N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 

JANE DOE, a minor, by her mother : Civ. No. 3:23-CV-1118 

and natural guardian, Jennifer Nied, : 

and JENNIFER NIED, individually, : 

 : 

 Plaintiffs, : 

 : 

v. : (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom) 

 : 

RIVERSIDE SCHOOL DISTRICT, : 

d/b/a Riverside Junior/Senior : 

High School, et al., : 

 : 

Defendants. : 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

I. Introduction 

This case comes before us for consideration of a motion to dismiss 

the plaintiffs’ amended complaint filed by Defendants Bryan and Nicole 

Pica. (Doc. 56). Jennifer Nied filed this action on behalf of herself and her 

daughter Jane Doe, a minor student in the Riverside School District. 

(Doc. 1). The complaint alleged that Jane Doe was sexually assaulted off 

school grounds by A.P., the Picas’ minor child, and that A.P. was 

permitted to attend school with Jane Doe following the assault. (Id.). The 

plaintiffs asserted claims of negligence and negligence per se against the 

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Picas, alleging that they knew of their son’s ongoing harassment of Jane 

Doe following the assault and failed to stop the behavior. (Id.). 

The Picas filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which we 

granted.1 (Docs. 20, 38, 39). We concluded that the complaint, as pleaded, 

failed to state a negligence claim against the Picas because the plaintiffs 

had failed to assert factual allegations from which we could infer that the 

Picas had knowledge of their son’s conduct. (Doc. 38 at 15). However, we 

dismissed this negligence claim without prejudice to the plaintiffs 

endeavoring to amend their complaint.2 (Id. at 16). 

The plaintiffs have since filed an amended complaint, which is 

currently the operative pleading. (Doc. 45). In the amended complaint, 

the plaintiffs contend that the Picas knew of the ongoing harassment of 

Jane Doe by their son following the sexual assault and failed to intervene 

or take any action to stop the conduct. (Id.). Specifically, the amended 

complaint asserts that the Picas were informed of A.P.’s ongoing 

harassment of Jane Doe by both the District and the Juvenile Probation 

1 The District Defendants also filed a motion to dismiss, which we 

addressed through a separate Memorandum Opinion and Order. (Docs. 

36, 37). 

2 We dismissed the negligence per se claim with prejudice. (Docs. 38, 39). 

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Office but failed to take action to stop the behavior. (Doc. 45 ¶¶ 120-21). 

The amended complaint further alleges that Nicole Pica took part in the 

harassment when she allegedly threatened or attempted to strike Jane 

Doe with her car in the school parking lot. (Id. ¶ 122). The plaintiffs allege 

that the Picas had the opportunity to stop this harassment by, at a 

minimum, removing A.P. from the school Jane Doe also attended. (Id. ¶ 

125). 

Thus, the amended complaint asserts a claim of negligence against 

the Picas. (Doc. 45 ¶¶ 118-31). The Picas filed a motion to dismiss, 

arguing that the amended complaint fails to state a claim against them. 

(Doc. 56). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for resolution. (Docs. 59-

61). After consideration, the defendants’ motion will be denied. 

II. Background 

 

The factual background of this Memorandum Opinion is taken from 

the well-pleaded facts alleged in the plaintiffs’ amended complaint (Doc. 

45), which we must accept as true for purposes of the instant motion to 

dismiss. The minor plaintiff, Jane Doe, was enrolled as a student in the 

Riverside School District (“the District”) at Riverside Junior/Senior High 

School, located in Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 45 ¶ 26). 

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Jane Doe was a student with a disability and had a 504 Service 

Agreement with the District that outlined the accommodations she 

required. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28). 

In January and February of 2021, Jane Doe was sexually assaulted 

by A.P., a minor who was also enrolled at Riverside Junior/Senior High 

School. (Doc. 45 ¶¶ 34-35). The assaults occurred outside of the school 

setting. (Id.). Following the assaults, the Luzerne County District 

Attorney’s Office filed a Petition Alleging Delinquency, claiming that A.P. 

raped and/or sexually assaulted Jane Doe. (Id. ¶ 36). After a hearing, the 

Court adjudicated A.P. delinquent of Felony 2 Sexual Assault pursuant 

to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3124.1. (Id. ¶ 37). 

