

29Jan04; Lieutenant General Michael A. Hough, “State

of Marine Aviation,” Marine Corps Gazette 88 (May04),

5: pp. 11-27; PPO 040129; USCENTCOM msg was his

040803ZJan04; CJTF-7 reported a shortfall of 2,780 uparmored HMMWVs in Iraq; Brigadier General William

D. Cato, “Rapid Acquisition in Support of Operation

Iraqi Freedom II” Marine Corps Gazette 88 (May04), 5:

pp. 48-50.

Chapter 3

For information on the geography and population

of the al-Anbar province see Department of Defense,

Iraq Transitional Handbook, Dec 2003, DOD-2630-

IRQ-005-04; Iraq Tribal Study: Al-Anbar Governorate,

Global Resources Group, June 18, 2006; Gretchen A.

Sparkman “COLISEUM Requirement K506-04-0029-S,”

a contracted précis, S-4522-06\HistoricFiles\al-Anbar

Historical; Lewis Owen, “Tigris-Euphrates river system.” Encyclopedia Britannica (2007); “2004 World

Data,” Encyclopedia Britannica (2006).

For the deployments of I MEF’s component units

see Regimental Combat Team 7 ComdC Feb-Mar04;

1MarDiv ComdC Jan-Jun04, 3d MAW ComdC JanJun04, 1st FSSG Comdc Jan-Jun04, 1st Marines 7th

Marines ComdC Jan-Jun04, 1st BSSG ComdC JanJun04; pilot controller handbook 15Jun05, S-0265-

06\FECC Encl\Air Web Page Files. 

For I MEF’s relief of the 82d Airborne Division and

initial I MEF engagements in al-Anbar see Regimental

Combat Team 7 Intentions messages, 19-29Mar04, S3933-06\Intentions Mssg\Mar04\Regimental Combat

Team 7; Regimental Combat Team 7 ComdC FebMar04; 1MarDiv Sequential Listing of Events, S-3801-

06; 1BCT Intention messages, 21Mar04-30Mar04,

S-3933-06\Intentions Mssg\Mar04\1BCT; 1MarDiv

ComdC Jan-Jun04; 1MarDiv Sequential Listing of

Events, S-3801-06; Michael S. Groen, “The Tactical Fusion Center,” Marine Corps Gazette 89 (April, 2005) 4:

pp. 59-63; Headquarters Marine Corps Operations

Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief” 18April04;

Combat Power 15Apr04; S-3937-06\I MEF

Sitreps\SitrepOfficer\AsstSitrepOfficer\Combat Power.

Chapter 4

For Operation Vigilant Resolve, including background of the battle and operation, see 1MarDiv

ComdC Jun-Jan04; 1st Marine Division Operation Iraqi

Freedom II draft manuscript, (unpublished, undated),

Ch4; 1MarDiv Intentions 01April04, S-3933-06\Intentions Mssg\Apr04; 1MarDiv Intentions 03April04; Regimental Combat Team 1 ComdC Apr04; “1/5 Frag

Order 005-04” 11Apr04, Ref Sect, 1-5 Historical Docs

OIF1-2; 1st Bn, 2d Mar, 1st Bn, 5th Mar, A Battery, 1st

Bn, 11th Mar, and Regimental Combat Team 1 ComdCApr04; U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence Center, “Complex Environments: Battle of Fallujah, 1 April

2004,” S-4504-06.

For Company B, 1st Bn, 5th Mar action during the

first battle of Fallujah, see J. Smith Silver Star Citation,

RefSect; Robert D. Kaplan “Five Days in Fallujah,” The

Atlantic Monthly 294 (July/August 2004), 1:pp. 116-26.

For the indecisive conclusion to the first battle of

Fallujah, see 1MarDiv ComdC Jan-Jun04; U.S. Army

National Ground Intelligence Center, “Complex Environments: Battle of Fallujah 1,” April04, S-4504-06.

For the Sadr Uprising and the Mahdi Army, see

CJTF-76 April FragO 581; Estes, “1st Armored Division:

Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2004 -July 2004” (Wiesbaden: HQ 1st Arm Div, 2005); 1MarDiv 8Apr04 Intentions; 1MarDiv 11Apr04 Intentions.

For fighting in Ramadi during the spring of 2004,

see 2d Bn, 4th Mar Intsum 06-07April04-7, S-0306-

0 6 \ D i s k F o u r \ 2 - 4 J a n A p r ( S e c ) T a b K S 2 \ T

\KS2\INTSUMS\APR; Morel and Copeland Navy

Cross, Baptista, Bronzi and E. M. Smith silver star citations, RefSect.

For the redeployment of Regimental Combat Team

7 and Operation Ripper Sweep, see 1MarDiv Intentions 13Apr07; 1MarDiv Intentions 14Apr07; 1MarDiv

17Apr04 Intentions; 1MarDiv Intentions Apr-May04;

1Mar-Div ComdC June-July04; Regimental Combat

Team 7 ComdC Apr-May04.

For the reorganization of the Combined Joint Task

Force 7 into Multi National Force–Iraq and Multi National Corps–Iraq see Donald P. Wright and Colonel

Timothy R. Reese with Contemporary Operations

Study Team, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003–January 2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS,

2008), pp. 173-176.

154 INTO THE FRAY
Notes 155

For I MEF operations during the spring and early

summer of 2004, see 1MarDiv Intentions May-June04;

1Mar-Div ComdC Jan-Jun04; Regimental Combat Team

1 ComdC May04 and Jun04; Regimental Combat Team

7, ComdC May and Jun04; Silver Star citation Matthew

A. Lopez, RefSect; 1MarDiv Intentions 26April04.

For the deployments of the 11th, 24th, and 31st Marine Expeditionary Units, see USMC Chronology, RefSect; Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center

(POC) “Current Operations Brief” 040518, 040621,

041004; 24 July report to 1stMarDiv by 24th MEU

based upon 1MarDiv Intentions message that date; S3937-06\IMEF sitreps\Jul04\11th MEU sitrep 31Jul04;

Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC)

“Current Operations Brief,” 06June04; 040604; USCENTCOM RFF serial 325 (020847Zjun04; Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current

Operations Brief” 21Jun2004; COMMARFORPAC DEPORD 151900ZJun04.

For the Battle of an-Najaf see, Francis X. Kozlowski,

U.S. Marines in Battle: an-Najaf, August 2004 (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps History Division, 2009); Jackson, 89; G-3 I MEF “Information Memorandum on

Operations in An-Najaf.

For the status of forces in July 2004, see Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current

Operations Brief,” 20July2004. 

Chapter 5

For the situation in Fallujah during the summer of

2004, including security operations, the Fallujah

Brigade, and attacks against I MEF forces, see I MEF

Cdr Update 11May04, S-3709-06\CdrsUpdate Highlighted\May04; MajGen Amos in IMEF Cdr Updates

5May04, 20 May04, S-3709-06\CdrsUpdate Highlighted\May04; “Talking points for Fallujah Brigade Situation,” S-3811-06\MEF Briefs; IMEF Cdr Updates

1May-1Sept04, S-3709-06\CdrsUpdate Highlighted

\May04; “OIF II Aircraft Loss Report (as of 14Sep04)”

in Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center

(POC) “Current Operations Brief” 041001; Sitrep

092200Sep04, S-3709-06\IMEF Sitrep\Sep04. 

For preparations for the second battle of Fallujah,

see Clifton Distinguished Flying Cross citation, RefSect;

Slide, “Laptop Standalone” (7Sep04) and briefing,

“Shaping Fallujah” (9Sept04), S-3811-06\MEF Briefs for

Historical Purposes\VIP briefs; “TF 6-26 Fallujah Shaping Operations” (27Sept04), S-3811-06\MEF Briefs for

Historical Purposes\VIP briefs\Prospective Slides;

1MarDiv Frag Orders 0295, 0300 and 0314-04, S-3925-

06\1DivChron\DivClasChron IV items; 1MarDiv

ComdC, July-Dec04; Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief”

01Oct04; Regimental Combat Team 1 and Regimental

Combat Team 7 ComdC, July-Dec04; 31st MEU, “Operation Phantom Fury, Mission Analysis Briefing

28Oct04,” S-3925-06\1stDivChronology\Ops History\ChronFileS3. 

For the rocket attack on RCT-1’s headquarters, see

1st Marines ComdC, 1Sept-31Sept04 (Gray Research

Center, Quantico, VA), pp. 15-16.

For the plans for Operation Phantom Fury/al-Fajr

see App 11–Intell Est, RCT7 FragO 0220-04 31Oct04, S3813-06\Regimental Combat Team 7 docs\Operation

Phantom Fury CD; ”Regimental Combat Team 7 Mission Analysis and COA Development Fallujah

24Sep04,” S-3815-06\Chessani\planning docs; cf. “Falluja II OPT” (1Oct04) Regimental Combat Team 1, S3815-06\Chessani\planning docs; 1 Div Chronology

July-Dec04; Regimental Combat Team 1 Intentions

Messages, S-3925-06\1st MarDiv ComdC Dec04\RCT1

Part III TAB C\November Intentions; Regimental Combat Team 7 Intentions messages, S-3925-06\1st Div

Chronology Dec04\Regimental Combat Team 7 JulyDec04\Regimental Combat Team 7 Command

Chrono\Regimental Combat Team 7\November Supporting docs; Lee Silver Star citation, RefSect.

For the events of the second battle of Fallujah see

Regimental Combat Team 1 “Air in Fallujah,” S-4501-

06.

For details and illustrations, see “Aviation FiresConOps,” S-3925-06\1stDivChronology Dec04\RCT1 Part

IV\H Tab\”Phantom Fury Air Brief v.3.ppt”

(11/2/2004). “I MEF OIF2.2 11 Sept for BG Mcabee,”

S-3811-06\MEF briefs historical\VIP briefs\VIP briefs

for WEB. Fred Allison, “Urban CAS Marine Corps Style

Fallujah 2004” unpublished essay, Marine Corps Historical Division (December, 2007); 1MarDiv ComdC

July-Dec04; MNF-I “Fallujah Strategic Mission Analysis

Briefing (3Oct 04),” S-4501-06; I MEF Sitrep of 9

Nov2004; Regimental Combat Team 1 Intentions, S3925-06\1st Div Chronology Dec04\RCT1 Part III TAB

C\November Intentions; Regimental Combat Team 7

Intentions, S-3925-133 06\1st Div Chronology

Dec04\Regimental Combat Team 7 July-Dec04\Regimental Combat Team 7 ComdC\Regimental Combat

Team 7\ November Supporting docs; 2-7 Cavalry,

“Optimized Fallujah Storyboard, S-3925-06\1st Div

Chronology Dec04\2-7 Cav; Adelsperger Navy Cross

(posthumous) and Kirk Silver Star citations, RefSect;

Regimental Combat Team 1 Intentions 12 Nov04, S3925-06\1st Div Chronology Dec04\RCT1 Part III TAB

C\November Intentions; 1MarDiv Jan-July04 SignEvents, S-3801-06; Fallujah Capt Winslow\S-3515 to

3519-06; Department of Defense “Fallujah Update 05

Nov 04” S-4503-06; “Optimized Train Station Recon-
naissance Results,” Regimental Combat Team 1, S3815-06\Chessani \planning docs for photos of Regimental Combat Team 1 assembly areas, routes; “Iraqi

Order” Regimental Combat Team 1, S-3815-06\Chessani\planning docs for details of Regimental Combat

Team 1 assault, plus detailing of Iraqi FOF for pacification, Phase IV.

For aviation operations during Operation al-Fajr see

Major A. R. Milburn “Lessons Learned; Operation

Phantom Fury” 5 Jan 05, S-4501-06; Regimental Combat Team 1 CommandBriefDec04, S-3925-06\1stDivChonologyDec04\RCT1 Jul Dec04 PartIV\I Tab;

Regimental Combat Team 1 “Air in Fallujah”, S-4501-

06; Artillery table from S-4501-06, unknown provenance.

For the stabilization operations during Operation

al-Fajr see Regimental Combat Team 1 Intentions (various), S-3925-06\1st Div Chronology Dec04\RCT1 Part

III TAB C\November Intentions; Regimental Combat

Team 7 Intentions (various), S-3925-06\1st Div

Chronology Dec04\Regimental Combat Team 7 JulyDec04\Regimental Combat Team 7 Command

Chrono\Regimental Combat Team 7\ November Supporting docs; Regimental Combat Team 1 intentions,

12Nov04; Kasal and Mitchell Navy Cross citations, Refsect; I MEF sitreps, Nov-Dec 04; The Regimental Combat Team 1 ComdC Dec04 also notes 23 December as

the beginning of Phase IV operation; Krafft and Workman Navy Cross citations, RefSect. Colonel John Ballard comments on draft manuscript, 11Jun08;

“Phantom Fury Phase IV” S-3815-06\Chessani\planning docs; also in Regimental Combat Team 1 Frag

order 001(Phase IV) to OpOrd 003-04 (Phantom Fury),

S-3815\Regimental Combat Team 1 FragOsl.

For assessments of the second battle of al-Fajr, see

1MarDiv, “Phase IV ConOps” (11Oct04), S-4501-06;

“Phantom Fury Phase IV” Regimental Combat Team 1,

S-3815-06\Chessani\planning docs; LtGen John F. Sattler and LtCol Daniel H. Wilson, “Operation Al Fajr:

The Battle of Fallujah–Part II,” Marine Corps Gazette

89 (July, 2005) 7:12-24; “Intercept from Phantom Fury;”

S-4501-06–redacted for declassification purposes. As

of 27 Dec 04, cited in Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief”

041227 “Source: HQMC CRC manpower officer;”

Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC)

“Current Operations Brief” 041227.

Chapter 6

For information on the transfers of authority in alAnbar during the winter of 2004-2005, see Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current

Operations Brief” 24Nov04 and 09Dec04; 1MarDiv

ComdC July-Dec04.

For actions supporting the January 2005 elections

see Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center

(POC) “Current Operations Briefs” for 09Dec04,

22Dec04, 02Feb05, 07Feb05, 11Feb05, 18Feb05,

11Jan05, 20Jan05, 24Jan05, 24Oct05; “Election draft

FragO” (MNF-I), S-4522-06\HistoricFiles\Elections; I

MEF sitreps26-31Jan04; I MEF sitrep, 30Jan04.

For the repopulation of Fallujah, see 1MarDiv

ComdC Jan-June05.

For I MEF operations in early 2005, see I MEF, “Operation Iraqi Freedom II. 2 August, 2004-March, 2005,”

author files; 1MarDiv ComdC Jan-Jun05; 31st MEU

ComdC Jan-Jun05; 7th Marines ComdC Jan-Jun05;

Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC)

“Current Operations Brief” 09Dec04 Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief” 24Jan05; Headquarters Marine Corps

Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief”

11Feb05; Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief” 29Mar05; Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC)

“Current Operations Brief” 18Feb05050218.

Chapter 7

For Multi National Force–Iraq’s operational goals

and plans for 2005, see “Thoughts on the Current Situation in Raleigh and Fallujah,” S-3815-06\Chessani\Planning Docs; “CASB-12Jun04, with attached

OPlan Sovereign Iraq (May04 draft),” S-4521-06\TOA

and After.

For the Commandant’s planning guidance and deployment plans of II MEF, see 24Jun04 draft Command

Marine Corps (CMC) planning guidance for Operation

Iraqi Freedom III, CMC 081328ZJul04, and LOI for II

MEF Operation Iraqi Freedom III OPT 2-20Aug04; S4521-06\Operation Iraqi FreedomIII; “AO Atlanta Assessment” in 2d Intel Battalion,”Operation Iraqi

Freedom III OPB 134 040902” briefing, S-4521-06\Operation Iraqi Freedom III OPT; II MEF ComdC FebApr05; 2d AA Battalion ComdC JJ05; Regimental

Combat Team 8 ComdC JJ05; Headquarters Marine

Corps Operations Center (POC) Daily Briefs JanApr05; 3d Bn, 25th Mar ComdC Jan-Jun05; Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current

Operations Brief” 17Mar05. 

For supply issues faced by II MEF, see Marine Corps

Logistics Cmd, ComdC2004; Headquarters Marine

Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations

Brief” 22Feb05. 

