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SSI Monograph

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 

ORGANIZATION

AND THE EUROPEAN UNION’S COMMON 

SECURITY

AND DEFENSE POLICY:

INTERSECTING TRAJECTORIES

Sarwar A. Kashmeri

July 2011

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ii

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ISBN 1-58487-502-x
iii

FOREWORD

In this study, Mr. Kashmeri argues his thesis that 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has 

evolved from a confident, mission driven Alliance 

with a clear objective, to an organization that appears 

to be in disarray, still looking for a unifying mission 20 

years after its reason for creation—the Soviet Union—

ceased to exist.

Mr. Kashmeri maintains that the action to enforce 

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 

1073 against Libya is the latest in a series of demonstrations that highlight the disarray of the Alliance. 

He states that after weeks of preparation and increasingly optimistic statements about its readiness to 

enforce the UNSCR, Britain, France, and the United 

States chose to intervene in Libya alone. Mr. Kashmeri 

believes that NATO was once again sidelined as it had 

been after September 11, 2001 (9/11), when the United 

States unilaterally decided to go to war in Afghanistan. He argues that Afghanistan continues to demonstrate that, even in a deployment, NATO is far from a 

monolithic, efficient fighting force, since many of the 

allies have refused to participate in that war and, even 

before the end of the campaign, some are going home.

The primary question that Mr. Kashmeri attempts 

to answer is: So, what next for the once fabled alliance? In doing so, Mr. Kashmeri points out that during NATO’s deterioration the European Union’s (EU) 

Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has 

deployed 27 successful military/civil missions from 

Africa to Asia. These include the EU Naval force off 

Somalia—that is twice the size of NATO’s—and the 

EU mission to Chad that successfully deployed and 
iv

sustained a mobile fighting force of 3,800 troops 

thousands of kilometers from Brussels, Belgium. Mr. 

Kashmeri contends that through CSDP, Europeans 

are increasingly taking charge of managing their own 

foreign and security policy. NATO is no longer the 

sole and preeminent Euro-Atlantic security actor. 

Mr. Kashmeri asserts that NATO’s survival depends on its willingness to accept its reduced role 

and let the EU handle the day-to-day security needs 

of Europe and its periphery. NATO’s continued existence, Kashmeri maintains, is in a supporting capacity 

to CSDP and in its ability to craft a relationship with 

CSDP that will allow North America and Europe to 

act militarily together, should that ever become necessary. Mr. Kashmeri believes that watching NATO 

fade into irrelevance would be a mistake, since it is 

a tried and true platform to harness the resources of 

North America and Europe.

In conclusion, Mr. Kashmeri suggests that it is time 

for NATO 2.0, a new version of NATO that fits the 

realities of an ever more integrated Europe in the 21st 

century. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to 

offer this monograph as a topic of debate concerning 

European security and defense issues.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

SARWAR A. KASHMERI is a senior fellow with 

the Atlantic Council’s International Security Program 

and a Fellow of the Foreign Policy Association. He is 

recognized on both sides of the Atlantic as a specialist and commentator on transatlantic relations. Mr. 

Kashmeri speaks frequently before business, foreign 

policy, and military audiences and is a commentator on Vermont Public Radio. At the Atlantic Council he initiated and hosts the popular New Atlanticist 

Podcast Series—conversations with global leaders 

on globalization, international-business, and foreign 

policy. He teaches an annual course on American foreign policy at the Institute for Lifelong Education at 

Dartmouth College (ILEAD). Mr. Kashmeri is the author of NATO 2.0: Reboot or Delete? (Potomac, March 

2011) and America and Europe After 9/11 and Iraq: The 

Great Divide (3rd Ed., Potomac, September 2008). He 

has written numerous opinion pieces on transatlantic 

issues and chaired business and public policy panels. 

Mr. Kashmeri earned a BS in aerospace engineering 

and an MS in engineering from Saint Louis University, where he also taught on the faculty. 
SUMMARY

This report recommends that:

• The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

be bridged to the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

• The EU assume responsibility for the defense of 

Europe.

• NATO and CSDP continue to serve as the platform to enable the United States, Europe, and 

Canada to act militarily together in cases where 

severity of the issue calls for joint action.

The monograph recommends that these changes in 

the structure of Euro-Atlantic defense and security be 

initiated forthwith and completed within 3-5 years. It 

also contends that if NATO is not bridged to CSDP, 

NATO will become less and less relevant for the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and may well fade away 

as a military alliance.

The recommendations are based on the author’s 

original research and conversations with over 50 

military and political leaders, as well as academics 

and diplomats from Europe and the United States. 

They include General (Ret.) Bantz J. Craddock, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR); Lieutenant General (Ret.) Brent Scowcroft, 

former National Security Advisor and CEO of The 

Scowcroft Group; Lieutenant General Christopher J. 

R. Davis, CMM, CD Canadian Military Representative to NATO; Ersin Onunduran, Professor of International Relations, Ankara University, Turkey; General 

Håkan Syrén, Chairman, European Union Military 

Committee (Brussels, Belgium); General Karl-Heinz 

vi
vii

Lather, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied 

Powers in Europe, NATO (Mons, Belgium); and General Stephane Abrial, Supreme Allied Commander for 

Transformation, NATO.

The author’s research indicates that, through the 

EU’s CSDP, Europeans are now capable of defending 

their own territory, except in extraordinary situations 

and threats that require a combined response from the 

EU, Canada, and the United States. This monograph 

concludes that except for these extreme eventualities, 

NATO should serve in a supporting role to CSDP. It 

states that NATO is increasingly dysfunctional, makes 

commitments it cannot keep, and continues to assume 

responsibilities that it cannot fulfill, especially given 

the diminishing financial resources at its disposal. The 

New Strategic Concept (Stratcon) adopted by NATO in 

Lisbon, Portugal, at its November 2010 Summit did 

not, unhappily, deal with its degenerative symptoms. 

Nor did the Stratcon recognize the impact of Europe’s 

increasingly integrated foreign and security policy on 

NATO’s future.

If CSDP and NATO are not bridged, NATO will 

become increasingly irrelevant to Euro-Atlantic security and then likely fade away. That would be a real 

tragedy. It is far from certain the Alliance could be recreated again, and NATO’s fade-out would remove an 

important political and military link from the transatlantic relationship.
viii

INTERLOCUTORS FOR THE REPORT

This report is partly based on a series of conversations with military, political, and academic leaders 

from both sides of the Atlantic. These interlocutors 

included:

(In alphabetical order)

From the United States:

Andrew Bacevich, Professor of International Relations and History, Boston University 

Arnaud de Borchgrave, Director and Senior Advisor, Transnational Threats Project, CSIS 

Bantz J. Craddock, General (Ret.), U.S. Army, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) 

Brent Scowcroft, Lieutenant General (Ret.), U.S. 

Air Force, former National Security Advisor; CEO, 

The Scowcroft Group 

Charles Van Bebber, Colonel, U.S. Army, Director, 

European Studies, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, 

PA 

Chuck Hagel, Senator, Co-Chairman of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board; Chairman of the 

Atlantic Council of the United States 

Damon Wilson, Vice President and Director, International Security Program, Atlantic Council of the 

United States 

James Hoge, Editor, Foreign Affairs magazine

Dr. Larry Goodson, Professor, Middle East Studies, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA 

Leo G. Michel, Senior Research Fellow, Institute 

for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University 
ix

Marc Grossman, Vice Chairman, The Cohen Group; 

former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Pakistan 

Michael C. Ryan, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, United 

States Mission to the European Union (Brussels) 

Noel Lateef President and CEO, Foreign Policy Association 

Stan Sloan, Visiting Scholar, Middlebury College, 

Vermont 

Timothy Cornett, Colonel, U.S. Army, Commander, Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) US 

Southern Command 

Tom Twetten, Retired Deputy Director for Operations, CIA 

Victoria Nuland, former U.S. Ambassador to 

NATO 

From Canada:

Christopher J.R. Davis, CMM, CD, Lieutenant 

General, Canadian Forces, Canadian Military Representative to NATO 

Elizabeth Race, Deputy Defence Policy Advisor, 

Canadian Joint Delegation to NATO 

From Turkey:

Ersin Onunduran, Professor of International Relations, Ankara University, Turkey 

H. Tarik Oğuzlu, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Ankara University, Turkey 

From the European Union:

Dr. Alexis Vahlas, Associate Professor, University 

of Strasbourg; Director, Master’s Degree Thesis, External and Internal Security of the EU. 