The amended complaint alleges that following this adjudication, 

A.P. was still permitted to attend the same school as Jane Doe. (Doc. 45 

¶ 40-41). The plaintiffs assert that A.P. continued to harass Jane Doe 

during school hours and on school grounds. (Id. ¶ 47). For example, the 

amended complaint asserts that in January of 2022, A.P. attended the 

semi-formal dance, during which he sat at a table next to Jane Doe and 

her friends and allegedly harassed and tormented her all night, claiming 

she “made the whole thing up.” (Id. ¶¶ 55, 57). Additionally, the amended 

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complaint alleges that while passing Jane Doe in the hallway, A.P. 

mockingly shouted at her. (Id. ¶ 60). Jennifer Nied brought these issues 

to the District and requested a meeting with the principals and guidance 

counselor. (Id. ¶ 61). The meeting occurred on February 23, 2022. (Id. ¶ 

62). During the meeting, Nied was told that nothing could be done and 

that if Jane Doe was having issues, she could move to a different school 

district. (Id.). 

The plaintiffs allege that school continued to be a threatening and 

hostile environment for Jane Doe due to the District’s failure to protect 

her from A.P. (Doc. 45 ¶¶ 53-54). Additionally, the amended complaint 

asserts that the Picas were made aware of A.P.’s harassing behavior 

toward Jane Doe, both by the District and the Juvenile Probation Office, 

but did nothing to intervene. (Id. ¶¶ 120-21). Further, the plaintiffs allege 

that Nicole Pica encouraged and took part in the ongoing harassment 

when she allegedly threatened or attempted to strike Jane Doe with her 

car in the school’s parking lot. (Id. ¶ 122). 

The plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on July 5, 2023. (Doc. 1). 

After the defendants’ filed motions to dismiss, which we granted in part 

and denied in part, the plaintiffs then filed the amended complaint. (Doc. 

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45). As to the Pica Defendants, the amended complaint asserts one claim 

of negligence, alleging that they had a duty under state law to exercise 

control of their minor child to prevent him from harming others. (Id. 

Count III). The Picas have now filed a motion to dismiss the claim 

against them. (Doc. 56). 

This motion is fully briefed and ripe for resolution. (Docs. 59-61). 

After consideration, the motion will be denied. 

III. Discussion 

 

A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review 

The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the complaint 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 

12(b)(6) permits the court to dismiss a complaint if the complaint fails to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

Under federal pleading standards, a complaint must set forth a “short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under 

this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the 

complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

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(2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 

them after construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 

1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal 

conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 

Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice”). 

As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized: 

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a twopart analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim 

should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the 

complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any 

legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then 

determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are 

sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for 

relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more 

than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint 

has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 

515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, 

“[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer 

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint 

has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” 

determination will be “a context-specific task that requires 

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense.” Id. 

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Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). 

 Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on 

the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public 

record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court 

can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant 

attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are 

based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. 

White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if 

the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically 

attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the 

court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v. 

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). 

However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when 

deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261. 

B. The Motion to Dismiss will be Denied. 

 

As we have noted, the plaintiffs assert a negligence claim against 

the Picas. The amended complaint alleges that the Picas, as the parents 

of A.P., failed to intervene in the ongoing harassment of Jane Doe when 

they knew it was occurring. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the 

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Picas were informed by both the District and the Juvenile Probation 

Office that A.P. was engaging in tormenting and harassing behavior 

toward Jane Doe. It is further alleged that the Picas failed to take action 

to stop the behavior, including removing A.P. from the school. After 

consideration, we conclude that the amended complaint sufficiently 

states a negligence claim against the Picas. 