For II MEF operations during the first months of deployment in 2005, see Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief”

156 INTO THE FRAY
Notes 157

17Mar05; II MEF ComdC Feb-Apr05; Regimental Combat Team 2 ComdC Jan-Jun05; Bn, 8th Mar ComdC

Jan05; 3d Bn, 4th Mar ComdC Jan-Mar05; A/2d LAR

Bn ComdC Jan-Apr05; Regimental Combat Team 8

ComdC Jan-Jun05; Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief”

050211-15; 155th BCT Sitrep 132000Feb05, S-4489-

06\155BCT\05 Feb; Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief”

25Jan05, 08Jan05, 17Mar05, 04April05, 07April05; 1st

Bn, 1st Mar ComdC Jan-Jun05; MAG-26 ComdC, Mar05

and Apr05.

Chapter 8

For Operation River Blitz and River Bridge, see

2MarDiv Sitrep 050317, S-4489-06\2MarDiv Intentions

Messages\05 Mar ; Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief”

31Mar05; II MEF ComdC Feb-Apr05.

For the insurgent attack on Camp Gannon and

other operations on the Syrian-Iraqi border, see

1stMarDiv Intentions 050221, S-4489-06\2dMarDiv\2dMarDiv Intentions, see Regimental Combat

Team 2 ComdC Jan-Jun05; Steve Fainaru, “The Grim

Reaper, Riding a Firetruck in Iraq: Marines Recount

Dramatic Assault At Base Near Syria” Washington Post,

(10Apr05), A1.

For II MEF counterinsurgency operations throughout Area of Operations Atlanta, see Regimental Combat Team 2 ComdC JJ05, 3d Bn, 25th ComdC Mar JJ05;

for op order and maps, photos see S-4491-06\Operation Matador\S3; RCT2 ComdC Jan-Jun05 and JulSep05, 3d Battalion, 2d Mar ComdC July05, 3d

Battalion, 25th Mar ComdC Jan-Jun05, July-Dec05;

Stann and Wimberg (posthumous) Silver Star citations,

RefSect; 1st Bn, 5th Mar ComdC Jan-Jun05; Russell Silver Star citation, RefSect.

Chapter 9

For the Sunni insurgency, see Regimental Combat

Team 8 ComdC Jan-Jun05; 1st Bn, 6th Mar ComdC JanJun05 also featuring excellent maps; Waldron Silver

Star citation, RefSect.

For II MEF’s campaign plan for 2005, see MEF Campaign Plan 28Jan05,S-0259-06\MNF-WSitreps\OpOrdAnnexes.

For II MEF’s combat power in al-Anbar, see Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief” 04Aug05; RCT2 ComdC

Jul-Sep05; 3d Bn 2d Mar ComdC Aug05; 3d Bn, 25th

Mar ComdC July-Dec05; A/1st Tk Bn ComdC Aug05. 

For II MEF counterinsurgency operations in alAnbar during the summer of 2005, see “Multi-National

Force West (MNF-W) Operations Order 1-05 (Title:

Operation Iraqi Freedom 04-06 Campaign Plan)”, S0259-06\Opord-Annexes; 2MarDv Intentions 30May05,

S-4489-06\2dMarDiv\2dMarDiv Intentions Messages\05May; 2MarDiv Intentions 06Jun05, S-4489-

06\2dMarDiv\2dMarDiv Intentions Messages\05Jun;

Regimental Combat Team 2 ComdC Jul-30Sep05;

Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC)

“Current Operations Brief” 01Aug05. 

For the situation on the Iraq-Syrian border and II

MEF efforts to address the weak defenses there, see II

MEF Sitrep 050901; S-0259-06\MNFW Sitreps\Sep05;

“Task Force Phantom Tacon To 2d MarDiv (revised)”;

S-0627-06\publishedfragorders; “FECC Classified Command Chronology May 05 to Dec 05; S-4523-06\G3\FECC; Regimental Combat Team 2 ComdC

Jul-Sep05.

For information on training Iraqi military forces see

“BTT Location” “POE Brief v7.1” and “Al Qaim COA

Brief,” S-0266-06\ISF\DBE; Headquarters Marine

Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations

Brief” 05May05, 01Jun05, 31Aug05; “BTT Location 25

Dec,” S-0266-06\ISF enclosures. 

Chapter 10

For information on Iraqi Security Forces, see “Strategic Basing & ISF Laydown Narrative” (16Apr05), S4489-06\ISF; “MNF-W ISF Monthly Status,”

Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC)

“Current Operations Brief” 31Aug05; 7th IA Div movement in Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief” 15Feb06; MTT

data from Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief” 31Oct05; 2MarDiv G-3 ComdC Nov05 and Dec05; 13th MEU ComdC

July-Dec05; “021600CDec05. Cg.Loo.Briefing.Graphics,” S-0261-06\Dec05. 

For II MEF efforts to encourage voting in al-Anbar,

see 2MarDiv Frago 0158-05 of 30Jul05: Operation Liberty Express; S-4509-06\Elections Turnover.

For counterinsurgency operations during the latter

half of 2005 see “Div Liberty Express OPT Outbrief (08

Aug 05) V.2 (Optimized)” [with excellent illustrations],

S-4509-06\Elections Turnover\Liberty Express Documents; II MEF Future Ops [staff section] ComdC JD05,

S-4523-06\G3\FOPS; “Border FortCode Words 5-18”

(15Jan06), S-0266-06\ISF enclosures\DBE; FECC Classified Command Chronology May 05 to Dec 05; S-4523-

06\G3\FECC; Headquarters Marine Corps Operations

Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief” 03Oct05; 3d

Bn, 6th Mar ComdC Oct-Dec05; 1st Tk Bn ComdC JulyDec05; Foncon au with Lieutenant Colonel Alford,

03Jun08; Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center
(POC) “Current Operations Brief” 03Oct05; 2MarDiv Hq

Bn G-3 ComdC Oct05; 2MarDiv Hq Bn G-3 ComdC

Oct05; Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center

(POC) “Current Operations Brief” 051019; I MEF Future

Ops ComdC July-Dec05, S-4523-06\G3\FOPS;

“270001.Cdec05.Firm Bases.Hadithah.Haqliniyah.Barwana”; S-0621-06\Dec05; 2Mardiv 061212COct05 Mod

2 To FragO 0158-05, S-4509-06\Elections Turnover\Liberty Express Documents\Div Liberty Express FragO;

After action reports of 2d Marine Division, 8th Marines

and 2d Brigade: S-4509-06\Elections Turnover\Liberty

Express Documents\After action reports; Headquarters

Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief” 28Oct065; 13th MEU ComdC July-Dec05;

2MarDiv G-3 ComdC Sept05 and Oct, Nov05; 2MarDiv

G-3 ComdC Nov05; “010001CDec05.Op.Hard.Knock;”

S-0261-06\Dec05; 2MarDiv G-3 ComdC Dec05; “Div

Liberty Express Transition Brief (11 Dec 05)”; S-0237-

06\1-LibertyExpress Documents; 2MarDiv G-3 ComdC

Dec05; “312400CDec05.3.1.Op.Red.Bull” “Green Trident” and “Bulldog,” S-0261-06\Dec05; II MEF FOPS

ComdC July-Dec05; 2MarDiv G-3 ComdC Dec 05; casualties from Headquarters Marine Corps Operations

Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief” 03Jan06.

For information on the Constitutional Referendum

Elections, see John Ward Anderson and Jonathan

Finer, “Pollings Close in Iraq: Large Numbers Turn Out

Despite Sporadic Violence” Washington Post (October

15, 2005). 

For a summary of Operation Hunter see 13th MEU

ComdC Oct-Dec05; ComdC 3d Bn, 6th Mar OctDec05; “012400CDec05. Op.Hunter.Effects.Complete”, S-0261-06\Dec05; 2MarDiv G-3 ComdC

Nov05; II MEF, “012400CDec05.Op.Hunter. Effects.Complete,” “012000CDec05.ISF.Laydown,” S0261-06\Dec05; 2MarDiv G-3 ComdC Nov05;

MNF-W Sitrep 051110, S-0259-06. 3d Bn, 6th Mar

Oct-Dec05; “012400CDec05. Op.Hunter.Effects.Complete”, S-0261-06\Dec05; 2MarDiv G-3 ComdC

Nov05.

Chapter 11

For the operations of Marine Corps civil affairs

groups as well as reconstruction projects, see 5th CAG

ComdC Sept-Dec05; 4th CAG ComdC Jul-Dec05; 5th

CAG ComdC Jul-Dec05; 6th CAG, “Finding Guide for

the Records of the 6th Civil Affairs group (Provisional),” in a 362Mb disc filed with the ComdC JulDec05 and Jan-May06. Operational archives of 5th

CAG are in S-4488-06, for 6th CAG in S 0237, 0238,

0243-06; II MEF Presidential Unit Citation Award Recommendation 2005–2006, RefSect.

For aviation operations during 2005, see MAG-26

ComdC Mar05; VMU-1 and VMU-2, ComdC 2005; II

MEF Aviation Universal Needs Statements on UAV,

common data/ground links and pods are contained in

S-0265-06; 2d MAW, “Operation Matador 8-14 May

Rollup;” S-0265-06\Aviation Strike Reports; “MNF-W

Combat Operations in Review (28Jan06), S-0262-

06\Jan06.

For logistics operations, see 2d MLG, CLR-25, CLB2, CLB-8 ComdC Mar-Dec05; “MNF-W Combat Operations in Review (28Jan06), S-0262-06\Jan06.

Chapter 12

For the need for police forces and plans for training them, see II MEF, “Al Anbar: Near Term Way

Ahead (13Jan06),” S-4557-06\G3 1of7\V Corp Brief on

Al Anbar (13 Jan) (ver5.2).

For II MEF operations during the first months of

2006, as well as the relief of II MEF by I MEF in early

2006, see MNF-W Combat Operations in Review

(28Jan06),” S-0262-06\Jan06; 22d MEU ComdC JJ06;

Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC)

“Current Operations Briefs” 03Jan06-28Feb06; II MEF

Sitrep 051231, S-0259-06\MNFW Sitreps\Dec05

For General Mattis’ recommendations for new command structures for Marine Expeditionary Force deployments to Iraq, see Mattis interview 12Oct07; I MEF

ComdC Jan-Jun06.

For Marine Corps casualties sustained in Iraq since

2003, see Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief” 01Mar06.

Major General Johnson’s thoughts on the accomplishments of II MEF in Iraq can be accessed at

http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?tra

nscriptid=879.

Epilogue

For analysis of whether or not the coalition deployed enough troops to Iraq, see Carter Malkasian,

“Did the Coalition Need More Forces in Iraq? Evidence

from Al Anbar,” (Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses, 18 November 2006).

158 INTO THE FRAY
159

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)/Multi National Force–West

March 2004–February 2005

Commanding General: LtGen James T. Conway (until September 2004)

LtGen John F. Sattler

Deputy: MajGen Keith J. Stalder (until May 2004)

BGen Dennis J. Hejlik

Chief of Staff: Col John C. Coleman 

G-1: Col William J. Hartig (until May 2004)

Col Eric D. Bartch 

G-2: Col James R. Howcroft (until June 2004)

Col Ronald S. Makuta 

G-3: Col Larry K. Brown (until June 2004)

Col Michael R. Regner

G-4: Col Bruce E. Bissett (until June 2004)

Col Andrew Reynosa III

G-5: Col Anthony L. Jackson (until June 2004)

Col Richard O. Bartch

G-6: Col Marshall I. Considine III (until June 2004)

LtCol Martin E. Lapierre Jr.

I MEF Headquarters Group

Commanding Officer: Col John C. Cunnings (until June 2004)

Col Joseph A. Bruder IV

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC)

Commanding Officer: Col Anthony M. Haslam 

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC)

Commanding Officer: Col Robert J. Johnson 

31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Col Walter L. Miller Jr.

3d Civil Affairs Group

Commanding Officer: Col Michael M. Walker

4th Civil Affairs Group

Commanding Officer: Col John R. Ballard

Marine Ground Combat Element

1st Marine Division (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding General: MajGen James N. Mattis (until August 2004)

MajGen Richard F. Natonski

Assistant Division Commander: BGen John F. Kelly (until July 2004)

BGen Joseph F. Dunford Jr.

Appendix A

Command and Staff List1
Chief of Staff: Col Joseph F. Dunford Jr. (until July 2004)

Col Robert J. Knapp

1st Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 1)

Commanding Officer: Col John A. Toolan (until September 2004)

Col Lawrence D. Nicholson (14 September, 2004)

Col Michael A. Shupp

7th Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 7)

Commanding Officer: Col Craig A. Tucker

1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (U.S. Army)

Commanding Officer: Col Arthur W. Connor Jr., USA

2d Brigade, (-) (Reinforced), 1st Cavalry Division “Black Jack” (U.S. Army)

Commanding Officer: Col Michael D. Formica, USA

2d Brigade (-) (Reinforced), 2d Infantry Division, “Strike Force Brigade” (U.S. Army)

Commanding Officer: Col Gary S. Patton, USA

Marine Aviation Combat Element

3d Marine Aircraft Wing (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: MajGen James F. Amos (until May 2004)

MajGen Keith J. Stalder

Assistant Wing Commander: Col Roy A. Arnold 

Chief of Staff: Col Gerald A. Yingling Jr. (until July 2004)

Col Rex C. McMillian (until October 2004)

Col Rick W. Schmidt

Marine Aircraft Group 16 (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Col Stuart L. Knoll (until April 2004)

Col Guy M. Close

Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Col Ronnell R. McFarland (until June 2004)

Col Jonathan G. Miclot 

Marine Wing Support Group 37 (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Col Juan G. Ayala

Marine Combat Service Support Element

1st Force Service Support Group (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: BGen Richard S. Kramlich

Deputy Commander: Col John L. Sweeney Jr.

Chief of Staff: Col Tracy L. Mork

Combat Service Support Group 11 (-)

Commanding Officer: Col David B. Reist

Combat Service Support Group 15 (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Col Michael E. Kampsen

I Marine Expeditionary Force Engineer Group

160 INTO THE FRAY
Appendix A: Command and Staff List 161

Commanding Officer: RAdm Charles R. Kubic

RAdm Raymond K. Alexander

II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)/Multi National Force–West

March 2005–February 2006

Commanding General: MajGen Stephen T. Johnson (until January 2006)

MajGen Richard A. Huck

Deputy: BGen Charles S. Patton

Chief of Staff: Col John L. Ledoux 

G-1: LtCol John R. Armour (until September 2005)

Maj Blair S. Miles 

G-2: Col John T. Cunnings

G-3: Col Glenn T. Starnes (until October 2005)

Col Thomas L. Cariker 

G-4: Col John J. Fitzgerald Jr. (until July 2005)

Col. Donald C. Hales 

G-5: Col Kenneth D. Bonner

G-6: Col Sean T. Mulcahy

II MEF Headquarters Group: (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Col Daniel D. Leshchyshyn

13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (-)

Commanding Officer: Col James K. LaVine

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC)

Commanding Officer: Col Thomas C. Greenwood

22d Marine Expeditionary Unit

Commanding Officer: Col Kenneth F. McKenzie

5th Civil Affairs Group (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Col Steven E. McKinley

6th Civil Affairs Group

Commanding Officer: Col Paul W. Brier

155th Brigade Combat Team (Reinforced) (Army National Guard)

Commanding Officer: Col Augustus L. Collins, USA (until April 2005)

Marine Ground Combat Element

2d Marine Division (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding General: MajGen Richard A. Huck (until January 2006)

Assistant Division Commander: BGen Joseph J. McMenamin

Chief of Staff: Col Robert G. Sokoloski

2d Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 2)

Commanding Officer: Col Stephen W. Davis 

8th Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 8)

Commanding Officer: Col Charles M. Gurganus (until August 2005)

Col David H. Berger

2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division (Reinforced) (U.S. Army)

Commanding Officer: Col Gary S. Patton, USA
162 INTO THE FRAY

2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division (Reinforced) (Army National Guard)

Commanding Officer: Col John L. Gronski, USA

Marine Aviation Combat Element

2d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward)

Commanding General: BGen Robert E. Milstead 

Chief of Staff Col John T. Rahm (until August 2005)

Col Thomas M. Murray

Marine Aircraft Group 26 (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Col Thomas M. Murray (until February 2006)

Col David J. Mollahan

Marine Air Control Group 38

Commanding Officer: Col Jonathan G. Miclot 

Marine Air Control Group 28 (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Col Mark R. Cyr

Marine Wing Support Group 27 (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Col Scott M. Anderson