Andrzej Towpik, Ambassador of Poland to the 

United Nations 
x

Antonio Missiroli, Director of Studies, European 

Policy Studies (Brussels) 

Carlos Fernández-Arias Minuesa, Ambassador, 

Chairman, European Union Political & Military Committee (Brussels) 

David Leakey, CMG, CBE, Lieutenant General, 

British Army, Director General, European Union Military Staff (Brussels) 

Fernando Valenzuela, Ambassador of Spain to 

Russia 

Giampaolo Di Paola, Admiral, Italian Navy, Chairman, NATO Military Committee (Brussels) 

Giovanni Manione, Brigadier General, Italian 

Army, Crisis Management & Planning Directorate, 

EU Military Staff, (Brussels) 

Håkan Syrén, General, Swedish Army, Chairman, 

European Union Military Committee (Brussels) 

Horst-Heinrich Brauss, General, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary General, Defense Policy & Planning, NATO 

(Brussels) 

Jan Alhadeff, EU Crisis Management Planning Directorate (Brussels) 

James Appathurai, NATO Spokesman, Strategic 

Director of Press Office (Brussels) 

Sir Jeremy Greenstock, GCMG, former UK Ambassador to the United Nations 

Jurgen Bornemann, Lieutenant General, German 

Army, Director General NATO International Military 

Staff 

Karl-Heinz Lather, General, German Army, Chief 

of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe, NATO (Mons, Belgium) 

Mark C. Fischer, Transatlantic Center, The German 

Marshall Fund of the United States (Brussels) 
xi

Michael Ruehle, Head, Energy Security Section, 

Emerging Security Challenges Division, NATO (Brussels) 

Patrick Nash, Lieutenant General, Irish Army, former Operation Commander, European Union Force 

Chad/CAR (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) 

Patrick Chevallereau, Captain, French Navy, Executive Assistant, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, NATO 

Patrick de Rousiers, Lieutenant General, French 

Air Force, French Military Representative to the European Union Military Committee and the NATO Military Committee (Brussels) 

Paul Van der Heijden, Colonel, Royal Netherlands 

Air Force, NATO Representative to the United Nations 

Pedro Serrano, Ambassador and Acting Head of 

the EU Delegation to the United Nations 

Shada Islam, Senior Program Executive, European 

Policy Studies (Brussels) 

Stefani Weiss, Director, Europe ́s Future/Shaping 

Global Future, Brussels Office– Bertelsmann Stiftung 

Stephane Abrial, General, French Air Force, Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, NATO 

A.G.D. (Ton) Van Osch, Lieutenant General, Royal 

Netherlands Army, Director General, European Union 

Military Staff (Brussels) 

Sverker Ulving, Colonel, Swedish Army, Minister 

Counselor, European Union Military Staff, Military 

Liaison Officer to the United Nations 

From Russia:

Dmitry Rogozin, Ambassador to NATO (Brussels)
xii

The author used these one-on-one conversations 

for basic research and to refine his ideas. But the conclusions presented in this report are entirely the author’s, and it would be a mistake to link them to any 

particular interlocutor. Quotations used in the report 

without attribution are from these conversations.
1

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 

ORGANIZATION

AND THE EUROPEAN UNION’S COMMON 

SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY:

INTERSECTING TRAJECTORIES

INTRODUCTION

General Brent Scowcroft, dean of the American 

foreign policy establishment, has a deceptively simple 

test to determine whether the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) is still relevant. His test is in the 

form of a question: “What is NATO for?”

It is a question that has bedeviled NATO since 

the 1989 demise of the Soviet Union and end of the 

Cold War. NATO has been searching for an answer 

to General Scowcroft’s question for 2 decades. It has 

not yet found one. Set up in 1949 to defend against the 

threat of Soviet aggression, NATO today is increasingly dysfunctional, still searching for a new role 2 

decades after the end of the Cold War. Cohesion used 

to be NATO’s hallmark, but there is little of it left. The 

Eastern and Central European members still consider 

Russia to be their main threat, while the Western Europeans no longer do. Eastern and Central Europeans 

watch warily as Western European NATO members 

link their economies and trade with Russia.1

 The sale 

of an amphibious helicopter-carrying assault ship, the

Mistral, by France to Russia is but one example of this 

breakdown in cohesion among the Alliance’s members.

In 2008 Georgia and Russia fought a brief military 

engagement that almost led to the demolition of Georgia by Russian armed forces. A central part of Russia’s 

battle strategy was to occupy and neutralize Georgia’s 
2

Black Sea naval base. An armored thrust rolled across 

Georgia and secured this objective in 26 hours. Were 

the Russia-Georgia conflict to break out again, the 

Mistral would let Russia capture Georgia’s Black Sea 

naval installations in 45 minutes.2

 The Mistral represented the first weapons sale from a NATO country to 

Russia, and it is illustrative of the differing strategic 

perspectives of NATO’s Western European members 

from Central and Eastern Europeans. 

During a speaking engagement at an elite U.S. 

Army establishment, the author discovered this difference in perspective first hand. During the discussion period, an American participant asked the author 

why, if Georgia in 2008 was well on its way to NATO 

membership, did the United States not push NATO to 

take a more forceful stance against Russia. Before the 

author could respond, a German officer attending the 

establishment interjected that Germany would never 

have been part of such a plan and if the United States 

had insisted on involving NATO, America would 

have found itself isolated. He pointed out that Germany and Russia have the best of relations and Germany 

would not have jeopardized them.

NATO believed it had found its post Cold-War 

mission in 1999 by adopting an “out of area” strategy—transforming itself to be a world-cop—but this 

dream is dying a slow death in the mountains of Afghanistan, where many of NATO’s European members avoid the main battles, and are packing up to go 

home, even as the war continues. NATO finds it difficult to even send noncombatants to the Afghan war 

to relieve the stress on American forces that do most 

of the fighting. The Alliance has, for instance, been unable to find the resources to supply half the number of 

trainers for Afghanistan that it promised 7 years ago, 
3

even though the need for them is urgent.3 Yet, it now 

proposes to set up an integrated ballistic missile defense system to defend Europe against ballistic missile 

attack.

NATO’s Declining Trajectory. 

The American military has been losing confidence 

in NATO’s capabilities for years. When the Alliance 

volunteered to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan after 

September 11, 2001 (9/11), the United States summarily dismissed its offer and did the job by itself.4

 NATO 

supposedly runs the Afghan war by being in charge 

of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). 

But no NATO official was present at President Barack 

Obama’s side when he swore in the Alliance’s new 

Afghan commander, General David Petraeus, after 

firing General Stanley McChrystal, the previous commander. Both actions were all-American affairs and 

left out NATO’s top echelon—the Secretary General 

and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) who, under the NATO chain of command, is 

responsible for all the Alliance’s operations. Neither 

was the NATO chain of command used to discipline 

and relieve General McChrystal of command.

Part of NATO’s downwards trajectory is due to 

demographics. The officials that surrounded President Obama at that June swearing-in were of an age 

that gives them an instinctive appreciation of NATO’s 

value. But what about younger American military officers who are now moving into senior military ranks? 

What do they think of NATO? 

On a recent visit to a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier, the 

author was seated at dinner between two senior naval 

officers whose ages differed by around 15 years. He 
4

asked the older, the carrier’s executive officer, what he 

thought about NATO. The answer was an emphatic 

endorsement of the Alliance. Later, when the author 

asked the same question of the younger commander 

of the carrier’s attack squadrons, the answer was very 

different. “I remain to be convinced that NATO serves 

a useful purpose anymore.” 

This confusion is even more pronounced among 

Americans outside the military. “You mean NATO 

is still around?” a New York investment banker recently asked the author. The Dean of a college in Boston assured him that she was certain NATO was not a 

military force any more. “Probably just humanitarian 

assistance,” she said. A retired college professor from 

Arizona asked if the author was sure NATO troops 

really serve in Afghanistan. 

Common Security and Defense Policy’s Rising 

Trajectory. 

Through the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the European Union (EU) has already 

deployed 27 missions from Africa to Asia. Most were 

small, but, 2 years ago the EU sent a force of 3,700 European troops for a military operation in Chad and 

the Central African Republic. Even as the EU was 

engaged in Africa, it organized an anti-piracy naval 

flotilla that was twice the size of NATO’s to patrol the 

Horn of Africa.5

 Both of these operations illuminated 

the EU’s ability to deploy and sustain military forces 

with a high level of interoperability. In the case of its 

African deployment, 10,000 soldiers from 26 countries 

were mobilized to allow the EU to transport and sustain a highly mobile force of 3,700 for a period of 19 

months more than 3,000 miles from Brussels, Belgium. 
5

The EU gave the operation commander robust rules of 

engagement, which he had to use at an early stage of 

the campaign. The force was challenged by organized 

military units within the first 30 days and fought them 

off in a determined show of force.

Three main reasons account for the European 

Union’s growing military clout: 

1. The EU is a governmental entity, so it can combine civilian, police, legal, and military resources to 

tailor holistic missions that are far better suited to winning hearts and minds than NATO, which is a military 

organization. 

2. For its naval mission, the EU signed a treaty with 

Kenya that gives Kenyan authorities the right to prosecute captured pirates. EU legal and process teams 

follow up with help to improve the judicial system 

with experts and computers.6

 EU missions overcome 

the objections some countries have to American-led 

NATO forces on their territory. In the case of the EU’s 

deployment to Chad and the Central African Republic, the local governments had made it clear that a force 

comprised of Americans would not be acceptable.7

3. CSDP is European-owned and operated, consisting of Europeans making decisions in their countries’ 

national interests, which are not always aligned with 

America’s.

