IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

JEROME JUNIOR WASHINGTON, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

MICHAEL KNAPP, et al., 

 Defendants. 

 No. 4:22-CV-01269 

 (Chief Judge Brann) 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

DECEMBER 5, 2024 

 Plaintiff Jerome Junior Washington, a serial pro se litigant, lodged the 

instant Section 19831

 action in August 2022, alleging constitutional violations by 

two prison officials at SCI Rockview. Washington’s Section 1983 claims have 

been winnowed to a single Eighth Amendment supervisory liability medical 

indifference claim against a corrections officer at SCI Rockview. That Defendant 

now moves for summary judgment on Washington’s remaining Section 1983 claim 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the following reasons, the 

Court will grant Defendant’s Rule 56 motion. 

1

 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional 

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves 

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ. 

v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002). 

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

During all times relevant to the claims underlying this lawsuit, Washington 

was incarcerated at SCI Rockview.3

 Washington is now housed at SCI Camp 

Hill.4

 In his complaint, he alleged that two SCI Rockview officials—Unit Manager 

Michael Knapp and Superintendent Bobbi Jo Salamon—violated his Eighth 

Amendment rights.5

The Court screened Washington’s pro se prisoner complaint as required by 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and dismissed all claims except the Eighth Amendment 

medical indifference claim against Unit Manager Knapp.6

 Specifically, the Court 

dismissed all Section 1983 claims against Superintendent Salamon for lack of 

2

 Local Rule of Court 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment be supported “by a 

separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to 

which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” LOCAL RULE OF COURT

56.1. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of 

material facts responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving party’s statement 

and identifying genuine issues to be tried. Id. “Statements of material facts in support of, or 

in opposition to, a motion [for summary judgment] shall include references to the parts of the 

record that support the statements.” Id. Defendant filed a properly supported statement of 

material facts. See Doc. 68. Washington responded to this statement. See Doc. 74. 

Washington’s responses, however, either lack citations to the record or contain citations that 

simply do not support his counterstatements of fact. This directly contravenes Local Rule 56.1. 

See Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 2018) (explaining that Local 

Rule 56.1 “is essential to the Court’s resolution of a summary judgment motion due to its role 

in organizing the evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating precisely how each 

side proposed to prove a disputed fact with admissible evidence.” (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted)). Defendant’s statements of material facts, therefore, are deemed 

admitted unless properly countered by Washington with citations to competent record evidence 

supporting Washington’s counterstatements of fact. See LOCAL RULE OF COURT 56.1. 

3

 See Doc. 68 ¶ 7; Doc. 74 ¶ 7. 

4

 See Doc. 49 at 2. 

5

 See generally Doc. 1; see Doc. 12 at 4. 

6

 See Doc. 12 at 6-11; Doc. 13 ¶¶ 6-7. 

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personal involvement,7 dismissed Washington’s official capacity claims that 

sought monetary damages rather than prospective injunctive relief,8

 and dismissed 

all other Section 1983 claims against Knapp—including possible claims of denial 

of access to the courts, unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and verbal 

harassment—for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.9

As to the Eighth Amendment claim that survived Section 1915A screening, 

the Court liberally construed Washington’s complaint as alleging a supervisory 

liability claim regarding an unconstitutional policy or practice with respect to 

mental health care at SCI Rockview.10 As the Court explained, Washington’s 

complaint appeared to allege “that Knapp has a disciplinary policy or practice that 

does not properly account for the behaviors of mentally ill inmates and keeps them 

perpetually housed in the BMU,” and which policy also intentionally blocks 

adequate psychological services to BMU inmates.11 Washington, for his part, has 

never disputed the Court’s construction of this claim or provided an alternative 

interpretation. 

 Fact discovery has closed, and defendant Knapp now moves for summary 

judgment on the remaining Eighth Amendment claim.12 Washington eventually 

7

 Doc. 12 at 6-7. 

8

 Id. at 8-9. 

9

 Id. at 9-11. 