Marine Combat Service Support Element

2d Force Service Support Group (Forward)

Commanding General: BGen Ronald S. Coleman (until June 2005)

BGen John E. Wissler

Chief of Staff: Col James E. McCown III

Combat Logistics Regiment 25

Commanding Officer: Col Robert W. Destafney (until September 2005)

Col Dennis W. Ray

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)/Multi National Force–West

March 2006–February 2007

Commanding General: MajGen Richard C. Zilmer 

Deputy Commanding General for Operations: BGen Robert B. Neller

Deputy Commanding General for Support: BGen David G. Reist 

Chief of Staff: Col George F. Milburn

G-1: Col Eric D. Bartch

G-2: Col Peter H. Devlin

G-3: Col Michael P. Marletto

G-4: Col Scott A. Dalke

G-5: Col Chad W. Hocking

G-6: Col Kirk E. Bruno

I MEF Headquarters Group

Commanding Officer: LtCol Thomas Ward

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit

Commanding Officer: Col Thomas C. Greenwood (Until August 2006)

Col Brian D. Beaudreault
Appendix A: Command and Staff List 163

Marine Ground Combat Element

1st Marine Division (Forward) 

Commanding General: MajGen Richard F. Natonski (until August 2006)

MajGen John M. Paxton

Assistant Division Commander: Col Kevin A. Vietti

Chief of Staff: Col Kevin A. Vietti

5th Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 5)

Commanding Officer: Col Lawrence D. Nicholson

7th Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 7)

Commanding Officer: Col William B. Crowe

1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division (U.S. Army)

Commanding Officer: Col Sean B. MacFarland, USA

Marine Aviation Combat Element

3d Marine Aircraft Wing

Commanding General: MajGen Samuel T. Helland

Assistant Wing Commander: Col Jonathan G. Miclot (until June 2006)

Col Howard F. Baker

Chief of Staff: Col Rick W. Schmidt (until September 2006)

Col Guy M. Close

Marine Aircraft Group 16

Commanding Officer: Col Guy M. Close (until May 2006)

Col John C. Kennedy

Marine Aircraft Group 31

Commanding Officer: Col Robert Walsh (until May 2006)

Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Col Jonathan G. Miclot (until June 2006)

Col Mark G. Cianciolo

Marine Combat Service Support Element

1st Marine Logistics Group (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding General: BGen David G. Reist2

Col David M. Richtsmeier (CO Fwd)3

Deputy Commander: Col Elvis E. Blumenstock4

Chief of Staff: Col Michael D. Malone (until January 2007)

Col Juan G. Ayala

Combat Logistics Regiment 17

Commanding Officer: LtCol Todd A. Holmquist (until July 2006)

LtCol James C. Caley (July-August 2006)

LtCol Kirk C. Wille

Combat Logistics Regiment 15 (-) (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer: Col Charles L. Hudson (until June 2006)

Col Brian J. Vincent III
164 INTO THE FRAY

Notes

1. To present a comprehensive order of battle for the entire period covered by this anthology (2004-08) would require a

volume unto itself. The goal of this appendix is to give as comprehensive a list as possible within the space provided. Consequently, not all Marine Corps units deployed to Iraq between 2004 and 2008 are listed. 

The majority of Marines deployed to Iraq during this time period were under the command of Multi National Force–

West (MNF-West), which was coterminious with either I MEF (2004-05), II MEF (2005-06) or I MEF (2006-07). The appendix

is divided by MEF deployment, and lists commanders down to the regimental level and units down to the battalion level

that were at one time under the command of MNF-West during each MEF deployment. 

The information is drawn from the following sources: I Marine Expeditionary Force Presidential Unit Citation Recommendation (2005), II Marine Expeditionary Force Presidential Unit Citation Recommendation (2006), I Marine Expeditionary Force Presidential Unit Citation Recommendation (2007), LtCol Kenneth W. Estes, “U.S. Marine Corps Operations

in Iraq, 2003-2006” (Quantico, VA: History Division: United States Marine Corps, 2009), USMC History Division Reference

Branch, “Chronology of U.S. Marines and Global War on Terror,” at http://www.tecom .usmc.mil/HD/Chronologies/Campaign/GWOT_2001-2005.htm (accessed 3 June, 2009), and Institute for the Study of War, “Order of Battle, Coalition Combat Forces” at http://www.understandingwar.org /IraqOrderofBattle (accessed 3 June, 2009).

2. BGen Reist served as 1st MLG commanding general and as Deputy Commanding General for Supply. See 1st Marine

Logistics Group (MLG), Command Chronology (CC), July-December 2006, p.2. 

3. Col David M. Richtsmeier was Commanding Officer, 1st MLG (Fwd). See Cpl Daniel J. Redding, “Combat zone ingenuity protects Marines,” Operation Iraqi Freedom—Official Website of Multi National Force–Iraq, 10 August, 2006, at

http://dr15.ahp.dr1.us.army.mil/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2005&Itemid=225. accessed 25 August,

2009.

4. Col Blumenstock served as Acting Commander, 1st MLG, while BGen Reist was deployed to Iraq as Deputy Commanding General for Supply, I MEF (FWD). See 1st MLG Command Chronology, July-January, 2006, p.3.
165

U.S. Marines in Operation Iraqi Freedom

March 2004-February 2007

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) [I MEF]/Multi National Force–West [MNF-W] 

March 2004-February 2005

Command Element

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [11th MEU (SOC)]

Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 4th Marines [BLT 1/4]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 166 (Reinforced) [HMM-166]

Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 11 [MSSG-11]

Task Force, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry (U.S. Army) [TF 1st Bn, 5th CavReg]

1st Battalion, 227th Aviation (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 227th AvReg]

153d Engineer Battalion (U.S. Army) [153d EngrBn]

1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (U.S. Army) [1st Bn 5th SFG]

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [24th MEU (SOC)]

Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 2d Marines [BLT 1/2]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (Reinforced) [HMM-263]

Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 24 [MSSG-24]

Task Force 2d Battalion, 24th Marines [TF 2d Bn 24th Mar]

Task Force “Blackwatch” (United Kingdom) [TF “Blackwatch”]

31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (-) (Reinforced) [31st MEU]

1st Battalion, 23d Marines (Reinforced) [1st Bn 23d Mar]

Task Force Naha [TF Naha]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (Reinforced) [HMM-265]

1st Battalion, 7th Marines (Reinforced) [1st Bn 7th Mar]

Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 3d Marines [BLT 1/3]

3d Battalion, 5th Marines [3d Bn 5th Mar]

Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 31 [MSSG-31]

2d Force Reconnaissance Company (-) [2d ForReconCo]

2d Battalion, 11th Marines (-) (Reinforced) (Provisional MP Battalion) [2d Bn 11th Mar]

I Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group [I MEF HqGru]

2d Intelligence Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d IntelBn]

2d Radio Battalion (-) [2d RadBn]

9th Communications Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [9th CommBn]

Battery C, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines [Btry C, 1st Bn, 10th Mar]

Battery E, 2d Battalion, 10th Marines [Btry E, 2d Bn, 10th Mar]

Detachment, 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [Det, 1st ANGLICO]

3d Civil Affairs Group [3d CAG]

4th Civil Affairs Group [4th CAG]

Appendix B

Unit List
166 INTO THE FRAY

Marine Ground Combat Element

1st Marine Division (-) (Reinforced) [1st MarDiv]

Headquarters Battalion (Reinforced) [HqBn]

Small Craft Co (-) [Small Crft Co]

2d Battalion (-) 11th Marines (Reinforced) [2d Bn, 11th Mar]

3d Battalion, 24th Marines [3d Bn, 24th Mar]

3d Battalion (-) 11th Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 11th Mar]

2d Battalion, 4th Marines [2d Bn, 4th Mar]

1st Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 1 [1st Mar/RCT-1]

2d Platoon (-), 1st Force Reconnaissance Company [2d Plt, 1st ForReconCo]

Fire Control Team, 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [FCT, 1st ANGLICO]

2d Battalion, 1st Marines [2d Bn, 1st Mar]

3d Battalion, 1st Marines [3d Bn, 1st Mar]

2d Battalion, 2d Marines [2d Bn, 2d Mar]

3d Battalion 4th Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 4th Mar]

1st Battalion, 5th Marines [1st Bn, 5th Mar]

3d Battalion, 5th Marines [3d Bn, 5th Mar]

3d Battalion, 8th Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 8th Mar]

Task Force 2d Battalion 7th Cavalry (U.S. Army) [TF 2d Bn, 7th Cav]

Task Force Light Armored Reconnaissance [TF LAR]

1st Reconnaissance Battalion [1st ReconBn]

2d Reconnaissance Battalion [2d ReconBn]

Company B, 1st Battalion 4th Marines (-) (Reinforced), [Co B, 1st Bn, 4th Mar]

Company D, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion (Reinforced) [Co D, 2d AABn] 

Company C, 2d Tank Battalion (Reinforced) [Co C, 2d CmbtEngBn]

Company B, 2d Combat Engineer Battalion, (-) (Reinforced) [Co B, 2d CEB]

Battery M, 4th Battalion, 14th Marines (Reinforced) [Btry M, 4th Bn, 14th Mar]

7th Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 7 [7th Mar/RCT-7]

1st Battalion, 7th Marines [1st Bn, 7th Mar]

2d Battalion, 7th Marines [2d Bn, 7th Mar]

3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

1st Battalion, 8th Marines (Reinforced) [1st Bn, 8th Mar]

1st Battalion, 23d Marines [1st Bn, 23d Mar]

Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (Reinforced) [BLT 1/3]

1st Force Reconnaissance Company [1st ForReconCo]

2d Force Reconnaissance Company [2d ForReconCo]

3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [3d LAR Bn]

Task Force 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry (-),(U.S. Army) [TF 2d Bn, 2d Inf]

Company C, 3d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery (U.S. Army) [Co C, 3d Bn, 82d FldArty]

Company A, 2d Tank Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [Co A, 2d Tank Bn]

Detachment, Company C (-), 2d Combat Engineer Battalion [Det, Co C, 2d

CmbtEngrBn]

Detachment, Company A (-), 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

[Det, Co A, 3d LAR]

Marine Expeditionary Force Service Support Group 31 [MSSG-31]

2d Brigade (-) (Reinforced), 1st Cavalry Division “Black Jack” (U.S. Army) [2d Bde, 1st CavDiv]

15th Forward Support Battalion (U.S. Army) [15 FwdSptBn]
Appendix B: Unit List 167

Task Force 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry “Stryker” (U.S. Army) [TF “Stryker”]

Task Force 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry (U.S. Army) [TF 1st Bn, 5th Cav]

Battery A, 3d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery (U.S. Army) [A Btry, 82d FldArty]

Attack Helicopter (U.S. Army) [Atk Helo]

Company B, 312th Military Intelligence Battalion (U.S. Army) [B Co, 312th MilIntelBn]

Company B (-), 13th Signal Battalion (U.S. Army) [B Co, 13th SigBn]

759th Composite MP Battalion (U.S. Army) [759th Comp MPBn]

2d Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d ReconBn]

Company A (Reinforced), 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion,

[Co A, 2d LAR Bn]

Detachment, Explosive Ordinance Disposal Platoon (-), 63d Ordnance Battalion

[Det, EOD Plt, 63d OrdBn]

1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (U.S. Army) [1st Bde, 1st InfDiv]

2d Battalion, 4th Marines [2d Bn, 4th Mar]

2d Brigade (-) (Reinforced), 2d Infantry Division “Strike Force Brigade” (U.S. Army)

[2d Bde, 2d Inf]

2d Battalion, 2d Force Support Battalion (Reinforced) (U.S. Army), 

[2d Bn, 2dForSuppBn]

Task Force 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry (-), (U.S. Army) [TF 1st Bn, 503d Inf]

Task Force 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry (-) (U.S. Army) [TF 1st Bn, 506th Inf]

Task Force 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry (U.S. Army) [TF 1st Bn, 9th Inf]

Task Force 2d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery (U.S. Army) [TF 2d Bn, 17th FldArty]

44th Engineering Battalion (-) (U.S. Army) [44th EngrBn]

Company A, 102d Military Intelligence Battalion (U.S. Army) [Co A, 102d MilIntel Bn]

Company B(-), 122d Signal Battalion (U.S. Army) [Co B, 122d SigBn]

Company B, 5th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery (U.S. Army) [Co B, 5th Bn,

5th AirDefArty]

2d Battalion 5th Marines (Reinforced) [2d Bn, 5th Mar]

Marine Aviation Combat Element

3d Marine Aircraft Wing (-) (Reinforced) [3d MAW]

Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 3 (-) (Reinforced) [MWHS-3]

Marine Aircraft Group 16 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-16]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 367, MAG-39 [HMLA-367]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 (-), MAG-39 [HMLA-169]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 268, MAG-39 [HMM-268]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365, MAG-29, 2d MAW [HMM-365]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 774, MAG-42, 4th MAW [HMM-774]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 [HMH-361]

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (All-Weather) 242, MAG-11 [VMFA(AW)-242]

Marine Attack Squadron 542 [VMA-542]

Marine Attack Squadron 311 [VMA-311]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 (-) (Reinforced) [MALS-16]

Marine Air Control Group 38(-) (Reinforced) [MACG-38]

Marine Tactical Air Command Squadron (-) (Reinforced) [MTACS-38]

Marine Air Support Squadron 3 (-) (Reinforced) [MASS-3]
168 INTO THE FRAY

Marine Wing Communications Squadron 38 (-) (Reinforced) [MWCS-38]

Marine Air Control Squadron 1 (-) (Reinforced) [MACS-1]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 [VMU-1]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 [VMU-2]

Marine Wing Support Group 37 (-) (Reinforced) [MWSG-37]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 373 [MWSS-373]

4th Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion (Reinforced), 4th MAW (Prov Sec

Battalion, Al Asad) [4th LAAD Bn]

Battery F, 2d Battalion, 10th Marines (Tactical Control from 1st FSSG) [Btry F,

2d Bn, 10th Mar]

Battery K, 4th Battalion, 14th Marines [Btry K, 4th Bn, 14th Mar]

Battery P, 5th Battalion, 14th Marines [Btry P, 5th Bn, 14th Mar]

Detachment, Marine Air Control Squadron 1 [Det, MACS-1]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 472 [MWSS-472]

Detachment, 9th Communication Battalion [Det, 9th CommBn]

326th Area Support Group (U.S. Army) [326th AreaSptGru]

1439th Engineer Team (U.S. Army) [1439th EngrTm]

767th Engineer Team (U.S. Army) [767th EngrTm]

Marine Combat Service Support Element

1st Force Service Support Group (-) (Reinforced) [1st FSSG]

Headquarters and Service Battalion [HqSBn]

2d Battalion, 10th Marines (-) (Reinforced) [2d Bn, 10th Mar]

Combat Service Support Group 11 (-) [CSSG-11]

Combat Service Support Battalion 1 [CSSB-1]

Combat Service Support Battalion 7 [CSSB-7]

Combat Service Support Group 15 (-) (Reinforced) [CSSG-15]

I Marine Expeditionary Force Engineer Group [I MEFEngrGru]

Task Force Charlie [TF Charlie]

Task Force Echo [TF Echo]

Task Force Sierra [TF Sierra]

Task Force Tango [TF Tango]

With Participating Members From:

1st Naval Construction Battalion [1st NCB]

7th Naval Construction Regiment [7th NCR]

22d Naval Construction Regiment [22 NCR]

20th Seabee Readiness Group [20th CRG]

31st Seabee Readiness Group [31st CRG]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 3 [NMCB 3]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 4 [NMCB 4]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 7 [NMCB 7]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 14 [NMCB 14]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 15 [NMCB 15]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 17 [NMCB 17]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 23 [NMCB 23]
Appendix B: Unit List 169

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 74 [NMCB 74]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 [NMCB 133]

120th Engineer Battalion (Combat Heavy) (U.S. Army) [120th EngrBn]

II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)/Multi National Force–West [II MEF (FWD)/MNF-W]

March 2005-February 2006

Command Element

13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (-) [13th MEU]

Command Element

Battalion Landing Team 2d Battalion, 1st Marines [BLT 2/1]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 [HMM-163]

Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 13 [MSSG-13]

22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (-) [22d MEU]

Command Element

Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 2d Marines [BLT 1/2]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261 [HMM-261]

Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 22 [MSSG-22]