The Euro-Atlantic Security Space.

It is worth recalling that neither NATO nor the EU 

have a standing military force. Both organizations use 

soldiers and equipment from their member nations. 

The combined EU military assets are listed in Table 

1.8

 It is worth noting that 10 countries—the United 

Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the 
6

Netherlands, Greece, Poland, Sweden, and Belgium—

all members of both the EU and NATO—account for 

roughly 90 percent of EU defense spending.9

Table 1. ESDP Military Capabilities 1999–2009.

1999: 

EU15

1999: 

EU27

2009: 

EU27

change 

’99–’09

Defense Expenditure*

Total Expenditure (1997/2007) €156.2 Bn €162.9 Bn €209.7 Bn + 29%

Expenditure / GDP (1997/2007) 2.1 % 2.1 % 1.7 % - 19%

Budget / GDP (1998/2008) 1.7 % 1.8 % 1.4 % - 22%

Armed Forces

Total Active Military** 1,789,868 2,508,908 2,013,990 - 20%

Army 1,125,718 1,516,378 996,234 - 34%

Navy 281,450 327,400 222,313 - 32%

Air Force 381,605 538,925 345,153 - 36%

Conscripts 669,770 1,131,020 212,785 - 81%

Equipment

Land 

Main Battle Tanks 10,827 17,814 9,823 - 45%

Armored Fighting Vehicles 6,851 10,622 7,951 - 25%

Armored Personnel Carriers 19,751 26,311 22,844 - 13%

Aviation

Fixed Wing Aircraft 5,600 7,453 5,401 - 28%

Fighter Jets 2,684 3,835 2,410 - 37%

Transport (incl. tankers) 439 612 898 + 47%

Helicopters 3,515 4,732 3,573 - 24%

Attack 1,000 1,312 826 - 37%

Combat Support 969 1,305 849 - 35%

Utility (incl. transport) 445 584 1,076 + 84%

Naval 

Aircraft Carriers 6 6 7 + 17%
7

The estimates are taken from The Military Balance 1999–2000

and The Military Balance 2009, both published by the International 

Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The 1999–2000 edition uses 

figures from November 1998, including for defense budgets—the 

exception is defense expenditure estimates that date from 1997. 

The 2009 edition uses figures from 2008, except for defense expenditure figures, which date from 2007. 

* To calculate defense expenditure in euros, the 1997 total 

defense expenditure figures were calculated using the European 

Central Bank (ECB) fixed rates to the euro in 1999 where possible, 

or the earliest available annual average exchange rate provided 

by the ECB. For 2007 figures, where necessary, the ECB annual 

average exchange rates of the national currency to the euro were 

used.

** This figure also includes military police and paramilitary 

forces such as Gendarmerie and Carabinieri, as well as army, navy 

and air force estimates. 

The editors wish to thank Charlotte Blommestijn for her research assistance in compiling this table.

Source: Daniel Keohane and Charlotte Blommestijn, “Strength 

in numbers? Comparing EU military capabilities in 2009 with 

1999,” Policy Brief 05, Paris, France: European Union Institute for 

Security Studies, December 2009, available from www.iss.europa.

eu/uploads/media/PolicyBrief-05.pdf.

Table 1. ESDP Military Capabilities 1999–2009. 

(cont.)

1999: 

EU15

1999: 

EU27

2009: 

EU27

change 

’99–’09

Destroyers 29 31 26 - 16%

Frigates 145 155 108 - 30%

Patrol and Coastal 314 521 811 + 56%

Mine Warfare 208 296 243 - 18%

Amphibious 267 274 494 + 80%
8

Both organizations have military staffs, committees, and headquarters that are located within a few 

miles of each other, but cannot officially collaborate 

because of interminable political issues between Cyprus and Turkey. This political issue is explained further in the Conclusions section.

This expensive duplication is largely paid for by 

European taxpayers since 26 out of 28 NATO members are European states (the NATO/EU overlap is 

shown in Table 2). In today’s dire economic climate, 

when Europeans are slashing their defense budgets, 

it is hard to believe that these inefficiencies can long 

continue. 

Table 2. Membership Overlap between the EU and 

NATO.

Country European Union NATO

Belgium x x

Bulgaria x x

Czech Republic x x

Denmark x x

Estonia x x

France x x

Germany x x

Greece x x

Hungary x x

Italy x x

Latvia x x

Lithuania x x

Luxembourg x x

Netherlands x x

Poland x x

Portugal x x
9

Note: NATO (28 members) and the EU (27 members) have 21 

members in common.

Table 2. Membership Overlap between the EU and 

NATO. (cont.)

As the United States, its largest member and lynchpin, tires of the unending internal feuds between NATO’s European members and the EU and, responding 

to the new geopolitical reality, increasingly shifts its 

focus to Asia, NATO risks becoming even more irrelevant to the security needs of the Euro-Atlantic area.10

Country European Union NATO

Romania x x

Slovakia x x

Slovenia x x

Spain x x

United Kingdom x x

Albania x

Canada x

Croatia x

Iceland x

Norway x

Turkey x

United States x

Austria x

Cyprus x

Finland x

Ireland x

Malta x

Sweden x
10

NATO’s New Strategic Concept Sidesteps Reality.

Unfortunately, the Group of Experts set up by 

NATO’s Secretary General to advise him on NATO’s 

New Strategic Concept (Stratcon) and the Stratcon itself chose to overlook both NATO’s dysfunction and 

CSDP’s strengths. Instead of a dramatic course correction in NATO’s future mission statement to reconcile 

NATO and CSDP, the Stratcon chose to sidestep reality with statements such as: 

NATO enters the second decade of the 21st century 

as an essential source of stability in an uncertain and 

unpredictable world. Looking ahead, the Alliance has 

ample grounds for confidence. NATO’s role in maintaining the unity, security and freedom of the Euro-Atlantic region is ongoing. Its status as the globe’s most 

successful political-military alliance is unchallenged.11

It is this kind of sentimental thinking and the inability to face reality that has brought NATO to its 

present state. 

After consulting with over 50 military and government leaders from the United States and Europe, this 

report recommends that NATO be bridged to CSDP 

and that Europeans take primary responsibility for 

their defense. NATO will get a new lease on life, and 

a bridged military alliance will at least ensure that 

the transatlantic allies remain connected for the times 

when Europe, the United States, and Canada wish 

to act together. It would be a pity to let NATO fade 

away, because we may then have to re-invent it someday and that will not be easy.
11

Structure of Report.

Regretfully, CSDP is a relatively unknown entity 

not only in American military, but also civilian, circles. 

A large part of the reason for this is lack of coverage in 

the mainstream media. But another part of the reason 

is an ongoing erroneous depiction of Europeans as 

loath to engage in military solutions after the success 

of setting up the European Union through painstaking 

negotiations.12

To correct the CSDP information deficit, the next 

two sections of this monograph cover CSDP. The next 

section provides a CSDP timeline and seeks to answer 

the question: where did CSDP come from? The following section provides a description of three CSDP missions. These deployments were selected to illuminate 

the EU’s holistic approach to security and to show the 

difference between CSDP’s capabilities and those of 

NATO. Finally, the last section outlines policy options 

to bridge CSDP and NATO and sets forth recommendations for U.S. military and civilian policymakers.

THE EU COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE 

POLICY, 1999-2011

Background.

The origins of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)13 lie in the process that was used 

to transform Europe after World War II from a collection of independent European states into today’s political-economic bloc called the European Union (EU). 

The EU developed through a series of treaties that 

represent binding commitments by European states to 

give up national sovereignty over specific functions, 
12

such as atomic energy, and coal and steel production, 

and to make these functions the responsibility of a 

supra-national governmental organization, the EU. It 

dates its founding to the Treaty of Rome, signed in 

1957. The important Treaty of Maastricht, signed in 

1993, coined the phrase “European Union” and defined the so-called “three pillars” on which the EU is 

based.14 The first pillar consolidated the communities 

and set up the groundwork for the euro; the second 

pillar established the EU’s Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP), which makes it possible for the 

European Union to take coordinated “European” action in foreign and security affairs; and the third pillar 

dealt with justice and home affairs policy. 

CSDP is the operational part of CSFP. Though codified in EU law under the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht, 

CSDP remained unused for a number of years. The 

trigger for activating CSDP was the Balkan conflicts 

(Bosnia, 1992-95, and Kosovo, 1999) of the 1990s. Even 

though these violent events took place in Europe’s 

backyard, the Europeans found they were incapable 

of responding to them without the U.S. military and 

NATO. Specifically, The EU states discovered that 

there was no security mechanism within the EU besides NATO that European countries could use to 

forge political consensus among themselves for military action. There were no European facilities to plan, 

organize, and manage crisis management missions 

besides NATO. The result of this deficit meant the EU 

could not respond to an even purely European crisis 

without getting NATO and the United States involved. 