10 Id. at 7-8. 

11 Id. 12 Doc. 62. 

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filed a brief in opposition that complies with the Local Rules of Court.13 On 

November 13, 2024, Knapp timely filed his reply brief.14 Knapp’s Rule 56 motion 

is now fully briefed and ripe for disposition. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

“One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate 

and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.”15 Summary judgment is 

appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”16 Material 

facts are those “that could alter the outcome” of the litigation, and “disputes are 

‘genuine’ if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the 

position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.”17 

At the Rule 56 stage, the Court’s function is not to “weigh the evidence and 

determine the truth of the matter” but rather “to determine whether there is a 

genuine issue for trial.”18 The Court must view the facts and evidence presented 

“in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and must “draw all 

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.”19 This evidence, however, must be 

13 See Docs. 73, 76-79. 

14 Doc. 82. 

15 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). 

16 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 

17 EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Clark v. Modern 

Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993)). 

18 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). 

19 Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014). 

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adequate—as a matter of law—to sustain a judgment in favor of the nonmoving 

party on the claim or claims at issue.20 A “scintilla of evidence” supporting the 

nonmovant’s position is insufficient; “there must be evidence on which the jury 

could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].”21 Succinctly stated, summary 

judgment is “put up or shut up time” for the nonmoving party.22 

III. DISCUSSION 

 Washington’s remaining Section 1983 claim asserts deliberate indifference 

to serious medical needs via an unconstitutional policy or practice allegedly 

implemented by Knapp. Knapp contends that Washington cannot carry his Rule 

56 burden for two reasons: first, Washington has not established the elements of a 

claim of deliberate indifference to serious mental health needs; second, 

Washington failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to any relevant 

claim against Knapp. The Court agrees that Washington has not satisfied his Rule 

56 burden and will examine Knapp’s arguments in reverse order. 

 

20 Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250-57; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 

U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986). 

21 Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 

U.S. at 252) (alteration in original). 

22 Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Berkeley Inv. Grp. 

v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006)). 

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A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA)23 requires prisoners to 

exhaust available administrative remedies before suing prison officials for alleged 

constitutional violations.24 Proper exhaustion is mandatory, even if the inmate is 

seeking relief—like monetary damages—that cannot be granted by the 

administrative system.25 The exhaustion process a prisoner must follow is 

governed by the contours of the prison grievance system in effect where the inmate 

is incarcerated.26 

Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections (DOC) employs a three-step 

grievance process that must be completed to properly exhaust administrative 

remedies in most cases.27 If informal resolution attempts do not solve the problem, 

the first step is to file a written grievance (using form DC-804, Part 1) with the 

Facility Grievance Coordinator within 15 working days after “the event upon 

which the claim is based.”28 An adverse decision by the grievance coordinator 

must be appealed to the Facility Manager within 15 working days of the initial23 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et seq. 24 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639, 642 (2016) (explaining that only 

“available” remedies must be exhausted). 

25 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006). 

26 Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007); see also Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91. 

27 See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 292 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002); COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEP’T 

OF CORR., INMATE GRIEVANCE SYS., Policy No. DC-ADM 804 (May 1, 2015) (hereinafter 

“DC-ADM 804”). 

28 DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(3)-(5), (8). 

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review response or rejection.29 Finally, an adverse decision by the Facility 

Manager must be appealed to “Final Review” with the Secretary’s Office of 

Inmate Grievances and Appeals (SOIGA), and again must be submitted within 15 

working days of the date of the Facility Manager’s decision.30

The DOC has specific requirements for grievances submitted by inmates. 

Those requirements include, among other conditions, that the grievance “be legible 

[and] understandable”; “include a statement of the facts relevant to the claim” as 

well as “the date, approximate time, and location of the event(s) that gave rise to 

the grievance”; that the prisoner “identify individuals directly involved in the 

event(s)”; and that the grievance include “the specific relief sought,” including 

“compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court.”31

Washington is an indefatigable pro se litigant who has many years of 

experience with both federal civil rights litigation32 and the DOC’s administrative 

grievance process.33 Knapp has identified only one grievance filed by Washington 

that has any relevance to the case at bar: grievance number 969009.34 Washington 

does not adequately dispute this assertion or provide any additional grievances.35 

29 Id. § 2(A)(1). 

30 Id. § 2(B)(1). 

31 Id. § 1(A)(11). 

32 See Washington v. Salamon, No. 4:23-CV-01626, Doc. 9 at 1, 3, 4 & n.7 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 

2024) (Brann, C.J.). 