II MEF Headquarters Group (-) (Reinforced) [II MEF HqGru]

Headquarters and Service Company [HqSCo]

Headquarters and Service Company, 4th Tank Battalion, 4th Marine Division 

(Provisional MP) (Reinforced) [HqSCo 4th Tank Bn, 4th MarDiv]

Company A, 4th Tank Battalion [A Co, 4th Tank Bn]

Company B, 4th Tank Battalion [B Co, 4th Tank Bn]

Battery C, 1st Battalion, 14th Marines [Btry C, 1st Bn, 14th Mar]

Battery D, 2d Battalion, 14th Marines [Btry D, 2d Bn, 14th Mar]

Headquarters Battery, 5th Battalion, 14th Marines [HqBtry, 5th Bn, 14th Mar]

Battery N, 5th Battalion, 14th Marines [Btry N, 5th Bn, 14th Mar]

Battery O, 5th Battalion, 14th Marines [Btry O, 5th Bn, 14th Mar]

Company E, 2d Battalion, 25th Marines [Co E, 2d Bn, 25th Mar]

Battery D, 2d Battalion, 14th Marines [Btry D, 2d Bn, 14th Mar]

Battery C, 1st Battalion, 14th Marines [Btry C, 1st Bn, 14th Mar]

Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, 23d Marines [Wpns Co, 1st Bn, 23d Mar]

1st Platoon, 2d Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team Company [1st Plt, 2d FAST]

Antiterrorism Battalion, Combined Antiarmor Team [AT Bn, CAAT 3]

1st Intelligence Battalion (-) (Reinforced), I MEF [1st IntelBn]

2d Radio Battalion (-) [2d RadBn]

8th Communications Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [8th CommBn]

5th Civil Affairs Group

6th Civil Affairs Group

155th Brigade Combat Team, Army National Guard (Reinforced) [155th MissANG]

Task Force 2d Battalion, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (U.S. Army) [TF 2d Bn, 11th

ArmCavReg]

Marine Air Support Squadron 1 [MASS-1]

Marine Aircraft Group 14 [MAG-14]

Marine Air Control Squadron 2 [MACS-2]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 271 [MWSS-271]

Marine Wing Communications Squadron 38 [MWCS-38]
170 INTO THE FRAY

30th Naval Construction Brigade (U.S. Navy) [30th NCBde]

Task Force 2d Battalion, 198th Armor Regiment [TF 2d Bn, 198th AR]

Task Force 1st Battalion, 198th Armor Regiment [TF 1st Bn, 198th AR]

Task Force 1st Battalion, 155th Infantry Regiment [TF 1st Reg, 155th BCT]

106th Service Battalion [106th ServBn]

150th Engineer Battalion (-) [150th EngrBn]

Task Force, 2d Battalion, 114th Field Artillery Regiment [TF 2Bn, 114th FldArtyReg]

5th Battalion, 14th Marines [5th Bn, 14th Mar]

Marine Ground Combat Element

2d Marine Division (-) (Reinforced) [2d MarDiv]

Headquarters Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [HqBn]

2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (-) (Reinforced) [2d ANGLICO]

1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (-) (Reinforced) [1st ANGLICO]

Detachment, 3d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (-) [Det, 3d ANGLICO]

1st Force Reconnaissance Company (-) (Reinforced), I MEF [1st ForReconCo]

2d Force Reconnaissance Company (-) (Reinforced) [2d ForReconCo]

74th Multi-Role Bridge Company, 130th Engineering Brigade (U.S. Army) [74th

MRB Co, 130th EngrBde]

1st Battalion, 5th Marines [1st Bn, 5th Mar]

3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

2d Marines/Regimental Combat Team 2 (-) (Reinforced) [2d Mar, RCT-2]

3d Battalion, 1st Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 1st Mar]

3d Battalion, 2d Marines (-) (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 2d Mar]

3d Battalion, 6th Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 6th Mar]

3d Battalion, 25th Marines [3d Bn, 25th Mar]

3d Battalion, 504th Infantry [3d Bn, 504th Inf]

1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st LAR Bn]

2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d LAR Bn]

Detachment, 2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [Det 2d ANGLICO]

4th Battalion, 14th Cavalry Regiment, (U.S. Army) [4th Bn, 14th CavReg]

Fleet Antit-Terrorism Security Team, 172d Brigade Support Battalion [FAST,

172d BSB]

Battery A, 2d Battalion, 20th Field Artillery Regiment (U.S. Army) [A Btry, 2d 

Bn, 20th FldArtyReg]

Battery A, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines [A Btry, 1st Bn, 11th Mar]

Battery K (Reinforced), 3d Battalion, 10th Marines [Btry K, 3d Bn, 10th Mar]

Company A (Reinforced), 1st Tank Battalion [Co A, 1st TkBn]

Company A (Reinforced), 4th Assault Amphibian Battalion [Co A, 4th

AABn]

Information Company, Azerbaijani [InfCo, Azj]

8th Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 8 [8th Mar, RCT-8]

Company B (Reinforced), 2d Tank Battalion [Co B, 2d TBn]

Company B (Reinforced), 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion [Co B, 2d AABn]

Battery A (Reinforced), 1st Battalion, 10th Marines [Btry A, 1st Bn, 10th Mar]

3d Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Reinforced), 3d Marine Division [3d ReconBn]

3d Battalion 1st Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 1st Mar]

2d Battalion, 2d Marines (Reinforced) [2d Bn, 2d Mar]

1st Battalion, 4th Marines (Reinforced) [1st Bn, 4th Mar]
Appendix B: Unit List 171

3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 4th Mar]

1st Battalion, 6th Marines [1st Bn, 6th Mar]

2d Battalion, 6th Marines (Reinforced) [2d Bn, 6th Mar]

3d Battalion, 6th Marines [3d Bn, 6th Mar]

2d Battalion, 7th Marines (Reinforced) [2d Bn, 7th Mar]

3d Battalion, 8th Marines [3d Bn, 8th Mar]

1st Reconnaissance Battalion (Reinforced) [1st ReconBn]

Company D (Reinforced), 2d Tank Battalion [Co D, 2d TkBn]

Company A (Reinforced), 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion [Co A, 2d AABn]

2d Brigade (Reinforced), 2d Infantry Division (U.S. Army) [2d BCT 2d Inf]

1st Battalion, 503d Infantry (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 503d Inf]

1st Battalion, 506th Infantry (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 506th Inf]

Air Defense Artillery, Battery B, 5th Battalion, 5th Field Artillery (-) [ADA, Btry B, 5th 

Bn, 5th FldArty] 

1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 9th InfReg]

2d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery Regiment (U.S. Army) [2d Bn, 17th FldArty]

44th Engineer Battalion (U.S. Army) [44th EngrBn]

3d Battalion, 82d CSE (U.S. Army)

Battery B, 1st Battalion, 4th Artillery, 2d Forward Support Battalion (U.S. Army) [Btry

B, 1st Bn, 4th Arty, 2d ForSptBn]

1st Battalion (Reinforced), 5th Marines [1st Bn, 5th Mar]

2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division (Reinforced) (Army National Guard) [2d Bde, 28th InfDiv]

228th Forward Support Battalion (U.S. Army) [228th FwdSptBn]

1st Battalion, 506th Infantry (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 506th Inf]

1st Battalion, 110th Infantry (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 110th Inf]

1st Battalion, 172d Artillery (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 172d Arty]

2d Battalion, 222d Field Artillery (U.S. Army) [2d Bn, 222d FldArty]

2d Battalion, 116th Field Artillery Regiment (U.S. Army) [2d Bn, 116th FldArty]

3d Battalion, 7th Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

224th Engineer Battalion (C) (M) (Reinforced) [224th EngrBn]

Company C, 4th Tank Battalion [Co C, 4th TkBn]

54th Engineer Battalion (U.S. Army) [54th EngrBn]

Battery E, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines (Provisional MP) [Btry E, 2d Bn, 11th Mar]

Marine Aviation Combat Element

2d Marine Aircraft Wing (Fwd) [2d MAW]

Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 2 (-) [MWHS-2] 

Marine Aircraft Group 26 (-) [MAG-26]

Marine Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 26 [MHHS-26]

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 224 [VMFA-224]

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 332 [VMFA-332]

Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 142 [VMFA(AW)-142]

Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242 [VMFA(AW)-242]

Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 224, MAG-31 [VMFA(AW)-224]

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 142, MAG 42, 4th MAW [VMFA-142]
172 INTO THE FRAY

Marine Attack Squadron 223 [VMA-223]

Marine Attack Squadron 311 (-) MAG- 13, 3d MAW [VMA-311]

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 1 [VMAQ-1]

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 2 [VMAQ-2]

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 4 [VMAQ-4]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 167 [HMLA-167]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269 (-), MAG-26 [HMLA-269] 

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 [HMLA-369]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 775, MAG-46, 4th MAW [HMLA-775]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 [HMM-161]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264, MAG-26 [HMM-264]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266 [HMM-266]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 364, MAG-16, 3d MAW [HMM-364]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 764, MAG-46, 4th MAW [HMM-764]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 774 [HMM-774]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 465 (-) (Reinforced), MAG-16, 3d MAW [HMH-465]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 466 [HMM-466]

Marine Transport Squadron 1 [VMR-1]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 26 [MALS-26]

Marine Air Control Group 28 (-) (Reinforced) [MACG-28]

Marine Tactical Air Command Squadron 28 (-) (Reinforced) [MTACS-28]

Marine Air Control Group Headquarters [MACG-28 Hq]

Marine Air Control Squadron 2 (-) (Reinforced), MACG-28 [MACS-2]

Marine Wing Communications Squadron 28 (-) (Reinforced) [MWCS-28]

Marine Air Support Squadron 1 (-) (Reinforced), MACG-28, [MASS-1]

Marine Air Control Group 38 Headquarters [MACG-38 Hq]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 [VMU-1]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 [VMU-2]

Marine Air Control Squadron 1 [MACS-1]

Marine Wing Support Group 27 (-) (Reinforced) [MWSG-27]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 271 [MWSS-271]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 371 [MWSS-371]

2d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion [2d LAAD Bn]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 272 [MWSS-272]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 [MWSS-372]

Marine Combat Service Support Element

2d Force Service Support Group/2d Marine Logistics Group (Forward) [2d FSSG]

Headquarters Service Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [HqSBn]

Communications Company (Reinforced) [CommCo]

8th Engineer Support Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [8th EngrSBn]

Combat Logistics Battalion 2 [ComLogBn 2]

Combat Logistics Battalion 8 [ComLogBn 8]

Combat Logistics Regiment 25 [ComLogReg 25]

Headquarter Service Company (-), 2d Transportation Support Battalion [HqSCo,

2d TransSptBn]
Appendix B: Unit List 173

30th Naval Construction Regiment (-) (Reinforced), 1st Naval Construction Division (U.S.

Navy) [30th NCR, 1st NCD]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (-) 24 [NMCB-24]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (-) 1 [NMCB-1]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (-) 3 [NMCB-3]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (-) 5 [NMCB-5]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (-) 22 [NMCB-22]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (-) 23 [(NMCB-23]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (-) 24 [NMCB-24]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (-) 133 [NMCB-133]

983d Engineer Combat Battalion (Heavy), (U.S. Army) [983d EngrCbtBn]

46th Engineer Combat Battalion (Heavy), (U.S. Army) [46th EngrCbtBn]

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)/Multi National Force–West [I MEF (FWD)/MNF-W]

March 2006–February 2007

Command Element

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit [15th MEU]

Battalion Landing Team 2/4 [BLT 2/4] 

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 [HMM-165]

Combat Logistics Battalion 15 [CLB-15]

I Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group (-)(Reinforced) [I MEF Hq Gru]

1st Intelligence Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st IntelBn]

2d Intelligence Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d IntelBn]

1st Radio Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st RadBn]

2d Radio Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d RadBn]

9th Communication Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [9th CommBn]

1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (-) (Reinforced) [1st ANGLICO]

1st Force Reconnaissance Co (-) (Reinforced) [1st ForRecon Co]

3d Civil Affairs Group [3d CAG]

4th Civil Affairs Group [4th CAG]

6th Civil Affairs Group [6th CAG]

Marine Ground Combat Element

1st Marine Division (Forward) [1st MarDiv]

Headquarters Battalion [HqBn]

1st Battalion, 14th Marines [1st Bn, 14th Mar]

3d Battalion, 14th Marines [3d Bn, 14th Mar]

5th Battalion, 14th Marines [5th Bn, 14th Mar]

5th Marines/Regimental Combat Team 5 (-) (Reinforced) [5th Mar/RCT-5]

1st Battalion, 1st Marines [1st Bn, 1st Mar]

2d Battalion, 2d Marines [2d Bn, 2d Mar]

3d Battalion, 2d Marines [3d Bn, 2d Mar]

3d Battalion, 5th Marines [3d Bn, 5th Mar]

2d Battalion, 6th Marines [2d Bn, 6th Mar]

2d Battalion, 8th Marines [2d Bn, 8th Mar]

1st Battalion, 24th Marines [1st Bn, 24th Mar]

1st Battalion, 25th Marines [1st Bn, 25th Mar]
174 INTO THE FRAY

1st Reconnaissance Battalion [1st ReconBn]

2d Reconnaissance Battalion [2d ReconBn]

3d Reconnaissance Battalion [3d ReconBn]

7th Marines/Regimental Combat Team 7 (-) (Reinforced) [7th Mar/RCT-7]

1st Force Reconnaissance Company (-) (Reinforced) [1st ForReconCo]

4th Force Reconnaissance Company (-) (Reinforced) [4th ForReconCo]

4th Reconnaissance Battalion [4th ReconBn]

2d Battalion, 37th Armor Regiment (U.S. Army) [2d Bn, 37th AR]

1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) [1st LAR Bn]

2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) [2d LAR Bn]

3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) [3d LAR Bn]

1st Battalion, 7th Marines [1st Bn, 7th Mar]

3d Battalion, 1st Marines [3d Bn, 1st Mar]

3d Battalion, 3d Marines [3d Bn, 3d Mar]

3d Battalion, 6th Marines [3d Bn, 6th Mar]

3d Battalion, 4th Marines [3d Bn, 4th Mar]

3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

3d Battalion, 8th Marines [3d Bn, 8th Mar]

1st Battalion, 6th Marines [1st Bn, 6th Mar]

1st Battalion, 36th Infantry Regiment (Mechanized) (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 36th Inf]

4th Battalion, 14th Stryker Cavalry Regiment (U.S. Army) [4th Bn, 14th Stryker CavReg]

1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division “Ready First” (U.S. Army) 

[1st BCT, 1st ArmDiv]

1st Battalion, 6th Marines [1st Bn, 6th Mar]

3d Battalion, 8th Marines [3d Bn, 8th Mar]

1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 506th InfReg]

1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 9th InfReg]

1st Battalion, 37th Armor Regiment (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 37th ArmReg]

2d Battalion, 37th Armor Regiment (U.S. Army) [2d Bn, 37th ArmReg]

1st Battalion, 77th Armor Regiment (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 77th ArmReg]

1st Battalion, 35th Armor Regiment (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 35th ArmReg]

Marine Aviation Combat Element

3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) (Reinforced) [3d MAW]

Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 1 (-) [MWHS 1]

Marine Aircraft Group 16 [MAG-16]

Marine Aircraft Logistics Squadron 16 (-)(Reinforced) [MALS-16]

Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 533 [VMFA(AW)-533]

Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242 [VMFA(AW)-242]

Marine Attack Squadron 223 (-) [VMA-223]

Marine Attack Squadron 513 (-) [VMA-513]

Marine Attack Squadron 211 (-) [VMA-211]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 [HMLA-369]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 [HMLA-169]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269 [HMLA-269]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 367 [HMLA-367]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 167 (-) [HMLA-167]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 268 [HMM-268]
Appendix B: Unit List 175

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 364 [HMM-364]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 774 [HMM-774]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266 [HMM-266]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 [HMH-463]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 363 [HMH-363]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 [HMH-466]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 [HMH-361]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 465 [HMH-465]

Det, Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 252 [VMGR-252]

Det, Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 [VMGR-352]

Marine Aircraft Group 31 [MAG-31]

Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) (Reinforced) [MACG 38]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 [VMU-1]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 [VMU-2]

Marine Tactical Air Command Squadron 38 [MTACS-38]

Marine Air Support Squadron 3 [MASS-3]