This was a wakeup call for the EU states.

Nothing could really take the place of NATO as 

long as Europe was minutes away from nuclear incineration by the Soviet Union. However, the end of the 
13

Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 

removed this threat. The realization that years after 

the Cold War ended and a half century after the end of 

World War II, there was still no European institution 

that could undertake these campaigns in Europe’s own 

backyard was a frustrating and sobering reminder to 

the Europeans that they needed to put their security 

house in order.15

Britain and France change the EU’s Security 

Equation.

Britain and France decided to change Europe’s 

security deficit. At a meeting in Saint Malo, France, 

in December 1998, the two countries proposed aggressive steps to fire up the EU’s dormant CSFP. This 

landmark agreement and call to action was labeled the 

St. Malo Declaration.16

In the Declaration, the two powers declared that “. . .

The European Union needs to be in a position to play 

its full role on the international stage. . . . To this end, 

the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means 

to decide when to use them and a readiness to do so, 

in order to respond to international crises.”17

In a great leap forward, the two nations envisioned 

military actions in which NATO and the U.S. military 

might not be involved and in such instances they said 

that “. . . the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources 

of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic 

planning, without unnecessary duplication. . . ” The 

joint declaration goes on to say that “. . . Europe needs 

strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to 

the new risks, and which are supported by a strong 
14

and competitive European defense industry and technology. . .”18

The Saint-Malo declaration was then enshrined 

in 1999 as the European Security and Defense policy 

(ESDP), which encompassed both a specific policy and 

a set of dedicated institutions that the EU could use to 

plan, approve, and execute joint “crisis-management” 

actions.19 (In December 2009, with the Lisbon Treaty, 

ESDP formally assumed its original name: Common 

Security and Defense Policy, or CSDP. For consistency, the author has used CSDP throughout this monograph.)

CSDP Institutions.

The institutions that the EU set up to execute its 

security and military missions are two committees 

that are mirror images of their counterparts in NATO: 

the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is 

the policy making group, and the European Union 

Military Committee (EUMC). The PSC is equivalent 

to NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the 

EUMC to NATO’s Military Committee (MC). It is important to note that the PSC is a body of the Council 

of the EU, the highest level EU decisionmaking body 

representing the governments of the member states.

The EU also set up its own Military Staff (EUMS), 

a Situation Center (SITCEN) to provide intelligence 

and monitoring functions, and a Satellite Center (SATCEN) for mapping and positioning support. These institutions were embedded into the EU policymaking 

bureaucracy and are located in Brussels.

These CSDP structures also give the EU a firm 

foundation to build an even more robust security and 

defense structure in the future. The EU description of 

these entities follows:20
15

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) meets 

at the ambassadorial level as a preparatory body for 

the Council of the EU. Its main functions are keeping 

track of the international situation and helping to define policies within the Common Foreign and Security 

Policy (CFSP), including the ESDP. It prepares a coherent EU response to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic direction. 

The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) 

is the highest military body set up within the Council. 

It is composed of the Chiefs of Defense (CHODS) of 

the Member States, who are regularly represented by 

their permanent military representatives. The EUMC 

provides the PSC with advice and recommendations 

on all military matters within the EU. The EUMC is 

chaired by a four-star general from one of the EU 

states. (Most CHODS are double-hatted with NATO’s 

Military Committee.)

The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) is 

composed of military and civilian experts seconded 

to the Council Secretariat by the Member States. It is 

chaired by a lieutenant general seconded from one of 

the EU states. The EUMS is the engine of CSDP.

Finally, the EU’s Satellite Center based in Madrid, 

Spain, and the Institute for Security Studies based in 

Paris, France, were attached to the ESDP machinery to 

provide ESDP with mapping and analytical support.21

By 2003, the EU ESDP was operational with a military 

staff of around 200, which was still its size in 2010.

To provide a strategic framework for their security 

and defense policy, the EU adopted the European Security Strategy in 2003.22

In 2004, the EU’s Defense Agency (EDA) was set 

up to support the EU’s member states in their efforts 

to improve military capabilities needed for the CSDP. 
16

It does this by promoting research and development, 

armaments, and procurement cooperation and by 

working to strengthen the EU defense, technological, 

and industrial base.

Recognizing that crisis management operations in 

the future would require small, mobile units, in 2007 

the EU set a target of organizing nine “battle groups.” 

A battle group in EU terminology is a combined arms 

grouping of around 1,500 personnel approximately 

the size of an infantry battalion or armored regiment. 

Specifically, it is the smallest force package capable of 

stand-alone operations, including the ability to contribute to an initial entry force.23

The EU’s deployment goals aim for a battle group 

to be on the ground within 10 days of a European 

Council decision to launch an operation and be sustainable for 30 days initial operations extendable to at 

least 120 days. The Battle Group Concept reached full 

operational capability in 2007, and two battle groups 

have been on continuous readiness since that time.

CSDP has now been in operation for over a decade (1999-2011). During this time, the EU has used 

CSDP to deploy 27 military and/or civilian missions, 

in some cases to locations thousands of miles from Europe. It is worth noting that with the exception of one 

mission, all the deployments were planned and managed without any involvement with NATO’s facilities 

or the Alliance’s assets.

Table 3 shows the scope of these deployments as 

of May 2009. Note especially the number of deployments that the EU’s institutions are able to manage at 

one time.

 
17

Duration in Days

Title Operation Name Location Start Start Days End

EUMM (Western Balkans) EUMM Jan-03 1826 Jan-08

EUPM BiH (Bosnia and Herzegovina)EUPM BiH Bosnia and 

Herzegovina

Jan-03 2312 May-09

CONCORDIA fYROM (Macedonia) CONCORDIA fYROM Macedonia Apr-03 275 Jan-04

ARTEMIS DRC (Dem. Rep. of 

Congo)

ARTEMIS DRC Dem. Rep. 

of Congo

Jun-03 92 Sep-03

EUPOL Proxima fYROM, succ. by 

EUPAT fYROM (Macedonia)

EUPOL Proxima fYROM, 

succ. By EUPAT fYROM

Macedonia 1-Dec 762 Jan-06

EUJUST THEMIS (Georgia) EUJUST THEMIS 

(Georgia)

Jul-04 396 Aug-05

EUFOR ALTHEA BiH (Bosnia and 

Herzegovina)

EUFOR ALTHEA BiH Bosnia and 

Herzegovina

Dec-04 1612 May-09

EUPOL Kinshasa, succ. by EUPOL 

RD CONGO

EUPOL Kinshasa, succ. 

by EUPOL RD CONGO

Apr-05 821 Jul-07

EUSEC RD CONGO EUSEC RD CONGO Jun-05 1430 May-09

EUJUST LEX (Iraq) EUJUST LEX (Iraq) Jul-05 1400 May-09

AMIS EU Supporting Action 

(Sudan)

AMIS EU Supporting 

Action (Sudan)

Jul-05 914 Jan-08

AMM Aceh (Indonesia) AMM Aceh Indonesia Sep-05 487 Jan-07

EUSR BST (Georgia) EUSR BST Georgia Sep-05 1338 May-09

EUBAM Rafah (Gaza Strip) EUBAM Rafah Gaza Strip Nov-05 1277 May-09

EUBAM (Ukraine- Moldova) EUBAM (UkraineMoldova)Dec-05 1247 May-09

EUPOL COPPS (Palestine) EUPOL COPPS (Palestine)Jan-06 1216 May-09

EUPAT (fYROM) (Macedonia) EUPAT (fYROM) Macedonia Jan-06 181 Jul-06

EUPT (Kosovo) EUPT (Kosovo) Apr-06 822 Jul-08

EUFOR RD CONGO EUFOR RD CONGO Jul-06 153 Dec-06

EUPOL RD CONGO EUPOL RD CONGO Jul-07 670 May-09

EUPOL (Afghanistan) EUPOL (Afghanistan) Jul-07 670 May-09

EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (Chad/Central 

African 

EUFOR TCHAD/RCA Chad/Central African 

Republic

Feb-08 394 Mar-09

EUSSR (Guinea-Bissau) EUSSR (Guinea-Bissau) May-08 365 May-09

EULEX (Kosovo) EULEX (Kosovo) Jul-08 304 May-09

EUMM (Georgia) EUMM (Georgia) Oct-08 212 May-09

EUNAVCO, repl. by EU NAVFOR 

(Somalia)

EUNAVCO, repl. by EU 

NAVFOR (Somalia)

Sep-08 91 Dec-08

EUNAVFOR (Somalia) EUNAVFOR (Somalia) Dec-08 151 May-09
18

Table 3. CSDP Mission Deployments as of 

May 2009.

The Treaty of Lisbon.

On December 1, 2009, the EU foreign and security 

capability was significantly enhanced when the EU 

Treaty of Lisbon (Portugal)24 came into force. Among 

its many features is the creation of a new position: 

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a post that centralizes the 

responsibility for the EU diplomatic service, defense 

and security, and the distribution of development aid. 