To state a negligence claim, the plaintiffs must plead facts to 

establish: “(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty or obligation 

recognized by law; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) a causal 

connection existed between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting 

injury; and (4) actual damages occurred.” Sodders v. Fry, 32 A.3d 882, 

887 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011). A plaintiff asserting a negligence claim must 

show that “such negligence is the ‘proximate’ or ‘legal’ cause of the 

injury.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Generally, a parent-child relationship does not automatically 

impose liability on the parents for the acts of the child. Condel v. Savo, 

39 A.2d 51, 52 (Pa. 1944). However, parents may be liable if their 

negligence makes the alleged injury possible. J.H. ex rel. Hoffman v. 

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Pellak, 764 A.2d 64, 66 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). Pennsylvania has adopted 

the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides that: 

A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to 

control his minor child as to prevent it from intentionally 

harming others or from so conducting itself as to create an 

unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent 

(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability 

to control his child, and 

(b) knows or should know of the necessity and 

opportunity for exercising such control. 

Restatement (Second) of Torts 316. 

Thus, “parental liability is conditioned on the parent having (1) 

notice of a specific type of harmful conduct; and (2) a meaningful 

opportunity to interfere with it at the relevant time.” Keener v. Hribal, 

351 F. Supp. 3d 956, 966 (W.D. Pa. 2018) (citing J.H. ex rel. Hoffman v. 

Pellak, 764 A.2d 64, 66 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)). While these elements do 

not require a parent to be physically present at the time of the tort, “there 

must be some ‘present ability to discipline.’” Id. (quoting K.H. v. J.R., 826 

A.2d 863, 875 (Pa. 2003)). 

 Here, the amended complaint asserts that the Picas were made 

aware of both A.P.’s sexual assault and subsequent ongoing harassment 

of Jane Doe. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege the Picas “were provided 

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with actual notice of A.P.’s deliberate actions toward Plaintiff Doe” by 

Jennifer Nied at A.P.’s probation hearing, the Taylor Police Department, 

the Juvenile Probation Office, and the District, including the school’s 

football coaches. (Doc. 45 ¶¶ 120-21, 130). Accordingly, the plaintiffs have 

sufficiently pleaded that the Picas had “notice of a specific type of harmful 

conduct.” Keener, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 966. 

 Moreover, we conclude that the amended complaint sufficiently 

alleges that the Picas had the opportunity to control A.P. at the relevant 

time. The amended complaint asserts that the Picas, at a minimum, had 

the opportunity to keep A.P. out of the same school as Jane Doe once they 

learned of the sexual assault and the subsequent harassment. (Doc. 45 ¶ 

125). The amended complaint alleges that instead of acting to prevent 

further harm to Jane Doe, Nicole Pica participated in further harassment 

when she allegedly threatened to strike Jane Doe with her car in the 

parking lot. (Id. ¶ 122). Further, the plaintiffs allege that the Picas used 

Bryan Pica’s status as a football coach to try to conceal or cover-up A.P.’s 

harassment of Jane Doe. (Id. ¶ 123(g)). 

While the defendants contend that the allegations of notice and 

opportunity are not specific, specific and detailed factual allegations are 

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not required at the pleading stage. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 

F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008). In our view, the allegations in the amended 

complaint are sufficient at this stage to state a plausible claim of 

negligence against the Picas. See e.g., Keener, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 966 

(finding allegations that the parents had the opportunity to control their 

child by taking him out of school prior to the alleged harmful incident 

sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss). 

 Accordingly, because we conclude that the amended complaint 

adequately alleges a claim of negligence against the Picas, we will deny 

the motion to dismiss.3

3 We are constrained to comment on the defendants’ final paragraph of 

their brief, which expresses their belief that the plaintiffs have made 

“scandalous, hurtful, harmful, and completely unsupported . . . 

vilifications” of their son, A.P., which outside of a judicial pleading, they 

believe would constitute defamation. (Doc. 59 at 10-11; Doc. 61 at 15-16). 

While the defendants may disagree with the plaintiffs’ characterization 

of their son, A.P, this action stems from A.P.’s juvenile adjudication of 

felony sexual assault against Jane Doe. 

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IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 

56) will be DENIED. 

An appropriate order follows. 

 s/ Daryl F. Bloom 

Daryl F. Bloom 

Chief United States Magistrate Judge 

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