Marine Wing Communications Squadron 38 [MWCS-38]

Marine Air Control Squadron 1 [MACS-1]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 37 (-) (Reinforced) [MWSG-37]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 273 [MWSS-273]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 373 [MWSS-373]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 274 [MWSS-274]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 374 [MWSS-374]

3d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion [3d LAADBn]

Marine Combat Service Support Element

1st Marine Logistics Group (Forward) (-) (Reinforced) [1st MLG]

Combat Logistics Regiment 17 [CLR-17]

Headquarters Company (-) (Reinforced), 7th Engineer Support Battalion

[HqCo, 7th ESB]

Combat Logistics Battalion 5 [CLB-5]

Headquarters and Service Co, Combat Logistics Battalion 7 [H&SCo, CLB-7]

Combat Logistics Battalion 1 [CLB-1]

Combat Logistics Regiment 15 (-) (Reinforced) [CLR-15]

9th Engineer Support Battalion [9th EngrSptBn]

30th Naval Construction Regiment (-) (Reinforced) [30th NCR]

46th Engineer Battalion (U.S. Army) [46th EngrBn]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 [NMCB-133]

84th Engineer Construction Battalion (U.S. Army) [84th EngrConBn]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 22 [NMCB-22]

3d Naval Construction Regiment (-) (Reinforced) [3d NCR]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 18 [NMCB-18]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 74 [NMCB-74]
176 INTO THE FRAY
177

AIF–Anti-Iraqi Forces

ACR–Armored Reconnaissance Regiment 

AFDD–Air Force Doctrine Document

AQI/AQIZ–al-Qaeda in Iraq/al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia

AOR–Area of Responsibility

ASC–Anbar Salvation Council

BATS–Biometric Automated Tool Set

BBC–British Broadcasting Company

BCT–Brigade Combat Team

BIAP–Baghdad International Airport

BLT–Battalion Landing Team

BPC–Building Partnership Capacity

CAP–Combined Action Program

CAV–Cavalry

CEB–Combat Engineering Battalion

CERP–Commander’s Emergency Reconstruction Program

CENTCOM–U.S. Central Command

CF–Coalition Forces

CG–Commanding General

CGS–Common Ground Station

CIA–Central Intelligence Agency

CJTF–Combined Joint Task Force

CLB–Combat Logistics Battalion

CLR–Combat Logistics Regiment

CMO–Civil-Military Operations

CMOC–Civil-Military Operations Center

CP–Command Post

CPA/CPA–Coalition Provisional Authority

CSS–Combat Service Support

CSSB–Combat Service Support Battalion

DIA–Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD–Department of Defense

ECP–Entry Control Points

EFDC–Expeditionary Force Development Center

Appendix C

Selected Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations
EFIC–East Fallujah Iraqi Camp

EKMS–Electronic Key Management System

EOD–Explosive Ordnance Disposal

FLT–Fallujah Liaison Team

FOB–Forward Operating Base

FSS–Fast Sealift Ships

FSSG–Force Service Support Group

GIC–Gulf Investment Company

GCE–Ground Combat Element

HIDACZ–High Density Airspace Control Zone

HQMC–Headquarters Marine Corps

IA–Iraqi Army

IDF–Israeli Defense Force

IECI–Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq

IED–Improvised Explosive Device

IED WG–Improvised Explosive Device Working Group

IIF–Iraqi Intervention Force

IIG–Interim Iraqi Government

IMO–Information Management Officer

ING–Iraqi National Guard

IO–Information Operations

IPT–Integrated Process Team

IPSA–Intermediate Pumping Stations

IRMO–Iraq Reconstruction Management Office

ISF–Iraqi Security Forces

ISR–Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance

IW–Irregular Warfare

JCC–Joint Coordination Center

JDAM–Joint Direct Attack Munition

JIDI–Joint IED Defeat IPT

KIA–Killed in Action

LAR–Light Armored Reconnaissance

MA–Mortuary Affairs

MACCS–Marine Air Command and Control Squadron

MAG–Marine Air Group

MAGTF–Marine Air-Ground Task Force

MARCORSYSCOM–Marine Corps Systems Command

MarDiv–Marine Division

MAW–Marine Aircraft Wing

MCCDC–Marine Corps Combat Development Command

178 INTO THE FRAY
Appendix C: Selected Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations 179

MCIA–Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

MCWL–Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory

MCWP–Marine Corps Warfighting Publication

MEB–Marine Expeditionary Brigade

MEF–Marine Expeditionary Force

MEG–MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force) Engineer Group

MEU–Marine Expeditionary Unit

MHG–Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Headquarters Group

MLG–Marine Logistics Group

MNC-I–Multi National Corps–Iraq

MNF-I–Multi National Force–Iraq

MNF-W–Multi National Force–West

MNSTC-I–Multi National Security Transition Command–Iraq

MNSTC-I–Multi National Support and Training Command–Iraq

MOD–Ministry of Defense (Iraq)

MOI–Ministry of the Interior (Iraq)

MSR–Main Supply Route

MWSG–Marine Wing Support Group

MWSS–Marine Wing Support Squadron

NCO–Noncommissioned Officer

NCR–Naval Construction Regiment

NGO–Nongovernment Organization

OEF–Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF–Operation Iraqi Freedom

OIF II–Operation Iraqi Freedom II

PA–Public Affairs

PL–Phase Line

POE–Points of Entry

POW–Prisoner of War

PRDC–Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee

PRT–Provincial Reconstruction Teams

PSYOP–Psychological Operations

RCT–Regimental Combat Team

RLT–Reconstruction Liaison Team

RPG–Rocket-Propelled Grenade

RROC–Regional Reconstruction Operations Center

SAM–Surface-to-Air Missile

SVBIED–Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device

SERT–Seabee Engineer Reconnaissance Teams

SOF–Special Operations Forces
180 INTO THE FRAY

TACON–Tactical Control

TAL–Transition Administrative Law

TF–Task Force

TOC–Tactical Operations Center

TTP–Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

UAV–Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

USAF–United States Air Force

USA–United States Army

USMC–United States Marine Corps

USN–United States Navy

VBID/VIED–Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device

VCP–Vehicle Checkpoints

WIA–Wounded in Action
181

2004

March 20 The 82d Airborne Division transfers command of Multi National Force–West

to I Marine Expeditionary Force who takes responsibility for al-Anbar

Province.

March 31 Four civilian Blackwater USA contractors are ambushed and their bodies

mutilated by insurgents in Fallujah.

April 5 Units from I Marine Expeditionary Force launch Operation Vigilant Resolve

in Fallujah.

April 9 Gen John P. Abizaid, USA, Commanding General of U.S. Forces Central Command, orders Marines to suspend offensive operations against the insurgency

in Fallujah.

April 9–30 Units from I Marine Expeditionary Force engage in skirmishes and firefights

throughout Fallujah.

May 1 I Marine Expeditionary Force withdraws from Fallujah and hands authority

over to the Fallujah Brigade.

June 28 The official transfer of sovereignty to Iraq, dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority, and transfer of power to the Iraqi Interim Government.

Two days later, Marines raise the American flag over the new U.S. Embassy

in Baghdad.

July 16 First units of the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit arrive in an-Najaf.

July 23 Six Marines from 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Marine Division, complete the first combat, high-altitude parachute drop in the history of the Marine Corps. 

July 31 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit assumes operational control of an-Najaf and

al-Qadisiyah Provinces. 

August 2 Marines from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Force begin battling units of

the Mahdi Militia insurgency in Najaf and Kufa.

August 9 Multi-National Force–West assumes tactical control of 11th Marine Expeditionary Force with the arrival of I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)

Command Element.

August 11 11th Marine Expeditionary Force forces engage insurgents southwest, northwest, and northeast of Najaf.

Appendix D

Chronology of Events
August 21 1st Battalion, 4th Marines raid Kufa.

August 26 In Najaf, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, surround the Imam Ali Mosque Shrine.

Multi National Corps–Iraq orders Marines to cease offensive activities and

allow Iraqi officials to peaceably resolve the removal of Mahdi Militia forces. 

August 27 Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani negotiates a truce in Najaf. Iraq government declares that hostilities will officially end at 1000.

September 10 The Fallujah Brigade disbands, having failed in its efforts to secure the city.

September 12 LtGen John F. Sattler becomes commanding general, I Marine Expeditionary

Force, relieving LtGen James T. Conway.

September 26 Two suicide car bombers try to drive into a base used by U.S. Marines and

Iraqi National Guardsmen in Karma, near Fallujah. When challenged, they

detonate the cars. No injuries are reported.

October 5 More than 3,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops, including the 24th Marine Expeditionary Force, launch an offensive operation in the southern approaches to

Baghdad and take control of a bridge across the Euphrates River. 

October 14 Marines launch air and ground attacks against an insurgent stronghold in Fallujah after peace talks are suspended. The peace talks fizzle over the demand that the insurgent mastermind Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and other foreign

fighters be handed over to the authorities. 

November 7 Marines from I Marine Expeditionary Force conduct operations in preparation

for a second battle to clear Fallujah of insurgents. These include securing key

bridges, surgical air strikes, and seizing insurgent nodes outside the city.

November 2 George W. Bush re-elected as U.S. President.

November 8 I Marine Expeditionary Force launches Operation Phantom Fury (Operation

al-Fajr) against insurgents in Fallujah. The second battle of Fallujah begins.

November 11 Northern area of Fallujah falls to U.S. Marine forces.

November 13 The initial attack on Fallujah is completed. Search and attack operations commence.

November 14 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, takes the Jolan district in Fallujah. Marines successfully occupy the city.

November 23–27 Elements of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Force, along with U.S. Army soldiers and Iraqi forces, launch Operation Plymouth Rock against insurgents in

North Babil Province.

December 21 The 11th Marine Expeditionary Force assumes operational control of Karbala

Province from the Polish-led Multi National Division Central–South. 

December 23 Operation Phantom Fury concludes. Fallujah secured and cleared of insurgents. Repopulation of the city commences.

182 INTO THE FRAY
Appendix D: Chronology of Events 183

2005

January 14 All districts of Fallujah are opened for resettlement.

January 26 CH-53 helicopter crashes in western Iraq, claiming the lives of 30 Marines

and one sailor. Currently the single deadliest event for U.S. forces during the

war.

January 30 Iraqi national elections held for a Transitional National Assembly. Sunnis

largely boycott the vote.

February 20–March 5 Marines and Iraqi security forces launch Operation River Blitz throughout alAnbar Province. The operation targets insurgents in cities along the Euphrates

River including Hit, Ramadi, and Baghdadi.

March 10–25 Regimental Combat Team 7 and its relieving unit, Regimental Combat Team

2, conduct Operation River Bridge.

March 27 II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) relieves I Marine Expeditionary

Force as Multi National Force–West.

March II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) builds 1,700-man police department

in the city of Fallujah.

April 1–May 4 Marines from the 2d Marine Division conduct Operation Outer Banks and

Operation Patriot Shield to clear the Haditha-Hit corridor of insurgent operations.

April 11 Insurgents attack Camp Gannon at Husaybah. Three Marines are wounded.

March–June II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) disbands the 60th Iraqi National

Guard and integrates 2,000 former ING soldiers into the regular Iraqi Army.

May 2 Two F/A-18 Hornet fighters from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323 collide

over Iraq, killing both pilots.

May 7–14 Regimental Combat Team 2 conducts Operation Matador against insurgents

operating along the Syrian border.

May 25–29 Marines conduct Operation New Market in Haditha to battle entrenched insurgents.

June 6–July 31 Operation Guardian Sword: 2d Marine Division conducts operations against

insurgents to support Iraqi Constitutional Referendum.

June 17–22 Operation Spear: Marines focus on the rebel stronghold of Karabilah near

the Syrian border. 

June 18 Regimental Combat Team 8 launches Operation Dagger against insurgent networks in al-Anbar Province.

June 23 Iraqi insurgents carry out the deadliest attack involving U.S. female service

members to date when a suicide car bomber rams a convoy in Fallujah. Five
Marines and one female sailor—three males and three females—are killed in

the attack and 13 others are wounded, 11 female. 

June 28–July 6 Regimental Combat Team 2 conducts Operation Sword in Hit and Haditha.

July Marine, Army, and Iraqi Army units conduct Operation Sayaid (Hunter) to

continue efforts to secure Anbar Province.

July 7 Operation Scimitar begins with raids in the village of Zaidan, approximately

20 miles southeast of Fallujah, and at least 22 suspected insurgents are detained.

August 3 Fourteen Marine reservists and a civilian interpreter are killed in Haditha

when the amphibious assault vehicle they are traveling in is struck by a roadside bomb. Two days earlier, six other Marines are killed near the same city

by enemy gunfire.

August 3–10 Marines participate in Operation Quick Strike, an offensive operation aimed

at disrupting insurgent activities in Haditha, Haqliniyah, and Barwanah.

Marines net nine car bombs, 28 other explosive devices, and capture 36 suspected insurgents.

October 1 Marines from Regimental Combat Team 2 conduct Operation Iron Fist to disrupt insurgents filtering into the country from Syria. 

October 4–19 Marines conduct Operation River Gate in Haditha, Haqlaniyah, and Barwanah

to disrupt insurgent activities and secure the triad region. 

October 15 The referendum on the Iraqi Constitution, and the first phase of Operation

Liberty Express.

October 18 The deputy governor of Anbar Province, Talib al-Dulaimi, is assassinated in

Ramadi.

November 5–17 Regimental Combat Team 2 participates in Operation Steel Curtain against

insurgents in al-Qa’im along the Iraq-Syria border. 

November 19 Haditha Incident: Marines from the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, are attacked by

an insurgent land mine. In the aftermath, several civilians are killed or

wounded in questionable circumstances.

November 19 Roughly 150 Iraqi Army soldiers and 300 U.S. Marines and soldiers launch

Operation Dhibbah (Bruins) in Ramadi. 

November 26 Approximately 400 U.S. Marines and 150 Iraqi Army troops launch a new offensive in the Ma-Laab district of eastern Ramadi, Operation Tigers (Nimur). 

November 30 Operation Iron Hammer conducted by Marine and Iraqi armed forces to rid

the Hai al-Becker region of insurgents traveling from Syria into Iraq. 

December 2 Three hundred Marines from the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, and 200 Iraqi Army

soldiers from the 1st Brigade, 7th Division, conduct Operation Harba (Shank)

in Ramadi to secure the Anbari capital for elections on 15 December. 

184 INTO THE FRAY
Appendix D: Chronology of Events 185

December 15 The election for the Iraqi National Assembly. Operation Liberty Express provides security for polling.

December 17 Iraqi soldiers begin Operation Moonlight to disrupt insurgent activity along the

Euphrates River near the border with Syria. 

2006

January 15–27 Marines with Battalion Landing Team 1/2, and Iraqi Army soldiers conduct

Operation Koa Canyon along the western Euphrates River Valley. 

February 22 The bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra sparks an outbreak of sectarian violence. 

February 28 I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) assumes control of the Multi National

Force–West area of operations from II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward).

March 9 U.S. Army LtGen Peter W. Chiarelli, commander of Multi National Corps–Iraq,

directs further investigation into events surrounding the 19 November 2005 attack in Haditha. 

April 7 The battalion commander of 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, as well as two company

commanders, are relieved of command amid the investigation into the Haditha shootings.

April 17 Marines repel an attack by Sunni Arab insurgents in Ramadi, when the insurgents launch a coordinated assault against the city’s main government building and two U.S. observation posts. No U.S. casualties result from the

90-minute attack. 

May 26 Gen Michael W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps, announces Marines

will face criminal charges for the November 2005 shootings in Haditha.

June 7 Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Masab al- Zarqawi killed in an air strike.

June 14–July 20 Operation Together Forward: U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces establish curfews, security checkpoints, and more patrols in cities across Iraq. 

June 17 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Armored Division launches operations to

prevent Ramadi from become a center of al-Qaeda in Iraq.

August 8–October 24 Operation Together Forward II: 15,000 U.S. soldiers clear disputed areas and

cede security responsibilities to Iraqi soldiers. Iraqi troops ultimately fail to

secure the cleared cities.

Summer-Fall U.S. Army LtCol Sean B. MacFarland of the 1st Brigade Combat Team begins

forging anti-al-Qaeda alliances with Iraqi tribal awakening councils.

September Sheikh Sattar al-Rishawi of the Dulaimi confederation’s Albu Risha tribe

launches a campaign against al-Qaeda in Iraq.