The consolidation of these functions under one EU official gives the EU a powerful crisis management tool, 

akin to combining the U.S. Departments of State and 

Adapted from ISIS Europe, “Chart and Table of CSDP and EU missions,” European Security Review, No. 44, May 2009, available from 

isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_artrel_276_isis-esdpchart-may09.pdf.
19

Defense.25 If nonstate “winning hearts and minds” 

conflicts are the future of crisis management, the EU 

appears to be light-years ahead of NATO.

The Lisbon Treaty introduced two innovations 

into the EU’s foreign and security policy that lay the 

groundwork for even more control of Europe’s security by Europeans. These innovations are the mutual 

defense clause and the solidarity pledge. The former 

states that:

If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression 

on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the 

means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of 

the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the 

specific character of the security and defence policy of 

certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation 

in this area shall be consistent with commitments under 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those 

States which are members of it, remains the foundation 

of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation. (Title V, Article 42)26

The solidarity pledge states that:

The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a 

spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a 

terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made 

disaster. The Union shall mobilize all the instruments 

at its disposal, including the military resources made 

available by the Member States. . . . ”27(Article 222, 

Title VII)

While the two clauses may not significantly alter 

the EU’s security landscape now, it is the author’s 

opinion that they are an indication of how the Europeans view the management of their security as the 

EU continues to coalesce into an ever more integrated 

entity. 
20

The Question for U.S. Policymakers.

The last decade has dramatically altered the security arrangements that have existed in Europe since 

1949. The question that now confronts American policymakers is: If NATO and American military assets 

are no longer necessary for security missions being 

launched by the EU around the world, what is the 

purpose of NATO?

As impressive as the growth of CSDP has been, its 

performance in the field is equally noteworthy. The 

next section provides an overview of three CSDP missions chosen to demonstrate the increasing maturity 

and complexity of the EU military-civilian crisis management capabilities and to illuminate the changed 

geopolitical Euro-Atlantic security environment to 

which NATO must adapt if it is to remain relevant. 

EU’S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE 

POLICY IN ACTION

During its first decade of existence, the EU deployed 

27 missions28 using its CSDP instruments. CSDP has 

evolved from the 1998 declaration of intent at St. Malo 

to an organization that the EU can and has used to deploy military and civilian missions thousands of miles 

from Brussels. An impressive achievement, especially 

considering that the evolution has had to navigate the 

shoals of EU decisionmaking that requires unanimity between a grouping of sovereign states to make 

unanimous decisions in a sensitive area—foreign and 

security policy.
21

Four aspects of the EU’s missions are worth noting.

1. The geographic spread of these missions. CSDP 

has been used to plan and deploy missions over an 

area that stretches from Africa, through the Middle 

East, into Asia.29

2. Sophistication of management and control. 

CSDP has evolved sufficiently already to control multiple missions at one time. Table 3 shows all the missions that were active during May 2009. 

3. Civilian-Military mission coordination. Even 

before the Lisbon Treaty consolidated military, civilian, and development aid capabilities of the EU under one official—the Union’s High Representative for 

Foreign Affairs and Security Policy—the EU was able 

to deploy and coordinate these resources in a number 

of missions. NAVFOR, the EU’s first Naval mission, 

for instance, uses EU Navy warships and helicopters, 

lawyers, prosecutors, court administration specialists, 

computer advisors, and diplomats in a concerted effort to intercept pirates in the horn of Africa, capture 

them, and prosecute them.

4. Deploying where NATO cannot. EU missions 

have been able to deploy into countries that did not 

want a NATO presence in their country because 

NATO is viewed as an extension of American foreign 

and military policy. Two such missions—the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia and the military mission 

to Chad—are further analyzed in this monograph. 

Three of these CSDP deployments are described to illuminate the diversity of assets and skills that the EU 

has at its disposal for crisis management missions and 

illustrates the experience it has now accumulated by 

combining military as well as nonmilitary assets to 

achieve mission objectives.30
22

The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM).31

Duration: September 15, 2005-December 15, 2006.

Location: Aceh province, Indonesia.

Total Cost: E15 million ($22.5 million).32

Mission Strength: 125 EU personnel and 93 ASEAN 

personnel.

Contributing States: 12 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 

Lithuania, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) 

and seven third countries (Norway, Switzerland, and 

these Association of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN) states: Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, 

and the Philippines).

Highlights of the Mission’s Mandate. To monitor:

• The demobilization of Free Aceh Movement 

(GAM) and monitor and assist in the decommissioning and destruction of its weapons;

• The redeployment of . . . Indonesian military 

and police;

• The reintegration of active GAM members into 

society;

• The human rights situation in the context of the 

above tasks; and,

• The process of legislation change in Aceh.

To rule on disputed amnesty cases, and to investigate and rule on violations of the mission’s Memorandum of Understanding (MOU.)

Summary Discussion of Mission. From October 1976 

until August 2005, the Indonesian province of Aceh 

was wracked by armed conflict between the Free Aceh 

Movement (GAM), which sought Acehnese independence, and the Indonesian security forces, which 

sought to prevent such separation. 
23

The AMM comprised monitors from the EU, Norway, and Switzerland, as well as five ASEAN countries: Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, 

and Singapore. This was the first such cooperation 

between the EU and another regional organization, 

and it was as successful as it was ground breaking. A 

senior NATO military official told the author both the 

Indonesian Government and members of the GAM 

had refused to allow either NATO or United Nations 

(UN) involvement in the Aceh mission. “They wanted 

the EU to handle this mission because the two sides 

in the conflict believed only the EU had credibility as 

a soft power with military strength,” the official said.

AMM personnel comprised both civilians and 

military located at the mission’s headquarters and in 

11 district offices with mixed civil-military teams. The 

decommissioning teams were predominantly military 

and were also tasked primarily with monitoring the 

security aspects of the MOU such as decommissioning, demobilization, and redeployment. The civilian 

personnel of the AMM had diplomatic and managerial skills.

Results Achieved. The decommissioning of GAM 

weapons, the demobilization of GAM, the redeployment of the Indonesian security forces, and the facilitation of transition from conflict to peace in Aceh—a 

peace that still holds today. While the AMM demonstrated EU skills in coordinating military, civilian, legal, diplomatic, and development-aid instruments to 

fashion a successful crisis management intervention, 

its military component did not take center stage. The 

2008-09 mission to the center of Africa, however, demonstrated the EU’s ability to successfully mobilize, 

deploy, and sustain a mobile fighting force thousands 

of miles away from Brussels. Its area of operations, 
24

250,000 square kilometers (96,525 square miles), was 

half the size of France.

Both in terms of cost and size, the African mission 

dwarfs the Aceh operation and underscores the EU’s 

ability to scale its crisis management interventions to 

fit different needs. The mission underscored the credibility of the EU’s military capability and was the largest and most demanding EU military mission to date. 

As in the Aceh mission, the local governments had 

made it clear that they would not permit either NATO 

or the U.S. military forces to operate on their soil.33

The EU Military Operation in the Republic of Chad 

and in the Central African Republic 

(EUFOR Tchad/RCA).

34

Duration: March 15, 2008-December 15, 2009.

Location: Chad and the Central African Republic.

Total Cost: E1 billion ($1.5 billion). 

Mission Strength: 10,000 troops mobilized to deploy 

and maintain a force of 3,700 troops in theater over the 

duration of mission.

Contributing States: 23 contributing Member States 

(all but Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, and Malta) and 

three third countries (Russia, Albania, and Croatia).

Highlights of the mission’s mandate: 

• To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, 

particularly refugees and displaced persons;

• To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid 

and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the 

area of operations; and,

• To contribute to protecting UN personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement 
25

of its own staff and the UN and associated personnel.

Summary Discussion of Mission:

35 The EU military 

deployment to Chad (EUFOR TChad/RCA)36 consisted of troops from 23 of the 27 EU states, and, significantly, three non-EU countries, Albania, Croatia, and 

Russia, whose forces were integrated under EU command. Albania and Croatia provided force protection 

platoons. Russia provided four heavy lift helicopters 

and their crews.37

Under Irish and French command, the mission 

ran under the CSDP framework from March 2008 to 

April 2009. Authorized by a UN Security Council Resolution, the mission’s objective was to protect more 

than 200,000 refugees from Darfur, and some 225,000 

people displaced by internal fighting in Chad and the 

Central African Republic. 

Irish Lieutenant General Patrick Nash was the operation commander of the mission and ran his command 

from the operational headquarters in Mont-Valerien, 

near Paris, while French Brigadier-General Jean-Phillipe Ganascia was the “in theater” force commander, 

in charge of the military forces on the ground. Elite 

Irish rangers supported by special operations forces 

from Austria, Belgium, France, and Sweden prepared 

four operating zones after the mission was approved 

by the EU and had received clearance by Chad and the 

Central African Republic in January 2008. The entire 

force was deployed and in operation by the summer.