33 See Washington v. Anna, No. 4:22-CV-01744, Doc. 39-1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 2024) (Brann, C.J.). 

34 Doc. 68 ¶ 66; Doc. 68-6. 

35 See Doc. 74 ¶ 66. Although Washington cursorily mentions additional grievances in his 

opposition brief, (see Doc. 79 at 12), he does not provide copies of these grievances or state 

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Washington’s failure to exhaust is obvious for two reasons. First, in 

grievance number 969009, Washington’s allegations are exclusively related to his 

conditions of confinement on a single day in February 2022.36 In fact, Washington 

opens the grievance by explicitly stating that it is “against Unit Manager Knapp 

[for] cruel & unusual conditions of confinement dated 2-16-22[.]”37 Yet 

Washington’s conditions-of-confinement claim regarding the events of February 

16, 2022, has already been dismissed for failure to state a claim, as his allegations 

did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.38 Thus, Washington failed to 

exhaust the instant Eighth Amendment supervisory liability medical indifference 

claim because he never asserted this claim during the administrative process. 

Second, even if Washington had raised this claim in grievance 969009, his 

attempts at exhaustion would still fall short. That is because he never properly 

pursued this grievance through all three steps of the DOC’s grievance process. To 

wit: Washington’s final appeal to the SOIGA was rejected on procedural grounds 

their contents such that the Court could determine whether he exhausted (or even attempted to 

exhaust) the at-issue Eighth Amendment supervisory liability medical indifference claim. 

Washington’s bald, unsupported assertion that he “exhausted such available administrative 

remedies that was [sic] offered in this case,” (id.), is both conclusory and wholly insufficient 

at the Rule 56 stage to create a genuine dispute of material fact. 

36 See Doc. 68-6 at 6. 

37 See id. Although Washington also mentions being denied psychology treatment, (see id.), his 

complaint concerns only February 16, 2022, (id.). 

38 See Doc. 12 at 11 & n.49. 

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for failing to provide a legible copy of his initial grievance.39 Washington provides 

no evidence or even an allegation that he cured this deficiency and received a 

merits determination from the SOIGA. Administrative exhaustion, however, 

requires an inmate to properly complete each step of the grievance process and 

receive a decision on the merits.40

In summary, Washington never asserted in any grievance of record that 

Knapp had implemented an unconstitutional policy or practice with respect to 

mental health care, much less did Washington receive a decision on the merits 

from the SOIGA on such a claim. Without raising or properly appealing this claim 

as required by DC-ADM 804, Washington failed to exhaust administrative 

remedies and thus procedurally defaulted the instant Eighth Amendment medical 

indifference claim. With no excuse for his procedural default, he is barred from 

seeking relief in federal court on this claim.41 Summary judgment, therefore, must 

39 See Doc. 68 ¶ 69; Doc. 68-6 at 2. Washington disputes the Chief Grievance Officer’s 

determination and alleges that he provided a copy of his initial grievance. See Doc. 74 ¶ 69. 

However, Washington’s attempted rebuttal fails because (1) he does not aver that he provided 

a legible copy of the initial grievance for SOIGA review, and (2) he provides no citation to 

record evidence to support his counterstatement and therefore Knapp’s statement of fact is 

deemed admitted. See LOCAL RULE OF COURT 56.1. 

40 See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90 (explaining that proper administrative exhaustion “means using 

all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the 

issues on the merits)” (citation omitted)); see also Williamson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 

131 F. App’x 888, 890 (3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential) (finding that filing initial grievance 

only was insufficient to exhaust administrative remedies under state prison’s three-step 

grievance requirements). 

41 See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230 (3d Cir. 2004); Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 

299, 304-05 (3d Cir. 2020); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

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be granted in Knapp’s favor based on Washington’s failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. 

B. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs 

Even if Washington had exhausted his Eighth Amendment supervisory 

liability claim against Knapp, it would still fail on the merits. Washington has 

proffered no evidence of an unconstitutional policy or deliberate indifference to 

mental health needs. 

A Section 1983 plaintiff can establish a supervisory liability claim by 

showing that a defendant, “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, 

established and maintained a policy, practice[,] or custom which directly caused 

constitutional harm.”42 The alleged constitutional harm here is deliberate 

indifference to serious mental health needs. As best as the Court can discern, 

Washington alleged in his complaint that Knapp had a policy or practice by which 

he disciplined mentally ill inmates and kept them perpetually housed in the BMU, 

and which policy also denied them appropriate psychological services.43 

In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth Amendment “requires 

prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it has 

incarcerated.”44 To establish an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim 

42 A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting 

Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989)). 

43 See Doc. 12 at 7-8 (citing Doc. 1 ¶¶ 10, 16, 31)). 

44 Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). 

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regarding inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must show “(i) a serious medical 

need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate 

indifference to that need.”45 A serious medical need is “one that has been 

diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay 

person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”46 

Deliberate indifference by prison officials may be evidenced by intentional 

refusal to provide care known to be medically necessary, delayed provision of 

medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, 

or denial of reasonable requests for treatment resulting in suffering or risk of 

injury.47 Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is an exacting standard, 

requiring a showing of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”48 Claims 

sounding in mere medical negligence will not suffice.49 

Knapp’s statement of material facts and attached records provide a thorough 

history of Washington’s BMU phase progression and his psychological care at SCI 

Rockview.50 The Court need not regurgitate the extensive treatment details set 

forth in this evidence. Suffice it to say that, according to the undisputed51 record 

45 Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). 

46 Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). 

47 See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 

at 346). 

48 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted). 

49 Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197. 

50 See Doc. 68 ¶¶ 15-64. 

51 Washington generally does not cite countervailing evidence in his counterstatement of material 

facts. See Doc. 74 ¶¶ 15-64. Although in several paragraphs he disagrees with Knapp’s 

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evidence, during all relevant times Washington received constant psychological 

care from the SCI Rockview psychiatrist (Dr. Weber) and other mental health 

professionals, timely received BMU phase reviews at regular intervals, and largely 

progressed forward in his BMU phases.52

Washington has simply failed to put forth any evidence that Knapp 

sabotaged his BMU Phase progression, denied him access to psychological care, or 

otherwise interfered with his mental health treatment. Indeed, there is no evidence 

of an unconstitutional policy or practice by Knapp, nor is there any evidence that 

Knapp was deliberately indifferent to Washington’s mental health needs.53 The 

record actually reflects that Knapp frequently voted to advance Washington to the 

next BMU phase, even when others on the care team opposed this progression.54 

The record also demonstrates that Washington received regular psychological care 

while housed in the BMU at SCI Rockview with no interference from Knapp (or 

any other prison official, for that matter).55 

Washington has not proffered evidence to support his remaining Eighth 

Amendment supervisory liability medical indifference claim against Knapp. So 

statements of fact and cites to Knapp’s exhibits, (see id. ¶¶ 26, 30, 33), those exhibits support—

rather than contravene—Knapp’s statements. Thus, Knapp’s statements of material facts are 

deemed admitted. See LOCAL RULE OF COURT 56.1. 

52 See Doc. 68 ¶¶ 15-64. 

53 Washington’s opposition brief is rife with aspersions and allegations, but it is bereft of 

evidence that could create a genuine dispute of material fact or sustain a judgment in his favor 

on this Eighth Amendment claim. 

54 Id. ¶¶ 34, 49, 63. 

55 See Doc. 68-2 (psychiatry progress notes). 

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even if Washington had properly exhausted this claim, summary judgment would 

still be granted in Knapp’s favor. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant Knapp’s motion for summary 

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. An appropriate Order 

follows. 

 

BY THE COURT: 

s/ Matthew W. Brann 

 Matthew W. Brann 

 Chief United States District Judge 

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