October Marines from 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, commanded by LtCol William M. Jurney fight to secure Ramadi in support of Awakening operations.
November 6 Saddam Hussein found guilty by Iraqi tribunal for the 1982 murder of 148

Shi’ites in Dujail and sentenced to death.

November 7 U.S. midterm elections end Republican control of both houses of Congress.

November 8 Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld resigns. His successor, Robert M.

Gates, is confirmed by the Senate on 8 December 2006.

December 21 Eight Marines are charged for the killings of 24 Iraqi civilians in Haditha in November 2005. Four of the Marines, all enlisted, are charged with unpremeditated murder while four officers are accused of dereliction of duty for failures

in investigating and reporting the deaths.

December 30 Saddam Hussein executed.

186 INTO THE FRAY
187

Col Thomas L. Cariker

Col Robert H. Chase

Col Guy M. Close

Col Mark R. Cyr

Col Stephen W. Davis

Col Robert W. Destafney

Col Paul K. Durkin

Col Thomas C. Greenwood

Col Curtis E. Haberbosch

Col Anthony M. Haslam

Col John P. Holden

Col Michael E. Kampsen

Col John C. Kennedy

Col Stuart L. Knoll

Col John T. Larson

Col James K. La Vine

Col Kenneth J. Lee

Col Clarke R. Lethin

Col Ron R. McFarland

Col Steven E. McKinley

Col Jonathan G. Miclot

Col W. Lee Miller

Col David J. Mollahan

Col Glenn T. Starnes

Col Michael A. Shupp

Col Darrell L. Thacker

Col Craig A. Tucker

Col Michael Walker

LtCol Francis X. Carroll

LtCol Joseph A. L’etoile

Gen James T. Conway

Gen Michael Hagee

Gen James N. Mattis

LtGen James F. Amos

LtGen Richard S. Kramlich

LtGen Richard F. Natonski

LtGen John F. Sattler

LtGen Keith J. Stalder

MajGen Joseph F. Dunford Jr.

MajGen Dennis J. Hejlik

MajGen Richard A. Huck

MajGen Stephen T. Johnson

MajGen John F. Kelly

MajGen Robert E. Milstead Jr.

MajGen Michael R. Regner

MajGen James L. Williams

BGen David H. Berger

BGen Charles M. Gurganus

BGen Ronald J. Johnson

BGen Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.

BGen Thomas M. Murray

BGen Lawrence D. Nicholson

BGen Charles S. Patton

BGen David B. Reist

BGen John A. Toolan Jr.

BGen John E. Wissler

Col Scott M. Anderson

Col John R. Ballard

Col Elvis E. Blumenstock

Col Paul W. Brier

Col Larry K. Brown Jr.

Appendix E

Reviewers
188 INTO THE FRAY
189

Abizaid, General John P. (USA), 1, 6-7, 37-38, 47, 51,

58, 130

Abu Ghraib, 21, 81, 105, 108, 

Prison, 21, 29-30, 39, 42, 92, 

See Camp, Abu Ghraib 

Abu Hyat, 96, 123

ad-Diwaniyah, 41

Adelsperger, PFC Christopher S., 71, 155

Agency for International Development, 135

aircraft

AAI/IAI RQ-2B Pioneer, 64-65, 71, 136 

Bell AH-1 Cobra, 97, 

Bell AH-1W Super Cobra, 20, 36, 45, 48, 54,

64 

Bell UH-1N Iroquois (Huey), 20, 36, 120

Boeing CH-47E Chinook, 121

Boeing ScanEagle, 64, 136

Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight, 15-16, 48-

49, 54, 98, 102, 122

General Atomics RQ-1/MQ-1 Predator, 64

General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon, 36,

45

Grumman EA-6B Prowler, 48, 93, 124, 128

Lockheed AC-130 Spectre, 34, 36, 48, 50-51,

65-66, 71 

Lockheed C-130 Hercules, 20, 81, 89, 139 

Lockheed EC-130 Compass Call, 48

Lockheed EP-3 Orion, 48

Lockheed KC-130 Hercules, 14, 16, 20, 66, 

93, 118

McDonnell Douglas AH-64 Apache, 50, 65

McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier, 48, 53, 

65-66, 93

McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet, 14, 60, 

65-66, 93 

McDonnell Douglas F-15E Strike Eagle, 61

Northrop Grumman E-8 Joint Surveillance 

Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS), 125

Sikorsky CH-53D Sea Stallion, 144

Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallion, 16, 48, 81, 

102

aircraft operations, 63

Air–Ground Training Center, 89

Aitkin, Colonel William S., 139

Akashat, 95, 113

Al Bu Hardan Bridge, 119-20

Al Fajr (newspaper), 83

Al-Jazeera, 38, 95

Al-Amiriyah, 11, 45

Al-Anbar, 14, 15, 33, 40, 147, 148, 150

Brigade. See Iraqi Army, 113

civil affairs, 132–35

counterinsurgency, 115–21

election security, 80–83

insurgency, 8, 40, 42, 44–46, 79, 149

Iraqi military, 141-142, 147, 150

logistics, 136, 139-40

map, 10, 25-26, 93

operations, 19, 25, 30, 55, 105–8, 112–14

police, 142, 148

Province, 6, 11, 15, 31, 48, 51–53, 58, 76, 79,

86, 95, 123-26, 143, 145

voting, 129-30

Al-Andalus District, 73-74

Al-Asad, 27, 109, 143 

Air Base, 20-21, 27, 45–49, 58, 60, 83, 89, 

111, 117, 124, 129, 131, 136, 144 

Camp. See Camp al-Asad, 93, 137

Marine units, 20, 36, 101

Regimental Combat Team 2, 90-91, 139

Regimental Combat Team 7, 14, 46–48

squadrons, 66, 84, 93-94, 125

3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 15

Al-Ash, 112

Al-Fallujah, 8,19, 29–39, 42–86, 88-89, 91–93, 95 102–

4, 107, 109, 111, 114–16, 118, 125, 130, 143-

44

Brigade, 40, 46, 

Camp. See Camp, Fallujah

civil affairs in, 132–35

civilian contractors, 149

clearing operations, 55, 70, 73, 150

first battle of, 40, 44, 51, 59, 63, 91

hospital, 61, 67-68, 76 

logistics, 139

model, 124, 142

Opening Gambit, 31

police, 148

second battle of, 58-60, 64, 66, 75, 77-78, 84,

126, 141

Index
Alford, Lieutenant Colonel Julian D., 121, 127

Al-Habbaniyah, Lake, 19

Al-Habbaniyah (city), 114, 133 

Al-Hajarah, (Southwestern Desert), 19 

Al-Hillah (river), 19 

Al-Hindiyyah (river), 19

Al-Karabalah, 100-1, 107-8, 119, 121, 126-27, 130

Al-Karmah, 38, 46, 48, 79, 91, 95, 102-3, 109, 132 

Al-Khalidiyah, 79

Al-Kufah, 40, 50-51 

Allawi, Ayad, 50, 54, 57

Al-Malaab District, 43

Al-Mahmudiyah, 11, 21, 48

Al-Milh, 19

Al-Musayyib, 35

Al-Qaeda, 23, 111, 122, 129 

Al-Qaim, 19, 44, 48, 55, 90, 92, 98, 100-1, 108-9, 111-

13, 119-21, 123, 125-26, 130, 133, 139, 142, 148 

garrison, 119, 127 

Al-Qaim–Hit corridor, 118-19

al-Sadr, Moqtada, 25, 35, 40-42, 50-51, 

al-Sadr Militia, 35, 40, 46, 50-51, 

revolt, 39, 42, 44, 47-48, 50, 149

uprising. See revolt.

Al-Shahabi, 95

Al-Taqaddum, 20, 25, 28, 45, 103, 130, 136, 145

Air Base, 20, 54, 93, 111, 124 

Camp, 20-21, 90 

Al-Ubayd, 97-99, 119, 126-27, 134 

Al-Walid, 45, 112-13, 130

Amariyah, 79 

ambushed contractors, 31-32

Amos, Major General James F., 1, 6, 8, 20, 53-54, 90 

amphibious assault vehicle, 39, 46, 71, 73, 87, 89, 98-

99, 120-21 

Anah, 109, 112

An-Najaf, 1, 35, 41–43, 47, 49, 63, 79-80, 105, 107,

112, 130 

holy city, 23-24

losses, 51

province, 50, 94, 114, 143 

Shi’a majority, 24, 41, 82

Ansar al-Islam, 23

Ar Ar, 112

Ar’ar Wadi, 21

Arba’een pilgrimage, 38, 42

Area of Operations

Atlanta, 15, 19, 20, 25, 46, 88, 111, 139 

Biloxi, 94, 112-114, 126, 139

Denver, 25-26, 58-59, 79, 90-91, 93, 97, 111

Regimental Combat Team 1, 83, 95

Regimental Combat Team 2, 96, 101,

116, 139

Regimental Combat Team 7, 20, 27-

28, 46, 48, 55, 83-84

Dogwood, 130

Fairbanks, 127, 130, 143-44

Jackson, 104

Manassas, 14, 21

Raleigh, 40, 79, 84–86, 93, 102-3, 109, 114, 

133

map, 25

Regimental Combat Team 1, 21, 47,

83, 91

Regimental Combat Team 7, 44-45,

47

Regimental Combat Team 8, 111, 

116, 139

Saber, 112-13, 120, 130 

Topeka, 21, 25, 43, 79, 88, 93, 101, 111, 116

Tucson, 123, 125, 127

Army, U.S.

III Corps, 47

V Corps, 4, 141

1st Armored Division, 38, 41, 46, 48, 50 

1st Cavalry Division, 41, 50, 53, 57, 79 

2d (Black Jack) Brigade, 57, 61, 74,

80 

5th Brigade (Provisional), 94

1st Infantry Division, 49, 57, 109 

1st Brigade, 7, 14, 20-21, 28-29, 43-

44, 46, 52, 56 

2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment,

57 

2d Infantry Division, 

2d (Stryker) Brigade, 52, 56-57, 59, 

61, 69, 73, 79, 84, 111

3d Infantry Division, 94, 103

4th Infantry Division

2d Brigade, 130

10th Mountain Division, 21

28th Infantry Division 

2d Brigade, 111, 116, 121, 128, 144

42d Infantry Division, 95

82d Airborne Division, 3, 5, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16,