The deployment was a significant military logistical operation considering that thousands of tons of 

military equipment, fuel, and water had to first be 

shipped to Douala, Cameroon, on the East African 

coast—a 2-week journey from Europe. Then supplies 
26

had to be transported another 1,700 km to Chad, a 

distance equivalent to traveling from Rome to Stockholm, using containers, trucks, and other vehicles on 

rough roads. Camps had to be built from scratch in the 

middle of the desert to house the 3,700 troops. 

To get to the operations zone in the center of Africa, an air bridge was established from Europe to 

N’Djamena, and a sea-land bridge was set up from 

the port city of Douala in the Cameroon to Chad. Ultimately, over 2,400 units (containers and vehicles) of 

equipment would be transported through Cameroon, 

and 540 air transport flights would fly troops and 

equipment directly from Europe to Chad.

Italian troops installed a field hospital with 15 airconditioned interlinked tents containing operating 

rooms, x-ray equipment, a pharmacy, and a dentistry 

unit. To ensure that the insurgents understood early 

on that the Europeans meant business, multinational 

special force units carried out reconnaissance missions 

deep into hostile territory.

In order to minimize the loss of life, once the force 

was fully established, extensive operations using air 

and ground assets were undertaken to target specific 

areas of concern and to display the force’s military 

capabilities. Long range patrols were sent throughout 

the area of operation to project EUFOR Tchad/RCA 

as a credible force with a significant deterrent effect. A 

coordinated information campaign underpinned the 

military deployment. UN personnel, who would ultimately take over from the EUFOR, were co-located in 

EUFOR’s camps, and the military provided a security 

umbrella that enabled the deployment of the UN force 

after mission completion. 

General Nash asked for and got extremely robust 

rules of engagement. He wanted the highest level of 
27

rules he could get to ensure the mission was successful in completing its mandate and for the security of 

the soldiers. “I have no quibbles with the European 

Council in this respect because they approved what I 

wanted to do in Chad,” the general told the author of 

this report.38

Nash’s military preparations proved prescient. 

The EU force found itself militarily engaged in the 

first month of the deployment. “There was a major 

altercation near the Sudanese border, I mean a major 

fire-fight,” Nash told the author. “We had to bring in 

helicopters to support the troops and to extricate them. 

Our troops found themselves engaged against regular 

military units and lost one soldier in the engagement. 

“But we dealt with it strongly and taught them a good 

lesson,” Nash said.39

Within weeks after the first engagement, an Irish 

contingent was attacked by a well organized rebel 

force outside the town of Goz Beida, Chad. It was another serious fire-fight, and the rebel militia sustained 

a number of casualties. This was followed by a number of subsequent occasions when Belgian and Austrian troops fought off attacks in the North of Chad 

and killed a number of the enemy. Nash went out of 

his way to speak about the French and Polish troops 

attached to his force. They never hesitated to engage 

the enemy to defend the mission’s mandate.

Results Achieved.

40 EUFOR Tchad/RCA met its 

objectives. On March 14, 2009, Transfer of Authority 

(ToA) documents were executed in theater, simultaneously in Chad and the Central African Republic. The 

ToA marked the handover of responsibility to a UN 

follow-on force, the UN Mission in the Central African 

Republic and Chad, MINURCAT.
28

Upon the conclusion of the EU military mission, 

a significant number of EUFOR troop-contributing 

nations agreed to re-hat their troops to MINURCAT, 

thereby embedding a high level of continuity and experience into the UN follow-on force.

EUMM Georgia: The European Union Monitoring 

Mission in Georgia.41

The United States has traditionally played a central 

role in resolving military crises in Europe. This American monopoly ended on October 1, 2008, when the EU 

Monitoring Mission in Georgia became operational. 

The conflict between Georgia and Russia marked a 

milestone in Euro-Atlantic security relations. Not only 

was the United States not a party to negotiating an end 

to the conflict, it does not play a role in monitoring the 

ceasefire. For the first time in recent history, a European conflict was ended by Europeans themselves. Of 

the 27 EU states, 24 participated in this mission.

Duration: September 15, 2008—ongoing.

Location: Along the borders between undisputed 

Georgian territory on the one hand and the breakaway 

regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other.

Budget: E49.6 million ($74.40 million) 2008-10.

Mission Strength: 340.

Contributing states: 24 Member States (Austria, 

Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 

France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 

Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 

Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the UK).

Highlights of the mission’s mandate: 

• Provide civilian monitoring of the conflict parties’ behavior, including full compliance with 

the six-point agreement of August 12, 2008;
29

• Close cooperation with partners, namely the 

UN and the OSCE;

• Main objectives: long term stability throughout 

Georgia after the war; and,

• Tasks: stabilization, normalization, confidence 

building, and reporting.

Summary Discussion of Mission. The outbreak of 

hostilities between Georgia, South Ossetia, and Russia 

on August 7, 2008, paralyzed the international actors 

hitherto involved in conflict resolution in Georgia. In 

this situation, the EU under the French Presidency 

quickly moved in to close the gap.

On September 8, 2008, Russia and the EU concluded an additional agreement on the implementation of 

the six-point [ceasefire] plan. 

The mission mandate by definition covers the 

whole of Georgia, hence including South Ossetia and 

Abkhazia. Within 2 weeks of the adoption of the Joint 

Agreement, the Union was able to establish the mission headquarters in Tbilisi and four regional offices 

and to deploy more than 200 monitors as well as technical and support staff. 

The EUMM’s monitoring activity is not limited 

to security developments in the narrow sense of the 

word. The mission mandate encompasses “soft areas” 

such as monitoring and reporting on the normalization of civil governance with a focus on the rule of 

law, human rights, and the humanitarian situation of 

the local population. 

Results Achieved. The record speed of its implementation proved the EU capability to react quickly 

in a situation of serious crisis, provided that sufficient 

political will and strong leadership exists. Through 

the creation of the EUMM, the EU has considerably 
30

increased its profile in conflict resolution. The mission 

has quickly delivered on its first and most prominent 

task, the stabilization of the situation after the war. 

The EUMM therefore represents a success for the 

CSDP.

The author made it a point to ask every European 

interlocutor for this analysis if they thought the EU 

was now able to defend Europe. Without exception, 

the answer was in the affirmative. With one caveat: if 

we have the will. American military power embedded 

in NATO has brought Europe from its weakened state 

after World War II to today, when it is hard to imagine 

a threat to the European homeland that cannot be met 

by the EU and its CSDP.

The question that must now be asked by U.S. policymakers is: given a robust, proven, and growing EU 

military-civilian capability in a benign European environment with no serious threat, what should be the 

future purpose of NATO? 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

NATO used to be a tightly focused and effective 

military alliance, its members unified under the pressures of an existential threat from a nuclear armed 

and aggressive Soviet Union. With the collapse of the 

Soviet Union, NATO’s original reason for existence 

disappeared. The Soviet Union disintegrated years 

ago and the unity of purpose disappeared with it. 

NATO’s dreams of being a world cop are withering in 

the mountains of Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, over the last decade the EU security 

and defense establishment—Common Security and 

Defense Policy (CSDP)—has organized and deployed 

27 successful military/civil missions from Africa to 
31

Asia, including the EU’s first ever naval force now operating in the Horn of Africa. Through CSDP, Europeans are increasingly taking charge of managing their 

own foreign and security policy. NATO is no longer 

the sole and preeminent Euro-Atlantic security actor.

As the EU continues its slow but steady march 

to—if not a United States of Europe, certainly a United 

Europe of ever closer States—its need to have security assets that reflect the EU’s national interests will 

continue to grow. Increasingly, the EU will want and 

need to make security decisions without involving the 

United States in the process.

With the rise of the EU’s CSDP and the downward trajectory of NATO, the security compact that 

has existed since 1949 between Europe and the United 

States—that America and NATO are central to the 

security of Europe—is increasingly obsolete. Meanwhile, cuts to the U.S. defense budget and the stress of 

two decade-long wars on America’s military resources also underscore the need to recalibrate the EuroAtlantic security relationship. 

Policy Options.

Broadly speaking, the United States faces two policy options in responding to the Euro-Atlantic security 

developments laid out in this report:

1. Business as usual. Continue to believe that 

NATO, and the United States as NATO’s leader, are 

indispensible for European security.

2. Bridge NATO with CSDP and re-mission NATO 

as a platform for Canada, the United States, and the 

EU to use only when the three decide a security threat 

exceeds the capacity of the EU’s defense capabilities. 

This alternative assumes the EU will be responsible 
32

for the day-to-day security needs of Europe, and action via NATO will be an unusual circumstance.

Ramifications of Options.

Using option 1 is the easy decision. No politically 

difficult choices need be made in choosing it. But it 

is the wrong choice. For reasons outlined herein, 

this choice will lead to an increasingly dysfunctional 

NATO and more friction between the Alliance members: between America and Europe but also between 

the European states. The choice of this option will result in further weakening NATO and the transatlantic 

relationship. In time, NATO may well be reduced to 

something akin to a discussion group, or, as the author believes, more likely it will simply fade away.