22, 25, 28-29, 145

3d Brigade, 14, 15, 29, 30 

101st Airborne Division, 5

155th Brigade Combat Team, 79, 80, 90, 110,

127, 129-30, 137, 143-44

area of operations Biloxi, 112, 114,

139

area of operations Jackson, 104

home stations, 94

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 50 

3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 3, 5, 13–15, 

190 INTO THE FRAY
Index 191

25, 94, 112

1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 50

1st Battalion, 5th Field Artillery, 21

1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, 101, 108

1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, 21

1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, 7, 21, 29, 42, 46,

48-49 

1st Battalion, 34th Armor, 21, 28

1st Battalion, 36th Infantry, 144

1st Battalion, 155th Infantry, 80

1st Battalion, 172d Armor, 121, 130

1st Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry, 101

1st Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry, 144

1st Combat Engineer Battalion, 34, 45, 123 

1st Squadron, 5th Cavalry, 50

1st Squadron, 167th Cavalry, 121

2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, 57, 69, 73

2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 50

2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 50, 58, 69–71, 73

2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry, 80 

2d Squadron, 14th Cavalry, 109

2d Battalion, 69th Armor, 122, 144

2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, 130, 139

2d Battalion, 114th Field Artillery, 112, 127-28

2d Battalion, 130th Infantry, 130, 139

3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry, 112, 

122, 126, 130

4th Combat Engineer Battalion, 131

4th Squadron, 14th Cavalry, 112, 121, 126-27

112th Military Police Battalion, 47, 53

120th Engineer Battalion (Heavy), 21

224th Engineer Battalion, 108

227th Aviation Battalion, 50

519th Military Intelligence Battalion, 112

814th Bridge Company, 98

Company A, 4th Combat Engineer Battalion,

91

Company F, 51st Infantry, 112

2d Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, 109

2d Brigade, 81, 103, 108, 114

Ar-Rabit, 98

Ar-Ramadi, 8, 19–22, 25, 29, 38, 46-47, 52-53, 63, 81,

95, 102, 105, 113, 117, 121, 124, 129, 148, 150 

casualties, 43-44

civil affairs, 132–36

counterinsurgency in, 33, 43, 55, 115-16, 118

curfew, 67

election support, 80-81

logistics, 139-40

military units in, 14, 20-21, 28, 55-56, 59, 93,

101, 111, 114, 128, 130, 144

raids, 56, 88, 108

sector, 105, 107, 125

Ar-Rutbah, 20, 55, 59, 101, 120, 125, 133, 143

artillery,

M109A6 Paladin, 21, 56

M270A1 guided multiple-launched rocket 

systems, 120

Arufi, Governor, 50

aviation, 20, 30, 87, 89, 94, 103-4, 111, 127, 144, 146

Army component, 13

at al-Asad Air Base, 14, 49, 58

expended ordnance, 78

support plan, 63-64, 135-36

aviation support, 15, 20, 59-60, 64, 76, 88, 118, 128,

135

Ba’ath Party, 5, 8, 22

Ba’athist, 4, 5, 10, 23, 24

Regime, 4, 11, 19, 23

Babil, 21, 42, 46, 94, 130 

Province, 6, 8, 21, 25, 29, 38, 47–49, 94

counterinsurgency operations, 33, 

42, 79

Iraqi police, 107

Iraqi army, 113-14

U.S. Army control, 46

Badr Corps, 23–25

Baghdad, 1, 8, 38, 41, 49, 61, 79, 81-82, 94, 97, 104,

112, 149 

area of operations, 103

electric generators, 57

International Airport, 5, 21, 117, 124 

religious sects, 23-24

revolt, 35

suburbs, 21

Task Force, 6, 50 

U.S. Embassy, 44

Baghdadi, 96, 112

Balad Air Base, 8, 13, 29

Baptista, Sergeant Lendro F., 43

Barstow, California, 90

Barwanah, 96, 109-10, 122-23

Bases

Horno, 123

Raider, 123

Sparta, 123 

Basrah, 149

Bataan (LHD 5), 13

battle of Hue City, 22-23, 57 

Berger, Colonel David H., 128, 

Black Jack Brigade. See Army, US, 1st Cavalry Division

Black Watch,

Battalion, 79

Regiment, 57

Blackwater USA, 31-32
border forts, 112-113, 119, 127, 130

Boxer (LHD 4), 13

Bradley Fighting Vehicle (M2), 56, 71

Brandl, Lieutenant Colonel Gareth F., 69

Bremer, L. Paul, III, 4, 6, 38–40, 44 

Brier, Colonel Paul W., 118

Bronzi, Captain Christopher J., 43

Buhl, Lieutenant Colonel Willard, 33, 73

Byrne, Lieutenant Colonel Brennan T., 32

Camp,

Abu Ghraib, 21, 48, 58, 64, 91

al-Qaim, 20, 27, 45-46, 96

al-Taqaddum, 14 

Baharia, 21, 58, 61, 64, 83, 91

Blue Diamond, 14, 30, 46, 114, 133, 146

Dogwood, 21, 139

Fallujah, 9, 28–30, 42, 46–48, 57-58, 61, 63, 

64, 93, 104, 116, 145-46

1 Marine Expeditionary Force head

quarters, 14, 21

civil affairs, 133

logistics, 138-39

US Army at, 29-30, 73, 91

Gannon, 55, 97, 111, 121, 127, 157

Habbiniyah, 114

Haditha, 20, 45, 101, 137

Haditha Dam, 45

Hit, 220, 45, 90, 101

Hurricane Point, 91

Iskandariya, 21

Korean Village, 25, 45, 120, 139

air support elements, 20

Marine units at, 46, 83, 91, 93, 112-

13, 125

Lejeune, North Carolina, 54, 89-90, 113

Mudaysis, 112

New York, 13

Pendleton, California, 91, 131

Udari, 13, 15

Victory, 13

Cape Hudson (T-AKR 5066), 88

Casey, General George W., Jr. (USA), 41, 47, 50, 73,

111-12, 130

Central Command, 3, 4, 13, 63, 80, 83, 119, 139

commander, 1, 6, 37-38, 58, 130, 139

directive, 16

theater, 83, 94 

Charleston (T-LKA 113), 49

Chessani, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey R., 84, 122

Chiarelli, Lieutenant General Peter W., 141, 143

civil affairs, 5-6, 11, 27, 31, 35, 59, 103-4, 116–18, 131–

35

groups, 74, 134 

units, 53, 68

Civil Camp, 108

Clifton, First Lieutenant Steven M., 54

Coalition, 6, 11, 15, 32, 37, 39, 41, 43, 47, 52, 54–57,

61, 67, 69, 76, 77-78, 86, 96, 102, 105-6, 109, 114, 125–

27, 133, 143, 148–50

anti-, 8-9, 19, 22-23, 40, 54, 88

atrocities, 38

aviation, 76

commanders, 79, 104

control, 118

engineers, 119

forces, 2, 4, 16, 22–25, 42, 44, 53, 59, 80, 87,

95, 105, 117, 123-24, 126, 129, 136, 141

humanitarian relief, 127

logistics, 130, 139

occupation, 4-5, 40

partnership, 147

plan, 81, 114

program, 108

projects, 134

representatives, 35

security efforts, 51

strategy, 115

traffic, 36

transition teams, 142

Coalition Forces Land Component Command, 4

Coalition Provisional Authority, 4–6, 8-9, 37–41, 44,

47, 149

Coleman, Brigadier General Ronald S., 1, 90, 93

Collins, Colonel Augustus L., 90, 94

Combat Outpost Rawah, 112

Combined Action Platoon doctrine, 150

Combined Joint Task Force 7, 4–6, 13, 16, 23, 31, 41,

47

Commandant, 1, 3-4, 16, 87, 131, 146

Commander’s Emergency Response Program, 134,

141-42

Connor, Colonel Arthur W., Jr. (USA), 21, 29, 30

constitutional referendum, 115-16, 118-19, 121, 123–

26, 129, 133, 147-48 

Conway, Lieutenant General James T., 1, 4, 7, 11, 15-

16, 31-32, 40, 44, 50, 53-54, 56, 149 

Copeland, Sergeant Willie L., III, 43

counterinsurgency, 11, 31, 55-56, 80, 96, 105-6, 118,

123, 125, 129–31, 133, 146-47, 149, 151

formula, 150

in al-Anbar Province, 115-16

in Fallujah, 109

in Jazirah, 111

in Lake Tharthar, 102

in Qalat Sukkar, 9

in Saqlawiyah, 92, 108

192 INTO THE FRAY
Index 193

in western Euphrates River Valley, 84

Iraqi troops, 114

near Haditha Dam, 142

operations in Ramadi, 33

strategy, 105

Davis, Colonel Stephen W., 90, 96-97, 100-1, 108, 110,

112, 122, 126

Dawa Party, 25

Department of Border Enforcement, 112-13, 119, 130

Desert Protectors, 126

districts

Dulab, 108

Jolan, 29, 32, 34, 35, 37, 59, 62, 69–72, 75, 

80, 85, 102

Muallimeen, 59

Sook, 59

Ekiert, Major General Andrzej, 49-50

elections, 82, 87-88, 105, 108, 113, 115, 125, 130, 133,

148

local, 5

support of, 79–81, 91, 112, 116-17, 122, 149

voting, 126

enemy (Iraqi insurgent groups), 5, 21-22, 26, 34-35,

39, 43, 59-60, 62, 64, 70, 72, 74, 76, 80-81, 90, 95, 100,

108, 128, 141, 150-51

air strikes against, 136

center of gravity, 30

combat losses, 44, 98-99, 101, 104, 121, 123,

127

elements, 71, 75, 79

improvised explosive devices, 18

infiltration routes, 20

movement, 49

organizations, 23, 105

potential, 6

sanctuary, 9, 38, 45, 97, 103, 111

supplies, 11

surge, 42

territory, 37

urban combat, 75

Eskan patrol base, 79

Essex (LHD 2), 84

Euphrates River, 19-20, 26, 29, 31, 35, 61, 69, 73, 101,

109, 121-22, 127-28, 131

Old Bridge, 31

valley, 59, 84, 91, 111, 119, 125, 142, 147-48

Fall, 5

Fallujah. See Al-Fallujah

Faw Peninsula, 1

female Marines, 104, 131, 139 

Fifth Fleet, 1

firm base, 33, 49, 79, 101, 123

1stLt Baldomero Lopez (T-AK 3010), 13

flight restriction templates, 63

Forkin, Major Keith A., 56

Formica, Colonel Michael, 58

Forward Operating Bases

Chosin, 48

Duke, 49

Falcon, 94

Hotel, 49

Furness, Lieutenant Colonel David J., 94

Gamboa, Lieutenant Colonel John D., 45

Gannon, Captain Richard J., 55

generators, 57, 95, 101, 139

Glavy, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew G., 58

Greenwood, Colonel Thomas C., 80, 94

gridded reference graphic, 65

Gronski, Colonel John, 111, 128

Gurganus, Colonel Charles M., 91, 102

Habbaniyah, 19, 114, 133

Haditha, 19, 46, 48, 90-91, 95, 112, 114, 120, 123, 130,

139

Dam, 19-20, 45, 48, 108, 110, 122, 131, 142

garrison, 109, 119

raids, 55, 99, 122

voting at, 125

Haditha-Hit corridor, 46, 48, 55, 91, 95-96, 125, 142

Hadrah Mosque, 70-71

Hagee, General Michael W., 1, 3-4, 51, 87, 131, 146

Hai al Becker district, 128

Hammadi, 101

Haqlaniyah, 81, 96, 110, 122-123

Haslam, Colonel Anthony M., 49-50, 79-80

Haswah police station, 79

Hatton, Lieutenant Colonel Jay L., 94

Hejlik, Brigadier General Dennis J., 50

Hezbollah, 23

Hibbinaya, 21

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles

(HMMWV) “Humvee”, 16–18, 43, 61, 90, 94, 99, 103,

137

Highway,

1, 30

10, 29-30, 35-36, 53

E1, 29-30, 34–36, 47-48, 53

Hit, 19, 46, 90, 101, 109, 112, 119-20, 123, 127, 130,

139

civil affairs in, 134

garrison, 119, 143

interdiction in, 95, 101

security, 128

voting, 125

Howza, 24-25

Huck, Major General Richard A., 88-89, 108, 115-16,

118, 123, 125, 146, 148
human exploitation team, 12, 132

humanitarian assistance, 1, 5, 68, 73-74, 80-81, 83, 94

Hunter, Corporal Jeff S., 100

Husabayah, 127

Husaybah, 19, 25, 46, 48, 55, 59, 95, 100, 108, 111,

113, 118-19, 126-27, 130

Hussein, Saddam, 9, 19, 24, 40, 105

Imam Ali Shrine, 50-51

improvised explosive device, 12, 16, 18, 25, 28, 30,

49, 53, 59, 70, 82, 96, 103-4, 111, 115, 140, 148

Independent Election Commission of Iraq (IECI), 80-

81, 115, 117-18, 123, 129

individual augmentees, 22

information warfare, 38

insurgency, 4-5, 8-9, 16-18, 22-23, 27, 38, 40, 44, 50,

54, 59-60, 75, 79, 84-85, 97, 105, 141, 148-50

insurgents, 8–10, 15, 17-18, 21, 23, 27-28, 30–40, 42–

46, 48, 50, 53, 55-56, 59–63, 67–71, 73–76, 78, 80–82,

86, 92, 95–104, 106, 109–11, 115, 117-18, 121, 125–28,

133-34, 139, 141, 143, 148–50

intelligence, 6, 9, 12-13, 23-24, 27, 30, 38, 44, 46, 49,

52, 54, 59-60, 95, 98-99, 103, 111-12, 115-16, 136

Iran, 23-25

Iraq, 1–12

Army, 5, 35, 40, 54, 63, 67, 87, 96, 101, 109,

113-114, 119, 122–30, 141, 144, 147-48, 150

Civil Defense Corps, 6, 27, 32, 35, 42, 45, 47,

53, 87, 149-50

intelligence service, 9

interim government, 4-5, 8, 23, 39, 44, 47, 53,

57, 59-60, 66-67, 87-88, 105

Islamic Party, 22

military units,

1st Division, 114, 

1st Brigade, 120, 140

1st Battalion, 114, 

126

2d Battalion, 114, 

122

2d Brigade,

3d Battalion, 108

3d Brigade, 111

4th Brigade,

1st Battalion, 109

7th Division, 114, 124, 

1st Brigade, 

1st Battalion, 122

2d Battalion, 108, 

122, 128

3d Battalion, 122

2d Brigade, 

1st Battalion, 127-

28

3d Brigade, 120, 123

2d Battalion, 122

7th Reconnaissance Battalion, 122

8th Division, 114

2d Special Police Commando 

Brigade, 128-29

2d Battalion, Muthanna Brigade, 81,

103

36th Commando Battalion, 32, 35, 

39, 50-51, 61, 67, 144

404th (Iraqi National Guard) Battalion, 50

405th Battalion, 51

503d (Iraqi National Guard) Battalion, 90, 96

504th Battalion, 96

505th Battalion, 39

506th Battalion, 35

507th Battalion, 45

7th Reconnaissance Company, 96

Shahwani Special Forces, 47, 96, 100

1st Division, 2d Battalion, 109-10

1st Brigade, 1st Battalion, 114

1st Brigade, 2d Battalion, 101, 114

1st Brigade, 4th Battalion, 50

2d Brigade, 2d Battalion, 142

3d Brigade, 6th Battalion, 61

4th Brigade, 2d Battalion, 100 

2d Battalion, 35 

4th Battalion, 70 

Ministry of Defense, 114

National Assembly, 82-83, 87, 125, 133

National Guard, 35, 47-48, 50-51, 67, 90, 95-

96, 114, 150

Reconstruction Management Office, 135

Republican Guard, 9, 96

security forces, 5, 11, 22, 33, 42, 47–51, 53–

55, 59, 67, 74, 79, 81, 87-88, 92, 102, 104–8,

114-15, 124, 129, 139-40, 142, 147-48, 150

special forces, 47, 96, 107, 111, 120, 126

transitional government, 87, 115, 125, 132

Iron Mountain, 63

Iskandariyah, 11, 48, 110

Islamic Fundamentalist Republic, 23

al-Jafari, Ibrahim, 83

Jamaili, Muhammed, 125

Jazirah, 111, 130

joint direct attack munition (JDAM), 65, 111

Johnson, Colonel R. J., 49, 57, 79

Johnson, Corporal Robert W., 106

Johnson, Major General Stephen T., 87-88, 90, 105,

123, 130, 141, 143, 146–48

194 INTO THE FRAY
Index 195

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 83, 87-88

joint staff, 3, 8, 54

Jolan, 35, 59, 69, 72, 75

cemetery, 69

district, 32, 34, 37, 62, 70-71, 75, 80, 85

park, 62, 70, 102

quarter, 29

Jordan, 9, 19-20, 57, 67, 79, 95, 113, 147

Jubeil, 75

Jurf as Sakhr, 38, 42, 45, 46, 80

Karbala, 23, 38, 41, 47, 79, 80, 82, 94, 105, 107, 112,

114, 143

province, 80

Karmah, 38, 46, 48, 79, 91, 95, 102-3, 109, 132

Kasal, 1stSgt Bradley A., 72

Kearsarge (LHD 3), 49

Kelly, Brigadier General John F., 31, 38, 46

keyhole template, 63-64, 76–78

Kimmitt, Brigadier General Mark (USA), 31

Kirkush military training base, 97

Kosid, Lieutenant Colonel Robert R., 143

Kraft, Sergeant Jarrett A., 74

Kramlich, Brigadier General Richard S., 1, 6-7, 9, 20

Kubaysah, 96, 111

Kufa mosque, 50

Kurds, 23, 82-83, 115

soldiers, 150

Kuwait, 1, 2, 13, 21, 46, 49, 51, 58, 79-80, 83-84, 88-

89, 94, 139

La Vine, Colonel James K., 123, 125, 127

Lake Qadisiyah, 19

Lake Tharthar, 19, 95, 102-3, 109, 143 

Lee, Lieutenant Jeffrey T., 70, 

light armored vehicle (LAV-25), 25, 61, 71

Liles, Lieutenant Colonel Donald J., 128

lines of operation, 11, 105-106

Litening targeting pod, 53, 63, 65, 99

Lopez, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew A., 48

Madaysis, 21

Mahdi army, 35, 40, 41-42

militia, 50-51

Maintenance Center, Marine Corps Logistics Command, Albany, Georgia, 89

March Air Force Base, California, 89

Maritime Prepositioned Squadron, 2, 3, 13 

Marine Corps,

aviation units,

2d Marine Aircraft Wing (2d MAW),

87, 90, 92, 94, 111, 115, 125, 136, 

140

3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW),

1, 6, 13–16, 20, 45, 49, 53-54, 58, 63-

64, 66, 76, 81, 84, 92, 144

Marine Aircraft Group 16 (MAG-16),

20, 144

Marine Aircraft Group 26 (MAG-26),

87, 93, 136, 144

Marine Air Control Group 38 

(MACG-38), 20

Marine Wing Support Group 37 

(MWSG-37), 20 

Marine All Weather Fighter Attack 