Option 2 is the option recommended to U.S. military and congressional decisionmakers. This option 

rests on the author’s belief, based on his research and 

discussions with officials on both sides of the Atlantic, that Europe is increasingly capable of defending 

its periphery with the EU’s CSDP. It no longer needs 

NATO or American troops for this purpose.

Although it removes NATO and U.S. forces from 

day-to-day European security concerns, this option 

leaves NATO and its operational bureaucracy in place, 

but bridged to CSDP. Under this option NATO’s assets are freely available to support CSDP operations, 

and the assets are in place for Canada, the EU, and the 

United States to use in an extreme security event that 

threatens the entire Atlantic constituency.
33

Execution of Policy Recommendation #2.

The United States should take the initiative to 

implement the recommendation by inviting the Canadian Prime-Minister and the President of the European Council (or another EU official, or a group of EU 

officials nominated by the EC) to a top level meeting 

with two items on the agenda:

1. Endorse the recalibration of the Euro-Atlantic 

security relationship as described in option #2; and,

2. Authorize the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense, the Canadian Foreign and Defense Ministers, 

and the EU High Representative of Foreign and Security Policy to put together an action plan to bridge 

CSDP and NATO. 

The two biggest obstacles to combining CSDP and 

NATO are the political confrontation between Cyprus 

(supported by Greece) and Turkey, and the fact that 

the United States is not a member of the EU, which 

means America cannot be part of CSDP or the EU decisionmaking process.

The Cyprus-Turkey bottleneck can be summarized 

as follows. Cyprus is a member of the EU but not of 

NATO. Turkey is a member of NATO but not of the 

EU, which it aspires to join. A number of European 

states now oppose Turkey’s accession to the EU, even 

though the EU invited Turkey to join as far back as 

1987. As matters now stand, EU-NATO collaboration 

is vetoed by Turkey because Cyprus is not a NATO 

member, and Cyprus in turn responds by vetoing 

Turkey’s EU aspirations.42 This state of affairs has persisted for some 7 years and shows no sign of being resolved through intra-European negotiations. The author believes the only way to overcome the bottleneck 
34

is through direct involvement of the Canadian Prime 

Minister, the U.S. President, and the EU leadership. 

The issue of the United States not being a member 

of the EU is an obstacle only if the United States insists on being involved in EU decisions that deal with 

European security and defense. Once the EU assumes 

responsibility for the defense of Europe’s periphery, it 

is not necessary for the United States to be a party to 

internal EU decisionmaking. 

As a part of the discussion to bridge CSDP and 

NATO, the transatlantic allies should negotiate procedures and structures to allow CSDP to use NATO’s 

bureaucracy without the need to request permission 

from the United States. For example, while the EU 

does have a strategic planning capability embedded in 

its Military Staff, it does not have a permanent operational headquarters (OHQ) to convert a strategic plan 

with a broad political-military mission into actionable 

military objectives and to then exercise the command 

and control functions necessary to execute the mission. Due to political resistance (mainly, but not solely, from the United States and Britain), CSDP missions 

are deployed using an ad-hoc system of OHQs that 

are set up for each mission and dismantled after it.

Giving the EU responsibility for European defense 

would also require that the EU be able to set up a permanent OHQ to interface with its existing strategic 

planning capability. It may well be that the EU chooses to use NATO’s long established OHQ at SHAPE 

as a kernel for its OHQ. The EU should be able to do 

this and use the OHQ without any need to involve the 

United States and Canada or seek their permission.

Perhaps, as a part of the negotiations to bridge 

CSDP and NATO a latent North American pillar 

could be established within the OHQ. Should Canada, 
35

the EU, and the United States decide to act militarily 

together, this pillar would be operationalized.43

Impact of Policy Recommendation.

On NATO. The biggest impact of implementing 

this report’s recommendation will be to halt further 

deterioration of NATO’s relevance to Euro-Atlantic 

security. The recommendation will help recalibrate 

the transatlantic security compact, and preserve an 

Alliance that has developed and perfected institutions 

to facilitate military operations between Canada, the 

EU, and the United States.

Were NATO to fade away, these institutions would 

have to be recreated before the three parties could act 

together to defend their interests in the event of an extraordinary threat that requires American superpower 

assets. It is doubtful if NATO or a like structure could 

again be created in time to meet such a threat.

There are political advantages to recalibrating 

NATO as described above in order to preserve it. Although Europeans are firmly opposed to NATO’s war 

in Afghanistan and refused to participate in the Iraqi 

war, polling clearly shows the NATO brand is widely 

admired by citizens on both sides of the Atlantic.44

Therefore, preserving NATO is in the best interest of 

the wider transatlantic relationship.

On the United States. As demonstrated in the following analysis by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), there is a tangible cost associated with the 

American commitment to defend Europe. 

• The Department of Defense (DoD) Overseas 

Cost Report prepared by the CRS, shows that 

the cost for maintaining America’s military 

presence in Europe in FY 2010 was around $12 

billion.45
36

• In an earlier CRS report prepared during 

1983-92, a period that included the Cold War, 

Congress required the DoD to account for the 

costs of U.S. forces available for the defense of 

Europe against the Soviet Union and its allies. 

Some of this information was made public and 

showed around 50 to 60 percent of America’s 

defense budget (then, typically around $150 

billion) was allocated to the defense of Europe. 

That would mean $75 billion-$90 billion was allocated during 1983-92 for defending Europe.46

The CRS qualified this analysis by adding the 

following caveat to its cost projections for the 

post Cold-War years.

— In the post-Cold War era, the DoD has shifted away from a strategy focused on a U.S.-

Soviet conflict in Europe to one focused on 

two major regional contingencies (MRCs). 

Given that all U.S. military forces are dedicated to fighting and winning first one and 

then, if necessary, two MRCs, any measure 

of the total costs of regional commitments 

simply would reflect DOD’s top line—a requested $257.8 billion in budget authority 

in FY1996. Thus, setting aside the issue of 

flaws in the methodology, in the post-Cold 

War era a calculation of total costs of regional commitments would provide no additional useful input to the burden sharing 

debate.47

Without recourse to information on present American contingency plans to defend Europe (which are of 

necessity classified), it is not possible to further quantify the financial impact of implementing the report’s 

recommendation. But it is safe to assert, based on the 
37

two reports cited above, that there will be a reduction 

in defense expenditures allocated to the defense of Europe if this monograph’s recommendation is adopted.

Adoption of this recommendation will also have an 

important indirect impact on the U.S. military that has 

been under stress for over a decade through continuous involvement in two wars. Europe’s assumption 

of responsibility for its own defense can help reduce 

this stress level because it will result in a lowering of 

America’s defense commitments.

The European Union. For the EU, the biggest impact 

of assuming responsibility for the defense of Europe 

will be in accelerating the efforts already under way 

to rationalize EU defense spending, which currently 

stands at around $300 billion. These expenditures by 

the EU states and the EU’s defense assets are shown 

in Table 2.

The financial crisis that has hobbled defense spending on both sides of the Atlantic is finally forcing the 

EU states to pool their defense capabilities. While the 

EU is comprised of 28 states, four of them—Britain, 

France, Germany, and Italy—account for over 70 percent of the EU’s defense spending. Britain and France 

alone comprise 43 percent and are projected to spend 

65 percent of the EU’s defense spending 2013.48 During the last year, all four countries have begun to pool 

their defense assets and reduce their national defense 

expenditures.

Leading this charge are France and Britain, with 

their December 2010 decision to share their aircraft carrier, nuclear weapon, and cyber-warfare operations.49

In February 2010, Germany renewed calls for an allEuropean Army to continue pooling EU resources.50

The recommendation made here will act as a catalyst 

for accelerating this trend.
38

The Transatlantic Alliance. If there is one constant 

in transatlantic security relations, it is America’s criticism of Europe’s defense expenditures. The criticism 

does nothing but create more friction between the 

transatlantic allies. It is a perpetual thorn in American-European relations.

“If the Europeans did not increase their defense 

spending during the Cold War, they will certainly not 

do it today,” General Hǻkan Syrén, Chairman of the 

EU Military Committee flatly put it to the author during the conversations for this monograph. The General sees no possibility of an increase in EU defense 

expenditures for the foreseeable future.

The recommendation made herein will change this 

narrative. Europe will spend what it feels is necessary 

for its own defense. The recommendation will also ease 

the continuing friction over the differing geopolitical 

threat perspectives of the EU and the United States, 

and make the transatlantic relationship smoother.51 In 

view of the continuing importance of the transatlantic 

relationship, this might be the biggest benefit of all resulting from the recommendation to bridge CSDP and 

NATO.52

ENDNOTES 

1. The EU is Russia’s main trading partner, accounting for over 

half of its annual trade turnover and the majority of its foreign 

direct investment, information available from ec.europa.eu/trade/

creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/russia/. Of the 27

EU countries, Germany, France, and Italy are the main trading 

partners, information available from www.tradingeconomics.com/

Economics/Balance-of-Trade.aspx?Symbol=RUB.