Squadron 242 (VMFA[AW]-242), 66,

68

Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA211), 66

Marine Attack Squadron 214 (VMA214), 53, 66

Marine Attack Squadron 311 (VMA311), 66

Marine Attack Squadron 542 (VMA542), 66

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron

361 (HMH-361), 81-82

Marine Medium Helicopter 

Squadron 161 (HMM-161), 54

Marine Medium Helicopter 

Squadron 163 (HMM-163), 125

Marine Medium Helicopter 

Squadron 165 (HMM-165), 94

Marine Medium Helicopter 

Squadron 166 (HMM-166), 49

Marine Medium Helicopter 

Squadron 263 (HMM-263), 49

Marine Medium Helicopter 

Squadron 265 (HMM-265), 58, 83

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

Squadron 1 (VMU-1), 65, 136

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

Squadron 2 (VMU-2), 65, 136

Marine Wing Headquarters 

Squadron 3, 20

Marine Wing Support Squadron 374

(MWSS-374), 30

casualties, 52, 78, 148

Combat Development Command, 54

ground units,

Headquarters US Marine Corps, 2

Marine Logistics Command, 1, 16, 

89-90

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground

Task Force, 1

1st Marine Division, 1, 6-7, 13–15, 

20-21, 23, 25, 30-31, 35, 38, 40, 42–

44, 46–49, 52-53, 55–59, 69, 74–76, 

78, 84, 87–89, 94-95, 145, 149
2d Marine Division, 84, 87–89, 94, 

102-103, 106, 108, 111, 112, 114–17,

120, 124-25, 127, 129–31, 

133-34, 137, 144-45

4th Marine Division, 28, 89, 111, 

131-32

I Marine Expeditionary Force (I 

MEF), 1–4, 8, 13, 15, 19, 28, 31, 56,

87, 95, 149

II Marine Expeditionary Force (II 

MEF), 54, 79, 86–88, 90, 93, 95-96, 

105, 115, 141, 147

III Marine Expeditionary Force (III 

MEF), 87

Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1),

7, 14, 21, 28–31, 33, 36, 38, 42, 44–

49, 53, 55–58, 60–62, 64, 68-69, 71–

73, 74, 80-81, 83, 85, 91, 95

Regimental Combat Team 2 (RCT-2),

90-91, 95-96, 98–101, 108–14, 116, 

119–20, 122-23, 125–27, 132-33, 139

Regimental Combat Team 5 (RCT-5),

87

Regimental Combat Team 7 (RCT-7),

14-15, 19, 21, 25, 27-28, 30, 35-36, 

40, 44–49, 53, 55–62, 64–66, 68-69, 

71, 73-74, 81, 83–86, 90, 95, 128

Regimental Combat Team 8 (RCT-8),

87, 91-92, 102–104, 108-109, 111, 

116, 134-35, 139

1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade 

(1st MEB), 1

2d Brigade, 91, 103, 106, 108, 113-

14 

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit 

(11th MEU [SOC]), 42, 49, 51, 79-80

13th Marine Expeditionary Unit 

(13th MEU), 1, 123, 125–27, 130

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit 

(15th MEU), 80, 94

22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (22d

MEU), 130, 143-44

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit 

(24th MEU), 49, 51, 57, 59, 79, 93

25th Brigade, 114

31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (31st

MEU), 3, 49, 51, 56, 58-59, 66, 82, 84

1st Marines

1st Battalion (1/1), 1, 94

2d Battalion (2/1), 21, 29–

32, 34–36, 47-48, 61, 125–28 

3d Battalion (3/1), 33, 68–

71, 73-74, 112, 122, 142 

2d Marines

1st Battalion (1/2), 47, 49, 

79-80, 143 

2d Battalion (2/2), 21, 29, 

34, 46, 48-49, 122-23, 128

3d Battalion (3/2), 90, 97-

101, 107–11, 121, 136

3d Marines

1st Battalion (1/3), 51, 58, 

62, 69–71, 74, 82-83, 91

2d Battalion (2/3), 51

4th Marines

1st Battalion (1/4), 49-50

2d Battalion (2/4), 7, 14, 21,

28, 43

3d Battalion (3/4), 20, 27, 

36, 39, 42, 45, 46, 48-49, 91-

92, 103-4, 106

5th Marines

1st Battalion (1/5), 21, 29, 

32, 34, 36, 39, 48, 91, 101, 

108, 117

2d Battalion (2/5), 56, 82, 

91 

3d Battalion (3/5), 68–72, 

74, 144

6th Marines

1st Battalion (1/6), 91-92, 

102–4, 108

2d Battalion (2/6), 128

3d Battalion (3/6), 111, 113,

120-21, 126-27, 130

7th Marines

1st Battalion (1/7), 1, 16, 55,

59, 90

2d Battalion (2/7), 27, 45-

46, 144 

3d Battalion (3/7), 20, 25, 

27, 45-46, 48, 55, 122, 128

8th Marines

1st Battalion (1/8), 49, 51, 

63-64, 66, 69–71, 73, 85, 91

3d Battalion (3/8), 91, 102–

4, 112

10th Marines

1st Battalion (1/10), 91, 104

3d Battalion (3/10), 91

5th Battalion (5/10), 59

11th Marines, 

1st Battalion (1/11), 36, 125 

2d Battalion (2/11), 45, 57

3d Battalion (3/11), 21, 28,

131

196 INTO THE FRAY
Index 197

23d Marines

1st Battalion (1/23), 59, 81,

89

24th Marines

2d Battalion (2/24), 79 

3d Battalion (3/24), 3, 21, 

45 

25th Marines

3d Battalion (3/25), 89-91, 

95-96, 98 –101, 108–11, 122

1st Force Service Support Group, 7,

9, 14-15, 20, 30, 60, 63, 74, 81

1st Force Service Support Group 

(Forward), 6

2d Force Service Support Group (2d

FSSG), 87, 90, 93, 103, 111, 115, 117,

136

2d Marine Logistics Group, 115, 136, 138, 140, 145

3d Civil Affairs Group, 53, 131

4th Civil Affairs Group, 68, 73, 76, 

131-32, 134-35 

5th Civil Affairs Group (Provisional),

92, 118, 131–33

6th Civil Affairs Group (Provisional),

118, 131, 133, 135

30th Naval Construction Regiment, 

117, 140

Combat Logistics Regiment 25, 93, 

103, 137, 139

Combat Service Support Group 11 

(CSSG-11), 7, 20

Combat Service Support Group 15 

(CSSG-15), 7, 20

Expeditionary Strike Group 3, 49

MEF Engineer Group (MEG), 81, 93

MEU Service Support Group 15 

(MSSG-15), 94

MEU Service Support Group 31 

(MSSG-31), 58

1st Intelligence Battalion, 52, 111

1st Light Armored Reconnaissance 

Battalion (1st LAR), 20, 25, 33, 45-

46, 48, 113, 122, 126, 143

1st Reconnaissance Battalion, 21, 29-

30, 33, 42, 128, 130, 143

1st Tank Battalion, 37, 45, 47

2d Assault Amphibian Vehicle Battalion (2d AAVB), 89, 92, 103, 144

2d Combat Engineer Battalion, 91, 

112

2d Intelligence Battalion, 30, 52, 111

2d Light Armored Reconnaissance 

Battalion (2d LAR), 90-91, 95, 98, 

100-1, 108–11, 120

2d Radio Battalion, 52, 111

2d Reconnaissance Battalion, 61, 81,

91

2d Tank Battalion, 

Company A, 91

3d Assault Amphibian Vehicle Battalion (3d AAVB), 47

3d Light Armored Reconnaissance 

Battalion (3d LAR), 59, 61, 67, 70, 91 3d Radio Battalion, 52, 111

3d Reconnaissance Battalion, 102-

103, 109

4th Assault Amphibian Vehicle Battalion (4th AAVB), 131

Company A, 4th Assault 

Amphibian Battalion, 91

4th Combat Engineer Battalion, 91,

131

4th Light Antiaircraft Defense Battalion

as provisional infantry battalion, 131

4th Light Armored Reconnaissance 

Battalion (4th LAR), 1

4th Maintenance Battalion, 131

4th Tank Battalion

as military police unit, 131

8th Engineer Support Battalion, 137,

139

8th Tank Battalion, 92

9th Psychological Operations Battalion, 71

Combat Logistics Battalion 2 (CLB2), 93, 98, 101, 137, 139

Combat Logistics Battalion 8 (CLB8), 93, 101-2, 138-39

Combat Service Support Battalion 1

(CSSB-1), 20

Combat Service Support Battalion 7

(CSSB-7), 20, 58

1st Force Reconnaissance Company,

20, 27, 45, 48, 91, 96, 100-1, 108, 110 1st Small Craft Company, 45

2d Force Reconnaissance Company,

111, 120, 123, 126

Amphibious Squadron 5, 49

Amphibious Squadron 11, 51, 84

Detachment B, 4th Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, 1

Fleet Antiterrorist Security Team, 1

Reserve, 3, 8, 13, 22, 52, 89, 94, 131
expeditionary units, 49, 79, 151

Mattis, Major General James N., 1, 6-7, 15, 21–23, 28,

30-33, 35, 38, 40, 42, 44–47, 49, 53–55, 145-46, 149

Maverick (AGM-65) air-to-ground missile, 65, 78, 111

Mayer, Lieutenant Colonel John L., 49-50

McKenzie, Colonel Kenneth F., 130, 143

McKiernan, Lieutenant General David D. (USA), 4 

Medina, Brigadier General Joseph V., 49

Metz, Lieutenant General Thomas F., 47, 50, 54, 143

Miclot, Colonel Jonathan G., 144

Miller, Colonel W. Lee, 55-56, 58-59, 84, 

Milstead, Brigadier General Robert E., Jr., 90, 92, 93,

144

Mish Al Bridge, 119-20

Mitchell, Corporal Robert J., Jr., 72

Morel, Captain Brent L., 42-43

Mosul, 22, 95, 121

Mudaysis, 20, 112

Muhamadi, 96

Mujahideen, 75

Mulaab, 108, 128

Multi National Corps–Iraq, 41, 47, 54, 87, 94, 119, 130,

138, 141

Multi National Division–Baghdad, 130

Multi National Division Center–South, 1, 49

Multi National Division–Southeast, 1

Multi National Force–Iraq, 41, 47, 57, 78, 86-87, 105,

111-12

Multi National Force–West, 47, 54, 60, 94, 106, 114,

147, 149, 151

Mundy, Lieutenant Colonel Timothy S., 98

Murray, Colonel Thomas M., 93

Muslim extremists, 23, 115-16, 141, 149

Nasr Wa Salam, 81, 95

National Guard,

Illinois, 130, 139

Pennsylvania, 111

Texas, 139

Utah, 111

Vermont, 111

Virginia, 144

National Highway,

8, 21

9, 21

Natonski, Brigadier General Richard F., 54

Major General Richard F., 55, 58-59, 67, 89, 

95

Naval Air Facility, Sigonella, Italy, 20

Navy Mobile Construction Battalion 74, 34

Nazl, 75

Neary, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M., 102

Neller, Brigadier General Robert B., 145-46

Newman, Lieutenant Colonel Randy, 56

Nicholson, Colonel Lawrence D., 56

Office of Transitional Initiative, 135

oil, 19

Okinawa, 2-3, 51, 84, 87

Olson, Lieutenant Colonel Gregg P., 32, 36

Operations,

al-Fajr, 61–67, 69, 73, 75, 78-79, 83, 126

Bulldog, 130

Citadel II, 81

Clear Decision, 102

Cyclone, 120

Dagger, 103-4

Firm Control, 103

Green Light, 112

Green Trident, 130

Greenback, 102

Guardian Shield, 111

Guardian Sword, 103, 107-8, 111, 114–16

Heavy, 111

Hunter, 111-12, 118-19, 130, 133, 141

Hunter II, 118, 120

Iraqi Freedom, 1–3, 6-7, 87-88, 91, 104

Iron Fist, 94, 121–23

Iron Hammer, 128

Koa Canyon, 143

Lakota Sunrise, 143

Liberty Express, 112, 115, 125, 129

Lightning Bolt, 79

Lightning Strike, 112

Lightning Strike II, 109-10

Longstreet, 6

Matador, 97–99, 136

Mountaineers, 121

Mustang, 112

New Market, 99

Night Stalker I, 96 

Night Stalker II, 96 

Night Stalker III, 100

Patriot Shield, 96, 102, 106–8, 142

Phantom Fury, 57–59, 61, 63, 65, 67, 75

Plymouth Rock, 79-80

Quick Strike, 110, 122

Rawah II, 48

Red Bull, 130

Red Bull II, 142

Resolute Sword, 41

Ripper Sweep, 44–46

River Blitz, 84, 95

River Bridge, 84, 90-91, 95

River Gate, 121–23

River Sweep, 94

Rodeo, 55

Saber, 109, 112-13, 130

198 INTO THE FRAY
Index 199

Sanguine Thunder, 107

Scimitar, 111

Southern Fire, 111

Southern Hunter, 128

Spear, 100, 107

Steel Curtain, 118, 120-21, 125–27

Strong Will, 94

Sunrise, 107

Sword, 101

Terrapin I, 57

Terrapin II, 57

Terrapin III, 95

Trifecta, 123, 128

Vigilant Resolve, 31–36, 39, 41-42, 44, 63, 66

Vital Ground, 111

Warning Track, 94

Western Shield, 143

White Feather, 92, 102

Zaidon Focus, 102

Patton, Colonel Gary S., 52, 56

Pennella, Captain Brad S., 36

personal body armor, 16–18

phase line

Ethan, 70

Fran, 70-71

George, 69

Henry, 70-71

PFC William B. Baugh (T-AK 3001), 13

Pvt Franklin J. Phillips (T-AK 3004), 13

Provincial Civil Military Operations Center, 133-34

Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee,

116, 133-34

Qadisiyah, 19, 50, 109, 112

Ramadi. See Ar-Ramadi

Ramana, 98

Bridge, 98

Ramos, Lieutenant Colonel Michael R., 58

Rawah, 19, 27, 44, 48, 95, 109, 112, 119-120, 123, 125

patrol base, 20

combat outpost, 112

Rawi, Ammar, 125

regimental combat teams, 6, 57-58, 62 

Regional Reconstruction Operation Center, 135

Reist, Brigadier General David G., 146

Renforth, Lieutenant Colonel Austin E., 120

reservists, 2, 4, 52, 131

Richtsmeier, Colonel David M., 145

Route, 

8, 79, 94

10, 44, 53, 59, 62, 69–71, 73, 82, 125

12, 125

E1, 36, 47-48, 53

Rumsfeld, Donald H., 3

Russell, First Lieutenant David T., 101

Rutbah, 20, 27, 55, 59, 101, 120, 125, 133, 143

Sadr, 

city, 41

Mahdi Army, 40

Mahdi Militia, 50

Sanchez, Lieutenant General Ricardo S. (USA), 4–6,

31-32, 38, 41, 47

Saqlawiyah, 28, 38, 47, 79, 92, 108

Sattler, Lieutenant General John F., 54, 56, 58, 60, 79,

87

Saudi Arabia, 9, 14, 21, 23, 27, 112-13, 147

Seabees, 6, 68, 73, 119

security, 5, 13, 19, 21, 27, 29, 45, 47, 60, 80–83, 87-

88, 129-30, 149-50

Azerbaijani company, 45, 108

forces, 5-6, 21, 33, 42, 47-48, 50-51, 55, 74,

105–9, 115-16, 124, 140, 142

operations, 1, 3, 7-8, 11, 14, 16, 30, 

shaping operations, 60-61

Shea, Major Kevin M., 56

Shi’a, 9, 11, 23-24, 38, 40–42, 50, 82, 115, 141, 150

Shi’ite, 23, 25, 149

Shuhada, 75

Shuhada (Martyrs) District, 59

Shupp, Colonel Michael A., 56, 58, 60, 69, 71–74, 85 

Sin’a District, 35

Sistani, Ayatollah , 23, 25, 51, 

Skaggs, Captain Michael D., 37

Smith, Captain Jason E., 39

Smith, Corporal Eric M., 43-44

Souq, 75

South Dam Village, 142

Southwestern Desert, 19

special forces, 125-26

stabilization operations, 49, 56, 73, 75

Stalder, Major General Keith J., 54, 68

Stann, Second Lieutenant Brian M., 98-99

Stoddard, Captain Kyle, 34

Stryker Brigade, See 2d Infantry Division

suicide vehicle bombs, 97

Sunni, 5, 9, 11, 19, 22–24, 26, 39, 82-83, 86, 105, 114–

16, 125, 129, 141, 149–51

Triangle, 8, 22, 29, 149

Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,

23-24

Swannack, Major General Charles H., Jr. (USA), 15

Syria, 8–10, 19–21, 25, 27, 45, 59, 67, 79, 112–14, 119,

126, 147

Syrian Desert, 19

Tactical Fusion Center, 30

Taheer Firm Base, 79
Talabani, Jalal, 83

Tammin, 108, 130

tank,

M1A1/2 Abrams Main Battle Tank, 28, 34, 37,

56, 71, 97, 99

Taqaddum, 20, 5, 103, 136

Air Base, 14, 20, 54, 93, 111, 124

task force,

1st Battalion, 6th Marines, 103,

2d Battalion, 114th Field Artillery, 112, 124, 

128

3d Battalion, 2d Marines, 98, 100-1, 136

3d Battalion, 25th Marines, 91, 99, 101

3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion,

61

Baghdad, 6, 50

Dragon, 49

Ironhawk, 108

LAR, 67

Lionheart, 101

Naha, 59, 83

Phantom, 112, 144

Walsh, 45

Taza, 57

team,

Brawler, 103

Gator, 103

Tehran, 23-24

Tharthar Bridge, 44

Canal, 28

lake, 19, 95, 102-3, 109, 143

the Salafist seam, 95

Tigris River, 19

Tikrit, 95

Toolan, Colonel John A., 21, 29-30, 33, 35, 38-39, 47-

48, 56

traffic control point, 33, 42, 48, 53, 55, 101, 143 

transfer of control, 130

Trebil, 45, 112-113, 130

Tucker, Colonel Craig A., 19, 26, 30, 40, 44–46, 48,

55, 58, 60, 69, 73, 83

Twentynine Palms, California, 89

U.S.-Iraqi teams, 27

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), 6, 64, 87, 93, 111,

136

Ubaydi, 97–99, 126-27, 134

Udairi range, 58

Umm Qasr, 1

United Iraqi Alliance, 82

Urgent Universal Need Statement (UUNS), 16

Urquhart, Lieutenant Colonel Lionel B., 99, 110

Vietnam, 57, 150

Vohr, Lieutenant Colonel James A., 58

Wahhabi, 22-23

Waldron, Corporal Wyatt L., 104

Walsh, Major Bennett W., 45

Wimberg, Sergeant David N., 99-100

Wissler, Brigadier General John E., 90, 93, 136, 145

Workman, Corporal Jeremiah W., 74

Zaidon, 81, 91, 102-3, 112, 123, 128

Zilmer, Major General Richard C., 144, 146–48

Zuni rocket, 65

200 INTO THE FRAY
Cover: Regimental Combat Team 7 Marines,

alongside Iraqi Army Emergency Response

Unit Soldiers, prepare for offensive operations

against enemy insurgents inside a mosque in

the city of Fallujah, al-Anbar Province, Iraq, on

10 November 2004, during Operation al-Fajr.

(Photo by SSgt Jonathan C. Knauth)