2. Doreen Carvajal, “French Deal To Sell Ships To Russians 

Is Criticized,” New York Times, December 29, 2010. Recently released U.S. military and government articles refer to the emer-
39

gence of a so-called pro-Russian “gang of five” headed by France 

and Germany, and which includes Norway, the Netherlands, and 

Spain. This grouping is frequently supported by Portugal on key 

policy areas dealing with Russia. See Gerard O’Dwyer, “Better 

Ties For Norway, Russia Cause NATO Strain,” Defense News, 

February 23, 2011, available from www.defensenews.com/story.

php?i=5783978&c=EUR&s=TOP.

3. Judy Dempsey, “NATO Falls Far Short of Helping Afghans,” 

New York Times, February 4, 2010, available from www.nytimes.

com/2010/02/05/world/europe/05iht-nato.html?emc=tnt&tntemail1=y.

4. Sarwar Kashmeri, NATO 2.0: Reboot or Delete? Washington, 

DC: Potomac Books, 2011, p. 8.

5. For a first hand account, see Ibid.

6. The EU NAVFOR relationship with Djibouti is a good example of how these arrangements complement the naval force’s 

objectives. See, for example, “EU NAVFOR supports a legal training course for regional countries in Djibouti,” available from 

www.eunavfor.eu/2010/10/eu-navfor-supports-a-legal-training-coursefor-regional-countries-in-djibouti/.

7. Author’s personal conversation with EU officials who were 

part of the negotiation team for the Chad mission, officially, EUFOR Tchad/CAR.

8. European Security and Defense Policy, The First Ten Years, Paris, France: EU Institute for Security Studies, October 2009, p. 81.

9. Ibid., pp. 89-98.

10. For a sense of the Europeans’ growing awareness of the 

U.S. changing geopolitical focus, see James Bliz, “Finland Urges 

EU to focus on its own defence,” Financial Times, November 15, 

2010, p. 6; and “Pivotal Poland, Radek Sikorski, foreign minister 

of Poland, urges the West to look east,” The Economist, November 

22, 2010, Europe Section.

11. Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts 

on a New Strategic Concept for NATO, available from www.nato.
40

int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_05/20100517_100517_expertsreport.pdf.

12. The often quoted phrase, “Americans are from Mars, Europeans from Venus,” is typical of the still widely prevalent opinions in America about the EU’s supposed disdain for war. For the 

origins of this quote and related sentiments, see Robert Kagan, 

Of Paradise And Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, 

New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003.

13. As noted later, CSDP used to be called ESDP until December 

2009.

14. The European Union—A Guide for Americans, Washington, 

DC: The Delegation of the European Commission to the USA, 

2008.

15. David Armitage, “Soft Power in Hard Times: An American Perspective of ESDP after a Decade,” Washington, DC: Office 

of Analysis for Europe, U.S. Department of State, available from 

www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2009/papers/armitage_10J.pdf.

16.“Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defense,” St. Malo, France, December 4, 1998, available from www.

atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html. 

17. Antonio Missirolie, “ESDP—How it works,” Catholic University of Louvain, Brussels, Belgium, available from www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/pols/documents/missiroli_ESDP_How_it_works.

pdf.

18. CSDP Structure and Instruments, available from European Union Website, www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx? 

id=279&lang=EN.

19. Ibid.

20. CSDP Structure and Instruments, available from www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=279&lang=EN.

21. Ibid.
41

22. European Security Strategy, “A Secure Europe In A Better World,” Brussels, Belgium, December 12, 2003, available from 

www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

23. Gustav Lindstrom, “Enter the EU Battlegroups,” Chaillot 

Paper, No. 97, February 2007, Paris, France: EU Institute for Security Studies.

24. Available from europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm. 

25. The EU External Action Service is described at eeas.europa.

eu/background/index_en.htm; its provisional organization chart is 

available from eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/eeas_organisation_

en.pdf. Note especially that the crisis management institutions report directly to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 

Security Policy.

26. Frances G. Burwell and Ludger Kühnhardt, “The Lisbon 

Treaty in Focus: Germany, the EU, Transatlantic Relations, and 

Beyond,” by AICGS Policy Report 44, Baltimore, MD: The Johns 

Hopkins University, 2010.

27. Ibid.

28. Depending on how they are counted, the number of missions deployed add up to 27 or 28. The author has chosen to use 

the lower number. The interactive chart referenced here provides 

a wealth of information on each mission and is available from 

www.csdpmap.eu/mission-chart.

29. Ibid.

30. For descriptions of the three missions chosen for this chapter, I have relied on the exhaustive documentation provided in 

the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), European Security & Defence Policy, The First 10 Years (1999-2009), Paris, 

France, October 2009. The permission of the EUISS to let me make 

annotated use of their material is gratefully acknowledged. The 

organization’s website is a portal for up-to-date information on 

the EU and its foreign and security policy, and is available from 

www.iss.europa.eu. 

31. Ibid., p. 265.
42

32. For consistency, I have used $1.5 per euro throughout this 

monograph.

33. The prohibition of NATO or U.S. military forces was confirmed to the author independently by two EU officials who had 

participated in negotiating the composition and operations of the 

mission with local African government officials. One was a senior 

military official, the other a high ranking diplomat.

34. An exhaustive description of the Chad mission may be 

found in Bjoern H. Seibert, Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA and the 

European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy, Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 2010. 

35. Sarwar A. Kashmeri, NATO 2.0: Reboot or Delete, Dulles, 

VA: Potomac Books, 2011.

36. In ESDP protocol, the designator at the beginning of the 

mission’s name reveals the kind of mission it is: EUPT or EUPOL 

for a police mission, EUJUST for a Rule of Law mission, EUFOR 

for a military mission, as in Chad, and so on. This mission also 

impacted the Central African Republic (CFA) but is far more often 

called the Chad mission, and I have adopted this name herein.

37. Besides permitting its incorporation into the EU’s unified 

military command, the Russian force contribution is significant 

also because it took place during the Russia-Georgia conflict.

38. General Patrick Nash, personal interview with author.

39. Ibid.

40. EUFOR OHQ Tchad RCA, Operation EUFOR TCHAD/

RCA, BCAC 80, 00450, Armees, France: Fort du Mont-Valérien.

41. European Security and Defence Policy, p. 379.

42. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Daniel 

Keohane, “Unblocking EU-NATO Cooperation,” Center of European 

Reform Bulletin #48, June/July 2006, available from www.cer.org.

uk/articles/48_keohane.html. For a more recent discussion, see Nicole Gnessoto, “The EU beyond appearances.” This essay is a part of 
43

What Do Europeans Want From NATO, Report No. 8, Paris, France: 

The EU Institute for Security Studies, November 2010, available 

from www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Report_8-What_do_Europeans_want_from_NATO.pdf.

43. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Luis Simon 

and Alexander Mattelaer, “Unity of Command—The Planning 

and Conduct of CSDP Operations,” Egmont Paper, #41, January 

2011, Brussels, Belgium: Royal Institute For International Relations.

44. Transatlantic Trends 2010, p. 18; Transatlantic Trends 

2009, p. 15; The German Marshall Fund of the United States.

45. CRS Report, “Department of Defense FY 2010 Overseas 

Cost Report,” CRS Recalculated From Yearly Data, Washington, 

DC: Congressional Research Service.

46. Stephen Daggett, “Defense Budget: Alternative Measures 

of Costs of Military Commitments Abroad,” CRS Report For Congress (95-726F), Washington, DC: Foreign Affairs and National 

Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, June 16, 1995.

47. Ibid.

48. Ben Jones, “Franco-British military cooperation: a new engine for European defence?” Occasional White Paper, #88, Paris, 

France: EU Institute for Security Studies, February 2011.

49. BBC News, November 2, 2010, available from www.bbc.

co.uk/news/uk-politics-11672796. 

50. “Germany Calls For EU Army,” The Trumpet.com, February 2, 2010, available from www.thetrumpet.com/?q=6977.5479.0.0.

51. Sarwar A. Kashmeri, “This Rift is Different,” Chap. 1, 

America and Europe After 9/11 and Iraq: The Great Divide,” Rev. and 

Updated Ed., Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2008.

52. German chancellor Angela Merkel spoke eloquently about 

the continuing relevance of, and need for, the transatlantic alliance 
44

in Washington, DC, on receiving the Eric M. Warburg Award in 

Washington, DC, July 15, 2009, London, UK: eGov Monitor, available from www.egovmonitor.com/node/26349.

For me, the special feature of this transatlantic partnership is our sharing of the same fundamental values, 

meaning we do not have to endlessly debate our interpretation of human rights and respect for the dignity of 

the person. Our common ground is the sharing of these 

fundamental values—something that goes for every 

partnership between German Federal Chancellors and 

American Presidents, and likewise for partnerships all 

the way down to the level of members of parliament and 

local politicians in the states of the Union and the German Länder. The dignity of every individual human being is our Benchmark.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Mr. Sarwar A. Kashmeri

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil